

THE RISE OF RUSSIAN NATIONALISM UNDER VLADIMIR PUTIN:
2000 - 2008

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

VIKTORIIA DEMYDOVA

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS
IN THE PROGRAM OF
EURASIAN STUDIES

AUGUST 2010

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

Prof. Dr. Meliha Altunışık
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts.

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Pınar Akçalı
Head of the Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts.

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Oktay F. Tanrısever
Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ceylan Tokluoğlu (METU, SOC) _____

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Oktay F. Tanrısever (METU, IR) _____

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Fırat Purtaş (Gazi Uni., IR) _____

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last name: Viktoriia Demydova

Signature:

ABSTRACT

THE RISE OF THE RUSSIAN NATIONALISM UNDER VLADIMIR PUTIN: 2000 - 2008

Demydova, Viktoriia

M.A., Department of Eurasian Studies

Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Oktay F. Tanrısever

August 2010, 213 pages

The thesis aims to discuss the process of nation-building and discourse of Russian nationalism of the Russian President Vladimir Putin in 2000 - 2008. It focuses on the rise of the nationalism in Russia since 2000 and analyzes discourse of nationalism at the state level, in culture and religious sphere, as well as its representation in various ultra right-wing political movements. The thesis argues that despite the ethnic elements in Vladimir Putin's discourse of Russian nationalism, his version of nationalism is not ethnic, but rather multiethnic and inclusive that seeks to promote loyalty to the Russian state among the Russian citizens without eliminating their ethnic identities. In fact, Putin's version of nationalism is multidimensional. Unlike ethnicity, religion and other cultural elements, the loyalty to the state constitute the core of this nationalism.

The thesis comprises of four main chapters. After the introduction chapter, the second chapter examines the main projects of the Russian nation-building and identity construction that emerged after the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, and explains which of them were chosen by the leadership of the republic. The third chapter focuses on the discussion of the nation-building under Boris Yeltsin. The fourth chapter is the analysis of Vladimir Putin's nation-building policy and his discourse of nationalism. The fifth chapter analyses the foreign policy of Vladimir Putin, paying attention to policy towards compatriots in the near abroad, countries of the CIS and West. The concluding chapter discusses the main findings of the thesis.

Keywords: Russia, Vladimir Putin, ethnic nationalism, nation-building, foreign policy.

ÖZ

PUTİN DÖNEMİNDE RUS MİLLİYETÇİLİĞİNİN YÜKSELİŞİ: 2000-2008

Demydova, Viktoriia

Yüksek Lisans, Avrasya Çalışmaları Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi : Yard. Doç. Dr. Oktay F. Tanrısever

Ağustos 2010, 213 sayfa

Bu tez 2000-2008 dönemindeki ulus inşa sürecini ve Rusya Cumhurbaşkanı Vladimir Putin'in milliyetçilik söylemini incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Tez, 2000'li yıllardan bu yana Rus milliyetçiliğinin yükselişine odaklanmaktadır ve milliyetçilik söylemini devlet, kültür, din ve aşırı sağcı siyasal hareketleri temsilcileri düzeyinde incelemektedir. Bu tez Vladimir Putin'in Rus milliyetçilik söyleminin etnik unsurlar içermesine rağmen onun milliyetçilik anlayışının etnik olmadığı tersine Rus vatandaşlarının etnik kimliklerini ortadan kaldırmadan Rus devletine sadık olmalarını öngören çok etnikli ve kapsayıcı bir söylem olduğunu savunmaktadır. Aslında, Putin'in milliyetçiliği çok çeşitlidir. Etnisite, din ve diğer kültürel unsurlardan farklı olarak, devlete bağlılık bu milliyetçilik anlayışının temelini oluşturmaktadır.

Bu tez beş ana bölümden oluşmaktadır. Giriş bölümünün ardından, İkinci bölüm 1991'de Sovyet Birliğinin dağılmasından sonra ortaya çıkan Rus ulus inşa süreci ve kimlik oluşumunun ana unsurlarını ve inceler ve bu unsurlardan hangilerinin devlet liderliği tarafından seçildiğini açıklamaktadır. Üçüncü bölüm ise, Boris Yeltsin dönemindeki ulus inşa politikasına odaklanmaktadır. Dördüncü bölüm Vladimir Putin'in ulus inşa politikası ve onun milliyetçilik söylemini incelemektedir. Beşinci bölüm ise Rus dış politikasını, Yakın çevredeki Ruslara dönük politikası ve BDT ülkeleri ile Batı ile ilişkilerini incelemektedir. Sonuç bölümü ise tezin ana bulgularını tartışmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Rusya, Vladimir Putin, etnik milliyetçilik, ulus inşa, dış politika.

To My Family

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First of all, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor Assoc. Prof. Dr. Oktay F. Tanrısever for his inestimable scholarly insight, valuable advices, impartial assessment and, of course, for his endless patience and understanding throughout my research. I also express my sincere thanks to my examining committee members Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ceylan Tokluođlu and Assoc. Prof. Dr. Fırat Purtař for their helpful comments.

I am very grateful to the European Union's program - Erasmus Mundus External Cooperation Window, Lot 6 - for the scholarship with which I have had an opportunity to study at the Middle East Technical University. In addition, I am thankful to the Study Abroad Office of the Middle East Technical University, especially to its coordinators Mete Kurtođlu and Gölizar Karahan for their invaluable support and help during all period of my staying in Turkey.

Finally, I would like to express my thanks to my parents Vilgelmina Antipina and Anatoliy Demydov and my friends Yuliya Biletska, Janara Borkoeva, and Anastasiya Stelmakh who always have been near me and who have shared my sorrows and joy. They have been a constant source of moral support and motivation to me. Without their immense psychological input, the present work would not be possible.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM.....	iii
ABSTRACT.....	iv
ÖZ.....	v
DEDICATION.....	vi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	viii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.....	x
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.1. Scope and Objective.....	1
1.2. Literature Review.....	3
1.3. Thesis Argument	12
1.4. Methodology.....	12
1.5. Organization of the Thesis.....	17
CHAPTER II. NATIONAL IDENTITY AND DISCOURSES OF NATIONALISM IN POST-SOVIET RUSSIA	19
2.1. National Identity in Russia after the Breakup of the USSR.....	19
2.2. Discourse of the State-Level Nationalism in Post-Soviet Russia.....	24
2.3. Actors of the Conservative Resistance – the Russian Opposition Nationalism in Post-Soviet Era.....	34
2.4. The Rise of Russian Nationalism in the mid-1990s.....	41
2.5. Conclusion.....	45
CHAPTER III. BORIS YELTSIN’S STRATEGY OF NATION-BUILDING: 1991 – 1999.....	48
3.1. The Evolution of Ideas on the Nature of the Russian Nation and Nation-Building: 1991 – 1999.....	48
3.2. Yeltsin’s Policy of the Nation-Building.....	59

3.3. Yeltsin’s Policy of State-Building and Nature of Nationalism.....	77
3.4. Yeltsin’s Foreign Policy and Nature of Russian Nationalism.....	81
3.4.1. Russia’s Policy towards Compatriots Abroad.....	84
3.4.2. Russian Foreign Policy towards the CIS and the West.....	93
3.5. Conclusion.....	105
CHAPTER IV. VLADIMIR PUTIN’S DOMESTIC POLICIES AND THE NATURE OF RUSSIAN NATIONALISM.....	108
4.1. Vladimir Putin’s Recentralization of the State and Nation-Building Strategy.....	109
4.2. Putin’s Discourse of Nation-Building	116
4.3. Putin’s Policy of Nation-Building.....	120
4.4. The Rise of Russian Nationalism and Russian Orthodox Church under V.Putin.....	125
4.5. The Rise of Russian Nationalism in the Sphere of Culture and Education.....	134
4.6. Conclusion.....	139
CHAPTER V. RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE NATURE OF RUSSIAN NATIONALISM UNDER VLADIMIR PUTIN.....	141
5.1. Putin’s Foreign Policy Concept.....	141
5.2. Putin’s Policy Regarding Compatriots Abroad.....	149
5.3. Commonwealth of the Independent States.....	157
5.4. Russia and the West.....	164
5.5. Conclusion.....	184
CHAPTER VI. CONCLUSION.....	187
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	195

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABM Treaty – The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty

CFE – Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty

CIS - Commonwealth of the Independent States

CPRF - Communist Party of the Russian Federation

CSTO - Collective Security Treaty Organization

ENP – European Neighborhood Policy

EU - European Union

GUUAM – Organization for Democracy and Development of Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Moldova

LDPR - Liberal Democratic Party of Russia

NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NMD – National Missile Defence

NRC – NATO – Russia Council

OSCE – Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

PCA – Partnership and Cooperation Agreement

PJC – Permanent Joint Council

RF - Russian Federation

ROC - Russian Orthodox Church

SORT – the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty

UN - United Nations Organization

US – the United States

USSR - Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics

WTO – World Trade Organization

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Scope and Objective

The thesis aims to discuss the process of nation-building and discourse of Russian nationalism of the Russian President Vladimir Putin between 2000 - 2008. It focuses on the rise of nationalism in Russia since 2000 and analyzes discourse of nationalism at the state level, in cultural and religious sphere, as well as its representation in various right-wing movements.

The topic is important insofar the emergence of the fifteen new independent states provoked the scholars' interest to the region. Some of the states gained wishful independence, while some of them had to face the collapse of the USSR. These states became nationalizing states that seek to promote the interests of the core nation in the state.¹ Among post-Soviet republics case of Russia is unique. Being a federal, multinational state, it has lost its previous territories, status and powers. The coup of August 1991 was followed by the question: "Who we are, the Russian people?". The study of Russia is important insofar it seeks to understand the process of nation-building in a multinational state, which population exceeds 140 millions of people, and which experienced the loss of its territories and status of the Great Power, and has large minorities abroad. It is an example of the statist nationalism² project of the state, the pragmatic use of nationalistic rhetoric for the achievement of political and economic goals. At the same time, it is a hegemonic state that represents nationalism of majority, of titular group and is often defined as "a manifestation of ambitions and interests on a part of «imperial nation» to defend or to acquire a

¹ See BRUBAKER, Rogers, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p.5

² SIMONSEN, Sven Gunnar, "Nationalism and the Russian Political Spectrum: Locating and Evaluating the Extremes", *Journal of Political Ideologies*, Vol.6, No. 3, October 2001, pp.272 – 273

privileged status at the expense of others”³. Besides, there are numerous debates on Russian ethnic nationalism. The thesis aims to distinguish the types of the nationalism manifested by state authority, and the one represented by various right-wing movements.

The thesis aims to present that Vladimir Putin’s discourse of Russian nationalism and his policies contributed to the nation-building in the Russian Federation much more than his predecessor’s policy. The thesis aims to examine that despite ethnic elements in Vladimir Putin’s discourse of Russian nationalism, his version of nationalism is not ethnic, but rather multiethnic and inclusive that seeks to promote loyalty to the Russian state among the Russian citizens without eliminating their ethnic identities. For this purpose, author examines the view on the nature of the Russian nation of Boris Yeltsin, his policy of nation- building, the evolution of his foreign policy and influence of the nationalistic ideas on it, as well as the rise of Russian nationalism among opposition and various political movements. Author studies the program of V. Putin regarding the nation-construction, development patriotic feelings among Russians, his policy of the program implementation, as well as the impact of the nationalistic ideas on Putin’s foreign policy.

The thesis observes the theory of nationalism – inclusionary state-level nationalism discussed by Eric Hobsbawm, Rogers Brubaker, Valerii Tishkov. On the other hand, it distinguishes this type of nationalism from exclusionary nationalism of ethnic Russians groups and movements, the main aim of which is to promote the interests of their particular units. For the better understanding of the wide range of the Russian nationalistic projects that have existed and still exist, their ideologies and discourse, the second chapter studies the approaches to the state-level nationalism in Russia, as well as nationalism of various rightist movements. However, the main purpose of this thesis is to study the discourse of the state-level nationalism of Vladimir Putin, embodied in the policy of nation-building, in its comparison with the policies of the

³ TISHKOV, Valerii, *Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union: the Mind Aflame*, London; Thousand Oaks, California: Sage, 1997, p.234

first Russian President Boris Yeltsin. The thesis does not analyze the nationalistic discourse of non-Russians in the Russian Federation.

1.2. Literature Review

The issue of the nation-building and discourse of nationalism in Russia have been previously discussed in the literature. Vera Tolz in her book analyzes the process of construction of the Russian nation starting from Peter the Great and discussing the Russian Empire and Soviet Union. She analyzes five definitions of the Russian nation that dominated in political and scientific discourse after the demise of the USSR, that are the union identity, community of eastern Slavs, Russian nation as the community of the Russian-speakers, racial and civic definition of the Russian nation. Vera Tolz presents the evolution of these approaches and their implementation into the concrete policy during Yeltsin's presidency in domestic policy as well as regarding the near abroad.⁴

The necessity of the civic nation construction is discussed by Valerii Tishkov. He defined doctrinal academic nationalism that took place in the Soviet Union; hegemonic nationalism; and defensive or titular nationalism. Two latter are two types of nationalism that can be seen in newly independent states and that can be regarded as a factor of the USSR demise.⁵ Russia's case is hegemonic nationalism. This is a nationalism of majority, of titular group. Often it is defined by scholars as "a manifestation of ambitions and interests on a part of «imperial nation» to defend or to acquire a privileged status at the expense of others". He characterizes Russian nationalism as "deeply rooted in Tsarist past, collectivist and authoritarian by its character, but not purely ethnic by its appeal". The term "Russian" was considered as a synonym of the state, not the ethnic group. The idea of Russian nation in its ethnic meaning was introduced into public discourse during Soviet period as an element of

⁴ TOLZ, Vera, *Russia: Inventing the Nation*, London: Arnold; New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, pp.236 - 269

⁵ TISHKOV, Valerii, *Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union: the Mind Aflame*, London; Thousand Oaks, California: Sage, 1997, pp.228 – 246

Soviet doctrine on nationalities. The glory of Russian nation, its deep historical roots, mystique soul and other nationalistic rhetoric has been deliberately provoked by Stalin in a period of the Second World War as a part of war mobilisation but the founding fathers of this new Russian ethno-nationalism were academic and literary writers. Till the late 1960th nationalist paradigm was carrying predominantly patriotic, self-glorifying, paternalistic meanings. Later on new motives of degradation of the Russian people, their culture, traditions appeared.⁶

Gerhard Simon also discussed the issue of the Russian nationalism in the Russian Federation. The scholar points out the aspects of the civic nation construction in the Russian Federation. First one is a linguistic construct. Adjective *rossiiskii* (Russian) and corresponding noun *rossiiane* (the Russians) up until 1991 almost were not used in Russian everyday and literary language. Since 1992 the terms experienced their revival. The intention of the government and those intellectuals, who supported idea of creation civic Russian nation, was to distinguish these terms from the terms *russkii* (English translation is also “Russian”) and *russkiiie* (in English it is also “Russians”).⁷ *Rossiiane* is used in connection with the territory or the multi-national state, meaning the citizens of the Russian Federation, regardless their ethnic or linguistic identity. *Russkii* and *russkie* are to be applied only to Russians as an ethnic group and to their language. These terms – *rossiiskii* and *rossiiane* are the core in the doctrine of the construction of a civic Russian nation. However, these terms separates Russian elites into two major groups. Those who represent democratic train started to use them in political and intellectual discourse, while national patriots claimed that all *rossiiane* are *russkie*. This gave a fertile soil to various word manipulations and speculations.⁸

⁶ TISHKOV, Valerii, *Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union: the Mind Aflame*, London; Thousand Oaks, California: Sage, 1997, pp.232 - 237

⁷ SIMON, Gerhard, “The Russian Federation Nationalism of Russians and Non-Russians”, in Egbert Jahn (ed.), *Nationalism in Late and Post-Communist Europe, Vol.2, Nationalism in the Nation States*, Baden-Baden, 2009, pp.21 – 22

⁸ SIMON, Gerhard, “The Russian Federation Nationalism of Russians and Non-Russians”, in Egbert Jahn (ed.), *Nationalism in Late and Post-Communist Europe, Vol.2, Nationalism in the Nation States*, Baden-Baden, 2009, p.22

Another aspect of the civic identity construction in Russia is a demographic basis and problem of borders of a civic nation. In 1994 82.95 per cent of 147 million inhabitants were ethnic Russians. The Tatars constituted 3.77 per cent, the Ukrainians 2.34 per cent, the Chuvash 1.17 per cent, the Bashkirs 0.94 per cent, the Belarusns 0.66 per cent, and the Mordvins 0.64 per cent of the population. In general one can speak of a relative ethnic homogeneity and a clear predominance of ethnic Russians. This is a better basis for the nation-building, than for example in Ukraine, where Ukrainians made up only 73 per cent of the citizens. Another factor that made the nation-building easier is that the non-Russians within the borders of the RF are highly russified and were not seen as a source of potential conflict.⁹ These three factors, mentioned above, are conducive to the civic nation-building in Russia. On the other hand, administrative-territorial structure of the RF is considered as an obstacle for the nation-building, as Simon and Tishkov proved. For example, Tishkov regarded elites of non-Russian ethnic autonomous areas as a major obstacle to the creation of a civic nation in the Russian Federation. They feel that the concept of a nation as a community of citizens means assimilation with the main ethnic group, and abolition of autonomous administrative units in the country. This means the loss of broad political and economic rights that autonomous received according to Federal Treaty of 1992.¹⁰ This view is shared by Gerhard Simon, who stated that having experienced a significant improvement in their status, the non-Russian subjects of the Russian Federation could cause serious problems for nation-building.¹¹

⁹ SIMON, Gerhard, "The Russian Federation Nationalism of Russians and Non-Russians", in Egbert Jahn (ed.), *Nationalism in Late and Post-Communist Europe*, Vol.2, *Nationalism in the Nation States*, Baden-Baden, 2009, p.23

¹⁰ TOLZ, Vera, *Russia: Inventing the Nation*, London, Arnold; New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, p.250

¹¹ SIMON, Gerhard, "The Russian Federation Nationalism of Russians and Non-Russians", in Egbert Jahn (ed.), *Nationalism in Late and Post-Communist Europe*, Vol.2, *Nationalism in the Nation States*, Baden-Baden, 2009, pp.16-40

Kathleen Smith in her book *“Mythmaking in the New Russia. Politics and Memory During the Yeltsin’s Era”* describes attempts of Yeltsin and his administration to build a single identity in Russia by means of introducing new symbols.¹² Hobsbawm believes that invented traditions are important for nation-building, in the same manner as symbols, histories and legends that all require “social engineering”.¹³ One of the first myths created was a state version of the 1991 events as the “...day of victory... of the forces of democracy and the supporters of change, of the whole Russian people, over reaction”.¹⁴ Yeltsin’s administration understood that for the creation of civic unity of all people within RF there should be symbols that would not be equivocal, symbols that would unite all the citizens despite their political views.¹⁵ That is why the anniversary of the October revolution was not celebrated in Russia, although November 7 remained an official holiday. Instead, Russian government revised commemorative calendar and introduced some “useful” holidays, which goal was to symbolize new Russia, glorify its past and unify Russian citizens. First of them was 9 May, a day of the victory over fascist Germany in 1945. Another holiday that was introduced after 1991 in Russian was Russian Independence Day, June 12, 1991 when Russia adopted Declaration of State Sovereignty. In 1997 the name of the holiday was changed, it started to be known as Russia’s Day.¹⁶

Policy of Yeltsin’s administration regarding Russian diaspora in the near abroad is discussed by Igor Zevelev. He points out five projects of the nation-building in post-

¹² SMITH, Kathleen E., *Mythmaking in the New Russia: Politics and Memory During the Yeltsin Era*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002

¹³ HOBSBAWM, Eric, “The Nation as Invented Tradition”, in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (eds.), *Nationalism*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1994, p.76

¹⁴ SMITH, Kathleen E., *Mythmaking in the New Russia: Politics and Memory During the Yeltsin Era*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002, p. 85

¹⁵ SMITH, Kathleen E., *Mythmaking in the New Russia: Politics and Memory During the Yeltsin Era*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002, p.80

¹⁶ SMITH, Kathleen E., *Mythmaking in the New Russia: Politics and Memory During the Yeltsin Era*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002, pp.78 - 101

Soviet Russia. The first project – *new state-building* - was advocated by President Boris Yeltsin and the Democratic Russia movement. The essence of this project was state-building through the creation and stabilization of new state institutions within the borders of RSFSR, inviolability of the borders between the former Soviet republics and development of relations with neighboring states as fully independent entities.¹⁷ The second project – *ethnonationalism* – was to unite Russia with the Russian communities in the near abroad and build the Russian state within the area of settlement of the Russian people and other Eastern Slavs.¹⁸ The third project is *restorationism* - was to restore a state within the borders of the USSR. The restorationists advocate decisive assistance to the Russians in the near abroad - including economic sanctions and threats of military intervention.¹⁹ Next project – *hegemony and dominance* – is very close to imperialist approach. Its main idea is state-building within the borders of present-day Russia accompanied by subjugation of other successor states and the creation of a buffer zone of protectorates and dependent countries around Russia. Russian diaspora was viewed as a convenient instrument of influence and manipulation in the neighboring states.²⁰ Finally, *integrationalism* promoted economic reintegration, which could lead to similar coordination of defense and other policies. Some versions of integrationalism envisioned a sort of confederation of former Soviet republics. Project emphasized economy and security issues, downplaying more abstract components such as identity, ethnicity, and nationhood.²¹ The first project – new state-building was the

¹⁷ ZEVELEV, Igor, *Russia and Its New Diasporas*, Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2001, p.68 – 69

¹⁸ ZEVELEV, Igor, *Russia and Its New Diasporas*, Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2001, pp.69 – 71

¹⁹ ZEVELEV, Igor, *Russia and Its New Diasporas*, Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2001, pp.71 - 72

²⁰ ZEVELEV, Igor, *Russia and Its New Diasporas*, Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2001, pp.72 - 73

²¹ ZEVELEV, Igor, *Russia and Its New Diasporas*, Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2001, pp.74 - 75

framework within which Kremlin worked out its policy towards compatriots abroad. Zevelev also discusses the attempts of the Russian policy-makers to achieve dual citizenship for the members of diaspora.

The strategy of the Yeltsin's administration towards Russian speakers in the newly independent states is also studied by Neil Melvil, who analyzes the Russian identity in different periods of time starting from the Soviet Union, paying attention to the identity within Russian diaspora, struggle for the citizenship in the Baltic states, and focuses on the issues of ethnicity and diaspora in Ukraine, Moldova and Kazakhstan.²²

The evolution of the foreign policy during Yeltsin's President is examined by Ilya Prizel. Author argues that Yeltsin's initial foreign policy was based on a belief that to break its cycle of authoritarianism, it must abandon any notion of messianism and integrate itself both politically and economically into international system. The dominant school of thought in the foreign ministry held tightly to the idea that the future of the international system would be shaped primarily by economic determinants. Believing that the international system would experience a new bipolarity between North and South, Russian foreign policy makers sought to integrate Russia into developed South.²³ Foreign ministry continued Gorbachev's policy that sought to avoid confrontation with the West, but rather demonstrate commitment to the common human values: support for international organizations, human rights, ecological protection, arms control and so on.²⁴ However, the Atlanticist policy of foreign ministry was severely criticized. Diplomats were accused of forgetting that the country was confronting fourteen new neighbors, on

²² MELVIN, Neil, *Russians Beyond Russia: the Politics of National Identity*, London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995

²³ PRIZEL, Ilya, *National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia, and Ukraine*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.264

²⁴ PRIZEL, Ilya, *National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia, and Ukraine*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.264

which it was widely dependent.²⁵ The event that symbolized the shift towards centrist foreign policy was probably Yeltsin's cancellation of his trip to Japan in 1992, when it became clear that a Russo-Japanese summit would be dominated by a link between Japanese aid and the resolution of the territorial dispute between two countries.²⁶ However, rejection of the liberal foreign policy did not mean return to the messianism or confrontation with the West. Centrism presupposed that Russia is a part of West, that Russia has no natural allies in Asia and that Russia's natural security is connected to cordial relationships with the West. The greatest expression of the shift from the Western-oriented to centrist foreign policy can be seen on the Southern rim of the Russian Federation.²⁷

Thomas Parland in his book focuses on the study of the rightist ideas in Russia. He distinguishes several trends within Russian nationalism such as ethnocentric and great power nationalism; patriotic dissidents and statist; extreme and moderate nationalism.²⁸

Putin's article "*Millennium*" and the book of Putin's interviews by Nataliya Gevorkyan, Natalya Timakova, Andrei Kolesnikov "*First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia's President*" present Putin's program of nation-construction. The core principle is patriotism that rejected the exclusivity associated with the concept of nationalism but instead encompassed pride in Russia's diversity, its history and its place in the world. This was supported by a strong political statehood that could maintain internal order, the integrity of the country and assert the country's interests abroad. Finally, pragmatic patriotism was to be supra-ethnic

²⁵ PRIZEL, Ilya, *National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia, and Ukraine*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.265

²⁶ PRIZEL, Ilya, *National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia, and Ukraine*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.269

²⁷ PRIZEL, Ilya, *National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia, and Ukraine*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp.280 - 290

²⁸ PARLAND, Thomas, *The Extreme Nationalist Threat in Russia: the Growing Influence of Western Rightist Ideas*, New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005

and statist, and it was on this basis that segmented regionalism was attacked to create a homogeneous constitutional space in which the ethnocratic rights of titular elites were to be subsumed into a broader political community.²⁹

The policies of Vladimir Putin, including his program of nation-building and discourse of nationalism are the focus of Richard Sakwa's book "*Putin: Russia's Choice*".³⁰ Sakwa characterizes Putin as a liberal statist (*gosudarstvennik*). Scholar thinks that Putin inherited this liberal statist tradition from his predecessor and his milieu, although there were some crucial differences. Firstly, Putin refused idea of Russian as a balance between East and West. He recognized strategic and economic interests of Russia in Asia, but considered it as a part of West. Secondly, Putin accepted the presence of Russians outside the RF refused all ideas of Russian nationalists to challenge the territorial integrity of neighbors. Thirdly, Putin's patriotism was liberal in economic sphere. Fourthly, he was aware of the importance of preserving interethnic peace in Russia and the harm that can be caused to its territorial integrity by xenophobia. He concludes that Putin was a civic nation builder, demonstrated "a new type of pragmatic minimal patriotism – shorn of nationalistic excesses".³¹

Steven Fish analyzing the state- and nation-building of Vladimir Putin argues that Russia's second President was searching "practical ideology". Fish stresses that Putin indeed promoted "supraethnic statist nationalism". "In place of the Communist party and allegiance to it, Putin seeks to substitute the state, the constitution, and devotion to them".³² However, for the Russian citizens both these notions are abstract, they needed concrete embodiment, therefore Presidential team chose three institution that

²⁹ PUTIN, Vladimir, "Russia at the Turn of Millennium", (*Rossia Na Rubezhe Tysiacheletii*), *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, December 12, 1999; SAKWA, Richard, *Putin: Russia's Choice*, London and New York: Routledge, 2004, p. 163

³⁰ SAKWA, Richard, *Putin: Russia's Choice*, London and New York: Routledge, 2004

³¹ SAKWA, Richard, *Putin: Russia's Choice*, London and New York: Routledge, 2004, pp.167 – 168

³² FISH, Steven M., "Putin's Path", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol.12, No.4, October 2001, p.74

could gain public respect and devotion. These were presidency and the President himself, military and, finally, law. They were to supplement his program of nation-building with the practical, “real” institutions. In practice, the programs of military-patriotic education were introduced in schools (this will be discussed later), as well as new criminal code was adopted.³³

Sven Gunnar Simonsen argued “Putin at an early stage of his presidency appears less sensitive to issues of ethnicity than his predecessor, meaning that his statism is not devoid of an ethnic element”. Scholar calls Putin’s patriotism as “ethnocentric”.³⁴ In opinion of Simonsen the “new patriotism” comes in a loose ideological format. It is not dogmatic with regard to market relations or other aspects of policy. Rather, it is “a «minimum package» of policies that will secure the fundamental needs for a country in crisis”, such as as strengthening the state and the economy, introducing order, securing Russia’s territorial integrity, raising its status internationally, and strengthening the military to resist possible attacks by other powers. Simonsen finds the most apparent connection with authoritarianism (rather than political liberalism); the willingness to put to use tough measures to bring about changes appears essential in a reluctant environment. In opinion of Simonsen, Putin used the term “patriotism” in its popular way, “as a noble sentiment that may have nothing to do with the evils of nationalism”.³⁵

Vladimir Putin’s relations with the Russian Orthodox Church are the focus of the article of Nicholas Gvosdev. In opinion of Gvosdev, Orthodoxy could be to be used as ethnic and political marker for Russian identity and as a new value system to undergird new post-Soviet regime. The church is also likely to emerge as an important symbol of the unity of the state at a time when Putin’s administration

³³ FISH, Steven M., “Putin’s Path”, *Journal of Democracy*, Vol.12, No.4, October 2001, pp.74 – 75

³⁴ SIMONSEN, Sven Gunnar, “Nationalism and the Russian Political Spectrum: Locating and Evaluating the Extremes”, *Journal of Political Ideologies*, Vol.6, No. 3, October 2001, p.283

³⁵ SIMONSEN, Sven Gunnar, “Nationalism and the Russian Political Spectrum: Locating and Evaluating the Extremes”, *Journal of Political Ideologies*, Vol.6, No. 3, October 2001, pp.263 - 288

appears to be making a bid for a significant recentralization of political power in the hands of the local governments. At the same time since Russia is only a portion of the base of the Russian Orthodox Church, the promotion of the transnational Orthodox identity will continue to be one of the several factors keeping other states of the former Soviet Union in some sort of the Muscovite orbit.³⁶ Rosalind Marsh focuses on the study of attitude to the West in Russian literature and culture.³⁷

1.3. Thesis Argument

The thesis argues that despite ethnic elements in Vladimir Putin's discourse of Russian nationalism, his version of nationalism is not ethnic, but rather multiethnic and inclusive that seeks to promote loyalty to the Russian state among the Russian citizens without eliminating their ethnic identities. The thesis aims to examine that although in fact, Putin's version of nationalism is multidimensional. Unlike ethnicity, religion and other cultural elements, the loyalty to the state constitute the core of this nationalism.

Despite the presence of various rightist movements in the Russian Federation and nationalistic discourse of the opposition in mid-1990s, their rhetoric could hardly influence the policies of the Russian state. Control over media, weak civic society and pragmatic character of political parties made the state the single source of nation-building policies as well as policies towards Russian diaspora in the near abroad. This made the nationalistic discourse a lever of the state policies.

On the other hand, variety of means used by Putin in the process of nation-building reveal more assertive position of his government in this issue. This can be hardly said about Yeltsin. At the same time while thesis characterizes Putin's policies as statist

³⁶ GVOSDEV, Nicholas K., "The New Party Card? Orthodoxy and Search for Post-Soviet Identity", *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol.47, No.6, November-December 2000, p.32

³⁷ MARSH, Rosalind, "The Nature of Russia's Identity: the Theme of «Russia and the West» in Post-Soviet Culture" in Roger E. Kanet, (ed.), *Identities, Nations and Politics after Communism*, Abingdon, Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2008, pp.149 - 172

inclusionary nationalistic policies, one cannot characterize Russia nation as civic. Despite the declared goals the civic nation has not been built in Russia, and the ethnic elements still can be found in political discourse.

1.4. Methodology

The study of nation-building processes and discourses of Russian nationalism of Yeltsin and Putin is based on the “instrumentalist” approach to nationalism articulated by the Marxist historian *Eric Hobsbawm*, who argues that the nation was one of many traditions “invented” by political elites in order to legitimize their power in a century of revolution and democratization.

Hobsbawm quotes Gellner’s definition of nationalism as “primarily a principle which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent”.³⁸ In addition, he takes a strong view on the commitment involved in nationalism, viewing it as providing obligations and priorities that override all others.³⁹

Hobsbawm argues that nation is a wholly modern phenomenon, which “belongs exclusively to a particular, and historically recent period”.⁴⁰ As Anthony Smith stresses, Hobsbawm insisted that pre-modern religious, linguistic and regional communities cannot be regarded as ancestors or progenitors of modern nationalism “because they had or have no necessary relation with the unit of territorial political organization which is crucial criterion of what we understand as a «nation» today”.⁴¹

³⁸ GELLNER, Ernest, *Nations and Nationalism*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1983, p.1

³⁹ SPENCER, Philip, WOLLMAN, Howard, *Nationalism: a Critical Introduction*, London: Thousand Oaks; California: Sage, 2002, pp.42-43

⁴⁰ HOBBSAWM, Eric, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p.9

⁴¹ HOBBSAWM, Eric, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p.47, cited in SMITH, Anthony D., “Nations and History”, in Montserrat Guibernau and John Hutchinson (eds.), *Understanding Nationalism*, Cambridge: Polity; Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2001, p. 12

State-building, democratization, language construction, scientific racism, socialism inter alia have all left their mark on the twists and turns of nationalism. In the process, nationalism has changed its character as a political movement, being notably transformed in the last quarter of the nineteenth century when it acquired a strong ethnic focus.⁴² Pointing out the inventing of traditions, Hobsbawm tries to suggest that it maybe has exhausted its progressive potential. Basing his arguments on the increasingly internationalized nature of economic and political relationships, the existence of alternative forms of identity, the distinction between nations and states, and the non-viability of small nation-states, Hobsbawm argues that “in spite of its evident prominence, nationalism is historically less important.”⁴³

He stresses that it was natural that the classes within society, and in particular the working class, should tend to identify themselves through nation-wide political movements or organizations (“parties”), and equally natural that de facto these should operate essentially within the confines of the nation.⁴⁴

Working within a Marxist framework, he implies that nationalism was at one stage a unifying force as a limited number of nation-states emerged which were economically viable, large-scale units.

Classic nineteenth century liberal nationalism was the opposite of the current search for a definition of group identity by separatism. It aimed to extend the scale of human social, political and cultural units: to unify and expand rather than to restrict and separate⁴⁵.

⁴² SPENCER, Philip, WOLLMAN, Howard, *Nationalism: a Critical Introduction*, London: Thousand Oaks; California: Sage, 2002, p.43

⁴³ HOBBSAWM, Eric, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p.191

⁴⁴ HOBBSAWM, Eric, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p.77

⁴⁵ HOBBSAWM, Eric, “Ethnicity and Nationalism in Europe Today”, in Gopal Balakrishnan (ed.), *Mapping the Nation*, London: Verso, 1996, p.257

Like many authors, he distinguishes two forms of nationalism, one inclusionary and progressive, the other exclusionary and divisive:

It is important to distinguish between the exclusive nationalism of states or right wing-political movements which substitute itself for all other forms of political and social identification, and the conglomerate national/citizen, social consciousness which, in modern states, forms the soil in which all other political sentiments grow.⁴⁶

The “nation” with its associated phenomena: nationalism, the nation-state, national symbols, histories rest on exercises in social engineering which are often deliberate and always innovative, if only because historical novelty implies innovation.⁴⁷ Hobsbawm argues that

...modern nation and all their impedimenta generally claim to be the opposite of novel, namely rooted in the remotest antiquity, and the opposite of constructed, namely human communities so «natural» as to require no definition other than self-assertion.⁴⁸

However, he continues the very concept of the nation requires a constructed or invented component.

“Invented tradition”, Hobsbawm’s key term,

...is taken to mean a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of ritual or symbolic nature, which seek

⁴⁶ HOBBSAWM, Eric, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p.145

⁴⁷ HOBBSAWM, Eric, “The Nation as Invented Tradition”, in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (eds.), *Nationalism*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1994, p.76

⁴⁸ HOBBSAWM, Eric, “The Nation as Invented Tradition”, in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (eds.), *Nationalism*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1994, p.76

to indicate certain values and norms of behavior by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past.⁴⁹

Hobsbawm differs “tradition” from “custom”. “Traditions” object and main characteristic is their invariance. They past, real or invented, to which traditions refer, imposes fixed, formalized practices, such as repetition. As Hobsbawm argues, “custom in traditional societies has the double function of motor and fly-wheel”. It does not preclude innovation and change up to a point, though evidently the requirement that it must appear compatible or even identical with precedent imposes substantial limitations on it.⁵⁰ Less important distinction is between tradition and convention and routine, which have no significant ritual or symbolic function as such, though it may acquire it incidentally.⁵¹

Invented traditions since the industrial revolution have played three main roles: establishing or symbolizing social cohesion or the membership of groups, real or artificial communities; establishing or legitimizing institutions, status or relations of authority; and socialization, inculcation of beliefs, value systems and conventions of behavior.⁵²

Although the theory of Eric Hobsbawm is based on the study of European state in late nineteenth early twentieth century, particularly France, it can be applied to the study of the Soviet successor states. However, the degree of use of the Hobsbawm’s theory in different cases varies. In case of Russian nationalism, one deals with the

⁴⁹ HOBSBAWM, Eric, “Introduction: Inventing Traditions”, in Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds.), *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p.1

⁵⁰ HOBSBAWM, Eric, “Introduction: Inventing Traditions”, in Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds.), *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p.2.

⁵¹ HOBSBAWM, Eric, “Introduction: Inventing Traditions”, in Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds.), *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p.3

⁵² HOBSBAWM, Eric, “Introduction: Inventing Traditions”, in Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds.), *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p.9.

inclusionary state nationalism which aim is to work out new identity for its inhabitants, unite different ethnic groups, and stimulate state transition.

In terms of the invention of tradition, three major innovations are particularly relevant. The first was the development of a secular equivalent of the church – primary education, imbued with revolutionary and republican principles and content, and conducted by the secular equivalent of the priesthood – or perhaps given their poverty, the friars – the instituteurs.⁵³ In the third chapter the author shows how the system of education was constructed in order to develop patriotism and national identity among Russian citizens. This includes patriotic lessons, courses on religious education, rewriting historiography and other.

The second was the invention of the public ceremonies.⁵⁴ This includes all-nation holidays celebrations, such as Russia's Day, Victory Day.

The third was mass production of public monuments.⁵⁵ The erection of the new monument of historic personalities in post-Soviet republics are the case.

I aim to distinguish the form of nationalism described by Hobsbawm from the exclusionary xenophobic nationalism of various political movements and groups within the Russian Federation that aim to promote interests of the ethnic Russians (*russkiie*). This thesis is a study of the state-level inclusionary nationalism, embodied in the project of single identity- and nation-construction of Vladimir Putin. Thesis does not aim to discuss the nationalism of non-Russians in the Russian Federation.

⁵³ HOBBSAWM, Eric, "Mass-Producing Traditions: Europe 1870 – 1914", in Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds.), *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p.271

⁵⁴ HOBBSAWM, Eric, "Mass-Producing Traditions: Europe 1870 – 1914", in Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds.), *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p.271

⁵⁵ HOBBSAWM, Eric, "Mass-Producing Traditions: Europe 1870 – 1914", in Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds.), *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p.271

In this thesis, qualitative methods are used. Author studied theoretical approaches to the definition of the nationalism and its main types. In the framework of the documentary research, Russian Constitution of 1993, legislation regarding ethnic groups, citizenship, and religion of the Russian Federation as well as Soviet successor states were examined. Author analyzed the documents that define the basis of the Russian foreign policy. Besides, the speeches and statements of the Russian Presidents, their interviews and articles, as well as other officials' and church clergy's speeches were analyzed. The comparative analysis was used in this thesis to study the dynamic of development of the issue from Yeltsin to Putin.

1.5. Organization of the Thesis

The introductory part of the thesis explains the implication for the choice of the topic, the purposes of the thesis, observes the literature on the topic, discusses the theory of the nationalism, introduces methodology, argument, and presents the organization of the thesis.

The second chapter of the thesis studies the main projects of the Russian nation and identity construction that were discussed after the breakup of the Soviet Union, and shows which of them were chosen by the leadership of the republic, explaining the implications of this choice. The second part of the chapter presents scientific approaches to the analysis of the Russian nationalism of Valerii Tishkov and Rogers Brubaker. Besides, this chapter analyzes ultra right-wing movements that have existed in Russia in since late 1980s and the rise of the Russian nationalism in mid 1990s.

The third chapter focuses on the study of the nation-building under Boris Yeltsin. I discuss the evolution of the Yeltsin's views on the nature of the Russian nation and his strategy of the nation-building. Besides, this chapter seeks to explain the implications of the rise of nationalistic ideas in society by analyzing Yeltsin's state-building project, economic and political reforms. Finally, author discusses he transformation of the foreign policy of Boris Yeltsin.

The fourth chapter is the study of Vladimir Putin's nation-building policy his discourse of nationalism. Author discusses Putin's policy of strengthening power as an implication of the more successful nation-building; his program of the nation-building, its key elements, discourse of nationalism; discusses Putin's strategy of nation-building. Moreover, author seeks to study the nationalism in the sphere of religion, education and culture.

The fifth chapter analyses the foreign policy of Vladimir Putin, paying attention to policy towards compatriots in the near abroad, countries of the CIS, West, and revealing the pragmatically nationalistic character of it.

In conclusion author discusses the findings of the thesis, defines which types of the nationalism characterizes Putin's domestic and foreign policy.

CHAPTER II

NATIONAL IDENTITY AND DISCOURSES OF NATIONALISM

IN POST-SOVIET RUSSIA

The second chapter of the thesis studies the main projects of the Russian nation and identity construction that were discussed after the breakup of the Soviet Union, and shows which of them were chosen by the leadership of the republic, explaining the implications of this choice. Besides, this chapter analyzes the right wing movements that have existed in Russia in since late 1980s and the rise of the Russian nationalism in mid 1990s.

2.1. National Identity in Russia after the Breakup of the USSR

After the downfall of the Soviet Union, Russians were confronted with the fact that their previous attempts of nation- and state-building had failed. The question “Who are we, the Russian people?” became very crucial. This provoked debates among intellectuals and politicians, the main goal of which was to understand the nature of the Russian nation. This part will discuss these debates and analyze their influence on policy-making in post-Soviet Russia.

Vera Tolz distinguishes five main definitions of the Russian nation that were put forward into intellectual debates. The first one is *the union identity*: the Russians were defined as an imperial people or as a people with a mission to create a supranational state. The most outspoken advocates of this definition are communists. They were dominated by the belief that either the Union would eventually be recreated, or the Russians would completely disappear as a distinct community. According to those who support reestablishment of the Soviet Union, the Russian empire and the USSR were “a unique civilization”. All its peoples had one compound identity. Not only Russians but all other nationalities would be unable to survive outside the structure of the USSR, which was “a supranational force that

reflected the interests of a multiethnic Eurasian community”. Contemporary Unionists follow Danilevskiy in arguing that all the nationalities of the former USSR are united by a common Russian culture.⁵⁶

The second approach defined the Russians as a *community of Eastern Slavs*. By the late 1993 intellectuals had abandoned their views on Union identity. Instead, they started to speak about the “triune orthodox Russian nation” of Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians.⁵⁷ As Vera Tolz points out, those who define the Russians as a community of eastern Slavs therefore see primordial qualities in a nation and reject the idea that membership of it can be voluntary.⁵⁸

Another way to define the Russian nation is through the *language* as a main marker of national identity. Starting from nineteenth century many intellectuals considered language as a tool for unifying different ethnic and social groups. For seventy years Soviet policy made Ukrainians, Belarusns to change their language and therefore to identify themselves as Russians. Many Russians were forced to settle outside the RSFSR, and after the fall of the USSR intellectuals considered them as a part of divided Russian nation.⁵⁹ Identification with the certain territory is viewed as an important marker of common identity. They argue that the RF cannot even be regarded as a surrogate Russian state, because of the artificial nature of its borders with many ethnic Russians living outside them.⁶⁰

⁵⁶ TOLZ, Vera, *Russia: Inventing the Nation*, London: Arnold; New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, pp.238 – 239.

⁵⁷ TOLZ, Vera, *Russia: Inventing the Nation*, London: Arnold; New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, p.241

⁵⁸ TOLZ, Vera, *Russia: Inventing the Nation*, London: Arnold; New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, p.242

⁵⁹ TOLZ, Vera, *Russia: Inventing the Nation*, London: Arnold; New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, pp.242 – 243.

⁶⁰ TOLZ, Vera, *Russia: Inventing the Nation*, London: Arnold; New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, p.244

Next approach to defining the Russian nation is *racial*, where blood types constitute common identity. Those advocating racial view on the nature of the Russian nation argued that in order to survive Russians should safeguard themselves from the harmful influences of other “ethnoses”. One example is the Jews. In political sphere they argued that only those who have “Russian blood” should be represented in the government.⁶¹

Finally some intellectuals define Russian national identity as *civic*. Valeriy Tishkov, Russian ethnographer, has been the main advocate of this civic definition of a nation. Since the demise of the USSR, he has been arguing that politicians and intellectuals should be working to form a civic Russian (*rossiiskaia*) nation, as a community of all citizens of the Russian Federation regardless of their cultural and religious differences. The use of the word *rossiiskaia* in itself implies a civic identity, based on citizenship of the Russian Federation (or Rossiia), rather than on any form of ethnic Russian (*russkii*) characteristics. Nationalism, according to Tishkov, should be understood as the solidarity of citizens regardless of their ethnicity, and should therefore be encouraged. Tishkov, working in the government and being an outstanding scholar made numerous proposals aimed to construct civic Russian nation. They include spreading of common civic values and symbols among Russian citizens; the encouraging the use of this symbols; nationality should be understood as citizenship.⁶² In the Russian Federation extra-territorial ethnic and cultural autonomy should be introduced in order to avoid ethnically based federalism of the Soviet Union. Tishkov emphasized that local ethnic and cultural loyalties could exist without being in conflict with Russian (*rossiiskaia*) civic identity. In his opinion,

⁶¹ TOLZ, Vera, *Russia: Inventing the Nation*, London: Arnold; New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, p.247

⁶² TOLZ, Vera, *Russia: Inventing the Nation*, London: Arnold; New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, p.249

legislature should talk not about the rights of the people, but the rights of individuals, belonging to national, ethnic, religious and language minorities.⁶³

Igor Zevelev, professor of Russian studies at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, in his turn, specifies five projects of nation-building in post-Soviet Russia. The projects define the possible relations of the new Russian states with neighboring republics.

The first project – *new state-building* - was advocated by President Boris Yeltsin and the Democratic Russia movement. The essence of this project was state-building through the creation and stabilization of new state institutions within the borders of RSFSR, inviolability of the borders between the former Soviet republics and development of relations with neighboring states as fully independent entities. The problems of Russian ethnic identity and the new Russian diaspora were treated practically as political insignificant.⁶⁴ The project stressed civic patriotism and de-emphasized the allegedly artificial character of the Bolshevik-drawn borders of the RSFSR, which were much narrower than the domain Russian culture, language, religion and traditions. The strategy of the new state-builders towards diaspora included promotion of their integration into host societies, defense of their human rights, some assistance in cultural projects, and help for those who chose to migrate to Russia.⁶⁵

The second project – *ethnonationalism* – was politically represented by the Christian Democratic Party, led by Viktor Aksiuchits, and the Constitutional Democratic Party, headed by Mikhail Astaf'ev. Later on, in 1995 – 1998, Derzhava, headed by Aleksandr Rutskoï, and the extremist National Republican Party of Russia, headed

⁶³ TOLZ, Vera, *Russia: Inventing the Nation*, London: Arnold; New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, p.250

⁶⁴ ZEVELEV, Igor, *Russia and Its New Diasporas*, Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2001, pp.68 – 69.

⁶⁵ ZEVELEV, Igor, *Russia and Its New Diasporas*, Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2001, p.69.

by Nikolai Lysenko.⁶⁶ The essence of this program is to unite Russia with the Russian communities in the near abroad and build the Russian state within the area of settlement of the Russian people and other Eastern Slavs. Again diasporic existence is viewed as abnormal for Russians, and ethnonationalism addresses the most painful problems of the new Russian identity being formed after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The difference between extremist and moderate ethnonationalists is that the former completely reject the “Western values” of democracy, human rights and the rule of law.⁶⁷

The third project is *restorationism*. The most influential party that advocated this approach was Communist Party of the RF. Less Soviet version of the program was expressed by the former vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi who drifted to a more ethnonationalist stand after 1993. the most extremist interpretation of restorationism belongs to Vladimir Zhirinovskii, leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, famous of his extravagant behavior and intolerant statements. The essence of this project is to restore a state within the borders of the USSR.⁶⁸ The restorationists advocate decisive assistance to the Russians in the near abroad - including economic sanctions and threats of military intervention. According to many restorationists, the most important difference between the Soviet Union and the future state must be the abolition of ethnoterritorial units within the state and restoration of denationalized administrative *gubernii*s.⁶⁹

Next project – *hegemony and dominance* – is very close to imperialist approach. Its main idea is state-building within the borders of present-day Russia accompanied by

⁶⁶ ZEVELEV, Igor, *Russia and Its New Diasporas*, Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2001, p.69.

⁶⁷ ZEVELEV, Igor, *Russia and Its New Diasporas*, Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2001, pp.69 – 71.

⁶⁸ ZEVELEV, Igor, *Russia and Its New Diasporas*, Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2001, p.71

⁶⁹ ZEVELEV, Igor, *Russia and Its New Diasporas*, Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2001, p.71

subjugation of other successor states and the creation of a buffer zone of protectorates and dependent countries around Russia. Russian diasporas are viewed as a convenient instrument of influence and manipulation in the neighboring states. From 1996 to 1999 the most vocal advocate of this policy was Yurii Luzhkov, the mayor of Moscow and leader of the Otechestvo movement. Luzhkov relied on Konstantin Zatulin, his adviser and the director of the Institute of Diaspora and Integration.⁷⁰

Finally, *integrationalism* project embraced those, who called themselves political center. These forces included the amorphous Civic Union and its spin-offs, All-Russia's Union "Renewal", Sergei Shakhrai's Party for Russian Unity and Accord, and the Democratic Party of Russia. The essence of the project is the promotion of economic reintegration, which could lead to similar coordination of defense and other policies. Some versions of integrationalism envisioned a sort of confederation of former Soviet republics. Project emphasized economy and security issues, downplaying more abstract components such as identity, ethnicity, and nationhood.⁷¹

The projects preferred by the Russian first President Boris Yeltsin that is new state-building and civic nation construction were the most reasonable for the Russian Federation. Being multinational state that chose democratic path of development, Russia had to create new state institutions, its own nation and respect sovereignty of other Soviet successor states. At the same time, the crucial task was to promote single identity among the citizens of the Russian Federation. However, the real policy did not coincide with the declared tasks. While it was necessary to declare, in democratic traditions, the new state-building with respect to independent neighbors and all ethnic groups within the Russian federation, this task appeared hard to achieve.

⁷⁰ ZEVELEV, Igor, *Russia and Its New Diasporas*, Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2001, pp.72 - 73

⁷¹ ZEVELEV, Igor, *Russia and Its New Diasporas*, Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2001, pp.74 - 75

After the discussion of the main approaches to the nation-building process in post-Soviet Russia, it is important to focus on the study of the type of state-level nationalism in Russia. It is important to study the academic works that show which type of the nation-building was preferred by Russian leadership. The next part of this chapter discusses the approaches of the scholars that characterize the Russian state-level nationalism as a certain type.

2.2. Discourse of the State-Level Nationalism in Post-Soviet Russia

This part aims to study the academic discourse regarding state-level nationalism in Russia. Insofar the purpose of this thesis is to study the discourse of nationalism of the Russian Presidents Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin, the development of this discourse from the first President to the second, with the stress on the rise of the nationalistic ideology, it seems important to examine the approaches of the social scientists to the study of state level nationalism.

Valerii Tishkov, leading Russian ethnographer analyzed nationalism in the USSR and on the post-Soviet space. He defined *doctrinal academic nationalism* that took place in the Soviet Union; *hegemonic nationalism*; and *defensive or titular nationalism*. Two latter are two types of nationalism that can be seen in newly independent states and that can be regarded as a factor of the USSR demise. The key element of the *first doctrine* is the notion of the term “nation” as it is given in Grand Soviet Encyclopaedia and that is very similar to Stalin’s definition of the nation: “a historical entity of people which emerges in a process of formation its territory, economic ties, literary language and specifics of culture and character comprising at a whole a nation's features”.⁷² Later on one important element was added to this definition of the nation that is a feeling of common identity (“national self-consciousness”). Thus, Soviet nations were defined basically in ethno-cultural terms referring to a commonality of history, culture and language and to a certain “thnic

⁷² TISHKOV, Valerii, *Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union: the Mind Aflame*, London; Thousand Oaks, California: Sage, 1997, p.230

territory” supposed to be their “own” land - an exclusive property of a nation, one of its basic characteristics.⁷³ This policy required invention of the national nomenclature in the republics and overcoming other local identities, like clan, religious etc. to achieve this, Soviet scholars included into censuses a question “Nationality” in its ethnic notion. Ethnographers, linguists, historians had input a lot of efforts to redefine the list in “a proper way” declaring some identities as “dialectic”, “subethnic”, “local” variants of larger “ethnoses”. The main purpose of ethnic engineers was to achieve ethnic integration and consolidation.⁷⁴

Another key principle of doctrinal Soviet nationalism can be expressed in the following: “if a nation has its own territory possible to define in geographical terms then state formations as territorial units could exist only as «national-state formations»”⁷⁵. Thus, the USSR was the only state in the world, in which ethnic principle was a basis for its administrative-territorial structure. Each unit of this state was proclaimed to be realization of the right of self-determination. “Demography was not important: a titular nationality could comprise a decisive majority or a striking minority and nobody was able to challenge this status from below while it was sanctioned from above”⁷⁶.

A third element of doctrinal nationalism is an image of a nation as a homogeneous entity, a kind of “collective individual with its common blood and soul, with its primordial rights and a single will”⁷⁷.

⁷³ TISHKOV, Valerii, *Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union: the Mind Aflame*, London; Thousand Oaks, California: Sage, 1997, p.230

⁷⁴ TISHKOV, Valerii, *Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union: the Mind Aflame*, London; Thousand Oaks, California: Sage, 1997, pp.230 - 232

⁷⁵ TISHKOV, Valerii, *Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union: the Mind Aflame*, London; Thousand Oaks, California: Sage, 1997, p.232

⁷⁶ TISHKOV, Valerii, *Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union: the Mind Aflame*, London; Thousand Oaks, California: Sage, 1997, p.233

⁷⁷ TISHKOV, Valerii, *Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union: the Mind Aflame*, London; Thousand Oaks, California: Sage, 1997, p.233

Another type of nationalism, described by Tishkov, is *hegemonic nationalism*. Two obvious examples in post-Communist camp are Russian and Serbian nationalism. This is a nationalism of majority, of titular group. Often it is defined by scholars as “a manifestation of ambitions and interests on a part of «imperial nation» to defend or to acquire a privileged status at the expense of others”.⁷⁸ He characterizes Russian nationalism as deeply rooted in Tsarist past, collectivist and authoritarian by its character, but not purely ethnic by its appeal. The term “Russian” was considered as a synonym of the state, not the ethnic group. Before Bolsheviks came to power hegemonic Russian nationalism was civic in its nature but the process of civic nation-building in Russia was not completed and was abrupt by a new regime opted for an ethnic formula of nation-building. The idea of Russian nation in its ethnic meaning was introduced into public discourse during Soviet period as an element of Soviet doctrine on nationalities. The glory of Russian nation, its deep historical roots, mystique soul and other nationalistic rhetoric has been deliberately provoked by Stalin in a period of the Second World War as a part of war mobilisation but the founding fathers of this new Russian ethno-nationalism were academic and literary writers. Till the late 60th nationalist paradigm was carrying predominantly patriotic, self-glorifying, paternalistic meanings. Later on new motives of degradation of the Russian people, their culture, traditions appeared.⁷⁹

As a political movement contemporary Russian ethno-nationalism formed in the 1980th when “*Pamiat*” organisation began to work as an organization for cultural and historic preservation and revival, and some ecologic rhetoric. Its ideological context was a mixture of Orthodox monarchism, national-bolshevism and anti-Semitism. In 1989-1990 the leader of “*Pamiat*” Dmitrii Vasil’iev published Manifest of this organization. Its main ideas can be summarized in following: Russian Orthodox religion is the only possible spiritual basis for the Russians and for

⁷⁸ TISHKOV, Valerii, *Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union: the Mind Aflame*, London; Thousand Oaks, California: Sage, 1997, p.234

⁷⁹ TISHKOV, Valerii, *Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union: the Mind Aflame*, London; Thousand Oaks, California: Sage, 1997, p.234

Russia; Tsarist monarchy is the best form of state power as carrying a sacral character; no to disintegrative and weakening the state politics: “The Empire must stay an empire and nothing wrong with it”; the Russians as a great nation is a triangle entity including itself three Slavic peoples - Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusns; disintegration and conflicts as well as other negative phenomena are results of the mordial Zionist-masons conspiracy directed towards Russian people and their state; all power in this country must belong the Russians, other groups could have only proportional representation in all institutions, including politics, culture and science.⁸⁰ However, in the 1990-1991 this movement disappeared, partly as a result of the governmental activity. Starting from 1991 many nationalistic organizations appeared in Russia, representing various approaches to the understanding the nature of the Russian nation. They will be discussed in the third part of this chapter.

Finally, the third type of nationalism in a post-Soviet space, discussed by Tishkov, is *defensive or titular nationalism*. It is the nationalism of the former Soviet republics that was a reaction to demise of the USSR. Non-Russian nationalism was and still is the most flourishing ideological doctrine and political practice of the post-Soviet space. Its roots are in Soviet legacies in spite of the fact that among some nationalities elite elements formulated an idea of a nation under the Tsarist empire and nationalist political movements has been taking place before 1917 – 1918.⁸¹

Rogers Brubaker also devoted one of his works to the case of the post Soviet republics. Brubaker criticizes the tradition of distinguishing civic and ethnic nationalism that started from Hans Kohn’s works.⁸² Brubaker argues that it is often

⁸⁰ TISHKOV, Valerii, *Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union: the Mind Aflame*, London; Thousand Oaks, California: Sage, 1997, p.235

⁸¹ TISHKOV, Valerii, *Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union: the Mind Aflame*, London; Thousand Oaks, California: Sage, 1997, p.240

⁸² See KOHN, Hans, *Nationalism, Its Meaning and History*, New York: Anvil, 1965; KOHN, Hans, *The Idea of Nationalism. The Study of Its Origins and Background* (with a new introduction by Craig Calhoun), New Brunswick, London: Transaction Publishers, 2005 (Originally published in 1944 by The Macmillan Company), pp.3 - 27

impossible or problematic to characterize an entire state, or an entire national movement, simply as civic or ethnic. He points at the analytical ambiguity of the terms “ethnic” and “civic”. Ethnicity on the one hand can be understood as referring to common descent, but on the other hand it ethnic can be identical with the term cultural, without further specification.⁸³ Civic nationalism can also be identified very broadly. On the one hand, it can be interpreted strictly as involving an acultural, ahistorical, universalist, voluntarist, rational understanding of nationhood. “«The nation» is then construed as a voluntary association of culturally unmarked individuals”.⁸⁴ On the other hand, civic nationalism may be defined broadly, as “rooted in individual assent rather than ascriptive identity. It is based on common values and institutions, and patterns of social interaction. The bearers of national identity are institutions, customs, historical memories and rational secular values...”⁸⁵.

Brubaker also points out normative ambiguities of “civic-ethnic” distinction, arguing that civic nationalism is generally glossed as liberal, voluntarist, universalist, and inclusive, while ethnic nationalism is usually understood as illiberal, ascriptive, particularist, and exclusive. He stresses that this classification omits variations of those two main types.⁸⁶

In contrast, for the case of newly emerged states Brubaker proposes terms “nationalizing” and “external national homelands”.⁸⁷ Nationalizing nationalisms

⁸³ BRUBAKER, Rogers, *Ethnicity without Groups*, Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2004, pp.136 - 137

⁸⁴ BRUBAKER, Rogers, *Ethnicity without Groups*, Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2004, p.137.

⁸⁵ BRUBAKER, Rogers, *Ethnicity without Groups*, Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2004, p.138.

⁸⁶ BRUBAKER, Rogers, *Ethnicity without Groups*, Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2004, pp.140 - 141

⁸⁷ BRUBAKER, Rogers, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp.4 - 5

involve claims made in the name of a “core nation” or nationality, defined in ethnocultural terms, and sharply distinguished from the citizenry as a whole. The “core nation” is understood as the legitimate “owner” of the state which is conceived as the state of and for the core nation. Despite having “its own” state, core nation is conceived as a being in a weak cultural, economic, or demographic position within the state. This weak position - seen as a legacy of discrimination against the nation before it attained independence – is held to justify “remedial” or “compensatory” project of using state power to promote specific (and previously inadequately served) interests of the core nation.⁸⁸

Directly challenging these “nationalizing” nationalisms are the transborder nationalisms that Brubaker calls “external national homelands”. Homeland nationalisms assert states’ right – indeed their obligation – to monitor the condition, promote the welfare, support the activities and institutions, assert the rights, and protect the interests of “their” ethnonational kin in other states. Such claims are typically made when the ethnonational kin in question are seen as threatened by the nationalizing (and thereby, from the point of view of the ethnonational kin, denationalizing) policies and practices of the state in which they live. Homeland nationalisms thus arise in direct opposition to and in dynamic interaction with nationalizing nationalisms. Against nationalizing states’ characteristic assertion that the status of minorities is strictly internal matter, “homeland” states claim that their rights and responsibilities vis-à-vis ethnonational kin transcend the boundaries of territory and citizenship. “Homeland”, in this sense, is a political, not an ethnographic category. A state becomes an external national “homeland” when cultural or political elites construe certain residents and citizens of other states as co-nationals, as fellow members of a single transborder nation, and when they assert that this shared nationhood makes the state responsible, in some sense, not only for its

⁸⁸ BRUBAKER, Rogers, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p.5

own citizens but also for ethnic co-nationals who live in other states and possesses other citizenships.⁸⁹ The case of Russia Brubaker calls to be a homeland nationalism.

Nationalizing states and external national homelands advance competing jurisdictional claims over the same set of persons. These are persons who “belong”, or can be represented as belonging, to both states – to the nationalizing state by citizenship, to the homeland by putative ethnocultural nationality. The nationalizing state, appealing to the norms of territorial integrity and sovereignty, asserts that the status and welfare of its citizens, whatever their ethnocultural nationality, is a strictly internal matter over which it alone has legitimate jurisdiction. The external national homeland, rejecting this view, asserts that its rights and responsibilities vis-à-vis “its” (transborder) nation cut across the boundaries of territory and citizenship, that it has the right, even the obligation, to monitor, promote, and, if necessary, protect the interests of “its” ethnic co-nationals even when they live in other states and possess other citizenships.⁹⁰

Caught between two mutually antagonistic nationalisms - those of the nationalizing states in which they live and those of external national homelands to which they belong by ethnonational affinity though not by legal citizenship – are the national minorities. They have their own nationalism: they too make claims on the grounds of their nationality. Indeed it is such claims make them a national minority. National minority also designates political stance, not an ethnodemographic fact. Minority nationalist stances characteristically involve a self-understanding in specifically “national” rather than merely “ethnic” terms, a demand for state recognition of their distinct ethnocultural nationality, and the assertion of certain collective, nationally-based cultural or political rights. Although national minorities and external national homelands nationalism both define themselves in opposition to the “nationalizing”

⁸⁹ BRUBAKER, Rogers, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p.5

⁹⁰ BRUBAKER, Rogers, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p.111

nationalism of the state in which minorities live, they are not necessarily harmoniously aligned. Divergence is especially likely when homeland nationalisms are strategically adopted by the homeland state as means of advancing other, non-nationalist political goals; in this case ethnic co-nationals abroad may be precipitously abandoned when, for example, geopolitical goals require this.⁹¹

In opinion of Brubaker, Russia represents the case of homeland nationalism insofar it has a large number of minorities in Soviet successor states, which have been portrayed as as threatened by the nationalizing policies of these states. Russia has suffered a loss of territory and status of the Great Power, “creating an opening for political entrepreneurs with a variety of remedial, compensatory, or restorationist political agendas”.⁹²

Brubaker points out three distinguishing features of the homeland Russian nationalism. First of them is the public pronouncements on the right and the obligation to protect Russians in the near abroad that became a staple of official Russian discourse and has been figuring in in Russian foreign policy priorities.⁹³ The second aspect of the Russian nationalism is the greater military, political and economic preponderance of Russia vis-à-vis newly independent states, than, for example, the one of Weimar Germany vis-à-vis East and Central Europe. It enables Russia to adopt an assertive stance on Russian minorities abroad. At the same time Russia, unlike Weimar Germany is not necessarily committed to the territorial revision.⁹⁴ There is a rough elite consensus on the need to restore Russia’s status as a world or at least continental Power; but there is no consensus that this necessarily

⁹¹ BRUBAKER, Rogers, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp.5-6

⁹² BRUBAKER, Rogers, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p.135

⁹³ BRUBAKER, Rogers, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p.136

⁹⁴ BRUBAKER, Rogers, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p.139.

requires border adjustments, let alone the wholesale reincorporation of the newly independent states.⁹⁵ Finally, in Russia, civil society homeland nationalism is weak. Oppositional political parties and factions, as well as political entrepreneurs have used homeland nationalistic rhetoric to castigate the government for failing to take bolder measures in defense of Russians in the near abroad. But they too can scarcely be conceptualized as part of civil society, since their homeland nationalism, although defined in opposition to government policy and practice, arises directly from the struggle for political power.⁹⁶ Besides, in Russia, there is no agreement, even in principle, about the circle of persons addressed by Russian homeland claims.⁹⁷

Brubaker concludes that the Russian homeland nationalist discourse because of the lack of a comparable tradition in Russia, “has had to be assembled by «brocolage» from various available and legitimate cultural «scraps»”.⁹⁸ He continues:

Lacking indigenous roots, it has had to be cobbled together from a variety of discursive traditions: from “classical” homeland nationalism, from the legal rhetoric of diplomatic protection of citizens in other states, from human rights discourse, from the vocabulary of Great Power politics. As a result, the discourse has been multivocal and opportunistic, playing, as argued above, on multiple registers, and lacking consistency.⁹⁹

⁹⁵ BRUBAKER, Rogers, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p.140

⁹⁶ BRUBAKER, Rogers, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p.141

⁹⁷ BRUBAKER, Rogers, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p.142

⁹⁸ BRUBAKER, Rogers, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p.147

⁹⁹ BRUBAKER, Rogers, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p.147

As we can see from the quotation the discourse of Russian nationalism lacked consistency due to the absence of the historic background and experience of the nation-building in its contemporary understanding. It has been worked out of the different discourses and approaches.

Russian homeland nationalism lacks the strong associational base in civil society, and it involves the cultivation and maintenance of cross-border relations and the provision of cross-border resources. These relations will determine the political dispositions of Russian minorities and degree to which and manner in which they look to Russia for solutions of their problems.¹⁰⁰

The approach of Valerii Tishkov and Rogers Brubaker seek to explain the nature of the Russian nationalism and describes its main features. These are important for the understanding of the priorities in the nation-building projects as well as in the foreign policy. While Tishkov stresses such features of the Russian nationalism as its titular character, ethnic elements, presence of the East Slavic identity, Brubaker points out the restorationist discourse, and the assertive willingness to protect Russian-speakers abroad. These approaches are complementary and characterize the Russian nationalism from the different stances: while first one pays attention to the domestic policies mainly, the second one focuses on the position regarding minorities.

The previous parts have discussed the academic discourse regarding nation-building process in Russia and type of the nationalism that characterizes Russian case. After that, to understand intellectual approaches to the national issues that existed in Russia to full extent, it is important to examine the approaches to these issues of various nationalistic movements and parties in Russia. The next part discusses the ideologies and discourse of Russian right wing political parties and movements that started to emerge in late 1980s.

¹⁰⁰ BRUBAKER, Rogers, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p.147

2.3. Actors of the Conservative Resistance – the Russian Opposition Nationalism in Post-Soviet Era

This part discusses the right movements in Russian society that represent different nationalistic ideologies. While this thesis focuses on the analysis of the nation-building project, it is important to examine the discourse of Russian rightist parties and nationalistic movements. These are presented here as a classification of their main types with a brief overview of their ideologies and demands.

The classification of the types of Russian nationalism made by Thomas Parland in his work *“The Extreme Nationalist Threat in Russia: The Growing Influence of Western Rightist Ideas”* represents different approaches to the nature of nationalism and its definition. Depending on the criteria of classification, the author distinguished ethnocentric and great power nationalism; extreme right and moderate (pragmatic) nationalism; pro-communist – anti-communist national patriots; traditional – modern national patriotism.

Parland distinguishes two different trends - *etnosentrism* (ethnocentric nationalism) and *derzhavniki* or *gosudarstvenniki* (great power nationalism) that historically refer to two basic interpretations of the “Russian idea”. The former emphasizes the primacy of the ethnos, i.e. Russian nation and its traditions. It involves a typical conservative outlook with respect to traditional Russian values. In post-Soviet Russia representatives of this approach are Alexander Solzhenitsyn (died in August 2008) and Igor Shafarevich. The latter stresses the primacy of the state. *Derzhavniki* glorify the former multinational imperial Russia, or the Soviet Union as its historical continuation. Geographically this type of nationalism can be found in Moscow, St. Petersburg and the central parts of Russia. The ethnocentric type of nationalism is closer to common people and makes itself felt at a grass-root level.¹⁰¹ Russian nationalism partly reflects the controversies existing between central power and local

¹⁰¹ PARLAND, Thomas, *The Extreme Nationalist Threat in Russia: the Growing Influence of Western Rightist Ideas*, New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005, pp.64 – 65.

authorities in Russia. The classification of types of Russian nationalism is emphasized by the process of regionalization – the different regions’ aspiration towards greater independence from Moscow. As Parland stresses, despite the differences between *etnosentrismy* and *gosudarstvenniki* they have a common idea of a separate non-Western path of development, reject Western liberal and democratic models of political culture, and are more or less anti-Semitic.¹⁰²

The close to Parland’s is the classification by John Dunlop. He distinguishes the patriotic dissidents, so-called *vozhrozhdensy*, on the one hand, and the pro-communist loyalists, the national Bolsheviks, who can be considered statist.¹⁰³

The next classification is extreme right versus moderate (pragmatic) nationalism. Extreme ethnocentric nationalists are racists in general and anti-Semites in particular. They interpret all Russia’s failures entirely as a result of intrigues of foreign and domestic enemies. The supposed enemies are ethnic aliens in general and Jews in particular. There is a conviction that ethnic Russians are inherently superior in Russia’s political, economic and cultural life. Furthermore, according to their ideas, future Russia is supposed either to russify the world or at least to play a leading international role among the nations. Among Russian extremist nationalists are the profascist *Natsional’no-Patrioticheskiy Front Pamiat’* (National Patriotic Front Pamiat’) and several openly fascist or national socialist parties and grouping like *Russkoe Natsional’noe Edinstvo* (Russian National Unity, RNU), led by Alexander Barkashov, *Russkiy Natsional’nyi Soiuz* (Russian National Union) led by Konstantin Kasimovskiy, and others. Representatives of these groups are concerned about how the ethnic Russians should be saved from being dominated by “aliens”. The numerous solutions suggested range from ethnic purges to introducing a system of

¹⁰² PARLAND, Thomas, *The Extreme Nationalist Threat in Russia: the Growing Influence of Western Rightist Ideas*, New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005, p.65

¹⁰³ DUNLOP, John, *The Faces of Contemporary Russian Nationalism*, Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1983

proportional representation of different ethnic groups in Russia's power structures.

104

As to extreme nationalists among *derzhavniki*, they are more radical in theory rather than in practical politics. Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, the leader of Russia's Liberal Democratic Party (Liberal'no-Demokraticeskaya Partiya Rossii, LDPR) is a good example. He can make statements that Russia's frontiers have to be extended to the Indian Ocean, however, in Duma, the LDPR fractions supports governmental policies.¹⁰⁵

Pragmatic or moderate nationalists do not exclude cooperation with other political forces and are ready to make compromises with those in power. The main representatives of this train are Lebed's *Rossiyskaya Narodno-Respublikanskaya Partiya* (Russian People's Republican Party) and Ziuganov's Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF).¹⁰⁶

Russian nationalistic groups and movements can also be analyzed in their attitude to communism. From this point of view Parland distinguishes pro- and anti-communist national patriots or "pure" national patriots and national Bolsheviks. Coalitions of pro-Communist nationalists, emerged soon after the breakup of the Soviet Union, such as National Salvation Front (Front Natsional'nogo Spaseniya - FNS), Russian National Assembly (Russkiy Natsional'niy Sobor, RNS), embraced nearly all outstanding thinkers and party leaders of both left and right opposition. This union was based on pragmatic considerations: left needed to revitalize their bankrupt ideology with some new content, but had kept their organizational structures operative, while right could offer an acceptable ideology, whereas their organisations

¹⁰⁴ PARLAND, Thomas, *The Extreme Nationalist Threat in Russia: the Growing Influence of Western Rightist Ideas*, New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005, p.65

¹⁰⁵ PARLAND, Thomas, *The Extreme Nationalist Threat in Russia: the Growing Influence of Western Rightist Ideas*, New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005, pp.65 – 66.

¹⁰⁶ PARLAND, Thomas, *The Extreme Nationalist Threat in Russia: the Growing Influence of Western Rightist Ideas*, New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005, p.66

were weak and poorly articulated. Some of the “pure” nationalists like A.Dugin, I.Shafarevich, were ready to cooperate with those communists who rejected international Marxism in favour of Orthodoxy and/or national socialism of sorts. But there were nationalist who rejected any forms of contacts with any communists.¹⁰⁷

Another approach to analysis of Russian nationalism is traditionalism versus modern national patriotism approach. Opposite to European nationalist thought, contemporary Russian nationalism is still strongly influenced by religion, i.e. by Orthodoxy. Only in the 1990s, with the breakthrough of political modernization in Russia a growing number of national patriots began to “secularize”, i.e. to adopt elements of Western non-religious rightist thought. The examples of traditional national patriotism are front *Pamiat'*, Solzhenitsyn, Metropolitan of St.Petersburg Ioann, Patriarch Aleksiy II.¹⁰⁸

Traditional nationalism had its rise in 1998 – 91. Most of traditionalists were advocating Orthodoxy and monarchism. With the ongoing Westernization process, secularization and commercialization of life, another important process – clericalisation of society started. Several political leaders and top-level officials began to attend important religious ceremonies conducted by Orthodox Church. Such thinking became fashionable among nationalist-minded citizens. However, it is important to stress that “pure” traditional nationalism exists only in theory. In practice it is always marked by certain “modernist” influences.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁷ PARLAND, Thomas, *The Extreme Nationalist Threat in Russia: the Growing Influence of Western Rightist Ideas*, New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005, p.68

¹⁰⁸ PARLAND, Thomas, *The Extreme Nationalist Threat in Russia: the Growing Influence of Western Rightist Ideas*, New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005, pp.69 – 70.

¹⁰⁹ PARLAND, Thomas, *The Extreme Nationalist Threat in Russia: the Growing Influence of Western Rightist Ideas*, New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005, pp.70 – 71.

“New right”, appeared in the beginning of 1990s, represented a revision of traditionalism. They adopted more secular theories of western extraction such as national socialist geopolitics and racial biology.¹¹⁰

Similar to Parland’s classification, is the scheme of Sven Gunnar Simonsen, who presents four different categories of “nationalist sentiments” in post-Soviet space, distinguished along two different dimensions: territorial orientation (“core” or “empire”) and character of nationalism (primarily ethnic or primarily statist).¹¹¹

Ethnic core nationalism (core oriented, primarily ethnic is focused on promoting the interests of ethnic Russians within a core area densely populated by ethnic Russians. The territorial ambitions of this nationalism may coincide with the borders of the Russian Federation, but may in principle be both narrower and wider. In practice, somewhat wider ambitions are not uncommon, relating in particular to such areas as eastern Estonia, northern Kazakhstan, and southern and eastern Ukraine. (As many Russian nationalists see little or no difference between Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians, this category also touches onto the promotion of East Slav union).¹¹²

Russian Federation nationalism (core oriented, primarily statist) is focused on the Russian Federation, accepting the borders it had when it was still the RSFSR. Being less oriented towards ethnicity than the category above, it holds that this new state should define its own national interest, and that these might not always coincide with those of its neighbours.¹¹³

¹¹⁰ PARLAND, Thomas, *The Extreme Nationalist Threat in Russia: the Growing Influence of Western Rightist Ideas*, New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005, pp.70 – 71.

¹¹¹ SIMONSEN, Sven Gunnar, “Nationalism and the Russian Political Spectrum: Locating and Evaluating the Extremes”, *Journal of Political Ideologies*, Vol.6, No. 3, October 2001, pp.272 - 273

¹¹² SIMONSEN, Sven Gunnar, “Nationalism and the Russian Political Spectrum: Locating and Evaluating the Extremes”, *Journal of Political Ideologies*, Vol.6, No. 3, October 2001, pp.272 - 273

¹¹³ SIMONSEN, Sven Gunnar, “Nationalism and the Russian Political Spectrum: Locating and Evaluating the Extremes”, *Journal of Political Ideologies*, Vol.6, No. 3, October 2001, p. 273

Russian supremacist nationalism (empire oriented, primarily ethnic) signifies a nationalism that has territorial ambitions outside Russia's current borders, also into areas that are not necessarily inhabited mostly by ethnic Russians. The ethnic element expresses itself as an acceptance of a degree of oppression of other peoples in order to realize such ambitions.¹¹⁴

Empire restorers (empire oriented, primarily statist) may be seen as shaped by Soviet official ideology both by its emphasis on the multi-ethnic character of the USSR, and by its parallel emphasis on the greatness of that state. It was in the form of the Soviet Union that Russia had become a superpower, projecting its might—ideologically as well as militarily—around the globe.¹¹⁵

Discussing Russian ethnic nationalism, Franz Preißler distinguished three currents that appeared in the early years of *perestroika*. His classification is very similar to the one made by Parland, but it is generalized up to three basic currents, and all of them are called by author the ethnic nationalism. Preißler explains that he analyzes those political actors and players, whose concept of the nation is less that of a community of citizens, who enjoy equality under the law, than one of a community defined by linguistic, confessional and/or regional ties or even by common descent.¹¹⁶ First current, Russian imperial nationalists, often called National Bolsheviks, supported the USSR's system of government and ideology, seeing in it the continuation of Russia's centuries-old imperial history and considering its internationalist ideology to be indispensable to the coherence of the multi-ethnic empire.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁴ SIMONSEN, Sven Gunnar, "Nationalism and the Russian Political Spectrum: Locating and Evaluating the Extremes", *Journal of Political Ideologies*, Vol.6, No. 3, October 2001, p. 273

¹¹⁵ SIMONSEN, Sven Gunnar, "Nationalism and the Russian Political Spectrum: Locating and Evaluating the Extremes", *Journal of Political Ideologies*, Vol.6, No. 3, October 2001, pp.272 - 273

¹¹⁶ PREIBLER, Franz, "Russian (Ethnic) Nationalism", in Egbert Jahn (ed.), *Nationalism in Late and Post-Communist Europe*, Baden-Baden, 2009, p.42

¹¹⁷ PREIBLER, Franz, "Russian (Ethnic) Nationalism", in Egbert Jahn (ed.), *Nationalism in Late and Post-Communist Europe*, Baden-Baden, 2009, p.44

The second current, the Russian cultural nationalists, gave less attention to the concept of the empire state and focused much more on Russian culture. The origins of this school can be traced back to the 1960s, when an officially tolerated interest in certain elements of Russian culture began to emerge. The authors of the village prose (*derevenskaia proza*) movement of the 1970s (Vasilii Belov, Viktor Astaf'ev, Valentin Rasputin) raised topics such as destruction of the Russian peasantry through collectivization, the persecution of the Russian Orthodox Church under the Soviet regime and the environmental devastation that resulted from the Soviet development model. The representatives of this movement (with which Alexander Solzhenitsyn can also be seen as affiliated) took a rather negative stance on the Soviet system of government and ideology and tended to be anti-modern and anti-western in attitude. They idealized a simple life in the country and pre-revolutionary Russia and believed that strengthening the Orthodox Church would lead to Russia's moral rebirth.¹¹⁸

For the third nationalist current, the liberal Russian nationalists, the issue of the damage that the Soviet system had done to Russia's culture was also an important theme. However, they placed greater emphasis on the need for economic and political modernization in the country, advocating the creation of incentives to increase production, and liberalization from the state censor.¹¹⁹

In opinion of Preißler, these Russian ethnic nationalist played marginal role in political conflict of 1990/1991 insofar they failed to integrate Russians in the neighboring republics into Russian state. The reasons of that are the incomplete nation-building and ambiguity of the term Russia; political institutional weakness of the new Russian and necessity to built coalitions; the absence of an experience of repression or genocide committed by another national/ethnic group and the

¹¹⁸ PREIBLER, Franz, "Russian (Ethnic) Nationalism", in Egbert Jahn (ed.), *Nationalism in Late and Post-Communist Europe*, Baden-Baden, 2009, p.44

¹¹⁹ PREIBLER, Franz, "Russian (Ethnic) Nationalism", in Egbert Jahn (ed.), *Nationalism in Late and Post-Communist Europe*, Baden-Baden, 2009, p.44

ambivalence in the Russian's attitude to their own system of government; the relatively unstrained nature of the relationship between Ukrainians and Russians.¹²⁰

Despite the accepted by Kremlin main project of unitary identity construction and nation-building discussed ideas play an important role: they inform society and state leadership about the wide range of associations, their problems and needs; they are important as the opposition to the state project. Even if their demands are not taken into the consideration to the full extent, some of them will be inevitably used to work out efficient state policy.

After the analysis of the academic and political discourse regarding nation-building and nationalism, it is important to focus on the rise of the nationalistic discourse in Russia in 1993-1995 in order to understand its implications and ideological basis. The next part discusses the rise of the nationalism in Russia in 1990s.

2.4. The Rise of Russian Nationalism in the 1990s

This part examines the rise of the nationalistic ideas in Russian society in 1990s. Rosalind Marsh exploring Russia's post-Soviet identity stresses that in the mid-1990 a resurgence of Russian nationalism took place. The reasons of this are the failure of Russia's market reforms, as well as the failure of liberal, democratic politicians to pay attention to questions of nationality, ethnicity and state-building, which encouraged traditional nationalist views to move in to fill the ensuing intellectual and political vacuum. Nationalism was again officially promoted in 1995 by Yeltsin's government to coincide with the patriotic celebrations accompanying the 50th anniversary of the Soviet victory in the Second World War.¹²¹

¹²⁰ PREIBLER, Franz, "Russian (Ethnic) Nationalism", in Egbert Jahn (ed.), *Nationalism in Late and Post-Communist Europe*, Baden-Baden, 2009, p.44

¹²¹ MARSH, Rosalind, "The Nature of Russia's Identity: the Theme of «Russia and the West» in Post-Soviet Culture" in Roger E. Kanet, (ed.), *Identities, Nations and Politics after Communism*, Abingdon, Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2008, p.154

In Marsh's opinion, this was demonstrated by Duma's decision of 1995 to abrogate the Belovezh records of 1991 which had ratified the demise of the USSR; the adoption of a law enshrining Russia's right to protect the Russian minorities in the near abroad; and subsequently, during the wars in the former Yugoslavia, the revival of traditional notions of protecting Russia's Orthodox "brother Serbs", and Russia's hostility to the expansion of NATO.¹²²

Thomas Parland also sees the reasons of the turn to nationalism in the failure of the economic reforms due to lack of attention to Russia's own traditions, habits and historical experience, growth of criminal, shadow economy as a result of it: "People felt cheated as the radical democrats in power spearheaded by Yeltsin had not lived up to their promises of a better life".¹²³ In this situation conservative thinking including right-wing radicalism became to gain ground within society. They included pessimism, social Darwinism, inequality, anti-communism, the Pinochet syndrome and some other.¹²⁴ For this work the most crucial is the national reconciliation on nationalist terms, the drive towards nationalism.

Parliamentary elections of December 1993 brought the "third force" – Zhirinovskiy rightist party. Russian Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) won 64 seats in State Duma, the same as a pro-Yeltsin block Russia's Choice did. For comparison, Communist Party of the Russian Federation won 42 seats.¹²⁵ In opinion of Parland, the ideological climate in society had changed towards great power nationalism as a manifestation of a grave identity crisis that Russian had been undergoing after the

¹²² MARSH, Rosalind, "The Nature of Russia's Identity: the Theme of «Russia and the West» in Post-Soviet Culture" in Roger E. Kanet, (ed.), *Identities, Nations and Politics after Communism*, Abingdon, Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2008, p.154

¹²³ PARLAND, Thomas, *The Extreme Nationalist Threat in Russia: the Growing Influence of Western Rightist Ideas*, New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005, p. 48

¹²⁴ PARLAND, Thomas, *The Extreme Nationalist Threat in Russia: the Growing Influence of Western Rightist Ideas*, New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005, pp. 48 – 56.

¹²⁵ Data of the Central Elections Commission on the elections of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, December 12, 1993, available from http://www.cikrf.ru/vib_arhiv/gosduma/1993/index.jsp, (accessed on August 10, 2010)

dissolution of the empire. In 1995 – 96 even Yeltsin's domestic and foreign policies were influenced by the changed ideological climate. The amnesty to the putschists of 1991 and to the organizers of the armed uprising in October 1993, as well as Agreement on civic accord signed in April 1994, were good examples of this influence. A partial national reconciliation – the communists and the Agrarian party had not signed the aforementioned Agreement – became reality. The fact that Zhirinovsky as the leader of the LDPR, the strongest opposition party in Duma, had signed Agreement was of crucial importance.¹²⁶

In 1995-96 political life was marked by a new polarization due to the parliamentary and Presidential elections. However, the political situation was not as explosive as in 1993 due to the 50th Anniversary of the Soviet Victory in World War II that was celebrated in May 1995. Becoming an occasion for national unity and reconciliation, these festivities, however, strengthened the position of the Communists and the anti-Western nationalists at the expense of the pro-market parties. As a matter of fact, before the Duma elections in 1995, all political parties appeared under the banner of Russian patriotism.¹²⁷ Partly as a result of this, during parliamentary elections of December 1995 Communist Party of the RF (CPRF) won 157 that were three times as LDPR received (51 mandates).¹²⁸

In 1996, the Presidential elections divided society between the supporters of Yeltsin and those of Zyuganov, head of the CPRF who stressed that he was a candidate of the association of socialist and nationalist parties. The former got 35.28 per cent of

¹²⁶ PARLAND, Thomas, *The Extreme Nationalist Threat in Russia: The Growing Influence of Western Rightist Ideas*, New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005, p. 57

¹²⁷ PARLAND, Thomas, *The Extreme Nationalist Threat in Russia: the Growing Influence of Western Rightist Ideas*, New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005, p.57

¹²⁸ Data of the Central Elections Commission on the elections of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, December 17, 1995, available from http://www.cikrf.ru/vib_arhiv/gosduma/1995/index.jsp, (accessed on August 10, 2010)

the votes, latter won 32.03 per cent.¹²⁹ In the 1996 Presidential race communists and nationalists focused on the decline in general standard of living and in industrial production, Zhirinovskiy trumpeted his familiar theme of loss of empire, Yeltsin's campaign was based on past.¹³⁰

Article 3 of the 1993 Constitution describes the "multinational people" of the Russian Federation as a "repository of sovereignty".¹³¹ The Constitution guarantees equal rights independent of nationality, language, origin, and religious conviction and forbids any form of restriction of civil rights on racial, national or religious grounds.¹³² Propaganda instigating racial, national or religious hatred and strife is forbidden.¹³³

However, the authorities themselves violated these provisions. For instance, the sale of anti-Semitic printed material directly advocating violence has gone on unimpeded in central Moscow for years. Following the bloody repression of rebellion by parts of the parliamentary opposition in October 1993, the mayor of Moscow issued an ordinance allowing the police to search houses and conduct security checks on individuals. Almost all of those detained were of dark complexion. The vehemence and nervousness on the part of state officials was only increased by the Russian-Chechen War, which spilled over into areas outside of Chechnya in the form of hostage-taking. After an explosion in the Moscow underground, mayor Yurii

¹²⁹ Data of the Central Elections Commission on the elections of the President of the Russian Federation, June – July 1996, available from http://www.cikrf.ru/vib_arhiv/President/1996/index.jsp, (accessed on August 10, 2010)

¹³⁰ SMITH, Kathleen E., *Mythmaking in the New Russia: Politics and Memory During the Yeltsin Era*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002, pp. 131 – 157.

¹³¹ Article 3, Constitution of the Russian Federation (*Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii*), December 12, 1993, available from <http://www.constitution.ru/>, (accessed on August 17, 2010)

¹³² Article 19, Constitution of the Russian Federation (*Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii*), December 12, 1993, available from <http://www.constitution.ru/>, (accessed on August 17, 2010)

¹³³ Article 29, Constitution of the Russian Federation (*Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii*), December 12, 1993, available from <http://www.constitution.ru/>, (accessed on August 17, 2010)

Luzhkov expressed desire, on camera, that the entire Chechen diaspora to be resettled out of Moscow.¹³⁴

On 16 June 1996 the “Concept of the State Nationality Policy of the Russian Federation” entered into force.¹³⁵ According to the introduction, it is based on the principles of the Russian Federation Constitution and on generally recognized standards of international law. However, this document refers to ethnic Russians explicitly more than once. At one point, reference is made to their unifying role within the territory of Russia, a role that, the paper says, has led to the preservation of a unique unity and diversity of multiple peoples. Moreover, Russians are underlined as one of the peoples suffered from Stalinist totalitarian regime (*udar po vsem narodam [...], vključaia russkii*). In the part concerning regional programs Conception stresses that “relations among nationalities mostly will be defined by the national self-assurance of the Russian (*russkii*) people that is the stanchion of the Russian state.” The documents states that

...the needs and interests of the Russian (*russkii*) people to be reflected to the full extent in federal and regional programs, and to be taken into consideration in political, economic and cultural life of republics and autonomous units of the Russian Federation.¹³⁶

This reflects the concern of the Russian Federation about Russian-speakers abroad. However in the same passage it is stated that the solution of the problems of other

¹³⁴ PREIBLER, Franz, “Russian (Ethnic) Nationalism“, in Egbert Jahn (ed.), *Nationalism in Late and Post-Communist Europe*, Vol.2, *Nationalism in the Nation States*, Baden-Baden, 2009, p.67

¹³⁵ “The State Nationality Policy Concept of the Russian Federation”, (*Kontsepsiia Gosudarstvennoi Natsional’noi Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii*), June 15, 1996, available from <http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/27.html>, (accessed on August 18, 2010)

¹³⁶ “The State Nationality Policy Concept of the Russian Federation”, (*Kontsepsiia Gosudarstvennoi Natsional’noi Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii*), June 15, 1996, available from <http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/27.html>, (accessed on August 18, 2010)

peoples of the Russian Federation is of no less importance.¹³⁷ In opinion of Preißler, the document sought to create balance between the central interests and regional interests, between the dominant culture and the cultures of other people.¹³⁸

2.5. Conclusion

The projects preferred by the Russian first President Boris Yeltsin that is new state-building and civic nation construction were the most reasonable for the Russian Federation. Being multinational state that chose democratic path of development, Russia had to create new state institutions, its own nation and respect sovereignty of other Soviet successor states. At the same time, the crucial task was to promote single identity among the citizens of the Russian Federation. However, the real policy did not coincide with the declared tasks. While it was necessary to declare, in democratic traditions, the new state-building with respect to independent neighbors and all ethnic groups within the Russian federation, this task appeared hard to achieve.

The approaches of Valerii Tishkov and Rogers Brubaker seek to explain the nature of the Russian nationalism and describes its main features. These are important for the understanding of the priorities in the nation-building projects as well as in the foreign policy. While Tishkov stresses such features of the Russian nationalism as its titular character, ethnic elements, presence of the East Slavic identity, Brubaker points out the restorationist discourse, and the assertive willingness to protect Russian-speakers abroad. These approaches are complementary and characterize the Russian nationalism from the different stances: while first one pays attention to the domestic policies mainly, the second one focuses on the position regarding minorities.

¹³⁷ “The State Nationality Policy Concept of the Russian Federation”, (*Kontseptsia Gosudarstvennoi Natsional'noi Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii*), June 15, 1996, available from <http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/27.html>, (accessed on August 18, 2010)

¹³⁸ PREIBLER, Franz, “Russian (Ethnic) Nationalism“, in Egbert Jahn (ed.), *Nationalism in Late and Post-Communist Europe*, Vol.2, *Nationalism in the Nation States*, Baden-Baden, 2009, p.68

In mid 1990s as a result of the failure of Russia's market reforms, as well as the failure of liberal, democratic politicians to pay attention to questions of nationality, ethnicity and state-building, traditional nationalist views reemerged to fill the ensuing intellectual and political vacuum. Their ideas play an important role: they inform society and state leadership about the wide range of associations, their problems and needs; they are important as the opposition to the state project. Even if their demands are not taken into the consideration to the full extent, some of them will be inevitably used to work out efficient state policy.

On the state level one can also trace nationalistic discourse. This can be viewed as an attempt to appeal to the patriotic feelings of the Russian citizens in the period of economic and political crisis. Some authors suggest even that this was an attempt to find groups that can be represented as guilty in Russia's breakdown. In my turn, I consider this as an attempt to draw Russians' attention away from economic and political concerns to the issues of patriotism and nationalism that are not that much crucial to the stability of political power in Russia as economic and political issues.

The third chapter is devoted to the study of the nation-building under Russia's first President Boris Yeltsin. I discuss the evolution of the Yeltsin's views on the nature of the Russian nation and his strategy of the nation-building. Besides, this chapter seeks to explain the implications of the rise of nationalistic ideas in society by analyzing Yeltsin's state-building project, economic and political reforms. Finally, author discusses the transformation of the foreign policy of Boris Yeltsin.

CHAPTER III.

BORIS YELTSIN'S STRATEGY OF NATION-BUILDING: 1991 – 1999

The third chapter is devoted to the study of the nation-building under Boris Yeltsin. I discuss the evolution of the Yeltsin's views on the nature of the Russian nation and his strategy of the nation-building. Besides, this chapter seeks to explain the implications of the rise of nationalistic ideas in society by analyzing Yeltsin's state-building project, economic and political reforms. Finally, author discusses he transformation of the foreign policy of Boris Yeltsin.

3.1. The Evolution of Ideas on the Nature of the Russian Nation and Nation-building: 1991 – 1999

This part analyzes Boris Yeltsin's view on the nature of the Russian nation and his policy of the nation-building in accordance with it. It is presented as an evolution of approaches and their implementations according to the needs of the new Russian state.

The policy of nation-building in Russia under Boris Yeltsin can be divided into few periods, according to Yeltsin's and his administration's views on the nature of the Russian nation. Between autumn 1991 and late 1992 Yeltsin demonstrated commitment to the strengthening of civic identities. This distinguished Russian from other new independent states where one can see attempts of nation and state-building with reliance on both ethnic and civic identities. In contrast, no ethnic national doctrine was officially promoted in Russia in 1991 – 1992.¹³⁹ The approach based on civic understanding of the nation seems to be the only reliable in case of the Russian Federation insofar the promotion of the ethnic nationalism in multi-ethnic state with a federative structure might have caused ethnic conflicts.

¹³⁹ TOLZ, Vera, *Russia: Inventing the Nation*, London, Arnold; New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, p.252

According to Gerhard Simon, the construction of a civic nation in Russia had some aspects. First one is a linguistic construct. Adjective *rossiiskii* (Russian) and corresponding noun *rossiiane* (Russians) up until 1991 almost were not used in Russian everyday and literary language. Since 1992 the terms experienced their revival. The intention of the government and those intellectuals, who supported idea of creation civic Russian nation, was to distinguish these terms from the terms *ruskii* (English translation is also “Russian”) and *ruskie* (in English it is also “Russians”).¹⁴⁰ *Rossiiane* is used in connection with the territory or the multi-national state, meaning the citizens of the Russian Federation, regardless their ethnic or linguistic identity. *Ruskii* and *ruskie* are to be applied only to Russians as an ethnic group and to their language. These terms – *rossiiskii* and *rossiiane* are the core in the doctrine of the construction of a civic Russian nation. However, these terms separates Russian elites into two major groups. Those who represent democratic train started to use them in political and intellectual discourse, while national patriots claimed that all *rossiiane* are *ruskie*. This gave a fertile soil to various word manipulations and speculations.¹⁴¹

Another aspect of the civic identity construction in Russia is a demographic basis and problem of borders of a civic nation. In 2002 79.83 per cent of 145.166 million inhabitants were ethnic Russians. The Tatars constituted 3.83 per cent, the Ukrainians 2.03 per cent, the Chuvash 1.12 per cent, the Bashkirs 1.15 per cent, the Chechens – 0.93 per cent, the Belarusians 0.55 per cent, and the Mordvins 0.58 per cent of the population.¹⁴² In general one can speak of a relative ethnic homogeneity and a clear predominance of ethnic Russians. This is a better basis for the nation-

¹⁴⁰ SIMON, Gerhard, “The Russian Federation Nationalism of Russians and Non-Russians”, in Egbert Jahn (ed.), *Nationalism in Late and Post-Communist Europe*, Vol.2, *Nationalism in the Nation States*, Baden-Baden, 2009, pp.21 – 22.

¹⁴¹ SIMON, Gerhard, “The Russian Federation Nationalism of Russians and Non-Russians”, in Egbert Jahn (ed.), *Nationalism in Late and Post-Communist Europe*, Vol.2, *Nationalism in the Nation States*, Baden-Baden, 2009, p.22

¹⁴² The Data on National Composition of the Russian Federation of 2002 all-Russian Census, available from <http://www.perepis2002.ru/>, (accessed on August 10, 2010)

building, than for example in Ukraine, where Ukrainians made up only 73 per cent of the citizens. Another factor that made the nation-building easier is that the non-Russians within the borders of the RF are highly russified and were not seen as a source of potential conflict.¹⁴³ These three factors, mentioned above, are conducive to the civic nation-building in Russia. On the other hand, administrative-territorial structure of the RF is considered as an obstacle for the nation-building, as Simon and Tishkov proved. For example, Tishkov regarded elites of non-Russian ethnic autonomous areas as a major obstacle to the creation of a civic nation in the Russian Federation. They feel that the concept of a nation as a community of citizens means assimilation with the main ethnic group, and abolition of autonomous administrative units in the country. This means the loss of broad political and economic rights that autonomous received according to Federal Treaty of 1992.¹⁴⁴ This view is shared by Gerhard Simon, who stated that having experienced a significant improvement in their status, the non-Russian subjects of the Russian Federation could cause serious problems for nation-building.¹⁴⁵

Policy of Yeltsin's administration was supported by real steps on the way of building the civic nation within the Russian Federation. One of the earliest documents is the Citizenship Law of the Russian Federation, adopted on 28 November, 1991. The Law defined a citizen of the RF as *rossiianin* (in civic terms) and recognized all those living on the territory of the RF at the time of its adoption as Russian citizens.¹⁴⁶ The Law is very flexible: it does not require any process of naturalization

¹⁴³ SIMON, Gerhard, "The Russian Federation Nationalism of Russians and Non-Russians", in Egbert Jahn (ed.), *Nationalism in Late and Post-Communist Europe*, Vol.2, *Nationalism in the Nation States*, Baden-Baden, 2009, p.23

¹⁴⁴ TOLZ, Vera, *Russia: Inventing the Nation*, London, Arnold; New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, p.250

¹⁴⁵ SIMON, Gerhard, "The Russian Federation Nationalism of Russians and Non-Russians", in Egbert Jahn (ed.), *Nationalism in Late and Post-Communist Europe*, Vol.2, *Nationalism in the Nation States*, Baden-Baden, 2009, p.23

¹⁴⁶ Citizenship Law of the Russian Federation, (*Zakon O Grazhdanstve Rossiiskoi Federatsii*), November 28, 1991, available from <http://www.antropotok.archipelag.ru/text/a010.htm>, (accessed on August 18, 2010)

to receive a citizenship (as it is, for example, in Baltic States¹⁴⁷), and lack any ethnic criteria of nationality. According to the Law, all citizens of the former USSR until 2000 were free to move to Russia and get automatic registration as the RF citizens. The only requirement for foreigners and stateless people who themselves or whose parents have never had citizenship of the USSR or the RF, is to live on the territory of Russia for three years sequentially or five years all together, if the period of residence was interrupted.¹⁴⁸

The Citizenship Law indicated mixture of RF civic and Union identities. At that time Russian speaker in near abroad were not concerned as a Russian (*rossiiskaia*) nation, which was defined in territorial and political terms.¹⁴⁹

In its initial form the doctrine of civic nation was discussed in a position paper “On the Concept of the State Nationality Policy of the Russian Federation” at the Federal Cabinet's meeting on 30 July, 1992 headed by Boris Yeltsin. The position paper was not rejected and was not approved formally.

The President and members of the Government were ill-prepared to discuss the issue in suggested terms and formulas like co-citizenship, civic identity, cultural pluralism, consociational democracy.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁷ BRUBAKER, Rogers W., “Citizenship Struggles in Soviet Successor States”, *International Migration Review*, Vol. 26, No. 2, Summer 1992, pp. 269-291

¹⁴⁸ Citizenship Law of the Russian Federation, (*Zakon O Grazhdanstve Rossiiskoi Federatsii*), November 28, 1991, available from <http://www.antropotok.archipelag.ru/text/a010.htm>, (accessed on August 18, 2010)

¹⁴⁹ TOLZ, Vera, *Russia: Inventing the Nation*, London: Arnold; New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, p.253

¹⁵⁰ TISHKOV, Valerii, *Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union: the Mind Aflame*, London; Thousand Oaks, California: Sage, 1997, p.252

Nevertheless, July 1992 was an important point in re-evaluating nationality issues on a top political level. It had influenced later on the text of the new Constitution approved in December 1993.

However in 1993 – 1994 under the influence of the opposition forces in Russian parliament, attitude of Yeltsin and his close milieu towards ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers in the near abroad changed. In the discourse of Russian politicians they started to be described as a part of the Russian nation, as *rossiiskaia diaspora*, for whom Russia was a homeland. In his New Year Address to the citizens Yeltsin specifically appealed to Russian-speakers in the near abroad by calling them *rossiiane* and saying: “Dear compatriots! We remember you and we will do everything to protect your rights and interests. You are inseparable from us and we are inseparable from you. We were and we will be together.”¹⁵¹ This can be understood: the concept of civic identity was very new for the Russians while the Russianness in terms of its language and culture has a long tradition. However, Yeltsin’s definition of the Russian nation as a community of Russian-speakers always had an element of civic identity.

At the same time Constitution of the Russian Federation, adopted in December 1993 preserves an idea of civic nation-building. Constitution defines the Russian people as a community of citizens. It enlarges and guarantees integrity and rights of Russia's republics but at same time it does not define republics as “national” states. It was first serious step to challenge privileged status of titular ethnic groups in republics. There were no serious arguments against but there was a hidden discontent on a part of republican leaders to depart the word “national” from the Constitution. Only business-oriented President of Kalmykia Kirsan Ilumzhinov supported this position. A hard bargaining for taking more power from the centre and a certain degree of political realism helped to make this step aside of ethno-nationalism. Meanwhile, the

¹⁵¹ New Year Address of Boris Yeltsin to the Citizens of the Russian Federation, (*Novogodnee Obrasheniie Borisa Yeltsina K Grazhdanam Rossiiskoi Federatsii*), *Rossiiskaia Gazeta*, December 31, 1993

very fact that the Constitution was not approved by majority of republics during a referendum is still one of a weak point in its legitimate power.¹⁵²

In Yeltsin's address to the parliament in February 1994 he referred to different definitions of the Russian (*rossiiskaia*) nation as a co-citizenship of people of the Russian Federation regardless their ethnicity, culture, language and religion. For the first time in Soviet and post-Soviet history, the leader of Russia has publicly pronounced that the structure of the state - the contradiction between the principles of "national statehood" (when political-administrative units have been created on ethnic factor) and that of territorial federalism may cause ethnic strife.¹⁵³ Not avoiding ambivalences in its own political language, President Yeltsin nevertheless stated:

A multitude of national (surely read: "ethnic") problems have been engendered by the contradictory nature of two principles which, from the very beginning, were established as the basis of the state structure of the Russian Federation: the ethno-territorial principle and the administrative-territorial principle. This becomes clear today as a redistribution of functions and powers is taking place between the federal government and subjects of the Federation. Under present conditions, a historical necessity for both principles to coexist persists. At the same the contradiction between them will diminish on the basis of a new notion of the nation as co-citizenship, which is enshrined in the Constitution.¹⁵⁴

For the first time, the Russian leader has declared that the sovereignty of the Russian Federation, as well as that of its constituent parts, is invested in the entirety of its multiethnic population, not in ethnic groups:

¹⁵² TISHKOV, Valerii, *Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union: the Mind Aflame*, London; Thousand Oaks, California: Sage, 1997, p.257

¹⁵³ TOLZ, Vera, *Russia: Inventing the Nation*, London: Arnold; New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, p.254

¹⁵⁴ Address of Boris Yeltsin to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, (*Obrasheniie Borisa Yeltsina K Federal'nomu Sobraniuu Rossiiskoi Federatsii*), *Rossiiskaia Gazeta*, February 25, 1994

No single ethnic group can possess an exclusive right to control over territory, political institutions and resources. Equility of rights is conditioned by the necessity to take mutually-agreed decisions, taking into account the interests of various ethnic groups.¹⁵⁵

Moreover, in the Address to the Peoples of Caucasus in May 1994 Yeltsin emphasized the unity of Caucasus with Russia, importance of their cooperation, and at the same time appealing to the great historic past of Caucasus in the Russian Empire.¹⁵⁶ One can see here an element of the Union identity.

Not abandoning the idea of the unity of all Russian-speakers, from 1993 to late 1994 Yeltsin government's policy towards diaspora concentrated on persuading the government of the non-Russian post-Soviet states to grant dual citizenship to the members of Russian diaspora. According to Zevelev, in the eyes of Russian officials, the advantage of dual citizenship for Russians was viewed in the following. First of all, as mentioned before, Russian government accepted the civic definition of a nation. On this occasion, instead of establishing special ties with co-ethnics, Russian government aimed to protect Russian nation without unleashing conflict. Second, since Russian economy was not able to stand for the mass immigration flow, Russia supported dual citizenship which could provide some security and peace for Russian settlers in their host states. Ultimately, existence of Russian population in near abroad was seen as an instrument either for affecting the policy of neighbor states or dominating the region.¹⁵⁷ In this concept, a new Russian policy focused on building political, economic and cultural links to the diaspora by establishing provisions for dual citizenship and developing international/bilateral agreements for protecting the

¹⁵⁵ Address of Boris Yeltsin to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, (*Obrasheniie Borisa Yeltsina K Federal'nomu Sobraniu Rossiiskoi Federatsii*), *Rossiiskaia Gazeta*, February 25, 1994

¹⁵⁶ Address of the Russian President Boris Yeltsin to the Peoples of Caucasus, (*Obrasheniie Rossiiskogo Prezidenta Borisa Yetlsina K Narodam Kavkaza*), May 18, 1994, available from <http://heku.ru/forums.php?m=posts&p=53088>, (accessed on August 10, 2010)

¹⁵⁷ ZEVELEV, Igor, *Russia and Its New Diasporas*, Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001, pp.133-134

rights of Russian-speaking minorities. The Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation adopted in November 1993 defined “the suppression of the rights, freedoms, and legitimate interests of citizens of the Russian Federation in foreign states” as an “external military danger”.¹⁵⁸ Accordingly, Russian government laid a basis for justifying its military intervention as defense.

However, all newly independent states, with the exceptions of Turkmenistan and Tajikistan (which have the smallest Russian-speaking communities), refused to agree to the Russian proposal for dual citizenship. This meant that the policy that paid the main attention to Russian-speakers, collapsed. Policy-makers in Moscow had only three choices: partial return to the idea of a common Union identity, attempt to reinforce eastern Slavic identity, and finally, to strengthen new civic identity.¹⁵⁹

Following collapse of the dual-citizenship policy, Yeltsin’s government increased its activity within Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Russian government began to propose CIS citizenship, which could reinforce Union identity of the Russians and other peoples of the former Soviet Union.¹⁶⁰ On 23 May 1996, *Nezavisimaya gazeta* published a working paper of the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy that claimed that the revival of the Union was feasible. Two member of the Council were also members of the Presidential Council. Authors of the paper argued that a Russian national statehood couldn’t be formed without the reestablishment of political, economic and military union on the territory of the former USSR. For this task Ukraine and Belarus were seen as having the greatest

¹⁵⁸ MELVIN, Neil, *Russians Beyond Russia: The Politics of National Identity*, London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995, p.19.

¹⁵⁹ TOLZ, Vera, *Russia: Inventing the Nation*, London: Arnold; New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, p.254

¹⁶⁰ TOLZ, Vera, *Russia: Inventing the Nation*, London: Arnold; New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, p.255

importance. Although, President never claimed that Ukrainians and Belarusians belong to the Russian nation.¹⁶¹

In 1997 the Presidents of Russia and Belarus signed a Charter on the Union between two states. Chapter 4 of this document is devoted to the issues of the citizenship of new Union. Thus, it created the citizenship of the Union.¹⁶² In 1999 a Treaty on creating a Union state was signed. It stated that citizens of Russia and Belarus receive the Union citizenship.¹⁶³ As Vera Tolz noticed, despite the Treaty laid down that Russian and Belarus are to retain sovereignty and independence within Union state, a traditionally underdeveloped Belarusian national identity, separated from Russian, will further be weakened.¹⁶⁴

There were similar attempts to achieve such agreement with Ukraine, however they failed, and only in May 1997 RF and Ukraine signed agreement on friendship and cooperation. The efforts to facilitate CIS integration, secure a union with Belarus intensified during Presidential elections campaign of 1996. Union and eastern Slavic identities were used by Yeltsin insofar he believed that the majority of his electorate share them.¹⁶⁵

After 1996 Kremlin turned to civic identity construction. The members of the government suggested that this type of identity could stimulate social mobilization to

¹⁶¹ TOLZ, Vera, *Russia: Inventing the Nation*, London, Arnold; New York, Oxford University Press, 2001, p.255

¹⁶² Charter of the Treaty on Creation the Union State of Russia and Belarus, April 2, 1997, available from http://www.belrus.ru/law/act/dokumentyi_opredelyayuchie_osnov/ustav_k_dogovoru_o_soyuze_belaru/grazhdanstvo_soyuza.html, (accessed on August 10, 2010)

¹⁶³ Treaty on Creating the Union State of Russia and Belarus, December 8, 1999, available from http://belrus.ru/law/act/dokumentyi_opredelyayuchie_osnov/dogovor_o_sozdanii_soyuznogo_gos/obtchie_polozeniya.html, (accessed on August 10, 2010)

¹⁶⁴ TOLZ, Vera, *Russia: Inventing the Nation*, London: Arnold; New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, p.255

¹⁶⁵ TOLZ, Vera, *Russia: Inventing the Nation*, London: Arnold; New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, p.256

support governmental reforms. And following Tishkov's recommendations, Russian government started creating new symbols that could unite all Russian citizens irrespective of their ethnicity. In July 1996 in his speech Yeltsin appealed society to search "Russian national idea."¹⁶⁶

One month before, on June 15, 1996 Yeltsin published "The State Nationality Policy Concept of the Russian Federation".¹⁶⁷ This document was conceived as an official signpost that would consolidate civic nation in Russia.¹⁶⁸ It declared the task of the state as a "strengthening of the spiritual unity of the *rossiiane*", and the "refining and dissemination of the ideas of spiritual unity, friendship between the peoples, and the cultivation of the feeling of *rossiiskii* patriotism". The authors of the document do not use the term "nation", even with the adjective *rossiiskii*; instead, they use term "people" (*narod*) and peoples (*narody*). Citizens of the RF are called "the multinational people of the RF". In opinion of Simon, the goal of the authors was to avoid nationalistic discourse of the modern period.¹⁶⁹ The Russian people are declared as the main support of the "*rossiiskii* statehood", and its task is to unify all the peoples of the RF, to "contribute to consolidation of the all-*rossiiskii* civil and spiritual-moral community".¹⁷⁰ Analyzing the Concept, Simon stresses that despite Russians are called equal to other peoples of the RF, enjoying the same rights, these

¹⁶⁶ TOLZ, Vera, *Russia: Inventing the Nation*, London: Arnold; New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, p.256

¹⁶⁷ "The State Nationality Policy Concept of the Russian Federation", (*Kontseptsia Gosudarstvennoi Natsional'noi Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii*), June 15, 1996, available from <http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/27.html>, (accessed on August 18, 2010)

¹⁶⁸ SIMON, Gerhard, "The Russian Federation Nationalism of Russians and Non-Russians", in Egbert Jahn (ed.), *Nationalism in Late and Post-Communist Europe*, Vol.2, *Nationalism in the Nation States*, Baden-Baden, 2009, p.26

¹⁶⁹ SIMON, Gerhard, "The Russian Federation Nationalism of Russians and Non-Russians", in Egbert Jahn (ed.), *Nationalism in Late and Post-Communist Europe*, Vol.2, *Nationalism in the Nation States*, Baden-Baden, 2009, p.26

¹⁷⁰ "The State Nationality Policy Concept of the Russian Federation", (*Kontseptsia Gosudarstvennoi Natsional'noi Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii*), June 15, 1996, available from <http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/27.html>, (accessed on August 18, 2010)

formulations are insincere. For example, Russian language and culture cannot be considered as equal. Everywhere within the borders of Russian Federation, except of the Northern Caucasus, Russian language is dominant in public communications and educational institutions. Trying to build civic nation in Russia authors avoid mentioning these obvious facts.¹⁷¹ The Concept also provides for the establishment of an “Assembly of the Peoples of Russia” to function as a central body responsible for consultation and mediation between the state and the non-Russian national communities, but until the late 1990s this was not materialized.¹⁷²

On the other hand, the Concept allows the non-Russians to establish institutions for developing their language and culture. This provision received support in the Federal Law on National-Cultural Autonomy that came into force on June 17, 1996.¹⁷³

The inconsistency in the policy of nation construction until 1996 can be seen as a search for the new identity, for the project that can provide stable development of the new state, and at the same time to satisfy its crucial needs. The policy of civic nation-building adopted in 1991 – 1992 and resembled in official documents was the important basis. Despite difficulties, such as the federative structure, multi ethnic composition, Yeltsin’s administration adopted key documents for the nation-building – Citizenship Law, Constitution of the Russian Federation. On the other hand, policy of nation-building with its inconsistencies was pragmatic and was worked out for the needs of the new state. It was necessary for the new democratic state to introduce the legislation mentioned above and declare the equality and respect of the right of all ethnic groups. The appeal to the Russian diaspora in 1993 – 1994 was the result of

¹⁷¹ SIMON, Gerhard, “The Russian Federation Nationalism of Russians and Non-Russians”, in Egbert Jahn (ed.), *Nationalism in Late and Post-Communist Europe*, Vol.2, *Nationalism in the Nation States*, Baden-Baden, 2009, p.26

¹⁷² SIMON, Gerhard, “The Russian Federation Nationalism of Russians and Non-Russians”, in Egbert Jahn (ed.), *Nationalism in Late and Post-Communist Europe*, Vol.2, *Nationalism in the Nation States*, Baden-Baden, 2009, p.27

¹⁷³ Federal Law of the Russian Federation on National-Cultural Autonomy, June 17, 1996, available from <http://www.humanities.edu.ru/db/msg/46904>, (accessed August 10, 2010)

the influence of the more nationalistic opposition in the parliament. This can be understood: the concept of civic identity was very new for the Russians while the Russianness in terms of its language and culture has a long tradition. At the same time Russia was seeking to achieve pragmatic goals – solve economic and security problems. The period of 1996-1997 when Kremlin was promoting Union and Eastern Slavic identity was successful in achievement the Union with Belarus that also reveals pragmatic character of Yeltsin's policies. The adoption of the civic nation construction strategy after 1996 was the declaration of the course of Kremlin. It was resembled in "The State Nationality Policy Concept of the Russian Federation". Although Simon points out the insincere character of this document, it was important to declare the character of the future state policies regarding nations.

Despite the changes of the priorities in Russia's domestic and foreign policies, discussed in this part, Russian leadership preferred one of them – the construction of the civic nation. Although Russian nation can hardly be characterized as civic nowadays, the process of the nation-building requires attention. The next part will discuss the policies of Yeltsin regarding nation-building in Russia.

3.2. Yeltsin's Policy of the Nation-building

This part discusses Yeltsin's policy of the nation-building, such as introducing new symbols, ceremonies and traditions, policies regarding historiography and education, search for the national idea of the new state, and nationalistic discourse in mass culture.

Analyzing the civic identity building in the Russian Federation, most of the authors agree that three preconditions must be met before its realization. The exclusive ethno-nationalism of the Russians and non-Russian nations must be overcome the

civic nation in Russia must be restricted within the borders of the RF, and there must be authority ready to implement the Concept of the State National Policy.¹⁷⁴

A nation only exists when it shares a set of symbols and orientations towards its own history. In the 1990s Russia was divided in this respect. While Communists insisted that Soviet era reflects Russia's greatness, liberals pointed out enormous costs in human lives and in relative economic backwardness.¹⁷⁵

In 1990s Yeltsin made out a number of temporary arrangements. The former tsarist tricolor (white, blue and red), used by Provisional Government in 1917, had become a flag of the democratic movement in late Gorbachev era, and symbolized a defeat of the coup plotters in 1991. However, because of the opposition in Duma, no official law was adopted. Similarly, the state emblem (two-headed eagle) was used but no law was adopted.¹⁷⁶

With the demise of the USSR new anthem was introduced drawing on the work of Mikhail Glinka, but this wordless melody did not meet popular response. A nationwide poll conducted on November 13, 2000, revealed that only 15 per cent of the Russian people supported the Glinka anthem.¹⁷⁷ The fact that the Glinka's work was chosen as a new anthem for Russia was not a surprise. Due to his composition Glinka earned reputation of the father of Russian musical nationalism.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁴ SIMON, Gerhard, "The Russian Federation Nationalism of Russians and Non-Russians", in Egbert Jahn (ed.), *Nationalism in Late and Post-Communist Europe*, Vol.2, *Nationalism in the Nation States*, Baden-Baden, 2009, p.27

¹⁷⁵ SAKWA, Richard, *Putin: Russia's Choice*, London and New York: Routledge, 2004, p.164.

¹⁷⁶ SMITH, Kathleen E., *Mythmaking in the New Russia: Politics and Memory During the Yeltsin Era*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002, p.30

¹⁷⁷ DAUGHTRY, Martin J., "Russia's New Anthem and the Negotiation of National Identity", *Ethnomusicology*, Vol. 47, No. 1, Winter 2003, p.51

¹⁷⁸ DAUGHTRY, Martin J., "Russia's New Anthem and the Negotiation of National Identity", *Ethnomusicology*, Vol. 47, No. 1, Winter 2003, p.50

Due to the temporary use of the symbols Yeltsin's government was considered by nationalist opposition as provisional temporary.¹⁷⁹

The introducing new symbols by Yeltsin and his administration are described by Kathleen Smith.¹⁸⁰ One of the first myths created was a state version of the 1991 events. On August 21, 1992 Boris Yeltsin welcomed media in Kremlin and congratulated them "on the day of victory... of the forces of democracy and the supporters of change, of the whole Russian people, over reaction". He praised the defenders of the White House and compared the significance of this even with the victory over Germany in 1945. Yeltsin stressed that only the civic unity of all the citizens is a formula for defeating enemy.¹⁸¹ This glorification of the events of August 1991 was challenged by conservatives, communists and nationalists. In August 1993, on the second anniversary of the coup Yeltsin insisted that the coup was a turning point in the history of Russia; however, he was more political and rather defensive. Starting from 1994 President's attention to August coup decreased. In his interviews he tried to avoid provocative questions and ambiguous statements. This can be understood: President could not talk about commemoration of August events without paying attention to the September 1993 events that were far less democratic.¹⁸²

Yeltsin's administration understood that for the creation of civic unity of all people within RF there should be symbols that wouldn't be equivocal, symbols that would unite all the citizens despite their political views. That's why the anniversary of the October revolution was not celebrated in Russia, although November 7 (the date of

¹⁷⁹ SAKWA, Richard, *Putin: Russia's Choice*, London and New York: Routledge, 2004, p.164

¹⁸⁰ SMITH, Kathleen E., *Mythmaking in the New Russia: Politics and Memory During the Yeltsin Era*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002, pp. 30–56, 78–101.

¹⁸¹ SMITH, Kathleen E., *Mythmaking in the New Russia: Politics and Memory During the Yeltsin Era*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002, p.33

¹⁸² SMITH, Kathleen E., *Mythmaking in the New Russia: Politics and Memory During the Yeltsin Era*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002, pp. 33-36.

the Revolution due to the change from Gregorian to the Julian calendar) remained an official holiday. It was a strange situation – November, 7 was an official day off, but after 1991 not a holiday anymore.¹⁸³

Instead, Russian government revised commemorative calendar and introduced some “useful” holidays, which goal was to symbolize new Russia, glorify its past and unify Russian citizens. First of them was 9 May, a day of the victory over fascist Germany in 1945. Yeltsin amended the Bolsheviks ceremonies of celebration with military parades on the Red Square. Instead, he laid a wreath at the tomb of the Unknown Soldier in 1992. Moreover, paying no attention to Communist protestors who were trying to block his entrance, he went to Gorky Park to meet with veterans.¹⁸⁴

Another holiday that was introduced after 1991 in Russian was Russian Independence Day. It was a June 12, 1991 when Russia adopted Declaration of State Sovereignty. This met considerable opposition of those for whom the demise of the USSR was a tragedy.¹⁸⁵ The name of the holiday – Russia’s Independence Day was also provocative. Independence from what? Whom? In 1997 the name of the holiday was changed, it started to be known as Russia’s Day. Yeltsin, announcing this change, observed: “As a President, I would like [June 12] to be a special day. [To be remembered] not as the day when a document was signed, an important event, but rather to be accepted as a common holiday. As the day of our country - Russia”.¹⁸⁶

Yeltsin’s second attempt to create a popular holiday commemorating the establishment of a new Russian state met a similarly rocky reception. In 1994 Yeltsin

¹⁸³ SMITH, Kathleen E., *Mythmaking in the New Russia: Politics and Memory During the Yeltsin Era*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002, p.80.

¹⁸⁴ SMITH, Kathleen E., *Mythmaking in the New Russia: Politics and Memory During the Yeltsin Era*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002, p. 85.

¹⁸⁵ SMITH, Kathleen E., *Mythmaking in the New Russia: Politics and Memory During the Yeltsin Era*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002, pp. 91 – 95.

¹⁸⁶ SMITH, Kathleen E., *Mythmaking in the New Russia: Politics and Memory During the Yeltsin Era*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002, p. 94.

needed to issue a special decree to make December 12, the anniversary of the referendum in 1993 in which the new Russian constitution was adopted, a nonworking holiday insofar parliamentary deputies refused to endorse Yeltsin's suggestion.¹⁸⁷

Peter J. S. Duncan, analyzing Russian identity after demise of the Soviet Union, noticed that rather than gaining independence, Russia had lost prestige and superpower status.

Yeltsin himself was one of the principal symbols of the state, and anti-communism, in practice, was its legitimating ideology. The discrediting of Yeltsin personally, the rising support for the Communists, and the nostalgia for Soviet power undermined the new symbols and the legitimacy of both the state and the regime.¹⁸⁸

Yeltsin achieved greater acceptance from the population by restoring the imperial tricolour flag and the imperial two-headed eagle as the state emblem. His attempt to introduce Mikhail Glinka's "Patriotic Song" by decree as the national anthem was, however, unpopular.¹⁸⁹

In 1996 Yeltsin declared that Russia's goal was to find its national idea, around which the country could unite:

There were various periods in the Russian history of the twentieth century – monarchy, totalitarianism, *perestroika*, and, finally, the

¹⁸⁷ SMITH, Kathleen E., *Mythmaking in the New Russia: Politics and Memory During the Yeltsin Era*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002, p. 94.

¹⁸⁸ DUNCAN, Peter J. S., "Contemporary Russian Identity Between East and West", *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 48, No.1, 2005, p.286

¹⁸⁹ SMITH, Kathleen E., *Mythmaking in the New Russia: Politics and Memory During the Yeltsin Era*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002, p. 166.

democratic path of development. Each stage had its own ideology.
We do not have it.¹⁹⁰

The three major political camps – democrats, patriots and communists sought to work out the national idea for Russia, naturally in accordance with their ideologies. Despite their rival ideologies they had common views that (1) that Russia has lost its way in the present because vital connections with its past have been severed and (2) that the blame for this debilitating condition belongs to nefarious opponents (those participating in the opposing dis-courses).¹⁹¹ Even though some democratic values, such as rule of law, human rights and freedoms, political liberties, were accepted in Russia, ideology of democrats has exhausted itself discredited them in early years after the demise of the USSR, especially in terms of its economic policy that was associated with Yeltsin’s liberal reforms, and crisis, chaos and instability that followed the reforms. “And, worse, the democrats had developed no national purpose that might psychologically absorb some of the shocks visited on society beginning in 1992. There was no larger good to justify the sacrifices and the suffering”.¹⁹² Liberal democratic ideology’s focus on the individual, its formal preference for instrumental-rational forms of thought and its preoccupation with Western standards in Russia could be easily vulgarised to mean simply a society enjoying high levels of material consumption. This would provoke the public to assess its situation both materially and as individuals, with predictably disastrous results for the popularity of liberal democratic ideas.¹⁹³

Vitalii Naishul’, sociologist, President of the Institute of the Economy’s National Model, in 1996 published his work “About the Norms of Contemporary Russian

¹⁹⁰ SAKWA, Richard, *Putin: Russia’s Choice*, London and New York: Routledge, 2004, p.163.

¹⁹¹ URBAN, Michael, “Remythologising the Russian State”, *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 50, No. 6, September 1998, p.969

¹⁹² URBAN, Michael, “Remythologising the Russian State”, *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 50, No. 6, September 1998, p.975

¹⁹³ URBAN, Michael, *Remythologising the Russian State*, *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 50, No. 6, September 1998, p.975

Statehood” in which he argued that Russia has to be national ideocratic state, headed by Autocrat exercising full power in the state. Essential condition for Russia, in his opinion, is “all-national culture, all-national order and all-national external security”.¹⁹⁴ Author lists “national duties” that are the «“sacralization” of the nation-state» - “feeling of the belonging to the whole people, to the nation”; and “direct financial democracy” – citizens can donate money voluntarily. For the effective work of state and democracy Naishul’ worked out the mechanism of elective President – Autocrat and traditionally Russian appointed *Dumas*, *Soviets* (Councils) and Courts that would “brake” President’s decision. The absence of the elected parliament could be compensated by the public control. Private property is declared inviolable and the absence of central taxes as well as limited taxation on the local level would serve to this aim.¹⁹⁵

Urban characterized Naishul’'s work as “a comprehensive, armchair synthesis of definitive national traits (culled from folklore) with militant free market ideology (the role models among contemporary political figures listed are Margaret Thatcher and Augusto Pinochet). Naishul’'s essay is an extremely effective caution against any grand synthesis seeking to marry the irrational elements associated with putative Russian cultural practices to the requirements of a modern market economy”.¹⁹⁶

More modest and therefore more promising approach was expressed in the work of Igor’ Chubais, Russian philosopher, whose doctoral dissertation in 2000 was devoted to the new Russian identity and national idea of Russia, and elder brother of Antolii Chubais. Like Naishul’, Chubais’s new national idea is based on components largely from Russia’s past. However, his scope includes a wider range of sources, such as folklore and folk aphorisms and he treats them far less mechanically, setting cultural

¹⁹⁴ NAISHUL’, Vitalii, “About the Norms of Contemporary Russian Statehood”, (*O Normakh Sovremennoi Rossiiskoi Gosudarstvennosti*), *Segodnya*, May 23, 1996

¹⁹⁵ NAISHUL’, Vitalii, *About the Norms of Contemporary Russian Statehood (O Normakh Sovremennoi Rossiiskoi Gosudarstvennosti)*, *Segodnya*, May 23, 1996

¹⁹⁶ URBAN, Michael, “Remythologising the Russian State”, *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 50, No. 6, September 1998, p.976

values in context wherein they appear as the rationale behind corresponding practices aimed at solving extant state and economic tasks. As is customary among ideologists advancing their respective conceptions of a new national idea, Chubais frames the task in urgent terms. He regards Russia's crisis as "the deepest in the entire history of the country" and claims that the calamity befalling Russia is the direct result of the ideational disorientation experienced with the collapse of the communist national identity and the "vacuum" left in its wake. Rummaging through the ideas of the past and using his historical "vectors" as a decision-making device, he separates those that are obsolete (e.g. *sobornost'* and *kollektivnost'*, which no longer correspond to modern economic realities) from those that are enduring (e.g. the Orthodox religion). The usable past should then be wedded to the present (market economy) and emergent future (political liberalism) to achieve that synthesis that will sustain Russia in the coming century.¹⁹⁷

In addition to the eclectic, if not desultory, quality of Chubais's vision, two serious problems attend it. First, Chubais numbers among those who view the Soviet period as a complete aberration in Russia's history from which nothing of use can be salvaged. On questioning from interviewers about those 70-old years and some possibly positive things that can be taken from them, Chubais replies with the example of postwar Germany, forefronting the need to confess all the crimes and to repent. In a practical sense, then, the new Russia for which Chubais has cobbled together a new idea is one in which former or practising communists have no place at all. They are to be removed from all public offices by means of what he calls "denomenklaturisation". Consequently, his writings serve as a textbook example of a partisan political orientation masquerading as a unifying national identity.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁷ URBAN, Michael, "Remythologising the Russian State", *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 50, No. 6, September 1998, p.976.

¹⁹⁸ URBAN, Michael, "Remythologising the Russian State", *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 50, No. 6, September 1998, pp.976 – 977.

Second, and related to the partisan edge of his work that is concealed by its nationally oriented narrative, Chubais has painted himself into a political corner. That is patriotic ideologues who represent far more egregious examples of this tendency - Chubais has laid out his recipe for a new national identity in which incommensurable ingredients belonging to separate spheres of existence - public/private, state/society, collective/individual - have been tossed together. Like those surveyed below, this problem grows directly out of a method that attempts to abstract a collection of cultural values from the past and, on the basis of these, to synthesise an abstract conception, a national idea. Assumedly, the nation would then be expected to live up to, to realise, this idea. But when the question is posed concretely - "How will this come about in practice?" - The very breadth of the idea would indicate that only one agency is available for accomplishing it: the state. Apparently mindful of the pitfalls besetting that path, Chubais shies away from prescribing any concrete role for the state in this respect.¹⁹⁹

Communist-patriotic political elite of Russia in turn presented a synthesis of communist and nationalist, patriotic ideology. Their demands are based on idea of "national salvation". The discourse of the CPRF can be regarded as a folktale and analysed on that basis. From this vantage, the tale is set in motion by some lack or misfortune: here, by the collapse of the USSR and the consequent exanguination of the Russian state and the disintegration of Russian culture and society. This collapse and its disturbing aftermath have been brought about by forces both outside (the West, especially the USA) and inside the country (ambitious and treacherous politicians said to have "sinned" against the nation). This calamity and the sinister nature of the evil doers propel the narrative forward along two lines: elaborations on the hero-victim, the Russian nation, and excursus on those dark forces set on extinguishing it entirely.²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁹ URBAN, Michael, "Remythologising the Russian State", *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 50, No. 6, September 1998, p.977

²⁰⁰ URBAN, Michael, "Remythologising the Russian State", *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 50, No. 6, September 1998, p.979

With respect to the former, Zyuganov supplies his account with the sweep of an historical epic in which Russia has appeared for centuries as that singular force capable of stopping the spread of evil from the West. Russian culture-which is regularly regarded as representing Slavonic cultures in general - is portrayed as embodying those traits and values uniquely suited to the flourishing of human life on earth. Principal among these are “spirituality”, a selflessness enabling the individual to search for the true and the good; sobornost’, a mystical notion of harmonious communion of the people based on the Orthodox faith; and certain “instincts” that this nation has to form and support a great power state (derzhava) that rules a temporal order corresponding to the true nature of this nation: namely, an empire that, indeed, is the Third Rome. The righteous nature of this empire consists in its realisation of the values of Russian spirituality and sobornost’. It is the selflessness of the people that gives it flesh and blood, just as it is state builders who have transcended all personal ambitions that serve as its head.²⁰¹

Zyuganov’s version of this tale includes a rich and extended plot line wherein the protagonists are not classes but nations. The dynamic of the plot is the Russian nation-and, in particular, its state-tested by and ultimately triumphant over the attacks launched against it by the forces of an anti-moral, aggressive and militaristic West. As such, the Russian Revolution, which weakened the state, appears as either a sad mistake or an unavoidable tragedy that, thanks to the insight of Lenin and, especially, Stalin, was quickly turned from the false and destructive path of international proletarian revolution back towards the purpose of building the Russian nation and state. It was during the Stalin period that Russia realised its potential as a civilisation based on patriotism, religion and a great power state. Subsequent degeneration is dated from Stalin’s death, as de-Stalinisation witnessed an erosion of the party’s patriotic ethos, a “de-nationalisation” of part of the population (the liberal intelligentsia) and the substitution of false idols of material wellbeing for the sacred mission of the Russian nation. Historically, the Russian people have taken up their

²⁰¹ URBAN, Michael, “Remythologising the Russian State”, *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 50, No. 6, September 1998, pp.979 - 980

burden, evinced by the fact that “in the struggle for the liberation of humanity from social and national oppression in the twentieth century, Russia has lost about 100 million of its citizens”. And with that image of the hero-victim before society, it would follow that ‘to be a Russian today means to feel with your heart, confessing with word and deed your participation in the deep culture of the Fatherland with an unquenchable thirst for righteousness and a readiness to willingly be a victim, [to display] that which over the course of long centuries has helped Russia to stand, surprising the world with its greatness, heroism and longsuffering.’²⁰²

Since the mid-1990s nationalistic ideas became to emerge in cultural sphere and education. In the field of education, the new history textbooks that appeared in Russian schools in the mid-1990s had a reproachful, anti-communist tone.

Children had to be told to swallow bitter truths. Revolutionary heroes were dethroned, not only Bolsheviks but all the Russian revolutionary leaders. The texts proclaimed democracy, private property, and individual rights to be positive values in history, even though the Russian past gave little evidence of them.²⁰³

The way the new texts handled World War II, for example, induced feelings of national inferiority.²⁰⁴ Since the mid-1990 with the rise of the question about Russia’s identity, school history textbooks also faced changes. Thus, textbooks published by the government tried to combine moderate nationalism with high appreciation of Western history and culture. They emphasize national spiritual values and Russia's cultural achievements, but at the same time, they positively assess western economic development and democratic governance. On the other hand there

²⁰² URBAN, Michael, “Remythologising the Russian State”, *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 50, No. 6, September 1998, p. 980

²⁰³ VOLODINA, Tatyana, “Teaching History in Russia after the Collapse of the USSR”, *The History Teacher*, Vol. 38, No. 2, February 2005, p.182

²⁰⁴ VOLODINA, Tatyana, “Teaching History in Russia after the Collapse of the USSR”, *The History Teacher*, Vol. 38, No. 2, February 2005, p.182

were many textbooks without the label “Authorized by Ministry of Education” on the market. One of the texts – “History Textbook for Developing Russian National Consciousness,” was a shocking mixture of xenophobia and chauvinism.²⁰⁵

The resurgence of Russian nationalism by the mid-1990s allowed anti-Western sentiments to surface in some mainstream Russian films on historical topics, in which foreigners or Russians subject to alien Western influences were presented either as capitalist exploiters, political enemies, or purveyors of decadent political culture. Nikita Mikhalkov’s films *Utomlennye Solntsem* [Burnt by the Sun, 1994], *Sibirskii Tsiriul’nik* [The Barber of Siberia, 1999] are explicit in their anti-Western bias. The Russian government contributed \$ 10 million dollars to sponsor 45 million *Sibirskii Tsiriul’nik*, suggesting that by late 1990s the search of national identity and the propagation of patriotic values had now entered the mainstream of Russian culture and political thinking.²⁰⁶ Mikhalkov attempts simultaneously to celebrate and mock the Russian national character, to assert Russia’s spiritual superiority over the materialist West, and to praise traditional Russian values of collectivism and brotherhood. Westerners were depicted as exploiters, prostitutes and rogues. Some critics argued that the film was a political program and advertising slogan, since Mikhalkov supported Yeltsin’s nationalist opponent Ruskoi. Film attempts to imbue its audience with pride in the Russian state and the soldiers charged with its defence. Indeed the film is dedicated “to the honor of Russian officers”.²⁰⁷ The official tsarist values of “autocracy, Orthodoxy and nationality” are much in evidence in this film,

²⁰⁵ VOLODINA, Tatyana, “Teaching History in Russia after the Collapse of the USSR”, *The History Teacher*, Vol. 38, No. 2, February 2005, pp.182 – 183

²⁰⁶ LARSEN, Susan, “National Identity, Cultural Authority, and the Post-Soviet Blockbuster: Nikita Mikhalkov and Aleksei Balabanov”, *Slavic Review*, Vol. 62, No. 3, Autumn 2003, p.498

²⁰⁷ MARSH, Rosalind, “The Nature of Russia’s Identity: the Theme of «Russia and the West» in Post-Soviet Culture”, in Roger E. Kanet (ed.), *Identities, Nations and Politics After Communism*, Abingdon, Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2008, p.155

which made it an appropriate vehicle to express the essence of the new Russia and the values underpinning the Russian involvement in the Second Chechen War.²⁰⁸

In the 1990s Russian readers also had the opportunity to acquaint themselves with messianic notions through some of Solzhenitsyn's newly published publicistic works. Notably his "Harvard Commencement Address" of 1979 that had suggested that Russia's immense suffering in the twentieth century had enabled her to experience "a spiritual schooling which has by far superseded Western experience".²⁰⁹ "Life, repressing us in complex and mortal ways, has produced characters which are stronger, deeper and more interesting than those produced by the prosperous, regimented life in the West."²¹⁰

In the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the twenty first century, a new genre of nationalist fiction emerged which came to be known as the "imperial novel", since it advocated a strong state and imperial expansionism. One prominent example is Pavel Krusanov's *Ukus Angela* [The Bite of an Angel, 1999], which adapted to the contemporary political and cultural situation by combining fashionable fantastic and esoteric themes with imperialistic ambitions. Krusanov describes an alternative world in which at the end of the twentieth century, Russia, instead of shrinking to its smallest size for about 200 years, has extended its empire to China and the Balkans, and is waging a world war to annex more territories.²¹¹

²⁰⁸ MARSH, Rosalind, "The Nature of Russia's Identity: the Theme of «Russia and the West» in Post-Soviet Culture", in Roger E. Kanet (ed.), *Identities, Nations and Politics After Communism*, Abingdon, Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2008, p.156

²⁰⁹ MARSH, Rosalind, "The Nature of Russia's Identity: the Theme of «Russia and the West» in Post-Soviet Culture", in Roger E. Kanet (ed.), *Identities, Nations and Politics After Communism*, Abingdon, Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2008, p.156

²¹⁰ MARSH, Rosalind, "The Nature of Russia's Identity: the Theme of «Russia and the West» in Post-Soviet Culture", in Roger E. Kanet (ed.), *Identities, Nations and Politics After Communism*, Abingdon, Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2008, p.156; KRUSANOV, Pavel, *The Bite of an Angel (Ukus Angela)*, Moscow, Amfora, 1999

²¹¹ MARSH, Rosalind, "The Nature of Russia's Identity: the Theme of «Russia and the West» in Post-Soviet Culture", in Roger E. Kanet (ed.), *Identities, Nations and Politics After Communism*, Abingdon, Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2008, p.161

Relations with the Russian Orthodox Church appeared in the new light in mid-1990s. Polls of 1990s showed that about 50 per cent of the population of the Russian Federation is believers.²¹² After the demise of the USSR policy makers in Kremlin sought to use Russian Orthodoxy as a unifying factor. However, only taking into consideration five Islamic and one Buddhist republic, one can hardly consider this policy reasonable. 1993 Constitution of Russia formally separated the Church from the state. Thus Article 14.1 states that “The Russian Federation is a secular state. No religion may be established as the state religion or a compulsory religion”. At the same time Article 14.2 insists that “Religious associations are separated from the state and are equal before the law”. Article 28 guarantees freedom of religion, including the right to profess and disseminate any religion, and Article 13 states that there should be no national ideology in Russia.²¹³

During his second inauguration ceremony in August 1996 and in legislation 1997, which sought to regulate life of the organized churches, Yeltsin identified four historical religions in Russia: Orthodoxy, Islam, Buddhism, and Judaism. Preamble of the law stresses that “the Russian federation is a secular state” and recognized “the special role of Orthodoxy in the history of Russia”.²¹⁴

Article 6.2 demonstrates “Orwellian nature of equality”,²¹⁵ stating that “religious organization may be formed as religious groups and religious associations”.²¹⁶ This

²¹² BACON, Edwin, “Church and State in Contemporary Russia: Conflicting Discourses”, in Rick Fawn and Stephen White (eds.), *Russia After Communism*, London, Frank Cass, 2002, p.101

²¹³ Article 14, Constitution of the RF (*Konstitutsiia Rossiyskoi Federatsii*), December 12, 1993, available from <http://www.constitution.ru/> (accessed on August 17, 2010)

²¹⁴ Federal Law of the Russian Federation “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations”, (*Federal'nii Zakon O Svobode Sovesti I Religioznykh Ob'iedineniakh*), September 26, 1997, available from http://www.zonazakona.ru/zakon/index.php?zakon=fz_rely&go=index, (accessed on August 17, 2010)

²¹⁵ BACON, Edwin, “Church and State in Contemporary Russia: Conflicting Discourses”, in Rick Fawn and Stephen White (eds.), *Russia After Communism*, London, Frank Cass, 2002, p.103

²¹⁶ Federal Law of the Russian Federation “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations”, (*Federal'nii Zakon O Svobode Sovesti I Religioznykh Ob'iedineniakh*), September 26, 1997, available

provision contradicts to the Article 4.1 of the law that actually repeats the Article 14.2 of the 1993 Constitution – “Religious associations are separated from the state and are equal before the law”²¹⁷, making a distinction between religious groups and organizations. Officially registered organization are granted certain rights and freedoms, such as to own property, to establish and maintain buildings, conduct services in prisons, hospitals, homes for elderly etc., to produce and distribute literature etc. In fact, those associations that were called by the law as “religious groups” were deprived of their rights. In another words, this was positive state interference with regard traditional religions of Russia, especially Russian Orthodoxy, while putting restrictions on other groups deemed non-traditional. Thus the registration requirements of the law favored religious associations with a hierarchical and centralized structure. Besides, a detailed charter is necessary. This worked against newly emerged movements and organizations. The religious associations could be dissolved by the government because of many reasons.

The law was widely supported by the Orthodox Church. It was a declaration against Western influence of “non-traditional” religions. In opinion of Bacon, ROC embodied Russian culture, and it is lauded by politicians as a primary representation of “Rusianness”. It owns the spiritual right to Russia and is the most trusted public institution in Russia.²¹⁸ Sakwa also shares this idea, arguing that Russian Orthodox Church plays an exceptional role in the development of the Russian national identity.²¹⁹

from http://www.zonazakona.ru/zakon/index.php?zakon=fz_rely&go=index, (accessed on August 17, 2010)

²¹⁷ Federal Law of the Russian Federation “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations”, (*Federal’nyi Zakon O Svobode Sovesti I Religioznykh Ob’iedineniakh*), September 26, 1997, available from http://www.zonazakona.ru/zakon/index.php?zakon=fz_rely&go=index, (accessed on August 17, 2010)

²¹⁸ BACON, Edwin, “Church and State in Contemporary Russia: Conflicting Discourses”, in Rick Fawn and Stephen White (eds.), *Russia After Communism*, London, Frank Cass, 2002, p.113

²¹⁹ SAKWA, Richard, *Putin: Russia’s Choice*, London and New York: Routledge, 2004, p.169

In the early 1990s ROC and other religions cooperated closely with the state. However, in mid-1990s the preference was given to Orthodoxy. Thus, for example, in 1995 Ministry of education suspended an agreement with the CoMission. A US evangelical charity, and stopped all the activities of this group in schools.²²⁰ At the same time in the 1990s ROC had retreated from direct participation in political life of the state and sought to present itself as a non-partisan keeper of the nation's spiritual values. In the last years of the Soviet Union and early post-Communist years Aleksii II and other clerics had been elected to the Soviet and Russian parliaments, but by 1993 they had withdrawn from the active campaigning and clerics were forbidden from running for office. The church refused to endorse particular candidates or specific party platforms.²²¹ In opinion of Edwin Bacon, this was one factor allowing the church to retain a high degree of trust as a social institution.²²²

In 1996 Presidential race, Orthodox Church played an important role. For example, In December 1995, representatives from 17 parties attended a conference hosted by Patriarch Aleksii at the Danilovsky Monastery. Those present included the leader of the Communist Party (and subsequent "runner-up" in the Presidential election) Gennadii Zyuganov, the leader of the ultranationalist Liberal Democratic Party of Russia Vladimir Zhirinovskii and the prime-minister and leader of the Russia Is Our Home Party Viktor Chernomyrdin.²²³

The readiness of such leading political figures to be seen in the presence of the Patriarch and to be identified with the Russian Orthodox Church continued and increased during the Presidential campaign. When the policy platforms of various

²²⁰ BACON, Edwin, "Church and State in Contemporary Russia: Conflicting Discourses", in Rick Fawn and Stephen White (eds.), *Russia After Communism*, London, Frank Cass, 2002, p.111

²²¹ GVOSDEV, Nicholas K., "The New Party Card? Orthodoxy and Search for Post-Soviet Identity", *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol.47, No.6, November-December 2000, p.32

²²² BACON, Edwin, "Church and State in Contemporary Russia: Conflicting Discourses", in Rick Fawn and Stephen White (eds.), *Russia After Communism*, London, Frank Cass, 2002, pp.97 – 116

²²³ BACON, Edwin, "Church and State in Contemporary Russia: Conflicting Discourses", in Rick Fawn and Stephen White (eds.), *Russia After Communism*, London, Frank Cass, 2002, p.257

candidates did mention religion there was little difference between them. Candidates generally claimed to be in favour of religious freedom, and often particularly emphasised the “traditional religions” of Russia, notably Orthodoxy and Islam, with the occasional reference to Buddhism and Judaism. Zhirinovskiy appealed to religion in terms of Orthodoxy and nationalism. His policy program took a specifically anti-Western stance and promised vague “additional advantages to the Russian Orthodox Church”. One election poster featured a picture of Zhirinovskiy arm in arm with a senior Orthodox priest and the one word - in Russian – “I bless you”.²²⁴

“The notions of «Russian» and «Orthodox» have merged into one”, asserted Ioann, Metropolitan of St.Petersburg and Ladoga, the most authoritative figure of the Church among the Russian nationalists and informal leader of the non-conformist clergy, deceased in late 1995. he contended that in Russia national self-awareness had a “religious basis”. In characteristically journalist manner Father Dmitrii Dudko echoed this idea, saying that “if Orthodoxy is alive, so is Russia”, and voicing the belief that “Russia must be reborn as a Christian country; it will even have an Orthodox tsar...”²²⁵

One of the most outstanding advocates of the uniqueness of the ROC was Metropolitan of Smolensk and Kaliningrad Kirill, since 2008 – All-Russia Patriarch. Although he claims that Russian Orthodox Church doesn’t claim any special privileges from the state, Metropolitan insists that the Orthodox Church has a “historical mission” for the Russian state and its people. “I am often asked, Why was only the Orthodox patriarch and no representative from other denominations invited to take part in the Presidential inauguration [in 1996]? I guess the reason is the same

²²⁴ BACON, Edwin, “Church and State in Contemporary Russia: Conflicting Discourses”, in Rick Fawn and Stephen White (eds.), *Russia After Communism*, London, Frank Cass, 2002, p.258

²²⁵ MALASHENKO, Aleksei, “Russian Nationalism and Islam”, in Michael Waller, Bruno Coppieters and Aleksei Malashenko (eds.), *Conflicting Loyalties and the State in Post-Soviet Russia and Eurasia*, London – Portland, Frank Cass, 1998, p.193

as why the Bol'shoi Theater is invited to tour the United States while small independent ensembles from the provinces are not".²²⁶

The almost complete overlapping of Orthodox perceptions and national affiliation is linked to another idea – the ascription to the Church of a special role in the field of state-building. The same Ioann wrote on the pages of *Sovetskaia Rossiia* that “full dissolution of Church and state” was “unnatural”. The Chair of the Union of Orthodox Fraternities of St.Petersburg, Konstantin Dushenov, called for granting the Orthodox Church a “most favored treatment”, while stressing simultaneously that this was “not equivalent to calling for a theocratic statehood characteristic of Islamic fundamentalism”.²²⁷ For his part, historian A.Stepanov claimed that the “Orthodox Church, for a start, has to be recognized as a pre-eminent church by the Russian state”. Member of the *Russkii Sobor* (Russian Council) organization, archpriest Alexander Shargunov, called for people to work for the “restoration of Orthodox statehood”.²²⁸

Aleksei Malashenko points out another trend – proclaiming by the Orthodox clergy and nationalists groupings that touches upon the question of religion, the equality of all confessions. He explains this as a desire to raise Orthodoxy on the level of state religion, and on the other hand to demonstrated the democratic nature of their programs.²²⁹

²²⁶ STAALESEN, Atle, “Orthodoxy and Islam in Post-Soviet Russia: Opposing Confessional Cultures or Unifying Force?”, in Pal Kolsto and Helge Blakkisrud (eds.), *Nation-building and Common Values in Russia*, Oxford, 2004, p.303

²²⁷ MALASHENKO, Aleksei, “Russian Nationalism and Islam”, in Michael Waller, Bruno Coppieters and Aleksei Malashenko (eds.), *Conflicting Loyalties and the State in Post-Soviet Russia and Eurasia*, London – Portland, Frank Cass, 1998, p.193

²²⁸ MALASHENKO, Aleksei, “Russian Nationalism and Islam”, in Michael Waller, Bruno Coppieters and Aleksei Malashenko (eds.), *Conflicting Loyalties and the State in Post-Soviet Russia and Eurasia*, London – Portland, Frank Cass, 1998, p.193

²²⁹ MALASHENKO, Aleksei, “Russian Nationalism and Islam”, in Michael Waller, Bruno Coppieters and Aleksei Malashenko (eds.), *Conflicting Loyalties and the State in Post-Soviet Russia and Eurasia*, London – Portland, Frank Cass, 1998, p.195

In general, Preißler argues that nationalism serves ruling elites as an ideology that reinforces the legitimacy of the state and social-political cohesion in periods of transition.²³⁰ Starting from 1993, the state changed its rhetoric, espousing a strong Russian “statehood” and emphasizing Russia’s status as a great power. References to Russian culture accompanied this promulgation of state/ territorial concepts. The combination of references to great-power status and civic and ethnic national elements reflects the difficulties associated with Russian state and nation-building. Too little ethnic identity in the mix makes the process of state-building very difficult, but too much of it runs the risk of permanently dividing the population along ethnic lines. Official Russian policy adheres largely to a civic concept of the nation, though one containing a respectable dose of cultural elements. It combines state-building within the RF with the attempt, successful to varying degrees, to create a zone of formally sovereign but in essence dependent neighboring states.²³¹

The changes in the system of education and historiography were logical for that time – every state needs its myth and official version of the history. The mass culture was also sponsored to promote the state interest – to introduce new historical myths about Great Russia. The most pragmatic and far reaching strategy was the use of the Russian Orthodox Church. While ROC on its own had ethnic nationalism discourse, it was bond to the state and supported its legitimacy. In other words, taking into consideration the trust to this institution, Kremlin sought to be personified with it, sometimes not remembering about the Muslim Russians.

The policy chosen by Yeltsin started with the adoption of the key document discussed in the previous part and introducing the new symbols. However, this policy was inconsistent. No official law was adopted regarding state symbols. There was no popular response to them. The search for the national idea in Russia started in 1996.

²³⁰ PREIBLER, Franz, “Russian (Ethnic) Nationalism”, in Egbert Jahn (ed.), *Nationalism in Late and Post-Communist Europe*, Vol.2, *Nationalism in the Nation States*, Baden-Baden, 2009, p.69

²³¹ PREIBLER, Franz, “Russian (Ethnic) Nationalism”, in Egbert Jahn (ed.), *Nationalism in Late and Post-Communist Europe*, Vol.2, *Nationalism in the Nation States*, Baden-Baden, 2009, pp.69 - 70

This did not become an issue for its leadership earlier because of two factors. First, Russia continued to be undecided between nation and state-building or rebuilding a new Union. In the same month (May 1997) that Russian signed a close treaty on creating a future “Union” with Belarus, which Armenia was invited to join, it ratified a treaty with Ukraine recognizing its border. Second, there was less urgency because an old Russian imperial national idea existed, which held a consensus for Russia to regain its great power status coupled with a nostalgia for “lost territories”.²³² Discussed projects were the extreme points and could not be adopted by the state leaderships as a program for nation-building. Instead, there had to be balanced moderate project that could be shared by all the citizens of Russia.

Historiography, education, mass culture are the servants of the state policies. Historical memory is a central component of national identity. This historical memory could be in the form of popular myths, self images and ethnic stereotypes where they profoundly affect how we perceive the outside world. Collective memories and myths and a shared history are essential to unite a heterogeneous populace into a united polity and nation. With the old myths and legends in disarray new ones are urgently required. Hobsbawm believes that invented traditions are important for nation-building, in the same manner as symbols, histories and legends that all require “social engineering”. Myth about Great Russia was spread in history textbooks and mass culture. The most pragmatic and far reaching strategy was the use of the Russian Orthodox Church. While ROC on its own had ethnic nationalism discourse, it was bond to the state and supported its legitimacy. In other words, taking into consideration the trust to this institution, Kremlin sought to be personified with it, sometimes not remembering about the Muslim Russians.

After the the analysis of the nation-building policies of Boris Yeltsin it is important to focus on his domestic policies in general, insofar they can be viewed as an implication for the rise of the discourse of nationalism in Russian society. The next

²³² KUZIO, Taras, *Ukraine: State and Nation-building*, London and New York: Routledge, 1998, p.138.

part analyzes the state-building strategies as an implication for the rise of the nationalistic discourse in Russia.

3.3. Yeltsin's Policy of State-building and Nature of Nationalism

This part explains why the policy of state-building conducted by Boris Yeltsin can be seen as an implication for his unsuccessful policy of nation-building. I discuss institution construction, market reforms, 1993 constitution, relations with the regions of the Federation and political-economic situation in Russian society under the presidency of Boris Yeltsin.

Boris Yeltsin made several attempts to reform political institutions. First one took place in 1990 when through the negotiations with Mikhail Gorbachev he tried to establish new political institutions. Then in 1991 Yeltsin achieved the peaceful dissolution of the Soviet Union and introduced some political and economic reforms, preventing the disintegration of Russian Federation.²³³

On August 25, 1991 Communist Party of the Soviet Union was banned and its property was confiscated. Soon Yeltsin declared the radical economic reforms. As a result of the policy of prices liberalization hyperinflation emerged. After implementing of the privatization through vouchers and auctions most of the former state enterprises passed into the hands of the oligarchs. Inflation and ruble devaluation, as well as two rounds of privatization led to the establishment of several large financial-industrial groups, that controlled the Russia's largest banks, enterprises, TV channels, etc.²³⁴ "In 1996 Boris Berezovsky, the chief of Logovaz and the deputy secretary of the Security Council boasted that he and six other people controlled 50 percent of Russia's gross national product".²³⁵ Corruption, mafia

²³³ McFAUL, Michael, "A Precarious Peace: Domestic Politics in the Making of Russian Foreign Policy", *International Security*, Vol. 22 No.3, Winter 1997-1998, pp.11 – 14.

²³⁴ McFAUL, Michael, "A Precarious Peace: Domestic Politics in the Making of Russian Foreign Policy", *International Security*, Vol. 22 No.3, Winter 1997-1998, pp.17 – 19.

²³⁵ McFAUL, Michael, "A Precarious Peace: Domestic Politics in the Making of Russian Foreign Policy", *International Security*, Vol. 22 No.3, Winter 1997-1998, p.19.

slowed down the market economy building. The strata of population that were dependent on state budget (teachers, medical workers, miners, retired persons) were the main losers.²³⁶

In some regions of Russia separatist movements increased. For instance, Tatarstan refused to pay revenues to the state budget; Chechen leaders didn't recognize the authority of the federal government on their territory.²³⁷

The situation became worse in 1992 – 1993. In December 1992 after the Congress of deputies rejected Yegor Gaydar as a candidate for the Prime-minister post, Yeltsin criticized the Congress.²³⁸ In March 1993 the Congress of Deputies abrogated Yeltsin's decree on Constitutional Order Stabilization and resolutions on economic policy. Yeltsin implemented "special regime of governance". Supreme Council made an attempt to conduct impeachment of the President.²³⁹

On April 25, 1993 a referendum was conducted. 58.7 per cent of Russian citizens expressed the confidence to the President, 53 per cent supported his economic and social reforms, 49.5 per cent supported pre-term election of the President, and 67.2 per cent of Russians supported pre-term elections of the parliament.²⁴⁰ Yeltsin and his close milieu interpreted these results as a public support of the President and on September 23, declared the dismissal of the Supreme Council and the Congress of People's deputies. The dispute between two branches of power transferred into the

²³⁶ McFAUL, Michael, "A Precarious Peace: Domestic Politics in the Making of Russian Foreign Policy", *International Security*, Vol. 22 No.3, Winter 1997-1998, p.20.

²³⁷ SOLNICK, Steven, "Will Russia Survive? Center and Periphery in the Russian Federation", in Barnet Rubin and Jack Snyder (eds.), *Post-Soviet Political Order, Conflict and State-building*, London and New York: Routledge, 1998, pp.65 – 66.

²³⁸ McFAUL, Michael, *Russia's Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin*, Ithaca and New York: Cornell University Press, 2001, p.186.

²³⁹ McFAUL, Michael, *Russia's Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin*, Ithaca and New York: Cornell University Press, 2001, pp.187 – 188.

²⁴⁰ McFAUL, Michael, "The Electoral System", in Stephen White, Zvi Gitelman, and Richard Sakwa (eds.), *Developments in Russian Politics 6*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p.65.

military conflict and after the assault of several administrative buildings Supreme Council was dismissed.²⁴¹

On December 12, 1993 the elections to the Federal Council and State Duma and the Referendum on a Constitution were held. 58.4 per cent of electorate supported Presidential draft of the Constitution.²⁴² As to elections to the State Duma, Russian voters remained divided in rather equal proportions between those who supported Yeltsin's reforms and those that did not. The pro-reform party affiliated with Yeltsin, Russia's Choice, won only 15 per cent of the vote. Vladimir Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, a xenophobic nationalist organization, that was neither liberal nor democratic, won 23 per cent of public vote.²⁴³

Under the new constitution, the survival of the President and the government is independent of parliamentary approval. The President alone had the power to dissolve the parliament or the government. The President was further entrusted with special powers and resources, which are employed at his or her personal discretion and permit the circumvention of established procedures of power-sharing and policy making.²⁴⁴

In 1994 Yeltsin initiated the bilateral treaty with Tatarstan, followed by the treaties with other Russian subjects of the Federation.²⁴⁵ As a result governors created power-bases that were buttressed by local constitutions and in some cases

²⁴¹ McFAUL, Michael, "The Electoral System", in Stephen White, Zvi Gitelman, and Richard Sakwa (eds.), *Developments in Russian Politics 6*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p.66

²⁴² McFAUL, Michael, "The Electoral System", in Stephen White, Zvi Gitelman, and Richard Sakwa (eds.), *Developments in Russian Politics 6*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p.68.

²⁴³ McFAUL, Michael, "The Electoral System", in Stephen White, Zvi Gitelman, and Richard Sakwa (eds.), *Developments in Russian Politics 6*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p.68

²⁴⁴ EASTER, Gerald M., "Preference for Presidentialism: Post-Communist Regime Change in Russia and the NIS", *World Politics*, Vol.49, January 1997, p.196

²⁴⁵ SOLNICK, Steven, "Will Russia Survive? Center and Periphery in the Russian Federation", in Barnet Rubin and Jack Snyder (eds.), *Post-Soviet Political Order, Conflict and State-building*, London and New York: Routledge, 1998, p.66.

contradicted the constitution of the Russian Federation. These constitutional arrangements allowed heads of the constituent units to dominate local self-government (municipal councils) and act arbitrarily within their Region, Republic or Territory, with recourse to almost unlimited power. They habitually ignored federal legislation and so act unconstitutionally. For example, in 1998, Tatarstan's State Council passed a law on citizenship that contradicts Russian Federal law - a resident of Tatarstan can hold Tatarstani citizenship without keeping Russian citizenship.²⁴⁶

The asymmetry in federal relations was reflected most strongly in budgetary matters. By May 1999 there were only 13 donor regions. Various bilateral agreements allowed differences to emerge in the amounts of tax revenue transferred to the centre. Tatarstan, for example, passed only 50 per cent of its revenues to the state budget, while other regions transferred 75 per cent.²⁴⁷ Moreover, between 1991-95 alone Russian regions signed over 300 agreements on trade, economic and humanitarian co-operation with foreign countries, undermining Moscow's monopoly on foreign relations and shifting attention away from high diplomacy to the pressing needs of Russia's regions.²⁴⁸

Due to the unsuccessful economic reforms and war in Chechnya in 1994 – 1996 Yeltsin's rating decreased to 3 per cent. Despite this, in 1996 Yeltsin was elected for the second term. In 1997 President an agreement with Chechnya was signed. In 1998 Russians faced economic crisis and devaluation of ruble. Next year after the dismissal of four governments Yeltsin appointed Putin as a prime-minister. On a proposal of Putin several counter-terrorist operations in Chechnya were held. This increased Putin's ratings and Yeltsin decided to resign from the presidency.²⁴⁹

²⁴⁶ HERD, Graeme P., "Russia: Systemic Transformation or Federal Collapse?", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 36, No. 3, May 1999, p.251.

²⁴⁷ SAKWA, Richard, *Putin: Russia's Choice*, London and New York: Routledge, 2004, p.133.

²⁴⁸ SAKWA, Richard, *Putin: Russia's Choice*, London and New York: Routledge, 2004, p.134.

²⁴⁹ SAKWA, Richard, *Putin: Russia's Choice*, London and New York: Routledge, 2004, p.134

The economic and political crisis and instability in Russian society can be seen as implications for the unsuccessful policy of the nation-building of Boris Yeltsin and the cause for the rise of radical nationalistic movements in Russian society that demanded to choose Russia's own way of development, that is not bond to the Western liberal market reforms, and engagement with the West in foreign policy that was seen as a cause of deep economic and political crisis.

The next part discusses Yeltsin's foreign policy, attempts to work out foreign policy concept that would represent Russian national idea and the evolution of the foreign policy of Russia.

3.4. Yeltsin's Foreign Policy and Nature of Russian Nationalism

This part discusses Yeltsin's foreign policy, attempts to work out foreign policy concept that would represent Russian national idea, Russia's policy towards compatriots in the near abroad, and the evolution of the foreign policy of Russia towards the Commonwealth of the Independent States and West.

In the foreign policy Russia was also searching for the national idea. Having lost the status of empire and the territories that for the long time were the part of it, Russia was trying to define its status on the international arena and foreign policy strategy in the CIS region as well as towards Western states.

Foreign policy makers in post-Soviet Russia were not homogeneous group. According to Glenn Chafetz, they split into three camps. The first one, *liberals*, included President Boris Yeltsin, who articulated main ideas of this group; Grigory Yavlinsky, an American-educated economist, the head of the block Yabloko, one of the three major liberal factions; and Yeltsin's former foreign minister, Andrei Kozyrev. Their opponent fall into two groups: the *statists* and the *authoritarians*. The latter include both communists and authoritarian chauvinists. The communists were led by Gennadi Zyuganov as it has been shown before. The most prominent of the national chauvinists was Vladimir Zhirinovskiy. Alexander Lebed may once have been a nationalist, but the fact that he joined Yeltsin's cabinet and that he describes

himself as a “semi-democrat” makes it easier to classify him as a statist. The statist conception of Russian identity is most easily characterized by being not quite democratic and not quite authoritarian. The most prominent of the statist is Alexander Lebed, who earned 15 percent of the vote in the June 1996 Presidential election and then joined Yeltsin's cabinet.²⁵⁰ All three groups refused to accept Russia's decline in the international order, and all agree that Russia must again achieve the status of great power, but each camp defines the term “great power” differently.

The nationalistic nature of Russian policy in 1990s can be seen in Russia's interferences into three big conflicts on the post-Soviet area: Moldova-Transdnistria, Georgia-Abkhazia, and Tajikistan war. Needless to say that Russia sought to regain its power and influence among CIS states, and policies were pragmatically nationalists: on the one hand Russia recognized borders and sovereignty of neighboring states, democratic principles, but, on the other hand, Russia sought to protect its own interest.²⁵¹

Ilya Prizel at the beginning of 1992 saw three major clusters of opinion regarding Russia's foreign policy. They were the liberal Atlanticist school, the centrists, and the Eurasianism. The liberal Atlanticist school consisted mainly of the remnants of the broad coalition headed by Gorbachev and propelled Yeltsin to power. Their basic view is that Russia's tragedy lies in its repeated bouts of messianism cum belief in its inherent uniqueness, which demands that it rejects existing world order. Russia, according to the proponents of this school, will become a normal, prosperous and democratic country only when it abandons all pretensions to “uniqueness” or “manifest destiny”. They insisted that Russia is a part of Western culture and civilization. Russia's hope for salvation lies in rapid integration with the “North” –

²⁵⁰ CHAFETZ, Glenn, “The Struggle for a National Identity in Post-Soviet Russia”, *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 111, No. 4, Winter 1996-1997, pp. 672 - 673

²⁵¹ JACKSON, Nicole J., *Russian Foreign Policy and the CIS: Theories, Debates and Action*, London and New York: Routledge, 2003, p.135

G-7 group. In practice, the most important element of that policy would be an alliance with the United States. Accepting the notion that Russia is a landmass surrounded by three concentric, hierarchical circles of countries, the liberals consider the states in the most distant ring Russia's top priority. Thus, the West, primarily the United States, comprises the most important circle, with countries adjacent to the former Soviet Union taking second priority and the CIS, although pivotal for Russia both in cultural and economic terms, the least significant in Russia's quest to become a "normal" country.²⁵²

Centrists, while recognizing Russia's Asian and Turkic roots, assert that Russia is the part of the West, that Russia has no natural allies in Asia, and that Russia's national security is linked to the cordial relationship with the West. Centrists argued that Russia neither can nor should discard its past as a great power entirely and that Russia should continue pursuing its own distinct national interest. The fundamental assumption of the centrists is that Russia's economic, cultural and political links to the first circle are such that Russia will have to remain the pillar of both political and economic stability across the space of the former USSR. Predominant economic weight of Russia within the CIS, as well as the presence of Russophone populations in the near abroad, are legitimate tools of Russian policy. Indeed, centrists are determined to integrate Russia into the "core" of the international system. But unless Russia re-establishes close and intimate relations with the CIS, Russia will become isolated and marginalized within the international system.²⁵³

Group of Eurasianists includes members ranging from monarchists, substantial part of the Russia Orthodox Church, and Cossacks to extreme nationalists modeling themselves on interwar fascists, to hardline communists in the Stalinist mold. They believe that Russia is a distinct civilization whose survival depends on preserving a

²⁵² PRIZEL, Ilya, *National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia, and Ukraine*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 241 - 242

²⁵³ PRIZEL, Ilya, *National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia, and Ukraine*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 248 - 250

way of life that is different from, if not contrary to, the civilizations of the West. The essence of the “Russian idea” is the negation of the West. In opinion of Eurasianists Russia must seek a restoration of a “Great Russian State, where intra-CIS issues will be treated again as internal problems”.²⁵⁴

After the discussion of the main foreign-policy makers and Russia and their ideas, it is important to analyze the evolution of the Russian foreign policy, starting with the policy towards Russian diaspora in the near abroad.

3.4.1. Russia’s Policy Towards Compatriots Abroad

After the demise of the USSR 25 million Russian-speakers found themselves outside the Russian Federation. There is a substantial Russian presence in every corner of the former Soviet Union. In 1989, they made up 18 per cent of the total population of the non-Russian republics. Only in Armenia was the Russian share of the population less than 5 per cent. It was 22 per cent in Ukraine, 30 per cent in Estonia, 34 per cent in Latvia, and 38 per cent in Kazakhstan.²⁵⁵

Neil Melvin stresses that in early years after the breakup of the Soviet Union the post Soviet states were seen as having all responsibilities for the Russian diasporas on their territories. Therefore, despite the ties between Moscow and Russian-speakers in newly independent states, a specific Russian policy towards diaspora seemed unnecessary.²⁵⁶ Due to this, Russian-speakers in the near abroad were not viewed as an integral part of the Russian nation. Kremlin supported the idea that Russian population residing in ex-Soviet republics should take citizenship of their host states. Any problem between host states and Russian diaspora should be solved

²⁵⁴ PRIZEL, Ilya, *National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia, and Ukraine*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 256 - 264

²⁵⁵ BRUBAKER, W. Rogers, “Citizenship Struggles in Soviet Successor States”, *International Migration Review*, Vol. 26, No. 2, Summer 1992, 272

²⁵⁶ MELVIN, Neil, *Russians Beyond Russia: the Politics of National Identity*, London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995, p.11

within the republic or through international organizations such as the UN and the OSCE. These statements demonstrated that Russian foreign policy makers did not had purpose to interfere the domestic affairs of the neighbours.²⁵⁷

This policy of Yeltsin's government was questioned by opposition. Statists and authoritarianists that shared the view on close ties between Moscow and Russian-speakers in the near abroad criticized foreign policy strategy of Yeltsin and Kozyrev. In addition, the adoption of the new citizenship law in Estonia which refused to grant automatic citizenship to people arriving there in the Soviet era and their descendants, and required the procedure of naturalization,²⁵⁸ chaos in Transdniestria, and growing tensions in Ukraine during the summer 1992 pushed Yeltsin's administration to reconsider the policies towards diasporas.

The new Russian Military Doctrine's draft in the late summer 1992 were the first step in the changes of the policies towards Russian-speakers. "The draft version of Russia's new military doctrine identified the violation of the rights of Russians outside the Russian Federation and of those who identify ethnically and culturally with Russia' as a casus belli."²⁵⁹ At the same time, Russia postponed military withdrawal from the Baltic States region. As a reason behind the postponement was cited the failure of the Baltic States to protect rights of the Russian minorities.²⁶⁰

Between 1993 – 1994 Yeltsin's administration was concerned to protect the rights of the Russian-speakers in the near abroad. Foreign Policy Concept which was adopted in April 1993, proclaimed that "...ensuring the strict observance of individual human

²⁵⁷ MELVIN, Neil, *Russians Beyond Russia: the Politics of National Identity*, London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995, pp.11 - 12

²⁵⁸ BRUBAKER, Rogers W., "Citizenship Struggles in Soviet Successor States", *International Migration Review*, Vol. 26, No. 2, Summer 1992, pp. 280 - 283

²⁵⁹ MELVIN, Neil, *Russians Beyond Russia: the Politics of National Identity*, London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995, p.142

²⁶⁰ SIMONSEN, Sven Gunnar, "Compatriot Games: Explaining «Diaspora Linkage» in Russia's Military Withdrawal from the Baltic States", *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol.53, No.5, July 2001, pp.771 - 791

rights and minority rights in the countries of the near abroad, particularly the rights of ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking populations”²⁶¹ is one of the most important foreign policy tasks. In addition, the consular sections of Ministry of Foreign Affairs expanded within the CIS and Baltic States in order to develop links with the Russian –speaking communities.

The Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation adopted in November 1993 defined “the suppression of the rights, freedoms, and legitimate interests of citizens of the Russian Federation in foreign states” as an “external military danger”.²⁶² Accordingly, Russian government laid a basis for justifying its military intervention as defense.

In particular, in 1993-94 it concentrated on persuading the governments of the Soviet successor states to grant dual citizenship to the members of Russian diaspora. Russia could benefit from the dual citizenship in three aspects. Firstly, having accepted the civic definition of the Russian nation in the beginning of 1990s Russian government aimed to protect Russian nation without unleashing conflict. Secondly, since Russian economy was not able to stand for the mass immigration flow, Russia’s policy-makers saw a dual citizenship as a mean for providing some security and peace for Russian settlers in their host states. Finally, presence of Russian population in near abroad was seen as an instrument either for affecting the policy of neighbor states or dominating the region.²⁶³ In this concept, a new Russian policy focused on building political, economic and cultural links to the diaspora by establishing provisions for dual citizenship and developing international/bilateral agreements for protecting the rights of Russian-speaking minorities.

²⁶¹ MELVILLE, Andrei and SHAKLEINA, Tatiana, *Russian Foreign Policy in Transition: Concepts and Realities*, Budapest: Central European University Press, 2005, p.27.

²⁶² MELVIN, Neil, *Russians Beyond Russia: The Politics of National Identity*, London, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995, p.19.

²⁶³ ZEVELEV, Igor, *Russia and Its New Diasporas*, Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2001, pp.133-134

The government's program that was expressed in "General Principles of RF Policy Concerning Compatriots" did not include ethno-national elements. Reference to ethnic Russian was avoided. The main aim of the document was designated as "the promotion of voluntary integration of compatriots into the host states in a manner that both accommodates the local culture and preserves their specific culture". Diplomatic and economic measures were defined as the most important means for defending the rights and interest of compatriots. The main focus of the proposed measures lay in the field of culture and strengthening economic relationships with companies associated with a large proportion of compatriots.²⁶⁴

Another key document was a document adopted on August 31, 1994, named as "On Measures to Support Compatriots Abroad"²⁶⁵. In this document, strategic line of Russian policy regarding compatriots in the near abroad was defined as support for compatriots to integrate into political, economic, social life of the newly independent states and to adopt local culture while preserving their distinctive culture. In order to strengthen cultural ties with compatriots, Russia aimed to conduct negotiations with the administrations of the newly independent states for the establishment of Russian language radio, television and Russian cultural centers. The document also called for economic cooperation between Russia and ex-Soviet states. Even though Russian government showed its willingness to cooperate in the fields of economic and culture with the governments of newly independent post-Soviet states, this document did not guide effective tools for coordination among governmental bodies. In short, the document pointed out that protection of the economic, political, social, cultural and civil rights of the compatriots must be diplomatic and economic. It suggested the use of international mechanisms in the matter of protecting human rights and minority rights and in some cases, economic pressure due to defense compatriots. Thus, this

²⁶⁴ PREIBLER, Franz, „Russian (Ethnic) Nationalism“, in Egbert Jahn (ed.), *Nationalism in Late and Post-Communist Europe*, Vol.2, *Nationalism in the Nation States*, Baden-Baden, 2009, p.69

²⁶⁵ "On Measures to Support Compatriots Abroad" (*O Merakh Po Podderzhke Sootechestvennikov Za Rubezhom*), August 31, 1994, available from <http://www.russiane.org/law/46.html>, (accessed on August 19, 2010)

document provided moderate support to Russian compatriots. Moreover, it aimed to avoid mass immigration of compatriots to Russia.²⁶⁶

Beginning from 1994, Presidents of Russia established a practice of annual address to Federal Assembly. In these speeches the president articulates key points of internal and foreign policy. In his first address “Consolidation of the Russian Government” in February 1994, Yeltsin focused on the issue of compatriots. Instead of encouraging them to come back Russia; he implied that Russia should help them to settle their life in the states where they live. Yeltsin noted that “Everywhere, where our compatriots reside, they should feel that they are full and equal citizens.”²⁶⁷ He concluded that interests of the Russians who are living in these countries can be secured if these countries obey the rules recognized in the field of human rights and minority rights. In addition, in order to protect the rights of the Russians in the near abroad Yeltsin stressed that Russia would pursue its interests via international organizations.²⁶⁸

Despite all efforts of the Russian government, all newly independent states, with the exceptions of Turkmenistan and Tajikistan (which have the smallest Russian-speaking communities), refused to agree to the Russian proposal for dual citizenship. This meant that the policy that paid the main attention to Russian-speakers, collapsed. Policy-makers in Moscow had only three choices: partial return to the idea

²⁶⁶ “On Measures to Support Compatriots Abroad” (*O Merakh Po Podderzhke Sootechstvennikov Za Rubezhom*), August 31, 1994, available from <http://www.russiane.org/law/46.html>, (accessed on August 19, 2010)

²⁶⁷ Address of the President of Russia Boris Yeltsin to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, “Consolidation of the Russian Federation” (*Obrasheniie Prezidenta Rossii Borisa Yeltsina K Federal'noi Assambleie Rossiiskoi Federatsii “Ob Ukreplenii Rossiiskogo Gosudarstva”*), February 25, 1994, available from <http://www.intelros.org/lib/elzin/1994.htm>, (accessed on August 19, 2010)

²⁶⁸ Address of the President of Russia Boris Yeltsin to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, “Consolidation of the Russian Federation” (*Obrasheniie Prezidenta Rossii Borisa Yeltsina K Federal'noi Assambleie Rossiiskoi Federatsii “Ob Ukreplenii Rossiiskogo Gosudarstva”*), February 25, 1994, available from <http://www.intelros.org/lib/elzin/1994.htm>, (accessed on August 19, 2010)

of a common Union identity, attempt to reinforce eastern Slavic identity, and finally, to strengthen new civic identity.²⁶⁹

Vera Tolz argued that Russian government started attempts to establish Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) citizenship in 1996 instead of setting dual citizenship. CIS citizenship was seen as an instrument which could strengthen Union identity of Russians and the other peoples of the former USSR. In this framework, in May 1997, the presidents of Russia and Belorussia signed a Charter including that two countries should introduce common citizenship. In December 1999, two countries signed a treaty on creating a Union state.²⁷⁰ Despite the fact that Russian government had desire to set a similar arrangement with Ukraine, the leadership of Ukraine resisted this idea.

On May 17, 1996. Russian government adopted the document entitled “Program of Actions to Support Compatriots Abroad”²⁷¹, for the first time, the premise diaspora was used widely. It is said that

as a result of disintegration of Soviet Union and establishment of new independent states, millions of compatriots found themselves to be separated from boundaries of Russian Federation. They have to live and determine their own destiny in the difficult politic, economic, social, cultural, psychological conditions and they need

²⁶⁹ TOLZ, Vera, *Russia: Inventing the Nation*, London: Arnold; New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, p.254

²⁷⁰ TOLZ, Vera, “Forging the Nation: National Identity and Nation-building in Post-Communist Russia”, *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 50, No. 6, September 1998, p.1010

²⁷¹ “Program of Actions to Support Compatriots Abroad”, (*Programma Mer Po Podderhke Sootechestvennikov Za Rubezhom*), May 17, 1996, available from <http://www.friendspartners.org/partners/valery/humright/hr960512.html>, (accessed on August 19, 2010)

assistance and support from the states where they reside and Russia.²⁷²

It also stated that political difficulties confronted by compatriots were provoked in relation to the fact that “newly independent states are being formed as nation states of self-determined titular nations”²⁷³. Moreover, the document pointed out that “the issue of compatriots is the most important factor in formation of relations between Russia and the participants of CIS and Baltic states”²⁷⁴. It called for safeguarding legal, political, economic, cultural rights of compatriots by states where they live. In turn, Russia as the successor of the USSR is ready to assist the governments of the newly independent post-Soviet states in fulfilling these tasks. One of the important elements of this document was the announcement that the policy of support to compatriots abroad never means implicit refusal of their right to return Russia. Therefore, ‘main two goals of Russian policy towards compatriots’ was described as following: Ensuring integration of compatriots into the life of states where they reside while preserving the cultural identity of compatriots, and the right of them to return to the historical homeland.²⁷⁵ Nevertheless, this program did not introduce instruments for return of compatriots and their settlement in Russia.

²⁷² “Program of Actions to Support Compatriots Abroad” (*Programma Mer Po Podderhke Sootechstvennikov Za Rubezhom*), May 17, 1996, available from <http://www.friendspartners.org/partners/valery/humright/hr960512.html>, (accessed on August 19, 2010)

²⁷³ “Program of Actions to Support Compatriots Abroad” (*Programma Mer Po Podderhke Sootechstvennikov Za Rubezhom*), May 17, 1996, available from <http://www.friendspartners.org/partners/valery/humright/hr960512.html>, (accessed on August 19, 2010)

²⁷⁴ “Program of Actions to Support Compatriots Abroad” (*Programma Mer Po Podderhke Sootechstvennikov Za Rubezhom*), May 17, 1996, available from <http://www.friendspartners.org/partners/valery/humright/hr960512.html>, (accessed on August 19, 2010)

²⁷⁵ “Program of Actions to Support Compatriots Abroad” (*Programma Mer Po Podderhke Sootechstvennikov Za Rubezhom*), May 17, 1996, available from <http://www.friendspartners.org/partners/valery/humright/hr960512.html>, (accessed on August 19, 2010)

Moreover, by calling for 1) negotiations on the legal status of compatriots, 2) arrangements bilateral and multilateral agreements with participants of CIS and Baltic states, 3) maintenance of negotiations on Russian language for being accepted as second state language, this document aimed integration of Russian diaspora in to newly independent post-Soviet states under better conditions.

In his annual address to the Federal Assembly in 1997, Yeltsin pointed out that

The key task of Russian foreign policy was and will be the protection of the rights of our compatriots who lives abroad. The principal concern derives from the situation of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia, Latvia and a number of other states. The leaders (of these states) should understand clearly that we are in favor of good relations with neighbors, but we never disregard legitimate rights of compatriots.²⁷⁶

In 1998, Yeltsin focused on the same point by saying that “the main element of our Baltic policy is the concern for the realization of legitimate rights of our compatriots abroad”²⁷⁷. Moreover, he mentioned that “despite the efforts of Russia and some European institutions, this problem in relations with Estonia and Latvia still has not been solved”.²⁷⁸

²⁷⁶ Address of the President of Russia Boris Yeltsin to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, “The Order in the Authority- The Order in the Country”, (*Obrasheniie Prezidenta Rossii Borisa Yeltsina K Federal'noi Assambleie Rossiiskoi Federatsii "Poryadok Vo Vlasti - Poryadok V Strane"*), March 6, 1997, available from <http://www.intelros.org/lib/elzin/1997.htm>, (accessed on August 19, 2010)

²⁷⁷ Address of the President of Russia Boris Yeltsin to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, “With Common Efforts to the Developing of Russia”, (*Obrasheniie Prezidenta Rossii Borisa Yeltsina K Federal'noi Assambleie Rossiiskoi Federatsii "Obshimi Silami - K Pod'emu Rossii"*), 1998, available from <http://www.intelros.org/lib/elzin/1998.htm>, (accessed on August 19, 2010)

²⁷⁸ Address of the President of Russia Boris Yeltsin to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, “With Common Efforts to the Developing of Russia”, (*Obrasheniie Prezidenta Rossii Borisa Yeltsina K Federal'noi Assambleie Rossiiskoi Federatsii "Obshimi Silami - K Pod'emu Rossii"*), 1998, available from <http://www.intelros.org/lib/elzin/1998.htm>, (accessed on August 19, 2010)

In the course of 1998, Moscow periodically protested against the attitude of Latvia towards its large Russian minority. In his last speech to the Federal Assembly in 1999, Yeltsin declared that

The policy of Russia on the protection of legal rights of our compatriots remained constant. We don't remove the problem of discrimination against the Russian-speaking population in Estonia and Latvia from the agenda. Russia will insist on that these countries modify their approaches to the problem of human rights according to the requirements determined by UN, OSCE, and the Council of Europe.²⁷⁹

The premise "compatriots" was used widely in the legal documents; however, the proper definition of it had not been made until May 1999. The "Law on the State Policy of the Russian Federation Concerning the Compatriots Abroad"²⁸⁰ adopted on 24 May 1999 defined compatriots as following (Art 1, p. 2): a) Russian citizens permanently residing abroad; b) former USSR citizens, residing in the states which had been a part of the USSR, that became citizens of these states or became stateless; c) emigrants from Russian state and USSR that became citizens of the foreign state or became stateless; d) descendants of the people from the above categories, except the descendants of the titular ethnicities of the foreign states. Nevertheless, this definition is very ambiguity since it refers to the any of former citizen of USSR regardless ethnicity as compatriots whereas it excludes descendants of ethnic Armenians, Georgians, who were nationals of Russia, from context of compatriots.

²⁷⁹ Address of the President of Russia Boris Yeltsin to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation "Russia at the Brink of Epoch", (*Obrasheniie Prezidenta Rossii Borisa Yeltsina K Federal'noi Assambleie Rossiiskoi Federatsii "Rossiia na Rubezhe Epoh"*), March 30, 1999, available from <http://www.intelros.org/lib/elzin/1999.htm> (accessed on August 19, 2010)

²⁸⁰ Law on the State Policy of the Russian Federation Concerning the Compatriots Abroad (*Federalniu Zakon Rossiiskoi Federatsii O Gosudersivennoi Politike Rossiiskoi Federatsii V Otmoshenii Sootechstvennikov za Rubezhom*), May 24, 1999, available from <http://www.mid.ru/nsdgpch.nsf/215bdcc93123ae8343256da400379e66/51efd81cd0b2a328c325722e0>

048e320?OpenDocument, (accessed on August 19, 2010)

Rather than approaching the premise compatriot congruently, this law, first of all, was adopted by considering the political value of compatriots. Despite the fact that the notion of compatriots includes mainly ethnic Russians, the Russian government hesitated to mention this directly because of its multi ethnic structure.²⁸¹

To conclude, Russian Federation failed to work out congruent balanced policy regarding Russian diaspora in the near abroad. As it was discussed, Yeltsin's domestic policy, as well as his policy regarding compatriots was dependent on the view on the Russian nation at the certain period of time, and these policies changed under the influence of opposition and changes of domestic and foreign agendas of the newly independent states. The attitude towards Russian-speakers was pragmatic: for Kremlin they were a means to justify Russia's interference into domestic affairs of the ex-Soviet states, as well as tools for solution of political, economic and security issues. After the discussion of the Russia's policy towards compatriots in the near abroad, it is important to examine the evolution of the policies towards the CIS and the West, in order to understand to the full extent how these policies evolved and which factors influenced it.

3.4.2. Russian Foreign Policy towards the CIS and the West

Yeltsin's initial foreign policy was based on a belief that to break its cycle of authoritarianism, it must abandon any notion of messianism and integrate itself both politically and economically into international system. The dominant school of thought in the foreign ministry held tightly to the idea that the future of the international system would be shaped primarily by economic determinants. Believing that the international system would experience a new bipolarity between North and South, Russian foreign policy makers sought to integrate Russia into developed

²⁸¹ Law on the State Policy of the Russian Federation Concerning the Compatriots Abroad (*Federalniy Zakon Rossiiskoi Federatsii O Gosudersivvennoi Politike Rossiiskoi Federatsii V Otnoshenii Sootechestvennikov za Rubezhom*), May 24, 1999, available from <http://www.mid.ru/nsdgpch.nsf/215bdcc93123ae8343256da400379e66/51efd81cd0b2a328c325722e0>

048e320?OpenDocument, (accessed on August 19, 2010)

South. Foreign ministry continued Gorbachev's policy that sought to avoid confrontation with the West, but rather demonstrate commitment to the common human values: support for international organizations, human rights, ecological protection, arms control and so on. Relying on the assumption that there are no major disputes or political and economic schisms between Russia and West, and that West will be both willing and able to finance Russia's transformation, Russian foreign policy fixed on West, particularly the USA.²⁸² Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev declared that the G-7 countries were Russia's natural "allies".²⁸³ Finance minister Boris Federov confidently declared that Russia would soon join NATO or its successor organization. Under the aegis of the foreign ministry, Russia quickly accepted America's new arms reduction schemes and continued to support the economic embargo against Iraq, NATO's intervention to Yugoslavia, the curtailment of arms exports, and so on.²⁸⁴

However, the Atlanticist policy of foreign ministry was severely criticized. Diplomats were accused of forgetting that the country was confronting fourteen new neighbors, on which it was widely dependent. Other critics pointed out that such policy could provoke instability along Russia's periphery. Moreover some of them asserted that the fixation on the USA could lead to the awake of Russian fundamentalism against Russian foreign policy. Finally, some critics argued that Russia made many concessions to the United States, while USA treated Russia rather with an arrogant patronage. Russian observers bitterly complained about the efforts of the USA to end Russia's attempts to export rocket engines to India and submarines to Iran at a time when the United States was aggressively promoting their own arms exports. America's habit to make unilateral decisions in Balkans also irked

²⁸² TOLZ, Vera, *Russia: Inventing the Nation*, London: Arnold; New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, p.264

²⁸³ KOZYREV, Andrei, "Russia: a Chance for Survival", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.71, No.2, 1992, pp.1 - 13

²⁸⁴ TOLZ, Vera, *Russia: Inventing the Nation*, London: Arnold; New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, p.265

many Russian nationalists, while Japan's overt effort to link Western credits to Russian flexibility on the Northern territories and Kuril islands was characterized by most Russians as a by-product of an uncritical pro-Western policy. Kozyrev's foreign policy was undermined by the perception that Washington condoned discrimination against Russian-speakers in the Baltic States and hesitated to confront Ukraine about breaking its promise to disclose nuclear weapons. Even apparently friendly gestures by West, such as the idea of bringing Russia into NATO or the Strategic Defense Initiative, were perceived as an attempt to bind Russia into a position of inferiority.²⁸⁵

By late 1992, Kozyrev's policy appeared to be anachronistic. Russia didn't possess either the means or the geopolitical position of the USSR, furthermore as bipolarity ended following the demise of the USSR, Russia's America-centered foreign policy increasingly appeared to be out of step with the current realities. Kozyrev's defense of his pro-American posture – urging Russia to follow the example of post-World War II West Germany, Italy, Japan, which used their pro-Americanism to regain international stature – angered many Russians, who felt that Russia did not deserve to be ranked with the defeated fascist powers, and prompted calls for Kozyrev's resignation.²⁸⁶

The event that symbolized the shift towards centrist foreign policy was probably Yeltsin's cancellation of his trip to Japan in 1992, when it became clear that a Russo-Japanese summit would be dominated by a link between Japanese aid and the resolution of the territorial dispute between two countries. However, rejection of the liberal foreign policy did not mean return to the messianism or confrontation with the West. Centrism presupposed that Russia is a part of West, that Russia has no natural allies in Asia and that Russia's natural security is connected to cordial relationships

²⁸⁵ ARBATOV, Alexei, "Russia's Foreign Policy Alternatives", *International Security*, Vol.18, No.2, Fall 1993, pp. 5- 43

²⁸⁶ PRIZEL, Ilya, *National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia, and Ukraine*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 266

with the West. Centrists argued that Russia neither can nor should discard its past as a great power entirely and that Russia should continue pursuing its own distinct national interest. West remained a cornerstone of the Russian foreign policy.²⁸⁷ The expectations that initial pro-American foreign policy of Moscow would result in massive economic aid by the West and rapid integration into G-7 failed; moreover even much-heralded \$24 billion package was not delivered. However the hope that the cooperation is possible still remained.

Russian centrists complained that while Washington embraced noxiously repressive regimes such as those in China or Saudi Arabia, it protested against Russia's relationship with Iran. Also since the collapse of the USSR, the United States has aggressively expanded its export of arms while applying overt pressure on Russia to curtail its arms deals with India and Iran. The Council of Europe was unwilling to admit Russia because of its treatment of prison inmates and conscripts, but gave immediate membership to Latvia and Estonia despite the Russian perception of mass disenfranchisement of ethnic Russians in those countries, the discrepancy was perceived by many Russians and it embittered many centrists. The NATO's continued existence and its expansion to USSR former republics was perceived across the Russian polity as the ultimate hypocrisy. However Moscow still preferred to preserve its relationship with Washington. Therefore commercial deal between Moscow and New Delhi on the sell of cryogenic rocket engines to India was shelved. Similarly, despite Russia sold tree diesel submarines to Iran, Yeltsin in September 1994 promised that the new arms contracts won't be signed with Teheran. Russian desire to avoid direct confrontation with the USA extended even to issues of Balkans, where Russia, despite rhetoric in support of the Serbs, never blocked any UNO resolution authorizing NATO's involvement in the Bosnian crisis, nor did it ultimately lift the economic embargo imposed in Yugoslavia even after Belgrade

²⁸⁷ PRIZEL, Ilya, *National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia, and Ukraine*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.270

broke with the Bosnian Serbs.²⁸⁸ Moscow's effort to retain Washington's good graces was seen in Russia's withdrawal, with American prodding, of its troops from the Baltic States, without linking of that presence to the rights of Russophones in Latvia and Estonia. Similarly, despite Russian defense ministry contended that the conventional forces in Europe reduction agreements were signed by the USSR, so they do not correspond to the realities and have to be revised, facing the refusal of the USA to reopen the matter, Russia didn't push it further. Moreover, despite Yeltsin's statements that Russia will not tolerate NATO's expansion to the Russian borders, Russia did not close the door to the link with the West. Instead, Yeltsin stated that he is confident Russian and the USA will be able to reach consensus on this issue.²⁸⁹

Although Russia understood that the USA will continue to be the sole truly global power, its influence and military presence in Europe will decline. In economic terms, European Union appeared to be Russia's largest economic partner; therefore, believing that the EU is bound to become the major political actor, Russia sought to deepen its European link. In issues of NATO expansion and war in Balkans European states were much in the side of Russia. The United State rejected proposals to expand the OSCE as the main institution guaranteeing security in Europe and ridiculed Saddam Hussein's recognition of Kuwait's sovereignty, brokered by Kozyrev, but the French position was far more in line with that of Russia. France joint Russia in calling for the end to sanctions against Iraq and in insisting that Europe should not be allowed to fragment into blocks, which the French argued to occur if NATO admits the Vyshegrad group as new members.²⁹⁰

²⁸⁸ PRIZEL, Ilya, *National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia, and Ukraine*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp.270 - 271

²⁸⁹ PRIZEL, Ilya, *National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia, and Ukraine*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.272

²⁹⁰ PRIZEL, Ilya, *National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia, and Ukraine*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp.273 - 274

The growing Russian orientation towards Western Europe was articulated by Kozyrev, who, during his visit to Paris, declared:

The historic link between France and Russia, along with the present partnership between our countries, looks like one of the central supports for the construction of the new Europe... this will open additional opportunities for our work in Europe and serve to strengthen our strategic interaction with the key European partners – France, Britain and Germany. This will not be partnership against the United States. It will be a partnership with them, but one in which Europe has its own voice and in which Moscow's voice within the European chorus is heard loudly enough.²⁹¹

Anglo-Russian relations acquired new substance following the US decision to stop enforcing the arms embargo against Bosnia in November 1994. British observers perceived this decision not only as a move that endangered British troops in the Balkans, but, more important, as an American reversion to unilateralism, if not outright isolationism. The shifts in Europe's political landscape gave sufficient encouragement to Kozyrev to declare that both NATO and the OSCE are relics of the Cold War and that a pillar of Europe's security should be "the historic Russo-French Alliance".²⁹²

Germany, in turn, despite its contradictory position regarding Russia, continued to advocate idea that the enlargement of NATO to accept Vyshegrad group states in conjunction with the contractual security partnership between NATO and Russia within the framework of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council would be the best solution. Germany appeared to be the most respectful to Russia's proposals to upgrade OSCE to an intermediary organ between its members and the United

²⁹¹ PRIZEL, Ilya, *National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia, and Ukraine*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.274

²⁹² PRIZEL, Ilya, *National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia, and Ukraine*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.275

Nations, hence giving the Kremlin greater voice in shaping Europe-wide agenda. Chancellor Kohl was the most consistent advocate of full Russian membership in the G-7, while Russia was the first permanent member of Security Council of the United Nations to endorse permanent status for Germany as well.²⁹³

Unlike Russian nationalist who saw the alliance with Germany as the means of destroying the current international system, the Russian centrist recognized that it can be dangerous as, for instance Ribbentrop-Molotov pact. At the same time centrists were trying not to repeat the mistake of the last century - not to become a West's tool to contain Germany.

The greatest expression of the shift from the Western-oriented to centrist foreign policy can be seen on the Southern rim of the Russian Federation. The Westernizers' policy of indifference to the southern rim was predicated on the belief that Russia would be able to integrate rapidly into and shift its trade pattern towards the West. Another assumption of Atlanticists was that Russia could insulate itself from the region's problems and that, in fact, the region would be stabilized mainly as a result of Turkey and the Western powers. However this attitude didn't last long. Security forces of the RF that from the beginning felt that the Islamic fundamentalism could spread into the Russian Federation itself, continued to insist that Russia's viability as a state depend on its ability to counter Islamic fundamentalism by waging local, low-intensity conflicts, and to contain the chaos emanating from Afghanistan at the borders of the USSR rather than those of the Russian Federation. Chechnya's declaration of independence from the Russian Federation and its ultimate repression, illustrated the fragility of Russia's body politic when dealing with its southern rim. The Russian-speaking diaspora in the Central Asia, confronting with the indigenous nationalism stimulated Russia's policy towards the region. Finally, fall of the

²⁹³ PRIZEL, Ilya, *National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia, and Ukraine*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp.275 - 276

attempts to built market economy and difficulties in Russian industrial sector created a powerful lobby that viewed Central Asia as opportunity rather than burden.²⁹⁴

In May 1992 Tashkent Accord that created regional defense alliance, was signed. It symbolized a shift from neglecting the region to the view that the region insulates Russia from the sea powers across the southern fringe of the Eurasian landmass and against militant Islam and a potentially threatening China.

To consolidate Russia's security interests the Kremlin resorted to several strategies. In the Caucasus, Russia, by shifting its support, dexterously utilized the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, forcing both states to enter CIS and to accept Moscow as the regional hegemonic power and arbitrator Conflict and Russia's interest. On the final stage of the Georgia-Abkhazia conflict Russian policy was in line with the dominant foreign policy ideas that Russia should retain influence, and the war and continue its military ties. Pragmatic nationalism helped to define Russia's foreign policy in this conflict. Similarly to Moldova-Transdniesterian conflict, Russia's key interests in the region included: desire to retain military influence in the region (this was more significant than in Moldova); to protect the small Russian diaspora; to develop economic ties with the region. In a short term Russian policy makers produced "road map": war subsided and strong Russian-Georgian military relations had been forged. Russia achieved two main goals: close military relations with Georgia and Georgia's entry into the CIS. On February 3, 1994, Georgia signed a Treaty of Friendship, Neighborliness and Cooperation with Russia, as well as 24 other agreements, which included provisions for the right to establish five Russian military bases, the stationing of Russian border guards along Georgia's border with Turkey and trade and cultural cooperation agreement. On October 22, 1994 Georgia signed the CIS agreements. The next day

²⁹⁴ PRIZEL, Ilya, *National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia, and Ukraine*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp.280 - 281

Yeltsin ordered deployment of Russian troops to the region in order to guard Georgian railways.²⁹⁵

As in the case of Moldova and Georgia, Russia's interests in Tajikistan were inherited from Tsarist and Soviet past. Russia had a diaspora and strong military presence in the region. However, Tajikistan was more politically unstable and economically dependent on Russia. It had an especially fragile and fractured national identity. In the beginning of the war – end 1991 – fall 1992 - Russian elite was trying to ignore the conflict. By the end of 1992 Russian elite unified around the ideas of pragmatic nationalism of retaining influence in the near abroad. Russia didn't hesitate to support a coup against an objectionable regime in Tajikistan.²⁹⁶ To ensure that its security interests are honored Russia signed a series of bilateral and multilateral agreements, allowing for collective surety under Russian auspices, and military basing rights in most Soviet republics along Russia's southern fringe.

When several Central Asian countries attempted to move towards closer economic cooperation with Turkey, Russia's Deputy Prime-minister Shokhin made it clear that these countries would have to choose between Moscow and Ankara and forced the Central Asian states to abandon the notion of using Turkey as a counterweight to Russia's presence. Russia reacted angrily when Turkey hosted a summit of heads of state of Turkic countries, accusing the Turkish government into "dangerous nationalism".²⁹⁷

A key issue for Russia's activism in Central Asia is the access to the Caspian basin's vast reserves of oil and gas. This interest has two main elements. The first is an insistence upon Russian participation in the various multinational efforts to develop

²⁹⁵ JACKSON, Nicole J., *Russian Foreign Policy and the CIS: Theories, Debates and Action*, London and New York: Routledge, 2003, p.135

²⁹⁶ JACKSON, Nicole J., *Russian Foreign Policy and the CIS: Theories, Debates and Action*, London and New York: Routledge, 2003, p.135

²⁹⁷ PRIZEL, Ilya, *National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia, and Ukraine*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.283

the oil fields of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. In both cases Russian oil companies were given shares of stock in the ventures despite the fact that the Russian enterprises did not contribute significant towards the development of those fields. A far more important dimension is a forceful policy to retain control over access of these energy resources to world markets. Russia's hard-pressed economy will clearly benefit from pipeline construction across its territory and from transit fees this pipeline will generate. However, it is rather geopolitical considerations that motivate Russia to insist upon the control of access to the energy riches of the Caspian Basin. With this control Russia will remain the largest energy-exporters among world countries, along with Saudi Arabia that gives Russia significant political clout in its relations with energy-producing and energy-consuming countries. Thus, Kremlin aborted the deal to develop accord between Azerbaijan and Western consortium, insisting that no agreement can be consummated until Russia is guaranteed that the pipes linking the energy-producing regions traverse its territory. In order to eliminate Turkey as a competitor offering an alternate access route to Russia, Moscow, along with Armenia, hinted that the Kurdish insurrection in eastern Turkey might well become a means to contain Turkish ambitions in Central Asia. In response to Ankara's growing reluctance to allow super-tankers through the Bosphorus straits, Russia entered intense negotiations to build a pipeline between Varna, Bulgaria, on the Black Sea and Alexandropolis, Greece bypassing the Bosphorus straits and eliminating Turkey altogether from the energy transport circuit.²⁹⁸

Russia's proprietary attitude to the Central Asia and Caucasus resulted in denying international norms and regulations. Not only Russia had a hand in the overthrow of several regimes that it found objectionable, but in the case of Azerbaijan, where there was an attempt to set up peace force under the sponsorship of the OSCE, Russia responded by supporting the coup against the independent minded Azeri President Abulfaz Elchebey replacing him with Heidar Aliyev and using Russian forces as peace monitors.

²⁹⁸ PRIZEL, Ilya, *National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia, and Ukraine*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.284

Russia's policy in the region was to ensure maximum economic benefit from the region on the one hand, and on the other hand, do not allow tension in the region to develop into either a regional or a global crisis. Thus, despite an obvious displeasure with Turkey resulting from the competition in Central Asia and the Caucasus as well as Turkey's advocacy of rapid expansion of NATO to include Poland, Russia continued to cultivate close economic links with Ankara and advocated an economic community of states bordering the Black Sea. Similarly, though tensions with Iran over exploitation of the Caspian Sea and Tajikistan surfaced, Moscow continued to cultivate working relations with Teheran, expanding economic links by agreeing to sell Iran some military weapons, including submarines, and entering negotiations to complete a nuclear reactor whose construction was initiated by the Shah.²⁹⁹

The disappointment with the West came in the mid 1990s. The lack of Russian sensitivities over Serbia on the part of NATO represented just one of several disappointments. Membership of the Council of Europe was delayed until early 1996 due to concerns over Russia's commitment to human rights, and Russia's voting rights in the same body were removed during the Second Chechen War. Even the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement signed between the European Union and the Russian Federation in June 1994 was not fully implemented as a sign of the EU's displeasure at the first Chechen War (1994 - 1996). Perhaps the most significant issue to foster Russian disappointment with the West was the question of NATO expansion. The decision by NATO countries to expand the alliance eastwards disappointed Russia's westernizers, who saw it as a betrayal of their avowedly friendly stance, and confirmed the suspicions of Eurasianists, who believed that the West was determined to gain maximum advantage from its post-Cold War strength, and Russia's post-Cold War weakness.³⁰⁰

²⁹⁹ PRIZEL, Ilya, *National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia, and Ukraine*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp.287 - 288

³⁰⁰ BACON, Edwin and WYMAN, Matthew, *Contemporary Russia*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, p.161.

Throughout the process of NATO enlargement, the Russian Federation took up a stance based on the belief that Russia is a “great power” and should be treated as such. This can at least be seen to have produced some benefits, in the form of the Russian – NATO Founding Act of May 1997.³⁰¹

The foreign policy consensus in Russia emerged after the appointment of Yevgenii Primakov as Russia’s foreign minister in 1996. His foreign policy reflects a centrist view. Primakov became very popular among Russian population after the abrogation of his visit to the United States in 1999 when he had learned about the decision to bomb Yugoslavia. Among foreign policy makers there was a belief expressed by Sergei Karaganov:

90 per cent of Russia’s prosperity will depend on Russia’s ability to influence the policies of Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and other former Soviet republics, and not relations with the United States and Europe, though they will remain extremely important too.³⁰²

However, even within the confines of the CIS, Russian foreign policy, reflecting the mood of the Russian citizens, appeared to be following the demands of “narrow nationalism”, making the Kremlin’s engagements selective and avoiding deep economic commitments.³⁰³

Thus, while Russia didn’t hesitate to use force in Tajikistan or to use blackmail to defend its interest in Central Asia, the Kremlin resisted the temptation of supporting the Crimea’s drive to separate from Ukraine and declined to take up Belarus’ offer to integrate with Russia as economically too costly for Russia. In fact Russian foreign

³⁰¹ BACON, Edwin and WYMAN, Matthew, *Contemporary Russia*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, p.162.

³⁰² PRIZEL, Ilya, *National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia, and Ukraine*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.298

³⁰³ PRIZEL, Ilya, *National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia, and Ukraine*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.284

policy after Primakov shifted from one of threats and intimidation to one of co-optation or. The policy of selective approach enjoyed support of all major streams in Russian politics.

As to the relations with the West, the events of the second half of 1998 provided a clear example of this aspect of Russian policy thinking. In August 1998, the United States launched missile strikes against suspected terrorist bases in Afghanistan and Sudan. It had long been Russian policy to stand shoulder to shoulder with the USA and other world powers engaged in the fight against terrorism. On this occasion, however, President Yeltsin issued an unexpectedly firm denunciation of American action. By the end of the year such firm denunciations of American, and British, air strikes were to become commonplace, as the short Anglo-American bombing campaign against Iraq got underway in December 1998.³⁰⁴

The reaction of virtually all senior Russian officials to these raids seemed to presage a major split with the United States in particular. President Yeltsin charged that the USA had “crudely violated the UN Charter and the generally accepted principles of international law”. Moscow temporarily withdrew its ambassadors from Washington and London. In terms of concrete actions the ratification of the START II arms control treaty by the Russian Duma was again delayed.

Shift in the foreign policy led to the building up a tripartite alliance in Asia, and so Russia’s relations with China and India increased in significance both in diplomatic terms and practically, for example in the increased arms trade between two countries.

Kremlin’s foreign policy was pragmatic. It can be seen, firstly, in the relations with the Russian-speakers in the near abroad. Russia was trying to achieve economic and political goals by means of compatriots. The transformation of the foreign policy towards the CIS and the West presented in this part shows that Russia abandoned the idea of great power and messianism and gradually chose the multi dimensional

³⁰⁴ BACON, Edwin and WYMAN, Matthew, *Contemporary Russia*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, p.163

policy. It was a pragmatic step: Russia always perceived its interest in relations with the CIS, as well as with the West. Besides, the discourse on the nature of the Russian nation influenced foreign policy of the Russian Federation.

3.5. Conclusion

The projects preferred by the Russian first President Boris Yeltsin that is new state-building and civic nation construction were the most reasonable for the Russian Federation. Being multinational state that had chosen democratic path of development, Russia had to create new state institutions, its own nation and respect sovereignty of other Soviet successor states. However, the real policy did not coincide with the declared tasks. While it was necessary to declare, in democratic traditions, the new state-building with respect to independent neighbors and all ethnic groups within the Russian Federation, this task appeared to be hard to achieve. Economic crisis, political instability, difficult relations with the regions and neighboring states complicated the process of the nation-building.

The inconsistency in the policy of nation construction until 1996 can be seen as a search for the new identity, for the project that can provide stable development of the new state, and at the same time to satisfy its crucial needs. The policy of civic nation-building adopted in 1991 – 1992 and resembled in official documents was the important basis. Despite difficulties, such as the federative structure of the Russian state, multi ethnic composition, Yeltsin's administration adopted key documents for the nation-building – Citizenship Law, Constitution of the Russian Federation. On the other hand, policy of nation-building with its inconsistencies was pragmatic and was worked out for the needs of the new state. It was necessary for the new democratic state to introduce the legislation mentioned above and declare the equality and respect of the right of all ethnic groups. The appeal to the Russian diaspora in 1993 – 1994 was the result of the influence of the more nationalistic opposition in the parliament. This can be understood: the concept of civic identity was very new for the Russians while the Russianness in terms of its language and culture has a long tradition. At the same time, Russia was seeking to achieve

pragmatic goals – solve economic and security problems. The period of 1996-1997 when Kremlin was promoting Union and Eastern Slavic identity was successful in achievement the Union with Belarus that also reveals pragmatic character of Yeltsin's policies. The adoption of the civic nation construction strategy after 1996 was the declaration of the course of Kremlin. It was resembled in the "The State Nationality Policy of the Russian Federation". Although Simon points out the insincere character of this document, it was important to declare the character of the future state policies regarding nations.

Historiography, education, mass culture are the servants of the state policies. Historical memory is a central component of national identity. This historical memory could be in the form of popular myths, self-images and ethnic stereotypes where they profoundly affect how we perceive the outside world. Collective memories and myths and a shared history are essential to unite a heterogeneous populace into a united polity and nation. With the old myths and legends in disarray new ones are urgently required. Hobsbawm believes that invented traditions are important for nation-building, in the same manner as symbols, histories and legends that all require "social engineering". The former can be seen in the policies of Yeltsin's administration that sought to spread new symbols and values necessary for each state, and that could help to unify nation. Myth about Great Russia was spread in history textbooks and mass culture. The most pragmatic and far-reaching strategy was the use of the Russian Orthodox Church. While ROC on its own had ethnic nationalism discourse, it was bond to the state and supported its legitimacy. In other words, taking into consideration the trust to this institution, Kremlin sought to be personified with it, sometimes neglecting the interests of the Muslim Russians.

In mid 1990s as a result of the failure of Russia's market reforms, as well as the failure of liberal, democratic politicians to pay attention to questions of nationality, ethnicity and state-building, traditional nationalist views reemerged to fill the ensuing intellectual and political vacuum. Even on the state level, one can trace ethnically nationalistic discourse. Various rightist movements represented different

approaches, but all of them sought to glorify the Russia's history and former status of empire, as well as sought to achieve a new place for Russia in the world system.

Kremlin's foreign policy was pragmatic. It can be seen, firstly, in the relations with the Russian-speakers in the near abroad. Russia was trying to achieve economic and political goals by means of compatriots. The transformation of the foreign policy presented in this part shows that Russia abandoned the idea of great power and messianism and gradually chose the multi dimensional policy. It was a pragmatic step: Russia always perceived its interest in relations with the CIS, as well as with the West.

The third chapter discussed the policy of nation-building and discourse of nationalism, as well as foreign policy of the first Russian President Boris Yeltsin. The fourth chapter is the study of Vladimir Putin's nation-building policy his discourse of nationalism. It discusses Putin's policy of strengthening power as an implication of the more successful nation-building; his program of the nation-building, its key elements, discourse of nationalism; discusses Putin's strategy of nation-building. Moreover, author seeks to study the nationalism in the sphere of religion, education and culture.

CHAPTER IV.

VLADIMIR PUTIN'S DOMESTIC POLICIES

AND THE NATURE OF RUSSIAN NATIONALISM

As it was discussed before, the main goal of the Russia's first President Boris Yeltsin was to cultivate common identity among citizens of the Russian Federation after the demise of the USSR. In the 1990s it was crucial task: customary Soviet identity no longer existed. Instead, new multinational state appeared. It had to have values and symbols, that would be meaningful for all citizens regardless their ethnic origins, religion, language etc. They were considered as means of unification of the residents of the Russian Federation. As a guarantor of the Constitution and liberal democratic leader, Yeltsin was trying to achieve this goal. However, there was more nationalistic minded opposition: both in the parliament, and among various political movements in Russia. The wide range of these movements and their ideas were discussed in the previous chapter.

In this chapter author concentrates on the domestic policy of the Russia's second President Vladimir Putin, in particular, his achievements in nation-building and state-consolidating. Author analyzes Putin's versatile program that overlaps creating new more effective symbols; sphere of education, culture; involves Russian Orthodox Church. The first part of the chapter analyzes the recentralization of the state by Vladimir Putin as a basis for successful nation-building. Second part of the chapter discusses Putin's ideas on nation-building, its core components as they are presented in his program. Further, author analyses the policy of the nation-building of Putin, relations with the Russian Orthodox Church and the nationalistic discourse in education and mass culture.

George Breslauer states that Yeltsin sought to play three historic roles:

Founder of the new state and nation; guarantor of nascent democratic institutions, of processes of Westernization and privatization and of

territorial integrity of the Russian state; integrator of Russia into Western international organizations.³⁰⁵

After the humiliating breakup of the Soviet empire, the political climate in society had become more and more colored by frustrating feeling of loss of identity among ordinary Russians. The political initiative was more and more taken over by the conservative and rightist forces in Russia. Strong and influential nationalist and “red-brown” movements emerged. This development was the mainstream trend in the late 1990s. However, the nationalist opposition in and outside the Duma was very heterogeneous including different varieties, that are presented in the third chapter. The above-mentioned division of the patriotic forces was connected to the absence of the strong leader among them. The bulk of the Russian media was in a possession of the liberal minded journalists and publishers. All these implications let Yeltsin and his administration to survive throughout 1990s.

4.1. Vladimir Putin’s Recentralization of the State and Nation-building Strategy

This part discusses the strengthening of the state by Vladimir Putin as a basis for nation-building. In the beginning Putin was dependent on three groups – Yeltsin’s “Family”, “economic liberals” and *siloviki* (key elements of the security services). They had different interests but one common goal that was a consolidated Russian state which would protect their interests.³⁰⁶ Former KGB workers or *chekisty* (taking their name from Lenin’s secret police established in 1918, the Cheka) was one of Putin’s main sources of personnel. There appeared to be a fundamental rivalry in Kremlin between the “old Moscovites”, members of Yeltsin’s “family”, and the Petersburg newcomers (economic liberals and *chekisty*).³⁰⁷

³⁰⁵ BRESLAUER, George W., “Evaluating Gorbachev and Yeltsin as Leaders”, in Archie Brown and Lilia Shevtsova (eds.), *Gorbachev, Yeltsin, Putin: Political Leadership in Russia’s Transition*, Washington, 2001, p.59

³⁰⁶ HASHIM, S. Mohsin, “Putin’s Etatization Project and Limits to Democratic Reforms in Russia”, *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Vol.38, No.1, March 2005, p.31

³⁰⁷ SAKWA, Richard, *Putin: Russia’s Choice*, London and New York: Routledge, 2004, p.62

Unlike his predecessor Putin had a pro-Presidential party – “United Russia”. Putin drew allies from the relatively obedient and hierarchical security services. He restricted the independence of oligarchs. Moreover, national identity strengthened incumbent power.³⁰⁸

Putin managed to cope with the Chechen conflict after second campaign in Chechnya and won wide public support.³⁰⁹ His political power United Russia got the majority in Duma (in December 2003 its fraction had 300 of the 450 seats) so President could control the parliament. Putin reformed the FSB, Emergencies, Interior and Defense Ministries by decreasing the number of the personnel and increasing the salaries in order to consolidate security services.³¹⁰

Putin’s power was based not on a formal coalition of political groupings but on his ability to draw forces in under the wing of the hegemonic presidency.³¹¹

One of the key tests of Putin leadership was how he would relate to Yeltsin’s elite. Putin’s policies did not challenge the economic and political privileges and semi-feudal power of neo-nomenklatura elite, but Putin was more than simply a representative of one of these factions... He clearly represented a more enlightened and developmentally progressive group disgusted at the rapacity and short-termism of the dominant Yeltsinite faction...³¹²

³⁰⁸ WAY, Lucan A., “Authoritarian State-building and the Sources of Regime Competitiveness in the Fourth Wave. The Cases of Belarus, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine”, *World Politics*, Vol. 57, No.2, January 2005, p.259

³⁰⁹ SAKWA, Richard, *Putin: Russia’s Choice*, London and New York: Routledge, 2004, p.175

³¹⁰ HASHIM, S. Mohsin, “Putin’s Etatization Project and Limits to Democratic Reforms in Russia”, *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Vol.38, No.1, March 2005, p.39

³¹¹ SAKWA, Richard, *Putin: Russia’s Choice*, London and New York: Routledge, 2004, p.63

³¹² SAKWA, Richard, *Putin: Russia’s Choice*, London and New York: Routledge, 2004, p.64

Putin started by introducing the program of re-centralization of the state. Russia was divided into “seven “super” districts based on existing military districts. Each of them was to be headed by a Putin’s appointed Presidential Representative”. Five of them were drawn from security services. They were appointed as the members of Security Council.³¹³

The new system made the emergence of regional “policy communities” more difficult since each of the new Presidential envoys is responsible for a dozen-odd regions, to which they send their own “inspectors”.³¹⁴ With only two exceptions (Nizhniy Novgorod and Novosibirsk), the new federal centers coincided with the headquarters of the military districts, suggesting a certain “militarization” of federal relations.³¹⁵

In 2000 – 2002 Putin submitted to the State Duma a package of laws designed “to strengthen and cement Russian statehood”³¹⁶. As a first step Putin initiated the reform of the Federal Council, the upper house of Russia’s bicameral Federal Assembly. According to the new system, the Federation Council was to be composed of two permanent representatives from each region, one nominated by each region’s executive branch and one by the legislature. The new “senators” were to be delegates of the regional authorities rather than popular representatives.³¹⁷

³¹³ HASHIM, S. Mohsin, “Putin’s Etatization Project and Limits to Democratic Reforms in Russia”, *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Vol.38, No.1, March 2005, p.33

³¹⁴ SAKWA, Richard, *Putin: Russia’s Choice*, London and New York: Routledge, 2004, p.141

³¹⁵ SAKWA, Richard, *Putin: Russia’s Choice*, London and New York: Routledge, 2004, p.142

³¹⁶ SAKWA, Richard, *Putin: Russia’s Choice*, London and New York: Routledge, 2004, p.146

³¹⁷ SAKWA, Richard, *Putin: Russia’s Choice*, London and New York: Routledge, 2004, p.146

Secondly, on April 4, 2002 a law that provides a President with a mechanism whereby the heads of regions could be removed and regional legislatures dissolved if they adopted laws that contradicted federal legislation.³¹⁸

The third measure was the bill approved by Duma in 2000 that allowed the President to sack the governors, as well as governors to sack the local mayors.³¹⁹

According to the law that was passed in 2000, regions had to pass a half of their revenues with the center. In 2002 this figure raised up to 62 per cent;³²⁰ 30 of 42 bilateral treaties with the subjects of the Russian Federation made by Yeltsin were abrogated.³²¹

Vladimir Putin declared the war with oligarchs; however, it was selective and politically grounded. The first Presidential term saw related moves against the independent media, particularly television that criticized Putin's regime. NTV, Gusinsky television channel, was taken by the state company, the staff of his weekly magazine *Itogi* was dismissed, and his liberal daily paper *Segodnya* forced into liquidation. Boris Berezovsky's TVC channel that took on the staff of NTV was closed.³²²

During the second term the politics concerned oil companies. Khodorkovsky, the head of Yukos, was arrested in 2003 on charges of tax evasion, but in reality he was financing opposition parties. Yuganskneftegaz, the largest Yukos asset, was acquired

³¹⁸ SAKWA, Richard, *Putin: Russia's Choice*, London and New York: Routledge, 2004, p.149

³¹⁹ HASHIM, S. Mohsin, "Putin's Etatization Project and Limits to Democratic Reforms in Russia", *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Vol.38, No.1, March 2005, p.34

³²⁰ HASHIM, S. Mohsin, "Putin's Etatization Project and Limits to Democratic Reforms in Russia", *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Vol.38, No.1, March 2005, p.33

³²¹ HASHIM, S. Mohsin, "Putin's Etatization Project and Limits to Democratic Reforms in Russia", *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Vol.38, No.1, March 2005, p.36

³²² WHITE, Stephen, "The Domestic Management of Russia's Foreign and Security Policy", in Roy Alison, Margot Light, and Stephen White (eds.), *Putin's Russia and the Enlarged Europe*, London, Chatham House, 2006, p.23

by the state oil firm. Roman Abramovich's Sibneft was bought by state-owned Gazprom.³²³

According to Gordon Hahn, Putin's policy in Chechnya has consisted of four elements: (1) giving the army, police, military intelligence and loyal Chechen forces freedom to prosecute the war while overlooking their massive human rights violations and economic criminality in order to fulfill his promise to "wipe out the terrorists in the john"; (2) refusal to negotiate with any Chechen actors that were independent of the Russian central elite; (3) some exaggeration of the level of direct involvement and operational and financial role of international Islamo-fascists in the Chechen separatist movement; and (4) the "Chechenization" of administration and, if possible, much of the fighting in the republic.³²⁴

Public opinion was supportive for the campaign perceiving it as a war with terrorism.³²⁵ After a long Russian campaign on March 2003 during the referendum 96 per cent of the residents of Chechnya voted for the constitution proposed by pro-Moscow administration; 95 per cent of citizens supported the Presidential election law and 96 per cent – the draft law on parliamentary elections.³²⁶

The turning point of Putin's presidency was Beslan siege in September 2004. Stephen White called it as the "September revolution".³²⁷ Soon after the events, a law that deprived ordinary citizens the right to call a referendum was adopted. In

³²³ LIGHT, Margot, "Russian Political Engagement with the European Union", in Roy Alison, Margot Light, and Stephen White (eds.), *Putin's Russia and the Enlarged Europe*, London, Chatham House, 2006, pp. 66 – 67

³²⁴ HAHN, Gordon, "Reforming the Federation", in Stephen White, Zvi Gitelman, and Richard Sakwa (eds.), *Developments in Russian Politics 6*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p.165

³²⁵ SAKWA, Richard, *Putin: Russia's Choice*, London and New York: Routledge, 2004, p.175

³²⁶ SAKWA, Richard, *Putin: Russia's Choice*, London and New York: Routledge, 2004, p.179

³²⁷ SAKWA, Richard, *Putin: Russia's Choice*, London and New York: Routledge, 2004, p.28

December a new law gave the President the right to nominate local governors with the further approval by the local assemblies.³²⁸

In May 2005 single-member constituencies were abolished. The threshold became 7 per cent. Political parties got monopoly to nominate candidates; those who had seats in Duma were not obliged to collect signatures in support of a candidate. A state funding for parties based on electoral support was introduced.³²⁹

Putin showed a strong preference for NGO organizations that share his enthusiasm for a strong state, nationalistic themes, and traditional Russian values.³³⁰ In 2001 through the creation of a Civic Forum Putin made an attempt to integrate civil society organizations throughout Russia into single corporatist body that would allow them an official consultative role with the government. However, soon Kremlin policy-makers gave up the idea.³³¹

In November 2005 a new law on non-governmental organizations gave the federal authorities greater power to regulate their affairs, first of all financial issues. The impetus for the adoption of the law was the series of the “colored revolution” in NIS.³³² Kremlin made attempts to regulate the funding of NGOs by declaring a list of desirable donors for the NGOs. Those ones that were not in the list were subject to a high tax.³³³

³²⁸ SAKWA, Richard, *Putin: Russia's Choice*, London and New York: Routledge, 2004, p.29

³²⁹ SAKWA, Richard, *Putin: Russia's Choice*, London and New York: Routledge, 2004, p.29

³³⁰ EVANS, Alfred B., “A Russian Civil Society?”, in Stephen White, Zvi Gitelman, and Richard Sakwa (eds.), *Developments in Russian Politics 6*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p.109

³³¹ EVANS, Alfred B., “A Russian Civil Society?”, in Stephen White, Zvi Gitelman, and Richard Sakwa (eds.), *Developments in Russian Politics 6*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p.109

³³² WHITE, Stephen, “The Domestic Management of Russia's Foreign and Security Policy”, in Roy Alison, Margot Light, and Stephen White (eds.), *Putin's Russia and the Enlarged Europe*, London, Chatham House, 2006, p.29

³³³ HASHIM, S. Mohsin, “Putin's Etatization Project and Limits to Democratic Reforms in Russia”, *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Vol.38, No.1, March 2005, p.41

Putin implemented economic reforms on the way towards market economy. He achieved a balanced budget (for only the second time in the ten-year history of post-Soviet Russia) on track for 2002; the easing of the tax burden through a 13 per cent flat rate for income tax, designed to kick start the tax-paying habit, a reduction of corporate profit tax from 35 per cent to 24 per cent, and the lowering of some import tariffs.³³⁴ Putin implemented structural reform: a Land Code that would regularize the buying and selling of land, including agricultural land, and provide the basis of a mortgage market was adopted; a package of measures to de-bureaucratize the process of setting up and running a business was introduced; a law to restrict opportunities for money laundering was adopted. Finally a new a Labor Code replaced the existing Soviet-era Code of 1972. Four bills on pension reform, which were to institute contributory and graduated pensions in place of the current one-rate-for-all state pension, were adopted.³³⁵

Under Putin, gross domestic product has risen from \$200 billion in 1999 to \$920 billion in 2006. Gold and currency reserves had risen from \$12.7 billion in 1999 to \$303.86 billion in February 2007. In 2006 the trade surplus was more than \$120 billion, and the budget surplus is currently 7.5 per cent of gross domestic product. The Russian economy is now the twelfth largest in the world.³³⁶

However, the structure of Russian society is hardly a recipe for stability.

Between 1 and 2 per cent of the population constitute really rich people; 15–20 per cent are middle class, able to save and to

³³⁴ NICHOLSON, Martin, “Putin’s Russia: Slowing the Pendulum without Stopping the Clock”, *International Affairs* (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 77, No. 4, October 2001, p.881

³³⁵ NICHOLSON, Martin, “Putin’s Russia: Slowing the Pendulum without Stopping the Clock”, *International Affairs* (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 77, No. 4, October 2001, p.881

³³⁶ SHEVTSOVA, Lilia, “Post-Communist Russia: a Historic Opportunity Missed”, *International Affairs*, Vol.83, No.5, September 2007, p.894

contribute money to their children's education; 60–65 per cent dwell in the «twilight zone» between the middle class and the poor; 15–20 per cent are fighting for survival; and 5–7 per cent have fallen to the social «bottom».³³⁷

Economic and political reforms conducted by Vladimir Putin were the necessary basis for the nation-building in Russia. The achievements on the post of prime-minister and the strengthening of the Presidential power raised the ratings of Putin and allowed him to implement his program successfully.

After the analysis of the state-building policy of Vladimir Putin, it is important to concentrate on his program of nation-building, and after it to shift to the study of the policies regarding new identity and nation construction. The next part examines the key elements of the new program of nation-building for Russia as it was presented in pre-election program of Putin and his interviews.

4.2. Putin's Discourse of Nation-building

Although Putin in his article insisted that he is “against the restoration of an official state ideology in Russia in any form”³³⁸, on several occasions he returned to the core principles of a revived Russian state. He insisted that the basis of the social accord would be based on patriotism: “Large-scale changes have taken place in an ideological vacuum. One ideology was lost and nothing new was suggested to replace it”. Soon he specified the elements of this ideology:

It is very difficult to strive for conceptual breakthroughs in the main areas of life if there are no basic values around which the nation

³³⁷ SHEVTSOVA, Lilia, “Post-Communist Russia: a Historic Opportunity Missed”, *International Affairs*, Vol.83, No.5, September 2007, p.897

³³⁸ SAKWA, Richard, *Putin: Russia's Choice*, London and New York: Routledge, 2004, p.163; PUTIN, Vladimir, *First Person: an Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia's President*, Nataliya Gevorkyan, Natalya Timakova, Andrei Kolesnikov (eds), London: Hutchinson, 2000, p.213

could rally. Patriotism, our history and religion, can and, of course, should become such basic values.³³⁹

In his *Millennium* article Putin identified Russia's "traditional values as "patriotism", "gosudarstvennichestvo" (statehood) and "social solidarity."³⁴⁰ He defined patriotism as "a feeling of pride in one's country, its history and accomplishments and the striving to make one's country better, richer, stronger and happier". He insisted that "when these sentiments are free from the tints of nationalist conceit and imperial ambitions, there is nothing reprehensible or bigoted about them."³⁴¹

According to Putin's program article his policy of the nation-building focused on four key elements. The core principle, as it was discussed above, was patriotism that rejected the exclusivity associated with the concept of nationalism but instead encompassed pride in Russia's diversity, its history and its place in the world. This was supported by a strong political statehood that could maintain internal order, the integrity of the country and assert the country's interests abroad. Third, the pragmatic patriotism was to be supra-ethnic and statist, and it was on this basis that segmented regionalism was attacked to create a homogeneous constitutional space in which the ethnocentric rights of titular elites were to be subsumed into a broader political community.³⁴² In opinion of Fish, Putin chose recentralization to separate ethnicity from identity, an effort that involves reducing the salience of ethnicity in public consciousness as well as in territorial administration.³⁴³ Finally, new nation state was

³³⁹ SAKWA, Richard, *Putin: Russia's Choice*, London and New York: Routledge, 2004, p.163

³⁴⁰ SAKWA, Richard, *Putin: Russia's Choice*, London and New York: Routledge, 2004, p.163

³⁴¹ PUTIN, Vladimir, *First Person: an Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia's President*, Nataliya Gevorkyan, Natalya Timakova, Andrei Kolesnikov (eds), London: Hutchinson, 2000, p.214

³⁴² PUTIN, Vladimir, "Millenium", (*Rossia Na Rubezhe Tysiacheletii*), *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, December 12, 1999; SAKWA, Richard, *Putin: Russia's Choice*, London and New York: Routledge, 2004, p. 163

³⁴³ FISH, Steven M., "Putin's Path", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol.12, No.4, October 2001, p.73

to be socially just. In Russia it was the most difficult to achieve. Fish, analyzing Putin's policy stresses:

In his attempt to develop and instill a practical ideology, he [Putin] has aggressively promoted its own brand of supraethnic, statist nationalism. To this end, Putin not only has attacked the ethnic republics' special privileges but has also promoted many non-ethnic-Russians in government and in the political party he controls, Edinstvo (Unity).³⁴⁴

Yet Putin's effort to build an inclusive sense of national belonging does not mean that he advocates a rights-based, civic conception. Rather, his understanding of citizenship is distinctly statist. Membership in the national community, social solidarity, and unwavering loyalty to the state and regime should, in Putin's view, form the core of citizens' public consciousness and identity. The social cement Putin is intent upon manufacturing is largely a neo-Soviet elixir. In place of the communist party and allegiance to it, however, Putin seeks to substitute the state, the constitution, and devotion to them.³⁴⁵

Following terrorist acts in Russia Yeltsin was careful not to identify any national group as responsible. However, Sven Gunnar Simonsen argues that Putin was less nuanced and sought to incriminate the Chechens as a nation, demonstrating all Chechens as "terrorists" and "bandits". Simonsen argued "Putin at an early stage of his presidency appears less sensitive to issues of ethnicity than his predecessor, meaning that his statism is not devoid of an ethnic element". In another his work scholar calls Putin's patriotism as "ethnocentric".³⁴⁶ In opinion of Simonsen the "new patriotism" comes in a loose ideological format. It is not dogmatic with regard to market relations or other aspects of policy. Rather, it is "a «minimum package» of

³⁴⁴ FISH, Steven M., "Putin's Path", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol.12, No.4, October 2001, p.73 – 74.

³⁴⁵ FISH, Steven M., "Putin's Path", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol.12, No.4, October 2001, p.74.

³⁴⁶ SIMONSEN, Sven Gunnar, "Nationalism and the Russian Political Spectrum: Locating and Evaluating the Extremes", *Journal of Political Ideologies*, Vol.6, No. 3, October 2001, p.283

policies that will secure the fundamental needs for a country in crisis”, such as as strengthening the state and the economy, introducing order, securing Russia’s territorial integrity, raising its status internationally, and strengthening the military to resist possible attacks by other powers. Simonsen sees the most apparent connection with authoritarianism (rather than political liberalism); the willingness to put to use tough measures to bring about changes appears essential in a reluctant environment. In opinion of Simonsen, Putin used the term “patriotism” in its popular way, “as a noble sentiment that may have nothing to do with the evils of nationalism”.³⁴⁷

The assumption about Putin’s ethnocentrism and authoritarianism is made on the basis of several observations. One is the way the President has allowed racism against Caucasians to grow during the Chechen war. More directly, we may consider how Putin on several occasions has identified Russia (and the Soviet Union) primarily with ethnic Russians. For instance, at his speech on Victory Day, 9 May 2000, commemorating the victory over Nazi Germany, Putin focused on the achievements of the Slavic peoples, and in particular on the ethnic Russians: “The people’s pride and Russian [*russskiy*] patriotism are immortal. And therefore no force can win over Russian [*russskoe*] arms, defeat the army”³⁴⁸. Non-Orthodox believers may find his playing on religion (in *Millennium* article he was speaking of “religion” rather than Orthodoxy) for nation-building purposes excluding, e.g., Muslims. Nevertheless, it is sufficiently evident that Putin is rather *gosudarstvennik*; his nationalism is *primarily statist* rather than *primarily ethnic*, but there is an ethnic element in it.³⁴⁹

³⁴⁷ SIMONSEN, Sven Gunnar, “Nationalism and the Russian Political Spectrum: Locating and Evaluating the Extremes”, *Journal of Political Ideologies*, Vol.6, No. 3, October 2001, p.282

³⁴⁸ PUTIN, Vladimir, Speech at the Reception In Commemoration 55th Anniversary of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War 1941 – 1945, (*Vystuplenie Na Torzhestvennom Prieme V Oznamenovanie 55-y Godovshchiny Pobedy V Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyne 1941–1945 Godov*), May 9, 2000, available from http://euroasia.cass.cn/2006Russia/Russia/speech_President/2000/28725.htm, (accessed August 10, 2010)

³⁴⁹ SIMONSEN, Sven Gunnar, “Nationalism and the Russian Political Spectrum: Locating and Evaluating the Extremes”, *Journal of Political Ideologies*, Vol.6, No. 3, October 2001, p.283

Steven Fish with the reference to Ken Jowitt characterizes Putin's policy as a search for "practical ideology". Fish agrees with Simonsen that Putin indeed promoted supraethnic statist nationalism. "In place of the Communist party and allegiance to it, Putin seeks to substitute the state, the constitution, and devotion to them".³⁵⁰ However for the Russian citizens both these notions are abstract, they needed concrete embodiment, therefore Presidential team chose three institution that could gain public respect and devotion. These were presidency and the President himself, military and, finally, law. They were to supplement his program of nation-building with the practical, "real" institutions. In practice, the programs of military-patriotic education were introduced in schools (this will be discussed later), as well as new criminal code was adopted.³⁵¹

Richard Sakwa also describes Putin as a liberal statist (*gosudarstvennik*). Scholar thinks that Putin inherited this liberal statist tradition from his predecessor and his milieu, although there were some crucial differences. Firstly, Putin refused idea of Russian as a balance between East and West. He recognized strategic and economic interests of Russia in Asia, but considered it as a part of West. Secondly, Putin accepted the presence of Russians outside the RF refused all ideas of Russian nationalists to challenge the territorial integrity of neighbors. Thirdly, Putin's patriotism was liberal in economic sphere. Fourthly, he was aware of the importance of preserving interethnic peace in Russia and the harm that can be caused to its territorial integrity by xenophobia. He concludes that Putin was a civic nation builder, demonstrated "a new type of pragmatic minimal patriotism – shorn of nationalistic excesses".³⁵²

Putin's policies of the nation-building show his statist character. "Practical ideology" based on patriotism were the necessary measure for Russia. Its pragmatic task was to

³⁵⁰ FISH, Steven M., "Putin's Path", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol.12, No.4, October 2001, p.74

³⁵¹ FISH, Steven M., "Putin's Path", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol.12, No.4, October 2001, pp.74 – 75.

³⁵² SAKWA, Richard, *Putin: Russia's Choice*, London and New York: Routledge, 2004, pp.167 – 168.

fulfill vacuum that were in Russia after the collapse of Socialism. The traditional Russian institutions were presented as a strong point of the state and source of proud for its citizens. The division of the state into seven districts was to replace the loyalty to one's ethnic group by the loyalty to the state and its institutions.

After the discussion of the program of the nation-building and discourse of nationalism, it is important to analyze its implementation. The third part of this chapter discusses the concrete policies of the new nation construction in Russia.

4.3. Putin's Policy of Nation-building

As author presented before for any nation state symbols and images are crucially important. Putin sought to reconcile Russia's various pasts to overcome divisions between different political groups by means of introducing new symbols and myths.

One of the biggest Putin's achievements was to put the end to the provisional character of the post-Soviet era. On December 8, 2000 a Federal Law on State Anthem was adopted by the President.³⁵³ New Russian Anthem was in reality the old anthem composed in 1943 by Alexander Alexandrov, with the new words written by the author of the original lyrics Sergei Mikhalkov.³⁵⁴ However new anthem provoked debates among politicians and intelligentsia and marked a line between them. The cultural intelligentsia's interpretation of the anthem constituted the most vocal and passionate criticism of the Soviet period, and consequently the most emphatic support of Russia's fledgling democracy, in years. At the same time, the overwhelming support of the anthem by the government and a plurality of Russia's

³⁵³ Federal Constitutional Law of the Russian Federation on State Anthem of the Russian Federation, (*Federal'nii Konstitutsionnii Zakon Rossiiskoi Federatsii o Gosudarstvennom Gimne Rossiiskoi Federatsii*), December 8, 2000, available from <http://www.gazeta.ru/2000/12/09/polnyjtekstz.shtml>, (accessed on August 10, 2010)

³⁵⁴ DAUGHTRY, J. Martin, "Russia's New Anthem and the Negotiation of National Identity", *Ethnomusicology*, Vol. 47, No. 1, Winter 2003, pp.46 – 47

146 million citizens was powerful evidence of a widespread nostalgia for the Soviet period, and proof of Putin's political mandate.³⁵⁵

On the same day, December 8, 2000 the two-headed Tsarist eagle, stripped on the shields denoting Muscovy's victory over the former Russian principalities, but with the addition of two small crowns flanking a large one intended to symbolize the sovereignty of the Russian federation and its republics became a state emblem.³⁵⁶

On December 25, the tricolor was confirmed as a state flag of the Russian Federation.³⁵⁷ It thus appeared that all three periods of the Russian twenty-first century history had been reconciled: the Tsarist, brief experiment with democracy in 1917, and the Soviet era.³⁵⁸

There were other arenas of symbolic contestation. One of the problems was what to do with Lenin's embalmed remains in the mausoleum on the Red Square, built on Stalin's orders in 1924 after Lenin's death. Putin understood that it is an extremely crucial issue for society that could provoke debates. On the press conference on July 18, 2001 he stated that he opposed the removal Lenin's body from the Red Square. He stressed that this is important for the people who still associate their lives with Lenin, and removal of his body can deprive them of the values they have been living with for a long time.³⁵⁹ However, this statement has another side. Putin's career

³⁵⁵ DAUGHTRY, J. Martin, "Russia's New Anthem and the Negotiation of National Identity", *Ethnomusicology*, Vol. 47, No. 1, Winter 2003, p. 61

³⁵⁶ Federal Constitutional Law of the Russian Federation on the State Emblem of the Russian Federation, (*Federal'nii Konstitutsionnii Zakon Rossiiskoi Federatsii O Gosudarstvennom Gerbe Rossiiskoi Federatsii*), December 8, 2000, available from http://www.goldenkorona.ru/zakon_gerb.html, (accessed on August 18, 2010)

³⁵⁷ Federal Constitutional Law of the Russian Federation on the State Flag of the Russian Federation, (*Federal'nii Konstitutsionnii Zakon Rossiiskoi Federatsii O Gosudarstvennom Flage Rossiiskoi Federatsii*), December 25, 2000, available from <http://www.kostyor.ru/history/flag.html>, (accessed on August 18, 2010)

³⁵⁸ SAKWA, Richard, *Putin: Russia's Choice*, London and New York: Routledge, 2004, p.165

³⁵⁹ SAKWA, Richard, *Putin: Russia's Choice*, London and New York: Routledge, 2004, p.165

before the demise of the USSR was made in state bodies of power, shadowed by Lenin and other Communist leaders. The removal of the body of outstanding leader could present Putin as a controversial President. On the other hand, the Lenin's monument is still adorns many cities and towns' main squares not only in Russia, but in most of the Soviet successor states. In many cities the main street still has the name Lenin Prospect. An attack on Lenin could lead to controversies everywhere.

Restoration of the Soviet anthem and decision not to remove Lenin's body from the mausoleum provoke rhetoric among democrats about neo-Sovietism. The discourse was encouraged by the decision of the President Putin to restore red flag as a symbol of the Russian Army.³⁶⁰ However, Putin appeared to be inconsistent in this trend. On the one hand Putin refused to open Kremlin's Presidential Archive (former archive of Politburo) for scholars; on the other hand he intervened in 2002 in the debates on the restoration the name Stalingrad to the city where one of the most crucial battles of the Second World War took place. He explained that Russia is not going to return to the times of Stalinism.³⁶¹

In his first Address to Federal Assembly on 10 June 2000, Putin showed his awareness of the expectations of Russian people by saying that "Russia's only real choice should be the choice of a strong country, strong and confident".³⁶² In order to create a strong state, Putin has seemed to advocate a civic and non-ethnic definition of Russian nation. Considering the multi-ethnic structure of Russian Federation,

³⁶⁰ Federal Law of the Russian Federation on a Flag of the Military Forces of the Russian Federation, Flag of the Navy and Flags of Other Military Forces of the Russian Federation, and Flags of the Other Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, (*Federal'noi Zakon Rossiiskoi Federatsii O Znameni Vooruzhennykh Sil Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Znameni VoЕННО-Morskogo Flota, Znamenakh Inykh Vidov Vooruzhennykh Sil Rossiiskoi Federatsii I Znamenakh Drugikh Voisk*), December 29, 2000, available from <http://www.rusflag.ru/docm/zarimbpr3.htm#flagimg1>, (accessed August 10, 2010)

³⁶¹ SAKWA, Richard, *Putin: Russia's Choice*, London and New York: Routledge, 2004, p.166

³⁶² Address of the President of Russia Vladimir Putin to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, "The State of Russia: A Way to an Effective State", (*Obrasheniie Prezidenta Rossii Vladimira Putina K Federal'noi Assambleie Rossiiskoi Federatsii "Gosudarstvo Rossiia: Put' K Effektivnomu Gpsudarstvu"*), July 7, 2000, available from <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/russia/2000/russia-000710a.htm>, (accessed August 10, 2010)

Putin, first, has strived to disseminate a sense of common values and identification which are necessary to construct a civic nation. He has drawn attention to the unity of Russia engendered by cultural traditions, moral and spiritual values, and common historical values. At the same time, Putin expressed that Russia is in the beginning of a new spiritual development, which is vital to integrate multi ethnic people of Russia to new state. In order to ensure unity of Russian people, tri-color flag was accepted as the national flag while double-headed eagle became the new national anthem. Keeping the tsarist flag and eagle as national anthems, “Putin sought to build a Russian multi-ethnic identity on the basis of positive elements within both imperial and the Soviet traditions, and create a consensus”³⁶³. Therefore, he reorganized federal nature of Russian Federation in introducing seven superregions which don’t have ethnic connotations. In his each speech to Federal Assembly, Putin reiterated that the “only source and bearer of power in the Russian Federation is its multiethnic people”³⁶⁴. In the same way, he described the Russia

...as a union of many peoples and cultures and the idea of a common community, a community in which people of different nationalities and religions live together, has been at the foundation of the Russian peoples spiritual outlook for many centuries now”³⁶⁵.

utin’s advocacy to a civic nation does not mean that the domestic policies he has followed supported this idea completely. In contrast, according to John Dunlop, Putin is sponsoring a new imperial project which aims at bringing ethnic Russians

³⁶³ DUNCAN, Peter J. S., “Contemporary Russian Identity between East and West”, *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 48, No. 1, 2005, p.287

³⁶⁴ Address of the President of Russia Vladimir Putin to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, (*Obrasheniie Prezidenta Rossii Vladimira Putina K Federal’noi Assambleie Rossiiskoi Federatsii*), May 26, 2004, available from http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2004/05/26/1309_type70029type82912_71650.shtml, (accessed August 10, 2010)

³⁶⁵ Address of the President of Russia Vladimir Putin to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, (*Obrasheniie Prezidenta Rossii Vladimira Putina K Federal’noi Assambleie Rossiiskoi Federatsii*), April 26, 2007, available from http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2007/04/26/1209_type70029type82912_125670.shtml, (accessed August 10, 2010)

superiority over non- Russians. He points out that the decree ordering the creation of seven federal districts within Russia recasts this aim. Because the governors of these districts are being appointed by Putin, they become instruments for taking control of finances, taxation, security services in these regions. In addition, centralization of state by downgrading the status of autonomous republics, Putin regime ignores the non-Russians' representation and protection, which is mainly directed towards Islamic populace.³⁶⁶ As John Dunlop, Peter Duncan concludes that “Putin nationalism was state-centered and in some ways imperial”.³⁶⁷

On one hand, Putin has committed with existing border of Russian Federation and referred to people as “Rossiiskii” which defines multi-ethnicity of Russia. On the other hand, Putin, as Yeltsin, extended civic definition of a nation to ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking population in near abroad to cover the premise “compatriots”. Generally, the attitude of Putin towards compatriots and the states where compatriots reside is perceived as a part of his imperial policy.

Putin managed to complete the policy began by Yeltsin and introduced legally new state symbols. At the same time he managed to protect the important symbols of the Soviet past. He sought to unite the citizens of the Russian Federation not rejecting any of important groups.

Discussing the policy of the nation-building in post-Soviet Russia, it is important to study the role of the Russian Orthodox Church in this process and its discourse of the Russian nationalism, insofar ROC has been and is one of the most important non-political institutions in Russian society. The next part will study the Russian Orthodox Church's discourse of the Russian nationalism and nation-building in Russia.

³⁶⁶ DUNLOP, John B., “Russia under Putin: Reintegrating «Post-Soviet Space»”, *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 11, No. 3, July 2000, pp. 45-46

³⁶⁷ DUNCAN, Peter J. S., “Contemporary Russian Identity between East and West”, *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 48, No. 1, 2005, p. 294

4.4. The Rise of Russian Nationalism and Russian Orthodox Church under V. Putin

To analyze Russian nationalism in 2000s it is not sufficient only to study political discourse and policy-making in merely political sphere. It is important to analyze it in whole, i.e. how Russian national idea was considered by cultural intelligentsia, how the education could serve to the goal of the cultivation of common identity among Russian citizens. This part is devoted to the discourse of the Russian Orthodox Church.

During his second inauguration ceremony in August 1996 and in legislation 1997, which sought to regulate life of the organized churches, Yeltsin identified four historical religions in Russia: Orthodoxy, Islam, Buddhism, and Judaism. However, dozens of others existed and conducted active proselytizing work in Russia, much to the alarm of the official Orthodox hierarchy. Others, for example Roman Catholic Church, had long existed in Russia with a community numbering over half a million, but Roma and its acolytes were regarded with suspicion verging on paranoia by the leadership of ROC. The creation by the Pope in February 2002 of four new dioceses in Russia enraged Patriarch Aleksii II, who responded by blocking the Pope's visit.³⁶⁸ Sakwa argues that Russian Orthodox Church plays an exceptional role in the development of the Russian national identity.³⁶⁹

1993 Constitution of Russia formally separated the Church from the state. Thus Article 14.1 states that "The Russian Federation is a secular state. No religion may be established as the state religion or a compulsory religion". At the same time Article 14.2 insists that "Religious associations are separated from the state and are equal before the law".³⁷⁰ In the 1990s ROC had retreated from direct participation in

³⁶⁸ SAKWA, Richard, *Putin: Russia's Choice*, London and New York: Routledge, 2004, p.169

³⁶⁹ SAKWA, Richard, *Putin: Russia's Choice*, London and New York: Routledge, 2004, p.169

³⁷⁰ Article 14, Constitution of the Russian Federation (*Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii*), December 12, 1993, available from <http://www.constitution.ru/>, (accessed on August 17, 2010)

political life of the state and sought to present itself as a non-partisan keeper of the nation's spiritual values. In the last years of the Soviet Union and early post-Communist years Aleksii II and other clerics had been elected to the Soviet and Russian parliaments, but by 1993 they had withdrawn from the active campaigning and clerics were forbidden from running for office. The church refused to endorse particular candidates or specific party platforms.³⁷¹ In opinion of Edwin Bacon this was one factor allowing the church to retain a high degree of trust as a social institution.³⁷²

“Although not the state religion, Orthodoxy was certainly for Putin the religion of the state”.³⁷³ In his public speeches he stresses Russia's religious pluralism, but in his public life he attends Orthodox services. During Putin's visit in Vatican in 2007 Pope Benedict XVI described Putin as a “true believer who pays much attention to the (Orthodox) Church and who always listens to the Patriarch's opinion”.³⁷⁴ Putin has a spiritual father (*duhovnii otets*), who is the deputy head of the Sretensky Monastery, archimandrite Tikhon. On a visit to Vaalam monastery on a White Sea Putin remarked that without Orthodoxy there would be no Russia. Archimandrite Tikhon is no liberal, insisting that the only alternatives facing Russia were “the horrors of Islamic terrorism and the no less terrible power of those who seek to achieve total American hegemony”. Putin enjoyed a particularly close relationship with the Patriarch, and on numerous occasions sought his advice. For many Russians the church was the source of values and traditions around which a post-Communist national identity could be constructed. This was reflected in Putin's congratulations for Aleksii II on the day of the 10th anniversary of his enthronement in 2000:

³⁷¹ GVOSDEV, Nicholas K., “The New Party Card? Orthodoxy and Search for Post-Soviet Identity”, *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol. 47, No. 6, November-December 2000, p.32

³⁷² BACON, Edwin, “Church and State in Contemporary Russia: Conflicting Discourses”, in Rick Fawn and Stephen White (eds.), *Russia After Communism*, London, Frank Cass, 2002, pp.97 – 116

³⁷³ SAKWA, Richard, *Putin: Russia's Choice*, London and New York: Routledge, 2004, p.170

³⁷⁴ “Putin to Hold First Meeting with Pope on Italy Trip”, *Reuters*, March 13, 2007

The church is recovering its traditional mission as a key force in promoting social stability and moral unity around general priorities of justice, patriotism, good works, constructive labor and family values.³⁷⁵

The Orthodox Church, moreover, was also a symbol of the unity of the Eastern Slavs, and thus reflected the larger identity of Russians (*russkie*) as the people of Eurasia divided most inconveniently by the borders that appeared after the demise of the USSR. The church helped in part to fill the vacuum left after the breakup of the Soviet Union, Communist Party and its version of the Marxist-Leninist ideology, and thus acted as a source of values around which much of the nation could unite. However, quasi-official role played by the Orthodox Church and its close relationship with the state under Putin suggested to many that it could act a new instrument of state ideological control.³⁷⁶

Starting from the Presidential campaign Putin sought to stress his link to Russian Orthodox Church. In January 2000 during Putin's campaign Patriarch Aleksii gave his blessing to Putin.³⁷⁷ In March 2000 Putin and Aleksii II met with the Higher Patriarch and Catholicos of the Armenians Garegin II. Next month they congratulated Archimandrite of the Pskov-Pecherskii Monastery father Ioann that provoked many talks regarding purpose of the visit.³⁷⁸ During inauguration ceremony of Putin in May 2000 patriarch Aleksii II gave his blessing to the newly elected President. The representatives of all religious confessions were invited to the ceremony of inauguration. In official text accompanied the ceremony it was stressed

³⁷⁵ SAKWA, Richard, *Putin: Russia's Choice*, London and New York: Routledge, 2004, p.170; "Russian Elite Congratulated Aleksii II", (*Rossiiskaia Elita Pozdravila Aleksiya II*), *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, June 14, 2000

³⁷⁶ GVOSDEV, Nicholas K., "The New Party Card? Orthodoxy and Search for Post-Soviet Identity", *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol. 47, No. 6, November-December 2000, pp.29 - 38

³⁷⁷ "Russian Elite Congratulated Aleksii II", (*Rossiiskaia Elita Pozdravila Aleksiya II*), *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, June 14, 2000

³⁷⁸ "Patriarch and President Congratulated Monastic Elder", (*Patriarkh I Prezident Pozdravili Startsa*), *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, April 26, 2000

that “the absence of preference to one of the confessions means the equal attitude of the new authority to all traditional for Russia religions”.³⁷⁹

After the elections, the relations between Putin and Orthodox Church became even closer. Thus in March 2000 Putin signed a law that postponed a deadline for the registration of the religious organizations. Despite expectation that was merely a respond to the policy of ROC and some Muslim institutions that lobbied the law, but not the sign of the new policy of tolerance towards all religions in Russia. Many protestant religious organizations that have registration are refused to rent buildings for their services.³⁸⁰ In January 2010 Putin signed new National Security Concept. The old one, signed by Yeltsin in 1997 stressed the role of the Russian Orthodox Church in preservation values³⁸¹; the new version of the document does not mention the ROC but underlies that “spiritual and moral education of the citizens” should be regulated by the state policy.³⁸² Moreover, the old version of the Conception saw the main threat to Russia in religious sphere in “destructive activity of various religious sects”³⁸³, while the new Conception mentioned the “negative influence of the foreign missionaries”.³⁸⁴ Moscow Patriarchy supports Putin’s policy: Patriarch Aleksii II

³⁷⁹ “Blessing on Presidentship”, (*Blagoslovenii na Prezidentstvo*), *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, May 17, 2000

³⁸⁰ “Freedom of the Conscience as a factor of Struggle with the Governors”, (*Sovoda Sovesti Kak Faktor Bor’by S Gubernatorami*), *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, May 17, 2000

³⁸¹ National Security Concept of the Russian Federation, (*Kontseptsiiia Natsional’noi Bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii*), December 17, 1997, available from <http://terroristica.info/node/208>, (accessed August 10, 2010)

³⁸² National Security Concept of the Russian Federation, (*Kontseptsiiia Natsional’noi Bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii*), January 10, 2000, available <http://www.armscontrol.ru/start/rus/docs/sncon00.htm>, (accessed August 10, 2010)

³⁸³ National Security Concept of the Russian Federation, (*Kontseptsiiia Natsional’noi Bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii*), December 17, 1997, available from <http://terroristica.info/node/208>, (accessed August 10, 2010)

³⁸⁴ National Security Concept of the Russian Federation, (*Kontseptsiiia Natsional’noi Bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii*), January 10, 2000, available <http://www.armscontrol.ru/start/rus/docs/sncon00.htm>, (accessed August 10, 2010)

supported Putin's policy in Chechnya, accusing West in the policy of double standards regarding the critics of the war in Chechnya.³⁸⁵

However, in his words Putin preferred middle way between supporting religious pluralism and freedom, and yet preferring the Russian Orthodox. This approach was marked in January 2001 when he organized a ceremony at the Kremlin, where he presented state medals to the leading Orthodox clergy. His speech included "a stirring rallying-cry in favor of religious freedom"³⁸⁶:

We have stepped over the threshold of the 2000th anniversary of the history of Christianity and are convinced that once and for all we have done away with spiritual nihilism and moral poverty and with the century of fierce struggle for the individual's right to believe. We enter the new millennium with hope, which, I am convinced, will be a time of historic and spiritual transformation of our motherland, Russia.³⁸⁷

ROC expressed its view on its place in Russian society in early 2001 during World Russian National Congress, which gathered a wide variety of politicians and public officials, and that is initiated and organized by the Russian Orthodox Church and its two top officials Patriarch Aleksii II and Metropolitan Kirill. Congress, among other things, called for

...a reevaluation of the school system and the system of higher education so that the citizens of Russia, from cradle to grave, feel

³⁸⁵ "Freedom of the Conscience as a Factor of Struggle with the Governors", (*Sovoda Sovesti Kak Faktor Bor'by s Gubernatorami*), *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, May 17, 2000

³⁸⁶ BACON, Edwin, "Church and State in Contemporary Russia: Conflicting Discourses", in Rick Fawn and Stephen White (eds.), *Russia after Communism*, London, Frank Cass, 2002, pp.97 – 116.

³⁸⁷ "Putin Presented Award to Outstanding Christian Pastors", (*Putin Vruchil Nagrady Vidnym Hristianskim Oastyriam*), *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, January 18, 2001

themselves as living in a society with Christian oriented ethics, esthetics, politics, law, family, and economy.³⁸⁸

Another significant statement was made about “the divided Russian people”:

It is a great Russian national task to reunite the divided Russian people within its historical statehood. The World Russian National Congress considers it necessary to point out that without a direct and unequivocal reestablishment of the historically rightful Russian Federation, not the one from 1991 and not from 1922, but the one from 1917, it will be impossible to change today’s situation of Russians as a divided people.³⁸⁹

As we see, ROC promoted not only the ideas of uniqueness and privileges of itself, but also served to the state nationalism. It violated the premise to stay outside the politics and clearly expressed a wish to support Putin’s program. Former Orthodox priest Mark Smirnov has called position of the Orthodox Church in a contemporary Russian society “a natural continuation of Russian Orthodox history”.³⁹⁰

However, within the Orthodox Church there is a fundamental disagreement about the status of Russia as a multinational, multicultural state. Metropolitan Kirill participated in this discussion. In his work “Norms of the Faith as Norms of Life” priest raised a question of contradiction between liberal civilization standards, on the one hand, and values of national, cultural and religious identity, on the other hand. In his opinion, this contradiction is the main challenge for humanity in the twenty-first

³⁸⁸ STAALESEN, Atle, “Orthodoxy and Islam in Post-Soviet Russia: Opposing Confessional Cultures or Unifying Force?”, in Pal Kolsto and Helge Blakkisrud (eds.), *Nation-building and Common Values in Russia*, Oxford, 2004, p.304

³⁸⁹ STAALESEN, Atle, “Orthodoxy and Islam in Post-Soviet Russia: Opposing Confessional Cultures or Unifying Force?”, in Pal Kolsto and Helge Blakkisrud (eds.), *Nation-building and Common Values in Russia*, Oxford, 2004, p.304

³⁹⁰ STAALESEN, Atle, “Orthodoxy and Islam in Post-Soviet Russia: Opposing Confessional Cultures or Unifying Force?”, in Pal Kolsto and Helge Blakkisrud (eds.), *Nation-building and Common Values in Russia*, Oxford, 2004, p.304

century. Kirill described the liberal society as a system based on unrestrained individualism and the contemporary Western lifestyle as deprived of all moral restraint. Although he believes that liberal society is incompatible with the Christian ideals. Kirill doesn't reject completely the idea of liberalism. He offers a third way between "isolationism" and liberalism: a liberal economy and political system can be morally justified as long as the principle of liberal philosophy doesn't become a part of people's private life and human relations. "if the liberal idea is put as the basis for our public model of development," the prelate asserts, "then the sphere of upbringing, education, and human relations must be founded on the system of traditional values of Russia". However these traditional values of Russia seem to be not Orthodox values. Metropolitan Kirill is trying to adjust the Russian reality to modernity approach:

The rapid development of communications technology lately has fundamentally changed not only the very picture of the world but also the relationship among individuals, nations, and states. The period of monoethnic and monoconfessional states is slowly coming to an end. The Muslim presence on the European continent has become a social and cultural factor that cannot be ignored. The world has become open, diffuse, interactive.³⁹¹

Furthermore, Kirill warns against what he calls a vanishing cultural pluralism:

If Europe, and, perhaps, the whole world, is unified on the basis of a common cultural and civilizational norm, it will perhaps be easier to rule, but the beauty of diversity and also people's happiness will probably vanish. The standards that consciously and unconsciously lead to the destruction of people's national and cultural identity will

³⁹¹ Metropolitan of Smolensk and Kaliningrad Kirill, "Norms of Faith as Norms of Life" (*Normy Very Kak Normy Zhizni*), *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, February 16, 2000

inevitably impoverish this God-made world, impede its unification, and the last resort lead to its collapse.³⁹²

Kirill's principle is that Russia should rely on its own traditions and those traditions are not exclusively Orthodox. In his opinion Orthodoxy, Islam, Buddhism and Judaism must form the base for the Russia's value system.³⁹³

In opinion of Gvosdev, Orthodoxy could be used as ethnic and political marker for Russian identity and as a new value system to undergird new post-Soviet regime. The church is also likely to emerge as an important symbol of the unity of the state at a time when Putin's administration appears to be making a bid for a significant recentralization of political power in the hands of the local governments. At the same time since Russia is only a portion of the base of the Russian Orthodox Church, the promotion of the transnational Orthodox identity will continue to be one of the several factors keeping other states of the former Soviet Union in some sort of the Muscovite orbit.³⁹⁴ However, pluralism of Metropolitan does have clear limitations: nontraditional confessions does not have place in Russia's values system.

The editor of the journal *Pravoslavnoe Knizhnoe Obozrenie* (Orthodox Book Review) Vitalii Aver'ianov described any concessions to liberalism as a "betrayal": "Not the wide perspective of "free choice" but only the narrow path of truth can really liberate people. Orthodoxy is hardly compatible with today's policy of freedom."³⁹⁵ Like Kirill Aver'ianov wants to prevent Russia from adopting global cultural norms. However, unlike prelate, Aver'ianov is opposed to any external

³⁹² Metropolitan of Smolensk and Kaliningrad Kirill, "Norms of Faith as Norms of Life" (*Normy Very Kak Normy Zhizni*), *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, February 16, 2000

³⁹³ Metropolitan of Smolensk and Kaliningrad Kirill, "Norms of Faith as Norms of Life" (*Normy Very Kak Normy Zhizni*), *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, February 16, 2000

³⁹⁴ GVOSDEV, Nicholas K., "The New Party Card? Orthodoxy and Search for Post-Soviet Identity", *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol. 47, No. 6, November-December 2000, p.36

³⁹⁵ AVER'IANOV, Vitalii, "About the Synthesis of the Orthodox Idea", (*O Sinteze Pravoslavnoi Idei*), *Nezavisimaia Gazeta – Religii*, March 7, 2000

cultural influences whatsoever. Russia must be built on a conservative Russian Orthodox ideology that “does not adapt to the outside world but makes the outside world adapt to Orthodoxy.”³⁹⁶

Statements of Aver'ianov and his supporters influenced the multiconfessional situation in Russia. It's hardly surprising that the intolerance towards Islam and other religions increased. Thus the director of the Orthodox media group Radonezh Evgenii Nikiforov argued that Muslim religious culture simply doesn't fit into contemporary Russian life:

A Muslim society has a value foundation that is completely different from a Christian society, which is based on Christian teaching on human dignity. Islam has a different idea about the institutions of society. Notions such as human rights and democracy have a completely different meaning for Muslims. If we want to survive as a people, if we love our culture and the sanctity of our religion, then freedom, mercy, peoples' respect for one another, the protection of humanity in the entire public sphere must become a basis for an ideology of the new Russia.³⁹⁷

According to Nikiforov, the only way to resist “the threats of the Muslim world” is to strengthen Russian Orthodoxy and its position in society.³⁹⁸

One who makes assumptions that Russian Orthodox Church is promoting its uniqueness and exclusiveness and supports the power in the state in order to achieve privileged position certainly simplifies the situation. The role of the Orthodox Church and its place in post-Soviet society is much complicated. After the demise of

³⁹⁶ AVER'IANOV, Vitalii, “About the Synthesis of the Orthodox Idea”, (*O Sinteze Pravoslavnoi Idei*), *Nezavisimaia Gazeta – Religii*, March 7, 2000

³⁹⁷ SHVETSOV, Nikolai, “What Can Be a Response to the Challenge of Islam”, (*Chto Mozhet Byt' Otvetom Na Vyzov Islama*), *Nezavisimaia Gazeta – Religii*, November 10, 1999

³⁹⁸ SHVETSOV, Nikolai, “What Can Be a Response to the Challenge of Islam”, (*Chto Mozhet Byt' Otvetom Na Vyzov Islama*), *Nezavisimaia Gazeta – Religii*, November 10, 1999

the USSR, ROC appeared to be a substitution to the state ideology of Communism. It was a unifying factor, at least for the Slavic population of Russia that was an essential part of the new identity. Being the most trustful institution in Russian society, ROC gave legitimacy to the power institutions and politicians who sought to involve Church into public affairs. One can hardly speak about nationalistic rhetoric of the ROC, its aim to make Orthodoxy the only “official” religion in Russia. The top-clergy in ROC understood and promoted the multicultural and multiconfessional nature of Russia. At the same time there are conservative members of the Orthodox Church that see Russian way of development to be based on Orthodox values exclusively. As to the position of Putin regarding ROC, it was pragmatic. The ROC was used as means of support of policies of the new President. Although the appeal to Orthodoxy could promote interethnic tensions in society, Putin by means of ROC gained much more support than if he did not appeal to any of the confessions or promoted multiconfessionalism.

Along with the Orthodox Church, the important place in society has the education and phenomenon of mass culture. They were also seen as means of promoting new patriotic ideas. Next part will analyze the discourse of patriotism and nationalism in the sphere of education and culture.

4.5. The Rise of Russian Nationalism in the Sphere of Culture and Education

In 1999 the Coordinating Council was created for the cooperating of the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation and Russian Orthodox Church. The aim of the Council was to prepare the implementation into the school programs the course of the Orthodox Culture. In 2001 the first project of this course was prepared and sent to the regions. The regional authorities had the right to decide whether to include the course of the Orthodox Culture into the school programs. Starting from September 1, 2006 it was introduced in 15 regions of the Russian Federation.³⁹⁹

³⁹⁹ “In Schools the Lessons of Orthodoxy are Being Introduced”, (*V Shkolakh Vvodyat Uroki Pravoslaviia*), *Komsomol'skaia Pravda*, September 1, 2006

Patriarch Aleksii stressed the importance of this course for schoolchildren: “If in our country there are people who confess other religions, they, for sure, should study their culture, but they also have to know the culture of the country, they are living in”.⁴⁰⁰ However, in December 2007 President Putin signed law liquidated the right of the regional and local authorities to regulate the system of education. Finally, in 2009 Cabinet of Ministers issued a decree implementing the course of Basics of Religious Cultures and Orthodox Ethics in 2010 – in 18 subjects of the RF, and since 2012 - on the whole territory of the Russian Federation. Important to stress that, the program included not only the Basics of Orthodox Culture course, but also courses on Buddhism, Islam, Judaism.⁴⁰¹

The nationalistic discourse can be traced in the field of education, especially in history. The new recipes for national identities are not original. They involve inventing deep historic, even pre-historic roots for a people, fashioning new historical heroes, and constructing the history that stress glory and achievement. This process is an under-standable response to the nationalist charge to legitimate new states and can be accomplished partly with the tools of education and scholarship. History is a powerful instrument for raising self-esteem and revalorizing the status of a nation among other nations. The logic is specific: we are a people with a glorious past and our roots are in ancient times. Ergo, we should enjoy special rights, for example, the right to be free of taxes paid to a federal center, that is, Moscow.⁴⁰²

⁴⁰⁰ Interview with Patriarch Alexii II, available from <http://religion.sova-center.ru/events/13B7455/13DF6DE/7DE904F>, (accessed August 10, 2010)

⁴⁰¹ “Medvedev Proposed Religious-Educational Experiment” (*Medvedev Predlozhit RELigiozno-Obrazovatel'nyy Eksperiment*), *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, July 21, 2009; “Spirituality in Schools Has Been Given Start” (*Dukhovnosti v Shkole Dan Start*), *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, December 30, 2009; “School Afterburning” (*Shkol'nyy Forsazh*), *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, December 14, 2009

⁴⁰² VOLODINA, Tatyana, “Teaching History in Russia after the Collapse of the USSR”, *The History Teacher*, Vol. 38, No. 2, February 2005, pp.184 - 185

On July 11, 2005 “State Program of the Patriotic Education of the Russian Federation Citizens on 2006-2010 Years” was adopted.⁴⁰³ The aim of the program was

to improve the system of the patriotic education that guarantees the development of Russia as free, democratic state, develops among the citizens of the Russian Federation patriotic consciousness, allegiance to the state and willingness to fulfill constitutional duties.⁴⁰⁴

The main directions of the program were the improvement of the process of the patriotic education; the development of the scientific, theoretic and methodic grounds of the patriotic education; the coordination of the work of the public organizations; information supply for the implementation of the program; and the use of the state symbols. The Program was to overlap the institutions of secondary and higher education, institutions of science and culture, mass media, cinematograph and art aiming to strengthen the patriotic idea of Russian Federation.⁴⁰⁵

However, long before the adoption of the state program in Russian cinematograph and literature anti-Western attitudes could be traced. Thus, for example, Aleksandr Prokhanov’s *Gospodin Geksogen* [Mr Hexogen, 2002], winner of the “National Bestseller Prize” in 2002, which marks the growing appeal of a new kind of anti-Western, politically committed Russian nationalist literature in the twenty-first century. Novel satirizes many of Russia’s main politicians of the last decade,

⁴⁰³ “State Program of the Patriotic Education of the Russian Federation Citizens on 2006-2010 Years” (*Gosudarstvennaya Programma Patrioticheskogo Vospitaniia Grazhdan Rossiiskoi Federatsii NA 2006 0 2010 Gody*), July 11, 2005, available from www.llr.ru/razdel3.php?id_r2=55, (accessed August 10, 2010)

⁴⁰⁴ “State Program of the Patriotic Education of the Russian Federation Citizens on 2006-2010 Years” (*Gosudarstvennaya Programma Patrioticheskogo Vospitaniia Grazhdan Rossiiskoi Federatsii NA 2006 0 2010 Gody*), July 11, 2005, available from www.llr.ru/razdel3.php?id_r2=55, (accessed August 10, 2010)

⁴⁰⁵ “State Program of the Patriotic Education of the Russian Federation Citizens on 2006-2010 Years” (*Gosudarstvennaya Programma Patrioticheskogo Vospitaniia Grazhdan Rossiiskoi Federatsii NA 2006 0 2010 Gody*), July 11, 2005, available from www.llr.ru/razdel3.php?id_r2=55, (accessed August 10, 2010)

including Yeltsin and Putin. Author stated that Reagan and Gorbachev conspired together in 1986 to dismantle “the great Soviet Union”. Belovezh accords that declared the demise of the USSR were presented by Prokhanov as criminal. The novel that displays extreme anti-Semitism, anti-Western feelings and Stalinist nostalgia, was greeted with some enthusiasm.⁴⁰⁶ Prokhanov’s text is permeated by revulsion against contemporary Russian capitalism, presented as typical of egoistic western values and embodied by rich Russian Jews and the corrupt traders of “Caucasian nationality” that inundated Moscow.⁴⁰⁷

Anti-Western feeling is even more evident in contemporary Russia’s mass culture, such as the thrillers of Viktor Dotsenko and the wave of works eulogizing the Russian security services. In Ilia Riasnoi’s bestseller *White Legion*, for example, Gorbachev’s reforms are presented as a CIA plot, and the chaotic post-communist society is saved from complete ruin by a secret network of former KGB officers.⁴⁰⁸

Peter Finn, journalist of the *Washington Post*, stated:

For critics here [in Russia], the reemergence of the heroic agent is a reflection of the Kremlin's desire to cultivate greater patriotism, one that is loyal to the strong, centralized and secretive state that is at the heart of President Putin's ambitions for Russia.⁴⁰⁹

⁴⁰⁶ MARSH, Rosalind, “The Nature of Russia’s Identity: The Theme of «Russia and the West» in Post-Soviet Culture”, in Roger E. Kanet (ed.), *Identities, Nations and Politics After Communism*, Abingdon, Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2008, pp.160 - 161

⁴⁰⁷ MARSH, Rosalind, “The Nature of Russia’s Identity: The Theme of «Russia and the West» in Post-Soviet Culture”, in Roger E. Kanet (ed.), *Identities, Nations and Politics After Communism*, Abingdon, Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2008, p.162

⁴⁰⁸ MARSH, Rosalind, “The Nature of Russia’s Identity: The Theme of «Russia and the West» in Post-Soviet Culture”, in Roger E. Kanet (ed.), *Identities, Nations and Politics After Communism*, Abingdon, Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2008, p.163

⁴⁰⁹ FINN, Peter, “In Russia, Pop Culture Coup for the KGB”, *Washington Post*, February 22, 2005, p.C01

In 1990 Russian television was dominated by Latin American soap operas; TV shows produced by Russians were mostly criminal sagas. In early 2000 new trend came into appearance. It is connected to Kremlin's efforts to strengthen patriotic feelings among Russian citizens.

The common ideology for many writers and filmmakers now is that the only clean institutions we inherited from the Soviet Union were the special services, and without them life in the country would be completely degraded," says Natalia Ivanova, deputy editor of *Znamya*, a literary journal. "There is a correlation between who comes to power and what kind of heroes is preferred by mass culture." Putin climbed to the upper ranks of the KGB before going into politics.⁴¹⁰

In February 2005 Ministry of Defense of the RF decided to launch what it calls a channel of "patriotic TV." It will show war documentaries and feature films to create "effective informational and ideological influences to ensure the social activities of Russian citizens," Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov wrote in a letter quoted by the financial newspaper *Kommersant*. Last month, Ivanov, complaining about the mass media, said the "moronization of the people must be stopped."⁴¹¹

Another trend of the 2000s is the use of history in mass literature. Mass literature as well as television seem to be the most convenient to influence the ordinary people, to create and strengthen patriotic feelings among Russians. One of the examples is Boris Akunin's novels. The attitude to his novels among intelligentsia is contradictory. While some praise Akunin for his treatment of Russian history, others accuse him of purposefully distorting the country's past. Of those who argue that Akunin's texts are historically inaccurate, some accuse Akunin of xenophobia; others

⁴¹⁰ FINN, Peter, "In Russia, Pop Culture Coup for the KGB", *Washington Post*, February 22, 2005, p.C01

⁴¹¹ FINN, Peter, "In Russia, Pop Culture Coup for the KGB", *Washington Post*, February 22, 2005, p.C01

charge him with Russophobia and with creating a caricature of Russian imperial history; and another critic argues that Akunin articulates “various opinions on the Russian past without giving clear priority to any one view”.⁴¹²

Elena Baraban discusses the role of his novels in the process of formation of the new identity for Russia. Akunin’s historical mysteries show an awakening from the past, from a nostalgia for the golden age in Russian history. Although many details in his depictions of pre-revolutionary Russia may be viewed as an expression of admiration and nostalgia for the imperial past, Akunin is also critical of such nostalgia. Instead of depicting the end of the nineteenth century as a period of abundance and social stability, favorably different from the economic and social chaos of post-Soviet Russia, Akunin frequently discusses problems relevant to both, post- and pre-Soviet Russia.⁴¹³

The changes in the sphere of education were the necessary basis for the promotion of the new state ideology. Historiography and education were to serve the goals of the state. Nationalistic trends in literature and culture served to promote patriotic ideas of great Russia on the level appropriate to ordinary Russians. This presents the policies of the state leadership as many-sided that overlap different spheres of public life.

4.6. Conclusion

Economic and political reforms conducted by Vladimir Putin were the necessary basis for the nation-building in Russia. The achievements on the post of prime-minister and the strengthening of the Presidential power raised the ratings of Putin and allowed him to implement his program successfully. Putin’s policies of the nation-building show his statist character. “Practical ideology” based on patriotism were the necessary measure for Russia. Its pragmatic task was to fulfill vacuum that

⁴¹² BARABAN, Elena V., “A Country Resembling Russia: the Use of History in Boris Akunin's Detective Novels”, *The Slavic and East European Journal*, Vol. 48, No. 3, Autumn 2004, p.397

⁴¹³ BARABAN, Elena V., “A Country Resembling Russia: the Use of History in Boris Akunin's Detective Novels”, *The Slavic and East European Journal*, Vol. 48, No. 3, Autumn 2004, p.411

were in Russia after the collapse of Socialism. The traditional Russian institutions were presented as a strong point of the state and source of proud for its citizens. The division of the state into seven districts was to replace the loyalty to one's ethnic group by the loyalty to the state and its institutions. Putin managed to complete the policy began by Yeltsin and introduced legally new state symbols. At the same time he managed to protect the important symbols of the Soviet past. He sought to unite the citizens of the Russian Federation not rejecting any of important groups.

One who makes assumptions that Russian Orthodox Church is promoting its uniqueness and exclusiveness and supports the power in the state in order to achieve privileged position certainly simplifies the situation. The role of the Orthodox Church and its place in post-Soviet society is much complicated. After the demise of the USSR, ROC appeared to be a substitution to the state ideology of Communism. It was a unifying factor, at least for the Slavic population of Russia that was an essential part of the new identity. Being the most trustful institution in Russian society, ROC gave legitimacy to the power institutions and politicians who sought to involve Church into public affairs. One can hardly speak about nationalistic rhetoric of the ROC, its aim to make Orthodoxy the only "official" religion in Russia. The top-clergy in ROC understood and promoted the multicultural and multiconfessional nature of Russia. At the same time there are conservative members of the Orthodox Church that see Russian way of development to be based on Orthodox values exclusively. As to the position of Putin regarding ROC, it was pragmatic. The ROC was used as means of support of policies of the new President. Although the appeal to Orthodoxy could promote interethnic tensions in society, Putin by means of ROC gained much more support than if he did not appeal to any of the confessions or promoted multiconfessionalism.

The fifth chapter analyses the foreign policy of Vladimir Putin, paying attention to policy towards compatriots in the near abroad, countries of the CIS, West, and revealing the pragmatically nationalistic character of it.

CHAPTER V.

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE NATURE OF RUSSIAN NATIONALISM UNDER VLADIMIR PUTIN

The fifth chapter analyses the foreign policy of Vladimir Putin, discussing policy towards compatriots in the near abroad, CIS states, West, and revealing the pragmatically nationalistic character of it.

5.1. Putin's Foreign Policy Concept

This part examines the foreign policy concept of the Russia's second President as it was presented in official documents of the Russian Federation, approaches to foreign policy strategy of the different leadership groups.

Although Vladimir Putin managed to consolidate the power within the Russian Federation, one can still distinguish three main groups among Russian elite regarding foreign policy. These groups are *liberal westernizers*, *pragmatic nationalists*, and *fundamentalist nationalists*.⁴¹⁴

The *liberal westernist* policy was based upon the premise that Russia's identity should be defined as a civic state in the boundaries of the new Russian Federation. This orientation was founded on the idea that Russia had no usable Tsarist or Soviet history on which to base its new policies, and that the break up of the Soviet Union was a positive act. This was accompanied by the goals of liberal democracy, market reforms and the prioritization of relations with the West. Politicians with these views developed policy positions which relegated relations with the former Soviet republics to a secondary position vis a vis the West. Their policies towards the near abroad

⁴¹⁴ JACKSON, Nicole J., *Russian Foreign Policy and the CIS: Theories, Debates and Actions*, London and New York: Routledge, 2003, pp.33 – 50; LIGHT, Margot, "The Place of Europe in Russian Foreign Policy", in Roy Allison, Margot Light and Stephen White (eds.), *Putin's Russia and the Enlarged Europe*, London, The Royal Institute of International Relations, 2006, pp.12-13.

were base upon the principles of equality of states, mutually advantageous cooperation and non-interference in the other states' domestic affairs.⁴¹⁵

Fundamentalist nationalists, who included extreme nationalists and communists, believed in ethnic or Slavic definition of Russia. Russia's borders were seen either to extend beyond the Russian Federation or to be narrowly combined to the areas populated by ethnic Russians in Russia. Despite differences, fundamentalist nationalists agreed that certain elements of Russia's history were highly significant to Russia's future, that the collapse of the Soviet Union was negative; and that the West was blame for it. They agree that Russia's spiritual essence and prestige had to be saved and that it ought to continue its historical, even divine, mission to create an "organic society". Advocates of this idea wanted to recreate a greater Russia – which, for example, some envisioned as the rebirth of the Soviet Union, others as a unitary Russian state modeled upon the Tsarist empire.⁴¹⁶

Finally, *pragmatic nationalists* defined Russian identity linguistically and thus they strongly championed the defense of Russian-speakers in the near abroad. They considered that the Soviet and Russian historical legacies ought not to be completely dismissed, that the collapse of the Soviet Union was unfortunate and that the country's former prestige must be restored. At the same time they accepted liberal westernist goal of liberal democracy and marketization, but wanted the process of transition to take Russian conditions into account. "Russian special interest in the CIS" was substituted for "Great Power interests", and military force was deemed acceptable if necessary to protect these vaguely defined interests. They conceived the world to be organized according to the principle of "balance of power" in which strong states protect their spheres of interests and, unlike the liberal westernists, they

⁴¹⁵ JACKSON, Nicole J., *Russian Foreign Policy and the CIS: Theories, Debates and Actions*, London and New York: Routledge, 2003, p.34

⁴¹⁶ JACKSON, Nicole J., *Russian Foreign Policy and the CIS: Theories, Debates and Actions*, London and New York: Routledge, 2003, p.35

identified specific threats to Russia which included the treatment of diaspora and NATO expansion.⁴¹⁷

When President Putin came to power he proved himself to be far more of a foreign policy activist than his predecessor. Within a year of succeeding Boris Yeltsin, he had visited the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, China, Japan, Mongolia, two remaining Marxist-Leninist countries of Cuba and North Korea, and the CIS states of Belarus, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan. There was concern in some quarters in the West, the United States, in particular, that Putin was creating a pole of influence out of those states which had long-standing quarrels with the USA. Russia's closer relations with North Korea, Cuba, Iran and Iraq led to talk of an "alliance of aggrieved".⁴¹⁸

Putin, on the other hand, declared his foreign policy to be "Eurocentric", again raising the possibility that a wider Europe might increasingly represent a separate pole of influence in a multi-polar world.

New foreign policy doctrine of the Russian Federation was presented in three documents adopted in 2000. On January 10, 2000 new National Security Concept was adopted. Document listed the external threats of the Russian Federation, noting in particular the weakening of the OSCE, the UN, and the CIS. The tension between the emergence of a multipolar world, in which relations are based on international law and an acceptance of a significant role for Russia, and the attempt by the US and its allies to carve out a unipolar world outside of international law was stressed. There was no longer talk of "partnership" with the West and instead more emphasis

⁴¹⁷ JACKSON, Nicole J., *Russian Foreign Policy and the CIS: Theories, Debates and Actions*, London and New York: Routledge, 2003, pp. 35 - 37

⁴¹⁸ BACON, Edwin and WYMAN, Matthew, *Contemporary Russia*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, p.164

placed on more limited “co-operation”.⁴¹⁹ To complement the above a new Military Doctrine was ratified by Presidential decree on April 21, 2000.⁴²⁰

Russia’s new Foreign Policy Concept was adopted by the new President on June 28, 2000.⁴²¹ The document specifies CIS countries as an area of Russia’s foreign policy priority: “The emphasis will be made on the development of good neighborly relations and strategic partnership with all CIS member states”.⁴²² The Concept also states that “The Russian Federation views the EU as one of its main political and economic partners and will strive to develop with it an intensive, stable and long-term cooperation devoid of expediency fluctuations”.⁴²³ As to NATO, the Concept says that “Russia proceeds from the importance of cooperation with it in the interests of maintaining security and stability in the continent and is open to constructive interaction”.⁴²⁴ However, the document recognizes that on certain parameters “NATO’s present-day political and military guidelines do not coincide with security interests of the Russian Federation and occasionally directly contradict them. This

⁴¹⁹ “National Security Concept of the Russian Federation”, (*Kontseptsiia Natsional’noi Bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii*), January 10, 2000, available from <http://www.armscontrol.ru/start/rus/docs/sncon00.htm>, (accessed August 10, 2010)

⁴²⁰ “Military Doctrine of the Russian federation”, (*Voennaia Doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii*), April 21, 2000, *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, April 22, 2000

⁴²¹ “The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation”, (*Kontseptsiia Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii*), June 28, 2000, available from <http://www.mid.ru/Bl.nsf/arh/19DCF61BEFED61134325699C003B5FA3?OpenDocument>, (accessed August 10, 2010)

⁴²² “The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation”, (*Kontseptsiia Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii*), June 28, 2000, available from <http://www.mid.ru/Bl.nsf/arh/19DCF61BEFED61134325699C003B5FA3?OpenDocument>, (accessed August 10, 2010)

⁴²³ “The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation”, (*Kontseptsiia Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii*), June 28, 2000, available from <http://www.mid.ru/Bl.nsf/arh/19DCF61BEFED61134325699C003B5FA3?OpenDocument>, (accessed August 10, 2010)

⁴²⁴ “The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation”, (*Kontseptsiia Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii*), June 28, 2000, available from <http://www.mid.ru/Bl.nsf/arh/19DCF61BEFED61134325699C003B5FA3?OpenDocument>, (accessed August 10, 2010)

primarily concerns the provisions of NATO's new strategic concept, which do not exclude the conduct of use-of-force operations outside of the zone of application of the Washington Treaty without the sanction of the UN Security Council. Russia retains its negative attitude towards the expansion of NATO. Substantive and constructive cooperation between Russia and NATO is only possible if it is based on the foundation of a due respect for the interests of the sides and an unconditional fulfillment of mutual obligations assumed".⁴²⁵ The same attitude was expressed in the Putin's Address to the Federal Assembly of the RF in April 2001:

We think that this organisation [NATO] often ignores the opinion of the international community and the provisions of international legal documents in its decision-making process, and this is the biggest problem. The future of our relations with NATO therefore depends on how closely the basic principles and norms of international law will be respected in questions of use of force and threat of the use of force. Our position is clear: the only organisation with the right to authorise the use of force in international relations is the United Nations Security Council.⁴²⁶

In addition, the Foreign Policy Concept of the RF says that Russia is ready to overcome considerable latter-day difficulties in relations with the U.S., and to preserve the infrastructure of Russian - American cooperation. Despite the presence of serious, and in a number of cases, fundamental differences, Russian - American interaction is the necessary condition for the amelioration of the international situation and achievement of global strategic stability. "It is in our mutual interests to

⁴²⁵ "The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation", (*Kontseptsiia Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii*), June 28, 2000, available from <http://www.mid.ru/Bl.nsf/arh/19DCF61BEFED61134325699C003B5FA3?OpenDocument>, (accessed August 10, 2010)

⁴²⁶ Annual Address of the President of the Russian Federation to the Federal Assembly, (*Ezhegodnoie Obrasheniie Prezidenta Rossiiskoi FederatsiiK Federal'noi Assamblee Rossiiskoi Federatsii*) April 3, 2001 available from http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2001/04/03/0000_type70029type82912_70660.shtml, (accessed August 10, 2010)

maintain regular bilateral contacts at all levels, not allowing pauses in relations and setback in the negotiating processes on the main political, military and economic matters.”⁴²⁷

Richard Sakwa characterizes Putin’s foreign policy as a “cooperative pragmatism”, “based on a sense of shared destiny and on awareness of mutual threats and opportunities”.⁴²⁸ There is a little of Eurasianism in his thinking, but much about Russia’s position in Eurasia. Under Putin a “new realism” rapidly emerged. In the “new realism” there was a much sharper recognition of the limits of the Russian power, grounded above all in economic weakness. This did not mean giving up aspirations to global influence, but it did mean the pursuit of a far more conscious attempt to match ambitions to resources. The style and priorities of policy were also to change.⁴²⁹

In a keynote speech at the foreign ministry on January 26, 2001 Putin stressed that Russia’s strategic aim was “integrating into the world community”. In the same speech, he stressed another important aspect of his foreign policy: it’s Europeanization. He stressed that the “European direction is traditionally the most important for us”.⁴³⁰

The dual and contradictory position of Russia on the world stage on Putin’s accession has been characterized as follows:

⁴²⁷ “The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation”, (*Kontseptsiia Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii*), June 28, 2000, available from <http://www.mid.ru/BI.nsf/arh/19DCF61BEFED61134325699C003B5FA3?OpenDocument>, (accessed August 10, 2010)

⁴²⁸ SAKWA, Richard, *Putin: Russia’s Choice*, London and New York: Routledge, 2004, p.209

⁴²⁹ SAKWA, Richard, *Putin: Russia’s Choice*, London and New York: Routledge, 2004, p.209

⁴³⁰ Speech of the President of the Russian Federation V.Putin at the Foreign Ministry (*Vystuplenie Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii V. Putina V Ministerstve Inostrannikh Del*), January 26, 2001, available from <http://www.President.kremlin.ru/events/145.html;strana.ru>, (accessed on August 18, 2001)

On the one hand, it has many of the attributes of the world power – in the club of nuclear powers, a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, participates (although not always on equal footing) in summits of world leaders. On the other hand, its present economic capacities clearly do not correspond to its still surviving nominal military power and political influence. In many respects Russia has declined to the level of a less developed country.⁴³¹

Some scholars note that in early years of Putin's presidency his foreign policy was rather nationalistic and aggressive, especially regarding the United States. The military campaign in Chechnya as well as position regarding the newly independent states can be an example.⁴³²

Moreover, former prime- and foreign minister Yevgenii Primakov's policies that were supported by Putin, may be called Eurasianist, although he never called himself a Eurasianist.⁴³³ Primakov has argued for that Russia had important tools; and he named the accumulation of political influence, special geopolitical position, early membership in the world's nuclear club, growing economic possibilities and military production which establishes the condition for military-technological cooperation with numerous foreign partners. He considered that, if these above-mentioned diplomatic- political instruments are used cleverly, they will be the means of American policies' frustration and Russia's interests' advancement or safeguard. Primakov also observed that many countries resent and fear a US dominated-world and that their uneasiness could be mobilized to Russia's advantage. Besides these, Primakov is in favour of and executes a multifaceted policy for Russia rather than an uni-dimensional approach. He has barely used congenial adroitness in relations with the United States, Germany, France, Great Britain, Japan, China and India; but at the

⁴³¹ SAKWA, Richard, *Putin: Russia's Choice*, London and New York: Routledge, 2004, p.209

⁴³² ERŞEN, Emre, "Neo-Eurasianism and Putin's "Multipolarism" in Russian Foreign Policy", *Turkish Review of Eurasian Studies*, Annual 4, 2004, p. 135 - 136

⁴³³ ERŞEN, Emre, "Neo-Eurasianism and Putin's "Multipolarism" in Russian Foreign Policy", *Turkish Review of Eurasian Studies*, Annual 4, 2004, p. 143

same time, he has always been in favour of the pursuation of good relations with secondary powers such as Turkey, Iran, Indonesia, Syria and Greece.⁴³⁴

Today, he said, we need to pursue a “rational pragmatism” devoid of Romanticism and unaffordable sentimentality , and Russia needs to look much farther afield for “constructive partnerships”, especially to China, India and Japan, as well as Iran, Libya, Iraq, and others.⁴³⁵

Since Primakov’s foreign policy had important impacts on Putin’s policies and since the key elements of his multi-faced policy were later adopted by Putin to give direction to the Russian foreign policy as opposed to Yeltsin’s policies especially towards the USA,⁴³⁶ it is essential to review the five key aspects of Primakov’s multi-faceted foreign policy:

- i. Russia should continue to defend its position as a great power in world politics (despite all its current weaknesses)
- ii. Russia should follow a multi-dimensional policy and increase its relations not only with great powers such as the US, China and the European Union (EU), but also with regional powers like Iran and Turkey
- iii. Russia has very important cards at its disposal such as its unique geopolitical position, possession of nuclear weapons and permanent membership in the United Nations (UN) Security Council
- iv. Russia should forge ties with those countries which are also uneasy about the increasing American tendency towards uni-polarism

⁴³⁴ RUBINSTEIN, Alvin Z., “Russia Adrift: Strategic Anchors for Russia’s Foreign Policy”, *Harvard International Review*, Vol. 22, No. I, Winter-Spring 2000, p. 6.

⁴³⁵ RUBINSTEIN, Alvin Z., “Russia Adrift: Strategic Anchors for Russia’s Foreign Policy”, *Harvard International Review*, Vol. 22, No. I, Winter-Spring 2000, p.7

⁴³⁶ ERŞEN, Emre, “Neo-Eurasianism and Putin’s “Multipolarism” in Russian Foreign Policy”, *Turkish Review of Eurasian Studies*, Annual 4, 2004, p. 144

v. There are no constant enemies for Russia, but there are constant national interests, thus, Russia should “pursue a “rational pragmatism” devoid of romanticism and unaffordable sentimentality” and it should “look much farther a field for ‘constructive partnerships’, especially to China, India, and Japan, as well as Iran, Libya, Iraq, and others partnerships’, especially to China, India, and Japan, as well as Iran, Libya, Iraq, and others.

Having analyzed the key documents that define the Russian foreign policy starting from 2000 and approaches of different elite groups one can conclude about multidimensional pragmatic character of Putin’s foreign policy Not opposing to any of the possible vectors of the foreign policy and working actively in all directions, Putin sought to promote Russia’s key interests. After the study of the official documents, and discourses regarding Russian foreign policy, it is time to shift to the analysis of the policies regarding compatriots abroad, CIS states and western countries. The next part of the chapter discusses Kremlin’s policy towards Russian-speakers in the near abroad.

5.2. Putin’s Policy Regarding Compatriots Abroad

In his annual address to the State Duma on April 25, 2005, Putin declared:

First and foremost it is worth acknowledging that the demise of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century. As for the Russian people, it became a genuine tragedy. Tens of millions of our fellow citizens and countrymen found themselves beyond the fringes of Russian territory. The epidemic of collapse has spilled over to Russia itself.⁴³⁷

Putin’s policy towards Russia diaspora in the near abroad as well as to the states where Russia-speakers reside can be viewed as a part of his imperial policy. Thus,

⁴³⁷ Annual Address of the President of the Russian Federation to the State Duma, (*Ezhegodnoe Obrasheniie Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii K Gosudarstvennoi Dume*), April 25, 2005, *Rossiiskaia Gazeta*, April 26, 2005

when Putin was a prime-minister, he showed his attitude towards the near abroad. For instance, he was an advocate of the Russia – Belarus agreement of December 8, 1999 that created Union state between these republics. Analyzing this issue, Igor Zevelev argue that Russia’s post-imperialism took neo-imperialistic course and seeking to control domestic and foreign policies of the Soviet successor states.⁴³⁸

Since Putin has a control over the Russian parliament and high ratings of support among population, the struggle of political actors did not have a significant influence on the Putin’s policy regarding Russia-speakers in the near abroad. In 2000 the attitude towards diaspora was pragmatic. Kremlin viewed Russian diaspora as an instrument for the solution of economic and demographic crisis Russia faced, and as a means of the improvement relations with the states where Russian-speakers reside. Therefore, Putin regarded all Russian-speakers living in the CIS and Baltic States as compatriots.⁴³⁹ However, the absence of ethnic connotation did not mean that the Pan-Orthodox concept of the Russian nation as well as Slavic one was neglected. Dealing with the Chechen problem Putin preferred to avoid ethnically colored rhetoric that could provoke ethnic nationalism. In the first years of presidency Putin followed the same rhetoric with Yeltsin towards Russian-speakers in the near abroad. In his address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation on April 3, 2001, Putin stressed that Russia would defense the rights and interests of Russians abroad:

The hundreds of thousands of Russians living and working outside this country must be sure that Russia will not abandon them, we will protect their personal rights, protect their families from possible violations of the law and from unlawful pressure and help uphold their human dignity. No one should be allowed to apply a selective version of human rights and freedoms based on people’s passports,

⁴³⁸ ZEVELEV, Igor, “Russia’s Policy towards Compatriots in the Former Soviet Union”, *Russia in Global Affairs*, No. 1, 2008

⁴³⁹ DUNLOP, John B., “Russia under Putin: Reintegrating Post-Soviet Space”, *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 11, No. 3, July 2000, p. 43.

and our diplomats should be not only active in such cases, but also show professional firmness and take effective action.⁴⁴⁰

“The Concept of Support of Compatriots Abroad by the Russian Federation at the Present Stage” signed by President Putin in 2001 specified the policy of the Russian Federation towards the compatriots abroad as following: 1) to provide full support for compatriots, 2) to secure their rights and freedoms as well as other legitimate interests in accordance with the international law, 3) to preserve and develop ties with compatriots and their organizations.⁴⁴¹

Concept defines compatriots as person who are “permanently living abroad, but connected with Russian history, ethnic, culture, language and spirit; trying to keep own Russian originality and, feeling for a need to maintenance contacts and cooperation with Russia”.⁴⁴² Furthermore the Concept describes the main directions of the Russia’s policy towards compatriots that are: 1) to use international mechanisms and procedures to maintain and protect the rights and fundamental freedoms of the person, including the rights of the persons belonging to minority; 2) to give financial and economic support to compatriots in post-Soviet states; 3) to develop the ties and contacts in humanitarian, cultural, educational, scientific spheres and sphere of information; 4) to ensure the rights of free movement and resettlement to Russia on a voluntary basis or by virtue of force measure; 5) to support public

⁴⁴⁰ Address of the President of Russia Vladimir Putin to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, (*Obrasheniie Prezidenta Rossii Vladimira Putina K Federal’noi Assamblee Rossiiskoi Federatsii*), April 3, 2001, available from http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2001/04/03/0000_type70029type82912_70660.shtml, (accessed on August 10, 2010)

⁴⁴¹ “Concept of Support of Compatriots Abroad by the Russian Federation at the Present Stage”, (*Kontseptsiiia Podderzhki Rossiiskoi Federatsiei Sootechstvennikov za Rubezhom na Sovremennom Etape*), August 30, 2001, available from http://council.gov.ru/kom_home/kom_sng/relation_compatriot/item638.html, (accessed August 10, 2010)

⁴⁴² “Concept of Support of Compatriots Abroad by the Russian Federation at the Present Stage”, (*Kontseptsiiia Podderzhki Rossiiskoi Federatsiei Sootechstvennikov za Rubezhom na Sovremennom Etape*), August 30, 2001, available from http://council.gov.ru/kom_home/kom_sng/relation_compatriot/item638.html, (accessed August 10, 2010)

organizations and associations of compatriots. 6) to support socially unprotected groups of the Russian diaspora.⁴⁴³

However, although the Concept declares the necessity to protect Russian-speakers and presents main mechanisms of their support, it does not mention tools of achieving this goal. Furthermore, similarly to the policy adopted by Yeltsin's administration, the Concept stresses that Russian policy purpose is the adaptation and integration of compatriots into life of the states where they reside plus restriction of their uncontrolled migration to Russia. However, this does not presuppose that Moscow opposes their resettlement on its territory. It stresses that Russia, according to its international obligations and national legislation, is ready to accept compatriots who migrate voluntarily and as a result of the existing of extraordinary situations in the countries where they live, into the territory of the RF.⁴⁴⁴

The official discourse regarding compatriots abroad started to change gradually since 2000. The shift towards the new policy was the Congress of Compatriots held on October 11, 2001. During the Congress Putin defined the tasks of the Russian Federation regarding compatriots abroad as preserving the national culture, helping uphold human rights and protecting them against discrimination. Moreover, President stressed that the productive dialogue with the compatriots as well as with the countries where they reside can help Russia to integrate into new world system.⁴⁴⁵ By saying this, Putin demonstrated that the compatriots abroad are no

⁴⁴³ "Concept of Support of Compatriots Abroad by the Russian Federation at the Present Stage", (*Kontsepsiia Podderzhki Rossiiskoi Federatsiei Sootechestvennikov za Rubezhom na Sovremennom Etape*), August 30, 2001, available from http://council.gov.ru/kom_home/kom_sng/relation_compatriot/item638.html, (accessed August 10, 2010)

⁴⁴⁴ "Concept of Support of Compatriots Abroad by the Russian Federation at the Present Stage", (*Kontsepsiia Podderzhki Rossiiskoi Federatsiei Sootechestvennikov za Rubezhom na Sovremennom Etape*), August 30, 2001, available from http://council.gov.ru/kom_home/kom_sng/relation_compatriot/item638.html, (accessed August 10, 2010)

⁴⁴⁵ Address of the President of Russia Vladimir Putin at the Opening of the Congress of Compatriots, (*Obrasheniie Prezidenta Rossii Vladimira Putina Na Otkrytii Kongressa Sootechestvennikov*), October 11, 2001, available from

longer a tool for legitimizing domestic policy, but rather a resource for the cooperation with the ex-Soviet states. This also meant that Kremlin began to perceive Russian diaspora as a tool of influence on the domestic and foreign policies of the newly independent states. In addition, at the Congress Putin declared that Russia is interested to return Russians due to economic reasons, moral considerations, as well as other problems Russia faced.⁴⁴⁶

In 2002, Putin signed the “Basic Guidelines of Russian Federation’s Support to Compatriots Abroad for 2002-2005”. This document designed the basic directions of the Russian Federation’s support to compatriots abroad. The latter included:

measures on creating effective mechanisms of cooperation between Russian state and the Russian diaspora in the protection of the rights and freedoms of the compatriots living abroad, preservation of their legitimate interests and ethno-cultural originality, promotion of their role either in the expansion of Russia’s cooperation with the foreign states or development democratic reforms in Russian Federation.⁴⁴⁷

In this context, it is possible to say that Russia perceived Russian-speakers abroad as Russia’s people in other states. Furthermore, their role was to contribute to the cooperation between Russia and neighboring states. In addition, similarly to the “Concept of Support of the Compatriots Abroad”, this document also stated that

http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2001/10/11/0001_type82912type84779_137328.shtml, (accessed August 10, 2010)

⁴⁴⁶ Address of the President of Russia Vladimir Putin at the Opening of the Congress of Compatriots, (*Obrasheniie Prezidenta Rossii Vladimira Putina Na Otkrytii Kongressa Sootechestvennikov*), October 11, 2001, available from http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2001/10/11/0001_type82912type84779_137328.shtml, (accessed August 10, 2010)

⁴⁴⁷ “Basic Guidelines of Russian Federation’s Support to Compatriots Abroad for 2002-2005” (*Osnovnyie Napravleniia Podderzhki Rossiiskoi Federatsiei Sootechestvennikov Za Rubezhom Na 2002-2005gody*), November 28, 2002, available from http://www.mosds.ru/Dokum/dokum_rosOsn2005.shtml, (accessed August 10, 2010)

Russia's policy's main goal was not only the adaptation of the Russian-speakers into life of the host states but also the restriction of their migration to the RF.⁴⁴⁸

It is noteworthy to say that since 2000 the issue of the immigration of Russian-speakers became the issue of crucial importance for Russia. Due to decline of population and work force shortage, Russia needed the immigrants. Moreover, a massive influx of migrants from South-East Asia plus post 9/11 and Russian domestic realities generated strong feelings of fear among Russian policy makers. Migration became a main security issue and was considered as a threat to stability and integrity of the RF. In order to solve this, starting from 2000, the Russian government began to demonstrate their willingness to accept large numbers of Russian-speaking population. At the end of the 2002, Putin pointed out:

We were in a better situation compared with other countries, as we had an obvious reservoir, from which we could take people for Russia. These people have our mentality, often speak Russian as their mother-tongue; we have common cultural and confessional routs.⁴⁴⁹

Nonetheless, the new Citizenship Law of the Russian Federation adopted on May 2002 made the procedure of acquiring Russian citizenship for the Russian-speaking population from the near abroad complicated. Article 13 of the new law demands a proof of legal permanent residence for at least five years and of legal source of income.⁴⁵⁰ Moreover, analyzing the Russian legislation on the issue of migration starting from 2005, Nadzeya Zhukava concludes that the Russian government failed

⁴⁴⁸ DEĞİRMEN, Burcu Fadime, *Russian Diaspora and the Politics of Russian Nationalism in the Post Soviet Era*, Middle East Technical University, Thesis for the Degree of Master of Science in International Relations, 2008, p.34

⁴⁴⁹ NOZHENKO, Maria, «Motherland Is Calling You! Motives behind and Prospects for the New Russian Policy on Compatriots Abroad», available from <http://www.lfpr.lt/uploads/File/Current/Nozhenko.pdf>, (accessed on August 18, 2010)

⁴⁵⁰ Article 13, Federal Law of the Russian Federation on Citizenship of the Russian Federation, May 31, 2002, available from <http://www.consultant.ru/popular/civic/>, (accessed on August 18, 2010)

to implement congruent policies and establish mechanisms for controlling migrations. This resulted in combating migration as a whole instead of controlling it; thus made process of obtaining work permit harder for Russian-speaking population as well.⁴⁵¹

As it was discussed above, in his domestic policy Putin sought to unify the citizens of the Russian Federation. Migration flow could disintegrate Russian community while solving demographic and economic problems. To make the policy regarding migration consequent and congruent Russia adopted the document “On Measures to Support Voluntary Migration of Compatriots Living Abroad into the Russian Federation in 2006”.⁴⁵² The document declared the support for voluntary migration of compatriots from the near abroad as one of the most important solutions of the Russia’s demographic problem. Moreover, it introduced seven years program. The goals of the program are defined as

stimulation and the organization of the process of voluntary migration of compatriots to the Russian Federation on the basis of promotion of its attractiveness to the subjects, and also compensation of the natural population decrease in the country as a whole and in its separate regions by attracting immigrants for constant place of residence in the Russian Federation.⁴⁵³

⁴⁵¹ ZHUKAVA Nadzeya, “The Russian Federation: New Immigration Pole in Eurasia”, available from <http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/research/SchoolOnEuro-MedMigration/2006pdfs/Paper%20Zhukava.pdf>, (accessed on August 19, 2010)

⁴⁵² Decree of the President of Russian Federation No. 637, June 22, 2006 “On Measures of Support of the Voluntary Migration of Compatriots Living Abroad to the RF” (*O Merakh Po Okazaniiu Sodeistviia Dobrovol'nomu Nereceleniiu v Rossiiskiyu Federatsiiu Sootechestvennikov Prozhivayushikh za Rubezhom*), *Rossiiskaia Gazeta*, June 28, 2006

⁴⁵³ Decree of the President of Russian Federation No. 637, June 22, 2006 “On Measures of Support of the Voluntary Migration of Compatriots Living Abroad to the RF” (*O Merakh Po Okazaniiu Sodeistviia Dobrovol'nomu Nereceleniiu v Rossiiskiyu Federatsiiu Sootechestvennikov Prozhivayushikh za Rubezhom*), *Rossiiskaia Gazeta*, June 28, 2006

On the other hand, Russia is not only interested in return of the compatriots, but also in migration of skilled, educated and law-abiding people to Russia.⁴⁵⁴ Additionally, Russian government was concerned to resettle the migrants in specific regions of the Russian Federation. The document defined three main categories of regions for resettlement. The category A included strategically important Russian frontier regions, which are characterized by a reduction in the population. The category B included the territories, where major investment projects were implemented. Thus, these territories require the mass attraction of migrants due to the absence of labor force in local market. The regions where sustainable social and economic development has been going on and reduction of population took place were called as category C. The program stated that all migrants were given state guarantees and social support. In turn, Moscow asked for a special certificate of a participant of the state program at least for two years which bounded compatriots to the regions where they settled.⁴⁵⁵

However, this program appeared to be insufficient on some occasions. The definition of compatriots was very unclear as those who “brought up in the tradition of Russian culture, speak Russian; do not want to lose links with Russia.”⁴⁵⁶ Moreover, according to the document, twelve regions including the most under-populated areas have been fixed to take in Russian-speaking migrants. So, it is unclear what could convince people to move there. Additionally, these regions included Far East and

⁴⁵⁴ Address of the President of Russia Vladimir Putin to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, (*Obrasheniie Prezidenta Rossii Vladimira Putina K Federal'nomu Sobraniuu Rossiiskoi Federatsii*), May 10, 2006, available from http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2006/05/10/1823_type70029type82912_105566.shtml, (accessed August 10, 2010)

⁴⁵⁵ Decree of the President of Russian Federation No. 637, June 22, 2006 “On Measures of Support of the Voluntary Migration of Compatriots Living Abroad to the RF” (*O Merakh Po Okazaniuu Sodeistviia Dobrovol'nomu Nereceleniiu v Rossiiskiyu Federatsiiu Sootechestvennikov Prozhivayushikh za Rubezhom*)”, *Rossiiskaia Gazeta*, June 28, 2006

⁴⁵⁶ Decree of the President of Russian Federation No. 637, June 22, 2006 “On Measures of Support of the Voluntary Migration of Compatriots Living Abroad to the RF” (*O Merakh Po Okazaniuu Sodeistviia Dobrovol'nomu Nereceleniiu v Rossiiskiyu Federatsiiu Sootechestvennikov Prozhivayushikh za Rubezhom*)”, *Rossiiskaia Gazeta*, June 28, 2006

Siberia where mass immigration of Chinese was going on. Thus, compatriots were forced to live in areas where Russian citizens would not like to move. Finally, despite Moscow offered financial support (in 2007, 4.7 billion rubles allocated in addition to fund from local budgets) to compatriots willing to resettle in Russia, it was not enough. As a result, while Moscow tried to welcome 50.000 people to Russia in the first half of the year, only ten families arrived.⁴⁵⁷

In 2006, two more documents were adopted: the “Program Work with Compatriots Abroad for 2006-2008” and “The Russian Language Federal Target Program (2006-2010)”. The interpretation of three documents adopted in 2006 was given in the “Review of Foreign Policy of Russian Federation” published by Foreign Ministry in 2007. Moscow decided that 342 million ruble from the Federal budget would be used for reaching the goals of the “Program Work with Compatriots Abroad” in 2007, which focused on mainly legal defense and social security of compatriots. Moreover, 1.58 billion rubles was earmarked for the implementation of the “Russian Language Program”.⁴⁵⁸ The figures show how much money from Federal budget Russia was ready to spend in order to attract the Russia-speaking migrants.

The adoption of these documents, made it obvious that Russia viewed the compatriots as a political resource for solution its problems of the population and work force shortage. The evaluation of Russian policy towards diaspora between 2000 and 2008 shows its pragmatic and imperial character. Viewing Russian-speakers in the post-Soviet states as compatriots/diaspora, Kremlin considered them as Russia’s people in the newly independent republics. Russia identified itself as protector of the rights and freedoms of compatriots living abroad. This perception allowed Russia to influence domestic policies of newly independent states. By means of this, Russia secured its interest on the post-Soviet space. Moreover, Russia’s

⁴⁵⁷ ZEVELEV, Igor, *Russia’s Policy towards Compatriots in the Former Soviet Union*, Russia in Global Affairs, No.1, 2008

⁴⁵⁸ ZEVELEV, Igor, *Russia’s Policy towards Compatriots in the Former Soviet Union*, Russia in Global Affairs, No.1, 2008

diasporic polity was to solve Russia's internal problems. Kremlin sought to stimulate economic development of the depopulated regions by means of promoting the resettlement of mainly ethnic Russians from the ex-Soviet states.⁴⁵⁹

After the discussion of Putin's policy towards Russian diaspora, it is important to focus on the Russian policies regarding Commonwealth of the Independent States to understand its nature. The next part analyzes Russia's policy towards the CIS states.

5.3. Commonwealth of the Independent States

The emphasis in relations with the CIS shifted from multilateralism to bilateralism, a change that Putin adhered to throughout his leadership, above all with Belarus. At the same time the need to protect Russian ethnic minorities in the former Soviet Union states was important. These provisions were made in Foreign Policy Concept of the RF, adopted in June 2000.⁴⁶⁰

Freedom from the treaty's restrictions allowed Putin to increase military presence in various regions of post-Soviet territory. While NATO was building a new missile-defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic, saying that this system was needed against a possible missile attack by Iran, Putin accused NATO of erecting an anti-missile shield to repel Russia's own nuclear arsenal. Nuclear weapons are the most convincing deterrent to any attempt to violate the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, including the threat of overpopulated China's expansion into Siberia, the separatist wars in the Caucasus supported by NATO intervention, and the ultimate resolution of the "Russian Question".⁴⁶¹

⁴⁵⁹ ZEVELEV, Igor, "Russia's Policy towards Compatriots in the Former Soviet Union", *Russia in Global Affairs*, No.1, 2008

⁴⁶⁰ "The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation", (*Kontseptsiia Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii*), June 28, 2000, available from <http://www.nationalsecurity.ru/library/00014/index.htm>, (accessed August, 10, 2010)

⁴⁶¹ RASIZADE, Alec, "Putin's Place in Russian History", *International Politics*, Vol. 45, No.5, September 2008, p.545

It was clear that Putin recognized that the CIS had no interests of its own but was instead the immediate sphere for the pursuit of Russian interests and concerns. The adoption of the new Citizenship Law in 2002 revealed the new unsentimental approach, with the CIS states seen as the source of labor while at the same time cutting off all those who had failed to claim Russian citizenship by then. The new law finally drew a line between who was and who was not a Russian citizen and thus was designed to play its part in reinforcing Russia's national identity. The term *sootchestvennik* was to be used henceforth strictly to describe Russian citizens living abroad, and not to the great mass of ethnic Russians living in the former Soviet republics.⁴⁶²

Surrounded by relatively weak states and with powerful security threats emanating from the South, Russia had little choice but to reassert some sort of hegemony over the region. There were different ways in which this could be achieved, above all either coercive or cooperative, and Russia appeared to pursue all them simultaneously. The great strategic problem Russia faced was the foreign policy diversification of the former Soviet republics. It was clear that the CIS had failed to become the great counter-European institutions that some in Moscow had anticipated. The most vivid evidence of the decline of the CIS was the creation in 1998 of the GUUAM group of states (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Moldova and Azerbaijan that joined in 1999). The aim was to stay outside Russia's orbit and Russian-dominated bodies like the CIS Collective Security Treaty and the Eurasian Economic Community. However, the relative failure of GUUAM, with almost no achievements to its credit other than resisting Moscow's attempts to revise the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, showed the fact how central Moscow was to the region. Uzbekistan by early 2000 had clearly cooled towards the body, wanting Russian assistance in its struggle against "Islamic extremism", while Moldova feared antagonizing Russia and suffered from multiple vulnerabilities.⁴⁶³

⁴⁶² SAKWA, Richard, *Putin: Russia's Choice*, London and New York: Routledge, 2004, p.230

⁴⁶³ SAKWA, Richard, *Putin: Russia's Choice*, London and New York: Routledge, 2004, p.230

Putin maintained Yeltsin's policy to support for the various de facto states left behind in the detritus of the breakup of the USSR. Thus Russia continued to support Abkhazia's struggle for autonomy from Georgia and in August 2008 recognized it as an independent republic. The majority of the population was granted the Russian citizenship, and the Russian ruble became the currency of the new republic. Similarly, in August 2008 after military intervention into South Ossetia Russian Federation recognized its independence.

Russia's support for the intransigent and corrupt regime headed by Igor Smirnov at the head of the breakaway Transdniester region of Moldova, however, was liable to cause Putin considerable embarrassment. Russia had agreed at the OSCE summit in November 1999 to withdraw its forces from the region by December 2002, and failure to do so undermined international trust in his leadership. Russia was reluctant to fulfill its pledge made at the OSCE summit in late 1999 to close down its Gudauta base in Georgia by July 2001, and to negotiate the closure of the Batumi and Akhalkalaki bases.⁴⁶⁴

Putin sought to find effective instruments to institutionalize links with willing CIS partners. Russia tries to reinvigorate the Eurasian Economic Community and the Collective Security Treaty. However, it also reflected the weakness of such bodies. In June 2002 when the new partnership council was established with NATO, Putin signed the papers that transformed the CIS into a Collective Security Treaty Organization. The aim was to pour some operational content into what had been largely political organization. A rapid reaction force was created, with Russia deploying aircraft to the Kant airbase near Bishkek in Kyrgyzstan. While the anti-Western Lukashenko greeted the creation of the CSTO as a counter-weight for NATO, few really believed that a new geopolitical force was emerging in the East as the successor to the Warsaw Pact.⁴⁶⁵

⁴⁶⁴ SAKWA, Richard, *Putin: Russia's Choice*, London and New York: Routledge, 2004, p..231

⁴⁶⁵ SAKWA, Richard, *Putin: Russia's Choice*, London and New York: Routledge, 2004, pp.231 – 232

However, regional alliances were not able to substitute for bilateral links, the most intense of which was with Belarus. Putin rejected Lukashenko's plan of June 10, 2002 for unification, insisting that the unification should not be at the expense of Russia's economic interests. He refused to countenance Lukashenko's demands that Belarus, whose economy was only 3 per cent of Russia's, would have "rights of veto, sovereignty and territorial integrity" unless Russia had them too, and spoke against creating a "a supranational organ with undefined functions". Putin, however, later insisted that "the Belarusian and Russian peoples are brotherly people in the full sense of this word", and stressed the close economic links between the two countries and that Russia could be strengthened by unification with Belarus as part of the "movement of the Russian Federation – both territorial and demographic – in the direction of Europe". The main thing, however, he insisted was that the "form and methods of the unification should be beneficial for both the Belarusian and Russian peoples".⁴⁶⁶

The important tool of Russia's foreign policy, in particular towards the CIS states, is the energy resources. Russia's emergence since 1999 as a leading energy producer and exporter has had a major impact on international affairs. Russia has huge energy reserves: it holds 45 per cent of the world's total reserves of gas, 23 per cent of the coal, 14 per cent of the uranium and 13 per cent of the oil.⁴⁶⁷ In 2003 Russia accounted for 22 per cent of world natural gas production, 12 per cent of the world's oil production and 24 per cent of gas exports (including exports of liquified natural gas). Russian gas supplied roughly 24 per cent of gas consumption in non-CIS Europe. In 2006 Russia produced 1.7 billion cubic metres of gas, making it the world's largest energy producer.⁴⁶⁸

⁴⁶⁶ SAKWA, Richard, *Putin: Russia's Choice*, London and New York: Routledge, 2004, p.230p.232

⁴⁶⁷ NYGREN, Bertil, "Putin's Use of Natural Gas to Reintegrate the CIS Region", *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol.55, No.4, July-August 2008, p.3

⁴⁶⁸ AHREND, Rudiger and TOMPSON, William, "Unnatural Monopoly: The Endless Wait for Gas Sector Reform in Russia", *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 57, No. 6, September 2005, p.802

Putin used energy as an instrument of the foreign policy against neighboring countries. This approach is particularly effective in the sector of natural gas as consumer countries cannot overcome their dependence on Russia in short and even medium term. This contributes to the economic enrichment especially during the period of high prices and allows Russia to rebuild the image of Great Power. Moreover, such dependence leads to the closer integration of the economies of the NIS.

Bertil Nygren distinguishes two types of “natural gas weapons” towards the CIS states that are strongly interrelated: the “tap weapon” and “the transit weapon”. The first one means that Russia can impose prices and policies to the CIS states under the threat of “shutting off the tap”, and the second one presupposes that Russia establishes the transit prices and the prices it buys the natural gas for.⁴⁶⁹ Russia’s geographic location and infrastructure built in USSR allowed it to be a provider, an importer of gas and manager of gas deliveries.⁴⁷⁰ Russia’s goal is to gain control over energy production and transit resources on the post-Soviet space and the gas weapons can be used by Russia in order to “punish” or to “reward” neighbors.

Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova are totally dependent on Russia’s gas. In the case of these states the tap gas weapon has been countered by a transit gas weapon. When Gazprom decided to increase prices for Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, they replied by cutting off transit routes, stealing gas or increasing transit prices.⁴⁷¹ Ukraine is the

⁴⁶⁹ NYGREN, Bertil, “Putin’s Use of Natural Gas to Reintegrate the CIS Region”, *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol.55, No.4, July-August 2008, p.5

⁴⁷⁰ NYGREN, Bertil, “Putin’s Use of Natural Gas to Reintegrate the CIS Region”, *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol.55, No.4, July-August 2008, p.13

⁴⁷¹ NYGREN, Bertil, “Putin’s Use of Natural Gas to Reintegrate the CIS Region”, *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol.55, No.4, July-August 2008, p.5

most vulnerable in this situation despite the fact it is the main market for Russian gas.⁴⁷²

In case of Ukraine energy was a major instrument in Putin's attempt to develop a policy towards Ukraine: "energy transit issues, energy debts, and energy thefts were all stumbling blocks".⁴⁷³ After the Orange revolution Gazprom initiated the rise of prices, Ukraine refused to negotiate and threatened to siphon off gas. Finally, the parties reached an agreement: for 2007 Ukraine was to buy all of its gas from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan for \$130 per thousand cubic meters. "Russia had merely exchanged its tap weapon for a transit weapon against Ukraine, since Central Asian gas deliveries are entirely dependent on Russian gas pipelines".⁴⁷⁴

The interconnection of the two weapons was seen in negotiations for 2008 prices. It showed that Russia could block the deliveries of gas to Ukraine, while Kyiv could halt the transit of Russian gas to Europe. This means that Russia is dependent on Kyiv, and it is trying to overcome the dependence. Therefore the North European Gas pipeline under the Baltic Sea between Russia and Germany was projected to weaken Ukraine's transit weapon.⁴⁷⁵

Vladimir Milov, President of the Institute of Energy Policy in Russia, also argues that Russia is seeking to use its energy as a political tool and post-Soviet space is in the main focus. There are two possible scenarios for the energy policy towards former Soviet Union states (especially Ukraine): using the fact of energy

⁴⁷² NYGREN, Bertil, "Putin's Use of Natural Gas to Reintegrate the CIS Region", *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol.55, No.4, July-August 2008, p.13

⁴⁷³ NYGREN, Bertil, "Putin's Use of Natural Gas to Reintegrate the CIS Region", *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol.55, No.4, July-August 2008, p.5

⁴⁷⁴ NYGREN, Bertil, "Putin's Use of Natural Gas to Reintegrate the CIS Region", *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol.55, No.4, July-August 2008, p.6

⁴⁷⁵ NYGREN, Bertil, "Putin's Use of Natural Gas to Reintegrate the CIS Region", *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol.55, No.4, July-August 2008, p.6

dependence/energy supplies from Russia in order to achieve certain political goals in relations with countries that are purchasing Russian energy (1); getting control over the downstream energy assets (distribution and retail sales) in the energy importing nations in order to pursue both commercial and, presumably, political goals (2).⁴⁷⁶

Milov points that the Baltic States, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia are the most visible targets for the Russian energy policy. Energy is used as a tool of restoring Russia's former economic dominance in the region as well as a tool of political pressure. The scholar thinks that Russia doesn't have any strategy for "energy diplomacy" and its behavior is unpredictable.⁴⁷⁷ The cases of Ukraine can be an example.

Initially, they started with Russia's attempts to get control over Ukrainian and Belarussian gas transit pipelines, which together account for 95 per cent of total capacity of Russian export transportation corridors. After refusal of Ukrainian leaders Russia cut off gas in January 2006, declaring that Ukraine did not accept new prices.

According to Milov, the gas disputes with Ukraine and Belarus showed that Russian "energy diplomacy" can have a wide range of targets, depending on the opportunity for influence in each case. In the cases of Ukraine and Belarus, the goal seemed to have been gaining control of vital national infrastructure such as pipelines, and capturing certain influential local politicians by involving them in certain affiliated businesses and using them as lobbyists for Russian interests. However, if the goal turns out to be unachievable, a switch to more tactical goals (such as increasing prices) is possible. The negotiations with Ukraine reveal that there was something more involved than just a desire to increase prices. Moscow had avoided all the steps needed to increase prices from a purely commercial point of view. The political

⁴⁷⁶ MILOV, Vladimir, "The Use of Energy as a Political Tool", *EU-Russia Review* 1, Brussels: EU-Russia Centre, May 2006, p.14

⁴⁷⁷ MILOV, Vladimir, "The Use of Energy as a Political Tool", *EU-Russia Review* 1, Brussels: EU-Russia Centre, May 2006, p.15

agenda is always in the background, but, as appears from the Belarus case, cannot always be clearly identified.⁴⁷⁸

CIS has always been an important arena of Russia's interest. Russia is still trying to regain its influence and the status of the great power on the territory by means of energy tools, presence of diaspora etc. One can see here the great power nationalism that sought to establish its control over former territories. After the discussion of Russia's relations with the CIS, it is important to concentrate on Russia's policy towards western countries insofar they play an important role for Russia. The last part discussed the relations of the Russian Federation with USA, NATO, and European countries.

5.4. Russia and the West

In the early years after the breakup of the USSR, Russia's relations with the US and EU can be characterized by ups and downs. However, following the multipolar policy Putin sought to warm them up. But the tough foreign policy of the US President George Bush, first revealed during NATO's enlargement towards the Baltic States, was perceived as a threat by Russia. The continuation of the National Missile Defence (NMD) project of the Cold War Period, the expulsion of several Russian diplomats from the US on the charges of espionage, and Bush's accusation of Russia of the human right violations in Chechnya, led to a public view in Russia in favour of the neo-Eurasianists.⁴⁷⁹

In this context, Putin re-evaluated his foreign policy towards the US and as a demonstration of his multi-faceted policies, he signed a Treaty of Good Neighbourliness, Friendship and Cooperation with China (July 2001), that was the subject of severe criticism and anger by the US since an American EP-3 spy plane

⁴⁷⁸ MILOV, Vladimir, "The Use of Energy as a Political Tool", *EU-Russia Review* 1, Brussels: EU-Russia Centre, May 2006, p.17

⁴⁷⁹ ERŞEN, Emre, "Neo-Eurasianism and Putin's «Multipolarism» in Russian Foreign Policy", *Turkish Review of Eurasian Studies*, Annual 4, 2004, pp.148 – 149

was shot down by Chinese Forces at that time. In the meantime, he even searched for negotiations with Iran, Iraq, Libya, Cuba and North Korea which were categorized as “rouge states” by the US and one of the major reasons of the National Missile Defense Project. So much so that, Russia re-started the nuclear partnership with Iran which was supposed to be stopped according to the 1995 Al Gore - Victor Chernomyrdin Agreement; as well as signed technical and economic partnership agreements with North Korea.⁴⁸⁰ Besides that, Putin declared that Russia could outlaw all the nuclear agreements signed with the US, such as START I and II, if the US intends to withdraw from the 1972 ABM Treaty which includes the mutual decrease of nuclear warheads.⁴⁸¹

In return of all these abovementioned, besides the policy of “multipolarism”, Putin focused on Russia’s economic development which has always been a key element in his foreign policy. Regarding this, Putin attempted to make Russia a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) which would help to increase the credibility of the Russian Economy in the eyes of the foreign investors and could put an end to the damages of the 1998 financial breakdown.⁴⁸²

Although the economic gap between Russia and the US started widening soon after the dissolution of the USSR, the desperate situation of the economy got worse with the 1998 financial breakdown. In this connection, Putin realized that healing the damages of the economy would have been possible only if they could develop better relations with the US: “the global economic leader”. However, some commentators argued that Putin’s policy of intensification of relations with the US was due to the NMD. They asserted that since Russia did not have adequate economic and technological power to enforce a counter project, she was obliged to stand for the

⁴⁸⁰ ERŞEN, Emre, “Neo-Eurasianism and Putin’s «Multipolarism» in Russian Foreign Policy”, *Turkish Review of Eurasian Studies*, Annual 4, 2004, p.149

⁴⁸¹ MENDELSON, Jack, “America, Russia and the Future of Arms Control”, *Current History*, Vol. 100, No. 648, October 2001, p. 327

⁴⁸² ERŞEN, Emre, “Neo-Eurasianism and Putin’s «Multipolarism» in Russian Foreign Policy”, *Turkish Review of Eurasian Studies*, Annual 4, 2004, p. 151

NMD. The tragic abandonment of the Russian Soldiers in the Kursk submarine in 2000 due to the lack of technological sources seems supportive to the above argument.⁴⁸³

Jeffrey Mankoff characterized the period of 2000 – 2004 as an improvement of relations between two countries.⁴⁸⁴ Furthermore, Putin had continued his rapprochement policy by attempting to ratify START II in April 2000; nevertheless the ratification of the project waited for a long time in the Duma.⁴⁸⁵ Soon Putin signed new, if limited, arms control pact with Washington, the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) that also contributed to the establishment of the “new strategic partnership” between two countries. However, these two documents strengthened Russia’s bargaining position in future arms control negotiations. As Mankoff points out, this lowering tensions with Washington while enhancing Russian bargaining power was typical Putin’s position in dealing with the USA in the first half of its presidency. Thus, SORT ensured maintenance of rough strategic parity by limiting the United States ability to to build new offensive weapons. These actions, while improving for a time US – Russia relations, also helped to promote Russia’s global role and influence, which had been a primary goal of policy makers under Yeltsin.⁴⁸⁶

However, Russian leaders remained cautious regarding the degree of intimacy with Washington they were ready to accept. Moscow was rather ready to be a

⁴⁸³ ERŞEN, Emre, “Neo-Eurasianism and Putin’s «Multipolarism» in Russian Foreign Policy”, *Turkish Review of Eurasian Studies*, Annual 4, 2004, pp. 151-152

⁴⁸⁴ MANKOFF, Jeffrey, *Russian Foreign Policy: the Return of Great Power Politics*, Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009, pp, 106 - 107

⁴⁸⁵ ERŞEN, Emre, “Neo-Eurasianism and Putin’s «Multipolarism» in Russian Foreign Policy”, *Turkish Review of Eurasian Studies*, Annual 4, 2004, p.152

⁴⁸⁶ MANKOFF, Jeffrey, *Russian Foreign Policy: the Return of Great Power Politics*, Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009, p.109

Washington's ally but not to fall in line behind it.⁴⁸⁷ In mid-2001 foreign minister Igor Ivanov stressed that "modern Russian diplomacy combines the firm protection of national interests with a consistent search for mutually acceptable solutions through dialogue and cooperation with the West".⁴⁸⁸

After the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington in September 2001, Putin decisively sided with the USA in its "war on terrorism" – a stance which appeared somewhat unpopular amongst more anti-American members of the Russian elite. He was the first official who called to American President to express the condolences and support. However, this broad support for US action against al Qaeda and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan did not signal a total abandonment of multipolarity, but rather a shift in its character. Russia tried to take advantage of both cases. After September 2001 Russia could justify its war in Chechnya and violence of human rights. The intervention into Afghanistan was also used for this purpose. Russia's policy was to engage with the West on a case by case basis, with Russian interests to the fore. In 2002 and 2003 Russia, along with China and France – played a restraining and blocking role on the UN Security Council in the face of the United States' and the United Kingdom's more aggressive policy against Iraq. Russia, in alliance with France and Germany, staunchly opposed the Iraq war of 2003, arguing instead that more UN-backed weapons inspections were the way forward.⁴⁸⁹

Nevertheless, the attacks of September 11, 2001 helped Russia and the US to recognize that they are on the same side of an important historical watershed.⁴⁹⁰ The issue has continued to unite countries throughout the Bush – Putin era, with two

⁴⁸⁷ MANKOFF, Jeffrey, *Russian Foreign Policy: the Return of Great Power Politics*, Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009, p.110

⁴⁸⁸ IVANOV, Igor, "The New Russian Identity: Innovation and Continuity in Russian Foreign Policy", *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 24, No.3, Summer 2001, p.11

⁴⁸⁹ BACON, Edwin and WYMAN, Matthew, *Contemporary Russia*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, p.165

⁴⁹⁰ MANKOFF, Jeffrey, *Russian Foreign Policy: the Return of Great Power Politics*, Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009, p.111

countries announcing at the 2006 G8 summit in St.Petersburg the formation of the new Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.⁴⁹¹ Cooperation in the sphere of counterterrorism continued even after the start of hostilities between Russia and Georgia in August 2008.⁴⁹² As to the fighting Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan, Russia, while avoiding direct military intervention, was receptive to the American request for aid, offering intelligence cooperation, overflight of Russian territory, diplomatic pressure on the Central Asian states to cooperate with the antiterrorist campaign, participation in search-and-rescue missions, and military aid to the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, as well as (eventually) agreement to the placement of US bases in Central Asia.⁴⁹³ By doing this Russia hoped to position itself as a crucial player in the postwar reconstruction of the world while also directly influencing the campaign of the US in Afghanistan.⁴⁹⁴

Russian security establishment was uneasy to recognize the US military presence on the post-Soviet space. To prevent US from becoming too established in the region, the Russian military urged anti-Taliban Northern Alliance to drive the Taliban out of Kabul before US forces arrived, and established their own headquarters in Afghanistan ahead of the Americans.⁴⁹⁵ Continuing to worry about US presence in the Central Asia Russia supported Uzbek President Islam Karimov who ordered the US troops to leave after Washington criticized Andijon events in Uzbekistan.

⁴⁹¹ Joint Statement by U.S. President George Bush and Russian Federation President V.V. Putin announcing the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, available from <http://www.en.g8russia.ru/docs/5.html>, (accessed on August 19, 2010)

⁴⁹² MANKOFF, Jeffrey, *Russian Foreign Policy: the Return of Great Power Politics*, Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009, p.111

⁴⁹³ MANKOFF, Jeffrey, *Russian Foreign Policy: the Return of Great Power Politics*, Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009, p.112

⁴⁹⁴ MUKHIN, Vladimir, "Washington and Moscow are Planning the Postwar World Order", (*Washington I Moskva Uzhe Planiruiut Poslevoennoie Ustroystvo Mira*), *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, September 21, 2001

⁴⁹⁵ LO, Bobo, *Vladimir Putin and the Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy*, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2003, pp.118 - 120

Immediately after departure of American troops in 2005 Russia started the first joint exercises with Uzbek forces.⁴⁹⁶

By the mid-2000s the relations between two states degenerated into “a troubled partnership in drift” as a result of Russia’s increasingly assertive international behavior, Putin’s progressively more authoritarian leadership, and the continued US inclination to make major strategic decisions that were in odds with Russia’s professed national interests.⁴⁹⁷ Some of the signals came with the US invasion into Iraq in March 2003, and then with the admission of the Baltic States into NATO and the so-called Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004, that revived fears of a US – Russian struggle over Russian periphery. Although USA expressed their gratitude to Russia for its aid in Afghanistan, concrete concessions were few; restrictions on economic and technical cooperation as well as visa stringent requirements for travel to the US remained in place, while Washington gave no indication it was willing to reconsider its opposition to the existing arms control regime.⁴⁹⁸

Russia argued that it was more eager to preserve partnership with Washington that had turned to be one sided. Russian political establishment tended to consider Russia’s decision to close overseas military facilities in Cuba and Vietnam, acceptance of US military installations in Central Asia, and muted response to both the demise of the ABM Treaty and NATO expansion as a down payment on the strategic partnership with the USA.⁴⁹⁹

⁴⁹⁶ MANKOFF, Jeffrey, *Russian Foreign Policy: the Return of Great Power Politics*, Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009, pp.113 - 114

⁴⁹⁷ GOLDGEIER, James M. and McFAUL, Michael, “What to Do about Russia?”, *Policy Review*, Issue 133, October –November 2005, pp.45 - 62

⁴⁹⁸ MANKOFF, Jeffrey, *Russian Foreign Policy: the Return of Great Power Politics*, Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009, p.116

⁴⁹⁹ KUCHINS, Andrew, “Russia and the USA: Partners Necessarily” (*Rossia I SShA: Partnery Po Neobhodimosti*), *Vedomosti*, November 20, 2006

A report drafted by pro-Kremlin analysts for Putin before his Camp David Summit in 2003 stated “It is American approach to formulating and manipulating the bilateral agenda in the US interest that continues to dominate”.⁵⁰⁰ The report suggested that Russia dedicate itself to establishing a full alliance relationship with the United States, urging Putin to pledge his cooperation in building the liberal-democratic world order at the heart of the Bush doctrine and promise active assistance in resolving such major issues as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Korean nuclear standoff.⁵⁰¹ The proponents of an alliance between the US and Russia stressed that in exchange the US would have to accept Russia’s right to police its own neighborhood.⁵⁰²

The Camp David summit in September 2003 seemed to be the last serious attempt to create a foundation for the US – Russia strategic partnership. In the next twelve months, US – Russian relations entered a period of significant tensions. In Russia, 2004 electoral campaign encouraged nationalistic posturing that was accompanied by a turnover in Putin’s team of advisors, with the replacement of pro-US liberals with Eurasianists and *siloviki* in a number of key positions.⁵⁰³ Yukos acquisition in 2003 threatened investments into Russia’s gas sector. Orange revolution in Ukraine in 2004 revealed that Russia and the US are on the opposite sides of watershed.

A new attempt to define the nature of the US – Russia partnership emerged during 2008 summit in Sochi when Washington and Moscow signed new “Strategic Framework Declaration”. It defined the areas where US – Russia cooperation was possible and desirable. At the top of this list was arms control, with Moscow and

⁵⁰⁰ “Doctrine on Formation the Strategic Union of Russia and the USA”, (*Doktrina Formirovaniia Strategicheskogo Soiuzia Rossii I SShA*), *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, October 29, 2003

⁵⁰¹ IVANOV, Nikita and FROLOV, Vladimir, “Treaty on Strategic Friendship”, (*Dogovor O Strategicheskoi Druzhbe*), *Izvestiia*, September 11, 2003

⁵⁰² MANKOFF, Jeffrey, *Russian Foreign Policy: the Return of Great Power Politics*, Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009, p.117

⁵⁰³ MANKOFF, Jeffrey, *Russian Foreign Policy: the Return of Great Power Politics*, Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009, p.117

Washington pledging to seek a legally binding successor to the START I agreement, and continue cooperation on non-proliferation, and continue to seek agreement on missile defense. The agreement also focused on economic cooperation, in particular, concrete terms to overcome the barriers to Russia's WTO ascension.⁵⁰⁴

In sum, despite some ups and downs in relations with the US, Russia sought to sustain multipolar vector of foreign policy, and to support good relations with all countries, in particular with the USA. The policy that sought strategic partnership with the US was pragmatic: Russia aimed to gain certain concessions as well as to obtain influence in the region of its interest. At the same time, Russia has been concerned to secure its primary interests, especially in post-Soviet space, therefore Moscow opposed the US and NATO policies that could harm Russia's interests.

For Russia, Europe is part of the broad coalitions of democracies, comprising the West. Besides, Europe also implies the web of institutions and shared values that sprang up in the aftermath of World War II. Since the end of the Cold War these institutions, first of all the EU and NATO, have expanded into Europe's East, taking in countries that had long been in the Russian sphere of influence. Therefore, Russia's relations with these institutions operate simultaneously on two levels: that of Moscow's bilateral relations with countries like Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, as well as that of its ties with international institutions, such as the EU, NATO, the OSCE.⁵⁰⁵ The halting steps that Brussels took towards the creation of an integrated European Security and Defense Policy and Common Foreign Policy unsettled the Russians further, forcing Moscow to confront the appearance of the new, at least potentially powerful security actor right on its border.⁵⁰⁶ Besides, aspiring to play a greater international role, the new, larger EU has been more

⁵⁰⁴ Fact Sheet: U.S.-Russia Strategic Framework Declaration, April 6, 2008, available from <http://moscow.usembassy.gov/sochi-factsheet-040608.html>, (accessed on August 20, 2010)

⁵⁰⁵ MANKOFF, Jeffrey, *Russian Foreign Policy: the Return of Great Power Politics*, Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009, p.146

⁵⁰⁶ LYNCH, Dov, "Russia's Strategic Partnership with Europe", *Washington Quarterly*, Vol.27, No.2, Spring 2004, pp.99 - 118

assertive toward Russia than the old European Community ever was. NATO's expansion to the East has affected Russia's security calculations while also buttressing Cold War-era anxieties about Russia's strategic isolation and encirclement. The NATO's decision to accept countries of the former Warsaw Pact in Eastern Europe was particularly unwelcome, especially as the Kremlin believed that, in exchange for Russia's promised to tolerate the presence of Germany in NATO, the alliance would not expand further. Instead, NATO moved to include former Russian satellites in Eastern Europe and initiated discussion on possible acceptance of Georgia and Ukraine. While Moscow had many reasons to send troops to Georgia in August 2008, concern about NATO's ambitions about Georgia was the dominant one.⁵⁰⁷

Despite such fear and dissatisfaction with the West, Moscow has often emphasized the importance of good relations with the West. This is important for Russia in the field of economics, since Europe, especially Eastern part, remains a major market for Russian exports. It is matched by Europe's dependence on Russian energy supplies, especially oil and gas that will be discussed later. Due to these reasons Russia cannot afford complete estrangement from Europe, at least in a short term.⁵⁰⁸

Despite the declaration on necessity of good relations with the West, Russia remained firmly opposed to joining the EU⁵⁰⁹, much less NATO.⁵¹⁰ Although, Putin repeatedly stressed that Russia is "an integral part of the European civilization", Russia's desire to remain outside the European institutional framework meant that

⁵⁰⁷ MANKOFF, Jeffrey, *Russian Foreign Policy: the Return of Great Power Politics*, Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009, p.147

⁵⁰⁸ MANKOFF, Jeffrey, *Russian Foreign Policy: the Return of Great Power Politics*, Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009, p.148

⁵⁰⁹ MERKUSHEV, Vitaly, *Relations between Russia and the EU: the View from Across the Atlantic*, *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, Vol. 6, Is. 2, 2005, pp. 360 - 362

⁵¹⁰ GRIGOR'IEV, Yevgenii, "The Host of Russia in NATO is Wandering Europe", (*Prizrak Rossii V NATO Brodit Po Evrope*), *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, October 2, 2001

Russia consider the normative foundations of the EU and NATO cautiously.⁵¹¹ The Great Power ambitions that have motivated Russia's foreign policy during post-Soviet era are not in line with European identity. However, despite this, Russia insisted, that it is eager not only to increase cooperation, but also increase integration, at least in the fields of economics and trade.⁵¹²

The most salient factor of the transformation of relation between Russia and the EU is the transformation of the EU itself. EU members prefer bilateral agreements with Moscow when it serves to their interests. The growth of these agreements has increased Russia's bargaining leverage, allowing Russia to play different European states off against one another and limiting the range of issues where Russia can confront with the EU as a block. At the same time, countries who have a little bargaining leverage in relations with Russia, seek to push the EU as a whole into a more confrontational position.⁵¹³

The most important interest of Russia in the EU is economic. However, Russia's growing authoritarianism has been a major source of contention with Europe, even more so than in Kremlin's relations with the US. In 1999 Russia elaborated its approach to the EU in the document "Medium-Term Strategy for the Development of Relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union 2000 - 2010",⁵¹⁴ which Putin, as a prime-minister helped to draft. This document emphasized Russia's interest in creating multipolar world order, in which none single state could impose

⁵¹¹ PUTIN, Vladimir "50 Years of the [sic] European Integration and Russia", *Johnson's Russia List*, No.72, March 26, 2007

⁵¹² MANKOFF, Jeffrey, *Russian Foreign Policy: the Return of Great Power Politics*, Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009, p.148

⁵¹³ MANKOFF, Jeffrey, *Russian Foreign Policy: the Return of Great Power Politics*, Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009, p.149

⁵¹⁴ Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation, "Medium-Term Strategy for the Development of Relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union 2000 - 2010", (*Strategiia Razvitiia Imoshenii Rossiiskoi Federatsii S Evropeiskim Soiuzom Na Srednesrochnuiu Perspektivu, 2000 - 2010*), October 22, 1999, available from <http://www.ieras.ru/journal/journal1.2000/9.htm>, (accessed on August 21, 2010)

its will by force. Europe was seen as Russia's strategic partner in creation the multipolar world order. The Strategy made clear that Russia consider itself as a Euro-Asian state that was not interested in any kind of association wit the EU. At the same time it left the possibility that Russia would play a greater role in pan-European security, perhaps by means of the OSCE.⁵¹⁵

The major factor that contributed to Russia's estrangement with the EU in the early years of Putin's presidency was the rapprochement with the US. More generally, the EU rejected the geopolitical thinking pattern common for both the US and Russia. After the EU in December 2003 adopted the first comprehensive EU security strategy and in 2004 established an integrated European Defense Agency to coordinate the strategic planning of the member states, at the same time having appointed former NATO secretary-general Javier Solana as the EU's top foreign policy figure, Russia no longer saw the difference between "good" EU and "bad" NATO. The EU's capacity in the field of security and defense may increase, and it will mean that the EU is no longer insignificant institution, as Russian foreign policy maker used to assume in 1990s. Besides, Russia's participation in NATO' decision making makes Russia more eager to influence its deliberations of NATO, than those of the EU.⁵¹⁶

Russia also worries about EU expansion, especially when EU now is on the borders of unstable states Moldova and Ukraine. Russia has not raised any objection to the prospects of the Ukraine's membership in the EU (unlike its opposition to Ukraine's entrance to NATO's), but the increasing EU's security and defense capacity may replay the risk of debates on possible acceptance of the former Soviet Union states

⁵¹⁵ Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation, "Medium-Term Strategy for the Development of Relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union 2000 - 2010", (*Strategiia Razvitiia Otnoshenii Rossiiskoi Federatsii S Evropeiskim Soiuzom Na Srednesrochnuiu Perspektivu, 2000 - 2010*), October 22, 1999, available from <http://www.ieras.ru/journal/journal1.2000/9.htm>, (accessed on August 21, 2010)

⁵¹⁶ MANKOFF, Jeffrey, *Russian Foreign Policy: the Return of Great Power Politics*, Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009, pp.154 - 155

into NATO.⁵¹⁷ As a result of growing skepticism about the EU as an organization, Russia has emphasized the bilateral agreement with the states-members of the EU as an alternative to working through Brussels.⁵¹⁸ For Russia, this approach has few advantages. On the one hand, it is closer to Moscow's belief in states and distrust of international institutions. States can at least be expected to act in their national interest and to be less moralistic about democracy, human rights etc. On the other hand, it makes more sense for Russia to seek for the partnership with those states-members of the EU that have good relations with Moscow.⁵¹⁹

Although Kremlin sought closer relations with certain European countries, it could not avoid some quarrels with its former satellites most of which have been the EU members since 2004. Such disputes have centered on the question of ethnic Russian minorities in the Baltic states, the adherence of the new members to the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, tariffs, border controls and inspections, visa requirements, access to Kaliningrad, energy, ties to opposition groups in Belarus and Ukraine, the stationing of NATO assets in Eastern Europe, and even the status of a memorial to World War II Red Army soldiers in Estonia.⁵²⁰

The bilateral relations with EU countries deepened the division in the EU. The 2008 crisis in Georgia further exposed deep line within Europe over how to deal with Moscow.

The creation of the EU's European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) in 2003 put Russia in a strange position. Designed to bring coherence into the series of PCAs between Brussels and neighboring countries, the ENP aimed to develop "privileged relations,

⁵¹⁷ "EU Must Give Kiev Ascension Hope", *Financial Times*, August 28, 2008

⁵¹⁸ MANKOFF, Jeffrey, *Russian Foreign Policy: the Return of Great Power Politics*, Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009, p.156

⁵¹⁹ MANKOFF, Jeffrey, *Russian Foreign Policy: the Return of Great Power Politics*, Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009, pp. 156 - 157

⁵²⁰ MANKOFF, Jeffrey, *Russian Foreign Policy: the Return of Great Power Politics*, Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009, p.157

building upon mutual commitment to common values”.⁵²¹ Russia rejected the ENP insofar it saw the demand to coordinate its legislation with the principles contained in its documents as interference in Russia’s internal affairs and because it objected to be given the same status as the smaller states covered by the ENP.⁵²²

Instead of participating in the ENP, Russia agreed on a creation of the Four Common Spaces at the May 2003 St.Petersburg summit. The Common Spaces – economics; freedom, security and justice; external security; and research, education and culture – provided a framework for closer cooperation between Russia and the EU without formalities of integration and allowed Russia to maintain its special status.⁵²³ Long-lasting negotiations within the Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice led to the signing at 2006 Sochi summit, the EU – Russia agreement on visa facilitation and readmission, addressing Russian concerns about the difficulty to travel to the EU and Kaliningrad region.⁵²⁴

Putin and the European Commission president discussed the possibility of replacing the PCA with a broader, legally binding treaty in 2005. However, at 2008 Khanty – Mansiisk summit Russia expressed the concern, that Lithuania could throw up obstacles to the new agreement through its appeals to European solidarity.⁵²⁵

To conclude, Europe holds an important place in Russian foreign policy. Despite patriotic-nationalistic rhetoric of Putin in domestic arena, Russian President has

⁵²¹ European Commission, “The Policy: What is the European Neighbourhood Policy?”, available from http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/policy_en.htm, (accessed on August 21, 2010)

⁵²² MANKOFF, Jeffrey, *Russian Foreign Policy: the Return of Great Power Politics*, Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009, p.159

⁵²³ GOMART, Thomas, “The Performance in the Half-Empty Hall”, (*Predstavleniie Pri Polupustom Zale*), *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, May 11, 2005

⁵²⁴ MANKOFF, Jeffrey, *Russian Foreign Policy: the Return of Great Power Politics*, Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009, p.161

⁵²⁵ MANKOFF, Jeffrey, *Russian Foreign Policy: the Return of Great Power Politics*, Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009, pp.161 - 163

always sought to support good relations with European states as well as institutions such as the EU and NATO. Europe is important for Russia first of all due to the economic reasons: European market is the biggest recipient of Russian goods and energy. At the same time, Kremlin is very cautious in relations with the EU, particularly concerning possible closer integration. Moscow prefers bilateral agreements with the EU-members insofar they give Russia a bargaining leverage and allow it to collaborate only with preferred countries. This pragmatic approach can be also seen in the Russia's concern about the EU enlargement into the sphere of Russia's influence. Despite the importance of Europe as a trade partner for Russia, the latter has ever been concerned about its primary interests and spheres of influence and has been ready to protect them.

As president, Putin sought to manage tensions with NATO while taking advantage from the expansion to assert Russia's own agenda with the alliance. Putin gave some hint that he did not regard NATO, even in its expanded form, as a major problem. Indeed, he pursued more wide-range cooperation with NATO than Yeltsin did. In early years of his presidency he tried to vocally downplay the impact of NATO expansion on Russian security as a part of his larger strategy of making Russia an indispensable partner of the West. As relations between Russia and Western partners got worse, NATO's enlargement revived Russia's fears about purpose and scope of the alliance and led Moscow to take steps to limit the impact of the new NATO on its own security. The prospect of Ukraine's and Georgia's acceptance to NATO, which was discussed during 2008 Bucharest summit, coupled with Russia's own politically –military revival was instrumental in precipitating the conflict between Russia and Georgia. With its invasion, Moscow sought to persuade the alliance to reaffirm its interest in expanding up to Russia's borders and to show the leaders of Ukraine, Georgia and other ex-Soviet states the limitations of the Western power in the region.⁵²⁶

⁵²⁶ MANKOFF, Jeffrey, *Russian Foreign Policy: the Return of Great Power Politics*, Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009, p.164

The NATO secretary-general, Lord George Robertson, was among the first foreign dignitaries scheduled to come to Moscow after Putin's inauguration. Over the objections of his generals Putin refused to cancel Robertson's visit in response to the crisis in Kosovo. This visit led to the restoration of the relations between NATO and Russia and laid the foundation for the establishment in 2002 the NATO – Russia Council (NRC), which was designed to supplant Permanent Joint Council (PJC). The NRC created a post of Russia's ambassador to NATO, who participates in monthly meetings of the Council. The establishment of the NRC gave Russia a greater degree of influence on the alliance but also more generally one component of Putin's policy of cooperation with the West adopted in the aftermath of September 11.⁵²⁷

Still the war in Iraq and NATO's commitment to enlargement revealed the limits of even these arrangements. Putin's appointment of the nationalistic minded Dmitrii Rogozin as Russia's ambassador to NATO in January 2008 signaled a move away from accommodation on the part of Moscow that had been frustrated by its inability to influence NATO's decision-making. NATO – Russia cooperation within the NRC remained pronounced in the arena of counterterrorism – until the work of the council was halted in September 2008 to punish Russia for its invasion into Georgia.⁵²⁸

The relations between Russia and NATO came to almost derailing point due to the alliance second round enlargement. This time, Russia's fears were not only about the continuous expansion of the Alliance, but the fact that the Baltic states – former part of the USSR, located strategically across the Russian border – were invited to join NATO. Besides, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia did not sign the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE). NATO expansion complicated the implementation of the CFE Treaty, the updated version of which was signed in Istanbul in 1999. Western signatories refused or ratify Treaty until Russia withdraws

⁵²⁷ MANKOFF, Jeffrey, *Russian Foreign Policy: the Return of Great Power Politics*, Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009, p.169

⁵²⁸ MANKOFF, Jeffrey, *Russian Foreign Policy: the Return of Great Power Politics*, Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009, pp.169 - 170

its troops from Georgia and Transdniestria.⁵²⁹ Moscow, in its turn, refused the demand to withdraw its military forces from Transdniestria, because of the fears of the increased vulnerability of the region due to the close presence of alliance.⁵³⁰

At the same time Moscow was complaining that its own Western frontier and frontiers of Belarus were open to invasion. The presence of the Russian military troops in these countries gave Russia opportunity to provoke chaos on their territories, if necessary, and a kind of protection against any aggressive action on the part of the alliance.⁵³¹ Moscow's position concerning NATO expansion was decisive: in September 2007 Lavrov warned NATO that the presence of antimissile facilities on the territory of the former Warsaw Pact (as well as Kosovo's independence) were critical issues where Moscow would not engage into bargaining.⁵³²

As a response to the establishment on Polish territory antiballistic missile system by Washington (that happened after Russia's invasion into Georgia), Russia declared that Poland had opened its territory to the possibility of nuclear retaliation.⁵³³ Russia also protested against agreements signed in 2005 allowing the US establish military bases in Romania and Bulgaria as violating the terms of the CFE Treaty and justifying its own military presence in Transdniestria.⁵³⁴ Russian fears for the future

⁵²⁹ SOCOR, Vladimir, "Moscow Confronts the West over CFE Treaty at OSCE", *Jamestown Foundation Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Vol.4, Is.103, May 25, 2007, available from [http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=32766&tx_ttnews\[backPid\]=171&no_cache=1](http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=32766&tx_ttnews[backPid]=171&no_cache=1), (accessed on August 21, 2010)

⁵³⁰ IVANOV, Sergei, "Speech at the 42nd Munich Conference on Security Policy", February 5, 2006, available from <http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?id=171&sprache=en&>, (accessed on August 21, 2010)

⁵³¹ MANKOFF, Jeffrey, *Russian Foreign Policy: the Return of Great Power Politics*, Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009, p.171

⁵³² LAVROV, Sergei, "Speech at MGIMO University, Moscow, September 3, 2007", *Johnson's Russia List*, No.188, September 4, 2007

⁵³³ GORST, Isabel and CIENSKI Jan, "Missile Shield Accord Draws Russian Fire", *Financial Times*, August 15, 2008

⁵³⁴ TULLY, Andrew, "What IS Strategy for Bases in Former Soviet Bloc?", *Rudio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty Newsline*, December 7, 2005

of the CFE regime became even more evident once the United States announced it would station antimissile batteries on the territory of the new members. After a series of sharp exchanges on the issue in the spring of 2007 Russia announced it was suspending its participation in the CFE Treaty altogether.⁵³⁵

While Putin's own reaction to the NATO's enlargement, in particular the inclusion of the Baltic States, was calmly negative, some part of the Russian elite remained hostile. To be sure, Putin initially removed some of the most vocal opponents of NATO and NATO – Russian cooperation from their posts. The two most notable victims were the former defense minister Igor Sergeev, and the head of the Defense Ministry International department general Leonid Ivashov.⁵³⁶ While Putin for the most part succeeded in using NRC to defuse tensions and in maintaining a good working relationship with NATO, this area is one where the former president was significantly out of touch with the general run of elite opposition. The appointment of Rogozin as Russia's ambassador to NATO and the invasion of Georgia were the recognition that the attempts to minimize conflicts with NATO did not bring results.⁵³⁷

Russia's policy toward North Atlantic Alliance can also be characterized as pragmatic. Putin sought cooperation with the alliance on the number of issues, first of all security. However, the neglect of the Russian interests that have been expressed in the enlargement of NATO provoked Putin's dissatisfaction with these relations. Aiming to protect its sphere of interest Russia demonstrated its decisive attitude by appointing Rogozin as ambassador to NATO and its power in Georgia in 2008. Despite the importance of the cooperation with NATO, Russia is concerned

⁵³⁵ KISSINGER, Henry A., "Don't Rule Out Putin's Initiative", *International Herald Tribune*, August 9, 2007

⁵³⁶ FORSBERG, Tuomas, "Russia's Relationship with NATO: A Qualitative Change or Old Wine in New Bottles?" *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, Vol.21, No.3, September 2005, p.345

⁵³⁷ MANKOFF, Jeffrey, *Russian Foreign Policy: the Return of Great Power Politics*, Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009, p.172

about its primary interest – influence on the territory of the former Warsaw Pact. NATO's moves on these territories were met with hostility by Russian policy makers and led to the derail in Moscow's relations with Alliance.

An important aspect of the Russia's relations with the West is energy. As Andrew Monaghan states, Russia's "energy diplomacy" has a goal to regain the status of super power, however it is failing.⁵³⁸ Scholar argues that during 2006 – 2007 due to the lack of coherence of an overall strategy for the development of its resources, and lack of coherence in state planning in the use of national resources Russia failed to be a reliable energy supplier. 2006 dispute with Ukraine and 2007 conflict with Belarus undermined confidence to Russia in the NIS, the EU and in the United States. This made led the EU to begin a search for alternative energy types, suppliers and transit routes.

Monaghan discussed internal dynamics of Russian "energy diplomacy". The implications of its failure he sees in inefficient and incoherent exploitation of gas reserves. Gas deliveries are dependent on small amount of mature fields. Even if small independent companies propose alternative sources of energy production they will face the pressure from Gazprom that dominates in this sector. The consequence of this is the attempt of Kremlin to gain control over resource sector which is seen to be too important to be left to market forces. Moreover, to have a greater control over the sector, Moscow decided that priority should be given to Russian investors. The policy has resulted with a stagnation of the gas industry as an outcome of ineffective state management and has undermined the confidence of Russian and foreign investors. Consequently, new fields are under-explored.⁵³⁹

Another issue of the gas industry is the incoherence of the strategy of national resources development and lack of understanding of Russia's national interest in

⁵³⁸ MONAGHAN, Andrew, "Russia's Energy Diplomacy: a Political Idea Lacking a Strategy?", *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, Vol. 7, No.2, June 2007, pp. 275–288

⁵³⁹ MONAGHAN, Andrew, "Russia's Energy Diplomacy: a Political Idea Lacking a Strategy?", *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, Vol. 7, No.2, June 2007, pp.278 – 279.

general. The main problems are the weak influence of state on independent sector, incoherent planning, competition between companies, state and its monopolies, and even within the state. Moreover, Russian energy policy is not the same as Gazprom energy policy and the latter has its own interests.⁵⁴⁰ Because of these reasons, it is difficult to say that Russia can play a significant role in international energy game.

As to external factors of Russia's energy diplomacy dynamic, there are three areas of action, that are NIS, EU, Russia's largest market, and Asia-Pacific region. In all these areas Russia's policy lacks clarity and specified direction. Its policy in the Black Sea region caused negative attitude to Russia among EU states: "The dispute between Gazprom and Ukraine was a "wake up call" for many outside the region, reflecting both Russia's strong arm tactics and highlighting its efforts to strengthen its positions in the NIS"⁵⁴¹

Monaghan stresses that Russia undermined the confidence of Western European consumers by increasing state control over the sector, attacking Yukos and other independent firms. The policy of prices increasing served to decrease Russia's dependence on other countries in transition sphere and resource sector, i.e. to protect its own interests and even to overcome its weakness.⁵⁴²

In gas relations with the European Union states Russia is seeking for bilateral agreements with the states as a tool of increasing its influence. Russia is trying to create the image of reliable partner by pushing long-term contracts and improving the Russia-EU gas infrastructure system, for example, constructing North Stream pipeline. This pipeline is seen in Europe as a threat to its energy security insofar as it can increase EU dependence on Russian gas. Russia's attempts to secure access to

⁵⁴⁰ MONAGHAN, Andrew, "Russia's Energy Diplomacy: a Political Idea Lacking a Strategy?", *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, Vol. 7, No.2, June 2007, pp.279 – 280.

⁵⁴¹ MONAGHAN, Andrew, "Russia's Energy Diplomacy: a Political Idea Lacking a Strategy?", *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, Vol. 7, No.2, June 2007, p.281.

⁵⁴² MONAGHAN, Andrew, "Russia's Energy Diplomacy: a Political Idea Lacking a Strategy?", *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, Vol. 7, No.2, June 2007, pp.281 - 282

European downstream assets as “reciprocity” for European access to upstream Russian assets and repeated rejections of EU proposals to liberalise the Russian energy sector by breaking up the Gazprom monopoly and ratifying the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) and its Transit Protocol are seen by the scholar as an attempt to defend its interests.⁵⁴³

According to Andrew Monaghan, all the mentioned issues made Russia to be considered even as a threat to Europe’s energy security. The author even compares the North-European Gas Pipeline with Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact.⁵⁴⁴

Perhaps the clearest admission of this [failure of energy diplomacy – V.D.] on the Russian side is Gazprom’s decision to hire public relations consultants to improve its image in the West and President Putin’s recent attempt to move away from the terminology of Russia as an “energy superpower”, arguing that its use was counter productive: it was being used to revive echoes of the Cold War and the “evil USSR”.⁵⁴⁵

This has an important political impact: having faced Russia’s unreliability EU started searching for alternative sources of energy, alternative suppliers and routes. One of the examples is the projected Nabucco pipeline. In this case Russia would loose not only economic profit but one of the main vessels of political influence. Ukraine in this situation would not be a “mediator” in Russia – EU relationships, and will not be presented by Russia as the only guilty in gas cut off. On the other hand, it will loose fees it collects for transit and the lever of influence on Russia, i.e. its “transit weapon”.

⁵⁴³ MONAGHAN, Andrew, “Russia’s Energy Diplomacy: a Political Idea Lacking a Strategy?”, *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, Vol. 7, No.2, June 2007, pp.283 – 284

⁵⁴⁴ MONAGHAN, Andrew, “Russia’s Energy Diplomacy: a Political Idea Lacking a Strategy?”, *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 2, June 2007, p.276

⁵⁴⁵ MONAGHAN, Andrew, “Russia’s Energy Diplomacy: a Political Idea Lacking a Strategy?”, *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 2, June 2007, p.286

The point of Andrew Monaghan is shared by Margot Light.⁵⁴⁶ She argues that the increase of state ownership of Russia energy resources following the acquisition of Yuganskneftegaz and Sibneft by Gazprom and gas dispute with Ukraine in 2005 – 2006 pushed EU to discuss the diversification of energy carries. The scholar stresses that the dispute arose after Russia and Germany reached an agreement on North-European Gas Pipeline. Although it will reduce Russia’s dependency on Poland and Ukraine it will increase the dependence of the EU on Russian gas.⁵⁴⁷

The debate on Russia’s unreliability started when Putin under the slogan of the “war with oligarchs” increased the state ownership in energy sector. In 2003 Mikhail Khodorkovsky, head of Yukos, was sentenced on the charge of tax evasion, next year state-owned Rosneft bought Yaganskneftegaz, the largest Yukos asset. In 2005 Roman Abramovich’s Sibneft was acquired by Gazprom.⁵⁴⁸

Debate became more intense when in 2006 in mid-winter Russia raised the prices of gas for Ukraine. When Russian-Ukrainian negotiations broke down and Russia cut off gas for Ukraine, the EU Gas Coordination Group held an emergency meeting to discuss not only security of supplies but also diversification of energy carries. 2005 – 2006 gas conflicts demonstrated “fragility of the Russia-EU relationships and the rapidity with which both sides resort during a crisis to rhetoric reminiscent of the

⁵⁴⁶ LIGHT, Margot, “Russian Political Engagement with the European Union”, in Roy Alison, Margot Light, and Stephen White (eds.), *Putin’s Russia and the Enlarged Europe*, London, Chatham House, 2006, pp. 65 – 67

⁵⁴⁷ LIGHT, Margot, “Russian Political Engagement with the European Union”, in Roy Alison, Margot Light, and Stephen White (eds.), *Putin’s Russia and the Enlarged Europe*, London, Chatham House, 2006, p.66

⁵⁴⁸ LIGHT, Margot, “Russian Political Engagement with the European Union”, in Roy Alison, Margot Light, and Stephen White (eds.), *Putin’s Russia and the Enlarged Europe*, London, Chatham House, 2006, pp.66 – 67

Cold War”.⁵⁴⁹ Conflict of 2008 – 2009 only deepened the dissatisfaction with Russia as a partner.

Russia’s gas relations with the Europe bear a pragmatic character. While seeking economic profit, total control over domestic gas industry as well as infrastructure of the former Soviet republics, greater influence on European countries through the bilateral agreements, Russia seem to forget about necessity of good relations with Europe and its possible negative response to Russia’s gas policies. This led to the dissatisfaction with Russia as energy supplier and search for alternative energy suppliers and routes. The final part of this chapter discusses the main finding of the chapter.

5.5. Conclusion

The analysis of Putin’s foreign policy let us to conclude about its pragmatic character. The analysis of the key documents that define Russian foreign policy starting from 2000 and approaches of different elite groups revealed multivector character of Putin’s foreign policy. Not opposing to any of the possible vectors of the foreign policy and working actively in all directions, Putin sought to protect Russia’s key interests, economic, security, and main spheres of influence.

The evaluation of Russian policy towards diaspora between 2000 and 2008 shows its pragmatic and imperial character. Viewing Russian-speakers in the post-Soviet states as compatriots/diaspora, Kremlin considered them as Russia’s people in the newly independent republics. Russia identified itself as protector of the rights and freedoms of compatriots living abroad. This perception allowed Russia to influence domestic policies of newly independent states. By means of this, Russia secured its interest on the post-Soviet space. Moreover, Russia’s diasporic polity was to solve Russia’s internal problems. Kremlin sought to stimulate economic development of the

⁵⁴⁹ LIGHT, Margot, “Russian Political Engagement with the European Union”, in Roy Alison, Margot Light, and Stephen White (eds.), *Putin’s Russia and the Enlarged Europe*, London, Chatham House, 2006, pp.67 - 68

depopulated regions by means of promoting the resettlement of mainly ethnic Russians from the ex-Soviet states.

CIS has always been an important arena of Russia's interest. Russia is still trying to regain its influence and the status of the great power on the territory by means of energy tools, presence of diaspora etc. One can see here the great power nationalism that sought to establish its control over former territories. After the discussion of Russia's relations with the CIS, it is important to concentrate on Russia's policy towards western countries insofar they play an important role for Russia. The last part discussed the relations of the Russian Federation with USA, NATO, and European countries.

Despite some ups and downs in relations with the US, Russia sought to sustain multipolar vector of foreign policy, and to support good relations with all countries, in particular with the USA. The policy that sought strategic partnership with the US was pragmatic: Russia aimed to gain certain concessions as well as to obtain influence in the region of its interest. At the same time, Russia has been concerned to secure its primary interests, especially in post-Soviet space, therefore Moscow opposed the US and NATO policies that could harm Russia's interests.

Europe holds an important place in Russian foreign policy. Despite patriotic-nationalistic rhetoric of Putin in domestic arena, Russian President has always sought to support good relations with European states as well as institutions such as the EU and NATO. Europe is important for Russia first of all due to the economic reasons: European market is the biggest recipient of Russian goods and energy. At the same time, Kremlin is very cautious in relations with the EU, particularly concerning possible closer integration. Moscow prefers bilateral agreements with the EU-members insofar they give Russia a bargaining leverage and allow it to collaborate only with preferred countries. This pragmatic approach can be also seen in the Russia's concern about the EU enlargement into the sphere of Russia's influence. Despite the importance of Europe as a trade partner for Russia, the latter has ever

been concerned about its primary interests and spheres of influence and has been ready to protect them.

Russia's policy toward North Atlantic Alliance can also be characterized as pragmatic. Putin sought cooperation with the alliance on the number of issues, first of all security. However, the neglect of the Russian interests that have been expressed in the enlargement of NATO provoked Putin's dissatisfaction with these relations. Aiming to protect its sphere of interest Russia demonstrated its decisive attitude by appointing Rogozin as ambassador to NATO and its power in Georgia in 2008. Despite the importance of the cooperation with NATO, Russia is concerned about its primary interest – influence on the territory of the former Warsaw Pact. NATO's moves on these territories were met with hostility by Russian policy makers and led to the derail in Moscow's relations with Alliance.

Russia's relations with the Europe concerning energy bear a pragmatic character. While seeking economic profit, total control over domestic gas industry as well as infrastructure of the former Soviet republics, greater influence on European countries through the bilateral agreements, Russia seem to forget about necessity of good relations with Europe and its possible negative response to Russia's gas policies. This led to the dissatisfaction with Russia as energy supplier and search for alternative energy suppliers and routes.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

This thesis discussed the processes of the nation-building under Russia's President Vladimir Putin and his discourse of Russian nationalism. The main findings of the thesis can be concluded in following.

The primary goal of Russia's first President Boris Yeltsin was to cultivate new common identity among citizens of the Russian Federation after the demise of the USSR. In the 1990s it was crucial task: customary Soviet identity no longer existed. Instead, new multinational state appeared. It had to have values and symbols, that would be meaningful for all citizens regardless their ethnic origins, religion, language etc. They were considered by Kremlin as means of unification of the residents of the Russian Federation. As a guarantor of the Constitution and liberal democratic leader, Yeltsin was trying to achieve this goal. However, there was more nationalistic minded opposition: both in the parliament, and among various political movements in Russia.

Taking into consideration the multinational character of Russia, and its federative structure, civic nation-building was the only reasonable solution to keep the state alive. As to the project of state-building, Yeltsin advocated new state-building within the borders of the Russian federation with the respect to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the newly independent states. After the breakup of the USSR it was important for Russia to declare the goal of the new democratic state building, commitment to the democratic values.

However, in practice, the policy was not in line with the proclaimed goal. In early years of independence, Yeltsin paid attention to the construction of the civic identities, by means of the introducing new symbols, granting citizenship to the residents of the Russian Federation and avoiding ethnic discourse. However, in 1993 – 1994 Russia became concerned more about Russian-speakers abroad and even made attempts to the implementation of the dual citizenship for the members of

diaspora. This policy had a pragmatic aim to strengthen Russian economy, provide some sort of security and gain the tool for the influence on the neighboring states. When this policy failed, Yeltsin increased the activity within Commonwealth of the Independent States. Within this frame, the agreement on the creation on the Union state with Belarus was signed. That move also had aim to stabilize Russia's economy be means of Belarus, and gain control over the pipelines system.

The 1996 was the stabilizing point for Russia, when Yeltsin turned his head towards civic nation-building. Various factors, such was the war with Chechnya, economic and political crisis in the state, the bilateral agreements with the republics within the RF stimulated this policy, insofar they created real threat to the integrity of the Russian state. The policy of the inventing new nation presupposed the inventing new symbols that could unite the nation, search for the national idea, the involvement of the culture, education, art, religion into the process of the construction of the civic nation. However, the Yeltsin's policy failed. The liberal economic reforms finished with the crisis of 1998, corruption and mass unemployment. The bilateral treaties with the Russian republics caused the threat to the stability of the Federation. In such conditions, one can hardly achieve success in nation-building. The engagement with the West in foreign policy and the liberal market reforms were seen as a reason of deep crisis in the state. The new state symbols introduced by Yeltsin were not officially adopted and were not used widely. The appeal to the ROC provoked the dissatisfaction of the representative of other confessions. Having a wide trust of the population and being the substitution for the communist ideology, ROC understood its special place and the discourse of some officials within ROC could be called even xenophobic.

Under such conditions, ethnic Russian nationalist views reemerged to fill the intellectual and political vacuum. Even on the state level one can trace ethnically nationalistic discourse. The nationalistic ideas of various political parties and movements play an important role: they inform society and state leadership about the wide range of associations, their problems and needs; they are important as the opposition to the state project. Even if their demands are not taken into the

consideration to the full extent, some of them will be inevitably used to work out efficient state policy.

The emergence of the discourse of the ethnic nationalism on the state level can be viewed as an attempt to appeal to the patriotic feelings of the Russian citizens in the period of economic and political crisis. Some authors suggest even that this was an attempt to find groups that can be represented as guilty in Russia's breakdown. In my turn, I consider this as an attempt to draw Russians' attention away from economic and political concerns to the issues of patriotism and nationalism that are not that much crucial to the stability of political power in Russia as economic and political issues.

In general, it can be said that nationalism serves ruling elites as an ideology that reinforces the legitimacy of the state and social-political cohesion in periods of transition.⁵⁵⁰ Starting from 1993, the state changed its rhetoric, espousing a strong Russian "statehood" and emphasizing Russia's status as a great power. References to Russian culture accompanied this promulgation of state/ territorial concepts. The combination of references to great-power status and civic and ethnic national elements reflects the difficulties associated with Russian state and nation-building. Too little ethnic identity in the mix makes the process of state-building very difficult, but too much of it runs the risk of permanently dividing the population along ethnic lines. Official Russian policy adheres largely to a civic concept of the nation, though one containing a respectable dose of cultural elements. It combines state-building within the RF with the attempt, successful to varying degrees, to create a zone of formally sovereign but in essence dependent neighboring states.⁵⁵¹

The legacy of Yeltsin needed a wide range of measures. Recentralization of the state, strengthening the presidential power, economic reforms were the important base for

⁵⁵⁰ PREIBLER, Franz, "Russian (Ethnic) Nationalism", in Egbert Jahn (ed.), *Nationalism in Late and Post-Communist Europe*, Baden-Baden, 2009, p.69

⁵⁵¹ PREIBLER, Franz, "Russian (Ethnic) Nationalism", in Egbert Jahn (ed.), *Nationalism in Late and Post-Communist Europe*, Baden-Baden, 2009, pp.69 - 70

the successful nation-building. Putin's attitude to the policy of the nation-building was far more serious than the one of Yeltsin. His political program included the part devoted to the nation-building. This was the set of ideas of statist nationalism, based on patriotism, statehood. The appeal was also made to the great past of the Russian Simonsen argued: "Putin at an early stage of his presidency appears less sensitive to issues of ethnicity than his predecessor, meaning that his statism is not devoid of an ethnic element".⁵⁵² Scholar calls Putin's patriotism as "ethnocentric". In opinion of Simonsen, the "new patriotism" comes in a loose ideological format.⁵⁵³

Economic and political reforms conducted by Vladimir Putin were the necessary basis for the nation-building in Russia. The achievements on the post of prime-minister and the strengthening of the presidential power raised the ratings of Putin and allowed him to implement his program successfully. His policies of the nation-building show his statist character. "Practical ideology" based on patriotism were the necessary measure for Russia. Its task was to fulfill vacuum that was in Russia. One can trace nationalistic elements in Putin's discourse. As we see, Putin managed to complete the policy began by Yeltsin and introduced legally new state symbols. At the same time, he managed to protect the important symbols of the Soviet past. He sought to spread symbols that could unite citizens of the Russian Federation.

One who makes assumptions that Russian Orthodox Church is promoting its uniqueness and exclusiveness and supports the power in the state in order to achieve privileged position certainly simplifies the situation. The role of the Orthodox Church and its place in post-Soviet society is much complicated. After the demise of the USSR, ROC appeared to be a substitution to the state ideology of Communism. It was a unifying factor, at least for the Slavic population of Russia that was an essential part of the new identity. Being the most trustful institution in Russian

⁵⁵² SIMONSEN, Sven Gunnar, "Nationalism and the Russian Political Spectrum: Locating and Evaluating the Extremes", *Journal of Political Ideologies*, Vol.6, Issue 3, 2000, p.283

⁵⁵³ SIMONSEN, Sven Gunnar, "Nationalism and the Russian Political Spectrum: Locating and Evaluating the Extremes", *Journal of Political Ideologies*, Vol.6, Issue 3, 2000, p.283

society, ROC gave legitimacy to the power institutions and politicians who sought to involve Church into public affairs. One can hardly speak about nationalistic rhetoric of the ROC, its aim to make Orthodoxy the only “official” religion in Russia. The top-clergy in ROC understood and promoted the multicultural and multiconfessional nature of Russia. At the same time, there are conservative members of the Orthodox Church that see Russian way of development to be based on Orthodox values exclusively. As to the position of Putin regarding ROC, it was pragmatic. The ROC was used as means of support of policies of the new President. Although the appeal to Orthodoxy could promote interethnic tensions in society, Putin by means of ROC gained much more support than if he did not appeal to any of the confessions or promoted multiconfessionalism.

The reforms in the sphere of education introduced by Putin were the necessary basis for the promotion of the new state ideology. Nationalistic trends in literature and culture served to promote patriotic ideas of great Russia on the level appropriate to ordinary Russians. This shows the policies of the state leadership as many sided that overlap different spheres of public life, and at the same time they beard pragmatic character.

The analysis of Putin’s foreign policy let us to conclude about its pragmatic character. The analysis of the key documents that define Russian foreign policy starting from 2000 and approaches of different elite groups revealed multivector character of Putin’s foreign policy. Not opposing to any of the possible vectors of the foreign policy and working actively in all directions, Putin sought to protect Russia’s key interests, economic, security, and main spheres of influence.

The evaluation of Russian policy towards diaspora between 2000 and 2008 shows its pragmatic and imperial character. Viewing Russian-speakers in the post-Soviet states as compatriots/diaspora, Kremlin considered them as Russia’s people in the newly independent republics. Russia identified itself as protector of the rights and freedoms of compatriots living abroad. This perception allowed Russia to influence domestic policies of newly independent states. By means of this, Russia secured its interest on

the post-Soviet space. Moreover, Russia's diasporic polity was to solve Russia's internal problems. Kremlin sought to stimulate economic development of the depopulated regions by means of promoting the resettlement of mainly ethnic Russians from the ex-Soviet states.

CIS has always been an important arena of Russia's interest. Russia is still trying to regain its influence and the status of the great power on the territory by means of energy tools, presence of diaspora etc. One can see here the great power nationalism that sought to establish its control over former territories. After the discussion of Russia's relations with the CIS, it is important to concentrate on Russia's policy towards western countries insofar they play an important role for Russia. The last part discussed the relations of the Russian Federation with USA, NATO, and European countries.

Despite some ups and downs in relations with the US, Russia sought to sustain multipolar vector of foreign policy, and to support good relations with all countries, in particular with the USA. The policy that sought strategic partnership with the US was pragmatic: Russia aimed to gain certain concessions as well as to obtain influence in the region of its interest. At the same time, Russia has been concerned to secure its primary interests, especially in post-Soviet space, therefore Moscow opposed the US and NATO policies that could harm Russia's interests.

Europe holds an important place in Russian foreign policy. Despite patriotic-nationalistic rhetoric of Putin in domestic arena, Russian President has always sought to support good relations with European states as well as institutions such as the EU and NATO. Europe is important for Russia first of all due to the economic reasons: European market is the biggest recipient of Russian goods and energy. At the same time, Kremlin is very cautious in relations with the EU, particularly concerning possible closer integration. Moscow prefers bilateral agreements with the EU-members insofar they give Russia a bargaining leverage and allow it to collaborate only with preferred countries. This pragmatic approach can be also seen in the Russia's concern about the EU enlargement into the sphere of Russia's influence.

Despite the importance of Europe as a trade partner for Russia, the latter has ever been concerned about its primary interests and spheres of influence and has been ready to protect them.

Russia's policy toward North Atlantic Alliance can also be characterized as pragmatic. Putin sought cooperation with the alliance on the number of issues, first of all security. However, the neglect of the Russian interests that have been expressed in the enlargement of NATO provoked Putin's dissatisfaction with these relations. Aiming to protect its sphere of interest Russia demonstrated its decisive attitude by appointing Rogozin as ambassador to NATO and its power in Georgia in 2008. Despite the importance of the cooperation with NATO, Russia is concerned about its primary interest – influence on the territory of the former Warsaw Pact. NATO's moves on these territories were met with hostility by Russian policy makers and led to the derail in Moscow's relations with Alliance.

Russia's relations with the Europe concerning energy bear a pragmatic character. While seeking economic profit, total control over domestic gas industry as well as infrastructure of the former Soviet republics, greater influence on European countries through the bilateral agreements, Russia seem to forget about necessity of good relations with Europe and its possible negative response to Russia's gas policies. This led to the dissatisfaction with Russia as energy supplier and search for alternative energy suppliers and routes.

To sum up, despite ethnic elements in Vladimir Putin's discourse of Russian nationalism, his version of nationalism is not ethnic, but rather multiethnic and inclusive that seeks to promote loyalty to the Russian state among the Russian citizens without eliminating their ethnic identities. In his case, Eric Hobsbawm's approach explains the policy of the nation-building and statist inclusive nationalism. In fact, Putin's version of nationalism is multidimensional. Unlike ethnicity, religion and other cultural elements, the loyalty to the state constitute the core of this nationalism.

Despite the presence of various rightist movements in the Russian Federation and nationalistic discourse of the opposition, their rhetoric could hardly influence the policies of the Russian state. The control over media, weak civic society and pragmatic character of political parties made the state the single source of nation-building policies as well as foreign policies. This made the nationalistic discourse a lever of the state policies. On the other hand, the variety of means used by Putin in the process of nation-building reveal more assertive position of his government in this issue. This can be hardly said about Yeltsin. While thesis characterizes Putin's policies as statist inclusionary nationalism, one cannot characterize Russia nation as civic. Despite the declared goals, the civic nation has not been built in Russia, and the ethnic elements still can be found in political discourse.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Address of Boris Yeltsin to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, (*Obrasheniie Borisa Yeltsina K Federal'nomu Sobraniuu Rossiiskoi Federatsii*), *Rossiiskaia Gazeta*, February 25, 1994

Address of the President of Russia Boris Yeltsin to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, "Consolidation of the Russian Federation", (*Obrasheniie Prezidenta Rossii Borisa Yeltsina K Federal'noi Assambleie Rossiiskoi Federatsii "Ob Ukreplenii Rossiiskogo Gosudarstva"*), February 25, 1994, available from <http://www.intelros.org/lib/elzin/1994.htm>, (accessed on August 19, 2010)

Address of the President of Russia Boris Yeltsin to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, "The Order in the Authority- the Order in the Country", (*Obrasheniie Prezidenta Rossii Borisa Yeltsina K Federal'noi Assambleie Rossiiskoi Federatsii "Poryadok Vo Vlasti - Poryadok V Strane"*), March 6, 1997, available from <http://www.intelros.org/lib/elzin/1997.htm>, (accessed on August 19, 2010)

Address of the President of Russia Boris Yeltsin to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, "With Common Efforts to the Developing of Russia", (*Obrasheniie Prezidenta Rossii Borisa Yeltsina K Federal'noi Assambleie Rossiiskoi Federatsii "Obshimi Silami - K Pod'emu Rossii"*), 1998, available from <http://www.intelros.org/lib/elzin/1998.htm>, (accessed on August 19, 2010)

Address of the President of Russia Boris Yeltsin to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation "Russia at the Brink of Epoch", (*Obrasheniie Prezidenta Rossii Borisa Yeltsina K Federal'noi Assambleie Rossiiskoi Federatsii "Rossiia na Rubezhe Epoh"*), March 30, 1999, available from <http://www.intelros.org/lib/elzin/1999.htm> (accessed on August 19, 2010)

Address of the President of Russia Vladimir Putin at the Opening of the Congress of Compatriots, (*Obrasheniie Prezidenta Rossii Vladimira Putina Na Otkrytii Kongressa Sootechestvennikov*), October 11, 2001, available from

http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2001/10/11/0001_type82912type84779_137328.shtml, (accessed August 10, 2010)

Address of the President of Russia Vladimir Putin to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, “The State of Russia: A Way to an Effective State”, (*Obrasheniie Prezidenta Rossii Vladimira Putina K Federal’noi Assambleie Rossiiskoi Federatsii “Gosudarstvo Rossiia: Put’ K Effektivnomu Gpsudarstvu”*), July 7, 2000, available from <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/russia/2000/russia-000710a.htm>, (accessed August 10, 2010)

Address of the President of Russia Vladimir Putin to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, (*Obrasheniie Prezidenta Rossii Vladimira Putina K Federal’noi Assambleie Rossiiskoi Federatsii*), May 26, 2004, available from http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2004/05/26/1309_type70029type82912_71650.shtml, (accessed August 10, 2010)

Address of the President of Russia Vladimir Putin to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, (*Obrasheniie Prezidenta Rossii Vladimira Putina K Federal’noi Assambleie Rossiiskoi Federatsii*), April 26, 2007, available from http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2007/04/26/1209_type70029type82912_125670.shtml, (accessed August 10, 2010)

Address of the President of Russia Vladimir Putin to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, (*Obrasheniie Prezidenta Rossii Vladimira Putina K Federal’noi Assamblee Rossiiskoi Federatsii*), April 3, 2001, available from from http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2001/04/03/0000_type70029type82912_70660.shtml, (accessed on August 10, 2010)

Address of the President of Russia Vladimir Putin to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, (*Obrasheniie Prezidenta Rossii Vladimira Putina K Federal’nomu Sobraniuu Rossiiskoi Federatsii*), May 10, 2006, available from

http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2006/05/10/1823_type70029type82912_105566.shtml, (accessed August 10, 2010)

Address of the Russian President Boris Yeltsin to the Peoples of Caucasus, (*Obrasheniie Rossiiskogo Prezidenta Borisa Yetlsina K Narodam Kavkaza*), May 18, 1994, available from <http://heku.ru/forums.php?m=posts&p=53088>, (accessed on August 10, 2010)

AHREND, Rudiger and TOMPSON, William, “Unnatural Monopoly: The Endless Wait for Gas Sector Reform in Russia”, *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 57, No. 6, September 2005, pp.801 - 821

Annual Address of the President of the Russian Federation to the Federal Assembly, (*Ezhegodnoie Obrasheniie Prezidenta Rossiiskoi FederatsiiK Federal’noi Assamblee Rossiiskoi Federatsii*) April 3, 2001 available from http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2001/04/03/0000_type70029type82912_70660.shtml, (accessed August 10, 2010)

Annual Address of the President of the Russian Federation to the State Duma, (*Ezhegodnoe Obrasheniie Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii K Gosudarstvennoi Dume*), April 25, 2005, *Rossiiskaia Gazeta*, April 26, 2005

ARBATOV, Alexei, “Russia’s Foreign Policy Alternatives”, *International Security*, Vol.18, No.2, Fall 1993, pp. 5- 43

AVER’IANOV, Vitalii, “About the Synthesis of the Orthodox Idea”, (*O Sinteze Pravoslavnoi Idei*), *Nezavisimaia Gazeta – Religii*, March 7, 2000

BACON, Edwin and WYMAN, Matthew, *Contemporary Russia*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006

BACON, Edwin, “Church and State in Contemporary Russia: Conflicting Discourses”, in Rick Fawn and Stephen White (eds.), *Russia after Communism*, London, Frank Cass, 2002, pp. 97 - 116

BARABAN, Elena V., "A Country Resembling Russia: the Use of History in Boris Akunin's Detective Novels", *The Slavic and East European Journal*, Vol. 48, No. 3, Autumn 2004, pp. 396 - 420

"Basic Guidelines of Russian Federation's Support to Compatriots Abroad for 2002-2005" (*Osnovnyie Napravleniia Podderzhki Rossiiskoi Federatsiei Sootechstvennikov Za Rubezhom Na 2002-2005gody*), November 28, 2002, available from http://www.mosds.ru/Dokum/dokum_rosOsn2005.shtml, (accessed August 10, 2010)

"Blessing on Presidentship", (*Blagosloveniiie na Prezidentstvo*), *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, May 17, 2000

BRESLAUER, George W., "Evaluating Gorbachev and Yeltsin as Leaders", in Archie Brown and Lilia Shevtsova (eds.), *Gorbachev, Yeltsin, Putin: Political Leadership in Russia's Transition*, Washington, 2001, pp. 45 - 66

BRUBAKER, Rogers W., "Citizenship Struggles in Soviet Successor States", *International Migration Review*, Vol. 26, No. 2, Summer 1992, pp. 269-291

BRUBAKER, Rogers, *Ethnicity without Groups*, Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2004

BRUBAKER, Rogers, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996

CHAFETZ, Glenn, "The Struggle for a National Identity in Post-Soviet Russia", *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 111, No. 4, Winter 1996-1997, pp. 661 - 688

Charter of the Treaty on Creation the Union State of Russia and Belarus, April 2, 1997, available from http://www.belrus.ru/law/act/dokumentyi_opredelyayuchie_osnov/ustav_k_dogovoru_o_soyuze_belaru/grazhdanstvo_soyuza.html, (accessed on August 10, 2010)

Citizenship Law of the Russian Federation, (*Zakon O Grazhdanstve Rossiiskoi Federatsii*), November 28, 1991, available from <http://www.antropotok.archipelag.ru/text/a010.htm>, (accessed on August 18, 2010)

“Concept of Support of Compatriots Abroad by the Russian Federation at the Present Stage”, (*Kontseptsiiia Podderzhki Rossiiskoi Federatsiei Sootechestvennikov za Rubezhom na Sovremennom Etape*), August 30, 2001, available from http://council.gov.ru/kom_home/kom_sng/relation_compatriot/item638.html, (accessed August 10, 2010)

Constitution of the Russian Federation (*Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii*), December 12, 1993, available from <http://www.constitution.ru/>, (accessed on August 17, 2010)

Data of the Central Elections Commission on the elections of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, December 12, 1993, available from http://www.cikrf.ru/vib_arhiv/gosduma/1993/index.jsp, (accessed on August 10, 2010)

Data of the Central Elections Commission on the elections of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, December 17, 1995, available from http://www.cikrf.ru/vib_arhiv/gosduma/1995/index.jsp, (accessed on August 10, 2010)

Data of the Central Elections Commission on the elections of the President of the Russian Federation, June – July 1996, available from http://www.cikrf.ru/vib_arhiv/President/1996/index.jsp, (accessed on August 10, 2010)

Data on National Composition of the Russian Federation of 2002 all-Russian Census, available from <http://www.perepis2002.ru/>, (accessed on August 10, 2010)

DAUGHTRY, Martin J., "Russia's New Anthem and the Negotiation of National Identity", *Ethnomusicology*, Vol. 47, No. 1, Winter 2003, pp. 42 - 67

Decree of the President of Russian Federation No. 637, June 22, 2006 "On Measures of Support of the Voluntary Migration of Compatriots Living Abroad to the RF" (*O Merakh Po Okazaniiu Sodeistviia Dobrovol'nomu Nereceleniiu v Rossiiskiyu Federatsiiu Sootechestvennikov Prozhivayushikh za Rubezhom*), *Rossiiskaia Gazeta*, June 28, 2006

DEĞİRMEN, Burcu Fadime, *Russian Diaspora and the Politics of Russian Nationalism in the Post Soviet Era*, Middle East Technical University, Thesis for the Degree of Master of Science in International Relations, 2008

Doctrine on Formation the Strategic Union of Russia and the USA", (*Doktrina Formirovaniia Strategicheskogo Soiuza Rossii I SShA*), *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, October 29, 2003

DUNCAN, Peter J. S., "Contemporary Russian Identity between East and West", *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 48, No.1, 2005, pp. 277 - 294

DUNLOP, John B., "Russia under Putin: Reintegrating «Post-Soviet Space»", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 11, No. 3, July 2000, pp. 39 - 47

DUNLOP, John, *The Faces of Contemporary Russian Nationalism*, Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1983

EASTER, Gerald M., "Preference for Presidentialism: Post-Communist Regime Change in Russia and the NIS", *World Politics*, Vol.49, January 1997, pp. 184 - 211

ERŞEN, Emre, "Neo-Eurasianism and Putin's "Multipolarism" in Russian Foreign Policy", *Turkish Review of Eurasian Studies*, Annual 4, 2004, p.

"EU Must Give Kiev Ascension Hope", *Financial Times*, August 28, 2008

European Commission, “The Policy: What is the European Neighbourhood Policy?”, available from http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/policy_en.htm, (accessed on August 21, 2010)

EVANS, Alfred B., “A Russian Civil Society?”, in Stephen White, Zvi Gitelman, and Richard Sakwa (eds.), *Developments in Russian Politics 6*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, pp. 96 - 113

“Fact Sheet: U.S.-Russia Strategic Framework Declaration”, April 6, 2008, available from <http://moscow.usembassy.gov/sochi-factsheet-040608.html>, (accessed on August 20, 2010)

Federal Constitutional Law of the Russian Federation on the State Anthem of the Russian Federation, (*Federal'nii Konstitutsionnii Zakon Rossiiskoi Federatsii o Gosudarstvennom Gimne Rossiiskoi Federatsii*), December 8, 2000, available from <http://www.gazeta.ru/2000/12/09/polnyjtekstz.shtml>, (accessed on August 10, 2010)

Federal Constitutional Law of the Russian Federation on the State Emblem of the Russian Federation, (*Federal'nii Konstitutsionnii Zakon Rossiiskoi Federatsii O Gosudarstvennom Gerbe Rossiiskoi Federatsii*), December 8, 2000, available from http://www.goldenkorona.ru/zakon_gerb.html, (accessed on August 18, 2010)

Federal Constitutional Law of the Russian Federation on the State Flag of the Russian Federation, (*Federal'nii Konstitutsionnii Zakon Rossiiskoi Federatsii O Gosudarstvennom Flage Rossiiskoi Federatsii*), December 25, 2000, available from <http://www.kostyor.ru/history/flag.html>, (accessed on August 18, 2010)

Federal Law of the Russian Federation “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations”, (*Federal'nii Zakon O Svobode Sovesti I Religioznykh Ob'iedineniakh*), September 26, 1997, available from http://www.zonazakona.ru/zakon/index.php?zakon=fz_rely&go=index, (accessed on August 17, 2010)

Federal Law of the Russian Federation on a Flag of the Military Forces of the Russian Federation, Flag of the Navy and Flags of Other Military Forces of the Russian Federation, and Flags of the Other Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, (*Federal'nii Zakon Rossiiskoi Federatsii O Znameni Vooruzhennykh Sil Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Znameni VoЕННО-Morskogo Flota, Znamenakh Inykh Vidov Vooruzhennykh Sil Rossiiskoi Federatsii I Znamenakh Drugikh Voisk*), December 29, 2000, available from <http://www.rusflag.ru/docm/zarmbpr3.htm#flagimg1>, (accessed August 10, 2010)

Federal Law of the Russian Federation on Citizenship of the Russian Federation, May 31, 2002, available from <http://www.consultant.ru/popular/civic/>, (accessed on August 18, 2010)

Federal Law of the Russian Federation on National-Cultural Autonomy, June 17, 1996, available from <http://www.humanities.edu.ru/db/msg/46904>, (accessed August 10, 2010)

FINN, Peter, "In Russia, Pop Culture Coup for the KGB", *Washington Post*, February 22, 2005

FISH, Steven M., "Putin's Path", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol.12, No.4, October 2001, pp. 71 - 78

Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation, "Medium-Term Strategy for the Development of Relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union 2000 - 2010", (*Strategiia Razvitiia Otnoshenii Rossiiskoi Federatsii S Evropeiskim Soiuzom Na Srednesrochnuiu Perspektivu, 2000 - 2010*), October 22, 1999, available from <http://www.ieras.ru/journal/journal1.2000/9.htm>, (accessed on August 21, 2010)

"Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation", (*Kontsepsiia Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii*), June 28, 2000, available from

<http://www.mid.ru/Bl.nsf/arh/19DCF61BEFED61134325699C003B5FA3?OpenDocument>, (accessed August 10, 2010)

FORSBERG, Tuomas, "Russia's Relationship with NATO: A Qualitative Change or Old Wine in New Bottles?" *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, Vol.21, No.3, September 2005, pp.332 - 353

"Freedom of the Conscience as a factor of Struggle with the Governors", (*Sovoda Sovesti Kak Faktor Bor'by S Gubernatorami*), *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, May 17, 2000

GELLNER, Ernest, *Nations and Nationalism*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1983

GOLDGEIER, James M. and McFAUL, Michael, "What to Do about Russia?", *Policy Review*, Issue 133, October –November 2005, pp.45 – 62

GOMART, Thomas, "The Performance in the Half-Empty Hall", (*Predstavleniie Pri Polupustom Zale*), *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, May 11, 2005

GORST, Isabel and CIENSKI Jan, "Missile Shield Accord Draws Russian Fire", *Financial Times*, August 15, 2008

GRIGOR'IEV, Yevgenii, "The Host of Russia in NATO is Wandering Europe", (*Prizrak Rossii V NATO Brodit Po Evrope*), *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, October 2, 2001

GVOSDEV, Nicholas K., "The New Party Card? Orthodoxy and Search for Post-Soviet Identity", *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol.47, No.6, November-December 2000, pp. 29 - 38

HAHN, Gordon, "Reforming the Federation", in Stephen White, Zvi Gitelman, and Richard Sakwa (eds.), *Developments in Russian Politics 6*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, pp. 148 - 167

HASHIM, S. Mohsin, "Putin's Etatization Project and Limits to Democratic Reforms in Russia", *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Vol.38, No.1, March 2005, pp. 25 - 48

HERD, Graeme P., "Russia: Systemic Transformation or Federal Collapse?", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 36, No. 3, May 1999, pp. 259 - 269

HOBBSAWM, Eric, "Ethnicity and Nationalism in Europe Today", in Gopal Balakrishnan (ed.), *Mapping the Nation*, London: Verso, 1996, pp. 255 - 266

HOBBSAWM, Eric, "Introduction: Inventing Traditions", in Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds.), *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 1 - 14

HOBBSAWM, Eric, "Mass-Producing Traditions: Europe 1870 – 1914", in Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds.), *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 263 – 308

HOBBSAWM, Eric, "The Nation as Invented Tradition", in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (eds.), *Nationalism*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1994, pp. 76 - 82

HOBBSAWM, Eric, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992

"In Schools the Lessons of Orthodoxy are Being Introduced", (*V Shkolakh Vvodyat Uroki Pravoslaviia*), *Komsomol'skaia Pravda*, September 1, 2006

"Interview with Patriarch Alexii II, available from <http://religion.sova-center.ru/events/13B7455/13DF6DE/7DE904F>, (accessed August 10, 2010)

IVANOV, Igor, "The New Russian Identity: Innovation and Continuity in Russian Foreign Policy", *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 24, No.3, Summer 2001, pp. 7 – 13

IVANOV, Nikita and FROLOV, Vladimir, “Treaty on Strategic Friendship”, (*Dogovor O Strategicheskoi Druzhbe*), *Izvestiia*, September 11, 2003

IVANOV, Sergei, “Speech at the 42nd Munich Conference on Security Policy”, February 5, 2006, available from <http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?id=171&sprache=en&>, (accessed on August 21, 2010)

JACKSON, Nicole J., *Russian Foreign Policy and the CIS: Theories, Debates and Action*, London and New York: Routledge, 2003

“Joint Statement by U.S. President George Bush and Russian Federation President V.V. Putin announcing the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism”, available from <http://www.en.g8russia.ru/docs/5.html>, (accessed on August 19, 2010)

KISSINGER, Henry A., “Don’t Rule Out Putin’s Initiative”, *International Herald Tribune*, August 9, 2007

KOHN, Hans, *Nationalism, Its Meaning and History*, New York: Anvil, 1965

KOHN, Hans, *The Idea of Nationalism. The Study of Its Origins and Background* (with a new introduction by Craig Calhoun), New Brunswick, London: Transaction Publishers, 2005 (Originally published in 1944 by The Macmillan Company)

KOZYREV, Andrei, “Russia: a Chance for Survival”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.71, No.2, 1992, pp.1 - 13

KRUSANOV, Pavel, *The Bite of an Angel (Ukus Angela)*, Moscow, Amfora, 1999

KUCHINS, Andrew, “Russia and the USA: Partners Necessarily” (*“Rossiia I SShA: Partnery Po Neobhodimosti”*), *Vedomosti*, November 20, 2006

KUZIO, Taras, *Ukraine: State and Nation-building*, London and New York: Routledge, 1998

LARSEN, Susan, “National Identity, Cultural Authority, and the Post-Soviet Blockbuster: Nikita Mikhalkov and Aleksei Balabanov”, *Slavic Review*, Vol. 62, No. 3, Autumn 2003, pp. 491 - 511

LAVROV, Sergei, “Speech at MGIMO University, Moscow, September 3, 2007”, *Johnson’s Russia List*, No.188, September 4, 2007

Law on the State Policy of the Russian Federation Concerning the Compatriots Abroad (*Federalniuu Zakon Rossiiskoi Federatsii O Gosudersivennoi Politike Rossiiskoi Federatsii V Otnoshenii Sootechestvennikov za Rubezhom*), May 24, 1999, available from <http://www.mid.ru/nsdgpch.nsf/215bdcc93123ae8343256da400379e66/51efd81cd0b2a328c325722e0048e320?OpenDocument>, (accessed on August 19, 2010)

LIGHT, Margot, “Russian Political Engagement with the European Union”, in Roy Alison, Margot Light, and Stephen White (eds.), *Putin’s Russia and the Enlarged Europe*, London, Chatham House, 2006, pp.45 – 71

LO, Bobo, *Vladimir Putin and the Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy*, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2003

LYNCH, Dov, “Russia’s Strategic Partnership with Europe”, *Washington Quarterly*, Vol.27, No.2, Spring 2004, pp.99 – 118

MALASHENKO, Aleksei, “Russian Nationalism and Islam”, in Michael Waller, Bruno Coppieters and Aleksei Malashenko (eds.), *Conflicting Loyalties and the State in Post-Soviet Russia and Eurasia*, London – Portland, Frank Cass, 1998, pp. 187 - 202

MANKOFF, Jeffrey, *Russian Foreign Policy: the Return of Great Power Politics*, Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009

MARSH, Rosalind, “The Nature of Russia’s Identity: the Theme of «Russia and the West» in Post-Soviet Culture” in Roger E. Kanet, (ed.), *Identities, Nations and Politics after Communism*, Abingdon, Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2008, pp. 149 – 172

McFAUL, Michael, “A Precarious Peace: Domestic Politics in the Making of Russian Foreign Policy”, *International Security*, Vol. 22 No.3, Winter 1997-1998, pp. 5 - 35

McFAUL, Michael, “The Electoral System”, in Stephen White, Zvi Gitelman, and Richard Sakwa (eds.), *Developments in Russian Politics 6*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, pp. 61 - 79

McFAUL, Michael, *Russia’s Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin*, Ithaca and New York: Cornell University Press, 2001

“Medvedev Proposed Religious-Educational Experiment” (*Medvedev Predlozhit RELigiozno-Obrazovatel’niy Eksperiment*), *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, July 21, 2009

MELVILLE, Andrei and SHAKLEINA, Tatiana, *Russian Foreign Policy in Transition: Concepts and Realities*, Budapest: Central European University Press, 2005

MELVIN, Neil, *Russians Beyond Russia: the Politics of National Identity*, London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995

MENDELSON, Jack, “America, Russia and the Future of Arms Control”, *Current History*, Vol. 100, No. 648, October 2001, pp.

MERKUSHEV, Vitaly, Relations between Russia and the EU: the View from Across the Atlantic, *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, Vol. 6, Is. 2, 2005, pp. 353 – 371

Metropolitan of Smolensk and Kaliningrad Kirill, “Norms of Faith as Norms of Life” (*Normy Very Kak Normy Zhizni*), *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, February 16, 2000

Military Doctrine of the Russian federation”, (*Voennaia Doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii*), April 21, 2000, *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, April 22, 2000

MILOV, Vladimir, “The Use of Energy as a Political Tool”, *EU–Russia Review* 1, Brussels: EU–Russia Centre, May 2006, pp. 12 - 21

MONAGHAN, Andrew, “Russia’s Energy Diplomacy: a Political Idea Lacking a Strategy?”, *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 2, June 2007, pp. 275 – 288.

MUKHIN, Vladimir, “Washington and Moscow are Planning the Postwar World Order”, (*Washington I Moskva Uzhe Planiruiut Poslevoennoie Ustroystvo Mira*), *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, September 21, 2001

NAISHUL’, Vitalii, “About the Norms of Contemporary Russian Statehood”, (*Normakh Sovremennoi Rossiiskoi Gosudarstvennosti*), *Segodnya*, May 23, 1996

“National Security Concept of the Russian Federation”, (*Kontsepsiia Natsional’noi Bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii*), December 17, 1997, available from <http://terroristica.info/node/208>, (accessed August 10, 2010)

“National Security Concept of the Russian Federation”, (*Kontsepsiia Natsional’noi Bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii*), January 10, 2000, available <http://www.armscontrol.ru/start/rus/docs/sncon00.htm>, (accessed August 10, 2010)

“New Year Address of Boris Yeltsin to the Citizens of the Russian Federation”, (*Novogodnee Obrasheniie Borisa Yeltsina K Grazhdanam Rossiiskoi Federatsii*), *Rossiiskaia Gazeta*, December 31, 1993

NICHOLSON, Martin, “Putin’s Russia: Slowing the Pendulum without Stopping the Clock”, *International Affairs* (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 77, No. 4, October 2001, pp. 867 - 884

NOZHENKO, Maria, «Motherland Is Calling You! Motives behind and Prospects for the New Russian Policy on Compatriots Abroad», available from <http://www.lfpr.lt/uploads/File/Current/Nozhenko.pdf>, (accessed on August 18, 2010)

NYGREN, Bertil, “Putin’s Use of Natural Gas to Reintegrate the CIS Region”, *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol.55, No.4, July-August 2008, pp. 3 - 15

O’LOUGHLIN, John, TOAL, Gerard, KOLOSSOV, Vladimir, “Risky Westward Turn?” Putin’s 9-11 Script and Ordinary Russians”, *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 56, No.1, January 2004, pp. 3 - 34

PARLAND, Thomas, *The Extreme Nationalist Threat in Russia: the Growing Influence of Western Rightist Ideas*, New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005

“Patriarch and President Congratulated Monastic Elder”, (*Patriarkh I Prezident Pozdravili Startsa*), *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, April 26, 2000

PREIBLER, Franz, “Russian (Ethnic) Nationalism”, in Egbert Jahn (ed.), *Nationalism in Late and Post-Communist Europe*, Baden-Baden, 2009, pp. 42 – 73

PRIZEL, Ilya, *National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia, and Ukraine*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998

“Program of Actions to Support Compatriots Abroad” (*Programma Mer Po Podderhke Sootechstvennikov Za Rubezhom*), May 17, 1996, available from <http://www.friendspartners.org/partners/valery/humright/hr960512.html>, (accessed on August 19, 2010)

Program “On Measures to Support Compatriots Abroad” (*O Merakh Po Podderzhke Sootechstvennikov Za Rubezhom*), August 31, 1994, available from <http://www.russiane.org/law/46.html>, (accessed on August 19, 2010)

“Putin Presented Award to Outstanding Christian Pastors”, (*Putin Vrchil Nagrady Vidnym Hristianskim Oastyriam*), *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, January 18, 2001

“Putin to Hold First Meeting with Pope on Italy Trip”, *Reuters*, March 13, 2007

PUTIN, Vladimir, “50 Years of the [sic] European Integration and Russia”, *Johnson’s Russia List*, No.72, March 26, 2007

PUTIN, Vladimir, “Russia at the Turn of Millenium”, (*Rossia Na Rubezhe Tysiacheletii*), *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, December 12, 1999

PUTIN, Vladimir, *First Person: an Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia's President*, Nataliya Gevorkyan, Natalya Timakova, Andrei Kolesnikov (eds), London: Hutchinson, 2000

PUTIN, Vladimir, Speech at the Reception In Commemoration 55th Anniversary of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War 1941 – 1945, (*Vystuplenie Na Torzhestvennom Prieme V Oznamenovanie 55-y Godovshchiny Pobedy V Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyne 1941–1945 Godov*), May 9, 2000, available from http://euroasia.cass.cn/2006Russia/Russia/speech_President/2000/28725.htm, (accessed August 10, 2010)

RASIZADE, Alec, “Putin’s Place in Russian History”, *International Politics*, Vol. 45, No. 5, September 2008, pp. 531 - 553

RUBINSTEIN, Alvin Z., “Russia Adrift: Strategic Anchors for Russia’s Foreign Policy”, *Harvard International Review*, Vol. 22, No. I, Winter-Spring 2000

“Russian Elite Congratulated Aleksii II”, (*Rossiiskaia Elita Pozdravila Aleksiya II*), *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, June 14, 2000

SAKWA, Richard, *Putin: Russia’s Choice*, London and New York: Routledge, 2004

“School Afterburning”, (*Shkol’niy Forsazh*), *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, December 14, 2009

SHEVTSOVA, Lilia, “Post-Communist Russia: a Historic Opportunity Missed”, *International Affairs*, Vol.83, No.5, September 2007, pp. 891 - 912

SHVETSOV, Nikolai, “What Can Be a Response to the Challenge of Islam”, (*Chto Mozhet Byt’ Otvetom Na Vyzov Islama*), *Nezavisimaia Gazeta – Religii*, November 10, 1999

SIMON, Gerhard, “The Russian Federation Nationalism of Russians and Non-Russians”, in Egbert Jahn (ed.), *Nationalism in Late and Post-Communist Europe*, Vol.2, *Nationalism in the Nation States*, Baden-Baden, 2009, pp.16 – 41

SIMONSEN, Sven Gunnar, “Compatriot Games: Explaining «Diaspora Linkage» in Russia’s Military Withdrawal from the Baltic States”, *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol.53, No.5, July 2001, pp.771 – 791

SIMONSEN, Sven Gunnar, “Nationalism and the Russian Political Spectrum: Locating and Evaluating the Extremes”, *Journal of Political Ideologies*, Vol.6, No. 3, October 2001, pp. 263 - 288

SMITH, Anthony D., “Nations and History”, in Montserrat Guibernau and John Hutchinson (eds.), *Understanding Nationalism*, Cambridge: Polity; Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2001, pp.9 – 31

SMITH, Kathleen E., *Mythmaking in the New Russia: Politics and Memory During the Yeltsin Era*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002

SOCOR, Vladimir, “Moscow Confronts the West over CFE Treaty at OSCE”, Jamestown Foundation Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol.4, Is.103, May 25, 2007, available from [http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=32766&tx_ttnews\[backPid\]=171&no_cache=1](http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=32766&tx_ttnews[backPid]=171&no_cache=1), (accessed on August 21, 2010)

SOLNICK, Steven, "Will Russia Survive? Center and Periphery in the Russian Federation", in Barnet Rubin and Jack Snyder (eds.), *Post-Soviet Political Order, Conflict and State-building*, London and New York: Routledge, 1998, pp. 58 - 80

SPENCER, Philip, WOLLMAN, Howard, *Nationalism: a Critical Introduction*, London: Thousand Oaks; California: Sage, 2002

"Spirituality in Schools Has Been Given the Start", (*Dukhovnosti v Shkole Dan Start*), *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, December 30, 2009

STAALESEN, Atle, "Orthodoxy and Islam in Post-Soviet Russia: Opposing Confessional Cultures or Unifying Force?", in Pal Kolsto and Helge Blakkisrud (eds.), *Nation-building and Common Values in Russia*, Oxford, 2004, pp. 301 - 326

State Nationality Policy Concept of the Russian Federation", (*Kontsepsiia Gosudarstvennoi Natsional'noi Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii*), June 15, 1996, available from <http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/27.html>, (accessed on August 18, 2010)

TISHKOV, Valerii, *Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union: the Mind Aflame*, London; Thousand Oaks, California: Sage, 1997

TOLZ, Vera, "Forging the Nation: National Identity and Nation Building in Post-Communist Russia", *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 50, No. 6, September 1998, pp. 993 - 1022

TOLZ, Vera, *Russia: Inventing the Nation*, London: Arnold; New York: Oxford University Press, 2001

Treaty on Creating the Union State of Russia and Belarus, December 8, 1999, available from http://belrus.ru/law/act/dokumentyi_opredelyayuchie_osnov/dogovor_o_sozdanii_so_yuznogo_gos/obtchie_polozeniya.html, (accessed on August 10, 2010)

TULLY, Andrew, “What IS Strategy for Bases in Former Soviet Bloc?”, *Rudio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty Newslne*, December 7, 2005

URBAN, Michael, “Remythologising the Russian State”, *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 50, No. 6, September 1998, pp. 969 - 992

VOLODINA, Tatyana, “Teaching History in Russia after the Collapse of the USSR”, *The History Teacher*, Vol. 38, No. 2, February 2005, pp. 179 - 188

WAY, Lucan A., “Authoritarian State-building and the Sources of Regime Competitiveness in the Fourth Wave. The Cases of Belarus, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine”, *World Politics*, Vol. 57, No.2, January 2005, pp. 231 - 261

WHITE, Stephen, “The Domestic Management of Russia’s Foreign and Security Policy”, in Roy Alison, Margot Light, and Stephen White (eds.), *Putin’s Russia and the Enlarged Europe*, London, Chatham House, 2006, pp. 21 – 44

ZEVELEV, Igor, “Russia’s Policy towards Compatriots in the Former Soviet Union”, *Russia in Global Affairs*, No. 1, 2008, pp. 49 - 62

ZEVELEV, Igor, *Russia and Its New Diasporas*, Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2001

ZHUKAVA Nadzeya, “The Russian Federation: New Immigration Pole in Eurasia”, available from <http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/research/SchoolOnEuro-MedMigration/2006pdfs/Paper%20Zhukava.pdf>, (accessed on August 19, 2010)