

THE RELATION BETWEEN NATIONALISM AND DEVELOPMENT:
THE CASE OF THE YÖN-DEVRİM MOVEMENT IN 1960'S

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ABSTRACT

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Nationalism has long been a subject of discussion in the literature on development. It has been discussed whether nationalism is indispensable or not on the way to modernity and development. Third World nationalism and revolution from above emerged as key concepts within these discussions. Nationalism was brought forth in many Third World countries as an understanding, which is thought to facilitate paving the way for development, as it imagines a nation based on integrity. The stance that *Yön* (1961-1967) and *Devrim* (1969-1971) journal movements had can be thought within this framework. In this study, it will be explored whether we can think of the Yön-Devrim movement by rethinking the link between development and nationalism, especially Third World nationalism. While doing this, comparisons between Yön-Devrim Movement and the Nasserist movement, which had similar political and intellectual tendencies in the same period, will be used.

Keywords: Nationalism, Development, Yön-Devrim Movement, Nasser, Third World

ÖZ

KALKINMA VE MİLLİYETÇİLİK ARASINDAKİ İLİŞKİ: 1960'LARDAKİ YÖN-DEVRİM HAREKETİ ÖRNEĞİ

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Milliyetçilik, kalkınmaya dair yazında uzun zamandır tartışma konusu olagelmiştir. Milliyetçiliğin, modernite ve kalkınmaya giden yolda vazgeçilmez olup olmadığı tartışılagelmiştir. Üçüncü Dünya milliyetçiliği ve tepeden inmeci devrim, bu tartışmalarda anahtar birer kavram olarak ortaya çıktılar. Milliyetçilik, bütünlüğe dayanan bir ulus tahayyül ettiği için birçok Üçüncü Dünya ülkesinde kalkınmaya giden yolun döşenmesinde kolaylaştırıcı bir anlayış olarak ileri sürülmüştür. *Yön* (1961-1967) ve *Devrim* (1969-1971) dergi hareketlerinin sahip olduğu çizgi de bu çerçevede düşünülebilir. Bu çalışmada, Yön-Devrim Hareketi'nin kalkınma ve milliyetçilik, özellikle de Üçüncü Dünya milliyetçiliği, arasındaki bağın yeniden düşünülerek ele alınıp alınamayacağı araştırılacaktır. Bu yapılrken, aynı dönemde benzer siyasal ve düşünsel eğilimlere sahip iki hareket olan Yön-Devrim ve Nasırıst hareketler arasında yapılacak karşılaştırmalarдан da yararlanılacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Milliyetçilik, Kalkınma, Yön-Devrim Hareketi, Nasır, Üçüncü Dünya

To My Parents
&
To My Poor Working People

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The relation between development and nationalism that the Yön-Devrim Movement had explored and utilised very effectively was also a subject both for studies on development and for studies on nationalism. However, none of the past studies on the Yön-Devrim Movement did analyse the movement within such a framework that inquires whether there is a theoretical source for the supposed relation between development and nationalism. If to define a “case” as “an instance of a class of events”¹, then it would be appropriate for this study to determine this movement as the case of this study since its policy-making for rapid development could be understood as a class of events. The method used here is not a “comparative method”, but rather a “case-study method”, since the former is “the use of comparisons among a small number of cases” while the latter “include[s] both within-case analysis of single cases and comparisons of a small number of cases”.² This study’s main research interest is to investigate the theoretical roots of that supposed relation, and the main research question is that whether the Yön-Devrim Movement can be analysed within such a theoretical framework.

¹ Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005): p. 17.

² Ibid.: p. 18.

When the emergence and the evolution of the concept “development” are examined carefully, it is going to be seen that the concept mainly emerged as a need, and thus as a political goal, in the underdeveloped countries, which many of them gained their independence just after the Second World War. In these countries the search for an alternative path of development, and especially of rapid development in order to catch the developed Western countries, was going hand in hand with some kind of a nationalist discourse. First systematic approaches to development and the theories of development and underdevelopment also reflect this phenomenon. There are many theoretical insights, which associate a particular element that is thought to be inherent to capitalism, such as “democracy”, and “nationalism” as well, with development. Besides these diffusionist theories of development, theories of underdevelopment also come closer with the diffusionist theories that associate development with nationalism in favour of a “national front” against the outsider, or say “imperialist”, exploiters since the theories of underdevelopment incorporate themselves into various conceptions of “dependency” and pay great attention to theories of “imperialism”. Therefore, the policies offered and implemented for rapid development in these underdeveloped countries have mostly been composed of some nationalist or protectionist policies. This is going to be covered in the chapter where the theories of development are being discussed.

There is also much material to work on within the literature on theories of nationalism if to search for a theoretical relation between development and nationalism. In order to achieve a general perspective on how to look and where to search within this vast literature, one should begin from setting forth the main approaches and paradigms of the theories of nationalism. This is what is being done in the third chapter. However, the exhibition of the mainstream approaches and paradigms of the literature on theories of nationalism is very often not so much helpful to find out which approach or paradigm does best fit the ongoing search for a particular case. In order to overcome this problem one should develop or imitate an alternative way of classification that would be made according to or in line with the research goals of the study. Such an alternative classification, thus, is also going to be borrowed and utilised from in the same chapter. Once such theoretical glasses are achieved, then it is much easier to reach the most appropriate theoretical approaches and paradigms. The approaches of John Breuilly and Paul R. Brass on nationalism are going to be discovered by following such a manner. These approaches explain that nationalism could be a “form of politics” or an “instrument” in the way to realise some political goals or to gain a political power, and they are going to be presented with some detail since they look like to be quite explanatory for the understanding of nationalism of the Yön-Devrim Movement, which had utilised nationalism also as an instrument, though it had been really sincere in this nationalist discourse, very effectively in the search for the achievement of its particular political goals such as rapid economic development via socialism.

The political implications of the mentioned theoretical approaches of development and of nationalism have been more like an inclination in the Third World towards nationalist discourses and nationalist policies while offering or implementing supposedly developmentalist policies. This new kind of nationalism as “a fusion of tradition and ideology”, as Dawa Norbu puts, or as an understanding that makes a distinction between the “material” and “spiritual” domains of the world affairs, which recognises the supremacy of the West in the former and does in no way accept anything outside from the home culture in the latter domain, as Partha Chatterjee describes, emerged as a state-centric ideological belief that was to find its empirical reflections in politics as struggles to topple the colonial powers, to take the state power and to direct the nation-state machinery in order to apply nationalist/protectionist policies toward economic development. These were soon going to be a research subject for the social scientists such as Theda Skocpol and Ellen Kay Trimberger. This new synthesis of developmentalism and nationalism and the social revolutions that it led brought forth a new category of revolutions, “revolutions from above”, which was best analysed by Trimberger. Third Worldism and Trimberger’s conceptualisation are going to be elaborated in the fourth chapter. The basic characteristics of these “revolutions from above” and the structural features needed for these revolutions to occur are also going to be analysed. These are also going to help to reach or derive out some possible reasons of the well-known

and tragic failure of the Yön-Devrim Movement in its search for a revolution from above.

After developing such a theoretical framework, the analysis of the movement is going to be made by placing the movement into its historical position within the Ottoman-Turkish intellectual tradition, of which it is one of the last rings. Although the movement has much in common with the former members of this traditional intellectual line, such as the New Ottomans, Young Turks, Ittihadists and Kemalists, it is going to be analysed specifically within the more recent intellectual tradition called “Left Kemalism” since it is only these intellectual movements or figures, which had a leftist stance and even utilised from Marxism, unlike the former ones that were merely nationalist. As a movement organised around a journal, *Kadro*, and derived its socioeconomic analyses very much from Marxism with some kind of a leftist nationalist discourse, the *Kadro* Movement can be considered as an undoubted predecessor of the Yön-Devrim Movement, and, thus, is going to be analysed in the first part of the fifth chapter in order to remark one of the most possible intellectual sources of the Yön-Devrim Movement.

Along with the summary of the short political life of the Yön-Devrim Movement, its understanding of nationalism, its problematic of culture and religion and the model it offered for rapid development, that is to say a revolution from above, are going to be analysed one by one. Claiming that the “real nationalists” are the socialists since they

are anti-imperialists, Doğan Avcioğlu and the movement he led were also in search of utilising from nationalism as a “form of politics” or as an “instrument” for their ultimate political goal: rapid economic development or better say, the “non-capitalist path” for this, socialism. From this point of view, the movement’s understanding of nationalism seems to be compatible with the approaches of John Breuilly and Paul R. Brass. With its rejection to the Westernism that used to be integral to the former official Kemalist doctrine with a justification that it brought only more dependency and more underdevelopment and with its appraisal of the Easternity of Turkey besides its sincere efforts to reconcile the religion, Islam in this case, with socialism, the movement appears to be a great example of the typical Third World nationalism, which writers such as Dawa Norbu and Partha Chatterjee describes.

The model for rapid development that the movement offered is going to be analysed after these insights. This model was a revolution that was to be made by some patriot and revolutionary military officers, who were thought to be the “intellectuals in uniforms” and thought to be the natural allies of the revolutionary intellectuals, which altogether composed the “dynamic powers”. These dynamic powers had played their progressive role many times in the history of the Ottoman-Turkish modernisation, and they were to play their role for the last time for the sake of their country. This revolution was going to create the necessary socioeconomic transformations and conditions for a transition to socialism. In this sense, what the movement foresaw was nothing else than a revolution from above. Besides various

other examples from Asia, Africa and Latin America, from the Third World in general, the most apparent example that the movement presented as a model and also followed very carefully was the Nasserist experience of Egypt. The Nasserist experience is also going to be analysed within the framework that Trimberger provides in order to derive some conclusions and reasoning for the Yön-Devrim Movement's efforts to take the political power in collaboration with the military bureaucrats in Turkey. It is going to be understood that the Yön-Devrim Movement, if had succeeded in taking the political power, would also have been successful in achieving rapid economic development since it had already foreseen what the Nasserist regime could not or did not want to. However, it is also going to be seen that the Yön-Devrim Movement could not calculate whether the preconditions necessary for a revolution from above to occur did exist or not, or maybe that it was too late when it could realise that they did not exist.

Despite its de facto disappearance from the Turkish political life since the 12 March 1971 military counter-intervention, the Yön-Devrim Movement had deep impacts on the Turkish political life. Beginning from early 1990s, especially during the heydays of the crises of the civilian governments with the Turkish Armed Forces, but mainly as a result of the rising nationalist opposition, which mainly consists of former leftist figures, that had first emerged as a reaction to the neoliberal transformation, even the “elimination” according to some circles, of the state and of the whole socioeconomic relations and as a reaction to the Islamic-tended or conservative policies and

practices, the heritage and the theses of the Yön-Devrim Movement have begun to revive. The movement that is gathered around the journal *Türk Solu*, Doğu Perinçek and the movement he leads, and finally Prof. Dr. Yalçın Küçük, a socialist writer, who had also been a very close friend of Doğan Avcioğlu, are going to be analysed in the sixth chapter in this sense. However, what the time has eroded in the Left Kemalist discourse are, as it is also going to be seen, the developmentalism, Marxist analyses and the emphasis on socialism in general; what has undoubtedly remained, on the other hand, is nothing else than nationalism. Nevertheless, the developmentalist stance has not totally come to an end. There are still some groups, such as the Independent Social Scientists (*Bağımsız Sosyal Bilimciler*) who criticise and study against the capitalist path of uneven development in Turkey, especially against the neoliberal economic policies.

CHAPTER 2

THEORIES OF DEVELOPMENT

In the underdeveloped countries, which used to be colonised by the industrialised countries for long and which gained their independence only after the World War II, economic development emerged as the basic political goal. It was widely assumed that economic development, and modernisation as well, would remove the inequalities of income and other social inequalities. It was also presumed that any other kind of economic and social goal, or result, if not rooting from the national income growth, would only be complementary to it.³ This blossoming of the development as a policy was of course a story of the 1950s and '60s.

The need for development in these countries was also going to lead to the birth of the first systematic approaches to the concept of “development”. Albert O. Hirschman explores two main motivations in these first developmentalist approaches: 1) the rejection of “the monoeconomics claim”, a claim of the traditional economic analysis that has concentrated on the industrial countries, in favour of a new understanding that demands a new and different way of evaluation for the underdeveloped countries

³ Erik Thorbecke, “The Evolution of the Development Doctrine and the Role of Foreign Aid, 1950-2000” in Finn Tarp and Peter Hjertholm (eds.), *Foreign Aid and Development: Lessons Learnt and Directions for the Future* (London: Routledge, 2000): pp. 19-20.

just because they have specific characteristics, 2) the assertion of the claim that “mutual benefits” would be created by reforming the relations between the industrialised and the underdeveloped countries.⁴ By going along these two motivations, Hirschman also classifies the main attitudes or approaches on development into four main categories: These are the “orthodox economics”, which accepts both the understanding of “monoeconomics” and the claim of “mutual benefits”; “modern development economics”, which refuses the first while celebrating the second; “Marxist economics”, which takes the first while rejects the second and “neo-Marxism”, which rejects both of them.⁵

Ronald Chilcote, on the other hand, in his seminal study, notes the dual classification of these, which is made according to their approaches to capitalism in general.⁶ According to this classification, “[s]ome interpretations of development and underdevelopment that emphasize the positive accomplishments of capitalism tend to be called diffusionist theories of development, whereas those stress the negative consequences of capitalism tend to be identified as theories of underdevelopment.”⁷ Chilcote goes on his elaborations by defining and classifying the “diffusionist theories of development” and the “theories of underdevelopment”. He explains the

⁴ Albert O. Hirschman, “The Rise and Decline of Development Economics” in Albert O. Hirschman, *Essays in Trespassing: Economics to Politics and Beyond* (Cambridge University Press, 1981): p. 3.

⁵ For details of these four approaches, see: Ibid.: pp. 3-5.

⁶ Ronald Chilcote, *Theories of Development and Underdevelopment* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984): pp. 10-12.

⁷ Ibid.: p. 10.

three most prevalent types of diffusionist theories, each of which has a different explanation for being successful in achieving development: one associates “democracy” with development, the second associates “nationalism”, and the third one has an understanding of “a linear path toward modernization” with a “belief that the Western world would civilize other less developed areas by spreading Western values, capital, and technology.”⁸ What Chilcote calls as “diffusionist theories of development” is indeed the approaches on “political development” and the theories of modernisation that were derived from this concept.

“Political development”, as a concept, emerged after the World War II, and was influenced both by the political conjuncture of that period and by the developments in social sciences occurred in the same period.⁹

Why do some countries remain poor and “backward” despite exposure to capitalism and other aspects of modern life? What can be done to make capitalism develop further in these countries? These were the questions addressed by a group of theorists whose ideas heavily influenced US efforts to foster capitalist development in poorer nations, then called the “Third World.” ... Politicians, development experts, academicians, and the public were afraid of people in Latin America and Africa deciding that Communism was a surer path to development than capitalism. In response, theories about development that were generated in the 1950s and 1960s in the United States provided an explicitly non-Communist solution to poverty and underdevelopment.¹⁰

⁸ Ibid.: pp. 10-11.

⁹ Levent Köker, *Modernleşme, Kemalizm ve Demokrasi* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayımları, 2007): p. 27.

¹⁰ J. Timmons Roberts and Amy Bellone Hite (eds.), *The Globalization and Development Reader: Perspectives on Development and Global Change* (Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2007): p. 7, 8.

The concept “political development” contains the idea that “democracy” may not be “functional” as a “political method” in all “social systems”. It is only functional in a “modern social system”, and it is, therefore, necessary to reach this level for the societies that are under “traditional social systems”. Approaches on “political development”, accordingly, claim that particular economic and cultural conditions are needed for the emergence and formation of democracy.¹¹ One of these conditions is “economic development” for sure.¹² These approaches have some sort of a determinist understanding that claims the “traditional societies” and “modern societies” would be identical someday in the future after the former ones meet the necessary economic and cultural conditions.

“Political development”, as a concept, began to be perceived as one aspect of a “more comprehensive process of social change” through the mid-1960s: this process was nothing else than “modernisation”.¹³ It was being redefined as the reflections of economic and social modernisation on the political life in a particular society, in other words, as “political modernisation”.¹⁴ Nevertheless, what is understood by “political modernisation” was absolutely a supposed progress toward “liberal

¹¹ Köker, op. cit.: p. 33.

¹² Ibid.: p. 36.

¹³ Ibid.: p. 39.

¹⁴ Ibid.: p. 39.

democracy".¹⁵ The modernisation theorists, thus, focus more on internal factors as key ones that drive development.¹⁶ Although theories of modernisation have in common a determinist understanding of history, more recent ones take the human factors into account in their analyses. Some human interventions during this process of social change may either accelerate or delay the very process.¹⁷ However, according to these theories, this transition is often guided by foreigners or by local intellectuals, who are well-equipped with the intellectual instruments of the Western modern culture, or by a coalition of these two.¹⁸ Therefore, more recent theories of modernisation tend to legitimise an authoritarian regime in a particular society as a necessary element of the transition period of that society in its way to a modern type of social order, whereas the former theories of modernisation consider the Western type of democracy as a universal value.¹⁹

The two most prominent theorists of modernisation are Walt Whitman Rostow and Samuel Huntington. W. W. Rostow claims, “[i]t is possible to identify all societies, in their economic dimensions, as lying within one of five categories: the traditional society, the preconditions for take-off, the take-off, the drive to maturity, and the age

¹⁵ Ibid.: p. 47.

¹⁶ Roberts and Hite, op. cit.: p. 4.

¹⁷ Köker, op. cit.: p. 50.

¹⁸ Ibid.: p. 51.

¹⁹ Ibid.: p. 72.

of high-mass consumption.”²⁰ Rostow develops his identification by stating that a “traditional society” has “limited production functions”. He also notes that “the potentialities which flow from modern science and technology were either not available or not regularly and systematically applied” in the traditional societies of old times.²¹ Therefore, according to him, “the story of traditional societies was ... a story of endless change.”²² Rostow continues his linear identification with a transition period before “the take-off”, which is defined as “the interval when the old blocks and resistances to steady growth are finally overcome.”²³ This transition period before the take-off is the historical moment at which “the preconditions for take-off” begin to emerge and develop. The developments in modern science and their translation into new production functions were the key factors in the creation of the preconditions for take-off in Western Europe. In the Western European experience, the factors such as “geography, natural resources, trading possibilities, social and political structure” were essential to develop the preconditions for take-off.²⁴ However, the traditional societies of the modern history was to have these preconditions “arise not endogenously but from some external intrusion by more advanced societies” either by “literal invasions” or “figurative invasions” that would

²⁰ W. W. Rostow, “The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (1960)” in Roberts and Hite, op. cit.: p. 47.

²¹ Ibid.: p. 47.

²² Ibid.: p. 47.

²³ Ibid.: p. 49.

²⁴ Ibid.: p. 48.

shock the traditional society and begin or hasten its undoing.²⁵ Rostow leaves some space for state-building and nationalism too:

Although the period of transition –between the traditional society and the take-off- saw major changes in both the economy itself and in the balance of social values, a decisive feature was often political. Politically, the building of an effective centralized national state –on the basis of coalitions touched with a new nationalism, in opposition to the traditional landed regional interests, the colonial power, or both, was a decisive aspect of the preconditions period; and it was, almost universally, a necessary condition for take-off.²⁶

Huntington, on the other hand, departs from the fact that economic development increases economic inequality. He, thus, claims that while increasing social mobilisation decreases the legitimacy of the economic inequalities in countries lacking governments that are able to govern their peoples, the two aspects of modernisation, economic development and social mobilisation, produce greater political instability.²⁷ Huntington’s thesis is that the violence and instability in these countries is “in large part the product of rapid social change and the rapid mobilization of new groups into politics coupled with the slow development of political institutions.”²⁸ He argues that the lack of sufficient political institutions creates a “political gap” when it is combined with economic development and high

²⁵ Ibid.: p. 49.

²⁶ Ibid.: p. 49.

²⁷ Samuel Huntington, “The Change to Change: Modernization, Development, and Politics (1971) and Political Order in Changing Societies (1968)” in Roberts and Hite, op. cit.: pp. 56-67.

²⁸ Ibid.: p. 60.

social mobilisation.²⁹ This argument is the core of his “gap hypothesis”. This “political gap” leads to some kind of a “political decay” rather than a political stability. Huntington, therefore, does not find “the Lockean American’s formula”, which is that governments should be based on free and fair elections, relevant for the modernising societies. Like Rostow, Huntington too thinks that some preconditions are necessary for political modernisation:

Elections to be meaningful presuppose a certain level of political organization. The problem is not to hold elections but to create organizations. In many, if not most, modernizing countries elections serve only to enhance the power of disruptive and often reactionary social forces and to tear down the structure of public authority. ... The primary problem is not liberty but the creation of a legitimate public order. Men may, of course, have order without liberty, but they cannot have liberty without order.³⁰

Huntington, in his another work, draws a more clear deterministic framework, in which he defines modernisation as a “complex”, “systemic”, “global”, “lengthy”, “phased”, “homogenizing”, “irreversible” and “progressive” process.³¹ This is in fact a general framework that is shared by the adherents of the theories of modernisation or, in other words, of the diffusionist theories of development.

²⁹ Ibid.: pp. 59-67.

³⁰ Ibid.: p. 62.

³¹ Ibid.: p. 57-9.

Theories of underdevelopment, on the other hand, varies from ideas defending protectionist economic policies, i.e. import substitution, through approaches focusing on the dominance of metropolitan centre within a nation over peripheral areas, to world-scale elaborations emphasising the relationship between metropolises and peripheral backward nations, and finally to the ones paying attention to transfers of value from the periphery to the centre and to “uneven” and “combined development”.³² The main commonality of all these underdevelopment theories is their incorporation into various conceptions of “dependency” and in their attention to theories of “imperialism”. Chilcote summarises the problem of these theories by the following criticisms:

The view that a progressive national bourgeoisie will resolve underdevelopment is challenged by the failure of this bourgeoisie. Further, according to critics, autonomous capitalist development is impossible in the face of dominant nations, and internal class relations often are ignored by these theories. Finally, no unified theory of underdevelopment exists, and the various and contradictory tendencies are not always relevant to the historical experience of backward nations.³³

It is, thus, possible to conclude that the development and underdevelopment is mainly an issue deriving directly from the impacts of capitalism.³⁴ However, in the

³² Chilcote, op. cit.: p. 11.

³³ Ibid.: p. 12.

³⁴ Yalçın Küçük notes the same point too: “Capitalism was born in England. It expanded through other countries of Europe, through North America and in recent times through Far East. In the lands where capitalism expanded, the phenomenon of development emerged. But planning did not emerge in any of these. Balance between different segments [of society] could not be established in none of these. More interestingly, there was no need for this. On contrary, imbalance, somehow, became the

case that is going to be analysed in this study and in most of the Third World³⁵ experiences, this relation between uneven development and capitalism is, if not forgotten at all, often neglected in favour of a “national front” against the outsider, or say “imperialist”, exploiters.³⁶ This leads these Third World intellectuals to come closer with the diffusionist theories of development, especially with the ones that associate nationalism with development. Chilcote points the basic assumption of such approaches out with the following sentences: “Nationalism provides the ideological impetus and motivation for development. Nationalism is usually associated with capitalist development, but it is also found in societies pursuing socialist alternatives.”³⁷

feature and the creative power of the system. Development emerged just because there was imbalance.” [Unless noted otherwise, translations from Turkish are mine. CM] Yalçın Küçük, *Planlama, Kalkınma ve Türkiye* (Ankara: Tekin Yayınevi, 1985): p. 35.

³⁵ There are many critiques over the term “Third World”. See for instance: Chilcote, op. cit.: p. 1. The writers using this term often neglect the class conflicts that exist within each of these underdeveloped countries that are called as “Third World countries”. However, the term can be used in an understanding that “emphasizes exploitation and oppression, lack of technology and development, underdevelopment brought about by colonialism and imperialism, and dependency upon the dominant capitalist system and outside influences, wherever in the world these occur.” Ibid.: p. 1. Besides these, the term can also be used since “it is not without its empirical content.” Dawa Norbu, *Culture and the Politics of Third World Nationalism* (London: Routledge, 2003): p. 21. The countries that are called “Third World countries” have a real history of solidarity that is composed of some historical events such as the Bandung Conference of Asian and African nations in 1955 and the discussions made in the United Nations mainly by initiative of countries sharing similar historical backgrounds and similar economic conditions called as “the Group of 77”. See: Ibid.: pp-18-20. The term “Third World” and its derivations, therefore, will continue to be used in this study.

³⁶ Patel and McMichael moves this argument beyond noting a simple failure by claiming that Third Worldism could only mobilise citizens in ways favourable to capital and even that “Third Worldism can be situated as a moment in the maturation of ‘global fascism’.” Rajeev Patel and Philip McMichael, “Third Worldism and the lineages of global fascism: the regrouping of the global South in the neoliberal era”, *Third World Quarterly*, 25:1 (2004): pp. 231-54.

³⁷ Chilcote, op. cit.: p. 10.

The engagement of the Third World intellectuals with such pro-nationalist approaches of development was going to be followed by the implementation, or at least the powerful defence, of development policies that are mostly comprised of nationalist or national protectionist measures. Kitching underlines the “nationalist dimension” of the classical populist thought that sought an easy-going way for rapid development.³⁸ McMichael emphasises that the process of globalisation made the development policies inevitably evolve into a new dimension from their previous dominantly national character, and evaluates the period after 1970s as a new period, during which the concept “development” and policies advised for development have much changed.³⁹ Gereffi, while showing there are many alternative paths, uses the term for the development policies of various Third World countries pursued as “national development”.⁴⁰ Ha-Joon Chang also presents the different “catch-up strategies” that particular countries implemented but always through national protectionism.⁴¹ It must not be surprising when he and Ilene Grabel, in another study, propose some national policies for development under the name “economic policy alternatives”.⁴²

³⁸ Gavin Kitching, *Development and Underdevelopment in Historical Perspective: Populism, Nationalism and Industrialization* (London and New York: Methuen, 1982): pp. 3-5.

³⁹ Philip McMichael, *Development and Social Change: A Global Perspective* (Los Angeles: Pine Forge Press, 2008).

⁴⁰ Gary Gereffi, “Rethinking Development Theory: Insights from East Asia and Latin America (1989/1994)”, in Roberts and Hite, op. cit.: pp. 114-34.

⁴¹ Ha-Joon Chang, *Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective* (London: Anthem Press, 2002): pp. 19-51.

CHAPTER 3

THEORIES OF NATIONALISM

Although there is a vast literature on nationalism, nationalism is a relatively late developed field of study in social sciences; it had to wait to be a subject of academic inquiry until 1920s. The works before the 20th century discuss the positive and negative aspects of nationalism with some kind of philosophic and ethic interests.⁴³ These works did not analyse nationalism systematically, nor did they try to explain nationalism in a theoretical framework.⁴⁴ Özkirimli states that some of these writers had “critical” and some others had “partisan” stance while writing on nationalism.⁴⁵ The “critical” camp is composed of the first-generation Marxists and some liberal intellectuals.⁴⁶ However, none of these brought forth a deliberate theoretical approach to nationalism.

⁴² Ha-Joon Chang and Ilene Grabel, *Reclaiming Development: An Alternative Economic Policy Manual* (London: Zed Books, 2005): pp. 53-201.

⁴³ Anthony D. Smith, *Theories of Nationalism* (London: Duckworth, 1983): p. 257.

⁴⁴ Umut Özkirimli, *Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction* (New York: Palgrave, 2000): p. 13.

⁴⁵ Ibid.: p. 22.

⁴⁶ Ibid.: p. 22.

There are many clear points on the need for “national” –not in the bourgeois sense of the term- struggles that would be given by the working classes of each country, “proletariat”, against the national bourgeoisie in their countries at the first stage and on the need for all nations to gain independence, or their autonomies at least, in order to achieve the “international union of the proletariat” in Marx’s and Engels’ (especially the latter one’s) writings:

Though not in substance, yet in form, the struggle of the proletariat with the bourgeoisie is at first a national struggle. The proletariat of each country must, of course, first of all settle matters with its own bourgeoisie. ... Since the proletariat must first of all acquire political supremacy, must rise to be the leading class of the nation, must constitute itself *the* nation, its is, so far, itself national, though not in the bourgeois sense of the word.⁴⁷ [Emphasis is in the original text.]

Without restoring autonomy and unity to each nation, it will be impossible to achieve the international union of the proletariat, or the peaceful and intelligent cooperation of these nations towards common aims.⁴⁸

However, there are ambiguities in the writings of Marx and Engels on what the fate of nation-states or the state in general terms. They emphasise in *The Communist Manifesto* that “[a]ll that is solid melts into air”⁴⁹ and that “[n]ational differences and antagonisms between peoples are daily more and more vanishing”⁵⁰ due to the

⁴⁷ Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto* (London: Penguin Books, 2002): p. 232, 241.

⁴⁸ Friedrich Engels, “Preface to the Italian Edition of 1893” in Marx and Engels, op. cit.: p. 216.

⁴⁹ Marx and Engels, op. cit.: p. 223.

⁵⁰ Ibid.: p. 241.

developments that the capitalist transformation of the societies causes. The supposedly future “supremacy of the proletariat will cause to vanish still faster.”⁵¹ This prospect was drawn most fully in *The German Ideology*, where they present the famous depiction of the future “communist society” that would emerge in the afterwards of the extinction of the states, because the emancipated human beings would not need them anymore:

[C]ommunist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic.⁵²

Communism would replace the state as “the illusory community”, which always “took on an independent existence” in relation to the individuals who composed it, with “a real community” in which “individuals obtain their freedom in and through their association”.⁵³ The underlying understanding here is that the state would “wither away” or “die out” in the supposedly future “administration of things”. Instead of Marx, this is best expressed by Engels: “The government of persons is

⁵¹ Ibid.: p. 241.

⁵² Karl Marx and Friedrick Engels, “The German Ideology” in Karl Marx and Friedrick Engels, M. Miligan and D. J. Struik (trans.), *Collected Works*, Vol. 5 (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1976): p. 47.

⁵³ Ibid.: pp. 60, 88, 78.

replaced by the administration of things. ... The state is not ‘abolished’. *It dies out.*”⁵⁴ [Emphasis is in the original text.]

Marx, however, in his later works, conceded that some form of “labour” of an unspontaneous and undesirable sort would remain necessary. “Labour time necessary for the satisfaction of basic needs” would have to be made shared and this would make necessary the reintroduction of “the government of men”.⁵⁵ It would be, thus, right to conclude that such an admission leaves all the arguments that the state might wither away open to discussion.

When one leaves these two fronts aside, it can be seen that the first endeavour to analyse nations and nationalism sociologically was shaped as a result of a political discussion, instead of theoretical inquiries. Some prominent names such as Rosa Luxemburg, Vladimir I. Lenin, Karl Liebknecht, Karl Renner and Otto Bauer, who can be identified as second-generation Marxists, produced important texts during the discussions grown among the directors and theorisers of the social democrat parties that were members of the Second International. Nevertheless, only Austrian Marxism, a school which was born in the Habsburg Empire where the nationalist movements pose great problems before a socialist mobilisation, could develop a systematic approach on nationalism. However, all of these discussions made on

⁵⁴ Friedrich Engels, “Anti-Dühring. Herr Dühring’s Revolution in Science” in Marx and Engels, *Collected Works* ... Vol. 25: p. 268.

⁵⁵ Karl Marx, “Outlines of the Critique of Political Economy (Rough Draft of 1857-8)” in Marx and Engels, *Collected Works* ... Vol. 28: pp. 530-531.

nationalism and the national problem had completely a political character and the main motivation behind them was to find a remedy to the problems or the desire to utilise from the opportunities.⁵⁶

According to Benedict Anderson, this situation was a result of the lack of great thinkers such as Hobbes, Tocqueville, Marx or Weber in the field of nationalism, and “[t]his ‘emptiness’”, in his own words, “easily gives rise, among cosmopolitan and polylingual intellectuals, to a certain condescension.”⁵⁷ Things were going to change with the new world order that was built on nation-states in the post-Versailles period and with fascism and national-socialism that emerged from within this order. Despite the fact that the studies issuing histories of particular nationalisms long dominated the field, the interwar years was going to witness the emergence of first studies, which sought to investigate the roots of nationalism as a doctrine and to classify supposedly different types of nationalisms.⁵⁸

⁵⁶ For these discussions, see: Horace B. Davis, *Nationalism & Socialism: Marxist and Labor Theories of Nationalism to 1917* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967): pp. 133-65. For discussions on nationalism within Marxism see for instance: Ronaldo Munck, *The Difficult Dialogue: Marxism and Nationalism* (London: Zed Books, 1986) and Ephraim Nimni, *Marxism and Nationalism: Theoretical Origins of a Political Crisis* (London: Pluto Press, 1991).

⁵⁷ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1996): p. 5.

⁵⁸ Özkırımlı, op. cit.: p. 37.

It is generally assumed that the first person to handle nationalism as a subject of academic scrutiny is Carlton Hayes.⁵⁹ Hayes, in his book *Essays on Nationalism* published in 1926, writes on the nature, historical rise and potential dangers of the extremely militant version of nationalism.⁶⁰ In his later book *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism*, he explains how nationalism evolved into different typologies in the European tradition of thought.⁶¹ Emphasising that there are different types of nationalism, Hayes led a generation of writers such as Hans Kohn, Louis Snyder and E. H. Carr, who have built their own typologies of nationalism.⁶² However, the main motivation behind these endeavours for classifying nationalisms was a normative fiction, which tried to separate “good” and “bad” nationalisms.⁶³

It can be said that the first period of the academic studies on nationalism was opened with Hayes’ works. In this period that was going to last until the second half of the 1970s, two main lines consisting of one, which went further upon the normative and idealist approach to nationalism of Hayes, and a second, which was born from the

⁵⁹ For instance: Anthony D. Smith, “Nationalism and the Historians” in Gopal Balakrishnan (ed.), *Mapping the Nation* (London: Verso, 1996): p. 182.

⁶⁰ Carlton J. Hayes, *Essays on Nationalism* (New York: Russel & Russel, 1966 [1926]).

⁶¹ Carlton J. Hayes, *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism* (New York: MacMillan, 1961 [1931]).

⁶² For Hayes’, Kohn’s, Snyder’s and Carr’s typologies of nationalism, see: Özkırımlı, op. cit., pp. 36-48.

⁶³ Umut Özkırımlı, *Contemporary Debates on Nationalism: A Critical Engagement* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005): pp. 26-8.

theories of modernisation –a paradigm started to prevail the field beginning from 1950s. The first line has two main characteristics. First, it continued some kind of a normative understanding of nationalism by making a division as the “Eastern” and “Western” type of nationalisms, that is to say, the “bad” and “good” ones. Secondly, this line tried to understand how nationalism, as a political doctrine or ideology, expanded through different parts of Europe and the world from a “diffusionist” understanding of nationalism.⁶⁴ The second line, which is also named as “nation-building school”, looked at political modernisation processes and at nationalism within the framework of the “modernisation” paradigm, which has emerged as a product of the structuralist-functional tradition of sociology. The main characteristic of this line is its efforts to develop a structural explanation contrary to the idealist approaches of the diffusionists. Although each member of this point of view puts forward a different dynamic forth, they in common have an understanding of nationalism as an important instrument accompanying the modernisation of the societies.⁶⁵

The influences of both lines went on during the first period of nationalism theories. However, the diffusionist line gradually lost its influence whereas the studies within

⁶⁴ Kohn claims that nationalism has begun its diffusion since the French Revolution, whereas Kedourie writes that nationalism is “a doctrine invented in Europe”. Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism* (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2005); Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism* (London: Hutchinson, 1986): p. 9. Both writers have books on the expansion of nationalism as a Europe-originated phenomenon through Africa and Asia. Hans Kohn, *A History of Nationalism in the East* (New York: Harcourt Brace Comp., 1969); Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism in Asia and Africa* (New York: World Pub. Co., 1970).

⁶⁵ Özkırımlı, *Theories of Nationalism ...* : p. 49.

the modernisation paradigm went along the second period with a more developed form of functionalism, especially with the important contribution of Ernest Gellner.⁶⁶ Many social scientists, which went forward from the route Gellner had opened, produced their works in 1970s and made nationalism a distinct literature on its own. Day and Thompson label all these theories of nationalism that were generated until the post-structuralist turning point in the 1990s as “classical theories of nationalism”.⁶⁷

The studies of nationalism had a new direction by the second half of the 1990s. The studies of nationalism were influenced directly from the general transformation in social sciences in this period, which can also be called as “post-classical”.⁶⁸ The impact of alternative epistemological perspectives such as feminism, postcolonialism and postmodernism is easy to be recognised in the new generation studies on nationalism.⁶⁹ It will, however, not be true to claim that the classical theories have lost their importance despite the undeniable influence of the post-classical theories, because classical and post-classical theories depart from different questions, and post-classical theories do not offer different answers to the questions classical

⁶⁶ For Gellner's approach on nationalism, see: Ernest Gellner, *Thought and Change* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1964) and Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983).

⁶⁷ Graham Day and Andrew Thompson, *Theorizing Nationalism* (New York: Palgrave, 2004): p. 7.

⁶⁸ For a study that analyses the change in social sciences, see: Terrence J. McDonald (ed.), *The Historic Turn in the Human Sciences* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1996).

⁶⁹ Özkırımlı, op. cit.: pp. 191-2.

theories try to answer. Questions that classical theories of nationalism try to find answers, like “when and how the nations were born” or “what dynamics lie behind the rise and success of national movements”, still lack answers that are agreed upon and these questions continue to mark productive areas for studies of social sciences.

3.1. Classifying the Theories of Nationalism

Accumulation of a vast literature of theories of nationalism made theories of nationalism itself a field of research. Many studies trying to classify theories of nationalism was published by the second half of 1990s. Anthony Smith’s two critical books, *Nationalism and Modernism* and *Nationalism*, are among the most prominent examples of those studies. In his first book, Smith argues that there are three dominant paradigms in the field, and later that there are four, in his second book.⁷⁰ These paradigms, if to order them according to their dates of emergence, are called primordialism, perennialism, modernism and ethno-symbolism. Classification was adopted by many researchers and later became the standard way of classifying theories of nationalism.⁷¹

⁷⁰ Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations and Nationalism* (London: Routledge, 1998) and Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007 [2001]).

⁷¹ Özkırımlı utilises the same way of classification too. Özkırımlı, *Theories of Nationalism ...*

What we call as primordialism, beyond its claim that “nation” is the basic form of unity among people, is an understanding defending that “nation” is also an inherent feature of the human nature. According to this understanding, nations, beyond the historical time, have the same age as the humanity.⁷² Primordialism has two mainstream lines of approach. First one, which in fact can not be named as “theory”, is the style of interpretation on nationalism of the nationalist historians. These historians believe that the history is the story of nations without beginning or end. The other line is derived from anthropologists studying on ethnicity such as Clifford Geertz and Edward Schils. Without any intention to explain nationalism or how nations came into being, these authors use the term “primordial” in order to define the ethnic connections between the social groups, but this does not mean that they think these connections are really primordial, rather both the two anthropologists claim that these connections are thought to be primordial by members of social groups.⁷³

The second paradigm, perennialism, claims that nations can not be fixed into a particular stage of history and that “even if nationalist ideology was recent, nations had always existed in every period of history, and that many nations existed from time immemorial”.⁷⁴ Perennialists need not be primordialists since it is possible to

⁷² Anthony D. Smith, *The Antiquity of Nations* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004): p. 5.

⁷³ Özkirimli, op. cit.: pp. 72-4.

⁷⁴ Smith, *Nationalism ...*: p. 49.

concede the antiquity of ethnic and national ties without holding that they are “natural”.⁷⁵ What primordialists and perennialists have in common is that these scholars try to break the link between modernity and nationalism.

The third paradigm, which is called “modernist”, in general, defines nations and nationalisms as modern phenomena, and emerged as a reaction to the older generation primordialists, who tacitly accepted the basic assumptions of the nationalist ideology.⁷⁶ In this classical classification, the authors that are labelled as “modernists” are later classified into subcategories according to what they choose as the main determinant of the birth of nationalism. However, bringing names, that have completely different explanations of nationalism, such as Gellner, Hroch, Breuilly, Anderson, Greenfeld and Hobsbawm, makes the important theoretical differences between these authors disappear. In this classification, a Marxist and a structuralist-functional sociologist, each of whom has totally a different perception on a certain social reality, are seen as the identical components of the same paradigm. Moreover, all of these authors bring forth quite different causal explanations on the relation between nation, nationalism and modernism.

Last paradigm, “ethno-symbolism”, is at least as problematic as the other paradigms listed here. This approach, which is also adopted by the main creator of this

⁷⁵ Özkirimli, op. cit.: p. 68.

⁷⁶ Ibid.: p. 85.

classification, Smith, claims that modernity does not present sufficient knowledge that would enable us to understand nationalism and nation-formation, and that researchers must concentrate on the transformations that pre-modern ethnic elements had.⁷⁷ Özkırımlı spells the names of John Armstrong and John Hutchinson besides Anthony Smith as other examples of the ethno-symbolist theorisers.⁷⁸

It is not possible to cover and criticise all of these theories of nationalism in depth in this study. Moreover, this classification used here is only little helpful if one thinks about which paradigm and approach would be the most appropriate while analysing the case in question in this study. Although the classification summarised here helps to present the literature on nationalism in a tidier way, one must move towards a more functional classification in order to find out the most appropriate paradigm or approach.

3.2. An Alternative Classification

French author Antoine Roger, who is aware of the mentioned limits and problems of the efforts to classify the theories of nationalism, suggests an alternative way of

⁷⁷ Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995 [1986]).

⁷⁸ Özkırımlı, op. cit.: p. 168.


classification.⁷⁹ Roger's classification is much more developed and functional. Distancing him of the abundance of usable resources in the field of nationalism, Roger argues that a researcher, with an intention to solve the codes of any nationalist movement, is not in a "conceptual desert" anymore, but is more or less in a "real jungle".⁸⁰ It is difficult to draw a way of her/his own for a researcher in such a jungle. Even when the researcher becomes sure on what direction to walk on, problems do not end. It is, this time, difficult to determine which theories to combine due to lack of any bridges between them which would enable the researcher to establish connections between them, and to combine more than one theoretical approach of nationalism seems to be necessary in order to analyse nationalist movements in a sensitive and deliberate way.⁸¹ A facilitating classification, therefore, must underline the complex relations of kinship between different interpretations of nationalism instead of putting them side by side.⁸²

⁷⁹ Antoine Roger, Aziz Ufuk Kılıç (tran.), *Milliyetçilik Kuramları* (Istanbul: Versus, 2008).

⁸⁰ Ibid.: p. 1.

⁸¹ Ibid.: p. 1.

⁸² Ibid.: p. 2.



Scheme 1: General Order of Theories of Nationalism
(Translated from the original scheme in Roger, op. cit.: p. 7.)

Roger, with his alternative classification, challenges the dichotomy between the “perennialist” and “modernist” theories of nationalism. He proposes to array theories of nationalism along two axes in his scheme. In the horizontal axis, he draws a line beginning from theories that ascribe great importance to structural constraints on the left side of the axis, and through the right side to theories that ascribe importance to individual agents’ intentions. In the second axis, he draws another but a vertical line that is cutting the former, on which theories of nationalism that see nationalism arising from mutually willed solidarity at the bottom whereas the theories that see nationalism as an instrument for the domination by the elites stand at the top of the scheme.⁸³ Roger also draws two rectangular frames that encapsulate the four different parts of the scheme. In the first one, there are approaches admitting that nationalists have many options, but thinking that these options are mutually exclusive; they also admit that these may come one after another in time or that may exist simultaneously in different places, but they do not admit that they may be combined with each other in one social community. According to these approaches, nationalists compose a homogeneous and monolithic unity, and this unity may have different lines in different periods and places, but it is never agitated by internal conflicts. However, other approaches that are placed in the second frame give permission to take into consideration that many options would exist together or sometimes would conflict with each other in one particular period and in one

⁸³ For this scheme, see: Scheme 1.

particular community.⁸⁴ Roger adds that it is only possible to combine the ones that are placed in the second frame.⁸⁵ Donahue gives a useful summary of Roger's scheme:

Roger schematizes his typology to improve comprehensibility. I will not reproduce the figure here, but if the left pole of the x-axis is taken to be the "strong structure" position, while the right pole is taken to be the "strong agent" position; and if the top of the y-axis is taken to be the "domination" position, while the bottom is taken to be the "solidarity" position; then we get a distribution in which "international Marxist perspectives" (such as those of Immanuel Wallerstein and Tom Nairn) are clustered on the upper far left; "internal Marxist perspectives" (Etienne Balibar) are clustered on the far left just above the x-axis; "primordialist theories" (Clifford Geertz) are on the far left just below the x-axis; and "sociobiological theories" are grouped in the lower far left. Just to the left of the y-axis, "logics of social emancipation" (Miroslav Hroch) are closest to the domination pole, while "logics of identity recycling" (Eric Hobsbawm) are just above the x-axis; beneath the x-axis, "logics of communication" (Karl Deutsch) are seen as less structuralist than "primordialist theories" and given to weaker views on solidarity than are "logics of homogenization" (Ernest Gellner). To the right of the y-axis, "logics of political redemption" (John Breuilly and Paul Brass) are seen as strongly domination-driven but only weakly agent-based, while "logics of political legitimization" (Liah Greenfeld) take a weak-domination, weak-agent, view. On the solidarity side of the weak agent-based column, "logics of cultural interaction" (Louis Dumont) take a weaker view of solidarity than do "logics of cultural reformation" (Anthony Smith). In the strong agent column, "theories of interests" (Nathan Glazer) stack up as strongly domination-driven, while "theories of identity competition" (Ronald Rogowski, Hudson Meadwell) take a weaker view of domination; on the other side of the x-axis, "theories of identity friction" (Walker Connor) take a weaker view of solidarity than

⁸⁴ Ibid.: p. 4.

⁸⁵ Ibid.: p. 5.

do “diffusionist theories” (Hugh Seton-Watson, Hans Kohn, Elie Kedourie).⁸⁶

The absence of the post-classical theories of nationalism in this scheme does not create any problem here, for this study is already devoted to the relation between development, modernity and nationalism. This scheme has great importance not only because of its inclusiveness, but also because of its facilitating role for the researchers to develop combinations with different theories and to relate these theories with the main paradigms such as Marxism and structuralist-functionalism by placing these theories in a broader social theory context. However, which theories would be combined is still a matter of the researcher. The researcher must decide which pole of theories should be chosen for her/his own research goals.

Roger, in his book, reviews the theories of nationalism according to the horizontal axis going from theories that ascribe importance to structural constraints to theories that ascribe importance to individual agents’ intentions.⁸⁷ The method that will be used here is, however, to make a division according to the second axis, and to choose the pole of “domination”. This is mostly because the authors on this pole are the names that place the conflict between social classes and the economic and political stages of this at the centre of their perceptions of the society in general. Additionally,

⁸⁶ Tom Donahue, “Book Review: *Le Grandes Théories du Nationalisme*”, *The Nationalism Project* (December 2002): Worldwide Web Source, retrieved from <<http://www.nationalismproject.org/books/bookrevs/Roger.html>>, last visited on 25 June 2008.

⁸⁷ Roger, op. cit.

these authors mostly concentrate upon the nationalist movements as a social reality whereas the members of the opposite pole take the nation-formation at the centre of their research agendas. Thus, it is going to be appropriate to progress from the “domination” pole in this study, which seeks to analyse the nationalist Yön-Devrim Movement.

Once one chooses the “domination” pole and focuses on the second frame in Roger’s scheme for analytic flexibility, theories that can be moved through become more apparent. However, it will be necessary to choose from theories that ascribe greater importance to the individual agents’ intentions instead of the ones that ascribe greater importance to the structural constraints, since the Yön-Devrim Movement is, as it is going to be demonstrated, a movement directed by almost one intellectual –Doğan Avcioğlu. John Breuilly and Paul Brass, with the label “logics of political redemption”, and Guy Hermet and Liah Greenfeld, with the label “logics of political legitimization”, are on this limited part of the scheme.⁸⁸ When it is also thought that the Yön-Devrim Movement did not have some sort of power or position to be legitimised, but rather that it was politically blocked and was in search of a way to overcome this situation, it will be easier to understand that Yön-Devrim Movement was also utilising nationalism for its political demands and programme although it was sincere in its nationalist stance. It is now clear that the theoretical approaches of

⁸⁸ See: Scheme 1.

John Breuilly and Paul Brass look like to be more useful for an analysis of the Yön-Devrim Movement.

3.3. Nationalism as an “Instrument”

John Breuilly, a British historian, treats nationalism “as a form of politics” in his widely respected book *Nationalism and the State* by claiming that it can be “best understood as an especially appropriate form of political behaviour in the context of the modern state and the modern state system.”⁸⁹ He does not believe in the functionality of focusing on one determinant such as “class interest” or “economic or social structure” in order to analyse nationalism in general, and argues that this would make us “neglect the fundamental point that nationalism is, above and beyond all else, about politics and that politics is about power.”⁹⁰

Power, in the modern world, is principally about *control of the state*. The central task is to relate nationalism to the objectives of *obtaining and using state power*. We need to understand why nationalism has played a major role in the pursuit of those objectives. To understand that we need to examine closely how nationalism operates as politics and what is about modern politics that makes nationalism so important. Only then should we go on to consider the contributions of culture, ideology, class and much else.⁹¹ [Emphases are added.]

⁸⁹ John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994): p. 1.

⁹⁰ Ibid.: p. 1.

⁹¹ Ibid.: pp. 1-2.

Breuilly defines nationalism as “political movements seeking or exercising state power and justifying such action with nationalist arguments.”⁹² Breuilly goes on with writing that a nationalist argument, as a political doctrine, is built upon three basis assertions:

- (a) There exists a nation with an explicit and peculiar character.
- (b) The interests and values of this nation take priority over all other interests and values.
- (c) The nation must be as independent as possible. This usually requires at least the attainment of political sovereignty.⁹³

Breuilly continues and develops his analysis by discussing the problem of forming the relation between “state” and “society” in modern societies, the crisis of liberalism -as the first important political doctrine of the modern era- in its reconciliation with the collective or community interests, and therefore “the ‘modern’ need to develop political languages and movements which could appeal to a wide range of groups”.⁹⁴ This need, of course, would be met best by nationalism. According to Breuilly, nationalism has three functions activated by nationalist ideas: “coordination”, “mobilization” and “legitimacy”: He means that “nationalist ideas are used to promote the idea of common interests amongst a number of elites which otherwise

⁹² Ibid.: p. 2.

⁹³ Ibid.: p. 2. For the third assertion Breuilly also notes: “Some nationalist movements demand less than this but usually because they recognise that full independence is either unattainable or liable to be dangerously short-lived, because the new independent nation will be exposed in a way that it was not within a larger political structure. The Czech demand for increased autonomy within the Habsburg empire was pragmatic in this way.” 3rd endnote in Ibid.: p. 15.

⁹⁴ Özkirimli, op. cit.: pp. 106-8.

have rather distinct interests in opposing the existing state” by his term “coordination”, and means “the use of nationalist ideas to generate support for the political movement from broad groups hitherto excluded from the political process” by his term “mobilization” and “the use of nationalist ideas to justify the goals of the political movement both to the state it opposes and also to powerful external agents, such as foreign states and their public opinions”.⁹⁵ It is going to be seen that Yön-Devrim Movement tried to utilise all these three functions of nationalism.

Paul R. Brass, an American political scientist and an expert on South America, is one of the most prominent names that stress the “instrumental” character of ethnic and national identities.⁹⁶ Instrumentalists argue that

ethnic and national units afford convenient ‘sites’ for generating mass support in the universal struggle of elites for wealth, power and prestige, and that, given a world of scarce resources but high levels of communication, ethnic symbols and boundaries are able to evoke greater commitment and easier modes of co-ordination of different sectional interests under a single banner.⁹⁷

According to this understanding, identities serve to purposes, and their spokesmen utilise them “by combining economic and political interests with cultural ‘affect’.”⁹⁸

⁹⁵ Quoted from John Breuilly, “Approaches to Nationalism”, in Gopal Balakrishnan (ed.), *Mapping the Nation* (London: Verso, 1996): pp. 166-7 in Özkırımlı, op. cit.: p. 109.

⁹⁶ Ibid.: p. 109.

⁹⁷ Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* ... : p. 9.

⁹⁸ Ibid.: pp. 9-10.

Brass notes that the competition between elites would influence how ethnic groups identify themselves and would determine to what extent they are going to be permanent, because the culture and the values of communities form a political source for the elites, who are seeking political or economic power.⁹⁹ Brass, on the other hand, points out that there are some necessary conditions before an identity transformation would occur. Besides the need for objective differences between the communities and the competition between the elites of a particular community, for an identity transformation to begin in that community, Brass lists some conditions that must be sufficient:

the existence of the means to communicate the selected symbols of identity to other social classes within the ethnic group, the existence of a socially mobilized population to whom the symbols may be communicated, and the absence of intense class cleavage or other difficulties in communication between elites and other social groups or classes.¹⁰⁰

This study will examine the Yön-Devrim Movement, as a nationalist movement with an aspiration to utilise nationalism as an instrument on the way towards its political goals, especially in its search of taking the political power, in the forthcoming chapters.

⁹⁹ Özkirimli, op. cit.: p. 110.

¹⁰⁰ Paul R. Brass, *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1991): p. 63.

CHAPTER 4

THIRD WORLDISM: BETWEEN DEVELOPMENT AND NATIONALISM

Where theories of development were summarised, it was underlined that there is a line of diffusionist theories, which associate nationalism with development. It was also explained that theories of underdevelopment and the Third World intellectuals have tended to engage with such pro-nationalist approaches to development. Having also summarised that some theories of nationalism depicts nationalism as a “form of politics” or as an “instrument” to legitimise or realise particular political goals such as taking the political power, it can be moved through the political results of these theoretical understandings.

The intellectual and political leaders of the Third World countries, which are underdeveloped and which had similar historical experience, that is to say, western dominance in common, were beginning to have an inclination toward nationalist discourse, as well as nationalist policies. Dawa Norbu explains:

The similar stages of underdevelopment mean that the secularization of the religious belief system in most Third World nations has not progressed to the extent it has in the west, and that tradition still

continues to be a core of their national identities. The similar historical experience of colonialism and imperialism until recently means that the target of Third World nationalism continues to be, sustained by growing economic interest conflict, the west. It is on these grounds we feel we are justified to refer to a special phenomenon called Third World nationalism. Although we don't deny variations within it, yet we are entitled to treat the subject as a distinct one in relation to western nationalism.¹⁰¹

According to Norbu, as a “fusion of tradition and ideology”, Third World nationalism “may then be defined as a ‘*politicized social consciousness* centred upon a common national identity rooted in a shared tradition, and the *ideological belief in the structure of the modern nation-state* as the most efficacious instrument of national unity, national independence and national interest’.”¹⁰² [Emphases are added.] This state-centric ideological belief was soon going to find its empirical reflections in politics as struggles to topple the colonial powers, to take the state power and to direct the nation-state machinery in order to apply nationalist/protectionist policies towards economic development. In line with these intellectual and practical developments, the revolutions that occur in the Third World one after another made the social scientists explore a new field to be researched: revolutions and social transformations, which are made and directed from above by

¹⁰¹ Norbu, op. cit.: p. 21.

¹⁰² Ibid.: p. 26. Partha Chatterjee, one of the most prominent names of the group of Subaltern Studies and of the writers on Third World nationalism, also describes what he calls as “anticolonial nationalism” by giving a definition that is close to Norbu’s conception of Third World nationalism as a “fusion of tradition and ideology”. Chatterjee explains how “anticolonial nationalism creates its own domain of sovereignty ... by dividing the world of social institutions and practices into two domains—the material and the spiritual. The material is the domain of the ‘outside,’ of the economy and of the state-craft, of science and technology, a domain where West had proved its superiority and the East had succumbed. ... The spiritual, on the other hand, is an ‘inner’ domain bearing the ‘essential’ marks of cultural identity.” Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993): p. 6.

using the state machinery. The masterpieces of two women scholars, *Revolution From Above* of Ellen Kay Trimberger and *States and Social Revolutions* of Theda Skocpol were published in 1978 and 1979, at a time when the storming years of the Third World wave were already left behind.

Trimberger tries to configure the characteristics of and the necessary conditions for what she calls as “revolutions from above”: a kind of social change by a revolution made by military bureaucrats attempting to industrialise and modernise a particular underdeveloped country through the policies applied from top to the bottom by using the state machinery.¹⁰³ Skocpol, on the other hand, in her perceptive book on revolution, is in search of the necessary “structural defects” to underpin revolutionary situation in its way to a successful social revolution from a comparative and structuralist perspective.¹⁰⁴ What the first one calls as “revolution from above” is especially important for the purposes of this study since it is going to be seen that the case-study of this study, the Yön-Devrim Movement, was in search of a revolution of the same kind that Trimberger theorises.

¹⁰³ Ellen Kay Trimberger, *Revolution From Above: Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt, and Peru* (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1978).

¹⁰⁴ Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980 [1979]). Skocpol was to update her approach by her later study: Theda Skocpol, *Social Revolutions in the Modern World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997 [1994]).

Trimberger begins her book by emphasising that “there can be no general theory of revolution (or of social change) applicable to all societies at all times.”¹⁰⁵ She goes on her analyses by explaining the second theoretical preconception of her book: “both the causes and consequences of revolution from above –or any revolution- are determined by structural relationships internal to a national society and by the international context of that society.”¹⁰⁶ According to her, the basic requirement for a particular series of events to be considered as a “revolution” is the existence of “an extralegal takeover of the central state apparatus which destroys the economic and political power of the dominant social group of the old regime”, instead of a “mass movement” or of a “mass upheaval”.¹⁰⁷

Trimberger lists the five characteristics that define a revolution from above:

1. The extralegal takeover of political power and the initiation of economic, social, and political change is organized and led by some of the highest military and often civil bureaucrats in the old regime.
2. There is little or no mass participation in the revolutionary takeover or in the initiation of change. Mass movements and uprisings may precede and accompany revolution from above, but military bureaucrats who take revolutionary actions do so independently from, and often in opposition to, such movements.
3. The extralegal takeover of power and the initiation of change is accompanied by very little violence, execution, emigration, or counter-revolution.

¹⁰⁵ Trimberger, op. cit.: p. 1.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.: p. 2.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.: p. 2.

4. The initiation of change is undertaken in a pragmatic, step-at-a-time manner with little appeal to radical ideology. Both the third and fourth characteristics are the result of control and use of a bureaucratic apparatus for radical aims.
5. Military bureaucrats who lead a revolution from above –as opposed to a coup d'etat- destroy the economic and political base of the aristocracy or upper class. This destructive process is basic to both revolution from above and from below.¹⁰⁸

For a “revolution from above” to occur, certain structural features must exist such as the autonomy of the military bureaucracy from class domination, the existence of a politicised military bureaucracy, the rise of nationalist movements from below demanding an end to national degradation, the opportunity for international manoeuvre and the need for a provincial power-base.¹⁰⁹ Trimberger adds that “prior consolidation of a centralized and relatively homogenous nation-state” abrogates the fifth prerequisite, and that it is “no longer a necessary precondition for revolution from above.”¹¹⁰ What led the Yön-Devrim Movement face a tragic outcome in its search for a revolution from above in cooperation with one clique within the armed forces might be the non-existence of these particular structural features.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.: p. 3.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.: pp. 151-6.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.: p. 156.

CHAPTER 5

YÖN-DEVRİM MOVEMENT

Kemalism has always been influential in the modern Turkish thought since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey. Kemalist thought, if not an ideology, has been an element of the contending modern ideologies in the republican Turkey either as an ingredient or as an enemy target of an ideological stance. This is quite apparent in the experiment of the left in Turkey. The left in Turkey has always had a special relationship with the Kemalist thought, because, on one hand, Kemalism sought to engage itself with the left in 1960s, and, on the other hand, the majority of the leftist groups in Turkey took Kemalism as a step towards their ideal revolution. The interaction between Kemalism and the left in Turkey created a genuine and completely new ideological stance that can be labeled as “Kemalist socialism”, “Left Kemalism” or even “Kemalist Marxism”. It is not proper to call this new stance, which is peculiar to Turkey, as “Nationalist Socialism”, for first this term has quite different associations and attributions, and, second, for we can not talk about a fascist understanding in this stance. Although it is subject to debate whether we can attribute nationality to the left as an ideological stance, the term “Left Kemalism”¹¹¹ will be

¹¹¹ This concept is adopted from Hikmet Özdemir. See: Hikmet Özdemir, *1960'lar Türkiye'sinde Sol Kemalizm: Yön Hareketi* (İstanbul: İz, 1993).

used while referring to the Turkish intellectual tradition, of which the main object of analysis of this study, the Yön-Devrim Movement, is a part.

Left Kemalism has its own understanding of development and nationalism. Left Kemalism, though not homogeneous in its thinking from person to person and from time to time, has an attitude, which nurtures from its position both as a defender of the Republic of Turkey and as a critique of it. The main tendency in defining the “we” or the “nation” within this political tradition has two sides: the exclusion of the non-Muslim minorities, which are almost equated with foreign capitalism and identified as the local collaborators of imperialism, from the “we” in general, and the consideration on Kurds that these people are without any doubt within the “we”. More generally, Left Kemalism adopts a constructivist and an instrumentalist approach to nationalism on the way to the rapid development of the country.

In this chapter the nationalist discourse of the Yön-Devrim Movement will be covered within this intellectual tradition’s understanding of nationalism, as well as of development. This is, first of all, because the Yön-Devrim Movement always considered itself as the inheritor of the Ottoman-Turkish traditional intellectuals.¹¹² Avcioğlu calls the representatives of this intellectual tradition as “nationalist

¹¹² This is expressed most clearly in the writings of Doğan Avcioğlu, who led the movement. For instance, see: Doğan Avcioğlu, *Türkiye'nin Düzeni: Dün, Bugün, Yarın* (Ankara: Bilgi, 1968): pp. 524-6.

revolutionaries”. This is a line, which includes New Ottomans, Young Turks, Ittihadists, Kemalists and the Kadro Movement.

The common question of this intellectual tradition is how the country would be saved. New Ottomans suggested the guidance of science and the improvement of education, whereas the Young Turks proposed to cut the ties between religion and social life in favour of positive sciences.¹¹³ Neither New Ottomans nor early Young Turks had a clear economic point of view on the underdevelopment of the country. First serious searches for clearer economic principles were being undertaken during the Ittihadist governments. Especially after the Balkan Wars (1912-13) Ittihadists adopted the policy to pursue “National Economics” (*Millî İktisat*) and to create “National Bourgeoisie” (*Millî Burjuvazi*).¹¹⁴ Kemalists, on the other hand, followed a similar line by reformulating the principles such as nationalism, populism, revolutionism, Etatism and secularism, which they had taken from the Young Turks, on their way to found a nation-state.¹¹⁵ The principles that were later going to be reformulated by the Yön-Devrim Movement have their intellectual roots in this intellectual tradition.

¹¹³ Şükrü Hanoğlu, *Osmancı, İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti ve Jön Türkliük* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayımları, 1985): pp. 25-29, p. 42, p. 49.

¹¹⁴ Zafer Toprak, *Millî İktisat Millî Burjuvazi* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt, 1995): p. 107.

¹¹⁵ Gökhan Atılgan, *Yön-Devrim Hareketi: Kemalizm ile Marksizm Arasında Geleneksel Aydinlar* (İstanbul: TÜSTAV, 2002): pp. 70-1.

Nevertheless, the Yön-Devrim Movement has very significant differences from most of these traditional intellectual movements in the sense that it has a strong economist and leftist character, which is apparent in its analyses that are mainly made by utilising Marxism and the Dependency School. Though it has also important differences from the Kadro Movement, the Yön-Devrim Movement has a greater commonality with the Kadro Movement, since both of them are leftist nationalist movements that sought and offered models for development. It is, thus, worthy to draw the line beginning from the journals *Kadro* (Cadre), *Yön* (Direction) and *Devrim* (Revolution) through the successors that claimed to be the inheritors of this tradition: the journal *Türk Solu* (Turkish Left) and two other most prominent figures Doğu Perinçek and Yalçın Küçük including the magazines and journals they represent.¹¹⁶ These figures and their understandings of nationalism and development will be explored by utilising the main manuscripts and texts of this tradition. Therefore, the magazines, journals, and the important authors and personalities of the mentioned tradition will be subject to analyses with regard to their perspectives on the notions mentioned.

¹¹⁶ Aytemur analyses this tradition including the first Communist Party of Turkey (TKP), which had established in the years during the War of Independence of Turkey. In this study, however, the same tradition is going to be analysed beginning from the Kadro Movement, since the first TKP was quite different from the movements and figures that were mostly organised around journals and texts, and that were inclined to influence the government or the military bureaucrats. See: Nuran Aytemur, *The Turkish Left and Nationalism: The Case of Yön*, unpublished Master of Science thesis (Ankara: METU, August 2000).

According to this depiction of the tradition that the Yön-Devrim Movement is a part of, it would be more appropriate to begin with analysing the Kadro Movement, which is widely thought to be a predecessor of the Yön-Devrim Movement. The movement is going to be analysed by discussing its emergence, its understanding of nationalism, its problematic on culture and religion, and its search for rapid development. Nevertheless, the Nasserist revolution is also going to be handled within the framework of Trimberger's revolution conceptualisation, "revolution from above", as one of the clearest examples of such revolutions, since what the Yön-Devrim Movement sought to create the conditions for was nothing else than such a revolution from above. Moving apart from this framework, I will try to explore some of the possible reasons of the failure of the Yön-Devrim Movement by utilising from the preconditions that are put forth by Trimberger.

5.1. *Kadro* (Cadre)

The journal *Kadro* (January 1932-December/January 1934/1935) has a great significance within the history of Turkish political thought. It was published by a group of Turkish intellectuals that was composed of Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, İsmail Hüsrev Tökin, Vedat Nedim Tör, Burhan Asaf Belge and Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu.¹¹⁷ Mehmet Şevki Yazman, a military officer of the period, joined

¹¹⁷ Mustafa Türkeş, *Uluslararası Bir Akım: Kadro Hareketi (1932-1934)* (İstanbul: İmge, 1999): p. 9.

them a year later.¹¹⁸ It emerged in a time that the young Republic of Turkey, which was founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in 1923, was seeking a way of its own while the world was facing the Great Depression of 1929. The writers of *Kadro* had considered themselves responsible, not only to participate in the ideological and economic discussions, but also to evaluate the “Turkish revolution” and to provide a theoretical framework for it.¹¹⁹ They declared their mission in the first volume of *Kadro* as follows:

Turkey is inside a revolution. This revolution has not stopped yet. The whole actions we have passed, incredible revolt views we have witnessed are only one stage of it. We have passed a rebellion. Rebellion is not the end of the revolution, but its means. If we had stopped at the rebellion stage, our revolution would have remained fruitless. However, it is enlarging and deepening. It has not said its last word, and it has not given its last product yet. ... This revolution has all theoretical and ideal elements, which could be principles for itself and conscious for the ones, who are going to keep it alive. But these theoretical and ideal elements have not yet been synthesised and codified into a system of ideas, which would be an IDEOLOGY for the revolution. ... KADRO HAS COME FOR THIS REASON.¹²⁰ [Capital letters are in the original.]

They were coming from a tradition that said, “Our generation was a generation, which did not think of any rights for it. There was no right for us, but duty.”¹²¹ With a Marxist education background, they sought to give a direction to the Kemalist

¹¹⁸ Mustafa Türkeş, “Kadro Dergisi” in Ahmet İnsel (ed.), “Kemalizm”, *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce*, Vol. 2 (İstanbul: İletişim, 2007): p. 464.

¹¹⁹ Türkeş, op. cit. (1999): p. 9.

¹²⁰ “Kadro”, *Kadro* (Vol. 1, January 1932): p. 3.

¹²¹ Sevket Süreyya Aydemir, *Suyu Arayan Adam* (İstanbul: Remzi, 1979): p. 72.

leadership. *Kadro* was an expression of a radical nationalist leftist approach, which strived to place nationalism within historical materialism, which was influenced in its imperialism analysis directly from Lenin, which defended the positivist type of modernism and which defended that the allocation of resources and incomes must not be left to the hegemony of the bourgeoisie, but the state control over the bourgeoisie.¹²² According to the movement shaped around this journal, there were the classes that were inherent to pre-capitalist societies, but the state must prevent the emergence of classes that are integral to capitalist societies and the dominance of one of these classes.¹²³ The approach of “National Democratic Revolution” (*MDD*) in Turkey had first been born in the Communist Party of Turkey in 1920s, but it is often claimed to come into a concrete being first in *Kadro*.¹²⁴ It is also claimed that the idea of Turkey’s peculiarity or uniqueness because of its socio-economic conditions was organized first in *Kadro*.¹²⁵ However, they also wanted to promote the idea of republicanism in other countries around Turkey.¹²⁶ They made discussions with the liberals of the period, such as Ahmet Ağaoğlu, that the state must have a control over individuals and that “democracy for the people is somewhat in benefit of the people

¹²² Türkeş, op. cit. (2007): p. 470.

¹²³ Ibid.: p. 159.

¹²⁴ Suavi Aydin, “Sosyalizm ve Milliyetçilik: Galiyefizmden Kemalizme Türkiye’de ‘Üçüncü Yol’ Arayışları” in Tanıl Bora (ed.), “Milliyetçilik”, *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce*, Vol. 4 (İstanbul: İletişim, 2007): p. 461.

¹²⁵ Ibid.: pp. 454-456.

¹²⁶ Ali Kazancıgil, “Anti-Emperialist Bağımsızlık İdeolojisi ve Üçüncü Dünya Ulusçuluğu Olarak Kemalizm” in Ahmet İnsel (ed.), “Kemalizm”, *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce*, Vol. 2 (İstanbul: İletişim, 2007): p. 245.

but sometimes despite the people.”¹²⁷ They explained their development ideology within a framework based on some sort of an “authoritarian nationalism” and on Etatism.¹²⁸ They dealt with the conflict between the nations and imperialism, instead of class conflicts.¹²⁹ At first Mustafa Kemal Atatürk supported them indirectly; he did it later directly by sending a congratulation letter. However, *Kadro* fell in controversies with the Kemalist leadership in many cases, and they had to end their publication for good in 1935. *Kadro* was a journal, with high-quality analyses based on historical materialism and class perspective appeared. It was also a journal where the ideas of the famous theoreticians of that time were discussed and where planned economics and Etatism were defended.

The four founder names of *Kadro*, Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, İsmail Hüsrev Tökin, Vedat Nedim Tör and Burhan Asaf Belge, except Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, whom they met later, were all familiar with and well-equipped on the Marxist discussions and analyses. *Kadro* had an understanding that the national society must be preceded by the national state. It was the state, which would be a “national” one by the political Etatist policies and thus would create the “national society” in a country that lacks a “nation”. After explaining this mission of the state, Şevket

¹²⁷ Ayşe Kadıoğlu, “Milliyetçilik-Liberalizm Ekseninde Vatandaşlık ve Bireysellik” in Tanıl Bora (ed.), “Milliyetçilik”, *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce*, Vol. 4 (İstanbul: İletişim, 2007): pp. 290-291.

¹²⁸ Ahmet İnsel, “Milliyetçilik ve Kalkınmacılık” in Tanıl Bora (ed.), “Milliyetçilik”, *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce*, Vol. 4 (İstanbul: İletişim, 2007): p. 770.

¹²⁹ Birsen Talay, “Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu” in Ahmet İnsel (ed.), “Kemalizm”, *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce*, Vol. 2 (İstanbul: İletişim, 2007): p. 438.

Süreyya Aydemir calls his advices for the young Republic as “economic functions of the new state”.¹³⁰ Vedat Nedim Tör is one of the first intellectuals, who made the argument that was later going to be very popular in the young Republic: he notes that military victories must be succeeded by economic victories, and if not there is the danger of falling in the midst of imperialism.¹³¹ This economic development must be not only against the external enemies, but also against the “non-national” (*gayrimillî*) domestic enemies.¹³² For example, Burhan Asaf Belge did not hesitate to show the maltreatment and torture against Jews in Germany by Hitler as an example of what these “domestic enemies” would face unless they conform with the young Republic’s national character.¹³³ This was an indirect message for the non-Muslim minorities and the Kurds. According to *Kadro*, the problem in the eastern part of the country is also very clear: feudalism. Aydemir claims that the feudal way of life has always been incompatible with the qualities of Turks.¹³⁴ The Kurdishness is also an economic regime that is based on the slavery of land.¹³⁵ The people in the region are being forced to feel as Kurd, to speak Kurdish and to be loyal to the Kurdish feudal

¹³⁰ Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, “Yeni Devletin İktisadî Fonksiyonları”, *Kadro* (Vol. 29, May 1934): pp. 5-14.

¹³¹ Vedat Nedim Tör, “Müstemleke İktisadiyatından Millet İktisadiyatına”, *Kadro* (Vol. 1, January 1932): pp. 8-11.

¹³² Ibid.: pp. 8-11.

¹³³ Tanıl Bora, “Türk Milliyetçiliği ve Azınlıklar” in Tanıl Bora (ed.), “Milliyetçilik”, *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce*, Vol. 4 (İstanbul: İletişim, 2007): p. 913.

¹³⁴ Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, “Derebeyi ve Dersim”, *Kadro* (Vol. 6, June 1932): pp. 41-45.

¹³⁵ Ibid.: pp. 41-45.

landowners in the region.¹³⁶ İsmail Hüsrev Tökin repeats similar arguments that there is no Kurdish nation since the “nation is a higher social category” and these people are only some Turkish tribes who speak Kurdish many times later.¹³⁷ One of the most prominent missions of the young Republic was to free Turks, who were “Kurdified” by the pressure of the Kurdish feudalism. The national society that was going to be created by the state must also have some qualities such as going to theatres and operas.¹³⁸ Especially Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu also expressed the need for a “national literature” and a “national science” in the journal.¹³⁹

Kadro Movement was in a desire of influencing the Kemalist government. One of the founders of the movement, Aydemir had already begun in early 1929 to declare his views that there had been a need for “the formation of an elite cadre in order to make the revolution of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk perpetual”.¹⁴⁰ Kadro Movement excluded the Kemalist leaders and the state from their class analyses, though they made serious class analyses of the society of Turkey. Although they produced leftist

¹³⁶ Ibid.: pp. 41-45.

¹³⁷ İsmail Hüsrev Tökin, “Şark Vilayetlerinde Derebeylik”, *Kadro* (Vol. 12, December 1932): pp. 18-25.

¹³⁸ Birsen Talay, “Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu” in Ahmet İnsel (ed.), “Kemalizm”, *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce*, Vol. 2 (İstanbul: İletişim, 2007): p. 438.

¹³⁹ Ibid.: p. 439.

¹⁴⁰ Türkeş, op. cit. (1999): p. 91.

discourses, they could not produce an alternative ideology, and they mainly tried to reconcile the nationalist and leftist discourses of their time.¹⁴¹

The writers of *Kadro* were listing the states in the afterward of the First World War as three particular kinds: “the states with capitalist order”, “the states with a socialist order” and “the states that were going to be founded as a result of the ‘National Liberation Movements’”. They claimed that they had objections to both first two kinds of development, and they adopted an approach that depicted the main conflict in the 20th century as the conflict between the industrialised countries and the non-industrialised countries, so that they had been one of the first advocates of the later theses, which were going to be put forth by the writers of the Dependency School.

It has already been noted that the writers of *Kadro*, who were competent in the class analyses of Marxism, chose to exclude the new Republic of Turkey and the Kemalist military-bureaucratic elite from their class analyses just because they were trying to influence these. Türkeş elaborates on this issue:

It is precise that the members of the Kadro Movement make the discussion of whose interests the state *must represent* instead of a discussion of whose interests the state *represents* when it comes to Turkey. In different words, they got stuck between the problematic of what is and what must be.¹⁴² [Emphasis is added.]

¹⁴¹ Ibid.: pp. 159-160.

¹⁴² Ibid.: p. 198.

Türkeş adds that if they had analysed the Kemalist state from a Marxist perspective, it would not have been possible for them to place the Kemalist strategy to create a national entrepreneur bourgeoisie into a framework that is thought to represent the interests of the whole nation: “The members of the Kadro Movement were aware of this and it is most probable that they intentionally tried to influence and transform the Kemalist state by avoiding making a class analysis.”¹⁴³ The main difficulty for the Kadro Movement was mainly this matter: the unequal relation between them and the Kemalist government. However, the publication life of *Kadro* was going to come to an end when the Kemalist government pulled its initial support back at a time the government changed the direction of its policies.¹⁴⁴

5.2. Yön-Devrim Movement

What is called as “Yön-Devrim Movement” is basically the group of intellectuals, who were gathered around the journals *Yön* (Direction) in 1960s, and *Devrim* (Revolution) in 1969-1971. Before the foundation of these two journals, the general tendency toward such a movement was being shaped by the growing distress under the Democrat Party government during 1950s. Some intellectuals of that time, such as Doğan Avcıoğlu and Mümtaz Soysal, began to express their opposition in several

¹⁴³ Ibid.: p. 198.

¹⁴⁴ For the closure story of *Kadro*, see: Ibid.: pp. 203-11.

newspapers and journals like *Forum*, *Akis*, *Kim* and *Ulus*.¹⁴⁵ *Yön* was first published in December 1961 after the 27 May 1960 military coup. It began its publication life with a declaration known as “*Yön Bildirisi*”, and over 1000 intellectuals and public figures signed this declaration.¹⁴⁶ According to this declaration, the achievement of the modern civilization level that the Atatürk reforms had aimed was dependent on the success of increasing the national production.¹⁴⁷ After several warnings and threats to the journal from government circles, *Yön* finally ended its publication in 1967.¹⁴⁸ This is in fact Doğan Avcioğlu’s own decision.¹⁴⁹ It might have been that *Yön* was thought to have completed its mission to give a “direction” to the country. *Devrim* followed *Yön*, but *Devrim* was directly aiming to hold the power by a revolution. *Yön* discussed how Turkey would develop in a non-capitalist fashion, and *Devrim* was there to implement the outcomes of the discussion made.¹⁵⁰ Doğan Avcioğlu compares his two journals as follows: “We determined the direction of Turkey with *Yön* in 1960s, and we will make the revolution with *Devrim*.¹⁵¹ Avcioğlu had really caught the possibility to hold the power, and many people began

¹⁴⁵ Gökhan Atılgan, *Yön-Devrim Hareketi: Kemalizm ile Marksizm Arasında Geleneksel Aydinlar* (İstanbul: TÜSTAV, 2002): p. 35.

¹⁴⁶ Özdemir, op. cit.: pp. 48-49.

¹⁴⁷ Hikmet Özdemir, *Doğan Avcioğlu: Bir Jön Türk'ün Ardından* (İstanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2000): p. 19.

¹⁴⁸ Özdemir, op. cit. (1993): pp. 53-56.

¹⁴⁹ Atılgan, op. cit.: p. 279.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.: p. 309.

¹⁵¹ Hasan Cemal, *Kimse Kızmasın Kendimi Yazdım* (İstanbul: Doğan, 1999): p. 204.

to contact him with this belief, even the later Prime Minister of the 12 March Junta Nihat Erim had begun to come to his office.¹⁵² However, the revolution was dependent only on the consent of the Commander of the Land Forces, General Faruk Gürler, and when he did not intend to press the button for the revolution, the rival wing of the Turkish Armed Forces took the initial action.¹⁵³ The March 1971 junta closed *Devrim*, and the Yön-Devrim Movement was removed de facto from the Turkish political scene.

5.2.1. Yön-Devrim Movement's Understanding of Nationalism

During its emergence, the Yön-Devrim Movement in Turkey reconsidered the conceptual obstacles before its struggle, and one of the most influential weapons of the period was “nationalism”. According to Avcioğlu, nationalism was a tool in the hands of the allies of Uncle Sam.¹⁵⁴ The “nationalism” that is connected with capitalism and imperialism was a “masked nationalism”, whereas the real nationalism was socialism.¹⁵⁵ Avcioğlu says, “Socialism, shortly, is the method to develop rapidly in social justice. Rapid development in social justice is, on the other hand, the only way to save our country from current deadlock. Therefore, socialism

¹⁵² Atılgan, op. cit.: p. 323.

¹⁵³ Ibid.: p. 323.

¹⁵⁴ Doğan Avcioğlu, “Son Söz”, *Devrim* (Vol. 222, 1967): p. 3.

¹⁵⁵ Atılgan, op. cit.: p. 101.

is the greatest nationalism.”¹⁵⁶ However, the nationalism of the Yön-Devrim Movement was not only in rhetoric. Their purpose was to save the “Turkish country” and the “Turkish nation”, whose existence was under threat once again after the victory of the Independence War.¹⁵⁷ They considered themselves as the followers of Namık Kemal, and they claimed that they were the inheritors of the patriotisms of whom they called “nationalist revolutionaries” such as Young Turks, Ittihadists, Kemalists and the Kadro Movement.¹⁵⁸

Kurdish problem was a tension point for the Yön-Devrim movement, which was trying to give a new content to its nationalism with a socialist understanding in a time the social mobility was very much high in 1960s. Doğan Avcıoğlu chose to leave the official view on this issue. He became the first person in Turkey, who wrote down the problem as “Kurdish problem” in 1966 whereas all other groups referred to it as “the Eastern Problem”.¹⁵⁹ Doğan Avcıoğlu stated that the problem has an “ethnic dimension” and that it cannot be solved only by the economic or class measures”.¹⁶⁰ He writes that the issue became a taboo for many people, and that the official

¹⁵⁶ Doğan Avcıoğlu, “Yapıcı Milliyetçilik”, *Devrim* (Vol. 4, 1962): p. 3.

¹⁵⁷ Doğan Avcıoğlu, “Milliyetçilere Sesleniş”, *Devrim* (Vol. 78, 1964): p. 3.

¹⁵⁸ Atılgan, op. cit.: p. 105; Doğan Avcıoğlu, *Türkiye'nin Düzeni: Dün, Bugün, Yarın* (Ankara: Bilgi, 1968): pp. 524-6.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.: p. 112.

¹⁶⁰ Doğan Avcıoğlu, “Kürt Meselesi”, *Devrim* (Vol. 194, 1966): p. 3.

policies failed to solve the problem.¹⁶¹ However, he calls all socialists to think more on the issue by also adding that he is far from bringing suggestions for the solution of the problem.¹⁶² He also does not consider the Kurds as a “nation”, and he thinks that the imperialists have a plan to establish a Kurdish state in Iraq.¹⁶³ He even labels the official policy of the Turkish state toward Kurds as “one kind of colonialism”, and he restates that these policies failed to bring any solution to the matter.¹⁶⁴ He was also strictly against the idea of a Kurdish state either in Iraq or in Turkey.¹⁶⁵ Güvenç summarises Avcioğlu’s views on the Kurdish problem:

Although his suggestion ‘to restart from the point that Atatürk had left’ that he emphasised in the context of solution [of the Kurdish problem] is not much clear, especially in 1960s and ’70s Avcioğlu’s stance, which concedes the existence of the ethnic/cultural dimensions of the problem that must absolutely be resolved and the existence of the pressures over the Kurdish people, though made in an intense nationalist jargon, can be considered as much more progressive than the contemporary movements that pretend to be social democrat.¹⁶⁶

To sum up, the movement placed the concept of nationalism, which it had taken from the previous Ottoman-Turkish traditional intellectual movements, at the core of its

¹⁶¹ Ibid.: p. 3.

¹⁶² Ibid.: p. 3.

¹⁶³ Doğan Avcioğlu, “Kürt Devleti mi?”, *Devrim* (Vol. 27, 1970): p. 1.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.; Doğan Avcioğlu, “Aşırı Uçlar”, *Devrim* (Vol. 63, 29 December 1970).

¹⁶⁶ Serpil Güvenç, “1960-70’lı Yıllarda Türkiye’de Sosyalist Soldan Kürt (Doğu) Sorununa Bakışlar”, *Bilim ve Gelecek* (Vol. 76, June 2010): p. 79.

discourse after reformulating the concept according to the conditions of the period, in which the movement emerged. This had two basic fundamentals.¹⁶⁷ The first one was to demonstrate that capitalism and imperialism was the enemy of national sovereignty, national foreign policy and national culture. The second point was the emphasis that socialism was the unique way to the emancipation and the development of nations in economics, politics and culture. In other words, the movement's perception of nationalism was based on an instrumentalist reformulation of the Kemalist nationalism with a socialist perspective.¹⁶⁸ This kind of usage of nationalism as a tool for particular political goals or for seizing directly the political power, as elaborated above, is analysed quite well by such scholars of nationalism as John Breuilly and Paul R. Brass.

5.2.2. Yön-Devrim Movement's Problematic of Culture and Religion

As an interesting example of Third World nationalism, the movement had a different understanding of the West, the East and Islam. Its understanding of nationalism and its approach to the “national culture” or to Islam allow us to think of this movement’s nationalism within the framework of Norbu’s conceptualisation of Third World nationalism as “a fusion of tradition and ideology”¹⁶⁹ or Chatterjee’s elaborations on

¹⁶⁷ Atilgan, op. cit.: p. 122.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.: p. 122.

¹⁶⁹ For details, see: Norbu, op. cit.: p. 26.

what he calls “anticolonial nationalism” that makes a distinction between the “material” and “spiritual” domains.¹⁷⁰ The movement was equating nationalism with anti-imperialism, while also attributing a negative content to Westernisation, whereas it sought to defend that Islam and its cultural heritage did not contradict with socialism and that, in contrast, a positive relation between Islam and socialism might be constructed.¹⁷¹ The “real” nationalism, which was identified with the aspirations for the national development, would only be possible with a “revolutinarism” both against Westernisation and against the West.¹⁷² This understanding against Westernisation and the West in general was rooted in the views of Niyazi Berkes, one of the writers of *Yön*, and especially those of Roger Garaudy, a French Marxist.¹⁷³ Garaudy argued that it is not correct to identify the concepts such as progress, rationalism and modernity with the West, and that socialism can get a “universal” character only by claiming to be the owner of the positive cultural heritage of both the West and the East.¹⁷⁴ The Yön-Devrim Movement inspired from Garaudy’s arguments, and considered his theses as a possibility towards defining Turkey as an Eastern country and claiming that it was possible and necessary to

¹⁷⁰ For details, see: Chatterjee, op. cit: p. 6.

¹⁷¹ Atılgan, op. cit.: p. 141.

¹⁷² Ibid.: p. 143.

¹⁷³ Ibid.: p. 147. For Berkes’ views on Westernisation, see the book, which is comprised of his articles that were first published in *Yön*: Niyazi Berkes, *Batıcılık, Ulusçuluk ve Toplumsal Devrimler* (İstanbul: Yön, 1965). For Garaudy’s views, see: Roger Garaudy, Doğan Avcıoğlu and E. Tüfekçi [Mihri Belli] (trans.), *İslâmiyet ve Sosyalizm* (İstanbul: Yön, 1965).

¹⁷⁴ Atılgan, op. cit.: p. 148.

analyse the “national culture” of the Turkish nation, as an Eastern nation, as one of the sources of socialism.¹⁷⁵ This was also because the movement was in search of demonstrating that the universal character of socialism was not in conflict with national cultures since the movement sought to minimise the distance that would be put by the various segments of the supposed “national front” with the pretend that socialism was developed by foreigners.¹⁷⁶ The movement, which defended that a cultural colonisation was accompanying the economic and political colonisation of Turkey, argued that “socialism is going to provide the necessary environment for the Turkish nation to raise its national culture in every field and with its all depth to the highest peaks”.¹⁷⁷ The movement was depicting Turkey as a country, which had the same fate not with the Western but with the Eastern nations, which was in the same stage of national liberation war, and which needed to follow not the capitalist path but the “non-capitalist path” of development.¹⁷⁸

The movement’s perspective on the potential relationship between Islam and socialism is an interesting one. The question they faced was: “How would they establish an integration relationship between Marxist socialism and Islam, which was a strong phenomenon in Turkey that they defined as an Eastern country?”¹⁷⁹ They

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.: p. 148.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.: p. 149.

¹⁷⁷ Doğan Avcıoğlu, “Türk Milliyetçiliğine Sesleniş”, *Yön* (Vol. 110, 1965): pp. 8-9.

¹⁷⁸ Atilgan, op. cit.: pp. 151-2.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.: p. 152.

chose to follow Garaudy and Arab socialists in this issue too. However, they did not offer an “Islamic socialism” like the Arab socialists had done; they rather tried to develop a definition of socialism, which would integrate Islam by also taking into account the directory social roles of the religious state officers (such as “imam” or “müftü”), of leaders of religious communities (such as a “tarikat” chief or a sheikh) and of intellectuals, who believe in Islam.¹⁸⁰

The efforts to reconcile Islam and socialism derived from a very burning fact: When socialism made its first strong and legal rise, which was represented by the Workers’ Party of Turkey (TİP) and *Yön*, in 1960s’ Turkey, one of the greatest obstacles before socialism was the anti-communist propaganda, which presented socialism as an enemy of religion and honour.¹⁸¹ Thus, some *Yön* writers tried to prove that Islam and socialism did not contradict each other, showing examples from verses of Qur'an and from the sayings of the Prophet Mohammad.¹⁸² The second efforts in this issue were to dissolve the identification made by the nonreligious intellectuals between Islam and reactionism: the Yön-Devrim Movement followed a line that a religious person, who defends that the right of property is social rather than individual, and a socialist, might and must be side by side in the struggle against capitalists and

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.: p. 153.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.: p. 153.

¹⁸² For instance, see: Cahit Tanyol, “İslamın Cenneti Sosyalizmdir”, *Yön* (Vol. 130, 1965): p. 7.

imperialists.¹⁸³ There are similarities between the Yön-Devrim Movement and its predecessors in the sense that they all tried to present their ideas acceptable for Islam. Nevertheless, the Yön-Devrim Movement is different from its predecessors in the sense that it did not tend toward despising the cultural heritage of the East, since it did not form itself with a Westernist kind of discourse.¹⁸⁴ The factor that made them form an integration relationship between Islam and socialism was not their belief in Islam, rather they tried to utilise the activity of religious groups and Islam in general like Mustafa Kemal Pasha had done during the National Liberation War of Turkey, just because they had already understood that the Kemalist attitude toward religion had backfired.¹⁸⁵

5.2.3. Yön-Devrim Movement’s Model for Rapid Development: “Revolution from Above”

When the Yön-Devrim Movement emerged, the main agenda around the world was development. The movement defined socialism mainly as a method of rapid development.¹⁸⁶ It was offering a “non-capitalist path of development” in a world

¹⁸³ Ibid.: p. 155.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.: p. 157.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.: p. 157.

¹⁸⁶ Aytemur, op. cit. (2000): p. 4; Nuran Aytemur, “Yön Hareketi Örneğinde Türk Solu ve Milliyetçilik”, *Bilim ve Eleştiri* (Vol. 5: No. 7, 2008): p. 45; Mümtaz Soysal, “Tez Danışmanı Prof. Dr. Mümtaz Soysal’ın Tez Hakkında BİRKAÇ SÖZÜ” in Özdemir, op. cit. (1993): p. 12; Atılgan, op. cit. (2002): especially pp. 48-59; Gökhan Atılgan, “Türk Siyasal Hayatında ve Emek Tarihinde Kritik Bir Uğrak: Türkiye Çalışanlar Partisi Girişimi”, *Toplum ve Bilim* (Vol. 116, 2009): p. 169.

where the USSR and the underdeveloped Third World countries have already demonstrated rapid success in development. The Yön-Devrim Movement, in Yalçın Küçük's words, was shining "in a world where Nasser was a star".¹⁸⁷ The movement can not be considered Marxist at all, although the prominent figures of the movement, especially Doğan Avcıoğlu, utilised Marxism very well.¹⁸⁸ The movement rejected the main Marxist thesis that the historical development is mainly dependent on the class struggles. As it is fixed on the idea that the working class is not able to get rid of the influences of the "conservative forces" in Turkey, the movement sought another primary social stratum which was going to lead the foreseen change of political regime: "the military-civil intellectuals".¹⁸⁹ Therefore, the movement tended toward a programme like the one Nasser was implementing in Egypt.¹⁹⁰

Yön-Devrim Movement perceived a close relation between the backwardness and the low level of production, and offers to change the backward economic structure.¹⁹¹ The first manifesto of the movement was highlighting the "tragic situation" of the

¹⁸⁷ Yalçın Küçük, "Cumhuriyet Dönemi Aydınlar ve Dergileri" in *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, Vol. 1 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık, 1983): p. 143.

¹⁸⁸ Atılgan, op. cit. (2002): p. 78.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.: p. 85.

¹⁹⁰ Yön published the programme that Nasser implemented in Egypt with an intention to discuss it as a model also for Turkey. "Azgelişmiş Ülkeler İçin Tek Çıkar Yol Sosyalizmdir", *Yön* (Vol. 45, 1962): pp. 10-11.

¹⁹¹ "Yön Bildirisi", *Yön* (Vol. 1, 1961): pp. 12-13.

“dynamic powers” (*zinde kuvvetler*) that was thought to be composed of military and civil intellectuals, because what was thought to be very crucial was not yet understood sufficiently by these “dynamic powers”: this was development.¹⁹² There was no philosophy of development adopted by these circles, according to the manifesto.

According to Doğan Avcıoğlu, the history of the struggle to reach the modern civilisation had been the history of a wrong modernisation policy in Turkey for a century.¹⁹³ In a society with a backward social structure, classical parliamentary system would provide nothing else but the dominance of the conservative forces of the system.¹⁹⁴ The future of the country was dependent on the awakening of the dynamic powers from their “hundred-year intellectual sleep”.¹⁹⁵ According to the movement, the main solution was a “fundamental change in the regime”, and this was going to be possible by a radical change in the military and civil intellectuals in their approaches to the concept “social development”.¹⁹⁶ This difficult task was to be accomplished by the “revolutionaries, who have already integrated the revolutionary ideas”.¹⁹⁷ This is the line that the Yön-Devrim Movement is a part of the traditional

¹⁹² Ibid.

¹⁹³ Doğan Avcıoğlu, “27 Mayıs”, *Yön* (Vol. 165, 1966): p. 3.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁹⁵ Doğan Avcıoğlu, “Soyuttan Somuta”, *Devrim* (Vol. 66, 1971): p. 1.

¹⁹⁶ “SKD’nin İstanbul ve Diyarbakır Şubesi Açıldı”, *Yön* (Vol. 69, 1963): p. 5.

¹⁹⁷ Doğan Avcıoğlu, “27 Mayıs Üzerine Düşünceler”, *Devrim* (Vol. 32, 1970): p. 1.

intellectual¹⁹⁸ movements of the Ottoman-Turkish intellectual history: the movement, as well as its predecessors, New Ottomans, İttihat ve Terakki (Party of Union and Progress), Kemalism and the Kadro Movement, explained the process of modernisation in Turkey as the struggle between the progressive-revolutionary intellectuals and the “conservative forces”.¹⁹⁹ Nevertheless, the movement is different from the other intellectual movements that it followed in the sense that it suggested a different way to achieve the goals that have been put forth by these intellectuals.

The Yön-Devrim Movement was attributing the main role in achieving the goals of development and modernisation directly to the “harsh leadership” of the supposed dynamic powers.²⁰⁰ It is sure that one of the main components of these “dynamic powers” was the military bureaucrats, whom were thought to be relatively autonomous from class ties, and that what was desired by that “harsh leadership” was

¹⁹⁸ This term, “traditional intellectuals”, is used in Atilgan’s book and derives from Marxist theoretician Antonio Gramsci’s analyses on intellectuals. Gramsci classifies intellectuals as “organic” and “traditional” according to their relations with and dependence to the social classes in a particular society. Each class tends to create their own organic intellectuals, whereas after a change in the social order the organic intellectuals of the previous dominant social classes become “traditional intellectuals”. The members of the Yön-Devrim Movement are “traditional intellectuals” in the sense that they chose to stand outside any particular class, including the working class, and that they were the successors of the traditional Ottoman-Turkish intellectual line, which has always been in search for a rapid development for the country. For detailed elaborations of Gramsci on intellectuals, see: Antonio Gramsci, Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (eds. and trans.), *Selections from the Prison Notebooks* (New York: International Publishers, 1992): pp. 5-23. Atilgan explains his identification of the movement by utilising from Gramscian intellectual conceptualisation in Atilgan, op. cit. (2002): pp. 18-21.

¹⁹⁹ Atilgan, op. cit.: p. 83.

²⁰⁰ Doğan Avcıoğlu, “Yeni Türkiye”, *Yön* (Vol. 5, 1962): p. 3.

a revolution that was going to be implemented from above in a Trimbergerian sense.

As noted above, the Yön-Devrim Movement utilised Marxism in forming its programme for Turkey to achieve the level of modern civilisation and in criticising the intellectual movements, of which it was a follower, and it had a materialist conception of history.²⁰¹ However, this was not a materialist conception that conceptualised history as the history of the class wars; it was rather an “economist” self-criticism of the traditional intellectual movements.²⁰²

The movement deliberated the development experiences of the various countries, especially of the ones that had national liberation wars in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The key term to reach the goals that were declared in the manifesto of *Yön* was “Etatism”. The manifesto was declaring the movement’s belief that the desired goals were only to be achieved by a new understanding of Etatism.²⁰³ The hitherto understanding and practices of Etatism, according to the movement, had been in favour of the capital. The movement was formulating this “new Etatism” as a policy in favour of the labour and not a kind of “state capitalism”.²⁰⁴

²⁰¹ Atilgan, op. cit.: p. 84.

²⁰² Ibid.: p. 84.

²⁰³ “*Yön Bildirisi*”, *Yön* (Vol. 1, 1961): pp. 12-13.

²⁰⁴ Atilgan, op. cit.: p. 88.

The movement imagined itself and other groups, which were supposed to implement the new sort of Etatism, as independent from both the capitalist and the working classes. These were the “circles, which were going to give a direction to the Turkish society”.²⁰⁵ This “military-civil intellectual group” was being defined as “a decisive, intelligent and energetic political cadre”.²⁰⁶ According to the discourse of the movement, this group is in a different position in the underdeveloped countries like Turkey unlike the developed capitalist countries.²⁰⁷ The Etatism that was to be implemented by the supposed dynamic forces of Turkey was also a policy that would form and develop the working class and a system that would eliminate capitalism and its class relations that were in favour of the capital in Turkey.²⁰⁸

Development was to be achieved only with a heavy industrialisation and the elimination of the classes that are peculiar to the Middle Age.²⁰⁹ Therefore, “the capitalist path [of development] was clogged for the underdeveloped countries in the 20th century”.²¹⁰ However, according to Doğan Avcıoğlu, there was a need for some

²⁰⁵ “*Yön Bildirisi*”, *Yön* (Vol. 1, 1961): pp. 12-13.

²⁰⁶ “Sosyalist Kültür Derneği: Bildiri”, *Yön* (Vol. 53, 1963): p. 16.

²⁰⁷ Atılgan, op. cit.: p. 88.

²⁰⁸ Ibid.: pp. 88-9.

²⁰⁹ Doğan Avcıoğlu, “Sosyalizme Giden Yollar: Sosyalizmden Önce Atatürkçülük”, *Yön* (Vol. 69, 1963): pp. 8-9.

²¹⁰ Doğan Avcıoğlu, “SKD İstanbul Şubesi’nin Açılışında Konuşma”, *Yön* (Vol. 75, 1963): pp. 9-10.

sort of “transition period” (*intikal devresi*)²¹¹ in the underdeveloped countries before socialism, since socialism would only be possible with the existence of “great industry and powerful working class”.²¹²

The “new Etatism” as a transition period policy would emancipate the peasants with a radical land reform, enhance organisation among the peasants and workers, and improve the indoctrinisation of the working class by a great advance in education with institutions such as the Village Institutes (Köy Enstitüleri) experience of the young Republic of Turkey.²¹³ According to Avcioğlu, “thus the necessary conditions to construct socialism were going to be prepared”.²¹⁴ This was of course not an understanding peculiar to the Yön-Devrim Movement, but was rather a variant of the “dependency theory”, which was developed during the search for effective policies for development in the Asian, African and Latin American countries, which had turned towards national liberation wars against imperialism in the aftermath of the Second World War.²¹⁵ Avcioğlu was using the arguments of classical Marxist thinkers such as Marx, Engels, Lenin and Trotsky while defining socialism and its

²¹¹ Doğan Avcioğlu, “Sosyalizm Anlayışımız”, *Yön* (Vol. 36, 1962): p. 3.

²¹² Doğan Avcioğlu, “Sosyalizme Giden Yollar: Sosyalizmden Önce Atatürkçülük”, *Yön* (Vol. 69, 1963): pp. 8-9.

²¹³ Doğan Avcioğlu, “SKD İstanbul Şubesi’nin Açılışında Konuşma”, *Yön* (Vol. 75, 1963): pp. 9-10.

²¹⁴ Doğan Avcioğlu, “Azgelişmiş Ülkelerde Antiemperialist Mücadele... Halkçı, Devletçi, Devrimci ve Milliyetçi Kalkınma Yolu”, *Yön* (Vol. 111, 1965): pp. 7-8.

²¹⁵ Atılgan, op. cit.: pp. 93-4.

possibility conditions, whereas he utilised the theories of underdevelopment while he was considering the path for socialism for the underdeveloped countries.²¹⁶

In sum, the programme that the Yön-Devrim Movement suggested was an “anti-imperialist” or, in its own expressions, a “national revolutionary”, “national democratic” programme.²¹⁷ The movement was defining the century that they lived as the century of “social and national revolutions”.²¹⁸ Another feature of the century, according to them, was the division of the world into two camps as the capitalist-imperialist camp and the socialist one, and the events were developing obviously in favour of the second.²¹⁹ The paths for reaching socialism had varied in this rising era.²²⁰ The main problem in the underdeveloped countries and Turkey was between imperialism, as well as its collaborators, and the nation²²¹ unlike the developed countries where the main problem was between labour and capital or between the working class and the bourgeoisie. The movement’s call to the “national front” was the following: “independentists, nationalists, unite”.²²² This call was for everyone,

²¹⁶ Ibid.: p. 94, 17th footnote.

²¹⁷ Ibid.: p. 113.

²¹⁸ Doğan Avcıoğlu, “Millet Gerçeği ve Milliyetçilik”, *Yön* (Vol. 216, 1967): pp. 8-9.

²¹⁹ Atılgan, op. cit.: p. 114.

²²⁰ Doğan Avcıoğlu, “Sosyalizme Giden Yollar: Sosyalizmden Önce Atatürkçülük”, *Yön* (Vol. 69, 1963): pp. 8-9.

²²¹ Doğan Avcıoğlu, “27 Mayıs”, *Yön* (Vol. 165, 1966): p. 3.

²²² Quoted from Doğan Avcıoğlu, “Biz Ne İstiyoruz?”, *Yön* (Vol. 198, 1967): p. 3 in Atılgan, op. cit.: p. 115.

who was against imperialism, whatever their political views, religious beliefs and their political parties were.²²³ The movement thought that being socialist was not a precondition for the “national struggle”, but the rational result of such a struggle.²²⁴

The movement defined the national liberation struggle that it suggested for Turkey as “realising the national liberation revolution that was started with Atatürk with all of its results within contemporary conditions”.²²⁵ What the movement called “Second Liberation War” had the same goals with the previous one, but in order to get result, the second was going to complement the first one’s principles with a socialist approach, which did not exist in the first one.²²⁶

Since national liberation movement would be developed against imperialism and capitalism, it must also, according to the Yön-Devrim Movement, not adopt the “bourgeois democracy” just because this was the regime type of capitalism and imperialism.²²⁷ The government was to be shared by workers and national bourgeoisie. In such a new kind of democracy, the power relations would be changed in favour of the working class via the education of the workers, organisation and

²²³ Ibid.: p. 115.

²²⁴ Doğan Avcıoğlu, “Azgelişmiş Ülkelerde Antiemperyalist Mücadele... Halkçı, Devletçi, Devrimci ve Milliyetçi Kalkınma Yolu”, *Yön* (Vol. 111, 1965): pp. 7-8.

²²⁵ Doğan Avcıoğlu, “Devrimi Bekleyen Sorunlar”, *Devrim* (Vol. 57, 1970): p. 1.

²²⁶ Atilgan, op. cit.: p. 116.

²²⁷ Ibid.: p. 117.

active participation to the determination process of the government policies.²²⁸ The First Liberation War deviated from its way by not integrating with the working class and by changing the power balance in favour of the bourgeoisie, so the second one must choose the guiding ideology and the powers to rely on in a correct way: these were nothing else than socialism and working class.²²⁹

The Yön-Devrim Movement was trying to reformulate the “national economy” perspective and the anti-imperialist content of the previous traditional intellectual movements by uniting them with the “national economy that provides possibility for transition to socialism” approach of the Dependency School, which can be summarised as “against capitalism toward socialism”.²³⁰ The movement adopted the idea of “national economy”, which can be traced back to Namık Kemal in the traditional Ottoman-Turkish intellectual line, by transforming the idea: “national economy”, which had previously shaped with a perspective of building a “national” capitalism by creating a national bourgeoisie both in Ittihadism and Kemalism, this time would eliminate capitalism and create the conditions for the transition to socialism.

²²⁸ Doğan Avcıoğlu, “Azgelişmiş Ülkelerde Antiemperyalist Mücadele... Halkçı, Devletçi, Devrimci ve Milliyetçi Kalkınma Yolu”, *Yön* (Vol. 111, 1965): pp. 7-8.

²²⁹ Atılgan, op. cit.: p. 117.

²³⁰ Ibid.: p. 118.

The main task of Turkey was to get rid of the colonial relation with an anti-imperialist struggle. According to the movement, the national independence was drawn mainly by the “national interests”, and the place of Turkey would be beside the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, which supported the movements of national struggle and national development.²³¹ Avcıoğlu writes on this: “If the Soviet Union had not existed, the Nasser regime, which nationalised the Suez Channel, would have already collapsed, and Egypt would have declined to a semi-colony position.”²³² The movement took the opinions of the famous former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the governments led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Tevfik Rüştü Aras, in order to prove that pro-Soviet foreign policies were also compatible with the Kemalist foreign policy understanding. Aras told how they had always been careful to establish close relations with the Soviet Union.²³³

5.2.4. The Model Presented by the Yön-Devrim Movement: Nasser’s Revolution from Above

It has already been noted above that the Yön-Devrim Movement, in Yalçın Küçük’s words, “was shining in a world, where Nasser was a star”²³⁴ and that the movement

²³¹ Ibid.: p. 121.

²³² Doğan Avcıoğlu, “Azgelişmiş Ülkelerde Antiemperyalist Mücadele... Halkçı, Devletçi, Devrimci ve Milliyetçi Kalkınma Yolu”, *Yön* (Vol. 111, 1965): pp. 7-8.

²³³ Doğan Avcıoğlu, “Atatürk’ün Dışişleri Bakanı Anlatıyor”, *Yön* (Vol. 83, 1964): p. 5.

²³⁴ Küçük, op. cit. (1983): p. 143.

had published the programme of the Nasserist regime in Egypt as a model for rapid development for underdeveloped countries such as Turkey.²³⁵ Studies on how the Nasserist movement had emerged and transformed took place in the pages of the journal *Yön*.²³⁶ Doğan Avcıoğlu, the leader of the movement, was not in an expectation that socialism would directly be established by a military intervention. However, he was expecting that such an intervention of the military officers, who were “historically progressive” according to him, would eventually create the conditions of socialism. The Nasserist experience seemed to be a great example for the movement in this sense. Avcıoğlu, in his article on the Free Officers Movement in Egypt, was stating that Nasser’s experience could be considered as “an important example” for Turkey.²³⁷ Avcıoğlu was very much influenced from the development of the 7 Egyptian military officers from an anti-socialist point of view toward a socialist policy-making mainly because of their anti-imperialist understanding. The fact that Nasser had begun to be interested in politics first by reading the life of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was also striking for him: This was, according to Avcıoğlu, just another proof of his argument that one would easily reach socialism by moving apart from Kemalism, because he was also formulating Kemalism as an anti-imperialist understanding. Although Avcıoğlu was acknowledging that struggle against imperialism is not the same thing with socialist struggle, he was also

²³⁵ See: “Azgelişmiş Ülkeler İçin Tek Çıkar Yol Sosyalizmdir”, *Yön* (Vol. 45, 1962): pp. 10-11.

²³⁶ Atılgan, op. cit.: p. 185.

²³⁷ See: Doğan Avcıoğlu, “Çağımızda Ekonomik Bağımsızlık Mücadelesi: Mısır Örneği”, *Yön* (Vol. 189, 1966): pp. 8-10.

claiming that “an anti-imperialist struggle would, though with some zigzags, eventually reach socialism”.²³⁸ It must not be surprising that he was also praising the policies of the Nasserist regime of Egypt such as the nationalisation of the Suez Channel.²³⁹ It is, finally, worth noting that there are also some speculations that the Soviet Union was in direct contact with the Yön-Devrim Movement and that it had an expectation of “Nasserist Socialism” from this movement.²⁴⁰

It is, therefore, important to analyse the Nasserist experience in detail in order to get the clues of what sort of transformation was desired by the Yön-Devrim Movement, and to understand whether this supposed transformation would or would not be successful in achieving a rapid development of a kind that would make the peasants and the working class happier just like the movement desired. It is also important for an effort to explore the possible reasons of the failure of the movement in realising a revolution from above. While analysing the Nasserist experience, I will use and remain in large part loyal to the framework that is drawn by Trimberger. Nevertheless, I must first make an explanation on why I ignore Trimberger’s elaborations on a more familiar case: the Turkish case in 1920s.

²³⁸ Ibid.: pp. 8-10.

²³⁹ Doğan Avcıoğlu, “Azgelişmiş Ülkelerde Antiemperyalist Mücadele... Halkçı, Devletçi, Devrimci ve Milliyetçi Kalkınma Yolu”, *Yön* (Vol. 111, 1965): pp. 7-8.

²⁴⁰ For instance, see: Yalçın Küçük, *Aydınlık Zindan* (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayıncılık, 2000): pp. 208-209.

Trimberger analyses the Kemalist experience of nation-state building as a case of “revolution from above” along with the Japanese Meiji Restoration case of the late 19th century.²⁴¹ She utilises these two cases while explaining the characteristics that define a revolution from above. The Kemalist experience is pretty much fitting these characteristics.²⁴² There was an extralegal takeover of the political power, and this was organised and led by some of the highest military and civil bureaucrats of the old regime.²⁴³ There was little mass participation in this revolutionary takeover.²⁴⁴ Relatively little violence, execution, emigration, or counter-revolution attempts appeared during this revolutionary change in Turkey.²⁴⁵ The initiation of change was step-by-step and often pragmatic instead of a radical step forward.²⁴⁶ Contrary to a simple coup d'état, bureaucrats that led the revolution destroyed the political, and only part of the economic, base of the aristocracy or upper class.²⁴⁷ Trimberger claims that the Kemalist regime was only marginally revolutionary because of this last characteristic.²⁴⁸ As class destruction is an important defining element of revolutionary change, the Kemalist revolution remained marginally revolutionary,

²⁴¹ Trimberger, op. cit.: pp. 1-146.

²⁴² Ibid.: p. 3.

²⁴³ Ibid.: pp. 14-24.

²⁴⁴ Ibid.: pp. 17-24.

²⁴⁵ Ibid.: pp. 30-6.

²⁴⁶ Ibid.: pp. 26-9.

²⁴⁷ Ibid.: pp. 24-9.

²⁴⁸ Ibid.: p. 3, 29.

since it destroyed the economic base of the aristocracy or upper class of the old regime in limited terms. According to Trimberger, this is the main factor that later made the Kemalist revolution thwarted.²⁴⁹

What the Yön-Devrim Movement, on the other hand, sought was not to repeat this Kemalist experience in the same way. The movement was, as noted sufficiently, in search of a new revolution that would be guided by the reformulated and updated principles of Kemalism, that is to say, a reformulation of the Kemalist principles by also utilising a Marxian approach and some Marxist concepts. They were revising and discussing the Kemalist experience in order not to fall into the same traps. The movement sought a revolution that would create the appropriate conditions to establish a socialist order. The Nasserist revolution was, in this sense, was much more attractive than the past failed Kemalist experience as a model for the movement. The Nasserist movement and the Yön-Devrim Movement were also contemporaneous movements. It was possible for the Yön-Devrim Movement to observe the Nasserist government and its policies directly at its time. Nevertheless, it is also more relevant for a researcher to draw comparisons between the Yön-Devrim Movement and its contemporaneous one instead of making comparisons between the movement and a different experience, which had occurred in totally different social and international conditions. Thus, for the Yön-Devrim Movement considered the Nasserist revolution as a model and for it is more relevant for analytic purposes, I

²⁴⁹ Ibid.: p. 29.

will analyse the Nasserist experience in order to deduce some conclusions on the Yön-Devrim Movement, what it sought to do and why it failed.

Before the coup d'état of the Free Officers, the greatest capitalist class in Egypt was the “Egyptianised foreigners”, which was called “mutamassirun”.²⁵⁰ The second important group was the bureaucrats that were in the high positions within the state. These bureaucrats gained wealth through utilising their state positions by owning land and property and by investing in industry with the subsidies they got from the state.²⁵¹ The third important group was the Egyptian aristocracy, which had large amounts of land. Tür explains that these groups indeed had activities both in agriculture and in industry, and their “indigenousness” and to what extent they were serving to the interests of Egypt were already being questioned before the Nasserist regime.²⁵² The Free Officers took the power in such a social structure in 1952.

Analysts of this military takeover recognise that this was not an ordinary coup. The coup that led by Muhammad Naguib and later Gamal Abdel Nasser, in Trimberger's words, “established a stable authoritarian regime, sought national economic autonomy, and initiated basic social and economic change.”²⁵³ Nasserist regime won

²⁵⁰ Özlem Tür, “Mısır’da Ekonomik Kalkınma Çabaları”, *İstanbul Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi* (No. 41, October 2009): p. 185.

²⁵¹ Ibid.: p. 185.

²⁵² Ibid.: p. 185.

²⁵³ Trimberger, op. cit.: p. 147.

popular approval through expropriation of a great foreign enterprise such as the Suez Channel. This new regime also destroyed the economic and political power of the landed upper class with a significant land reform. Trimberger argues that the Nasserist regime, in so doing, “turned a political and nationalist coup into a social and economic revolution.”²⁵⁴ A revolution that was directed from top to bottom, that is to say, a “revolution from above”. It might be useful to move further how Trimberger details this revolution from above according to the characteristics and structural features that she puts forth as the preconditions for a revolution from above to occur.

Nasser, who had a charismatic personality, was ultimately a bureaucrat. He did not build a rebellious force to seize power, but rather seized the power by issuing orders through ordinary administrative channels via the officers, whom he had previously eased into key positions.²⁵⁵ So this revolution was without a mass involvement due to its realisation by bureaucratic means. Therefore, the Free Officers, at the beginning, sought to gain mass legitimacy through nationalism, they presented themselves, for example, as the first Egyptians in nearly twenty-five hundred years to rule Egypt.²⁵⁶ Once they consolidated their power in the state bureaucracy, they banned the former

²⁵⁴ Ibid.: p. 147.

²⁵⁵ Miles Copeland, *The Game of Nations* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1969): pp. 68-66.

²⁵⁶ Eliezer Beeri, *Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society* (New York: Praeger, 1970): p. 423.

mass parties and movements.²⁵⁷ The Nasserist regime sought to organise their own mass organisations such as the Liberation Rally, the National Union and the Arab Socialist Union.²⁵⁸

The Nasserist regime, as in all revolutions from above, consolidated its political power before initiating social and economic change and before developing an ideology. Nasser destroyed the monarchy, strengthened its political rule step-by-step, and only after these he moved against the economic interests of the landed upper class; this destruction of the economic and political power of the traditional classes made the Nasserist regime revolutionary.²⁵⁹ However, this movement against the traditional classes was not the result of a prior ideological commitment, nor of an aim to redistribute resources to the peasants and working class; this was rather because the military leaders became convinced that these traditional classes were an irreconcilable obstacle to industrialisation, and thus to development.²⁶⁰ The destracted landlords were paid for compensations for their nationalised properties.²⁶¹ However, they were also not dangerous enough to cause a mass uprising since they had no legitimacy at all among the masses as noted above. The Nasserist revolution

²⁵⁷ Trimberger, op. cit.: p. 149.

²⁵⁸ Zeynep Güler, *Süveyş'in Batisında Arap Milliyetçiliği: Mısır ve Nasırcılık* (İstanbul: Yenihayat, 2004): p. 125.

²⁵⁹ Trimberger, op. cit.: p. 149.

²⁶⁰ Ibid.: p. 150.

²⁶¹ Ibid.: p. 150.

was relatively a non-violent process if to consider its approach to civil liberties, it revoked the civil liberties for some time, but always reinstated soon.²⁶²

Military officers, who led the revolution from above in Egypt, as the only ones that have the potential for breaking the institutional subordination mechanisms of the dominant classes, were highly bureaucratised and autonomous from the class ties.²⁶³ Nasser and many of the Free Officers were officers, who were recruited from a wider social base. By the late 1940s, most of the lower-rank officers were without traditional links to the dominant class.²⁶⁴ Trimberger adds that “[t]hey were drawn from the same sociological background as Egypt’s intellectuals” and that “they thought of themselves as ‘intellectuals in uniform’”.²⁶⁵ That class autonomy provided the potential for their radicalisation. Their status and fortune was depending on a strong state, which needed industrialisation, and also they would not personally suffer from the abolition of the existing economic structure.²⁶⁶

As for the second precondition of Trimberger’s model of revolution from above, the Egyptian military bureaucrats were already politicised and they had begun to develop

²⁶² Güler, op. cit.: pp. 120-7, 251-69.

²⁶³ Trimberger, op. cit.: p. 152.

²⁶⁴ Mahmoud Hussein, *Class Conflict in Egypt: 1945-1970* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973): p. 77.

²⁶⁵ Trimberger, op. cit.: p. 152.

²⁶⁶ Ibid.: p. 153.

specific ideas on how to deal with the crisis in Egypt. The Free Officers emerged as a political group planning the future Egyptian state, and many of them individually had become politicised much earlier.²⁶⁷ As the third precondition, Trimberger argues that it is unlikely that autonomous military bureaucrats would become ready to take revolutionary action without the push of disruption from below.²⁶⁸ The international threats to the Egyptian national autonomy was causing a dissent in the society, which had started to be mobilised by the Muslim Brotherhood –a group led by discontented elements of the middle class.²⁶⁹ Trimberger claims that there is a direct connection between these dissents and the subsequent revolution from above.²⁷⁰

The Nasserist regime also found a room for manoeuvre in the international arena. Trimberger states that “[t]he decline of British imperial power and the cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union permitted Nasser to nationalize the Suez Channel, expropriate all large foreign business, and take a leading role in forming a third block of nonaligned nations.”²⁷¹ So that the fourth precondition for a revolution from above to occur in Trimberger’s model was there existing in the Egyptian experience. The fifth precondition, the need for a provincial power base,

²⁶⁷ Güler, op. cit.: pp. 102-8.

²⁶⁸ Trimberger, op. cit.: p. 155.

²⁶⁹ Richard Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brother* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969): p. 331.

²⁷⁰ Trimberger, op. cit.: p. 154.

²⁷¹ Ibid.: p. 155.

was no more important, because the prior consolidation of a centralised and relatively homogenous nation-state in Egypt made the Free Officers stage a coup at the centre of the country.²⁷²

Trimberger, in the section where she evaluates the revolution from above experiences of Egypt and Peru, states that Nasser “sought to use state apparatus to foster a capitalist bourgeoisie without mobilizing the mass of the population.” Trimberger claims that this commitment to capitalism undermined the Nasserist regime’s attempts at autonomous development, and adds: “The policy of capitalist industrialization also undermined the autonomy of the state bureaucracy and created a more conservative political coalition of bureaucrats with an urban and rural capitalist bourgeoisie.”²⁷³ As a result of this, the Nasserist regime completely excluded the poorest and most backward sectors of the population from the revolution, and reinforced traditional agrarian ideological and social structures.²⁷⁴ Though three political parties that were founded by the Nasserists had mobilisation ideologies, they only served “to eliminate opposition, to prevent prior political groups from regaining strength, and to depoliticize masses”.²⁷⁵ Therefore, the

²⁷² Ibid.: pp. 155-6.

²⁷³ Ibid.: p. 159.

²⁷⁴ Ibid.: p. 160.

²⁷⁵ Ibid.: p. 162.

Nasserist experience could only succeed “in renegotiating the terms of their dependence on the advanced capitalist countries.”²⁷⁶

The state played an important role in Egypt’s attempts at industrialisation, but the state capitalism that was established gradually did not eliminate private profit, the market, or conditions of wage labour, and Egypt could never break its dependence on foreign capital.²⁷⁷ This was only to be prevented by mobilising “mass support for a vast productive effort combined with the sacrifice of immediate consumer fulfillment”.²⁷⁸ However, the Nasserist regime did not choose to implement such mass mobilisation, and thus had to rely on continuing foreign investment. The country remained a dependent supplier of raw materials to the international market. The industrialisation was confined to light consumer industries. The agriculture sector remained not modernised, and the regime did not pay much attention to transforming the position of small farmers and peasants. Ultimately, this dependent industrialisation did not improve the living standard of the mass of the population.²⁷⁹ Therefore, problems began to increase beginning from early 1960s, and they were soon deepened by the defeats in the wars against Israel.²⁸⁰ After Nasser, Egypt has

²⁷⁶ Ibid.: p. 163.

²⁷⁷ Ibid.: p. 165.

²⁷⁸ Ibid.: p. 165.

²⁷⁹ Ibid.: pp. 165-6.

²⁸⁰ Tür, op. cit.: pp. 188-93.

moved day by day toward an absolute dependency, in which the peasants and the working class suffered more and more everyday.

This failure of the Nasserist experience does not mean that a revolution that was to be done by the Yön-Devrim Movement would fail too. Asking, “Is there any possibility that future revolutions from above in the Third World will be more successful?”²⁸¹ after concluding that all four revolutions from above that she analysed in her book did fail, Trimberger answers her own question as follows:

The only way any country today can hope to industrialize autonomously without foreign domination of its economy is through a wide mass mobilization for a vast productive effort. ... Such mass mobilization in a relatively populous country would have at least some possibility of activating the accumulation of capital and prodigious human effort necessary to achieve autonomous industrialization. ... The only possibility that a revolution from above could move in a more progressive direction depends on the existence of a strong and independent mass socialist or communist movement. Such a movement might have the power to force political measures on the military. Cooperation –even antagonistic cooperation- between radical military bureaucrats and a strong left-wing movement might create a new pattern of development in the Third World.²⁸²

The Yön-Devrim Movement, unlike the Nasserist regime, as noted previously, had already foreseen the strengthening of the peasants by a great land reform and of the working class by taking steps towards the indoctrinisation and the underpinning of the working class with effective education and organisation policies. Also Avcıoğlu

²⁸¹ Trimberger, op. cit.: p. 167.

²⁸² Ibid.: pp. 174-5.

had already declared that they were going to mobilise the peasantry and the working class by a revolutionary political party organisation.²⁸³ These declared policies show the difference and the foresightedness of the movement. However, the movement did fail just at the beginning: there were things that Doğan Avcioğlu and his friends could not or did not want to calculate and that was going to pre-empt their attempt to take the power in collaboration with some military bureaucrats.

5.2.5. Possible Reasons of the Failure of the Yön-Devrim Movement

It has been already stated that some necessary structural features must exist for a revolution from above to occur in a particular underdeveloped country. These were the autonomy of the military bureaucracy from class domination, the existence of a politicised military bureaucracy and the rise of nationalist movements from below demanding an end to national degradation, and the opportunity for international manoeuvre.²⁸⁴ The second and the third preconditions can be thought to have existed in 1960s and early 1970s. There was a politicised military bureaucracy at least beginning from the second half of 1950s, a period that the Democrat Party (DP) had tended toward a kind of despotic governance that was finally going to lead the Turkish Armed Forces to take the power by a military coup d'état in 1960.²⁸⁵ The

²⁸³ Doğan Avcioğlu, “Devrimi Bekleyen Sorunlar”, *Devrim* (Vol. 57, 1970): p. 1.

²⁸⁴ Trimberger, op. cit.: pp. 151-6.

²⁸⁵ Tevfik Çavdar, *Türkiye'nin Demokrasi Tarihi: 1950'den Günümüze* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2004): pp. 53-95.

nationalist youth movements were already in rise in the same period, and this went on by increasing especially after the widened civil liberties brought by the 1961 Constitution of Turkey.²⁸⁶

Nevertheless, it can not be claimed that the first and the last precondition existed in Turkey. Turkish Armed Forces was, beyond all other class ties, ultimately, an army of a country, which had already become a part of the defence organisation of the capitalist bloc, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), in 1952. Because of the same fact, the last precondition was lacking too, since there remained no opportunity for an international manoeuvre towards a non-capitalist path of development and an anti-imperialist revolution that would target first the United States and other leading NATO countries after the NATO membership of Turkey. The Soviet intelligence KGB and the Turkish intelligence Millî İstihbarat Teşkilatı (MIT) against each other were both following the preparations made by Avcioğlu and his officer supporters in the Turkish Armed Forces, and this led, finally, to the failure of Avcioğlu and others with a counter-revolution on 12th of March in 1971.²⁸⁷ All of these developments and the ultimate failure de facto removed the Yön-Devrim Movement from the Turkish political history.²⁸⁸

²⁸⁶ Ibid.: pp. 182-8.

²⁸⁷ Atilgan, op. cit.: pp. 250-1.

²⁸⁸ Ibid.: p. 251.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

Although the movement was de facto removed by the 12 March 1971 military intervention, its impacts on the Turkish political life have lasted until today. The theses of the Yön-Devrim Movement were being remembered and discussed as arguments and counter-arguments among various political groups and intellectuals during the heydays of the 28 February 1997 military interference against the Islamist Welfare Party (RP).²⁸⁹ Moreover, the growing nationalist opposition of the former leftist actors against the rapid neoliberal transformation of the Turkish state apparatus and socioeconomic structure during 1990s with the impetus that was granted by the 12 September 1980 coup d'état have also adopted the theses of the movement after eliminating the former Marxist propositions from these theses.²⁹⁰ This situation went on with an increase during the years under the governments of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), especially during the criminal operations and trials against various nationalist, Kemalist or leftist writers, professors, journalists, politicians, state officials and military officers, who are accused of attempting to topple the AKP government supposedly by an illegal organisation called

²⁸⁹ Ibid.: pp. 12-14.

²⁹⁰ Gökhan Atilgan, ““Yön’ünü Ararken Yolunu Yitirmek”, *Praksis* (Vol. 6, 2002): p. 144.

“Ergenekon”. The most prominent actors and figures that use similar arguments with that of the Yön-Devrim Movement and that claim to be the inheritors of the same movement are the circle of *Türk Solu* journal, the movement that is led by Doğu Perinçek and Professor Yalçın Küçük.

Türk Solu was first published in April 2002 by several university students: namely, Gökçe Fırat, Erkin Yurdakul, Özgür Erdem and İnan Kahramanoğlu. The journal takes its name from the famous leftist journal, which was being published during 1960s. *Türk Solu* mentions Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Nazım Hikmet, the Yön-Devrim movement, the Labour Party of Turkey (TİP) (1961-1971, 1975-1980), Deniz Gezmiş, Uğur Mumcu and Aziz Nesin as their traditional heritage.²⁹¹ It defines itself as “national leftist” against the “comprador leftists”.²⁹² However, the journal is based on pure hostility towards the various ethnic groups other than Turks in Turkey, which they perceived as the “source of the problem”.²⁹³ They rejected the Kurdish existence, but later it is claimed that everything that is Turk is under attack from the Kurds.²⁹⁴ Even the calls for the fraternity of the Turkish and Kurdish people are considered as slogans of the Kurdish illegal organisation, PKK.²⁹⁵ Even the lynching attempts to the Kurdish people in some regions of Turkey are also being considered

²⁹¹ Erkin Yurdakul, “Gelenek”, *Türk Solu* (Vol. 1, 8 April 2002).

²⁹² Güneş Ayas, “Komprador Değil Ulusal Sol”, *Türk Solu* (Vol. 2, 22 April 2002).

²⁹³ Gökçe Fırat, “‘Kürt’ Varsa Sorun Var”, *Türk Solu* (Vol. 90, 12 September 2005).

²⁹⁴ Ibid.

²⁹⁵ Ibid.

as “the consciousness about the problem”.²⁹⁶ Gökçe Fırat also warns the Turks not to do their shopping from Kurdish people, not to enter the places where Kurdish music is played, not to eat Kurdish foods or meals such as “kebab, lahmacun” etc.²⁹⁷ According to the journal, the main threat is the “Kurdish incursion” to the Western parts of Turkey and “Kurdish proliferation” in order to establish the “Kurdish majority”.²⁹⁸

Another interesting figure of this line is undoubtedly Doğu Perinçek and his circle. Perinçek began his political life with the Labour Party of Turkey (TİP) membership in 1960s. He was an activist in the student unions at the same time.²⁹⁹ He was with Mihri Belli in the journal *Aydınlık Sosyalist Dergi* for some time, and later he left this group. The journal *Proleter Devrimci Aydinlik* led by him was the home for many National Democratic Revolution sympathizers, as well as Maoists. He was the leader of the Revolutionary Workers and Peasants Party of Turkey (TİİKP) before the 12 March 1971, and after several prison years he became the leader of Workers and Peasants Party of Turkey (TİKP). He was imprisoned in 12 September 1980 military coup this time, and when he got free he published journals *Saçak* and *2000'e Doğru*. He also became the leader of the Socialist Party (SP) for a short time (1991-

²⁹⁶ Ibid.

²⁹⁷ Gökçe Fırat, “Türk Oğlu, Türk Kızı Türklüğünü Koru!”, *Türk Solu* (Vol. 89, 29 August 2005).

²⁹⁸ Gökçe Fırat, “Kürt Sorunu Yok, Kürt İstilası Var”, *Türk Solu* (Vol. 88, 15 August 2005).

²⁹⁹ For his detailed biography: Kerem Ünvar, “Doğu Perinçek”, Murat Gültekingil (ed.), “Sol”, *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düişünce*, Vol. 8 (İstanbul: İletişim, 2007): pp.710-716.

1992) until the Constitutional Court banned the party. He is now the leader of the Workers' Party (İP) since 1992, and his followers publish journals such as *Aydınlık*, *Bilim ve Ütopya* and *Teori*. His circle is also broadcasting over a TV channel named *Ulusal Kanal*. Doğu Perinçek has always some theoretical mismatches in his understanding of socialism, however he had a great transformation to a purer Kemalist way of understanding through the 2000s. The person, who writes, "Kemalism is not a new and unique ideology as some claims. What is Kemalism else than the defence of the bourgeois ideology, which is systematized under the leadership of the bourgeoisie of the Western countries, in Turkey?"³⁰⁰, and also the person, who writes, "Atatürkçülük is to do what Atatürk had done; it means, it is revolutionism,"³⁰¹ are the same person. The break between the relatively more leftist past and the current nationalist stance of the Workers' Party and Perinçek in particular is very much clear in its look at the Kurdish question. Perinçek and his followers sought some sort of alliance with the PKK and its leadership within a leftist approach. It is a well-known remark that Perinçek visited Öcalan and the PKK camps in 1991. The news in 2000'e *Doğru* through the end of 1980s like "Turkish soldiers use chemical weapons in Cudi"³⁰², "PKK is becoming an army"³⁰³, "Kurdish intifada in Nusaybin"³⁰⁴, "Hakkari's young generals"³⁰⁵ and "PKK camp

³⁰⁰ Doğu Perinçek, *Kemalist Devrim* (İstanbul: Aydınlık, 1977): p. 87.

³⁰¹ Doğu Perinçek, *Aydınlık* (Vol. 3, 20 August 2006): p. 3.

³⁰² "Türk Askerleri Cudi'de Kimyasal Silah Kullaniyor", 2000'e *Doğru* (23 July 1989).

³⁰³ "PKK Ordulaşıyor", 2000'e *Doğru* (6 Ağustos 1989).

³⁰⁴ "Nusaybin'de Kürt İntifadası", 2000'e *Doğru* (18 March 1990).

commanders tell: children are not our target”³⁰⁶ are enough to show the sympathy of Perinçek and his followers toward the Kurdish military struggle in that period. However, today the Kurdish problem, according to the *Aydınlık* movement, is a “so-called” problem that is being manipulated by the EU and the USA.³⁰⁷ “Kurdish question has already been resolved as a democratic rights and freedoms,” and “our Kurdish originated citizens have achieved their democratic rights in all fields,” writes Perinçek.³⁰⁸ This is “no more a democratic rights problem, but a problem of unity and independence against the USA imperialism”.³⁰⁹ Workers’ Party (İP) accepted Perinçek’s ideas directly in its Central Committee in 27-28 August 2005.³¹⁰ İP also declared that Turks and Kurds are in a fusion process within the same nation and that “the main thing is to complete this fusion”.³¹¹ Ultimately, what we see is that the İP finds two main elements in this problem: external provocations and incomplete

³⁰⁵ “Hakkari’nin Küçük Generalleri”, *2000’e Doğru* (21 May 1990).

³⁰⁶ “PKK Kamp Komutanları Anlatıyor: Hedefimiz Çocuklar Değil”, *2000’e Doğru* (3 December 1989).

³⁰⁷ Mesut Yeğen, “Türkiye Solu ve Kürt Sorunu” in Murat Gültekingil (ed.), “Sol”, *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce*, Vol. 8 (İstanbul: İletişim, 2007): p. 1230.

³⁰⁸ Doğu Perinçek, “Türk Ordusuna Değil Mayın Döşeyene Yetki”, *Aydınlık* (Vol. 943, 14 August 2005).

³⁰⁹ Ibid.

³¹⁰ “İşçi Partisi Merkez Komitesi Kararı”, *Aydınlık* (Vol. 946, 4 September 2005).

³¹¹ Ibid.

assimilation.³¹² Not surprisingly, the same movement considers the extension of the rights of the non-Muslim minorities as a threat to the national integrity.³¹³

The last symbol figure of this tradition today is Yalçın Küçük. Prof. Dr. Yalçın Küçük has also a very interesting life story.³¹⁴ He began his student life as an activist against the DP government in 1950s. He has always been active either with his articles in the political journals of late 1960s, 1970s and 1980s or with his books. He acted within the Labour Party of Turkey (TİP) for some time with Behice Boran and Sadun Aren, and he defended the Socialist Revolution thesis against the National Democratic Revolution discussions. Although he was one of the most favorite friends of Doğan Avcioğlu, he was not admitting Avcioğlu's political stance.³¹⁵ Like Doğu Perinçek, he got closer with the Kurdish political movement and had direct contacts in the late 1980s and 1990s.³¹⁶ He chose to go to Paris, in his own words, "when Tansu Çiller became the Prime Minister, Süleyman Demirel became the

³¹² Yeğen, op. cit.: p. 1230.

³¹³ "Vakıflar Yasası'ndaki Görülmeyen Tehlike: Vakıflar Şirket, Yabancı Şirketler de Vakıf Kurabilecek", *Aydınlık* (17 February 2008).

³¹⁴ For details: Yalçın Küçük Net, "Biyografi": retrieved from <http://www.yalcinkucuk.net/haber_detay.asp?haberID=11>, last visited on 25 June 2008.

³¹⁵ Yalçın Küçük, *Aydın Üzerine Tezler III* (İstanbul: Tekin, 1985), pp. 177-200; Yalçın Küçük, *Aydın Üzerine Tezler V* (İstanbul: Tekin, 1988): pp. 621-679; Yalçın Küçük, *Türkiye Üzerine Tezler III* (İstanbul: Tekin, 1986): pp. 285-361.

³¹⁶ For his talks with Abdullah Öcalan and other arguments on the Kurdish problem, see: Yalçın Küçük, *Kürtler Üzerine Tezler* (İstanbul: Dönem, 1990) and Yalçın Küçük, *Kürt Bahçesinde Sözleşî* (Ankara: Başak Yayınları, 1993).

President and when Manukyan had tax records in Turkey".³¹⁷ When he returned to Turkey in 1998, he entered the prison for the accusations about the connection with the Kurdish political movement. He began to deal with Hebrew originated Dönmes (Donmeahs) or Sabbateans in the prison, and wrote many books on them since that time. Yalçın Küçük claimed that there is a Hebrew domination over the key positions in Turkey, and he tried to prove it by showing the relationships among the famous and well-known figures of the society, by showing the Hebrew meanings of their names and by presenting other examples of Judaic behaviours of these people.³¹⁸ With his own understanding of "class", he claimed that the family relationships between the same groups of people dominate the society and keep the whole significant positions close to the worthy people by establishing renter relationships. Küçük's studies led to the proliferation of anti-Semitic thinking in the society, although he claims that he is not an anti-Semite. In his books, he very often argues that he only searches for "the people, who lost their loyalty to these lands." In order to prove that he is not an anti-Semite, he very often tells that his most favorite Turkish women figures are Halide Edip Adıvar, Sabiha Sertel and Behice Boran, and that all three of them have Hebrew origins.³¹⁹ He seems to be consistent in his ideas that he is not bringing forth anti-Semitic analyses. However, especially with the

³¹⁷ İlker Maga, "Dr. Yalçın Küçük ile Konuşma: Türkiye Aydınınu Temsil Ediyorum" in İlker Maga (ed.), *Yalçın Küçük'e Armağan* (İstanbul: YGS, 1999): p. 46.

³¹⁸ For an example of Küçük's late studies: Yalçın Küçük, *Şebeke* (İstanbul: İthaki, 2005).

³¹⁹ Ahmet Yıldız, "Yalçın Küçük'le Şebeke Adlı Kitabı ve Edebiyat Üzerine Söyleşi", *Edebiyat ve Eleştiri* (Vol. 59, January-February 2002).

deepening of discussions related with secularism and religion in the rule of the AKP governments, he began to use a nationalist discourse in the last period. He wrote two books on the supposed epileptic illness of the Prime Minister Erdoğan.³²⁰ Although he was critical with Doğan Avcıoğlu's National Democratic Revolution in 1970s, he is trying to send many messages to the Armed Forces and the Kemalist segments of the society these days, most probably in the lack of a revolutionary worker class.³²¹ Even these activities caused him to be arrested in the criminal operation that is claimed to be against the supposed illegal organisation called "Ergenekon", which is mainly defined as an organisation trying to topple the AKP government.³²² Nevertheless, his views on the Kurdish problem have not changed, unlike Perinçek. In a recent interview of him, he still defends a solution that "contains Abdullah Öcalan" and he also claims that no measure, which excludes him, would bring a solution to the matter.³²³

As it can easily be seen, there are important similarities within this tradition, as well as significant differences with respect to their approach to nationalism. The main element of defining the nation seems to be the loyalty to the country in all these figures that seem to be the inheritors of the Yön-Devrim Movement. In all these

³²⁰ Yalçın Küçük, *Caligula: Saralı Cumhur* (İstanbul: Salyangoz, 2007); Yalçın Küçük, *Epilepsi ile Orgazm* (İstanbul: Arkadaş, 2008).

³²¹ In addition to the last two works, we can also mention: Yalçın Küçük, *Sol Müdafahale* (İstanbul: Salyangoz, 2007).

³²² "Yön'den Ergenekon'a Yalçın Küçük", *Radikal* (7 January 2009).

³²³ "Öcalan'sız Bir Tedbir Hiçbir Sonuç Vermez", *Vatan* (22 December 2007).

figures and movements, the former socialist understanding is mostly appeared to be instrumentalised for the sake of Kemalism, or for the sake of lasting of the nation-state: the Republic of Turkey. If not enemy, these figures and movements within this tradition all see some sort of “threatening groups” within the society. These are the non-Muslim minorities in general, and the main inclination is to consider these minorities as “non-national” (*gayrimillî*), outside the nation in other words. Only Yalçın Küçük has a criterion of “loyalty to the country” while considering the situation of the non-Muslim minorities, and we do not come across with an objection against the extension of the rights of the non-Muslim minorities within the Yön-Devrim movement.

While the exclusion of the non-Muslim segments of the society is the general tendency within this tradition, the minds are a little bit confused when to talk about the Kurdish problem, for instance. The first apparent stance within this tradition on this problem is to deny or ignore the problem. For instance, the Kadro movement and the Türk Solu movement claim that there is no Kurd, but Kurdified Turks, as we have already discussed above. However, *Türk Solu* takes this one step forward, and calls the people to follow hostile policies and actions towards the Kurds within the country: Kurds are the open target in this case. The rest of them differ in their understanding although they recognise the existence of the Kurdish people within the society, but they differ in their understandings too. The Yön-Devrim movement, having recognised the existence of the Kurdish people and the ethnic dimension of

the problem, also claims that the Kurds are not a nation. The Yön-Devrim movement calls the socialists to think more on the problem, as we have already seen above, but they are also strictly against any Kurdish separation or land demands. Doğu Perinçek and the Aydınlık movement around him, on the other hand, claim that the democratic rights dimension of the problem has already been overcome. Nevertheless, they also highlight the ongoing fusion and integration process between the Turkish and Kurdish peoples, and their ultimate solution to the problem looks like the assimilation of the Kurds. The different figure in this issue is Yalçın Küçük, because he still defends his past claims about the political demands of the Kurds.

The tradition that we put here as the Left Kemalism, from the Kadro movement to contemporary figures such as *Türk Solu*, Perinçek and Küçük has some general tendencies while defining the nation. Although they are not homogenous in their way of thinking the issues, overwhelmingly speaking, they tend to exclude the non-Muslim minorities. However, another common feature of them while defining the “Turkish nation” shows itself while thinking about the Kurdish problem. Although some of them even does not recognise the existence of such an ethnic group, what we understand from all their evaluations is that they consider the Kurds inside the nation, no matter whether they put them there as “Kurdified Turks” or “Kurds, but not a nation”.

The important point here is that the emphasis on development and the instrumentalist usage of nationalism of the Yön-Devrim Movement have some theoretical roots, which I tried to demonstrate in the first chapters where I outlined the theoretical approaches on development and nationalism. The movement's understanding of development is similar with the diffusionist theories of development, or the modernisation theories let's say, which incorporate nationalism as an important ingredient on the way to modernity and development. Furthermore, the movement's perception of developmentalism is also similar with the theories of underdevelopment in the sense that they in common incorporate into various conceptions of "dependency" and in their attention to theories of "imperialism". The relation between uneven development and capitalism is, if not forgotten at all, often underemphasised in favour of a "national front" against the outsider, or say "imperialist", exploiters. The movement's understanding of nationalism, though sincerely, is also a great example of the usage of nationalism as a "form of politics" and as an "instrument" in their struggle for power and legitimising their understanding of "rapid development".

What is more striking is the fact that the emphasis on development and the instrumentalist usage of nationalism of the Yön-Devrim Movement gradually degraded, and left the scene for a more hardliner reactionary nationalism in most of its successor actors and figures.³²⁴ Nevertheless, the developmentalist stance against

³²⁴ Aytemur, op. cit. (2008): pp. 52-3.

the capitalist path of uneven development in Turkey has not totally dissolved. The Independent Social Scientists (*Bağımsız Sosyal Bilimciler*) is a noteworthy example. BSB was established by 18 distinguished social scientists of the country in 2000 with an aim “to make society conscious against neoliberal policies that cause the dissolution of the Turkish economy and social structure.”³²⁵ They published critical researches and studies against the neoliberal economic policies that are being implemented by the Turkish governments, against the fiscal and financial policies that are imposed by the international financial organisations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and about the recent global economic crisis that occurred in 2008 and 2009.³²⁶

³²⁵ See: Bağımsız Sosyal Bilimciler – İktisat Grubu, “BSB 2009 Çalışması (Nisan 2009)”, retrieved from <<http://www.bagimsizsosyalbilimciler.org>>, last visited on 25 June 2009.

³²⁶ The three most recent studies of the BSB are these: Bağımsız Sosyal Bilimciler, 2008 *Kavşağında Türkiye: Siyaset, İktisat ve Toplum* (İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2008); *IMF Gözetiminde On Uzun Yıl, 1998-2008: Farklı Hükümetler, Tek Siyaset* (İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2007); *Türkiye’de ve Dünyada Ekonomik Bunalım, 2008-2009* (İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2009).

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