

NATO AND THE FIGHT AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM:
2001-2010

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ABSTRACT

NATO AND THE FIGHT AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM:
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This thesis analyzes the evolution of the policies, strategies and actions of NATO within the context of the fight against transnational terrorism. The thesis focuses on the post 9/11 period. After the 9/11 events, the security perceptions of NATO changed dramatically and the threat of transnational terrorism emerged as a prominent challenge to the security of all members of NATO so the fight against terrorism became a key priority for NATO. Consequently, the NATO experienced a significant transformation since 2001 in order to have an effective and active role in the fight against transnational terrorism. In this thesis, Afghanistan operation of NATO is evaluated in terms of NATO's readiness to deal with soft security threats such as transnational terrorism effectively. The thesis argues that despite the significant achievements of NATO in the fight against terrorism in Afghanistan, NATO has not yet become quite effective in dealing with transnational terrorism since the Alliance is still primarily designed to deal with conventional hard security threats.

This thesis has five main chapters. The first chapter is the introduction. In the second chapter NATO's security concerns and its stance with regard to terrorism in the Cold War and post-Cold War era is discussed. The third chapter continues with the examination of NATO's transformation after the 9/11 attacks in terms of fight against transnational terrorism. The fourth chapter explores the Afghanistan operation of NATO. The fifth chapter is the conclusion.

Keywords: Transnational Terrorism, NATO, Transformation of NATO, Afghanistan

ÖZ

NATO VE SINIRÖTESİ TERÖRİZMLE MÜCADELE: 2001-2010

Yıldırım, Yeşim

Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

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Bu tez sınırötesi terörizmle mücadele kapsamında NATO'nun politikalarının, stratejilerinin ve faaliyetlerinin gelişimini incelemektedir. Tezde, 11 Eylül sonrası döneme ağırlık verilmiştir. 11 Eylül olaylarından sonra NATO'nun güvenlik algıları önemli ölçüde değişmiş ve sınırötesi terörizm NATO üyelerinin güvenliğine önemli bir tehdit olarak ortaya çıkmıştır ve bu yüzden, terörizmle mücadele NATO için önemli bir öncelik haline gelmiştir. Bu nedenle NATO sınırötesi terörizmle mücadelede daha etkili ve aktif rol alabilmek amacıyla 2001'den bu yana önemli bir dönüşüm geçirmiştir. Bu tezde, Afganistan operasyonu NATO'nun sınır ötesi terörizm gibi yumuşak güvenlik tehditleriyle etkili bir biçimde mücadeleye hazır olup olmaması açısından değerlendirilmiştir. Bu tez, NATO'nun Afganistan'daki terörizmle mücadelede önemli başarılarına rağmen, henüz sınır ötesi terörizmle mücadelede etkinlik sağlayamadığını ve bu durumun da İttifak'ın hala öncelikle sert güvenlik tehditleriyle mücadele için tasarlanmasından kaynaklandığını iddia etmektedir.

Bu tez, beş bölümden oluşmaktadır. İlk bölüm giriş kısmıdır. İkinci bölüm Soğuk Savaş döneminde ve Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde, NATO'nun güvenlik konularını ve terörizm karşısındaki tutumunu incelemektedir. Üçüncü bölümde 11 Eylül saldırıları sonrasında NATO'nun terörizmle mücadele bakımından dönüşümü ele alınmıştır. Dördüncü bölümde NATO'nun Afganistan operasyonu analiz edilmiştir. Beşinci bölüm ise sonuç kısmıdır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Sınırötesi Terörizm, NATO, NATO'nun Dönüşümü, Afganistan

To my family and my fiancée for their continuous support.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

NATO	-North Atlantic Treaty Organization
USSR	- Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UN	- United Nations
CSCE	-Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
NACC	- North Atlantic Cooperation Council
EAPC	-Euro Atlantic Partnership Council
PfP	-Partnership for Peace
OSCE	- Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
WEU	- Western European Union
IFOR	- Implementation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina
KFOR	- Kosovo Force
NBC	- Nuclear, Biological and Chemical
OEF	- Operation Enduring Freedom
NAC	- North Atlantic Council
NRF	- NATO Response Force
PCC	- Prague Capabilities Commitment
CEP	- Civil Emergency Planning
CJTF	- Combined Joint Task Force
CBR	- Chemical, Biological, Radiological
WMD	- Weapons of Mass Destruction
ISAF	- International Security Assistance Force
MD	- Mediterranean Dialogue
ICI	- Istanbul Cooperation
NTM-A	- NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan
ANSF	- Afghanistan National Security Forces
OMLT	-Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams
PPDA	- People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
JUI	- Jamiat-i Ulema-i Islami
PRT	- Provincial Reconstruction Team
ANP	- Afghan National Police
EUPOL	- European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Scope of the Thesis

This thesis aims to evaluate the transformation of NATO's security perception and how the fight against terrorism became a key priority for the Alliance. Within this framework, the thesis analyzes security policies of NATO beginning from its establishment and explores that terrorism issue was disregarded until the 9/11 events. Since terrorism became a prominent threat for the security of the Allies after the 9/11 attacks, NATO realizing its irrelevance with the transnational terrorism issue, needed to revise its security strategies. So, this thesis attempts to portray the transformation process of NATO's security strategies and examine NATO's accelerated efforts with regard to the fight against transnational terrorism. Also, Afghanistan operation of the Alliance is in the scope of this thesis in order to provide an evaluation basis for NATO's performance in the fight against terrorism. In this chapter, I will explain the change in the security environment after the Cold War and the rise of transnational terrorism as a prominent threat in the new century by analyzing the literature and I will touch upon the Afghan operation and then clarify my argument. Finally, the structure and methodology of this thesis will be explained.

1.2 Literature Review

Although terrorism threat was not a main issue of security studies in the Cold War and post-Cold War era, the September 11 attacks marked the change in the viewpoint of security studies scholars. The international community was awakened by the sudden attacks of transnational terrorists to the territories of a superpower killing almost 3000 people. After this event, traditional security threats disappeared to a great extent and transnational terrorism became a top security concern for the scholars.

Heinz Gärtner affirms that in the Cold War era, traditional security thinking dominated the international security system.¹ NATO was established in an international security environment where the realist view of international relations was predominant and the major threat could only emanate from an armed attack by an aggressive state. Realists acknowledge the nation-states as the major actors in world politics. The referent object of security is the state; states act as strategic, self-interested units which seek to ensure their own security. So, the essential security threat was expected to be posed by the states and depending on the power and authority acquired, states needed to secure their national interests.² These interests were under the protection of the national armies against a potential challenge emanating from another state. Conventional hard security threats were the main issues to be dealt with and soft security threats such as terrorism activities were not regarded as the major threat to the security of the states. And non-state actors conducting terrorist activities were disregarded as an actor in the security environment in that period.

NATO was founded in order to deter armed attacks against the Allies that could emanate from Warsaw Pact countries and prevent their policy of expansion of their area of influence by spreading communism. Security policies were based on “the stable management of relations between two heavily militarized blocs that shared a common interest in avoiding direct confrontation, but nevertheless remained deeply divided along ideological lines.”³ Both of the two superpowers leading the blocs built nuclear capabilities and they acquired the capacity to destroy each other. So the alliances had the function of balancing each other thus providing stability for the international environment. So NATO provided the stable management of the

¹ Heinz Gärtner, “European Security: The End of Territorial Defense”, *The Brown Journal of the World Affairs*, Volume 9, Issue 2, Winter/Spring 2003, p. 135

² Seyom Brown, “World Interests and the Changing Dimensions of Security” in Michael T. Klare and Yogesh Chandrani, *World Security: Challenges for a New Century*, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), p.1

³ Mats Berdal, “International Security After the Cold War: Aspects of Continuity and Change”, in Kurt R. Spillmann and Andreas Wenger (eds.), *Towards the 21st Century: Trends in Post-Cold War International Security Policy*, p. 21

bipolar world against the Warsaw Pact countries by deterrence and its collective defence strategy.

However, with the end of the Cold War, the source of threat changed. A new political and strategic environment emerged in the world. The security challenges and risks that the states faced were different in nature. The hard security threat of a clearly defined armed attack diminished and NATO's classical collective defence task lost its significance.⁴ So the Allies reviewed their security strategies and adopted a Strategic Concept in 1991.

The threat of a simultaneous, full-scale attack on all of NATO's European fronts has effectively been removed and thus no longer provides the focus for Allied strategy... Risks to Allied security are less likely to result from calculated aggression against the territory of the Allies, but rather from the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in central and eastern Europe.⁵

As it is understood, the Allies realized that rather than an armed attack, a threat to the security of the Alliance was more likely to emanate from the political vacuum in the Central and Eastern Europe after the collapse of their system. So it was not reasonable to focus on the idea that state was the only referent object for security issues. After the changes in the structure of the international system, the traditional security perceptions needed to be revised.

Security is no longer defined as the absence of war and military intimidation. And security is no longer synonymous with defence. Today most countries in the world do not face acute threats of foreign invasion. These factors are mainly the result of developments preceding but enhancing the immediate consequences of the collapse of the politically static, however ambiguously stable, bipolar security system. They find their roots i.a. in the emerging uncontrollable proliferation of technology, enabling even smaller, but fanatic

⁴ Dick A. Leurdijk, "NATO's Shifting Priorities: From Peace Support Operations to Counter-Terrorism", in Thierry Tardy, *Peace Operations After 11 September 2001*, (London; New York: Routledge, 2004), p.62

⁵ NATO Official Texts, "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept", 7-8 November 1991, Article 9, online at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_23847.htm (accessed on 17.09.2009)

developing countries to acquire weapons and delivery means which can pose a real threat to major powers. They include the growing gap between rich and poor countries as another condition bearing the roots for instability and tension, discontent and desperation, aggravated by incompetent government, social injustice and lack of democracy. These factors generate not only such serious security problems as illegal migration, or smuggling of drugs, small arms and people etc. They also create the breeding grounds for fanaticism that can, in turn, produce regional unrest, escalate ethnic and religious conflicts, launch terrorism and lead to continued violation and abuse of human rights. A growing number of states are too weak to control developments on their territory and, consequently, have become a base and asylum for international crime and terrorist networks.⁶

It can be derived from the Wilhelm N. Germann's explanations that after the end of the Cold War and the demise of stable bipolar system, the definition of security as defending the borders and sovereignty of the state by using armed and nuclear forces became less valuable. The potential of a foreign invasion seemed unlikely. Disparities among the states, inefficient governments, absence of justice and democracy constituted the roots of instability. So military and force based approaches lost their validity. The scholars of international relations began to criticize realist understanding which confined the security to traditional military threats to the territorial integrity of states and emphasized the need for a broader understanding of security.⁷ One of the critics, Barry Buzan and his colleagues, claimed that the security had military, political, economic, societal and environmental dimensions and all these are intertwined affecting each other.⁸ In this framework, a wide range of new categories of security challenges started to be examined such as organized crime, international migration, asylum seekers, environmental degradation and transnational terrorism.⁹ Among those, transnational

⁶ Wilhelm Germann, "Responding to post cold war security challenges: conceptualizing security sector reform", Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Working Paper No. 94, Geneva, October 2002, p. 3

⁷ European Research Project, Transnational Terrorism, Security, and the Rule of Law, "Notions of Security: Shifting Concepts and Perspectives", 15 February 2007, p.33, online at: <http://www.transnationalterrorism.eu/tekst/publications/Notions%20of%20Security.pdf> (accessed on 08.10.2009)

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ European Research Project, Transnational Terrorism, Security, and the Rule of Law, "Notions of Security: Shifting Concepts and Perspectives", 15 February 2007, p. 34, online at:

terrorism became central security issue for the international community in the new century.

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon however, earlier attacks were not considered as so important because they did not have striking consequences and they were limited to certain regions and countries. Transnational terrorism appeared as the most significant threat to the international community in the beginning of the 21st century and became a defining feature of today's world politics after the 9/11 attacks. The terrorism trend in the earlier periods was restricted geographically in targeting and did not have global objectives; but in the new epoch, terrorist organizations and operations do not have effects only within the borders of a specific state and do not create consequences only for the citizens of a specific country. For that reason, transnational terrorism was 'appreciated as a prominent threat to western and European security'¹⁰ especially after the terrorist attacks on the USA.

Transnational terrorism has similarities with international terrorism in terms of generating consequences for more than one state however, they differ. According to Wilkinson, international terrorism is conducted by people controlled by a sovereign state, transnational terrorism is practiced by autonomous non-state actors but not necessarily with the support of sympathetic states.¹¹ So it can be argued that traditional realist approaches which regards security in military and state-centered terms are insufficient to explain the nature of the new kind of terrorism. Transnational terrorism transcends the national boundaries and it is the most dangerous and lethal kind of terrorism.

Moreover, as the forces of globalization gained ground, hazardous effects of terrorism increased. Globalization contributed much to the evolution of

<http://www.transnationalterrorism.eu/tekst/publications/Notions%20of%20Security.pdf> (accessed on 08.10.2009)

¹⁰ *Ibid*, p. 45

¹¹ Singh B. P. Seghal, *Global terrorism: Socio-politico and Legal Dimensions*, (New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications, 1996), p. 5

transnational terrorism. As the world became more interconnected, terrorist groups managed to take advantage of the developing technologies in the fields of communication, transportation and arms.¹² As the borders lost their significance, it became easy to spread instability beyond the nation states with the help of the technological developments. It easily flourished with the intensification of the interactions, increased movement of people, information and funds and these developments created new opportunities for the transnational terrorists.¹³ And establishing many networks and cells in all over the world they became transnationalized and autonomous. The most significant example is the Al-Qaeda terrorist network which realized the 9/11 attacks. Steve Smith explains the structure of the organization as ‘the antithesis of the hierarchical modern state, and according to him the identity of the group is ‘correspondingly amorphous.’¹⁴ And Gus Martin draws up the characteristics of the Al-Qaeda as; it “holds no territory, does not champion the aspirations of an ethno-national group, has no ‘top-down’ organizational structure, has virtually nonexistent state sponsorship and promulgates political demands that are vague at best.”¹⁵ The characteristics of the terrorist group indicates the uniqueness and the very transnational dimension of the threat. Terrorism, adapting to the new developments in the globalization epoch, has become a transnational phenomenon which threatens each state within the current international system.

The 9/11 attacks heightened the public’s awareness of the threat posed by transnational terrorism because of its disastrous consequences. Almost 3,000 people

¹² Angus Muir, “Trends in the Development of Terrorist Bombing”, in David Martin Jones, *Globalisation and the New Terror*, (Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2004), p.80

¹³ Anthon Bebler, “NATO’s Role in the Struggle against Transnational Terrorism”, in Iztok Prezelj, *The Fight against Terrorism and Crisis Management in the Western Balkans*, (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2008), p. 6

¹⁴ Steve Smith, “The end of the Unipolar Moment? September 11 and the Future of World Order ” in Gus Martin, *The New Era of Terrorism*, (California, Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 2004), p. 261

¹⁵ Gus Martin, *Understanding Terrorism: Challenges, Perspectives, and Issues*, (California, Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 2006), p. 293

were killed and it was unprecedented in terms of terrorist attacks.¹⁶ Moreover, it demonstrated the vulnerability of a superpower failing to prevent the attacks. Therefore, transnational terrorism attracted the attention of the world community and became the foremost security threat for the international community. Before, states were confronting with terrorism individually and as a security organization, NATO did not show concern for the issue until the 9/11. After the dramatic attacks to the USA, states realized that individual struggles against terrorism did not prevail. Therefore, the world community receded from their old security understanding of individual territorial defence and recognized the need of cooperation in the fight against the new threat.

As a member of the world community and adapting itself to the changing security environment, NATO also undertook the mission of countering terrorism. NATO's contributions to the fight against terrorism will be analyzed in the following chapters.

1.3 Argument

After the 9/11 events, NATO began to deal with the transnational terrorism issue and transformed itself in order to contribute effectively to the fight against terrorism. In 2003, embarking upon the Afghanistan operation, NATO found an opportunity to evaluate where it stands in the counter-terrorism efforts.

Despite the significant achievements of NATO in the fight against transnational terrorism in Afghanistan, NATO has not yet become quite effective in dealing with transnational terrorism. The scholars found many reasons behind the incremental progress in the situation of Afghanistan such as 'insufficient number of troops, internal division among the NATO members over its presence in Afghanistan, weakening of international resolve, mounting regional challenges, growing lack of confidence among the Afghan people with regard to NATO's determination and ability to stabilize the country, the presence of drug barons, corruption among the

¹⁶ Peter B. Rosendorff and Todd Sandler, "The Political Economy of Transnational Terrorism", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Volume 49, Number 2, April 2005, p. 171

Afghan officials'.¹⁷ However, besides these, after the end of the Cold War conventional hard security threats reduced substantially. NATO lost its *raison d'être* and the cohesion of the Alliance loosened. Member states began to shape their foreign and defence policies according to their national interests. And since NATO members did not consider the threat as hazardous as it was in the Cold War era, it became hard to behave collectively. In other words, NATO was not designed to deal with soft security threats such as transnational terrorism. Instead, it was primarily designed to counter hard security threats.

1.4 Theoretical Framework and Methodology

The theoretical model of this thesis is established on the basis of neo-realist theories' assumptions for the reason that the basic principles of the neo-realist approaches explain the mechanism of NATO's formation and cohesion; and they are still applicable to the contemporary Alliance. Also, the main argument of this thesis is supplemented within this framework. Neo-realist view of international relations provides valid arguments for a better understanding of NATO's situation in Afghanistan in terms of fight against transnational terrorism.

Neo-realism or structural realism is outlined by Kenneth Waltz and it differs from the traditional realism by presenting a systemic approach. Neo-realists acknowledge that an international system above the states with a defined structure exists and influences state behaviour. The nature of this system is anarchic, having no central authority and is composed of formally equal sovereign states.¹⁸ These states are primarily concerned with their own security and seek to survive within this system through balancing against potential dangers represented by tangible power and when their intentions are seen as threatening as well.¹⁹ In order to balance the great

¹⁷ Cheema, Pervaiz Iqbal, "Has NATO failed in Afghanistan?" *Pakistan Times*, 25 February 2008, online at: <http://pakistanimes.net/2008/04/08/oped2.htm> (accessed on 17.03.2010)

¹⁸ Scott Burchill, "Realism and Neo-Realism", in Scott Burchill et al., *Theories of International Relations* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), p.91

¹⁹ Robert B. McCalla, "NATO's Persistence after the Cold War", *International Organization*, Volume 50, Number 3, Summer 1996, p. 450

powers, the states may create alliances so Waltz's balance of power theory gives explanations about the roots of the alliances.

According to Stephen Walt, states do not balance against powers, instead they balance against threats. Walt makes a contribution to the Waltz's argument, putting the emphasis on balance of threat instead of balance of power. For Walt, states will generally align with the others against the stronger state only if the stronger state is perceived by them as a threat.²⁰ Walt makes a distinction between power and threat and his balance of threat theory includes power as one of the threat factors. He supplemented the realist explanation of state behavior by adding the variables of proximity, offensive capability, and perceived intention as the threat factors.²¹

In the case of NATO, formation of the Alliance was triggered by the desire to unite in the case of a revitalized German attack and by the Soviet's expansionist intentions and plans in the eastern Europe. European countries being uncomfortable with the significant political activities of the Soviet Union such as Berlin Blockade and Czechoslovakia Coup in 1948, recognized the urgent need of extending and institutionalizing their ties.²² According to them, in order to maintain a secure order in the continent and balance the Soviet expansionism, the U.S. participation was vital. And for the USA, Europe was an area of concern because of its main objective to confront the greatest threat to Western security posed by the Soviet Union and communism. Main logic was to establish a strong European pole and prevent the containment of Europe by the Soviet Union. As Walt explained, the roots of the transatlantic alliance lied in the efforts to balance the Soviet threat and throughout the Cold War, it was the main policy.

²⁰ Stephen M. Walt, "Alliances: Balancing and Bandwagoning" p. 116, online at: <http://www.ou.edu/uschina/texts/WaltAlliances.pdf> (accessed on 14.07.2010)

²¹ Thomas Gangale, "Alliance Theory: Balancing, Bandwagoning, and Detente" online at: http://pweb.jps.net/~gangale/opsa/ir/Alliance_Theory.htm (accessed on 14.07.2010)

²² Steve Weber, "Shaping the postwar balance of power: Multilateralism in NATO", *International Organization*, Volume 46, Issue 3, June 1992, p. 644

According to neo-realists, after the end of the Cold War, when the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact disappeared, the threat perceived by NATO allies was reduced. For Stephen Walt's balance-of-threat theory, it is a remarkable change because the threat perceived by the West has reduced rapidly and substantially. In the face of the new situation, NATO's reason to survive seemed disappeared and neo-realists predicted that cohesion of the Alliance would loosen, the U.S. position in NATO would weaken, and the degree of policy coordination among alliance members would shrink as members seek out their own policy directions.²³ Robert McCalla wrote the neo-realist predictions about the future of the Alliance:

Thus, neorealist theories applied to NATO predict the following: (1) NATO members will cut military expenditures substantially to bring their cost-benefit ratios back into balance following the loss of the threat that previously had justified high levels of spending. (2) Members will engage in more disputes over common alliance policy as they take more independent directions in their foreign and defense policies ("renationalization" of policy). (3) Members will move away from NATO to other less costly forms of international cooperation.²⁴

It seemed that neo-realists' predictions realized to a great extent. The military system of NATO is fundamentally different from the system that existed before the end of the Cold War. Alliance published a new security doctrine after the Cold War and NATO's standing military forces have been reduced substantially because the alliance no longer faced with an extended military threat or enemy. Since 1991, defence budgets have decreased by 30 percent; armed forces have decreased in size by 28 to 40 percent for most countries; land forces are down 25 percent; major warships by 20 percent; and combat aircraft by 30 percent; and finally the U.S. forces in Europe are reduced by 66 percent.²⁵ Moreover, NATO members founded new ways of international cooperation especially with the former enemies. NATO gave support to the development of the European Security and Defense Identity

²³ Robert B. McCalla, "NATO's Persistence after the Cold War", *International Organization*, Volume 50, Number 3, Summer 1996, p.451

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 454

²⁵ Fact Sheet: How NATO Has Changed in the Post Cold War Era, Prepared and compiled by the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, The USA State Department, 21 March 1997, online at: <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/natousis.htm> (accessed on 14.07.2010)

(ESDI) within the framework of the alliance. The USA's position in Europe weakened.²⁶

Changes in the power or threat forced the alliance to change. NATO adapted itself to the new security environment however; the cohesion of the alliance was affected. For the alliances, cohesion is as important as its existence because it has an influence on freedom of action (agreeing to let external events commit states to action and some degree of policy alignment) and actual resources (troops and material) committed to alliance needs.²⁷ If the cohesion does not exist, namely if the member states consider that alliance participation is not valuable, members will be unlikely to subordinate individual interests to group interests.²⁸ In the Cold War period, the cohesion was strong because of the existence of hard security threats however; after the collapse of the great threat, members became more independent in their foreign and defence policies.

In the Afghanistan operation, it can be observed that member states perceive the threat in the country differently so their contribution to the operation differs. The USA currently supplies more than half of the foreign forces in Afghanistan and the next largest contributor is the United Kingdom. Other members provide small amount of troops.²⁹ Some of the Allies such as Germany, France, Italy and Spain, are restricted by the national caveats, which constrain where they can station their forces and whether or not they are allowed to fight.³⁰ These national caveats indicate that member states do not intend to make sacrifices and they keep their freedom of action. They do not subordinate their national interests to the Alliance's

²⁶ Fact Sheet: How NATO Has Changed in the Post Cold War Era, Prepared and compiled by the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, The USA State Department, 21 March 1997, online at: <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/natousis.htm> (accessed on 14.07.2010)

²⁷ Robert B. McCalla, "NATO's Persistence after the Cold War", *International Organization*, Volume 50, Number 3, Summer 1996, p. 451

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ "International Security Assistance Force: Key Facts and Figures" For more information, <http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/Placemats/100804%20Rev%20Placemat.pdf>

³⁰ BBC News, Caroline Wyatt, "Afghan burden tasks Nato allies", 24 October 2007, online at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7061061.stm (accessed on 14.07.2010)

interests and this demonstrates that the cohesion of the Alliance is not as strong as it was in the Cold War era. And, this prevents the Alliance to form a strict strategy and to present a comprehensive political settlement in Afghanistan.

Methodologically, during the analysis of the aforementioned issues, open sources materials provided by NATO website were utilized. Summit declarations, official texts, press releases, speeches and communique were the major sources. Also, materials provided by academic journals, books, newspapers and various internet sources were consulted. Throughout this study descriptive method is mainly used and collected facts have been consulted in order to support the argument.

1.5 Structure of the Thesis

Firstly, in the introductory part, the question of how transnational terrorism emerged as the prominent threat in the new century and became a prior security concern for the Alliance will be analyzed and the changing security environment will be examined. Then, in the second chapter, the thesis will focus on the NATO's security policies and strategies before the 9/11 attacks. NATO's security strategy of collective defence during the Cold War will be analyzed and its transformation within the framework of changing security environment after the Cold War will be explored. Within this context, the Rome Declaration and London Declaration will be discussed in order to portray the transition period of the Alliance adopting the collective security understanding. Since NATO did not regard terrorism as a threat to the security of its members in this period, its security policies were shaped by the Cold War and post-Cold War security environment with a little refer to the terrorism issue. So referrals to the terrorism threat in the NATO's Strategic Concepts of 1991 and 1999 will be analyzed in order to demonstrate NATO's indifference to the fight against terrorism before the 9/11 events.

In the third chapter, in order to have a clearer view on how NATO decided to engage in the fight against terrorism, the impacts of the 9/11 attacks on the world order and security perceptions of NATO with the other international actors will be examined. With the USA's reluctance to involve the Alliance in the war on

terrorism, it was understood that NATO was irrelevant in the face of new security threats and NATO had to go through a transformation period to have an effective role in the fight against terrorism. This transformation process within the framework of fight against terrorism of the Alliance will be explored in details.

In the fourth chapter, the Afghan mission will be studied since it constitutes a turning point in the history of the Alliance. As being the first real out-of-area operation of the Alliance, it worths a profound analysis in order to present an operational perspective while examining NATO's fight against terrorism. Before studying what NATO did in Afghanistan, the history of the country beginning from the Soviet invasion will be explained in order to understand how Afghanistan became a safe haven for the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization and attracted the attention of the world community. And this study will be enriched by the examination of the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom and ISAF's achievements and limitations under the command of NATO will be explained.

In the conclusion part, findings in the chapters of this thesis will be summarized and the argument will be put forward.

CHAPTER II

NATO AND FIGHT AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM BEFORE 2001

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter, NATO's approach to the terrorism in the Cold War and post-Cold War era will be examined. Since NATO attached little importance to terrorism as a threat to the security of its members in this period, this part will be mainly dominated by the security policies and understandings of NATO excluding terrorism (not totally but to a great extent). NATO's perception of security and threat will be taken in hand with a little refer to the terrorism.

2.2 NATO and the Cold War Security Environment

During the Cold War, state-centralism dominated the international power structure and the concept of security has been shaped around the rivalry between the two super powers. After the Second World War, the United States and the Soviet Union emerged as the only two powers that had sufficient capacity to enforce a global policy. The new distribution of power brought about by the war had two consequences.³¹ While two superpowers were improving their power positions relatively, the strength of the dominant powers of the WWII period were drained away after the war. This resulted with the fact that the USA and the USSR not only took part actively in the postwar era but also they acquired the monopoly of decision in the world politics.³²

After the Second World War, Western Europe collapsed and its military power diminished to a great extent. Also Germany became a great concern both for the two new global superpowers for the reason that a power vacuum occurred in the

³¹ Charles O. Lerche Jr., *The Cold War and After*, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1965), p. 3

³² *Ibid.*

centre of the Europe after the overthrow of the Nazi regime. Moreover, the structure of the older world powers were dissolved and imperialism ended in the Middle East, Asia and Africa. Many young assertive and unstable new states were established.³³ This new environment brought about new concerns for the rising powers. Europe needed to be rebuilt and existing political and economic institutions were in a need to be reconstructed. World political system ought to be reestablished by taking into account all new actors and situations. The roots of the Cold War might be founded in this situation.

The power vacuum emerged in Europe, paved the way for a competition for undertaking the leadership role in the reorganization of the continent. Both the US and the USSR aspiring to fill this power vacuum launched their own mechanisms in the different regions of Europe to ameliorate the situation. “In eastern Europe, reconstruction proceeded in large measure according to the wishes of Soviet authorities and the political goals of the communist parties. In western Europe, severe economic shortages and fears of Soviet domination combined to make these countries diplomatically and economically dependent on the United States.”³⁴

During the Cold War period, Europe was an area of concern for the United States because of its main objective to confront the threat to Western security posed by the Soviet Union. Main logic was to establish a strong European pole and prevent the containment of Europe by the Soviet Union, so the USA undertook the reconstruction of Europe that was ruined by the Second World War.³⁵ If the ideological aims of the Soviet Union were taken into consideration, it was evident that the national sovereignty and independence of the Western European states were not guaranteed. There was a growing threat of communist expansion by subversion and direct aggression. Imposition of the unstable and undemocratic political systems and repression of basic human rights and freedoms in the Central and

³³ Charles O. Lerche Jr., *The Cold War and After*, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1965), p. 3

³⁴ Daniel R. Brower, *The World since 1945*, (Upper Saddle River N.J.: Prentice Hall, 2004), p. 25

³⁵ Baskın Oran (ed.), *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar*, Cilt 1: 1919-1980, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık, 2004), p.485

Eastern European countries, also frightened the Western European. It was obvious that the USSR established a dominance reinforcing its gains in the Central and Eastern Europe by constructing satellite regimes. Moreover, the USSR embarked upon a rapid armament and gradually, expanded its troops. Until 1948, Soviet Union was in an attempt to strengthen its ties with the Eastern Europe and it imposed several bilateral arrangements on its Eastern neighbors. Treaties of Friendship and Mutual Assistance were concluded preventing the Eastern European countries from dealing with one another in the security matters.³⁶ Soviet Union managed to bind these countries to itself and maximized its influence over them. As the two superpowers were trying to shape the post-war period in different ways, both struggled to establish an area of influence for themselves.³⁷

Formation of the Atlantic Alliance is the result of many substantial initiatives that were launched after the Second World War. Step by step, the USA involved in the security affairs of Europe and NATO emerged. In March 1947, France and Britain concluded a Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance also named as the Dunkirk Treaty.³⁸ By this agreement, they committed to unite in the case of a revitalized German attack and make provisions for Soviet intentions in the east. Then, on 12 March 1947, the USA declared the Truman Doctrine in order to give support for “free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures”³⁹. It was decided to grant military and economic aid to Turkey and Greece in their fight against communism. The Doctrine was brought forward in order to confront and contain communist and Soviet expansionism.

³⁶ Steve Weber, “Shaping the postwar balance of power: multilateralism in NATO”, *International Organization*, Volume 46, Issue 3, June 1992, p. 636

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ NATO Speeches, “Recommendation for assistance to Greece and Turkey”, Speech by the President of the United States, Harry Truman, before a joint session of the senate and the house of representatives, recommending assistance to Greece and Turkey, 12 March 1947, online at: http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1947/s470312a_e.htm (accessed on 14.09.2009)

Being aware of the threat and potential consequences of a renewed conflict and economic and political disorder in Europe, the USA continued with the Marshall Plan which provided economic assistance for Europe. The Plan aimed to reduce the vulnerability of Western Europe to Soviet expansionism. It provided a well structured economy and supported the development of stable democratic governments countering the communist subversion.⁴⁰

European countries became more uncomfortable with the significant political events such as Berlin Blockade and Czechoslovakia Coup in 1948 and then, they recognized the urgent need of extending and institutionalizing their ties. As an expansion to the Dunkirk Treaty and with the inclusion of Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands the Brussels Pact was signed.⁴¹ This did not also seem sufficient by the Europeans. According to them, in order to maintain a secure order in the continent and balance the Soviet expansionism, the U.S. participation to the alliance was sine qua non guaranteeing the U.S. intervention in the situation of an aggression. They wanted to keep the United States engaged in European and world affairs otherwise the Soviet Union would enhance its area of influence at the expense of Europeans and take control of the security in the continent. With the Vandenberg Resolution adopted on 11 June 1948, the USA approved the military assistance for the collective defence arrangements that operated within the UN Charter and its national security interests.⁴² The Resolution was a turning point in the American foreign policy because the USA decided to give priority to the collective security arrangements even in the cases in which its security concerns are at issue. This paved the way for Europeans to start talks with the USA and Canada about the establishment of a possible defence union. The negotiations for the North Atlantic Treaty began in December 1948 and on 4 April 1949, the Treaty creating

⁴⁰ Steve Weber, "Shaping the postwar balance of power: multilateralism in NATO", *International Organization*, Volume 46, Issue 3, June 1992, p. 644

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 647

⁴² NATO Official Texts, "U.S. Senate Resolution 239: 80th Congress, 2nd Session - (The Vandenberg Resolution)", 11 June 1948, online at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-2A3F3CF1-F9CAF702/natolive/official_texts_17054.htm? (accessed on 27.09.2009)

NATO that was a 'defensive' military alliance was signed between the US, UK, Canada, France, Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Italy, Portugal, and the Benelux countries.⁴³

The most striking point in the Treaty was the Article 5 which bounded the Allies with a serious commitment of collective defence:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.⁴⁴

This was a crucial step for the United States because until that time it was avoiding engaging in an alliance with Europe. The USA tried to help Europe to rebuild its economy and defence capabilities; so the Europeans would be able to bear the military responsibilities in balancing Soviet Union in Europe.⁴⁵ After the invasion of South Korea in June 1950, the USA was convinced to change its vision and shift away from its previous policies. Americans decided to take part in the defence of Europe and send troops there. An integrated military force under central command was established and the USA approved the substantial increase in the number of American forces in Europe.⁴⁶ South Korean invasion demonstrated that the United States should not leave Europe on its own to develop and respond possible Soviet aggressions. It became evident that the Communist bloc was in an attempt to

⁴³ NATO Archives, "Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty", in Lord Ismay, *NATO the first five years 1949-1954*, Part 1 Chapter 1, online at: <http://www.nato.int/archives/1st5years/chapters/1.htm> (accessed on 15.09.2009)

⁴⁴ NATO Official Texts, "The North Atlantic Treaty", Article 5, online at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm (accessed on 15.09.2009)

⁴⁵ David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed: the Alliance's New Roles in International Security*, (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), p. 29

⁴⁶ Steve Weber, "Shaping the postwar balance of power: multilateralism in NATO", *International Organization*, Volume 46, Issue 3, June 1992, p. 650

actualize further aggressions for the extension of its sphere of influence. This created the perception that any time a Communist attack against Western Europe could be realized. So with the changes in the perceptions of the United States NATO became a real collective defence organization.

NATO's security strategy of collective defence during the Cold War sought to establish cooperation for the promotion of security in case of an actual or potential threats coming from other states. In the collective defence organization, main commitment of the Allies is to help a member state under aggression by a country or countries outside the alliance. The threat is posed by external actors, a state or a group of states that are not members of the organization so there is an attempt to divide the world as 'we' and 'they'.⁴⁷ The Parties try to maintain balance of power in order to deter an attack or thwart its outbreak. In the collective defence strategy, allies are expected to fulfill their commitments of mutual defence in the event of aggression against another ally.

After the development of nuclear weapons by both the United States and the Soviet Union, the dimension of collective defence extended from the 1950s.⁴⁸ The race in producing nuclear arsenals complicated the defence debates paving the way for the creation of several nuclear strategies. Deterrence of a possible Soviet aggression required possession of strategic nuclear arsenals. So from the 1950s, nuclear dimension of the collective defence strategy loomed large. Despite the relaxation of the tension between the USSR and the USA in some periods, existence of the Soviets was always a stimulus for the adherence to the NATO by the Allies providing the cohesion in the organization. Soviet aggressions in East Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan and crises such as Berlin and Cuba brought about a strengthened consensus in NATO. These events required to take measures for effective collective defence against the Communists. It can be

⁴⁷ David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed: the Alliance's New Roles in International Security*, (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), p. 7

⁴⁸ Cold War, online at: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/cold_war.htm (accessed on 16.09.2009)

summarized that NATO's security strategy during Cold War focused on the ways to prevent the Soviet Union from undertaking invasions and coercion.

NATO members were not only preoccupied with defence concerns, they were also uneasy with the Soviet's totalitarian and dictatorial policies that it pursued in the countries it had invaded and had seized control.⁴⁹ So the Allies had purposes including more than collective defence. In the early communiqués of NATO, it was mentioned that political changes in Europe was necessary. In 1957 Communiqué members also specified that it was vital to promote peaceful change.⁵⁰ The Allies were in an expectation of establishing a stable relationship with the Soviet Union and resolving the political issues by negotiating. The Harmel Report of 13 December 1967 provided an evaluation of the Alliance's tasks and provided NATO with a new function which was "to pursue the search for progress towards a more stable relationship in which the underlying political issues can be solved."⁵¹ NATO's activities included arrangement of activities and policies which would relax the tense relations with the USSR. However, after the construction of Berlin Wall and the Cuba Crisis in the early 1960s, political issues such as peaceful transformation of the Eastern Europe became relatively less important than military issues keeping the collective defence strategy in the foreground.

During the Cold War, the alliance helped to the creation of a transatlantic community sharing common values and interests and the Cold War environment obliged the Allies to stay together. Throughout this period, NATO had a static mission of deterring an attack against the members and prevention of its outbreak. Collective defence strategy of NATO did not involve a political dimension although

⁴⁹ David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed: the Alliance's New Roles in International Security*, (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), p. 36

⁵⁰ NATO Ministerial Communiqué, "Final Communiqué", adopted at the North Atlantic Council Meeting, 16-19 December 1957, online at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c571219a.htm> (accessed on 10.09.2009)

⁵¹ NATO Official Texts, "The Future Tasks of the Alliance, Report of the Council – The Harmel Report", 13-14 December 1967, Article 5, online at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_26700.htm (accessed on 14.09.2009)

the member states had political purposes and after 1960s, nuclear strategies and deterrence remained at the core of the security concerns of NATO.

In the late 1980s, the Soviet system began to weaken because of economic mismanagement, adoption of policies paving the way for decentralization and the rise of ethno-nationalism among non-Russians in the USSR.⁵² With its dissolution at the end and the victory of the Western world, it was thought that NATO's mission had finished. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact however, did not require the collapse of transatlantic alliance because these two organizations were different in structure and nature. NATO members were not in a thought of dissolving the alliance for the reason that it provided a platform for consultation and cooperation in which the Allies could debate about their concerns and find resolutions to their problems. Apart from providing an efficacious platform, other factors also did not allow NATO to dissolve. After a sudden change in the international environment and emergence of a new order by the end of the Cold War, different challenges remained for the Allies. As a result, NATO found itself in the midst of new roles and responsibilities which required a new security understanding and strategy in the post-Cold War era.

2.3 Post-Cold War Security Environment and Changing Missions of NATO

The Rome Declaration which was published in November 1991 marked the change in the Alliance's security strategy. The Allies agreed on a new Strategic Concept emphasizing that the nature of the security challenges had changed. Instead of a 'calculated aggression against the territory of the Allies', in the new environment threat was posed more by the 'adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes'. Moreover, 'other risks of a wider nature, including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of the flow of vital resources and actions of terrorism and sabotage' were also included in the list of

⁵² Collapse of the Soviet Union 1989-1991, online at: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/soviet-collapse.htm> (accessed on 16.09.2009)

threats affecting security interests of the Allies.⁵³ Fundamental changes in the security environment mainly required the use of political means and it became obvious that security and stability had ‘political, economic, social, and environmental elements as well as the indispensable defense dimension’. So a broader approach to security was needed. The Allies formed a security policy based on three pillars; ‘dialogue, co-operation, and the maintenance of a collective defense capability’.⁵⁴ However, the military aspect remained essential. As it is emphasized in the Alliance’s Strategic Concept, “the maintenance of an adequate military capability and clear preparedness to act collectively in the common defense remain central to the Alliance's security objectives.”⁵⁵ In the words of the Strategic Concept:

Two conclusions can be drawn from this analysis of the strategic context. The first is that the new environment does not change the purpose or the security functions of the Alliance, but rather underlines their enduring validity. The second, on the other hand, is that the changed environment offers new opportunities for the Alliance to frame its strategy within a broad approach to security.⁵⁶

These conclusions implied that NATO did not come to an end, on the contrary, with the changing security environment and threats, new missions emerged for the Alliance and military dimension still remained important. Moreover, the Strategic Concept brought forward the concept of the indivisibility of security which led to a strategic shift in the security strategy of the Alliance.

The security of all Allies is indivisible: an attack on one is an attack on all. Alliance solidarity and strategic unity are accordingly crucial prerequisites for collective security. The achievement of the Alliance's objectives depends

⁵³ NATO Official Texts, “The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept”, 7-8 November 1991, Article 12, online at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_23847.htm (accessed on 17.09.2009)

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, Article 24

⁵⁵ NATO Official Texts, “The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept” 24 April 1999, Article 28, online at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm (accessed on 17.09.2009)

⁵⁶ NATO Official Texts, “The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept”, 7-8 November 1991, Article 14, online at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_23847.htm (accessed on 17.09.2009)

critically on the equitable sharing of roles, risks and responsibilities, as well as the benefits, of common defence.⁵⁷

Collective security understanding started to influence strongly the security policy of the Alliance. Collective defence strategy did not lose its significance; the Allies continued to stress its validity. However, with the changing strategic environment and as a result of new security vision, NATO started to heed the security of non-Allies and established closer links with them. To give example, after the Gulf War in 1991 the Alliance recognized the importance of security of the Southern Mediterranean and Middle Eastern countries and tried to keep 'peaceful and non-adversarial relations' with them. It became evident that the stability and peace of the countries on the southern periphery of Europe were important for the security of the Alliance. The provision and maintenance of stability within NATO and the regions immediately surrounding it, became the focal point of NATO's new *raison d'être*, practically replacing its paramount function of the provision of collective defence for its members.⁵⁸

During the Cold War, the security of the Allies was significant however, after this Declaration security of the states outside the Alliance also became a concern for the Allies. The Alliance was based on collective defence strategy which binded the states together to deter and defence against external threats emanating from non-Allies as the Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty stipulated. As the Cold War ended and old adversaries turned out to be new partners, NATO needed to transform its security perception. The 'security is indivisible' understanding came to the agenda and it differed from the previous strategy of collective defence expressing an ambition towards collective security. It suggests that the security of the any member state of the CSCE can be jeopardized by any threat to the security of NATO allies and the former members of Warsaw Pact.⁵⁹ In this understanding a

⁵⁷ NATO Official Texts, "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept", 7-8 November 1991, Article 36, online at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_23847.htm (accessed on 17.09.2009)

⁵⁸ Gülnur Aybet, "NATO's New Missions", *Perceptions*, Volume 4, Number 1, March - May 1999, p. 67

⁵⁹ David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed: the Alliance's New Roles in International Security*, (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), p. 6

pact is formed against a threat coming from an ambiguous party to the pact which should embrace all the states in the state system because security is interdependent and every state's security interests are believed to be affected by any aggression anywhere. Contrary to the collective defence strategy, the world is not divided as 'we' and 'they and all the world is perceived as 'we'. This system helps to establish a "community of states" eliminating the alliance system, the adversaries and the allies. Aggression is deterred by forming shared peaceful norms.⁶⁰

NATO modified its old strategy of balancing the Soviet Union and adapted its security strategy to the newly emerging system. Collective security system was more appropriate for the post-Cold War environment because the international system went into a great transformation and ethnic and nationalistic conflicts began to appear after the end of the Cold War. Additionally, the satellite states of the Cold War were confronted with economic and political problems which were needed to be resolved in the framework of a security organization with the notion of cooperation. A broader approach to security was required for the post-Cold War period. Balancing behavior in the new international arena proved useless because of the changes in the security concept. "Security paradigm" of the Cold War was about safeguarding territorial integrity and the threats could be eliminated by using military means. However, the security understanding was put into question with the problematic situation in the Balkans after the Cold War. Territorial integrity of the NATO members was not jeopardized but indifference to the events would bring huge problems for the Allies, so security meant more than simply protecting the borders.

Risks to Allied security are less likely to result from calculated aggression against the territory of the Allies, but rather from the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in Central and Eastern Europe.⁶¹

⁶⁰ David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed: the Alliance's New Roles in International Security*, (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), p. 18

⁶¹ NATO Official Texts, "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept", 7-8 November 1991, Article 9, online at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_23847.htm (accessed on 17.09.2009)

Integration of the problematic regions to the system and resolution of their conflicts within the system would be the reasonable solution for the maintenance of security in the new world. “Indivisibility of security” understanding forced NATO to carry out a far-reaching review of its strategy in order to adapt it to the new circumstances. With the new strategy, NATO decided to deal with the security issues of the non-Allies, in other words, NATO became ready to undertake a mission beyond its borders increasing cooperation and contacts with Central and Eastern European states. Comprehensive approach to the security, taking into account economic, political and social dimensions, formed the basis of the Alliance’s security policy and besides military means; political tools also became significant in the fight against new threats.

The Alliance's active pursuit of dialogue and cooperation was underpinned by the commitment to an effective collective defence capability and to building up the institutional basis for crisis management and conflict prevention, therefore it had the following key objectives: to reduce the risk of conflict arising out of misunderstanding or design; to build increased mutual understanding and confidence among all European states; to help manage crises affecting the security of the Allies; and to expand the opportunities for a genuine partnership among all European countries in dealing with common security problems.⁶²

After the Cold War, NATO increased cooperation and dialogue with its old adversaries and did not neglect the problems of them. Also NATO actively took part in the resolution of the problems of non-members.

2.4 Building Cooperation with ‘Outsiders’

In the London Declaration adopted at NATO’s London Summit in July 1990, attention was paid to the change in the international environment with the collapse of the Communist governments and the Allies affirmed that NATO should adapt to

⁶² NATO Official Texts, “The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept”, 7-8 November 1991, Article 25, online at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_23847.htm (accessed on 17.09.2009)

these changes. It was decided to keep the Alliance together because of the uncertainty of the future. The Allies adopted that security and stability did not lie solely in the military dimension, and they aimed to develop a political component for the alliance.⁶³

In the Declaration it was stated that ‘Yet our Alliance must be even more an agent of change. It can help build the structures of a more united continent, supporting security and stability with the strength of our shared faith in democracy, the rights of the individual, and the peaceful resolution of disputes.’⁶⁴ As an ‘agent of change’, NATO was expected to undertake a political task. Additionally, as a new mission NATO would ‘reach out to the countries of the East which were our adversaries in the Cold War, and extend to them the hand of friendship.’ Instead of working only for the common defence, the Alliance would establish new partnerships with all the nations of Europe. So the Allies proposed the member states of the Warsaw Treaty Organization to sign a joint declaration affirming that they are ‘no longer adversaries’ and invited them for commitment to non-aggression principle. NATO members also wanted to ‘establish regular diplomatic liaison’ and ‘intensify military contacts’ with former Communist governments.⁶⁵ In the Declaration it was signified that the Alliance started to transform itself because of the political and military developments in Europe.

Later, in November 1990, after the Paris Summit meeting of the CSCE, a joint declaration and commitment to non-aggression was signed between the NATO allies and the members of Warsaw Pact. In the Joint Declaration, it was affirmed

⁶³ NATO Ministerial Communiqués, “London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance”, 5-6 July 1990, Article 2, online at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c900706a.htm> (accessed on 17.09.2009)

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, Article 6 and 7

that two sides were ‘no longer adversaries’.⁶⁶ In that context, they affirmed their obligations and commitment to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or the political independence of any state, from seeking to change existing borders by threat or use of force, and from acting in any other manner inconsistent with the principles and purposes of those documents. None of their weapons would ever be used except in self defence or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.⁶⁷

The Parties approved ‘the intensification of political and military contacts among them to promote mutual understanding and confidence.’ They decided to ‘contribute actively to conventional, nuclear and chemical arms control and disarmament agreements which enhance security and stability for all.’ Moreover, measures were taken to advance the CSCE process that contributed enhancing mutual confidence and security building by providing a forum for political dialogue. Former enemies recognized the fact that ‘security is indivisible and that the security of each of their countries is inextricably linked to the security of all the States participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.’⁶⁸ This statement also demonstrated a clear transformation in the NATO’s security strategy.

Repressive policies and actions of Soviet Union with regard to Baltic states before declaring their right to establish their own independence; the deteriorating situation and outbreak of hostilities in Yugoslavia, leading to the break-up of the Yugoslav Federation; and the attempted coup d’état in the Soviet Union itself which took place in August 1991 demonstrated that it was so beneficial to establish closer contacts and increased cooperation between the former Warsaw Pact states. So in 1991, visits and diplomatic contacts between NATO and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe were intensified.

⁶⁶ NATO Handbook 2001, Chapter 2: The Transformation of the Alliance, “Europe’s New Security Environment: The Hand of Friendship and Cooperation”, online at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb020103.htm> (accessed on 22.09.2009)

⁶⁷ “Joint Declaration of Twenty-two States”, 19 November 1990, Article 2, online at: <http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/cfe/text/paris1.htm> (accessed on 15.09.2009)

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, Article 3

With the publication of the Rome Declaration in November 1991, the Allies laid the basis for the creation of a new platform for the evolving relationship with the former adversaries and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was established.⁶⁹ It was composed of NATO members and Warsaw Pact countries excluding other states which were out of these blocs. The Council was perceived as a platform to handle the division that was created by the Cold War. NACC meetings focused on the remnant security concerns of the Cold War such as the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic States. Political cooperation was also launched on a number of security and defence issues. The first meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council which brought together the member countries of NATO and, initially, nine Central and Eastern European countries was held in December 1991.⁷⁰ It was an attempt to transcend adversarial relationship and move beyond establishing military contacts and diplomatic relations with the Warsaw Pact countries. The Parties aimed to establish ‘a more institutional relationship of consultation and cooperation on political and security issues’. In the Work Plan for Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation issued at the Ministerial Meeting of the NACC in 1992, it was stated that:

The focus of our consultations and cooperation will be on security and related issues, such as defence planning, conceptual approaches to arms control, democratic concepts of civilian- military relations, civil- military coordination of air-traffic management, the conversion of defence production to civilian purposes and enhanced participation in NATO's "Third Dimension" scientific and environmental programmes.⁷¹

However, after a while, the platform became restricted because the governments were reluctant to take action against the problems such as the withdrawal of Soviet troops. NAAC was ineffective to awake the willingness to act together and lacked

⁶⁹ NATO Handbook 2001, Chapter 2: The Transformation of the Alliance, “New Institutions: North Atlantic Cooperation Council”, online at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb020201.htm> (accessed on 22.09.2009)

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷¹ NATO Ministerial Communiqués, “Work Plan for Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation”, 10 March 1992, Article 3, online at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c920310b.htm> (accessed on 16.09.2009)

the possibility of each Partner developing individual cooperative relations with NATO. The issues such as peacekeeping, scientific and environmental cooperation came to the agenda, the platform became more effective. And, in 1997, the NAAC was replaced by Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) because of the need to develop an enhanced and more operational partnership.

As a further step in building cooperation, the Parties were invited in the NAAC Ministerial Meeting in January 1994 to adopt a program ‘that would transform the relationship between NATO and participating states’. With the Partnership’s Framework Document issued at the NATO’s Brussels Summit in January 1994, the program was launched. According to the NAAC Meeting Document, ‘this new program went beyond dialogue and cooperation to forge a real partnership - a Partnership for Peace (PfP).’ The purposes of the PfP program were declared in the Partnership’s Framework Document. The aims were “to facilitate the transparency in national defense planning and budgeting processes; to ensure democratic control of defense forces; to maintain the capability and readiness to contribute to the operations under the authority of the UN and/or the responsibility of the CSCE; to develop cooperative military relations with NATO, for the purpose of joint planning, training, and exercises in order to strengthen the partner countries’ ability to undertake missions in the fields of peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations, and others as may subsequently be agreed; and finally to develop forces that are better able to operate with those of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance.”⁷²

Furthermore, relationships regarding the security matters between NATO members and other Partners were redefined. Also NATO Allies accepted the obligation to ‘consult with any active participant in the partnership if that partner perceived a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security.’ Commitments that were made in the framework of the purposes by the Partners helped to ‘expand and intensify political and military cooperation throughout

⁷² NATO Official Texts, “Partnership for Peace Framework Document”, 10 January 1994, Article 3, online at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_24469.htm (accessed on 16.09.2009)

Europe, increase stability, diminish threats to peace, and build strengthened relationships by promoting the spirit of practical cooperation and commitment to democratic principles'. This Partnership provided a better and more effective cooperation ground for the reason that it allowed for a 'self-differentiation'.⁷³ In the PfP Program, the Partner countries formed a comprehensive list of political commitments and determined the activities to undertake compatible with their capacities and ambitions. Individual Partnership Programs which were 'drawn up from an extensive menu of activities, according to each country's specific interests and needs" mutually formed and adopted between NATO and each Partner country. So with the Boczek's statement: "The PfP goes beyond the NAAC non-differentiation principle by taking into account the varying interests and differing potentials of the individual partner countries."⁷⁴ So the PfP program played an important role in the evolutionary process of the expansion of NATO preparing the countries for membership.

2.5 Relations with Former Major Adversary-Russia

As a former main adversary, NATO did not neglect Russia in the post-Cold war period. Instead of excluding and antagonizing Russia, NATO attached importance to establish firmer relations with it and Russia participated to the PfP program in 1994.⁷⁵ It was not until May 1997 that the main forum for NATO-Russia relations was established with the Founding Act on Mutual Relations. This act specified the objectives and mechanism of consultation and cooperation that constituted the essentials of the bilateral relations between NATO and Russia. Both sides committed to adapt their conventional and nuclear forces to the new security

⁷³ Sorin Lungu, "NATO Cooperation with Former Adversaries", *American Diplomacy*, web edition, Volume 4, Number 3, Summer 1999, Part 2, online at: http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/AD_Issues/amdipl_12/lungu_coop2.html (accessed on 10.09.2009)

⁷⁴ Boleslaw A. Boczek, "NATO and the Former Warsaw Pact States", in S. Victor Papacosma and Mary Ann Heiss (eds.), *NATO in the Post-Cold War Era: Does it Have a Future?*, (London: MacMillan Press, 1995), p. 217

⁷⁵ David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed: the Alliance's New Roles in International Security*, (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), p. 135

environment. NATO-Russia Permanent Council was established with the objective "to build increasing levels of trust, unity of purpose and habits of consultation and cooperation between NATO and Russia, in order to enhance each other's security and that of all nations in the Euro-Atlantic area and diminish the security of none."⁷⁶ The Council constituted a forum for consultation on the issues of common concern such as 'aggressive nationalism, proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, terrorism, persistent abuse of human rights and the rights of persons belonging to national minorities and unresolved territorial disputes.'⁷⁷

Enlargement, incorporation of the former adversaries to the system, has been one of the most crucial topic in the relations with Russia. Enlargement idea, as a pillar of the indivisible security understanding, proved that NATO was in a transformation, paying increasing attention to the pan-European collective security purposes. Although the expansion was not a salient idea just after the collapse of the Soviet Union, in the course of time it became more relevant. As a product of the Cold War, Russia always approached the issue with skepticism perceiving it as an expansion of the NATO's area of influence. And, at the beginning of the process, Russia declined to adopt the PfP Program because of its concerns about the enlargement. However, in the NATO-Russia Founding Act, there was not any provision that would block NATO's potential eastern expansion. The Act stipulated that NATO and Russia will "respect for sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all states and their inherent right to choose the means to ensure their own security, the inviolability of borders and peoples' right of self-determination as enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act and other OSCE documents."⁷⁸ Thus, Russia had nothing to do other than respecting for the decisions of the Central and Eastern European countries to join NATO. After soothing the Russian unrest with the Founding Act in the Madrid

⁷⁶ NATO Official Texts, "Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation", 27 May 1997, Part 2, par.1, online at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/fndact-a.htm> (accessed on 18.09.2009)

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, Part 1, par.3

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, Part 1, par. 6

Summit of 1997; Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary were invited to begin accession talks with NATO.⁷⁹

Moreover, as a part of the enlargement –expanding area of influence- strategy, NATO initiated a Mediterranean Dialogue with seven non-NATO countries for cooperation in political and military issues in 1994.⁸⁰ Furthermore, for the prevention of Ukraine being in the Russian sphere of influence, NATO initiated Partnership with Ukraine in 1997 in order to “further broaden and strengthen their cooperation and to develop a distinctive and effective partnership, which will promote further stability and common democratic values in Central and Eastern Europe.”⁸¹ In a nutshell, building cooperation with the former Soviet countries could be regarded as a signal for the transformation of NATO’s post-Cold War security strategy.

2.6 Crisis Management and Peace Operations

Besides promoting dialogue and cooperation with former adversaries, NATO embraced another principal security role of supporting crisis management and peace operations. During the Cold War, NATO operations outside the territories of the members were unthinkable however; after the events mainly in the former Yugoslavia, the requirement to involve in the peace establishments emerged.⁸² In November 1991, a statement was issued about the situation of Yugoslavia by NATO members. The Allies emphasized that they were “deeply concerned by the current crisis in Yugoslavia and the grave danger it poses to stability in the

⁷⁹ NATO Press Releases, “ Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation”, 8 July 1997, Article 6, online at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1997/p97-081e.htm> (accessed on 07.09.2009)

⁸⁰ , “NATO Mediterranean Dialogue”, For more information, <http://www.nato.int/med-dial/summary.htm>

⁸¹ NATO Basic Texts, “Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Ukraine”, 9 July 1997, Article 1, online at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/ukrchr.htm> (accessed on 19.09.2009)

⁸² David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed: the Alliance’s New Roles in International Security*, (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), p. 193

region.”⁸³ They condemned ‘the tragic loss of life, the intimidation of civilian populations and the extensive destruction of property and the use of force to achieve political goals.’⁸⁴ It was stated that changing current borders by the use of violent means was unacceptable. The parties were invited “to cooperate fully with the European Community in its efforts under the mandate given to it by the CSCE, both in the implementation of ceasefire and monitoring agreements and in the negotiating process within the Conference on Yugoslavia.”⁸⁵

At the beginning, NATO did not consider to have responsibilities in the solution of the conflict in Yugoslavia however, after the escalation of the violence and worsening of the situation, NATO prepared itself in order to involve in the management of the conflict. With the declaration of the final communiqué of the Oslo Summit in June 1992, NATO’s new roles of the military operations beyond its territories for collective security missions were affirmed. It was stated that;

The Alliance has the capacity to contribute to effective actions by the CSCE in line with its new and increased responsibilities for crisis management and the peaceful settlement of disputes. In this regard, we are prepared to support, on a case-by-case basis in accordance with our own procedures, peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of the CSCE, including by making available Alliance resources and expertise.⁸⁶

This declaration marked a turning point in the history of the NATO with the approval of NATO’s preparedness to take part in the collective security tasks. In 1992, NATO began to participate slowly in the efforts to finish conflicts in the former Yugoslavia by joining in air and sea operations to apply UN Resolutions, because after Bosnia declared its independence, ethnic conflicts and genocides escalated. In June 1993, NATO decided to give support of air force in the formation

⁸³ NATO Press Releases, “The Situation in Yugoslavia”, Statement issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, 1-8 November 1991, Article 1, online at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c911108b.htm> (accessed on 08.09.2009)

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, Article 1 and 3

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, Article 4

⁸⁶ NATO Ministerial Communiqués, “Final Communiqué”, 4 June 1992, Article 11, online at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c920604a.htm> (accessed on 10.09.2009)

of the safe areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The UN, CSCE, and European Community could not take serious and effective measures in order to ameliorate the situation and could not make use of the NATO and WEU support. Despite the condemnations and efforts to end Serbian aggression, the Serbs could not be prevented. In 1995, they attacked to the safe areas which were thought to be under the UN assurance. Therefore, NATO launched air strikes on Serbian military targets and this contributed much to compel the parties into peace negotiations. Following the Dayton Peace Agreement, NATO deployed NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) in order to effectuate the military aspect of the agreement thus; NATO undertook its first peacekeeping operation.

Later, at the beginning of 1998, the ethnic cleansing policy of Milosevic emerged again in Kosovo. In May 1998, with a statement on Kosovo NATO members expressed that they were ‘deeply concerned’ by the conflict and clarified its objectives as ‘to help achieve a peaceful resolution of the crisis by contributing to the response of the international community’ and ‘to promote stability and security in neighbouring countries, with particular emphasis on Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.’⁸⁷

Despite the steps taken to manage the conflict, the situation deteriorated in Kosovo at the beginning of 1999. Milosevic refused to comply and intensified the operations against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. Between March and June 1999, NATO started an air strike and after that, parties were called for a settlement. “NATO’s operation in Kosovo, a 78-day air campaign, represented the first time in its fifty-year history that the alliance had gone to war.”⁸⁸ Then, the UN Security Council Resolution was passed and the principals for a political solution were specified. KFOR was deployed as a security force and with substantial NATO participation. NATO was also at the forefront in resolving humanitarian problems assigning its forces in the region to humanitarian missions.

⁸⁷ NATO Press Releases, “Statement on Kosovo”, 28 May 1998, Article 4, online at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1998/p98-061e.htm> (accessed on 10.09.2009)

⁸⁸ Ellen Williams, “Out of Area and Very Much in Business? NATO, the U.S., and the Post-9/11 International Security Environment”, *Comparative Strategy*, Volume 27, Issue 1, 2008, p. 67

To sum up, during the Cold War and at the beginning of its history, NATO functioned as a collective defence organization. The collective defence measures were evinced in the Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and deterrence was implemented by forming a collective threat based on nuclear weapons. Besides establishing a nuclear defence, NATO also tried to deal with security and defence cooperation. Political amendments were also made such as the Harmel Report of 1967 establishing a new approach that emphasized the importance of dialogue with the adversaries. After the end of the Cold War, in the 1990s, NATO undertook missions that transcend its main strategy of collective defence and loomed large in the political arena. When the parties adopted that they were no longer adversaries, NATO extended its functions adding cooperation with former adversaries. However, NATO did not lose its military roles. Besides dealing with hard security threats, NATO developed new political and military missions and roles adapting itself to the new security environment that came out of the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Lungu summarizes NATO's transformation that in the post-cold war era, NATO has transformed itself by establishing NATO-sponsored cooperative institutions to include the former members of the Warsaw Pact and other non-NATO countries. NATO has acknowledged that political, economic and even environmental concerns are gaining greater importance, while the military missions of the Alliance have become more complex so NATO has redefined its military missions.⁸⁹

2.7 NATO and Terrorism in the Cold War and Post-Cold War Period

As the political environment in the years of NATO's foundation demonstrates, it can be claimed that the principal factor lying behind the establishment of the Alliance was the threat of communism and a potential communist attack that could emanate from the Eastern bloc. In this period, security perceptions of the states were based on the expectation that major security challenges may stem from the

⁸⁹ Sorin Lungu, "NATO Cooperation with Former Adversaries", *American Diplomacy*, web edition, Volume 4, Number 3, Summer 1999, Part 2, online at: http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/AD_Issues/amdipl_12/lungu_coop2.html (accessed on 10.09.2009)

military forces of the enemy state. As a consequence of this, terrorist movements conducted by non-state groups were not regarded as a threat for international community. Within this framework, NATO during the Cold War did not give place to the terrorism concern in its security agenda. In the proper sense, counter-terrorism concept was included within the missions of the Alliance after the 9/11 attacks.

Before the 9/11 terrorist attacks, NATO Allies faced with the threat of the terrorist groups. In the Cold War period, there were terrorist activities conducted with the motivations of anti-colonialism, struggle for national liberation, ideology, religion and ethnic separation. However, these were not regarded as a serious security concern for the reason that they could not damage seriously and in a way that they could attract attention.

According to Anthon Bebler, “prior to 11 September 2001 NATO had not collectively reacted when terrorist attacks with considerable consequences had occurred in the territory of their member states”.⁹⁰ NATO was indifferent to the terrorism threat. NATO’s security priorities were different and this was because of the international security environment in the time of its establishment. A. Bebler finds out three main reasons for this negligence of the Alliance. Firstly, NATO was established among the rising tensions between the East and the West, specifically the USA and the Soviet Union. The expected threat concept was different in the minds of the states. They were ‘fearing of possible massive military attacks that could be posed exclusively by the armed forces of hostile states excluding other hostile actions (e.g. sabotage, terrorist acts etc.) below the level of a massive military attack.’ Secondly, states pursued different and vague policies towards terrorism according to their national interests. So the Allies did not need to adopt a common position against terrorism because the damage was limited to the territorial borders. Bebler explains the final reason as: ‘NATO’s institutional structure, mode of decision-making, nature and distribution of capabilities etc. were not geared from

⁹⁰ Anthon Bebler, “NATO’s Role in the Struggle against Transnational Terrorism”, in Iztok Prezelj, *The Fight against Terrorism and Crisis Management in the Western Balkans*, (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2008), p. 3

the outset nor adapted in the following decades to effective protection against terrorism, let alone preventing or combating it.⁹¹ All these motives reveal the logic behind NATO's indifference.

It can be argued that NATO's role during the Cold War was primarily static. It was formed in order to prevent an attack against the territory of its member countries. The Alliance aimed to 'safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their people' while trying to 'promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.'⁹² According to NATO's first Secretary General, Lord Ismay, NATO was established to keep "the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down."⁹³ From the formation of the Alliance, until the end of the Cold War, state-centric security approaches dominated the international power structure and the concept of security has been shaped around the rivalry between the two poles. Therefore, as the analysis of the NATO's security understanding in the Cold War era in the second chapter proved, NATO paid no attention to the terrorism threat emanating from minor non-state actors.

As far as terrorism is concerned, the Rome Declaration which was adopted in November 1991 marked the beginning of a new era and the change in the Alliance's security strategy. NATO members acknowledged the fact that the possibility of an unexpected armed attack to the territories of the Allies reduced so they decided that the threat of a simultaneous, full-scale attack thus no longer provided the focus for Allied strategy.⁹⁴ Moreover, Allies were aware of the changes in the nature of the threat. "In contrast with the predominant threat of the past, the risks to Allied

⁹¹ Anthon Bebler, "NATO's Role in the Struggle against Transnational Terrorism", in Iztok Prezelj, *The Fight against Terrorism and Crisis Management in the Western Balkans*, (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2008), p. 6

⁹² NATO Official Texts, "The North Atlantic Treaty", online at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm (accessed on 15.09.2009)

⁹³ Niruban Balachandran, "The New NATO: Changed Priorities Reflect This Decade's Coming Security Challenges", 20/April-June 2010, online at: <http://www.globalaffairs.es/en/nato-changed-priorities-reflect-this-decades-coming-security-challenges/> (accessed on 15.09.2009)

⁹⁴ NATO Official Texts, "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept", 7-8 November 1991, Article 7, online at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_23847.htm (accessed on 17.09.2009)

security that remain are multi-faceted in nature and multi-directional, which makes them hard to predict and assess.”⁹⁵ Risks were less likely to emanate from a ‘calculated aggression against the territory of the Allies’, instead ‘the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes’ constituted the major source of threat. And these challenges did not directly threaten the security and the territorial integrity of members of the Alliance but they harboured the risk of ‘leading to crises inimical to European stability and even to armed conflicts, which could involve outside powers or spill over into NATO countries, having a direct effect on the security of the Alliance.’⁹⁶

Although the Allies attached more importance to the new kinds of threats, they were still concerned with the conventional forces and large nuclear arsenal of the Soviet Union which was only comparable with that of the United States. The Allies recognized the fact that these capabilities of the Soviets had to be taken into account in order to preserve stability and security in Europe.⁹⁷ “Even in a non-adversarial and cooperative relationship, Soviet military capability and build-up potential, including its nuclear dimension, still constitute the most significant factor of which the Alliance has to take account in maintaining the strategic balance in Europe.”⁹⁸

After the end of the Cold War, drawing attention to the global context, the Allies defined the new sources for instability and threats to the security. “Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of the flow of the vital resources and actions of terrorism and sabotage.”⁹⁹

⁹⁵ NATO Official Texts, “The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept”, 7-8 November 1991, Article 8, online at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_23847.htm (accessed on 17.09.2009)

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, Article 9

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, Article 10

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, Article 13

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, Article 12

The Allies were conscious of the changing security environment where the potential of conflict stemming from a spontaneous full-scale attack reduced and new roots of risks and crisis came to the agenda. However, they did not attach significant importance to those new challenges treating them as inferior because they could not get rid of the perception that hard security threats had the priority. Therefore, it indicated that terrorism was not in the first rank among NATO's security concerns.

In the 1990s, the frequency of the terrorist activities and the number of victims increased. But Allies did not attempt to take a collective action against the threat of terrorism. In the Strategic Concept adopted in 1999, the importance attached to the terrorism did not change. The Allies adopted a broad approach to the security issues. 'Serious economic, social and political difficulties, ethnic and religious rivalries, territorial disputes, inadequate or failed efforts at reform, the abuse of human rights, and the dissolution of states' were described as sources of instability.¹⁰⁰ Additionally, the proliferation of NBC weapons and their means of delivery became a matter of serious concern for the Allies.¹⁰¹ It was stated that non-state actors had the potential to create and use some of these weapons, but the Allies did not consider these non-state actors as terrorist organizations. And terrorism was again in the secondary position. They described terrorism as 'other risks' that may affect the Alliance's security interests together with sabotage, organised crime, and the disruption of the flow of vital resources.¹⁰²

Thus, it can be claimed that terrorism did not become an essential concern until 9/11 attacks. The Allies merely recognized terrorism as one of the risks that could affect their security but they were indifferent to the terrorist activities that member states confronted. Any counter-terrorism strategy was not formed.

¹⁰⁰ NATO Official Texts, "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept" 24 April 1999, Article 20, online at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm (accessed on 17.09.2009)

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, Article 22

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, Article 24

2.8 Conclusion

During the Cold War, NATO was founded among the rising tensions between the East and the West and focused on the collective defence of its members against a potential threat that may originate from the Soviet Union and its Allies. After the end of the Cold War, the security environment altered and NATO needed to develop new political and military missions and roles adapting itself to the new security environment. The Allies established new partnerships with all the nations of Europe, took part in the crisis management and peace operations. They were not interested in terrorism issue.

With the escalation of terrorist activities in the post-Cold War period, terrorism came to the foreground in the security environment. In the Strategic Concepts (both in 1991 and 1999), the Alliance mentioned about terrorism in the other risks category but did not specify a strategy in the fight against it. NATO's this stance profoundly changed with the 9/11 attacks. Because of the magnitude and lethality of the events, NATO could not stay indifferent to the problem as the world community. NATO's new era with regard to the fight against transnational terrorism which began with the 9/11 attacks will be analyzed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER III

EVOLUTION OF NATO'S STRATEGIES FOR FIGHTING AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM IN THE AFTERMATH OF 9/ 11

3.1 Introduction

After exploring the place of terrorism in the security concerns of NATO during the Cold War and post-Cold War period and NATO's deal with the transnational terrorism in that period; the reactions and responses of NATO to the 9/11 event which is a milestone both in the international security environment and in the history of terrorism will be analyzed. In this regard, the impacts of the 9/11 attacks and the following immediate responses to them by the international community will be evaluated in order to discover the efforts of international cooperation and how NATO became significant organization in the fight against terrorism. Then, the urgent reaction of NATO and the debates within NATO regarding the question of how to counter terrorism will be taken in hand profoundly. Finally, by focusing on the NATO summits, the gradual inclusion and increasing efforts of the NATO in the fight against the terrorism will be examined in this chapter.

3.2 Impacts of 9/11 on the International Order

The terrific attacks to the World Trade Center and Pentagon were turning point for the international political system. The world met with the new realities and had to deal with the new disorder that has come into being particularly after the strikes. A new period with a new global security environment emerged which required a great transformation in the security strategies of the states. The sense of security in the minds of everyone was damaged with the images of such a huge destruction. In other words, it was clear that the international order was profoundly affected.

States lost their significance as the main actors in the international system.¹⁰³ The terror attacks on the USA introduced non-state actors as the new source of threat. Before, non-state actors were not considered in the security concerns of the international system. The system was state-centric. In this state centric approach, non-state actors were not perceived a global security threat of the international security until the 9/11 attacks. However, these events demonstrated that the non-state actors also acquired the power to form a grave threat to the security of the international community. In this framework, Al-Qaeda, a transnational Islamic fundamentalist movement headed by Osama bin Laden, constitutes a good example. The militant organization is unique among other terrorist groups in terms of its structure and the methods of combat. Anton Bebler clearly explains the characteristics of the new terrorist group:

- the structure of clandestine transnational and loosely connected networks, with concealed, possibly alternate headquarters and an anonymous leadership which uses a wide variety of means of communication – from very crude to highly sophisticated ones;
- a secret network of highly motivated members ready to sacrifice their lives, supported in many countries by thousands of sympathisers and providers of funds, shelter, legal covers, food, medical and technical assistance etc. Most sympathisers live or originated in states with majorities of population professing Islam. However, cells of devoted members and supporters have also been discovered in several EU and NATO member states;
- the use of surprise, high mobility and unconventional combinations of destructive means in attacks against high-value, symbolic and mostly civilian targets;
- the very uneven distribution of targets and wide geographical spread of violent acts with the most numerous and destructive attacks since September 2001 having taken place in countries and regions with significant a Muslim population (in the Near East, North Africa, Middle East, South and South-East Asia and the Russian Federation); and
- the exploitation of the mass media, particularly of television, to magnify the psychological and political impact of terrorist acts.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰³ Steve Smith, “The End of the Unipolar Moment? September 11 and the Future of World Order ” in Gus Martin, *The New Era of Terrorism*, (California, Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 2004) p. 261

¹⁰⁴ Anthon Bebler, “NATO’s Role in the Struggle against Transnational Terrorism”, in Iztok Prezelj, *The Fight against Terrorism and Crisis Management in the Western Balkans*, (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2008), p. 10

With this structure, it became easy for the terrorists to organize and conduct operations and after the 9/11 strikes, the Al-Qaeda organization managed to capture global attention, introducing a new threat for the international society and forcing the states into cooperation against the new challenge. This can be explained as; in the global world since the threat emanated from non-state transnational organizations, it seems that unilateral defiance does not avail. Cooperation with other members of the world community is a must in the fight against the international threat. Because the threat of terrorism in the new era is a concern for many states since the terrorist groups are transnational in structure establishing cells in many countries and their acts are widely spreaded all around the world in an extensive geographical area.

The choice of the United States as a target and the excessiveness of the damage that was made in one single attack, made the terrorism issue a top concern in the security agenda of the states recognizing the significance of cooperation in the face of a transnational threat.

3.3 Immediate Reactions of the World Community

Just after the terrific attacks, in his speech on 20 September 2001, President Bush declared “War on Terror” which called for the creation of a global coalition of states in order to end transnational terrorism. And in this war, there was no place for neutrality. The world community had to make choice of whether they were with the USA or the terrorists.¹⁰⁵ At the beginning, the USA found support for its war against global terror. The Europeans were startled by the events of 9/11 and hastened to support the USA and line up with it. Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder assured the USA "unlimited solidarity" after the attacks¹⁰⁶ and in

¹⁰⁵ CNN News, “Transcript of President Bush’s Address to Congress”, 21 September 2001, online at: <http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/> (accessed on 20.09.2009)

¹⁰⁶ “Comments and Images of the World's Leaders Following the September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks”, online at: <http://www.september11news.com/InternationalReaction.htm> (accessed on 10.02.2010)

the French newspaper *Le Monde* it was written “We are all Americans”¹⁰⁷ expressing full support for the USA.

In October 2001, Operation Enduring Freedom was launched in Afghanistan with the support of Great Britain and with the aim of destroying Al-Qaeda and its use of the Afghan territory as a base of operations for terrorist activities. Then, on 29 January 2002, in his State of Union address, George Bush defined axis of evil. Axis of evil included the states which was considered to support and finance terrorism. Additionally, these states were considered to develop weapons of mass destruction and threaten world peace. In his speech Bush avowed the new targets in fight against terrorism:

North Korea is a regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction, while starving its citizens. Iran aggressively pursues these weapons and exports terror, while an unelected few repress the Iranian people's hope for freedom. Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror. The Iraqi regime has plotted to develop anthrax and nerve gas and nuclear weapons for over a decade... States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States.¹⁰⁸

North Korea, Iran and Iraq were declared as ‘evils’ and the USA gave the signal that it would take action against those “evil” states in the near future.

Realizing the gravity of the new threat, the EU condemned the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these terrorist attacks in the strongest possible terms with a joint declaration on 14 September 2001. And European states enounced that the US Administration and the American people could rely on their complete solidarity and full cooperation to ensure that justice was done.¹⁰⁹ Then, the

¹⁰⁷ Colombani, Jean-Marie, “We Are All Americans”, *World Press Review*, web edition, Volume 48, Number 11, November 2001, online at: http://www.worldpress.org/1101we_are_all_americans.htm (accessed on 17.01.2010)

¹⁰⁸ CNN News, “Bush State of the Union Address”, 29 January 2002, online at: <http://transcripts.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/01/29/bush.speech.txt/> (accessed on 20.09.2009)

European Council made a special session on 21 September 2001 to “analyse the international situation following the terrorist attacks in the United States and to impart the necessary impetus to the actions of the European Union.”¹¹⁰ Fight against terrorism became primary objective for the Union and a Plan of Action, urging for measures in five main areas, was adopted. According to this Plan, it was decided to enhance police and judicial cooperation, develop international legal instruments, prevent funding of terrorism, strengthen air security and finally to coordinate the European Union’s global action.¹¹¹

Then, the EU reserved more resources for the fight against terrorism and accelerated the pace of its activities. Then the EU members adopted acts to combat terrorism, formed working groups. They established a European Arrest Warrant and came to terms on a common concept of terrorist offences. Additionally, minimum level of penal sanctions for this kind of offences was determined.¹¹²

As far as Russia concerned, President Vladimir Putin was the first leader to call the U.S. president on 11 September.¹¹³ For the reason that Russia itself suffered a series of terrorist attacks, Putin supported the USA in his words: “...we, more than anyone, understand the feelings of the American people. In the name of Russia, I want to say to the American people: we are with you.”¹¹⁴ In the USA’s fight with terrorism in Afghanistan, Putin presented his willingness of cooperation by offering

¹⁰⁹ “Joint Declaration by the Heads of State and Government of the European Union, the President of the European Parliament, the President of the European Commission, and the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy”, 14 September 2001, online at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/er/Declaration.en1.pdf (accessed on 23.09.2009)

¹¹⁰ “Conclusions and Plan of Action of the Extraordinary European Council Meeting on 21 September 2001”, online at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/140.en.pdf (accessed on 23.09.2009)

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹¹² “The EU Fights against the Scourge of Terrorism”, online at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/terrorism/fsj_terrorism_intro_en.htm (accessed on 23.09.2009)

¹¹³ CNN News, “9/11 a 'turning point' for Putin”, 10 September 2001, online at: <http://archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/europe/09/10/ar911.russia.putin/> (accessed on 24.09.2009)

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*

further support. Putin affirmed: “Russia will continue to provide intelligence information we have collected on the infrastructure, location and training of international terrorists,”¹¹⁵ Furthermore, Russia cooperated with central Asian states to permit U.S. forces, for the first time, to take advantage of the military bases of the former Soviet Union.¹¹⁶

The UN passed a Resolution declaring the 9/11 attacks as a ‘threat to international peace and security.’ International community was called on a global cooperation to prevent and repress terrorist acts. It was also denoted that the Security Council was ready ‘to take all necessary steps to respond to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001’ and the UN recognized ‘the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter’.¹¹⁷ In an another Resolution, states were obliged “to criminalise terrorism, its perpetrators, its accomplices and its financiers, in addition to ratifying the international antiterrorist conventions and transferring said conventions to domestic law.”¹¹⁸ A road map was defined for the member states to pursue in the fight against terrorism. Moreover, a Counter-Terrorism Committee was established which had the tasks of ‘monitoring the implementation of the resolution, with the assistance of appropriate expertise’.¹¹⁹ These Resolutions provided the USA with the required justification for a military response in Afghanistan.

The OSCE was the first international organization to adopt an action plan for combating terrorism and has made the fight against terrorism one of its central tasks. Predicating its readiness to make contribution to the fight against terrorism in

¹¹⁵ CNN News, “9/11 a 'turning point' for Putin”, 10 September 2001, online at: <http://archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/europe/09/10/ar911.russia.putin/> (accessed on 24.09.2009)

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁷ UN Press Release SC/7143, UN Security Council Resolution 1368 (2001), online at: <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/SC7143.doc.htm> (accessed on 27.09.2009)

¹¹⁸ Javier Ruperez, “The Role of the United Nations in the Fight against Terrorism: A Provisional Balance”, *Perceptions*, Volume 10, Summer 2005, p. 41

¹¹⁹ UN Press Release SC/7158, UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), online at: <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sc7158.doc.htm> (accessed on 27.09.2009)

close co-operation, the OSCE with the Bucharest Plan of Action for Combating Terrorism aimed to “establish a framework for comprehensive OSCE action to be taken by participating States and the Organization as a whole to combat terrorism, fully respecting international law, including the international law of human rights and other relevant norms of international law; expand existing activities that contribute to combating terrorism, facilitate interaction between States and, where appropriate, identify new instruments for action; and identify activities to be implemented immediately as well as over the medium and long term”.¹²⁰ All OSCE states were obliged to prepare a road map for the implementation and to present this to the Chairman-in Office. Furthermore, the “Bishkek Programme of Action for Combating Terrorism” was produced by the regional conference held in Bishkek on 13-14 December 2001.¹²¹ Also, in 2002, Action against Terrorism Unit was established, coordinating the counter-terrorism efforts of the OSCE states and cooperating with other international or regional organizations.¹²²

These immediate reactions demonstrated that the 9/11 attacks was strictly speaking a turning point for the world community as a whole. As it is understood from the Russia’s attitude; former enmities and national primary interests were ignored and several cooperation calls were made. The world united in the face of a serious threat and as a result of this, the USA receiving full support of international society, launched its own ‘War on Terrorism’.

3.4 Nato and Terrorism After 9/11

As it is proved, all international organizations were ready to take part in countering terrorism considering the multi-faceted nature of the threat. However, NATO was different from other organizations in terms of its political-military structure and its long history with the security concerns. And NATO felt obliged to undertake

¹²⁰ “The Bucharest Plan of Action for Combating Terrorism”, 4 December 2001, Article 3, online at: http://www.osce.org/documents/cio/2001/12/670_en.pdf (accessed on 05.10.2009)

¹²¹ OSCE Activities: “Combating terrorism”, online at: <http://www.osce.org/activities/13032.html> (accessed on 13.10.2009)

¹²² “Action against Terrorism Unit”, For more information, <http://www.osce.org/atu/>

responsibility in the fight against terrorism for the reason that one of its members was attacked.¹²³

NATO, as an international security platform, has many advantageous aspects in the fight against terrorism. According to the Committee Report of NATO Parliamentary Assembly, the capabilities of NATO member countries and their cooperation with different partner countries with different geography, ethnicity, and culture; permit NATO as an organization to produce counter-terrorism strategies that are useful to a wide range of situations and threats. NATO also has the capability of sending out expertise from the members that are experienced in dealing with terrorism to the countries with weaker defences. Moreover, NATO is able to evoke political will among the Allies in the terrorism debates in the platform of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and with its consensus-driven decision-making. It has improved its intelligence-sharing channels, used mainly in the military arena. Furthermore, NATO has the military equipments such as force generation and command and control procedures that are required for operations to prevent terrorist activities. And with the help of technological developments, NATO can carry out the research and development activities to counter terrorism in a more effective way.¹²⁴

However, although NATO was a very convenient platform to establish counter-terrorism strategies, before the 9/11 attacks there was not any endeavour for this and the Alliance did not prefer to collectively react. NATO's security priorities were different and this was because of the international security environment in the time of its establishment. The Allies were 'fearing of possible massive military attacks that could be posed exclusively by the armed forces of hostile states excluding other hostile actions (e.g. sabotage, terrorist acts etc.) below the level of a massive military attack.'¹²⁵ Moreover states pursued different and vague policies towards

¹²³ NATO Parliamentary Assembly Committee Report 2007, "The Fight against Terrorism - Impact and Implications for the Atlantic Alliance", Article 7, online at: <http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=1175> (accessed on 01.10.2009)

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, Article 6

terrorism according to their national interests. So the Allies did not need to adopt a common position against terrorism. However, with the change in the nature of the terrorism and after recognizing the potential of terrorists in destruction, it was not reasonable to remain inactive. And as it is expressed in the Policy Paper prepared by Richard Nelson and presented to the Atlantic Council:

International terrorism presents the Euro-Atlantic nations with a complex, persistent threat that calls for a multilateral strategic response involving many dimensions of policy and many international actors. No simple approach and no single institution or channel of international cooperation can be expected to suffice. It follows that there is a need to define appropriate roles for all the institutions involved and to formulate a strategy by which the countries engaged in the struggle can most effectively coordinate and combine their responses in what will at best be a long and difficult task.¹²⁶

In order to prove the necessity of the Alliance's endurance, NATO felt obliged to embark upon this mission. When terrorist attacks with considerable consequences had occurred in the territory of a member state, NATO immediately renewed vision. As it is understood from immediate reactions of the world community, terrorism issue became a focal point for many states and international organizations. Facing with a new kind of security challenge with a transnational dimension, states apprehended the need for cooperation and international and regional organizations became a platform for calling the nations for collaboration and determining counter-terrorism measures. In this kind of international environment, NATO also needed to engage in the new concern of the world and for this reason, NATO aspired to be an encircling international organization in order to coordinate the international endeavours. Since the fight against terrorism posed a military dimension, as a "big security organization"¹²⁷, NATO found its new mission in the new atmosphere that came up with the 9/11 attacks.

¹²⁵ Anthon Bebler, "NATO's Role in the Struggle against Transnational Terrorism", in Iztok Prezelj, *The Fight against Terrorism and Crisis Management in the Western Balkans*, (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2008), p. 5

¹²⁶ Richard A. Clarke and Barry R. McCaffrey, "NATO's Role in Confronting International Terrorism", *The Atlantic Council of the United States, Policy Paper 2004*, p. ix, online at: http://www.acus.org/docs/0406NATO_Role_Confronting_International_Terrorism.pdf (accessed on 01.10.2009)

3.4.1 Reactions and Activities of NATO in the Post-9/11 Period

On 12 September 2001, the North Atlantic Council met in an emergency session and the Alliance agreed that "... if it is determined that this attack was directed from abroad against the United States, it shall be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which states that an armed attack against one or more of the Allies in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all."¹²⁸ Thus, the Article 5, which is the collective defence provision of the Alliance, was invoked for the first time in the history of NATO. This provoked the solidarity between the United States and its European Allies.

The Bush administration appreciated the allies' declaration of solidarity however, they did not have intentions of appealing for NATO military support in the 'war on terror'.¹²⁹ The US Deputy Secretary of Defence Paul Wolfowitz also declared that they were not going to rely also on European forces.¹³⁰ "NATO's lack of capacity in this regard was perhaps most vividly demonstrated by the Bush Administration's rebuff of NATO offers of support as it prepared for war in Afghanistan..."¹³¹ The USA preferred to bypass NATO. Within this framework, it can be claimed that the 9/11 events indicated NATO's lack of capabilities and 'the Article 5 pledge being a primarily symbolic gesture while the United States conducts a military operation largely alone with support from the British.'¹³²

While the military contribution of NATO was very limited, the political solidarity of the Allies was so important for the USA. Considering later stages of the war, the

¹²⁷ Julian Lindley-French, *The North Atlantic Treaty Organization - The Enduring Alliance*, (London; New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 2

¹²⁸ NATO Press Releases, "Statement by the North Atlantic Council", 12 September 2001, online at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-124e.htm> (accessed on 15.10.2009)

¹²⁹ Philip H. Gordon, "NATO After September 11", *Survival*, Volume 43, Number 4, Winter 2001–2002, p. 93

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 92

¹³¹ Rebecca R. Moore, *NATO's New Mission - Projecting Stability in a Post-Cold War World*, (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International, 2007), p.33

¹³² Philip H. Gordon, "NATO After September 11", *Survival*, Volume 43, Number 4, Winter 2001–2002, p. 89

USA attached importance to the commitment of the Allies and requested from the Allies to adopt eight specific measures to support the American campaign.¹³³ On 4 October 2001, the United States and the NATO Allies agreed on to take eight measures to expand the options available in the campaign against terrorism. They committed to enhance intelligence sharing and co-operation, relating to the threats posed by terrorism and the actions to be taken against it. Moreover, they agreed to provide assistance to Allies and other states which are or may be subject to increased terrorist threats and take necessary measures to provide increased security for facilities of the United States and other Allies on their territory.

The Allies decided to backfill selected Allied assets in NATO's area of responsibility that are required to directly support operations against terrorism. And for military flights related to operations against terrorism, they would provide blanket overflight clearances for the United States and other Allies' aircraft, and also for operations against terrorism the Allies would provide access for the United States and other Allies to ports and airfields on the territory of NATO nations. The North Atlantic Council also agreed that the Alliance was ready to deploy elements of its Standing Naval Forces to the Eastern Mediterranean in order to provide a NATO presence and demonstrate resolve; and the Alliance was similarly ready to deploy elements of its NATO Airborne Early Warning Force to support operations against terrorism.¹³⁴

With these measures, the USA guaranteed the NATO support and the Alliance committed to assist the USA with all its capabilities. On 7 October, following the refusal of the Taliban government in Kabul to surrender Osama bin Laden and other Al Qaeda members, the USA, the UK, France, Australia, Canada and Germany

¹³³ NATO Topics, "NATO and The Fight against Terrorism", online at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48801.htm (accessed on 10.10.2009)

¹³⁴ NATO Speeches, "Statement to the Press", NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, on the North Atlantic Council Decision on Implementation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty following the 11 September Attacks against the United States, 4 October 2001, online at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s011004b.htm> (accessed on 28.11.2009)

commenced Operation Enduring Freedom against Afghanistan.¹³⁵ Then, NATO launched its first ever anti-terror operation, Operation Eagle Assist. The USA requested that from mid-October 2001 to mid-May 2002, seven NATO AWACS radar aircraft were provided in order to assist in patrolling the skies over the United States. In total 830 crew members from 13 NATO countries flew over 360 sorties. This was the first time that NATO military assets were deployed in support of an Article 5 operation.¹³⁶ NATO demonstrated that it was determined to actively participate in the fight against terrorism.

On 26 October 2001, the Alliance conducted its second counter-terrorism operation in response to the attacks on the United States. The operation was called as Operation Active Endeavour. NATO's Standing Naval Forces were sent 'to patrol the eastern Mediterranean and monitor shipping to detect and deter terrorist activity, including illegal trafficking'. Then the Operation was extended to include escorting civilian shipping through the Strait of Gibraltar on 10 March 2001.¹³⁷

Another historic decision was made in the Reykjavik meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in May 2002 with regard to fight against terrorism. The Allies agreed that: "To carry out the full range of its missions, NATO must be able to field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, sustain operations over distance and time, and achieve their objectives."¹³⁸ The Allies removed the geographical limitations in their operations. The decision terminated the debate on what is and what is not NATO's area of operations and made it possible for NATO to expand

¹³⁵ "Operation Enduring Freedom and the Conflict in Afghanistan: An update" Research Paper 01/81, International Affairs and Defence Section, 31 October 2001, p. 14, online at: <http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons/lib/research/rp2001/rp01-081.pdf> (accessed on 11.12.2009)

¹³⁶ NATO Topics, "NATO and The Fight against Terrorism", online at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48801.htm (accessed on 10.10.2009)

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*

¹³⁸ NATO Press Releases, "Final Communique" adopted at the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, 14 May 2002, Article 5, online at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-059e.htm> (accessed on 18.09.2009)

its area of operation to Afghanistan.¹³⁹ Moreover, the debates about the endurance of the Alliance ended because in the struggle against the threats, NATO opened the way for out-of-area operations and terrorism was included in the missions of the Alliance. Although NATO gave full support for the USA, the USA did not want to involve NATO in its struggle with an active role. One of the main reasons for this stance of the USA was the incapability of NATO in fight against terrorism. NATO gave the signs of being ready to undertake out-of-area operations in fight against terrorism however, without posing the sufficient capability. In order to make the Article 5 of the Washington Treaty operational against the terrorist activities, NATO needed a broad transformation and the efforts of transformation was launched at the 2002 Prague Summit in November.

3.4.2 Prag Summit and Roadmap for Transformation

Since the USA disregarded NATO in the war in Afghanistan, NATO Allies realized their irrelevance with regard to fight against terrorism. It was perceived that there was a need of comprehensive transformation in the structure of NATO to undertake an effective mission in the war on terrorism. The roadmap of this transformation was determined in Prague Summit and within this framework, the Summit was so important and differed from other meetings. Lord Robertson confirmed this in his speech at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly: “However, in one important respect it will differ from its predecessors: The past NATO Summits were about incremental change. Prague is about NATO's comprehensive transformation.”¹⁴⁰

In the Prague Summit that was held on 21 November 2002, crucial decisions were taken in order to effectively defy the serious new threats and security challenges of the new century. The Allies determined a new agenda for the Alliance ‘to ensure that it can continue to serve as the foundation of the Allies’ security and as one of

¹³⁹ NATO Topics, “NATO and The Fight against Terrorism”, online at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48801.htm (accessed on 10.10.2009)

¹⁴⁰“Towards the Prague Summit”, Secretary General's Speech at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Istanbul, 15 November 2002, online at: http://www.foreignpolicy.org.tr/documents/robertson_151102_p.htm (accessed on 09.12.2009)

the principal international agents of stability and democratic reform throughout a wider area.’ So the decisions affected the role of NATO in transatlantic security and ‘its ability to adjust to new priorities and to adapt its capabilities in order to meet new challenges’. As NATO’s former Secretary General Lord Robertson puts it: “‘The biggest point of the summit is not enlargement which will be historic, it is NATO making itself relevant for the threats and the challenges of the 21st century.’”¹⁴¹

The most important and systematic steps were taken in the Prague Summit in terms of fight against terrorism. In this Summit, the essentials of the mechanisms and programs that would be put into effect for counter-terrorism were ascertained. The mentioned programs and mechanisms included formation of NATO Response Force (NRF), Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC), Civil Emergency Planning (CEP) Action Plan, Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism and determination of the Military Concept for Defence against Terrorism.¹⁴²

Transformation efforts began with the NATO’s overall military capabilities. NATO’s military command arrangements were streamlined, a NATO Response Force was created and in certain significant fields, NATO’s military capabilities were improved and developed. NATO members agreed on a set of measures in order to improve their ability to act effectively and not to be bypassed in the security concerns. First of all, NATO’s military capabilities needed to be redesigned in a way that NATO ‘must be able to field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, upon decision by the North Atlantic Council, to sustain operations over distance and time, including in an environment where they might be faced with nuclear, biological and chemical threats, and to achieve their objectives’.¹⁴³ Since effective military forces are the significant part of the Alliance’s overall political

¹⁴¹ Alena Škodová, “Prague Summit will be a turning point for NATO, says Lord Robertson”, online at: <http://www.radio.cz/en/article/34615> (accessed on 09.12.2009)

¹⁴² NATO Press Releases, “Prague Summit Declaration”, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, 21 November 2002, online at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm> (accessed on 04.01.2010)

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, Article 4

strategy in order to ‘safeguard the freedom and security of its populations and to contribute to peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic region’; a NATO Response Force (NRF) was decided to be created.¹⁴⁴ The NRF consisted of ‘a technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable and sustainable force including land, sea, and air elements ready to move quickly to wherever needed, as decided by the Council.’ Moreover, NATO’s military command arrangements were streamlined:

There will be two strategic commands, one operational, and one functional. The strategic command for Operations, headquartered in Europe (Belgium), will be supported by two Joint Force Commands able to generate a land-based Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) headquarters and a robust but more limited standing joint headquarters from which a sea-based CJTF headquarters capability can be drawn. There will also be land, sea and air components. The strategic command for Transformation, headquartered in the United States, and with a presence in Europe, will be responsible for the continuing transformation of military capabilities and for the promotion of interoperability of Alliance forces, in cooperation with the Allied Command Operations as appropriate.¹⁴⁵

Furthermore, for the improvement and development of military capabilities, the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) was adopted in the summit. Allies made political commitments to enhance their capacity in the fields of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defence; intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition; air-to-ground surveillance; command, control and communications; combat effectiveness, including precision guided munitions and suppression of enemy air defences; strategic air and sea lift; air-to-air refuelling; and deployable combat support and combat service support units.¹⁴⁶

A Military Concept for Defence against Terrorism was adopted in order to be effective in fight against terrorism. On 18 December 2001, the NATO Military authorities prepared the Concept with a political guidance from the North Atlantic

¹⁴⁴ NATO Press Releases, “Prague Summit Declaration”, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, 21 November 2002, Article 4, online at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm> (accessed on 04.01.2010)

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, Article 4/b

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, Article 4/c

Council and then it was adopted by the Council.¹⁴⁷ Finally, in the Summit, the Heads of State and Government endorsed the Concept. In its political guidance, the Council decided that NATO should act to “help deter, defend, disrupt and protect against terrorist attacks, directed from abroad against populations, territory, infrastructure and forces of any NATO member state”. NATO forces should “be prepared to deploy as and where required” and provide assistance. Moreover; NATO was charged with “providing assistance to national authorities in dealing with the consequence of terrorist attacks and support operations by other international organizations or coalitions involving Allies on a case-by-case basis.”¹⁴⁸ The Concept gave some roles for NATO operations in order to defend against terrorism. These were Anti Terrorism, Consequence management, Counter Terrorism and Military Co-operation. Anti Terrorism role was based on ‘the use of defensive measures to reduce the vulnerability of forces, individuals and property to terrorism if a nation calls for help’. Consequence management role included military support for the states by using ‘reactive measures to mitigate the destructive effects of terrorism’. Counter terrorism involved active measures for destroying the capabilities of the terrorists. NATO was charged with two broad roles in counter terrorist operations according to the Concept. NATO may lead a counter terrorist operation conducting the operation by itself or may be in a supportive role in the operations conducted by the European Union or other international organizations or coalitions involving Allies on a case-by-case basis. This Concept was significant for the reason that it mapped out a route for NATO and determined the methods specifying some roles for military operations. Within this context, it could be regarded as a roadmap for transformation efforts of the Alliance. Consequently, it can be claimed that the Concept has an important role in intensification of the counter-terrorism efforts and detailing the reorganization of NATO after 9/11 attacks in the context of fight against terrorism.

¹⁴⁷ NATO Issues, “NATO’s Military Concept for Defence Against Terrorism”, For more information, <http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/terrorism.htm>

¹⁴⁸ NATO Topics, “NATO and The Fight against Terrorism”, online at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48801.htm (accessed on 10.10.2009)

Further measures taken in the Summit included the implementation of the Civil Emergency Planning (CEP) Action Plan to be prepared for the potential attacks against the civilian populations with chemical, biological or radiological (CBR) weapons. The implementation of five nuclear, biological and chemical weapons defence initiatives (a Prototype Deployable NBC Analytical Laboratory; a Prototype NBC Event Response team; a virtual Centre of Excellence for NBC Weapons Defence; a NATO Biological and Chemical Defence Stockpile; and a Disease Surveillance system) was adopted for the aim of improving defence capabilities against WMD.¹⁴⁹ The decision to enhance the capabilities of cyber-defence was made ‘to better protect against and prepare for a possible disruption of NATO and national critical infrastructure assets, including information and communications systems.’¹⁵⁰ NATO members endorsed to investigate ‘options for addressing the increasing missile threat to Alliance territory, forces and population centres in an effective and efficient way through an appropriate mix of political and defence efforts, along with deterrence’¹⁵¹. As a further step, Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism was launched for establishing a platform in which the Allies and its partners work together to enhance collaboration in counter terrorism efforts by the means of political consultation and a set of practical measures.¹⁵²

In the Prague Summit, situation in Afghanistan and Iraq was also a matter of concern. NATO member countries agreed to ‘assist the Afghan government in restoring security in Kabul and its surroundings’ and to provide support in selected

¹⁴⁹ NATO Press Releases, “Prague Summit Declaration”, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, 21 November 2002, Article 4/e, online at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm> (accessed on 04.01.2010)

¹⁵⁰ NATO Topics, “NATO and The Fight against Terrorism”, online at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48801.htm (accessed on 10.10.2009)

¹⁵¹ NATO Press Releases, “Prague Summit Declaration”, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, 21 November 2002, Article 4/g, online at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm> (accessed on 04.01.2010)

¹⁵² NATO Topics, “The Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism”, For more information, <http://www.nato.int/issues/papt/index.html>

areas'.¹⁵³ And with regard to Iraq, the Allies adopted a Statement on Iraq. After expressing their serious concern about terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, NATO Heads of State and Government pledged their full support for the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1441 and called on Iraq to comply fully and immediately with this and all relevant UN Security Council resolutions.¹⁵⁴

As it is revealed, Prague Summit helped to accelerate the transformation process of NATO for an effective fight against the new security challenges that emerged in the new century. In order to be more active, NATO introduced new capabilities and enhanced its relations with the partners. Moreover, the Allies issued Statement on Iraq and committed to support for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. These developments demonstrated that NATO was determined to take part actively in fight against terrorism. Then, Istanbul Summit furthered the efforts within this framework by reinforcing the decisions made and pushing for the implementation of the roadmap that was drawn in Prague.

3.4.3 Istanbul Summit and Split within the Alliance

Essentially, main issue of the Istanbul Summit which was held on 28-29 June 2004 was to build upon the transformation agenda ascribed in Prague Summit and promote security through bringing stability, especially to the NATO's periphery. Priorities were set out with regard to Greater Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia region; and further improvement of the Alliance capabilities.

On the other hand, before the Istanbul Summit, the divisions within the Alliance started to break out. Turkey, invoking Article 4 of the Washington Treaty¹⁵⁵,

¹⁵³ NATO Press Releases, "Prague Summit Declaration", Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, 21 November 2002, Article 14, online at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm> (accessed on 04.01.2010)

¹⁵⁴ NATO Press Releases, "Prague Summit Statement on Iraq" Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, 21 November 2002, online at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-133e.htm> (accessed on 04.01.2010)

¹⁵⁵ The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

requested protection from its Allies against the potential attacks of Iraq. However, France, Germany, and Belgium blocked military planning to defend Turkey for the reason that the Alliance would be drifted to a war and a peaceful ending of the Iraq crisis would be risked.¹⁵⁶ The division furthered with the USA's invasion of Iraq (which was defined as one of the axis of evil states by the US President in his State of the Union Address to the Congress) without a U.N. mandate and with the reason of possessing WMD as explained by Bush in his speech of State of the Union on 29 January 2003:

Today, the gravest danger in the war on terror, the gravest danger facing America and the world, is outlaw regimes that seek and possess nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. These regimes could use such weapons for blackmail, terror and mass murder. They could also give or sell those weapons to terrorist allies, who would use them without the least hesitation... Almost three months ago, the United Nations Security Council gave Saddam Hussein his final chance to disarm. He has shown instead utter contempt for the United Nations and for the opinion of the world... With nuclear arms or a full arsenal of chemical and biological weapons, Saddam Hussein could resume his ambitions of conquest in the Middle East and create deadly havoc in that region... And the day he and his regime are removed from power will be the day of your liberation.¹⁵⁷

The tensions among the Allies were sharpened strictly with the USA's use of hard power. Headed by France and Germany some European Allies such as Belgium and Luxembourg opposed the occupation of Iraq and the unilateral attitude of the United States. And later, when the USA asked for the NATO's involvement in Iraq, some NATO Member States, notably France and Germany, opposed the commitment of troops under the NATO banner. The USA insisted on NATO's military contribution by sending troops to Iraq. However, France and Germany resisted until an interim solution was found. According to the solution, the Alliance 'decided to offer NATO's assistance to the government of Iraq with the training of its security forces' and 'encouraged nations to contribute to the training of the Iraqi armed

¹⁵⁶ "Allies Block NATO Aid to Turkey", online at:
<http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/167/35198.html> (accessed on 01.12.2009)

¹⁵⁷ CNN News, "Bush's State of the Union Speech", 29 January 2003, online at:
<http://edition.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/01/28/sotu.transcript/> (accessed on 09.12.2009)

forces.¹⁵⁸ NATO was only charged with the training missions apart from directly involving in the war with its troops.

As far as the transformation efforts concerned, in the Istanbul Summit, further direction was given to the adaptation process of NATO's capabilities, structures and procedures to the new threats and further strengthening the relations with the partners was determined.

As being the most important development in the counter-terrorism efforts, NATO took over the leadership of the ISAF in Afghanistan on 11 August 2003. And in the Communiqué issued by the NATO Heads of State and Government at the Istanbul Summit, it was declared that contributing to peace and stability in Afghanistan became a key priority for the Alliance. And the Allies decided to expand the NATO's role therein through the establishment by lead nations of additional PRTs.¹⁵⁹ In order to enhance the Alliance's contribution to fight against terrorism, Operation Active Endeavour was extended to the whole Mediterranean and the Allies agreed to enhance their contribution. Further measures were agreed in terms of fight against terrorism. The Allies agreed to improve intelligence sharing between them through Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit and review current intelligence structures at NATO Headquarters. The capabilities of the members to defend against terrorist attacks and the ability of the Alliance to respond rapidly to requests of its members for assistance in protecting against and dealing with the consequences of terrorist attacks were decided to be enhanced. The Allies also decided to provide a continued robust effort through operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan to help create conditions in which terrorism can not flourish. Cooperation with the partners would be enhanced through the implementation of

¹⁵⁸ NATO Press Releases, "Statement on Iraq", Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, 28 June 2004, online at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2004/p04-098e.htm> (accessed on 10.12.2009)

¹⁵⁹ NATO Press Releases, "Istanbul Summit Communiqué", Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, 28 June 2004, Article 5, online at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2004/p04-096e.htm> (accessed on 10.12.2009)

our Civil Emergency Action Plan and the Partnership Action Plan on Terrorism, and with other international and regional organizations.

At the Istanbul Summit, the progress of transformation was decided to accelerate and further improvement was provided. NATO demonstrated that it was determined in its efforts of transformation for an effective role in fight against terrorism.

3.4.4 Riga Summit

At the Riga Summit which was held on 28-29 November 2006, major topics to be discussed were the Afghan mission, the future role of NATO in the global sphere, enlargement and relations with non-member countries and partners. Moreover, the summit focused on the alliance's continued transformation.

NATO leaders adopted the Comprehensive Political Guidance that 'provided a framework and political direction for NATO's continuing transformation, setting out, for the next 10 to 15 years, the priorities for all Alliance capability issues, planning disciplines and intelligence' with the aim of 'enhancing coherence through an effective management mechanism. Instability due to failed or failing states, regional crises and conflicts, and their causes and effects; the growing availability of sophisticated conventional weaponry; the misuse of emerging technologies; and the disruption of the flow of vital resources were counted as the major threats in the new era. In this framework, the document enounced 'the kinds of operations that the Alliance must be able to perform and the kinds of capabilities it will need.'¹⁶⁰ Furthermore, as a further step in military transformation, NATO Response Force (NRF) was declared as 'fully operational'. NRF is very significant in the Alliance's response to a rapidly emerging crisis and 'can number up to 25,000 troops and start to deploy after five days' notice and sustain itself for operations lasting 30 days or longer if resupplied.'¹⁶¹ NATO members also agreed new initiatives in areas such as

¹⁶⁰ "NATO After Riga: Prevailing in Afghanistan, Improving Capabilities, Enhancing Cooperation", online at: http://www.nato.int/docu/nato_after_riga/nato_after_riga_en.pdf (accessed on 18.01.2010)

¹⁶¹ NATO Topics, "The NATO Response Force", online at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49755.htm (accessed on 27.12.2009)

tactical missile defence, air-to-ground surveillance, and cooperation between special operations forces.

In order to contribute to the security and stability of the world; Albania, Croatia and Macedonia were invited to join NATO for the reason to provide their full integration with the West. Within the same context, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia was offered to join the Partnership for Peace programme. The Allies started a Training Cooperation Initiative offering to share NATO training expertise with partners in the Mediterranean and in the broader region of the Middle East.¹⁶²

Additionally, as it is emphasized in the summit declarations, it is obvious that NATO's partnerships, dialogue, and cooperation is very essential for the aims and missions of the Alliance. And within this framework, NATO developed strong relationships with countries of the EAPC, the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD), and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), as well as with Contact Countries.¹⁶³ And at the Riga Summit, as a major step with respect to NATO's political transformation, Allies agreed to deepen their cooperation with partner countries, including those in the Middle East and establish new relationships with countries in the Asia-Pacific region that share the Alliance's security interests. It was also emphasized that NATO would continue to look for closer cooperation with other international actors, such as the United Nations, the European Union, the G-8, or the World Bank, as well as with Non-Governmental Organizations.¹⁶⁴

At the time of the Riga Summit, six missions and operations in three geographic regions were being carried out in order to contribute to peace and security. Afghan operation was NATO's key priority. It was determined to carry on the assistance

¹⁶² NATO Press Releases, "Riga Summit Declaration", Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, 29 November 2006, Article 17, online at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm> (accessed on 19.01.2010)

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, Article 11

¹⁶⁴ Michael Ruehle, "NATO after Riga - A New Direction?", online at: http://worldsecuritynetwork.com/showArticle3.cfm?article_id=14370 (accessed on 05.01.2010)

that was given to the Afghan authorities in providing security, stability and reconstruction throughout the country and especially in training and the further development of the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police. Moreover, PRTs that were formed to support the Afghan people in achieving their security, governance, and development goals and supported by military forces were in the lead of NATO's endeavours. NATO struggled much to support the efforts of the Afghan Government to build civilian capacity and develop institutions.¹⁶⁵

To conclude, all the decisions helped to deepen the NATO's transformation into an organization that would better respond to transnational terrorism. "The Riga Summit marked another step in NATO's evolution towards a security provider beyond the Euro-Atlantic area, increasingly acting in concert with other institutions and partner countries from all over the globe".¹⁶⁶

3.4.5 Bucharest Summit

As far as terrorism concerned, at the Bucharest Summit the Allies reviewed their progress and decided to continue the transformation process. Improving military operations in Afghanistan was a central concern of the NATO summit in Bucharest. The Allies stated their long term vision as "building an enduring stable, secure, prosperous and democratic state, respectful of human rights and free from the threat of terrorism."¹⁶⁷ And on 3 April 2008, NATO Heads of State and Government of the countries participating in ISAF issued a "Strategic Vision" statement declaring their "guiding principles" for rebuilding Afghanistan. The Strategic Vision set out the guiding principles as: a firm and shared long-term commitment; support for

¹⁶⁵ NATO Press Releases, "Riga Summit Declaration", Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Riga on 29 November 2006, Article 6, online at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm> (accessed on 19.01.2010)

¹⁶⁶ Michael Ruehle, "NATO after Riga - A New Direction?", online at: http://worldsecuritynetwork.com/showArticle3.cfm?article_id=14370 (accessed on 05.01.2010)

¹⁶⁷ NATO Official Texts, "ISAF's Strategic Vision", Declaration by the Heads of State and Government of the Nations contributing to the UN-mandated NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, 3 April 2008, Article 1, online at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8444.htm?mode=pressrelease (accessed on 14.01.2010)

enhanced Afghan leadership and responsibility; a comprehensive approach by the international community, bringing together civilian and military efforts; and increased cooperation and engagement with Afghanistan's neighbours, especially Pakistan.¹⁶⁸

NATO decided to assist the Government of Afghanistan in further establishing and maintaining a secure environment and extending good governance. And by training and mentoring, Afghanistan's security forces were aimed to become increasingly capable of leading and sustaining operations independently. In the long term it was expected that Afghan-led security forces and institutions would ensure the rule of law in the country. Since the success of the operation depends on enhanced cooperation with all actors involved in Afghanistan, NATO decided to intensify coordination and work on for more regular consultations. Finally, Afghanistan's neighbours have an important role to play in fight against terrorism so NATO agreed to deepen dialogue with the neighbours and encourage further cooperation.¹⁶⁹

Issues other than Afghanistan such as enlargement, missile defence, energy security and French membership also occupied the agenda of the Summit. Albania and Croatia were invited to begin accession talks to join the Alliance and Ukraine's and Georgia's aspirations for membership were welcomed in NATO. In terms of energy security a report was prepared after the Riga Summit. The principles that will orient NATO's approach towards energy security were identified and options and recommendations were outlined for further activities.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁸ NATO Official Texts, "ISAF's Strategic Vision", Declaration by the Heads of State and Government of the Nations contributing to the UN-mandated NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, 3 April 2008, Article 1, online at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8444.htm?mode=pressrelease (accessed on 14.01.2010)

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, Article 4,5,6,7 and 8

¹⁷⁰ NATO Press Releases, "Bucharest Summit Declaration", Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, 3 April 2008, online at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm (accessed on 15.01.2010)

With regard to missile defence, the Alliance mentioned about the ballistic missile proliferation as an increasing threat to Allies' forces, territory and populations. NATO decided to contribute to the protection of the Allies from long-range ballistic missiles by deploying European-based United States missile defence assets. A Policy on Cyber Defence emphasized the need for NATO and nations to protect key information systems in accordance with their respective responsibilities; share best practices; and provide a capability to assist Allied nations, upon request, to counter a cyber attack. Structures and authorities were developed to carry out the policy.

To sum up, the Summit provided an opportunity to further explain and strengthen the Alliance's vision of its role in meeting the changing challenges of the 21st century and improving the capability to manage its missions of collectively defending security of the members and contributing to stability of the world.¹⁷¹

3.4.6 Strasbourg/Kehl Summit

At the Strasbourg Summit held in April 2009, the Allies issued a Declaration on Alliance Security¹⁷² reaffirming the basic values, principles and purposes of the NATO Alliance. Global challenges threatening the Alliance were counted and terrorism was mentioned in the forefront. This demonstrated that fight against terrorism became a key priority for NATO. The Secretary General was tasked to develop a new Strategic Concept document that would define NATO's longer-term role in the new security environment of the 21st century.

At the beginning of the North Atlantic Council, Albania and Croatia were welcomed at their first NATO Summit as members of the Alliance by the Secretary General. The Allies reaffirmed NATO's commitment to continue dialogue and cooperation with partner countries and to keep open the door to NATO

¹⁷¹ NATO Press Releases, "Bucharest Summit Declaration", Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, 3 April 2008, Article 3, online at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm (accessed on 15.01.2010)

¹⁷² NATO News, "Declaration on Alliance Security", Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, April 2009, online at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_52838.htm (accessed on 10.01.2010)

membership, with the aim of strengthening security for all in the Euro-Atlantic area.¹⁷³

In terms of transformation, NATO Heads of State and Government decided to further their work on the enhancement of capabilities and on the Alliance's engagement with other international organizations and countries and on missions and operations.

As far as Afghanistan is concerned, NATO Heads of State and Government adopted a Summit Declaration on Afghanistan and agreed to a number of new initiatives for Afghanistan, including a significant expansion of the training and support effort for Afghan National Security Forces, enhanced engagement with neighbouring countries and a more integrated approach to working with the International Community and the Afghan Government to implement the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS). In order to overcome the serious challenges in Afghanistan firstly the Allies agreed to establish a NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan (NTM-A) within ISAF to oversee higher level training for the Afghan National Army, and training and mentoring for the Afghan National Police. The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) would be assisted and supported in order to secure the upcoming electoral process by temporarily deploying the necessary election support forces. For the progressive enlargement of the Afghan National Army, operational mentoring and liaison teams (OMLT) were decided to be provided. NATO members agreed to encourage and support the strengthening of Afghan and Pakistani government cooperation; and build a broader political and practical relationship between NATO and Pakistan and then, further develop the evolving relationship between NATO and Afghanistan. With these measures, NATO contributed to the Government of Afghanistan in its fight against terrorism

¹⁷³ NATO News, ““Strasbourg – Kehl Summit strengthens Transatlantic Link and looks at NATO's future challenges”, 4 April 2009, online at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_52845.htm (accessed on 29.01.2010)

and in its efforts to become a powerful state eradicating the terrorist hubs in the country.¹⁷⁴

To sum up, as the summit declarations demonstrated, NATO gradually transformed its structure and enhanced its capabilities in order to be effectively involved in the fight against terrorism. As a beginning, in the Prague Summit (2002), the Allies determined the road map of this transformation and in this regard, the Summit was essential. The most important and systematic steps were taken in the Prague Summit in terms of fight against terrorism and the essentials of the mechanisms and programs that would be put into effect for counter-terrorism were ascertained. All the decisions taken in the following summits (Istanbul, Riga, Bucharest and Strasbourg/Kehl) helped to deepen the NATO's transformation and turn it into an organization that would better fight against transnational terrorism. Further direction was given to the adaptation process of NATO's capabilities and structures.

3.5 Conclusion

The transnationalized character of terrorism after the 9/11 attacks demonstrated that international cooperation and international organizations became significant in fight against terrorism and in maintaining the tranquillity and security of the states. NATO, as a big international security organization and seeking for new missions in order to sustain its endurance, needed to embark upon responsibilities in fight against transnational terrorism for the reason that one of its members had been attacked. Then, NATO invoked, for the first time in its history, Article 5 of Washington Treaty which provided for collective defence against an attack on any of its members. However, at the beginning, NATO was bypassed by the United States in its own 'War on Terrorism' and excluded from the Afghanistan operation because of its insufficient capabilities. So the 9/11 events revealed NATO's irrelevance with regard to fight against terrorism and it became evident that NATO needed a profound political and military transformation. Then, NATO's primary agenda was set out and in every summit, transformation of NATO was the key priority. Step by step, NATO transformed itself in terms of its structure and

¹⁷⁴ NATO News, "NATO Expands Its Role in Afghanistan", 4 April 2009, online at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_52799.htm (accessed on 29.01.2010)

capabilities and enhanced its relations with its partners and non-member countries, taking its place in counter terrorism. NATO also transformed its role by removing the territorial limits. A declaration of NATO's Foreign Ministers in May 2002 said "to carry out the full range of its missions, NATO must be able to field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, sustain operations over distance and time, and achieve their objectives."¹⁷⁵ The phrase "wherever [forces] are needed" implied that NATO would become a global organization. In November 2002, the NATO Secretary General noted about the Prague Summit that "it will mark the beginning of a new, bigger, outward-looking Euro-Atlantic community, a community that is able and willing to engage wherever our security interests demand it."¹⁷⁶ These indicated that NATO would carry on out-of area operations and in 2003, NATO took over the leadership of the ISAF in Afghanistan and conducted its first truly out-of-area operation. Afghanistan Operation will be examined in the next chapter in order to evaluate where NATO stands in fight against terrorism and the achievements of NATO within this context.

¹⁷⁵ NATO Press Releases, "Final Communique" adopted at the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, 14 May 2002, online at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-059e.htm> (accessed on 18.09.2009)

¹⁷⁶ NATO Speeches, "The Summit Ahead: Accession, Transformation, Capabilities", Speech by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, 4 November 2002, online at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s021104a.htm> (accessed on 18.12.2009)

CHAPTER IV

NATO'S FIGHT AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM IN AFGHANISTAN

4.1 Introduction

Immediately after the 9/11 attacks on the USA, the Al-Qaeda terrorist network was identified as responsible for the strikes and its host Taliban regime in Afghanistan was therefore regarded as an enemy. And suddenly, the chaos and extremism plaguing the failed state became the serious concern for the USA, seeing the country closely linked to its security and national interests.¹⁷⁷ The USA urgently needed to invade Afghanistan and prevent country from being the origins of insecurity. The war in Afghanistan was launched in 2001 because of this main reason.

Before making the analysis of the NATO's operation in Afghanistan, the historical background of the country will be taken in hand in order to better evaluate the recent situation therein. So, in this chapter firstly, the rise of Taliban regime after the Soviet invasion in 1979 will be explained. After understanding the dynamics of the Taliban regime, its relations with the Al-Qaeda terrorist group will be handled in order to apprehend how Afghanistan became a hub for terrorists. The USA, as the victim of the tragic event of 9/11, considering Afghanistan as the hub of terrorists, commenced a war. So, after understanding where Afghanistan stands in the new strategy of the United States just after the 9/11 attacks, the study will continue with the analysis of the US-led operation in Afghanistan. The role of NATO in Afghanistan Operation started with assuming the leadership of ISAF which was established on 20 December 2001. On the contrary of its indifferent attitudes towards terrorism before the 9/11 attacks, NATO transformed itself becoming an

¹⁷⁷ "The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan in 1979: Failure of Intelligence or of the Policy Process?", Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University, Working Group Report No. 3, 26 September 2005, p.1, online at: http://www12.georgetown.edu/sfs/isd/Afghan_1_WR_group.pdf (accessed on 10.02.2010)

active player in the Afghanistan mission and an active participant in helping Afghan government against the resurgent Taliban regime. Afghan operation is also significant for NATO in terms of being its first truly out-of-area operation and NATO's future is closely linked to its mission in Afghanistan. Therefore, next parts of the chapter will profoundly analyze NATO's role in Afghanistan.

4.2 The Rise of Taliban Regime and Its Relations with Al-Qaeda

Thanks to its geographical location, Afghanistan suffered from centuries of conflict and turmoil because it is located at the crossroads of Central Asia and Middle East and on the ways of historical trade routes.¹⁷⁸ Many foreign powers invaded the country for their national interests and the Soviet Union was one of them because of its policy of enhancement of the area of influence and spread communism.

4.2.1 Political Environment of Afghanistan before the Soviet Intervention

For Modern Afghanistan the turmoil flourished with the overthrow of the King Mohammed Zahir Shah in 1973 by the former Prime Minister Mohammad Sardar Daoud.¹⁷⁹ Daoud ended monarchy and declared Afghanistan a republic appointing himself as the first prime minister and president.¹⁸⁰ However, new President decided to establish closer relations and align its policies with the West dissociating his country from the Soviet Union. And also, he imposed repressions on the opposition party of Communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) and one of the leading PDPA members, Mir Akbar Khyber, was murdered.¹⁸¹ The

¹⁷⁸ Amalendu Misra, *Hot Spots in Global Politics*, (Cambridge, UK; Malden, Mass.: Polity Press, 2004), p. 13

¹⁷⁹ Stephen Tanner, *Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban*, (New York: Da Capo Press, 2002), p. 284 cited in Denis O. Young, "Overcoming The Obstacles To Establishing A Democratic State in Afghanistan", Strategic Studies Institute, October 2007, p.6

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁸¹ Henry S. Bradsher, *Afghanistan and the Soviet Union*, (Durham, N.C. : Duke Press Policy Studies, 1983), p. 72

death of Khyber provoked anti-government demonstrations and this led to the further suppression by the government arresting some leaders of the PPDA.¹⁸² In 1978, leftist officers of the Afghan army under the direction of PPDA made a coup called as ‘Saur Revolution’. They overthrew and executed Daoud along with members of his family.¹⁸³ Nur Muhammad Taraki, Secretary General of the PDPA, became the Prime Minister of the newly established Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. However, PPDA which managed to overthrow the Daoud regime, was under the control of two adverse factions: the Khalad (‘Banner’) and the Parcham (‘Masses’). Moreover, within these factions there were ethnic divisions.¹⁸⁴ So the government was divided along factional lines, with President Taraki and Deputy Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin of the Khalq faction against Parcham leaders such as Babrak Karmal and Mohammad Najibullah. After undermining the Parcham faction, two groups led by Taraki and Amin within the Khalad faction competed for supremacy.¹⁸⁵ In September 1979, it was announced that Amin had been appointed as President.¹⁸⁶

As the situation further deteriorated in Afghanistan after the take over of Amin, in December 1979, the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan. A failed state with the lack of internal cohesion was a good opportunity for the Soviets to enhance its ‘sphere of influence’.

4.2.2 The Soviet Invasion and After: The Rise of Taliban Movement

The Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979 and Karmal was brought to power. They aimed to consolidate communism in Afghanistan and prevent possible revival of

¹⁸² Shaista Wahab and Barry Youngerman, *A Brief History of Afghanistan*, (New York: Facts on File, 2007), p. 135

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁴ Amalendu Misra, *Hot Spots in Global Politics*, (Cambridge, UK; Malden, Mass.: Polity Press, 2004), p. 45

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 46

¹⁸⁶ Martin Ewans, *Afghanistan A Short History of Its People and Politics*, (New York: Perennial, 2002), p. 200

American influence. The socialist revolutionary reforms of the government under Soviet control angered Afghan people. They conceived the reforms as an assault on their traditional and Islamic values and they formed resistance groups called mujahideen.¹⁸⁷ Anticommunist Muslim rebels called as mujahideen, were supported by the United States and many Muslim countries, especially Pakistan¹⁸⁸ and Saudi Arabia. The Soviet Union could not manage to cope with the resistance inside and defeat the rebel groups so it decided to withdraw its forces from the beginning of 1988.

After the Soviets complete withdrawal in 1989, the expected situation was the fall of pro-Soviet Najibullah regime however; it did not realize for two main reasons: the continued Soviet support and failure of mujahideen groups to unite and pursue an effective strategy for the removal of the Najibullah regime. Following the Soviet withdrawal, a shura was organized in Pakistan composed of mujahideen political leaders, field commanders, religious leaders, nationalist exiles and refugee elders and an interim government was elected disregarding the government in Kabul.¹⁸⁹ Then this division led to a civil war in the country. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Najibullah regime could not manage to survive without Soviet support and the mujahideen groups acquired power in 1992.

The political situation in Afghanistan beginning from the mujahideen takeover of the government, led to the rise of the Taliban, who ruled until the U.S.-led invasion toppled the regime in 2001. The mujahideen rule was characterized by the inability of its leaders to agree among themselves on any lasting political settlement and the internal agonies not just because of confronting personal ambitions but also ethnic, tribal and religious antipathies.¹⁹⁰ “This chaotic social and political environment

¹⁸⁷ Robert D. Crews and Amin Tarzi, *The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2008), p. 90

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 91

¹⁸⁹ Angelo Rasanayagam, *Afghanistan A Modern History* (London: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 2005), p. 127

¹⁹⁰ Martin Ewans, *Afghanistan A Short History of Its People and Politics* (New York: Perennial, 2002), p. 249

gave rise to a vacuum of leadership and gave momentum to the appearance of a political force that promised to stop the infighting and further destruction of the country.”¹⁹¹ So the indifference of the international system to the political situation in Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal left the country with internal disorder creating the convenient atmosphere for Taliban, host of terrorist groups.

4.2.3 Taliban and Its Relations with Al-Qaeda

Taliban is Pashto and Persian word of Arabic origin and the plural form of talib, religious student, usually from poor, rural backgrounds and always males.¹⁹² The core of Taliban movement was constituted of Afghan refugee students of Islam receiving their basic education in Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province and in Baluchistan (Pashtun areas of Pakistan). Most of these students were rootless (born in Pakistani refugee camps and orphans of war) so they were open to the ideological influences to which they were exposed in the religious schools of Pakistan.¹⁹³ And their education was based on indoctrination of the rules of primitive Islam and far from inculcating Islamic history, law and scholarship. As Nojumi explains in his article: “Besides learning general subjects related to Islamic law, such as the *usul* (methods) and *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence), they were trained in the theory and practice of political concepts like jihad as “holy war” against the Soviets and the West.”¹⁹⁴ Additionally, the political ideology of Taliban was mainly influenced by the Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islami (JUI) which was an organization responsible for running many madrasas (religious schools) and became a coalition partner in the

¹⁹¹ Robert D. Crews and Amin Tarzi, *The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2008), p.101

¹⁹² Shaista Wahab and Barry Youngerman, *A Brief History of Afghanistan* (New York: Facts on File, 2007), p. 205

¹⁹³ Angelo Rasanayagam, *Afghanistan A Modern History* (London: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 2005), p. 143

¹⁹⁴ Robert D. Crews and Amin Tarzi, *The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2008), p.106

Pakistani government.¹⁹⁵ The JUI was ideologically characterized by its fundamentalist interpretations of Islam, its opposition to *ijtihad* (innovation in adapting to new conditions), its injunctions against any meaningful role for women outside their homes, and its opposition to feudal and tribal structures.¹⁹⁶

Taliban as a political force began to emerge in the 1980s. Some groups of these students joined the mujahideens or the traditionalists. And some others established their own independent bands. However, the core group of Taliban was organized around Mullah Muhammad Omar aimed to put an end to the discomfort made by ex-mujahideens. They were raged by the Afghan mujahideens and other local groups for the reason that they could not manage to establish a central political administration.¹⁹⁷ They began to gain in popularity when they responded to the anxieties of the repressed people and effaced the lawless situations in the southern Afghanistan.

However, the world became aware of the group with the mission given by Pakistan. After this task, the Taliban broke out in the political arena in November 1994 when they were appointed by Pakistan to guard a Pakistani commercial convoy on its way from Quetta to Turkmenistan across the border toward Kandahar.¹⁹⁸ Pakistan's Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto sent the convoy with the orders to traverse western Afghanistan and blaze a trade route to the newly independent Muslim countries of Central Asia.¹⁹⁹ This was a great opportunity for Taliban to show up. The Taliban, proving an effective protection and fencing out the attacks of other mujahedin

¹⁹⁵ Martin Ewans, *Afghanistan A Short History of Its People and Politics*, (New York: Perennial, 2002), p. 255

¹⁹⁶ Angelo Rasanayagam, *Afghanistan A Modern History* (London: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 2005), p. 144

¹⁹⁷ Robert D. Crews and Amin Tarzi, *The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2008), p.107

¹⁹⁸ Martin Ewans, *Afghanistan A Short History of Its People and Politics*, (New York: Perennial, 2002), p. 254

¹⁹⁹ Shaista Wahab and Barry Youngerman, *A Brief History of Afghanistan*, (New York: Facts on File, 2007), p. 206

groups, moved forward and seized Kandahar city. Following the capturing of Kandahar, the Taliban benefited from the increasing local support and they acquired massive amounts of new weapons. Within three weeks their forces grew to 2500 fighters.²⁰⁰ And in three months they took control of many provinces of Afghanistan and finally Taliban managed to capture Kabul by September 1996.

After the seizure of power, Mullah Muhammad Omar claimed himself “Commander of the Faithful” (Amir al-Muminin) and renamed Afghanistan an “Islamic Emirate”.²⁰¹ Educated by the very fundamental version of Islam, the Taliban launched a repressive regime institutionalizing Islamism within the state bureaucracy and society.²⁰² Education for girls and women participation in public life was banned. For women, it was forbidden to work outside the home and leave their home without a male family member. Playing or listening to music, dancing, television, flying kites, soccer, keeping caged birds, Nawruz spring festival, photographs of people or animals, makeup, nail polish were all prohibited. Moreover, women were compelled to cover their public appearances from head to toe. Taliban stipulated the exact lengths of beard to be worn by adult males and prescribed a list of Muslim names that could legally be given to newborns. In other words, private life was to a great extent narrowed and the Taliban intervened in every part of life. Those who violated these rules were executed violently. There were institutions of stoning amputation and public execution as punishments.²⁰³ The religious decrees that they issued provoked opposition within Afghanistan. Since they did not have an effective and centralized administrative system to provide public services, they failed to govern the state. Their regime relying on force and terror lacked internal legitimacy. The international community denouncing the

²⁰⁰ There were 200 Taliban in the mission of protecting Pakistani commercial convoy. And by the end of 1995 Taliban forces reached a total of some 25.000 men. (Rasanayagam, *op. cit.*, p. 145, 149)

²⁰¹ Shaista Wahab and Barry Youngerman, *A Brief History of Afghanistan*, (New York: Facts on File, 2007), p. 214 and 215

²⁰² Robert D. Crews and Amin Tarzi, *The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2008), p.108

²⁰³ Shaista Wahab and Barry Youngerman, *A Brief History of Afghanistan*, (New York: Facts on File, 2007), p. 218

Taliban regime isolated the country. Thus, Afghanistan became a political area for various radical non-state groups to grow up their organizations.²⁰⁴ Taliban, losing power because of the opposition resistance and financial difficulties due to international exclusion, opened the way for Al-Qaeda to make Afghanistan its headquarters.

Al-Qaeda's presence in Afghanistan does not begin with the Taliban era. It dates back to the period of Soviet invasion. The leader of the group, Osama bin Laden, made his first visit to Afghanistan three years after the invasion (1982) in order to support Afghan mujahideen with their war against the Soviet Union. This was part of the plans of the USA trying to prevent the Soviets enhancing their area of influence. The USA aimed to gather the radical Muslims in Pakistan to help the Afghans in their war against communism and raised funds for these groups. Abdallah Azzam, the lecturer and mentor of Osama bin Laden and the ideological father of Al-Qaeda, preached jihad against the Soviets. He provided funds, recruited, and organized Muslims from all over the world for fight in Afghanistan.²⁰⁵ However, when it became evident that the Soviet Union would withdraw its forces, the situation reversed for the Americans. Discerning the Soviet intentions, Abdallah Azzam and Osama bin Laden founded a group, Al-Qaeda, through which they would realize their objectives. And after the assassination of Azzam in 1989, bin Laden became the leader of the group.²⁰⁶

Following the Soviet withdrawal, the mission of the organization and its operation seemed to come to an end. However, bin Laden wanted to extend the operations of the group to all over the world with the goal of fighting for Muslims facing persecution and struggling for a pure Islam.²⁰⁷ Therefore, Al-Qaeda expanded its

²⁰⁴ Amalendu Misra, *Hot Spots in Global Politics*, (Cambridge, UK; Malden, Mass.: Polity Press, 2004), p. 87

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 89

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 89

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 90

operation field carrying it to a global level. After fighting against communism and renewing the mission of the group, bin Laden returned his country, Saudi Arabia, in the time of Gulf War. He offered the King assistance with his mujahideen fighters in order to end the invasion of Iraqi army. When the King rejected his offer, allowing the U.S. and allied forces to deploy troops into Saudi territory, bin Laden publicly criticized Saudi rulers and protested his country feeling betrayed. He went to Sudan to escape from the threat of arrest because of his overt criticisms of his country. At the beginning, Sudan, with a regime dominated by Islamic fundamentalists, offered bin Laden convenient conditions to develop his organization.²⁰⁸ By using the bases in Sudan Al-Qaeda launched terrorist attacks in various countries. As a result, The USA and Saudi Arabia pressed Sudan authorities for expelling bin Laden. And bin Laden came to Jalalabad, eastern province of Afghanistan, where Taliban was in control in 1996. As Rasanayagam denotes in his book: “In Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden, with the collusion of the highly impressionable Taliban leader, Mullah Omar, hijacked a failing state. To seal his alliance, bin Laden took one of Omar’s daughters as his fourth wife.”²⁰⁹ By establishing a strong tie with Taliban movement, Osama bin Laden found the place that he sought for in order to enhance the capabilities of its organization and better fight against the Western civilization. Afghanistan became the main base of the operations of Al-Qaeda in the holy war. Thousands of Islamic extremists came to Afghanistan for military and ideological training.²¹⁰ Afterwards, as Taliban weakened, Al-Qaeda gradually gained power and Taliban became dependent both militarily and financially on Al-Qaeda. “By 2001, Al Qaeda controlled its own military and training camps in various parts of the country, notably in the eastern province of Nangarhar and the Northern province of Konduz, and frequently overruled Taliban authority.”²¹¹

²⁰⁸ Angelo Rasanayagam, *Afghanistan A Modern History* (London: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 2005), p. 229

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 234

²¹⁰ Robert D. Crews and Amin Tarzi, *The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2008), p.112

²¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 114

What made Afghanistan available for the settlement of terrorist groups was the political turmoil in the country and the lack of an effective strong administration therein. Denouncing the Taliban regime because of its governance based on force and terror with extreme rules and human rights abuses, international community isolated the country. This vacuum created the convenient political space for bin Laden and his followers to enrich their organization, carry out operations, train the fighters of the holy war and prepare them for a global jihad. In a speech at the Institute for Strategic Studies in London, Jack Straw clearly explained the situation in Afghanistan. “Terrorists are strongest where states are weakest. Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida found safe havens in places not just in Afghanistan but where government and society have collapsed.” And he added “The west's abandonment of Afghanistan allowed it to be "hijacked" by terrorist warlords such as Osama bin Laden.”²¹²

According to Amelendu Misra, there were three key reasons for the Al-Qaeda’s use of Afghanistan as a base. Firstly, despite the illegitimacy of the regime in the eyes of international community, the Afghan state was surviving with its sovereignty and territory providing convenient conditions for the terrorist group. Secondly, the ideology of Al-Qaeda had common visions with the Taliban movement and they became strong allies. Finally, the isolation of Afghanistan by the West, paved the way to open up its borders for the extremists seeking for a sanctuary.²¹³

The situation in Afghanistan was so appropriate for Al-Qaeda that it marked to the 21st century as the most dangerous threat for the world community by organizing the 9/11 attacks in the territories of the superpower. And as a host of the group, this event brought the end for Taliban.

²¹² The Guardian, “West must help rebuild 'failed states', says Straw”, 22 October 2001, online at: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/oct/22/september11.usa4> (accessed on 15.04.2010)

²¹³ Amalendu Misra, *Hot Spots in Global Politics*, (Cambridge, UK; Malden, Mass.: Polity Press, 2004), p. 86

4.3 Operation Enduring Freedom and the End of Taliban

After the 9/11 attacks, President George W. Bush addressed a joint session of Congress on 20 September 2001 and answered the question of “Who attacked our country?” stating that all the evidence gathered pointed to a collection of loosely affiliated terrorist organizations known as Al-Qaeda. And Bush launched global “war on terror”. Taliban regime in Afghanistan became the main target because it provided a safe haven to the organization to plan and carry out operations, train the terrorists that were recruited from many countries. In his words Bush claimed that Taliban regime was committing murder by aiding and abetting murder and demanded from the Taliban to deliver all of the leaders of Al-Qaeda who hide in Afghanistan; release all foreign nationals, including American citizens that they imprisoned, protect foreign journalists, diplomats and aid workers. Bush also called Taliban to close immediately and permanently every terrorist training camp in Afghanistan; hand over every terrorist and every person and their support structure to appropriate authorities and to give the United States full access to terrorist training camps. These demands were not open to negotiation or discussion and the Taliban was expected to act immediately.²¹⁴

The Taliban have defied the U.S. demands, refusing to hand over bin Laden without proof or evidence that he was involved in attacks on the United States. Since the USA did not have diplomatic relations with the Taliban, they communicated through Afghanistan ambassador to Pakistan, Abdul Salam Zaeef. He declared that: “There has been no change in our stand toward Osama. It would be an insult to Islam and its laws if bin Laden is handed over to the United States or forcibly expelled from Afghanistan.”²¹⁵ And in case of an American attack, Taliban said that

²¹⁴ CNN News, “Transcript of President Bush’s Address to Congress”, 21 September 2001, online at: <http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/> (accessed on 20.09.2009)

²¹⁵ Amin Shah, “Fearful Afghans try to leave Kabul”, *Herald Journal*, Spartanburg, S.C., 22 September 2001, p. A15, online at: <http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1876&dat=20010922&id=DSsfAAAIAIAJ&sjid=EdAEA AAAIAIAJ&pg=4703,7673079> (accessed on 16.04.2010)

they were ready ready to defend the country. “If they want to show their might, we are ready and we will never surrender before might and force.”²¹⁶

And British government released a document on 4 October 2001 pointing out the Al-Qaeda terrorist group as being responsible for the attacks on the USA. According to the document, Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda (the terrorist network which he heads) planned and carried out the atrocities on 11 September 2001 and they retained the will and resources to carry out further atrocities. And it was claimed that the terrorist group were able to commit these atrocities because of their close alliance with the Taliban regime, which allowed them to operate with impunity in pursuing their terrorist activity.²¹⁷

Usama Bin Laden's Al Qaida and the Taleban régime have a close and mutually dependent alliance. Usama Bin Laden and Al Qaida provide the Taleban régime with material, financial and military support. They jointly exploit the drugs trade. The Taleban régime allows Bin Laden to operate his terrorist training camps and activities from Afghanistan, protects him from attacks from outside, and protects the drugs stockpiles. Usama Bin Laden could not operate his terrorist activities without the alliance and support of the Taleban régime. The Taleban's strength would be seriously weakened without Usama Bin Laden's military and financial support.²¹⁸

These statements clearly demonstrated that military response of the USA with the support of Britain would not be delayed. On 7 October 2001, the USA sent a letter to the UN Security Council in order to inform that in response to the attacks and in accordance with the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence, the United States armed forces had initiated actions designed to prevent and deter further attacks on the United States. And the US government denoted that they had obtained ‘clear and compelling information that the Al-Qaeda organization, which

²¹⁶ CNN News, “Taliban: Aircraft Shot Down”, 21 September 2001, online at: <http://archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/central/09/22/ret.afghan.aircraft/index.html> (accessed on 17.04.2010)

²¹⁷ BBC News, “The UK’s Bin Laden Dossier in Full”, 4 October 2001, online at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/1579043.stm (accessed on 17.04.2010)

²¹⁸ “Responsibility for the Terrorist Atrocities in the United States, 11 September 2001”, Document Released By The UK Government, 3 November 2001, online at: <http://www.september11news.com/OsamaEvidence.htm> (accessed on: 17.04.2010)

is supported by the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, had a central role in the attacks.²¹⁹ Then, the USA and coalition forces working with the Afghan opposition forces of the Northern Alliance began an air campaign against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces. The operation called as Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and aimed to end the Al-Qaeda existence in Afghanistan by destroying the organization, toppled the Taliban regime that provided a safe haven for the terrorist network. As a result of massive attacks, Kabul was captured on 13 November 2001. Taliban regime was ousted and Al-Qaeda was destroyed seriously.

4.4 Post-Taliban Period and Establishment of ISAF

Since the regime in Afghanistan was destroyed with the US-led operation, it became necessary to have a transition period before a permanent government was established. On 14 November 2001, the UN Security Council adopted the Resolution 1378. The Council expressed “its strong support for the efforts of the Afghan people to establish a new and transitional administration leading to the formation of a government.” And also it was affirmed that the United Nations should play a central role in this process.²²⁰ And with the efforts of UN representative, it was decided to hold a meeting in Bonn with the participation of Afghan political groups and concerning the future of Afghanistan. The aim was to rebuild Afghanistan, establish an interim administration and set out the rules under which the interim government would rule the country. Under the Bonn agreement adopted on 5 December 2001, Hamid Karzai was elected as the head of the Afghanistan Interim Authority consisting of 30 members.²²¹ As far as the security of the country is concerned, with an annex named as international security force

²¹⁹ UN Security Council S/2001/946, Letter dated 7 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, online at: <http://www.hamamoto.law.kyoto-u.ac.jp/kogi/2005kiko/s-2001-946e.pdf> (accessed on: 17.04.2010)

²²⁰ UN Press Release SC/7212, UN Security Council Resolution 1378 (2001), online at: <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sc7212.doc.htm> (accessed on 10.04.2010)

²²¹ “Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions”, online at: <http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/afghan-agree.htm> (accessed on 01.04.2010)

was attached to the agreement. And the participants of the conference called the UN Security Council for “authorizing the early deployment to Afghanistan of a United Nations mandated force.” This force would help the new Afghan government in the reconstruction of the state and provide security for Kabul and its surroundings. “Such a force could, as appropriate, be progressively expanded to other urban centres and other areas.”²²² And it would also train the new Afghan security and armed forces.

On 19 December 2001, a letter was presented to the Security Council by the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom stating that the UK was willing to become the initial lead nation for the ISAF for Kabul and its surrounding areas, under the terms of Annex I to the Bonn Agreement. According to the letter, the responsibility for providing security and law and order throughout Afghanistan resided with the Afghans themselves so the International Force would assist the Interim Afghan Administration.²²³

On 20 December 2001, the UN Security Council “authorized the establishment for six months of an ISAF in Afghanistan and welcomed the United Kingdom’s offer to take the lead in organizing and commanding such a force” with the Resolution 1386.²²⁴ Establishment of the ISAF laid the foundation for NATO’s future involvement in Afghanistan.

4.5 NATO in Afghanistan

The mission of Afghanistan began for the Alliance with the takeover of the command and control of ISAF in 2003. The fundamental role of NATO in Afghanistan is to boost the Afghan Transitional Authority in exercising and extending its authority and influence across the country and thereby assist in the

²²² Bonn Agreement, Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, Annex I, online at: <http://www.afghangovernment.com/AfghanAgreementBonn.htm> (accessed on 20.04.2010)

²²³ UN Press Release SC/7248, UN Security Council Resolution 1386 (2001), online at: <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sc7248.doc.htm> (accessed on 18.04.2010)

²²⁴ *Ibid.*

reconstruction and effective governance. And NATO conducts its mission mainly through its UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force.²²⁵

And as being its first out-of-area operation outside Europe, the Afghanistan operation has an important political role. Although NATO has embarked upon stabilization and reconstruction missions before (for example in Kosovo); its new mission in Afghanistan is substantially difficult. Taliban and Al-Qaeda fighters are hardly resisting to the operations of NATO and Afghanistan is lacking an effective, well-functioning central government. Moreover, the country is remote from Europe, and the geographical characteristics of the country present intimidating impediments to the NATO soldiers and equipment. Stabilization and reconstruction efforts go along the combat operations. And, there are disagreements over the issue of how to achieve the general political objective of the ISAF mission. Moreover, there is a burden on NATO to prove that it transformed in a way that it has the capability to fight against the new security challenges. Therefore, the mission in Afghanistan is important for NATO's future. NATO members undertook a profound transformation and several times made commitments of developing capabilities making their forces more expeditionary, flexible, and deployable. So it turned out to be a test case for NATO members to demonstrate that the transformation did not only realize in the rhetorical level.

4.5.1 Evolution of ISAF in Afghanistan

NATO's existence began with the assumption of the leadership of the ISAF operations on 11 August 2003. The Alliance became responsible for the command, coordination and planning of the force, including the provision of a force commander and headquarters on the ground in Afghanistan.²²⁶

At the beginning, ISAF's authorization was restricted to maintaining security in Kabul and its surroundings. However, gradually NATO was allowed to operate in

²²⁵ NATO Topics, "NATO's Role in Afghanistan", online at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_8189.htm (accessed on 10.09.2009)

²²⁶ "The Evolution of ISAF" in NATO Topics, "NATO's Role in Afghanistan", online at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_8189.htm#evolution (accessed on 10.09.2009)

other areas out of Kabul. In October 2003, the United Nations with the Resolution 1510 authorized the expansion of the mandate of the ISAF to allow it, as resources permit, to support the Afghan Transitional Authority and its successors in the maintenance of security in areas of Afghanistan outside of Kabul and its environs.²²⁷ So, NATO expanded its missions across the country. In December 2003, the expansion of ISAF was initiated with the taking over command of the Kunduz Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), previously led by Germany.²²⁸ On 28 June 2004, at the Summit meeting of the NATO Heads of State and Government in Istanbul, NATO announced that it would establish four other provincial reconstruction teams in the north of the country. On 10 February 2005, NATO declared that ISAF would be further expanded, into the west of Afghanistan.

By September 2005, NATO provided security assistance in the half of the Afghan territories. Next expansion began on 31 July 2006, when ISAF assumed command of the southern region of Afghanistan from US-led Coalition forces, expanding its area of operations. And finally ISAF expanded to east, taking responsibility for entire country in October 2006.²²⁹

4.5.2 ISAF Missions

The main mission of the ISAF was defined in the UN Security Council Resolution 1386. Security Council recognized that the responsibility for providing security and law and order throughout the country resided with the Afghan themselves. So ISAF was granted a collateral role that was “to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, so that the Afghan Interim Authority as well as the personnel of the United Nations can operate in a secure environment.”²³⁰ ISAF was called upon to work in close cooperation with

²²⁷ UN Press Release SC/7894, UN Security Council Resolution 1510 (2003), online at: <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/sc7894.doc.htm> (accessed on: 20.04.2010)

²²⁸ “The Evolution of ISAF” in NATO Topics, “NATO’s Role in Afghanistan”, online at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_8189.htm#evolution (accessed on 10.09.2009)

²²⁹ *Ibid.*

²³⁰ UN Press Release SC/7248, UN Security Council Resolution 1386 (2001), online at: <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sc7248.doc.htm> (accessed on 18.04.2010)

the Afghan Interim Authority and the member states participating in ISAF was called on “to provide assistance to help the Afghan Interim Authority in the establishment and training of new Afghan security and armed forces.”²³¹ Also, according to the Military Technical Agreement that was signed between ISAF and the Interim Administration of Afghanistan in January 2002, ISAF may assist the Interim Administration in developing future security structures, and in reconstruction. ISAF may also identify and arrange training and assistance tasks for future Afghan security forces.²³²

In accordance with the tasks ascribed in the Resolution and the agreement, ISAF forces are carrying on security and stability operations across the country in collaboration with the Afghan Security Forces and are directly involved in the development of the Afghan National Army through mentoring, training and equipping. Within this framework, NATO also provides support to the Afghan National Police (ANP) within means and capabilities. This constitutes another essential task of support. In this field, ISAF while conducting its mission gets support of the United States as well as the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL) which was launched in June 2007.²³³ Additionally, ISAF collects illegal weapons, ordnance and ammunitions from armed groups and individual persons and safely destroy them in order to prevent a potential troublesome situation that could affect the local population, Afghan National Security Forces or ISAF personnel. In order to enhance the physical security of the Afghan National Army’s ammunition depots and develop its ammunition stockpile management capabilities; NATO executes a Trust Fund Project. ISAF forces also

²³¹ UN Press Release SC/7248, UN Security Council Resolution 1386 (2001), online at: <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sc7248.doc.htm> (accessed on 18.04.2010)

²³² Military Technical Agreement Between the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Interim Administration of Afghanistan (‘Interim Administration’), Article V/2, online at: <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+http://www.operations.mod.uk/isafmta.pdf> (accessed on 15.04.2010)

²³³ “ISAF’s Tasks” in NATO Topics, “NATO’s Role in Afghanistan”, online at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_8189.htm#tasks (accessed on 10.09.2009)

undertake mission in the immediate aftermath of significant military operations by provision of humanitarian assistance such as the provision of food, shelter and medicines as well as the repair of buildings and key infrastructure. And an ISAF Post-Operations Humanitarian Relief Fund (POHRF) was founded to this end in 2006.²³⁴

As far as the reconstruction and development of the country concerned; ISAF conducts its mission through the PRTs. PRTs are the main mechanisms to rebuild the Afghan state and they are composed of both civilian and military personnel. The civilian officials take the lead in political, economic, humanitarian and social aspects of PRTs' work, and on the other hand; the military components deal with 'increasing security and stability in the area and building security sector capacity in support of the Afghan national development priorities.'²³⁵ PRTs were established in 2003 in order to provide a crucial assistance to the Afghan Government in its efforts 'to improve security and democratic governance, to provide essential services, and to expand economic opportunity.'²³⁶ Their main mission is "to help provincial governments develop a transparent and sustained capability to govern; promote increased security and rule of law; promote political and economic development; provide assistance necessary to meet the basic needs of the population; and help ensure that improvements in security are sustainable."²³⁷ There are twenty-six PRTs operating in Afghanistan and conducting many projects throughout the country. Additionally, if it is requested, they assist the Afghan government and international actors with humanitarian relief.

²³⁴ "ISAF's Tasks" in NATO Topics, "NATO's Role in Afghanistan", online at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_8189.htm#tasks (accessed on 10.09.2009)

²³⁵ *Ibid.*

²³⁶ The White House Fact Sheet: "Making Afghanistan More Secure with Economic and Reconstruction Assistance", 26 September 2008, online at: <http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/afghanistan/WH/20080926-16.pdf> (accessed on 18.03.2010)

²³⁷ *Ibid.*

Narcotics issue is also one of the crucial problems to be solved for the future of Afghanistan due to its linkage with Afghan insurgency. Cultivation, transportation and processing of opium poppy in the country constitute a major source of funding for the insurgency.²³⁸ And Afghanistan supplies %93 of the world opium production.²³⁹ For this reason, effective counter narcotics efforts are significant. Therefore, ISAF forces supports the counter-narcotics efforts when Afghan Government requests ‘by sharing information, conducting an efficient public information campaign, and providing in-extremis support to the Afghan National Security Forces’ counter-narcotics operations.’ ISAF also takes part in the training of Afghan National Security Force’s personnel in counter-narcotics related activities and provides logistic support.²⁴⁰ And from the beginning, ISAF was not authorized to play a direct role in the counter-narcotics effort, such as destroying poppy fields or processing facilities. However, with the strengthening of the relationship between narcotics industry and insurgency, it was decided by the NATO Defence Ministers’ Meeting in Budapest on 10 October 2008 that NATO would enhance its support ‘including the destruction of processing facilities, as well as action against narcotic producers if there is a clearly established link with the insurgency’ on the request of the Afghan government and with the consent of the national authorities of the forces involved.²⁴¹

As it is evident, NATO has profoundly engaged in the reconstruction and stabilization period of Afghanistan since 2003 by the ISAF forces. ISAF forces penetrated in every aspect of life assisting the Afghan government.

²³⁸ Vincent Morelli and Paul Belkin, “NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance”, Congressional Research Service, 3 December 2009, p. 14

²³⁹ Christopher M. Blanchard, “Afghanistan: Narcotics and the US Policy”, Congressional Research Service, 12 August 2009, p. 2

²⁴⁰ “ISAF’s Tasks” in NATO Topics, “NATO’s Role in Afghanistan”, online at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_8189.htm#tasks (accessed on 10.09.2009)

²⁴¹ *Ibid.*

4.5.3 Recent Situation in Afghanistan

Up to present, NATO endeavoured to contribute rebuilding of the state and took important steps within this framework. A new constitution was ratified and presidential and parliamentary elections were held. There has been a progress in extending the rule of law, establishing effective governance, and furthering economic development despite some limitations. On the other hand, also there have been concerns for the deteriorating security environment on the ground. Insurgent attacks became frequent and complex because rebellious groups managed to find safe haven across the border in Pakistan.²⁴² Therefore, the need for taking further measures arose.

In 2008, efforts began with the formation of a clearer and more robust strategy to guide Afghan and international efforts. In the Bucharest Summit held in April 2008, NATO Allies adopted ISAF's Strategic Vision for Afghanistan. The vision of success was clearly defined in the document as: 'extremism and terrorism will no longer pose a threat to stability; Afghan National Security Forces will be in the lead and self-sufficient; and the Afghan Government will be able to extend the reach of good governance, reconstruction, and development throughout the country to the benefit of all its citizens'²⁴³, and guiding principles and commitments of the participating members were set out in a clear way.

With the declaration on Afghanistan adopted at the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit which was held in April 2009, NATO members decided to further enhance their role in Afghanistan and agreed to a number of new initiatives for Afghanistan, including a significant expansion of the training and support effort for Afghan National

²⁴² Steve Bowman and Catherine Dale, "War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Operations, and Issues for Congress" Congressional Research Service, 3 February 2009, p. 6

²⁴³ NATO Official Texts, "ISAF's Strategic Vision", Declaration by the Heads of State and Government of the Nations contributing to the UN-mandated NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, 3 April 2008, par. 3 online at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8444.htm?mode=pressrelease (accessed on 14.01.2010)

Security Forces.²⁴⁴ Then, in October 2009, NATO Defence Ministers met in Bratislava and endorsed the strategy proposed by General McChrystal based on four priorities for ISAF operations. They decided to focus upon the Afghan population, enhance their efforts to build the capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces, promote better Afghan governance and finally engage more effectively with Afghanistan's neighbours, particularly Pakistan.²⁴⁵

President Obama in his speech at the US Military Academy in December 2009 outlined his strategy on Afghanistan, and Pakistan drawing attention to the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan, he denoted that: "There's no imminent threat of the government being overthrown, but the Taliban has gained momentum. Al-Qaeda has not reemerged in Afghanistan in the same numbers as before 9/11, but they retain their safe havens along the border."²⁴⁶ He set the goal of disrupting, dismantling, and defeating Al-Qaeda and its extremist allies. President Obama particularly aimed to deny Al-Qaeda a safe haven; reverse the Taliban's momentum and deny it the ability to overthrow the government; and finally to strengthen the capacity of Afghanistan's security forces and government so that they can take lead responsibility for Afghanistan's future.

In order to achieve these goals, President Obama offered three ways. First is the pursuit of a military strategy that will break the Taliban's momentum and increase Afghanistan's capacity over the next 18 months. Second way is to work in close cooperation with the partners, the United Nations, and the Afghan people to pursue a more effective civilian strategy, so that the government can take advantage of improved security. Finally, Obama stressed the importance of an effective partnership with the Pakistani government and expressed that as a third way it was

²⁴⁴ NATO News, "NATO Expands Its Role in Afghanistan", 4 April 2009, online at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_52799.htm (accessed on 29.01.2010)

²⁴⁵ NATO News, "NATO Ministers Agree on Key Priorities for Afghanistan," 23 October 2009, online at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_58510.htm (accessed on 28.03.2010)

²⁴⁶ CNN News, "Obama Afghanistan Strategy: More Troops in Quickly, Drawdown in 2011", 1 December 2009, online at: <http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/12/01/obama.afghanistan/index.html> (accessed on 10.03.2010)

crucial to strengthen Pakistan's capacity to target the insurgent groups. He declared that it was in their vital interest to deploy an additional 30,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan. Emphasizing the significance of transferring lead responsibility for security to the ANSF, he expressed that they would begin the transfer of their forces out of Afghanistan in July of 2011.²⁴⁷

In January 2010, with the participation of representatives of more than 60 countries an International Conference on Afghanistan in London was held. They committed support and resources to the increased personnel objective and accelerated timeline for the development of Afghan National Security Forces, and announcing new commitment of troops and trainers to ISAF.²⁴⁸ It was determined to develop a plan for phased transition to Afghan security lead province by province to begin. The Afghan Army and Police Force were decided to increase and it was confirmed to increase the international forces to support the training of Afghan forces. In order to foster the development of Afghanistan, the participants agreed to take measures to tackle corruption; provide a better coordinated development assistance to the Afghan Government; enhance sub-national government to improve delivery of basic services to all Afghans; and finally support for the Afghan Government's national Peace and Reintegration Programme, including financial support for a Peace and Reintegration Trust Fund. Also it was decided to offer economic alternatives to those who renounce violence, to cut links to terrorism and to work within the democratic process. In order to combat terrorism, violent extremism and the drugs trade; it was decided to increase regional co-operation, trade and cultural exchange and to create conducive conditions for the return of Afghan refugees.²⁴⁹

In February 2010, NATO Defence Ministers met in Istanbul to discuss alliance funding issues, Kosovo and Afghanistan. The Allies were encouraged for greater

²⁴⁷ CNN News, "Obama Afghanistan Strategy: More Troops in Quickly, Drawdown in 2011", 1 December 2009, online at: <http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/12/01/obama.afghanistan/index.html> (accessed on 10.03.2010)

²⁴⁸ "Outcomes From Afghanistan: The London Conference", online at: <http://afghanistan.hmg.gov.uk/en/conference/outcomes/> (accessed on 01.03.2010)

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

participation in Afghan operations. Despite the previous commitments of sending an additional 9,000 troops to Afghanistan, the officials cited that ISAF was still short of 4,000 mentors and trainers for the Afghan National Security Forces.²⁵⁰

On 23 April 2010, NATO and ISAF Foreign Ministers came to terms with a common approach to support the Afghan government increasingly take more responsibility for its own affairs, beginning in 2010. The transition process will facilitate for the Afghan Government to progressively exercise its sovereignty, with the continuing support of NATO-ISAF. NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen defines the process as: “Transition means that Afghan authorities take the lead, and we move into a supportive role. But it doesn’t mean a rush for the exit.” This ‘sustainable and irreversible’ process will be launched and planned when the conditions allow.²⁵¹

As it is observed, in the recent years, the Allies accelerated their efforts for a more expeditious solution in the country. Strategies about Afghanistan became more evident and additional supportive forces were sent and will be sent. And as the US President Obama expressed that in July 2011, the transfer of the international forces out of Afghanistan will begin and the responsibility in the country will be handed over Afghan government and forces.²⁵² Increasing efforts of the Allies demonstrate that NATO has not yet presented a comprehensive political solution in Afghanistan. Taliban forces and the terrorist network continue to resist creating difficulties for the Allied forces. The progress in Afghanistan is slow because of several restrictions that prevent the Allies to end their mission and leave the country.

²⁵⁰ “Gates Asks NATO for More Trainers and Mentors,” American Forces Press Service, February 4, 2010, cited in Steve Bowman and Catherine Dale, “War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Operations, and Issues for Congress” Congressional Research Service, 3 February 2009, p.7

²⁵¹ NATO News, “NATO Agrees Roadmap for Transition to Afghan Lead”, 23 April 2010, online at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_62858.htm?selectedLocale=en (accessed on 05.05.2010)

²⁵² UK Ministry of Defence, Defence News, “Head of NATO forces in Afghanistan says situation is no longer deteriorating”, 5 February 2010, online at: <http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/DefencePolicyAndBusiness/HeadOfNatoForcesInAfghanistanSaysSituationIsNoLongerDeteriorating.htm> (accessed on 18.04.2010)

4.5.4 Limitations of ISAF

Afghan war started in 2001 and has not come to an end yet. Stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan has very significant implications for the international security environment and the members of the world community have vital interests in the solution of the problem. The government of Afghanistan expects to survive against Taliban and other insurgents, sustain security and stability without support of the international community and get rid of the elements of instability. The USA has both regional and global concerns. Firstly, the US government aims to prevent Afghanistan from being a safe haven to terrorists for the global security and to assist Afghan government in providing a secure and stable environment. So, regional security balance will be ensured. Moreover, the states in the neighbourhood of Afghanistan have concerns about their security in the future so they may create impact on the situation in the country. Since NATO members are anxious about rising threat of terrorist activities they want to destroy terrorist networks but on the other hand some of them are reluctant for consigning more resources in the area that is so distant and sending more troops there. Therefore, in the face of such complex security concerns, it is inevitable to face some difficulties stemming from different expectations and interests of the parties. And this retards the achievement of the Alliance in Afghanistan.

NATO currently comes up against a number challenges that hinder its efforts in Afghanistan. According to Kulesa, the first of these challenges is the unwillingness of some of the Allies to commit troops to counter-insurgency tasks.²⁵³ At the beginning, the problem was the lack of sufficient number of troops. The Allies committed more forces to contribute to ISAF however; another difficulty emerged with the ‘national caveats’ of the countries contributing to ISAF. The problem was how some of those forces provided would operate after their deployment. Many allies committed forces to the NATO operation, but with certain restrictions called as “national caveats” on tasks those forces could undertake. They do not allow their

²⁵³ Łukasz Kulesa, “ISAF Operation in Afghanistan and the Future of NATO – Time for Change”, *The Polish Institute of International Affairs PISM Strategic Files*, web edition, Number 2, March 2008, p. 1, online at: http://www.pism.pl/zalaczniki/2_Strategic_Files_1.pdf (accessed on 17.03.2010)

troops to participate in combat operations except for self-defence situations. So the alliance faces difficulties in securing the countryside because of the lack of sufficient number of troops. And even though there has been work on the removal of the limitations placed on the troops, national caveats or restrictions that allies impose on the use of their forces, continue to trouble ISAF.²⁵⁴

Another challenge for Kulesa is to define, in realistic terms, the objectives of the military operation in Afghanistan and specify the instruments needed for measuring progress. For him, the ultimate achievement in Afghanistan will include ‘neither the complete defeat of the insurgency and those terrorist groups aligned with it, nor the establishment of a well-functioning, self-sustained state’. In his paper, he expresses the expected outcome according to many countries contributing to ISAF forces as ‘the creation (within a reasonable timeframe) of a relatively stable security environment, making it possible to withdraw their contingents without the threat of an imminent collapse of the Afghan government or the takeover of a large part of the country by the Taliban.’²⁵⁵ In order to create the mentioned stable security environment in the region the Allies need to be clear with their strategy and get rid of their ‘national caveats’.

According to Mariet D’Souza, the existence of two major international military coalitions – the US led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and the ISAF-complicates the situation in terms of command and control. Presence of the two security forces with two commands violates the principle of ‘unity of command’ and creates a serious problem of coordination in the operational field.²⁵⁶

²⁵⁴ Vincent Morelli and Paul Belkin, “NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance”, Congressional Research Service, 3 December 2009, p. 10-12

²⁵⁵ Łukasz Kulesa, “ISAF Operation in Afghanistan and the Future of NATO – Time for Change”, *The Polish Institute of International Affairs PISM Strategic Files*, web edition, Number 2, March 2008, p. 1, online at: http://www.pism.pl/zalaczniki/2_Strategic_Files_1.pdf (accessed on 17.03.2010)

²⁵⁶ Shanthie M. D’Souza, “NATO in Afghanistan: Fault lines in the transatlantic alliance?”, Institute for Defence Studies & Analyses, *Special Feature*, 2 April 2009, p. 3

As it is well known, constituting an effective counter-narcotics policy is of vital importance in fight against terrorism, since the Taliban insurgency is benefiting from the production of opium in Afghanistan. D'Souza claims that, because of the significant differences exist in the Allies' approach to counter narcotics in Afghanistan, an effective unique strategy could not be established and counter-insurgency efforts of the Allies are undermined. While the USA favors a policy of using hard power for the eradication of the opium fields such as aerial spraying, NATO allies do not support the USA because of the fear of 'losing the battle for hearts and minds'.²⁵⁷

For D'Souza, another essential challenge for ISAF lies in the effectiveness of the PRTs in Afghanistan. The problem of coordination between PRTs arises because of the conflicting national agendas and national caveats in PRTs. Some of the Allies are reluctant to actively engage with the Afghan population not to face up to the risks. Moreover, the management of the funds and the implementation of the projects are not supervised and they are not transparent so corruption and delays make things difficult for the PRTs.²⁵⁸

The neighbour Pakistan also creates an outside challenge in front of the NATO forces with its safe havens for the Taliban and the Al-Qaeda. It becomes hard to eradicate the roots of the insurgents because of the new insurgents brought up in the safe havens of Pakistan. It is important to deal with Pakistan to forestall the country being new nest for terrorists.²⁵⁹

Besides these, the essential limitation for NATO is the structure of the Alliance as a traditional security organization. Formation of the Alliance was triggered by the desire to unite in the case of a revitalized German attack and by the Soviet's

²⁵⁷ Shanthie M. D'Souza, "NATO in Afghanistan: Fault lines in the transatlantic alliance?", Institute for Defence Studies & Analyses, *Special Feature*, 2 April 2009, p. 4

²⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

expansionist intentions and plans in the eastern Europe. The Allies faced with a conventional hard security threat and this provided a strong cohesion within the Alliance. However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union the military threat disappeared and the cohesion of the alliance was affected. As a result, members became more independent in their foreign and defence policies and this created problems in the collective actions. Against the soft security threats such as transnational terrorism, NATO members can not act decisively.

Although NATO struggles much to create an effective and strong government in Afghanistan in order to remove the convenient conditions for the terrorists, these limitations slows down the process and leads to the criticisms about the future of the operation.

4.6 Conclusion

Since 2003, NATO and Western powers assuming the leadership of ISAF, have been conducting a war in order to eradicate the roots of terrorism and establish a strong central government which prevents the country from becoming the hub of insurgents. NATO forces embarked upon various missions and contributes much to the fight against insurgents and on the other hand, to the reconstruction of Afghanistan by stabilizing and democratizing the country. As far as security of the country is concerned, ISAF forces are conducting security and stability operations throughout the country in collaboration with the Afghan Security Forces and are directly involved in the development of the Afghan National Army through mentoring, training and equipping. On the other hand, PRTs were built in order to help the central government in extending its authority to the rural areas.

Despite these developments, current situation in Afghanistan proves that Afghan operation of the Alliance has not come to an end yet and security situation in the country still creates a challenge for the Alliance. There are remnants of Taliban and Al-Qaeda and they continue their operations. And in the regions where the Afghan security forces do not have full control, people give support to the insurgents. Moreover, economic situation of the country also hinders the progress. Production

of narcotics can not be prevented totally. All these realities demonstrate that despite certain achievements, NATO has not yet managed to contribute effectively to the fight against transnational terrorism in Afghanistan.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

This thesis focused on the NATO's efforts in the fight against transnational terrorism. The essential question was how transnational terrorism ingrained in the security agenda of the Alliance and how the Alliance managed to carry out its new mission in Afghanistan with regard to transnational terrorism. In this thesis it was argued that despite significant achievements in the fight against transnational terrorism in Afghanistan, NATO has not yet become quite effective in dealing with transnational terrorism since the Alliance is still primarily designed to deal with conventional hard security threats.

In the first chapter, I explained the changing security environment beginning from the Cold War period and clarified the transnational terrorism concept. I explained how transnational terrorism became important in the security concerns of the international community in order to understand NATO's increasing attention to the transnational terrorism threat. I found out that transnational terrorism which is practiced by autonomous non-state actors emerged as a prominent threat after the 9/11 events. Terrorism was restricted geographically in the earlier periods and did not have global objectives; but in the new era, the terrorist organizations and operations not only have effects within the borders of a specific state but also create consequences for the citizens of a specific country. International community became aware of the lethal consequences of the new kind of terrorism with the 9/11 events therefore; transnational terrorism attracted the attention of the world community and became the foremost security threat for the international community and for NATO.

In the second chapter, in order to provide a better understanding of NATO's indifference to the terrorism issue before 9/11 attacks, I have analyzed NATO's security strategies in the Cold War and post-Cold War period. I found out that the

collective defence and collective security strategies did not deal with the terrorism issue. Soviet policies of expanding its area of influence by building satellite regimes in Central and Eastern Europe mobilized the Western countries and led to the foundation of a collective defense organization. NATO was founded to safeguard the security of its members in the face of a threat that could stem from the Soviet Union. NATO's main security strategy, collective defense, was stipulated by the Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. According to the clause, the Allies aimed to deter an attack against them or thwart its outbreak and in the case of an attack they committed to assist the attacked party or parties. So, the primary mission of the Alliance in the Cold War era was to balance the Soviet threat and preserve the territorial security of its members.

Then, in the second chapter, I continued with the analysis of the collective security strategy of NATO in the post-Cold War period. And I reached the conclusion that NATO continued to disregard the terrorism threat in its security strategies. NATO's security concerns focused on the new environment that came out with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the victory of the Western world. After the Cold War, the traditional security threat of an attack from a non-member country disappeared. However, security policies of the Allies were still challenged with the political vacuum emerged after the downfall of the Eastern pole. Ethnic and nationalistic conflicts began to appear and additionally, the Eastern European states were confronted with economic and political problems which were needed to be resolved. Territorial integrity of the NATO members was not directly jeopardized by these security challenges but indifference to the events would bring huge problems for the Allies, so security meant more than simply protecting the borders. Comprehensive approach to the security, taking into account economic, political and social dimensions of it, formed the basis of the Alliance's security policy in the post-Cold War era and besides military means; political tools also became significant in the fight against new threats. Within this context, NATO decided to build cooperation with the former Soviet countries in order to prevent the security problems that would arise from the political gap created by the end of the Soviet

Union and NATO participated missions and operations such as crisis management and the peaceful settlement in the Balkans.

As far as terrorism concerned, the London Declaration and the Strategic Concepts (1991 and 1999) adopted in this period demonstrated that NATO did not consider terrorism as a serious threat to the security of its members. Until the 9/ 11 attacks, what NATO did with regard to terrorism can be summarized as the recognition of it as a new threat without taking a collective action against it. This was because of the perception of terrorism as a domestic issue of the states and according to the Allies major source of the potential threats was still the states itself.

In the third chapter, I analyzed the profound change in NATO's security strategy with regard to the terrorism threat after the 9/ 11 attacks and I found out that these attacks substantially affected the security agenda of the world community as a whole. Transnational terrorism came to the foreground as the most prominent threat of the new century. The international community mobilized in the face of transnational terrorism threat and states revised their security strategies taking urgent measures for the new threat. The USA launched a global war on terror however, NATO was bypassed in the fight against the global terror. It was understood that current capabilities and policies of NATO were insufficient in order to counter the new kind of threat. Just after the attacks, although NATO member states took a historical decision of invoking Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the USA did not want to include NATO in its war against terrorism. This demonstrated the fact that NATO was irrelevant with regard to fight against terrorism and it became evident that NATO needed a profound political and military transformation. Then, NATO's primary agenda was set out and in every summit, transformation of NATO was the key priority. The summit declarations proved that NATO transformed itself gradually, in terms of its structure and capabilities and enhanced its relations with its partners and non-member countries, taking its place in countering terrorism.

In the fourth chapter, NATO's Afghanistan operation in the context of the fight against terrorism was examined in order to provide a practical view for NATO's fight against transnational terrorism and in order to expose where NATO stands. Before analyzing the Afghan mission, I focused on the historical background of Afghanistan beginning from the Soviet invasion in order to understand why Afghanistan became a focal point in the fight against transnational terrorism. I found out that what made Afghanistan available for the settlement of terrorist groups were the political turmoil and the lack of an effective strong administration in the country. And the USA as a victim of the terrorist attacks and considering Afghanistan as a hub of the terrorists launched the Operation Enduring Freedom. After the overthrow of the Taliban regime that provided safe haven for the Al-Qaeda organization, Afghan Interim Authority was elected and the UN authorized the establishment for six months of an ISAF. NATO's existence in Afghanistan began with the assumption of the leadership of the ISAF operations on 11 August 2003. The Alliance became responsible for the command, coordination and planning of ISAF, including the provision of a force commander and headquarters on the ground in Afghanistan. NATO embarked upon Afghan mission in order to prove that the Alliance was able to cope with the new challenges of the new century. Within this framework, NATO undertook the mission of creation and development of the Afghan state and eradicating the terrorist networks in the country. ISAF under the command and control of NATO was granted a collateral role that was to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in the country. ISAF also was tasked to help the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan through PRTs.

NATO forces contribute much to the security and reconstruction of Afghanistan since 2003. They carry on security and stability operations across the country in collaboration with the Afghan Security Forces and are directly involved in the development of the Afghan National Army. ISAF forces also undertake humanitarian missions such as the provision of food, shelter and medicines as well as the repair of buildings and key infrastructure. PRTs support the Afghan Government in its efforts 'to improve security and democratic governance, to

provide essential services, and to expand economic opportunity. With regard to political developments, in Afghanistan, new constitution setting up a presidential system, with an elected president and a separately elected National Assembly (parliament) was adopted in 2004 and the first presidential election was held in October 2004. A year later, parliamentary elections took place in September 2005.

Although NATO struggles much to create an effective and strong government in Afghanistan in order to remove the convenient conditions for the terrorists, there are limitations that hinders the mission and slows down the progress in Afghanistan. NATO has undertaken various stabilization and reconstruction missions, such as in Balkans, however, the operations in Afghanistan are different because Afghanistan has already been in political turmoil with continuous internal conflicts. And it has been devoid of a centralized government for a long time with the extremists that struck roots benefiting from the political vacuum in the country. Moreover, geographical position of Afghanistan creates certain difficulties in conducting the operations to eradicate the terrorist network. The geography of Afghanistan enables the insurgents to conduct asymmetric war that the Alliance is unable to cope with. The Allied forces have difficulties to execute operations in such geography. Moreover, each of the parties involved in the mission have various national concerns and interests. The scholars also found many reasons behind the incremental progress in the situation of Afghanistan such as ‘insufficient number of troops, internal division among the NATO members over its presence in Afghanistan, weakening of international resolve, mounting regional challenges, growing lack of confidence among the Afghan people with regard to NATO’s determination and ability to stabilize the country, the presence of drug barons, corruption among the Afghan officials’.

Another reason behind the incremental progress in Afghanistan is that NATO is designed to counter hard security threats. Hard security issues such as territorial defence had priority in the security agenda of the Allies. After the end of the Cold War and after the emergence of a new security environment, hard security threats reduced substantially. NATO lost its *raison d’être* and the cohesion of the Alliance

loosened. Member states began to shape their foreign and defence policies according to their national interests. And since NATO members did not consider the threat as hazardous as it was in the Cold War era, it became hard to behave collectively. Members felt more independent and their national interests prevailed the group interests. This situation influenced the future of the Afghan operation.

After the evaluation of the Afghan operation of NATO I reached the conclusion that although the out-of-area mission in Afghanistan has played an important role for NATO to prove its relevance with regard to provision of security in the face of new threats, it is hard to claim that NATO has completed its mission in Afghanistan because of the aforementioned restrictions. NATO provided significant contributions to the fight against global terrorism however; it has not come up with a comprehensive political outcome yet. Afghan War has not come to an end. NATO completed its transformation in order to adapt itself to the new security environment emerged after the 9/11 attacks and undertook its first out-of-area mission, however, at the practical level insufficiencies emerged. NATO is restricted by geographical, political, economic and military reasons.

It can be concluded that despite significant achievements, progress of the situation in Afghanistan is restricted. The main important reason behind this inefficiency is the structure of NATO as a classical security organization. In order to fight against a transnational threat, national security interests should be disregarded to some extent but they still matter for the member states and they are not able to form a strict coherent strategy. NATO members should get rid of the pressure of their national interests or concerns. The national interests are still at stake. And the problem of transnational terrorism necessitates cooperation since it goes beyond the borders. In order not to become irrelevant in a world in which terrorism has become the principal threat, NATO has to reorganize its structure and become more effective in the fight against soft security threats.

Moreover, in order to be effective in the fight against terrorism it is important to decide whether the terrorism is best dealt with as war, crime or disease because the

point of how terrorism is dealt with will have an influence on NATO's achievements in Afghanistan. There are different perceptions and types of terrorism. If there is no consensus on the perception and type of terrorism, there can never be any consensus on what an appropriate response should be. NATO members should have concerted efforts to address the definition of the terrorism issue and the way to fight against it.

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