

GERMAN CONSERVATISM AND ITS IMPACT ON TURKEY'S
MEMBERSHIP DEBATE

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

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IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE
OF
MASTER OF SCIENCE
IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF EUROPEAN STUDIES

SEPTEMBER 2010

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

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ABSTRACT

GERMAN CONSERVATISM AND ITS IMPACT ON TURKEY'S MEMBERSHIP DEBATE

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September 2010, 101 pages

This thesis aims to analyze German Conservatism and the impact of Germany's policies towards Turkey's membership. The point of departure is *privileged partnership* which is offered to Turkey in replace of membership to the EU. German Chancellor Angela Merkel is a prominent defender of *privileged partnership* and previous Chancellor Gerhard Schröder who supported Turkey's accession, had a totally different attitude. It is questioned whether this sharp change in foreign policy derives from German Conservatism and Christian Democracy. As a result, it is not possible to claim an essentialist opposition to Turkey's accession by German Christian Democrats but *privileged partnership* is a product of German Conservative thinking which sees European Integration as a cultural project.

Keywords: German Conservatism, Turkey-EU Relations, Privileged Partnership

ÖZ

ALMAN MUHAFAZAKARLIĞI VE TÜRKİYE’NİN ÜYELİK MÜZAKERELERİNE ETKİSİ

Aliođlu, Özlem

Yüksek Lisans, Avrupa Çalışmaları Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi : Prof. Dr. Atila Eralp

Eylül 2010, 101 sayfa

Bu tez Alman Muhafazakârlığı’nı ve Almanya’nın politikalarının Türkiye’nin üyeliğine etkilerini incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Türkiye’ye üyelik yerine önerilen *imtiyazlı ortaklık* kavramı bu tezin çıkış noktasını oluşturmaktadır. Alman Şansölyesi Angela Merkel imtiyazlı ortaklığın önde gelen savunucularından iken; bir önceki Şansölye Gerhard Schröder Türkiye’nin girişini destekleyerek tamamen farklı bir tutum izliyordu. Bu keskin değişikliğin Alman Muhafazakârlığı ve Hıristiyan Demokrasi’den kaynaklanıp kaynaklanmadığı sorgulanmaktadır. Sonuç olarak, Alman Muhafazakârlarının Türkiye’nin üyeliğine süregelen ve kökten bir karşıtlığı olduğu savunulamaz ancak imtiyazlı ortaklık kavramı, Avrupa Bütünleşmesi’ni kültürel bir proje olarak gören Alman Hıristiyan Demokratlarının bir ürünüdür.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Alman Muhafazakârlığı, Türkiye – AB İlişkileri, İmtiyazlı Ortaklık

*To those who try to write their thesis falling from
failure to failure without loss of enthusiasm*

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The Author would like to thank TUBİTAK who supported this study.

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INTRODUCTION

Membership to the European Union has been one of the most important issues of Turkish Foreign Policy in the last decades. Beginning from the first application in 1959, it was considered as a prominent step for Turkey's Westernization process and took place at the top of the agenda. It has been a narrow road with many rises and falls. Especially by the 1980s, Turkey became more ambitious about membership and took fast steps towards. The following decades witnessed tangible changes in Turkey. Customs Union, Candidate status, and finally opening of accession negotiations were achieved one by one as a result of determined policies. As a result, at the beginning of the new millennium, Turkey seemed so close to become a member of the European Union.

Today, the accession negotiations continue but there are implications shadowing the process. There is a reminder and a consistent offer for the candidate Turkey. The reminder says that the process is "open-ended" and the offer is a "privileged partnership" instead of a "full"* membership. The very simple analysis of these two implications could be like that: Turkey's negotiation process may continue for years, there is no target date, and it does not have to end with membership. However, the discussions and forecasts about whether Turkey would become a member one day or not, is not the focus of this theses.

The *privileged partnership* and the discussions arising from it constitute a large part of intellectual and political debates about Turkey's membership process to the EU. In Europe there are many people favoring this idea and in Turkey, people mostly reject this offer and some consider it as a plan B. However, the

* In the record of the European Union, there is no semi or full membership examples. All candidates either become a member or continue the negotiation process. This term was created after "privileged partnership" was introduced as a choice of relation with the EU.p

content of the concept is not clear and only a few people ask what it covers and its differences from “full” membership.

The ambiguity of the notion pushed me to research about its content. The European Union is too young to give examples of different membership models. On the other hand, the proposers of the offer do not give clear definitions about it. There are clues about its content but the *privileged partnership* lacks a clear explanation. At this point, various questions arise and the most prominent two are: Who offers it? And, why is it offered to Turkey? My departure point is the first question because the answer of the first may lead to the answer of the second. There are many different groups in Europe favoring *privileged partnership* for Turkey. The most visible characters are the German Chancellor Angela Merkel, French President Nicolas Sarkozy, European Peoples Party in the European Parliament and the Austrian Chancellors and Foreign Ministers from ÖVP. They are all Christian Democrats and Angela Merkel is the leading name among these and even her name is almost attached with this notion.

The rejections for Turkey’s membership have various reasons. These reasons will be explained under Chapter III but one of them is distinct from the others. Many of them are concrete and possible to overcome. But the statement that Turkey does not belong to Europe needs attention. It is sometimes unfolded with a geographical explanation and sometimes the emphasis is on the cultural, historical and religious heritage of Turkey which is diverse with the European. It is clear that Turkey is different from the European states in many ways. It is the successor of Europe’s historical enemy, the majority of its population is Muslim and as a result there are cultural differences. Then, is it, to be a part of European heritage, a precondition to join the club? For some, it is not and Turkey’s membership is considered as a chance to gain to multicultural character and prove that the EU is not a Christian club. For others, Turkey should not be in the list of European countries because of its disparities.

This diversity among the Union derives from the fact that different groups have different understandings about the concept of the European Integration. Is it an inclusive peace project based on human rights, rule of law and free trade or is it a cultural project that brought solidarity to the historically tied European states on the bases of Christianity and kinship? Both answers are valid among the Union but this variety in understanding Europe does not cause great troubles in the functioning of the Union.

However, in putting a stand for Turkey's membership this variety makes sense. For those who consider the EU as a cultural project based on European values, Turkey cannot be a part of this project. Since the focus is on the identity of Europe and Turkey has been the most prominent *other* of the European Identity, it does not seem possible to locate Turkey in this portrait.

As a next step, I wanted to find linkages between the proposers of the *privileged partnership* and understandings of the European Integration. Angela Merkel, as the most passionate supporter of the idea deserves special attention. The analysis should not focus on her character, instead the ideological perspective and the political tradition that she represents need to be observed.

Merkel is the leader of the Christian Democratic Union and the party has a persistent foreign policy especially about European Integration. Germany had been a prominent supporter of Turkey at the beginning of the membership process and today she is on the opposite side. On the edge of the membership, why does Germany stands against Turkey? What were the motivations of the earlier support? Is there a turning point in the attitude of Germany? Considering the political tradition of the Christian Democratic Union, is it possible to explain the stand against membership and offers for a *privileged partnership*?

This study is supposed to answer the above listed and further questions about *privileged partnership*. In searching answers to the mentioned questions I will follow historical analysis method and supplement it with a theoretical perspective. If I can reach some conclusions, it may help understanding this obscure notion, *privileged partnership*, which sits in the centre of Turkey's membership process.

The first Chapter constitutes the theoretical part which is going to help explain the concrete policies. To understand Christian Democracy it is necessary to understand Conservative ideology which lies behind it. Conservatism with its background, emergence and the historical conditions surrounding the Conservatives will be explained. Edmund Burke who is considered as the father of Conservatism and his motivations will be detailed to understand the emergence of the idea. This part is supposed to set the general characteristics of the Conservative idea, so its evolution and the modern form deserve attention. After gaining a general knowledge of Conservatism, German Romantics and the German Conservatism will be observed more specifically. German Romantics, an early form of German Conservatism, is important because there are references to them in the later forms of German Conservatism. The second part of the theoretical approach to Conservatism is reserved for the differences of German Conservatism than the Conservative thoughts in general and different forms of it like Conservative Revolutionary Movement. Understanding the characteristics of German Conservatism would help analyzing Christian Democracy in Germany.

In the second part of the theoretical chapter, the idea of Europe, European identity and the Turks in the creation of European identity would be examined. The notions that constitute European idea and identity are crucial to understand today's Union and its preferences. There are several attempts in the history to Unite Europe but they all had different motivations and none of them succeeded before European Union. To comprehend the dynamics of the today's

Union it is necessary to take a look at the previous attempts and the “instinct” for a “United Europe” in the European history and thinking. It is largely known that Turks have had great role in the creation of the European identity but not as a hero instead, the “other” of Europe. It is necessary to understand what “Turk” means for a European to analyze the policies towards Turkey’s membership.

The second Chapter provides a closer look at the European Integration and the Christian Democratic Party with its policies towards Integration. This Chapter is supposed to identify the motives of the European Integration and the attitude of the Christian Democrats of Germany to this project.

The first part of the Chapter starts with a brief history of the European Integration. The next subtitles are supposed to explain the motivations on the road to economic and political integration in the continent. The founding fathers and their approach have to be investigated because their ideas lie in the foundations of this gigantic organism of today. It is not necessary to mention every single step so I would like to select the most prominent turning points of European Integration and the developments related to enlargement policies. The criteria which should be fulfilled to be a member and latest enlargements will be checked. In addition, there are historical and current debates about Integration. It is not possible to claim that every single member understand integration the same or share common expectations. The level and the contents of integration have been subject to discussions because different actors have diverse final stages for European Union in their minds.

The second part of this Chapter aims to take a closer look at the Christian Democratic Union. The historical background of this political movement and the founding fathers will be observed. The linkages between CDU and Christian Democracy in general will be set. In addition, CDU’s European policies and their approach to European Integration as one of the first six

members of the process need to be clarified. I would like to observe the most prominent Chancellors of Germany from the CDU and examples of their policies in the European Union. This part is supposed to give clear clues about CDU's approach to the European Integration, so it is possible to locate CDU's side in the debates about future of Europe.

The relation between two parts of this Chapter, European Integration and CDU, has importance for possible conclusions of this thesis. The stance of the CDU towards European Integration shall be related with its stance towards Turkey's membership.

The third and the last chapter gets closer to the membership process of Turkey and merges the discussions in the previous Chapters. The history of Turkey's membership is necessary to examine to not to get confused about where Turkey was not ambitious enough about membership and where the European Union wanted to give a break to the ongoing process. The steps taken by Turkey may also give an idea about what further steps may be achieved. The dynamics of Turkey's process would help us position the importance of Germany's policies towards Turkey's membership.

The second part of the third Chapter gives the history of Turkey – Germany relations in regard to the EU membership process and then gives list of Christian Democrat Chancellors and their policies towards Turkey. The domestic dynamics of Germany are also taken into consideration to understand the turning points. This part may answer the question about the reasons for the slowly removing support of Germany on European issues and the final stand of Angela Merkel who is directly against Turkey's "full" membership and inventor of *privileged partnership*. In this part, Gerhard Schröder, the Social Democrat (SPD) Chancellor of Germany between 1998 and 2005, and his policies towards Turkey's membership should be also taken into consideration. It is important to examine Schröder because his attitude towards Turkey's

membership differs both from his predecessor and successor. They are both Christian Democrats and in between two, Schröder pursues a totally different program. It is interesting because the Foreign Policy possess continuity indifferent to the governments. This is valid for Germany for example about the European Policy in general. Schröder followed more or less the same line with his predecessor about European integration but he is totally different about Turkey's membership process who has been a loyal supporter of Turkey. The last but not the least, the policies of Angela Merkel will be studied especially with quotations from her speeches. The analysis of her stand would give a clear idea of *privileged partnership* and its dynamics.

The last part of the last Chapter goes directly to the heart of the subject. The notion of privileged partnership is analyzed under three titles searching answers for three different questions. Under the first subtitle the reasons for this offer are investigated. It is mostly the declared reasons either by politicians or various authors because I would like to preserve my implications to the conclusions. The second question aims to distinguish the defenders of this plan B for Turkey. The supporters of the idea may vary or they may have common points. The political backgrounds and affiliations of these people may lead us to a number of conclusions about the emergence of this offer. Lastly, I will try to clarify the content of this closed concept. As stated above there is not a direct definition and my target is to bring the declarations together without speculation. For sure, there might be a number of resolutions to derive from the manifestations but I will limit them to keep in the borders of the concept of this thesis.

Briefly, under three Chapters I will analyze the theoretical background, concrete policies and the historical developments woven around the concept of *privileged partnership*. It is necessary to look at Conservatism and German Conservatism and find out their approach to European Integration in general. The way that German Conservatives approach European Integration and

Turkey's membership should be considered together and comparatively. I suppose that the attitudes from different actors towards Turkey's membership to the EU are directly related with their understanding of European Integration. This thesis is going to focus on Germany's and especially German Conservatives' policies towards Turkey's membership and the motivations behind these policies. The breaking points and the reasons for change carry great importance and these fluctuations may help understanding the concept of *privileged partnership*. In this context, there are a number of questions that this study attempts to answer. Is there a direct linkage between German Conservatism and Christian Democracy? How do Conservatives and Christian Democrats consider European Integration? What was Germany's Foreign Policy towards Turkey's membership and how did it change according to changing conditions? Did Germany always pursue policies against Turkey's accession? What does the concept of *privileged partnership* include and what are the differences from "full" membership? What are the motivations for offering *privileged partnership*? Is this a traditional attitude or an instrumental invention?

In order to answer the above mentioned questions I am going to use main resources of theoretical concepts. The historical events, comments, and the debates woven around these historical developments will be applied as well. Since the *privileged partnership* is a recent concept, the online resources which provide speeches of the politicians and current debates on the issue, constitute an important part of the resources used in this thesis.

I – Conservatism and the Idea of Europe

A - Conservatism and German Conservatism

1- Conservatism

a- The Definition Question

The hardest part in discussing conservatism is the question of definition. Though, the term “conservatism” gives a clear clue about what it covers. The stem of the term “conserve” briefly means “to protect from harms – to preserve.” The concept of the conservative idea is not distant from this short definition but, no doubt, much more detailed and sophisticated.

The philosophical roots of conservatism can be found in many earlier writings but it was formed as an ideology after the French Revolution in Europe. The first founding fathers of conservatism did not name themselves as conservative at the time and the term conservative was first used by the French politician and writer François-René de Chateaubriand.¹

The hardship for defining the concept derives from the fact that; it is not possible to talk about a monotype conservatism which appears more or less the same in each time and space. Conservatism in different societies and in different epochs do not have to be linked with each other or consistent. Huntington identifies conservatism as a “positional ideology” which develops to meet a specific historical need so when the need disappears, the conservative philosophy subsides.² The positional character and the fixation with a specific “need” clarify the reason for poor linkages of conservative thinking among its reoccurrences in different times. In addition to that, Jerry Z. Muller underlines the inconsistency by stating that conservatives in their own national past have

¹ <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conservatism> (25.12.2009)

² Samuel P. Huntington, *Conservatism as an Ideology*, **The American Political Science Review**, Vol.51, No. 2, Jun. 1957, p.468.

defended institutions which contemporary conservatives abhor.³ The reason for this diversification is inherent to the emergence and concept of the idea.

Conservatism mainly stands against the attempts to change the tradition and the status-quo. As the actual situation, the genre of attempt to change and their arguments vary in different times; the emergence, concept, motivation of conservatism against, varies as well. It is not possible to describe a conservative society and there is no described conservative utopia. There may be institutions to be conserved but there are not conservative institutions. The absence of these refers to the lack of “ideal” for the conservative theory.⁴ In this respect, conservatism is different from other ideologies because the existing institutions are favored instead of idealized institutions or a redefined society.

Conservatism is, rather than an ideology, more close to be a way of doing, disposition or human characteristic. Then, if there is no clear definition, no ideal and poor continuity; how do we call a way of thinking or theory as conservative? It is possible because there are general principles of conservatism which may lead to a definition of the conservative theory. These principles are derived from different manifestations of conservatism rather than a commonly accepted one. Besides, it is widely accepted that Edmund Burke has drawn the archetype of conservatism with his book *Reflections on the Revolution in France* and his various essays. Since the Burkeian conservatism will be detailed below the general principles of conservatism will be briefly summarized here.

The assumptions on human beings, institutions, moral values and on society in general are the grounds for conservative thought. Firstly, the conservatives

³ Jerry Z. Muller, **Conservatism, an Anthology of Social and Political Thought from David Hume to the Present**, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997, p.3.

⁴ Huntington, **op.cit.**, pp.457-458.

consider the human beings as imperfect creatures who need the guidance of institutions. The moral imperfection of individuals leads them to act badly and the restraints and constraints of institutions are necessary to limit their uncontrolled impulses. Briefly, individuals are not morally perfect and their uncontrolled liberation is not preferred. Secondly, the society is considered too complex to theoretically simplify and the human beings are cognitively imperfect with their limited knowledge. The third assumption is on institutions as an emphasis on the necessity of them. The authority and legitimacy of existing institutions are required because the society can only flourish with them. In addition to that, institutions are accepted as the products of historical development and evaluated in their own contexts particularly without comparisons. Fourthly, rather than the contractual social relations; involuntary duties, obligations and allegiances are emphasized by conservatives stating that these are not matters of choice. Lastly, the social utility of religion is approved by conservatives despite there is no necessary link between conservatism and religious belief. Religion is believed to be false but useful especially because it legitimizes the state and leads men to act morally with its ultimate reward and punishment belief.⁵

Before mentioning the emergence and the historical background of the conservative idea; it is necessary to explain the current daily meaning of the term and the modern form of conservatism. In the daily usage, conservatism almost saves its original concept. When it is attached to a person, he is someone who is traditionalist and resistive to change. Politically conservative mostly carries the meaning with religious tendency. It is because of the religious affiliations of the political parties especially in Europe such as Christian Democratic Union or Christian Democratic Appeal.*

⁵ The paragraph is summarized from Muller, **op.cit.**, pp.9-14.

* Christian Democratic Union forms the CDU/CSU grouping in German Bundestag with its Bavarian sister party Christian Social Union of Bavaria. Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) is the center-right Dutch Christian democratic political party.

b- Modern Conservatism

In portraying modern form of conservatism the writings of Michael Oakeshott will be used in this part. He is an English philosopher who was born in 1901 and known as one of the most important conservative intellectuals of the twentieth century. He took place in the Britain's war against National Socialism as an active participant. After spending three years in the British army he returned back to Cambridge and founded *The Cambridge Journal* in 1947.⁶

In his essay *On Being Conservative* he details the conservative character. He clarifies his approach at the beginning of the essay stating that he is not talking about a creed or a doctrine, but a disposition. Therefore "to be conservative is to be disposed to think and behave in certain manners, it is to prefer certain kinds of conduct and certain conditions of human circumstances to others; it is to be disposed to make certain kinds of choices."⁷ He continues by giving examples for the conservative disposition. The conservative is someone who enjoys what is available instead of looking for something else, what is present instead of what was or what may be. Then, looking for the "new" is an unnecessary endeavor for the conservative. This is not about idolizing the past and the gone. In addition to that the available situation does not have to be the ideal one. The reason to not favor change is a kind of attachment. So, for the conservative there are certain things to care for, he is happy in the opportunities and can not be indifferent to a loss while trying to achieve new ones.⁸

The ideas of the conservative for innovation, as you can guess, are not enthusiastic. The innovation symbolizes the unknown, untried, mystery, unbounded and distant; none of which are preferred. While innovation means

⁶ **Ibid.**, p. 290.

⁷ Russell Kirk, **The Portable Conservative Reader**, New York: Penguin Books, 1982, p.567.

⁸ **Ibid.**, p.568.

improvement, the conservative is not worried about the absence of innovation⁹ because he is much focused on the possible loss than the possible gain.

Oakeshott sees certain risks in the idea of change and innovation. He asserts that the result of a change would be greater than planned so that the gain and the loss could be unpredictable. This is a great risk from the point that the conservative stands. He is not completely closed to change but prefers a small, limited and slow one. This choice is in relation with the human nature which is defined by Oakeshott as lazy and not energetic, closed to the unknown and trouble, favoring safety to danger.¹⁰ He uses assumptions about the human nature for grounding the so-called disposition. He does not relate conservatism with any theory or data and departs from his own and other conservatives' disposition explained by him again. Since he states in advance that he is to describe a "disposition"; his primary material is his own choices and preferences.

After the description of the conservative from Oakeshott's view it is necessary to take a look at the Rationalist which he opposes and their role in politics. His essay *Rationalism in Politics*¹¹ is clear enough to see his approach to politics. In this essay what he explains is not the conservative manner in politics but the rationalist in politics and the conservative criticism to that. He is concerned with the modern Rationalism which is the intellectual fashion of the post-Renaissance Europe. He defines the Rationalism and rationalist politics in detail. The authority of the "reason" is the single authority that is saved and recognized. The Rationalist is the enemy of authority, prejudice, tradition, customs and habits. There is nothing that he hesitates to bring in front of the judge which is "reason" in rationalism, so he is skeptical. He is also optimistic

⁹ **Ibid.**, p.571.

¹⁰ **Ibid.**, p.573.

¹¹ Muller, **op.cit.**, pp. 292 – 312.

because he carries no doubt about the power of the “reason” as a determinant.¹² The experience does not have a great importance and he does not believe in the cumulative experience; instead, he is always ready to experience through a formula. He isolates the intellectual from all external influence and causes him to lose his rhythm and this loneliness is to be surmounted by the “reason.” The traditional knowledge of the society and value of education are denied, only training in technique of analysis is recognized.¹³ On the other hand, all the political activity is brought to the tribunal to judge by “reason.” There is not tendency to repair in solving a problem but invent a new device for the solution which partly means “assimilating of politics to engineering.”¹⁴

According to Oakeshott, there are two sorts of knowledge: technical and practical. The technical knowledge is the one that can be formulated with definite rules like a cookery book which involves the technique of the cookery. Oakeshott thinks that also the practical knowledge which cannot be formulated is necessary for the mastery of any skill. These two sorts of knowledge are distinguishable but inseparable for him. But, rationalism neglects the practical knowledge and recognizes only the technical knowledge. The technical knowledge can be written down in a book with rules, principles, and directions. But it is not enough as Oakeshott asserts because it is like the technical art book written by a painter but the aesthetic element can be seen only in his paintings since he has no other way to express it. The Rationalist considers the practical knowledge as a sort of nescience. Oakeshott suggest that the knowledge in every concrete activity is never solely technical knowledge. Then the error of the rationalist is to mistake a part for the whole, of endowing a part with the qualities of the whole.¹⁵

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 293.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 294.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 295.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 291 – 301.

The generation of the Rationalist is the one with political inexperience. This condition exists in European societies as a lack of political education also in the modern world but it is ignored. The politicians are mostly unaware of the knowledge of the political traditions of his society which takes two or three generations to acquire. They do not understand custom and habit seeing it as a nescience of behavior. Oakeshott considers this kind of politician dangerous and expensive which damages the most in his failures but the price of his success is also high as a firmer hold of the Rationalism in the intellectual fashion upon the whole life of the society.¹⁶

The morality of the rationalist is another object for Oakeshott's criticism. The Rationalist prefers the self-conscious pursuit of moral ideals and the education of moral principles rather than unconscious following of a tradition of moral behavior. But this is again reducing morality to a technique, education in behavior. The Rationalist tries to get rid of all inherited nescience in morality and expect from the common "reason" of the mankind to fill the blank nothingness with certain knowledge.¹⁷ In response, from the conservative perspective of Oakeshott "moral ideals are a sediment; they have significance only so long as they are suspended in a religious or social tradition, so long as they belong to a religious or a social life."¹⁸ He is also complaining about the decline in the belief in Providence where the technique replaced the God and the Providence was not available to correct the mistakes of men.¹⁹

By reading both essays a familiarity is gained about both the modern rationalist and the modern conservative "disposition" opposing to it. It is possible to claim that the conservative suffers from the rationalist dominance in politics especially in Europe. The rationalism is ignorant to providence, tradition,

¹⁶ **Ibid.**, p. 307.

¹⁷ **Ibid.**, p.311.

¹⁸ **Idem.**

¹⁹ **Ibid.**, p. 302.

morality, and political heritage. While the conservative is disposed to save these, the rationalist is running after innovations which mean risk of great losses to the conservative.

The arguments of the conservative philosophers during the Enlightenment and just after the French Revolution are not completely different from the arguments of the modern conservatives.

c- Reflections to the French Revolution

The first signs of conservative idea may go back to the Protestant Reformation process with the reactions against it and conservatism is considered as an Enlightenment product. David Hume is a prominent representative of the Enlightenment Conservative idea. His political writings form a conservatism distinguished from orthodoxy and it is mostly based upon the utility of historically developed institutions. These institutions were not preordained; they developed according to the human needs historically. Here the emphasis is on the “utility” which is to explain both the existence and indispensability of the institutions. Hume is conservative but the society he sought to conserve was liberal and commercial. He mentions the scarcity of goods and the men’s tendency to be partial to themselves. This assumption is used to reinforce the necessity of written laws and governmental authority. Since goods are scarce there should be laws of justice to control the conflict among self-interested individuals. He means a system of laws which protects the life and property of all, by “justice.”²⁰ After this glance on Hume’s conservatism it is necessary to mention about the reflections to the French Revolution which are accepted as the basis of conservative idea.

The emergence of conservative theory is mostly dated back to the French Revolution. Since it led to a radical and extensive change in the society and

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp.32-45.

in its many institutions in France and later spread to the whole Europe; it is not surprising that the reactions to the French Revolution gave the form to the conservative idea. The archetype formed at the time was followed by later conservatives, in this sense; it is possible to claim that the modern conservatives are the disciples of Edmund Burke who did not employ the word “conservatism” himself.²¹ Burke and his theory were named as conservative later and a great historical significance was attached to his works.

Edmund Burke was born in Dublin in 1729 and moved to London to study law. He quitted from university and decided to have a literary career. A few years later in 1756 he gave his first product *A Vindication of Natural Society* and continued his political and philosophical works in the following years. By 1765, he became a member of the House of Commons in the British Parliament. He was a member of the Whig Party. Just after the French Revolution he wrote his masterpiece *Reflections on the Revolution in France* in 1790. He died in 1797.

After this very short biography it is necessary to go into details of his philosophy which is considered unique even today.²² As mentioned above his masterpiece was *Reflections* * but the indications of his philosophy are available also in his early writings.

In *A Vindication of Natural Society* he used an ironic and satirical method. The form of the book is a letter from a young philosopher to an older aristocrat. In general, his skepticism on abstract rationalism to guide worldly affairs was evident. Burke, aware of the limits of human reasoning, led to a principled respect for custom. He claimed that the rational intellectuals were to meet

²¹ Kirk., **op.cit.**, p.xiii.

²² In writing this chapter the sources used are: Muller, **op.cit.**, pp. 63 – 122., Russell Kirk, **The Conservative Mind**, Washington DC: Regnery Publishing, 2001, pp. 3-70.

* Edmund Burke’s book *Reflections on the Revolution in France* will be abbreviated as *Reflections* in this text

unintended and abhorrent consequences of their guidance. He also claimed them with delegitimizing all established institutions without ability to create new ones in their place.

The French Revolution and the ideas derived from it, spread to Britain and the British intelligentsia who gave a great support to them. After that Burke devoted himself preserving British institutions and at the same time criticizing Revolutionaries and their ideas. The pro-revolutionary ideas were very dominant in the public opinion and Burke's goal was not easy to accomplish. He was aware of the increasing circulation of the newspapers and their effect on the public opinion. The intelligentsia was using this new efficacious instrument to shape the public opinion. Burke called these people as the "men of letters" and defined the impression on the public opinion by calling it "published opinion."

Reflections was again written in the form of a letter so it was literarily powerful and informal in explaining his ideas. The main theme of this letter was a critique to the attempt to create entirely new structures on the basis of rational, abstract principles by revolutionaries which is reversing Burke's conception of legitimate reform as building upon existing, historical institutions. By eliminating the traditional institutions of the aristocracy and the Church; a threat was directed to the French society which Burke explained as the return of men to the "natural" state that is supposed to be barbaric. Thus, the weakening of the aristocracy and the Church would result with "rapine" and "rape." This prediction shows that, in Burke's mind, the established aristocracy and the Church are the guardians of all kinds of possession and without their authority the only way that the society would go is anarchy.

Burke constitutes his philosophy on the basis of some presumptions. One of them could be defined as "epistemological modesty." According to Burke the lifetime of a human being is so short to understand the transcendent order and

the attempts to rationalize it are just waste of time. This point of Burke is opposite of the spirit of the French Revolution appreciating human rationale.

In exalting the transcendent order, Burke uses the notions of “Providence”, “prescriptive truth” and, “veneration” several times but he does not approve religion. He puts the mundane order in the first place considering it a derivation and remaining part of the divine order. Thus his stand up for the Church does not have a fully religious origin; instead its utility as an institution is favored.

In addition to criticism targeted to the Revolution in France and the theory behind it, Burke labors many pages to demonstrate why the Revolution or the ideas attached to the Revolution cannot spread to Britain. At this point, he distinguishes the Glorious Revolution of England in 1688 which was in accordance with historical continuity from the Revolution in France tearing up the history and disregarding the tradition. Burke asserts adherence to history in the British political tradition taking “the death and the unborn” into consideration as a profound reason that would prevent the spread of the Revolution in France to Britain.

Briefly, in his *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, Burke stands against the spreading ideas of the Revolution with his rhetoric and asserts its incompatibility with the British political tradition. He defends the social utility of aristocracy and the Church with a reference to habit, history and tradition. Burke is not directly against change but prefers a prudent approach closer to legitimate reform.

In addition to Burke, it is necessary to look at Joseph de Maistre to understand the conservatism that emerged as a response to the French Revolution.

He was born in 1753 in Chambéry, in the Duchy of Savoy which belonged to the Kingdom of Sardinia. His family was French origin and had settled in Savoy, attaining an aristocratic rank. He studied law and he was supporting the reform movements in France. He had a reaction against the decision to join

three orders of clergy, aristocracy, and commoners into the single legislative body that became the National Constituent Assembly. After the revolutionary legislation of 4 August 1789 was passed; he turned against the course of events.²³

His reactions against the French Revolution are available in *Considérations sur la France* (Considerations on France) which was written in 1796 but it is necessary to take look at *Essai sur le principe générateur des constitutions politiques et des autres institutions humaines* (Essay on the Generative Principle of Political Constitutions and of Other Human Institutions) which was written in 1809, to understand his criticism.

In his *Essay** the major emphasis is on written laws and constitutions. He is sharply against the idea that a nation's constitution can be written *a priori* claiming that a constitution is a divine work and the essentials of it cannot be written. Therefore he expresses his respect to the British constitution by these words: "The real English constitution is the public spirit, admirable, unique, infallible, and above praise, which guides all, conserves all, preserves all. What is written is nothing."²⁴ Following that he reveals his propositions as the principles of a constitution. His propositions ordain that the fundamentals of political constitutions exist prior to all written laws and a preexisting and unwritten law is necessary for a constitutional law. The most essential and fundamental is never written because that could imperil the state and the written constitutional articles weaken a constitution.²⁵ These propositions show that he is opponent to limit the sovereignty and power of the state by writing

²³ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_de_Maistre (05.02.2010)

* Joseph de Maistre's *Essay on the Generative Principle of Political Constitutions and of Other Human Institutions* will be abbreviated as *Essay* in this text.

²⁴ Muller, *op.cit.*, p.138.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p.139.

down the constitution which at the same time harms the arbitrariness of the authority.

Maistre sharply criticizes in his *Essay*, the delusive arrogance of man who tries to shape social order as an actor of it by forgetting that he is also an implement of God. In addition he emphasizes the impossibility for man “to change for better” addressing reform.

Considerations on France is the work that Joseph de Maistre evaluates the French Revolution. It is a sharp and accusing criticism. He begins with an emphasis on France’s influence on Europe and derives a responsibility through that. He puts together “the most Christian” king of France and anti religious character of the French Revolution, underlines the incompatibility and accuses all French who supported the Revolution with promoting atheistic ideas instead of the French civilization. He attaches politics directly with religion and especially Christianity. “Either every imaginable institution is founded on a religious concept or it is only a passing phenomenon. Institutions are strong and durable to the degree that they are, so to speak, *deified*.”²⁶ He locates Christianity in the roots of every institution in Europe as an animating and sustaining power. For ignoring that, de Maistre criticizes Rousseau sharply and calls him “the most self deceived man who ever lived.”²⁷ He was also against the idea of social contract.

In many ways, Edmund Burke and Joseph de Maistre assert similar ideas on their reactionary basis to the Revolution in France. The difference in their nationalities, no doubt, affects their standing points. Maistre, whose family was French, criticizes sharper and accusingly both the ideas and the method. He attaches much more importance to the events both for France and the Europe.

²⁶ Joseph de Maistre, *Considerations on France*, ed. Richard A. Lebrun, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 41.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

On the other hand, British Burke stays distant and establishes his arguments to prevent the spread of these ideas to Britain. Both carry an emphasis on divine order of the society but de Maistre relates it with religion, Christianity, while Burke sees it only as an instrument to control people.

The arguments of Burke and de Maistre are profound examples of conservatism which emerged as reflections to the French Revolution. The necessity of the European institutions was underlined and the attempt to replace royal power, aristocracy, and the Church with human rationale and social contract was rigorously opposed.

As stated above the French Revolution was spread over Europe and the reflections were various. The German phase of these reflections is German Romantics who were influenced by Burke but follow a quite different path. At this point it is necessary to take a look at the German Romantics who affected both Germany and the Europe.

d- German Romantics

The immediate decade after the French Revolution, the 1790s, witnessed the emergence of three important political traditions in Germany which were liberalism, conservatism and romanticism. Romanticism began as a literary movement which located the art at the top of values and it is an important school of German political thought. The Romantic School is classified under three periods: the Early Romanticism (*Frühromantik*) 1797-1802, the High Romanticism (*Hochromantik*) 1803 – 1815, and the Late Romanticism (*Spätromantik*) 1816 – 1830. It is divided into three periods because romanticism transformed in time. The prominent names of the early romanticism are August Wilhelm and Friedrich Schlegel brothers, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, Ernst Daniel Schleiermacher and Friedrich von Hardenberg who is mostly known with his pen name Novalis. Joseph Görres, Adam Mueller and Gotthilf Heinrich von Schubert are of the representatives of

the high romanticism and the leading figures of the late romanticism are Franz Baader, E. T. A. Hoffmann, Johann von Eichendorff, the elder Schlegel and Schelling.²⁸

The early romanticism has a character between liberalism and conservatism. It supports the individualism of liberalism and the communitarian character of conservatism but avoids the extremes of both currents.²⁹ The early romanticism is also reactionary to the French Revolution but differs from Burkeian ideas. In fact, early romantic criticism focuses on the Enlightenment (*Aufklärung*) which they define capable of destroying everything and incapable of creating anything. The early romantics abhorred rational but rootless, faithless and non-attached modern individuals that the enlightenment attempted to create. After the French Revolution, their reflection was against the social vacuum resulting from the wholesale destruction of traditional social institutions and the growing materialism and atheism in France. They approved the principles of the Revolution, liberty, equality and fraternity but they disapproved its practice. They did not believe that fundamental social and political change could be achieved through violence or mass action from below. They agreed with the necessity of the reform but prefer a gradual reform from above, ruled by elites and adapted to the special conditions of the country. In addition, the true republic should be a mixture of democracy, aristocracy and monarchy.³⁰ In my opinion, the romantic preference of reform is quite similar to Burke's but this attitude is not very characteristic for the early romantics. In their gradual change plan education and the enlightenment of the people had great importance. The people should be prepared for the grand moral ideas of a republic and this is the burden of the intellectuals. In young romantics'

²⁸ Frederick C. Beiser (ed.), **The Early Political Writings of the German Romantics**, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. xi-xii.

²⁹ Frederick C. Beiser, **Enlightenment, Revolution and Romanticism**, London: Harvard University Press, 1992, p.223.

³⁰ Beiser, **The Early Political Writings...**, pp. xiv – xvi.

education and enlightenment of the people, arts had great importance. They emphasized the main springs of human nature which are impulse, imagination, passion and art is the best tool to arouse and direct these. They claimed that art could unify the two sides of our nature: reason and sensibility, so that we would then do our duty *from* and not *against* our inclinations. The art was also considered as the tool which could fill the vacuum left by reason after *Aufklärung* locating art as a positive power against reason as a negative power.³¹

The emphasis on aesthetics and art is valid especially during the years 1797 – 1800. By the autumn of 1799 art is almost replaced by religion for the young romantics. The revival of the religion and a new Catholic church is seen as the key for the cultural and political rebirth of Europe for Novalis. Instead of or in accordance with arts, religion could be the chief instrument of *Bildung* and the means of educating people to act according to the moral ideals of a republic. It was reactionary to *Aufklärung* and the French atheism but at the same time search for a way to have the liberty, equality, and fraternity of the Revolution without the materialism, egoism and anarchism of France.³² This emphasis on the revival of religion is considered as an anti-revolutionary tendency and many of the critics label it conservative. In fact early romantics support revolutionary values and their attempt to revive religion is not similar to Burke's or De Maistre's defense of Christianity.

Friedrich Schlegel who is classified under early romantics changed his path in his later works. These works contain conservative tendency and he is criticized for this turn. The fragments in the *Ideas*³³ in his "Philosophical Fragments" show the first signs of dignifying religion. In his *Ideas* he counts religion as the

³¹ **Idem.**

³² Beiser, **Enlightenment, Revolution...**, pp. 239 – 244.

³³ Friedrich Schlegel, **Philosophical Fragments**, trans. by Peter Firchow, USA: University of Minnesota Press, 1991, pp. 94 – 111.

forth invisible element with philosophy, morality and poetry.³⁴ His fragments are woven around the notions which are religion, morality, infinity, art – artists, virtue of culture, philosophy and poetry. He builds the correlations among these notions, repeatedly stating the same result: the religion is the *sine qua non* value. For example, poetry and religion could be different spheres and at the same time components of religion and the combination of the two gives religion.³⁵ Both philosophy and poetry are less valuable and unrespectable without religion³⁶ and the religion without philosophy and poetry is evil and lustful.³⁷ The relation between religion and morality is also clarified in Schlegel's fragments. Morality is to subordinate religion if there is a dualism between the two.³⁸ That derives from the old classification; morality is human and religion is divine but separating morality from religion causes emergence of evil in man which is dwelt in his spirit.³⁹ The artist is redefined and assigned to special missions. The artist is the one who separates and isolates himself from everything ordinary and worships the perfection.⁴⁰ Therefore he has the place among men, similar to what men have among other creatures of the earth.⁴¹ In addition, only a man among men can write divine poetry, think divine thoughts and he is also the mediator for all other men.⁴² On the other side, politics and economics are far from morality and the divine world should be preferred to political world.⁴³ He gives small place for the French

³⁴ **Ibid.**, p.94.

³⁵ **Ibid.**, p. 98.

³⁶ **Ibid.**, p. 95.

³⁷ **Ibid.**, p. 108.

³⁸ **Ibid.**, p. 100.

³⁹ **Ibid.**, p. 104, 106.

⁴⁰ **Ibid.**, p. 107.

⁴¹ **Ibid.**, p. 97.

⁴² **Ibid.**, p. 98.

⁴³ **Ibid.**, p. 103.

Revolution claiming that the French are far from being mystics and the revolution as a stimulator for the slumbering religion.⁴⁴

As I stated above, religion is located at the top of the virtues and values. The relation among philosophy, poetry, morality and artists is drawn within interdependence. His *Ideas* is like an announcement for the rebirth of religion and his following works are in the same line.

Romantics faced much criticism at the time but almost a century later the Nazis appropriated them. Nazis saw the German Romanticism as the first form or flame of their ideas and National Socialism in the German political thought history. Romanticism was heavily used for Nazi propaganda as the essentials and correcting historical background of Nazis. Besides the Nazis, even many critics of Romanticism today, find linkages between German Romanticism and National Socialism.

2- German Conservatism

In defining Conservatism, it was stated that it occurs in reaction to a challenge and it is characterized with this specific challenge and the conditions surrounding it. Therefore it is not possible to formulize Conservative ideology or imply it to different situations. Since it is not possible to generalize Conservatism, there is no common European stand even if they are simultaneous in different countries. This is why the German Conservatism will be detailed in this chapter after a general look at the emergence and the formation of this idea. German Conservatism itself is not homogenous or in continuity as well. However, the emergence of German Conservatism and its later recurrences will be held in this chapter.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 102.

a- The *Aufklärung* and the rise of Conservatism in Germany

This title includes the Conservative Movements in Germany beginning from 1770 to the collapse of Holy Roman Empire in 1806. It starts with the 1770s because liberal demands strengthened in Germany by then. It would be comprehensive to briefly explain the character of thoughts and movements that German Conservatism emerged against. It was, for sure, against Enlightenment also in Germany which will be mentioned as *Aufklärung* in this text.

The spread of *Aufklärung* in Germany was partly through dedicated private individuals who edited journals, wrote books and pamphlets, ran progressive schools, funded reading clubs, and organized secret societies; partly through the work of rulers who made the promotion of *Aufklärung* their public responsibility.⁴⁵ The German *Aufklärung* was mostly based on religious questions and its influence was on religion and education. It was an intellectual movement and there was not a single great leader. But there were important names who gave impetus to the movement with their writings and actions. The two representative leaders of German *Aufklärung* are Friedrich Nicolai (1733-1811) and Karl Friedrich of Baden (1728 – 1811).⁴⁶

In response to the *Aufklärung* and other sources of attack in the German community the core of German Conservatives were the princes and their court entourage, the aristocracy and the officer corps of the numerous standing armies, the patriciate of the cities, the guild masters threatened by new economic developments, and the broad mass of the peasantry whose unbroken traditionalism made them immune to the *Aufklärung* rather than actively hostile it.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ Klaus Epstein, **The Genesis of German Conservatism**, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966, p. 35.

⁴⁶ For a brief introduction of these leaders, **Ibid.**, p. 38-44.

⁴⁷ **Ibid.**, pp. 58-59.

Conservative attitude in German society, for sure, did not appear suddenly at a point of history. There have always been reactions against change within the society in different forms. But around 1770 this reactionary attitude turned into a self-conscious kind and developed a distinctive *Weltanschauung*.⁴⁸

The challenge of the *Aufklärung* in every sector of life forced men with inclination to change their unreflective traditionalism, acceptance of status quo in favor of a self-conscious defense of the society. The Conservative men, although condemn criticism, could not escape from criticizing the arguments of the *Aufklärung* in a form of single answers. It was a defensive battle against the questioning manner for traditional institutions, Churches, governments and social structures. So, Conservatives launched a counterattack against the criticism of the *Aufklärung*. The critique of the conservative was focused on the results of this movement and its motives. The three evils of the *Aufklärung* were set as skepticism, immorality and the undermining of all constituted authority.⁴⁹

Albrecht von Haller (1708 - 1777) was an early critic of skepticism. His critique mainly focuses on the skeptical man who devotes all his life to earthly wishes and does not have any moral restraints at all. This attitude leads to negative results in private and social life.⁵⁰

Another Conservative writer Karl von Eckartshausen (1752 – 1803), also argued that traditional religion was the foundation of morality and it could only be based upon religious custom and tradition, not the rational convictions of individual persons. His focus was on morality which was designed by Christian

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 66-67.

⁵⁰ For more comprehensive information about his critique: Albrecht von Haller (ed. and tr.), *Prüfung Einer Sekte, die an allem zweifelt*, Göttingen, 1751.

traditions. These traditions were the main basis for European morality and without them, the order of the society cannot sustain.⁵¹

Daniel Joachim Köppen, a Lutheran Clergyman of Pomerania was one of the authors who defended the need for authority. He addressed the common people, servants, day-laborers, proletarians, common artisans and so on and underlined the necessity of a superior authority and guidance for those people. They seek for supervision over religious and moral principles for the order of the society.⁵²

Besides these critiques an important emphasis was on German national sentiment for the Conservatives. The ideas of the *Aufklärer* were supposed to be universal and originated from Western Europe. This caused a nationalist counterattack asking “Should Germans not cherish German ideas and institutions which were the result of Germany’s distinctive historical heritage?”⁵³ At this point it is crucial to mention the administrative of the small Westphalian state of Osnabrück, Justus Möser (1720 – 1794). He has an important position at the beginning of self-conscious Conservatism of Germany and he has largely influenced many of his contemporaries. He is known with his hostility to deism, his distrust of rationalism, his hatred of uniformity, his emphasis on variety and individuality in Nature and history, his rejection of the doctrine of progress, and his skepticism. He used the vocabulary of the *Aufklärung* but concealed his differences with the *Aufklärung*. His conservatism was largely inspired by a love for the existing order and by an idealized picture of the past. He was between unreflective traditionalism and self-conscious Conservatism. He did not confine his defense

⁵¹ For more comprehensive information about his critique: Karl von Eckartshausen, **Über Religion, Freydenkerey und Aufklärung. Eine Schrift zu den Schriften unsrer Zeiten, der Jugend geweiht**, Augsburg, 1789.

⁵² For more comprehensive information: D.J. Köppen, **Das Recht der Fürsten, die Religionslehrer auf ein feststehendes Symbol zu verpflichten**, Leipzig, 1789.

⁵³ Epstein, *op.cit.*, p. 76.

to particular institutions under attack, but struck against many of the fundamental premises which stood behind the *Aufklärung* assault upon German society since he gave importance to the national sentiment.⁵⁴

This is a brief explanation of the emergence of self-conscious Conservatism in reaction to the *Aufklärung*. This reactionary movement did not formulate an alternative social model but mostly criticized the criticism of the *Aufklärung* to the existing customs, traditions and religion of the society.

b- Conservative Revolutionary Movement

The character of the 18th century Conservatism was defined above. Revolutionary movement, on the other hand, has different motives. This type of Conservatism did not target to conserve the *status quo*. Instead, they were dedicated to demolish the Weimer Republic and its political, cultural and social system. In this manner, they were totally different from a century ago Conservatives in Germany. They hated the *status quo* and instead of saving it, they were determined to abolish. Their method was not a reform, it was rather revolutionary. In addition, they were very well aware of the fact that the pre-1918 world was irretrievably gone and they did not work on bringing the *ancien régime*. In a very radical form of Conservatism, the Revolutionaries wanted to reconstruct the society in a different form by theoretical blueprints. This movement did not have chance to realize its goals because it did not turn into a mass movement and the Nazi demagoguery was very dominant. Their impact helped the Weimar Republic fall but it resulted with the rise of Nazism which was unfortunate for the Revolutionaries.⁵⁵

The rise of Conservative Revolutionary movement coincides with the end of World War I and it is classified as a new form of “conservatism” and

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, pp.297 – 338.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 11-12, fn. 7.

“nationalism”. As the guardians of ancient traditions they attacked the progress of modernity and they warned about the loss of faith, unity and values. The beginning writers of the movement had the mood of a “doomsayer” in the second half of the 19th century. The post – World War I defenders differs from the earlier but they all attack to same cultural values in the German society. Liberalism was highly criticized since it was considered as the source of modern society. The individualism led by liberalism was considered as the enemy of the unity of the folk. They have also found insidious forces as a reason of disunity and they were anti-Semite. In this sense, they felt the necessity for the creation of political institution that could embody and preserve the peculiar character of Germans.⁵⁶ The leading figures of the Conservative Revolutionaries were: Hugo von Hofmannstahl, Ernst Jünger, Paul de Lagarde, and Moeller van den Bruck.

c- Christian Democracy and *Zentrumspartei*

Christian Democracy can be briefly defined as the ideology that aims to implement Christian principles to the society. Christian democracy as a political movement emerged by the end of the 19th century. It is symbolized with the encyclical of the Pope Leo XIII, “*graves de communi*”. The European examples of Christian Democracy have a Conservative character and it is spread over the continent. Its conservatism is focused on social, moral and cultural areas.⁵⁷

The German example in the practice of Christian Democracy gained impetus by the unification in the 19th century. At the same time the *Zentrumspartei* (Centre Party) emerged in Germany. After the Napoleonic Wars, Protestant domination increased in Catholic populated states. Joseph Görres a journalist was one of the early historical characters who called the Catholics to get

⁵⁶ Fritz Stern, **The Politics of Cultural Despair: a Study in the Rise of the Germanic Ideology**, London: University of California Press, 1974, pp. xi-xv.

⁵⁷ In writing this chapter the sources used are: <http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06484b.htm> , http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Centre_Party_%28Germany%29 . (25.08.2010)

united. This movement gained power after the Revolution of 1848. In the National Assembly a “Catholic Club” was formed. This club did not turn into a party or a firm union. Later in 1870 the Catholics came together and drew up an election program in Soest. Its focus was on attacks to the Church and social issues like marriage and education. That was the Prussian movement and in 1871 Catholics came together also in the Reichstag. Different parties emerged in different German states in names of Bavarian Patriotic Party and Catholic People’s Party which linked with the national “Centre Party” in 1888.

As a response to the rise of Catholic movement Protestants claimed Catholics giving the priority to Vatican instead of their own nation. Bismarck also launched *Kulturkampf* (Cultural Struggle) against the Catholic Church. This unsuccessful attempt resulted with greater support to the Centre Party from the Catholic population. Still, the Centre Party was not powerful under Bismarck’s rule and kept the opposing position. After his resignation in 1890, the Centre Party supported new policies in the Reichstag.

In fact, the Centre Party did not want to underline the Catholic character after a while and declared that it is open to anyone who ever accept it. They even tried to increase the Protestant representatives in their party. These attempts to become popular did not give a positive result and the Centre Party remained Catholic. Just after these negotiations the World War I started.

In the after war era, the endeavors for enlarging the party spectrum out of the Catholic typology continued. They wanted to form a Christian middle-party in order the cope with the Social Democratic influence. After the World War I, the Centre Party carried its existence in the parliament in opposition or as a coalition party. The appointment of Adolf Hitler to the Chancellorship drew the beginning of the end for the Centre Party. The attempts to gain a majority in the parliament did not give results so the only choice was to show loyalty to the new uprising party to save the existing members in the parliament. The vote of

the “Enabling Act” of 1933 caused hard debates within the party. The Centre’s decision was important for its approval. As a result of long discussions the Centre Party in general voted in favor of the enabling act. In the following month the rise of Hitler brought the demise of other political parties. Centre Party also dissolved itself on 6 July.

After the World War II, the Centre Party reunited. This time the new challenge was the Christian Democratic Party which could catch Catholics and Protestants at the same time. Most of its founders were old Centre Party members but these two parties existed separately.

B – Identity of Europe

1- The Idea of Europe and Attempts to Unite Europe

The European history has witnessed many different attempts to unite Europe under a single notion; a language, flag, religion or army. Each had different motives and stories but the aim to attach Europe a single voice had been the same.

In debating European history it is important to define what Europe is, where is in and where is out. The geographical borders and definitions have evolved in time. For example, the name Europe comes from the Greek Mythology a Phoenician woman *Europa*. Today, the Phoenicia territory is not a part of the European continent. Therefore, it is better to follow successive states and their definitions for Europe.

Ancient Greece⁵⁸ is commonly accepted as the roots of the European culture, philosophy, science, politics and arts. The Roman Empire largely inherited these values and level of civilization. It was settled in a great large territory and

⁵⁸ For the summary of the attempts to Unite Europe the source used is: Oral Sander, **Siyasi Tarih, İlkçağlardan – 1918’e**, Ankara: İmge Kitapevi, 1994.

the Europe of the time was under Roman rule. That was a powerful example of unity where the state was sovereign and the civilization of Roman Empire was effective on this territory. It was one of the greatest examples of state building and rule with its legal and political system. By the end of the 4th century this great empire was split into two parts, Western and Eastern Roman Empires. The Western Roman Empire could not resist to continuing attacks from the Germanic tribes and finally fell in 476. The Eastern Roman Empire which was going to be named Byzantium because of the capital and the name of the city was renamed as Constantinople was going to survive for centuries. The Roman Empire legalized Christianity and it was a very important step for Europe. All the European states in relation to the Roman Empire later accepted Christianity and it became the common notion which was going to unite these states later.

On the other hand, the Islam emerged in the 7th century and turned into a threat for the Christian world. The advance of the Seljuk Turks to the West threatened Byzantium and the rest of the Christian world. The Christian world was not a bloc in peace and solidarity. They came together under the Crusades against the common threat Turks or Islam. It was not a political unity among the fighting Christian Princes but they could come together militarily for defense from the external enemy. Crusades continued for centuries but the fight in the Christian world continued as well. It was an important stage in the creation of the European identity based on Christianity.

The Holy Roman Empire which existed between 962 and 1806 was also an important successor of the Western Roman Empire. However, it was Germanic and cannot be defined as the direct successor. It was made up of many small states under the same Empire on a large territory in Middle Europe.

In addition to the Empires, the currents of thought have had great importance in the creation of common European identity. The enlightenment, which was experienced by the whole Europe, had irreversible impact in the European

thinking. It was based on the European citizens and humanitarian thinking. There were also reactionary movements against Enlightenment and these reactionaries paved the way to the emergence of new ideologies in the European politics. Today, Europeans are proud that the Enlightenment flamed in Europe which is considered as the beginning of the modern thinking.

The very ambitious military and political leader of France in the 19th century, Napoleon Bonaparte, attempted to change European map seriously. As a result of his invasions the French Empire enlarged to a great extent. His aim was to bring all Europe together under the French flag. It was not a realistic plan where the nation states started to shape. And his adventure ended on the edge of Russia. This disastrous end was an important lesson for Europe.

Just after the Napoleonic Wars, a congress was settled in Vienna to establish peace among the great powers of Europe in 1815. The concert created in Vienna was an important step towards peace settlement because it also sets common principles to the European politics. The Concert of Europe more or less continued until the World War I.

Just after the destruction of the World War I, European countries found themselves in a new fight. This time Germany was the forthcoming invader country. Hitler's aim was to create Lebensraum for the German folk in the Middle Europe. The disastrous World War II ruined the continent and none of the parties benefited.

The European states had to wait until the second half of the 20th century for a real peace settlement in the continent. The previous attempts with different motivations did not give results but the idea of a "United Europe" was available for centuries.

2- The Notion of “Turks” in the Creation of European Identity

The concept of identity has many different components and it also has many levels. In my opinion the most important two components of identity are *consciousness* and *distinction*. The first is about the awareness of *me* or *we* and the latter has to do with “what makes *me* or *us* different from the *others*”. So the definition of the *others* gives the definition of *me* or *us* and draws the boundaries of the identity. As Huntington states “we know who we are only when we know who we are not and often only when we know who we are against”⁵⁹. According to this statement the *other* leads to the distinction and definition of the identity and solidifies the mortar of *us* through an opposition. Therefore, it is clear that the *other* has great role in the formation and duration of an identity. This is valid especially for collective identity that is based on the dichotomy between identity and difference.

When we look at the formation of European identity the lack of a common notion to unite the continent is evident. So, the ‘*we-ness*’ of European identity is not nourished within Europe by any tradition or way of living. Then, the power of unity is found outside Europe which addresses the importance of *otherness* in European identity. As Breakwell states, this dichotomy between “Self” and “Other” has been central in the making of Europe.⁶⁰

The role of the other in the making of an identity may appear in different form. The other may be the determinant on the basis of familiarity without adding too much value neither on the familiar nor the unfamiliar. In a different case in which some negative characteristics are attributed to the unfamiliar in addition to a threat perceived, the other has a negative definition and a different role on

⁵⁹ Samuel Huntington, **The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order**, New York: Simon&Schuster, 1996, p.21.

⁶⁰ Glynis M. Breakwell and Evanthia Lyons (eds.), **Changing European Identities: Social Psychological Analyses of Social Change**, Boston: Butterworth Heinemann, 1996, p.16.

the identity formation. Any threat perceived strengthens the identity to save *us* from *them*.

The European example of identity creation fits the second form of positioning the other. As stated above the Europe was not united by inner motive. The continent faced many invasions for centuries so the fear that some barbarians would come and attack European territory was common and helped the Europeans act together against the enemy.

Christianity was the prominent motive of the European identity until the 17th century. The emergence and spread of Islam was considered as a threat for Christianity because these two religions had many points in common and caused competition. Both religions claim to carry a universal message and the aim to spread it to everywhere possible is also available. They are both monotheist, have the Book and claim to be the last message of the God to the humankind. Even if Islam recognizes Christianity, still reserves to be the newer and the last religion, amending all previous degenerated versions. On the other hand, Christianity does not recognize Islam and considers Muslims as corrupted. This diversity is nurtured by prejudices and stereotypes even for the people who never had direct engagement with the so called enemy.

There is also geographical coincidence for the origins of the two religions which emerged in the Middle East. In addition to that commonality, Islam spread to the lands of the Christians. So the theological challenge is strengthened by the military one. As a result of this challenge Europeans came together for the first time under the Crusader flag in 1095. The Crusades have importance in the formation of European identity but the otherness of Islam was consolidated by the conquest of Istanbul in 1453.⁶¹

In fact, these campaigns were waged also for Pagans, Jews, Russian and Greek Orthodox Christians etc. but the leading other has always been the Islamic

⁶¹ A. Nuri Yurdusev, *Avrupa Kimliğinin Oluşumu ve Türk Kimliği*, in Atila Eralp (ed.), **Türkiye ve Avrupa**, Ankara: İmge Kitapevi, 1997, pp. 17-85.

world. The Turks were the most prominent representatives of Islam with their invasions through Balkans. The Caliphate passed to the Ottoman Empire in the 16th century but also before the word Turk was used as a synonym of Muslim. Especially in the Ottoman Empire, Islam was the most important component of the Turkish identity. So the otherness of Islam was totally attached to the Muslim – Turk Ottoman Empire who threatened European territories for centuries.

Turks as the other of Europe sustained for long time but the image of the Turk changed from time to time according to cyclical changes. The introduction of Islamic threat dates back to 8th and 9th centuries, the Arab conquests to Spain and Sicily. The Turks emerged to the scene in 1071 after the Battle of Manzikert as the Seljuk Turks against the Eastern Romans. The expansion of Turks to the European lands continued in the following centuries and the conquest of Constantinople was no doubt a great milestone in the history of Turkish – European relations. Also before 1453, the military power of the Turks was recognized by the Europeans and the new campaigns for Crusades against Turks were held. But the fall of Constantinople and Trebizond (1461) alerted Europeans against the Turkish threat. The call from the Cardinal Bessarion of Trebizond was focused on the power and greed of the Turks and attacking before Turks instead of waiting for them to attack Italy.⁶² This call shows that the fast advance of the Turks to Europe propagated the fear and the hatred in the Continent in general. Turks were representing the Persians and the barbarians against the civilized Christian world in Europe.

The naval defeat of Ottoman Empire at Lepanto in 1571 affected the image of the Turk in Europe. The invincible Turk was defeated and the euphoria spread to the whole Europe. It was even symbolized as Muhammad's failure to beat

⁶² Mustafa Soykut, *The Genealogy of the 'Other': The Turks, Islam and Europe*, in Edgeir Benum, Alf Johansson, ... (et. al.), **Are We Captives of History?**, Oslo: Oslo Academic Press, 2007, pp. 33-39.

Christ in a Venetian sonnet.⁶³ That is clear evidence about how the conflict between the Ottoman Empire and the European states is seen as the conflict between Islam and Christianity in the European mind.

In the 17th century, the calls for a Holy War against the Turk were valid in the Christian world. These calls to the Pope coincided with the religious fragmentation among the Christians so the Catholic Church would use the rhetoric of Crusade against the infidel Turks to direct attention away from the fragmentation.⁶⁴ As a result the war against Turks was going along with the war against Protestants. There was an emphasis on how the Turks are unified under single religion and how the Christians were not able to come together. There also the belief that in case the Christian Princes could come together it could be very easy to defeat 'invincible' Turk.⁶⁵

As mentioned above, the image of invincible Turk was weakened after the Lepanto defeat. Later, the Ottoman failure in Vienna in 1683 changed the picture more dramatically. The victory of the Christians in the Vienna siege partly removed the calls for Crusade. The writings on the Ottoman Empire were less about military power. The unfamiliarity and the otherness were again stressed but mostly focused on cultural and daily life issues. The Turks were the *other* of Europe again after the Enlightenment but as an antithesis of European civilization. Although the military power of the Ottoman Empire deteriorated, Turks remained as the other of Europe with changing focuses and definition and on the edge of the World War I; in the 19th century it was the *sick man of Europe* not as a threat but remaining as question.⁶⁶

After the collapse of Ottoman Empire, the new Turkish state was formed in a secular system as Turkish Republic in the beginning of the 20th century. This

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 44.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 46.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 55-70.

new secular republic was no doubt totally different from the Ottoman State even from the beginning. However, it is not enough to change the historical images and collective memories for the both sides. Turkey's modernization process and attempts to join European Union are closely related with the image of the Turk in the European mind.

II – European Integration and the Christian Democratic Union

A – European Integration

1- Brief History of the European Integration

After failed attempts to unite Europe explained above, the new idea to establish peace in Europe came into existence. The great destruction of two great wars which took place mainly in Europe created circumspection among European leaders, elites, and the people. The main target was to prevent new wars and establish sustainable peace. Therefore the first step of European Integration was about the raw materials of war: coal and steel. This idea was first proposed by French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, in his famous declaration on 9th May, 1950. The target was to prevent further war between France and Germany. Different than previous peace acts this new agreement was to “make war not only unthinkable but materially impossible” as Jean Monnet stated. It was the first supranational institution which was formally established by Treaty of Paris on 18 April 1951. The first six parties to the Treaty were France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg which will be called as “the Six” in the following years of the integration.

The High Authority as the institutional depository of shared national sovereignty on coal and steel sector, Council of Ministers to act as a brake on supranationalism within the Community, and the Common Assembly consisting of the national parliaments to give democratic accountability to the ECSC were the institutions emerged.⁶⁷

The launching of the ECSC was an important success considering the European portrait one decade ago. But this success was not enough for the ideals of a United Europe. In addition, the coal was losing its position as an industrial power and atomic energy was gaining importance. So Monnet

⁶⁷ Desmond Dinan, **Ever Closer Union**, USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p. 27.

proposed a European atomic energy community in a similar form with the ECSC. Following the meeting in Messina in June 1955 the representatives of the Six met more times and finally signed the Treaties of Rome.⁶⁸ On 25 March 1957 two treaties were signed on the same day establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the European Economic Community (EEC). The objective of the EURATOM was to create a specialist market for nuclear power and distribute it through the Community and to develop nuclear energy and sell surplus to non-Community states. The aim of the EEC was stated as to “preserve peace and liberty and to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe”. The parties of the EEC were assuming to establish a customs union by eliminating tariffs and quotas among themselves and to set a common external tariff in relations with the rest of the world, to imply common policies in socioeconomic sectors to organize a single internal market and to enlarge the EEC to the rest of Europe. These two new communities were going to share the institutions of the ECSC except the High Authority. The new High Authorities were going to be named as Commissions with a reduction in their power.

The inflation of institutions was abolished by the Merger Treaty on 1967 and a single set of institutions for the three communities were created and referred as the European Communities (EC).

On 1 July 1968, eighteen months earlier than planned, the Customs Union was completed among the Six. After long debates and two failed attempts the EEC enlarged for the first time in 1973 with the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark. The waves of enlargement were followed by Greece’s entry in 1981, Spain and Portugal in 1986.

The community was enlarged to 12 members successfully but the deepening strategy was not in order. Although customs duties were eliminated in 1968,

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 30-35.

trade was not flowing freely across EU borders. The main obstacle was the incompatibility of national regulations. To solve these problems and revive integration the first major change was realized by the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986. The new goal of the EC was to complete Internal Market which is defined as “an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured”.

Three years later, in 1989 the Berlin Wall fell which symbolizes the collapse of the Soviet Union. By this significant event the political map of Europe changed substantially. The West and East Germany were reunified and the former East Germany joined EC.

In addition to internal goals of integration now EC was getting prepared to accommodate itself in the new Europe.

a- Founding Fathers

Uniting Europe by economic integration beginning with coal and steel is a brilliant idea when it is considered retrospectively. At the time, it was an ideal rather than a plan. There were many politicians and statesmen who contributed to this ideal and the most prominent ones are considered as the “founding fathers” of the European Integration.

Jean Monnet (1888-1979) is no doubt, one of the first names that come to the minds as an architect of the integration who is at the same time considered as the “father of Europe”. He was not a politician but a civil servant and diplomat but his influence was above his rank that he could convince Robert Schuman to propose European Coal and Steel Community. That was only the first step and he later pushed politicians for the creation of the EURATOM and the EEC and he worked hard for the first enlargement of the Community.

The innovations of the new century and the destructiveness of nuclear weapons in addition to the two World Wars shaped his thinking. He argued that world was in a mode of rapid changes and the men and nations had to control themselves and their relations with the others. The way of solving problems had to be changed. The only method of such change was to adopt common rules governing their behavior and create common institutions to apply these rules. According to Monnet, these could lead a “silent revolution in men’s minds” which changes the way people think and act.⁶⁹ Therefore, Monnet preferred to pursue functional economic integration. This “single economic entity” could lead to a federation made up of the States of Europe.

Briefly, Monnet was committed to the idea of federation which meant common rules and institutions for European states and that could be possible by functional economic integration.

If Jean Monnet was the backroom boy Robert Schuman (1886 – 1963) was the front man but he was also more than this. He was a Christian Democrat and a devout Catholic. He was grown up in the German occupied territory of France and was the ideal name to promote reconciliation between France and Germany. Therefore, the historical step to create a single authority on coal and steel for Germany and France is symbolized with his speech on 9 May 1950. In his famous speech he proposes to create “*de facto* solidarity” and shows the elimination of age old opposition of France and Germany as a precondition for the coming together of the nations of Europe.⁷⁰ Also today, the end of opposition between France and Germany is shown as one of the main achievements for the beginning of a peaceful era in Europe.

⁶⁹ Jean Monnet, *A Ferment of Change (1962)*, in Brent F. Nelsen, Alexander C-G. Stubb (eds.), **The European Union: Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration**, USA: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994, pp. 17-24.

⁷⁰ http://europa.eu/abc/symbols/9-may/decl_en.htm (20.05.2010)

Although, Monnet and Schuman are considered as the first men articulated and planned European integration; there was an earlier politician who proposed to unite Europe as well. Winston S. Churchill (1874-1965), the great wartime prime minister of Britain continued to take part in politics after the war. He was the leader of Conservative opposition in the Parliament. His speech at Zurich University on 19 September 1946 is very important for the post war era especially in Europe. In his speech, he emphasizes the importance of Europe with its civilization, culture, arts, philosophy and science. He also underlines the damage of wars to this “precious” continent and the necessity to carry this heritage to the future. He does not draw a clear plan or method but spells “building United States of Europe” as a must.

When we look at the Italian pace, there are two important names in the foundation of European Integration. First name is Altiero Spinelli (1907 – 1986) who was an Italian political theorist and European federalist. In the first years of integration he was criticizing small steps approach and dominance of intergovernmentalism. He advocated a “big bang” approach for the European integration bringing Europe together with a constituent assembly and a constitution. There was the idea that Europe could be united before the sovereign states of Europe were re-established and gained power behind his precipitancy. Later he took place in the Commission and the Parliament as a federalist. Second name in Italy was Alcide de Gasperi (1881- 1954) who was in office on the first years of European integration. He is known as the founder of Christian Democrat Party and European idealist. The interests of Italy were primary to European ones for him and he had a marginal role in the development of European integration.

Paul-Henri Spaak (1899-1972) was a Belgian Socialist politician and statesman. His role in the European integration increased after Messina meeting of foreign ministers in June 1955. He is one of the leading names in creating Euratom and EEC but his socialism and anti-clericalism were

discomforted by other federalists. Desmond Dinan states that “in the pantheon of European federalists, Spaak is a lesser deity than Adenauer, Schuman and de Gasperi”.⁷¹

Konrad Adenauer (1876 – 1967) is no doubt one of the first names in creating European integration. Since there will be another chapter detailing his European policies, I am contented with putting his name in the list of founding father.

When we look at the founding fathers of European integration it is possible to distinguish Christian democrat dominance and federalist plus intergovernmentalist approach in theory. Although the integration started with few sectors and small steps the supranational character and the ideal of uniting Europe politically is evident.

b- 1992 Maastricht Treaty and the new European Ideal

Maastricht Treaty has a distinct place among the amending treaties to Treaty of Rome. It is known as the treaty creating the European Union therefore it is also called Treaty on European Union.

The years just before signing of Maastricht Treaty there were significant changes in Europe. By the collapse of Soviet Union the Central and Eastern European Countries were willing to join EEC. Germany was reunified and was much powerful by then. After the new arrangement brought by the SEA, Europe was getting ready for further enlargement.

In these years there was an important actor in European integration, Jacques Delors. He is mostly compared with Jean Monnet of 1950s. He served as the

⁷¹ Desmond Dinan, **Origins and Evolution of the European Union**, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 304.

President of the Commission for two terms between 1985 and 1995. His aim was to revitalize the EC by revising decision making procedures, new monetary policy, and extending Community competence in the field of foreign and defense policy. Since he was a former finance minister and a committed Eurofederalist, he preferred to concentrate on EMU.⁷²

On the other hand, the fall of the Berlin Wall brought the prospect of German unification. It was a challenge for the member states and especially Britain and France were doubtful. The first question was about absorbing less developed East Germany in the EC and the second was about keeping the unified powerful Germany's interest without her dominance within the EC. Both Thatcher and Mitterrand showed their hesitation on this issue but finally Germany was reunified.

Along with the political agenda of Europe, member states produced a draft treaty in April 1990. The new treaty was changing the name of the European Economic Community to "the European Community". It also brought the three pillars system with Common Foreign and Security Policy and Cooperation on Justice and Home Affairs in addition to the EC. This three pillars system was going to be called "the European Union". The treaty was also setting the goal of the European Monetary Union and opening the way for the creation of the *Euro*.

After a hard ratification process Treaty on European Union was signed in Maastricht on 7 February 1992 and entered into force on 1 November 1993.

c- The Copenhagen Criteria

The mass enlargement to the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) was on the agenda of the EU in the 1990s. It was going to symbolize the victory of the West on the continent. But this mass enlargement was going to

⁷² Desmond Dinan, *Ever Closer ...* , p.105.

compel the Union which was at the same time targeting more integrated and ever closer union.

In order to clarify the conditions for membership, it was necessary to itemize the factors for evaluation. Therefore, in June 1992 the Copenhagen Criteria were set by the Commission under three titles: political, economic, and legislative.

- Stable institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities
- A functioning market economy, as well as the ability to cope with the pressure of competition and the market forces at work inside the Union
- The ability to assume the obligations of membership, in particular adherence to the objectives of political, economic and monetary union.⁷³

In addition to these three criteria, the ability to put the EU rules and procedures into effect was clarified as a precondition in 1995 the Madrid European Council. According to that, “accession also requires the candidate country to have created the conditions for its integration by adapting its administrative structures”⁷⁴.

“The EU’s capacity to absorb” is another condition before the EU may say “yes” to a new member states. “It needs to ensure that its institutions and decision-making processes remain effective and accountable; it needs to be in a position, as it enlarges, to continue developing and implementing common policies in all areas; and it needs to be in a position to continue financing its policies in a sustainable manner”⁷⁵.

⁷³ http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/the-policy/conditions-for-enlargement/index_en.htm
(20.05.2010)

⁷⁴ **Ibid.**

⁷⁵ **Ibid.**

In addition to these criteria it is possible to talk about a “geographical criteria” which is not as clear as the other ones above. The article 49 of the Treaty on European Union states that “any European country that respects the principles of the EU may apply to join”. There is not a clear statement excluding non-European countries but several decisions and policies of the EU indicate so. The refusal of Morocco’s application and the limit of closest integration put to Israel as “just short of full membership” show that it is not possible for the non-European countries to join EU. But this rule is not that clear because there are exceptions as well. The best example is Cyprus which is an Asian continentally. However, Cyprus is a member of the EU since 2004 regarding her cultural, historical, and political ties with Europe. In addition, the precedent parts of EU member states being outside of Europe are members of the EU. The European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), a foreign policy instrument of the EU, is set especially for African and Middle Eastern countries which are not supposed to join EU. The ENP puts these countries in the framework of the EU and offers financial assistance.

The examples show that historical, cultural, and political ties are more determinant in considering a country European of non-European. This argument leads to the fact that the borders of Europe can be drawn politically rather than geographically.

d- Steps Forward Creating an International Actor: Reform Process, Failed Constitution and the Lisbon Treaty

The reform idea for the European Union lies through the past decades however, visibly the process starts with the year 2000. At the beginning of the new century, European Union checked the situation and determined specific problems for Europe on the edge of new century. The European Council held a special meeting on 23-24 March 2000 in Lisbon to agree a new strategic goal for the Union in order to strengthen employment, economic reform and social

cohesion as part of a knowledge-based economy.⁷⁶ The report produced from the meeting clarifies the European agenda for the next century.

The report starts with the achievements of European Union in the last 50 years. Besides internal market, economic and monetary union and the launch of euro, the economic growth was sufficient and seemed to be sustainable. However the problem is defined as a common paradigm shift driven by globalization and the knowledge based economy and the necessity for a transformation derives from this fact. The biggest problem of EU's economy at the time is stated as unemployment. Although the economy sustains on the right way, unemployment remains in the contrary. The main features of the employment gap are titled as: gender gap, services gap, market regional imbalances, long term structural unemployment, skills gap and age gap. Besides the unemployment problem, the challenge is the need for a more dynamic and knowledge based economy. On the way forward to these challenges three aspects should be ensured: sustained economic growth, full employment and social cohesion. Briefly, the economic target of the European Union at the beginning of the 21st century is to create "the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion."

According to the questions and targets defined above the EU was ready to prepare the Union for the next century. To realize reforms in these areas the EU needed to be more coherent in a form that decision-making is easier.

- Creating a European Constitution

Beginning from the first years of integration the idea of drawing a constitution was available. Especially the federalists were favoring this idea. In 1953, a text drafted by ECSC Assembly proposing a federal system was submitted. But some members (France, Belgium) found it too federalist and rejected. Later in 1961-1962, an intergovernmental "Union of States" in the context of the

⁷⁶ http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/00100-r1.en0.htm
(22.05.2010)

Fouchet Plan was rejected by smaller member states with a fear that they could be put under supervision. After these rejections the target was put as “union” and the further integration was realized by intergovernmental cooperation without disturbing the national sovereignties.

Generalizing qualified majority voting in the Council and co-decision-making with the Parliament could help realizing the new agenda before the 21st century only to a specific extend. Then, the Governments began talking about a European Constitution but with different perspectives. While German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer was favoring a federal basis, the French President Jacques Chirac supported a more intergovernmental approach.⁷⁷

The drafting for the European Constitution began in a call for a new debate on the future of Europe at the Laeken European Council in December 2001. A European Convention was founded afterwards chaired by former French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing. After many meetings and negotiations the final text creating the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE) was settled in June 2004. It was signed by 25 member states on 29 October 2004 in Rome. After the positive voting in the European Parliament in 2005; the ratification process started. The French and Dutch voters said “no” to the Constitution in the referenda in 2005. As a result of these rejections there was no choice other than shelving the Constitution.

- **Lisbon Treaty**

After the rejection and a period of reflection the European leaders decided to make a new plan. A group of high level European politicians started to meet on 30 September, 2006 in Rome. On 4 June 2007, this group proposed to establish a new Inter-Governmental Conference with the aim of rewriting Treaty on European Union, amend the Treaty establishing the European Community and give the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union a legally

⁷⁷ <http://www.ena.lu/> (22.05.2010)

binding status. The negotiations were completed by the end of the year and the Reform Treaty with the name of Lisbon Treaty was signed in Lisbon on 13 December 2007. In the ratification process, this time Irish voters said “no” but in a second referendum held this result was reversed and the Treaty of Lisbon went into force on 1 December, 2009.⁷⁸

The innovations brought by the Lisbon Treaty are headlined under four titles. The first one is about a more democratic and transparent Europe. This is provided by the strengthened role of the European Parliament and more involvement of the national parliament. Also, withdrawal from membership is recognized by this treaty. Secondly, Treaty of Lisbon aims to create a more efficient Europe. The efficiency is supposed to be increased by adding new areas to be voted by qualified majority in the Council so the Council can take decisions faster. By 2014, with the double majority principle majority of both member states and population will be necessary to take decisions. The President of the European Council who is elected for two and a half years is also introduced. Third innovation is titled: “A Europe of rights and values, freedom, solidarity and security”. The Treaty introduces the Charter of Fundamental Rights into European primary law, so the fundamental rights are under the guarantee of the Union. There is also an emphasis on solidarity against terrorist attacks or man-made disasters to which member states will act and react jointly. Lastly, Europe is becoming an actor on the global stage. A new High-Representative for the Union in Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, European External Action Service and the single legal personality recognized for the Union are the elements which strengthen Europe’s role on the world stage in relation with third countries and international organizations.⁷⁹

When we analyze the innovations brought by the Reform Treaty or Treaty of Lisbon, it is possible to claim that the failure of the constitution is mostly

⁷⁸ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Constitution#History (24.05.2010)

⁷⁹ http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/glance/index_en.htm (24.05.2010)

compensated. Looking back to the beginning of the reform process the reason for reforming the EU was the globalizing world and the aim was to locate Europe as an actor in this new world of complex networks and sudden changes. The supranational character of the EU was not enough to meet the necessities of the global world system. The first step for creating a Constitution which could lead to a kind of system close to a federation failed. The reason for the failure was partly terminological because the presence of a constitution reminds a state. The back step from the Constitution and putting the Reform Treaty forward eliminated fears but met the goals of the reform process at a satisfactory level. Although the nation states are saved, the global character of the EU as an actor increased prominently. Briefly, this is an important step for political integration and further steps would be expected.

2- Euro-Federalists and their Opponents

Federalism among other theories of integration has a more political character rather than theoretical. The best known advocates are Altiero Spinelli, Alcide de Gasperi, Paul-Henri Spaak and Walter Hallstein who are at the same time political leaders. It is presented as a method to abolish war grounding from the premise that sovereign states and the balance of power is a primary cause of war. So, to eliminate conflicts it is necessary to combine states into larger units. There are many definitions of federalism but it is possible to find some common approaches. Federalism relies on the division of power between a federal core and its constituent units. The federal core or the central authority operates directly upon citizens and the transfer of power from constituent units to the central authority should be a voluntary act.

The idea of creating a federation gained popularity in the interwar period. Count Coudenhove-Kalergi (1894 – 1972) was the founder of *Pan-Europa* movement who put forward the idea of “United States of Europe” based on a republican constitution. The interwar federalism found support from only small intellectual and political elite.

The destruction of the World War II increased the supporters of federalism. It was necessary to create a system of “checks and balances” to divide power between many centers so that power could be controlled. There were many movements favoring federalism but they were mostly varying about the method. Some preferred a top-down constitutional revolution and some like Spinelli held that the constitutional revolution should come from a broad popularity in the society and with a pressure on elites. A third approach which is also associated with Jean Monnet is called “incremental” or “functional” federalism. This approach views political integration as a result of gradual process instead of a radical constitutional change.⁸⁰

In 1950s, the European Defence Community was a federalist attempt but it failed. These years also witnessed division among federalist but they collected up in the 1960s.

Since the 1980s federalist theory has enjoyed a revival. A group of members of the European Parliament formed the *Crocodile Club* which was an informal group espousing European federation. The group was formed in July 1980 with nine MEPs including Spinelli. In a year time this group grew to one hundred and eighty members in the Parliament. They prepared a “Draft Treaty Establishing a European Union” and it was approved by the parliament in 1984. However, the text was not approved by the member states but this movement led to Single European Act and later Maastricht Treaty.⁸¹

In the recent past the prominent performance of the federalists was the campaign for the Federal European Constitution. The fate of the Constitution was explained above.

⁸⁰ Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, **Debates on European Integration**, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, pp. 18-21.

⁸¹ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crocodile_Club (17.04.2010)

B – Christian Democratic Union and the Policies towards European Integration

1- History of the Christian Democratic Union

In the post-war era there were two prominent political movements in the European politics: Christian Democracy and Social Democracy. However, the roots of the both tendencies can be found in previous centuries.

Christian Democracy dates back to mid-nineteenth century in German politics. The *Zentrumspartei* or shortly *Zentrum* was formed in 1870. The members of this Catholic party were mostly Catholic noblemen and clergy. Conservatism and Christian Democracy are the prominent ideological affiliations of the *Zentrum*. It was hard for Catholic politicians to survive under the pressures of both Iron Chancellor Bismarck and the church. Bismarck launched *Kulturkampf* against *Zentrum* but it resulted in the opposite way and strengthened their Catholic character and they gained support from the Catholic population. At the beginning of the 20th century some *Zentrum* politicians offered to change the minority position of the party and open it to Protestant members as well. This offer caused hard debates and soon after the World War I broke out. The Centre Party survived during the War and Weimer republic but the Hitler government drew the party's road to the end. They voted in favor of the Enabling Act in the Reichstag. After that the demise of the *Zentrum* revealed especially by losing some party members especially to the NSDAP. 1933 was witnessing dissolution of political parties in Germany and the *Zentrum* was one of them. After the war, the Central Party was refounded but this time the emergence of the Christian Democratic Union blocked their way. Many of the Central Party politicians joined to the CDU or they were even the founding fathers of the new party meeting Catholic votes.⁸²

⁸² <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zentrumspartei#Kulturkampf> , Arnold J. Heidenheimer, **Adenauer and the CDU**, Netherlands: The Hague, 1960, pp. 10-20.

As explained above the members of the *Zentrum* have an important place in the founding of the Christian Democratic Union because the two parties have ideological similarities and the detached members of one formed the other. The emergence of the CDU was just after the War and the demise of the German Reich when Germany was occupied by foreign troops and in need of reconstruction economically, politically and socially. There were many newly emerging parties at the time from various currents of ideologies. There were many Christian parties as well which showed their nonalignment with the *Zentrum* in a few years time. At this point it was hard to define the character of these new parties and detect where they stand. The dominant theme was Christianity and western social values after the atheist regime. It was easy to agree on anti-Nazi feelings but they were not sure about the role of Christians in politics. Some theologians were against using Christ's name in political market-place. Also what they understood from Christian was differing. For some, it meant Catholic as it was before and for the other it was more inclusive. The discussion on *Weltanschauung* arose at this point because if the party founding is not shaped by Catholic concepts then it does not rest on a *Weltanschauung* and it has a negative definition, it stands against anti-Christians. This idea was also opposed by many founding members and they argued that their attempt is to use their movement for translating spiritual values into political action. They agreed that they had no coherent *Weltanschauung* and Christianity was as vital as a *Weltanschauung* to them.⁸³

There were various discussions on the edge of the party formation similar to the ones described above since there were many different components of the party. One of them was about the selection of the party name. Even after setting it as Christian Democratic Union the emphasis was on the different word for different regions. For some, it was a "Democratic Union" and "Christian" was merely added and for some others the most important word

⁸³ *Ibid.*, pp.30-34.

was “Christian”. The emphasis on Christian also had different opening outs for different groups. It could be an orthodox Catholic tradition or a broader cultural basis for all Christians. For the latter Christianity was a merger instead of a division point. But at the final stage, the name Christian Democratic Union was the right choice for a newly emerging party to attract different segments of the population. For Catholics it was the protector of Catholic interests, for Protestants it was the protector against atheistic left, for Liberals it is the non-sectarian interpretation of Western cultural tradition and for the Bourgeois it keeps save from socialism.⁸⁴ The party name and context was a unifying one but the party founding had different centers in diverse forms. However, the CDU was going to manage bringing these together in the following years.

The common point of different groups was democracy and denouncement of the Nazi regime. The founders of the CDU preferred to do so because it was a problematic era since the need for reconstruction was really high. The variety within the party caused specific problems but it was also an advantage because different groups called upon various groups and the party gained a character opened to many social groups in the German population. The example about the first Berlin proclamation of June, 1945 given by Heidenheimer is very illustrative to show the all-inclusive character of the CDU: “To adhere to the proclamation of the Berlin CDU it was necessary to be ‘Christian’ only in the sense of accepting broad traditions of Western civilization, and it was necessary to be ‘Democratic’ only in the sense of having at one time or another been in opposition to the Nazi regime”.⁸⁵ Then, it is necessary to ask who is out? The non-Christians, Christianity including all sects, atheists, the ones who are not part of the Western civilization which is perceived as same with Christianity, the defenders of Socialism and Communism and finally the Nazis if it could be possible to find alive Nazis who reveal their identity loud in these years.

⁸⁴ **Ibid.**, pp. 34-36.

⁸⁵ **Ibid.**, p. 44.

The foundation of the CDU with her Bavarian sister party CSU in 1945 was a great innovation in the German party system. By ending the Christian sectarian party system which had begun in the second half of the 19th century and uniting them under a new party; the CDU/CSU brought both novelties and stability.

2- CDU and the European Integration

a- CDU's Approach to the Idea of United Europe

In the first assembly meeting in October 1950, CDU defined its mission as cultural, oriented to Europe and social. CDU also expressed that she devoted herself to overcome divided Germany, eliminate social problems and the idea of Europe as a political and economic power.⁸⁶

It was clear for Germans that the European Integration was in favor of German interests beginning from the 1950s. The federalist consensus was valid for German elites in the name of "United States of Europe". It became a fundamental part of the German foreign policy and the attitude continued even more committed also after the reunification of Germany. After the World War II, Europeanness was located as a primary notion of the German identity. The "other" was the "non-European" and a good-German equaled good-European.⁸⁷

This determination was clear also in party politics. The Christian Democrat approach to the European Integration both shaped German citizens in favor of integration and strengthened the European dynamics. Their stand is federalist who prefers the closest ties within the member states. In line with these basic

⁸⁶ Günter Buchstab, *Alman Partiler Sisteminin Oluşumu ve CDU/CSU'nun Rolü*, in **Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ve Almanya Federal Cumhuriyeti – Fikri Temeller ve Siyasi Yönelim**, Ankara: Konrad Adenauer Vakfı, 2002, p.61.

⁸⁷ Maria Green Cowles, Caporaso, Risse (eds.), **Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change**, London: Cornell University Press, 2001, pp. 206 – 209.

principles, it is necessary to take a look at German Chancellors from CDU/CSU and their policies towards European Union.

b- CDU's European Policies

- Konrad Adenauer

Konrad Adenauer is known as the first Chancellor of the Federal Germany but his political life started long before. He was born in 1876 in Cologne and he studied law and politics. In 1906 he joined the Centre Party and was elected as a member of the Cologne's city council. From 1917 to 1933 he served as the Mayor of Cologne. After the World War II he devoted himself creating a new party. His contribution was prominent in the founding of the CDU. In a very short time the previous Mayor of Cologne, Adenauer became the first Chancellor of the Federal Germany in 1949 when he was already 73 years old. He and CDU won the following elections and he was in office until 1963. He is remembered as a great conservative leader with his contributions to the reconstruction of Germany and European unity. It is possible to claim that Germany still follows the same foreign policy towards West which was set by Adenauer.

The first commemorative coin after the introduction of Euro in 2002 was prepared as homage to the three pioneers of the European unification. One of the three portraits on the coin belongs to Konrad Adenauer with Robert Schuman and Paul-Henri Spaak. His policies and the motivation behind these policies constitute the content of this part.

Adenauer came to the office in 1949, Germany was weak and the rules of the new world system, Cold War, were almost clear. Adenauer had to form his policy in the framework of the Cold War, aware of Soviet threat and with a Germany both divided and under the occupation of other countries. The reconstruction was urgent but the foreign policy issues were also vital for the sovereignty and security of Germany.

In Adenauer's mind almost the most important policy initiative was the relations with West, especially with the USA. The security of the Western European countries and West Germany was attached to the political and military support of the United States in response to the threat perceived from the Soviet Union. There were other Western European leaders who shared the same idea and these demands from the United States ended with the creation of NATO and Marshall Plan. The importance that Adenauer attaches to the USA is also relevant in one of his speeches in which he states that Europe is not a geographical but cultural notion. This culture is based on Christian traditions and democratic principles so the USA should be counted as European.⁸⁸ This speech was made in 1947 and in 1962 he was going to state opposite arguments. In 1962 he declares that there is a significant gap between Europe and the US, while the Europeans are tied with the ideology of Christian humanism the Anglo-Saxons have no ideology and supporting idea to stand against the totalitarian atheism of Russia and Red China.⁸⁹ Because in the 1950s, the foundations of an economic integration among European countries was set and the ideal of a United States of Europe was formed. Then, Adenauer began to imagine Europe as the "third power" in the world system but not as a rival to the USA but as a balancing power. This idea was reinforced by the belief that European countries lost their impact in the world politics and the only way to regain their status was an economic and political integration. Even from the beginning the idea of an economically united Europe was in Adenauer's mind. Besides, the reunification of two Germany's was a long-term target and the integration of Europe was considered as a precondition for it. It is possible claim that he put European unity before national unity but at the same time he supported European integration because it was the only way for

⁸⁸ Hans Peter Schwarz, Adenauer'in Almanya'nın Batıya Entegrasyonu ve Avrupa'daki Uzlaşmaya Katkısı, in **Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ve Almanya Federal Cumhuriyeti – Fikri Temeller ve Siyasi Yönelim**, Ankara: Konrad Adenauer Vakfı, 2002, p.84.

⁸⁹ Ronald J. Granieri, **The Ambivalent Alliance: Konrad Adenauer, the CDU/CSU, and the West 1949-1966**, Canada: Berghahn Books, 2005, p.154.

Germany to be able to act free and equal with other Western European countries.

Today in mentioning European integration the peace built between France and Germany is emphasized in the foundations of the Union. This is really worth mentioning when we look at the both of the World Wars and European history how the relations between France and Germany are important for the peace in Europe. Adenauer, the experienced politician of after-war Germany, had to find a peaceful path to empower Germany without letting other countries perceive any threat from Germany. At this point, France gains more importance because she is one of the first countries perceiving threat from Germany. So, Adenauer acted with France and for Europe not to receive reactions. Both de Gaulle and Adenauer worked hard for the reconciliation and rapprochement because both of the leaders had the belief that the future of their countries and the future of Europe depended above all on close Franco-German accord.⁹⁰ The meeting of the two leaders continued beginning from September, 1958 and reached to a point by 1963. It was Élysée Treaty or the Treaty of Friendship which symbolizes and establishes the end of the rivalry between two countries and reconciliation. Besides the treaty, the policy of reconciliation provided positive steps in the European integration. It is possible to claim that in the core of the European integration, the Franco-German peace and cooperation lies. Therefore, Konrad Adenauer is considered as one of the founding fathers of the United Europe with his contributions to the process.

After fourteen years of successful Chancellorship he resigned in 1963 and died in 1967. He was firmly criticized as a Chancellor but his policies are still pursued.

⁹⁰ Desmond Dinan, **Ever Closer Union?**, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p. 45.

- Helmut Kohl

Helmut Kohl was born in 1930 in a conservative and Roman Catholic family who remained loyal to the Catholic Centre Party before and after 1933. He joined CDU in the first years of its foundation and he was also one of the co-founders of the Junge-Union. Carrying his affiliation with the party he studied history and political science. His political career started in 1960 and continued in different ranks but always in the CDU. In 1969, he was elected minister-president of Rhineland-Palatinate and in 1973 he became the federal chairman. He was going to carry this mission until 1998. He came to the office of Chancellorship in 1982 as a result of a government change but he could not gain the confidence vote so the government was dissolved. After the 1983 elections, Kohl's victory was clear and he was the Chancellor.

His 16-year tenure was the longest after Otto von Bismarck and his leadership is symbolized with the Maastricht Treaty and reunification of Germany. Both incidents have great importance in the European history and Kohl is one of the architects.

Kohl's coming to power was also the return of the CDU/CSU to the federal government after thirteen years in opposition. Kohl considered himself as the follower of Adenauer. Both Adenauer and Kohl were socially conservative, economically liberal and pro-European integration. Especially in the foreign policy issues Kohl followed traditional principles with his dual commitment to European integration and close German-US relations. He kept warm relationship with the French President François Mitterrand and the Franco-German alliance became the motor of the European integration once more.⁹¹

The 'Solemn Declaration' at Stuttgart in 1983 is a clear evidence for Kohl's European policy. It led to the effort to revive integration process with more

⁹¹ Simon Green, Dan Hough (et.al.), **The Politics of the New Germany**, New York: Routledge, 2008, pp. 33,34.

dynamism. Kohl and his long-serving Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher worked for the completion of the single market and these efforts ended with the Single European Act.⁹² Briefly, in the pre-unification process German Chancellor Helmut Kohl pursued a European policy in line with Adenauer's.

Kohl was going to be known as the father of the reunification in the German history. In line with his effort to unite Germany, his policies towards more united and powerful Europe are not surprising. The great obstacle for the reunification could be the other European countries which had historical fears of a powerful Germany in the centre of Europe. To eliminate this obstacle German Chancellor gave full support and commitment to the idea of united Europe.

Since Genscher was in post, the shift to the center-right did not affect some foreign policy initiatives like *Ostpolitik*. The good relations with East and the Soviet Union also eased Kohl's steps towards reunification. In addition to the *Ostpolitik*, the increasing power of Germany in NATO favored the same purpose. As a result of supportive policies the two Germanys reunified in November, 1990.

The great question after the unification was whether or not the foreign policy of empowered Germany would change. The very following years of the reunification witnessed Germany's increasing commitment to the European integration. The signing of Maastricht Treaty was the answer of above mentioned question. The European integration was strengthened but the power of Germany within the union was not increased. Kohl was rather concentrated on taking the Central and Eastern European Countries into the EU. That was both an historical burden and regaining the market in this geography in which Germany could be very influential. Kohl was supporting Eastern enlargement

⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 145.

but at the same time stating that “enlargement should not come at the expense of internal cohesion among the member states”.⁹³ The endeavors to enlarge Europe to Central and Eastern Europe were not considered as the outcomes of newly gained power. Instead, Germany was undertaking the role of peace builder and stabilizer in the region.

- Angela Merkel

Angela Dorothea Merkel was born in Kasner in 1954. She studied physics while her predecessors had social sciences background. Her rise to the Chancellorship was surprising and partly a result of party dynamics. There is a common claim that her coming to the office was to cover up Kohl’s donation scandal with a new face. Ignoring internal party dynamics, she has a success story on the way to Chancellorship.

The CDU/CSU-FDP government gave the office to the SPD-Green government in 1998 after sixteen years. The European policy of the SPD-Green government was different from Kohl’s by means of confidence in expressing Germany’s interests in EU. The return of the CDU/CSU government with Angela Merkel in 2005 did not cause big changes in Germany’s European policy. It is possible to state that Angela Merkel increased Germany’s weight in European institutions in compare to the previous government, but she was consistent in stating German preferences.

Merkel in general, pursued the traditional line of the German Foreign Policy with her commitment to the European Integration. She was even honored with the “European of the year” award in 2010 because of her willingness to find solutions to the problems on the European scale.⁹⁴ In addition to the traditional attitudes Merkel brought new perspectives. She wanted to return to Germany’s

⁹³ **Ibid.**, p. 146.

⁹⁴ [http://www.denmark.dk/en/servicemenu/news/generalnews/danischeumovementhonoursangela merkel.htm](http://www.denmark.dk/en/servicemenu/news/generalnews/danischeumovementhonoursangela Merkel.htm) (03.06.2010)

role as an honest broker and mediator in Europe. This role is important for Germany because international organizations like NATO or EU are determinant in the effectiveness of her foreign policy.⁹⁵ After the refusal of the Constitution she played an active role in the signing of Lisbon Treaty but European Integration does not have a priority over NATO or transatlantic relations.

Beginning from her election campaign, Angela Merkel is known with her opposition to Turkey's membership to the EU. The details of this policy and the concept of "privileged partnership" will be analyzed below.

⁹⁵ Christian Hacke, Germany's Foreign Policy under Angela Merkel, <http://www.aicgs.org>, August 8, 2008, <http://www.aicgs.org/documents/advisor/hacke.vuln0808.pdf> .(03.06.2010)

III – Turkey’s EU Membership Process and the CDU

A – Turkey’s EU Membership Process

The Ottoman State was not in relation with the Western countries until the 18th century. The Ottoman State structure was stable and she was politically and diplomatically superior to European countries. The prominent sign of the recession in Ottoman State was the Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699. As a result of recession, the Ottomans started a reform process in the 18th century and the first permanent missions to European countries were established after 1792. The 18th and the following centuries witnessed the modernization process in the Ottoman State which was inspired from Western countries. The *Tanzimat* process was an important step on Westernization and on the other hand the Ottoman State was a part of Concert of Europe in the 19th century. The Western style of modernization continued with an increasing concentration. However, the reforms did not stop the fall of the Empire and the successor state was established by modeling the European nation states. After the Independence War the new Turkish State was founded as a republic and many revolutionary regulations were imposed to the society from top to bottom in a very short process. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk who is accepted as the founding father of the Turkish Republic led this reform process and his target was to carry the State to the level of modern civilizations which addresses the Western countries.⁹⁶

In the following decades, the new Turkish Republic maintained close ties with Western countries. Turkey was a part of the Western Bloc during the Cold War and an important member of NATO beginning from 1953. The good relations with Western states sustained as the primary objective of Turkish Foreign Policy and showed this will also by joining Western institutions such as Council of Europe in 1949.

⁹⁶ For a comprehensive analysis of Turkish modernization look at: Niyazi Berkes, **Türkiye’de Çağdaşlaşma**, İstanbul: YKY, 2005.

1 - Application, Association Agreement and Additional Protocol

Treaty of Rome was signed on 25th March, 1957 creating the European Economic Community. This new formation in Europe was neither known nor discussed in Turkey. The first reason for this indifference was the economic and political challenges in Turkey. The latter was a division within Europe or OEEC countries on this issue. While the first six countries were creating EEC, the other OEEC members led by England were trying to establish European Free Trade Area (EFTA). At this point Turkish bureaucrats were watching Greece because Turkey's policy was to join all European or International institutions that Greece takes place. At least, the objective was not to be excluded from international fora and alliances which might be used against Turkey's interests by Greece. Regarding these dynamics the application of Greece to EEC on 15th July, 1959 created a great panic in Turkish Foreign Ministry. Turkey could not foresee Greece's application and felt the necessity to catch up. Briefly, Turkey's application was prepared with lack of information about EEC while the country was economically and politically depressed and by the motivation to catch up with Greece.

The negotiations between Turkey and EEC lasted four years for the Association Agreement. There were several reasons for such a long negotiation process. Firstly, Turkey demanded a parallel negotiation process with Greece but Turkey's economy was weaker than Greece's and Turkish bureaucracy could not prepare the content of demands and the obligations assumed so the negotiations hampered. EEC was timid not to let Turkey divert from EEC and join EFTA at the beginning. But that timidity started to erode as EEC gained strength. The military coup d'état in Turkey in 1960 interrupted the process and the changes in administration renewed the plans. The death sentences and shelved democracy caused hesitation in the EEC members although the temporary administration showed the will to continue negotiations. Finally in

1961, the elections were held and the new government was formed in Turkey. After long bargains Turkey signed Ankara Agreement on 12th September, 1963 with the EEC. The agreement plans the three-stepped process for the creation of a Customs Union which would help secure Turkey's membership to the EEC. It also foresees a financial assistance from the EEC to Turkey. In addition to the Customs Union, the agreement refers to the articles of Treaty of Rome for free movement of workers, services and removal of barriers for free establishment.

The Provisional Protocol of the Ankara Agreement article 1 states that: "Four years after the entry into of this agreement, the Council of Association shall consider whether, taking into account the economic situation of Turkey, it is able to lay down, in the form of an additional Protocol, the provisions relating to the conditions, detailed rules and timetables for implementing the transitional stage referred to in Article 4 of the Agreement." So, in 1970 the Additional Protocol was signed. It was voted and accepted in the Parliament in 1971. After that in 1972, Turkey demanded amendments on Additional Protocol but was refused by EEC. Finally in 1st January, 1973 the Protocol went into force. The negotiations both within Turkey among bureaucrats, politicians and also with EEC were long and painful. Technically Turkey had not completed preparatory stage but stepped to transitional stage because of domestic political reasons.⁹⁷ Additional Protocol is economically, socially and politically similar to Ankara Agreement which is at the same time supplementary part of it. It is an "executive agreement" in comparison to Ankara Agreement and it is the Interim Agreement that regulates the pre-entry process which will be followed by "full membership".⁹⁸

⁹⁷ For a more detailed explanation of the period resumed under this subtitle: Mehmet Ali Birand, **Türkiye'nin Büyük Avrupa Kavgası**, İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2005, pp. 51-224. and İlhan Tekeli, Selim İlkin, **Türkiye ve Avrupa Topluluğu**, Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, 1993, pp. 120-140.

⁹⁸ **Avrupa Topluluğu ve Türkiye**, T.C. Başbakanlık Hazine ve Dışticaret Müsteşarlığı, Ankara, 1993, pp. 177-178.

2 - The Recession Period and Membership Application

The following years after the Additional Protocol witnessed great economic crises both in Europe and Turkey. The increase in oil prices due to the OPEC crisis in 1973 and the parallel price increase in all raw materials caused increase in unemployment and a big chaos. Turkey was also affected from these problems and the trade gap between Turkey and EEC was increasing. There were also political problems such as instability in governments and Turkey's invasion of Cyprus that collected reactions from Europe and the USA.

In contrast to all economic and political problems on 1st January, 1976, Turkey realized second Reduction of Customs Tariffs and Harmonization of Consolidated Liberation List. But by the end of the same year, Turkey de facto suspended all responsibilities due to the Article 60 of the Additional Protocol which lets contracting parties take protective measures. This suspension in obligations was going to continue until 1988.

In 1978, Turkey claimed the suspension of the Agreement for 5 years and demanded assistance approximately 8 billion USD. The assistance demand was refused by EEC Commission and they proposed an IMF Agreement as a prerequisite to help Turkey. Turkey accorded with IMF in 1979 and in the summer of 1980 she was planning to revive relations with EEC and apply for membership in autumn. Instead of a membership application, the autumn of 1980 brought military coup d'état and the parliament was abolished. This also caused deterioration in relations with EEC even if National Security Council* in Turkey showed determination about becoming a member of EEC. As a result of delaying democracy and violation of human rights in Turkey, the agreement between Turkey and EEC was suspended in 1982.

* National Security Council was formed after 1980 military coup d'état as a junta rule which holded legislative and executive forces until the democratic elections in 1983.

The shelved relations came to life after democratic elections in 1983 and normalized by 1986. The same year, Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Özal decided to apply for membership and held meetings with the representatives of EEC member countries. His meetings were not promising for a support but he did not delay his decision. On 14th April, 1987 Turkey applied for full membership of the European Community based on Article 237 of the Rome Treaty, Article 98 of the European Coal and Steel Community and Article 205 of the EURATOM.⁹⁹ After the application, Turkish representatives continued meetings member countries but Greece who became a member of EEC in 1981 was an obstacle in this process. On 18th December, 1989 European Commission replied Turkey's application. That was just after the fall of the Berlin Wall on 7th November, which opened a new phase in European politics. The Commission's opinion was negative to accept a new member before completing its own Internal Market. In addition, Turkey was not considered ready to join and the Commission pointed to the Customs Union to be completed.

3 - Customs Union

The obligations that were suspended beginning from 1978 started to be implemented again by 1988. Turkey submitted an accelerated schedule the European Community. The Turkey – EC Association Council started holding regular meetings again in 1991. Except Greece's objections the process went en route and Turkey had to wait this obstacle to be removed to be able to step Customs Union. By 1995, Greece changed her policy in this issue. The new policy was to let Turkey proceed to membership and ensure Cyprus's EC membership in return. Again after very hard debates especially on Cyprus issue the Customs Union agreement was signed on 13th December, 1995 that is to go into force by 1st January, 1996. This date was the end of the "transition period"

⁹⁹ For technical info and chronology the website <http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=112&l=2> (16.05.2010) was used in this part.

for Turkey and the next step was expected to be the final period which will end with Turkey's membership to the European Union.

4 - Luxembourg and Helsinki Summits

Turkey's expectations increased after Customs Union Agreement. But at the same time EU's agenda changed by the end of the Cold War. The new target was to overcome the Europe's Cold War divisions.¹⁰⁰ As a result the new enlargement was designed for Central and Eastern European Countries. The Luxembourg Summit in 1997 was going to be the time to announce the candidates of the new enlargement. The longstanding associate Turkey was also expecting to be in the list of candidates as one of the first comers to the European integration and a member of Customs Union. In the preparatory period Turkish diplomats and Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz contacted with many European leaders but the picture did not change dramatically. As a result, in The Luxembourg Summit in 1997 Turkey was not in the list of candidate countries but was taken in the concept of enlargement. 10 Central and Eastern European countries and Cyprus were in the list of the next enlargement.

This result was regarded discriminatory and politicized under the influence of Greece. The anti-European tendency increased in political and economic elites in Turkey. There was almost a consensus about suspending political dialogue with EU and not participate in the European Conference in 1998. The talks on Turkey's policy alternatives other than EU strengthened and it became hard to implement Customs Union as well because of opposition to EU. The European Commission formulated proposals to change this attitude but even including Turkey in the regular report of 1998 with other applicant countries did not

¹⁰⁰ Erhan İçener, *Privileged Partnership: An Alternative Final Destination for Turkey's Integration with the European Union*, **Perspectives on European Politics and Society**, vol. 8, No. 4, December 2007, p.418.

work. Turkey was persistent on a major change on the issue of candidacy from the European Council.¹⁰¹

As explained above the exclusion of Turkey by Luxembourg decisions caused a distance between Turkey and the EU. Especially because of security concerns that was disadvantageous for both sides. Therefore, EU had to correct this situation in a way that Turkey may be convinced. Consequently, in Helsinki Summit of 1999 Turkey was offered candidate status within the enlargement process. The candidacy status settled the relations, answered the question of whether or not Turkey is a European country and gave Turkey the opportunity to receive financial and technical support from the EU like other candidate countries getting prepared for membership. At that point Turkey had to realize major political and economic reforms to meet the Copenhagen criteria. In this line, Turkish government prepared the “Turkish National Program for the Adoption of the *Acquis*” and submitted it to the Commission in 2001. Turkey was warned to focus more on the political field and did so in the years 2001 and 2002. To this purpose, 34 amendments to the constitution were accomplished and that was followed by harmonization of laws. These were major attempts but there were still some points that Turkey and the EU contradict, such as death penalty, cultural rights of minority groups, role of military and Cyprus question.¹⁰²

In the following years Turkey took steps to solve all these problems although most of them were sensitive issues. In 2002, the death penalty was abolished and the right to broadcast in native tongues was given to minorities. In 2003, by the adoption of the sixth and seventh package of legislative reforms, Turkey targeted Europe’s concerns on the role of military in Turkey. In 2004, a referendum was held in Cyprus for the Annan Plan which drew a solution for

¹⁰¹ Atila Eralp, *Turkey and the European Union*, in Lenor G. Martin and Dimitris Keridis (ed.), **The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy**, London: The MIT Press, 2004, pp. 71-75.

¹⁰² **Ibid.**, pp. 75-80.

the island. Turkish Cypriots approved with 64.9% but the Greek people in Cyprus refused with 75.83%.¹⁰³ In contrast to these attempts, Turkey was the only candidate country without an accession timeline and who has not opened accession negotiations yet.

The Cyprus question was not solved and Cyprus was included to the new enlargement in 2004 although Greek Cypriots voted against the Annan plan. As a result the Cyprus question was removed from the list of obstacles to Turkey's membership at least temporarily. Thus, on the second half of 2004 opening of accession negotiations for Turkey came to the EU's agenda. According to the Regular Progress Report for Turkey on 6th of October, Turkey was said to have fulfilled the political criteria and was recommended to begin the negotiations. On 15th of December, the European Parliament voted Turkey's accession negotiation's date and accepted with 407 ayes to 262 nays. By this historical resolution 3rd October, 2005 was going to be the date for the opening of accession negotiations for Turkey.

5 - 3rd October 2005, and the Opening of the Accession Negotiations

In spite of the Parliament resolution and the exact date given, still there was doubt about its realization in the Turkish side. That was due to the general tendency of the relations with the EU and the fear that a new problem may occur or a member state may oppose. In addition, the statement that the negotiations with Turkey are "open-ended" caused doubts in Turkey reinforcing the belief that the EU would never let Turkey become a member. Briefly, the process before the 3rd of October was full of uncertainties for Turkish side. The very profound bargains continued until the late hours of 3rd of October.

¹⁰³ For a comprehensive work on Cyprus question, Annan Plan and the referendum process please take a look at: Ahmet Aydođdu, **Kıbrıs Sorunu Çözüm Arayışları: Annan Planı ve Referandum Süreci**, Ankara: BRC Basım, 2005.

The hardest debate was due to Austria's objection for "full membership" of Turkey as the target of negotiations. The talks on "privileged partnership" for Turkey instead of a "full membership" were sharply opposed by Turkish side. As a result of Austria's foreign minister Ursula Plassnik's efforts EU's "capacity to absorb" new members took place as a precondition for Turkey's membership. After long bargains, a compromise was set and Turkey's foreign minister Abdullah Gül went to Luxembourg, so the accession negotiations started for Turkey and the EU.

The opening of accession negotiations was celebrated and revived hopes in Turkish side. However, it was not going to be easy to take further steps for membership. Cyprus issue once more appeared as an obstacle for membership. The UN asked Turkey to open its harbors and airports to the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus until the 14-15th of December, 2006. There are 35 chapters that Turkey should complete regulations about and as Turkey did not open harbors and airports this processed was suspended. The resolution of the Commission declares 8 chapters shall not be opened and none of the chapters shall be closed temporarily until confirming the commitments relating to Additional Protocol.¹⁰⁴ The suspending chapters are: Free Movement of Goods, Right of Establishment and Freedom to Provide Services, Public Procurement, Agriculture and Rural Development, Fisheries, Transport Policy, Customs Union and External Relations. On the other hand there are 13 chapters open to negotiation but it is not possible to close or temporarily close any of them.

Different than other candidate countries, Turkey has to settle conflicted issues and fight with prejudices in the European public opinion. The reform process is considered slow and not satisfying. Turkey is expected to complete formal process by 2014 and this date is not the one for membership. Even if all

¹⁰⁴ <http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p=112&l=2> (16.05.2010)

conditions are met Turkey has to wait to remove obstacles and Turkey's entrance will be voted in referenda in some European countries.

B – Germany and Turkey's EU Membership

The member states of the EU have the word for enlargements both for Turkey and other candidate countries. The founding six members had a comparable weight especially in the first enlargements. Among these six founding countries Germany has always had an important role in Turkey-EU relations. So that, the membership process of Turkey should be analyzed with Germany's policies towards Turkey's membership.

The relations between two countries, Turkey and Germany, are defined in various shapes. For some it is a "one-sided love" and for the other, two countries are tied to each other for many reasons. The alliance in the World War I is the historical explanation but also today millions of Turkish workers in Germany and the increasing German citizen population residing in Turkey are important facts. On the other hand, Germany is Turkey's greatest trading partner and both countries are NATO members. The deep analyses and the character of the relations between two countries is not a main subject of this theses but it is necessary to state that these countries are tied to each other for various reasons. Therefore, both as a founding member of the EEC and as an important partner in the international fora, Germany's policies towards Turkey's membership have great importance in the process.

1- Germany the Great Defender: 1959 - 1973

Following Turkey's application in 1959, Germany was the greatest defender of Turkey's membership. Konrad Adenauer was the Chancellor of Federal Republic of Germany at the time. Following negotiations after application, Turkey's demands did not match with EEC and German delegates played an important role in this process. In the meeting on 11 September, 1959, German delegate Van Scherpenberg met Turkey's demand to have a similar agreement

with Greece as follows: “The negotiations with Greece and Turkey should be parallel. The equality should not be overlooked.”¹⁰⁵ The same person replied the doubts about Turkey’s economy and other political problems again in favor of Turkey in 1960. After repeating the crises and risks in Turkey he underlined the necessity support Western advocates in Turkey against the attempts to accept economic aid from the Soviet Union.¹⁰⁶

Following the coup d’état and the dead penalties in Turkey, France was against signing an agreement with Turkey. Germany stood against France and stated the necessity for continuing negotiations underlining Turkey’s importance in Western security.¹⁰⁷ France was the supporter of Greece and Germany played the same role for Turkey. Therefore, the rivalry between Turkey and Greece was carried to Europe.

Germany had some repeating arguments for defending Turkey’s interests in the EEC. The main emphasis was on Turkey’s strategic power and weight in Europe’s security. As a prominent member of NATO, Turkey had to be kept in the Western alliance. The Cold War conditions strengthened this argument because it was crucial to keep Turkey as a strategic country in the Western bloc. The risk of Turkey’s shift to the Soviet bloc could be eliminated by maintaining close ties with her. Germany could easily see this risk and the USA was leading Germany on this issue.

The support of Germany with aforementioned motivations eased Turkey’s negotiation process but it was not possible to take all privileges by the effort of one founding country among six. This fact does not mean that other founding members were totally against Turkey but Germany helped Turkey to step forward even in hard cases.

¹⁰⁵ Birand, *op.cit.*, p.54.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 75.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 95.

2- Oil Crisis and Decreasing Support: 1973 - 1982

The boycott implied by OPEC countries and the following increase in oil prices affected the European countries seriously. The economies were shaken by increasing inflation and unemployment. German economy was threatened and the unemployment problem became a vital question. The immigrant workers were going to be the receivers of the unemployment bill and they were no more welcomed. The Turkish workers in Germany, for sure, were at the top of the undesirables list. There was a pressure on the politicians from the German citizens as a result of unemployment and this pressure was reflected to Turkish workers as well. Therefore the immigrant issue became a core matter of elections in Germany. The candidate government had to promise solutions for the immigrant worker and unemployment question. The possible membership of Turkey to the EEC turned into a threat for German politicians because membership meant flow of Turkish workers and their families to the country. Under these conditions Germany could no more act as Turkey's advocate in Europe.

In addition to the domestic reasons the government shifted from CDU to SPD. The Social Democrats were more critical on the issues like human rights and democracy questions in Turkey. However when Turkish politicians decided to apply for membership by the end of the 1970s German politicians stated that they would support Turkey but free movement of workers was considered impossible. That was a direct effect of domestic politics to the foreign policy. In 1980, the second military coup d'état came and Turkey did not have chance to apply so we do not know whether or not SPD government was going to support Turkey. In 1982, Christian Democrats came to the office again after eight years of break.

3- Helmut Kohl – No More Privileges

The military coup d'état was a concussion for Turkey – EEC relations. The doubts about democracy and human rights in Turkey were reinforced with the second break to democracy in two decades time. The member states wanted to suspend negotiations and German Foreign Minister Genscher, handled the case with a different perspective claiming that this intervention was going to strengthen democracy in the country.¹⁰⁸ As a result the relations could not be conserved but were not harmed totally. The 1983 elections in Turkey did not satisfy Europeans because there were many political limitations and Turgut Özal became the Prime Minister through this questionable election.

Parallel to that, Helmut Kohl became the Chancellor of Germany. Later he was going to be known as the father of German reunification and a great contributor to European integration. But the relations with Turkey were not promising. Firstly, his focus was on German reunification and secondly, the possible flow of Turkish workers by membership had become a sensitive issue for German domestic politics. On the other hand, Prime Minister Özal was ambitious about membership and took fast steps towards his target. Before the membership application in 1987, Turkish government worked on gaining support from the German Chancellor and Foreign Minister Genscher. The answer was direct and the refusal was focused on the timing of the application. The German government was considering domestic reasons before new elections and warned Turkish representatives without promising support. The persistence of the Turkish government did not give a positive result and Germans were angry about the impatient moves. As a result the Turkish application was declined and the fall of the Berlin Wall became the explanation of the refusal.

After the futile application Turkey paved the way to the completion of the Customs Union in line with the European countries' suggestions. This time Germany gave full support. The idea behind the support was to satisfy Turkey

¹⁰⁸ **Ibid.**, p. 295.

with Customs Union which is also in favor of Germany and closing the doors for full membership which includes free movement of people and workers. Customs Union was successfully completed by 1995 and the enlargement policy of the European Union was diverted to the Central and Eastern European Countries. The membership of old Soviet Bloc countries was a kind of burden for Germany because of historical ties and kinship. These years were turbulent both for Germany-Turkey and EU-Turkey relations.

As explained above, Helmut Kohl did not play an active role in pushing Turkey's membership. In contrast, he was doubtful about Turkey's membership and free movement of Turkish people in the EU. The end of the Cold War and the changes in strategic preferences weakened Turkey's pressure on Germany and the motivation of Germany's policy towards Turkey's membership to the EU gained a domestic character.

4- Gerhard Schröder – Good Cop

Gerhard Schröder was Germany's Chancellor between 1998 and 2005. These were golden years for Turkey-Germany relations. Schröder pursued a pro-Turkey policy especially for Turkey's membership to the EU.

He visited Turkey in 12-13 October, 2005, just after the opening of membership negotiations and his speech was promising. He clearly declared Turkey as 'European' and emphasized the importance of a "powerful Turkey in a powerful European Union." Appreciating the reforms in Turkey, he underlined the necessity of continuity for breaking the prejudices in the European public opinion. He mentioned Turkey's cultural and religious difference and considered them in the context of "togetherness in diversity" which was the election slogan of European Union. His speech was focused on

historical ties and common interests of Turkey and Europe which leads to a collaboration.¹⁰⁹

The abovementioned speech is only an example of Schröder's Turkish friendly approach. Even in the election campaign against Merkel, supporting Turkey's membership was one of his policy initiatives.

5- Angela Merkel – Bad Cop

Angela Merkel, the Christian Democrat Chancellor of Germany beginning from 2005 up to now has a totally different attitude than his predecessor.

Beginning from her opposition years she was sending negative messages about Turkey's membership. On her speech in 2004, February she warned EU to "stop sending out overly encouraging signs to Turkey and said that the EU was not ready to admit the country."¹¹⁰ In another speech on 2005, August she articulated "privileged partnership" and stated that "the conservatives are fully convinced that accepting Turkey would overburden the EU politically, economically and socially and would endanger the European Integration process."¹¹¹ Also in the 2005 election campaigns she was not promising for Turkey's membership instead she was trying to collect votes with her stand against Turkey. Just after the elections, her victory was considered as a drawback for Turkey's European steps by Turkish and international commentators.¹¹²

¹⁰⁹ http://www.ankara.diplo.de/Vertretung/ankara/tr/03_Aussen_und_EU_Politik/Bilaterale_Beziehungen/BK_Schroeder_2005_iftar_essen_rede.html (08.08.2010)

¹¹⁰ <http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/german-politicians-divided-turkey-bid-join-eu/article-112172> (08.08.2010)

¹¹¹ <http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/turkey-france-germany-turn-heat/article-143563> (08.08.2010)

¹¹² <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9d26eb58-cbb0-11d9-895c-00000e2511c8.html> (08.08.2010)

In the first years of her office, Merkel did not change her position. One of the key issues she put forward with French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac was Turkey's debate with Cyprus. The two leaders pushed Turkey to open ports and airports to the ships and planes from Cyprus. They were on the same page with regard to Turkey. The "privileged partnership" was still valid and Merkel often emphasized that the negotiations are open ended. In addition to Merkel's suggestions, the "absorption capacity" of the union was put forward by the Bavarian CSU (Christian Social Union) leader Stoiber. Absorption capacity means, the Union's ability to absorb new member states and he advises that as a precondition for accepting new members.

As a result of all these discouraging messages Turkey was frustrated against the German Presidency in the EU. Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan asked for a clear target date, road map, timeline for negotiations but Merkel kept on stating that the outcome of the negotiations is open.¹¹³ By the year 2007, she was mostly focused on the completion of the constitution. In that year, the relations were slowed down. The rejection of the Constitution by French voters was expected. CDU declared that if Constitution is not approved further enlargement should be suspended.¹¹⁴ A better functioning union was a precondition before further enlargement. On the other hand, the year 2008 was announced as the "EU year in Turkey" by Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan and showed full commitment for reforms to kick-start Turkey's accession bid.¹¹⁵

The idea of "privileged partnership" became the settled policy of Germany towards Turkey's membership. The two European leaders Merkel and Sarkozy

¹¹³ <http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/turkey-frustrated-eu-accession-talks/article-163149> (08.08.2010)

¹¹⁴ <http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/germany-cdu-french-vote-eu-suspend-enlargement/article-139873> (06.08.2010)

¹¹⁵ <http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/2008-eu-year-turkey-foreign-minister/article-170121> (08.08.2010)

repeated this suggestion several times echoing each other. In a gathering of young conservatives on 10 May, 2009 Merkel stated that “it does not make sense for the EU to continuously expand if it leaves the Union unable to operate.” She also added that “she would prefer Turkey to receive a privileged partnership from the EU, rather than full membership.”¹¹⁶ This speech caused a shock in Turkey and the response was a clear “no”. The conservative European People’s Party also mentioned “Judeo-Christian roots and common cultural heritage” of Europe in considering enlargement. So Croatia was the only possible candidate for membership and Turkey was rejected without mentioning.¹¹⁷

Merkel did not change her stand about Turkey’s membership up to now. She is criticized by some politicians both in Germany and abroad for alienating Turkey. Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan also warned her by reminding the principle of “pacta sunt servanda”. Merkel confirmed that Germany respects the pacts but continuingly stating that the negotiation process is “open ended” and “privileged partnership” is a better choice for Turkey-EU relations.

C- Privileged Partnership

1- The Reasons for the Offer

The membership process of Turkey, especially the developments in the last two decades, shows that Turkey’s admission to the Union has different dynamics than other previous or actual candidate states. It is a tough journey and the balances are very sensitive for both sides. Meeting the Copenhagen Criteria and opening of the accession process do not lead Turkey’s destination to the membership. Some countries, groups or political parties are directly against the idea of a European Union including Turkey. Some others are in favor of Turkey’s admission and their position is about behaving fair to any candidate

¹¹⁶ <http://www.euractiv.com/en/eu-elections/turkey-shocked-franco-german-election-rhetoric/article-182187> (12.08.2010)

¹¹⁷ <http://www.euractiv.com/en/eu-elections/protests-mark-opening-eu-conservative-congress/article-181878> (08.08.2010)

who fulfills the criteria. The supporters also consider Turkey's young population, growing economy, large market and dynamic military power. In addition, they care about multicultural character of the Union which shall be proven by inclusion of Turkey with a different background, culture and religion. The third attitude, which constitutes the main part of this chapter, is the "privileged partnership" offer as a plan B. The idea behind this offer is to not accept Turkey in the Union without alienating her. Since Turkey is an important international actor both in the world and in the Caucasian – Middle East region, it is crucial to keep good relations with her. The European Union wants to hold Turkey close but imagining her as a member of the Union is difficult for the supporters of privileged partnership.

This offer, which is less than original plan (membership), begs for a good explanation. The supporters of the privileged partnership have different lines of argument for the answer. The first is mostly about the dynamics of the European Union itself. The big bang enlargement of 2004 mostly to the Central and Eastern European Countries caused negative effects and the term of "enlargement fatigue" derived from it. The European Union was late to settle a realistic enlargement policy and the result was costly. The lessons taken from this great enlargement are an important reason of hesitations for further enlargement steps. The "absorption capacity" of the Union turned out to be another criterion to welcome new member states. Turkey with a great population and comparatively lagging economy has low chance to handle with this new criterion. The no votes in Dutch and French referenda on Constitutional Treaty in 2005 also broke the confidence of the Union.¹¹⁸ The two directions of the Union, deepening and enlargement have to go parallel for healthy growth. The failure of the Constitution moved the focus on integration process. A powerful and well integrated Union is considered as a precondition for further enlargement. On the other hand, a Union with Turkey as a member would be far from enthusiastic integration targets of European Union. So, the

¹¹⁸İçener, *op.cit.*, p.415.

admission of Turkey as a full member is supposed to be an obstacle for further political integration. The perspective that Turkey with her culture, religion and interests is too diverse from Europe's and this odd partner cannot operate within the system of European Union synchronized with other European counterparts.

The above mentioned reasons are mostly about the Union itself and should be more or less the same for all candidate countries but privileged partnership is only offered to Turkey. The reason for this double standard attitude derives from the second line of explanation which is based on Turkey itself. The legal reform process in Turkey is not satisfying for many of the member states. For them, Turkey is still far away from meeting the political criteria. The human rights records, problematic democracy are put forward as answers of why Turkey cannot take part in the Union with other member states. At this point it is necessary to underline the fact that Turkey is not the single country facing these problems but the condition is vital only for Turkey. The public opinion for Turkey's membership is also negative. This is partly because of prejudices and the Turkish population living in these countries and their integration problems. The rising Islamophobia in Europe is for sure another significant element of the refusals. Many people see European Integration as a cultural project based on common European and Christian heritage. In this project Turkey does not have a place with the highly Muslim population and different historical background. The fears derive from high population, poverty and borders with conflicted geography have acceptance in common. But the cultural argument has much to do with the understanding of European Integration and it is an important element to define EU's identity.

To sum up, the European Union has noteworthy reasons to hesitate about further enlargement but the internal reasons should be same for all candidates. However, "privileged partnership" is only offered to Turkey. The obstacles deriving from Turkey herself can be removed and the way to progress is

possible. In the end of the list there are only two issues which close doors to the membership: high population with high unemployment rates and the cultural, religious, historical diversification. The unemployment problem is also open to solution and the young population is even an advantage for the aging Europe. As a result there remains only one reason which cannot be changed further efforts. In my opinion, in offering privileged partnership for Turkey as a final destination there is only one issue which cannot be removed. It is the culture, religion and history of Turkey different from Europe's. The ones who focus on this difference have no approval for Turkey's admission and they are the ones who put privileged partnership forward.

2- The Supporters of the Idea

At this point, supporters of the privileged partnership deserve attention. Their profile would lead to a conclusion regarding the statements above. There are people who support privileged partnership in the society or in some social groups. But in this study, it is necessary to focus on political figures and their ideology to derive results.

Angela Merkel, the Chancellor of Christian Democratic Union is the most known supporter of the idea. In fact, the German Christian Democrats in general are the leading figures. Some senior party members, such as Wolfgang Schäuble,¹¹⁹ Friedbert Pflüger,¹²⁰ Karl Theodor zu Guttenberg¹²¹ and Matthias Wissmann¹²² have also espoused it in different articles and interviews.¹²³ The following sentences clarify Schäuble's stand: "The EU is, after all, European. Although Australia or Japan could fulfill its accession criteria, no one has proposed them as potential EU members. Similarly, countries such as Turkey

¹¹⁹ Minister of Interior – CDU.

¹²⁰ Chairman of CDU parliamentary group in the Berlin Parliament.

¹²¹ Member of Foreign Affairs Committee in the Bundestag – CSU.

¹²² The chairman of Europe Committee in the German Bundestag – CDU.

¹²³ **Ibid.**, p.421.

and Russia only partly share Europe's heritage and geography; in other parts, they definitely do not."¹²⁴ He considers EU on the basis of heritage and geography; and privileged partnership is the solution to avoid seeming exclusivist. This stand is directly fits with the ideal "keeping Turkey out without alienating her." Another example is from, Karl Theodor zu Guttenberg. His offer is simple "a privileged partnership instead of an unprivileged membership."¹²⁵ He posits this offer because of the possibility of Turkey's failure in fulfilling requirements and even if Turkey fulfills them he asks another question: "It is not only a question of whether Turkey can fulfill the political and economic requirements of the EU entry rules known as the Copenhagen criteria, but also whether the EU, according to the same criteria, can add new member states while "maintaining the momentum of European integration."¹²⁶ After that the argument turns into a geographical character he states considering the EU: "Its borders should create a close and comprehensive bond between Europe and its neighbors. This can be done successfully on the EU's border with Turkey — but not on along Turkey's other borders."¹²⁷ In this statement it is possible to see that he draws the borders of Europe before Turkey and there is not a clear explanation for that. However, it is possible to assume that this argument is in line with the view that Turkey is not part of European Continent or Europe. This geographical classification has to do with historical borders of Europe and culture since Southern Cyprus did not face a similar classification and could be a member of the EU.

The second group of supporters of this offer is from France. The French society is against Turkey's membership in general and two political leaders clearly share these feelings and offer privileged partnership: former French President

¹²⁴ <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/60278/wolfgang-schauble-and-david-l-phillips/talking-turkey?page=2> (12.08.2010)

¹²⁵ http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/15/opinion/15iht-edguten_ed3_.html?_r=1 (12.08.2010)

¹²⁶ **Idem.**

¹²⁷ **Idem.**

Giscard D'Estaing and current French President Nicolas Sarkozy who was the leader of Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) before his Presidency. The ideology of his previous party is defined as liberal conservatism, Christian Democracy and Gaullism.¹²⁸ This is a clear similarity with its example in Germany the CDU/CSU.

Austria has also powerful resistance for Turkey's membership. The Eurobarometer surveys show that the Austrian public opinion has sharp negative view for Turkey as a candidate to membership.¹²⁹ The prominent supporters of the privileged partnership among political characters are former Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel and former Foreign Minister, Ursula Plassnik. They are members of Austrian People's Party (ÖVP) which is also conservative and Christian Democrat in character.¹³⁰

The supporter of the idea on the European level is European People's Party (EPP). The Liberal Conservative and Christian Democratic EPP is the largest group in the European Parliament with 265 members.¹³¹

When we look at the general portrait of privileged partnership supporter we see a Conservative and Christian Democrat character in general. They are all members of powerful states and groups in the EU. Therefore, it is a powerful stance and the idea is articulated quite often.

3- What does “Privileged Partnership” cover?

As explained above privileged partnership is very popular and people discuss whether it is a better destination for Turkey or not. However, there is only little discussion about its meaning. The differences between “full membership” and

¹²⁸ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Union_for_a_Popular_Movement (12.08.2010)

¹²⁹ <http://www.euractiv.com/en/priorities/turkey-eu-public-thinks/article-171187> (12.08.2010)

¹³⁰ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Austrian_People%27s_Party (12.08.2010)

¹³¹ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_People%27s_Party (12.08.2010)

“privileged partnership” are not clear. There is no written recipe which sets the principles of this alternative relationship. The Turkish side is not interested in the content either and their stand is: “no for any other offer than full membership”, so they even do not ask. Besides, the “privileged partnership” lacks a clear explanation of content and it is waiting to be developed. At this point there are two main questions to ask: What does “privileged partnership” cover? And, what is the difference from full membership?

At this point, it is crucial to take a look at the most prominent supporter of the idea, Angela Merkel’s definition which she gave in her speech in 2004 in Turkey. According to Merkel it is very easy to adapt a common foreign and security policy by working together with Turkey because the strategic interests are in line. At the same time she clarifies the exclusive elements: structural and regional funds, agricultural policy, and free movement of workers.¹³² This is still a very weak explanation and her focus is mostly on the “open-endedness” of the negotiations. She agrees to continue integration with the EU but she is against setting membership as the final destination. Merkel underlines her honesty in relations with Turkey, speaking frankly, and considering full membership impossible for Turkey even at the beginning of the process.

Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg is a politician of CSU and current Minister of Defense in the second Merkel cabinet. He has defined three core elements of a possible partnership. The first element is improving institutional cooperation and instead of Turkey’s access to European Economic Area, using the economic area’s structures and institutions as a model and expanding cooperation in the Association Council. He adds EU-Turkey committee to be established to adopt and monitor the implementation of EU legislation applicable to the privileged partnership. Secondly, he touches upon the policy areas. He is for expanding the existing customs union by establishing unlimited exchange of goods in a free trade area. Among the “four basic freedoms” of the

¹³² http://www.kas.de/proj/home/home/44/12/webseite_id-2515/index.html (12.08.2010)

EU free movement of services is supposed to be the starting point. He also rejects free movement of workers and he only foresees easing visa regulations. In line with Merkel, the only area of membership in EU structures is in European Foreign, Security and Defense policy.¹³³

When we look at the above listed definitions it is possible to say that Turkey is already a privileged partner. The offers foresee only further development in some policy areas. Some structures of the EU are totally closed. Only the foreign and security policy seems to be open for Turkey and this is in favor of the EU. The strictest point is free movement of workers. As a result Turkey is out of the room and working in line with Europe's foreign and security policy and there is no improvement in human interaction. In fact they offer only minor changes to the status quo

¹³³ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karl-Theodor_zu_Guttenberg (12.08.2010)

CONCLUSION

The concept of privileged partnership has been offered to Turkey beginning from 2004 and its emphasis increase day-by-day. The “open-endedness” of the negotiation process is the sister argument and mostly follows the first one. It is possible to say that these two statements appear in Angela Merkel’s speeches most often. Germany had been an important supporter of Turkey in the European Union historically, but today she is at the opposite side.

In the light of above explained theories, debates and historical events; it is possible to derive a number of conclusions.

The Conservative idea has emerged as a response to the Enlightenment and the ideas of the French Revolution. The Conservative thinkers have different standing points but in general it is possible to state that the Conservative wishes to preserve the tradition, culture, institution and order of authority in the society. The attack of the enlightened ideas was mostly directed to religion, Christianity and Church; so the Conservatives’ focus was on preserving these institutions. This movement has found support in many European countries and in Germany. The German Conservatives have much in common with the others but there are also characteristics that the German Conservatives differ from their contemporaries. They state that the overspread ideas of the Enlightenment and French Revolution are not compatible with German society and this claim can be called as the national sentiment. The German society with her traditions, history and culture is glorified and the attempts to change it are abhorred. It was not possible to understand for a German Conservative, the motivations to change German ideas and institutions that were created by the distinctive history of Germany. As stated above, since the attack was focused on religion, the defense had a special emphasis on Christianity but at the same time, German Romantics are known with their Nationalist character.

Nationalism has been a sensitive issue for the German community and the results of the World War II revealed the necessity to keep it under control because the nationalism of German society threatened the existence of German State among other nation states of Europe. The solution was to convert German nationalism into a harmless sentiment and it was European identity. The post-war politicians aimed to equal German identity to European identity and diverted the nationalist energy to European integration. So, the rise of European values meant the rise of German values. As a result, Germany has always been pro-integration and the German politicians supported federalism to create an ever closer strengthened Union.

The Christian Democrat Chancellors of Germany after the World War II have become prominent actors of European integration. They were all voluntary and desirous for further steps of integration. The Christian Democrats both in Germany and in general in Europe share the Federalist approach. Their target shall be briefly stated as “United States of Europe”. According to the Federalists, the final step of integration, political integration, would be possible on the basis of common historical heritage of Europe. In this picture, Turkey with her different culture, religion and historical background could not have a place. The Pluralists in the EU favor a multicultural European project which may include Turkey by fulfilling the conditions and prove that it is not a “Christian Club” instead it is a peace project with the motto of “solidarity in diversity”.

The image of “Turks” is very important in the formation of European identity. The threat perceived from Turkish invasions brought Europe together several times. It was the defense of the Christian world from Islam. Even today, Christianity with its system of values and traditions nurture the solidarity of Europeans. Rather than religious exercises, the common way of living in the historically Christian societies is the resource of the solidarity. This is the brief portrait of European identity which is favored by the German society as well.

When we look at Germany's policies towards Turkey's membership, it is possible to find tangible support especially in the first years after Turkey's application. Adenauer was also a Christian Democrat Chancellor but his attitude was totally different from today's Christian Democrat Chancellor Angela Merkel. This difference is due to the balance of power in the post War era. Also the Cold War conditions attached great importance to Turkey which had crucial strategic and military power in NATO. In these years, Turkey was at the first steps of membership process and its realization was not in a foreseeable future by then. The early support aimed to keep Turkey in the Western alliance and did not promise membership at all. Thus, I do not claim that Christian Democracy in Germany was historically against Turkey's membership but it is mostly related with the targets of European Integration and balance of power. So, it is not surprising that after Turkey achieved steps forward membership in the post-Cold War era, Germany removed the support and even started to block Turkey's membership process.

To sum up, Angela Merkel and the CDU/CSU inherit Christian Democratic ideology. Christian Democracy derives from Conservatism and in the German example, German Conservatism. The Christian Democrats are mostly Federalists in Europe who favor ever closer union on the basis of common cultural, traditional, religious and historical values. In the last decades, especially with reform and constitution process, the will to create federalist Europe strengthened. Turkey is not considered compatible with European values and the historical image of Turks in European identity has an impact in this consideration. On the other hand, Turkey's membership process continued and Turkey achieved many important goals. By this impetus, candidate Turkey could fulfill all conditions and become a member in the foreseeable future. This is not acceptable for German Conservatives because it is not compatible with their "United States of Europe" project. At this point, a way to keep Turkey out of the European Union had to be found without alienating Turkey.

It could be a plan B in which Turkey could continue good relations with the European Union and be a part of Common Foreign and Security Policy. As a result, the concept of *privileged partnership* was invented by German Conservatives to realize the above mentioned conditions.

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