

**THE ANALYSIS OF THE EVOLUTION OF THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN THE HASHEMITE REGIME AND
THE JORDANIAN MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD**

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
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ABSTRACT

THE ANALYSIS OF THE EVOLUTION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE HASHEMITE REGIME AND THE JORDANIAN MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD

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This thesis analyzes the evolution of the relationship between the Hashemite regime and the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood from 1946 to 2007. Reformist and pragmatic rhetoric of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood distinct from the most of other Muslim Brotherhood branches operating in different countries in the Middle East enabled it to set up relatively harmonious relations with the Hashemite regime without being declared as illegal even in crisis periods.

While focusing on this interesting case, this study reveals that the relationship between the Hashemite regime and the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood is mostly affected and shaped by two variables: regime survival concern and the regional context. In this regard, it maintains that the relations between the two parties have evolved around the policies of coexistence, cooperation, control and repression as well as containment with respect to the change in regime's survival concern and regional developments related to the Palestinian issue.

This thesis argues that the period from 1946, when the Muslim Brotherhood was legalized as a charitable organization in Jordan, to the end of 1980s is generally marked with a coherent and cooperative relations between the two parties since their interests overlapped. However, since the beginning of 1990s the relationship began to deteriorate due to a shift in the interests of both parties as a result of developments

in the regional context, namely Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the rise of political Islam globally.

Keywords: The Muslim Brotherhood, Jordan, Islamist movements and regimes, regime survival, Palestinian issue.

ÖZ

HAŞİMİ REJİMİ VE ÜRDÜN'DEKİ MÜSLÜMAN KARDEŞLER HAREKETİ ARASINDAKİ İLİŞKİNİN GELİŞİMİNİN BİR ANALİZİ

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Bu tez, 1946'dan 2007'ye kadar geçen sürede Haşimi rejimi ve Ürdün'deki Müslüman Kardeşler hareketi arasındaki ilişkinin gelişimini incelemektedir. Ürdün'deki Müslüman Kardeşler hareketinin Ortadoğu'da değişik ülkelerde faaliyet gösteren diğer Müslüman Kardeşler hareketlerinden farklı olarak reformcu ve faydacı bir söyleme sahip olması, Haşimi rejimiyle ilişkilerinin devamlı olmasını ve hareketin kriz dönemlerinde dahi yasadışı ilan edilmeden faaliyet göstermesini mümkün kılmıştır.

Bu çalışma, Haşimi rejimi ve Ürdün'deki Müslüman Kardeşler arasındaki ilişkinin büyük ölçüde rejimin varlığını sürdürme endişesi ve bölgedeki gelişmelerden etkilendigini ve bu iki değişkene göre şekillendigini ortaya koymaktadır. Bu bağlamda, rejimin varlığını sürdürme endişesine ve Filistin meselesine ilişkin bölgede meydana gelen gelişmelerdeki değişime bağlı olarak iki taraf arasındaki ilişkilerin bir arada yaşama, işbirliği, kontrol, baskın ve çevreleme politikaları arasında değişiklik gösterdiği tespit edilmiştir.

Bu tezde, Müslüman Kardeşlerin Ürdün'de 1946 yılında hayır kurumu adı altında yasal olarak faaliyete geçmesinden 1980'lerin sonuna kadar olan dönemde, Haşimi rejimi ile hareketin çıkarları örtüşüğü için iki taraf arasındaki ilişkilerin uyumlu ve işbirliğine müsait bir yapıda olduğu ileri sürülmektedir. Bununla birlikte, 1990'lardan başlamak üzere Filistin-İsrail ihtilafına bağlı olarak yaşanan bölgesel

gelişmeler ve siyasi İslam'ın yükselişe geçmesiyle iki tarafın çıkarlarının farklılaşlığı ve ilişkilerinin bozulmaya başladığı iddia edilmektedir.

Anahtar kelimeler: Müslüman Kardeşler, Ürdün, İslami hareketler ve rejimler, rejim güvenliği, Filistin meselesi

To my mother, Şefika Terzioğlu

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The relationship between the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood and the Hashemite regime traces back to the very establishment of the Kingdom. Since then the Jordanian case presents an anomaly as the Muslim Brotherhood has built a cooperative relationship with a conservative regime for a long period of time and has legally found and expanded its base within the Kingdom. This anomaly has become a part of daily politics in Jordan as a result of the combination of historical and regional conditions. Moreover, these historical and regional conditions have led the movement to pursue its activities legally even after all other political groups representing different ideologies have been banned in 1957. Although the regime resorted to the mechanisms that limit the activities of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood after disagreements on several issues came to surface at the end of 80s and afterwards, it did not declare the movement as illegal. All these points make it worth to examine the relationship between an Islamic organization and conservative monarchy in Jordan.

In this context, this thesis analyzes the relationship between the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood and the Hashemite regime. The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood has been an Islamic movement which accepted the existence of the monarchical regime and operates within the confines of the establishment. From the initial stages of its foundation until now the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood has pursued a gradual rather than revolutionary policy and has not resorted to violence in its relations with the regime. In that sense the relationship between the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood and the regime presents an interesting case to study.

This thesis argues that up until the end of 1980s, the relationship between the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood and the Hashemite regime was coherent because

their interests overlapped. However, since the beginning of 1990s the relationship began to deteriorate due to a shift in the interests of both parties as a result of developments in the regional context, namely Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the rise of political Islam globally.

The establishment and evolution of relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the regime in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan will be examined according to two variables: regime survival concern and regional context. The relations between the two parties have evolved around the policies of coexistence, cooperation, control and repression as well as containment with respect to the change in regime's survival concern and regional developments on Palestinian issue, which became not only a matter of foreign policy but an issue of domestic politics for the ruling family after Arab-Israeli Wars.

Regime survival concern, the first variable of this thesis to scrutinize the relationship between the regime and the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, has a particular importance for the Hashemite family because of the challenges to the sovereignty and the legitimacy of the state posed by either inside or outside forces since the state formation process.

Before World War I, the territories that would become the Kingdom of Jordan were peripheral provinces of the Ottoman Empire. During 1915, Sir Henry McMahon, Britain's High Commissioner in Egypt, and Sharif Hussein, the Guard of the Holy Sites in Mecca, exchanged letters, known as the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence. According to this correspondence, if Sharif Hussein organized Arab forces and revolted against the Ottomans during World War I, British then would agree to support Arab independence and establishment of an Arab Kingdom under his leadership. Based on this promise, "Sharif Hussein's objective in undertaking the Great Arab Revolt was to establish a single independent and unified Arab state,

stretching from Aleppo (Syria) to Aden (Yemen)", namely Greater Syria.¹ However, after the end of the World War I, the British and French divided the Middle East into spheres of influence in line with the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement which actually contradicted with the promises made to Sharif Hussein while accepting the principle of Arab independence. Sykes-Picot Agreement, as well as Balfour Declaration of 1917, a British promise of a national home for Jews in Palestine, caused to the dissolution of Greater Syria into several political entities such as Lebanon, Transjordan, Syria and Palestine. Transjordan, created as a mandate territory by the British, was given to the Hashemite family in 1921 in return for their support and cooperation against the Ottomans during the war. On the British side, they were searching for a buffer zone between their direct rule in Palestine and the Saudi dynasty in Arabia as well as the French mandate in Syria. For Abdullah I, the formation of a new state was the first step to establish a greater Arab Kingdom with Damascus as its capital.² Hence, the two side's wishes were fulfilled with the creation of Transjordan.

Transjordan was not the ancestral land of the Hashemite family and thus new rulers faced with difficulties to bring independent tribes together who had little or no loyalty to them. In this context, King Abdullah and the British worked together to eliminate threats coming from various powerful tribes to the existence of the state. Besides military, technical and political assistance to the Hashemite family, Britain also provided economical aid to them. The British subsidy to Amir Abdullah allowed him to buy support among indigenous leaders.³ After Transjordan was granted its independence in 1946, the mandate became a Kingdom and Amir Abdullah became King Abdullah I. From 1927 until 1947, King Abdullah I and the British established

¹ See "Great Arab Revolt", available at http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/his_arabrevolt.html, accessed on 30 June 2010.

² Mansoor Moaddel, "Religion and the State: The Singularity of the Jordanian Religious Experience", *International Journal Politics, Culture and Society*, Vol. 15, No. 4, Summer 2002, p. 530.

³ Russell Lucas, *Institutions and the Politics of Survival in Jordan: Domestic Responses to External Challenges, 1988-2001*, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005), p.15.

the core of the Jordanian state and monarchical authoritarian rule under the Hashemite family.⁴

In addition to the British assistance, Hashemite family has also tried to consolidate their legitimacy over local tribes by utilizing Pan-Arab credentials, which they attained through leadership of the 1916 Great Arab Revolt, and its connection to the Islamic faith. Islam has served as an important factor to unite local tribes around the ruling family, while ensuring regime legitimacy and nation building. Hashemite family's links with the Prophet Mohammad's tribe (Qurayshi) as well as Sharif Hussein's previous position as the keeper and guardian of the two holiest cities, Mecca and Medina, were respected by indigenous tribes as well as by the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood.

The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, which was a spring-off the mother organization in Egypt, established in 1946 in Jordan under this historical background. King Abdullah I approved the establishment of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood and legalized the movement as a charitable society. Moreover, the King allowed them to establish branches throughout the Kingdom and promote their conservative values among Jordanians which enabled the movement to extend their influence within Jordan during the initial stage of state formation. The founding principles of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood at that time stressed the significance of Islamic education and assisting to the development of an Arab culture based on Islamic principles. Therefore, the conservative composition of the movement and its reformist and pragmatic rhetoric has served the regime interest in which Islamic credentials were used as one of the means to consolidate legitimacy over local tribes.

As the regime consolidated its rule within the Kingdom, this time, its moderate political stance, pro-Western foreign policy and conservative monarchical institutions caused it to be perceived as a target by the emerging regional nationalists

⁴Ibid., p.14.

and revolutionists flourished by the emerging Cold War ideological rifts. On the other side, with the beginning of the Cold War, the Western Powers came to view Jordan as a conservative buffer zone against communism and radical forms of pan-Arabism. This helped Jordan to establish stronger ties with the United States beside the existing ties with Britain. Successive kings of Jordan have tried to hold their artificially created state together against domestic and regional challenges first by external support and subsidy and then by domestic friendly networks. As a result, the relationship between the regime and the Muslim Brotherhood provided a common platform against radical pan-Arab ideologies and left-leaning secular oppositional trends ranging from Ba'thism and Nasserism to Communism. Therefore, until the end of 1980s while the regime survival concern of the Hashemite ruling family provide a suitable environment for the Muslim Brotherhood to introduce, establish and flourish their base within Jordan, the Muslim Brotherhood has became a loyal partner of the ruling family in the construction of the new Jordanian entity. In this period, Palestinian conflict did not constitute a major source of crack between the two parts since their policy with respect to the Palestinian issue one way or another overlapped.

The developments in Palestinian issue, the second variable of this thesis, has brought another significant dimension both to the regime survival concern of Hashemite family and also to the regional context where Jordan is located. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is located in the heart of the Middle East and has the longest border with Israel than any other Arab country in the region. It has participated in Arab-Israeli wars in 1948, 1967 and 1973. As a result of the first Arab-Israeli War in 1948, Jordan occupied the West Bank and East of Jerusalem and formally annexed these areas in 1950 and kept them under de facto control for nearly 19 years until the second Arab-Israeli War in 1967. Jordan has only declared its disengagement decision from the West Bank both administratively and legally in 1988. Proximity to Israel and Jordan's direct rule over the West Bank from 1948 to 1967 made it the natural and unavoidable destination for hundreds of thousands of Palestinian

refugees.⁵ As a result, Jordan's population has grown tremendously. From that time until now, the influx of Palestinian refugees into Jordan has affected the structure of Jordanian society and economy as well as its Palestinian policy by dividing people into two camps either supporting regime's or opposition's policies. One of the most striking examples how the Palestinian issue had shaken the Jordanian politics and threatened the regime survival was the civil war experienced during 1970-71 between the ruling family and the PLO which asserted its organizational power in Jordan in 1960s. The war broke out after the creation of armed militias by the PLO which operated strikes into Israel from Jordan. This move was unacceptable for King Hussein, who pursued an accommodationist policy with Israel to eliminate the possibility of a direct military threat, and resulted in the expulsion of PLO from Jordan. In sum, the Arab-Israeli conflict and Palestinian refugees in Jordan shaped not only foreign policy decisions but also domestic policies of the ruling family. Given that international community is still searching for a solution to end the conflict between Palestinians and Israelis, the Palestinian issue continues to occupy a remarkable place in Jordanian politics. According to the UNRWA data, "today, around 1.9 million registered refugees live in Jordan and there are ten official and three unofficial camps, with other refugees living near the camps".⁶

At the end of 1980s, changes in the regional environment affected the relations between the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood and the Hashemite regime. Firstly, the cooperative relationship between the regime and Muslim Brotherhood was shaken as Islamism replaced Arab socialism and Arab nationalism as the main ideological challenge to the monarchy. The growth of Islamic tendencies in regional politics has led the Jordanian regime to approach Muslim Brotherhood with suspicion and the Hashemite regime has resorted to containment policy against the movement. Secondly, the Palestinian question began to represent an important diverging point between the regime and the Muslim Brotherhood. While the Muslim Brotherhood's'

⁵See Beverley Milton-Edwards and Peter Hinchcliffe, *Jordan: A Hashemite Legacy*, (USA and Canada: Routledge, 2009).

⁶See "Jordan", available at <http://www.unrwa.org/etemplate.php?id=66>, accessed on 15 June 2010.

perception of the Palestinian question was based on purely religious ideology, regime's perception has been shaped by political pragmatism over the years. Due to the historical significance of Jerusalem and Palestine as an Islamic land, the Muslim Brotherhood perceived the liberation of whole Palestine as a religious task. Therefore, the Muslim Brotherhood's views were close to those of the Hashemite regime with regard to the Israeli threat to Jordan and the Arab world, the special connection of Jordan with Palestine and Jordanian policy towards the West Bank before the disengagement in 1988. The decision taken by the regime to disengage from the West Bank in July 1988 led to the rise of opposing voices among the ranks of the Muslim Brotherhood. Moreover, the Muslim Brotherhood consistently opposed the 1994 Peace Treaty between Jordan and Israel, and worked against endeavors of normalization process in Jordan. Additionally, the link between the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood and HAMAS, whose leadership was expelled from Jordan in 1999 by King Abdullah II since he perceived them as an obstacle in the Middle East peace process and normalization of relations with Israel as well as a security threat within the Kingdom, caused further severance of relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the regime. The Muslim Brotherhood's perception of Hamas was totally contradicting with that of the regime and caused ideological and political confrontation between them. The Hashemite regime has believed that the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood has become radicalized and dominated by extremists. Therefore, the Muslim Brotherhood, which was referred to as loyal opposition in Jordanian politics before, became a real opposition.

In this thesis, while the relationship between the two parties is studied, the concept of "regime" designates the ruling family, namely successive Kings from Hashemite descent, not government. In the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, which is a constitutional monarchy, both the executive and legislative powers are exercised by the King. He's the most powerful figure in decision-making as head of state and appoints the Prime Minister, traditionally from outside of the Parliament and may dismiss him or accept his resignation. Although it is the King who decides on the name of Prime Minister, the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood has frequently criticized the government policies which they opposed while they have never questioned

legitimacy of the Hashemite regime. Therefore, there will be a distinction between the ruling family and government throughout this study.

The main body of this thesis will consist of three chapters. The second chapter will be divided into two parts. In the first part, a general framework about the International society of Muslim Brotherhood will be drawn with a particular focus on the Egyptian branch out of which the Jordanian branch was born. In the second part, historical overview of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood and its discourse and strategy will be explained briefly. This chapter aims to provide a background to understand the motives of the Muslim Brotherhood and a base to examine the relationship between the Hashemite regime and the movement.

The third chapter will examine the relations between the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood and Hashemite regime during period from 1946 when the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood was legalized as a social charity organization to 1989 when the political liberalization was initiated. In this chapter, it will be argued that the relationship between the two parties was coherent and cooperative from 1946 to 1989 because of the common threat perception and mutual interest resulting from the historical and political context. While exploring the relationship through regime survival concern and the Palestinian issue the following questions will be answered: Which dynamics provided a base for the establishment and development of a relationship between the Hashemite regime and the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood? How these dynamics affected the perception of the Hashemite regime towards the Muslim Brotherhood and facilitated for the latter to legally establish, flourish and consolidate its grassroots base? What kind of relationship has been built between the two parties?

The fourth chapter will cover the period from 1989 to 2007 when last parliamentary elections were held. This chapter will scrutinize the relationship between the Hashemite regime and the Muslim Brotherhood with an emphasis on changing domestic and regional contexts. It will be argued that since the beginning of 1990s the relationship between the two parties began to deteriorate due to the growing the

power of Islamic movements as a challenge in regional environment, Jordanian-Israeli Peace treaty, and regime's suspicions over radicalization of the movement. In order to prove this argument the following questions will be answered: What factors have changed that affected the perception of the Hashemite regime towards the Muslim Brotherhood? How did regime respond to limit and contain the strength of the movement? What kind of relationship has been evolved between the two parties?

CHAPTER 2

THE NATURE OF THE JORDANIAN MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD AND ITS HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

From the initial stages of its foundation the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, as an Islamist movement, has pursued a gradual rather than revolutionary policy and has not resorted to violence in its relations with the regime. It has accepted the existence of the monarchical regime and legally operated within the confines of the establishment. Indeed, this reformist and pragmatic rhetoric of the movement, distinct from the most of other Muslim Brotherhood branches operating in different countries in the Middle East, enabled it to set up relations with the Hashemite regime and to function within the Kingdom. Given that the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood was born out of the Egyptian branch, first a general framework will be drawn about the international movement before scrutinizing Jordanian branch particularly in terms of its ideology, objectives and strategy.

2.1 General Overview of the Muslim Brotherhood Movement

The Muslim Brotherhood is the world's oldest, largest and most influential organization which politicized Islam within the context of the colonial age during its establishment and put into practice the theories of Salafist thinkers such as Gamal el-Deen el-Afghani and Muhammad Abdu. These two Muslim revivalists argued for the compatibility of Islam with modernity and claimed that since the Muslims "have fallen into fatalism" by "abandoning the quest for understanding"; they lost control over their destinies.⁷ Therefore, the Muslims' divergence from the true faith has opened the doors of Muslim lands to Western colonialism.

⁷ Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, "Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimeen: The Muslim Brotherhood", *Military Review*, July-August 2003, p.27, available at <http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/cac/milreview/download/english/JulAug03/abo.pdf>, accessed on 9 March 2010.

Hasan Al-Banna, a schoolteacher who impressed by the teachings of Gamal el-Deen el-Afghani and Muhammad Abdu, established the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928 against the background of the political, social and cultural domination of Britain in Egypt. Banna claimed that Egyptian poverty, weakness and lack of dignity stemmed from failing to stick on Islam and from adopting Western values and culture.⁸ According to him, the primary risk threatening the society was the dangerous penetration of the western values and notions to the main fabrics of society in terms of cultural domination, economic exploitation and military control. As a solution to get rid of all ills of the Muslim society, he advocated returning Islam and then maintaining general commitment to it. In this point of view, Islam encompasses and governs all aspects of life: “material and spiritual, societal and individual, political and personal”.⁹

Therefore, from the very beginning, the Muslim Brotherhood movement has supported the liberation of Muslim territories from foreign domination and establishment of a new social and political order under the guidance of Sharia. According to the Brotherhood, the establishment of Sunni Islamic governments is an important step towards the final goal which is “the unification of these regimes under the caliphate or universal Islamic state”.¹⁰

In this framework, the objectives of the Muslim Brotherhood are explained in their guideline as follows:¹¹

⁸Ibid.

⁹Sana Abed-Kotob, “The Accommodationists Speak: Goals and Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 3, August 1995, p. 323.

¹⁰See “The Muslim Brotherhood”, Investigate Project on Terrorism, available at www.investigativeproject.org/documents/misc/135.pdf , accessed on 16 April 2009.

¹¹See “The Muslim Brotherhood's Guidelines”, Part I, Chapter 2 Objectives and Means, Article 2, available at <http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=22687>, accessed on 18 February 2010.

- The need to inform the masses, Muslims and non-Muslims of Islamic teachings, explaining the signs in detail to those who understand the pure human nature upon which Allah has created man.
- Endeavor to purify the hearts and souls of men from evil and sin. Unify humankind into the fundamental principles of Islam and bringing closer the viewpoints of the Islamic sects.
- Make efforts to raise the standard of living of marginalized people and contribute to the further growth and development of the nation's wealth.
- Achieve social justice and expand social insurance to cover every citizen. Fight poverty, disease, ignorance, hunger, depravity, encourage and invite others towards virtue, righteousness and piety.
- Insist to liberate the Islamic nation from the yoke of foreign rule, help safeguard the rights of Muslims everywhere and unite Muslims around the world.
- The need to work on establishing the Islamic State, which seeks to effectively implement the provisions of Islam and its teachings. Defend the nation against the internal enemies, try to present the true teachings of Islam and communicate its ideas to the world.
- The sincere support for a global cooperation in accordance with the provisions of the Islamic Sharia, which would safeguard the personal rights, freedom of speech for active and constructive participation towards building a new basis of human civilization as is ensured by the overall teachings of Islam.

The Muslim Brotherhood tries to achieve these objectives through gradual awareness and education of the masses. They believe that non-formal (*tarbiya*) and formal education (*ta'lim*) of the masses (*tarbiya* and *ta'lim*) will create a situation in which the masses will demand an Islamic state and will understand that Islam is the truth.¹²

¹²Anne Sofie Roald, “From Theocracy to Democracy? Towards Secularisation and Individualisation in the Policy of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan”, *Journal of Arabic and Islamic Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 7, 2008, p.89.

Therefore, introduction of *da'wah* (*call to Muslims to repent and return to Islam*) to the society is the main goal of the Muslim Brotherhood. According to Banna, restoring and reviving the Islamic society would start with individual who should have three qualities: “spiritual strength manifested through the determination of the individual and his integrity and self-sacrifice, knowledge of principles of Islam, and the ability to relate the Islamic principles to real life and apply them effectively to practical circumstances”.¹³ In other words, in order to accomplish their final goal, the Muslim Brotherhood would follow a path through building a Muslim individual, Muslim family, Muslim society and Muslim state. By doing this, step by step they aim at increasing Islamic consciousness and practice within the society as well as prepare them for an Islamic government. When they would manage

... to establish a Muslim government, then this government would transform the state into an Islamic one governed by Sharia, as desired by the Muslim society. Afterwards, this Islamic state would work to free “occupied” Muslim lands and unify them together under one banner, from which Islam could be spread all over the world.¹⁴

In addition to the education of masses, the Muslim Brotherhood also utilizes propagation as a tool to disseminate their Islamic message among masses. Through propagation, they simply aim at attracting people's attention towards daily social and public issues in order to increase their awareness and to offer their “better” solutions and alternatives. Therefore, the Muslim Brotherhood believes the importance of publication and issues a number of newspapers, magazines and periodicals. They also involve into social welfare projects such as hospitals, schools, mosques, charities, clubs to create grassroots support for their *da'wah* and soliciting membership from public organizations like unions, syndicates, and student unions.¹⁵

¹³See “Hasan Al-Banna and His Political Thought of Islamic Brotherhood”, available at <http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=17065>, accessed on 26 March 2010.

¹⁴See “The Muslim Brotherhood”, Investigate Project on Terrorism, available at www.investigativeproject.org/documents/misc/135.pdf, accessed on 16 April 2009.

¹⁵Louay Safi, “A Critical Reading of the Political Discourse and Actions of the Islamic Movement in Egypt”, *Intellectual Discourse*, Vol.3, No.1, 1995, pp.23-49, available at http://Isinsight.org/articles/1998_Before/Reform.htm, accessed on 26 March 2010.

Given that the Muslim Brotherhood movement was first established in Egypt as an Islamic revivalist movement with an objective of returning to the origins of Islam and restoring the Islamic Caliphate, the movement has grown rapidly and has managed to influence masses from other countries. Israel Altman argues that the Muslim Brotherhood movements, which have reached global status and have influence in almost 70 countries with covert and overt branches, demonstrate ideological similarities such as;

“an interpretation of history and of the crisis of Islam; a holistic view of Islam as religion and state which are inseparable; a vision of bringing Islam back to its rightful place; and a number of principles regarding how to make that vision a reality, namely: resistance to foreign occupation, and liberation of Muslim countries from all types of foreign domination; creation of the Islamist state which will implement the Shari’ah; unification of the Muslims; and spreading Islam, a universal religion, all over the world.”¹⁶

Although these branches operating in different countries have been sharing similar ideologies, the primary characteristics of the movement that are flexibility and adoptability against local circumstances, in which the political and social reforms have tried to be implemented, paved the way for them to develop different strategies to attain power and to set up an Islamic state.¹⁷ Therefore, the details and features of their general intellectual and political outlook might differ from one local branch to other. They might choose to employ either missionary work or participatory politics or armed revolt. In other words, the Brotherhood movements operate in parallel rather than collectively, and it is difficult to claim an existence of coordination for policy moves between them except on the Palestinian issue.¹⁸ In the same manner,

¹⁶Israel Elad Altman, “Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood Movement 1928-2007”, *Hudson Institute, Research Monographs on the Muslim World Series*, No. 2, Paper No. 2, January 2009, p.1.

¹⁷Diaa Rashwan, “Political Islamists Movements: The Case of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt”, in Amit Pandya and Ellen Laipson (eds), *Islam and Politics: Renewal and Resistance in the Muslim World*, (Washington: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2009), p.5.

¹⁸Barry Rubin, “Comparing Three Muslim Brotherhoods: Syria, Jordan, Egypt”, *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 11, No. 2, Articles 8/8, The Gloria Center, June 2007, available at <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2007/issue2/jv11no2a8.html>, accessed on 02 April 2009.

the attitudes and responses of the existing regimes towards the movements in the countries where they operate also differ from accommodation to outright hostility.

In the light of this general overview about the Muslim Brotherhood movement, the next section will deal with the establishment and objectives of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood which has employed the strategies of societal work and political participation rather than armed revolt to reach their objectives. What is more the movement has chosen to employ gradual evolutionary policies to reach its aims instead of revolutionary ones which in return helped them to establish peaceful relations with the regime that was seeking either an ally or loyal opposition to consolidate its rule and legitimacy within the Kingdom.

2.2 The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood

2.2.1 Historical and Ideological Context

The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood was established in Jordan by Abdul Latif Abu Qura who was known with his charitable works, religiosity and his interest in the Palestinian cause.¹⁹ During one of his visits to Palestine, Abdul Latif Abu Qura met with the members of Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in the late 1930s and was impressed by the ideas of Hassan Al-Banna, the founder of the movement in Egypt. After he stated his intention to set up a branch in Transjordan, two prominent Egyptian Muslim Brothers, Said Ramadan and Abdel Hakim Abdeen, accompanied him in his tour within the Emirate to introduce and promote the Muslim Brotherhood's ideology and activities through speeches, lectures and sermons.²⁰ Consequently, in 1945, Emir Abdullah received a delegation who asked for a license to open a branch in Transjordan. Their request was accepted and Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood was founded in Jordan on 19 November 1945. King Abdullah I

¹⁹ Egbert Harmsen, *Islam, Civil Society and Social Work: Muslim Voluntary Welfare Associations in Jordan Between Patronage and Empowerment*, (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2008), p.133.

²⁰Ibid.

participated in the opening ceremony of general office and legalized the movement in January 1946 as a charitable society. Abdul Latif Abu Qura became the General Guide of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood and Abdel Hakim Abdeen was included into the government's cabinet. King Abdullah I allowed the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood to establish branches throughout the Kingdom, enabling the movement to extend its influence.²¹ In other words, the movement enjoyed the outspoken support and backing of the Jordanian authorities during its early years of establishment.²²

The founding principles of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, published in 1946, were of a relatively apolitical nature, underlying the importance of Islamic education and “contributing to the development of a new Arab culture” based on Islamic principles.²³ Their teachings reflected the general ideas and principles developed by their Egyptian counterparts. They claimed that their aims were to purify Islam, unify Muslim countries, and develop the Islamic world in a direction that would assure an equitable distribution of wealth among Islamic nations, encourage charity to the poor, instill a spirit of Muslim patriotism in the population and establish Islam as a global and competitive world culture.²⁴ At this stage, the style of leadership and organization was at largely of a personalized, informal and spontaneous character.

The movement entered into a new stage of its evolution in 1953 when Mohammad Abdel-Rahman Khalifa was appointed as Secretary General of the Muslim Brotherhood. After Khalifa took over the leadership of the Jordanian Brotherhood, endeavors began to restructure the organization of the movement. Khalifa believed that Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood was an organization which came out of a

²¹Quintan Wiktorowicz, *The Management of Islamic Activism: Salafis, Muslim Brotherhood, and State Power in Jordan*, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001), p. 96.

²²Hassan Abu Hanieh, *Women&Politics: From the Perspective of Islamic Movements in Jordan*, (Amman: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2008), p.83.

²³Egbert Harmsen, *Islam, Civil Society and Social Work*:....., p.133.

²⁴Mansoor Moaddel, “Religion and the State:.....”, p. 538.

comprehensive Islamic platform and doctrine and it should operate in political, economic, social and cultural spheres. In this context, the movement applied to the authorities to be registered as a General Islamic Assembly. This attempt led Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood to have legal status as an “organized group” which allowed it to broaden its activities beyond charity works and operate as “general and comprehensive Islamic committee”.²⁵

Khalifa explained the importance of this initiative by referring to the complex spirit of the movement:²⁶

“We are not a political party, though we believe that political action is part of Islam. Neither are we a charitable society, though charitable action is an indivisible part of our call, and we are not a sports club, though physical training goes hand in hand with our spiritual education and ideological culture...The decision (to license the movement) has given...sanction to spread its call in the mosques, public places and the Brotherhood’s premises. It also enables it to public places and the Brotherhood’s premises. It also enables it to open branches all over the country, to be administered by general committees and to act in absolute freedom without intervention of the security authorities, unless a breach of law occurs.”

From its foundation until 1954, the movement was under the control of the Egyptian leadership.²⁷ Following Nassir’s suppression of the Brothers in Egypt, the principles set by the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood reflects its own character. These are.²⁸

- Jordan is an inseparable part of the Islamic world.
- The Muslim Brotherhood rejects any regime which is not based on Islam.
- The Muslim Brotherhood will not support any government unless it implements Sharia.

²⁵ Quintan Wiktorowicz, *The Management of Islamic Activism*:....., p. 96.

²⁶ Hani Hourani, *Islamic Action Front Party*, (Amman: Al-Urdun al-Jadid Research Center, 1993), p. 12, quoted in Shmuel Bar, *The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan*, (The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University, June 1998), p.15.

²⁷ Mansoor Moaddel, “Religion and the State:.....”, p.539.

²⁸ Marwan Ahmad Sulayman al-Abdallat, *Kharitat al-Ahzab al-Siyasiyya al Urdunniya*,(Amman, 1992), p. 94, quoted in Shmuel Bar, *The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan*....., p.17.

- The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan is part of the Islamic movement in the Islamic world.
- The Muslim Brotherhood regards the Palestinian problem as an Islamic problem and will concentrate all its material and moral resources to liberate Palestine from world Jewry and International Crusaders.

2.2.2 The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood's Strategies

In the light of this historical context and ideology, in general framework, the movement's strategies have aimed at increasing public consciousness about daily policies in Jordan and directing public opinion as well as utilizing institutional and legislative channels to pressurize the Government.²⁹ Specifically, the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood has tried to achieve its objectives through working in two levels: society and politics.

Being aware of the importance of missionary work in societal affairs, Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan has employed three strategies. From the very beginning, the Brotherhood has used social and educational activities as means to disseminate their ideology and to maintain grassroots support. For instance, in 1947, the movement took part in the establishment of the Islamic Scientific College.³⁰ Furthermore, in 1963, the Brotherhood also established the Islamic Center Society which has conducted social welfare and medical assistance to general public through its hospitals, medical centers, mosques and schools. While these institutions provided the movement's members with job opportunities, it also helped them to develop communication channels between the Brotherhood and people. The movement expanded its social base in universities and professional associations as well. The

²⁹Sami Al-Khazendar, *Jordan and the Palestine Question: The Role of Islamic and Leftist Forces in Foreign Policy-Making*, (Reading, UK: International Politics of the Middle East Series, Ithaca Press, 1997), p. 164.

³⁰Mohammad Abu Rumman, *The Muslim Brotherhood in the Jordanian Parliamentarian Elections 2007: A Passing “Political setback” or “Diminished Popularity?”*, (Amman: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2007), p. 19.

Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood has exploited its popular presence in these institutions as a strategy to influence the government's policies.³¹

Secondly, the Brotherhood has also published newspapers and weeklies, organized seminars and public festivals and gave lectures to persuade the masses that "Islam is the solution" to overcome social, economic and political crisis.

Thirdly, in connection with its involvement in societal problems, the Muslim Brotherhood has exploited economic and political crisis which created discontent among the society, as it did during 1989 bread riots and after the Jordan's signature of Wadi Araba peace treaty with Israel, to pressurize government to make policy changes and to convince the society that implementation of Islamic principles in Jordan would solve problems. However, although the movement mainly criticized and condemned government's policies, they did not direct any criticism to the system of power or the legitimacy of the regime and remained within the confines of law.

The main political strategy that the Muslim Brotherhood has employed is political participation. Indeed, it has largely benefited from its access to institutions of governance, including parliament, cabinets, national consultative bodies and various ministries. In 1956, the Brotherhood ran in parliamentary elections for the first time as a movement and won four seats. When martial law was imposed in May 1957 because of the pan-Arabist challenge, which threatened the authority and even the existence of the monarchy within Jordan, political parties were dissolved. However, the Muslim Brotherhood was able to continue its legal existence in the Kingdom as a religious and charitable organization. This helped the Brotherhood to pursue its grassroots campaign within the state and provided employment opportunities to its members in critical government posts. For instance, Ishaq Farhan served as Minister of Education in 1970-73 and later as the Minister of Awqaf from 1983-1985. He was also the Director of Curriculum and Textbooks (Ministry of Education), the Director of Teacher Education (Ministry of Education) and the President of Jordan University

³¹ Sami Al-Khazendar, *Jordan and the Palestine Question*:....., p. 166.

which is controlled by the Government. Abdul Latif Arabiyyat, another leading figure in the Brotherhood, was the Director General of the Amman Educational Department from 1980-1982 and the Secretary General of the Ministry of Education from 1982-1985.³²

In 1989, with the decision of King Hussein, parliamentary elections were held for the first time after twenty-two years. Members of the Brotherhood who participated in the elections campaigned in 1989 with a slogan of “Islam is the solution”. However, Brotherhood’s involvement into the formal political arena caused renewal of internal discussions, which actually had begun at the end of 1960s with the introduction of Sayyid Qutb’s ideas, about what the most appropriate objectives, activities and strategies of the movement should be.³³ Especially, after the King’s approval for National Charter in 1991, which signified the end of martial law and return of political pluralism to the Jordanian political scene, this debate intensified among the movement’s members. On the one hand, members from radical wing, ideologists, argued that participating in political life would force them to make compromises on their Islamic values and goals. On the other hand, members from moderate wing, pragmatists, believed that the creation of a political party would allow the Brotherhood to expand its influence to a large extent in society. At one point of these discussions and with the legalization of political parties in Jordan, Islamic Action Front (IAF) party, which has constituted the political wing of movement, was established in 1992. The IAF declared its objectives as resuming Islamic life by

³² Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Islamists, the State, and the Cooperation in Jordan”, *Arab Studies Quarterly (ASQ)*, Fall 1999, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2501/is_4_21/ai_58564186/ accessed on 26 February 2010.

³³ Sayyid Qutb (1906–66) was one of the most prominent Egyptian Islamist thinkers who participated in the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in the early 1950s. He was arrested in 1954, set free in 1965, and then rearrested the following year. Qutb is considered the true founder of modern *jihadist* thought. He wrote two major books (*In the Shade of the Qur'an* and *Milestones*) that explain the general principles of his ideology which indeed stemmed from the confrontations between the Muslim Brotherhood and Nasser in Egypt. In these books he reinterpreted traditional Islamic values and discourses. In the *Milestones*, he argues that the world had degraded into a state of ignorance or *jahiliyya*, as existed before the Prophet Mohammad. He proposes that the overthrow of apostate rulers and the establishment of Islamic societies worldwide through offensive jihad is the only way to solve this state of affairs.

implementing Sharia to all fields, preparing the society for jihad against the Zionist and imperialists, seeking to liberate Palestine, establishing a system based on democracy and shura, and attending to people's concerns.

2.2.3 Competing Trends within the Movement

In line with the divisions between radicals and pragmatists within the movement, competing trends has also emerged within the party in terms of their vantage points about the relations with the regime, the role of Islam in politics and Palestinian issue.³⁴

The attitude towards the Jordanian political system is the first point of differentiation between radicals and pragmatists within the IAF. Pragmatists believed the importance of participating political life and cooperating with the regime. Although they may have disagreements on certain subjects with the government policies, they act as a loyal opposition within the confines of the political system. On the radicals' side, they conceive political participation as a tool to come to power but not as an end in itself. They criticize pragmatists for making compromises with regard to their principles and for their pursuance of accomodationist behavior on the part of regime politics. For instance, during the preparation of the list of Brotherhood's candidates in 2007 parliamentary elections, radicals claimed that pragmatists manipulated the list as a part of a deal and collusion with the government against other trends in the movement.³⁵

The second diverging point between two wings of the party is the role of Islam in politics and true implementation of Islamic principles in political life. Although they

³⁴Nathan Brown argues that even the scholars are usually clasify the competing trends within the movement under two or four titles as radicals, pragmatists, centrist and hamas, indeed there are a variety of intermatiate positions and significant differences among likeminded groups depending on the importance of the issue. Therefore, he prefers to make a distinction between the opposing trends in terms of their perspectives on the relations with the regime, the role of Islam in politics and the Palestinian issue. See Nathan J. Brown, "Jordan and its Islamic Movement: The limits of Inclusion, Democracy and Rule of Law Project", *Carnegie Papers*, No.74, November 2006.

³⁵Mohammad Abu Rumman, *The Muslim Brotherhood in the Jordanian Parliamentarian* ,p. 58.

are all followers of Islamist ideology, pragmatists opt for gradual change of the society. In that sense, we can argue that they are evolutionists. Radicals, however, put greater emphasis on the immediate application of the Islamic Sharia in all aspects of political and social life.

The third matter of controversy is the Palestinian issue. Indeed, mainly all members of the party have the same vision of supporting the Palestinian cause and opposing to the Jordanian–Israeli peace treaty and normalization of relations with Israel. The division lies beneath the surface; that is their willingness to establish weak or strong relations with Hamas. While pragmatists believe that they have to prepare their own agenda rather than coordinate their political activities according to the Hamas, the radicals declared their full support to the objectives of Hamas.³⁶ However, it is important to remind here, both the Muslim Brotherhood movement and its political wing-IAF- have always declared that they are against the use of violence as a mean to reach their domestic political goals, while the regime has suspicions about the increasing influence of radical wing, especially after the Hamas's victory in Palestine in 2006.

The decisions taken about politics, domestic and foreign policies have mainly been shaped according to the weight and impact of either one wing or the other within the movement or the party in certain periods. For instance, the Muslim Brotherhood members' acceptance of ministerial posts in Mudar Badran's government in 1991 has signaled that the debate was won by pragmatists. Another example is the appointment of Zaki Bani Irshad, an extremist known for his close ties with Hamas's political head Khaled Mashal, as the new IAF secretary general in May 2006 which has indicated the radicals gained upper hand over decisions at that time.

In conclusion, the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood has entered the Jordanian political scene with an apolitical rhetoric and a general educational and social focus similar to the parent organization in Egypt. However, it has also quickly shifted its interest to

³⁶ Juan Jose Escobar Stemmann, “The Crossroads of Muslim Brothers in Jordan”, *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 14, No. 1, March 2010, p.42.

the Palestinian issue developing both in local and regional environment. While trying to preserve somehow a unity among its members both in the movement and the party, there are variety of different ideologies embedded within. However; although the Muslim Brotherhood and the Party have experienced internal divisions over the application of their objectives or they have opposed and criticized some of government policies, since its creation in 1945, the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, and since 1992 its political wing, the Islamic Action Front (IAF) have accepted the existence of the monarchical regime and operated within the confines of law. Both worked for the Islamization of society, creation of the Islamic state which will apply the Shari'ah, liberation of occupied Muslim lands, especially in Palestine and unification of the Muslim Nation. They did not attempt to resort to an armed revolt or violence to make regime or government accept its terms within the Kingdom.

In the light of historical and ideological overview of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, which was drawn to provide a background to understand the policy behavior of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, next two chapters will explore the relationship between the Hashemite regime and the Muslim Brotherhood in terms of regime survival concern and the Palestinian issue. The period covering in the following chapter (1946-1989) coincided with the era when the movement solely functioned as a charitable society and later as an organized committee. The latter chapter deals with the era (1989-2007) when Islamist Action Front Party was also established and since then has served as a political wing of the movement.

CHAPTER 3

JORDAN AND ITS ISLAMIC MOVEMENT: FORMATION OF A COMMON PLATFORM (1946-1989)

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was created artificially as a part of the post World War I settlement. Thus, successive Kings of Jordan has to deal with the problem of consolidating their legitimacy and sovereignty over indigenous population. While they were trying to keep their state intact, they faced with another problem emerging next door, namely the Palestinian issue. Shortly after, Palestinian issue has become both a domestic and foreign policy concern of the Hashemite regime due to the outcomes of Arab-Israeli Wars, first of which broke out just two years after the independence of the Kingdom.

The relationship between the Hashemite regime and the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood was established against this background. The historical and political context up until the end of 1980s created a perception of mutual threat or common interest in terms of regime survival concern and Palestinian issue both for the Hashemite regime and the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood. Acting together against rival Pan-Arabist ideologies, left-leaning secular trends and radical Islamists movements as well as supporting Palestinian cause led to a coherent as well as cooperative relationship between the two parties which made a warm and peaceful beginning in 1946.

3.1 The Evolution of Relations between the Two Parties through Regime Survival Concern (1946-1989)

3.1.1 The Muslim Brotherhood's Entry to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

The relationship between the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood and the regime began when the movement was founded in Jordan on 19 November 1945. King Abdullah I gave his approval for the establishment of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood's general office and legalized the movement as a charitable society in January 1946. The timing of the legalization of the movement was indeed very close to the independence of the Kingdom. Since the movement has declared its respect to the Hashemite family's links with the Prophet Mohammad's tribe and its founding principles were stressing the importance of Islamic education as well as contributing to the development of a new Arab culture based on Islamic principles, King Abdullah thought that the movement's arguments would help him to sustain solidarity among local tribes and to consolidate his legitimacy and sovereignty in his artificially created state. The King has also personally known the Jordanian Brotherhood's founder Abdul Latif Abu Qura and the movement's secretary Abdul Hakim Adeen's inclusion to the government's cabinet by the King indicated the beginning of a warm and peaceful relationship between the regime and the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood.³⁷ Abdullah I allowed the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood to establish branches throughout the Kingdom and promote their conservative values among the Jordanians. This enabled the movement to extend its influence during the initial period of state formation. Thus, a cooperative relationship which would continue up until the end of 1980s and stemmed from the alliances of two parties against radical Pan-Arab ideologies, left-leaning secular trends as well as radical Islamist movements has been installed.

³⁷ Quintan Wiktorowicz, *The Management of Islamic Activism:.....*, p. 96.

3.1.2 A Common Platform against Radical Pan-Arab Ideologies and Left-Leaning Secular Oppositional Trends

Transjordan was not the ancestral land of the Hashemite family and thus new rulers faced with difficulties to bring independent tribes together who have little or no loyalty to them. In this context, King Abdullah and the British worked together to eliminate threats coming from various powerful tribes to the existence of the state and established the monarchical authoritarian rule under Hashemite family.

As the Hashemite regime has consolidated its rule within Jordan, its moderate political stance, pro-Western foreign policy and conservative monarchical institutions caused it to be perceived as a target by the emerging regional nationalists and revolutionists flourished by the emerging Cold War ideological rifts. In the period of 1950s, a political turmoil has been experienced throughout the Arab world. Much of this unrest was resulted from the popular dissatisfaction stemming from the establishment of the state of Israel and the loss of Palestine in 1948-49. Israel became the catalyst for the Arab anti-colonial struggle and conceived as a threat not only to Arab Palestine, but to the whole Arab world.³⁸ In addition to this, colonial powers also continued to exercise their influence over the Arab nation in the context of the Cold War ideological division which increased the degree of resentment among the masses. As a result of growing popular discontent, several Arab states pursuing pan-Arab ideologies became more radical and acquired the character of a full-fledged Arab revolution, while advocating "Arab socialism" and rapprochement with the Soviet Union and the communist world.³⁹

Indeed, in the 1950s and 1960s, inter-Arab conflict mainly divided into two camps, namely the radical reformists represented by Nasserism and Ba'thism and the traditional monarchist. The power struggle between the two camps centered on the

³⁸Mohamed Sid-Ahmed, "Shifting Sands of Peace in the Middle East", *International Security*, Vol. 5, No. 1, Summer 1980, The MIT Press, p.54.

³⁹Ibid.

type of political system an Arab country should have, its choice of superpower alliance and its Palestinian policy.⁴⁰ Jordan's two neighbours, Egypt and Syria were from the first camp and had radical reformist agendas. On the one hand, the Ba'th (Renaissance) Party originated in Syria in the late 1940s advocated the immediate political unity of all Arab states under the slogan of "Unity, Freedom, and Socialism." On the other hand, Gamal Abdel Nasser, the President of Egypt, who came to power in 1954 after the 1952 Free Officers' coup, had charisma and rhetoric skills which enabled him to influence the Arab masses, especially the displaced Palestinians. His view was focused on unification and integration in the form of one Arab state by using nationalism and socialism as means for fulfilling this unity. The main conditions for unity were free choice by people seeking union, consolidation of internal unity by each Arab state, willingness of a majority in a country to live in a union and adoption of socialism.

However, these pan-Arabist regimes had a major differentiation in their ideological approach to the issues in compare to the Jordanian regime. While radical pan-Arabists such as Nasser and the Ba'th proposed unity agreements and believed the importance of it for success, King Hussein persistently pursued his own ideal of Arab nationalism. According to him, "pan-Arabism could only succeed in promoting unity among the Arabs if it respected the special character of the different Arab countries and regimes, without infringing on their individual national sovereignties."⁴¹

Therefore, the emergence of radical Pan-Arabist ideologies and their claims of solution for political order and stability constituted a new threat for the Hashemite regime which has recently managed to consolidate its rule over indigenous people. Furthermore, the transition of the throne from Abdullah I to Tallal and then to

⁴⁰Nabeel A. Khoury, "The Pragmatic Trend in Inter-Arab Politics", *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 36, No.3, Summer 1982, p.374.

⁴¹See "Charting a Difficult Course: Jordan in 1950s", available at http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/his_periods1.html, accessed on 30 June 2010.

Hussein in a short period of time has also added a new aspect to the stability and survival concern of the regime.

Being aware of these regional and local destabilizing elements, King Hussein's attempts to apply the principles of liberalization and democratization within the Kingdom started, following his ascension to the throne in 1953. In this framework, several steps have been taken to expand political freedoms and civil liberties. For instance, political parties were formed, political prisoners were released and restrictions on the freedom of the press and association were repealed. In this suitable environment, the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood was granted legal status as an "organized group" which allowed it to broaden its activities beyond charity works and operate as "general and comprehensive Islamic committee".⁴²

Concurrently, pan-Arab nationalism, which was as antimonarchical as it was anti-West in this period, made a powerful entry into Jordan's political life. In the parliamentary elections held in 1956, the National Socialists formed the largest party in the House of Representatives under the leadership of Suleiman Nabulsi while the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood won four out of 40 seats. As a Prime Minister, Nabulsi followed a pro-Egyptian policy, abrogated Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, and signed the Arab Solidarity Agreement with Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia. Accordingly, the Communist Party emerged from the underground and the Soviet news agency, *Tass*, made its first appearance in Jordan. The government also reorganized the army and the bureaucracy by replacing well-known royalists and supporters of conservative groups.⁴³

Jordan's first test of democracy and political freedom resulted from the parliamentary election in 1956 was short-lived and came to a sudden end when Arab nationalists in Jordan, who inspired by the policies of Egypt and Syria which considered Hashemite regime as agents of the West, began to challenge royal

⁴²Quintan Wiktorowicz, *The Management of Islamic Activism*:....., p. 96.

⁴³Mansoor Moaddel, "Religion and the State:.....", p.541.

sovereignty. The nationalist's rhetoric supported by external allies exceedingly infringed upon the prerogatives of the King and his sovereignty over the Kingdom. The nationalists believed that Jordan would eventually have to be integrated into other Arab states to successfully combat Israel. Rising demands for a republic or union with Syria and Egypt in 1957 threatened the authority and even the existence of the monarchy.⁴⁴ While King Hussein supported mutual cooperation among Arab states, he viewed it as an equal partnership rather than full integration, and was not prepared to tolerate an erosion of his power and control. An attempted coup, an assassination attempt and national strikes led by nationalists' sympathizers prompted the King to impose martial law in 1957.

In this conjuncture, the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood has openly stated its loyalty to King Hussein, supporting the precautions such as martial law to combat against destabilizing movements. According to Quintan Wiktorowicz, at that point, opposition to common enemies resulted in an alliance between the regime and the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood since both of them felt threatened by Nasserist forces.⁴⁵ Indeed, the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood's hostility toward Nasserism stemmed from the experience of the Brotherhood's Egyptian branch. After a 1954 assassination attempt against Nasser, which was blamed on the Egyptian Brotherhood, he brutally repressed the movement. The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan feared a similar fate if Nasserists gained political control of the Kingdom. Therefore, they worked together with the regime to combat the Nasserist movement. Additionally, the Hashemite regime and the Muslim Brotherhood also cooperated against communists, leftists and Ba'thist forces in this period. While the main concern of the Brotherhood in objecting to these movements was their atheistic nature, King Hussein feared an erosion of his power and control.⁴⁶ In other words,

⁴⁴Ranjit Singh, "Liberalization or Democratization? The Limits of Political Reform and Civil Society in Jordan", in George Joffé (ed), *Jordan In Transition, 1990-2000*, (London: Hurst & Company Publishers, 2002), p. 67.

⁴⁵Quintan Wiktorowicz, *The Management of Islamic Activism:.....*, p. 98.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 97.

the religious and historical legitimacy of the King, Hashemite family's links with the Prophet Mohammad's tribe (Qurayshi) as well as Sharif Hussein's previous position as the keeper and guardian of the two holiest cities, Mecca and Medina, also provided a concrete base for their cooperation. Hence, warm and peaceful relations between the regime and the Brotherhood have been further strengthened with the movement's support of and loyalty to the King against radical pan-Arab ideologies.

During 1950s and 1960s, the leftists and the nationalists supported by Syria, Iraq and Egypt and their increasing popularity within the Kingdom constituted a serious political threat and a severe opponent to the regime.⁴⁷ On the Brotherhood's side, since it was a newly established organization in Jordan, they did not have much influence or support among the people as compared to the leftists and nationalists. Moreover, the movement's leadership had a conservative composition, and the nature of their program was reformist and pragmatic. As Curtis R. Ryan argues, "from the perspective of the ruling regime, this de facto, if not de jure, relationship between the monarchy and Islamist movement was intended in part to provide a counter to left-leaning secular oppositional trends ranging from Ba'thism to Nasserism to Communism."⁴⁸

3.1.3 Countering Radical Islamists Ideologies

The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, which did not constitute a threat to the regime at that time because of their anti-revolutionary and reformist agenda and sided with the regime against radical Pan-Arab ideologies and left-leaning secular trends, also assisted the King to counter radical Islamic groups, particularly the outlawed Islamic Liberation Party (Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami) which was founded by Taqi al-Din Ibrahim Yusuf al-Nabahani in 1952. Islamic Liberation Party was seeking to create an Islamic Caliphate by following first underground activity, then Jihad and Dawa

⁴⁷Mohammad Abu Rumman, *The Muslim Brotherhood in the Jordanian.....*, p.19.

⁴⁸Curtis R. Ryan, "Islamist Political Activism in Jordan: Moderation, Militancy and Democracy", *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 12, No. 2, June 2008, p.2.

and finally Islamization of Jahili society.⁴⁹ Therefore, when Hizb al-Tahrir asked permission from Jordanian monarch for legalization, the regime prevented it to be neither a political party nor a charitable organization because of the Party's ideological background. Then, it operated clandestinely. Many attempts have made to merge Tahrir with the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood during 1950s, but Brotherhood's loyalty to Hashemite regime has always been the main obstacle.⁵⁰

From the perspective of the Hashemite regime, one of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood's most important functions is that it helps to restrict the power of more militant Islamic groups which had revolutionary agenda for the change in political and social system. The Brotherhood, which has operated legally and had reformist as well as pragmatic agenda, was perceived as a means of absorbing the increased religiosity and prevented it to head towards more radical groups such as Hizb-al-Tahrir. Indeed, there were occasions like in the case of Hizb al-Tahrir in which the Brotherhood has used its high profile and legitimacy to delegitimize the claims and ideologies of groups that has resorted violence in the Kingdom.⁵¹ Therefore, those more radical Islamist groups who demanded to challenge the Hashemite regime first required to diminish the Brotherhood's influence and divert it away to obtain popular support.⁵² Therefore, this function of the Brotherhood has provided a shield for the regime against revolutionary radical challenges. In other words, the Brotherhood has prevented more threatening Islamic groups from challenging the legitimacy and sovereignty of the King.

⁴⁹Shmuel Bar, *The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan*, pp. 18-20.

⁵⁰Ibid.

⁵¹Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Islamists, the State, and the Cooperation in Jordan", *Arab Studies Quarterly (ASQ)*, Fall 1999, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2501/is_4_21/ai_58564186/ accessed on 26 February 2010.

⁵²Ibid.

3.1.4 Outcome of Alliance for the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood

As a result of its alliance with the Hashemite regime against radical Pan-Arab ideologies, left-leaning secular trends as well as radical Islamist movements, the regime has permitted the Muslim Brotherhood to expand its base within the Jordan and has fostered its growth. While all other political parties were banned after the implementation of martial law in 1957, the Muslim Brotherhood was allowed to continue its activities through its charitable organizations and mosques. For instance, in 1963, the Brotherhood established the Islamic Center Society which has conducted social and welfare services to public. Its branches were included hospitals, medical centers, schools and mosques. Throughout this period, the Brotherhood has been able to build up and develop a wide network for public welfare and social work. They have also usually taken part in volunteer activities. All these initiatives helped them to set up communication channels with society to introduce themselves and disseminate their da'wah. In the face of strong nationalist-leftist and radical movements of the 1950s and 1960s, the regime did not mind these activities and indeed at certain stages encouraged them to strengthen the Brotherhood.⁵³

Concluding Remarks

In conclusion, three conditions facilitated the king's approval and political tolerance of the Muslim Brotherhood's activities in terms of regime survival from 1946 to 1967. First, the religious and historical legitimacy of the King, which stems from the Hashemite family's links with the Prophet Mohammad's tribe (Qurayshi) as well as Sharif Hussein's previous position as the keeper and guardian of the two holiest cities, Mecca and Medina, made the Muslim Brotherhood natural allies to the regime. The regime has conceived the Brotherhood as a partner, which recognized the legitimacy of the King to rule, to build solidarity among local tribes through its

⁵³ Mohammad Abu Rumman, *The Muslim Brotherhood in the Jordanian Parliamentarian.....*, p. 19.

religious rhetoric. Second, the conservative composition of the movement's leadership, its reformist and pragmatic program, and "its lack of an established clergy or a class of Imams" also decreased the possibility of their challenge to the Hashemites.⁵⁴ What is more the regime has also exploited this reformist and pragmatist nature of the movement to decrease the influence of revolutionary and radical Islamic movements. Third, the containment of the threat of radical pan-Arabist ideologies gave King Hussein strong incentives to cooperate with the Brotherhood with whom it has shared a vision of common enemy. In this period, although some ups and downs experienced in their relations because of the movement's protests against policies that permitted a substantial British presence in the Kingdom in 1956 and its criticism of the Baghdad Pact in 1958, the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood did not attempt to destabilize the Kingdom by resorting violence or underground activities and remained royal to the political system as well as the Hashemite regime. Therefore, these three conditions led the regime not to perceive the movement as a threat to its survival and set up a coherent and cooperative relationship.

3.1.5 Black September: Civil War during 1970-71

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is located in the heart of Middle East and has the longest border with Israel than any other Arab country has in the region. While the establishment of Israeli state and the loss of Palestine in 1948-49 caused popular dissatisfaction among Arab states and prompted them to pursue more radical and revolutionary policies which in return constituted a threat to the Hashemite regime's survival as examined in the previous part, Palestinian issue has also brought another dimension to the Jordanian political scene due to growing Palestinian presence in the Kingdom. Jordan has participated in Arab-Israeli wars in 1948, 1967 and 1973. Proximity to Israel and Jordan's direct rule over the West Bank from 1948 to 1967 made it the natural and unavoidable destination for hundreds of thousands of

⁵⁴Emile Sahliyeh, "The State and the Islamic Movement in Jordan", *Journal of Church and State*, Winter 2005, p.114.

Palestinian refugees.⁵⁵ Therefore, the stability and regime survival concern of the Hashemite regime was reinforced over the years by growing Palestinian presence, which became a threat to the authority of the King. One of the most striking examples how the Palestinian issue had shaken the Jordanian politics and threatened the regime survival was the civil war experienced during 1970-71 between the regime and the PLO.

In 1960s, Palestinian groups, especially the PLO, asserted their organizational power in Jordan. PLO gained the support of Palestinians living in Jordanian refugee camps and soon after the 1967 defeat this support turned into the creation of armed militias operating strikes into Israel from Jordan which was unacceptable for the King. Actually, the PLO's left-leaning opposition became a main constraint on Hussein's domestic and foreign policy. The PLO in effect created a "state within a state" that increasingly became a rival for the institutions of the Jordanian state.⁵⁶ On the one hand, this opposition was contrary to the King Hussein's accommodationist policy with Israel and increasing the possibility of a direct Israeli military threat. King Hussein thought that such a conflict could damage Jordan's economic, political and military situation.⁵⁷ On the other hand, PLO-leftist parties were also a major threat to the King's control over Jordan's internal authority and situation. At the end, a violent confrontation between the Jordanian army and the Palestinian resistance groups broke out in September 1970 and consequent 1970-71 civil war caused to the deaths of 3,400 Palestinians and expulsion of the PLO from Jordanian territory. The outcome of the civil war resulted in the elimination of a significant military and organizational threat to the Hashemite regime's sovereignty.

During the civil war, the Muslim Brotherhood did not support the Palestinian resistance groups in their confrontation with the Jordanian army despite the fact that

⁵⁵See Beverley Milton-Edwards and Peter Hinchcliffe, *Jordan: A Hashemite Legacy*, (USA and Canada: Routledge, 2009).

⁵⁶Quintan Wiktorowicz, *The Management of Islamic Activism*:....., p.11.

⁵⁷Sami Al-Khazendar, *Jordan and the Palestine Question*:....., p.40.

they participated actively in Palestinian militia training camps in Jordan. As in the 1950s and 1960s, they remained loyal to the regime. Hence, the Muslim Brotherhood's support for the King was confirmed during 1970-71 civil war when the movement refrained from entering the conflict, reinforcing its loyalty and commitment to stability and order. The Muslim Brotherhood was against the leftist-Marxist structure of the PLO and believed that the Palestinian issue has gradually been deteriorated because of the PLO's efforts to separate the religious beliefs of the Palestinian people from the rifle.⁵⁸ Since the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood proved its loyalty to the King one more time and opted for sustaining stability, the regime continued to perceive the movement as reliable and the relations between the two parties has been strengthened.

3.1.6 Outcome of Alliance for the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood

The position of the Muslim Brotherhood during the civil war reinvigorated their relations with the regime. The regime gave them the “space and liberty to work more freely in Palestinian camps and residential areas to fill in the vacuum created after the expulsion of the Palestinian fighters and organizations” from Jordan.⁵⁹ These positive circumstances combined with the rise in Islamist movements across the Middle East, especially after the Arab-Israeli War in 1967, which resulted in the great retreat of the nationalistic and leftist movement in the Arab world, helped the Brotherhood to expand their social base as well as facilitated their active involvement in universities, professional associations, and charitable societies in Jordan. A prominent Brotherhood member, Ishaq Farhan, was also appointed as Education Minister and he assumed this position from 1970 to 1974. He also became Minister of Awqaf in 1972. These critical posts provided an opportunity for the Brotherhood to build up the educational system as a significant power base.⁶⁰

⁵⁸Ziad Abu-Amr, *Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza: Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad*, (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994), p.28.

⁵⁹Mohammad Abu Rumman, *The Muslim Brotherhood in the Jordanian Parliamentarian.....*, p. 20.

⁶⁰Shmuel Bar, *The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan*, p. 32.

The Brotherhood's accession to the state apparatus as well as nongovernmental organizations provided the movement new opportunities to apply its gradualist religious agenda based on bottom-up approach to reach their final goal, namely building a Muslim individual, Muslim family, Muslim society and Muslim state.

In the 1970s the Muslim Brotherhood has also participated in student and workers unions and their position has further strengthened in these institutions by the financial support coming from the Gulf region. The prosperity period in the Gulf region during oil prices boom of the 1970s and 1980s allowed the emigration of thousands from the Jordanian labor force to the conservative Gulf States. The members of the Muslim Brotherhood benefited from this opportunity to a large extent since conservative Gulf States pushed for a condition which promoted a steady trend towards becoming more religious.

3.1.7 Regional Context after Arab-Israeli War in 1967

A political vacuum has begun to be occurred in the Middle East in the aftermath of Arab-Israeli War in 1967. The defeat of Arab states was seen as the failure of the mainstream leftist and nationalist movements' policies and caused a decline in the political influence of radical regimes on Arab society. Later, this gap was filled by a wave of Islamic resurgence in the 1980s. Moreover, the 1973 Arab Oil Embargo and the dramatic increase in the price of oil also led to the subsequent economic and political dominance of the conservative Gulf States which also contributed to the reviving of Islamist ideologies. In this framework, Iranian Revolution is the most significant example of the Islamic revival which constituted a divergence point between the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood and the regime.

Before the 1979 Iranian revolution, King Hussein paid visits Iran 3 times in 1978 and met with Shah to express his support. At that time, the majority of the population was in favor of Iranian Revolution in Jordan. Thus, the Muslim Brotherhood saw the King's supportive policies of the Shah as an opportunity to criticize the

government's policies as un-Islamic.⁶¹ From the perspective of the regime, the overthrow of a conservative pro-Western monarch by an Islamist movement was disturbing. For the Brotherhood, Iranian revolution and the establishment of the only Islamist regime in the region was a story of success. Hence, in the 1980s, when Islamism replaced leftist and secular movements in the political arena, the Hashemite regime began to conceive Islamic movements as the main ideological challenge to its survival. That's one of the reasons why King Hussein has supported Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war which broke out after the revolution. Since the Brotherhood has backed Iran as opposed to the regime, this war further emphasized their diverging policies. Nevertheless, the relationship between the two parties remained on as guarded but constant. By contrast, the smaller and more militant Islamic Liberation Party was repressed.⁶²

Concluding Remarks

In terms of regime survival, in this period, the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood has proved itself as loyal to the King second time by pursuing supportive policy against the PLO in the civil war during 1970-71, after it had allied with the regime against radical pan-Arabist ideologies and left-leaning secular trends. From the regime's perspective, this attitude of the Brotherhood has increased its credibility and reliability. That's why, the regime allowed the movement to replace PLO in refugee camps as well as in Palestinian residential areas where the movement has strengthened its influence by expanding its infrastructure. Indeed, during 1950s and 1960s, the regime tacitly approved the expansion of movement's bases in the face of leftist and nationalist threat. However, after the civil war, it has openly encouraged the Brotherhood to fill the gap which occurred by the expulsion of the PLO since it had concerns over destabilization due to huge Palestinian population in the Kingdom.

⁶¹ Curtis R. Ryan, "Islamist Political Activism in Jordan:.....", p. 3.

⁶² Sami Al-Khazendar, *Jordan and the Palestine Question:.....*, p. 144.

Secondly, the religious conservative structure of the Muslim Brotherhood has facilitated for the regime to benefit from subsidies and remittances coming from Gulf States as a result of oil prices boom of the 1970s and 1980s which was a heal for the Kingdom's sensitive economy.

In the 1980s, when Islamism replaced leftist and secular movements as the main ideological challenge to the Hashemite monarchy, moments of tension have begun to increase between the regime and the Muslim Brotherhood. Nevertheless, although the regime had a watchful eye on the members of the Muslim Brotherhood, the relationship between the two parties remained on as constant and the movement was conceived as a loyal opposition. Although the movement's ability to promote its ideology and agenda was limited by the vital concerns of the regime, points of mutual interest have led to a cooperative relationship up until the end of 1980s.

3.2 The Evolution of Relations between the Two Parties through Palestinian Issue (1946-1989)

In this section, the relationship between the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood and the regime will be examined by focusing on Palestinian issue which has also important reflections likewise regime survival on the relations between the Hashemite regime and the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood.

From the first Arab-Israeli War in 1948 to 1988 when King Hussein declared his decision of disengagement from the West Bank, the policies of the Brotherhood and the regime on Palestinian issue have exhibited similarities despite the fact that the logic behind their moves is different. As argued in this thesis their relationship remained coherent with respect to the Palestinian issue in this period beginning with the unification of the two Banks.

3.2.1 Annexation of the West Bank by Jordan

After the British declared that they would end their mandate in Palestine, in 1947 the United Nations opted for the establishment of two countries, one Jewish and one Arab. As a result, the Palestinian Arabs launched a war in order to block the UN Resolution and prevent the division of their land. Neighbouring Arab countries, including Jordan, sent forces into Palestine to stop Palestinian Jews' retaliation. The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood also participated in the 1948 War, under the leadership of Abdul Latif Abu Qura, joining with members of the International Muslim Brotherhood to mobilize Arabs to participate in the war. During the war, Jordan's army, namely the Arab Legion, occupied the West Bank and some areas in and around Jerusalem. After the end of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, King Abdullah I expressed his intention to annex the areas under his occupation. In spite of the objections of other Arab states, King Abdullah I expanded his population and territories covering both Banks of the Jordan. The debate, which is still prevalent, has begun whether Abdullah's move preserved Arab territory from complete Israeli control, or whether he had prevented the possibility of a smaller Palestinian state by annexing the territory to realize his ambition of Greater Syria.⁶³

During the discussions about annexation of West Bank in the Parliament, the spokesman of the Muslim Brotherhood expressed their belief as "we're in the two Banks one nation in blood and in family. We're one people not two".⁶⁴ On this ground, the Brotherhood demonstrated its tendency to support the annexation of the West Bank as well as the decision of merging the West Bank with the East Bank. At the end of discussions, Jordanian parliament in which Palestinian Arabs from the West Bank were also represented voted unanimously to unite the West Bank with Jordan by the Act of Union in 1950. The regime explained the reason of the Act of Union as to safeguard the remaining Arab territory of Palestine from Zionist

⁶³Curtis Ryan, *Jordan in Transition: From Hussein to Abdullah*, (Boulder and Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), p.7.

⁶⁴ Sami Al-Khazendar, *Jordan and the Palestine Question*:....., p.141.

expansion.⁶⁵ In accordance with this decision, the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood also supported the idea that Jordan defended the western part of Palestinian territories with King Abdullah's decision to unite two Banks. After the unification of two Banks, the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood also established many offices and branches in some Palestinian cities on the West Bank and on Jerusalem.

Indeed, the Muslim Brotherhood's views about the Palestinian conflict base on religion. Due to the historical significance of Jerusalem and Palestine as an Islamic land, the Muslim Brotherhood perceived the liberation of Palestine as a religious task. This religious perspective is coming from an interpretation of a Hadith. According to this Hadith, the Prophet said that "Muslims would fight and defeat the Jews one day before the end of the world, and that the place of Muslims will be on the east side of River Jordan, while the Jews will be on the west side."⁶⁶ In conformity with this Hadith, the Muslim Brotherhood leaders believe that the Muslims will liberate the whole of Palestinian land and will beat the Jews as stated by the Prophet. Therefore, from the point of Muslim Brotherhood, Jordan, which has a strategic location because of its geographical proximity to both Israel and Palestine, is the land for mobilization for the whole Muslim world in its battle for the liberation of Palestine.⁶⁷ Thus, the Muslim Brotherhood believed that before the unification of Islamic states under the caliphate or universal Islamic state, it's crucial for the time being to maintain the indivisibility of Palestine. In fact, the legal ground for this has been provided by the Act of Union.

Even if those, who claim that King Abdullah's annexation of the West Bank was resulted from realizing his Greater Syria ambition, were right in their argument, the Muslim Brotherhood would prefer Muslim rule in the area rather than Israel since their conceptualization of the issue derives its base from religion centered on the

⁶⁵See "Address to the Nation, Amman, 31 July 1988", available at http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/speeches_letters.html, accessed on 17 July 2010.

⁶⁶ Sami Al-Khazendar, *Jordan and the Palestine Question*:....., p.139.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

Islamization of the Palestinian conflict. At the end, since both the regime and the movement were on the favor of annexation, their mutual interest paved the way for a cooperative relationship with respect to the Palestinian issue in 1950.

3.2.2 Palestinian Issue under the Reign of King Hussein

After King Hussein's accession to the throne, from 1953 to 1967 when the West Bank was occupied by Israel as a result of Arab-Israeli war, his policy towards the Palestinian issue was mainly centered on the maintaining of the West Bank under Jordanian rule, the Palestinian population in Jordan and the power of left-wing opposition, mainly supported by Palestinians and the establishment of the PLO.⁶⁸ In that period, King Hussein official views concerning Israel's goals and policy were the same with the Muslim Brotherhood. He stated that "Israel wanted to divide the Arab world, abolish Palestinian history and bring Arab water under Israeli occupation."⁶⁹ In the same manner, the Muslim Brotherhood has also considered Israel as a foreign tool created to divide both the Arab and Islamic world.⁷⁰ This similar perspective of both the regime and the movement on Israeli state between 1953 and 1967 has also provided a base for coherent relationship.

The foundation of the PLO in 1964 and Israeli victory in the 1967 war and the loss of the West Bank and all of Jerusalem constituted a cornerstone in the Jordanian's policy towards the Palestinian problem. In that period, King Hussein continued to pursue his ambition towards the West Bank, his policy of accommodation with Israel and his adoption of a peaceful solution for the Arab-Israeli conflict in conformity with the UN Resolution 242 which calls for Israeli withdrawal from West Bank and Gaza, and the principle of land for peace. After the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, based on its commitment to the region, Jordan continued to pay the salaries and pensions of civil servants, while administering religious endowments and

⁶⁸Ibid., p.5

⁶⁹Ibid.

⁷⁰Ibid., p.139

educational affairs. On the Palestinian side, the defeat in 1967 and the growing influence of the PLO in the conflict triggered the introduction of Palestinian nationalism distinct from the Arab nationalism. Given that the PLO asserted its organizational power in Jordan, it gained the support of Palestinians living in Jordanian refugee camps who came to the country after the defeat. This support turned into the creation of armed militias operating strikes into Israel from Jordan which was unacceptable for the King since his strategy was to prevent any sudden aggressive attack before achieving complete mobilization. The tension between the Hashemite regime and the PLO turned into a civil war and resulted in the expulsion of the PLO from Jordan in 1971. From then on, the disputes between the PLO and the Jordanian regime became mainly political and diplomatic and were focused on the peace process and the representation of Palestinians.

The Muslim Brotherhood's point of view towards the PLO was different from the Hashemite regime in the sense that it was more concerned with the PLO's ideology and policy rather than with the PLO's representation of Palestinian people whether inside or outside Jordan since it rejected the whole idea of peace process, regardless of who was representing the Palestinian-Jordanians. During the civil war, the Muslim Brotherhood did not support the Palestinian resistance groups in their confrontation with the Jordanian army. Although the Muslim Brotherhood's policy to settle Palestinian issue has been based on Jihad and they participated actively in Palestinian militia training camps in Jordan, as a loyal and legal opposition they were against any armed revolt within the Kingdom and opted for stability. Moreover, the Muslim Brotherhood was against the leftist-Marxist structure of the PLO and believed that the Palestinian issue has gradually been deteriorated because of the PLO's efforts to separate the religious beliefs of the Palestinian people from the conflict. The Muslim Brotherhood also opposed the PLO's strategic goal of establishing a secular democratic state in Palestine. According to them, Palestine is an Islamic land in which an Islamic state must be established and Palestinian issue is an Islamic issue, not an issue of one people or one nation.⁷¹ Although they have different views

⁷¹Ziad Abu-Amr, *Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank....., pp.29-30.*

regarding the PLO, once again, the regime and the movement were on the same side. Since the movement remained out of the conflict between the PLO and the Jordanian army, the Muslim Brotherhood has found the ground to strengthen its relations with the regime.

3.2.3 On the Way to Disengagement

The developments which took place in the regional context from 1967 to 1988 has led to the King Hussein's decision to dismantle legal and administrative ties with the West Bank which came 17 years after the civil war, 14 years after the Rabat Summit and 1 year after the first intifada.

One of the most important legacies of the civil war for Hashemite regime on Palestinian issue was its struggle with the PLO leadership over who should speak for the Palestinians. After the PLO's expulsion from Jordan, its popularity has continued to increase within Palestinian population as well as Arab public and Palestinian nationalism has gained momentum. At the end of its endeavors, PLO became successful to get the recognition as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people" at the Arab summit conference held in Rabat in 1974. King Hussein also accepted the decision of the summit since he did not have much option after his proposed plan for the establishment of a United Arab Kingdom between Trans-Jordan and the West Bank based on federal principles was rejected by the PLO, the Arab states as well as Israel in 1972.⁷² However, Jordan carried on its administrative and financial support to Palestinians of the West Bank which would continue up until disengagement.⁷³ Hashemite regime's move for recognizing the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people did not constitute

⁷² Husseini Sirrieh, "Jordan and the Legacies of the Civil War of 1970-71", *Civil Wars*, Vol. 3, No. 3, 2000, p.80.

⁷³See "Address to the Nation, Amman, 31 July 1988", available at http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/speeches_letters.html, accessed on 17 July 2010.

a dispute with the Muslim Brotherhood since the movement's sole aim was to liberate whole Palestine without giving priority to the representation issue.

In addition to the outcome of the Rabat Summit which has consolidated the PLO's position in representing Palestinian people, Egypt's independent move regarding Arab-Israeli conflict and the signature of the Camp David Accords in 1979 also signaled the end of pan-Arab socialist and nationalist movements and a beginning of a new regional order in the Middle East in which Arab states as well as the PLO were seeking their national interest, territorial preferences and pursuing pragmatic policies. While Egypt's normalization of its relationship with Israel commenced a new era for Arab states to give priority to preserve their self-interest in the regional context, it also led to a tension between the Muslim Brotherhood and Jordanian regime. King Hussein did not completely break ties with Egypt by continuing economic relations after the Camp David Accords, despite his earlier public condemnation of rapprochement between Egypt and Israel and the subsequent peace efforts. The Muslim Brotherhood expressed its disappointment over the regime's policy by claiming that it was inadequate reaction against Egypt's independent break with the united Arab front against Israel.⁷⁴ Although this created a tension between the two parties, their relationship remained constant.

Another important development which paved the way for disengagement decision was the Palestinian uprising (intifada), which started in the Gaza Strip in 1987. Intifada changed the regional context considerably while reducing the Jordanian regime's range of policy options about Palestinian issue. According to Philip Robins, this occurred in two ways: first, the effect of intifada has revitalized the PLO; second, the protests also affected the public opinion inside the Kingdom.⁷⁵ Although the intifada occurred within the occupied territories, it strengthened the position of the PLO which was partly at the expense of Jordan. The emphasis which the regime put on the role of the PLO as the only popular representatives of Palestinians living

⁷⁴ Quintan Wiktorowicz, *The Management of Islamic Activism:.....*, p.99.

⁷⁵ Philip Robins, "Shedding Half a Kingdom: Jordan's Dismantling of Ties with the West Bank", *Bulletin,(British Society for Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 16, No. 2, 1989, p. 163.

under occupation increased the political gravitas of the Organization. Intifada had also important effects on the population of the Kingdom since large demographic component was Palestinian origin, which held the greatest potential for influencing policy-making. The involvement and interaction of Palestinian-Jordanians and the East Bankers in supporting the intifada led to many military infiltrations against Israel across the Jordanian border which was inconsistent with the regime's policies.

After the Arab Summit at Rabat, these important developments have also revived the discussions about the future of Jordanian-Palestinians in Jordan. Besides, the Israeli Likud Party which came to power in 1977 began to increasingly argue that 'Jordan is Palestine' on the grounds that there is a Palestinian state in the Eastern part of the River Jordan by the 1980s. Looked from the regime's perspective, this was as a direct threat to its survival. On the Brotherhood's side, although they refused to admit any distinction between a Jordanian and Palestinian identity through Islamizing the Palestinian issue, they completely rejected the idea of Jordanian option for the Palestinians. According to them, as far as the Islamic Shari'ah and faith are concerned, to give up Palestinian, Arab and Islamic rights in Palestine is unacceptable.

As a result of the changing regional context and local circumstances regarding the Palestinian issue after the Arab-Israeli War in 1967, King Hussein decided to disengage from the West Bank on 31 July 1988 by terminating Jordan's claim of sovereignty over the area with the exception of guardianship over the Muslim Holy Sites of Jerusalem. This decision came after 38 years of the unity of the two banks. The policy shift of the Hashemite regime on Palestinian issue with the decision of disengagement from West Bank in 1988 later allowed Jordan to call for 'two-state solution'. Indeed, this move was intended both to cope with the results of Palestinian uprising and growing Palestinian activism for national liberation as well as to reduce the challenge posed by Israeli 'Jordan Option'.

The Muslim Brotherhood disapproved King's decision to sever ties with the West Bank since their perceptions of the Palestinian question were based on an ideology

deriving from purely religious views and far from political pragmatism which shaped Jordan's foreign policy regarding Palestinian issue.

Concluding Remarks

In conclusion, the Muslim Brotherhood's views were close to those of the Hashemite regime regarding to the annexation of West Bank, the Israeli threat to Jordan and the Arab world, the special connection of Jordan with Palestine and Jordanian policy towards the West Bank before disengagement. In this period, their coexistence was not affected from the developments in Palestinian issue. However, substantial differences between them began to increasingly emerge because of the Jordan's foreign policy concerning peace process and the regime's acceptance of the existence of Israel in part of Palestine, as reflected in the UN Resolutions. The Muslim Brotherhood has strongly opposed to the acceptance of Israeli state. They have just accepted the Jewish minority which was settled in Palestine before 1918 but under Muslim majority rule. With respect to the peace negotiations, they argued that Palestinian land can never be subjected to bargaining since it's a trust whose preservation is the responsibility of all Muslim generations.

All in All

In this period, the Muslim Brotherhood has been regarded as a loyal opposition and even as a cooperative partner by the regime in the face of threats coming from rival radical Pan-Arabist ideologies, left-leaning secular trends as well as radical Islamists movements. The Muslim Brotherhood has developed its relations with the Hashemite regime on a non-confrontational basis and acted together with the regime to eliminate these challenges. From the perspective of the regime, the reformist, pragmatic and loyalist nature of the movement facilitated to formulate its foreign policy without being at odds with national agenda. The Muslim Brotherhood also played a crucial role within the Jordan in maintaining the solidarity in diversity which was not regular in the region. In return the movement utilized the posts and opportunities granted by the regime for more than four decades. Furthermore, the

policies of the Hashemite regime and the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood were also closer on the Palestinian issue although the policy motives behind their behaviors were based on different ideologies. All these dynamics and factors resulted in the establishment of coherent and cooperative relationship.

The difference in ideologies and policies between the two parties have began to identified on foreign policy matters, namely Palestinian issue, after King Hussein's decision of disengagement from the West Bank, and especially after the Jordanian peace treaty with Israel which will be the subject of next chapter.

CHAPTER 4

FROM ACCOMMODATION TO CONFLICT (1989-2007)

Beginning from the end of 1980s, changes in the regional and political environment have negatively affected the relations between the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood and the Hashemite regime. Elimination of mutual threats coming from radical-Pan Arab ideologies and left-leaning secular trends and removal of common interest in Palestinian issue after the Jordan's peace treaty with Israel highlighted deeper policy divergence between the two parties. As a result of growing Islamic tendencies in regional politics, Hashemite regime has increasingly come to regard the Muslim Brotherhood as a real opposition instead of a loyal one which has replaced the position of radical Arab nationalist and leftist. Although the Muslim Brotherhood has consistently remained loyal to the political system of the Hashemite regime as described in the previous chapter, the foreign policy choice of the regime has undermined the traditional ties between the two parties by creating important policy differences. Deteriorating relations have become quite apparent after the movement's refusal to recognize Israel when the peace process was underway by 1990s and the consequent developments in the regional context afterwards.

Indeed, the first major signals of alteration in the relationship between the two parties came after the beginning of political liberalization attempts, which was implemented as a survival strategy of the regime, in Jordan in 1989. The Brotherhood's successful election result in 1989 and powerful entry to the parliament and later to the political arena through Islamic Action Front Party made the regime worry about the increasing strength and rising popularity of the movement. Therefore, it is important to examine the political liberalization period by focusing on reasons and results of it while evaluating its reflections on the relationship between the Hashemite regime and the Muslim Brotherhood.

4.1 Political Liberalization and Re-Formation of Political Parties in Jordan

Political liberalization, which commenced in 1989, was also the beginning of a transformation in the Jordanian political scene. It was mainly initiated to diminish the effects of “bread riots” and consequent widespread political unrest resulted from the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) economic austerity program which was initiated to improve the Kingdom's declining economy. A drop in oil prices in the mid-1980s, a decline in economic assistance of the Gulf States after the beginning of Iran-Iraq war and a decrease in remittances, which were the main sources of the Jordanian economy, left the government with a problem of budget deficit accompanied by increasing tendency of external borrowing. Since the government faced with difficulty to meet its foreign debt payment, it began to negotiate with the IMF and assumed a series of economic reforms including cuts in government spending and increases in taxes. After the announcement of the reform package, protests and riots started against government policies as well as against the ruling family which has been accused by Jordanian people with corruption.

Given that the riots were mostly organized and carried out by the regime's fundamental East Bank supporters and indicated a political alienation between the two parties, this situation was considered as a danger for the survival of the Jordanian regime. During the protests and riots, the Muslim Brotherhood mainly criticized and condemned government's policies, which applied IMF's economic austerity program. However they did not direct any criticism to the system of power or the legitimacy of the regime. By conceiving the ongoing political turmoil as a threat to its survival, the regime responded with a “defensive” or “preemptive” democratization program to prevent more serious challenges to the political order.⁷⁶ Glenn Robinson explains the political liberalization attempt of Jordan in 1989 as a process planned to maintain basic power relations and to strengthen the regime's

⁷⁶Glenn Robinson, “Can Islamists Be Democrats? The Case of Jordan”, *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 51, No. 3, Summer 1997, p.374.

position in society.⁷⁷ Similarly, Sean L. Yom also describes the political liberalization in Jordan as “a tactic in the endless struggle to hang on to power.”⁷⁸ By controlling the speed and extent of political change in the Kingdom, the regime has tried to keep the mobilization of political activism inside formal and regime-defined the boundaries of political space.

As a first sign of political liberalization attempts, King Hussein announced that parliamentary elections would be held in 1989. This important call came 22 years after the martial law had been declared in the aftermath of 1967 War with Israel. Besides indicating reestablishment of democracy in the Kingdom, the 1989 elections was also significant in the sense that it would be the first one in which the West Bank representation was excluded. As a consequence of Jordan’s disengagement from the West Bank both administratively and legally in 1988, the electoral law was amended and the parliamentary seats were reallocated. The changes made on the election law gave more power to East Bank origin Jordanian citizens while decreasing Palestinian representation. Thus, with the enactment of 1989 electoral law, King Hussein’s ‘East Bank First’ policy started to become institutionalized and the King actually rewarded the East Bankers while regaining regime’s traditional support.

Although the decision was taken to hold elections and the election law was adjusted, candidates participated in the 1989 elections individually due to the fact that political parties were still illegal. More than 640 candidates competed for seats in the Lower House, which was expanded from 60 to 80 members.⁷⁹ In parallel to the developments in the Kingdom, the Muslim Brotherhood decided to participate in the

⁷⁷Glenn Robinson, “Defensive Democratization in Jordan”, *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 30, No.3, August 1998, p.391.

⁷⁸Sean L. Yom, “Jordan Ten More Years of Autocracy”, *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 20, No. 4, October 2009, p.151.

⁷⁹See “The Elections of 1989”, available at http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/his_periods10.html, accessed on 30 June 2010.

1989 elections and campaigned with the slogan of “Islam is the solution”.⁸⁰ By utilizing the advantageous position as a charitable society and an organized group, which had control over several civil society institutions and associations during the period when other political parties were banned, the Muslim Brotherhood gained 22 parliamentary seats out of 80, while independent Islamists won an additional 12 seats. The total number marked that 40 % of the parliamentary seats went under the control of Islamists.

The outcome of election results and active involvement of the Islamists into political arena in Jordan led to not only external debates throughout the region but also internal debates within the Muslim Brotherhood. Jordan’s neighbors and Israel regarded the outcome of the election as serious and observers declared that the “tide of Islamic fundamentalism” had “swept into Jordan’s political system” threatening to bring it down overnight.⁸¹ Internally, members of the Muslim Brotherhood began to discuss whether it is appropriate to serve in the government or to actively involve in political life and what the goals and activities of the movement should be? ⁸² This debate between pragmatic “doves”, mainly East Bank origin, and ideological “hawks”, mainly Jordanians of Palestinian origin, was won by the doves when five members of the Brotherhood accepted ministerial positions. The Muslim Brotherhood was given Ministries of Education (Abdullah Akaileh), Health (Adnan Jaijuli), Justice (Majid Khalifeh), Social Development (Yusuf al-Athm) and Awqaf (Ibrahim Zayd al-Kilani) in Mudar Badran’s government.⁸³ In addition to cabinet posts acquired by the members of Muslim Brotherhood in 1991, Dr. Abd al-Latif Arabiyyat, one of the most influential Islamist leaders, was elected as the speaker of the Lower House. Having five ministries and dominating an Islamist block of 34

⁸⁰Alex Glennie, Reform in Jordan: The Role of Political Islamists, *Institute for Public Policy Research*, November 2007, pp.10-11.

⁸¹Beverley Milton-Edwards, “Facade Democracy and Jordan” , *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 20, No. 2, 1993, p.196.

⁸²Curtis R. Ryan, “Islamist Political Activism in Jordan:.....”, p.4.

⁸³Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Islamists, the State,,”, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2501/is_4_21/ai_58564186/, accessed on 26 February 2010.

parliamentary seats, the Muslim Brotherhood won a triumph in the wake of 1989 elections.

In 1991, as a second pillar of political liberalization attempts, King Hussein approved the National Charter which was finalized by the Royal Commission composed of different ideological segments of society ranging from leftists to Islamists. The leading members of the Muslim Brotherhood were also among the members of Commission drafting and signing the charter; including Ishaq al-Farhan, Yusuf al-Azim, 'Abdallah al-Uqayli, Abd al-Latif Arabiyyat, Majid Khalifa, and Ahmad Qutaysh al-Azayida.⁸⁴ While it represented a further step on the way of democratization which gave floor to end martial law and to legalize political parties, it also consolidated a territorial nation state with the Hashemite monarchy being its legitimate ruler. Indeed, the Charter was designed to set the rules of the game for a pluralist political life.⁸⁵

Thirdly, the Political Parties law, adopted in 1992, was also central in the liberalization process and provided legal base for opposition to form parties and legalize its structures. In this conjuncture, the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood decided to set up a political party in 1992, namely the Islamic Action Front. However, this decision only came after long discussions. Within the movement, while radicals argued that participating in political life would force them to make compromises on their Islamic values and goals, pragmatists believed that a political party would allow the Brotherhood to significantly expand its influence in society.⁸⁶ This second view becomes especially important facing the fact that Jordanian political scene has been opened to political parties from different ideological backgrounds and Muslim Brotherhood had to play with them on the same ground. At the end of the debate, the members of the Muslim Brotherhood found a middle way. Israel Altman explains that with the formation of Islamic Action Front Party, the

⁸⁴Glenn Robinson, "Defensive Democratization in Jordan", p. 394.

⁸⁵Ranjit Singh, "Liberalization or Democratization?.....", p.80.

⁸⁶Alex Glennie, "Reform in Jordan:....." pp.10-11.

movement guaranteed the continuation of its *dawa* and social activities in case the growing tensions with the regime led to measures against its political activities.⁸⁷ Secondly, the party was believed to present a platform to attract new followers from other Islamic groups and independent Islamists in Jordan. Initially, IAF has claimed that it has no administrative and financial links with the Muslim Brotherhood. However, despite the initial statements, at the end, it has completely drawn the members of Muslim Brotherhood and served as its political wing.⁸⁸

Finally, the last step on the way of liberalization came with the promulgation of Press and Publications Law in 1993. Lots of weeklies and newspapers belonging of different ideological trends began to be published. However, the law excluded certain sensitive issues from public discussion such as the role of armed and security forces or the King and royal family.⁸⁹ In the following years, as press become a tool for the opposition to express its dissatisfaction over foreign and economic policies, especially after the normalization of ties with Israel and following peace treaty, a tension between the regime and media started to occur which ended with limitations on press freedom.

According to Russell E. Lucas, Jordan's political liberalization in the 1990s was not on the purpose of democratization; instead it was a survival strategy of the regime trying to consolidate its legitimacy in the face of economic structural adjustment and internal dissatisfaction over peace with Israel.⁹⁰ In time, when opposition's criticism has increased on Jordan's foreign and economic policies, which was disturbing and unacceptable for the regime, then it gradually abandoned this strategy. The regime

⁸⁷ Israel Elad Altman, "Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood.....", p.30.

⁸⁸ Sabah El-Said, "Between Pragmatism and Ideology: The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan 1989-1994", *The Washington Institute Policy Papers*, No. 39, p.2.

⁸⁹ Renate Dieterich, "The Weakness of the Ruled is the Strength of the Ruler: The Role of Opposition in Contemporary Jordan", in George Joffé (ed), *Jordan In Transition, 1990-2000*, (London: Hurst & Company Publishers, 2002), p. 133.

⁹⁰ Russell E. Lucas, "Deliberalization in Jordan", *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 14, No. 1, January 2003, p.138.

has used administrative and legal practices as well as repression to channel opposition into regime-delineated area which actually threatened the consolidation of liberal democracy in Jordan. Consequently, liberalization has been replaced by its opposite, namely “deliberalization”.⁹¹

Looked from the relations between the Hashemite regime and the Muslim Brotherhood's side, the results of initial political liberalization attempts highlighted the strong hold and popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood within the Kingdom while worried the regime about the increasing strength of the movement. The Muslim Brotherhood largely benefited from the political liberalization attempts since the movement found a chance to expand its participation into the parliament, national consultative bodies and various ministries. Indeed, the Muslim Brotherhood's success resulted to a greater extend from the regime's tolerance of previous decades. Thanks to the mutual threat perception against radical movements and common interest on the Palestinian issue before the disengagement, the regime's policy has facilitated for the movement to consolidate its base and to maintain its grassroots supports by conducting social-welfare programs and exploiting communication channels while other political parties from different ideologies were banned. Even after the adoption of Political Parties law, the newly founded parties were lack of infrastructure and popular support as compared to the Islamic Action Front Party which enjoyed the support of Muslim Brotherhood followers. At the end of the political liberalization attempts, the regime has faced with a well-equipped opposition, namely the Muslim Brotherhood as well as its political wing, Islamic Action Front Party.

⁹¹ Ibid.

4.2 The Relations of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jordanian Regime in Deterioration: The Road to Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty and afterwards

While the Hashemite regime were busy with the domestic agenda at the end of 80s and the beginning of 90s, significant developments, which had serious repercussions on Jordan's foreign policy, were being also experienced around surrounding regions. The Kingdom's support for Iraq following the invasion of Kuwait and its refusal to join the US-led coalition against Iraq left Jordan isolated after the defeat of Iraqi regime in the Gulf War. Indeed, the support given to Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War was mainly related to his stand against the US and particularly Israel rather than the invasion and occupation of Kuwait by another Arab state.⁹² Although during the initial stage of the war Hashemite regime has taken a neutral position, the demonstrations organized in Jordanian streets in support of Iraq left no room but to respond to the popular sentiments of the newly electorate and pursue a policy in line with them both for the King as well as for the Muslim Brotherhood and other political actors.⁹³ However, after the end of Gulf War and defeat of Iraq, Jordan paid a high price for its backing to Saddam Hussein. It was punished by international community, its relations with Gulf States deteriorated and foreign contributions to the country's economy decreased. Therefore, the Middle East Peace Conference held in Madrid in 1991 to find a solution to the Palestinian issue by the initiatives of the US after the Gulf war provided an opportunity for the regime to give an end to its isolation, to mend its ties with the West and to pursue a peace with Israel.

While the Hashemite regime regarded the Madrid Conference as an occasion to restore its relations with the international community and to settle the Palestinian problem, the Muslim Brotherhood could not support a settlement that would bring liberation only to a part of Palestine. Since the peace negotiations in Madrid were said to be based on United Nations Resolution 242 which calls for Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza and the principle of 'land for peace', the Muslim

⁹²Beverley Milton-Edwards, "Facade Democracy and Jordan" , p.197.

⁹³Maha Azzam, "The Gulf Crisis Perceptions in the Muslim World", *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, Vol. 67, No. 3, July 1991, p.476.

Brotherhood stated its opposition against any negotiations from the beginning. In other words, Hashemite regime's official foreign policy approach was severely contradicted with that of Muslim Brotherhood on the issue of settlement of Palestinian-Israeli dispute. Therefore, the tendency of the regime to participate in peace talks resulted in a crackdown with the movement.

In order to create a convenient environment to maneuver his pragmatic policies and to seek peace with Israel, King Hussein tried to tame Muslim Brotherhood's opposition and dissolved the Badran government in which the members of Muslim Brotherhood had ministries and appointed Tahir Al-Masri, a Nablus-born Palestinian-Jordanian, as a prime minister in June 1991. Hence, the Badran government which only lasted six months was disbanded, and no Islamist has held a government post since then in Jordan.⁹⁴ As a result, the members of the Muslim Brotherhood has deprived from opportunities of accessing and exploiting ministerial positions for their sake.

After the Madrid Peace Process came the 1993 Oslo Accords between Israel and the PLO, which recognized the establishment of an independent Palestinian entity on the West Bank and Gaza.. On the one hand, Hashemite regime was surprised by the secret peace talks between the PLO and Israel and displeased with the PLO's unilateral act. Oslo Accords also increased the Hashemite regime's concern over the stability and regime survival because of the huge Palestinian presence in the Kingdom. On the other hand, it enabled Hashemite regime to move toward its own peace agreement with Israel by providing an external dynamic to the Arab-Israeli conflict.⁹⁵ In other words, PLO's unilateral diplomacy with Israel and the signing of the Declaration of Principles presented Jordan a chance to justify a peace treaty with Israel. Hashemite regime believed that normalization of relations with Israel would help Jordan to act more freely in a regional environment and would secure its

⁹⁴Juan Jose Escobar Stemmann, "The Crossroads of Muslim Brothers", p.39.

⁹⁵Lamis Andoni, "King Abdallah: In His Father's Footsteps?", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 3, Spring 2000, p.78.

borders. Furthermore, peace would provide Israeli recognition that Jordan is not Palestine by refuting Likud Party's Jordan Option.

In August 1993, just before the 1993 elections were held and as the possibility of a peace between Jordan and Israel gained a momentum, the election law was amended paving way to the principle of "one person, one vote." Before the amendment of election law, each citizen could vote as many as the number of seats in his electoral district. Therefore, voters could cast one of their votes for candidates to whom they have tribal affinities and could cast the other vote for ideological candidates to whom they feel sympathy such as Islamists or leftists.⁹⁶ When the political culture of the Jordan was taken into account, with the new arrangement, each voter would choose to vote in support of tribal or clan affinities rather than ideological or political affinities. The Brotherhood claimed that this law aimed at curtailing their representation in parliament and also a means of preventing their opposition to the approval of any forthcoming peace treaty.⁹⁷ Therefore, the amendment of election law also intensified the tension between the two parties which had already disagreement over peace negotiations.

Mainly due to the adjustment of election law, the Muslim Brotherhood's representation in the Lower House decreased in 1993 elections. Another reason for the decrease in votes belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood may be counted as their inadequate performance in Badran's government in 1991. During their mandate, all their policy initiatives were aimed at regulating individual behavior such as "banning alcohol in the Kingdom, sexual segregation in some governmental office buildings, banning on fathers watching their daughters in competitive sports."⁹⁸ These policies created dissatisfaction for less conservative section in the society and did not meet expectations for economic or political reforms.

⁹⁶Glenn Robinson, "Defensive Democratization in Jordan", p. 397.

⁹⁷Mohammad Abu Rumman, *The Muslim Brotherhood in the Jordanian Parliamentarian.....*, p. 23.

⁹⁸Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Islamists, the State,.....", available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2501/is_4_21/ai_58564186/, accessed on 26 February 2010.

Nevertheless, mostly as a result of the new electoral system designed to minimize the movement's influence, IAF won 16 seats out of 80 in the 1993 elections which was the first election that they participated in. Therefore, when Jordan signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1994, after Israel and PLO signed Oslo Accords in September 1993, the Muslim Brotherhood was incapable of either delay or block the treaty since they did not have the majority in the Parliament. Therefore, the government was able to ratify the Wadi Araba peace treaty but before the signature a ban on public demonstrations has been imposed.⁹⁹ Thus, the policy crack on Palestinian issue between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Hashemite state has sharpened with the signing of Jordan's own peace treaty with Israel in 1994.

In this turbulent political environment, King Hussein put forward several reasons to gain domestic support for the peace treaty. The regime explained the logic behind the peace treaty as a strategic choice which would provide Jordan water, border and security as well as economic benefits. The regime also claimed that the peace with Israel would foster further negotiations between Egypt, Palestine and Israel to settle refugee issue. On the opposition side, Jordan was criticized for neglecting Arab coordination and UN Resolutions concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict, i.e. the Security Council Resolutions 194, 237, 232, and 334, for not solving Palestinian refugee problem, and also for governmental efforts to curb the opposition right after the ratification of the treaty by reversing the political liberalization process.¹⁰⁰

To sum up, the Hashemite regime seeking opportunities to settle the Palestinian issue, which has been an essential component of its domestic and foreign policy making, found the suitable environment in the aftermath of Madrid Peace Conference and subsequent Oslo Accords. At the end of its endeavors, Jordan managed to develop an understanding with Israel and signed the peace treaty. However, the signing of Wadi Araba Peace Treaty launched a period of deterioration

⁹⁹Russell E. Lucas, "Deliberalization in Jordan", p.140.

¹⁰⁰Paul L. Scham and Russell E. Lucas, "Normalization and Anti-Normalization in Jordan: The Public Debate", *Israel Affairs*, Vol. 9, No. 3, Spring 2003, p. 148.

in its relationship with its previous ally, namely the Muslim Brotherhood. Given that Muslim Brotherhood and its political wing, Islamic Action Front Party were strongly opposing to any peace treaty with Israel under any circumstances, the Hashemite regime amended the election law to reduce the movement's presence in the Parliament and impede it from blocking the treaty. Thus, while the regime took the movement's opponent reaction to the treaty under control, the movement has become a real opposition. Afterwards, the Muslim Brotherhood shifted its agenda to terminate the treaty and to resist the normalization of relations with Israel.

4.3 Anti-normalization Camp

Having been unsuccessful to deter the regime to sign a peace treaty with Israel and to block the legislation, the Muslim Brotherhood endeavored to unite people around opposition to reject the normalization of political and economic relations with Israel. They frequently claimed that Israeli plan was economically and culturally invade the Arab world beginning from Jordan. Thus, the Brotherhood became a pioneer of the broader "anti-normalization" movement in Jordan. For instance, given that the movement has control on professional associations, they declared a ban on working with Israeli counterparts and began to expel members visiting Israel.¹⁰¹

As the anti- normalization tendency has grown in 1997 to a degree to be able to close a trade fair organized by Israeli companies in Amman through protests with the participation of nearly 4,000 demonstrators, the regime came to perceive institutionalization of anti-normalization tendency as a potentially serious threat.¹⁰² In this incident, the opposition clearly demonstrated its ability to mobilize population due to the fact that the regime has consistently worked for normalization of relations. King Hussein feared that if the difficulties experienced by implementation of economic reforms would combine with the growing consensus against normalization of relations with Israel, it would then provide a base for a series of demonstrations

¹⁰¹Russell E. Lucas, "Deliberalization in Jordan", p.141.

¹⁰²Paul L. Scham and Russell E. Lucas, "Normalization and Anti-Normalization in", p. 155.

which might turn into a full-scale anti-regime mobilization threatening its survival. Therefore, the King put further limitations on freedom of expression, convening of public gatherings and imposed restrictive amendments on the press law. This indicated the reversal of political liberalization attempts to gain control over opposition in order to implement required policies on the regime side. The amendment on press law had negatively affected publications some of which were independent Islamic newspapers and magazines which opposed normalization of relations with Israel and criticized the government's failure to curb mounting unemployment and economic recession.¹⁰³ Russell E. Lucas argues that the regulation of press has been the most prominent factor in the regime's survival strategies in which the regime sought first to co-opt its critics and then to silence them.¹⁰⁴ As a result of the regime's precautions such as institutional constrictions and other constraints to keep the Muslim Brotherhood under control and to limit its anti-normalization activities, the tension between the two parties has grown.

The amendments on election and press laws, in addition to the signature of the Wadi Araba peace treaty with Israel, caused the Muslim Brotherhood to call for a boycott of the 1997 elections as well as the deterioration of relations between the regime and the movement. Most of the opposition parties participated in the boycott under the leadership of Muslim Brotherhood. The boycotters demanded a repeal of the press and election decrees and a reversal of the normalization process with Israel. As a result of the boycott, only a small portion of opposition remained in parliament while most deputies elected and gained seat in the Lower House were strong loyalists of the regime and supporters of its policies. Given that the Muslim Brotherhood has remained out of the Parliament and lost the opportunity to repeatedly express its opposition both to the peace treaty and normalization of relations with Israel on the legislative level, they continued their opposition at the grassroots stage and through professional associations and unions.

¹⁰³Emile Sahliyeh, "The State and the Islamic Movement.....", p. 120.

¹⁰⁴Russell E. Lucas, "Press Laws as a Survival Strategy in Jordan, 1989-99", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 39, No. 4, October 2003, p.82.

4.4 The Relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Regime under the Reign of King Abdullah II; Hamas Factor, Second Intifada and Iraq War

The ascension to the throne of King Abdullah II in 1999 after his father's death signifies a new period in relations between the Jordanian regime and the Muslim Brotherhood. The transfer of authority with a risk of destabilization caused King Abdullah to govern domestic politics through a harsher security approach.¹⁰⁵ In addition to this authority change, King Abdullah has been suspicious about the true intentions of Muslim Brotherhood, which has continuously declared its loyalty to the monarchy. This stemmed mainly from the change in the balance of forces between the radicals and the pragmatists within the organization and also from the radicalization and Islamization of foreign policy rhetoric of the Movement, especially over the Palestinian issue. These perceptions of the new King led him to consider the relations of the regime with the Muslim Brotherhood not just as a political matter but also a security issue.

The first move of King Abdullah on Palestinian issue after his accession to the throne was to expel Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) from Jordanian territory. Hamas had born out of Muslim Brotherhood movement in the West Bank and Gaza with the outbreak of first intifada in 1987 and it was permitted to establish an information office and political bureau in Amman during the reign of King Hussein, forced to leave Jordan.¹⁰⁶ From the perspective of King Abdullah II, Hamas' opposition to the whole peace process, which started after Madrid Conference, constituted a treat for normalization of relations between Jordan and Israel.¹⁰⁷ Moreover, inside the country, Hamas was "...accused of engaging clandestine paramilitary training and ... of penetrating local fundamentalist

¹⁰⁵ Mohammad Abu Rumman, *The Muslim Brotherhood in the Jordanian Parliamentarian.....*, p. 24.

¹⁰⁶ Wendy Kristianasen, "Challenge and Counterchallenge: Hamas's Response to Oslo", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 3, Spring 1999, p.21.

¹⁰⁷ The Hamas office in Amman had openly urged the sabotaging of peace talks with terrorist attacks inside Israel. William A. Orme Jr., Jordan Frees Four Jailed Hamas Leaders and Expelled Them, NY Times, 22 November 1999.

opposition parties.”¹⁰⁸ Given that both Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood were related to the general International Muslim Brotherhood movement, Hamas has become an important actor rallying Palestinian-Jordanians as well as Palestinians in refugee camps via Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan. King Abdullah II has suspected that the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood’s already radicalized foreign policy on Palestinian issue might have been further affected by Hamas factor that would create new sources of opposition in restricting normalization of relations with Israel and Kingdom’s relations with Palestinian citizens. Therefore, perceiving Hamas as an obstacle in the Middle East peace process and realizing the need for two-state solution to settle Palestinian problem, King Abdullah expelled Hamas from Jordan in 1999. This move demonstrated that the regime’s tolerance of dissent had reached to its limit and Jordan did not seek a strategic role in the future of the West Bank. Instead, it preferred to focus on domestic matters and maintaining good relations with the Palestinian Authority.¹⁰⁹ Existing severe relationship between the regime and the Muslim Brotherhood due to the peace treaty of Jordan with Israel has deepened by the expulsion of Hamas leadership from Jordan to which the Muslim Brotherhood preferred to keep its ties instead of Palestinian Authority as opposed to the Hashemite regime.

In 2000s, two significant events occurred in the regional context, namely the second intifada and Iraqi war as a result of 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, have also negatively altered the relationship between the regime and the Muslim Brotherhood. When the second intifada broke out in September 2000 and the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations broke down, the renewed uprising in the West Bank had reflections on Jordanian domestic politics likewise it had during the first intifada, in 1987. The King and his cabinet perceived the new uprising as a threat not only to Jordan’s peace agreement with Israel but also to the survival of the regime itself since it triggered instability in the region and increased the tension between the followers of normalization and anti-normalization trends within the Kingdom. The

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Juan Jose Escobar Stemmann, “The Crossroads of Muslim Brothers.....”, pp.40-41.

repercussions of the second Intifada led the King to reshape his domestic agenda in order to sustain stability and contain opposing groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood. Therefore, King Abdullah II took strict precautions in order to handle public demonstrations of support for the uprising. For example, when the opposition staged a march in the Jordan Valley that drew almost 20,000 people, security forces broke it up with violence.¹¹⁰

From then on regime's policy towards containment of opposition and the Palestinian pressure were mainly shaped through banning public demonstrations in support of intifada and restricting public assemblies with a temporary law as well as implementation of 2001 Electoral Law. The new election law adopted in July 2001 led to further debate and deepened the gap between the regime and the Muslim Brotherhood.¹¹¹ Meanwhile, the parliament elected in 1997 finished its term in 2001. However, King Abdullah postponed the elections by two years in the face of the effects of second intifada over Jordan, the economic crisis, and the growing instability in the aftermath of 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001.

Up until June 2003, Jordan was ruled by decrees and temporary laws published by the King and his cabinet. These were mostly aiming at preventing the Muslim Brotherhood and professional associations from mobilizing mass protests against regime support for U.S. policies, including obtaining written permission three days in advance for public gathering, broader definitions of terrorism, and extended authority for the State Security Court to censor the press and arrest critics.¹¹² These rapid de-liberalization attempts of the regime to maintain stability and to control the opposition in Jordan heightened the sense of confrontation between the regime and the Muslim Brotherhood.

¹¹⁰Russell E. Lucas, "Deliberalization in Jordan", pp.142-143.

¹¹¹While the law was preserving 'one person-one vote' system, it did not eliminate disproportionate allocation of the electoral districts. The 2001 Law also extended the number of seats in the Lower Chamber from 80 to 110 and the number districts rose from 21 to 45.

¹¹²Sean L. Yom, "Jordan Ten More Years of Autocracy", p.157.

The 2003 elections were the first under King Abdullah and marked the return of the opposition to electoral politics. The IAF and the opposition parties dropped the boycott tactics of 1997 and took part in the elections. Becoming aware of the fact that their absence from parliament had diminished their influence, the Islamic Action Front Party participated in elections and won 17 of the 110 seats. The IAF remained focused on its own Islamist political agenda included implementing the Sharia and abrogating the Jordan-Israel peace treaty. However, these goals remained unfulfilled given that it had no political power and majority to affect the legislations within the Lower House. For the IAF, the Lower House has just become a debating forum.¹¹³ At the end of the day, the return of the members of Muslim Brotherhood to parliament did not prevent their relations with the regime from further deterioration.

Having a tension in their relationship over Jordan-Israeli peace treaty, war in Iraq in 2003 also added a new dimension to this tension. Since Jordan lies in a very fragile region and it has vulnerabilities with respect to its demographic composition, economy and politics, regional conflicts in the Middle East always prompts the regime to be cautious and alarm it to take necessary precautions beforehand to prevent instabilities. Restrictions on basic freedoms and frustration at regional developments have caused dissatisfaction and prevented opposition opinions from being expressed through established channels.¹¹⁴ Due to the reversal of political liberalization attempt, Islamists increasingly used mosques to express and debate their dissatisfaction about daily politics. Therefore, in order to contain increasingly radical Islamist stance flourished by anti-American sentiments and resentment on Middle Eastern conflicts, several Brotherhood imams, including Ibrahim Zaid Kilani-former government minister and president of the Shura Council-, were arrested in

¹¹³ Curtis R. Ryan, “Islamist Political Activism in Jordan:,” p.5.

¹¹⁴ “The Challenge of Political Reform: Jordanian Democratization and Regional Instability”, *Crisis Group Middle East Briefing*, No. 10, 8 October 2003, available at www.crisisgroup.org, accessed on 1 September 2010.

October 2004 for ignoring to follow the instructions issued by the Preaching and Guidance Council on the Iraqi conflict.¹¹⁵

The developments on domestic and regional environment in this period- the expulsion of Hamas from Jordan, the second Intifada and the US's invasion of Iraq have deepened the crisis taken its roots from the peace treaty between the Muslim Brotherhood and the regime. As far as the Palestinian issue is concerned, the Muslim Brotherhood has expressed its full support to Hamas and backed anti-normalization of relations with Israel while the regime has centered its policy on normalizing relations with Israel and good relations with Palestinian Authority. As far as Iraq is concerned, the Muslim Brotherhood strongly opposed American invasion in all its forms, while the regime has pursued more cautious policy and tried to keep its relations with the US intact. As far as political liberalization is concerned the Muslim Brotherhood has consistently objected to bans on the right to protest or public demonstrations while regime has taken these precautions to restrict opposition's reaction on the Second Intifada and Iraqi war. These rival views between the two parties led to further deterioration of relations but the worst part has come in the aftermath of Hamas election victory in 2006 in Palestine and the condolence visit of Muslim Brotherhood's members to family of Zarqawi who was responsible from the terrorist bombings in Amman in 2005.

4.4.1 Directly Curtailing the Strength of the Muslim Brotherhood

Two significant events that took place in 2006 altered the Jordanian regime's attitude toward the Muslim Brotherhood and led the regime believe that the movement has become radicalized and dominated by extremists. First incident which increased the regime's suspicions on the intention of movement came after the Muslim Brotherhood's expression of support for Hamas government which won the Palestinian elections in 2006. Following Hamas victory, the Muslim Brotherhood demanded restoration of ties with them after the organization's expulsion in 1999.

¹¹⁵ Juan Jose Escobar Stemmann, "The Crossroads of Muslim", pp.40-41.

However, the regime refrained from any dialogue with Hamas and accused it of plotting to carry out terrorist attacks in Jordan.¹¹⁶ The Muslim Brotherhood's stance towards Hamas was totally contradicting with that of the regime and caused ideological and political confrontation between them. In May 2006, the Muslim Brotherhood appointed Zaki Bani Irshad, a Jordanian of Palestinian origin and an extremist known for his close ties with Hamas's political head Khaled Mashal, as the new IAF secretary general.¹¹⁷ This decision was interpreted by the regime, which was already suspicious about the link between Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood, as further evidence that Hamas had managed to penetrate into the movement. Jordan, which stood firmly against Hamas and Islamist extremism for years, perceived this development as a threat. Moreover, Hamas' victory just across the Jordan River in the West Bank has invigorated the Muslim Brotherhood movement with optimism and strengthened its conviction that fair elections would lead to an Islamic republic in Jordan which was a disturbing idea for the regime.¹¹⁸

Secondly, after the killing of Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, Al-Qaeda leader, who was responsible from the bombings in Amman targeted to luxury hotels in 2005, in Iraq on 9 June 2006, four members of the Muslim Brotherhood, including Mohammad Abu Fares-from radical wing-, visited the Al-Zarqawi's family and expressed their condolences.¹¹⁹ The condolence visit and Abu Fares's declaration of Al-Zarqawi as *shahid* not only increased the tension between the regime and the movement but also considered as a further radicalization of the Brotherhood. Although, the Muslim

¹¹⁶ Schmuel Bachar, Schmuel Bar, Rachel Machtiger and Yair Minzili, "Establishment Ulama and Radicalism in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan", Research Monographs on the Muslim World, Series No. 1, Paper No. 4, December 2006, *Hudson Institute, Center on Islam, Democracy, and the Future of the Muslim World*, p. 25.

¹¹⁷ Hassan Barari, "Elections in Jordan: Poor Showing for Islamists", *The Washington Institute for Near East Policy*, Policy Watch No. 1317, 13 December 2007.

¹¹⁸ Thanassis Cambanis, "Jordan's Islamists See a Path to Political Power: Hamas's Victory Buys Movement," *Globe Staff*, 21 March 2006, available at http://www.boston.com/news/world/middleeast/articles/2006/03/21/jordans_islamists_see_a_path_to_political_power/, accessed on 02 April 2009.

¹¹⁹ Schmuel Bachar, Schmuel Bar, Rachel Machtiger and Yair Minzili, "Establishment Ulama and Radicalism.....", p.25.

Brotherhood and the IAF were actually among the first to condemn and organize an anti Al-Qaeda rallies in the country in 2005, they refused to apologize for condolence visit.¹²⁰

Thus, in the aftermath of these two developments, the Muslim Brotherhood's and IAF's foreign policy approaches were evaluated "by some more security-minded officials as moving from opposition to potential sedition" while the movement as well as its political wing persistently refrained from violent political action in Jordan and supported gradual and peaceful change.¹²¹ During its confrontation with the regime, on 6 July 2006, the Muslim Brotherhood and IAF jointly issued a statement. In this statement while the movement and the party declared their support for national security and national causes as well as their rejection of extremism and terrorism, they expressed their support for Hamas and insisted that the success of Hamas did not threaten Jordan.¹²² As a second attempt, after their meeting with the Prime Minister Bakhit on 11 July 2006, the Muslim Brotherhood declared one more statement affirming the following:¹²³

- Commitment to national fundamentals, the constitution and laws in force; affirmation of the respect to the democratic path, political pluralism and respect for the opinions of the majority; commitment to the principles of resolving disputes and differences through peaceful means and dialogue.
- Total commitment to the precedence of Jordanian national interests over all other interests; rejection of promoting any other party over Jordan and its interests under any circumstances and justification whatsoever.
- Declare clear and frank allegiance to God, the country and the King.

¹²⁰ Ibid., p.26.

¹²¹ Nathan J. Brown, "Jordan and its Islamic Movement: The limits of Inclusion, Democracy and Rule of Law Project", *Carnegie Papers*, No.74, November 2006, p.16.

¹²² Ibid., p.19

¹²³ See http://ammanmessage.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=46&Itemid=35

- Affirm frank denunciation of terrorism in all its forms regardless of its source, and of terrorists acts and actions in particular those that target Jordan and its higher interests; denounce terrorist acts that target the security of Jordan, its institutions and citizens, especially bombing of hotels.
- Rejection of the destructive *Takfiri* ideology in all its forms; declare resolve to combat this ideology; declare commitment to the consensus of Islamic scholars and leaders of the eight sects in July 2005 that all who adhere to these sects cannot be accused of being infidel.
- Commitment to the recommendation of the Amman Conference of Islamic *Fiqh* Academy (in June 2006) which affirms the importance of prohibiting any person or party to issue *Fatwas* without having certain qualifications specified by the each of eight sects.
- Frank rejection of any statement that insulted the feelings of the families of the victims of the Amman hotel bombings and the feeling of all the Jordanian people.

However, having suspicions over the true intentions of the movement, the regime responded to the Muslim Brotherhood's expression of support for Hamas government which won the Palestinian elections in 2006 and to the condolence visit of Muslim Brotherhood's members to Zarqawi's family by taking a series of harsh measures to decrease the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood. Indeed, the suspicions were not resulted from the movement's declared statements but from expectations of what the movement might actually behave if it gained more power or more alienated from the regime. That is why; the regime has applied repression and containment policies to curb the power of the Muslim Brotherhood.

First, the regime has showed that it has no mercy to those who resort terrorist attacks and *takfiri* ideas to shape Jordan's future by trialing Abu Fares and Abu Sukar and accused them of harming Jordan's national interest and being extreme fanatics.¹²⁴

¹²⁴ Schmuel Bachar, Schmuel Bar, Rachel Machtiger and Yair Minzili, "Establishment Ulama and Radicalism.....", p. 25.

Secondly, the Islamic Center Society belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood, which conducted social welfare and medical assistance to general public through its institutions, was accused of financial and administrative corruption.¹²⁵ Then, its possessions were taken over on 10 July 2006. It was a major blow to the Muslim Brotherhood in the sense that the movement deprived from a vital source of income and from a platform where its mobilization activities took place for maintaining grassroots, popular and electoral support.

Thirdly, the regime also either adopted or amended laws on issues of terrorism, supported the issuing of *fatwas* and encouraged preaching to further restrict the Muslim Brotherhood's influence. The new law, passed on 27 August 2006, for the Prevention of Terrorism authorized the State Security Court public prosecutor to arrest suspects, operate surveillance on their residences, monitor their contacts, and prevent them from traveling on.¹²⁶ In the Lower House several discussions were taken place. The Muslim Brotherhood and IAF members claimed that the law was violated the articles of the constitution that guarantee individual liberty and freedom of religion and argued that since the law does not clearly define what constitutes terror it gives to much freedom to the security forces to define terror.¹²⁷

The Law on Deliverance of Legal Opinion approved by parliament on 5 September 2006 restricted the delivery of *fatwas* by clerics who are not authorized by the state.¹²⁸ With this law, the regime aimed at preventing the *takfiri-jihadi* movements and Muslim Brotherhood from issuing *fatwas* on government policy and political issues and strengthening the religious establishment by granting the primary authority to issue and control *fatwas* to a governmental council on religious law. The

¹²⁵ Mohammad Abu Rumman, *The Muslim Brotherhood in the Jordanian Parliamentarian.....*, p.26.

¹²⁶ Israel Elad Altman, "Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood Movement.....", p.34.

¹²⁷ Yair Minzili, "The Jordanian Regime Fights the War of Ideas", in Hillel Fradkin, Husain Haqqani, Eric Brown (eds), *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology*, Vol. 5, (Washington: Center on Islam, Democracy, and The Future of the Muslim World, Hudson Institute, 2007), pp.65-66.

¹²⁸ Israel Elad Altman, "Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood Movement.....", p.34.

amended Law on Preaching, Guidance, Sermons, and Teaching in Mosques, approved by parliament on 3 September 2006 was also designed to deny the Muslim Brotherhood use of mosques to propagate their message, by giving the Ministry of Waqf and Religious Affairs to approve mosque preachers.¹²⁹

At the end, the confrontation between the regime and the Muslim Brotherhood during 2006 and the regime's subsequent containment policies to curb the power of the Muslim Brotherhood have further aggravated their relationship. Given that the King's concerns over the radicalization of the movement has grown to the extent that the regime has shifted its policy from tolerating to cracking down the movement. Indeed, this kind of a low profile relationship has been experienced for the first time since the establishment of their relationship 60 years ago. As a result of the changing attitude of the regime towards the Brotherhood and its containment policy, the Brotherhood's communication channels and social-welfare network with its grassroots support have been weakened. The outcome of regime's shifting policy led to the great setback for the Muslim Brotherhood in 2007 elections.

4.4.2 2007 Elections

Despite the increasingly strained relations with the regime, the Muslim Brotherhood began to make preparations for the municipal and parliamentary elections to be held in 2007. The municipal elections caused another conflict between the regime and the Muslim Brotherhood when the movement withdrew their candidates on the Election Day, accusing the government of electoral fraud. The IAF blamed the government to provide transportation to plainclothes soldiers to cast votes for non-Islamist candidates in several IAF strongholds.¹³⁰ In announcing the IAF's withdrawal decision, IAF Secretary-General Zaki Bani Irsheid called the elections as

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰David Schenker, "The Islamist Boycott of Jordanian Municipal Elections: A Victory of Public Relations or Politics", *The Washington Institute for Near East Policy*, Policy Watch No. 1269, 7 August 2007.

"democratic massacre".¹³¹ On the government side, it denied accusations of fraud and declared the last-minute IAF pullout illegal. Moreover, the government claimed that the IAF simply withdrawn from elections because they had realized that the outcome would be weak.

Nevertheless, despite several discussions whether to take part or not in legislative elections, the IAF decided to participate in the Parliamentary elections but got just six seats. The main reason of setback in the 2007 elections was the negative effects of regime's policies toward the movement during the past decade. In addition to removing the movement's control on Islamic Center Society and amending the laws on the issue of terrorism, fatwa and preaching, the regime also further decreased the influence of the movement by amending *zakat* system, closing down the Society for the Protection of the Koran and taking the administration of Zarqa University away from the Islamists. As a result, the regime has become successful to weaken the Brotherhood's social-welfare network as well as its communication channels with its grassroots.

When political liberalization, which paved the way for multi-party politics and legislative elections, was resumed in 1989, Muslim Brotherhood candidates took 22 out of the 110 seats, followed up by 16 seats in 1993. After boycotting the 1997 elections, the movement won 17 seats in the 2003 parliamentary elections. However, in 2007 they just won 6 seats which indicated their lowest total since 1989 in the Parliament. The decreasing representation of the Muslim Brotherhood movement in the Parliament was to a large extend depended on the regime's new tactics to deprive the movement of its tools and the support pillars that the Brotherhood built and expanded in the previous decades.

To conclude, this period witnessed an unprecedentedly problematic relationship between the Hashemite regime and the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood. First, the signing of the peace treaty between Jordan and Israel undermined the traditional ties

¹³¹ Ibid.

between the two parties by creating important policy rift. Then, the key concern of the regime that affect its attitude towards the Brotherhood became the distinct relationship between the movement and Hamas. The regime's stance towards the Muslim Brotherhood was severed after the November 2005 hotel bombings and the following visit of Muslim Brotherhood's members to Zarqawi's family as well as with 2006 Hamas electoral victory which could be seen as a turning point in relations between the two parties. From then on, the regime almost systematically alienated the Muslim Brotherhood from political and social areas by regarding the movement as a real opposition instead of a loyal one.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

Historical relationship between the Hashemite regime and the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood was established in 1946 and the movement has continuously been a legal organization in the Kingdom from then on. The Muslim Brotherhood formulated its policy towards the regime on non-confrontational basis and its gradual, reformist and loyalist stance provided the ability to hang on Jordan's authoritarian monarchical structure. Furthermore, the relationship between the Hashemite regime and the Brotherhood has provided one of the main factors bringing together a divided society along geographical, historical and cultural lines due to the artificial formation of the Kingdom.

The nature of relationship between the Hashemite regime and the Muslim Brotherhood, however, has been shaped and changed over time in response to regional and political developments as interpreted by the regime and the movement. As argued in this thesis, the period from 1946 to the end of 1980s generally marked coherent and cooperative relations between the two parties. As far as the radical Pan-Arabist, left-leaning secular and radical Islamists movements of 1950s and 1960s are concerned; the Hashemite regime and the Brotherhood acted together by forming a common platform against these rival ideologies. Since the movement backed the regime against challenges to the very existence of monarchy, it has been granted permission to conduct social and welfare activities while other political parties with different ideological affiliation were banned during 1960s and 1970s. Although, the movement's ability to promote its ideology and agenda was limited by the vital concerns of the regime, points of mutual interest have led to a cooperative relationship in this period.

Both the Hashemite regime and the Muslim Brotherhood movement considerably benefited from their relationship, however, after the end of 1980s tension areas emerged as well. The elimination of mutual threats coming from radical-Pan Arab ideologies and left-leaning secular trends and removal of common interest in Palestinian issue beginning from the disengagement of Jordan from the West Bank in 1988 signaled the diverging foreign policy views of both parties by putting a burden on their relationship.

From the perspective of the Muslim Brotherhood, at base, the Palestinian issue was essentially an Islamic problem and had to be addressed in Islamic terms. The Muslim Brotherhood believed that Palestine was part of a larger God-given Islamic endowment thus nobody had the right to surrender control of any part of such lands to non-Muslims. On the other hand, the Hashemite regime preferred to play its cards by pursuing a pragmatist policy to sustain its survival due to its geographical proximity to Israel and demographic Palestinian presence in the Kingdom. Therefore, the regime has reshaped its policies by taking into account local and regional developments on Palestinian issue which has been both a domestic and foreign policy concern on its part. In short, the foreign policy choice of the regime and signature of Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty in 1994 has undermined the traditional ties between the two parties by creating important policy differences.

Already having concerns over growing Islamic tendencies in the regional context, the Hashemite regime redefined its policy towards the Muslim Brotherhood movement. Consistent and strong opposition of the movement to the peace treaty and to the subsequent efforts for normalization of relations with Israel has been reciprocated by the regime through implementation of measures to curb the strength of the Brotherhood even if this meant the reversal of political liberalization which started in 1989. What made the picture even worse in terms of relations between the Hashemite regime and the Brotherhood were the growing suspicions of the regime over the radicalization of the movement and Brotherhood's link with Hamas. The harsh responses of the regime to reduce the strength of the movement in the aftermath of two developments -the Muslim Brotherhood's expression of support for Hamas

government which won the Palestinian elections in 2006 and the condolence visit of Muslim Brotherhood's members to Zarqawi's (responsible from the hotels bombing in Amman in 2005) family- clearly demonstrated that the movement would not be allowed to cross red lines defined by the regime. Furthermore, these developments also indicated a policy shift on the part of regime from tolerating to cracking down the movement although the movement persistently refrained from resorting violence within the Kingdom. As a result, the two parties have experienced a very low profile relationship for the first time since the establishment of their ties 60 years ago. Thus, as argued in this thesis, the relationship between the two parties began to deteriorate after the end of 1980s and this deterioration reached a peak in 2006. Nevertheless, the regime did not declare the movement as illegal despite it took serious precautions to restrict the movement's activities that resulted in a great retreat of the latter in the Parliament in 2007 elections.

The elected deputies in 2007 elections served in the Lower House of the Parliament until November 2009 when King Abdullah II dissolved the legislature on the grounds that it was not fast enough to engage with his program of economic reform.¹³² Then, Jordan has begun to be governed by temporary laws and royal decrees. Indeed, the Kingdom has previously experienced such a period under King Abdullah II's rule for two years between 2001 and 2003 in which the government adopted more than 200 temporary laws.

After the dissolution of the Parliament, new parliamentary elections were announced to be held on 9 November 2010. The government also passed a new temporary elections law for the coming parliamentary elections in May 2010. However, the key aspect of the previous elections law is not amended. New law has maintained the one-person one-vote system while it increased the number of seats in the Lower House from 110 to 120, including six additional quota seats for women that make the total 12 for them. This means that only four seats have been added to address

¹³² Jillian Schwedler, "Jordan's Risky Business", 30 June 2010, available at <http://www.merip.org/mero/mero063010.html>, accessed on 20 August 2010.

demographic imbalances in the elections system which has been a source of disappointment on the side of opposition demanding for a full scale reform.¹³³ On the part of the opposition, new law has largely conceived as a means of consolidating Transjordanian dominance in Parliament at the expense of Jordanian Palestinians and as a means of weakening the performance of political parties such as Islamic Action Front, which has been more and more appealing for Palestinians due to its rhetoric.

The announcement of a new elections law for the November parliamentary elections seems to cause tensions between the regime and the Muslim Brotherhood. The new law is said to be aiming at preventing vote buying, which was a subject of severe discussion in 2007 elections between the Muslim Brotherhood and the regime, by punishing vote buying and vote selling up to seven years in jail, a sentence that cannot be replaced with a fine.¹³⁴ However, according to the opposition, including the Muslim Brotherhood, the regime remains committed to form a parliament composed of mainly its loyalist traditional tribal base and to return a “pro-regime” parliament, excluding political opposition.¹³⁵

After the announcement of the new election law, the Muslim Brotherhood’s spokesman, Jameel Abu Baker argued that new law contains “superficial changes and show a lack of respect towards the opposition and civil society.”¹³⁶ He also expressed the movement’s view on the law as “We can clearly see that reform is only

¹³³ Under the new elections law, the southern part of the country will continue to have one seat allocated for every 3,000-5,000 citizens, while some districts in the north, particularly in metropolitan Amman where Palestinians are concentrated, will continue to have one seat for every 20,000 citizens or more.

¹³⁴ Jillian Schwedler, “Jordan’s Risky Business”, 30 June 2010, available at <http://www.merip.org/mero/mero063010.html>, accessed on 20 August 2010.

¹³⁵ Mohammad Ben Hussein, “Opposition Parties Express “Disappointment””, *The Jordan Times*, 20 May 2010, available at <http://www.jordantimes.com/index.php?news=26729&searchFor=election> law, accessed on 3 September 2010.

¹³⁶ Mohammad Ben Hussein, “The Muslim Brotherhood Criticizes New Elections Law”, *The Jordan Times*, 11 May 2010, available at <http://www.jordantimes.com/index.php?news=26459&searchFor=election> law, accessed on 3 September 2010.

words, not deeds. This legislation, if passed without genuine change, will only enhance the state of frustration and alienate most opposition groups.”¹³⁷

Today, regime’s containment policy towards the Muslim Brotherhood and its political wing appears to be strengthening radicals who opts for stronger ties with Hamas and a more confrontational stance towards the state at the expense of pragmatists who are pushing for the party to sever its links with the Palestinian Islamist group and focus on local issues. In May, Islamic Action Front Party elected Ali Abu Al-Sukkar, who was former head of Jordan’s Anti-Normalization Committee and was jailed because of paying a condolence visit to Zarqawi’s family in 2006, as President of Shura Council. Moreover, Hamzah Mansour, who was also close to the radical wing, was elected as Secretary General of the party for the coming four years in June.

In this framework, Muslim Brotherhood’s political wing, Islamic Action Front Party, decided to boycott the November parliamentary elections that indicate the marginalization of the Kingdom’s only coherent political opposition. Moreover, anger at the US policies on Middle Eastern issues which are mainly supported by the Hashemite regime, constricted political system, increasing economic disparities, inadequate opportunities and frustrations over restrictions on basic freedom of expression in Jordan caused revival of sympathy towards *jihadi* Islamism. The recommendations of the international crisis group titled “Jordan’s 9/11: Dealing With *Jihadi* Islamism” to counter political and cultural challenges to the regime from *jihadi* movements and to sustain stability in the country are indeed valid for the present day.¹³⁸ In terms of political measures, the report suggests that a new electoral law should be drafted to provide a more accurate popular representation and a more inclusive government coalition incorporating opposition tendencies should be formed. In terms of cultural measures, it argues that the regime should promote a

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ “Jordan’s 9/11: Dealing With Jihadi Islamism”, *Crisis Group Middle East Report*, No. 47, 23 November 2005, available at www.crisisgroup.org, accessed on 1 September 2010.

tolerant version of Islam and provide a concrete space for credible, competent and independent preachers who denounce violence, including those who are critical of government policy, to debate Salafi ideologues. The implementation of these measures may not only help to reduce sympathy towards radical trends but also meet the Muslim Brotherhood's demands for promised reforms and decrease the number of confrontational issues between the two parties.

Several predictions are made about the future scope of the Brotherhood's political role in Jordanian politics as well as the future of relationship between the Hashemite regime and the movement. According to Mohammad Abu Rumman, maintenance of relationship between the two parties is needed to guarantee stability in Jordan. He argues that if the relationship comes to an end, then the regime will lose Palestinian support which is mostly embedded within the movement while Jordan will lose an important model for dialogue in the region.¹³⁹ Indeed, several well-known scholars examining the history of the relationship between the Hashemite regime and the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood such as Quintan Wiktorowicz, Sabali el-Said, Glenn Robinson, Malik Mufti and Jacki Silbermann conclude that the history of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan presents an example for the compatibility of Islam with the principles of democracy and political stability.¹⁴⁰

This thesis concludes that the continuation of relationship between the regime and the movement is beneficial for both parties given the fragile structure of the Kingdom as well as volatile structure of the region. However, until fundamental change occurs either in the foreign policy orientation of the regime or in the Jordanian political system in which the political liberalization process has slowed

¹³⁹ Mohammad Abu Rumman, *The Muslim Brotherhood in the Jordanian Parliamentarian.....*, p. 19.

¹⁴⁰ Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Islamists, the State, and Cooperation in Jordan," *Arab Studies Quarterly* 21, Fall 1999, pp. 1-17; Glenn E. Robinson, "Can Islamists Be Democrats? The Case of Jordan," *Middle East Journal* 51, Summer 1997, pp. 373-88; Sabali el-Said, "Between Pragmatism and Ideology: The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan", *The Washington Institute Policy Papers*, Policy Paper No. 39, 1995; Mufti, Malik, "Elite Bargains and the Onset of Political Liberalization in Jordan", *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 1, February 1999; Jacki Silbermann, "Divergence and Discourse: Negotiations between the Hashemite Regime and the Islamic Opposition", *NIMEP Insights*, Vol. 3, Fall 2007, pp.95-111.

down, the uneasy tension between the Hashemite regime and the Muslim Brotherhood will persist and it will not turn into a partnership that experienced before the end of 1980s. If the regime reduces the scope of its repression towards the movement, pragmatists then might gain upper hand in the internal debates within the movement which is crucial for the emergence of more moderate positions. As divisions between the radicals and pragmatists in the movement concerned, the more the members of the Brotherhood or the party manage to built a common understanding in terms of their views and find a middle way, the more they grasp the advantages and opportunities granted by the regime.

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