

IRANIAN NUCLEAR CRISIS
AND
ITS IMPACT ON US-IRANIAN RELATIONS BETWEEN 1953-2008

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

SENA ÜZMEZ

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE
IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

DECEMBER 2010

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

Prof. Dr. Meliha Altunışık
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Özlem Tür
Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Özlem Tür (METU, IR) _____

Prof. Dr. Prof. Dr. Meliha Altunışık (METU, IR) _____

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Mustafa Kibaroğlu (BİLKENT UNI., IR) _____

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last name : Sena Üzmez
Signature :

ABSTRACT

IRANIAN NUCLEAR CRISIS AND ITS IMPACT ON US-IRANIAN RELATIONS BETWEEN 1953-2008

Üzmez, Sena
M.S., Department of International Relations
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Özlem Tür

December 2010, 101 pages

This thesis analyzes the U.S.-Iran relations in accordance with Iranian Nuclear Crisis from a historical perspective. Analyzing the U.S.-Iran relations since 1953 until 2008, it is possible to see that as the two countries' perceptions towards each other change, their policies towards the nuclear issue change, too. While nuclear developments were not a threat for the two states that were close allies during the Shah Era, the perceptions totally changed after the Islamic Revolution. However, even if US and Iran started to perceive each other as a threat, nuclear issue lost its importance because of Khomeini's approach in this period. With the September 11, 2001 attacks, the American approach has changed not only regarding the Middle East, but also regarding the nuclear issue in Iran. The Nuclear Crisis that started in 2002 by the announcement of secret nuclear centrals escalated to its peak with the election of Ahmedinejad as the president. Different historical facts that were experienced at different periods shaped perceptions of two nations towards each other. As these perceptions change towards each other, their perceptions regarding the nuclear issue and their policies have changed, too. In this study, how these two nations' perceptions towards each other were shaped and their approaches regarding the nuclear issue influenced by the historical events will be examined and analyzed.

Key words: USA, Iran, Nuclear Crisis, Foreign Policy.

ÖZ

İRAN NÜKLEER KRİZİ VE KRİZİN 1953- 2008 ARASI ABD-İRAN İLİŞKİLERİ ÜZERİNDEKİ ETKİSİ

Üzmez, Sena.
Yüksek lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Yardımcı Doçent Özlem Tür

Aralık 2010, 101 sayfa

Bu çalışma, İran nükleer krizi çerçevesinde Amerika-İran ilişkilerini tarihsel bir perspektiften incelemektedir. 1953'ten 2008'e dek İran ve Amerika'nın ilişkilerine baktığımızda, iki ülkenin birbirlerini algılayışları değiştikçe nükleer soruna karşı yaklaşımlarının da değiştiğini görmek mümkündür. Şah döneminde yakın dost olan iki ülke için nükleer gelişmeler hiç bir şekilde tehdit oluşturmazken, İslam Devrimi ile algılamalar tamamen değişmiştir. İslam Devrimi ile her ne kadar Amerika ve İran birbirini tehdit olarak algılamaya başlasa da, bu dönemde nükleer sorun Humeyni'nin yaklaşımından dolayı önemini kaybetmiştir. 11 Eylül 2001 saldırıları ile ABD'nin sadece Orta Doğu'ya karşı yaklaşımı değil, İran'ın nükleer soruna olan yaklaşımı da değişmiştir. 2002 yılında gizli nükleer santrallerin ortaya çıkması ile başlayan kriz Ahmedinejad'ın 2005'te devlet başkanı seçilmesi ile zirveye tırmanmıştır. Farklı dönemlerde yaşanan farklı tarihsel olaylar iki ülkenin birbirine karşı algılamaları şekillendirmiştir. Ülkelerin birbirlerine karşı olan algılamaları değiştikçe nükleer soruna karşı olan yaklaşım ve politikalar da değişmiştir. Bu çalışmada iki ülkenin birbirlerine karşı olan algılamalarının nasıl şekillendiği ve nükleer soruna karşı yaklaşımlarının tarihsel olaylardan nasıl etkilendiği incelenip, analiz edilecektir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: ABD, İran, Dış politika, Nükleer program.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor Assoc. Prof. Dr. Özlem Tür for her guidance, advice, criticism, encouragements and insight throughout the research.

I owe the greatest gratitude to my family who supported me in all I have done throughout my life and whose support I would not even be what I am and where I am today.

I would like to thank all of my friends for giving me the trust and help I needed while I was writing my thesis. I have my special thanks to Ozan Kovancı for giving me support during the preparation phase of the thesis.

To my hero dead, angel mother and beloved sister...

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM	iii
ABSTRACT	iv
ÖZ	v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	vi
DEDICATION	vii
TABLE OF THE CONTENTS	viii
ABBREVIATIONS	x
CHAPTER	
1. INTRODUCTION	1
2. 1953-1979 THE SHAH ERA & THE EMERGENCE OF THE NUCLEAR ISSUE	9
2.1. The US Foreign Policy after the Second World War in the Middle East	9
2.2. Shah's Increasing Power & The Oil Crisis.....	13
2.3. Start of Nuclear Program	18
3. ISLAMIC REVOLUTION & DETERIORATION AT NUCLEAR ISSUE BETWEEN 1979 – 2001.....	24
3.1. Islamic Revolution and Khomeini's Ideology	23
3.2. The US Dual Containment Policy and Deterioration of the Nuclear Issue	29
3.3. Rafsanjani & Khatemi Presidencies & Restart of Nuclear Issue.....	35
4. RELATIONS BETWEEN 2001-2008 & THE NUCLEAR CRISIS.....	42

4.1. September 11 Attacks and the “Axis of Evil”	42
4.2. The Concept of Preventive War.....	46
4.3. Iranian Nuclear Crisis	52
4.3.1. Announcement of Secret Nuclear Facilities	52
4.3.2. Tehran Declaration of October 2003	54
4.3.3. Suspension problem of Tehran Declaration and the Paris Agreement.....	56
4.3.4. Security Council Report.....	57
4.3.5. Security Council December 2006 First Sanctions - UNSC Resolution 1737(2006)	58
4.3.6. Security Council March 2007 Second Sanctions - UNSC Resolution 1747(2007)	59
4.3.7. Security Council March 2008 Third Sanctions - UNSC Resolution 1803(2008)	61
4.3.8. Security Council September 2008 Fourth Sanctions - UNSC Resolution 1835(2008)	63
4.4. The Policy of the US in Nuclear Crisis.....	64
4.4.1. The US’ Policy & International Response.....	67
4.5. The Policy of the Iran in Nuclear Crisis	73
4.5.1. The Iran’s Policy & International Response.....	78
5. CONCLUSION.....	84
BIBLIOGRAPHY	93

ABBREVIATIONS

- (EU)** European Union
- (EU-3)** Great Britain, France and Germany
- (IAEA)** International Atomic Energy Agency
- (NCRI)** The National Council of Resistance of Iran
- (NPT)** Non-Proliferation Treaty
- (SNSC)** The Supreme National Security Council
- (UN)** United Nations
- (UNSC)** United Nations Security Council
- (US)** United States

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In August 2002, an Iranian opposition group which is called The National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) publicly released an underground “nuclear fuel production” facility under construction at Natanz and of a heavy-water production facility in Arak.¹ The discovery of nuclear Natanz installation demonstrated the Iranian mastery of complex process of enriching nearly weapon-grade uranium. Tehran has been similarly active in the development of plutonium route enrichment capabilities that were much more advanced than initially anticipated. Since 2002 there have been lots of talks, negotiations, and declarations between different actors but still the problem cannot be solved.

Iran nuclear crises can be determined as one of the most complicated hallmark of the international arena. Although the main actors of the crisis are the United States (US) and Iran, there are also different players in this game such as the European Union (EU) countries, Russia, Israel and China. While Iran considers nuclear development for energy is its natural right, US criticizes Iran’s nuclear position and perceives Iran as the main threat to global security. The US saw undeclared nuclear activities of Iran as an important evidence for Iranian deceit about its nuclear program and supports economic sanctions and political isolation of Iran. Since the crises broke out, despite the sanctions imposed by the United Nations (UN) and the negotiations of the EU-3 (Great Britain, France and Germany) countries, there has not been any change; Iran continues its nuclear activities.

¹ The International Institute for Strategic Studies(IISS) strategic dossier: *Iran’s Strategic Weapon’s Programmes*, ed. Gary Samore (New York: Routledge, 2005),16.

This thesis aims at analysing the US – Iranian relations from a historical perspective and its impact on the Iranian nuclear issue. My main research questions are; “Why is Iran trying to become a nuclear power?”, "Why does the US see nuclear Iran as one of the most important threat for itself and security of the world?" and "How does the US – Iranian relations and nuclear crisis affect each other?"

While the US argues that Iran has no need for nuclear energy and the country is superbly endowed with natural resources of oil and gas that are significantly cheaper to develop, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) focuses on controlling and limiting Iran’s access to proscribed technologies. However these activities address the core of Iran’s motivations to develop nuclear technology such as its perception of insecurity and vulnerability against antagonists with greater military capabilities. Iran’s policy depends on the type of relationship it has with the US, the emerging security architecture in the Persian Gulf and the evolving nature of its domestic politics.² While diplomacy should underlie US strategy, it is also obvious that the current US and European diplomatic approach and several United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions have not succeeded in stopping Iran from developing its nuclear capacity.

Although the US is the main advocator of stopping Iran’s nuclear development, surprisingly it was again the US who provided the basic nuclear research facilities to Iran during the late 1960s. Actually, Iran’s nuclear program began in 1967, when the country received a US research reactor as part of “Atoms for Peace” agreement signed by Reza Shah Pahlavi and the Eisenhower administration in 1957. However, the US’ approach to Iran’s nuclear program

² Ibid, 52.

changed as the relations of two states changed. Especially after the Islamic revolution, Iran's nuclear program was started to be seen as a problem but it was not considered a pressing concern, an attitude possibly attributable to Iran's compliance with IAEA safeguards and Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations.³ However in 2002 this position changed. After the report of The National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) Iran's nuclear program quickly became one of the most important international concerns in the Middle East. Moreover, the summer of 2005 marked the election of neoconservative candidate Mahmud Ahmadinejad as well as escalating tensions resulting in the passage of several UN sanctions regimes. Till the summer of 2005 Iran kept the door open for negotiations and possible solutions on the nuclear dilemma. However with the election of Ahmadinejad every previous possibility of a diplomatic solution vis-à-vis the Iranian nuclear program was refused.⁴

When we consider Iran's nuclear issue and the US response of it, we realize that due to bilateral relationship US' attitude towards Iran's nuclear policy has changed. Between 1953 and 1979, during the Shah Period Iran started its first nuclear development and built up its first nuclear research centers. Filling the power gap that emerged with the withdrawal of Great Britain from Suez was the primary aim of the US at that time. Hence, the US chose to cooperate with Iran as a powerful state in the region. With the oil revenue that Iran gained by the oil crisis, Shah started to develop nuclear research centers for Iran in 1960s. Not only had the US, but also Germany and France helped Iran to get nuclear technology. At the domestic level, Iranians

³ Mahjoob Zweiri, "Revisiting the Iranian Nuclear Dilemma: A Study of 2002-2009 Developments", *Ortadoğu Etüdleri*, (January 2010), 37.

⁴ *Ibid*, 40.

were not pleased with the close alignment with the US at that time because they interpreted Shah's policy as a dependency to the US' regional desires and global strategy. 1953 coup also caused to start hostility in Iranian public towards the US. Also, Shah's policies like the White Revolution caused the rise of dissatisfaction among Iranians. During this period, nuclear policy of Iran was not a problem for the US; contrarily the US was one of the most important supporter and promoter of Iran's nuclear technology. This is mainly because of circumstances of the Cold War era. Shah was the close ally of the US and the policeman of the Gulf for Washington. Hence, nuclear issue was not a real issue until the Islamic Revolution.

With the Islamic Revolution everything has changed between the US and Iran. Close alignment left itself into a deep hostility and both the US and Iran has started to perceive each other as enemies. For Khomeini, the US was the "Great Satan" and for the US, Iran was the most important threat for both regional and global security. However, because of Khomeini's approach to the nuclear issue, there is no nuclear issue during this period. Khomeini stopped all nuclear activities of Iran because he interpreted nuclear reactors as the suspicious western inventions. Hence even if conflicts between US and Iran escalated to the peak point and caused serious crises such as hostage crisis, during this period the problems had nothing to do with the nuclear issue. During the Khomeini period, Iran also ended nuclear cooperations with Germany and France. New foreign policy of Khomeini also pushed the US to implement new policy towards the Middle East and Iran. In this regard, during the Iran-Iraq War, US chose to provide information to Iraq about the Iranian troops' movement to counterbalancing Iran by striking a tacit alliance with Iraq and opposing the Soviet Union by fortifying the American military presence in the

Persian Gulf. With the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq and the end of the Cold War in 1990, the US started to implement a dual containment policy in the region and by this policy the US started to isolate the two challengers in the region -Iran and Iraq- politically, economically and militarily. Hence until the end of the Khomeini period, even if the two states perceived each other as security threats, such relationships were not connected to the nuclear issue as there was no nuclear issue during that period.

With the election of Rafsanjani, nuclear policy of Iran restarted. During the era of reconstruction, Iran tried to resume its nuclear program. However, Iran could not find the assistance that it expected from the Western countries. Because of US pressure, Western powers were not willing to cooperate with Iran in terms of its nuclear program. The approaches of western powers to Iran's nuclear aim pushed Iran to cooperate with China and Russia. Main reason for the restart of nuclear development can be determined as the isolation of Iran during the Gulf War. Even if the US perceived Iran's nuclear aims as a threat for itself and tried to prevent assistance of western powers to Iran's nuclear policy, nuclear issue was not a crisis in the US-Iranian relations till September 11.

September 11, 2001 attacks are one of the most important turning points not only for the nuclear issue but also for all dimensions of international relations. September 11 attacks strengthened the threat perceptions and caused radicalization both in the US and in Iran. The US "Axis of Evil" argument and preventive war changed balance in the Middle East. With Afghanistan and Iraq Wars, US and Iran became neighbors to each other. Iran started to feel the existence of US in the region and tried to implement policies to protect itself from any possible attack of the US.

With the coming to power Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005, Iran focused on the nuclear policy as its primary aim and almost any issue in the US and Iranian relations became related to the nuclear issue. Radical speeches between Bush and Ahmadinejad, caused escalation of the nuclear crisis and the nuclear issue turned into a real nuclear crisis during this period. Since the beginning of the crisis, US always maintains that Iran aims to produce nuclear weapons and urges Iran to stop its nuclear issue totally. The US sees economic and political isolation of Iran as the only way to prevent Tehran from producing nuclear weapons. In response to the US, Iran has claimed its nuclear program serves only peaceful purposes. However, with the election of Ahmadinejad as the president nuclear crisis came to a bottleneck.

When we analyze the policies of the US and Iran during the nuclear crisis, we see that backgrounds of two states and their old experiences are still affecting their policies towards each other. In this respect, understanding and analyzing turning points in the past are very important to understand the policies of these two states.

As Ali Ansari noted in his book *Confronting Iran*;

The events of 1953 were a foundational moment in the construction of US-Iran relations and transferred Iran suspicions from the historic Anglo-Russian axis towards Americans. The events of 1979 crystallized this tradition. The revolution of 1979 bound Iran and the United States in intimate ideological relationship, defined by a collective and shared traumatic experience. The political hysteria that characterized British reactions to Iran in 1951 and perplexed their American interlocutors would now affect the Americans in more intense and socialized manner.⁵

The coup against Mosaddeq in 1953 is perceived as a turning point in the US-Iranian relations by many Iranian professionals and political class. Although two states had close relations during, the Shah Period, the Iranian Revolution symbolized

⁵ Ali M. Ansari, *Confronting Iran* (London: Hurst&Company,2006),70.

the main change in the US-Iranian relations and the perceptions of the two states. Hence, the main causes of hostility towards the US in Iran are intertwined with the causes of revolution. Understanding the causes of revolution and evolution of relations would be useful for us to understand the hostility between the US and Iran. September 11 attacks are also an other important dynamic that affect the US and Iran's policies. So, experiences of states in the past also affect their current perceptions related about security. In this research, I will focus on the turning points and the main historical events that shaped today's US-Iranian threat perceptions and their current policies in the nuclear crises.

It is possible to divide the historical developments in the nuclear issue into three main periods. First one is between 1953-1979, the Shah Period. This period reflects the close alignment of two states and the emergence of the nuclear program. The second period is between 1979 – 2001, which reflects the dramatic change in the relations of two states. During this period we also see the deterioration at nuclear issue. Last period is between 2001-2008, it reflects the effect of September 11 attacks to relations and also the real nuclear crisis. This thesis analyzes the nuclear issue in the respect of these three time periods, within three chapters from a historical perspective.

In the first chapter, the reason of close alignment of the US and Iran at the Shah Era will be examined. In this regard, twin pillars policy of the US and its security concerns will be studied. At regional level, oil crisis and its effect on the relations and the start of the nuclear program will be analyzed. Moreover, the rising American hostility will be reflected in domestic level. In second chapter the Islamic revolution and its impact on relations with the US and Iran's foreign policy will be

dealt with. The Gulf War, dual containment policy of the US and the difference between Khomeini's and Rafsanjani's nuclear policies stand out as important aspects in this context. In the last chapter, I will analyze the nuclear crisis that started in 2002. First the September 11 attacks, Afghanistan and Iraq Wars that shaped the perceptions of the US and Iran towards each other will be studied. Then the Iranian Nuclear Crisis and UN sanctions will be analyzed. At international level, focus will be on Russia, China and EU's role in the nuclear crisis. Finally at the domestic level the effect of Ahmedinejad's election as the president both to the nuclear crisis and to US-Iranian relations will be studied.

CHAPTER 2
1953-1979 THE SHAH ERA
&
THE EMERGENCE OF THE NUCLEAR ISSUE

2.1.The US Foreign Policy After the Second World War in the Middle East

After the Second World War the US and the Soviet Union became two superpowers of the world and during the Cold War both of them challenged each other in a constant struggle for power and control. Both for the US and the Soviet Union, the Middle East was one of the most important regions because of its strategic place and oil. Both of them tried to protect their interests by making alliances in the region.

During the first years of the Cold War, the main aim of the US foreign policy can be determined as containing the Soviet Union by providing economic and military assistance to the states that are under the threat of the communism. Iran was one of the most critical states for the US because in 1945 Iran was confronted with threats to its sovereignty by the Soviet Union. In Iran the crisis was caused by the declaration of autonomous government of Azerbaijan with the Moscow's support in November 1945. A month later, Kurdish groups also proclaimed their autonomy in the southwestern region of Azerbaijan. In response, the Iranian government presented a complaint to the UN Security Council with strong support of the US. Following this in 1946, the Soviet Union withdrew its forces from Iranian territory. The US interpreted all these activities of the Soviet Union as aggressive intentions

toward its neighbours and an expansionist power's aim for spreading communism throughout the world.⁶

The concerns of the US were reinforced with the crises in Turkey and Greece. In Turkey crisis with the Soviet Union was occasioned by the claims of Moscow for a greater share in governing and policing Turkish Straits. Demands of the Soviet Union for military rights to the Dardanelles with Turkey and its will for joint defense of the straits with Turkey in 1946 were interpreted as a sign of expansionism of the Soviet Union. In the same year, a communist insurgency outbreaked in Greece. Hence, along with Iran, Turkey and Greece constituted the first line of defense against communism of the US policy.⁷

In this regard, the US started to implement Truman Doctrine in 1947. It is based on the belief that unless the US intervened, the Soviet Union was likely to gain the control of Greece, Turkey and other states of the Middle East. Hence, the Truman Doctrine aimed to provide military assistance and economic aid to Greece and Turkey. The US containment policy also included plans to construct network of interlocking alliances among the states of the Middle East.⁸

In 1950, the attack of North Korean forces to South Korea increased the Soviet threat in the international arena. Truman's sentence "Here (Iran) is where they will start trouble if we aren't careful"⁹ shows the importance of Iran and the security of Middle East region for the US. From Truman's point of view for ensuring the

⁶ William L. Cleveland, "A history of the Modern Middle East", USA: Westview Press, 1994.259-260.

⁷ Malcolm Byrne, *The Road to Intervention Factors Influencing U.S. Policy Toward Iran 1945-1953*, ed. Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2004), 205.

⁸ William L. Cleveland, "A history of the Modern Middle East", USA: Westview Press, 1994.271.

⁹ Malcolm Byrne, *The Road to Intervention Factors Influencing U.S. Policy Toward Iran 1945-1953*, ed. Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2004), 107.

nation's security and protecting them against the Soviet Union's threat, the US should provide not only military aid but also provide economic aid.¹⁰

In the late 1950s, Iran has domestic problems because of economic and social structure in the country. Especially in 1940s and early 1950s, national sovereignty was increasingly connected to the oil issue. The Majlis (Iranian Parliament) supported Mosaddeq as Prime Minister and pressured the Shah to appoint him.¹¹ For Mosaddeq, national sovereignty of a country like Iran for so long under foreign domination and occupation, meant national control over its resources and politics. Hence international developments could be addressed only after national interests were secured. In 1949 the oil nationalization bill was passed and Mosaddeq became prime minister of Iran.¹² After being Prime Minister Mossaddeq nationalized the oil in Iran. The principal objective of oil nationalization as declared by Mosaddeq and his colleagues was to attain complete oil independence in order to establish a lasting democratic government in Iran. However, this failed by the coup d'état of 1953, which was carried out by the US.¹³

The Mosaddeq case caused the change in the US policy towards Iran because Washington understood that for consolidating Shah regime and improving loyalty of armed forces, it should also provide technical and economic assistance to Iran.¹⁴

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Mustafa Kibaroglu, "Iran's Nuclear Ambitions from a Historical Perspective and the Attitude of the West" *Middle Eastern Studies* (vol.43, no.2),224.

¹² Mazier Behrooz, *The 1953 Coup in Iran and the Legacy of the Tudeh*, ed. Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne (New York: Syracuse University Press,2004),107.

¹³ Homa Katouzian, *Mosaddeq's Government in Iranian History*, ed. Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne (New York: Syracuse University Press,2004),2.

¹⁴ Mustafa Kibaroglu, "Iran's Nuclear Ambitions from a Historical Perspective and the Attitude of the West" *Middle Eastern Studies* (vol.43, no.2),224.

Hence, the US started to give the new regime total support. In this period American policy in Iran was primarily concerned with helping Iran to ensure stability and economic well-being against the Soviet Union's expansionist activities.¹⁵ The 1953 coup also marks the first important historical event that still affects Iranian's attitudes towards the US. The American intervention of August 1953 was a momentous event in the history of Iran-American relations which were damaged for the next years following the revolution of 1979. The US intervention in Iran in 1953 was well known to Iranians but was not widely publicized in the US until the revolution in the late 1970s.¹⁶

In 1950s the American policy was evolved toward a formula that was an alliance with traditional regional regimes and opposition to nationalist regimes. In this regard, in 1955 the Baghdad Pact was created by an alliance between Turkey and Iraq to which Britain, Pakistan and Iran soon became parties. American support for an alliance which includes Arab States caused security concerns in Israel during this period. Even if the US has the main role in signing of the Baghdad Pact, Israel's opposition prevented formal membership of the US; however the US continued its informal participation to the Pact.¹⁷

In 1956 with the withdrawal of Great Britain after the Suez Canal War from the east of Suez increased tension at the region. This withdrawal left a power vacuum in the region, causing a competition between Iran and Iraq in the Persian Gulf. The

¹⁵ Richard W. Cottam, *Iran and The United States A Cold War Case Study*, (London:University of Pittsburgh Press,116.

¹⁶ James A. Bill, *America, Iran, and the politics of intervention, 1951-1953*, ed. James A. Bill and WM. Roger Louis (London: I.B.Tauris Co&Ltd,1988),285.

¹⁷ Richard W. Cottam, *Iran and The United States A Cold War Case Study*, (London:University of Pittsburgh Press,118.

Suez Canal Crisis was also important for the US role in the region, because the US started to act as the dominant power of the region. The US started to implement the Eisenhower Doctrine which can be summarized as “aiding non-communist Middle Eastern nations threatened by armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism and using armed forces to assist any such nation or group of nations requesting assistance”.¹⁸

2.2. Shah’s Increasing Power & The Oil Crisis

With the help of the US assistance, Shah was consolidating his power and strengthening his internal control day by day. The period from 1965 to 1975 can be determined as the best years of the Shah’s monarchy because during this period the problems could be easily covered up by the revenue of oil. However, Shah’s White Revolution project increased the domestic problems. Shah started “White Revolution” project aiming modernization and liberalization, to achieve a degree of independence, to connect with the poor with the help of agricultural reform for reducing the class tensions and support for communism in 1963. The reforms mainly consisted of profit sharing for workers, establishing Literacy Corps and right to vote for women. Although the Shah was hopeful for his reforms, these reforms increased the opposition towards him. Neither farmers nor the clergy was happy with the reforms. The farmers were not happy because the agricultural reforms were good for the tenants, the ulama was not happy because they were afraid of losing their

¹⁸ Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions from a Historical Perspective and the Attitude of the West” *Middle Eastern Studies* (vol.43, no.2), 225.

religiously endowed landings. The system of Shah helped only the rich people and the more the rich got richer, the more the poor got poorer.¹⁹

In 1968 Richard Nixon; a Republican, came to power in the US and two leaders developed a close friendship in addition to the diplomatic relations. In the respect of the Nixon doctrine the US preferred encouraging regional powers for composing security at different regions rather than involving directly. Hence, till the revolution the US followed state-centered approach and tried to maintain stability between states through regional balance of power and protecting the territorial integrity of weak allies from regional states such as Kuwait, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. In the Gulf, the US relied heavily on the two key states of Iran and Saudi Arabia, a strategy that quickly became known as the “Twin Pillar Policy”.²⁰

Concerning Nixon’s twin-pillar policy, the US aimed to control the Gulf by the help of Saudi Arabia and Iran for preventing the Soviet dominance at the region. However Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabi politics, low population and limitations for diversified growth caused an obstacle on the way of becoming a dominant power in the region. On the other hand Iran’s capacity was enough for providing regional stability and security. Hence, the US chose Iran as its main ally and the main player in the region.²¹

This atmosphere affected the social relations between the two states especially in terms of student exchanges and workers. This interaction also affected

¹⁹April R Summitt, “For a White Revolution: John F. Kennedy and the Shah of Iran”, *The Middle East Journal* (Autumn 2004),569.

²⁰ Gary Sick, *The United States in the Persian Gulf: From Twin Pillars to Dual Containment*, ed.David W. Lesch (USA:Westview Press, 1996),284.

²¹ Nathan Gonzalez, *Engaging Iran: The Rise of a Middle East Powerhouse and America’s Strategic Choice* (London: Praeger Security International, 2007),50.

the perceptions of the two nations. The presence of the American military in Iran was felt by the younger generation and some left-wing students criticized the American television as a colonizing actor. The presence of the Americans in Iran was surprising for the Iranians because while they expected that the development in military equipment would decrease the US presence in Iran contrarily it increased the presence of Americans and also the dependency. As a result the Iranians started to feel a big disappointment towards the US.²²

Income from oil was also strengthening Iran's economy. In terms of preserving the stability and minimizing the Soviet affect in the region the alliance between Iran and the US was working however the combination of the US unconditional support and Iran's new oil wealth caused some changes at the Shah policy. Shah started to use its rising power in a way which the US did not support and used his rising power for his own dominance in the Gulf Region. In this context, the most important issue that the Shah and the US differed was the price of oil.

For punishing the Western states because of their support to Israel in the 1973 Yom Kippur War between the Arab states and Israel, Arab states started the oil boycott. This was the first change in the balance between the oil consumers and producers. Although the Shah criticized the use of oil as a weapon at first, within three months he decided that it was a good time to increase the oil prices. In a press conference in Iran in December 1973, the Shah who would start to be described as the "Emperor of Oil" said that:

As far as the industrial world I concerned... the era of extraordinary progress and income- and an even more extraordinary income-based on cheap oil has ended. They should find new energy resources and gradually tighten their belts, and eventually all the children of wealthy families who have plenty to eat, who have cars and who act almost like terrorists, planting bombs here and there, or choosing other ways will

²²Ali M. Ansari, *Confronting Iran* (London: Hurst&Company,2006),69.

have to reconsider these aspects of this developed industrialized world. They will have to work harder.²³

The Shah announced he was taking over the oil consortium altogether in January 1973 and by this way completing the nationalization which Mosaddeq started twenty-two years before. Hearing an announcement like this from its ally was shocking for the US. The Shah used this war as an opportunity for rising oil prices and by convincing from Iran, the Gulf oil states raised oil prices from \$3.01 oil per barrel to \$5.12. In addition to this, an embargo towards the US on oil sales was announced by the Arab states and they added that they would continue to cut in production by 5 percent every month until the US stopped its support for Israel and Israel agreed to withdraw to the 1967 borders. However, unlike the Arab States, Iran did not put embargo on the US and continued to sell oil to the US. By this way Iran made a huge profit.²⁴

After the negotiation of the OPEC oil ministers in Tehran, the oil prices had increased again to a price of \$11.65 per barrel. Considering the new boost Nixon wrote a personal message to its “ally” in the Middle East and requested from him to reconsider the increase on the oil prices. Shah answered this request with the sentences following; “America and the other industrialized nations will have to realize that the era of their terrific progress and even more terrific income and wealth based on cheap oil is finished...”²⁵ The oil crises which caused serious separations between the two allies continued until March 1974 and resulted in a 276 percent

²³ Ibid, 61.

²⁴ Keneth M. Polack, *The Persian Puzzle* (New York: Random House, 2004),105.

²⁵ Ibid, 105.

increase in oil prices.²⁶ When Gerald Ford publicly called for a reduction in oil prices in September 1974, the Shah fired back with the memorable line, “No one can dictate to us. No one can wave a finger at us, because we will wave a finger back.”²⁷

While the oil embargo pushed the Western states into a recession, it pushed Iran into wealth. Oil revenues of Iran grew from \$885 million in 1971 to \$17.8 billion in 1975. The Shah used this resource for new weaponry thus Iran’s defense budget moved to \$9.4 billion in 1977 from \$1.4 billion in 1972.²⁸ Despite the close relation between the US and Iran, the US was concerned because of the possibility of a military program as a part of the nuclear developments. However, consolidation of the Shah’s regime in Iran was very important for the US and the policy approved by the Richard Nixon in 1972 asserted that Iran should act as the policing power in the region and in this respect it should be able to buy any military hardware short of nuclear weapons. Thus, Iran became the largest single buyer of US arms.²⁹ Shah’s desire to buy weapons from the US was also good for the US because the more the Shah bought weapons from the US, the more the US gained its money back that it had given for oil. With the growing oil wealth, Iran started to buy weapons and become an important regional player in the region.

²⁶ Ibid, 106-107.

²⁷ Andrew Scott Cooper, “Showdown at Doha: The Secret Oil Deal That Helped Sink the Shah of Iran”, *Middle East Journal*, Autumn 2008, 575.

²⁸ Seth P. Tillman, *The United States in the Middle East* (The US:Indiana University Press),77.

²⁹ Kenneth M. Polack, *The Persian Puzzle* (New York: Random House, 2004),104.

2.3.Start of Nuclear Program

At the beginning of Cold War, even if the US started to make alliances for preventing the spread of communist threat to the other parts of the world and provide economic and military assistance to the states in the region, at the beginning it chose not to share nuclear technology with other states. Building up of nuclear weapons by the US was necessary to contain the Soviet Union expansionism and being the only state who has the capability of nuclear weapons make the US most powerful state. However in 1949, the Soviet Union also reached the same capability of producing nuclear weapons. At the end of World War II, when the United States had the only nuclear weapons in the world, President Harry Truman proposed to destroy the U.S. nuclear arsenal if other countries would agree not to acquire nuclear weapons and would permit inspections to verify that agreement. However, the Soviet Union rejected this approach; it was already seeking its own nuclear weapons.³⁰

Eisenhower's 1953 "Atoms for Peace" speech, which proposed providing assistance to other countries in the peaceful uses of atomic energy, came after the failure of the U.S. nonproliferation efforts. The US changed its policy and started to share nuclear technology with its close ally Great Britain. As a result of Eisenhower's proposal, the U.S. Atomic Energy Act was amended to authorize nuclear assistance to others. The United States, followed by the Soviet Union, France, and others, began providing research reactors to non-nuclear-weapon states around the world.³¹ In this sense, Iran's first research reactor with 5 megawatt (MWth) capacity was built in

³⁰ George Bunn, "The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: History and Current Problems", *Arms Control Association*, October 2009, 2.

³¹ *Ibid*, 2.

Tehran University in 1955 by a nuclear cooperation agreement with the US.³² In the following decade, Iran signed several agreements with the US to buy reactors, with Germany and France. Moreover, Iran purchased a ten percent share in a uranium enrichment plant built by a French company. In short, Western governments and companies started to work with Tehran to help Iran's nuclear development.³³

Following the speech of "Atoms For Peace", nuclear technology and information were started to be transferred to different states which were seen as allies very fast. This situation created a need for a formal institution. Hence International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was created to respond fears and provide both assistance and inspectors for peaceful nuclear activities in 1957.³⁴

In 1960s France and China also mastered nuclear technology to acquire nuclear weapons. China's attempt to get its first nuclear weapon caused increase of concerns at international arena and in 1968, Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was approved. The NPT was created for three main aims that can be listed as non- proliferation, disarmament and the right to peaceful use of nuclear technology.³⁵ The NPT was aiming to ban all members except the number of declared nuclear weapon states at five as the US, Russia, UK, France and China. The treaty also aims to prevent the spread of nuclear energy and to further the goal of

³² Mustafa Kibaroglu, "Iran'in Nükleer Programı: Aktörler ve Etkileri" in Kaosa Doğru İran edited by Osman Metin Öztürk and Yalçın Sarıkaya, sf. 72.

³³ Gawdat Baghdad, "Nuclear Proliferation:The Islamic Republic of Iran", *Iranian Studies* (September 2006),308-309.

³⁴ Mustafa Kibaroglu, "Iran'in Nükleer Programı: Aktörler ve Etkileri" in Kaosa Doğru İran edited by Osman Metin Öztürk and Yalçın Sarıkaya, sf. 90.

³⁵ Arzu Celalifer Ekinci, "İran Nükleer Krizi", (Ankara:2009), 16.

achieving nuclear disarmament.³⁶ In the NPT of 1968, the IAEA also gained authority for policing the nuclear activities of member countries to ensure that those without nuclear weapons did not acquire them.³⁷ In July 1968, Iran also signed Non Proliferation Treaty and the Majlis ratified the Treaty in February 1970. In addition, Iran completed a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA. By this way, Iran accepted IAEA inspections on all “source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other explosive devices”.³⁸

Although today the US declares that it could not understand the will of Iran for generating nuclear energy as a state which has so much oil, in 1970s it was again the US that determined the same will of Iran as meaningful and necessary. In fact Richard Helm, the US Ambassador of Iran and later the head of the CIA, wrote to the Shah “We have noted the priority that His Imperial Majesty gives to developing alternative means of energy production through nuclear power. This is clearly an area in which we might most usefully begin on a specific program of cooperation and collaboration”.³⁹ This sentence shows the US’ constructive approach towards Iran’s nuclear program at the time. Certainly, the US’ positive approach towards Iran’s desire for having nuclear technology was structured in the conditions of that period.

³⁶ <http://www.iaea.org/About/history.html> History of the IAEA (accessed in 25 April,2010)

³⁷ <http://www.armscontrol.org/print/1419> Arms Control Association (accessed in 25 April, 2010)

³⁸ The International Institute for Strategic Studies(IISS) strategic dossier: *Iran’s Strategic Weapon’s Programmes*, ed. Gary Samore (New York: Routledge, 2005), 10.

³⁹ Muhammad Sahimi, “Iran's Nuclear Energy Program”, *Energy*, (Winter 2005),1.

In 1972 Nixon and Henry Kissinger stopped off Iran while they were turning back from their visit to Moscow and it was announced that Iran was allowed to purchase any non-nuclear weapon it wanted from the US in the respect of the twin pillars policy of the US.⁴⁰ The US believed that the two countries shared the same interests in the region and in that sense the Shah was one of the best allies of the US.⁴¹ The US saw the Shah of Iran as a perfect controller for the region because of his will for stability, opposition to Nasser, the other Arab radicals, communism and the Soviet Union.⁴²

In the decade after 1973, Iran's economic growth reached such an impressive level even before the rise at oil prices. After the oil crises the Shah had money to spend and nuclear technology was one of the most significant areas that the Shah chose for developing. For the US, providing nuclear technology to Iran could be a balancing way of the huge oil expenses. The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) was established in 1974 under the Swiss trained physicist Dr Akbar Etemad by Shah Reza Pehlevi who announced the plan for generating 23,000 MW of nuclear energy within 20 years. In 1974, the US signed a ten year agreement for supplying enriched uranium to Iran. For developing nuclear capabilities, Iran started to work in cooperation with different states from Europe such as France and Germany. In this respect, Iran signed contracts with German company Kraftwerk Union AG (KWU) in July for twin 1,300 MW light water reactors and with the French Company

⁴⁰ Keneth M. Polack, *The Persian Puzzle* (New York: Random House, 2004),103-104.

⁴¹ Henner Fürtig, "Conflict and Cooperation in the Persian Gulf: The Interregional Order and US", *The Middle East Journal* (Autumn 2007), 628.

⁴² Nikki R. Keddie and Eric Hooglund, *The Iranian Revolution and The Islamic Republic* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1982),174.

Framatome for twin 900MW light water reactors which were going to be built near the city of Busehr and Ahvaz. In addition to these contracts, Iran also signed “letters of intent” for buying six reactors from France, four from Germany and eight from the US which were twenty-two reactors in total and capable of generating about 23,000 MW of electrical power. Canada also signed nuclear cooperation agreement with Iran and Britain agreed to provide nuclear training to Iranian scientists.⁴³ In 1960s and 70s Iran tried to develop its technological and technical infrastructure so during these years Iranian students and technicians went to Europe. The states in Europe supported the nuclear studies in Iran because of the economic gains that they made. In addition Shah extended one billion loan to the France in 1974 to help launch European enrichment consortium Eurodif.⁴⁴

In 1975 the Ford administration encouraged Tehran to develop multinational reprocessing facility in Iran with the US assistance. In this sense, the US offered Tehran to buy and operate a U.S. built reprocessing facility for extracting plutonium from nuclear reactor fuel. The deal was for a complete nuclear fuel cycle reactors. From Ford’s point of view “introduction of nuclear power will both provide for the growing needs of Iran’s economy and free remaining oil reserves for export or conversation to petrochemicals.”⁴⁵

Carter Administration in late 1970s tried to change the policy of the US towards Iran because of Iran’s increasing power and independence pushed the US to

⁴³The International Institute for Strategic Studies(IISS) strategic dossier: *Iran’s Strategic Weapon’s Programmes*, ed. Gary Samore (New York: Routledge, 2005), 11.

⁴⁴ Ibid,10-11.

⁴⁵ Dafna Linzer, “Past Arguments Don’t Square With Current Iran Policy”, *The Washington Post*, 27 March 2005.(accessed in 12 January 2010).

reshape its security relations with Tehran. Although the Carter Administration would like to persuade the Shah to reduce its arms purchases, it could not achieve this because the Shah was prepared to purchase arms also from the Soviet Union. Iran had emerged as the significant regional power but it was still important for deterring direct Soviet expansionism in the Middle East region.⁴⁶ Hence, President Carter's policy was similar to the Ford's in early 1970s. In 1978 a new agreement was signed between the two states and the US presented Iran as the "most favored nation" status for fuel reprocessing. In addition, US-Iran Energy Agreement was signed. This agreement was aiming to facilitate cooperation in the field of nuclear energy, to govern the export and transfer of equipment and material to Iran.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ Babak, Ganji. *Politics of Confrontation The Foreign Policy of the USA and Revolutionary Iran* (New York: 2006),19.

⁴⁷ Mustafa Kibaroglu, "Iran's Nuclear Ambitions from a Historical Perspective and the Attitude of the West" *Middle Eastern Studies* (vol.43, no.2),230.

CHAPTER 3
ISLAMIC REVOLUTION
&
DETERIORATION AT NUCLEAR ISSUE BETWEEN 1979 – 2001

3.1. Islamic Revolution and Khomeini's Ideology

When the Shah was toppled down, it was very surprising for everyone. Although the circumstances for the Iranian Revolution available in the late 1960s and 1970s very few people predicted it. In January 1979, the Shah's government collapsed, he and his family fled into exile. On 1 February, Khomeini returned to Iran in triumph. There was a national referendum and Khomeini won a landslide victory. He declared an Islamic republic and was appointed Iran's political and religious leader for life. In addition Islamic law was introduced across the country.

Khomeini was not only the undisputed supreme leader of the new Iran but also the one who would solve the problems, clarify the chaos and make the decisions. He was again the person who built up the essence of the new Iran's ideology when he was exiled in Paris. Khomeini's idea was mainly concentrated on a political authority for a single cleric. "Velayet-e Faqih", which means the rule of jurisprudent, was the central actor of Khomeini's ideal Islamic state which would be controlled by a theocratic minded leader. It was referring the establishment of an Islamic state by a nobly guided Islamic jurist. According to Khomeini, Islam was the only source which could provide a complete law system, morality and governance.⁴⁸

⁴⁸Wilfried Buchta, "Taking Stock of a Quarter Century of the Islamic Republic of Iran", Islamic Legal Studies Program (June 2005),5-6.

Although revolutions realize with the interaction of so many different determinants in a state, it is very obvious that the most important actors of the revolutions are people in that state. The Islamic revolution also shows the capability of Islam as an ideology capable of mobilizing masses and cause regime change. However, the fact of the attendance to Iranian Revolution and the high support for Khomeini did not mean that all these people espoused the Khomeini's ideology totally. In that circumstances people were not really interested in the Khomeini's methods, they were supporting him because of economic and social problems, inequality, the dominance of the US in Iran and the Shah's administration. Hence, Islamic revolution is the result of double alienation. First the Shah does not have a strong legitimacy in the eyes of people. Second foreign factors, especially the US involved in domestic policies of Iran and the alliance with the US was seen as a source of weakness of the administration. Hence, domestic discontent is the most important factor that causes the revolution.⁴⁹ Khomeini got the full support from both the lower classes, middle classes even traditional land-owning classes and students because his ideas and criticisms about the Shah regime were overlapping with the masses. The support of people to Khomeini for his ideas about the US and ending the dominance of the US show the Iranian people's discontents about the close relations between the US and Iran.

The Islamic Revolution could be determined as a turning point in terms of both domestic and foreign policy. The obvious fact is that the revolution affected the US and Iran's relations most of all. This is fundamentally related about the spirit of the revolution and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's approach. After the revolution

⁴⁹ Manoucher Ganji, *Defying the Iranian Revolution* (USA: Praeger Publishers, 2002),34-35.

Islam became the principal influence in forming the character of Iran's relations with the outside world. Islamic notions of nation, state and interstate relations shaped the Iranian administration's world view. Export of the revolution and independence from both the East and the West or "Neither west nor east" policy were the two basic concepts of revolutionary Iran.⁵⁰

Relations with the US also started to be change dramatically with the Hostage Crisis. The first occupation of the US embassy was on Valentine's Day in 1979 but it was ended in a very short time by the Khomeini forces. The embassy attack was realized in a period when the US was trying to manage the transition in Iran and find the ways for improvement despite the disagreements. Mainly the US was trying to implement a wait and see policy. Although the US embassy declared that Americans understood and respected the revolution and would not interfere to Iran's domestic politics, the Iranians were suspicious about the declarations of the US Embassy because of their experiences of 1953 and the coup against Mosaddeq.⁵¹

The acceptance of the Shah by the US was interpreted as the activities of the US for restoring the Shah's Monarchy and a recurrence of the events of 1953 and on the 4th of November in 1979, the US Embassy was overrun by a group of three hundred or more Islamist students. The admission of the Shah by the US on the 22nd of October was the main cause of the taking over of Embassy.⁵² So, the Carter administration's decision to allow the ill Shah to come to the United States for cancer treatment led to the debacle of the embassy takeover and the 444 days of the hostages'

⁵⁰ Ziba Moshaver, "Revolution, Theocratic Leadership and Iran's Foreign Policy: Implications for Iran-EU Relations", *The Review of International Affairs* (Winter 2003),287.

⁵¹ Ali M. Ansari, *Confronting Iran* (London: Hurst&Company,2006),86.

⁵²David Patrick Houghton, *US Foreign Policy and the Iran Hostage Crisis* (United Kingdom: Cambridge University,2001),50.

ordeal. However this was not reasonable for the Iranians. The students interpreted the act of the US as a humiliation of Iran. Although the students were not a member of any party, it was certain that they were very religious and strong supporters of Khomeini.⁵³

The sentences of the spokesperson, Massoumeh Ebtekar, will be helpful for us to understand the reason of the students while they were attacking the embassy. He said that “The young man and women who participated in the embassy takeover did so based on their conviction that their action was in line with the Imam’s policy. We believed then that action was essential; we were determined to take a stand against past and possible future humiliation by the United States.”⁵⁴ Plainly the students perceived the admission of Shah as a new humiliation and wanted to take revenge of the coup against Mosaddeq in 1953.⁵⁵

Consolidating the new structure of the Iranian Islamic Republic was very important especially for the Khomeini and taking the American Embassy helped him in this way. The most effective policy at Khomeini’s disposal was the nation’s anti-imperialist feeling, which was best exploited to consolidate Islamic institutions. Islamic Republic seized the opportunity not only to characterize the US as the imperialist enemy and later as the “Great Satan” and use it as powerful means of eliminating internal opposition.⁵⁶ Anti-Americanism and an image of “us versus them” were helpful to strengthen the affect of the Iranian Revolution and form the

⁵³ Bruce Riedel, “America and Iran: Flawed Analysis, Missed Opportunities, and Looming Dangers”, *The Brown Journal of World Affairs*, (Fall/Winter 2008), 102.

⁵⁴ Kenneth M. Polack, *The Persian Puzzle* (New York: Random House, 2004),154.

⁵⁵ Ibid,154- 155

⁵⁶ Parviz Daneshvar, *Revolution in Iran* (London: Macmillan Press, 1996),145.

revolutionary identity and establish legitimacy of rulers. The new structure was mainly based on the sovereignty of religious government domestically and the anti-Americanism as a matter of foreign policy.⁵⁷ The hostage crises showed the radical impact of the new Iran and the big change at the relations between the US and Iran.

From the point of Iran, Islamic Revolution was the break with the past and end of the relations with the US. Also, the attack on the embassy was the defining moment of this break up. However, the US interpreted the hostage crises as the main cause of the collapse in relations and the defining moment. While Iran was divorcing the break in diplomatic relations from the seizure of embassy and determining it as a natural result of the presence of foreign pressure in Iran, the US determined the seizure of the embassy as the beginning of an era and related it with the Islamic Revolution.⁵⁸

The US froze the relations between Iran and Iranian assets in the US and started to implement economic sanctions on Iran. Although it was against the international law, according to Khomeini, the hostage crisis was useful for unifying the public and erasing the disparate groups. 444 days Hostage Crises can be determined as the permanent and tragic symbol of both the revolution and the US-Iran relations. It was also the event that the perceptions of the two states were changed and reinterpreted. As the Iranians mentioned the Hostage Crises could serve as the break with the past and transformed the US to the main enemy against the Revolution and Iran. Additionally the seizure helped the consolidation of the

⁵⁷Nathan Gonzalez, *Engaging Iran: The Rise of a Middle East Powerhouse and America's Strategic Choice* (London: Praeger Security International, 2007),53-54

⁵⁸ Ali M. Ansari, *Confronting Iran* (London: Hurst&Company,2006),71-72.

revolution. It was also the end of the reengagement of the two states, for the US it was the end of their policy for understanding the revolutionary process.⁵⁹

3.2. The US Dual Containment Policy and Deterioration of the Nuclear Issue

Khomeini's opposition to the US was very obvious and his sentences like; "The Great U.S Satan has dominated our country for the past 2500 years." and "All our problems were coming from the US."⁶⁰ show the ideas of Khomeini toward the US. Hence Iranian Revolution also refers to a "revolution" in the US and Iranian relations. In fact with the hostage crises both of two states would see the gravity of the situation. Although some groups such as moderates, liberals and clergy were not challenging to a new relationship with the US, Khomeini refused any kind of relationship with the US and redefined the aim of the Iranian Revolution as the total cleansing of the US dominance from Iran and the Shah who was the puppet of the US.⁶¹

The new approach pushed also the nuclear issue to a bottleneck. Khomeini placed little priority on nuclear development. Moreover after the revolution, many of Iran's top scientists fled into exile and the US stated an international campaign to block any nuclear assistance to Iran. According to Khomeini, nuclear technology was only suspicious western invention hence the nuclear desire of Iran was declined down with the end of Shah Era. In this respect, the Eurodif agreement and the contract signed with France and Germany were canceled by the Iranian Islamic

⁵⁹ Ibid, 89-90

⁶⁰ Keneth M. Polack, *The Persian Puzzle* (New York: Random House, 2004),146.

⁶¹ Ibid,146.

Republic. In addition after the revolution Iran started to be seen as a destabilizing force and the western states began to abstain from providing nuclear reactors to Iran. Also, Ronald Reagan, the US president, called the states for the international embargo towards Iran on all forms of peaceful nuclear cooperation as a caution for the possibility of Iran's use nuclear energy for non-peaceful activities. All of these caused to deterioration at nuclear developments. However in 1982, Tehran began negotiations with the German company KWU for restarting the power station in Bushehr but this time Germany asserted the Iraq attacks to Bushehr following the Iran-Iraq war as a security risk. Besides these hesitations, Iran made progress in terms of laboratory facilities for uranium conversion and fuel fabrication at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC) which were completed in 1983 and 1985 with the help of the French Company.⁶²

Together with Khomein's approach, Iran-Iraq War from 1980 to 1988 also caused to stop nuclear developments of Iran. Both Iran and Iraq were effective states in terms of political influence, resources, population and size in the Middle East region however, they have problems about border, water ways such as Shatt al-Arab and ethnic groups.⁶³ These problems started to go worse after the Iranian Revolution and Saddam Hussein became the president of Iraq in 1979. While Khomeini was working on the exporting of revolution, the Iraqi Kurds tried to use the regime change in Iran as an advantage for themselves. Also, Khomeini got knowledge about the ethnic structure of Iraq and the dominance of Ba'th party, the Shi'a majority and

⁶² The International Institute for Strategic Studies(IISS) strategic dossier: *Iran's Strategic Weapon's Programmes*, ed. Gary Samore (New York: Routledge, 2005),12.

⁶³ Carolyn C. James, "Iran and Iraq as Rational Crisis Actors: Dangers and Dynamics of Survivable Nuclear War", *Journal of Strategic Studies*, (March 2000), 57.

the Sunni minority, during his exile era in Iraq. Hence, he was aware that the ethnic divisions in Iraq could be used for the beginning of exporting the Iranian Revolution to the Gulf Region. In this respect Khomeini maintained his rejection about the Iran-Iraq relationship which pre-existed and started to support and provide assistance to the Iraqi Kurds. In the contrast, Saddam Hussein moved against the Shia community in Iraq and captured Muhammed al-Sadr who was the important Shia Leader. This raised the opposition of Shia groups in Iraq and Saddam considered this rising opposition as a dangerous threat to his administration. The usage of the ethnic groups and religious differences as a power balance act by two states, caused the escalation of tension. Because of the fear of a coming threat towards his presidency, Saddam started to use the ethnic and religious problems which were caused by Iranian propaganda for foundation of Arab unity and maintained his expectation for a conflict with Iran. Briefly, Iraq tried to reflect Iran as an increasing threat for the Gulf region and Iraq as a volunteer who would risk everything for the welfare of the Gulf region.⁶⁴

Finally, in 1980 Iraq attacked Iran and the eight year war started. Saddam tried to be alliance with the US by showing its potential importance which could be used as a bufferzone between the Gulf and Iran. Although the Gulf States were worried about the Saddam administration in Iraq, they supported Iraq in the respect of the Gulf War. Especially, Saudi Arabia which was concerned very much from the

⁶⁴ Kylie Baxter & Shahram Akbarzadeh, *The US Foreign Policy in Middle East the Roots of Anti-Americanism*, (New York: Rouyledeg, 2008),116.

expansion of Iran allowed Iraq to use its air bases and ports; additionally it provided billions of dollars of monetary source.⁶⁵

One of the most important point of the Gulf War is about the usage of chemical weapons towards civilians in their own country. In February 1988, up to 5000 civilians died because of the usage of poison gas in the Kurdish village of Halabjah in Iraq. Iraq pointed out the Kurdish support for Iranian army as a reason for its activity against the Iraqi Kurds.⁶⁶ Iraq's combat use of chemical weapons against Iranian forces evolved over the course of the eight- year war and moved from defensive tactical purposes to offensively orientated tactical uses in the last stages of the war.⁶⁷

During the Gulf War between Iraq and Iran, the US made efforts for protecting its interests and it provided information to Iraq about the Iranian troops' movements. In short, counterbalancing Iran by striking a tacit alliance with Iraq and opposing the Soviet Union by fortifying the American military presence in the Persian Gulf formed the basis of US' foreign policy during the early 1980s. An Iranian victory was not considered desirable because of fears of a radical Islamist spillover effect in Saudi Arabia. However this time while the US was helping to the states in the region, it was very careful about not producing a regional hegemon and maintaining balance of power between Iran and Iraq.⁶⁸

⁶⁵ Peter Malanczuk, "The Kurdish Crisis and Allied Intervention in the Aftermath of the Second Gulf War", (Keesing's Record of World Events, 1991), 117.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Richard L. Russell, "Iraq's Chemical Weapons Legacy: What Others Might Learn from Saddam", *The Middle East Journal* (Spring 2005), 195.

⁶⁸ Rosemary Hollis, *The U.S. Role: Helpful or Harmful?* ed. Lawrence G. Potter and Gary G. Sick (New York: Palgrave, 2004), 197-198.

Just two years after the end of the Iran-Iraq War, in August 1990 Iraq invaded Kuwait and the UN Security Council immediately passed a resolution declaring that the invasion was a breach of international peace and security.⁶⁹ Even if the US saw Iraq as a potential ally at first, the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq put an end to the cooperation between two states. The US perceived Iraq as a challenger in the region against itself. Through the Operation Desert Storm, both Iran and Iraq determined as the enemies of the US and in the respect of dual containment policy the US started to isolate both Iran and Iraq politically, economically and militarily. By the policy of dual containment the US aimed to isolate Iraq and Iran as much as possible. This required direct intervention and presence of the US in the Gulf. Like the US, the invasion of Kuwait increased the concerns of Iran about Iraq which is militarily and politically challenging. Issues such as weapons of mass destruction, territorial encroachment were problematic not only for the US but also for Iran.⁷⁰ However, for the US Iran was also in the containment zone. With the election of Republican George Bush, containment policy turned into a new doctrine under the name of “fight against terrorism” and Tehran started to see the US as an important threat.⁷¹

Official announcement of the policy of dual containment came in May 1993. Core values of dual containment policy can be determined as; (1) pursuit of democratic institutions, (2) expansion of free markets, (3) peaceful settlement of

⁶⁹Musallam Ali, *The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: Saddam Hussein, His State and International Power Politics* (London: British Academic Press,1996), 4.

⁷⁰Anoushivaran Enteshami, *The Foreign Policy of Middle East States* ed. Lynne Rienner (United Kingdom: Durham University Press 2002),129.

⁷¹Ibid, 132.

conflict and (4) promotion of collective security.⁷² Containment would be done in three ways: first through isolation from the international community, second, diplomatic and economic pressures using such methods as UN sanctions or international boycotts, and third, restrictions of their military and technical capabilities.⁷³ The main idea of dual containment was the restriction of military aids both in Iran and Iraq which are announced as “rouge states”. It was also aiming to improve the living standards of masses and this would also affect the ideas of people and keep them away from radical anti-American groups. Hence the US aimed to implement free market reforms by IMF and World Bank during 1980s and 1990s in states such as Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia and Morocco.⁷⁴

In 1989, following its costly eight-year war with Iraq, Iran initiated a major programme to rebuild, expand and modernize its ravaged armed forces. Before 1990s Iran’s nuclear efforts did not constitute a dedicated nuclear weapons programme, instead it was for developing use of nuclear technologies, with civilian applications. It was motivated by at least three reasons, first is a desire to achieve self-reliance in all areas of national life including the military arena, second is a determination to transform Iran into a regional power capable of projecting influence throughout and beyond the Middle East and last is the need to strengthen its deterrent capability against various perceived threats in order to forestall new acts of aggression after the war with Iraq.⁷⁵ Bolstering the standing of the regime in the eyes of the Iranian

⁷² Maj. Jerry L. Mraz, “Dual Containment: US Policy in the Persian Gulf and A Recommendation for the Future” *The Research Department Air Command and Staff College* (March 1997),12-13.

⁷³Ibid,12-13.

⁷⁴ Yakup Halabi, “US Responses to Major Developments in the Arab-Islamic World: Evolution of Role of Ideas”, *International Studies* (43,2006), 355.

⁷⁵ Micheal Einsenstadt, “Living With Nuclear Iran,” *Survival* (Vol.41,No.3, Autumn 1999), 125-126.

people and throughout the Arab and Muslim worlds, threatening US allies such as Israel, Egypt or Saudi Arabia in order to gain leverage over the US during a crisis or confrontation can be added as the other reasons for nuclear power aim of Iran.⁷⁶

3.3. Rafsanjani & Khatemi Presidencies & Restart of Nuclear Issue

The year after the end of the war in 1989, Khomeini died and Hashemi Rafsanjani became president and served the period of two terms which was called “Era of Reconstruction”. Iran-Iraq War effected both political and economic relations of Iran in a negative way. Under Rafsanjani it was declared that the wartime era of austerity was over and the era of reconstruction began. Especially in the first five years of Rafsanjani, Iran was opened for business and returned to the international market. Rafsanjani’s push for the rationalization and de-revolutionization of the Iranian government was directly linked to his economic liberalization program⁷⁷ He pushed for pragmatic changes in terms of relaxing some social controls, opening up the economy and showing flexibility in foreign affairs, including helping to secure the release of Western hostages in Lebanon.⁷⁸ Moreover Rafsanjani gave importance to foreign trade however the foreign investors simply did not find Iran as an attractive option. This was mainly because of the economic sanctions imposed by the United States and the absence of transparency, accountability and nationalist fear of being misled by foreigners.

⁷⁶Ibid.

⁷⁷Naghmeh Sohrabi, “The Corious Case of Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani”, *Middle East Brief* (November 2009), 4.

⁷⁸Amin Saikal, “The Roots of Iran's Election Crisis”, *Survival*, (October–November 2009), 96.

The Iran-Iraq War, the changes at international arena, the rise of Gorbachevism and the death of Khomeini increased the opportunity for implementation of new regional, international and pragmatist strategies by Iran. With Rafsanjani, the policies such as the “peaceful coexistence” and economic co-operation with the advanced capitalist countries started to be implemented for balancing the US presence in the Middle East. In this respect, Iran’s greater participation in regional and global organizations such as the United Nations and the Islamic Conference Organization (ICO) helped Iran. Additionally, Iran for the first time appointed permanent envoy to the ICO in 1991 and the Economic Co-operation Organization (ECO). Briefly, Rafsanjani tried to end Iran’s regional and international isolation by implementing pragmatist policies. In this respect, Rafsanjani’s sentences which he said before his election as the president helped us to understand his approach:

The pressure of war, the psychological problems caused by the war, boycotts and sieges created these [economic and social] difficulties. But now things can be different, up to an extent. And I especially emphasize peace. We should strive seriously for peace in the region, then I do not think that matters can progress as they should... Trust among neighbours and a calm situation in the region can automatically solve many problems for us.⁷⁹

Rafsanjani and his reformist movements differed from hardline conservatives. According to Rafsanjani, economic progress would itself yield political reform. While Rafsanjani was determining the economy as a starting point, his critics were arguing that both economy and political issues should be taken in tandem. The point

⁷⁹Anoushiravan Ehteshami, *After Khomeini The Iranian Second Republic* (NewYork :Routledge, 1995), 145-146.

that two sides were common was the view that the Islamic Republic had not yet achieved the goals of the Revolution.⁸⁰

Unexpected invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990 also helped to improve the image of Iran. In short, while Iraq was trying to build up regional domination by military, Iran launched its own diplomatic offensive aimed at enhancing and consolidating its regional influence through isolation of Iraq. Anoushiravan Ehteshami summarizes the Rafsanjani policy briefly as the following; Rafsanjani changed the idea old Pahlavi doctrine which determined Iran as the policeman of the Persian Gulf and prevented the outbreak of any future hostility. While the position of the Second republic is not dependent on a formal alliance with the West, Iranian aims of ensuring stability in the Persian Gulf may suit long-term Western interest there. Tehran's endorsement of good-neighbourliness and co-operation with the Persian Gulf monarchies in the fields of oil exploration, trade, common defence, etc., ought to satisfy the Western powers that Iran is not seeking any longer to overthrow of the regimes of their conservative Gulf Arab allies or disrupt the flow of oil from the countries of Persian Gulf.”⁸¹

On 23 May 1997, Muhammed Khatemi won in a surprise landslide, gaining more than 20 million votes out of the 29 million votes cast. Rafsanjani's support was seen as the key factor for the election of Khatemi. Khatemi gained the support of different sides such as women, students and the intellectuals.⁸² Khatemi's approach

⁸⁰ Ali M. Ansari, “Iran under Ahmadinejad: The Politics of Confrontation” *The International Institute for Strategic Studies(IISS)* (Vol. 47 Issue 393, 2007),17

⁸¹ Anoushiravan Ehteshami, *After Khomeini The Iranian Second Republic* (NewYork :Routledge, 1995),154.

⁸² Bruce Riedel, “America and Iran: Flawed Analysis, Missed Opportunities, and Looming Danger” *The Brown Journal of World Affairs* (Fall Winter 2008), 105.

to political and domestic issues was also reformist like Rafsanjani. In this respect, while he was mentioning his ideas about the foreign policy before the elections, contrary to Islamists he emphasized the concept of “national interest” many times rather than the “Islamic principles”. By this way he gave the message that he was against giving harm to the Iranian National interests because of the ideological factors. Khatemi was seen as the key person who could continue the policies such as liberalization of economy implemented by Rafsanjani.⁸³ First two years of the Khatami Administration were the golden years of the Islamic Republic in terms of political liberalization and social- cultural openness when the country became clearly a freer and more tolerant place to live since 1979.⁸⁴

During the 1990s, both the intellectuals and students argued the synthesis of ideas that would legitimate Western thought within Iranian framework. While some of them argued that everything from west was alien and should be shunned, some of them criticized these ideas by the name of Islamic Republic as giving an example of a uniquely Iranian synthesis and the term “republic” being a wholly Western contribution. In this respect Khatami’s sentences about the American democracy as the union of religion and democracy to the cause of Islamic democracy in Iran were given as the most intriguing intellectual development by Ali Ansari. Briefly, Rafsanjani and Khatemi represented the new type of conservatism which was

⁸³ Sami Oğuz, Ruşen Çakır, *Hatemi'nin İran'ı*(İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık,2000),87.

⁸⁴ Jahangir Amuzegar, “Khatami's Legacy: Dashed Hopes”, *The Middle East Journal*;(Winter 2006), 65.

emerging. In the respect of this new approach, wholesale rejectionism was not an option.⁸⁵

The policies about nuclear development of Iran also began to change. Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamene the supreme leader and Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani the elected president changed the nuclear approach of Khomeini and tried to resume the nuclear cooperation with western states. However, this time the US became the biggest barrier in front of Iran's nuclear policy. Iran repeated its will for resuming the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant to Germany in June 1991 however like a decade ago; Germany showed the Iraq-Iran war as a main problem although the war was ended three years earlier. In addition to this, because of the US coercion in November 1991, India stopped the negotiations with Iran which were about selling 10 MW heavy-water research reactor and related facilities to Iran. Moreover in January 1992 Argentina defeated the agreement about providing pilot-scale uranium milling and fuel fabrication facilities and stopped the negotiations about a heavy water production plant, as a response to the US objection.⁸⁶

Unlike the US and other states, in early 1990s China became the main provider of Iran in terms of nuclear technology. Considering the agreements between Iran and China from 1990 to 1992, several small research reactors and laboratory-scale laser equipment for laser research were provided for the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center and Tehran Nuclear Research Center. More importantly, China started to build an industrial-scale conversion facility and zirconium production plant

⁸⁵ Ali M. Ansari, "Iran under Ahmadinejad: The Politics of Confrontation" *The International Institute for Strategic Studies(IISS)* (Vol. 47 Issue 393, 2007),19-20.

⁸⁶ The International Institute for Strategic Studies(IISS) strategic dossier: *Iran's Strategic Weapon's Programmes*, ed. Gary Samore (New York: Routledge, 2005) 13.

at ENTC. It was the most critical supply of China because these facilities also could be used for producing large quantities of materials for enrichment and fuel fabrication. In addition, China provided a ton of natural uranium to Iran in 1991.⁸⁷

However China's willingness for providing nuclear technology to Iran came to an end. In 1992, when Rafsanjani visited China, Iran reached an agreement with China in principle for buying a 300-MW power reactor and a large research reactor but later China decided to not provide the research reactor because of the possibility of military production. This was the first breaking point between Iran and China in terms of nuclear cooperation. The second happened in October 1997 with the agreement which was signed between the US and China. While China ended its nuclear cooperation with Iran, it started a new nuclear cooperation with the US. China admitted to end the project in Esfahan and gave guarantee for refusing any future nuclear cooperation with Iran for providing nuclear power imports from the US.⁸⁸

In August 1992 and January 1995, Iran and Russia signed two agreements which were for bilateral nuclear cooperation and finishing one unit of Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant. However, with the coming out of a secret protocol between Iran and Russia aimed to supply large scale reactors, fuel fabrication facilities and centrifuge enrichment plant from Russia, the cooperation between two states started to be limited. All of these factors made it easy to understand the strong nuclear support of Russia towards Iran. This close and strong cooperation was criticized by the US president Clinton and Russian president Boris Yeltsin had to retreat. In this

⁸⁷ Ibid,13

⁸⁸Yonah Alexander and Milton Hoenig, *The New Iranian Leadership* (London:Praeger Security International),125.

respect, Russia agreed to limit nuclear cooperation until the Bushehr plant was completed and additionally agreed to cancel fuel cycle assistance.⁸⁹

With the election of Vladimir Putin the Russia's nuclear policy towards Iran began to change. Russia announced that it canceled its agreement which was limiting the nuclear cooperation with Iran and it would start to sell new power reactors to Iran. While Russia was making cooperation with Iran, it was also very careful at making cooperation in authorized areas. Even in this respect Russia stopped supplying a laser enrichment pilot-plant because of the absence of required export licences in 2000.⁹⁰

⁸⁹1992 and January 1995, Iran and Russia signed two agreements which were for bilateral nuclear cooperation and finishing one unit of Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant,13.

⁹⁰The International Institute for Strategic Studies(IISS) strategic dossier: *Iran's Strategic Weapon's Programmes*, ed. Gary Samore (New York: Routledge, 2005),13.

CHAPTER 4
RELATIONS BETWEEN 2001-2008
&
THE NUCLEAR CRISIS

4.1. September 11 Attacks and the “Axis of Evil”

On September 11, 2001; 19 Muslim men carried out a terrorist attack on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center in the name of Islam. After September 11 attacks, there have been important changes at the international system in terms of the concept of security, the roles of actors and the foreign policy of the USA. In the post-90 period, by the affect of globalization and development at technology, terrorism became more dangerous and transnational actor. In this sense 9/11 showed the world that the affects of terrorism are not limited to the place where they take place. In addition to this, September 11 demonstrated that terrorist groups can give harm to states even if they are very strong.

Since the late 1960s, ideas which challenge the western models of modernization and secularization started to emerge. In this respect, Mawlana Mawdudi, Sayyid Qutb and Ayetollah Ruhollah Khomeini are the main theological scholars who have important roles in the ideological and theoretical period of challenge to west. They argued against Western concepts of democracy, socialism and nationalism. Also, the link between Al-Qaeda and the various Muslim Radical groups is the evidence that Al-Qaeda is not only a global terrorist organization but

also a symbol of Islamic resistance against US dominance and the social, political and economic injustice it is related to.⁹¹

Additionally, September 11 attacks is one of the other main case which affected the perceptions and policies of the US and Iran towards each other in terms of nuclear crises because after September 11 American officials and commentators declared that “Everything has changed” and “The world will never be same.”⁹² and in this sense the US started to adopt a more direct approach to confronting radical Islamist groups and supportive states that it deems direct threats to its national security and after the attacks the policy of the United States toward Islamic world and radical Islamism started to be more active.

In the 2002 National Security Strategy, which is the first NSS published after September 11 attacks, the US’ provided its vision for the nation’s security in the respect of eight themes. These are human dignity, strengthening alliances to defend against global terrorism, diffusion of regional international conflicts, the prevention of the threats created from weapons of mass destruction, free markets and trade to increase global economic growth, the expansion of development and support to democracies, development and cooperation with other centers of global power, and the transformation of America’s security institutions. The NSS also mentioned that the US would take the following actions to protect America from terrorism, lead continuous and constant action using all elements of national and international

⁹¹ Ahmad Ghazali, “Radical Islam, Terrorism, and the Impact of September 11 on the Muslim Community,” in *The War on Terror in Comparative Perspective*, ed. Mark J. Miller and Boyka Stefanova (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 102.

⁹² Robert Jervis, *American Foreign Policy in a New Era* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 52.

power, find and target those threats before they reach the internal borders of the US, engage with other nations to do the same and to deter them from sponsoring terror.⁹³

President George W. Bush also declared that “Defending our Nation against its enemies is the first and fundamental commitment of the Federal Government. Today, that task has changed dramatically”. He continued “Terrorists are organized to penetrate open societies and to turn the power of modern technologies against us. To defeat this threat we must use of every tool in or arsenal military power, better homeland defenses, law enforcement, intelligence, and vigorous efforts to cut off terrorist financing.”⁹⁴

The US determined two main policies for preventing terrorist attacks. First policy is changing radical regimes to moderate Islam because US make a direct link between democracy and international security and determined the democracy deficit at the rogue states (Iran, Iraq and North Korea) as the main cause of terrorist attacks. Hence, the US maintained building moderate Islamic regimes in the Middle East states, which are mainly ruled by political Islam or radical administrators, is very important. According to the US, democratic transformation of governments in the region is the way to make them less likely to harbor terrorists or tolerate activities that promote terrorism. Second policy of the US is preventive war; acting against emerging threats before they are fully formed. Bush emphasizes the danger of rogue states existence because of the harboring terrorist groups so he believes in acting before the terrorists.

⁹³Colonel Patrick C. Malackowski, “Improving the United States National Security Strategy: An Infomed Public”, US Army War College Pennsylvania, 3.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

After the 9/11 attacks, President Bush declared the attacks as an “Act of war” and maintained that the US would direct the full resources for its intelligence and law enforcement communities to find those responsible and bring them to justice. He emphasized that they would make no distinction between the terrorists and those who harbor them too. Moreover he maintained that the enemy of America is not their Muslim friends but radical network terrorists and every government that supports them as enemy of USA.⁹⁵

It is obvious that 9/11 was the highest attack of Radical Islamist groups to the West and these attacks caused a fundamental shift in U.S. foreign policy and after the attacks the policy of the United States toward Islamic world and radical Islamism started to be more active. In the respect of new policy, preemptive war was shown as the one of most important solving way for preventing terrorism. According to the US, September 11 demonstrated that terrorists could not be deterred in the asymmetrical warfare. They are not territorially based but they need bases from which to operate. So in the war on terrorism, eliminating their bases will disrupt and destroy their networks. Bush determined rogue states under control of totalitarian/authoritarian and anti-democratic leadership and regimes, as a threat to international security and peace because failed states’ weakness could be exploited by terrorist groups. Thus, Bush emphasized the importance of democratization of these states very much, the responsibility of US in this democratization process and characterized American policy nothing less than “crusades.”⁹⁶ In the concept of

⁹⁵ Bahram M. Rajace, “US Foreign Policy and Radical Islam,” in *The War on Terror in Comparative Perspective*, ed. Mark J. Miller and Boyka Stefanova (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007),91.

⁹⁶ James K. Oliver, “US Foreign Policy After 9/11: Context and Prospect,” in *The War on Terror in Comparative Perspective*, ed. Mark J. Miller and Boyka Stefanova (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007),36-38.

“War on terrorism”, the Bush Administration drew the linkage between international terrorism and state power. Thus in the “War on Terrorism”, the United States would “prevent regimes that sponsor terror from threatening America or their friends and allies with weapons of mass destruction”. Bush pointed out Iraq, Iran and North Korea as constituting “an axis of evil”, arming to threaten the peace of the world and emphasized that they could provide these arms to terrorists but added that he would not wait for events, while dangers gather.⁹⁷

4.2. The concept of Preventive War

In the respect of new policy, Bush declared the terrorism as a threat to international security and called the international arena to take action against terrorism. Like US, the United Nations Security Council classified the attacks as threats to international peace and security and called upon member states to cooperate for bringing the perpetrators the justice. As a result, the war of Afghanistan began on 7 October 2001 and by mid-December 2001, the Taliban lost control and a new interim Afghan administration was established under UN auspices.

On the same day of the September 11 attacks, President Muhammad Khatami expressed his condolences. Immediately after September 11, Iran called for an emergency meeting of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and in this regard, Iran’s spiritual leader Ayatollah Khamenei gave the message to the world’s Muslims for engaging in a holy crusade, jihad against terrorism. At Afghanistan case, Iran offered to rescue the American soldiers who were stranding near its borders in Afghanistan, reinforced the control of its borders with Afghanistan and

⁹⁷ J.Maggio, “The Presidential Rhetoric of Terror: The (Re)Creation of Reality Immediately after 9/11”, *Politics&Policy*, (Volume 35, No:4 2007) :829.

guaranteed to apprehend Al-Qaeda fighters fleeing through its borders and handed over scores of Al-Qaeda to the countries of their origins.⁹⁸

Iran played helpful roles in the actual conflict against the Taliban and in talks in Bonn on post-conflict Afghanistan even though Supreme Leader Khamene dismissed the possibility of Iranian cooperation against the Taliban and al-Qa'ida. Naturally, the level of cooperation had its limits. However, Bush's "axis of evil" declaration that presents Iran as well as Iraq, North Korea, and their terrorist allies, "constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world" put an end to Iran- US cooperation in Afghanistan.⁹⁹

Bush started to declare the need for removing Saddam dictatorship from early 2002. US claimed that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction and this created a threat to US. Moreover US asserted that there were links between Saddam's secular government and Al-Qaeda terror network. Although US could not persuade the majority of countries on the UN Security council, Bush Administration started to act in March 2003 to remove Saddam. The absence of UN decisions caused erosion at the "war on terror" policy of US and legitimacy problems at the case of Iraq. The International Security Assistance Force wing of the coalition forces against terrorism in Afghanistan was composed of 37 countries whereas the joint forces under the US command in the 2003 Iraq war were composed of 30 countries.¹⁰⁰ Hence, we can say

⁹⁸ Kaveh Afrasiabi and Abbas Maleki, "Iran's Foreign Policy After 11 September", *The Brown Journal of World Affairs* (Winter/Spring 2003, Vol IX, Issue 2), 258-259.

⁹⁹ Abbas William Samii, "A Stable Structure on Shifting Sands: Assessing the Hizbullah-Iran-Syria Relationship" *The Middle East Journal* (Winter 2008),45.

¹⁰⁰ Beril Dedeoğlu, "Fighting Terrorism and Intervention: Paradoxes and Misunderstandings," *Perceptions* (Winter 2005): 164.

that in Iraq case, states can not agree on the issue preemptive military intervention against terrorism.

After Afghanistan intervention, the US continued “spreading democracy” in Iraq. The US claimed that it should also use military force in Iraq for toppling the regime of Saddam Hussein who had WMD and cutting links between Iraq and the Al-Qaeda, if there were any. In the long run, the US also aimed to spread democracy. However, the period after military intervention was very hard for the US. Construction of democracy was not easy as the US thought. The civil war started and affected not only Iraq but also the other states in the region. The civil war between Sunni and Shi’ite, the problems related about Kurds had pushed Iraq into chaos rather than consolidating democracy and also affected the other states in the region such as Iran, Turkey and etc.

Iranian government was also aware of the importance of Shiite majority in Iraq. In this context, shortly after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein President Akvar Hashemi Rafsanjani declared that” the dissolution of Ba’th regime was neither good not bad; it all depended on the kind of regime that replaced it. If the United States succeeded in establishing a client state in Iraq, that would be extremely detrimental to Iran’s national security. On the other hand, if elections were held and an independent government emerged, that would be in Iran’s interests because it was bound to be dominated by a Shiite majority.”¹⁰¹

The geopolitical balance uneasily maintained between Iran and Iraq disappeared, leaving only Iran standing as a viable regional power. The United States found itself in occupation of a major Persian Gulf country, with full responsibility for

¹⁰¹ Fred H. Lawson, “Syria’s Relations with Iran, Managing the Dilemmas of Alliance” *The Middle East Journal* (Winter 2007),38.

at least its immediate future.¹⁰² As a neighbour state of Iraq, the new system is very important for Iran. Iran was encouraging democracy for Shi'ites. Because the majority of Iraq's population was Shi'ites and a Shi'ite administration can also constitute friendly relations with Iran. Iraq was another struggle arena for the US and Iran. Each of them wanted to give Iraq their own image. Iran wanted to keep the US preoccupied with Iraq's internal affairs as long as possible because thereby Iran could keep away the US from attacking its nuclear capabilities. Iran was also in the list of rogue states and perceived the US the main threat for its own security. Hence, Iran tried to empower Shi'ites in Iraq as much as possible. Since 1979, Iran tried to reduce the US presence and pressure in Persian Gulf but because of the US need of oil, withdrawal from the Gulf is impossible for the US. Sunni states such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Kuwait and Jordan also were afraid of the emergence of a Shi'ite government in Iraq because they also see Iran as a threat for the region like the US.

Although the US was supporting the construction of democracy in Iraq, it was also anxious about the election of Islamic and anti-American parties. Hence the US never supported totally free and open elections in Iraq. For many Arabs the US was still working for its own interests not for the democratization of Iraq.¹⁰³

In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, operations against terrorism were undertaken by the co-operation with lots of states at international arena but US has been considered as the unique actor leading them. US National Security Strategy in 2002 pointed out that "terrorist groups see weapons of mass destruction as weapons of choice. That elevates terrorists to the level of tyrants in Bush's thinking and that's

¹⁰² Robert E. Hunter, "A New American Middle East Strategy?", *Survival* (December 2008–January 2009), 50.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*

why he insists preemption must be added to the tasks of containment and deterrence”. However preemption concept is not a term that can be acceptable at international arena very easily because of legitimacy problems but Bush shows his stability at deterrence by the following sentences: “We will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country”. Thus, Bush declared that US would continue preempt terrorists and tyrants, even if it does so alone.¹⁰⁴

Preventive war involves predictions about future threats. Moreover the information on capabilities may not reflect the real situation, as the case of Iraq shows. However, the main idea of preemptive war dealing with threats before they become imminent because it is too late if they become imminent. National Security Strategy declared: “The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction. In the past, a state could let a potential threat grow because it might not turn into a major menace. Now, if one follows this cautious path and the worst case does arise, the price will be prohibitive”.¹⁰⁵ Moreover, the speeches and determinations of Bush like “axis of evil, crusades” caused the rise of the sense of “other” in the Middle East and raised the stress between especially Iran. In addition to this, the Iraq case affected US military action’s legitimacy because of the absence of weapons of mass destruction that claimed before the war too. Following, Bush administration identified a need for activist, preemptive policy “defending the US, the American people, and their

¹⁰⁴ John Lewis Gaddis, “A Grand Strategy,” *Foreign Policy* (November-December 2002): 52.

¹⁰⁵ Robert Jervis, *American Foreign Policy in a New Era* (New York: Routledge, 2005),86.

interests at home and abroad by identifying and destroying the threat before it reaches its borders”.¹⁰⁶

Post-11 September developments in the Middle East have had a paradoxical impact on the Islamic Republic of Iran. Two of Iran’s formidable foes, the Taliban and Saddam Hussein, have been overthrown by the United States. The US eliminated Iran’s enemies both in the east and west by destroying Taliban regime in Afghanistan and Saddam regime in Iraq. However, America’s presence in Afghanistan and Iraq is also cause threats for Iran. With the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the US turned into prominent actor on the ground rather than external power with partial involvement. Uncertainties in the region also rised the strategic utility of nuclear weapons to Iran and validates the claim that Iran requires such a capability to ensure both regime survival and territorial integrity. The US key regional policy concerns can be listed as; reconstruction of Afghanistan and Iraq as democratic and stable states, global access to energy supplies in the Gulf, defeating the spread of terrorism, preventing Iran from becoming a nuclear power, defending the security and regional interests of Israel.¹⁰⁷

The US status as superpower and its declaration of Iran in the “Axis of Evil”, caused a serious threat to Tehran. In fact, many objectives of the war in Iraq such as elimination of WMD, suppression of the state-supported terrorism and regime

¹⁰⁶Dona J. Stewart, “The Greater Middle East and Reform in the Bush Administration’s Ideological Imagination,” *Geographical Review* (July 2005):1.

¹⁰⁷ David Menashri, “Iran after the Fall of Baghdad: Implications for Western Foreign and Security Policy”, *International Policy Analysis Unit* (2003), 2.

change and democratization through external intervention could also be applied to Iran easily.¹⁰⁸

Although Iran viewed the presence of thousands of American troops in Afghanistan and did not welcomed the US as its new neighbor, it was also optimistic about the common goal of fighting against a common enemy such as Taliban would accelerate the rapprochement with the US that had begun during the last years of the Clinton Administration.¹⁰⁹

4.3. Iranian Nuclear Crisis

4.3.1. Announcement of Secret Nuclear Facilities

Iran nuclear crisis started with the announcement of secret nuclear production facilities in August 2002. This caused a big shock at international arena and after this declaration Iran nuclear crisis started and could not be solved until now. From 2002 to 2010 there had been lots of cross talks, negotiations, and declarations between states but still the problem can not be solved.

After the declaration of secret researches, International Atomic Energy Agency requested explanation about Iran's nuclear activities. In response to this, Reza Aghazadeh maintained that

“Iran is embarking on a long term plan based on the merits of energy mix, to construct nuclear power plants with a total capacity of 6000 MW within two decades. Naturally, such a sizeable project entails with it an all out planning, well in advance, in various fields of nuclear technology such as fuel cycle, safety and waste management. I take this opportunity to invite all the technologically advanced member States to participate in my country's ambitious plan for the construction of

¹⁰⁸ Ibid,2.

¹⁰⁹ Fred H. Lawson, “Syria's Relations with Iran, Managing the Dilemmas of Alliance” *The Middle East Journal* (Winter 2007),38.

nuclear power plants and the associated technologies such as fuel cycle, safety and waste management techniques.¹¹⁰

After the announcement of Iran's secret research reactors in Natanz and Arak, IAEA and the United Nations (UN) started to investigate the nuclear programme of Iran. In this regard, on 22-23 February 2003, IAEA Chief Muhammed El Baradei visited Iran and was informed of Iran's uranium enrichment programme which consists of two new facilities in Natanz to produce enriched uranium fuel. Iran also admitted the heavy-water production reactor in Arak. Additionally, IAEA enquired explanation from Iran about the transfers of nuclear material. In response to this, Iran admitted its workshop of Kalaye Electric Company for the production of centrifuge components, but stated that there had been no nuclear material was used in simple experiments. However, IAEA was suspicious about the possibility of enriching uranium capacity of Iran and would like to investigate. Although at first Iran refused the request of IAEA, then Tehran admitted and let to investigations in March and May 2003. Moreover, on 5 May 2003 Iran for the first time informed to IAEA about its plan about building a 40 MW and a fuel fabrication facility in Isfahan.¹¹¹ Briefly, IAEA reported that "Iran has failed to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with the respect to the reporting of nuclear material, the subsequent processing and use of that material and the declaration of facilities where the material was stored and processed".¹¹²

¹¹⁰ The speech of Vice-President of Islamic Republic of Iran and President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran at the 46th General Conference of the IAEA in Vienna, 16 September 2002, pg.3 <http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC46/iran.pdf> (accessed in 28 feb 2009).

¹¹¹ <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-40.pdf> International Atomic Energy Agency, Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran Report by the Director General (GOV/2003/40) 6 June 2003 pg.2-3 (accessed in 28 Feb 2009).

¹¹² Ibid,7.

On 12 September 2003, Agency “called on Iran to provide accelerated cooperation and full transparency, to ensure there are no further failures to report material, facilities and activities that Iran is obliged to report pursuant to its safeguards agreement, call on Iran to take action essentially for verification of compliance with Iran’s safeguard Agreement.”¹¹³ The US announced that this resolution was the last chance of Iran before referral to UN Security Council. In September 2003, IAEA resolution called on Iran to suspend all further enrichment related activities. Additionally, EU-3 states (France, Germany, and England) urged Iran to adopt the Additional Protocol¹¹⁴ and offered general promises of increased technical cooperation if the nuclear issue was resolved.¹¹⁵

4.3.2. Tehran Declaration of October 2003

Iran first protested the September Resolution and maintained that if the Board referred Iran to Security Council, excessive groups would demand the withdrawal of Iran from the NPT. However following the EU-3 foreign ministers visited to Tehran, in 21 October 2003. In this sense Iran accepted engaging in full cooperation with Agency through full transparency but at the same time Iran emphasized that it would suspend all uranium enrichment “voluntarily”. Moreover, Iran promised to sign Additional Protocol too. The most important issue in the statement was the wording announcing that Tehran had decided “voluntarily” to suspend all uranium enrichment

¹¹³ Ibid,3

¹¹⁴ http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/sg_overview.html The Additional Protocol is a legal document aiming to enable the IAEA inspectorate to provide assurance about both declared and possible undeclared activities.

¹¹⁵ Shahram Chubin, *Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions* (Washington: Edward Brothers, 2006),xv.

and related activities.¹¹⁶ In the respect of the Tehran Agreement, the EU-3 states maintained their opposition to referral of Iran to the UN Security Council as long as she implemented the commitments under the agreement and accepted cooperation with Iran “to promote security and stability in the region”.¹¹⁷

After the meetings in October between Reza Aghazadeh, Vice President of the Islamic Republic and IAEA President Muhammed El Baradei, Aghazadeh maintained that Iran was prepared “to provide, in full transparency, any additional clarifications that the Agency may deem necessary.” Additionally, Iran admitted that it had carried out some testing of centrifuges at the Kalaye Company in late 90s and gave information about its old experiments.¹¹⁸

The Agency, in the respect of 26 November 2003 resolution paper, maintained its welcoming the signing of the Tehran Declaration and requested Iran to ratify and fully implement the Additional Protocol.¹¹⁹ After all these negotiations and reports Iran signed Additional Protocol on 18 December 2003.¹²⁰

¹¹⁶ Shannon N. Kile, “The Controversy over Iran’s Nuclear Programme,” in *Europe and Iran Perspectives on Non-Proliferation*, ed. Shannon N. Kile (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005),7.

¹¹⁷ The International Institute for Strategic Studies(IISS) strategic dossier: *Iran’s Strategic Weapon’s Programmes*, ed. Gary Samore (New York: Routledge, 2005), 20.

¹¹⁸ <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-75.pdf> International Atomic Energy Agency, Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran Report by the Director General (GOV/2003/75) 10 November 2003 pg.4 (accessed in 1March 2009)

¹¹⁹ <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-81.pdf> International Atomic Energy Agency, Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran Resolution Adopted by the Board on 26 November 2003 (GOV/2003/81) 10 November 2003 pg.1 (accessed in 1March 2009)

¹²⁰ <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-11.pdf> International Atomic Energy Agency, Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran Report by the Director General 24 February 2004 (GOV/2004/11) 10 November 2003 pg.1 (accessed in 1March 2009)

In the respect of Tehran Agreement, Iran maintained that it would “voluntarily suspend all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities as defined by the IAEA.”¹²¹

4.3.3. Suspension problem of Tehran Declaration and the Paris Agreement

Because of the absence of a consensus on the definition of the activities which would be suspended, problems had occurred. According to IAEA, Iran should consider the suspension to include “all activities on the site of Natanz, not to produce feed material for enrichment related items.” Unlike IAEA, Iran maintained that it considered the suspension to include “the operation, installation, and testing of centrifuges with or without nuclear materials was specifically applied to Natanz, creating suspicion that suspension might not apply to other centrifuge facilities in Iran”.¹²² For preventing breaking down of the Tehran Declaration, negotiations hold between Iran and EU-3 states and as a result of negotiations on 15 November 2004 Paris Agreement was signed. In the respect of Paris Agreement , Iran had decided on a voluntary basis, to continue and extend its suspension to include all enrichment related and reprocessing activities. Iran also accepted to continue implementing voluntarily the Additional Protocol. However, these agreements were not enough to solve the problem.

In August 2005 Ahmadinejad, the hard-line conservative major of Tehran, was elected and became the president of Iran. In 2005 Iran was criticized because of the uranium which was existed in Isfahan and not obeying the rules of agreements.

¹²¹The International Institute for Strategic Studies(IISS) strategic dossier: *Iran’s Strategic Weapon’s Programmes*, ed. Gary Samore (New York: Routledge, 2005),20-21.

¹²²Ibid.

Additionally, Iran was warned of being referred to the Security Council of the UN both by Agency and the EU-3. In January 2006 Iran informed IAEA that it was going to start its nuclear studies, which was suspended voluntarily.¹²³

4.3.4 Security Council Report

This decision of Iran was criticized at international arena and after the meetings of 5 permanent members of Security Council, Germany and IAEA Board of Governors, IAEA decided to refer Iran to the UN. On 29 March 2006 Security Council declared that “noting with serious concern Iran’s resumption of uranium enrichment-related activities and its suspension of cooperation with the IAEA, the SC underlined the importance of re-establishing full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development”.¹²⁴ Additionally, the SC emphasized that the Agency was unable to conclude that there were no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran and expressed that implementation of the requirements which were set out by the IAEA such as suspension, and full, verified, compliance would contribute a diplomatic, negotiated solution which would guarantee Iran’s nuclear programme was for exclusively peaceful purposes. Moreover, the Council requested a report from the Director General Mohammed El- Baradei, on Iranian compliance with the steps requested by the Board within 30 days.¹²⁵

In response to Council request, on 28 April 2006 the Agency announced in its report that except from the small quantities previously reported to the Board, it did

¹²³Shahram Chubin, *Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions* (Washington: Edward Brothers, 2006),xxiii-xx.

¹²⁴ <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8679.doc.htm> United Nations Security Council SC/8679 29 March 2006 5430rd Meeting (PM) (accessed on 10 March 2009).

¹²⁵ Ibid.

not find any other undeclared nuclear material in Iran. However, the Agency added that because of the gaps in the Agency's knowledge about Iran's centrifuge programme, concerns about Iran were still exist. Hence, Agency requested from Iran more transparency.¹²⁶ Also, Agency emphasized that Iran's decision to cease implementing the provisions of the Additional Protocol and Safeguard Agreement would be a big difficulty at the Agency's ability to clarifying the nuclear activities of Iran.¹²⁷

4.3.5 Security Council December 2006 First Sanctions - UNSC Resolution 1737(2006)

The UN imposed first sanctions in 23 December 2006. Because of the fact that Iran had not established full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and did not resume its cooperation with the IAEA under the Additional Protocol, the Security Council admitted sanctions towards Iran.¹²⁸ The Security Council decided that all states should take necessary measures to prevent the provision to Iran any technical assistance or training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or other services, prohibited materials.¹²⁹ In addition, the SC called upon all the states to exercise vigilance regarding the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals who are engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and listed in the

¹²⁶ <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-27.pdf> International Atomic Energy Agency, Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran Report by the Director General 28 April 2006 (GOV/2006/27) 28 April 2006 pg.7 (accessed in 11 March 2009)

¹²⁷ Ibid, 8.

¹²⁸ http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/unsc_res1737-2006.pdf United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737(2006) 27 December 2006 5612th Meeting (accessed on 14 March 2009).

¹²⁹ Ibid,3.

attachment.¹³⁰ The SC, also requested a report from Director General within 60 days about Iran has established full and sustained suspension of all activities mentioned in the resolution.¹³¹

In response, Iran announced that the sanctions were not fair because its nuclear program for peaceful purposes so it would continue its nuclear policy. Iran's former United Nations ambassador, Javad Zrif, criticized the sanctions and said that it "can only remind the Iranian people of the historical injustices this Security Council has done to them".¹³²

4.3.6 Security Council March 2007 Second Sanctions - UNSC Resolution 1747(2007)

On 24 March 2007, the UN widened the scope of its December 2006 sanctions against Iran by banning the country's arms exports and freezing the assets and restricting the travel of additional individuals engaged in the country's proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.¹³³ The SC widened the scope of December 2006 sanctions because of the fact that Iran did not implement the first sanctions of the SC.¹³⁴ It "called upon the all states to exercise vigilance and restraint regarding the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals who are engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear

¹³⁰ Ibid,4.

¹³¹ Ibid,7.

¹³² <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/24/world/24nations.html> Elissa Gootman, "Security Council Approves Sanctions Against Iran Over Nuclear Program", The New York Times, 24 December 2006, (accessed 19 September 2008).

¹³³ http://iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/laeaIran/unscre_s1747-2007.pdf International Atomic Energy Agency United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737 (2006) :2.(accessed 25 January 2008).

¹³⁴ http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/laeaIran/unscre_s1747-2007.pdf United Nations Security Council Resolution 1747(2007) 24 March 2007 5647th Meeting (accessed on 16 March 2009).

activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.” In addition, the report listed thirteen entities and fifteen people that should be exercised vigilance and restrained regarding the entry into or transit through territories.¹³⁵ The SC called upon “all the states to exercise vigilance and restraint in the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft of any battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register on Conventional Arms to Iran...” and “called upon all states and international financial institutions not to enter into new commitments for grants, financial assistance, and concessional loans, to the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, except for humanitarian and developmental purposes”.¹³⁶

In response to the SC Sanctions Iran again declared that the decision for sanctions was unfair and mentioned that international agreements give Iran the right for peaceful nuclear studies. Additionally President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad warned that “If the West did not end its pressure against Iran to stop the production of uranium, Iran would review its policy of cooperation with the IAEA, the United Nations nuclear monitoring entity.”¹³⁷ When the US saw that the sanctions couldn’t stop the nuclear programme of Iran, it demanded to wide sanctions again.

On 26 October 2007, the USA decided to implement sanctions to the Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) because of its support to international terrorism

¹³⁵ Ibid,2.

¹³⁶ Ibid,3.

¹³⁷ <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/10/world/middleeast/10iran.html> The New York Times, “Iran Says It Can Enrich Uranium On A Large Scale” (accessed 18 January 2008).

and role in proliferating weapons of mass destruction. Iran's Ministry of Defense and three of Iran's largest banks- Bank Melli, Bank Mellat, and Bank Saderat -also were subject to sanctions as were individuals engaged in the regime's proliferation and terrorist support activities.¹³⁸

On 25 September 2007, addressing the U.N General Assembly on Iran's nuclear activities, Ahmadinejad said that ,” The issue of Iran's nuclear activities is a matter only for the United Nations atomic watchdog now and not the Security Council.” He also added that, “Previously, they illegally insisted on politicizing the Iranian nations's nuclear case, but today, because of resistance of the Iranian nation, the issue is back to the IAEA, and I officially announce that in or opinion the nuclear issue of Iran is now closed and has turned into an ordinary Agency matter.”¹³⁹

4.3.7 Security Council March 2008 Third Sanctions - UNSC Resolution 1803(2008)

On 3 March 2008, the SC widened its sanctions towards Iran again. In this respect, the SC rose up the number of people and companies that should be exercised vigilance and restraint regarding the entry into or transit through their territories by the states. It called all states to take necessary measures to prevent transfer, supply, sale of all items, materials equipment goods and technology which were determined specifically in the documents and called upon all states to exercise vigilance in entering into new commitments for public provided financial support for trade with Iran and over the activities of financial institutions in their territories with all banks

¹³⁸ <http://washingtontimes.com/article/20071026/FOREIGN/110260060/1003> The Washington Times, “U.S. Hits Regime's Military with New Sanctions” (accessed 20 January 2007).

¹³⁹ Hussein D. Hassan, “Iran: Profile of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad” CRS Report for congress, July 2008, 5.

domiciled in Iran, especially Bank Melli and Bank Saderat and their branches and subsidiaries abroad.¹⁴⁰ Also, the SC called upon all the states to inspect the cargos from Iran, of aircraft and vessels, at their airports and seaports owned or operated by Iran Air Cargo and Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Line, provided there are reasonable grounds to believe that the aircraft or vessel is transporting goods prohibited under this resolution or previous resolutions.¹⁴¹ It also called upon all States to report to the Committee within 60 days of adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken. It also encouraged the European Union High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy to continue communication with Iran in support of political and diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution including relevant proposals by China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States with a view to create necessary conditions for resuming talks.¹⁴² The SC requested a report from the Director General of the IAEA about Iran attitudes towards new sanctions in resolution within 90 days and underlined that further decisions would be required by the SC, in the event that Iran has not complied with this resolution and the previous ones.¹⁴³

¹⁴⁰ Ibid,4.

¹⁴¹ http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/iaeaIran/unsc_res1803-2008.pdf United Nations Security Council Resolution 1803(2008) 3 March 2008 5648th Meeting (accessed on 18 March 2009) .

¹⁴² Ibid,5.

¹⁴³ Ibid,6.

4.3.8 Security Council September 2008 Fourth Sanctions - UNSC Resolution 1835(2008)

On 27 September 2008, the Security Council admitted fourth sanctions towards Iran. However, this time there was no any new sanction; it was just a repetition of the previous sanctions. In this respect, the SC reaffirmed the previous resolutions and its commitment to an early negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear issue and welcomes the continuing efforts. It also emphasized the importance of the dual-track approach to the Iranian nuclear issue. The SC once again called upon Iran to comply fully and without any further delay the required measures under the resolutions of the Security Council and IAEA.¹⁴⁴

The last report of 2008 was announced by the IAEA on 19 November. The Agency maintained that because of the lack of cooperation by Iran in connection with the alleged studies and other associated key issues of serious concern, the Agency had not been able to make substantive progress on these issues. Agency determined the providing information and documents in relevant issues and implementation of Additional Protocol as the way of solution. The report reaffirmed that Iran was continuing its nuclear related activities contrary to the Security Council decisions and urged Iran to implement all measures required.¹⁴⁵

On 9 July the United Nations Security Council leveled its fourth round of sanctions against Iran's nuclear program. The new resolution, hailed by President

¹⁴⁴ http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/unscre_s1835-2008.pdf United Nations Security Council Resolution 1835(2008) 27 September 2008 5984th Meeting (accessed on 18 March 2009).

¹⁴⁵ <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2008/gov2008-59.pdf> International Atomic Energy Agency, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran Report by the Director General 19 November 2008 (GOV/2008/59) 19 November 2008 pg.4 (accessed in 18 March 2009).

Obama as delivering “the toughest sanctions ever faced by the Iranian government”. The main thrust of the sanctions is against military purchases, trade and financial transactions carried out by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, which controls the nuclear program and has taken a more central role in running the country and the economy the sanctions tighten measures previously taken against 40 individuals, putting them under a travel ban and asset freeze. The new sanctions also ban selling Iran heavy weapons, specifically battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, large caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles and missile systems.¹⁴⁶

4.4. The Policy of the US in the Nuclear Crisis

Today the US stands as Iran’s most important strategic challenge and the US-Iranian relations have become even more strained in recent years. With the start of the Bush Doctrine, the United States declared that it has the right to employ preventive military intervention as a tool of counter proliferation and to effect regime change as a means of ensuring disarmament.¹⁴⁷ According to the US, a government that is nuclear-armed and dominated by conservative clerics and politicians act more aggressively toward its neighbors and foes. Hence, the US tries to develop a strategy to stop the Iranian nuclear weapons capability or change the regime. In this sense, President Bush has stated that “The development of a nuclear weapon in Iran is intolerable”¹⁴⁸ and tried to reduce Iranian motivations for retaining its nuclear

¹⁴⁶ <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/10/world/middleeast/10sanctions.html> Neil Macfarquhar, “U.N. Approves New Sanctions to Deter Iran”, *The New York Times* (20 July 2010).

¹⁴⁷ Ray Takeyh, “Iran Builds the Bomb”, *Survival*, (Winter 2004-05), 54.

¹⁴⁸ Davis Ian and Paul Ingram, “Taking the Wind Out of the Perfect Geopolitical Storm: Iran and the Crisis over Non-proliferation,” *Foreign Policy In Focus* (November 23, 2005):7.

program along with coercive measures to inflict sufficient punishment on the regime. The Bush administration supports that Iran must not be allowed to develop enrichment technology. It believes Iran has lost its right to civil nuclear power technology by constructing facilities without declaring them to the international arena.¹⁴⁹

The US describes Iran as one of the greatest potential threats in both the short and the long term future because of Iran's influence over the Middle East affairs stem from its rich oil supply and its strong pro-Islam and nationalist rhetoric. Additionally, according to the US Iran give support to Islamic terrorism in Iraq and in the broader Middle East.¹⁵⁰ In addition, the US policy toward Iran is also characterized by a special antipathy going beyond distrust or the legacy of past events such as the hostage crises. For many Americans, Iran is more dangerous than North Korea or Iraq. Iran's opposition to Israel, the regime's shifty behavior or the lack of a domestic constituency or congressional support in the US can be determined as the main causes of this perception.¹⁵¹

Both Israel and Iran perceive each other as an important and dangerous threat. Like the US, Israel does not believe that nuclear Iran can be contained and has problematic relations with Iran. While Ahmadinejad discusses the legitimacy of Israel's existence, Israel presents Iran as the center of violence and a threat to the entire world. As the US did, Israel tries to convince the international community that Iran is a threat not only for Israel but also for the whole world. Hence, Israel

¹⁴⁹Ibid.

¹⁵⁰Matthew S. Duchene, "What If: A Perspective on the Iranian Nuclear Weapon," *Defense & Security Analyses* (Vol. 23, No.3),331.

¹⁵¹ Shahram Chubin, *Iran's Nuclear Ambitions* (Washington: Edward Brothers, 2006), 90.

supposes that Iran should be stopped before becoming a nuclear power. Although Israel admits merits of diplomatic efforts of the EU, it also emphasizes the importance of military option. Declarations of Ahmadinejad's such as "Iran would wipe out Israel off the map" and in response to Ahmadinejad's remarks Mark Regev, a spokesman for the Israel Foreign Ministry "We see today that there is a growing understanding in the international community that the extremist regime in Tehran is not just Israel's problem, but rather an issue that entire international community must grapple with."¹⁵² also cause to escalate tension with both the US and Israel.

The logic behind the US' military prevention is also related about new threats such as terrorism, rogue states and weapons of mass destruction require a new response. Deterrence and containment policies were worked during the Cold War however they may not be enough for the stateless enemies without territory. The September 11 attacks demonstrated America's worst post-Cold War fears about its enemies who are unable to attack America directly. Hence, September 11 revealed the reality of mass terrorism and the emergence of large-scale asymmetric threats.¹⁵³ Hence, the Bush administration is rightly focused on rogue regimes. In that context, Washington sees most arms-control and non-proliferation agreements as adequate because determined proliferators simply ignore the rules and cheat.¹⁵⁴

Beyond proliferation, Iran's opposition to the Arab-Israel peace process and its disturbing approach to post-war Afghanistan were criticized by Washington. In

¹⁵² <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/26/world/africa/26iht-iran.html> The New York Times, "Wipe Israel 'off the map' Iranian says", Nazila Fathi October 27, 2005 (Accessed on 12. April 2010).

¹⁵³ Gilles Andréani, "The 'War on Terror': Good Cause, Wrong Concept", *Survival* (Winter 04-05), 43.

¹⁵⁴ Antony J. Blinken, "From Preemption to Engagement", *Survival* (Winter 2003-2004), 40.

this regard, Condolezza Rice claimed that “Iran’s direct support for regional and global terrorism belie any good intention it displayed in the days after the world’s worst terrorist attacks in the history”.¹⁵⁵

As Iran’s regime and its nuclear programme are seen as a major threat to the regional stability, containment of Iran has become the central feature of US policy in the Middle East. In this regard, Washington has three simultaneous and overlapping goals: containing what is seen as an Iranian aspiration for regional hegemony; stopping the nuclear programme; and regime change through working for a ‘free and democratic Iran’.¹⁵⁶ Briefly, the US’s policy toward Iran consists of a combination of prevention through sanctions, export controls, denial strategies, containment and freezing the program at a certain level of capability though limiting its growth. Especially the US supported the economic sanctions and political isolation of Iran for solving nuclear crises and urged the UN and other countries for implementing sanctions.

4.4.1. The US’ Policy & International Response

In the respect of the US policy, Reagan administration cut off western assistance to Iran nuclear policy because of concerns that Iran would misuse peaceful nuclear technology to pursue a nuclear weapons programme but Iran continued its way with Russia and China. At the end of the first Bush administration, while Russia agreed in principle to complete the Bushehr nuclear power project, China agreed in principle to supply Iran with two nuclear power reactors. However, Russia continued to cooperate with Iran and explained its support pointing out that light water nuclear

¹⁵⁵ Parama Sinha Palit, “US-Iran: The Changing dynamics and the likelihood of a conflict”, *Strategic Analysis* (January 2004), 106.

¹⁵⁶ Tim Guldimann, “The Iranian Nuclear Impasse”, *Survival*, (Autumn 2007),173.

power technology under IAEA safeguards did not pose a serious proliferation threat hence Iran was not in violation of its NPT commitments. Anxious between Russia and the US started to escalate but at the end Russia agreed not to provide fuel-cycle assistance or additional power reactors to Iran for a period of time. Because of the fact that the US insisted on the prevention any nuclear cooperation with Iran, Russia took a series of export-control system and canceled several contracts between Russia Companies and Iran's missile programme.¹⁵⁷

Even if Washington and Moscow struggled to deal with missile issue, Russian nuclear cooperation with Iran reemerged as a problem at the end of 90s. In 2000 January, Putin was elected as the President. Putin administration agreed to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, and gave firm assurances that Russia would not allow sensitive nuclear technology to be transferred to Iran. However, Putin was also more protective to assert Russia's national interests. By the time of the May 2002 Moscow summit, Putin strongly reasserted Russia's right to provide Iran with nuclear power reactors as legitimate civilian commerce.¹⁵⁸

Despite the progress, the issue of supporting Iran has never been completely solved and Iran continued to seek missile technology from smaller companies and individual scientists in Russia. In this regard, the US thinks that even if Russia made clear commitments to stop supporting Iran, the implementation of commitments were problematic. Washington thinks that Moscow has done just enough to relieve American pressure and threat of sanctions without taking decisive measures that

¹⁵⁷Vladimir A. Orlov and Alexander Vinniko, "The Great Guessing Game: Russia and the Iranian Nuclear Issue", *The Washington Quarterly*, (Spring 2005), 53-54.

¹⁵⁸Victor Mizin, "The Russia- Iran Nuclear Connection and U.S. Policy Options", *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, (March, 2004),76.

might damage Russia's overall relations with Iran. From the Russia's perspective, the US was exaggerating the problem, making accusations without providing any specifics, and trying to interfere in normal economic transactions and scientific exchanges.¹⁵⁹

The US' aim to install missile defenses in Eastern Europe has caused another tension between two states. Although the US insists on the missile defenses in the Czech Republic and Poland are directed against Iran, Russia posed them as a threat for itself. The US declared its will to deploy ten mid-course interceptors in Poland and a narrow-beam X-band radar in the Czech Republic by 2011–13 as part of its limited ballistic-missile-defence Programme in 2002. From the Russia's point of view entry of Poland and its Central European neighbours into NATO was one of the humiliations of the post-Soviet era. Russia also thinks that the American proposal threatens the Russian nuclear deterrent, at least in the long term.¹⁶⁰

China which is the other problematic state for the US in the nuclear crisis, became a net importer of oil in 1992. Hence the regional stability and regular supply of oil is important for Beijing.¹⁶¹ China also became the world's second largest important importer of oil and the IAEA estimates that in 2002, China will consume half of oil in the world. Since the China does not trust world oil and gas market and fear that supply lanes and markets could be controlled by the US, it has decided that

¹⁵⁹ Robert Einhorn and Gary Samore, "Ending Russian Assistance to Iran's Nuclear Bomb" *Survival* (Summer 2002), 55-56.

¹⁶⁰ Walter B. Slocombe, "Europe, Russia and American Missile Defence", *Survival* (April-May 2008), 19-20.

¹⁶¹ Sanam Vakil, "Iran: Balancing East against West", *The Washington Quarterly*, (Autumn 2006), 54.

it needs to control stakes in other nations' oil and gas fields and infrastructure.¹⁶² Hence, for protecting its economic and political relations with Iran China opposes strong stance against Iran. However, China does not want to worsen its relations with the US because its economic growth depends on American support in international institutions, the US market, technology and investment. As a result nuclear crisis pushed China to dilemma. While trying to maintain an amiable relationship with Iran to protect its important energy interests in the oil rich country, Beijing also wants to be seen as a responsible rising power supporting the principles of nuclear nonproliferation.¹⁶³ Even if China does not want to acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran, it tries to stand at a midpoint between UN and Iran. Hence, it participates fully in representations to Iran but has refused to support new UN sanctions. In this regard, Beijing is reluctant to impose harsh sanctions to further Chapter VII resolutions. The US also showed that it is against the cooperation between China and Iran by sanctioning five Chinese companies in June 2006 for assisting Iran's ballistic missile programs and had previously sanctioned 33 Chinese companies.¹⁶⁴

Another important actor in the crisis for the US is the EU. Since the crisis broke out, the EU takes the leading role in trying to convince Iran to give up its efforts to acquire a large-scale civilian nuclear program. In this respect Britain, France and Germany (EU-3) has important role in nuclear crisis. The EU-3 carried out the diplomatic way for solution and act as the main negotiator. The EU approach

¹⁶² Joshua Kurlantzick, "China's New Diplomacy and its impact on the World", *Brown Journal of World Affairs*, (Winter 2007), 223.

¹⁶³ Jing-dong Yuan, "China and the Iranian Nuclear Crisis", *China Brief a Journal of analysis and information*, (February 2006), 2-3.

¹⁶⁴ Steve A. Yetiv and Chunlong Lu, "China, Global Energy and Middle East", *The Middle East Journal*, (Spring 2007), 213.

to Iran is clearly more understanding and flexible than the US. Its aim is formulating an alternative approach to US policy regarding the use of force to address proliferation challenges because of the UN's fail to deal with proliferating states such as North Korea. The EU seeks to address nuclear problems through a strategy of "preventive engagement" in the context of respecting international law and supporting the UN system. It also sets out a programme to improve the non-proliferation regimes. This new approach was determined as "effective multilateralism" by Javier Solana and it is characterized by a new resolve to pursue common security objectives in a framework that emphasizes multilateral institutions, especially the UN and regional organizations, and the rule of law with an emphasis that military force alone cannot resolve the security challenges and threats, and which acknowledges the root causes of these problems.¹⁶⁵

Both the US and Europe see diplomacy as a necessary step but there is a difference between the two, the Europeans are less focused on the nature of Iran's regime. In his speeches President Bush has emphasized the aspect of democracy in Iran and warned that "a non-transparent society that is world's premier sponsor of terror cannot be allowed to possess the world's most dangerous weapons".¹⁶⁶ Additionally, Secretary of the US Condoleezza Rice emphasized that "No one wants to see a Middle East that is dominated by an Iranian hegemony, particularly one that has nuclear technology."¹⁶⁷ One of the main assumptions of the Bush administration

¹⁶⁵ Gerrard Quille and Keane Rory, "The EU and Iran: towards a new political and security dialogue," in *Europe and Iran Perspectives on Non-Proliferation*, ed. Shannon N. Kile (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 112-113.

¹⁶⁶ Shahram Chubin, *Iran's Nuclear Ambitions* (Washington: Edward Brothers, 2006), 90.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

for the Middle East is that in the long run, peace, stability and an end to anti-Western terrorism will not be possible until the region's regimes become more democratic. Regarding this development of weapons of mass destruction poses an unacceptable threat that would make long-term peace and stability in the region impossible.¹⁶⁸

With the election of President Obama some argues that Obama will have a positive affect at the nuclear crises, there hasn't been a critic change at nuclear crises yet.¹⁶⁹ Since coming to office, President Barack Obama has offered to 'extend a hand' and engage in direct talks with Iran, dropping a previous US condition that Iran should first suspend all uranium-enrichment activity, as called for by five UN Security Council resolutions. In May 2009, President Obama sent a letter to Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei offering a framework for talks on regional security and Iran's nuclear programme. However, Obama's diplomatic initiatives have taken place in the context of failed multilateral diplomacy over Iran's nuclear programme. Since summer 2009, the Obama administration was threatening to close the window on diplomacy with Iran. In this regard, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said on 6 August 2009 that "We are under no illusions; we were under no illusions before their elections that we can get the kind of engagement we are seeking... We're not going to keep the window open forever."¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁸ Philip H. Gordon, "Bush's Middle East Vision", *Survival* (Spring 2003), 156.

¹⁶⁹Richard Dalton, "Iran: Breaking the Nuclear Deadlock", (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2008), 29.

¹⁷⁰ Andrew Parasiliti, "Iran: Diplomacy and Deterrence", *Survival* (October–November 2009), 5-6.

4.5. The Policy of Iran in Nuclear Crisis

Before 1990s Iran's nuclear efforts did not constitute a dedicated nuclear weapons programme, instead it was for developing use of nuclear technologies, with both civilian and military applications. In 1989, following its eight-year war with Iraq, Iran initiated a major programme to rebuild, expand and modernize its ravaged armed forces. It was motivated by at least three reasons, first is a desire to achieve self-reliance in all areas of national life including the military arena, second is a determination to transform Iran into a regional power capable of projecting influence throughout and beyond the Middle East and last is the need to strengthen its deterrent capability against various perceived threats in order to forestall new acts of aggression after the war with Iraq. Bolstering the standing of the regime in the eyes of the Iranian people and throughout the Arab and Muslim worlds, threatening the US allies such as Israel, Turkey, Egypt or Saudi Arabia in order to gain leverage over the US during a crisis or confrontation can be added as the other reasons for nuclear power aim of Iran.¹⁷¹

The election of Ahmadinejad represents a major turning point in Iranian politics. He represents a far more radical shift in the social structure of the country and his agenda seems more radical even when compared with first revolutionary generation.¹⁷² Ahmedinajad is using foreign policy against domestic problems as a protector for his candidacy. He blames Western capitalism for economic problems in Iran and emphasizes the imminent collapse of Western powers and rise of Iran. In this context, authoritarian interpretation of Islam and plays down the democratic

¹⁷¹Micheal Einsenstadt, "Living With Nuclear Iran," *Survival* (Vol.41, No.3, Autumn 1999):125-126.

¹⁷² Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Mahjoob Zweiri, *Iran and the Rise of its Neoconservatives: The Politics of Tehran's Silent Revolution*, (London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd), 93.

elements in the constitution in favour of government by the elections can be determined as the main reflections of Ahmedinajad's policy.¹⁷³

Iran's nuclear program has gained a symbolic resonance comparable to Muhammed Mossadegh's nationalization of Iranian oil in 1951. In both of them, energy resources includes nationalist themes of modernity, sovereignty, self-sufficiency and non-submission to western control. In this respect Ahmedinajad's populist discourse follows the main idea of Mossadegh's model that is "indisputable right".¹⁷⁴ By this discourse Ahmadinejad tries to affect public opinion and consolidate his position. Hence, Iran links its nuclear programme closely to its national independence and security. Its leaders have responded to international pressures by comparing resistance in the nuclear issue to resistance in the 'Holy Defence' (against Iraq in the war of the 1980s). They also consider Western countries' record on assisting nuclear development to be poor and argue that Iran should move towards full self-sufficiency.¹⁷⁵ In this regard, Iran's nuclear program turned into a national pride and prestige. According to Dr. Gholamali Chegnizadeh, who is the Assistant professor in the Faculty of Law and Political Science at the University of Allame Tabatabaee in Tehran, there are three main pillars for understanding the Iranian strategic thinking. First one is Iranian's sense of victimization which occurred after Islamic revolution and especially in the Gulf war because of the policies of Western states. Second was Iranian's quest for recognition and last one is continuity of the pre-revolutionary period. He related Iran's policy

¹⁷³ Ali Ansari, "Iran Under Ahmadinejad: Populism and its Malcontents", *International Affairs* (84-04), 6-7.

¹⁷⁴ Jean-Louis Gergorin, "Breaking the Nuclear Deadlock", *Survival*, (June-July 2009), 22.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid*, 22-23.

with the psychological deficit which is trying to fulfill with developing nuclear weapons capability.¹⁷⁶

Despite international pressure, IAEA resolutions, four UN Security Council resolutions, UN and unilateral sanctions and the threat of a military attack by the US and Israel, the Iranians have shown no flexibility in their determination to pursue enrichment. Iran sees itself as the embodiment of an ancient civilization and wants to be respected as such. This claim for honor and respect is central to Iran's aspiration to be treated as a regional power and a leading player in the Islamic world. Tehran's insistence on international respect is supported by strong national pride in the population. In this regard, Iran's response to UN sanctions was very aggressive. Ahmadinejad had warned that any move toward sanctions would prompt a "decisive and appropriate answer"¹⁷⁷ from Iran. Moreover, hardline members of the Majlis (Iranian parliament) and newspapers demanded that Iran pull out of the NPT. However, that threat remained as a bluff, because it would destroy Iran's claims to the legitimacy of its nuclear programme. Hence, Iran continued to its cooperation with the IAEA.¹⁷⁸

Tehran views the American presence in the Middle East as a potential existential threat and Iranian defense officials say that Iran faces no threat from a regional state, hence the probable challenge is from "an ultra-regional power like America".¹⁷⁹ They argue that Washington is using the nuclear issue to limit Iran's

¹⁷⁶ Mustafa Kibaroglu, "Good for the Shah, Banned for the Mullahs: The West and Iran's Quest for Nuclear Power", *Middle East Journal* (Spring 2006), 219.

¹⁷⁷ Mark Fitzpatrick, "Can Iran's Nuclear Capability Be Kept Latent?", *Survival*, (Spring 2007), 44.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹ Shahram Chubin, "Iran's Power in Context", *Survival* (February–March 2009), 167.

regional power, which it sees as already so impressive that ‘no country in the [Middle East] can stand against it’.¹⁸⁰ Although the US accused Iran for not obeying the international treaties and criticizing the uranium enrichment activities, Iranian officials have insisted on their right to carry out nuclear development. The US argued that Iran has no need for nuclear energy because the country is endowed with natural resources of oil and gas that are significantly cheaper to develop. They also linked their will for nuclear development with Iran’s electricity consumption.

Iran’s security concerns are also related to historical realities encountered hence Iranians have reason to be wary of the nations that have harmed them in the past.¹⁸¹ Iran’s security dilemma is tainted by a historical perception of repeated letdowns and betrayals.¹⁸² In response to threats that it perceived, Iran has embarked on a major attempt to develop its non-conventional military capability, particularly the nuclear option. Yet, despite Washington’s assessment of Iran’s determination to acquire a nuclear capability, there is in fact a debate in Tehran regarding the wisdom of crossing the nuclear weapons research programme that will broaden Iran’s strategic options, but are not agreed on whether Iran should actually pursue nuclear status.¹⁸³

Presumably, when Iran resumed its pre-1979 nuclear programme during the Iran–Iraq War in the early 1980s, it was with military intent. The programme continued in the 1990s. But after the US-led coalition toppled Saddam Hussein in

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ Fariborz Mokhtari, “No One Will Scratch My Back: Iranian Security Perceptions in Historical Context”, *The Middle East Journal* (Spring 2005), 228.

¹⁸² Ray Takeyh, “Iran at a Crossroads” *The Middle East Journal*; (Winter 2003), 55.

¹⁸³ Ibid, 29.

Iraq and the Iranian regime felt the threat of regime-change action could be extended to Iran, Tehran opened up its programme and enhanced cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, started negotiations with the EU and implemented the Additional Protocol from late 2003 until early 2006. In 2004, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the highest state authority, stressed the exclusively peaceful purpose of the programme for energy production. Today, the most likely goal of the regime is to achieve a military option – a breakout capability – but not to build the bomb itself or conduct a nuclear test. The core aim is mastering enrichment technology. Iran’s current approach to military doctrine reflects years of dealing with the complex geopolitical environment that emerged from Iran’s revolution, its defeat by Iraq, and its lack of economic and technological strength. Major factors shaping Iran’s initial efforts to develop a post-war doctrine included the losses of men and equipment during the 1980-1988 war with Iraq and the success of US efforts to restrict weapons sales to Tehran.¹⁸⁴

The Bush axis of evil speech upset the positive trend that had begun in Iranian politics, such as a more open attitude to the international community and a normalization of relations with the US. There were many talks of the “objective” alliance between the two countries in overthrowing the Taliban and reconstructing the Afghan government. For many people in Tehran having good relations with the US is usefulness. With the launching of the Axis of Evil, all the endeavors were put on ice and would not be taken again for a long time.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸⁴Steven R Ward, “The Continuing Evolution of Iran's Military Doctrine” *The Middle East Journal*; (Autumn 2005),560-561.

¹⁸⁵ Daniel Heradstveit and G Matthew Bonham, “What the Axis of Evil Metaphor Did to Iran”, *The Middle East Journal* (Summer 2007), 437.

Current Iranian nuclear policy aims at building a strong bargaining position for an eventual arrangement which would have to pay full respect to the country as a regional power, and to the regime. However, Iran's expectations collide with the US policy of further containment and isolation of Iran, so escalation of the crisis continues. This escalation may give the Iranian regime a 'Cuban option': justifying internal stagnation and repression by fighting the external enemy.¹⁸⁶

4.5.1. Iran's Policy and the International Responses

Changing security environment and the existence of nuclear weapons in different states can also be considered as intention for Iran. Although international community agrees on the fact that an Iran who has nuclear weapons capability would cause big threat to the whole world, actors such as Russia and China help Iran at nuclear technology development. This is both because of economic and political factors. However, the US tries to stop nuclear cooperation between Iran and different states. In this context, the US prevented Europe from exporting nuclear technology to Iran and pushed Germany to end its cooperation with Iran at Ronald Reagon era. Also, the US affected China to cease its nuclear cooperation with Iran. However some Iranians advocate that the long-term American challenge can only be achieved by "strategic weapons" and the asymmetry of power between the US and Iran can only be balanced with a presumed nuclear capability. Hence, Iran had continued to build new cooperations and as a result Iran turned its face to Russia for improving its nuclear capabilities.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁶ Tim Guldemann, "The Iranian Nuclear Impasse", *Survival* (Autumn 2007), 169.

¹⁸⁷ Colin Dueck and Ray Takeyh, "Iran's Nuclear Challenge" *Political Science Quarterly* (Summer 2007), 193.

Even if the US tried to stop international assistance to Iran's nuclear project, Iran tries to continue its way with other states such as Russia and China. In this respect, disagreement between the US and Russia is an important tool for Iran in the crisis. Even if Russia agrees on the idea that a nuclear Iran is dangerous for itself and its interests, profits that Russia gained from arm sales, technological assistance and energy partnership restrained Russia to implement sanctions towards Iran. Hence, Russia tried to downgrade sanctions for the continuity of its nuclear assistance to Iran. Russia's economic interest is not only incentive for engaging in nuclear Iran, Moscow also considers that Iran will be a key player in the Gulf Region and Middle East in future, therefore wants to have good relations. Islamic extremism within Russia is also another important factor for Moscow to protect relations with Iran, because of Iranian influences in Muslim communities in Russia. Russian officials believe that Iran has so far played a moderating role on Chechnya hence do not want to put that risk. From geopolitical perspective, Russia is aware of the fact that good relations with the US and the West are critical to its future. However, Russia has no reason why closer alignment with the US should require the cooperation cut off with Iran which they believe to be legitimate and non threatening.¹⁸⁸ Hence, Russia acts carefully in the nuclear issue, for instance fourth sanctions did not contain new sanctions because of the opposition of Russia and China.

The antipathy that is shared by both Iran and Russia is the common point that brings two states together, but it is not enough to become a strong alliance. Iran never forgets that Soviet Union once threatened its sovereignty. Hence, Iran rejects the option to enrich uranium in Russia because of the fear that Iran would enrich its

¹⁸⁸ Robert Einhorn and Gary Samore, "Ending Russian Assistance to Iran's Nuclear Bomb" *Survival* (Summer 2002), 62-64.

uranium beyond commercial grade to weapons grade level, Tehran claims the right to enrich its own uranium for its civilian atomic energy program and reject this opportunity. In late 2005 and May 2006, Putin attempted two times to make the Russian offer more palatable to Tehran by proposing that enrichment should be undertaken in Russia. However both of them were rejected by Iran with the declaration of Iran's will to enrich some uranium inside.¹⁸⁹ On the other hand, Tehran tries to cooperate with Russia as much as possible. Especially after Putin's visit to Tehran in October 2007, the cooperation between Russia and Tehran became stronger.¹⁹⁰ The main problem between Russia and Iran occurred because of UNSC sanction and completion of the Bushehr nuclear reactor.

Both Russia and Iran prefer to defy America and the West rather than to cooperate with them. According to Russia, Iran should be willing to make concessions to Moscow such as agreeing to allow Russia to supply all of Iran's enriched uranium for itself. However, Tehran has had troubled relations with Russia for far longer than with America. Iranians who consider themselves being successful challengers against America, the world's greatest power, see no reason why they should make concessions to Russia, which does not represent great power as much as the US. Indeed, many in Tehran considered Russia as a state that needs to make concessions to Iran for fear of risking the loss of Iranian business to China, India, Japan, or Europe.¹⁹¹

¹⁸⁹ Mark Katz, "Russian-Iranian Relations in the Ahmadinejad Era", *Middle East Journal* (Spring 2008), 206.

¹⁹⁰ http://www.tehrantimes.com/index_View.asp?code=154905 Tehran Times Political Desk "Putin visit will lead to leap in Iran-Russia relations: expert", *Tehran Times* (15 October 2007), (Accessed in 03 February 2010).

¹⁹¹ Thomas Graham, "The Sources of Russia's Insecurity", *Survival* (February-March 2010), 63.

China is the other important state for Iran in the nuclear crisis. Since the mid 1990s, China has expanded the number and depth of its bilateral relationships, joined various trade and security accords, deepened its participation in key multilateral organizations and helped to address global security issues. China's attention to involvement in global arms control and non proliferation affairs has undergone an equally important transformation. It has ratified several important and major arms control and non proliferation accords, such as the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Chemical Weapons Convention. However, even if the scope, content and frequency of its export of sensitive weapons related items have declines and diminished, companies in China continue to assistance to countries such as Iran and Pakistan.¹⁹²

Over the past 25 years China has enhanced its position and interest in the Persian Gulf region and has become increasingly dependent on Middle Eastern oil in recent times. In order to ensure adequate energy to sustain its growing population and economy, China has established diplomatic, economic and security ties in the region. From the Iran's perspective, China has a role to check the US in the UN Security Council. Even if China, reluctantly agree on the notion that Iran should be punished for non-declared nuclear program, its definition of "punishment" is different from the US'.¹⁹³

Regarding this, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman Qin Gang has declared that "China's position has been consistent on the Iranian nuclear issue. We stand for maintaining the rigor and effectiveness of the international nuclear non-proliferation

¹⁹² Evan S. Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel, "China's New Diplomacy" *Foreign Affairs*, (November-December 2003),27.

¹⁹³Ibid.

regime and hope to solve the issue properly through negotiation.” Even if supporting Iran has supplied economic gains to China, it is aware that proliferation in Iran, North Korea or other states would create insatibility that could hurt China’s economic growth and generate security concerns as well.¹⁹⁴

In an effort to diffuse tensions and to preserve the integrity of the non-proliferation regime, the EU-3 entered into negotiations with Iran in October 2003 and offered a mix of positive and negative incentives in exchange for permanent suspension of its indigenous fuel cycle capability. Iran agreed to temporarily suspend enrichment pending these negotiations, but did not accept to a permanent cessation. The EU guaranteed to oppose efforts to refer Iran to the Security Council at the next Board meeting, as long as Iran fully implemented its commitments.

The EU-3 has also important role in the nuclear crisis for Iran. Iran took steps to implement the agreement by submitting further information to the IAEA on past nuclear activities and signing the Additional Protocol in December 2003, promising to implement it pending ratification by the Majlis (Parliament). After Iran’s admitted to cooperate with the IAEA and accepted the Additional Protocol and suspend its enrichment programme, EU-3 recognized Iran’s right to enjoy the peaceful use of nuclear energy in accordance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty’s provisions. Briefly, EU-3 showed that as long as Iran imlemented its commitments under agreement fully, they would oppose efforts to refer the Iran to the UN Security Council.¹⁹⁵

¹⁹⁴ Steve A. Yetiv and Chunlong Lu, “China, Global Energy anf Middle East”, *The Middle East Journal*, (Spring 2007), 214.

¹⁹⁵Shannon N. Kile, “ The Contraversy over Iran’s nuclear Programme,” in *Europe and Iran Perspectives on Non-Proliferation*, ed. Shannon N. Kile (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005),8.

By offering a mix of positive and negative incentives, the EU-3 have tried to convince the Iranians to make the suspension permanent. As regards positive incentives, they have offered assistance and cooperation in three broad spheres: nuclear, technological and economic, political and security. The EU-3 have offered to reaffirm the right of Iran to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination in conformity with the NPT; to support Russian - Iranian cooperation in the field of power reactors and fuel supply and management. They also have offered to resume negotiations on a Trade and Cooperation Agreement and to actively support the opening of Iranian accession negotiations to the WTO in the technological and economic sphere. In the political and security sphere they have offered to cooperate with Iran to help it establish and develop an effective national system of export, transit and end-use control of WMD related goods and Technologies.¹⁹⁶ However, in early 2004, Iran's cooperation started to wear thin.

¹⁹⁶ Aldo Zammit Borda, "The Iranian nuclear issue and EU3 negotiations", *Fornet Working Paper* (May 2005), 18-19.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

When we analyze the background of nuclear policy of Iran, we see that first nuclear ambitions of Iran started during the Shah Period. Since then, even if Iran froze its nuclear policy from time to time, in general Tehran always continues its nuclear project. As a result of the oil crises, Tehran gained lots of money and Shah chose to spend this huge amount of money to nuclear policy. Twin pillar policy of the US also helped Shah's ambitions because as a close ally the US also encouraged Iran to develop nuclear technology both for the security of region and for gaining the money that it lost because of high oil prices.

However, with Islamic Revolution and the toppling down of the Shah a new era which is very different from the previous one started. Ironically close ally of the US turned into the most important adversary. Not only foreign policy of Iran but also its domestic policy has changed and Islam became the main idea of Tehran. Khomeini's approach to nuclear issue was totally different from the Shah's. According to Khomeini, nuclear technology was just a suspicious western invention. Hence, shortly after the Islamic Revolution Iran froze its nuclear policy.

Iran's negative approach to development of nuclear technology has been changed by the eight year Gulf War during which Iran realized the importance of chemical weapons. The attitudes of other states and their support for Iraq, made easier for Iran to realize its isolated position at international arena. Hence, Iran started to change its policy of nuclear technology. With the election of Rafsanjani, the era of reconstruction began and Iran restarted and resumed its nuclear program. Same approach continued also during Khatemi's presidency. In 1990s China and

Russia became the main supplier of nuclear technology to Iran. Even if these cooperations were criticized by the US, Washington could not stop the transfer of nuclear technology to Iran as cooperation with Iran in nuclear technology was a good way of making profit both for Russia and China.

Here we see that, at different periods regarding the domestic, regional and international dynamics Iran changes its attitude towards nuclear technology. The same happens to the US. While two states were close allies, there was no problem related about transferring nuclear technology to Iran. The problem started when two states started to perceive themselves as the major threats. Also domestic developments such as Islamic revolution and regional developments affected Iran's nuclear policy. Even if, because of Khomeini's "Great Satan" and "anti-western" policy Iran stopped its nuclear policy, regional and international realities pushed Iran to restart its nuclear program during Rafsanjani and Khatemi Presidencies.

Although the nuclear policy of Iran was started at Shah Period the crisis broke out in August 2002. In nuclear crisis, the US always emphasizes the danger of Iran as one of the greatest potential threat in both the short and the long term. The main argument of the US in the nuclear crisis is as following: a government that is nuclear-armed and dominated by conservative clerics and politicians might become less risk-averse and act more aggressively toward its neighbors and foes. As a government that is dominated by conservative clerics and politicians following a hard line on foreign policy, Iran should be stopped before reaching the capacity of nuclear weapons. According to US, economic sanctions and political isolation of Iran is the only way of solution. Prevention through sanctions, export controls, denial strategies, containment and freezing the program at a certain level of capability through limiting

its growth can be determined as the main aims of the US policy toward Iran at nuclear crisis.

Despite international pressure, International Atomic Energy Agency resolutions, three UN Security Council resolutions, UN and unilateral sanctions and the threat of a military attack by the US and Israel, the Iranians have shown no flexibility in their determination to pursue enrichment.

Although Iran maintains that its nuclear activities are peaceful and are not aimed at nuclear weapons production, the US doesn't believe such arguments and wants from Iran to stop its programme totally but Iran insists that the nuclear development for energy is its natural right and won't stop this. Generally, Iranian nuclear policy aims at building a strong bargaining position for an eventual arrangement which would have to pay full respect to the country as a regional power, and to the regime.

Iran's old experiences shape the vision of future. Some experiences left big impacts on Iranians memory and attitudes. In my opinion, long standing antipathy between two states towards each other is the main reason of these kinds of policies. As a result of domination and exploitation by foreign states, Iran's attitudes towards international arena and foreign policy were shaped. Traumatic historical experiences like the 1953 Coup, the Iranian Revolution which deposed the Shah, the subsequent 1979-80 hostage crisis, the Gulf War, September 11 attacks and war in Afghanistan and Iraq caused to perceptions of security threat.

The American intervention of August 1953 can be determined as the beginning of perceptions of security threats. For Iranians the chance of being independent and beginning of democratic state choice is frustrated by the US. With

the Islamic Revolution the US totally appeared as the greatest threat and Great Satan. The same was for the US. According to US, new Iran is the greatest threat to international security. Close ally Iran turned into an important security threat for the US. Hostage crises was the reflection of huge otherization between the US and Iran. This time taking over of the US embassy during 444 days was traumatic for the Americans. For Iranians especially for the students admission of Shah was a new way of humiliation and hostage crisis was the revenge of Mossaddeq.

Since the Islamic Revolution, the role of ideology in determining Iran's foreign policy has increased. Generally foreign policy is also shaped by domestic policy. Especially regimes that lack adequate popular support try to consolidate their domestic position through foreign policy alternatives. Also Iran did the same, after Islamic revolution with the help of "us versus them" policy, Khomeini consolidated his regime. Islam became the principle influence in forming the character of Iran's relations with the outside world. Islamic notions of nation, state, and interstate relations shaped both Iran's foreign and domestic policy. The revolutionary Islam message became the primary aim of Iran's foreign policy.

Gulf War is the other important determinant of Iran's and the US' foreign policy. During the Gulf War Iran felt the sense of isolation at international arena and understood the importance of chemical weapons. In the Gulf War, the US tried to counterbalance Iran and prevent Soviet Union from exporting socialism to the Middle East region, the US provided information to Iraq about the Iranian troops' movements. However, invasion of Kuwait changed the US policy then the US started to implement dual containment policy. By this way, the US aimed the restriction of

military aids both in Iran and Iraq. Iran still felt a sense of isolation, years after the end of the war with Iraq and this effected Iran's external behavior.

In this regard, Iran believes that it can maintain its territorial integrity, restore its prestige, and preserve its political survival by gaining nuclear capabilities. Additionally, the US' discourse after September 11 causes Iran to treat the US as a threat to its regime because the US started to support the change of authoritarian regimes to democratic ones after September 11 and fight against terrorism. With Afghanistan and Iraq wars, the US appeared as a neighbor of Iran and threat perceptions of two states have risen. "Axis of Evil" speech of Bush and his emphasis on the importance of democratization of these states, the responsibility of US in this democratization process and the policy of "preemptive war" cause concern in Iran.

Even if the relations between the US and Iran affected the nuclear policy of Iran, also domestic dynamics are very important determinants of Iran's foreign policy. In this regard, Ahmadinejad and the Iranian nation can be determined as the most powerful impulsive forces in the nuclear policy of Iran. For Ahmedinajad nuclear crisis is a way of cover-up domestic problems and consolidation of his power in Iran. In this sense, Ahmadinejad links the nuclear policy of Iran with the main idea of Mossadegh's "indisputable right". As we can see, all domestic dynamics pushed and supported Iran's continuity of nuclear policy.

Regional actors are also very important in nuclear crisis. Actually, the most important threat for Iran in the region is Israel. Hostility between two states affects nuclear crisis and many times caused escalation in the crisis. Most of the Iranian clerics consider Israel as an illegitimate state, usurping Islamic lands and acting as an agent of US imperialism in the Middle East. In addition, Iran views Israel as an

illegitimate state and in this respect the alignment between the US and Israel is the other important motivation for Iran for nuclear activities. In nuclear crisis, Israel follows up the US. In this regard, Israel tries to convince the international community that Iran is a threat for the whole world. Hence, Israel supposes that Iran should be stopped before becoming a nuclear power and emphasizes the importance of military option.

When we consider Iranian nuclear crisis at international level, we see Russia, China and the EU as the most important actors of the nuclear crisis. While Russia and China have great role at transferring nuclear technology and information to Iran, the EU appears as the mediator of nuclear crisis. Both Russia and China continue to cooperate with Iran in nuclear policy, because by this way both of them afford an opportunity for economic gains. Their support also cause concern at the international arena. Especially, the US find cooperation between Russia and Iran dangerous. However, the cooperation between Russia and Iran is not the only cause of tension between Russia and the US. The US' aim to install missile defenses in Eastern Europe is the other cause of tension between two states in 2008. Although the US insists on the missile defenses in the Czech Republic and Poland are directed against Iran, Russia sees them as a threat for itself. Iran uses the hostility between Russia and the US as an advantage for itself and continues to cooperate with Russia as much as possible.

China is other important supplier of Iran in the nuclear issue. Regional stability and regular supply of oil is important for China as the world's second largest importer of oil. Hence, Iran nuclear crisis pushed China to a dilemma, because of the fact that China wants to protect its economic and political relations with Iran so, it

opposes a strong stance against Iran. At the same time China does not want to worsen its relations with the US because its economic growth depends on American support in international institutions, the US market, technology and investment. However, for Iran China is important to check the US in the UNSC.

As the mediator of Iran nuclear crisis, the EU's approach is totally different from all other states. While the US determines economic sanctions and political isolation of Iran as a way of solution, the EU prefers dialogue and cooperation with Iran on different programs such as energy, technology. Like the US, the EU-3 support democracy and criticize the regime of Iran, however the EU does not support economic sanctions because of its economic relations with Iran which is a highly attractive market for European exports and a financial source of investment. The EU-3 have tried to convince the Iranians to make the suspension permanent by offering a mix of positive and negative incentives. As regards positive incentives, they have offered assistance and cooperation in three broad spheres: nuclear, technological and economic, political and security. The EU has also tried to solve nuclear issue by coercive diplomacy which is a combination of demand, threat and time-pressure. Hence it can be said that; the EU approach to Iran is clearly more understanding and flexible than that of the USA.

In October 2009 Iran entered the Geneva talks. The US, Russia, China, Britain, France and Germany made clear that they would focus on Iran's nuclear program. However, there had not been too much change. Even if, UN Security Council said that until Iran's peaceful intentions can be fully established, it should stop enrichment and other nuclear activities, Iran maintained as a signatory of the

NPT, it has the right to enrich uranium for fuel for civil nuclear power.¹⁹⁷ In May 2010, Iran also signed an agreement with both Brazil and Turkey to ship low-enriched uranium to Turkey in Exchange for nuclear fuel for its power plant.¹⁹⁸ However, these developments are not enough to solve nuclear crisis and the crisis continues.

To sum up, Iran nuclear crisis is one of the most complicated problems of the international arena. Lots of different domestic, regional and international actors are the players of this game and they have different strategies which protect their own security perceptions. Considering the US and Iran's policies in nuclear crises, we can say both of them still shape their policies by concerning the past experiences. Their past still affects their current policies towards each other and they continue to perceive themselves as the most important threat and adversary. In addition, their attitudes towards the nuclear issue has changed according to their relationships. While two states were close allies, they do not perceive each other as security threat, so nuclear developments do not cause problem. However, when two states perceive each other as a security threat, nuclear policy causes a nuclear crisis. Moreover, there are so many different domestic, regional and international dynamics that affect both Iran and the US. Hence, since 2002 the nuclear crisis can not be solved yet because finding a common point for all players is so hard. In my opinion, if the US and Iran continue to avoid negotiations, Iran nuclear crisis will always be one of the most

¹⁹⁷ Sinkaya, Bayram. "Iran's Nuclear Program: Rise and Fall of Hope in the Negotiation Process" *Ortadoğu Analiz* (Aralık 2009), 74.

¹⁹⁸ <http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2010/05/201051795513637980.html> Joint Declaration by Iran Turkey and Brazil Declaration (accessed 5 December, 2010)

complicated problems of international relations. To solve this problem, both of them should try to forget past experiences and start negotiations for future.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Afrasiabiabbas, Kaveh and Abbas Maleki. "Iran's Foreign Policy After 11 September." *The Brown Journal of World Affairs* (Winter/Spring 2003):255-265.
- Alexander, Yonah and Milton Hoenig, *The New Iranian Leadership*. London: Praeger Security International), 2008.
- Amuzegar, Jahangir. "Khatami's Legacy: Dashed Hopes." *The Middle East Journal* (Winter 2006): 57-74 .
- Andréani, Gilles. "The 'War on Terror': Good Cause, Wrong Concept." *Survival* (Winter 04–05) : 31-50.
- Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Mahjoob Zweiri, *Iran and the Rise of its Neoconservatives: The Politics of Tehran's Silent Revolution*, (London:I.B.Tauris &Co. Ltd).
- Ó Ansari, Ali M. "Iran under Ahmadinejad: The Politics of Confrontation" *Adelphi Paper 393 The International Institute for Strategic Studies(IISS)*, (Vol. 47 Issue 393, 2007).
- Ó Ansari, Ali M. *Confronting Iran*. London: Hurst&Company, 2006.
- Ó Ansari, Ali M. "Iran Under Ahmadinejad: Populism and its Malcontents" *International Affairs* (2008): 1-18.
- Baghat, Gawdat. "Nuclear Proliferation: The Case of Saudi Arabia." *The Middle East Journal* (Summer 2006): 421-443.
- Baxter, Kylie and Shahram Akbarzadeh. "The Us Foreign Policy in Middle East the Roots of Anti-Americanism." New York: Rouyledeg, 2008.
- Behrooz, Mazier. "The 1953 Coup in Iran and the Legacy of the Tudeh." In *Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran*, edited by Mark J.
- Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, 102-125. New York: Syracuse University Press, 2004.
- Bill, James A. "America, Iran, and the politics of intervention, 1951-1953." London: I.B.Tauris Co&Ltd, 1988.
- Blinken, Antony J. "From Preemption to Engagement." *Survival* (Winter 2003-2004) : 33-60.
- Byrne, Malcolm *The Road to Intervention Factors Influencing U.S. Policy Toward Iran 1945-1953*, ed. Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne (New York: Syracuse University Press,2004).

- Borda, Aldo Zammit. "The Iranian nuclear issue and EU3 negotiations." *Fornet Working Paper* (May 2005): 1-24.
- Buchta, Wilfried. *Taking Stock of a Quarter Century of the Islamic Republic of Iran*. Cambridge: Islamic Legal Studies Program Harvard University, 2005.
- Bunn, George "The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: History and Current Problems", *Arms Control Association*, October 2009.
- Carolyn C. James, "Iran and Iraq as Rational Crisis Actors: Dangers and Dynamics of Survivable Nuclear War." *Journal of Strategic Studies*, (March 2000): 52-73.
- Cleveland, William L. "A history of the Modern Middle East". USA:Westview Press, 1994.
- Cooper, Andrew Scott. "Showdown at Doha: The Secret Oil Deal That Helped Sink the Shah of Iran" *Middle East Journal* (Autumn 2008): 567-591.
- Cottam, Richard W. *Iran and The United States A Cold War Case Study*, London:University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Dalton, Richard. *Iran: Breaking The Nuclear Deadlock*. Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2008.
- Daneshvar, Parviz. *Revolution in Iran*. London: Macmillan Press, 1996.
- Dedeoğlu, Beril. "Fighting Terrorism and Intervention: Paradoxes and Misunderstandings." *Perceptions* (Winter 2005): 147-173.
- Dona J. Stewart, "The Greater Middle East and Reform in the Bush Administration's Ideological Imagination," *Geographical Review* (July 2005):1-13.
- Duchene, Matthew S. "What If: A Perspective on the Iranian Nuclear Weapon." *Defense & Security Analyses* (Vol. 23, No.3): 331-334.
- Dueck Colin and Ray Takeyh. "Iran's Nuclear Challenge." *Political Science Quarterly* (Summer 2007): 189-205.
- Ó Ehteshami, Anoushiravan . *After Khomeini The Iranian Second Republic*. NewYork : Routledge, 1995.
- Ó Enteshami, Anoushivaran. *The Foreign Policy of Middle East States*. United Kingdom: Durham University Press 2002.
- Einhoni, Robert and Gary Samore, "Ending Russian Assistance to Iran's Nuclear Bomb." *Survival* (Summer 2002):51-70.

- Einsensstadt, Micheal. "Living With Nuclear Iran." *Survival* (Vol.41, No.3, Autumn 1999): 124-148.
- Ekinci, Arzu Celalifer. "İran Nükleer Krizi", (Ankara: 2009).
- Fitzpatrick, Mark. "Can Iran's Nuclear Capability Be Kept Latent?" *Survival* (Spring 2007): 33-58.
- Fürtig, Henner. "Conflict and Cooperation in the Persian Gulf: The Interregional Order and US" Gaddis, John Lewis. "A Grand Strategy." *Foreign Policy* (November-December 2002): 50-57.
- Ganji, Babak. *Politics of Confrontation The Foreign Policy of the USA and Revolutionary Iran*. New York: 2006.
- Ganji, Manoucher. *Defying the Iranian Revolution*. USA: Praeger Publishers, 2002.
- Gergorin, Jean-Louis. "Breaking the Nuclear Deadlock." London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2009.
- Gerrard Quille and Keane Rory, "The EU and Iran: towards a new political and security dialogue," in *Europe and Iran Perspectives on Non-Proliferation*, ed. Shannon N. Kile, 97-121. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).
- Ghazali, Ahmad. "Radical Islam, Terrorism, and the Impact of September 11 on the Muslim Community," in *The War on Terror in Comparative Perspective*, ed. Mark J. Miller and Boyka Stefanova, 99-110. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
- Gonzalez, Nathan. *Engaging Iran: The Rise of a Middle East Powerhouse and America's Strategic Choice*. London: Praeger Security International, 2007.
- Gordon, Philip H. "Bush's Middle East Vision." *Survival* (Spring 2003): 155-165.
- Graham, Thomas. "The Sources of Russia's Insecurity." *Survival* (February-March 2010): 55-74.
- Guldimann, Tim. "The Iranian Nuclear Impasse", *Survival*, (Autumn 2007): 169-178.
- Halabi, Yakup. "US Responses to Major Developments in the Arab-Islamic World: Evolution of Role of Ideas." *International Studies* (43, 2006): 339-365.
- Hassan, Hussein D. "Iran: Profile of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad" CRS Report for congress, July 2008: 1-6.
- Heradstveit, Daniel and G Matthew Bonham. "What the Axis of Evil Metaphor Did to Iran." *The Middle East Journal* (Summer 2007): 421-440.

- Hollis, Rosemary. "The U.S. Role: Helpful or Harmful?" in the Iran, Iraq and the Legacies of War edited by Lawrence G. Potter and Gary G. Sick, 193-211. (New York: Palgrave, 2004).
- Houghton, David Patrick. *US Foreign Policy and the Iran Hostage Crisis*. United Kingdom: Cambridge University, 2001.
- Hunter, Robert E. "A New American Middle East Strategy?" *Survival* (December 2008–January 2009): 49-66.
- Ian, Davis and Paul Ingram. "Taking the Wind Out of the Perfect Geopolitical Storm: Iran and the Crisis over Non-proliferation." *Foreign Policy In Focus* (November 23, 2005):1-12.
- Jervis, Robert. *American Foreign Policy in a New Era* (New York: Routledge, 2005).
- Ó Katz , Mark. "Putin, Ahmadinejad and The Iranian Nuclear Crises", *Middle East Policy Council* (2006):125-131.
- Ó Katz, Mark. "Russian-Iranian Relations in the Ahmadinejad Era", *Middle East Journal* (Spring 2008):202-216.
- Katouzian, Homa. *Mosaddeq's Government in Iranian History*, ed. Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne (New York: Syracuse University Press,2004).
- Keddie, Nikki R. and Eric Hooglund. *The Iranian Revolution and The Islamic Republic*. New York: Syracuse University Press, 1982.
- Ó Kibaroglu, Mustafa. "Good for the Shah, Banned for the Mullahs: The West and Iran's Quest for Nuclear Power." *Middle East Journal* (Spring 2006): 207-232.
- Ó Kibaroglu, Mustafa. "Iran's Nuclear Ambitions from a Historical Perspective and the Attitude of the West"(vol.43, no.2): 223-245.
- Ó Kibaroglu, Mustafa. İran'ın Nükleer Programı: Aktörler ve Etkileri" in Kaosa Doğru İran edited by Osman Metin Öztürk and Yalçın Sarıkaya. : 71-120.
- Kurlantzick, Joshua. "China's New Diplomacy and Its Impact on the World." *Brown Journal of World Affairs* (Winter 2007): 221-235.
- Lawson, Fred H. "Syria's Relations with Iran, Managing the Dilemmas of Alliance." *The Middle East Journal* (Winter 2007): 29-47.
- Maggio, J. "The Presidential Rhetoric of Terror: The (Re)Creation of Reality Immediately After 9/11." *Politics&Policy* (Volume 35,No:4 2007) :255-265.

- Malackowski, Colonel Patrick C. "Improving the United States National Security Strategy: An Informed Public", US Army War College Pennsylvania: 1-21.
- Malanczuk, Peter. "The Kurdish Crisis and Allied Intervention in the Aftermath of the Second Gulf War." (EJIL 1991): 114-133.
- Medeiros, Evan S. and M. Taylor Fravel. "China's New Diplomacy." *Foreign Affairs* (November, December 2003): 22-35.
- Menashri, David. "Iran after the Fall of Baghdad: Implications for Western Foreign and Security Policy." *International Policy Analysis Unit* (Autumn 2003): 1-10.
- Mizin, Victor. "The Russia- Iran Nuclear Connection and U.S. Policy Options." *Middle East Review of International Affairs* (March, 2004): 71-85.
- Mokhtari, Fariborz. "No One Will Scratch My Back: Iranian Security Perceptions in Historical Context." *The Middle East Journal* (Spring 2005): 209-229.
- Mraz, Maj. Jerry L. "Dual Containment: US Policy in the Persian Gulf and A Recommendation for the Future." *The Research Department Air Command and Staff College* (March 1997): 1-27.
- Musallam, Ali. *The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: Saddam Hussein, His State and International Power Politics* London: British Academic Press, 1996.
- Naghmeh Sohrabi, "The Corious Case of Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani", *Middle East Brief* (November 2009): 1-8.
- Oğuz, Sami and Ruşen Çakır. *Hatemi'nin İran'ı*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık, 2000.
- Oliver, James K. "US Foreign Policy After 9/11: Context and Prospect." in *The War on Terror in Comparative Perspective*, ed. Mark J. Miller and Boyka Stefanova, 19-45. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
- Orlov, Vladimir A. and Alexander Vinniko. "The Great Guessing Game :Russia and the Iranian Nuclear Issue." *The Washington Quarterly* (Spring 2005): 49-66.
- Palit, Parama Sinha. "US-Iran: The Changing Dynamics and The Likelihood of a Conflict." *Strategic Analysis* (January 2004): 102-116.
- Parasiliti, Andrew. "Iran: Diplomacy and Deterrence." *Survival* (October–November 2009): 5-13.
- Polack, Kenneth M. *The Persian Puzzle*. New York: Random House, 2004.
- Rajace, Bahram M. "US Foreign Policy and Radical Islam." In the *The War on Terror in Comparative Perspective*, edited by Mark J. Miller and Boyka Stefanova, 69-95. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.

- Riedel, Bruce. "America and Iran: Flawed Analysis, Missed Opportunities, and Looming Dangers" *The Brown Journal of World Affairs* (Fall/Winter 2008): 101-111.
- Russell, Richard L. "Iraq's Chemical Weapons Legacy: What Others Might Learn from Saddam." *The Middle East Journal* (Spring 2005): 187-208.
- Sahimi, Muhammad. "Iran's Nuclear Energy Program" *Energy*, (Winter 2005):1-3.
- Saikal, Amin. "The Roots of Iran's Election Crisis." *Survival* (October–November 2009) : 91-104.
- Samii, Abbas William. "A Stable Structure on Shifting Sands: Assessing the Hizbullah-Iran-Syria Relationship." *The Middle East Journal* (Winter 2008):32-53.
- Samore, Gary. et all. The International Institute for Strategic Studies(IISS) strategic dossier: *Iran's Strategic Weapon's Programmes*. New York: Routledge, 2005.
- Sauer, Tom. "Coercive Diplomacy by the EU. Case-study: the Iranian Nuclear Weapons Crisis", from *ECPR Standing Group on the EU Third Pan-European Conference on EU Politics* that is held on 21-23 September 2006 in Istanbul.
- Ó Shahram Chubin. *Iran's Nuclear Ambitions*. Washington: Edward Brothers, 2006.
- Ó Shahram Chubin. "Iran's Power in Context." *Survival* (February–March 2009): 165-190.
- Shannon N. Kile, " The Contraversy over Iran's nuclear Programme," in *Europe and Iran Perspectives on Non-Proliferation*, ed. Shannon N. Kile 1-21. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).
- Sick, Gary. "The United States in the Persian Gulf: From Twin Pillars to Dual Containment". In the *The Middle East and the United States A Historical and Political Reassessment* edited by David W. Lesch, 277-293. (USA:Westview Press, 1996).
- Sinkaya, Bayram. "Iran's Nuclear Program: Rise and Fall of Hope in the Negotiation Process" *Ortadoğu Analiz* (Aralık 2009): 71-79.
- Slocombe, Walter B. "Europe, Russia and American Missile Defence." *Survival* (April-May 2008): 19-24.
- Summitt, April R. "For a White Revolution: John F. Kennedy and the Shah of Iran." *The Middle East Journal* (Autumn 2004): 560-575.
- Ó Takeyh, Ray. "Iran at a crossroads" *The Middle East Journal* (Winter 2003): 42-56.

- Ó Takeyh, Ray. "Iran Builds the Bomb" *Survival* (Winter 2004-05): 51-64.
- Tillman, Seth P. *The United States in the Middle East*. The US:Indiana University Press, 1982.
- Vakil, Sanam. "Iran: Balancing East against West." *The Washington Quarterly* (Autumn 2006): 51-65.
- Ward, Steven R "The Continuing Evolution of Iran's Military Doctrine." *The Middle East Journal* (Autumn 2005): 559-576.
- Yetiv, Steve A. and Chunlong Lu, "China, Global Energy and Middle East." *The Middle East Journal* (Spring 2007): 199-218.
- Yuan, Jing-dong. "China and the Iranian Nuclear Crises." *China Brief a Journal of analysis and information*, (February 2006): 1-3.
- Ziba Moshaver, "Revolution, Theocratic Leadership and Iran's Foreign Policy: Implications for Iran-EU Relations", *The Review of International Affairs* (Winter 2003):283-305.
- Zweiri, Mahjoob. "Revisiting the Iranian Nuclear Dilemma: A Study of 2002-2009 Developments" *Ortadoğu Etüdüleri* (January 2010) : 35-5.1
- <http://www.armscontrol.org/print/1419> Arms Control Association (accessed in 25 April, 2010)
- <http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2010/05/201051795513637980.html>
Joint Declaration by Iran Turkey and Brazil Declaration (accessed in 5 December, 2010)
- <http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC46/iran.pdf> The speech of Vice-President of Islamic Republic of Iran and President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran at the 46th General Conference of the IAEA in Vienna, 16 September 2002. (accessed in 28 feb 2009)
- <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-40.pdf>
International Atomic Energy Agency, Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran Report by the Director General (GOV/2003/40) 6 June 2003 pg.2-3 (accessed in 28 Feb 2009)
- http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/sg_overview.html The Additional Protocol is a legal document aiming to enable the IAEA inspectorate to provide assurance about both declared and possible undeclared activities.
- <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-75.pdf>
International Atomic Energy Agency, Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran Report by the Director General (GOV/2003/75) 10 November 2003 pg.4 (accessed in 1March 2009)

<http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-81.pdf>

International Atomic Energy Agency, Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran Resolution Adopted by the Board on 26 November 2003 (GOV/2003/81) 10 November 2003 pg.1 (accessed in 1 March 2009)

<http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-11.pdf>

International Atomic Energy Agency, Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran Report by the Director General 24 February 2004 (GOV/2004/11) 10 November 2003 pg.1 (accessed in 1 March 2009)

<http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-27.pdf>

International Atomic Energy Agency, Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran Report by the Director General 28 April 2006 (GOV/2006/27) 28 April 2006 pg.7 (accessed in 11 March 2009)

http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/unsc_res1737-2006.pdf United

Nations Security Council Resolution 1737(2006) 27 December 2006 5612th Meeting (accessed in 14 March 2009).

http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/unsc_res1747-2007.pdf International

Atomic Energy Agency United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737 (2006) :2.(accessed in 25 January 2008).

http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/unsc_res1747-2007.pdf United

Nations Security Council Resolution 1747(2007) 24 March 2007 5647th Meeting (accessed in 16 March 2009)

http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/unsc_res1803-2008.pdf United

Nations Security Council Resolution 1803(2008) 3 March 2008 5648th Meeting (accessed in 18 March 2009)

<http://www.iaea.org/About/history.html> History of the IAEA (accessed in 25 April,2010)

<http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/26/world/africa/26iht-iran.html> The New York

Times, “Wipe Israel 'off the map' Iranian says”, Nazila Fathi October 27, 2005 (accessed on 12. April 2010)

<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/24/world/24nations.html> Elissa Gootman,

“Security Council Approves Sanctions Against Iran Over Nuclear Program”,The New York Times, 24 December 2006, (accessed in 19 September 2008)

<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/10/world/middleeast/10iran.html> The New York

Times, “Iran Says It Can Enrich Uranium On A Large Scale” (accessed in 18 January 2008)

<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/10/world/middleeast/10sanctions.html> Neil Macfarquhar, "U.N. Approves New Sanctions to Deter Iran", *The New York Times* (accessed in 20 July 2010)

http://www.tehrantimes.com/index_View.asp?code=154905 Tehran Times Political Desk "Putin visit will lead to leap in Iran-Russia relations: expert", *Tehran Times* (15 October 2007), (Accessed in 03 February 2010).

<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8679.doc.htm> United Nations Security Council SC/8679 29 March 2006 5430rd Meeting (PM) (accessed in 10 March 2009).

<http://washingtontimes.com/article/20071026/FOREIGN/110260060/1003> The Washington Times, "U.S. Hits Regime's Military with New Sanctions" (accessed in 20 January 2007)