

EUROPE AND MUSLIM IMMIGRANTS  
AT THE INTERSECTION OF SECULARISM, RELIGION AND  
RACISM

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO  
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES  
OF  
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

By  
BENĞİ BEZİRGAN

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS  
FOR  
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE  
IN THE DEPARTMENT OF  
SOCIOLOGY

DECEMBER 2010

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

---

Prof. Dr. Meliha Altunışık  
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

---

Prof. Dr. Ayşe Saktanber  
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

---

Prof. Dr. Meyda Yeğenoğlu  
Supervisor

**Examining Committee Members**

Prof. Dr. Mesut Yeğen	(İŞU, SOC)	_____
Prof. Dr. Meyda Yeğenoğlu	(METU, SOC)	_____
Assist. Prof. Çağatay Topal	(METU, SOC)	_____

**I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.**

Name, Last name : Bengi Bezirgan

Signature :

## **ABSTRACT**

### **EUROPE AND MUSLIM IMMIGRANTS AT THE INTERSECTION OF SECULARISM, RELIGION AND RACISM**

Bezirgan, Bengi

M.S., Department of Sociology

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Meyda Yeğenoğlu

December 2010, 127 pages

This study intends to discuss the problematical relation between Europe and Muslim immigrants in the light of the issues of secularism, religion and racism. Over the three decades, there has been a large body of literature in both theoretical and empirical fields about the peculiar European identity, the implications of secularism for European society and its distance from religion particularly in public sphere. Besides, 1980 onwards, the focus of the theories of racism shifted from biological explanations to culturally designated accounts. European manner of production of knowledge about race has started to concentrate on the incompatible cultural character of Muslim immigrants. Simultaneously, multicultural discourse has been put forward as an evidence for anti-racist and tolerant approach towards these guest citizens. By taking into consideration these theoretical analyses about Europe, the main goal of this study is to point out how specific discursive sphere is produced-reproduced and the representations of Muslim immigrants are shaped by certain Eurocentric definitions and recurrent notions. This attempt contains two interrelated theoretical layers. On the one hand, it is aimed to uncover the stereotyped and racist representations of Muslim immigrants in both public and political discussions. On the other hand, the inherent contradictions of Europe as both sovereign political subjectivity and hegemonic discursive sphere are highlighted.

Keywords: Europe, Muslim immigrants, secularism, religion, racism

## ÖZ

### SEKÜLARİZM, DİN VE İRKÇILIK KESİŞİMİNDE AVRUPA VE MÜSLÜMAN GÖÇMENLER

Bezirgan, Bengi

Yüksek Lisans, Sosyoloji Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Meyda Yeğenoğlu

Aralık 2010, 127 sayfa

Bu çalışma Avrupa ve Müslüman göçmenler arasındaki sorunlu ilişkiyi sekülerizm, din ve ırkçılık konularının ışığında tartışmayı amaçlamaktadır. Otuz yılı aşkın bir süredir, hem teorik hem de ampirik alanda özgün Avrupa kimliği, sekülerizmin Avrupa toplumu üzerindeki etkileri ve özellikle kamusal alanda dine olan uzaklığıyla ilgili geniş bir literatür bulunmaktadır. Ayrıca, 1980'lerden itibaren ırkçılık teorilerinin odağı biyolojik açıklamalardan kültürel olarak belirlenmiş açıklamalara doğru değişmiştir. Avrupa'ya ait, ırk hakkında bilgi üretme biçimi Müslüman göçmenlerin uyumsuz kültürel özelliği üzerine odaklanmaya başlamıştır. Aynı zamanda çokkültürlü söylem, bu misafir vatandaşlara yönelik ırkçılık karşıtı ve hoşgörülü bir yaklaşımın kanıtı olarak ileri sürülmüştür. Avrupa hakkındaki bu teorik analizleri göz önünde bulundurarak, bu çalışmanın esas amacı, belirli bir söylemsel alanın nasıl üretildiğini, yeniden üretildiğini ve Müslüman göçmenlerle ilgili temsillerin belli Avrupa-merkezci tanımlamalarla ve tekrarlanan kavramlarla şekillendiğini göstermektir. Bu çaba birbiriyle ilgili iki teorik katmanı içerir. Bir taraftan, hem kamusal hem de politik tartışmalardaki Müslüman göçmenlerle ilgili kalıplaşmış ve ırkçı temsiliyet biçimlerinin açığa çıkarılması amaçlanmaktadır. Diğer taraftan, hem egemen politik öznellik hem de hegemonik söylemsel alan olarak Avrupa'nın içsel çelişkileri vurgulanmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupa, Müslüman göçmenler, sekülerizm, din, ırkçılık

To My Parents

Süheyla and Ali Erkan Bezirgan

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First of all, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor Prof.Dr. Meyda Yeğenođlu. There is no doubt that her academic guidance and inspiring criticisms have given shape to my prospective academic career. I would also like to thank the committee members, Prof. Dr. Mesut Yeğen and Assist. Prof. Çađatay Topal. Their affirmative comments and criticisms have encouraged me to proceed on this academic journey.

I would also like to thank my parents, Süheyla and Ali Erkan Bezirgan for their unconditional love and support. By all means, this thesis would not have been possible without their considerate attitude and efforts to put me at ease. They make me feel proud of being a member of this family.

I am also grateful to N.Koray Günyaşar who never gives up supporting me in every stage of this exhausting process. His love and patience always hearten me to achieve success in every sphere of life. I also thank A.Tolay Günyaşar and A.Volkan Işık for their continuous encouragement, hospitality and generosity. I am so indebted to our fraternity.

I would also like to thank my friends, Semihan Başöz and Melis Elçi. I doubt that I will ever be able to convey my appreciation fully, but I owe them my everlasting gratitude for their friendship. Lastly, but by no means least, I would also like to thank Ayşecan Ay, İpek Demirsu, Irmak Aynur, Neşe Karahasan, Burcu Şentürk, Hande Sarıkuzu and Bilun Erim for their invaluable friendship and support.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM .....	iii
ABSTRACT .....	iv
ÖZ .....	v
DEDICATION .....	vi
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....	vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS .....	viii
CHAPTER	
1. INTRODUCTION .....	1
2. EUROPE IN-BETWEEN SECULAR AND RELIGIOUS .....	6
2.1. Secularization Thesis Reconsidered .....	8
2.2. The Revival of Religion.....	20
2.3. Multiculturalism in Question .....	31
3. THE RACIALIZED DISCOURSE OF EUROPE.....	46
3.1. Cultural Racism in Europe.....	48
3.2. Securitization of Migration.....	59
4. THREE CASES OF SECULARISM-RACISM NEXUS IN EUROPE.....	73
4.1 The Headscarf Debate in France.....	75
4.2. Danish Cartoon Crisis .....	86
4.3. Assassination of Theo Van Gogh in Netherlands .....	96
5. CONCLUSION .....	108
REFERENCES.....	115



## **CHAPTER 1**

### **INTRODUCTION**

The relationship between Europe and Islam has entered a new phase due to recent geo-political and socio-economic conditions. Particularly after the 9/11 attacks and London/Madrid bombings, Muslim immigrants in Europe have become the target of criticisms and public debates about the potential risks which Europe would tackle in succeeding years. Even the presence of Muslim immigrants in Europe has been problematized as a challenge to secularity, cultural unity and security of Europe. Predominantly, the increasing visibility of Islam in public space has become the main issue in debates that the inherent characteristics of Islam, as a source for specific cultural identity, contrary to European principles and values are underlined. The central claim is that Islamic culture and way of life are not compatible with European secular culture. This contention goes hand in hand with the idea and concerns about Islamization of Europe. This incompatibility argument also operates through the discourse of cultural racism. The belief for incompatibility between different cultures/cultural practices has turned out to be base for new hierarchy between Europeans and Muslim immigrants and the impossibility of integration.

Moreover, in the narratives about the respect for cultural differences, Islam as a religious culture is depicted on the basis of essentialist understanding which brings about the productive ground for racist statements about Muslim immigrants. The features and roles ascribed to Islam are represented as definitely exterior to secular Europe. The attempts of European secularism for marginalizing and privatizing religion and its distance from politics are put forward as opposite to public Islam. In fact, not only the challenges allegedly caused by Islam but also the discourse of

secularism in Europe and its implications for new forms of racism should be examined. As Salvatore underlines the separation between religion and politics has never been fully institutionalized as the discourse of secularization claims to be if one looks at the European history of the formation of modern secular nation-states.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, the position of Muslim immigrants and the perception towards Islam have become problematical issues for nation-states that they have to deal with. Since these immigrants resist to the cultural and national integration and Islam is not secular enough to be able to accommodate within Europe, the signs of racist discourse reveal itself in the issues related to the rights of Muslims and their visibility in public sphere. This new racist discourse also highlights the security threat posed by immigrants and it develops into a kind of legitimization theme for the anti-immigrant campaigns.

On the one hand, in the dominant European imaginary, the figure of Muslims and their religion, Islam, have been described as hostile, enemy within and prepared for jihad against Europe. Therefore, their cultural identities and religion can not be parts of European secular character so they can only exist as minorities. However, on the other hand, Europe compels Muslim immigrants to rearrange their cultural and religious practices and be accord in secular, modern and democratic conditions so European tolerance could be provided. In other words, the difference between *Muslims in Europe* and *Muslims of Europe*<sup>2</sup> is a significant criterion in Europe. The integration process of Islam and its followers is conditional in terms of internalizing the ideals of secularism of Europe and succeeding to detach their religious sentiments in public space and also re-elaborating their cultural and religious identities. Undoubtedly, this process is not independent from the Eurocentric perspective about the peculiar nature of Islamic culture and European racist tradition founded upon the racial stereotypes and resentment against immigrants. However, Europe's disengagement from Judaeo-Christian heritage is still uncertain because even the secularity's institutional core is intrinsically built on the European post-Christian, post-Enlightenment and post-imperial cultural

---

<sup>1</sup> Armando Salvatore, 'The Euro-Islamic Roots of Secularity: A Difficult Equation', *Asian Journal of Social Science*, Vol.33, No. 3, 2005, pp. 431

<sup>2</sup> Gabriele Marranci, 'Multiculturalism, Islam and The Clash of Civilisations Theory: Rethinking Islamophobia', *Culture and Religion*, Vol.5, No.1, 2004, pp. 112

understanding of majorities. That is to say, the equal treatment of religions and their visibility in the public sphere within Europe connected to the dialogic re-foundation of the European public sphere will dissolve the idea of cultural majorities and overcome the limitations of political and religious tolerance and open way to Islam.<sup>3</sup> While accusing Islam as backward and uncivilized culture and Muslim immigrants as aliens to privatization of religion, Europe proposes its own secular ideals as the universal codes. Then to question Europe's independence from the strings of its colonial history, Orientalist system of thought and racist borders of self-conception and detachment from Christian imprints on ordering of social structures becomes essential.

It has become evident that, since the end of 1990s, the understanding of multiculturalism as the protector of minority rights and advocate of equal treatment of citizens and also symbol of European tolerance and democracy has begun to be replaced by both implicit and explicit cultural racist discourses focused on clash of values between secularism and Islam. This shift particularly discloses itself in claims for Europeanness and European integration project anchored in traditions of tolerance and the separation between public and private spheres. Eurocentric logic carries out the dichotomy between Europeans and non-Europeans that narrative of Western historicism, as Chakrabarty<sup>4</sup> calls it, presents secularism as a means to manage and also put an end to religious conflicts by confining religion to private sphere. While secularism has been put forward as an appropriate and necessary path to bring stability by terminating the violence led by the intervention of the religious forces, it actually seeks to regulate the violence. Although Europe's violence in both religious and racial terms is restricted to the religious wars and period of Holocaust and accepted as came to end with Treaty of Westphalia and the end of World War II, Asad argues that the violence of Europe shifted to national and colonial wars rather than managed by secularism. More prominently, the current violence is the paradoxical "violence lying at the heart of a political doctrine that has disavowed violence on principle" which means

---

<sup>3</sup> Talal Asad, *Formations of the Secular. Christianity, Islam, Modernity*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003

<sup>4</sup> Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: postcolonial thought and historical difference*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000

violence in need for cultivation for Other.<sup>5</sup> It can be claimed that Muslim immigrants are exposed to this liberal and secular violence in contemporary Europe in many different spheres of public life which resulted in debates about cultural racism.

In reference to these remarks, this study mainly aims to discuss the European secularism as a way of managing Islam in public sphere and how it operates as a force for cultural racism towards Muslim immigrants. It underlines how the presence of Muslim immigrants and the public visibility of Islam are shown as a threat to secular culture of Europe and the arguments of incompatibility of cultures function as the basis of cultural racism; though different cultures are depicted as signs for freedom of expression. It also attempts to focus on European secular violence, directed towards Muslim immigrants by placing Islam as a reference point for their cultural identity and practices within hegemonic value system and this violence contains overtones of certain racist logic and language and Judaeo-Christian heritage.

In order to critically discuss and evaluate these issues, in the second chapter, the secularization thesis, one of the most controversial theoretical frameworks, will be discussed. The secular claims of Europe which depends on the distinctions between public-private and secular-religious will be problematized. Then, the multiple roles played by religion and its relation to media and politics will be located within the debate of the revival of religion. This revival is commonly associated with increasing public visibility of Islam rather than religion's status in the self-identification of Europe. With regard to these discussions, multiculturalism as a governing device for cultural and religious diversities will be questioned and also the claims about its failure in terms of integrating Muslim immigrants and creating secure environment will be underlined.

In the third chapter, new racialized forms of discourse in Europe, in line with secularism, revival of religion and the failure of multiculturalism, about Muslim immigrants and Islam will be covered. There will be an attempt to indicate how

---

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., pp.59

cultural racism supported by securitization of the issue of immigrants contributes to marginalization of immigrants and reconstruction of Europe as a sovereign political subjectivity. The common points shared by the secularism claims of Europe and the representations of Muslims constituted by the discourse of cultural racism will be revealed.

In the fourth chapter, three critical cases, the headscarf controversy in France, cartoon crisis in Denmark and the assassination of Theo van Gogh will be analyzed in relation to Muslim immigrants and Islam and also their representations particularly in media. Out of diverse and also connected three topics, it will be pointed out how particular and parallel arguments prominent in European public debate focus on the clash of cultural differences and religious fundamentalism inherent to Islam rather than rising and changing racist discourses in Europe.

## CHAPTER 2

### EUROPE IN-BETWEEN SECULAR AND RELIGIOUS

The epoch started by 9/11 and continued with terrorist attacks in different parts of the Europe has underlined orientalist and exclusionary representations about Muslim immigrants. It has also recalled the need for secularism within the ongoing process of European cultural identity (re)construction. Although the image of Islam as the Other of Europe rooted in the non-universal system of values and particular cultural characteristics has been always a part of European history, recent events have paved the way for discussions about the inherent distinction between the secular Europe and religious oriented Muslim immigrants as residents in Europe for decades. Among the universal traits Europe attributed to itself such as having unique history, scientific achievements and multiple cultural traditions congregated under the name of civilization<sup>6</sup>, secularist arguments have become the recurring theme in public debates about Muslim immigrants and identification of Islam with terrorism. Modernist narrative of secularism both legitimizes itself as the indispensable aspect of the European democracy, progress and culture and (re)creates rigid boundaries between Europe and Islam by employing secular-religious dichotomy.

What needs to be addressed is the place of the religious within the public space whereas Europe imposes itself as the universal civilizational project based on secular premises. The basic distinction between private and public spaces corresponding to appropriate positions of the religious and the secular is no longer

---

<sup>6</sup> Hayden White, 'The Discourse Of Europe As The Other', in Bo Strath (ed.) *In Europe And The Other and Europe As The Other*. Bruxelles: Peter Lang, 2000, pp.77-82

adequate for developing analyses about the public visibility of Islam and Christian influence on contemporary European hegemony. In other words, Europe's supposed secular identity and political measures about Muslim immigrants do not directly point out the susceptibility of Europe about the dissociation of the religious from the public sphere. Rather, the certain biased approach can be recognized since Christian imprints have still influence on political decisions.

In this chapter, the first task is to problematize the secular identity of Europe, allegedly thought as began with the Enlightenment and signifies a break from the past religious orientations. In line with this aim, the most controversial theoretical framework called the secularization thesis and its critics will be mentioned. It is because its assertions affect many theorists' way of thinking about the parameters of secularism in Europe and it stands for widespread convictions of public opinion. The secularization thesis emerged during the 1960s "as the most powerful theoretical explanation of the relationship between religion and society and the outcome of the theory of de-Christianization"<sup>7</sup> and its interpretations of the variables such as church attendance or religious practices are still accepted as criteria for the level of religiosity in Europe. These factors are also employed to illustrate the difference between America and Europe in terms of their degree of religiosity. While Europe's current position with regard to the religious within public sphere especially to post-Christian remnants is blurred, its efforts to marginalize/privatize Islam and confine it to private sphere can be noticed as an indicator of governing Christian culture. Therefore, to question the articulation or division of the religious and the secular and the link between modernity and secularist discourse from Asadian perspective becomes essential.

After these present secular arguments, I will attempt to offer a critical evaluation about the radical breaking point of Europe from Christian insight to the secularist consideration. Undoubtedly, it will be considered whether with the Enlightenment, Christian world view and its status within both public sphere and political arena discontinue suddenly or is it possible to talk about the persistence of the past

---

<sup>7</sup> Karel Dobbelaere, 'Some Trends in European Sociology of Religion: The Secularization Debate', *Sociological Analysis*, Vol.48, No.2, 1987, pp.110

religious tendencies. Finally, related to European confinement of religion to the private sphere, the remarkable presence of Islam in the public space resulted in significant problems for multicultural ideology will be handled. This is not simply about Muslim immigrants constituting multicultural environment within European borders. Rather it is about how liberal multicultural approach in praise of multiculturalism has become inefficient to deal with the argument of clash of civilizations. In other words, in both discursive and practical levels, endeavors to preserve Europeanness of Europe against “Islamic threat” have transformed the structure of multicultural policies as parts of civilizational project and the neutrality of nation-states towards all cultural and religious groups.

## **2.1 Secularization Thesis Reconsidered**

Since the nineteenth century, there has been a huge body of academic literature on secularization particularly within the field of sociology of religion and the predecessor theorists, such as Weber, Durkheim, Comte and Marx, basically linked the decline of the importance of the religion to modernity’s effects. In the mid 1960s, with the publication of three books, Wilson’s *Religion in Secular Society* (1966), Luckmann’s *Invisible Religion* (1967) and Berger’s *The Sacred Canopy* (1967), the secularization theory stepped forward and in the subsequent years, the attempts to develop and replicate it continued.<sup>8</sup> However, 1980s might be characterized as the turning point for shifting meanings and implications of the concept of religion. Not only in Europe but all over the world, religion began to relocate from its private sphere to the public sphere. José Casanova explains the reasons behind religion’s gain of global publicity by the four unconnected but at the same time unfolding incidents; these were Islamic Revolution in Iran, the rise of Solidarity Movement in Poland, the role of Catholicism in the Sandinista revolution and in other political conflicts throughout Latin America and the public recurrence of Protestant fundamentalism as a power in American politics.<sup>9</sup> Due to

---

<sup>8</sup> Staf Hellemans, “Secularization in a Religiogeneous Modernity”, in R. Laermans, B. Wilson and J. Billiet (eds.) in *Secularization and Social Integration: Papers in Honor of Karel Dobbelaere*. Leuven:Leuven University Press, 1998, pp.67-68

<sup>9</sup> José Casanova, *Public Religions In the Modern World* .Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1994, pp.3



these developments, the validity of the secularization thesis began to be questioned. Simultaneously the arguments about the revival of the religion became a significant part of the global politics and the public concern.

More prominently, this decade witnessed the diverse roles played by religion. In other words, the distance of religion from social and political patterns appeared vague. It was understood that religion was beyond its passive character limited to particular settings and identities. Its Janus face revealed itself not only as the carrier of the exclusive, particularist and primordial identities but also of inclusive, universal and transcending ones.<sup>10</sup> The persistent and even expanding outcomes of the religiosity eroded the basic assumption of the analysts of the secularization thesis that the social significance of the religion would decline as a result of modernization. Casanova claims,

What was new and became “news” in the 1980s was the widespread and simultaneous character of the refusal to be restricted to the private sphere of religious traditions as different as Judaism and Islam, Catholicism and Protestantism, Hinduism and Buddhism, in all “three worlds of development.”<sup>11</sup>

The privatization of religion has been another noteworthy remark of the secularization thesis and it embodies European secularism based on the separation of church and state, private and public sphere. This contention of privatization as an inherent commitment to secular modernity also operates in self-definition of Europe. By accusing Islam for its consent about the public representations of any kind of religious idea or practice, Europe positions itself as decision maker in terms of terminating the presence of religion in the public sphere. Not only Muslims’ religious otherness as part of a non-Christian and non-European religion but their religiousness itself as the other of European secularity turned out to be cause of anxiety.<sup>12</sup> This anxiety mainly derives from the belief towards Islam’s

---

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., pp.4

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., pp. 6

<sup>12</sup> José Casanova, ‘Religion, European secular identities, and European integration’, available at: <http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2004-07-29-casanova-en.html>

incompatibility with European heritage of modern secular values such as human rights, democracy, and tolerant liberal multiculturalism.

The assumptions of the decline and privatization of religion under the effects of changing processes of modernization over time constitute the theoretical backbone of the secularization theory. It has been criticized strongly in the recent years. For the concerns of this chapter, it is required to analyze these criticisms and move beyond the stereotyped arguments about the religious and the secular so that contemporary secular claims and concerns of Europe about Muslim immigrants will be assessed. This attempt also evokes more complicated reevaluation of the concepts of the secular and religion and their interplay within the constitution of European cultural identity and designation of the boundaries of Europeaness of Europe. It is also endeavored to disclose the multiple mechanisms and forms inside the issue which are not handled within the secularization thesis debate. Since there are diverse perspectives about the subject, it would be more appropriate to follow a certain line of theoretical frame.

Although, in recent years, there has been great academic effort devoted to the analysis of secularism in various contexts and disciplines, it is not so difficult to state Talal Asad's book *Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity* (2003) has become a pioneering work. Its contributions to the debate on European identity, the concepts of the secular and the religion and anthropological and sociological inquiry about modern forms of secularism are noteworthy. In the debates over secularization, José Casanova's *Public Religions in the Modern World* (1994) is also admitted as one of the influential critiques as well as Asad's arguments. Both of them address the problematical sides of European secular assumptions based on the binary oppositions of public/ private and secular/religious. According to Armando Salvatore, both of them perceive Europe as a main testing ground for evaluating secularity. By taking into consideration their point of view, he asks "Is [secularity] a set of rules not intrinsically hostile to public religion, but ideologically open and contestable (Casanova), or a sociocultural and political "formation" affecting life forms and modes of governance (Asad)?" However, Casanova's interpretation of secularity as the

product of a malleable transformation of religion's access to public sphere has engendered a prominent debate between him and Asad.<sup>13</sup> In order to expose the central place of this theoretical debate within the discussions about secularism and indicate both overlapping and detached stances, the focus positions should be allocated to Asad and Casanova.

From the perspective of Asad, one of the main critiques is directed towards the meager analysis of the notion of secular, so I have decided to begin with the elucidation of this mostly contested concept. In spite of the fact that the analytical differentiation between the secular, secularization and secularism at first glance seems as if not so explicit and requisite, actually the place these concepts occupied in academic debate and public discourse are delineated by both their own uniqueness and connection with other concepts. The secular is depicted as an epistemic category whereas the secularism denotes a political doctrine.<sup>14</sup> Casanova also describes the secular as a pivotal modern category- theologico-philosophical, legal-political, and cultural-anthropological- to create, codify, grasp, and undergo a realm or reality distinguished from the religious.<sup>15</sup> In his point of view, to position the secularism as ideology and statecraft principle in distinct corners within the field of secularism is essential in order to draw a line between the neutrality of the state towards religion and holding a particular posture about religion. That is to say, secularism as statecraft indicates a separation between religious and political authority which in turn necessitates state's neutrality with regard to all religions, protection of every citizen's freedom of conscience and assisting all citizens for equal access to democratic participation.<sup>16</sup> It can be suggested that perceiving secularism per se is accordingly prevalent and inherent in Eurocentric insight about both the political

---

<sup>13</sup> Armando Salvatore, 'Secularity and public religion in Europe: Historical roots, theoretical debates and the case of public Islam', *HAGAR International Social Science Review*, Vol. 6, No.1, 2005, pp. 17; Armando Salvatore, 'The Euro-Islamic Roots of Secularity: A Difficult Equation', pp. 427

<sup>14</sup> Talal Asad, *Formations of the Secular. Christianity, Islam, Modernity*. pp.1

<sup>15</sup> José Casanova, 'The Secular and Secularisms', *Social Research*, Vol.76, No.4, Winter 2009, pp.1049

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.1051

and social developments in secular states. Moreover, European way of secularism as the pathfinder is introduced for “uncivilized” societies that they should adopt this model in their development process. However, this mode of secularism converts into ideology according to Casanova when the state retains a specific opinion of religion and statecraft doctrine assumes any substantive theory of religion which determines what religion is or does.<sup>17</sup> While Casanova primarily seeks to uncover multiple secularities which are codified or institutionalized and underscore the secularist prejudgments about the religious other, Asad is mainly concerned with the concept of the secular itself and a kind of interdependent relationship between the secular and the religious.

Before making a partial genealogy of the concept of the secular, at the beginning Asad explicates that “the secular is conceptually prior to the political doctrine of secularism, that over time a variety of concepts, practices and sensibilities have come together to form the secular.”<sup>18</sup> More notably, his efforts to interpret secularism and secularization begin with transcending the typical binary opposition constructed between the secular and the religious. It is significant to note from Asadian point of view, “the secular is neither singular in origin nor stable in its historical identity, although it works through a series of particular oppositions” and he also maintains “the religious and the secular are not essentially fixed categories”<sup>19</sup>. In spite of the secularist arguments based on modernist understanding of the certain spaces allocated to the secular and religious, Asad considers that “the secular is neither continuous with the religious that supposedly preceded it”, nor “a simple break from it”, thus religion and the secular are closely linked in thought and in the way that they have emerged historically.<sup>20</sup> This way of thinking both alters and contributes to the current debate about the presence of Muslim immigrants in Europe and the Islamic threat they allegedly posed to secular environment of European public life. In other words, the opposition constantly emphasized between Europe and Islam is much

---

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., pp. 1051

<sup>18</sup> Talal Asad, *Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity*. pp. 16

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., pp. 25

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., pp. 22-25

more beyond the incongruity of secular and sacred values. From Eurocentric point of view, the integration problem of Muslim immigrants mainly stems from their religion's interference to public sphere and ossified traditional values leading violence, intolerance and unease in European political and social domains. The claims about increasing visibility of Islam in public space both lead to the fears such as Islamization of Europe or reversal of pre-Enlightenment social setting, and the justified reasons for racist exclusionary practices. These frequently uttered claims simultaneously replicate the identification of Islam with pre-modern system of values and rituals, on the one hand, and European image as fulfilling all the requirements of modernity, on the other hand. Within the contemporary political and social climate, after 9/11 attacks, London and Madrid bombings, the publication of Danish cartoons, even the concept of the secular is highlighted as the indispensable feature of European "civilization" whereas Islamic "culture" penetrates into the every aspect of its members' lives and their host societies. In line with these approaches, it can be alleged that the representations of Muslims in Europe immensely overlap with the classical secularization thesis. Nevertheless, this scheme is incompetent with respect to provide theoretical means for the elucidation of current European secular claims in accordance with modernity.

Since the public discussions about the integration and adaptation "problems" risen by Muslims in Europe usually concentrate on the visibility and return of the religion in the public space and Europe's achievement of modern secular political and social order, the (re)evaluations of Asad and Casanova have become relevant. As the idea of secularization and modernity are so connected, the secularization thesis has also been paid attention to describe the "universal" traits of European modernity. Casanova selects three components of this argument in order to underscore European progress of modernity. The first one is the increasing structural differentiation of social spaces resulted in the separation of religion from politics, economy, science, and so forth; the second one is the privatization of religion within its own sphere; the final element is the declining social significance of religious belief, commitment, and institutions. It is also stated that Casanova holds the first and third elements of the thesis as applicable.<sup>21</sup>

---

<sup>21</sup> Talal Asad, *Formations of the Secular. Christianity, Islam, Modernity*. pp. 181

Nevertheless, Casanova rejects this supposition, and related to the statement that religion is inclined to decay with progressive modernization, a notion, he pointed out, “has proven patently false as a general empirical proposition, was traced genealogically back to the Enlightenment critique of religion.” Thus he upholds the idea that Asad has misinterpreted his standpoint about the subject.<sup>22</sup>

As Asad notices a drawback with regard to Casanova’s reformulation about the privatization of religion, he asks

“If ‘the deprivatization of religion’ is compatible with ‘modernity’, doesn’t this jeopardize the ‘core of the theory of secularization’, according to which the structural differentiation of modern society requires that distinctive social activities belong to appropriate social spaces?”<sup>23</sup>

Yet, he adds immediately that Casanova is also aware of his inconsistent position, and this is the reason behind of Casanova’s remark “in the modern secular world, the boundaries between the religious and the secular are so fluid” and thus indicating such analytical differentiations should be done carefully.<sup>24</sup> Having declared his expectations about Casanova’s efforts to analyze this supposition, Asad draws attention to the three points which have great importance for Europe-Islam nexus. There is more beyond the interpenetration of the secular and the religion. Both the secular and the religion are created historically; diverse notions, practices and sensibilities together out of accidental progression make this possible; and the law is included in describing and protecting the uniqueness of social spaces in modern society particularly the legitimate space for religion is determined.<sup>25</sup> For the contemporary issue of Muslims in Europe and their religious identity in an ongoing struggle with secular European cultural identity, these remarks imply a much more critical look. The underlined point is the

---

<sup>22</sup> José Casanova, “Secularization Revisited: A Reply to Talal Asad”, in D. Scott and C. Hirschkind (eds.) *Powers of the Secular Modern: Talal Asad and His Interlocutors*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2006, pp. 13

<sup>23</sup> Talal Asad, “Responses”, in David Scott and Charles Hirschkind (eds.) *Powers of the Secular Modern: Talal Asad and His Interlocutors*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2006, pp. 208

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.209

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.209

concept of the secular itself, the secular ideas and the representation of secularism as the ultimate and universal political stance did not emerge within an isolated social conditions or unimpressionable discursive sphere of European identity construction process. Both Christianity and Islam and their interaction have still influence on the understanding of secularism in today's Europe. By taking into consideration Jack Goody's book, *Islam in Europe* (2004), Salvatore states

“This widely-held perception of Muslims in Europe and more generally the self-understanding of Europe as a secular *and* post-Christian continent reposes on a willful ignorance of the fact that long before colonialism and mass migration, Islam participated in Europe's history, both as an external competitor and as an internal political and cultural force”<sup>26</sup>

Just in the case of the process of European identity (re)construction, Islam also takes an active part as both cultural and religious Other of Europe in framing its fictive secular configuration. It can be straightforwardly argued, Europe's problematic manner reveals itself when the secular is manifested as the intrinsic feature of its self-representation in conjunction with critiques and discomfort about the presence of public Islam. This is also not unrelated to the close bond between Christianity and secularism albeit the latter is supposed to be emancipated from its theological strings in the course of historical developments. Although secularism's ideological genealogy can be based on partially to the Renaissance principle of humanism, partially to Enlightenment notion of nature and partially to Hegel's philosophy of history<sup>27</sup>, the ostensible disenchantment of Christianity from its organic link to secularism seems problematical.

It can be asserted that the attempts of Europe to associate itself with secularism usually end up with Christianity's gaining neutral status. On the national level, for instance, the liberal doctrine held by the nation-states entails the principles of

---

<sup>26</sup> Armando Salvatore, 'Power and Authority within European Secularity: From the Enlightenment Critique of Religion to the Contemporary Presence of Islam', *The Muslim World*, Vol.96, No.4, October 2006, pp.555

<sup>27</sup> Talal Asad, "Religion, Nation-State, Secularism", in Peter van der Van der Veer and Hartmut Lehmann (eds.) *Nation and Religion: Perspectives on Europe and Asia*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999, pp. 185

liberty, equality and neutrality. This means the state allows any religion's practice within the restrictions determined by the other basic rights; the state does not regard one religion superior over another; the state does not opt for the religious over the non-religious.<sup>28</sup> However, the position and cultural rights of the minority groups within the European host societies disclose the present circumstances. Since the states experience difficulties in dealing with multiplicity of religions and cultures, they promote discriminatory coping mechanisms. Instead of simply arranging the state's rapprochement and distance to religion, secularism "has to do with the (correct) response of the democratic state to diversity".<sup>29</sup> To provide this correct response also necessitates the equal treatment of all citizens. Correspondingly, the issue of state neutrality turns out to be significant parameter for European secularism. According to Charles Taylor, this neutrality is not restricted to avoidance of supporting or opposing religion's positions, this also involves any basic religious or non religious standing; thus he explicitly states "We cannot favor Christianity over Islam, but also religion over against nonbelief in religion, or vice versa."<sup>30</sup> Yet, it can be proclaimed that the secularized form of European self-representation is not independent from Christian imprints and the state control over the religious symbols and practices are usually aimed at eliminating the visibility of Islam in public sphere.

With the intention of elaborating the argument about Christianity's neutral position and its diffusion within secularism, it is essential to move another connected aspect of the subject. The notion of secularized religion identified with Christianity very much intersects with the dominant Orientalist view of European imperial powers. More than a religion or an idea, Christianity, indicated by Gil Anidjar, is particularly hegemonic communal institution and the aggregate of the philosophical, scientific, economic and political accomplishments and also the

---

<sup>28</sup> Partha Chatterjee, "Secularism and Tolerance", in *Secularism and Its Critics*, Rajeev Bhargava(ed.).Delhi, New York: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 358

<sup>29</sup> Charles Taylor, 'The Polysemy of the Secular', *Social Research*, Vol. 76, No.4, Winter 2009, pp. 1153

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 1153



discursive, administrative and institutional success.<sup>31</sup> For the concerns of this study, the discursive power of Christianity within the European narrative about its own identity and relation to its Others, particularly Islam seems vital. At this point, the connection between secularism and Orientalism within the Christian context turns into a recognizable facet. What makes Christianity peculiar within the discussion of European secularism in opposition to Islam is that it is no longer assessed as a specific religion with its own rules or rituals but by itself it has become a critique of religion. By separating itself into private and public, politics and economics, religious and secular, Christianity disenchanted its own world, and also it

“turned against itself in a complex and ambivalent series of parallel movements, continuous gestures and rituals, reformist and counterreformist, or revolutionary and not so revolutionary upheavals and reversals while slowly coming to name that to which it ultimately claimed to oppose itself: religion. Munchausen-like, it attempted to liberate itself, to extricate itself from its own conditions; it *judged* itself no longer Christian, no longer religious. Christianity (that is, to clarify this one last time, Western Christendom) judged and named itself, it *reincarnated* itself as secular.”<sup>32</sup>

To equate Christianity with secularism contradicts to the premises of secularization thesis and at the same time it divulges how both religious and secular are invented by dominant European discursive universe. To put it simply, Orient has become the homeland for the religious whereas West is shown as being able to emancipate itself from religious identifications and attain the objectives of modern secular life. Throughout history, it can be observed that, Christianity, even though being far away from homogenous entity, somehow pursued and shaped Europe's interaction with its Others for instance during the colonization process or the times it gained strength as an imperial power. Today, also Christianity, as supposedly disengaged with religious identity, controls the meaning and implications of a religion particularly Islam and its limits, and

---

<sup>31</sup> Gil Anidjar, 'Secularism', *Critical Inquiry*, Vol.33, Autumn 2006, pp.58

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 59-60

decides on which Muslim groups and their practices can be “tolerated” within the secular Europe. In addition to Europe’s Orientalist imaginary of Islam, it should be emphasized that the idea of Europe as an “exemplary” sphere for universality functions surreptitiously. The “exemplarist logic” elaborated by Jacques Derrida points out from the very beginning, the idea of Europe is born in Europe; it is the idea of philosophy that is a European idea.<sup>33</sup> More remarkably, Michael B.Naas underlines “while Europe would present itself as one example among many, it would, insofar as it articulates this very logic of the example, it would be the example of what remains completely outside the discourse”<sup>34</sup>.Therefore, it is not surprising that the distinction between the secular and religious is under both European and Christian influence.

In parallel with these arguments, I would like to end this part by secular criticism put forward by Edward Said. His critical contributions to the discussion on secularism are noteworthy since his contemplation about Orientalism as the founding doctrine of European identity assists to interpret today’s Europe with the secularized remnants of Christianity. Said’s critical position implies a secularism instilled by the experience of minority- a secularism for which minority is not simply the name of a crisis.<sup>35</sup> Under current conditions in Europe, the needs and expectations of the majority, the constitutive of the Europeaness of Europe by obeying the rules of democracy, human rights and law, govern the structure of secularism. Even a quick glance at the representations of Muslim immigrants in Europe denotes that their presence all along is thought as the primary objection source for the secularist principles. Any idea or act of these “minority” groups may cause anxiety and initiate a debate on the upcoming Islamic threat. Consequently, in Europe, the active participation of immigrant groups specified as

---

<sup>33</sup> Michael B. Naas, “Introduction: For Example,” in intro. by Michael B.Naas, trans.by Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael B. Naas, *The Other Heading: Reflections on Today’s Europe*, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992,pp.xix

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., pp. xxix

<sup>35</sup> Aamir R. Mufti, ‘Auerbach in İstanbul: Edward Said, Secular Criticism, and the Question of Minority Culture’, *Critical Inquiry*, Vol.25, No.1, Autumn 1998, pp.96

religious in molding secularism and also state's neutrality contention under liberal governance become dubious.

The aspiration of Said's secular criticism should not be conceived as the plain critique of religious or theological discourses or modes of cognition, rather it is just symptomatically a sort of thought antithetical to religion.<sup>36</sup> By commenting on Said's arguments, Stathis Gourgouris calls for the emancipation of the secular from the severe opposition to the religious which in current age suggests removing the religious the agency of deciding what is secular; and search for in its place, in the secular, "another epistemological mode that points to whatever is open to contention and critique, interrogation and doubt".<sup>37</sup> It should be also noted, in today's Europe the meaning and area of influence of secular deeply count on its distance from religious. In this context, the Muslim immigrants set the position of secular rather than its inherent power. Particularly, the efforts for not becoming/resembling the religious Other dominate European politics. This fear of the Other is explained as the basis of all the political and cultural impulses within Said's standpoint. Secular criticism, at the center of this argument, is praxis for the management of such fear, and, a quarter century after its publication, *Orientalism* may now be read fruitfully as a sustained warning about the global atmosphere of fear that is now our everyday experience in the post-September 11 era.<sup>38</sup> Besides, in European narrative there is a strong tendency to explain the current problems and events associated with Muslim immigrants by the past confrontations and historical Otherness of Islam; then it results in historicizing of this fear of the Other. Thus, in the eyes of European powers today's exclusive attitudes towards Muslims are legitimate due to this shared history and continuing pre-modern character of Islam. Moreover, from European point of view, the descriptions of the contemporary events and Muslim immigrants frequently embrace "religious extremism" or "terror on behalf of

---

<sup>36</sup> Stathis Gourgouris, 'Orientalism and the Open Horizon of Secular Criticism', *Social Text*, Vol.24, No.2, Summer 2006, pp.18

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.18

<sup>38</sup> Aamir R. Mufti, 'Critical Secularism: A Reintroduction of Perilous Times', *Boundary 2*, Vol.31, No. 2, 2004, pp.4

religion”. The dichotomous characterization of the religious and secular along with their own dispositions is ceaselessly reproduced so that Europe’s endeavors to defend its secular character and governance might gain a “normal” temperament.

As all of these remarks impart, firstly, the differentiation constructed between the secular and the religious theoretically is artificial European product. Secondly, it is widely accepted view that secular form of identification belongs to Europe, experienced the transition from the religious to secular and implemented the missions of modernity and civilizational project, whereas the religious locates in the Orient and Muslim immigrants convey the pre-modern traditions. Thirdly, the problematic dichotomy between Europe and Islam and the secular claims of Europe both lead to treat Christianity as a type of secular belief instead of a regular religion with its own obligations. This is mainly originated from the replacement of Europe with Christianity as the preeminent cultural model and the concept of the Occident was preserved as its referent; thus the idea of Europe became a secular surrogate for Christendom and represented the secularized equivalent of Christendom and is not a break from it.<sup>39</sup>

## **2.2 The Revival of Religion**

The unity/conflict of the secular and religious as playing constitutive role in the self-identification of Europe, the incapacity of the secularization thesis to explicate the current issues with regard to religious minorities in Europe and rising visibility of the articulation of religion and political sphere have triggered the debate about “the revival of religion”. Although there is an overriding European idea about the direct correlation between the religion and European historical progress, under the effects of globalization and shifting social and political conditions, the different roles of religion have become visible in the contemporary European scene. Thus, in the twentieth century, the influence of religion and its relevance to political issues have been met by great European

---

<sup>39</sup> Gerard Delanty, *Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality*, Houndsmill: Macmillan Press, 1995, pp.68

concern that former religious orientations would begin to gain strength owing to both internal and external factors. This unforeseen incident has evoked appraisals about the scope of religiosity, the effect of the presence of Islam in the public sphere and inadequacy of modern secular narrative.

There lie crucial reasons behind the growing and noticeable role of religion in European societies and politics. While Willfried Spohn examines the conflictive role of religion in post-1989 Europe, he points out three interrelated dimensions determining the revitalization of religion in the contemporary situation of Europe. After the dissolution of communism and then reattachment of separated Europe, there has reappeared the enclosing structural and cultural pluralism of the European civilization portrayed by distinct forms of religion and secularization patterns which have changeable influence on states, nations, ethnic groups and related collective identities. Owing to the effect of rising international migration, European societies are converted into more multicultural and religiously more disparate societies. Furthermore, the contemporary globalization movement went along with the strengthening of inter-civilizational and inter-religious encounters in cooperative and competitive as well as particularly between the Islamic world and the Christian secularized West, in markedly conflictive ways.<sup>40</sup> The consequences of this revival have revealed how religion is defined and controlled by Europe particularly in public sphere and religion is linked to the political particularly in the integration issue of Muslim immigrants. Therefore, the secular claims of European project simply labeling the revival of the religious as archaic mask the multifaceted set of relations.

All of these mentioned causes had altered the status of religion and paved the way for reconsideration about European cultural identity founded on secular arguments. Furthermore it seems unpretentious to argue that 9/11 attacks were the turning point for the debates about religion. Yet, in the subsequent years, Europe has to confront with the striking events and controversies in which religion, not surprisingly Islam, has been the focal point. The presence and the practices of

---

<sup>40</sup> Willfried Spohn, 'Europeanization, Religion and Collective Identities in an Enlarging Europe: A Multiple Modernities Perspective', *European Journal of Social Theory*, Vol.12, No.3, 2009, pp.359

Muslim immigrants have been shown as responsible for this “unfamiliar” disorder in Europe. The use of religious symbols in the schools, new religious movements, the accession of Turkey to the European Union, the murders of Pim Fortuyn and Theo Van Gogh in the Netherlands, London/Madrid bombings, the French car burnings, Danish cartoon crisis and minaret referendums are regarded as instances. They have incited new interpretations about religion with respect to Europe’s social and political atmosphere.

The public debates alerting about the revitalization of religion usually point out the shifting nature of churchgoings, possible penetration of Islamic values/practices into the secular social life, the necessary detachment of religion from politics and the categorization of Islam as the core of premodern way of thinking. However, from the very beginning the concept/idea of the religious and the ways religion shown are problematic. As being aware of this conceptual challenge, Derrida asks “In view of the Enlightenment of today, and of tomorrow, in the light of other Enlightenments (Aufklärung, Lumière, illuminismo), how to think religion in the daylight of today without breaking with the philosophical tradition?”<sup>41</sup> This question can be also conceived as a criticism directed towards the hegemonic European theoretical universe shaped by its own historical developments. In other words, how would it be possible to deal with the issue of religion without taking into consideration the dominant European philosophical thinking based on certain line of arguments such as the privatization of religion? Yet, as a response to Bergson, Derrida states overtly even holding that religion is properly thinkable, though thinking is neither seeing, nor knowing, nor conceiving, is still to hold it in advance in respect.<sup>42</sup> The concern is not simply to address the difficulty of defining religion and inferring from religious orientations within Derridean understanding. Thus, to scrutinize indicated issues by the return of religious within this theoretical agenda becomes requisite.

---

<sup>41</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Acts of Religion*, intro. and ed. by Gil Anidjar, New York: Routledge, 2002, pp.77

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 77

The expression of the revival/return of religious is usually grasped with reference to secularist understanding which underlines the threat of religion's dispersal into the public domain. However, under current socio-political conditions, to handle religion as dispersed and sole dynamic seems pointless. In European public discourse, this inclination manifests itself in allegations about Islam's inability to keep pace with the requirements of secularism and also modernism. Yet, the new modes of religion linked to other cultural and political domains and the new areas religion displayed itself under the influence of globalization with its interconnected social bonds should be taken into account. Derrida considers the return of the religious that is the spread of a multifaceted and overdetermined incident, as not a simple return since its globality and its figures remain original and unprecedented.<sup>43</sup> Though the figures mentioned by Derrida draw attention to theoretically different point, the analysis regarding the effect of globalization also finds a place in Hent de Vries's conceptualization. After pointing out the incapacity of the term "fundamentalism" to comprehend this revival, he asserts that "rather than returning religion to its original form, the different public religions in the world (by citing José Casanova's book) respond to the challenges of globalization, the power of the market, the new media and other issues on the contemporary geo-political scene."<sup>44</sup> The pre-assigned place of religion in opposition to the public sphere and identified with pre-modern nature of Islam are no longer significant symptoms since religion has promoted different mechanisms to live within information-technology age and adapts itself to vigorous global circumstances.

In line with these arguments and the aim of this study, the issue of the revival of religion will be discussed with other parameters rather than merely focusing on the dichotomy between European secularist narrative and Muslim immigrants as conveyors pre-modern religious ideas/customs. To begin with, religion's revival in the world, Derrida contends, is pertinent to the technological transformation

---

<sup>43</sup> Ibid., pp.78

<sup>44</sup> Hent de Vries, 'In Media Res: Global Religion, Public Spheres, and The Task of Contemporary Religious Studies' in Hent de Vries and Samuel Weber (eds.) *Religion and Media*.Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001,pp. 6

and intersection of societies, cultures, nations and tokens of communication and exchange.<sup>45</sup> Globalization actually has enabled new technological developments, including improved communication systems which eliminate the time-space limitations, newborn industries and inventions, and also interdependency between societies and cultures. In return for all these changes, chaining social transitions and movements have taken place. Correspondingly, the modes of religion have been subjected to change; but the fundamentalist or extremist types of religious orientations comprise a different heading in other theoretical base. Derrida accounts for the current position of religion within this scientifically and socially diverse global setting and maintains

Religion today allies itself with tele-technoscience, to which it reacts with all its forces. It is, *on the one hand*, globalization; it produces, weds, exploits the capital and knowledge of tele-mediatization; neither the trips and global spectacularizing of the Pope, nor the interstate dimensions of the “Rushdie Affair”, nor planetary terrorism would otherwise be possible, at this rhythm- and we could multiply such indications *ad infinitum*. But, *on the other hand*, it reacts immediately, *simultaneously*, declaring war against that which gives it this new power only at the cost of dislodging it from all its proper places, *in truth from place itself*, from the *taking place* of its truth.<sup>46</sup>

Since religion actively gets involved and directs communication and media systems, that is tele-mediatization, its revival cannot be considered as purely antiquated reappearance. Moreover, this described resurgence situation is represented as the contrary to secularization, and this is widespread as well as meager stance in public debates in Europe. Muslim immigrants as the bearers of Islamic threat are exposed to the exclusive power of secularism because their presence is already thought as giving voice to religion in European public sphere.

---

<sup>45</sup> Carl Raschke, ‘Derrida and the Return of Religion: Religious After Postmodernism’, *Journal for Cultural and Religious Theory*, Vol.6, No.2, Spring 2005, pp. 13

<sup>46</sup> Jacques Derrida, ‘Faith and Knowledge: the Two Sources of ‘Religion’ at the Limits of Reason Alone’ in Jacques Derrida and Gianni Vattimo (eds.) *Religion*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998, pp.46 (emphases in original)



Rather than being fixed to traditions and past doctrines and conventions, as Hent de Vries says, religion is “on-line” with the new media. He expounds, religion somehow engages in and contributes to the uprooting force of a “radical abstraction” but also marks the “tele-technological transcendence” of a *méchané* that creates a virtual, cyber space-time –that inscribes religion into the realm of the televisual and digital.<sup>47</sup> This interaction can be clearly observed in media representations of Muslim immigrants because they continuously reproduce Eurocentric and Orientalist images/stereotypes. The debates on Islam and its rules/practices usually end up with evaluations about its degree of compatibility with European modernity, human rights, democracy. For instance, the cartoons portrayed Muslims and prophet of Islam as potential terrorists were published in Denmark and severely criticized in both national and international levels since they aimed at humiliating the particular religious group’s sacred beliefs and disrespecting Islam and its believers. Yet, the remarkable point is, these cartoons were re-published in some European countries despite great public reaction, and this was presented as a freedom of speech. It became inevitable in the course of discussions to question the openness of Islam to criticism, freedom of thought and the conditions of modern life. While mostly Christianity is supposed to be purified from its religious identity and new modes of co-existence with secularism and its distance from politics are appreciated, the revival of religion is indicated as the peculiar case of Islam within European civilization. Here, the concern is neither compare nor revert the dichotomy in favor of Islam but to show biased and typical perception about particular religion and its followers.

Moreover, Hent de Vries underlines that the relationship between religion and media sheds light on the paradox demonstrating the ever more sophisticated negotiation between private and public sphere. He also refers to the mediatized return of the religious that media enables the public voice retrieved by religion which operates generally in the private sphere. Rightly, he criticizes the contemporary studies paying little attention to significant developments, the rise of the new media and the revival of the religious. Their indifference to examine

---

<sup>47</sup> Hent De Vries, *Philosophy and the Turn to Religion*. Baltimore, Md.:John Hopkins University Press, 1999, pp.16

them concomitantly is noteworthy. That is to say, the simultaneous upsurge of new media technologies and their relation with religion and its return as a political factor are neglected. If religion and media technologies are handled as two independent developments, then on the one hand there is revitalized importance of the religious and the proliferation of political theologies it entails, on the other hand, information technologies experience the equally unexpected revolution. According to Hent de Vries, this blindness is only overcome by Derrida in *Faith and Knowledge: The Two Sources of 'Religion' at the Limits of Reason Alone* and also in Derrida's more recent analysis, reconsideration of religion and the new media of communication, the increasingly complicated forms of teletechnology go hand in hand.<sup>48</sup> More prominently, Derrida believes that "one would blind oneself to the phenomenon called 'of religion' or of the 'return of the religious' today if one continued to oppose so naively Reason *and* Religion, Critique or Science *and* Religion, technoscientific Modernity *and* Religion."<sup>49</sup> However, this kind of blindness is so prevalent that Europe positions itself in the first part of these dichotomies and allocates religion to Islam. As many commentators emphasize the influence of Enlightenment heritage on perceptions about religion's status, there is still lack of insight about how technoscientific reason, in Derridean conception, feeds religion. Hent de Vries asserts, when this essential relationship between religion and media is translated into geo- and theo-political terms, this would signify terminating to represent, for instance, political Islam in an anachronistic way, as the epitome of fundamentalism.<sup>50</sup> For instance, after the great migration flows of Muslims to European societies, their increasing participation in economy, politics and culture and prominent Islam's visibility in public sphere might not directly and explicitly lead to fears such as Islamization of Europe, the replacement of democratic and secular governments with fundamental Islamic administration or invasion of European values by religious traditions, if the dimensions of present day (media, communication systems or

---

<sup>48</sup> Hent De Vries, 'In Media Res: Global Religion, Public Spheres, and The Task of Contemporary Religious Studies', pp.17-19

<sup>49</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Acts of Religion*. pp. 65

<sup>50</sup> Hent De Vries, 'In Media Res: Global Religion, Public Spheres, and The Task of Contemporary Religious Studies', pp. 20

socioeconomic factors) and Islam as a religion and culture are taken into account simultaneously and interactively.

In addition to these statements, the critical reading of the issue of religion's return should exceed mere identification with Islam since new forms of Christianity and its implications are also in charge. Although from the very beginning of his analysis, Derrida seems as if not satisfied with the term return of religion due to its implications he asserts that in its revitalized form it is less predictable than ever before and manifested in "cyberspatialized or cyberspaced wars of religion" or "wars of religions". Most enlightened and universalist purposes can conceal these wars' barbarous and malevolence character.<sup>51</sup> For Derrida, not only religious intentions, but other interests such as economic, politico-military, are at work in these new wars of religion. Yet, the point is what introduces itself under the name of religion and beyond what defends or attacks in its name and he elucidates

It is not certain that in addition to or in the face of the most spectacular and most barbarous crimes of certain 'fundamentalisms' (of the present or the past) *other* over-armed forces are not *also* leading 'wars of religion', albeit unavowed. Wars or military 'interventions', led by the Judaeo-Christian West in the name of the best causes (of international law, democracy, the sovereignty of peoples, of nations or of states, even of humanitarian imperatives), are they not also, from a certain side, wars of religion? The hypothesis would not necessarily be defamatory, nor even very original, except in the eyes of those who hasten to believe that all these just causes are not only secular but *pure* of all religiosity.<sup>52</sup>

These today's wars of religion also recall colonial history of Europe since colonial discourse had also its legitimate and rational reasons to invade the lands which supplied the necessary raw materials and labor force. European interventions were done on behalf of democracy, human rights or helping people in need of basic rights in Third World countries, and Christian way of life and practices were also intrinsic to every domain, so Christian effects became invisible. There were also

---

<sup>51</sup> Ibid., pp. 21

<sup>52</sup> Jacques Derrida, *Acts of Religion*. pp. 63 (emphases in original)

attempts to Europeanize the colonies in which Christianity played a constitutive role for European civilization. Even a quick glance over European history can demonstrate the effects of religion which were always outstanding in cultural and political spheres. Besides, on its own Thirty Years' War can be accepted as a sign for religious violence; there were attempts to secularize Christianity and ensure its accommodation within modern Europe. From European point of view, all of these developments are required in order to reach the current civilized, modern and exemplary status. Yet, Islam's presence by itself is incompatible with this harmony. While Muslim immigrants are accused of their "backward" religious customs and Europe takes political measures to protect its Europeaness, how religion and politics are detached from each other in both decisions and implementations? How Islam is perceived as an exceptional case that should be dealt with politically different means?

By bethinking the mentioned arguments in the first part of the chapter, now I would like to discuss how secular, religion and politics intermingle within European context and inter-reliant. As religion becomes more noticeable in political domain, even the very basic definition of secularism, the separation of politics and religion and their independent decision making mechanisms, seems in need of re-interrogation. However, to overlook the visibility and influence of religion within political field is conventional approach because unsurprisingly hegemonic European secular narrative leaves no space for further thinking.

Casanova contends the secular nature of modern European state and the secular character of European democracy serve as one of the foundational myths of contemporary European identity and there is a frequently heard secular narrative as normative justification for the secular character of European democracy. He explains schematic structure of this secular narrative as such: Long time ago, in medieval Europe, politics and religion were combined and this is a characteristic of premodern societies; but this synthesis due to the new circumstances of religious diversity, tremendous sectarianism, and conflict generated by Protestant Reformation caused serious, violent and enduring religious wars which resulted in European societies' devastation; so the exact response to this subversive setting

was the secularization of the state and this was also written inerasably on the collective memory of European societies. Then, Enlightenment made the remaining parts of this process that religion, politics and science started to be detached from each other by modern Europeans. Most significantly, to domesticate religious enthusiasm and to disperse retrograde fanaticism were learnt by confining religion to private sphere whereas liberal, secular public sphere was founded upon freedom of expression and public reason.<sup>53</sup> This historical narration exposes once again how theologico-political distinctions are European products and secularism is presented as the ultimate point that all modern, civilized and developed societies arrive through passing necessary and sequent historical and social developments.

However, recent works on religion and politics point out another set of conceptualizations and analyses. Instead of focusing on how secular Europe and its citizens in comparison to Islam, to study the challenges introduced by the co acting of religion-politics seems more meaningful. Claude Lefort initially accepts the fact that political institutions have long been separated from religious institutions and also religious beliefs retreated into the realm of private opinion and then he asks “Can we say that religion has simply disappeared in the face of politics without asking ourselves what its investment in the political realm once meant?” He also argues that religion has invested in politics in where it has become unrecognizable and religious survives in the guise of new beliefs and representations.<sup>54</sup> In present day, European Union is one of the perceptible areas that religion’s existence and penetration into politics emerge within the debates. The criticisms about the imprints of Christianity in European Union also engender question marks about religious impartiality; intensely Turkey’s potential accession and enlargement policies once again draw attention to the differences in terms of religion and culture. Yet, the most recurring theme in responses to these

---

<sup>53</sup> José Casanova, “Public Religions Revisited” in Hent de Vries (ed.) *Religion: Beyond A Concept*. New York: Fordham University Press, 2008, pp. 109

<sup>54</sup> Claude Lefort, “The Permanence of the Theologico-Political?” in Hent de Vries and Lawrence E. Sullivan (eds.) *Political Theologies: Public Religions in a Post-Secular World*. New York: Fordham University Press, 2006, pp.150

criticisms is, European Union is congenitally secular political body without any implicit or explicit reference to Christianity. Unquestionably, church-state relations in the nation-states and their maintenance of official means between religion and politics do not always rely on the legal discourse of the Union.

As Mirjam Künkler and Michael Meyer-Resende assert, the relationship of the state to religious in established democracies takes such a variety of forms that it is impossible to speak of one general pattern. They also notice the diverse aspects of state-religion relations in European democracies such as education system, finances, law and media. For instance, some kind of religious instruction in public schools or state funding for private religious schools are granted by every member state; in England, non-denominational religious education is compulsory in all state schools and the Church of England enjoys veto power over the construction of local agreed syllabuses and also in secular France, teachers of religious schools qualify for state support and as much as a fifth of the entire educational budget goes to private Catholic schools.<sup>55</sup> Furthermore, Yves Meny and Andrew Knapp stress the European tradition of a 'dominant' church or religion 'marking' the political systems of both Italy in Southern Europe and the UK in Northern Europe.<sup>56</sup> Then it seems apparent that religion has not returned or revitalized due to the public presence and governance of Islam or Muslim immigrants' religious claims, but it is already there. Religion has always the power to structure European collective self-understanding and define its exclusive Others; religion's relation to other domains very much determine European social or political configuration both in implicit and explicit terms; and new religious representations have emancipated from classical roles, such as privatization, and converted into new forms in the global world. The problematical issue is how European dominant narrative of secularization is challenged by the presence of

---

<sup>55</sup> Mirjam Künkler and Michael Meyer-Resende, 'A Missing Link: Why Europe should talk about Religion when Promoting Democracy Abroad', *Discussion Paper*, No.1, Berlin: Democracy Reporting International, June 2009, pp. 2

<sup>56</sup> Yves Meny and Andrew Knapp, *Government and Politics in Western Europe: Britain, France, Italy, Germany*. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 26

public Islam and how myth of secular European identity fails to recognize religion's interdependent position within media and politics.

### **2.3 Multiculturalism In Question**

In the previous parts of the chapter, the discussions on the secularization thesis and revival of religion have been questioned jointly since in the dominant European discourse the increasing presence of Muslim immigrants are shown as threats to secularism and causes for religious revival. As a prevalent political stand in Europe to cope with changing social conditions, multiculturalism operates side by side secularist claims and subjects related to religion. It is also a kind of method to keep the differences under control within unified system that bears resemblance to the purposes of secularism. On the one hand, to reconsider the status of multiculturalism in current European setting and the narrative consulting with premises of secularism and religion, as already discussed, becomes crucial. On the other hand, the postulate that multiculturalism is in crisis after 9/11 turns into a controversial topic in public discussions.

In the contemporary global settings, mainly the escalating flow of labor and capital, widespread use of the communication technologies, the changes in the time and place conceptions, which Anthony Giddens<sup>57</sup> characterizes as “distanciation” and “disembedding”, have brought about more interdependent and also interconnected affiliations. The conditions of globalization have determined these relations which are also affected more extensively by the existence of immigrants, refugees and, in very crude terms, culturally different groups within the states. Hence, the need for finding new coping mechanisms has become inevitable. The concept and also policy of multiculturalism can be regarded as one of the controlling devices which aim to prevent any divisive act and maintain the so-called order by offering equal treatment to all citizens despite of their ethnic or

---

<sup>57</sup> Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity*. Stanford, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990, pp. 21-27

racial backgrounds. Although within this global context almost every country can be labeled as multicultural due to the ethnically, racially diverse social structures, the issue of multiculturalism is usually acknowledged as the subject matter of developed Western countries. Certainly it is not possible to approach all European societies with the same conceptualization of multiculturalism since it has different implications for each country and policies based on this legal framework may be formed in line with the specific conditions of the country. Still, it is apparent that the unifying factor for this discussion is the attempts of states to manage the diversity within their homogenous disposition of the society in which European secular claims and confinement of religion to private sphere are principal arguments.

In the post 9/11 epoch, the problematical existence of Islam in public sphere and identification of Muslim immigrants with terrorism have paved the way for evaluations about the meaning of multiculturalism means and its features,, how multiculturalism fails to tackle with cultural/religious diversity and it goes hand in hand with European understanding of secularism. Gunew quotes Homi Bhabha's claim; multiculturalism functions as a "floating signifier" that finds "meaning and strategic capabilities" in a given context.<sup>58</sup> For Stefano Allievi, multiculturalism is the "mere recognition of a plurality of competing cultural options present in the same territory and of competing cultural universes, linked in particular with the arrival of populations which have these as their own heritage of reference, is now part of the European agenda". Besides the introduction of the use of the term multiculturalism in Europe indicated the route from an immigration perceived only as economic and temporary to a permanent presence of populations.<sup>59</sup> This also suggests the permanent acceptance of Muslim immigrants as a vital part of European culture and civilization as well as other religiously and culturally

---

<sup>58</sup> Sneja Gunew, *Haunted Nations: The Colonial Dimensions of Multiculturalisms*. London, New York: Routledge, 2004, pp. 28

<sup>59</sup> Stefano Allievi, 'Multiculturalism in Europe', Conference Paper, St Antony's-Princeton Conference on "Muslims in Europe post 9/11" Oxford: St. Antony's College, 25-26 April 2003, available at : [http://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/princeton/pap\\_allievi.shtml](http://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/princeton/pap_allievi.shtml)



different groups; but the liberal multicultural guideline sets this rapprochement to respect and tolerate these religiously and culturally different groups. At the same time as respecting and tolerating its Other, Europe again consolidates its position in the role of political and cultural authority and escapes from questioning about its sovereignty. Having the status of decision maker and culturally superior, Europe is the active agent in terms of determining whom to respect and tolerate and which conventions are corresponding to secular juridical-political regulations.

In order to explore the details of the subject, I would like to continue with a modest analysis of the discourse of multiculturalism utilizing certain notions which have gained neutral connotations within public debates. Firstly, the insistence on the culture and equality are two of the most significant indicators of multicultural discourse; the overemphasis on the specificity of the different social groups' cultures brings about simultaneously the search for authenticity. As Peter Caws underscores "It has come to be a familiar claim of some advocates of multiculturalism that a culture's of one's own (that is, one not imposed from without) is one of the conditions or the achievement of an authentic identity."<sup>60</sup> In the hands of prevailing perception of multiculturalism, cultural diversity becomes a tool for creating multiple authentic identities within states in where they try to maintain homogeneity and unity. Moreover, Bassam Tibi calls attention to cultural relativism which is at the core of multiculturalism that European multiculturalists look with a sense of romantic-eccentric mystification at other cultures so view aliens in the Eurocentric tradition as *bons sauvages* (noble savages).<sup>61</sup> This effort for preserving specific cultural identities also proceeds with the claims of toleration and respect for cultural difference. There is an inclination, at one level, within the media, public and some political discourse, on the other level, in the multiculturalist policies, that the existence and survival of the "other"

---

<sup>60</sup> Peter Caws, "Identity: Cultural, Transcultural, and Multicultural", in David Theo Goldberg (ed.) *Multiculturalism: A Critical Reader*. Cambridge, Mass: Blackwell Publishers, 1994, pp. 371

<sup>61</sup> Bassam Tibi, "Muslim Immigrants in Europe: Between Euro-Islam and Ghettoization", in Nezar AlSayyad and Manuel Castells (eds.) *Muslim Europe or Euro-Islam: Politics, Culture, and Citizenship in the Age of Globalization*. Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books; Berkeley: Center for Middle Eastern Studies, University of California at Berkeley, 2002, pp. 45

culturally, ethnically and racially different groups depend on the majority's (particularly, the dominant national group) tolerance and respect for them. In parallel with this, Slavoj Žižek also emphasizes, a Eurocentric distance is involved in multiculturalism in the case of respecting and tolerating the particular cultures.<sup>62</sup> Any kind of problem emerged within the Muslim population in one of the European countries is considered as an ungratefulness act and disloyalty to European tolerance. Netherlands thought as the most tolerant and multicultural society was oscillated by the murders of Pim Fortuyn and Theo Van Gogh, which will be discussed in the fourth chapter, in November 2004. These events opened many debates all around Europe and unsurprisingly multicultural character of Netherlands became the focus point and they were accepted as the proof for the failure of multiculturalism in this country.

The striking point is, the events are epitomized as the hostility of the minority/culturally different groups, especially Muslim immigrants, to the core European values such as freedom, tolerance and liberalism. As a mechanism to tackle with the difficulties stemmed from the practices and demands of these different groups, multiculturalism develops into an entity "given" by the homogenous majority group (i.e. pure Europeans). That is to say, the groups with cultural, racial and ethnic differences are given the equal rights like the citizens from the dominant group even if they do not "deserve" these economic, social or political rights. There arises the distinction between the bearers of multicultural policies and the ones applied these policies and which in return this distinction protects the binary opposition between the majority and minority, colonizer and colonized, the suppliers and recipients of the rights. At this point, the double-faced character of multiculturalism is also divulged itself since these conditions contradict with its equality principle as the basis of it. On the hand, it puts forward itself as the protector of the minority rights and advocate of equal treatment, on the other hand, its over-valorization and attitude towards the members of culturally different groups as exotic subjects intercept their mobility. That is to say,

---

<sup>62</sup> Slavoj Žižek, 'Multiculturalism, or, the Cultural Logic of Multinational Capitalism', *New Left Review*, Vol.225, September/October 1997, pp. 44

multiculturalism contributes to strengthen the marginalized and “problematical” status of these groups in the host societies.

Being inherent to the assumptions of multiculturalism, the references to identity and difference once again draw a line between Europe and Muslim immigrants. However, Douglas Hartmann and Joseph Gerteis highlight, in scholarly circles and popular discourse, the widespread conception of multiculturalism depends on what it stands in opposition to such as homogeneity, unity and universalism.<sup>63</sup> Its emphasis on identity and difference is interpreted as a menace to national solidarity and order since they raise awareness of Muslim immigrants to demand their rights. From another aspect, when multiculturalism challenges homogeneity or unity and hangs on its premises underlining identity, difference and particularism, it fails to notice the other side of the medallion. David Theo Goldberg warns about the exclusionary aspect of both the identity and difference although their representations within this discursive sphere stress their uniting force and particularity of the groups. Moreover, Goldberg explains

... It has been pointed out commonly that identity can be exclusionary of those who are outside its scope, those who are- or who are taken to be- in no way affiliated... What is less observed is that identity can also be a bondage within. It can keep people in who don't want to be in. And it can do so by insisting on an essential character, or simply by requiring racial solidarity... Difference can be straightforwardly exclusionary, indeed (as West points out), it can be deathly dangerous. There is a long history of racialized or gendered exclusion in the name of difference... But difference also can be used as a mark of delineation to cut off- in organization, in interaction, in memory-those included as members of the group, of the same kind, in virtue of their differential heritage or biology. This (self-) imposed distinction may be cast as a mark of elevation or moral superiority, as being necessary to group survival or self-determination, or as a burden worth bearing, no matter one's desire or effort. Identity can

---

<sup>63</sup> Douglas Hartmann and Joseph Gerteis, 'Dealing with Diversity: Mapping Multiculturalism in Sociological Terms', *Sociological Theory*, Vol.23, No.2, June 2005, pp. 219

sustain fascist social movements as readily as emancipatory ones, and difference may license genocide almost as easily as it does celebration.<sup>64</sup>

Although multiculturalism is considered as a kind of response to the extreme nationalist attitudes with the possible exclusionary sides of identity and difference, it can be argued that, it falls into the same trap of exclusionist and violent (in mental and discursive spheres) ways of managing diversity. Unquestionably, this does not mean directly that they have the same goals and ideologies but the noteworthy aspect is that multiculturalism, set as a new and embracing mechanism, is not able to break the predominant view of homogenization and form a new discursive universe. Although it emerged within the mainstream nationalist settings as a counter apparatus and locates itself opposition to the main assumptions of nationalism, such as unity, homogeneity and universality, it is possible to claim multiculturalism does not really succeed in crossing the nationalist frontiers.

The dichotomy between the homogeneity and heterogeneity is another part of the multicultural framework but here the claim for heterogeneity requires more attention since the homogeneous group of citizens is taken for granted in preserving the unity and integrity of the state. This becomes a touchy debate because the multicultural emphasis on heterogeneity seems as if preventing the appropriate conditions for the society and the state and this claim can easily turn into a threat according to opponents of multiculturalism. It is very much connected to the states' defense mechanisms against the challenges rooted in increasing number of immigrants and other culturally different groups; the united and coherent structure of the nation and national identity gains importance in the case of the encounters with foreigners/the unknown (being not from "us"). The dominant group needs the exclusion and also marginalization of these culturally, ethnically and racially different groups in order to sustain its identity. Therefore, the stress on heterogeneity depicted by multiculturalism also serves such a need of nations and their subjects. When confronted with the challenges due to the existence or arrival of racial/cultural/ethnic others, multiculturalism functions

---

<sup>64</sup> David Theo Goldberg, "Introduction: Multicultural Conditions", in David Theo Goldberg *Multiculturalism: A Critical Reader*. Cambridge, Mass: Blackwell Publishers, 1994, pp.12-13

partly for the maintenance of essential/ pure identity of the nations. Certainly, these identities are not fixed formations and are subjected to the change and more prominently, Ernesto Laclau points out that “the constitution of a social identity is an act of power” because “if... an objectivity manages to partially affirm itself it is only by repressing that which threatens it.” He also reminds how Derrida contributed to conceptualization of identity’s constitution which is always based on excluding something and establishing a violent hierarchy between the two resultant poles.<sup>65</sup> Then to construct a link between the insufficiency and sometimes the failure of the multicultural policies and the act of power becomes more meaningful; in other words, the claim of multiculturalism about the representation of different groups can not be effectively realized due to its close relation with the exercise of power. This indicates the fact that representations of cultural diversity are not independent from the powerful economic/social/political body having and exercising power. The heterogeneity claims of multiculturalism may actually contain the homogenizing process. Tariq Modood believes in the homogenizing aspect of the multiculturalism and says that “...Multiculturalism is a form of integration. It is the form of integration that best meets the normative implications of equal citizenship and under our present post-9/11, post-7/7 circumstances stands the best chance of succeeding.”<sup>66</sup> However, it is so difficult to agree with Modood; after terrorist attacks, the failure of multiculturalism began to be talked since it is predominantly put into words that the welcoming attitude of multiculturalism towards Muslim immigrants ended up with chaotic social atmosphere in Europe.

Related to all of these controversial concepts used within the multicultural discourse, although the approaches of conservatives, liberals and left-liberals in the West appear as distinct from each other and unique, they share some common ideas about this issue. Setting out from the arguments of Peter McLaren here, I would like to mention the collaboration between conservative, liberal and left-

---

<sup>65</sup> Ernesto Laclau, *New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time*. London, New York: Verso, 1990, pp. 33

<sup>66</sup> Tariq Modood, *Multiculturalism*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007, pp.14

liberal multiculturalism. Firstly, the standpoint of conservative multiculturalism very much overlaps with the colonial insights especially about the attitude towards African-Americans. McLaren criticizes conservatives in this way

Although they would like officially to distance themselves from racist ideologies, conservative multiculturalists pay only lip service to the cognitive equality of all races and charge unsuccessful minorities with having “culturally deprived backgrounds” and a “lack of strong family-oriented values. This “environmentalist” position still accepts black cognitive inferiority to whites as a general premise and provides conservative multiculturalists with a means of rationalizing why some minority groups are successful while other groups are not.<sup>67</sup>

Such views held by conservatives intersect with the term “new racism”, identified by Martin Barker and Paul Gilroy to point out shift in the racialization process, as Sunera Thobani emphasizes, in this new conception, the biological inferiority is replaced with the discourse of cultural and national difference in the construction of racial hierarchies.<sup>68</sup> Therefore, this new racism consider race as equal partner with nation and culture. Further this can bring forward the contention that conservatives employ multiculturalism as a camouflaging device to keep on being one of the dominant standpoints within the contemporary global political relations. Moreover, McLaren points at other aspects: this kind of multiculturalism does not regard the state of “whiteness” as one of the ethnicities and sets an “invisible norm” and more strikingly, the concept of “diversity”, a common and important theme of multiculturalism in general, is employed in order to disguise the ideology of assimilation intrinsic to this perception.<sup>69</sup> On the other side, liberal multiculturalism is interested in the market place and the equal competition within the capitalist system and also the ideas of universalistic

---

<sup>67</sup> Peter McLaren, “White Terror and Oppositional Agency: Towards a Critical Multiculturalism” in David Theo Goldberg (ed.) *Multiculturalism: A Critical Reader*. Cambridge, Mass: Blackwell Publishers, 1994, pp. 48

<sup>68</sup> Sunera Thobani, *Exalted Subjects: Studies in the Making of Race and Nation in Canada*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007, pp. 158

<sup>69</sup> Peter McLaren, “White Terror and Oppositional Agency: Towards a Critical Multiculturalism”, pp. 49

humanism and sameness among cultures/races occupy central positions within this understanding. Unlike the liberal multiculturalism, the left-liberal multiculturalism insists on the cultural difference rather than sameness and McLaren approaches this “difference” emphasis in a skeptical manner and states that “The left-liberal position tends to exoticize “otherness” in a nativistic retreat that locates difference in a primeval past of cultural authenticity.”<sup>70</sup> Although it seems as if there is a big difference between these three standpoints, the remarkable conclusion drawn by McLaren is that conservatives and liberals underscore sameness and the left-liberal emphasis on difference is really a false opposition; and also identity based on “sameness” and identity based on “difference” are forms of essentialist logic: in both, individual identities are presumed to be autonomous, self-contained, and self-directed.<sup>71</sup> Therefore, all of these three types of multiculturalism associated with “different” ideologies meet in the same theoretical framework that does not provide a transformative force of multiculturalist policies for the minority groups.

Although at first sight multiculturalism appears as unconnected to secularism, after the contemporary controversies over the disorder allegedly caused by Muslim immigrants, their shared discursive sphere has become noticeable. Brenna Bhandar illustrates the debates about the rights of Muslim women to wear veil in both France and United Kingdom, they have led *laïcité* and multiculturalism as main doctrines controlling the political settings of these nations respectively to be examined. While in France, the veil as the sign of different femininity was recognized as a threat to secularism, multiculturalism in United Kingdom was observed as showing too much tolerance to difference. The need for defending secularism in French context, that is protecting dominant and historical values of the nation, is similar to the criticisms of multiculturalism in United Kingdom. She points out the similarities, despite there are obvious discrepancies between these two doctrines, they were both challenged by the visible presence of Muslim feminine difference particularly when there were debates about headscarf in

---

<sup>70</sup> Ibid., pp.51

<sup>71</sup> Ibid., pp. 53

France and British Muslim women to wear distinct forms of veil in the school classroom. In spite of their differences, she continues to argue, it is disclosed that the same task is carried out by multiculturalism and secularism which are both reproducing and holding in place a unitary, sovereign political subjectivity; both of them are also positioned as methods to regulate difference. This difference is at once cultural, religious, gendered and mired in the history of colonial encounters that shaped the emergent political consciousness of the subject of Enlightenment Europe.<sup>72</sup> European present political consciousness enforces the idea that secularism and multiculturalism, as both separate and mutual mechanisms, strive for the maintenance for sovereign national bodies and also European solidarity; for this reason the headscarf issue or controversy over Danish cartoons are directly assessed in line with the interests or concerns of the dominant subjects.

Additionally, the private-public distinction resides at the crossroads of both secularism and multiculturalism. As mentioned persistently before, this distinction constitutes the backbone of secularism and its implementations and also it is central to multiculturalism. Modood consults Rex's opinions about this pivotal aspect in multiculturalism; the primary distinction between a pluralist society without equality and multicultural ideal is that the latter limits cultural diversity to private sphere so that all enjoy equality of opportunity and uniform treatment in the public sphere. What he seeks to allege is on the one hand, multiculturalism contains the acceptance of a single culture and a single set of individual rights managing the public sphere, on the other hand, controlling a variety of folk cultures in the private domestic and communal domains.<sup>73</sup> Moreover, the necessity of this distinction is highlighted in order to create and preserve equality within multiculturalism, and for Taras Kuzio<sup>74</sup>, it is also a kind of means for "avoiding the excesses of multiculturalism". Although Kuzio's analysis focuses on another place

---

<sup>72</sup> Brenna Bhandar, 'The Ties that Bind: Multiculturalism and Secularism Reconsidered', *Journal of Law and Society*, Vol.36, No. 3, September 2009, pp.304

<sup>73</sup> Tariq Modood, "Introduction: The Politics of Multiculturalism in the New Europe" in Tariq Modood and Pnina Werbner (eds.) *The Politics of Multiculturalism in the New Europe: Racism, Identity and Community* New York: Zed Books, 1997, pp.16-17

<sup>74</sup> Taras Kuzio, 'The Politics of Multiculturalism. The Perils of Multiculturalism: A Theoretical and Area Studies Approach to the Former USSR', *Contemporary Political Studies*, Vol.3, 1998, pp.113



of study, similarly in European context, the attempts to find a balanced application of multiculturalism still proceed. Particularly after 9/11 and terrorist attacks in Europe, the criticisms about multiculturalism mostly intensified on the excessive support and tolerance of Muslim immigrants that sovereignty of the states and European order are now at the hands of uncontrollable multicultural governance. The explanations for the urban disturbances in northern English towns and car burnings in the French banlieues were mainly predicated on betrayal of Muslim immigrants in these host societies in which this liberal multicultural social environment is ensured. Gilles Keppel declared that the bombers of 7/7 London attacks were the children of Britain's own multicultural society and also the implicit social consent has been destroyed by the bombings that caused multiculturalism to smitherens.<sup>75</sup> Thus, any political response or claim of the host state has become legitimate and also the retrospectively voiced concerns about secularism have been justified. Different evaluations and solutions have come into question in the host societies to deal with the "problem" of Muslim immigrants and the violent character of Islam. One of the remarkable but rarely uttered ideas belongs to David Hayes, the deputy editor of *openDemocracy*, who suggests two models for prevention of further attacks. The first model, radical secularism would necessitates the elimination of Church of England and redefinition of the whole state as a secular enterprise having a consistent agenda of induction for new arrivals, closure of faith schools, and expulsion of religious symbolism. As the second model, radical multiculturalism would include the establishment of autonomous Muslim parliament elected by its community, responsible for administering it and more prominently, the language, procedures, schedules, routines and culture of the parliament would be subject to its own designated rule-making bodies.<sup>76</sup> Yet, the responses are not limited to this kind of "radical" views or the perceptions of right-wing parties. A very pervasive comment is, multiculturalism is in crisis or multiculturalism has come to an end.

---

<sup>75</sup> Gilles Keppel, 'Europe's Answer to Londonistan', *openDemocracy*, 23-08-2005, available at: [http://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict-terrorism/londonistan\\_2775.jsp](http://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict-terrorism/londonistan_2775.jsp)

<sup>76</sup> David Hayes, 'What Kind of Country', *openDemocracy*, 28-07-2005, available at: [http://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict-terrorism/britain\\_2713.jsp](http://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict-terrorism/britain_2713.jsp)

Along with the rising marginalization, subordination and also rebellions of Muslim immigrants, endeavors for integration have started to be seen as failures and it has been understood that Europe has also its tolerance limits. This is why it is commonly said, Europe experiences a crisis of multiculturalism. Accounts in media reveal how this crisis is depicted and again stereotyped distinctions are employed. In *The Sunday Times*, the ten days after 7/7 bombings in London, the article named “Multiculturalism has failed but tolerance can save us” was published. It gives salient clues about the focal point of the subject and the forms it has taken. Throughout the article, the author blames the British left since it hesitated to take action about multiculturalism and many unresolved issues were compelling such as the rights of Muslim women. Besides, the idea of all cultures are morally equivalent impairs the ability to recognize good and evil. Yet, the outstanding paragraph is here below:

It is tempting in a tolerant society to want to see other people’s point of view. If Islam has thrown up its extremists, we can recall the excesses committed over centuries in the name of Christianity. We can understand that a devout Muslim might find western society licentious and irreligious. But the time for sophistry has passed. Our citizens and our society are under threat from those who believe that difference is a justification for terror and murder. Our country has the right to assert its values and require from everyone living here compliance with our laws and respect for our standards.<sup>77</sup>

This indicates not only one of the typical Eurocentric reactions to the Islamic issues but also how orientalist line of reasoning finds its way to justify its exclusionary attitude and crystallize Europe’s victimized position ascribed to itself. In addition, empathy developed about Muslims’ incapability of comprehending Western society’s liberal and secular atmosphere again signifies the dominant European subjectivity. Actually these rigorous reactions and biased criticisms are not peculiar to the epoch marked by terrorist attacks or the

---

<sup>77</sup> Michael Portillo, ‘Multiculturalism has failed but tolerance can save us’, *The Sunday Times*, 17.07.2005, available at [http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest\\_contributors/article544921.ece](http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article544921.ece)

increasing problems related to Muslims. In 2004, the article called “Multiculturalism is dead. Hurrah?” published in *The Guardian* can be regarded as a typical example of cultural and religious incompatibility claim and demonstration of the impossibility of coexistence due to unalterable inherent traditions. In order to indicate how Muslim immigrants try to find a place in European society, young Muslim women’s wearing of headscarf is included in the subject as such:

My guess is that many second-and third-generation Muslims choose this dress not out of religious beliefs, but because they think it's cool. By which I mean, they like the identity that the accoutrements of religious observance afford them, how it sets them apart, makes them visible, albeit by making them invisible. For that, after all, is what most young people want: a sense of their own identity.<sup>78</sup>

These remarks underline groundless religious beliefs or practices of Muslim immigrants and their efforts to form their identity. At the same time, the differences are celebrated in the light of identity politics. These religious, national or cultural differences are embodied in the representations of Muslim immigrants and their racialized way of being is just hidden behind cultural and religious guise.

For both new covert racialized thinking and European type of secularization, the concept of Muslim immigrant on its own has become a political category as well as a reference point for cultural and religious distance from Europe. While diversity and differences are constantly emphasized within the debate about politics of recognition in the contemporary European social context, Muslim immigrant as a political category has developed into a homogenous, precarious and conflicting entity. It is the common denominator in the discussions about European racism and secularism and also starting point for other areas of questioning.

---

<sup>78</sup> Andrew Anthony, ‘Multiculturalism is dead. Hurrah?’, *The Guardian*, 8.4.2004, available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/apr/08/religion.race#history%E2%80%90byline>

What unite the discussions on the issues of secularism and racism with regard to Europe and Muslim immigrants? Europe's race relations and European racial categories particularly after 1980s do not simply tackle with the notion of race, biologically defined hierarchical social positions of the races and (re)production of racial knowledge. The differences defined in terms of culture and religion have involved in the process of racial divisions and narrative. Simultaneously secular claims of Europe have utilized these differences to rationalize the incompatible and inassimilable character of Muslim immigrants and to strengthen Europe's discriminatory political culture. This also indicates that secular claims are far beyond a pure critique of religion and racialized discourse finds new spaces for its survival without any allusion of racial ranking. Moreover, the sense of what it meant to be European is in part described along with the approval of secularism and its principles in both political and social spheres and glorification of differences together with anti-racist ideas. The tasks of preservation of Europeanness of Europe and conservation of Christian legacy are usually carried out by right wing ideologies. Radical political parties, such as Front National in United Kingdom, National Front in France, Freedom Party of Austria, and Party for Freedom in Netherlands, deal with the enactment of anti-immigration laws and perpetuation of racial politics. However, this is not limited to extreme right wing parties any more; leftists also seek to rescue Europe from Islamization. The distance between the political poles have become erased in the name of promoting secular liberal values together with Judaeo-Christian heritage. As they advocate European secular and religious commitments, the representation of difference comes to engage in "othering" of immigrants and reproducing racial categorizations. On behalf of European values and Christian roots, contemporary political orientations and immigration policies directly or indirectly encourage racial violence towards Muslim immigrants and underline the limits of European tolerance.

In addition to this complex and intertwined relation between secularism and racism in Europe, the initiatives for multicultural approach aim at overcoming the barriers in front of the governance of religious diversity. To ensure anti-racist and harmonious social disposition, multiculturalism is introduced as opposite to

cultural assimilation approach and new type of racism based on cultural inferiority claims. As multiculturalism supposedly strives for granting equality, diversity, heterogeneity and also security, the elimination of all forms of racism becomes the complementary idea. This also leads multicultural approach to be thought as the equivalent of anti-racism in Europe and protector of minority rights. The frontiers of these rights are not only determined by the principles of multiculturalism but European secularism also delimit the freedom of minorities. In other words, even in a multicultural environment, hegemonic secular culture is selective in terms of the recognition of difference and rights of religious/cultural groups. Although platforms for intercultural dialogue are established, even European Commission declared the year 2008 as the “European Year of Intercultural Dialogue”, and there are attempts to encourage social and political participation of Muslim immigrants, it is not likely to speak of a neutral stance of secularism. According to Modood,

Secularism becomes relevant to a multiculturalism concerned with the accommodation of religious minorities if they make political claims that apparently violate the separation of religion and politics, and in so far as multicultural policies accommodating such claims would transgress limits on whether and how a secular state can legitimately involve itself with, take a stand on and possibly support religious groups and their practices.<sup>79</sup>

Particularly these secular concerns with regard to the suggestions of multiculturalism point at Muslim immigrants and their prospective cultural and religious invasion of the host societies. The alarming theme is whether political claims of this group may turn into a religious project; undoubtedly this also poses risks not only for rooted secular structure of Europe but also European cultural solidarity. These apprehensions and projections also ensure a legitimate ground for developing a racialized discourse adapted to the present day and declaring the fears about security all over Europe. The issues of cultural racism and securitization of migration will be discussed in the next chapter.

---

<sup>79</sup> Tariq Modood, *Multiculturalism*, Cambridge: Polity, 2007, pp.70 and Tariq Modood, ‘A Basis for and Two Obstacles in the Way of a Multiculturalist Coalition’, *British Journal of Sociology*, 2008b, Vol.59 No.1, pp.50 cited in Sune Lægaard, ‘Moderate Secularism and Multicultural Equality’, *Politics*, October 2008, Vol. 28, No.3, pp. 160

## CHAPTER 3

### THE RACIALIZED DISCOURSE OF EUROPE

If secularism constitutes one side of Europe and its identity in relation to its Others, the idea of race and its incarnation as racism can be regarded as complementing entities. Although the historical or racial Others of Europe have changed over time since antiquity, the racist tradition continued to operate depending on the discursive rehearsal of Europe. Particularly, the immigrants, asylum seekers, refugees or ex-colonized people comprise Europe's racial Others and the long history of racism has been formed with regard to the interaction between Europe and its Others. Beyond pointing out the certain geographical area or continent, Europe has imposed its centrality and universality of its system of ideas and practices to the ones outside it; so there is an underlying representational issue in which Europe is an active subject like any other subject in the process of identity construction in need of recognition of its presence by its Other(s).

The long history of racism in Europe reveals the ways the immigrants or the culturally differentiated groups have been (re)considered and represented at many levels of political, cultural or economic spheres. Moreover, the conceptualization of racism and its connotations have been adapted to the new conditions in Europe. Although the existence of racism in Europe and its effects are not new to interrogate, second or third immigrant groups still face the discriminatory measures and even racist violence. As Eduardo Bonilla-Silva mentions Braudel's remark, "It is the problem of otherness, that is, the feeling that a foreign presence is other, a challenge to one's own self and identity."<sup>80</sup> This problem of otherness

---

<sup>80</sup> Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, "This is a White Country': The Racial Ideology of the Western Nations of the World-System', *Sociological Inquiry*, Vol. 70, No.2, Spring 2000, pp.188

concerning the issue of racism, as a discursive conduct, in Europe has gained importance again beginning from 1980s and come up with “new” implications for European identity, national discourses and racial politics.

As problematized in the second chapter, in Europe the separation of the secular and religious is blurred and transitional in contrary to the claims of secularization thesis. Besides, Christianity and its influence on discursive sphere of politics and social life were not abandoned in Middle Ages or European religiously led orientations/decisions were not left behind by Enlightenment. However, the failure of secularization thesis and interrelatedness of secular to religious in Europe do not bring along percipience regarding Muslim immigrants. In other words, in the name of protecting national interests and culturally unique character of Europe, secularism attains an exclusionist character particularly in relation to public Islam. Similarly, the idea emerged as a coping and controlling mechanism of diversities in a so-called unified entity, multiculturalism in collaboration with liberal doctrine shares a common ground with secularism in terms of constructing and consolidating Europe as a sovereign political subjectivity and precluding and marginalizing Muslim immigrants. There is a minor step to pass through racism and in some cases racism is so inherent to the applications and views about Muslim immigrants. The implicit acts of this new racism result in finding out reasonable justifications to mask its existence and also questioning the presence of immigrants in new areas.

In line with these delicate and interconnected issues, in this chapter, firstly, new (cultural) racism and its components will be analyzed. It will be demonstrated how the discourse of cultural incompatibility or contradiction of cultural differences operates as a legitimate theoretical tool for explanations about the problem-ridden relationship between Europe and Islam. How the biased representations of Muslims in Europe are interpreted within the scope of freedom of expression? How the current discourse of new racism is exempt from labeling as racist or European secular culture’s signification about Islam, the religious in this context, carries racist tone? Moreover, to examine the idea of racism and racist language becomes essential for comprehending secularism’s decisive position in the

relationship between European nation-states and Islam. In the second part of the chapter, the subject of securitization of immigrants will be touched upon. Europe's some kind of obsession with security takes its source from the belief that the presence and practices of Muslims challenge both the unity and security of states. This situation is also considered as antithetical to secure European environment freed from any type of conflict. As these security fears grow up and pronounce in Europe, synchronically theoretical literature on this issue begins to expand. This academic repertoire mostly comprises critiques about the opinions and measures with reference to the need for maintenance of security within Europe because this claim proceeds as another way of discrimination.

### **3.1 Cultural Racism in Europe**

The recurring themes in Europe-Islam dichotomy such as the need for protection of secular character, increasing public visibility of religion, clash of civilizations, security threats both reinforce and reproduce the negative image of Muslim immigrants. In media representations and political discourses, persistently underlined "difference" and "incompatibility" between these two lead to position Islam in opposition to "civilizational" values. These inevitably result in improvement of a new discursive sphere in which without any reference to race, racism becomes speakable. What makes this feasible is "culture" introduces itself as a key concept to explore differences and justify certain identities. This cultural approach turns out to be a new tool for European racism. Since 1980s, the analyses have attributed to culture a specific role in the (re)construction of racism, due to over growing Muslim population, integration problems, public visibility of Islam and global terror threat, cultural racism has come to the agenda again. Moreover, owing to changed patterns in racial discourse and shifts in socio-economic and political status of Europe, biological racism is no longer able to interpret the contemporary discriminatory attitude and policies.

Although in Europe there is a strong tendency to predicate the rise of racism and racial ideologies on intolerable and resistant acts of Muslim immigrants like in the issue of the revival of religion in the public sphere associated with Islam's



presence, racism has not come into the picture with immigrants. In fact, racism is the indispensable dimension of modern European history. Yet, what is the relevant side of opening a discussion on cultural racism about immigrants is to critically evaluate the underlying mechanisms and discursive sphere about certain representations of Muslim immigrants. More outstandingly, by using specific vocabulary and reflections, this racism succeeds in introducing itself as a criticism or discomfort about immigrants stemmed from the “cultural incompatibility”. Furthermore, this contemporary type of racism has become one of the primary topics on the discursively established myth of European identity and integration project. Before elaborating cultural racism in Europe, two points should be clarified. The first one is, the analyses about European racism should not be confined to only Holocaust and its consequences. The second point is, racism is one of the foremost aspects of European history that actively participates in self-construction process of Europe and it will survive within the borders of Europe as long as the Others of Europe are within the European borders.

To begin with, the history of European racism did neither begin nor end with Holocaust, but this does not mean to ignore its being momentous and excruciating experience and profound effects. Theodor W. Adorno did not constrain the outcomes of Holocaust with only Jews but also for Western civilization, it was a disloyalty of the entire philosophical project of the West, the search for a rational totality. Moreover, he argued that “Auschwitz confirmed the philosopheme of pure identity as death”.<sup>81</sup> Yet, to limit the history of European racism to Holocaust brings about insufficient analyses about diverse racist formations and evaluations which compare a particular racist experience with Holocaust. When the subject is about the current position of Muslim immigrants subjected to racist practices, there is a widespread response in European public discourse which objects to the contemporary claims of racism since it came to an end by Holocaust. Then, it is commonly assumed that racism can only be identified with Holocaust, it is a blot in European history, but at the same time a kind of painful experience Europe is

---

<sup>81</sup> Anson G. Rabinbach and Jack Zipes, ‘Lessons of the Holocaust’, *New German Critique*, No.19, Special Issue 1, Winter 1980, pp. 4

capable of confronting, accepting and apologizing. This gives rise to regard existing different versions of racism and experiences as “exclusionary” or “marginalizing” instead of taking racism itself into account. For instance, the rape epidemic debate in Norway revealed that the word of racism is no longer used since it is commonly connected to Holocaust period or the apartheid regime in South Africa.

The pervasive denial atmosphere in Europe about racism and Europe’s efforts to remove the memories of Holocaust from its collective mind introduce new understanding about experiences of racism. Goldberg states that Holocaust is the defining event, the mark par excellence, of race and racially inscribed histories and continues to expound

There is no racism because race was buried in the rubble of Auschwitz...  
No imagination of the racial because the terms are deadened, taken away.  
And so no conceivable recognition of the marks of its effects, let alone of  
the effects themselves. Buried. But buried alive. Tolerance expresses these  
denials directly.<sup>82</sup>

Moreover, Holocaust signifies for a heritage shared by all European countries and thus a noteworthy dimension of European identity. In *Die Welt* (26.02.2000), Dan Diner, *Haider und der Schutzreflex Europas* (Haider and the protective reflex of Europe), maintains that the commemoration of the Holocaust is increasingly becoming the core of a unifying European memory which gives constitution building in Europe the necessary symbolic foundation. Following Diner’s argument, Lothar Probst also states, the commemoration of the Holocaust is not only a source of symbolic legitimacy but also of political action and values, such as the rejection of racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia.<sup>83</sup> While the past experience of Holocaust and its reminiscence make the current forms of racism and racial thinking invisible in the eyes of European public and political

---

<sup>82</sup> David Theo Goldberg, ‘Racial Europeanization’, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol.29, No.2, 2006, pp.336-339

<sup>83</sup> Lothar Probst, ‘Founding Myths in Europe and the Role of the Holocaust’, *New German Critique*, No.90, Taboo, Trauma, Holocaust, Autumn 2003, pp.53

authorities, Holocaust denial and hate speech about Jews are still spoken and discussed. In addition, the impact of Holocaust can be discerned in European countries' response when Joerg Haider's far-right Freedom Party (Freiheitlichen Partei Österreich) was in coalition government with the People's Party (Die Österreichische Volkspartei) in 2000. This was shocking for both Austria and the rest of Europe and with a sudden decision, fourteen European Union countries decided to terminate their cooperation with Austrian government and also European Union has instantly introduced new political sanctions to exclude Austria.<sup>84</sup>

These remarkable reactions and public discussions in many online newspapers' forums and television programs mainly disclose the fear about the possibility of Haider's becoming of Hitler of the new times and spreading of racist ideology to other European countries. Although not directed by the same concerns, this salient European public reaction also appears in different forms about the issue of Islamophobia or the threat of Muslim immigrants. Certainly, they are distinct subjects and have various implications that should be examined in separate historical, political and theoretical frameworks; but at the same time they both divulge the fear of Europe to transform into an entity it seeks to forget, erase and oppose and this also forms the basis of its identity. This can be seen as a sign of negations and lacks of European identity which, Stuart Hall alleges, is constructed through difference. By referring to Derrida, Laclau and Butler, he points out that this identity construction "is only through the relation to the Other, the relation what it is not, to precisely what it lacks, to what has been called its *constitutive outside* that the 'positive' meaning of any term – and thus its identity-can be constructed."<sup>85</sup> As Europe's constitutive outside is always an integral part of its identity, its racist tradition has played a supplementary role.

---

<sup>84</sup> [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/talking\\_point/630960.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/talking_point/630960.stm)

<sup>85</sup> Stuart Hall, "Introduction: Who Needs 'Identity'?" in Stuart Hall and Paul du Gay (eds.) *Questions of Cultural Identity*. London; Thousand Oaks, California: Sage, 1996, pp. 4-5

In order to provide both historical and social background to the contemporary racism existent in Europe, a cursory glance seems essential. Particularly, the eighteenth century was the exact time when the racial thought was consolidated and Europe in this century became the cradle of modern racism.<sup>86</sup> Following this line, the racial stereotypes and certain physical traits were set as the exemplary modes in where European man was accepted as the universal and civilized role model for the rest of the non-European people; also science activated the racist attitudes by putting forward scientific proofs for the hierarchy between races. Eugenics, physiognomy and phrenology served to the racial discourse by (re) producing the category of race in socio historical processes. Moreover, the racist tradition of Europe strengthened its position in the nineteenth century by outstanding developments such as colonialism, scientific and industrial developments, immigration, urbanization, individualization and upsurge of nationalisms.<sup>87</sup> Still, the identification of race with nation and specific national character function as exclusionary force towards immigrants.

Eighteenth and nineteenth centuries revolutionized the racial thinking and added new social components to the changing face of European racism. The definition of Other in the eyes of European public, the self-identification of Europe as a discursive myth and the status of Europe as a sovereign subject entered a new age in which unsurprisingly racial boundaries were rested on more concrete explanations and legitimizations. John Solomos and Les Back maintain it was in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries that the concept of race began to signify distinct types of people classified according to their physical traits although the presence of the images of the Others in various societies had a long history; and they underline that the contemporary meaning of the concept took its form within the development of modern capitalist societies.<sup>88</sup> Moreover, the political developments such as the collapse of Chinese, Holy Roman, Spanish and

---

<sup>86</sup> George L. Mosse, *Toward the Final Solution: A History of European Racism*. New York: Howard Fertig, 1997, pp.1

<sup>87</sup> Michel Wieviorka, *The Arena of Racism*. trans. by Chris Turner, London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1995, pp.4

<sup>88</sup> John Solomos and Les Back, *Racism and Society*. New York: St.Martin's Press, 1996, pp.34

Portuguese empires and the rising power of British Empire and German Empire, the technological progress marked by inventions and the rapid population growth regulated Europe and its relations with the Others in both 'inside' and 'outside' in nineteenth century. It was also the time when Europe set itself as the role model for civilization and began to dictate its values, culture and ideologies as 'universal' for non-Europeans. This process also went ahead together with the development of capitalism and the emergence of nation-states which paved the way for different racial thinking and discrimination. The effects of Enlightenment, Renaissance and Reform on European identity, the development of capitalism and the emergence of nation-states influenced the course of the racialized relationship with the Others.

The category of race was accepted as the departure point to decide who should govern and who should obey, and also attempts to encourage a shared national identity began to be circulated within the nation states in the nineteenth century. Certainly, this was not only an internal issue affecting the residents of Europe; but also the imperial expansion of Europe was supported by racist theories and the categories of differentiation such as "uncivilized", "savage", or "barbaric" are provided within these theories. Therefore, the required legitimization basis for the exploitation of the new lands and domination and also labeling of the exotic and oriental subjects introduced Europe how to position itself at the centre of the civilizational universe and generate necessary excuses not only for exploitation of the lands but also for the civilizing mission. This civilizing mission included many phases; exploring the "nature" of the characteristics and culture of exotic subjects, getting knowledge about their "essence", propounding the physical, cultural and economic differences between Europe and the newly discovered lands/people, placing Europe as the criteria for civilization and progress, appointing a civilizing role for Europe to educate and improve the inferior races, and imposing its superiority over the rest of the cultures and impossibility of reaching its status. Unquestionably, this process was not taken place in sequence; they are all interrelated and sometimes simultaneously operating mechanisms.

Although, the academic debates about racism in Europe dated back to fifteenth century, since the 1960s and 1970s, it has been argued that racism has lost its

classical meaning dependent on the biological differences. With the recognition of changed patterns in the racial discourse, in 1981 Martin Barker<sup>89</sup> was the first in Britain to claim, there emerged a “New Racism” that simply considers cultures as essential and different and also equates race with culture. Until 1980s, the idea of race and the theories of racism had been explained in biological terms and depended on the dichotomy between the superiority and inferiority of the races. The language of the theories of classical racism had also stressed the dominance of white man and in line with this, the category of race in natural history of which the governing categories are preeminently classificatory categories.<sup>90</sup> As an object of modern discourse, the emergence of the idea of white supremacy reliant on these classificatory categories and the descriptive, order imposing and representational goals of natural history had the first stage called “normative gaze”; so the genealogy of racism in the modern West can not be separated from the appearance of the classificatory category of race in natural history.<sup>91</sup> The second stage of the emergence of the idea of white supremacy as an object of modern discourse occurred when the new disciplines called phrenology and physiognomy linked with anthropology had appeared. As Cornel West explains, their peculiarity had resulted from their function as an open platform for proliferation of the idea of white supremacy but it was not only due to their presence of pseudo-sciences; yet, they admitted the European value-laden character, which was founded on classical aesthetic and cultural ideals, of their observations.<sup>92</sup> These disciplines also affected the evolution of the understanding of race as a fixed category, a kind of essence and objective entity. The figure of the Other was molded on both self-identification of Europe and the scientific proofs about the hierarchical ranking of the races. As the position of white is addressed, European supremacy within modern discourse as well as the idea of race and the possibility of racism with the assistance of modernity in Europe have come into the agenda inevitably. It is

---

<sup>89</sup> Martin Barker, *The New Racism*. London: Junction Books, 1981

<sup>90</sup> Cornel West, “A Genealogy of Modern Racism”, in Philomena Essed and David Theo Goldberg (eds.) *Race Critical Theories: Text and Context*. USA, UK: Blackwell Publishers, 2002, pp. 98

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.99

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 101

mainly because to think racism without the advancement of modern science, modern technology and modern forms of state power is unattainable and within the modern world's ambition about self-control and self-administration, racism announces a certain category of people endemically and hopelessly resistant to control and immune to all efforts at amelioration.<sup>93</sup> In addition to the arguments of racial doctrines and ideologies as products of modernity, the European racism reached its peak when modernity had influenced the social, economic and political constitution of Europe. The historical search for racial discrimination changing over centuries can ensure the basis for contemporary form of cultural racism.

This cultural racism and its claims involved in the debates have opened a new space in the literature about the position and representations of Muslim immigrants in Europe. After 1960s and 1970s, new studies about racism in different parts of Europe began to come into prominence since the inadequacy of classical understanding of racism based on biological explanations had been recognized. Although it is usually called *new*, to prefer *cultural racism* seems more consistent with its operating discursive mechanisms and because it carries the traces of past ideas and conventions. Thus to examine and state the features of cultural racism should not be considered as a break from previous experiences but it is a different from racism has taken. In the aftermath of Holocaust, culture came to replace the language of race and the discourse of cultural differences began to take the place of racial categorizations, as Alana Lentin argued in her article.<sup>94</sup> A kind of neutrality is attached to the concept of culture as if it denotes non-hierarchical and non-racial understanding and the notion of difference becomes a inherent part of cultural racism which, Ali Rattansi explains, refers to the supposition that cultural difference operates like nature through the means in which “*cultural* demarcations are often drawn and used in a form that *naturalizes* them by implying that they are

---

<sup>93</sup> Zygmunt Bauman, “Modernity, Racism, Extermination”, in Les Back and John Solomos (eds. and intro.) *Theories of Race and Racism: A Reader*. London and New York: Routledge, 2000, pp. 212-215

<sup>94</sup> Alana Lentin, ‘Replacing ‘race’, historicizing ‘culture’ in multiculturalism’, *Patterns of Prejudice*, Vol.39, No.4, 2005

more or less *immutable*”<sup>95</sup> During this transition culture is crystallized, the centrality of the concept of race within racism and the arguments based on biological superiority have been erased and they have become less visible.

The classical dichotomies between the white and the black going along with the civilized and the uncivilized were displaced and they became out of focus since the dominant distinction between Europe and Islam is situated at the center of contemporary racial discourses. The category of Muslim immigrant has turned out to be the target of racial discrimination owing to the claims of incompatibility of Islam with European values, such as democracy, human rights, and secularism. Besides, the conviction about the impossibility of civilizing Islamic culture and overcoming inherent differences between European civilization and Islamic culture dominates the political discussions about migration problems, the rising tide of racism, crisis of multiculturalism and the end of secular period. In such a segregationist atmosphere, the impossibility of integration of Muslim immigrants becomes the supplementary idea. As Etienne Balibar puts it, “the functioning of the category of the immigration” operates “as a substitute for the notion of race and a solvent of class consciousness”<sup>96</sup> Many immigrants from the ex-colonies and “Third World” countries encouraged by Europe to work in the states for the supply of labor force in the 1950s and 1960s now turn into the victims of racist culture in Europe. When it was understood that the presence of guest workers was not temporary, both political and public concerns headed towards the efforts for family reunification and integration of immigrants. Starting from the early 1990s, the policies of states about immigration and asylum seekers contained a more exclusivist system which began to be implemented against the fictional threat posed by the Third World immigrants.<sup>97</sup> This was also the period when the debates on migration problems merged with the question of racism and the assertions about cultural difference started to play central role. The focus of current racism

---

<sup>95</sup> Ali Rattansi, *Racism: A Very Short Introduction*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007, pp.104, original emphases

<sup>96</sup> Etienne Balibar, “Is There a ‘Neo-Racism’?”, in Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein (eds.), trans. by Etienne Balibar and Chris Turner, *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities*. London, New York: Verso, 1991, pp. 20

<sup>97</sup> Phil Marfleet, “Europe’s Civilizing Mission” in Phil Cohen (ed.) *New Ethnicities, Old Racisms*. London: Zed Books, 1999



on the immigration fits into the framework of ‘racism without races’ whose dominant theme is the insurmountability of cultural differences, rather than biological heredity, this is a racism which “at first sight does not postulate the superiority of certain groups of peoples in relation to others but ‘only’ the harmfulness of abolishing frontiers, the incompatibility of life-styles and traditions”, this is what Taguieff called a *differentialist racism*.<sup>98</sup>

This explicated form of racism very much depicts the picture of the exposure of Muslim immigrants somehow both implicit and explicit racial violence since this compatibility argument draws attention to the impassable boundaries paradoxically in a “Europe without borders”. As the member states of European Union become more interconnected and informed of the diverse political, economic or social developments thanks to the introduction of Schengen Convention, creation of a single market and common political decision-making bodies, their perception of external threat also starts to concentrate on Muslim immigrants, “enemy within”. As well as political implementations, cultural borders are drawn between pure Europeans and immigrants; and the recent terrorist attacks and the reemergence of the security issue have strengthened and justified already existing stereotypes based on racial thinking and apprehensions regarding the upcoming threats. These can elucidate how cultural racism serves Europe to recreate its identity based on exclusions, perceive Muslim immigrants as the scapegoats for threats, and restructure the conception of racism by cultural difference.

In addition to the remnants of previous ideas, categorizations and ideologies, it is possible to say that the current European racism has its own formation. Under present conditions, the practice of racism continues even with a new ideological content which is prevalently covert and institutional rather than overt and individual forms of racism; thus it is talked about the dominant groups in the society not the superior races.<sup>99</sup> Even though this depiction of contemporary

---

<sup>98</sup> Etienne Balibar, “Is There a ‘Neo-Racism’?”, pp. 21

<sup>99</sup> Monika Fréjuté-Rakauskiené, ‘Contemporary phenomenon of racism and its manifestations in public discourse’, *Philosophy Sociology*, No.4, 2006, pp. 14

language of racism looks as if it functions implicitly and makes no reference to race, its reference groups are so obvious that some peripherally positioned cultural and religious minorities in Europe are targeted. Robert Miles argues that the concept of race is widely disappearing but racism as a process continues in new ideological forms.<sup>100</sup> The reflections of this new ideological stance of racism can be observed in many anti-Muslim and anti-Islamic expressions in Europe. Jean-Marie le Pen, leader of le Front National calls for a “halt to the Islamization of France”, Franz Schonhuber, leader of the right-wing Republikaner Party of Germany, declares “Never will the green flag of Islam fly over Germany”, and the election slogan of the Denmark Progressive Party is “Denmark Without Muslims”.<sup>101</sup> These remarks without any allusion of race promote the racist images about Islam and Muslim immigrants in Europe and convince the public about the threat of Islamization of Europe. The European public is also warned about religiously led cultural differences of Muslim immigrants who constitute the new enemy of European democracies and secularism. Furthermore, in order to relocate the discussions in a moderate level, the distinction between “good” and “bad” Muslims comes into question and racialized knowledge gets involved in the process. Yet, Goldberg underscores

racialized discourse does not consist simply in descriptive representations of others. It includes a set of hypothetical premises about human kinds (e.g., ‘the great chain of being’, classificatory hierarchies, etc.) and the differences between them (both mental and physical). It involves a class of ethical choices. (e.g., domination and subjugation, entitlement and restriction, disrespect and abuse)<sup>102</sup>

For the case of Muslim immigrants-Europe confrontation, this racialized discourse is shaped by hegemonic European knowledge production which mostly reaches the public through mass media. Although this discourse penetrates into the almost every sphere of life, the messages and representations conveyed by media have

---

<sup>100</sup> Robert Miles, “Racism as a Concept” in Martin Bulmer and John Solomos (eds.) *Racism*. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 354

<sup>101</sup> Steven Vertovec and Ceri Peach, “Introduction”, in Steven Vertovec and Ceri Peach (eds.) *Islam in Europe: The Politics of Religion and Community*. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997, pp.5

<sup>102</sup> David Theo Goldberg, *Racist Culture: Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell, 1993, pp.47

unquestionably more impression on the public opinion. The tendency to accuse immigrants for all the socioeconomic ills and widespread concerns about security threats and culturally incompatible character of their religion can be regarded as echoes of Orientalist thinking as well as the course of self-referential European identity (re)construction. Particularly, the supremacy of Orientalist ideas direct the media representations about Islam and the messages are transmitted through disguised racial representations. Said contends Orientalism should be examined as a type of discourse, which systematically managed and produced the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically and imaginatively during the post-enlightenment era and what is significant about Orientalism is not the correspondence between what it says of the so-called Orient but rather the manner in which it constructs an image of the Orient and the internal consistency of that image, despite the lack of correspondence with a real Orient.<sup>103</sup> Thus, the Orientalist representations of Muslims accompanied by cultural arguments employ the particular labels such as backward, uncivilized or traditional to draw a picture of the immigrants from the Orient. Moreover in *Covering Islam*, one of the important reasons behind Said's interpretation of the "media's fueling and inciting negative attitudes towards Islam and Muslims" is that he perceives this simply as a new form of orientalism.<sup>104</sup> The very direct instance of this hegemonic knowledge (re)production and circulation can be detected in the usage of the existing European terminology which associates Islam with backward culture and terrorism on behalf of religion. To put it briefly, the combination of cultural racism and Orientalist discourse and media representations about Muslim immigrants reverberate in Europe as the resurgence of racial thinking based on culture, continuation of dichotomist views, and justifications for labeling immigrants as threats or enemy within.

### **3.2 Securitization of Migration**

As stated many times in previous parts, 9/11 attacks and terror events in Europe have both altered the social and political atmosphere and also opened way for

---

<sup>103</sup> Edward Said, *Orientalism*. New York: Vintage Books, 1979, pp. 3-5

<sup>104</sup> Enes Karić, 'Is 'Euro-Islam' a Myth, Challenge or a Real Opportunity for Muslims and Europe?', *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, Vol.22, No.2, 2002, pp. 438

testing the conformity of Muslim immigrants. Europe's one of the concerns about migration and immigrants has turned out to be security and in return new restrictive and sometimes racist legislations are imposed. Unsurprisingly the stance and strategies of European Union about the potential threats are affected by up-to-date developments. Yet, this should not be considered as a regular and predictable reaction of Europe and its internal security system to terrorist attacks pertinent to Islam or social turmoil stemmed from the dissonant acts of Muslim immigrants. It is not so novel for Europe to put forward the notion of security as one of the gateways to exclude immigrants or generate legitimate causes for taking precautions about prospective conflicts. After the recent incidents, bombings and murders in various parts of Europe, and reconsideration of the position of Muslim immigrants, the adjustments of Europe's security claims correspondingly to new racist discourses and extremist religiously led representations about Islam and its believers should be reckoned.

It can be argued that the adaptation of the security discourse to the prevailing conditions in Europe resembles inherent contradiction of secularism and racist tradition of Europe. In other words, this obsession about security and tendency to accuse outsiders for all economic and social crises in the countries have not arisen abruptly when terrorist attacks took place but when the control over the migration flows began to be lost after the second wave of immigrants coming from non-European countries, the concerns about security have started to be put into words. As recently stated, the "securitization of migration" in contemporary Western Europe has been anchored in the permanent settlement of large and culturally and ethnically different minority populations within the host societies.<sup>105</sup> The projections about these long lasting dwellers and the potential risks they pose also lead to associate migration with terror. Moreover, Islam and its alleged backward traditions/rituals have become the scapegoat for terror in Europe that Muslim immigrants are categorized as the enemy within. Thereby framing the issue in this

---

<sup>105</sup> Mikhail A. Alexseev, *Immigration Phobia and the Security Dilemma: Russia, Europe and the United States*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp.175-176; Carl Levy, 'The European Union after 9/11: The Demise of a Liberal Democratic Asylum Regime?', *Government and Opposition*, Vol.40, No.1, 2005, pp. 54

way, the attitude and measures of European states are considered as “natural” responses to terror.

To detect how migration has gained securitized character in Europe gives an idea about which deficiencies are reflected as the consequences of migration. Jef Huymans asserts that immigration “has been increasingly presented as a danger to public order, cultural identity, and domestic and labor market stability; it has been securitized.”<sup>106</sup> After the scope and impact of migration were detected, in 1980s this issue more and more was a subject of policy debates which had to do with the preservation of public order and domestic stability. These debates also signified migration as a challenge to the welfare state and to the cultural composition of the nation. That is to say, security discourses and technologies penetrated the Europeanization of migration policy.<sup>107</sup> Congruently, the present epoch bears the stamps of 1980s that the similar suppositions are on the European agenda. More interestingly, independent from the juncture these claims always seem as rational and comprehensible. This recalls Anidjar’s remarks, “What does secularism make us hate, then? Racism, nationalism, sexual inequalities, and, all right, religion. And who advocates secularism? Who opposes racism, nationalism, sexual inequalities and religion, and from where?”<sup>108</sup> What he seeks to point out is the discursive influence of secularism in terms of justifying itself through commonly inadmissible and criticized subject matters and determining which side is worth of supporting. In order to struggle with racism, nationalism or sexual inequalities, the need for secularism and its components are beyond the dispute since there is an opposition to negative and segregationist compositions. By means of imposing proper way of thinking and silencing the criticisms, hegemonic discourse defines what to support or oppose. At this point, the agent also comes into prominence and thus “who” aspect participates in the process. The relevance of Anidjar’s comments for the current issue stems from the resemblance of the decisive role played by the concepts of security and securitization. In other words, when the

---

<sup>106</sup> Jef Huysmans, ‘The European Union and the Securitization of Migration’, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol.38, No.5, 2000a, pp. 752

<sup>107</sup> Ibid., pp. 756

<sup>108</sup> Gil Anidjar, *Semites: Race, Religion, Literature*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2008, pp. 52

dissidences related to public order, national interests/solidarity and European peace are questioned, the answer is already there; securitization becomes inevitable dimension for survival of Europe with its immigrants. A common public opinion about securitization of immigrants originates from the idea that any person or act threatening both national and European values already deserves this kind of insulation. What seems more tragic about European public opinion is Muslim immigrants are thought to deceive in such a tolerant and liberal social setting and commit factious attempts.

Following Huysmans's comments, Anna Kicingier also underlines social stability, demographic concerns, risks to cultural identity, rising levels of crime and the threat to a generous and universal welfare state which constitute the primary characteristics of security issue in relation to migration.<sup>109</sup> This migration- security nexus also divulges the contradictory structure of Europe, elaborated repeatedly throughout this study in different but related aspects, on the one hand, there are huge numbers of immigrants living and working within its borders so their presence become a part of solutions for ageing population of Europe and labor shortage; on the other hand, the nationalist concerns and commitment to solidarity and purity of European culture lead to perceive the immigrants as agents of threats. This may result in approaching the assumptions of liberal democracy reliant on human rights and equality dubiously since mostly "praised" identity politics in Europe starts to lose its reliability. Although in recent years, multicultural discourse, anti-racist attitudes and measures become prevalent, their distance from security issues should be explored. To be precise, security and any theme pertinent to this issue are located in the protected area even if the subject is stigmatized as racist or violator of human rights. It is because within the global conditions enclosed by terror menace, security issue insuppressibly turns out to be one of the "sacred" priorities of the nation-states in Europe.

Unquestionably, the political aftershocks pursuing the events of 9/11 in United States, the Madrid bombings in 2004 and the 2005 London terrorist attacks have

---

<sup>109</sup> Anna Kicingier, 'International Migration as a Non-Traditional Security Threat and the EU Responses to this Phenomenon', *CEFMR Working Paper*, Warsaw: Central European Forum for Migration Research, October 2004, pp. 2-3

accelerated the securitization of migration.<sup>110</sup> It is commonly agreed that Islamic extremism lies at the center of the war on terror or global threat. Thus, to combat terrorism and take necessary precautions whether strict, discriminatory or not have been installed on European security regimes. New political rhetoric and measures have also introduced new re-conceptualizations in both political and public discourse particularly in notions of justice, terror, limits of tolerance and diversity. Shortly after 9/11, European Union and its members started to take action and announced they will support United States' foreign policy founded upon a global war on terrorism. Yet, as Liz Fekete argues the focal point was not European states' responsibility in terms of not taking proportionate precautions to protect their citizens from al Qaida terrorist attacks; but the responses of the states were attention grabbing. This refers to not only the resolutions and legislations implemented by European Union that brought an entire collection of disparate issues under the rubric of the war against terror but the most important European heads of state took a part in creating the myth that the West was in 'imminent' danger from Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction.<sup>111</sup> The enlargements of the scope of war against terror and myth construction about the succeeding attacks have led Europe to act again as hegemonic power and sovereign political subjectivity. On behalf of combating terrorism, Europe is authorized to label some groups or ideas as potential threats for European security. More remarkably, Fekete highlights, only three months after 9/11, The EU Common Positions and Framework Decision on combating terrorism broadened the definition of terrorism. This connotes,

Terrorist activity was no longer confined to extreme violence committed for political ends; now any action designed to 'seriously damage a country or international organisation' or that 'unduly compel[ed]' a government to act in a particular way could fall within the definition. If the notion of undue compulsion or serious damage still implies that extreme violence is integral to the concept of terrorism, this was believed by the subsequent

---

<sup>110</sup> Mikhail A. Alexseev, *Immigration Phobia and the Security Dilemma: Russia, Europe and the United States*, pp. 37

<sup>111</sup> Liz Fekete, 'Anti-Muslim Racism and the European Security State', *Race and Class*, Vol. 46, No.3, 2004, pp.5

inclusion under the definition of all those who gave terrorism ‘any form of support, active or passive’.<sup>112</sup>

As more issues are implicated in the war against terror and new definitions for terrorist activity are identified, members of particular religious or cultural groups demanding only justice for civil liberties and terror offenders can be subjected to the same laws and regulations. Then, again European political implications of securitization for Muslim immigrants come on the scene. This brings about both reconfiguration of political and cultural boundaries and maintenance of existing power formations.

To elaborate this theoretical discussion on the issue, the analyses of Copenhagen School of Security Studies is an appropriate point to proceed since even the concept of securitization was introduced by this school and developed by Ole Wæver. By rejecting the objectivist stance of realism, Copenhagen School mainly holds a constructivist approach beginning from the mid 1990s and its endeavors were for broader conceptualization of security within a more consistent theoretical background. This theoretical framework has been utilized in several topics, for instance immigration, minority rights or political disagreements especially after terror attacks but it has been also criticized rigorously. As put forward by Copenhagen School, security is not considered as given, rather human agency and moral choice designate the conception of security policy. Therefore, by accepting a constructivist approach this school transformed the epistemology of the traditional analysis of security and its policy. The key contention is that rather than concentrating on security as something out there, a security analysis should consider the process by which actors construct issues as threats to security.<sup>113</sup> As underlined before, Europe has added distinct subjects under the definition of terror; and it is not innovative to say, both the definition and scope of terrorism are European inventions. In line with Copenhagen School’s of view, the process

---

<sup>112</sup> Ibid., pp. 5-6

<sup>113</sup> Georgios Karyotis, ‘European Migration Policy in the Aftermath of September 11: The Security-Migration Nexus’, *Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research*, Vol.20, No.1, March 2007, pp.2-3



of securitization of migration is managed by Europe who as an agent has the power to determine which issues can menace to security. Consequently, Muslim immigrants are exposed to restrictive measures and even racist conducts; their integration process and their way of life are also affected by decisions taken on behalf of protecting security apparatus.

Securitization takes place when a field of 'normal politics' is moved forward into the security realm by a political actor who employs the existential threat rhetoric. This is done to validate the adoption of 'emergency' measures outside the formal and established procedures of politics. That is to say, securitization is the process through which an issue appears as a security one and not essentially due to the nature or the objective importance of a threat but just because the representation of the issue is as such.<sup>114</sup> Furthermore, Ole Wæver, one of the key figures in this literature, states that "in naming a certain development a security problem, 'the state' can claim a special right, one that will be...always be defined by the state and its elites". This is why he defines security as a "speech act" and "The world security is the act" declared by elites so as to build hierarchical conditions in which security issues are dramatized and presented as supreme priorities of the state or the actor in question.<sup>115</sup> To put it simply, any issue can become a security problem if the state and its elites mark it as such; and it becomes securitized when it has been announced as a security problem approved by the rest of the people. Marianne Stone draws attention to Barry Buzan's work "The 'War on Terrorism' as the new Macro-Securitization" and points at his way of understanding of security. Barry Buzan's idea of macro-securitization also resembles Wæver's conceptualization with a slight difference since it targets at larger scale analyses. Buzan explicates, "macro-securitization are aimed at and up to a point succeeding in framing security issues, agendas and relationships on a system-wide basis" and they "are based on universalist constructions of threats and/or referent objects." Two possible causes are put forward by Buzan, one is globalization and the other

---

<sup>114</sup> Ibid., pp.3

<sup>115</sup> Ole Wæver, "Securitization and Desecuritization" in Ronny Lipschutz (ed.) *On Security*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1995, pp. 54-55

is a “belief in a universalist ideology” and the Cold War is indicated as a historical case of macro-securitization. He claims that this event was able to shape “the mainstream security dynamics of interstate society for several decades.” He also speculates on the possibility of the appearance of War on Terrorism as a macro-securitization reminiscent of Cold War. More radically, he continues, there is also the possibility that states necessitate securitization “as a part of their day-to-day functioning”; the threat deficit came out after the Cold War was completed by the aftermath of 9/11 which is categorized as war on terrorism.<sup>116</sup> If this idea of macro-securitization is applied for European context, following 9/11, the terrorist attacks and assassinations may be considered as unconscious preparations for suitable settings within Europe to create its own macro-securitization discourse. Since securitization is activated through European political hegemony, the necessary actor, states can employ it as a political means so as to legitimize their actions and periphery position of Muslim immigrants.

In addition, through presenting an issue as an existential menace, security is “the move which takes politics beyond the normal rules of the game” and securitization can be regarded as “a more extreme version of politicization”. This security issue requires priority over all other issues since “if we do not tackle this problem, everything will be irrelevant (because we will not be here or be free to deal with it in our own way). Therefore, “the actor has claimed a right to handle the issue through extraordinary means, to break the normal political rules of the game.”<sup>117</sup> The reflection of prioritizing security issue is found in anti-immigration campaigns in Europe or the propagandas of right-wing parties about sending immigrants back to their homelands in order to defend host countries any further problems or attacks. According to public opinion, violation of political ethic and human rights in the name of security and national interests has been allowed. This conviction has simply such a line of reasoning derived from observations; although enough time and political/economic and also social investments had

---

<sup>116</sup> Marianne Stone, ‘Security According to Buzan: A Comprehensive Security Analysis’, *Security Discussion Papers Series 1*, Spring 2009, pp. 8-9

<sup>117</sup> Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Japp de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. London: Lynne Rienner, 1998, pp.23-34

been devoted to the integration of Muslim immigrants, they are still persistent to resist core European values and sustain their own traditions and religiously led world-views. Besides, it is alleged, not being contented with blessings of civilized life, they even exist in the pivotal status in the debates of terrorism. Ariane Chebel D'Appollonia underscores, anti-immigrant propaganda also holds the terrorists and foreigners, even the native-born citizens, as equal that has been stimulated by the unsuccessful integration's consequences which contain unemployment and *insécurité* (a French word denoting the combination of vandalism, delinquency, and hate crimes). At the same time anti-immigrant groups exploit these incidents by depending on the claim clash of cultures which paves way for the ideas about inability or reluctance of immigrants to integrate.<sup>118</sup>

However, this emphasis on integration “problem” and accusations for economic or social drawbacks are not peculiar to the ideas of securitization process. Similar line of reasoning can be also observed in racist tradition and secular self-definition of Europe that dominant insights about immigrants do not mostly cross the frontier of certain conceptual mentality based on the idea of stranger. “the Stranger” in George Simmel’s perspective, “whose position in this group is determined, essentially, by the fact that he has not belonged to it from the beginning, that he imports qualities into it, which do not and cannot stem from the group itself.”<sup>119</sup> It seems as if the contemporary explanations and representations of Muslim immigrants match with this understanding. Outstandingly, whenever their culture, customs, religion, religiously led orientations, status of integration or related issues are opened to discussion, the opinions or suggestions within both public and political domains come to a deadlock due to the belief towards inherently fixed “essence” of them and impossibility to transform them into “pure” Europeans. In addition to pre-existing concerns and identifications,

---

<sup>118</sup> Ariane Chebel D'Appollonia, “Immigration, Security, and Integration in the European Union”, in Ariane Chebel D'Appollonia and Simon Reich (eds.) *Immigration, Integration, and Security: America and Europe in Comparative Perspective*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008, pp. 227

<sup>119</sup> George Simmel, “The Stranger” in Kurt Wolff (ed. and trans.) *The Sociology of Georg Simmel*. New York: Free Press, 1950, pp. 402

security aspect is just another layer for proposing integration failure of immigrants and by itself it poses a threat to liberal and multicultural European states.

In order to indicate how the process of securitization takes place and what underlying mechanisms function, as theorized by Copenhagen School, now, I would like to continue with an exemplifying case. It is about how intercultural dialogue is proposed as a means to security and securitization becomes activated. In 2003, at the initiative of former European Commission President Romano Prodi, a report by the High-Level Advisory Group was prepared. It was about “Dialogue Between Peoples and Cultures in the Euro-Mediterranean Area” which aims at construction of a common future with different societies and cultures by following a path of change “together between a resigned fatalism in the face of an essentially economic globalization on the one hand and a retreat into exclusive identity politics on the other”.<sup>120</sup> Although the departure point for this effort was to achieve intercultural dialogue through overcoming prejudices, the securitization of this process can be observed step by step. Even if this report engages in analyzing and developing the relationships between Mediterranean countries, non-members of European Union, and Europe, parallel endeavors, for instance, “Dialogue with the Islamic World” in Germany or United Nation’s “Year of Dialogue Among Civilization”, are done to “understand” Islamic culture of Muslim immigrants, unfortunately they could not transcend orientalist and racist discursive universe along with securitization of issues.

As a response to United States’ declaration of war on terror after 9/11, this report for dialogue was correspondingly planned. By underlining culture as a medium for dialogue, the idea behind is

“to involve civil societies in ending the discriminations from which European citizens of immigrant origin still too often suffer and the persistent situation of injustice, violence and insecurity in the Middle East,

---

<sup>120</sup> High Level Advisory Group, ‘Dialogue Between Peoples and Cultures in the Euro-Mediterranean Area’, Brussels, October 2003, available at: <http://www.iemed.org/documents/lindhgroupen.pdf>

in implementing educational programmes designed to replace negative mutual perceptions with mutual knowledge and understanding.”<sup>121</sup>

The subtitles of these statements can be read as such; after terrorist attacks, Europe has started to search for alternative means to fight with extremist movements and security threats instead of declaring war immediately; by introducing and also recommending notions such as mutual knowledge and understanding, Europe seeks to guarantee order and peace within its territories; through supporting intercultural dialogue, Europe tries to indicate its responsibility for struggling with violence, insecurity and racism. However, these are not adequate reasons to admit these attempts for intercultural dialogue and security serve for “actual” principle of reciprocity and they are independent from the permeation of Eurocentric and orientalist effects. Moreover, it is claimed, in this report, intercultural dialogue was transformed into a tool for preventing conflicts and war. The report accepts that the dialogue of civilizations stems from the polemical notion of the clash of civilizations but while it may be aimed as opposite, it unfortunately shares the same logic despite it gives credence to the idea that the whole question is thrashed out between ‘blocs’ distinguished by quasi-ontological differences.<sup>122</sup> It is also possible to see the traces of the highlighted features of securitization, enunciated by Copenhagen School’s theorists, in the report. While it continues to criticize the clash of civilization thesis of Huntington since it is manipulated by some and to warn about the potential risks if this understanding is left as it is, there appears the typical prioritization and exaggeration of the issue. It affirms, “This is matter of urgency, and by urgency we mean starting tomorrow and not stopping the day after tomorrow”<sup>123</sup> ; thus a kind of social atmosphere is created in which potential danger in future is continuously portrayed and the need for intercultural dialogue is repeated.

---

<sup>121</sup> Ibid., pp. 2

<sup>122</sup> Zuhul Yeşilyurt Gündüz, ‘Europe and Islam: No Securitization, Please!’, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, International Policy Analysis, Berlin, October 2007,pp.5

<sup>123</sup> High Level Advisory Group, ‘Dialogue Between Peoples and Cultures in the Euro-Mediterranean Area’,pp. 36

Additionally, in her analysis of the report of High Level Advisory Group (2004), concentrated on “Dialogue Between Peoples and Cultures in the Euro-Mediterranean Area,” Helle Malmvig draws attention to similar points. In an answer to the question of how the legitimizations of this Dialogue functions that the intercultural dialogue is securitized, she identifies three points; the first one is the articulation of an alternative analysis of the root causes of conflict between cultures in opposition to Huntington’s analysis, the second one is the articulation of dialogue as an urgent necessity and the third one is the articulation of a threatening future in the absence of dialogue.<sup>124</sup> These connected postulations can be seen as the symptoms of Europe’s legitimization of its security obsession which in return charges Muslim immigrants for their “closed-minded” standpoint. In other words, rather than acting as an integrative and unifying attempt, these types of dialogue-constructing efforts become exclusionary since hegemonic actor defines the causes of conflict or the articulation of dialogue. Malmvig asserts, securitization of the Dialogue between Cultures also results in exclusion and tightened governmental control and this becomes obvious when the prioritized fields of activities and the selection of civil society groups are given access to the Dialogue. She underlines the paradox of employing security concerns as a legitimizing strategy as such

On the one hand, securitization serves as a powerful justification for engaging in an ambitious and challenging dialogue, yet on the other hand it also threatens to compromise the ideal conditions of dialogue by bringing extreme politicization and increased attempts of governmental control. This in turn leads to policies of exclusion and limits the participation of a plurality of civil society groups, those very groups who were intended to be the driving forces and engines of the dialogue.<sup>125</sup>

In fact, instead of opening up new spaces for different social groups both to speak out and be listened through dialogue, securitization of migration issue in Europe inclines to subjugate Muslim immigrants by pretending the high crime rates,

---

<sup>124</sup> Helle Malmvig, ‘Security Through Intercultural Dialogue? Implications of the Securitization of Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue between Cultures’, *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol.10, No.3, November 2005, pp. 355

<sup>125</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 360-361

unemployment, social unconformity and even the difficulties of controlling diversities. Particularly after the terrorist attacks in both United States and Europe, the (potential) threats posed by Muslim immigrants mainly related to sovereignty, solidarity and security of the nation-states have become more spoken. In Europe, media representations of immigrants are filled with certain stereotypes and Islam is the focal point of terrorism. By all means, it is possible to say somehow both intentionality and awareness of the dominant discourse command the security agenda. To put it explicitly, Matt McDonald insists on the consciousness in depicting immigrants as threatening, one frequently used means is the communication of political leaders with domestic constituents, and the other that looks as if to validate emergency measures and the suspension of the normal rules of the game. He upholds that securitization demonstrates these dynamics and not unexpectedly “it has been seen as aiding our understanding of political responses to population movements in Europe”.<sup>126</sup> In addition to these remarks, his main contribution to the discussion on securitization is to point out the vital “distinction between the construction of security and the narrower concern with the discursive positioning of threat”; this narrower concern overlooks “the historical and social contexts in which security and threat become possible and the question of how particular voices within political communities are empowered or marginalized in *speaking security*.”<sup>127</sup> The similar criticism directed towards theoretical inadequacy in addressing historical context finds its place also in Thierry Balzacq’s analysis about securitization. For him, “every securitization is a historical process that occurs between an antecedent influential set of events and their impact on interactions; this involves concurrent acts carrying reinforcing or aversive consequences for securitization.”<sup>128</sup> Here the conditions and incidents are taken into consideration rather than just the power of the actor leading the process of securitization. Moreover, the interaction of the events, as frequently seen in

---

<sup>126</sup> Matt McDonald, ‘Securitization and the Construction of Security’, *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol.14, No.4, December 2008, pp.567

<sup>127</sup> Ibid, pp.580

<sup>128</sup> Thierry Balzacq, ‘The Three Faces of Securitization: Political, Agency and Context’, *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol.11, No.2, 2005, pp. 193

Europe, has also influence on marginalizing the particular voice of Muslim immigrants in speaking security.

Up to this point, it has been striven to illustrate how after terror attacks Europe's over-emphasis on the security issue turns out to be a reason for segregation of Muslim immigrants and securitization process emerges as a kind of necessity for states to combat terrorism and a part of intercultural dialogues. Yet, mostly the statements seek to interpret securitization in Europe as a component of crisis situation. It is presented as if the fear of security and potentially forthcoming terrorist attacks compel Europe to make critical mistakes in its relation with Muslim immigrants in the face of global catastrophic environment. Besides, the belief towards the novelty of terrorism as a trouble for Europe is constantly reinforced in both media representations and political speeches. At this juncture, it should be recalled Europe is not unfamiliar to terrorism and violence in both internal and external spheres. As Fekete evokes, although European Union governments have used September 11 as an occasion to enlarge the definition of terrorism and "spread the tentacles of the security state in previously unthinkable ways, albeit Europe is no stranger to political movements that target civilians for bombings and other attacks."<sup>129</sup> She gives the examples of the-thirty year war in Northern Ireland, the ongoing conflict between Spain and Basque separatists and in France over the future of Corsica; they all threaten the lives of civilians but remarkably none of these events led to the extensive security measures taken after 9/11 and following events. As a last comment and a topic of another study, Europe should be reminded about its colonial history filled with violence when there are serious incriminations about Muslim immigrants.

---

<sup>129</sup> Liz Fekete, 'Anti-Muslim Racism and the European Security State', *Race & Class*, Vol. 46, No.3, 2004,pp.6



## CHAPTER 4

### THREE CASES OF SECULARISM-RACISM NEXUS IN EUROPE

This chapter attempts to point out overlapping aspects of secular claims and racial discourse within European context and their concentration on Muslim immigrants through scrutiny of three cases in different states. These cases are the headscarf debate in France since 1989, the crisis over the Danish cartoons published in *Jyllands-Posten* in 2005 and the assassination of the film-maker Theo Van Gogh in Netherlands only two years after the assassination of Pim Fortuyn in 2002. Although these controversial events took place in different states in which diverse contextual social, cultural and political climates regulate, the constant in these events is the categories of Muslims and Islam as permanent opposites of Europe and its features. Other unifying elements are the common perception of Europe, its difference from Islam and the threats posed by Muslim immigrants. Under the guise of freedom of expression, tolerance, preservation of secularism and secure atmosphere, hegemonic European discourse demonstrate the presence and practices of Muslim immigrants as barriers to their integration. These events also gave Europe an opportunity for justifying its negative and sometimes racist ideas about Islam and its culture. The criticisms towards cartoons or the provocative film, *Submission*, of Theo Van Gogh were generally responded by pointing at freedom of expression and tolerance in Europe. Since the new form of racism of Europe, as discussed in the third chapter, constructs itself as the indicator of cultural incompatibility, the focus point again shifts from European problematical stance and racism to Muslim immigrants and Islamic culture.

While the debates following these events have focused on the integration problem of Muslim immigrants and the incompatibility of their archaic Islamic culture with

European civilization, both the authorities and public have begun to question the integration and multicultural policies. The underlying idea is, although the efforts for Muslims' accommodation in an alien culture without a hitch were done and many policies were implemented for them to be integrated, it has been proven that European states can not act reasonably due to excessive concessions. In other words, it is argued, the unbalanced integration attempts of Europe along with the "inherent" cultural and religious differences have resulted in these events particularly headscarf issue in France and the assassinations in Netherlands. The case of Danish cartoon crisis in the eyes of European public and authorities reveals the intolerance character of Islam. Despite the enormous protests from Muslim groups both inside and outside Europe, by publishing cartoons repeatedly in various newspapers, on the one hand, Europe showed how it attaches importance to the freedom of expression; on the other hand, it indicated how the idea of intolerant and disrespectful Islamic culture for "even" few cartoons becomes defensible. Moreover, in the wake of these events racialized thinking and arguments have come into sight with secular claims and culturalist arguments accompanied by the emphasis on European core values. What should be critically handled is how the anti-immigrant and Islamophobic calls of racist contentions present themselves as speaking out for fundamentalist Muslim groups.

With the aim of discussing these critical events in a theoretical framework, first part is allocated to the headscarf debate in France which has a long history. The second part focuses on the Danish cartoon crisis. It has resulted in reassessments about the limits of freedom of expression in democratic and liberal states and the increasing anti-Muslim sentiments. The third part is about the discussions after the assassination of Theo Van Gogh. In order to illustrate the problem-ridden secularist claims and prevalent racism and their connections with other issues, as theoretically evaluated in the previous chapters, specific cases are chosen which mostly attracted academic and public attention. In spite of their dissimilar features, the discussions after the incidents have disclosed the common discursive sphere.

#### 4.1 The Headscarf Debate in France

In the fall of 1989, three young North African immigrant girls in French public secondary school were expelled from the school since they insisted to wear their headscarves in the classroom. The school, Gabriel-Havez College in Creil, was composed of students from different religious and cultural backgrounds and was continuously having problems due to the diverse demands of students for variety of religiously based exceptions; and in the new school year the school declared that headscarves could only be worn in the school building but must be put them off while in the class.<sup>130</sup> However, the persistence of the Muslim girls to wear headscarves also in the classroom resulted in expelling from the school on the ground that they violated the principles of *laïcité*, the backbone of French national identity. This decision was met by remarkable reactions firstly in the Creil, the residents attempted to resolve the problem and “meetings were held between school officials, the young women and their parents, Islamic religious leaders, and the representatives of the immigrant community”. Since the two girls insisted to wear headscarves in the class, the efforts were not successful. This denoted that they refused to return school without scarves and more remarkably, the other students also started to wear headscarves.<sup>131</sup> The event exceeded the local borders; it was presented in the national media when S.O.S Racisme, anti-racist organization, complained about the principal of the school to the Socialist Minister of Education. Lionel Jospin, Minister of Education in France at that time, rejected the decision of the principal and announced that “the Muslim girls should be “persuaded” to remove their veils in class, but if they refused to do so, they should be still be allowed to attend class” because he considered that “the denial of this right would be a form of religious discrimination”.<sup>132</sup> After this declaration, an extensive debate in France began and from several segments of the society the

---

<sup>130</sup> Norma Claire Moruzzi, ‘A Problem with Headscarves: Contemporary Complexities of Political and Social Identity’, *Political Theory*, Vol. 22, No. 4. November 1994, pp. 657

<sup>131</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 658

<sup>132</sup> Nezar Alsayyad, ‘Muslim Europe or Euro-Islam: On the Discourses of Identity and Culture’, in Nezar AlSayyad and Manuel Castells (eds.) *Muslim Europe or Euro-Islam: Politics, Culture and Citizenship in the Age of Globalization*. Lanham, Boulder, New York, Oxford: Lexington Books, pp. 12-13.

opposing voices started to be heard. The incident was called as *l'affaire du foulard* (the affair of the headscarves) and generated national crisis and debates.

It is claimed that the headscarf is more than a piece of cloth because it symbolizes certain way of religiosity, cultural practice and also Islamic pressure on Muslim women. It is also not independent from particular political objectives as the conveyors of extremist religious ideas and practices. Any allowance or little tolerance for headscarf in the public sphere may challenge the very basic regulations of secularism and its political implications may prompt other Muslim groups in both France and other European states for regime changes. Therefore, the survival of this kind of a symbol should not be permitted within the borders of a secular state like France. French Right, Jean Marie Le Pen and the National Front, as well as French Left “made near-hysterical references to a vulnerable national heritage, Moslem fanaticism and fundamentalism, and the need for a strong national sense of discipline that...to prohibit young women wearing headscarves from attending public school classes.”<sup>133</sup> In addition to the over emphasis on national identities, the entrenched prejudices about Islam and Muslims were again reproduced through this minor incident. One of the most notable moments about the headscarf debate was occurred when an article in *Le Nouvel Observateur* was published. In an open letter, the title on the cover of the magazine was “Profs, ne capitulons pas” (Teachers, don’t capitulate) and five intellectuals warned that “...The future will say if the year of the Bicentennial will have been the Munich of the Republican education.” What they suggested is, the accommodation of the students with headscarves would imply a renouncement of the French Revolutionary national heritage of secular Republican education.<sup>134</sup> That is to say, there is no place for Muslim women with headscarves within the borders of France. Throughout the debate, it is also insinuated, Islamic patriarchal oppression on women by covering them and hiding their sexuality would not be allowed in such a liberal, democratic and developed state. In the end, the Conseil d’Etat decided, “the wearing of religious insignia itself did not necessarily

---

<sup>133</sup> Norma Claire Moruzzi, ‘A Problem with Headscarves: Contemporary Complexities of Political and Social Identity’, pp. 660

<sup>134</sup> Ibid., 659

contravene the nonreligious tradition of state schools, [and] suggested that the practice could be forbidden if it formed part of religious propaganda, affected the dignity of the pupil, or disrupted teaching,”<sup>135</sup> Actually, this decision did neither terminate the discussions nor lead public to lose its concern about the subject.

In her analysis of *l'affaire du foulard*, Seyla Benhabib asserts, this event signifies all the dilemmas experienced by French national identity in the age of globalization and multiculturalism and she asks

How is it possible to retain French traditions of laïcité, republican equality, and democratic citizenship in view of France's integration into European Union, on the one hand, and the pressures of multiculturalism generated through the presence of second-and third-generation immigrants from Muslim countries on French soil, on the other hand? Would the practices and institutions of French citizenship be flexible and generous enough to encompass multicultural differences within an ideal of republican equality?<sup>136</sup>

In fact, the issue she addresses is not unique to France, the other European states with high populations of Muslim immigrants confront with the same dilemma. The national traditions and interests and alleged homogenized culture are in perpetual conflict with multiculturalism and correspondingly European Union's impositions/sanctions. She envisages, as long as European integration endures and multiculturalism compels, “France will have to discover new models of legal, pedagogical, social and cultural institutions to deal with the dual imperatives of liberal democracies to preserve freedom of religious expression and the principles of secularism.”<sup>137</sup> This mentioned predicament about co-existence of both freedom of religious expression as a democratic right and the requirements of secularism constrain the mobility of states in terms of political decisions. Owing to immigrants' demand of religious recognition in state institutions, the French

---

<sup>135</sup> Pierre Bréchon and Subrata Kumar Mitra, ‘The National Front in France: The Emergence of an Extreme Right Protest Movement’, *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 25, No. 1, October 1992, pp. 67

<sup>136</sup> Seyla Benhabib, ‘Chapter 7: L’Affaire du Foulard (The Scarf Affair)’, *Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education*, Vol.107, No. 1, April 2008, pp. 105

<sup>137</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 105

version of democracy in which a citizen enjoys rights through the state only as an individual is challenged.<sup>138</sup> The collective claim for religious identification of Muslim immigrants seeks to erode the basic premise of secularism, the confinement of religion to the private sphere. At the junction of the requirements of multicultural policies and secular concerns of the state, the headscarf claim seems as if itself a challenge to the principle of privatization of religion. However, this does not directly stand for the religious objections to the secular character of the state. This controversial issue is also a testing ground for France with regard to the position of secularism as an ideology or statecraft. Following Casanova's theoretical distinction between the two, in French case, it can be asserted, the state has a certain idea about religion and the decisions of statecraft doctrine define what religion is or does. This overshadows the neutrality of state about any religion and weakens the strength of equality principle due to the presence of secularism in France as an ideology as well as statecraft. The question of Benhabib can be revised as follows: "Would the principles and implementations of French secularism be consistent and credible enough to incorporate religious and cultural differences within an ideal of republican equality and liberty?" The internal contradictions of French secularism and republican ideals determine the course of headscarf issue.

The year of 1994 was also a remarkable moment for the headscarf controversies because François Bayrou, the Minister for Education, published proposal which included banning all "ostentatious" religious symbols in the schools. This tagging of religious symbols as ostentatious also caused ambiguity about which symbols could be assumed as pretentious or discreet. Jane Freedman expresses one of the most crucial aspects of these debates that although Bayrou declared such a deterrent and restricting decision about headscarves, he had actually supported the right of Muslim girls to wear headscarves in 1989. The reason he put forward was that he now fully understood the threat posed by Islamic fundamentalism. Not only Bayrou but also S.O.S Racisme, the anti-racist organization previously advocated the headscarves in 1989, altered its opinion and endorsed the Government's

---

<sup>138</sup> N.M. Thomas, 'On Headscarves and Heterogeneity: Reflections on the French Foulard Affair', *Dialectical Anthropology*, Vol.29, 2005, pp. 379

standpoint. In *Le Monde*, 27 October 1994, under the title of “La polémique sur le port du foulard islamique dans les établissements scolaires” (The polemic over the wearing of Islamic headscarves in educational institutions), the leaders of the S.O.S Racisme explicated that “they believed that the growth of Islamic fundamentalism was a real danger in some of the suburbs with large immigrant populations”. She also elucidates signs of this change of opinions towards banning headscarves. Anti-racist movement was not able to represent the real interests of many immigrants and mainstream politics benefited from their failure; it can be also regarded as the indication of “the decreasing strength of the movement in favour of *le droit à la différence* (the right to be different) and of the reassertion of the primacy of a strict version of French Republicanism over any form of multiculturalism”.<sup>139</sup> This Republican tradition of France controls not only the relationship between the state and Muslim immigrants but also seeks to balance the outcomes of multicultural composition. The headscarf issue is introduced as the marker for the political and social integration problems of Muslim immigrants. In fact, the concern of the dominant political subjects is not to facilitate the integration process of these immigrants but to compel them for assimilation. The priority of French tradition of assimilation is to preserve national identity and ethno-cultural ties of the community but these are under attack due to the existing claims of minority groups. The insistence of Muslim immigrants to reaffirm their identity with its own specific religious and cultural conventions contradicts with the ideal of French national identity. Simultaneously, given their exposure to racist and discriminatory expressions and law enforcements, Muslim immigrants may become more responsive about their own identity.

Furthermore, the admission for headscarf in public sphere cannot be thought of independently of the debates about the return of religion in Europe. The headscarf issue is admitted as the most visible form of the return of religion into European politics and public sphere and predictably Islam symbolizes this backward and non-European change. According to Meyda Yeğenoğlu, the Orientalist motives directly become involved in the process of identification of any resurgence of

---

<sup>139</sup> Jane Freedman, ‘Secularism as a Barrier to Integration? The French Dilemma’, *International Migration*, Vol. 42, No.3, 2004, pp. 14-15

religion under current conditions with ‘fundamentalist’ or ‘political Islam’ which are very problematical concepts. This supposition certainly points at the influence of secularist thesis in terms of presenting “the West as exemplary in attaining modernity which meant that all its spheres of social life could progressively distance themselves from religion, hence relegating Christianity to the private sphere of individually held beliefs”<sup>140</sup> Yet, it is so difficult to state that this revival of religion under the guise of headscarf issue is by itself a threat to secular Republican French identity. In today’s globalized world, the engagement of religion with media, culture and politics assures its survival along with new religious forms. A critical review about the headscarf issue should bear in mind that to find out the return of religion in public sphere through particular religious symbols or rituals is not adequate because now religion operates in many modes and constructs strong relations with other realms. This also means that the claims about the confinement of Christianity to the private sphere and its purification from its religious identity stand in theoretically slippery ground.

In 2003, the “problem” of headscarf came into the national agenda again since the Minister of Interior, Nicholas Sarkozy persisted for the poses of Muslim women as bare headed for official identity photographs. Yet, the controversy was headed towards the schools; and as Joan Wallach Scott explains, socialist deputy Jack Lang offered a bill to the National Assembly that, in the name of *laïcité*, would ban signs of any religious affiliation in public schools.<sup>141</sup> She also highlights the point in the parenthesis that this proposition is introduced as a necessity for preservation of *laïcité* but unsurprisingly there is no information about how Muslim immigrants will be subjected to discrimination. In July 2003, President Chirac appointed a commission headed by Bernard Stasi, to investigate the realization of *laïcité* principle in the French Republic. In the previous weeks, the increased violence in public schools became so visible in the media and public eye. The French National Assembly had already created a commission which had a varied membership-

---

<sup>140</sup> Meyda Yeğenoğlu, ‘The Return of the Religious’, *Culture and Religion*, Vol.7, No.3, November 2006, pp. 246-247

<sup>141</sup> Joan Wallach Scott, *The Politics of the Veil*. Princeton, Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007, pp. 30



school principals and teachers, academics, civil servants, business people and members of parliament-from diverse origins, religious beliefs and political opinions, to examine the issue of religious symbols in schools.<sup>142</sup> After four months, the Stasi Commission drew up a proposal of twenty-five recommendations for control of religion and religious symbols within the secular France. Outstandingly, only one recommendation was accepted by Chirac in July 2004, which was the law prohibiting the wearing of religious symbols in the public schools.

In the report, “Laïcité et République”, there were also other significant recommendations but they were overlooked by both many members of the Commission and Chirac. In addition to the prohibition of conspicuous signs of religious affiliation in public schools, Scott spells out other recommendations as such

[They] also included recognition of a need to tolerate varieties of religious practices and even to adopt policies that were more inclusive than in the past. Acknowledging the reality of the pluralistic nature of French society, the commission called for “full respect for spiritual diversity”; the addition of instruction in the history and philosophy of religions to the educational curriculum; the establishment of a national school for Islamic studies; the creation of Muslim chaplaincies in hospitals and prisons.<sup>143</sup>

Although these recommendations were not brought into agenda and discussed in the media and public to the extent that the law enacted, their content seems more radical and promising. It is because they aim at providing compromise between the Republic and the immigrants and taking into consideration the pluralistic character of the society and the rights of religious minority groups. The issues raised by these suggestions uncover their awareness about the current difficulties faced by immigrants and also inclusive approach for the unresolved integration problem in France. Hence, there is an attempt to cease the subordination of Muslim immigrants in almost every aspect of social life, plus partially freedom of religious

---

<sup>142</sup> Patrick Weil, ‘Lifting the Veil’, *French Politics, Culture and Society*, Vol.22, No.3, Fall 2004, pp. 141

<sup>143</sup> Joan Wallach Scott, *The Politics of the Veil*. pp. 34

expression is allowed under the supervision of the state. Compared to the law authorized by Chirac, it can be easily recognized that these recommendations are solution-oriented rather than problem-procrastinated. Then to interrogate the question “Why the most exclusionist and also racist recommendation among others was enacted as a law and which underlying reason/imperatives were in charge?” becomes essential.

Patrick Weil, a member of the Stasi Commission whose expertise is immigration policy and nationality law and also former member of the High Advisory Council on Integration, explicates the line of reasoning behind the Commission’s decision. Unexpectedly, Weil accepts that the purpose of the Commission was not to sustain the 1905 law; it ensures the separation of state and church and protects individual rights in light of religious pressure from the group. Besides, the Commission was not engaged with guaranteeing gender equality. If the aim was to ban headscarf as a symbol of the oppression of women, in contrary to Weil’s assertion, the Commission would not have limited the law to the schools but would have applied to all spheres in the nation. Although the main motive was to reduce the threat of Muslim fundamentalism, the prohibition did not serve for this purpose; Weil is also aware of this actual situation; due to this ban many Muslim girls will probably leave school or attend private religious schools which in return the segregation of the girls will be intensified and the support for fundamentalist groups might be enhanced.<sup>144</sup> In addition to the failure of the law in terms of attaining its problematical goals such as assurance of gender equality or prevention of fundamentalism, even such an attempt gives important clues about secularism as French republican tradition in line with racism and Orientalism.

By this legislation, the Orientalist discourses are (re)generated that Muslim woman in Islamic culture has no decision over her body/life and she should be rescued from her inferior position and the Islamic violence. In this case, the French Republic takes this responsibility both to provide emancipation of Muslim woman like European woman and preserve its national unity also with regard to gender

---

<sup>144</sup> N.M. Thomas, ‘On Headscarves and Heterogeneity: Reflections on the French Foulard Affair’. pp.382-384

issue. The remnants of the colonial legacy of France within the debate over headscarf are easily noticed. Gabriele vom Bruck argues that during the headscarf debate, the emphases on the nationalist politics were privileged over references to the colonial history. She elaborates her argument,

In the late twentieth/early twenty-first century, colonial policies that had aimed at leveling cultural difference between the “*métropole*” and the colonies by encouraging of forcing women to unveil were elided from national memory and not discussed in relation to a proposal on prohibiting the wearing of scarves in schools...By maintaining the theme of protecting women and the republic rather than discussing the more invidious aspects of colonial policy during the headscarf dispute, the government avoided the risk of forfeiting moral authority that is essential to political power.<sup>145</sup>

Since the idea of unveiling the Muslim woman from the very beginning and also the efforts to formulate policies for the removal of headscarf are the reflections of Orientalist way of thinking, the headscarf has become politicized as in the case of colonial history. The politics over the body of Muslim woman is also a fertile soil for cultivating the seeds of racist discourse. Although the reason behind the objections to headscarf of Muslim women is put forward as opposition to oppression of women, the claim for gender oppression is itself racialized. For Alia Al-Saji, “the racism that structures this perception is covered over by the manifest anti-sexist and feminist concern for the liberation of Muslim women”.<sup>146</sup> In other words, under the guise of liberation of Muslim women from their archaic and suppressive religion and culture, the discourse of cultural racism continues to survive and reproduce existing differences.

Along with this situation, the colonial claims of France with reference to “civilizing mission”, a part of European project, are manifested through contemporary headscarf issue. Related to the permanence of “civilizing mission” as a colonial legacy in up-to-day debates, Scott gives an interesting example of

---

<sup>145</sup> Gabriele vom Bruck, ‘Naturalising, Neutralising Women’s Bodies: The “Headscarf Affair” and the Politics of Representation’, *Identities*, Vol.15, Issue 1, January 2008, pp. 60

<sup>146</sup> Alia Al-Saji, ‘The racialization of Muslim veils: A philosophical analysis’, *Philosophy and Social Criticism*, Vol.36, No.8, 2010, pp.889

the television debate in January 2004. On the one side, there was the founder of *French Muslim Women in Action*, Saida Kada with a headscarf defending it as form of religious not political expression. She insisted that headscarf is not antithetical to women's freedom and also claimed that "two things are mixed up [that ought to be separated]; emancipation and Westernization." Elisabeth Badinter, a devoted advocate of "the values of the Republic", broke in and said "Rightly so; they are rightly connected to one another." As Scott comments on, "there is fascinating slippage from "Westernization" to the emancipatory values of republican France".<sup>147</sup> Even this minor instance indicates how the issue of headscarf is Westernized and at the same time politicized.

In addition to the influence of Orientalist discourses and colonial legacies along with the ideals of Republican tradition of France, the dominant form of racism based on insurmountability of cultural differences participates in the production process of knowledge. The insistence of Muslim immigrants about wearing headscarf in public sphere, particularly in schools where should be absolutely refined from the religious affiliations, is shown as a typical sign of the incompatibility of European values and Islamic culture. From European point of view, the ongoing headscarf controversies in France since 1989 have confirmed that Islam and its culture have inassimilable character and these lead Muslim immigrants to behave in accordance with their imperatives even in the host societies. The point of departure for the law is also the intolerable religious demands in the public sphere because these demands point out the certain differences which can not be acknowledged and allowed within the borders of Republic. Moreover, Scott explains, opponents of the ban charged the supporters with hypocrisy since the repeated recourse to the pure secular nature of nation distorted its past experiences with Catholic Church and the issue, according to the critics, was not religion in general but Islam and not just Islam but "immigrants"; they claimed that "the defense of secularism was but another mask for racism".<sup>148</sup> The marginalized condition of the immigrants is represented as the consequence of the cultural and religious differences which threaten the secular state.

---

<sup>147</sup> Joan Wallach Scott, *The Politics of the Veil*. pp 84-85

<sup>148</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.98

Tariq Modood and Riva Kastoryano draw attention to this paradox of France's republican ideology which "is meant to be blind to 'difference', above all to religious difference, in its institutional architecture France not only recognizes difference at the level of organized religion but recognizes no other form of group difference to anything like the same degree".<sup>149</sup> The founding principle of Republican ideology depends on the construction of sameness; as Jeremy Jennings underlines the Republic is understood as "one and indivisible", as, in the same way, the French people is conceived as 'one, without regard to origin.'<sup>150</sup> However, the approach of France towards Islam and the headscarf issue indicates more than the expression of the republican ideology. According to Asad, one of the prominent characteristics of Republican political theology is its postulate of an internal enemy and out of its struggle with Christianity, laïcité produced its own ideology which has now become vital in the struggle with another enemy- a homogenized fundamentalist Islam.<sup>151</sup> Actually, this struggle arises from the Republican own problematical ideology; but France charges Muslim immigrants with all current social and political problems rather than questioning its political principles and mechanisms. Particularly, in media representations and public debates, the expectation from the immigrants is, to leave aside their "difference" in order to be accepted in the secular public sphere and internalize the nationalist ideals of France. Then, if these are realized, there will be no obstacle for assimilation. Any consent regarding the issue of headscarf in the schools is interpreted as concession by the state for a specific minority group; but as Anna Elisabetta Galeotti clarifies this "does not mean giving special attention to Islamic students, but giving them the same consideration as that granted to non-religious

---

<sup>149</sup> Tariq Modood and Riva Kastoryano, "Secularism and the accommodation of Muslims in Europe", in ed.by Tariq Modood, Anna Triandafyllidou and Ricard Zapata-Barrero (eds.) *Multiculturalism, Muslims and Citizenship: An European Approach*. London, New York: Routledge, 2006, pp. 175

<sup>150</sup> Jeremy Jennings, 'Citizenship, Republicanism and Multiculturalism in Contemporary France' *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 30, No. 4. (Oct., 2000), pp. 584.

<sup>151</sup> Talal Asad, "Trying to Understand French Secularism" in Hent de Vries and Lawrence E. Sullivan (eds.) *Political Theologies: Public Religions in a Post-Secular World*. New York:Fordham University,2006, pp. 507

and Christian students,”<sup>152</sup> This unilateral approach also reveals itself whenever there is Eurocentric claim that emancipation of Muslim woman can only be enabled through unveiling them.

#### 4.2 Danish Cartoon Crisis

When the twelve cartoons of the Prophet Mohammad were published in the Danish newspaper, *Jyllands-Posten*, on 30 September 2005, it was shocking for many people in both national and international level. Shortly after the publication, Muslims from different states, , started to protest against the newspaper. Sune Lægaard describes the cartoons as such,

One drawing simply depicts Mohammad in the desert; two combine Mohammad with Islamic symbols like the crescent and the star; one is of a boy named Mohammad writing ‘the editors of *Jyllands-Posten* are a bunch of reactionary provocateurs’ on a blackboard in Arabic letters; and two satirise a Danish author, whose claim not to be able to find illustrators for a children’s book about Mohammad started the whole affair. Others somehow associate the Prophet, Islam or Muslims with terrorism, however: one shows Mohammad with a turban in the shape of an ignited bomb with verses from the Qur’an inscribed on it; another portrays the Prophet in Paradise, saying ‘Stop, Stop. We ran out of virgins’ to a long line of suicide bombers; two refer to the fear of cartoonists that pictures of Mohammad will trigger revenge from Muslims; and two link the Prophet with suppression of women.<sup>153</sup>

Since drawing the portrait or any kind of depiction of Prophet Mohammad is a religious taboo for many sects of Islam, to see him as caricaturized led many Muslim groups to make excessive responses. In the subsequent months, the scope of the controversy expanded and gained a transnational character. The demonstrations in the street and also in cyberspace took place in many Muslim countries and European states with Muslim immigrants. The chain of protests

---

<sup>152</sup> Anna Elisabetta Galeotti, *Tolerance as Recognition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp.135

<sup>153</sup> Sune Lægaard, ‘The Cartoon Controversy: Offence, Identity, Oppression?’, *Political Studies*, Vol.55, 2007, pp. 481

began in Denmark. On 9 October 2005, The Islamic Society of Denmark called for an apology and also the removal of the cartoons; a peaceful protest organized by 5,000 people in Copenhagen on 14 October 2005. The crisis became international on 19 October 2010 when the ambassadors from eleven Islamic countries asked for a meeting with the Danish Prime Minister, Rasmussen, to dispute over the cartoons. Yet, he refused this request by propounding the free speech and his government's reluctance for affecting editorial opinion.<sup>154</sup> In December 2005, an emergency conference was held by the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and although the meeting was supposed to be about sectarian violence, the cartoon issue overshadowed other problems. The Organization of the Islamic Conference strongly condemned: "[We express our] concern at rising hatred against Islam and Muslims and condemned the recent incident of desecration of the image of the Holy Prophet Mohammed."<sup>155</sup> Until this point, it can be said that the crisis management was in rational terms, in early 2006, the debates became intensified. In January 2006, the Norwegian newspaper *Magazinet* re-published the cartoons and in February 2006 this was pursued by a wave of re-publication in seven European newspapers including Italy's *La Stampa*, Germany's *Die Welt*, Spain's *El Periodico*, the Netherland's *Volkskrant* and France's *France Soir*.<sup>156</sup> Yet, *France Soir* announced the reason behind the republication of the cartoons and stated that "no religious dogma can impose itself on a democratic and secular society". More extraordinarily, underneath a headline starting with "Yes, we have the right to caricature God", *France Soir* ran a front page cartoon of Buddhist, Jewish, Muslim and Christian gods floating on a cloud. It showed the Christian deity saying: "Don't complain, Muhammad, we've all been caricatured here."<sup>157</sup> Here, the intention is to highlight that freedom of speech/expression necessitates

---

<sup>154</sup> Randall Hansen, 'The Danish Cartoon Controversy: A Defence of Liberal Freedom', *International Migration*, Vol.44, No.5, 2006, pp. 9

<sup>155</sup> Daniel Howden, David Hardaker, & Stephen Castle, 'How a Meeting of Leaders in Mecca Set Off the Cartoon Wars Around the World', *The Independent*, London, February 10, 2006, available at: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/how-a-meeting-of-leaders-in-mecca-set-off-the-cartoon-wars-around-the-world-466109.html>

<sup>156</sup> Paul Marshall, The Mohammed Cartoons; Western Governments Have Nothing to Apologize For, *The Weekly Standard*, February 13, 2006, available at <http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/006/680llmyu.asp>.

<sup>157</sup> France Enters Muslim Cartoon Row, *BBC News*, February 1, 2006, available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4669360.stm>.

no concession for any religion and its sacred values. However, the stress about the intolerant character of Islam and the advice of Christian deity to Prophet of Islam are worthy of noting. The racist tone in this cartoon is also camouflaged by the Europe's own 'sacred' principles such as democracy and secularism. Although European public discourse gives advices to Islam and its followers about the need for tolerant and liberal attitude concerning religious issues, European values are not open to criticism thanks to their universality and sacredness.

The repercussions of the (re)publication of these cartoons in the countries outside the Europe with high populations of Muslims were more serious and intense. *France Soir's* "sarcastic" rapprochement also affected the composition of protests severely. As Hansen explains the incidents and protests, beginning from early 2006, respectively, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Syria publicly condemned the cartoons, Libya closed its embassy in Denmark, and the Danish flag was burned in Nablus and Heron. Although *Jyllands-Posten* released two apologies for hurting Muslim feelings not for publishing the cartoons, it did not influence the course of events. On 30 January, European Union (EU) office in Gaza was attacked by armed gunmen intimidating to kidnap the workers if EU did not announce an official apology. Hamas's leader also insisted that Denmark should punish the cartoonists and the newspaper. The turning point for the events and reactions took place on February 2006 when ten European and one American publisher came to a decision of publishing some or all of the cartoons; and this idea was followed by the publishers in different parts of the world such as Argentina, Canada, New Zealand, and South Korea. In London, outside the Danish embassy, demonstrations were arranged and there were placards such as: Slay [also butcher/massacre/behead/exterminate] those who insult Islam", "Free speech go to hell", "Europe is the cancer and Islam is the cure", "Europe will pay, your 9/11 is on its way". Simultaneously, Syria and Lebanon determined to formalize the crisis; in Damascus, outside the Swedish and Danish embassies, demonstrations took place and the embassies were set on fire by mob and also the Norwegian embassy was burned. The protests became crueller that people were killed in Somalia, India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan and when the events came into an end, 139 people were



killed.<sup>158</sup> It was very unfortunate for both the Denmark and other countries that this cartoon crisis brought about such a tragic end. This crisis at the same time has also been accepted as a starting point for new debates in political and public realms.

The first impression evoked by these cartoons is the reproduction of the Orientalist imagery of Muslims and manifestation of current fears about Islam as a terrorist threat. The basic stereotypical perceptions of Islam and East are promoted through the depiction of prophet with Islamic symbols in the desert and the suppression of women. They also remind how the effects of the shared history of Europe and Islam are still alive and determine the Eurocentric perceptions. Furthermore, the fears after 9/11 attacks, London and Madrid bombings brought about the tendency to identify Islam with terrorism. Moreover, the belief towards the inherently violent nature of Islamic culture is once again divulged in the cartoons which portray Mohammad with a turban in the shape of an ignited bomb with verses from the Qur'an inscribed on it and Mohammad as warning the suicide bombers. The other two cartoons illustrate the fear of cartoonists themselves since these cartoons could make Muslims irritated and the attempts for revenge could be triggered. While this concern indicates the prejudice about the intolerant and violent character of Muslims, at the same time it makes explicit that cartoonists and the newspaper had been aware of the provocative configuration of the cartoons. Thus, inevitably the intention(s) behind the publication of these cartoons come into question and more importantly, after the protests in Denmark, what stimulates the other newspapers to republish them.

In the public debates, the freedom of expression/speech is the most underlined claim and also the motivation for the re-publication of cartoons. In addition to the freedom of expression, European satire and critical thinking are put forward as opposites to the Islamic culture. The dichotomy between Europe and Islam is continually repeated in public discourses. On the one side, there is secular, liberal, tolerant and multicultural Europe, on the other side, there is violent, narrow

---

<sup>158</sup> Randall Hansen, 'The Danish Cartoon Controversy: A Defence of Liberal Freedom', *International Migration*, Vol.44, No.5, 2006, pp.10

sighted, intolerant Islam. As it is expected from the proponents of the (re)publication of the cartoons, they highlighted the necessity for freedom of expression in a democratic and liberal state; thus any attempt for withdrawal of the cartoons can be considered as a direct violation to freedom of expression and also democracy. According to Robert Post, for the value of democratic legitimacy, free speech has to perform and thus the Danish cartoons should be exempted from legal censorship.<sup>159</sup> The underlying idea is that in a democracy as a collective self determination, citizens should be capable of declaring their views about any subject without being punished or exposed to any kind of constraint. However, this process does not take place smoothly as usually claimed; under the current global conditions, interrelatedness of the issues disallows the simple answer such as freedom of expression. In other words, the claim for freedom of expression did not simply suggest solutions for the debates over the publication of these critical cartoons.

Although many advocates regard the cartoons as the symbols of freedom of expression, it is maintained that there are some limits to this freedom due its blasphemy content and offensive attitude towards Muslims. Shaida Nabi criticizes the group of European commentators since they “have invoked the freedom to speak as a smokescreen for the crudest form of racist vilification” and therefore the cartoons cannot be positioned within “the tradition of European satire but can be located within the tradition of racist representation, currently directed at Europe’s powerless minorities.”<sup>160</sup> In addition to the dominant racialized categories, the cartoons provoked hatred against the Muslims who have been upgraded from the “enemy within” to the “terrorist within”. Karmini Pillay clarifies the positions; the critics condemned the cartoons as both Islamophobic and blasphemous and alleged that they were aimed at disparaging Muslim immigrants as inferior group; according to the supporters of the cartoons, the portrayals demonstrated a significant issue in a period of Islamic extremist terrorism and the publications

---

<sup>159</sup> Robert Post, ‘Religion and Freedom of Speech: Portraits of Mohammad’, *Constellations*, Vol.14, No.1, 2007, pp. 77

<sup>160</sup> Shaida Nabi, ‘Honing European traditions’, *openDemocracy*, available at: [http://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict-terrorism/muslim\\_cartoons\\_3244.jsp#seven](http://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict-terrorism/muslim_cartoons_3244.jsp#seven)

were a legitimate exercise of the right to free speech.<sup>161</sup> This insistence on the issue of freedom of speech can be read as an attempt of Europe to prove its commitment to democracy and its basic requirements. In other words, there is the underlying message that even the Islamic terrorism and its potential attacks cannot hinder freedom of expression and its circulation in transnational settings. As the supporters believe in the exemplary role of the publication of the cartoons concerning freedom of speech, it has also become the testing ground for tolerance of Islam. Particularly, the violent protests in the “Islamic” countries were thought as the justification for intolerant feature of its culture and along with the cartoons, these protests became the focal point of hate speech in Europe, which is usually identified with anti-Semitism. Since there is a dominant European understanding about racism that it ended up with Holocaust, the center of a unifying European memory, hate speech is only considered within the borders of anti-Semitism. Then, one could wonder how anti-Semitic cartoons would be met by the European public and what makes hate speech about Jews exceptional in the contemporary social setting?

Many commentators have pronounced the choice of *Jylland-Posten* about not publishing some anti-Christian cartoons and the newspaper justified its decision on the ground that it did not want to offend its readers. Although it is legally permitted to publish racist and anti-Semitic cartoons in many places, no reputable newspaper in Europe or North America would attempt to do so.<sup>162</sup> This might give an idea about why the criticisms concentrated on the cartoons’ disseminating cultural prejudices and inciting hate speech about specifically Muslim immigrants. However, the cultural editor of *Jyllands-Posten* objected to the charges, he stated that “in fact the same cartoonist who drew the image of Muhammed with a bomb in his turban drew a cartoon with Jesus on the cross having dollar notes in his eyes and another with the star of David attached to a bomb fuse. There were, however,

---

<sup>161</sup> Karmini Pillay, ‘The Cartoon Wars- free speech or hate speech? A closer look at the recent case of Jamiat-UI-Ulama of Transvaal v Johncorn Media Investment Ltd and Others Case No. 1127/06’, Conference Paper VIIth World Congress of the International Association of Constitutional Law, Athens 11-15 June 2007, pp. 7-8

<sup>162</sup> Joseph H. Carens, ‘Free Speech and Democratic Norms in the Danish Cartoons Controversy’, *International Migration*, Vol.44, No.5, 2006, pp. 35

no embassy burnings or death threats when we published those.”<sup>163</sup> With regard to this proclamation, in simple terms, the explicit difference between the attitudes of religions and their culture towards satire and criticisms are put forward to underline the tradition of tolerance. It is insinuated that intolerant and taboo-centralist mentality of Islam, unlike other religions experienced the same sarcasm, responded to the cartoons by violence. That is to say, there is no exceptional case but what make this case exceptional are the reactions of Muslim groups and their inassimilable temperament.

The criticisms were as such; the cartoons reinforced the already abhorrence towards Muslim immigrants particularly in Denmark and no measure was taken to prevent hate speech. The regulation of Denmark against hate speech is put forward as a reply to these criticisms. David Keane gives details about the historical background of the regulation which was formed “in response to the growing racism and anti-Semitism emanating from Hitler’s Germany.” In 1971, it modified its Penal Code in order to meet the expectations of International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination.<sup>164</sup> Moreover, under the Danish penal code, there are some regulations for controlling the limits of freedom of speech. The racism clause prevents people, or groups of people from “defamation” whereas the blasphemy clause safeguards “those religious sensibilities of believers that are connected to dogmas or rituals deemed central to their religion.”<sup>165</sup> According to these legal directives, any act comprising or evoking racism or blasphemy should be considered as a violation of the law. Besides, it means that the rights of the Muslims in Denmark should be under the statutory protection. To put it simply, there was no problem with the cartoons with reference to the law.

---

<sup>163</sup> Flemming Rose, ‘Why I Published Those Cartoons’, *The Washington Post*, available at: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/17/AR2006021702499.html>, 19 February, 2006

<sup>164</sup> Lene Johannessen, “Denmark: Racist Snakes in the Danish Paradise” in Sandra Coliver, Kevin Boyle and Frances d’Souza (eds) *Striking a Balance: Hate Speech, Freedom of Expression and Non-Discrimination* (1992), pp. 140 and International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, *adopted* 21 Dec. 1965, art. 4, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 cited in David Keane, ‘Cartoon Violence and Freedom of Expression’, *Human Rights Quarterly*, Vol.30, No.4, November 2008, pp. 862

<sup>165</sup> Sune Lægaard, ‘The Cartoon Controversy: Offence, Identity, Oppression?’, *Political Studies*, Vol.55, 2007, pp. 486

Although there were many complaints and applications to the Court, *Jyllands-Posten* was never called for any trial related to the infringements of the blasphemy or racism clauses. It was because the Danish Public Prosecutor did make a decision that the cartoons did not violate these clauses.<sup>166</sup> The aim to mention these developments within the course of event is neither to suggest the idea that the newspaper and cartoonists should (not) be penalized nor to support the censorship of media, but to point out whether the reactions of the Muslim immigrants are overlooked, exceptionally treated and the laws actually protect the rights of the silenced and racialized groups.

Director of Public Prosecution stated, although some of the cartoons were satirical caricatures of the Prophet Mohammad, given the vital role in Islam, “they might imply ridicule of or express disdain for Muslims’ religious beliefs or worship in the sense protected by the blasphemy clause.” After a specific assessment of the cartoons, Public Prosecutor decided that the cartoons did not violate the clause and regarding the racism clause, he stressed that “the cartoons depicted an individual, Mohammad, and as such could not be taken to be referring to Muslims in general and that the depictions of Muslims in the cartoons were not insulting or degrading”.<sup>167</sup> It is still uncertain on which grounds these cartoons are “not insulting or degrading” and which media representations are evaluated under the blasphemy and racism clauses. Another problem about the decision text is it does not notice any challenge for all the Muslims because there was only the portrayal of Mohammad in the cartoons. However, as it is widely known and many times voiced in the protests, Mohammad is on his own sacred and any portrait of him is prohibited in Islam. Thus the statement is not extenuating for Muslim groups. Moreover, the law-the line between the freedom of speech and hate speech- has become questionable since it constitutes one of the important subheadings in the public discussions.

---

<sup>166</sup> Ibid., pp.486

<sup>167</sup> Director of Public Prosecution Afgørelse om eventuel strafforfølgning i sagen om Jyllands-Postens artikel ‘Muhammeds ansigt’ [Decision on Possible Criminal Prosecution in the Case of Jylland-Posten’s Article ‘The Face of Mohammad’], 2006b , pp.6-9 available at: <http://www.rigsadvokaten.dk/ref.aspx?id=889> cited in Sune Læggaard, ‘The Cartoon Controversy: Offence, Identity, Oppression?’, *Political Studies*, Vol.55, 2007, pp. 486

Erik Bleich contends that “Perhaps the harder task is to elaborate principles that allow us to determine which if any of the cartoons should be legally actionable. I believe that it must remain permissible to criticize elements of a religion, even interpretations of core beliefs.” But he holds separate the criticism which is evolved into essentializing, stereotyping and branding the entire group as a threat or subordinated along with provoking abhorrence; such criticism in his view is hate speech and should be punished by law. In connection with these assumptions, Bleich considers the cartoons portraying Mohammad with a sword and a bomb as hate speech since by classifying Mohammad as inextricably linked to violence, it is conveyed that all Muslims are connected to violence.<sup>168</sup> In this debate, Brendan O’Leary asks “Were the original 12 cartoons racist?” and in his point of view, they were not, because they ridicule religion and politically violent Islamist, not race.<sup>169</sup> Contrary to Bleich, he does not even regard the cartoons as racist in the first place and also never mentions hate speech unsurprisingly. His way of approach towards the issue of race reminds dominant form of racism in Europe. In both of them, culturalized conceptions of the discourse enable the rejection of its racist inference. Although the notion of race and any reference to it cease to exist within the discourse of cultural racism, to emphasize the incompatible/insurmountable cultural differences between Europe and Islam does not purify the concept of culture. Since Islamic culture is thought equivalent to its religious tenets and rituals, supposedly violent and intolerant character of Islam simultaneously signifies the cultural formation of Muslims. In other words, without any reference to race or a racial group, it is possible to reproduce racial thinking and racialized discourse about Muslim groups. It is mainly because “Racial Europeanization has rendered race unmentionable and unspeakable if not as reference to an anti-Semitism of the past that cannot presently be allowed to revive”<sup>170</sup> Thus, the claim of culturally superior Europe along with the exclusion and othering process of Muslims can still survive in the discursive sphere.

---

<sup>168</sup> Erik Bleich, ‘On Democratic Integration and Free Speech: Response to Tariq Modood and Randall Hansen’, *International Migration*, Vol.44, No.5, 2006, pp. 21

<sup>169</sup> Brendan O’Leary, ‘Liberalism, Multiculturalism, Danish Cartoons, Islamist Fraud, and the Rights of the Ungodly’, *International Migration*, Vol.44, No.5, 2006, pp.26

<sup>170</sup> David Theo Goldberg, ‘Racial Europeanization’, pp.339

After many discussions on the cartoons rising up the issues of freedom of speech, racism and blasphemy and republication of the cartoons by other newspapers, on February 19, 2006, the cultural-editor of *Jyllands-Posten* Flemming Rose released an article “Why I Published Those Cartoons?” and tried to clarify his reasons and also concerns. What makes this article worthy of noting is neither his position in the newspaper nor proposing original ideas about the current discussions; but it helps to understand very central arguments of the dominant Eurocentric discourse about Muslim immigrants accompanied by the incompatibility claim. In other words, it reflects how Europe justifies its cultural superiority and externalization of minorities in the discursive sphere. He states that

We have a tradition of satire [in Denmark]. . . . The cartoonists treated Islam the same way they treat Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism and other religions. And by treating Muslims in Denmark as equals they made a point: We are integrating you into the Danish tradition of satire because you are part of our society, not strangers. The cartoons are including, rather than excluding, Muslims.<sup>171</sup>

Although this affirmative endeavor about integration of Muslims seems as if it aims at removing the borders between Europe and Islam, the problematical aspect according to Christian F. Rostbøll is, Rose might aspire about integrating Muslims, “but it is on *his* terms; they have to listen to and learn from him, while he has not shown an equal interest in listening to and learning from Muslims.”<sup>172</sup> However, the term integration in itself means a two-way process which requires the equal participation of the sides. The demands of the majority are privileged over the minority rather than providing opportunities for the peripherally positioned group to speak. Who is free to speak and in what terms?

Frankly, Rose says, in response to several incidents of self-censorship in Europe led by expanding fears and feelings of threats in tackling with subjects related to

---

<sup>171</sup>Flemming Rose, “Why I Published Those Cartoons”

<sup>172</sup> Christian F. Rostbøll, ‘Autonomy, Respect, and Arrogance in the Danish Cartoon Controversy’, *Political Theory*, Vol.37, No.5, October 2009, pp.631

Islam, the cartoons were ordered from the artists.<sup>173</sup> In various parts of his defense, a kind of social and political atmosphere is presented that the potential violent threats from Muslim minorities would prevent Europe's freedom of speech and cause self-censorship. This is mainly due to the taboos of Islam which are the signs of its narrow sighted worldview. In other words, the publication of these cartoons is represented as uprising to influential Islamic intervention on European freedom of speech and culture. The intention for the publication of these cartoons can be interpreted as if they had been planned to give a lesson about the freedom of speech to Muslim immigrants. Rose wrote that "The modern, secular society is rejected by some Muslims. They demand a special position, insisting on special consideration of their own religious feelings. It is incompatible with contemporary democracy and freedom of speech, where you must be ready to put up with insults, mockery and ridicule".<sup>174</sup> While satire, ridicule and criticism are indicated as the intrinsic dimensions of secular and modern European societies, the incompatibility argument again operates to point at the differences and implicitly underline the impossible integration of Muslim immigrants.

#### **4.3 Assassination of Theo Van Gogh in Netherlands**

In August 2004, a short film by Theo van Gogh was broadcasted on a Dutch television which handled the subject of violence against women in Islamic societies. In the key scene of the film, there were four topless women with transparent clothing and their bodies were wrapped by calligraphically inscribed verses from the Koran which justify the obedience of women. By employing a script written by Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Theo van Gogh produced this film, *Submission*, a direct translation of Islam.<sup>175</sup> In this film, these four women were depicted as the victims of oppression and domestic violence because Islam's commands entail the

---

<sup>173</sup> Ibid., pp. 631

<sup>174</sup> Jeppe Fogtmann, 'Free speech should include respect', *The Copenhagen Post Online*, May 1 2009 available at: <http://www.cphpost.dk/news/commentary/142-commentary/45547-free-speech-should-include-respect.html>, May 1 2009

<sup>175</sup> Peter van der Veer, "Pim Fortuyn, Theo van Gogh, and the Politics of Tolerance in the Netherlands", in Hent de Vries and Lawrence E. Sullivan (eds.) *Political Theologies: public religions in a post-secular world*. New York: Fordham University Press, 2006, pp. 527



subordinated position of women. The visual descriptions of women and representation of Islam indicate very crude reproduction of Orientalist thinking. Besides, its disturbing and provocative tone led some commentators to label as racist. After the release of the film, many public debates in Netherlands focused on the connection between Islam and violence and the suppression of women in Islam. This film also reinforces the Orientalist ideas and representations in very simple and careless way that serves to the expectations of Europe and it speaks out the things what Europe cannot profess easily. After the release of the film, both Ayaan Hirsi Ali and Theo van Gogh received death threats and soon afterward, the assassination took place.

On 2 November 2004, Theo van Gogh was killed by Mohamed Bouyeri, which alarmed Netherlands. The assassin, a 26-year-old Dutch citizen of Moroccan descent, shot Van Gogh several times and when the final shots were fired, van Gogh was shouting “We can still talk about this, don’t do it”, Hirsi Ali specified this utterance as typically Dutch. After he was dead, the assailant cut his throat and attached through a knife a note including threatening statements to Ayaan Hirsi Ali.<sup>176</sup> Since Netherlands is usually regarded as one of the most liberal and tolerant countries in Europe which accepted multiculturalism as a state policy, Theo van Gogh’s assassination by Mohammed Bouyeri, a Muslim with both Dutch and Moroccan citizenship led to many demonstrations and discussions about Muslim immigrants. In an exaggerated manner, a nation wide panic came into scene after this murder and an outstanding polarization between Muslim immigrants and Dutch people became visible. This murder resulted in many protests and discussions about Muslim immigrants across the nation wide and in regard to the 9/11 attacks and bombings in London, this was considered as Netherlands’s own 9/11. Unquestionably, the content of the letter stabbed into the Theo van Gogh’s body also drew attention because there were both suras from Koran and the coercion against Ayaan Hirsi Ali. This letter of threat was interpreted as a warning for further murders on behalf Islam. It was also commented that Theo van Gogh’s

---

<sup>176</sup> Ron Eyerman, *The Assassination of Theo Van Gogh: from social trauma to cultural trauma*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2008, pp.5

murder was only a beginning for Muslim attacks which would capture the liberal and tolerant essence of Netherlands and Islamize the country.

In order to indicate the discourse and the representations of the Dutch media, its implications for the Dutch stance towards Muslim immigrants and also the racial connotations, a closer look to news and comments will be helpful for further examinations. Since this murder is accepted as a threat to unity of the country and the values of Dutch society, the nature of Islam was the focal point for new discussions about the position of Muslim immigrants. Peter Van der Veer portrays these discussions as follows

Discussions in Holland after van Gogh's murder focused on the intolerance of Islam, the threat of Muslim extremism, and perhaps, most significantly, Muslims' lack of humor. As many Dutch commentators remarked, Muslims simply could not take a joke; they took life and religion too seriously.<sup>177</sup>

While the discussions about the murder focused on the nature of Islam, global terrorism and Muslim immigrants, in many contexts the Dutch society itself, its culture and the attitudes and policies towards Muslim immigrants were not even in question. It is because after the murders of Theo van Gogh and Pim Fortuyn, the cultural traits of Dutch society and the civilized nature of Netherlands were imposed as the signs of the universality and they were put forward as a development ideal for Muslim immigrants. The Minister of Justice declared that "The murder stemmed from radical Islamic beliefs". The equal conditions provided by Netherlands for both its own citizens and immigrants are stressed by following sentences

Although they (the immigrants) are worse off than the ethnic Dutch, there is no immigrant underclass, and no real ghettos exist. Some immigrants

---

<sup>177</sup> Peter Van der Veer, "Pim Fortuyn, Theo van Gogh and the Politics of Tolerance in the Netherlands", pp.528

are, like Hirsi Ali, already joining the Dutch middle class, both in incomes and in lifestyle.<sup>178</sup>

It is suggested that there are no definite obstacles for the integration of immigrants and Hirsi Ali is given as an example for smooth integration. Yet, this is so thought provoking because she is the person defining herself as “ex-Muslim” and blaming Islam as the source of backward cultural practices. In successive sentences, the article also speculates that the label “foreign” attached to Moroccan and Turkish origin Dutch citizens will not be changed and there is also no way for the immigrants apart from the adoption of the liberal values. In other words, in order to be a part of the Dutch society, the immigrants should leave aside their cultural heritage. Again there arises the question “Since Muslim immigrants are not perceived as ‘pure’ Europeans how these immigrants will be treated as ‘real’ citizens even if they are completely integrated?” Mortimer B. Zuckerman’s article “Confronting the Threat” points out the potential Muslim threat shared by United States, Britain and Netherlands and claims that the second and third generation Muslims in these countries, despite their education and wealth, aim a kind of Islamic-fascist community in which their radical Islamic understanding and practices will come into existence. The tone of this article seems very successful in provoking the national and also racial feelings through criticizing the ungratefulness of Muslim immigrants who were born and educated in European countries and had the similar opportunities with the citizens. The article uttered this view as such

The outrages committed in the name of Islam are doubly painful in Britain and the Netherlands because, besides the grief and suffering these young Muslim men have caused, there is the viciousness of their betrayal of trust in these notably--perhaps one should say excessively--tolerant European countries. These are the same nations that gave many Muslim immigrants a new start, nurtured their children as Britons and Netherlanders, and listened

---

<sup>178</sup> Another Political Murder, *Economist*, 4/11/2004, available at: <http://www.economist.com/node/3353677>

courteously to the venom of militant Muslim leaders who, like Tanweer and Bouyeri, had assumed the mantle of citizenship.<sup>179</sup>

It is alleged that more and more Dutch citizens are critical about the fact that Netherlands has indulged the Muslim immigrants for a long time so in return the cultural, racial and religious differences have resulted in contemporary tensions within the society.<sup>180</sup> It means that Muslim immigrants have acquired many rights from the tolerant and liberal Netherlands more than they deserve, and in fact this paved the way for the complaints of pure Dutch citizens. Although it is not always explicitly stated, in many articles the potential ventures of Muslim immigrants' towards invasion of Dutch values are insinuated. "Value" is one of the mostly used concepts to criticize Islam and illustrate the reason of incompatibility between Europe and Islam. The existence of certain and structured European and Islamic values are accepted as preconditions. Indisputably Europe ascribes itself specific characteristics and as White highlights the claims of having history, scientific achievements and multiple cultural traditions constitute the core elements of Europe's identity as well as its assertions of being most liberal, democratic, secular and civilized region of the world.<sup>181</sup> In the specific case of Netherlands and the debate over Muslim immigrants, the emphasis on Dutch values is oriented towards its tolerant and liberal nature and also the freedom of speech. After the assassinations of Theo van Gogh and Pim Fortuyn, due to the fear regarding the loss of Dutch values of tolerance and the impulsive force of the Dutch public, the government had to take precautions about the prospective immigrants. As Dan Bilefsky and Ian Fisher referred, one of the striking means to select "appropriate" immigrants for Netherlands is to present a primer on Dutch values and a DVD

---

<sup>179</sup> Mortimer B. Zuckerman, "Confronting the Threat", *US News and World Report*, Vol.139, No.4, August 1, 2005

<sup>180</sup> Bruce Stokes, 'Immigration Tests Holland's Tolerance', *National Journal*. Vol. 37, No.45 November 5, 2005, pp.3466- 3468

<sup>181</sup> Hayden White, "The Discourse of Europe and the search for a European identity", pp.77-82

including topless women and homosexual intercourse.<sup>182</sup> By this way, the tolerance of potential newcomers are tested and measured so, the consistency between the Dutch values and other cultural values is exposed. The effectiveness of this measure is also very questionable due to its pointless content and equivocal way of testing tolerance. This application mainly conveys the message that “you as a foreigner have to adopt ‘our’ values and life style or leave the country if you are not willing to integrate into the society.” It is also highlighted that many Europeans have started to talk straightforwardly about cultural differences particularly the overdependence of Muslims on religious beliefs and social values so they are more conservative than Europeans about the issues such as the rights of women or homosexuality. Joost Lagendik, a Dutch member of the European Parliament for the Green Left Party at that time, regards Islam as a challenge for European assumptions and developments and says that “So there is this fear that we are being transported back in a time machine where we have to explain to our immigrants that there is equality between men and women, and gays should be treated properly. Now there is the idea we have to do it again.”<sup>183</sup>

The other common theme in the discussions and newspapers about the murder of Theo van Gogh is the interference to the freedom of speech. Since the film *Submission* by van Gogh includes the condemnation towards Islam and its affiliation with oppression of Muslim women, in many sources, this murder is represented as the sign of Muslims’ intolerance. It also denotes that these foreigners are not open to criticism especially if their religion is questioned. The major conclusion about this murder is that it was so difficult for Muslims to put up with such a harsh criticism about their religion along with their lack of tolerance, one of the radical Muslims preferred to silence the critic. A kind of link between this murder and Islam was established, as the Muslim women are silenced and even oppressed by Islam (according to many Dutch people, *Submission* was the visual projection of this condition) this murder equipped with Islamic aims was also an attempt to suppress the freedom of speech in the country of tolerance and

---

<sup>182</sup> Dan Bilefsky and Ian Fisher ‘Across Europe, Worries on Islam Spread to Center’ *New York Times*. October 11, 2006, available at: [http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/11/world/europe/11muslims.html?pagewanted=2&\\_r=1](http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/11/world/europe/11muslims.html?pagewanted=2&_r=1)

<sup>183</sup> Ibid

democracy. Therefore, Theo van Gogh began to be considered as a symbol of freedom of speech by almost all media and many politicians. In video recordings of *Reporter* and *Zomergasten* both Theo van Gogh and Hirsi Ali declared their objective behind displaying women naked in the film as revealing the covered Muslim woman and showing their body because “we are talking about women that are made of flesh and blood and not things that can be thrown away.”<sup>184</sup> While van Gogh criticized the Islamic values and practices, he also underlined the mission of liberating Muslim women from Islam and particularly from the Muslim men. Leeuw and Wichelen comments on the *Submission* relying on a feminist analysis of the issue in this way

Submission not only produces the Western “Oriental” image of Muslims and Islam, but also frames this within a Western misogynist image in which women’s bodies are depersonalized as objects of desire and lust. As such, one can argue that Submission refers both to the depersonalization of Muslim women (as oppressed and helpless object), as to the depersonalization of Western women (as sexual and commodified objects).<sup>185</sup>

In addition to these issues, the stress on the idea of jihad and the enthusiasms of Muslims towards the foundation of an Islamic country in the center of Europe are the last themes in the discussions after the murder. This belief mainly stems from the resistance of Muslim immigrants to the assimilation policies and insistence on pursuing their own cultural practices. Especially after this event, in both legal and illegal spheres, Muslims in Netherlands for two or more generations confronted with high level of discrimination. All the Muslim immigrants were thought as potential risk factors to the peculiar characteristics of Dutch society such as freedom of expression, liberalism and toleration. There is also a kind of illusionary idea that the jihadist ideology is able to unite all the Muslims in European

---

<sup>184</sup> Reporter (videorecording) Hilversum, KRO, The Netherlands, 2004 and Zomergasten (videorecording) Hilversum, VPRO, The Netherlands, 2004 cited in Marc de Leeuw & Sonja van Wichelen ‘Please, Go Wake Up’ Submission, Hirsi Ali, and the ‘War on Terror’ in the Netherlands’, *Feminist Media Studies*, Vol.5, No.3, 2005, pp.332

<sup>185</sup> Ibid., pp.328

countries to establish a big Islamic community in the continent. However, according to the information provided by Dutch secret service, approximately 150 radicals are on the fringes of terrorism in Netherlands.<sup>186</sup> Without doubt, the numbers do not necessarily signal the possible terrorist threat or the murder on behalf of Islam, but it can be accepted as a sign for exaggerated apprehension in Dutch media and also public with regard to the potential jihadist movements

The study of Mervi Pantti and Liesbet van Zoonen is motivated by the conspicuous character of the public reaction, the involvement of the media and political messages in Netherlands after the murder of Theo van Gogh and Pim Fortuyn so it uncovers significant sides of the issue. The Dutch newspapers such as Trouw and Volkskrant- quality papers, Het Parool-local Amsterdam paper and Telegraaf-most popular paper in the Dutch newspaper landscape were used in order to make a qualitative content analysis. According to the results of this study, the identified discourses in these newspapers can be grouped under three headings. The first discourse is restraint and solidarity used by Dutch and foreign governments, political representatives and non-governmental organizations. In this discourse, the main message focuses on the public solidarity plea against the internal threat originated from Muslim immigrants. In the second type of the discourse, the anger comprises the primary feeling towards the murders and the extreme-right politicians and the people in the street used such a way to utter their rage especially about the Muslims as the violators of the smooth system in Netherlands. The discourse of shock is shared by the families, the friends of the victims and many members of the society and interestingly “there is neither a call for restraint nor for revenge in this discourse, just a general shock and sorrow about the ‘unthinkable’”.<sup>187</sup>

The assassination of Theo van Gogh did not only lead to the debates in the public and media, but also the immigration policies and the multiculturalist nature of the

---

<sup>186</sup> A Civil War on Terrorism. *Economist*, November, 25, 2004, available at: [http://www.economist.com/node/3427223?story\\_id=3427223](http://www.economist.com/node/3427223?story_id=3427223)

<sup>187</sup> Mervi Pantti and Liesbet van Zoonen, ‘Do Crying Citizens Make Good Citizens?’, *Social Semiotics*. Vol. 16, No.2, June 2006, pp. 213

Dutch government started to be interrogated. In the country of tolerance, the transformation towards racism and racist attitudes began to be pronounced. Up until this murder, it is generally alleged that Netherlands is one of the most “tolerant” European countries in where all the liberties from religiosity to sexuality could be practiced and even the Muslim immigrants had an opportunity to exercise their rituals. Since Theo van Gogh was admitted as an icon of freedom of expression, the Dutch public was concerned with the severity of the consequences of this event because this was a turning point for the forthcoming social and political settings and government policies. Throughout the debates on the implications of the murder, the shift from tolerance to racism has become noticeable. Since the politicians with racist tendencies promise for preventing further inflow of Muslim immigrations to the country, a significant segment of the Dutch society inclines to support these politicians despite their opposition to the membership of European Union.

Furthermore, after the assassination, the school giving Koran lessons was buried and eight mosques and four churches were attacked so the Muslims began to keep guards on the mosques. The Prime Minister Balkenende called for a calm environment and declared that “The events do no benefit to Netherlands” As a result of the incidents continued for one week, the controversy over the racism was inflamed and a certain segment of the population affirmed their opinions that the tolerance has been lost and “the day van Gogh murdered is the day all of us become racists”. The idea that even the tolerant individuals become racists at the final level due to the actions of Muslims began to dominate the public opinion. Besides, the detrimental events are introduced as the results of Muslim community’s faults. Their provocative Islamic understanding and intolerance to freedom of thought are put forward as the main reasons. The Turkish origin Muslim leader in Netherlands, Ayhan Tonca, said he has been attempting to protect Turkish society from the events emerged right after the murder of van Gogh. Although he and his supporters perceive the film *Submission* and the



articles of the filmmaker as insults to their religion, the Muslim community certainly do not accept such murders and operations.<sup>188</sup>

Due to all of these developments, there emerged a need for review about the contemporary multiculturalist standpoints and immigration policies in Netherlands even the country is not unfamiliar to the concept of immigration. 1961 onwards, *gastarbeiders* -the guest workers- from Turkey and Morocco were recruited by the Dutch government and they were given temporary accommodation. Since there was the belief that they would return to their homelands after their missions were accomplished, they were seen as temporary workers. When the government allowed the guest workers for family reunification, a permanent residence by adopting completely different culture and its practices came on the scene. In this period, they had the right to be educated in their own languages; the government provided the support for the appropriate conditions for their representation in the parliament and even the media paid attention to its tone freed from racist connotations. Then a term borrowed from geography, *allochtonen* which means from foreign soil started to be employed rather than more discriminative concept of *gastarbeider* and also the people from Dutch descent were called *autochtonen*. It can be maintained that the problems associated with immigrants became activated with the second generation Muslim immigrants. As the children of parents without any knowledge about Dutch, they confronted with difficulties in the schools and in return the low level education brought about the low-paid jobs. Instead of living in urban areas, these immigrant groups had to live in the suburbs and isolate themselves from the Dutch culture and they continued to preserve their introvert culture. Since the right wing parties escalated in 1970s and the Centruumpartij (Centre Party) came to power in 1982, the attitudes towards immigrants started to be more discontented and discriminative in comparison to the earlier periods. In 1990s, the topics of integration and immigration again occupied the central position within the current political atmosphere in the state.

---

<sup>188</sup> Fikret Aydemir Lahey, 'Hoşgörü ülkesinde medeniyetler çatışması', *Sabah*, 11/11/2004, available at: <http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2004/11/11/gnd106.html>

In 2000s, 9/11 attacks, bombings in London and the murders of Pim Fortuyn and Theo van Gogh gave rise to the critical scrutiny about the notions of assimilation, integration and multiculturalism. The reasons behind the current tension between the pure Dutch citizens and Muslim immigrants and also the crises, which Dutch state confronts in tackling with these “foreigners”, are usually identified with the Muslim identity. Similar to the discussions about the murder of Theo van Gogh, the emphasis is on the composition of Muslim identity rather than the Dutch society, in this situation also the resilient character of this identity is regarded as the main dilemma for assimilation policies. John O’Sullivan agrees with this stance and says that

Dutch identity is now primarily cultural, historical and political rather than religious, so there should be no explicitly religious barrier to the concept of a Muslim Dutchman. In these circumstances, assimilation and cultural integration amount to much the same thing. That does not mean to say that, however, that there are no genuine obstacles to Muslim adoption of a Dutch identity. The first is the nature of the Muslim identity itself-which is cohesive, strong and resistant to assimilation.<sup>189</sup>

This murder was also admitted as the evidence for the failure of multiculturalism in Netherlands. Although assimilation and multiculturalism are proposed as two different models for dealing with the issue of immigration in Europe, their ignorance of de-linking of culture and religion led to the failures of both policies.<sup>190</sup> Furthermore, multiculturalism includes a bargaining process in which both sides have to give up some of their rights in order to compensate the equal conditions. In line with the strict assimilation policies of Balkenende after the murders in Netherlands, the protests for the implementation of multiculturalist perceptions have become more meaningful. It should be noted that like many places in Europe, also in Netherlands new terminologies are constructed so as to

---

<sup>189</sup> John O’Sullivan, ‘The Islamic Republic of Holland’, *National Review*. Vol.57, No.13, June, 18, 2005, pp.37-38

<sup>190</sup> Olivier Roy, ‘A Clash of Cultures or a Debate on Europe’s Values?’ *ISIM Review*. Spring 2005, pp.6-7

avoid the term of “racism”. In addition to these points, the anti-immigration policies, racism and orientalist perceptions very much overlap in the discussions.

To put it briefly, by taking a specific case into consideration, the assassination of Theo van Gogh, it is attempted to point out the current Muslim immigrant issue in Netherlands. Since this event resulted in many demonstrations and suggestions about the country’s “own 9/11”, the contemporary position of Muslim immigrants in one of the most “tolerated” states should be re-conceptualized and reorganized. To illustrate the orientalist and racist representations in the media, different articles of the newspapers have been used to underline the one-sided attitude towards this subject matter. The themes such as the invasion of Muslim values into the Dutch ones, the violation of freedom of speech and the claims of Muslim towards a jihadist ideology and Islamic society are shared by both public and political discourse. Furthermore, the implicit or explicit emphasis on the tolerant nature of Netherlands is one of the indispensable tools for the explanations about the disadvantaged status of Netherlands in its relations with the intolerant and violent Muslim immigrants. It is alleged that the immigration policies of Netherlands should be more strict and selective in order to cope with the incompatible cultural values of Muslim immigrants. The historical interaction between the Netherlands and Muslim community also reveals the transition of the understanding from *gastarbeiders* to *allochtonen*.

## **CHAPTER 5**

### **CONCLUSION**

This thesis intends to concentrate on how Europe has positioned its self-referential identity with regard to its problematical relationship with Muslim immigrants particularly after the 9/11 and terrorist attacks in Europe and the increasing visibility of Islam in the public sphere.

Under these new social and global conditions, even the presence of Muslim immigrants in Europe has been perceived as a challenge to European secularism and cultural unity irrespective of the shared history of Europe and immigrants for a long time. Although Islam as the Other has been one of the constitutive elements of European identity, its recognizable visibility in the public realm has caused debates about its inherent features contrary to European secularism, the revival of religions and the control of religious diversity. The idea of distinctive European culture along with the concerns about becoming Islamized has been the departure point for these debates. The claim of the incompatibility of Islam and its culture with European secular civilization operates through the discourses of cultural racism. This incompatibility argument between different cultures has become one of the new means for marginalization and charges of Muslim immigrants.

As the Muslim immigrants in Europe are depicted as resistant to cultural and national integration and Islam is thought as not secular enough to adapt European values, the new forms of racist discourse provide a legitimate basis for their already exteriorized status particularly in the issues related to their social and political rights and the visibility of Islam in public sphere. Furthermore, the security threat allegedly caused by Muslim immigrants ensures the justifications for anti-immigration policies. The belief towards Islam's inherent tendency to

violence and the tragic events, such as London and Madrid bombings, the assassinations of Pim Fortuyn and Theo van Gogh, are admitted by European public as both evidence for failure of multiculturalism and betrayal of immigrants to this liberal and democratic political and social setting. However, on the one hand, the characterization of Muslim immigrants and Islam in opposition to European culture and as “enemy within” points out the fact that they can by no means be part of European culture and secular society; on the other hand, Europe continuously criticizes and insists on the rearrangement of their cultural and religious ideas and rituals in order to be integrated and deserve to be “tolerated”. Even though this seems as a dilemma, the constant in these remarks is the superior position of Europe as a decision-making subject and the universality of European civilization.

One can maintain that the distinction between *good* and *bad* Muslims<sup>191</sup> and *Muslims in Europe* and *Muslims of Europe*<sup>192</sup> are designated through the evaluations regarding their adaptation to secularism and its principles and detachment from their religious orientations in the public realm. From this departure point, the commonly employed secularization thesis, the disengagement of European secularism from Judeo-Christian heritage, the concerns about the revival of religion in the public sphere, the controversy between the secular and religious and the failure of multiculturalism are critically touched upon in the second chapter.

Since the secularist arguments have become the recurring theme in the public debates about the integration problems, the visibility of religion in the public sphere, potential security threats identified with Muslim immigrants, European secularism acts both as exclusionary and regulatory force. Modernist narrative of secularism as the indispensable aspect of European democracy creates the rigid boundaries between Europe and Islam and also seeks to control religious violence of Islam. By taking into account these remarks, in the first part of the chapter, I

---

<sup>191</sup> Mahmood Mamdani, *Good Muslim, bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the roots of terror*,. New York: Pantheon Books, 2004

<sup>192</sup> Gabriele Marranci, “Multiculturalism, Islam and The Clash of Civilisations Theory: Rethinking Islamophobia”, pp.112

attempted to problematize the secular aspect of European identity based on principally the secular-religious dichotomy together with public-private distinction. As mostly conventional and also criticized theoretical framework, the secularization thesis and its critics were examined and this provided significant insights about the current parameters of European secularism and prevalent assertions of public opinion. It was underlined that the relocation of religion from private to public sphere and its attainment of global visibility from 1980 onwards led secularization thesis to be questioned. The decline in the importance of religion as a result of modernization and the privatization of religion constitute the theoretical basis of the secularization thesis and this is what European perception of secularism relies on. Particularly the claim of privatization operates in self-definition of Europe in opposition to Islam, which symbolizes the presence of religion in the public sphere. In other words, Casanova mentions not only Muslim's religious otherness but also their religiousness itself as the other of European secularity turned out to be cause of anxiety.<sup>193</sup> In order to discuss contemporary secular claims of Europe in relation to Muslim immigrants, the concepts of the secular and religious and their interplay within the European cultural identity and the criticisms towards secularization thesis were indicated. Asad's theoretical frame was employed to clarify the concepts and give a direction for the discussion. The important point to emphasize is that the secular and the religious are not fixed categories and since they emerged historically the secular can not be regarded as a continuous with the religious or a simple break from it.<sup>194</sup> The debates about the threat of Muslim immigrants within the secular structure of Europe and increasing visibility of Islam were positioned within this frame. Particularly Asad's and Casanova's evaluations with respect to secularization thesis connected to modernity were explained. The ideas about the concept of the secular itself, the secularist ideas and the representation of secularism as the ultimate and universal political stance did not emerge within an isolated social conditions or unimpressionable discursive sphere of European identity construction process. Both Christianity and Islam and their interaction have still

---

<sup>193</sup> José Casanova, "Religion, European secular identities, and European integration" <http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2004-07-29-casanova-en.html>

<sup>194</sup> Talal Asad, *Formations of the Secular. Christianity, Islam, Modernity*. pp. 22-25

the effects on the understanding of secularism today in Europe. The other important highlighted point was the attempts of Europe to associate itself with secularism resulted in the attribution of Christianity a neutral status. As a last point, the assertions of secular criticism especially the idea of secularism as instilled by the experience of minority were mentioned with regard to current relation between Muslims and Europe.

Moreover, in the second chapter, the debate on the revival of religion and multiculturalism as a controlling mechanism of diversities were explored. Although there is an overriding European idea about the direct correlation between the religion and the historical progress of Europe, under the effects of globalization and shifting social and political conditions, the different roles played by religion have become visible in the contemporary European scene. Besides, the unity/conflict of the secular and the religious in constitutive role in the self-identification of Europe, the incapacity of the secularization thesis to explicate the current issues about religious minorities in Europe and rising visibility of the articulation of religion with the political sphere have brought about the debate on the revival of religion. What needs to be addressed is, the revival/return of the religious does not imply its dispersal into the public domain but the new modes of religion linked with other cultural and political domains and the new areas religion display itself under the influence of globalization. It is because public religions respond to challenges of globalization, new media market and other geo-political issues and move beyond the pre-assigned place in the private sphere. The essential relation between religion and media within the global settings were mentioned by Hent de Vries' and Derrida's contentions. The influence and visibility of religion within political domain and its survival in the guise of new representations also determine today's secular Europe. Furthermore, in the post 9/11 epoch, the problematical presence of Islam in public sphere and identification of Muslim immigrants with terrorism have paved the way for evaluations about multiculturalism. To scrutinize the implications of multiculturalism and its traits, the ways it fails to tackle with cultural/religious diversity and its partnership with European understanding of secularism becomes necessary. In line with this, the prominent concepts and their applications in the representations of Muslim

immigrants within multiculturalism particularly after the increasing fear of terror were emphasized.

In parallel with the issues discussed in the previous chapter, the third chapter deals with the discourses of cultural racism consolidated by securitization of the issue of immigrants in Europe. It indicates how this form of racism contributes both to the marginalization of Muslim immigrants and strengthening of Europe as a sovereign political subjectivity. In other words, secularist understanding of Europe and the representations provided by current cultural racism share some claims within the similar discursive sphere. The components of cultural racism, the criticisms towards Holocaust as an exemplary case of racism, the racist tradition of Europe, the replacement of the concept of race with culture and media representations were handled to give an idea about the racial violence towards Muslim immigrants and masking of European racism itself through propounding cultural and religious differences. Besides, the issue of securitization is put forward as a legitimate reason for developing exclusionist and even racist ideas and implementing restrictive policies. Copenhagen School's standpoint draws attention to the influence of actor in terms of creating issues as threats to security. This gives clues about Europe's tendency to add new topics under the heading of terror and charges of Muslim immigrants for both previous and forthcoming terrorist attacks. Anti-immigrant propaganda and campaigns also benefit from Europe's inclination of securitization.

Lastly, the cases of headscarf issue in France, the cartoon crisis in Denmark and the assassination of Theo van Gogh in Netherlands were chosen to illustrate how they are at the intersection of secularist claims and racial discourses. Although these incidents have different historical and social backgrounds, the categories of Muslim immigrants, Islam and common conceptualization of Europe are the uniting factors. Moreover, under the guise of freedom of expression, tolerance, preservation of secularism and secure atmosphere, hegemonic European discourse demonstrated the presence and practices of Muslim immigrants as barriers to their integration. These events also gave Europe the opportunity to justify its negative and sometimes racist ideas about Islam and its culture and distance itself as a



secular entity. In order to examine the cases, many media representations were employed since a semiotic approach in which mass media is not merely “definers of reality but as dynamic sites of struggle over representation and complex spaces in which subjectivities are constructed and identities are contested”.<sup>195</sup> The common symptom of these analyses was, the focus point was Muslim immigrants and their backward and incompatible Islamic culture whereas Europe as the fortress of freedom of expression, tolerance, secularism and democracy sets the borders of universal values.

In the light of all of these critical issues, it should be seen that this study does not simply analyze problematical opposition between Europe and Islam and its reflections on Muslim immigrants and suggest the reversal of the situation in favor of Islam. Yet, the concern is to point out how the representations of Muslim immigrants in politics, media and public opinion are formed within the European hegemonic discursive sphere. On the one hand, this discursivity continuously (re)constructs and consolidates European identity and values and underlines the existence of a sole and genuine conception about universality and civilization. On the other hand, connectedly, within the borders of this sphere, the Orientalist and colonialist perspectives assist the reproduction of specific Muslim image and legitimize the current unequal positioning in Europe. In each step of the uncovering of this discursive plane, it is clarified that the encounters of the rooted European conceptual distinctions with today’s interrelated political, cultural and religious parameters result in the problematical inferences with regard to Islam and Muslim immigrants.

The theoretical inquiries about the secularization thesis and revival of religion in public sphere also reveal that the secular identity of Europe is not independent from religious orientations. The idea of religious otherness of Islam and the belief towards the privatization of religion in Europe lead Christianity to be a part of secular identity of Europe. The point is that the interplay and historical connection between the secular and religious determine the structure of European identity.

---

<sup>195</sup> Debra Spitulnik, “ Anthropology and mass media”, *Annual Review of Anthropology*, Vol.22, 296 cited in Marc de Leeuw & Sonja van Wichelen ‘Please, Go Wake Up’ Submission, Hirsi Ali, and the ‘War on Terror’ in the Netherlands’, *Feminist Media Studies*, Vol.5, No.3, 2005, pp.325

Furthermore, the visibility of religion in public sphere is not novel for European public and the concerns about the revival of religion should not be limited to Islam. Although it is not certain whether the European secularism is emancipated from its theological strings, the biased approach towards Islam and its visibility in public realm designate strong racist overtones.

This study also indicates that cultural racism operates under the guise of secular claims, the risks of multicultural environment and security threats. On behalf of preserving Europeanness of Europe along with its 'universal' values and principles, the incompatibility of cultural differences is put forward to justify discriminatory attitude towards Muslim immigrants. Although the concept of 'culture' differentiates the contemporary racialized discourse from the previous ones, it is possible to claim that the racist tradition of Europe still influences its relation with its religious and cultural Others. The idea of culture and appeal to cultural differences become the major tools for criticisms about the multicultural policies particularly after the terrorist attacks and increasing integration problems of Muslim immigrants. The claim for the crisis of multiculturalism does not only refer to the cultural and religious inassimilable character of the immigrants but also their 'betrayal' to liberal and tolerant social and political atmosphere. The penetration of security discourse into the European migration policies also reminds the protection of secularism from the potential threats. The constant fear of terror menace together with security obsession paves the way for questioning even the presence of Muslim immigrant within the European borders.

## REFERENCES

Alexseev, Mikhail A., *Immigration Phobia and the Security Dilemma: Russia, Europe and the United States*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005

Allievi, Stefano, 'Multiculturalism in Europe', *Conference Paper*, St. Antony's-Princeton Conference on "Muslims in Europe post 9/11". Oxford: St. Antony's College 25-26 April 2003, available at [http://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/princeton/pap\\_allievi.shtml](http://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/princeton/pap_allievi.shtml)

Al-Saji, Alia, 'The racialization of Muslim veils: A philosophical analysis', *Philosophy and Social Criticism*, Vol.36, No.8, 2010, pp. 875-902

Alsayyad, Nezar, "Muslim Europe or Euro-Islam: On the Discourses of Identity and Culture" in Nezar Alsayyad and Manuel Castells (eds.), *Muslim Europe or Euro-Islam: Politics, Culture and Citizenship in the Age of Globalization*. Lanham, Boulder, New York and Oxford: Lexington Books, 2002, pp. 9-30

Anidjar, Gil, 'Secularism', *Critical Inquiry*, Vol.33, Autumn 2006, pp.52-77

\_\_\_\_\_, *Semites: Race, Religion, Literature*. Stanford and California: Stanford University Press, 2008

Anthony, Andrew, 'Multiculturalism is dead. Hurra?', *The Guardian*, 8-4-2004, available at: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/apr/08/religion.race#history%E2%80%9Byline>

Asad, Talal, *Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003

\_\_\_\_\_, "Responses" in David Scott and Charles Hirschkind (eds), *Powers of the Secular Modern: Talal Asad and His Interlocutors*. Stanford and California: Stanford University Press, 2006, pp. 206- 241

\_\_\_\_\_, “Religion, Nation-State, Secularism” in Peter van der Veer and Hartmut Lehmann (eds), *Nation and Religion: Perspectives on Europe and Asia*. Princeton and New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999, pp.178-196

\_\_\_\_\_, “Trying to Understand French Secularism” in Hent de Vries and Lawrence E. Sullivan (eds.), *Political Theologies: Public Religions in a Post-Secular World*. New York: Fordham University, 2006, pp. 494- 526

Balibar, Etienne, “Is There a Neo-Racism?” in Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein (eds.), trans.by Etienne Balibar and Chris Turner, *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities*. London and New York: Verso, 1991, pp. 17-28

Balzacq, Thierry, ‘The Three Faces of Securitization: Political, Agency and Context’, *European Journal of International Review*, Vol.11, No.2, 2005, pp. 171-201

Barker, Martin, *The New Racism*. London: Junction Books, 1981

Bauman, Zygmunt, “Modernity, Racism, Extermination” in Les Back and John Solomos (eds.), *Theories of Race and Racism: A Reader*. London and New York: Routledge, 2000, pp.212-228

Benhabib, Seyla, ‘Chapter 7: L’Affaire du Foulard (The Scarf Affair), *Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education*, Vol.107, No.1, April 2008, pp. 100-111

Bhandar, Brenna, ‘The Ties that Bind: Multiculturalism and Secularism Reconsidered’, *Journal of Law and Society*, Vol. 36, No.3, September 2009, pp. 301-326

Bilefsky Dan and Fisher, Ian ‘Across Europe, Worries on Islam Spread to Center’, *New York Times*. October 11, 2006, available at:  
[http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/11/world/europe/11muslims.html?pagewanted=2&\\_r=1](http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/11/world/europe/11muslims.html?pagewanted=2&_r=1)

Bleich, Erik, ‘On Democratic Integration and Free Speech: Response to Tariq Modood and Randall Hansen’, *International Migration*, Vol.44, No.5, 2006, pp. 17-22

Bonilla-Silva, Eduardo, 'This is a White Country: The Racial Ideology of the Western Nations of the World System', *Sociological Inquiry*, Vol.70, No.2, Spring 2000, pp.188-214

Bréchon, Pierre and Subrata Kumar Mitra, 'The National Front in France: The Emergence of an Extreme Right Protest Movement', *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 25, No. 1, October 1992, pp. 63-82

Bruck, vom Gabriele, 'Naturalising, Neutralising Women's Bodies: The "Headscarf Affair" and the Politics of Representations', *Identities*, Vol.15, Issue 1, January 2008, pp.51-79

Buzan, Barry, Wæver, Ole and de Wilde Japp, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. London: Lynne Rienner, 1998

Carens, Joseph H 'Free Speech and Democratic Norms in the Danish Cartoons Controversy', *International Migration*, Vol.44, No.5, 2006, pp.33-42

Casanova, José, *Public Religions in the Modern World*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994

\_\_\_\_\_, 'Religion, European secular identities, and European integration', available at: <http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2004-07-29-casanova-en.html>

\_\_\_\_\_, "Secularization Revisited: A Reply to Talal Asad" in David Scott and Charles Hirschkind (eds), *Powers of the Secular Modern: Talal Asad and His Interlocutors*. Stanford and California: Stanford University Press, 2006, pp. 12-30

\_\_\_\_\_, "Public Religions Revisited" in Hent de Vries (ed.), *Religion: Beyond A Concept*, New York: Fordham University Press, 2008, pp. 101-115

\_\_\_\_\_, 'The Secular and Secularisms', *Social Research*, Vol.76, No. 4, Winter 2009, pp.1049-1066

Cawls, Peter, "Identity: Cultural, Transcultural, and Multicultural", in David Theo Goldberg(ed.), *Multiculturalism: A Critical Reader*. Cambridge, Mass: Blackwell Publishers, 1994,

Chakrabarty, Dipesh, *Provincializing Europe: postcolonial thought and historical difference*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000

Chatterjee, Partha, "Secularism and Tolerance" in Rajeev Bhargava (ed.) *Secularism and Its Critics*. Delhi and New York: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 345-379

D'Appollonia, Ariane Chebel, "Immigration, Security, and Integration in the European Union", in Ariane Chebel D'Appollonia and Simon Reich (eds.) *Immigration, Integration, and Security: America and Europe in Comparative Perspective*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburg Press, 2008, pp. 203- 228

Delanty, Gerard, *Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality*. Houndsmill: Macmillan Press, 1995

Derrida, Jacques, *Acts of Religion*. intro. and ed.by Gil Anidjar, New York: Routledge, 2002

\_\_\_\_\_, "Faith and Knowledge: the Two Sources of 'Religion' at the Limits of Reason Alone" in Jacques Derrida and Gianni Vattimo (eds), *Religion*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998

Dobbelaere, Karel, 'Some Trends in European Sociology of Religion: The Secularization Debate', *Sociological Analysis*, Vol.48, No.2, 1987, pp.107-137

Eyerman, Ron, *The Assassination of Theo Van Gogh: from social trauma to cultural trauma*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2008

Fekete, Liz, 'Anti-Muslim Racism and the European Security State', *Race and Class*, Vol.46, No.3, 2004, pp.3-29

Freedman, Jane, 'Secularism as a Barrier to Integration? The French Dilemma', *International Migration*, Vol.42, No.3, 2004, pp. 5-27

Fréjuté-Rakauskiené, Monika, 'Contemporary phenomenon of racism and its manifestations in public discourse', *Philosophy Sociology*, No.4, 2006, pp.13-19

Fogtmann, Jeppe 'Free speech should include respect', *The Copenhagen Post Online*, May 1 2009, available at:

<http://www.cphpost.dk/news/commentary/142-commentary/45547-free-speech-should-include-respect.html>

Galeotti, Anna Elisabetta, *Toleration as Recognition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002

Giddens, Anthony, *The Consequences of Modernity*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990

Goldberg, David Theo, "Introduction: Multicultural Conditions" in David Theo Goldberg (ed.), *Multiculturalism: A Critical Reader*. Cambridge, Mass: Blackwell Publishers, 1994, pp.1-44

\_\_\_\_\_, 'Racial Europeanization', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol.29, No. 2, 2006, pp. 336-339

\_\_\_\_\_, *Racist Culture: Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell, 1993

Gourgouris, Stathis, 'Orientalism and the Open Horizon of Secular Criticism', *Social Text*, Vol.24, No.2, Summer 2006, pp.11-20

Gunew, Sneja, *Haunted Nations: The Colonial Dimensions of Multiculturalism*. London, New York: Routledge, 2004

Gündüz, Zuhale Yeşilyurt, 'Europe and Islam: No Securitization Please!', Friedrich Ebert Foundation, International Policy Analysis, Berlin, October, 2007, pp.1-7

Hall, Stuart, "Introduction: Who Needs Identity?" in Stuart Hall and Paul du Gay (eds.) *Questions of Cultural Identity*. London, Thousand Oaks and California: Sage, 1990, pp.1-17

Hansen, Randall, 'The Danish Cartoon Controversy: A Defence of Liberal Freedom', *International Migration*, Vol.44, No.5, 2006, pp. 7-16

Hartmann, Douglas and Gerteis Joseph, 'Dealing with Diversity: Mapping Multiculturalism in Sociological Terms', *Sociological Theory*, Vol.23, No.2, June 2005, pp. 218-240

Hayes, David, 'What Kind of Country', *openDemocracy*, 28-07-2005, available at: [http://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict-terrorism/britain\\_2713.jsp](http://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict-terrorism/britain_2713.jsp)

Hellemans, Staf "Secularization in a Religiogeneous Modernity" in Rudi Laermans and Bryan R. Wilson(eds), *Secularization and Social Integration: Papers in Honor of Karel Dobbelaire*. Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1998, pp.67-81

High Level Advisory Group, 'Dialogue Between Peoples and Cultures in the Euro-Mediterranean Area', Brussels, October 2003, available at: <http://www.iemed.org/documents/lindhgroupen.pdf>

Howden, Daniel Hardaker David and Castle Stephen, 'How a Meeting of Leaders in Mecca Set Off the Cartoon Wars Around the World', *The Independent*, London, February 10, 2006, available at: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/how-a-meeting-of-leaders-in-mecca-set-off-the-cartoon-wars-around-the-world-466109.html>

Huysmans, Jef, 'The European Union and the Securitization of Migration', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol.38, No.5, December 2000, pp. 751-777

Jennings, Jeremy, 'Citizenship, Republicanism and Multiculturalism in Contemporary France', *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 30, No. 4, October, 2000, pp.575-598

Karić, Enes, 'Is Euro-Islam a Myth, Challenge or a Real Opportunity for Muslims and Europe?', *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, Vol.22, No.2, 2002, pp.435-442

Karyotis, Georgios, 'European Migration Policy in the Aftermath of September 11: The Security-Migration Nexus', *Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research*, Vol.20, No.1, March 2007, pp. 1-17

Keane, David, 'Cartoon Violence and Freedom of Expression', *Human Rights Quarterly*, Vol.30, No.4, November 2008, pp.845-875

Keppel, Gilles, 'Europe's Answer to Londonistan', *openDemocracy*, 23-08-2005, available at: [http://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict-terrorism/londonistan\\_2775.jsp](http://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict-terrorism/londonistan_2775.jsp)



Kicinger, Anna, 'International Migration as a Non-Traditional Security Threat and the EU Responses to this Phenomenon', CEFMR Working Paper, Warsaw: Central European Forum for Migration Research, October 2004

Kuzio, Taras, 'The Perils of Multiculturalism: A Theoretical and Area Studies to the Former USSR', *Contemporary Political Studies*, Vol.1, 1998, pp. 108-123

Künkler, Mirjam and Meyer Michael-Resende, 'A Missing Link: Why Europe should talk about Religion when Promoting Democracy Abroad', *Discussion Paper*, No.1, Berlin: Democracy Reporting International, June 2009, pp. 1-6

Laclau, Ernesto, *New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time*. London and New York: Verso, 1990

Lægaard, Sune, 'The Cartoon Controversy: Offence, Identity, Oppression?', *Political Studies*, Vol.55, 2007, pp.481-498

\_\_\_\_\_, 'Moderate Secularism and Multicultural Equality', *Politics*, Vol. 28, No.3, pp. 160-168

Lahey, Fikret Aydemir, 'Hoşgörü ülkesinde medeniyetler çatışması', *Sabah*, 11/11/2004, available at: <http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2004/11/11/gnd106.html>

Lefort, Claude, "The Permanence of the Theologico-Political?", in Hent de Vries and Lawrence E. Sullivan(eds), *Political Theologies: Public Religions in a Post-Secular World*. New York: Fordham University Press, 2006, pp. 148-187

Lentin, Alana, 'Replacing 'race', historicizing 'culture' in multiculturalism', *Patterns of Prejudice*, Vol.39, No.4, 2005, pp.379-396

Leeuw, Marc de and Wichelen Sonja van 'Please, Go Wake Up' Submission, Hirsi Ali, and the 'War on Terror' in the Netherlands', *Feminist Media Studies*, Vol.5, No.3, 2005, pp. 325- 340

Levy, Carl, 'The European Union after 9/11: The Demise of a Liberal Democratic Asylum Regime?', *Government and Opposition*, Vol.40, No.1, 2005, pp.26-59

Malmvig, Helle, 'Security Through Intercultural Dialogue? Implications of the Securitization of Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue between Cultures', *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol.10, No.3, November 2005, pp.349-364

Mamdani, Mahmood, *Good Muslim, bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the roots of terror*. New York: Pantheon Books, 2004

Marranci, Gabriel, 'Multiculturalism, Islam and the Clash of Civilisations Theory: Rethinking Islamophobia', *Culture and Religion*, Vol.15, No.1, 2004, pp.105-117

Marshall Paul, 'The Mohammed Cartoons; Western Governments Have Nothing to Apologize For', *The Weekly Standard*, February 13, 2006, available at <http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/006/680llmyu.asp>

McDonald, Matt, 'Securitization and the Construction of Security', *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol.14, No.4, December 2008, pp. 563-587

Mclaren, Peter, "White Terror and Oppositional Agency: Towards a Critical Multiculturalism" in David Theo Goldberg (ed.) *Multiculturalism: A Critical Reader*. Cambridge and Mass: Blackwell Publishers, 1994, pp.45-74

Mény, Yves and Knapp Andrew, *Government and Politics in Western Europe: Britain, France, Italy, Germany*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998

Miles, Robert, "Racism as a Concept" in Martin Bulmer and John Solmos (eds), *Racism*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp.344-355

Modood, Tariq, *Multiculturalism*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007

\_\_\_\_\_, "Introduction: The Politics of Multiculturalism in the New Europe" in Tariq Modood and Pnina Werbner (eds.) *The Politics of Multiculturalism in the New Europe: Racism, Identity and Community*. New York: Zed Books, 1997, pp. 1-26

Modood, Tariq and Kastoryano Riva, "Secularism and the accommodation of Muslims in Europe", in Tariq Modood, Anna Triandafyllidou and Ricard Zapata-Barrero (eds.) *Multiculturalism, Muslims and Citizenship: An European Approach*. London, New York: Routledge, 2006

Moruzzi, Norma Claire, 'A Problem with Headscarves: Contemporary Complexities of Political and Social Identity', *Political Theory*, Vol.22, No.4, November 1994, pp. 653-672

Mosse, George L., *Toward the Final Solution: A History of European Racism*. New York: Howard Fertig, 1997

Mufti, Aamir R., 'Auerbach in Istanbul: Edward Said, Secular Criticism, and the Question of Minority Culture', *Critical Inquiry*, Vol.25, No.1, Autumn 1998, pp.95-125

\_\_\_\_\_, 'Critical Secularism: A Reintroduction of Perilous Times', *Boundary 2*, Vol.31, No.2, 2004, pp.1-9

Nabi, Shaida, 'Honing European traditions', OpenDemocracy, available at: [http://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict-terrorism/muslim\\_cartoons\\_3244.jsp#seven](http://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict-terrorism/muslim_cartoons_3244.jsp#seven)

Naas, Michael B. "Introduction: For Example" in intro. by Michael B.Naas, trans.by Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael B. Naas, *The Other Heading: Reflections on Today's Europe*, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992, pp.vii-lix

O'Leary, Brendan, 'Liberalism, Multiculturalism, Danish Cartoons, Islamist Fraud and the Rights of the Ungodly', *International Migration*, Vol.44, No.5, 2006, pp.22-33

O'Sullivan, John 'The Islamic Republic of Holland', *National Review*. Vol.57, No.13, June, 18, 2005, pp. 37-38

Pantti Mervi and Zoonen Liesbet van , 'Do Crying Citizens Make Good Citizens?', *Social Semiotics*. Vol. 16, No.2, June 2006, pp.205-224

Pillay, Karmini, 'The Cartoon Wars- free speech or hate speech? A closer look at the recent case of Jamiat-Ul-Ulama of Transvaal v Johncorn Media Investment Ltd and Others Case No. 1127/06' , *Conference Paper* ,VIIth World Congress of the International Association of Constitutional Law, Athens 11-15 June 2007, available at: <http://www.enelsyn.gr/papers/w12/Paper%20by%20Karmini%20Pillay%28draft%29.pdf>

Portillo, Michael, 'Multiculturalism has failed but tolerance can save us', *The Sunday Times*, 17-07-2005, available at:  
[http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest\\_contributors/article544921.ece](http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article544921.ece)

Post Robert, 'Religion and Freedom of Speech: Portraits of Mohammad', *Constellations*, Vol.14, No.1, 2007, pp. 72-90

Probst, Lothar, 'Founding Myths in Europe and the Role of the Holocaust', *New German Critique*, No.90, Taboo, Trauma, Holocaust, Autumn 2003, pp.45-58

Rabinbach, Anson G. and Zipes Jack, 'Lessons of the Holocaust', *New German Critique*, No.19, Special Issue 1, Winter 1980, pp.3-7

Raschke, Carl, 'Derrida and the Return of Religion: Religious after Postmodernism', *Journal of Cultural and Religious Theory*, Vol.6, No.2, Spring 2005, pp. 1-16

Rattansi, Ali, *Racism: A Very Short Introduction*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007

Rose, Flemming 'Why I Published Those Cartoons', *The Washington Post*, 19 February, 2006 available at:  
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/17/AR2006021702499.html>,

Rostbøll, Christian F., 'Autonomy, Respect, and Arrogance in the Danish Cartoon Controversy', *Political Theory*, Vol.37, No.5, October 2009, pp. 623-648

Roy, Olivier, 'A Clash of Cultures or a Debate on Europe's Values?', *ISIM Review*. Spring 2005, pp.6-7

Said, Edward, *Orientalism*. New York: Vintage Books, 1979

Salvatore, Armando, 'The Euro-Islamic Roots of Secularity: A Difficult Equation', *Asian Journal of Social Science*, Vol.33, No.3, (2005), pp.412-437

\_\_\_\_\_, 'Power and Authority within European Secularity: From the Enlightenment Critique of Religion to the Contemporary Presence of Islam', *The Muslim World*, Vol.96, No.4, October 2006, pp.543-561

\_\_\_\_\_, 'Secularity and public religion in Europe: Historical roots, theoretical debates and the case of public Islam', *HAGAR International Social Science Review*, Vol. 6, No.1, 2005, pp. 7-24

Scott, Joan Wallach, *The Politics of the Veil*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007

Simmel, Georg, "The Stranger" in Kurt Wolff (ed.and trans.) *The Sociology of Georg Simmel*. New York: Free Press, 1950

Solomos, John and Back Les, *Racism and Society*. New York: St.Martin's Press, 1996

Spohn, Willfried, 'Europeanization, Religion and Collective Identities in an Enlarging Europe: A Multi-Modernities Perspective', *European Journal of Social Theory*, Vol.12, No.3, 2009, pp.358-374

Stokes, Bruce, 'Immigration Tests Holland's Tolerance', *National Journal*, Vol.37, No.45, November 5, 2005, pp.3466-68

Stone, Marianne, 'Security According to Buzan: A Comprehensive Security Analysis', Security Discussion Papers Series 1, Spring 2009, pp.1-11

Taylor, Charles, 'The Polysemy of the Secular', *Social Research*, Vol.76, No.4, Winter 2009, pp. 1143- 1166

Thobani, Sunera, *Exalted Subjects: Studies in the Making of Race and Nation in Canada*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007

Thomas, N.M, 'On Headscarves and Heterogeneity: Reflections on the French Foulard Affair', *Dialectical Anthropology*, Vol.29, 2005, pp.373- 386

Tibi, Bassam, "Muslim Immigrants in Europe: Between Euro-Islam and Ghettoization", in Nezar Al-Sayyad and Manuel Castells(eds.), *Muslim-Europe or Euro-Islam: Politics, Culture, and Citizenship in the Age of Globalization*. Lanham, Md: Lexington Books; Berkeley: Center for Middle Eastern Studies, University of California at Berkeley, 2002, pp. 31-52

Veer, Peter van der, "Pim Fortuyn, Theo van Gogh, and the Politics of Tolerance in the Netherlands", in Hent de Vries and Lawrence E. Sullivan (eds.), *Political Theologies: public religions in a post-secular world*. New York: Fordham University Press, 2006, pp.527- 538 Vertovec, Steven and Peach Ceri (eds), *Islam in Europe: The Politics of Religion and Community*. New York: St.Martin's Press, 1997

Vries, de Hent, "In Media Res: Global Religion, Public Spheres, and the Task of Contemporary Religious Studies" in Hent De Vries and Samuel Weber (eds), *Religion and Media*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001, pp. 3-42

\_\_\_\_\_, *Philosophy and the Turn to Religion*. Baltimore, Md: John Hopkins University Press, 1999

Wæver,Ole, 'Securitization and Desecuritization' in Ronny Lipschutz (ed.) *On Security*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1995, pp. 46-86

West, Cornel, "A Genealogy of Modern Racism" in Philomena Essed and David Theo Goldberg (eds.), *Race Critical Theories: Text and Context*. USA and UK: Blackwell Publishers, 2002, pp. 90-112

Weil, Patrick, 'Lifting the Veil', *French Politics, Culture and Society*, Vol.22, No.3, Fall 2004, pp. 142-149

White, Hayden, "The Discourse of Europe as The Other" in Bo Strath (ed.), *Europe and the Other and Europe as the other*. Bruxelles: Peter Lang, 2000, pp.67-85

Wieviorka, Michel, *The Arena of Racism*, trans.by Chris Turner. London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1995

Yeğenoğlu Meyda, 'The Return of the Religious', *Culture and Religion*, Vol.7, No.3, November 2006,pp. 245-261

Zizek, Slavoj, 'Multiculturalism, or, the Cultural Logic of Multinational Capitalism', *New Left Review*, 225 September/October, 1997, pp.28-51

Zuckerman, Mortimer B. 'Confronting the Threat', *US News and World Report*, Vol.139, No.4, August 1, 2005

## Internet Sources

BBC News

France Enters Muslim Cartoon Row, *BBC News*, February 1, 2006,  
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4669360.stm>

BBC News Talking Point

Haider: Is Europe over-reacting?, April 4, 2000  
[http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/talking\\_point/630960.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/talking_point/630960.stm)

The Economist

Europe: Islam in Netherlands  
Another Political Murder, November 4, 2004  
<http://www.economist.com/node/3353677>

The Economist

Europe: Charlemagne  
A Civil War on Terrorism, November 25, 2004  
<http://www.economist.com/node/3353677>