

SECURITY DIMENSION OF TURKEY'S RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA: 2000-2010

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

GÜLŞAH GÜREŞ

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE
IN THE PROGRAM OF
EURASIAN STUDIES

JANUARY 2011

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

Prof. Dr. Meliha Altunışık
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Pınar Akçalı
Head of the Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Oktay F. Tanrıseven
Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ayşegül Aydınğün (METU, SOC) _____

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Oktay F. Tanrıseven (METU, IR) _____

Assist. Prof. Dr. Burak Tangör (TODAIE, IR) _____

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last name: Gülşah Güreş

Signature :

ABSTRACT

SECURITY DIMENSION OF TURKEY'S RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA: 2000-2010

Güreş, Gülşah

Master of Science in Eurasian Studies

Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Oktay F. Tanrısever

January 2011, 196 pages

This thesis aims to examine the security dimension of Turkey's relations with Russia during the period between 2000 and 2010. In this context, political, military and energy aspects of the security relations between Turkey and Russia are examined in detail. Contrary to the views that conceive the recent rapprochement in Turkish-Russian relations as 'strategic partnership' or a form of cooperation that has the potential of reaching the level of strategic partnership, the thesis argues that these countries have developed their bilateral relations in the form of pragmatic cooperation due to the existing limits to the deeper levels of cooperation in the security field. It seems that the euphoria of rapprochement between two countries is resulted from the diminution of mutual threat levels as well as the proliferation of common interest areas. Nevertheless, despite these developments, both Turkey and Russia continue to consider their relations as a form of pragmatic cooperation rather than strategic partnership.

Keywords: Turkey, Russia, Security, Pragmatic Cooperation, Strategic Partnership

ÖZ

2000-2010 ARASI DÖNEMDE TÜRKİYE’NİN RUSYA İLE İLİŞKİLERİNİN GÜVENLİK BOYUTU

Güreş, Gülşah

Yüksek Lisans, Avrasya Çalışmaları

Tez Yöneticisi: Doçent Dr. Oktay F. Tanrısever

Ocak 2011, 196 sayfa

Bu tez çalışması, Türkiye’nin Rusya ile 2000-2010 yılları arasındaki ilişkilerinin güvenlik boyutunu incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu bağlamda, ikili ilişkilerin güvenlikle ilgili siyasi, askeri ve enerji boyutları detaylı bir şekilde incelenmiştir. Bu tez, Türkiye-Rusya arasındaki son dönemdeki yakınlaşmayı stratejik ortaklık veya stratejik ortaklık düzeyine erişme potansiyeline sahip bir işbirliği olarak algılayan görüşün aksine, bu ülkelerin ikili ilişkilerini güvenlik alanında daha derin düzeyde işbirliği geliştirmeye engel olan mevcut sınırlar nedeniyle pragmatik işbirliği şeklinde geliştirmekte olduğunu savunmaktadır. İki ülke arasındaki yakınlaşma havasının karşılıklı tehdit düzeyinin azalması ve ortak çıkar alanlarının çoğalması neticesinde ortaya çıktığı görülmektedir. Ancak bu gelişmelere rağmen hem Türkiye hem de Rusya ilişkilerini stratejik ortaklıktan ziyade pragmatik bir işbirliği biçimi olarak düşünmeye devam etmektedirler.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye, Rusya, Güvenlik, Pragmatik İşbirliği, Stratejik Ortaklık

Sevgili Annem Ayşe Güreş'e...

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my sincere gratitude and appreciation to my supervisor Assoc. Prof. Dr. Oktay F. Tanrısever and thank him for his invaluable guidance, continual encouragements and support during the preparation of this thesis.

I would also like to thank the members of my thesis committee, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ayşegül Aydıngün and Assist. Prof. Dr. Burak Tangör for their suggestions and comments.

Finally, I would like to thank my family and my dearest friend Şeyma for their patience and moral support throughout my studies.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM.....	iii
ABSTRACT.....	iv
ÖZ.....	v
DEDICATION.....	vi
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....	vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	viii
CHAPTER	
1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.1 Literature Review.....	4
1.2 Argument.....	12
1.3 Research Methodology.....	18
1.4 Organization of the Chapters.....	19
2. SECURITY ASPECT OF TURKISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS IN THE 1990s.....	21
2.1 Initial Period (1991-1993).....	21
2.2 Period of Intense Mutual Suspicion (1993-1996).....	25
2.3 Beginning of Fuzzy Rapprochement (1996-1998).....	33
2.4 Turbulent Russia and Rapprochement (1998-2000).....	39
3. SECURITY ASPECT OF TURKISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS IN THE 2000s.....	48
3.1 Redefinition of Relations with Putin’s Presidency (2000-2002).....	48
3.2 Turkey’s New Foreign Policy Vision and the Establishment of ‘Strategic Partnership’ (2002-2004).....	53
3.3 First State Visit and Materialization of ‘Strategic Partnership’ (2004-2008).....	55
3.4 Diversification of Interests (2008-2010).....	60

4. SOURCES OF COOPERATION IN TURKISH-RUSSIAN SECURITY	
RELATIONS.....	74
4.1 Diminution of Mutual Threat Level.....	74
4.2 September 11 and the Fight Against International Terrorism.....	78
4.3 Opposition to the War in Iraq.....	89
4.4 Black Sea Dimension.....	100
4.5 Arm Sales.....	109
5. LIMITS TO COOPERATION IN TURKISH-RUSSIAN SECURITY	
RELATIONS.....	118
5.1 Persistence of the Culture of Insecurity.....	118
5.2 Fight against Separatist Terrorism.....	122
5.3 Restrained Competition in the Caucasus.....	129
5.4 Restrained Competition in Central Asia.....	132
5.5 NATO Factor in Turkish-Russian Relations.....	139
5.6 Competitive Pipeline Politics.....	150
6. CONCLUSION.....	159
REFERENCES.....	167

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The momentous changes in the international system which emanated from the collapse of the Soviet Union and continued with the shifts triggered by the dramatic changes in Eurasian geopolitical landscape throughout the 2000s brought very welcomed opportunities along with challenges for Turkey and Russia, mostly defined as traditional geopolitical rivals in Eurasian scenery, since these changes in the system radically altered the geopolitical and geostrategic conditions and thus the considerations of both countries. These changes in the considerations in parallel with the conditions led to the diminution of the threat levels together with the proliferation of common interest areas. This new period in the history of the relations made Turkish-Russian rapprochement more possible and promising while putting an end to the Cold War type enmity. However this new appearance of the relations has brought along with some certain limitations. Even though these restrictive factors to the cooperation between Turkey and Russia did not obstruct the emergence of the sources of the cooperation, they did it so in the development of the cooperation as in the form of ‘strategic partnership’ or cooperation on its way to reach that level by putting back the opponent postures vis-à-vis each other in some specific issues. Within this context, the thesis intends to explore the security aspect of the bilateral relations throughout the 1990s and 2000s, first by giving a special reference to the approaches of Turkey and Russia to the developments of the changing security environment and then focusing on the source factors heading them to cooperate more and the limiting factors heading them to cooperate less.

To have a better grasp of the current bilateral relations between Turkey and Russia, one must look at the long history of the relations between these two countries. The letter dated August 31, 1492 of Muscovy Prince Ivan III to Ottoman Sultan Bayezid II via the Crimean Khan Mengli Giray, accepted as the official start of the relations, was mainly focusing on trade matters.¹ According to Prof. Halil İnalçık, the first rapprochement in 1492 in bilateral relations seems to be realized under the weight of economic factors rather than political ones but the geographical location and geopolitical conditions together with political and social

¹ İnalçık, Halil; “An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire Volume I (1300-1600)”, ed. by Halil İnalçık & Donald Quataert, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994, pp.278-279.

ideologies lay the foundations of political and economic competition and conflict in the later stages.² The emergence of Russia as a great power in the 18th century changing the European balance disfavoring the Ottoman Empire, its two century long expansion at the expense of Ottoman territory and 13 bloody wars had formed and strengthened the traditional antagonism between Turkey and Russia.³ The supremacy of the Orthodox and Slavic identities is significant in this period of time. Ottoman statesman Talat Pasha's statement in the 19th century of that "We do not have a policy toward Russia. We do the exact opposite of whatever Ambassador Ignatiev is saying" while describing the policy toward Russia is quite noteworthy.⁴ The mentioned person in the declaration is Nikolas P. Ignatiev who had served as Russian ambassador in Ottoman Istanbul between the years of 1864 – 1878.

The baby steps of the newly established states in the 1920s required most of their attention and energy into first the struggling against the Western intervention and then the domestic politics since both were in a flurry of establishing new regimes from the rough. During an interview with Turkish media in Sochi on September 01, 2004, Russian President Putin identifies the period in-between 1920s and 1930s as the years "when the young Soviet republic gave the new Turkish leadership direct moral and political support".⁵ However the picture drawn by the converging interests began to change as time went by. The founder of Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk states in 1932 that: "We Turks, being a close neighbor of Russia and a nation who has fought numerous wars against her, are following the events that are taking place there and watching the real danger as a bare truth. Bolsheviks have become a principal power threatening not only Europe but also the continent of Asia".⁶ After the mid-1940s, Turkey had positioned itself vis-à-vis Soviet Russia because of its threat perception pertaining to Soviet intentions. The revival of the old expansionist policies of Russia in the post-World War II years has led to the return of insecurity and conflict to the relations.⁷ However this did not avoid them in entering into relations even putting efforts for

² İnalçık, Halil; "Osmanlı - Rus ilişkileri (1492 - 1700)", *Vatan Kırım website*, <http://www.vatankirim.net/yazi.asp?YaziNo=57>.

³ Karaosmanoglu, Ali L.; "The Evolution of the National Security Culture and the Military in Turkey", *Journal of International Affairs*, Fall 2000, Volume 54, Number 1, p.203.

⁴ Kiniklioğlu, Suat and Morkva, Valeriy; "An anatomy of Turkish-Russian Relations", *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, Volume 7, Number 4, December 2007, p.535.

⁵ "Interview with the Turkish Media, Sochi, 01 September 2004", Official website of the Russian President.

⁶ Karaosmanoglu, Ali L.; "The Evolution of the National Security Culture and the Military in Turkey", *Journal of International Affairs*, Fall 2000, Volume 54, Number 1, p.203.

⁷ İnalçık., Halil; "Osmanlı - Rus ilişkileri (1492 - 1700)", *Vatan Kırım website*, <http://www.vatankirim.net/yazi.asp?YaziNo=57>.

fixing the relations albeit in tactical terms. During the interview held in Sochi on September 01, 2004, Russian President Putin named the 1960s and 1970s as the years that Soviet Union gave assistance to Turkey in constructing industrial establishments in steel, aluminum and oil sectors.⁸ The 1967 dated agreement which provided Turkey Soviet support in building a number of industrial installations, the 1972 dated Declaration on the Principles of Good-Neighborly Relations and the 1978 dated Political Document on Good-Neighborly and Friendly Relations are required to be mentioned in here.⁹ The identities, which had been defined as being located in the opposite seats of the bi-polar world and built on the threat perceptions requiring to take stance against each other during the Cold War period, became upside down with the disintegration of the Soviet Union. During the first decade of the post-Soviet era, except the very short period in the beginning, bilateral relations of Turkey with Russia tended to be fluctuating due to the competition on manifold issues even though the visible continuation of the relations through mutual high-level visits, agreements and increasing trade volume.

The apprehensive relations between Turkey and Russia covering most of the 1990s turned into mild with the very significant shifts occurred in the 2000s enforcing them to change their approaches towards each other mainly driven by security considerations. The interaction throughout the 1990s and 2000s provided a reasonable decrease in threat levels posed to each other since they embarked on knowing each other better with strengths and weaknesses. Besides, proliferation of common interest areas in addition to the changing threat levels eased cooperation between Turkey and Russia. However the limits to the cooperation are still there as untouched. These limits composed of historical, regional, structural factors are Pandora's Box waiting to be opened. Both parties prefer not to itch or even touch any of these issues, for the time being, while carrying on a restrained competition for the sake of the ongoing seemingly good-mood relations which are perceived as vital to the security interest of each country. However the abiding presence of these limits to the cooperation hampers robust and trustworthy relations between Turkey and Russia. Therefore pragmatic cooperation rather than strategic partnership is better to be used to define the existing character of the relations between these two states.

⁸ "Interview with the Turkish Media, Sochi, 01 September 2004", Official website of the Russian President.

⁹ Danilov, Vladimir I.; "Some Features of Russian-Turkish Relations in the 1990s", *Perceptions*, December 2001-February 2002, p.61.

1.1. Literature Review

The last decade witnessing the rapid development felt in almost each and every field of Turkish-Russian relations directed scholars towards making inquire about the underlying reasons of the current euphoria of rapprochement between Turkey and Russia to identify the very nature of the relations. The confusion and blurriness are inescapable two facts for the ones studying on the relations between Turkey and Russia due to the manic-depressive tendencies in the very long history of the relations in addition to the irrationality of making robust evaluations by relying on the very short period of time in the course of the relations such as the last decade. In spite of these obstacles, it has been observed that two different groups emerged trying to explain the factors behind the picture of the current euphoria of rapprochement between Turkey and Russia by relying on diverse centrifugal points. The first group's magnetic needle shows the current relations as at the level of 'strategic partnership' or 'towards strategic partnership' whereas the second group's needle points out the nature of the relations in progress as pragmatic and tactical reckonings without any strategic depth. Each group refers to the different issue or field as the stamina of the emerging relationship between Turkey and Russia. Among these groups, the ones voicing the expressions of 'strategic partnership' or 'towards strategic partnership' between these two countries constituted the contrary group of what this thesis argues and written for.

The first group is mainly composed of political élites, experts and journalists on both countries. The group defining the current level of the relations as 'strategic partnership' and/or defending the direction of the relationship between Turkey and Russia towards 'strategic partnership' puts forward the recent developments in the political, economic, military and cultural fields as signals proving their rightfulness. The general tendency of this group has been labeling the level of the relations as abovementioned expressions in their evaluations of each high-level visit either before or after it took place. While doing this, they put the limitations as challenges that could be overcome through widening and deepening cooperation that will be upgraded by the willpower of both parties.

The idea of establishing a strategic partnership between Turkey and Russia was first voiced during the landmark visit of Russian Premier Chernomyrdin to Turkey in December 1997 when 'Blue Stream Project' together with other agreements was signed.¹⁰ Premier Chernomyrdin stated that: "If Turkey shakes the hand extended by Russia, we shall become

¹⁰ "Stratejik Ortaklık Önerisi", *Milliyet*, 17 December 1997; "Ayın Tarihi", Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, December 1997.

strategic partners in the economy in the twenty-first century... We shall be able to do much together in third countries and contribute to the insurance of stability and tranquility in the region".¹¹ Russian President Vladimir Putin, in his letter to Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer which delivered by Russian First Deputy Premier Ilya Klebanov in May 2000, stated that "Turkey and Russia are two strategic partners strong in the region".¹² Russian Premier Kasyanov, during his visit to Turkey in October 2000, highlighted the possible strategic partnership after having common vision on energy and its transportation issues.¹³ In April 2001, Turkish Ambassador in Moscow Nabi Şensoy voiced the possibility of upgrading the relations to the level of 'strategic partnership' in the upcoming five to ten years.¹⁴ In March 2002, the Secretary General of the Turkish National Security Council, General Tuncer Kılınc voiced the necessity of configuring new arrangements as alternative to EU by showing Russia as one of the candidates.¹⁵ After the visit of Russian Premier Putin to Turkey in August 2009, Turkish Premier Erdoğan voiced the existence of 'strategic partnership' between Turkey and Russia.¹⁶ In May 2010, this time Russian President Medvedev stated that, "First off, we can confidently say that Russian-Turkish relations have advanced to the level of a multidimensional strategic partnership," referring to the joint declaration signed in February 2009 to upgrade the relations as evidence.¹⁷ President Medvedev underlined the importance of political relations through high-level contacts, the ongoing cooperation in the fields of trade and energy, the nascent cultural ties in addition to the partnership in regional and international issues.¹⁸ In November 2010, Turkish Ambassador in Moscow, Ayhan Sezgin stated that Turkey agrees on the expression of 'strategic partnership' to identify the current level of Turkish-Russian relations by indicating the similarities between the evaluations of Turkey and Russia over the regional and international issues in addition to the

¹¹ "Bazoğlu Sezer, Duygu; "Turkish-Russian relations: The challenges of reconciling geopolitical competition with economic partnership", *Turkish Studies*, 2000, Volume 1, Number 1, p.66.

¹² Çevikcan, Serpil; "Putin'den Ortaklık Teklifi", *Milliyet*, 27 May 2000.

¹³ "Rusya Başbakanı Mihail Kasyanov *Hürriyet*'e konuştu", *Hürriyet*, 23 October 2000.

¹⁴ "Ayın Tarihi", Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, April 2001.

¹⁵ "Avrupa kavgası kızıştı", *Radikal*, 09 March 2002.

¹⁶ "Komşuluktan Stratejik İşbirliğine: Türk-Rus İlişkileri", Report Number 18, *ORSAM*, May 2010, p.10, p.15.

¹⁷ "Russia and Turkey to continue relationships beyond goals by Dmitry Medvedev", *Today's Zaman*, 10 May 2010.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

complementary economies of both countries.¹⁹ The head of Turkish Chamber of Commerce Rıfat Hisarcıklıođlu, declares that there is no obstacle left limiting current Turkish-Russian relations as happened in the Cold War years by showing the sample of Germany-France for the future of Turkish-Russian relations.²⁰ Two exceptions to the chorus of political élites came from Russian President Putin who called the expression of ‘strategic partnership’ or ‘towards strategic partnership’ as clichés during the interview with Turkish media in 2004²¹ though he had defined the two countries as strategic partners in his letter to Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer in May 2000 and Russian Ambassador in Ankara Vladimir Ivanovskiy who expressed his dislike of the ‘strategic partnership’ by emphasizing the existing common interests instead in an interview dated 2010.²²

Political commentator Andrei Fedyashin from Russia's leading news agency RIA Novosti in his 2010 dated commentary titled as “*Russia and Turkey consider strategic partnership*”, voices the ‘multifaceted strategic partnership’ by alluding the possible coordination between these two countries in the fields of energy politics and regional security which may end up with the creation of regional security structure in the years ahead.²³ Respected Russian economy journal RBC in its February 2009 dated printing introduces Turkey as candidate of Russia’s strategic partner for Russia’s regional ambitions especially in the Black Sea region.²⁴ However the comments in the same journal warning Russia about Turkish pragmatism with reference to Turkey of the 1990s favoring Russia-free Black Sea region, Turkey’s indispensable relations with the US mentioning the presence of several pressure tools open to the US disposal and Turkey’s NATO face end up with that the partnership should be built by taking into consideration of all these factors.²⁵ Similarly, several news in Turkish press taking the relations at the level of ‘strategic partnership’ or on its way to that

¹⁹ “Rusya-Türkiye dev projeleri uygulamaya başlıyor”, *Haberrus*, 06 November 2010, <http://www.haberrus.com/yorum/roportaj/4122-Rusya-Turkiye-dev-projeleri-uygulamaya-basliyor.html>.

²⁰ “Komşuluktan Stratejik İşbirliğine: Türk-Rus İlişkileri”, Report Number 18, *ORSAM*, May 2010, p.15.

²¹ “Interview with the Turkish Media, Sochi”, 01 September 2004, Official website of the Russian President.

²² Sarıışık, Döndü; “Envoy: No strategic partnership between Turkey, Russia”, *Hürriyet Daily News*, 19 January 2010.

²³ “Russia and Turkey consider strategic partnership”, *RIA Novosti*, 13 January 2010, <http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20100113/157533140.html>.

²⁴ “Türkiye, Rusya'nın stratejik müttefik olabilir”, *Hürriyet*, 19 February 2009.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

level have been published.²⁶ Professor Aleksey Bogaturov, first deputy rector of Moscow University states, in an interview dated May 2010, that Turkey is evaluated as a new strategic partner of Russia within the framework of Russia's new foreign policy activism.²⁷ Ankara-based think-tank Center for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies (ORSAM) in its May 2010 dated Report titled as "*From Neighborliness to Strategic Partnership: Turkish-Russian Relations*" evaluates the developments in the political, economic, military and cultural fields of the bilateral relations as setting the stage for "multidimensional strategic partnership".²⁸ The Report evaluates Russian leader Medvedev's visit in May 2010 as an important step in this direction.²⁹ Differences in international and regional political issues in addition to the still persisting insecurity culture are perceived as obstacles that can be overcome. Saban Kardas, in his 2009 dated commentary titled as "*Turkey and Russia Developing a New Economic and Strategic Partnership*", interprets the relations as 'towards strategic partnership' while evaluating the four-day visit of Turkish president Abdullah Gül to Russia in February 2009 with reference to the thriving multidimensional relations between the two countries.³⁰

Şener Aktürk, in his 2006 dated article titled as "*Turkish-Russian Relations after the Cold War (1992-2002)*", evaluates the upgraded relations between Turkey and Russia as 'strategic partnership' and adds that each step contributing to this relationship, with specific reference to the Russian President Putin's 2004 dated visit to Turkey, as further enhancement of this partnership.³¹ Aktürk gives the priority to the shrinking threat level while explaining the Turkish-Russian cooperation. He argues that first the dwindling Russian threat and then the increase in the common geopolitical interests made Turkish-Russian cooperation level reach

²⁶ "Turkey and Russia on way to strategic partnership", *Hürriyet Daily News*, 11 January 2010; "Turkey and Russia move closer to building strategic partnership", *Today's Zaman*, 15 January 2010; "Turkey, Russia eye strategic partnership in Medvedev visit", *Today's Zaman*, 11 May 2010; "Turkish-Russian ties evolve into strategic partnership", *Today's Zaman*, 13 May 2010; "Turkey, Russia enter era of 'strategic partnership'", *Today's Zaman*, 16 May 2010.

²⁷ "Türkiye Rusya'nın yeni stratejik ortağı", *Haberrus*, 10 May 2010, <http://www.haberrus.com/yorum/roportaj/2783-Turkiye-Rusyanin-yeni-stratejik-ortagi.html>.

²⁸ "Komşuluktan Stratejik İşbirliğine: Türk-Rus İlişkileri", Report Number 18, *ORSAM*, May 2010, pp.5-15.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p.14.

³⁰ Kardas, Saban; "Turkey and Russia Developing a New Economic and Strategic Partnership", *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, 17 February 2009, Volume 6, Issue 31, [http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=34515](http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=34515).

³¹ Aktürk, Şener; "Turkish-Russian Relations after the Cold War (1992-2002)", *Turkish Studies*, September 2006, Volume 7, Number 3, p.359.

to the current altitude.³² Aktürk points out the three common interest areas that proliferated in time; cooperation in the military technical field, cooperation in the fight against terrorism and also cooperation in some specific regional matters such as common opponent posture against the invasion of Iraq and the stability in the Caucasus.³³ However, he also underlines the fact that the likely emergence of Russian threat may destroy the current picture albeit the presence of common interests.³⁴ Pertaining to the arguments yielding the precedence to the factors such as international institutions and the economic relations, Aktürk identifies these factors as symptoms rather than sources of cooperation.³⁵

Bülent Aras, in his 2009 dated article titled “*Turkey and the Russian Federation: An Emerging Multi-Dimensional Partnership*” makes a pro-con analysis of the “emerging multidimensional partnership” between Turkey and Russia. Aras puts the “growing number of mutual high level visits, booming economic relations, cooperation in energy related projects, agreements for military-technical relations and arms sales, and the diversity of activities designed for the region” as good news for the relations in the upcoming decades by reminding the “burden of past negative memories, difficulties of regional geopolitics, growing pains in the relationship” as challenges in front of the development of the relations further.³⁶ Aras thinks that the decisive factor in the craft of future relationship between Turkey and Russia will be the “ability of the sides to tackle these challenges”.³⁷

While the political élites, experts and journalists on both sides have been showing an increasing tendency of evaluating the relations by including the ‘strategic partnership’ dimension, the second group, mainly composed of scholars, acts with caution towards this popularized label of ‘strategic partnership’. They affirm that the ongoing cooperation between Turkey and Russia cannot be named as ‘strategic partnership’ because of the significant limiting factors mostly ignored or put as unimportant by the first group.

³² *Ibid.*, p.337.

³³ *Ibid.*, p.356.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p.339.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p.338.

³⁶ “Aras, Bülent; “Turkey and the Russian Federation: An Emerging Multi-Dimensional Partnership”, SETA Policy Brief, Number 35, August 2009, p.11.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p.11.

Fiona Hill and Omer Taspinar, in the article dated 2006 and titled “*Turkey and Russia: Axis of Excluded?*”, aver that the necessary political and structural substance for a strategic partnership do not exist between Turkey and Russia. In order to explain the current rapprochement, they yield the precedence to the impact of the US actions in strategic regions and fields converging the positions of Turkey and Russia to each other by attributing the opposition to the war Iraq a special significance. They argue that Turkey’s deep exasperation with the US policies in Iraq since the invasion in 2003 and the US penetration to the Russian sphere of influence created the formation of today’s picture of Turkish-Russian rapprochement by pinpointing the conflictual historical record, cavernous structural divergences and contradictory views which exist between Turkey and Russia.³⁸ The initial years of the relations are described as a period of Russia’s perception of Turkey as US proxy, escalating tension caused by opponent stance in regional matters and the rivalry in energy issues and both countries attention directed to their own relations with the West.³⁹ Moreover, the exclusion of both countries from the picture of Europe in addition to the frustration with the US is taken as another important factor directing each country to look for their own interests through cooperating as regional actors.⁴⁰ Turkey’s reactionary action of putting efforts to have a new level of relationship with Russia in varying fields following the invasion of Iraq is evaluated as ‘tactical’.⁴¹ To sum up, the common posture of Turkey and Russia with regard to issues pertaining not only to Iraq but the Middle East in general which was shaped by the US self-focused policies ignoring the vital interests of these two states and the choice of Turkey and Russia favoring stability rather than injected democracies in their neighborhood which might open the Pandora’s box enforced these two states put their differences aside and cooperate.⁴² They built the argument on the impact of the invasion of Iraq. While explaining all these aforementioned points, they mention the economic relations as a contributory factor but not the main issue at the core.

Igor Torbakov, in his 2007 dated article named “*Making Sense of the Current Phase of Turkish-Russian Relations*”, questions the ongoing Turkish-Russian rapprochement with a critical eye and reaches to the conclusion that the appearance and the facts are different since

³⁸ Hill, Fiona and Taspinar, Omer; “Turkey and Russia: Axis of Excluded?”, *Survival*, Spring 2006, Volume 48, Number 1, p.81.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, pp.83-84.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp.84-85.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p.81.

⁴² *Ibid.*, pp.84-85.

the partnership module is not mature yet and the ideological foundation is falling short of an ‘alliance-type relationship’.⁴³ Igor Torbakov raises critical evaluations on three key factors namely energy, posture against the West and non-Western identity which are put forwards as the driving forces of the current relations. He claims that the objectives of Turkey and Russia in the energy field are at odds.⁴⁴ Torbakov even sees the speedy development in the field of economic cooperation not as the reason but more like the result of the change in threat perceptions.⁴⁵ He evaluates the rapprochement triggered by the US unilateral actions which started with the invasion of Iraq as ‘tactical’ due to the fact that unlike Russia, Turkey’s disappointment with the West does not have a ‘global’ framework by reminding the existence of hot spots between Turkey and Russia such as PKK, Cyprus, Armenia, Karabakh.⁴⁶ Besides, Torbakov finds the voiced ‘alienation’ notion, which is alleged by some scholars as a driving factor behind the current rapprochement, as lack of ‘a serious philosophical platform’ due to the fact that each country’s disappointment with the West is originated from different source namely the uneasiness with the West does not have the same source.⁴⁷ With regards to the non-Western identity promotion, Torbakov claims that the theories such as Eurasianism and Neo-Ottomanism are not functional for convergence since the first one has different meanings and backgrounds for Turkey and Russia, and the latter one may revive the old type rivalry between Turkey and Russia.⁴⁸ Torbakov puts the ‘diverging strategic outlooks, mutual distrust and feeble cultural ties’ in addition to the existence of ‘potential for the reemergence of the geopolitical rivalry’ as the factors limiting the rapprochement between Turkey and Russia.⁴⁹ Torbakov asserts that the foremost reason explaining the current rapprochement is the changing threat perceptions in Turkey and Russia towards each other.⁵⁰ The diminution of Russian threat with the sharp decline of Soviet capabilities, especially in military terms, and the collapse of the ‘pan-Turkic’ ideas with the failure of the ‘Turkish model’ made them get close to each other.⁵¹

⁴³ Torbakov, Igor, “Making Sense of the Current Phase of Turkish-Russian Relations, Jamestown Foundation Occasional Paper, October 2007, p.3.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp.7-9.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p.5.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp.10-11.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p.3.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, pp.11-14.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p.5.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, pp.5-6.

Suat Kiniklioğlu and Valeriy Morkva, in the article dated 2007 with the title of “*An anatomy of Turkish–Russian Relations*” assert that the ongoing relations are conditional in essence and positional in appearance but not at the level of strategic partnership. They put forwards the ‘sense of alienation from the West’⁵² to explain the rapprochement between Turkey and Russia which has become more pronounced in time. They argue that the political and strategic dimensions of Turkish-Russian relations in addition to the existing trade and energy dimensions are brought with this ‘distinct sense of alienation’ triggered by the EU’s unwillingness toward Turkish membership and Turkey’s disappointment with the US over the Iraqi war.⁵³ The other input to the further rapprochement in the bilateral relations is evaluated as the key policy concepts of the strategic depth and the zero-problem-with-neighbors developed by Prof. Ahmet Davutoğlu,⁵⁴ the former advisor to the Turkish premier but currently Turkish Foreign Minister. Davutoğlu’s vision of putting Turkey as a key country among the surrounding regions instead of a flank country and of following multi-faceted foreign policy understanding is appraised as necessary “the intellectual legitimacy to pursue the acceleration of the ongoing rapprochement and deepen the bilateral relationship”.⁵⁵ To sum up, it is asserted that the defensive and reactionary nature of Turkish-Russian relationship against both the latent instabilities in their hinterlands beside of the creation of a new Europe without including them to the picture made these two countries become closer to each other.⁵⁶ For that reason, Kiniklioğlu and Morkva associate the future of Turkish-Russian relations with the quality of the respective relations with the West.⁵⁷

Eugene Kogan in his article “*Turkish-American Strategic Partnership versus Turkish-Russian Partnership without Strategy*” dated in October 2009 defines the partnership of Turkey and Russia as devoid of strategy. He avers that there are several blanks to be filled in this partnership. Kogan’s main argument is that the source of the rapprochement is ‘a shared desire to maintain the status quo’ due to the fact that Turkey has concerns regarding the impact of near border destabilizations on its territorial integrity whereas Russia has concerns

⁵² Kiniklioğlu, Suat and Morkva, Valeriy; “An anatomy of Turkish-Russian Relations”, *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 2007, Volume 7, Number 4, p.548.

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p.535.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, pp.535-536.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p.548.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

as regards to the Western permeation to its own self-proclaimed sphere of influence.⁵⁸ Kogan claims that Russia is getting advantage of Turkey's disappointment triggered by the West.⁵⁹ Since he puts forward the Western actions as a cause of the rapprochement, he links the fate of their bilateral relationship to their relations with the West.⁶⁰ He indicates the low level of cooperation in defense industry as symptom of partnership lack of substance.⁶¹ Kogan puts Turkey's NATO membership as a concern for Russia, and increasing economic and energy dependence of Turkey on Russia as a concern for Turkey.⁶² Additionally, Kogan states that the re-appearance of a muscular Russia in the regions where competition is not outdated between Turkey and Russia can change the picture.⁶³

1.2. Argument

In response to the arguments identifying the very nature of the current relations between Turkey and Russia as 'strategic partnership' or as a cooperation on its way to reach that level, the thesis argues that the current euphoria of rapprochement between these two countries is caused by pragmatic considerations on both countries because of the limits to this cooperation.

As regards the definition of the concept of security in international relations⁶⁴, the thesis takes the mostly accepted definition of the concept that "security, in an objective sense measures the absence of threats to acquired value, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked".⁶⁵ Since total absence is not possible in an anarchic

⁵⁸ Kogan Eugene; "Turkish-American Strategic Partnership versus Turkish-Russian Partnership without Strategy", Internationales Institut Liberale Politik Wien, October 2009, p.12.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² *Ibid.*, pp.11-12

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p.11

⁶⁴ With regard to the definitional problem of the concept, Bjørn Møller states that "Surprisingly little was, however, written about the concept of security (as opposed to presumed strategies for achieving it) by the IR theoreticians". Please see, Møller, Bjørn; "National, Societal and Human Security: A General Discussion with a Case Study from the Balkans", Paper for the First International Meeting of Directors of Peace Research and Training Institutions on *What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?*, UNESCO, Paris, 27-28 November 2000, p.4. For a more detailed discussion over the concept, please see; Romm, Joseph J.; *Defining National Security: The Non-Military Aspects*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993 and Baldwin, David A.; "The Concept of Security", *Review of International Studies*, 1997, Vol. 23.

⁶⁵ Wolfers, Arnold; "National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol", *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 67, No. 4, Dec. 1952, p.485.

international system, “alleviation of threats to cherished values”⁶⁶ would be much more realistic approach to the concept. The identification of these values and threats change from state to state by time and thus the meaning attributed to the concept of security by each state. In contrast to the early approaches to the concept taking only the military aspect in a narrow sense or later approaches taking “societal, human and environmental”⁶⁷ aspects in broader sense, the concept of security in this thesis is used to address its traditional meaning namely ‘national security’ to a great extent. Since ‘states’ are the main actors, ‘sovereignty and territorial integrity’ are two key values and ‘other states and substate actors’ are sources that may threaten these values, as categorized by Møller.⁶⁸ From this point of view, definition of the concept of ‘national security’ by Amos A. Jordan and William J. Taylor as “a more extensive meaning than protection from physical harm; it also implies protection, through a variety of means, of vital economic and political interests, the loss of which could threaten fundamental values and the vitality of state”⁶⁹ is taken as referent definition of the thesis.

The thesis accepts the fact that there is an ongoing process of cooperation, albeit fragile nature, between Turkey and Russia in various fields but departs from the ones presenting this relationship as ‘strategic partnership’ or on its way to reach that level by putting forward the limits to this cooperation between two countries. The relations which exist between these two countries is not the result of a tailor-made policy designed for each other or for specific purpose but just the part of a wider picture drawn by each country for their ambitious future goals and interests. Therefore it would be much more realistic to name the current relations as pragmatic cooperation instead of ambitious concept of ‘strategic partnership’.

Although there are varying definitions of strategic partnership, “a long-term commitment by two important actors to establish a close relationship across a significant number of policy areas”⁷⁰ is used to refer the concept in here. “It must also be comprehensive, holistic and

⁶⁶ Williams, Paul D.; *Security Studies: An Introduction*, (ed. by Williams, Paul D), New York: Routledge, 2008, p.5.

⁶⁷ Møller, Bjørn; “National, Societal and Human Security: A General Discussion with a Case Study from the Balkans”, paper for the First International Meeting of Directors of Peace Research and Training Institutions on *What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?*, UNESCO, Paris, 27-28 November 2000, p.10.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹ Romm, Joseph J.; *Defining National Security: The Non-Military Aspects*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993, pp. 5-6.

⁷⁰ Cameron, Fraser & Zheng, Yongnian; “Key Elements of Strategic Partnership” in *China-EU: Common Feature* (ed. by Crossick, Stanley & Reuter, Etienne), Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co., 2007, p.4.

long-term, and there must be an intensive, on-going and stable commitment to it".⁷¹ From this point of view, the thesis stands against the use of concept as means for establishing economic and/or trade relations with another country. "Mutual trust, respect and understanding" are also other key words of strategic partnership. As regards pragmatic cooperation, parties involved in this kind of relations considers and acts as based on their mutual security interests which may apt to change within short period of time, so long-term and stable commitment is out of question for this kind of relations. With regard to the interests at stake, mutual trust is another lacking part for this kind of relationship. Besides, the policy areas that the parties agreed to cooperate on are designated pragmatically which makes most of the abovementioned features of 'strategic partnership' impossible to apply.

Let the one begin with the bright side of the story. The first step as the source of the cooperation came with the diminution of mutual threat level which came with the familiarization to each other's strong and weak facets after the breakup of the Soviet Union. The emerging common interest areas have prepared the necessary ground for further cooperation between these two countries. External events such as September 11 triggering dramatic changes in the international system and the war in Iraq as a major event providing convergence in Turkey's and Russia's security interests facilitated this process. However dormant but enduring limits to this cooperation are the heart of the issue identifying the very nature of the relations thereby the direction of where and also how far this cooperation can go in the years ahead.

In order to grasp the spirit of the current relations between Turkey and Russia that have always been the countries where geopolitics and pragmatism matter, neorealist school of thought appears as the best theoretical framework to analyze the relations between these two countries since both states as the holder of strong state traditions are very well aware of the fact that they are the main actors destined to search for power and security to stand firm in this anarchic international structure by having experienced very well the results of the otherwise situations in their traumatic histories. The neorealist approach to the knotty problem of long-term cooperation in this international structure is pessimistic. Within this context, Kenneth N. Waltz, Joseph M. Grieco and Robert Jervis as the foremost names of the neorealist theory holding the argument of that there are limits of cooperation will be given the floor.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p.8.

Kenneth N. Waltz puts the 'structure of international politics' per se as 'limit' to cooperation.⁷² Waltzian neorealist assumption of this international structure is the amalgam of anarchy, self-help and insecurity. When it comes to the question of how this structure limits cooperation, Waltz identifies two qualms making states take the decision of limiting its cooperation with the other state. First one is the relative gains problem namely "a state worries about a division of possible gains that may favor others more than itself" and the second one is the dependency issue namely "a state worries lest it become dependent on others through cooperative endeavors and exchanges of goods and services".⁷³ The chronic suspicion towards the other and its future manners fed by 'the condition of insecurity' of the structure of international system deepens these fears.⁷⁴

Robert Jervis starts with drawing the picture of security dilemma in the anarchical context while embarking on his vision of the structure of the international politics. Jervis identifies the limits of cooperation by referring three points. First, Jervis points out the insecurity towards the other state's considerations and actions in the future since today's status quo biased state may change its position in the forthcoming days.⁷⁵ "Minds can be changed, new leaders can come to power, values can shift, new opportunities and dangers can arise".⁷⁶ Second point of that states' desires to protect their possessions and to secure their supplies in the possible war situations through the way of either controlling the resources or territory nearby their own borders increases the worries among the others whose interests and security are becoming under potential danger.⁷⁷ Third and the final point is the security dilemma. Jervis avows that "one state's gain in security often inadvertently threatens others".⁷⁸ By quoting a French spokesman's definition of security which includes "maintenance of a people's homeland, or even of their territories beyond the seas...maintenance of the world's respect for them, the maintenance of their economic interests, everything in a word, which goes to make up the grandeur, the life itself, of the nation"⁷⁹, Jervis shows the width and

⁷² Waltz, Kenneth N.; *Theory of International Politics*, New York: Random House, 1979, (First Edition), p.105.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p.106.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p.105.

⁷⁵ Jervis, Robert; "Cooperation under Security Dilemma", *World Politics*, John Hopkins University Press, January 1978, Volume 30, Issue 2, p.168.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, pp.168-169.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p.170.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p.185.

depth of the term by adding that similar attributes to the meaning of security makes the competition and conflict unavoidable. Since security is the end at apogee and power is just a means of reaching this end to guarantee the survival, the argument of the thesis also benefits from realist definition of power with reference to the material possessions of states. Given the fact that asymmetry/imbalance in relative gains will have either direct or indirect effect on the relative distribution of power calculated with the material possessions, different parameters used by realist school are taken into consideration to measure the relative power.

Joseph M. Grieco highlights the fact that international anarchy is the main factor behind the formation of competitive, instead of cooperative, natured international politics.⁸⁰ According to Grieco, realism addresses two core problems of international cooperation. These are cheating and relative gains problems.⁸¹ Unlike neoliberals focusing on the former problem as the most important barrier of international cooperation, Grieco takes the latter to the center of his attention.⁸² Grieco underlines relative gains issue by spelling out that states in the anarchic international system are ‘positional’, but not atomistic as argued by neoliberals, in the sense that the ‘relative achievements of gains’ is as important as ‘absolute achievements of gains’ in limiting the cooperation since the friend in today may appear as foe in the future.⁸³ The uncertainty of a state about the future intentions of another state as indication of the “persistence of the uncertainty of international relations” directs the attention to the question of “how cooperation might affect relative capabilities in the future”.⁸⁴ This obscurity and insecurity which is the natural environment of states in the international system of anarchy lead each state to think in a way that “state utility functions” are not totally independent because one’s utility affects the other’s in opposite terms.⁸⁵ This asymmetry in the relative gains and hence in the relative capabilities among states carries serious risks for their independence and/or security in the anarchical, self-help and insecure international politics visualized by realist theory.⁸⁶ Therefore, state may prefer to non-

⁸⁰ Grieco, Joseph M.; “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism” in *Theory and Structure of International Political Economy: An International Organization Reader* (ed. by Cohen, Benjamin J.& Lipson, Charles), Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999, p.9.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p.11.

⁸² *Ibid.*

⁸³ *Ibid.*

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

cooperate or to stop cooperation even when they share common interests⁸⁷ since the cooperation game of relative maximizers, no matter of power or influence to reach security, sooner or later turns into zero-sum game.⁸⁸

Unlike the neoliberal institutionalism depicting the maintenance of long-term cooperation as achievable among the self-interested atomistic states in the anarchic international context through the usage of several means such as institutions, regimes or economic interdependence to weaken the effects of anarchy, the neorealist assumptions yielding the precedence to the 'security' by employing all the necessary means to reach this end provide a much more solid ground to discuss the relations between Turkey and Russia. Since the dynamics of inter-state cooperation in the security sphere is extremely difficult to achieve from the perspective of neorealism.

Turkey and Russia, after getting over the intricacy of the initial years which appeared as several ups and downs in the relations of the 1990s, separately but approximately around the same times embarked on crafting necessary steps of their grand strategies to achieve their highest ends namely security through the means of power while upholding their positions in the anarchic, self-helping and insecure international system. While doing this, both paid "internal and external efforts"⁸⁹ as the means taking them to the desired positions and motivations of each one. The appearance of current rapprochement came to life as a result of this reckoning. However this rosy appearance does not have a solid ground since the current picture of the bilateral relations between these two countries are just the part of the grand strategy of each country created with the wisely crafted pragmatist and tactical considerations. Beside of the international political structure limiting cooperation, Russia's ambition of becoming a global power and Turkey's ambition of becoming a global actor in the same geographical landscape make them look at their relative gains carefully. In the end, one of them will be more dependent on another. Insecurity between Turkey and Russia fed by the shadow of the past and blurriness of the changes in the future, not to mention the system injected insecurity, will be one of the factors limiting cooperation. Security dilemma

⁸⁷ Grieco, Joseph M.; *Cooperation Among Nations: Europe, America and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade*, New York: Cornell University Press, 1990, p.4, p.27.

⁸⁸ Stein, Arthur A.; "The Hegemon's Dilemma: Great Britain, the United States, and the International Economic Order" in *Theory and Structure of International Political Economy: An International Organization Reader*, (ed. by Cohen, Benjamin J. & Lipson, Charles), Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999, p. 312.

⁸⁹ Waltz defines these internal efforts as developing wise strategies together with increasing economic and military capabilities, and the external efforts as steps either to empower its own partnership circle or to weaken the opponent's. For further information, please see Waltz, Kenneth N.; *Theory of International Politics*, New York: Random House, 1979, (First Edition), p.118.

will always be the case especially in the issues or areas where the interests of each country be conflicting.

In closing, the last decade of the bilateral relations between Turkey and Russia which have been developing as dissimilar from the status quo ante in the 1990s is the result of wisely designed and implemented pragmatism and tactical rapprochement. Naming the current relations with an ambitious concept like 'strategic partnership' is starry-eyed attitude due to the limits to this cooperation.

1.3. Research Methodology

The thesis is undertaken to grasp the very nature of the current relations between Turkey and Russia. The defined research problem is to question the validity of the arguments of 'strategic partnership' or 'towards strategic partnership' attributes to the current level of the relations between these two countries. The main argument of the thesis formulated as that these attributes do not reflect the true nature of the current euphoria of rapprochement between Turkey and Russia due to the existing limits which lead to the seemingly good relations in the end but based on pragmatic cooperation instead.

As regards research methodology, analytical research type together with qualitative content-analysis method⁹⁰ has been used. In order to understand the true nature of the relations between Turkey and Russia, the content analysis of official documents and statements, interviews, news and articles are used to show how the approaches/perceptions/attitudes of Turkey and Russia towards each other and also to the events in their common interest areas have changed over time with causal connection. Since the last decade of the relations is taken into scrutiny as the main focus of the thesis by referring the first decade as background, priority is given mostly to the extensive use of the online primary resources rather than secondary ones. As primary resources, official statements and documents which are available on internet as well as the materials of online newspaper archives and news services are used. Especially the official websites of Turkish Foreign Ministry, the President of Russia and the Russian Embassy in Turkey in addition to the online news archive of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information are surveyed. As

⁹⁰ Alan Bryman defines the method as "a searching-out of underlying themes in the materials being analyzed" and "an approach to documents that emphasizes the role of the investigator in the construction of the meaning of and in texts". Kohlbacher, Florian; "The Use of Qualitative Content Analysis in Case Study Research", Forum: Qualitative Social Research (FQS) online journal, Volume 7, No. 1, 2006, <http://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/viewArticle/75/153>.

secondary resources, books, academic journals, and the comments of newspaper columnists and think-tank experts through both library and internet researches are utilized.

The main strengths of this method are the possibility of giving a lucid chronology of the history of relations through the wide use of data collected from different resources, mostly based on official texts, and availability of updating these data. The main weakness of this method is subjectivity since data selection is apt to choice and collected data is being interpreted. Another weakness that should be mentioned in here, even not directly related to method per se, is the lack of analysis of the resources in Russian since the thesis took only English and Turkish resources.

1.4. Organization of the Chapters

The thesis is composed of six chapters. The first introductory chapter addresses the literature review, the argument and the research methodology of the thesis respectively. The second and third chapter consisting of four sections studies the evolution of the security aspect of the Turkish-Russian relations in the 1990s. These four sections point out the different leanings emerged during the first decade of the bilateral relations in the post-Soviet era. The third chapter, organized in four sections, examines the security aspect of the Turkish-Russian relations in the 2000s. Each section indicates different phase of the relationship between Turkey and Russia.

The fourth chapter, made up of five sections, focuses on the sources of cooperation in the development of Turkish-Russian security cooperation. The first section examines the diminution of mutual threat levels in the relations between Turkey and Russia. The second section covers September 11 and the fight against international terrorism. The third section investigates the war in Iraq as the main external threat providing Turkish-Russian co-positioning by removing the stereotype image of Turkey's foreign policy orientations from the minds of Russia's foreign policy makers due to emergence of new factors with the end of the war threatening the vital security interests of both countries. The fourth section explores closely the factors behind the developing cooperation between Turkey and Russia in the Black Sea. The final fifth section deals with the issue of arm sales between Turkey and Russia.

The fifth chapter, composed of six sections, discusses the limits to the Turkish-Russian security cooperation. In each section, detailed analysis of the limits constraining the further development in front of the cooperation in the security field is presented. These limits are

taken as the main factor providing the basis of the relations which have been developed in the form of pragmatic cooperation. The first section takes the persistence of the culture of security into scrutiny. The second section looks at the impacts of the fight against terrorism at home on the bilateral relations since both countries still hold necessary cards to play against each other in 'if need be' situations. The third and fourth sections probe the competitive nature of Turkish-Russian relations in the Caucasus and Central Asia and ends up with that the competitive nature seems to be apt to change on the surface with the changing circumstances but in essence the competition is still going on albeit in a much more managed way. The fifth section takes the picture of Turkey-NATO-Russia triangle as limiting the further cooperation between Turkey and Russia. The sixth section deals with the energy dimension of the relations by focusing on the competitive pipeline politics of Turkey and Russia.

The sixth chapter as the concluding one asserts that the development of the relations between Turkey and Russia is motivated by pragmatic considerations in reaction to the changes in the regional and international context due to the limits to the cooperation. Labeling the bilateral relations as 'strategic partnership' or 'towards strategic partnership' is far from grasping the very nature of the relations. The enduring opponent demeanor on both sides in some specific matters limits the development of a relationship on robust ground.

CHAPTER TWO

SECURITY ASPECT OF TURKISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS IN THE 1990s

In order to give background information of the current relations between Turkey and Russia, this chapter will examine the security aspect of the bilateral relations in the first decade of the post-Soviet era. The relations will be studied under four sections. In each section, related developments pertaining to the security aspect of the bilateral relations will be described briefly. The first section will look at the developments between 1991 and 1993. The second section titled period of intense mutual suspicion will be dealing with the developments occurred between 1993 and 1996. The third section titled beginning of fuzzy rapprochement will take the picture of the relations between 1996 and 1998. The fourth section titled turbulent Russia and rapprochement as the last section of this chapter will take the relations between 1998 and 2000 into scrutiny.

2.1. Initial Period (1991-1993)

Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Turkey recognized the new successor state, the Russian Federation, on December 24, 1991 and took necessary initiatives to start the official relations. After the exchange of the official visits realized first by Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin to Russia on January 20-22, 1992 and then the Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev to Turkey on February 02-04, 1992, Turkish Premier Süleyman Demirel and his Russian counterpart Boris Yeltsin signed the "Treaty on the Principles of Relations between the Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation" on May 25, 1992 in Moscow which is deemed as the founding treaty composed of basic principles regulating the bilateral relations between Turkey and Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union.⁹¹ This multi-dimensional agreement including various subjects has references to following points: respect to the territorial integrity, non-intervention in internal affairs, abstention from the use of force, peaceful resolution of the conflicts, neutrality in the case of attack to each party by a third country, disallowing the use of their territories for the separatist and destructive

⁹¹ "Turkey's Political Relations with Russian Federation", Official website of Turkish Foreign Ministry, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-political-relations-with-russian-federation.en.mfa; Kamel, Ayhan; "İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nın Bitiminden Günümüze Kadar Türk - Rus İlişkileri", *Foreign Policy*, http://www.foreignpolicy.org.tr/turkish/dosyalar/akamel_p.htm.

activities targeting the each other and upgrading the high-level military contacts on a regular basis.⁹² The previously signed 13 agreements between Turkey and the Soviet Union were also validated for Russia.⁹³ In October 1992, Turkish Interior Minister İsmet Sezgin to Moscow went to Moscow and two cooperation agreements were signed with the Russian Security Ministry and the Russian Interior Ministry covering the fight against terrorism.⁹⁴ Minister Sezgin stated that Turkey and Russia had similar points of view with regard to the security problems in the bilateral and international levels.⁹⁵

Turkish President Demirel, in his opening speech of the Turkish-Russian jointly organized symposium “500 Years in Turkish-Russian Relations” on December 12, 1992, expressed the pleasure of what had been achieved until now regarding the bilateral relations by adding Turkey’s readiness for further steps in the 21st century.⁹⁶ However the second undersecretary of the Russian Foreign Ministry Adami Sin’s statement in the same symposium was underlining a small overlooked detail that Russia had not formed its foreign policy concept yet since the state not been established in full sense.⁹⁷ There were many disturbances mainly caused by the ongoing state-building process in Russia. The transition problems in political, social and economic terms hit the Russian Federation severely and began to discredit its pro-Western policies aiming the integration with Euro-Atlantic structures and organizations under the duo leadership of the Russian President Yeltsin and the Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev since the first day they came to power. The ‘shock therapy’ recipe of Yegor Gaidar, which started in June 1992, juggled Russia dramatically with 47 percent decrease in real income, 2600 percent inflation rate, 14 percent decline in GDP together with the independence declarations as in Chechnya or similar tendencies as in Tatarstan and

⁹² “Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ile Rusya Federasyonu Arasındaki İlişkilerin Esasları Hakkında Antlaşma”, 25 May 1992, Official website of Turkish Foreign Ministry, <http://ua.mfa.gov.tr/detay.aspx?5411>.

⁹³ “Ayın Tarihi”, Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, May 1992.

⁹⁴ “Türkiye Cumhuriyeti İçişleri Bakanlığı ile Rusya Federasyonu Güvenlik Bakanlığı Arasında İşbirliğine İlişkin Anlaşması”, Turkish Foreign Ministry website, 28 October 1992, <http://ua.mfa.gov.tr/detay.aspx?5283>; “Türkiye Cumhuriyeti İçişleri Bakanlığı ile Rusya Federasyonu İçişleri Bakanlığı Arasında İşbirliği Anlaşması”, Official website of Turkish Foreign Ministry, 30 October 1992, <http://ua.mfa.gov.tr/detay.aspx?7050>.

⁹⁵ “Ayın Tarihi”, Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, October 1992.

⁹⁶ “Ayın Tarihi”, Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, December 1992

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

Bashkortostan made the things even more difficult for Russia.⁹⁸ The reluctance of Turkic Bashkortostan in signing the Federation treaty, unilateral declaration of independence by Chechnya in 1991 by calling Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan to stand against Russian influence and germinating pan-Turkic movements among Siberian Tatars suddenly surrounded Russia that was already suffering from transition process.⁹⁹ However what made this transition process even much more traumatic for the Russian Federation was the fact of its being a former great power.

While all these happening in Russia, the post-Soviet periphery began to spill over with the turmoil coming from the Soviet times. Among several inter/intra-conflicts, the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict was the most important one for Turkey due to several reasons. The crisis which had started in 1988 between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno Karabakh escalated during the Gorbachev years in 1990, peaked with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the anticipated full-scale war broke out in 1992.¹⁰⁰ In the initial stage of the conflict, even though the lines seemed blurry, the parties were clear enough but both sides saw more cost than benefit in the engagement with such a war. Therefore both Turkey and Russia kept cautious policies towards the conflict because of taking into account several factors. Turkey defended its impartial attitude with the lack of legal base for intervention and the absence of Azerbaijan's demand for Turkish intervention in the problem though the call of some high-level authorities both in Turkey and Azerbaijan for the military intervention bearing from Kars Agreement.¹⁰¹ Turkey asked for the pursuance of the same neutrality policy from Russia as well through diplomatic channels on February 26, 1992.¹⁰² Meanwhile a bilateral military agreement signed between Russia and Armenia in February 1992 entitling the Russian Border Forces Commandership to guard the Armenian-Turkish border together with

⁹⁸ Karaman, Tatyana A.; "Russia (1994-1996)" in *Civil Wars of the World: Major Conflicts since World War II* (ed. by DeRouen Jr, Karl&Heo, Uk), California; ABC-CLIO Inc. , 2007, p.636.

⁹⁹ Konarovsky, Mikhail; "Russia and the Emerging Geopolitical Order in Central Asia" in *The New Geopolitics of Central Asia and its Borderlands*, (ed.by Banuazizi, Ali and Weiner, Myron), Great Britain: I.B.Tauris&Co Ltd., 1994, p.237.

¹⁰⁰ Beehner, Lionel; "Nagorno-Karabakh: The Crisis in the Caucasus", *Council on Foreign Relations*, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/9148/nagornokarabakh.html>.

¹⁰¹ Cornell, Svante E.; "Turkey and the Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh: A Delicate Balance", *Middle Eastern Studies* , January 1998, Volume 34, Number 1 , p.60; "Ayın Tarihi", Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, May 1992.

¹⁰² "Ayın Tarihi", Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, February 1992.

Armenian-Iran border.¹⁰³ However both Abülfez Elçibey known with his pro-Turkish and anti-Russian tendencies together with the increasing critiques and public reaction in Turkey after Khojaly massacre in late February began to drag Turkey and Russia to the opposite camps of this conflict.¹⁰⁴ As a result of the increasing critiques from the opposition parties concerning Turkey's neutral stance towards the Armenian attacks in Azerbaijan, Turkish Premier Demirel stated in an interview with Washington Post on March 19, 1992 that they did not eliminate the option of military intervention.¹⁰⁵ Turkish President Turgut Özal made a supportive statement of such an intervention as well.¹⁰⁶ The threat of possible Turkish military intervention in the Azerbaijan-Armenia war alerted Russia. Russia not only showed strong reaction to this possibility but also Marshal Shaposhnikov, the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the CIS overtly threatened with the outbreak of the Third World War, if such thing happens.¹⁰⁷ Russia and Armenia along with some other post-Soviet republics got under the same defense umbrella through signing the CIS Collective Security Treaty on May 15, 1992, hence legal ground for Russian involvement in meeting any attack against Armenia happened to be ready.¹⁰⁸ Tension could only be reduced with the cease of Armenian attacks on Nakhichevan upon Turkey's warnings.¹⁰⁹ On May 22, 1992, before the visit of Turkish President Demirel to Moscow, Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement condemning the Armenian attacks by naming them as illegal activities.¹¹⁰ On May 24, 1992, Turkish Foreign Minister Çetin uttered Turkey's concern over different voices in Russia regarding the Armenian attacks by adding that Russia will be invited to keep one voice in

¹⁰³ Cabbarlı, Hatem; "Ermenistan ve Rusya Arasında Gelişen Askeri İşbirliği", *ATSAM – Eurasian Center For Security And Strategic Studies*, January 2005, <http://www.atsam.org/ermenistan-ve-rusya-arasinda-gelisen-askeri-isbirligi/>.

¹⁰⁴ Beehner, Lionel; "Nagorno-Karabakh: The Crisis in the Caucasus", *Council on Foreign Relations*, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/9148/nagornokarabakh.html>; Cornell, Svante E.; "Turkey and the Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh: A Delicate Balance", *Middle Eastern Studies*, January 1998, Volume 34, Number 1, p.60.

¹⁰⁵ Cornell, Svante E.; "Turkey and the Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh: A Delicate Balance", *Middle Eastern Studies*, January 1998, Volume 34, Number 1, p.61.

¹⁰⁶ Kasım, Kamer; "The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict From its Inception to the Peace Process", *Armenian Studies*, June-July-August 2001, Issue 2, <http://www.eraren.org/index.php?Page=DergiIcerik&IcerikNo=227&Lisan=en>; "Özal: Asker Gönderin", *Hürriyet*, 19 May 1992.

¹⁰⁷ Trenin, Dimitri; "Russia's Security Interests and Policies in the Caucasus Region" in *Contested Borders in the Caucasus*, (ed. by Bruno Coppieters), Brussel: VUB University Press, 1996; Kasım, Kamer; "The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict From its Inception to the Peace Process", *Armenian Studies*, June-July-August 2001, Issue 2, <http://www.eraren.org/index.php?Page=DergiIcerik&IcerikNo=227&Lisan=en>.

¹⁰⁸ Kasım, Kamer; "The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict From its Inception to the Peace Process", *Armenian Studies*, June-July-August 2001, Issue 2, <http://www.eraren.org/index.php?Page=DergiIcerik&IcerikNo=227&Lisan=en>.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁰ "Ayın Tarihi", Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, May 1992.

this matter.¹¹¹ This issue became the focus of the talks between Turkish President Demirel and his Russian counterpart during his visit to Moscow to sign the founding treaty establishing the relations on May 25, 1992.¹¹² During the visit, Turkish side guaranteed the Russian side that it will not send soldiers to Nakhichevan.¹¹³ At the end of the talks, both leaders expressed their common posture with regard to the conflict and issued a joint declaration condemning the escalation of the tension in Karabakh by calling ceasefire.¹¹⁴ During the visit of the Russian State Secretary Gennadi Burbulis on August 26, 1992, the speaker of Turkish Parliament Hüsametdin Cindoruk described the bilateral relations as in the beginning of a bright period.¹¹⁵ Russian Ambassador to Turkey Albert Chernishev in a press meeting held on September 06, 1992 in Ankara, expressed Russia's desire to have 'allied type' relations with Turkey in the long-run by stating that both countries should stand against extreme nationalist and religious tendencies in the Caucasus and Central Asia.¹¹⁶

Although Turkey focused on the opportunities more than challenges posed by the new circumstances appeared after the collapse of the Soviet Union and even these perceived opportunities made President Turgut Özal call the 21st century as Turkish century in 1992¹¹⁷, the challenges standing in front of Turkey turned out to be more overt and marked along in due time.

2.2. Period of Intense Mutual Suspicion (1993-1996)

A gradually soft shift from pro-Westernism to 'new Eurasianism' in Russia became visible with the Foreign Policy Concept dated April 1993 and the military doctrine dated November 1993 in consequence of incompetent western economic aid, worsening economic situation

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹¹² *Ibid.*

¹¹³ İşyar, Ömer Göksel; "Türkiye'nin Azerbaycan-Ermenistan Uyuşmazlığına Yönelik Politikaları: 1992-2004" in *Geçmişten Günümüze Dönüşen Orta Asya ve Kafkasya*, (ed. by Demirağ, Yelda&Karadeli, Cem), Ankara:Palme Yayıncılık, 2006, pp.252-253.

¹¹⁴ "Ayın Tarihi", Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, May 1992.

¹¹⁵"Ayın Tarihi", Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, August 1992.

¹¹⁶"Ayın Tarihi", Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, September 1992.

¹¹⁷ Laçiner, Sedat; "Turgut Özal Period in Turkish Foreign Policy: Özalism", *The Journal of Turkish Weekly*, 09 March 2009, <http://www.turkishweekly.net/article/333/turgut-Özal-period-in-turkish-foreign-policy-Özalism.html>.

because of failed economic reforms and unmet demands of Russia from the Western powers to be accepted as a great power.¹¹⁸ The dominance of “geopolitical realism” with the declaration of Near Abroad Doctrine in 1993 as a reaction to the blindfold pro-Western posture pursued since 1991 brought assertive discourse and steps along with.¹¹⁹ Christian Thorun summarizes it as follows:

The thinking by this period was geopolitical Realist in the sense that Moscow conceived of the international system as competitive, states were thought to strive for spheres of influence, and Russian foreign policy was tasked with establishing Russia as an equal partner vis-à-vis the Western states and as a Eurasian great power. It was assumed that the best strategy to achieve these objectives was to conduct more assertive policies.

In accordance with the Near Abroad Doctrine, the interests of Russia in the CIS region are underlined with a special emphasis to the danger of third parties’ involvements as political-military entities or their actions in the shape of economic and religious groups.¹²⁰ While mentioning the danger of economic and religious groups set by the third parties, one of the targets was Turkey together with Iran since both countries were being criticized for their competitive efforts for having influence in the region. Turkey was using economic means to infiltrate to the region whereas Iran was playing the religion card. Similarly, in specific parts of the “Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation” adopted on November 02, 1993, Turkey was indirectly referred. “Protection of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and other vitally important interests of the Russian Federation in the event of aggression launched against itself or its allies”, “attacks on facilities and installations on the state border of the Russian Federation and on the borders of its allies and the launching of border conflicts and armed provocations”, “training of armed formations and groups on the territory of other states which are intended to be transferred to the territory of the Russian Federation and its allies” and “the introduction of foreign troops in the territory of neighboring states of the Russian Federation” could be taken as a warning for any possible attack against Armenia.¹²¹

¹¹⁸ Rieber, Alfred J.; “How Persistent are Persistent Factors?” in *Russian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century & The Shadow of the Past* (ed. by Legvold, Robert), New York; Columbia University Press, 2007, p.259; Light, Margot; “In Search of an Identity: Russian Foreign Policy and the End of Ideology”, *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, 19 (3), 2003, p.43.

¹¹⁹ Thorun, Christian; *Explaining Change in Russian Foreign Policy: The Role of Ideas in Post-Soviet Russia’s Conduct towards the West*, Great Britain: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, p.9.

¹²⁰ Curtis, Glenn E., (ed.); “The Emergence of Russian Foreign Policy” in *Russia: A Country Study*, Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1996, <http://countrystudies.us/russia/77.htm>.

¹²¹ “The Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation”, <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/russia-mil-doc.html>.

On May 10, 1993, Russian Defence Minister General Pavel S.Grachev came to Ankara.¹²² The memorandum of understanding between the Defence Ministries of Turkey and Russia was signed on May 11, 1993.¹²³ Turkish Premier Tansu Çiller paid an official visit to Russia on September 08-09, 1993 mainly to discuss the issues of Karabakh and the lifting the embargo on Iraq, and she stated that Turkey and Russia had the same postures in both issues.¹²⁴ The visit of Turkish Premier Çiller to Russia resulted in signing the “Agreement on Creation of a Joint Committee and Working Group in the spheres of Telecommunications, Energy, Industry and Hi-tech”.¹²⁵ On September 16, 1993, a ‘goodwill’ protocol on the cooperation in the military and defence industry fields was signed in Ankara.¹²⁶ Turkey and Russia signed the “Agreement on Cooperation in Military Technical Matters and in the Field of Defense Industry” on April 20, 1994 in Moscow.¹²⁷ On April 24, 1994, Turkish Defence Minister Mehmet Gölhan announced in Moscow the signature of the ‘Agreement on Cooperation in Military Technical and Defence Industry Fields’ which allows joint production in the future.¹²⁸ First Deputy Premier of Russian Federation Oleg Soskovets paid a visit to Turkey on July 15-21, 1994.¹²⁹ As a result of the talks, it was agreed on July 18, 1994 that Russia’s debts to Turkey amounting 400 million dollars were to be paid as in the form of the purchase of arms from Russia and return payment within three years.¹³⁰ “Protocol between Turkish General Staff and the Ministry of Defense of Russian Federation

¹²² “Aydın Tarihi”, Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, May 1993.

¹²³ “Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti ile Rusya Federasyonu Hükümeti Arasında Askeri Teknik Konular ve Savunma Sanayii Alanında İşbirliği Yapılmasına Dair Anlaşma”, Official website of Turkish Foreign Ministry, 18 August 1994, <http://ua.mfa.gov.tr/detay.aspx?5471>.

¹²⁴ “Aydın Tarihi”, Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, September 1993.

¹²⁵ Oku, Asim; “Turkey-Russia Relations Dynamics”, *Axis Information and Analysis (AIA)*, 12 May 2005, <http://www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=71>; Kamel, Ayhan; “İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nın Bitiminden Günümüze Kadar Türk - Rus İlişkileri”, *Foreign Policy*, http://www.foreignpolicy.org.tr/turkish/dosyalar/akamel_p.htm.

¹²⁶ “Aydın Tarihi”, Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, September 1993.

¹²⁷ “Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti ile Rusya Federasyonu Hükümeti Arasında Askeri Teknik Konular ve Savunma Sanayi Alanında İşbirliği Yapılmasına Dair Anlaşma”, Official website of Turkish Foreign Ministry, 20 April 1994, <http://ua.mfa.gov.tr/detay.aspx?5471>.

¹²⁸ “Aydın Tarihi”, Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, April 1994.

¹²⁹ Kamel, Ayhan; “İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nın Bitiminden Günümüze Kadar Türk - Rus İlişkileri”, *Foreign Policy*, http://www.foreignpolicy.org.tr/turkish/dosyalar/akamel_p.htm; “Aydın Tarihi”, Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, July 1994.

¹³⁰ “Aydın Tarihi”, Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, July 1994.

on Social and Cultural Exchange of Families of Armed Forces Personnel” was signed on August 28, 1995.¹³¹

In 1993, more than 20 percent of the Azerbaijani territory was under Armenian occupation.¹³² The oust of Abulfaz Elchibey by a coup orchestrated by Colonel Surat Huseynov in 1993 brought Heydar Aliyev who was keen on following masterly balance policy between Turkey and Russia.¹³³ However waters were not down yet. Russian Defence Minister General Grachev tried to connect Turkish-Russian bilateral military co-operation with the condition that Ankara should stop its military assistance to Azerbaijan in 1993.¹³⁴ Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin paid a visit to Russia on March 01, 1993 to discuss mainly the ethnic conflicts which were interest of both countries and stated that they agreed on acting together on Karabakh issue.¹³⁵ Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin sent a letter to his Russian counterpart Kozyrev in late March 1993 for expressing Turkey’s expectation to have a ceasefire between Azerbaijan and Armenia by referring to the joint efforts to reach this aim.¹³⁶ Turkish President Demirel’s September 03, 1993 dated message to the US, French and Russian leaders warning the possible confrontation between Turkey and Armenia if the Armenian occupation would have continued was answered by Russia through the September 04, 1993 dated message of its ambassador in Ankara stating that “Ankara can not militarily intervene in the region all alone”.¹³⁷ Russian Ambassador in Baku, Valter Soniya recommended Turkey to give up ‘big brother’ role in the Caucasus on September 06, 1993 and offered drawing policy in coordination with each other in the region.¹³⁸ Russian-led

¹³¹ “Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Genelkurmay Başkanlığı ile Rusya Federasyonu Savunma Bakanlığı Arasında Silahlı Kuvvetler Personel Ailelerinin Sosyal ve Kültürel Amaçlı Mübadelesine İlişkin Protokol”, Official website of Turkish Foreign Ministry, 28 August 1995, <http://ua.mfa.gov.tr/detay.aspx?5716>.

¹³² Beehner, Lionel; “Nagorno-Karabakh: The Crisis in the Caucasus”, *Council on Foreign Relations*, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/9148/nagornokarabakh.html>.

¹³³ *Ibid.*

¹³⁴ Trenin, Dimitri; “Russia’s Security Interests and Policies in the Caucasus Region” in *Contested Borders in the Caucasus*, (ed. by Bruno Coppieters), Brussel: VUB University Press, 1996.

¹³⁵ Kamel, Ayhan; “İkinci Dünya Savaşı’nın Bitiminden Günümüze Kadar Türk - Rus İlişkileri”, *Foreign Policy*, http://www.foreignpolicy.org.tr/turkish/dosyalar/akamel_p.htm; “Ayın Tarihi”, Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, March 1993.

¹³⁶ “Ayın Tarihi”, Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, March 1993.

¹³⁷ “Ayın Tarihi”, Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, September 1993.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*

ceasefire was accepted by the warring parties in May 1994.¹³⁹ The statement of the Chief of Turkish General Staff, Doğan Güreş in June 1994 addressing the Russian threat as greater than in the Cold War years¹⁴⁰ increased the tension. Upon the Russian Foreign Ministry's statement regarding its uneasiness over this statement, President Demirel underlined the historical ties existing between two countries and strongly objected the arguments that Russia was posing a threat to Turkey.¹⁴¹ The tension was on and off in this period but it did not turn into a big crisis. Moreover, October 21, 1994 dated Russian-Armenian agreement legalizing the presence of two Russian military bases in Armenia and March 16, 1995 dated second agreement donating Gyumru military base with 3000 soldiers, SU-27 squadron, air defence units and S-300 rockets¹⁴² provided a status quo favoring Russia rather than Turkey in the region. Turkish Foreign Minister Çetin criticized Russia's attitude by asserting the point of no single dominant power in the Caucasus.¹⁴³

While dealing with Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict, three new issues began to emerge in the agenda of the bilateral relations. First issue was raised as a result of Turkey's declaration to prepare a regulatory statute pertaining to the Montreux Convention for providing security of the Turkish Straits in the beginning of 1993. Russian Ambassador in Ankara Albert Chernishev expressed Russia's disturbance through using the diplomatic channels on February 12, 1993 upon the statement of Turkey for the unavailability of Turkish Straits for carrying the Central Asian oil.¹⁴⁴ Upon the statement of Russian Ambassador Chernishev as 'Montreux can not be changed' on August 07, 1993, he was summoned to the Turkish Foreign Ministry.¹⁴⁵ Two days later on August 09, 1993, Premier Çiller had a meeting with the Russian Ambassador to explain Turkey's main concerns with regard to the danger

¹³⁹ Beehner, Lionel; "Nagorno-Karabakh: The Crisis in the Caucasus", *Council on Foreign Relations*, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/9148/nagornokarabakh.html>.

¹⁴⁰ Cornell, Svante E.; "Turkey and the Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh: A Delicate Balance", *Middle Eastern Studies*, January 1998, Volume 34, Number 1, p.61.

¹⁴¹ "Ayın Tarihi", Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, June 1994.

¹⁴² Cabbarlı, Hatem; "Ermenistan ve Rusya Arasında Gelişen Askeri İşbirliği", *ATSAM – Eurasian Center for Security and Strategic Studies*, January 2005, <http://www.atsam.org/ermenistan-ve-rusya-arasinda-gelisen-askeri-isbirligi/>.

¹⁴³ "Ayın Tarihi", Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, April 1994.

¹⁴⁴ "Ayın Tarihi", Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, February 1993.

¹⁴⁵ "Ayın Tarihi", Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, August 1993.

pertaining to the transfer of oil through the Straits by referring the pipelines would be safer.¹⁴⁶ Turkey's thesis was based on the dramatic change in the number, size and the content of the ships whereas Russia was focusing its economic interests.¹⁴⁷ Accordingly there were 4 to 5 thousand ships crossing the Straits in the following years of the 1936 dated Montreux Convention whereas this number reached to 60 thousand in 1997.¹⁴⁸ As stated by some, Turkey was putting forward the principle of *rebus sic stantibus* to support its thesis. Russian Ambassador Chernishev in Ankara stated on February 10, 1994 that Turkey had to comply with the principle of the free passage indicated in the Montreux Convention.¹⁴⁹ Upon this statement, Russian Ambassador was summoned to the Turkish Foreign Ministry on February 14, 1994 and warned. Subsequently, the written statement of Turkish Foreign Ministry reiterated that the Statute was not against the Montreux Convention by evaluating the issue as a matter under the national jurisdiction of Turkey.¹⁵⁰ On June 03, 1994, Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson stated in a press meeting held in Moscow that the discussions over the Straits could be solved within the spirit of mutual cooperation.¹⁵¹ Even though the Russian reactions, Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin stated on June 30, 1994 that the Turkish Straits Statute would be put into force on July 01, 1994 by adding that some amendments could be made in the future.¹⁵² Russia gave a note to the Turkish Embassy in Moscow on June 30, 1994 to notify Turkey that Russia would not adopt some points indicated in the Statute by adding that all the responsibility would belong to Turkey in the event of a crisis.¹⁵³

Secondly, deeply rooted Russo-Chechen conflict turned into an internecine war in the following three years of the independence declaration of Chechnya in 1991. Before the war took place, the shadow of the escalating tension fell down over the bilateral relations. Chechen leader Dzhokhar Dudaev's visits to Turkey and President Demirel's receiving him

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁷ Kohen, Sami; Boğazlar Boru Hattı Değil!..”, *Milliyet*, 12 May 1998.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁹ “Ayın Tarihi”, Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, February 1994.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁵¹ “Ayın Tarihi”, Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, June 1994.

¹⁵² “Türk Boğazları”, Official website of Turkish Foreign Ministry, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turk-bogazlari.tr.mfa>.

¹⁵³ “Ayın Tarihi”, Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, June 1994.

in October 1993 increased the Russian concerns which were conveyed to the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow by adding that the meeting as such should not be repeated in the future.¹⁵⁴ After getting over the instability problem in its domestic politics, Russia militarily intervened in the breakaway republic of Chechnya on December 11, 1994.¹⁵⁵ Turkish Foreign Ministry's related statement on December 30, 1994 described the Russian military intervention in Chechnya with heavy bombardments as worrisome and drew the attention to the civilian casualties which was defined as unacceptable.¹⁵⁶ Russian Ambassador in Ankara Vadim I. Kuznetsov said in a conference held in Ankara on February 13, 1995 that the chief of Russian Foreign Intelligence Yevgeni Primakov had informed Turkish President Süleyman Demirel about the arms sent to Chechnya transiting Turkey and the Turkish volunteers joining the war in Chechnya.¹⁵⁷ On 17 June 1995, Russian leader Yeltsin even accused Turkey of accepting the demands for giving help to the departure of Dudaev from Chechnya.¹⁵⁸

Thirdly, the PKK affiliated structures 'Kurdistan Committee and Kurdistan Liberation Front' organized a conference in Moscow in February 1994 with the title of 'Kurdistan at the Crossroads of History and Politics' that the Russian Ministry of Nationalities and Regional Policy took role as co-organizer.¹⁵⁹ This issue strained the relations reasonably. Turkish Foreign Ministry sent a protest note through diplomatic channels but Russia denied all the attributed claims.¹⁶⁰ While interviewing with Russian Newspaper Nevazisimaya on February 23, 1994, Turkish President Demirel stated that Turkey was expecting detailed explanation from Moscow on this issue to avoid the image of Russia supporting terrorism in the Turkish public.¹⁶¹ However both the different voices on this issue among the Russian authorities and

¹⁵⁴ Winrow, Gareth M.; *Turkey in the Post-Soviet Central Asia*, London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995, p.43.

¹⁵⁵ "Russia Timeline", BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/1113655.stm; Karaman, Tatyana A.; "Russia (1994-1996)" in *Civil Wars of the World: Major Conflicts since World War II*, (ed. by DeRouen Jr, Karl&Heo, Uk), California; ABC-CLIO Inc., 2007, p.635.

¹⁵⁶ "Ayın Tarihi", Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, December 1994.

¹⁵⁷ "Ayın Tarihi", Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, February 1995.

¹⁵⁸ "Ayın Tarihi", Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, June 1995.

¹⁵⁹ Karagiannis, Emmanuel; *Energy and Security in the Caucasus*, London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002, p. 102.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁶¹ "Ayın Tarihi", Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, February 1994.

the discovery of a PKK rehabilitation camp located in Moscow¹⁶² enforced Turkey to be on alert against Russia. Another conference gathering, Kurdish organizations of the CIS region was realized in Moscow on October 28, 1994 by the PKK elements and the decision to establish 'Kurdish Union' was announced at the end of the Conference.¹⁶³ When Turkey raised the issue, Russia rejected all the claims again. While Russian Ambassador in Ankara Kuznetsov was denying the connection of the government with the PKK-initiated conference held in Moscow, Turkey sent a delegation headed by Turkish Foreign Ministry Undersecretary to Russia on November 05, 1994 for having direct talks with the Russian authorities on this issue.¹⁶⁴ Opening of 'Kurdish House' and 'Kurdish Center' in Moscow under the control of PKK following the efforts of establishing 'Kurdish Parliament in Exile' in Moscow by the run-away PKK linked members of the Turkish Parliament increased the already high tension but Russia kept on denying any connections with this effort.¹⁶⁵ Thereupon Turkish Interior Minister Nahit Menteşe went to Moscow on January 22-24, 1995, Turkey's concerns were conveyed and the Russian side promised to take necessary steps as demanded by the Turkish side to obstruct PKK activities in Russia.¹⁶⁶ In return, Turkey gave its word of disallowing pro-Chechen activities in its territory.¹⁶⁷ The parties declared their common desire to take necessary measures against sheltering terrorist organizations by signing 'Protocol to Prevent Terrorism'.¹⁶⁸ Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Albert Chernishev voiced the Kurdish issue as Turkey's internal problem in his comment to a newspaper in Moscow on August 04, 1995.¹⁶⁹ Though the problem was solved rhetorically, it was not in the essence. The third international conference of the 'Kurdish Parliament in Exile' to be hosted by Russian Duma members in Moscow in October 1995¹⁷⁰ posed the very sample of the ongoing problem in this issue. Turkey sent a protest note on

¹⁶² Karagiannis, Emmanuel; *Energy and Security in the Caucasus*, London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002, p. 102.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁴ "Ayın Tarihi", Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, November 1994.

¹⁶⁵ Karagiannis, Emmanuel; *Energy and Security in the Caucasus*, London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002, p. 103.

¹⁶⁶ "Ayın Tarihi", Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, January 1995.

¹⁶⁷ Karagiannis, Emmanuel; *Energy and Security in the Caucasus*, London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002, p. 103.

¹⁶⁸ "Ayın Tarihi", Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, January 1995.

¹⁶⁹ "Ayın Tarihi", Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, August 1995.

¹⁷⁰ Karagiannis, Emmanuel; *Energy and Security in the Caucasus*, London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002, p. 103.

October 30, 1995 criticizing the upcoming gathering of the ‘Kurdish Parliament in Exile’ in Moscow to Russia through diplomatic channels. However Russian authorities initially stated that nobody had requested permission from the related Russian authorities to realize such a gathering. However when the gathering was realized and Turkey accused Russia of not showing the decisiveness to avoid such thing before it got happen by warning that the relations would be affected negatively, Russian Ambassador Kuznetsov confessed that they had given permission to the event assuming it as a seminar by underlining that Russia never gave credits to the separatist movements and so the terrorist organizations.¹⁷¹

Apart from the points mentioned above, few other developments should also to be highlighted. Turkey’s own initiated ‘First Congress of Turkic Peoples’ was held on March 21, 1993 with the participants from Azerbaijan, Central Asia and Turkic-speaking regions of Russia.¹⁷² After that, ‘Turkic Republics Summit’ was held in Istanbul on October 18-19, 1994.¹⁷³ Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mihail Demurin stated in a press meeting organized on the occasion of evaluating the Summit in Moscow on October 18, 1994 that Russia was disturbed by the summit which had ethnic fabrics.¹⁷⁴ Turkish leader Demirel’s statements towards calming down the Russian concerns did not eliminate traditional skepticism of Russia towards Turkey. Turkey’s detection of public diplomacy tools through establishing education programs for students and civil servants coming from these newly independent Central Asian republics, allocating direct financial aid to these republics and also TV networking was fastened in these years.¹⁷⁵

2.3. Beginning of Fuzzy Rapprochement (1996-1998)

Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeni Primakov’s term between January 1996 and September 1998, following the end of six-year foreign ministry of Andrey Kozyrev, highlighted the concepts of ‘competitive pragmatism’, ‘anti-Western realism’ and ‘multi-polarity’ as argued

¹⁷¹ “Ayn Tarihi” Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, October 1995; “Ayn Tarihi” Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, November 1995.

¹⁷² Peimani, Hooman; *Regional Security and the Future of Central Asia: The Competition of Iran, Turkey and Russia*, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998, p.50.

¹⁷³ “Ayn Tarihi”, Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, October 1994.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁵ Peimani, Hooman; *Regional Security and the Future of Central Asia: The Competition of Iran, Turkey and Russia*, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998, p.50, p.96.

by Richard Sakwa.¹⁷⁶ Similarly, Christian Thorun uses “dogmatic geopolitical believing” which directed Russia to apply the multipolarity as a balance against the unipolarity in the international system to “enhance its international status” through “pursuing an active and ambitious foreign policy, and by diversifying relations and cooperating with non-Western states”.¹⁷⁷ Thereby, bilateral relations under Primakov’s foreign ministry presented pretty much complex picture due to the increasing incoherency of the Russian foreign policy towards Turkey.¹⁷⁸ This incoherency was caused by the fact that both countries were resuming cooperation and competition at the same time. Cooperation and competition was limiting each other and this leads to several ups and downs in their bilateral relations. Robert Freedman gives the trade level reaching to 10 and 12 billion dollars per annum, the activities of Turkish construction companies even in the repair of the Duma building damaged by the 1993 skirmishing, donation of Turkish businessmen valued at 5 million dollars to Yeltsin’s reelection campaign and also Turkey’s being major purchaser of Russian gas and Russia’s arm sales to Turkey as the rosy side of the bilateral relations.¹⁷⁹ On the other hand, the competition for gaining the sphere of influence in the regional context as in South Caucasus and Central Asia beside of the rivalry on energy export routes, disagreement over the shipping of the oil through Turkish Straits, Russian accusations of Turkey with giving support to Chechens constitute the problematic side of the bilateral relations.¹⁸⁰ PKK activities in Russia under the plea of cultural activities should be added to this list as well. Freedman sums up the Russian attitude in this period with the following words; “it often appears that Russia's right hand doesn't know--or worse perhaps--doesn't care what its left hand is doing”.¹⁸¹

The period started with an unexpected action to draw the attention of the world to the Chechen issue namely the commandeering of a ferry in the Black Sea by armed Chechens. The seizure of the ferry boat named ‘Avrasya’ together with its 211 passengers by the

¹⁷⁶ Sakwa, Richard; *Putin: Russia's Choice*, London: Routledge, 2004, pp.208-209, (Sakwa defines the concept of ‘competitive pragmatism’ as “at root the interests of Russia and the West were divergent and thus every agreement and even the very idea of alliance was temporary and instrumental”).

¹⁷⁷ Thorun, Christian; *Explaining Change in Russian Foreign Policy: The Role of Ideas in Post-Soviet Russia's Conduct towards the West*, Great Britain: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, p.9.

¹⁷⁸ Freedman, Robert O.; “Russia and the Middle East: The Primakov Era”, *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, May 1998, Volume 2, Number 2, p.5.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*

Chechen sympathizers on January 16, 1996 ended on January 20, 1996 with the telephone message of Dudaev conveyed to the militants indicating that they must stop their acts in coordination with Turkish authorities because the hostages did not have any value for Russians and the activities putting Turkey into a difficult situation must be avoided.¹⁸² During his meeting with Turkish press on February 26, 1997, Russian Ambassador Kuznetsov voiced Russia's concerns with regard to the court hearing of Avrasya ferryboat since they could be freed.¹⁸³ On April 28, 1996, Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeni Primakov attending to the BSEC meeting in Bucharest answered Turkish journalists' questions with regard to Turkey's Chechen policy as that "Turkey's official policy is in the manner of not supporting the Chechens but it is a fact that the Chechens are using Turkish lands".¹⁸⁴ Furthermore, after the end of the the first Chechen war in August 1996, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor Posuvalyuk threatened Turkey and other Muslim countries with the cessation of diplomatic relations in the case of extending recognition to Chechnya after its possible independence declaration following the elections.¹⁸⁵

The most important event of this period is the issue of Russia's sale of SAM 300-PMU-1 surface-to-air missile system (S-300) to Greek Cypriot. On January 05, 1997, Russia's state-run arms export company called Rosvooruzhenie decided to sell S-300s to the Greek Cypriots. The ranges of the S-300s were up to 150 kilometers for destructing aircrafts and up to 40 kilometers for destructing incoming missiles¹⁸⁶, and hence this feature could have given the Greek Cypriots the ability to shoot the Mediterranean coast of Turkey together with the supremacy in the air vis-à-vis Turkey over the island.¹⁸⁷ In response to this decision of Russia, Turkish Foreign Ministry handed over a warning note to Russia.¹⁸⁸ The spokesperson of Turkish Foreign Ministry Ömer Akbel stated in the routine press meeting held on January 06, 1997 that the emerging situation was unacceptable for Turkey by

¹⁸² "Denizde kabus bitti", *Milliyet*, 20 January 1996; "Böyle Kaçırıldı", *Milliyet*, 03 December 1996.

¹⁸³ "Ayın Tarihi", Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, February 1997.

¹⁸⁴ "Ayın Tarihi", Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, April 1996.

¹⁸⁵ "Ayın Tarihi", Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, January 1997.

¹⁸⁶ "Cyprus, the S-300PMU-1 Missile System, and Regional Security: An Annotated Chronology, 1997[1]", James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies website, <http://cns.miis.edu/cyprus/chr97.htm>.

¹⁸⁷ Tanrısever, Oktay F.; "Turkey and Russia in Eurasia" in *The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy*, (ed. by Lenore, Martin G.&Keridis, Dimitris), Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004, p. 141.

¹⁸⁸ "Türkiye'den Moskova'ya Uyarı", *Milliyet*, 07 January 1997.

reminding Russia the responsibilities bearing its membership to the OSCE and UNSC.¹⁸⁹ On January 08, 1997, Turkish Minister of Defence Turhan Tayan pointed out accused OSCE member Russia of acting irresponsibly through the sale of arms to the Greek Cypriots by reminding UNSC member Russia that it had to obey the decisions of the UN.¹⁹⁰ Turkish Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister Tansu Çiller's January 11, 1997 dated statement of that 'We shoot if necessary' boosted the tension.¹⁹¹ The US announced its position as against the installation of the S-300 missiles to the island.¹⁹² Turkey also officially notified NATO allies about its disturbance.¹⁹³ Russia did not change its decision and stated that the sale issue of S-300 missiles was purely trade related matter by adding that there was no connection between the sale of the missiles and Cyprus conundrum.¹⁹⁴ On September 11, 1997, Turkish Premier Mesut Yılmaz specified that Russia had to yield the precedence to its strategic interests in the region rather than few million dollars.¹⁹⁵ However the statement of Russian leader Yeltsin's spokesperson Sergey Yastjembksi voiced in a press meeting held on September 10, 1997 that only if Turkish soldiers had withdrawn from the island, then Russia would have abandoned its sale decision was worth mentioning.¹⁹⁶ According to AFP and Interfax news agencies, the same message was conveyed to Turkish Foreign Minister İsmail Cem by the Russian Foreign Minister Primakov in New York on September 26, 1997 as in the form that "the optimum solution to Turkish apprehension over the planned sale by Russia to Greek Cyprus of S-300s would be the total demilitarization of the island".¹⁹⁷ Russian Ambassador in Greek Cypriot Georgi Muradov warned Turkey on 10 October 1997 that any Turkish attack to the ship carrying the S-300s would be accepted as *casus belli*.¹⁹⁸ The issue kept its place until it was solved in December 1998.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁰ "Aydın Tarihi", Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, January 1997.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁹² *Ibid.*

¹⁹³ "Türkiye'den Moskova'ya Uyarı", *Milliyet*, 07 January 1997

¹⁹⁴ Ayan, Noyan; "S-300'lerin kilit adamı Büyükelçi Vladimir Çıjov Milliyet'e konuştu: Füzeleri mutlaka vereceğiz", *Milliyet*, 14 February 1997.

¹⁹⁵ "Aydın Tarihi", Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, September 1997.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁷ "Russia, Turkey at odds over Cyprus", *RFE/RL*, Vol 1, Number 127, 29 September 1997, <http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1141504.html>.

¹⁹⁸ "Aydın Tarihi", Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, October 1997.

There are three important developments to be mentioned belonging to this period. First, with regard to PKK activities in Russia, Turkish Foreign Ministry Undersecretary Onur Öymen carrying on talks in Moscow in March 1996 indicated that both countries had a good progress on various issues by referring to Russia's positive attitude.¹⁹⁹ However Russia's hosting of the 2nd International Congress of Kurdish Organizations in early May 1996 in which PKK took an active role cast a suspicion on this progress and the discourse of Turkish authorities.²⁰⁰ Secondly, regarding the Karabakh issue, the developments favoring Russia's role in comparison with Turkey's position happened to be realized. Following the June 02, 1997 dated visit of the acting Foreign Minister of the USA Strobe Talbott who came to Turkey in the framework of OSCE Minsk Group, Turkish Foreign Minister Çiller announced the new initiative giving active roles to the US, France and Russia while Turkey would be playing assisting role in the process.²⁰¹ Thereby Turkey's role diminished while Russia's role was having greater importance vis-à-vis Turkey in the South Caucasus region. Russia and Armenia signed a friendship treaty in August 1997 which includes the supply of mutual defense assistance in the event of a military threat originated from a state or groups of states to either party.²⁰² Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova established GUAM in October 1997 to uphold cooperation in the appearance but in its essence to resist Russian efforts of injecting its sphere of influence to the CIS countries.²⁰³ Unsurprisingly, Turkey supported this initiative. Thirdly, concerning the Turkish Straits Statute, before the visit of the Russian Premier Chernomyrdin to be held in December 1997, Turkish delegation headed by Deputy Undersecretary of Turkish Foreign Ministry Ambassador İnal Batu arriving in Moscow for having political consultations informed the Russian authorities about the forthcoming change in the Statute adopted in 1994.²⁰⁴ Before coming to Turkey, Russian Premier Chernomyrdin

¹⁹⁹ "Aydın Tarihi", Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, March 1996.

²⁰⁰ Tanrısever, Oktay F.; "Turkey and Russia in Eurasia" in *The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy*, (ed. by Lenore, Martin G.&Keridis, Dimitris), Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004, p. 139.

²⁰¹ "Aydın Tarihi", Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, June 1997.

²⁰² Peimani, Hooman; *Conflict and Security in the Central Asia and the Caucasus*, California: ABC-CLIO, 2009, p.219; Cabbarlı, Hatem; "Ermenistan ve Rusya Arasında Gelişen Askeri İşbirliği", *ATSAM – Eurasian Center For Security And Strategic Studies*, January 2005, <http://www.atsam.org/ermenistan-ve-rusya-arasinda-gelisen-askeri-isbirligi/>.

²⁰³ Peimani, Hooman; *Conflict and Security in the Central Asia and the Caucasus*, California: ABC-CLIO, 2009, p.219.

²⁰⁴ 'Boğazlar Tüzüğü Değişiyor', *Milliyet*, 20 November 1997.

cited in Russia on December 14, 1997 that Russia was always against the unilateral introduction of navigation rules by Turkey.²⁰⁵

During the landmark visit of Russian Premier Chernomyrdin to Turkey on December 15, 1997, Turkish President Demirel emphasized the importance of Turkish-Russian cooperation in the period of both the world and Europe were reshaping, Turkish Premier Mesut Yılmaz underlined the positive impact of developing political relations over the development of economic relations and Russian Premier underscored the necessity of getting rid of looking at the Kurdish and Chechen files to improve the bilateral economic relations.²⁰⁶ The leaders signed 10 agreements on various subjects including the 'Blue Stream Project' which resulted in describing the bilateral relations as 'strategic partnership' for the first time.²⁰⁷ Furthermore, through signing one of the political agreements among those ten, "the two countries agreed to abstain from actions likely to harm the other's economic interests or threaten their territorial integrity".²⁰⁸ However, as very well put by Freedman, this productive visit could achieve to change neither Russia's position with regard to the sale of the S-300s nor Turkey's position on oil shipping through the Straits.²⁰⁹ Furthermore, Turkish Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister Çiller paid an official visit to Russia on December 18-19, 1996.²¹⁰ During her visit, "Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation on Combating Terrorism" signed between Turkey and Russia on December 18, 1996.²¹¹ The memorandum was a very detailed formal document incorporating the points such as information exchange on terrorist groups and possible terrorist acts, avoidance of terrorist acts, providing security during high-level contacts and international events, safety of transportation and the exchange of information, experience and personnel over the issues pertaining to fight against terrorism.²¹²

²⁰⁵ "Ayn Tarihi", Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, December 1997.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁷ "Stratejik Ortaklık Önerisi", *Milliyet*, 17 December 1997; "Ayn Tarihi", Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, December 1997.

²⁰⁸ Freedman, Robert O.; "Russia and the Middle East: The Primakov Era", *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, May 1998, Volume 2, Number 2, p.6.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

²¹⁰ "Ayn Tarihi", Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, December 1996.

²¹¹ "Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti ile Rusya Federasyonu Hükümeti Arasında İmzalanan Terörizm ile Mücadele Alanında İşbirliğine İlişkin Memorandum", 18 December 1996, Official website of Turkish Foreign Ministry, <http://ua.mfa.gov.tr/detay.aspx?5869>.

²¹² *Ibid.*

“Russian Federation National Security Blueprint” was announced on December 17, 1997.²¹³ In the first part of the Blueprint, Russia is described as “an influential European-Asian power with national interests in Europe, the Near East, Central and South Asia, and the Asian and Pacific region”.²¹⁴ In the second part of the Blueprint addressing Russia’s national interests in the international sphere; the necessity of developing equal partnership with great powers, international cooperation to fight against terrorism and reinforcing international mechanisms such as UNSC in which Russia has a say and a role to play are underscored.²¹⁵ The clause of that “realization of Russia's national interests in the international sphere is largely determined by the nature of relations with the leading powers and integration-oriented associations of the world community”²¹⁶ has to be highlighted since Russia, though pretending to play assertive role as a great power, accepts the fact that it is not a play maker. In the third part of the Blueprint on the threats in international sphere, “the attempts of other states to counter Russia's consolidation as an influential center of the multi-polar world” is underlined with reference to the threats to the territorial integrity through direct and indirect means, diminishing Russia’s role in the international politics and containing its influence in its vital interest areas namely in ‘Europe, the Near East, the Transcaucasus and Central Asia’.²¹⁷

2.4. Turbulent Russia and Rapprochement (1998-2000)

The period mostly defined as rapprochement in the bilateral relations is the result of the interactive financial crisis. Deteriorating economic indicators of the Russian economy in 1997 hit the bottom with the 1998 financial crisis.²¹⁸ Devaluation of Ruble, encashment problems, ninety-day moratorium for the repayment of the debts followed one another during the 1998 financial crisis in Russia. Due to the suspension decision of some Asian buyers in the purchase of the Russian arms, Russian economy worsened more.²¹⁹ “Indeed, arms sales, which along with oil are Russia's main exports, fell from a high of \$5.3 billion in 1995 to

²¹³ Caldwell, Lawrence T.; “Russian Concepts of National Security”, in *Russian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century&The Shadow of the Past*, (ed. by Legvold, Robert), New York; Columbia University Press, 2007, p.311.

²¹⁴ “Russian National Security Blueprint”, <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/blueprint.html>.

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*

²¹⁸ Freedman, Robert O.: “Russian Policy toward the Middle East under Yeltsin and Putin”, *Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs Letter and Viewpoints*, 02 September 2001, Number 461, <http://www.jcpa.org/jl/vp461.htm>.

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*

only \$2.3 billion in 1998,²²⁰ Falling oil prices with 30% between June 1997 and August 1998 made the worst case scenario happen for Russia.²²¹ Similarly, 1997 financial crisis in Turkey was deepened by the 1998 Russian financial crisis since Turkey was the main trading partner of Russia in the Middle East.²²² Turkish stock market turned out to be the most affected one with its largest decline in its history since its establishment after Russian stock market.²²³ The devastating 17 August earthquake in 1999 which hit the industrial areas also affected Turkish economy negatively. All abovementioned factors constituted the background of the rapprochement between Turkey and Russia by making these two countries keep an ear close to the ground underlining the weaknesses of each. These weaknesses also made them aware of that they had to cooperate rather than compete since they could have got over the difficulties only through this means. Furthermore, distancing affect of both the signing of the accession protocols of the Visegrad trio to NATO for Russia and the EU Luxembourg Summit for Turkey in 1997 in terms of their results made this rapprochement easier.

Two important visits to Russia were realized in this period. The first high-level contact at the level of the Chief of Staff since 1992 was realized through the visit of Turkish Chief of Staff General İsmail Hakkı Karadayı to Russia on May 18-22, 1998.²²⁴ During his visit to Moscow held, General İsmail Hakkı Karadayı stated that “There is a common understanding and cooperation between two sides. We are against all kinds of terror because the values are different now. Among these values, there is no place to terror.”²²⁵ “Memorandum of Understanding” between Turkish and Russian General Staffs was signed on May 20, 1998.²²⁶ The Memorandum underlines both countries’ desire to develop and to diversify the existing military cooperation aside of its reference to provide security beyond the territorial waters

²²⁰ *Ibid.*

²²¹ Karluk, S. Rıdvan&Tonus, Özgür&Çatalbaş, Nazım; “Güneydoğu Asya ve Rusya Krizi Karşısında Türkiye”, *EconTurk*, <http://www.econturk.org/tonus.pdf>, p.6.

²²² Freedman, Robert O.: “Russian Policy toward the Middle East under Yeltsin and Putin”, *Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs Letter and Viewpoints*, 02 September 2001, Number 461, <http://www.jcpa.org/jl/vp461.htm>.

²²³ Karluk, S. Rıdvan&Tonus, Özgür&Çatalbaş, Nazım; “Güneydoğu Asya ve Rusya Krizi Karşısında Türkiye”, *EconTurk*, <http://www.econturk.org/tonus.pdf>, p.9, p.12.

²²⁴ “Moskova'da generaller zirvesi”, *Hürriyet*, 17 May 1998.

²²⁵ “S-300'lerde top Rusya'da”, *Hürriyet*, 21 May 1998.

²²⁶ “Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Genelkurmay Başkanlığı ve Rusya Federasyonu Silahlı Kuvvetleri Genelkurmay Başkanlığı Arasında İmzalanan "Mutabakat Zaptı'nın Onaylanması Hakkında Karar”, Official website of Turkish Foreign Ministry, 20 May 1998, <http://ua.mfa.gov.tr/detay.aspx?6120>.

and cooperation in the Black Sea welcoming the contribution of other littoral states.²²⁷ While commenting on a question with regard to arm sales, General Karadayı stressed Turkish side's desire to have a dialogue and cooperation at each and every level and the field within the new understanding beside of the desire of having balance in the region.²²⁸ During the high-level contacts of Turkish General Staff in Moscow, Turkish side also conveyed its uneasiness to Russia with regard to the sale of the S-300s to the Greek Cypriots.²²⁹ Turkish Premier Bülent Ecevit paid an official visit to Russia on November 04-06, 1999.²³⁰ Before his official visit to Russia, Turkish Premier Bülent Ecevit announced on November 03, 1999 at the meeting of his party group that Turkey sees the Chechen issue as Russia's internal problem and regards the Russian territorial integrity as much as Turkey's territorial integrity.²³¹ During the visit, the message of accepting the Chechen issue as an internal matter of Russia was reiterated.²³² Turkey and Russia signed the "Joint Declaration on the Fight against Terrorism" together with several other protocols on various issues.²³³ In his address to the Turkish-Russian Businessmen Council, Turkish Premier Ecevit stated that the world was in the process of 'Eurasianisation' by adding that Turkey and Russia were key countries in this process.²³⁴ Turkish Premier Ecevit's statement to Russian newspaper *İzvestiya* underlined the development of Turkish-Russian bilateral relations within mutual confidence.²³⁵

Meanwhile, Chechen issue was back to the agenda of Russia by 1999. Following the invasion of Dagestan by Chechens and a series of apartment bombings in Russia, the second Chechen war began on October 01, 1999 with the entrance of Russian troops into Chechnya

²²⁷ *Ibid.*

²²⁸ "S-300'lerde top Rusya'da", *Hürriyet*, 21 May 1998.

²²⁹ *Ibid.*; "Moskova'da generaller zirvesi", *Hürriyet*, 17 May 1998.

²³⁰ "Ayın Tarihi", Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, November 1999.

²³¹ *Ibid.*

²³² Aras, Bülent; "Türkiye ve Rusya Federasyonu: Çok Boyutlu Ortaklık", *SETA Analiz*, August 2009, p.6.

²³³ Oku, Asim; "Turkey-Russia Relations Dynamics", *Axis Information and Analysis (AIA)*, 12 May 2005, <http://www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=71>; "Ayın Tarihi", Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, November 1999.

²³⁴ "Ayın Tarihi", Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, November 1999.

²³⁵ *Ibid.*

and continued with heavy bombardments and full-scale attacks on the republic.²³⁶ Before the Russian military operation took place, Russian Deputy Interior Minister claimed in a press meeting on September 22, 1999 that mercenaries were being formed in Turkey and Russian Intelligence Service found bases where “terrorists were trained”.²³⁷ On November 09, 1999, Russia stopped the flights temporarily between the airports in North Caucasus and in a number of countries including Turkey to avoid terror.²³⁸ On November 17, 1999, Turkish leader Süleyman Demirel and Russian leader Boris Yeltsin had a meeting during the OSCE summit in Istanbul where Turkish leader expressed the sympathy over Russia’s fight against terror with a warning over civilian casualties upon a request raised by the Russian leader for a clear attitude from Turkey towards Chechen issue.²³⁹ On November 23, 1999, the heads of Turkish and Russian Intelligence Services Şenkal Atasagun and Viacheslan Trubnikov had a meeting as follow-up of the meeting held between the leaders of both countries in Istanbul to discuss the allegations directed to Turkey with regard to Chechen issue.²⁴⁰

Another development was on PKK issue. As a result of the fastening diplomatic contacts but especially the visit of the Russian Premier Chernomyrdin held in 1997, Russia’s attitude towards the PKK presence in its territory became tough and even the closure of PKK camp ‘Solniçnyy’ in Yaroslav city nearby Moscow was taken to the agenda of Russia.²⁴¹ However the PKK issue led to a diplomatic tension between Turkey and Russia towards the end of the 1998 in an unexpected way. The news alleging the abscondment of PKK terrorist organization leader Abdullah Öcalan from Syria to Russia upon the green light given by Russia strained the softening strings between Turkey and Russia.²⁴² Russian Ambassador Aleksandr Lebedev paid a visit to Turkish Premier Mesut Yılmaz on October 19, 1998 to give information upon the news alleging that Öcalan was in Russia.²⁴³ After the meeting, Lebedev denied all the allegations by stating that Russia would never indulge this kind of

²³⁶ Karaman, Tatyana A.; “Russia (1994-1996)” in *Civil Wars of the World: Major Conflicts since World War II*, (ed. by DeRouen Jr, Karl&Heo, Uk), California; ABC-CLIO Inc., 2007, p.645.

²³⁷ “Aydın Tarihi”, Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, September 1999.

²³⁸ “Aydın Tarihi”, Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, November 1999.

²³⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁴¹ “PKK Rusya’da Sıkışıyor”, *Milliyet*, 23 January 1998.

²⁴² Yazaroğlu, Vahap; “Öcalan Rusya’ya kaçtı iddiası”, *Milliyet*, 15 October 1998.

²⁴³ “Aydın Tarihi”, Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, October 1998.

people.²⁴⁴ On October 22, 1998, Premier Yılmaz announced the detection of Turkish Intelligence Service that Öcalan had gone to Russia one week ago by adding that the other allied intelligence services verified this information as well.²⁴⁵ The problem caused by the lack of extradition agreement between Turkey and Russia, since Russian Parliament had objected earlier to make such an agreement with Turkey, was tried to be overcome by sending extradition file for Öcalan relying on the principles of international reciprocity.²⁴⁶ In response to Turkey's statements, Russia kept its silence. The only exception was the Russian Federal Security Service's statement as that they had information on neither the entrance nor the presence of Öcalan.²⁴⁷ Turkish Premier Yılmaz sent a letter to his Russian counterpart demanding the extradition of Öcalan.²⁴⁸ Russian Ambassador Lebedev stated that even though Öcalan had been in Russia, his extradition could not have been possible because of the absence of an extradition agreement between the countries by adding that yet he could have been avoided to act against Turkey.²⁴⁹ Turkish Embassy in Moscow handed over a note to the Russian Foreign Ministry demanding the extradition of Öcalan.²⁵⁰ Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov's visit to Ankara to attend the celebratory ceremony of the 75th Anniversary of the Republic on October 29, 1998 had a high importance since Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov delivered the letter of the Russian Premier Primakov to the Turkish Premier Yılmaz in response to his letter demanding the extradition of Öcalan.²⁵¹ Russian Premier Primakov's letter notifying his Turkish counterpart about the deportation of Öcalan, allegedly until the 2nd of November, was welcomed by Turkish authorities.²⁵² While Turkey was discussing whether Russia kept its word or not, Duma's decision to accept the political asylum demand of Öcalan on November 04, 1998²⁵³ caused freezing effect in Turkey. Upon the reactions of Turkey carried out through diplomatic channels, Russian Ambassador Lebedev stated that Duma's decision would not lead to any change in Russia's attitude

²⁴⁴ "Apo Baskısı: Yılmaz Rus Büyükelçisi'yle görüştü", *Milliyet*, 20 October 1998.

²⁴⁵ "Ayın Tarihi", Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, October 1998.

²⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁷ Başlamış, Cenk; "Apo'ya Rus Koruması", *Milliyet*, 22 October 1998.

²⁴⁸ Başlamış, Cenk; "Rus elçi sözünden döndü", *Milliyet*, 24 October 1998.

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁰ "Rusya'ya nota", *Milliyet*, 27 October 1998.

²⁵¹ Bila, Fikret; "Apo sınırdışı ediliyor", *Milliyet*, 30 October 1998.

²⁵² *Ibid.*

²⁵³ Başlamış, Cenk; "Rusya Öcalan'a kucak açtı", *Milliyet*, 05 November 1998.

towards the issue by underlining that they would not give asylum to Öcalan.²⁵⁴ While Turkish President was reminding the promises of Russia given to Turkey through the messages of Russian President Yeltsin and Premier Primakov²⁵⁵, Turkish Premier Yılmaz called Duma as not the addressee of Turkey.²⁵⁶ Different voices in Russia following this event confused the minds in Turkey. Some interpreted Duma's decision as a trump card in the energy field taken in response to Turkey's steps and some evaluated it as Russia's internal dispute. Turkish Ambassador in Russia Nabi Şensoy warned Russia that if political asylum right had been given to Öcalan, the relations would be damaged severely.²⁵⁷ Turkey also threatened Russia with suspending the common projects especially in the energy field in the case of giving asylum to Öcalan.²⁵⁸ Russia again preferred to keep its silence and did not make any clarifying statement. On November 13, 1998, Russian Ambassador in Ankara Lebedev delivered Russian Premier Primakov's message to Turkish Premier Yılmaz about the deportation of Öcalan with that he would never be allowed to enter into Russia.²⁵⁹ Öcalan was captured at the airport in Italy after taking the flight from Moscow to Rome on the same day. However the issue was not closed yet since Öcalan departed from Rome on January 16, 1999 and it was alleged that he had been taken to Moscow back with the special plane of Italian Intelligence Service.²⁶⁰ Russia again kept its silence with regard to the allegations.²⁶¹ Only Russian government office making statement on the issue was the Federal Security Service and it was all about 'we do not have information'.²⁶² Turkish Ambassador in Moscow said that he was told by the Russian Foreign Ministry officials that the assurances given by the Russian Premier Primakov were still valid.²⁶³ On the same day, Russian Ambassador in Ankara was telling that Öcalan was not in Russia.²⁶⁴ However Turkish Premier Bülent Ecevit voiced this claim overtly with reference to unofficial reliable

²⁵⁴ "Duma'nın kararı etkilemez", *Milliyet*, 05 November 1998.

²⁵⁵ "Demirel: Yeltsin taahütte bulundu", *Milliyet*, 05 November 1998.

²⁵⁶ Başlamış, Cenk; "Rusya Öcalan'a kucak açtı", *Milliyet*, 05 November 1998.

²⁵⁷ Başlamış, Cenk; "Rusya'yı son kez uyardık", *Milliyet*, 09 November 1998.

²⁵⁸ Şener, Nedim; "Ortak projeleri askıya alırız", *Milliyet*, 06 November 1998.

²⁵⁹ Cıvaoğlu, Güneri; "Tarihi Olay", *Milliyet*, 14 November 1998.

²⁶⁰ Yurtsever, Ali H.; "Apo Roma'dan gitti", *Milliyet*, 17 January 1999.

²⁶¹ Başlamış, Cenk; "Rusya sessiz", *Milliyet*, 17 November 1998.

²⁶² Başlamış, Cenk; "Roma'dan ayrıldı, Moskova sıkıldı", *Milliyet*, 18 January 1998

²⁶³ *Ibid.*

²⁶⁴ "Lebedev ne demişti?", *Milliyet*, 19 January 1999.

resources.²⁶⁵ Three days later on January 22, 1999, Premier Ecevit stated that Öcalan was definitely in Russia by expressing his belief of that Russia would take necessary steps.²⁶⁶ The information confirming Öcalan's departure from Moscow to Athens in the last days of January²⁶⁷ justified his belief. According to the Turkish intelligence sources, Öcalan went to Russia three times since his departure from Syria in mid-October 1998 until his capture in Kenya in mid-February 1999.²⁶⁸ Russia's awkward stance either by denying or keeping its silence throughout this process led to suspicion in the minds of Turkish policy makers.

Greek Cypriot Government had to step back with regard to the deployment of the S-300s to the island on December 29, 1998 owing to the increasing pressure both by the Western countries-specifically the US and Turkey.²⁶⁹ The missiles were taken from Russia to be deployed to Crete Island instead of Cyprus.²⁷⁰ Although the result was disappointing for Greek Cypriot, it was not for Russia. As stated by Oktay F. Tanrısever, this problematic issue "convinced Turkey that its rivalry with Moscow could get extremely dangerous and even harms Turkey's relations with its NATO allies".²⁷¹ According to Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Valeri Nesteruskin, the issue of deteriorating relations between two NATO allies by a non-NATO member was also mentioned in the letter of Turkish Chief of Staff General İsmail Hakkı Karadayı written to the NATO Chief Commandership.²⁷² Meanwhile Russian Defence Ministry's January 16, 1999 dated statement announcing the delivery of S-300 missiles together with five MIG-29 war planes to Armenia was signaling that the game was not over yet, at least for Russia.²⁷³

²⁶⁵ "Sahte kimlikle Rusya'da", *Milliyet*, 19 January 1999.

²⁶⁶ "Ecevit: Kesin Rusya'da", *Milliyet*, 22 January 1999.

²⁶⁷ "Apo düğümü Atina'da", *Milliyet*, 02 February 1999.

²⁶⁸ Başlamış, Cenk; "Rusya hem rahatladı, hem kozunu kaybetti", *Milliyet*, 17 February 1999.

²⁶⁹ Bazoğlu Sezer, Duygu; "Russia: The Challenges of Reconciling Geopolitical Competition with Economic Partnership" in *Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power*, (ed. by Rubin, Barry & Kirişçi, Kemal), USA: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001, p.169ç

²⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁷¹ Tanrısever, Oktay F.; "Turkey and Russia in Eurasia" in *The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy*, (ed. by Lenore, Martin G. & Keridis, Dimitris), Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004, p. 141.

²⁷² "Ayın Tarihi", Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, October 1997.

²⁷³ "Ayın Tarihi", Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, January 1999.

As regards the issue of the Turkish Straits Statute, Russia raised this issue at the meeting of the Maritime Security Committee of the International Maritime Organization held in London on May 11-20, 1998 by offering to create a new international body responsible from the traffic in the Turkish Straits but could not get any result due to Turkey's successful diplomacy supported by many states.²⁷⁴ As it had been declared earlier by Turkey, the new regulatory statute on the Turkish Straits was entered into force on November 06, 1998 by taking into consideration of the points raised by Russia and some other littoral states in the Black Sea.²⁷⁵ This 1998 dated Statute used the phrase of 'Turkish Straits' for the first time.²⁷⁶ Turkish State Minister responsible from Maritime Affairs Burhan Kara stated that "I address to the people insisting on the transportation of the Caspian oil through the Straits. Turkey is not oil road and will not be. They never think the transfer of this oil via the Straits. They will see that this will cost them more than the Baku-Ceyhan" by reiterating Turkey's main concerns as human and environmental security.²⁷⁷ Russia did not go over the issue further but kept its abstention on the issue together with its suspicion over the intentions of Turkey.

To sum up, the bilateral relations between Turkey and Russia followed a fluctuating tendency in the first decade of the post-Soviet era. On the one hand, most of the 1990s, the relations are strained mainly because of the competition in the Caucasus (Karabakh) and Central Asia (Turkish activism there), Turkish Statutes on the straits, Chechen and PKK issues. On the other hand, the relations are carried on in political, economic and military spheres. The mutual high-level visits were realized, agreements in several fields were signed, trade volume continued to increase since 1992, except the swift decline of the trade volume between 1997 and 1999 from 10 billion dollars to 5 billion dollars²⁷⁸ due to the financial crisis in both countries. However the bilateral relations began to improve in the end of the 1990s, albeit the continuing ups and downs. Three factors played role in this process; Turkey's cognizance of the political and economic limits of its power in fulfilling the vacuum emerged with the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia's relinquishment from great power status by accepting the limits of its power which surfaced with the August 1998 financial crisis in this country and the standpoint of both that the seemingly never-ending

²⁷⁴ Kohen, Sami; "Boğazlar Boru Hattı Değil!..", *Milliyet*, 12 May 1998.

²⁷⁵ "Petrolde 'Türk Boğazları' resti", *Milliyet*, 07 November 1998.

²⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁸ Aktürk, Şener; "Turkish-Russian Relations after the Cold War (1992-2002)", *Turkish Studies*, September 2006, Volume 7, Number 3, p. 354.

rivalry between them could be harmful for their own national security beside of having subversive impact on their relations with the West. “It was the limitations in their capacities that pushed both countries to a more balanced and a generally positive relationship”.²⁷⁹

Having briefly evaluated the anatomy of relations between Turkey and Russia in the 1990s, the next chapter will be detailing the 2000s to highlight the significant developments occurred in the security field of the bilateral relations.

²⁷⁹ Tanrisever, Oktay F.; “Turkey and the Russian Federation: Towards a Mutual Understanding?” in *Turkey’s Foreign Policy in the 21st Century: A Changing Role in World Politics* (ed. by Ismael, Tareq Y.&Aydm, Mustafa), Great Britain: MPG Books, 2003, p.129.

CHAPTER THREE

SECURITY ASPECT OF TURKISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS IN THE 2000s

This chapter will focus on the second decade of the post-Soviet era which is considered as the beginning of the euphoria of rapprochement between Turkey and Russia. The relations will be studied under four sections giving the brief account of the related key developments in the specific period of time. First, the bilateral relations which were redefined with Putin's presidency in 2000 will be discussed. Then, Turkey's New Foreign Policy Vision and Establishment of 'Strategic Partnership' will be explored between the years of 2002 and 2004. Thirdly first state visit and the materialization of 'strategic partnership' between 2004 and 2008 will be investigated. Finally, diversification of interests starting from 2008 to 2010 will be analyzed.

3.1. Redefinition of the Relations with Putin's Presidency (2000-2002)

Following the resignation of the Russian President Boris Yeltsin on December 31, 1999, Premier Vladimir Putin took the charge of the office as of 2000 first as acting and then as elected. Thereby the first Putin period in the Russian history which would last until 2008 happened to be started. "Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation" of June 2000, "National Security Concept of the Russian Federation" of January 2000 and "Russian Military Doctrine" of February 2000, which are approved by Putin, define the contours of Russian national security policy envisioned for the new millennium.²⁸⁰ Putin's strategic vision based on pragmatism seeking to create a strong Russia in political, economic and military terms in pursuit of its own national interests through the use of all possible means brought a Russia attaching great importance to the multilateral mechanisms and multi-polar world. The featured main objectives of this vision is formulated in the 2000 Foreign Policy Concept as "to create favorable external conditions for steady development of Russia", "to form a good-neighbor belt along the perimeter of Russia's borders" and "to seek concord and coinciding interests with foreign countries and interstate associations in the process of resolving the tasks that are determined by the national priorities of Russia, and on this basis,

²⁸⁰ Caldwell, Lawrence T.; "Russian Concepts of National Security" in *Russian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century & The Shadow of the Past*, (ed. by Legvold, Robert), New York; Columbia University Press, 2007, p.310.

to build a system of partnership and allied relations that improve the conditions and parameters of international cooperation”.²⁸¹ Richard Sakwa calls this period as “cooperative pragmatism” whereas Christian Thorun names it as “pragmatic geo-economic realism” which will continue until 2004.²⁸² This new pragmatist vision of Russian leader Putin, be it ‘cooperative’ or ‘pragmatic geo-economic’, brought further development in the bilateral relations of Russia with Turkey.

To compensate the burden of the war in Chechnya over Russian budget and to finance its enormous military high-tech programs, Russia began to give weight to the arm sales as it had been the case in the Soviet times.²⁸³ Thereby the main topic of the visit of the Russian Deputy Premier Ilya Klebanov to Turkey which realized under the acting President Putin became apparent. Turkish President Demirel received Ilya Klebanov, Russian Deputy Premier for Industry, Science and Technology on February 28, 2000.²⁸⁴ During the meeting, Deputy Premier Klebanov stated that Russia was ready for military and technical cooperation including high-tech products.²⁸⁵ On May 25, 2000, Deputy Premier Klebanov paid another visit to Ankara and delivered Russian leader Putin’s letter to Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer identifying Turkey and Russia as ‘strategic partners’ in the region. However the two key issues mentioned in the letter namely the unfinalized attack helicopter tender and the Blue Stream Project unapproved yet by the Turkish Parliament²⁸⁶ are evaluated as the main reason behind the ‘strategic partnership’ discourse of Russia trying to give the message to Turkey that it can be a reliable partner. During the visit, Deputy Premier Klebanov repeated the cooperation offer of the Russian side in defense industry.²⁸⁷

²⁸¹ “The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation”, 28 June 2000, Official website of Russian Foreign Ministry, <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/econcept.htm>.

²⁸² Sakwa, Richard; *Putin: Russia’s Choice*, London: Routledge, 2004, p. 209; Thorun, Christian; *Explaining Change in Russian Foreign Policy: The Role of Ideas in Post-Soviet Russia’s Conduct towards the West*, Great Britain: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, p.55.

²⁸³ Blank, Stephen; “From Kosovo to Kursk: Russian Defense Policy from Yeltsin to Putin”, *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, Winter 2000, Volume 12, Number 2, pp. 264-265.

²⁸⁴ “Ayın Tarihi”, Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, February 2000.

²⁸⁵ *Ibid.*; Çevikcan, Serpil& Yinanç, Barçın; “Kafkas Paktı’na Destek”, *Milliyet*, 01 March 2000.

²⁸⁶ Çevikcan, Serpil; “Putin’den Ortaklık Teklifi”, *Milliyet*, 27 May 2000.

²⁸⁷ “Ayın Tarihi”, Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, May 2000.

Subsequent to Putin's inauguration as President of Russia on May 07, 2000, Turkish Foreign Ministry Undersecretary Faruk Loğoğlu went to Moscow in late May 2000 and delivered the invitation letter of Turkey's new president Ahmet Necdet Sezer who was elected on May 16, 2000 to Russia's new president Putin and also the invitation letter of Turkish Premier Bülent Ecevit to Russia's new premier Mikhail Kasyanov.²⁸⁸ During the contacts of Ambassador Loğoğlu in Moscow, the soft language used by Russian side with regard to the ongoing energy rivalry between Turkey and Russia which surfaced with the Russian authorities' statements of that "It is very natural that Russia and Turkey are interested in regional energy resources. Even Russian companies are interested in Baku-Ceyhan pipeline," took the notice of Turkish side.²⁸⁹ Turkish President Sezer and his Russian counterpart Putin had a meeting while attending the Millenium Summit held in New York in June 2000.²⁹⁰ Russian Premier Mikhail Kasyanov paid an official visit to Turkey on October 23-25, 2000 and during the meetings he had, the military cooperation issues together with the issues of shared interests were discussed and the formation of a joint "Military Cooperation Commission between Turkey and Russia" was decided.²⁹¹ It is stated that the Commission would aim at greater cooperation in the field of defense industry.²⁹²

On February 13, 2001, during the visit of Russian Interior Minister Vladimir B. Rushaylo to Turkey, he stated that both countries have been sharing the same approach towards the fight against terrorism.²⁹³ On April 16, 2001, in a conference on Turkish-Russian relations held in Moscow, Turkish Ambassador Nabi Şensoy mentioned the possibility of escalating the bilateral relations to the level of 'strategic partnership' within five to ten years.²⁹⁴ On June 06, 2001, during the visit of the Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov to Turkey, both sides agreed on rendering the bilateral relationship multi-dimensional character through the

²⁸⁸ Hacıoğlu, Nerdun; "Cumhurbaşkanı Ahmet Sezer'den Vladimir Putin'e davet", *Hürriyet*, 24 May 2000.

²⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁹⁰ Aras, Bülent; "Türkiye ve Rusya Federasyonu: Çok Boyutlu Ortaklık", *SETA Analiz*, August 2009, p.6.

²⁹¹ "Mikhail Kasyanov's Visit", Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, <http://www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/ta%C5%9Finan-newspot/2000/Nov-Dec/N5.htm>.

²⁹² *Ibid.*

²⁹³ "Aydın Tarihi", Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, February 2001.

²⁹⁴ "Aydın Tarihi", Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, April 2001.

cooperation in Eurasia.²⁹⁵ The parties decided to set up a joint working group to upgrade the efforts of struggling against illegal trafficking and international terrorism.²⁹⁶ On November 16, 2001, Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem and his Russian counterpart signed the “Action Plan for Cooperation in Eurasia-From Bilateral towards Multilateral Partnership” in New York.²⁹⁷ The Action Plan states that the radical changes in the world triggered a new era that both countries can develop bilateral and regional cooperation in every field including the fight against international terrorism within the spirit of friendship and trust, and underlines the both countries’ determination of upgrading the current relations to the level of the strengthened constructive partnership through transferring their current good relations, political consultations and economic cooperation to the Eurasian dimension.²⁹⁸ Moreover, the decision to establish a common working group was taken to develop regular bilateral consultations on the issues of common interest including international terrorism.²⁹⁹ In the Action Plan, both countries utter their common believes of that such dialogue and cooperation will also contribute positively to the region as a whole beside of their own interests.³⁰⁰

Turkey’s relations with Russia in the field of military and defense industry gained further momentum through the reciprocal visits of the Russian Commander of Joint Staff General Anatoly Kvashnin and the Turkish Chief of Staff General Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu in 2002.³⁰¹ During the visit of General Kvashnin to Ankara on January 14, 2002, “Framework Agreement on Cooperation in the Military Field and Agreement on Cooperation in Training of the Military Personnel” was signed.³⁰² “Protocol on the Formation of the Joint

²⁹⁵ Aktürk, Şener; “Turkish-Russian Relations after the Cold War (1992-2002)”, *Turkish Studies*, September 2006, Volume 7, Number 3, pp. 344; “Turkey’s Political Relations with Russian Federation”, Official website of Turkish Foreign Ministry, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-political-relations-with-russian-federation.en.mfa.

²⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁹⁷ Aktürk, Şener; “Turkish-Russian Relations after the Cold War (1992-2002)”, *Turkish Studies*, September 2006, Volume 7, Number 3, pp. 344; “Turkey’s Political Relations with Russian Federation”, Official website of Turkish Foreign Ministry, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-political-relations-with-russian-federation.en.mfa.

²⁹⁸ “Turkey’s Political Relations with Russian Federation”, Official website of Turkish Foreign Ministry, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-political-relations-with-russian-federation.en.mfa.

²⁹⁹ “Rusya Federasyonu ile Türkiye Cumhuriyeti arasında Avrasya’da İşbirliği Eylem Planı”, Official website of the Russian Embassy in Turkey, http://www.turkey.mid.ru/relat_2_t.html.

³⁰⁰ “Turkey’s Political Relations with Russian Federation”, Official website of Turkish Foreign Ministry, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-political-relations-with-russian-federation.en.mfa.

³⁰¹ *Ibid.*

³⁰² “Ayın Tarihi”, Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, January 2002; Aktürk, Şener; “Turkish-Russian Relations after the Cold War (1992-2002)”, *Turkish Studies*, September 2006, Volume 7, Number 3, p.344.

Commission which was referred in Article 5 of the April 20, 1994 dated Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the Russian Federation in Military Technical Matters and in the Field of Defense Industry” was signed by related Turkish and Russian authorities in Moscow as replacing the former one signed in 2000.³⁰³ General Kıvrıkoğlu’s return visit to his Russian counterpart was held on June 03-05, 2002.³⁰⁴ General Kıvrıkoğlu also had meeting with Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov on Russia-NATO relations, the fight against terrorism, Chechnya and the financial support given by the foundations in Turkey beside of the cooperation in the military technical field.³⁰⁵ The first Joint Bilateral Committee meeting on military-technical cooperation was held in Ankara in September 2002.³⁰⁶ Turkish Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister Şükrü Sina Gürel and the Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov met in New York on September 11, 2002 and had opportunity to talk over several regional and international issues but the main focus of the talks was the fight against international terrorism, militant separatism and religious extremism which were defined as ‘acute’ problems in Eurasia by relying on the ‘Action Plan’ signed on November 16, 2001.³⁰⁷

In this period, two speeches took the attentions. The reactionary speech of the Secretary General of the Turkish National Security Council, General Tuncer Kılınç at Turkish War College on March 08, 2002, upon the frustration of the EU’s policies towards Turkey, over the pursuit of forming an alliance with Russia by including Iran but without ignoring the US³⁰⁸ possessed a considerable significance. Indeed, the point raised by General Kılınç was leading to an awkward situation given the fact that eight years ago another member of top brass, Turkish Chief of Staff Doğan Güreş had defined the Russia posing greater threat than the Soviet Union. After the end of the intensive fightings in Grozny by February 2000, the

³⁰³ “Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti ile Rusya Federasyonu Hükümeti Arasında Askeri Teknik Konular ve Savunma Sanayii Alanında İşbirliği Yapılmasına Dair Anlaşma’nın Beşinci Maddesinde Öngörülen Karma Komisyonun Teşkiline İlişkin Protokol”, 16 May 2002, Official website of Turkish Foreign Ministry, <http://ua.mfa.gov.tr/detay.aspx?6899>.

³⁰⁴ “Ayın Tarihi”, Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, June 2002.

³⁰⁵ “On the meeting of the Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov with Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Turkey H. Kyvrykoglu”, Official website of the Russian Embassy in Turkey, <http://www.turkey.mid.ru/hron/8.html>.

³⁰⁶ Oku Asim; “Turkey-Russia Relations Dynamics”, 12 May 2005, *Axis Information and Analysis (AIA)*, <http://www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=71>.

³⁰⁷ “Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov Meets with Turkish Deputy Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs Sukru Sina Gurel”, 12 September 2002, Official website of the Russian Embassy in Turkey, <http://www.turkey.mid.ru/hron/12.html>.

³⁰⁸ “Avrupa kavgası kızıştı”, *Radikal*, 09 March 2002.

statements of Turkish State Minister Abdulhaluk Çay voiced at the Caucasus-Chechen Solidarity Committee in Ankara on February 17, 2000 defining Chechen insurgency as a nation's struggle and Russia's acts in Chechnya as genocide by adding that Chechnya's independence would be recognized by Turkey in 2002 angered Russia extremely.³⁰⁹ Russian Federation handed over a protest note to Turkey on February 21, 2000 indicating the unacceptability of the Minister's statements and calling Turkey to clarify its Chechen policy.³¹⁰ On March 15, 2001, Russia gave a note to Turkey requesting extra security for Russian citizens and official buildings upon the event of hijacking of Russian Tupolev-156 departing from Istanbul to Moscow by Chechen air pirates and Turkey handled the case in a very professional way through using diplomatic channels.³¹¹ Another note was given following the hotel raid by Chechen terrorists in Istanbul, and Turkey stated severe condemnation regarding the terrorist event in response on April 25, 2001.³¹²

3.2. Turkey's New Foreign Policy Vision and Establishment of 'Strategic Partnership' (2002-2004)

The elections held on November 03, 2002 brought the Justice and Development Party (AKP) to the government in Turkey. The intellectual architect of the foreign policy vision of the AKP government, chief foreign policy advisor to Turkish Premier Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Prof. Ahmet Davutoğlu put forward five principles of Turkey's new foreign policy concept as to establish balance between security and democracy in the country to "have a chance to establish an area of influence in its environs", to follow "zero problem policy toward Turkey's neighbors", "to develop relations with the neighboring regions and beyond", "adherence to a multi-dimensional foreign policy" as complementary not as competitive and the pursuance of a "rhythmic diplomacy".³¹³ In accordance with this new foreign policy vision formulated by Prof. Davutoğlu; 'multi-dimensional', 'multi-faceted', 'multi-vectored' and 'multi-level'³¹⁴ approach brought so many changes but also further development of the

³⁰⁹ "Ayın Tarihi", Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, February 2000.

³¹⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹¹ "Ayın Tarihi", Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, March 2001.

³¹² "Ayın Tarihi", Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, April 2001.

³¹³ Davutoğlu, Ahmet; "Türkiye merkez ülke olmalı", *Radikal*, 26 February 2004; Davutoğlu, Ahmet; "Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007", *Insight Turkey*, 2008, Volume 10, Number 1, pp.79-83.

³¹⁴ Gaber, Y.V.; "Turkey's New Foreign Policy Strategy: Local, Regional and Global Dimensions", *Journal of Odessa National Mechnikov University*, Volume 14, Issue 13, 2009, p.652.

relations with Russia as well. Russian leader Putin's ongoing foreign policy thinking of "pragmatic geo-economic Realism" since 2000³¹⁵ facilitated the implementation of this vision in their shared neighborhood. However while following their own interests, both countries refrained from taking steps which will drag them into a confrontational situation vis-à-vis each other.

In this period, three issues came forward. First, towards the end of the 2002, the Chechen issue created tension in the bilateral relations mainly because of the press coverage of the Moscow theatre siege events. Russian authorities underlined that they do not have any problems with regard to the official response given by the Turkish authorities following the terrorist attack in Russia by criticizing only Turkish media's attitude. Secondly, PKK activities in Russia under the plea of cultural activities continued to create problem in the bilateral relations. Following the speeches favoring the forceful resolution of the Kurdish question targeting Turkey voiced in the press conference of the "Representation of the Freedom and Democracy Congress of Kurdistan in Russia and the CIS" in Moscow on December 19, 2002, Russian foreign Ministry Spokesperson Alexander Yakovenko issued a press statement on December 21, 2002 notifying Turkey that Russia was still committed to the principles of the cooperation in the bilateral relations by extending its condemnation of terrorism in any of its forms and manifestations and warned these organizations for being careful about their statements.³¹⁶ Thirdly, the US-led military operation, 'Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)' which began on March 19, 2003³¹⁷ provided further rapprochement between Turkey and Russia since both countries took opposite stance vis-à-vis the operation due to their own national interest calculations. Turkey's opponent position was greatly welcomed by Russia and changed the Russia's perception towards Turkey in positive sense. Russian leadership's statements with regards to the necessity of protecting the territorial integrity of Iraq corresponded to the vital security interests of Turkey. The following meetings onwards held between the high-level authorities of both countries in different platforms took the issue of the Iraqi war into the top of their agendas.

Furthermore, the issue of the Turkish Straits Statute kept its place in the bilateral relations but with losing its previous weight. On September 17, 2003, Russian President Vladimir

³¹⁵ Thorun, Christian; *Explaining Change in Russian Foreign Policy: The Role of Ideas in Post-Soviet Russia's Conduct towards the West*, Great Britain: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, p.55.

³¹⁶ "Statement By Alexander Yakovenko, The Official Spokesman of Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs", Official website of the Russian Embassy in Ankara, <http://www.turkey.mid.ru/hron/23.html>.

³¹⁷ "Operation Iraqi Freedom", *Global Security*, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraqi_freedom.htm.

Putin's following statements articulated that the issue was still on for the Russian side, albeit the Turkish Straits Statute had been updated by Turkey in 1998 in tandem with the points raised by Russia along with the other littoral states:

What's more, Turkey is unfortunately attempting to restrict passage for ships through the straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles into the Sea of Marmara. This particularly concerns oil tankers....There are some objective reasons for these decisions, but our partners' temptation to do a little squeezing out the competition and promote their own interests is also present. I think the Foreign Ministry should follow this matter closely and keep watch on what is going on in this area. There are certain agreements and documents that have been signed, and everyone should comply with them. Of course, environmental issues are of great importance. But here, too, actions should be based on international law and on the documents relating to this area. No one should go beyond the limits set by these documents.³¹⁸

Even though Turkey had started to use the expression of 'Turkish straits' in the 1998 updated Statute, Russian leader Putin used the phrase of "the straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles" and also the summary of the speech given in the Kremlin official website used the expression of 'Black Sea straits' instead of 'Turkish Straits'.³¹⁹

3.3. First State Visit and the Materialization of 'Strategic Partnership' (2004-2008)

The period between 2004 and 2008 is a hectic term which is full of exchange of high-level visits and important bilateral agreements signed between Turkey and Russia. The first official visit to Russia at the Foreign Minister level since 1996 was realized on February 23-26, 2004 by Turkish Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül.³²⁰ During the visit, Turkish and Russian Foreign Ministers signed the "2004-2005 Consultations Programme" between Turkish and Russian foreign ministries providing the official framework for bilateral consultations on manifold topics which are interest to both parties such as security, maritime issues, bilateral political and economic relations, consular and cultural affairs, regional and international matters.³²¹ However what makes the year of 2004 is significant with regard to the development of the bilateral relations is the realization of the postponed visit of the Russian leader Putin to Turkey due to the Beslan tragedy in Russia. The visit held on December 05, 2004 recorded as the first state visit held at the presidential level form

³¹⁸ "Speech at a Meeting on Issues of the Russian Military-Diplomatic Presence in the Black Sea-Azov Region", Official website of the Russian President, 17 September 2003.

³¹⁹ "President Vladimir Putin chaired a meeting in Yeisk on the Russian military-diplomatic presence in the Black Sea-Azov region", 17 September 2003, Official website of the Russian President, 17 September 2003.

³²⁰ "Turkey's Political Relations with the Russian Federation", Turkish Foreign Ministry official website, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-political-relations-with-russian-federation.en.mfa.

³²¹ *Ibid.*

Russia to Turkey after 32 years period since the last visit at this level had been paid by the USSR head Nikolay Podgorny in 1972. Accompanying delegation of Vladimir Putin composed of the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, Russian Industry and Energy Minister Viktor Khristenko, the first Deputy Director Directors of the FSB, the President of Tatarstan Mintimer Shaimiev, President of Ingushetia Murat Zyazikov and the heads of the biggest Russian companies such as Gazprom and Tatneft³²² shows the comprehensive agenda of the visit.³²³ The issues of cooperation in the fields of defense and security, energy, economy, the Black Sea region, the fight against terrorism, oil transportation through Turkish straits and regional issues focusing on Cyprus, the Caucasus and the Middle East were discussed.³²⁴ Russian side conveyed its interest and willingness to increase its share of investment and privatization in Turkey.³²⁵ With regard to the helicopter tender of Turkey, Russia offered the “partial manufacture of the helicopters in Turkey” and “re-export of this production” and, in return, Turkey expressed its interest of buying Russian military products together with co-producing these items.³²⁶ The parties agreed on the exchange of information in the fight against terrorism.³²⁷ During the talks, Russian side put forward the end of Chechen activities in Turkey whereas Turkish side demanded the end of the PKK activities in Russia.³²⁸ Regarding the regional issues, the parties paid attention to understand the each other’s differing posture especially in the South Caucasus and Cyprus while being of the same mind in the issues such as Iraq.³²⁹

³²² “The First Visit of Vladimir Putin to Turkey (5-6.12.2004)”, *Axisglobe*, 21 August 2005, <http://www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=332>; “Russian President Putin Visits Turkey”, Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, <http://www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/ta%C5%9Finan-newspot/2004/nov-dec/n4.htm>.

³²³ *Ibid.*; *Ibid.*

³²⁴ *Ibid.*; *Ibid.*

³²⁵ “The First Visit of Vladimir Putin to Turkey (5-6.12.2004)”, *Axisglobe*, 21 August 2005, <http://www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=332>

³²⁶ *Ibid.*

³²⁷ *Ibid.*

³²⁸ *Ibid.*

³²⁹ *Ibid.*

In the course of the landmark visit of the Russian leader Vladimir Putin to Ankara, six agreements and cooperation protocols were signed on December 06, 2004.³³⁰ These are; “Agreement on Mutual Protection of the Rights and the Intellectual Property within the Framework of Military-Technological Cooperation”, “Agreement on Mutual Protection of the Classified Information and Materials Transmitted within the Framework of Military-Technological Cooperation”, “Agreement on Prevention of Incidents on the Sea Outside the Territorial Waters”, “Cooperation Agreement Between Vnesheconombank, Roseksimbank and Eximbank of Turkey”, “Memorandum on Development of Cooperation in Gas Sphere Between Gazprom and Botaş” and “Memorandum on Cooperation Between Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and the Center of Strategic Researches in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey”.³³¹ In addition to the abovementioned documents, parties signed “Joint Declaration between the Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation on Deepening Friendship and Multi-Dimensional Partnership” covering cooperation in various fields.³³² This declaration is having special significance since the signatories reiterated their common objective of increasing cooperation in combating “terrorism in all its forms and manifestations”.³³³

The following months in 2005 witnessed the dizzying visit traffic between Turkey and Russia. Turkish Premier Recep Tayyip Erdoğan paid three visits to Russia in 2005. The first visit was held on January 10-12, 2005 to open the Turkish Trade Center in Moscow, the second one was on May 08-09, 2005 to participate the 60th Anniversary of the Second World War Victory Day and the third one was realized on July 17-18, 2005 to have talks with the Russian leader Putin.³³⁴ At the heels of Premier Erdoğan’s visits, Russian leader Putin came to Turkey in November 2005 for attending the opening ceremony of the Blue Stream Gas Pipe Line.³³⁵ Two years later of the Russian President Putin’s noteworthy visit to Turkey,

³³⁰ “Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti ile Rusya Federasyonu Hükümeti Arasında Savunma Sanayii Alanında İkili İş Birliği Süresince Mübadele Edilen veya Oluşturulan Gizlilik Dereceli Bilgi ve Malzemelerin Karşılıklı Korunması Anlaşması”, 06 December 2004, Official website of Turkish Foreign Ministry, <http://ua.mfa.gov.tr/detay.aspx?15462>.

³³¹ “The First Visit of Vladimir Putin to Turkey (5-6.12.2004)”, *Axisglobe*, 21 August 2005, <http://www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=332>; “Russian President Putin Visits Turkey”, Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, <http://www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/ta%C5%9Finan-newsport/2004/nov-dec/n4.htm>.

³³² “Türkiye-Rusya: İşbirliğimiz ivme kazanacak”, *Hürriyet*, 06 December 2004.

³³³ *Ibid.*

³³⁴ “Turkey’s Political Relations with Russian Federation”, Official website of Turkish Foreign Ministry, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-political-relations-with-russian-federation.en.mfa.

³³⁵ *Ibid.*

Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer's return visit to Moscow was held on June 28, 2006. Subsequent year, Russian President Putin together with his foreign minister Lavrov came to Istanbul to participate in the BSEC Summit held on June 25, 2007.³³⁶ The exchange of visits between the Speakers of the Parliaments, Bülent Arınç and Sergey Mironov, of both countries held in July 2006 and in March 2007 encouraged further contacts between the Parliaments.³³⁷ Furthermore, "Memorandum of Understanding of the Fourth Meeting of the Joint Working Group on Combating Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism" was issued on March 14, 2007.³³⁸ Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan's official visit to Moscow on February 19-20, 2008 to have talks on regional and international issues was reciprocated by the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's visit to Turkey on July 01-02, 2008 to discuss the key bilateral issues together with regional and international developments appealing both countries.³³⁹

In the period between 2004 and 2008, the most important issue coming forward was Russia's veto of the draft resolution on Cyprus known as 'Annan Plan' at the meeting in the UN Security Council held on April 21, 2004 before the separate referendums were held among the Greek and Turkish communities of the Cyprus Island on April 24, 2004. The Plan was supported by the majority of the Turkish Cypriots whereas declined by the majority the Greek Cypriots. Russia was the only country vetoed the Plan in the UN Security Council. Russia explained its veto decision by referring to the three points; not to cause any pressure on the communities of the island before the referendums, a reaction against "the way the work had been arranged on the draft resolution put to a vote in the Council" and the inadequate attention to the amendment proposals of Russia.³⁴⁰ Russia summed up the all three reasons by using the expression of a "procedural-technical" issue while indicating that

³³⁶ "Turkey's Political Relations with Russian Federation", Official website of Turkish Foreign Ministry, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-political-relations-with-russian-federation.en.mfa.

³³⁷ *Ibid.*

³³⁸ "Joint Declaration between the Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation on Progress towards a New Stage in Relations and Further Deepening of Friendship and Multidimensional Partnership, Moscow, 13 February 2009", Official website of Turkish Foreign Ministry, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/joint-declaration-between-the-republic-of-turkey-and-the-russian-federation-on-progress-towards-a-new-stage-in-relations-and-further-deepening-of-friendship-and-multidimensional-partnership_-moscow_-13-february-2009.en.mfa.

³³⁹ "Rusya Federasyonu Dışişleri Bakanı Sayın Sergey Lavrov'un Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'ni Ziyareti Hk.", Official website of the Russian Embassy in Turkey, http://www.turkey.mid.ru/hron/pr_t_07.html.

³⁴⁰ "Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation on the Vote in the United Nations Security Council on the Draft Resolution on Cyprus Settlement", 22 April 2004, Official website of the Russian Embassy in Turkey, http://www.turkey.mid.ru/text_t42.html; "Statement by Gennady Gatilov, Acting Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the UN, Security Council Meeting on Cyprus, 21 April 2004", Official website of the Russian Embassy in Turkey, http://www.turkey.mid.ru/text_t41.html.

it did not have a major problem with the content of the draft resolution.³⁴¹ However the issue in its essence has different facets. Russia's political, economic and military calculations enforced it to veto the resolution.³⁴² During the interview with Turkish media in Sochi on September 01, 2004, Russian President Putin argued that Russia's veto decision was not met negatively by Turkey.³⁴³ However, following the referendums, Russia voiced that there was an overt necessity of giving support to the economic development of the Turkish Cypriots and recommended that the steps in this regard should have been taken within UN framework.³⁴⁴ During the visit of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to attend the 31st meeting of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) Foreign Ministers held in Istanbul on June 14-16, 2004, he had meeting with Turkish Cypriot Premier Mehmet Ali Talat and Turkish Cypriot Foreign Minister Serdar Denktaş.³⁴⁵ Few lower level contacts were realized either with Moscow's own initiative or with the participation of Turkish Cypriots authorities by taking place in Turkish delegations, alas, these efforts did not go further. Putin's statements in favor of loosening the restrictions on Turkish Cypriots and supporting the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's efforts in the settlement of this problem voiced during the visit of Turkish Premier Erdoğan to Russia in January 2005 and in July 2005³⁴⁶ did not go beyond the limits of the gesture.

Furthermore, Russian President Medvedev approved a new 'Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation' on July 12, 2008, allegedly prepared during Putin's presidency, where 'network diplomacy' instead of 'bloc diplomacy' was put forward.³⁴⁷ In the approved concept, Turkey appeared as one of the countries together with Egypt, Algeria, Iran, Saudi

³⁴¹ "Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation on the Vote in the United Nations Security Council on the Draft Resolution on Cyprus Settlement", 22 April 2004, Official website of the Russian Embassy in Turkey, http://www.turkey.mid.ru/text_t42.html.

³⁴² Oğan, Sinan; "Russian Federation's Cyprus Politics, Turkish Centre for International Relations&Strategic Analysis (TURKSAM), 06 February 2005, <http://www.turksam.org/en/a249.html>.

³⁴³ "Interview with Turkish Media", 01 September 2004, Official website of the Russian President.

³⁴⁴ "Kıbrıs Türk Toplumuna ekonomik yardım planları konusunda", 28 April 2004, Official website of the Russian Embassy in Turkey, http://www.turkey.mid.ru/text_t46.html.

³⁴⁵ Oğan, Sinan; "Russian Federation's Cyprus Politics, Turkish Centre for International Relations&Strategic Analysis (TURKSAM), 06 February 2005, <http://www.turksam.org/en/a249.html>.

³⁴⁶ Christou, Jean; "Putin Calls for end of Turkish Cypriots' Isolation", *Cyprus Mail*, 12 January 2005, <http://www.cyprus-mail.com/cyprus/putin-calls-end-turkish-cypriots-isolation>; "Press Statements and Answers to Questions following Russian-Turkish Talks", 18 July 2005, Official website of the Russian President.

³⁴⁷ Kosyrev, Dmitry; "Foreign policy: Medvedev taking inventory", *RIA Novosti*, 15 July 2008, <http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20080715/114049494.html>.

Arabia, Syria, Libya, Pakistan and other leading regional States that Russia would like to develop its relations further in bilateral and multilateral levels.³⁴⁸

3.4. Diversification of Interests (2008-2010)

The constantly deteriorating relations between Russia and Georgia since the coming into power of the pro-Western and anti-Russian Saakashvili Government as a result of the Rose Revolution in 2003 turned into a brief war, known as the Five-Day war, in August 2008. The Five-Day war which started on August 07-08, 2008 continued until August 12-13, 2008 when the Six-point Peace Plan was agreed upon by the parties in the coordination of the EU head, French President Nicolas Sarkozy. With the end of the war, Russia announced the recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in a statement on August 26, 2008 with special reference to Kosovo.³⁴⁹ The US decision to send warships for the delivery of the humanitarian goods following the end of the war led to another crisis in the region. The war did not only sharpen up the warring parties but also their supporters as well. In this crisis, Russia and the US were located in two different edges of the issue. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov stated that the West but especially the US had to choose either Georgia, which he named it as a project, or Russia named as real partner.³⁵⁰ The US was not the only country that has to make choice. So the first question to be answered is that how Turkey defined its position during the crisis.

From beginning to end, Turkey did strive to pursue a very balanced policy and acted accordingly in its contacts with Russian, Georgian and American authorities. Even the language used by the high-level authorities was noticeably cautious. Throughout the crisis, Turkey carried out contacts and consultations with both parties for the peaceful settlement of the conflict. The Georgian territorial integrity and sovereignty was accentuated both by the Turkish Premier and Turkish President within the framework of this peaceful settlement.³⁵¹ Turkish Premier expressed Turkey's support to the peace plan being prepared by the OSCE

³⁴⁸ "The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation", Official website of Russian Foreign Ministry, 17 July 2008 <http://www.mid.ru/ns-osndoc.nsf/0e9272bfa34209743256c630042d1aa/cef95560654d4ca5c32574960036cddb?OpenDocument>.

³⁴⁹ "Statement by President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev", Official website of the Russian President, 26 August 2008, http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/08/26/1543_type82912_205752.shtml.

³⁵⁰ Lister, Richard; "US sends aid, but rethinks policy", *BBC*, 13 August 2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7559855.stm>.

³⁵¹ "Erdoğan: Bütünlük korunmalı", *BBC Turkish*, 14 August 2008, http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkish/news/story/2008/08/080814_erdogan.shtml; "Gül: Toprak bütünlüğü mühim", *BBC Turkish*, 12 August 2008, http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkish/news/story/2008/08/080812_georgia_turkey.shtml.

and the EU for bringing permanent peace to the Caucasus.³⁵² In addition to but also as part of its impartial moderate rhetoric, Turkey developed its own crisis management or handling language per se through offering the creation of a ‘Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform’ (CSCP) as the peaceful settlement of the conflict. Turkish Premier Erdoğan raised the issue of forming a ‘Caucasus Alliance’ on August 11, 2008 and the Turkish President Abdullah Gül upheld the initiative of establishing ‘Caucasus Stability Forum’ on August 12, 2008 for building peace, stability and welfare in the region.³⁵³ After the Russo-Georgian war in August 2008, Premier Erdoğan as the first leader who paid a visit to Russia to discuss the issue of peaceful settlement of the conflict announced his proposal for the establishment of the CSCP on August 13, 2008 in Russia and on August 14, 2008 in Georgia during the official meetings held in both countries.³⁵⁴ Turkey’s suggestion to include the US into the Platform in the beginning by drawing the picture as three region states plus Turkey, Russia and the US was met by Moscow’s objection and the format appeared as 3+2 (three South Caucasus states, Turkey and Russia) in the end.³⁵⁵ However Georgia declined the offer with pointing out the ongoing Russian occupation.³⁵⁶ After the official talks of the US Foreign Relations Committee member Richard Lugar with the Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan on August 26, 2008, Lugar stated that all the discussions on the issue of CSCP will be postponed until the completion of Russian withdrawal from Georgia.³⁵⁷ The Russian Ambassador in Ankara Vladimir Ivanovskiy stated that the BSEC may be the floor for further discussions with regard to the CSCP on August 27, 2008.³⁵⁸ This posture was confirmed by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov at the joint press conference held in Istanbul on September 02, 2008 with his own words of; “We see the chief value in the Turkish initiative for the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform in that it rests on

³⁵² “Erdoğan: Bütünlük korunmalı”, *BBC Turkish*, 14 August 2008, http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkish/news/story/2008/08/080814_erdogan.shtml.

³⁵³ Kanbolat, Hasan; “What is Caucasian stability and cooperation? What can Turkey do in the Caucasus”, *Today’s Zaman*, 19 August 2008, <http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=150578>.

³⁵⁴ Akkan, Faruk; “Türkiye Moskova Büyükelçisi Akıncı: Rusya ile 100 milyar dolar ticaret hayal değil - ÖZEL”, *Haberrus*, 10 May 2010, <http://www.haberrus.com/gundem/2787-Turkiye-Moskova-Buyukelcisi-Akinci-Rusya-ile-100-milyar-dolar-ticaret-hayal-degil---OZEL.html>; Kanbolat, Hasan; “What is Caucasian stability and cooperation? What can Turkey do in the Caucasus”, *Today’s Zaman*, 19 August 2008.

³⁵⁵ Safrastyan, Ruben; ‘On Turkey’s New Undertaking in South Caucasus’, Noravank Foundation, 29 September 2008, http://www.noravank.am/eng/articles/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=3487&spphrase_id=1077.

³⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁵⁷ “Aydın Tarihi”, Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, August 2008.

³⁵⁸ “Aydın Tarihi”, Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, August 2008.

common sense and assumes that countries of any region and, first of all, countries belonging to this region should themselves decide how to conduct affairs there. And others should help, but not dictate their recipes”.³⁵⁹ Interestingly, Turkish President Abdullah Gül, in his commentary given to ‘The Guardian’ newspaper on August 16, 2008, highlighted the importance of common decision taking, consultation with other states and joint actions instead of individual ones with allusion to the war in Georgia as the evidence of the US incapability in shaping the global politics per se.³⁶⁰ During his official visit to Turkey on November 18-19, 2008, Russian Defence Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov also valued Turkey’s initiative of CSCP and Turkey’s views on Georgia’s territorial integrity by stating that Russia has concerns with regard to Georgia’s efforts of developing its military potential and its leaning towards NATO.³⁶¹ Pertaining to the applicability of the CSCP, it is claimed that the Russian support to the Turkish initiative is tactical and conditional.³⁶² It is tactical due to the fact that Russia never let another actor, be it littoral or non-littoral, take a leading role while considering the theater scene as its own sphere of dominance.³⁶³ It is conditional since it excludes the US. Whereas some argue that the realization of the CSCP is possible since Russia always prefers a regional player instead of a non-regional player as the US.³⁶⁴

Following the bilateral meeting held in Istanbul on August 31, 2008, Turkish Foreign Minister Babacan and Georgian Foreign Minister Eka Tkeshelashvili made a joint press meeting and Georgian Foreign Minister also expressed its appreciation because of Turkey’s support favoring Georgian territorial integrity and sovereignty.³⁶⁵ Mikhail Saakashvili also thanked Turkey for being the first state to deliver humanitarian aid to Georgia and asked for

³⁵⁹ “Transcript of Remarks and Response to Media Questions by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov at Joint Press Conference with Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs Ali Babajan, Istanbul, September 2, 2008”, Official website of Russian Foreign Ministry, 03 September 2008, http://www.un.int/russia/new/MainRoot/docs/off_news/030908/newen3.htm.

³⁶⁰ Kinzer, Stephen; “US must share power in new world order, says Turkey's controversial president”, *The Guardian*, 16 August 2008, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/aug/16/turkey.usforeignpolicy>; “Medvedev'in beş ilkesi”, *BBC Turkish*, 01 September 2008, http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkish/news/story/2008/09/080901_russia_fp.shtml.

³⁶¹ “Rusya Federasyonu Savunma Bakanı'nın Türkiye'ye yaptığı resmi ziyaret hk.”, Official website of the Russian Embassy in Turkey, http://www.turkey.mid.ru/hron/pr_t_23.html; “Rusya Savunma Bakanı Serdyukov, Gönül'ü ziyaret etti”, *Milliyet*, 18 November 2008.

³⁶² Safrastyan, Ruben; “On Turkey’s New Undertaking in South Caucasus”, Noravank Foundation, 29 September 2008, http://www.noravank.am/eng/articles/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=3487&spphrase_id=1077.

³⁶³ *Ibid.*

³⁶⁴ Yınaç, Barçın; “Old rivals, new partners: Conflict and cooperation in politics”, *Hürriyet Daily News*, 11 August 2010.

³⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

help in reconstruction works to be held after the war.³⁶⁶ The moderate statements of top level Turkish authorities were also welcomed warmly by Russia as expressed by the Chargé d’Affaires of the Russian Embassy in Ankara Andrey Buravov on August 12, 2008 emphasizing the Russian appreciation with regard to the balanced attitude of Turkey while giving consideration to the Turkish concerns.³⁶⁷

After the ceasefire in August, most of the statements from the US and Europe were about the slow withdrawal of the Russian forces from Georgia whereas interestingly no single Turkish statesmen did join this chorus.³⁶⁸ Upon the Russian declaration of recognizing the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, US Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Robert Wood, French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner, the EU and the Council of Europe made statements criticizing the Russian recognition of breakaway republics with varying degrees of pungency up to the level of condemnation.³⁶⁹ Whereas Turkish Foreign Ministry only expressed its concerns because of the recent developments in the region by reminding the significance of the peaceful resolution of the conflict.³⁷⁰

There appeared two issues of having potential to cause a crack between Turkey and Russia; the years long military technical cooperation of Turkey with Georgia and Turkey’s possible incomppliance with the rules of Montreux Convention. First, during the first days of the war, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov indirectly accused the countries which had military cooperation with Georgia through arms sales or military training of having provoked Georgia whilst Russian Ambassador to NATO Dmitry Rogozin was linking the events to the NATO Bucharest Summit where Georgia was encouraged for the membership.³⁷¹ Beside of the political support and munificent economic assistance, the US designed a special program covering wide-ranging military aid for Georgia first to struggle against terrorism in the

³⁶⁶ “Erdoğan: Bütünlük korunmalı”, *BBC Turkish*, 14 August 2008, http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkish/news/story/2008/08/080814_erdogan.shtml.

³⁶⁷ “Ayın Tarihi”, Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, August 2008.

³⁶⁸ “Ayın Tarihi”, Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, August 2008.

³⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

³⁷¹ “NATO encouraged Georgia – Russian envoy”, *Russia Today (RT)*, 09 August 2008, http://rt.com/Top_News/2008-08-09/nato_encouraged_georgia_russian_envoy.html.

Caucasus and then to train the Georgian armed forces for international postings in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan.³⁷² This kind of deep political and military cooperation brought large number of US political and military presence as in person to Georgia.³⁷³ According to the news in Pravda, there is a widespread belief among the Russian officials that the war is a US design.³⁷⁴ The Chairman of the State Duma Committee for Security, Vladimir Vasilyev argues that the conflict is the evocative of the wars in Kosovo and Iraq, and adds that “Georgia would never be able to do all this without America”.³⁷⁵ Russian President Medvedev’s statement of 26 August 2008 raised a very harsh critique towards Georgia and the countries supporting it with the words of “political and material support provided by their foreign guardians”.³⁷⁶ Right at this point, Russian newspaper Izvestya pointed Turkey as one of the countries supported Georgia with weapons and ammunitions valued at 45 million dollars thereto the military training relying on a report prepared by the Russian Defense Ministry.³⁷⁷ Actually, Turkish eagerness to play an active role in Georgia was quite noticeable fact after September 11. Turkey assisted in modernizing the Air Force base in Marneuli near Tbilisi, built and co-staffed the United Military Academy in Tbilisi where Georgian Lieutenant-General David Tevzadze highlighted the NATO standards at the opening ceremony of the academy.³⁷⁸ Turkey’s initiative of signing a tripartite agreement with Georgia and Azerbaijan for providing regional security which includes articles on combating terrorism, organized crime and protecting the oil pipelines specifically Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan was signed in January 2002 in Ankara.³⁷⁹ As stated by Zeyno Baran; “In the past, Georgia had asked the Russians for help against the Ottomans, but today Georgia receives military, economic and political assistance from Turkey”.³⁸⁰ However the military

³⁷² “The Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia (IIFMCG)”, Volume I, September 2009, http://www.ceiig.ch/pdf/IIFMCG_Volume_I.pdf, p.15.

³⁷³ *Ibid.*

³⁷⁴ “War between Russia and Georgia orchestrated from USA”, *Pravda*, 09 August 2008, http://english.pravda.ru/hotspots/conflicts/09-08-2008/106046-russia_georgia-0/.

³⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁷⁶ “Statement by President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev”, 26 August 2008, Official website of the Russian President, http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/08/26/1543_type82912_205752.shtml.

³⁷⁷ “Russian media: Turkey supports Georgia”; *Hürriyet Daily News*, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/home/9626649.asp?gid=244&sz=3441>.

³⁷⁸ Singh, Gajendra K., ‘Russian Bear Calls on Grey Wolf’, 24 August 2004, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/FH28Ag01.html.

³⁷⁹ Torbakov, Igor; ‘A New Security Arrangement Takes Shape in the South Caucasus’, *Eurasia Insight*, 24 January 2002, <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav012402.shtml>.

³⁸⁰ Torbakov, Igor; ‘The Turkish Factor in the Geopolitics of the Post Soviet Space’, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 10 January 2003, <http://www.fpri.org/enotes/20030110.torbakov.turkeypostsovietspace.html>.

relations between Turkey and Georgia decelerated with the process started with the entrance of American counter-terror special forces into the country and continued to reduce with the increasing influence of the US on Georgian government through its advisors since Georgia began to head toward the US military to get more financial and military assistance. Georgia seeking American protection to get support against Russia and to be backed for NATO membership moved away from Turkey's sphere of influence. By the same token, the name of Turkey was not voiced together with the countries giving military support to Georgia such as the US, Ukraine, Czech Republic and Israel in the report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia established by the Council of the European Union known as 'Tagliavini Report' in September 2009.³⁸¹ Thereupon the critics mentioned regarding the Turkish arms used during the war, Turkish Premier Erdoğan commented that the arms sale is a commercial business and the use of Turkish arms in the war does not mean anything by giving the sample that Turkey can sell weapons to Georgia and buy weapons from Russia.³⁸² Moreover, Turkey's smartly considered vigilant strategy of handling the parties during the war made Turkey out of the Russian target board.

Secondly, the US decision to send warships for the delivery of the humanitarian goods suddenly became more important than the conflict per se. The US President Bush announced the big scale humanitarian aid plan on August 13, 2008 to be realized with the participation of military planes, naval forces and troops.³⁸³ This was followed by the statement of Georgian leader Saakashvili on the same day as "It means that Georgian ports and airports will be taken under the control of the U.S. Defense Ministry in order to conduct humanitarian and other missions".³⁸⁴ Upon the interpretation of the Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili of the statement made by the US President Bush with regard to sending naval and air forces for delivering the humanitarian aid to Georgia as in the way that the ports and airports to be guarded by American soldiers, White House Spokesperson elucidated that the sending the US forces to Georgia was only meant for providing

³⁸¹ "The Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia (IIFFMCG)", Volume I, September 2009, http://www.ceiiig.ch/pdf/IIFFMCG_Volume_I.pdf, p.15.

³⁸² "Erdoğan: Herkes silah satabilir", *Milliyet*, 11 August 2008.

³⁸³ "US troops to fly in to Georgia", *The Independent*, 13 August 2008, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/us-troops-to-fly-in-to-georgia-893917.html>.

³⁸⁴ "U.S. to take control of Georgian ports: Saakashvili", *Reuters*, 13 August 2008, <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLD49893320080813>; Ward, Jon; "U.S. to deliver 'humanitarian aid' to Georgia", *The Washington Times*, 13 August 2008, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/aug/13/bush-us-to-deliver-humanitarian-aid-to-georgia/>.

humanitarian aid not for another purpose such as securing the ports.³⁸⁵ However Russian authorities questioned the delivery of the humanitarian aid through the highly sophisticated warships instead of airlift or merchant ships which are not up to any restriction under the Montreux Convention. Russian suspicions concentrated on that whether it was a kind of American show-off to give the message that we are here or the US was bringing weapons to be handed over to Georgia.³⁸⁶ Tension was escalating upon these suspicions. First, the US initiated unofficial contacts with Turkey for sending two hospital ships named Mercy and Comfort to Georgia on August 16, 2008.³⁸⁷ However Turkey conveyed the message that it could not allow the entrance request of the ships to the Black Sea with reference to the 70,000 tons of the each ship which is quite above both the transit tonnage limit specified as 15,000 tons in the Montreux Convention and the maximum tonnage limit of the ships belonging to the non-littoral states to have stayed in the Black Sea specified as 30,000 in peace time.³⁸⁸ One interesting comment on this issue was raised by Ariel Cohen from the US think-tank Heritage Foundation by resembling this event to the 01 March motion in connection with the possible damage on Turkish-US relations and accused Turkey of not concerting its actions with its allies.³⁸⁹ According to Fyodor Lukyanov, the chief editor of 'Russia in Global Affairs', albeit its contribution to the Georgian military, Turkish attitude by not letting the US warships enter into the Black Sea and also by objecting the offer of sending surveillance planes as a show-off to the region in the immediate aftermath the August war became complementary part of its independent interest-seeking attitude during the invasion of Iraq in 2003 for the Russian perception.³⁹⁰ Turkey strictly followed the

³⁸⁵ "Ayın Tarihi", Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, August 2008.

³⁸⁶ Kramer, Andrew E.; "NATO Ships in Black Sea Raise Alarms in Russia", *The New York Times*, 27 August 2008, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/28/world/europe/28russia.html>; Morrison, David; "Turkey restricts US access to the Black Sea", 18 October 2008, <http://www.david-morrison.org.uk/us/turkey-restricts-us-access.htm>; Traynor, Ian; "US and Russian warships line up in dispute over Georgia", *The Guardian*, 27 August 2008, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/aug/27/georgia.russia1>; "NATO's navy delivers weapons to Georgia under the guise of humanitarian aid", *Pravda*, 27 August 2008, http://english.Pravda.ru/world/ussr/27-08-2008/106216-nato_georgia-0/.

³⁸⁷ "Ayın Tarihi", Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, August 2008; "ABD gemilerine geçiş izni, tezkereyi hatırlatıyor", *Ntvmsnbc*, 19 August 2008, <http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/456632.asp>.

³⁸⁸ "Boğazlar Rejimi Hakkında Mukavelename (Montreux/Montrö)", 20.07.1936", Official website of Turkish Foreign Ministry, <http://ua.mfa.gov.tr/detay.aspx?2479>; Zeyrek, Deniz; "ABD gemilerine Montrö izin vermiyor", *Radikal*, 20 August 2008; Enginsoy, Ümit; "ABD Karadeniz'e geçiş izni istiyor", *Ntvmsnbc*, 19 August 2008, <http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/456628.asp>.

³⁸⁹ "ABD gemilerine geçiş izni, tezkereyi hatırlatıyor", *Ntvmsnbc*, 19 August 2008, <http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/456632.asp>.

³⁹⁰ Yınanç, Barçın; "Old rivals, new partners: Conflict and cooperation in politics", *Hürriyet Daily News*, 11 August 2010.

Montreux provisions. The US warships namely the guided missile destroyer the USS McFaul74 (8,915 tons), the US Coast Guard cutter the USCGC Dallas (3,250 tons) which was later replaced by the USNS Pathfinder survey vessel and the USS Mount Whitney (18,400 tons) began to enter to the Black Sea as of August 22, 2008 through the Turkish Straits in accordance with the provisions of the Montreux Convention.³⁹¹ What is interesting at this specific issue is that Russia started to implement an extensive customs procedure on August 13, 2008 towards not only Turkish exports but also the exports with Turkish origin at the Russian borders which cost Turkey more than 500 million dollars and the problem was solved with signing a protocol on September 18, 2008.³⁹² Even though Turkey is not the only country facing with this custom procedure, Turkish Undersecretariat of Customs states in its website that it was implemented towards Turkey in a more extensive and rampant way compared to other countries.³⁹³ Even though there are people in Turkey asserting that it is mere coincidence by referring to the previous customs procedure which had started earlier, the dates prove that it is not that simple indeed. Given the gradual economic weaponization of Russian foreign policy mostly appears in the former Soviet space, it should not be so. Turkey's economic vulnerability with growing trade imbalance and energy dependency reaching to 70 percents became apparent.³⁹⁴

Turkey did not raise any harsh critique about the ongoing tension toward the players of the conflict, did stick to the Montreux provisions, participated in the joint critical statements of NATO towards Russia while carrying on its relations with Russia as uninterrupted and unaffected, carried on BLACKSEAFOR Activations where Russia is taking part and also showed its presence in the prescheduled NATO military exercises 'Cooperative Longbow 09' and 'Cooperative Lancer 09' in Georgia without being exposed to any expostulation by anyone.³⁹⁵ This tailor-made policy of balance deserves applause. However there are more to

³⁹¹ Daly, John C.K.; "Montreux Convention Hampers Humanitarian Aid To Georgia", *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, 03 September 2008, Volume 5, Issue 168, [http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=33915](http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=33915); "Ayın Tarihi", Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, August 2008.

³⁹² Jenkins, Gareth; "Ongoing Trade Crisis Demonstrates Turkey's Lack of Leverage Against Russia", *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, 09 September 2008, Volume 5, Issue 172.

³⁹³ "Rusya - Türkiye Gümrük Sorunları ve Basitleştirilmiş Gümrük Hattı (BGH)", Turkish Undersecretariat of Customs website, <http://www.gumruk.gov.tr/tr-TR/abdisiliskiler/Sayfalar/RusyaBGH.aspx>.

³⁹⁴ According to Turkish Undersecretariat of Customs; Turkey's export to Russia is 3.2 billion dollars whereas its import from Russia is 19,7 billion dollars in 2009.

³⁹⁵ Kilner, James; "Factbox - NATO military exercises in Georgia", *Reuters*, 06 May 2009, <http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKTRE5452WR20090506>; "August 2008 Activation was between 04-26 August 2008 with Ukraine in command", BLACKSEAFOR website, http://www.blackseafor.org/english/activation_2008_agust.php.

be mentioned than it appears. Notwithstanding that no party would like to put the five-day war as a insurmountable barrier in front of further cooperation, the war brought back the issue of confidence problem to the agenda, changed the calculus of the regional geopolitics in favor of Russia, and reminded Turkey its increasing vulnerability in its economic relations with Russia emergent with trade imbalance and energy dependency.³⁹⁶ Russia's assertive emergence with the Five-Day war raised traditional suspicions in the minds of Turkish foreign policy makers leading to the revival of the insecurity. The shifting balance favoring Russia in the region caused a subtle uneasiness in Turkey. Turkey's effort of initiating the CSCP can be evaluated as restoring the shifted balance to its old place or, if not possible to do that, then a place where there is no asymmetric relative gains.

After getting over the trauma of the Five-Day war, the exchange of visits continued from where it stayed. The first 'state visit' to Russia from Turkey was realized by the visit of the Turkish President Abdullah Gül on February 12-15, 2009.³⁹⁷ Beside of its being as first state visit from Russia to Turkey, the visit is significant with its program including a visit to Tatarstan Republic of the Russian Federation that Turkey has historical and cultural ties.³⁹⁸ The leaders signed the "Joint Declaration between the Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation on Progress towards a New Stage in Relations and Further Deepening of Friendship and Multidimensional Partnership" in Moscow on February 13, 2009.³⁹⁹ In this specific document, Turkey and Russia articulated their satisfaction of the cooperation in various fields including the fight against terrorism they have made until now and expressed their desire to go further by deepening the existing partnership especially in the security field.⁴⁰⁰ This is a very significant document with its reference to the importance of the CSCP and the Montreux Convention.⁴⁰¹ Besides, the visits of the Speaker of Turkish Parliament,

³⁹⁶ Torbakov, Igor; "The Georgia Crisis and Russia-Turkey Relations", USA: The Jamestown Foundation, 2008, p.6.

³⁹⁷ There had been an 'official visit' in the previous years but this one is recorded as first 'state visit' in accordance with the information given in the website of Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For further information, please see <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-rusya-federasyonu-siyasi-iliskileri.tr.mfa>.

³⁹⁸ "Türkiye-Rusya Federasyonu Siyasi İlişkileri", Official website of Turkish Foreign Ministry, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-rusya-federasyonu-siyasi-iliskileri.tr.mfa>.

³⁹⁹ "Joint Declaration between the Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation on Progress towards a New Stage in Relations and Further Deepening of Friendship and Multidimensional Partnership, Moscow, 13 February 2009", Official website of Turkish Foreign Ministry, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/joint-declaration-between-the-republic-of-turkey-and-the-russian-federation-on-progress-towards-a-new-stage-in-relations-and-further-deepening-of-friendship-and-multidimensional-partnership_-moscow_-13-february-2009.en.mfa.

⁴⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰¹ *Ibid.*

Turkish Premier, Russian Deputy Premier and Russian Foreign Minister were realized in 2009.⁴⁰² Turkish Premier Erdoğan went to Russia on May 15-16, 2009 upon the invitation of the Russian Premier Putin.⁴⁰³ The speaker of the Turkish Parliament Köksal Toptan, paid a visit to Russia on June 21-24, 2009 upon the invitation of his Russian counterpart Sergey Mironov.⁴⁰⁴ Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu paid a visit to Russia upon the invite extended by the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on July 02, 2009.⁴⁰⁵ Russian Deputy Premier Igor Sechin paid a working visit to Turkey on July 20, 2009.⁴⁰⁶ As a result of the one-day working visit of the Russian Premier Putin to Turkey with the participation of Italian Premier Silvio Berlusconi on August 06, 2009, twelve protocols were signed between Turkey and Russia covering the fields of energy, economy, science and culture beside of eight documents signed among the energy companies of these states.⁴⁰⁷ Turkey and Russia also agreed on the establishment of an intergovernmental mechanism to have consultations on bilateral issues once a year at the leadership level.⁴⁰⁸ A protocol on the cooperation in the nuclear energy field was also signed.⁴⁰⁹ Additionally, both countries declared their support to the pipeline projects of each other named as South Stream and Samsun-Ceyhan.⁴¹⁰ The speaker of the Turkish Parliament Mehmet Ali Şahin went to Russia on November 23-25, 2009 to participate in BSEC Inter-Parliamentary Assembly meeting.⁴¹¹ Following the Protocols on the “Establishment of Diplomatic Relations” and the “Development of Bilateral Relations” between Turkey and Armenia on October 10, 2009, Premier Erdoğan paid a working visit to Russia on January 12-13, 2010 to discuss the issues relating to the nuclear

⁴⁰² “Türkiye-Rusya Federasyonu Siyasi İlişkileri”, Official website of Turkish Foreign Ministry, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-rusya-federasyonu-siyasi-iliskileri.tr.mfa>.

⁴⁰³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰⁵ “Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanı Sayın Ahmet Davutoğlu’nun Rusya Federasyonu’na yaptığı çalışma ziyaret hk.”, Official website of the Russian Embassy in Turkey, http://www.turkey.mid.ru/hron/pr_t_26.html.

⁴⁰⁶ “Türkiye-Rusya Federasyonu Siyasi İlişkileri”, Official website of Turkish Foreign Ministry, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-rusya-federasyonu-siyasi-iliskileri.tr.mfa>.

⁴⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰⁸ “Rusya’yla Yakın Temas”, *Ntvmsnbc*, 06 August 2009, <http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/24988352>; “Türkiye-Rusya Federasyonu Siyasi İlişkileri”, Official website of Turkish Foreign Ministry, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-rusya-federasyonu-siyasi-iliskileri.tr.mfa>.

⁴⁰⁹ “Rusya’yla Yakın Temas”, *Ntvmsnbc*, 06 August 2009, <http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/24988352>.

⁴¹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹¹ “Türkiye-Rusya Federasyonu Siyasi İlişkileri”, Official website of Turkish Foreign Ministry, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-rusya-federasyonu-siyasi-iliskileri.tr.mfa>.

power plant, visa exemption and Karabakh.⁴¹² During the meeting, Turkey requested Russia to play more active role in Karabakh issue whereas Russia emphasized that the problem between Turkey and Armenia should be evaluated as separate from the problem between Azerbaijan and Armenia by adding that putting these two issues into the same basket avoids the solution to both problems.⁴¹³ Russian President Dmitri Medvedev's official visit to Turkey held on May 11-12, 2010 resulted in signing sixteen separate documents and agreements on various topics beside of the establishment of 'High-level Cooperation Council'.⁴¹⁴ Russian President Medvedev voiced real strategic partnership which exists between Turkey and Russia at the press meeting on May 12, 2010.⁴¹⁵ Among the papers signed in the course of this momentous visit, the agreement on mutual visa exemption, the agreement on the establishment and the operation of a nuclear power plant in Akkuyu field of Turkey, the memorandum of understanding on the transfer of the oil in the Black Sea through giving the priority to the Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline together with the cooperation documents in security, maritime and aviation fields are remarkable.⁴¹⁶

According to Turkish Ambassador to Moscow Halil Akıncı, there are many factors working for the development of bilateral cooperation such as the quantity and the quality of high-level contacts, the comprehension of commonality of the interests, advantageous interdependency in trade, the social contacts, the advanced awareness of the mutual benefits of cooperating and the declared intentions of the top level government authorities in the direction of upgrading the bilateral relations.⁴¹⁷ Bülent Aras argues that the developments in this period are the outcome of Russia's new posture of cooperating with regional and international actors without ignoring its own national interests in parallel with Turkey's newly developing multi-faceted dynamic foreign policy orientations attaching importance to the good neighborly relations as well as international conjuncture by adding that this led to

⁴¹² Balkaç, Nilgün; "Rusya'yla da vizeler kalkıyor mu?", *Ntvmsnbc*, 13 January 2010, <http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25043934/>; "Türkiye-Ermenistan Siyasi İlişkileri", Official website of Turkish Foreign Ministry, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-ermenistan-siyasi-iliskileri.tr.mfa>.

⁴¹³ Balkaç, Nilgün; "Rusya'yla da vizeler kalkıyor mu?", *Ntvmsnbc*, 13 January 2010, <http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25043934/>.

⁴¹⁴ "Türkiye-Rusya Federasyonu Siyasi İlişkileri", Official website of Turkish Foreign Ministry, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-rusya-federasyonu-siyasi-iliskileri.tr.mfa>.

⁴¹⁵ "Aydın Tarihi", Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, May 2010.

⁴¹⁶ "Türkiye-Rusya Federasyonu Siyasi İlişkileri", Official website of Turkish Foreign Ministry, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-rusya-federasyonu-siyasi-iliskileri.tr.mfa>.

⁴¹⁷ Akkan, Faruk; "Türkiye Moskova Büyükelçisi Akıncı: Rusya ile 100 milyar dolar ticaret hayal değil - ÖZEL", 10 May 2010, *Haberrus*, <http://www.haberrus.com/gundem/2787-Turkiye-Moskova-Buyukelcisi-Akinci-Rusya-ile-100-milyar-dolar-ticaret-hayal-degil---OZEL.html>.

reasonable increase in the mutual official visits and the establishment of new dialogue mechanisms between two countries.⁴¹⁸ Political analyst and the chief editor of 'Russia in Global Affairs', Fyodor Lukyanov also thinks that the change in Turkish security policy is driven by two factors; the retouch in Turkish foreign policy in pursuit of more independent and multi-faceted path of policy making in international sphere together with the growth of economic ties.⁴¹⁹ However this rosy picture is the result of the parallel interests of two countries dictating cooperation due to the necessity to do it. The equation may apt to change in the long term.

Russia was and will remain a great power. It is preconditioned by the inseparable characteristics of its geopolitical, economic and cultural existence. They determined the mentality of Russians and the policy of the government throughout the history of Russia and they cannot but do so now. This Russian mentality however should incorporate new ideas. In today's world the might of a country is measured more by its ability to develop and use advanced technologies, a high level of popular wellbeing, the reliable protection of its security and the upholding of its national interests in the international arena than in its military strength.⁴²⁰

The abovementioned words of the Russian leader Putin stated in late 1999 give the address where Russia wants to go namely to a great power status. Economic development is one of the means to be used taking Russia to the address. Cooperation with the elements of the international system in political and economic spheres is the gate opening to this development. And this is where Putin's well-designed pragmatism came to be flourishing. The modus operandi of Putin's strategy is as follows:

The operating principle of his conduct of foreign policy appears to be 'whatever works'; he is not fixated on ideology, geopolitics or cultural and civilizational categorization. He has shown that he is prepared to be whoever and whatever depending on context and timing. Thus he is European in Europe, transcontinental 'strategic partner' when dealing with the United States, Asian and Eurasian in Asia, and cautiously integrationist in the CIS. At the same time, he does not subscribe to the infantile view that strategic and economic cooperation with the West (or East) must necessarily be at the expense of good relations elsewhere.⁴²¹

Putin's presidency brought a reasonable political and economic stability to Russia and a good reputation abroad. This development is carried on under the presidency of Medvedev. President Putin's idea of re-building strong Russia took the economic development as

⁴¹⁸ Aras, Bülent; "Türkiye ve Rusya Federasyonu: Çok Boyutlu Ortaklık", *SETA Analiz*, August 2009, pp.6-7.

⁴¹⁹ "Turkey no longer considers Russia a threat", *RIA Novosti*, 24 August 2010, <http://en.rian.ru/papers/20100824/160323433.html>.

⁴²⁰ Putin, Vladimir; "Russia at the Turn of the Millenium", 29 December 1999 in Sakwa, Richard; *Putin: Russia's Choice*, London: Routledge, 2004, p.257.

⁴²¹ Lo, Bobo; *Vladimir Putin and the Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy*, London: Blackwell, 2003, p.131.

background. His pragmatism and priority list to create a strong Russia paid back. The boom in oil prices and successful economic restructuring eased the things for Putin both in domestic and international arenas. “Russia’s greatest weakness was its financial status, and its removal was precondition for dealing with other weaknesses”.⁴²² Putin is aware of the fact that the first step to craft a strong Russia depends on creating a Russia standing on its own feet. Putin’s step-by-step forwarding strategy worked well and Russia paid all its debts to IMF and Paris Club creditors by 2006.⁴²³ According to Gaddy and Kuchins, Russia turned to become assertive both inside which became apparent with the increasing discussions on ‘sovereign democracy’ and outside that became visible with Putin’s discourse from that time on. Russian leader Putin’s famous speech at the 43rd Munich Security Conference in February 2007 constitutes a good sample of this new evolving posture of slowly resurging Russia. The Five-Day war in 2008 is the materialized version of this resurging Russia. As put by Gaddy and Kuchins:

Having regained financial independence, Russia now faces the question of how to deal with the changes that took place in its environment during its period of financial weakness that began in the late 1980s. Today’s Russia regards many elements of the international system that evolved during that period of weakness as illegitimate.⁴²⁴

Kosovo, NATO expansion, missile defense shield, CFE Treaty, color revolutions occurred in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan within subsequent one year period since 2003, and all the other steps of the West which were perceived by Russia as ‘having taken undue advantage of Russia’ were spelled out.⁴²⁵

Two years after Putin’s plan took place in Russia, the government change in Turkey brought AKP whose foreign policy design taking the same modus operandi with Russia. Turkey’s new foreign policy vision designed by Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu is as follows:

Turkey’s foreign policy needs a new orientation in the light of the new regional and global developments. As a major country in the midst of the Afro-Eurasia landmass, Turkey is a central country with multiple regional identities that cannot be reduced to one, unified category. In terms of its sphere of influence, Turkey is a Middle Eastern, Balkan, Caucasian, Central Asian, Caspian, Mediterranean, Gulf, and Black Sea country all at the same time. Turkey should appropriate a new position in its region by providing security and stability not

⁴²² Gaddy, Clifford G. & Kuchins, Andrew C.; “Putin’s Plan”, *The Washington Quarterly*, Spring 2008, p.123.

⁴²³ *Ibid.*, p.124

⁴²⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴²⁵ *Ibid.*

only for itself but also for its neighbors and the region. Turkey's engagements from Africa to Central Asia and from EU to OIC are parts of new foreign policy vision. Domestically, Turkey needs to deepen and enrich its democracy, accommodate the differences within its society, and strengthen the coordination and balance among its institutions in 2008 and the years that follow. These initiatives will make Turkey a global actor as we approach 2023, the one hundredth anniversary of the establishment of the Turkish Republic.⁴²⁶

Until now, the bilateral relations did not get affected by Russia's confidently growing resurgence to become 'global power' and Turkey's new pro-activist foreign policy vision aspiring to become 'global actor'. Paradoxically, their overlapping objectives made them cooperate more in various fields. However history does not have a record of the peaceful coexistence of two global players side by side.

⁴²⁶ Davutoğlu, Ahmet; "Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007", *Insight Turkey*, 2008, Volume 10, Number 1, p. 77.

CHAPTER FOUR

SOURCES OF COOPERATION IN TURKISH-RUSSIAN SECURITY RELATIONS

This Chapter aimed to analyze the factors appearing as sources driving both Turkey and Russia to cooperate with each other. The sources are identified as diminution of mutual threat levels and the proliferation of common interest areas. After the first section examining the lessening of mutual threat levels, the following sections categorized under the sections of September 11 and the fight against international terrorism, opposition to the war in Iraq, the Black Sea dimension and the issue of arm sales will be scrutinized as common interest areas considered as flourishing.

4.1. Diminution of Mutual Threat Levels

Due to the plethora of historical and geopolitical reasons, both Turkey and Russia are obsessed with the concept of security. The fear of losing the territorial integrity and national unity is not only Achilles heel but rather a matter of life or death for these countries of past's imperial powers. The traumatic past and the slithery geopolitical conditions made these two countries seek national interests based on security concerns. Thereby the realist school of thought is chosen as the best methodological tool to illuminate the complex and mostly confusing web of relations between Turkey and Russia.

Even the Realist school representatives diverge over the factors elucidating the behaviors of the states, *ad infinitum*, competing for power, they agree on two important points. The first one is that “power is the currency of international politics”⁴²⁷ as put by John Mearsheimer to the bull's eye. The second one is that, by and large, the ownership of material resources is decisive in conceptualizing power, albeit not in measuring it.⁴²⁸ From the classical Realist school; Hans J. Morgenthau juxtaposes the items like “geography, natural resources (food and raw materials), industrial capacity, military preparedness, population” as “stable

⁴²⁷ Dunne, Tim & Kurki, Milja & Smith, Steve (eds), *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, p.72.

⁴²⁸ Schmidt, Brian C.; “Competing Realist Conceptions of Power”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 2005, Volume 33, Number 3, http://www.iiss.ee/files/7/IISS6001Schmidt_Realist%20conceptions%20of%20power_2005.pdf, p.548.

elements” contributing to the power of nation and E.H. Carr emphasizes the indivisibility of military, economic and opinion influencing powers as in order of priorities.⁴²⁹ From the structural Realist school; the defensive and offensive realists put the emphasis on “capabilities that represent the sum total of various national attributes” and “military power and latent power” respectively.⁴³⁰ Kenneth Waltz as the most influential scholar of the defensive Realism speaks of the “size of population, and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence”.⁴³¹ Stephen M. Walt, in his renowned theory of balance-of-threat, uses the aggregate power as one of the four parameters to identify the degree of the threat.⁴³² Another defensive realist Robert Gilpin defines power with “military, economic, and technological capabilities”.⁴³³ John J. Mearsheimer as offensive realist mentions two kinds of state power as military power and latent power which is defined as “socioeconomic ingredients”, like wealth and population, to be used in building military power by yielding the precedence to the first one.⁴³⁴ The neo-classical Realist school also accepts the “material conception of power” beside of their unit level analysis.⁴³⁵ As a proponent scholar of this school, Randall Schweller takes into consideration of the “military (forces-in-being), industrial (war potential) and demographic (staying power and war-augmenting) capability” as gauges of national power even though attributing the unit level factors central meaning.⁴³⁶ All things considered, there is a broad consensus among the Realist scholars that the indicators pertaining to the population, economy and military can be used as conceptualizing relative power existing between two countries.

After giving brief background of the Cold War years, the rapprochement following the end of the Cold War between Turkey and Russia will be examined by relying on the possession of the material resources in relative to each other. The change in this possession leads to the

⁴²⁹ *Ibid.*, p.532-533.

⁴³⁰ *Ibid.*, p.528.

⁴³¹ Waltz, Kenneth; *Theory of International Politics*, New York: Random House, 1979, p.131.

⁴³² Walt, Stephen M.; ‘Testing Theories of Alliance Formation: The Case of Southwest Asia’, *International Organization*, Spring 1988, Volume 42, Number 2, p.281.

⁴³³ Gilpin Robert; *War and Change in World Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981, p.13.

⁴³⁴ Schmidt, Brian C.; “Competing Realist Conceptions of Power”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 2005, Volume 33, Number 3, http://www.iiss.ee/files/7/IISS6001Schmidt_Realist%20conceptions%20of%20power_2005.pdf, p.541.

⁴³⁵ *Ibid.*, p.543.

⁴³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp.543-544.

diminution of the mutual threat level. The analysis of the rapprochement in 1990s will be examined in both from Turkish and Russian standpoints.

The increase in the threat perception of Turkey in its close vicinity made Turkey be in league of the US which located distantly and also had no historical record of hostility towards Turkey.⁴³⁷ The arrival of US battleship to Turkey in 1946, the Truman doctrine in 1947, Turkey's entrance to NATO in 1952, the US assistance from 1950s to 1960s, and bilateral defense agreements and in return the opening of Turkish lands to the American military presence came step by step.⁴³⁸ However the 1960s saw the deteriorations of Turkey's relations with the USA while showing improvement in its relations with Russia since the Russian threat decreased and Turkish state gets stronger slightly in those years.⁴³⁹ This alteration in the foreign policy of Turkey continued in the 1970s as well but especially 1974 Cyprus events made Turkey think twice in its alliance formulation with the West but mainly with the US. The 1980s saw the peak point since the Soviet Union guaranteed over 3 billion dollars of economic aid and improving economic relations brought along with better political ties with Soviet Union.⁴⁴⁰ The weapon embargo of the US made Turkey turn its head to the Soviet Union and the first military relations began in 1976.⁴⁴¹ In accordance with the statement of Premier Bülent Ecevit given to the Turkish Senate, "Turkey can no longer leave its national security only to its cooperation with the US and NATO", Turkey got closer to the Soviet Union which it does not perceive the usual threat anymore and put distance to its western allies.⁴⁴² However the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 put the bricks into their old places and Turkey turned its head to the West again.⁴⁴³

From Turkish point of view, the breakup of the Soviet Union led to the diminution of the Russian threat since the sharp decline in the possession of the material resources by Russia beside of the disappearance of the shared borders. This enabled the increasing cooperation between Turkey and Russia. Further diminution of the Russian threat as of the latter half of

⁴³⁷ Walt, Stephen M.; 'Testing Theories of Alliance Formation: The Case of Southwest Asia', *International Organization*, Spring 1988, Volume 42, Number 2, pp.293-294.

⁴³⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴³⁹ *Ibid.*, p.294.

⁴⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p.295.

⁴⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p.296.

⁴⁴² *Ibid.*, pp.295-296.

⁴⁴³ *Ibid.*, p.296.

the 1990s intensified the cooperation. Şener Aktürk gives the following comparative data between Turkey and Russia with regard to GDP, population, GDP per capita and military manpower:

We observe a doubling of the Turkish GDP in relative terms vis-à-vis the Russian GDP in latter half of the 1990s. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the earlier 1990s witnessed Turkey reaching one-third of the Russian GDP, and the latter half of the 1990s witnessed Turkey's reaching two-thirds of the Russian economy. In terms of the demographic component, the balance is even more consistently changing in favor of Turkey. Turkish population jumped from one-fifth to two-fifths of the Russian population with the end of the Cold War and reached almost half of the Russian population by year 2002. Derivative of changes in GDP and population and Turkish GDP/capita, which was 24 percent of the Soviet GDP/capita in 1971, reached 145 percent of the Russian GDP/capita in 2001...With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian manpower shrank to 2.7 million while the Turkish manpower stood at 560,000. Hence, the corresponding ratio improved to a 1:5 ratio in 1992. Continued demobilization of the Russian army brought the Russian army down to 1.5 million in 1995, while the Turkish army remained at about a half a million, establishing a 1:3 ratio. In the mid-1990s, and especially in 1995/1996, Russian demobilization sped up, while Turkish manpower increased by 20 percent in absolute terms, so that the Russian and Turkish armies had 1.27 million and 630,000 soldiers, respectively, revising the Turkish-Russian ratio at 1:2. Turkish manpower as a percentage of Russian manpower never again declined below 50 percent, thus stabilizing the Turkish-Russian ratio at 1:2.⁴⁴⁴

Likewise, Turkish threat for Russia had a tendency to diminish with that Russia realized the political, economic and military limits of what Turkey can or cannot do by analyzing Turkey's efforts to create its own sphere of influence in the former-Soviet space in the early 1990s.⁴⁴⁵ Turkey's futile Eurasian policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia, which became evident with its failure in being model for the region countries due to several mixed factors caused by Turkey per se, the region and the international environment,⁴⁴⁶ is one of the factors relieving Russian concerns with regard to 'Turkish threat'. These developments reduced Turkey's potential for posing a threat against Russian interests from the Russian point of view. Indeed, this was a reciprocal process since Turkish-Russian common view that Turkey does not situate a direct threat in the Russian perception also helped to reduce the Russian threat in the eyes of Turkey.⁴⁴⁷

⁴⁴⁴ Aktürk, Şener; "Turkish-Russian Relations after the Cold War (1992-2002)", *Turkish Studies*, September 2006, Volume 7, Number 3, pp.346-348.

⁴⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p.339.

⁴⁴⁶ Tellal, Erel; "Avrasya'da Türkiye-Rusya İlişkileri" in *Beş Deniz Havzasında Türkiye* (ed. by Mustafa Aydın&Çağrı Erhan), Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 2006, pp.45-53.

⁴⁴⁷ Aktürk, Şener; "Turkish-Russian Relations after the Cold War (1992-2002)", *Turkish Studies*, September 2006, Volume 7, Number 3, p.339.

Şener Aktürk puts the “proliferation of common geopolitical interests” as the second stage of the development of the relations between Turkey and Russia.⁴⁴⁸ The following three sections examining September 11 and the fight against international terrorism, opposition to the war in Iraq, the Black Sea dimension and the issue of arm sales as the sources of cooperation in the security realm will be studied within this context.

4.2. September 11 and the Fight against International Terrorism

September 11 tragic incidents leading to the formation of the most extensive international coalition resulted in the collective fight against international terrorism. Both Turkey and Russia suffering from terrorism at home for years valued the opportunity of taking side in the same camp. Since both countries have had difficulties in explaining their ongoing struggles against terrorism to the outer world and encountered the reluctance of the other states in supporting their counter-terror efforts. The new security environment which enforced these terror-blind states to adopt different behavior pattern is interest of both Turkey and Russia and created some sort of symbiosis between these two Eurasian powers primarily based on security interests.

During the telephone conversation of Turkish President Sezer and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin held on September 28, 2001, two leaders reiterated their common posture in handling the fight against international terrorism with reference to the cooperation and solidarity among the countries.⁴⁴⁹ The common posture of Turkey and Russia was also voiced by the Russian foreign Minister Igor Ivanov at the press meeting held following the signing of the November 16, 2001 dated “Action Plan for Cooperation in Eurasia-From Bilateral towards Multilateral Partnership”:

A first priority for the international community today is counteraction against international terrorism and other global threats and challenges. Russia and Turkey declare their readiness to make a joint contribution to these efforts, and a determination to fight against terrorism in all its forms and manifestations.⁴⁵⁰

In his visit to Turkey on December 07, 2003, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Razov delivered a letter of Russian Foreign Minister I.S. Ivanov on the necessity of both countries’

⁴⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p.338

⁴⁴⁹ “President Vladimir Putin had a telephone conversation with Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer”, 28 September 2001, Official website of the Russian President.

⁴⁵⁰ “Transcript of Minister of Foreign Affairs of The Russian Federation Igor Ivanov's Remarks at Press Conference Following Signing of a Russian-Turkish Document (New York, November 16, 2001)”, Official website of the Russian Embassy in Turkey, <http://www.turkey.mid.ru/hron/31.html>.

cooperation in the fight against international terrorism to the Turkish Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül.⁴⁵¹ In the press meeting and its release issued after the bilateral talks held in the framework of Russian President Vladimir Putin's visit to Ankara on December 06, 2004, President Putin drew the attention to the close position of Turkey and Russia in the joint fight against international terrorism defined by him as among the 'mature partnership' areas under construction while pointing out Turkey as sincere in its acts since it knows very well what terrorism means as it was subjected to several terrorist attacks and thanked for its support to Russia in this fight.⁴⁵²

There are similar views put forward by Turkey and Russia with regard to issues concerning counter-terrorism efforts of the international community. First one is related to the definition problem, both states accept the annihilation of 'terrorism in all its forms and manifestations' since conceptualization difficulties left both countries without any support from the outer world specifically the western world throughout all those years in their struggles. Russian leader Putin, in his September 2001 dated interview given to German Bild, identifies the lack of confidence and common standards as the main problems in the fight against terror and gives religious extremism, fanaticism and separatism as three parameters of the roots of terrorism.⁴⁵³ Secondly, both countries believe in that UN should be located at the center of the international activities carried out against terrorism and give strong support to the September 28, 2001 dated UNSC Resolution 1373 which is named as the utmost step taken in the fight against terrorism and all the rest should work as complementary to the UN. Turkey is signatory of all 12 agreements mentioned as to be signed in the UNSC 1373, holder of bilateral anti-terror and security cooperation agreement with 70 countries beside of trilateral agreements with Bulgaria and Romania duo and Azerbaijan and Georgia duo and active participant to the ongoing works in UN on this issue.⁴⁵⁴ Russian President Putin even made the UNSC 1373 the presidential decree on January 11, 2002.⁴⁵⁵ The existence of

⁴⁵¹“Rusya Federasyonu Ankara Büyükelçiliği'nin Basın Açıklaması”, 10 December 2003, Official website of the Russian Embassy in Turkey, http://www.turkey.mid.ru/text_t9.html.

⁴⁵²“Press Statement Following Russian-Turkish Talks, Ankara”, 06 December 2004, Official website of the Russian President; “Responses to Questions from Russian Journalists, Ankara”, 06 December 2004, Official website of the Russian President.

⁴⁵³ “Interview with the German Newspaper Bild, Official website of the Russian President, Sochi, 18 September 2001”, http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2001/09/18/0001_type82916_136376.shtml.

⁴⁵⁴ “Türkiye'nin Terörizmle Mücadele Konusundaki Tutumu”, Official website of Turkish Foreign Ministry, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye_nin-terorizmle-mucadele-konusundaki-tutumu-tr.mfa.

⁴⁵⁵ “On Measures to Comply with UN Security Council Resolution 1373 of September 28, 2001”, 14 January 2002, Official website of the Russian Foreign Ministry, <http://www.in.mid.ru/bl.nsf/5d5fc0348b8b2d26c3256def0051fa20/66d955f1f458b98343256b41005ef790?OpenDocument>.

binding international instruments as such eliminates the arbitrariness of some countries towards the fight of another country against terrorism. Given that Turkey and Russia have concerns for long time with regard to the reluctance and ignorance of mostly Western countries in providing moral and political support to the struggle of these countries against terror at home, there is no need to question the underlying reasons. Thirdly, Turkey and Russia sincerely put their positions against Islamophobia and defended the separation of the concept of terrorism from any titles. Russia is against the consideration of international terrorism as threats originated from Islamic world resisting against the Western civilization but rather the clash of moderate and extremist tendencies.⁴⁵⁶ Even in the peak times of the war in Chechnya in the 1990s, Russia was not referring Islam as the challenger civilization. Russian leader Putin's statement on September 24, 2001 of that they will support a conference in Moscow named "Islam against Terror" initiated by the Moslem Religious Boards of Russia by mentioning the necessity of active involvement of religious communities against all sorts of religious extremism and fundamentalism with reference to the point that as may occur in the other religions is a good sample in this sense.⁴⁵⁷ In direct contradiction to the Russian perception, Samuel P. Huntington, in his theory of 'the clash of civilizations' which first showed up in 1993, was asserting that the wars in Chechnya like the previous wars, 1979 Soviet-Afghan war and 1992 Tajik civil war, are samples of inter-civilization conflict.⁴⁵⁸ Since Russia perceives itself neither Western nor Eastern as its first steps became visible in the world history, it does not engage itself into the 'basic paradigm of the West and the rest' which was dubbed as the reformulation of the Cold War opposition especially after 9/11 tragedy and interprets the terrorism, as in the harsh critiques of Edward Said towards Huntington's theory, by putting the crazy fanaticism combined with criminal purposes as the main reason instead of incriminating the whole Islam.⁴⁵⁹ It is palpable that Russian tradition of continued existence as multi-religious and multi-national society since Tsardom era played role in the evolution of this perspective. Not to mention 20 million Muslim population of Russia. Upon a question whether post-9/11 era is the picture drawn by Huntington, Putin states that "To fight manifestations of religious fanaticism today it is necessary first of all to find a support base in the region from which that religion originates"

⁴⁵⁶ Matunina, L.; "Rus Dış Politikasında Türkiye'nin Rolü ve Önemi" in Türkiye-Rusya Arasında İhtilafı Konular ve Çözümleri (ed. by Gülten Kazgan), İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, August 2008, p.81.

⁴⁵⁷ "Russian President's Statement, Moscow, 24 September 2001", Official website of the Russian President, http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2001/09/24/0002_type82912_138534.shtml.

⁴⁵⁸ Huntington, Samuel P.; *Medeniyetler Çatışması ve Dünya Düzeninin Yeniden Kurulması*, İstanbul: Okuyan Us Yayın, 15th edition, 2006, pp.414-418.

⁴⁵⁹ Said, Edward W.; "The Clash of Ignorance", *The Nation*, 04 October 2001, <http://www.thenation.com/article/clash-ignorance?page=0.0>.

by standing against cultural bigotry.⁴⁶⁰ Likewise and needless to say that Turkey denominated the attempts to associate terrorism with a religion particularly Islam as wrong by adding that terrorism is a crime against humanity.⁴⁶¹ Furthermore, in a press statement held after Russian-Turkish talks held in Moscow on June 29, 2006, Russian President Putin announced his support to the Turkish-Spanish initiated ‘Alliance of Civilizations’ project for the promotion of dialogue among different cultures and religions to obstruct extremism after stating that both countries succeeded to show good performance in the joint fight against terror.⁴⁶²

However while both Turkey and Russia were giving strong support to the fight against international terrorism, they preferred to give rather limited hand to the military operation in Afghanistan by acting with discretion. Now, the turn is detailing the Turkish and Russian positions with regard to the war in Afghanistan. Two operations launched in Afghanistan. The first one is the US-led ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ (OEF) started on October 07, 2001 complying with the December 12, 2001 dated UNSC Resolution 1368 and the second one is the “International Security Assistance Force” (ISAF) operation began on January 16, 2002 in accordance with the Annex I of Bonn Agreement in December 2001 and the December 20, 2001 dated UNSC Resolution 1386.⁴⁶³ NATO took the leadership of the ISAF operation on 11 August 2003 as par the collective defense clause in Article 5 of NATO.⁴⁶⁴ In contrast to the OEF which was established for counter-terrorism purposes, the ISAF is entitled to support the Afghan government through providing security and reconstruction business.⁴⁶⁵

⁴⁶⁰ “Interview with the German Newspaper Bild, Official website of the Russian President, Sochi, 18 September 2001”, Official website of the Russian President, http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2001/09/18/0001_type82916_136376.shtml.

⁴⁶¹ “Terörizm-Din bağlantısı”, Turkish Foreign Ministry official website, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/terorizm-din-baglantis_i.tr.mfa.

⁴⁶² “Press Statements following Russian-Turkish Talks, Moscow, 29 June 2006”, Official website of the Russian President.

⁴⁶³ Mowle, Thomas S.; “Transatlantic Relations and Turkey” in *Contentious Issues of Security and the Future of Turkey*, (ed. by Atesoglu Guney, Nursin), England: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2007, pp.26-27; “Letter dated 5 December 2001 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council”, UN website, <http://www.undemocracy.com/S-2001-1154.pdf>; “UNSC Resolution 1386”, UN website, [http://www.undemocracy.com/S-RES-1386\(2001\).pdf](http://www.undemocracy.com/S-RES-1386(2001).pdf).

⁴⁶⁴ “ISAF History”, Official website of ISAF/NATO, <http://www.isaf.nato.int/history.html>; “International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Operation”, “International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Operation”, Turkish Armed Forces website, <http://www.tsk.tr/eng/uluslararasi/isaf.htm>.

⁴⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

The most precipitous reaction to the 9/11 incident which was realized with Vladimir Putin's phone to his American counterpart to deliver his condolence and support was followed by the September 24, 2001 dated statement of the Russian leader offering five-points plan to support the forthcoming US-led counter-terror operation composed of intelligence-sharing, opening air-space to the cargo planes for humanitarian purposes, opening the airports of Central Asian countries to the utilization, contributing to the international research and rescue operations and increasing the military cooperation with Rabbani government in Afghanistan.⁴⁶⁶ However Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov, from the beginning, stated overtly on September 14, 2001 that Russia agreed the punishment of Saudi terrorist Osama Bin Laden who also supported the Chechen militants but it would not give any combat support to the US-led counteraction efforts towards Afghanistan.⁴⁶⁷ It is asserted that this courtesy had some significant considerations. Four points come forward. First, Russia had a great opportunity for getting support and reducing the critics pertaining to its counter-terror operations in Chechnya that has been up to harsh critics from the West. While Russian leader presenting its own country's help to the US, he strongly emphasizes that "what is happening in Chechnya cannot be viewed out of the context of the fight against international terrorism".⁴⁶⁸ With regard to a question on Chechnya raised in a press meeting held in Paris on January 15, 2002, Russian president Putin evaluates the situation in the post-9/11 with reference to double-standards by referring the existence of a network between Al-Qaeda and Chechnya and comments as follows:

September 11 gave the world a jolt because it was indeed a brazen crime against the whole humankind. But Russia shuddered even earlier when hundreds of people died in Moscow and other big cities in explosions of blocks of flats. I assure you that the blood of the Russian people who died in Moscow at the time is of the same colour as the blood of those Russians who died in the World Trade Center, and of course of the same colour as that of the people from other countries and nationalities who died in New York on September 11.⁴⁶⁹

⁴⁶⁶ Bigg, Claire; "Five Years After 9/11: The Kremlin's War on Terror", 08 September 2006, *RFE/RL*, <http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1071174.html>; "Russian President's Statement, Moscow, 24 September 2001", Official website of the Russian President, http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2001/09/24/0002_type82912_138534.shtml.

⁴⁶⁷ "Ayın Tarihi", Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, September 2001.

⁴⁶⁸ "Russian President's Statement, Moscow, 24 September 2001", Official website of the Russian President, http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2001/09/24/0002_type82912_138534.shtml.

⁴⁶⁹ "Extracts from a Joint News Conference with President Jacques Chirac of France", 15 January 2002, Official website of the Russian President.

Secondly, Russia has had some serious concerns with regard to the rising extremist threats menacing its southern border but now it will be relieved from this problem with clean hands. Indeed, as of mid-1990s, Russia began to raise the danger of the religious extremism boiling in Afghanistan for its southern tier in several international platforms. The escalating extremism was not only threatening Russia but also the CIS states and so the Russian interests in these former-Soviet countries. While speaking with US media chiefs on Afghanistan in Moscow in 2001, President Putin strongly and consistently underlined the international character of terror by linking the terror in Chechnya to the one in Afghanistan with reference to the existing network among the extremist groups and the movement of these fundamentalists from one country to another easily from Caucasus to Central Eurasia.⁴⁷⁰ Thirdly, it gave Russia the opportunity to become fully integrated with the West. Upon a question whether Russia is afraid of the strategic advantages to be gained by the US through the bases in Central Asian countries, Putin uses quite interesting phrase like; “If Russia becomes a full-fledged member of the international community it should not and will not be afraid to see its neighbors develop relations with other countries, and that applies to the development of relations between the Central Asian states and the United States,” also by mentioning the independent status of these former-Soviet states and the necessity of acting together against common threat by getting rid of the past fears.⁴⁷¹ President Putin’s following statements summarizes the whole situation indeed:

The United States created or at least did nothing to prevent the creation of the Taliban while opposing the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has also done a good many “favours” to the United States by supporting all its rivals and enemies. We forgot that sooner or later these things would get out of control. As a result international terrorist training camps sprang up in Afghanistan, and terrorists are regularly sent into the Russian Federation and Chechnya, and the United States faced an unprecedented terrorist attack on Washington and New York on September 11.⁴⁷²

Russian leader highlights that this support is neither unconditional nor tactical by linking the issue to the ‘quality of the relations’ which can be upgraded by the mutual efforts of Russia and the US, NATO and other foremost Western countries.⁴⁷³ Russia’s offer for providing land transit to ISAF participant countries in Afghanistan in April 2008 did not come to

⁴⁷⁰ “Transcript of the Meeting with Moscow Bureau Chiefs of Leading US Media, Moscow, 10 November 2001”, Official website of the Russian President.

⁴⁷¹ “Transcript of the Meeting with Moscow Bureau Chiefs of Leading US Media, Moscow, 10 November 2001”, Official website of the Russian President.

⁴⁷² *Ibid.*

⁴⁷³ *Ibid.*

conclusion because of the crisis between Russia and NATO in the aftermath of Five-Day War in Georgia.⁴⁷⁴ However, during the visit of the US President Obama to Moscow in July 2009, Russia and the US expanded the cooperation through signing a military transit agreement for the transfer of lethal military equipment to Afghanistan via Russia and the formation of the Working Group on Foreign Policy and Fighting Terrorism under the newly established U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission.⁴⁷⁵ The Drug-Trafficking Working Group was set up within the framework of this agreement to manage the fight against illegal narcotics trafficking fueling terrorism.⁴⁷⁶ Both leaders, Medvedev and Obama, reiterated their common desire to fight against terrorism, armed extremism and illegal drug trafficking in Afghanistan.⁴⁷⁷ Through giving transit right for the US forces, Russia turned to be included to the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) and became alternative to unsafe Pakistani route. Currently the US was getting thirty percent of its supplies by using the NDN and sixty-five percent of this amount reaching to the US forces in Afghanistan coming through Russia.⁴⁷⁸ Russia promised to give the financial assistance for the routing and flight fees of the 4300 official US flights beside of allowing air transit for unlimited amounts of commercial charter flights with supplies.⁴⁷⁹ Since the signature of the military transit agreement; more than 35 thousand U.S. military personnel went to Afghanistan via Russian route and additionally Russian companies provided crucial airlift capacity for over 12 thousand flights to support the ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, thirty percent of the fuel U.S. military use in Afghanistan, and over 80 MI-17 helicopters for the Afghan Security Forces.⁴⁸⁰ Furthermore Russian leader Medvedev promised to provide 3 MI-17 helicopters for NATO mission in Afghanistan with supplementary offering over twelve in the framework of a special financial agreement in a bilateral meeting held on June 24,

⁴⁷⁴ "NATO's relations with Russia", NATO website, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-A06DEC4D-5B0D0664/natolive/topics_50090.htm.

⁴⁷⁵ "Joint Press Conference with President of the United States of America Barack Obama Following Russian-American Talks, Moscow, 06 July 2009", Official website of the Russian President.

⁴⁷⁶ "U.S.-Russia Relations: 'Reset' Fact Sheet", *The White House website*, 24 June 2010, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/us-russia-relations-reset-fact-sheet>.

⁴⁷⁷ "Joint Statement by the President of the United States of America Barack Obama and the President of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev Concerning Afghanistan, Moscow, 06 July 2009", Official website of the Russian President.

⁴⁷⁸ U.S.-Russia Relations: "Reset" Fact Sheet, *The White House website*, 24 June 2010, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/us-russia-relations-reset-fact-sheet>.

⁴⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

2010.⁴⁸¹ Michael McFaul, President Obama's senior advisor for Russia evaluates the Russian help on Afghanistan as one of the very results came by Washington's resetting its relations with Russia after the crisis over Georgia.⁴⁸² Deputy Head of the Russian Security Council, Vladimir Nazarov states that the success of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan is totally interest of Russia after describing Afghanistan as an important cooperation area for Russian-American bilateral relations.⁴⁸³ Fourthly, it has been argued that Russia was against the operation as such. In the light of this argument, it has been alleged that Russia saved its face through pretending to be approving the operation as such since it was aware of the fact that it could not have avoided it in any case.⁴⁸⁴ If it had raised its voice against the operation and the war had started though its objections, its prestige would have diminished. Russia's support to the joint counter-terrorism club brought secured southern tier, stronger hand in defending its policies in Chechnya and closer cooperation with the West/the US. Russia's getting closer to the West/the US through its assistance to the international forces in Afghanistan contributed as a facilitating factor in the development of Turkish-Russian relations.

The story from the Turkish side with regard to the war in Afghanistan developed in a different way by showing distinctive similarities with Russia. Indeed, Turkey's contribution to the war on terror in Afghanistan is invaluable thing per se since it is the only Muslim country in NATO club along with its other noteworthy features such as having efficient intelligence and developed network in Afghanistan. Turkey followed a very consistent policy by positioning itself as strong supporter of the war in Afghanistan but not as part of combat forces in Afghanistan.

Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer condemned the attacks severely in his September 11, 2001 dated condolence message to the US President George W. Bush.⁴⁸⁵ Turkish leaders President Sezer and the Premier Ecevit expressed the necessity of international cooperation

⁴⁸¹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸² Stott, Michael; "U.S. sees Iran, Afghanistan as gains in Russia relationship", *Reuters*, 28 May 2010, <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE64R1JP20100528>.

⁴⁸³ Vtornik, Delovoi; "Russia does not fully approve of NATO policy in Afghanistan", *Vedomosti*, 24 August 2010, translated by *RIA Novosti*, <http://en.rian.ru/papers/20100824/160323433.html>.

⁴⁸⁴ Lolo, Bo: *Vladimir Putin and the Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy*, UK: Blackwell, 2003, p.118.

⁴⁸⁵ "Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'ne karşı gerçekleştirilen terörist saldırılara ilişkin olarak Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Bşkamı George W. Bush'a gönderdikleri mesaj", *Official website of the Presidency of Turkey*, 11 September 2001, <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/ahmet-necdet-sezer-basin-aciklamalari/494/58262/amerika-birlesik-devletlerine-karsi-gerceklestirilen-terorist-saldirilara-iliskin-olarak-amerika-bir.html>.

against terrorism by taking the side with the US in its fight against terror on September 12, 2001.⁴⁸⁶ As a result of the internal security summit headed by Turkish President Sezer on September 20, 2001, Turkey declared its intention and determination in the fight against international terrorism which is expected to be effective, permanent and based on international cooperation by stating that it would provide all necessary cooperation to punish the terrorists who had attacked the US.⁴⁸⁷ In an interview with CNN Turk on September 21, 2001, Turkish Premier Ecevit drew the limits of Turkish contribution to the upcoming operation in Afghanistan by stating that Turkey could share its extensive intelligence on the country and give military training to the opponent forces there but could not send combat forces.⁴⁸⁸ While doing this, Turkey used three pretexts namely the lack of information with regard to method and the objective to be pursued by the US, Turkey's own evaluation as the necessity of new methods and strategies instead of classical military interventions and Turkey's own fight against terror at home.⁴⁸⁹ Besides, Turkey as a NATO ally could have face more demands which would put the country into the target board of radicals and this would have catastrophic results for Turkey already suffering from PKK terror for many years. Though the weight of the reasons have been up to change as the time pass by, the attitude and approach of Turkey did not change. On September 21, 2001, Turkish Premier Bülent Ecevit sent a letter to the US leader Bush by notifying him that the US demands of the use of Turkish airspace and airports by the US cargo planes whenever necessary had been responded positively by offering cooperation and intelligence-sharing with regard to the developments in Northern Afghanistan.⁴⁹⁰ It is also stated in the letter that Turkey will increase its equipment, education and other assistances all along to the Northern Alliance.⁴⁹¹ During the press meeting on October 12, 2001, the Presidential Chief Foreign Affairs Advisor Tacan İldem stated that Turkey would give hand to the international efforts for the fight against terrorism but refraining from any unnecessary adventurous actions which would put the country and the nation to danger.⁴⁹²

⁴⁸⁶“Ecevit'ten teröre karşı dayanışma çağrısı & Sezer: Teröre karşı uluslararası işbirliği artırılmalı“, *Hürriyet*, 12 September 2001.

⁴⁸⁷ Yetkin, Murat; “Ankara kararlı”, *Radikal*, 21 September 2001.

⁴⁸⁸ Yetkin, Murat; “Türkiye bölgesine sahip çıkıyor”, *Radikal*, 22 September 2001.

⁴⁸⁹ “Bush Sezer'den destek istedi”, *Hürriyet*, 21 September 2001; “Irak operasyonu Türkiye'ye zarar verir”, *Hürriyet*, 14 October 2001.

⁴⁹⁰ “Ecevit'ten Bush'a destek mektubu”, *Hürriyet*, 22 September 2001.

⁴⁹¹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹² “Ayın Tarihi”, Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, October 2001.

The decision of sending Turkish troops to Afghanistan was taken by Turkish Parliament on October 10, 2001.⁴⁹³ Turkey took the command of ISAF two times: from June 20, 2002 to February 10, 2003 (ISAF-II) and from February 13 to August 04, 2005 (ISAF-VII).⁴⁹⁴ During its first commandership period in 2002, Turkey with its contribution of 1300 troops took the command of the Kabul International Airport and the Multinational Headquarters.⁴⁹⁵ After transferring the command, though the number of its participating troops decreased to the level of 300, Turkey allocated three helicopters to ISAF to be used for medical evacuation and reconnaissance purposes.⁴⁹⁶ During its second commandership period in 2003, Turkey with its contribution of 1430 troops contributed to the ISAF Operation in three ways; while Turkish 3rd Corps under NATO was leading the ISAF-VII Operation, Turkish 28th Mechanized Infantry Brigade acted as Kabul Multinational Brigade in addition to the ongoing management of the Kabul International Airport by Turkish Armed Forces.⁴⁹⁷ Moreover, former foreign minister of Turkey Hikmet Çetin served as NATO Senior Civilian Representative for two terms from January 2004 to August 2006.⁴⁹⁸ Turkey also vigorously participated in the establishment of Southeastern Europe Brigade (SEEBRIG) served as Kabul Multinational Brigade between February 2006 and August 2006.⁴⁹⁹ Turkey actively took part in the formation of Kabul Regional Command Capital (RCC), which aims to give supply service in providing security and reconstruction business, on August 06, 2006 and took the rule of Kabul Regional Command two times in April 2007 and in November 2009.⁵⁰⁰ Moreover, Turkey established Gazi Turkish Military Training Center in Kabul in February 2010 and designed special training programs for Afghan soldiers in Turkey.⁵⁰¹ So

⁴⁹³ “International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Operation”, Turkish Armed Forces website, <http://www.tsk.tr/eng/uluslararası/isaf.htm>.

⁴⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹⁵ “Afganistan’da komuta Türkiye’nin”, *Hürriyet*, 20 June 2002; “International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Operation”, Turkish Armed Forces website, <http://www.tsk.tr/eng/uluslararası/isaf.htm>.

⁴⁹⁶ “International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Operation”, Turkish Armed Forces website, <http://www.tsk.tr/eng/uluslararası/isaf.htm>.

⁴⁹⁷ *Ibid.*; “Turkey’s Contribution to Afghanistan”, Turkish Foreign Ministry booklet, June 2010, p.7.

⁴⁹⁸ Doğan, Salih; “Türkiye’nin Afganistan’daki Varlığı ve Önemi”, 17 August 2010, *USAK*, <http://www.usak.org.tr/makale.asp?id=1647>.

⁴⁹⁹ “International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Operation”, Turkish Armed Forces website, <http://www.tsk.tr/eng/uluslararası/isaf.htm>.

⁵⁰⁰ Koçer, Gökhan; “Afganistan’a Asker Göndermek”, *Stratejik Düşünce Enstitüsü (SDE)*, 07 December 2009, <http://www.sde.org.tr/tr/kose-yazilari/70/afganistana-asker-gondermek.aspx>; “International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Operation”, Turkish Armed Forces website, <http://www.tsk.tr/eng/uluslararası/isaf.htm>.

⁵⁰¹ Güranlı, Zeynep; “ABD’li komutanı şaşırta 96 yıllık fotoğraf”, *Hürriyet*, 18 March 2010.

far, Turkey has given military training to 1200 Afghan National Army soldiers in Turkey.⁵⁰² The number of trained soldiers in Afghanistan by Turkey is more than 8000.⁵⁰³ Turkey's grants to Afghan National Army composed of weapons and equipment have exceeded 71 million dollars since 2003.⁵⁰⁴ Furthermore, as continuation of its own perception and evaluation of Afghanistan since the beginning of the operations in Afghanistan, Turkey carried on its support to the projects of Afghan state-building process giving the role and responsibility to Afghan people. President Abdullah Gül's remarks highlighting the importance of providing education, health and employment services in the NATO defense ministers meeting held in Istanbul in February 2010 also approve Turkey's coherent policy developed since 2001.⁵⁰⁵ Considering the military precautions are not enough all alone to restore peace and stability in Afghanistan, Turkey has started to carry out the most comprehensive development assistance program in the fields of education, security, health and agriculture beside of training Afghan military personnel and building Afghan military school.⁵⁰⁶ Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu indicates that Turkey's expenditure of 250 million dollars for Afghanistan since 2005 constitutes the largest amount spent for a specific issue by adding that this is the most comprehensive development program in the history of the republic.⁵⁰⁷ Turkey's Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Wardak was established in November 2006 has also been conducting activities to provide better conditions in the fields of infrastructure, public works, social support, administrative and judiciary beside of giving training to the Afghan Police Force.⁵⁰⁸ Last but not least, Turkey also either initiated or hosted several conferences for fostering regional cooperation such as the 4th meeting of Turkey-Afghanistan-Pakistan trilateral summit in January 2010, Istanbul summit of 'Friendship and Cooperation in the Heart of Asia' which was realized with the participation of Afghanistan, its neighbors and some observer countries, and Turkey-

⁵⁰² "Afghan National Army Receives More Than \$3 Million Donation", ISAF NATO website, 15 June 2010, <http://www.isaf.nato.int/article/isaf-releases/afghan-national-army-receives-more-than-3-million-donation.html>.

⁵⁰³ "Turkey's Contribution to Afghanistan", Turkish Foreign Ministry booklet, June 2010, p.7.

⁵⁰⁴ "Afghan National Army Receives More Than \$3 Million Donation", ISAF NATO website, 15 June 2010, <http://www.isaf.nato.int/article/isaf-releases/afghan-national-army-receives-more-than-3-million-donation.html>.

⁵⁰⁵ "Gül: Afganistan'ı sadece askeri yollarla çözemeyiz", *Hürriyet*, 05 February 2010.

⁵⁰⁶ "Kabil'in komutası yeniden Türkiye'de", *Sabah*, 31 October 2009.

⁵⁰⁷ Davutoğlu Kabil'de, *Hürriyet*, 20 July 2010.

⁵⁰⁸ "International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Operation", Turkish Armed Forces website, <http://www.tsk.tr/eng/uluslararasi/isaf.htm>.

Afghanistan-Pakistan Foreign Ministers meeting in June 2010.⁵⁰⁹ The remarks of Ahmed Rashid, well-known Pakistani journalist and author, as that “There are signs that Iran, India and Russia are shifting their position and would support negotiations with the Taliban, having adamantly opposed them in the past, and that consensus over the need for negotiations is building among countries in the region,” together with the claims of a senior Pakistani official commenting to Reuters as that “The Turks are among those working on negotiations with the Taliban-not all the Taliban, it's being selectively done” affirms both Turkey’s importance and Turkish-Russian co-positioning on the subject.⁵¹⁰ During his visit to Ankara in 2004, Russian President Putin denotes the close positions of Turkey and Russia towards Afghanistan.⁵¹¹ Besides, Turkey and Russia took part together in a NRC pilot project which was developed in 2005 to train Afghan and Central Asian security personnel in counter-narcotics by hosting training courses.⁵¹²

To put in a nutshell, the fight against international terrorism constituted a solid ground for cooperation between Turkey and Russia in the security field. Russia’s developing relations with the West, more specifically the US and NATO as a result of its attendance to the international chorus of the fight against international terrorism together with its support to the war in Afghanistan strengthened Turkey’s hand for further development. Turkey and Russia have given support to the ‘the first war of the 21st century’⁵¹³ against terrorism in Afghanistan by following coherent policy from beginning to end. Both expressed the principle of non-attendance to the combat forces overtly. Furthermore, Turkey and Russia share the same positioning with regard to the way of handling the ongoing process namely giving voice and responsibility to the local people and neighbor countries.

4.3. Opposition to the War in Iraq

The US President George W. Bush was pronouncing the name of Iraq as one of the three countries composing ‘axis of evil’ in his first State of the Union address to the Congress on

⁵⁰⁹ “Türkiye-Afganistan Siyasi İlişkileri”, Official website of Turkish Foreign Ministry, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-afganistan_siyasi-iliskileri.tr.mfa.

⁵¹⁰ Cameron-Moore, Simon; Turkey kicks off international meetings on Afghanistan, *Reuters*, 22 January 2010, <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE60L4QG20100122>.

⁵¹¹ “Press Statement Following Russian-Turkish Talks, Ankara, 06 December 2004”, Official website of the Russian President.

⁵¹² “NATO’s relations with Russia”, NATO website, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-A06DEC4D-5B0D0664/natolive/topics_50090.htm?

⁵¹³ “Bush: 21. yüzyılın ilk savaşı olacak”, *Hürriyet*, 14 September 2001.

January 29, 2002, and this was followed by the October 10, 2002 dated US Congress joint resolution allowing the use of force against Iraq which was later on October 16, 2002 approved by the American President Bush.⁵¹⁴ Russian leader Putin was conveying the message of that there was not enough data supporting the possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) by Iraq to the UK leader Tony Blair during a meeting held in Moscow on October 11, 2002.⁵¹⁵ In the press release of Turkish National Security Council (NSC) meeting on October 22, 2002 dated, it was stated that Turkey expected a responsible attitude from Iraq in accordance with the UNSC resolutions for the elimination of the military intervention as an option and that Turkey would be following the developments in the framework of UN with reference to the preeminence of the principles of international legitimacy and consensus.⁵¹⁶ Following these developments, several leading Turkish and Russian political and military authorities individually voiced their opponent stance against unilateral action devoid of international legitimacy by yielding the precedence to the peaceful resolution of the conflict by using all diplomatic mechanisms. After the immediate warning from the US to Saddam Hussein to leave Iraq within 48 hours on March 17, 2003, the US-led military operation under the name of the Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) began on March 19, 2003.⁵¹⁷ Especially after the US decision to start the Iraqi War, Turkey and Russia, albeit being the pursuant of different methods because of having dissimilar nature of relations with the US, took the same opponent positioning against such a war.⁵¹⁸ Since right after this critical stage, the interests of Turkey and Russia began to follow a parallel path.

From its inception of the Iraqi crisis escalated with the statements of the US leader Bush in 2002, Turkey phased in three intermingling processes: the espousal of a peaceful resolution, the approval of a legitimate war and as last the acceptance of an illegitimate war quid pro quo the protection of its national interests in Iraq. First, Turkey expressed repeatedly its position favoring the exploitation of all viable political and diplomatic means for the peaceful resolution of the conflict. The press releases of the NSC meetings give certain and

⁵¹⁴ “Operation Iraqi Freedom”, *Global Security*, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraqi_freedom.htm; “Aydın Tarihi”, Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, October 2002.

⁵¹⁵ “Russian rebuff for Blair over Iraq”, *The Guardian*, 11 October 2002, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2002/oct/11/foreignpolicy.uk1>.

⁵¹⁶ “22 Ekim 2002 tarihli MGK Toplantısı Basın Bildirisi”, Official website of the National Security Council of Turkey, <http://www.mgk.gov.tr/Turkce/basinbildiri2002/22ekim2002.html>.

⁵¹⁷ “Operation Iraqi Freedom”, *Global Security*, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraqi_freedom.htm.

⁵¹⁸ Aktürk, Şener; “Turkish-Russian Relations after the Cold War (1992-2002)”, *Turkish Studies*, September 2006, Volume 7, Number 3, p.358.

clear idea about the posture of Turkey with regard to Iraqi crisis. The necessity of the continuation of efforts for the peaceful resolution of the problem within the framework of the UN resolutions and the legitimacy of international law was accentuated in the NSC meetings held on October 22, 2002 and on December 27, 2002.⁵¹⁹ Turkish Foreign Minister Yaşar Yakış, while commenting for NTV on January 03, 2003, mentioned that if Turkey opens its doors to US soldiers, the Iraqi army will have to enter into two fronted war which is in quite favor of the US interests but not Turkish interests since, in that kind of situation, Turkey would have been a country opening its territory for helping the invasion of its neighbor.⁵²⁰ However, this did not refrain Turkey from giving reconnaissance permission to the US in its own bases for any further step toward Iraq. While having press meeting on January 09, 2003, Turkish Premier Abdullah Gül confirmed the decision given for the reconnaissance permission in Turkish bases registered to NATO catalogue.⁵²¹ On January 21, 2003, Foreign Minister Yakış, in his comment to the US radio NPR, stated that Turkey is not into the large-scale deployment of the US forces in Turkey by indicating that both the National Assembly and Turkish public does not seem to be ready in giving the support to the transit of US soldiers through Turkish lands.⁵²² Turkey also hosted “Regional Initiative for Iraq” foreign ministers meeting for the peaceful resolution of the problem in Istanbul on January 23, 2003.⁵²³ The meeting which was realized with the participation of Egypt, Jordan, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Syria ended with the final declaration calling Iraq to fulfill its obligations and the US to solve this issue without war.⁵²⁴ Russian President Putin also mentions this conference hosted by Turkey as a signal of that the region countries neither support the Iraqi regime nor perceive a threat from Iraq and also adds that Turkey does not see war as a solution by citing the telephone conversation with the Turkish Premier.⁵²⁵ While Turkey was carrying on its efforts for the peaceful resolution of the conflict to avoid a devastating war in Iraq, it has been in regular contact with the US authorities which were expecting to get infrastructural

⁵¹⁹ “27 Aralık 2002 tarihli MGK Toplantısı Basın Bildirisi”, Official website of the National Security Council of Turkey, <http://www.mgk.gov.tr/Turkce/basinbildiri2002/27aralik2002.html>.

⁵²⁰ “Aydın Tarihi”, Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, January 2003.

⁵²¹ *Ibid.*

⁵²² *Ibid.*

⁵²³ *Ibid.*

⁵²⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵²⁵ “Interview Granted to France-3 Television”, 09 February 2003, Official website of the Russian President; “Transcript of a Meeting with the French Regional Press and TV Channels”, 12 February 2003, Official website of the Russian President.

help from Turkey during the forthcoming war. Turkey's this term policy can be defined as double-edged getting started to lean more to the diplomatic solutions.

Secondly, the NSC's press release on January 31, 2003 states that Turkey believes in the requirement of the elimination of WMDs in Iraq referring to the UNSCR 1441 and calls Iraq to cooperate with UN in all necessary fields by repeating the importance of the peaceful resolution but this time Turkey puts the principles of international legitimacy and consensus to the 'in the case of a military operation' instead of 'peaceful resolution for the problem' as mentioned in the previous releases. As understood from the release, Turkey sees that the war as unavoidable and elevates its efforts with a maneuver to 'a legitimate war' agreed by all. On January 17, 2003, President's Chief Advisor Tacan İldem mentioned the difficulty of approving the military option in the absence of the new UN resolution by adding that some US demands were already met without assuming any obligations and the reconnaissance works in the bases, ports and airports of Turkey have been carried out by the US via the given permission.⁵²⁶ Turkey's immediate maneuver in this second phase is in direct correlation with the international developments. Since UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan clearly stated on January 13, 2003 that a new UNSC resolution other than the UNSCR 1441 is required for starting a military operation to Iraq.⁵²⁷

Thirdly, when the US President Bush indicated overtly that the UNSCR 1441 is enough for a military operation to Iraq on January 31, 2003, then Turkey had to reformulate its policy in accordance with the new realities of the international politics.⁵²⁸ Turkey made a new reading from the scratch and identified the situation as an illegitimate war will show up very soon in its nearby where a security depression is very likely to emerge for Turkey since a security vacuum in Iraq might cause a cyclonic situation absorbing all settled or settling security structures into its contexture. Thereby an apparent policy change happened by February 2003. In this period, the US also intensified its pressure on Turkey for getting infrastructural, strategic and military support for its upcoming operation in Iraq. Turkey was calculating the political, economic and security aspects of a cooperation as such by not refraining from giving hopes to the US side on the condition that the demands of Turkey to be met by the

⁵²⁶ "Ayın Tarihi", Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, January 2003.

⁵²⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵²⁸ *Ibid.*

US.⁵²⁹ Turkish Premier Gül's statement on February 04, 2003 in his party meeting favoring the strategic importance of deploying Turkish soldiers to the Northern Iraq is quite interesting since it shows that Turkey accepted the new circumstances and repositioned itself accordingly.⁵³⁰ Turkish Defence Minister Gönül said on February 04, 2003 that Turkey can not be out of the formulation in Northern Iraq.⁵³¹ In a press meeting on February 05, 2003, Premier Gül said that Turkey did everything for the peaceful resolution of the problem but the new course directs Turkey to act with the US.⁵³² On February 06, 2003, Premier Gül asked for the support from the deputies to the motion allowing the use of Turkish territories as logistic and strategic hub by covering the modernization of bases and ports, usage of Turkish territory as entrance point by the US forces and sending Turkish forces abroad, and assured them that Turkey will not enter into a war.⁵³³ This was a clear change in the direction of the policy adopted earlier. However, the same Premier Gül, in his meeting with the ambassadors of region countries on February 06, 2003, was calling Iraq to cooperate more with UN inspectors, to declare its relinquishment from its armament program and to prove that it does not pose any threat to region countries.⁵³⁴ This was just face saving discourse since Turkey was sure about the approaching war. On February 06, 2003, White House Spokesperson Ari Fleischer conveyed the thanking message of the US President for the approval of the Turkish Parliament in preparing its military bases and identified Turkey as steadfast friend and close NATO ally.⁵³⁵ Meanwhile Russian President Putin, in an interview with France-3 Television on February 09, 2003, specified that all political and diplomatic channels under the umbrella of international law should have been exhausted for the peaceful resolution of the problem by naming any unilateral action as a big mistake.⁵³⁶ Furthermore, Russia together with Germany and France made a joint statement in Paris on February 10,

⁵²⁹ "Aydın Tarihi", Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, February 2003.

⁵³⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵³¹ *Ibid.*

⁵³² *Ibid.*

⁵³³ *Ibid.*

⁵³⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵³⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵³⁶ "Interview Granted to France-3 Television", 09 February 2003, Official website of the Russian President.

2003 by expressing their opposition to a war in Iraq before the exploitation of all diplomatic channels with reference to UNSCR 1441 dated November 08, 2002.⁵³⁷

On February 14, 2003, Foreign Minister Yaşar Yakış ve State Minister Ali Babacan stated that the second motion allowing the deployment of US soldiers in Turkey will pass very soon in a press meeting evaluating the visit to the White House and added that the US is so determined and will do this operation with or without Turkey.⁵³⁸ At this stage, Turkey turned to be more concerned with the interests that it can get by helping this operation in an indirect way since the US operation is somewhere beyond doubt. On February 16, 2003, State Minister Ali Babacan was announcing that they are in contact with the US for agreeing on the financial conditions of the possible costs siding with the US during the war.⁵³⁹ While the US was waiting response from Turkish side, White House Spokesperson Ari Fleischer commented on February 20, 2003 that Turkey is already playing a role through allowing the modernization of the bases and a rejection of the deployment of soldiers will not change this.⁵⁴⁰ Turkish Foreign Minister Yaşar Yakış was stating that Turkey and the US are very close to reach an agreement on February 22, 2003. Upon a question of the US Fox News concerning why the US has to give financial aid to Turkey on February 22, 2003, Turkish Ambassador in Washington Faruk Loğoğlu was giving an answer as such that 95 percent of Turkish people are against the war and the first Gulf war cost Turkey a lot.⁵⁴¹ However, albeit several visits and ongoing negotiations, Turkish Foreign Minister Yaşar Yakış stated on February 23, 2003 that the demands of Turkey were not met by the US side yet but the negotiations were still on.⁵⁴²

After the rejection of the second motion on March 01, 2003, Assembly Spokesperson of Turkey Bülent Arınç stated that this decision is the will of the nation, Premier Gül stated that Turkish-American relations should not be tied down to the motion and the Chief of Staff

⁵³⁷ “Official Statements”, French Foreign Ministry website, <https://pastel.diplomatie.gouv.fr/editorial/actual/ael2/bulletin.gb.asp?liste=20030211.gb.html>; “Resolution 1441 (2002)”, UN website, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/682/26/PDF/N0268226.pdf?OpenElement>.

⁵³⁸ “Ayın Tarihi”, Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, February 2003.

⁵³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴² *Ibid.*

Hilmi Özkök expressed its respect to the result.⁵⁴³ First US reactions were unperturbed, US Deputy State Secretary Grossman featured the possible losses of Turkey in Iraq with this decision and White House Spokesperson Ari Fleischer described the result as unexpected on March 03, 2003 but added that they still keep their hopes for the new positive decision of the Assembly.⁵⁴⁴ Indeed the rejection of the motion did not stop the negotiations and the Turkish government began to work on the issue again by staying in touch with the US officials. However it did not bring any result in the later stage since the US authorities rescheduled their war plans as being without Turkey. The latent crisis caused by the rejection of the very needed motion by the US re-emerged with the following statements of the Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld in an interview with Fox News in 2005: “Given the level of the insurgency today, two years later, clearly if we had been able to get the 4th Infantry Division in from the north through Turkey, more of the Iraqi Saddam Hussein Baathist regime would have been captured or killed,” by adding that if Turkey had cooperated, the US would not have coped with this high level of insurgency.⁵⁴⁵ On the other hand, Turkish Parliament’s rejection of the motion allowing the US troops use Turkish soil in the invasion of Iraq on March 01, 2003 strengthened the image of Turkey as an independent actor in regional as well as international politics so in the Russian perspective that got used to perceive Turkey as sole implementer of the US policies in the region.⁵⁴⁶ The Russian leader Putin’s sincere remarks on December 06, 2004 given below are quite clear:

Second, we are impressed by Turkey’s independent foreign policy. To be honest, I was thinking of how the situation with Iraq developed. Turkey’s independent stand on this issue came as a surprise for me personally, for the entire Russian leadership, and I think for many of my colleagues in the world. Turkey’s stand was dictated above all by its national interests and shares a lot in common with Russia’s own position.⁵⁴⁷

In an interview given by Turkish Ambassador in Moscow Halil Akıncı in May 2010, Ambassador Akıncı also emphasizes the significant role of Turkey’s rejection of the motion in changing the Russian perceptions towards Turkey by proving the independent foreign

⁵⁴³ “Ayın Tarihi”, Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, March 2003.

⁵⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴⁵ Vlahos, Kelley Beaucar; “Rocky U.S.-Turkey Relations Persist Since Iraq War”, *Fox News*, 07 April 2005, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,152683,00.html>.

⁵⁴⁶ Kiniklioğlu, Suat and Morkva, Valeriy; “An anatomy of Turkish-Russian Relations”, *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 2007, Volume 7, Number 4, p.535.

⁵⁴⁷ “Responses to Questions from Russian Journalists, 06 December 2004, Ankara”, Official website of the Russian President.

policy approach of Turkey.⁵⁴⁸ Prime Ministry Chief Consultant Savaş Barkçin states that the Turkish Parliament's rejection of the motion is a turning point with regard to the bilateral relations since after then Turkish-Russian relations gained political weight.⁵⁴⁹

On March 05, 2003, Russian, French and German foreign ministers had a trilateral meeting in Paris and announced that they will veto the proposal for allowing the use of force against Iraq in UN.⁵⁵⁰ On March 07, 2003, while the US President Bush was declaring that they do not need any UN approval for acting, State Minister and Deputy Premier Mehmet Ali Şahin denoted that they are working on the second motion by citing that Turkey decided on acting together with the US otherwise Turkey can not get into the Northern Iraq when the intervention was made.⁵⁵¹ Besides, White House Spokesperson pronounced the name of Turkey among the countries giving support to the Iraqi operation of the US by referring the permission given for use of Turkish air space on March 07, 2003.⁵⁵² AKP Chairman Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, after receiving the US Ambassador in Ankara Robert Pearson, stated that Turkish demands regarding the role of the ethnic Turks in Iraq, conditions of the US aid to Turkey and the limit of the US soldiers to be deployed in Turkish territory were conveyed to the US side on March 09, 2003. However the US State Secretary Colin Powell stated on March 18, 2003 that the time is over for the use of Turkish lands for a land operation and so the offer of 6 million dollars aid package but they need Turkish assistance for the air operations.⁵⁵³

The US declared war against Iraq on March 19, 2003. The day before the US declaration of war, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Ivanov said that the US unilateral action will lead to dissolution of the coalition against terror.⁵⁵⁴ The day after the US declaration of war, President Sezer featured that he did not find the US unilateral action correct since there was an ongoing process in the UNSC. The prime ministry motion allowing the sending of

⁵⁴⁸ Akkan, Faruk; "Türkiye Moskova Büyükelçisi Akıncı: Rusya ile 100 milyar dolar ticaret hayal değil - ÖZEL", *Haberrus*, 10 May 2010, <http://www.haberrus.com/gundem/2787-Turkiye-Moskova-Buyukelcisi-Akinci-Rusya-ile-100-milyar-dolar-ticaret-hayal-degil---OZEL.html>.

⁵⁴⁹ "Türkiye-Rusya İlişkileri Çalıştay Raporu", *SETA*, December 2009, p.4.

⁵⁵⁰ "Ayın Tarihi", Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, March 2003.

⁵⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

Turkish forces abroad and the use of Turkish air space by the US for its operation to Iraq were approved by the Turkish Parliament on March 20, 2003. Turkish discourse of entering into Northern Iraq for the protection of its interests was responded negatively by the US with reference to that there is no reason of Turkey to do such an action.⁵⁵⁵ During the congratulating telephone conversation upon the election of AKP Chairman Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as Premier on March 24, 2003, President Putin and Premier Erdoğan expressed their desire to end the ongoing war and a peaceful solution in the framework of the UNSC.⁵⁵⁶ The first press release of the NSC on March 28, 2003 after the beginning of the war put the following points forward; developments in Iraq is directly related to the Turkish national interests and security, Turkey hopes the end of the military operation soon but without leaving insecure and unstable region behind, Turkey opened its airspace for the planes of US and UK participating in the Iraqi operation with the approval of the Turkish Parliament, continuation of bilateral and multilateral cooperation with the US is underlined and Turkish expectations from the US in taking necessary measures for relieving security concerns of Turkey with regard to Northern Iraq are reminded.⁵⁵⁷

Turkey kept an oppositional posture against a war in Iraq mainly because of three reasons. The first and foremost reason is the political one since the war-torn Iraq might be a safe heaven for PKK terrorists and also encourage PKK elements in Turkey for secession in the scenario of the emergence of three independent states in the lands of Iraq. The realization of that kind of scenario as a result of a fratricidal war among the parties in Iraq would lead to the emergence of security vacuum which will put Turkey's own security into danger as well. Therefore Turkey's strong emphasis on the preservation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty was very salient both before and after the war. On March 26, 2003, Turkish Chief of Staff Hilmi Özkök stated that the Iraqi territorial integrity is Turkey's foreign policy.⁵⁵⁸ Russian President Putin, in an interview with the Turkish media in Sochi on September 01, 2004 responded a question on Russia's position in the case of hypothetical possibility of the establishment of a Kurdish state in Northern Iraq as that "...our position has always been and will remain clear and transparent: we are for preserving Iraq's territorial

⁵⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵⁶ "President Vladimir Putin spoke by telephone with Turkish Premier Recep Tayyip Erdogan, 24 March 2003", Official website of the Russian President.

⁵⁵⁷ "28 Mart 2002 tarihli MGK Toplantısı Basın Bildirisi", Official website of the National Security Council of Turkey, <http://www.mgk.gov.tr/Turkce/basinbildiri2003/28mart2003.html>.

⁵⁵⁸ "Ayın Tarihi", Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, March 2003.

integrity and against dividing the country up into quasi-state formations”.⁵⁵⁹ Moreover, President Putin, in the third meeting of the Valdai Discussion Club on September 09, 2006, clearly expressed its discomfort with what has been going on in Iraq with the following words: “They told us that everything would be all right in Iraq. And already today in Iraqi Kurdistan only Kurdish flags and not Iraqi flags are flying”.⁵⁶⁰ This is definitely a clear indication of common interests between Turkey and Russia. The second one is the economic. Turkey had lost money in-between 100 and 150 million dollars per year because of 1991 Gulf War due to the embargo and closure of Kerkuk-Yumurtalik oil pipeline.⁵⁶¹ State Minister Kürşat Tüzmen commenting on January 11, 2003 says that Turkey does not want a new war by indicating the 80 billion dollars valued loss within 10 year time of Gulf crisis.⁵⁶² Turkey’s losses were not recouped for good and all. Several US authorities’ declarations with regard to compensating the possible economic loss in the case of war verify this concern. Turkish Premier Gül, in his comment to CNN Turk on January 27, 2003, said that Turkey agreed with the US on a flexible method for the compensation of all kinds of losses in the case of an Iraqi operation.⁵⁶³ Last but not the least, the public opinion in Turkey. Allegedly more than 80 percent of the people were against the operation to Iraq.⁵⁶⁴ This means that a government letting the US army in Turkey would have lost public support.

Russian objections were based on three points. First one is similar to the Turkish one. Possible security vacuum in Iraq might put Russian security into danger because the armed and experienced religious extremists might suddenly show up in North Caucasus and Central Asia where Russia had already been struggling against these radicals for a while.⁵⁶⁵ Therefore Russia thought that expansion of radicalism from war-torn Iraq might have destabilizing consequences for Russia per se but also for its neighborhood specifically its southern tier. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Victor Posuvaliuk in 1994 articulated this concern with the following words: “very geographically close to the former Soviet borders

⁵⁵⁹ “Interview with Turkish Media”, 01 September 2004, Official website of the Russian President.

⁵⁶⁰ “Transcript of Meeting with Participants in the Third Meeting of the Valdai Discussion Club, Novo-Ogaryovo, 09 September 2006”, Official website of the Russian President.

⁵⁶¹ Terrill, Andrew W.; “Strategic Effects of the Conflict with Iraq: The Middle East, North Africa, and Turkey”, March 2003, *Strategic Studies Institute*, p.12.

⁵⁶² “Ayın Tarihi”, Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, January 2003.

⁵⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶⁴ Terrill, Andrew W.; “Strategic Effects of the Conflict with Iraq: The Middle East, North Africa, and Turkey”, March 2003, *Strategic Studies Institute*, p.11.

⁵⁶⁵ Trenin, Dmitri; “Russia’s Threat Perception and Strategic Posture” in *Russian Security Strategy Under Putin: U.S. and Russian Perspectives*, November 2007, *Strategic Studies Institute*, p.41.

and even Russia itself. It is not a far away country where one can play its political games. The developments there have an impact on the political life in Russia, including its domestic problems".⁵⁶⁶ Second reason was related to being against the American imposition on unipolar world system since the US forces started the operation as bypassing the UNSC where Russia has a voice. Third reason is economic. Iraq was an important economic partner for Russia and Russia had already lost a lot because of the earlier implemented economic sanctions in accordance with the UN sanctions.⁵⁶⁷ Iraqi debts to Russia valued at 7 billion dollars, Russian-Iraqi oil deal costing 10 billion dollars and possible Russian involvement in different projects, industry fields of Iraq and possible Russian arm sales to Iraq were the issues which was supposed to be hold on until the easing or lifting the UN sanctions against Iraq.⁵⁶⁸ In August 2002, the Associated Press was reporting Russian-Iraqi economic cooperation plan on its way valued at 40 billion dollars.⁵⁶⁹ The stability in the Middle East which may have direct affect on the Russian security interests in its own neighborhood and in the Gulf region means more than anything else for Russia. In his concluding remarks after a meeting with Turkish business circle in Moscow, President Putin highlighted the importance of providing the security in Iraq with the following wording: "The situation remains difficult; and we are interested in peaceful development of the situation in this country, and will do everything on our part to achieve this, and will unite the efforts of Russia and Turkey, because the situation in our country depends to a large degree on prosperity in this region of the world".⁵⁷⁰

That's why both countries strongly defended the necessity of providing the territorial integrity of Iraq since the Middle Eastern security complex in the post-Cold war has potential to trigger other dynamics in Turkey and Russia. According to the news titled 'Secret Turkish-Russian Cooperation for Iraq' in Turkish newspaper Radikal on August 06, 2002; during the visit of Russian Deputy Foreign Minister and the Presidential Special Envoy to the Middle East, Alexander Sultanov to Turkey on July 29, 2002, Turkey and Russia secretly agreed on two-phased plan that both countries would have done their utmost

⁵⁶⁶ Ismael, Tareq Y. & Kreutz, Andrej; "Russian-Iraqi Relations: A Historical and Political Analysis", *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Fall 2001, p.9.

⁵⁶⁷ Nizameddin, Talal; *Russia and the Middle East: Towards a New Foreign Policy*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999, p.203.

⁵⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, pp.203-208.

⁵⁶⁹ "Russia, Iraq near \$40 billion pact", *USA Today*, 17 August 2002, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2002-08-17-russia-iraq_x.htm.

⁵⁷⁰ "Concluding Remarks after a Meeting with Representatives of Turkish Business Circles", 11 January 2005, Official website of the Russian President.

to avert the US military intervention in Iraq and if they do not succeed, they would have directed all their efforts to avoid the establishment of a Kurdish state in Iraq.⁵⁷¹ Turkey's position in this scenario is quite understandable but what are the Russian concerns obstructing the establishment of a Kurdish state in Iraq? The answer is simple because Russian interests say so. The formation of a state as such will strengthen the US existence and influence in the region while splashing the radicalism all over the intersecting regions with the Middle East including Russia which had already had hard times in Chechnya and Dagestan in the past. Moreover Russian approval of such a state would also alienate the other Middle Eastern states that had involved in the war through their connection with Sunni or Shia Iraqi people which means further economic loss for Russia beside of losing the political leverage in the Middle East due to reducing prestige among the eyes of Middle Eastern States. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov expressed the common positioning of both Turkey and Russia in a joint press conference held in Istanbul in September 2008 favoring "a definitive resolution of the situation in Iraq on the basis of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of that state".⁵⁷² For this period of the history, two countries share the same interests in the Middle East and Iraq constitutes small but important part of this big picture. The similar posture of these two countries before and after the war, and the steps and the decisions they took which provided rapprochement between them were based on common interests they have had.

4.4. Black Sea Dimension

Black Sea dimension based on the security aspect of the relations between Turkey and Russia has three courses; first one is the BSEC, second one is the BLACKSEAFOR and the OBSH, and the third one is other littoral cooperation forums either initiated by Turkey or attended by Turkey.

The BSEC was formed on June 25, 1992 with the initiative of Turkey. Establishment of the organization possessing 20 million km² land, 350 million population and 300 billion dollars trade volume as designed to promote economic cooperation while both trying to alleviate the difficulties of the transition period of the region countries and making them get closer to the

⁵⁷¹ Aktürk, Şener; "Turkish-Russian Relations after the Cold War (1992-2002)", *Turkish Studies*, September 2006, Volume 7, Number 3, p.358.

⁵⁷² "Transcript of Remarks and Response to Media Questions by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov at Joint Press Conference with Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs Ali Babajan, Istanbul, September 2, 2008", Official website of Russian Foreign Ministry, 03 September 2008, http://www.un.int/russia/new/MainRoot/docs/off_news/030908/newen3.htm.

West is the first strategic step of Turkey to its north.⁵⁷³ Allegedly, Turkish authorities were in the enthusiasm of creating an organization which will compete with the EU in the future.⁵⁷⁴ Both Turkey and Russia are among the constituents as littoral states. Founding members of the BSEC are composed of Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, and Ukraine as littoral states, and Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Greece and Moldova as non-littoral states together with 2004 dated membership of Serbia.⁵⁷⁵ The observers are Austria, Belarus, Croatia, Czech Republic, Egypt, the EU, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Poland, Slovakia, Tunisia and the US.⁵⁷⁶ It was the first post-Cold War design in the Black Sea region, albeit, touches upon mainly the economic matters. However it was established with the belief of that the first tiny step would pave the way to the latter big developments as occurred in Europe. The ‘Statement of the High Level Meeting of the BSEC Participating States’ held in Bucharest on June 30, 1995, the ‘Moscow Declaration of the Heads of State or Government of the Participating States of the BSEC’ held in Moscow on October 25, 1996, the ‘Yalta Summit Declaration’ dated 05 June 1998 and ‘Istanbul Summit Declaration’ dated November 17, 1999 were signed to make BSEC fully-fledged regional economic cooperation.⁵⁷⁷ Additional ‘Protocol on Combating Terrorism’ to the ‘Agreement Among The Governments of the BSEC Participating States on Cooperation in Combating Crime, in particular in its Organized Forms’ was signed on December 03, 2004.⁵⁷⁸ All these meetings and paperwork did not hinder the slow disappearance of the enthusiasm among the states towards the future of the organization. When the BSEC was holding the organization’s 18th foreign ministers meeting in Ukraine on April 17, 2008, ten member states out of twelve were represented by low ranked representatives except Turkey and Ukraine.⁵⁷⁹ Even though today this organization and its later added organizational branches are far from being able to meet the expectations

⁵⁷³ Kasım, Kamer; “Türkiye’nin Karadeniz Politikası: Temel Parametreler ve Stratejiler”, *Orta Asya ve Kafkasya Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 2008, Volume 3, Number 5, p.173.

⁵⁷⁴ Jenkins, Gareth; “Is the End of the BSEC in Sight?”, *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, 22 April 2008, Volume 5, Issue 76, [http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=33571](http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=33571).

⁵⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷⁶ “The Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation”, BSEC website, http://web.archive.org/web/20070928091304/http://www.bsec-organization.org/main.aspx?ID=About_BSEC.

⁵⁷⁷ “Summits, The Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation”, <http://www.bsec-organization.org/documents/declaration/summit/Pages/summit.aspx>; “Karadeniz Ekonomik İşbirliği Örgütü (KEİ)”, Official website of Turkish Foreign Ministry, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/karadeniz-ekonomik-isbirligi-orgutu-kei_tr.mfa.

⁵⁷⁸ “Add. Prot. Combating Terrorism”, BSEC website, <http://www.bsec-organization.org/documents/LegalDocuments/agreementmous/agr3/Download/AddPrtTerrorism%20071120.pdf>.

⁵⁷⁹ Jenkins, Gareth; “Is the End of the BSEC in Sight?”, *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, 22 April 2008, Volume 5, Issue 76, [http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=33571](http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=33571).

put forward in its inception, it is an accepted fact that it created a forum for further dialogue beside of cooperation in various fields.⁵⁸⁰ Indeed, there are many factors to the question of why the theoretical framework could not be put into practice and the BSEC remained only as a dialogue forum. Yet maybe the most important factor is that the majority of the founding members were engaged with this initiative either to guard themselves from the likely threats of their rivals located mainly in the neighborhood around early 1990s.⁵⁸¹ Furthermore, BSEC is a kind of game theatre defining the actors, either as member or observer, in the Black sea region together with the role of these actors possible to play. When the US wanted to join the BSEC as observer in 2005, Turkey kept quiet upon the Russian objections which caused an awkward situation considering Turkey and the US as strategic allies, and Washington had to get the observer status through lobbying over the other BSEC members.⁵⁸²

The BLACKSEAFOR as another Turkish initiative started in 1998. The idea of creating such a “multinational naval on-call peace task force”, aimed at fortifying good-neighborly relations, confidence-building, providing peace and stability through boosting regional cooperation and interoperability among the naval forces in the Black Sea region, was developed as stepwise and final signatures of the six Black Sea littoral states including Russia were put on the ‘BLACKSEAFOR Establishment Agreement’ in Istanbul on April 02, 2001.⁵⁸³ BLACKSEAFOR has six duties enumerated as “Search and Rescue Operations, Humanitarian Assistance Operations, Mine Counter Measures, Environmental Protection Operations, Goodwill visits and any other missions agreed by the Parties” that will be performed through regular joint exercises.⁵⁸⁴ Since the first activation held in Istanbul in September 2001 until May 2010, 15 activation operations were held in the command of different Black Sea littoral states.⁵⁸⁵ As a result of regular political consultations at the level of Deputy Foreign Ministers of the littoral states; Ankara Statement on January 19, 2004,

⁵⁸⁰ Aktürk, Şener; “Turkish-Russian Relations after the Cold War (1992-2002)”, *Turkish Studies*, September 2006, Volume 7, Number 3, pp.339.

⁵⁸¹ Jenkins, Gareth; “Is the End of the BSEC in Sight?”, *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, 22 April 2008, Volume 5, Issue 76, [http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=33571](http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=33571).

⁵⁸² Torbakov, Igor; “Turkey Sides with Moscow Against Washington On Black Sea Force”, *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, 03 March 2006, Volume 3, Issue 43, [http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=31442](http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=31442).

⁵⁸³ “Establishment”, BLACKSEAFOR website, <http://www.blackseafor.org/english/establishment.php>.

⁵⁸⁴ “Agreement”, BLACKSEAFOR website, <http://www.blackseafor.org/english/agreement.php>.

⁵⁸⁵ “BLACKSEAFOR Activations/Operations”, BLACKSEAFOR website, http://www.blackseafor.org/english/activation_genel.php.

Moscow Statement on July 07, 2004, Kyiv Statement on March 31, 2005 and Tbilisi Statement on December 15, 2005 were issued.⁵⁸⁶ In all these communiqués, the threats and risks putting the security of the Black Sea region in jeopardy and possible cooperation methods and tools to meet these challenges are referred. Combating terrorism is emphasized strongly among the listed threats and risks such as organized crime, illegal trafficking and proliferation of WMD.⁵⁸⁷ In addition to that BLACKSEAFOR can be assigned to the missions out of the Black Sea with the unanimous decision of the participant countries, BLACKSEAFOR can also be deployed in the operations under the UN and the OSCE.⁵⁸⁸ Moreover Kyiv meeting on March 31, 2005 has significance in regards to that Turkey extended an invitation to the littoral states for participating in its national operation called the OBSH that was initiated by the Turkish Navy on March 01, 2004 to reinforce the naval collaboration in the Black Sea.⁵⁸⁹

In harmony with the related UNSC resolutions 1373, 1540 and 1566, the objective of the OBSH is defined as deterrence and avoidance of terrorism and of the illegal transfer of WMD and its materials through flag presence in the Black Sea.⁵⁹⁰ Indeed, the OBSH is the Black Sea format of the NATO-led Operation Active Endeavour (OAE) in the Mediterranean, thereof, pretty much connected to NATO and since the OBSH shares the same goals and intentions with the OAE, albeit in different regions, they have some sort of coordination by way of information and intelligence sharing.⁵⁹¹ The purpose of the OBSH is providing deterrence to the illegal activities in the Black Sea by the means of random perambulations to haunt the suspected ships.⁵⁹² The Operation gained a multi-national character with the participation of Russia in December 2006, of Ukraine in April 2007 and of Romania in March 2008.⁵⁹³ The OBSH has a permanent coordination center in Karadeniz

⁵⁸⁶ “BLACKSEAFOR”, Official website of Turkish Foreign Ministry, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/blackseafor.en.mfa>.

⁵⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸⁸ Kasım, Kamer; “Türkiye’nin Karadeniz Politikası: Temel Parametreler ve Stratejiler”, *Orta Asya ve Kafkasya Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 2008, Volume 3, Number 5, p.175.

⁵⁸⁹ “BLACKSEAFOR”, Official website of Turkish Foreign Ministry, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/blackseafor.en.mfa>.

⁵⁹⁰ Gürdeniz, Cem; “Türkiye’nin Akdeniz ve Karadeniz’de Deniz Güvenliğine Katkıları”, in *Güvenliğin Yeni Boyutları ve Uluslararası Örgütler*, Dördüncü Uluslararası Sempozyum Bildirileri (İstanbul, 31 Mayıs - 01 Haziran 2007), SAREM, Ankara:Genelkurmay Basımevi, 2007, p.280.

⁵⁹¹ “Maritime Security in the Black Sea”, Turkish General Staff website, <http://www.tsk.tr/eng/uluslararasi/karadenizdenizisbirligorevgrubu.htm>.

⁵⁹² *Ibid.*

⁵⁹³ “BLACKSEAFOR”, Official website of Turkish Foreign Ministry, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/blackseafor.en.mfa>.

Ereğli and a Russian military officer has started to work at this center.⁵⁹⁴ The extension request of the NATO-led OAE in 2005, which had been orchestrated in October 2001 as one of the eight measures of Article 5 based NATO response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, to the Black Sea region was objected by Turkey and Russia.⁵⁹⁵ Turkey and Russia, both countries do not want the involvement of non-littoral actors in the Black Sea region relying on different reasoning. Turkey's objection to the US-led involvement in the Black Sea region has two reasons; first one is Ankara's concern over keeping the Montreux provisions tight and the second one is the already existing connections of the BLACKSEAFOR and OBSH with NATO.⁵⁹⁶ However the most important reason behind Turkey's standing aloof from the idea of the extension of the OAE to the Black Sea is caused by the fact that this kind of initiatives might have caused negative results for the Montreux, which is perceived by Turkey as the main pillar for protecting its and relatively the region's security by putting the rules abided by everyone, through opening its provisions to the discussion and thereby might have corroded the Turkish initiatives favoring the establishment of a system of balance. For some countries, the OBSH is a Turkish attempt to obstruct the NATO extension to the Black Sea through OAE to carry on its domination in the region.⁵⁹⁷ Russia, though joined the OAE upon NATO invitation, deprecates to see the extension of the OAE towards the Black Sea region since according to the Russian point of view, the region is still seen as a part of Russian sphere of interest where non-regional Western powers but specifically the US must be kept out as much as possible until or unless Russian interests say the otherwise.⁵⁹⁸ Additionally, Russia's shipping of its oil and gas exports from the Russian ports in the Black

⁵⁹⁴ Gürdeniz, Cem; "Türkiye'nin Akdeniz ve Karadeniz'de Deniz Güvenliğine Katkıları", in *Güvenliğin Yeni Boyutları ve Uluslararası Örgütler*, 4. Uluslararası Sempozyum Bildirileri (İstanbul, 31 Mayıs - 01 Haziran 2007), SAREM, Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 2007, p.281.

⁵⁹⁵ Torbakov, Igor; "Turkey Sides with Moscow Against Washington On Black Sea Force", Eurasia Daily Monitor, 03 March 2006, Volume 3, Issue 43, [http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=31442](http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=31442); "Operation Active Endeavour", NATO website, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_7932.htm; "Add. Prot. Combating Terrorism", BSEC website, <http://www.bsecorganization.org/documents/LegalDocuments/agreementmous/agr3/Download/AddPrtTerrorism%20071120.pdf>.

⁵⁹⁶ Torbakov, Igor; "Turkey Sides with Moscow Against Washington On Black Sea Force", Eurasia Daily Monitor, 03 March 2006, Volume 3, Issue 43, [http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=31442](http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=31442); Kasım, Kamer; "Türkiye'nin Karadeniz Politikası: Temel Parametreler ve Stratejiler", *Orta Asya ve Kafkasya Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 2008, Volume 3, Number 5, p.177.

⁵⁹⁷ "Russian ships join Turkish security operation", *RIA Novosti*, 30 September 2006, <http://en.rian.ru/russia/20060930/54403204.html>.

⁵⁹⁸ Torbakov, Igor; "Turkey Sides with Moscow Against Washington On Black Sea Force", Eurasia Daily Monitor, 03 March 2006, Volume 3, Issue 43, [http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=31442](http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=31442).

Sea all through the Turkish Straits constitutes the two third of tanker traffic in the Straits where about 3.7 percent of the world's oil consumption has been transiting in a day⁵⁹⁹ and this increases the importance of the Black Sea for Russia. However the desire to keep the existing balance favoring their current conditions lies behind the whole matter indeed. Especially if the issue is the involvement of a giant actor like the US, then everything may apt to change for both Turkey and Russia. This NATO extension issue might cost for Russia losing the control of this strategic region but for Turkey, it means more than just losing the critical region because of the discussions over Montreux provisions which Turkey sticks to the bargain in it. Both Turkey and Russia are very well aware of the challenges standing in front of their main security concerns. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Ivanov expresses this by pointing out only Turkey and Russia as countries must be in charge of the Black Sea security.⁶⁰⁰

To avoid any possible involvement of third actors under the name of meeting security challenges of the post-9/11 world, Turkey either initiated or gave hand to several projects favoring both the preservation of the current status quo in the region and strengthening its critical role in this picture. Turkey joined the "Initiative on Confidence and Security Building Measures in the Naval Field in the Black Sea" through signing the document on April 25, 2002 together with the other five littoral states.⁶⁰¹ In 2003, the Black Sea Border Coordination and Information Center (BBCIC) was established in Bulgaria by the six littoral states for the purpose of sharing information among the coastguards on possible illegal activities in the Black Sea region.⁶⁰² Turkey's initiative of having regular meetings among the leaders of the Black Sea Littoral States Coast Guard Agencies as of 2000 resulted in the signature of "The Black Sea Cooperation Forum (BCSF)" in Istanbul on November 09, 2006 to provide peace, stability, confidence and security in the region by co-operating against the plethora of challenges.⁶⁰³ All three platforms are only reserved for the littoral states and aims

⁵⁹⁹ Babalı, Tuncay; "Turkey at the Energy Crossroads", *Middle East Quarterly*, Spring 2009, http://www.meforum.org/2108/turkey-at-the-energy-crossroads#_ftnref13.

⁶⁰⁰ Sanders, Deborah; "U.S. Naval Diplomacy in the Black Sea: Sending Mixed Messages", *Naval War College Review*, 22 June 2007, Volume 60, Number 3, p.68.

⁶⁰¹ "Document On Confidence- And-Security-Building Measures In The Naval Field In The Black Sea", Turkish Armed Forces Website, http://www.tsk.tr/4_ULUSLARARASI_ILISKILER/4_17_Karadenizin_Deniz_Guvenligi/pdf/karadenizggao.pdf.

⁶⁰² Baran, Zeyno; "Turkey and the Wider Black Sea Region", in *The Wider Black Sea Region in the 21st Century: Strategic, Economic and Energy Perspectives* (ed. by Hamilton, Daniel and Mangott, Gerhard), Washington, D.C.: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2008, p.89.

⁶⁰³ "The Meetings of the Leaders of the Black Sea Littoral States Border/Coast Guard Agencies and Black Sea Cooperation Forum", Turkish Coast Guard Command website, http://www.sgk.tsk.tr/baskanliklar/genel_sekreterlik/ingilizce/international_relations.asp.

to collaborate more against the challenges by all means. Both Turkey and Russia as littoral states have been welcoming the initiatives as such for improving their influence in the region by excluding the possible signal-breaking efforts of the third parties. Apart from that, there are many intergovernmental organizational efforts involving some or all of the Black Sea states for different purposes such as GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic Development, the Community of Democratic Choice, the Black Sea Forum and the EU's Black Sea Dimension.⁶⁰⁴ Among the initiatives mentioned above, Romania initiated 'Black Sea Forum', which both Turkey and Russia are the members, is perceived by Turkey as an effort to weaken the BSEC while it is being perceived by Russia as US penetration to the Black Sea through using a region country. Indeed, the Forum failed since both Turkey and Russia did not support this initiative based on different reasoning.⁶⁰⁵

The military exercises held with the non-littoral states in the region are kind of show-off and carry a significant unbalancing and mistrusting elements in the perceptions. The US-Ukrainian led multinational naval military exercise 'Sea Breeze' which takes place in the Black Sea since 1997, except the years of 2006 and 2009 due to the political reasons, in accordance with the US naval strategy of the 1990s has been a visible evidence of American presence in the Black Sea seeking its interests through coalition building and this is perceived as detrimental by Russia in regards to its vital security interests in the Black Sea region.⁶⁰⁶ "Sea Breeze is an invitational combined and joint maritime exercise in the Black Sea with the goals of enhancing Black Sea nation maritime security capabilities and improving Black Sea theater security cooperation strategies".⁶⁰⁷ The 'Sea Breeze' military exercises were realized with the participation of NATO forces and PfP (Partnership for Peace) countries like Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan.⁶⁰⁸ The Russian-Ukrainian version of the 'Sea Breeze' was the naval exercises called "Fairway of Peace" which started in 1997

⁶⁰⁴ Kasım, Kamer; "Türkiye'nin Karadeniz Politikası: Temel Parametreler ve Stratejiler", *Orta Asya ve Kafkasya Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 2008, Volume 3, Number 5, pp. 175-176, p.180.

⁶⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 175-176.

⁶⁰⁶ "Ukrainian, NATO ships start Sea Breeze 2010 drills in Black Sea", *RIA Novosti*, 18 July 2010 http://en.rian.ru/military_news/20100718/159856422.html; Sanders, Deborah; "U.S. Naval Diplomacy in the Black Sea: Sending Mixed Messages", *Naval War College Review*, 22 June 2007, Volume 60, Number 3, pp.61-62

⁶⁰⁷ "Flag Ship Band rocks Odessa during Sea Breeze", *EUCOM website*, 12 July 2010, <http://www.eucom.mil/english/FullStory.asp?article=Flag-Ship-Band-rocks-Odessa-Sea-Breeze>.

⁶⁰⁸ Ukrainian, NATO ships start Sea Breeze 2010 drills in Black Sea, *RIA Novosti*, 18 July 2010, http://en.rian.ru/military_news/20100718/159856422.html.

until its suspension in 2003 because of political reasons.⁶⁰⁹ The “Fairway of Peace” was restarted in 2010 to conduct search and rescue operations with the partaking of the warships, aviation and marine units during peacekeeping activities in crisis.⁶¹⁰ Furthermore, Turkish initiatives of BLACKSEAFOR and OBSH are invaluable tools of Russian naval diplomacy by siding with Turkey to respond the American coalition building efforts. However cooperation with Russia in this specific framework does not refrain Turkey from participating the ‘Sea Breeze’ military exercises held together with some NATO and PfP countries in the region whereupon invitation.⁶¹¹ Similarly, Turkey took part in the August 2008 Activation of BLACKSEAFOR naval exercises together with the littorals states including Russia held between August 04-26, 2008 under the Ukrainian command which was completed in all designated ports namely Sevastopol of Ukraine, Novorossiysk of Russia and Batumi of Georgia as unaffected from the August war.⁶¹² The exercises held in April and in August of the following years were also fulfilled without any delay or cancellations. This can be interpreted that Turkey masterly manages to have two different domains as separate from each other by following a very pragmatist policy in the region.

The US military bases operating in Romania and Bulgaria opened in 2005 and 2006 respectively are also other point of tension for the Russian side since the presence of these bases means that the US will be included to the regional picture for long time.⁶¹³ The US plans for having naval bases in the Black Sea, upon the rumors on the grapevine that Turkey declined the American requests for establishing a base in Trabzon earlier and the replacement of the US as a substitute to the problematic presence of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine until 2017 which was solved with the extension decision of the pro-Russian leader Yanukovich until 2042, are close to getting realized though the bases in Bulgaria and

⁶⁰⁹ “Russia and Ukraine resume joint naval exercises”, *The Voice of Russia* 16 April 2010, <http://english.ruvr.ru/2010/04/16/6503071.html>.

⁶¹⁰ Russian-Ukrainian war game Fairway of Peace 2010 starts in Sevastopol , *Russian Navy website*, 22 June 2010, http://rusnavy.com/news/navy/index.php?ELEMENT_ID=9793.

⁶¹¹ For further details about the exercise and its participants, please visit EUCOM website, <http://www.eucom.mil/english/index.asp>.

⁶¹² “August 2008 Activation was between 04-26 August 2008 with Ukraine in command”, BLACKSEAFOR website, http://www.blackseafor.org/english/activation_2008_agust.php.

⁶¹³ Sanders, Deborah; “U.S. Naval Diplomacy in the Black Sea: Sending Mixed Messages”, *Naval War College Review*, 22 June 2007, Volume 60, Number 3, p.62, <https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/7f8e6247-a1de-4da5-85e6-dd179455f97f/U-S--Naval-Diplomacy-in-the-Black-Sea--Sending-Mix>; Kasım, Kamer; “Türkiye’nin Karadeniz Politikası: Temel Parametreler ve Stratejiler”, *Orta Asya ve Kafkasya Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 2008, Volume 3, Number 5, p.177.

Romania.⁶¹⁴ The active presence of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, the US Joint Task Force-East and the US Black Sea Rotational Force Security Cooperation Marine Air-Ground Task Force in the Black Sea through the bases in Bulgaria and Romania is perceived by some in Russia as “the prototype for expansive and permanent military build-ups in Eastern Europe and into former Soviet space”.⁶¹⁵ Konstantin Sivkov, First Vice President of the Academy of Geopolitical Issues in Moscow evaluates these bases as threat to Russian national interests trapping Russia both in strategic and economic terms.⁶¹⁶ Turkey as NATO ally has been sharing several common interests with the US in the regional setting but any act in the direction of first opening the Montreux to discussion and secondly the formation of a dangerous polarization among the littoral states will not be welcomed by Turkey. Russia’s parallel security interests confirm Turkey’s position for the time being. Turkey’s ‘neither-nor approach’ yielding the precedence to ‘international but littoral’ structure formation without taking any sides is also increasing its credibility in regional and international fora.

Both Turkey and Russia reiterated their desire to co-operate further more under the current framework of the BSEC, BLACKSEAFOR, OBSH, Confidence and Security Building Measures in the Naval Field in the Black Sea and other latent arrangements to reinforce and augment the cooperation among littoral states by signing the “Joint Declaration between the Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation on Progress towards a New Stage in Relations and Further Deepening of Friendship and Multidimensional Partnership” on February 13, 2009 in Moscow, inter alia, expressed their common posture toward protecting the security and stability in the Black Sea region against all existing and potential challenges.⁶¹⁷

⁶¹⁴ Oğan, Sinan; “The Black Sea: New Arena for Global Competition”, 24 August 2008, *TURKSAM*, <http://www.turksam.org/en/a195.html>; Kardas, Saban; “Will the Closure of Manas Airbase Strengthen U.S.-Turkish Relations?”, *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, 23 February 2009, Volume 6, Issue 35, [http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=34544](http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=34544); “Ukrainian parliament ratifies agreement extending Russian Black Sea Fleet’s presence in Crimea”, *Kyiv Post*, 27 April 2010, <http://www.kyivpost.com/news/politics/detail/65103/#ixzz0yDGEdzOn>; Maher, Heather; “U.S. And Ukraine Strengthen Ties with New Security Agreement”, *RFE/RL*, 20 December 2008, http://www.rferl.org/content/US_And_Ukraine_Strengthen_Ties_with_New_Security_Agreement/1361877.html.

⁶¹⁵ Rozoff, Rick; “U.S. And NATO Accelerate Military Build-Up In Black Sea Region”, *Global Research*, 21 May 2010, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=19259>; “Black Sea rotational force officially kicks off”, *EUCOM website*, 17 May 2010, <http://www.eucom.mil/english/FullStory.asp?article=Black-Sea-rotational-force-officially-kicks>.

⁶¹⁶ “USA Prepares to Attack Russia in 3 or 4 Years?”, *Pravda*, 23 October 2009, http://english.Pravda.ru/world/europe/23-10-2009/110090-usa_russia-0/.

⁶¹⁷ “Joint Declaration between the Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation on Progress towards a New Stage in Relations and Further Deepening of Friendship and Multidimensional Partnership, Moscow, 13 February 2009”, Official website of Turkish Foreign Ministry, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/joint-declaration-between-the-republic-of-turkey-and-the-russian-federation-on-progress-towards-a-new-stage-in-relations-and-further-deepening-of-friendship-and-multidimensional-partnership_-moscow_-13-february-2009.en.mfa.

4.5. Arm Sales

Cooperation in the military technical field of Turkey as the second biggest army in NATO with Russia as the firm opponent of NATO is one of the interesting topics to be examined. Russia as the second main arm exporter country after the US has sold arms and military hardware to more than 70 countries including Turkey between 2000 and 2010 with an estimated value of 60 billion dollars.⁶¹⁸ Turkey's increasing defense expenses putting it into the first 15 arms importing countries has been whetting the appetite of the Russia.

First step with regard to the arm sales between Turkey and Russia was taken on 06 November 1992 with the agreement on the purchase of Russian military equipment, including helicopters, armored vehicles and other weapons that was signed by Turkish Interior Minister İsmet Sezgin and Russian Foreign Economic Relations Minister Petr Aven, in return of the Russian debts to Eximbank amounting 75-80 million dollars.⁶¹⁹ Thereby Russia made its first military sale to a NATO member. On July 18, 1994, the parties also agreed that some part of Russia's debts to Turkey amounting 400 million dollars would be paid as further arm sales to Turkey.⁶²⁰ Until 2000s, Russia has delivered 19 general purpose Mi-17V helicopters, 70 BTR-80 armored personal carriers and several other weapons with total value of 114 million dollars.⁶²¹

The purchase of Russian military goods following Turkey's decision of having an extensive defense cooperation agreement with Russia on April 20, 1994 following the Treaty on the Principles of Relations between Turkey and Russia on May 25, 1992 and the Memorandum of Understanding between the Defense Ministries on May 11, 1993 which serves a first model among NATO countries was not the matter of choice but rather an absolute necessity since Turkey had difficulties in getting military arms and equipments from its western suppliers to be used in its fight against terror at home.⁶²² Through this first step, Turkey and

⁶¹⁸ "Rusya silah satışında 10 milyar dolarla rekora gidiyor", *Haberrus*, 28 October 2010, <http://haberrus.com/savunma/4056-Rusya-silah-satisinda-10-milyar-dolarla-rekora-gidiyor.html>.

⁶¹⁹ "Aydın Tarihi", Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, November 1992; Kile, Shannon; "Appendix 2. Chronology of principal defence and security-related agreements and initiatives involving the Russian Federation and Asian countries, 1992-99" in *Russia and Asia: The Emerging Security Agenda* (ed. by Chufirin, Gennady), Sipri books, US: Oxford University Press, 1999, p.500.

⁶²⁰ "Aydın Tarihi", Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, July 1994.

⁶²¹ Kandaurov, Sergei; "Russian Arms Exports to Greece, Cyprus and Turkey", *Moscow Defence Brief*, Number 2, 2001, <http://mdb.cast.ru/mdb/2-2001/at/raegct/>.

⁶²² Kiniklioğlu, Suat and Morkva, Valeriy; "An Anatomy of Turkish-Russian Relations", *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 2007, Volume 7, Number 4, p.537.

Russia documented their common desire of the extension of cooperation in the ‘development, production and supply of defense goods and services beside of strengthening their defense capacities.’⁶²³ However, the initial period of the cooperation in this field did not appear as a rosy picture. Two of the helicopters fell down out of 19 and the modernization bid of the remaining 17 helicopters caused a problem in 2002 between Turkey and Russia in which Turkey blamed Russia for not giving necessary abiding post-sale support whereas Russia claimed that it had warned Turkey before the tender about the firm called ‘Talov’ which won the modernization tender.⁶²⁴ This problem full of contradictory explanations remained as a black mark in the initial stage of relations in the field of military procurement; however it did not stop the natural evolution which makes Turkey thinking of buying Russian made combat helicopters and defence missile systems when we come today.

As of 1995, Turkey was seeking to buy new attack helicopters to replace the AH-1P/S Cobra attack helicopters bought as used from the USA in the 1970s and 1980s which later upgraded with AH-1F specifications.⁶²⁵ Thereupon, Turkey started a project called as ‘ATAK’ to buy 145 attack and reconnaissance helicopters valued at 4 billion dollars in 1996.⁶²⁶ The Russian-Israeli Kamov-IAI group’s co-production named Ka-50-2 and the US company Bell Helicopter Textron’s AH-1Z Super Cobra reached the final phase of the bid after competing with Italian Augusta’s Mangusta A-129, Franco-German co-production Eurocopter and Boeing’s Apache Longboy.⁶²⁷ By 2003, the Russian-Israeli Kamov-IAI group’s offer vis-à-vis the US firm Bell Helicopter Textron’s AH-1Z Super Cobra seemed more tempting for Turkey by putting forward the technology transfer, the joint production to be held in Turkey, the sole ownership of the soft-ware source codes, the responsibility of international marketing to the third countries, 20 year guarantee of post-sale maintenance and 350 million dollars lesser price together with the offer of joint development-production of the Ka-115 general-purposed helicopters and their sale to the third countries while the US firm was constantly increasing the cost of the project apart from the company’s disapproval of the

⁶²³ “Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti ile Rusya Federasyonu Hükümeti Arasında Askeri Teknik Konular ve Savunma Sanayi Alanında İşbirliği Yapılmasına Dair Anlaşma”, 20 April 1994, Official website of Turkish Foreign Ministry, <http://ua.mfa.gov.tr/detay.aspx?5471>.

⁶²⁴ Ekşi, Özgür; “Kayıp Helikopterlerin Sırrı Çözüldü”, *Hürriyet*, 01 October 2007.

⁶²⁵ McGregor, Andrew; “Arming for Asymmetric Warfare: Turkey’s Arms Industry in the 21st Century”, The Jamestown Foundation, June 2008, p.21; “Turkey to buy Russian Mi-28 attack helicopters”, 16 June 2009, <http://www.defencetalk.com/turkey-to-buy-russian-mi-28-attack-helicopters-19825/>.

⁶²⁶ Özbay, Fatih; “Askeri Amaçlı Helikopter Alımı İhalesi ve Türkiye-Rusya”, 20 July 2005, <http://www.tasam.org/pencere.php?altid=1250&islem=yazdir>.

⁶²⁷ *Ibid.*

issues such as technology transfer and joint-production in Turkey.⁶²⁸ However Turkish Defense Industry Executive Committee cancelled the bid on 14 May 2004 and announced that a new bid will be opened with new tender specifications in August 2004.⁶²⁹ There are many speculations about the cancellation decision raised by different sides such as the unmet extra demands of Turkish Undersecretariat for Defence Industries (SSM) over some technological prerequisites entailing the involvement of Turkish produced high-tech systems, growing US influence, or the reverse, lack of Russian influence in Turkey, lack of guarantee by the Russian side over the production of certain number of products in the future or over the post-sale maintenance conditions and the absence of mass-production.⁶³⁰

Before the second bid, it is claimed that the result will be in favor of a European company because of that European Union took the decision of starting the negotiations with Turkey in December 2004.⁶³¹ The US companies did not return to the bid due to the knotty issues such as technology transfer and licensing even though the several changes in the Request for Proposal (RFP) and so in the bidding deadlines to appease the complaints of the US side.⁶³² The South African Denel's AH-2A Rooivalk and Italian Agusta Aerospace's A129 International were the finalists in 2006 after the elimination of Franco-German EADS Eurocopter (Tiger) and Russian-Israeli Kamov-IAI group's co-production Ka-50-2 from the bid.⁶³³ In 2007, Turkey decided on the 1.2 billion euro valued 51 T-129s (upgraded version of the A129 Mangusta) helicopters of AgustaWestland, Italian-British Company, to be co-produced with the involvement of Turkish Aviation Industry (TAI) and ASELSAN in Turkey.⁶³⁴ It is beyond doubt the technology transfer and licensing offers of the company made Turkey take this decision. However since the first T129 helicopter is supposed to be

⁶²⁸ Özbay, Fatih; "Askeri Amaçlı Helikopter Alımı İhalesi ve Türkiye-Rusya", 20 July 2005, *TASAM*, <http://www.tasam.org/pencere.php?altid=1250&islem=yazdir>; "Rus helikopterinde damping", *Milliyet*, 22 August 2002.

⁶²⁹ Özbay, Fatih; "Askeri Amaçlı Helikopter Alımı İhalesi ve Türkiye-Rusya", 20 July 2005, *TASAM*, <http://www.tasam.org/pencere.php?altid=1250&islem=yazdir>.

⁶³⁰ McGregor, Andrew; "Arming for Asymmetric Warfare: Turkey's Arms Industry in the 21st Century", The Jamestown Foundation, June 2008, p.14; "Turkey to buy Russian Mi-28 attack helicopters", 16 June 2009, <http://www.defencetalk.com/turkey-to-buy-russian-mi-28-attack-helicopters-19825/>.

⁶³¹ "ATAK'ta ibre AB'den yana", *Cumhuriyet*, 08 May 2005, <http://gbulten.ssm.gov.tr/arsiv/2005/05/08/01.htm>.

⁶³² Bekdil, Burak; "How not to buy weapon system", *Turkish Daily News*, 23 November 2005, <http://gbulten.ssm.gov.tr/arsiv/2005/11/23/01.htm>.

⁶³³ "Turkey Finally Lands Its Attack Helicopters", *Defense Industry Daily*, 20 June 2010, <http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/turkey-shortlists-2-attack-helicopters-updated-02397/>.

⁶³⁴ McGregor, Andrew; "Arming for Asymmetric Warfare: Turkey's Arms Industry in the 21st Century", The Jamestown Foundation, June 2008, p.14; "Turkey Announces the Start of Contract Negotiations with AgustaWestland for the ATAK Project", 31 March 2007, <http://www.agustawestland.com/node/3399>.

delivered by 2015 and the emerging urgent necessity for the domestic use in the fight against the terror at home, Turkey informed the related US authorities officially about its desire to buy 12 new Cobra helicopters but the USA declined this demand by stating that the US does not have Cobras in their stock to sell.⁶³⁵ It is argued that the reluctance of the US side is originated from Turkey's decision to buy AgustaWestland beside of SSM's demanding contract terms and conditions beclouding the chances of the US companies in the bids.⁶³⁶ Upon the negative answer from the US pertaining to the Cobras, although not officially declared, it is alleged that Turkey started to get interested in buying Russian Mi-28N Night Hunter attack helicopters despite of the fact that it had bought seven used AH-1W Super Cobra helicopters in 2008 to be used its struggle against terror at home.⁶³⁷ Yet, there is no result so far. Furthermore, Turkey made an agreement with Russian state-run company Rosoboronexport in 2008 for the procurement of 80 medium-range anti-tank guided missile systems named 'Metis M-1 ATGM and 800 missiles valued at 80 million dollars beside of an opportunity to order another 72 anti-tank guided missile systems with a significant technology transfer.⁶³⁸ Another contract for the purchase of 80 Kornet-E laser-guided ATGM systems together with 800 missiles valued at 100 million dollars was signed in 2008.⁶³⁹ The rival bidders of Rosoboronexport were South African Denel, Israeli Rafael and American Raytheon.⁶⁴⁰ Through the purchases of these anti-tank guided missile systems, Turkey began to get the share of 4.4 percent in the Russian arms export pie in terms of the value of signed contracts in 2008 but also it took a special notice as the most significant importer of Russian arms from NATO club.⁶⁴¹

⁶³⁵ Gürcanlı, Zeynep; "Türkiye Rusya'dan savaş helikopteri alacak", *Hürriyet*, 17 June 2009.

⁶³⁶ Sariibrahimoğlu, Lale; "Turkey's four-star generals protest Turkish-US meeting", *Today's Zaman*, 14 April 2008.

⁶³⁷ "Turkey to buy Russian Mi-28 attack helicopters", 16 June 2009, <http://www.defencetalk.com/turkey-to-buy-russian-mi-28-attack-helicopters-19825/>; "Türkiye Rusya'dan Mi-28 tipi savaş helikopteri satın almak istiyor", *Milliyet*, 11 June 2009; Gürcanlı, Zeynep; "Türkiye Rusya'dan savaş helikopteri alacak", *Hürriyet*, 17 June 2009.

⁶³⁸ McGregor, Andrew; "Arming for Asymmetric Warfare: Turkey's Arms Industry in the 21st Century", The Jamestown Foundation, June 2008, p.21; Vasiliev, Dimitri; "Preliminary Estimates of Russia's Arm Trade for 2008", *Moscow Defence Brief*, <http://mdb.cast.ru/test/>.

⁶³⁹ Vasiliev, Dimitri; "Preliminary Estimates of Russia's Arm Trade for 2008", *Moscow Defence Brief*, <http://mdb.cast.ru/test/>.

⁶⁴⁰ Abdullaev, Nabi; "Turkey Buys 80 Russian Anti-Tank Missile Systems", *Defence News*, <http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3737946&c=LAN&s=TOP>; Ekşi, Özgür; "İsrail yerine Ruslardan füze alıyoruz", *Hürriyet*, 11 April 2008.

⁶⁴¹ "Preliminary Estimates of Russia's Arm Trade for 2008", *Moscow Defence Brief*, <http://mdb.cast.ru/test/>.

Turkey fastened its efforts to buy anti-ballistic missile shield composed of four long-range missiles and high-altitude air defense systems with the estimated value of 1.4 billion dollars.⁶⁴² The possible candidates in the contest are likely to be the Russian S-400 “Triumph” models, the Israeli-U.S. Boeing-IAI group’s co-developed Arrow, the Chinese HQ-9 medium-to-long range missile system developed by taking the Russian S-300 as model, and the U.S. Patriot systems composed of Patriot Advanced Capability-3 PAC 3 and PAC 2 ABMs developed by American Lockheed Martin and Raytheon.⁶⁴³ Russian S-400 Triumph air defense system which is the upgraded versions of the S-300, the S-300PMU1 and the S-300V/Antey 2500 missile defense systems might come into prominence among its rivals, through offering long-term post-sale support and possible technology transfer which are two key factors determining the winner in the end from Turkish point of view aside of its alleged flamboyant superiority compared to the U.S. made MIM-104 Patriot and Chinese made HQ-9 missile defense systems.⁶⁴⁴ The head of SSM, Murad Bayar also confirmed the ongoing talks with the governments of Russia, the US and China as contenders for possible future purchases.⁶⁴⁵ What is striking at this point is the warning of the US Defense Secretary Robert Gates, during his visit to Ankara in 2008, concerning the possible problems to show up with reference to the NATO interoperability standards in the case of Turkey’s opt for Russian made S-400 instead of its allies.⁶⁴⁶

Indeed, there are several factors affecting Turkey’s choices trying to focus on pragmatic decision-making rather than policy-driven one. To grasp the core of the issue, one has to look at the main concerns of Turkey emanated by its historical experiences. Turkey, beside of putting great effort to produce its own military procurement, prefers to diversify its resources by taking several interrelated points into consideration. First one is originated from Turkey’s own acrid experiences of embargos implemented by the major Western arm suppliers. The USA and Germany are important examples in this sense. Turkey had to face

⁶⁴² McGregor, Andrew; “Arming for Asymmetric Warfare: Turkey’s Arms Industry in the 21st Century”, The Jamestown Foundation, June 2008, p.17.

⁶⁴³ Daly, John C.K.; “Turkey Ponders Russian Missile Offer”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 23 July 2008, Volume 5, Issue 140, [http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=33827](http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=33827).

⁶⁴⁴ McGregor, Andrew; “Arming for Asymmetric Warfare: Turkey’s Arms Industry in the 21st Century”, The Jamestown Foundation, June 2008, p.17; “Turkey interested in S-400 air defense systems from Russia”, *Defence Talk*, 28 April 2009, <http://www.defencetalk.com/turkey-s-400-air-defense-systems-russia-18229/>; “Russia to offer Turkey advanced surface-to-air missiles”, *Defence Talk*, 18 April 2010, <http://www.defencetalk.com/russia-to-offer-turkey-advanced-surface-to-air-missiles-27091/>.

⁶⁴⁵ “Murad Bayar”, *Defence News*, 29 June 2009, <http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4160708>.

⁶⁴⁶ Enginsoy, Ümit; “Turkey in Talks for Missile Defense System Buy”, *Turkish Daily News*, 29 April 2008.

with the limited embargo by the USA in 1975 following the Turkish military intervention in Cyprus as a response to coup d'état attempting to annex the island to Greece and Turkey's lifting the ban on poppy cultivation. This event plants the seeds of the idea of building self-sufficient defence production. During the 1990s, the USA together with Germany that were the top arms suppliers to Turkish military applied arm sale restrictions over the use of weapons and military equipments bought by Turkey or over the further sales.⁶⁴⁷ While Turkey was having a really hard time in its struggle against terrorism, the US State Department reports of 1995 and 1997 were criticizing the use of weapons sold by the US in Southeastern Turkey under the pretext of human rights abuses.⁶⁴⁸ These reports negatively affected the further sales of the US attack helicopters and in a way directed the US decision-makers to take a decision in 1998 for hanging its funding and credits which had been allocated in the past to Turkey for buying US weapons on the plea of Turkey's strong economic indicators which invalidates the necessity of such assistance.⁶⁴⁹ Meanwhile following Turkish cross-border operations in combating PKK terror, Germany began to apply arm sale restrictions in 1992 under the pretext of 'human rights violations' and carried on this attitude intermittently until 2009 by putting the precondition of not being used in Southeastern Turkey.⁶⁵⁰ Beside of Leopard II tanks valued at 300 million euros, even G-3 infantry rifles were not allowed to use in the Southeastern Turkey by the German side.⁶⁵¹ Turkey as a country which does not want to cope with such restrictions based on political considerations which directly relevant to its own domestic problems became to realize that it has to improve its own defence industry capabilities not to have *déjà vu* in a bad sense. These embargo decisions or restrictions on arms sales paved the way of building self-sufficient and independent Turkish defence industry. Turkey began to get closer to the idea that it must be ready to cooperate with other open-minded and flexible players who are ready to share their high-tech and know-how abilities in the arms sale market as well until its domestic production sector gets mature. As second, technology transfer either through licensed production or joint projects which will provide Turkey self-sufficiency with regard to the arms production in the long-run is decisive. For that purpose, the Turkish SSM began to prioritize technology transfer in its defense industry building program. However this

⁶⁴⁷ McGregor, Andrew; "Arming for Asymmetric Warfare: Turkey's Arms Industry in the 21st Century", The Jamestown Foundation, June 2008, p.5.

⁶⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p.19.

⁶⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵⁰ "Leopard'lara PKK'yi Vurma İzni", *Vatan*, 05 May 2009.

⁶⁵¹ *Ibid.*

caused a great uneasiness among the arms suppliers from the USA in the Turkish market mainly because of the US legal inhibitions on the transfer of military technology, joint production and also on acquiring advance government endorsement for export licenses as requested by the Undersecretariat.⁶⁵² As third, Turkey wants to reach its goals in the field of defense industry by diversifying its resources to avoid any excessive dependency on one arm supplier.⁶⁵³ While doing this, the competitiveness of the market provides Turkey the opportunity of cost cutting and desired technology transfer to some extent. Russia voiced its uneasiness with regard to this issue by claiming that Turkey uses Russian presence in the bids to get more from its Western suppliers. However there are certain Russian concerns over the issues shadowing Russia's active involvement in the market of Turkish defense industry. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov summarizes these issues in 2005 as follows: "I must say that Turkey's adoption of NATO standards as well as the tough competition by the US and other western countries limits our defense cooperation. One must also admit that some political and military circles in Turkey are sympathetic to these countries".⁶⁵⁴ Even though Turkey's membership to NATO did not pose an obstacle for the commencement of cooperation in this field, it certainly limits the scope and volume of these slowly developing cooperation due to the technical difficulties caused by interoperability issues beside of political pressures by the USA and other Western powers.⁶⁵⁵

To sum up, Turkey's purchasing arms and military equipment from Russia though as a NATO member was not a choice but a requirement which was shaped by the circumstances that Turkey has faced starting from 1974 and all along with the mid-1990s. The embargo and arm sales restrictions enforced Turkey to think and act in a flexible way within the parameters of pragmatist politics which was dominantly and masterly implemented by Turkey throughout the Cold war years. This way of thinking easily rationalized the procurement of the Russian military equipment in the 1990s. However it should also be noted that Turkey has a specific objective of producing its own high-tech based defence

⁶⁵² McGregor, Andrew; "Arming for Asymmetric Warfare: Turkey's Arms Industry in the 21st Century", The Jamestown Foundation, June 2008, p.19.

⁶⁵³ Kandaurov, Sergei; "Russian Arms Exports to Greece, Cyprus and Turkey", *Moscow Defence Brief*, Number 2, 2001, <http://mdb.cast.ru/mdb/2-2001/at/raegct/>.

⁶⁵⁴ Kınıklıoğlu, Suat; "Turkey and Russia: Partnership by Exclusion", European Stability Initiative, 2006, http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_turkey_tpq_id_61.pdf; Başlamış, Cenk; "Ortak Olalım", *Milliyet*, 05 September 2005.

⁶⁵⁵ Aras, Bülent; "Türkiye ve Rusya Federasyonu: Çok Boyutlu Ortaklık", *SETA Analiz*, August 2009, p. 7; Özbay, Fatih; "Askeri Amaçlı Helikopter Alımı İhalesi ve Türkiye-Rusya", 20 July 2005, <http://www.tasam.org/pencere.php?altid=1250&islem=yazdir>.

industry to achieve and Russia is just an actor which is eager to provide necessary means to Turkey in return of getting a kind of indirect political leverage vis-à-vis other Western suppliers but narrowly the USA beside of economic advantages of selling the expensive high-tech products to Turkey. Apart from this, Turkey, prospectively, has been planning to increase the share of the exported products of its own defence industry to the countries in the Middle East, Central Asia and in the Caucasus. Given that Russia is the main supplier in these countries and the country ready to share the high-tech, know-how and licensing with Turkey, the cooperation in this field is highly likely to provide Turkey to kill two birds with one stone. Russia as a country which desires strongly to return to the same old good days welcomes warmly having a share in the Turkish market and behaves as flexible as possible with regards to the pricing and conditions to include a NATO country to its list. Turkey seems to be willing to cooperate with any country in this field which will show eagerness to share its high-tech and know-how without getting involved in its domestic politics through putting restrictions on arm sales. Russia's readiness to provide the necessary means in desired conditions demanded by Turkey smoothed the progress of cooperation in this specific field.

In closing the chapter, the aforementioned factors and the posture of Turkey and Russia caused these two countries to become closer to each other. Diminution of the mutual threat levels constituted the first step. The process starting with September 11 located them in the same camp of the fight against terrorism. However the turning point came with the invasion of Iraq. Since the emergence of seriously vital threat elements, especially for Turkey, enforce them design a coordinated policy in the Middle East. The source of the threat is not the US but the picture of instability drawn by the US unilateral actions ignoring the interests of these states. This policy is reverberated in the Black Sea region as well. The issue of arms sale is added up to the sources since the late-1990s. It was also observed that the change in the accepted attitudes and high-level contacts between the countries led to deepening the existing relations by diversifying the cooperation areas. As symptom of getting closer to each other, trade volume between Turkey and Russia reached to the approximate level of 40 billion dollars in late 2000s which is triple of Turkish-US trade volume.⁶⁵⁶ Any action of any actor leading to the instability in their neighborhood made these two states show the symptoms of balancing. Thereby they reformulated their relationship by deciding on leaving the problematic issues aside. However the problematic topics left aside because of the priority issues in their common agendas may show up in the future. Chapter Four explored

⁶⁵⁶ Özel, Soli & Yılmaz, Şuhnaz & Akyüz, Abdullah; "Rebuilding a Partnership: Turkish American Relations for a New Era/ A Turkish Perspective", TÜSIAD Report, Istanbul: Graphis Print, April 2009, p.70.

the sources of cooperation between Turkey and Russia. The next Chapter will be delineating the factors limiting the cooperation between Turkey and Russia.

CHAPTER FIVE

LIMITS TO COOPERATION IN TURKISH-RUSSIAN SECURITY RELATIONS

The chapter will investigate the limits which may or might have been thwarting the cooperation between Turkey and Russian Federation by exploring the complex web of the relations which exists between two countries. The Chapter is organized as the persistence of the culture of insecurity being the first, the fight against terrorism (keeping the ‘glass house’ alive) being the second, restrained competition in the Caucasus being the third, restrained competition in Central Asia being the fourth and NATO Factor in Turkish-Russian Relations being the fifth and the competitive pipeline politics as the final section.

5.1. Persistence of the Culture of Insecurity

Russian leader Putin’s remarks of that “We have a complex but very interesting shared history. We know very well that there is a bit of everything in this history – wars and times of reconciliation – but strange though it may seem, there has been more cooperation than anything else,”⁶⁵⁷ can be referred as a brief description of the ages-long bilateral relations. Retrospectively, it is a fact that the relations had a degree of continuum even in the worst times of the shared history. However the existence of ‘more cooperation than anything else’ framework could not avoid high-tension relations which is point at issue most of the time in the past. Russian leader shows the full part of the glass but what about the empty part? What are the factors leading to the persistence of the culture of insecurity between Turkey and Russia? The content and sources of insecurity will be examined in a retrospective analysis to answer the abovementioned questions.

The culture of insecurity is quite complicated issue when it comes to the relations between Turkey and Russia considering deep historical background of the ages-long relations, changing geopolitical scenery and different identities⁶⁵⁸ created or featured throughout this long history. The content of culture of insecurity in both Turkey and Russia are quite similar

⁶⁵⁷ “Interview with the Turkish Media, Sochi, 01 September 2004”, Official website of the Russian President.

⁶⁵⁸ The concept of identity is used to refer “how states see themselves in relation to other states”. Griffiths, Martin&O’Callaghan, Terry&Roach, Steven C.; *International Relations: The Key Concepts*, 2nd edition, London: Routledge, 2008, p.52.

to each other because of the similar traumas that they had experienced in the past. The borders of the content with regard to the insecurity culture between Turkey and Russia can be drawn by two key concepts; survival and territorial integrity. Any signal which will jeopardize each of these two vital issues will trigger the feeling of insecurity and direct these states to act against threats. As stated by Geoffrey Hosking, a well-known name on Russian history; “At all times the survival of the empire and the maintenance of its territorial integrity were the paramount priorities for Russia’s rulers, before which national, religious, economic and other priorities invariably yielded”.⁶⁵⁹ The fear legacy pertaining to the loss of survival and territorial integrity inherited from earlier times is still an issue for today’s Russia which is frequently voiced by the leaders giving reference to the collapse of the Union.⁶⁶⁰ The same fears of failing to preserve the territorial integrity and disintegration may be the most important legacy of the Ottoman era inherited by the young republic of Turkey and still subsist today because of the existing threats.⁶⁶¹

When it comes to the sources of the culture of insecurity between Turkey and Russia based on this content, the historical legacy mostly remembered as negative in both countries, cultural prejudices fed by this legacy and strategic qualms due to the opponent posture in some bilateral and regional issues build the roots of the culture of insecurity between Turkey and Russia. The cumulative knowledge shaped by the experiences of not only that state but also its antecedent existences throughout the history constitutes the first source. All the processes in the course of interaction are registered to the memory constructing the cumulative knowledge. As related to the issue, Bazoğlu-Sezer’s comment is as follows:

The long history of Turkish-Russian relations is not one of positive images nor does it inspire bright hopes for the future. On the contrary, that same history has nourished negative perceptions that have been passed on from one generation to the other. When such memories survive, both at the official and popular levels, they can be expected to influence state policy.⁶⁶²

Pertaining to the negative historical legacy, Bülent Aras argues that there is a settled enmity against Russia/Russians in Turkey by pointing out the migration flows from the Caucasus to

⁶⁵⁹ Hosking, Geoffrey; *Russia: People and Empire, 1552-1917*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998, p.41.

⁶⁶⁰ Graham, Thomas; “The sources of Russia’s Insecurity”, *Survival*, February–March 2010, Volume 52, Number 1, pp. 55-56.

⁶⁶¹ Karaosmanoglu, Ali L.; “The Evolution of the National Security Culture and the Military in Turkey”, *Journal of International Affairs*, Fall 2000, Volume 54, Number 1, p.202.

⁶⁶² Bazoğlu Sezer, Duygu; “Turkish-Russian relations: The challenges of reconciling geopolitical competition with economic partnership”, *Turkish Studies*, 2000, Volume 1, Number 1, p.62.

Turkey during the imperial era with reference to their negative memories about Russians transferred among the generations and also adding that this enmity became more settled with the Cold War years.⁶⁶³ Duygu Bazoğlu-Sezer states that there has not been a settled “culture of dialogue” between Turkey and Russia.⁶⁶⁴ The formation of prejudices may be evaluated as linked to the lack of a “culture of dialogue”. These factors also play role in nourishing strategic suspicions.

Since the collapse of the Cold War, there has been an ongoing process running both for Turkey and Russia to drive them to the re-reading each other from the angle of altering threat perceptions in the new security environment together with relying on the information provided by the history. As doing this, the memoir of the past rejuvenates even in a minor event. While Russian Ambassador in Ankara Alexander Lebedev was commenting on the terrorist acts occurred in Moscow on October 29, 2002 by criticizing the double standards of Turkish media in covering the Chechen and Kurdish issues with making reference to the shared history, he makes a critical statement alluding the imperial era:

I shall allow myself to recall certain events that have occurred in relations between our countries over the slightly more than four years that I have been the Ambassador of Russia to Turkey. Because Russia and Turkey are now both democratic countries I am confident that for my statement I, as in previous centuries, won't be punished. Neither here (by imprisonment in the Istanbul Castle of the Seven Towers, which quite often happened to Russian ambassadors in the past) nor, to be sure, in Moscow.⁶⁶⁵

Furthermore, perception of the other country is also worthy of consideration. Since “identity and insecurity are produced in a mutually constitutive process”⁶⁶⁶ and “identity, that is, can only be established in relation to what is not-to difference. Difference, in turn, is constituted in relation to identity”⁶⁶⁷, the opponent identities of Turkey and Russia will be the source of insecurity culture. A change in the opponent identity of each will be deemed as a new source of insecurity by the other though no harmful action was taken with the newly gained identity

⁶⁶³ “Rusya, Türkiye’yi yanında istiyor”, *Ntvmsnbc*, 18 January 2005, <http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/305647.asp>.

⁶⁶⁴ Bazoğlu Sezer, Duygu; “Turkish-Russian relations: The challenges of reconciling geopolitical competition with economic partnership”, *Turkish Studies*, 2000, Volume 1, Number 1, p.75.

⁶⁶⁵ “Statement by Alexander Lebedev, the Russian Ambassador to Turkey, Regarding the Terrorist Act in Moscow, 01 November 2002”, Official website of the Russian Embassy in Turkey, <http://www.turkey.mid.ru/hron/17.html>.

⁶⁶⁶ Weldes, Jutta&Laffey, Mark&Gusterson, Hugh&Duvall, Raymond; *Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities and the Production of Danger* eds. et al, Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1999, p.11.

⁶⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

since “the very visibility of its mode of being as other”.⁶⁶⁸ Among several different identities of Turkey and Russia, two of them came forward. These are being region countries in competition, be it overt or hidden, and their positions with regard to NATO. First, both countries as region states holder of overlapping and conflicting interests in their concurrent neighborhoods. The picture on the wall drawn by the conflicting interests adds more to the culture of insecurity between Turkey and Russia. As Tanrısever argues, “The lack of mutual trust is stems mainly from the fact that these countries have developed their relations without settling their rivalries over the Caucasus and Central Asia, which could re-emerge in the near future”.⁶⁶⁹ In addition to this, Turkey’s own problem with Armenia, caused by 1915 events and Armenia’s decline of the recognition of Turkish territorial integrity, may pose another problematic issue in its relations with Russia in the upcoming decades since Russia as a years-long strategic partner of Armenia and as the host country of the largest Armenian Diaspora community in the world⁶⁷⁰, though not activated yet, will have to be involved in this matter. Notwithstanding Duma resolution in April 2005 accepting the 1915 events as ‘genocide’ condemned by Turkey, this issue was not allowed to have an effect on the bilateral relations.⁶⁷¹ However it is not wrong to assert that the issue has been keeping its potential weight in the bilateral relations by injecting further insecurity. Secondly, Turkey is above all a NATO country in the eyes of Russia beside of being just a region country in competition. As expected, the activities of NATO in the Russian neighborhood which can work against the Russian interests are supposed to have a degree of impact over the bilateral relations between Turkey and Russia. “Although Turkey is increasingly seen by Russia as a friendly actor in the region, the Russians are not quite sure to what degree a NATO member country can be trusted”.⁶⁷² According to Eugene Kogan, this distrust is mutual since Turkish Foreign Ministry has still doubts about Russia’s intentions.⁶⁷³ These suspicions came into focus especially in the regional issues where Turkey and Russia are opponents. Moreover, the use of Chechen and Kurdish issues in the bilateral relations along with the desire to keep the possibility of bringing into play through preserving the necessary means is another

⁶⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶⁹ Tanrısever, Oktay F.; “Turkey and the Russian Federation: Towards a Mutual Understanding?” in *Turkey’s Foreign Policy in the 21st Century: A Changing Role in World Politics* (ed. by Ismael, Tareq Y.&Aydın, Mustafa), Great Britain: MPG Books, 2003, p.135.

⁶⁷⁰ Armenian Diaspora Conference Official Site, <http://www.armeniadiaspora.com/followup/population.html>.

⁶⁷¹ Kiniklioğlu, Suat and Morkva, Valeriy; “An anatomy of Turkish-Russian Relations”, *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 2007, Volume 7, Number 4, p.547.

⁶⁷² *Ibid.*, p.537.

⁶⁷³ Kogan, Eugene; Turkish-American Strategic Partnership versus Turkish-Russian Partnership without Strategy”, *Internationales Institut Liberale Politik Wien*, October 2009, p.12.

important factor injecting insecurity to the bilateral political culture of both countries. Each and every new crisis in this problematic issue leads to the persistence of the already existing insecurity. This issue will be detailed in the next section of this chapter.

5.2. Fight against Separatist Terrorism

All along the 1990s, the use of Chechen and PKK issues in the context of tit-for-tat has occupied the top of the bilateral agenda straining the relations between Turkey and Russia. It is argued that in accordance with the official and unofficial policies drafted for the North Caucasus region in general including Chechnya, Turkey tried to keep the distance from the issue by following an official policy of avoiding any confrontation with Russia over the region as acting in harmony with international organizations in the region and taking into account several factors such as its relations with Russia based on mutual interests, the possibility of the use of Kurdish issue by Russia against itself and its policy in line with the preservation of territorial integrity whereas unofficially turned a blind eye over the Chechen activities in Turkey.⁶⁷⁴ Likewise, Russia responded the concerns raised by Turkish authorities with regard to the PKK activities in Russian territory either by refusing or labeling them as “Kurdish cultural activities only”.⁶⁷⁵ This situation was up to some changes as a result of high level contacts especially after the expulsion of the head of the PKK terrorist organization from Moscow in 1999⁶⁷⁶ but the fundamental change came with the internationalization of the issue of locally active terrorist organizations in the wake of September 11 attacks.

The process starting with the signature of the “Action Plan for Cooperation in Eurasia-From Bilateral towards Multilateral Partnership” in November 2001 made Turkey follow a quite distant relations with the region and so Chechnya throughout the 2000s.⁶⁷⁷ Yet the alienation of Turkey from Russia’s Chechnya issue did not happen in one day. Indeed, the process continued until the years of 2005-2006. Currently both sides have been keeping the presence of the elements of each other’s nightmare under control but together with the option of ‘if

⁶⁷⁴ Çelikpala, Mithat; “Kuzey Kafkasya’da Anlaşmazlıklar, Çatışmalar ve Türkiye” in *Beş Deniz Havzasında Türkiye* (ed. by Aydın, Mustafa&Erhan, Çağrı), Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 2006, pp.100-101.

⁶⁷⁵ Aydın, Ersel; “Russia’s ‘Kurdish Card’ In Turkish-Russian Rivalry”, *Caspian Crossroads*, 1997, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp.9-13.

⁶⁷⁶ Bazoğlu Sezer, Duygu ; “Turkish-Russian National Security Interaction at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century” in *Türkiye-Rusya Arasında İhtilaflı Konular ve Çözümleri* (ed. by Gülten Kazgan), İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, August 2008, p.129.

⁶⁷⁷ Çelikpala, Mithat; “Kuzey Kafkasya’da Anlaşmazlıklar, Çatışmalar ve Türkiye” in *Beş Deniz Havzasında Türkiye* (ed. by Aydın, Mustafa&Erhan, Çağrı), Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 2006, p.101.

need be' in the future. Therefore, this issue of tit-for-tat is evaluated not as a threat but as a potential danger point precluding the development of healthy relations since both sides perceive the separatist terrorism not as only Achilles heel but rather as a matter of life or death.

Notwithstanding that September 11 did not cause any radical change in Russia's re-evaluation of terrorism posing one of the biggest threats to its own security since terrorism was not invented with the attacks in the US for Russia, it made Russia revise its general approach toward struggling terrorism.⁶⁷⁸ Terrorist attacks in Russia concurrently occurred with the other ones in different parts of the world following September 11 supplied Russia enough tangible material to legitimize its fight in Chechnya by entrenching its seat in international coalition against terrorism. Russia used the 9/11 card masterly both for acting at its own sweet will locally in Chechnya voicing its concerns to be saved from all critics pertaining to the human rights violations in Chechnya by getting international support in its fight in Chechnya. Even in the first days following the September 11, Russian leader Putin voiced its criteria as follows: religious extremism, fanaticism and separatism.⁶⁷⁹ President Putin used each criterion pragmatically depending on the floor and the occasion. During a press meeting held in France on 15 January 2002, Russian President makes the comment below upon a question whether Russia will carry on the fight against terrorism in Chechnya:

We do not support separatists anywhere, and the problem of separatism is highly relevant in Russia, in Chechnya. It is relevant in Turkey and other countries. And we know about the Kurdish people's fight for independence. Have we forgotten about the Kurds? There are forty million of them. Aren't there problems related to separatism in Europe? Yet, nobody even contemplates supporting that fight. And rightly so, because if we try to do it we will plunge Europe into chaos. Western Europe and even more so Eastern Europe.⁶⁸⁰

While commenting on the common feature of separatism without any distinction to as east or west on January 17, 2002, Russian President Putin highlights that they are against the separatism per se and also external intervention given as support to it by giving the following sample:

⁶⁷⁸ Stepanova, Ekaterina; "The Fight against Terrorism" in *Russia as a Great Power: Dimensions of Security under Putin* (ed. by Hedenskog, Jakob&Konnander Vilhelm&Nugren, Bertil&Oldberg, Ingmar&Pirsiainen, Christer), Oxon: Routledge, 2005, p.306.

⁶⁷⁹ "Interview with the German Newspaper Bild, Sochi, 18 September 2001", Official website of the Russian President, http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2001/09/18/0001_type82916_136376.shtml.

⁶⁸⁰ "Extracts from a Joint News Conference with President Jacques Chirac of France", 15 January 2002, Official website of the Russian President.

The Kurdish people have been fighting for their independence for many years. A people of 40 million. They live in several countries, and I think there are about 20 million of them in Turkey. Does that mean that you are going to support annexation of territories from stable national governments? That would be an extremely short-sighted policy.⁶⁸¹

The years of 1990s which can be dubbed as ‘conflict-related terrorism’⁶⁸² used to refer two wars together with a plethora of bombings, kidnappings, suicide attacks and taking hostage events in Russia left the floor to the years of 2000s composed of the emergence of ‘super-terrorism’⁶⁸³ starting with September 11 and two highly critical events namely Moscow theatre siege and Beslan school siege strengthening Russia’s position in its struggle in the eyes of international community. First one is the hostage taking event in Moscow theatre on October 23, 2002 by Chechen terrorists demanding Russian withdrawal from Chechnya ended with the intervention of Russian Special Forces which resulted in the death of 129 hostages out of more than 800 hostages.⁶⁸⁴ In his written statement on November 01, 2002, Russian Ambassador in Ankara Alexander Lebed criticized harshly the Turkish media by accusing them of the double standards they applied while making the news of this hostage crisis by adding, “a terrorist, if you read through many local newspapers, committing terrorist acts in Turkey against Turkish citizens is supposedly one thing. A Chechen or foreign Wahhabite terrorist performing acts of sabotage against Russians in Russia is something different!”⁶⁸⁵ Upon a question of Russian media pertaining to Turkey’s reaction to the terrorist act in Moscow, the official spokesperson of the Russian Foreign Ministry Alexander Yakovenko expressed its satisfaction with Turkey’s official response condemning the attacks while making a severe criticism about some members of Turkish media.⁶⁸⁶ Following this event, Turkey prohibited the entrance of some Chechen rebel leaders to Turkey. Russia appreciated the decisions announced by Turkish Ambassador in Moscow

⁶⁸¹ “From an Interview with the Polish Newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza and the Polish TVP Channel”, 17 January 2002, Official website of the Russian President.

⁶⁸² Stepanova, Ekaterina; “The Fight against Terrorism” in *Russia as a Great Power: Dimensions of Security under Putin* (ed. by Hedenskog, Jakob&Konnander Vilhelm&Nugren, Bertil&Oldberg, Ingmar&Pirsiainen, Christer), Oxon: Routledge, 2005, p.301.

⁶⁸³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸⁴ Karaman, Tatyana A.; “Russia (1994-1996)” in *Civil Wars of the World: Major Conflicts since World War II* (ed. by DeRouen Jr, Karl&Heo, Uk), California; ABC-CLIO Inc., 2007, pp.646-647.

⁶⁸⁵ “Statement by Alexander Lebedev, the Russian Ambassador to Turkey, Regarding the Terrorist Act in Moscow, 01 November 2002, Official website of the Russian Embassy in Turkey, <http://www.turkey.mid.ru/hron/17.html>.

⁶⁸⁶ “Alexander Yakovenko, the Official Spokesman of Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Answers a Question from Russian Media About Turkey's Reaction to the Terrorist Act in Moscow, 01 November 2002”, Official website of the Russian Embassy in Turkey, <http://www.turkey.mid.ru/hron/18.html>.

Kurtuluş Taşkent on November 19, 2002 of prohibiting the entrance of some names such as M. Udugov and R. Gelayev linked to terrorist structures in Chechnya and the expulsion of Z. Arslangeriyev and R. Dushuyev from Turkey who were named by Russia as ‘so-called representatives of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria’.⁶⁸⁷ The Spokesperson Yakovenko evaluated Turkey’s decision as “an important and responsible step by Turkey in fulfilling its international obligations within the framework of the struggle against international terrorism”.⁶⁸⁸

Russian Ambassador in Ankara Petr Stegny in his July 19, 2003 dated letter to Turkish Daily News denotes its disappointment pertaining to an article mentioning the phrase of “using the Kurdish card” by Russia as tit-for-tat against Turkey with another news report on terrorist attacks by calling these claims as “irresponsible and completely groundless” in regards to the shared objective of both countries for cooperation in Eurasia.⁶⁸⁹ Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei S. Razov stated once more in an interview given to the Moscow chief of Turkish Anatolian News Agency on November 12, 2003 that Russia was pleased with Turkey’s official approach and added that related Turkish authorities were informed about still existing concerns of Russia with regard to some foundations and people supporting terrorists in Chechnya by expressing his hope of Turkish reaction in harmony with the joint fight against terrorism.⁶⁹⁰ The press release of the Russian Embassy in Ankara on February 19, 2004 on the occasion of the forthcoming visit of Deputy Premier and Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül to Russia to be held on February 23-26, 2004 mentions that “Recently Ankara has been showing that it is ready to take into consideration of Russia’s sensitivity concerning the Chechen issue”.⁶⁹¹ This statement is noteworthy since it gives a significant hint on how Russia perceives Turkey’s actions and statements on Chechnya.

⁶⁸⁷ “Statement By Alexander Yakovenko, The Official Spokesman Of Russia's Ministry Of Foreign Affairs, 20 November 2002”, Official website of the Russian Embassy in Turkey, <http://www.turkey.mid.ru/hron/20.html>.

⁶⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸⁹ “The Chechen Republic is an integral part of the Russian Federation” (Article by P.Stegny, the Ambassador of the Russian Federation to Turkey published in *Turkish Daily News* 19.07.03), Official website of the Russian Embassy in Turkey, 19 July 2003, <http://www.turkey.mid.ru/hron/37.html>.

⁶⁹⁰ “Rusya Federasyonu Dışişleri Bakan Yardımcısı Sergey S.Razov’un Anadolu Ajansı’nın Moskova Temsilcisi Nihat Dağdelen’e verdiği mülakat, 12 November 2003, Official website of the Russian Embassy in Turkey, http://www.turkey.mid.ru/razov2_t.html.

⁶⁹¹ “Büyükelçilik Basın Açıklaması”, 19 February 2004, Official website of the Russian Embassy in Turkey, http://www.turkey.mid.ru/text_t18.html.

Russian leader Putin's chief advisor Sergey V. Yastrjembkiy, in his interview to Itar-Tass News Agency on March 10, 2004, stated that Ankara perceives the presence of mercenaries with Turkish origins in Chechnya as an extra signal for the necessity of further cooperation between the related authorities of both countries in the fight against international terrorism.⁶⁹² In his interview to Hürriyet newspaper, Yastrjembkiy mentioned that the terror in Chechnya is not Russia's internal problem anymore but an international problem.⁶⁹³ Yastrjembkiy in his another interview given to Russian Interfax news agency declared the parallelism in the attitudes of both countries in the fight against terrorism by referring that Russia was aware of the official policy of Turkey respecting Russia's territorial integrity.⁶⁹⁴ Russian leader Putin stated in his interview with Turkish media on August 30, 2004 that Turkey's official position and efforts over the Chechen issue has been understood by Russia very well while confirming the existing networks between some foundations located in Turkey with Chechen separatists.⁶⁹⁵

Second one is the siege of a school in Beslan city of the Russian republic of North Ossetia by Chechen terrorists on September 01-03, 2004 which ended with the brutal intervention of Russian special forces by leaving behind 330 death people and 783 severely injured people out of 1,120 hostages.⁶⁹⁶ After the Beslan tragedy, the delayed visit of Russian leader Putin was realized in December 2004 and Turkey's position on the Chechen issue was clarified during the visit. The serious intelligence-sharing on terrorism started especially in this period.⁶⁹⁷ Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov expressed his appreciation on February 07, 2005

⁶⁹² "Rusya Federasyonu Devlet Başkanı Başdanışmanı Sergey Yastrjembkiy'nin İTAR TASS Haber ajansına verdiği özel mülakatı", 10 March 2004, Official website of the Russian Embassy in Turkey, http://www.turkey.mid.ru/text_t34.html.

⁶⁹³ "Rusya Federasyonu Devlet Başkanı Başdanışmanı Sergey V. Yastrjembkiy'in Hürriyet gazetesine verdiği özel demeci: Çeçen terörü artık iç meselemiz değil", 11 March 2004, Official website of the Russian Embassy in Turkey, http://www.turkey.mid.ru/text_t35.html.

⁶⁹⁴ "Rusya Federasyonu Devlet Başkanı'nın Başdanışmanı S.V. Yastrjembkiy'nin Rus İnterfax Haber Ajansına yaptığı açıklama", 11 March 2004, Official website of the Russian Embassy in Turkey, http://www.turkey.mid.ru/text_t36.html.

⁶⁹⁵ "Interview of Vladimir V. Putin, President of the Russian Federation with the Turkish Media", 30 August 2004, Official website of the Russian Embassy in Turkey, http://www.turkey.mid.ru/text_t68.html.

⁶⁹⁶ Klussmann, Uwe (*Translated from German by Patrick Kessler*); "The Beslan Aftermath: New Papers Critical of Russian Security Forces", *Der Spiegel*, 07 April 2005, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,363934,00.html>.

⁶⁹⁷ Taşpınar, Ömer; "Batı'ya kızgınlık büyüyor", *Radikal*, 27 July 2005.

regarding 'satisfactory steps' taken by Turkey in combating terrorism upon a question on whether Russia is pleased with Turkey's support to its fight against Chechen terrorism.⁶⁹⁸

With regard to the PKK, Russian Premier Putin's statement in an interview with media during the visit of his Turkish counterpart Ecevit to Moscow in November 1999 announcing that "Russia has never supported and will never support any terrorist aspirations directed against Turkey, no matter where they come from" is worth mentioning in here.⁶⁹⁹ However Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoly Safonov's declarations in an interview held in Moscow on November 16, 2001 as that the PKK activities and its leader's asylum seeking efforts in Russia were not against the Russian law by claiming that Turkey was doing the same for Chechens are the other side of the coin.⁷⁰⁰ Turkish Ambassador to Moscow Nabi Şensoy, in his interview with the press on October 19, 2001, indicated that there was not any change in Russia's attitude towards PKK after September 11 though the issue has been in the agenda constantly.⁷⁰¹ Development of multi-faceted bilateral relations and the emergence of common interest areas that are vital to the interests of both countries together with other international developments put down this issue all along the 2000s and thereby no tension erupted between Turkey and Russia originated from the activities of these 'cultural groups'. It has also been argued that Turkey's standing aloof from Chechen movement brought Russia's keeping aloof from PKK.⁷⁰² However Turkish Ambassador in Moscow Halil Akıncı verifies the sleeping PKK presence in Russia.⁷⁰³

Even though the current level of the bilateral relations developing in various fields and their common declarations voiced in various milieus that they are against terror with all its forms and manifestations, Russia has not accepted PKK as a terrorist organization yet. During the visit of Russian Defence Minister Sergey Borisovic Ivanov to Ankara in December 2004, Turkish Defence Minister Vecdi Gönül brought this recognition issue to the agenda at the

⁶⁹⁸ Çakırözer, Utku; "Aynı düşüncedeyiz", *Milliyet* in Official website of the Russian Embassy in Turkey, 07 February 2005, http://www.turkey.mid.ru/text_t83.html.

⁶⁹⁹ Bazoğlu Sezer, Duygu ; "Turkish-Russian National Security Interaction at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century" in *Türkiye-Rusya Arasında İhtilaflı Konular ve Çözümleri* (ed. by Gülten Kazgan), İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, August 2008, pp.129-130.

⁷⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p.130.

⁷⁰¹ "2001 Yılında Türkiye'nin Dış İlişkileri", *Milliyet*, <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/content/dosya/almanak2001/disiliskiler.html>.

⁷⁰² Taşpınar, Ömer; "Batı'ya kızgınlık büyüyor", *Radikal*, 27 July 2005.

⁷⁰³ Yınanç, Barçın; "Old rivals, new partners: Conflict and cooperation in politics", *Hürriyet Daily News*, 11 August 2010.

ministerial level and Russia responded to the request as that the issue was under review.⁷⁰⁴ In 2006, when Russia unveiled its terrorist organizations list which was created in 2003, Turkey could not see PKK in that list.⁷⁰⁵ Russian Ambassador in Ankara Petr Stegnyy states in an interview dated 23 July 2005 that there is no need to complain on the claim that Russia does not put PKK to its black list since the system is different in Russia and court decision rather than the decision of the foreign ministry is required.⁷⁰⁶ Ambassador Stegnyy detailed this legal process in another interview on July 31, 2005 as that there are cultural foundations belonging to Kurdish groups, certain information has to be submitted to the court certifying the violation of Russian legal system by these groups and the court has to enact a verdict in favor of including PKK to terrorist organizations list.⁷⁰⁷ During the round-table meeting titled ‘Russia-Turkey: Partnership Strategy’ organized in May 2009 jointly by Turkish Asian Center for Strategic Studies and Moscow State University Asian-African Countries Institute, Russian scholar Samed Samedov’s following statement on Russia’s non-recognition of PKK as terrorist organization summarizes the Russian point of view: “This has legal bases. Because there is not any evidence of that the PKK is involved in terrorist activities in Russia. I don’t think that the issue has a political reason”.⁷⁰⁸ However there is no need to be exposed to an attack by a terrorist organization for adding that one to the black list. As stated by Russian Ambassador Lebedev’s statement on November 01, 2002 criticizing double standards in Turkish media, terrorism does not have any borders. Apparently Russia would like to hold that card in its hand for a while.

The parallel interests and well-going bilateral relations in various fields prevent the neighbors from throwing rock at each other’s glass houses- hailing the former Russian Ambassador in Ankara Albert Chernishev who is the owner of the glass house parlance- namely using the trump cards against each other but do not avoid them holding the cards in their hands for ‘if need be’ situations. Turkey and Russia must put up confidence roof to their glass houses before securing their houses by way of replacing glasses with walls.

⁷⁰⁴ “Rusya, PKK’yı gözden geçiriyor”, *Hürriyet*, 07 December 2004.

⁷⁰⁵ “Rusya PKK’yı terörist saymadı”, *Radikal*, 22 July 2006.

⁷⁰⁶ Köylü, Hilal; “Yeni dünyanın ortaklarıyız”, *Radikal* in Rusya’nın Ankara Büyükelçisi Petr Stegnyy’in *Radikal* gazetesine verdiği mülakat, Official website of the Russian Embassy in Turkey, 23 July 2005, http://www.turkey.mid.ru/text_t101.html.

⁷⁰⁷ Küçükkoşum, Sevil; “Çatışma değil, ortaklık...” Tercüman in Rusya’nın Ankara Büyükelçisi Petr Stegnyy’in Tercüman gazetesine verdiği mülakat, 31 July 2005, http://www.turkey.mid.ru/text_t102.html.

⁷⁰⁸ “Ruslardan Komik PKK Bahanesi”, *Stratejik Boyut*, 19 May 2009, <http://www.stratejikboyut.com/haber/ruslardan-komik-pkk-bahanesi--19334.html>.

The next two sections of this chapter are dedicated to the restrained competition between Turkey and Russia in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Comparative positionings of Turkey and Russia will be explored within the light of significant developments in these two regions to show how Russia's position got strength slowly vis-à-vis Turkey's position.

5.3. Restrained Competition in the Caucasus

The geopolitical and geostrategic importance of the Transcaucasus beside of Central Asia increased further with the war in Afghanistan both in the regional and international scale. Russia as a country which deems Transcaucasus as its own self-proclaimed sphere of influence and Central Asia as its own self-proclaimed sphere of dominance has turned out to be the most affected and the most affective actor by the causation. Albeit distant location of Central Asia, the Caucasus was of the strategic interest of Turkey.⁷⁰⁹ South Caucasus countries have always taken more attention than the Central Asian countries for Turkey since the events happening in the South Caucasus have much higher possibility of affecting Turkey's security and well-being than the events in Central Asia due to the proximity, geo-strategic and geo-political reasons. Therefore South Caucasus turned out to be "the focal point of Turkish-Russian regional rivalry".⁷¹⁰

Russia's policies towards South Caucasus have been different than its policies towards Central Asia due to the geopolitical importance of the region for Russia, the character of the region countries together with the engagement level and ability of the external players. While getting in contact with the states in the South Caucasus, Russia tended to have bilateral contacts instead of international framework since the region countries have different orientations and several conflicts between each other in addition to their internal conflict zones. All the factors mentioned above, in return, orientated Russian policies to follow more cautious path before taking any step together with more belligerent reactions in the case of Russian security interests under threat since the borders of the South Caucasus are not limited with its own margins per se from the eyes of the Russian security considerations. Russia perceives this sub-region as an indispensable part of the Caucasus region and thereby its security considerations attribute this sub-region a great importance within the pretext of that any imbalance disfavoring Russia might go for worsening effects in whole Caucasus.⁷¹¹

⁷⁰⁹ Winrow, Gareth M.; *Turkey in the Post-Soviet Central Asia*, London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995, p.44.

⁷¹⁰ Bazoğlu-Sezer, Duygu; "Turkish-Russian relations: The challenges of reconciling geopolitical competition with economic partnership", *Turkish Studies*, 2000, Volume 1, Number 1, p.68.

⁷¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp.68-69.

Russia's Chechen impasse has key importance at this point. Therefore Russia has had a tendency to show more aggressive policies in the South Caucasus. The fact that these Southern Caucasus states, except Armenia, have intentions and necessary means provided by the Western states to move away from Russian orbit which became evident in the era following 9/11 increases Russian concerns further. The relations of these states, except Armenia, with the major Western powers and institutions, specifically with the US and NATO irritated Russia.

Russia perceived Turkey as a proxy of the US in providing the guidance for the purpose of the articulation of these states to the West by protecting them from Russian sphere of influence.⁷¹² Turkey's relations with Azerbaijan and Georgia based on robust political, military and economic cooperation in the 1990s driven by Turkey's support to these countries was not welcomed by Russia. Moreover, Russia's policies towards South Caucasus are considered as getting advantage of the instability which emerged as a result of inter-state and intra-state conflicts in the region for the purpose of establishing its own system.⁷¹³ Turkish President Süleyman Demirel voiced his suspicions with regard to the probable Russian policy of re-establishing its empire through provoking the internal conflicts in these newly established states in his speech at the Turkish Parliament on September 01, 1993.⁷¹⁴ Even though Russia's authorization demand from UN to intervene in the problems of the CIS region was not accepted, Russia did not refrain from taking an active role in the region politics.⁷¹⁵ Russia's exploitation of the potential hot spots coming from Soviet times-Nagorno Karabakh between Azerbaijan and Armenia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia-to intervene in the region and the imposition of the CIS as institutional framework to balance against the Western institutions made Russia an active party in the region. Russia's enforcement of Azerbaijan and Georgia to make them join the CIS resulted in 1993 to the advantage of Russia.⁷¹⁶ Russia's policies in the region in the course of 1990s are evaluated as more affective compared to Turkey.⁷¹⁷ Turkey's own political and economic

⁷¹² Hill, Fiona; "Seismic shifts in Eurasia: the changing relationship between Turkey and Russia and its implications for the South Caucasus", *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, Volume 3, no. 3, 2003, p.56.

⁷¹³ Tanrısever, Oktay F.; "Sovyet Sonrası Dönemde Rusya'nın Kafkasya Politikası" in *Türkiye'nin Komşuları* (ed. by Türkeş, Mustafa and Uzgel, İlhan), İstanbul: İmge Kitabevi, 2002, p.386.

⁷¹⁴ Bazoğlu Sezer, Duygu; "Turkish-Russian relations: The challenges of reconciling geopolitical competition with economic partnership", *Turkish Studies*, 2000, Volume 1, Number 1, p.70.

⁷¹⁵ Tanrısever, Oktay F.; "Sovyet Sonrası Dönemde Rusya'nın Kafkasya Politikası" in *Türkiye'nin Komşuları* (ed. by Türkeş, Mustafa and Uzgel, İlhan), İstanbul: İmge Kitabevi, 2002, p.388.

⁷¹⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p.389

problems together with Russia's keen political maneuvers getting the advantage of Soviet legacy can be explanatory of this result.

Following the 9/11 events, changing political context in the region created new opportunities as well as new challenges as it had happened just after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Russia's policies in the South Caucasus focused on the developments in Georgia since the major shift happened there. Russia followed a policy based on 'wait and see' mind-set with regard to Georgia. The entrance of US military officers to Georgia through train-and-equip military program for the Georgian army for counter-terrorism as of 2002 was reacted by the Russian side but the US and Georgian guarantees over that the program only aims at counter-terrorism calmed down these reactions.⁷¹⁸ However Georgia's assertive pro-Westernism, more like pro-Americanism indeed, following the Rose revolution in 2003 annoyed Russia. More importantly, Georgian rapprochement towards the Western orbit significantly toward NATO by not watching any balance with Russia and the Western patting in response became the last straw for Russia. The follow-up putsches; Orange Revolution of Ukraine in 2004, Tulip Revolution of Kyrgyzstan in 2005 and Andijan events in 2005 caused a quite complex picture in the region while making Russia get suspicious about the Western specifically the US intentions. Similar to Russian view with regard to the color revolutions, Turkish President Gül made a statement paralleling Russian tone as that "Democratization is a process, and it should be expected to proceed at a different pace in different countries."⁷¹⁹ This should be evaluated as in the framework of that Turkey's interests are in favor of keeping the status quo since any tension in this region has potential to affect Turkey and its interests negatively. The Five-Day War was the Russian response to all. Beyond doubt, the war toughened the Russian geopolitical position not only in the Caucasus but further than the region per se. This shifted balance is in disfavor of Turkey's interests. Russia tacitly declared through this war that it does not want to see any country in the South Caucasus as a NATO member and gave the message to other countries that any action in that direction will not be unanswered. Thereby desired equilibrium by Russia had been achieved through Azerbaijani-Armenian war in the 1990s, and the final step in its reconfigured equilibrium was taken with the August war in 2008 for Georgia. Now this sub-region is settled from the Russian point of view namely nothing ever possible without the will and permission of Russia. In other

⁷¹⁸ Nichol, Jim; "Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Security Issues and Implications for U.S. interests" CRS Report for Congress, 14 January 2009, p.32, p.41, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30679.pdf>.

⁷¹⁹ Torbakov, Igor; "Making Sense of the Current Phase of Turkish-Russian Relations, The Jamestown Foundation Occasional Paper, October 2007, p.10.

words, a formulation excluding Russia can be neither successful nor desirable but most importantly this view came to an accepted fact by other states as well.

Turkey's policies, as the first country recognizing the independence of Transcaucasian republics and sending an official delegation to the region, is shaped by the fact that Turkey has always refrained from confronting with Russia though keep on going with extending its political, economic and military support to both Azerbaijan and Georgia. Turkey's active political, economic and military engagement with these two region countries has a special significance for Turkey due to geopolitical and geo-economic reasons. However almost chronic problems of the region labeled mostly as Soviet legacies which enforce region countries to establish some sort of love-hate relationship with Russia limits the abilities of Turkish activism in the region. Turkey is also sensitive about the Russian factor in the region and became more aware with the Five-Day war in Georgia.

Within the limits of the current conjuncture, Turkey and Russia have seen more benefit than cost in carrying on their bilateral relations as separate from the regional framework by deciding not to itch the confrontational issues. The spirit of the fight against international terrorism and the diminution in mutual threat levels together with the proliferation of common interests have contributed to this process. This point of view underlines the pragmatic approaches of Turkey and Russia since the regional framework is still problematic where Turkey and Russia are standing in opponent sides of the problems. The unresolved conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, ethnic conflicts in Georgia which ended up with two breakaway republics in Georgian territory and Turkey's problems with Armenia which went nowhere after signing two Protocols as prepared to solve the problems are the issues that Turkey and Russia had a different voice from each other. For now, these issues are taken as neutral elements on the bilateral relations by both countries but any unexpected flame in one of these issues may have the potential to trigger the 'same old' rivalry between Turkey and Russia. Moreover, the existence of the confrontational issues, albeit untouched for now, hinders the development of cooperation to the upper levels and stepping on confidence floor since both parties carry on the mutual distrust towards each other.

5.4. Restrained Competition in Central Asia

Except the first few years of the Russian Federation, Central Asia, as the southern frontier of Russia, has always had a significant importance for Russia with its geopolitical, geo-economics and geostrategic features. As time goes by, these features have gained much more importance with security-driven and energy-driven concerns. Central Asian states, as the

most suffered ones of the Soviet legacies, felt obliged to have good relations with Russia because of that they were aware of three facts; they were out the strategic interest of the Western orbit, Russia was vital for their economic development due to the ongoing affects of Soviet legacy in economic terms and as the last one, the political survival was possible for the incumbent leaders with Russian support, be it political or military. Since these countries have faced with plethora of internal and external threats challenging their survival or the political survival of the incumbents, they were desperately looking for an umbrella which will provide a guarantee. This situation was expected to be changed after the war in Afghanistan since the region gained strategic importance for the Western world but this did not bring the desired economic support to the region countries though it strengthened their bargaining hands vis-à-vis Russia. As a result of the abovementioned factors, Russian policy towards Central Asian republics followed the path of gathering them under the intergovernmental organizations, be it security or military blocs, mostly designed by Russian policy-makers. Russia achieved to re-establish its dominance in the region through three phased engagements.

First engagement was maintained through the formation of Commonwealth of Independent States with the declaration of the Alma-Ata Declaration in December 1991.⁷²⁰ Signatories are five post-Soviet Central Asian states together with Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova. In the early 1990s, Russia was using this loose organization to protect its own geopolitics while watching the internal and external connections of these states.⁷²¹ Second engagement was achieved through stepping on the common security field. The Collective Security Treaty (CST) known as ‘Tashkent Treaty’ was signed by the Central Asian republics on 15 May 1992 and it entered into force in 1994.⁷²² Beside of Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (withdrew in 1999); Armenia and Belarus also signed the Treaty which was registered to the UN Secretariat on November 01, 1995.⁷²³ Thereby the first step was taken to shape today’s security complex of Central Asia. However what is interesting at this point is that 1995 Declaration of the CST member states underlines the newly established collective security structure not only as the

⁷²⁰ “The Alma-Ata Declaration”, Library of Congress, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/belarus/by_appnc.html.

⁷²¹ Urazova, Y.İ.; “Rus Dış Politikasında Orta Asya’nın Önemi” in *Türkiye-Rusya Arasında İhtilaflı Konular ve Çözümleri* (ed. by Gülten Kazgan), İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, August 2008, p.87.

⁷²² “Charter of the Collective Security Treaty Organization”, United Nations Treaty Collection, Volume 2235, I-39775, http://untreaty.un.org/unts/144078_158780/5/9/13289.pdf, p.89; “Basic Facts”, CSTO website, http://www.odkb.gov.ru/start/index_engl_official_statements.htm.

⁷²³ “Basic Facts”, CSTO website, http://www.odkb.gov.ru/start/index_engl_official_statements.htm.

part of the European security system but also as an element of future's latent Asian security structure.⁷²⁴ The regional security system began to shape with the adoption of several official documents in the following years. The Charter declaring the foundation of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) was signed on October 07, 2002.⁷²⁵ The CSTO is fully-fledged collective defense organization dedicated to improve the military-political cooperation among the member countries to meet the all kinds of challenges and threats in key areas.⁷²⁶ Uzbekistan joined the CSTO in 2006 as re-adjustment of its policies following the Andijan events in 2005.⁷²⁷ Dushanbe Summit of the CSTO held on October 06, 2007 has a certain degree of significance since the organization announced that it will create peacekeeping forces with international status but also it will have the freedom of operations in its responsibility zone without any UN sanctions.⁷²⁸ The first large-scale three level military exercise named "Rubezh 2008" was held in the lands of Russia and Armenia with the participation of 4,000 soldiers from Armenia, Russia and Tajikistan together with military representatives from the other member countries.⁷²⁹ The CSTO Rapid Reaction Force was created on February 04, 2009 to cope with both symmetric and asymmetric threats in the region.⁷³⁰ For this purpose, the CSTO is in contact with several other intergovernmental security organizations such as the Counter-Terrorism Committee of the UNSC and OSCE.⁷³¹ Third engagement was achieved through the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) through signature of the "Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism" on June 15, 2001 by the former members of the Shanghai Five, which had been founded in 1996 to solve the border disputes, namely Russia, China and the four Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,

⁷²⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷²⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷²⁶ "Charter of the Collective Security Treaty Organization", United Nations Treaty Collection, Volume 2235, I-39775, http://untreaty.un.org/unts/144078_158780/5/9/13289.pdf, p.89.

⁷²⁷ Burnashev, Rustam and Chernykh, Irina; "Changes in Uzbekistan's Military Policy after the Andijan Events", Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, 2007, Volume 5, Number 1, p.72.

⁷²⁸ "Gendarme of Eurasia", *Kommersant*, 08 October 2007, http://www.kommersant.com/p812422/CIS_CSTO_Russia_Lebedev/.

⁷²⁹ "Rubezh 2008: The First Large-Scale CSTO Military Exercise", PIMS - Partnership for Peace (PfP) Information Management System, <http://www.pims.org/news/2008/08/06/rubezh-2008-the-first-large-scale-csto-military-exercise>.

⁷³⁰ "CSTO's rapid-reaction force to equal NATO's - Medvedev", *RIA Novosti*, 04 February 2009, <http://en.rian.ru/russia/20090204/119984654.html>; "Basic Facts", CSTO website, http://www.odkb.gov.ru/start/index_engl_official_statements.htm.

⁷³¹ "Basic Facts", CSTO website, http://www.odkb.gov.ru/start/index_engl_official_statements.htm.

Tajikistan and plus Uzbekistan.⁷³² However, by time, this organization widened its spectrum even to encompass deeper military cooperation, joint counter-terror maneuvers and intelligence sharing.⁷³³ The SCO made its first political show-off with its statement over that the US has to schedule its withdrawal from the military bases in Central Asia in 2005.⁷³⁴ The SCO is also another tool of Russia to have a word on the upcoming developments in the region and a political leverage vis-à-vis the US influence which emerged after the war in Afghanistan. The Memorandum of Understanding signed between the CSTO and the SCO on October 05, 2007 envisages joint cooperation between these two organizations in the struggle against terrorism, all kinds of illegal trafficking, organized crime but also in other areas of common interest to provide regional and international security and stability.⁷³⁵

The strength of the relations between Russia and the Central Asian republics was confirmed following the 9/11 by rendering them closer to each other and empowering the existing relations.⁷³⁶ Moreover the political and military threats caused by radical Islamist movements have been compelling them to cooperate more in the related fields to destroy or minimize the existing threats.⁷³⁷ Today, Russia and the Central Asian republics want to upgrade their relations through having exchange of high-level visits, agreements, projects, cooperation in political, economic, social and cultural fields.⁷³⁸ Furthermore, during the meeting dated August 2010 held in Sochi with the participation of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, Pakistani President Asaf Ali Zardari, Tajik President Imamali Rahmon hosted by Russian President Dmitri Medvedev, Russian leader offered the reinvigoration of the Soviet projects in the field of social and economic development which had been coordinated among these four countries as to contribute to the fight against terrorism and reconstruction.⁷³⁹ Medvedev

⁷³² “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization”, Chinese Foreign Ministry Website, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/sco/t57970.htm>.

⁷³³ Scheineson, Andrew; “The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation”, *Council on Foreign Relations*, 24 March 2009, http://www.cfr.org/publication/10883/shanghai_cooperation_organization.html.

⁷³⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷³⁵ “Chronicle of main events at SCO in 2007”, The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation website, <http://www.sectSCO.org/EN/show.asp?id=97>.

⁷³⁶ Urazova, Y.İ.; “Rus Dış Politikasında Orta Asya’nın Önemi” in *Türkiye-Rusya Arasında İhtilaflı Konular ve Çözümleri* (ed. by Gülten Kazgan), İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, August 2008, p.90.

⁷³⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp.90-91.

⁷³⁹ “Rusya’da Afganistan zirvesi: Medvedev Sovyet dönemi projelerin canlandırılmasını istedi”, *Haberrus*, 18 August 2010, <http://www.haberrus.com/politika/3466-Rusyada-Afganistan-zirvesi-Medvedev-Sovyet-donemi-projelerin-canlandirilmasini--istedi.html>.

emphasized the necessity of concerted action in method among the four countries to cope with drug trafficking, terror and extremism. This initiative of Russia can be interpreted as an individual attempt of Russia to create a new role by refreshing its former projects in the region through co-operation with the key countries.

Unlike Russia's post-Soviet relations with the region countries and Turkey's own experiences in the South Caucasus, Turkey could not achieve to upgrade its efforts of creating sphere of interest to the level of sphere of influence. Both geographical distance and Turkey's misreading the regional realities due to lack of enough information and experience can be counted as main reasons among several factors. In order to have a better grasp, one has to look at the issue retrospectively.

Turkey as the first country recognizing the independence of the Central Asian republics and sending an official delegation to the region wanted to compensate its total absence throughout the Cold War years and its Moscow-centered policies in the last years of the Soviet Union.⁷⁴⁰ Common features like ethnicity, culture, language and religion of Turkey with the Turkic states are perceived as necessary means by Turkey which put forward itself as a role model to these countries. Turkey's interaction with these states are categorized by Prof. Mustafa Aydın as the first honeymoon period between 1991 and 1993, the second period of the facing with the realities of its own and the region between 1993 and 1995, the third period of the adaptation to the regional realities between 1995 and 2001, and the fourth period as responsive to the US actions in the post-9/11 era.⁷⁴¹

During the first few romantic years, Turkey followed an active policy towards the region dominated by Turkic-Turani ideas. In these initial years, every statement in Turkey referring to the Turkish world was either starting or finishing with the emphasis on the great Turkic world 'stretching from the Adriatic Sea to the Great Wall of China'. Turkey's endeavors of being role model as democratic secular country following market economy for the region countries were approved and also encouraged by the West- specifically the US and also by Russia because of the fact that both were afraid of the establishment of pro-Iranian Islamic regimes in these newly established states.⁷⁴² Russia's pro-Western policies disregarding the

⁷⁴⁰ Aydın, Mustafa ; "Türkiye'nin Orta Asya Politikaları" in *Beş Deniz Havzasında Türkiye* (ed. by Aydın, Mustafa & Erhan, Çağrı), Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 2006, pp.3-7.

⁷⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p.5

⁷⁴² *Ibid.*

region made Turkey follow policies towards the region omitting Russian factor. These Turkic states approached Turkey to get assistance in their state-building and transition processes beside of getting contact with the world that they were not familiar previously. Turkey saw these countries mainly as political and economic opportunities for its own benefits. Turkish President Süleyman Demirel visited the Central Asian states in the immediate aftermath of the visit of the Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin in 1992.⁷⁴³ During his visit, President Demirel talked over the possibility of creating Union of Turkish States by also recommending these new states to go for the ruble-free zone.⁷⁴⁴ Furthermore President Demirel promised to give import credit and foreign aid valued at 1.1 billion dollar beside of offering cooperation in the military training field, transportation of Central Asian oil and gas to the Western markets through Turkey, inter alia, the recommendation on switching to the Latin alphabet.⁷⁴⁵ Turkey signed more than 140 bilateral agreements with these states until 1993 beside of the promises given to the leaders of these countries paying visit to Turkey.⁷⁴⁶ The establishment of public diplomacy tools such as Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency (TİKA) was realized in January 1992. However Turkey's assertive rhetoric began to frighten the region countries, the preferences of the leaders of region countries mostly shaped by the post-Soviet circumstances became more pronounced and regional limitations drawn by post-Soviet legacies slowed down the romantic tone in this newly established relationship.⁷⁴⁷ In the second period starting with 1993, the political unfeasibility and economic weaknesses of the Turkish model became more evident among the region countries.⁷⁴⁸ Meanwhile, Russia's Near Abroad Policy of 1993 was overt declaration of Russian interests in the CIS region demanding an absolute recognition and acts in accordance with this recognition from other states as well. The return of Russia and the reluctance of the major Western powers for giving support to Turkey vis-à-vis Russia in the region due to their complex calculations were not welcomed by Turkey.⁷⁴⁹ Russia began

⁷⁴³ *Ibid.*, p.7.

⁷⁴⁴ Peimani, Hooman; *Regional Security and the Future of Central Asia: The Competition of Iran, Turkey and Russia*, 1998, Westport, CT: Praeger, p.50.

⁷⁴⁵ Aydın, Mustafa ; "Türkiye'nin Orta Asya Politikaları" in *Beş Deniz Havzasında Türkiye* (ed. by Aydın, Mustafa & Erhan, Çağrı), Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 2006, p.11.

⁷⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p.8.

⁷⁴⁷ Aydın, Mustafa ; "Türkiye'nin Orta Asya Politikaları" in *Beş Deniz Havzasında Türkiye* (ed. by Aydın, Mustafa & Erhan, Çağrı), Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 2006, pp.12-13.

⁷⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, pp.14-17.

⁷⁴⁹ Tanrısever, Oktay F.; "Turkey and Russia in Eurasia" in *The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy*, (ed. by Lenore, Martin G.&Keridis, Dimitris), Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004, p.135.

to evaluate Turkey as a threat against its own interests in its near abroad and decided to re-activate its dominance in the region. Third period from 1995 up until 2000 is considered as Turkey's slow paced withdrawal from the region by accepting its own limitations and mistakes together with leaving behind a strengthening Russian factor in the region.⁷⁵⁰ While Turkey was keeping its own interests safe, it realized that it had to bear in mind the Russian factor and thereby refrained from a direct confrontation with Russia in this specific region. Kazakh leader Nursultan Nazarbayev's statement dated 2000 in the World Economic Fair of that, "There is no chance for the former Soviet republics other than the engagement with Russia. Our culture, history and ancestors are all the same. We face with the similar problems of the same economic infrastructure. Only through this way, we can integrate to the west,"⁷⁵¹ was the confirmation of the collapse of the Turkish model and the victory of the Russian model in the region. In the 2000s, Turkey's developing relations with Russia, the US-Russia competition replacing Turkish-Russian-Iranian competition in the region, Turkey's own international priorities such as EU, Iraq and Cyprus directed Turkey to follow more rational policies towards the region and to become more sensitive to the Russian interests.⁷⁵²

Indeed, all throughout the 1990s, Russia was following the rhetorical and factual developments with great concern since Russia itself had a reasonable amount of Turkic population but preferred not to show an exaggerated reaction in the beginning. The pressure caused by Russia's own internal and external dynamics enforced Russia to follow an active policy in the region. The support given to Turkey by the West in this region, Turkey's intermediary role between the West and these states mainly in the economic field together with the tumultuous conflicts in the Caucasus and Russia's disappointment with the West are the factors affecting Russia's perception towards Turkey in the region. However Turkey's assertive policies mainly supported by its rhetoric did go out of the threatening level for Russia in time since the overall capabilities of Turkey overshadowed by its limitations made Russia think about a Turkey far from being a direct threat to Russia.⁷⁵³ Today, Turkey's existence in Central Asia was limited with public diplomacy tools mostly reverberated in the

⁷⁵⁰ Aydın, Mustafa ; "Türkiye'nin Orta Asya Politikaları" in *Beş Deniz Havzasında Türkiye* (ed. by Aydın, Mustafa & Erhan, Çağrı), Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 2006, p.19.

⁷⁵¹ Tınç, Ferai: "Türkiye, Orta Asya'dan siliniyor", *Hürriyet*, 30 April 2000.

⁷⁵² Aydın, Mustafa ; "Türkiye'nin Orta Asya Politikaları" in *Beş Deniz Havzasında Türkiye* (ed. by Aydın, Mustafa & Erhan, Çağrı), Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 2006, p.29, pp.30-31.

⁷⁵³ Aktürk, Şener; "Turkish-Russian Relations after the Cold War (1992-2002)", *Turkish Studies*, September 2006, Volume 7, Number 3, pp.339.

cultural field and economic relations which have been developing slowly. Turkey has been following a cautious policy taking into account of the Russian sensitivities in the region not only because Russia wants it so but the region countries desire an equation in their foreign policy formulations where Russia has a certain role. However there is no doubt that any assertive Turkish policy in the region will not be welcomed by Russia, be it rhetorical or factual.

The following section of this chapter will carry on with an analysis of the NATO factor in the bilateral relations between Turkey and Russia with special reference to the Five-Day war and the NATO-led ABM system.

5.5. NATO Factor in Turkish-Russian Relations

Beyond doubt, Turkey's relations with Russia cannot be evaluated as independently from Russia's relations with NATO since any significant deterioration in the relations between NATO and Russia will have an impact, either direct or indirect, on the relations between Turkey and Russia. Since Turkey was, is and will be 'above all a NATO country' from the Russian point of view. Turkey's playing of regional power card may work for a while but its dominant identity of being a NATO power in the region is recorded to the deep parts of Russian sub-conscious as a limit. Even the trendy pragmatism with flexible region politics cannot stand firm against this limit for long time.

First the chronological evolution of the relations since the formation of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) in 2002 will be examined to give some hints about the level of cooperation. The 1990s were the years passing with the establishment of official relations between Russia and NATO. The formal framework of the relations in the 1990s embarked upon Russia's participation in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in 1991 continued with Russia's partaking in NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) in 1994 and completed with the establishment of Permanent Joint Council (PJC) in 1997. NATO operations in the Balkans and the first post-Cold War enlargement of the Alliance to absorb Visegrad trio countries in the 1990s increased the tension between NATO and Russia. The relations have followed a path with ups and downs but have never tended to bring to an end.⁷⁵⁴ Russia's new president Vladimir Putin's pragmatist vision emerged as a new opportunity for the relations in the beginning of the millenium. The challenging threats of the post-9/11 world system rendered Russia-NATO relations the prospective solid ground for the further development. Russia-

⁷⁵⁴ "NATO's relations with Russia", NATO website, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-A06DEC4D-5B0D0664/natolive/topics_50090.htm?

NATO rapprochement provided by the combination of the post-9/11 international conjuncture and the Russian pragmatist response in harmony with this new system of values led to the declaration of “NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality” and the establishment of NATO-Russia Council (NRC) in 2002 replacing PJC.⁷⁵⁵

However two important events took place in the same year not perceived as good news from the Russian side. First one is the accession process of the three Baltic States plus Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia which commenced at NATO’s Prague Summit held in 2002.⁷⁵⁶ By this move, NATO came near to the Russian border. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Ivanov voiced the Russian concerns towards the nearing of NATO to the Russian borders in December 2003.⁷⁵⁷ The second post-Cold War NATO enlargement which started in 2002 was completed in 2004. Russia did not react harshly to the second round of NATO enlargement due to the two factors namely the inability of Russia to avoid it and giving Russia the approximate role that it wants to play in the Alliance through much more incorporation of Russia to NATO affairs with NRC.⁷⁵⁸ It is also alleged that NATO’s approach towards Russia was much more pragmatic as shown by giving some tension reducing concessions before the expansion decision of the alliance in 1997 and in 2002 when the basic documents establishing the PJC and NRC were signed. Second one is that both Georgia and Ukraine voiced their desire for prospective membership to NATO in 2002.⁷⁵⁹ However the declaration of these two countries alarmed the Russian security interests, albeit, the NATO-Russia relations which were upgraded with the newly established NRC structure. Indeed, Russian concerns with regard to the NATO expansion were already mentioned both in 2000 dated Foreign Policy Concept and National Security Concept of Russia.⁷⁶⁰ Although the US ambassador to NATO Nick Burns affirmed with a statement in 2004 that the NATO’s eastward expansion does not pose any threat to the Russian security, Russia noted down the fact that NATO turned out to be an organization where 40 percent of alliance members

⁷⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵⁶ “NATO Enlargement”, NATO website, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm.

⁷⁵⁷ Eke, Steven; “Russia blasts Nato encroachment”, *BBC*, 10 December 2003, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3308563.stm>.

⁷⁵⁸ Hendrickson, Gordon B.; “The Future of NATO-Russia Relations: Or, How to Dance with a Bear and Not Get Mauled”, The Atlantic Council of the United States, Occasional Paper, December 2005, p.1, http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/82/0512-Future_NATO_Russian_Relations_Gordon_Hendrickson.pdf.

⁷⁵⁹ “NATO’s relations with Georgia”, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_38988.htm; “NATO’s relations with Ukraine”, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_37750.htm?selectedLocale=en.

⁷⁶⁰ Caldwell, Lawrence T.; “Russian Concepts of National Security” in *Russian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century and the Shadow of the Past*, (ed. by Legvold, Robert), New York: Columbia University Press, p.314.

composed of former communist countries leading to a switch in the organization's centrifugal.⁷⁶¹ Notwithstanding that, the relations have made reasonable progress between 2004 and 2008. NRC joint military exercises, the issuance of the NRC Action Plan on Terrorism, Russia's participation in NATO's Operation Active Endeavor in the Mediterranean as the first non-NATO partner and the efforts of building interoperability are registered as developments.⁷⁶² However the ongoing talks with both Georgia and Ukraine for further enlargement increased the Russian concerns.⁷⁶³ Russian President Vladimir Putin's speech delivered at the 43th Munich Conference on Security Policy on February 10, 2007 gives enough trace about the roots of the ongoing disturbance of the Russian side:

I think it is obvious that NATO expansion does not have any relation with the modernization of the Alliance itself or with ensuring security in Europe. On the contrary, it represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust. And we have the right to ask: against whom is this expansion intended? And what happened to the assurances our western partners made after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact? Where are those declarations today? No one even remembers them. But I will allow myself to remind this audience what was said. I would like to quote the speech of NATO General Secretary Mr Woerner in Brussels on 17 May 1990. He said at the time that: "the fact that we are ready not to place a NATO army outside of German territory gives the Soviet Union a firm security guarantee". Where are these guarantees?⁷⁶⁴

Dr. Sergei Karaganov, worked as presidential adviser for both Yeltsin and Putin, states that the NATO expansion, which was perceived as disparaging and treachery even by the Westernizers in Russia, is a bigoted step since it envisages to create a security structure in Europe by not including Russia to the European security architecture.⁷⁶⁵ Karaganov underlines the accepted legitimacy of NATO from the Russian point of view without expansion and adds that the further expansion with the motto of 'expand or die' will only deteriorate the existing situation by making Russia feel more humiliated and insecure vis-à-vis the West/NATO.⁷⁶⁶ Notwithstanding the Russian concerns, Georgia and Ukraine were

⁷⁶¹ Lungescu, Oana; "US calms Russia's Nato fears", *BBC*, 29 March 2004, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3580533.stm>.

⁷⁶² "NATO's relations with Russia", NATO website, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-A06DEC4D-5B0D0664/natolive/topics_50090.htm?

⁷⁶³ "NATO Enlargement", NATO website, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm.

⁷⁶⁴ "Putin's Prepared Remarks at 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy", *The Washington Post*, 12 February 2007, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021200555.html>.

⁷⁶⁵ Karaganov, Sergei; "Russia's Uneasy Dance with the West", *BBC World Lectures*, http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/people/features/world_lectures/karag_lect.shtml.

⁷⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

pronounced as potential members for the first time at the Bucharest Summit of NATO held in April 2008.⁷⁶⁷

Following the Five-Day war in August 2008, Russian military intervention in Georgia was defined as ‘disproportionate’ by NATO and Russia was warned about the possible results in the end.⁷⁶⁸ The third Russian frigate deployment in the Operation Active Endeavour was also cancelled.⁷⁶⁹ Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov underlined that the cooperation with NATO was shelved though the prospective cooperation was still on the table but NATO had to make its choice between holding up Georgia and building up further cooperation with Russia.⁷⁷⁰ NATO did not show any explicit reaction to Russia’s decision of the deferral of the cooperation, only its spokesperson Carmen Romero stated that it was noted down.⁷⁷¹ NATO condemned Russian recognition of Abkhazian and South Ossetian independence with its statement on August 27, 2008 and asked for its resumption.⁷⁷² Russian Ambassador to NATO Dmitry Rogozin evaluated the statement of the alliance in “Vremya Novostei” newspaper by referring to the recognition decision of the alliance members with regard to Kosovo independence and added that any attack of the alliance against these de facto republics will be deemed as war against Russia.⁷⁷³ However the mutual interdependent security architecture emerged after 9/11 benefited by both parties made them never voice the termination of the relations totally. As a matter of fact, the suspension of some formal meetings and practical collaboration in some fields was applied with the exception of combating terror and counter-narcotics until March 2009.⁷⁷⁴ Since the reached level of cooperation until August 2008 was of interest to both sides, the parties did not think of waiving the cooperation altogether. Even in the most stressful days of the Five-Day War in Georgia and the existence of an obvious disagreement between Russia and NATO, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov could say that NATO was not perceived as a danger but more like

⁷⁶⁷ “NATO Enlargement”, NATO website, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm.

⁷⁶⁸ “NATO’s relations with Russia”, NATO website, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-A06DEC4D-5B0D0664/natolive/topics_50090.htm?.

⁷⁶⁹ “Operation Active Endeavour”, NATO website, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_7932.htm.

⁷⁷⁰ Nato-Russia links 'should remain', *BBC*, 25 August 2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7581004.stm>.

⁷⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷² “NATO statement”, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_43517.htm.

⁷⁷³ “Ayn Tarihi”, Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, August 2008.

⁷⁷⁴ “NATO’s relations with Russia”, NATO website, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-A06DEC4D-5B0D0664/natolive/topics_50090.htm?.

an organization that Russia desires to co-operate in the European security architecture.⁷⁷⁵ However it is a fact that the level of cooperation could not avoid the emergence of this kind of crisis over a tiny country Georgia as such. The first NRC foreign ministers meeting after the war could be held in December 2009 initiated a “Joint Review of 21st Century Common Security Challenges” as to bolster and refresh the NRC cooperation.⁷⁷⁶ As stated by Anatol Lieven, NATO-Russia relations will have tendency to heal as long as the membership issue of Georgia and Ukraine to NATO will be out of the agenda.⁷⁷⁷ The new Military Doctrine approved by President Medvedev in February 2010 named the NATO expansion and deployment of ABMs as among the external threats.⁷⁷⁸ President Medvedev drew the attention that the issue is not the NATO per se but its ‘endless’ enlargement towards the former Soviet states located nearby Russian borders.⁷⁷⁹

Turkey, as a country refrained from making pungent statements during and after the Five-Day war by also expressing its stance against the retaliatory measures spoken at NATO towards Russia, saluted the recommencement of the NATO-Russia dialogue.⁷⁸⁰ However as stated by Prof. Mark Almond from Oxford University, the NATO expansion turned out to be a very debatable issue among countries like Germany and Turkey since Georgia a small country as such might have dragged the whole organization based on the principle of collective defense to an internecine war situation.⁷⁸¹ As put delicately by Alexander Rahr, an expert on Russia at Berlin's German Council on Foreign Relations; “The price of losing Russia in this whole game is much higher than would be the gain of getting a very fragile

⁷⁷⁵ “Lavrov deplores Nato Cold War logic”, *BBC*, 21 April 2009
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8011137.stm>.

⁷⁷⁶ “NATO’s relations with Russia”, NATO website, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-A06DEC4D-5B0D0664/natolive/topics_50090.htm?

⁷⁷⁷ “Anatol Lieven: Russia-NATO relations have improved considerably”, 06 May 2010, Valdai Discussion Club, <http://www.valdaiclub.com/content/anatol-lieven-russia-nato-relations-have-improved-considerably>.

⁷⁷⁸ Sweeney, Conor; “Russia names NATO expansion as national threat”, *Reuters*, 05 February 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6144LA20100205?loomia_ow=t0:s0:a49:g43:r1:c1.000000:b31090546:z0.

⁷⁷⁹ Sweeney, Conor; “Medvedev objects to "endless" NATO expansion”, *Reuters*, 25 February 2010, <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE61O2OQ20100225>.

⁷⁸⁰ Kardas, Saban; “Turkey Welcomes NATO-Russia Military Cooperation”, *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, 30 June 2009, Volume 6, Issue 125, [http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=35197&tx_ttnews\[backPid\]=7&cHash=9043ea02c6](http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=35197&tx_ttnews[backPid]=7&cHash=9043ea02c6).

⁷⁸¹ Yıldız, Güney; “Kafkasya yeni krizlere gebe”, *BBC Turkish*, 12 August 2008, http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkish/news/story/2008/08/080812_almond.shtml.

Ukraine and a very fragile Georgia into NATO,”⁷⁸² Turkey sees more benefit in its balanced policy between NATO and Russia as a result of its cost-benefit analysis in the regional security framework and do not want to face with ‘an enemy Russia’. The tightrope diplomacy of Turkey between NATO and Russia seems successful since neither Russia nor NATO accused Turkey of siding with the other.

During the joint press conference held by Turkey and Russia in Istanbul on September 02, 2008, upon a question whether Russian perception yielding the precedence to Turkey’s NATO membership part or its economic partnership part, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov answers the question as follows:

I will say at once that we feel no restraining factors due to Turkey’s NATO membership within the framework of our bilateral dialogue, which is truly sincere, truly trustful and truly mutually respectful. In our bilateral relations Turkey has never tried to use its NATO membership to the detriment of these principles on which our dialogue is based. Moreover, we, naturally, presume that Turkey fulfills the obligations and commitments which it has to fulfill as a member of the North Atlantic Alliance. This is completely understandable. But meanwhile Turkey does not forget about its other international commitments and obligations. In the first place, obligations under international law as a whole, in the framework of the UN, OSCE and in the framework of the international treaties that govern the regime on the Black Sea, for example. Turkey never places its commitments to NATO above its other international obligations, but always strictly follows all those obligations that it has in the totality. This is a very important trait not characteristic for all countries. We appreciate this, and endeavor to approach our relations likewise.⁷⁸³

The statement above tells more than it appears with opposite reading. If Turkey wants to use its NATO card to protect its own interests against Russian interests in the case of conflicting interests, the situation will be opposite. Turkey’s current interests tell it not to risk its relations with Russia for Georgia but what if the future interests say the otherwise. Since NATO does not seem to stop its enlargement in the long-run, signaled with its 2009 enlargement, and Russia reiterates its opposite stance against the enlargement of NATO towards Russian borders in both its 2008 dated Russian Foreign Policy Concept and 2009 dated National Security Strategy until 2020.⁷⁸⁴

⁷⁸² Alison, Sebastian & Neuger, James G.; “Putin Says NATO Expansion Is Direct Threat to Russia (Update2)”, *Bloomberg*, 04 April 2008, <http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aq34xuTFCvx0&refer=europ>.

⁷⁸³ “Transcript of Remarks and Response to Media Questions by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov at Joint Press Conference with Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs Ali Babajan, Istanbul, September 2, 2008”, Official website of Russian Foreign Ministry, 03 September 2008, http://www.un.int/russia/new/MainRoot/docs/off_news/030908/newen3.htm.

⁷⁸⁴ Haas, Marcel de; “Medvedev’s Security Policy: A Provisional Assessment”, *Russian Analytical Digest*, 18 June 2009, Number 62, p.5.

Another issue of tension is the US-led ABM system project which turned into a NATO-led ABM project. The talks over the establishment of ABM system in Europe which started in 2002 resulted in an agreement to set up 10 interceptors to Poland together with a radar tracking system to the Czech Republic against any potential aggression from rogue states such as Iran and North Korea was voiced by the US President Bush in 2006.⁷⁸⁵ The statement of an US official as that establishing such a base ‘would not have been conceivable before Poland joined NATO in 1999’ is quite noteworthy since it gives signals to Russia what it might face in the future if NATO expands more.⁷⁸⁶ President Putin harshly criticized the US arguments used to legalize its acts.⁷⁸⁷ Russia underlined the flimsiness of the US argument by calling the attention to the location of the missile shield which is close to the Russia’s strategic nuclear arsenal.⁷⁸⁸ President Putin speaks sarcastically by stating that Russia had withdrawn its forces from Eastern Europe and closed its military bases in Cuba and Vietnam in return of facing US missile defense system in its nearby and the US bases in Bulgaria and Romania.⁷⁸⁹ Putin also called the attention to the 1998 NATO pledge prohibiting any settlement of “substantial combat forces” on former Warsaw Pact territory.⁷⁹⁰ General Vladimir Zaritsky, the chief of artillery and rocket forces for Russian ground troops sums up the Russian posture with the following words: “Any action meets a counter-action, and this is the case with elements of the US missile defense in Poland and the Czech Republic.”⁷⁹¹ President Putin’s July 2007 dated decree for shelving the implementation of the CFE Treaty was the first serious signal of the Russian opposition to the US missile plans in Europe.⁷⁹²

⁷⁸⁵“US considers Polish missile base”, *BBC*, 17 November 2005, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4445284.stm>; “ABM project of the US in Europe”, US Policy in a Big World website, 21 September 2009, <http://www.uspolicyinabigworld.com/2009/09/21/russia-obama-scraps-the-abm-system/>; Sanders, Deborah; “U.S. Naval Diplomacy in the Black Sea: Sending Mixed Messages”, *Naval War College Review*, 22 June 2007, Volume 60, Number 3, p.62, <https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/7f8e6247-a1de-4da5-85e6-dd179455f97f/U-S--Naval-Diplomacy-in-the-Black-Sea--Sending-Mix>; Kasım, Kamer; “Türkiye’nin Karadeniz Politikası: Temel Parametreler ve Stratejiler”, *Orta Asya ve Kafkasya Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 2008, Volume 3, Number 5, p.177.

⁷⁸⁶ “US considers Polish missile base”, *BBC*, 17 November 2005, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4445284.stm>.

⁷⁸⁷ “Press Statements and Answers to Questions Following Russian-Czech Talks”, 28 April 2007, Official website of the Russian President.

⁷⁸⁸ “ABM project of the US in Europe”, US Policy in a Big World website, 21 September 2009, <http://www.uspolicyinabigworld.com/2009/09/21/russia-obama-scraps-the-abm-system/>.

⁷⁸⁹ Alison, Sebastian & Neuger, James G.; “Putin Says NATO Expansion Is Direct Threat to Russia (Update2)”, *Bloomberg*, 04 April 2008, <http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aq34xuTFCvx0&refer=europ>.

⁷⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷⁹¹ Blomfield, Adrian; “Russia piles pressure on EU over missile shield”, *Telegraph*, 15 November 2007 <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1569495/Russia-piles-pressure-on-EU-over-missile-shield.html>.

⁷⁹² Marcus, Jonathan; “Russia send warning to the West”, *BBC*, 14 July 2007, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6898897.stm>.

During his visit to Germany on June 05, 2008, Russian President Medvedev voiced the idea of developing a new treaty on European security to replace 1975 Helsinki accords for creating a new pan-European security structure standing against any kind of blocs or associations by putting forward states as sovereign entities instead.⁷⁹³ The focal motivation of this initiative is stated as “to create – in the context of military and political security in the Euro-Atlantic region – a common undivided space in order to finally do away with the Cold War legacy”.⁷⁹⁴ President Medvedev states that his offer of creating a new security framework as such also aims to craft a structure “which no nation or international organisation operating in the Euro-Atlantic region is entitled to strengthen its own security at the cost of other nations or organizations”.⁷⁹⁵ “In short, he proposed starting from tabula rasa”.⁷⁹⁶ A tabula rasa of where NATO does not exist ever assumingly would be the most desired option for Russia but a weakened role of NATO in the European security architecture also well work for Russia. Medvedev’s offer drafted in February 2009 highlighting the multi-polarity and indivisibility of the security in the Euro-Atlantic region was not very welcomed by the NATO members.⁷⁹⁷ NATO representative Rasmussen indicated that there is no need for a new security framework with reference to the validity of the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997, the Charter for European Security of 1999, and the Rome Declaration of 2002.⁷⁹⁸

Russian President Putin stated that they had offered the deployment of the interceptors either on mobile platforms or in a country which is an US ally such as Turkey or Iraq instead of Poland and the joint use of the Gabala radar station located in Azerbaijan instead of Czech Republic.⁷⁹⁹ Moreover a plethora of leading Russian political and military authorities overtly

⁷⁹³ Kosyrev, Dmitry; “Foreign policy: Medvedev taking inventory”, *RIA Novosti*, 15 July 2008, <http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20080715/114049494.html>.

⁷⁹⁴ “The draft of the European Security Treaty has been published”, 29 November 2009, Official website of the Russian President.

⁷⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷⁹⁶ Kosyrev, Dmitry; “Foreign policy: Medvedev taking inventory”, *RIA Novosti*, 15 July 2008, <http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20080715/114049494.html>.

⁷⁹⁷ “European Security Treaty”, 29 November 2009, Official website of the Russian President; Sweeney, Conor; “Medvedev objects to “endless” NATO expansion”, *Reuters*, 25 February 2010, <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE61O2OQ20100225>.

⁷⁹⁸ Charnysh, Volha; “Russia Drafts European Security Pact”, *Arms Control Association website*, January/February 2010, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_01-02/EuropeanSecurity.

⁷⁹⁹ “Press Conference following the end of the G8 Summit”, 08 June 2007, Official website of the Russian President.

expressed their distrust to the US plan and the given target in this plan.⁸⁰⁰ When the US and Poland signed the related agreement in the immediate aftermath of the Five-Day war in Georgia, the expected Russian reactions appeared to show up. Russian Foreign Ministry's statement on August 21, 2008 with regard to the agreement signed between the US and Poland for the establishment of the ABM shield in Poland classified as an anti-Russian initiative triggering insecurity and arms race and it is said that this agreement will definitely be responded.⁸⁰¹ Russian General Anatoly Nogovitsyn stated in August 2008 that "Poland, by deploying (the system) is exposing itself to a strike-100 percent,"⁸⁰² Russian Ambassador to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin stated: "The fact that this was signed in a period of very difficult crisis in the relations between Russia and the United States over the situation in Georgia shows that, of course, the missile defence system will be deployed not against Iran but against the strategic potential of Russia,"⁸⁰³ The final step came by the Russian President Medvedev's avowal on November 08, 2008 of the forthcoming Russian deployment of Iskandar-M missiles in *Kaliningradsky* region of Russia which is close to the place where the US ABMs will be located in Poland.⁸⁰⁴ NATO spokesman James Appathurai criticized the Russian decision as a 'step in the wrong direction'.⁸⁰⁵

In September 2009, the new President of USA Barrack Obama announced the decision to overhaul the former plans of providing security in Europe with ground-based long-range missiles in Poland and, instead, took the decision of deploying smaller SM-3 interceptors within the sea-based Aegis system by increasing their quality and quantity of the shorter-range ground- and sea-based missiles in time but to be located more on ships by 2011, 2015, 2018 and 2020 against the attacks of the newly defined Iranian threat composed of

⁸⁰⁰ "Russia: Countries That Host U.S. Missile Shield Will Be Targets", *Fox News*, 19 February 2007, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,252771,00.html>; Zarakovich, Yuri; "Why Putin Pulled Out of a Key Treaty", *Time*, 14 July 2007, <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1643566,00.html>; "Russia to deploy missiles near Poland", *The Independent*, 05 November 2008, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russia-to-deploy-missiles-near-poland-993981.html>.

⁸⁰¹ "Ayın Tarihi", Official Website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, August 2008.

⁸⁰² "Russia: Poland risks attack due to U.S. missiles", *MSNBC news*, 15 August 2008, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/26203430/>.

⁸⁰³ "Russia angry over US missile shield", *Aljazeera*, 15 August 2008, <http://english.aljazeera.net/news/europe/2008/08/200881514010734640.html>.

⁸⁰⁴ "Russia to deploy missiles near Poland", *The Independent*, 05 November 2008, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russia-to-deploy-missiles-near-poland-993981.html>; Zarakovich, Yuri; "Why Putin Pulled Out of a Key Treaty", *Time*, 14 July 2007, <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1643566,00.html>.

⁸⁰⁵ Zarakovich, Yuri; "Why Putin Pulled Out of a Key Treaty", *Time*, 14 July 2007, <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1643566,00.html>.

short/medium-range missiles.⁸⁰⁶ Thereupon, Medvedev's reaction was welcoming but cautious to some extent.⁸⁰⁷ Cancellation decision of the former plan was also welcomed by the Polish and Czech republics.⁸⁰⁸ Marine Corps General James Cartwright characterized the new system as "globally deployable and globally exportable," and added that the radar system instead of the one in Czech Republic will be built either in Europe or in the Caucasus region as offered by Russia before.⁸⁰⁹ Head of the Missile Defense Agency, Lieutenant General Henry Obering stated in 2008, "A powerful, 'forward based' X-band radar station could go in Southeastern Europe, possibly in Turkey, the Caucasus or the Caspian Sea region,"⁸¹⁰ In 2009, the brain behind the design of the US-led ABM project in Europe since the time of the former US President Bush, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, Ellen Tauscher underlined the necessity "to move in a NATOized way" for the project reconfigured as "a more sophisticated, diversified, mobile interceptor system in Europe and its expansion into the Middle East, integrated with all 28 NATO member states and doubtlessly with several key partners".⁸¹¹

In February 2010, the first step towards the implementation of the new plan got started with the acceptance of Romania for hosting the (SM-3) interceptor.⁸¹² NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen in his address to the German Marshall Fund's annual Brussels Forum Conference on March 27, 2010 pronounced the inclusion of Russia to the Euro-Atlantic missile defence system under NATO to protect deployed troops, lands and people, and emphasized that the cooperation with Russia in this field aimed at specifically the removal of Russian fears.⁸¹³ The recent offer raised to Turkey and the extended invitation to Russia for being part of the project show that the project is well on the way to realization.

⁸⁰⁶ Baker, Peter; "White House Scraps Bush's Approach to Missile Shield", *The New York Times*, 17 September 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/18/world/europe/18shield.html?_r=3&hp.

⁸⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸⁰⁸ McMichael, William H.; "Obama sharply alters missile defense plans", *Navy Times*, 19 September 2009, http://www.navytimes.com/news/2009/09/military_missiledefense_obama_091709w/.

⁸⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

⁸¹⁰ Rozoff, Rick; "Romania: U.S. Expands Missile Shield into Black Sea", 06 February 2010, <http://rickrozoff.wordpress.com/2010/02/06/romania-u-s-expands-missile-shield-into-black-sea/>.

⁸¹¹ *Ibid.*

⁸¹² Kaufman, Stephen; "Romania Agrees to Host Ballistic Missile Interceptor", *US Department of State website*, 04 February 2010, <http://www.america.gov/st/eur-english/2010/February/20100204155405esnamuak0.8593866.html>.

⁸¹³ "Security policy in an era of budgetary constraint": Speech by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the annual conference of the Security and Defence Agenda in Brussels, NATO website, 21 June 2010, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_64563.htm.

Russia acts to the non-detailed offer of NATO, hitherto, with deliberation. At this point, Russian Ambassador in Ankara Vladimir Ivanovskiy's warning of that Russian concerns must be taken into consideration for the strategic stability is important to be mentioned.⁸¹⁴ Beyond doubt, this issue will affect Turkey, its relations with Russia and its position in the region. Both the enlargement and the US-driven ABM project of NATO will be decisive in the course of relations between Turkey and Russia as summarized below:

From Ankara's perspective, NATO's enlargement, or the prospects of NATOization of the Black Sea region, should not lead Russian elites to believe that NATO has never given up the old containment strategy. The more Russia feels besieged by NATO's expansion, the more it would define NATO as a potential threat to its security. The more NATO appears as a threat in Russian radars, the more pressure Moscow would exert on Ankara to define Turkish-Russian relations in bilateral terms and out-of-NATO frameworks. This would in turn make Turkey's policy towards Russia susceptible to Russian sensitivities and demands. A Russia that feels itself estranged from the West would likely want to see that Turkey follow suit.⁸¹⁵

All things evaluated, the fragile relations between Russia and NATO full of mistrust constitute a limit in the relations of Turkey with Russia even though both Russia and NATO leaders underline the necessity of the cooperation with each other in the new era. During the competition times, the countries in NATO which will act in favor of Russia, or not act against Russia, or keep balanced stance are desired result and means for Russian foreign policy. In this regard, Russia creates a separation in the organization as it happened in the wake of Five-Day war and exploits it masterly. Since these states do not want to put their major gains in their relations with Russia to risk for small ones. However the lack of trust between Russia and these countries, pragmatist policies of these states with changing circumstances and NATO's strong organizational structure limits this flexibility. Turkey as one of those countries has no other option to live with this limit while carrying on its relations with Russia.

The final section of this chapter which will have a look at the competitive pipeline politics of Turkey and Russia will try to show that both countries disguise their worries beneath their recent conciliatory appearance and soft discourse on their competitive energy projects.

⁸¹⁴ "Rusya'nın ABD'nin 'Füze Kalkanı Projesi'yle ilgili yaklaşımı böyle: Süreçte yer alırsak kalkan rahatsız etmez", 22 October 2010, <http://www.nethaber.com/Dunya/165905/Rusyanin-ABDnin-Fuze-Kalkani-Projesiyle>.

⁸¹⁵ Oguzlu, Tarık; "Turkey and NATO's Transformation", *ORSAM*, 25 October 2010, <http://www.orsam.org.tr/en/showArticle.aspx?ID=307>.

5.6. Competitive Pipeline Politics

The competition over access to energy resources is getting tough in right correlation with the tremendous increase in the energy consumption, so the demand, on all over the world. Within this context, control over the pipeline transit routes providing access to these rich hydrocarbon resources became as important as owning these resources. Since the one who rules the vital energy corridors between the energy-rich east and energy-hungry west will also gain significant advantages in geopolitical terms. In this sense, Russia as holder of rich energy resources wants to keep also the transit rights in its hand to guarantee its economic security and to achieve its goal of reaching influential global power status. On the other hand, Turkey as holder of very limited energy resources would like to be the “fourth corridor” after Algeria, Norway and Russia in order to guarantee the supply of its own energy resources with raising its off-take rights and to achieve its goal of reaching an influential actor in European and global politics. Therefore pipeline politics of Turkey and Russia in the current energy geopolitics is competitive. External dynamics also position these two actors vis-à-vis each other. Diversification of the supply resources and so the transit routes in order to decrease the dependency which is above the average levels of Europe on Russia assign Turkey to new role in this sense. In order to grasp the issue in a proper way, one has to look at the issue retrospectively.

The appearance of the energy dimension of the relations between Turkey and Russia goes back to the 1980s when Soviet Union was still alive. This first natural gas agreement at the governmental level known as “Russia-Turkey Western Pipeline” was signed on September 18, 1984 and this is followed by a trade agreement between Turkish Botaş and Soviet Gazexport companies signed on 14 February 1986 envisaging 6 billion cubic meters per annum of gas for 25 years period.⁸¹⁶ The second natural gas agreement envisaging the additional 8 billion cubic meters per annum of gas from Russia to Turkey through the same “Russia-Turkey Western Pipeline” was signed on December 10, 1996 for 23 years period.⁸¹⁷ The third natural gas agreement known as ‘Blue Stream pipeline project’ was signed on December 15, 1997 foreseeing the delivery of 16 billion cubic meters per annum.⁸¹⁸ This

⁸¹⁶Ediger Volkan S.; “Turkey-Russia Energy Relations: Same Old Story, New Actors”, *Insight Turkey*, 01 July 2010, <http://www.fiqs.org/periodicals/201007/2114775591.html>; “Natural Gas Sale and Purchase Agreements”; BOTAŞ website, <http://www.botas.gov.tr/index.asp>.

⁸¹⁷ Oğan Sinan: “MAVİ AKIM: Türk-Rus İlişkilerinde Mavi Bağımlılık”, *TÜRKSAM*, 02 January 2006 <http://www.turksam.org/tr/yazdir627.html>.

⁸¹⁸ Yınanç, Barçın ; “Old rivals, new partners: Russia and Turkey, tied by energy dependence”, *Hürriyet Daily News*, 09 August 2010; Oğan Sinan: “MAVİ AKIM: Türk-Rus İlişkilerinde Mavi Bağımlılık”, *TÜRKSAM*, 02 January 2006 <http://www.turksam.org/tr/yazdir627.html>.

project bringing the first direct pipeline construction between Turkey and Russia was materialized by 2005. There are two important facts to be underlined with regard to this project. First, Turkey became the second importer country of Russian natural gas after Germany with its energy dependency increasing to 65 percent.⁸¹⁹ As noted by Turkish energy expert Necdet Pamir, this amount of dependency is risky both in economic and strategic terms.⁸²⁰ Secondly, according to the Article 4 of the project agreement, Turkey cannot sell the gas bought from Russia to the third states unless Russia gives its consent.⁸²¹ Apart from the agreements signed with Russia, Turkey also signed natural gas agreements with Algeria, Nigeria, Iran and Turkmenistan.⁸²² However these agreements can meet only the small part of Turkey's increasing energy demand beside of being evaluated as precarious due to the several political factors.

The energy dimension of the relations between Turkey and Russia which had been defined earlier in the framework of consumer-supplier relations tended to change with the promotion of Turkey to the role of energy transit hub in the East-West energy corridor due to the increasing Western, specifically the US, concerns about the rapidly mounting dependency of Europe, Turkey included, on Russia in this field. This led to the emergence of competitive pipeline politics between Turkey and Russia both in oil and natural gas sectors. Several projects are designed for this purpose. First one is the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC), 1768-kilometer-long oil pipeline project with the delivery of 1 mbd to the world markets, which kicked off in 2002 and became operational by 2006.⁸²³ "BTC is the first non-Russian main pipeline exit to the international markets built after the collapse of the Soviet Union".⁸²⁴ BTC project transports Azerbaijani oil to Turkey through Georgia. In later stages of the project, Kazakh and Russian oil is planned to be included.⁸²⁵ BTC is a project aiming to reduce the energy dependency of Europe on Russia by strengthening the hands of energy-rich post-

⁸¹⁹ Pamir, Necdet; "Turkey: A Case of a Transit State" in *Energy Security Challenges for the 21st Century* (ed. by Luft, Gal&Korin, Anne), USA: Greenwood Publishing, 2009, p.254.

⁸²⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸²¹ Oğan Sinan: "MAVİ AKIM: Türk-Rus İlişkilerinde Mavi Bağımlılık", *TÜRKSAM*, 02 January 2006 <http://www.turksam.org/tr/yazdir627.html>.

⁸²² "Natural Gas Sale and Purchase Agreements", BOTAŞ, <http://www.botas.gov.tr/index.asp>.

⁸²³ Yınanç, Barçın; "Old rivals, new partners: Russia and Turkey, tied by energy dependence", *Hürriyet Daily News*, 09 August 2010.

⁸²⁴ Pamir, Necdet; "Turkey: A Case of a Transit State" in *Energy Security Challenges for the 21st Century* (ed. by Luft, Gal&Korin, Anne), USA: Greenwood Publishing, 2009, p.251.

⁸²⁵ *Ibid.*

Soviet countries vis-à-vis Russia both in political and economic terms. The project as a signal of Turkey's desire of being energy transit hub led to irritation in Russia which wants to keep on holding the energy card in its hand with all possible means. Another project in the oil transport field is the projects designed to bypass the Straits for relaxing the heavy tanker traffic in the Straits. Turkey developed Samsun-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline Project crossing over Turkish territory whereas Russia initiated Burgas-Alexandroupolis Oil Pipeline Project bypassing not only the Straits but also Turkish territory.⁸²⁶ Russia signed an agreement with Bulgaria and Greece in 2007 for transporting oil from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean with the pipelines starting from Novorossiysk in Russia to the Adriatic Sea by crossing over the territories of Romania, Serbia, Croatia.⁸²⁷

BTC oil pipeline project is complemented by another project constructed in parallel, Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) Natural Gas Pipeline also known as South Caspian Pipeline (SCP), connecting Azerbaijan's Shah Deniz field to the Turkey through Georgia. It has been operational as of 2006. Its optimum volume is 6.6 billion cubic meters per annum and it envisages the transit of the additional volume of 3 billion cubic meters gas per annum to Greece in Europe with Turkey-Greece Gas Pipeline, with possible extension to Italy in further stages.⁸²⁸ The project has a certain degree of importance because of several advantages brought to Turkey such as cheaper prices, take-off rights and diversification of resources to provide energy security.⁸²⁹ SCP project came with some delay due to Russia's pressure on both Azerbaijan and Georgia to halt the project.⁸³⁰ Another project aiming to reduce the European energy dependency on Russia is 3300-kilometer-long Nabucco Gas Pipeline Project with the peak capacity of 31 billion cubic meters of gas per annum if it is realized by mid-2010s.⁸³¹ The initial steps of the Nabucco Project aiming to transport the natural gas resources of Caspian, Iran, Iraq and Egypt to Europe through Turkey was taken by Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Turkey in early 2002.⁸³² German RWE joined

⁸²⁶ *Ibid.*, p.252

⁸²⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp.254-255

⁸²⁹ *Ibid.*, p.254

⁸³⁰ *Ibid.* p.257

⁸³¹ Yınanç, Barçın ; "Old rivals, new partners: Russia and Turkey, tied by energy dependence", *Hürriyet Daily News*, 09 August 2010.

⁸³² "Avrupa Komisyonu Nabucco'yu destekliyor", *Milliyet*, 26 June 2007; "Brief History of Nabucco", http://www.nabucco-pipeline.com/portal/page/portal/en/company_main/about_us.

the Project as sixth investor in February 2008 and the EU declared its support to the Project at the Budapest Summit held in January 2009.⁸³³ The intergovernmental agreement was signed in Ankara on July 13, 2009.⁸³⁴ The possible suppliers of the Project are Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Iran, Iraq and Egypt namely the countries other than Russia.⁸³⁵ However even though the strong US support to the Project beside of the EU and Nabucco countries, there are several difficulties in front of this project. The initial obstacles are caused by the supply side. The ongoing instability in Iraq, the US reluctance with regard to the possible inclusion of Iran to the Project, the disagreement between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan over the sharing of the Caspian resources, Kazakhstan's ambivalence in joining to the Project led to the emergence of the question of finding the necessary amount of natural gas to fill in the pipeline.⁸³⁶ The problematic status of Caspian is also another factor taken into consideration since a possible sub-sea pipeline project in the Caspian depends on the consent of other littoral states. Apart from this, there is an ongoing discussion over the sufficiency of the supply reserves since these countries have already been engaged with other pipeline projects, mostly with Russia but also with China and India.

The Nabucco project increased the Russian disturbances further. In return, Russia came with another project named as South Stream Gas Pipeline Project. With this project, Russia plans to deliver 31 billion cubic meters natural per annum with a 900-kilometer-long pipeline connecting Russia to Bulgaria under the Black Sea by mid-2010s.⁸³⁷ Russia signed agreements with Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Serbia and Slovenia.⁸³⁸ France decided to join the South Stream Project in November 2009 upon its request to join to the Nabucco Pipeline Project had been declined by Turkey. Despite of the statements arguing that these two projects are not competitive, the experts agree on that the realization of these two similar projects at the same time is highly unlikely due to the questions with regard to the financing and resource sufficiency. Considering that the countries participating in both projects such as Austria, Bulgaria and Hungary, these questions become more

⁸³³ "Brief History of Nabucco", Nabucco Pipeline Project official website, http://www.nabucco-pipeline.com/portal/page/portal/en/company_main/about_us.

⁸³⁴ *Ibid.*

⁸³⁵ Pamir, Necdet; "Turkey: A Case of a Transit State" in *Energy Security Challenges for the 21st Century* (ed. by Luft, Gal&Korin, Anne), USA: Greenwood Publishing, 2009, p.254.

⁸³⁶ Kamalov, İlyas; "Nabucco-Güney Akım Rekabeti Devam Ediyor", 10 July 2010, *ORSAM*, <http://www.orsam.org.tr/tr/yazigoster.aspx?ID=474>.

⁸³⁷ "Yunanistan da Güney Akımı Projesine Katıldı", *Dünya*, 1 Mayıs 2008.

⁸³⁸ South Stream Pipeline Project official website, <http://south-stream.info/index.php?id=4&L=1>.

important. Vladimir Socor from the Jamestown Foundation argues that Russia wants to kill the Nabucco project with the South Stream project by adding that it seems difficult with reference to the Russian project falling short of having necessary gas resources to fill in the pipeline.⁸³⁹

The heightened competition on getting the transport right of the Caspian resources to the Western markets has proceeded as a chess play. Each move of one side is met by the countermove of the other side. In order to get the support of the European countries to its own project, Russia went on step by step. After Turkey signed memorandum of understanding with Iran to carry the Iranian and Turkmen natural gas to Europe in July 2007, Russia signed natural gas purchase agreements with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan in December 2007.⁸⁴⁰ Turkey's efforts for the normalization of its relations with Armenia in October 2009 which led to crisis in its relations with Azerbaijan stood Russia in good stead and Russia took advantage of the situation by signing a purchase agreement with Azerbaijan on October 14, 2009 to buy 500 million cubic meters natural gas as follow up to the agreement signed on June 29, 2009.⁸⁴¹ Thereby Russia happened to secure the supply of natural gas while insecuritying the competitor projects. The Five-Day war in Georgia dated August 2008 which is a pipeline transit country is recorded as a stick for the Nabucco project.⁸⁴² However severe gas crisis in Europe in January 2009 due to the problem between Russia and Ukraine, that 80 percent of Russian gas transported to Europe through this country, worked as a carrot for the Nabucco project.⁸⁴³

The second layer obstacles are caused by the demand side. The high-level of dependency of the countries constituting the demand side namely Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Austria on Russian imports also put forward the Russian factor.⁸⁴⁴ Since these countries' high-level

⁸³⁹ Yınanç, Barçın; "Old rivals, new partners: Russia and Turkey tied by energy dependence", *Hürriyet Daily News*, 09 August 2010.

⁸⁴⁰ Çınar Burak; "Tarihte Üçüncü Güç ve Orta Asya Enerji Savaşları", *Harp Akademileri Güvenlik Stratejileri Dergisi*, 08 December 2008, Volume 4, Number 8, p.30, http://www.harpak.edu.tr/saren2/files/GSD/guv_str_sayi_8_aralik2008.pdf.

⁸⁴¹ Samel, Matus; "Nabucco or South Stream?: A Political Drama Unfolds", *Global Politics*, 23 November 2009, Issue 9, <http://www.global-politics.co.uk/issue9/matus/>.

⁸⁴² Pamir, Necdet; "Turkey: A Case of a Transit State" in *Energy Security Challenges for the 21st Century* (ed. by Luft, Gal&Korin, Anne), USA: Greenwood Publishing, 2009, p.257.

⁸⁴³ Samel, Matus; "Nabucco or South Stream?: A Political Drama Unfolds", *Global Politics*, 23 November 2009, Issue 9, <http://www.global-politics.co.uk/issue9/matus/>.

⁸⁴⁴ Pamir, Necdet; "Turkey: A Case of a Transit State" in *Energy Security Challenges for the 21st Century* (ed. by Luft, Gal&Korin, Anne), USA: Greenwood Publishing, 2009, p.259.

dependency on Russian energy items make them susceptible to the Russian pressure. As a result of the combination of the initial and second layer obstacles, third layer obstacle appeared in the agenda with the support of some European countries to Russia's South Stream pipeline project. Energy companies from Italy, Bulgaria and Greece materialized this support by signing an agreement with Russia for the construction of the pipeline in May 2009.⁸⁴⁵ Turkey joined to the chorus later by offering the use of its territorial waters. This pretty much perplexing picture is the result of that each actor wants to see itself sitting in the winners lodge with the best possible advantages it could get. However it does not change the fact that there will be only one winner in this competition and seemingly irrational actions of the actors named above are just attempts to play to the winner of the competition without being sure of which one will be preponderant in the end.

However this new topic in the agenda neither keeps them carrying on their consumer-supplier relations nor announcing support to the forthcoming competitive natured projects of each other, or at least pretending so, for the time being. During the visit of the Russian Premier Putin to Turkey in August 2009, Turkey and Russia declared support to each other's project. Turkey's support to Russia's South Stream Gas Pipeline Project by giving permission to Russia in making feasibility studies in the Turkish territorial waters in the Black Sea in return of Russia's declaration of its commitment to 555-kilometer-long Samsun-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline Project⁸⁴⁶ appears like the beginning of a new cooperation area but it is not indeed. Turkey extends its support to South Stream by thinking that the project is hard to realize because of insufficient funding and supply. Regarding Samsun-Ceyhan Pipeline Project, Russia has not put its final signature yet. Even though Russian Premier Putin voiced Russia's support to Turkey's project, head of Transneft which is the major oil transit company in Russia, Nikolay Tokarev's statements favoring the transit of oil through the Straits instead of Samsun-Ceyhan option due to less cost is the first signal of disagreement in this issue.⁸⁴⁷ His further statements mentioning Russia's own oil pipeline project of Burgas-Alexandroupolis as less costly⁸⁴⁸ gives the possible direction of Russia's preference if the deal is not finalized or why the deal may not be finalized. While Turkey is

⁸⁴⁵ Samel, Matus; "Nabucco or South Stream?: A Political Drama Unfolds", *Global Politics*, 23 November 2009, Issue 9, <http://www.global-politics.co.uk/issue9/matus/>.

⁸⁴⁶ Yınanç, Barçın; "Old rivals, new partners: Russia and Turkey tied by energy dependence", *Hürriyet Daily News*, 09 August 2010.

⁸⁴⁷ Hacıoğlu, Nerdun; "Putin, 'Samsun-Ceyhan'a kefil oldu, Transneft yine dinlemedi", *Hürriyet*, 16 September 2010.

⁸⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

favoring Samsun-Ceyhan oil pipeline project connecting the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, Russia put its own project of Burgas-Alexandroupolis as competitive to Turkey's project. Russian political analyst close to Kremlin, Sergei Markov summarizes the main reason behind the Russian logic as the basic principle of the Russian posture in the pipeline politics with the statement of "If the pipeline passes from our territory we support it, if it does not, we don't support it,".⁸⁴⁹ Russia's support to any transit project giving the main role to Turkey would only be explained by tactical considerations namely either a strategy of *reculer pur mieux sauter** or a pragmatism of getting politically and economically advantageous position by being the part of that project if it cannot avoid it.

For a country like Turkey importing 92 percent of its oil need and 98 percent of its natural gas need⁸⁵⁰, over-dependency on one country has certain security risks in the long-term that cannot be ignored. Considering Turkey's primary energy consumption of 52,6 Mtoe in 1992 almost doubled in 2008 by mounting to the level of 101,8 Mtoe,⁸⁵¹ these risks get doubled. Currently, Turkey imports 65 percent of its natural gas and 40 percent of its oil from Russia.⁸⁵² These risks get much more serious if the country being dependent on is a country like Russia using its energy card as a weapon straightforwardly. This imbalanced situation disfavoring Turkey's position in the competition strengthens Russia's hand vis-à-vis Turkey. The head of Gazprom's contract-restructuring and price-formation directorate, Sergei Komlev states that; "Those talking about dependence on Russia should understand that Russia is also dependent on Turkey. It is mutual dependence,".⁸⁵³ On the other hand, Kremlin-connected political analyst Sergei Markov's simple but very clarifying statement on this so-called mutual interdependency as that "I want you to depend on me, rather than me depending on you." is noteworthy.⁸⁵⁴ Waltz explains this with the following words: "If I

⁸⁴⁹ Torbakov, Igor; "The Georgia Crisis and Russia-Turkey Relations", USA: The Jamestown Foundation, 2008, p.31.

* to draw back in order to make a better jump

⁸⁵⁰ Pamir, Necdet; "Turkey: A Case of a Transit State" in *Energy Security Challenges for the 21st Century* (ed. by Luft, Gal&Korin, Anne), USA: Greenwood Publishing, 2009, p.250.

⁸⁵¹ "Primary Energy Consumption", Statistical Review of World Energy, BP, 2010, <http://www.bp.com/productlanding.do?categoryId=6929&contentId=7044622>.

⁸⁵² Bhalla, Reva&Goodrich, Lauren&Zeihan, Peter; "Turkey and Russia on the Rise", 17 March 2009, STRATFOR, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20090317_turkey_and_russia_rise.

⁸⁵³ Yınanç, Barçın; "Old rivals, new partners: Russia and Turkey, tied by energy dependence", *Hürriyet Daily News*, 09 August 2010.

⁸⁵⁴ Torbakov, Igor; "The Georgia Crisis and Russia-Turkey Relations", USA: The Jamestown Foundation, 2008, p.31.

depend more on you than you depend on me, you have more ways of influencing me and affecting my fate than I have of affecting yours".⁸⁵⁵

This over-dependency limits Turkey's competitive maneuverability not only in the energy field but also in the political field. This became very evident with the following statement of Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu voiced when he was the Chief Advisor to Turkey's Premier:

For example, Turkish-Russian relations: Turkey is a member of NATO. Turkey is a candidate for EU [membership]-part of Western bloc, there is no doubt about it. But you can't say that Turkish-Russian relations can be like Danish-Russian relations, or Norwegian-Russian relations, or Canada-Russian relations. ... Any other European country can follow certain isolationist policies against Russia. Can Turkey do this? I ask you to understand the geographical conditions of Turkey. In principle, we are against isolation... Isolation creates a barrier... If you isolate Russia, economically, can Turkey afford this? ... Unfortunately, we have to admit this fact. Turkey is almost 75 percent dependent on Russia [for energy]. We don't want to see a Russian-American or Russian-NATO confrontation. ... We don't want to pay the bill of strategic mistakes or miscalculation by Russia, or by Georgia.⁸⁵⁶

Then the main question comes. If Turkey's dependency on Russia in the energy field is presented as a factor clipping Turkey's wings, how come Turkey will be able to keep on developing its own pipeline projects stepping on Russia's foot. Since this over-dependency will demand, sooner or later, some concessions in the energy field in addition to the ones in the political field. This situation leads to some errors in Turkey's pipeline politics. Turkey does not have a coherent policy in its efforts of reducing its over-dependency on Russia. On the one hand, Turkey has taken several steps to diversify its sources of supply. On the other hand it has created another field of dependency by giving the nuclear power plant bid to Russia and also has announced its support to the projects strengthening Russia's hand in the long term. Thereby another question came up that whether Turkey wants to play the role of energy bridge or just wants to secure its own energy supply by getting the utmost economic benefit it can get. Sinan Oğan, the head of the Ankara-based International Relations and Strategic Analysis Center states that, "Turkey only considers commercial profits and has to

⁸⁵⁵ Waltz, Stephen M.: "Structural Realism After the Cold War", *International Security*, Summer 2000, Volume 25, Number 1, pp. 15-16.

⁸⁵⁶ "Turkey's Top Foreign Policy Aide Worries about False Optimism in Iraq", 19 September 2008, *Council on Foreign Relations*, http://www.cfr.org/publication/17291/turkeys_top_foreign_policy_aide_worries_about_false_optimism_in_iraq.html.

change its policy in line with evolving conditions. Russia, however, follows a more strategic and geopolitical policy and gets closer to its final goal step-by-step.”⁸⁵⁷

To sum up, there are several obstacles surrounding Turkey’s ambitious policy of being the ‘fourth corridor’. The problems caused by the supply side are mainly political. Possible further energy partnerships with Iraq and Iran seem quite complicated in the current picture owing to the enduring instability in the war-torn Iraq and the nuclear issues driving Iran to the corner in addition to the technical problems in the flow of Iranian gas. Regarding the hydrocarbon resources in the Caspian region, the main obstacle is that the region countries have disagreement over the sharing of the resources due to the delimitation issue in addition to the region countries’ cautious balance policies not to pay the bill of the ongoing competition in the West by prioritizing their own economic benefits. These countries engagement with the other projects opens the discussion of the sufficiency of the supply for the projects crossing over Turkish territory. Russian factor emerges as a dominant factor playing significant role in most of the mentioned points. So Turkey has limited place to maneuver in this sense. The problems caused by the demand side is both political and economic since these countries attribute special importance to their relations with Russia due to their over-dependency and they do not want to put their supply security into risk because of the instability in the South Caucasus. These states’ tendencies leaning towards Russia put Turkey re/position itself somewhere neither very close nor too distant to Russia. Last but not least, the Byzantine games in energy politics running behind the soft diplomatic language made Turkey re/define its position along with its objectives by limiting its cooperation with Russia and/or vice versa.

⁸⁵⁷ Sarıışık, Döndü; “Nabucco falls behind rival Russian gas projects”, *Hürriyet Daily News*, 23 October 2009.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

“The greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century”⁸⁵⁸ namely the collapse of the Soviet Union had triggered dramatic changes in the regional and global equations of the international political structure. In accordance with the changing parameters in these equations, each and every state found itself in the beginning of a new dynamic international environment enforcing the re/evaluation of itself, identification of the possible new parameters and its place in this new milieu. These post-Cold War international circumstances which led to serious changes both in terms of micro and macro security levels mostly reverberated in the Eurasian geopolitical landscape. Within this atmosphere, Turkey and Russia, as two influential actors of the Eurasian scenery have attempted to carry on their complex web of relations which is mostly defined as cooperation and competition hand-in-hand. The problematic relations of the 1990s showing the characteristic of rather more competition gave its place to the rosy drawn picture of the relations since 2000s which was predominantly began to be defined at the level of ‘strategic partnership’ or cooperation impending to that level. However, contrary to the recently popularized tendency describing the bilateral relations within the framework of ‘strategic partnership’ or cooperation reaching to that level, the second decade since the abovementioned catastrophe of the last century, pragmatist considerations which were shaped by the changing conditions of the regional and international milieus constituted the basis of the current euphoria of rapprochement in essence. Even though the existence of the sources pushing both countries in the direction of the development of their relations, the dormant limits surrounding them are at stake. The thesis dedicated to find out the truth with regard to the very nature of the relations from critical standpoint analyzed the developments of the relations in these two decades and presented the sources and limits of this relationship by arguing that the latter issue is still dominant in crafting the relations, albeit, not in the surface for the time being.

The introductory chapter puts the anarchic, self-helping and insecure international structure bringing the issues of ‘security dilemma’ and ‘relative gains problem’ to the table as factors

⁸⁵⁸ “Putin deplores collapse of USSR”, *BBC*, 25 April 2005, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4480745.stm>.

limiting the long-term partnership based on mutual trust but injecting constant competition between these two states instead. Following the introductory chapter explaining the relations between Turkey and Russia within the perspective of the neorealist school of thought, Chapter Two gives the significant developments belonging to the Turkish-Russian security relations during the 1990s. The decade beginning with the dissolution of the Soviet Union led to a huge power vacuum in the post-Soviet landscape which resulted in several political, economic and social problems which surfaced with the inter/intra-state conflicts and transition problems. Turkey's assertive rhetoric and policies of the initial years caused by its eagerness to fill the vacuum continued until the change in Russia's policy focus declared with the Near Abroad Doctrine and Turkey's slowly being aware of the limits of its own capabilities. Turkey's lack of information and experience with regard to the realities in this landscape in addition to the insufficiency of its financial capabilities emerged as factors of the failure of Turkish model. Turkey also became more aware of the undeniable impact of the Soviet legacy in the post-Soviet landscape which is ready to be converted to the Russian interests. In this period of time, the bilateral relations became tense over the following issues: Karabakh conflict, Turkey's amendment of the Montreux Convention, Chechen issue, PKK activities in Russia, Russia's sale of S-300s to Greek Cypriot, PKK terrorist organization leader Abdullah Öcalan's temporary presence in Russia, Turkey's activism in the post-Soviet landscape and beginning of the rivalry on energy export routes. These points settled the experienced prejudices and insecurity between these two countries, albeit the ongoing mutual official visits and signed agreements on plethora issues from security to energy, while making them learn how to stand tight in the new parameters of the anarchic international structure. The security interests called both Turkey and Russia to some sort of managed cooperation and restrained competition.

Chapter Three took the developments of the 2000s in the field of bilateral relations into scrutiny to show the standing of the edgy issues of the 1990s under the new circumstances. Beyond doubt, the reign of the Russian leader Putin and his dynamic pragmatism appeared as a turning point for Russia so as for the bilateral relations with Turkey. However this pragmatism seeking power/security maximization by the use of several means does not mean the disappearance of the problematic issues and the insecurity between Turkey and Russia. Similarly, Turkey began to show the symptoms of analogous pragmatism in its relations with Russia. This happened to be confirmed by the bilateral agreement titled "Action Plan for Cooperation in Eurasia-From Bilateral towards Multilateral Partnership" signed in New York on 16 November 2001. Even though the relations were being open to question time to time when it comes to issues such as the Chechen issue, PKK issue and Russia's rejection of

the Annan Plan, the pragmatist understanding of both countries dragged them to manage the insecurity injected tension and to restrain the existing competition. There is no doubt that the objection of both countries to the war in Iraq relying on different reasons which might be categorized under the parallelism in security interests constituted a backdrop for the current euphoria of rapprochement between Turkey and Russia. Russia's intervention in the South Caucasus by the means of Five-Day War inserted further question marks in the minds of Turkish foreign policy makers although Turkey followed a policy of balance between the parties. Since it has been evaluated by the reasonable majority as the return of assertive Russia. Especially Russian policy of applying special custom procedures towards Turkish exports at the border throughout the entrance and stay of the US warships in the Black Sea carrying humanitarian aid to Georgia showed the Russian insecurity towards Turkey with regard to the implementation of Montreux and increased Turkey's concerns over Russia in these kind of specific situations. The agreements on trade and energy as symptoms of this rapprochement also gave the means serving to provide power maximization for affording necessary tools to guarantee their own national security interests.

Chapter Four dealt with the sources of the cooperation between Turkey and Russia which are composed of the diminution of mutual threat levels and proliferation of common interest areas. Diminution of mutual threat levels between Turkey and Russia as first pillar of the sources was introduced with the devaluation of the currencies of both countries in international politics namely relative power conditions. In order to measure the relative power between Turkey and Russia, population, economy and military are taken as three reference points agreed by almost all scholars of Realist school of thought. From Turkish point of view; diminution of Russian threat started with Russia's power loss in all three titles due to the severe results of its dissolution and transition difficulties. From Russian point of view, diminution of Turkish threat came into being with Russia's analysis of the limits of Turkey's power projection in the South Caucasus and Central Asia and confirmed with the failure of 'Turkish model' in these regions. Proliferation of common interest areas constitutes the second pillar of the sources. First, following the September 11 events, both countries joined to the coalition of the fight against international terrorism. Given the fact that both countries have experienced terrorism in its most severe forms at home and faced with harsh criticism from the West in their fights, it was rather a requirement than a mere choice. In the rhetorical part of the fight against international terrorism, Turkey and Russia took similar stands with regard to the definition problem of terrorism, UN's central role in the international activities against terrorism and their positions against Islamophobia. In the practical application of the fight against international terrorism, both Turkey and Russia gave

a limited hand to the war in Afghanistan due to different calculations. Russia's support is based on the following three points; strengthening its hand in Chechen issue vis-à-vis Western critics, solving the increasing extremism in its southern border threatening itself and the CIS countries without risking anything and gaining the opportunity of becoming fully integrated with the West through granting the Western military presence in Afghanistan, specifically the US, transit and transfer facilities. Given that Turkey is the second largest army in NATO surrounded by the majority of the potential crisis regions stated by both NATO and EU⁸⁵⁹ and in line with the principle of indivisibility of security, Turkey's support to ISAF operation is an expected development. However Turkey's support and contribution to the ISAF forces have been limited with giving the supply service in the back stage by standing aloof from participating in the combat forces there. Turkish authorities mostly attributed this to Turkey's own evaluation with regard to the necessity of applying new strategies other than classical military ones and the ongoing terror at home by giving more importance to the latter one. Russia also confirms Turkey's position in the necessity of applying new strategies. Secondly, beyond doubt, the objection to the US-led war in Iraq is the intersection point where Turkish and Russian interests meet, in the first phase against the operation as such and in the second phase against the disintegration of Iraq. Turkey's opposition to such an operation is caused by the impact of a war-torn Iraq on Turkey's national security, Turkey's economic losses due to war conditions and post-war circumstances with special reference to the cost of the Gulf war in the 1990s and the lack of Turkish public support to the operation as such. Russia's opposition is based on the destabilizing consequences of the expansion of radicalism from war-torn Iraq on Russia and its neighborhood, the unilateral action of the US bypassing the UNSC where Russia has voice and the economic losses of Russia due to an operation as such. Turkish Parliament's rejection of the 1 March motion allowing the US troops use Turkish soil in the invasion of Iraq was welcomed by Russia but as a surprise. Notwithstanding the concerns of both Turkey and Russia, the US realized the operation. Furthermore, the hood event on 04 July 2003 which was interpreted as the revenge of the rejection of the 1 March motion tensed the relations between Turkey and the USA by tightening the co-positioning of both Turkey and Russia against the war, especially with regard to the preservation of Iraqi territorial integrity and national unity. Thirdly, Black Sea dimension of the relations phased in with the BSEC and developed incrementally within the framework of the BLACKSEAFOR, the OBSH and

⁸⁵⁹ Atesoglu Gunes, Nursin; "The New Security Environment and Turkey's ISAF Experience" in *Contentious Issues of Security and the Future of Turkey*, (ed. by Atesoglu Guney, Nursin), England: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2007, p.179.

other littoral cooperation forums. However the most significant point behind what makes Black Sea as source of cooperation is the agreed understanding of both countries on the exclusion of the non-littoral states from the issues belonging to the Black Sea region. Indeed, Turkey and Russia have different reasons to do that. Turkey focuses on the preservation of the Montreux status quo and refrains from any act which will jeopardize this status quo. Turkey's silence with regard to Russia's objection against the US application for getting observer status at the BSEC in 2005 and Turkey's decision of acting together with Russia against the extension request of the NATO Operation Active Endeavor to the Black Sea in 2005 should be examined in this context. Whereas Russia still sees the region as vital part of its sphere of influence and does not want to see non-regional Western powers specifically the US there. Besides, Russia's big slice in tanker transit carrying Russian oil and gas exports via the Turkish Straits which is a route of roughly 3.7 percent of the world's oil consumption transiting per diem make Russia more concerned about any possible change disfavoring its interests in this specific region.⁸⁶⁰ Since the Russian way of securitization of the energy routes through either owning, if not, or eliminating the other actors that can work against its interests say so as well. The military exercises realized with the inclusion of non-littoral states are another tension source for Russia and thus indirectly for the region though not converted into a serious crisis up until now. Turkey has been following the skillful policy of balance and attending to the exercises made with both the littoral states and non-littoral states. Furthermore, the presence of the US forces in the Black Sea region through its military bases in Romania and Bulgaria which began to operate in the mid-2000s is another potential candidate of possible future crisis. Fourthly, the issue of arms sales has crucial importance for both parties. Turkey's problems of both getting the needed high-tech military products and the conditions of use due to the embargos applied by the major Western suppliers since the mid-1970s and Russia's desire of getting a big slice from Turkish arms import pie made them cooperate in this field.

Chapter Five took the limits to the cooperation between Turkey and Russia into scrutiny. As first limit, persistence of the culture of insecurity is explained with reference to the content and sources of this insecurity. The content involves the fear legacy with regard to the loss of survival and territorial integrity due to the traumatic experiences of both countries in their past. The sources cover the shared history full of mutual negative images resulted in prejudices and suspicions in both ways stiffened with the lack of dialogue culture, migration

⁸⁶⁰ Babali, Tuncay; "Turkey at the Energy Crossroads", *Middle East Quarterly*, Spring 2009, http://www.meforum.org/2108/turkey-at-the-energy-crossroads#_ftnref13.

flows during the imperial era from the Caucasus to Turkey and the Cold War era. Opponent identities as being competitive regional actors and also being non/NATO member, development of the bilateral relations with procrastinating the problematic issues in their bilateral relations and the desire of each party to hold trump cards ready to be served as tit-for-tat against each other are also the factors considered as sources injecting more insecurity to the culture of the bilateral relations. As second, mutual accusations pertaining to the PKK-Russia and Chechen-Turkey connections in the context of tit-for-tat is a serious limit keeping both states from developing healthy relations on robust ground. Even though the official approaches of both parties are mostly evaluated as satisfactory, the presence of latent units in each country under the name of either cultural foundations is concern for both Turkey and Russia. Turkey's request from Russia demanding the inclusion of PKK to its list of terrorist organizations is still not met by Russia. As third and fourth limits, restrained competition between Turkey and Russia in the Caucasus and Central Asia is analyzed. Turkish-Russian restrained competition in the South Caucasus is more salient compared to the one in Central Asia since the equally weighted strategic importance of this sub-region to both countries. In this sense, both countries have tended to evaluate each and every development in the South Caucasus as in the framework of the relative gains. Inter/intra- conflicts in the region constitute the hot spots with regard to the bilateral relations of Turkey and Russia. The picture gets more complicated with the region's increasing importance in global scale following the war in Afghanistan, the color revolutions resulted in the emergence of pro-Western incumbent profiles and the geographical position on the transit routes of energy supplies. Russia's assertive aggressiveness which confirmed with the Five-Day war in Georgia can be considered as a complementary to the Karabakh issue favoring Russia's standpoint vis-à-vis Turkey. Russia got the political leverage over Azerbaijan and Armenia through Karabakh conflict and achieved to do the same over Georgia with its move in August 2008. Thereby, it became impossible to solve any of the abovementioned issues in the Caucasus without including Russia to the formulation. Turkish-Russian restrained competition in Central Asia followed different path from the one in the South Caucasus due to several reasons such as dissimilar meaning of the region to Turkey and to Russia, geographical distance from Turkey, the preferences of region countries shaped by the Soviet legacy and lack of necessary Western attention to the region. Within the first decade since 1990, Western supported Turkish model failed due to the fact that Turkey's romantic discourse in the initial years was unable to analyze its own capabilities and the regional realities. The failure of Turkish model stymied the increase of the tension by giving the floor to Russia. During this period, Russia's both interest and influence in the region was apt to increase. Russia used CIS, CSTO and SCO structures beside of its bilateral relations within

the framework of its foreign policy activism. Turkish foreign policy designed with the mixture of public diplomacy tools and economic motivations does not have any element threatening Russian interests. However any change in this picture towards assertiveness will meet opposite power by Russian side. As fifth limit, NATO factor in the relations between Turkey and Russia was examined with reference to the Five-Day war and NATO-led ABM systems. It was shown that the delicate characteristics of the relations between Russia and NATO carrying the mutual mistrust would either directly or indirectly have an effect on the sensitive balances on this triangular equation. Despite of the ongoing cooperative framework of NATO-Russia relations, this fragile nature of the relations between these two will be a factor limiting the relations of Turkey with Russia. Since, whatever is said or done, Turkey was, is and will be 'above all a NATO ally' in the eyes of Russia. Russia's pragmatist policy of using the cracks among NATO allies, as happened following the Five-Day war, in favor of its own interests could give some maneuver place to Turkey but even this has also some serious limits caused by the lack of trust between Russia and these countries, skillfully implemented pragmatism of these countries and NATO's strong organizational structure. As last limit, energy dimension of the relations defined as competitive pipeline politics of Turkey and Russia to securitize the energy routes stretching from energy-rich Caspian to energy-hungry Europe by offering different pipeline projects passing through its own lands was scrutinized. Turkey wants to become the fourth energy corridor to guarantee the supply and diversification of energy resources and so the transit routes in order to decrease over-dependency levels on Russia. If this happens, Turkey will develop into an influential actor in European and global politics. However Russia's opposite moves caused by its competitive ambitions emerges as an obstacle. Russia's objections to BTC, BTE, Samsun-Ceyhan and Nabucco pipeline projects by offering alternative projects such as Burgas-Alexandroupolis and South Stream should be evaluated in this framework. Even soft and conciliatory discourse is getting dominant on the recent competitive projects of Turkey and Russia through supportive statements of each side to the other's project, this does not change the competitive nature of the projects and the fact that one of them will be successful in the end. Since the countries of both demand and supply sides want to be in the winning side in the end, they go for both of the competitor projects. This is an overt issue especially for Nabucco and South Stream projects. This situation keeps Turkey away from following a coherent policy by leading to confusion in the objectives namely just to secure its own supply or act as entrepot for diversification. Thereby the issue of diversification to decrease over-dependency is coming forward. For Turkey, over-dependency on Russian supply reaching to 75 percents is a major risk and the rhetoric of mutual interdependency does not save the face. As it is a very well know fact the degree and the item of this mutual interdependency is important.

Over-dependency of strategic items such as oil and gas will bring the issue of concessions in the energy field as well as political ones by limiting the maneuver capability of a country. The issue of that Turkey could not afford to isolate Russia due to its over-dependency on Russian energy was raised overtly by Turkey following the Five-Day war in Georgia.

To sum up, it is a fact that the relations between Turkey and Russia have been developing in the last decade more different than the status quo ante in the 1990s. Both the diminution of mutual threat levels and the proliferation of common interest areas resulted in the current euphoria of rapprochement. Notwithstanding that the sources of cooperation between Turkey and Russia encourage them to develop their relations in manifold fields, the limits emerge as the main element forming the basis of the relations and define the very nature of the relations. The existing limits surrounding the relations between Turkey and Russia keep both countries from developing healthy relations on robust grounds. Therefore the relations expressed with 'strategic partnership' or cooperation on its way to reach that level does not reflect the truth beneath the very nature of the relations. As this thesis shows the relations between Turkey and Russia have developed as in the form of pragmatic cooperation on both sides due to the existing limits.

All things considered, the sustainability of the current good-mood relations between Turkey and Russia in the forthcoming days seems difficult. At some certain point, these two countries will have to face with the factors limiting the development of their cooperation on robust grounds. In that kind of situation, either one of them will be accepting to give concessions or they will find themselves as positioned against each other since the chronic 'condition of insecurity' and 'relative gains problem' of the anarchic structure of international system will enforce them to do that. This will make the long-term and steady cooperation based on wide-ranging agenda set by both parties to reach 'strategic partnership' unattainable. Besides, relations with the West, specifically with the USA, NATO and EU have the potential to change the picture at some critical points.

REFERENCES

- “ABM project of the US in Europe”, US Policy in a Big World, 21 September 2009, <http://www.uspolicyinabigworld.com/2009/09/21/russia-obama-scraps-the-abm-system/>
- “ABD gemilerine geiş izni, tezkereyi hatırlatıyor”, *Ntvmsnbc*, 19 August 2008, <http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/456632.asp>
- Abdullaev, Nabi; “Turkey Buys 80 Russian Anti-Tank Missile Systems”, *Defense News*, <http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3737946&c=LAN&s=TOP>
- “Add. Prot. Combating Terrorism”, BSEC website, <http://www.bsecorganization.org/documents/LegalDocuments/agreementmous/agr3/Download/AddPrtTerrorism%20071120.pdf>
- “Afganistan'da komuta Türkiye'nin”, *Hürriyet*, 20 June 2002.
- “Afghan National Army Receives More Than \$3 Million Donation”, ISAF NATO website, 15 June 2010, <http://www.isaf.nato.int/article/isaf-releases/afghan-national-army-receives-more-than-3-million-donation.html>
- “Agreement”, BLACKSEAFOR website, <http://www.blackseafor.org/english/agreement.php>
- Akkan, Faruk; “Türkiye Moskova Büyükelçisi Akıncı: Rusya ile 100 milyar dolar ticaret hayal değil - ÖZEL”, *Haberrus*, 10 May 2010, <http://www.haberrus.com/gundem/2787-Turkiye-Moskova-Buyukelcisi-Akinci-Rusya-ile-100-milyar-dolar-ticaret-hayal-degil---OZEL.html>
- Aktürk, Şener; “Turkish-Russian Relations after the Cold War (1992-2002)”, *Turkish Studies*, September 2006, Volume 7, Number 3
- “Alexander Yakovenko, the Official Spokesman of Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Answers a Question from Russian Media About Turkey's Reaction to the Terrorist Act in Moscow”, Official website of the Russian Embassy in Turkey, 01 November 2002, <http://www.turkey.mid.ru/hron/18.html>
- Alison, Sebastian & Neuger, James G.; “Putin Says NATO Expansion Is Direct Threat to Russia (Update2)”, *Bloomberg*, 04 April 2008, <http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aq34xuTFCvx0&refer=europ>
- “Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'ne karşı gerçekleştirilen terörist saldırılara ilişkin olarak Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Bşkanı George W. Bush'a gönderdikleri mesaj”, Presidency of the Republic of Turkey official website, 11 September 2001, <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/ahmet-necdet-sezer-basin-aciklamalari/494/58262/amerika-birlesik-devletlerine-karsi-gerceklestirilen-terorist-saldirilara-iliskin-olarak-amerika-bir.html>

“Anatol Lieven: Russia-NATO relations have improved considerably”, Valdai Discussion Club, 06 May 2010, <http://www.valdaiclub.com/content/anatol-lieven-russia-nato-relations-have-improved-considerably>

“Apo Baskısı: Yılmaz Rus Büyükelçisi’yle görüştü”, *Milliyet*, 20 October 1998

“Apo düğümü Atina’da”, *Milliyet*, 02 February 1999

“Aras, Bülent; “Turkey and the Russian Federation: An Emerging Multi-Dimensional Partnership”, SETA Policy Brief, Number 35, August 2009

“Aras, Bülent; “Türkiye ve Rusya Federasyonu: Çok Boyutlu Ortaklık”, *SETA Analiz*, August 2009

“Armenian Population in the World”, Armenian Diaspora Conference Official Site, <http://www.armeniadiaspora.com/population.html>

“ATAK'ta ibre AB'den yana”, *Cumhuriyet*, 08 May 2005, <http://gbulten.ssm.gov.tr/arsiv/2005/05/08/01.htm>

“August 2008 Activation was between 04-26 August 2008 with Ukraine in command”, BLACKSEAFOR website, http://www.blackseafor.org/english/activation_2008_agust.php

“Avrupa kavgası kızıştı”, *Radikal*, 09 March 2002.

“Avrupa Komisyonu Nabucco'yu destekliyor”, *Milliyet*, 26 June 2007.

Ayan, Noyan; “S-300’lerin kilit adamı Büyükelçi Vladimir Çıjov Milliyet’e konuştu: Füzeleri mutlaka vereceğiz”, *Milliyet*, 14 February 1997

Aydın, Mustafa ; “Türkiye’nin Orta Asya Politikaları”, in Aydın, Mustafa & Erhan, Çağrı, eds., *Beş Deniz Havzasında Türkiye*, Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 2006, pp.3-7

Aydınlı, Ersel; “Russia's ‘Kurdish Card’ In Turkish-Russian Rivalry”, *Caspian Crossroads*, 1997, Volume 3, Number 2, 1997

“Aydın Tarihi”, Official website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, February 1992

“Aydın Tarihi”, Official website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information May 1992

“Aydın Tarihi”, Official website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, August 1992

“Aydın Tarihi”, Official website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, September 1992

“Aydın Tarihi”, Official website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, October 1992

“Ayn Tarihi”, Official website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, November 1992

“Ayn Tarihi”, Official website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, December 1992

“Ayn Tarihi”, Official website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, February 1993

“Ayn Tarihi”, Official website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, March 1993

“Ayn Tarihi”, Official website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, May 1993

“Ayn Tarihi”, Official website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, August 1993

“Ayn Tarihi”, Official website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, September 1993

“Ayn Tarihi”, Official website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, December 1993

“Ayn Tarihi”, Official website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, February 1994

“Ayn Tarihi”, Official website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, April 1994

“Ayn Tarihi”, Official website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, June 1994

“Ayn Tarihi”, Official website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, July 1994

“Ayn Tarihi”, Official website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, October 1994

“Ayn Tarihi”, Official website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, November 1994

“Ayn Tarihi”, Official website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, December 1994

“Ayn Tarihi”, Official website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, January 1995

“Ayn Tarihi”, Official website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, February 1995

“Ayn Tarihi”, Official website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, June 1995

“Ayn Tarihi”, Official website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, August 1995

“Ayn Tarihi”, Official website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, October 1995

“Ayn Tarihi”, Official website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, November 1995

“Ayn Tarihi”, Official website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, March 1996

“Ayn Tarihi”, Official website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, April 1996

“Ayn Tarihi”, Official website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, December 1996

“Ayn Tarihi”, Official website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, January 1997

“Ayn Tarihi”, Official website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, February 1997

“Ayn Tarihi”, Official website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, June 1997

“Ayn Tarihi”, Official website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, September 1997

“Ayn Tarihi”, Official website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, October 1997

“Ayn Tarihi”, Official website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, December 1997

“Ayn Tarihi”, Official website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, October 1998

“Ayn Tarihi”, Official website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, January 1999

“Ayn Tarihi”, Official website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, September 1999

“Ayn Tarihi”, Official website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, November 1999

“Ayn Tarihi”, Official website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, February 2000

“Ayn Tarihi”, Official website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, May 2000

“Ayn Tarihi”, Official website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, February 2001

“Ayn Tarihi”, Official website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, March 2001

“Ayn Tarihi”, Official website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, April 2001

“Ayn Tarihi”, Official website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, September 2001

“Ayn Tarihi”, Official website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, October 2001

“Ayn Tarihi”, Official website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, January 2002

“Ayn Tarihi”, Official website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, June 2002

“Ayn Tarihi”, Official website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information official website, October 2002

“Ayn Tarihi”, Official website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information official website, January 2003

“Ayn Tarihi”, Official website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information official website, February 2003

“Ayn Tarihi”, Official website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information official website, March 2003

“Ayn Tarihi”, Official website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, August 2008

“Ayn Tarihi”, Official website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, May 2010

Babali, Tuncay; “Turkey at the Energy Crossroads”, *Middle East Quarterly*, Spring 2009, http://www.meforum.org/2108/turkey-at-the-energy-crossroads#_ftnref13

Baker, Peter; “White House Scraps Bush’s Approach to Missile Shield”, *The New York Times*, 17 September 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/18/world/europe/18shield.html?_r=3&hp

Baldwin, David A.; “The Concept of Security”, *Review of International Studies*, 1997, Vol. 23

Balkaç, Nilgün; “Rusya’yla da vizeler kalkıyor mu?”, *Ntvmsnbc*, 13 January 2010, <http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25043934/>

Baran, Zeyno; “Turkey and the Wider Black Sea Region”, in *The Wider Black Sea Region in the 21st Century: Strategic, Economic and Energy Perspectives* (ed. by Hamilton, Daniel and Mangott, Gerhard), Washington, D.C.: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2008

“Basic Facts”, CSTO website, http://www.odkb.gov.ru/start/index_engl_official_statements.htm

Başlamış, Cenk; “Apo’ya Rus Koruması”, *Milliyet*, 22 October 1998

Başlamış, Cenk; “Ortak Olalım”, *Milliyet*, 05 September 2005

Başlamış, Cenk; “Roma’dan ayrıldı, Moskova sıkıldı”, *Milliyet*, 18 January 1998

Başlamış, Cenk; “Rus elçi sözünden döndü”, *Milliyet*, 24 October 1998

Başlamış, Cenk; “Rusya hem rahatladı, hem kozunu kaybetti”, *Milliyet*, 17 February 1999

Başlamış, Cenk; “Rusya Öcalan’a kucak açtı”, *Milliyet*, 05 November 1998

Başlamış, Cenk; “Rusya sessiz”, *Milliyet*, 17 November 1998

Başlamış, Cenk; “Rusya’yı son kez uyardık”, *Milliyet*, 09 November 1998

Bazoğlu Sezer, Duygu; “Russia: The Challenges of Reconciling Geopolitical Competition with Economic Partnership” in *Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power* (ed. by Rubin, Barry& Kirişçi, Kemal), USA: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001

Bazoğlu Sezer, Duygu; “Turkish-Russian National Security Interaction at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century” in *Türkiye-Rusya Arasında İhtilaflı Konular ve Çözümleri* (ed. by Gülten Kazgan), İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, August 2008

Bazoğlu Sezer, Duygu; “Turkish-Russian relations: The challenges of reconciling geopolitical competition with economic partnership”, *Turkish Studies*, 2000, Volume 1, Number 1

Beehner, Lionel; “Nagorno-Karabakh: The Crisis in the Caucasus”, *Council on Foreign Relations*, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/9148/nagornokarabakh.html>

Bekdil, Burak; “How not to buy weapon system”, *Turkish Daily News*, 23 November 2005, <http://gbulten.ssm.gov.tr/arsiv/2005/11/23/01.htm>

Bhalla, Reva&Goodrich, Lauren&Zeihan, Peter; “Turkey and Russia on the Rise”, 17 March 2009, *STRATFOR*, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20090317_turkey_and_russia_rise

Bigg, Claire; “Five Years After 9/11: The Kremlin's War On Terror”, *RFE/RL*, 08 September 2006, <http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1071174.html>

Bila, Fikret; “Apo sınırđışı ediliyor”, *Milliyet*, 30 October 1998

“Black Sea rotational force officially kicks off”, *EUCOM website*, 17 May 2010, <http://www.eucom.mil/english/FullStory.asp?article=Black-Sea-rotational-force-officially-kicks>

“BLACKSEAFOR Activations/Operations”, BLACKSEAFOR website, http://www.blackseafor.org/english/activation_genel.php

“BLACKSEAFOR”, Official website of Turkish Foreign Ministry, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/blackseafor.en.mfa>

Blank, Stephen; “From Kosovo to Kursk: Russian Defense Policy from Yeltsin to Putin”, *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, Winter 2000, Volume 12, Number 2

Blomfield, Adrian; “Russia piles pressure on EU over missile shield”, *Telegraph*, 15 November 2007, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1569495/Russia-piles-pressure-on-EU-over-missile-shield.html>

“Boğazlar Rejimi Hakkında Mukavelename (Montreux/Montrö)”, 20.07.1936”, Official website of Turkish Foreign Ministry, <http://ua.mfa.gov.tr/detay.aspx?2479>

“Boğazlar Tüzüğü Değişiyor”, *Milliyet*, 20 November 1997

“Böyle Kaçırdık”, *Milliyet*, 03 December 1996

“Brief History of Nabucco”, Nabucco Pipeline Project official website, http://www.nabucco-pipeline.com/portal/page/portal/en/company_main/about_us

Burnashev, Rustam and Chernykh, Irina; “Changes in Uzbekistan’s Military Policy after the Andijan Events”, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, 2007, Volume 5, Number 1, p.72

“Bush: 21. yüzyılın ilk savaşı olacak”, *Hürriyet*, 14 September 2001.

“Büyükelçilik Basın Açıklaması”, Official website of the Russian Embassy in Turkey, 19 February 2004, http://www.turkey.mid.ru/text_t18.html

Cabbarlı, Hatem; “Ermenistan ve Rusya Arasında Gelişen Askeri İşbirliği”, ATSAM – Eurasian Center For Security And Strategic Studies, January 2005, <http://www.atsam.org/ermenistan-ve-rusya-arasinda-gelisen-askeri-isbirligi/>

Caldwell, Lawrence T.; “Russian Concepts of National Security” in *Russian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century and the Shadow of the Past*, (ed. by Legvold, Robert), New York: Columbia University Press, 2007

Cameron, Fraser& Zheng, Yongnian; “Key Elements of Strategic Partnership” in *China-EU: Common Feature*, (ed. by Crossick, Stanley& Reuter, Etienne), Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co., 2007

Charnysh, Volha; “Russia Drafts European Security Pact”, Arms Control Association website, January/February 2010, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_01-02/EuropeanSecurity

“Charter of the Collective Security Treaty Organization”, United Nations Treaty Collection, Volume 2235, I-39775, http://untreaty.un.org/unts/144078_158780/5/9/13289.pdf, p.89

Christou, Jean; “Putin Calls for end of Turkish Cypriots’ Isolation”, *Cyprus Mail*, 12 January 2005, <http://www.cyprus-mail.com/cyprus/putin-calls-end-turkish-cypriots-isolation>

“Chronicle of main events at SCO in 2007”, The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation website, <http://www.sectSCO.org/EN/show.asp?id=97>

Cıvaoğlu, Güneri; “Tarihi Olay”, *Milliyet*, 14 November 1998

Cameron-Moore, Simon; “Turkey kicks off international meetings on Afghanistan”, *Reuters*, 22 January 2010, <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE60L4QG20100122>

“Concluding Remarks after a Meeting with Representatives of Turkish Business Circles”, Official website of the Russian President, 11 January 2005

Cornell, Svante E.; “Turkey and the Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh: A Delicate Balance”, *Middle Eastern Studies*, January 1998, Volume 34, Number 1

“CSTO's rapid-reaction force to equal NATO's - Medvedev”, *RIA Novosti*, 04 February 2009, <http://en.rian.ru/russia/20090204/119984654.html>

Curtis, Glenn E., (ed.); “The Emergence of Russian Foreign Policy” in *Russia: A Country Study*, Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1996, <http://countrystudies.us/russia/77.htm>

Çakırözler, Utku; “Aynı düşüncededeyiz”, *Milliyet* in Official website of the Russian Embassy in Turkey, 07 February 2005, http://www.turkey.mid.ru/text_t83.html

Çelikpala, Mithat; “Kuzey Kafkasya’da Anlaşmazlıklar, Çatışmalar ve Türkiye” in *Beş Deniz Havzasında Türkiye* (ed. by. Aydın, Mustafa&Erhan, Çağrı), Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 2006, pp. 100-101

Çevikcan, Serpil& Yinanç, Barçın; “Kafkas Paktı’na Destek”, *Milliyet*, 01 March 2000.

Çevikcan, Serpil; “Putin’den Ortaklık Teklifi”, *Milliyet*, 27 May 2000

Çınar Burak; “Tarihte Üçüncü Güç ve Orta Asya Enerji Savaşları”, *Harp Akademileri Güvenlik Stratejileri Dergisi*, 08 December 2008, Volume 4, Number 8, http://www.harpak.edu.tr/saren2/files/GSD/guv_str_sayi_8_aralik2008.pdf

Daly, John C.K.; “Montreux Convention Hampers Humanitarian Aid to Georgia”, *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, 03 September 2008, Volume 5, Issue 168, [http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=33915](http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=33915)

Daly, John C.K.; “Turkey Ponders Russian Missile Offer”, *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, 23 July 2008, Vol.5, Issue 140, [http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=33827](http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=33827)

Danilov, Vladimir I.; "Some Features of Russian-Turkish Relations in the 1990s", *Perceptions*, December 2001-February 2002

"Davutoğlu Kabil'de", *Hürriyet*, 20 July 2010.

Davutoğlu, Ahmet; "Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007", *Insight Turkey*, 2008, Volume 10, Number 1

Davutoğlu, Ahmet; "Türkiye merkez ülke olmalı", *Radikal*, 26 February 2004

"Demirel: Yeltsin taahütte bulundu", *Milliyet*, 05 November 1998

"Denizde kabus bitti", *Milliyet*, 20 January 1996

"Document On Confidence-And-Security-Building Measures In The Naval Field In The Black Sea", Official website of the Turkish Armed Forces, http://www.tsk.tr/4_ULUSLARARASI_ILISKILER/4_17_Karadenizin_Deniz_Guvenligi/pdf/ka_radenizggao.pdf

Doğan, Salih; "Türkiye'nin Afganistan'daki Varlığı ve Önemi", 17 August 2010, *USAK*, <http://www.usak.org.tr/makale.asp?id=1647>

"Duma'nın kararı etkilemez", *Milliyet*, 05 November 1998

Dunne, Tim & Kurki, Milja & Smith, Steve (eds); *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006

"Ecevit: Kesin Rusya'da", *Milliyet*, 22 January 1999

"Ecevit'ten Bush'a destek mektubu", *Hürriyet*, 22 September 2001.

"Ecevit'ten teröre karşı dayanışma çağrısı & Sezer: Teröre karşı uluslararası işbirliği artırılmalı", *Hürriyet*, 12 September 2001.

Ediger Volkan S.; "Turkey-Russia Energy Relations: Same Old Story, New Actors", *Insight Turkey*, 01 July 2010, <http://www.faq5.org/periodicals/201007/2114775591.html>

Eke, Steven; Russia 'blasts Nato encroachment', *BBC*, 10 December 2003, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3308563.stm>

Ekşi, Özgür; "İsrail yerine Ruslardan füze alıyoruz", *Hürriyet*, 11 April 2008.

Ekşi, Özgür; "Kayıp Helikopterlerin Sırrı Çözüldü", *Hürriyet*, 01 October 2007.

Enginsoy, Ümit; "ABD Karadeniz'e geçiş izni istiyor", *Ntvmsnbc*, 19 August 2008, <http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/456628.asp>

Enginsoy, Ümit; "Turkey in Talks for Missile Defense System Buy," *Turkish Daily News*, 29 April 2008.

“Erdoğan: Bütünlük korunmalı”, *BBC Turkish*, 14 August 2008,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkish/news/story/2008/08/080814_erdogan.shtml

“Erdoğan: Herkes silah satabilir”, *Milliyet*, 11 August 2008.

“Establishment”, BLACKSEAFOR website,
<http://www.blackseafor.org/english/establishment.php>

“European Security Treaty”, Official website of the Russian President, 29 November 2009

“Extracts from a Joint News Conference with President Jacques Chirac of France”, Official website of the Russian President, 15 January 2002

“Flag Ship Band rocks Odessa during Sea Breeze”, *EUCOM website*, 12 July 2010,
<http://www.eucom.mil/english/FullStory.asp?article=Flag-Ship-Band-rocks-Odessa-Sea-Breeze>

Freedman, Robert O.: “Russian Policy toward the Middle East under Yeltsin and Putin”, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs Letter and Viewpoints, 02 September 2001, Number 461,
<http://www.jcpa.org/jl/vp461.htm>

Freedman, Robert O.; “Russia and the Middle East: The Primakov Era”, *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, May 1998, Volume 2, Number 2

“From an Interview with the Polish Newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza and the Polish TVP Channel”, Official website of the Russian President, 17 January 2002

Gaber, Y.V.; “Turkey’s New Foreign Policy Strategy: Local, Regional and Global Dimensions”, 2009, Journal of Odessa National Mechnikov University, Volume 14, Issue 13,
http://www.nbu.gov.ua/portal/Soc_Gum/Vonu_sip/2009_13/index.html

Gaddy, Clifford G. & Kuchins, Andrew C.; “Putin’s Plan”, *The Washington Quarterly*, Spring 2008

“Gendarme of Eurasia”, *Kommersant*, 08 October 2007,
http://www.kommersant.com/p812422/CIS_CSTO_Russia_Lebedev/

Gilpin Robert; *War and Change in World Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981

Graham, Thomas; “The sources of Russia’s Insecurity”, *Survival*, February–March 2010, Volume 52, Number 1

Grieco, Joseph M.; “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism” in *Theory and Structure of International Political Economy: An International Organization Reader* (ed. by Cohen, Benjamin J. & Lipson, Charles), Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999

Grieco, Joseph M.; *Cooperation Among Nations: Europe, America and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade*, New York: Cornell University Press, 1990

Griffiths, Martin&O'Callaghan, Terry&Roach, Steven C.; *International Relations: The Key Concepts*, 2nd edition, London: Routledge, 2008.

“Gül: Afganistan'ı sadece askeri yollarla çözemeyiz”, *Hürriyet*, 05 February 2010.

“Gül: Toprak bütünlüğü mühim”, *BBC Turkish*, 12 August 2008,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkish/news/story/2008/08/080812_georgia_turkey.shtml

Atesoglu Gunes, Nursin; “The New Security Environment and Turkey's ISAF Experience” in *Contentious Issues of Security and the Future of Turkey*, (ed. by Atesoglu Gunes, Nursin), England: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2007

Gürcanlı, Zeynep; “ABD'li komutanı şaşkırtan 96 yıllık fotoğraf”, *Hürriyet*, 18 March 2010.

Gürcanlı, Zeynep; “Türkiye Rusya'dan savaş helikopteri alacak”, *Hürriyet*, 17 June 2009.

Gürdeniz, Cem; “Türkiye'nin Akdeniz ve Karadeniz'de Deniz Güvenliğine Katkıları”, in *Güvenliğin Yeni Boyutları ve Uluslararası Örgütler*, Dördüncü Uluslararası Sempozyum Bildirileri (İstanbul, 31 Mayıs - 01 Haziran 2007), SAREM, Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 2007

Haas, Marcel de; “Medvedev's Security Policy: A Provisional Assessment”, *Russian Analytical Digest*, 18 June 2009, Number 62

Hacıoğlu, Nerdun; “Cumhurbaşkanı Ahmet Sezer'den Vladimir Putin'e davet”, *Hürriyet*, 24 May 2000.

Hacıoğlu, Nerdun; “Putin, ‘Samsun-Ceyhan’a kefil oldu, Transneft yine dinlemedi”, *Hürriyet*, 16 September 2010.

Hendrickson, Gordon B.; “The Future of NATO-Russia Relations: Or, How to Dance with a Bear and Not Get Mauled”, The Atlantic Council of the United States, Occasional Paper, December 2005,
http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/82/0512-Future_NATO_Russian_Relations_Gordon_Hendrickson.pdf

Hill, Fiona and Taspınar, Omer; “Turkey and Russia: Axis of Excluded?”, *Survival*, Spring 2006, Volume 48, Number 1.

Hill, Fiona; “Seismic shifts in Eurasia: the changing relationship between Turkey and Russia and its implications for the South Caucasus”, *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 2003, Volume 3, Number 3

Hosking, Geoffrey; *Russia: People and Empire, 1552-1917*, Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1998

Huntington, Samuel P.; *Medeniyetler Çatışması ve Dünya Düzeninin Yeniden Kurulması*, İstanbul: Okuyan Us Yayın, 15th edition, 2006

“International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Operation”, Turkish Armed Forces website,
<http://www.tsk.tr/eng/uluslararasi/isaf.htm>

“Interview Granted to France-3 Television”, Official website of the Russian President, 09 February 2003

“Interview of Vladimir V.Putin, President of the Russian Federation with the Turkish Media”, Official website of the Russian Embassy in Turkey, 30 August 2004, http://www.turkey.mid.ru/text_t68.html

“Interview with the German Newspaper Bild”, Official website of the Russian President, Sochi, 18 September 2001, http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2001/09/18/0001_type82916_136376.shtml

“Interview with Turkish Media”, Official website of the President of Russia, 01 September 2004

“Irak operasyonu Türkiye'ye zarar verir”, *Hürriyet*, 14 October 2001.

“ISAF”, Official website of ISAF/ NATO, <http://www.isaf.nato.int/history.html>

Ismael, Tareq Y.& Kreutz, Andrej; “Russian-Iraqi Relations: A Historical and Political Analysis”, *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Fall 2001

İnalçık, Halil; “An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire Volume I (1300-1600)”, ed. by Halil İnalçık & Donald Quataert, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994

İnalçık., Halil; “ Osmanlı - Rus ilişkileri (1492 - 1700)”, *Vatan Kırım website*, <http://www.vatankirim.net/yazi.asp?YaziNo=57>

İşyar, Ömer Göksel; “Türkiye'nin Azerbaycan-Ermenistan Uyuşmazlığına Yönelik Politikaları: 1992-2004” in *Geçmişten Günümüze Dönüşen Orta Asya ve Kafkasya*, (ed. by Demirağ, Yelda&Karadeli, Cem), Ankara:Palme Yayıncılık, 2006

Jenkins, Gareth; “Is the End of the BSEC in Sight?,” *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, 22 April 2008, Volume 5, Issue 76, [http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=33571](http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=33571)

Jenkins, Gareth; “Ongoing Trade Crisis Demonstrates Turkey’s Lack of Leverage Against Russia”, *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, 09 September 2008, Volume 5, Issue 172

Jervis, Robert; “Cooperation under Security Dilemma”, *World Politics*, John Hopkins University Press, January 1978, Volume 30, Issue 2

“Joint Declaration between the Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation on Progress towards a New Stage in Relations and Further Deepening of Friendship and Multidimensional Partnership”, 13 February 2009”, Official website of Turkish Foreign Ministry, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/joint-declaration-between-the-republic-of-turkey-and-the-russian-federation-on-progress-towards-a-new-stage-in-relations-and-further-deepening-of-friendship-and-multidimensional-partnership_-moscow_-13-february-2009.en.mfa

“Joint Press Conference with President of the United States of America Barack Obama Following Russian-American Talks”, Moscow, 06 July 2009, Official website of the Russian President

“Joint Statement by President of the United States of America Barack Obama and President of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev Concerning Afghanistan”, Moscow, 06 July 2009, Official website of the Russian President

“Kabil'in komutası yeniden Türkiye'de”, *Sabah*, 31 October 2009.

Kamalov, İlyas; “Nabucco-Güney Akım Rekabeti Devam Ediyor”, 10 July 2010, *ORSAM*, <http://www.orsam.org.tr/tr/yazigoster.aspx?ID=474>

Kamel, Ayhan; “İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nın Bitiminden Günümüze Kadar Türk - Rus İlişkileri”, *Foreign Policy*, http://www.foreignpolicy.org.tr/turkish/dosyalar/akamel_p.htm

Kanbolat, Hasan; ‘What is Caucasian Stability and Cooperation? What can Turkey do in the Caucasus’, *Today's Zaman*, 19 August 2008.

Kandaurov, Sergei; “Russian Arms Exports to Greece, Cyprus and Turkey”, *Moscow Defense Brief*, Number 2, 2001, <http://mdb.cast.ru/mdb/2-2001/at/raegct/>

“Karadeniz Ekonomik İşbirliği Örgütü (KEİ)”, Official website of Turkish Foreign Ministry, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/karadeniz-ekonomik-isbirligi-orgutu-_kei_.tr.mfa

Karaganov, Sergei; “Russia's Uneasy Dance with the West”, *BBC World Lectures*, http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/people/features/world_lectures/karag_lect.shtml

Karagiannis, Emmanuel; *Energy and Security in the Caucasus*, London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002

Karaman, Tatyana A.; “Russia (1994-1996)” in *Civil Wars of the World: Major Conflicts since World War II* (ed. by DeRouen Jr, Karl&Heo, Uk), California; ABC-CLIO Inc., 2007

Karaosmanoglu, Ali L.; “The evolution of the national security culture and the military in Turkey”, *Journal of International Affairs*, Fall 2000, Volume 54, Number 1

Kardas, Saban; “Turkey and Russia Developing a New Economic and Strategic Partnership”, *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, 17 February 2009, Volume 6, Issue 31, [http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=34515](http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=34515)

Kardas, Saban; “Turkey Welcomes NATO-Russia Military Cooperation”, *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, 30 June 2009, Volume 6, Issue 125, [http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=35197&tx_ttnews\[backPid\]=7&cHash=9043ea02c6](http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=35197&tx_ttnews[backPid]=7&cHash=9043ea02c6)

Kardas, Saban; “Will the Closure of Manas Airbase Strengthen U.S.-Turkish Relations?”, *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, 23 February 2009, Volume 6, Issue 35, [http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=34544](http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=34544)

Karluk, S. Rıdvan&Tonus, Özgür&Çatalbaş, Nazım; “Güneydoğu Asya ve Rusya Krizi Karşısında Türkiye”, *EconTurk*, <http://www.econturk.org/tonus.pdf>

Kasım, Kamer; “The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict From its Inception to the Peace Process”, *Armenian Studies*, June-July-August 2001, Issue 2, <http://www.eraren.org/index.php?Page=DergiIcerik&IcerikNo=227&Lisan=en>

Kasım, Kamer; “Türkiye'nin Karadeniz Politikası: Temel Parametreler ve Stratejiler”, *Orta Asya ve Kafkasya Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 2008, Volume 3, Number 5

Kaufman, Stephen; “Romania Agrees to Host Ballistic Missile Interceptor”, US Department of State website, 04 February 2010, <http://www.america.gov/st/eur-english/2010/February/20100204155405esnamfuak0.8593866.html>

“Kıbrıs Türk Topluluğuna Ekonomik Yardım Planları Konusunda”, 28 April 2004, Official website of the Russian Embassy in Turkey, http://www.turkey.mid.ru/text_t46.html

Kile, Shannon; “Appendix 2. Chronology of principal defence and security-related agreements and initiatives involving the Russian Federation and Asian countries, 1992–99” in *Russia and Asia: The Emerging Security Agenda*, (ed. by Chufirin, Gennady), Sipri books, US: Oxford University Press, p.500, 1999

Kilner, James; “Factbox - NATO military exercises in Georgia”, *Reuters*, 06 May 2009, <http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKTRE5452WR20090506>

Kiniklioğlu, Suat and Morkva, Valeriy; “An Anatomy of Turkish-Russian Relations”, *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 2007, Volume 7, Number 4

Kınıklıoğlu, Suat; “Turkey and Russia: Partnership by Exclusion”, *European Stability Initiative*, 2006, http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_turkey_tpq_id_61.pdf

Kinzer, Stephen; “US must share power in new world order, says Turkey's controversial president”, *The Guardian*, 16 August 2008, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/aug/16/turkey.usforeignpolicy>

Klussmann, Uwe (*Translated from the German by Patrick Kessler*); “The Beslan Aftermath: New Papers Critical of Russian Security Forces”, *Der Spiegel*, 07 April 2005, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,363934,00.html>

Koçer, Gökhan; “Afganistan’a Asker Göndermek”, *Stratejik Düşünce Enstitüsü (SDE)*, 07 December 2009, <http://www.sde.org.tr/tr/kose-yazilari/70/afganistana-asker-gondermek.aspx>

Kogan Eugene; “Turkish-American Strategic Partnership versus Turkish-Russian Partnership without Strategy”, *Internationales Institut Liberale Politik Wien*, October 2009

Kohen, Sami; “Boğazlar Boru Hattı Değil!..”, *Milliyet*, 12 May 1998

“Komşuluktan Stratejik İşbirliğine: Türk-Rus İlişkileri”, *ORSAM Report Number 18*, May 2010

Konarovsky, Mikhail; “Russia and the Emerging Geopolitical Order in Central Asia” in *The New Geopolitics of Central Asia and its Borderlands*, (ed. by Banuazizi, Ali and Weiner, Myron), Great Britain: I.B.Tauris&Co Ltd., 1994

Kosyrev, Dmitry; “Foreign policy: Medvedev taking inventory”, *RIA Novosti*, 15 July 2008, <http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20080715/114049494.html>

Köylü, Hilal; “Yeni dünyanın ortaklarıyız”, *Radikal* in Rusya’nın Ankara Büyükelçisi Petr Stegnyy’in *Radikal* gazetesine verdiği mülakat, Official website of the Russian Embassy in Turkey, 23 July 2005, http://www.turkey.mid.ru/text_t101.html

Kramer, Andrew E.; "NATO Ships in Black Sea Raise Alarms in Russia", *The New York Times*, 27 August 2008, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/28/world/europe/28russia.html>

Küçükkoşum, Sevil; "Çatışma değil, ortaklık..." Tercüman in Rusya'nın Ankara Büyükelçisi Petr Stegnyy'in Tercüman gazetesine verdiği mülakat, 31 July 2005, http://www.turkey.mid.ru/text_t102.html

Laçiner, Sedat; "Turgut Özal Period in Turkish Foreign Policy: Özalism", *The Journal of Turkish Weekly*, 09 March 2009, <http://www.turkishweekly.net/article/333/turgut-Özal-period-in-turkish-foreign-policy-Özalism.html>

"Lavrov deploras Nato Cold War logic", *BBC*, 21 April 2009, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8011137.stm>

"Lebedev ne demişti?", *Milliyet*, 19 January 1999

"Leopard'lara PKK'yi Vurma İzni", *Vatan*, 05 May 2009.

"Letter dated 5 December 2001 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council", UN website, <http://www.undemocracy.com/S-2001-1154.pdf>

Light, Margot; "In Search of an Identity: Russian Foreign Policy and the End of Ideology", *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, 2003, 19 (3)

Lister, Richard; "US sends aid, but rethinks policy", *BBC*, 13 August 2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7559855.stm>

Lo, Bobo; *Vladimir Putin and the Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy*, London: Blackwell, 2003

Lungescu, Oana; US calms Russia's Nato fears', *BBC*, 29 March 2004, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3580533.stm>

Maher, Heather; "U.S. And Ukraine Strengthen Ties With New Security Agreement", 20 December 2008, *RFE/RL*, http://www.rferl.org/content/US_And_Ukraine_Strengthen_Ties_With_New_Security_Agreement/1361877.html

Marcus, Jonathan; "Russia send warning to the West", *BBC*, 14 July 2007, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6898897.stm>

"Maritime Security in the Black Sea", Turkish Armed Forces website, <http://www.tsk.tr/eng/uluslararasi/karadenizdenizisbirligigorevgrubu.htm>

Matunina, L.; "Rus Dış Politikasında Türkiye'nin Rolü ve Önemi" in *Türkiye-Rusya Arasında İhtilaflı Konular ve Çözümleri* (ed. by Gülten Kazgan), İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, August 2008

McGregor, Andrew; "Arming for Asymmetric Warfare: Turkey's Arms Industry in the 21st Century", Jamestown Foundation, June 2008

McMichael, William H.; “Obama sharply alters missile defense plans”, *Navy Times*, 19 September 2009,
http://www.navytimes.com/news/2009/09/military_missiledefense_obama_091709w/

“Medvedev'in beş ilkesi”, *BBC Turkish*, 01 September 2008,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkish/news/story/2008/09/080901_russia_fp.shtml

“Mikhail Kasyanov’s Visit”, Official website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, <http://www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/ta%C5%9Ffinans-newspot/2000/Nov-Dec/N5.htm>

Morrison, David; “Turkey restricts US access to the Black Sea”, 18 October 2008,
<http://www.david-morrison.org.uk/us/turkey-restricts-us-access.htm>

“Moskova'da generaller zirvesi”, *Hürriyet*, 17 May 1998.

Mowle, Thomas S.; “Transatlantic Relations and Turkey” in *Contentious Issues of Security and the Future of Turkey*, (ed. by Atesoglu Guney, Nursin), England: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2007

Møller, Bjørn; “National, Societal and Human Security: A General Discussion with a Case Study from the Balkans”, Paper for the First International Meeting of Directors of Peace Research and Training Institutions on *What Agenda for Human Security in the Twenty-first Century?*, UNESCO, Paris, 27-28 November 2000

“Murad Bayar”, *Defense News*, 29 June 2009,
<http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4160708>

“NATO encouraged Georgia – Russian envoy”, *Russia Today (RT)*, 09 August 2008,
http://rt.com/Top_News/2008-08-09/nato_encouraged_georgia_russian_envoy.html

“NATO Enlargement”, NATO website, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm

“NATO statement”, NATO website, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_43517.htm

“NATO’s navy delivers weapons to Georgia under the guise of humanitarian aid”, *Pravda*, 27 August 2008, http://english.pravda.ru/world/ussr/27-08-2008/106216-nato_georgia-0/

“NATO’s relations with Georgia”, NATO website,
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_38988.htm

“NATO’s relations with Russia”, NATO website, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-A06DEC4D-5B0D0664/natolive/topics_50090.htm

“NATO’s relations with Ukraine”, NATO website,
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_37750.htm?selectedLocale=en

“Nato-Russia links 'should remain”, *BBC*, 25 August 2008,
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7581004.stm>

“Natural Gas Sale and Purchase Agreements”, *BOTAŞ*, <http://www.botas.gov.tr/index.asp>

Nichol, Jim; “Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Security Issues and Implications for U.S. interests”, CRS Report for Congress, 14 January 2009, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30679.pdf>

Nizameddin, Talal; *Russia and the Middle East: Towards a New Foreign Policy*, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999

“Official Statements”, French Foreign Ministry website, <https://pastel.diplomatie.gouv.fr/editorial/actual/ael2/bulletin.gb.asp?liste=20030211.gb.html>

Oğan Sinan: “MAVİ AKIM: Türk-Rus İlişkilerinde Mavi Bağımlılık”, *TÜRKSAM*, 02 January 2006 <http://www.turksam.org/tr/yazdir627.html>

Oğan, Sinan; “Russian Federation’s Cyprus Politics, Turkish Centre for International Relations&Strategic Anlysis, 06 February 2005, <http://www.turksam.org/en/a249.html>

Oğan, Sinan; “The Black Sea: New Arena for Global Competition”, 24 August 2008, *TURKSAM*, <http://www.turksam.org/en/a195.html>

Oguzlu, Tarık; “Turkey and NATO’s Transformation”, *ORSAM*, 25 October 2010, <http://www.orsam.org.tr/en/showArticle.aspx?ID=307>

Oku, Asim; “Turkey-Russia Relations Dynamics”, Axis Information and Analysis (AIA), 12 May 2005, <http://www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=71>

“On Measures to Comply with UN Security Council Resolution 1373 of September 28, 2001”, Russian Foreign Ministry official website, 14 January 2002, <http://www.ln.mid.ru/bl.nsf/5d5fc0348b8b2d26c3256def0051fa20/66d955f1f458b98343256b41005ef790?OpenDocument>

“On the meeting of the Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov with Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Turkey H. Kyvykoglu”, Official website of the Russian Embassy in Turkey, <http://www.turkey.mid.ru/hron/8.html>

“Operation Active Endeavour”, NATO website, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_7932.htm

“Operation Iraqi Freedom”, Global Security, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraqi_freedom.htm

“Özal: Asker Gönderin”, *Hürriyet*, 19 May 1992

Özbay, Fatih; “Askeri Amaçlı Helikopter Alımı İhalesi ve Türkiye-Rusya”, 20 July 2005, *TASAM*, <http://www.tasam.org/pencere.php?altid=1250&islem=yazdir>

Özel, Soli & Yılmaz, Şuhnaz & Akyüz, Abdullah; “Rebuilding a Partnership: Turkish American Relations for a New Era/ A Turkish Perspective”, TÜSİAD Report, Istanbul: Graphis Print, April 2009

Pamir, Necdet; “Turkey: A Case of a Transit State” in *Energy Security Challenges for the 21st Century* (ed. by Luft, Gal&Korin, Anne), USA: Greenwood Publishing, 2009

Peimani, Hooman; *Conflict and Security in the Central Asia and the Caucasus*, California: ABC-CLIO, 2009

Peimani, Hooman; *Regional Security and the Future of Central Asia: The Competition of Iran, Turkey and Russia*, Westport, USA: Praeger, 1998

“Petrolde ‘Türk Boğazları’ resti”, *Milliyet*, 07 November 1998

“PKK Rusya’da Sıkışıyor”, *Milliyet*, 23 January 1998

“President Vladimir Putin chaired a meeting in Yeisk on the Russian military-diplomatic presence in the Black Sea-Azov region”, Official website of the Russian President, 17 September 2003

“President Vladimir Putin had a telephone conversation with Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer”, 28 September 2001, Official website of the Russian President

“President Vladimir Putin spoke by telephone with Turkish Premier Recep Tayyip Erdogan”, 24 March 2003, Official website of the Russian President

“Press Conference following the end of the G8 Summit”, 08 June 2007, Official website of the Russian President

“Press Statement Following Russian-Turkish Talks”, Official website of the Russian President, Ankara, 06 December 2004

“Press Statements and Answers to Questions Following Russian-Czech Talks”, 28 April 2007, Official website of the Russian President

“Press Statements and Answers to Questions following Russian-Turkish Talks”, Official website of the Russian President, 18 July 2005

“Press Statements following Russian-Turkish Talks”, Official website of the Russian Embassy in Turkey, 29 June 2006, http://www.turkey.mid.ru/text_t9.html

“Primary Energy Consumption”, Statistical Review of World Energy, *BP*, 2010, <http://www.bp.com/productlanding.do?categoryId=6929&contentId=7044622>

“Putin, Vladimir; “Russia at the Turn of the Millenium”, 29 December 1999 in *Putin: Russia’s Choice* (Sakwa, Richard), London: Routledge, 2004

“Putin's Prepared Remarks at 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy”, *The Washington Post*, 12 February 2007, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021200555.html>

“Putin deplores collapse of USSR”, BBC, 25 April 2005, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4480745.stm>
“Resolution 1441 (2002)”, *UN website*, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/682/26/PDF/N0268226.pdf?OpenElement>

“Responses to Questions from Russian Journalists”, 06 December 2004, Ankara, Official website of the Russian President

Rieber, Alfred J.; “How Persistent are Persistent Factors?” in *Russian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century and the Shadow of the Past* (ed. by Legvold, Robert), New York; Columbia University Press, 2007

Romm, Joseph J.; *Defining National Security: The Non-Military Aspects*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993

Rozoff, Rick; “Romania: U.S. Expands Missile Shield Into Black Sea”, 06 February 2010, <http://rickrozoff.wordpress.com/2010/02/06/romania-u-s-expands-missile-shield-into-black-sea/>

Rozoff, Rick; “U.S. And NATO Accelerate Military Build-Up In Black Sea Region”, Global Research, 21 May 2010, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=19259>

“Rubezh 2008: The First Large-Scale CSTO Military Exercise”, PIMS - Partnership for Peace (PfP) Information Management System, <http://www.pims.org/news/2008/08/06/rubezh-2008-the-first-large-scale-csto-military-exercise>

“Rus helikopterinde damping”, *Hürriyet*, 22 August 2002, <http://www.Milliyet.com.tr/rus-helikopterinde-damping/dunya/haberdetayarsiv/02.08.2010/57608/default.htm>

“Ruslardan Komik PKK Bahanesi”, *Stratejik Boyut*, 19 May 2009 , <http://www.stratejikboyut.com/haber/ruslardan-komik-pkk-bahanesi--19334.html>

“Russia and Turkey consider strategic partnership”, *RIA Novosti*, 13 January 2010, <http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20100113/157533140.html>

“Russia and Turkey to continue relationships beyond goals by Dmitry Medvedev”, *Today's Zaman*, 10 May 2010.

“Russia and Ukraine resume joint naval exercises”, *The Voice of Russia*, 16 April 2010, <http://english.ruvr.ru/2010/04/16/6503071.html>

“Russia angry over US missile shield”, *Aljazeera*, 15 August 2008, <http://english.aljazeera.net/news/europe/2008/08/200881514010734640.html>

“Russia Timeline”, *BBC News*, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/1113655.stm

“Russia to deploy missiles near Poland”, *The Independent*, 05 November 2008, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russia-to-deploy-missiles-near-poland-993981.html>;

“Russia to offer Turkey advanced surface-to-air missiles”, *Defence Talk*, 18 April 2010, <http://www.defencetalk.com/russia-to-offer-turkey-advanced-surface-to-air-missiles-27091/>

“Russia, Iraq near \$40 billion pact”, *USA Today*, 17 August 2002, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2002-08-17-russia-iraq_x.htm

“Russia, Turkey at odds over Cyprus”, *RFE/RL Newsline*, Vol 1, Number 127, 29 September 1997, <http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1141504.html>

“Russia: Countries That Host U.S. Missile Shield Will Be Targets”, *Fox News*, 19 February 2007, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,252771,00.html>

“Russia: Poland risks attack due to U.S. missiles”, *MSNBC news*, 15 August 2008, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/26203430/>

“Russian media: Turkey supports Georgia”, *Hürriyet Daily News*, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/home/9626649.asp?gid=244&sz=3441>

“Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov Meets with Turkish Deputy Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs Sukru Sina Gurel”, 12 September 2002, Official website of the Russian Embassy in Turkey, <http://www.turkey.mid.ru/hron/12.html>

“Russian National Security Blueprint”, <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/blueprint.html>

“Russian President Putin Visits Turkey”, Official website of the Turkish Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, <http://www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/ta%C5%9Finan-newspot/2004/nov-dec/n4.htm>

“Russian President’s Statement”, Official website of the Russian President, 24 September 2001, Moscow, http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2001/09/24/0002_type82912_138534.shtm

“Russian rebuff for Blair over Iraq”, *The Guardian*, 11 October 2002, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2002/oct/11/foreignpolicy.uk1>

“Russian ships join Turkish security operation”, *RIA Novosti*, 30 September 2006, <http://en.rian.ru/russia/20060930/54403204.html>

“Russian-Ukrainian war game Fairway of Peace 2010 starts in Sevastopol”, *Russian Navy website*, 22 June 2010, http://rusnavy.com/news/navy/index.php?ELEMENT_ID=9793

“Rusya - Türkiye Gümrük Sorunları ve Basitleştirilmiş Gümrük Hattı (BGH)”, Turkish Undersecretariat of Customs website, <http://www.gumruk.gov.tr/TR/abdisiliskiler/Sayfalar/RusyaBGH.aspx>

“Rusya Başbakanı Mihail Kasyanov Hürriyet'e konuştu”, *Hürriyet*, 23 October 2000

“Rusya Federasyonu Ankara Büyükelçiliği’nin Basın Açıklaması”, Official website of the Russian Embassy in Turkey, 10 December 2003, http://www.turkey.mid.ru/text_t9.html

“Rusya Federasyonu Devlet Başkanı Başdanışmanı Sergey Yastrjembki’nin İTAR TASS Haber ajansına verdiği özel mülakatı”, Official website of the Russian Embassy in Turkey, 10 March 2004, http://www.turkey.mid.ru/text_t34.html

“Rusya Federasyonu Devlet Başkanı Başdanışmanı Sergey V.Yastrjembkiy’in *Hürriyet* gazetesine verdiği özel demeci: Çeçen terörü artık iç meselemiz değil”, Official website of the Russian Embassy in Turkey, 11 March 2004, http://www.turkey.mid.ru/text_t35.html

“Rusya Federasyonu Devlet Başkanı' nın Başdanışmanı S.V.Yastrjembskiy'nin Rus İnterfax Haber Ajansına yaptığı açıklama”, Official website of the Russian Embassy in Turkey, 11 March 2004, http://www.turkey.mid.ru/text_t36.html

“Rusya Federasyonu Devlet Başkanı Vladimir Putin'e başsağlığı”, Presidency of the Republic of Turkey official website, 28 December 2002, <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/ahmet-necdet-sezer-basin-aciklamalari/494/58872/rusya-federasyonu-devlet-baskani-vladimir-putine-bassagligi.html>

“Rusya Federasyonu Dışişleri Bakan Yardımcısı Sergey S.Razov'un Anadolu Ajansı'nın Moskova Temsilcisi Nihat Dağdelen'e verdiği mülakat”, Official website of the Russian Embassy in Turkey, 12 November 2003, http://www.turkey.mid.ru/razov2_t.html

“Rusya Federasyonu Dışişleri Bakanı Sayın Sergey Lavrov'un Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'ni Ziyareti Hk.”, Official website of the Russian Embassy in Turkey, http://www.turkey.mid.ru/hron/pr_t_07.html

“Rusya Federasyonu ile Türkiye Cumhuriyeti arasında Avrasya'da İşbirliği Eylem Planı”, Official website of the Russian Embassy in Turkey, http://www.turkey.mid.ru/relat_2_t.html

“Rusya Federasyonu Savunma Bakanı'nın Türkiye'ye yaptığı resmi ziyaret hk.”, Official website of the Russian Embassy in Turkey, http://www.turkey.mid.ru/hron/pr_t_23.html

“Rusya PKK'yı terörist saymadı”, *Radikal*, 22 July 2006.

“Rusya Savunma Bakanı Serdyukov, Gönül'ü ziyaret etti”, *Milliyet*, 18 November 2008.

“Rusya silah satışında 10 milyar dolarla rekora gidiyor”, *Haberrus*, 28 October 2010, <http://haberrus.com/savunma/4056-Rusya-silah-satisinda-10-milyar-dolarla-rekora-gidiyor.html>

“Rusya, PKK'yı gözden geçiriyor”, *Hürriyet*, 07 December 2004.

“Rusya, Türkiye'yi yanında istiyor”, *Ntvmsnbc*, 18 January 2005, <http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/305647.asp>

“Rusya'ya nota”, *Milliyet*, 27 October 1998.

“Rusya'yla Yakın Temas”, *Ntvmsnbc*, 06 August 2009, <http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/24988352>

“Rusya'da Afganistan zirvesi: Medvedev Sovyet dönemi projelerin canlandırılmasını istedi”, *Haberrus*, 18 August 2010, <http://www.haberrus.com/politika/3466-Rusyada-Afganistan-zirvesi-Medvedev-Sovyet-donemi-projelerin-canlandirilmasini--istedi.html>

“Rusya'nın ABD'nin 'Füze Kalkanı Projesi'yle ilgili yaklaşımı böyle: Süreçte yer alırsak kalkan rahatsız etmez”, 22 October 2010, <http://www.nethaber.com/Dunya/165905/Rusyanin-ABDnin-Fuze-Kalkani-Projesiyle>

“Rusya-Türkiye dev projeleri uygulamaya başlıyor”, *Haberrus*, 06 November 2010, <http://www.haberrus.com/yorum/roportaj/4122-Rusya-Turkiye-dev-projeleri-uygulamaya-basliyor.html>

“S-300'lerde top Rusya'da”, *Hürriyet*, 21 May 1998.

“Safrastyan, Ruben; ‘On Turkey’s New Undertaking in South Caucasus’, Noravank Foundation, 29 September 2008,
http://www.noravank.am/eng/articles/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=3487&spphrase_id=1077

“Sahte kimlikle Rusya’da”, *Milliyet*, 19 January 1999

“Said, Edward W.; ‘The Clash of Ignorance’, *The Nation*, 04 October 2001,
<http://www.thenation.com/article/clash-ignorance?page=0,0>

“Sakwa, Richard; *Putin: Russia’s Choice*, London: Routledge, 2004

Samel, Matus; “Nabucco or South Stream?: A Political Drama Unfolds”, *Global Politics*, 23 November 2009, Issue 9, <http://www.global-politics.co.uk/issue9/matus/>

Sanders, Deborah; “U.S. Naval Diplomacy in the Black Sea: Sending Mixed Messages”, *Naval War College Review*, 22 June 2007, Volume 60, Number 3

Sariibrahimoğlu, Lale; “Turkey’s four-star generals protest Turkish-US meeting”, *Today’s Zaman*, 14 April 2008

Sarıışık, Döndü; “Nabucco falls behind rival Russian gas projects”, *Hürriyet Daily News*, 23 October 2009.

Sarıışık, Döndü; “Envoy: No strategic partnership between Turkey, Russia”, *Hürriyet Daily News*, 19 January 2010.

Scheineson, Andrew; “The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation”, Council on Foreign Relations, 24 March 2009, http://www.cfr.org/publication/10883/shanghai_cooperation_organization.html

Schmidt, Brian C.; “Competing Realist Conceptions of Power”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 2005, Volume 33, Number 3,
http://www.iiss.ee/files/7/IISS6001Schmidt_Realist%20conceptions%20of%20power_2005.pdf

“Security policy in an era of budgetary constraint: Speech by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the annual conference of the Security and Defence Agenda in Brussels”, NATO website, 21 June 2010, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_64563.htm

Şener, Nedim; “Ortak projeleri askıya alırız”, *Milliyet*, 06 November 1998

Singh, Gajendra K.; ‘Russian Bear Calls on Grey Wolf’, 24 August 2004,
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/FH28Ag01.html

“South Stream Pipeline Project official website, <http://south-stream.info/index.php?id=4&L=1>

“Speech at a Meeting on Issues of the Russian Military-Diplomatic Presence in the Black Sea-Azov Region”, Official website of the Russian President, 17 September 2003

“Statement by Alexander Lebedev, the Russian Ambassador to Turkey, Regarding the Terrorist Act in Moscow”, Official website of the Russian Embassy in Turkey, 01 November 2002,
<http://www.turkey.mid.ru/hron/17.html>

“Statement by Alexander Yakovenko, the Official Spokesman of Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs”, Official website of the Russian Embassy in Turkey, <http://www.turkey.mid.ru/hron/23.html>

“Statement by Alexander Yakovenko, The Official Spokesman Of Russia's Ministry Of Foreign Affairs”, Official website of the Russian Embassy in Turkey, 20 November 2002, <http://www.turkey.mid.ru/hron/20.html>

“Statement by Gennady Gatilov, Acting Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the UN”, Security Council Meeting on Cyprus, 21 April 2004, Official website of the Russian Embassy in Turkey, http://www.turkey.mid.ru/text_t41.html

“Statement by President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev”, Official website of the Russian President, 26 August 2008, http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/08/26/1543_type82912_205752.shtml

“Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation on the Vote in the United Nations Security Council on the Draft Resolution on Cyprus Settlement”, 22 April, 2004, Official website of the Russian Embassy in Turkey, http://www.turkey.mid.ru/text_t42.html

Stein, Arthur A.; “The Hegemon’s Dilemma: Great Britain, the United States, and the International Economic Order” in *Theory and Structure of International Political Economy: An International Organization Reader* (ed. by Cohen, Benjamin J.& Lipson, Charles), Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999

Stepanova, Ekaterina; “The Fight against Terrorism” in *Russia as a Great Power: Dimensions of Security under Putin*, (ed. by Hedenskog, Jakob&Konander Vilhelm&Nugren, Bertil&Oldberg, Ingmar&Pirsiainen, Christer), Oxon: Routledge, 2005

Stott, Michael; “U.S. sees Iran, Afghanistan as gains in Russia relationship”, *Reuters*, 28 May 2010, <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE64R1JP20100528>

“Stratejik Ortaklık Önerisi”, *Milliyet*, 17 December 1997

“Summits”, The Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, <http://www.bsec-organization.org/documents/declaration/summit/Pages/summit.aspx>

Sweeney, Conor; “Medvedev objects to "endless" NATO expansion”, *Reuters*, 25 February 2010, <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE61O2OQ20100225>

Sweeney, Conor; “Russia names NATO expansion as national threat”, *Reuters*, 05 February 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6144LA20100205?loomia_ow=t0:s0:a49:g43:r1:c1.000000:b31090546:z0

Tanrısever, Oktay F.; “Sovyet Sonrası Dönemde Rusya’nın Kafkasya Politikası” in *Türkiye’nin Komşuları* (ed. by Türkeş, Mustafa and Uzgel, İlhan), İstanbul: İmge Kitabevi, 2002

Tanrısever, Oktay F.; “Turkey and Russia in Eurasia” in *The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy*, (ed. by Lenore, Martin G.&Keridis, Dimitris), Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004

Tanrısever, Oktay F.; “Turkey and the Russian Federation: Towards a Mutual Understanding?” in *Turkey’s Foreign Policy in the 21st Century: A Changing Role in World Politics* (ed. by Ismael, Tareq Y.&Aydın, Mustafa), Great Britain: MPG Books, 2003

Taşpınar, Ömer; “Batı'ya kızgınlık büyüyor”, *Radikal*, 27 July 2005.

Tellal, Erel; “Avrasya’da Türkiye-Rusya İlişkileri” in *Beş Deniz Havzasında Türkiye* (ed. by Mustafa Aydın&Çağrı Erhan), Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 2006.

“Terörizm-Din bağlantısı”, Turkish Foreign Ministry official website, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/terorizm-din-baglantis_i_.tr.mfa.

Terrill, Andrew W.; “Strategic Effects of the Conflict with Iraq: The Middle East, North Africa, and Turkey”, Strategic Studies Institute, March 2003

“The Alma-Ata Declaration”, Library of Congress, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/belarus/by_appnc.html

“The Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation”, <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/russia-mil-doc.html>

“The Chechen Republic is an integral part of the Russian Federation” (Article by P.Stegniy, the Ambassador of the Russian Federation to Turkey published in *Turkish Daily News* 19.07.03), Official website of the Russian Embassy in Turkey, 19 July 2003, <http://www.turkey.mid.ru/hron/37.html>

“The draft of the European Security Treaty has been published”, Official website of the Russian President, 29 November 2009

“The First Visit of Vladimir Putin to Turkey (5-6.12.2004)”, AxisGlobe, 21 August 2005, <http://www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=332>.

“The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation”, 28 June 2000, <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/econcept.htm>

“The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation”, Official website of the Russian Foreign Ministry website, 17 July 2008

“The Meetings of the Leaders of the Black Sea Littoral States Border/Coast Guard Agencies and Black Sea Cooperation Forum, Turkish Coast Guard Command website, http://www.sgk.tsk.tr/baskanliklar/genel_sekreterlik/ingilizce/international_relations.asp

“The Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), http://web.archive.org/web/20070928091304/http://www.bsec-organization.org/main.aspx?ID=About_BSEC

“The Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia (IIFFMCG)”, Volume I, September 2009, http://www.ceiig.ch/pdf/IIFFMCG_Volume_I.pdf

“The Shanghai Cooperation Organization”, Chinese Foreign Ministry Website, <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/sco/t57970.htm>

Thorun, Christian; *Explaining Change in Russian Foreign Policy: The Role of Ideas in Post-Soviet Russia's Conduct towards the West*, Great Britain: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009

Tınc, Ferai: “Türkiye, Orta Asya'dan siliniyor”, *Hürriyet*, 30 April 2000.

Torbakov, Igor; ‘A New Security Arrangement Takes Shape in the South Caucasus’, *Eurasia Insight*, 24 January 2002,
<http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav012402.shtml>

Torbakov, Igor; “Making Sense of the Current Phase of Turkish-Russian Relations, Jamestown Foundation Occasional Paper, October 2007

Torbakov, Igor; “The Georgia Crisis and Russia-Turkey Relations”, USA: The Jamestown Foundation, 2008

Torbakov, Igor; Turkey Sides With Moscow Against Washington On Black Sea Force, *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, 03 March 2006, Volume 3, Issue 43,
[http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=31442](http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=31442)

Torbakov, Ivan; “Making Sense of the Current Phase of Turkish-Russian Relations”, Jamestown Foundation Occasional Paper, October 2007

“Transcript of a Meeting with the French Regional Press and TV Channels”, Official website of the Russian President, 12 February 2003

“Transcript of Meeting with Participants in the Third Meeting of the Valdai Discussion Club”, Novo-Ogaryovo, 09 September 2006, Official website of the Russian President

“Transcript of Minister of Foreign Affairs of The Russian Federation Igor Ivanov's Remarks at Press Conference Following Signing of a Russian-Turkish Document (New York, November 16, 2001)”, Official website of the Russian Embassy in Turkey,
<http://www.turkey.mid.ru/hron/31.html>

“Transcript of Remarks and Response to Media Questions by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov at Joint Press Conference with Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs Ali Babajan, Istanbul, September 2, 2008”, Russian Foreign Ministry website, 03 September 2008,
http://www.un.int/russia/new/MainRoot/docs/off_news/030908/newen3.htm

“Transcript of the Meeting with Moscow Bureau Chiefs of Leading US Media”, Moscow, 10 November 2001, Official website of the Russian President

Traynor, Ian; “US and Russian warships line up in dispute over Georgia”, *The Guardian*, 27 August 2008, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/aug/27/georgia.russia1>

Trenin, Dimitri; “Russia's Security Interests and Policies in the Caucasus Region” in *Contested Borders in the Caucasus*, (ed. by Bruno Coppieters), Brussel: VUB University Press, 1996

Trenin, Dmitri; “Russia’s Threat Perception and Strategic Posture” in *Russian Security Strategy Under Putin: U.S. and Russian Perspectives*, Strategic Studies Institute, November 2007, p.41

“Türk Boğazları”, Official website of Turkish Foreign Ministry, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turk-bogazlari.tr.mfa>

“Turkey and Russia move closer to building strategic partnership”, *Today’s Zaman*, 15 January 2010.

“Turkey and Russia on way to strategic partnership”, *Hürriyet Daily News*, 11 January 2010.

“Turkey Announces the Start of Contract Negotiations with AgustaWestland for the ATAK Project”, AgustaWestland website, 31 March 2007, <http://www.agustawestland.com/node/3399>

“Turkey Finally Lands Its Attack Helicopters”, *Defense Industry Daily*, 20 June 2010, <http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/turkey-shortlists-2-attack-helicopters-updated-02397/>

“Turkey interested in S-400 air defense systems from Russia”, *Defence Talk*, 28 April 2009, <http://www.defencetalk.com/turkey-s-400-air-defense-systems-russia-18229/>

“Turkey no longer considers Russia a threat”, *RIA Novosti*, 24 August 2010, <http://en.rian.ru/papers/20100824/160323433.html>

“Turkey to buy Russian Mi-28 attack helicopters”, *Defence Talk*, 16 June 2009, <http://www.defencetalk.com/turkey-to-buy-russian-mi-28-attack-helicopters-19825/>

“Turkey, Russia enter era of strategic partnership”, *Today’s Zaman*, 16 May 2010.

“Turkey, Russia eye strategic partnership in Medvedev visit”, *Today’s Zaman*, 11 May 2010.

“Turkey’s Contribution to Afghanistan”, Turkish Foreign Ministry Booklet, June 2010

“Turkey’s Security Perspective, Historical and Conceptual Background, Turkey’s contributions”, Official website of Turkish Foreign Ministry, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/i_turkey_s-security-perspective-historical-and-conceptual-background-turkey_s-contributions.en.mfa

“Turkey’s Political Relations with the Russian Federation”, Official website of Turkish Foreign Ministry, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-political-relations-with-russian-federation.en.mfa

“Turkey's Top Foreign Policy Aide Worries about False Optimism in Iraq”, 19 September 2008, Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/publication/17291/turkeys_top_foreign_policy_aide_worries_about_false_optimism_in_iraq.html

“Turkish-Russian ties evolve into strategic partnership”, *Today’s Zaman*, 13 May 2010.

“Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanı Sayın Ahmet Davutoğlu’nun Rusya Federasyonu’na yaptığı çalışma ziyaret hk.”, Official website of the Russian Embassy in Turkey, http://www.turkey.mid.ru/hron/pr_t_26.html

“Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Genelkurmay Başkanlığı ile Rusya Federasyonu Savunma Bakanlığı Arasında Silahlı Kuvvetler Personel Ailelerinin Sosyal ve Kültürel Amaçlı Mübadelesine İlişkin Protokol”, 28 August 1995, Official website of Turkish Foreign Ministry, <http://ua.mfa.gov.tr/detay.aspx?5716>

“Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Genelkurmay Başkanlığı ve Rusya Federasyonu Silahlı Kuvvetleri Genelkurmay Başkanlığı Arasında İmzalanan "Mutabakat Zaptı'nın Onaylanması Hakkında Karar”, 20 May 1998, Official website of Turkish Foreign Ministry, <http://ua.mfa.gov.tr/detay.aspx?6120>

“Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti ile Rusya Federasyonu Hükümeti Arasında Askeri Teknik Konular ve Savunma Sanayii Alanında İşbirliği Yapılmasına Dair Anlaşma”, 18 August 1994, Official website of Turkish Foreign Ministry, <http://ua.mfa.gov.tr/detay.aspx?5471>

“Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti ile Rusya Federasyonu Hükümeti Arasında İmzalanan Terörizm ile Mücadele Alanında İşbirliğine İlişkin Memorandum”, 18 December 1996, Official website of Turkish Foreign Ministry, <http://ua.mfa.gov.tr/detay.aspx?5869>

“Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti ile Rusya Federasyonu Hükümeti Arasında Askeri Teknik Konular ve Savunma Sanayii Alanında İşbirliği Yapılmasına Dair Anlaşma'nın Beşinci Maddesinde Öngörülen Karma Komisyonun Teşkiline İlişkin Protokol”, 16 May 2002, Official website of Turkish Foreign Ministry, <http://ua.mfa.gov.tr/detay.aspx?6899>

“Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti ile Rusya Federasyonu Hükümeti Arasında Savunma Sanayii Alanında İkili İş Birliği Süresince Mübadele Edilen veya Oluşturulan Gizlilik Dereceli Bilgi ve Malzemelerin Karşılıklı Korunması Anlaşması”, 06 December 2004, Official website of Turkish Foreign Ministry, <http://ua.mfa.gov.tr/detay.aspx?15462>

“Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümeti ile Rusya Federasyonu Hükümeti Arasında Askeri Teknik Konular ve Savunma Sanayi Alanında İşbirliği Yapılmasına Dair Anlaşma”, 20 April 1994, Official website of Turkish Foreign Ministry, <http://ua.mfa.gov.tr/detay.aspx?5471>

“Türkiye Cumhuriyeti İçişleri Bakanlığı ile Rusya Federasyonu Güvenlik Bakanlığı Arasında İşbirliğine İlişkin Anlaşması”, 28 October 1992, Official website of Turkish Foreign Ministry, <http://ua.mfa.gov.tr/detay.aspx?5283>

“Türkiye Cumhuriyeti İçişleri Bakanlığı ile Rusya Federasyonu İçişleri Bakanlığı Arasında İşbirliği Anlaşması”, 30 October 1992, Official website of Turkish Foreign Ministry, <http://ua.mfa.gov.tr/detay.aspx?7050>

“Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ile Rusya Federasyonu Arasındaki İlişkilerin Esasları Hakkında Antlaşma”, 25 May 1992, Official website of Turkish Foreign Ministry, <http://ua.mfa.gov.tr/detay.aspx?5411>

“Türkiye Rusya'dan Mi-28 tipi savaş helikopteri satın almak istiyor”, *Milliyet*, 11 June 2009.

“Türkiye Rusya'nın yeni stratejik ortağı”, *Haberrus*, 10 May 2010, <http://www.haberrus.com/yorum/roportaj/2783-Turkiye-Rusyanin-yeni-stratejik-ortagi.html>

“Türkiye, Rusya'nın stratejik müttefiki olabilir”, *Hürriyet*, 19 February 2009.

“Türkiye'den Moskova'ya Uyarı”, *Milliyet*, 07 January 1997

“Türkiye-Afganistan Siyasi İlişkileri”, Official website of Turkish Foreign Ministry, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-afganistan_siyasi-iliskileri.tr.mfa

“Türkiye-Ermenistan Siyasi İlişkileri”, Official website of Turkish Foreign Ministry, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-ermenistan-siyasi-iliskileri.tr.mfa>

“Türkiye'nin Terörizmle Mücadele Konusundaki Tutumu”, Official website of Turkish Foreign Ministry, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye_nin-terorizmle-mucadele-konusundaki-tutumu-tr.mfa

“Türkiye-Rusya Federasyonu Siyasi İlişkileri”, Official website of Turkish Foreign Ministry, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-rusya-federasyonu-siyasi-iliskileri.tr.mfa>

“Türkiye-Rusya İlişkileri Çalıştay Raporu”, *SETA*, December 2009

“Türkiye-Rusya: İşbirliğimiz ivme kazanacak”, *Hürriyet*, 06 December 2004.

“U.S. to take control of Georgian ports: Saakashvili”, *Reuters*, 13 August 2008, <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLD49893320080813>

“U.S.-Russia Relations: ‘Reset’ Fact Sheet”, The White House website, 24 June 2010, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/us-russia-relations-reset-fact-sheet>

“Ukrainian parliament ratifies agreement extending Russian Black Sea Fleet's presence in Crimea”, 27 April 2010, *Kyiv Post*, <http://www.kyivpost.com/news/politics/detail/65103/#ixzz0yDGEdzOn>

“Ukrainian, NATO ships start Sea Breeze 2010 drills in Black Sea”, 18 July 2010, *RIA Novosti*, http://en.rian.ru/military_news/20100718/159856422.html

“UNSC Resolution 1386”, UN website, [http://www.undemocracy.com/S-RES-1386\(2001\).pdf](http://www.undemocracy.com/S-RES-1386(2001).pdf)

Urazova, Y.İ.; “Rus Dış Politikasında Orta Asya’nın Önemi” in *Türkiye-Rusya Arasında İhtilaflı Konular ve Çözümleri* (ed. by Gülten Kazgan), İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, August 2008

“US considers Polish missile base”, *BBC*, 17 November 2005, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4445284.stm>

“US troops to fly in to Georgia”, *The Independent*, 13 August 2008, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/us-troops-to-fly-in-to-georgia-893917.html>

“USA Prepares to Attack Russia in 3 or 4 Years?”, *Pravda*, 23 October 2009, http://english.pravda.ru/world/europe/23-10-2009/110090-usa_russia-0/

Vasiliev, Dimitri; “Preliminary Estimates of Russia’s Arm Trade for 2008”, *Moscow Defense Brief*, <http://mdb.cast.ru/test/>

Vlahos, Kelley Beaucar; “Rocky U.S.-Turkey Relations Persist Since Iraq War”, *Fox News*, 07 April 2005, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,152683,00.html>

Vtornik, Delovoi; “Russia does not fully approve of NATO policy in Afghanistan”, *Vedomosti*, 24 August 2010, translated by *RIA Novosti*, <http://en.rian.ru/papers/20100824/160323433.html>

Walt, Stephen M.; ‘Testing Theories of Alliance Formation: The Case of Southwest Asia’, *International Organization*, Spring 1988, Volume 42, Number 2

Waltz, Kenneth N.; *Theory of International Politics*, New York: Random House, 1979 (First Edition)

Waltz, Stephen M.: “Structural Realism After the Cold War”, *International Security*, Summer 2000, Volume 25, Number 1

“War between Russia and Georgia orchestrated from USA”, *Pravda*, 09 august 2008, http://english.pravda.ru/hotspots/conflicts/09-08-2008/106046-russia_georgia-0/

Ward, Jon; “U.S. to deliver 'humanitarian aid' to Georgia”, *The Washington Times*, 13 August 2008, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/aug/13/bush-us-to-deliver-humanitarian-aid-to-georgia/>

Weldes, Jutta&Laffey, Mark&Gusterson, Hugh&Duvall, Raymond; “Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities and the Production of Danger” eds. et al, Minneapolis: Minnesota Univ. Press, 1999

Williams, Paul D.; *Security Studies: An Introduction*, (ed. by Williams, Paul D), New York: Routledge, 2008

Winrow, Gareth M.; *Turkey in the Post-Soviet Central Asia*, London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995

Wolfers, Arnold; “National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol”, *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 67, No. 4, Dec. 1952

Yazaroğlu, Vahap; “Öcalan Rusya'ya kaçtı iddiası”, *Milliyet*, 15 October 1998

Yetkin, Murat; “Ankara kararlı”, *Radikal*, 21 September 2001.

Yetkin, Murat; “Türkiye bölgesine sahip çıkıyor”, *Radikal*, 22 September 2001.

Yıldız, Güney; “Kafkasya yeni krizlere gebe”, *BBC Turkish*, 12 August 2008, http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkish/news/story/2008/08/080812_almond.shtml

Yınanç, Barçın; “Old rivals, new partners: Conflict and cooperation in politics”, *Hürriyet Daily News*, 11 August 2010.

“Yunanistan da Güney Akımı Projesine Katıldı”, *Dünya*, 1 Mayıs 2008

Yurtsever, Ali H.; “Apo Roma'dan gitti”, *Milliyet*, 17 January 1999

Zarakhovich, Yuri; “Why Putin Pulled Out of a Key Treaty”, *Time*, 14 July 2007, <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1643566,00.html>

Zeyrek, Deniz; “ABD gemilerine Montrö izin vermiyor”, *Radikal*, 20 August 2008.

“2001 Yılında Türkiye'nin Dış İlişkileri”, *Milliyet*, <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/content/dosya/almanak2001/disiliskiler.html>

“22 Ekim 2002 tarihli MGK Toplantısı Basın Bildirisi”, Official website of the National Security Council of Turkey, <http://www.mgk.gov.tr/Turkce/basinbildiri2002/22ekim2002.html>

“27 Aralık 2002 tarihli MGK Toplantısı Basın Bildirisi”, Official website of the National Security Council of Turkey, <http://www.mgk.gov.tr/Turkce/basinbildiri2002/27aralik2002.html>

“28 Mart 2002 tarihli MGK Toplantısı Basın Bildirisi”, Official website of the National Security Council of Turkey, <http://www.mgk.gov.tr/Turkce/basinbildiri2003/28mart2003.html>.