

TURKEY'S FOREIGN AID POLICY TOWARDS CENTRAL ASIA FROM A
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

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ABSTRACT

TURKEY'S FOREIGN AID POLICY TOWARDS CENTRAL ASIA FROM A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

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The objective of this thesis is to examine the basic factors that motivate Turkey's foreign aid policy towards Central Asia from a comparative perspective. Generally, the development aid aims eliminating the problems that have arisen from underdevelopment and contributing to regional and universal peace. In addition to this holistic goal, there are several other motivating factors. This thesis explores the reasons behind the foreign assistance programs of Turkey, the United States, Japan, and Russia towards Central Asia which ensure the development of the Central Asian countries and their integration within the international system. From a comparative perspective of the development aid provided by Turkey to the region and the aid provided by the other donor countries will also be presented. This thesis, argues that Turkey does not provide development assistance to the Central Asian countries merely as a result of its foreign policy interests, but also it aims to integrate these countries with the international system.

This thesis consists of four chapters other than introduction and conclusion chapter. The second chapter examines relationship between foreign aid and foreign policy. The third chapter explores general characteristics of post- Soviet Central Asia. The fourth chapter discusses Turkey's foreign aid policy towards Central Asia and the fifth chapter examines other donors' foreign aid policy towards Central Asia.

Keywords: Foreign Aid, Foreign Policy, Central Asia, Turkey, TICA

ÖZ

KARŞILAŞTIRMALI AÇIDAN TÜRKİYE’NİN ORTA ASYA’YA YÖNELİK DIŞ YARDIM POLİTİKASI

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Bu tezin amacı Türkiye’nin Orta Asya’ya yönelik kalkınma yardımı politikasını teşvik eden unsurları karşılaştırmalı açıdan incelemektir. Kalkınma yardımları genellikle ekonomik yetersizlikten kaynaklanan pek çok sorunu ortadan kaldırmayı hedeflemekte, bölgesel ve evrensel barışa hizmet etmektedir. Bu bütünsel amacın yanında kalkınma yardımlarını teşvik eden farklı unsurlar da söz konusudur. Bu tez Türkiye, ABD, Japonya ve Rusya’nın bölgeye yaptığı dış yardımların temel sebeplerini ve bu yardımların Orta Asya ülkelerinin kalkınmasına ve uluslararası sisteme entegre edilmesine yönelik olduğunu ortaya koymaktadır. Diğer ülkelerle karşılaştırmalı olarak Türkiye’nin bölgeye yaptığı kalkınma yardımları da bu bağlamda izlenmektedir.

Tez giriş ve sonuç bölümlerine ek olarak dört ana bölümden oluşmaktadır. İkinci bölüm dış yardım politikası ve dış politika arasındaki ilişkiyi incelemektedir. Üçüncü bölüm Orta Asya ülkelerinin Sovyet sonrası dönemdeki genel özelliklerini incelerken dördüncü bölüm Türkiye’nin Orta Asya’ya yönelik dış yardım politikasını tartışmaktadır. Beşinci bölüm ise diğer donör ülkelerin bölgeye yönelik kalkınma yardımlarını ele almaktadır.

Anahtar kelimeler: Dış Yardım, Dış Polika, Orta Asya, Türkiye, TİKA

To My Mother and Father
Hanife Kılıç & Ömer Kılıç

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ABBREVIATIONS

AKP: Justice and Development Party

ASEAN: Association of Southeast Asian Nations

CIS: Commonwealth of Independent States

CSTO: Collective Security Treaty Organization

DAC: Development Assistance Committee

EC: European Community

EU: European Union

GDP: Gross Domestic Product

GNP: Gross National Product

IDA: International Development Association

IMF: International Monetary Found

JBIC: Japan Bank for International Cooperation

JICA: Japan International Cooperation Agency and Development Aid

MDG: Millennium Development Goal

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGO: Non-Governmental Organization

ODA: Official Development Assistance

OECD: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

RAO UES: Russia's Unified Energy System

TCP: Trans Caspian Project

TICA: The Turkish Agency for Technical and Economic Cooperation DPT

UN: United Nations

US: United States

USAID: The U.S. Agency for International Development

USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Scope and Objective

This thesis examines the relationship between foreign policy and foreign-aid policy. It also looks at Turkey's foreign aid towards Central Asia and compares Turkey with other donors providing assistance to the region. The major dynamics of Turkish foreign-aid policy in general can be evaluated in this context. Following an in-depth analysis of these diverse dynamics, this thesis aims to examine the similar and different aspects of the foreign-aid policies of four countries: the United States, Japan, Russia, and Turkey. These four donors differ as to the interest they have in providing foreign aid to the countries of Central Asia, though the similar points and common directions of their aid policies will also be evaluated in the following chapters of this thesis.

This thesis focuses on the intent of foreign aid provided by the above-mentioned donors rather than examining the achievements or failings of such aid. In other words, it seeks to analyze the primary factors of motivation behind foreign assistance towards Central Asian countries. Because much of the aid given is socio-economic in nature, this thesis will briefly discuss the economic and political circumstances of the five countries of the region after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Turkey's foreign policy and foreign-aid policy towards Central Asia are extensively analyzed in this thesis and compared with the policies of the U.S., Japan, and Russia. In the end, in answering the questions, "Why do these countries provide foreign aid to Central Asia?" or "What are the main motivating factors behind these policies?" it will be clear that Turkey has a special place among the donors.

1.2. Review of Literature

Though the effect of aid on recipient countries has been extensively analyzed, there have not been as many articles analyzing the donor side of the equation. R.D. McKinaly,¹ the pioneer analyst of donor-side foreign aid, was the first to begin a discussion on the factors that motivated donor involvement in the foreign aid regime of the Cold War era. Today, three general theories of international relations—neo-realism, neo-Marxism, and neo-liberalism—attempt to explain the factors that have led countries to provide foreign aid during the Cold War era and post-Cold War era. In both periods, the primary determinations for foreign aid were defined as humanitarian need, strategic importance, economic potential, cultural similarity, and ideological stance.²

Kenneth Waltz, a scholar who represents the neo-realist stance in describing international relations, argues, “The first concern of states is (...) to maintain their position in the system.”³ Jack Donnelly explains the implications of such a stance: “In International Relations, political realism is a tradition of analysis that stresses the imperatives states face to pursue a power politics of the national interest. ... Realists accentuate the constraints on politics imposed by human selfishness and the absence of international government which require ‘the primacy in all political life of power and security.’”⁴ In addition according to Waltz, “preserving state’s relative position; however is neither survival nor domination (...).”⁵ He claims that “states seek wealth, advantage and flourishing, peaceful coexistence, and peace and prosperity

¹ R. D. McKinaly, “The Aid Relationship: A Foreign Policy Model and Interpretation of the Distributions of Official Bilateral Economic Aid of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, 1960-1970”, *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 11, No.4, 1979.

² Peter J. Schrader, Stewen W. Hook, and Bruce Taylor, “Clarifying the Foreign Aid Puzzle A Comparison of American, Japanese, French, and Swedish Aid Flows”, *World Politics*, Vol. 50, 1998, p. 303.

³ Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, (Boston, McGraw-Hill, 1979), p. 144.

⁴ Jack Donnelly, “Realism”, in Scott Burchill, Andrew Devetak, Jack Donnelly, Matthew Paterson, Christian Reus-Smit, Jacqui True, *Theories of International Relations*, (New York, Palgrave, 2001), pp. 29-30.

⁵ Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, (Boston, McGraw-Hill, 1979), p. 126.

that they want to protect their sovereignty, autonomy and independence and that they act out of pride and feeling of being put upon.”⁶

According to realism, foreign aid, which is considered a foreign policy instrument, is motivated by the strategic interests,⁷ national security, and self-protection of nation-states. Hobbes⁸ assumes that national security and self-protection are donors’ primary, if not exclusive, objectives. From the realist point of view, therefore, foreign aid does not necessarily stem from a desire to help recipients achieve their development goals or humanitarian needs. However there is a difference between the classical realist and neo-realist perspectives on foreign aid. The former claims that foreign aid is motivated primarily by the political-military strategic importance of recipient states, whereas the latter attributes more importance to recipients’ economic security dimension instead of the political-military dimension.⁹ Nevertheless, military strength and security, the so-called “high politics” of international relations, are not as emphasized today as during the Cold War era.

Although it is possible to explain foreign aid from the donor side in terms of realist theory, other theories provide a more convincing explanation for the behavior of foreign-aid donor countries. World-system theory, developed by Immanuel Wallerstein, challenged the classical Marxist proposition that capitalism would bring industrial development to the whole world.¹⁰ Because the underdevelopment of developing countries can actually benefit the economic and political prosperity of developed countries, argues Wallerstein, aid is provided with the goal of keeping the underdeveloped and developing countries at a certain (lower) level of development.

⁶ Jack Donnelly, “Realism”, in Scott Burchill, Andrew Devetak, Jack Donnelly, Matthew Paterson, Christian Reus-Smit, Jacqui True, *Theories of International Relations*, (New York, Palgrave, 2001), p. 42.

⁷ The following works were inspired by a realist perspective: Lloyd D. Black, *The Strategy of Foreign Aid* (Princeton, Nostrad, 1968); Steven W. Hook, *National Interest and Foreign Aid* (Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1995); Hans J. Morgenthau, “A Political Theory of Foreign Aid” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 56, 1962.

⁸ See Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1987).

⁹ Peter J. Schrader, Steven W. Hook, and Bruce Taylor, “Clarifying the Foreign Aid Puzzle A Comparison of American, Japanese, French, and Swedish Aid Flows”, *World Politics*, Vol. 50, 1998, p. 298.

¹⁰ Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Capitalist World Economy*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 152.

Although such a “world system” helps some countries shift their economic positions from periphery to semi-periphery, there will always exist a certain “hegemon” since the system provides for its continued survival by keeping the balance. “Dependency theory and the world-systems approach have been described as ‘neo-Marxist’ because they do not believe that the spread of capitalism will bring industrial development to poorer regions, and because they shifted the analysis from relations of production to such phenomena as ‘unequal exchange’ in world markets,” explains Arghiri Emmanuel.¹¹ Marxist and neo-Marxist theories enjoyed their greatest prominence in the 1970s and 1980s, but they remain significant in the contemporary era of increasing global inequalities.¹²

Looking at the position of liberals, meanwhile, will give us the chance to explore the concept of “foreign policy”: “Neo-liberal institutionalism offers a political science of international interdependence, a description of the relations between state and non-state actors in the anarchical environment of world politics.”¹³ Peter Sutch and Juanita Elias continue to explain neo-liberalism by writing, “The primary reason that this school of thought qualifies for the title liberal is because its members argue that international politics has more opportunities for sustained cooperation. In making their case neo-liberal institutionalists challenge some of the basic assumptions of realism.”¹⁴

Burchill explains liberal tradition by means of peace, democracy, and trade:

For liberals, peace is the normal state of affairs. War is therefore both unnatural and irrational, and artificial contrivance and not a product of some peculiarity of the human condition. Recent conflicts in Balkans, Central Asia and the Persian Gulf, all involving major industrial powers, are a reminder that the post-Cold War period remains volatile and suggest that war may not yet have lost its efficacy in international diplomacy. None of these constitutes conflicts between democratic states but they are

¹¹ Arghiri Emmanuel, *Unequal Exchange: A Study of the Imperialism of Trade*, (New York, Monthly Review, 1972), p. 92.

¹² Andrew Linklater, “Marxism” in Scott Burchill, Andrew Devetak, Jack Donnelly, Matthew Paterson, Christian Reus-Smit, Jacqui True, *Theories of International Relations*, (New York, Palgrave, 2001), p. 123.

¹³ Peter Sutch and Juanita Elias, *International Relations The Basics*, (New York, Routledge, 2007), p. 72.

¹⁴ Peter Sutch and Juanita Elias, *International Relations The Basics*, (New York, Routledge, 2007), p. 72

no less important to the maintenance of world order. ... Free trade, however, was a more peaceful means of achieving national wealth because, according to the theory of comparative advantage, each economy would be materially better off than if it had been pursuing nationalism and self-sufficiency. Free trade would also break down the division between states and unite individuals everywhere. It also would expand the range of contacts and levels of understanding between the peoples of the world and encourage international friendship and understanding.¹⁵

Although “neo-liberals concentrate on issues of international political economy and environment; neo-realists are more prone to study international security and the causes, conduct, and consequences of wars.”¹⁶ For liberals,¹⁷ “aid stands as a projection abroad of national values and social forces, as well as an instrument used to promote interdependence and international justice and global integration.”¹⁸ Foreign aid can thus be given using both perspectives.

İdris Bal, too, claims that Turkey’s foreign aid policy towards Central Asia has been principally driven by ethnic, historical, and cultural similarities, in addition to the humanitarian goals of broadly shared economic development and the provision of basic human needs.¹⁹ On the other hand, Turgut Demirtepe suggests that in the first half of 1990s, Turkey provided foreign aid to Central Asia in order to engage in “energetic and economic,” attempting to draw the new states into the Turkish sphere of influence while separating them from the Russian.²⁰

¹⁵ Scott Burchill, “Liberalism” in Scott Burchill, Andrew Devetak, Jack Donnelly, Matthew Paterson, Christian Reus-Smit, Jacqui True, *Theories of International Relations*, (New York, Palgrave, 2001), p. 63.

¹⁶ Robert Jervis, “Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate”, *International Security*, Vol. 24, No.1, 1999, p. 45.

¹⁷ See Roger Riddell, *Foreign Aid Reconsidered* (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987); Lumsdaine, *Moral Vision in International Politics* (Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1993); Alain Noël and Jean-Philippe Thérien, “From Domestic to International Justice: the Welfare State and Foreign Aid” *International Organization*, Vol. 49, No.3, 1995.

¹⁸ Alain Noël and Jean-Philippe Thérien, From Domestic to International Justice: the Welfare State and Foreign Aid, *International Organization*, Vol. 49, No.3, 1995, p. 525.

¹⁹ İdris Bal, *Turkey’s Relations with the West and the Central Asian States: “The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Model”*, (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2000), p. 43.

²⁰ Turgut Demirtepe, the Head of Centre For Euraisan Studies at USAK an Ankara Based Think-Tank, Interviewed on 07 March 2011.

1.3. Argument

Contrary to the views that Turkish foreign policy towards Central Asia has been dominated by realist considerations of a regional struggle for power, this thesis argues that Turkey's foreign aid policy towards Central Asia reflects a synthesis of the neo-realist and neo-liberal outlooks. Turkey's foreign aid contributes significantly to these countries' transition from totalitarian to more democratic regimes, from command economies to free-market economies, and from closed societies to more pluralistic societies. It contributes to the integration of these countries into the global system through strengthening the basis for international cooperation. However, Turkey cannot be considered totally altruistic in its provision of aid to the region. In line with the realist perspective, foreign policy interest also guides Ankara's assistance to the region.

In this thesis, we demonstrate how the official development assistance (ODA) provided by Turkey, the U.S., Japan, and Russia to Central Asia from 1992 to 2008 parallels donors' foreign-policy interests. Using data on foreign aid, I seek to clarify the motivation factors of these four donors' foreign-aid policy. The data results demonstrate that different combinations of factors influence the foreign-aid policies of different donor states. This study shows that each donor has a unique position in Central Asia; in other words, their motivations do not frequently overlap. Each donor, for instance, is located in a different geography and has particular interests.

Turkey is the most active donor country in the region, providing a larger amount of foreign aid to Central Asia than others. Since Central Asia is the region which has strong historical, ethnic and cultural bonds with Turkey, Turkey prioritizes the region as a recipient of foreign aid: Turkey provided 157.13 million dollars of foreign aid to the five Central Asian states in 2009, nearly a quarter of its total aid that year.²¹

After the collapse of the USSR, other states have taken more of an interest in using "soft power" elements as instruments of foreign policy in order to increase their influence. Japan in particular has decided to help newly independent states by means of foreign aid to strengthen their economy, society, and democracy. There is a

²¹ See: Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TICA), Turkish Development Assistance Report-2009, (Ankara, TICA, 2009).

consensus that post-Cold War Japan was motivated primarily by economic factors, looking for areas to use foreign aid because of its rising economic superpower as the world's second-largest economy. By increasing the economic potential of recipient countries, Japan hopes "to contribute to the peace and development of the international community and thereby help to ensure Japan's own security and prosperity."²² U.S. foreign-aid policies, similarly, were targeted to establish free-market economies and enhance those democracies willing to support Washington's containment policies. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, both the U.S. and Japan have had strategic interests in the region as a result of Afghanistan War. As a result cases of Japan and the U.S. demonstrate that foreign aid policies are influenced by different combinations of foreign policy. However, all of these policies have the purpose of integrating Central Asian countries to the international system by means of foreign aid to enhance these countries social infrastructure and economic growth.

It may be estimated, meanwhile, that strategic and military interests directed Russia to provide foreign aid to Central Asia in the first half 1990s. Although there is no data about the amount of Russian foreign aid to the region, it is known that Russia has given foreign aid to Central Asia based on media and other observers' reports.²³ During the Cold War, the Soviet Union gave aid to North Korea, Vietnam, and China

²² Roger C. Riddell, *Does Foreign Aid Really Work?* (New York, Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 59.

²³ Since Russia was also a recipient of aid after the Cold War, it is given a different place throughout the analyses provided in this study. Since the available data pertaining to the amount of aid that Russia provided to Central Asia and other countries is restricted, it makes examining Russian foreign aid harder than any other countries. Russia is neither a member of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) nor on the list of non-DAC countries. Although it is a member of the G-8, Russia is not considered a donor country by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). However, media and country reports from various institutions have indicated that Russia is a donor country. Moreover, some of the websites for Embassies of the Russian Federation declare the amount of Russian aid. During the Cold War there was a similar situation in which the Soviet government itself did not provide any information about foreign aid. However some academicians' work on Soviet foreign aid over compiled information from the press. This thesis will analyze Russian foreign aid by considering first Soviet foreign aid and then Russian foreign policy after 1990 to 2008. On the other hand, it is known that Russia also provides undeclared foreign aid to the Central Asian countries. Consequently, if the donor provides foreign aid there may be a purpose other than the global aims of foreign aid, which are increasing prosperity and the general welfare. As a result, it can be said that Russia has used foreign aid for its own foreign policy interests or any other political, economic, military and strategic profit.

to achieve its political goals rather than contribute to development of the country concerned. This example has some parallels analogies with Russian aid policy today. Nevertheless, although it has some strategic concerns to the region, Russia's main motivation has been contributing the process of development for all five Central Asian states. Russia also has used its 'soft power' elements by means of language, schools and media towards the region for improving education rates and rise a new qualified generation. Many examples show us that Russia also provides foreign aid to Central Asia to progress infrastructure, the level of education, and to solve energy problems. It is known, for instance, that Russia has given credits to complete the construction of hydro-power dams in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which are the poorest countries with respect to energy resources.

The thesis takes a synthesis of the neo-liberal and neo-realist views of international relations to explain Turkey's foreign aid policy by comparing it with that of other donor countries. The end of the Cold War meant such clear-cut theories could not explain all foreign policy and had to be revised. These views can be brought together because foreign aid not only provides an advantage for recipient countries but also to worldwide prosperity.

In the case of Turkish aid to Central Asia, many scholars take a neo-liberal approach. For example, Bülent Aras, a Turkish scholar, explains U.S. aid policy towards Central Asia using a neo-liberalist approach: "The U.S. policy in Central Asia is directed to help transition from nature of the ex-system toward a democratic-capitalistic structure based on globally accepted principles, by the way to prevent some new risks (...)." ²⁴ He evaluates the U.S. policy towards new states in Central Asia as a way to gain influence in these republics. ²⁵ According to him, "Turkey does not, however, go to the region with chauvinist aims. While the Central Asian states look to Turkey as a successful example, Ankara wants to spread its own model of

²⁴ Bülent Aras, "Amerika-Orta Asya İlişkileri ve İran'ın Konumu", *Avrasya Dosyası*, Vol. 5, No. 3, 1999, p. 225.

²⁵ Bülent Aras, "U.S.- Central Asian Relations: A View From Turkey", *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vo. 1, No. 1, 1997, p. 3.

secularism in an Islamic society, parliamentary democracy, and a free market economy.”²⁶

1.4. Methodology

The literature mentioned above shows that scholars of international relations have yet to reach a consensus on the motivating factors behind foreign aid. An examination of the relationship between foreign aid and development confirms the synthesis of neo-liberal theory and neo-realist theory. Turkey holds a unique position in our explanation of this theoretical synthesis, since its foreign aid motivations to Central Asia depend on strategic issues besides humanitarian, economic, cultural and ethnic factors. Turkey has a neo-liberal spirit in its foreign aid policy towards the region. Because of the strong historical, ethnic and cultural bonds with the Central Asian countries, the billions of dollars in development aid provided by Turkey to the Central Asian republics since 1992 for the purpose of eliminating, or at least minimizing, their socio-economic problems are far more important than the economic, social, and geopolitical benefits that Turkey is believed to receive in return.

This study uses qualitative methods to understand the reasons behind providing foreign aid to Central Asian states by Turkey, Russia, the U.S., and Japan. Primary sources such as official statements, speeches and newspapers have been examined, and secondary sources such as books and articles on foreign aid and Central Asia have been surveyed. To better understand foreign aid policy towards Central Asia, data, statistics, figures, and tables derived from the IMF, World Bank, TICA, USAID, JICA, and other primary sources have been provided to supplement our analysis of reports related to Central Asian foreign aid.

²⁶ Bülent Aras, “U.S.- Central Asian Relations: A View From Turkey”, *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vo. 1, No. 1, 1997, p. 3.

1.5. Chapters of the Thesis

This thesis comprises six main chapters. After the introduction chapter, the second chapter examines the concept of aid from a historical perspective. It analyzes how the understanding foreign aid has changed since the U.S. and USSR began giving aid during the Cold War era. It discusses the relationship between foreign-aid policy and foreign-policy interests during that time as well as the role of international organizations such as the Organizations of Economic Co-operations and Development.

The third chapter is devoted to the description of the Asian countries after 1990. The difficult economic, political, and social conditions in all five Central Asian countries which arose out of independence have continued today. The chapter both highlights the continuing role of Russia in the region and discusses in detail the urgent need for aid of these five states.

The fourth chapter firstly describes the relationship between Turkey and Central Asia, analyzing the factors which have affected the relations. After summarizing the history of relations in the period between 1990-2008, it seeks to answer of the question of why Turkey gives foreign aid to Central Asia. Moreover, it discusses why Turkey gives a priority to Central Asian states in foreign aid. In the conclusion of this chapter, Turkey's foreign aid policy is analyzed by drawing parallels with its foreign policy towards Central Asia.

In the fifth chapter the foreign-aid policies of the U.S., Japan, and Russian towards Central Asia are described and compared with Turkey's own foreign aid to the region. The motivation factors of these four countries are analyzed in this chapter on the basis of humanitarian need, strategic importance, economic potential, and cultural similarity. Finally, the concluding chapter summarizes the main findings of the thesis.

CHAPTER II

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FOREIGN POLICY AND FOREIGN AID POLICY

In this chapter, the history of development aid will be reviewed briefly, followed by a discussion of the importance of this aid for the U.S. and Russia during the Cold War period. In general, we will attempt to find answers to the question, “What is aid?” Finally, the basic motivating factors for such assistance will be discussed with reference to the organizations that currently provide development aid. Although it is not the core topic of this thesis, the effectiveness of foreign aid, discussed briefly by scholars, will be mentioned at the end of this chapter. This chapter will enable us to evaluate foreign aid from the perspectives of its effectiveness and motives.

2.1. Conceptualizing Foreign Aid

The answer to the question “What is aid?” may seem very simple at first glance, but when the issue is examined from different perspectives, it becomes more complicated. The most comprehensive efforts to improve the definition of what foreign aid includes has been conducted by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD. DAC was formed in 1960 by the leading donor governments to coordinate and provide aid from donor governments. The DAC’s work has not aimed to define development aid in general. “Rather it sought merely to define that part of overall aid provided by donor governments to poor countries.”²⁷

The core definition of Official Development Assistance (ODA), first agreed upon by the DAC in 1969 and refined in 1972, is reproduced by Helmut Führer. According to the definition reconstituted by Führer in a 1994 article approved by DAC:

²⁷ Roger C. Riddell, *Does Foreign Aid Really Work?*, (New York, Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 18.

“Official Development Assistance consists of flows to developing countries and multilateral institutions provided by official agencies, including states and local governments, or by their executive agencies, each transaction of which meets the following two criteria: (1) it is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective, and (2) it is concessional in character and contains a grant element of at least 25 per cent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 per cent).”²⁸

Certainly, this definition is not complete, since it does not include any aid transferred from rich to poor countries originating from non-governmental sources. In other words, the aid given by NGOs or international organizations is not included in this definition. Today, even the biggest international NGOs do not use a common definition of aid developed within the DAC framework. Rather, they publish their own definitions on their own Internet websites. The absence of an agreed-upon definition of what constitutes NGO aid is likely to become an increasing problem, both because of the growing importance of NGOs, and because some NGO ‘aid’ activities would not qualify as aid under the DAC definitions.²⁹

The lack of a clear definition regarding “aid” and the purpose-based structures of the current definitions not only cause a contradiction in terms, but also give rise to the problems with respect to categorization of aid. According to their different purposes (for example, political, strategic or commercial), purpose-based definitions of aid can sometimes be misleading. Within this framework, questions such as who will decide³⁰ whether the aid given aims at human development or national development and what criteria should be used to judge whether the purpose-based criteria are met must be raised. In practice, it is donors who decide whether the aid given aims at human development or national development.

²⁸ Helmut Führer, *The Story of Development Assistance: A History of Development Assistance Committee and the Development Co-operation Directorate in Dates and Figures*, (Paris, OECD, 1994) p.25.

²⁹ “For example some NGO development projects include the payments of loans or in some cases in excess of, commercial interest rates (...) and most use aid funds in advertising and fund-raising initiatives.” Roger C. Riddell, *Does Foreign Aid Really Work?*, (New York, Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 20.

³⁰ Bruce Bueno de Mesquita & Alastair Smith, “Foreign Aid and Policy Concessions” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 51, No.2, 2007, p.251.

Moreover, DAC's definition regarding the aid can be cited for lack of attention to detail. Owing to the lack of a common and clear definition, certain terms have been used in substitution for each other. For example, in approximately 80 per cent of the cases, the term 'foreign aid' is being used in lieu of the terms 'development aid,' 'development assistance,' and 'foreign assistance.' Elsewhere, these terms are generally used interchangeably.

Defining clearly what is meant by 'foreign aid for development' is a difficult task. In this thesis, the term 'development aid, foreign aid, foreign assistance and development assistance' will be used broadly in order to consider both humanitarian aid and emergency aid. For the purpose of avoiding contradictions, the official development assistance given by the governments will be taken as a basis for this thesis. Donors will be taken to be states, the main actors in the international arena.

2.2. Evolution of Foreign Aid Policy after World War II

Helping and providing assistance have been viewed by many cultures with skepticism and suspicion. In some societies, sacrifice may not make a good impression and sometimes charities may be construed as a threat. A well-known military victory may be a good example for this notion. The ancient Greeks gained a big victory against the Trojans by the virtue of a giant horse presented as a gift in which the Greek soldiers were hidden. At night, this enormous gift was left silently in front of the Trojans' city gates. The Trojans welcomed it imprudently and as a consequence lost the war. Of course, in the real world, aid is given with certain purposes as well. Although the aid is mainly aimed at the development and prosperity of the poor countries, there are various strategic and political goals underlying this target.

Modern aid programs commenced in 1940s. The aid programs initiated by the United States after the Second World War for the purpose of helping Europe during its recovery period from the destruction were similar to aid programs today in terms of both purpose and execution.

As a matter of fact, the start of aid in the contemporary sense after the Second World

War is itself a matter of dispute. The history of “aid” goes back further than 1940s to the period when assistance was provided by powerful countries to their colonies and vassals. During this period, the states used to supply safe food and water together with health and education services to their colonies.³¹ Charity provided by churches and missions or church-based agencies are also examples of assistance whose origins lie in the distant past. For instance, churches have distributed a considerable amount of aid to African countries:

The history of formal education in Zimbabwe is synonymous with the history of the Christian churches. ‘Mission Schools ‘were established over 30 years before the arrival of the white settlers to the country in the 1890s.³²

In this work, we will disregard assistance provided during the colonial period or by non-state actors, instead focusing on foreign aid’s modern and state-based manifestations.

2.3. Marshall Plan

Especially during the bipolar period, most aid was given by the USSR and the U.S. to third world countries. Moreover, due to the bipolarity characteristic of the period, the majority of the aid given during this period consisted of military aid.

The Second World War destroyed Europe so badly that its recovery required a considerably long and difficult process. England in particular had been hit badly. While the Middle East, Indian Ocean, the Straits and Eastern Mediterranean were areas of vital interest for England,³³ as the most vulnerable points of imperial England against Russia, the Second World War destroyed England so badly that England did not have any power to challenge Russia in these regions. England knew that the United States was the only power which could stand up to Russian

³¹ Jorge Arbache, Delfin S. Go, John Page, “Is Africa’s Economy at a Turning Point?” in Delfin S. Go & John Page, *Africa a Turning Point? Growth, Aid, and External Shocks*, (Washington, The World Bank, 2008), p.13.

³² B-J. Dorsey, “The African Secondary School Leaver”, in Marshall W. Murphree (ed), *Education, Race and Employment in Rhodesia*, (Harare, Association of Round Tables in Central Africa Publications, 1975), p. 174.

³³ Fahir Armaoğlu, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi*, (İstanbul, Alkim, 1990), p. 441.

imperialism.³⁴ On this basis, England sent two memorandums to the U.S. government regarding Turkey and Greece. On March 12, 1947, in an address to the U.S. Congress, President Harry Truman asked for power to grant 400 million dollars of military aid to assist both Turkey and Greece.³⁵ On 22 May 1947, the U.S. Congress approved military aid of 300 million dollars for Greece and 100 million dollars for Turkey. This aid, part of a strategy known as the Truman doctrine, essentially aimed at military assistance to Greece and Turkey because they were two countries directly under the pressure and threat of the Soviet Union.

However, during this period Europe suffered from a very bad economy. The war, which lasted for six years, had consumed the economic resources of the European countries. All countries of the continent were destroyed seriously and there were not any resources left to reinvigorate their economies.

Between June 1945 and the end of 1946, for the purpose of assisting the Western European countries for their economic recovery, the U.S. granted a total amount of 15 billion dollars³⁶ of economic aid to Western Europe. However, economic destruction and fragmentation meant that Europe could not benefit from this aid efficiently.

In response, the U.S. developed another formula for new aid, which it unveiled in 1947 during a speech at Harvard University by Secretary of State George Marshall.³⁷ According to this formula, European countries would establish cooperation aimed at fulfilling their basic needs, and the U.S. would provide assistance to these countries with the sole intention of covering up their deficiencies. When the U.S. put the law on foreign aid in effect and granted another economic aid package to sixteen

³⁴ Sergei Y. Shenin, *America's Helping Hand: Paving the Way to Globalization (Eisenhower's foreign aid policy and politics)*, (New York, Nova Science Publishers, 2005), p. 15.

³⁵ Sergei Y. Shenin, *America's Helping Hand: Paving the Way to Globalization (Eisenhower's foreign aid policy and politics)*, (New York, Nova Science Publishers, 2005), p. 15.

³⁶ Michael J. Hogan, *The Marshall Plan, America, Britain, and the Reconstruction Western Europe, 1947- 1952*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 20.

³⁷ Michael J. Hogan, *The Marshall Plan, America, Britain, and the Reconstruction Western Europe, 1947- 1952*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 20.

European countries for a total of 6 billion dollars.³⁸ This assistance continued through the following years.

2.4. The 1950s and 1960s

On the other hand, after Stalin's death in 1953, the Soviet Union also started to grant financial and technical assistance to developing countries in gradually increasing amounts. In the following years, upon their economic recovery, the "great powers" of Western Europe also participated in foreign aid campaigns initiated by the U.S. However, the assistance of these states has always been limited to their allies and old colonies and was never wide-ranging. After the Second World War, other than the U.S., the only country that provided assistance in considerable amounts for political purposes was the Soviet Union. The reason for the Soviet Union's assistance (Table 1) was perhaps its realization that, after the Korean War, further territorial expansion of the country was not possible in Europe or Asia by military power alone. The Soviet Union started threatening the countries outside its "power zone" instead of gaining their trust.³⁹

³⁸ Michael J. Hogan, *The Marshall Plan, America, Britain, and the Reconstruction Western Europe, 1947- 1952*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 42.

³⁹ Alastair McAuley & Dubravko Matko, "Soviet Foreign Aid", *Bulletin of the Oxford University Institute of Economics & Statistics*, Vol. 1966, 28, No.4, p. 262.

Table 1: Credit Agreements signed by the USSR

	1946-54	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	Total
Credits provided for non- Soviet block countries	7,3	2,5	283,9	343,5	445,4	786,5	556,5	1075,4	296,4	103,9	3901,3
Credits to Yugoslavia	154		281,5								435,5
Military assistance	72	125	90	25		131	368				811
	223,3	127,5	655,4	368,5	445,4	917,5	924,5	1075,4	296,4	103,9	5147,8
Credit for the European Soviet block countries	968,4		540	803,8	247	91,5	162,5	685,5			3499,7
Credits to North Kores, North Vietnam,	712,71	99	50	135,9	39,6	50	582,3	239,3	100		1954,8
Credits to China	1490,9	706,6	49,9	9,8				360			2617,2
Total Soviet bloc states	3172	805,6	604,9	949,5	286,6	141,5	690,8	1284,8	100		8071,7
Total	3405,3	933,1	1296,3	1318	732	1059	1615,3	2360,2	396,4	103,9	13219,5

Source: Alastair McAuley & Dubravko Matko⁴⁰

When we look back at the period between 1950 and 1960, we see that “aid” concept is not the same as in the period after the Second World War. For example, the Marshall Plan was prepared for the purpose of helping Europe’s infrastructural development during its reconstruction period. However, during the period in question “aid” was given with the intention of helping poor countries reach prosperity. The basic goal of the aid granted in this period was to help the poor countries in their growth and development processes and to strengthen their organizational structures, since these were important countries for the future of the entire world.⁴¹ Within the framework of such aid, and in order to further assists developing countries, the UN Secretariat established a group of experts.⁴² And at the end of 1950s, the leadership of the World Bank established its “International Development Association” (IDA)

⁴⁰ Alastair McAuley & Dubravko Matko, “Soviet Foreign Aid”, *Bulletin of the Oxford University Institute of Economics & Statistics*, Vol. 1966, 28, No.4, p. 264.

⁴¹ Charles J. Kegley, *World Politics Trend and Transformation*, (USA, Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 1976), p. 219.

⁴² David Halloran Lumsdaine, *Moral Vision in International Politics: The Foreign Aid Regime 1949-1989*, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 236.

was established. The IDA soon became an important channel for distributing aid to poor countries. During this period, voluntary charitable foundations began to be established. These voluntary charitable foundations drew attention especially with their activities aimed at the Asian and Sub-Saharan African countries.⁴³

The important developments of the 1960s carve out the history of aid of this period. UN declared the 1960s as the first Development Decade and developed a strategy for the coordination of the assistance to be provided to the poor countries. During this period, the intellectuals started to question the role of the aid in the development of the countries. First, studies were performed for the purpose of demonstrating the effect of aid on the development of poor countries. Then, arguments were raised suggesting that cash inflow to the countries was not sufficient; in order to make aid effective, certain organizational changes were necessary and various economic regulations were required for poor countries' economic transformation.⁴⁴

2.5. The 1970s and 1980s

As the role of the NGOs expanded during the 1970s, they began to coordinate a wide range of aid. During this period, aid was directly given to the poor countries through the projects prepared within the frameworks of education, health, and water-supply services.

Pearson has explained the post-1970s aid concept in his book named "Patterns in Development: Report of the Commission on International Development" as follows:

Why aid? This is a basic question which... goes to the very root of the weakening of the will... to continue, yet alone strengthen, development co-operation... It is not to close all gaps and eliminate all inequalities. It is to help the poorer countries to move forward, in their own way, into the industrial and technological age so that the world will not

⁴³ "What is IDA?" *World Bank, International Development Association*, available at: <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/IDA/0,,contentMDK:21206704~menuPK:83991~pagePK:51236175~piPK:437394~theSitePK:73154,00.html> >, (accessed on 28 October, 2010).

⁴⁴ "...this meant far more than financial assistance to fill savings and Exchange gaps. It also required an improvement expansion of human skills and, importantly necessary institutional change"; Hollis B. Chenery and Alan M. Strout, "Foreign Assistance and Economic Development", *The American Economic Review*, Vol. 56, No. 4, 1966, pp. 680.

become more starkly divided between the haves and the have-nots, the privileged and the less privileged.⁴⁵

With this explanation, Pearson demonstrates that the understanding of the concept of aid that had developed in the 1960s was dealt within a wider range. In these years, “aid” was accepted as a matter of humanitarian assistance and human development rather than a tool based on certain ideologies, mutual interests, or profit.

In the 1980s, the concept of aid became more complex. When it became clear, through reports published by IDA, that development targets were not achieved, the effectiveness of the aid was brought to the agenda.⁴⁶ Aid providers began to realize that donor and recipient relationships were not as simple as Pearson’s descriptions, and structural changes in poor countries as well as the stabilization of their economies became essential.

Meanwhile, aid provided by NGOs, which began to gain importance in the 1970s, increased dramatically during the 1980s. The influence of NGOs tended to vary considerably across countries. It was in 1985 that the government of India, for instance began formally to make use of NGOs to implement their on development program with state funds.⁴⁷

2.6. Foreign Aid in the Post Cold War Era

At the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, the collapse of the bipolar world structure naturally had a tremendous impact on international relations and foreign aid. According to some, the collapse of the separation between the west and east was supposed to bring an end to aid as well.⁴⁸ Since the aid granted by the states was indeed dramatically reduced with the termination of the Cold War, this

⁴⁵ L. Pearson, *Patterns in Development: Report of the Commission on International Development*, (New York, Praeger Publishers, 1969), pp. 7-8.

⁴⁶ “Global Challenge Global Opportunity Tends in Sustainable Developments”, *UN (United Nations)*, Johannesburg Summit, , 2002, p. 6.

⁴⁷ Roger C. Riddell, *Does Foreign Aid Really Work?*, (New York, Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 37.

⁴⁸ James Meernik, Eric L. Krueger & Steven C. Poe, “Testing Models of U.S. Foreign Policy: Foreign Aid During and After the Cold War”, *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 60, No. 1, 1998, p. 65.

expectation has, in one sense, come true.

As indicated above, foreign aid was used as a foreign policy tool for the first time after the Second World War by the U.S. This economic and military aid was given by the U.S. as a result of the “Cold War” between the Western and Eastern Blocs for the purpose of preventing the Western European powerful states which were destroyed during the war to “fall prey” to the Soviet Union.⁴⁹ This aid was granted with the intention of stabilizing the countries’ economies and re-empowering them. As the Soviet Union was not a powerful threat as before, the aid granted to Turkey and Greece ended with the termination of the Cold War. However, the developing countries’ need for aid did not end with the Cold War. On the contrary, conflicts and economic problems⁵⁰ arising in the post-Soviet region once again gave aid considerable importance.

With the end of the Cold War, the dispute over the role of ideology and morality in foreign policy theory and practice has intensified. In particular, the possibilities of liberalism have gained credence as the U.S. has searched for principle(s) to guide its vision of new world order. Presidents and Congress have indicated the promotion of democracy, development, and human rights as the major goals of the U.S. foreign policy in general and foreign aid in particular in the post-Cold War world.

The experts who claimed that the termination of the Cold War would lead to the dramatic decrease of the official development aid argued that the world had come to the end of an era and this meant “the end of the political foreign aid.” However, such observers overlooked a crucial fact: Official development aid had already decreased before the end of the 1980s (Figure 1).

⁴⁹ James Meernik, Eric L. Krueger & Steven C. Poe, “Testing Models of U.S. Foreign Policy: Foreign Aid During and After the Cold War”, *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 60, No. 1, 1998, p. 69.

⁵⁰ Glenn Palmer, Scott B. Wohlander, T. Clifton Morgan, “Give or Take: Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy Substitutability”, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 39, No. 1, 2002, p. 12.




Figure 1: All Donors Total ODA between 1989-2008

However, contrary to the popular belief, the 1990s was an era in which the concept aid was redefined and the *number* of recipients increased. In 1996, the OECD determined certain principles for the reorganization and encouragement of aid. Some of the principles which were determined for the purpose of encouraging aid donors are as follows:

- The need for aid recipients to take control of the development process, for aid to be integrated into recipient-owned and -led policy frameworks, developed with the co-operation of local civil societies.
- The need for recipient countries to foster internal accountability for their activities.
- The need for strong and effective partnerships between donors and recipients.
- The need for donors to work more closely together by coordinating and harmonizing their aid activities, and by providing aid on a more reliable basis, including through direct support for public expenditure programs.⁵¹

These principles certainly contributed to shaping the thought that informed the

⁵¹ *Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development Co-operation*, (Paris, OECD,1996).

Millennium Development Summit of Heads of State, convened by the UN in September 2000. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) document was signed by 150 countries, and in 2002, the Monterey Consensus was signed as a Framework for Global Partnership for the purpose of ensuring an alliance necessary for the realization of the designated targets. In 2005, the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness was issued with the intention of resolving or at least alleviating eight of the most important global problems⁵² by 2015. Poverty took its place at the top of the list.⁵³

During the 2000s, just as the discussions regarding the assistance provided by the states for political reasons were at the point of coming to an end, an important development rekindled them. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, put the political assistance onto the agenda of various countries, particularly the U.S. Even though the MDGs designated targets based on human development, the conjuncture which emerged following the attacks in 2001 meant that countries began once again to place emphasis on aid provided for political and economic purposes.

Thus far, issues related to saving lives in emergencies and contribution to development, growth, and poverty eradication in poor countries⁵⁴ are emphasized. However, on the other hand, ideological and political aid⁵⁵ completes the missing pieces of the puzzle. While seeking to better the socio-economic conditions of underdeveloped and developing countries with the help of development aid, most developed countries try to make use of such aid for their own economic, political and military interests as well.⁵⁶ The Marshall Plan and Truman Doctrine can be given as

⁵² MDGs: 1) eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, 2) Achieve universal primary education, 3) Promote gender equality, 4) Reduce child mortality, 5) Improve maternal health, 6) Combat HIV/AIDS, 7) Ensure environmental sustainability, 8) Develop a global partnership for development., available at: <http://www.oecd.org/document/37/0,3746,en_2649_33721_34087845_1_1_1_1,00.html>, (accessed on 13 December 2010).

⁵³ “Millennium Project”, UN (United Nations), Report 2005, p. 176.

⁵⁴ Roger C. Riddell, *Does Foreign Aid Really Work?*, (New York, Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 91.

⁵⁵ Joseph Wright, “How Foreign Aid Can Foster Democratization in Authoritarian Regimes”, *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 53, No. 3, 2009, p. 554.

⁵⁶ Abhijit Banerjee & Ruimin He, “Making Aid Work”, in William Easterly(ed), *Reinventing Foreign Aid*, (London, The MIT Press, 2008), p. 47.

examples for such ideological and political aid. When development aid provided by the U.S. to Middle East is taken into consideration, we can see that within this scope the U.S. gives a particular importance to the targets of its aid. Also during the period following 1990, the U.S. began to provide assistance to Central Asia aimed at neutralizing the nuclear weapons.⁵⁷

In asking about the reasons for particular allocation of funds, Kaul's 2003 book reveals seven different reasons: (1) to help address emergency need, (2) to assist recipients in achieving their development (growth and poverty-reducing) goals, (3) to show solidarity, (4) to further their own national political strategic interests, (5) to help promote the donor-country's commercial interests, (6) because of historical ties, and (7) strengthening global public goods while reducing the ill effects of global evils.⁵⁸

Riddell added an eighth reason to these items: Some donors have started more explicitly to base aid-giving decisions on the human-rights record of the recipient government, in particular reducing or halting completely the flow of aid to the countries whose record on basic human rights they assess as seriously deficient.⁵⁹

2.7. Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the historical development of foreign aid by examining changes in the motivating factors behind aid provision over the course of the late twentieth century. Since its inception until today, development aid has been used as a policy tool by donor countries. While strategic priorities have changed, the development aid provided from the end of World War II through the Cold War period, and from the breakup of the Soviet Union to the 2000s, has maintained its

⁵⁷ "Kazakhstan had nuclear infrastructure. The U.S. gave Kazakhstan a high amount of aid at this period." Karol Lancaster & Ann Van Dusen, *Organizing U.S. Foreign Aid: Confronting the Challenges of the Twenty-First Century*, (Washington, The Brookings Institutions, 2005), p. 5.

⁵⁸ Inge Kaul (ed), *Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization*, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 29.

⁵⁹ Roger C. Riddell, *Does Foreign Aid Really Work?*, (New York, Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 92.

importance in the foreign policies of both recipient and donor countries.

Though foreign assistance is a concept which has a long history, today the OECD has given primacy to assistance provided for the purpose of increasing the prosperity of poor countries and fighting hunger and poverty. The aid given by donors, however, has continued to be provided in line with their own interests and ideologies, as during the Cold War period.

While the usefulness of aid is up for debate,⁶⁰ this study discusses the factors which promote donors to provide assistance rather than the effectiveness of the aid in the recipient countries. In the following chapters, the donor-side motivations for aid provision will be discussed. The next chapter will provide a broad overview of the economic and social conditions of the five Central Asian countries to give a basis for further discussion of aid in the region.

⁶⁰ Catrinus Japma, "Foreign Aid and Global Environment Policy", in Kanhaya L. Gupta(ed), *Foreign Aid: New Perspectives*, (Boston, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999), p. 52.

CHAPTER III

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF POST-SOVIET CENTRAL ASIAN STATES

After summarizing the reasons for Soviet Union's dissolution, this chapter will describe the general economic and political conditions of Central Asian countries following independence. The Russian influence in the region, an important element in Central Asia's international relations, will also be discussed. (This influence will continue to play an important role in Chapter 5, where Russian foreign aid will be discussed.) After a general overview of Central Asian geography, this chapter will continue by examining the situation in which individual countries find themselves. In doing so, this chapter will enable us to better understand the Central Asia's need for foreign aid.

3.1. Central Asia and the Collapse of the Soviet Union

With the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, three important classes arose in the Soviet Union, namely, the new class, the proletariat and the peasantry.⁶¹ The new class, constituted by high-level members of the Communist Party, was in power and had ownership over the means of production. Meanwhile, the employment of the proletariat and peasantry in the agricultural and industrial sectors as an "army of slaves" gave rise to incredible social tension.⁶²

After the 1970s, economic development rates have been lower than predicted and the meltdown of the Soviet economy revealed itself for the first time after 1980 under Andropov's premiership.⁶³ The economic failure of the Soviet government is directly

⁶¹ Joseph R. O'Neil, *The Bolshevik Revolution*, (United States, Essential Events, 2009), p. 87.

⁶² Luke March, *The Communist Party in Post-Soviet Russia*, (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2002), p. 19.

⁶³ Peter Kenez, *A History of the Soviet Union from the Beginning to the End*, (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 247.

proportional to the low quality of production. For example, most of the refrigerators produced in 1986 were returned to the manufacturer and 31 percent of their production cost was spent on repairs. Despite reforms made for the purpose of increasing the productivity of the labor force, Andropov's success was hampered by bureaucracy and bribery. His successor Chernenko believed that the Party would solve all of the problems and was totally opposed to the reforms of his predecessor.⁶⁴

After Chernenko's death, Gorbachev was elected as the new leader. Gorbachev, who became the Secretary General of the Party as a popular politician, was not an economist. But the reports of his advisors showed that the country's main economic problem lay in strict centralized planning. In order to increase the public trust before implementing *glasnost* (openness) and *perestroika* (administrative and economic reconstruction), Gorbachev withdrew Russian soldiers from Afghanistan, considered the factor gradually weakening the Soviet Union. He signed disarmament agreements with the U.S. And following these agreements, he submitted the reform package including also *glasnost* and *perestroika*.⁶⁵ According to his devoted advisor Yakoles, "these reforms are important milestones like 1789 French Revolution and 1917 Bolshevik Revolution."

We can summarize the factors preparing the reform process as follows: (1) Following the constitution of industrial society, socialism presented a roadblock to development in a period when efficiency was more important than the economic growth. (2) Even though the USSR was the country with the second-highest production, it was underdeveloped in terms of technological quality (for example, in 1955, the Vukualin Report determined that the country produces 13.5 billion rubles of waste in the heavy industry sector every year. In 1989, this amount decreased by 150 million rubles).⁶⁶ (3) After a certain point, economic instability arose out of the failure of centralized planning. For example, because of the lack of stability between tire demand and automobile demand, either tires are overproduced, or people wait in long lines for

⁶⁴ Peter Kenez, *A History of the Soviet Union from the Beginning to the End*, (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 255.

⁶⁵ Hillel Tickin, "The Contradiction of Gorbachev", *The Journal of Communist Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 4, 1988, p. 86.

⁶⁶ Vahit Halefoğlu, "Doğu Bloku'nda Son Gelişmeler ve Türkiye", *Türkiye İktisat*, Vol. 3 No. 4, 1990, p. 47.

tires.⁶⁷ As the center decides the number of shoes or nails to be produced in factories thousands of kilometers away, either there is a shortage of shoes or nails, or there is an excessive production that can not be sold, or this excessive production is destroyed. (4) Overemployment in agricultural and industrial sectors and administrative mistakes are also factors which increase economic inefficiency. (5) Recession is another factor that must be indicated here. As Kennedy noted in *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, recession is an inevitable feature of all empires. As countries become stronger, they seek to enlarge; if this spread is not supported with economic power, it becomes a burden. As their economic power weakens, countries start again to shrink. (6) Increasing defense expenditures is another policy that demanded reform. Gorbachev argued for cutting defense expenditures and transferring them to other sectors of the economy.

Gorbachev foresaw reforms in economic and political fields, but he only made superficial improvements in the system.⁶⁸ Until 1987, he only dealt with economic renewals and a series of staff changes. It was at a Supreme Soviet meeting of November 2, 1987, before the seventieth anniversary of the Revolution, that Gorbachev put emphasis for the first time on *perestroika*. Gorbachev described *perestroika* as the continuation of the October Revolution. He argued that even socialist communities could experience bottlenecks and major socio-political crises, and he aimed at surpassing this by means of “revolutionary” reforms.⁶⁹

As the first secretary of the Moscow Communist Party, Boris Yeltsin also attended the Central Committee Meeting of the Party held within the framework of seventy-year celebrations. Criticizing Gorbachev’s speech, Yeltsin argued that as long as reforms were not made in party organization, further attempts made in the direction of political and economic reform were hindered.⁷⁰ Gorbachev dismissed Yeltsin from his position as first secretary, but Yeltsin, who was also a member of the Supreme

⁶⁷ Richard Sakwa, *The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union 1917-1991*, (New York, Routledge, 1999), p. 405.

⁶⁸ Jay Bergman, “Was The Soviet Union Totalitarian? The View of Soviet Dissidents and The Reformers of The Gorbachev Era”, *Studies in East European Thought*, Vol. 50, 1998, p. 262.

⁶⁹ Jay Bergman, “Was The Soviet Union Totalitarian? The View of Soviet Dissidents and The Reformers of The Gorbachev Era”, *Studies in East European Thought*, Vol. 50, 1998, p. 272.

⁷⁰ Robert William Davies, *Soviet History in The Yeltsin Era*, (New York, Macmillan, 1997), p. 176.

Soviet, was elected the President of Parliament of the largest of the fifteen republics, the Russian Republic. As Yeltsin was preparing for an uphill struggle against Gorbachev, when Gorbachev was reelected as secretary general at the twenty-seventh Communist Party congress, he resigned both from membership and presidency of Parliament.⁷¹ Yeltsin was planning to continue his struggle on the popular front. Two different power centers were constituted in Moscow, one official and one popular.⁷² The Russian presidential elections of June 12, 1991 were decisive. In the beginning of 1991, Yeltsin developed a stronger opposition against Gorbachev, blaming the secretary general of dictatorship and calling for his resignation.⁷³ On the one hand, Yeltsin tried to gain the support of Russian people with slogans emphasizing the independence of Russia, such as “first and foremost Russia” or “independent Russia.” On the other hand, he tried to receive support from the non-Russian population within the Russian Federation by promising “limitless sovereignty for everyone.”⁷⁴

When Yeltsin won the elections, real power and sovereignty was transferred from Gorbachev to Yeltsin. While its leaders attempted to hold the Union together by means of various formulas, the declarations of independence made by its constituent republics were beginning to bring the Union to an end.⁷⁵ By December, all former Soviet republics had declared independence. Independence in the Baltic republics was followed by Caucasian and Central Asian declarations of independence. Russia and Kazakhstan were the two republics that did not make decisions for independence until the last minute. With the signing of Minsk and Almaty treaties in December 1991, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was established, replacing the Soviet Union.

Central Asia’s experience in the USSR helps explain their current economic and

⁷¹ Robert William Davies, *Soviet History in The Yeltsin Era*, (New York, Macmillan, 1997), p. 181.

⁷² Fırat Purtaş, *Rusya Federasyonu Ekseninde Bağımsız Devletler Topluluğu*, (Ankara, Platin, 2005), p. 40.

⁷³ Fırat Purtaş, *Rusya Federasyonu Ekseninde Bağımsız Devletler Topluluğu*, (Ankara, Platin, 2005), p. 40.40.


⁷⁴ Fırat Purtaş, *Rusya Federasyonu Ekseninde Bağımsız Devletler Topluluğu*, (Ankara, Platin, 2005), p. 44.

⁷⁵ Andrew Langley, *The Collapse of The Soviet Union: The End of an Empire*, (Minneapolis, White-Thomson, 2006), p. 82.

political situation. In the next section, we will discuss the potential for development in the five countries of the region—Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan—since their 1991 declaration of independence.

3.2. Potential for Development in Post Soviet Central Asian States

Central Asia is a large landlocked geographical region which has great economic potential because of its significant gas and oil reserves (especially in the Caspian basin), richness in iron and non-ferrous metals, its potential for hydropower, and its geopolitical position (it borders Afghanistan, Russia, the Middle East and the Caucasus).



Rafis Abazov, an expert on the region, explains Central Asia’s geography as follows:

Central Asia is a land of extremes and contrasts, and the region can be subdivided into five major geographical and climatic zones that do not necessarily coincide with national

boundaries: the northern steppe and steppe forest zone; the western dry desert zone; the southern and southeastern high-mountain zone; the fertile valleys and oases between the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya Rivers; and a series of moderately elevated valleys on the border between the high mountains and the central plain.⁷⁶

Agriculture remained the dominant economic activity in Central Asia during the Soviet period. Although irrigation-based agriculture is a dominant feature of the economies of all five Central Asian republics, the irrigation system is most crucial to Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan (see Table 2). The second significant important common economic feature, determined by history, is the integration of the Central Asian republics into the Soviet economic system during seventy years of membership in the USSR.⁷⁷ The Central Asian republics shared with the rest of the USSR the general inefficiencies of central planning, the drawbacks of poor quality, obsolete industry, and lack of concern for environmental costs.⁷⁸

Table 2: Sectoral Distribution of Employment⁷⁹

	Agriculture	Industry	Transportation	Trade	HSEA	Other
Kazakhstan	23	31	11	8	19	8
Kyrgyzstan	34	27	7	7	18	7
Tajikistan	42	21	7	6	17	7
Turkmenistan	41	21	8	6	17	7
Uzbekistan	38	24	7	6	19	6
USSR	19	38	9	8	18	8

Source: IMF, 1991.

The Central Asian republics were important energy producers within the USSR, but reserves are not spread evenly across the region (see Table 3).

⁷⁶ Rafis Abazov, *Culture and Customs of the Central Asia*, (USA, Greenwood Press, 2007), p. 2.

⁷⁷ Richard Pomfret, *The Economies of Central Asia*, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 28.

⁷⁸ Richard Pomfret, *The Economies of Central Asia*, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 32.

⁷⁹ Petar Kurečić, “The New Great Game: Rivalry of Geostrategies and Geoeconomies in Central Asia”, *Critical Review (Kritički pregledni članak)*, Vol. 72, No. 1, 2010, p. 27.

Table 3: Oil and Natural Gas in Central Asia, 1991⁸⁰

<i>Oil</i>	<i>Reserves^a</i>	<i>Production^b</i>	<i>Consumption</i>
Kazakhstan	2,140	530	430
Kyrgyzstan	25	5	55
Tajikistan	5	–	50
Turkmenistan	210	110	200
Uzbekistan	115	55	205
<i>Natural Gas</i>			
Kazakhstan	1,830	130	225
Kyrgyzstan	6	–	35
Tajikistan	7	–	30
Turkmenistan	2,720	1,395	135
Uzbekistan	1,820	695	565

Source: Petromin, September 1993, 40.

^a Oil: proved and probable, in millions of tons. Natural gas: proved, in billions of cubic meters.

^b Thousands of barrels per day, oil equivalent.

The Central Asian republics' place in the Soviet system was mainly as producers or processors of raw materials.⁸¹ Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan produced energy to serve the entire USSR. The greatest oil reserves in the region lie under the Caspian Sea. However, the exploitation of these reserves has required cooperation among the Caspian states.

The economic model of the Soviets was based on central planning which featured a mixed and sector-specific division of labor.⁸² A study carried out on six thousand different products being sold in the USSR once demonstrated that 77 percent of products on the market were being produced “only in one factory.” The new

⁸⁰ Richard Pomfret, *The Economies of Central Asia*, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 36.

⁸¹ William Byrd, Martin Raiser, *Economic Cooperation in the Wider Central Asia Region*-World Bank Working Paper No. 75, (Washington, The World Bank, 2006), p. 2.

⁸² “e.g. a factory that produced cars would gather the parts of the car from other factories. The bodywork and the motor were produced in different countries.” Peter J. Boettke, *The Political Economy of The Soviet Socialism: The Formative Years 1918-1928*, (The Netherlands, Kulwer Academic, 1990), p. 56.

republics founded on the same structure had a big production capacity in only one or two fields, while very little production capacity existed in other sectors. Accordingly, we can say that the Central Asian region does not present an important potential compared to the other regions.⁸³ Because of the industrial division of labor applied by the USSR, all of the Central Asian republics also got their share after the dissolution of the Union. After the end of the central production, factories producing goods within the Union-wide division of labor became nonfunctional.

Like all other member countries of the Soviet Union, the Central Asian republics also experienced a difficult transition to free-market economics after the end of socialism. Because the weak economic infrastructure was unprepared for the shock of transition, Central Asian republics experienced a period of economic crisis. The economic woes of other countries began to affect their own economies much more directly as well. For instance, the Asian Crisis in 1997 and the Russian Financial Crisis in 1998 were two early blows to the Central Asian economies.

3.3. Kyrgyzstan

Living a tribal existence throughout history, the Kyrgyz have not had a long experience with statehood. Due to the relatively democratic parliamentary elections in 1990, Kyrgyzstan was described as the “island of democracy in Central Asia” by some Western observers. On the other hand, like in the other Central Asian countries, although the separation of legislative, executive, and judiciary powers is specified in the constitution, this division is mostly formal, and the president overpowers in practice.

The most important feature of the economy of Kyrgyzstan that separates it from the other Central Asian countries is that it is the poorest country in terms of energy resources (natural gas, oil). While it is poor in energy resources, Kyrgyzstan is fortunate to have vast water resources. Also, with three-quarters of its territory covered by mountains, Kyrgyzstan has proved to be rich in mineral resources. It emerged as the leading source of mercury and antimony in the USSR and one of its

⁸³ Richard Pomfret, *The Central Asian Economies Since Independence*, (New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 9.

main producers of coal and uranium. In the early 1950s, it also had the opportunity to further develop its agriculture and animal husbandry infrastructure.⁸⁴

Since Kyrgyzstan is a country that is suitable for agriculture and livestock, its economy is based on these two factors. After the dissolution of the USSR, the economic structure of Kyrgyzstan became extremely vulnerable, as did its political structure. Because the Russian political elite left the country due to the impact of the collapse, the economy sustained even greater damage, and Kyrgyz people were also forced to immigrate to other countries because of the financial situation. Today, the country's economy still survives on substantial remittances coming from abroad.⁸⁵

Askar Akaev held power in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan from his election in 1991 until the 2005 "Tulip Revolution," after which Kurmanbek Bakiev came to power. Although it was expected that Bakiev would take further steps after the revolution to further the country's democratic development⁸⁶ and would take more stringent measures in the fight against corruption, he followed in Akaev's path. In 2010, Kyrgyzstan experienced a second "revolution,"⁸⁷ distinguished from the first by its violence and ethnic conflict. In both "revolutions," the public expressed disgust about corruption and economic challenges. After the events of April 2010, Roza Otunbaeva, then chair of the provisional government of the Kyrgyz Republic came to power in Kyrgyzstan. This level of political instability demonstrates that Kyrgyzstan's social, political, and economic infrastructures still need to be developed.

⁸⁴ Dilip Hiro, *Between Marx and Muhammad: The Changing Face of Central Asia*, (London, Harper Collins Publishers, 1995), p.130.

⁸⁵ "Country Report April 2009, Kyrgyz Republic," The Economist Intelligence Unit, p.10, available at: <http://www.eiu.com/report_dl.asp?issue_id=974527882&mode=pdf>, (accessed on 30 May 2010).

⁸⁶ Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) Kyrgyz Ex-President Bakiev: 'I Don't Think It Is About Me' (accessible at <http://www.eurasianet.org/node/61185>) (accessed on May 21, 2010).

⁸⁷ See "Kyrgyzstan: A Hollow Regime Collapses", *International Crisis Group, Policy Briefing*, 27 April 2010.

3.4. Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan, one of the world's largest nations, is also landlocked, with water access only on the Caspian Sea. Kazakhstan was one of the most important countries in the USSR and played a central role in both industrial and agricultural planning.⁸⁸

Like all other newly independent states, Kazakhstan also discovered they were still tied to the remnants⁸⁹ of the old Soviet economic system. In Brill Olcott's words: "Moscow's *diktat* had disappeared, but the economies of the various post-Soviet republics remained interconnected."⁹⁰ Although Kazakhstan is the most resource-rich country among the Central Asian republics, it bears striking witness to the difficulties of the transition to a market economy.⁹¹ Because of the division of labor policy mentioned above as well as the country's close ties to Russia during the Soviet period, Kazakhstan's economy has had great difficulty in separating from the Russian economy. A turning point for the Kazakh economy came in 1996, when the government sold the country's largest oil refinery, its largest oil enterprises, and one of its largest gold mines to foreign companies. These sales led to improved confidence among international investors.

Kazakhstan's president Nursultan Nazarbaev played the most important role in quickly gathering Kazakhstan's economic strength. First, Nazarbaev guaranteed his own personal position in power, then he forced through policies necessary for the economic development of the country. Even though he supported Gorbachev during the breakup, he showed the highest effort in securing the economic independence of the country from Russia, especially in the energy sector.⁹² On the other hand, with

⁸⁸ Glenn E. Curtis, "Kazakhstan: A Country Study", in Lydia M. Buyers (ed), *Central Asia in Focus Political and Economic Issues*, (New York, Nova Science, 2003), p. 37.

⁸⁹ Martha Brill Olcott, *Central Asia's New States Independence, Foreign Policy, and Regional Security* (USA, United States Institute of Peace, 1996), p. 57.

⁹⁰ Martha Brill Olcott, *Central Asia's New States Independence, Foreign Policy, and Regional Security* (USA, United States Institute of Peace, 1996), p. 58.

⁹¹ Martha Brill Olcott, *Kazakhstan Unfulfilled Promise*, (Washington, Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, 2002), p. 128.

⁹² Martha Brill Olcott, "Democratization and The Growth of Political Participation in Kazakhstan", in Karen Dawisha, Bruce Parrott (eds), *Conflict, Cleavage, and Change in Central Asia and the Caucasus*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997) p. 209.

respect to foreign policy, in order to protect the economic and politic interests of the country, Nazarbayev continued to emphasize its relationship with Russia. Kazakhstan's secure relationship with Russia also ensures its closer ties with the West, compared to other Central Asian countries. Nazarbaev's political overtures to Russia are also noteworthy. For example, Russian is accepted as a second official language in Kazakhstan. This policy made Nazarbayev popular among the Russian minority in the country. Meanwhile, compulsory Russian education strengthened the bonds of the Kazakh population with its (Soviet) history.⁹³ Finally, by supporting double citizenship, he stemmed the migration of the Russian minority to Russia to a certain extent and forestalled a serious economic collapse in Kazakhstan.

On the other hand, after the breakup of the USSR, Kazakhstan owned a considerable number of nuclear weapons and power plants. In November 1994, the U.S. began the Sapphire Project, a mission to ensure the nuclear disarmament of Kazakhstan, a goal which was realized by May 1995.⁹⁴ In addition, the U.S. promised Kazakhstan substantial economic aid for decommissioning the nuclear test complex at the Semipalatinsk site.⁹⁵

The most important factor separating Kazakhstan from other Central Asian countries is the importance it has given to economic cooperation. In 1993, Kazakhstan established the Asian Economic Union with Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.

3.5. Tajikistan

Tajikistan is not only one of the poorest Central Asian countries, but also the most unlucky country with regards to geographic conditions and energy resources. Following the 1917 revolution, the Bolsheviks took important steps to ameliorate the

⁹³ Martha Brill Olcott, "Democratization and The Growth of Political Participation in Kazakhstan", in Karen Dawisha, Bruce Parrott (eds), *Conflict, Cleavage, and Change in Central Asia and the Caucasus*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997) p. 209.

⁹⁴ Lydia M. Buyers (ed), *Central Asia in Focus Political and Economic Issue*, (New York, Nova Science, 2003), p. xvi.

⁹⁵ Talbott, Strobe. "Promoting Democracy and Prosperity in Central Asia." *U.S. Department of State Dispatch*. Vol. 5, No. 19, 1994, p. 22.

disadvantageous conditions of Tajikistan by expanding the country's infrastructure and supporting development in education and industry. The Tajik economy, which was based on agriculture and animal husbandry, was traditionally controlled by clans in the north of the country, and by means of their economic power, these clans also achieved political power in the country during the Soviet period.

Among the Central Asian republics, whose birth was called "premature" by Martha Brill Olcott⁹⁶, Tajikistan experienced the most difficult and painful transition period. Serious ethnic conflicts arose immediately after the breakup of the Union. The opposition gained power rapidly and grabbed power—in 1992, a third of the seats in a twenty-four member cabinet belonged to the opposition, including the presidency, vice-presidency, and ministries of defense and internal affairs.⁹⁷ The new government was confronted with discontent by the northern clans, which controlled the country's economy and politics. This resentment erupted in civil war in 1992 but did not end with the departure of the opposition groups from the country.⁹⁸ A peace treaty took two years to negotiate and was eventually signed in 1997.

Tajikistan's economy depends on agriculture and its industry is underdeveloped. Compared to other Central Asian countries, the underground resources and natural resources of Tajikistan are limited. The civil war which started in 1992 and ended in 1997 had a negative effect on Tajikistan's economy. The civil war not only prevented the implementation of the reform packages which were prepared for transition to market economy, but also realization of foreign investments in the region.⁹⁹ For these reasons, Tajikistan is today the most underdeveloped Central Asian country in terms of its political, economic, and social structures. During the civil war, the real GDP

⁹⁶ Martha Brill Olcott, *Central Asia's New States Independence, Foreign Policy, and Regional Security*, (USA, United States Institute of Peace, 1996), p. 7.

⁹⁷ Dilip Hiro, *Between Marx and Muhammad: The Changing Face of Central Asia*, (London, Harper Collins, 1995), p. 208.

⁹⁸ Gregory Gleason, "Why Russia is in Tajikistan", *Comperative Strategy*, Vol. 20, 2001, p. 80.

⁹⁹ Lena Jonson, *Tajikistan in the New Central Asia: Geopolitics, Great Power Rivalry and Radical Islam*, (New York, I.B. Tauris & Co, 2006), p. 42.

shrank 36.9 percent in 1994 and grew by 25.5 percent in the first quarter of 1995.¹⁰⁰ In 1997, following the end of the war, the real GDP grew by 4.7 percent.¹⁰¹ The negative effects of the civil war on the country's economy can be clearly understood by comparing the dramatic differences between the real GDP ratios.

The civil war also affected the foreign policy of Tajikistan. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia, which played an important role in all other Central Asian countries, also continued to maintain significant influence over Tajikistan. Notably, the Soviet army's 201st Division, which was in Tajikistan after the break up of the Soviet Union, did not leave the country after its independence.¹⁰² The division supported the government during the civil war, and it played an active role in ensuring security in the country following the war.¹⁰³ Russia also acted as a mediator between the Tajik government and the opposition.

On the grounds of its historic, religious, and cultural bonds with Iran, Tajikistan established a close political relationship with that country as well. However, since Turkey did not consider Tajikistan a "Turkic republic," the relationship between these two countries was not developed, especially during the civil war, and Tajikistan has always remained in the background for Turkey.¹⁰⁴ But today, because of the changing geopolitical considerations and Tajikistan's important position, Turkey has begun to consider Tajikistan an inseparable part of the region and has made an effort to develop relations between the two countries.

¹⁰⁰ Country Report October 1997, "Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan" *The Economist Intelligence Unit*, available at: <http://www.eiu.com/report_dl.asp?issue_id=424028242&mode=pdf>, (accessed on 30 October 2010), p. 10.

¹⁰¹ Dov Lynch, "The Tajik Civil War and Peace Process" *Civil Wars*, Vol. 4, No. 4, 2001, p. 37.

¹⁰² Pınar Akçalı, "Bağımsızlıktan Günümüze Türkiye-Tacikistan İlişkileri", *Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi*, Vol. 2, No. 5, 2005, p. 147.

¹⁰³ Shahram Akbarzadeh, "Why Did Nationalism Fail in Tajikistan?", *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 48, No. 7, 1996, p. 1109.

¹⁰⁴ Mustafa Aydın, "Regional Security Issues and Conflicts in the Caucasus and the Caspian Regions", in Kurt R. Spillmann, Joachim Krause (eds.), *International Security Challenges in a Changing World*, (Zurich, Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research, 1999), p. 120.

3.6. Turkmenistan

Turkmenistan, the most ethnically homogeneous Central Asian republic, faced very serious economic problems right after it declared independence. The main reason for these problems was the special condition of the country's economy. During the Soviet era, clearing and settlement systems dominated the economy¹⁰⁵, but reform packages prepared after independence were not implemented and the country's economy came to a dead end. Saparmurad Niyazov, who was the first secretary of the Turkmen Communist Party and who continued to lead Turkmenistan as its first president, is responsible for this stagnation. Niyazov gave himself the title *Turkmenbashi*, meaning the leader of all Turkmen. Turkmenbashi supported the communist system and did not implement the economic programs prepared by the IMF and the World Bank for his country.¹⁰⁶ Turkmenbashi believed that by means of natural gas, he would be able to develop the country and create a second Kuwait.¹⁰⁷ Nevertheless, this approach did not bring welfare to the country; on the contrary, he dragged the population to a period of poverty which has lasted for decades. Between 1993 and 1995, the GDP of Turkmenistan shrank by 30 percent and by 26 percent in 1997 alone.¹⁰⁸ At the same time, in 1995, the inflation rate increased by 1,800 percent. Turkmenistan ranked among the countries with the highest inflation rates during the transition period,¹⁰⁹ though it dropped in 1996 to 450 percent.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁵ Oktay F. Tanrısever, "Rusya ve Bağımsız Türk Devletleri: Bağımsızlığın Anlamını Keşfetmek", *Avrasya Etüdüleri*, Vol. 20, 2002, p. 80.

¹⁰⁶ Gregory Gleason, *Markets and Politics in Central Asia: Structural Reform and Political Change*, (New York, Routledge, 2003), p. 99.

¹⁰⁷ Oktay F. Tanrısever, "Rusya ve Bağımsız Türk Devletleri: Bağımsızlığın Anlamını Keşfetmek", *Avrasya Etüdüleri*, Vol. 20, 2002, p. 81.

¹⁰⁸ Country Report February 1996, "Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan" available at: <http://www.eiu.com/report_dl.asp?issue_id=373882837&mode=pdf>, (accessed on 1 November 2010); "Country Report August 1996, "Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan" p. 45. Available at: <http://www.eiu.com/report_dl.asp?issue_id=373882837&mode=pdf>, (accessed on 1 November 2010), p. 32.

¹⁰⁹ Country Report July 1998, "Turkmenistan" available at: <http://www.eiu.com/report_dl.asp?issue_id=934085893&mode=pdf>, (accessed on 1 November 2010).

¹¹⁰ Country Report February 1996, "Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan" available at: <http://www.eiu.com/report_dl.asp?issue_id=373882837&mode=pdf>, (accessed on 1 November 2010), p. 32.

Almost the whole country is covered by desert, while 3.5 percent of Turkmenistan is arable and 17 percent is used for grazing. Irrigation has a vital importance in the country, directed mostly at the country's important cultivation of cotton. The central planning system implemented during the Soviet Union period continues to direct Turkmenistan's economy. According to this system, services with regards to processing, evaluation and marketing of a certain product cultivated in one country are rendered in other countries.¹¹¹ Such a system prevented innovation in industry by ignoring demand, input from consumers, and the introduction of new equipment and technology. Some effort has been made to rejuvenate the economy. After 2000 a number of cotton factories were established all over the country under the leadership of Turkmenbashi. On one hand, these factories provided employment; on the other, it meant that more than half the cotton produced in Turkmenistan began to be processed in the country as well.¹¹²

Energy is a sector in which Turkmenistan is more fortunate than other Central Asian countries. Turkmenistan is the country which has the biggest natural gas reserves and highest annual production capacity in the entire region.¹¹³ However, in Turkmenistan pipelines could not be constructed independently from Russian involvement.¹¹⁴ In addition, the countries to which Turkmenistan exports natural gas, primarily Russia and Ukraine, could not pay their debts amounting billions of dollars, giving rise to an economic bottleneck in the country.¹¹⁵

There are several reasons why Turkmenistan did not or could not implement many of the free-market reforms carried out by its neighbors. Turkmenistan suffers from a shortage of resources and is landlocked, so the export of the resources it has in abundance—natural gas and oil—is more difficult. Politically, the government of

¹¹¹ Saule Baycaun, "10 Yıllık Bağımsızlık Sürecinde Türkmenistan Ekonomisine Genel Bir Bakış", *Avrasya Dosyası*, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2002 p. 27.

¹¹² Luca Anceschi, *Turkmenistan's Foreign Policy Positive Neutrality and the Consolidation of the Turkmen Regime*, (New York, Routgetle, 2009), p. 87.

¹¹³ Luca Anceschi, *Turkmenistan's Foreign Policy Positive Neutrality and the Consolidation of the Turkmen Regime*, (New York, Routgetle, 2009), p. 89.

¹¹⁴ Oktay F. Tanrısever, "Rusya ve Bağımsız Türk Devletleri: Bağımsızlığın Anlamını Keşfetmek", *Avrasya Etüdlere*, Vol. 20, 2002, p. 82.

¹¹⁵ Saule Baycaun, "10 Yıllık Bağımsızlık Sürecinde Türkmenistan Ekonomisine Genel Bir Bakış", *Avrasya Dosyası*, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2002, p. 21.

Turkmenistan has exhibited a conservative approach regarding the transition to democracy and a free-market economy. Today, most of the final decisions are given by the president. According to the 2010 Freedom House report, Turkmenistan is among the countries rated “not free,” earning seven points.¹¹⁶ Turkmenistan’s approach to foreign policy, meanwhile, is dominated by pro-Russian policies. These two countries have ensured economic and political cooperation with several mutual agreements signed in 1995. In 2000, they declared each other as “strategic partners.”¹¹⁷

3.7. Uzbekistan

After the breakup of the Soviet Union, Uzbekistan has been the most fortunate country in the region. By the virtue of its high population (exceeding 20 million) and its industrial structure left over from the Soviet era, the country has the most buoyant economy in Central Asia.

The economy is heavily dependent on cotton. Uzbekistan is now the world's second-largest cotton exporter and its fifth-largest producer.¹¹⁸ However, the lack of water leads to both problems with regards to cotton cultivation and disputes with its neighbors, particularly Kyrgyzstan. On the other hand, Uzbekistan has important natural gas and oil resources. There are also several mineral deposits and resources, most notably in gold.

Of all Central Asian countries, Uzbekistan recovered the fastest economically after 1991. Because of the factors listed above, it was the first country to achieve (in 2001)

¹¹⁶ See Country Report, “Turkmenistan”, *Freedom House* available at: <<http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2010&country=7938>>, (accessed on November 2011).

¹¹⁷ James P. Nichol, “Turkmenistan: Current Developments and U.S. Interests”, in Lydia M. Buyers (ed), *Central Asia in Focus Political and Economic Issue*, (New York, Nova Science, 2003), p. 15.

¹¹⁸ Richard Pomfret, *The Central Asian Economies Since Independence, USA*, (Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 25; See also “Central Asia, Uzbekistan”, CIA Fact Book, available at: <<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/uz.html>> , (accessed on 3 November 2010).

the same GDP it enjoyed during the Soviet era.¹¹⁹ Over the entire period 1990-2005, per capita GDP shrank about 4 percent and recovered fully only in 2006.¹²⁰ As an economically powerful country, Uzbekistan assumed a leading role in Central Asia, and, from the very beginning, it tried to keep the dominant effect of Moscow at a minimum.¹²¹ Today, however, Uzbekistan has attempted to strengthen its relationship with the other Central Asian republics and countries outside the region for the purpose of diversifying its economic and political alternatives.

President Islam Karimov is the most important political leader of the country. In the 1980s, during the implementation of *glasnost* and *perestroika*, new political parties were founded and the opposition gained power. When it declared independence, Uzbekistan also accepted a constitution based on democracy and division of powers. However, like the other countries in the region, Uzbekistan never implemented such a system. The political system in Uzbekistan is more conservative and totalitarian compared to the other countries. The Uzbek government claims that this policy is adopted for the purpose of “maintaining stability.” On the grounds of this policy, Karimov has prevented the constitution of a democratic opposition by resorting to force. Karimov has monopolized management of the country’s economy and created a totalitarian political system, to be lifted only when the country achieves “true security.”

3.8. Conclusion

The major common characteristic of the Central Asian countries is the economic and political heritage left over from the Soviet Union. As soon as they declared independence, many countries began to implement economic and political reform packages, but most attempts in this direction failed. As a result of economic bottlenecks, the countries could not stabilize their domestic political systems, and

¹¹⁹ Richard Pomfret, *The Central Asian Economies Since Independence*, (USA, Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 25.

¹²⁰ Martin C. Spechler, *The Political Economy of Reform in Central Asia Uzbekistan under Authoritarianism*, (New York, Routledge, 2008), p. 66.

¹²¹ Oktay F. Tanrısever, *Rusya ve Bağımsız Türk Devletleri: Bağımsızlığın Anlamını Keşfetmek, TICA Avrasya Etüdüleri*, Vol. 20, 2002, p. 89.

consequently witnessed civil wars, ethnic disputes, and political instability. In Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in particular, domestic disputes and poverty arising from the economic problems during the initial period of independence still continue.

In the Soviet Union, “central planning” constituted the backbone of the economy. This institution was reformed several times before the Union disintegrated, but the essential structure of the system remained unchanged. Strict bureaucratic structuring; enormous amounts of wasted products produced without regard for actual demand; unproductive, old technology; and an undeveloped industry of basic consumer goods (with an overdeveloped aerospace and defense industry) are characteristics of the old system and problems which continue to plague the new economies.

The historical, economic, and political bonds between these countries and Russia has continued to play a central role since independence. Russia has preserved its title as the country with the highest commercial relationships with Central Asia. Additionally, Russia has continued its military and economic activities via the Russian population of the region. For example, during the Tajik Civil War, Russia intervened militarily and acted as a mediator between the opposition and the government. In addition, Russia has also provided financial aid to the region. Russia’s Central Asia policy will be explained in further detail before the conclusion.

While we can evaluate the Central Asian region as a whole, these countries also differ in many aspects. These differences arise from geographical conditions and Russian policies implemented during the centuries of direct rule. Central Asia features an interdependent economic structure, but the overspecialization problem arising from the politics implemented by the Soviet Union became one of the common problems of the region. Although the Soviet Union established many more modern factories after World War II, this was not sufficient to overcome the problems of resource overspecialization. For example, though it was a rich country in terms of raw material, Kazakhstan owned only 3 percent of the old Soviet industry, and despite its large share in cotton production, Turkmenistan owned only 5 percent

of the textile industry.¹²²

These countries reported lower-than-average scores in fields such as education, health, communication, transportation, and infrastructure compared to the other republics. While the ratio of the literate people and average quality of life was lower than the Soviet average, the infant mortality rate was higher.¹²³ Aside from the economic dependence created by the adoption of Soviet industrial policy, agriculture-heavy production, insufficient qualified personnel, and weak infrastructure have created barriers to the republics' self-sufficiency and domestic economic integration. Because the Central Asian region was not prepared to switch to an economy open to foreign competition, the transition has been no less than disastrous. The questionable usefulness of Soviet-era reforms in the region, as well as a continued lack of a political environment conducive to reforms, mean that major changes have not been made to most of the economic structures of Central Asian countries.

¹²² *Eski SSCB Cumhuriyetleri İstatistik Göstergeleri 1970-1992, T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü*, Ekim 1993, Ankara, pp. 46-50.

¹²³ *Eski SSCB Cumhuriyetleri İstatistik Göstergeleri 1970-1992, T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü*, Ekim 1993, Ankara, pp. 46-50.

CHAPTER IV

TURKEY'S FOREIGN AID POLICY TOWARDS CENTRAL ASIA

This chapter will begin with a discussion of Turkey's foreign policy towards Central Asia, followed by a more specific evaluation of Turkey's foreign assistance policy from a historical and current perspective. The specific motives driving Turkey's foreign assistance policy in Central Asia will be stressed. The diversity of reasons for Turkey's foreign assistance will become even more clear by Chapter 5, where Turkey's policy will be compared to those of other donor countries.

It was during the nineteenth century that Ottoman Turks "rediscovered" Turkish groups abroad, kindling a sense of nationalism and even pan-Turkism. During the late nineteenth century, the *cedits* of Turkistan¹²⁴ went to Istanbul as students. There they became acquainted with the activities of the Committee of Union and Progress, a political faction of the Young Turks, dissident Ottoman intellectuals. When the *cedits* returned to their country, they called themselves the Yaş Buharas and Yaş Hivelis.¹²⁵ The complex situation in the region was made more difficult by the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, which restricted the even meager relations that had just begun to develop. Moscow's exaggerated fear of pan-Turkism—the ideology that aspired to the establishment of a common homeland for all Turks—played an important role in its divide-and-rule tactics towards the Turkic peoples and its endeavor to minimize contacts between Turkey and Turkish-Muslim republics.¹²⁶ Some representatives of Central Asia tried to continue dialogue with Anatolian and Balkan Turks until 1920, but after this year the relations with outside world were stopped significantly until 1989.

¹²⁴ İsmail Gaspıralı led the school of *usul-ü cedit*, which means *new method school*. Reformists associated with these schools referred to themselves as "Cedit". A.Ahat Andican, *Cedidizm'den Bağımsızlığa Hariçte Türkistan Mücadelesi*, (İstanbul, Emre Yayınları, 2003), p. 25.

¹²⁵ A. A. Andican, *Cedidizm'den Bağımsızlığa Hariç'te Türkistan Mücadelesi*, (İstanbul, Emre, 2003) p. 25.

¹²⁶ Charles Warren Hostler, *Turkism and the Soviets*, (London, Allen and Unwin, 1957), p. 102.

After the First World War, the newly established USSR easily imposed its power in Central Asia and the Caucasus, while the Anatolian Turks were struggling for survival. The newly founded Turkish Republic's hands-off policy towards the ethnic Turks who lived outside Turkey (in the Soviet Union, the Balkans, or the Middle East) made Moscow's task easier.¹²⁷ During this period, Turkey had neither enough power to deal with external Turks, nor a serious independence movement in the Soviet Union on which it could rely for support. Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Turkish Republic, defined Turkish national identity exclusively with reference to the Turks living within the country's boundaries.¹²⁸ This strategy was designed to strengthen Turkish nationalism at home and to preclude irredentist activities on behalf of the Turks of neighboring states.¹²⁹ In real terms, the splits in the Turkic world were solidified by the iron hand of Stalin's policy in Central Asia combined with Turkey's weakness in the international system.

During the Cold War, there were two main reasons that Turkey did not establish a relationship with the region: First, the world was the site of ideological warfare, and the Turkic world had split into two large pieces in the capitalist and communist spheres. It was not possible for the Turkish community to create a constructive and trusting relationship within the tense atmosphere of Soviet-American competition. Second, Turkey's non-provocative foreign policy continued in this period. Although there were not insignificant Turkic populations in some countries, including the Soviet Union and China in Asia, Bulgaria and Greece in the Balkans, and Iraq and Iran in the Middle East, Turkey expended special energy on avoiding these countries' hostility, especially Soviet Russia and China's. Naturally, Turkey did not involve itself with these countries' Turkic communities. Turkey did not have status to stand against the Soviet Union, especially during the Cold War. Due to the totalitarian regimes in the Soviet Union and China, it also was impossible to improve any

¹²⁷ Sabri Sayari, "Turkey, the Caucasus and Central Asia" Ali Banuazizi, Myron Weiner (eds), *The New Geopolitics of Central Asia and Its Borderlands*, (London, I.B. Tauris, 1994), p. 177.

¹²⁸ Sabri Sayari, "Turkey, the Caucasus and Central Asia" Ali Banuazizi, Myron Weiner (eds), *The New Geopolitics of Central Asia and Its Borderlands*, (London, I.B. Tauris, 1994), p. 177.

¹²⁹ Sabri Sayari, "Turkey, the Caucasus and Central Asia" Ali Banuazizi, Myron Weiner (eds), *The New Geopolitics of Central Asia and Its Borderlands*, (London, I.B. Tauris, 1994), pp. 177-178.

relationship with the Turkish communities in these countries on the basis of Turkey's unilateral efforts. It was very difficult to establish even the most basic cultural and human relations during these years.

4.1. Turkey and Independence in Central Asia

The main goal of the Central Asian states after the fall of the Soviet Union was to secure and maintain their independence,¹³⁰ which entailed ensuring recognition at the international level. According to Kemal Karpat, post-Soviet Central Asian foreign policy aimed to accomplish three goals: (1) liberation from bonds established in the past with czarist Russia and the Soviet Union; (2) close cooperation with their historical, linguistic, cultural, and religious neighbors while strengthening national sovereignty; and (3) encouragement of the states for a radical "civilization."¹³¹

For its part, even after the Cold War period, it was not easy for Turkey to establish policies towards the region because of the long period of neglect. Despite the independence of Central Asian countries and Azerbaijan, their political and economic dependence on Russia was not yet broken. These countries' economies were not in a good condition, and they also had to deal with internal problems. Immediately after independence, the population of the region was very heterogeneous. During the first years of independence, the population of Kazakhs in Kazakhstan was under 50 percent. At the same time, the Russian language had come gained predominance over local languages as an everyday language. Briefly, the independence of Central Asian States on paper seemed questionable in practice. The question of how long these countries could maintain their independence also permeated the post-Cold War atmosphere.

In the early 1990s, as a consequence of the Soviet Union's collapse and the Central

¹³⁰ Kemal Karpat, *Türkiye ve Orta Asya*, Hakan Gür (Translated in Turkish), (Ankara, İmge,2003), p. 265.

¹³¹ Kemal Karpat, *Türkiye ve Orta Asya*, Hakan Gür (Translated in Turkish), (Ankara, İmge,2003), pp. 302-305.

Asian states' emergence as a separate political structure, Turkey obtained a chance to re-establish its relationship with Central Asia and the Caucasus. Turkey was very excited when the unexpected unraveling of the Soviet Union enabled them to develop relations with long-forgotten Turkic cousins in Central Asia and Azerbaijan.¹³² In this emotional atmosphere, even Tajikistan mistakenly began to be referred to as a "Turkic Republic." Turkey was the first country to recognize the independence of the region's countries and establish diplomatic relations with them. Amidst this euphoria, President Özal said, "The twenty-first century will be the century of the Turks."¹³³

In this context, the question discussed at many national and international conferences was whether Turkey could serve as a "model country" for Central Asia and the Caucasus. The "Turkish model" is a model for development for Muslim-majority countries that have religious and ethnic ties with Turkey. Proponents of the model say that Turkey is proof that Islam and democracy can coexist peacefully. This model, supported from time to time by the European states and especially the U.S., has three important components, though some are controversial even in Turkey: democracy, secularism, and a free-market economy. Fearful of the possible spread of Iranian influence, in early 1992, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker urged Central Asians to adopt the "Turkish model" of secularism, liberal democracy, and a market economy.¹³⁴

Turkey was predisposed to develop relationships with regional countries, as well as help these states develop their relationships with the international community, because Turkey was feeling the pressure of isolation. Turkey's strategic value to the West as a barrier to Soviet expansion had disappeared.¹³⁵ The European Community (EC, later known as the European Union) had rejected Turkey's application for full

¹³² Gareth M. Winrow, "Turkish Policy in Central Asia", Touraj Atabaki, John O'Kane (eds), *Post-Soviet Central Asia*, (New York, IIAS, 1998), p. 96.

¹³³ Kemal H. Karpat, *Türkiye ve Orta Asya*, (Ankara, İmge Kitabevi, 2003), p. 316.

¹³⁴ Gareth Winrow, "Turkish Policy towards Central Asia and the Transcaucasus" in Alan Makovsky, Sabri Sayari (eds), *Turkey's New World Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy*, (Washington DC, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000), p. 117.

¹³⁵ Yasemin Çelik, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy*, (the U. S., Prager, 1999), p. 23.

membership in 1989, sending a message to the Turkish public as well as to Turkish politicians that Turkey's future did not lie with Europe.¹³⁶ In this atmosphere, it can be said that Turkey's most important priorities in the region aimed to sustain the young Turkic states and support them the international community. Many in Turkey had apparently hoped and believed that an active role in post-Soviet Central Asia—led by financial and emotional campaigns—would boost Turkey's international image and would enhance the prospects of Turkey's admission to the EU.¹³⁷ Turkey began to develop cooperation with the Turkic states, setting up telecommunications and air links, providing scholarship for Turkic students to study at Turkish universities and schools, and organizing training courses for Turkic diplomats and businessmen.¹³⁸ In addition, the Turkish Agency for Technical and Economic Cooperation (TICA) was established in 1992 to train personnel to work in a market economy¹³⁹ and to coordinate public- and private sector cooperation (especially in the fields of education, culture, and technology).¹⁴⁰ Politically, Turkey focused on creating close ties with the governments of Central Asia. By the end of the 1991, the presidents of the many of the Central Asian republics, such as Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan, had travel to Turkey on official visits as Turkey (Ankara) pledged to support their development efforts. Since 1992, such high-level visits played an important role in enhancing relations, with nearly 500 bilateral and multilateral agreements signed. In February 1992 Turkish Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel declared a “gigantic Turkish world” was emerging from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China. And at the first Turkic Summit, held in October 1992, Turkish President Turgut Özal had declared that a Turkic common market and a Turkic Development and Investment Bank should be established, requesting firm pledges from Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan to construct oil and gas pipelines

¹³⁶ Yasemin Çelik, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy*, (the U. S., Prager, 1999), p. 23.

¹³⁷ Gareth M. Winrow, “Turkish Policy in Central Asia”, in Touraj Atabaki, John O’Kane (eds), *Post-Soviet Central Asia*, (New York, IIAS, 1998), p. 91.

¹³⁸ Gareth M. Winrow, “Turkish Policy towards Central Asia and the Transcaucasus” in Alan Makovsky, Sabri Sayari (eds), *Turkey's New World Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy*, (Washington DC, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000), p. 117.

¹³⁹ Yasemin Çelik, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy*, (the U. S., Prager, 1999), p. 55.

¹⁴⁰ Gareth M. Winrow, *Turkey in Post-Soviet Central Asia*, (London, the Royal Institute, 1995), p. 17.

from their territories to Europe via Turkey.¹⁴¹

4.2. Characteristics of Turkish Foreign Policy towards Central Asia

The reemergence of the Central Asian Turkic world and the establishment of political, economic and cultural relations between Turkey and the newly independent Central Asian States generated an emotional and enthusiastic public response in Turkey that bordered on euphoria.¹⁴² However, in such euphoria, Turkish officials somewhat recklessly pledged to extend generous aid to the Central Asians.¹⁴³ This emotional atmosphere was shattered by the “failure” of the first Turkic Summit in October 1992, which could only produce the vaguely worded Ankara Declaration.¹⁴⁴ Nevertheless, Turkic summits continued to be held regularly and focused on economic and cultural cooperation. By 2000, six Turkic summits had been convened. The Turkic summits were to be used as a platform where problems of common concern may be addressed. But the establishment of a Turkic Union or a Turkic Commonwealth, suggested in 1992, was no longer the aim of these summits.

Nevertheless, active efforts on the part of the prime minister and president to join with Central Asian countries at summits did help Turkey enlarge its influence area in the region.¹⁴⁵ This new approach was interpreted by Turgut Özal as a kind of neo-Ottomanism:

When we have a look at the geopolitical area between the Adriatic Sea and Central Asia under the leadership of Turkey, we understand that this area has been shaped by the Ottoman-Islamic and Turkish population, and here the Turkish population is dominant. Today, it is possible to eliminate the ethnic differences by means of an Islamic identification, in a manner that was being realized during the Ottoman Empire period.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴¹ Hasan Ali Karasar, Sanat K. Kuşumbayev, *Türkistan Bütünleşmesi Merkezi Asya'da Birlik Arayışları 1991-2001*, (İstanbul, Ötüken, 2009), p. 26.

¹⁴² Sabri Sayari, “Turkey, the Caucasus and Central Asia” Ali Banuazizi, Myron Weiner (eds), *The New Geopolitics of Central Asia and Its Borderlands*, (London, I.B. Tauris, 1994), p. 179.

¹⁴³ Gareth M. Winrow, *Turkey in Post-Soviet Central Asia*, (London, the Royal Institute, 1995), p. 36.

¹⁴⁴ The Ankara Declaration was short on detail and specific commitments.

¹⁴⁵ Robert Mauthner, “Turkey strides firmly on to a new stage: Ankara has suddenly found itself at the center of this.” *Financial Times*, May 12, 1992, p. 2

¹⁴⁶ Turgut Özal, “Türkiye'nin Önünde Hacet Kapıları Açılmıştır”, *Türkiye Günlüğü*, No: 19, 1991, p.15.

In the early days of the post-Cold War era, Turkey's goal was to convince Central Asia of the viability of a "Turkish model" and to export its own Western-oriented ideology¹⁴⁷ to the former Soviet republics. This stance had several important motivations: (1) to increase Turkey's standing in world affairs as a bridge between East and West; (2) to ensure its security by securing allies with which it shared political, economic and cultural characteristics; and (3) to enhance economic well-being due to cooperation with the resource-rich states.¹⁴⁸ When we look at whether these goals were achieved or not, it can be said that the process remains ongoing. Turkey made many mistakes in the beginning, but after realizing the factors which constrained action in the region, Turkey tried to improve economic relations.

These constraints can be separated into two groups, internal and external. The most important internal factors were the following: (1) Turkey's economy was too weak to be major supplier of foreign assistance;¹⁴⁹ (2) its democracy was also too weak to export as a "model" to the former Soviet republics; and (3) Turkey had to deal with the PKK problem, channeling a large part of its resources in an effort to overcome this problem. External factors included the fact that (1) the end of the Cold War was accompanied by the rise of numerous ethnic and national conflicts, leading to significant instability and insecurity in the region; (2) Turkey had overestimated its abilities to play a political, cultural, and economic role in development of the newly independent republics; and (3) Central Asian states were much closer to (and more dependent on) the Russian Federation.¹⁵⁰ Despite all of the constraints, Turkey succeeded in becoming economically involved in the region. Turkey has very strong ethnic, historical, religious, social and cultural bonds with regional countries, and this gives Turkey an edge over other countries in the region (for example Iran).

¹⁴⁷ Yasemin Çelik, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy*, (the U. S., Prager, 1999), p. 122.

¹⁴⁸ Yasemin Çelik, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy*, (the U. S., Prager, 1999), p. 122.

¹⁴⁹ Mehmet Dikkaya, *Orta Asya ve Kafkasya: Dönüşüm Süreci ve Uluslararası Ekonomi Politik*, (İstanbul, Beta, 2009), p. 98.

¹⁵⁰ Kemal H. Karpat, "The Sociopolitical Environment Conditioning the Foreign Policy of the Central Asian States" in Adeed Dawisha and Karen Dawisha (eds), *The International Politics of Eurasia, Volume 4 (The Making of Foreign Policy in Russia and the New States of Eurasia)*, (New York, M.E. Sharpe, 1995), p. 178.

What were the basic dynamics behind Turkey's policy towards Central Asia in the early 1990s? At the beginning, Turkey wanted to properly develop its economic and political relationship with regional countries. At the same time, it must be noted that some important mistakes were made under these excited, but unprepared, initiatives. Turkey was unprepared for the rapid change that occurred in Central Asia and the Caucasus after the collapse of the Soviet Union. During the process of disintegration, Turgut Özal was the president and the Anavatan party was the ruling party in Turkey. Neither had any vision or information about the region, because the Soviet Union had been a closed box for decades. Since 1990, the Turkish private sector led Turkish interests in the region, but they, too, could not initially succeed in establishing close ties. In addition to constructive enterprises, some people with bad intentions cast a shadow on the prospect for Turkish enterprises' success. It could be seen that the government was not acting as an important guiding force in commercial relations, and it was also observed that the government gave more disincentives than support in many situations. On the other hand, it is difficult to perceive holistic or stable policies on the part of the Turkish state either. Political conflicts and quarrels in Turkey were also reflected in its policies towards the Turkic world, with some politicians in the Turkey claiming that involvement in the Turkic world amounted to "imperialism" or "fascism." Many well-intentioned attempts ran aground on the rocks of government bureaucracy and economic weakness.

Even if the government showed weakness in the region, civil society surprisingly closed many of the gaps in government policy. These people and organizations succeeded in making very large investments in Central Asia and Azerbaijan, whether for commercial, ideological, or religious reasons. If Turkey and the rest of the Turkic world have become closer since 1991, it is in large part thanks to the Turkic civil society organizations and companies who pursued direct investments, tenders, mutual exchange, and commerce.

In the mean time, the Turkish state has also given broad help to the countries of the region through different channels, including the Turkish Agency for Technical and Economic Cooperation (TICA), Eximbank, and scholarships. Nevertheless, these

donations were often disorganized, unpredictable, and not properly targeted. It also has become clear that this assistance has not been supported by followup programs. For example, the problems Central Asian students who studied in Turkey faced after their education, including lack of equivalency and unemployment, were ignored. Turkey has lost power, energy, and resources on the problems of Central Asian diplomats in Turkey and, from time to time, the hostile attitude of the Turkic people in the region towards one another. In some cases, the Turkish government has given a number of promises that remained unfulfilled.

Another problem is the Russian factor, which was ignored by Turkey at the beginning of the 1990s and realized only much later. For example, as Ankara focused on the cultural and economic fields, military cooperation was touched upon but not fully explored because of Moscow's stated mistrust of it. The military agreements that were signed did not amount much more than small numbers of cadets from Central Asia coming to Turkey to receive training.¹⁵¹ The military ties between Russia and the former Soviet republics, on the other hand, were much closer than those with Turkey.

To sum up, Turkey achieved some success in establishing economic involvement in Central Asia, particularly through non-governmental channels. The emphasis on developing close economic relations with a region outside of Turkey's traditional foreign policy partners marked a departure from the policy of the Cold War, during which Turkey focused its foreign relations entirely on the United States and Western Europe and in which security issues dominated the foreign policy agenda.¹⁵²

4.3. Principles of Turkish Foreign Aid Policy towards Central Asia

In this section, we will discuss the evolution of Turkey's development aid policy to the Central Asian countries. The factors which have impacted this aid as well as the factors that motivate it will be addressed.

¹⁵¹ Yasemin Çelik, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy*, (the U. S., Prager, 1999), p. 136.

¹⁵² Yasemin Çelik, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy*, (the U. S., Prager, 1999), p. 139.

There are several goals which motivate Turkey to provide development aid to Central Asia. These include: (1) contributions made for the purpose of strengthening the governmental structures of these countries; (2) protection of the political and economic stability of the region and reinforcement of regional cooperation; (3) support given to political and economic reforms; (4) assistance provided for the region's integration with world and European-Atlantic institutions; (5) development of bilateral relations on the basis of mutual interests in all fields and dominant equality; and (6) support given for the unobstructed and profitable transfer of the region's energy resources.¹⁵³

Emotional and geostrategic motivations also drive Turkish policy in the region. Even though Turkey sought to take advantage of a historical opportunity to boost its political, economic, and psychological status,¹⁵⁴ it did not take long to understand that Turkey's economic and technological capacity was not developed enough to meet the excessive needs of the former Soviet republics. The emergence of Turkic states also posed an existential question to Turkey, which since the 1920s, had viewed itself as isolated, as "the last Turkish state that survived in the middle of a hostile world without any support."¹⁵⁵ While some viewed Turkey as a model to these countries, others within Turkey began to adopt Turkish-Turanist views once again.

Another issue which must be underlined within the context of Turkey's policies with regards to the region is the approach of the Western countries, which feared the establishment of Iran-supported Islamist regimes in the region. While Europe and the U.S. supported the "Turkish model" for Central Asia, Russia also tolerated Turkey's (non-military) presence in the region for the same reason.¹⁵⁶ Accordingly, Central Asian countries also approached Turkey with the purpose of strengthening their

¹⁵³ "Türkiye Orta Asya İlişkileri" available at: < <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-orta-asya-ulkeleri-iliskileri.tr.mfa>>, (accessed on 23 November 2010).

¹⁵⁴ Mustafa Aydın, "Türkiye'nin Orta Asya-Kafkaslar Politikası" in Mustafa Aydın (ed) *Küresel Politikada Orta Asya: Avrasya Üçlemesi I*, (Ankara, Nobel, 2005), p. 103.

¹⁵⁵ Mustafa Aydın, "Türkiye'nin Orta Asya-Kafkaslar Politikası" in Mustafa Aydın (ed) *Küresel Politikada Orta Asya: Avrasya Üçlemesi I*, (Ankara, Nobel, 2005), p. 103.

¹⁵⁶ İdris Bal, *Turkey's Relations with the West and the Central Asian States: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Model*, (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2000), p. 107.

independence and establishing links with the outside world.¹⁵⁷

Turkey's policy of development aid to the region consists of five main pillars: cooperation in the fields of communication, transportation, culture, education, economy, and energy.¹⁵⁸ In line with these targets, the most important step taken by Turkey was the establishment of TICA (Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency). In addition, one of the main goals in founding Eximbank in Turkey was the provision of loans with low interest rates. Turkey has provided important development assistance to the region in this context. Naturally, the main motive for this aid has always been the support of Turkey's stated interests, based on the MDGs discussed in the first section: After 2001, Turkey directed aid mainly at Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Balkans. After TICA was charged with the coordination of development aid, part of the Turkish aid was channeled to Middle East and Africa as well. Even while Turkey bases its aid policy primarily on the MDGs, particular importance has been given to the Central Asian republics. Cultural and ethnic ties, the prospect of the "Turkish model," and the region's economic potential¹⁵⁹ have already been discussed. Additional impetus for aid were the socio-economic problems (see Chapter 3) which cropped up after Central Asia's independence. Most of the development assistance provided by Turkey to the Central Asian states was directed at the development of socio-economic infrastructure. Development aid aimed at basic socio-economic structures makes future aid more meaningful.

4.4. TICA and the Implementation of Turkey's Aid Policies in Central Asia in the Post-Soviet Era

At the beginning of this chapter, we indicated that Turkey's development aid in Central Asia was not carried out within the context of a coordinated plan. However,

¹⁵⁷ İdris Bal, *Turkey's Relations with the West and the Central Asian States: The Rise and Fall of the 'Turkish Model'*, (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2000), p. 107.

¹⁵⁸ Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs web site, available at: <<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-orta-asya-ulkeleri-iliskileri.tr.mfa>>, (accessed on 23 November 2010).

¹⁵⁹ Güner Özkan, "Kalkınma Yardımlarında Öncelikler ve Türkiye-Türk Dünyası Örneği," *Orta Asya ve Kafkasya Araştırmaları Dergisi*, No. 2, Vol. 4, 2007, p. 58.

this does not mean that Turkey has been completely unsuccessful in the matter of development assistance. After 1992, Turkey has provided a considerable amount of development aid to Central Asia and the Caucasus. However, this aid was not satisfactory enough to meet the enormous needs of the Central Asian countries.

We can only give a specific picture of how much aid was given since 1997. Though aid to former Soviet countries began in 1992, the registration of this aid started only five years later. The State Planning Organization (DPT) was established to collect data over those five years from the relevant institutions.¹⁶⁰ The study conducted by the DPT reviewed only the bilateral foreign aid provided by Turkey.¹⁶¹ However, in this thesis, we will try to draw a general picture based on also the data provided by OECD. During the period between 1997 and 2004, the official development aid was audited by the State Institute of Statistics.¹⁶² Finally, after the prime ministry issued Circular No. 2005/11 for the purpose of eliminating the coordination mistakes and certain deficits, this duty was undertaken by TICA.

According to the Law No. 4688, the goals and duties of TICA can be summarized as follows: (1) developing economic, commercial, technical, social, cultural, and educational relationships between Turkey and developing countries; (2) preparing projects and programs which may contribute to the development of developing countries; (3) sending experts to the developing countries in the necessary fields and providing training and internship opportunities for personnel and students from these countries; (4) implementing cooperation programs in the fields of education and culture in the foreign countries; and (5) providing the necessary cooperation and coordination with respect to the matters regarding the main services and duties.¹⁶³ Aid provided by Turkey to the Central Asian countries within the framework of these

¹⁶⁰ Hakan Fidan, "Önsöz" in Nükrettin Parlak, *Orta Asya- Kafkasya-Balkan Ülkeleriyle İlişkiler ve Türk Dış Yardımları (1992-2003)*, (Ankara, TICA, 2007), p. 1.

¹⁶¹ Hakan Fidan, "Önsöz" in Nükrettin Parlak, *Orta Asya- Kafkasya-Balkan Ülkeleriyle İlişkiler ve Türk Dış Yardımları (1992-2003)*, (Ankara, TICA, 2007), p. 1.

¹⁶² Nükrettin Parlak, *Orta Asya- Kafkasya-Balkan Ülkeleriyle İlişkiler ve Türk Dış Yardımları (1992-2003)*, (Ankara, TICA, 2007), p. 73.

¹⁶³ Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TICA), *Turkish Development Assistance Report-2008*, (Ankara, TICA, 2008), p. 7.

duties is given in Table 4.

Table 4: Turkey's ODA toward Central Asia, 1992-2001

Recipient/USD Million	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Kazakhstan	215.719	3.087	3.147	54.094	48.048	4.675	4.662	3.289	1.646	1.340
Kyrgyzstan	25.901	53.995	7.234	4.188	7.088	3.716	7.247	2.057	2.084	1.543
Tajikistan	3.488	249	592	250	285	695	348	157	265	320
Turkmenistan	94.570	11.792	6.076	5.665	6.158	8.252	6.435	1.914	2.637	1.449
Uzbekistan	754.706	11.013	2.711	2.268	44.193	2.733	3.288	927	276	360

Source: The table compiled from following source: Nükrettin Parlak, *Orta Asya- Kafkasya-Balkan Ülkeleriyle İlişkiler ve Türk Dış Yardımları (1992-2003)*, (Ankara, TICA, 2007).

*The figures are compiled from the documents which are registered in DPT's records and the DIE bulletins regarding official aid.

**In the table, debts and loans are not included. In addition, technical, economic, humanitarian, and cultural/scientific aid is taken as a basis for calculation.

In examining the figures, we can see that the euphoria prevailing in Turkey after the breakup of the Soviet Union was also reflected to the aid that was provided to the region. Until 2001, the maximum amount of assistance was provided in the year 1992. This can be explained by the fact that, during the early 1990s, the Central Asian and Caucasian regions were being regarded as new alternatives for Turkish foreign policy, as we explained above. Development aid is one of the indicators which demonstrate the new importance attached to the region by Turkey. In 1992, Demirel, who had aimed at establishing closer relationships with the countries in the region, went on a tour of Central Asia. Following his observations in the region, he announced a 1.2 billion-dollar Eximbank credit package and 10,000 student projects.¹⁶⁴ However, in 1994, Turkey faced a serious economic crisis. In the table it can be observed that as of 1994, there was a significant decrease in the amount of the aid. In addition to the economic crises of 1994 and 1999, instability of coalition governments¹⁶⁵, the struggle against the PKK, and the failure of the Turkish model¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁴ Hasan Ali Karasar, Sanat K. Kuşumbayev, *Türkistan Bütünleşmesi Merkezi Asya'da Birlik Arayışları 1991-2001*, (İstanbul, Ötüken, 2009), p. 32.

¹⁶⁵ Beril Dedeoğlu, "Türkiye'nin Türk Dünyası ile İlişki Kurması Rusya'ya Rağmen Olamaz", *Mülakatlarla Türk Dış Politikası (Cilt I)*, (Ankara, USAK Yayınları, 2009), p.70.

¹⁶⁶ Mustafa Aydın suggests that after seventy years of experience, Turkey still could not establish a civilian constitution. As a country which made attempts for developing a democratic understanding in

contributed to the decline.

Following the elections held in Turkey in 2002, the AKP (Justice and Development Party) came into power, signaling a change in foreign policy. “During the period between 2002 and 2007, Turkey’s foreign affairs were determined to a great extent by international developments,”¹⁶⁷ writes Mustafa Aydın. There were three important factors which had impact on Turkey’s foreign policy: the issue of EU membership,¹⁶⁸ the Cyprus Problem (Annan Plan), and the 2003 Iraq War. At the same time that Turkey was recovering from economic crises, it was given the prospect of EU membership at the 1999 Helsinki summit.¹⁶⁹ Particularly because of regional problems like Kurdish separatism and conflicts in the Middle East, Turkey also reached a turning point in relations with the U.S. Relations with Central Asia naturally changed as well. In his book titled *Strategic Depth* (Stratejik Derinlik), current Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu underlines two basic motives with respect to Turkey’s policies directed at Central Asia: historical and ideological. Davutoğlu explains these motives as follows:

If a more recent period as of Karlowitz is taken as a basis, it is understood that as of the Tanzimat reforms, the origin of the history of the modern Turkish diplomacy has a background which mainly favors the European parameters and intensifies on the defense lines on the Middle East/Balkans axis.

During this period, the strategic mentality, cultural and psychological factors, institutional structuring and the foreign policy reflexes followed a course which was adjusted to the diplomatic courses of the European centered major powers. (...) The second important reason is related to the ideological approach that shapes the strategic point of view. This can be discussed in two main groups namely the Westernization experience and Cold War conjuncture...¹⁷⁰

the region before completing its own structuring process, Turkey could not find support. Mustafa Aydın, “Kafkasya ve Orta Asya’yla İlişkiler”, in Baskın Oran (ed), *Türk Dış Politikası, (Cilt: II 1980-2001)*, (İstanbul, İletişim, 2003), p. 393.

¹⁶⁷ Mustafa Aydın, “Türkiye Farklı Alternatifleri Birarada Yaşatmak Zorunda,” *Mülakatlarla Türk Dış Politikası (cilt III)*, (USAK, Ankara 2010), p. 24.

¹⁶⁸ “During the 1998-2000 period, despite all political parties inside and outside the parliament, almost all media organs, the army, the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs, the business world, briefly all institutions which play important roles on the determination of Turkey’s domestic and foreign policies made different suggestions with regards to Turkey’s EU membership issue, they have arrived to a substantial agreement.” Mustafa Aydın, “Türkiye Farklı Alternatifleri Birarada Yaşatmak Zorunda,” *Mülakatlarla Türk Dış Politikası (cilt III)*, (USAK, Ankara 2010), p. 24.

¹⁶⁹ Mustafa Aydın, “Türkiye Farklı Alternatifleri Birarada Yaşatmak Zorunda,” *Mülakatlarla Türk Dış Politikası (cilt III)*, (USAK, Ankara 2010), p. 24.

¹⁷⁰ Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Stratejik Derinlik*, (İstanbul, Küre, 2001), p. 488.

In his book, Davutoğlu also states that as of the second half of the 90's, Turkey has tried to determine its Central Asian policies in line with the strategic choices of the predominant powers of the international system, particularly the U.S. and EU.¹⁷¹ Besides, he underlines the fact that in Turkey the frequent political crises hinder the sustainability of an effective and coordinated policy with respect to the region.

A significant increase in the amount of aid distributed since 2003 can be observed in Table 5. 2004 showed a particularly important increase; Turkey's economic recovery and stronger multilateral relationships may be regarded as the two main reasons of the increase in the aid sent to the region at the time. Also important is the changing priority of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs—as of 2001, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has given a special importance to the aid. While Turkey's assistance was not limited to Central Asia, Caucasus and Balkan countries, it made an effort to understand in more depth the nature of its policy towards Central Asia. On the grounds of the new vision created by the AKP government regarding the region, Turkey has begun to consider the psychology, socio-cultural structures, internal relationships, mutual dependencies, leadership, and elite formations¹⁷² of Central Asian countries. On the other hand, just as the Uzbekistan example, the region's authoritarian political leaders and the tension prevailing the region not only weakened Turkey's influence in the region, but also had a negative impact on the aid. When the assistance provided between 1992 and 2009 are examined, the impact of the tension can be observed clearly. However, after 2004, this situation has changed and much of the aid began to be distributed outside the political framework.

¹⁷¹ Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Stratejik Derinlik*, (İstanbul, Küre, 2001), p. 497.

¹⁷² Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Stratejik Derinlik*, (İstanbul, Küre, 2001), p. 500.

Table 5: Turkey's ODA Toward Central Asia, 2002-2008

<i>Recipient/USD Million</i>	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Kazakhstan	1.514	2.869	27.170	27.170	45.340	42.810	61.560
Kyrgyzstan	2.475	2.666	34.740	57.450	113.140	69.560	53.000
Tajikistan	394	552	648	5.090	5.940	6.900	6.530
Turkmenistan	1.928	2.961	18.820	14.970	17.730	19.840	11.250
Uzbekistan	601	598	5.480	4.270	3.790	7.250	7.250

Sources: Nükrettin Parlak, *Orta Asya- Kafkasya-Balkan Ülkeleriyle İlişkiler ve Türk Dış Yardımları (1992-2003)*, (Ankara, TİKA, 2007); Turkish Development Assistance Report (TICA), from 2004 to 2008.

*In the table the debts and loans are not included. Technical, economic, humanitarian and cultural/scientific aid are taken as a basis for calculations.

During this period, Turkey developed its bilateral relationships within the scope of the “Common Cultural Geography.” Figure 2 demonstrates that Central Asian countries were among the most important recipients of development aid provided by Turkey in 2004. In 2005, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan were not among the first ten countries which received the biggest aid from Turkey.¹⁷³ But in 2006, all Central Asian countries once again took place among the first ten countries that received assistance from Turkey (see Figure 3).¹⁷⁴ Turkey has also made several attempts to strengthen cooperation between developed and developing countries in general. Turkey has achieved much within the framework of the goals of the Development Aid plan for the years 2004 and 2005. Thanks to the increasing amount of aid it has provided, Turkey has been described as an “emerging donor”¹⁷⁵:

The direct monetary aid understanding within the scope of the development aid started to change as of 2003. Instead of direct monetary donations, project based assistance understanding was developed. Thus, the visibility of Turkey in the region has increased.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷³ Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TICA), Turkish Development Assistance Report-2005, (Ankara, TICA, 2005), p. 21.

¹⁷⁴ Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TICA), Turkish Development Assistance Report-2006, (Ankara, TICA, 2006), p. 61.

¹⁷⁵ Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TICA), Turkish Development Assistance Report-2005, (Ankara, TICA, 2005), p. 2.

¹⁷⁶ Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TICA), Turkish Development Assistance Report-2005, (Ankara, TICA, 2005), p. 2.

As of this year, Turkey started to use the working principles of OECD and DAC as a baseline with regards to the development assistance, integrating itself more into the international aid regime.¹⁷⁷




Figure 2: The Top Ten Recipients of Turkish Development Aid, 2004.
(Source: Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TİKA), Turkish Development Assistance Report-2004.)

By 2007, Turkey increased the number of the countries which were subject to assistance by 131.¹⁷⁸ (In 2004, this figure was recorded as 72.¹⁷⁹) In 2007, according to the sorting performed with respect to GNP, Turkey was the twenty-third highest aid donor among the DAC member countries.¹⁸⁰ In 2007, Central Asian countries continued to take their place in the list of the top recipients of Turkey's development aid (see Figure 3). (Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, however, again lost their place on the list.)

¹⁷⁷ Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TICA), Turkish Development Assistance Report-2004, (Ankara, TICA, 2004), p. 11.

¹⁷⁸ Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TICA), Turkish Development Assistance Report-2007, (Ankara, TICA, 2007), p. 22.

¹⁷⁹ See Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TICA), Turkish Development Assistance Report-2004, (Ankara, TICA, 2004).

¹⁸⁰ Turkey is not a member of Development assistance Committee (DAC), There are 25 members in DAC just one of them is an institution which is European Union Institutions other members are countries.




Figure 3: Turkey's ODA, The First Ten Countries, 2007
 (Source: Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TİKA), Turkish Development Assistance Report-2007.)

In 2008, the global economic crisis seriously affected the economies of countries with low revenues. During this period, the most serious drop in the world trade was observed since the Great Depression of 1929. However, as demonstrated in the table, this crisis was not reflected in the level of Turkey's development aid to Central Asia. On the contrary: Turkey actually provided a higher contribution compared to New Zealand, Luxembourg, Portugal, and Greece and was ranked tenth place among the DAC member countries in 2008.¹⁸¹ During this period, most of the countries which received assistance from Turkey were Central Asian, Caucasian and Balkan countries; this demonstrates that Turkey was one of the most active donors within its region.

In 2009, the negative effects of the global economic crisis continued in almost every region and in every sector:

The negative impacts of the crisis urged some donor countries to make limitations in the budgets reserved for cooperation for development, or to review their commitments for assistance which were made in the previous years. (...) even in this crisis environment,

¹⁸¹ See Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TİKA), Turkish Development Assistance Report-2008, (Ankara, TİKA, 2008), p. 3.

in spite of all challenges created by the negative economic conditions, TICA has managed to improve its performance in 2009 and started to perform its services in a more advanced level.¹⁸²

This comment made by TICA head Musa Kulaklıkaya explains Turkey's situation with regards to the development aid. During this period, despite the crisis, Turkey has managed to take a higher place among donor countries. Examining TICA's 2009 data, we see that the Central Asian countries continue to win an important share in Turkey's development assistance. In 2009, 44.44 percent of aid provided by Turkey was to Central Asian and Caucasian countries.¹⁸³ Five Central Asian countries are listed among the top recipients of assistance from Turkey.¹⁸⁴

Aside from the targets of Turkish aid, it is important to discuss how aid money is spent. Following 2003, Turkey started to come into prominence in Central Asia with projects based in five sectors: (1) social Infrastructure; (2) economic Infrastructure; (3) production Sectors; (4) multisector or cross-cutting projects; and (5) emergency response and cultural activities. The first four sectors are those defined by the OECD as well.¹⁸⁵

In 2005, 50 percent of the total assistance provided by Turkey to Uzbekistan was related to social infrastructure.¹⁸⁶ This ratio is 40 percent in Turkmenistan, 63 percent in Kyrgyzstan, 82 percent in Tajikistan and 58 percent in Kazakhstan (Figure 4).

¹⁸² Musa Kulaklıkaya's (Head of TICA) preface in the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency's (TICA) Turkish Development Assistance Report-2009, (Ankara, TICA, 2009), p. 1.

¹⁸³ Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TICA), Turkish Development Assistance Report-2009, (Ankara, TICA, 2009), p. 65.

¹⁸⁴ Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TICA), Turkish Development Assistance Report-2009, (Ankara, TICA, 2009), p. 46.

¹⁸⁵ See OECD Statistics, available at: < <http://stats.oecd.org/qwids/>>, (accessed on 26 January 2011).

¹⁸⁶ Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TICA), Turkish Development Assistance Report-2005, (Ankara, TICA, 2005), p. 21.




Figure 4: Total Social Infrastructure (%), 2005.

(Source: Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TİKA), Turkish Development Assistance Report-2005.)

When TICA's reports regarding the development aid provided in 2006 are examined, we see that 82.3 percent of Turkey's total assistance was used for the development of social infrastructure.¹⁸⁷ In 2006, Turkey's contribution to Central Asian aid increased significantly. After 2006, Kyrgyzstan was the most prominent recipient of aid, yet it is Kyrgyzstan which, among Central Asian countries, has the most unstable economy and political structure. This country, which stands out especially for its insufficient infrastructure, experienced in 2010 several developments which ended in the fall of the Bakiev government. These developments also triggered a serious ethnic dispute in Kyrgyzstan. During this period, Turkey did not leave Kyrgyzstan alone. In August 2010, a committee under the leadership of the Deputy Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ambassador Hakkı Akil paid a visit to Kyrgyzstan¹⁸⁸ and announced that it will provide a further 21 million dollars to Kyrgyzstan.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁷ Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TICA), Turkish Development Assistance Report-2006, (Ankara, TICA, 2006), p. 62.

¹⁸⁸ "Türk Heyeti Kırgızistan'da", Archive of Anadolu Agency, available at: < www.haber.aa.tr; <http://haber.aa.com.tr/haber_goster.php?sessionid=9fac7d27e04182acc3b2ed6e975a8612&haber_id=158714&sorgustr='K%FDrg%FDzistan'&habertable=haber2010>, (25/08/2010 -- 10:44), (accessed on 27 January 2011).

¹⁸⁹ The aid mentioned above given cash 10 million dollars and the rest of the aid TICA promised to get built house; Anadolu Agency, Archive, available at: < www.haber. aa. tr. >, (accessed on 27 January 2011).

In Kyrgyzstan, Turkey helped establish a computer lab at the police academy; send technical equipment aid for two schools and equipment aid for the Jalalabad Atatürk student dormitory; establish computer labs at three universities; establish the Kyrgyz-Turkish Bone Marrow Transplant Center; and modernize the Kyrgyz National Radio-TV Center. Moreover Turkey fought against forest pests in Kyrgyzstan and founded two Turkish cultural centers in 1996. In Kazakhstan in 2006 Turkey helped establish computer labs in the 99th School and set up a computer class at the Kentav Fire Professional Training Center. In Uzbekistan in 1996 Turkey supported the purchase of equipment for the Tuberculosis and Respiratory Tract Diseases Hospital Children's Clinic. In Tajikistan Turkey helped provide drinking and utility water in the Hisar District in 1996, and in Turkmenistan it aided the repair of several schools and provided equipment for those schools. It also helped provide drinking water those living in the desert.¹⁹⁰

4.5. Conclusion

Central Asia became the center of interest for both Turkey and the entire world after its independence. Evaluating aid given by Turkey must take into account that this is a relatively new development. Taking into account Turkey's broader economic relations with the region in addition to its development aid, we might conclude that Turkey has begun to develop effective policies toward these states and it has started to implement more comprehensive programs.¹⁹¹ Turkey has attempted to present itself as a model country for Central Asia in the fields of economic development, democracy, and nationalization. Such attempts to highlight Turkey's role have supported especially by Europe and the U.S.

Central Asian foreign policy goals have been based very much on their economic

¹⁹⁰ The aid mentioned above provided in social infrastructure; for more information look at Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TICA), Turkish Development Assistance Report-2006, (Ankara, TICA, 2006), p. 77.

¹⁹¹ Dr. Önder Kabasakal, "Türkiye'nin Türk Cumhuriyetleri ile Ekonomik ve Ticari İlişkileri," *Avrasya Etüdleri*, Vol. 2, p. 28.

interests, still tied at this stage very closely with those of Russia. On the other hand, the new states have tried to establish and develop economic relationships regardless of ethnic, religious, or linguistic identities and differences. Turkey has provided an important amount of foreign aid to the countries in the region. It has also put into practice several significant projects together with the OECD. As a country made prominent by projects implemented in the countries of the region, especially in the social infrastructure sector, Turkey has achieved an important goal which other actors have failed to accomplish: Since 1992, Turkey has continued providing the economic aid to the region without any interruption. Especially over the last several years, Turkey has developed new initiatives (for example, project assistance rather than direct monetary aid), which have achieved success. Even though the aid given by Turkey to the countries of the region may not be as extensive as that provided by wealthier countries, in terms of integration, Turkey has been more successful, because of its cultural and ethnic bonds. Germany also provided economic assistance to the region, but Germany is a country which has developed a negative attitude even to the Turks in the country after the economic crisis that broke out in the first half of the 1990s.¹⁹² Turkey, meanwhile, has managed to overcome negative conditions, a lack of historical relations, and the past mistakes of the early 1990s in order to become prominent in the region.

There are three basic reasons for Turkey to provide development aid to the region. In general, donor countries focus their attention on certain regions and countries for ethnic, political, humanitarian and geopolitical reasons.¹⁹³ As indicated in this chapter, Turkey is no different, principally providing assistance to Central Asian and Caucasian countries. The primary reason for this approach are Turkey's ethnic and cultural bonds with the region. Second, as we saw in the figures listed above, aid has gradually increasing in quality and quantity over the years since independence. Much of this targets the elimination of poverty, ironing out socio-economic problems, and

¹⁹² Bess Brown, "Central Asia: The Economic Crisis Deepens," *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol.3, No.1, January 1994, p. 23.

¹⁹³ Stephen Knack, Aminur Rahman, "Donor Fragmentation", in William Easterly, *Reinventing Foreign Aid*, (London, The MIT Press, 2008), p. 46.

strengthening the security and rule of law in the region.¹⁹⁴ Third, Turkey has prioritized Central Asian states because of the economic and geopolitical benefits that arise out of the region's proximity to Turkey. In order to prevent its own dependence on neighbor countries for commerce, energy, education, and social matters, Turkey aims at empowering the Central Asian states as well.

In conclusion, Turkey has not provided development aid to the Central Asian countries solely for its own interests, but it has used this aid for making its presence felt in Central Asia and to strengthen the region as a potential partner. As a result of the serious problems related to their insufficient infrastructure, the Central Asian states are among the biggest recipients Turkey's gradually increasing development aid. The billions of dollars of development aid provided to Central Asian states since 1992 for the purpose of eliminating, or at least minimizing, their socio-economic problems are far more important to Central Asia than the economic, social, and geopolitical benefits which are believed to be provided to Turkey through such aid.

¹⁹⁴ Güner Özkan, "Kalkınma Yardımlarında Öncelikler ve Türkiye-Türk Dünyası Örneği," *Orta Asya ve Kafkasya Araştırmaları Dergisi*, No. 2, Vol. 4, 2007, p. 58.

CHAPTER V

COMPERATIVE ANALYSIS OF AID POLICY OF TURKEY WITH THE U.S., RUSSIA AND JAPAN

The newly established states of Central Asia attracted the attention not only of Turkey, but of the whole world. In the 1990s, the survival of these countries following the collapse of socialism and their future governmental systems were issues of concern for the countries themselves. On the other hand, several international actors also rushed to the region with their own economic and geopolitical interests. Besides Turkey, the U.S., Japan, Germany, India, China, Pakistan, Israel, and Ukraine showed great interest in the region. Naturally, Russia also took part among these countries, even though its position was different from the others. In this chapter, the foreign policies of the actors inside and outside the region and their development aid will be discussed. The picture which emerges from this discussion will be compared with Turkey's foreign policy and development aid.

In this chapter the countries which will be compared with Turkey are the U.S., Japan, and Russia. When appropriate, the regional policies of the aforementioned countries will also be mentioned. Following a detailed examination of this assistance, in this chapter, the assistance provided by other donor countries will also be discussed in turn.

5.1. The U.S. Foreign Policy and Aid Policy towards Central Asia

Though Central Asia was not considered a region of vital importance for U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War, the region was transformed to an area which had a significant importance for the U.S. following the breakup of the Soviet Union. The post-Cold War U.S. policy in the region can be examined across two different periods: The period between the breakup and 2001, and the period following September 11, 2001. After the framework of the foreign policy and the targets of the

U.S. are described in general terms, U.S. development aid will be examined in the same framework.

Central Asia drew the attention of the U.S. because of the nuclear capacity it inherited from the Soviet Union during the first half of the 1990s; then, in the middle of the 1990s, it again became a focus of interest upon the re-exploration of oil and natural gas reserves, especially in the Caspian Basin. By the end of the 1990s the region was in the spotlight again because of issues such as democracy and human rights.¹⁹⁵ However, for the U.S. the most important point was empowering the governmental infrastructure of the states following their independence and ensuring the passage of constitutions providing for democratic institutions. In this way, the U.S. aimed at preventing the dominance of Russia in the region.¹⁹⁶ The support given by the U.S. for the “Turkish Model” in the region and its taking the initiative for this project proved that it did not want powers such as Russia or Iran to become predominant players.

During the George H. Bush administration, after the Freedom Support Act was passed by the U.S. Congress in October 1992, the provision of assistance to the independent former Soviet republics became possible.¹⁹⁷ Before this legislation, a series of conferences was held in Congress and a discussion platform was established. Richard L. Armitage, deputy to the State Department coordinator of U.S. Assistance to the New Independent States, explained the main strategy of the Freedom Support Act:

“–We need a strategy designed bury forever the Cold War; one based upon a non-partisan national consensus.

- This strategy should not and, in fact, can not be based on an open-ended foreign aid program. We do not possess the resources to compensate for 70 years of communist malfeasance and mismanagement, and the peoples of the new independent states do not see themselves as wards of the American taxpayer.

¹⁹⁵ Eugene Rumer, “Flashmans Revenge: Central Asia after September 11” *Srtategic Forum*, No. 195, 2002, p. 2.

¹⁹⁶ Çağrı Erhan, “ABD’nin Orta Asya Politikası ve 11 Eylül Sonrası Yeni Açılımları” in *Küresel Politika’da Orta Asya (Avrasya Üçlemesi)*, (İstanbul, Nobel, 2003), p. 35.

¹⁹⁷ “Should the Freedom Support act of 1992 Be Approved? PRO”, *Congressional Digest*, Vol. 71 No. 8/9, 1992, p. 14.

- Our strategy should, it seems to me serve our overall objective of removing forever every vestige of an international military threat to the security of free peoples everywhere, not the least of whom are American taxpayers who have invested trillions of dollars and tens of thousands of lives in a “Cold War” of some five decade’s duration.
- Our bilateral strategy should employ of different sort of investment, one infinitely less expensive; one involving the application of technical assistance designed to help the leaders and peoples of 12 new countries learn the ways of democratic governance and market economics.
- When combined with macro-economic support provided by the IMF and other multinational financial institutions, our technical assistance can accelerate the peace of democracy and spur the process of economic reform.
- More to the point, multinational macro-economic support combined with technical assistance can open up unparalleled opportunities for American workers and businesses to benefit by helping to develop, in productive and environmentally sound ways, what may be the world’s largest untapped market; one based on an extraordinary array of human and natural resources. It is through open market and private sector initiatives-not official development assistance- that these economize will attain their enormous potentials. It is through trade and investment made possible by macro-economic and technical assistance that the enormous talents of people in these new independent states will be channeled into peaceful, productive pursuits and away from the enforced fading of an insatiable military machine.”¹⁹⁸

Specific U.S. priorities changed over time. Because Central Asia was subjected to political, cultural, and economic assimilation by the Soviet Union before 1990, the U.S. could not develop a comprehensive policy towards the region. In the years 1992 and 1993, the U.S. determined its Central Asian policy within the framework of a comprehensive policy it applied to all former Soviet countries. The U.S. approach in Central Asia was specified within the framework of the aims described in the Freedom Support Act. In this early period, the U.S. had a considerable interest in the nuclear security of the region, particularly in Kazakhstan. Between 1994 and 1995, the U.S. was interested in the region because of the energy resources of the Caspian Basin. During this period, U.S. energy companies began establishing a presence in the region. Nevertheless, during this period, Central Asia continued to take last place on the U.S. foreign-policy priority list. In 1997 and 1998, the U.S. carried on its economic and commercial relationships with the region for the purpose of

¹⁹⁸ Richard L. Armitage, Deputy to the Coordinator Of U.S. Assistance to the New Independent States, Department of State; *U.S. Assistance to the New Independent States, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, One Hundred Second Congress, Second Session, March 19; April 9; May 5 and 6, 1992, p. 331.*

empowering the Central Asian countries and preventing the spread of Russian influence in the region.

Countries such as Russia and Iran were the external factors which determined U.S. Central Asian policy, while the internal factors were the big energy companies in the country. Based on these internal factors, the U.S. has played an important role in the extraction and usage of the energy resources in the region.¹⁹⁹ The targets of the Silk Road Strategy Act²⁰⁰ which was accepted by the U.S. Congress in the second half of the 1990s, can be summarized with four main points: a) developing and strengthening of the independence, sovereignty, democratic rule, and human rights; playing an active role in the solution of regional problems; c) clearing any obstacles hampering commercial activities, the development of the economic cooperation, or support of U.S. commercial interests and investments in the region; and d) assisting the development of infrastructure in Central Asian countries in the fields of education, transportation, communication, health, etc.²⁰¹

Upon the election of George W. Bush to the U.S. presidency and the September 11 attacks shortly thereafter, a new period in U.S. foreign policy began. Central Asia also acquired new importance in U.S. foreign policy. The U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan gave the Central Asian states geostrategic importance, and the fight against terrorism was included in the scope of U.S. policies in the region. Parallel to these efforts, the U.S. established military bases in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.²⁰² It was this period of the rise to prominence of Central Asia that the neo-conservative politicians began to direct U.S. foreign and defense policies. The “Project for the New American Century” which supported the discourse of global American leadership.²⁰³ Within this framework, terrorism, the proliferation of

¹⁹⁹ Stephen J. Blank, “US Interests in Central Asia and the Challenges to Them,” *Military Technology*, Vol. 31, No. 1, 2007, p. 25.

²⁰⁰ “The Silk Road Strategy Act”, US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Report Together with Minority Views, 11 May 1999, available at: < <http://thomas.loc.gov/>>, (accessed on 13 January 2011).

²⁰¹ See: The Silk Road Strategy Act, available at: < <http://thomas.loc.gov/>>, (accessed on 13 January 2011).

²⁰² The U.S. located 1000 soldiers in Uzbekistan and 3000 soldiers in Kyrgyzstan after 9/11. Charles W. Maynes, “America Discovers Central Asia” *Foreign Affairs*, 2003, Vol. 82, No. 2, p. 121.

²⁰³ Andrew J. Bacevich, *American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy*, (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2002), pp. 229-230.

weapons of mass destruction weapons, and opponents of globalization were established as the main barriers to American dominance. The project supported the use of military power aimed at controlling the regions that were deemed strategically important.²⁰⁴ According to some contemporary observers, the U.S. could become a global power only if it had influence over Central Asia.²⁰⁵ During Bush's second term in office, however, the balance of power in the U.S. government started to change.²⁰⁶ In 2006, the National Security Strategy was rearranged. This strategy corresponds to the document prepared in 2002 following September 11 almost completely. However, at this point, upon realizing the gap between discourse and reality, the U.S. decided that a foreign policy solely dependent on military power was not effective and brought forward a new vision aiming at receiving support from friendly and allied nations. Similarly, Barack Obama's election in 2008 was received optimistically both in his country and many other countries with the hope that the U.S. would be transformed into a benevolent power acting under a more responsible foreign policy.²⁰⁷

The foreign assistance provided by the U.S. corresponds closely to its foreign policy. During the Cold War, the U.S. aimed at protecting the Third World against Soviet influence by means of foreign aid provided to these countries. In the 1990s, it carried on providing assistance to the newly independent states within the framework of concepts such as human rights and democracy. The second phase of U.S.-Central Asian relations had a major effect on foreign aid as well. After 2001, The U.S. doubled the development aid it provided to the region for counter-terrorism. While development aid has not only provided through USAID, but is distributed jointly with several institutions and organizations operating in cooperation with the countries of the region, this thesis will evaluate U.S. aid within the framework of Official Development Assistance.

²⁰⁴ Evgeny F. Troitskiy, "US Policy in Central Asia and Regional Security," *Global Society*, Vol. 21, No. 3, 2007, p. 426.

²⁰⁵ Boris Rumer, "The Powers in Central Asia," *Survival*, Vol. 44, No. 3, 2002, p.108.

²⁰⁶ Ömer Kurtbağ, *Amerikan Yeni Sağı*, (Ankara, USAK, 2010), p. 369.

²⁰⁷ Look at: Full text of the US president's speech at Turkish Parliament, Hurriyet Daily News, <<http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/domestic/11376661.asp>>, (accessed on 15 January 2011).

USAID explains the development of U.S. aid policy as follows:

On September 4, 1961, the Congress passed the Foreign Assistance Act, which reorganized the U.S. foreign assistance programs including separating military and non-military aid. The Act mandated the creation of an agency to administer economic assistance programs, and on November 3, 1961, President John F. Kennedy established the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).

The 1961 reorganization of America's foreign aid programs resulted from an increasing dissatisfaction with the foreign assistance structures that had evolved from the days of the Marshall Plan, to which USAID and the U.S. foreign assistance policy traces its roots.²⁰⁸

USAID supports long-term and equitable economic growth and advances the U.S. foreign-policy objectives by supporting economic growth, agriculture and trade, global health, democracy promotion, conflict prevention, and humanitarian assistance.²⁰⁹ As such, USAID's goals correspond to those of the Freedom Support Act.

The specific sectors which have been targeted by U.S. aid have changed along with changing foreign-policy goals. In the 1990s, U.S. aid was given to the Central Asian countries for the purpose of strengthening sovereignty and ensuring the development of democracy and human rights. During this period, the U.S. was among the countries which provided the most assistance to Central Asia. The development aid provided by the U.S. to the Central Asian countries is given in the Table 7. In the table it can be observed that in 1998 the biggest part of the aid provided between 1992 and 1998 to Kazakhstan was used for the neutralization of the nuclear weapons.²¹⁰ In addition, the U.S. has provided assistance to the Central Asian countries almost in all sectors.²¹¹ In 1995, the U.S. provided 23 million dollars to

²⁰⁸ "About USAID" available at : <http://www.usaid.gov/about_usaid/usaidhist.html>, (accessed on 06 February 2011).

²⁰⁹ "About USAID" available at : <http://www.usaid.gov/about_usaid/>, (accessed on 06 February 2011).

²¹⁰ USAID Reports (Kazakhstan), from 1992 to 1998, available at: <<http://dec.usaid.gov/index.cfm?p=search.getSQLResults&CFID=16336546&CFTOKEN=64235229>>, (accessed on 06 February 2011); Bülent Aras; "Amerika-Orta Asya İlişkileri ve İran'ın Konumu", *Avrasya Dosyası*, Vol. 5, No. 3, 1999, p. 235.

²¹¹ USAID Reports (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistn, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) annual reports from 1992 to 1998, available at: <<http://dec.usaid.gov/>>, (accessed on 06 February 2011).

Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan for developing the private sector and 10.5 million dollars to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan for economic reconstruction.²¹² The technical assistance provided by the U.S. towards Central Asian countries in 1995 intended to support the free-market economy and private sector as well as the development of agricultural enterprises, small and medium-sized businesses, communications, banking, settlement policy and management, and consumer protection.²¹³ The economic independence of the regional countries from Russia (as well as Iran) was an especially important policy goal. The aid which aims at the U.S. free market economy and the development of the private sector has a priority in proportion to the other fields.²¹⁴

Table 6: The U.S. Aid Toward Central Asia from 1992 to 2000

(MLN USD)	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Kazakhstan	2	9	12	8	63	37	61.89	44.55	58.3
Kyrgyz Republic	1	59	22	19	28	8	29.95	30.17	24.62
Tajikistan	10	17	18	18	21	13	25.23	19.54	22.63
Turkmenistan	5	24	13	16	12	..	2.45	8.28	7.54
Uzbekistan	..	1	4	1	6	2	4.33	17.53	35.66

Source: USAID Reports (<http://dec.usaid.gov/>)

Table 7: The U.S. Aid Toward Central Asia from 2001 to 2008

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Kazakhstan	56.01	74.01	47.81	56.39	51.58	51.5	77.65	157.57
Kyrgyz Republic	28.08	51.66	40.06	39.9	40.76	50.32	39.82	63.63
Tajikistan	40.41	75.88	47.1	47.5	56.43	43.61	34.89	59.92
Turkmenistan	14.12	12.14	6.51	6.54	9.61	3.11	0.14	-3.36
Uzbekistan	50.24	74.27	68.36	61.24	34.97	49.15	19.1	17.96

Source: USAID Reports (<http://dec.usaid.gov/>)

²¹² Bülent Aras; “Amerika-Orta Asya İlişkileri ve İran’ın Konumu”, Avrasya Dosyası, Vol. 5, No. 3,1999, p. 234.

²¹³ Jim Nichol, “Central Asia’s New States: Political Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests”, CRS Issue Brief, (Washington, Library of Congress, 1996), p. 13.

²¹⁴ USAID Reports (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistn, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) annual reports from 1992 to 1998, at: < <http://dec.usaid.gov/>> (accessed on 06 February 2011).

When we review the U.S. Official Development Assistance (ODA) after 2001, it is seen that the aid provided to Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan, the countries located closest to Afghanistan, were approximately doubled (see Table 7). This situation perfectly corresponds to the U.S. foreign policy adopted after 2002. While the U.S. continued to provide social and economic assistance in this period, after 2001 military aid was also increased because the countries of the region were used for logistic support and carried a vital importance for the U.S. in the war in Afghanistan.

The motivation behind such aid is more nuanced than mere military exigencies, according to Jim Nichol: “The Bush Administration has provided added security and other assistance to the Central Asian states in response to the events of September 11, 2001. Some observers characterize this assistance as a U.S. quid pro quo for the use of military facilities and an incentive for continued cooperation. The Administration has argued that the safer environment in the Central Asian states fostered by security assistance and the U.S. military presence should permit greater democratization, respect for human rights, and economic liberalization in the region, and the development of Caspian energy resources.”²¹⁵

In searching for the reasons for development aid provided by the U.S. to the Central Asian countries, two important points can be underlined as a conclusion. First, during the period following 2001, it was clearly understood that Central Asia was a region closely related to central U.S. interests. During the period before 2001, the U.S. made an effort to strengthening the economic infrastructures of the countries of the region, but satisfactory results could not be achieved because of structural weaknesses. As a result, significant commercial networks could not be established between the U.S. and the Central Asian countries. On the other hand, the extraction and transportation operations of the oil and natural gas resources in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have been very attractive targets for the U.S. companies before and after September 11. The military dimension of U.S. development aid, however, did increase, providing a basis for a general increase in development aid aimed at the region. Despite the

²¹⁵ Jim Nichol, “Central Asia’s New States: Political Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests”, CRS Issue Brief, (Washington, Library of Congress, 2002), p. 15.

changes made in U.S. foreign policy after 2001, the basic goal of the U.S. aimed at strengthening the economic, social, and military infrastructure of the region through development aid have continued.

5.2. Central Asian Policy and Development Aid of Japan

After World War II, Japan was among the countries which received foreign assistance.²¹⁶ After the Cold War, the Japanese government adopted the “Official Development Assistance Charter” (1992), obliging Japan to use its foreign aid to promote human rights, democracy, and freedom.²¹⁷ During this period Japan preferred to use the foreign aid as an instrument for transmitting the values it adopted under the ODA Charter to recipient countries. Foreign-aid policy thus mirrored Japanese foreign policy.

After the Cold War, in line with the new global trend initiated by the U.S., Japan started to provide assistance within the framework of the human rights, democracy, and free-market economics. Like in other countries, awareness of foreign aid increased in Japan, which published “Four Guidelines of ODA” in 1991 and “ODA Charter” in 1992. The main principals of this charter were:

“Japan’s ODA Charter (1992), Principles

(Taking into account comprehensively each country’s requests, its socio-economic conditions, and Japan’s bilateral relations with the recipient country, Japan’s ODA will be provided in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter -especially those on sovereign equality and non-intervention in domestic matters- as well as the following four principles): (1) Environmental conservation and development should be pursued in tandem. (2) Any use of ODA for military purposes or for aggravation of international conflicts should be avoided. (3) Full attention should be paid to trends in recipient countries’ military expenditures, their development and production of mass destruction weapons and missiles, their export and import of arms, etc., so as to maintain and strengthen international peace and stability, and from the viewpoint that developing countries should place appropriate priorities on the allocation of their resources on their own economic and social development. (4) Full attention should be

²¹⁶ Famitaka Furuoka, “Human Rights Conditionally and Aid Allocation Case Study of Japanese Foreign Aid,” *Perspectives on Global Development and Technology*, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2005, p. 127.

²¹⁷ Famitaka Furuoka, “Human Rights Conditionally and Aid Allocation Case Study of Japanese Foreign Aid,” *Perspectives on Global Development and Technology*, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2005, p. 125.

paid to effort for promoting democratization and introduction of a market-oriented economy, and the situation regarding the securing of basic human rights and freedoms in the recipient country.”²¹⁸

Within this framework, among the targets of Japan directed at the region were primarily the improvement and enlivening of the Silk Road. The second target of Japan was assisting the countries of the region for their transition to the market economy and democratization. The third important reason for Japan’s interest in the region was the oil and natural gas reserves in Central Asia, which could help diversify the country’s sources of energy. Japan is a country dependent on Middle East for oil, while its territorial conflict with Russia prevents it from fully utilizing the reserves on the Sakhalin and Kuril Islands.²¹⁹ China is also a topic which influences Japan’s position in Central Asia. Japan has increased its foreign aid directed at the region because of its concern regarding the instability which may be created by China’s East Turkestan policy.²²⁰ Finally, Japan has racial and historical reasons for providing aid to Central Asia. In 1945, Manchuria was invaded by the Red Army. During this invasion, 60 thousand Japanese prisoners of war were exiled by Stalin.²²¹ For this reason, Japanese claim they have racial similarities to the Central Asian nations.

JICA, Japan’s aid coordination agency, was established in 1974. Its vision depends on four main principles: addressing the global agenda, reducing poverty through equitable growth, improving governance, and achieving human security.²²² JICA provides in the four priority areas listed above with the aim of supporting self-sufficient development in Central Asia.

²¹⁸ Glenn D. Hook, Julie Gilson, Christopher W. Huges, and Hugo Dobson, *Japan’ International Relations: Politics, Economies, and Security*, Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (New York, Routledge, 2001), p. 21.

²¹⁹ John P. Tuman, Jonathan R. Strand, and Craig F. Fmmerr, “The Disbursement Patternof Japanese Foreign Aid:A Reappraisal,” *Journal of East Asian Studies*, Vol. 9, 2009, p. 221.

²²⁰ Josuha S. S. Muldavin, “Aiding Regional Instability? The Geopolitical Paradox of Japanese Development Assistance to China,” *Geopolitics*, Vol. 5, No.3, 2000, p. 23.

²²¹ Edwin O. Reischauer, “The Allied Occupation: Catalyst Bot Creator” in Harry Wray, Hilary Conroy (eds), *Japan Examined: Perspectives on Modern Japanede History*, (Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1983), p. 337.

²²² “JICA- Mission Statement” available at: < <http://www.jica.go.jp/english/about/>>, (accessed on 20 January 2011).

ODA provided by Japan within the framework of these principals is presented in Tables 8 and 9. The Figure 5 displays the total ODA of Japan between 1992-2008.

Table 8: Japan's ODA toward Central Asia from 1992 to 2001

USD (MLN)	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Kazakhstan	1.04	0.85	1.62	4.4	8.96	43.09	95.21	67.46	83.33	43.93
Kyrgyz Republic	0.82	0.78	44.49	45.8	44.27	18.05	25.17	62.51	47.79	23.15
Tajikistan	0.36	0.09	0.2	0.3	0.31	0.31	0.41	1.55	2.06	4.61
Turkmenistan	0.39	0.09	0.21	0.52	0.71	0.78	4.36	1.69	1.07	16.42
Uzbekistan	1.25	0.76	2.55	16.05	25.3	83.16	103.01	81.63	82.2	30.92

Table 9: Japan's ODA toward Central Asia from 2002 to 2008

USD MLN	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Kazakhstan	30.13	136.27	130.76	66.17	24.87	43.31	37.9
Kyrgyz Republic	8.12	31.23	26.69	20.95	17.22	15.68	12.35
Tajikistan	26.96	4.77	6.58	9.93	8.04	9.43	8.06
Turkmenistan	11.37	6.8	2.22	0.13	0.62	-0.54	-1.54
Uzbekistan	40.16	63.22	99.75	54.44	18.61	56.32	48.63

The Figure 5 demonstrates total ODAs of Japan between 1992-2008.




Figure 5: Japanese Total Aid toward Central Asia between 1992-2008

Looking at Japanese aid to Central Asia by sector, we can determine clear priorities. For Central Asian countries, securing transportation and telecommunication access to markets in other regions is essential for economic growth. JICA has recognized the barriers standing in the way of this goal: “In the absence of adequate maintenance and management since independence, facilities have considerably deteriorated and are in urgent need of rehabilitation.”²²³ Japan provided 50.9 billion yen to Kazakhstan in 1995 for three projects including the Railway Transport Capacity Development Project, the Iritysh River Bridge Construction Project, and the Astana Airport Reconstruction Project.²²⁴

In May 1999, Japan provided an ODA loan of 2.3 billion yen to Kyrgyzstan. The aid administration wrote the following regarding the targets of aid:

Considering the particular importance of the extensive rehabilitation and modernization of the deteriorated transportation network for the country’s development, JBIC has mainly provided support for the transportation sector. ODA loan commitments have been provided for the Bishkek-Manas Airport Modernization Project, which upgrades the Manas Airport in the capital of Bishkek to function as an international airport; and the Bishkek-Osh Road Rehabilitation Project to improve the condition of the main road linking the capital Bishkek with the second largest city, Osh. JBIC has provided ODA loans totaling ¥25.7 billion to Kyrgyz for six projects.²²⁵

In 1997, 4.5 billion yen was provided by Japan for the Railway Transportation Modernization Project in Turkmenistan. For the Telecommunication Network Expansion Project (II) and the Three Local Airports Modernization Project (II) in Uzbekistan, Japan provided 15.6 billion yen.²²⁶

Meanwhile, the power sector in Central Asia is a second important sector for Japan’s foreign aid. Power-supply systems in these countries suffer from not only a lack of efficient supply but also infrastructure deterioration as well.

²²³ Japan International Cooperation Agency and Development Aid (JICA), Japan Development Assistance Report-2000, (Japan Bank For International Cooperation(JBIC), 2000), p. 38.

²²⁴ Japan International Cooperation Agency and Development Aid (JICA), Japan Development Assistance Report-2000, (Japan Bank For International Cooperation(JBIC), 2000), p. 40.

²²⁵ Japan International Cooperation Agency and Development Aid (JICA), Japan Development Assistance Report-2000, (Japan Bank For International Cooperation(JBIC), 2000), p. 40.

²²⁶ Japan International Cooperation Agency and Development Aid (JICA), Japan Development Assistance Report-2000, (Japan Bank For International Cooperation(JBIC), 2001), p. 49.

Japan has established many bilateral aid agreements. In 2006, the following were established as four priority areas of cooperation between Uzbekistan and Japan: (1) Support for building human-resource development systems needed for developing a market-oriented economy and industrial development; (2) support for rebuilding social sectors; (3) support for upgrading and improving economic infrastructure; and (4) promotion of intra-regional cooperation.²²⁷ JICA has set a goal of promoting the reduction of poverty through economic growth based on the transition to a market economy, and is promoting regional cooperation in priority support areas based on (1) developing a foundation including transport infrastructure; (2) support for social sectors and, (3) the Central Asia Plus Japan Dialogue.²²⁸ In 2009, Japan established the following four priority areas of cooperation for Tajikistan: (1) rural and industrial development; (2) transport and traffic; (3) border control and, (4) the upgrade of basic social services.²²⁹

In 2009, Japan established the following four priority areas of cooperation for Tajikistan: (1) rural and industrial development; (2) transport and traffic; (3) border control and, (4) the upgrade of basic social services.²³⁰

Using the September 11 attacks as a basis, we can discuss the Japan assistance provided to Central Asia in two different periods. During the period following 1992, Japan used the development aid for the purpose of strengthening its relationships with the countries of the region.²³¹ Yet Japan did not use efficient strategies during this period, even if the foreign aid it provided did increase until 1997. Between 1997 and 2004, Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto's began a new phase of

²²⁷ Japan International Cooperation Agency and Development Aid (JICA), Japan Development Assistance Report-2009, (Japan Bank For International Cooperation(JBIC), 2009), p. 43.

²²⁸ Japan International Cooperation Agency and Development Aid (JICA), Japan Development Assistance Report-2009, (Japan Bank For International Cooperation(JBIC), 2009), p. 44.

²²⁹ Japan International Cooperation Agency and Development Aid (JICA), Japan Development Assistance Report-2009, (Japan Bank For International Cooperation(JBIC), 2009), p. 44.

²³⁰ Japan International Cooperation Agency and Development Aid (JICA), Japan Development Assistance Report-2009, (Japan Bank For International Cooperation(JBIC), 2009), p. 44.

²³¹ Tsukasa Takamine, "A New Dynamism in Sino-Japanese Security Relations: Japan's Strategic Use of Foreign Aid," *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 18 No. 4, 2005, p. 441.

foreign policy in Eurasian diplomacy²³² known as the “Hashimoto Doctrine.” The goal of this doctrine was the strengthening of the close relationship between ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and Japan in working together to address global issues. Japan’s commitment to working with ASEAN was tested by the outbreak of the East Asian financial and economic crises from mid-1997 onwards. A study published by the Japanese Ministry of foreign affairs concluded, “These Japanese initiatives with their emphasis upon regional and multilateral strategies indicated that, although Japan was certainly not abandoning its attachment to the bilateral norm and bilateral relationship with the U.S., these were beginning to be challenged in the minds of Japanese policy-making agents by the resurgent norms of Asianism and internationalism.”²³³

When the assistance provided between 1997 and 2004 by Japan to Central Asia is reviewed, we observe that the aid was first reduced in 1997 due to the “Hashimoto Doctrine”, but was increased once again in 2001 after the September 11 attacks. During the post-September 11 period, Japan has increased its assistance to Central Asia with the purpose of maintaining security in Asia. Since Japan was anxious about the spread of terrorism to its region (ASEAN) after the invasion of Afghanistan, it attempted to use development aid to stem such inclinations in Central Asia.

After 2004, Japan’s interest in Central Asia grew once again. The “Central Asia Plus Japan” initiative was begun, including cooperation between the countries of the region and Japan that would go beyond mere financial assistance.²³⁴

Japan, which has always made efforts to increase the prestige of its own country in the international platform, has aimed to take a balancing role in the region with these

²³² Glenn D. Hook, Julie Gilson, Christopher W. Huges, and Hugo Dobson, *Japan’ International Relations: Politics, Economies, and Security*, Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (New York, Routledge, 2001), p. 188.

²³³ Glenn D. Hook, Julie Gilson, Christopher W. Huges, and Hugo Dobson, *Japan’ International Relations: Politics, Economies, and Security*, Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (New York, Routledge, 2001), p. 194.

²³⁴ “Central Asia and Caucasus”, *JICA Report*, available at: <<http://www.jica.go.jp/english/publications/reports/annual/2010/pdf/22.pdf>>, (accessed on 12 March 2010), p. 43.

efforts. When its records in the post-Cold War era are examined, we observe that Japan was the country which provided the most foreign aid to the region after the U.S. While Japan is also interested in energy resources and security, it does not have a military presence in the region and is therefore welcomed more than the competing powers of Russia, Iran, and the U.S. As we emphasized in Chapter 2, the foreign policy generally implemented by Central Asian countries welcomes such a multi-dimensional approach. From the Japanese perspective, aid is used primarily for the region's democratic development and economic recovery, even if Japan also has significant strategic interests in the region.

5.3. Russian Foreign Policy towards Central Asia and its Foreign Aid

Here, we will discuss the role of Central Asia and development assistance in Russian foreign policy. Since data on Russian development aid is classified, the assistance provided by Russia to Central Asia will not be presented using quantitative data like American and Japanese aid.

Russian foreign policy before the presidency of Dmitri Medvedev can be examined in two different periods: the 1991-1999 period which also includes the period following the breakup of the Soviet Union (Yeltsin period) and the 2000-2008 period (Putin period). The Yeltsin period is characterized with the domestic conflicts and foreign policy quests, but during the Putin period, Russia started to gather strength again and implemented its policies in a more decisive manner.

During the period following 1990, Russia suffered the crisis arising from the break up and faced various problems in all fields. After it recovered from this problematic period, Russia developed the "near abroad" concept in foreign policy. This concept was a part of the "Basic Provisions of the Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation" which was accepted in 1992. The "Basic Provisions" characterized the tasks of Russian foreign policy²³⁵ as (1) guaranteeing a stable formation of Russian statehood; (2) defending territorial integrity; (3) creating conditions which ensure the stability and irreversibility of political and economic

²³⁵ Natalia Morozova, "Geopolitics, Eurasianism and Russian Foreign Policy Under Putin," *Geopolitics*, Vol.14, 2009, p. 669.

reforms; (4) securing the Russian Federation's active and full participation in building a new system of international relations in which it is assured a fitting place; and (5) protecting the interests of Russian citizens abroad.

The near abroad doctrine,²³⁶ developed on the grounds of these principles, includes the following policies: (1) on the basis of bilateral relationships and within the framework of the CIS, developing political, economic and military cooperation with the newly independent states; (2) strengthening the infrastructures of the newly independent states; (3) making agreements with respect to the protection of the Russian citizens living in these states; and (4) protecting CIS borders and establishing peacekeeping forces at these borders.²³⁷

These targets were aimed not only at Central Asian countries, but at the CIS as a whole. The former Soviet republics were important for Russia for various reasons. The most important reason was Russia's concern regarding the spread of conflicts which arose in the region. Second, Russia sought to preserve the continuity of the tightly-knit economic relationship of the countries in the region. Finally, the relationship with the countries in the region was important for Russia in terms of protection of the rights of the 25 million members of the Russian diaspora living there.²³⁸

As indicated in the second chapter, the Central Asian countries were made extremely dependent to Russia within the Soviet system, where central planning was prevalent in all aspects of life. These countries accepted CIS membership after independence without any hesitation, but they were regarded during the Yeltsin period as economic, political, and military burdens which impeded Russia's development. Then-Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev visited Central Asia following his North America and Africa visits. Even when Russia's Central Asian policy was formulated

²³⁶ Karen Dawisha, "Russian Foreign Policy in the Near Abroad Beyond," *Current History*, Vol. 95, 1996, p. 330.

²³⁷ Roy Allison, "Strategic Reassertion in Russia's Central Asia Policy," *International Affairs*, Vol. 80, No. 2, 2004, p. 285.

²³⁸ Paul Kubicek, "Russian Foreign Policy and the West," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 114, No. 4 2000, pp. 553-554; Charles E. Ziegler, "The Russian Diaspora in Central Asia: Russian Compatriots and Moscow's Foreign Policy," *Demokratizatsiya*, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2006, p. 105.

in 1993, the Central Asian and Caucasian regions were still regarded as Russia's "backyard."

According to Dimitri Trenin, we can evaluate Russia's Central Asia policy on the basis of three factors: First are Russian security interests in the region. These include strategic Interests (keeping domestic stability, preventing "colored revolutions," containing the foreign military presence and Third-Party security alignments, maintaining interstate stability, stemming the drug trade, and nuclear nonproliferation) as well as specific interests (consolidating the Moscow-led alliance, defense industrial cooperation, and arms transfers). Second, Russia is concerned with its economic interests (free trade, customs union, economic cooperation), particularly those in the energy sector (Caspian oil, natural gas, and hydropower). Finally, Russia supports its humanitarian interests in the region, including the rights Russian minorities, demographic trends, and supporting Russian language and culture.²³⁹ (By the 2000s, however, the Russian population was reduced significantly in the countries of the region.)²⁴⁰

Regardless of such foreign-policy goals, Russia's strategic view of Central Asia as its "backyard" has shaped its policy tremendously. For example, it is known that during the Tajik Civil War, Russian military forces in the region were assigned to protect the pro-Russian Rahmanov government in Dushanbe.²⁴¹ Kazakhstan is also important for Russia as the only Central Asian country that had nuclear power and a space base, a large Russian population, and dependence on Russia for pipeline routes. Turkmenistan is dependent on Russia for similar reasons. However, Turkmenistan announced its "neutrality" in the international arena and remained cool toward Russia in terms of economic, political, and military initiatives, thereby

²³⁹ Dimitri Trenin, "Russia and Central Asia Interests, Policies, and Prospects," in *Central Asia Views from Washington, Moscow and Beijing*, Eugene Rumer, Dimitri Trenin, and Huasheng Zhao (New York, M.E. Sharpe, 2007), pp. 90-118.

²⁴⁰ Charles E. Ziegler, "The Russian Diaspora in Central Asia: Russian Compatriots and Moscow's Foreign Policy," *Demokratizatsiya*, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2006, p. 105; See: "Population of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan", CIA- The World Factbook, available at: <<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/>>, (accessed on 10 February 2011).

²⁴¹ Gregory Gleason, "Why Russia is in Tajikistan," *Comparative Strategy*, vol.20, 2001, p. 80.

restricting some Russian intervention in the country.²⁴² While Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan²⁴³ were competing with each other for her leadership of the region, Uzbekistan did not act favorably toward Russia. Uzbekistan made agreements with the U.S. and NATO and sought to reduce its indigenous Russian population to a minimum. Kyrgyzstan, meanwhile, continues to be dependent on Russia economically and has maintained its role as a Russian satellite. Despite its opposition to the colored revolutions that aim at reducing its influence in the region, Russia was even more concerned with “losing” Kyrgyzstan, establishing a relationship with the new government after the Tulip Revolution.

In 1992, Russia established the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which included all Central Asian countries, with the purpose of strengthening its influence in the region. However, instead of ensuring the domestic security through this organization, Russia used it as a political instrument. The Tulip Revolution has revealed this fact clearly.

Despite the efforts it showed the 1990s, Russia had difficulties maintaining its dominance in the region in the 2000s. Countries such as the U.S.,²⁴⁴ India, Japan, Turkey, and Germany, as well as the EU, had an increased interest in the region and began to balance the Russian presence. Indeed, this was even welcomed by Russia after the September 11 attacks. As a country being in a continuous war with terrorism, Russia condoned the closer relationships of the countries of the region with the U.S. within the framework of cooperation against terrorism. In his article published under the title “The Central Asian-Caucasian Policy of the Russian Federation: The Bankruptcy of the Close Neighborhood Doctrine,” Oktay F. Tanrısever made the following explanation:

²⁴² Oktay F. Tanrısever, “Rusya Federasyonu’nun Orta Asya- Kafkasya Politikası: ‘Yakın Çevre’ Doktrini’nin İflası” in Mustafa Aydın (ed), *Küresel Politikada Orta Asya (Avrasya Üçlemesi)*, (Ankara, Nobel, 2005), p. 52.

²⁴³ Hasan Ali Karasar, Sanat K. Kuşkumbayev, *Türkistan Bütünleşmesi Merkezi Asya’da Birlik Arayışları 1991-2001*, (İstanbul, Ötüken, 2009), p. 142.

²⁴⁴ Richard Pomfret, “Regional Integration in Central Asia,” *Economic Change and Restructuring*, Vol. 43, 2009, p. 49.

“After their independency, the policies of the countries in the region supporting Russia can be explained with the pragmatic interests of these countries. On the other hand, even if they want to establish close relationships with Russia, these countries carry on taking the necessary measures in order not to be under the Russian influence politically. Actually, the countries in the region do not approve Russia’s efforts made for increasing its influence in the region. (...) The “close neighborhood” doctrine pursued by Russia with respect to Central Asia and Caucasian following the breakup of the Soviet Union was developed on the grounds of the dependency of these countries to Moscow economically and the interest shown by the most powerful countries in the world, the US coming in the first place. The “close neighborhood” doctrine lost its validity in time due to the economic development of these countries and the importance given to the region by the US for its own security.”²⁴⁵

The close neighborhood doctrine was again restructured during the Medvedev period because of new goals and the outbreak of the 2008 war in Georgia.

What are some of the specific activities that Russia has pursued to provide aid to Central Asia? Aid to the region began at least during the Soviet era, though the Soviet government itself does not provide any figures relating to the annual value of credits provided or drawn upon.²⁴⁶ The estimates of Alastair McAuley and Dubravko Matko²⁴⁷ for aid between 1946 and 1963 have been used in this thesis. During this period, the United Nations and DAC did not describe the Soviet Bloc countries as underdeveloped. The fact that North Korea, North Vietnam, and China were among the countries which received assistance from the Soviet Union demonstrates that the development aid provided by the Soviet Union was more political than concerned with development. The assistance provided by the U.S. during the Cold War are given for the purpose of underlining the important given by the Soviet Union to the development aid. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union attempted to compete with the U.S. in aid-giving, as in other fields. In 1963, for instance, the Soviet Union gave a loan amounting to 3.9 million dollars to some underdeveloped countries.

²⁴⁵ Oktay F. Tanrısever, “Rusya Federasyonu’nun Orta Asya- Kafkasya Politikası: ‘Yakın Çevre’ Doktrini’nin İflası” in Mustafa Aydın (ed), *Küresel Politikada Orta Asya (Avrasya Üçlemesi)*, (Ankara, Nobel, 2005), p. 68.

²⁴⁶ Alastair McAuley and Dubravko Matko, “Soviet Foreign Aid,” *Bulletin of the Oxford University Institute of Economics & Statistics*, Vol.28, No.4, 1966, p. 261.

²⁴⁷ Alastair McAuley and Dubravko Matko, “Soviet Foreign Aid,” *Bulletin of the Oxford University Institute of Economics & Statistics*, Vol.28, No.4, 1966, p. 264.

After the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia experienced a serious economic crisis. The exchange rate of rubles was sixty to the dollar in December 1991, and more than 1000 rubles to the dollar in June 1993.²⁴⁸ During this period, Russia needed 76 to 167 billion dollars every year in order to recover from the economic crisis.²⁴⁹

After a long recovery period, Russia provided assistance and investments in the Central Asian countries within the framework of its foreign-policy goals. It made agreements with the countries in the region in favor of itself with the purpose of using the energy resources in the region. In this period Russia's overall goal with regards to Central Asia was obvious: It wanted to maintain stability. Stability in Central Asia was also a prerequisite for ease of importing oil and gas.²⁵⁰ Big Russian companies such as Gazprom and Lukoil signed oil and gas agreements with these countries to Russia's advantage. During this period, Russia sold the low-cost gas it purchased from Central Asian countries to the West.²⁵¹

Russia was interested in the Central Asian countries in terms of security as well. Cross-border crimes, drug smuggling, weapon smuggling, and terrorism issues were among the reasons compelling Russia to keep its military forces in the region. On this pretext, Russia keeps the 201st Motorized Rifle Division on the Tajiki border.

Russia's aid policy to Central Asia follows a similar rationale. For example, in 1993 it provided 17 billion dollars in aid to ex-Soviet republics.²⁵² It also eased loan repayments, even cancelling most of them. In return for this loan cancellation policy, Russia demanded the establishment of military bases in these countries free of charge. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan were the two main Central Asian countries subject to this approach. Since these two countries were less powerful economically, they accepted the presence of the Russian military forces in return for loan forgiveness.

²⁴⁸ Martha Brill Olcott, "Russia's Place in the CIS", *Current History*, Vol. 94, No. 594, 1995, p. 317.

²⁴⁹ After the collapse of the USSR, David Roche of Morgan Stanley calculated that amount. "Russia Looks at the World: Westward No?," *The Economist*, Vol. 4, 1992, p. 18.

²⁵⁰ Roj Sultan Khan Bhatti, "Russia: The Tradition Hegemon in Central Asia" *Perceptions*, autumn 2008, p. 48.

²⁵¹ Pavel K. Baev, "Assesing Russia's Cards: Three Petty Games in Central Asia," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 17, No. 2, 2004, p. 277.

²⁵² Karen Dawisha, "Russian Foreign Policy in the Near Abroad and Beyond," *Current History* Vol. 95, 1996, p. 332.

In addition, Russia also aimed at taking advantage of the hydropower potential of the region. In the first half of the 1990s, Russia purchased power from the electrical stations located in northern Kazakhstan. After 2000, the Russian electric company Russia's Unified Energy System (RAO UES) discovered the hydropower energy potential of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. UES initiated the establishment of the Kambarata-1 hydroelectric plant on the Naryn River in Kyrgyzstan. Within the scope of an aid package, Russia gave 1.7 billion dollars to Kyrgyzstan for the construction of the hydroelectric plant.²⁵³ In addition, in the same year, over 11 million dollars were transferred to Tajikistan via UES for the construction of the Sangtuda-1 hydropower plant. Since these countries are not able to produce enough electrical energy to satisfy their own demand, the construction of these dams was very important for both Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.²⁵⁴ Such assistance is advantageous to Russia as well. More than half of the dams belong to UES, and controlling the water in the region has become as significant as controlling its energy resources. As we can see, Russia has always expected a direct payoff in return of its economic assistance in the region, and it has carried on this policy in every field.

To summarize the foreign-assistance policy of Russia, it is observed that such assistance is directed primarily at the social and economic development of the region. Russia is a country that has contributed to the development of the region with this aim both during the Tsarist period and the Soviet Union period. Today, Russia maintains its influence in the region by means of the Russian schools, language teaching, TV channels, and other forms of "soft power." Unlike Japan and the U.S., Turkey has accessed the data with respect to the Russian aid through various reports and media. Even though the acquired data cannot be presented as a whole, it does demonstrate that Russian aid significantly contributes to the development of the social structure in the region, covering the region's energy requirements and helping eliminate socio-economic shortcomings. Russia's condoning of various American activities in the region also contributes to the region's integration with the international arena, because the American presence also aims in theory to meeting

²⁵³ "Country Report May 2009, Kyrgyz Republic," The Economist Intelligence Unit, p.19, available at: <http://www.eiu.com/report_dl.asp?issue_id=974527882&mode=pdf>, (accessed on 30 May 2010).

²⁵⁴ "Country Profile 2008, Kyrgyz Republic," The Economist Intelligence Unit, p.21, available at: <http://www.eiu.com/report_dl.asp?issue_id=733744258&mode=pdf>, (accessed on 30 May 2010).

the region's socio-economic needs. In addition to integration, such cooperation helps the region to become strong enough to fight against foreign threats, especially those originating in Afghanistan. Russia is the country which has the greatest desire to achieve this target.

5.4. Comparative Analysis of Aid Policy of Turkey with Other Donor Countries

The findings of this chapter not only help to clarify the status of foreign aid in Central Asia immediately after the 1990s, but also provide us with a base from which to analyze the twenty years after the fall of the Soviet bloc. During the period following 1990, Central Asia became a focus of interest both for the regional and distant countries. Central Asia has experienced rapid changes in the balance of powers in the region. Though it was not an initial priority of U.S. foreign policy, it suddenly became a focus after September 11, 2001. On the other hand, the region gained importance also for Japan with respect to its security and potential as an alternative to Middle East. In addition, as a region which can be described as essential for Russia, Central Asia faces the possibility of a weakening CIS.

In this conclusion, while drawing attention to the parallels between the foreign policies and the foreign-assistance policies of donor countries, we examine the specific status of each country and note that the factors which motivate assistance differ considerably from one another. Here, the factors which motivate the aid provided by these countries, including Turkey, will be compared.

Rather than demonstrating a positive relationship between foreign aid and recipient welfare factors, my findings have discounted the role of humanitarian need, democracy, and human rights in the aid policies of these donor countries. Japan and the U.S. do pursue this goal, since foreign aid is vital to eradicate poverty and satisfy other humanitarian needs. Certainly, both countries hope to achieve a higher quality of life in recipient countries. In the case of Russia, the relationship between foreign aid and humanitarian need is more tenuous, whereas Turkey has had genuine humanitarian concerns in providing aid to Central Asia.

A second, newer trend motivating countries to provide foreign aid is counter-terrorism, drug trafficking, human smuggling, and the prevention of refugees. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the struggle against communism was replaced by these new security concerns, made even more urgent after the attacks of September 11, 2001. The U.S. is a good example of how such changes in the international agenda affected aid policy. After the declaration of the “war on terror,” Central Asia gained geostrategic importance as a neighbor of Afghanistan. When we look at our data, it is clear that the U.S. has augmented its foreign aid to Central Asia to fight against terrorism. The U.S. thus has strategic concerns in giving foreign aid to these five countries. The same holds true for Japan after 2001, which also increased the amount of foreign aid to these countries in order to curb the potential for terrorism. Turkey, too, has some security concerns regarding international terrorism. Turkey, which was affected by the U.S. invasion of Iraq more than the invasion of Afghanistan, has still provided foreign aid not only to Central Asia but also to Afghanistan to improve these countries’ social infrastructure to help in the struggle against the threats to security mentioned above.

Third, economic potential also is a reason for providing foreign aid to the region. As mentioned in Chapter 2, some Central Asian countries have oil and gas reserves, which attract not only regional but also other international actors. Japan has pursued a foreign aid relationship with Central Asia based on economic self-interest. It regards the region as a second energy resource after the Middle East. In addition, the U.S. has sent its own energy companies to the Caspian basin in order to share energy sources with regional countries. The Russian case is unique, because all regional energy pipelines pass through Russian territory, and the strongest Russian oil company has already settled in the region. In the case of Turkey, these interests emerged after the independence of all five Central Asian countries. Turkey’s main goal has been to transfer these resources through its territory to Europe, a project that would be mutually beneficial for Turkey and Central Asia.




Figure 6: Total Aid toward Central Asia, 1992-2008

In contrast to the expectation of the case-study literature, the statistical findings suggest that economic interests have played a role in Turkey’s foreign aid policy toward Central Asia. In addition, closer analysis suggests that the cultural consideration (that is, ensuring the spread of Turkish language and culture) is critical to Turkish support for the Turkic countries of Central Asia. This is condition unique to Turkey, since it has strong ethnic, cultural, and historical bonds with Central Asia. This explains why Central Asia is one of the most important recipients of Turkish aid.

Unlike the U.S. and Japan, Russia is a country which is close to Central Asia geographically and makes its presence felt with “soft power.” Thus, Russia continues to enjoy importance in the region. With regards to development aid, it does not share the same concerns as Turkey. On the basis of the evidence presented here, we contend that Russia always acts in line with its foreign policy interests while it provides assistance to the countries of the region which it regards as its own backyard.

Turkey has put into practice several projects with the purpose of meeting the needs of these countries, and played a particularly active role in making up the social infrastructure deficiencies in these countries. The share of the assistance provided in the fields of education, health and communication is approximately 80 percent of the

total assistance. This situation is an indicator of the sincerity of Turkey with regards to the assistance it provides to the countries of the region, and also shows that its motivations are not one-dimensional.

In this thesis, we have discussed the factors which motivate the aid provided by selected donor countries to Central Asia. The motivation factors of each country show variety based on their particular foreign-policy goals. This finding is supported with data on the assistance provided by each country. Meanwhile they show that Central Asia constitutes a specific region that shares certain characteristics differentiating it as a subsystem from other geographical regions. For example, Turkey is related to the region both historically and ethnically. Russia, too, has its own conditions, enjoying the ability to promote soft power owing to the Soviet inheritance in the region. Like other countries, Russia maintains a tremendous economic interest in the region. At the same time, the U.S. and Japan have carried out their foreign-assistance policy in the region within the framework of other factors. Among these, the economic and strategic interests remain in the forefront.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

The main goal of development aid to reduce or eliminate several problems arising from international poverty, and in this way, contributing to the regional and global peace, security, and stability. Development aid policy is formulated with the aim of improving the socio-economic situation of the community it targets.

Using several examples, this study has discussed the basic factors which motivate the provision of development aid to Central Asia. Unlike most studies of development aid, the reasons for aid rather than its effectiveness have been focused on. Although donor countries provide development aid to Central Asia in line with their own foreign-policy interests, the cases covered in this study demonstrate that the basic motivation behind aid is actually to integrate recipient countries into the international arena both economically and socially. Donor countries thus seek to contribute to the economic growth and democratization of the countries in the region. Of course, this task is not easy: The region continues to face problems inherited from its Soviet past, including poverty, lack of health care and inadequate education.

Since the end of the Cold War, many countries, including Turkey, have been developing several projects for the purpose of finding solutions to various problems in the region. All donor countries being examined here have in common the fact that they use a diversity of policy tools to meet their goals.

But each donor country has unique motivating factors as well. To start with the reasons behind Turkey's provision of assistance, the vicinity of Central Asia to Turkey, the similar cultural structures of the region, and the economic and geopolitical benefits which would be attained by means of the assistance have convinced Turkey of the advantage of providing aid to Central Asia. Turkey prefers that Central Asian states become powerful and independent from their neighbor countries in terms of commerce, education, and social relationships. Needless to say, they also seek to benefit from the corridor of energy resources provided via Central Asia. The historic dominant influence of the Soviet Union in all fields and the fact

that the region is landlocked has made it susceptible to foreign influences. By using development aid, Turkey aims at reducing this influence to a minimum and assisting the region to gain social and economic independence so that it can integrate into the world economy. As these countries gradually become more economically self-sufficient and more integrated into the global system, Ankara will also be able to cooperate with them more easily in the international arena. As mentioned in Chapter 4, Turkey's growing economic capabilities and improving domestic reforms have given a chance (or advantage) to "emerge as a peace-promoter" (a term used by Bülent Aras²⁵⁵) in neighboring regions. Turkey struggle to integrate Central Asian countries into the global arena by referring to historical and cultural affinities providing an advantage to Turkey compared to other donor countries. If Turkey accomplishes its mission in the region, it can benefit strategically and economically. The region rich energy sources and close proximity to Afghanistan make the prospect of partnership tempting for Turkey.

For its part, the U.S. has always approached development-aid policy to the region with liberal motives. The weaknesses of the market volumes of the countries in the region, their insufficient capacities in the global economy, and insufficient infrastructures the commercial activities were the main motivating factors influencing the U.S. to provide development aid to the region following the breakup of the Soviet Union. Supporting economic development in the region and its integration with global markets, thereby popularizing the democracy and human rights in the region, has been the basic motive of the U.S. Unlike Turkish aid, aid provided by the U.S. was subject to socio-economic crises did not aim at supporting the region in the international arena. In this way, the U.S. was able to ensure the liberalization of foreign trade policy among the countries of the region. While U.S. development-aid policy was developed with economic interests in mind, it can be easily be argued that after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. has a new interest in Central Asia. Aside from its democratic and socio-economic concerns, strategic concerns have been added, and the U.S. has correspondingly

²⁵⁵ Bülent Aras, "Davutoğlu Era In Turkish Foreign Policy" SETA Policy Brief, No. 32, May 2009, p. 4.

increased foreign aid to Central Asia. On the other hand, it also set up military bases in some countries for the purpose of easy passage to Afghanistan. U.S. foreign-aid policy in Central Asia is thus two sided: not only socio-economic, but also strategic.

Regarding Japanese foreign aid, we observed that Japan believes that the stabilization of Central Asia and enhancement of its welfare level is important both regionally and globally, and such an attempt may create major opportunities for Japan as well. Since it was foreseen that powerful governments would be established in Central Asia following its development and progress at a global level, a significant amount of development aid was provided to the region by Japan during the initial period of independence. After September 11, during the second period, Japanese development aid was increasingly provided with the purpose of preventing the spread of regional instability. Like the U.S., therefore, Japan also displays both economic and strategic concerns while providing foreign aid to Central Asia.

Finally, Russia acted with motives similar to those of Turkey, the U.S., and Japan. It is obvious that Russia has serious interests in the region. On the other hand, these interests coincide with the development and empowerment of the region globally. Today, the problems which have arisen due to the economic underdevelopment of the region, poverty, or state weakness have a direct negative effect on Russia. Yet, as Putin noted during a speech given at the Kremlin on May 10, 2006, these countries present new and effective opportunities for economic cooperation. He has also stated that the priorities of Russian foreign policy regarding the country's close neighbors will not change. So, we do not expect that Russia will start to take much of a different line at Central Asia, aiming to develop its economic and commercial relationships within the scope of BDT and taking part in global markets. While Russia has condoned the activities of some of the actors in the region, it also shares some of the strategic concerns with the U.S. and Japan, especially after the war in Afghanistan.

In comparing all four countries' foreign aid policy's motivation factors, it is clear that the U.S., Japan, and Russia not only have economic and political concerns, but also strategic concerns in the region. The U.S. and Japan and also Turkey in particular want to improve democracy, human rights, and socio-economic conditions of Central

Asia to bring these countries into the global economic framework and cooperate with them in the energy sector. All three countries, as well as Russia, seek to avoid a breakdown in regional stability. Russia in particular is concerned with having a stable region on its border. When we look at the Turkey's foreign-aid policy towards Central Asia, meanwhile, it also seems to have democratic and socio-economic concerns regarding Central Asia.

Aid to Central Asia is a critical case for testing neo-realist, neo-Marxist, and neo-liberal perspectives on international relations. In conclusion, it has been observed that, despite the variety of the reasons behind providing development aid, the goals of all four countries examined especially those of Turkey, the main case examined in this study run parallel to what neo-realist and neo-liberal perspectives offer on the subject, namely foreign policy interest and economic integration of the region, respectively. While the realists view aid as a self-interested behavior; the neo-Marxists provide explanations rooted in class relations and imperialism and liberals approach it as a form of humanitarianism. Our findings give credence to the neo-liberal and neo-realist points of view. In line with these theories' arguments on the subject, this thesis revealed that the aid is rooted in the domestic values as well as international security concerns of the donor countries. Foreign aid provided has helped to end the socio-economic instability of recipient countries, which eventually has led to a more secure global environment for all countries. The region is located in a very critical geography (particularly because of the war in Afghanistan) and has a unique position because of its Soviet legacy. When Turkey began to recognize the opportunities presented by Central Asia after the Cold War, it did not hesitate in providing recognition and aid. In providing foreign aid to Central Asia, Turkey seeks to protect its democratic and socio-economic concerns as it struggles to integrate the region into the global community.

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