

THE TWO U.S. THINK TANKS ON TURKEY:
THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION AND THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS' PERCEPTIONS ON JDP'S FOREIGN POLICY
(2002-2010)

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BERKAY GÜLEN

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Prof. Dr. Meliha B. Altunışık
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

Prof. Dr. Mustafa Türkeş
Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Prof. Dr. Mustafa Türkeş (METU, IR) _____
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Emel G. Oktay (HU, IR) _____
Assist. Prof. Dr. Özgehan Şenyuva (METU, IR) _____

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last Name: Berkay Gülen

Signature:

ABSTRACT

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Gülen, Berkay

M.Sc., Department of International Relations

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Mustafa Türkeş

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This thesis examines perspectives of the two influential U.S. think tanks, the Brookings Institution and the Council on Foreign Relations, on Turkish foreign policy under the leadership of the Justice and Development Party (JDP) from 2002 to 2010. It attempts to analyze the perceptions of the noted institutions about the JDP's foreign policy by referencing their reports, articles, interviews and seminars. The study had four aims. First, it aims to analyze the JDP's foreign policy in the eyes of the two think tanks. Second, it shows the objective of the two institutions for shaping the framework of the discussions on the United States-Turkey relations and Turkish foreign policy by emphasizing the epistemic community. Third, this thesis intends to clarify divergences and convergences in the perceptions of the two think tanks. Fourth, it indicates the continuity, change and rupture in the JDP's foreign policy choices from the viewpoint of the Brookings Institution and the Council on Foreign Relations. Consequently, the thesis states that "the given framework" in the relations between the United States and Turkey has been largely determined by the U.S.' activities.

Keywords: The Justice and Development Party, Turkish foreign policy, the Brookings Institution, the Council on Foreign Relations, Epistemic Community

ÖZ

İKİ ABD DÜŞÜNCE KURULUŞUNUN TÜRKİYE'YE DAİR GÖRÜŞLERİ:
BROOKINGS ENSTİTÜSÜ VE DIŞ İLİŞKİLER KONSEYİ'NİN
AKP'NİN DIŞ POLİTİKASI ÜZERİNE ALGILARI
(2002-2010)

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Bu tez, 2002'den 2010 yılına kadar Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) önderliğindeki Türk dış politikasına dair Brookings Enstitüsü ve Dış İlişkiler Konseyi'nin perspektiflerini incelemektedir. Bahsi geçen enstitülerin AKP dış politikasına dair algıları, bu kuruluşların raporlarına, makalelerine, mülakatlarına ve seminerlerine atıfla analiz edilmeye çalışılmıştır. Bu çalışmanın dört amacı bulunmaktadır. İlk olarak, tez, iki düşünce kuruluşunun bakış açısından AKP'nin dış politikasını analiz etmektedir. İkinci olarak, epistemik topluluklara vurgu yapılarak, iki enstitünün ABD-Türkiye ilişkileri ve Türk dış politikasını şekillendirme amacı gösterilmektedir. Üçüncü olarak, bu tez, iki düşünce kuruluşunun algılarındaki ayrılıkları ve birlikleri aydınlığa kavuşturmayı amaçlamaktadır. Dördüncü olarak, Brookings Enstitüsü ve Dış İlişkiler Konseyi'nin bakış açısından AKP'nin dış politika seçimlerinde görülen devamlılık, değişim ve kırılma işaret edilmektedir. Sonuç olarak, tez, ABD ve Türkiye arasındaki ilişkilerin “belirlenmiş çerçevesinin”, büyük ölçüde ABD'nin aktivitelerine bağlı olarak tanımlandığını ifade etmektedir.

Anahtar kelimeler: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, Türk dış politikası, Brookings Enstitüsü, Dış İlişkiler Konseyi, Epistemik Topluluk

In Memory of My Father

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Subject in Question

2002 general election results were a turning point both for Turkey and the United States. Unstable domestic politics, consecutive economic crises, political parties' ineffective agenda, as well as international environment, Iraq War, rising political Islam and anti-Western tendencies in the Middle East emerged as problems which contributed to the rise of the Justice and Development Party (JDP) as a political party rendering it an important foreign policy actor which is at crossroads.¹ Due to the political atmosphere, the new Turkish government's direction in foreign policy was a question mark both for domestic and international actors. As a predecessor of the Welfare Party (WP), the JDP gave rise to some concerns about its background; but it was expected in the domestic and international politics that the leader of the new genre, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan would not repeat the old mistakes of the WP. Erdoğan's international visits signaled the prospective JDP foreign policy orientation. One of Erdoğan's first international visits took place in the White House during the presidency of George W. Bush when Erdoğan was banned from politics. Only six weeks after the November 2002 elections, Erdoğan went to the major European capitals² and after becoming Prime Minister, he

¹ İlhan Uzgel, "AKP: Neoliberal Dönüşümün Yeni Aktörü", *AKP Kitabı: Bir Dönüşümün Bilançosu* (eds.) İlhan Uzgel and Bülent Duru (Ankara: Phoenix Yayınevi, 2010), p.11

² According to the Prime Ministry Public Diplomacy Coordinator's Office, Erdoğan visited 84 countries since becoming Prime Minister on March 15, 2003. Most of them took place in European countries as Germany, Belgium, Austria, France and the United Kingdom. "8 Yılda 84 Ülke, 243 Ziyaret: Başbakan Erdoğan Dünyayı Karış Karış Gezdi, Türkiye'yi En Çok Avrupa'da Temsil Etti.",

frequently expressed its government's commitment to the Copenhagen criteria on the way to EU accession.³ Meanwhile this choice was presented as the willingness of the party for developing an identity which embraces the centre political spectrum rather than representing Islamist movement in Turkey.⁴

In relation to the United States-Turkey relations in the post-Cold War era, it can be argued that Turkey needed a new identity which would not be based on a security driven context. "Turkey has realized that it can no longer benefit from its traditional hard power assets in its relations with the U.S."⁵ The U.S.-led war in Iraq and the decision of Turkish Parliament on not to support U.S. troops in Iraq in 2003 demonstrated that Turkey was no longer a historical partner within the policy frame of the United States addressing Middle East. "The technological ability of the U.S. military has rendered Turkey's geopolitical location and strong military capabilities became meaningless in U.S. military strategy."⁶ Based on this assumption, Turkey had to redefine and reinterpret its function and its notion in NATO after the Cold War years. Due to the transformed structure of NATO, "from a Europe-centered collective defense organization into a non-Europe oriented semi-military/semi-political collective security organization"⁷, Turkey required to position in relation to the American foreign policy as well. As NATO has been used for in out-of-area missions by the United States, Turkey was in a situation to choose itself to keep in or out of the American politics. In such a political environment, the JDP administration confronted the demands of the United States on possible invasion to Iraq and was forced to reveal the lines of its foreign policy.

After the rejection of the motion on March 1st, 2003 by Turkish Parliament, the Syria-Israel-Turkey relations as well as Turkey's attempts for good offices between the two countries were not favored by the United States and Turkey's

<http://kdk.gov.tr/haber/8-yilda-84-ulke-243-ziyaret-basbakan-erdogan-dunyayi-karis-karis-gezdi-turkiyeyi-en-cok-avrupada-temsil-etti/39> (accessed on May 2, 2011)

³ "Erdoğan: AB Hükümetin Hedefi Olmaya Devam Ediyor", *Radikal*, (December 3, 2003),

<http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=98735> (accessed on May 2, 2011)

⁴ İlhan Uzgel, "Dış Politikada AKP: Stratejik Konumdan Stratejik Modele", *AKP Kitabı: Bir Dönüşümün Bilançosu* (eds.) İlhan Uzgel and Bülent Duru (Ankara: Phoenix Yayınevi, 2010), p.357

⁵ Tarık Oğuzlu, "Soft Power in Turkish Foreign Policy", *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 61/1, March 2007, p.91

⁶ *ibid*

⁷ Tarık Oğuzlu, "Middle Easternization of Turkey's Foreign Policy: Does Turkey Dissociate from the West?", *Turkish Studies*, 9/1, March 2008, p.7

active foreign policy towards its neighbors as Iran and Syria took the same reaction from the American officers. In the Obama administration, although bilateral relations were defined under the framework of “strategic partnership”; the problematic identity of Turkish-American relations did not change and Turkey-Israel relations were deeply affected by Turkish- American relations.

In a political atmosphere which is responsive to the bilateral relations, the U.S. think tanks developed their agendas and analyses on the changing parameters of Turkish foreign policy. What is more, two American think tanks, the Brookings Institution and the Council on Foreign Relations have specifically focused on Turkish foreign policy. The interpretation of their analyses was also integral to analyzing the viewpoint of the U.S. due to the effect of these institutions in American political life. In the American foreign policy-making process, there exist various agents which are influential and one of branches of this system is think tanks. According to William H. Baugh’s scheme⁸, think tanks, as actors among others in shaping U.S. foreign policy, are as influential as special interest groups, media and the Congress.⁹ Because of the political structure of the U.S., Washington needs to expand its perspective by consulting to think-tanks in order to shape its policy on Turkey. On the other hand, in terms of the depth of the literature, it is obvious that there exists a gap on the analyses of Turkey studies of the U.S. think tanks.¹⁰ Because of the lack of research on American think tanks’ perspective about Turkish foreign policy, particularly JDP’s foreign policy; this thesis aims to focus on articles, interviews and meetings of the Brookings Institution and the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and their approaches on Turkey’s foreign affairs from 2002 to 2010. It is also important to point out that whether these think tanks undertook an agenda to create an epistemic community both in the U.S. and Turkey is a question that will be explored in this thesis.

⁸ Appendix A

⁹ William H. Baugh, *United States Foreign Policy Making* (Orlando: Harcourt College Publishers, 2000), p.128

¹⁰ According to the database of Thesis Center of the Council of Higher Education (YÖK) in Turkey, only a few theses which were written in Turkish universities focus on the function of think tanks, moreover, none of them choose the way of analyzing the policies of these institutions.

1.2 Literature Survey

In analyzing JDP's foreign policy and its reflections on American think tanks, it is essential to keep in mind the concepts of "active foreign policy", "rhythmic diplomacy" and "zero problem policy" proposed by Ahmet Davutođlu, the former chief foreign policy advisor of the Prime Minister and current Minister of Foreign Affairs. Beyond being one of the pioneers of JDP's foreign policy makers, Davutođlu was an influential ideologue of the first JDP government. However, Uzgel and Törkeş stated that the discourse of "active foreign policy" and "zero problem policy" are not new terminologies in Turkish foreign affairs referring to the fact that former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey such as İsmail Cem and Hikmet Çetin frequently expressed the activeness of Turkey¹¹; both pointed out the sole distinctive feature of the Davutođlu's practice as, ideological-Islamic dimension in foreign affairs¹² and "Islamic realism"¹³. These two concepts, which are complementary, refer the same perception that Davutođlu's main purpose is to add geographic/geostrategic dimension to Turkish foreign policy-making process and to reinterpret this process with Islamic references.¹⁴ Parallel to that, Murinson points out that Davutođlu's doctrine is based on Islamist roots of the JDP and its origins stem from "Özal's neo-Ottomanism, the multi-dimensional foreign policy of the Erbakan government and Davutođlu's innovative approach to geopolitics".¹⁵ From this point of view, Murinson refers to the Davutođlu's doctrinaire book, *Stratejik Derinlik (Strategic Depth)*, and summarizes the argument of the book with the following statements

Prime Minister Erdogan's chief foreign policy advisor criticizes the Kemalist foreign policy for its failure to appreciate the advantages offered by the country's rich history and geographic space. The main thesis of this doctrine is that the strategic depth is predicated on historical depth and geographical

¹¹ İlhan Uzgel, "Dış Politikada AKP: Stratejik Konumdan Stratejik Modele", p.360 and Mustafa Törkeş, "Türkiye'nin Balkan Politikasında Devamlılık ve Deđişim", *Avrasya Dosyası*, 14/1, 2008, p.29

¹² Törkeş's definition

¹³ Uzgel's definition

¹⁴ İ. Uzgel, "Dış Politikada AKP: Stratejik Konumdan Stratejik Modele", p.362

¹⁵ Alexander Murinson, "The Strategic Depth Doctrine of Turkish Foreign Policy", *Middle Eastern Studies*, 42/6, November 2006, p.947

depth. Davutoğlu defines historical depth as a characteristic of a country that is ‘at the epicentre of (historical) events’.¹⁶

In addition, Türkeş stresses that Davutoğlu indicates the backbone problem of Turkish foreign policy by emphasizing the roles of religion and history in foreign policy-making processes. The author of the *Strategic Depth* injects the religious/ideological-Islamic motifs to the framework of Turkish foreign policy when he defines the backbone of Turkish foreign policy with reference to the Islamic dimension. On the other hand, Türkeş notes, this approach would be indefensible on international and regional scale.¹⁷ Parallel to that, Uzgel reads the process as an indication of neoliberal transformation (*dönüşüm*) in Turkish foreign policy and defines the JDP as an actor who restructures Turkish foreign policy in line with neoliberalism.¹⁸

On the other hand, Davutoğlu’s concept based on the Ottoman history, geostrategic analysis and Turkey’s active role in Middle East politics has found a strong legitimacy among the early members of the JDP. The legacy of the Ottoman Empire was utilized as a justification basis for playing more active regional and global role for modern Turkey by the JDP administration.¹⁹ Furthermore, since the JDP government came to power in November 2002, this “innovative approach” has been implemented in various ways; but the first test case was Iraq’s invasion by the United States. On March 1, 2003, the decision of Turkish parliament was not expected by the United States “when it refused to permit the United States to use Turkey as base for its northern front as part of the U.S. intervention into Iraq”.²⁰ Although a permit for site preparation and airport upgrades passed from the Parliament on February 6, 2003 and the officers of the U.S. Department of State began to negotiate with Turkish counterparts; economic consequences of invasion, memories of the First Gulf War, and concerns of the Turkish elites due to political developments in northern Iraq²¹ fed anti-war tendencies in Turkish society.

¹⁶ *ibid*, p.951

¹⁷ M. Türkeş, “Türkiye’nin Balkan Politikasında Devamlılık ve Değişim” p.23-30

¹⁸ İ. Uzgel, “AKP: Neoliberal Dönüşümün Yeni Aktörü”, p.38

¹⁹ Stephen F. Larrabee, “Turkey’s New Geopolitics”, *Survival*, 52/2, April-May 2010, pp.159-160

²⁰ Barış Kesgin and Juliet Kaarbo, “When and How Parliaments Influence Foreign Policy: The Case of Turkey’s Iraq Decision”, *International Studies Perspectives*, Vol.11, 2010, p.19

²¹ *ibid*, p.26

However, for the first time, public opinion played leading role in a parliament decision. Kesgin and Kaaro opine that the major indicators were, firstly, the mutual approach which was shared by the Turkish and American officers that the motion would never fail even if a number of no votes were expected from the opposition. Secondly, the moderately low leadership performance of former Prime Minister Gül compared to the influence of Erdoğan on MPs and the nonexistence of internal party decision on the voting affected the outcome as well.²² On this particular issue, the Brookings Institution and the Council on Foreign Relations developed quite different readings. While the Brookings sought to find a platform for rebuilding the relations between the United States and Turkey; the motion March 1 remained the agenda of the Council on Foreign Relations until Turkish-Israeli relations got worse.

As Larrabee points out one of the most important brittle point between Turkey and the United States was the status of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in northern Iraq after the motion on March 1st. The autonomous identity of the KRG and support of the United States to the independent Kurdish territory deeply concerned Turkey. Until the establishment of an institutional mechanism between Turkey and the United States in September 2006 for fighting against the PKK, the U.S. forces in Iraq consistently failed to take action against the terrorist organization.²³ “From Ankara’s perspective, the U.S. government should have supported Turkey’s military struggle against PKK presence in northern Iraq, even if it risks the functional cooperation between Washington and Erbil. Suggestions by the United States that Turkey should, above all, find an internal solution to the PKK terrorism and engage in a diplomatic relationship with the representatives of the KRG have not been perceived positively in Ankara.”²⁴ On the other hand, Larrabee argues the main shift in Turkish foreign policy took place in 2008. Beginning from 2008, Turkey has expressed its willingness in engage with the KRG and would have liked to be an actor in the energy market of the northern Iraq. As the author points out that Iraqi Kurds were in need of Turkey’s support for surpassing the political

²² *ibid*, pp.31-32

²³ William Hale, “Turkey and the Middle East in the ‘New Era’”, *Insight Turkey*, 11/3, 2009, p.146

²⁴ Tarık Oğuzlu and Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Is the Westernization Process Losing Pace in Turkey: Who’s to Blame?”, *Turkish Studies*, 10/4, December 2009, p.588

turmoil which was fed by the Shia-dominated central government resulting in the decrease of the U.S influence on Baghdad.²⁵ The noted think tanks had also perspectives which are different from each other about this issue.

The Turkish-American relations remained ambiguous until the Obama administration came to power at the end of 2008. Although the bilateral relations never returned to the period between November 2002 and March 2003, the relations did not reach to a level of total rupture as well. However this was not an obstacle to criticizing indirectly Turkey's active policy towards its neighbors, as Iran and Syria, by the United States. According to Robins, the first criticism on to JDP's active foreign policy came from the former U.S. ambassador in Ankara, Eric Edelman, who "publicly tried to cajole President Sezer into cancelling an official visit to Syria²⁶ due to the problematic relations between the United States and Syria. After this attempt, Turkey's rapprochement with Syria based on trade relations in 2005 and its good offices between Syria and Israel were received as a "source of friction with the United States during the Bush administration".²⁷ Barkey expresses that "the United States had almost no contact with Syria and, in fact, was discouraging the Israelis to hold such talks".²⁸ At the same time, the United States was not comfortable on Turkey's visa exemption agreements with Syria due to Syria's place in the United States' terrorist states list as well as "whether Syrian entry stamps on Turkish citizens' passports would impede obtaining visas to the West."²⁹

The Iran-Turkey relations throughout the JDP governments were constructed on the terrorism concerns and energy issues. Since the year of 2004, the two neighbors concluded a consensus on combating against the PKK activities together and signed a number of mutual agreements on sharing of intelligence.³⁰ On the other hand, the United States harshly criticized mutual energy agreements and pipeline projects of the two countries, and frequently proposed establishing a new

²⁵S.F. Larrabee, "Turkey's New Geopolitics", p.162

²⁶ Philip Robins, "Turkish Foreign Policy since 2002: Between a 'Post-Islamist' Government and a Kemalist State", *International Affairs*, 83/1, 2007, p.296

²⁷ S. F. Larrabee, "Turkey's New Geopolitics", p.166

²⁸ Henri J. Barkey, "The Effects of US Policy in the Middle East on EU-Turkey Relations", *The International Spectator*, 43/4, December 2008, p.41

²⁹ Nur Bilge Criss, "Parameters of Turkish Foreign Policy Under the AKP Governments", *UNISCI Discussion Papers*, No:23, May 2010, p.21

³⁰ S. F. Larrabee, "Turkey's New Geopolitics", p.164

route which would pass through Iraq, in lieu of Iran.³¹ In support of Washington's approach, the think tanks synchronously published reports on alternative energy pipelines and prospective role of Turkey in these projects. Those being put, it goes without saying that the crucial disagreement between Turkey and the United States was on Iran's nuclear activities. Iran's nuclear program and noncooperative image with the West directed Turkey to play a more active role rather than being the permanent ally of the United States in the Middle East. "Turkey holds the view that Iranian attempts to get nuclear energy are driven mainly by economic needs; that Iran feels encircled by the US presence in Afghanistan and Iraq; and that Iran is threatened by Israel's nuclear power."³² Nevertheless, Turkey's active stance during the course of 2010 and attempts to find a diplomatic solution were not welcomed by the Western alliance. Although an agreement was signed between Brazil, Iran and Turkey in May 2010, the Obama administration remained skeptical and the United Nations Security Council subsequently approved the fourth sanctions package on Iran.³³ The votes of Brazil and Turkey against the new sanctions are also to be examined in this thesis.

In line of U.S foreign policy, the most important parameter about Turkey, after Iraq, was Israel. Due to Erdoğan's critical discourse toward Israel and his governments' "more openly pro-Palestinian policy than previous Turkish governments"³⁴ raised first questions about Turkey's partnership role among the Western allies. JDP government's approach to Israel became prominent in Erdoğan's "state terrorism" charge for Israeli actions in Gaza and Hamas' leader, Halid Mashal's Ankara visit in February 2006. Mashal's visit upon Turkey's invitation has been interpreted as the most controversial action of Turkey's policy toward the region³⁵ and perceived as the Turkish government's irreconcilable breach in its relations with the United States and Israel.³⁶ Another differentiation in

³¹ W. Hale, "Turkey and the Middle East in the 'New Era'", p.154

³² T. Oğuzlu, "Middle Easternization of Turkey's Foreign Policy: Does Turkey Dissociate from the West?", p.9

³³ Ziya Öniş, "Multiple Faces of the 'New' Turkish Foreign Policy: Underlying Dynamics and a Critique", *Insight Turkey*, Vol.13/1, 2011, p.52

³⁴ S. F. Larrabee, "Turkey's New Geopolitics", p.166

³⁵ W. Hale, "Turkey and the Middle East in the 'New Era'", p.157

³⁶ Nicholas Danforth, "Ideology and Pragmatism in Turkish Foreign Policy: From Atatürk to the AKP", *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Fall 2008, p. 94

Turkey's Israel policy took place in the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2009. Erdoğan's vocal critique on the Israeli actions in Gaza marked a shift in the sense that "Turkey came out openly in favor of the Palestinian cause".³⁷ According to Öniş, second shift took place with the Flotilla Crisis in May 2010. The crisis explained as "Turkish officials openly condemned Israel for carrying out 'state terrorism' and Turkish-Israeli relations were reduced to the lowest point in history".³⁸ Consequently, many Western allies began to no longer consider Turkey as an honest broker and potential mediator in the Arab-Israeli conflict.³⁹ Additionally, the Brookings Institution as well as the Council on Foreign Relations analyzed the different aspects of the JDP's Middle East policy in various articles and meetings.

Finally, in relation to the JDP's foreign policy from the European Union aspect and United States' approach to the EU-Turkey relations; Öniş and Yılmaz name the period from November 2002 to the formal opening of EU accession negotiations in October 2005 as "golden years of the JDP"⁴⁰. The authors justify naming with three factors: successful period in Turkish economic growth history, major reforms on the democratization front, and conduct of foreign policy due to using soft power and developing friendly relations with Turkey's all neighbors.⁴¹ On the other hand, the last factor, using soft power, is linked to two reasons: JDP's willingness to resolve the Cyprus dispute in line with the blueprint of the Annan Plan and striking improvement in both economic and political relations with Syria. The post-2005 period is also interpreted by the authors as "loose Europeanization" or "soft Euro-Asianism."⁴² Although the term of soft Euro-Asianism refers to Oğuzlu's article⁴³, the authors state that "foreign policy activism is pursued with respect to all neighboring regions but with no firm EU axis as was previously the

³⁷ Z. Öniş, "Multiple Faces of the 'New' Turkish Foreign Policy: Underlying Dynamics and a Critique", pp.51-52

³⁸ *ibid*

³⁹ S. F. Larrabee, "Turkey's New Geopolitics", p.167

⁴⁰ Ziya Öniş and Şuhnaz Yılmaz, "Between Europeanization and Euro-Asianism: Foreign Policy Activism in Turkey during the AKP Era", *Turkish Studies*, 10/1, March 2009, p.8

⁴¹ *ibid*, pp.8-9

⁴² *ibid*, p.13

⁴³ Tarık Oğuzlu, "Middle Easternization of Turkey's Foreign Policy: Does Turkey Dissociate from the West?", *Turkish Studies*, 9/1, March 2008

case.”⁴⁴ The reluctant position of the EU on lifting embargo in Northern Cyprus, negative atmosphere due to the rejection of Constitutional Treaty by France and the Netherlands, the verdict of the European Court of Human Rights on the headscarf ban and weakening commitment of the JDP leadership to the goal of full EU membership marked the important parameters of the post-2005 era.⁴⁵ Although an early study of Öniş and Yılmaz was hopeful about the future of the EU-Turkey relations under the JDP administration; after two years, Öniş pointed out “the dramatic changes” in Turkish foreign policy. According to him, the first determinant in loss of motivation on the road of the EU was the global economic crisis of 2008-09. In this process, the EU became the major loser when Turkey purposed to reach nearest active markets.⁴⁶ Indeed, “atmosphere a more independent and IMF-free path in the economic sphere appeared to constitute a natural counterpart or corollary of a more independent and assertive style of Turkish foreign policy.”⁴⁷ Lastly, JDP, with its Islamist roots, leaned towards to developing cultural, diplomatic and economic bonds with the Middle East and the Islamic world. Additionally, the JDP actively began to use the foreign policy as an instrument for effecting public opinion in domestic politics.⁴⁸ Consequently, Öniş reminds that Turkey without exhibiting its enthusiasm and political will on the way to the EU membership cannot be a center of attraction for its neighbors and cannot propose the same kind of activeness in foreign policy.⁴⁹ Comments of the noted think tanks on the “golden years” of the JDP for the EU membership and the post-2005 era will also be taken up in next chapters.

In the light of the aforementioned arguments and discussions, one can conclude that, developing a reading of the think tanks is integral to understand American politics bearing in mind that the United States is a highly pluralistic, decentralized and fragmented country in which thousands of governmental and non-

⁴⁴ *op.cit.*, p.13

⁴⁵ *ibid*, pp.14-20

⁴⁶ Z.Öniş, “Multiple Faces of the ‘New’ Turkish Foreign Policy: Underlying Dynamics and a Critique”, pp.54-55

⁴⁷ *ibid*

⁴⁸ *ibid*, p.57

⁴⁹ *ibid*, p.59

governmental organizations seek to influence political agenda.⁵⁰ Due to dual chambers system of American system and lack of strong commitment to party system leave think tanks room for sharing their reports, projects and recommendations with representatives unlike in parliamentary democracies.⁵¹

Parallel to that, Abelson points out that

Given the time constraints imposed on members of Congress and the reality that very few of them possess a detailed understanding of the various policy issues on which they have to vote, they have an incentive to listen to think tanks, which are all too eager to share their knowledge. These and other features of the American political system have contributed to an environment in which dozens of so-called non-partisan think tanks descend upon the nation's capital to promote what they believe is a 'capitol idea'.⁵²

Due to aforementioned structure of the American politics and influence of American think tanks, the Brookings Institution and the Council on Foreign Relations are essential actors to study in understanding the Turkish foreign policy perspective of the United States throughout the JDP governments.

Lastly, the definition of “epistemic community” would help to understand the perception of these institutions. As Adler and Haas state that

The policy ideas of epistemic communities generally evolve independently, rather than under the direct influence of government sources of authority. The impact of epistemic communities is institutionalized in the short term through the political insinuation of their members into the policymaking process and through their ability to acquire regulatory and policymaking responsibility and to persuade others of the correctness of their approach.⁵³

1.3 Main Research Question of the Thesis

Each of the above-noted issues was taken up as a subject matter by the two think tanks; the Brookings Institution and the Council of Foreign Relations. Thus, this thesis attempts to identify the stances taken up by these two think tanks. Second, the thesis attempts to explore to what extent these two institutions created

⁵⁰ Donald E. Abelson, *A Capitol Idea: Think Tanks and US Foreign Policy* (Canada: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2006), p.xiii

⁵¹ *ibid*, p.6

⁵² *ibid*, p.7

⁵³ Emanuel Adler and Peter M. Haas, “Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program”, *International Organization*, 46/1, 1992, p.374

epistemic community in the United States as well as in Turkey. Third, the thesis undertakes to illustrate whether there is convergences or divergences in the analysis on the objectives of these two think tanks. Finally, the thesis works out to show continuity, change and rupture of two think tanks' agendas towards the JDP's foreign policies.

1.4 Methodology of the Thesis

During think tanks selection process, remarks and conclusions of the University of Pennsylvania, Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program's annual research were utilized.⁵⁴ Results of the last three years exhibit that the Brookings Institution is the top-think tank in many study fields and the Council on Foreign Relations is on the second position on the list. Besides, both think tanks rank among top three institutions in North America, as well as they are among the top ten in sections of international development⁵⁵, security and international affairs⁵⁶, international economic policy⁵⁷ and best external relations⁵⁸. Moreover, selected institutions were chosen in proportion to consistency and diversity of their publications and their events on Turkish politics.

Year	The Brookings Institution	The Council on Foreign Relations
2002	40	88
2003	75	139
2004	46	81

⁵⁴ The aims of the program are that “the Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program (TTCSP) conducts research on the role policy institutes play in governments and in civil societies around the world and specializes in the researching the challenges think tanks face and developing strategies and programs to strengthen the capacity and performance of think tanks around the world.”

http://www.gotothinktank.com/wp-content/uploads/2010GlobalGoToReport_ThinkTankIndex_UNEDITION_15_.pdf (accessed on April 10, 2011), p.73

⁵⁵ *ibid*, the Brookings Institution is at the first rank, the CFR is at the 8th rank.

⁵⁶ *ibid*, the Brookings Institution is at the first rank, the CFR is at the 3rd rank.

⁵⁷ *ibid*, the Brookings Institution is at the first rank, the CFR is at the 5th rank.

⁵⁸ *ibid*, the Brookings Institution is at the first rank, the CFR is at the 4th rank.

2005	46	78
2006	47	72
2007	55	105
2008	63	77
2009	68	51
2010	120	94

From 2002 to 2010, institutions' perception, subject selection, holding events such as seminars, panels and meetings were determinants of choosing these institutions. This thesis will primarily examine how the two think tanks evaluate Turkish foreign policy from the aspect of American politics and how they transmit their conclusions into American politicians when policies are generated on Turkey and the JDP government.

Time frame from the first quarter of 2002 to the summer 2010 was selected in order to analyze comprehensively JDP's foreign policy and viewpoints of noted think tanks. The last quarter of 2002 was the date of the first Turkish general election which was won by the JDP. Furthermore, for the sake of analyzing the perceptions of the think tanks on JDP's foreign policy and the perspectives of these institutions before the Iraq War in 2003, this thesis commences with the articles published in the first quarter of 2002. Afterwards, the arguments of the think tanks on Turkey's Middle East and European Union policy as well as transatlantic relations are to be discussed. Finally, August 2010 is to be a termination date of review with the aim of analyzing the consequences of Flotilla Crisis in Gaza and Brazil-Iran-Turkey nuclear agreement. Both events were integral to understanding the JDP's fluctuant policy direction and United States reactions toward Turkey's Middle East policy.

1.5 Organization of the Chapters

Given the focus of the research and the arguments, the study will be organized in the following line. After the introduction part, Chapter II will attempt to analyze the publications of the Brookings Institution on Turkish foreign policy between January 2002 and August 2010. Due to extent of the noted time frame, publications gathered from the institutions' websites and panels held will be examine under eight subheadings. Following the introduction part, the second subheading will present the short history of the Brookings and its main fields of interest as well as short biographies of fellows who focus on Turkey. In the third subheading, after the brief analysis on the establishment of the JDP, Brookings' publications from January 2002 to March 1st 2003 will be reviewed and the issue of how the institution had perceived Iraq invasion will be explored. Throughout the fourth subheading, articles and panels between March 2003 and December 2003 will pose questions on Turkey's reaction toward Iraq invasion and how the JDP interpreted Turkish secularism. The fifth subheading of this chapter shall focus on the period from 2004 to first half of 2007. The position of the Brookings towards the Cyprus Question and Annan Plan will be revealed and the questions on Turkey's first steps for implementing zero-problem policy in the Middle East, model suggestions of the Bush administration for Turkey as well as anti-Americanism allegations for Turkish public opinion will be explored. The sixth subheading is to analyze the publications from the second half of 2007 to 2009. Discussions on JDP's second government, Turkey's active role in the Middle East and due to this fact that the question of how the U.S. would use new Turkish activeness in the region, and the meaning of "self-confidence paradigm in Turkey" and "Islamist-authoritarian identity of the JDP" are to be addressed. The seventh subheading commences with Brookings' suggestions to Obama administration about its prospective Turkey policy such as new definition of Turkey's role as an ally. This part will proceed with the questions on results of Turkish local elections, the protocols signed between Armenia and Turkey, discussions on Iran's nuclear program and Brazil-Iran-Turkey joint declaration in May 2010, role of Turkish military in political scene related to Ergenekon investigation as well as Gaza Flotilla Crisis, and finally, United Nations Security Council's decision on additional

sanctions toward Iran. The eighth subheading is to summarize the essential pillars of the Brookings' approach toward Turkish foreign policy.

Chapter III will attempt to analyze the similar agenda from the Council on Foreign Relations' perspective. The website of the institution, its bimonthly magazine, *Foreign Affairs*, and the articles cited by the CFR are to be reviewed from January 2002 to August 2010. As in previous chapter, third chapter is also organized under eight subheadings and will start with introduction part. After that, the second subheading is to involve a short history of the CFR, its fields of interest, organizational structure, and brief biographies of the fellows who conduct research on Turkish politics. Third subheading is to scrutinize publications from the first quarter of 2002 till March 1st, 2003. In this part, CFR's scenarios about Iraq invasion and mission of Turkey, bargaining processes between the U.S. and Turkey and status of northern Iraq will be discussed. The fourth subheading will emphasize Turkish Parliament's decision on March 1st, 2003 and CFR's pessimist comments on the future of Iraq-U.S.-Turkey relations will be discussed. In the fifth subheading, time period from the first months of 2004 to general elections in 2007 will be reviewed under the scope of Turkey's EU agenda and the U.S. concerns on Turkey's EU enthusiasm and "Pro-Palestinian" Turkish foreign policy. The sixth subheading focuses on Turkey's identity crisis, "secularists versus Islamists" in 2007 elections as well as Turkey's possible intervention to northern Iraq due to the PKK issue, and questions about Turkey's mediator role in the Middle East. The seventh subheading will discuss the role of Turkish "active" foreign policy in Eurasian pipeline projects, Iran's nuclear program and Turkey's "peace" policy in the Middle East. This subheading will particularly focus on the question of whether the bilateral relations between Turkey and the U.S. would return to the old days which were constructed on mutual benefits. In responding to this question, JDP government's Israeli policy will be an indicator of the CFR. Lastly, the eighth subheading will conclude the perspective of the Council on Foreign Relations' perspective on Turkey.

Finally, Chapter IV is to summarize the main conclusions and the evaluation of chapters.

CHAPTER II

THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION AND ITS PERSPECTIVE ON TURKEY: HOW THE CLUB OF THE AMERICAN DEMOCRATS SEE JDP'S FOREIGN POLICY

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter, publications of the Brookings Institution on Turkey are to be analyzed from 2002 to 2010. Throughout the chapter, articles of the fellows as well as analyses of the speakers in panels are to be discussed and the policy of the institution on the Justice and Development Party's foreign policy is to be explored.

The chapter will examine the studies of the Brookings Institution under eight subheadings. Following the introduction part, in the second subheading, the history, aims, centers, scholars and the activities of the Brookings Institution are to be introduced. Third subheading will aim to analyze the perception of the Brookings about the first JDP government and to show the expectations of the scholars about the role of Turkey in U.S.-led Iraq invasion. The fourth subheading is to start with the decision of the Turkish Parliament on March 1st, 2003 and the reactions of the Brookings scholars will follow. At the same part, the transformation of Turkish secularism since the foundation of the Republic of Turkey and viewpoint of the JDP on secularism in Turkey is to be analyzed in a detailed manner. In the fifth subheading, Turkey's EU enthusiasm is to be discussed under the consequences of EU Constitution referendum in France and the Netherlands; moreover, after the rejection of the motion on March 1st, the phenomenon of "rising anti-Americanism

wave in Turkey” is also to be emphasized. In addition, the Middle East as new geography of Turkish foreign policy is to be explored by the scholars of the Brookings; regarding this matter, “softer proposals” in lieu of model or bridge country for defining the activeness of Turkish foreign policy will be offered. The sixth subheading is to be commenced with discussions on Turkish domestic politics under the atmosphere of general and presidential elections in Turkey. The analysis will focus on the phenomenon of “self-confidence in Turkish foreign policy” which means to pursue active policy in the Middle East by the scholars of the Brookings. Islamic references of “new and active” Turkish foreign policy are to be explained and the question of how the U.S. would interpret the “new” Turkey will be asked. The seventh subheading will focus on the alteration in Turkish foreign policy which is “pro-Iranian and anti-Israeli” during the Obama administration. The scholars of the Brookings will question that under which conditions the United States would be accepted Turkey’s new foreign policy. Taşpınar’s definition for the new era in Turkish foreign policy, “Turkish Gaullism” will be the keyword of this subheading. Lastly, the eighth subheading is to drive out general continuity and change of the Brookings’ analysis on Turkish foreign policy.

2.2 Gone with the Washington’s Wind¹ : The History and the Activities of the Brookings Institution

The Brookings Institution was founded by a group of government reformers in 1916 with the name of Institute for Government Research (IGR), “the first private organization devoted to analyzing public policy issues at the national level”.² Robert Sommer Brookings, eponym of the institution was an American wholesale trader, philanthropist and civic leader during the First World War. He served on the War Industries Board as commissioner of Finished Products and chairman of the Price Fixing Committee, “in this role, he became the link between

¹The headings and sub-heading are inspired from certain movies and reproduced here in new contexts.

“Gone With the Wind”, 1940, Director: Victor Fleming, Starring: Clark Gable, Vivien Leigh and Leslie Howard

² <http://www.brookings.edu/about/History.aspx> (accessed on July 9,2010)

the government and hundreds of industries”³. His relations with the American government throughout the WWI showed him the need for economic research and trained civil servants. “In 1916, Brookings worked with other government reformers to create the first private organization devoted to the fact-based study of national public policy. The new Institute for Government Research became the chief advocate for effective and efficient public service and sought to bring "science" to the study of government.”⁴

Today’s Brookings Institution emerged after the establishment of its two sister organizations: The Institute of Economics in 1922 and a graduate school in 1924. In 1927, these organizations united and present-day Brookings Institution was born. In the post-World War II period, the Brookings Institution took charge in reconstruction of world politics; the institution played a significant role in preparation of the Marshall Plan by generating the first draft of the plan. Moreover, in the 1960s, the institution had an influence on presidential elections; it started to publish a series of books mainly with a focus on public service and the federal budget. Finally in 1974, it played a crucial role in the establishment of Congress’ budget office and its economist was appointed as director. The years of 1980s and 1990s were the period of economic growth and tax system studies for Brookings. Numerous proposals of the institution were accepted by the U.S. Congress and various recommendations on social programs followed those. However, the September 11 attacks in 2001 have changed the economic route of the institution and its experts started to generate proposals on state security and intelligence operations. In the post-9/11, the institution appeared as an efficient public figure in the American politics by means of publications and broadcasting service.⁵ Considering the political atmosphere of the 9/11, the institution directed its attention to European-oriented studies, and the Center on the United States and Europe managed these activities. According to the website of the Center, research program of the Center focuses on three areas: “the transformation of the European Union; strategies for engaging the countries and regions beyond the frontiers of the EU including the Balkans, Caucasus, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine; European security

³ http://www.brookings.edu/about/History/RobertSBrookings_bio.aspx (accessed on July 9, 2010)

⁴ *ibid*

⁵ <http://www.brookings.edu/about/History.aspx> (accessed July 9, 2010)

issues such as the future of NATO, and forging common strategies on energy security and counter-terrorism”.⁶

The Center’s agenda on Turkey became apparent with special programs in 2007. The first organization was one-year “Turkey program” supported by Sabancı Group and Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association (TÜSİAD). Annual Sabancı Lectures and The Brookings-TÜSİAD Roundtable Series on Turkey followed this activity. The common themes of these events were constructed on the mutually relevant areas for the U.S. and Turkey such as Iraq and Afghanistan, weapon of mass destruction crisis in Iran, Turkish domestic and foreign policy, Turkey’s prospective EU membership process, pipeline projects related with Eurasia, and tendency of anti-Americanism in Turkey.

Lastly, before analyzing the Brookings’ perception on Turkey between 2002 and 2010, its scholars and regional experts also deserve to be mentioned with their background. The most effective scholars of the programs on Turkey are Mark Parris, Philip H. Gordon and Ömer Taşpınar. Mark Parris is a nonresident Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy Program at the Brookings Institution. A retired career Foreign Service officer with service in the Near East and the former Soviet Union, he was the U.S. ambassador in Turkey from 1997-2000. He served as special assistant to the President and Senior Director for Near East/South Asian affairs at the National Security Council. Since leaving government, he has been active in U.S.-Turkish NGO work and has written and spoken widely on Turkey and U.S.-Turkish relations. He was the founding director of Brookings’ well-received “Turkey 2007” project and was later active in Brookings’ ongoing work on Turkey. Parris is a graduate of the Georgetown School of Foreign Service.⁷

In May 2009, the U.S. Senate confirmed Philip Gordon as Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasian Affairs. As Assistant Secretary, he is responsible for 50 countries in Europe and Eurasia as well as NATO, the EU and the OSCE. Dr. Gordon has previously served as a Senior Fellow at the Brookings

⁶ <http://www.brookings.edu/cuse/about.aspx> (accessed on July 9, 2010) **There are no sources in the current document.**

⁷ http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/experts/parrism/parrism_bio.pdf (accessed on July 9, 2010)

Institution in Washington, DC (1999-2009); Director for European Affairs at the National Security Council under President Bill Clinton ; and Senior Fellow, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London. Dr. Gordon has a Ph.D. (1991) and M.A. (1987) in European Studies and International Economics from Johns Hopkins University (SAIS) and a B.A. in French and Philosophy from Ohio University.⁸

The senior fellow of Turkey program, Dr. Ömer Taşpınar is Professor of National Security Strategy at the U.S. National War College and the Director of the Turkey Project at the Brookings Institution. Dr. Taşpınar was previously an Assistant Professor in the European Studies Department of the Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies. He has held consulting positions at the Robert F. Kennedy Center for Human Rights in Washington, and at the Strategic Planning Department of TOFAŞ-FIAT in Istanbul. Dr. Taşpınar has a Ph.D. (2001) and M.A. (1995) in European Studies and International Economics from Johns Hopkins University (SAIS) and a B.A. (1993) in Political Science from the Middle East Technical University in Ankara, Turkey. His research focuses on Turkey-EU and Turkish-American relations; European Politics; Transatlantic relations; Muslims in Europe; Islamic Radicalism; Human Development in the Islamic world; and American Foreign Policy in the Middle East.⁹

A comparison of the numbers of articles, reports and panels took part in the website of the Brookings and the sources which were cited display the change: 94 links mentioned Turkey between 1996 and 2001; 254 links analyzed the term between 2002 and 2006 and 306 links discussed Turkey from 2007 to 2010.¹⁰ This comparison indicates that there exists an augmented interest on Turkey among the Brookings' scholars.

⁸ <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/biog/123518.htm> (accessed on July 9, 2010)

⁹ http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/experts/taspinaro/taspinaro_bio.pdf (accessed on July 9, 2010)

¹⁰ Comparison is based on the website of the Brookings Institution and it involved all the links that contain the word "Turkey".

2.3 Waltz with the JDP¹¹ : Preliminary Comments on JDP's Foreign Policy

Following the general elections in November 3, 2002, Turkey's agenda in domestic and foreign policy has changed extensively. After a decade of coalition governments, the Turkish electorate voted for the Justice and Development Party (JDP) and it received 34% of the national vote and came to power as forming single-party government. Concurrently, for the Brookings Institution, the last quarter of 2002 was not the time for dealing with Turkish election results. Almost a year after 9/11, Washington was interested in a policy of "regime change in Iraq"¹², organized various war simulations whose participants discussed the role of Kurds in Northern Iraq¹³ and mentioned Turkey's role as the "northern neighbor". According to the Brookings, Turkey, as the other neighbors of Iraq should have stop "its illicit trade with that nation—by which oil comes out and many goods, including weapons and dual-use technology, enter Iraq."¹⁴ In that respect, the primary concern of the Brookings was how the United States would avoid losing its access to the İncirlik land-bases, in case Turkey had to intervene to northern Iraq because of the Kurdish demands for autonomy.¹⁵

Beyond the possible war in Iraq, during the early days of the first JDP government, Henri Barkey, professor at Lehigh University told about the Washington visit of Tayyip Erdoğan as a JDP leader before the general elections in November 2002. Barkey did not remember any other person who had not any official position but "had royal treatment in Washington"¹⁶. In his recent visit to Washington at the end of 2002, a high level diplomatic program was organized for Erdoğan. According to Barkey, the latter visit of Erdoğan was important because the U.S. needed Turkey's cooperation and access to İncirlik Air Base in case of U.S.

¹¹ "Waltz with Bashir", 2008, Director: Ari Folman, Starring: Ari Folman

¹² Martin S. Indyk, "Don't Ignore the Sanctions", (October 15, 2002), http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2002/1015iraq_indyk.aspx (accessed on May 29, 2010)

¹³ Kenneth M. Pollack and Martin S. Indyk, "Lesson from a Future War with Iraq", (November 4, 2002), http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2002/1104iraq_indyk.aspx (accessed on May 29, 2010)

¹⁴ Michael E. O'Hanlon and Philip Gordon, "Iraq's 'Yes' Isn't Quite Good Enough", (September 18, 2002), http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2002/0918iraq_gordon.aspx (accessed on May 29, 2010)

¹⁵ *op.cit.*

¹⁶ "European Union to Discuss Expanded Membership, Raising Thorny Issues: Cyprus and Turkey", (December 10, 2002), <http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/events/2002/1210europe/20021210.pdf> (accessed on May 29, 2010)

intervention in Iraq. On the other hand, for the JDP, “supporting the United States is not really an option that they have to support.” But it was expected that the mutual past of the bilateral relations as well as IMF Programs and U.S. support to Turkey’s EU membership would affect the decision of Turkish Parliament. Moreover, “Erdoğan's party would understand that Iraq also offers an opportunity to consolidate the relationship between the United States and Turkey. And there's no question that the more Turkey can help the United States in this matter, the more the United States will be in debt towards Turkey and it will strengthen that relationship.”¹⁷ Barkey expressed that Erdoğan had also personal sympathy toward the United States and there was a reservoir of good will because of the visit of the American consul general when Erdoğan was in prison. In terms of Turkish domestic politics, Barkey thought that the last visit of Erdoğan to the White House would send messages to Turkey. After being Prime Minister, the invitation of the Washington would mean that “the United States at least does not believe that the AK Party and Mr. Erdogan have a hidden agenda, the hidden agenda being to bring an Islamic rule in Turkey.”¹⁸ Therefore, Barkey described the JDP’s political discourse as radically different from previous governments due to its enthusiasm for EU membership. A more democratic Turkey would also be meaningful for Erdoğan and his party “whose predecessors closed by the military or by the judiciary”¹⁹.

In February 2003, “last minute negotiations” between Turkey and the United States on cooperation in Iraq was still ongoing and Philip Gordon transmitted the message of the Bush administration that “(the U.S.) has other plans in place and it would be nice to have Turkish support but it's not absolutely necessary.”²⁰ Gordon went on to explain that if the U.S. could go into Iraq via Turkey, it could quickly control the oilfields, stabilize the region and prevent other ethnic groups from competing over it.²¹ From Turkish aspect, Gordon stated that it would be to Turkey’s benefit to cooperate with the U.S. Although Michael E. O’Hanlon, Senior

¹⁷ *ibid*

¹⁸ *ibid*

¹⁹ *ibid*

²⁰ “Preparing for a War with Iraq: Coalition Building and Homeland Defense”, (February 20,2003), <http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/events/2003/0220iraq/20030220.pdf> (accessed on May 29, 2010)

²¹ *ibid*

Fellow at the Foreign Policy Studies Department of the Brookings agreed with Gordon, he added that there was an option without Turkey and its land bases. “If (the U.S.) could get a couple of brigades into northern Iraq to help protect the Kurds, (the U.S.) could at least ensure that our important allies in that region were not decimated. Between our couple of brigades and the Kurdish forces could be in position early on, they could probably protect a good part of Kurdistan pretty well.”²² Another point raised by O’Hanlon was the reaction of Turkey to Kurdish refugees in case of weak U.S. position in northern Iraq due to the Turkey’s motion rejection. The senior fellow expressed that Turkish politicians might use this refugee crisis for legitimizing the act of “getting more involved inside of Iraq”.²³ The arguments of these Turkish politicians would be to help protect refugees and to help prevent these refugees from coming onto Turkey. But this would be a disadvantage for the American perspective, that’s why, for the sake of preventing problems between Turkey and the northern Iraq Kurds, the U.S. “has to send in one or two brigades through airplanes and they combined with the Kurds”.²⁴

At the last panel before the motion on March 1st of Turkish Parliament, Ömer Taşpınar, visiting fellow at the Brookings explained the reason why the bargaining process between Turkey and the United States had taken so long. “Turkey has already known that a northern front was indispensable for a quick U.S. victory. Absence of a northern front would not be a showstopper for the U.S., but its absence would be very important. It would have implications for the length of war and U.S. casualties and Iraqi casualties.”²⁵ In addition, alternative scenarios excluded Turkey did not seem feasible for Taşpınar. From the political aspect, the absence of the northern front would mean the clash of Turks and Kurds in northern Iraq. The U.S. presence was “crucial for keeping not only the Kurdish faction from potentially fighting but also to keep essentially the Turks and Kurds from racing towards Kirkuk.”²⁶ Taşpınar stated that in case of the Parliament would decide not

²² *ibid*

²³ *ibid*

²⁴ *ibid*

²⁵ “The Second UN Resolution: A Battle for Public Opinion”, A Brookings Iraq Series Briefing, (February 26, 2003), <http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/events/2003/0226iraq/20030226.pdf> (accessed on May 29, 2010)

²⁶ *ibid*

to ratify the motion; this would have serious implications for Turkish economy; Turkey would begin to lose its power in Kirkuk and Mosul and would not have a bargaining power in post-Saddam Iraq. In addition, the bilateral relations between Turkey and the U.S. would be damaged. “The U.S. trust in Turkey would be severely shaken with all the implications of support for Turkey in crucial areas such as IMF support, support on the European Union issues, on Cyprus, for potential agreements on preferential trade issues.”²⁷ On the civil-military relations in Turkey, Taşpınar pointed out that there would be a problem between the military and “the Islamist government” in case of the government would say no to the U.S. According to the visitor fellow, Turkish military was not sympathetic to the new government and was not very happy “about the U.S. projecting a Turkish model based on a softer kind of secularism”²⁸. So, the military would not be sad in case of the negative decision of Turkish Parliament. As a result, Taşpınar was not sure about ratification of the motion in the Turkish Parliament because of strong opposition to Iraq intervention within Turkish society. He was not also positive about the party discipline of the JDP over parliamentarians.²⁹ At the end of the session, he predicted that “if the war would happen, this would not be Turkey’s choice, so Turkey should have negotiated for financial compensation of this act.”³⁰

To sum up, it may be said that before the motion on March 1st, 2003, most of the fellows concentrated on predictions about Turkey’s potential role in U.S.-led invasion of Iraq and most of the fellows of the Brookings were feeling comfortable about the active role of Turkey and right to use İncirlik Air Base by U.S. forces, however, when vote of the motion get closer, question marks began to emerge on the Brookings members’ minds about Turkish Parliament’s decision. New Turkish government and extension of the negotiations between Turkey and the United States were the reasons of the Brookings’ concerns. In spite of the fact that the EU agenda of the JDP frequently emphasized by the Brookings, its Islamists roots were never passed over in this period.

²⁷ *ibid*

²⁸ *ibid*

²⁹ *ibid*

³⁰ *ibid*

2.4 Back to the Future in the Bilateral Relations³¹ : March 1st, 2003 Decision of Turkish Parliament and the Echoes

After the decision of Turkish Parliament which did not authorise the U.S. troops to launch a northern front via Turkey, Philip Gordon narrated atmosphere of Washington that

This was a tremendous failure on the part of the United States and Turkey could lead to important recriminations later.(...) Why did this happen? Blame will go in both directions. It's easy to blame the Bush Administration for not getting this done and underestimating the degree of Turkish resistance and so on. But I think a significant amount of that responsibility goes to the Turkish side as well which consistently underestimated our timeline and our willingness to wait and our other options.³²

In the near future, Gordon predicted that Turkey would allow the U.S. troops not because it supports the war, but because of the Kurdish issue. Presence of the U.S. forces would have been in Turkey's interests for preventing "the rapid rush to seize assets like the oilfields around Kirkuk which the Kurds feel are theirs but the Arabs feel are theirs and there's a large Turkmen community which also feels it has a stake in this."³³

Parallel to Gordon's approach, Taşpınar stated that behind the decision of Turkish Parliament, "Turkish lawmakers were in fact highly irritated and humiliated by the depiction of Ankara as a greedy carpetbagger seeking to exploit American war plans for extra cash."³⁴ Taşpınar went on saying that the majority of the Turkish society might adopt "religious solidarity with a Muslim neighbor and skepticism on American regional hegemony"³⁵ but the Turkish military and bureaucracy had concerns about the Kurdish issue. Ankara worried about either the possible refugee inflows from northern Iraq or renewed Kurdish demands for independence in northern Iraq. "Such domestic and foreign security concerns over the Kurdish

³¹ "Back to the Future", 1985, Director: Robert Zemeckis, Starring: Michael J. Fox, Christopher Lloyd and Crispin Glover

³² "On to Baghdad: What Will Coalition Forces Face Next?", (March 25, 2003), <http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/events/2003/0325iraq/20030325.pdf> (accessed on May 29, 2010)

³³ *ibid*

³⁴ Ömer Taşpınar, "Turkey's Kurdish Question", (April 6, 2003), http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2003/0406iraq_taspinar.aspx (accessed on May 29, 2010)

³⁵ *ibid*

question have managed to shadow Turkey's cooperation with its most important strategic ally.”³⁶

On July 4, 2003, eleven Turkish soldiers were arrested by American troops in Suleymaniye due to the allegations on planning to assassinate Kurdish leaders. Following the crisis between the two countries, Turkey's new motion which aimed to send Turkish troops to support Coalition Forces in Iraq was brought to agenda. Under this atmosphere, Taşpınar stated that it would be an irony of history that “a pro-Islamic Turkish political party is trying so hard to have good relations with both the United States and the European Union.”³⁷ Due to the aims of the JDP, Taşpınar gave hint about the future of the JDP's foreign policy that

The AKP's relations with Washington also trouble them because they are concerned that the United States will see in moderate Turkish Islam a more democratic model for the Muslim world than Kemalist secularism. Moreover, the AKP as a Muslim-Democrat party is more appealing to Washington because it is less dogmatic on the Kurdish issue. This is also why the AKP has a vested interest in being on the good side of America by delivering in Iraq. (...) Is there a way out for AKP? The dream scenario would be a United Nations or NATO mandate that would provide a multilateral cover for Turkish troops in Iraq. (...) My humble proposition for Turkey is to play a much more prominent role in the resolution of the number one problem in the Middle East: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In exchange for committing substantial amount of troops to Iraq, Turkey should demand political support from the United States for hosting an international conference in Istanbul. Good relations with Israel and improving ties with the Arab world already provide Turkey a unique advantage for hosting such a conference.³⁸

Phenomenon of repairing the bilateral relations was also argued by Philip Gordon. According to him, Turkey might help the U.S. in reconstruction of Iraq with its companies as well as it might play a role in stabilization of Iraq with its large army.³⁹ “Turkey could also play a constructive role alongside the United States in the Middle East peace process. As one of the only countries in the world that maintains excellent relations with both Israel and the Palestinians, it could

³⁶ *ibid*

³⁷ Ömer Taşpınar, “Will Turkey Send Troops to Iraq”, (August 3, 2003), http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2003/0803middleeast_taspinar.aspx (accessed on May 29, 2010)

³⁸ *ibid*

³⁹ Philip Gordon, “America's Partnership With Turkey Is Still Valuable”, (August 6, 2003), http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2003/0806europe_gordon.aspx (accessed on May 29, 2010)

engage with both sides and help provide legitimacy to the painful compromises that will be necessary to achieve peace.”⁴⁰

The first report on the JDP and Turkish secularism was written by Ömer Taşpınar, Turkish visitor-scholar in the summer of 2003. The main question of the study was whether Turkey and the JDP could be a model for authoritarian Arab states and the answer was vague. The author opined that Turkey’s role for the United States had changed after 9/11. However, “as the debate about “What went wrong?” in the Islamic world unfolded, Turkey’s secular and democratic political system stood out as a very positive exception. Attention shifted from Turkey’s geo-strategic location to what Turkey represents.”⁴¹ Turkey’s support to ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) in Afghanistan was also interpreted as a sign of the U.S. war against terrorism rather than the U.S. war against Islam by Taşpınar. But in context of Iraq, Taşpınar stated that Turkey’s minimal support caused “unexpected disappointment for American policymakers”⁴². “However, such frustration with Turkey also provided a crucial litmus test for Washington’s commitment to democratization in the Middle East.”⁴³ But in this point, Taşpınar reminded the statements of Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Defense Secretary in 2003 that “for whatever reason, the Turkish military did not play the strong leadership role we would have expected”.⁴⁴

On the way of representing secular Turkey as a model for Arab states, Taşpınar also mentioned some obstacles that

A crucial factor hurting the popularity of the Turkish model among Arab countries is the authoritarian and anti-Islamic image of Kemalist secularism. Turkey’s cultural revolution under Atatürk is perceived as a top-down imposition of Westernization on unwilling Muslim masses. This impression of forced Westernization in Turkey is compounded by the current role of the Kemalist military in enforcing and protecting Turkish secularism. Indeed, while the U.S. hopes to export the model abroad, Arab intellectuals question

⁴⁰ *ibid*

⁴¹ Ömer Taşpınar, “An Uneven Fit? The ‘Turkish Model’ and Arab World”, (August 2003), http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/rc/papers/2003/08islamicworld_taspinar/taspinar20030801.pdf (accessed on May 29, 2010), p.4

⁴² *ibid*

⁴³ *ibid*

⁴⁴ *ibid*, p.5

whether this Kemalist model has really conquered the hearts and minds of Muslims in Turkey itself.⁴⁵

From the historical aspect, Taşpınar expressed the historical antipathy of Arabs toward Turkish model and Turkish collective memory based on “the betrayal of Arabs by cooperating with the British forces during the World War I”⁴⁶; that’s why, the U.S. should have been aware of the legacy of the Ottoman Empire when represents Turkey as a model. “Thus, where Americans see the only pro-Western secular democracy in the Muslim world, most Arabs sees a former colonial master that turned its back on Islam.”⁴⁷ Taşpınar also asserted that Turkey’s *sui generis* secular and democratic model came from the Ottoman state system’s hegemony over the religious establishment and the harmony between Ottoman state and religion relations.

Ottoman state religion relations had two main characteristics. Contrary to the stereotype of an Islamic theocracy, the first and most important trait of the Ottoman system was state hegemony over the religious establishment. Ultimate authority and sovereignty rested with the Sultan and palace officials. Such authority was based on a legal framework operating independently of Islamic law. Accordingly, the Ottoman Sultan could make regulations and enact laws entirely on his own initiative. The second characteristic of Ottoman state-religion relations was harmony. The Sultan’s political hegemony over religion had to be legitimate. The Ottoman Sultans believed that only the rightful application of religion generated consent and legitimacy.^{48 49}

The cure proposed by the author to the Arab states was to create a democratic and secularist agenda, like the 1920s and 1930s’ spirit in Turkey; to establish free elections and a positivist education system and to separate “mosque and

⁴⁵ *ibid*, p.7

⁴⁶ *ibid*, p.9

⁴⁷ *ibid*

⁴⁸ *ibid*, pp.18-19

⁴⁹ Taşpınar’s stance toward the Ottoman state system’s hegemony over the religious institutions was derived from Mardin’s and Berkes’ arguments. Berkes argues that the term of “*din-ü devlet*” defines the function of Ottoman bureaucracy. This function was identified itself as a guardian of the state and glorifier of Islam. It means that on behalf of the protection of religion, the state must have survived. Moreover, for the continuity of the protector role, the state and the Sultan should have given priority to religion and religious institutions. Both Mardin and Berkes explain that this tradition was the basic motivation for controlling religion under the framework of Ottoman state system. Please see: Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964). Şerif Mardin, “Modern Türkiye’de Din ve Siyaset” in *Türkiye’de Din ve Siyaset*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2008)

state”⁵⁰. Author’s cure for Turkey was that “the JDP would be an opportunity for reconciling its Muslim roots” with democracy and a more acceptable model for the rest of the Muslim world.⁵¹ On the way of democratization, the EU and the United States should have supported Turkey’s test of democratic maturity.⁵²

Taşpınar also mentioned Turkish Parliament’s motion on October 6, 2003 for sending troops to the Coalition forces in Iraq and asked the reason of shift in Turkish foreign policy after the motion on March 1st.⁵³ He replied his own question that “Turkey gained self-respect as a real democracy and scored good points with the French and German governments, who hold the key to Turkey’s European Union membership and Ankara came to realize that it has no interest in seeing the United States fail in Iraq.”⁵⁴ Taşpınar added that the shift in policy change came from the Turkish military which had concerns about the separation of Iraq based on ethnic groups. On the other hand, Taşpınar reminded that Sunni and Shi’a Arab members of the Iraqi Governing Council did not want the presence of Turkish soldiers in central and southern Iraq as well as Kurdish leaders in north with reference to the joke that “the last time the Turks came they stayed for four hundred years”. From the U.S. aspect, Taşpınar stated that Washington needed much power in Iraq and Ankara thought that sending troops which would be controlled by the U.S. could repair the damaged bilateral relations and could keep under the control Kurdish-American cooperation. Contrary to the arguments of Taşpınar, Shibley Telhami, non-resident Senior Fellow in Saban Center of the Brookings argued that the opposition to Turkish troops was very strong in Iraq due to the “colonized history of Ottoman Empire”. Although it would be in interests of Washington, “it is equally clear that the deployment of Turkish troops will further delegitimize the American presence and alienate many Iraqis whose support is essential to the

⁵⁰ *op.cit.*, pp.24-41

⁵¹ *ibid*, p.38

⁵² *ibid*

⁵³ For a full text of the October 6, 2003 motion in Turkish, please see:
http://www.belgenet.com/yasa/izin_061003.html (accessed on May 13, 2011)

⁵⁴ Ömer Taşpınar, “The Turkish Turnaround”, (October 14, 2003),
http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2003/1014westerneuropa_taspinar.aspx (accessed on May 29, 2010)

American cause. It will also make it harder to gain the support of the other neighbors of Iraq.”⁵⁵

On November 15 and 20, 2003, truck carrying bombs exploded at Bet Israel and Neve Shalom synagogues as well as the headquarters of HSBC Bank and British Consulate in İstanbul.⁵⁶ According to Taşpınar, messages of these terrorist attacks were clear: “Cooperation with America will not go unpunished”.⁵⁷ Although Turkey’s offer to send troops “was shelved” by the U.S. because of the opposition in Iraq, Taşpınar argued that the pro-American image of Turkey in the Islamic world was the argument of terrorists. From the European Union aspect, Taşpınar mentioned divergence between the EU countries. On the one hand, the Christian Democrats argued that joining Turkey as a member to the EU would mean to bring the problems of the Middle East, but on the other hand, “the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs Jack Straw and German Foreign Minister Joschka Fisher has argued that the European Union, now more than ever, has to extend its hand to Turkey. The Turkish Republic, they argue, is being attacked because it is a secular, Muslim, pro-Western and democratic country.”⁵⁸

As a result, after the decision of Turkish Parliament which did not allow passing the U.S. troops via Turkey, the scholars discussed the reason of the decision and the common concept was that Turkey had concerns about the establishment of independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq, that was why, “Ankara gave up from its historical ally”. Moreover, there were also signs of the self-criticism between the lines. According to the articles, the U.S. could not properly explain its reasons for invasion and could not understand the hesitation of Turkey as a neighbor. But this atmosphere based on stagnant relations between the U.S. and Turkey swiftly began

⁵⁵ Shibley Telhami, “Share the Burden or Bear the Blame”, (October 16, 2003),

http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2003/1016iraq_telhami.aspx (accessed on May 29, 2010)

⁵⁶ In these attacks, 39 people killed and more than 700 people injured. “The Turkish authorities say the attacks were carried out by suicide bombers, reportedly linked to al-Qaeda.” Please see: “İstanbul Rocked by Double Bombing”, *BBC News*, (November 20, 2003),

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3222608.stm> (accessed on July 10, 2011); “İstanbul’da Bomba Dehşeti: 27 Ölü”, *ntvmsnbc.com*, (November 20, 2003), <http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/244717.asp> (accessed on July 10, 2011)

⁵⁷ Ömer Taşpınar, “Turkey Under Attack: Terrorists’ Message and Ankara’s Response”, (November 24, 2003), http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2003/1124turkey_taspinar.aspx (accessed on May 29, 2010)

⁵⁸ Ömer Taşpınar, “Europe Needs Turkey”, (December 9, 2003), http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2003/1209europe_taspinar.aspx (accessed on May 29, 2010)

to disperse and Turkey expressed its willingness to repair the relations as the motion on October 6, 2003. According to the Brookings, Turkey's willingness to re-engage with the U.S. should be taken into consideration by Washington.

2.5 Saving Private Ally⁵⁹ : US' Model Suggestions on Turkey and Turkey's Active Role in the Middle East

2004 commenced with a new agenda beyond suggestions of "model Turkey". The year was marked with prospective membership process to the EU alongside debates on the contribution of Turkey, Germany and France under the NATO framework to Coalition forces in Iraq⁶⁰; the European Union had some enlargement paradox about Turkey's prospective membership. According to the report of Ulrike Guérot from the German Marshall Fund of the United States, the accession process would have some obstacles as redistribution of sources in agriculture policies⁶¹, negative European public opinion, institutional issues and geopolitical debates on Turkey.⁶² In the same series, the common report of Philip Gordon and Ömer Taşpınar on Turkey's membership process to the EU expanded the viewpoint of the Brookings. In the first subheading of the report, the authors pointed out "the greatest obstacles to Turkish entry in the EU"⁶³: Civil-military relations. Reforms which aim to strengthen Turkish democracy and weaken the role of the military in Turkish domestic politics would be important steps for Turkey's EU membership. However, the authors reminded that "the key test of the military's willingness to play a lower-profile political role, however, would come if the AKP

⁵⁹ "Saving Private Ryan", 1998, Director: Steven Spielberg, Starring: Tom Hanks, Edward Burns and Matt Damon

⁶⁰ Jeremy Shapiro and Philip H. Gordon, "Istanbul Summit: An Alliance Waiting for November", (June 28, 2004), http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2004/0628europe_gordon.aspx (accessed May 29, 2010)

⁶¹ Ulrike Guérot, "The European Paradox: Widening and Deepening in the European Union", *U.S.-Europe Analysis Series*, (June 2004), http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/rc/articles/2004/06europe_guerot/guerot20040601.pdf (accessed on May 29, 2010)

⁶² Philip Gordon and Ömer Taşpınar, "Turkey's European Quest: The EU's Decision on Turkish Accession", *U.S.-Europe Analysis Series*, (September 2004), http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/rc/articles/2004/09europe_gordon02/gordon20040901.pdf (accessed on May 29, 2010)

⁶³ *ibid*, p.2

government decided to push forward with sensitive legislation in areas such as religious education or the wearing of headscarves, or if the security situation in southeastern Turkey were to deteriorate.”⁶⁴ Throughout the human rights and cultural rights subheadings, the authors after explaining the effect of Turkish government’s policies against torture and discrimination, pointed out the implementation part of the legal amendments. In judicial and economic reform subheadings, Gordon and Taşpınar underlined the successful profile of the JDP government in both issues, moreover, they expressed that “the Turkish government’s strong support of the (Annan) plan (in contrast to the Greek Cypriot leadership’s opposition) earned it much political credit with the EU and has helped Turkey’s case for membership.”⁶⁵

The challenges in Turkey’s membership adventure were mentioned by the authors too. One of the first comments was that the half of the European public opinion was against Turkey’s membership. The followings were the institutional issues as Turkey’s population and possible dominant role in political representation in case of its full membership; agricultural policies and regional aid which would be insufficient for “Turkey’s large agricultural sector and poor regions” and lastly, geopolitical issues due to Turkey’s borders with Iraq, Iran, Syria, Armenia and Georgia. These arguments were also supported by Antonio Missiroli, Senior Research Fellow at the Brookings under the features of size, culture, religion and geographic position of Turkey.⁶⁶ He also added that although Turkey deserved to open the accession negotiations, in the long term, “two potentially converging risks could materialize”⁶⁷: First, the negotiation process would proceed highly asymmetric due to the conditions, benchmarks and deadlines, how Turkey would react when it needs to put on actual implementation rather than formal commitments. Second risk stated by Missiroli was how the EU would satisfy Turkey’s expectations by not to cite an exact target date for eventual accession.

⁶⁴ *ibid*, pp.2-3

⁶⁵ *ibid*, p.4

⁶⁶ Antonio Missiroli, “Crossing the Bosphorus: Turkey’s Accession to the European Union”, (October 1, 2004), http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2004/1001europe_missiroli.aspx (accessed on May 29, 2010)

⁶⁷ *ibid*

On the other hand, the agenda of 2005 was not different than that of the previous year. Ratification of the Lisbon Treaty and rejection of it by France and the Netherlands became one of the top subjects of Center on the United States and Europe. According to Nicolas de Boisgrollier, Visiting Fellow at the Center on the U.S. and Europe of the Brookings, during the Lisbon Treaty referendum campaign, Turkey's shadow appeared in French political environment.⁶⁸ French political context was very sensitive on the issues of religion and immigration; also, the timing played a role on French public opinion. At the end of this process, due to the European Council's decision on Turkey's accession negotiations would start in October 2005, President Chirac took the decision to hold a referendum upon Turkey's prospective membership. In relation to that Taşpınar warned that Turkey should have been ready for "a serious debate about the borders of Europe that may end up marginalizing Turkey under the technical guise of 'variable geometry'".⁶⁹ Due to the concerns of Europe, the author offered to the Erdoğan's government that to require political stability, economic growth, to refrain from challenging the secular establishment on issues such as headscarves and religious education and no hint of military-civilian tension in Turkey."⁷⁰

From another aspect, Ivo H. Daalder⁷¹, Senior Fellow at the Brookings and James M. Goldgeier⁷², Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations asserted that the EU would not be an influential actor in the Middle East without Turkey⁷³. Member countries should consider Turkey, "if they want to play a stabilizing role in broader Middle East"⁷⁴. In concern with Turkey's role in the region, Taşpınar and Emile el-Hokayem, Middle East analyst exemplified Syria-Turkey rapprochement

⁶⁸ Nicolas de Boisgrollier, "Will the EU Constitution Survive a Referendum in France?", *U.S.-Europe Analysis Series*, (March 2005), <http://www.brookings.edu/fp/cuse/analysis/boisgrollier20050301.pdf> (accessed on May 29, 2010)

⁶⁹ Ömer Taşpınar, "Turkey and the EU", (March 2, 2005), http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2005/0302europe_taspinar.aspx (accessed on May 29, 2010)

⁷⁰ *ibid*

⁷¹ After his career in the Brookings Institution, Ivo H. Daalder became the U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO in May 2009.

⁷² James M. Goldgeier is a Professor of Political Science and International Politics at George Washington University.

⁷³ Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Goldgeier, "Now's Not the Time for Europe to Go Wobbly", (July 3, 2005), http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2005/0703europe_daalder.aspx (accessed on May 29, 2010)

⁷⁴ *ibid*

as well. The authors opined that although Turkey's focus has historically been on the West; the growing anti-Americanism related to Kurdish nationalism and great-power politics meant that Turkey's relations with Middle Eastern countries was developing⁷⁵. Simultaneously, shared concerns about the U.S. policy were gaining a common platform in Damascus and Ankara.⁷⁶ But the scholars did not forget to warn Turkey and reminded that Turkey should remember official cooperation with the U.S., historic journey to the EU and should not implement its foreign affairs depending onto dictators⁷⁷.

In relation to aforementioned discussions, Turkish business groups felt the necessity to introduce themselves to the Washington bureaucracy. With the EU membership negotiations, they had already set to create an image in Brussels and would like to intensify such efforts in Washington as well. In line with this purpose, in 2005, the annual Sakıp Sabancı Lectures began being sponsored by Sabancı Group, one of the biggest business groups of Turkey. The subject of the series was Turkey's role in the world and the lecturer of the first session was Madeleine Albright, Former U.S. Secretary of State. Just after her speech on the historical partnership between the two countries, she responded to a question on the anti-Americanism and Islam versus secularization debates in Turkey.⁷⁸ She expressed that it might be a bad word to use "bridge or model" for defining Turkey but "it is a democratic country that is able to have an Islamic party that could be voted in."⁷⁹ Furthermore, when a journalist asked her views about what Turkey would do if Iraq was divided into different parts; she told that "Turkey has to play a different role within the area and try to decide with whom to be".⁸⁰ Former U.S Secretary of State also mentioned the Bush administration's policy towards Turkey and expressed that

⁷⁵ Emile el-Hokayem and Ömer Taşpınar, "Syria Loves Ankara but Will the Relationship Last?", (April 19, 2005), http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2005/0419westerneurope_taspinar.aspx (accessed on May 29, 2010)

⁷⁶ *ibid*

⁷⁷ *ibid*

⁷⁸ Madeleine Albright, "First Sakıp Sabancı Lecture: America, Turkey and the World", (May 3, 2005), <http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/events/2005/0503europe/20050503.pdf> (accessed on May 29, 2010)

p.33

⁷⁹ *ibid*

⁸⁰ *ibid*, pp. 40-41

United States should not focus on the motion on March 1st; the people in Washington had needed to understand the position of Turkey in the Middle East.⁸¹

On the other hand, the anxiety of the United States about anti-Americanism wave in Turkey was a much debated issue throughout 2005 and 2006. Brookings published various reports about the issue and generally perceived the subject from the viewpoint of the chaotic situation in Iraq. With regards to most of the comments, the possibility of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq had created a powerful anti-Americanism wave in Turkey. Also, the distrust of Turkey in the Kurdish Question prevented it playing a more constructive role in the region.⁸² Scholars pointed out that in lieu of dealing with the Iraqi Kurds; the medium and long-term goals of Turkey should be that

In the medium term, with success in the starting of EU accession negotiations, Washington hopes that a more self-confident Turkey will focus less on the Iraqi Kurds and more on resolving some of its domestic limitations. There is ample room for cooperation between the two in Iraq. Once Iraq is stabilized, Washington will want Turkey to play a greater political and economic role. Turkey is Iraq's most direct access to the West. Finally, Iraq is not the only country where Turkey's role could be helpful to Washington, and ultimately the West in general. Iran and Syria, both direct neighbors, have proven to be difficult states. (...) What posture Turkey adopts with them could be critical. The Bush Administration was sharply critical of Ankara when Turkish leaders appeared to be backing Syria's president, Bashar Assad. Similarly Turkey has been reluctant to voice much criticism of the Iranian government. Here, too, Washington and Ankara need to establish a better dialogue and make sure they do not stray too far from each other because the stakes are high.⁸³

In another article, written by co-director of the Brookings Project on Turkey, Taşpınar mentioned the same issue and argued that after the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, "Turkey and the United States no longer share a common enemy; Turks have no sympathy for American unipolarism and unilateralism, especially when such unilateralism targets Turkey's neighbors such Iraq, Iran and

⁸¹ *ibid*, pp.43-48

⁸² Henri J. Barkey and Ömer Taşpınar, "Turkey: On Europe's Verge?", (February 7, 2006), http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/rc/articles/2006/0207europe_barkey/taspinar20060207.pdf (accessed on May 29,2010)

⁸³ *ibid*

Syria with no direct links with September 11.”⁸⁴ Taşpınar also evaluated the question of anti-Americanism in Turkey from the post-Cold War perspective. According to him, in the post-9/11 period, the American perception has changed and Turkey gained new importance that “it did not possess even during the Cold War years for the U.S.”⁸⁵ This importance arose from its profile which “is the most successful model of the modernization theory (in the Middle East) and much more importantly, with its large Muslim population.”⁸⁶ For the first time, Turkey became important not because of “where it was located but because of what it was”⁸⁷.

Taşpınar argued that

The U.S. policy on the democratization of the Middle East has clashed with Turkey’s sensitive approach to secularism for the first time. Washington, on the other hand, perceived this development as the insecurity of the Turkish regime and Turkey’s conflict with its own Muslim identity. Following these developments, the word “model” was immediately exchanged with softer phrases like “source of inspiration,” or “example country.” Today, that the frequent utilization of terms like “model” and “moderate Islam” results in perceptions similar to “Washington pressed the button for AKP” should be taken as the indicator of the apparent confusion in people’s minds. The second problem that has surfaced in the Turkey’s relations with the U.S. in light of Turkey’s identity crisis, which triggered by Washington’s Northern Iraq policy, consists of the Kurdish issue at large and the future of Kirkuk. The debate on Turkey’s role in the promotion of “moderate Islam” and as a “model” had already created anti-Americanism within the Turkish elite. The Kurdish issue, in contrast, has carried this anti-American sentiment to public and rejuvenated nationalist reactions. (...)Once more, the main concern here is the lack of trust in Washington. Nobody believes the redundant messages of Washington on the preservation of Iraq’s territorial integrity. Even the lack of evidence regarding the U.S. interest in a Kurdish state to assure Turkey’s suspicions does not change the situation.⁸⁸

Taşpınar concluded that the Bush administration was aware of JDP’s limited ability to maneuver on the issues that Turkish military deals as secularism. Despite the fact that the JDP did not have the luxury to shape its foreign policy with such an anti-American public opinion, Taşpınar warned that “populism in foreign policy-making is a dangerous approach, that’s why the AKP needs to create a vision that serves the

⁸⁴ Ömer Taşpınar, “The Anatomy of Anti-Americanism in Turkey”, (November 16, 2005), http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2005/1116turkey_taspinar.aspx (accessed on May 29, 2010)

⁸⁵ *ibid*

⁸⁶ *ibid*

⁸⁷ *ibid*

⁸⁸ *ibid*

long term interests of Turkey rather than implementing policies solely to maintain public support.”⁸⁹

A year before the general elections, in 2006, the discourse of “Turkish foreign policy dominated by the AKP” became more pronounced in publications of the Brookings Institution. At the second Sakıp Sabancı Lectures, an international research award with contributions of Sabancı University was initiated. The first year’s topic was “Turkey's New Geopolitical Environment: Policy Challenges and Opportunities for Engagement”⁹⁰ and top three awarded articles were about regional policies of Turkish foreign affairs. For instance, Lerna K. Yanık⁹¹, the scholar who won the first prize argued that in coming years, “Turkish foreign policy, which is known for its elitism and isolation from domestic politics, will be influenced by Turkey’s internal dynamics more than ever before.”⁹² And this will be realized by the impact of “domestic lobbies such as business; the internal cleavages of Turkey as in EU-Turkey relations; the nationalist reflex towards the Armenian, Cyprus and Kurdish question, and external reflex towards the EU and U.S. foreign policy.”⁹³ Finally, Yanık pointed out that

Apart from the fact that Syria and Iran are Turkey’s neighbors and Turkey would not like to see any more turmoil in its immediate neighborhood, there are two other reasons why Turkey is taking this “soft power” approach. First, Turkey wants to align its foreign policy with the EU, which, as argued by Graham Fuller, might increase the tension between the US and Turkey, if the “Transatlantic gap” gets larger. Second, Turkey wants to play a “benign power” or a “facilitator” role in the Middle East, and has shown its intention not only in the case of Syria and Iran, but also when it brought Pakistan and Israel together as well as the Sunni groups of Iraq. Although this is a good public relations move, it is more a matter of capability than intention. Because Turkey’s foreign policy alignment will probably be with the EU, what is left for Turkey and the US is finding common ground (rather than realignment) on the issues discussed above. If no common ground is found, Turkey’s ability to conduct an independent foreign policy in the Middle East will likely be

⁸⁹ *ibid*

⁹⁰ http://www.sabanciuniv.edu/tr/?arastirma/sakip_sabanci_uluslararasi_arastirma_odulu/odul_hakkinda.html (accessed on July 13, 2010)

⁹¹ Lerna K. Yanık is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science in Bilkent University.

⁹² Lerna K. Yanık, “Beyond 'Bridges', 'Crossroads' and 'Buffer Zones': Defining a New International Role for Turkey”, (May 23, 2006), http://www.brookings.edu/comm/events/20060523sabanci_1.pdf (accessed on May 29, 2010)

⁹³ *ibid*

limited, since Turkey will be facing the hegemon of the world—the United States—in the Middle East.⁹⁴

The second article written by Ian O. Lesser from Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars also reached similar conclusions and argued that, in the following years, Turkish public opinion would be more effective in the process of foreign-policy making.⁹⁵ On the other hand, the author expressed that Turkish foreign policy is more European-oriented than American approaches on various issues. In addition to active foreign policy toward Europe, Lesser stated that Turkey's rapprochement with the Middle Eastern countries would raise anti-Americanism and nationalism in Turkey as well. In this point, American officials should ask the question "whether Ankara's new regional activism can support Western objectives."⁹⁶ The author concluded that "the bilateral relations can no longer be guided by traditional patterns" and new strategic relationship based on new approaches, numerous participants and modest expectations is possible. "It will also require an end to the idea of cooperation based largely on Turkey's location - the real estate perspective- and the development of an approach based on forward planning and concerted policies."⁹⁷

In the third article, Suat Kınıklıoğlu⁹⁸ from German Marshall Fund of the United States described Ahmet Davutoğlu's vision as "fully tandem with the AKP's Muslim-sensitive outlook toward Turkey's immediate neighborhood".⁹⁹ According to Kınıklıoğlu, the problematic issues between Turkey and Russia are Cyprus and Armenian resolution in Russia's Duma. Russia's veto to block the Annan Plan and the decision of Duma about the Armenian "genocide" as well as bans on the import of Turkish goods due to healthy safety grounds and "clear rise in prostitution-related HIV infections in Turkey because of the so-called *Natasha Syndrome*"¹⁰⁰ were the attention-grabbing issues of the article.

⁹⁴ *ibid*

⁹⁵ Ian O. Lesser, "Turkey and The United States: From Geopolitics to Concerted Strategy", (May 23, 2006), http://www.brookings.edu/comm/events/20060523sabanci_2.pdf (accessed on May 29, 2010)

⁹⁶ *ibid*

⁹⁷ *ibid*

⁹⁸ Suat Kınıklıoğlu has been member of the Turkish Parliament since 2007.

⁹⁹ Suat Kınıklıoğlu, "The Anatomy of Turkish-Russian Relations", (May 23, 2006), http://www.brookings.edu/comm/events/20060523sabanci_3a.pdf (accessed on May 29, 2010)

¹⁰⁰ *ibid*

Abdullah Gül, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey in July 2006 gave a speech at the Brookings and stressed the historical relations and mutual interests of the U.S. and Turkey.¹⁰¹ Gül replied a question on anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism in Turkey that it has been exaggerated too much and criticism of Turkish people should not be interpreted as anti-Americanism or anti-Semitism. Arban Israel, the counselor of the Embassy of Armenia in Washington asked that when Turkey negotiates with the EU, it says that the Cyprus issue should not be raised in the negotiations but why Turkey would bring the relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan into the Turkish-Armenian issues. Gül responded that “Turkey has good intentions to create (positive) atmosphere in region and this should not be used as blackmail to Turkey”. He stated that Turkey feels sad about what happened in history but it was a war, not genocide and the problems need to be solved.

The last article of 2006 was on the resolution of lower house of French Parliament about vote on a law that would make it a crime to deny that Turkey perpetrated genocide against Armenians in 1915-17.¹⁰² According to Gordon and Taşpınar, “Turks rightly see the legislation as a cynical ploy not only to win Armenian votes but to put one more obstacle on the path to Turkey's EU membership.”¹⁰³

In this period, Turkey's most important motivation in its foreign policy was the EU. Due to the commencement of the negotiations between the EU and Turkey, the Brookings began to analyze this process and shed light on the possible obstacles which would be proposed by European statesmen for Turkey's membership to the EU. On the other hand, as from the year of 2005, Turkey-Syria rapprochement took attention of both the Bush administration and the Brookings. Although Washington did not agree with Turkey's active policy in the Middle East, the Brookings argued

¹⁰¹ “Turkish –U.S. Relations: Looking Ahead”, (July 6, 2006), <http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/events/2006/0706turkey/20060706turkey.pdf> (accessed May 29, 2010)

¹⁰² “France to Vote on ‘Genocide’ Law”, *BBC News*, (October 12, 2006), <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6043064.stm> (accessed on June 20, 2011); “Fransa Yine Gerecek”, *Radikal*, (September 30, 2006), <http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalHaberDetayV3&ArticleID=793147&Date=29.06.2011&CategoryID=100> (accessed on June 20, 2011)

¹⁰³ Philip Gordon and Ömer Taşpınar, “Why France Shouldn't Legislate Turkey's Past?”, (October 30, 2006), http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2006/1030turkey_gordon.aspx (accessed on May 29, 2010)

that Washington had to understand the role of Turkey in the Middle East and ruminate on whether Turkey would play a role for the U.S. interests in the Middle East. The last phenomenon of this subheading was the anti-Americanism discussion about Turkey. According to the fellows, the Iraq invasion increased the anti-Americanist feelings in Turkish society and this tendency was fed by the Iraq policy of the U.S. as well as the PKK attacks.

2.6 Who's Afraid of "the New Turkish Foreign Policy"?¹⁰⁴ : A "New Model" for Turkey in the Middle East

Turkey began the New Year with a renewed agenda which scrutinized all the old issues. At the beginning of 2007, the presidential election in Turkey started to be discussed in all aspects and the Brookings commenced with focusing on domestic issues of Turkey with its scholars and experts, as well as Turkish columnists, academics and retired diplomats who have represented different political perspectives. Despite the fact that the attendance and shared ideas of participants was not in accordance with the traditional line of the institution, their perspectives probably had been predicted by organizers. Therefore, the panelists' ideas were also important for analyzing viewpoint of the Brookings. In the year 2007, panels were the best stages for arguing about the atmosphere of Turkey's presidential election with regards to secularism and foreign policy. The favorite question of this term was "While the JDP occupies two-thirds of the seats in the Parliament; wouldn't it be fair that they could elect anybody who they wish for the presidency?" or "Would the candidacy of Prime Minister Erdoğan cause negative economic impact or destroy party discipline in the next general election?"

Murat Yetkin, columnist of *Radikal* expressed that there were many scenarios but two of them were distinctly significant. First one was Erdoğan's presidency would dissolve the JDP but if Abdullah Gül became president, this option would be removed. Second, "morale of the JDP would boost incredibly that they would consider themselves as they reach the ultimate target in a very short

¹⁰⁴ "Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf?", 1966, Director: Mike Nichols, Starring: Elizabeth Taylor, Richard Burton and George Segal

time, from being to nothing”¹⁰⁵ in the case of Erdoğan’s presidency. Moderator of the panel, Philip Gordon told about the discussions on the role of military in presidential elections and pointed out that “suggestions made that the military will not allow Erdoğan to become president”.¹⁰⁶ Yetkin replied that he heard this issue in Washington, more than in Ankara but he thought that conditions of Turkish democracy has changed and “neither Turkey nor one among the friends of Turkey would support that”.¹⁰⁷ On the other hand, question on the relations between the U.S. and Turkey was replied by Soli Özel, Professor at İstanbul Bilgi University that there is certainly a problem of communication between the American administration and the Turkish public, because obviously the United States sees the PKK issue not just as a terrorism issue, but as something bigger that is related to Turkey’s own domestic Kurdish problem.”¹⁰⁸ In addition to the comments of Turkish panelists, Gordon expressed that for the first time, at the end of the year, Turkey’s president, government, parliament and most municipalities would be under the control of Erdoğan’s ruling party—“inclined to loosen the strict barriers set up by Atatürk between religion and state.”¹⁰⁹

In the next panel on Turkish presidential election, Hasan Bülent Kahraman, Professor of Sabancı University stressed that he still considers Erdoğan not being a presidential candidate a possibility because “AKP has not become yet a real well-established, well-grounded political party and as soon as Erdoğan becomes the president, the intra-factions in AKP will fall into a kind of debate and there might be a breakdown of the party.”¹¹⁰ On the other hand, according to Kerim Balcı, Ankara Bureau Chief of *Zaman*, Erdoğan decided that his candidacy would cause concern in the military as well as among the secularists. “But if Erdoğan somehow prevented from being a candidate, he would be elected. AK Party uses suffering and

¹⁰⁵ “Turkey 2007: High Stakes in a Defining Year”, (February 13, 2007), <http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/events/2007/0213turkey/20070213turkey.pdf> (accessed on May 29, 2010), p.13

¹⁰⁶ *ibid.*, pp.17-18

¹⁰⁷ *ibid.*, p.19

¹⁰⁸ *ibid.*, p.34

¹⁰⁹ Philip Gordon, “Don’t Go Cold on Turkey”, (March 3, 2007), http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2007/0303turkey_parris.aspx (accessed on May 29, 2010)

¹¹⁰ “Filling Atatürk’s Chair: Turkey Picks a President”, (April 12, 2007), <http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/events/2007/0412turkey/20070412.pdf> (accessed on May 29, 2010), pp.12-13

Prime Minister Erdoğan used his own suffering to actually get votes, and we all know that about 20 percent of the votes that AK Party received in 2002 elections are because of Tayyip Erdoğan's own suffering.”¹¹¹ Mehmet Ali Bayar, former advisor of Turkish President Süleyman Demirel added that Erdoğan did not prepare the country for his candidacy, he did not get in touch with other political arenas and this caused instability both in his party and on the public.¹¹² Moreover, Bayar claimed that due to inadequacy in checks-and-balances system, “Turkish society was not comfortable with the idea of single party winning with only 34% of the votes would control all three powers as legislation, executive and judicial branches.”¹¹³ Bayar also shared his ideas about the threshold in election system that the main discussion point of the presidential elections should not be the Prime Minister’s definition of democracy or secularism; the point should be that his party was able to pass anything they wanted through the Parliament.¹¹⁴

Moderator of the panel, Gordon asked whether “the next prime minister would seek to pursue a radical agenda to change the baselines of where religion and the secular society meet in Turkey”.¹¹⁵ Bayar replied that the JDP was not an old-Welfare Party¹¹⁶ and it understood that it had to change its agenda for integrating to Europe.¹¹⁷ In Q&A session, Carol Migdalovitz, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs at the U.S. Congress expressed that there were some concerns in Washington that the JDP was using the EU agenda simply to avoid interference by the military; moreover, indicator of Turkish foreign policy orientation for officials in Washington was meeting with Hamas.¹¹⁸ Bayar replied that “it was not very easy to radically alter Turkish foreign policy orientations”¹¹⁹, for instance, during the presidency of Ahmet Necdet Sezer, Turkey did not seek a pro-Western foreign policy and sometimes Erdoğan was more pro-Western than Sezer in foreign policy-

¹¹¹ *ibid*, p.17

¹¹² *ibid*, pp.24-25

¹¹³ *ibid*, p.31

¹¹⁴ *ibid*, pp.42-43

¹¹⁵ *ibid*, p.47

¹¹⁶ The Welfare Party under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan was the most effective Islamist party of the 1990s. It was the coalition partner in 1997 and was banned in 1998 for violating the secularism principle of the Constitution.

¹¹⁷ *op.cit.*, p.52

¹¹⁸ *ibid*, p.65

¹¹⁹ *ibid*, p.68

making process. Kahraman added that “in Turkey’s recent history, there was not a period in which foreign policy had more impact on domestic politics than the domestic politics itself and this is due to the conditions of the Middle East.”¹²⁰

At the following panel, Ömer Taşpınar expressed that a power struggle exists in Turkish politics because there emerged a new elite class which was supported by a very dynamic capitalist private sector. Therefore, the JDP is the political manifestation of this transformation and had been a good source for consolidating democracy.¹²¹ Due to the question of Philip Gordon whether Turks still think that the JDP was controlled by Washington, Aslı Aydıntaşbaş, Ankara Bureau Chief of *Sabah* expressed that “this approach has significantly changed with the AKP’s decision to invite Hamas leader and the April 27th memorandum of the Turkish military”.¹²² Gordon also declared that in its second term, “AKP would have to deemphasize its ‘Islamic’ roots even more than they had to date. But hard core secularists would never trust them and the pragmatists in AKP will understand that there exists a fundamental incompatibility between a secret Islamist agenda and a vision of becoming the owners of Turkey’s political vital center.”¹²³

After the general elections being held on July 22, 2007, the comments became clearer about this process and it raised a question: why Turkish people overwhelmingly would like to see the JDP in power and in the forthcoming term, would the JDP pursue an Islamist foreign policy? Soli Özel replied that Turkish electorates, especially the middle class electorate did not want economic instability and was happy with the economic policies of the JDP. According to him, the Turkish electorate did not want the military, it respects it but it did not want the military to tell Turkey how to think and what to do. “This was a choice between a

¹²⁰ *ibid*, p.73

¹²¹ “Turkey Doubles Down: What’s at Stake in the July Elections?” ,(June 19, 2007), <http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/events/2007/0619turkey/20070619.pdf> (accessed on May 29, 2010) pp. 6-12

¹²² *ibid*, p.33

¹²³Mark R. Parris, “Secularism, Islamism, Democracy: The Future of U.S.-Turkish Relations” organized by the Heritage Foundation, (July 12, 2007), http://www.brookings.edu/speeches/2007/0712turkey_parris.aspx (accessed on May 29, 2010)

more open Turkey and a more introverted xenophobic Turkey.”¹²⁴ From the foreign policy aspect, Özel thought that “the AKP people feel much more comfortable about dealing with their counterparts in the Middle East”¹²⁵ and the engagement with the Middle East should be evaluated under such circumstances and consequences. In this point, Özel gave the example of free trade agreements with Muslim countries and offered to look at the foreign affairs of Turkey and Middle East from the political economy perception like the customs union agreement with the EU.¹²⁶

In another panel on the regional challenges for the U.S. foreign policy goals, Mark Parris from the Brookings asked that if Turkey plays an influential role in Middle East peace whether it could be an asset for the United States when most Americans thought of Iran and its expanding influence in the region.¹²⁷ Bülent Aras, Professor at Işık University replied that Turkey has been a more active country in the region since the 1990s; and now it would propose ideas for Iraq and play a facilitator role between Syria and Israel¹²⁸. Another speaker called attention to new regional role of Turkey after the Cold War. He argued that after that date, Turkey has a more-balanced and qualified position accepted by Palestinians, Israelis and Arabs; although, according to Arabs, Turkey is moving away from its traditional policy which took the side of the United States.¹²⁹ Another question of the moderator was if there were a different government in power, would the policy toward the Middle East peace or Iraq, be significantly different?¹³⁰ Semih İdiz, columnist of *Milliyet* replied as the JDP changed the general character of the Turkish foreign policy and has brought a new approach to Turkish foreign policy toward the Islamic world. But he also went on to saying that “this did not occur in the hurried way that the previous pro-Islamic government did.”¹³¹ The JDP had an Islamic agenda but according to him, “this is going to be pursued within the

¹²⁴ “Moving Forward: Interpreting Turkey’s July 22 Election”, (July 31, 2007), <http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/events/2007/0731turkey/20070731.pdf> (accessed on May 29, 2010) pp.8-11

¹²⁵ *ibid*, p.20

¹²⁶ *ibid*, pp.19-24

¹²⁷ “Regional Challenges to Post-Election Turkey”, (October 11, 2007), <http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/events/2007/1011turkey/20071011.pdf> (accessed on May 29, 2010) p.31

¹²⁸ *ibid*, pp.32-33

¹²⁹ Unknown Speaker, *ibid*, pp.33-34

¹³⁰ *ibid*, p.40

¹³¹ *ibid*

framework of the democratic parliamentary system and secular mode because there is no way other way to run Turkey.”¹³² Another speaker expressed that due to a survey among Turkish academicians, Turkey’s traditional foreign policy is still there even though the government is trying to shape it¹³³. Lastly, the other speaker mentioned the theme of “self-confidence in Turkish foreign policy in the JDP era” which was frequently discussed in the Brookings publications in 2008. According to him, since 2003, “Turkey has been a domestic transformation legally, politically, economically and this united with the EU process has created an impact towards a new self-confidence like Greece-US relations after Greece became a member of the EU.”¹³⁴ He also thought that this self-confidence would have happened if another party was in power.

In fall 2007, the most controversial problems between the U.S. and Turkey were the Armenian genocide resolution which was approved by the House Committee on Foreign Relations and the PKK issue. Before the voting of the resolution, on October 7, 2007, 13 Turkish soldiers were killed by the PKK in Şırnak¹³⁵ and the question of whether Turkey would launch a cross border operation against the PKK in northern Iraq. According to Taşpınar, “Ankara should have realized that this would be exactly what the PKK wants”.¹³⁶ After the general elections in 2007, the PKK would provoke the domestic politics and the want to unsettle the “the AKP’s landslide electoral victory in the Kurdish regions of Turkey”. From the relations between Ankara and Irbil, Taşpınar expressed that a constructive dialogue between the two sides would also be “a nightmare for the PKK and would sideline Öcalan as an irrelevant factor in the Turkish-Kurdish-American power equation”.¹³⁷ Due to these reasons, the PKK would like to damage any dialogue atmosphere between Turkey and the northern Iraq as well as Kurds and Turks in Turkey. On the other hand, Taşpınar stated that possible military

¹³² *ibid*

¹³³ Unknown Speaker, *ibid*, pp.41-42

¹³⁴ Unknown Speaker, *ibid*, pp.43-44

¹³⁵ “Turkish Soldiers Killed by Rebels”, *BBC News*, (October 7, 2007), <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7033075.stm> (accessed on June 22, 2011); “Birliğe Saldırı: 13 Er Şehit”, *Radikal*, (October 8, 2007), <http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=235144> (accessed on June 22, 2011)

¹³⁶ Ömer Taşpınar, “Turkish-American Relations: The Perfect Storm”, (October 15, 2007), http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2007/1015_turkey_taspinar.aspx (accessed on May 29, 2010)

¹³⁷ *ibid*

operation of Turkey would also diminish the relations between Ankara and Irbil; moreover, Turkish-American relations would be exacerbated. Due to these reasons, Taşpınar's advice to Prime Minister Erdoğan was that "to succumb to populist and nationalist anger is the tempting and easy thing to do. Statesmanship, however, requires what is strategically sound rather than what is popular."¹³⁸

Bruce Riedel¹³⁹, former CIA analyst and the Senior Fellow of the Brookings also gave an interview to *Newsweek* about the PKK issue. Riedel replied a question on why the U.S. was not in northern Iraq that American military forces had a limit and from the beginning "the U.S. has not been want to do military operation"¹⁴⁰ in there. The power of the PKK was explained by Riedel that Massoud Barzani and Iraqi Kurds were never eager to kill fellow Kurds on behalf of Turkey and "they turned a blind eye". Riedel thought that "Iraqi Kurdish parties have always been less than honest about what they're doing with the PKK. The truth is that they don't really do much at all; they have never really taken any action to permanently take the PKK down. At the end of the day, they all share the same dream: an independent Kurdistan that goes beyond Iraq to include parts of Turkey and Iran."¹⁴¹ Riedel's suggestion was that the U.S. should have pressed the Iraqi government and Kurdish leadership in the short term but it would be very hard to control a phenomenon which most of the Kurds want to realize. The second option would be "telling Turkey to live with it and get over but it does not work either". Riedel concluded that the U.S. could not solve this problem which is one of the Middle East's most unresolved and irresolvable national identity problems.

In his second article, Taşpınar broadened his viewpoint and pointed out that although Ankara would like the United States to take immediate military action against the PKK in northern Iraq, this option for Washington would mean to destabilize northern Iraq. "Clearly Washington has neither the willingness nor the capacity to conduct a large-scale land operation against the PKK in northern

¹³⁸ *ibid*

¹³⁹ Bruce Riedel served as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Near East Affairs on the National Security Council between 1997 and 2002.

¹⁴⁰ "We Can't Solve This", (October 26, 2007),

http://www.brookings.edu/interviews/2007/1027_turkey_riedel.aspx (accessed on May 29, 2010)

¹⁴¹ *ibid*

Iraq.”¹⁴² According to Taşpınar, when the PKK attacks Turkish soldiers, it had two important goals: to gain international legitimacy as “freedom fighters” and to create a Kurdish-Turkish polarization in Turkey’s urban centers. The possible solution would be U.S. air operation against the PKK as soon as possible because “Turkey reached the very end of its patience”¹⁴³.

From Parris’ perspective, Turkey wanted “the U.S. closes the PKK camps in northern Iraq, arrest the leaders and hands them over Turkey”¹⁴⁴ and these demands raised the Turkish distrust toward the U.S. On the other hand, according to Michael E. O’Hanlon, Senior Fellow at the Brookings and Edward P. Joseph, Visiting Scholar at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Turkish military operation “would destabilize the most successful part of Iraq and further solidify Kurdish nationalism -- rendering compromise over the flashpoint, oil-rich town of Kirkuk even more difficult.”¹⁴⁵ Lastly, Taşpınar stated that military operation by the U.S. would announce as a legitimacy of the PKK and “elevate its status in the eyes of the anti-American public opinion”¹⁴⁶. The author also summarized his perception about Turkish reaction to Washington in this issue.

The nationalist frenzy in Turkey has convinced itself that the PKK is an American and northern Iraq problem. Even well-intentioned liberal analysts started to revisit the thesis that Turkey would not be facing a PKK problem today if its parliament had decided to cooperate with Washington on March 1, 2003. Such views are naïve and wrong. It truly requires a strong degree of imagination to believe that the PKK is a product of America's invasion of Iraq or Iraqi Kurds decision to hurt Turkey. Instead of constantly blaming nefarious external forces, Turkish analysts and policy makers should learn to pay attention to domestic dynamics. It would also help to understand how nationalism, socio-economic problems and unfulfilled political expectations can become a toxic cocktail that fuels radicalism.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴² Ömer Taşpınar, “Deciphering the Kurdistan Workers’ Party”, (October 29, 2007), http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2007/1029_turkey_taspinar.aspx (accessed on May 29, 2010)

¹⁴³ *ibid*

¹⁴⁴ Mark R. Parris, “Last Chance for U.S.-Turkish Relations?”, (October 31, 2007), http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2007/1031_turkey_parris.aspx (accessed on May 29, 2010)

¹⁴⁵ Michael E. O’Hanlon and Edward P. Joseph, “Resolving the Kurdish Dilemma”, (November 2, 2007), http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2007/1102_turkey_ohanlon.aspx (accessed on May 29, 2010)

¹⁴⁶ Ömer Taşpınar, “No Magic Bullet Against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party in Washington”, (November 5, 2007), http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2007/1105_turkey_taspinar.aspx (accessed on May 29, 2010)

¹⁴⁷ *ibid*

If one needs to analyze Turkish foreign policy and the second JDP governments, Taşpınar's article written for *Foreign Affairs* sheds light on the question of what the self-confidence in Turkish foreign policy means. In his article, which directly examined Turkish secularism and the JDP, the author interpreted the general elections held on July 22 as a "victory of the democratic, pro-market and globally integrated Turkey over the old, authoritarian and statist one".¹⁴⁸ As in his early studies on Turkish secularism, the author once again mentioned Kemalism's two ideologies that divide Turkish society: "radical secularism (*laïcité*) and assimilationist nationalism"¹⁴⁹ Taşpınar pointed out that the French-origin *laïcité* interpretations in the early Republican period superseded Ottoman state system which had hegemony over religion. Based on this assumption, the author stated that modern Turkey "monopolized religious functions and incorporated religious personnel into the state bureaucracy"¹⁵⁰ instead of separation of religion and state. In his second argument, assimilationist nationalism, the author also argued that modern Turkey followed an active assimilationist policy towards its Muslim minorities and gave the example of the Ottoman practice on non-Muslim minorities. On the other hand, this nationalism model faced with violent opposition of religious conservatives and ethnic Kurds. Taşpınar suggested that after the World War II, Turkey met with the West and its concept as democracy, free elections, and balance of power, but Turkey's strategic role in the bipolar world was more important than its religion or democracy perception. In this atmosphere, opposition sides like Islamists or Kurdish nationalists were represented as the right and the left, and almost fifty years passed with the power struggle between state and these genres.¹⁵¹ In the 1990s, the rise of the Welfare Party (WP) in metropolitan cities and short-term political power in government ended up with a postmodern coup. But this movement's young leader learned many things from the short experience of the WP and began to search for a new soul which would compromise with Turkish secularism. The entrepreneurial, middle-class, globally integrated Muslim bourgeoisie created by Turgut Özal in the 1980s helped a new religiously

¹⁴⁸ Ömer Taşpınar, "The Old Turks' Revolt: When Radicalism Endangers Democracy", *Foreign Affairs*, 86/6, November/December 2007, pp.115-116

¹⁴⁹ *ibid*, p.119

¹⁵⁰ *ibid*

¹⁵¹ *ibid*

conservative base to emerge. This base created an Islamist, pro-market, pro-Western conservative democratic party which was the JDP.¹⁵²

When the general election in 2007 came to the fore, EU-based JDP foreign policy has began to change due to the various cases as headscarf decision of European Court of Human Rights in 2005¹⁵³. Although, decision of the Court created a deep disappointment among Party members, “the former Islamists continue to see the EU as the best hope for moving the country toward democracy but they realized the limits, particularly at a time when the EU is sending to Turkey mixed signals”¹⁵⁴. Due to these reasons, Taşpınar concluded that “the U.S. and the EU should do much more to help Turkish democracy because a resentful, authoritarian and nationalist Turkey would be opposite to their interests.”¹⁵⁵

Regarding the impact of discussions on JDP’s foreign policy style, evaluations on Turkish-American relations went on the publications of 2008. Although the PKK issue was still one of the biggest issues in the agenda, there were debates about Islamic tendency of Turkish foreign policy. Panelists and scholars were trying to predict the direction of the bilateral relations after the Bush presidency. In those days, the curiosity was how the new American president and his team would weigh Turkey’s policy of engagement with Hamas, Iran and Sudan.¹⁵⁶ Gündüz Aktan, retired ambassador and the member of Turkish Parliament for the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) replied that although the JDP government has no experience in the Middle East, Turkey wants to play a more active role¹⁵⁷. In term of playing the role of regional power, Aktan went on to saying that this role would not be comfortable for Turkey because Turkey can only help two sides (Israel and Palestine) or facilitate, but it should be secularized, “otherwise it may be closer to one side than to the other and cannot really command

¹⁵² *ibid*, pp.122-123

¹⁵³ For documents of the case, please see: European Court of Human Rights, 10 November 2005, Application No. 44774/98, Case of Leyla Şahin v. Turkey, Grand Chamber Judgment

¹⁵⁴ *op.cit.*, p.128

¹⁵⁵ *ibid*, p.130

¹⁵⁶ “Back to the Future: U.S.-Turkish Relations after the Bush Presidency”, (January 31, 2008), http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/events/2008/0131_turkey/20080131_turkey.pdf (accessed on May 29 2010),pp.28-29

¹⁵⁷ *ibid*, pp.30-31

the trust of both sides”.¹⁵⁸ Per contra Suat Kınıklıoğlu, Parliamentarian from the JDP expressed that the United States has greatest interest in working with Turkey which has a good economic relationship with Middle Eastern countries and these relations are not based on religious terms because the JDP has no religious outlook in foreign policy. “The JDP feels that Turkey is a pivotal state at the center of many regions and trying to project influence about moderation, stability and political and economic integration.”¹⁵⁹ In Q&A session, Kınıklıoğlu replied a question about party discourse based on religion that the foreign policy agenda of the JDP is dominated by the Middle East but the primary foreign policy objective of Turkey is the European Union.¹⁶⁰ Lastly, he explained that in the intellectual background of the JDP’s foreign policy based on former Ottoman geography that “the JDP has a responsibility to take part as a constructive partner wherever it can”.¹⁶¹

At the following panel which was on the PKK issue, Kurdish problem in Turkey and the JDP; Hasan Cemal, senior columnist of *Milliyet* stated that the JDP evaluates the Kurdish problem from the Islamic perspective in accordance with the doctrine of Islam which offers the community of believers instead of nations or ethnic groups.¹⁶² He reminded that JDP’s Kurdish policy stands out as a danger for democratic and secular system in the long run and “it could undermine the secular character of Turkish democracy.”¹⁶³

Turkey’s secularism perception and the JDP were discussed in Taşpınar’s column in spring 2008 as well. In reference to the speech of Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Secretary of State at the Turkish-American Council in Washington, Taşpınar pointed out that the Turkish secularists developed a perception that U.S. defends pro-moderate Islam in Turkey.¹⁶⁴ The author indicated that when American officials are desperately searching for a secular, democratic and pro-Western country in the

¹⁵⁸ *ibid*, pp.56-57

¹⁵⁹ *ibid*, pp.32-34

¹⁶⁰ *ibid*, p.46

¹⁶¹ *ibid*, p.57

¹⁶² “Turkey’s Kurdish Conundrum”, (March 20, 2008), http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/events/2008/0320_turkey/20080320_turkey.pdf (accessed May 29 2010), p.11

¹⁶³ *ibid*, p.12

¹⁶⁴ Ömer Taşpınar, “U.S. Policy and Turkey: Lost in Translation”, (April 14, 2008), http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2008/0414_turkey_taspinar.aspx (accessed on May 29, 2010)

Muslim world, they found Turkey fitting the description and they entitled it a “model” for Muslim countries. The author went on that after the U.S. referred to Turkey, the JDP came to power and “this situation further fueled the conspiracy theory that America was behind a diabolical plan to push Turkey as a model for moderate Islam in the Middle East”¹⁶⁵. Because of these comments, Washington had to change its discourse and began to mention Turkey as “a secular republic with a Muslim majority population and a source of inspiration for democratic reforms”¹⁶⁶.

During the summer of 2008, Turkey’s constitutional crisis about the headscarf ban and secularism continued to be discussed in the Brookings’ halls. In the panel, Mümtaz Soysal¹⁶⁷, former Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey stated that the Turkish experiment succeed in an experiment which was never tried before in an Islamic society. “Europe has to realize what Turkey is trying to do that maintaining a democratic order in an Islamic society in spite of the religion and difficulties in the economy.”¹⁶⁸ Soysal underlined that although Europe did not care the ban of ancestor parties of the JDP, the JDP has already served for the interests of Europe.¹⁶⁹ In Q&A session, a question was posed to Soysal about his threat perception on religion. He replied that the religion has to be controlled by the modern state and the Turkish Republic is a continuation of reformation process which has began during the Ottoman Empire. Although throughout the first years of the Turkish Republic, Jacobean attitude had been implemented by the state; today’s Turkey was possible thanks to these reforms. The lack of aim of separation of religion and state, religion would interfere in all stages of Turkish state; that is why; separation was indispensable for the Republic. Soysal named the ongoing process about the Constitution and JDP closure case as “an unending dialectic of Turkish society”¹⁷⁰. He explained this approach that state could not change people’s

¹⁶⁵ *ibid*

¹⁶⁶ *ibid*

¹⁶⁷ Mümtaz Soysal was the advisor of Rauf Denктаş, first President of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and currently, Soysal gives lecture on constitutional law as a Law Professor.

¹⁶⁸ “Turkey’s New Constitutional Crisis: A Judicial Coup d’Etat?”, (April 17, 2008), http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/events/2008/0417_turkey/20080417_turkey.pdf (accessed May 29, 2010), p.8

¹⁶⁹ *ibid*,p.9

¹⁷⁰ *ibid*,pp.29-33

religious beliefs but the Republic also would be there for changing the society. Throughout this transformation process, “the judiciary should maintain the values of Republic against the threat of religion in lieu of military”.¹⁷¹ Per contra, Mustafa Akyol, columnist of *Turkish Daily News* argued that the JDP government could not be identified as an Islamist, “the self-appointed guardians of the Republic¹⁷² always depicted their center-right conservative opponents as dangerous Islamists”¹⁷³. According to Akyol, constituencies of the JDP are the people who are religious, believe in other type of secularism and support center-right political parties. “That’s why, today’s JDP despite its roots coming from the Welfare Party, is properly traditional center-right party which was defined by supporters of Menderes and Özal.”¹⁷⁴ On the other hand, Akyol interpreted the meaning of secularism as the “protection of state from religion, in lieu of vice versa”¹⁷⁵; and concluded that “Turkish state is a sacred one as defined in the constitution.” Considering “the holy identity of Turkish state”, he expressed that healthy society should have freedom of religion and could express it in public sphere on the contrary of Turkish style.

Besides, Sakıp Sabancı Lecture of 2008 was on Turkey-U.S. relationship and Nicholas Burns, former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs at the U.S. Department of State was the speaker of that year. Burns started with Turkey’s Middle East policy and expressed that “it is to advantage of the U.S. that the Turkish government can speak directly to those very difficult regimes in Damascus and in Tehran. The U.S. understands well the sensitivities surrounding and the historical legacy surrounding Turkey’s relations with many of its neighbors. There are steps that Turkey can take to create a region of greater stability.”¹⁷⁶ Burns continued that “in the U.S. administration, there had been no conscious policy to promote Turkey as model for the Middle Eastern countries but a lot of Americans from the Clinton and Bush administration officials’ perspective that Turkey is the

¹⁷¹ *ibid*, p.9

¹⁷² Akyol refers to the Republican People’s Party (CHP).

¹⁷³ *op.cit.*, p.22

¹⁷⁴ *ibid*

¹⁷⁵ *ibid*, p.23

¹⁷⁶ “Righting The Course: The Future of the U.S.-Turkish Relationship”, (May 8, 2008), http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/events/2008/0508_sabanci/20080508_turkey.pdf (accessed on May 29, 2010), pp.24-25

perfect demonstration of what a secular Muslim country can be for other countries.”¹⁷⁷

While debates on JDP’s secularism definition went on, Mark Parris, one of the institution’s most respectable policy-maker fellows, mentioned Turkey’s role in the Middle East whilst the U.S. presidential elections were getting closer. His speech in May 2008 gave some clues to decipher the new policy of the institute: trying to re-understand Turkey with the new U.S. president. According to Parris, Turkey became a different kind of partner with the JDP; the new government has differences in terms of how they perceived the United States.

The men who run AKP – and they are all men -- had had little prior exposure to the U.S. before taking office. Indeed, some of them likely saw Washington as complicit in their periodic harassment by Turkey’s military and secular establishment. The empathy and easy rapport that past leaders like Turgut Ozal, Suleiman Demirel or Tansu Ciller had with America could no longer be taken for granted. (...)The AKP, in contrast, saw Turkey’s imperial past and its predominantly Muslim population as assets: assets Turkey could exploit to become a more significant regional player. They have not walked away from the West. Indeed, AKP has arguably done more than any Turkish party to advance Turkey’s candidacy to become a member of the EU. But under AKP achievement of what its theoreticians called, “strategic depth,” principally in former Ottoman lands, became an organizing principle of Turkish foreign policy.¹⁷⁸

Parris thought that Turkish criticism on American policies did not only come from the JDP. The opposition party was more strident than the JDP, therefore, Turkey’s own strategic depth, or new self-confidence suggests more independent foreign policy tools than before and American policy should construct bilateral relations on this base.¹⁷⁹ In his next article on the closure case of the JDP¹⁸⁰, although Parris mentioned the policy-making process of the JDP again, this time, statements were

¹⁷⁷ *ibid*, pp.44-45

¹⁷⁸ Mark R. Parris, “U.S. -Turkish Relations: How Firm a Foundation?, (May 8, 2008), http://www.brookings.edu/speeches/2008/0508_turkey_parris.aspx (accessed on May 29, 2010)

¹⁷⁹ *ibid*

¹⁸⁰ With the intention of abolishing the JDP, the chief prosecutor indicted that the JDP’s decision to lift the headscarf ban in universities undermined the principles of the Constitution. Chief prosecutor also demanded that 71 JDP members should be banned from politics for five years. For the final decision of the Constitutional Court, please see: “Turkey’s Ruling Party Escapes Ban”, (July 30, 2008), *BBC News*, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7533414.stm> (accessed on May 22, 2011); “AKP Siyasi Hayatına Devam Ediyor”, *Radikal*, (July 30, 2008), <http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&ArticleID=890996&Date=10.06.2011&CategoryID=78> (accessed on June 10, 2011)

critical. According to Parris, Erdoğan “has narrowed his circle of advisers, failed to follow through on promised economic and political reforms and displayed a disturbing degree of paranoia toward Turkey's press and civil society. He has also allowed himself to be maneuvered by the nationalist opposition into a showdown over the right of religiously observant university women to wear headscarves on campus.”¹⁸¹ These factors were the reasons of “Washington’s agonizingly balanced approach to the AKP case”¹⁸². But Parris argued that despite the people, “hegemony of elites” in Turkey should not damage the JDP which “is the closest thing to a liberal democratic party in Turkey today”.¹⁸³

The consequences of the JDP’s closure case was also discussed in a panel and İbrahim Kalın¹⁸⁴, the founding Director of the SETA pointed out that it would be so simplistic to say that there exists a struggle between Islamists and secularists in Turkey. “It is a struggle between reformists who open to change in various issues and establishment in Turkey”.¹⁸⁵ In this point, moderator of the panel, Parris asked whether there exist limits which would restrict policies of the JDP government.¹⁸⁶ Murat Yetkin, columnist and Ankara Bureau Chief of *Radikal* replied that there are limits. “If Erdoğan will touch (headscarf issue) once again before changing some reference points, like the political parties law, like the Constitution itself, he will have trouble again.”¹⁸⁷

After the 2008 presidential election in the U.S., Mark Parris wrote a memorandum note for the next Obama administration. In Turkey part of his note, the first time Parris frankly expressed that the Bush’s administration approach towards Turkey and the JDP was “schizophrenic”.

¹⁸¹ Mark R. Parris, “Turkey’s Courts Should Respect the Will of the People”, (May 17, 2008), http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2008/0517_turkey_parris.aspx (accessed May 29, 2010)

¹⁸² *ibid*

¹⁸³ *ibid*

¹⁸⁴ İbrahim Kalın has been Senior Advisor to Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan since 2009.

¹⁸⁵ “The Implications of Turkey’s Constitutional Court Decision on the Justice and Development Party (AKP)”, (August 6, 2008),

http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/events/2008/0806_turkey/20080806_turkey.pdf (accessed on May 29, 2010), p.7

¹⁸⁶ *ibid*, p.27

¹⁸⁷ *ibid*, p.28

Loose rhetoric (vis. Colin Powell's reference to an Islamic Republic"), the prominence assigned Turkey in the still-born Greater Middle East initiative, and an appearance of close personal relations at the top convinced many in Turkey we supported AKP as an "Islam light" alternative to more radical Islamic movements. Yet the Bush administration's ambiguity toward attempts by AKP's hard core secularist adversaries to check the ruling party's success at the polls was widely interpreted as indifference. Our mixed signals left both sides of the debate in Turkey frustrated, angry and unsure about US policy at what could have been a defining moment for the Turkish Republic.¹⁸⁸

Parris continued that the space left by the EU in Turkey's foreign policy framework should have to be filled up the U.S. The United States should leave no room for doubt about supporting Turkey's regional role. Parris believed that new American administration should also respect Turkish foreign policy's new sphere. With the impact of Turkey's historic and religious connections with the Middle East, Turkish foreign policy produced policies for reduced tension with neighbor states; created opportunities for playing a mediator role; favored engagement in Iran and Syria. On the other hand," these shift reflected a considered, coherent world view among AKP foreign policy makers. They have by and large been undertaken without extensive consultation or coordination with Washington."¹⁸⁹ In this point, Parris offered to accept the gaps between Turkey and the United States because Turkey could no more "gendarme or model"¹⁹⁰ but in next term, the bilateral relations should be based on "strategic partnership between equals."¹⁹¹ For the recovery of the bilateral relations, Parris also proposed an institutional suggestion. After 9/11, Turkish-American relations were focused mostly outside of Europe but Turkey had no longer obeyed the NEA's (The Bureau of Near East Affairs') authority. Officers of the department generally lack exposure to Turkey, that's why, it needs to establish a new department or position for Turkey and its environment.

In the following article, Parris continued to analyze the bilateral relations during the Bush administration term. According to the author, the U.S. had two fundamental mistakes in this period: "to view the JDP as Taliban and to view it as a

¹⁸⁸ Mark R. Parris, "Memorandum to President-Elect Obama, re: Turkey", *Private View*, (Autumn 2008), http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/rc/articles/2008/autumn_turkey_parris/autumn_turkey_parris.pdf (accessed May on 29, 2010), p.46

¹⁸⁹ *ibid*, p.47

¹⁹⁰ *ibid*

¹⁹¹ *ibid*

slightly more religious version of the secular predecessors”.¹⁹² The differences of the JDP were, first, its lack of experience due to their different backgrounds. Parris argued that the new administrative class’ view towards the United States is not as pure as predecessors who had worked or were educated in the States. So they did not have the same comfort level and instinct to look to the U.S. Secondly, JDP’s foreign policy makers have seen Turkey’s future in the Middle East. In this point, Parris proposed that Turkey might be able to be a “mediator” for its Western allies by active engagement with its neighbors. Therefore, the author did not agree with the paradigm of “Turkey move away from its traditional ties to the U.S., the West and Israel in a more sinister direction.”¹⁹³ Consequently, Parris advised that if the next American administration wanted to act intelligently, they would have to seriously explore Turkey’s uniqueness and effort in the region.¹⁹⁴

The year of 2008 terminated with Taşpınar’s article on Turkey’s Kurdish issue as it begins. According to the author, two dynamics of JDP’s foreign policy were neo-Ottomanism and the Kurdish challenge. Turkey’s Middle East policy was majorly shaped by these indicators. “Turkey’s Kurdish challenge is defined by the Kemalist norms of the republic, which neo-Ottomanism seeks to transcend. Kemalism considers Kurdish ethnicity and nationalism as existential threats to the national and territorial integrity of the Turkish Republic.”¹⁹⁵ Taşpınar claimed that neo-Ottomanism is more self-confident and less focused on the Kurdish issue than Kemalist ideology because of embracing a broad geography and less focused to Kurdish issue than Kemalist ideology because of the embracement a broad geography and willingness to solve the regional and global issues. Although neo-Ottomanism constructed on the imperial aims, Taşpınar defined this phenomenon as an ideology which projects “Turkey’s “soft power” -- a bridge between East and West, a Muslim nation, a secular state, a democratic political system and a capitalistic economic force. Like French Gaullism, it seeks Turkish “grandeur” and

¹⁹² Mark R. Parris, “U.S. -Turkish Relationship: What’s Wrong with This Picture?”, (September 10, 2008), http://www.brookings.edu/speeches/2008/0910_turkey_parris.aspx (accessed on May 29, 2010)

¹⁹³ *ibid*

¹⁹⁴ *ibid*

¹⁹⁵ Ömer Taşpınar, “Dancing With the Kurds”, (October 20, 2008), http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2008/1020_kurds_taspinar.aspx (accessed on May 29, 2010)

influence in foreign policy.”¹⁹⁶ Therefore, JDP’s foreign policy goes back and forth between the two alternatives. When the Kurdish issue makes Ankara “reactive, cautious and sometimes overly insecure”, JDP’s neo-Ottomanist aims to orient Turkish foreign policy to “be more audacious, imaginative and proactive”.¹⁹⁷

The general and presidential election processes of Turkey were a litmus test for the JDP’s policies. With the contribution of Turkish guest speakers that represent the liberal and conservative wings in Turkish politics, the Brookings thoroughly analyzed the JDP’s success in elections and domestic politics. On the other hand, the increase of PKK attacks and the military operation plans of Ankara towards northern Iraq were some of the most important issues between the U.S. and Turkey. In this period, major arguments of the Brookings’ scholars were that the stabile region and the most important ally of the U.S. in Iraq, northern Kurdish region would be unsettled in case of Turkey’s operation. As in the previous subheading, Turkey’s active foreign policy towards Middle Eastern countries as Syria, Israel and relations with Hamas was interrogated and the possible interests of the U.S. were also discussed in the Brookings’ halls. Due to the paradigm of “self-confidence in Turkish foreign policy”, the scholars examined the bilateral relations throughout the Bush administration and proposed “new” approaches which would fit Turkey’s activeness in its foreign policy.

2.7 No Country for Old Allies¹⁹⁸ : “Active” Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East

At the beginning of 2009, the Brookings Institution generated a number of recommendations for the Obama administration and their fundamental aim was to draw a road map for the bilateral relations between Turkey and the U.S. Turkey expert of the institution, Taşpınar opined that Turkish case usually is regarded as an important topic in U.S. agenda when the U.S. needs acute support or in case of regional crisis. That’s why American foreign policy has no strict agenda in dealing

¹⁹⁶ *ibid*

¹⁹⁷ *ibid*

¹⁹⁸ “No Country for Old Men”, 2007, Director: Joel Coen and Ethan Coen, Starring: Tommy Lee Jones, Javier Bardem and Josh Brolin

with Turkey.¹⁹⁹ In the same article, the author referred to discussions on unilateralism versus multilateralism in U.S. foreign policy and expected that the Obama administration would reverse the traditional foreign policy motto of “unilaterally if we can, multilaterally if we must.”²⁰⁰ Emphasis on multilateralism in American foreign policy was the keyword of the article, according to the author; most of the problems faced by the Bush administration arose from unilateralist policies of Washington. On the other hand, Taşpınar advised that Turkey’s soft power role in establishing a dialogue with Syria and Iran should be an asset for the Obama administration. Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs would “express their willingness to mediate between Iran and the United States, even though Muslim countries in the Middle East would not be extremely pleased to see Turkey as a main actor, that’s why, Turkey will has to compete such a role.”²⁰¹

Parris’ recommendations to the Obama administration was that Turkey’s unique mediator role between “the Israelis and Syrians, Syrians and Lebanese, Russians and Georgians, Iraqi Sunni and Shia Arabs, Iran and the world, Israelis, Palestinians and Egyptians, and even Armenians and Azeris”²⁰² might propose opportunities to Washington. On the other hand, Turkey’s state ideology “based on harmony between Islam and the West, between Islam and globalization, and between Islam and parliamentary democracy and free markets”²⁰³ is not perceived by Washington as well. Because of absence in expressing these qualifications, “model country” suggestions of American administration misunderstood by Turkey.

Brookings agenda for 2009 also concentrated on Iran and energy policies in the Middle East. The institution began to interrogate the security of energy supply corridors and prospective contributions of Turkey in order to affect Iran’s attitude. First evaluation note written by Sinan Ülgen, chairman of EDAM²⁰⁴ pointed out that although Turkey already knew that its margin for maneuver was very limited

¹⁹⁹ Ömer Taşpınar, “Obama’s Turkey Policy: Bringing Credibility to ‘Strategic Partnership’ “, *Insight Turkey*, 11/1, 2009, p.14

²⁰⁰ *ibid*

²⁰¹ *Ibid*, p.16

²⁰² Mark R. Parris, “Prospect for U.S.-Turkish Relations in the Obama Era”, (February 11, 2009), http://www.brookings.edu/speeches/2009/0211_turkey_parris.aspx (accessed on May 29, 2010)

²⁰³ *ibid*

²⁰⁴ Sinan Ülgen previously worked at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Ankara and Brussels.

for playing a mediator role between Iran and the West; “Turkey’s messenger role might be as important as the message”.²⁰⁵ But the author warned that the possible failures of negotiations would force Ankara into uncomfortable position. In case of failure, Ankara would have to make a choice between “supporting international sanctions and alienating the regime in Tehran”²⁰⁶. Considering this assumption, the author pointed out that Ankara would choose its Western allies and on the way of this choice, “it might have to sacrifice neighboring relationship and important regional power”.²⁰⁷ On the other hand, from the economic aspect of Turkey’s “soft power”, Abdullah Akyüz, Washington Permanent Representative of TÜSİAD stated that “increasing trade volumes between Turkey and its neighbors, significant Turkish investments and huge construction projects undertaken by Turkish companies in surrounding countries, and the development of some neighboring countries into de facto hinterlands of the Turkish economy, are evidence of the role the Turkish economy plays in its region.”²⁰⁸

Analysis on local elections results in spring 2009 introduced new evaluations on JDP and its foreign policy. According to Soli Özel, the JDP should be aware that providing services or patronage is not enough for Turkish people who are integrated to the global world. That’s why, the voters who live in the shores of Turkey against the JDP on ideological and political grounds in conjunction with the election results. Messages of opponents to the JDP were clear; they did not want to get a more conservative way of life.²⁰⁹ Parallel with this statement, Ömer Taşpınar argued that during the election campaign, the JDP set the bar too high and “they were waiting to win 50 to 60 percent of the vote for being immune from a military

²⁰⁵ Sinan Ülgen, “In Search of Lost Time: Turkey-US Relations After Bush”, *US-Europe Analysis Series*, (February 19, 2009), http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/rc/papers/2009/0219_turkey_ulgen/0219_turkey_ulgen.pdf (accessed on May 29, 2010)

²⁰⁶ *ibid*

²⁰⁷ *ibid*

²⁰⁸ Abdullah Akyüz, “Political Economy of Turkey: In Search of Stability Amid Domestic and Global Crisis”, *US-Europe Analysis Series*, (March 16, 2009), http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/rc/papers/2009/03_turkey_akyuz/03_turkey_akyuz.pdf (accessed on May 29, 2010)

²⁰⁹ “The Future of Turkish Democracy: Assessing Local Election Outcomes”, (April 1, 2009), http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/events/2009/0401_turkey/20090401_turkey.pdf (accessed on May 29, 2010)pp.15-19

intervention or from a judicial coup”.²¹⁰ Party’s belief was that only if they had a huge majority they would be immune from the military’s pressure, that’s why, they would like to create a populist image and policy based on identity politics. In this point, Taşpınar added that identity politics was the fundamental determinant in election process because people voted for their lifestyles; thus polarization became obvious.²¹¹ On the other hand, a question on the definition of JDP’s secularism, Soli Özel replied that Turkey did not have a real secularism definition and it needs to do that because the secularism issue stands as the symbol of power distribution in Turkey.²¹² Simultaneously, Murat Yetkin stated that the Republican People’s Party (CHP) left its secularist position and focused on the center votes as the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) did in this local election. That is why, during the election campaign, both opposition parties choose most of their candidates among moderate politician who have contact with regular people.²¹³

In April 2009, President Obama added Turkey to his first major trip abroad.²¹⁴ According to Mark Parris and Samuel Berger, chairman of Stonebridge International, the Obama administration should freely work with their Turkish counterparts. Although Erdoğan governments were marked with their “Islamic” orientation, “that does not mean U.S. leaders cannot find common ground, or have respectful, candid discussions. Not engaging with Turkey’s government simply raises the likelihood that Turkish and American policies will grow apart.”²¹⁵

In another gathering which discussed Turkey and the United States after 100 days of the Obama Administration, Soli Özel mentioned again strategic partnership between the two countries. Özel offered that “if the U.S. would like to make policies that involve Turkey; then it needs to work through these policies with

²¹⁰ *ibid*, p.20

²¹¹ *ibid*, p.21

²¹² *ibid*, p.31

²¹³ *ibid*, p.37

²¹⁴ “Obama Reaches Out to Muslim World”, *BBC News*, (April 6, 2009), <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7984762.stm> (accessed on June 22, 2010); “Obama’nın Türkiye Defteri Çok Dolu”, *Radikal*, (April 5, 2009), <http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalHaberDetayV3&ArticleID=929618&Date=24.06.2011&CategoryID=98> (accessed on June 22, 2011)

²¹⁵ Samuel Berger and Mark R. Parris, “Obama Sees Turkey’s Influence and Value, Trip Shows”, (April 9, 2009), http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/0409_turkey_parris.aspx (accessed on May 29, 2010)

Turkey rather than telling Turkey about them once the decisions were made.”²¹⁶ On the way to bilateral cooperation, Özel opined that the JDP “was guided more by its own ideological inclination and Islamic solidarity rather than structural forces and determinants of Turkish foreign policy”.²¹⁷ Because although the JDP government had used Islam as tool for reaching to Middle Eastern countries, “no matter who was in power in Turkey would have follow the same foreign policy in the Middle East, but perhaps the style or tone of the engagement would have been different.”²¹⁸ From Ömer Taşpınar’s aspect, the problem about analyzing the JDP arose from the polarized political environment in Turkey. Questions on lifestyle, conservatism, Islam, secularism would continue to polarize Turkey and “the JDP as a nationalist, populist and moderately Islamic party would use these divergences.”²¹⁹ On the other hand, Taşpınar proposed that Turkey’s dialogue with Iran, Syria and Hamas would be “a healthier approach” for Washington and this would not be accepted as the Islamization of Turkish foreign policy. Active Turkish foreign policy should be interpreted as a dialogue atmosphere in the Middle East which is compatible with United States foreign policy.²²⁰

Turkey’s prospective EU membership was also discussed in 2009. In a panel which was titled “Turkey in Europe: Breaking the Vicious Circle”, Martti Ahtisaari²²¹, chairman of the Independent Commission on Turkey²²² explained the details of their recent report on Turkey’s candidacy to the EU²²³. In his speech, Ahtisaari mentioned that Turkey played a constructive role in cease-fire between

²¹⁶ “U.S.-Turkish Relations: A Historic Era”, (April 13, 2009), http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/events/2009/0413_turkey/20090413_turkey.pdf (accessed on May 29, 2010), p.13

²¹⁷ *ibid.*, p.15

²¹⁸ *ibid.*, p.16

²¹⁹ *ibid.*, pp.21-22

²²⁰ *ibid.*, p.41

²²¹ Martti Ahtisaari is the former President of Finland.

²²² According to the web site of the Independent Commission on Turkey, “a group of distinguished European policymakers have formed an independent Commission to examine the challenges and opportunities presented by Turkey’s possible membership in the European Union. The Commission is made up of former heads of state and government, foreign ministers and European commissioners, and other Europeans who have previously held high positions in public office. The British Council is supporting the Commission in partnership with the Open Society Foundation–Turkey.”

<http://www.independentcommissiononturkey.org/about.html> (accessed on December 15, 2010)

²²³ For the full text, please see: “Turkey in the Europe: Breaking the Vicious Circle”, Second Report of the Independent Commission on Turkey, (September 2009), http://www.independentcommissiononturkey.org/pdfs/2009_english.pdf (accessed on December 15, 2010)

Israel and Palestine, negotiations between Egypt and Hamas; peace-making process in the Balkans and Afghanistan.²²⁴ In response to a question, Ahtisaari shared the details of the chapter of “Islam and Secular State” in their reports. Chairman of the Independent Commission on Turkey expressed that he could not see a major threat about growing Islamization in Turkey, and warned European colleagues that “these sorts of concerns should not lead to the negative reason against Turkey’s membership”.²²⁵

October 2009 was an important milestone for Armenia-Turkey relations. The protocols signed in Zurich for diplomatic rapprochement between the two countries were supported by the United States and Hillary Clinton, the U.S. Secretary of the State also attended the signature ceremony of the protocols. The protocols’ aim was “to establish good neighborly relations and to develop bilateral cooperation in the political, economic, cultural and other fields for the benefit of their peoples.”²²⁶ Two days later, Ömer Taşpınar wrote an article on the mutual traumas in Turkey and Armenia vis-à-vis each other; and examined the forces that drove the states to the rapprochement. According to Taşpınar, it is in Turkey’s advantage to avoid a major crisis with the United States. In this aim, not only the JDP’s “zero problems with neighbors” policy was a major indicator, but also “Obama’s political identity which has committed him to recognize the events of 1915 as genocide”²²⁷ was an indicator of the process as well. Due to the Obama’s policy, Taşpınar argued that Turkey would like to do its best in these negotiations for giving Obama “a face-saving reward to keep genocide recognition at bay”.²²⁸ Furthermore, in his next article, Taşpınar continued to question how come a country would be an authoritarian at home and Islamist in foreign policy but also engaged

²²⁴ “Turkey in the Europe: Breaking the Vicious Circle”, (September 23, 2009), http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/events/2009/0923_turkey_eu/20090923_turkey.pdf (accessed on May 29, 2010), p.15

²²⁵ *ibid*, p.25

²²⁶ Protocol on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Armenia, (October 10, 2009), <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/DISPOLITIKA/turkiye-ermenistan-ingilizce.pdf> (accessed on December 17, 2010)

²²⁷ Ömer Taşpınar, “Turkish-Armenian Traumas”, (October 12, 2009), http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/1012_turkey_armenia_taspinar.aspx (accessed on May 29, 2010)

²²⁸ *ibid*

with Armenia.²²⁹ The first answer was that the protocols between Armenia and Turkey were a crucial priority for the Obama administration; “the U.S. president needed a face-saving excuse in order to convince the Armenian lobby and the U.S. Congress”.²³⁰ In this point, the author asked again that where the Islamic agenda come forth all these policies. Firstly, he claimed Ankara’s close relations with Iran are based on economic interests and realpolitik; because of the trade and energy agreements, Turkey had to contact with Iran. Second, because the voice of Turkish streets reflected by the JDP, bilateral relations with Israel became fragile. In other words, Taşpınar explained the populist reaction as “the expression of frustration and willingness of the JDP to punish Israel for killing 1,400 innocent civilians in Gaza”.²³¹ The author concluded that for feeling such anger to Israel, it does not take to be an Islamist. In Turkey, populism and democracy go “hand-in-hand”, so JDP politicians follow the demands of streets.²³² Taşpınar interpreted Turkish populism from economic perspective as well. Although voters sometimes turn to extreme ideologies; he defined Turkish voter as pragmatist. Due to the fact that citizens prioritize the economic performance of the JDP, “the AKP would most probably lose the elections, if it is unable to run the economy.”²³³

At the last article of the year, Taşpınar fleshed out his perception on JDP’s foreign policy and bilateral relations with the United States. The popular headline of the last days of 2009 was the sanctions due to the nuclear program of Iran. The author interpreted the differences between Washington and Ankara that the EU and the United States saw Turkey as “Iran’s most vocal advocate”²³⁴. In fact, when Western diplomats expected such a behavior from Venezuela, Brazil, Russia or China; Turkey’s neighbor role or Muslim population would not be an excuse in the eyes of Washington. Taşpınar went on that “Turkey’s pro-Iran stance is perceived as evidence of Ankara’s pro-Islamic tilt in foreign policy”²³⁵, so that, the arguments

²²⁹ Ömer Taşpınar, “Pragmatic Populism or Islamic Extremism?”, (November 16, 2009), http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/1116_turkey_taspinar.aspx (accessed on May 29, 2010)

²³⁰ *ibid*

²³¹ *ibid*

²³² *ibid*

²³³ *ibid*

²³⁴ Ömer Taşpınar, “What’s Next in Turkish-American Relations?”, (December 7, 2009), http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/1207_us_turkey_taspinar.aspx (accessed on May 29, 2010)

²³⁵ *ibid*

on realpolitik base of Turkish foreign policy or sympathy of Turkish public to Iran would not change the American perception. In this environment, Taşpınar expected that Ankara would declare to act with its Western allies if Iran would not cooperate on the nuclear issue. About nuclear sanctions issue, another problem between Turkey and the United States was to send additional Turkish troops for combating against terrorism in Afghanistan. Taşpınar argued that this would be a political suicide for the Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan but not because of conditions in Afghanistan, because of anti-Americanist policies of the nationalist and secular opposition in Turkey. According to the author, if the Turkish government would send combat troops, first of all Turkish public opinion would perceive that “their son went to die for the name of ‘America’s war’”.²³⁶ Above all, the author predicted that oppositional parties would portray the JDP as “America’s ‘poodle’ in case of obeys ‘the big brother’s rules’”.²³⁷ As a result, Taşpınar’s approach was that “Ankara should pick one policy area where it can buy some American goodwill”²³⁸ and the best stage for that purpose is passing the protocols from the Turkish Parliament to realize normalization process with Armenia.

Iran-Turkey rapprochement and protocols between Yerevan and Ankara took part in the 2010 Brookings literature as well. Due to required parliamentary ratification in national parliaments, Taşpınar pointed out some obstacles. From the Turkish aspect, major obstacle was Armenian troops in Nagorno-Karabakh and according to the author, if these troops would not withdraw; Azeri-Turkish relations would get more rigid. Specifically if one keeps in mind the influence of Azeri lobby and energy relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey; “the AKP’s reluctance”²³⁹ was understandable. On the other hand, diaspora Armenians pressure on Yerevan about 1915 events made things difficult for the ratification of the protocols. Taşpınar argued that “if Turkey tried to link the Nagorno-Karabakh progress to the ratification of the protocols, then Armenia ‘would be free’ to impose conditions of

²³⁶ *ibid*

²³⁷ *ibid*

²³⁸ *ibid*

²³⁹ Ömer Taşpınar, “Turkish-Armenian Stalemate”, (January 11, 2010), http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0111_turkey_armenia_taspinar.aspx (accessed on May 29, 2010)

its own”.²⁴⁰ Under these circumstances, the author advised to find a visionary leader for rescuing the rapprochement. This leader like the United States also should be aware of “Turks do not like external pressure when it comes to difficult decisions.”²⁴¹

At the 2010 U.S.-Islamic World Forum²⁴², U.S. President Barack Obama made a call for fresh start between the United States and the Muslims around the world. Prime Minister Erdoğan also gave a speech and drew attention to differences between terrorism and Islam. Erdoğan stated that “it needs to publicly address the real threats of terrorism.”²⁴³

Simultaneously, Turkey’s domestic policy, especially civil-military relations was scrutinized by scholars of the Brookings Institution. With reference to the comment of *the Economist*²⁴⁴, Taşpınar defined the Ergenekon investigation as “the civilian supremacy over the military.” Then, he asked that “how far the AKP would like to rock the boat with the military.”²⁴⁵ His answer was that the case would need cooperation of the top brass as General Başbuğ, Chief of General Staff and Deniz Baykal, leader of the Republican People’s Party (CHP). In his next article, Taşpınar expanded his ideas and explained the real problem about civil-military relations:

The real problem is the political culture of the military and the educational system it created. It is much easier to change laws and regulations but much

²⁴⁰ *ibid*

²⁴¹ Ömer Taşpınar, “The Armenian Lobby and Azerbaijan: Strange Bedfellow in Washington”, (March 8, 2010), http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0308_turkey_armenia_taspinar.aspx (accessed on May 29, 2010)

²⁴² According to summary of the program, the Forum brings together leaders from across the Muslim world for dialogue with key U.S. officials and policymakers. It is an annual organization and in 2010 session, with a video message from U.S. President Barack Obama and an address from U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the Saban Center at Brookings and the Government of Qatar hosted the Forum in Doha, Qatar from February 13 to 15, 2010.

²⁴³ U.S.-Islamic World Forum, “Erdogan, Clinton, Kerry and Ibrahim Address the 2010 U.S. Islamic World Forum”, Doha, Qatar, (February 13-15, 2010), http://www.brookings.edu/events/2010/0213_us_islamic_world_forum.aspx (accessed on May 29, 2010)

²⁴⁴ In the noted article, the Economist identified the Ergenekon investigation that “many officers, including several retired generals, are languishing in jail in connection with the so-called Ergenekon trial of a group of would-be coup plotters. With each new revelation that taints the armed forces, ever more Turks fret that the army may be undermining the state.” Please see: “These Cursed Plots”, *The Economist*, (December 30, 2009), <http://www.economist.com/node/15180898> (accessed on May 29, 2010)

²⁴⁵ Ömer Taşpınar, “A Rotten Year for the Military”, (January 4, 2010), http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0106_turkey_taspinar.aspx (accessed on May 29, 2010)

harder to alter the mindset, particularly of a country like Turkey where the official ideology of Kemalism is indoctrinated from elementary schools to universities.²⁴⁶

Taşpınar stressed that military's approach towards Kurdish and Islamic identities had created "the lost decade" of the 1990s, for surpassing this militarist mentality, it needs to construct a new state identity which embraces multiculturalism in ethnic and religious identities, and "a tolerant secularism in the name of preserving its founding principles".²⁴⁷ Taşpınar's comments on the role of military in Turkish politics went on with the paradigm of political Islam. He criticized the approach that "Turkey without the secularist military would become a fundamental state" and explained why this idea was captious in four reasons: First reason was "Turkey's state supremacy over Islam." As in his previous articles, Taşpınar mentioned the independent jurisprudence power of sultan which was outside the realms of Shariah. In that sense, he identified the Ottoman system being closer to secularism because of the supremacy of *raison d'état* over Islam when they were clashed. Unlike the Arab states, Turkey was not the product of post-colonialism; "due to Turkey's organic formation with a strong legacy, Turkey did not need religion for political legitimacy, she can only need it for social harmony."²⁴⁸ Second reason of the author on why Turkey did not follow the political Islam was that "Islamic rule is impossible in modern Turkey due to the country's long history of democratization going back to the 19th century".²⁴⁹ Taşpınar defined the democracy as the best antidote to political Islam and Turkey's multi-party system since 1946 is the best example against "the Islamic tyranny"²⁵⁰. He summarized this reason with the statement of "if the Turkish military wants a more Islamic Turkey, it should simply emulate the Arab world and abolish democratic rule."²⁵¹ The third reason was the function of Turkish middle class. According to the author, there exists a middle class in Turkey which benefits from globalization and capitalism. Contrary to "Arab

²⁴⁶ Ömer Taşpınar, "Turkey's Difficult Democratization", (February 15, 2010), http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0215_turkey_democracy_taspinar.aspx (accessed on May 29, 2010)

²⁴⁷ *ibid*

²⁴⁸ Ömer Taşpınar, "Islamization is not the Issue in Turkey", (March 1, 2010), http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0301_turkey_islamization_taspinar.aspx (accessed on May 29, 2010)

²⁴⁹ *ibid*

²⁵⁰ *ibid*

²⁵¹ *ibid*

world's cursed oil and gas resources", source of income of middle class is highly productive and export-oriented materials. That's why; this mobile bourgeoisie has an interest in political and economic stability. Taşpınar expressed that Turkey's dream about the EU is majorly supported by this class in the name of maximizing their profits. Finally, the last reason was "the healthy dose of Sufism in Turkish Islam". Taşpınar defined "the healthy dose" with the social, cultural and mystical dimension of Turkish Islam and gave an example that "the country's most powerful religious movement²⁵² is more interested in education, media and civilizational dialogue than pure politics."²⁵³

From debates on political Islam to the axis of Turkish foreign policy, all dimensions of Turkish-American relations were discussed in the Sixth Annual Sakıp Sabancı Lecture. According to that year's lecturer, Philip Gordon, Assistant Secretary of European and Eurasian Affairs at the U.S. State Department, Turkey is a country which has a secular democratic state tradition and majority Muslim nation which plays a critical role in the Middle East, Islamic world, Caucasus and Black Sea region, Caspian Basin, Iraq Afghanistan, Pakistan and Europe and transatlantic regions.²⁵⁴ Gordon pointed out that Turkey's active foreign policy, performance in economic growth, debates on the role of religion in the society and civil-military relations were closely followed by the United States. However, the dynamism of Turkish foreign policy under the leadership of Ahmet Davutoğlu "caused some questions in the mind of some foreign policy observers"²⁵⁵. He formulized these suspicions with a question and asked whether Turkey turns away from the West. Gordon "frankly expressed"²⁵⁶ that the United States did not see that way. He defined Turkey as an integral part of Euro-Atlantic Alliance, partner of the United States which shares common interests and a European power which plays an active role in the world stage.²⁵⁷ Gordon dwelled on Turkey's zero-problem policy as well and reminded that this policy should not be pursued uncritically. With respect to

²⁵² The author did not call the name of "the most powerful religious movement in Turkey".

²⁵³ *ibid*

²⁵⁴ "The United States and Turkey: A View from the Obama Administration", (March 17, 2010), http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/events/2010/0317_turkey/20100317_turkey_sabanci.pdf (accessed on May 29, 2010) pp.7-8

²⁵⁵ *ibid*, p.8

²⁵⁶ Statement of Philip Gordon, *ibid*, p.9

²⁵⁷ *ibid*, pp.9-11

Iran, he pointed out Turkey's international responsibilities; then stated that "we (Turkey and the United States) should avoid actions that could potentially undermine or complicate our shared goal of a peaceful diplomatic resolution of this issue."²⁵⁸ Due to the negotiations between Iran and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on Iran's nuclear program²⁵⁹, Gordon hoped that Turkey would share the decisions of both IAEA and U.N. Security Council in order to restrict nuclear enrichment project. Additively, Gordon wished to work together for reinforcing the relations between Israel and Turkey, when Turkey develops its relations with neighbor countries.²⁶⁰ In questions and answers part of the lecture, Gordon replied a question on whether there exists a lack of partnership between Turkey and the United States. In his response, Gordon stated that if there was a gap between two countries, the U.S. would like to listen to the arguments of Turkey and reach an agreement.²⁶¹

At the following panel on the EU-Turkey relations and the Cyprus dilemma which was presented by Hugh Pope²⁶², Director of Turkey/Cyprus Project of International Crisis Group, one of the debated topics was "flamboyant rhetoric of AKP leaders, particularly the prime minister".²⁶³ With reference to Turkey's geographical identity, Pope pointed out the economic performance of the country and expressed that "Turkey is more internationalized, more globalized and more Europeanized in every passing year".²⁶⁴ On the other hand, Pope also mentioned the non-permanent membership of Turkey in the U.N. Security Council and evaluated the role of countries in this position as a "balanced, constructive and effective ones"²⁶⁵. In Q&A session, a journalist asked to Pope that when Turkey's problem about Cyprus still went on and the protocols between Armenia and Turkey was going backwards; how the zero-problem policy still could not create a gap between

²⁵⁸ *ibid*, p.14

²⁵⁹ For the chronology of key events between Iran and IAEA, please see: "IAEA Timeline", *BBC News*, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2645741.stm> (updated on February 8, 2011)

²⁶⁰ *op.cit.*

²⁶¹ *ibid*, p.20

²⁶² Hugh Pope was the Middle East and Turkey correspondent of *The Independent* and the *Wall Street Journal* from 1990 to 2005.

²⁶³ "Turkey's European Aspirations and Its Cyprus Dilemma", (April 1, 2010), http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/events/2010/0401_turkey/20100401_turkey_cyprus.pdf (accessed on May 29, 2010), p.8

²⁶⁴ *ibid*, p.9

²⁶⁵ *ibid*, p.11

Turkey and its neighbors. Pope replied that Turkish foreign policy has contradictory messages but also the problems are very related to each other like the Cypriots has already observe process of the Armenian question and they positioned themselves according to the developments in the problem.²⁶⁶

In the next article, Taşpınar finally put together all his ideas about the JDP and its foreign policy style as well. As in his previous studies, Taşpınar pointed out that analyzing Turkish foreign policy from the perspective of secular versus Islamic is a “fallacy”. Moreover, observing a Muslim country and its ruling political part which has Islamic roots and creating a fear speech on “losing Turkey” is another misconception for understanding Turkey.²⁶⁷ In that sense, the author drew attention to growing nationalism and frustration in Turkey towards the United States and Europe rather than Islamization of Turkey; and he defined “this nationalist, defiant, independent, self-confident and self-centered strategic orientation, in short, a Turkish variant of Gaullism²⁶⁸.”²⁶⁹ The possible policies of Turkish style Gaullism would be to “create Turkish force de frappe²⁷⁰” and choose its own realpolitik with countries like China, India and Russia. The reasons behind these policies were explained by Taşpınar with these statements:

A majority of Turks still want to see their country firmly anchored in the West, but their patience is wearing thin because of what they perceive to be Western prejudice, double standards and a lack of respect to their country. New obstacles to EU accession, perceived injustice in Cyprus, growing global recognition of the Armenian genocide and Western sympathy for Kurdish national aspirations are all major factors forcing Turks to question the value of their long-standing pro-Western geostrategic commitments.²⁷¹

In respect to these paradigms, the author stated that both “so-called Islamists” and secularists share the same perception: nationalist frustration. Taşpınar concluded that if the relations between Turkey and the United States and the EU would continue to recede; Turkey would choose its own way. For preventing this policy,

²⁶⁶ *ibid*, p.34

²⁶⁷ Ömer Taşpınar, “Turkish Gaullism”, (April 12,2010), http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0412_turkey_taspinar.aspx (accessed on May 29, 2010)

²⁶⁸ According to the author, Gaullism was an anti-American and anti-NATO policy of France in the 1960s under the presidency of Charles de Gaulle.

²⁶⁹ *op.cit.*

²⁷⁰ While Taşpınar was using this term, he referred to the French nuclear force which is the third largest nuclear-weapons force in the world after Russia and the United States.

²⁷¹ *op.cit.*

Taşpınar warned Western analysts to stop overplaying the discussion on the axis of Turkish foreign policy.²⁷²

In the next organization on Turkey's political polarization, two panelists expressed their ideas on Turkish democracy. The first panelist, Gareth Jenkins, nonresident Senior Fellow at the Central Asia and Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program of Johns Hopkins University expressed that the JDP's coming to power for the first time was interpreted as a sign of a more democratized period for Turkey but this was a clearly short period.²⁷³ He evaluated the JDP as another form of authoritarianism that came after the Kemalist authoritarianism and explained his approach about the struggle between secularists and Islamists.

There is an element of a battle between secularists and Islamists, but it is not a battle between democrats and authoritarian democrats. We have this battle between two different forms of authoritarianism and perhaps the tragic thing for Turkey at the moment is there aren't any democrats waiting in the wings to take over.²⁷⁴

On the other hand, the second panelists, Etyen Mahçupyan²⁷⁵, Director of Democratization Program in TESEV did not agree with Jenkins and stated that with the JDP, there was a more heterogeneous picture both in media and civil society because "if one part of the media gets manipulative, the other part of the media could show it".²⁷⁶ Mahçupyan mentioned segmentation of Islamic sphere, and explained that "twenty or thirty years ago, it was not possible to separate the economic activities from social, cultural or political ones, but today, they are different and when Muslim did politics, this was not political Islam anymore due to different segments among Muslims."²⁷⁷ Mahçupyan also identified another paradigm which changes among religious Muslims: "personification of religiosity". He expressed this definition that "when you ask the people who call themselves Muslim also call themselves more religious than before, but when you ask them

²⁷² *ibid*

²⁷³ Gareth Jenkins, "Turkey's Political Journey: From Where to Where?", (April 20, 2010), http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/events/2010/0420_turkey_politics/20100420_turkey_politics.pdf (accessed on May 29, 2010), p.5

²⁷⁴ *ibid*, p.14

²⁷⁵ Etyen Mahçupyan is also columnist of *Taraf* Daily.

²⁷⁶ *ibid*, p.19

²⁷⁷ *ibid*, p.24

what is religion and what is religiosity, you can see that it's a way of adaptation to the daily life and to modern life, so they are recreating the religion and religiosity today.”²⁷⁸ And he concluded that existence of the JDP has democratized Turkey due to their being hand-in-hand with the society.²⁷⁹ In Q&A part of the panel, moderator Ömer Taşpınar asked to Mahçupyan in connection with his Armenian identity that how the Armenian community in Turkey perceived the JDP. Mahçupyan replied that the JDP would like to solve the problems about the minorities in Turkey but it is questionable that the JDP would give as much as the Armenians want about their rights. However, he was sure that when the community compares the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the JDP, “it is obvious that an Armenian would like to see the AKP government rather than the CHP.”²⁸⁰ Mahçupyan lastly stated that with the JDP government, the Armenian people have come to feel like Turkish citizens after 80-90 years later.

In the spring of 2010, a debate about the amendments in Turkish constitution emerged. In respect to the content of constitutional amendment package of the JDP²⁸¹, the authors of the U.S.-Europe Analysis Series discussed concerns of opposite parties and explained different attitudes of Turkish liberal intellectuals under the two groups. According to the authors, first camp was the intellectuals who “argue that the whole constitution needs to be replaced instead of such partial attempts”.²⁸² Erdoğan’s leadership style, direction in foreign policy, tax cases against the media groups as Doğan Group made these intellectuals think that Erdoğan would like to preserve its political authority rather than reforms. On the other hand, second intellectual group fully supported the reform package and requested more radical change, but they were aware that a new constitution would

²⁷⁸ *ibid*, p.25

²⁷⁹ *ibid*

²⁸⁰ *ibid*, pp.46-47

²⁸¹ “Q&A: Turkey’s Constitutional Referendum”, *BBC News*, (September 12, 2010), <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11228955> (accessed on December 21, 2010); “Anayasa Değişiklik Paketi Meclis’e Sunuldu”, *Radikal*, (March 30, 2010), <http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&ArticleID=988618&Date=30.03.2010&CategoryID=78> (accessed on December 21, 2010)

²⁸² Emiliano Alessandri and Ömer Taşpınar, “Turkey’s Constitutional Dilemma and EU Ambitions”, *U.S.-Europe Analysis Series*, (April 30, 2010), http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/rc/papers/2010/0430_turkey_alessandri_taspinar/0430_turkey_alessandri_taspinar.pdf (accessed on May 29, 2010), p.2

not be possible in current political atmosphere of Turkey.²⁸³ Considering the amendments, the reaction of the EU was evaluated by the scholars as well. Taşpınar and Alessandri opined that the EU feared to miss another chance on the way of the democratization and does not want to touch the social issues as human rights. All in all, the authors pointed out that all the parties of the debate were focusing on the question of the JDP's political legitimacy rather than to discuss the democratization dimension.²⁸⁴ Scholars concluded that after accession negotiations to the EU began in 2005, the JDP did not follow the public diplomacy in European countries, that's why; European interest is very weak in the articles. Moreover, Turkey's close relationship with Iran due to the nuclear sanctions and Erdoğan's criticism towards Israel in international organizations created skepticism on transatlantic partners.²⁸⁵

The announcement of the joint declaration between Brazil, Iran and Turkey on Iran's nuclear program²⁸⁶ changed Turkey agenda of the Brookings Institution for a while. According to Hady Amr, Director of the Brookings Doha Center, this agreement was also an indicator of Brazil's and Turkey's attendance to the club of global powers.²⁸⁷ It was also obvious that the U.S. leadership in the Middle East was over due to Turkey's mediation between Syria and Israel as well as Qatar's hosting talks to bring Lebanon's rival factions.²⁸⁸

Between the years 2002 and 2010, one of the most confusing events for the Brookings scholars was the Flotilla Crisis in Gaza.²⁸⁹ According to the first article,

²⁸³ *ibid*

²⁸⁴ *ibid*, pp.3-4

²⁸⁵ *ibid*, p.4

²⁸⁶ For the full text of the joint declaration, please see: "Joint Declaration by Iran, Turkey and Brazil on Nuclear Fuel, May 2010", <http://www.cfr.org/brazil/joint-declaration-iran-turkey-brazil-nuclear-fuel-may-2010/p22140> (accessed on July 5, 2010)

²⁸⁷ Hady Amr, "Iran's Nuclear Deal and the New Global Power Brokers", (May 21, 2010), http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0521_nuclear_iran_amr.aspx (July 1, 2010)

²⁸⁸ *ibid*

²⁸⁹ At the night of May 31, 2010, a Turkish flotilla called Mavi Marmara was raided in international waters which is close to the Gaza Strip by the Israeli naval commandoes and nine Turkish citizens were killed. The flotilla and five ships wanted to deliver humanitarian aid to Gaza. Please see: "Q&A: Israeli Deadly Raid on Aid Flotilla", *BBC News*, (August 2, 2010), <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10203726> (accessed on June 20, 2011); "İsrail Uluslararası Sularda Sivil Katliam Yaptı:En Az 10 Ölü", *Radikal*, (June 1, 2010), <http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalHaberDetayV3&ArticleID=1000016&Date=29.06.2011&CategoryID=97> (accessed on June 20, 2011)

two days after the crisis, the siege in Gaza was failed by the effect of this crisis.²⁹⁰ Moreover, American and Egyptian policies towards Palestine and Gaza also failed. Bruce Riedel, senior fellow of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy continued to his comments that although Secretary Clinton defined the situation in Gaza “unsustainable”, U.S. policy also seems very “unsustainable”.²⁹¹ In the following article, Shibley Telhami, non-resident Senior Fellow of the Saban Center mentioned that “Arab leaders has annoyed demonstrators from Lebanon to Yemen chant the praises of Turkey and its prime minister.”²⁹² Telhami also criticized the “soft” reaction of the United States and stated that American policies for defending Israel against international isolation would not institute consensus in international environment and might reduce to seek international support for other American interests such as implementing sanctions on Iran.²⁹³ On the other hand, Martin Indyk, Vice President for Foreign Policy at the Brookings advised to regain all parties for the American administration. The first suggestion of Indyk was to support the negotiations between Hamas and Israel, but the preconditions of these negotiations for Hamas to should be to prevent all attacks to Israel and stop weapon smuggling. In return, Indyk’s precondition for Israel was to lift its siege and to allow goods to flow in and out of Gaza.²⁹⁴ From the perspective of Israeli-Turkish relations, Indyk pointed out the role of the United States in order to maintain a relation of trust between Israel and Turkey.²⁹⁵

Few days later, Martin Indyk gave an interview to the online version of German magazine, *Spiegel Online*. In response to a question on how Obama would appease the Arab world’s frustration about the crisis and restart peace talks in the Middle East, Indyk stated that Obama should change the discourse from Gaza crisis to peace-making process in the region as well as Israel should help the U.S. in this term. Another question on whether Turkey would say no to sanctions about Iran’s

²⁹⁰ Bruce Riedel, “Defusing the Gaza Flashpoint”, (June 2, 2010), http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0602_gaza_riedel.aspx (accessed on July 1, 2010)

²⁹¹ *ibid*

²⁹² Shibley Telhami, “The Deeper Crisis Behind the Bloodshed on the Gaza Flotilla”, (June 2, 2010), http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0602_gaza_telhami.aspx (accessed on July 1, 2010)

²⁹³ *ibid*

²⁹⁴ Martin Indyk, “From the Gaza Flotilla Crisis, a Peace Opportunity?”, (June 3, 2010), http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0603_gaza_indyk.aspx (accessed on July 1, 2010)

²⁹⁵ *ibid*

nuclear program in the UN Security Council; Indyk frankly said that it would not be a surprise, if it would happen, the unity within five permanent members would solve the problem.²⁹⁶ Taşpınar's last evaluations were also essential to comprehend the tendency of the Brookings. With reference to his concept Turkish Gaullism; Taşpınar drew attention to the nationalist, defiant, self-centered strategies of Ankara and asked a question that whether Turkey is ready to pay a price for challenging the United States, because the model partnership discourse failed and Turkey needs a new paradigm.²⁹⁷ Taşpınar opined that Turkey should decide how to build its relationship with the United States in the near future when Turkish bureaucrats came to Washington and want support against the Armenian genocide. Therefore, Taşpınar advised that Turkey should solve the Kurdish and Armenian problems immediately; otherwise, it would be so hard to find somebody in Washington for negotiating these issues.²⁹⁸

The decision of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to impose new sanctions on Iran²⁹⁹ was discussed in the Brookings as well. The author of *Reset: Iran, Turkey, and America's Future*, Stephen Kinzer was in Turkey, when the joint declaration between Brazil, Iran and Turkey was announced. According to his observations, Turkey thought that the U.S. would be in favor of the declaration and Ankara had some indications from Washington. But behind the scene, "there was a larger disconnects growing between these two countries."³⁰⁰ Kinzer pointed out that Turkey assumes a new world, in this world, Turkey expresses its common strategic values, mutual projects with the U.S., but it also warned the U.S. that Washington's tactics are not working in the Middle East anymore. "Turkey wants

²⁹⁶ Martin Indyk, "Obama Must Change the Subject from Gaza to Peacemaking", *Spiegel Online*, (June 7, 2010), http://www.brookings.edu/interviews/2010/0607_gaza_indyk.aspx (accessed on July 1, 2010)

²⁹⁷ Ömer Taşpınar, "A New Era in Turkish Foreign Policy", (June 14, 2010), http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0614_turkey_foreign_policy_taspinar.aspx (accessed on July 15, 2010)

²⁹⁸ *ibid*

²⁹⁹ "The Security Council imposed additional sanctions on the country, expanding an arms embargo and tightening restrictions on financial and shipping enterprises related to 'proliferation-sensitive activities'" Decision of United Nations Security Council, SC/9948, (June 9, 2010), <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/sc9948.doc.htm> (accessed on May 30, 2011)

³⁰⁰ "Turkey and Iran: Assessing the New Regional Diplomacy", (June 15, 2010), http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/events/2010/0615_turkey_iran/20100615_turkey_iran.pdf (July 15, 2010), p.11

the U.S. to try to scale down the confrontation and scale down the rhetoric and try to take a more cooperative and diplomatic approach and Ankara also says that we're going to try to help you and give you some advice on how you can do this."³⁰¹ But the U.S. as a hegemonic power are not at the point yet to understand "some good advices for the Middle East" even the long-time ally Turkey warns the U.S. On the Flotilla Crisis between Israel and Turkey, Kinzer expressed that it was a huge fiasco for both sides. Although Turkey's anger towards Israel still exists, Kinzer suggested that the bilateral relations between Israel and Turkey are very important for the future of the Middle East peace. From Iran aspect, Turkey told the U.S. that "don't punish Iran, don't yell at Iran, don't sanction Iran and try to see the world as Iran sees it, and come to the table with that understanding. If Turkey is advocating that approach to Iran, it should also take that same approach to Israel."³⁰²

Another speaker of the panel, Ömer Taşpınar expressed that the U.S. should be aware of what is happening in the Middle East and should "tend to sympathize with Turkey's position and Brazil's position".³⁰³ Taşpınar underlined the features of Turkey as the 16th largest economy in the world and as the self-confidence coming from the economy, as he announced the rise of a regional power. On the other hand, Taşpınar reminded that Turkey's sense of humiliation vis-à-vis the EU created a convergence in Turkey: with the neo-Ottoman vision of the JDP, "Turkey believes that it has to be a self-confident, independent and regional power."³⁰⁴ According to Taşpınar, the Obama administration understands the demands of Turkey and it needs a new paradigm for defining the relations with Turkey rather than "strategic or model partnership" as "transactional partnership".³⁰⁵ In this point, Taşpınar also pointed out the expectations of Turkey from the U.S. First, although it is a regional power, Ankara expects cooperation in relation to its domestic issues as the Kurdish issue due to the beliefs of Turks that the U.S. and Israel support the PKK. Second, the Armenian genocide resolution of the U.S. Congress is another issue of Turkey expects cooperation with the U.S. As a result, Taşpınar's advice was that

³⁰¹ *ibid*, p.12

³⁰² *ibid*, p.14

³⁰³ *ibid*, p.24

³⁰⁴ *ibid*, p.25

³⁰⁵ *ibid*, p.27

Turkey and the United States should look not really at Iran in the framework of sanctions, how to deal with the Ahmadinejad but should bring their policy planning themes and think about the Middle East and Iran in 2015, in five years, Iran either as a nuclear power or on the verge of becoming a nuclear power, the peace process still absent. How does Washington and Ankara cooperate in a 2015 scenario of the Middle East where Iran is likely to be a nuclear power? That kind of debate about how to contain Iran, how to deter Iran, how to avoid a disaster in the Middle East, could bring cooler heads together and focus the divergence right now into a more convergence oriented scenario.³⁰⁶

The Q&A session of the panel commenced with a question on whether Turkey's efforts to engage with Iran was successful. Taşpınar replied that the JDP government believed that there exist clear signals from the Obama administration to agree with the trilateral declaration but at the end of the day, Ankara was very disappointed and very frustrated. "Turkey should have avoided that kind of a success story and message that this is the deal that the U.S. wanted, instead should have downplayed the value of that deal as the beginning of a negotiation."³⁰⁷ At this point, Taşpınar pointed out a problem in Turkish foreign policy that both Prime Minister Erdoğan and Foreign Minister Davutoğlu presented the declaration as the big success of Turkey so "there is a kind of strategic disconnect between Ankara and Washington and it could have been avoided with better communication and more trust, more confidence, especially from Washington to Ankara."³⁰⁸ Another question on the vote of Turkey against the new sanctions on Iran in UNSC was replied by Kinzer that Turkey needed to show how firm it was in its independent policy but it was a mistake too and now, it is time to repair the damages.³⁰⁹ The last questions of the panel were whether the Israeli-Turkish relationship would be a key determinant for U.S.-Turkish policy and what role economics would play in Turkish-Iranian relations. Taşpınar responded the first question that there is common conspiratorial view in Turkey that the Israeli lobbies in the U.S. can change and control Turkey and Turkey expert was concerned about "anything happening in Turkey to be read by the Turkish public opinion as made in the United States plan to undermine Turkey from the Armenian genocide issue, to the Kurdish

³⁰⁶ *ibid*, pp.28-29

³⁰⁷ *ibid*

³⁰⁸ *ibid*, p.30

³⁰⁹ *ibid*, p.38

conflict, to domestic results of elections.”³¹⁰ The second answer about Turkish-Iranian relations put by Taşpınar that the JDP thought that the bilateral relations “are based on mercantilist interests and trade relations” between Iran and Turkey but still the EU is the biggest supplier to the Turkish market. In that sense, Turkey’s relations with Iran “is driven by sense of grandeur of Turkey that wants to promote itself in the region as a mediator, moderator, and this is not an ideological sympathy for the Iranian regime.”³¹¹

The following panel on Turkey had the similar discussion topic as the previous one. Ümit Boyner, chair of the Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association (TÜSİAD) mentioned Iran as well and stated that although “Turkey has always supported a nuclear-free Middle East, nuclear armament-free Middle East. On the other hand, it was not informed as a NATO member, as an ally throughout the process of developing the economic sanctions (toward Iran).”³¹² In Turkey-Israel relations, Boyner expressed that TÜSİAD criticized the policies of Israeli government vis-à-vis the Palestinians and the use of force against the humanitarian flotilla. Chair of TÜSİAD had also some criticism about the question of whether Turkey turns toward the East. Boyner explained that

“Turkish foreign policy, even prior to 2002 is based on to create stability in our region through economic cooperation, through dialogue, and peacekeeping. This role has actually been supported by the West and is emphasized as Turkey’s main input as a regional ally. At this point, to see that our zero problem policy with our neighbors have come to a serious conflict with our Western partners, and this actually reveals a need for better communication, empathy, and understanding on both sides.(...) The Middle East and Europe are not two completely different universes. It is also true that until the Gaza war, Turkey’s diplomatic activism in the region was also supported by Israel. Therefore, these policies are not at the expense of the West, but we feel there is more to be gained in that rapprochement and we feel there is a lot of opportunity to be gained”³¹³

The next panelist, Soli Özel, Professor of İstanbul Bilgi University stated that until the JDP came to power in 2002, Turkey’s three most important conflicting relations

³¹⁰ *ibid.*, p.40

³¹¹ *ibid.*, p.41

³¹² “U.S.-Turkish Relations: A Perspective From the Private Sector”, (June 17, 2010), http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/events/2010/0617_turkey_us/20100617_turkey_us.pdf (accessed on July 15, 2010), p.4

³¹³ *ibid.*, pp.6-8

namely with Syria, Iran and Greece had been already solved. That's why, "Turkey was no longer feeling as closed in and surrounded by hostile powers after 2002 as it did in 1996."³¹⁴ The Israeli-Turkish relations were also interpreted by Özel that Israel saw that Turkey pushed an Iran policy that was "unethical to what the Israelis would have preferred to see"³¹⁵. Although rhetoric of Turkish foreign policy has been applauded in the Arab streets, Arab regimes were not comfortable with Turkish activism, specifically with its Gaza and Hamas rhetoric. Lastly Özel pointed out the recent decision of UNSC and identified the relations between the U.S. and Turkey that "this is the yet undefined relations between a global power and a regional power which is increasingly more assertive and the global power can be said not to have made the adjustment to listening to regional powers, especially on matters that are relevant to the regional power's interest."³¹⁶

In his column, Ömer Taşpınar shared the reaction of the U.S. about the vote of Turkey in UNSC that "there has been a sharp rise in the tone and frequency of American voices arguing that Turkey is no longer part of the West. An Islamized Turkey turning its back to the West is now conventional wisdom in American circles."³¹⁷ According to Taşpınar, one needs to ask the question of "what went wrong in Turkey?". Although the author agreed with the reaction of Turkey towards Israel in the Flotilla Crisis, he also criticized the rhetoric of the JDP government. As a result, Taşpınar called for the Western world to understand the Turkish Gaullism phenomenon.

Consequently, due to Turkey's changing foreign policy concept after the Cold War, Brookings' offerings to the Obama administration were to repair the bilateral relations based on "new" identity of Turkey. At the same time, sanctions toward Iran's nuclear program and Turkey's regional player role in the Iran-West crisis were the most disputable subject for the Brookings. Protocols between Armenia and Turkey were another important issue for both the Obama

³¹⁴ *ibid.*, p.10

³¹⁵ *ibid.*, p.11

³¹⁶ *ibid.*, p.14

³¹⁷ Ömer Taşpınar, "Getting Turkey Right", (June 21, 2010), http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2010/0621_us_perspectives_turkey_taspinar.aspx (accessed on July 15, 2010)

administration and the Brookings, although both sides did not propose any different solution for the dispute between Armenia and Turkey, it maintained its importance in the Brookings' Turkey agenda. Lastly, 2010 witnessed the criticism toward the JDP's foreign and domestic policies. In domestic politics, the JDP was criticized due to its authoritarian tendencies as in Ergenekon case and the referendum for Constitutional amendment. On the other hand, harsh rhetoric of Erdoğan and his party toward Israel in Flotilla Crisis caused alteration in Brookings' Turkey discourse. Therefore, Taşpınar's Turkish Gaullism concept was introduced as the harmonization of authoritarian inclination and "anti-Israeli" rhetoric of the JDP.

2.8 Conclusion

In 2002, the agenda of the Brookings Institution concentrated on Turkey's role in U.S.-led invasion in Iraq and the main discussion was on Turkey's logistic support to the war. Although most of the scholars had no concern about the result of the ratification in Turkish Parliament; only Ömer Taşpınar foresaw the possibility of rejection of the motion due to the new government in Turkey. After the decision of Turkish Parliament on March 1st, 2003, the Brookings began to discuss the arguments of Turkey and emphasized the characteristic features of the JDP. Further detailed analyses on Turkey and the JDP raised a question mark in minds: How the bilateral relations would be repaired? For the Brookings, the answer was quite clear: Turkey might play an important role for the U.S. interests in the Middle East due to its engagement process with countries in the region. Turkey's possible membership to the EU was also supported by the institution; even concerns about the Euro-centric Turkish foreign policy had been frequently expressed. But as the term of the Obama administration got closer, the Brookings introduced a new phenomenon about Turkey's role in the Middle East: "Self-confidence in Turkish foreign policy". Due to this proposal, the Brookings offered to re-establish the bilateral relations over "the new identity" of Turkey which is based on being a regional player in the Middle East. Although this assumption has failed with the crisis between Turkey and Israel, the Brookings never adopted a manner which allowed total rupture in the U.S.-Turkey relations.

CHAPTER III

THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS AND ITS PERSPECTIVE ON TURKEY: THE AMERICAN REPUBLICANS READING OF JDP'S FOREIGN POLICY

3.1 Introduction

After Justice and Development Party (JDP) *came to power* on *November 3rd, 2002* elections, *the JDP government* largely changed the political atmosphere in Turkey. Both domestic and foreign actors affected this alteration. As an influential think tank, the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) made various analyses on Turkey's changing foreign policy scope from 2002 to 2010.

This chapter will look into the CFR's studies on Turkey under eight subheadings. After the introduction part, in the second subheading, history and principles of the CFR as well as scholars who study on Turkey will be introduced. Following that, the negotiation process between the U.S. and Turkey prior to the March 1st, 2003 motion is to be explored. Demands and concerns of Turkey about the role of the northern Iraqi Kurds after the U.S. invasion of Iraq and preliminary analyses of the CFR on the first JDP government are also to be explored in the third subheading. The fourth subheading of the chapter is to focus on the Turkish Parliament's decision on the motion and the reaction of the Bush administration to it. As the relations between Washington and Ankara deteriorated, the CFR focused this time on the question of how the bilateral relations could be repaired. In the fifth

subheading, the CFR turned to discuss the question of JDP's enthusiasm of the EU negotiation for the opening up of EU bid when the bilateral relations between the United States and Turkey remained cool. In the following subheading, Turkey's polarized domestic politics due to the presidential and general elections in 2007 are to be discussed. As the 2007 election was influenced by the polarized atmosphere in Lebanon, Palestine and the Middle East in general, in this sixth sub-heading "Pro-Palestinian" foreign policy of the second JDP government and concerns of the U.S. and Israel toward Syria-Turkey rapprochement are to be examined. In the seventh subheading, as scholars of the CFR started to point out the divergence between the interests of the U.S. and Turkey in the Middle East and announced the birth of "the new active" Turkish foreign policy under the changing conditions of the post-Cold War era, this issue is to be explored. Finally, the eighth subheading is to drive out general continuity and change of the CFR's analysis on Turkish foreign policy.

3.2 Once Upon a Time in the CFR¹ : History and the Activities of the Council on Foreign Relations

The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) was established under the circumstances of World War I as the Brookings Institution. It was formed out of an alliance of two organizations and focused on the aim of transatlantic cooperation in business expansion and sustaining world peace. First branch of the organization, "the Inquiry" was established in the winter of 1917-18 and "tasked to brief President Woodrow Wilson about options for the postwar world".² Woodrow Wilson, the President of the United States between 1913 and 1921, wanted to make use of analysis of this working group, represented the different ideological inclinations in order to formulate his postwar policies.

Throughout the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, the briefing papers of the group and group members' personal contacts in the bridge games as well as breakfast and dinner meetings gave them a chance to propagate the ideas of the

¹ "Once Upon A Time in America", 1984, Director: Sergio Leone, Starring: Robert De Niro, James Woods and Elizabeth McGovern

² <http://www.cfr.org/about/history/cfr/inquiry.html> (accessed on April 12, 2011)

United States in Paris. In these unrecorded and informal meetings with signatory countries, “the frontiers of Europe were redrawn and economic arrangements were devised on seemingly rational principles”.³ When the negotiations came to an end, the British and American diplomats and scholars discussed how their fellowship could be sustained after the peace. However, they proposed a permanent Anglo-American Institute of International Affairs, with one branch in London; the other in New York⁴; but this proposal was not realized due to isolationist foreign policy of the United States at the end of the World War I.

The second branch was a more discreet club of New York financiers and international lawyers established in June 1918 and they called it “Council on Foreign Relations”. “Its purpose was to convene dinner meetings, to make contact with distinguished foreign visitors under conditions congenial to future commerce.”⁵ During the early days of 1921, the scholars of “the Inquiry” was in need of financial support for their organizations, so they proposed to inject “an intellectual substance, dynamism, and contacts—whether to promote business expansion, world peace” to discussions of the Council on Foreign Relations. At the end of the negotiations between the two groups, “the business club” developed a new identity on July 29, 1921 and membership got restricted to American citizens “on the grounds that discussions and other meetings, confidential in nature, would be more productive if participants and speakers knew for sure that the others in the room were all Americans”.⁶

This initial stage of the formation of Council of Foreign Relations clearly shows that a U.S. president, from Democratic Party, help bringing together capital owners and intellectuals in order to contribute developing the U.S. foreign policy strategy as the U.S. influence grew at world level after the World War I. Thus it may well be said that establishment of the CFR is an indication of growing demands of the capital owners and intellectuals to exert its influence in particularly in the making of the U.S. foreign policy.

³ *ibid*

⁴ *ibid*

⁵ *ibid*

⁶ *ibid*

According to the CFR website (CFR.org), the institution always emphasized the American interests and its non-partisan identity: Democrats as well as Republicans, underrepresented groups in the early 1920 as Jews, Afro-Americans and women were the members of the CFR. Moreover, the CFR wanted to spread its ideas on world politics because “America had become a world power and desperately needed an informed public”.⁷ Due to that reason, it was decided to launch a journal in September 1922 under the name of *Foreign Affairs*. Selection of the journal name also emphasized the aim of the institution: The Council wanted to exhibit the American perspective to the world.

Throughout the interwar years, tendency of the CFR could be discerned from the content of the *Foreign Affairs*. In 1920s and 1930s, comments of the journal generally were Eurocentric and although officially the U.S. withdrew from the European affairs, through informal relations of the CFR with the League of Nations, the U.S. business and intellectual circles wanted to exert its policies. Moreover, natural resources, colonial history and underdeveloped social and political structure of the continent of Africa appeared among the columns of the journal.⁸ Meanwhile, rising militarism in Japan as well as Germany were main concern areas of the CFR. Speeches of the guest Japanese diplomats and German journalists at the CFR were criticized by some members of the CFR since such speeches were considered as a part of propaganda of Japan and Nazi Germany, thus indicating the division of opinion among the CFR members. During the late 1930s, isolationists versus interventionists’ debate⁹ formalized American foreign policy-making process and the CFR reflected upon those in its publications.

Before the U.S. entry into the World War II, the CFR proposed its first task to the Department of State “that would guide American foreign policy in the coming years of war and the challenging new world that would emerge after”.¹⁰ This secret study, “War and Peace Studies”, built the United States-Japan trade relations in the post-war era. The group which drafted the task was also very active in the 1944

⁷ <http://www.cfr.org/about/history/cfr/assumptions.html> (accessed on April 12, 2011)

⁸ <http://www.cfr.org/about/history/cfr/dissension.html> (accessed on April 12, 2011)

⁹ The CFR explains the debate that “those who agitated to resist totalitarian aggression and those who sought to keep America aloof from foreign power struggles”, *ibid*

¹⁰ http://www.cfr.org/about/history/cfr/war_peace.html (accessed on April 12, 2011)

Dumbarton Oaks Conference on world economic arrangements as well as throughout the preparations of the 1945 San Francisco Conference.¹¹

In the post-World War II period, despite the fact that American foreign policy needed intellectual consultancy more than before, there was a disagreement among the CFR members on Soviet-American relations. The greater part of the isolationist members argued for the rejection of the Council's draft on cooperation with the USSR in 1946, thus "the Council missed an opportunity to give guidance to American policymakers through constructive advice".¹² One year later, an American Foreign Service officer shared his ideas with the small group from the CFR and at the end of the session, participants offered him to write an article to the *Foreign Affairs*. Due to diplomatic duties, George Kennan sent his article with the pseudo name as "X", and "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," appeared in the July 1947 issue of the *Foreign Affairs*. Later on the CFR expressed the impact of the article with the following statement: "It ran only seventeen pages; its tone was scholarly, elegant but practical; only three sentences used the magic word that came to define American policy for half a century: Containment."¹³

Afterwards, the CFR established numerous study groups for discussing the Marshall Plan and the function of the NATO as well as the effectiveness of American aid programmes in Europe. Under the circumstances of the Cold War, a number of meetings were organized on the Korean War, war in Indochina, nuclear weaponry of the USA and the USSR and the Vietnam War. Early in the 1970s, when many American institutions attempt to analyze the global politics; the *Foreign Affairs* chose to change its motto:

From the founding, the journal had set out, among its purposes, to 'guide' American public opinion. The verb was changed; the purpose became to "inform" public opinion. Public interest in international relations is no longer in need of guidance or stimulation.¹⁴

¹¹ *ibid*

¹² http://www.cfr.org/about/history/cfr/first_transformation.html (accessed on April 12, 2011)

¹³ http://www.cfr.org/about/history/cfr/x_leads.html (accessed on April 13, 2011)

¹⁴ http://www.cfr.org/about/history/cfr/second_transformation.html (accessed on April 13, 2011)

In 1972, the studies and numbers of members increased and the CFR decided to open an office in Washington for supporting the facilities of New York. Throughout the 1980s, when the Cold War was still a fundamental fact of international politics, “study groups produced monographs on the military balance, regional conflicts, and arms control, both nuclear and conventional. But fully one-third of the Council’s papers dealt with economic and other issues that earlier diplomatic generations had considered beneath notice”.¹⁵

At the end of the Cold War, in 1990, “the Council published an important survey named *Sea-Changes: American Foreign Policy in a World Transformed*¹⁶, in which 17 influential experts showed how global relations were not merely in transition but on the brink of fundamental transformation”.¹⁷ This survey signaled the content of a new agenda: more American foreign policy and global politics. Parallel to that, the agenda of the 2000s focused on “nurturing the next generation of foreign policy leaders, expanding the Council’s outreach through national programs and the regular use of television for hearings and debates on major policy issues, and enlarging programs with two stated purposes: figuring out the rules and rhythms of foreign policy and developing new ideas for America and the international community”.¹⁸

On the organizational level, studies on Turkey take place in the “Southeastern Europe” section of the CFR’s website as well as the issues of the *Foreign Affairs*. In both resources, articles and book reviews on Turkey are written by various authors but prominent scholars of the institution are Steven Cook, Helena Kane Finn and David L. Philips.

Steven Cook, Hasib J. Sabbagh Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies, is the unique scholar of the institute who permanently study on Turkish politics. He is an expert on Arab and Turkish politics as well as U.S.-Middle East policy. Prior to joining CFR, Dr. Cook was a research fellow at the Brookings Institution (2001–2002) and a Soref research fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy

¹⁵ *ibid*

¹⁶ Nicholas X. Rizopoulos (ed.), *Sea-Changes: American Foreign Policy in a World Transformed*, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Book, 1990)

¹⁷ *ibid*

¹⁸ *ibid*

(1995–1996). Dr. Cook holds a BA in International Studies from Vassar College, an MA in International Relations from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and both an MA and PhD in Political Science from the University of Pennsylvania.¹⁹

Helena Kane Finn was the Cyrus Vance Fellow in Diplomatic Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York (2002 - 2003). Her article on public diplomacy appeared in *Policy Watch* and *Foreign Affairs*. Dr. Finn, who holds Ph.D. and B.A. from St. John's University, has served as the Counselor for Public Affairs at the U.S. Embassy in Ankara, Turkey (1997 - 2000), the Desk Officer for Greece, Turkey and Cyprus (1989 - 1991) as well as her first diplomatic assignment was to the U.S. Embassy in Ankara, Turkey (1981 -1984).²⁰

David L. Phillips has worked as a senior adviser to the United Nations Secretariat and as a foreign affairs expert and senior adviser to the U.S. Department of State. He has held positions as a visiting scholar at Harvard University's Center for Middle East Studies, executive director of Columbia University's International Conflict Resolution Program, and as a professor at the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna. He has also been a senior fellow and deputy director of the Council on Foreign Relations' Center for Preventive Action. He holds B.A. degree from Amherst College, Massachusetts.²¹

A comparison of the numbers of articles, reports and interviews appeared on the pages of CFR website and the *Foreign Affairs* between (1996-2001), (2002-2006) and (2007-2010) point to a striking change: 63 links discussed Turkish politics in the first term; 458 links analyzed Turkey in the second term; lastly, 327 links told Turkish politics in the third term.²² This comparison clearly suggests that there has been a clear intensification of the CFR interests in Turkey and its foreign policy.

¹⁹ <http://www.cfr.org/experts/egypt-turkey-nato/steven-a-cook/b10266> (accessed on April 14, 2011)

²⁰ http://www.fulbright.de/fileadmin/files/funnelOnline/2008_02/Dr.Finn_CV.pdf (accessed on May 10, 2011)

²¹ <http://www.ncafp.org/articles/CVs%20and%20Bios/Phillips%20David.pdf> (accessed on May 10, 2011)

²² Comparison is based on the website of the CFR and it involved all the links that contain the word "Turkey".

3.3 All the Negotiator's Men²³ : The Bargaining Process on Iraq Invasion between the Two Countries

At the beginning of 2002, the agenda of the CFR focused on the scenarios of U.S.-led Iraq invasion. At the same time, the discussion meetings which were announced publicly were the best stages for comprehending the perception of the CFR on Turkey's role in prospective invasion as well as expectations of Iraqi leaders from Turkey. For instance, in a panel on the future of Iraq, Ahmed Chalabi, Co-Founder of the Iraqi National Congress defined the reaction of Turkey about arming the Kurdish forces for Iraqi opposition as "schizophrenic".²⁴ According to him, Turkey has funded and gave the Iraq's Kurdish leaders weapons for combating the PKK on behalf of Turkey, but Turkish leaders refused to recognize Iraqi democratic opposition. Chalabi pointed out that if Turkey supports "getting rid of Saddam" operation, it also would have great benefit in the reconstruction of Iraq. At the same session, a member of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) raised an objection that the PUK never received ammunition from Turkey to fight against the PKK and they did not understand concerns of Turkey about the independence of Kurds in Iraq.²⁵

In articles of the CFR's website (CFR.org), Turkey's military bases and their role in invasion were also analyzed. David L. Philips stated that "Ankara worried that U.S.-led invasion of Iraq would create a power vacuum, destabilize the region, encourage separatism among Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin, and cause direct economic loss due to conflicts".²⁶ Although Turkish politicians and public opinion did not support the invasion, Philips continued that the United States had to satisfy Turkey's demands and guarantee the territorial integrity of Iraq. Despite the fact that Turkey was hopeless to recover up to \$40 billion in lost revenues from economic sanctions on Iraq since the Gulf War, "a good way of getting the next government's support would be to offer a commercial agreement expediting cross

²³ "All The President's Men", 1976, Director: Alan J. Pakula, Starring: Robert Redford, Dustin Hoffman and Jason Robards

²⁴ "What Role for the Iraqi National Congress in Iraq?", (February 1, 2002), <http://www.cfr.org/iraq/role-iraqi-national-congress-iraq/p4330> (accessed on May 14, 2010)

²⁵ *ibid*, Latif Rashid was the European Representative of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and Co-Founder of the Iraqi National Congress.

²⁶ "Spell Out the Goals for Iraq", (May 16, 2002), <http://www.cfr.org/iraq/spell-out-goals-iraq/p4583> (accessed on May 14, 2010)

border trade to be implemented as soon as a new government is erected in Baghdad”.²⁷

On the other hand, in her early articles, Helena Kane Finn drew attention to the fact that it would be difficult for the United States to persuade the Turkish people for regime change in Iraq. The scholar frankly stated that “Turkish public opinion can be changed, but that would require a tremendous effort on the part of a decisive leadership with a clear focus on this issue”.²⁸ As a former diplomat who served in the United States Embassy in Ankara, Finn also shared her evaluations about the voter profile of the JDP at the same article:

Support of the AK Party’s Islamist leader derives from Turkey’s urban poor, the people who benefit most from ministrations of Islamist charity, many of whom are recent Kurdish migrants to the cities of western Turkey. The Islamists have filled a vacuum left by the failures of the centrist and social-democratic parties to improve the economy and create hope for this segment of Turkish society.²⁹

On the other hand, she summarized the perception of the U.S. about Turkey’s role in Iraq that “the United States made clear the U.S. plans to take action regardless of whether Turkey cooperates or not.”³⁰ But she added that “it would obviously better for both countries if Turkey cooperated due to Turkey’s serious interest in the long term stability of the region and their potential role in new democratic Iraq.”³¹

After the Turkish general elections in November 2002, the first question about the new “Islamist” government was the future of the historical relationship between Israel and Turkey. Finn argued that the close relationship between Israel and Turkey would be maintained by the AK Party government and Turkey would continue “in the role it has played as “honest broker”, condemning violence and advocating a just settlement in the Middle East”.³²

²⁷ David L. Philips, “How to Convince Iraq’s Neighbors”, (July 19, 2002),

<http://www.cfr.org/turkey/convince-iraqs-neighbors/p4672> (accessed on May 14, 2010)

²⁸ Helena Kane Finn, “Turkish Political Disarray: Why Now? What Next?”, (July 10, 2002), <http://www.cfr.org/world/turkish-political-disarray-why-now-next/p5077> (accessed on May 14, 2010)

²⁹ *ibid*

³⁰ Helena Kane Finn, “Turkey’s Crisis, Iraq’s Future, and the Wolfowitz Visit”, (July 23, 2002), <http://www.cfr.org/world/turkeys-crisis-iraqs-future-wolfowitz-visit/p5075> (accessed on May 14, 2010)

³¹ *ibid*

³² Helena Kane Finn, “Iraq: What Does Turkey Want?”, (November 19, 2002), <http://www.cfr.org/world/iraq-does-turkey-want/p5239> (accessed on May 14, 2010)

Demands of Ankara were a guarantee on Iraqi territorial integrity; establishment of a strong central government and federated state system which is not based on ethnicity in Iraq; and Kirkuk and Mosul regions which are not to be controlled by an autonomous Kurdish administration. For the financial issues, Finn stated that Turkey would want guarantee that losses should be compensated in time and international aid should be provided in case of refugee crisis.³³

The agenda based on the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq continued to take major attention in the publications of 2003. In this context, opposition of Turkish public to Iraq invasion always reminded with the reference to the survey of the Pew Research Center. According to the data of the center, 85% of the Turkish public opposed the Iraq war in 2002. Due to the high opposition, Finn wrote an article and stated that although Turkish public strongly disliked Saddam Hussein, “it believes the status quo is better than the turmoil and the war”.³⁴ Finn proposed the solution for winning the Turkish public that the political leadership must be strengthened for convincing the public. Due to the political atmosphere in Turkey which “obsessively” concentrated on European Union, Finn also suggested that “AK Party had to convince its supporters because the party did not want to say no to the U.S.”.³⁵ As a consequence, she stressed that public opinion may change quickly if the inspiration can come from Turkish politicians. Parallel to that, she went on to explain the structure of opposition thoroughly. According to Finn, although Turkey supported the United States in Afghanistan, there is a big difference between Afghanistan and Iraq for Turkish public. Due to the historical bounds since the days of King Amanullah and Atatürk, there was deep appreciation for the Turkish presence in Afghanistan under the umbrella of ISAF. On the other hand, relation between Turkey and Iraq is far more complex than that of Afghanistan because of the Ottoman heritage in the Middle East.³⁶ Although throughout the Gulf War, Turkish public opinion did not oppose the active role of Turkey because of the Arab coalition, the newly formed AK Party government had an enormous job to do when

³³ *ibid*

³⁴ Helena Kane Finn, “Public Diplomacy in Turkey: A Response to Bill Safire”, (January 16, 2003), <http://www.cfr.org/world/public-diplomacy-turkey-response-bill-safire/p5489> (accessed on May 14, 2010)

³⁵ *ibid*

³⁶ Helena Kane Finn, “Turkey and the War on Iraq: It Isn’t Just about Money”, (February 20, 2003), <http://www.cfr.org/world/turkey-war-iraq-isnt-just-money/p5540> (accessed on May 14, 2010)

it came to convincing the Turkish public that a war against Iraq at this time”.³⁷ The author was sure that Turkey and the United States would agree for cooperation in Iraq regardless of the fact that Turks did not believe the existence of chemical and nuclear weapons in Iraq. Cooperation between the two sides would be sustained if the United States gave written assurances that Iraq would remain united and losses would be compensated.

Another former American ambassador also gave an interview to the CFR.org in February 2003 while bargaining between the United States and Turkey went on at full steam. Morton Abramowitz, U.S. Ambassador to Turkey during the 1990-1991 Gulf War, replied the question on the economic agreement between the sides that the negotiations took longer than expected but “it was expected that it would provide \$6 billion³⁸ in grants to Turkey and an unspecified but considerable amount, if the Turks want, in loans”.³⁹ Former ambassador proceeded that many Turks believed the United States would support an independent Kurdish state which will ultimately absorb some of southeast Turkey or lead to a second Kurdish state in southeast Turkey. He expressed that this would never be realized or the United States would never support a disintegrated Iraq. From the military aspect, Abramowitz propounded that Turkey would not fight in Iraq but “Turks want an active role which influence and assert their own interests in the establishment of new Iraqi government because of their concern on the emergence of an independent Kurdish state”.⁴⁰ Moreover, Abramowitz stated that Turkish troops from 40,000 to 60,000 would be based in northern Iraq and forces would stay under the control of Turkey. On the other hand, due to the question on the reaction of Turkish generals, he told that “the generals had let the ruling party take the lead on this and suffer the political consequences”.⁴¹ Although the military had concerns about the Islamic roots of the government, at the end of the day, they supported the agreement which

³⁷ *ibid*

³⁸ On the other hand, Ambassador Deniz Bölükbaşı, head of the Turkish negotiation delegation stated that the proposal of the United States was \$15 billion for grants and loans: \$10 billion for loans, \$3 billion for military and economic grants, \$1 billion for oil and \$1 billion for the renovation of bases in Turkey and purchasing budget. Deniz Bölükbaşı, *1 Mart Vakası: Irak Tezkeresi ve Sonrası*, (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2008), p.69

³⁹ “Former Envoy Abramowitz Says Turkey Will Receive \$6 Billion in Aid and Billions in Loans”, (February 23, 2003), <http://www.cfr.org/turkey/former-envoy-abramowitz-says-turkey-receive-6-billion-aid-billions-loans/p5572> (accessed on May 14, 2010)

⁴⁰ *ibid*

⁴¹ *ibid*

would be to Turkey's interest. He concluded that Turkey would make a strategic choice either go to the war on the side of the United States or "would suffer even more because there would have been no deal, and they would not have gotten much".⁴²

Before the motion on March 1st put to a vote in Turkish Parliament, Helena Kane Finn mentioned the same points as Abramowitz. In her article for the CFR.org, she stated the details of bargaining process that Turkey had insisted some of loans in cash immediately but they were impossible demands for the United States but main points between the sides were clarified and agreed upon.⁴³ Finn also mentioned the group of AK parliamentarians and stated that the party assured its MPs whether Turkey join or not, the war would cost Turkey billion dollars and loss of U.S. support, specifically on the way of EU membership. That's why; the author concluded at the end of the article that the decision of Turkish parliament would have "inordinate consequences for the future of the Turkish-American relations".⁴⁴

Before the decision of Turkish Parliament on March 1st, 2003; the expectations of the CFR from Turkey can be summarized in three points: First, the U.S. was sure about the support of Turkey in U.S.-led Iraq invasion on condition that guaranteeing Iraqi territorial integrity, establishment of a strong central government as well as Kirkuk and Mosul regions which are not to be controlled by an autonomous Kurdish administration. Second, it is possible to read up-to-date relationship between the Bush administration and the CFR on the CFR's publications which was largely parallel to the content of the negotiations between Turkey and the United States. For instance, Abramowitz's exact statement on the amount of U.S. economic aid package was the clear sign of the news flow between the CFR fellows and the officers in Washington. Lastly, although the CFR embraced "informing role" at the beginning of the 1970s, it was obvious that it played a "guiding role" by emphasizing the role of Turkish public opinion in forthcoming motion at Turkish Parliament. Specifically, the approach of Finn was based on persuading Turkish public opinion in favor of supporting the U.S.

⁴² *ibid*

⁴³ Helena Kane Finn, "Cliffhanger: Turkey and Iraq", (February 27, 2003), <http://www.cfr.org/world/cliffhanger-turkey-iraq/p5612> (accessed on May 14, 2010)

⁴⁴ *ibid*

invasion. Due to this purpose, new “Islamist” government was described as an ally who should be supported for convincing Turkish people. In addition, the publications of the institution assumed that the relations between Turkey and Israel would not change in the near future because of the mutual interests of Israel and Turkey.

3.4 Sleepless in Washington⁴⁵ : Reactions on the March 1st Decision of Turkish Parliament

After the decision of Turkish parliament on March 1st, 2003, the first evaluation came from Helena Kane Finn. First statements of her article were very clear: “Absolutely no one in Turkey wants the war. However, although, the Turkish public is 95% opposed neither the military nor the political leadership want to say no to an U.S. request”.⁴⁶ Afterwards, Finn explained the reasons of “failure” in two factors: Firstly, she referred “Turkish pride” which was damaged by the negative U.S. media campaign. “The rather racist and offensive cartoons about Turkey that appeared in the U.S. press were circulated widely before the vote and many MPs received angry phone calls from their voters”.⁴⁷ Second factor was “the enormity of the request the U.S. made”⁴⁸. According to the author, Turkey had an enormous sensitivity to the idea of stationed foreign troops in Turkey with the intention of attacking a neighboring Muslim country. Moreover, she stated that there did not exist *casus belli* which was like in the Gulf War, so many Turks did not believe the arguments of the United States.

Although Turkey was not a part of multinational forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom, invasion under the leadership of the United States began on March 20, 2003. Only five days later, a panel was organized by the CFR and scholars of the CFR, retired generals as well as former ambassadors attended as speakers.

⁴⁵ “Sleepless in Seattle”, 1993, Director: Nora Ephron, Starring: Tom Hanks, Meg Ryan and Bill Pullman

⁴⁶ Helena Kane Finn, “Turkey and the Iraq War: Another Vote in Parliament?”, (March 6, 2003), <http://www.cfr.org/world/turkey-iraq-war-another-vote-parliament/p5652> (accessed on May 14, 2010)

⁴⁷ *ibid*

⁴⁸ *ibid*

According to retired General Thomas McInerney⁴⁹, Turkey made a mistake by not taking aid package under the condition of cooperation with the United States. For whatever reason, “the U.S. could go into that, but it was a major error because Turkey would suffer financially and could very well suffer in the long run on the rebuilding of a liberated Iraq”.⁵⁰ Meanwhile, in an interview with Sharon Otterman, Associate Director of the CFR.org, the question on why Turkey refused to allow the United States access to its bases had been replied by Otterman that “there were many reasons: public opinion in Turkey which was solidly against the war; the misreading of Turkish lawmakers who thought that they could prevent the war or gain billions of dollars in aid with delaying tactics”⁵¹ and disarray within the JDP misdirected the American administration, although the agreement was finalized between the two sides. The next question was on the content of the deal between the U.S. and Turkey. Otterman responded that there were three major points:

Firstly, the U.S. could base up to 62,000 troops in Turkey temporarily on their way into northern Iraq. Second, the United States could use Turkish airbases and airspace. Third, the Turks would receive \$6 billion in direct aid, which could be leveraged into sizeable loans to defend the faltering Turkish currency. Additionally, the agreement would allow Turkey to send 10,000 to 15,000 soldiers into an area in Iraq not more than 18 kilometers from the Turkish border to set up camps to handle displaced persons.⁵²

The posterior question was what the United States would do after Turkey rejected the agreement. The author replied that the United States took back its offer of financial assistance and “senior U.S. officers urged Turkey to keep its troops out of northern Iraq”⁵³. Consequently, the author stated that although Turkey supported the United States in fight against terrorism and joined the operations of ISAF in Afghanistan, the decision of Turkish parliament would downgrade the ten years of improving relations.

⁴⁹ General Thomas G. McInerney is Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force, retired, and was Former Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force.

⁵⁰ “Crossing the Rubicon: A Status Report on Operation Iraqi Freedom”, (March 25, 2003), <http://www.cfr.org/iraq/crossing-rubicon-status-report-operation-iraqi-freedom/p5763> (accessed on July 5, 2010)

⁵¹ Sharon Otterman, “IRAQ: U.S.-Turkey Relations”, (March 31, 2003), <http://www.cfr.org/iraq/iraq-us-turkey-relations/p7795> (accessed on July 5, 2010)

⁵² *ibid*

⁵³ *ibid*

The discussion on March 1st motion headed towards the concerns on Turkish intervention in case of the emergence of an autonomous state in northern Iraq when the March 2003 ended. According to Yitzhak Nakash, Associate Professor of Modern Middle Eastern Study at Brandeis University, the prospect of a Turkish intervention to northern Iraq created sensitivity among the Kurds. Nakash opined that the more involved Turkey would give a chance to Iran for becoming influential on Iraqi Shiites, and the more involved Iran would evoke the Arab states “for saving Sunni minority in the name of God”.⁵⁴ At the same session, Eric Schwartz, Senior Fellow at the CFR⁵⁵ added that “neither the Kurds nor the Shiites or anybody said that they want to make their own states but they are in agreement that this regime must be removed”.⁵⁶ A question on who had influence on Syria about the war in Iraq was replied by Michael Doran, Adjunct Senior Fellow at the CFR⁵⁷ as “if the Turkish/Israeli alliance weathers all of these disruptions in Turkish politics and it probably will, that’s very scary for Syria with regards to its relations with the United States. Syria cannot ever to hope have its voice heard in Washington as much as the Turkish or Israeli or the new Iraqi voice and that’s profoundly threatening to the Syrians.”⁵⁸

If it goes back to the comments on March 1st motion of Turkish Parliament, on April 2003, Helena Kane Finn wrote a comprehensive article on this subject. Finn defined the decision of the Turkish Parliament as the major turning point of the Turkish foreign policy and very detrimental to the U.S.-Turkish relationship. According to her observations, Turkish military wanted the motion to pass, although the military did not like to oppose tendency of the public explicitly. On the other hand, the JDP understood the financial benefits that would accrue, “the military decided to step back and allowed the AK Party to take responsibility for a

⁵⁴ “A View from the Inside: Why Has the Road to Baghdad Gotten Longer?”, (April 1, 2003), <http://www.cfr.org/iraq/view-inside-why-has-road-baghdad-gotten-longer/p5791> (accessed on July 5, 2010)

⁵⁵ Eric P. Schwartz was the Senior Director in the Clinton National Security Council for Multilateral and Humanitarian Affairs.

⁵⁶ *ibid*

⁵⁷ Michael Doran is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University.

⁵⁸ *op.cit.*

decision that would be enormously unpopular”.⁵⁹ Finn continued to explain that both Turkish military and the AK Party misunderstood the meaning of the will of Turkish people on opposition to the war. She pointed out that “the military miscalculated the ability of the AK Party to manage the vote in the Parliament”⁶⁰. Because of the JDP’s choice on not to impose party discipline and the cartoon campaign of the U.S. media, one hundred JDP members voted against the motion.⁶¹ The author depicted the choice of the Parliament as a “terrible mistake” and stated that “Many Turks believed they could stop the war, hence, the U.S. would not go ahead without northern front”.⁶² On the other hand, Finn claimed that the major problem of the United States was the timing. The United States did not consider that new Turkish government’s inexperience in passing such an important decision from the Parliament immediately. According to the scholar, in the future, Turkey would come across “an important crossroad: Either it can work with the U.S. to restore the good relations of some fifty years or it can sink into isolationism”⁶³.

In an annotation of the CFR.org, the principles of the U.S.-Turkish relationship in next term were collected under the seven titles. The first principle important to United States’ interest was to establish good relations with the AK Party for preventing “miscalculations and miscommunications that surrounding the March 1st debacle do not recur”.⁶⁴ Second, the United States expected Turkey to work with the U.S. to resolve the Middle East dispute. Third principle was intensification of contacts with the Turkish army; thus empower the relations. Fourth, encouraging Turkey for establishing good relations with Iraqi people as well as Kurds in northern Iraq would also meaningful for the U.S.-Turkey relations. Fifth, working with Turkey on the way to achieving a resolution in Cyprus Question, and, sixth, supporting Turkey for EU membership would strengthen the bilateral relations. Final principle was assisting Turkey in improving and expanding

⁵⁹ Helena Kane Finn, “Turkey and the Iraq War”, (April 11, 2003), <http://www.cfr.org/world/turkey-iraq-war/p5931> (accessed on July 5, 2010)

⁶⁰ *ibid*

⁶¹ For comprehensive analyses of Turkish MPs during the voting, please see: Barış Kesgin and Juliet Kaarbo, “When and How Parliaments Influence Foreign Policy: The Case of Turkey’s Iraq Decision”, *International Studies Perspectives*, Vol.11, 2010

⁶² *ibid*

⁶³ *ibid*

⁶⁴ “The Effects of the Iraq War on the U.S.-Turkish Relationship”, (May 6, 2003), <http://www.cfr.org/turkey/effects-iraq-war-us-turkish-relationship/p6024> (accessed on July 5, 2010)

its educational system; hence diversifying the relationship. With reference to “U.S. Goals for the U.S.-Turkish Relationship” section of the annotation, three actors would implement these principles. First actor was the U.S. administration which should be realistic about the new populist Turkish government, because Washington should engage with MPs, “who are barely high school graduates”⁶⁵, for sharing mutual interest in all issues. Second actor was the Turkish military. According to the CFR, there was a split within the military between those supporting isolationism and those promoting Turkey’s EU membership. Third actor, the Turkish public opinion was a challenging counterpart with its rising anti-American sentiment. For shaping Turkish public opinion, it was recommended that influential members of the Turkish media would be invited to Washington and U.S. official should be ready for giving interviews to the Turkish press. Furthermore, in the long run, Turkish-American academic, professional and youth exchange programs needed to be amplified. At the final part of the annotation, gestures were expected from both parties: “The U.S. should allow Turkey a significant role in the reconstruction of Iraq, and Turkey should work much more closely with the U.S. on the resolution of the Middle East conflict”.⁶⁶

The next interview with the former U.S. ambassador to Turkey, Morton Abramowitz was on the decision of Turkish Parliament on October 7, 2003. According to the motion, Turkey would send troops to U.S.-led forces in northern Iraq⁶⁷ and “the government would allow for an unspecified number of troops to be deployed in Iraq for one year”⁶⁸. Due to the new motion of Turkish Parliament, Abramowitz explained that Turkey wanted to have influence on its neighbor and play a role in reconstruction of Iraq. Furthermore, sending troops would be helpful for fighting against PKK/KADEK and this would be a useful way to restore

⁶⁵ *ibid*

⁶⁶ *ibid*

⁶⁷ For the analysis of the decision of Turkish Parliament on October 6, 2003, please see: Ibrahim Al-Marashi, “A New Chapter in Iraqi-Turkish Relations?: Examining the Iraqi and Arab Reactions to the Proposed Turkish Deployment to Iraq,” *Insight Turkey*, January-March 2004.

⁶⁸ “Turkey to Send Troops to Iraq”, *BBC News*, (October 8, 2003), <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3172228.stm> (accessed on May 13, 2011); “Asker Tezkeresi Kabul Edildi”, *ntvmsnbc.com*, (October 7, 2003), <http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/237763.asp> (accessed on July 10, 2011)

harmony with the United States.⁶⁹ On the other hand, Abramowitz expressed that the opposition of Turkish public against the October 6 motion was not as widespread as it was on March 1st, but, there were still negative tones among the MPs from the JDP. In response to a question on what the payoff would be with regards to this motion for Turkey, Abramowitz did not state any number but continued that “the loan would help the Turkish economy and serve as a way to smooth the path to the deployment”⁷⁰ but if Turkish Parliament had passed the motion on March 1st, Turkey would have got as much as \$24 billion in loans. The last question was that as Turks are Sunni Muslims, that’s why whether Turkish troops suit in the Sunni areas around Baghdad. Abramowitz replied that it was also in U.S. officials’ minds, “they would put Turkish troops somewhere in or around Baghdad triangle, significantly away from northern Iraq”.⁷¹

If the viewpoint of the CFR on Turkey’s October 6 motion needs to be elaborated, David Philips argued that tension between Turkey and the Kurds in northern Iraq had worsened since the war because members of the Iraqi Governing Council as well as Kurds were not comfortable with the idea of settled Turkish troops in the region.⁷² Due to the approach of the Iraqi people towards Turkish troops, Philips recommended that the Bush administration should find an alternative way for withdrawing his military offer because “Iraq believes that Turkish troops will be more trouble than they are worth”⁷³.

As a result, CFR interpreted 2003 as a puzzling year for understanding Turkey. Because of the changing conditions of the post-Cold War era, Turkey earned a critical viewpoint toward the interests of American foreign policy in the Middle East and the motion on March 1st was the obvious reaction of the Turkish opposition toward American policies. Although scholars of the CFR attributed the rejection of Turkish Parliament to the divergences between the military and JDP government as well as anti-Americanist sentiments of Turkish public; it was also

⁶⁹ “Former Envoy Abramowitz: Turkey’s Decision to Deploy Peacekeepers a ‘Big Advance’ “, (October 8, 2003), <http://www.cfr.org/turkey/former-envoy-abramowitz-turkeys-decision-deploy-peacekeepers-big-advance/p6419> (accessed on July 5, 2010)

⁷⁰ *ibid*

⁷¹ *ibid*

⁷² David Philips, “Don’t Send Turkish Troops to Iraq”, (October 22, 2003), <http://www.cfr.org/iraq/dont-send-turkish-troops-iraq/p6456> (accessed on July 5, 2010)

⁷³ *ibid*

possible to read the process as the United States delayed to understand and respond to the changing conditions of Turkey and its foreign policy after the Cold War.

3.5 Requiem For An Ally⁷⁴ : Turkey's "Active" Foreign Policy and Possible Benefits for the U.S.

The year of 2004 commenced with the speech of Prime Minister Erdoğan at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. In his speech, Erdoğan expressed that "one of the main points of departure of Turkish foreign policy is membership within the structures of the Western World and this is the historical objective and nation's quest for modernization and contemporary development".⁷⁵ Throughout his speech, Erdoğan emphasized the mutual understanding between the United States and Turkey on fight against terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, poverty, famine and climate change. In Q&A session of the meeting, Peter Peterson⁷⁶ asked how the motion on March 1st would affect the U.S.-Iraq and U.S.-Turkey relations in post war era. Erdoğan replied that before the war, there were miscommunication between the two sides and that caused certain difficulties, but Turkish Parliament made its own decision that should be respected by any state. Erdoğan continued that indeed, Turkish Parliament did not refuse the motion, although the yes votes were higher, the motion did not have the necessary votes for the resolution to pass. Nevertheless, after the motion on March 1st, Erdoğan stated that Turkey accepted the request of the United States to open air corridors through overflight rights, therefore, the war ended. In the postwar period, Erdoğan pointed out that although negative statements of the American press on Turkey deeply affected Turkish public opinion, Turkey decided to send troops in the name of supporting the democratization of Iraq despite the fact that the public opinion was not in favor. Meanwhile, the next question was on Turkey's policy regarding "the autonomy of the Kurdish community in Iraq".⁷⁷ Erdoğan responded that federation

⁷⁴ "Requiem For a Dream", 2000, Director: Darren Aronofsky, Starring :Ellen Burstyn, Jared Leto, Jennifer Connelly and Marlon Wayans

⁷⁵ "Turkish Foreign Policy for the 21st Century", (January 26, 2004), <http://www.cfr.org/turkey/turkish-foreign-policy-21st-century/p6717> (accessed on July 5, 2010)

⁷⁶ Peter Peterson, Chairman of the Board of Directors at the Council on Foreign Relations

⁷⁷ Roland Paul, Lawyer

based on ethnicity would not be welcomed by Turkey and northern Iraq expressed its will on federation. But the same questioner restated the question whether Turkey also opposed ethnic federation in Cyprus. Although Prime Minister said that Annan Plan and Turkey's policy did not support ethnic group separation, Erdoğan finalized his answer with the following statement: "In Cyprus, there is no demand about federation based on ethnic structure; ethnic, religious and language-based groups are already preserved".⁷⁸ The last question on whether Turkey would play a mediating role between Syria and Israel. It was replied that Turkey would be involved and be ready to mediate in the Middle East, if there would be a demand.

At the end of January 2003, Prime Minister Erdoğan and President George W. Bush met in the White House and discussed the future of the Middle East. On this visit, David Philips wrote an article and explained that the aim of the visit as to "present Turkey as a model for democratization in the Muslim world".⁷⁹ Moreover, the author indicated that the best way to achieve this aim would be Turkey's membership to the EU. Despite the encouragement of the EU and "national obsession of Turkey" on membership, there were some major obstacles as Cyprus. According to the author, overcoming the division of the island would have many advantages one being "it would galvanize the forces for reform in Turkey"⁸⁰. That's why, President Bush should express that it would be to Turkey's interest "to distance itself from Rauf Denктаş, leader of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, who stubbornly oppose reunification"⁸¹. Furthermore, Philips argued that the United States should use its influence to secure the principles of the Annan proposal, specifically the phased withdrawal of Turkish troops and resettlement of Greek Cypriots in the north. On the other hand, Philips emphasized Turkey's security concerns in Iraq and recommended to the Bush administration to strengthen its support for Iraq's territorial integrity. On the PKK issue, the United States should on one hand increase pressure on the PKK to disarm and demobilize and on the other hand intensify between Washington and Ankara, intelligence sharing and

⁷⁸ *ibid*

⁷⁹ David L. Philips, "Bush Can Strengthen Turkey's Role in Europe", (January 27, 2004), <http://www.cfr.org/turkey/bush-can-strengthen-turkeys-role-europe/p6718> (accessed on July 15, 2010)

⁸⁰ *ibid*

⁸¹ *ibid*

cooperation on anti-terrorism. As a consequence, Philips stated that Turkey could play a vital role in the reconstruction process of Iraq and serve as a stability force in the Caucasus in case of opening the Turkish-Armenian border.

Although the agenda of 2004 began with the discussions on Iraq as in 2003, rest of the year was full of articles and meetings on Turkey's prospective EU membership process. The common point of these studies was the fact that the preliminary findings on JDP's EU policy and the viewpoint of the CFR on the JDP were expressed openly for the first time. In his article to *Foreign Affairs*, David Philips portrayed the early days of Tayyip Erdoğan as a Prime Minister:

Erdoğan had a transformative effect. He now appears to embrace without qualification Atatürk's vision of Turkey as a secular democracy. He maintains that religion is a private matter divorced from state and that, although Islam governs his personal conduct, Turkey's staunchly secular constitution is his political reference. His handling of the head scarf issue exemplifies his transformation. To rally support among traditional Turks during the campaign, Erdoğan argued against the ban on wearing headscarf in government offices and schools. But since assuming office, he has not moved to lift the restrictions.⁸²

In the same article, Philips stated that although Erdoğan might be torn between his Islamic beliefs and his politics, his foreign policy is based on to strengthen Turkey's ties with the West. In U.S.-Turkish relations, the decision of Washington on withdrawal of the offer of economic aid at the end of the motion on March 1st gave an opportunity to Erdoğan's opponent to undermine him. "Perhaps it calculated that the falling out within the AKP over the invasion of Iraq would bring down the government by driving a wedge between Erdoğan and party's more traditional wing".⁸³ However, this plan failed and the United States went to the war without Turkey. Nevertheless the U.S. failed in Iraq, Erdoğan received praise at home for keeping away its country from "the quagmire". The author also appreciated the Cyprus policy of the JDP government in order to reunite the island. He wrote that Erdoğan's policy which distanced from Rauf Denktaş was also favored by the European governments. In domestic politics, Erdoğan's efforts for EU caused a split between two camps: the supporters, who were the Foreign Ministry and General

⁸² David L. Philips, "Turkey's Dreams of Accession", *Foreign Affairs*, 83/5, September/October 2004, p.90

⁸³ *ibid*, p.92

Hilmi Özkök, Chief of the General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces, versus opponents, who were the officers of land army, army intelligence units and the corps of gendarmes due their Kemalist stance. Philips defined the opponents of the EU project that “they accused the United States of harboring a secret plan to establish an independent state of Iraqi Kurdistan and applauded academics who call for cutting ties with ‘imperialist America and the EU’”.⁸⁴ On the other hand, EU supporters as General Özkök forced opponent generals into retirement at the summer of 2003. Moreover, the supporters of the government who have the “obsession” of EU were not only some generals and Foreign Ministry; the minorities, liberals, business community and also Islamists considered the EU accession process to be the best way to introduce more human rights to Turkey. Consequently, the author put forward that if Erdoğan responded to the pressures coming from its Islamist supporters, nationalists would attack him for undermining the secularist principles of Turkey or the army would undertake actions as it did in the past. In the next general election, if the JDP failed and the Republican People’s Party (CHP) won, “such a change of guard could seem superficially appealing to the Bush administration”.⁸⁵ Indeed, although the U.S. administration supports Erdoğan, Pentagon is uncomfortable with the Islamic ideas of the JDP government.

In response to David Philips’ article, Wolfgang Schauble, Federal Minister of Finance in second cabinet of Merkel ⁸⁶ wrote up an article in the next issue of *Foreign Affairs*. The author argued that although Turkey is an important actor for the West, a perception that only full membership can preserve this relationship should not be the case. Instead of shutting the door, the author proposed to think on a new framework for cooperation to expand the borders of bilateral relations between the EU and Turkey. This framework could be under the name of “privileged partnership” and “this is what should be considered for Turkey”.⁸⁷ Although Schauble usually agreed with the Philips’ approach in Turkey’s economic

⁸⁴ *ibid*, p.93

⁸⁵ *ibid*, p.96

⁸⁶ From 1984 to 1991 the author was a member of Helmut Kohl's cabinet, first as Federal Minister for Special Affairs of Germany and Chief of the Chancellery and then as Federal Minister of the Interior. Between 1991 and 2000, he was chairman of the CDU/CSU group in the Bundestag. He served again as Federal Minister of the Interior in the First Cabinet Merkel from 2005 to 2009.

⁸⁷ Wolfgang Schauble, “Talking Turkey”, *Foreign Affairs*, 83/6, November/December 2004

(Note: Due to the fact that the online versions of *Foreign Affairs*’ articles were generally in use, page numbers in online articles could not be cited.)

and political development and “ardent desire” to join the EU, he did not approve the idea of the only reason to reject Turkey would be its religion. Moreover, he explained the possible reason of refusal of Turkey’s membership that “a far more likely explanation for Europe’s hesitation to admit Turkey is an awareness of the potential problems that could arise from the integration of a country that share hundreds of miles of borders with Syria and Iran”.⁸⁸ Then, the author asked that whether Turkey is aware of the responsibilities of the membership, for instance; it will have to share their national sovereignty with EU institutions or they might have to renounce its close partnership with NATO. The author continued that with the last enlargement circle, the EU has to concentrate on its current and new ten members; and not on “a country that could soon have a bigger population than any EU member states and that would require substantial assistance before its economic structure could be brought into Europe”.⁸⁹ That is why; discussing “privileged partnership” would be the only realistic option for the future and Philips should be aware of that full membership is still “a long way off”.⁹⁰ Schauble proposed that for the sake of passing the honesty test, EU must urgently develop a pathway for its neighbors that want to intensify their cooperation with it. “Turkey in this regard can be a special case and offers special opportunities”⁹¹ when EU focuses on its own integration among current members. At the end of the article, David Philips wrote a note which replied the question of Schauble. The scholar of the CFR stated that there exist many reasons for starting the accession negotiations with Ankara thanks to Turkey’s well-trained and disciplined work force for supporting Europe’s economy as well as Turkey’s attractive export market for European goods and Turkey’s sophisticated army stand between Europe and the Middle East and Central Asia. From the political aspect, including Turkey as member to the EU would send a message to its own religious minorities that would have a moderating effect on these groups.

The following publication on Turkey was an interview with Steven Cook and the scope was Turkey’s prospective membership to the EU. Cook explained the

⁸⁸ *ibid*

⁸⁹ *ibid*

⁹⁰ *ibid*

⁹¹ *ibid*

reason of the JDP government's enthusiasm for the EU that although the JDP have "Islamic roots", the reforms process for the full membership means "forging a Kemalist reformation from the outside that they cannot do it themselves from the inside"⁹². Contrary to the previous Islamist leaders, Erdoğan and the JDP see the EU as the best way for achieving human rights. A question on how the United States see Turkey's membership process replied by the interviewee that although there are some concerns on Turkey that may be moving away from the United States in case of membership, "for a long time the U.S. expect Turkey to line up shoulder-to-shoulder with the U.S. on almost every issue"⁹³.

Turkey agenda of the CFR in 2005 was also under the heel of the prospective membership to the EU. The first interview on Turkey's EU accession process was with Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, former President of France⁹⁴. The former president of France replied a question on Turkey's potential membership and the forthcoming European Constitution referendum in France that the entry of Turkey is "not a realistic approach" and according to the main document on Turkey's membership, 1993 Copenhagen criteria, EU will work for improving cooperation with Turkey but no membership was mentioned there.⁹⁵

The second heading of the 2005 agenda was naturally Iraq. In May 2005, Qubad Talabani, the U.S. Representative of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)⁹⁶ attended open discussion in New York office of the CFR and a journalist in asked the perspective of Talabani JR on the PKK issue. Qubad Talabani replied that the PKK issue has risen by Turkey and there needs to be a dialogue among parties for the solution. Talabani do not think that the solution would be military based and the PKK is not like in the 90s, it is much weaker and wants to adapt civilian life, an amnesty program may solve the problem in the long run.⁹⁷

⁹² "Cook: Despite Some European Qualms, Turkey Will Eventually Join the EU", (October 5, 2004), <http://www.cfr.org/world/cook-despite-some-european-qualms-turkey-eventually-join-eu/p7427> (accessed on July 5, 2010)

⁹³ *ibid*

⁹⁴ Valéry Giscard d'Estaing is chairman of the European Convention as well.

⁹⁵ "The New European Institutions: An Opportunity for Transatlantic Relations?", (March 7, 2005), <http://www.cfr.org/world/new-european-institutions-opportunity-transatlantic-relations/p7964> (accessed on July 5, 2010)

⁹⁶ Qubad Talabani is son of Jelial Talabani.

⁹⁷ "Iraq's Political Transition", (May 5, 2005), http://www.cfr.org/publication/8090/iraqs_political_transition.html (accessed on July 5, 2010)

In the summer of 2005, Abdullah Gül, Minister of Foreign Affairs gave a speech at the CFR in its New York branch. As in Erdoğan's speech of 2004, Gül mentioned the security aspect of the bilateral relations as fighting against terrorism and the PKK and mutual operations under the framework of NATO. Turkey's prospective membership to the EU, Turkish foreign policy in Cyprus Question and the Middle East dispute were the headlines of the agenda of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. In Q&A session, the first question was on arising anti-Americanism in Turkey. Gül expressed that he did not believe this tendency, results of surveys on public opinion about this issue is almost same with other European countries as France.⁹⁸ A question on consequences of referendum in France and the Netherlands replied by the Minister that this is good neither for European integration nor for Turkey. Although Turkey did not satisfy the EU with its reformation process, it would continue because of the aim of Turkey to upgrade in all fields, not only in democracy. The next question was asked on Turkey's northern Iraq policy. Gül stated that the Iraqis firstly need to decide on their regime but Turkey fully supports the territorial integrity of Iraq and its political unity. Then David Philips posed on the closed Armenia- Turkey border and postponed conference of Turkish historians on the Ottoman Armenians.⁹⁹ Gül responded that 40,000 Armenians of Yerevan-origin today live in Turkey and have jobs, save money and everything is very peaceful for them.¹⁰⁰ The problem derives from the Armenian occupation in Nagorno-Karabakh, although it is politically very complicated, Turkey wants to

⁹⁸ "A Conversation with H.E. Mr.Gul", (June 7, 2005), <http://www.cfr.org/world/conversation-hemr-abdullah-gul/p8189> (accessed on July 5, 2010)

⁹⁹ In May 2005, many academicians from different disciplines decided to organize a conference entitled "Ottoman Armenians during the Collapse of the Empire: Scientific Responsibility and Democracy" at Boğaziçi University. With the announcement of the program of conference, firstly it was delayed due to the nationalist reactions, and then it was postponed by the decision of Istanbul Provincial Administrative Court. At the end, it was took place on September 23, 2005 at İstanbul Bilgi University. Throughout the postponement process, it began a discussion on the history of the Armenian who lived in the territory of Ottoman Empire and genocide allegations in 1915. Please see: "Armenian Forum Ban Splits Turks", *BBC News*, (September 23, 2005), <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4275312.stm> (accessed on May 17, 2011); for the program of the conference, see: http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkish/conference_programme.doc (accessed on May 17, 2011); for the statement of Turkish politicians on the postponement decision of Istanbul Provincial Administrative Court, see: "Ermeni Konferansı Durduruldu", *BBC Turkish*, (September 22, 2005), http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkish/europe/story/2005/09/050922_armenians.shtml (accessed on May 17, 2011); for the abstract of the papers presented at the conference, see: "Ermeni Konferansı Sona Erdi", *BBC Turkish*, (September 26, 2005), http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkish/europe/story/2005/09/050926_armenian_conference.shtml (accessed on May 17, 2011)

¹⁰⁰ These people live in Turkey, as temporary residents and many times illegally.

solve this problem too. On the other hand, Gül expressed his sadness about the postponement and he added that “there’s a public sensitivity about that but the government ask (academicians) to continue with this conference, unfortunately, it was reflected outside that the government postponed this.”¹⁰¹ The last question was on the decision of Turkish Parliament on March 1st, 2003. Gül replied that this was the will of people who suffered from terrorism. Although the “yes votes” were more than “no votes”, it could not get approved, but this was not a sign of rising anti-Americanism wave in Turkey. That was the voice of a neighbor who suffered terrorism and lost its own 4,000 people in fight against terrorism.

Next visit made by the Prime Minister Erdoğan focused on the mutual interests of the United States and Turkey in Iraq, the Middle East, North Africa and Black Sea, Eurasian region as well as Cyprus. Joan Spero, Director at the CFR¹⁰² asked the first question of the meetings on the Middle East policy of the JDP government. Erdoğan replied that until the JDP government, Turkey did not have a close relationship with the Middle Eastern countries. But the JDP government engaged with these countries, moreover, with the U.S., this relationship evolved with the initiative for a broader Middle East and North Africa.¹⁰³ The following question was on the Erdoğan’s statement that goes as the Kurdish question required more democracy and human rights in Turkey. Erdoğan explained that although he did not name the question as the Kurdish question, it is possible to call it the east problem, the southeast problem or the Kurdish problem. Irrespective of a specific name, the JDP recognized the problem in its first party program and elaborated on the content and the possible solutions.¹⁰⁴ According to Erdoğan, the problem is not based on “sub-identity or one region, the objective is to throw out democracy and human rights to all of the people of Turkey as Copenhagen criteria foresees.”¹⁰⁵ The legal amendments due to the EU reform process were not only for the people of Kurdish descent, but for all citizens of Turkey. The aim of next question was on

¹⁰¹ “A Conversation with H.E. Mr.Gul”, (June 7, 2005)

¹⁰² Joan Spero is the President of Doris Duke Charitable Foundation as well as a Trustee of Columbia University and the Brookings Institution.

¹⁰³ “A Conversation with Recep Tayyip Erdogan”, (September 13, 2005), <http://www.cfr.org/turkey/conversation-recep-tayyip-erdogan-rush-transcript-federal-news-service-inc/p8880> (accessed on July 5, 2010)

¹⁰⁴ *ibid*

¹⁰⁵ *ibid*

modernism, tradition of Islamic civilization and the Turkish history in modernization process. Erdoğan stressed that Turkey is a good example that Islam is compatible with modernity and “others may wish to take some of the things that we do as example”¹⁰⁶, however, Turkey’s policy is not to export a regime. The last question was on the women participation both in Turkish politics and the JDP government. Erdoğan replied that although this is the weakest point of Turkey, JDP has 27 women parliamentarians because of the party’s 16-months-old organization structure.

The year of 2006 commenced with the article of Turkish scholars published in *Foreign Affairs*. The study argued the changing civil-military relations in terms of Turkey’s prospective membership to the EU. According the authors, there exists a consensus between Turkey’s new leaders and the military on working together for the EU:

For Erdoğan and his party, the decision to endorse reform was easy. Committing to economic liberalization and privatization, as demanded by the EU, would ingratiate the party with the Turkish public, especially the business elite and a growing Muslim bourgeoisie. Deeper engagement with Europe would allow the AKP to shift away from a U.S.-centric foreign policy. For (General Chief of Staff) Özkök and the armed forces, the calculus remained the same. And so, as long as the new politicians remained loyal to the grand consensus, their Islamism would be an irritant but not a deal breaker.¹⁰⁷

The scholars continued that pressure came from Brussels also helped to prevent conflicts between military and civilians. For instance, the AKP put away its “hardcore religious supporters” who defended lifting the ban of headscarves in universities and in public institutions by saying that the ban will be resolved during the EU negotiations. Similar to that, the AKP inhibited the anger of the military on Kurdish demands by referring to the Copenhagen criteria.

The first comprehensive report of the CFR on Turkish-American relations was published within *Council Special Report* (CSRs) in June 2006. The main aim of these special reports was “to provide a rapid response to a developing crisis or contribute to the public’s understanding of current policy dilemmas”¹⁰⁸ and the

¹⁰⁶ *ibid*

¹⁰⁷ Ersel Aydınli, Nihat Ali Özcan and Doğan Akyaz, “The Turkish Military’s March Toward Europe”, *Foreign Affairs*, 85/1, January/February 2006

¹⁰⁸ http://www.cfr.org/publication/by_type/special_report.html (accessed on May 18, 2010)

sponsors were Ahmet Ertegün, Carnegie Corporation of New York and the Council on Foreign Relations.¹⁰⁹ In its “Introduction” part, the authors explained their starting point for this dossier as “the fabric of the American relationship with Turkey became badly frayed as a result of the Bush administration’s decision to invade Iraq and the U.S. and Turkey have diverged on a variety of other important foreign policy issues, including Syria, Iran and Israel.”¹¹⁰ As the scholars stated that the “sources of friction” between the two allies stemmed from various incidents such as American pressure on Ankara to allow U.S. troops to enter Iraq through Turkey before the Operation Iraqi Freedom and the refusal decision of Turkish Parliament on March 1st, 2003; the U.S. arrest of eleven Turkish Special Forces soldiers in Suleymaniye due to the allegation of planning to assassinate Kurdish leaders in July 2003; and Turkey’s offer to send troops to Iraq for helping reconstruction and peace settlement. These developments coincided with the foreign policy debate in Turkey which for the first time, public was an actor. In this trend, “there has been a strident anti-American tone in the chambers of the Turkish Grand National Assembly and in Turkish media”.¹¹¹ This attitude caused “sharp diminution of contact and impatience” in Washington administration and Pentagon.

The chapter of “Sources of Friction” explained the divergence between the U.S. and Turkey in seven regions. The first headline was Iraq. The authors put forward that the two countries have two mutual principles: Territorial integrity of Iraq is essential and the PKK is a terrorist organization. Beyond that, there exist sharp divergences. Turkey believed the United States had two main mistakes in terms of invading Iraq: Washington ignored the early warnings of Turkey on the possible consequences of invasion; and, it has not taken sufficient care to Turkey’s security concerns. Consequently, Turks decided that the U.S. did not support Turkey’s struggle against the PKK and supported an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq. Furthermore, the Kirkuk case was another problem which caused disagreement between the two countries. Ankara requested Washington to force two amendments to the Iraq constitution. First, Turkey wanted that the referendum on

¹⁰⁹ Steven A. Cook and Elizabeth Sherwood- Randall, “Generating Momentum for a New Era in U.S.-Turkey Relations”, *Council Special Reports*, No. 15, June 2006, p.vii

¹¹⁰ *ibid*, p.3

¹¹¹ *ibid*, p.9

Kirkuk's status should be voted by the entire country. Second, Ankara also wanted to delay the referendum two years. Both ideas have been rebuffed by Washington.¹¹² In the early days of the invasion, although a number of operations were organized against the PKK by the U.S.; the depth and scope of the operations did not satisfy Turkey. Due to the fact that the only stable region of Iraq, northern Iraq, was an important point for the U.S. forces, "it would be illogical for them to take any action that might destabilize the only region of Iraq that has been relatively quiet".¹¹³

The second heading of the chapter was the European Union. Throughout the Bush administration, Washington sent mixed signals on Turkey's membership to the EU. In the first term, some American officials stated that the membership of Turkey to the EU could distance Ankara from Washington. This debate was over at the second term of the Bush administration and strong support was announced by Washington. On the other hand, in the spring of 2005, there was a strong public opposition to Turkey's membership due to the referendum in France and the Netherlands. In the case that Ankara's bid for EU membership fails, "there would be a significant risk that Turkey shifts its direction in foreign policy and look elsewhere for strategic advantage".¹¹⁴ In this scenario, Turkey may contact with alternative partners in Russia and the Islamic geography. Concerns about this option should have warned American policy makers to prevent such an outcome.

The third region of the chapter was Cyprus. Due to the failure of the Annan Plan, the AK Party came to the conclusion Cyprus would be an obstacle for the EU membership:

The United States has undertaken a series of initiatives to ease the isolation of Turkish Cyprus. Beginning in 2004, the United States initiated the "Cyprus Partnership for Economic Growth," a \$30.5 million program intended to assist Turkish Cypriot businesses in the banking, agriculture, and tourism sectors. It has expanded visa validity for holders of TRNC travel documents, and U.S. government officials permitted to travel directly to Turkish Cyprus on tourist passports. In May 2005, the U.S. Congressional Turkey Study Group flew directly to Ercan Airport in Turkish Cyprus from Istanbul, conducted a series of meetings, and flew from Ercan to Ankara. In the fall of the same year, Turkish Cypriot legislators met with members of the Congressional Turkey

¹¹² *ibid*, p.11

¹¹³ *ibid*, p.12

¹¹⁴ *ibid*, p.14

Study Group in Washington, DC. Finally, in October 2005, Secretary of State Rice met with Talat in her office.¹¹⁵

Additionally, the action plan of Turkish government on lifting restrictions on public and private relations with Cyprus in January 2006 supported by Washington and the rejection of the Annan Plan by the government of Cyprus created “disappointment” in the American administration.

The Middle East policy of the JDP government was evaluated in a detailed manner at the report. The authors analyzed it under four titles: Syria, Iran, Israel and Hamas. But the overall consequence was that “foreign policy intellectuals within the AK Party suggest that, because its population is almost entirely Muslim, has a natural affinity with its neighbors to the East”.¹¹⁶ In case of Syria, the authors pointed out that Washington was uncomfortable with Ankara’s close relations with Damascus, specifically on three issues: First, when the U.S. warned Syria for taking modest steps for political liberalization, Turkey’s close relations with Syria did not serve this purpose. Second, while the West isolated Syria diplomatically due to the assassination allegations of the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, Ankara’s relations remained friendly. Third, the United States expressed discontent that “Damascus provide safe haven for former Iraqi Ba’athist leaders and directly aided the insurgency by allowing jihadists from around the world to use Syria as a transit point for entry into Iraq.”¹¹⁷ On the other hand, Turkey has already known that its neighbor, Syria was more important than the interests of the United States, nevertheless Ankara also avoided the endorsement of the Syrian regime. Turkish officials argued that relations of Turkey with Syria offer a channel to Washington for transmitting its messages and warnings to Syrian officials. For Turkey’s point of view, isolating Syria would mean destabilization in the region. In the case of Iran, bilateral relations between the U.S. and Turkey are similar to Syria. As Washington was concerned about the Iran’s nuclear program, “Turkey regarded cordial relations with the Iranians as a means of guarding against potential Iranian meddling”.¹¹⁸ Consecutively, authors paid attention that the management of relations with

¹¹⁵ *ibid*, p.16

¹¹⁶ *ibid*, p.18

¹¹⁷ *ibid*, p.19

¹¹⁸ *ibid*, p.20

Teheran would be a sensitive issue between Washington and Ankara. In the case of Israel, since the AKP came to power, the bilateral relations between Jerusalem and Ankara have been “periodic strains”. For instance, Prime Minister Erdoğan criticized Israeli policy in Gaza Strip as “state-sponsored terrorism” in May 2004. The prime minister’s rhetoric led to concern both in Israel and the United States. Furthermore, at the same year, Turkey also indicated that Israel provided military and intelligence support to Iraqi Kurds. Despite the tension, Turkey and Israel continued joint military projects; additionally, Turkey mediated the first public, official talks between Israel and Pakistan in September 2005. Lastly, in the case of Hamas, Hamas leader Khaled Mashal’s Ankara visit in February 2006 was interpreted as “an initiative both to broaden Turkish foreign policy and raise Turkey’s profile in the Arab and Islamic worlds”¹¹⁹ by the authors. In contrast to U.S. and Israeli reactions to this visit, Turkey argued that Ankara could play a mediator role between the Palestinians and the Israelis. In spite of statements of Turkish officials, Hamas’ visit caused concerns that “Turkey is not an ally that can be counted on by the United States or its European partners”.

Consequently, the last chapter of the study offered an agenda for the future of the bilateral relations both in short and long run. In short term track, the most urgent issue was the establishment of a unitary Iraqi federal state. In case of dissolution of Iraq, the U.S. position in the Persian Gulf and Middle East would be threatened and the northern Kurds’ fight for independence would also be a problem for Turkey, Syria and Iran. For the name of preventing such conflicts, the trilateral dialogue between Turks and “legitimate representatives of the Iraqi Kurds” should have been established. If the unified Iraqi government is successful, this trilateral organization could support its implementations. On the other hand, cooperation between the United States and Turkey should have included officials from the American and Turkish governments, and The National Security Council, the State Department and Foreign Ministry, the Defense Department and General Staff. Representatives from Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Barzani’s Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) along with officials from the Iraqi Prime Ministry

¹¹⁹ *ibid*, p.22

and Ministry of Interior need to take place at the trilateral organization.¹²⁰ The agenda of this process was defined by the authors based on three purposes: clarifying the position of all parties for the future of Iraq; identifying areas of common interest; possible avenues for dealing with the PKK in northern Iraq in collaboration with the PUK and KDP. The short term purposes of the future agenda were not restricted to Iraq. Both authors had recommendations for Turkey and the United States on the Cyprus issue and European Union. Due to the fact that “at various times and under different circumstances, Turkey’s Islamic, European and nationalist identities would drive Ankara’s view of the world, but the goal of U.S. diplomacy with its European partners should be to develop a plan for anchoring Turkey in the West through the EU and strong bilateral ties”.¹²¹ Regarding Cyprus issue, scholars advised that the U.S. should have immediately assigned a special Cyprus coordinator (SCC), a position established in 1981. This strong bipartisan representative should have begun a high-level and discreet dialogue with all relevant parties and despite of influential Greek-American community, the Bush administration should have encouraged exchanges between the U.S. and northern Cyprus. These steps would encourage Ankara to implement its action plan for Cyprus and erode the international isolation of northern Cyprus.

In the long run, the aim of the U.S.-Turkey relations should be determined by new bilateral high-level commission:

The United States should propose to Turkey the establishment of a high-level commission that would meet twice a year and provide a structured and ongoing mechanism for interaction across agencies of government, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the private sector.(...) The U.S.-Turkish Cooperation Commission (USTCC) should be headed by a senior government official in both Washington and Ankara who has the power to convene all the relevant agencies and to discipline them to follow through on “deliverables” agreed upon during formal sessions. Secretary of State Rice and Foreign Minister Gul should provide the leadership for this effort.(...) Agencies participating in such an undertaking should at a minimum include the U.S. Department of State and Foreign Ministry, the U.S. Department of Defense, and the Turkish General Staff, as well as parallel institutions dealing with finance, commerce, and education. Further, such a process will benefit from the involvement of the private sector and relevant NGOs.¹²²

¹²⁰ *ibid*, p.26

¹²¹ *ibid*, p.27

¹²² *ibid*, pp.29-30

The authors recommended that the commission should be organized under three working groups: The first group should include security, military, diplomatic and intelligence representatives and agenda of the sub-group should be based on the future of Iraq, the nuclear program of Iran, engagement in the Middle East, democratization in Central Asia, security cooperation in the Caucasus. The second working group should focus on the expansion of economic relations between the U.S. and Turkey. “The U.S. Department of the Treasury should lead a process that focuses on economic reform and Turkey’s prospects for economic integration both regionally and globally. Moreover, the U.S. Department of Commerce has tools at its disposal that can stimulate greater private sector interest in Turkey.”¹²³ The third working group should concentrate on the development of cultural exchanges between the U.S. and Turkey, “with heavy emphasis on the expansion of educational opportunities that create a foundation of understanding for the future.”¹²⁴ Consequently, last advice of the report was that Turkey was in need of change of its official position on Armenian genocide. “Both Washington and Ankara need to consider what steps they can take to reduce the extent to which this issue is a constant irritant to the relationship. The Bush administration should continue to oppose efforts on Capitol Hill to pass an Armenian genocide resolution.”¹²⁵

Following four articles¹²⁶ which summarized the focal points of the report, a presentation of the study¹²⁷ was made by new Council member, Marc Grossman, the former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey. After the brief presentation of Grossman

¹²³ *ibid*, p.31

¹²⁴ *ibid*, p.32

¹²⁵ *ibid*, pp.32-33

¹²⁶ Steven A. Cook and Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, “U.S.-Turkey Relations Seriously Damaged by Iraq War, Finds Council Special Report”, (June 21, 2006), <http://www.cfr.org/turkey/us-turkey-relations-seriously-damaged-iraq-war-finds-council-special-report/p10934> (accessed on July 5, 2010); “Building a New Era in U.S.-Turkey Relations”, (June 22, 2006), <http://www.cfr.org/turkey/building-new-era-us-turkey-relations/p11002> (accessed on July 5, 2010); “The U.S. and Turkey: Rebuilding a Fractured Alliance”, (July 3, 2006), <http://www.cfr.org/turkey/us-turkey-rebuilding-fractured-alliance/p11039> (accessed on July 5, 2010); “Cook: Friction in U.S.-Turkey Relations over Iraqi Kurdistan”, (August 31, 2006), <http://www.cfr.org/turkey/cook-friction-us-turkey-relations-over-iraqi-kurdistan/p11378> (accessed on July 5, 2010)

¹²⁷ “Fractured Alliance? The Future of U.S.- Turkey Relations”, (June 22, 2006), <http://www.cfr.org/turkey/fractured-alliance-future-us-turkey-relations-transcript-federal-news-service-inc/p11014> (accessed on July 5, 2010)

and of the authors, attendants posed their question on the study and the future of Turkish-American relations. The first question was on Turkey's prospective EU membership and the long lag in Turkish membership. Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall replied that the first step should be to strengthen ties between Turkey and the U.S. By this way, in case of failure in Turkey's full membership, "Turkey would anchor in the strongest possible bilateral relationship with the United States"¹²⁸. In context of Turkey-EU relations, another question focused on that whether Turkey's religious identity played a role for the Europeans who resisted the membership of Turkey. Steven Cook responded that although EU represented multi-cultural Europe, there are also dissonances among Europeans who think that if Turkey joins the EU, one in three Europeans would be Muslim. "The people whom Germans have watched sweep their streets over the course of the last 15-20 years will have the most representation in the European Parliament"¹²⁹, so it takes time but at the end of the day, "this is primarily a religious issue"¹³⁰.

After the summer of 2006 which passed with the discussion on the future of U.S.-Turkey relations, an interview made with Steven Cook was the last article of the year which focused on Turkey-EU relations. Cook evaluated the status of ongoing negotiations as double-headed policy of the Union. While European leaders publicly support Turkey's entry, on the other hand, the European public opposed to membership in consequence of referendum in France and the Netherlands. "And it's clearly a religious issue although many Europeans never admit to it"¹³¹. Furthermore, Cook expressed that official membership will resolve many problems in Turkey such as secularism, freedom of expression, border problems with the Kurds, above all the issue of Kurdish nationalism. Finally in U.S. relations with Turkey, Cook observed that the Bush administration felt the Turkish military would support the motion on March 1st as they always supported the United States. But in this case, threat perception of the military about Saddam Hussein was not at the same level with the U.S. Nevertheless, the military did not

¹²⁸ *op.cit.*

¹²⁹ *ibid*

¹³⁰ *ibid*

¹³¹ "Cook: Pope's Visit Finds Turkey Preoccupied with European, Kurdish, Cypriot Issues", (November 20, 2006), <http://www.cfr.org/turkey/cook-popes-visit-finds-turkey-preoccupied-european-kurdish-cypriot-issues/p12059> (accessed on July 5, 2010)

oppose to the motion because the Kurds were not a problem at that time and the PKK declared a unilateral ceasefire. The main concern of the generals was the public opinion. At the end of the day, the public opinion highly dislike the idea of war and new Turkish government was ambivalent about it.

As a conclusion, post-motion on March 1st period was the scene of hegemonic power struggle between Turkey and the United States. The United States, as a hegemonic power wanted to realize its foreign policy interests in the Middle East, but Turkey's agenda, as a middle power country was not strictly compatible with the U.S. and the rejection of the motion on March 1st was the exact sample of this struggle. On the other hand, disagreement between the two countries did not cause total divergence between Ankara and Washington. As the publication of the CFR stated that there were still mutual interests of the two countries during the Bush administration as Iraq and the PKK issue which were mentioned in detail at the Cook and Sherwood-Randall's report. In addition, the noted period was important in terms of Turkey's prospective EU membership process. Another sign of the demarche between the two countries was the U.S. buttress to Turkey's enthusiasm on the way of the EU. Although Washington frequently expressed its concerns about the future of the bilateral relations in case of Turkey's full membership to the EU; these concerns never properly explained by the CFR.

3.6 All Quiet on the Eastern Front¹³² : CFR's Comments on Turkey's Domestic Politics and the Future of the Bilateral Relations

Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdullah Gül was the first guest speaker of the 2007 Turkey agenda of the CFR. In his speech, Gül emphasized the intensive trade relations between Iraq and Turkey as well as underlined the importance of Iraq's territorial integrity.¹³³ In Q&A session, an attendant asked the limits of "Turkish

¹³² "All Quiet on the Western Front", 1930, Director: Lewis Milestone, Starring: Louis Wolheim and Lew Ayres

¹³³ "A Conversation with Abdullah Gül", (February 13, 2007), http://www.cfr.org/publication/12632/conversation_with_abdullah_gl_rush_transcript_federal_news_service.html?breadcrumb=%2Fpublication%2Fpublication_list%3Fgroupby%3D0%26type%3Dtranscript%26filter%3D358 (accessed on May 30, 2010)

patience” both in Cyprus question and EU and then, interrogated that how much Turkey would endure if the negotiations become apparent that the EU is not prepared to admit Turkey. Gül responded that Turkey has no alternative plan and everything is so clear for Turkish governments. The important point for Turkey is to reach same standards in terms of democracy, economy and other important fields. The following question addressed the linkage between rising nationalism in Turkey, article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code and the murder of Hrant Dink.¹³⁴ Gül responded that the government will amend the noted article and they will do it with consultation to civil society in Turkey. The reason of amendment is that the article is an obstacle to freedom of expression as well as it shadows the reform process in Turkey. Although “the people think that journalists, intellectuals are in prison because of the article 301; indeed they are not. But unfortunately, some prosecutors (took an action against) these people but none of them was punished because of the article yet. In fact, in some of the member countries, similar articles are in force but the implementation is going wrong in Turkey.”¹³⁵

The 2007 Turkey agenda of the CFR focused on the PKK issue as well as Turkey’s domestic politics. According to Steven Cook, the major problem between Turkey and the U.S. was “Turkey’s fear of a resurgent PKK terrorist group and the failure of either the U.S. or the Kurdish autonomous government to do anything to thwart it.”¹³⁶ The interviewee attributed the blowup in the bilateral relations to three factors: First, the U.S. misread the events before the motion on March 1st. Turkey has a nationalist population as well as “its young population reminded the memoirs of World War I when foreign troops entered the country to dismember

¹³⁴ Turkish-Armenian newspaper editor Hrant Dink was shot dead outside of his office in newspaper *Agos* on January 19, 2007. Before he was shot by nationalist teenager, he was prosecuted to breach the Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code with the allegation of insulting ‘Turkishness’. After his death, due to the reactions of many civil organizations, noted article amended. Please see: Sarah Rainsford, “Killing Sparks ‘Turkishness’ Row”, *BBC News*, (February 9, 2007), <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6343809.stm> (accessed on May 19, 2011); “Turkey Moves to Amend Speech Law”, (November 6, 2007), <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7081747.stm> (accessed on May 19, 2011), “AKP’de Soru: ‘301’ İznini Kim Versin?”, *Radikal*, (January 4, 2008), <http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalHaberDetayV3&ArticleID=836339&Date=10.06.2011&CategoryID=98> (accessed on June 10, 2011)

¹³⁵ *op.cit.*

¹³⁶ “Cook: Turkish-U.S. Tensions ‘Great Underreported Story of Iraq War’”, (March 29, 2007), <http://www.cfr.org/turkey/cook-turkish-us-tensions-great-underreported-story-iraq-war/p12963> (accessed July 5, 2010)

it.”¹³⁷ Due to that, there was vibrant reaction to the presence of the U.S. troops. Second, the Turkish military thought that the Operation Iraqi Freedom was not feasible, not because of their tolerance to Saddam Hussein, but because former leader was not a significant threat to Turkey. Besides, the presence of Saddam Hussein meant the stability in Iraq which was better than independent Kurdish state for Turkey. Third, at the time of voting, there was a new Turkish government and it was unclear that they would be able to deliver enough votes for passing the motion. Additionally, the U.S. did not have enough answers for the questions of Turkish government as “how long the troops would stay?” or “what would be the plan for post-hostilities Iraq?”. The following question was on the upcoming referendum in Kirkuk. Cook explained that Iraq Study Group¹³⁸ also supported the delay in referendum because it could result in either violence or further problems in U.S.-Turkish relations. Cook told that although Turks claim that Kirkuk is historically a Turkish city, there is also a considerable Kurdish population, so “Turkey has broader strategic interests in preventing Kirkuk from becoming part of the Kurdish regional government.”¹³⁹ In competing interests of the U.S., Washington has to balance maintaining a relationship with Turkey, which is a historical ally, and its immediate allies in northern Iraq, the Kurds. As a result, Cook mentioned the special envoy of the U.S. for countering the PKK and the defined the mission of retired Air Force General Joseph Ralston “to bring together Turks and Iraqis for talking about the PKK issue and to build some trust between the U.S. and Turkey”¹⁴⁰.

In April 2007, Turkish presidential elections got in bind and political scene focused on the debate of secularism versus Islamism. The JDP government nominated Abdullah Gül, Minister of Foreign Affairs as a candidate for the presidential election but did not constitute the majority for elected him as a president. According to the former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey, Morton

¹³⁷ *ibid*

¹³⁸ Iraq Study Group was a ten-person bipartisan organization appointed by the United States Congress on March 15, 2006. The mission of the group was to assess the Iraq war and making policy recommendations to the Bush administration. For the final report of the group on December 6, 2006, please see: <http://www.usip.org/isg/index.html> (accessed on May 20, 2011)

¹³⁹ *op.cit.*

¹⁴⁰ *ibid*

Abramowitz, stir of the secularists was against Prime Minister Erdoğan, many secularists considered him as “very deceptive man due to his religious aspirations for changing the political system”¹⁴¹. On the other hand, some of the JDP members thought that if Erdoğan became president, the JDP may lose the votes in upcoming elections; that is why, Erdoğan chose Gül as a candidate for presidential election. A question on the polarized political atmosphere in Turkey replied by Abramowitz that religion is a very polarizing issue in Turkey and many secularists worry that “Islamists will change the nature of Turkish life, leading to more headscarves and more attention to religious schools”¹⁴². But Abramowitz also pointed out that the AKP government was significantly successful in last five years. From the U.S. aspect, the JDP government has done a good job, the two countries worked together in many issues. Although Abramowitz personally have some concerns as a secular, he also stated that Turkey would not be an extremist state as long as it wants to get into the European Union.

While the crisis on presidential election in Turkey took the CFR’s attention; Soner Çağaptay, Senior Fellow and Director of the Turkish Research Program at the Washington Institute wrote a different article which looks inside the JDP government. The author described the problem on presidential election that “Erdoğan wanted to use his party’s disproportionate parliament majority to elect the new president and made its decision without consultation with the society, the opposition or a debate in the press”.¹⁴³ Parallel to that, he referred to the “majoritarian malaise” which was the tradition of right-wing parties in Turkey for imposing their control on Parliament and ignoring democratic checks and balances. The author implemented the term into the JDP case as:

The AKP has exercised almost unchecked executive and legislative power since the 2002 elections. The party's attempt to appoint one of its own leaders to the presidency would have completed its dominance of the executive and legislative branches and also put control of the judiciary within grasp.

¹⁴¹ “Abramowitz: Major Political Clash in Turkey between ‘Secularists’ and ‘Islamists’”, (April 27, 2007), <http://www.cfr.org/turkey/abramowitz-major-political-clash-turkey-between-secularists-islamists/p13211> (accessed on July 5, 2010)

¹⁴² *ibid*

¹⁴³ Soner Çağaptay, “Turkey’s Ongoing Political Crisis: Where Now?”, (May 9, 2007), <http://www.cfr.org/turkey/washington-institute-turkeys-ongoing-political-crisis-now/p13357> (accessed on June 5, 2010)

Parliament elects the president, whose few powers include the appointment of judges to the high courts.¹⁴⁴

Specifically in judiciary- government relations, Çağaptay wrote that the JDP government did not recognize the secular courts and he gave the statement of Erdoğan as an example: “It needs to ask the *ulama* for recognizing the European Court of Human Rights’ decision at the ban on headscarf in universities”.¹⁴⁵

Turkey’s domestic politics focuses on the struggle between Islamists and secularists continued to be discussed in a panel with Mustafa Akyol, columnist of Turkish Daily and Steven Cook.¹⁴⁶ After Akyol mentioned the modern identity of the AK Party which is based on pro-European policies but also Turkish traditions; Cook posed his question that if there is no evidence about the possibility of Iranian theocracy in Turkey, why the secularists would walk into streets. Akyol replied that there is a class conflict in Turkey between the people came from periphery to the center and the people who accepted Westernized lifestyle but not believe in Western ideas as freedom of religion and democracy. According to the Turkish journalist, secular republic is the republic of secularists, not all citizens. For these people, it needs not to practice Islam for the sake of preserving the secular republic. The following question referred that whether Jews would play important role in Turkish politics as in other Middle Eastern states. Akyol responded that “there is not diehard tradition of anti-Semitism in Turkey; even some secularists believe the Iraq war made for Israel as well as some Islamists still have anti-Semitic thoughts relating to the Palestinian-Israeli dispute”¹⁴⁷. At this point, Cook agreed with Akyol that anti-Semitism is generally far to Turkish political culture. Meanwhile, Akyol returned the same question that there are some moderate Islamic circles which are very against anti-Semitism. One of the examples of this attitude is Fethullah Gülen movement that has very good relations with Chief Rabbi in Turkey and they believe in interfaith dialogue. He finalized that the axis on the issue of anti-Semitism is nationalism. There are some Islamists and secularists do not like the Jews,

¹⁴⁴ *ibid*

¹⁴⁵ *ibid*

¹⁴⁶ “Turkey’s Political Battle: Secularism versus Democracy”, (May 25, 2007), <http://www.cfr.org/turkey/turkeys-political-battle-secularism-versus-democracy-rush-transcript-federal-news-service/p13666> (accessed on July 5, 2010)

¹⁴⁷ *ibid*

Armenians, and Kurds. So the axis is not being Islamist or secularist. Afterwards, Akyol expressed that Turkey needs a real separation between church and state and the AKP frequently express its willingness for this separation as the U.S. type of secularism. Another questioner mentioned whether there exist EU reaction to Turkish style secularism and Akyol answered that EU do not help in this issue due to their opposition to Turkey's membership. Finally, Cook shifted ground and asked the possible Turkish reaction in case of Congress' decision on Armenian genocide resolution. Akyol put forth that it will empower Turkish nationalism and "predictions about West's evil plans about Turkey".

The divergence between Islamists and secularists was analyzed by other fellows as well. Michael J. Gerson, Senior Fellow at the CFR stated that although Turkish secularism has undeniable achievements; it is also a model which is hard to export¹⁴⁸. But, "if the AKP proves itself as a center-right religious party genuinely committed to pluralism that will be a reverberating model."¹⁴⁹ Additionally, Turkish model was in need of moderate Islamists who would direct religious conservative thoughts into democratic channels.

If one needs to mention the general election results in June 2007, Cook replied the questions on "the parliamentary victory of the JDP". He thought that result was good for the U.S.-Turkey relations due to the JDP's more pro-Western and pro-American identity than either the Republican People's Party or the Nationalist Movement Party. The author explained the non-democratic characteristics of these parties that "they have supported the military's meddling in politics to undermine the JDP government; they supported the military's ultimatum of late April which was one of the main reasons why JDP could not elect a member of the party as president".¹⁵⁰ Cook argued that people voted for JDP for the successful economic performance of the party as well as response of the people to

¹⁴⁸ Michael J. Gerson, "An Islamic Test for Turkey", (June 6, 2007), <http://www.cfr.org/turkey/islamic-test-turkey/p13561> (accessed on July 5, 2010)

¹⁴⁹ *ibid*

¹⁵⁰ "Cook: Turkish Elections Positive for Democracy, Relations with U.S.", (July 23, 2007), <http://www.cfr.org/turkey/cook-turkish-elections-positive-democracy-relations-us/p13875> (accessed on July 5, 2010)

the military's announcement¹⁵¹ in late April. On the other hand, Cook thought that most of the new MPs of the JDP are liberals, have no Islamist agenda, who want to live in a pluralist, modern, democratic Turkey, parallel to that, the party wants to normalize the effect of religion in politics and a truly secular system in which all the citizens freely pray. The last question was on the rising tension at the Iraq-Turkey border due to the PKK attacks. Cook responded that the military and other opponents used these attacks for weakening the JDP government "by demonstrating that this government was weak on this most important national security issue for average Turks"¹⁵². In the following article, Cook continued that Turkey's transition to democracy in recent years had been little related to the Bush administration's "forward strategy of freedom in the Middle East". Nevertheless, relations between the Bush administration and the JDP convinced the Arab states that "Washington is not opposed to Islamist power, but rather opposes certain kinds of Islamist groups"¹⁵³.

The 86th issue of the *Foreign Affairs* mentioned the recent general election results with the article of Stephen Larrabee. Larrabee commenced his article that Turkey is now an important diplomatic actor in the Middle East which establishes ties with Syria and Iran, adopts active policy towards Palestinians and improves its relations with Arab states.¹⁵⁴ Activism of Turkey towards the Middle East should not be read as the evidence of "creeping Islamization"; this policy is response to "structural changes in its security environments since the end of the Cold War"¹⁵⁵. The author added that if Turkey's active policy was conducted properly, this could also be to the advantage of Washington and its Western allies for "using Turkey as a bridge to the Middle East". At the same time, blocked Turkey-EU relations due to

¹⁵¹ "Before midnight on April 27, after the first round of the presidential election, the website of the Office of the Chief of the General Staff carried a message entitled 'On Reactionary Activities, Army's Duty'. It stated, 'it must not be forgotten that the Turkish Armed Forces do take sides in this debate (about secularism) and are the sure and certain defenders of secularism.... (T)hey will make their position and stance perfectly clear as needs be. Let nobody have any doubt about this.'" "Carol Migdalovitz, "Turkey's 2007 Elections: Crisis of Identity and Power", *CRS Report for Congress*, (July 11, 2007), <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL34039.pdf> (accessed on May 20, 2011) , p.7

¹⁵² *op.cit.*

¹⁵³ Steven Cook, "Cheering an Islamist Victory", (July 26, 2007),

<http://www.cfr.org/turkey/cheering-islamist-victory/p13924> (accessed on July 5, 2010)

¹⁵⁴ Stephen Larrabee, "Turkey Rediscovered the Middle East", *Foreign Affairs*, 86/4, July/August 2007

¹⁵⁵ *ibid*

the Cyprus issue, strained relations between the U.S. and Turkey in terms of Iraq, stalled economic and political reforms in Turkey as well as the rising concerns of the Europeans throughout the referendum process were the fundamental issues of Turkish foreign policy. As a result, Larrabee summarized the changes in Turkish politics that:

The pro-Western elite that has shaped Turkish foreign policy since the end of World War II is gradually being replaced by a more conservative, more religious, and more nationalist elite that is suspicious of the West and has a more positive attitude toward Turkey's Ottoman past. The ruling Islamist Justice and Development Party, headed by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, have managed to tap into rising popular nationalism by fusing it with Islam.¹⁵⁶

In this context, Larrabee evaluated Turkey's cooperation with Iran and Syria in recent years that shared interests on Kurdish nationalism and preventing the establishment of an autonomous Kurdish state brought these countries together. In terms of Iran-Turkey relations, the author pointed out that on mutual security concern drove the two countries to the cooperation on border protection. Energy and natural gas agreements were other major factors that made the rapprochement possible. However, Iran's nuclear program and concerns of the West worried Ankara. "A nuclear-armed Iran could have a destabilizing impact on the Persian Gulf region and force Turkey to take countermeasures for its own security."¹⁵⁷ In case of the rejection of demands of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Ankara had three options: to expand its cooperation on missile defenses with the U.S. and Israel; to empower its own military capabilities; or to develop its own nuclear program as a last option. The similar factors were valid for Syrian-Turkish relations as well. As it was in the Iranian case, the fundamental reason of close relations was raising Kurdish nationalism. On the other hand, this relationship was not welcome by Washington because of Syrian regime and the Bush administration preference to isolate the Damascus regime. However isolation policy did not find support from the former president of Ahmet Necdet Sezer's Damascus visit; it was

¹⁵⁶ *ibid*

¹⁵⁷ *ibid*

“a show of Turkish independence caused considerable consternation in Washington”.¹⁵⁸

Turkish foreign policy towards other Middle Eastern countries has also undergone a shift. Turkey’s Israel policy under the AKP government “has begun to adopt a more active pro-Palestinian”¹⁵⁹ approach. In this point, Larrabee referred the Erdoğan’s “state terrorism” criticism to the Israel’s policy in the West Bank and Gaza as well as Hamas leader, Khalid Mashal’s Ankara visit in January 2006 which irritated Washington and Jerusalem. From the aspect of Israeli-Turkish relations, Larrabee expressed that the motion of the AKP government which decided to send 1,000 troops to participate in the UN peacekeeping force in Lebanon also criticized by Turkish mainstream parties and some members of the AKP. Although Turkey’s new activism toward the Middle East caused concerns in some U.S. officials; Larrabee stated that these are misplaced. As a result of growing interest in the Middle East, the U.S. needed to build stronger partnership with Turkey as “Shared Vision” document released in July 2006 by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül. Additionally, the U.S. should play a more active role between Ankara and Iraqi Kurds for defusing tension. The appointment of retired General Ralston as a special envoy for coordinating efforts against the PKK should be an active channel which would serve this purpose. Furthermore, “Washington needs to press the Iraqi Kurdish leadership harder, particularly the regional government of Kurdistan, to crack down on PKK activities and close down PKK training camps”¹⁶⁰. Such a move would satisfy the Turkish government and reduce the anti-American sentiments of Turkish public opinion.

Parallel to Larrabee’s article on impressing Turkish public opinion, Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall agreed that American policymakers need to understand “the legitimate Turkish concerns and launched an invasion of nearby Iraq with substantial negative consequences for Turkish interests”.¹⁶¹ During the negotiation process, Randall argued that the U.S. aggressively sought Turkish

¹⁵⁸ *ibid*

¹⁵⁹ *ibid*

¹⁶⁰ *ibid*

¹⁶¹ Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, “Tend to Turkey”, (September 19, 2007), <http://www.cfr.org/turkey/tend-turkey/p14251> (accessed on July 5, 2010)

permission and the pressure of Washington rebounded negatively both in Turkish domestic debate and voting in Turkish Parliament. Moreover, the reaction of Pentagon to the motion was to freeze contacts with the Turkish military. Due to these factors and Turkey's arduous membership to the EU, the U.S. should stabilize the relations with Turkey and need to develop solutions to the problems between Iraqi Kurds and Turks with a trilateral mechanism.

In September 2007, Prime Minister Erdoğan visited the CFR once again, his agenda involved with "the Armenian genocide" draft resolution of the Congress, cooperation of the two countries in Afghanistan, Turkey's fight against the PKK as well as stagnant relations of Turkey and the EU.¹⁶² In Q&A session, the aim of the first question was to hear the policy of Turkey in case of immediate withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq. Erdoğan did not agree to an immediate withdrawal of all the U.S. troops and stressed the indispensability of an agreeable timeline for the peace of Iraqi people as well as security precaution against terrorist groups. In time of withdrawal announcement, Turkish Prime Minister pointed out that the Iraqi security forces have to be ready to take the responsibility for maintaining the stability; under these circumstances Turkey would consider the withdrawal of American troops via Turkey. In respect to the opinion polls, an attendant asked about the wave of anti-Americanism in Turkey. Erdoğan replied that there exists serious anti-Americanism in Turkey which is fed by the war in Iraq, Palestinian-Israeli dispute and the PKK issue. The last question was that whether the AK Party feels a double standard in terms of their religiosity and particularly their wives' headscarves when the Western leaders go to the church and nobody accuses them as turning back to secularism. Erdoğan stated that his party tries to establish a collective wisdom for Turkey and would like to be the party of all the people, not only their supporters.

The last article of Steven Cook in 2007 emphasized the general election success of the AKP which was the coalition of conservative Muslims, big business,

¹⁶² "A Conversation with Recep Tayyip Erdogan", (September 27, 2007), <http://www.cfr.org/turkey/conversation-recep-tayyip-erdogan-rush-transcript-federal-news-service/p14395> (accessed on July 5, 2010)

urban elites, and average Turks who supported the EU membership process.¹⁶³ For Turkey's prospective membership, author's first question was that whether the EU is a Christian club or union of states that share the common values, norms and principles. From this point of view, Cook stated that there is no polling data which argues that Europeans oppose to Turkish membership on religious grounds. However, EU should have clarified these points: First, "Turkey is the test case for how the West deals with the accumulation of Islamist political power in a Muslim society."¹⁶⁴ Second, the EU is an anchor of Turkish reform process, without "the incentives for change that the EU provides", driving force of Turkey may not occur. Third, in case of Turkey's failure to join the Union, Turkey may not left the Western alliance, but may turn to "insular, angry and nationalist" country that could be difficult for the interests of Brussels and Washington in the Balkans, Caucasus, Middle East and Central Asia.

Cook also pointed out the challenge of Washington's Turkey policy in last 15 years: First, the US invasion of Iraq fundamentally transformed the role of Turkey both in its region and international environment; second, the increasing reaction of Europeans to Turkey's membership to the EU drove Turkey to think either about its other options or to place emphasis on it as a great power itself; finally, the disappearance of the Soviet threat at the end of the Cold War weakened the bound between the U.S. and Turkey. As a result, the author thought that these consequences normalized Turkish foreign policy. But this normalization process did not fully welcome by the U.S. Specifically, Ankara's coral relations with Iran and Syria were not embrace by Washington. Although some observers attributed changes in Turkish foreign policy to AKP's roots in Turkey's Islamist movements, Cook argued that any Turkish government would chose the same way in this political environment. Moreover, he stated that "if AKP were pursuing an Islamist agenda, it would not be seeking Turkey's entry into the EU".¹⁶⁵ In this context, suggestion of the author to the Bush administration was to recognize Turkey as political, economic and diplomatic player for U.S. interests.

¹⁶³ Steven Cook, "Islamist Political Power in Turkey: Challenges for Brussels and Washington", *SWP-Berlin*, November 2007, <http://www.cfr.org/turkey/islamist-political-power-turkey-challenges-brussels-washington/p15236> (accessed on July 5, 2010), p.24

¹⁶⁴ *ibid*, p.26

¹⁶⁵ *ibid*, p.28

2008 began with the article of the former U.S. ambassador to Turkey. In his article, Abramowitz mentioned the indictment of chief prosecutor for banning the JDP and pointed out the battle between the government and judiciary that “this war could also last for months, its outcome would be uncertain and its consequences, whether the AKP wins or loses, would be bad”.¹⁶⁶ In addition, Turkey’s partners, the U.S. and EU needed the stabilization of Turkey for the cooperation in Iraq and Iran as well as Cyprus issue. But Abramowitz pointed “tepid disapproval” of Washington to the indictment that

Washington's words carry little weight with tough-minded secularists in the judiciary, media and military on this issue. Nor, to the surprise of Turks, does the United States like to muck around in their domestic politics. U.S. action is further complicated by the tricky legal nature of the dispute, as well as the pressing interest in maintaining good relations with Turkey. Moreover, the fact remains that if secularists are truly prepared to bring down the house, nothing the EU or the United States says will make any difference.¹⁶⁷

Former ambassador also advised that Washington should have expressed that removing the AKP from the power endangers the bilateral relations as well as economic and political ties between the two countries. Parallel to that, Turkish judiciary should have closed the file and the Erdoğan government ought to establish a dialogue atmosphere for reforming the Constitution. Afterwards, in an interview Steven Cook commented on the consequences of the decision of Turkish Constitutional Court that did not ban the JDP but decided the party is a center of anti-secular activity. Cook explained the reasons of why the JDP pushed onto change the law about the headscarf issue that the party pushed this when they got 47 percent of the vote in general elections. With the motivation of this support, they wanted to outmaneuver MHP which share the same constituencies and brought up the issue to Turkey’s agenda.¹⁶⁸ On Turkey-northern Iraq relations in terms of the PKK issue, Cook claimed that there is no clear evidence that the Iraqi Kurds has provided material support to the PKK. “The policy (of the Kurdish leaders) was essentially to turn a blind eye to PKK activities in the hope that the issue would not

¹⁶⁶ Morton Abramowitz, “Turkey’s Judicial Coup d’état”, (April 5, 2008), <http://www.cfr.org/turkey/newsweek-turkeys-judicial-coup-detat/p15952> (accessed on July 5, 2010)

¹⁶⁷ *ibid*

¹⁶⁸ “Turkey Crisis Over, For Now”, (July 30, 2008), <http://www.cfr.org/turkey/turkey-crisis-over-now/p16879> (accessed on July 5, 2010)

interfere with the broad goals of Iraq's Kurdish population.”¹⁶⁹ But Turkey did not believe Baghdad have any control over the north. In addition, Turkey's refusal to undertake official talks with the Kurdish regional government under the trilateral organization which Turks, Kurds and Americans attend would accelerate the Iraqi Kurdish support to the PKK and aim of independent Kurdish state. But if Iran would follow the way of Turkey in fight against the PJAK, Turkey would lose its status and prestige in the Middle East. Because of the same reason, “Washington would not look favorably on any Turkish actions in the north that would precipitate further Iranian meddling in Iraq”¹⁷⁰.

In September 2008, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ali Babacan gave a speech in New York office of the CFR. Babacan mentioned the Georgia-Russia conflict and Turkey's proposal to create a regional organization for cooperation under the name of “Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform” between Georgia, Russia, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Turkey. The Minister of Foreign Affairs also hoped that this platform would start the dialogue with Armenia and “overcome some of the historical baggage between the two countries”.¹⁷¹ Babacan continued to explain Turkey's contributions to the reconstruction of Lebanon under the UN Resolution 1701 as well as diplomatic contacts in the issue of Iran's nuclear program. Bill Drozdiak, President of the American Council in Germany opened the A&Q session by asking the anti-Americanism wave in Turkey. As Erdoğan and Gül, Babacan explained the rising wave with the PKK issue and the Iraq invasion. However, the foreign minister thought that the cooperation between Turkey and the U.S. against the PKK would turn this trend to positive in the near future. The next question was that whether new Israeli government would continue the negotiations between Syria and Israel under the mediation of Turkey. Babacan replied that both Syria and Israel, they may not trust each other, but they trust Turkey for peace talks; after the election process in Israel, many parties expressed their support for continuity of negotiations. On the other hand, Syria wanted to continue indirect talks, so political desire of both sides would be quite strong. On Armenia-Turkey relations, Babacan

¹⁶⁹ Steven Cook, “Turkey's Problematic Middle East Role”, (April 17, 2008), <http://www.cfr.org/turkey/turkeys-problematic-middle-east-role/p16057> (accessed on July 5, 2010)

¹⁷⁰ *ibid*

¹⁷¹ “Ali Babacan”, (September 22, 2008), <http://www.cfr.org/turkey/ali-babacan/p17324> (accessed on July 5, 2010)

added that both countries also wanted to solve the problems between Azerbaijan and Armenia, so the three countries exhibit strong will to solve these issues. The last question was on the program of the JDP for new Turkish Constitution. Babacan responded that it would need to discuss thoroughly that how the process would proceed. To serve this purpose, the government announced its draft national program which covers the political and economic reforms for the next four years and sent copies to NGOs and political parties for starting the discussion. After that, the officials would collect these viewpoints and the government would finalize the national program for the next four years.

After the brief war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008, Turkey wanted to play a balancing role which was pro-Western but also moderate to Russia's interests. Due to Turkey's active role in Iraq, Iran, Syria as well as Israel, the website of the CFR made an interview with Hugh Pope, the Turkey project director of the International Crisis Group. The first question posed to Pope was that how Turkey would balance its many competing interests around its region. Pope pointed out the rivalry in the Black Sea and expressed that Turkey would like to minimize the impact of the U.S. in the Black Sea by using its regional influence. If Turkey succeeds, its voice in Washington would be heard well.¹⁷² The situation in Iraq made the United States realize that there is a need to smooth the bilateral relations and the U.S. should accept Turkey's some demands, for instance, cooperation on fight against the PKK. Another question of the interviewer was on the Turkey-Russia relations. Pope answered that Turkey had no choice during the war, because it did not want any rise of tension which may cause the economic loss, that's why Turkey chose to keep away from the conflict.

Turkey's rising economic performance was an interesting subject for the CFR as well. Cook evaluated that Turkey's "remarkable discipline in pursuing economic reforms under the AKP government rewarded with strong growth and unprecedented electoral mandate in July 2007".¹⁷³ The successful economic and political performance of Turkey also constrained the U.S. that "Turkey will become

¹⁷² "Turkey's Rising Star", (October 9, 2008), <http://www.cfr.org/turkey/turkeys-rising-star/p17462> (accessed on July 5, 2010)

¹⁷³ "Steven Cook, "Turkey's Engine Shows Resilience", (November 21, 2008), <http://www.cfr.org/turkey/turkeys-engine-shows-resilience/p17832> (accessed on July 5, 2010)

en even more important strategic partner in managing the conflict in Iraq, confronting Iran, and working toward peace between Syrians and Israelis, and providing economic assistance for Palestinians.”¹⁷⁴ Turkey’s economic activeness also takes the Arab states’ attention as well as strengthens Turkey’s place in the Middle East. The Turkish economy’s fail due to the AKP’s lack of fiscal restraint, would diminish Ankara’s soft power in the region.

In this period, it was possible to track some patterns about the JDP government’s “pro-Palestinian” foreign policy which was frequently pointed out by the CFR. When JDP’s “Islamist” roots were emphasized; the fellows of the institution referred to the polarized domestic politics of Turkey which was based on the divergence between Islamists and secularists. But the CFR comprehended and narrated the dispute between Turkish domestic forces from the perspective of implementing “moderate Islamist model” by mentioning only the arguments of Turkish liberals or conservatives. Furthermore, although the institution did not criticize the mediator role of Turkey between Syria and Israel explicitly, it was possible to read between the lines that both the U.S. and the CFR had a “given framework” for Turkey’s activeness in the Middle East. Ankara’s mediator role between Jerusalem and Damascus should have fit to this position; in the contrary case, objection of Washington would be raised in the next future.

3.7 Political Apocalypse Now¹⁷⁵ : Divergence between the Two Allies

The 88th issue of the *Foreign Affairs* comprised a sponsored section by the name of “Turkey: On a Track for a Trillion”. In its introduction part, title was explained that

While the world worries how it will survive another economic meltdown, one nation's resilience has proven invaluable to its growth. Turkey has seen its share of crises, but by default has gained the experience to remain on top. Strategic Media finds how this nation at the southeastern corner of Europe is building up its reputation and steadily heading for a 1 trillion dollars gross

¹⁷⁴ *ibid*

¹⁷⁵ “Apocalypse Now”, 1979, Director: Francis Ford Coppola, Starring: Martin Sheen, Marlon Brando, Robert Duvall and Laurence Fishburne

domestic product, possibly becoming one of the 10 largest economies of the world.¹⁷⁶

The section consisted interviews with Ferit Şahenk, chairman of Doğu Group; Haluk Dinçer, chairman of the Turkish-American Business Council and Erdoğan Bayraktar, president of the Housing Development Administration of Turkey (TOKİ). The interviewees evaluated Turkey's economic growth and business relations with the U.S. in recent years. In the same issue of the journal, Richard Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations and Martin Indyk, vice president of the Brookings Institution wrote an article on the new U.S. strategy in Iraq and broader Middle East. In context of Syria-U.S. relations, both authors expressed that "Turkey, a NATO ally that borders Iran, Iraq, Syria and maintains a long-standing strategic relationship with Israel, can also play a central role"¹⁷⁷ in process of weaken Iran's influence on Syria. Credibility of the JDP on Arab states would also be meaningful for the next U.S. president and the Obama administration should support Israeli-Syrian peace talks that would cause the breakup of the Iranian-Syrian alliance. Both authors warned that the breakup of the relations between Syria and Iran could emerge in case of the involvement of the Obama administration to the negotiations.

If one needs to mention the key points of the CFR's Turkey agenda in 2009, Eurasian pipeline projects and Turkey's role should be pointed out. For this purpose, Jeffrey Mankoff, Adjunct Fellow for the Russian Studies at the CFR¹⁷⁸ wrote "Eurasian Energy Security" report for the series of the *Council Special Report* in February 2009. According to the arguments of the report, Turkey's role in Eurasian pipeline projects coincides with plans of Washington and the EU countries which are against Russia's dominant role in Eurasian energy market. In respect to diversify energy resources and reduce Russian dependency,

Washington's strategy centers on establishing an east-west energy corridor from the Caspian to Europe, bypassing both Russia and Iran. The EU also backs what it calls the Southern Gas Corridor as one element in its campaign to diversify supplies. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline, which

¹⁷⁶ <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/files/attachments/turkey.pdf> (accessed on May 23, 2011)

¹⁷⁷ Richard N. Haass and Martin Indyk, "Beyond Iraq: A New Strategy for the Middle East", *Foreign Affairs*, 88/1, January/February 2009

¹⁷⁸ Jeffrey Mankoff is also an Associate Director of International Security Studies at Yale University.

came online in 2006 and was followed shortly by the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE, or South Caucasus) gas pipeline, was a critical and very successful piece of this strategy.¹⁷⁹

According to the author, another option to distribute Caspian gas to Europe via Turkey would be Nabucco project, however due to the financial crisis in January 2009, the cost of this project would be very expensive and politically complicated for Western allies. Although there was political dispute on the route and leadership of Nabucco, from Turkey's aspect, Mankoff pointed out that many southeastern European states were cautious on Turkey's pivotal role in the project. The main reservation of Ukraine and Belarus was that Russia might want to cut the energy supplies of the two countries as a political intimidation. On the other hand, countries like Greece, Bulgaria, and Hungary would "fear increasing their reliance on Turkey and see South Stream, which would run beneath the Black Sea before coming ashore at Varna, Bulgaria, as a way of diversifying their gas supplies by reducing dependence on Ankara."¹⁸⁰

Comments on Turkey's active role in the Middle East went on in the year of 2009, but the difference between the viewpoint of the previous year and 2009 was the U.S. presidential election at the end of 2008. New president of the United States gained a new outlook to the CFR and more comments, reports began to publish on Turkey's active foreign policy. At the same time, Turkey expert of the institution, Steven Cook emphasized the anti-Western patterns of the JDP government; "the uproar of Prime Minister Erdoğan at the World Economic Forum in Davos" was the clear sign of "Turkey's diplomatic foray in the Middle East"¹⁸¹. According to Cook's observations, some American policymakers as wells as journalists and analysts interpreted the reaction of Erdoğan in Davos¹⁸² as Turkey's turn away from

¹⁷⁹ Jeffrey Mankoff, "Eurasian Energy Security", *Council Special Report*, No.43, February 2009, <http://www.cfr.org/europerussia/eurasian-energy-security/p18418> (accessed on July 5, 2010), p.19

¹⁸⁰ *ibid.*, p.22

¹⁸¹ Steven Cook, "The Evolving Turkish Role in Mideast Peace Diplomacy", (April 7, 2009), <http://www.cfr.org/turkey/evolving-turkish-role-mideast-peace-diplomacy/p19000> (accessed on July 5, 2010)

¹⁸² In a session about Gaza and the Middle East peace at the 2009 World Economic Forum in Davos, Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkish Prime Minister, Shimon Peres, Israel's President, Amr Moussa, Secretary General of the Arab League and Ban Ki-moon, Secretary General of the United Nations discussed the future of the Middle East chairing by David Ignatius, Washington Post columnist. When Israel's

the West in favor of the radicals of the Middle East. Additionally, Prime Minister's behavior was received as "embrace of Hamas during Israel's Gaza offensive, and his strong criticism of Israel, which at times veered into classic anti-Semitism, left observers wondering whether Turkey could continue to play a constructive role in the Middle East"¹⁸³. Afterwards, the author pointed out the ambitious characteristic of Turkish foreign policy, with bold domestic policy, of the AKP governments towards Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Iran. On the other hand, Turkey's strong efforts for the full membership to the EU were evaluated as "normalization in Turkish foreign policy". From Washington's aspect, there was doubt in the air that the negotiations between the U.S. and Turkey about using Turkish territory for the Operation Iraqi Freedom and the rejection of the motion on March 1st by Turkish Parliament "angered" the United States. The second part of the study focused on Turkish-Syrian rapprochement in 2005 despite the isolationist policy of the United States because of the role of Syrian regime in assassination of the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. Hamas leader's Ankara visit, improved relations between Iran and Turkey and the Davos Crisis were the signals of the American skepticism toward Turkish foreign policy. Cook also pointed out the Hamas leader's Ankara visit that this was a clearly mistake, then he mentioned the changing conditions of Turkish foreign policy after the end of the Cold War; "Turkey's tortured relations with EU and security fallout from the invasion of Iraq would be pushed any Turkish government to pursue a foreign policy similar to the AKP".¹⁸⁴ In context of the relations with Syria and Iran, although critics indicated "the Islamist worldview of the AKP"; Cook stated that Ankara developed its relations with the two countries since the late 1990s and early 2000s. These relationships were based on economic interests, rather than ideological reasons and the argument of the AKP's foreign policy-makers was parallel to these relations: "if Turkey's neighbors prosper, they are also more likely to be pacific, ensuring Turkish security and providing a regional environment more conducive to

president gave a speech about the conflict in Gaza, Prime Minister Erdoğan told that the moderator did not allow him to reply the comments of Peres. Then Prime Minister walked off the stage after he accused Israel to kill the innocent Palestinians. Please see, an analysis on Turkish-Israeli relations in post-Davos period: Tarık Oğuzlu, "The Changing Dynamics of Turkey-Israel Relations: A Structural Realist Account", *Mediterranean Politics*, 15/2, July 2010

¹⁸³ *op.cit.*

¹⁸⁴ *ibid*

peace”.¹⁸⁵ Some critics also alleged that Turkey might be an alternative to Iran for Syrian regime; indeed, Washington would be promoter of this policy. From the perspective of Israeli-Turkish relations, Cook reminded that Israel was wary of Ankara-Tehran relations as well as Turkey’s inclination to Palestinians. The conclusion of the author was:

Ultimately, the challenge for Turkey is, first, whether it has the capacity to pursue an activist role in the region without undermining its other priorities, and second, the extent to which other regional powers want Ankara to play the role it intends. Thus far, the Turks seem able to balance their desire to be influential in the Middle East with other national interests in the Caucasus, Cyprus, and Europe. There is also a palpable sense in the Middle East that Turkish activism, while helpful at times, can nevertheless undermine the efforts of more traditional regional powers like Saudi Arabia and Egypt.(...) As a result, in an era of diminished resources for the United States, Turkey can be a critical ally in the pursuit of Washington and Ankara's overlapping interests.¹⁸⁶

Turkey’s “new” role in Middle East arena continued to be discussed both in the website of the CFR and the journals cited by the CFR.org. Stephen Larrabee pointed out that one of the “most distinguishing hallmarks” of Turkish foreign policy under the AKP governments has been Ankara’s active engagement in the Middle East.¹⁸⁷ This tendency means “the response of Turkey to structural changes in its security environment since the end of the Cold War”¹⁸⁸ rather than the Islamization of Turkey. As previous authors, Larrabee mentioned the Turkish-Iranian energy agreements in July 2007 that the United States was sharply criticized. Instead of cooperation with Iran in energy field, the U.S. would want Turkey either to strengthen relations with Azerbaijan for transportation of natural gas from Shah Deniz or to import gas from Iraq. Although there was a gap between the United States and Turkey on energy issues, Larrabee explained that both U.S. and Turkish officials expressed their opposition to Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. But the author warned that if Turkey began to concern nuclear armed Iran, Turkish interest in missile defense might increase in short term. On the other

¹⁸⁵ *ibid*

¹⁸⁶ *ibid*

¹⁸⁷ Stephen Larrabee, “Europe’s World: How Turkey is Re-Discovering its Middle East Role?”, (October 28, 2009), <http://www.cfr.org/turkey/europes-world-turkey-re-discovering-its-middle-east-role/p21431> (accessed on July 5, 2010)

¹⁸⁸ *ibid*

hand, if the relations between the U.S. and Turkey worsen, Ankara might feel the need to acquire a nuclear deterrent. In the Syrian context, Larrabee offered the new Obama administration to open dialogue channels with Syria to prevent the Iranian dominance on Damascus. Ankara's diplomatic eagerness for sending troops to UN peacekeeping force in Lebanon was also evaluated by the author. According to Larrabee, the most interesting point in lively discussion among Turkish institutions was between President Sezer, who said that Turkey should avoid involvement in the Middle East, and Prime Minister Erdoğan and his Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül, who viewed engagement in the Middle East "essential to shaping developments on Turkey's periphery in directions conducive to Turkish interests"¹⁸⁹. Lastly, the author stressed that under the AKP leadership, Turkey-Israel relations has begun to change and Turkey pursued more pro-Palestinian policy due to the Israeli's policy in the West Bank and Gaza. Strained relations between the two countries reached a peak with the reaction of Erdoğan at the World Economic Forum in Davos. "Both sides have tried to play down the incident, but in Israel's eyes, Erdogan's outburst and more critical approach toward Israel have undermined Turkey's ability to act as an unbiased mediator in the Arab-Israeli dispute".¹⁹⁰ In post-Davos period, although Israeli officials wanted to establish a dialogue with the Turkish counterparts, "the growing anti-Israel tone of Erdoğan's rhetoric and his governments' support for Hamas"¹⁹¹ has worried the Israeli state. Consequently, Larrabee expressed that Turkey's diversification in its policy is a healthy process and its strong ties with the Middle East will be a great asset for the West in case of maintaining strong relations between the West and Turkey.

Council's guest dissident voice, Soner Çağaptay highlighted the discussion on Turkey's "new" role in the Middle East. Çağaptay claimed that the AKP viewed Turkey's interests from Islamist perspectives; the signs of this policy were that "the AKP officials called the 2004 U.S. offensive in Fallujah, Iraq, as 'genocide' and in February 2009, Erdoğan stated Gaza to a 'concentration camp'".¹⁹² Çağaptay continued that the AKP implemented its Islamist policy towards the Islamist, anti-

¹⁸⁹ *ibid*

¹⁹⁰ *ibid*

¹⁹¹ *ibid*

¹⁹² Soner Çağaptay, "Is Turkey Leaving the West?", (October 26, 2009), <http://www.cfr.org/turkey/turkey-leaving-west/p20524> (accessed on July 5, 2010)

Western regimes, for instance Sudan and Qatar, rather than cooperating with secular, pro-Western regimes as Egypt and Jordan. Furthermore, the day after Erdoğan's nervous speech in Davos, Ankara visit of the Sudanese Vice President Ali Osman Taha was very dangerous which proposed that Islamist regimes alone have right to attack their own people. From domestic politics, some critics argued that AKP's Islamist rhetoric has also affected the public opinion in terms of shifting to support the idea of politically united "Muslim world". According to independent opinion survey in Turkey, the number of people identifying themselves as 'Muslim' increased by ten percent between 2002 and 2007. Due to 'Islamist' foreign and domestic policies of Turkey, Çağaptay estimated that it would be impossible for Turkey to support Western foreign policy. For instance, "in AKP's tactical enthusiasm for the EU membership, the AKP pushed for membership when it brought public approval, but it did not take a strategic view of closer ties with Europe"¹⁹³. In response to the praises of normalization process in Turkish foreign policy and bridge role of Turkey's Middle East policy, Çağaptay pointed out that Turkey's foreign policy under the AKP leadership may not be in harmony with the West under the current AKP policies.

In last issue of the *Foreign Affairs* in 2009, Henri Barkey and Morton Abramowitz analyzed the internal dynamics of the AKP on the basis of its foreign policy. The authors identified Turkey in two camps: First, the largest group includes center-right politicians, liberals and the religious people fully support the AKP. According to its supporters, the AKP symbolizes the democracy, especially for Kurdish population, enthusiasm for EU membership and constructive diplomatic initiatives in the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Caucasus.¹⁹⁴ The other camp includes the staunch secularists, the military, civilian bureaucratic elites, and various types of nationalists. They point out the Islamist roots of the AKP and claim that its policies pave the way for authoritarianism, being against the freedom of press, and weakening the Turkish military despite the dangerous neighborhood. The conclusion of the authors was that the rise of the AKP is the result of class struggle

¹⁹³ *ibid*

¹⁹⁴ Morton Abramowitz and Henri Barkey, "Turkey's Transformers", *Foreign Affairs*, 88/6, November/December 2009

between the military, civilian bureaucratic elites and the new, largely provincial and pious middle class. It is possible to read the signs of this struggle from the legal changes made by the AKP governments which limit the military's power over politics. On the other hand, from the aspect of Turkey's domestic politics as Kurdish issue, "the AKP government has promised much and done little"¹⁹⁵. Despite its "democratic opening/Kurdish opening" policy, nothing can be taken for granted as well as the country was too divided on this issue. From the foreign policy aspect, Davutoğlu was described as a drive and vigorous foreign minister that Turkey never had before. Under his leadership, Turkish foreign policy with the motto of "zero problems with neighbors" was so successful in expanding trade and investment abroad. But it had been far less in making progress towards satisfying the EU's accession requirements and failed to solve the questions with Armenia. If one needs to summarize the perspective of two authors about Davutoğlu's Turkish foreign policy: First, they stressed that "ending political isolation of Iraqi Kurds was a major breakthrough for Turkey."¹⁹⁶ Ankara's motivation in "new" northern Iraq policy were U.S. decision to withdraw its troops from Iraq and the United States realized that Turkey's familiar relations with the northern Iraq would be useful in case of decline of Iraq. The second feature of Turkish foreign policy under the leadership of Davutoğlu was the Cyprus issue. Turkey would have to decide to whether open its ports to the Greek Cypriot part of the island in line with the agreement with the EU. Third, in the Middle East, Ankara's diplomatic efforts have yielded little. Although Turkey has become to adopt transmitting messages, such symbolic achievements have far exceeded concrete ones. Some examples of the "irksome and clumsy" initiatives of the AKP's foreign policy were reaction of Erdoğan at Davos Summit; several Ankara meetings of Sudan's president and Turkey's "cliché" response to the genocide allegations in Darfur; Erdoğan's criticism toward the Chinese government about Xinjiang's Uighur minority. As a consequence,

Turkey has become a far more complex country than it once was. Washington should not assume it knows it. The endless rhetoric about the "strategic" closeness between Turkey and the United States cannot substitute for concrete policy. (...)Turkey has problems with the EU, too, partly because of the

¹⁹⁵ *ibid*

¹⁹⁶ *ibid*

distance between the EU's and Turkey's conceptions of liberal democracy. This gap might narrow over time, but that will require conviction and effort on the part of Turkey's leaders.(...) The AKP has a unique opportunity to change Turkish society, change the country's constitution and its archaic political system, and make peace with both its neighbors and its own people. It seems ready to seize it. But it needs assistance. The West should not act as if Turkey is moving in the right direction in all respects, but it can help keep Turkey on track to becoming a tolerant liberal democracy.¹⁹⁷

The last article of 2009 was written by Steven Cook on the future of the U.S.-Turkey relations under the Obama administration. Cook stated that although bilateral relations have improved in the last two years, Turkey's independent policy toward the Middle East beclouded Erdoğan's visit to the White House in November 2009.¹⁹⁸ "President Barack Obama would have to balance his praise for Turkey's regional role with a tough message about Ankara's policies towards Israel and Iran, which run counter to U.S. interests".¹⁹⁹ According to Turkey experts, Turkey launched active policy toward the northern Iraq after the Bush administration provided intelligence against the PKK in November 2007. After this date, Ankara worked to strengthen its relations with Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). Establishment of a Turkish consulate in Irbil was the sign of a shift in Turkish foreign affairs. On the other hand, "the final disposition of the city of Kirkuk and the political deadlock in Baghdad over elections could destabilize northern Iraq and threaten Turkish security, which would likely force Ankara to return to a more traditional policy intended to contain the Kurds and Kurdish nationalism"²⁰⁰. In domestic politics, despite the fact that AKP's "Kurdish opening" engendered *bona fide* in terms of political, personal and cultural rights of Kurds in Turkey; Cook stated that there is also growing concern that "Erdoğan and his party are no longer committed to the reforms"²⁰¹. The author exemplified the implementation of the AKP in domestic politics that the government has levied \$2.5 billion tax liability against the Doğan Group, which is the largest media group in Turkey and one of the main criticism of the government as well the AKP government sold Turkey's

¹⁹⁷ *ibid*

¹⁹⁸ Steven Cook, "Balancing a Bullish Turkey", (December 4, 2009), <http://www.cfr.org/turkey/balancing-bullish-turkey/p20904> (accessed on July 5, 2010)

¹⁹⁹ *ibid*

²⁰⁰ *ibid*

²⁰¹ *ibid*

second largest media group, Sabah to investors who were associated with the Prime Minister and some pioneering AKP figures. In addition, Cook expressed that the “AKP government has increasingly used the cover of the Ergenekon case²⁰² to crush its political opponents, most of whom are fierce critics of the AKP but have no connection to violent plots against the Turkish state.”²⁰³ Consequently,

American officials should warn their Turkish counterparts that if Ankara continues along its present trajectory, Washington could ratchet down U.S. support for Ankara in Brussels, rethink the president's decision not to wade into the controversy over the Armenian genocide, cut the Turks out of the Middle East peace process, reassess support for Turkey on Cyprus, and hold Erdogan publicly accountable for the increasing ugliness of Turkey's domestic politics. Applying some much needed pressure on Ankara will signal to Erdogan and his government that despite Turkey's importance, there are limits to what Washington will tolerate from Turkish domestic and foreign policies.²⁰⁴

Concerns of Washington about Turkey-Israeli relations continued in the articles of 2010 as well. Due to the question on the reason of making the relationship tense, Steven Cook implied the Gaza Operation of Israeli forces in December 2008/January 2009, which was called Operation Cast Lead.²⁰⁵ Turkey was irritated the operations because Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert had been in Ankara two days before. Moreover, Olmert was in Ankara for negotiating with the Syrians under the mediation of Turkey and Ankara was not informed about the operations. “The Turks feel that they were deeply embarrassed.”²⁰⁶ Although representatives of the two countries expressed that there was no change in the content of relations, Cook indicated that public rhetoric has been changing. The next question was on the recent election in Israel that the government of Benjamin Netanyahu came to power in March and possible enthusiasm of the new Israeli

²⁰²“Ergenekon is the name given to an allegedly clandestine, ultranationalist organization in Turkey with ties to members of the country’s military and security forces. The investigation has, since July 2008, led to the arrest of over one hundred people, including military, party and police officials, and a former secretary general of the National Security Council (...) Ergenekon represents the culmination of a series of unconstitutional activities over the past four years aimed at destabilizing the government through coups.” Ümit Cizre and Joshua Walker, “Conceiving the New Turkey After Ergenekon”, *The International Spectator*, 45/1, March 2010, pp. 89-94

²⁰³ *op. cit.*

²⁰⁴ *ibid*

²⁰⁵ “Gaza and Strains in Israeli-Turkish Relations”, (January 20, 2010),

<http://www.cfr.org/israel/gaza-strains-israeli-turkish-relations/p21239> (accessed on July 5, 2010)

²⁰⁶ *ibid*

Prime Minister to change the relations with Turkey. Cook was pessimist about the condition of the relations when Turkey imposed some conditions as the improvement of humanitarian situation in Gaza, stopping the blockade in Gaza and Israeli settlement construction. Due to these reasons, mistrust which was fed by media channels of the two countries has continued. On the other hand, Cook mentioned that Erdoğan has been very vocal in his criticism of Israel since the Davos crisis; “the prime minister's strategy is to speak out as forcefully as possible in the hopes of putting enough pressure on them that they will alter their policies.”²⁰⁷ According to the author, Erdoğan’s strategy never considered Hamas and rocket attacks from Gaza. On the other hand, Cook claimed that “the lower chair crisis”²⁰⁸ was response to the Turkish TV series which accused Israelis to kidnap Palestinian children and convert them to Judaism. After the recent crisis between Turkey and Israeli on diplomatic manner, despite the fact that Ayalon refused to officially apologize, few days later Ehud Barak, Israeli Defense Minister came to Turkey but policy of new Israeli government evaluated by Cook as “amateurish and heavy-handed, and it obviously made the situation that was not great to begin with worse.”²⁰⁹

In March 2010, the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee passed a non-binding resolution that recognizes the Armenian massacres as genocide; it could undermine relations with Turkey. In 2005 and 2007, the Foreign Affairs Committee passed the similar resolutions; according to Cook, Turkey has warned that bilateral relations would be damaged in case of passing from the House at the time.²¹⁰ In recent resolution, Ankara withdrew its Washington ambassador and signaled to reconsider Washington’s use of İncirlik Air Base. And Cook pointed out that the

²⁰⁷ *ibid*

²⁰⁸ On January 11, 2010, Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman invited the Turkey’s ambassador to Israel, Oğuz Çelikkol, to the Israeli foreign ministry. Turkish ambassador placed in a chair lower than the deputy foreign minister, Dany Ayalon, and placed no Turkish flag on the table, only an Israeli flag, intentionally trying to embarrass Turkish ambassador. Please see: “Israeli Deputy PM: An Apology Was Offered”, *BBC News*, (January 13, 2010), <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/hardtalk/8457683.stm> (accessed on June 21, 2011); “Çelikkol: Film Senaryosu Gibiydi”, *Radikal*, (January 16, 2010), <http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&ArticleID=974935&Date=30.06.2011&CategoryID=77> (accessed on June 21, 2011)

²⁰⁹ *op. cit.*

²¹⁰ Steven Cook, “Congress, Genocide and a Turkish Rift”, (March 5, 2010), <http://www.cfr.org/turkey/congress-genocide-turkish-rift/p21583> (accessed on July 5, 2010)

resolution of the Foreign Affairs Committee would make difficult to convince Turkey, new non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, for supporting new sanctions on Iran.

“Turning away from the West” was the most commonly used phenomenon for Turkish foreign policy in 2010. The title of the discussion in March 2010 was parallel to this concept. One of the speakers of the session, Henri Barkey, Professor of Lehigh University replied the question on whether Turkey seeks more neo-Ottoman foreign policy as Turkey did not turn its back to the West but seeks an aggressive foreign policy, not only focused on the Middle East. Although Europe is still the most important economic ally for Turkey, “the government partially driven by religion and culture, because of their Ottoman history, they think that they have a window rest of the world due to the cultural relationship”.²¹¹ Barkey continued that while Turkey is a unique country that has relations with all countries in the Middle East, Ankara’s main anchors are still NATO and the EU. The response of the other speaker, Hugh Pope, the Turkey/Cyprus Project Director of the International Crisis Group²¹² was that Erdoğan sees himself as a national champion as well as Arab world supports him due to “their wish for someone to say something about what is going on in Israel and Palestine”²¹³. The ambition of the AK Party in the Middle East is not just link to the AKP government; between 1997 and 2002, former Foreign Minister İsmail Cem sought the same policy that is followed by the AK Party. The following question was that whether Turkey plays a useful role in establish dialogue with Iran or Erdoğan’s party want to take Turkey toward a much stronger Islamist line. Barkey replied that Turkey wants to be a unique Sunni power in the Middle East but they have also good relations with Iran. The problem between the U.S. and Turkey is threat perception that Turkey trust Iran to have a peaceful nuclear program. Barkey also expressed that “Davutoğlu or Erdoğan always tell that the problem is not Iran, is Israel because of its nuclear weapons”²¹⁴ but added that Erdoğan never mentioned the nuclear weapons and bombs of

²¹¹ “Turkey Update: A Discussion on Turkey’s Foreign Policy”, (March 30, 2010), <http://www.cfr.org/turkey/turkey-update-discussion-turkeys-foreign-policy/p21804> (accessed on July 5, 2010)

²¹² Hugh Pope was a Turkey correspondent of the Independent and the Wall Street Journal.

²¹³ *op.cit.*

²¹⁴ *ibid*

Pakistan. At the end of the day, this government feels more comfortable with Islamic states than they feel with others.

In context of Iraq, a question was posed on Turkey's possible role in stabilization of Iraq after the withdrawal of the U.S. troops. Pope replied that Turkey "has already made a great reconciliation with the U.S. over Iraq"²¹⁵ because Ankara totally disagreed on the invasion of Iraq. In northern Iraq issue, Barkey explained that Turkey made "a 180-degree turn" by accepting that domestic Kurdish problems cannot be solved militarily. In Q&A session, religion and internal struggles of Turkey was questioned. Barkey stated that "Turkey is going through a major transformation and this political party, AKP, is really the product of economic reforms that happened in the 1980s where, for the first time, there had a new bourgeoisie emerge in Anatolia that is conservative, that is pious, but it is also very market-oriented; and as a result, they carried this body to power."²¹⁶ Due to the market-oriented identity of the AKP, Barkey explained that the AKP is not a liberal party in terms of cultural codes. In U.S.-Turkey relations, Barkey also thought that the bilateral relations are not as bad as people claim. Except the issue of Armenian genocide resolution proposed by the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee, the most important problem between the two countries is the withdrawal of the U.S. troops from Iraq, after that Turkey's relations with northern Iraq. But "the Turkish military is quite anti-American because of their belief that the U.S. went to war in Iraq to create a Kurdish state; moreover, they were the main opposition in the March 1 motion."²¹⁷ The tension between Israel and Turkey was also asked and Pope stated that when Israel treated badly the Palestinians, the relations between Ankara and Jerusalem went down since the 1967 war. But the bureaucrats from the two sides wanted to keep open the channels.

The first Turkish minister who visited the CFR in 2010 was Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs and his Council agenda was full with U.S.-Turkey relations. During the meeting, the first question came from Marc Grossman on Turkish public opinion towards the U.S. and the future of the bilateral

²¹⁵ *ibid*

²¹⁶ *ibid*

²¹⁷ *ibid*

relations.²¹⁸ According to Davutoğlu, the relation between the two countries is of unique nature due to the “unique” histories of those countries and geopolitical challenges. “Geography and history are compatible and United States needs allies in Africa, Eurasia, on the other hand, Turkey needs cooperation with a global power. That’s why; Turkish-American ties are one of the most institutionalized relations which continued from the Cold War politics.”²¹⁹ A question on Turkey-Iran relations was also responded by the Foreign Minister that Turkey wanted a policy of engagement like President Obama’s approach, so Turkey’s policy toward Iran was compatible with that of the U.S. Davutoğlu specified their principles in Turkish foreign policy that as being “value-oriented rather than just interests or short-term interests”²²⁰. The explanation of this phenomenon was, first, the government would support to obtain nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and the limits of nuclear program would be compatible with the regulations of IAEA. Second, for resolving the crisis on Iran’s nuclear program, it would be taken diplomatic negotiation with Iran rather than economic sanctions, military measures. In Q&A session of the conversation, the first question was that how Turkey would vote if the five permanent members of the Security Council agree on sanctions for Iran. Davutoğlu believed that there was still a diplomatic solution before the resolution of the Security Council and Turkey made significant progress in its negotiations with Iran. On the other hand, there were many interests of Turkey about the relations with Iran as energy issue and Iran is the only way for Turkey to reach the reserves of Central Asia. That is why; Turkey wanted to continue the negotiations because of its national interests. Secondly, Davutoğlu pointed out that Turkey did not know the details of the sanctions; moreover, the sanctions against Iraq in the 1990s impaired the bilateral trade relations and Turkey would not want go through that again. The last question was on Turkish-Israeli relations and Davutoğlu shared his own outlook that issues between the two countries commenced with Israel’s Gaza attack in 2008. “If Israel changes the policy in positive way, responds the call of Obama administration and international community for peace negotiations with

²¹⁸ “A Conversation with Ahmet Davutoğlu”, (April 14, 2010), <http://www.cfr.org/turkey/conversation-ahmet-davutoglu/p21916> (accessed on July 5, 2010)

²¹⁹ *ibid*

²²⁰ *ibid*

Palestinians, be frozen settlements and stops the provocations in Jerusalem to the holy places of Muslims, there will be no problem between Turkey and Israel.”²²¹ Consequently, Davutoğlu added that Turkish policy was not against the people of Israel or Israeli state, it was against the policy of Israeli government in Gaza.

On May 17, 2010, Brazil, Iran and Turkey made a joint declaration that Iran would send 1,200 kg low enriched uranium to Turkey.²²² After three days, in her interview, Farideh Farhi, Adjunct Professor of the Department of Political Science at the University of Hawaii stated that the United States was resentful to the Brazilian and Turkish negotiation, because obviously those countries assuming that the U.S. would be supportive if they managed to get the kind of agreement that the United States had wanted in the past.”²²³ Article of Leslie Gelb, President Emeritus of the CFR was more comprehensive and summarized the viewpoint of the United States;

The Obama team was right to preempt the Brazil/Turkish pact on nuclear exchanges with Iran. It was basically an Iranian scam to circumvent new United Nations sanctions and other limitations on its nuclear programs. But Brazil and Turkey were also right to pursue their separate diplomatic track and solution. They were reflecting the mounting attitude in the world that Washington's anti-nuclear proliferation policy essentially serves American interests and not those of most other nations. And from their point of view, they were simply doing what the United States has been doing all along, namely protecting their own interests first. That is the story lost in current news accounts.²²⁴

According to the author, this agreement showed that these countries had their own foreign policies and interests; the days of supporting U.S. non-proliferation policy in the Cold War were over. Lastly, suggestions of the author were that instead the White House embrace the trilateral agreement, the U.S. should “instill in their diplomacy what remains critical common interest in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons”²²⁵.

²²¹ *ibid*

²²² For the full text of the joint declaration, please see: “Joint Declaration by Iran, Turkey and Brazil on Nuclear Fuel, May 2010”, <http://www.cfr.org/brazil/joint-declaration-iran-turkey-brazil-nuclear-fuel-may-2010/p22140> (accessed on July 5, 2010)

²²³ “Shifts in Iran on Nuclear Policy”, (May 20, 2010), <http://www.cfr.org/iran/shifts-iran-nuclear-policy/p22171> (accessed on July 5, 2010)

²²⁴ Leslie Gelb, “Why Our Nuke Policy Doesn’t Work”, (May 20, 2010), <http://www.cfr.org/iran/why-our-nuke-policy-doesnt-work/p22186> (accessed on July 5, 2010)

²²⁵ *ibid*

At the end of May 2010, Leslie Gelb wrote his article on recent crisis between Israel and Turkey which was called Flotilla, Gaza or Mavi Marmara Crisis. Gelb argued that Israel had every right under international law to stop and board ships; and “it is pretty clear that this ‘humanitarian’ flotilla headed for Gaza aimed to provoke a confrontation with Israel”.²²⁶ In addition, President Obama should have proposed to Israel that the organizations which want to send humanitarian aid to Gaza have to agree on the inspection of contents designated by Israel as well as Israel should agree to inspect cargoes in two or three days. On the other hand, viewpoint of Steven Cook was not parallel with Gelb. Cook wrote that “Israelis clearly found themselves in an extraordinarily difficult circumstance when the cargo was strictly humanitarian; the option for Israel is to shift its policy from a blockade to quarantine in which it would allow ships to pass after boarding and searching them”.²²⁷ Despite Cook’s conciliator attitude in Flotilla Crisis, he did not think the same in relations between Turkey and the United States which “are becoming strategic competitors in the Middle East”²²⁸. Cook argued that Flotilla Crisis might prove a wake-up call in Washington. Despite the Obama administration which emphasized diplomatic engagement, multilateralism and regional stability, specifically model partnership ties with Turkey, “Washington caught between its attempts to advance model partnership and recognition of the reality that Ankara move on.”²²⁹ Disagreement in details between the two countries mainly based on the Israel-Palestine dispute, Iraq, nuclear power of Iran, stability in Afghanistan and Syria. Cook pointed out the pro-Palestinian policy of the AKP government and stated that “for the first time in history, Ankara has chosen sides in the conflict and demanded that Israel take steps to ease the blockade of Gaza”²³⁰. Before the active Turkish foreign policy toward Gaza, Ankara had already taken position on the side of Hamas whose “declarations are parallel to Erdoğan’s Justice and Development

²²⁶ Leslie Gelb, “Israel was Right”, (May 31, 2010), <http://www.cfr.org/israel/israel-right/p22259> (accessed on July 5, 2010)

²²⁷ Steven Cook, “Stormy Seas off Gaza for Israel”, (May 31, 2010), <http://www.cfr.org/israel/stormy-seas-off-gaza-israel/p22245> (accessed on July 5, 2010)

²²⁸ Steven Cook, “How Do You say ‘Frenemy’ in Turkish?”, (June 1, 2010), <http://www.cfr.org/turkey/do-you-say-frenemy-turkish/p22293> (accessed on July 5, 2010)

²²⁹ *ibid*

²³⁰ *ibid*

Party”²³¹. On the other hand, many critics argued that Syrian-Turkish rapprochement might be a benefit for Washington’s Syria and Middle East policies. But Cook disagreed that “Turkey have been noticeably quiet about the U.S. and Israeli allegations that Syria either transfer Scud missiles to Hezbollah or trained Hezbollah fighters to use them in Syria”²³²; that is why, Ankara and Washington are on opposite sides on the Assad regime. But Cook referred “the biggest problem between the U.S. and Turkey” as Iran. Before the joint declaration between Brazil, Iran and Turkey, Cook stated that the Obama administration made “perplexing lapse of communication and coordination”, regardless of that the declaration revealed the divergence between Ankara and Washington on Iran: Washington evaluated the declaration as “another Iranian effort to split Washington and its allies in Europe”; in spite of that Turkey saw this trilateral initiative a chance for broader negotiations between the U.S. and Iran. For the sake of analyzing Turkish foreign policy in this trilateral joint declaration, Cook opined that to blame creeping Islamization for Turkish foreign affairs would be “easy temptation”. He was sure that there is an ideological tendency in Erdoğan’s “Islamic” rhetoric but the architect of Turkish foreign policy is not Erdoğan himself. Davutoğlu, “is the man responsible for Turkey’s new international activism” is described by the author as bookish, soft-spoken, extremely smart and not an Islamist. Moreover, Cook expressed that despite the polarization in Turkish domestic politics, many genres concurred the direction of Turkish foreign policy. At the end of the article, Cook concluded that neither rhetoric on strategic cooperation nor suggestion on model partnership can “mask the fundamental shift in bilateral relations”. Turkey and the United States are rivals in Middle East and Turkey wants to be an effective actor in Middle East for its own interest. The issue is there is no problem so long as these interests are compatible with that of Washington’s²³³. Although it is hard to accept the divergence between the U.S. and Turkey; Cook suggested that the Obama administration should accept the reality and develop relations with Turkey because “model partnership is a vast overstatement anymore”²³⁴.

²³¹ *ibid*

²³² *ibid*

²³³ *ibid*

²³⁴ *ibid*

The day after the Flotilla Crisis, Max Boot, Senior Fellow in National Security Studies at the CFR wrote that the Israel's response to the ships in Flotilla Crisis was "entirely justified and perhaps unavoidable", but it turned into a tactical and strategic fiasco and damaged the international reputation of the Jewish State.²³⁵ The author expressed that Gazan people have already access to food, medicine and other urgent needs and they are supplied by both Israel and Egypt. "But both countries have sought to limit the importation of military equipment or dual-use material that can be employed for military purposes by Hamas".²³⁶ Boot claimed that the Turkish organizer group, İnsani Yardım Vakfı (İHH) has links with both Al-Qaida and Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, moreover, "one of İHH activist, Izza Shahnin, was arrested by Israeli forces in the West Bank and expelled on charge of transferring tens of thousands of dollars to Hamas controlled charities"²³⁷. Boot continued that although the details were still not clear, Israeli commandos were in danger of being killed during the operation and they "had hoped to avoid violence and were armed with paintball guns instead of real ones"²³⁸.

The U.S. –Turkey relations on the Flotilla Crisis were also asked to Stephen Larrabee in a CFR.org interview. Larrabee explained the reasons of the split between Turkey and the United States and Israel that the divergence started with Israel's Gaza attack in December 2008. In a broader sense, the reaction of Ankara was also a symbol of "the adjustment of Turkey to the aftermath of the Cold War"²³⁹. According to interviewee, the post-Cold War era proposed many political and economic interests to Turkey both in Middle East and Central Asia. Thanks to these new opportunities, "Turkey is returning to a more traditional role, one in which it was closely involved in the Middle East for centuries, going to back to the Ottoman Empire"²⁴⁰. With respect to Israeli-Turkish relations, Larrabee expressed that Flotilla Crisis created an impact both internally and externally: Internally, Erdoğan became very popular and Turkish people expressed their wish to have a

²³⁵ Max Boot, "Israel's Gaza Flotilla Fiasco", (June 1, 2010), <http://www.cfr.org/israel/israels-gaza-flotilla-fiasco/p22287> (accessed on July 5, 2010)

²³⁶ *ibid*

²³⁷ *ibid*

²³⁸ *ibid*

²³⁹ "Managing a More Assertive Turkey", (June 3, 2010), <http://www.cfr.org/israel/managing-more-assertive-turkey/p22302> (accessed on July 5, 2010)

²⁴⁰ *ibid*

strong leader. Externally, the prestige of Turkey among Arab countries increased and Turkey's aim for being an influential actor in the Middle East augmented. The following question was on the nuclear deal between Brazil, Iran and Turkey and motivation of Turkey when the U.S. "is hostile toward the deal". Larrabee replied that Turkey showed its mediation willing during the indirect talks between Syria and Israel, then it wanted to keep the stance between Iran and the U.S. Turkey's active policy to the south would be related with the change in Turkish security environment. After the collapse of the USSR, most of the security problems that Turkey faces are in the south and around its borders as Iraq, Iran, and Palestine. In the aftermath of the Flotilla Crisis, the interviewer asked that how Turkey would evaluate the consequences of the crisis. Larrabee replied that "Turkey threatening to make this into a bigger thing in the UN and to put Israel in the defensive position."²⁴¹ Ankara would see this is a chance to strengthen its role in the Middle East, it knows Israel is in a weak position so "they want to exploit as much as they can to their political advantage"²⁴². Larrabee continued that criticism of Erdoğan and his Minister of Foreign Affairs towards Israel's Gaza attack in 2008 was not the first time that Turkey adopted an anti-Israeli attitude, indeed, the Gaza attack of 2008 was a "turning point that was the climax of the deterioration of a relationship which has been going on for some time"²⁴³. The comment of Larrabee on American reaction to the Flotilla Crisis was that the U.S. criticized the Israeli action in "relatively mild terms and tried to take a balanced position". Therefore, Larrabee's advice to the Obama administration was that the U.S. should recognize the new Turkey which "is more assertive and self-confident, not a junior partner of the Cold War era"²⁴⁴. Washington should know that the U.S. and Turkish interests would partially overlap in Middle East; the real issue would be to manage the differences. This alteration did not mean Turkey turns its back to the West or is being Islamized; it is the consequence of divergence of mutual interests in the post-Cold war era.

²⁴¹ *ibid*

²⁴² *ibid*

²⁴³ *ibid*

²⁴⁴ *ibid*

On June 9, 2010, UN Security Council's (UNSC) decision to impose new sanctions on Iran²⁴⁵, and Turkey and Brazil's votes against the new sanctions were subject of the article of James Lindsay, Senior Vice President of the CFR²⁴⁶. Lindsay stated that these votes signal a broader shift in geopolitical environment: "Tehran has regained diplomatic momentum".²⁴⁷ On the other hand, feedback of Walter R. Mead, Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow for U.S. Foreign Policy at the CFR about Turkey and Brazil's votes in UNSC was "the impotence of the terrible twins".²⁴⁸ The author continued that

Brazil and Turkey are learning something that more experienced world players already know: it is easier to make a splash than to make a change, easier to grab a headline than to set an agenda. Both countries can expect a rocky ride for some time; the democratic forces propelling new parties and new movements to the fore reflect domestic constituencies, domestic ideas and, in some cases, domestic fantasies about how the world works. Developing viable foreign policies that take those interests and values into account, but also respond to the realities and necessities of the international system will take time and take thought. At this point, it seems clear that neither the Brazilian nor the Turkish administrations have mastered the challenge. Their joint intervention on the Iranian nuclear program gives an impression of naive over-eagerness. If the two countries had wanted to play a serious and constructive role (and there was room for them to do so) they would have needed to inform themselves more fully about the state of play, build confidence among the current group of six countries who have been handling the issue (the five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany), and take a proposal to Iran that had a realistic chance of being accepted by both sides.²⁴⁹

Mead went on his comments by analyzing the secularism approach of the AK Party. According to him, Erdoğan and his party would like to annihilate "anti-religious secularism" tradition of Turkey, they would want to create a more active Turkish foreign policy in the Arab world, in Turkic-language speaking and energy rich Central Asia with Iran and Pakistan. Due to the party's purpose, the religion is a

²⁴⁵ "The Security Council imposed additional sanctions on the country, expanding an arms embargo and tightening restrictions on financial and shipping enterprises related to 'proliferation-sensitive activities'" Decision of United Nations Security Council, SC/9948, (June 9, 2010), <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/sc9948.doc.htm> (accessed on May 30, 2011)

²⁴⁶ James Lindsay is the Director of Studies and Maurice R. Greenberg Chair at the CFR.

²⁴⁷ James Lindsay, "Security Councils Muddled Message to Iran", (June 9, 2010), <http://www.cfr.org/iran/security-councils-muddled-message-iran/p22406> (accessed on July 5, 2010)

²⁴⁸ Walter R. Mead, "Turkey Still Needs the West", (June 15, 2010), <http://www.cfr.org/brazil/turkey-still-needs-west/p22467> (accessed on July 5, 2010)

²⁴⁹ *ibid*

tool which is supported by religious Muslim entrepreneurs, so East-oriented Turkey is the mark of these pious Turks. Mead added that the energy sources of the Arab and Central Asian states are the focal areas of Turkey's construction and infrastructure sectors. Furthermore, Turkey's penetration to those markets would satisfy "Turkey's nostalgic Ottoman eastward-looking foreign policy" as well as strengthen Turkey's prestige as an independent regional power, please Turkish nationalists, and feed Turkey's economic interests. Because of these reasons, the author was not surprised that Turkey aims to follow an east-facing policy. However, he also warned that the progression of this policy may not "be rewarding".

On the other hand, Mead interpreted the enthusiasm of the AK Party for joining the EU that this was a tool for forcing the Turkish military to retreat from practicing politics. In case of abandoning the idea of membership to the EU either by the EU or Turkey, "the pro- and anti-Kemalist, secular and religious groups of Turkish society will be closer to conflict and armed forces will lose some of their inhibitions against military rule as well as more Kurds will resort to violence."²⁵⁰ In broader sense, Mead explained the disadvantages of rapprochement between Turkey and Middle Eastern countries that, for instance, coral relationship with Iran may alarm the region's wealthiest and most powerful Arab states who "see Iran as a greater danger even than Israel"²⁵¹. Turkish closer relations with Syria may also irritate Arabs who "see Syria as part of a hostile 'Shi'a Crescent'"²⁵². Consequently, the author reminded that Turks ignore annoyance of Arabs about Ottoman imperialism, but "(active Turkish foreign policy) has few echoes in countries that suffered grievously under what they saw as corrupt and ineffective Ottoman rule"²⁵³. In accordance with these recommendations, Mead warned that playing Palestinian card in the Israel-Palestine dispute is easier than winning the game; when most Arab governments are playing the same card, they are also afraid of Hamas and dependence on Iran. That's why, "it is not certain that the Turkish prime minister and those around him have fully weighed the risks — or that they understand the degree to which the Iranians perceive them as 'useful idiots' to be

²⁵⁰ *ibid*

²⁵¹ *ibid*

²⁵² *ibid*

²⁵³ *ibid*

exploited and betrayed on other issues as in the case of nuclear issue at the Security Council.”²⁵⁴

Elliott Abrams, Senior Fellow for the Middle East at the CFR²⁵⁵ agreed with other fellows of the CFR on Turkey’s “staunch supporter of the radical camp”²⁵⁶ identity. The author claimed that cooperation between Ankara, Damascus and Tehran is an emblem of Turkey’s identity change and Turkey’s desire to “undermine UN sanctions against Iran”. In accordance with Turkey’s opposite vote in UNSC, Stephen Sestanovich, Senior Fellow at the CFR²⁵⁷ also stated that Turkey was the only American ally to vote against new sanctions on Iran and “the United States does not often face a challenge like this – a broad disagreement with a major ally, rooted in both domestic politics and clashing geopolitical aspirations”.²⁵⁸ The author reminded his readers of Erdoğan’s early days when he came to Washington for introducing himself to American officials, journalists and think tankers. Despite his party’s Muslim traditionalist platform, the author stated that Erdoğan talked bold on Islam and democracy and emphasized that Washington should encourage modern politicians who could defeat Islamists. But today, the author advised two models for disagreement between Turkey and the United States with reference to the American history: First, “de Gaulle model”, which is full-bore demonization, with heavy emphasis on the psychological origins of the U.S’ adversary behavior and enforced by the Kennedy and Johnson administrations to Charles de Gaulle, French president in the 1960s. The second model as a reaction to Erdoğan’s policies was “Brandt model” which was the best answer of Nixon and Kissinger in the 1970s to the dangers of Brandt’s *Ostpolitik*.

Finally, after the early days of Flotilla Crisis, the CFR.org made an interview with their Turkey expert, Steven Cook. The first question posed to Cook was why Turkey would be cool towards the United States and angry towards

²⁵⁴ *ibid*

²⁵⁵ Elliott Abrams was a Deputy National Security Advisor in the George W. Bush administration.

²⁵⁶ Elliott Abrams, “A Turkey of a Policy”, (June 21, 2010), <http://www.cfr.org/israel/turkey-policy/p22450> (accessed on July 5, 2010)

²⁵⁷ Stephen Sestanovich is a Professor at Columbia University.

²⁵⁸ Stephen Sestanovich, “How Obama Will Deal With Our Wayward Ally, Turkey”, (July 1, 2010), <http://www.cfr.org/turkey/obama-deal-our-wayward-ally-turkey/p22601> (accessed on July 5, 2010)

Israel.²⁵⁹ Cook explained that Turkey aspires to explore opportunities in the east and south without being haunted by the strings of the Cold War. As a rising economy, Turkey also wants to pursue its own economic and political interests, for instance, visa exemption agreement between Syria and Turkey was an opportunity for closer markets as well as a key for dealing with its own Kurdish nationalism. “The Turks believe that if there is economic development in that part of Turkey closest to Syria and closest to Iraq, it will mitigate impulses for Kurdish nationalism.”²⁶⁰ Moreover, reluctance of the EU in Turkey’s membership is a contributing factor that is creating a need for broader Turkish foreign policy. From the aspect of Israeli-Turkish relations, Cook argued that Turkey exercised power in a leadership role for the Middle East, moreover, referred to Turkish-American relations in the Obama administration, Turkey did not see a common interest or a strategic partnership that the President laid out in his speech in Turkey visit. “What it means is that there are going to be times when the two countries cooperate and times when the two countries disagree and have to stay out of each other’s way”²⁶¹. Eventually, a question on the impact of the motion on March 1st on Turkish-American relations, was replied by Cook that not only Turkish public opinion, but also Turkish military opposed the motion, so “there was no place for the United States to go”²⁶².

Consequently, the CFR followed the traditional line of the U.S. that Turkey should take its place in energy pipelines as a hub. On the other hand, as it was discussed in the previous subheading, the most important issue about Turkey for the CFR was the JDP’s critical foreign policy toward Israel. Although, both Erdoğan’s and the JDP’s approach criticized frequently, the CFR never discarded Turkey and always sought to find a common ground for rapprochement between the U.S. and Turkey. In the relationship between Turkey, the United States and Israel, the main argument of the CFR in this period was constructed on the phenomenon of “given framework” again and in case of step out of this line; the institution signaled to give strong reactions as in Davos and Flotilla Crisis. Within the boundaries of this

²⁵⁹ “Turkey’s Cooling Ties with U.S., Israel”, (July 13, 2010), <http://www.cfr.org/turkey/turkeys-cooling-ties-us-israel/p22624> (accessed on February 22, 2011)

²⁶⁰ *ibid*

²⁶¹ *ibid*

²⁶² *ibid*

framework, Turkey's active policy towards Iran and the Middle East was interpreted by the CFR fellows as well.

3.8 Conclusion

From 2002 to March 1st, 2003, the expectations of the CFR on Turkey were in accordance with Turkey's historical ally role: cooperation in Iraq and in the broader Middle East. Although the decision of the Turkish Parliament surprised the CFR and caused some concerns about the tendency of the JDP government; the institution continued its publications by supporting the JDP's EU enthusiasm. Until the general elections in 2007, the CFR searched a new definition for the framework of the bilateral cooperation between the U.S. and Turkey and proposed arguments about the content of the new term. On the other hand, after 2007, the JDP's self-confidence both in domestic and foreign policy began to push the boundaries which was drawn by the U.S. and in the Obama administration, Turkey's "active" foreign policy, specifically JDP's criticism to Israeli policies was frequently questioned. Parallel to that, the perception of the CFR towards Turkey and the JDP government has changed dramatically and the CFR expressed the need of a new manner for the mutual interests of the U.S. and Turkey in the Middle East.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

This thesis defined four main questions which were explored in the main texts and replied in the conclusion. First, the perspectives of the two U.S. think tanks towards the JDP's foreign policy were analyzed with reference to the articles, seminars, interviews and reports of the two think tanks. In this manner, perceptions of the noted institutions about Turkish domestic and foreign politics under the leadership of the JDP governments as well as the role of Turkish foreign policy in the world politics were examined in the eyes of the Brookings Institution and the Council on Foreign Relations. Second, with the objective of shaping the framework of the discussions on the U.S.-Turkey relations and Turkish foreign policy, the two think tanks contributed formation of their communities with statesmen, academicians, journalists and the members of civil society organizations. It appears that the two institutions were successful enough to shape the framework of the discussions from 2002 to 2010. Third, the thesis addressed the divergences and convergences in the perceptions of the two think tanks. It should be noted that divergences in the viewpoints of the two think tanks are not in essence but in style and rhetoric. Fourth, this thesis indicated that from the perspective of the two influential U.S. think tanks, there are some continuities and changes on the JDP's foreign policy tendencies. These two institutions tried to publicize "the given framework" which was defined by the U.S. administration within which the JDP was to operate. When the JDP intended to go beyond this "given framework", the two institutions were converged their arguments in order to keep the JDP on the "right track", although the two institutions' styles were different.

For the Brookings Institution and the Council on Foreign Relations, early days of the first JDP government had almost the same meaning: An Islamist party which could be able to maintain the regular relations with the United States in the Middle East. In this period, convergences of the two think tanks about the JDP were more than their divergences. Until the motion on March 1st, 2003 of Turkish Parliament, both institutions defined Turkey and its new government as a reliable ally in U.S.-led Iraq invasion. The remarkable point of this term was that both institutions pointed out the usage rights of İncirlik Air Base and the role of Turkey was defined over the logistic importance of these military bases. It is possible to remark this rhetoric that the U.S. still positioned Turkey as a gateway which opens to the Middle East as it was in the Cold War years and the expectations from its “historical ally” was similar to the first invasion in 1991: Turkey was a valuable partner as long as it brings into use the military bases and engage with the U.S. policies in the Middle East. Because of this perception of Washington administration, although the institutions pointed out “the red lines” of Turkey as territorial integrity of Iraq, the status of Kirkuk and Mosul, and emergence of the central government in Iraq; there was no other concern about the cooperation with Ankara. On the other hand, the relationship of the institutions with the Bush administration was the divergence issue. Due to the Republican identity of the CFR, specifically, Helena Kane Finn and Morton Abramowitz’s evaluations about the bargaining process between the U.S. and Turkey were more detailed than those of the Brookings. On the other hand, in spite of the fact that Ömer Taşpınar, the Brookings’ Turkey expert mentioned the possibility of rejection of the motion due to the JDP’s lack of experience in the Parliament; this option was not discussed among other fellows of the Brookings. In this point, the definition of “epistemic community” would help to understand the perception of these two institutions. As noted in the introduction, epistemic communities can influence one another as it is the case before the motion on March 1st, 2003 that both views of the Brookings and the CFR converged that until last moment, both did not expect Turkish Parliament would not ratify it.

Although before the decision of Turkish Parliament, both institutions had similar views toward Turkey and the JDP government; March 1st, 2003 was a

turning point both for their rhetoric and reactions. While the Brookings had more self-critical style toward Turkey; as well as tried to understand Ankara's arguments and discussed reasons of the failure in the U.S. foreign policy; the CFR had more critical style about Turkish politics and pointed out the anti-Americanism wave and the fear of independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq among Turkish people. Nevertheless none of the think-tanks discussed the total divergence between the U.S. foreign policy and Turkish foreign policy, even the CFR chose to recognize the change in Turkish foreign policy in the post-Cold War era, and both institutions considered Turkey an important ally and thus tried to ameliorate the U.S.-Turkey relations.

Turkey-EU negotiations which began in 2005 were another sign of the continuity paradigm in the analysis of the think tanks. For the Brookings, the opposition of Germany and France to Turkey's full membership would play a key role in this process and the structure of Turkey's adaptation to the EU, specifically in agricultural policies and voting system, were the most complex issues of the process. However, for the CFR, Turkey's enthusiasm for the EU membership raised concerns whether Turkish foreign policy would only be dominated by European-oriented politics in lieu of the dominance of transatlantic relations. In spite of this nuance, neither the Brookings nor the CFR chose to support the negotiation process of Turkey. Both think tanks published detailed analysis about the possible failure in the negotiations and technically informed the public and the U.S. administration before the obstacles toward Turkey's membership came true. As an epistemic community, they perfectly share the details about the process with the American decision-makers.

In the Middle East, Turkey's active foreign policy towards the Middle Eastern countries commenced with Turkey-Syria rapprochement. Although both institutions frequently mentioned the discontent of Washington about this closer relationship, the Brookings asked the question of how the U.S. would benefit from Turkey's relations with the Middle Eastern countries and discussed the Bush administration's proposal for Turkey: "model country for the Middle East". In the final analysis, both institutions tried to accommodate this "model role" in their

arguments and the CFR went on to show how this role would be materialized. The attitude of the CFR toward Turkey's engagement with its eastern neighbors was parallel with the Bush administration. Contrary to the Brookings, the CFR offered to define the relations between Turkey and the U.S. over the phenomenon of fight against the terrorism. In relation to this aim, future of Iraq and Turkey's potential role as well as the bilateral cooperation against the PKK issue were the main concerns of the CFR.

Turkish presidential and general election in 2007 was the best stage for understanding the perception of the two think tanks on the JDP and its policies. Both institutions invited Turkish academicians, journalists and politicians for discussing the agenda of Turkish domestic politics but they frequently emphasized the debate between the secularists and Islamists in Turkey. Although both the Brookings and the CFR expressed their concerns about the authoritarian tendency of the JDP by the reason of representing the majority time to time; they also interpreted these domestic discussions as the transformation of Turkish society to a more liberal manner. This "common liberal approach" to the JDP's domestic policy was not reflected in foreign policy orientation of the JDP. Although both institutions did not clearly object to Turkey's mediator role between Syria and Israel; the Hamas-Turkey relations as well as Turkey's Palestine policy did not get the same reaction. In this period, the Brookings was more pragmatist in Turkey's relations with the Middle Eastern countries than the CFR and asked the same question: How would Turkey's position in the Middle East serve the interests of the United States? In this point, the Brookings introduced a new term: "self-confidence in Turkish foreign policy". With reference to Turkey's activeness in the Middle East, the Brookings proposed new policies for the U.S. administration which would be based on "softer relations" and recognize the demands of Turkey as a regional player. On the other hand, the CFR draw the boundaries of its approach: If Turkey remains to play an active role in the Middle East; it has to fit "the given framework" of the U.S. foreign policy. This meant that Turkey would be active as a regional actor but its role should be in line with the boundaries set by the United States, in the contrary case, it is clearly expressed that Turkey's role would not be supported by Washington.

For the Brookings, the Obama period was the best political scene for implementing its offers since the JDP came to power in Turkey. The contribution of Philip Gordon, Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasian Affairs in Obama administration as a former director of the Center on the United States and Europe was an important factor for putting the Brookings' projects into practice. Iran's nuclear program and Turkey's relations with Armenia was evaluated under the impact of Brookings' "softer" framework in Washington. Specifically, in the Iran-West crisis, Turkey's concerns about the possible sanctions toward Iran only found voice in the Brookings. On the other hand, this attitude did not apply to the crisis between Turkey and Israel. From Prime Minister Erdoğan's speech at Davos to Flotilla Crisis in 2010, the Brookings raised its criticism toward "pro-Palestinian" Turkish foreign policy day by day. Under the shadow of the polarized domestic politics due to the Ergenekon case and the Constitutional referendum, the JDP's domestic politics also criticized by the Brookings but the rupture point was the Flotilla Crisis and Turkey's vote against the new sanctions toward Iran in UNSC. After these crises, Ömer Taşpınar from the Brookings proposed a new term for Turkish foreign policy: Turkish Gaullism. This term interpreted the activeness of Turkish foreign policy under the JDP leadership as nationalist, defiant, independent, self-confident and self-centered strategic orientation but the emphasis on the anti-Israeli rhetoric of Turkish foreign policy. On the other hand, the CFR was sharper in its critics toward Israeli policy of the JDP. According to the CFR, Turkey's policy in the Middle East was alarming and with its "anti-Israeli" rhetoric, Turkey has already passed the lines of "the given framework".

Consequently, the bilateral relations between the U.S. and Turkey transformed since the end of the Cold War. Until the Obama administration, it is obvious that understanding Turkey's changing conditions in foreign policy-making process took up Washington's time and the U.S. continued to see Turkey's role in the Middle East as in the Cold War years. Although American Democrats largely did not join this camp and propose new frameworks as model partnership and regional player; they also share "the given framework" approach for Turkey with American Republicans. The borders of "the given framework" mostly came into focus in Turkey's Israel and Iran policies which are not parallel to Turkey's

traditional Western foreign policy. At the end of the day, the Obama administration welcomed the active role of Turkish foreign policy in a geography which was defined by Washington. In this sense, the continuity from the Bush administration to the Obama administration about Turkey policy is obvious but Turkey's changing conditions in terms of seeking active diplomacy and using economic tools towards its neighbors in the Middle East caused alteration in rhetoric of American foreign policy.

Last but not the least; Turkish foreign policy changed its priorities under the leadership of the JDP governments in the last decade. The Middle East agenda of Turkey came to the fore and rhetoric on religion /Islam became an engagement tool with the countries in the region. On the other hand, Turkey changed its traditional position that Turkey now openly and loudly supports the Palestinian side against Israel, putting more emphasis on religious references. While Turkish foreign policy adding Islamic motifs to "its backbone", after Lebanon War in 2006, the JDP governments began to test the reactions of Washington and pushed the borders of "the given framework".

All in all, it may be said that from the beginning of 2002, the Brookings and the CFR had clear objective of shaping the public as well as the government policies both in the U.S. and Turkey. These two institutions, the present thesis reveals, have some similarities in their overall objectives. In the final analysis, however, both have tried to construct epistemic communities with which they tried to influence framework of the discussions on the U.S.-Turkey relations and Turkish foreign policy.

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“Back to the Future”, 1985, Director: Robert Zemeckis, Starring: Michael J. Fox, Christopher Lloyd and Crispin Glover

“Gone With the Wind”, 1940, Director: Victor Fleming, Starring: Clark Gable, Vivien Leigh and Leslie Howard

“No Country for Old Men”, 2007, Director: Joel Coen and Ethan Coen, Starring: Tommy Lee Jones, Javier Bardem and Josh Brolin

“Once Upon a Time in America”, 1984, Director: Sergio Leone, Starring: Robert De Niro, James Woods and Elizabeth McGovern

“Requiem For a Dream”, 2000, Director: Darren Aronofsky, Starring :Ellen Burstyn, Jared Leto, Jennifer Connelly and Marlon Wayans

“Saving Private Ryan”, 1998, Director: Steven Spielberg, Starring: Tom Hanks, Edward Burns and Matt Damon

“Sleepless in Seattle”, 1993, Director: Nora Ephron, Starring: Tom Hanks, Meg Ryan and Bill Pullman


“Waltz with Bashir”, 2008, Director: Ari Folman, Starring: Ari Folman

“Who’s Afraid of Virginia Woolf?”, 1966, Director: Mike Nichols, Starring: Elizabeth Taylor, Richard Burton and George Segal

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

Actors and Their Relative Influence in Shaping United States Foreign Policy⁶³⁸



⁶³⁸ William H. Baugh, *United States Foreign Policy Making* (Orlando: Harcourt College Publishers, 2000), p.128