**A CRITIQUE OF THE HISTORIES OF**
**EUROPEAN and OTTOMAN STATES:**
**FROM "MODERNIZATION REVISIONISM" and**
**"STATE TRADITION"**
**TOWARDS AN ALTERNATIVE READING**

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# ABSTRACT

A Critique of the Histories of European and Ottoman States: "From Modernization Revisionism" and "State Tradition" Towards an Alternative Reading

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In this thesis two "western modern state" and three Ottoman "state tradition" scholars (Gianfranco Poggi, Christopher Pierson, Şerif Mardin, Metin Heper and Çağlar Keyder) are elaborated in the way how they write the the history for their theorization attempts. The specially emphasized processes in these histories are asserted to be reconstructed as the sources of an "idealized"-type that is assumed to be fulfilled by "the West" and should also be followed by "the rest". The description of this form of a state entails a covert expectation on the requirement of an effective, limited but primarily strong state. Since the mainstream historical knowledge builds the foundations of both our academic studies and daily political arguments, it should be subjected to a critique. And state theory should be rethought with comparative and alternative perspectives.

This work does not only trace the histories of political development constituted on "modernization revisionist" and "state traditional" theses, it also aims to cast new perspectives for the theorization of state-formation momentums and mechanisms by making a potpourri from some alternative readings of historical theses. As a result some central debates are brought into the picture on the historical transformation of state-society relationships. Along with the attempts for more comprehensive thinking exersizes on the states, theorization does not deal with two separate states or separate narratives of the the history but rather with the experiences thought together and watched through the different forms they takes in each particular historical momentums.

Keywords:   The history of Modern State, Modernization Revisionism, State Tradition, Ottoman Political Development, Theories of State-Formation

# ÖZ

Avrupa ve Osmanlı Devletlerinin Tarihlerinin Bir Eleştrisi: "Modernleşmeci Revizyonizm" ve "Devlet Geleneği"nden Alternatif Bir Okumaya Doğru

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Bu tezde ikisi batılı "modern devlet" üçü Osmanlı "devlet geleneği" teorisyeninin (Gianfranco Poggi, Christopher Pierson, Şerif Mardin, Metin Heper and Çağlar Keyder) tarihselliği teorik çabaları adına ele alış biçimlerinde aranmaya çalışılıyor. Bu tarih metinlerinde özellikle vurgulanan süreçlerin, günümüzde Batı'ca sahip olduğu iddia edilen ve dünyanın geri kalanınca da takip edilmesi beklenen bir "ideal"-tip formun kökeni olarak inşa edildiği iddia ediliyor. Bu devlet formunun tanımlanışı; etkin, sınırlanmış (veya olması gerektiği halde yeterince sınırlanamaz görülen) ama aslen güçlü bir devletin gerekliliğine dair gizil bir beklentiyi de içinde barındırıyor. Bu sebepten akademik çabalarımıza ve gündelik politik argümanlarımıza kaynaklık eden ve kısmen tahrif alanı haline getirilmiş olan ana akım tarihsel bilgilerimizi gözden geçirmek, devlet teorisini de karşılaştırmalı ve alternatif bakışlarla yeniden düşünmek gereği ile karşı karşıyayız.

Bu çalışma "modernleşmeci revizyonist" ve "devlet gelenekçi" tezler üzerinden inşa edilen siyasal gelişim tarihçelerinin izini sürmekle kalmıyor, devlet oluşum izleklerini kuramsallaştırmak adına yeni perspektifler sunmak için görece geç dönem tarih metinlerinden Batılı ve Osmanlı alternatif okumaları barındıran bazı tezlerin bir araya getirildiği bir potpori de ortaya koyuyor. Sonuç olarak devlet-toplum ilişkilerinin tarihsel dönüşümlerine dair bazı temel tartışmalar yapılıyor. Kuramsallaştırma çabası da iki ayrı devlet ve iki ayrı tarih anlatısı görünümünden çıkarılmaya çalışılarak bir arada düşünülen ve farklı tarihsel uğraklarda farklı biçimler kazanan bir devlet düşüncesine doğru daha bütünlüklü bir düşünme egzersizi haline geliyor.

Anahtar kelimeler: Modern Devlet Tarihi, Siyasal Gelişme, Modernleşmeci Revizyonizm, Devlet Geleneği, Devlet(-oluşumu) Teorileri

*To my grannies:*
*Mahmut Nurettin Hasdemir and Ruhsar Demirel*

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All the mistakes and problems belong to me eventually, as to be expected.

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# CHAPTER 1


## INTRODUCTION


In Turkey it is like a custom to think the conditions lived in, by comparing and contrasting its differences with the so-called "Western" world. For each person there is a detailed but imaginary portrayal of these distant but better off countries. Any unwanted incident can be connected with "uncivilized" or "underdeveloped" manners and automatically brings to mind this idealized West, where such things would never(!) happen. "The guys in Europe" must have taken the precautions for that thing much earlier than "ours" have tried to do. When asked, all these had started with the "sudden" loss of power by "our" ancestors, the Ottomans; everybody knows that. Meanwhile it was "these Europeans, who were on the rise". "We" have been trying to catch up, since the unfortunately "delayed recognition of our underdevelopment". There must be something missing, something decaying, a cultural curse "our" people must have possessed for centuries. All of a sudden "we" were no longer the "greatest" in the world.

The conception of the Ottoman state in daily life has a serious impact on today's daily perception of state. The memory of the past is experienced like an inferiority complex together with a former burden of a loss of glory, a paradoxical state of mind. This is not an interesting case only in terms of social psychology. But it is also related with the area of interest of this thesis: about how contemporary conceptions of "state" are reconstructed on the narration of the historical reality.

The history is something being experienced, remaining sediments; and something that is constructed and reconstructed in time. The memory of a simple power shift in the history has a traumatic impact in the daily reasoning of the people. It is astonishing; no matter of how far it is a construct of the people or of the official histories. Commonsense or academies alike have been the battle field of arguments for the contemporary and the future political projects and the writings of the the history are born in the core of these struggles.

The studies for this thesis started from a discovery that the conceptions of Ottoman state have been lately reconstructed; in accordance with the latest hegemony project and its objectives on the restructuring of the state. When the intellectual path towards this reconsideration of the state is followed, the bases can be found in the mainstream works of Turkish social science and their historical narratives revisited.

To analyze this tendency detected; three scholars are picked from the contemporary social sciences in Turkey: Şerif Mardin, Metin Heper and Çağlar Keyder. Each of these figures has some central texts assessing the state-society relations in the Ottoman-Turkish line of political development.[1] Especially the parts dealing with the Ottoman the history are taken into consideration from these works and some other studies of the three scholars.

The traditions of the history, methodological departure points and theoretical theses cannot be analyzed without taking into account the Western versions of all these intellectual backgrounds. Neither the theorization of the Ottoman state can be analyzed totally, without a comparative perspective on these histories and theory. Thus the examination begins with the historical and theoretical sources the Western theorizations of state. Gianfranco Poggi and Christopher Pierson with their books about the "Western modern state"[2] became the examples to be investigated. Beside the theoretical and methodological impacts of the common sources of writing the history and theorizing the state; the two authors' studies should be thought together with the other three hence the way of reconsidering the state in the approximately same decades.

This thesis refers to five theoreticians Gianfranco Poggi, Christopher Pierson, Şerif Mardin, Metin Heper and Çağlar Keyder in total and their studies in terms of how they construct theories on their histories of state. European and Ottoman theories of state are based on the cultural distinctions of each. The particularism of the Ottoman historians and some theoreticians in Turkish social and political

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[1] From Şerif Mardin "Center-Periphery Relations: Key to Understand the Turkish Politics", From Metin Heper "State Tradition in Turkey" and from Çağlar Keyder "State and Classes in Turkey" (Mardin, 1973), (Heper, 1985) (Keyder, 1987)

[2] From Gianfranco Poggi "The Development of the Modern State." And from Christopher Pierson "The Modern State.". (Poggi, 1990) (Pierson, 1996)

sciences has been studied before[3]. The Weberian impact on the leading theories in Turkish political studies was also problematized[4] quite lately. Still, the theoretical, methodological and thematic relations between the studies of Ottoman-Turkish the history and their counterparts worked on Europe remains as an unstudied area.

Gianfranco Poggi and Christopher Pierson are included the scope of this thesis with Şerif Mardin, Metin Heper and Çağlar Keyder for three reasons. First, their works depend on the history while modeling a theory of state following a pattern development studies apply as Mardin, Heper and Keyder also do. Secondly the authors make peculiar contributions to their area like three pillars of the Turkish political development. All five were influenced both from some of the methodological premises of the modernization school and the statist institutionalism.

Secondly it is especially some particular works of these scholars are subjected to an analysis. For instance both the studies of Poggi and Pierson's carry the term "modern state" in their titles. Mardin, Heper, Keyder point out the "state tradition" in common; which is asserted to be valid in the same way all along the Ottoman and Turkish line of socio-political development. Similarly "state" becomes both the subject and the object of their inquiries. The very terminologies would exhibit the central methodological foundations of the theories alone. Additionally their concepts and theses for historical flow have become a central, moreover mainstream trend in political science departments in a reloaded fashion.

Thirdly each culturally distinctive thesis separates the political sphere with sharp borders with the other spheres. The alleged separation of each (religion, society and the military) from the state was held as the crucial momentums for the last type of state expected. The power is assumed to be gathered on some "political" hands in a governmental center; where it is distinguished from the social. Only the feudal and urban elites are worth mentioning in both European and Ottoman histories, when theorizing the political. The politics from the below is out of scope, thus the theory excludes the direct producers of life.

Although this thesis departs from the common tendencies of five scholars; each is goaled to be evaluated with their particularities as well as their similarities.

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[3] See : (Kaya, 2005), (Dinler, 2003) (Aydın, 2002)

[4] See: (Sönmez, 2010)

Moreover the hierarchy between European and Ottoman-Turkish states should be stressed here; which are reproduced within these versions of building theories but melt within the terminologies of culture. Additional to the general and common problems in the theories of state, the Ottoman case has extra burdens on its back. For that reason this study serves for generating a baseline for discussing the problems of numerous sources. The sources and the direct revelation of the texts are prioritized for developing an understanding on the problems.

This work starts with attempts of terminological, methodological and theoretical genealogies around the terms of the studies. The different histories written by the two groups of scholars are investigated in a chronological manner in the first chapter, after the genealogical examinations. The theses, elaboration of the themes and periods are sought within the texts and the weight of those in the historical flows, which are designed to explicate different aspects of the reality or the debate about the historical incidents.

Some implications of the investigation in the second chapter can be found within the assumptions and terminologies created in the second and employed throughout the third chapter. One center of interest is the ways of modeling the state. The focus of European and Ottoman models are named as the "end-forms". This term symbolizes a particular historical momentum, in which some particular criteria for being that "end-form" are fulfilled. In other words the conception of the end-form is constituted through the logic of Weberian *ideal-type*s. "Modern state" is the end-form for the European model for instance. It is presumed to be there in the 20$^{th}$ century, criteria of which are listed by referring directly to the Weber's description for the legal-rational *ideal-type*. Each event in the past appears as a leap forward for reaching the end-form, modern state.

The Ottoman state was about to end in the same century and this appears to be the outcome of an unsucess; or the lack of fulfilling the criteria for the Western state. That is why the Ottoman state of 20$^{th}$ century is identified with the term "non-formation". As a result of these analyses it is not the application of the models which is problematized but its modeling with this kind of tools of periodization and their usage in this thesis. Secondly the employment of the Weberian *ideal-type* is criticized. The term is known to be a tool for objective conceptualization; however the criteria for the European state are idealized in a normative way.

Some other versions of the European model must have affected the Ottoman theories of state examined in the second part of the second chapter. The Ottoman experience remains unexplained when trying to theorize the case with the "absences". (The absence of civil-society, separation of powers, European-like bourgeoisie, bureaucracy and economic development are some examples of these absences.) Hierarchically superior in the power relations can be subjected to a more detailed, identified analysis. Moreover the terms used to explain the superior phenomenon, lose their analytical value for other cultures.

The cultural presumptions are the unexplained *explananda* of the five histories of state. In other words the answer of all questions about how an incident has happened is based on the peculiar character of the culture. According to Poggi the state can be explained with purely political terms, actually. But Pierson confirms the external relations of the state with the social. Mardin goes back to the average of the individual meanings given to the state in the past. Heper and Keyder make the state work through bureaucratic elites; whose cultural identity is assumed to be peculiar.

Another perception of state should be installed instead. State should not be regarded as an actor, but as a result of the day-to-day relations of production, which are required to be understood. Michel Foucault stresses that power is not something that can be transferred or accumulated, it is a relation. Relational approach helps to overcome with the theoretical obstacles born out of subjectification. Marx was actually the first one to offer the relations as the unit of analysis. Poulantzas goes one step further and tries to theorize the state with a relational approach with a relatively more detailed analysis of one particular type especially: the capitalist state. This perspective should be applied to other forms and types of states including the historical versions. The theoretical pillars of his work should be attempted to be understood first.

Poulantzas identifies the formation of the state with the condensification of power relations. Power relations are there whenever there are contradictions and struggles. State is sometimes defined with those very class struggles. More precisely the state gains its shape within a project of the dominant classes, for whom the formation of a *power bloc* is goaled and maintained through an agreement within or with other fractions. The organization of these groups and inter-class or fractional contradictions within go hand in hand with the struggles of the productive classes

and these together produce the type of state Eventhough an agreement is reached among the dominant classes the contradictions and struggles persists and goes on reproducing the state. Lastly his concept of *political crisis* stands for the point when the elements of the bloc cannot respond to the inner crisis due to the unsolvable contradictions between the classes and or fractions in there; which would end up with the reconstruction of the bloc and the change of the form of the state. *The crisis of state* on the other hand would necessitate a change in type, which means a shift in the dominant mode of production and entire network of productive relations. The struggles sharpens the contradictions till new classes become dominant and initiate in the formation of a new *power bloc* to build the political instance according to their self-class-interests as much as they can. The Ottoman state should be perceived in that manner, of which periods should be theorized according to a Poulantzasian perspective in my opinion. But this is a difficult task. This study only puts a baseline for such a work; but first of all one has to be able to talk within his terms; which are actually excluded from the state theorization of the Ottoman-Turkish line. To challenge the mainstream thoughts limiting the historical and sociological imagination; some alternative readings of the history of both Ottoman and European political developments should be referred, compared and contrasted for setting the grounds of a new state theory.

Thus, the third chapter is designed to open new spaces for comparative historical debates. The themes presented in the second chapter are problematized and opened to discussion. Some considerable debates and counter-arguments in different European and Ottoman studies on the history are gathered in a chronological way. In the third section of this chapter these separate analyses are attempted to be collided. Following a review of the works of five scholars and their general perspectives for identifying particular time periods, the critique and argumentation is goaled to be managed under three sub-titles. In the last section the conclusive remarks are given.

# CHAPTER 2


# MODELS OF "EUROPEAN MODERN STATE" AND THE OTTOMAN "NON-FORMATIONS"


In this chapter five scholars and their historical perspectives when theorizing the political are analyzed. The first part of this chapter brings forward two particular figures into the scene Gianfranco Poggi and Christopher Pierson, whose theoretical interpretation brought about an ideal-typical Western "modern state" out of the European political the history. Various political development paths are reconstructed under one particular historical model for "Europe". Hence the theoretical contribution of the historical models Poggi and Pierson is inquired; the methodological roots of the two scholars have been prioritized in the first sub-section

The second part focuses on the use of histories in making of the theorization of the Ottoman political development, specifically in the works of Şerif Mardin, Metin Heper and Çağlar Keyder. These three scholars do not rely on the term "modern state" that much, but their methodological sources are quite similar with Poggi and Pierson's, despite each has a distinctive blend when theorizing about the state. In the beginnings of the second subsection the theoretical and thematical impacts of historical traditions are studied.

After investigating the theoretical backgrounds these five studies are built in, their own formulations on the political are given place. Poggi and Pierson's analyses to be in the first and Mardin, Heper and Keyder's to be in the second part, their perspectives the European and Ottoman versions of political development and their general understanding about how the current state are formed are followed through the historical flows they put forward.

The elaboration of the characteristics of two models, European "modern state"and the Ottoman "state tradition" will be more meaningful after detecting the methodological backgrounds, theoretical stances and the thematical sources of each scholar, which are applied in their analyses.

Each historical flow taken upon by the scholars are believed to show a pattern according to the models they are attached to.Thus Poggi and Pierson's histories are grouped together to underline some particularities of the European model of political development; whereas Mardin, Heper and Keyder are brought together to delineate the Ottoman part of Ottoman-Turkish "state tradition" account. In parallels theoretical implications of these studies are tried to be investigated, which will be shortly summarized in the end of the chapter.

## 2.1. A BROUGHT BACK STATE IN FLIRT WITH THE "MODERNIZATION REVISIONISM"

The term "modern state" has such a widespread usage that it seems to be valid for ages. But it is relatively a new term. The very wording is unquestionably legitimate not only as a terminology of the news broadcasting, but also as a fundamental term for social sciences. Then how did the term come to such a position within time? In this part following the paths that the individual words took, the "Western modern state" histories of Gianfranco Poggi and Christopher Pierson will be considered.

### 2.1.1. Journeys of the Terms: the "Modern" and the "State"

"Modern" and "state" could not be brought into play together in the first instances of the social thought. Even separately they could not be mentioned as relevant terms for philosophy or science until the late 19th century, and even after that neither could be accurately explained.

The term "modern" has always met the need to define the most recent, the newest and the contemporary. It was used to refer to some particular period of the late 19th century and then gained a descriptive power for some products of art in the early 20th century. More products from different areas were identified with a so-called "modernist" stream, the term started to acquire "newer contents and other

meanings". (Johnson, 2000; p.74)   It began to be connected to quite diverse phenomena, as it was tied to the separate fields of life or branches of study. This study is principally interested in the usage of the terms around the more "political" instances of the so-called modernity.

The "modern" is claimed to be the term to define what has happened and triggered a miraculous change between the 18th and 19th centuries in Western Europe as the bases of the social sciences. The authors who were writing in that age, namely "the great fathers of sociology", were the first ones defining the new spirit. They had the chance to observe a transformation that was being experienced by the recently emerged society. This transformation symbolized a drastic shift from the *traditional* ways of living; categorized under *Gemeinschaft* (community) experience and assumed an evolutionary unilinearism in reaching the new life. The change was generally taken as a process expanding from the cities, with the advance of the commercial life and the introduction of the industrial production; of which peak was reached with the outcomes of those in the social life. This urban transformation is found as the core of all happenings in this perspective, which should be held together with the rural socio-economic changes (Johnson, 2000; p. 126-128).

These new societies were named differently in those years: as the *Gesellschaft* (Ferdinand Tönnies), *industrial society* (Auguste Comte) or the societies of *mechanic solidarity* (Emile Durkheim), or *rational authority (Max Weber)* or *capitalist society* (Karl Marx). But the term "modern" could be an available adjective for none of these societies.  Interestingly enough, it was in the middle of the 20th century, when the theorization of these new formations were reviewed and renamed as the theories of the "modern society". They were usually reviewed and renamed by social scientists in North American scholarship[5].

Lately the theoreticians[6] studying on modernity as the project of the 18th-19th centuries think of the period with the theoreticians of the age. Another current[7] that envisages the "modernization project" as a respectable terminology moreover as an opportunity, also narrate the modernization critiques and reuse their conceptions due

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[5] Parsons and Almond are the central figures of this scholarship. See: (Parsons, 1961) (Almond, 1957)

[6] Frederic Jameson and Pierre Lyotard can be the examples. For their central theses see: (Jameson,1991), (Lyotard, 1984)

[7] For more detailed discussions see: Anthony Giddens, Jürgen Habermas, Ahmet Çiğdem. (Giddens, 1987),(Habermas, 1985),  (Çiğdem, 1997)

to construct their own agendas. After these two theoretical worlds, the term "modern" has become a short-cut definition for the classical authors. As the curses of modernity were accepted to be left from the project of those authors, modernization revisionist school in the sociological theory had to go back to these authors. Weber was specially revisited in that respect, whereas Marx and Durkheim's impacts on the theory are also analyzed in response to the Weberian theses. In terms of revisionism here, some particular themes of the classical authors are more emphasized, wheras some are neglected. As the post-modern critique blamed the modernist agendas with e*volutionism;* in the name of "reflexive" thinking this is aimed to be overcome by the modernization revisionists. The modern was seen as an opportunity, an "incomplete project" in need to be fulfilled with its ideals like democracy and welfare state of a new kind. The classical criticisms like the *unequal distribution of wealth* or *international division of labor* that had been put forward by the dependency school and critical approaches, appear to have lost their central critical capacity.

For the criticism of this approach, the thematic choices emphasized or in omitted while elaborating the figures and/or the history will be highlighted in the examples that are called as the "modernization revisionist" studies. Still, the main goal of the classical authors should be reformulated here. What they were trying to do was to explain the social transitions in their century systematically, in order to be able to predict them as applied for the measurable areas of positive sciences. Thus they initially described the transformations within the society, results of which had drastically affected lives. They questioned the quality of each development, marked the dangerous and the more promising ones according to their points of views and political stances; and they even argued about their own projects for change. Regardless of our approval or partial theoretical criticisms on their ways of thinking, classical authors cannot be alone accused of the deficiencies of their some "modernity" projects. The criticisms should not remain trapped in this network of terminology at least.

It should not be forgotten that the classical authors were among the first ones to draw attention to possible negative results of the so-called "growth" and "development" in the particular direction they saw on the humanity and the nature. One must remember Max Weber's *iron cage* image of men in captivity in such a bureaucratized society (Weber, 2009; p.164-168), Karl Marx's concerns about the nature and man's freedom, the constructive relation called capitalism was creating its

own crises all the time (Marx, 1976; 1-5), Emile Durkheim's and Auguste Comte's pessimism about the future of the "scientific" measures (Aron, 2000; p. 78-85; p. 311-317). These precautions are usually omitted but are also in need of reconsideration beyond the arguments around "modernity projects".

Lots of other ideas on the polities had cumulated in the course of the history, from the momentous products of political thought to the foremost empirical studies on politics. The direct usage of the "modernity" together with the "political" instances would come rather tardy.

Likewise it was even unthinkable to define a "state" in the primeval political treatises of the "Western" political thought. Brian Barry states that even in the tradition of analytical philosophy it was always dealt with the political terms like "political obligation" and "authority", "law" and "power" that became the terms for discussing the surrounding issues stemming from the area of linguistics. (Barry, 2000) The same can be thought for the terms like sovereignty, absolutism, constitutional monarchy, private property, contract, the law etc.

The political terms that we know today were discussed and varied due to the needs and the realities of their contexts. The conceptualization efforts are usually the results of the inquiries for the solutions of the existing problems or the descriptions of what was observed or desired to be seen[8]. Comparisons and the differences between diverse experiences made them possible to be named under types, principles and good or bad versions. This thesis offers to follow these lines of thought and the intentions beneath the conceptualizing efforts both in daily and intellectual bases. It does not mean that the use of the models creates problems but the missed points or exaggerated realities should be monitored from the perspective of the contextual impacts and ideological purposes. Especially in the theorization efforts built on the historical knowledge, the traces of the context and the intensions of the authors become more crucial. For the term "modern state", the perspective for understanding each of the concepts is prior: the concepts are always historically produced and reproduced. Etymologically the term "state" comes from its ancestor term "estate".

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[8] Alexis de Tocqueville's work "The Old Regime and the French Revolution" can serve as an example for each claim. (Tocqueville, 1955) In Michel Foucault's work on his famous vocabulary "governmentality", he follows the idea of "government". He explores how it was conceptualized in the political treatises and how its meaning had transformed through time. Both his perspective while he problematized an historical perception and his outcomes falls parallel to the thoughts above. (Foucault, 2000)

Like the differences in meanings between the two terms above, the first day of pronunciation of the term "state" and the contemporary conception should be worlds apart. Both of the terms "estate" or "state(s)" stood for privileged highness or an advantaged position quite parallel to the Ottoman "devlet" in the 18th to 19th centuries. (Barnhart, 1988) (Koll., 2005)

"State" could become a term to define the polities after centuries it was firstly used and in time it became the general name of "organized political communities. The meaning-formation processes effectual for the term state must be the official histories projected scientifically in the last decades of the 19th century by the nation-states. Surreiya Farouqhi calls it as the "traditional political the history school"; carrying more or less similar tendencies when formatting the "official histories" were born. The idea of "nation-state" and its relation with the society moreover the individual was effectively constructed through the textbooks for formal education. Thus the idea and definition of the state held a central position. (Farouqhi, 1999)

Scientific theorization attempts in social sciences overlap with the ages when writing official histories are written. However neither sociology nor a late-comer politology could study the "state". The reason of that was the positivist methodology. What the term "state" referred was not tangible thus could not be an object of inquiry. When looking from the same criterion, the question is still valid for other terms used instead of "state": Why was the "state" considered as a metaphysical ontology, whereas the terms like "government" or the "political system" were not? Most probably because the monarchs could no more claim that "*L'etat c'est moi*" or any other offices, which could be manifested through their personnel. As a result, there was a tendency to lack further rationalization and causality-building processes around the term "state" and the ambiguity valid for the term "state" persisted. The questions like why it is there and what it is exactly and what its components are remained unanswered. Henceforth it would stay as a mythical concept without being studied scientifically for a long time. (Barry, 2000)

Evasion of the term "state" due to positivist motives was a feature of the modernization school in North American academy as well. Political science departments were established on the branches like comparative governments or politics around the 1950s. It was not the term "state" but the "modernity" was here opened to discussion. The production of modernist perspectives in the social sciences

coincided with American hegemonic claims in the global system had roots in the 1930s and would be reproduced in the 1950s.

The culturalist and non-economical perceptions about the non-Western experiences were criticized firstly by Paul Baran and then by the underdevelopment studies of Andre Günder Frank that served as severe critiques against the modernization school in the 1950s to the 1970s. The criteria were built in the sole hand of the West and they were challenged at the same time with the Latin American contribution of ECLA. Institutionalist critique would bring about a methodological challenge as well. Taking that challenge into account, Samuel Huntington came about with an institutionalist version of modernization school; of which unilinear perspective at political development was altered but culturalist stance within the structural functionalism was preserved.

The positivist hesitation to employ the term would be profoundly criticized in the 1970s with the school of "bringing the state back in"; which was still positivist but also institutionalist. Thought together with all the critiques from institutionalist, post-modernist and neo-Marxist agendas to the political theory, the modernization school of the 1980s could be expected to find responses to all those theoretical challenges to reconfirm its academic dominance. Both Poggi and Pierson's works should be considered within that framework of events and they are part of the reconstruction of a mainstream modernization theory that eventually brought the terms "modern" and the "state" together to designate a political unit.

### 2.1.2. Histories by Gianfranco Poggi and Christopher Pierson

The personal methodological backgrounds and preferences of Poggi and Pierson will be taken upon here before the narration of historical flows intertwined with each other; in order to reveal their individual relations with the academic traditions they were nurtured and separated at some level.

Poggi is an Italian scholar, who spent his academic life in North America and Italy. As a specialist on feudalism, he refers to Weber as he develops his theory on the estates system as the preoperative of the absolutist rule, which is simply seen as the early form of the "modern state". His main research and instructing fields are

modern political institutions and the state. He has three published books and several essays in the related subjects. Secondly he deals with the "classics" (Tocqueville, Marx, Durkheim, Weber, and Simmel), on which he wrote books, chapters, or essays. His historical perspective carry some continental qualities more into account: This is perhaps because of his reevaluation of Weber, who took the French and German experiences as the foundations of the *ideal-types* in his works.

Poggi brings criticisms to both constructivist and Marxist agendas in one of his works and defends the elaboration of the history in a contingent way different than the first; and finds the conflicting nature of central political figures as the core of Western peculiarity made it reach to the "Modern State" Here Huntington's and Habermassian quotations go hand in hand about the scope of the modern and the political development; together with the Weberian delineation of the limits of the political.

Pierson is an Australian scholar working currently in Britain. In his earlier works his reviews on classical authors gains importance. The way he handles the issues stemming from Marxian agendas resembles to the Habermassian perspectives in terms of thematic choice and scope. For instance he tries to improve the conceptions of public sphere, rights and social justice by turning back to the primary sources of Marxist and Weberian terminological horizons.  His later studies focus more on the welfare state, social policies and the relationship between democracy and the market. In one of his books called "*Making Sense of Modernity*", Pierson volunteers for being the specialist reporter for the conversations with Anthony Giddens, with whose work he is quite familiar and comfortable. In the book "The Modern State" the prominence of both Giddens and the Weberian impacts on Pierson are striking. His perspective about the "modern" can be told to be inferred from Giddens, whereas the vision of state is provided by the perspectives employed from the selected works of Weber. These perspectives altogether set the characteristic and historical criteria for the contemporary states to fulfill the definition of the modern.

The works of both authors this study is interested in can be classified under institutionalist perspectives with a positivist stance. Institutionalists usually defend the state as an actor that could act through institutions in the name of policies or commands. Max Weber being one of their common sources set the grounds of both the Poggian and Pierson's conceptualization and periodization of the history. Weberian methodology shares nominalism with both Poggi and Pierson. But the

presumption of two scholars about ontological reality; materialism; makes them empiricists different from Weber's subjectivism.[9] In Weberian methodology the description of social reality is expected; after an extensive reading on the actors whose ideas on a particular case are required to be reflected and concluded for attaining the general perception and conception in the society. The empiricists, however, take one or few author's view (accepted to reflect the historical reality observed) in order to reach generalizations. (Johnson&Daneker&Ashworth, 1984)

The variety of developmentalist presuppositions owned by both authors must be from the structural-functionalist school that became popular in the USA with Talcott Parsons[10] and his counterpart in the political sciences Gabriel Almond. They both were inclined to conduct their analysis in terms of cultural variables.[11] Almond was differently curious about constructing the concepts for direct explanation of concrete problems, most of which were borrowed from other functionalist studies. The lack of a concern for a theoretical completeness (Rothman, 1971) by Almond is a common feature for the works of Poggi and Pierson as well. They also share the "liberal individualist" stance with the application of "rational-choice theory" to a limited extent. (Barry, 2000)

The mythical state remains as a non-qualifier for a long time, hence the abstract term could not be taken either as an *explanan* nor *explanandum.* Historical institutionalism[12] loosened the description of the institutions. In other words they could talk about institutions not limited to the formal bureaucratic structures found ways to take the state as an object of inquiry in positivist terms different from the old

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[9] As subjectivists take the social world as the outcome of interpretive activities of individual actors, empricists look at the human actions as observable behaviors taken in terms of generalized in the surrounding material circumstances. (Johnson, 1984)

[10] He used concepts and models from Weber and Durkheim to establish a sociological approach, which dominated American sociology from the 1940s onwards. One of the latent ends of his project was asserted to create a set against the Marxian views and concepts in the academy, which seems to be successful. Except a few exceptions structural-functionalism was the only sociological approach used, while the Marxian concepts and approaches lacked in the sociology textbooks. (Shills, 1955)

[11] The Almondian and Parsonian culturalist causal explanations for the nature of the development are rooted more on Herbert Spencer's, evolutionary views (although Parsons disliked Spencer's work) than Weber, according to Rothman. (Rothman, 1971)

[12] Around the turn of the twentieth century the scholars writing on institutions were mostly based their works on the study of formal institutions in a highly normative and prescriptive way, who were called as the "old institutionalists" as Almond and his followers did as well. In the 1950s, structural-functionalism made the study of institutions to focus more on prescribing and generalizing at the systemic level. (Rothman, 1971)

institutionalism. (Hay, 2002) Thus the state is regarded as the subject, the actor alone; making up policies, having bureaucrats, performing in particular ways.

In the works of Poggi and Pierson two fundamental quality of the new institutionalism can be detected. The motto of "bringing the state back in" is the first, and the goal of "loosening of the terminology to a certain extent" is the second. The loosening of the terminology implied a rethinking on the concepts and their scope by an adaptation of the techniques in "reflexive revolution". The critique carried some elements taken from the post-positivist agendas of constructivist or critical realist perspectives. A partial adaptation to the new institutionalism can be claimed based on Colin Hay's definition. In other words except "reflexive" questionings against the methodological stances Poggi and Pierson appear closer to the attitude of the old institutionalists. (Hay, 2002)

Poggi cannot call off rational-choice terms in the rise of bureaucracy or social democracy. Moreover he discusses the capacities of the governments in a behaviorialist sense. Poggi says that he is aiming to make a schematic breakdown of developments with the cut backs and cumulative structure of the stages. To achieve that he will go about firstly the important improvements affecting political institutions, then deal with the political identities, their representatives and supporters. But he will not evaluate these happenings with the synchronic evaluations on the other spheres of social life, though they do transform and are affected by political life. It is important for him to tell that the pattern exhibit differences in various regions in Europe. (Poggi, 2008)

Pierson on the other hand affirms that it is Eurocentric to define the "modern state" as a purely European thing but it must be accepted that it has firstly appeared in Europe. In that way he assumes that he overcomes the problem of Eurocentrism. More precisely he defines the states as entities working in a system of international affairs between the unequals and competitors in the modern times; and the mission he is taking on is to grasp the relation between the states and the social forces in the course of the history. He offers primarily taking the "the history of the modern" in an abstract and general level on the hand. It is obvious that the individuality of each state will be ignored. But its being, positivism and the temporality can only be stated within its historicity. (Pierson, 2000)

### 2.1.2.1. Feudalism

The flow of events that would lead to the "modern state" starts from the feudal times in Poggi and Pierson's works. Pierson begins with the collapse of the Roman Empire. The following process was supposed to bore the feudal system. Classical feudalism is dated between 12th and 14th centuries by Poggi. Pierson writes that the end of the system was symbolized with the collapse of the Duchy of Burgundy after which alternative forms were introduced to be the first structures to result with the early "modern state". According to Poggi the succession of events named here is a peculiar picture valid only for Europe. (Pierson, 2000) (Poggi, 2008)

The origins of the feudal social system are supposed to lie in the political institutions of the Germanic tribes before the big "barbarian" invasions. The basis of the system was the relations between the tribe leader and his warriors during its evolution to a kingdom. The conquered land was given to the warriors; in return they and their attendants are expected to be ready for wars whenever the king requests. The land-holder *vassi*s returned to an elite group in the political organization as the system benefits and authorities gets developed through time. (Poggi, 2008) The central constitutive relationship between the lord and the vassal was secured with an individual contract. (Pierson, 2000)

The generalization of these relations was examplified in the case of Franks, whereas this practice became the core of the government style to be copied all over Europe in the following centuries. The soldiers who fought with the king were proclaimed to be his consultants in the first version of the agreement; the feudal king was identified to be only the first amongst equals in this relationship. (Poggi, 2008) According to Pierson, this grant of *feudum* by the feudal king could be taken as a bribe, whereas the *vassal* is given the control of one piece of land called as the *fief*. (Pierson, 2000)

The authorities in this age were not the kings to regulate the life and build a civilization, but they were more like conquerors, rantiers and tribute-collectors. Each *vassal* initiated in agricultural work, did not pay anything for it (this was already proclaimed to be naturally his obligation) (Pierson, 2000) In return he had to keep himself and several specialized warriors and the *serfs* ready for possible wars or demands of money from the king, again mostly in the cases of war. (Poggi, 2008)

This characteristic relationship in classical feudalism was the quite unstable military relations. The sole guarantee was the expected loyalty, which could also be broken down very simply. These problems could rarely be solved with additional contracts. To the life-time limited transfer of the *fief* was one problem in front of the vassals for their long term interests for instance. (Pierson, 2000) Whenever a *vassal* died, the *fief* had to return to the control of the king. Inheritance rights had been achieved incrementally in the course of time. (Poggi, 2008)

The right of delegation of the *fief* from one *vassal* to another was the next goal to be achieved. Whoever distributed the *fief* of his own, had gone one step ahead in the deepening stratification and be named as *Herr, lord,* or *senior,* or *barone* due to the culture it is implanted in. The new vassal like sub-groups had also found other ways to profit and transferred the authority they once had been given, as well. (Poggi, 2008) As a result of the continuously created levels to the existing stratification, the practice was intensified more and more in time. Accordingly, new elements were introduced to the existing relations and stratification was systematized. The superior powers in terms of the hierarchical status relations were claimed to act together according to Pierson. They were gatherings due to "interests" and creating a baseline for further developments. (Pierson, 2000)

Privileged groups made up of chief soldiers came together more and more, agree or fight together for some common interest on an institutional basis. One major rule was that the senior could take back the *fief* whenever he wanted and it was enough for him to say that the land is supposed to be ruled badly. In cases of resistance the results could be brutal. Hence each party had their own independent military forces, the nobles did very frequently and commonly use it against either to the feudal authority or to a competing equal or to a lesser in cases of conflicts. That meant endless wars and struggles, taking a lot away from the strength of the parties. (Poggi, 2008)

It took time for the lawful contracts spread towards the agreements between seniors and inferiors as well. Nobility started holding positions in the courts, and their group interests were protected more than the common people. In parallels the established nets of contracts could make issues harder to overcome. As a result this system had divisionary tendencies. The social world of serfs (who were only objects in the contracts given with the land, not the subjects, yet) was lived between the agreements or struggles colliding and divided authorities. A social hierarchical

pyramid did affect any relations, according to a personal and elastic system of affairs. (Pierson, 2000)

The decay of the system after its peak is dated around 15<sup>th</sup> century, when several attempts for institutional and legal solutions appeared to overcome the ongoing problems. Holy Roman Empire example was idealized Roman heritage, for instance, in the way it retained power and the state through legal bases. Another structural source both Poggi and Pierson utilized was the organizational bases of the Catholic Church, which was sometimes more powerful than the kings in the provinces and was the sole holder of instruments to combine regions with the center. The first governmental bodies were based on the church's institutions and had many churchmen working in these places. These structures had served as the hope of the kings to build a res *publica*. (Poggi, 2008)

The opposition against the monarch that was turning to individual struggles began to be represented not by individuals but groups called as *estates* or the *Staende*. The regional aristocrats, cities and ecclesiastical structures, brought about self-governing bodies like the guilds, clerical groups or chambers of crafts and commerce, which were composed of the group's most privileged representatives. This resulted in sharp compartmentalization and the diffusion of the power. Each of these *Staende* represented its own common assets and claimed to represent a larger, more abstract social totality. They stood back for the monarchical tradition anyway and for the sake of their privileges and they appeared quite eager to secure the public interests and to serve for the people living on land (*terra, pays*) in their control (Poggi, 2008; p.74-78)

The monarchs started to see themselves as the authorities further than feudal leaders in the times the system was transforming into an *estates system*. The rule of land was depended on some pre-modern totality of regulations, which would be called as the *polity of estates* by Weber. The deepening of the contract system was left from the late feudal times brought about a condensation in the governing bodies from one perspective, which helped the kings to achieve their objectives with fewer losses due to domestic struggles. They were now given a "glorious title circle" (*sacre du roi*) in the holy coronation ceremonies, made them defining the legal holder of privileges and pride earned through nobility, the origins of which went back to the pre-feudal times. (Pierson, 2000)

The meetings between the monarch and leaders of estate were crucial events named by both authors, whereas Poggi asserted that this gained an increasing pervasiveness and importance in the age of the estates. Monarch demanded extra money or economic resources from the side of the *Staende*. The need was justified with the required expenditure for the general public needs (although the money went mostly to the wars.) In return each *Staende* was equipped with new benefits like the local governmental authorities due to their ranks and powers. These privileges meant that the functions of state were divided between these different units. Each counterpart of privilege had its own particular instruments to exert power, which meant they and their family members started to hold key positions in the civil service. The presence of privilege holders in the courts, the government of fiscal sources, the armed forces and the special missions were booming. Moreover each *Staende* could use these privileges freely according to their private interests. (Poggi, 2008)

In this period the attribution of the aristocrats with the land came closer to its future form of land-ownership. The dualist structure was drew the main line of struggle, between central and regional authorities. The centrality of the rural production and intensive physical labor in the feudal system, in the polity of estates towns and cities acquired dominance in the economic activities. Thus the laws regulating the lord-vassal relationship were inadequate in the formulation of the needs of the urban commercially-privileged residents. Their interests drove them to the political organizations that resulted in the spread the political rights. Further more personal or public interests were based more on institutionalized calculations. (Pierson, 1996; p.52) Based on Poggi, Pierson names these times as the prelude to the nearest source of "modern state" in the early modern period: absolutism.

### 2.1.2.2.    Absolutism

This period was symbolized with the French example of the 16th-17th centuries. The growth of the absolutist monarchy is explained with the particular losses some of the estates holders in the reign of Louis the XIVth had experienced and the monarch's collection of lost privileges in his individual hands.    The

empowering of the monarch is imagined together with the so-called "erosion of the estates system" in both authors. Poggi emphasizes the decrees, sets of rules becoming binding bases of authority for the monarch over the entirety of the territory he "possessed". He was supposed to aim using them homogeneously and extensively. Pierson stresses on the announcement and claim of the monarch that his own private privileges were the highest and largest held the monopoly in making laws and had the special control on the use of force just like Hobbes had described. The residues of feudal and estates-based order were still there together in the "cradle of the modern". (Pierson, 2000) (Poggi, 2008)

The newly designed central order was defined by Pierson as follows: There was a sovereign power in the center that focused on series of specialized spheres of interests. Qualitatively it was different from all other social powers and possessed a political structure in its full sense. The French kings had a government body consisting of the *parliménts,* like ministries. There was also an *Etats Generale*. But Louis the XIVth tried to balance the aristocratic weight in these institutions. He turned the palace as the source of power that changed the attitude of the aristocrats from privilege-seeking to status-seeking due to the appointments from the king. The *Poulette*'s were the typical archaic institutions symbolizing that transition. As being some kind of civil servant, the nobles could collect the taxes in the name of the king; though this right was still sold. (Pierson, 2000)

The *Staende* and the monarch organized within certain borderlines, whereas the monarch did not recognize any higher authorities than himself. In cases of conflict and competition some public courts (*parliments*) dealt with them and they consisted of the *Staende* structures in the 16th to 17th centuries. (Pierson, 2000)But in time the monarch took precautions to collect the entire powers of legislation, execution and the judiciary on his own hands. This seems to be found sufficient for the change Poggi prescribed for bureaucratic neutrality and objectivity achieved by the 18th century. All subjects might be free to exert any powers they want on the other hand, until the powers of the monarch were threatened. The relationship between these governments and the estate holders are simply drawn in the laws no more through individual contracts. (Poggi, 2008)

Only the monarch had the right to fall outside the sphere of morals and the laws in using unchained and unlimited versions of force and intended deception. The holder of the power expected only to be rational then, not moral. This       violation

right of the monarch as the source of the legislation was his duty for the sake of order and security and he was limited only with that ruleto secure the "free individual interests". Just as he was the legislator and guarantor of the obedience to the laws; he was also the provider and the protector of the "dominum" now. The birth and rise of the capitalism is dated to the absolutist age. The concepts "free individual interests" and "dominum" (The meaning of this Roman conception is held as if they were in equal with the term "the right of property") were not used here in vain. They are important integrients of the *ideal-type* of capitalism to be introduced in the future but supposed to be existent already. (Pierson, 2000; p. 25)

Those who supported the ideas against the distribution of privileges were on the side of the king fighting for an absolutist agenda put forward by the intellectuals. He no longer wanted further mechanisms that could divide the power and the authority into pieces. There were will of improvements as well as resistances against them by the traditional regulative and status quo groups. (Poggi, 2008; p.57, p. 32)

Beside the papacy or the *Staende*'s universal authority claims there were private and active organizations acting solely in their own boundaries. The individuals started to come together progressively, united their forces, formed institutions based on their ideas. There was the need of fulfilling the responsibility of formulation of claims and demands. The final solution would be installed on the side of the power superiority (e.g. in cases of resistance) in any case, but an aspiration to convince other party within a debate started to rise in value. Not only the interest owners but also the literates claimed that the antagonistic arguments should determine the laws. The need of the intellectual discussions for better, truer regulations in the government was outspoken. (Poggi, 2008)

To sum up, there were patrimonial positions to turn to a governmental structure and to the knowledge-based civil services. The officers served for the public interests and this was controlled with laws. Poggi insists that they could not serve their interests anymore because their interests could be threatened this way. (Poggi, 2008; p. 66-68)

Pierson summaries all these events under five institutional improvements: 1) Central bureaucracy 2) Regular army 3) Widespread network of taxation regime 4) Standing embassies and official diplomatic service 5) State policies to promote the commerce and development. (Pierson, 1996; p. 48)

### 2.1.2.3. The Modern State


Many of the characteristics of the "modern state" can be seen in the mature absolutist state and its constitutional contemporaries such as the monopoly on the instruments of force, possession of a particular territory, sovereignty, bureaucracy and taxation. (Pierson, 2008) The process is identified with the personalization of the power, true absolutism was possible with the legal-rational bureaucracy and refinement of the coexisting institutions of the pre-modern and modern times with the crystallization through the constitutionalism and the idea of citizenship. (Poggi, 2000)

Poggi focuses on the upside down relationship between the civil society and the state. To the contrary of the feudal and early absolutist ages society was taken as an object and later on as the subject, state was only an instrument there to be helpful in the society's autonomous and self-regulating development. This implies that there were no more an absolute but a limited, checked and balanced version of state power thereafter. England is a good example of how that happened. At the end of $17^{th}$ century rights were guaranteed and secured by law, and then the distribution of powers were almost concluded. The rise of the public, the institutionalization of the activity of the parliament and the cabinet, the legitimization of the opposition and the introduction of elections in the $18^{th}$ century led the way to a liberal democracy. (Poggi, 2008)

With the changes in the composition of the political staff effecting political parties and their extension, in the functioning style of the polities they entered the parliamentary structures and in the repertoire of the state action came together with the tendency of limiting its actions. As constitutionalism was the result of the struggle of the bourgeoisie, liberal democracy was the result of the political demands of the middle classes. Liberal policies and the parliamentary setting still reflecting the interests of former contenders are explained by Poggi with respect to other social powers and their choice of using the soft power to initiate change. (Poggi, 2008)

Finally the "modern state" in its matured form is identified with eight (or nine) categories taken from Max Weber, as it arrived to its maturity: 1)the monopoly on the uses of force 2) the territory 3)sovereignty 4) constitutionalism 5) non-

personal power 6) public bureaucracy 7)authority/legitimacy   8) citizenship [+9) taxation (added by Pierson)]. (Pierson, 2000)

## 2.2. THEORIZATION OF THE OTTOMAN - TURKISH "STATE TRADITION"

"State" can be regarded as the most important object of inquiry in the Ottoman-Turkish studies and it is widely accepted that it has sustained to be the same state for ages; namely the "state tradition". In that section, the historical accounts of the studies of three scholars Şerif Mardin, Metin Heper and Çağlar Keyder are examined. They do not found their analyses solely on the theoretical premises of modernization school and some theses of the critical approaches by turning back to the classical authors. Before statist institutionalist approaches came to being, the term state was the core element historical studies in the Ottoman-Turkish scope and could be seen as both the object and subject of a scientific effort. First of all, some views on the general tendencies of that statist historical traditions and of the social scientists sharing some of their central theses are given place here; then the central themes in their historical flow is goaled to be pictured.

### 2.2.1. Journey of the Term "State" in the Conventional Ottoman History and Theory

Demet Dinler touches on to the fact that there are some common themes and presuppositions in the Ottoman-Turkish political science; no matter of which academic backgrounds they are coming from. (Dinler, 2003) One of the reasons behind the consideration of the history writing of three prominent scholars Mardin, Heper and Keyder is hidden in the shared elements within the three perspectives of the state. Suavi Aydın illustrates some dominant tendencies in the historical sources; which Mardin, Heper and Keyder obviously nourished. He claims that the academic the history writing tradition that had begun in the Ottoman Empire; had flourished from the need for re-defining the state to overcome the contemporary problems of legitimacy. Thus the Ottoman historians are said to have invented an historical ideal, named under the "Classical Age". Surely there were reasons of the change from that system and the result was simply called the decay, downfall or the period of collapse. This school of thought is identified with the right-wing nationalist attitude that was also valid in European experience and arose especially after the German romantics and idealists. (Aydın, 2002)

In the republican era official narratives refused to define the national identity in terms of the Ottoman roots. The six hundred years of an empire was blamed with the "bad rule", "decadence" in the official the history text-books, especially based on the problems experienced in the last decades. On the other hand a branch of traditional historians are identified with an insistence on a particular aim: going back to a pure version of a state in the history. The examples that can be included within this perspective were told to be eager to find and construct parallelisms between the birth of the Ottoman state and the very recent foundation of the republic in terms of the success reached by the constitutive elements and purity. (Aydın, 2002)

Another wing of historians depicted by Aydın focused on a rationalist account that stemmed from a discontent in the recent situation and formulating the course of the history in its relations with the capitalist development. For Aydın they were also stepping to the same trap with the right-wing historians, since applying the peculiarist, moralist and purist approaches with romanticism while referring to the Ottoman classical age. He blames all these perspectives regarding their views on the

historical flow as a stagnant reality, perception of the "East" and the "West" within a historicism and their focus on a typology of state presumed to have a historical continuity. (Aydın, 2002) Although this classification might not be including each work in the area; still his criticism is worth giving credits.

Beside the methodological contents they shared, Mardin, Heper and Keyder's commonalities are based more on the themes Aydın mentions. Each might seem to have different theoretical bonds with the term state: Mardin takes the state as a fact that can be deducted from how it is generally understood by the individuals in relation with the political culture. Heper understands the term as being consisted of and acted through administrative institutions. To Keyder, state is a matter of the organization of classes and their systems on the appropriation of the surplus production. Eventually the state stands at the center of the inquiries of each scholar.

Whatever their methodological sources are, they all specify such a unique version of state, of which features and consequences of these features are more or less the same. Heper's denomination of the "state tradition" can be carried to another level and explicate the common spirit of the works of three authors standing for that a peculiarist character for the history of the Ottoman-Turkish political development. Demet Dinler preferred the term "strong state" in a similar manner for identifying a group of work with their theoretical backgrounds. The three scholars can also be grouped in Dinler's version of adapting Heper's terminology; since "strongness"of the state is a mainly referred theme in all three authors. But this study is interested in focusing on the Mardin, Heper and Keyder's contributions to state theory with their historical accounts in relation with the Poggi and Pierson's theoretical stances  They are rather called as part of the "state tradition" approaches here.

The term "tradition" accounts for an unending state of being experienced parallel to a long-term effort of "modernization", or a so-called "Westernization". The elaboration of the other experiences than the "West" with distinct characteristics and their representation in terms of "lacked features or mechanisms" is a prevalent attitude in the "Western" political philosophy.  What truly attracts the attention of this part is the other face of that attitude: some self-reflections, portrayals of the Ottoman-Turkish experience. This portrayal has latent presuppositions such as an obvious unfit to European examples. Another delineates an unending journey from the *non-developed* one towards the modern and the *developed*.

Similarly there were some main "criteria to be fixed" that took place as default qualities; sometimes carried to the very texts within some shorter historiographies of European states as models of divergent development. In the study of these idealized systems or structures of the "West", taken as if objective *ideal-type*s to proceed; the state was ascertained as the primary one among other objects of inquiry. The reason of such a characterization of the state (as being the source of all problems and the initiators of reforms in the same hand), pleads its justification from that very state-tradition again, which does not seem to be changing through centuries in terms of its central principles and their practice. A kind of circularism could be detected here in two ways: First, the state's quality is determined thorough the tradition it went through. The very tradition is the result of same qualities. Secondly the state is referred to be an entity that acts for the sake of itself, is able to change itself and prevail in a new form. It means that it becomes both the subject and object of its own actions. The state's position as an unexplained *explanandum* comes forward at that occurance (Yalman, 2002)

Another common feature of the three social scientists to be elaborated is the tendency of over-generalization in the histories over time and space. When it comes to the theorization of the historical development, the vagueness is more obvious in terms of the exact period or the region of the country. While reading the theories it should be kept in mind that the *ideal-type*-like cases are accepted to be valid the same way all around the country. Moreover the periodization of the Ottoman the history is also made in accordance to the rise and fall of one *ideal-typized* era: the Classical Age.

One purpose behind such a portrayal of the Classical Age can be related with discontent with the current political system; as in the Ottoman historians. However Mardin, Heper and Keyder do not define the Classical Age simply as the *asr-ı saadet* or an ideal, as the traditional right-wing historians did. The feeling the reader gets is that these three pillars of Turkish social sciences acknowledge an achievement base for the state in their particular ideological terminologies for the best rule.

Nadir Özbek asserts that the later Ottoman the history was based on modernizational and Eurocentricist explanations. A limited role and behavioral style was attained to the ruling elites in that sense: the role of elevating the backward society in the level of European civilizations and the "imitating" behavior in generating policies. For him this is a way to legitimize not only the ruling elite in the

past but also of today; due to the project of nation-state and its need to fictionalize a modernist the history. But today that requirement to use the Ottoman past as a constitutive other does not exist anymore; thus some more overarching versions of the history is in need. (Özbek, 2004)

This part of Özbek's perspective is supportive for one of the goals of this thesis: the qualification of Ottoman state as a the history of a "non-"Western" formation" should be questioned. As a result of such a view the Ottoman case cannot be thought in the same terms with the development of the European state. The Ottoman state cannot get away from being judged according to the criteria established by the modernization literature puts forward for Europe. The examination of two figures of a "modern state" literature in the first section was to illustrate the understanding that has shaped these criteria.

The literature reviewed here presents a particular flow of the history fashioned by some terminological momentums: *feudalism, absolutism* and *the modern state*. For feudalism explanatoriness remains a polemical issue. Absolutism and the modern state considered as non-qualifier for the Ottoman case. In other words Ottoman processes of state formation could not be evaluated by sharing the same toolbox for European studies on state the history. Moreover parallel to the trend in European histories; each time tools of periodization or even actors are utilized they are not adequately identified. The Ottoman historical studies with or without common concepts with the modernization narrative, should be expected to come about with a clearer definition. The conceptions from both worlds of studies will be asserted to be qualifiers of the same times; with many shared occasions as it was being experienced in the Ottoman Empire and its European neighbors.

In the following section the history writing of three important figures are tried to be filtered their entire attempts of theorization, focused on their elaborations on the Ottoman periods of what they would approve as the "state-traditions". Their more serious differences between each of these figure and those with Poggi and Pierson's, are underlined through a more detailed analysis on their views around the certain themes. But as in the Poggi and Pierson's analyses, the histories are taken in the hand chronologically and comparatively; that are entwined with each other.

### 2.2.2. Histories by Şerif Mardin, Metin Heper and Çağlar Keyder

In this part three important names, Şerif Mardin, Metin Heper and Çağlar Keyder on Ottoman-Turkish political development and the way they put forward their views within a historical flow is examined. Mardin, Heper and Keyder have been both world-wide and nationwide the mostly quoted and known authors, especially when a text refers to a historical background. Their main contribution is the way they format this historical knowledge in the terminological frameworks of sociological and political sciences as well as the appropriation of the mainstream ideas out of these perspectives for possible use in various academic areas. Consequently the emphasis of this work will be on the theoretical origins, and the common and distinctive features of these three projects of systematization of the history.

Among the three Mardin is the oldest scholar, who concluded his education in the U.S.A. from high school to the doctoral degree and worked there for decades. His works on Ottoman society and political culture reflect his authentic theoretical syntheses of the dominant perspectives in the American academy in the 1950s-1960s for political science. He is essentially equipped with Weberian methodology and concepts molded together with the analyses of the structuralist-functionalist and culturalist perception of state-society relations of the Almondian school. It is also possible to detect the terminological and analytical developmentalism of modernization theories. His readings of the history of Europe/"the West" and the Ottoman-Turkish from various European and Ottoman-Turkish sources are worth mentioning, hence inspire his analyses.

As a former law student Heper spent the late 1960s in the American academic environment and focused more on the issues around comparative government and public administration. After this period he held important posts in Turkish universities and had various influensive studies that created debates in the academic circles. In the beginning his objects of inquiry were the government and its sub-institutions in the political system, parallel to the Almondian heritage to the area of comparative politics. His flirts with the historians had also begun with his interest in the the history of these very administrative bodies. From the mid-1980s onwards he

was more and more in line with the state-centered approaches of institutionalism. Unlike Mardin, Heper treats "state" both as a subject and the object of the inquiry.

Keyder studied economics and was concerned with economic the history which gave him further perspectives in the hot discussions of the economic development in the 1960s Turkish academic life. He pursued his studies in Britain, the U.S.A and in Turkey. He firstly dealt with the French-British histories in comparison with the underdeveloped countries, then started with the debates on the Asian Type of Production and furthered his studies with the World-System explanations in departments of economic and sociological the history and political science. Wallerstein's critique within and against the modernization school enriched with some Marxist perspectives and the theoretical bases of statist institutionalists come together in his works.

### 2.2.2.1.   The Classical Age

The foundation of the Ottoman reign begins with conquests that brought the issue of redistribution process of the conquered land at first place. The nobility from the Seljuki roots, the Turkmen tribes were given these lands as a result of their military successes as warriors. This formed an *asabbiyat[13]*-like structure, while the major tension of the country was given birth: the cleavage between the center and the periphery. (Mardin, 1983)   All three perspectives point to these bases of the Ottoman state generally as being part of a centralization process. In Heper this reinforcement of the center comes forward as a more rapid occurance in his the history-telling, possibly because he might not think the Ottomanization or the process of the formation of the state unconnected from the quality of the centralization process.

In Mardin, these early periods are one small part of the story, studied by him as the source of the political thought to shape the system. As he focuses on the Eastern, Islamic and Turkmen roots of the story, Keyder feels the need to present the

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[13] Ibn-i Haldun's conception indicates the first stage in the strengthening of the state; where the relatives and good friends would be the cornerstones of the system. (Çaylak, 1998)

Byzantine heritage and the relations of the state and the people attributable to the land regime. In Keyder and Mardin the theorization starts from such a first picture of the center and the periphery, whereas Heper brings about the immediate act of the Ottoman state as if being only one among many sides of the story: the appropriation of the full possession of the land by the state. This feature is a elaborated as a less central issue in the others, still being one among the most important indicators of the strong and central state.

The (first) age of decentralization – the validity of which is in question in Heper-has a sporadic character, which comes and goes for several times in the lifespan of the state according to Keyder. (Keyder, 1998) For Mardin these periods seem to represent the periods without the secondary bodies. It will be the consolidation of the classical age, which would lead the structures to accomplish a social cohesion. The solution of the "feudal-like", but not feudal relics (Heper, 2006) was found in the *tımar system* in the bases of land regime, in the *devshirme system* for the case of central bureaucracy and in the education and merits based *political culture* shaping the ideological extensions of the authority.

For Mardin *tımar*-system or the land regime stands for the rural provinces (*tashra)* and relatedly for the periphery in general. Definitely there were civil officers sent from the center through appointment, who deals with the administrative issues. Neither the civil servants nor the *beys* could achieve their status through inheritance thus they could easily return to *reaya* status any time. (Mardin, 1975)

On the other hand *the tımar bey* cultivated the land "in the name of the state"[14] and he fed soldiers for the possible cases of war. Additionally he collected taxes from the *reaya*. However these rural people could not be named as the *serfs*, as the *beys* could not be seen as aristocrats as in the system of the early-modern or early-capitalist "West". The *beys* were more like the tenants and had solely local privileges. But again these privileges were not formulated in terms of political rights or rights of property as it was in the *"West"* (Heper, 2006). Neither the relation of the *reaya* and the *bey* or the *bey* and the *Sultan* was framed by a contractual corona. (Mardin, 1983) His economic and military contribution to the state appears to have

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[14] Which meant that the central rule had the authority to take the land back.(Heper, 2006)

been separated from his possible politicisation; he was counted as the one among the rural people[15]. (Heper, 2006)

One last element what made the Ottoman system different from the "Western" cases lied on the supposed fact that the land of the *bey* was comparably small and there was no aim or possibility of making profit out of it. (Heper, 2006) This was the reason exhibited by all three scholars behind the problem of creating the genuine capitalistic classes or enterprises from the very Ottoman dynamics. Ottoman Empire's introduction to capitalism is rather understood in that way: as a late, an externally emanating and moreover an enforced process.

Keyder introduces the issue of "petty-peasantry", of which source was Byzantine achievements in times of a strong central authority as well as securing the existence of this structure as it was the ultimate goal of the Ottomans from the very beginning of its long the history. *Petty-peasantry* designates that each villager family had a small amount of land for their own needs, excluding the capacity of creating a surplus value. No matter which events and transformations take place, Keyder believes that it is their place in the system which was determined the make up of the state in such a form. (Keyder, 1987)

Mardin combines this knowledge with the foundations of the Ottoman state. He discusses the *tımar* system only as one of the areas to investigate the foundational ideas of the Ottoman center. The main principle of this fiscally organized state is marked out as the maximization of the taxes out of peripheral economy (Mardin, 1967). It was based on the style of disposition of the land in the *tımar system* that made this maximization of the tax incomes possible in rural provinces. He counts properties, most of which are named above as the functioning style of an institution, supported with some other general principles[16]. The possible gaps are filled or cleavages between the center and the periphery are avoided through this institutional mechanism of *tımar* (Mardin, 1975).

A second solution found for the intensification of the power in the dynastical office of the Sultan was the *devshirme system*. According to Heper the possible aristocracy was dismissed from the ruling positions through that system's flourish.

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[15] "The rural people and the *tımar beg* were legally equal in terms of their obligations and priveledges on the land." (Heper, 2006)

[16] Under the terminology of rights *like şikayet(*complaints*), intifa (previleges), çiftlik system* (appointment for others)

The 14th -15th century bureaucratic center was heterogeneous. Alongside the noble Turkmen families still hoping to take part in the ruling elite, there were *medreses, tarikats* and *guilds* influential on the daily conducts. Knowing the previous experiences of division, the destructive tendency of those was kept in mind by the center. (Heper, 2006) Thus each year some kids were collected from the non-Muslim families and educated in the palace school *enderun* with highest knowledge of the times. Consequently these kids turned to loyal (slave-like) *kul*s and became either one among the palace officials and staff, bureaucracy, permanent legions or *tımar* cavalries. (Mardin, 1967)

Muslim elites were also educated mostly in the *tekke*s and those who achieved to take part in the *ulema*, could also reach up to higher positions. Mardin defines this institution also as a secondary body that fill an intermediary position between the center and the periphery. (Mardin, 1967) Keyder characterizes the *kapıkulu* and *ulema* as the "bureaucratic class". The appropriation of the surplus production through the device of tax made them a unified class, despite different positions. They were in the same side of the relationship, both in terms of relations of production and a shared ideological perspective and political attitude. (Keyder, 2008; p. 38)

The third element of the analyses of three authors is the ideological aspect of the classical age. Although the Ottoman system presupposed less contradictory elements than the feudal system for Keyder, ideology fulfilled a significant role in the legitimation of the state class. The doctrine of the central institutions of legitimation, legal and educational bodies underlined a complex relationship between the rulers and the ruled as well as the goodwill of these authorities. (Keyder, 2008)

Şerif Mardin explains a unique logic, a claim that Ottoman rulers adopted out of the variety of political philosophical sources. Based on that, the philosophical considerations and expectations about the best form of state were perfectly met and the outcome could be a perfectly-working system in itself[17]. The experience of the classical age was accepted to fit to the goal derived from the philosophy, to be proven with people's full perception of the system as it was acclaimed to. Therefore;

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[17] As a profound follower of Max Weber, Şerif Mardin finds the sources of that structure in the political philosophy, and relatedly the ideas of the people as being either the ruler or the ruled about the state, the system, the place of them and their Sultan. And the *ideal-type* for an evaluation on the Ottoman state lies on that average knowledge that would be accepted more or less in the same way.

the system was realized perfectly due to the *ideal-type* in Mardin's eyes. Being "perfect" in its own terms however could not prevent the actual logic to be the reason of whole later problems.

Different from other two authors, Mardin's object of inquiry does not directly aim at the state but he would rather give place to the systems and the culture around it. The core of the idea mentioned above was "nizam-ı alem" (order of the world). What he called as the political stratification was materialized through the *kul system*, the utilization of the land in terms of economic politics with the *tımar system.* But what was the logic beneath these systems? It was a *patrimonia*l one.

*Patrimonialism* debate is a common and a central element in the understanding of the Ottoman system. The term belongs originally to Weber, who distinguishes between societies according to their rule with either rationalist, *traditional* or the *charismatic* authorities. Ottoman society is placed directly among the typology of *traditional authority* by him. Everybody is alleged to be obeying this traditional authority, and the authority is obliged to rely on the traditions. Weber specifies the Ottoman system where the power is transferred to from father to the son. This makes the sovereignty a personal structure. The typical example of the personal rule is *Sultanism* that tends to arise anytime during military successes. The source of tradition and the arbitrariness given to the Sultan comes from the Islamic religious roots. This is a system that works according to the authority instead of the interest-based market dominance. As seen from the latest judgment itself, the term is a typical category in the "Western" thought born out of the attempt to define the social change out of the West through detecting different and missing features and structures. (Weber, 1990)

Actually Weber used the term patrimonialism in a general way to characterize all the states that have been organized as the extension of the dynasty. This feature was shaped in terms of *patrimonialism-sultanism*, in the "West" *patrimonialism-feudalism*. Mardin refers to the two principles, patrimonialism and feudalism, as to characterize the medieval society in the "West". Among the two he highlights the patrimonial principle with a far greater weight in Turkey and the emerging of a patrimonial bureaucracy is meant to be the most characteristic aspect of the Ottoman polity. (Mardin, 1975)

There are further discussions used by the authors according to the patrimonial *ideal-type*. The exclusion of the subjects from the rule of the state is one of the most

common themes. Extreme carefulness to keep any sources of power under control, surveillance of the all those sources of power and state control on the economic life are among the main ones. (Mardin, 1998) In Heper the analogy of household can be found in detail. The state budget is accepted to be the household economy of the father of the house, state officers to be the servants the subjects (t*ebaa)* are in custody to him by the God. Whole country is accepted to be one *oikos*, institutions of state as one part of the *malikhane* in the end. (Heper, 2006) This strengthens the share of the rulers in the famous duality between the ruler and the ruled or the center and the periphery.

The authority with a responsibility to maintain the welfare, the *hisba* principle is also mentioned in many texts and the obligation feeling is combined with the idea of being the father to all subjects. (Mardin, 1998) In Köymen's words with the role of the "mother state", the *reaya* was be subjected to the preservation and protection. On the other hand they opened themselves to the total central control as if the state was playing the father-role. (Köymen, 2007) The center legitimizes itself in front of the laws with an implicit (*zımni)* contract which in principle delineate reciprocal duties. Here Mardin appears to bring the Hobbesian fictive idea of contract as if it was a concrete and for Europe existent agreement signed within the society as a result of an agreement reached. Some groups within the subjects (or *reaya)* and central components of claimed authority might have been organized due to some agreements all the time. And this must have happened in European as well as in the Ottoman territories. Poulantzasian theoretical portrayal of the political corresponds to the reality in a more accurate way than the utopian Hobbesian accounts in that respect.

The bureaucratic classes are the most developed versions of specifying the state as a scientific object of inquiry. These elites were claimed to control economy and the society. The trade of the basic goods was under tight control. The possession of land is another source of limits. (Heper, 1987) According to Mardin, the Sultan was asserted to be the source of the problem alone hence he avoided the private property to come between him and his subjects. As the part of the same network of control, guilds were supposed to maintain "risky" behavior like creating monopoles and formation of the oligarchies are avoided through them. The determining peculiarity of the system lied actually on the cultural coding of the values. For

instance the interest with politics has a more central role than an interest in the market. (Mardin, 1975)

*Daire-i adalet* is the most famous philosophical basis of the Ottoman political culture. It summarizes the presupposed relations among the units of the society. In Keyder's terms the reproduction of the surplus is bounded to the "just rule" of the authorities in politics and justice. (Keyder, 2008) The state's intention to proceed with the laws comes forward here, stressed both by Şerif Mardin and Metin Heper. Mardin focuses on the Turkmen heritage *töre*, Heper on the *adap* as the secular and institutional sources of the political conduct. Both would accept that this was the main axis completed with the religious only in terms of legitimation.

Moreover they would agree that it did not simply ran through personal desires but more with a philosophy of state; a rationality Heper finds parallel to enlightened despots of the same age with a *Rechtsstaat.* And the guarantee of obeying rules was maintained through harsh punishments, which were most effective on the officers and servants who were expected to obey the rules. Still the institutionalization in the Ottoman Empire was more or less limited to the Sultan and the ones around him. Even the entire set of laws needed to approve and announce the validity of the laws until his encoronation, despite none of them refused to do that. (Heper, 2006)

The duality between the civil servants and the periphery is the issue mostly discussed by Şerif Mardin in terms of cultural products. The values of the center are the most influential one in a country where the most enthusiastically desired social leverage is the political power. As *status* was the first indicator of income, it was the politicians rather than the tradesmen the premiers of the empire. When the issue comes to wealth, it is not perceived as a goal alone that gains its real value with the conduct of social and political functions. (Mardin, 1967; p. 44-47) (Mardin, 1975; p. 83, p.94)

The two distinct environments of culture are explicated: 1. in the elite strata of administrative-military positions, 2. the low culture in the rural provinces. The Turkmen symbolic sources were not functional within the *ashiret* system according to Mardin. As the empire expanded, the former went out of the expected moulds with the quest of universal sources. The culture of the city, the palace overcame on the culture of the rural in such a way that the ideology of the state is indoctrinated to the entirety of the *tebaa*s through the high culture of the civil servants, with other aspects of the culture such as in the literature or the home fashion. (Mardin, 1986)

As far the division of labour went on as the way it was pursued their past according to the related economic factors, the ideology striving to maintain the valid hierarchical order could remain successful. (Keyder, 1975) As the owner of this depiction, Keyder points that they could not remain unchanged. For Mardin the ruin of the ideological cohesion, for Heper the differences in the acts of the state officials would lead to a transformation.

### 2.2.2.2. Post-Classical Ages

Suddenly the times are reported to change, the Ottoman state had transformed; in such a way that things could never be the same as they were before. However the central principles of the Ottoman state remained the same way, despite the short-lived counter-trends. The structural reformations of the Ottoman system or the attempts for simple employment of the "Western" institutions brought some recovery but did not end the turmoil. Moreover the polar structure inherited from the classical age got even deeper with the demise of the older structures, the reformation and the modernization efforts. This means that the Ottoman society had always been defined by a crack between the ruler and the ruled in terms of structure or political culture.

The loss of primacy in gun technology, the demise of *tımar* system and the detoriation of the tax system due to the changes in the trade routes, *Celali* uprisings and introduction of the American silver into the market came one after another. As consequences of these and their side effects the *iltizam* system was put into operation that had meant the subcontraction of some obligations of the state in the end. Beginning with the 16th century a new group of people (*ayan)* maintaining profits in capitalist terms was born. (Mardin, 1986) Heper claims that peasants had lost most of their lands as a result of that "class", whereas Keyder believes that the little peasantry somehow survived and it was the *tımar* holders who lost their land. In the beginning the old *tımar* holders started to become bandits and the *reaya* followed them in many cases against the state. (Keyder, 1987; p. 24)

Mardin talks about the "semi-feudalization" of the *iltizam* "possessors", who achieved to turn an urgent need of cash flow of the state into opportunities of wealth

and influence. As the center notices the loss of its absolute authority, the initiation the service of the local taxes to *multezim*s by the local parliaments was issued in the 18th century. The notables (*eshraf)* and the *ayan* took part next to some officers in these parliaments, being the absolute control of the center, although it was diminished. In time *ayan* embarked to the buffer function between the center and the periphery, hence they could show themselves in their side against the state. In the cases of resistance the state started to trust *ayan*s to persuade the people on some terms.

As a vacuum of authority occurred, the *ayan*s could be the pioneers of a change in the manners of the state. Nevertheless the *ayans* became the provincial representatives of the *center* instead. (Mardin, 1983; p. 28-32) Heper accuses them of not suggesting any rival system to the decaying one. The only dimension of protests to the rule was limited with the deposition of the Sultans as results of inter-class cliques. (Heper, 1967) Keyder underlined the fact that the center only faced ideological threats, not a rival hegemony project was there fighting for an alternative. Threats based on some new hegemony projects against the center came only after the integration of the Ottoman economy with capitalism. To be underlined here: Keyder's analyses on the transformations from the *Classical order* are usually based on the economic factors. (Keyder, 1976)

Consequently the *adab* lost its value, periphery could have autonomous attitudes against incidents or such as the power struggles in the center between organized groups like *ulema* and o*cak*, showed its effects in the uprisings in the capital city. As the soldiers with *ocak (jnissarie*s) had gained the right to deal with the trade, they also began taking shares from the distributions of privileges and opportunities. The bonds required for the free civil society or the *Staendestaat* were missing within these relations. (Heper, 1974) Mardin also writes about the lack of horizontal organizations rather than the vertical ones. Whenever the *ayan* could solve his problems by bribing the local officer, he did not feel the need to pressure the center. They maintained their representative roles in the local parliament and approved the regulator function of the state in the basic needs (Mardin, 1986)

After the height of their power, just after the *Sened-i İttifak* (1808), the most powerful *ayan*s were tried to be eliminated and the empire did not hesitate to use the harshest measures including getting help from the European powers. Heper dates the birth of a neo-patrimonialism which would find its peak in the age of the

Abdülhamit. Keyder puts the differences in terms of the state regime but he defines a process of *peripherization* after the demise of the Classical Age. Mardin highlights the transformation of the in the bureaucratic culture due to the attempts to control the local powers. (Heper, 1974; 34-43) (Keyder, 1987; 8-17) (Mardin, 1967; p. 79-99)

The parallel urges to reform the military education and the organization goes hand in hand with the processes of transformation the central bureaucracy getting integrated to the European system of bureaucracy. Mardin brings about a clearer division between the secular and Muslim elements of the central bureaucracy, which resulted with a cultural cleavage based power struggle. (Mardin, 1986; p. 114-116) At the same time Heper figures the times of powerful Sultans again, which were staying behind in the reign of the bureaucratic elements and effecting heterogeneous sources of power in the city. There was a necessity to go back to the same philosophical backgrounds, the principles of which were a controlling strong, central power. (Heper, 1985; p. 24-29)

Çağlar Keyder assesses the integration of the state class with their European counterparts, which included reforms for the institutionalization of the integration with the "Western" capitalism. By doing that, the so-called bureaucratic classes went on furthering the main frames of the state logic while fighting against some ancient uses of conduct. But the 1838 treaty on trades even would destroy the strong image of the state known with the controls. However their attitude putting forward their class interests made them sign under any paper that secured their class-based privleges. (Keyder, 1976)

Şerif Mardin gets use of many of the writings about the bureaucrats after 17th century. His analysis based on the political culture pointed out a shift on that base. But the problems of the system required a restoration of some central values and reforms to be made by the bureaucrats again. The effects of these could also be seen in the legal structure in the following centuries, as in the rising number of laws that had lived together with *ferman*s, roots of which were most frequently the *fikih* (religious law). This specialization brought even local change of the conduct of the state affairs; it was now the house of the *sadrazam* the (Prime Minister), rather than the palace. Likewise the internal and foreign affairs offices were solidified in certain separate buildings near to the palace but no longer in the complex. The bodies took their specialized shape in the 19th century after four hundred years of transformation. (Çaylak, 1998)

Heper theorizes the process as a period when the center tried to control the periphery more effectively in terms of autocratic and centralistic policies trying to avoid the formation of an intermediary element between the center and its *tebaa* in the same line with the center's traditional ideal. The vision of 18<sup>th</sup> century Europe finds its shape in the early-19<sup>th</sup> century policies ended up with the Tanzimat reforms in the Ottoman Empire. (Heper, 1976; p.16-19)

To review, some important characteristics of the theories will be revisited and the way of handling European and Ottoman histories of state by the five figures can be summarized as follows: From the modernization approaches a culturalist stance is left in the works of all five scholars. Eurocentrism, more precisely and determinism by modeling were aimed to be overcome by the authors, however these features persist. Except Mardin, all figures are strongly influenced from statist institutionalist accounts; to be observable in their adaption of the state as the main element of inquiry. In Mardin state is a very core element in the political culture. All these authors have taken into account the critiques against the modernization school, and each appear to have aimed instituting a new particular contribution to the area.

Poggi, Pierson, Mardin, Heper and Keyder rested on the historical sources of two –assumed to be separate- geographies, the European and the Ottoman; former of which was taken as if the control group. In other words some developments are presumed to be realized in a particular way while the formation of the European state, becomes the criteria for the theorizing of the Ottoman-Turkish political development.

In that way Ottoman state is identified as a "non-formation" of the *ideal-type* on the other hand the formation of a particular kind. Another group of historical presumptions can be found in some works of the Ottoman-Turkish historical schools, of which perspectives of the state is prioritized in this part. After an elaboration of these trends in theorizing the state as the central historical actor, the three scholars will be classified under literature of "state tradition". Finally it must be noted that the histories of the European and Ottoman states are written as if these states are separate entities with peculiar heritages. The theorization in that account exhibits a special emphasis on the political sector and political actors, which are defined in external relations with other sectors. The existence of the European political sphere is alleged to depend on some particular periods and aspects of the history like the transition

from *feudalism* to *absolutism* and the *centralization*. And the Ottoman theories are based on the non-allegiance to these processes of centralization of the state in the beginning; which would cause a late but ineffectual reform attempt with a so called neo-patrimonialism in the 19th century.

# CHAPTER 3

# TOWARDS AN ALTERNATIVE READING OF THE HISTORY: PERSPECTIVES FOR STATE THEORY IN THE EUROPEAN AND OTTOMAN HISTORIES

In this chapter a selection of different theses and arguments of numerous scholars are gathered, which problematize either theoretical problems when writing the history or make alternative readings for theorizing some particular time periods or cases. The theoretical contributions of different scholars studying on European and Ottoman histories are given here in a chronological order and seperately, in respect to the extensive histories of Poggi, Pierson and Mardin, Heper, Keyder. In the end the paths of the debates coming from chapter two are brought together with the alternative readings in that chapter, in order to lead to comparative perspectives and initiate further discussions.

Poggi, Pierson, Mardin, Heper and Keyder are the starting point of that part. The authors referred as the alternative readings can be criticized for their general perspectives or the methodological stance; here their theoretical contribution to the particular debates is prioritized. ;

## 3.1. READINGS FOR AN ALTERNATIVE THE HISTORY OF EUROPEAN STATE

Most of the studies discussed here elude evaluating Europe as a real whole still or at least they do designate the borders of the continent drawn with profound cultural breaches in the last instance. Christopher J. Wickham as a medieval historian proposes the internationalization of the scholarship against all odds, and complains that the sets of still highly valued interpretive paradigms are not challenged irrespective of a tenfold increase in the studies of documentary the history and new findings during the last three decades. (Wickham, 1995)

Two styles of generating interpretive paradigms in writing the history are named by Wickham. The first style concentrates on one country attempted and the purely national perspectives take the risk to omit the international scope. The second style takes one region as the "normal" and analyzes divergent patterns in this region as exceptions. The source of information of the studies on regional developmental patterns is once more typically a combination of local histories. Thus the problem with the second style includes the problems of the first descriptive way of generalization as well.

Wickham's criticism about the first one's application is that a the history as such is solely meaningful to the scholars of one country sometimes making no conclusive sense at all outside this country's borders. (Wickham, 1995; p.6) The present study depreciates the urge to find the traces of the contemporary state back in the the history. Imagining an age with the properties and borders of a future form entails anachronism, which is a crucial problem in an academic effort.

One of the central concerns of this study is to formulate a critical argument about the second style of generalization. Though her work is mainly devoted to the transformation from the feudal state to capitalism, Ellen M. Wood's contribution to the debate can be quite fruitful here: she blames the mainstream model (commercialization model) ,although it contains some significant elements of truth, for not corresponding to any actually existing pattern of historical development (Wood, 1995 p.78) More precisely, what is derived as the the history of the Europe in the end is "a composite picture formed largely of (…) the interpretation of the French political experience in the light of the English economic development." (Wood; 1995; p.3-4) The attempts to write the the history of the "West" is put into practice through some combinations of an information set, which are collected from particular incidents and stretched for a of a more general picture in a sweeping manner. This brings about problems in conveying historical facts and local particularities.

One of the general tendencies in the European the history writing on the Middle Ages is conceiving the origins of contemporary states together with the demise of the Roman Empire and/or flourishing of the polities of the middle ages. Wickham summarizes these debates in the scholarship over continuity or discontinuity of the Roman Empire as follows: 1) the ideas that see European the history as the continuation of the empire 2) the catastrophe theories of more recent

works highlighting significant breakthroughs between two epochs. (Wickham, 1995) The problem about the theory of transitional periods remains the same, however. Each time an inquiry is posed on the origins of a new system or on the qualities of a transformation, the very attempt is usually left inadequate.

Wood stresses a lack of real explanation in what she calls commercialization models; actually she speaks about the theory of "capitalist transformation"; but it can still be applied to the issue from the beginning: If the questions for finding the real origins of one case are not asked; then actually it is not a real attempt to explain what happens. (Wood, 2002) It must be there to explain some other cases, then. This is what Poggi and Pierson exactly do when they imagine the modern-state of their days and look at the the history to support the validity of institutions as if they were the early versions of the contemporary ones. Since they have a clear-cut expectation about some end-form in the period of the the history written about, all other affairs up to this day appear as if they were the "inevitable consequences" or reasons of this end-form. To avoid such a historical determinism, it must not be forgotten that today was only "one among many possibilities" in the past. (Wood, 2002) Hence the social formations building up histories were supposedly produced, no one feels the need to explain what has really happened. Wickham's analogy for the theory in this situation is "a floating anchor in the sea of current research". He stresses the requirement of anchoring, a rooting attempt in order to get closer to the production of newer paradigms. (Wickham, 2005, p.5-6)

His proposed anchor has a lot to do with a careful use of concepts, crucial in that means for generating theories. He notices that the typical historian would use the words just as they are taken from ordinary language vocabulary, without paying much attention to the differences in the meaning, overtones in the daily use of the words and the possible inconsistency even inside single countries or across different languages. (Wickham, 1995) The lesson to be learnt from these notifications of Wickham might be to pay attention to the entire story of each word, from its blossoming to gaining wide-spread relevance, with all the transformation it undergoes in scope and meaning.

The exception to the use of the words in an ordinary way in the the history writing can be the so-called "technological neologisms", although this is relatively rare compared to other social sciences. (Wickham, 1995; p. 7) Enlightenment, Medieval age, Feudalism, Absolutism, Bonapartism, Nation-state, Modern state,

Capitalism…All these words are among the significant examples referring to some - mostly overlapping- historical epochs, of which elaboration remains vague Thus this study strives to rethink them: under which category they are taken as, as what kind of a reality they are presumed to be? And what should be done to avoid the contemporary problems in theory? "İt is hard to tell rules to make out or make use of a technical term, and right-wrong policing is not possible all the time" as Wickham asserts, but what possible is "to have a clear and consistent idea of what the concepts mean and to explain them to the reader if necessary in their particular cases" (Wickham, 1995; p.7)

Unfortunately the simple picture desired by Wickham is quite out of reach when one starts with the term "feudalism". There is neither unity in categorization among various works nor an urge to stand back for it at least with some rationalization even within a particular study: Should it be taken as a political unit, a political system or rather, can feudalism be seen as only an economic feature or substructure of some other form -let's say absolutism? Heide Gerstenberger's perception of the age provokes thought at this point; her study has a perspective that can avoid anachronism stemming from wording and it parallels the cautions of Wickham.

### 3.1.1. Feudalism in Which Sense?

Gerstenberger's analysis on feudalism begins with a reference to Maitland's ascertainment that "feudalism was not introduced by William the Conquerer but by a seventeenth century historian and it reached its apogee in the mid-eighteenth century.(…)The scholars of the 17th and 18th centuries sought to explain the features of previous historical orders with the still visible residues, through the help of social connections and patterns of thought that were characteristic of their own time." In other words they constructed the idea of feudalism after seeing the model of what he

calls "the bourgeois society" and given meanings to its relatively new functions. (Gerstenberger, 2007; p. 633)[18]

He critizes the attempts to characterize feudalism as a system either in terms of castles and knights or the rebels and peasants, as if they are parts of distinct or at least successive realities. (Gerstenberger, 2007) The history could not be simply imagined as if there were always sharp and sudden shifts from one nature of reality to another. The technological neologism-based models like those above mostly rely on different aspects of life specifically within similar time periods. Different mechanisms and structures might be seen as the results of great transformations. But as life gradually changes, there are always overlapping and coexisting experiences of these different structural systems in the different aspects of the life. From his reminders a question as such appears more noteworthy then: how had the coexisting patterns been experienced throughout the historical period studied on?

Gerstenberger chooses not to get into the famous debates[19] about the transition that cannot clear up the times and the concept as the way they should have been. To avoid the pitfalls of interpretive models, to grasp the dynamics of structural change and to overcome the most famous theoretical problems of the the history of the age Gerstenberger dates the distinctive elements indicating the shift to feudalism (as being one among "the structural types" in his words) around the years 1000 and works with the term "personal rule" for a conceptual alternative. (Gerstenberger, 2007)

Personal rule is drawn as a complete portrait, covered with a system of rights and customs based on a religious teaching, reproduced in the practices of symbolic power and backed up with personal arms and equipped forces-as being the basis. The attendants and militaristic component of the rule could not be separated from the

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[18] His analysis proceeds following that line, for example as in the uses of the terms "right", "society", "individual" he rather prefers a more convenient similar for each like "custom", "families" and "kinship groups" and stresses the reason of his choice at that structural period or transitory times. Moreover this can be furthered for the term "property", hence the meaning attached to it cannot be so strong as in the bourgeois society. Even when the term was valid in that age its content cannot be the same. For instance the terms used in the following statement should be read after a precaution as the one above at least: "ruling power under feudalism was a property of individuals." (Gerstenberger, 2007; p.634)

[19] Such as: Those on the exact date of when feudalism was born or established, the discussions on the need, usefulness and timing of sub-divisions, the origins of feudal nobility as being purely local(instead of national)signposting a break off from Roman rulers or their continuing successors. For more details of these discussions see: (Gerstenberger, 2007; p. 636)

lords' part in the commodity production and personal relations with the limited trades of the day. The medieval church on the other hand was the organizational form of that rule and it was there for the generalization of practices in life determined by power. Beside that ideological function, the church was an organization of feudal rule and appropriation themselves altogether, which took part in wars as well[20]. (Gerstenberger, 2007)

He had a problem with the idea of the historians, who related the phenomena of the 11th century with the modern perception of state as if it is a political structure with "an institutionalized form". The sum of "the notions of the two bodies of the king and rule that can outlast the life-span of its owner" and "the customs involved in the practice of rule" could and should not be taken in the hand with the same but limited versions of the features contemporary state conceptions, as if they had factual correspondence with it. (Gerstenberger, 2007, p.637) For what Wood draws attention in the histories of capitalism can be carried forward to an analysis of the histories of the "modern state"[21]: it is clearly historicism to claim that the potential features of the "modern state" was hidden somewhere in the form it took at the time.

The limits and function of the power of that *personal rule* is pictured in its mechanism: the condition of the claim of a feudal system is that the lord should be able to execute his right to get the fief back. When he was not able to achieve that, in principle the ruling family could and should not have right, building up his authority. (Gerstenberger, 2007) Differing due to time and place the employment of other forces rather than an army to enforce their claims could be seen in practice, such as reconciliations over some other terms. These relations must have been bounded to the behavior of the parties and the the history of their struggles in particular, thus the analyses of changes in the customary weight of the networks should not be reduced to a process of centralization to be managed to a degree in the 15th centuries[22]. Power struggles cannot simply be outlined as a one-dimensional story between the feudal

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[20] For the transformations the Christian church had lived through like secularization and deals more with the worldly issues in the daily life, in the ruling bodies or like in the Crusades after 11th century see: (Gerstenberger, 2007)

[21] For her detection of the problem see: (Wood, 2002)

[22] Ellen M. Wood suggests that the monarchy of England was centralized much before than the French one through the implications of Common law. For more see her counter arguments against the theses of Nairn-Anderson. (Wood, 2002)

lords and the kings with a superiority claim either; where as one part of the dualism rose, the other fell.

The epoch of the rise of monarchies and the powerful feudal lords actually temporarily coincided and there were not drastic divergences in the general principles of the system no matter from which level the stratification started in different places as the readers are presented in the histories of absolutist states, for instance. (Gerstenberger, 2007) Gerstenberger defines the term *personal rule* to highlight the central features of the relations, no matter experienced in either the seigniorial, baronial or princely units; the process worth elaboration to be the dynamics of the "generalization of powers."

What Wood understands as the centralization processes is the attempts of a fragmented structure to overcome that. Actually she details Gerstenberger's "generalization" theme in her examples and underlines important aspects of the centralization dimension of the transformation. One distinctive feature to be put aside here is that of parcellized ruling power in the feudal system is that "ways of political appropriation of the surplus product"[23]. (Wood, 2002)

Nevertheless *feudalism* in minds is pervasively reduced to the *seigneurial appropriation*. Yet, *armed appropriation, mercantile appropriation* and *appropriation towards artisan production* were also combined to the networks of personal rule in the times of feudalism[24]. The dues and in time general taxes taken out from commodity production was the main but not the only type of exploitation in the system, productions of artisans and long-distance trade of merchants. There were also wage-laborers either in the palaces, military system, trades and artisanship, as objectified structures of personal obligation had space. Monarchies had also direct relations with these tradesmen, artisans, specialists of warfare who could be hired or held fiefs from more than one lord.

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[23] With a premise of won supremacy of the monarchy in every period of the feudal ages she tells the process until its end with that aspect: She speaks for France specially, where the state itself initiated to overcome the fragmentation through the integration of the nobility into the system (and petty-bourgeois elites after the revolution), the effectiveness of a civil service –supposed to be more and more neutral even in their $14^{th}$-$15^{th}$ century forms- and the proclamation of a "modern state", with a national wider bureaucratic network and legislative apparatuses.

[24] Ellen M. Wood's perception of the the history of commercialization is quite mind-opening at that point: shift to capitalism is always tied to the trades and trades are mostly put into the scene suddenly in the estates explanations of $15^{th}$-$17^{th}$ centuries around, as if there were no trade done before. The limits of the economic activity (compared to capitalism) were only its scope (basic commodity and luxury goods) and ways (arbitrage differences) to make profit. Not to forget: The spread of the trade lines needneed not bring about capitalism in the end. (Wood, 1991)

All the groups had comparative advantages in the types of appropriation, and they also competed for taking more shares from the system in forms of privileges, powers-rights or direct material gains. The study of struggles and other dimensions of the relationships between them would enrich the limited visions centralization theses additionally. Gerstenberger defines these power struggles altogether as the distinctive constitutive features of feudalism. They could not be reduced to an 'underlying' contradiction, even more; these relations are the precise ways in which feudal rule was organized and functioned. (Gerstenberger, 2007, p. 642-643)

### 3.1.2. Absolutism vs Ancient Regime?

Gerstenberger's introduction of the term ancient regime provides a closer look on earlier monarchial forms, more favorable than the histories of absolutist age, which cast in the anachronistic back and forwards in time for finding traces of a later form. The time period is significant for its integration of the aristocratic rule into the generalized power and the generalization of the systems of justice and markets in parallels, without abolishing the personal character of rule. But the foundations of *personal rule* under ancient regime were different from those under *feudalism*: the warfare had lost its feudal character and seigniorial power had lost its personal character by the transformation of labor rent into money rent, while both those of generalized and seigniorial powers had ruled more and more through the generalized royal fiscal and judicial bodies and executions, than the direct personal relations. (Gerstenberger, 2007)

Still there is no justification for the birth of a *"modern state"* neither its early form, which found "a new sense of life" in the 14$^{th}$ -15$^{th}$ centuries, anymore than becoming a "socially [relatively more] neutral instance" with the appointed officials, decreed laws of the king, etc. With the objectification of feudal rule, lords used the current formalization of their practice of rule (formalization, in the sense that fixing rules in writing made it possible to deploy the knowledge of rule against peasants) to further their appropriation; this was possible with the help of their personnel, no more composed heavily of those ready for war but specialists in law to make interpretations of right and justice. (Gerstenberger, 2007; p. 644-647)

Contrary to the views of Gerstenberger, Anderson depicts this period as the crisis of feudalism, from which absolutism was born. (Anderson, 1974) The reason Gerstenberger disagrees in calling the process as a crisis is the strengthening of the feudal lords with the formation of newer and more guaranteed structures such as the noble estates. Noble power became a privilege in relation to generalized power, of which rule was based on seigniorial appropriation in connection with the generalized princely power. In that picture the particular power competences of private individuals became, as a rule, *de facto* dependant on the crown, which created a reciprocal dependence. As a result they went on being responsible for the appropriation of surplus product as the main source for the reproduction of the system. (Gerstenberger, 2007)

Anderson's second point of reference, which is crucial for the following sections of the present study, is a theoretical statement about the 'transformation of feudalism'. He accuses Marxist theories of taking feudalism as a universalized mode of production, regardless of legal, ideological and political instances of reality. He claims that economy and politics, entities such as society and state were inseparable in pre-capitalist mode of production. (Anderson, 1974)

Firstly under the components of ruling power in feudalism, appropriation itself was held encompassing the social form as an analytical concept by Gerstenberger. Throughout that postulation he also underlines his stance about the quality of the relations between politics and economy, "there was no such realm as the economy that was distinct from the practice of power." The togetherness of the spheres can be relayed in the following networks of relationships: there was a competition for the possession of powers and for the effects and results of the powers. These had always internal impacts on the preconditions of the social struggles; and these impacts on the struggles changed and shaped the reality over their extent of surplus product and the forms of its appropriation. Conversely the result of that competition itself was influenced precisely by the seigniorial appropriation. For, the reproduction of the status of the lord[25] was necessary and could be best managed through the possession of the so-called powers to fight and the systems of appropriation. (Gerstenberger, 2007) Put either way, the analyses of

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[25] Its image and identity was perceived differently in that age from the latter dominant classes of the following ages: as not just that of a purely rich man but as a holy, powerful, knight and justice man (Gerstenberger, 2007, p.639) instead.

the relationships between the economical and the political in today's sense cannot be reduced to a matter of priority between the egg and chicken; the matter is rather their immediate interdependency in the reproduction of social formation.

In Ellen M. Wood's account, the separation of political and economic spheres in the first hand, then state and civil society, were occasions designating the formation and fulfillment of the capitalist state. In other words, like many, she sees this separation as a precondition, as a distinguishing mark of capitalist transformation. Abrams evaluates this separation as some kind of ideological interplay in which the perception of the separation is ideologically constructed. Timothy Mitchell's approach to state-society relations presents a more preferable methodological ground for analysis

Mitchell rejects the ahistorical, idealist and culturalist attempts to draw and explain the line between state and society: either through seeing the state as a coherent and autonomous agent that does all sort of things with identifiable intentions, or to give a sense to it as a phantom, an illusion, or an ideological mask that is created as a "discursively produced effect" by some "consciousness" of the state. In either way the state is taken as if it is a coherent structure, able to shape the society from an extrinsic and elevated position. He claims that the polarities are not only discursively created but they are also and firstly historical. What should be done is to follow the ways in which polarity was constructed in different temporal and spatial circumstances. To him, state and society should not be even separated, indeed especially in the modern-capitalist case. His suggestion for analysis is thus not to take "a boundary as it is between two discrete entities, but taking it as a line drawn internally within the network of institutional mechanisms through which a social and political order is maintained." (Piterberg, 2003; p. 139-141), (Mitchell, 1991) The road to achieve that goes through the highlight the historical conditions how exactly the relations between the realms were firstly produced and then reproduced.

### 3.1.3. Towards A Modern, Capitalist, Nation-State

Gerstenberger considers the issue under the re-production of the feudal rule in the *ancien regime* with the lordly, ecclesiastical and militarily connected powers and

peasant's coexistence under appropriation ways of feudalism. (Gerstenberger, 2007) Colin Moers dates a transition from these former ways towards the monarchial power's direct involvement in the appropriation process through a new tax-based system, which came to issue after the religious wars and peasant uprisings. After those the source of politico-legal coercion was displaced upwards and the apparatus of the feudal domination is recharged in that way for him. (Moers, 1991)

The monarchs wanted to use that relative advantage against seigniorial powers in the eyes of the peasantry, last extension of the central apparatus the more with the will of the kings ruling courts was the so far towards the rural, which exhibited actually its ineffectiveness. (Moers, 1991) The first instances of bureaucracy were the judiciary mechanisms, the more the offices were defined in detail the wider the French state became the signifier of modernism. (Wood, 2002) It was a kind of centralized appropriator of feudal "rent", depending on the production of the surplus of the peasants, of which tools of appropriation became the structures of civil servants. Private participation was integrated into centralized appropriation as well. The expansion of ruling competences offered a prospect for expanded appropriation, held also by generalised personal power, as generalisation could be affected only in collaboration with the possessors of partial rule, whose demands restrict the actual organisation of central appropriation. (Gerstenberger, 2007; p.651)

Moers tries to read these political developments with a specific reference to the rural transformation in the regimes of appropriation. The knowledge about the gained rights of heritability as results of the peasant uprisings made historians draw positive pictures about the subsequent period. The so-called "new logic" and the "advantageous processes" for the peasantry were identified with the rise of capitalism and its opportunity-based nature (for both in Britain and France); but this did not last long, since the advantages of rising prices for the products were lost gradually with the increasing rents turning to a new system *in kind*. (Moers, 1991) Wood suggests this moment cannot be capitalism yet, and it is doubly meaningless to define the times as capitalistic and thus brought about the freedom and choice. It was consolidated when the imperatives surrounded the activities of the people as a whole and forced them to increase production, efficiency and profit. (Wood, 1991)

A good explanation of that thesis is also worked up by Gerstenberger regarding the fiscalization process. This process caused firstly an exercise of the rule demanding resources that increasingly could be obtained only for money (on the side

of the lords), this offered them newer prospects for confirming social status by wealth and thus strengthening of position, but also the danger of reducing the material foundations of their lordly existence by indebtedness. Second consequence of the fiscalization promised a broader room for maneuver for those, who are dependant on the ruler, the ruler's larger personnel and those who had a conflict with the ruler. For peasants it might have created better prospects of advance but also the danger of getting into debt and losing the foundations of peasant existence. (Gerstenberger, 2007)

Gerstenberger refers to a new "cult of the rich" due to the increasing fiscalization and the age in which a new form of legitimization practice for the ruler was needed. The monarch was legitimized by itself and more accurately began to reproduce the system relying on the symbols of his "glamorous re-presentation". J. Engel's "heroism of the beautiful appearance" is a useful term to understand the case, as authors feel the need of speaking on the splendor of the renaissance prince. Service of art, claimed authority of estate of artisans, distinguishing of each artisan or artistic products by a truth of their own, development of the manufacture and trade other important markers of the representation practice were the parallel developments that made this kind of a legitimation possible. (Gerstenberger, 2007; p. 654-6)

Absolutism did not take the place of the other politically formed modes of possession totally in the rural provinces, which meant the coexistence of dues and taxes. Thence the life of the peasants and appropriation of larger amounts were hardened and a less direct way to appropriate the surplus from the direct producer was sought: rent. Everywhere small peasant modes of existence persisted, where peasant families got integrated to the market in a limited way as well, compared to the degree imposed by the power. Exploitation of a new possibility of appropriation by the lords gave birth to the ways of reproduction of the nobility in the newer political strength. They by no means followed consistent patterns of market rationality in their practice of rule at that point. Spread of market structures was not realised by any autonomous dynamic of economic development but rather by the struggles over the extent and forms of *personal rule*. (Gerstenberger, 2007; p.652)

There is some ambivalence in the issue of transition to capitalism, where the dates and/or ways of the introduction and consolidation of capitalist forms in different places were left ambiguous or conflicting. Moreover there is emphasis on

the French and English experiences when the historiographies of critical approaches decide to specify or reveal the former problems done latently over these lands. The so-called *bourgeois revolution* is among the most anticipated initiator of capitalism alone, for example Perry Anderson asserts that "the emergence of absolutism and the bourgeois revolution freed the bourgeois commercial freedom from the dead hand of feudalism". Moers and Wood reject this.

The conditions of a "fragmented state power", "parcellized sovereignty" and "political turmoils", hence the resistance of the peasants and the conflicts between the aristocracy and the ruling class, they were enforced to unite the fragmented political powers in terms of central monarchies and modern nation states. As one amongst feudal powers was elevated to the monarchial sovereign position, it still had roots in its feudal past. Thus these could not overcome fragmentation; it reconstructed the unity of economic and political powers in the level of central state. What determined the distinctness of the centralizing monarchies was their sovereignty over land and states where oppressive force was more and more applied until a non-personal structure of state replaced the personal rule of feudalism. Oppression, appropriation, private property and public power being the moments, the separation of the political and the economic was not yet managed, which was going to be achieved by the introduction of capitalism. "Modern state" was born in that period through social relations regardless of capitalism but with the conceptions of country and government, nation and sovereignty of the people. (Wood, 2002)

Attempting to challenge the abovementioned tendency to un-explain the transition to capitalism, Wood argues that this view about capitalism should be transcended: it manifested itself with the removal of the barriers against its emergence. Citing Brenner, she attacks former theses; there was no embryonic capitalism waiting there ready to challenge feudalism, that's why he took the tenaciousness of feudalism and looked for its inner dynamics. Class struggle need not always indicate simply the emancipation of the pioneering forces towards capitalism. In the English example, feudal lords were trying to conserve their positions, as with what they did in the conditions of England they evoked the dynamics later will turn into capitalism. The unexpected result was their unavoidable dependence on the necessities of the market in the end. (Wood, 2002)

The dissolution of old feudal relations had a different impact in each country; it was capitalism in England but absolutism in France. In the process the land in

England became in the property of the big land-owners and was cultivated by the tenants. The conditions of land use rights entailed the determination of rents increasingly by market conditions and thus sometimes with contracts instead of tradition and/or laws. This meant the rights of use levied heavy burdens over the shoulders of the tenants. This was then not a chance to get capitalized and accumulate their wealth on their own for them, but the urgent needs of specialization for high efficiency in a highly competitive atmosphere; the possible unfit would be excluded from the market and lose the land. That meant a dependency on the market to an unprecedented extent. The survival of both the landowner and the tenant was due to the success (growth of profit) in the markets. (Wood, 2002)

In this system the direct producers were forced to hand over a part of the surplus-value they produced against the patrons with superior power. The gripping force of the new mode of production on the rulers was not initially dependant on the necessity to increase productiveness but to the increase of the power of oppression by the appropriators, guaranteed by the state's tools of oppression to make the pressure imposed from the market. (Wood, 1991)

In the French case, the next stage of the the transformation of the rule was the integration of other groups and then the feudals into the stately bodies of exploitation, such as equally strengthening other estates holders. Bourgeoisie and its possible rights and chances were increasingly pronounced with their struggles in many spheres: Buying up lands, holding positions in the civil service, taking part in the different locations like political center or being the responsible of the rural relationship of peasantry and local rule and finally living a city-based life of economy and trade. (Moers, 1991)

Bourgeois did not and indeed cannot have the ambition of capitalism as a best system to their blossom. They had short-term interests, will for punctuating a better system in the long-term but no clear-cut projects of installing a particular order. The main short-term demand was the opening up of the civil service careers to the criteria of talent and merit. Interestingly, the focus of all struggles was the state. This means that there were signs of class character of the bourgeoisie as a motive but this was not a consolidated one. Moreover due to the vast majority and the probable enthusiasm of making politics "for the good of all"'s sake the ideology formatted before and during the revolution wanted a change for all containing a universalism to a degree. Consequently it cannot be said that the struggle was fought by the

capitalists and it led to a capitalist state and society in the end. (Moers, 1991) The class becomes class-conscious within the process and after the revolution it must have started to adopt the imperatives of a more capitalistic system of thought, though the figure of one class need not be the typical bourgeois the capitalist ways in conveyance, hence the integration of political ways and capitalist ways of appropriation must had been coincided for a long time[26]. "A capitalist need not be bourgeois, or bourgeois need not be a capitalist" writes Wood for the English and French versions in the same order. (Moers, 1991) (Wood, 2002)

A "modern state" analysis of Wood's and Moers' kind can be thus helpful for those countries in transition towards the new forms integrated from the former capitalist experiences thus capitalism to be at the door; but its dictates as a mode of production were not yet fulfilled. Before capitalism entirely surrounded the economic and political life, the techniques and experiences to deal with the transformations of the age were shared and as a result each country created its own system and version of state formation.

After the revolution in France there were both breaks and underpinnings to absolutism which should be considered together. Petty bourgeoisie now had access to political accumulation, while a new idealist state-elite was formed. Napoleon traditionalized their desires with hereditary rights, whereas the land-based appropriation was limited despite relative growth. Seemingly neutral, office holders in the rural province, had a relationship with landed wealth sometimes in a conflicting way, sometimes in a compromise. In a study of Lublinskaya on the absolutist era in France uses the terms of Gramsci, especially *hegemony* to explain the unmentioned, asymmetrical mechanisms of political formation and *hegemonic bloc* to explain the relationships between the dominant classes in the past. This technical aspect can be carried to the further studies. (Lublinskaya, 2001)

As far as the Napoleonic state is concerned, the reproduction of the old systems of appropriation and political system was successful to an extent, but was weak in the end; hence the state served as a vehicle for private accumulation and economic growth based mainly on wars and the revival of the court society and its consumption, which was still the only source of French trade. (Moers, 1991)

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[26] Moers finds the full integration of France into the capitalist ways in the 1860s; as Wood dates the English invention of capitalistic norms back in the 14th century.

In the rather short restoration period in France, changes in the cadres created an angry ambitious group of old office-holders in a time of coexistence of dues, rents and salary, land lord and land-owner in the rural life, and workers suffering from tough conditions in the gradually growing factory production as developed versions of artisanal production got together in the 1830 revolutions. The introduced Bonapartist state is seen as an impediment to the capitalist development, where the state in fact enhanced a parasitistic character more, as in the symbiosis of small-holding peasants and bourgeoisie. The proto-capitalistic orientation in production and trade relations was changed, a liberal scheme was introduced instead, in which state was holding a pioneer-role with credits this time, in a façade of populist democratization. As the private purchase was integrated with the state's political forms of appropriation, the formation was enabled to autonomize to an extent. This formation could not be equaled to absolutism from then on. (Moers, 1991) One of the common ways to formulate that state in that historical instance is the nation-state.

One of the first economic source of the nation-states is the customs unions within the centralized and generalized authorities, a second source is a more legal one, as in the British common law, an over-all effecting judiciary system, a third should be the national parliaments, as a fourth and latest of all public projects like "pure relief" and security units like "gendarmerie" should be counted. These all depended on the measurement and determination of the borders the service will be given at, a unitary project, uniting process was at work. These sound however more like the indicators of the "modern state" still.

The archetypical connotation about the primary appearance of the nationality as an identity is the French revolution. Nonetheless it was far away from its contemporary meaning compared to the late 18<sup>th</sup> century phenomena, meanings of the term "nation" had gained more load. French was something about the equal right of access in the career facilities and the processes of rule in the times of revolution. The introduction of a *nation,* an identity issue solved out through citizenship like in today's sense could fully be installed in the Napoleonic and Bonapartist ages. The reason for that is that the counter-ideological attacks of the dominant classes led the reconstruction of the term with "archaic" fulfillments into it. The citizenship notion of a Jacobin had anti-hierarchical, anti-noblety sounds; but whenever bourgeois classes were included to the chambers of dominant classes, they also took part in the reproduction of the term in a new way. British experience on the "nation" is also

worth naming according to Wood. Being "British" is sometimes found regardless of the continental modes of nationalism (eg. Anderson-Nairn theses), but "the selling of the new wine in an old bottle" was the case in other countries than in England as well. The symbolisms about the nation and nationalism made its real peak in the 19th century yet, as if responded to the possible threats against the established order. "Representation" issue produced for legitimacy in the cult of monarch(y) was united with the "representation" of the people in the national assembly. The ultimate messages were given through the royal and institutional symbols giving references to the feudal bases of the system such as the uses of militaristic, heroic, religious, etc. elements.

## 3.2. READINGS FOR ALTERNATIVE HISTORIES OF THE OTTOMAN STATE

### 3.2.1. Debates Alternative Readings in the Ottoman Histories of State

Just as it is done in the "modernization revisionist" theories of state for the West elaborated above, one can detect the teleology hidden in the Ottoman historiographies as well. The "tradition of state" might get forth from the so-called classical age and the journey on the minds of the authors might have been terminated in the early 20th century for the limits of the scope of this study; nevertheless the extensions of the same way of thinking on the state and its writing within the social and political histories can be traced until the most remarkable contemporary political arguments. The central motives in the construction of the will and support for the idea of "a change" seems to be an effective element of the latest hegemony project in action in Turkey and one of the focal bases of its ideological power is those outlasting perspectives on the nature of the state and the state elites, carried out from the Ottoman the history until recently: strong and inefficient state occupied by a "class" of political/bureaucratic elites recreating their own privileged world of living by suppressing and discriminating against other social groups. This tendency and way of theorizing is detected and criticized by galip Yalmaan. (Yalman, 2002)

Abou-El-Haj detects the problem of reducing the political structure of Ottoman state in these factors of explanation: one person's charismatic capacities of rule (Abou-El-Haj, 1991) or relatedly the behavior of the elite groups, their ways of executing the policies… Their being the foci of the attention gives way to a theoretical mess first of all: as if the "state" itself could be able to tell its own vision about itself (the state), the society, the system and their organizations, as if it can change itself and can get angry with some parts of its elements and can make them stop acting like that, state can hinder or even exterminate itself. Anything can be expected from such an extraordinary agent, having further practical capabilities than a human being. The perspectives of modernization theory strengthen this tendency and explain the ability of change only as "a top down" reality, whether it is social economic, political or cultural sort. (Quataert, 2000) Or it is expected to come as a structural effect coming from abroad, but again, it is the will the strongest that determines? Even the democratic atmosphere is ruled out with the same hierarchical principle determines the results of the struggle. It is an unequal fight from the beginning. One central theoretical link between the Western and Ottoman historiographies is built along these international hierarchies and their ideological construction.

States of continental Europe or South Asian or South American states or the Middle Eastern states including the Republic of Turkey are subjected to the same pressure for reorganization for the needs of the contemporary world-system. Surely, the so-called "developing countries" and the "least developed" are obliged to achieve more goals ones to utilize the monetary resources of supra-national organizations. But this is an order not purely designed with economic terms; the hierarchy within is reproduced covertly in the area of meanings on the idea(l) of the politics and state is only one part of the whole story.

The problem of the dominance of state-centered analyses in the Ottomanist the history writing and social sciences is tried to be thought together with the methodological perspectives of the modernization revisionist agendas and their impact on the so-called developing countries. Their founding level is the way histories of these "Western" and "developing" countries handled; according to the claim of this work. As it was already pronounced in the first chapter, the Ottoman way of state formation was often considered as separate from the European cases; in both separate worlds of Western and Ottoman literatures. Pitterberg calls that as

cultural essentialism, whichever level it is identified at. (Piterberg, 2003) As for the Western cases, it is the idealized qualities of numerous political units that are usually listed in a unified manner. For Ottoman cases, distant geographies are held the same parallels to the case for Europe; moreover Ottoman Empire was perceived as a unique experience. These constructs of identities manifested themselves in the symbolic definitions of common cultural spirits truly.

Eurocentric and orientalist perspectives were inherited from the observation reports of the ambassadors and spies from Western Europe.towards the Eastern cases have been transmitted to the academic Ottoman-Turkish studies as well. Double standards work for these backwards countries. One example from the Ottoman state historiographers was an obsession without exceptions until the 1970s: Ottoman historical development levels are evaluated with the criteria for contemporary nation-states. Abou-El-Haj reacts against that anachronistic view and finds it more like a revelation of a hypocrisy in the theory: why was an idea of strong state, a bribery incident or a privilege system in the Ottoman Empire can be regarded as "backwardness" in the 18th century Ottoman world, whereas similar experiences in Europe until in the second half of the 19th century England or France were being experienced? (Abou-El-Haj, 1991)

This study deals with how the the history writing is shaped due to the perspectives for perceiving the state of 20th century in the first hand, since the "modern state" is supposed to have completed its evolution in the West, whereas the school of "state tradition" could not regard to the Ottoman-Turkish experience as "modern" or willing to refer to the Ottoman state with any other descriptive adjective used for Western polities: it could be either democratic, capitalist or liberal alike. This dissatisfaction with Ottoman qualities compared to the West is not solely valid for the typology of the state in the end 19th century.

The state in Turkey is alleged to be a very strong entity, moreover the most able and powerful actor among all other actors, and it is claimed to be so for long centuries, beginning from the Ottoman experience and reaching up until the present day. This state is supposed to be built and rebuilt in the same way throughout time is also accepted to have followed a far more different path than the "Western" state; while having different cultural qualities and systems made the country miss taking some crucial measures to reach to their levels of development. And hence there is a political agenda on that state about a named requirement of transformation for

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democratic and liberal causes it becomes more crucial to define what really was wrong in the former conditions, and to which direction this state should be evolved.

When carried to policy basis, the factual reality is usually distorted for the sake of persuasion. The the history in the hands of social scientists with those innocent-appearing agendas can be issued to exaggeration of some particular happenings (such as the *müsadere* principle in the Ottoman case despite its limited implementation).Some recent findings might be resisted to be included to the analysis, since they might tear down the entire network of assumptions held as if real.

Beyond these peculiarist assumptions, there is an inferiority complex developed from the asymmetric power relations of the world's political entities and this is backed with the ranking and criteria by different non-governmental organizations in the world. Regarding to the Ottoman Empire as a "non-formation" n the theories of Mardin, Heper and Keyder should be conceived in relation to this inferiority complex, since the growth and knowledge of the Ottoman conditions between the 17th and 19th centuries must have met the criteria listed and portrayed by Poggi and Pierson for the "modern state"normally. At least the Ottoman political entity should be perceived as the product of its own time; all the time; which means this was an entity having close relationship with the daily life and developments in the neighboring countries and could not be resisting to them. Abou-El Haj and Salzmann argue for the same claim in their works and do not hesitate to use the same tools of periodization with the European histories without seing any harm in it.[27]

The conceptions in the Ottoman Empire can be different due to the different language but the cultural distinctions cannot create so deep-down impacts to create an island with peculiar solutions in my opinion. The the history of the nations can explicate to nothing, especially in the periods when entities were not organized in respect to a principle called as "the nation". It is the the history of the people sharing same problems in more or less same geographical or social contexts and the solutions found by one of those must have been adopted in each system ccording to its own particular conditions in the end. Quataert and Abou-El-Haj reminds in parallels that it was like bread and butter for the lives of the peoples living unknowingly of borders as we do today; and there were continuous mutual interactions between the Ottoman

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[27] See also Dna Rizk-Khoury for an example for that (Khoury, 1997)

lands and its wider west. (Abou-El-Haj, 1991) (Quataert, 2003) The authors using the same terminology for both European and Ottoman experienced make sense from that account. Backwardness cannot be defined for the Ottoman Empire who lived in such a close accordance with its neighbors, no matter which side appears to be generator of particular relations in the first sense. Even the very adoption of the solutions to the problem requires an high degree of creativity within each country's particular system and conditions.

The distinction in the share of the technology and experience must be affected heavily due to the imperial claims of superiority and its suppressive impositions enforcing another political organization in charge. In the conditions of the 19th century it was the British imperial plan, which would generate a "fall back" in the long term for the Ottoman Empire and the second half of the century is the time period when the impacts of a semi-colonization was gaining weight on that ground. This did not mean a slow-down in everything, as Quatert exhibits in the case of land reform; Özbek does in terms of social reform, in Kırlı's account the growing dynamism in the public sphere and in Deringil's stress the invention of the tradition in the relations between the valid rule with its subjects and the international counterparts. The cases revealing an unfit to the Western *ideal-type* can be observed at different levels of the European as well as the Ottoman polities, on the other hand. It is quite dangerous[28] to presuppose the idealized logic of one experience, even when it was contemplated in that way by the contemporary intellectuals. In other words the main problem for theorizing here is not the clear depiction of the proper "end-form"; or its re-specification as a term, as a diverse historical experience and as a possible tool for periodization. *Modern state* or *feudalism* alike should be the terms that can serve for distinguishing some general trends at the upper level of the analyses; but for more particular political distinctions shorter periods should be handled and named through the transitional dynamics of the state in form or types.

What is crucial is to be able to lay down a comparable ground for both the histories of Ottoman and other experiences of state-formation. This study is willing

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[28] I see the effects of such a theoretical non-correspondence with the reality in the social psychology of the individuals and the political self-perception in general. This can be regarded as the success of the international hegemony project at the ideological level. Self-identification problems mentioned in the Introduction, result with an acceptance of the position in the international power relations as a curse, which hardens the change. This aspect of the analysis cannot be studied further in the text in details. It must be the part of the scope of another work specified in the ideological instance.

to investigate the Ottoman experience of socio-political transformations as it deserves to be done: in a comparative perspective and with parallel standards. This should be the groundwork of any alternative approach. This study also wants to draw attention to that the gravity levied on the cultural differences while theorizing is excessive. So that comparison possibilities are blocked or the researcher is expected to make limited comparative efforts hence the deep structural breaches separating the experiences; whch are taken for granted. Different conceptions or implementations should not make us stay aside, while these exhibit cultural distinctions. In contrast the similarities and differences in terms of finding solutions to the problems of same time periods and geographies alike are like the heart beat of the the history in time and space to be revealed in comparative studies.

### 3.2.2. Debates on the Rise of the Ottoman Polity

Chronologically, the topics of debate under the Ottoman the history writing start with how a small garrison-based organization of Osman Beg turned into such a great empire. The conventional explanation for this is constructed around the terminology of "success" and the success of the Ottoman state is related with the centralist policies of the classical age, which are accepted to be built on the ideals of "harmony "and "justice". Leaving the fact that the levels of the achievement of the ideals are never questioned thoroughly, these are recognized as the cultural criteria beside the militaristic criteria of success. This criterion altogether explains the reasons of the "rise" of the empire.

Historians having problems with that literature based on that "rise" and "fall" introduced other criterion to explicate the survival of the empire for six centuries. Quataert makes use of the early incidents like turmoils in the Anatolia of Mongolian attacks and Byzantine defenses and finds the success of the Ottoman Empire in the flexşbility of it. Several authors seek for the ground for success of Ottoman institutionalization in adapting to changing conditions, in willingness to utilize talents and acceptance of allegiance from many sources. These properties were shared by the other Turkoman begs as well, the difference in the Ottoman case lies

on its "character as a state in the process of formation, of becoming and of doing what was necessary to attract and retain its followers". (Quataert, 2000)

Baki Tezcan provides insights about an early transition, which provides an opening for the problematique about "Ottoman success". He follows the change from the official records, from the alteration of the titles of the Ottoman rulers in time: they were once warlords and then they turned to emperors. Osman was a *marcher-lord* of a Mongol khan in western Persia, who recognized him as his sovereign. As he was a *vassal* in his relationship with his *suzerain,* he was an *over-lord* in his relationship with his *alp*s or knights. Osman had to fight and conquer in order to compete with other vassals in a horizontal axis in a world of limited agricultural productivity; and if he did not create these new resources and be a promising leader his men could shift allegiances toward another lordly family. (Tezcan, 2010) In Quataert's words with the advantage of geography, the Ottoman lords conquered Balkan principalities after the Anatolia and even the Byzantine lands by making them their vassals. (Quatert, 2000) Tezcan and Quatert underline here the feudal roots of the empire at the same time that blossomed naturally in such geography of feudal relations.

One important threshold of transformation in the spirit of organizations is dated in second half of the 15th century, where the vulnerable nature of their feudal relationships was revealed. Mehmed II led the development of a patrimonial political system in which vassals were replaced by the governors. These coincided with efforts of centralization in contrast the former lack of intervention in the local affairs, which was a conscious choice according to Halil İnalcık. Tezcan found that such attempts are rather involved "the political limitations imposed on the great lord by the nature of feudal relations" and the possible advantages of a more unified monetary zone. The security of a rich treasury was tried to be maintained with "a general move toward a monetary economy in the tax regulations of the Ottoman realms". (Tezcan, 2010; p. 48-50)

As Mehmed II became the great lord of these lands, the artificial kinship ties of the former system had turned into "real as well as fictive" bonds of slavery. Tezcan restricts this tendency of what he calls "political slavery" to the period of 1450-1580, as a solution to the instability problem with an unbreakable bond between master and the servant/slaves. Süleyman the Magnificent was not the suzerain of many vassals, thus was no more called a *beg*, but rather he was a master

of his slaves hereafter. The assertion about these new regulations was that they are done to reach to perfection in the political system, formulated in terms of "working like a clock" in the educational and promotional systems of the state offices. From his time period on the grand viziers were expected to become royal servants of merits and experience. (Tezcan, 2010; p.63)

It should be here noted that the classical age is not ideal-typized but idealized. The goals of laws, regulations, narrated words of the political elites and the political treatises for a harmonious and just environment, should not be held as if they were really realized. According to Quatert, this is a problem in the narrating and reproducing the arguments and perspectives of archival documents; the intentionality reading of the terms and questioning of the incidence of they really happened is pervasively missing in the studies of the the history with archival work.(Quataert, 2003) *Nasihat* literature had become very famous sources of study for instance, of which authors from 16$^{th}$ to 18$^{th}$ centuries perceived a "decline" in their empire and consign letters of advice for the Sultan. Without considering who they were and why they saw the events that way, many historians have taken that idea of "decline" in its face value as if it had realized because of the harmed unity and harmony of the classical ages certainly, due to the problems these officials denoted. The problem here is the elaboration of particular views as if they areunquestionable which became a part of official the history. (Abou-El-Haj, 1991)

During the proposal of alternatives about the readings of the *nasihatname*s, Abou-El-Haj reminds that those contain social/human dynamics of things in the author's world of explanation and the dynamics of his time and general value judgments. Thus to carry the perception about "decline" to the work of the the history writing is a problem. These works bring about a static society vision to the Ottoman life in these ages so far, in other words the society is taken as if it remained unchanged until the 18$^{th}$ or 19$^{th}$ centuries of so-called drastic transitions. (Abou-El-Haj, 1991) Piterberg offers that these *nasihatname*s can also be interpreted as a Puritan discourse, sought a moral regeneration and purification of state servants. The desire/will to return to a past, which was constructed ideologically in the name of a golden age, and which was bemoaned as a break-down of correct social order and its concomitants throughout the excessive social mobility in the 17$^{th}$ century. (Piterberg, 2003)

The limits of the "rise" and "decline" perspective are quite generally admitted lately. The "success" of the Ottoman Empire cannot be explained only with the victories in the wars respectively, but also with the 600 years long survival and the strength in the culture should be taken into account[29]. These theses highlight altogether different dimensions of the history like the achievements in the relative centralist policies of their own age, or like the  policy of promoting transition towards a more civilized urban and cultured rural life henceforth rather than the less taxable nomad life, or like the evolution of the political organizations due to the needs and possible cut backs of certain relations from time to time, or the shift from military way of appropriation towards an agricultural system… The tendencies of change in all these aspects of life should be imagined for understanding the political developments of 17th to 19th centuries; not only to set these as the background but to perceive the entire network of power relations that flourish and/or transform in direct interactions with each other.

### 3.2.3.  Debates on Alternative Views on Ottoman Transformation

The very identification of a *classical age* has been held "as an organizing abstraction and prevalence in Ottoman scholarship, symbolized in the name of Halil İnalcık, as if without this perspective, human sciences on the Ottomans cannot be thought" (Piterberg, 2003; p.64) This "cognitive filter" draws actually "an elusive line" in Piterberg's words, since primarily it makes intellectual discourse possible and enhances insights on the understanding of the courses of Ottoman the history with an abstraction. But on the other hand the abstraction becomes a fetish itself. (Piterberg, 2003) Everything that is tried to be conceived in Ottoman the history has to be related to this period and its ruling mechanisms in order to be explained. In most cases this is a development that damages the alleged harmonious structure of this classical age.

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[29] See Karen Barkey and Donald Quartert (Barkey, 2008), (Quatert, 2007) for  different versions of this view.

The end of the classical age of the Ottoman Empire is usually dated in the 16th century by Ottoman historians. The late 16th century also indicates the last decades of the "rise" in the official the history, which is said to be followed by "stagnation".  As touched upon before, most of the alternative scholars discussed here these lines of periodization. Besides they criticize that tendency of using the abstractions above. 16th to 17th centuries are sentenced to a "middle child syndrome" while they are found only evident between only for post-something and pre-another: the classical age and the *Tanzimat*. (Quatert, 2003)

Alongside the ignorance about the period it was assumed to lack historical dynamism. This is hidden in the terminology of stagnation yet. Additional to the three centuries of classical age order these two centuries of life cannot be reduced to a period with "slight changes" in the social system. (El Haj, 2010)  İt is then more understandable why the following centuries have to be named with great sudden transformations. Taking 18th century as a point of departure is a frequent choice that conventional historians make. They commonly concentrate on the reforms either with the Age of Tulips, and/or with the reigns of Selim III and Mahmut II and/or with the most famous base of explaining transition: the Tanzimat. (El Haj, 2010)

These perspectives standing for abrupt transformations become more and more outdated in these days, through the works of a number of authors, which do have a say against what was being done until now and give examples for a recourse perspective. İt is not a surprise that these alternative authors usually take the 16th to 18th centuries as their foci for analyses, most of whose theses are formulated in this part. Their point of departure is determined by their choice about the times when classical forms were departed or how should the the history of "the change" be written. Interestingly enough, transformations are usually presupposed to delineate a limited time period.

Abou-El Haj notices that the historians tend to freeze the transitional periods at least, the ones which are coming before and after the period they are working on. This brings forward a requirement for the assumption that their photographs for the past and the future are clear and true. But after the study one should not overlook to return to their fluid realities, Abou-El Haj suggests, so that he/she can talk about the continuities between the past and their time period of study; between the studied time period and the future. (Abou-El Haj, 2010; p. 32) The history should always been conceived as a fluent reality. And even the institutionalized levels of forming

relationships in the societies should been perceived to be in a transition of some kind. The freezing activity should be seen as a temporary anchor; and the photos should be used as heuristic devices for maintaining that. (El Haj, 2010; p.33) At that point the questions coming to mind are about how these transformations make the reality appear in forms and about how to theorize it.

Many authors find the most striking indicators of change in the age of Suleiman I. In his time the empire was included in the 16th century wars of Europe; Ottoman troops could be and were fighting in two or three fronts. This did not only manisfest the level of military and fiscal capacities, but also the changing of the routes between the India and Europe, which was risking the Ottoman transit trade revenues. Thus his age is regarded as the peak of the "rise"[30] of the empire and as the origins of all factors to decay the institutions of the empire. The significance of the Suleiman I for this work is that it indicates a further shift in the organization of the rural social relations after Mehmet II and its successive consequences in the political structures. (Quataert, 2000; p.54-55) As a typical element of a transitional period, the processes related with the "decline" of the empire stand side by side with the development of some other powers that might be heralding a "rise"; like those of the money, governmental structures, a new military regime, a new dynamic in the relations of *ulema* and the *medrese*s etc.

Sureia Farouqhi reminds a "long-standing hypothesis" of Sabri Ülgener; according to whom the economic boom in the Ottoman territories in the 15th-16th centuries was more like an "optical illusion" or at least should not be expected to be a long-lasting case, since the trade routes would suffer from the successes of Portuguese fleets had rounded African Cape of Good Hope. Prosperity of Mediterranean trade in the late 16th century is a hot topic amongst historians in 1950s-1960s; soon it came into the picture that most of the merchants except for the Venetians continued to the trade traffic and Ottoman demands went on being met by importing serious amounts of goods. Additional demands like Indian textile, coffee like elements of consumption had come into prominence among the members of the wealthier circles. Even in a later period of Ottoman economic difficulties around 1760s, it was a time of period, when new economic sectors could flourish. Greek

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[30] This is a word for the translation for this tool of periodization. In English sources the term corresponds to that is the "growth"; but the former is used here in order to reflect the feeling narrative gives.

shippers were holding the Mediterenneean business at large and engaging also in the American trade; of which revenues directly influenced the Ottoman markets. Even the empire was out of the European economic system around the mid-16<sup>th</sup> century, this would be changed in the second half of the same century. In summary Farouqhi refuses the hypotheses about the insignificance of Anatolian, Syrian and Egyptian trade around 1500-1600, hence they could not be "supported by the facts" but assumed to cause the end of the Red Sea trade and Meditterenean economic stagnation in the 16<sup>th</sup> to 17<sup>th</sup> centuries; (Farouqhi, 2005; p. 44-49)

It was impossible not to react to more and more roles gaining coins in the market beginning with the 16<sup>th</sup> century. Baki Tezcan finds the extensions of the "fiscalization" period in the Ottoman case, as it gains appearance in the rising value of the knowledge on the fiscal issues. He claims and tries to prove that the ones with more experience with the conduct of fiscal issues in the market was increasingly rewarded with a higher status in the stately offices with the end of 16<sup>th</sup> century. The power relations before gave about the *devshirme*[31] *officers,* who could become more prominant in the governmental structures after the end of 15<sup>th</sup> century, with their good education in the palace school (*enderun*) and their long-term palace experience. In the wake of 16<sup>th</sup> century the offices of the grand viziers (*sadrazam*), started to be taken by the new generations related with the noble *tımar beg*s dealing with the tax-farming as well as the matters of the guilds and markets. Like the *kapıkulları,* they took part as the military-administrative personnel of the state like the way in which well-to-do Frenchmen bought his way into the *noblesse de robe*. (Tezcan, 2010; p.65) Abou-El-Haj reaches a similar conclusion in his work on the rebellions in the following century; as he finds out that between 1450-1550 ruling elite was composed of a low number of achievement-based civil servants, ruling the state in terms of their own interests from 1560 to 1700, a period through which the structure of ruling elite was compelled to a change. System went more flexible in time, as *nasihatname*s also note, fortunes changed hands and this indicates a significant social mobility in the times. (Abou-El-Haj, 1984)

This story can be bounded with the entire story of the destroyed logic of *tımariots;* hence it was a militarily based system in the beginning. According to

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[31] Devshirme system got institutionalized in the reign of Murat II, namely in the second quarter of the 15<sup>th</sup> century and they gained more and more prominence all through the century.

Kemal Karpat it was the central structure of the Ottoman social-economic system. In the classical feudal times the fundamental element of the Ottoman army was the *sipahis*, identified with double duties of maintaining agricultural surplus and its transfer for the stately need for feeding of the army and taxation. In 17th century it was however no more the world of *ucbeyis*, or the conduct of life based on the conquest, anymore. The new Kaaba for social organizations was situated around the *vakıf* practice in the urban life, and the gaining wealth out of pure agricultural appropriation and its sale. The word *tımar* came from the idea of making a living or personal sustenance and the usage of it would leave its place to the terminology of *ciftlik* within time. Towards the end of these ages the *tımar*-holder known to lack the right to inherit the land controlled; started to prefer taking the right to use of the land under *esküncili* status[32], which was eligible for inheritance. (Karpat, 2006)

In that case the *bey* is rarely seen to "handle the plow". *Kadı*s were the judiciary authorities who adjudicated the cases about *tımar*s and *vakıf*s on property. The land was rented according to the going market price (*rayic*), so that the control of the state is balanced through the market forces within the system according to Karpat. Even the inter-*tımar* relations are notified to work in terms of market rules; which is drawn quite obviously in the purchasing of the goods in the local markets by the pickers within the system. They transferred the money to the *kahya*, kahya to the *tımar*- or *ciftlik*-owner for the payment of the rent, and ciftlik-owner pays the tax in kind (*ayni*): *Öşür*. (Karpat, 2006)

Dana Rizk Khoury reads the process of transformation from the transitions within different regimes of farming in the provincial society and its relations with the state developed over a tax relationship. The empire had a more or less uniformly applied tax administration in the hayday of the Ottoman absolutism (1450-1550); whereas *kanunname*s of end 1500s brought about further homogenization. Last decades of the 16th century the Ottoman provinces faced with growth of population, inflationary trends and costs of war; that drew the next century to social and economic upheavals. The state sought for different ways to finance the wars, as mentioned above. The sale of offices and relately the tax-farms would be the central part of it. (Khoury, 1997)

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[32] *Eşkincilü* was the cultivated land with partnership (*ortakci*) In the earlier years of the classical age it was only the timar lands owned by the dynasty (*hassa* lands) could apply this institution. Then with time this was opened to the used of other households as well. (Karpat, 2006)

To understand the parallel developments with these finacial and political issues with the military system, Virgina Aksan's work is meaningful to the extent she could demonstrate the weight militarily appropriation gained in that network. It could not remain as the sole and less risky source of income; the more agricultural production was escalating. The principles organizing the army were no more organizing the political life directly though, but it remained being vital with the entire economic world[33] around the massive troops.

As the face of war "changed a swell", the organization would give responses from internal dynamics. Ottomans were famous of their achievements in siege warfare, which could be a value within the fortress system. After the 30 years war (1618-1648) the old system was obviously decomposing: the siege warfare was no more efficient; hence the levels of fortress construction and cannon production had reached to equilibrium. These led to endless wars without a victor. That is why it became now the ability to sustain long-term campaigns that had become the new challenge within massive open confrontations. The relevant requirements were the structural and behavioral changes such as convincing well-organized and disciplined soldiers. They were expected to stand fast in opposing ranks and open fire at another without breaking ranks though comrades fall around. (Aksan, 2007) The collapse of the Ottoman Empire is pervasively assessed according to decline in the militarily power. But this was valid for all parties of war in the 16th century, whereas the Ottoman Empire had still three centuries ahead to reach to its end.

Aksan gives a place to the view that the Ottoman Empire is found unable to keep up with all these technical innovations; which is not true, either. The Ottoman army had experienced the change on the very arena of war. For instance between the years 1593-1606 wars with Iran and Austria coincided also with *Celali* revolts; which broke a new era in the Ottoman army parallel to the European cases of local banditry. Their techniques and their use of guns, their instrumentalization by the state in the fights with other bandits, had helped them formatting even a new school of

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[33] As stressed above these military developments also gave way to fiscal problems; which were tried to be resolved in the transformations within the tax-system, which brought about the replacement of direct pays to the state in kind and cash (*bedel-i nüzul, bedel-i sürsat*). The *bedel* (substitute) system involved in the demand of guarantee for the governmental side; maintained through a contract. An elaborate system of state contractors, accountants and commissaries were now the residents of the acquisition of garrisons. While the attainment of the taxes was very crucial for the vitality of military forces, shipment service was undertaken by the state, guaranteed by the commissaries, moreover road systems was needed to be renewed. Aall reforms spoke of the century's kind were experienced by the Ottoman Empire somehow in parallels with the European counterparts and neighbors.

fight. As regiments of irregular infantrymen were recruited from the local peasants for fighting against the militia, the new local forces were given guns and they learned to act like the militias on the mountains. As merceneries are required increasingly in the armies, these experienced bandits gained more weight. And the artillery branch was instituted working on technical advice of native professionals from these very infantry groups were formed under the names of "militia" groups in the army, whose soldiers were *sekban*s, *sarica*s, *levent*s in the meaning of strongmen, vagrant, bandit. (Aksan, 2007)

After the long war of 1606 with Austria a substantial reform was an issue on the *fief* assignation to the palace officials. Standing army was enlarged by the enlistment of provincials for whom the enrollment meant attaining the privileges of the corps. The trend was officially recognized and the enlistment in the muster-rolls called *esame*, became an entitlement to janissary pay and benefits, which made the Ottoman treasury to benefit from it. This process ended up with the so-called "fictionalization of the armies" with the high inflation of the muster rolls, which was the plague of pre-modern Europe, as well. As a result the recruitment remained as the less mobilized part of the transformations. (Aksan, 2007; p. 86-88) (Karpat, 2006)

Still the technical advance and the internalization of a functionalism as such, were said to be lacked by the Ottoman Empire. Beside the theses viewing the militarily and political reforms as imitation, another arena of assumption was about the lack of a "cultural revolution" expected to be proceesed within the enlightenment thought. A transition from the design of the well-organized and disciplined troops towards the achievement-based rational bureaucracy was the theoretical criteria. One important part of it is expected to begin with the secularization of the society and prosecuted with the rationalization of the processes with their detailed planning in advance. Aksan notes as a general attitude when theorizing on the Ottoman militarily the the history: Ottoman Empire is claimed to experience the process as a political entity not the same way with the European cases. Moreover the Ottoman path was defined to lay in the opposite direction with the European way. The increasing application of traditional elements in the military procedures in the Russian and Ottoman empires was considered as a proof of going more conservative. This can be however conceived with the imperial common development as becomes more appearant in Hobsbawm's terms, the invention of tradition. (Hobsbawm, 2000)

Aksan example from the critiques made on the usage of first Mohammed figure in the war in 1593, but she also re-reads the incident as signaling an acknowledgement for those in the eastern front, part of the attempts at establishing orthodox-Sunni Islam against nomads. (Aksan, 2007; p. 85-6) Tezcan reviews the theme of "murder of the beloved by his lovers" for the Osman II and the janissaries in the works of Andrews and Kalpaklı, who ended the so-called "age of the beloveds" with the death of a monarch parallel to the Charles the Second, and attached the event to a symbolic meaning called "a fissure" between the church and the state. Tezcan reconsiders the characterization of the fissure alleged with the separation of the church and the state; and with this separation to denominate a necessary feature of modernity. In contrast he defends that there is the establishment of a closer bond between the church and state around the beginning of the modernity also exhibited in the example cases of secularism from contemporary Turkey to Germany, UK, USA[34]. "IsIs not the 1648 principle of "whose region, his religion" a marker of the beginning of modern international relations?" he asks. It was this principle, which DID really separate the Roman Catholic Church from European states but only to replace its significance by "national" churches. (Tezcan, 2010)

When going back to Ottoman the history, he finds it "interestingly enough" that the peace of Augsburg(1st formulation of the principle) of 1555 coincided with the same year signed Peace of Amasya, after which Sunni identity of Ottoman Islam and Shiite identity of Safavid Islam were further consolidated.

> Thus modernity is perhaps not so much about the separation of the church and state; as it is about the control and identification of the former by and with the latter. Nevertheless Andrews and Kalpaklı are right in summarizing a fissure in Ottoman political order after the murder of Osman II, I would argue that this fissure was created in the conceptual bonds that held Ottoman notions of government together. (Tezcan, 2009; p.69)

Regarding the Ottoman Empire as part of the Greco-Islamic legacy, Ottoman traditions of governance ideology are claimed to legitimize themselves by the premise that "the ultimate perfection for a human being is in reaching unity with the One" and due to the impossibility of this aim, there was a worldly emphasis on

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[34] For more interesting examples; see: (Tezcan, 2009)

justice as the noblest virtue and balance to be the central virtuous action. The area of ethics was firmly defined under the government of the self, economics of the family and the household, politics for the government of the community at large, among which Tezcan also comes up with clear hierarchical bonds in the 16th century. (Tezcan, 2010) The real fissure Tezcan supposes the breaking of this bonds, came about with the regicide of the Osman II and the following depositions.

It was the military-administrative and educational-judiciary institutions that consolidated the hegemony of the patrimonial empire through the above called ideological continuity idea. As these spheres were slowly being appropriated by different social forces, the very spheres had been enlarged, got specialized and started to be used to limit the royal authority of the dynasty and its agents starting with the 17th century. The *ecnebi* were not merely descendents of emperors' slaves anymore, but they could now buy up their way into the imperial administration from the ranks of commoners thanks to some economic opportunities they earned through time, such as tax-farming privileges. Sons of *tımar beg*s and the descendants of *devşirme paşa*s achieved higher positions under *askeri* or a militarily organized principle in the 16th century, whose path could be followed by more and more subjects or the *reaya* for becoming the part of the ruling group. (Tezcan, 2010) Abou-El-Haj also points out the gradual transformation in the meaning of the "*kul* conception". (Abou-El-Haj, 1984)

In the middle of the 17th century *vizier paşa* household has emerged as a major locus of power. The recruited, trained and socialized manpower was turned into the service of Ottoman state structure increasingly. The networks of patronage were extended by these households became the *sine qua non* for participating in state politics and for attaining a successful career within it. Pasha households stand for the "oscillation of the early modern state between the patrimonial and bureaucratic politics". As the concern was transferred to a more monetary structure of surplus appropriation from *dirlik*, the actors and structures attain specific articulations of the patrimonial and bureaucratic state respectively. Together with the demise of *devshirme* system and the becoming of the state more bureaucratic and less patrimonial, *the* idea of Sultan's household's depiction as an institution of recruitment and socialization had transformed as well. The Ottoman state and the *kul*s befell much less coterminous than they had previously been. (Abou-El-Haj, 1984; p.150) Those new spheres occupied by new *kul*s generated should not be held

as a direct challenge to the power of the Sultan despite expectable conflicts. In the long run the coexistence and strengthening of both sides should be conceded.

With the secularization and specialization of the rule, the departmentalization of the governing bodies also witnessed a gradual demilitarization of the upper-classes. (Abou-El-Haj, 1984) On that ground their civil presence in these political circles can be commented to have produced an ennoblement of a new kind. Yet these noble families dealt with issues of land and trade as well, and it can very naturally be expected from the bureaucratic groups to be the representatives of different interest structures there. Putting Tezcan's inclination to call a bureaucratic class[35] aside, his perception of the early modern Ottoman State as a result of "a consensus among the members of the Ottoman ruling classes" (Tezcan, 2011; p.67) should be taken into account.

Legitimacy networks were reborn over these new spheres of bureaucratic central figures. It was still acquired from simply "being there and appearing to be eternal" like the Ottoman dynasty. When dynasty stopped pushing for its own empowerment and acknowledged the powers of such institutions like the janissaries and the *ayan*, the Ottoman state emerged as an institution that attracted respect from the representatives of Ottoman social forces. The central legitimizing concept for political institution was more secular, that is this-worldly than divine: a claim to eternity. (Tezcan, 2011)

These transformations observed through social mobility symbolize a shift from "a pyramid of political control at the apex of which stood the Ottoman emperor, to a spider web with the monarch in the center"[36]. Tezcan dates this political aspect social transformation in the interval between 1580 and 1826 and calls it as "the Second Empire. Some political actors, whom Tezcan calls as "constitutionalists", such as certain bureaucrats and jurists who were in an "uneasy alliance" with the janissaries would like to place the monarch at the symbolic center of this web. The so-called "absolutists" on the other hand were centered on the imperial court would rather have the sultan control in the spinning of the web. " (Tezcan, 2011, p. 65-66)

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[35] This study cannot be named under one classly body since the term's reference is their forms of surplus appropriation in other words ac to the production relationships. (Wood, 1995)

[36] Karen Barkey also shares the idea of a network society. For details see: (Barkey, 1998)

The second transformation of the tax system was taken into account here as among the measures led to a new form of tax-farming. Allowing individuals to maintain them the chance to use the land for a life-time; the so-called the *malikane* system it helped to widen the parts of society that can use their rights of disposal[37]. The devolution of the power from the center is thought with a decentralization tendency, but all these allude to the reorganization of the fiscal system in the Ottoman state; as well. This meant a transformation from the "atomized system of multiple prebends (*tımar*s) connected to state, to a more regionally cohesive which created expanded regional administration of the districts". (Khoury, 1997) Tax-farming and privatization of state's fiscal resources need not be called a loss of control as it is done in the argumentations of Ottoman decentralization against the French inclinations especially after provincial uprisings[38]. Rather a more hierarchical and differentiated bureaucratic structure was formed and tied with the state to local investors further; hence it was a strategy devised by Ottoman state to borrow money from large numbers of investors,…[who] became heavily vested in the survival of the Ottoman polity as a part of a new elite. This was the beginning of an end to the *ancient regime*" (Salzmann, 2004) at the same time.The tax-farm was involving the state directly into the kinship network. (Khoury, 1997)

İlber Ortaylı draws attention to the time Arabian Peninsula was conquered, since it corresponded to the years when *tımar* system started to lose its earlier bases. (Ortaylı, 2008) Thus the system was asserted to be different Karpat stresses on the *ikta* system for the same area, where there were no *sipahi*s but the local *eshraf* owned the right to control the land. They could take some part of the profits left from the sale of the products; after the agricultural and tax-collecting activities found an end and the tax was sent to the center.  This logic seems to explain the birth of the *ayans* in Karpat*,* as well. The concept was firstly used in the Arabic-speaking regions. (Karpat, 2006) According to Karen Barkey *ayan* could have military (*tımarlı* or *kapıkulu)*, commercial, religious or academic (*legal)* backgrounds. Sometimes also local governors started to run *ciftlik* or *malikane* businesses and founded networks

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[37] Not necessarily adminstrative elites but also other members of society like teachers, tradespeople, imams etc. But in the second half of 18th century, the reforms against the cartels having provincial powers were counterproduced; most of the land was recollected in the hands of provincial elites; beter off families in the Mousuli experience. (Khoury, 1997)

[38] For these arguments see Karen Barkey, Dana Rizk Khoury.(Barkey, 2008) (Khoury, 1997)

between other appointed officers, local craftsmen and peasants and as trusted intermediaries between the people and the state, they began taking part in the solution of the problems in taxation, recruitment, boarding (for food suppliance), lending money. And this was not only for the sake of income expectation, but also for founding and empowering social ties with inequality. (Barkey, 2008; p.323-329)

Karpat also points to the results of that transformation on the peasants' lives. The taxes were higher and the demise of the system created problems and unrest. The argumentative basis of the people was the betrayal of the monarchs; since acting against the Ottoman value of justice. Although he does not refer to sources for that claim, his emphasis on "the legitimization of the uprising" is praiseworthy. He also counts the *tımar beg* among the other rural actors, who is said to "fight no more with the enemy in the borders but the central elite". Even when they did not revolt themselves, they could or did not maintain the order they were supposed to serve. Peasants left their lands and some were appropriated by *ciftlik-owners*. Plenty of local tendencies and de-facto autonomy of some groups had increased. (Karpat, 2006)

Aytekin draws attention to future versions of these relations in the 19th century; where the credits and trapping the peasantry within an indebtedness cycle became one of the most profitable means of surplus extraction. The application instituted its own mechanisms and structural consequences. Unfulfilled tax obligation generated debts, unpaid debt and moneylending with high interest rates builds the basis of dependent relations in agriculture like from forced labor to dispossession and exile from the land. This meant on the other side of the relationship the monopolization of the small amounts of land in the hands of "few individuals, families or certain social groups" (Aytekin, 2008; p.306-308)

Barkey also asserts that the state-society relations were based on the center; which maintained coordination between numerous, separate and competing rural elites. (Barkey, 2008; p. 348) Both Barkey and Karpat mentioned the presence of oppositional groups and their ambitions to seek for legitimacy, for group-based or provincial autonomy and their alliances with other similar groups; which are not preferred to be referred in the works of Mardin, Heper and Keyder. The state is believed to suppress any opposition immediately and hence even the most powerful oppositional elements the *ayan*s do not pose a real threat against the central authority, all the ranges of founding and transforming power relations are neglected.

Even if Barkey and Karpat remain in a statist framework based on the actions of bureaucratic elites, their stress on the spectrum of the relationships constituted between the people and the central authority and within themselves is worth praise.

Karpat regards the incidents experienced as a result of the struggles with and between the oppositional groups as the beginnings of the nation-state, wheras Barkey sees those as motivated a process of centralization led up to a project of modern state, against the possible risk of collapse. (Barkey, 2008; p.320) (Karpat, 2006) In Karpat's terms transformation of social strata into social classes in the 17$^{th}$ century is the initiator of the fact of modernization. The 17$^{th}$ century state is accepted to let the system be fiscally decentralized by Barkey and she emphasizes on the combination of the commercial and *iltizam* networks around the needs of the state through the vertically condensification in terms of bureaucratic organization in the 18$^{th}$ century. (Barkey, 2008) (Karpat, 2006)

Two forms of state existed together in these centuries according to Barkey and Karpat, the success in the first [archaic, feudal-based] world of networks made the Ottoman experience appear to fail in the second [modern state]. Because the negotiated forms of rule and the diversity in the bargaining between the state and the society were fail into abeyance by the state; in the end the bases of legitimacy had changed. For the second aim Barkey defends the requirement to imitate the Western techniques, whereas Karpat rejects the claim that the success in the 18$^{th}$ and 19$^{th}$ century is based on the import of the technology, services or manpower but the foundation of the structures that made the social groups as direct participants rather than objects. (Barkey, 2008) (Karpat, 2006)

It was also mentioned above that Tezcan sees these processes together with the gradual development of a market society, in which the primary focus of the political power was altered toward the control of monetary resources. This new web-like structure was comprised of fresh and renewed networks of patron-client relationships. It did not have a single center anymore. (Tezcan, 1999) Wood would make a correction which I agree with: It was rather the process bringing through new rules, which would be preferably related to a *capitalist* order of things (consolidated fully when its specific ways of relations became dominant.) Tezcan might be right that there were the advances in the Ottoman commerce. But it waswas not merely about the raise in the amount of the trades, but in the forms of relationships (as he also points out as web-like). In other words, parallels to the development of the

fiscal and trade-based relations the system of surplus appropriation in the peasant production had a gradual regulative effect in the other aspects of life. (Wood, 1995)

Most authors from the economic the history field explore the transitions with merely international economic cycles or at least in domestic responds to other international experiences like "price revolution" or the "crisis of 17th century". Piterberg goes over the main trends of worldwide the history writing to come to terms with the scholarship on Ottoman Empire. The first line of events inferred are set up with the thesis of "Eurasian rise of prices" in the late 16th century and the attendant social-political features in 17th supply of money with the rising velocity of its circulation went hand in hand with demographic changes and urbanization efforts; eventually brought about intensity of trading contracts and networks. Second thesis follows the introduction of the monetary flow of precious metals, which caused a dramatic increase in prices, spread until the rest of Europe, Middle East and Asia. From these theses Ömer Lütfi Barkan accepted the monetarist explanation. Şevket Pamuk brings a reconsideration increasingly dense urban population and a relatedly increasing monetary circulation and inflationary consequences thesis, but he did not believe that those did directly cause the drastic changes in the prices, following Goldstone's line[39]. One of Goldstone's useful assertions on economic the history is that the velocity of monetary circulation rises through time anywhere and thus can be discarded as constant variables. The changes only in money supply should be kept in mind. (Piterberg, 2003)

Oya Köymen argues that there was an interlude as European prices ascended, but the Ottoman prices stayed behind. There was a mounting demand on cheap raw material in the Ottoman Empire, that made the owners of *ciftliks of hassa* import huge amounts of goods from the coastlines (not only grains or other basic goods), though breaking all the laws in the beginning. In return gold and valuable gems had increased in Ottoman local markets and this helped fiscalization to broaden and be

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[39]His vision is found quite impressive by Piterberg: Goldstone assumes that developmental growth is understandable with cleavages and conflicts within elites and state, including which the rebellions and reorganizations of ruling entities afterwards. Lastly ideological change needed to come. The usefulness of Goldstone's observations are nevertheless reach to a limit after a point when talked about Chinese and Ottoman Empires. After 1650 Chinese and Ottoman Empires were argued to be became more rigidly orthodox and conservative than they had been earlier in terms of social life and state, latter of which was reconstructed on the conservative terms successfully, while restoring a measure of prosperity and prolonging the life of these states, but this extent did not let them enter to 18th centuries without the dynamism of England. İt is the same cultural essentialism for Piterberg with the assumption: "Islam makes trade prevented" (Piterberg, 2003)

more influential. With the introduction of the valuable metals and shortages of food hence the produced amount was yet limited, high inflation was practiced consequently. The stately reaction against these occurrences was to let the export remains free, on contrary imports continued. The crafts had encountered a decline before the industrial revolution, because of the decreasing amount of processed product imports in the first hand. Budget deficit problems climbed and the Ottoman state was found accountable for these outcomes, for not taking into effect enough measures. Many countries are known to initiate mercantilist policies[40] after the results of geographical explorations and other discussed reasons: high tariff walls, low export-high import policies. The European achievement in industrialism depended on these policies according to Köymen and what Ottoman Empire lacked is stated to be this effort. (Köymen, 2003) At that point she also becomes the part of the absences literature. But she would prefer what she calls as the "mother state" attitude, protects the country against all odds. Such a solution is suggested by her to overcome with the problem of "the lack of capitalism" or a somewhat late emergence of it.

This very theme was shared by Mardin, Heper and Keyder as well; can be seen in the thesis that there was no place for private property in the Ottoman culture where the state impinged the economy too a large extent. The belief in the need of a liberal market makes them critize both the protective "mother state" and the suppressive "father state" versions. Köymen wants a revision of the overemphasized weight of the authoritative state on the economy, reminds that guild organizations of *ahi*s were the bodies taking part in the control of the prices, through a system of license (*berat*), was typical of the Middle Ages everywhere. The reason for that was mainly the İstanbul's needs for consumption (the solution for urban centers was the priece control in those ages), which had priority. The prices were determined by the *kadi*s(local courts) finally on the advice of the guilds. Other counterparts had the right to intervene in the process or complain for a trail against the decision. Some incidents took place, some actors responded in certain ways, these came together, formed a system, in the center of which money was positioned and it began to

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[40] Seven Ağır states that there was also an Ottoman debate moreover implementation of merchantalism but could not reach so far with the 18th century. The liberalizations in the late 17th and late 18th centuries speak for the partial and gradual leave of these policies; which would reach to a complete putting on ice of the merchantalism by the 1838 Agreement on Trade. (Ağır, 2011)

enforce the actors to behave in a certain way in the last instance: need to be more efficient, make profits more and more for each time in order to compete. Slowly this behavior was obliged to be executed as a rule in each interaction toward the same Ottoman Empire is accused of lacking the aim to accumulate the capital, to be able to initiate the industry. If there is a lateness problem, like in French case this was because of a system, affected by capitalistic features perceived early occurances mixture of surplus accumulation. Some groups had special privileges on trade or tax-collection. (Köymen, 2003)

Köymen's featuring of the urban social groups as actors is found important here. Her reference to the groups that can have established grounds to make demands for the sake of their interests and their fighting for them in their possible limitation due to contextual decisions of the governing bodies can be thought together with the Mehmet M. Sunar's introduction of the janissaries as political actors. Sunar's work serves for founding a serious ground for an alternative theorization of state in the case of Ottoman Empire; because the janissaries were not merely military powers but also shop-keepers *(esnaf),* artisans (*zanaatkar)*, door-keepers and wage-workers and had the networks of relationships with these and other urban social groups of different status and rank. He criticizes the theories, which do not consider the janiss rebellions of the affairs. These social tensions were usually seen as the inter-elite struggles between conservatives and reformists and this view is extruded to the entirety of janissary rebellions from the 16<sup>th</sup> to 19<sup>th</sup> centuries. He examplifies the construction of this view in the the history writing of the Ottoman and early Republican political elites as they were assessing the political processes behind the 1826 dismissal of the janissary troops (*vaka-yı hayriye*: benevolent incident). (Sunar, 2006)

The problem behind this reductionist perception of the rebellions is twofold: Firstly as reformers were glorified, the rebels were condemned and despised. The latter were not considered as "vulgar" figures which meant non-civilized and irrational bodies, or counted among "impoverished", lowest least reliable members of the society in the name of *çapulcu*s; to make them regarded as insignificant factors. Secondly this point of view distracts other counterparts in parallels other motives of the rebellion rather than the militarily and counter-reformist limits. Abou-El Haj's argument for 1708 rebellions was that rebellions offer good opportunities for historians to reconstruct the power struggles within political structures since

possible political alignments competing for supremacy can become more visible during such a time of crisis. (Sunar, 2006) (El Haj, 1984)

Tezcan reads the transformation of the janissary elements and their abolition as an entire institution as the cost of losing the empire's defenses against the Western colonialist ventures. As janissary troops transformed into a sociopolitical corporation, which was open to public and effectively limited the royal authority of the monarch, connection of troops and civil tradesmen of the imperial capital developing since 16<sup>th</sup> century ended up with a virtual identification. Some very *orta*s had (companies) become guilds of bakers, butchers etc. That is why professional soldiers far from being professional soldiers especially when compared to colonialist ventures having opponents. Janissaries were however not categorically against the development of a new and more professional fighting force, yet they could see such a development would eventually bring their privileges and political power to an end. Absolutist agendas of Sultans could not sooth them, question of military reform was a political question on which semi-political privileges of large masses hinged. The destruction of the corps did not however improve empire's defenses; inspite of the projected and instituted other institutional forces, it made them worse. The new order entailed a heavy dose of state centralization, which was supported by foreign powers with imperialist agendas. The history was often written from the vantage point of new order: 17<sup>th</sup>-18<sup>th</sup> centuries became a corrupt *ancien régime* in their discourse but in fact the new order starting to be founded on the Ottoman reform was actually a the history of semi-colonization. (Tezcan, 2009)

Taner Timur and Huricihan İslamoğlu also argue that the Ottoman reform was actually a history of semi-colonization. These theses put into account the external and world-systemic impact on the socio-politcal development. Their emphasis in the change of scope as well as the altering of the state's being as the initiator of transformation might seem revolutionary. But still they carry the risk of explaining entire 19<sup>th</sup> to 20<sup>th</sup> century with mere external causations.

Islamoğlu accepts the universality of capitalism parallel to World-system theory, which is assumed to have emerged since 15<sup>th</sup> century with the development of the trade and the internationally provoked the different regions of world trade into an era of specialization. The strong structures of state could control the working force based on wage labor but could not bring about accumulation of wealth if weak states were directed to organize the prices as the center would want. The "centers"

and "peripheries" are expected to be located according to the world hierarchical relations then. As a result a process of peripherization took place; some regions go on living peasant economies. In the scope of 19<sup>th</sup> century they were not even expected to manage a proper shift to capitalism. Ottoman problem of semi-colonization is thought in relation with that. (İslamoğlu, 2010)

Hence culturalist theses were regarded sufficient to justify the Ottoman difference again. One has to think how the Ottoman geography could have remained as an island without capitalism; as all other neighbors had already introduced with it. Kemal Karpat interestingly mentions that the Ottoman lands experienced the emergence of capitalism starting from the Balkans; however these relations were limited to the non-Muslim elements. How far could such a thesis be reliable? All the culturalist theses being aside, a theorization built on a basis of a capitalism inquiry would give insights for a the history of the state from below and with more internal *explananda.* The question about moment of introduction and consolidation of the capitalism needed to be responded properly by the way; as it is needed to be done in any periodical differentiation.

Another path towards an explanation of the 18<sup>th</sup>-19<sup>th</sup> century Ottoman state-formation with internal dynamics might be furthered from Selim Deringil's works on the symbols of power. El Haj's success in the analyses of the different counterparts of Ottoman *payitaht* elites with each other; Deringil contributes to the area with a perspective for the relationship between the ruling elites and the citizens in the 19<sup>th</sup> century conditions. He focuses on the particular ideological products generated in the name of the Sultan or the *Devlet-i aliyye* to reconstruct the people's consent and vision about the state; or in his words he founds his studies on the "applied policies of legitimization".  As he explores the newly created area of meanings in the Hamidian era, he tries to justify his thesis with a Habermassian term: a *legitimation crisis.*  (Deringil, 2007; p. 23-25)

The roots of these kinds of crises are vaguely defined, though. He announces that each state has periods in their histories, in which the established relationship between the monarch and the people; only. In parallels with the examples in Japanese, Austrian and Russian empires were also in the same tendency to *invent tradition.* In the ceremonial reproduction of the monarch's image in front of the people the old and the new, traditional and the modern was melting in the symbolisms around the Sultan in a same way. Ottoman version of that symbolic

response to the domestic and international legitimation crisis in the time of Mahmud II and was still wanted to be overcome in the Hamidian age. (Deringil, 2007)

Although they might be more frequent cases than it is designed in Deringil's works, *Legitimation crisis* is one crucial part of the story. Another common point of Mahmut's and Hamit is reigns is also the eagerness of their both to found new power blocs to rule country themselves and be the practical head of these newly founding projects of hegemony. The ideological products of the times might be better perceived through these Gramscian terms.

The ideological system surrounding the $19^{th}$-$20^{th}$ century atmosphere has also been an area of interest for Cengiz Kırlı. In his studies he also focuses on the policies implemented by the stately elites and again on the special measures the Sultans demand them to be taken. But different from those of Selim Deringil's, Kırlı's scope is widened through those mechanisms effective on the control of ideological production towards the "public space" and the behavior of the people in the daily life. From his picturing of the historical backgrounds of the spatial dimension of the issue of political consciousness, it becomes more visible that the issue was not an area of research solely for $18^{th}$ to $19^{th}$ centuries. (Kırlı, 2009)

Without mentioning those incidents the introduction of constitutional struggles and liberal democracy should be considered as developments happened all of a sudden or explained through external pressures. The detected absences in the "non-formation" literature according to the *ideal-type*s were for those of the public debate, the formation of a civil society and a struggle and limitation maintained for the governments. The actors of these social spheres of discussion and political debate were expected to found the bases of political institutions between $17^{th}$ to $20^{th}$ centuries; through the active pursuit of the called "middle class" or "bourgeoisie". The elaboration of these circles is enough revolutionary for the literature on Ottoman-Turkish political development. At least these later works, though Deringil and Kırlı amongst others set sight on $19^{th}$ century particularly, rely more on these parts of the historical reality.

The general tendency in the Ottoman studies was to approach either at the bureaucratic or incidental changes affecting the governmental life or at the studies can be categorized more under the current of "the history from the below". The latter group is occupied with the studies on education, reforms and ideology specialized around $19^{th}$-$20^{th}$ centuries. Although they try to anchor these studies with those of the

studies on the "center"; it is unfortunately inadequate for a theory of state–formation, according to the author of this thesis. For a revised theory of state this study proposes the togetherness of those areas and thus their linkages should be theorized in a more refined manner; to be able to give insights about multiple sides of the relations of power.

## 3.3. CRITIQUE OF "MODERNIZATION REVISIONIST" and "STATE TRADITION"

### 3.3.1. Contemporary State's Alleged Cultural Roots in the Pre-Modern Classical Ages

The grounds for transition to the early modern ages are the most detailed analyses in the historiographies. The emergence of the feudal Europe is the starting point of the theories of "modern state", whereas it is the foundation of Ottoman polity for the "state tradition" literature. In that respect these periods expected to be the bases for the theorization, the periods give insights about the cultural characteristics of the European and Ottoman experiences. These are roots of many later developments; it is feudalism, which symbolizes the pre-modern period within; whereas it is the Classical Age in the Ottoman version that comes to an end with the "decay" of the reign of Suleiman I.

Feudalism has two cultural and institutional sources according to Poggi and Pierson: Roman law and militarily organization of power in Germanic tribes. The relationship between the vassals and the feudal kings are narrated to exhibit the hierarchical structure, which was quite unstable in the early epochs of feudalism; but an immediate consolidation of the system came about with the thickening stratification, the general accumulation of wealth and the fixation of the customs by some legal codes. The system of privileges was assumed to possess some already democratic bases from the beginning. Estates system was produced from the heart of that order, which underlined this time the roles of the political elites within political institutions. The conflicts between the land-lords and the monarch to be the bases of

the system, the same dynamic with the monarch would be reproduced in the other estates, as well. (Poggi, 2008) (Pierson, 2000)

According to Mardin, Heper and Keyder Ottoman foundation was also based on two sources: the Turkoman-Islamic legal background (the örfi and şeri laws) and the Byzantine heritage in the land regime. One of the most frequently referred foundational presumptions is about the state's ownership of the land. A second important traumatic motive of the Ottoman dynasty is supposed to be the Ottoman Interregnum which is stressed as the reason of the traditional fear of the monarchs against decentralization and their precautions against any possible empowering of other social groups. Social unity in parallels was an important feature named and which was accepted to be realized with the success of the *tımariot* system. The center's authority to take the land back either from the *tımar* beg or the peasants was one among the most famous myths, with the "absence of contracts", and the "no intention of profit" theses. According to the petty-peasantry thesis, the rural subjects (tebaa) were self-sufficient, which excluded the possibility of a future development of a will to profit. The relationship between the Sultan and its tebaa was symbolized with the terms "center and periphery", which are harmoniously together. The center consisted of the Sultan, divan, devshirme, kapikullari and ulema (or in other words altogether of the "bureaucratic class"); of which members were also appointed to the provinces as the officers symbolizing the "center". In the last ages of the classical epoch the so-called patrimonial-sultanism being the *ideal-type*, the justice duty of the Sultan could still be preserved. (Mardin, 1986) (Heper, 2006) (Keyder, 2008)

Both of the narratives refer to the first sources of the systems because they presuppose the institutional roots of an ideal-typized end-form in the early feudal and the classical ages. The presumptions revealing a hypothetical superiority hidden in the Western past are built here again throughout the "idealized-types", so to speak. For example assuming a legal system regulating the daily lives of the people in these early ages is like stretching one cloth to make it fit to the table. Or regarding the provincial commissions gathered between the 12th to 14th centuries in Europe for operational reasons as democratic institutions are too easy conclusions.

The political systems in these centuries cannot and should not be compared with the contemporary forms of the political organizations and mechanisms. The regional and temporal differences should be taken into account. Very generalized cultural tendencies are accepted as the base of analyses in the name of Europe of the

Ottoman Empire and for long decades or even centuries. Both "modernization revisionists" and the authors defending the Ottoman-Turkish "state tradition" claim that the formations or the logic of these ages carry essences of the quality of the future forms. And their expectations from the future affect their writing of the the history in a large extent.

In the Western histories the relationship between the vassal and the feudal king is noted as if it was only a triggering effect for the "proper" development of European experience. The centering upon the inter-feudal relations between the different parts of a deepening stratification can be understood in that context In the Ottoman cases the perspective starts and remains in the obviously asymmetrical relations of the monarch and the *tımar*-holder; which were certainly unlike the ones between the European kings and their vassals. The historical essence that will not make up the Ottoman polity as the Western one lies on the state's assumed full control[41] on the social actors of both the so-called "center and the periphery"; on the *tımar* begs, the peasants, important families and the appointed officials of both the capital city and the provinces. The the *müsadere*[42] probabilities are overemphasized as well, to prove the later barriers against capital accumulation. Additionally, the relations of the *tımar* beg with the other elements in the rural sphere and the differences between the local and different provincial bonds are disregarded for the sake of these inferences. Could not these local authorities be the sovereign in their own territories? How was their transformation in a few generations, did not they turn into a Turcoman nobility in many families? The networking studies gain importance for initiating into analyses out of this idea. Additionally it should be asked: How could one be so sure about the extent of the central control on the provinces or the other social actors? How far the central forces were equipped or willing to fight back against the excessive uses of power in the provinces for instance? The degree of a central impact should be questionable due to different time periods, places or the each particular agreement met between the polities.

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[41] These alleged essential qualities could maintain harmony under the classical age, which was not achieved by other powers in that respect in those years. The Ottoman polity had reached to "what was required" within the given conditions of the epoch. But the very same choices or the stubbornness of the state in furthering these was seen as an unfit too the requirements of next centuries; namely to capitalism or the modern liberal state in the state tradition scholars. It was the West who could manage to hold the finger on the pulse of the age.

[42] A rather rare implemented principle, of which sanction was the dispossesing of the person of its wealth due to the justification of an unlawful profit. (my translation. ) (Koll; 2005)

The theorization in terms of "center-periphery" relations limits the horizont of the researcher; the variety in actors and quality of these relations remain unspecified. How were the relations of the prebendal cavalries[43] (*sipahi*s) with their counterparts in the army, which turned to payitaht at the end of the wars for example? Did their relations go on? Did not the members of the families from traditional nobility take part in the government-like structures? How did they achieve these positions? Would not the children of these *tımar beg*s or the esnaf was tried to be sent to the enderun or at least to the best medreses? It is frequently relied upon the possibility of poorer elements to mobilize upwards, but the chances of already priveleged circles are not specified. Following these questions in a historical research would give many insights about the social mobilization. Or the ulema, kapıkulu and Janissary-relations in the daily life are needy of more studies to be specified. The denied political affiliations and gatherings for initiating certain policies or changes in the organization of the ruling figures should be taken in the hand due to the contextual content the political might reach into.

Furthermore it should not be forgotten that the Ottoman experience cannot be accused with the lack of laws regulating the relations between the monarch and the subjects. The Kanunname of the Mehmet II was neither the first attempt to compile legal codes nor the last, for instance. Şerif Mardin's claim on the validity of zımni contracts in the Ottoman Empire (Mardin, 1975) lies in parallel to this previous premise. Set as a contrast to Ottoman experience, it is supposed to be one of the cultural cornerstones of European feudalism in both "modernization revisionist" and "state tradition" literatures. The problem here is the lack of temporal specification, whenever the custom-based verbal agreements turned to be written ones and they should be notably investigated in various regions.

The non-reference to the *estates system* typology of Max Weber for the Ottoman cases should also be pointed out. As the fragmentation of different groups of people -supposed to be politically active- is clearly taken as an indicator of democratic plurality for European historiographies, the politically activeness and the diversity of social groups are underestimated in the studies of "state tradition" The so-defined "interest-based" limitations on the feudal king's power are expected to co-

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[43] "Fundamental element of the Ottoman army until the 16th century. …. its existence was …bounded to the timariot system" (my translation)

determine the future system of the European state. All these are relied to occur particularly in Europe hence cultural reasons in the writings of "modernization revisionist" authors.

On the other hand the Ottoman social groups are not named with *Staende* revealing the onstracted unequality within the "state tradition" perspective in spite of Weber's denomination of the Ottoman social groups with these terms. The term *patrimonialism* was taken from Weber, which was originally considered as an epoch of European *estates system* by Weber. The term does not stand for European cases in the "modernization revisionist" authors, however.

Similarly the practices of the "sale of offices" are mentioned to be particularistic in both literatures on "West" and the Ottoman Empire. The sale of *poulettes* and *iltizam* are however alike; which are moreover not sole examples of the sold privileges that beganaround the 16th century.

At the end of 16th century some among the *estates-holders*, like the merchants and urban shopkeepers and artisans in Europe are described to be in a considerable "rise" in Europe; but this does not seem to happen in the end of Ottoman classical age because of the heavy controls of the state on prices and the petty-peasantry there was a barrier against the natural instincts for making profits and entrepreneurship. The European merchants are asserted to have carried goods for the sake of an idealist developmental ambition for trade, which were sometimes even "heavy in weight but light in value" against the expected rule for making profits, showing the ambition to improve trade. (Poggi, 2008) With the lack of these instincts and extra, heroic behaviors, Ottoman merchants could not craft the same influence in order to turn them into a respectable pressure group enforcing an alleged nascent democracy.

"State tradition" school blames the Ottoman monarchs in the wake of 16th century for not letting bourgeois society to flourish. In Europe the bourgeoisie was assumed to carry the seeds of -again the less-mentioned- capitalism in the 14th -15th centuries with their mytical cultural feature entrepreneurship and the monarch's emphatised policies. (Poggi, 2008) (Pierson, 2000) Instead of this infertile argumentation due to culturalist presumptions, another analysis should be laid down depending on the alternative readings of the the history and their theses.

Along the path Gerstenberger draws, when talking about *feudalism*, the vision should not be limited with the image of castles and knights or the land-based relationships. According to the weight of each kind of relationship as a determinant

in thetotality of power relations, they should be considered under different periods predicating on different instances of the state-formation. On the other hand, sectors of life are exhibited as if they come forward one by one within time (first military lords, then agricultural masters and then merchants in terms of European actors or rural then urban in spatial terms etc..) or as if they existed within earlier forms of relationships. Nevertheless Gerstenberger suggests thinking of these actors and processes in closer interactions with other sectors than it is imagined: the lords were fighting in the wars, fed soldiers, had started tax-farming and sold the products in the market in the 16th century onwards in many places. Most of them made the peasants indebted by working also as creditors, which was a mechanism for turning people into tenants and/or, serfs and/or wage-workers or dispossessed migrants. (Gerstenberger, 2007) (Moore, 1967) (Khoury, 2007) (Aytekin, 2008) From *tımar beg* or *feudal lord*, the functions of mechanisms and written historical experiences appear similar from the position of this work.

An imaginary example of a clerical officer can lead to vitalize the sociological imagination. He might be working in the judiciary system as a palace servant, he can even rise in rank to become a *vizier* and as the form of a payment he must had the income from the *tımar* or *zeamet* land. In return to his privileges, he must organize his business in terms of tenant relationships after the 15th century. This would make him get related with the market relations through his tenants and other middle men with the sale of the products. His initiative would be called as *ciftlik*s with time and would spend some time in his *malikane*. The patrimonial household networks could be carried to the countryside as well. The trainees hosted at homes might be helping in the improvement of his businesses. He could use his authority in the *payitaht* for overcoming local bureaucratic problems. The local competitors can create obstacles as well. He could own his own retinues including soldiers just like a feudal lord or a merchant and can get into a fight with them. He cannot be limited with his political personality and had complex relations with the different dimensions of the society, then. Cannot we imagine a similar path for an *ulema* officer? Could not a merchant household exhibit much different patterns when he also own some land? Or cannot a janissary officer of a lesser rank drawn into trade relations or cannot a member of a guild follow the same path for the surplus appropriation? Would not some of their children work in the same shops or go to the same schools; and should not they have more complex relations with eachother based on both

personal and inter-elite relationships? Lastly, cannot this perspective lead us to an alternative visison for perceiving classes than the Keyder's version?

Political sector cannot be limited with those elites around the feudal king, which is assumed to be turning into a monarch within patrimonial relations anyway. (Tezcan, 2009) (Weber, 1978) The rule of the king could still be qualified under the personal rule of Gerstenberger, who bases her periodization on the characteristics of the ruling principles. In that manner, she rejects the active usage of *feudalism* or *estates system* as stately systems; they worked upon personal relations and customs even when they were started to be done in groups. (Gerstenberger, 2007) This work finds the *Staende* relations within the *feudal* form as an acceptable tool for understanding the type of the state; but it should be defined as Wickham offers. Still the term cannot be the core of a theory of state; whenever short-term or rather specific historical study will be done.

Based on Ellen Meiskins Wood's critique, one cannot argue that the *feudalism* carried the seeds of capitalism in the European case, as well as it did not carry them in the Ottoman version of feudalism or in the absence of it. The estates groups would lose their preveleges, to be though with the *tımar* holders, janissaries and urban crafts and tradesmen in the Ottoman case. The transformation to a rational and immediate civil society, separated completely from the stately previleges was a myth, but was part of a reality in both European and Ottoman cases. These actors were significant actors already and they did not tear down the barriers preventing capitalistic burst out from some urban centers. Especially when the process of capitalism was defined vaguely between $12^{th}$ to $16^{th}$ centuries, the perspectives for a possible theorizing of the state would be limited. The transition can be tried to be explained in general terms with the dominant style of appropriation at least. Around the $12^{th}$ to $13^{th}$ centuries the dominant style of appropriation in cooperation with the others was the military-based appropriation. In time the agriculture-based appropriation gained prominence. *Feudalism* is comprised of both versions of dominating relations. Still the effects of the inter-feudal differentiations on the organization of power relations necessitate closer attention. For this tools for periodization should be employed for smaller time periods. Tax-farming and fiscallization should be thought together with the last centuries' economic specificities mostly thought inadequately with a sole commercialization to understand the conditions better. The agricultural capitalism must have entered the

lives of people firstly. The impacts of fiscallization could not be named with capitalism in that age. But the effects of it and the responds given by the people led them to capitalism. And the system was introduced when it started to dictated the people to become efficient and make growing profits for survival. Taking the framework for defining capitalsm from Wood, I deny that England could remain capitalist in a full extent alone for hundreds of years whereas France, Germany or even Ottoman Empire was left outside of these relations. English adoption of capitalism might have come rather early, but must have lasted long to be named like that.

The contributions of the alternative readings on Ottoman state theory can be the introduction of the tools of periodization again and go further than the periodization and theorization with the "growth and decline" of the classical system or a general success, not limited with the classical age or the most successful years in terms of military gain. The effects of the transformation in the tax-systems should be followed in the *tımar-holders'* lives for deepening in periodization for the different types of states were produced as aresult of the changing relations and struggles.

The system in the very early feudal years of the Ottoman Empire is called as military appropriation parallel to the many other countries in that age. Thus the investigation can be started from military appropriation, which was losing its dominant effect on the social relations. But this should not be understood as a military demise. It only lost its most prestigious and beneficial path to make a living. But still many soldiers went on with that occupation. After the Ottoman army was subjected quite drastic chnges in parallel to its neighboring counterparts; the number of victorious wars declined but the number of soldiers, size of the regiments and amount of weapons or technical equipment and innovation increased. (Aksan, 2007) This thesis wants to remind two theoretical distinctions: Firstly, Abou-El Haj calls for the writing of a "real the history"; which need not be evolutionary but sttil should presuppose changes, even when they are not as fast as those in 21st century. In other words it should not indicate a possible static suspense, as it is done by the "decline" literature. Secondly, power should not be taken as a seesaw game; whereas one party rises, the other is forced to pull down[44].

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[44] Here Michel's Foucault's critiques on the general problems in studying on power should be reckoned. (Foucault, 1982)

The military system lost some of its prominence with the transformation of *tımariot system*, but the accumulation of social and material capital of the cavalries, and later even of the mercenaries must be transferred to other sectors in time. Most of the strong war lords turned the land lords, old privilege relationships with the feudal superiors turned to a new version of privilege. Parallel to the increasing monetarization and generalization of the rule around 16th century, the nature of the relationships would change; even the privilege character of the gains will be lost with time and the impact of the courtly officers , in which system now dues and rents coexisted, as to be implicated from Karpat's description of the *eskincüli* experience. (Karpat, 2002)

Another example for a sectoral reorganization is what Tezcan detected for the spheres of religion and politics. This view provides an international perspective to alter the problem of perceiving seing the relations between political, economical, military and religious spheres as if the external ones. Tezcan claims that the transformation of the relationship between the Catholic Church and the polities is towards a reapprochement. This redefines the limits of the room for manuever for both parties. Separation does not mean a break off of the bonds in other words, in contrast the relations of determination and control deepens after the 16th century. (Tezcan, 2009)

### 3.3.2. Absolutist *Ideal-type*, Non-Personal Feudalism and Thoughts on 16th -18th Century Transformation

Poggi and Pierson's central thema of analysis is the absolutist centralization from 15th century onwards. The monarch was naturally the central actor of that analysis. All of a sudden superiority of one feudal elite or a family becomes appearant among other feudal powers; which would initiate centralization. The monarch takes on the executive and judiciary authorities on him, as well as his so-called right to pronounces laws. He declares his a monopoly in legislation without a requirement to obey these. The authority of the clergy and nobility is restricted by the monarch, the former privileges of collecting taxes, deciding for its own account, and initiatives in the judiciary were alleged to be transferred to the central authority, by

Poggi and pierson. Now it was the monarch that can give titles and appoint. Personal character of the official relations began to be based on *status* relations in that respect. *Poulettes* example was named as an archaic experience in France. Moreover the monarch could bestow the property right and was responsible for protecting it. Legitimization problem comes to the scene with the theme of the "rise of the public" and the thoughtful decisions of the enlightened despots of 17$^{th}$ -18$^{th}$ centuries in commitment with the Renaissance thoughts. Bureaucrats like the monarchs worked for the common good now; no more for their own interests.

Since the Ottoman post-16$^{th}$ century is identified with the decay of the classical age, the relations between "the center and the periphery" is turned to a "rupture" from the old harmony and unity in the analyses of Mardin, Heper and Keyder.  The sudden 'unlucky' fall of Ottoman power was explained with the change of routes, rise in population, demise of tımar and the tax-system. *Iltizam* practice resulted in the rise of the *ayan*s, which led the political system to decentralization. But these new actors of the play were accused of "being no real threats" to the center as in the "Western" sense (Mardin, 1975), they could not institute counter-hegemonical bases. (Keyder, 2008) The duality between the civil servants and the periphery are observed in the cultural products by Mardin, whose values were the most influensive country-wide. The political power's usage as a social leverage was looked down. (Mardin, 1986) Status was the first indicator of the income; politicians were the premiers of the society. (Mardin, 1967) Janissaries having trade rights were the discerned grounds for the decay in the Ottoman army. (Heper, 1974)

The sudden will of a prince to be the power is a description without any explananda. Why did this happen in those particular centuries, why this one gained prominence but not the other feudal lords, why did he decide to be the most powerful all of a sudden, did not he have it before? The answers of these questions are left without answers. Likewise the processes like the becoming monopolies in the areas of legislation, implementation and judiciary or in the exercise of the coercive power are not tried to be understood, either. The key here is to understand these incidents as the particular results of the power struggles of that age. The spatial-temporal specificity can show why that claim for superiority gained weight but not the other. It must be the more effective project this prince had executed. The entire mythical framework presented by Poggi and Pierson carries the tone used by these very monarchs to claim for their legitimacy.

"Absolutism" was a political project suggested by the thinkers of the age, which tried to solve the problem of legitimacy with a circular way as also taken as if the reality by Poggi and Pierson. The theses of the enlightened bystanders of the monarchs had been also applied in terms of policies. But as a term it does not really answer a question about what really happened there. The ideal could and did not be achieved fully, either. (Shulze, 2005) (Davies, 2004)

It should be noted that in the 13$^{th}$ to 15$^{th}$ centuries the legal and educational posts were held by the clerics in many parts of the Europe parallel to the tasks undertaken by the Ottoman ulema. As in the estates system the posts in the palace or parliments were the privileges nobility ran after. Then the sole reasoning for the rise of power was the mytical collection of the estates, i. e. the lands given with the privilege, in the hands of the monarch. "The new sense of life" in the even in the power relations of the 14$^{th}$ -15$^{th}$ centuries could not be enough for the classification of the polities under early modern states. (Gerstenbrger, 2007)

This resembles the Ottoman Sultan presumed to own everything, much before the terms of ownership or possession were pronounced in more or less closer meanings with their contemporary versions. The *ideal-type* for the patrimonial rule assumes such a phase in the work of Max Weber, which was historically tied to several French examples of monarchial re-appropriation or this time full appropriation of the land due to losses of powers of some feudal figures with wars of religion and peasant revolutions. (Weber, 1978) Not different than the kul system, besides this part of Ottoman experience was appreciated in some circles in France in the time of Tocqueville parallel to the criticisms of "enlightened despots" under the arguments of the absolutism (Salzmann, 2004), European patrimonialism was bounded to the new system of status, as the bases of political offices. (Weber, 1978) As Ellen M. Wood defines, the changed system of dominant appropriation was even a political one. (Wood, 2002)

Gerstenberger inserted the term ancien regime in her analysis, hence the wish to avoid *anachronism* of "modernization revisionist" authors. İt is the same 16$^{th}$ to 18$^{th}$ centuries that cuddled the estates groups, the shift towards the dominance of seigneurial appropriation in the further relations and a monarch came with a claim for generalizing his system widespread. Feudalism lost the personal character as the warfare lost its feudal character. The reorganization of the system of agricultural appropriation was done through the generalization of judiciary and market spheres

under the relatively same systems or rules and integration of the aristocratic rule into this structure. Moreover the former customs and the oppressive weight of seigneurs were formalized. (Gerstenberger, 2007) The generalization and formalization of some customary implementations have all realized through different series of struggles and temporary agreements; thus they cannot and should not be merely reduced to the centralist extension of the reality. Also these conflicts and reconciliations should not be limited with those between the elites.

Against Anderson's "crisis of feudalism" theses Gerstenberger refers to seigneurial appropriation that strengthened the noble estates and guaranteed structural positioning of the feudal lords. Additionally the local and rather central organizations of the authority structure of the rule, which are suggested to be theorized over power blocs, are based on the "temporary agreements" reached. They did not mean that the absolutism and decentralization intentions cease creating grounds for conflicts.

The debates about Ottoman decentralization are brought forward with the so-called stagnation period. It is not typically envisaged that the Ottoman country was subjected to a centralizing effort, moreover an absolutist agenda between $15^{th}$ to $16^{th}$ centuries in the "state tradition" theses, but none of Mardin, Heper or Keyder would deny that the classical period was a more or less a successfully centralized period. But from $16^{th}$ century onwards the changes in the land regime, such as the collection of taxes in kind, the rental and ownership relations in progress and the reorganization of this new tax-regime firstly by new cadres in provincial bases. (Khoury, 2002) No more the *vassals* but the *kuls* of the Ottoman emperor were going to be ruled by provincial bureaucrats henceforth. (Tezcan, 2009) Was the Ottoman state so centralized so far, or can a feudal king manage that with the technology of these epochs?[45]

These land lords of the age accumulated wealth and men around them are supposed to have more say than the Sultan, comparably to the times when military success was unquestionable and old responsible groups for tax were predicted to be passive against the peasants due to the Sultan's power. Two deceptive thoughts should be repeated here: Initially, tımar begs must have a relatively more weight in

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[45] For further thoughts of the Ottoman historians on the possibility to talk about the centralized Ottoman reality, see: (Çorlu, 1999)

the rural edges of the provinces. Maybe Ottoman *payitaht* had a traumatic perception of threat; still the generalization of the conditions was not be enough to create a pressure neither in the 16th or 18th centuries as it was expected. Probably the Ottoman monarch never planned such an exstensive control as Mardin or Heper had imagined. But when the level of technology and hardship of a campaign must have enabled central authorities to condone some behaviors accepted to be out of line or made them even to settle for more autonomy in some cases. (Abou-El Haj, 1991)

Decentralization was equalized with the unsuccessful efforts of the central elites according to the "state tradition" premises. The 16th to 18th centuries' process rendered to be the heart of many recent Ottoman studies, as being the source of transformations. With the perspectives on the feudal characters of *tımariot* soldiers and Sureiyya Farouqhi's disapproval of "economic stagnation" theses, this period is enabled to think together with the European cases of the same age. Ottoman patrimonialism was in advance in the 15th century with the first attempts to encourage a growing agricultural surplus, coincides with the establishment of the devshirme system. The specificity of Kanuni age was the consolidation of the system and its gaining dominance. But the implementation until that day brought about the shifts towards payments in kind –also related to a general fiscallization-, making the provincial nobility to gaining a retro-weight in the top of the governmental structure reveal how the power relations.

### 3.3.3. Fast Steps Towards the End-Forms (18th to 20th centuries) and Their Critique

The "Western" histories claimed that the state would evolve in such a way that the political institutions will be the extensions or refined versions of the absolutist institutions in principle. The claim must have been found enough what to legitimize a comparison between the descriptions of the *ideal-types* of absolutism and modern state. The central bureaucracy reaches to *legal-rational* criteria, regular army becomes more rationalized and disciplined than ever, a widespread network of taxation regime had gained unified character, diplomatic services with an increasing complexity in its organization and functions had spread due to worldwide relations of

the countries and the state had been a more talented master in promoting the commerce and development. The modern state alone is pictured with the qualities of constitutionalism, a systematized idea of citizenship, established relationships between the civil society and the state, the certainly non-personal power, the absolute monopoly of the state on the use of force, a relatively more public bureaucracy and the recognized sovereignty of the central political authority on land within particular borders.

This picture was maintained through the 17$^{th}$ -19$^{th}$ century conflicts which had limited and balanced the absolutist king and transformed the state accordingly. The rise of the public was institutionalized as the parliamentary and cabinet activities. The opposition was legitimized, elections were introduced and with the introduction of the political parties liberal democracy was complete. The prominence of bourgeois and middle classes are also stressed here, but while theorizing they can be summarized as part of society or civil society. Perhaps these classes and their opposition have already been carried to the institutional level and the sphere of political interests and conflicts are undertaken by a political society. (Poggi, 1998) (Pierson, 2000)

The 18$^{th}$ to 20$^{th}$ centuries are rather dynamically pictured in the Ottoman historiographies of the state. The Western development was acknowledged and many of the ordinary and naturally developed experiences of the contemporary European countries were tried to be copied as measures against the forthcoming collapse in the name of reform movements. In that respect the reformer Sultans or pashas are appreciated for trying to reassure the old centralized stately being. Any social movement against them are considered as reactionary, manifesting the prominence of traditional military institutions and/or religious fundamentalism. Both the state and the urban and provincial groups living breaches away from the state/bureaucratic elites/classes were guilty. Reform in the direction of Western reforms was perceived as a positive step in the name of the political elites but the furthering of the interventionist policies appear unacceptable for the scholars of the "state tradition". It is again the same state that prevented the people to create oppositional foci to limit the Sultan in parallels prevented the people to develop their entrepreneurial and profit-centered instincts. Even when they opened the country to the full control of the market dictations, these bureaucratic elites were following their so-called "class-based" interests and were condemned. The Ottoman people are also guilty, because

they were unable to offer counter-arguments for counter-hegemonic movements. As a result, the top-down reformed Ottoman state could not get close to the European counterparts and created its own peculiar, "neo-patrimonial" power, which could not prevent the empire's demise. The spirit of the Ottoman "state tradition" and the motives of the political elites are alleged to persist in the Republican era.

The European experience in these centuries were quite colorful and rich in terms of socio-political activities and historically significant all other daily events despite its less emphasis by the "modernization revisionists": The revolutions, street fights, first claims on the superiority of people's will, protests, first parliamentary attempts for a relatively democratic decision-making, strikes, group-based intellectual and long-lasting movements or in the less chaotic appearing setting hard-conditioned lives of the peasants and/or urban workers… Eventually all these deserved the mention at least; and a placement within a historical integrity.

The alternative histories here review these processes over the debates to understand the historicity of the tools of periodization; especially of those referred to be the end-forms. The European histories for the alternative views firstly problematized capitalist transformation. As Wood argues, the scene for investigating distinctively capitalist dynamics should be the rural appropriation processes of the agricultural surplus in the first hand. (Wood; 1991; I)  Gerstenberger draws attention to how the feudal rule was reproduced in the ancient regime; with the displacement of the tensions in terms of the politico-legal coercion towards the relations within vertical dimensions and the seigneurial domination was completely transferred to the agricultural production through tax-farming mechanisms. Moers stresses that the absolutist project was involved in the tax-farming processes directly, in that respect execution of the monarchial power relations had changed. This also might have brought relative advantage for the monarchial sovereignty bases, which positioned itself as a "neutral apparatus". For peasants the early conflicts between the lords and the monarch on the share of the revenues should illustrate the image of the monarch to a relatively more adventegous position against their first level exploiter. (Moers, 1991)

However the widening network of the central bureaucracy also would give the picture that the legal and official tools for appropriation were materialized in the structures of civil servants. The shaping of the mechanisms however were embodied in relation to the demands and pressures partial authorities exert for the restriction of

the areas of influence the representatives of central authority might entail. Regimes of appropriation are thus quite effective in the organization of the political instances of the local setting.

Rising of the prices and fiscallization due to the gold coming from Americas are considered to be the initiators of the increasing European trade potential in the 15<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> centuries according to the commercialization theorists. The swelling "opportunities" for importation, are explained to bring accelerated dynamics to the agricultural productivity, which triggered a series of developments like towards the transformation of the tax-system in kind and making it the dominant source of extracting income for the polities of the age by the end 16<sup>th</sup> century. (Moers, 1991)

The rise of prices and the introduction of the legitimized formulas for heritability, proposed more advantageous grounds for also the more ordinary peasant families enabling considerable accumulations of wealth and profit from the market "opportunities". Also for the bourgeois-like groups fiscalization conveyed "an area for maneuver" to balance the degree of dependence to the monarch. Money to become the new satisfactory element for the demands alone, wealth became not the result but also the "new prospect to confirm status." But this material that came with the winds of "freedom and choice" could turn to a trap with the risk of debt. To avoid this risk one had to learn the ongoing ways to make profits and enlarge the income in respect to the raising amounts of expenditure. This can be regarded as the central imperative of the capitalism, and the small the history of how it conquered the lives of people from diverse backgrounds gradually. Capitalism enforced people to walk in the same direction with its cogwheels are making their roundabout; and if one cannot keep up with its speed, he/she were convicted to be expelled from the material conditions of its existence. (Moers, 1991) (Wood, 1991; I)

One striking debate is about the introduction of the capitalist state. One question is about if the transition was given birth through the bourgeois revolutions. Against the idea of revolutions that ripped away the chains avoiding commercial freedom (Anderson, 1974), Wood's thesis is that these only worked for the introduction of modern nation states in the beginning, not yet for the full account of a capitalist state. The path towards that capitalist state she draws is worth reviewing. (Wood, 1991; I)

As mentioned before in this chapter as well, she delineates the pre-modern political atmosphere with a contended "fragmented" reality and a "parcellized

sovereignty"; reassuring political turmoil. This view on the feudal ages underscores the hierarchical relationships between vassals and their superiors of the age. The vertical relations need not be one-sided, which means one vassal had the dues to pay more than one superiors or the feudal prince could have another superior as well. And these relations should not be theorized with the contemporary thoughts on the ways of political organizations with clear borders and relatively more obvious central-national character. (Davies, 2006) Moreover even when the same fragments were generalized in the means of political rule likened to be one particular center in the future; the heritage of these fragments did not disappear instead was recreated as "new wines in old bottles".

The use rights of land reorganized in the forms of rents was holding now the very tenants be subjected to the problems and the outputs of the cultivation rather than the big land owners of holding property rights or alike in the 17th century. These tenants were due to the market conditions from the beginning to the end of their relations with the land lords or owners; with the widening threat of the exclusion from the market and loss of land, the goal to create more profitable conditions were about to become an imperative. The bosses had focused more on the further appropriation of land for increasing the bases of profit and the opportunity in the beginning would be bounded to the more entrenching market conditions, the rush for land went on in different continents for their searches for relative "freedom and opportunities" world wide. But the world also had some limits. The monarchs on the other hand was promising to provide the oppressive elements the stabilization of the circumstances their enterprises are built in. (Wood; 1991; I,II,III)

This provincial system was not the dominant organizing principle still, going hand in hand with seigneurial appropriation based much on noble networks of dues, rents and the tax of the center coexisted as the squeezing burden on the serfs, wage-workers or even on the living conditions of the dispossessed and/or slaves. Peasantry revolutions were not surprises in that respect, but these could only bring about a step forward for the bourgeoisie allied with urban and rural groups of the exploited. Post-revolutionary process could not bring an end to these multiplicity of different dictates in the organization of the surplus appropriation; but legal impositions might enforce the status-based relations to dissolve and reorganized in terms of a more efficient and productive versions of a rural order. The bourgeoisie was more interested in its class interests on political participation and their structural integration of the system; the

universalist discourse during the revolution would be furthered until their limitless access to the political appropriation could be maintained. Thus they were the ones now integrated within the system with an enlarging contribution to the dominant surplus extracting mechanisms closely tied with the former one: The commerce and the petty-industry. The political response of such integration can be said to come with the revolution: now without barriers they could take part in the provincial and central power blocs, as the constituent and leading member; furthermore. (Wood; 1991; I)

In the Napoleonic, restorational and Bonapartist period's French state for instance, the governments were eventually entangled with the capitalist requirements and searched the solution in the imperialistic agendas. Their demise enabled recent prospects of newer blocs for populist democratization attempts and coming about with policies for private accumulation and growth. In the end state appeared to lose its "parasitistic" tendencies and went toward the liberal state. The the history towards a capitalist form can be ended here; when referring to Wood. (Wood; 1991; III)


## 3.4. CONCLUSION


This thesis proposes that two groups of contemporarily valid and academically dominant state theories from "peculiarly distinct" cultural backgrounds can be thought together in the wake of a need of an alternative theory. In an age when change is prescribed due to the historical and inevitable structuration of the political, and the suggested *ideal-type* regarding to the end-form draws a similar picture for the favorable state of the day; it is a meaningful attempt to evaluate the theories in relations with each other.

When looking at the examples of historical pieces towards the "modern state" or the "strong traditional state"; firstly the theoretical and methodological commonalities are tried to be investigated. Then the study puts forward each author's stance within this background. Lastly this elaboration is blended with the alternative theses to open paths for the new visions for many historical instances and mechanisms and formulizing them in terms of a state theory.

The history of the "West" is imagined as the sum of instances towards a becoming (i.e. centralization of power and monopolization of the use of force at one hand towards the modern state) and constructed as a universal criteria stemming from the heritage of social thought (i.e. absolutism, constitutionalism, or liberal democracy). These are taken upon as forms of *ideal-types*. Borrowing the term and the claim/will to set these as objective criteria from Weber; not only Poggi and pierson but also Mardin, Heper and Keyder appear to rely on a normative "ideal". This stance can be traced in the determinism, culturalism and the loss of context in the "Western" historiographies. These are typical aspects of modernization theories, even though some of these five authors do not directly dedicated to; but all carry these impacts of that methodological stand point.

Culturalism is complemented with the idea of political development of the "rest". The elaboration of the Ottoman-Turkish the history and the end-form of state are made with more or less the same world of meanings taken from the "Western" *ideal-type*. Compared to that "Western" *ideal-type* the Ottoman state-tradition after the 16<sup>th</sup> century is simply a "non-formation" against the required characteristics of the European version.

Ottoman state is identified with some kind of a "tradition", which also enabled the Ottoman heritage to be evaluated under its peculiar "*ideal-type*" in the classical age. Moreover this perception of state in that age contains an idealistic dimension, in a normative sense, as well. The so-called Ottoman bureaucratic elites and the subjects were assumed to have reached an agreement, as if the monarchs had full legitimacy and the people had full consent on the system. Just like the "Western" world was presumed to achieve from the 16<sup>th</sup> century onwards, Ottomans were accepted to find a "true" formula of their times before that 16<sup>th</sup> century. In other words the cultural criteria of *the ideal-type* could not be met after the 16<sup>th</sup> century; with the assumed shift of weight in the power relations and the criteria of the idealized characteristics for a stately being.

Before all, such a categorization does make the contemporary theories of state limited, inexact and inconsistent from time to time. Moreover the conditions making out the *ideal-type* and its qualities appear to point out the authoritarian aspects of the state. At least the meaning of the political is reduced the free circulation of thoughts and the struggles; in which realistic account the inequalities are accepted but appear naïve when these conditions are called as democratic without

caring about the quality of the judgement.These qualities actually belong to the nature attributed to the market. The intrinsic problem of this perspective to be studied in another work, the way of its portrayal sets about a view at the the history; which was one in motion once; but as if it stopped today. One other reason for this appearance is the removal of the economic and/or social incidents such as daily personal or group struggles until the revolutionary and/protesting versions away from the theorization of the *ideal-type* of the political.  In that way the "western" *ideal-type* presupposes the legitimacy of the given end-form; furthermore seems to demand such a rational and inevitable *social contract* to be reproduced.

The "modern state" theorists Poggi and Pierson take the political development of the West as an incidental but inevitable success of the Western powers. The state tradition scholars find the strong, intervensionist, suppressive and protective Ottoman-Turkish state guilty of all absences. Moreover analyses also exhibit an over emphasis on the state as a subject of inquiry.

The theorizations of the transformation from *feudalism* to *absolutism* and its transition to *modern state* are quite thought-provoking. Paralells it is the disintegration of the *ideal-typical* Ottoman system, which was paid more attention in the state tradition theses. And a harmony is defined between the state and society in the *classical age*.

At that point the academicians picturing a political theory within a "modernization revisionist" perspective do give praise to a particular understanding of the the history and the state; as well as the scholars of "state tradition". Alhough personally the authors might be against a suppressive state; their theses result in an understanding that might promote the authoritarian characteristics. The qualities of the state and its becoming point to unquestionable, inevitable and coincidental (fortunately or unfortunately) sequence of events and cultural properties.

The author of this work cannot accept the horizon given by the "modernization revisionism" and "state tradition"; since they appear to be imprisoning the people of earth to a cursed existence. Not to forget the inclination of the the history to choose today's flow of the events among all other possibilities via the productions of the people; these mainstream theses on the the history and the state theory should not be accepted so easily; moreover they should be questioned both in the name of academic and political responsibility. Only in that way it could

be possible to reach some alternative theories of state or to keep the dreams for a world of another kind alive.

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