

**“DOWNWARD INTEGRATION” OF THE THIRD GENERATION IN THE  
TURKISH COMMUNITY IN A SMALL GERMAN TOWN: A CASE STUDY IN  
GOSLAR**

**A THESIS SUBMITTED TO  
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES  
OF  
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY**

**BY**

**Fuat GÜLLÜPINAR**

**IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS  
FOR  
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY  
IN  
THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY**

**DECEMBER 2010**

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

---

Prof. Dr. Meliha ALTUNIŐIK  
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology.

---

Prof. Dr. Ayőe SAKTANBER  
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully  
adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in  
Sociology.

---

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Helga RITTERSBERGER TILIÇ

Examining Committee Members

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Helga RITTERSBERGER TILIÇ (METU, SOC.) \_\_\_\_\_  
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ceylan TOKLUOĐLU (METU, SOC.) \_\_\_\_\_  
Assist.Prof. Dr. Çağatay TOPAL (METU, SOC.) \_\_\_\_\_  
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Mehmet OKYAYUZ (METU, PS.) \_\_\_\_\_  
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Tahire ERMAN (BILKENT, PS.) \_\_\_\_\_

**I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.**

Name, Last Name: Fuat GÜLLÜPİNAR

Signature :

## ABSTRACT

### “DOWNWARD INTEGRATION” OF THE THIRD GENERATION IN THE TURKISH COMMUNITY IN A SMALL GERMAN TOWN: A CASE STUDY IN GOSLAR

Güllüpnar, Fuat

Ph.D., Department of Sociology

Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Helga Rittersberger Tılıç

December 2010, 638 pages

The study examines the recent transformations of integration policies and citizenship laws in Germany with a special focus on the experience of the children of Turkish immigrants in Goslar, a small town. By following “civic stratification thesis,” it argues that the conditions and restrictions differentiated by different migrant categories and rights regarding entry, family reunification, welfare benefits, and labor market access go along with a particular legal status of those admitted migrants create hierarchy of stratified rights. Thus, this work suggests that the nature of the citizenship in Germany remains deeply *‘differentiated’*, *‘exclusive’* and *‘hierarchical’*. It argues that the children of Turkish immigrants have experienced downward integration and their upward integration is yet limited in Goslar/Germany regarding labor market and education. The results of the field study in Goslar had shown that more than group characteristics like social and cultural capital, structural and institutional factors (laws, government policy, citizenship regime and context of reception of Germany) could have a decisive role in promoting or hampering the educational and labor market integration and social mobility of young immigrants and the native-born second and third generation. In this context, the youth also seem to continue the celebration of ancestral origins of their religion and ethnicity, though in symbolic but reactionary ways. Regarding this study, the question for third or the next generation is not whether integration will take place, but to what

extent and to what segment of German society will integrate them. In other words, for children of Turkish immigrants, the question is no longer whether to stay or return but how to secure permanent spaces for their intercultural skills and identities.

**Keywords:** downward integration, hierarchical citizenship, civic stratification, children of Turkish immigrants, reactive identity formation, Goslar/Germany, Turkish-Muslim immigrant organizations.

## ÖZ

### BİR ALMAN KASABASINDA ÜÇÜNCÜ KUŞAK TÜRK TOPLULUĞUNUN “AŞAĞIYA DOĞRU ENTEGRASYONU”: GOSLAR’DA BİR SAHA ÇALIŞMASI

Güllüpnar, Fuat

Doktora, Sosyoloji Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi:

Doç. Dr. Helga Rittersberger Tılıç

Aralık 2010, 638 sayfa

Bu çalışma küçük bir kasaba olan Goslar’daki Türk göçmenlerinin çocuklarının deneyimlerine odaklanarak, Almanya’daki entegrasyon politikaları ve yurttaşlık yasalarındaki dönüşümleri sorgulamaktadır. “Tabakalı yurttaşlık” tezini takip eden bu çalışma, kabul edilmiş göçmenlere özel olarak düzenlenmiş yasaların yanında emek piyasası, sosyal yardım ve aile birleşmesi açısından farklılaştırılmış yasal statülerin ve göçmen kategorilerinin, tabakalaşmış hakların hiyerarşisini yarattığını ileri sürmektedir. Sonuç olarak, bu çalışma, Almanya’da yurttaşlığın doğasının hala “ayırıcı,” “dışlayıcı,” ve “hiyerarşik” olmaya devam ettiğini iddia etmektedir. Bu çalışma açısından sorun, üçüncü veya sonraki kuşakların entegrasyonun gerçekleşip gerçekleşmeyeceği değil, bu entegrasyonun Alman toplumunun hangi kesiminde ve hangi ölçüde gerçekleşeceği. Yani, Türk göçmenlerinin çocukları için sorun artık Almanya’da kalmaları ya da Türkiye’ye dönüp dönmeyecekleri değil, onların kültürler arası yetenekleri ve kimliklerinin güvenli bir şekilde yaşayabileceği alanların nasıl oluşturulacağıdır. Goslar’daki Türk göçmenlerinin çocuklarının çoğunlukla emek piyasası ve eğitim göstergeleri açısından yukarı doğru entegrasyonun oldukça sınırlı kaldığını ve çoğunlukla aşağıya doğru entegrasyonu (downward integration) deneyimlediklerini ortaya koymaktadır. Goslar’daki alan araştırmasının sonuçlarına dayanılarak, ikinci ve üçüncü kuşak gençlerin eğitim ve emek piyasasına entegrasyonun ve sosyal

hareketliliğinin desteklenmesi veya engellenmesi konusunda, onların sosyal ve kültürel sermaye gibi grup özelliklerinden ziyade, yapısal ve kurumsal faktörlerin (yasa, hükümet politikaları, yurttaşlık pratikleri ve göç alan ülkenin kabul etme koşullarının) geniş bir şekilde etkili olduğu düşünülmektedir. Buna karşılık olarak, bu gençler sembolik ve tepkisel biçimlerde olsa da, ebeveynlerinin dini ve etnik kimlik referanslarını benimsemeye devam etmektedir.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Aşağıya doğru entegrasyon, hiyerarşik yurttaşlık, tabakalı yurttaşlık, Türk göçmen çocukları, tepkisel kimlik oluşumu, Goslar/Almanya, Türk-Müslüman göçmen organizasyonları.

**TO MY MOTHER**



## ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This is a cooperative work in which I only try to express my ideas and opinions by giving some part of my life (6 years). Many have contributed to this dissertation. Although I cannot list all contributors, I would like to acknowledge the support of the many people and institutions who have contributed in different ways to the completion of this dissertation. Without the combined intellectual, emotional, and financial support I received from mentors, colleagues, friends, and family I would never finish this project.

First and foremost, I would like to thank my advisor Helga Rittersberger Tılıç for her support and encouragement, patience and invaluable contributions. She closely followed and influenced the evolution of this dissertation from designing the proposal to multiple readings of various drafts. She encouraged me to engage with different theoretical perspectives. My advisor, Helga hoca, reviewed and corrected countless drafts of various papers and gave me excellent professional and personal advice in every stage of the process beginning with my decision to pursue a Ph.D. Also, I would like to thank the members of my dissertation committee, Tahire Erman, Mehmet Okyayuz, Ceylan Tokluoğlu, and Cağatay Topal because of providing encouragement and constructive criticism, when it was necessary.

Middle East Technical University, Max Planck Institute and TÜBİTAK are very valuable institutions who financially supported me in this process. I firstly thank Middle East Technical University, Department of Sociology who provided opportunities for interaction with exceptional colleagues, which has not only affected this research but has also provided a social network for future collaboration and friendship.

Max Planck Institute for Social Ethnography in Halle/Saale provided remarkable resources for field research. Here, I have to especially refer to Professor Peter Finke who gave me such opportunity by accepting and introducing me to the institute. The very first step of this empirical research started with his generous invitation, hospitality and

companionship in Halle. Especially, I would like to thank the director of the institute, Günther Schlee, Meltem Sancak (Peter's wife), Tuba, Zlatina Bogdonova for their friendship and Armin Pippel and Oliver for their technical assistance in Max Planck Institute. I want to also thank Zeynep Sariaslan for accompanying me in Goslar for a short period and interviewing with some Turkish girls there. Melahat Abla transcribed most of the interviews and deserves cordial thanks for her professional and serious transcription.

The outstanding person who provided me very crucial assistant and invaluable contributions in writing process in Princeton was my friend, Agnes Sherman. I would like to thank Agnes, for her very helpful comments, directions, questions, answers, reading materials. Of all, I am in debt for your generous friendship and warm hospitality. Indeed, without Agnes, my wife and I would become very poor about Princeton and America. However, she was always with us in our America adventure. She provided us a dozen maps, magazines, newspapers, articles, etc. for my dissertation and also for our America tour. I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Agnes for her invaluable contribution to this dissertation by reading and correcting the whole English text.

Indeed, this dissertation was written in Princeton during my scholarly visit to Princeton University, Department of Sociology and Center of Migration and Development. Sociology department and Center of Migration and Development provided a healthy working environment and opportunity to obtain feedback on the ideas presented in this dissertation while I was still writing it. I am very much impressed by my supervisor in U. S, Professor Patricia Fernandez-Kelly and her husband Alejandro Portes who always responded to my questions with a mixture of patience, enthusiasm and candor that warrants recognition. I will not forget Professor Fernandez-Kelly's humor, fraternity and companionship. As being Mexican origin, she always showed her close interest as a kind of "third world solidarity," as she said.

I have to thank the community of Princeton University Graduate School who organized weekly ‘events’ which gave me valuable opportunity to participate in activities around campus, providing a break from my study and gave opportunity to be outside. Huge thanks also go to our departmental secretary, Nancy Doolan, my office friends, emeritus Professor Walter Wallace, Dr. Isabel Marin, Dr. Sonia Parella and Marc Sabadi for their warm and close friendships. Departmental Professors Miguel Centeno, Marta Tienda, Mitchell Duneier, Scott Lynch, Ana Maria Goldani, Paul DiMaggio, Martin Ruef and his wife, and Devah Pager were always supportive and friendly which contribute to family atmosphere of the department.... and other people around the department Barbara Lynch, Cyntia, Donna (departmental secretaries), and Jay Barnes (computer technician), and Tilly (Mexican cleaner). I will not forget departmental parties which were organized regularly and I am very happy to meet and benefit very much from two German scholars Professor Karen Schönwalder and Dr. Janina Söhn in their short visit to Princeton. Thanks also go to graduate students Jim Gibbon, Rene, Erik, Alejandro Rivas, and Chizuru Ishuda, Japanese Professor from Nanzan university. Of course, I cannot forget the classmates and audits, Laticia, John, Lenore and Mangi. Especially, audits Lenore (72) and Mangi (74) showed me that learning cannot be related to age. It is endless process. And thanks for your smile and fraternity during the class, Race and Ethnicity. I also thank Gözde, because, she kindly directed us about Turkish mechanics, shopping centers, restaurants, cafes, parking places in Princeton, when we first met in public library as a result of her kind attempt.

Throughout the fieldwork stage of this dissertation, the town of Goslar and its Turkish immigrant organizations and municipal youth centers provided me with a welcoming community and friends. I cannot say that I was away from home in Germany. Especially, I would like to thank Ali Göktaş for his first welcome in Goslar, which motivated me to stay there. I need to thank Sylvia and Eric for opening their house and hospitality for a couple of weeks in Berlin.

Coşkun (Taştan) taught me how important and central to have questions for any research. I have learnt a lot from him but especially this motto: question is the heart of any researches. He has never failed to offer fresh and thoughtful advice in my most trying moments and has always been there to talk despite the fact that we have spent a good many of our recent years on separate places. I want to also thank my friend, Mezher Yüksel (Mazar) for his giving permanent motivation during the writing process of the dissertation. Also, I want to thank my friend, Kadir Güneytepe, because I knew that he is there for his immediate and kind help for technical issues, whenever it is necessary.

Of course, this dissertation has been sustained by emotional support that each members of my family and friends have provided me. My mother and elder sister Dilek gave me love and support during the process but also I have to express my special thanks to my nephew, Koray, for his thoughtful support by typing some notes. I sincerely hope that he can manage to attend university and further academic stages. Of course, I am thankful to my family who have permanently supported me during the long education years: my mother, Yasemin, Ünsal, Soner, Mehmet and Hülya.

Acar, Hatem, Fatih (Taştan) Zafer, Miki Him, Gaye, Latife, Çiğdem, Atakan, Meral, Fabio Salomoni, Zerrin, Özgür (Sarı and Bal), Aksu, Önder, Alper, Elif, Selda, İrem, Alaaddin, Başak, Besim, Aylin, Gökhan (Topçu and Gökulu), Özlem (Çirli, Lökçü and Altunsu), Görkem, Berat, Berkay, Zeki, Feyaz, Şafak, Sanem, Ozan, Yıldırım, Yusuf, Murat, Tunca, Tülin, Gaye & Özay, Meltem, Mehtap, Sanem, Figen, Eylem and valuable others (that I don't remember here) I would like to thank our departmental graduate students of each (between 2005-2010), for their close and warm friendship.

Qualitative research of this kind is dependent on trust and generosity of strangers. I cannot finish without thanking the permanent residents and naturalized citizens in Goslar who shared their thoughts, opinions and experiences for the gift of their time and insight. Immigrant organizations and youth centers played a major role in helping me locate

potential informants. I am especially grateful to the members of immigrant organizations that provided time to talk about my project, advice on locating informants, meeting spaces, and gracious hospitality: Ali Göktaş, Bedir Boyraz, Mesut, İbiş, Sibel, Elfida, Çetin, Kadir, Memo, Oğuz, Ozan, Bülent, Tuncer, İsmet, Reşo, Abdurahman amca, Fikret Özdemir, Hanım Abla, Mahmut, Ahmet, Fatih, Christina, Giovanni, Susan, and Ömer. Thanks also go to Gökşen, Yasemin, Esmâ, my Nigerian friend Akala, Russian friends Alex and Inga Kravchik, for their enjoyable companionship in Goslar and in German and integration course of Volkshochschule. I cordially thank to my German teachers Frau Giesecke and Herr.Yalçın for their sincere efforts.

Steven Brieger was a high school training student when we first met in Jugendzentrum Gleis 95 in Oker. At that time, he wrote me a very successful brief about Turkish youth in Goslar from German perspective and I benefited from it very much. He is now a very successful university student in Lüneberg. He sent me lots of data, statistics and information about Goslar. I feel myself very chanceful because of having such a friend. Thank you Steven for your all contributions and I believe we will collaborate many projects in the future.

I would like to thank our landlady Professor Jeannie Brooks-Gunn in Hopewell because of her thoughtful help and close manner. She provided us very comfortable and peaceful environment in Hopewell with her marvelous house in wood. I feel extremely lucky because of living such a lovely place where I have completed the dissertation. Buddy, a lovely dog-friend, was always with us by playing around, walking, running and lying on this natural place.

Last but not least, my wife, Özlem more than anyone else, has had to live with its (and my) ups and downs. For helping in work, typing huge notes, drawing graphs, and everything in between, I thank her with all my heart.

Of course, in acknowledging the many contributors to this dissertation, I want to say that I am solely responsible for its mistakes.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM.....	iii
ABSTRACT.....	iv
ÖZ.....	vi
DEDICATION.....	viii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	ix
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	xiv
LIST OF TABLES.....	xix
ABBREVIATIONS.....	xxi

### CHAPTERS

#### 1. INTRODUCTION, THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

1.1. Introduction.....	1
1.2. Basic Research Questions.....	11
1.3. Civic Stratification and Differential Exclusionism in Goslar/Germany.....	14
1.4. Citizenship Matters.....	22
1.5. Local, National and Global Contexts also Matter.....	29
1.6. The Distinction between Formal and Substantial Citizenship.....	30
1.7. Why Integration? .....	39
1.8. Assimilationist Paradigm of Integration in Germany .....	42
1.9. “Segmented Integration” and “Divided Fates” of Children of Turkish Immigrants in Goslar.....	43
1.10. Restructuring Global Economy: Welfare Chauvinism as an Emergence of the New Right.....	49
1.11. German <i>Leitkultur</i> as a Hatred View of Other (Immigrant) Cultures.....	51
1.12. Reactive Identity Formation.....	55

1.13.	Youth Centers: between Violence and Normalization .....	58
1.14.	Turkish Youth in the Labor Market and Education .....	60
1.15.	Turkish-Muslim Immigrant Organizations .....	65
1.16.	On Methodology.....	70
1.17.	Macro-Meso-Micro Levels in Extended Case Method .....	74
1.18.	Overview of the Chapters .....	80

**2. CIVIC STRATIFICATION, HIERARCHICAL CITIZENSHIP AND DIFFERENTIAL EXCLUSIONISM IN GERMANY**

2.1.	Introduction.....	87
2.2.	Categorically Unequal: The Logic and Structure of Citizenship in the Nation-state.....	89
2.3.	The Postwar Process of Germany.....	107
2.4.	Civic Stratification: Different Layers of Rights and Discriminating Channels of Access.....	112
2.4.1.	Constructing a Tight Control and Selection Mechanism.....	113
2.4.2.	The Practice of Management through Civic Stratification .....	116
2.4.3.	Control through Civic Stratification.....	132
2.5.	The Uniqueness of the Guest Worker Incorporation: German Differential Exclusionism.....	134
2.6.	Immigrants and Citizenship: Methodological Principles of the Civic Stratification Analysis .....	143

**3. THE CONSEQUENCES OF CIVIC STRATIFICATION AND DIFFERENTIAL EXCLUSIONISM IN GERMANY**

3.1.	Ethnic Germans ( <i>Aussiedler</i> ).....	153
3.2.	“The Blacks” of Germany: Turks .....	161
3.3.	The Unhappy Marriage between Europeans and TCNs: Family Reunification.....	170

3.4. Special Context of Germany.....	176
3.4.1. The Increasing Visibility of Islam and Its Integration Problems through Family Reunification.....	186
3.4.2. A Phased Access to Success: the Labor Market .....	191
3.4.3. “The Boat Is Full or the Welfare System” .....	199
3.4.4. Downward Integration in the Labor Market .....	206
3.5. Conclusion: Lessons and Recommendations .....	217
<b>4. CHILDREN OF IMMIGRANTS IN GOSLAR: BETWEEN OPPORTUNITIES AND DISCRIMINATION STUCK IN CIVIC STRATIFICATION</b>	
4.1. Introduction.....	227
4.2. The Turkish Region of Goslar: OKER .....	254
4.3. Two Symbols for Economic and Political-Cultural Crisis.....	264
4.4. Trust, Inter-Group Relations and Racial Tolerance: Friendship and Marriage in Goslar.....	269
4.5. ‘Imported’ Brides and Bridegrooms from Turkey.....	274
4.6. Locality and Global Mediaspaces .....	279
4.6.1. The Limits of Mediaspaces.....	289
4.7. Conclusion: Lessons and Recommendations .....	291
<b>5. REACTIVE IDENTITY FORMATION AND TURKISH YOUTH CULTURE IN GOSLAR</b>	
5.1. Introduction: Bumpy Lines of Integration: Downward Mobility and Reactions of the Children of Turkish Immigrant .....	297
5.2. Youth Cultures: Turkish Youth Want To Be “Normal” .....	307
5.3. The Youth Centers in Goslar: ‘GLEIS 95’ AND ‘BGX’.....	313
5.4. Telling the Truth to Power: Aliens in Their Own Land .....	324
5.5. ‘Homo Economicus’ Turkish Migrant Family and the Loss of Power.....	330



5.6. Headscarf: a Locus of Resistance and Opportunity .....	338
5.7. Conclusion: Lessons and Recommendations .....	341

## **6. CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES WITHIN THE STRUCTURE of the LABOR MARKET AND EDUCATION in GOSLAR**

6.1. Introduction: The Context is Destiny .....	345
6.1.1. Segmented Assimilation: The Model for Education and Labor Market Integration.....	349
6.1.2. The Pessimism of Downward Assimilation Thesis.....	357
6.2. The Conditions of the Labor Market, Social Mobility and Entrepreneurs in Goslar .....	359
6.3. Inequality, Downward Mobility and Institutional Discrimination in Goslar .....	365
6.4. Is Self-Employment and Ethnic Niches a Way Out? .....	375
6.5. Educational Experience of Turkish Youth in Goslar: Downward or Upward Mobility? .....	380
6.6. Quo Vadis Goslar?.....	397
6.7. Conclusion: Lessons and Recommendations .....	411

## **7. TURKISH-MUSLIM ORGANIZATIONS IN GOSLAR**

7.1. Introduction: Islam, Organizations, and the Muslim Youth in Goslar.....	419
7.2. Symbolic Ethnicity and Religion through the New Generation Turkish Youth in Immigrant Organizations.....	440
7.3. Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görüş, IGMG (National View of Islamic Community).....	448
7.3.1. The IGMG in GOSLAR.....	453
7.3.2. The New Generations and the Changing Vision of the IGMG .....	462
7.3.3. Publicizing Islam: The Headscarf .....	468
7.3.4. Symptoms of Post-September 11 .....	469

7.3.5. The Cases of Yimpaş and Kombassan .....	479
7.4. Diyanet Turk İslam Birliđi, DITIB (The Directorate for Religious Affairs of Turkish Islamic Union [Türkisch Islamische Union der Anstalt fuer Religion])...	482
7.5. Conclusion: Lessons and Recommendations .....	497
<b>8. CONCLUSION.....</b>	<b>504</b>
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	528
APPENDICES.....	553
APPENDIX A EXTRA TABLES.....	554
APPENDIX B OVERALL SUMMARY of the STUDY SAMPLES, CHARACTERISTICS of the TURKISH INFORMANTS.....	575
APPENDIX C OVERALL SUMMARY of the STUDY SAMPLES, CHARACTERISTICS of the GERMAN INFORMANTS .....	579
APPENDIX D QUESTIONAIRES .....	580
APPENDIX E SUMMARY IN TURKISH (ÖZET).....	586
APPENDIX F CURRICULUM VITAE .....	634

## LISTS OF TABLES

Table 1: Hierarchies of citizenship within the Nation-state.....	p.37
Table 2: Distinction between Formal and Substantial Rights in Germany .....	p.38
Table 3: Legal Status: Rights Afforded or Denied by a Nation-State.....	p.106
Table 4: Stratified Immigration Model .....	p.130
Table 5: Logically Available Responses to Stratified Rights and Discrimination...	p.131
Table 6: Civic Stratification.....	p.147
Table 7: Privileging Laws.....	p.153
Table 8: Migration to (West) Germany.....	p.155
Table 9: Number of Ethnic German Immigration by Country of Origin.....	p.156
Table 10: Course Structure for Initial Language Training in 2002 and the New Introduction Course.....	p.165
Table 11: Economic, Social Rights and Active Integration Policies (Modes of Governmental Incorporation in Germany).....	p.170
Table 12: Visa granted for the purpose of family reunification in Germany, 1996-2006.....	p.189
Table 13: Visa granted for the purpose of family reunification in Germany by countries of origin 2002-2006.....	p.190
Table 14: Unemployment Figures of Turks and Total Population in Germany 1979-2004 .....	p.206
Table 15: Logically Available Responses to Stratified Rights and Discrimination.....	p.239
Table 16: Different Paths of Integration by Segmented Assimilation Model.....	p.351
Table 17: Summary Table of Benefit Eligibility in Germany.....	p.554
Table 18: Conditions of Family Reunification in Germany by Different Status in Germany.....	p.558
Table 19: General Picture of Education (2008) Comparing Germans with Foreigners.....	p.559

Table 20: School Types of Migrants in Germany.....	p.560
Table 21: Proportion of 15-year-old Students in 2000, with/without a Migration Background in Different School Types According to Their Countries of Origin or Background (in%).....	p.560
Table 22: School Persons Leaving (all) in Goslar.....	p.561
Table 23: School Persons Leaving ( <i>Ausländer</i> ) in Goslar.....	p.565
Table 24: School Leaving in Goslar; Only Turkish .....	p.568
Table 25: Population in Goslar 1968-2008 .....	p.568
Table 26: Foreign people in Goslar (2008).....	p.571

## ABBREVIATIONS

- CDU** : Christlich-Demokratische Union (Christian Democratic Union)
- CSU** : Christlich-Soziale Union (Christian Social Union)
- DIDF** : Demokratik Isci Dernekleri Federasyonu (The Federation of Democratic Worker Associations [Föderation demokratischer Arbeitervereine e.V.])
- DITIB** : Diyanet Turk Islam Birliđi, (The Directorate for Religious Affairs of Turkish Islamic Union [Türkisch Islamische Union der Anstalt fuer Religion])
- EC** : European Community
- ECHR** : European Court of Human Rights
- EEA** : European Economic Area
- EU** : European Union
- KMK** : Kultusministerkonferenz Ministries of Education and Cultural Affairs (Kultusministerkonferenz)
- IGMG** : Islamische Gemeinschaft *Milli Görüş*, (National View of Islamic Community)
- ILO** : International Labor Organization
- PISA** : Programme for International Student Assessment
- SPD** : Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party)
- TCNs** : Third Country Nationals

## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION, THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

“Modern man was divided between his identity as *bourgeois* and as *citoyen*; the former was his real identity, the latter a false, mythic identity. In the market, he lived as an unequal competitor; in the polis he was supposed to be a rights-bearing equal. His identity as a citizen was entirely legal and therefore imaginary (and thus ineffective) as a motive.” (Ignatieff 1987: 409)

#### 1.1. Introduction

In this dissertation, I argue that economic interests of neoliberal states in the globalizing world inevitably entail migrant labor (high skilled or low skilled) and produce cultural diversity through labor immigrants and their children in Northern host societies. However, the contradiction stems from this paradoxical context where the states also need to sustain their sovereign power within a moral unity or `imagined community` by reducing cultural complexity and assimilating the immigrants. These conditions produce a dual character of nation-state which causes a permanent dilemma for immigrants in the host society: the nation state oscillates between desiring a multicultural society as aspects of economic necessity and reducing it within the framework of asserting national sovereignty.

The study analyzes the recent transformations of immigrant and citizenship laws in Germany with a special focus on the children of Turkish immigrants<sup>1</sup> in Goslar ( a small town in Lower Saxony) by observing that the nature of citizenship in the country has remained deeply `differentiated`, `exclusive` and `hierarchical`. By following the “civic stratification thesis,” discussed in detail in the following, I argue that the conditions and restrictions differentiated by different migrant categories and rights regarding entry, family reunification, welfare benefits, and labor market access go along with a particular legal status of those admitted migrants and that this creates a hierarchy of stratified rights. With respect to employment, it can be claimed that Germany has a protective system of “phased access” in the management of the national labor market. Thus, the civic stratification thesis proves that Germany is an example of the differential exclusivist system of immigration and integration policy.

It aims at exploring the civic stratification system in Germany where the stratified hierarchy of rights allocated to non-citizen immigrants, namely, Turkish immigrants (except the citizens from the EU, the U.S, Canada, Japan and South Korea countries). This system is in contradiction with the concern to facilitate the integration of the immigrants in Germany (and

---

<sup>1</sup> I use the general descriptor “Turkish” throughout the dissertation to indicate the immigrants and their offspring's connection to Turkey. If necessary, other ethnic and religious terms will be used as a marker of defining all different ethnic and religious groups in Turkey such as Kurdish, Alevi, Sunni etc. Also, this study is well aware of not treating the ethnicity as a homogenous and closed entity rather it underlines that the identity formation of children of immigrants has multiple resources in so far as local, national and global values are all together affective in this process. In addition, identity is a process of ever-identification both by the self and other. Thus, there would be no one-time connotation defined by one-time event about identity. We have to consider circumstantialist claims about the fluidity and dynamism of identity. That is why we don't need value-loaded identity definitions which are only based on ethnic or national features. We need to accentuate the affinities of seemingly incommensurable stages of ‘host’ and ‘home’ country cultures.

Europe) more generally with the objective to promote equal participation, rights, access and non-discriminative actions.

Thanks to the semi-structured in-depth interviews with the children of Muslim-Turkish immigrants in Goslar/Germany, the study also reveals that severe downward integration and reactive ethnicity mostly characterize the experience of even third generation Turkish immigrants which can be seen as the essential results of such stratified rights formation in Germany. This process shows also that the canonical assimilation theory and sociology of social order which is very dominant in previous German immigrant literature is not valid anymore. German society like other European countries still appears often divided or separated rather than integrated or united, when looking at the societal relations with the immigrants.

This study analyzes migration policies, citizenship laws and their implementations of Germany in a `top-down` perspective through the analysis of legislation, modes of incorporation, state discourses and public debates including also global and international immigration policy trends in neoliberal restructuring economy. Secondly, it benefits from a `bottom-up` perspective by investigating the impact of conditions and restrictions on Turkish immigrants and their children and the responses and strategies immigrants adopt to cope with these challenges through the analysis of in-depth interviews within the local context of Goslar. Last but not least, it elaborates the reflexive experiences and identity formation of children of Turkish immigrants in Goslar by means of some conceptual tools like `reactive ethnicity` and `return of repressed` in the recent xenophobic/Islamophobic climates of Germany after 9/11.

It is assumed that the children of Turkish immigrants have experienced downward integration and their upward integration is yet limited in Goslar/Germany regarding labor market and education. The first insights



while entering and finally the site for the field study in Goslar had shown that more than group characteristics, systemic and institutional factors could have a decisive role in promoting or hampering the educational and labor market integration of young immigrants and the native-born second and third generation. They still experience some economic and cultural exclusion and discrimination within the context of the civic stratification system of Germany. Indeed, the question for third or the next generation is not whether integration will take place, but to what extent and to what segment of German society will they integrate them. In other words, for children of Turkish immigrants, the question is no longer whether to stay or return but how to secure permanent spaces for their intercultural skills and identities. The claim here is that integration of the Turkish-Muslim population will be more difficult within the conditions of deprivation, lack of access and barriers to social and political participation they have experienced directly and indirectly. I privilege institutional frameworks (laws, government policy, citizenship regime and context of reception of Germany) as primary, and suggest that the host country's institutional framework largely shapes Turkish immigrants and their offsprings social mobility and integration.

Both institutional/structural and cultural factors account for constraints and opportunities presented by German state and society to Turkish immigrants and their offsprings are very crucial to the social mobility and successful integration of the immigrant community.

In this study, the proponents of the segmented integration model state that the integration patterns of the "new generations" are diverse. Which path is chosen depends on individual factors such as education, language skills, and age of arrival on the one hand and structural factors such as context of reception, family background and place of residence on the other hand. Segmented integration describes alternative paths of integration as

depending on a number of factors, of which four are considered decisive: 1) the history of the first generation; 2) the pace of integration among parents and children and its bearing on normative integration; 3) the barriers, cultural and economic, confronted by second and third generation youth in their quest for successful adaptation; 4) the family and community resources for confronting these barriers. These factors determinate either integration takes downward or upward form.

For example, some migrant families and their children confront a series of barriers to successful integration: poor, prison-like schools (especially in Hauptschule); discrimination by native teachers and counselors; street violence; and the omnipresence of the drug trade. Such barriers can lead, in a number of cases, to early school abandonment, low educational career, severe unemployment, joining gangs, violent street confrontations, and early arrest and incarceration. These negative integration or adaptation outcomes have been well documented in the research literature and are collectively labeled “downward assimilation” (Portes and Zhou 1993; Portes *et. al.* 2005; Rumbaut 2005).

There is a common belief in Western Europe those Turkish migrants and their children do not integrate into the social, political, economic and cultural life of their countries of settlement. According to this belief, the political motivations of Turks in their receiving countries are primarily shaped by their homeland. This study does not believe this idea. According to this study, integration does occur but in segmented and different ways: upward and downward integration.

My study in Goslar indicates that Turkish-Muslim immigrants and their offspring do not rapidly integrate labor market and education and not disappear into culture of Germany. Their integration is highly diversified

and segmented as well as they retain their ethnic or/and religious identity although they are also formed in the context of the culture of Germany.

The current educational, economic and social situation of the Turkish youth in Goslar/Germany will depict in this study refers to a great extent not to their reluctance to integration, but to lots of shortcomings and of measures to be taken by all partners of migration/integration process. The high levels of unemployment, poor educational achievement and housing segregation are symptomatic of immigrant and their children` marginalization in Goslar. They cannot be explained simply by the argument that immigrants lack the necessary socio-cultural capital for educational achievement or having labor access. The high levels of downward mobility are, in part, the result of a specific type of discrimination against certain groups, characterized by racial, ethnic and religious markers in Germany. Through the discussions of labor market and education in Goslar, I try to show that there is a strong lack of commitment to full immigrant inclusion and participation that feeds into the structural discrimination in the labor market, in education and in the public discourse. The dissertation will argue German policy makers and some scholars have been unwilling to recognize the exclusionary practices and structures within German society that make it very difficult for immigrants to integrate. My argument is that it is not immigrants` refusal to integrate or the lack of socio-cultural capital or the generous welfare state that is the core issues, but rather processes of racialization within German society an idea largely ignored in dominant political and academic discourses.

This study basically claims that the formal equality as citizens does not in itself overcome economic disadvantage or social marginalization of third generation children of Turkish immigrants, nor does it give a share in power in major economic and political institutions. Being a citizen is also

no guarantee of protection from discrimination or violence, which may block minority members from exercising their formal civil, political and social rights. The experience of migrants and ethnic minorities is that established institutions will not be able to tackle a range of practices that block their full membership and actual participation in society. They may even be instrumental in upholding such practices, due to discriminatory rules, stigmatizing institutional ideologies or their habitual administrative routines; routines that may not be intentionally discriminatory, yet discriminatory in their effects.

This study claims, it is because, the formal citizenship rights (or naturalization) approach holds out the promise of full equality before the law for all members of a state but leaves unresolved how to transform formal into substantive equality.

Based on this research in Goslar/Germany, even though they are naturalized, most third generation Turks in Goslar are expected to continue to strive for downward integration within the labor market and education due to the “differential exclusion system”, as is discussed below, of Germany. In this context, the Turkish youth also seem to continue the celebration of ancestral origins of their religion and ethnicity, though in symbolic but reactionary ways.

By using vantage points of civic stratification theory, I will revisit structure/agency relations by both analyzing the *structure* through various globalizing trends (mostly referring to restructuring neoliberal political-economy), immigrant policies and regulations; state discourses; citizenship law and regimes in Germany and the *agency* regarding `identity formation`, `modes of incorporation`, `reactive ethnicity`, `diverse paths to identity formation`, `negotiations`, `reflexive youth culture`, and ”magnifying” Islamization as a return to institutional xenophobia`. It is

relevant to have an analytically broad view in order to understand the special character of immigrant incorporation in any host societies. In such a broad view, the study considers looking at restructuring a globalized world, social welfare system, legislation of citizenship regime and the historical (pre)context of Germany and partially Turkey vis a vis vigorous reactionary organizations and identity formations and a culture of immigrant communities.

The “reactive identity formation” part of the study addresses several problems and phenomena depicted as ‘ethnic’ and “religious” which are often far more complex. In short, this is because social conditions, residential legislation, legacies of discrimination, as well as, institutional or organisational structures and necessities, tend to contradict equal opportunities. Where immigrants experience marginalization, their best chance of success lies in mobilizing community solidarity (economic, cultural, political and religious) and transnational links – a sort of ‘reactive ethnicity.’ The discourse and practice on reactive identity formation can best be summarized by the help of the famous expression of social facts “reaping what you sow.”

Also, based on participant observation in two Turkish-Muslim immigrant organizations IGMG and DITIB<sup>2</sup>, in Goslar, one can recognize the evolution and separation of German Islam from Turkish Islam in response to divergent local needs and experiences. After having observed the IGMG and DITIB organizations in Goslar from the perspective of the Turkish immigrant youth during the fieldwork carried out in 2005-2006, it is

---

<sup>2</sup> In this dissertation, the terms of “IGMG” and “*Milli Görüş*” are interchangeably used for referring to the organization of “Islamic Gemeinschaft *Milli Görüş*” in Germany. On the other hand, the terms of “DITIB and “*Diyanet*” are interchangeably used for referring to the organization of “The Directorate for Religious Affairs-Turkish Islamic Union” in Germany.

possible to claim that it has merged syncretic Turkish-Muslim socio-political movements into a Turko-German form of Islam. The harder the German state pushes Turkish immigrants, the more resistant they develop in negotiations. It can be summed up as follows: ‘If Germans treat Turkish immigrants mildly, they will get a mild response; however, if the Germans treat them harshly, they will get tough immigrants’.

In terms of a structural point of view, the general aim of this study is to explore the contradictions inherent in migration and integration policies in Germany and the EU where the logic of the market is weighed against welfare protectionism: welfare and labor market regulation against demands for cheap labor; and national resource concerns against transnational obligations (Morris, 1997; 2002). The outcome is presented in terms of an increasingly complex system of civic stratification (Lockwood, 1996), only hinted at in the conventional distinction between citizens, denizens and aliens. This nascent structure of inequality built upon the differing rights conceded by the state raises a further contradiction: discriminatory exclusion and partial inclusion set alongside assertions of equal treatment. The result is an elaborate hierarchy of statuses with varying attendant rights, not easily captured by any single theoretical explanation.

By following the “civic stratification thesis” (Morris, 2002, 2003; Kofman, 2002), the author argues that the conditions and restrictions exemplified by different migrant categories and rights regarding entry, family reunification, welfare benefits, and labor market access, go along with a particular legal status of those admitted migrants creating a hierarchy of stratified rights. The study aims also at exploring the conditions and affections within the civic stratification system for third generation children of Turkish immigrants in Goslar/Germany. Here the stratified hierarchy of rights allocated to non-citizen immigrants, particularly

Turkish immigrants, is also in conflict with the German concern facilitating the integration of the immigrants in Germany (and Europe more generally) with the objective of promoting equal participation, rights, access and non-discriminative actions.

Indeed, I will not give a comprehensive summary of the mainstream migration theories that have changed a great deal throughout the last decades. I will not follow the trajectories of migration theories because my main focus is not on immigration or the question how immigration does occur. Rather in this study I am much more interested in the conditions of settlement and characteristics of integration of the children of Turkish immigrants who were born in Germany. To this extent, the construction of identity, the status of citizenship, the formation of a specific youth culture, the form and functions of institutional discrimination, the characteristics of the local setting, the roles of Turkish-Muslim organizations and the role of municipal youth centers and also the role of family, kin and peers are analyzed while studying the integration processes.

When immigrants arrive in places of destination and a modicum of opportunity and acceptance are present, their children integrate (or assimilate) to the host society, shedding elements of distinctiveness (language goes fastest, traditional dress etc.) to become full German, American or French etc. Critical in this process is the availability of means for upward mobility, especially access to education and the labor market. By contrast, when first generation immigrants are met with hostility, their children's children can respond by emphasizing their distinctiveness as a means of self protection. The result would be hardening and eventually racial identities might crystallize.

This study sees religion and ethnicity as a form of immigrant resistance to social amalgamation and erasure noting how ethnic and racial minorities

use religiosity to sharpen their profile, affirm identity, and oppose market pressures. Consideration is given to Islamic organizations (DITIB, IGMG) in Goslar/Germany that try to promote some immigrant rights but this is done from the perspective of the Turkish immigrant youth. In this sense, one of the important contributions of this research is the incorporation of perceptions and attitudes of children of Turkish immigrants, in a specific local context, to better understand the role of agency in the integration processes. This agency dimension is linked to the above described civic stratification thesis and differential exclusionism.

## **1.2. Basic Research Questions**

A very basic impetus of this study is to understand why most of the third generation Turkish youth has still experienced downward integration and reactive identity formation, although they have been socialized in German schools and the German society. Once we understand how they have experienced downward integration in the particular context of the educational sector and the labor market in Goslar through the cultural and material means, it will be easier to understand the basic dynamics of their inclusion-exclusion into German society.

The current educational, economic and social situation of the Turkish youth in Goslar/Germany depicted in this study refers to a great extent not to their “reluctance” to integrate, but to shortcomings and measures to be taken by all partners in the migration/integration process. The high levels of unemployment, poor educational achievement and housing segregation are symptomatic of Turkish immigrant and their children`s marginalization in Goslar. They cannot be explained simply by the argument that immigrants lack the necessary socio-cultural capital for educational achievement or having labor access or not. The high levels of downward mobility are, in part, the result of a specific type of discrimination against



certain groups, characterized by racial, ethnic and religious markers in Goslar/Germany. Through the discussions of labor market and education in Goslar, I try to show that there is a strong lack of commitment to full immigrant inclusion and participation that feeds into the institutional/structural discrimination in the labor market, in education and in the public discourse. The dissertation will argue that German policy makers and some scholars have been unwilling to recognize the exclusionary practices and structures within German society that make it very difficult for immigrants to integrate. My argument is that it is not the Turkish immigrants' refusal to integrate or the lack of socio-cultural capital that are the core issues or the argument that the "generous" German welfare state provides all opportunities and an easy access to resources open to everybody in the society. On the contrary, it is argued that racialization within German society and institutional discrimination and a resulting stratification, an idea largely ignored in dominant political and academic discourses, constitute the main reasons for this exclusive and hierarchical structure of the German society.

The dissertation asserts that severe downward integration and reactive ethnicity of Turkish youth can be seen as essential results of civic stratification formation of Germany, mostly characterized within the education and labor market. These results show that the canonical assimilation theory and sociology of social order which are very dominant in previous German immigrant literature is not valid anymore.

It will be relatively easy to understand the dynamics of discriminative and practices on the third generation Turkish youth, as soon as we understand how institutional/structural grounds such as citizenship regime and immigration policies work specifically. How has third generation Turkish youth been affected by the citizenship naturalization policies in Germany? What would be the reasons for the worse education degrees and lower

career or employment status (downward integration) of Turkish youth when compared with Germans? How does the German state respond to these differences?

How would younger generations of German-Turks influence the ways in which immigrant children become assimilated, and why may some of these ways be more advantageous than others? Will Turkish immigrant families and ethnic communities persist in affecting the lives of children of the second generation? Will cultural distinctiveness or reactive identity formation of children of Turkish immigrants eventually melt down into a pot of German homogeneity? If not, what will ethnic diversity mean for the offspring of today's new second and third generation? The clear answer of these questions will be uncertain in the foreseeable future, in part because there are so many competing elements: east/west, Turk/foreigner, blood/citizenship, German/European, national/transnational.

What are the main factors that affect cohesiveness of the Turkish ethnic community formation and Islamic identity among these immigrants? Why do most Turkish immigrants and their children experience downward mobility, low labor access and failed educational attainment in Goslar/Germany? Why is the identity of the Turkish children more reactionary than the other immigrants in Germany though they are born, educated or socialized in the society? How has third generation Turkish youth been affected by the citizenship naturalization policies in Germany? What would be reasons for the worse education degrees and lower career or employment status (downward integration) of Turkish youth when comparing with Germans? How does the German state respond to these differences? Instead of starting with class structure and asking how class formation affects social integration of children of Turkish immigrants, might it not be more advantageous to reverse the question and ask how the institutional structure central to social integration of children of Turkish

immigrants affects their identity formation? How does integration transform religious beliefs and practices? Conversely, how does religion affect the outcomes of integration?

These are some questions anchoring in this study. I will try to answer these questions by focusing on a particular case of Turkish youth in two Turkish-Muslim organizations (DITIB and IGMG) and two municipal youth centers (Gleis 95 and BGX) in Goslar.

### **1.3. Civic Stratification and Differential Exclusionism in Goslar/Germany**

This study tries to explore Germany's differential exclusionist model (Castles, 1995) and civic stratification system (Morris, 1997; 2000; 2001a; 2001b; 2002; 2003; 2007; Lockwood, 1996; Kofman, 2002; 2005) with a special reference to the experiences of third generation children of Turkish immigrants in Goslar/Germany. It is this model and stratification system, which affects a wide range of institutional and social factors that determine the migrants' position in society. It includes: immigration policy, family reunion and residence rights; labor market and educational position; residential situation and community formation; social policy; discrimination towards minorities.

Following the civic stratification thesis, this study deals with the question of how far the provisions of citizenship constitute a system of inequality for Turkish immigrants and their naturalized children in Goslar/Germany. Accordingly, three tensions are worth mentioning in the civic stratification system—formal inclusions and exclusions, informal gain and deficit, and the dynamic of expansion and contraction. The notion yields three sets of oppositions (Morris, 2002; 2007): inclusion and exclusion refer to the classification of formal statuses governing eligibility for particular rights;

gain and deficit refer to enhanced or impaired enjoyment of rights through the informal influence of prestige and stigma; while expansion and contraction refer to the shifting character of a regime of rights, or a particular area of its application.

In order to analyze civic stratification or stratified hierarchy of rights, the study undertakes an analysis of the ways in which immigration policies allocate different rights to different categories of Turkish immigrants and their children regarding entry to the country, family reunification, labor market access, and welfare benefits. In this context, this study pays more attention to the discriminatory consequences of civic stratification on Turkish migrants and their naturalized children and its wider implications for social cohesion and social integration.

The examination of the case study in Goslar indicates that as a result of the civic stratification system, Turkish immigrants and their descendants are poorly represented in higher education; they suffer from disproportionately high levels of unemployment; and they draw disproportionately on welfare services. As a result of this process, there is also worrying evidence of racialization across Goslar/Germany, which fails to ensure sufficient life chances for first-second and third generation Turkish migrants.

In the civic stratification analysis, I basically try to explore the levels of differentiation between Turkish immigrants and German natives in terms of their rights and their access to social services by trying to unpack the legal and social standing of immigrants into a hierarchical status differentiation at three levels: inclusion and exclusion encompassed by differentiated membership statuses and rights to nation-state; the criteria of management and control of migration that include various inherent tensions; and the results of civic stratification system and their affect on consolidation of institutional discrimination. Goslar/Germany is examined

as a case study in the management of migration through a hierarchical system for the granting of rights, which reflects the changes signified by the new nationality laws, and draws out the more general implications of the German experience for theorizing citizenship. Here, Germany is the typical example of the differential exclusionary system with its ethno-national understanding of citizenship (e.g. Castles 1995, Brubaker 1992).

In this dissertation, it is argued that patterns of disadvantage among Turkish immigrants and their naturalized children in Goslar/Germany cannot be explained solely by the low human capital or education attributes of the original immigrants. On the contrary, in spite of new liberal amendments in citizenship regimes toward jus soli and some “make-ups” in terms of multiculturalism, the causes have to be sought in pervasive civic stratification, institutional discrimination and the persistence of a culture of discrimination in Germany and elsewhere in Europe. Alas, there has also been a shift to assimilation since September eleventh through all Western immigration countries and it is more likely to maintain further societal divisions.

Accordingly, discrepancies among Turkish immigrants and their children regarding education and labor market position are too complex to be simply put down to cultural factors, lacking human capital or less effective networks. It is vital to look also for other reasons, and here I suggest the need to look at broader civic stratification, structural exclusion mechanisms of the German nation-state and society.

The dissertation mainly focuses on the children of Turkish immigrants` diversity of experiences and incorporations in education and labor market conditions of Goslar under which specific government policies and German people`s reactions will be critically underscored. For example, the economic adaptation of Turkish immigrants and their children needs to be

understood not merely in terms of their resources and skills but as it is shaped by specific government policies, labor market conditions and the characteristics of ethnic communities.

Also, this study explores the linkages through which “immigrant” become “ethnics” and the contrasting social and economic results of the process in Goslar/Germany. In keeping with the focus on public policy, it examines the ways in which German state action affects the adaptation process of Turkish immigrant groups and the opportunities for economic mobility and social integration of them.

Although physical controls at the border or within a country and related practices (detention, expulsion, deportation) remain important, contemporary migration management largely operates through allocating differential rights to different categories of migrants. It does so through various mechanisms (classification and selection, admission procedures, conditionalities, and restrictions) and along various axes, notably along nationality, skill level and socio-economic status, and gender – if often only indirectly. As a result, contemporary migration management involves a proliferation, fragmentation and polarization of different statuses and related bundles of rights with regard to admission, residence, work, social rights, and other domains, resulting in different forms of “partial membership” (Brubaker 1989) or “civic stratification” (Morris 1997), a term originally borrowed from David Lockwood (1996). In relation to immigrants, this can be conceptualized as the hierarchy of stratified rights resulting from processes of exclusion and inclusion which classifies and sorts out migrants and the realization of rights formally associated with Germany (Morris 2002: 7). The concept of civic stratification can also be used to evaluate the general expansion or contraction of rights in relation to specific groups of migrants.

The process of immigration policy decision making in a given state is driven by two very different sets of considerations, each of which relates to a distinct sphere of social interaction. In the perspective of capitalist dynamics, immigrants of any kind — including refugees — are considered primarily as “labor.” Accordingly, immigration policies are shaped by the prevailing “class compromise” and the specific configuration of economic interests in the country in question, in keeping with the imperatives of prevailing technological and economic conditions. Immigrants are characteristically welcomed by employers because they reduce the unit cost of labor (that is, lower wages) and also increase its elasticity; conversely, they are characteristically resented by resident workers as unfair competitors willing to accept lower wages (which constitute an improvement over their income in the country of origin) and below-standard conditions. At worst, they may not only lower wages but also altogether displace natives. For demographic, economic and social reasons, all highly-developed economies find themselves increasingly reliant on immigrant labour – at all skill levels (Castles, 2006). Virtually everywhere, international recruitment of highly-skilled personnel is considered a good thing, while lower-skilled migrant workers are seen as out-of-place in shiny new post-industrial economies. This is linked to the very hostile public climate towards migrant workers, asylum seekers and poor people from the South. The solution is to designate movement of the highly-skilled as professional *mobility*, and that of the lower-skilled as unwanted *migration* (Castles, 2008: 3).

However, all types of immigrants — including even temporary workers — also constitute a political and cultural presence, which evokes a distinctive dimension of consideration pertaining to the putative impact of immigration on the host country’s “way of life,” “cohesiveness,” or, in current discourse, “identity.” The process in question is well evoked by classical sociology’s concept of “integration,” from Emile Durkheim

through Talcott Parsons. In almost any immigration situation, there are significant groups among the hosts who believe that newcomers in general, or particular groups among them, would jeopardize the established national ways (Zolberg, 2006: 16).

In this way, immigration regulations produce new forms of inequality, while frequently reinforcing “traditional” ones along the lines of class, gender and ethnicity and “race”. Today, it is instructive to ask of civic stratification the questions conventionally asked of occupation based inequality in relation to social mobility within and across migrant generations.

Admittedly, in the German civic stratification system, the fulfillment of certain conditions has been a pre-requisite for the acquisition of further rights, and has therefore served as the basis for selection in the route to long term security, and ultimately citizenship. So, for example, full employment rights may only be granted after a period of self-maintenance, while a claim for social support, though permissible, eliminates the claimant from achieving the next stage of security. Such a process highlights the sometimes ambivalent nature of rights and their close association with mechanisms of control.

Civic stratification refers to a system of inequality by virtue of the rights that can be claimed from the state. Following the civic stratification thesis, this study deals with the question of how far the provisions of citizenship themselves constitute a system of inequality. Accordingly, the three tensions are worth mentioning in the civic stratification system – formal inclusions and exclusions, informal gain and deficit and the dynamic of expansion and contraction. The notion yields three sets of oppositions (Morris, 2002; 2007): inclusion and exclusion refer to the classification of formal statuses governing eligibility for particular rights; gain and deficit



refer to enhanced or impaired enjoyment of rights through the informal influence of prestige and stigma; while expansion and contraction refer to the shifting character of a regime of rights, or a particular area of its application.

In this civic stratification framework, the important starting point is, as Lockwood (1996) proposes, the assumption that the institutional unity of citizenship, market and bureaucracy is central to the delivery of social cohesion. According to Morris (2007:41), Lockwood is interested in how class and status *inequalities* affect this integrative function of citizenship rights, and once we recognize their influence through civic stratification the question of cohesion arises a new.

The exclusionary nature of the immigration regime has not only rested on an ethnic conception of citizenship but also on a complex permit system stratifying the rights of immigrants and restrictive measures aimed at guest-workers and asylum seekers from third country nations except Germans, ethnic Germans and European citizens as early as 1960s.

Regarding immigration policy in Germany and any other European states on asylum and family reunification or labor market, the resolution of the clash between universal principles and national interest and the preservation of national identities on the part of the state is through classification, selection and stratification, which seeks to filter, as far as possible, welcome from unwelcome strangers.

Regarding treatment of minorities, a series of contradictions and tensions have become evident in German and also European immigration policies. Kofman (2002; 2005) believes that these contradictions in Europe emerge from different forms of migration and focus on globalising market forces and continuing closed territorial politics (labour migration) or liberal

paradox (Hollifield, 2000), universal principles versus preservation of national identity (family migration), and humanitarian principles and national sovereignty (asylum). To put it more concretely, these contradictions emerge from the clash of principles primarily arising from the counter-posing of universal principles, on the one hand, and national interests and the preservation of national identities, on the other. These tensions play themselves out differently in each form of migration (labor, family and asylum). Their resolution on the part of the state is through classification, selection and stratification, which seeks to filter, as far as possible, welcome from unwelcome strangers (Schuster, 2003).

In general, two filtering factors can be mentioned for the newcomers in Germany: differentiating according to skills, cultural essentialism. The first one causes a civic stratification system in which classification, selection and stratification work through differentiated rights regarding income level and immigrant status (granted by skill). Second filter is cultural essentialism.

Following Abadan-Unat (1992: 404), I see two contradictory approaches in Germany and Europe. In the first one, individuals are confronting each other in a wide, open field of economic competition open to all, provided the qualifications exist. In the second approach, we see a secluded, carefully segmented social and political terrain in which different organizations and evidence of a pluralistic society are participating in the articulation and realization of societal demands. Entrance into this terrain is strictly reserved for European citizens. This explains why cultural barriers are so powerful: immigrants or citizens preserving a Muslim identity, when placing their religious affiliation in the forefront of their demands, are charged with being one-dimensional in their outlook and unable to achieve integration. However, one could equally say that they demand as much as they are forced into their role.

To sum up, in the civic stratification system, “market driven” migration law and policies encourage or fail to prevent a dualism between citizens (mostly non-poor) and immigrants or ethnic/racial communities (mostly poor).

#### **1.4. Citizenship Matters**

It is important to note that this dissertation, while accepting the emancipatory potential of citizenship as agents, is primarily devoted to the radical critiques of the citizenship framework in the nation-state, which tends to highlight the flawed nature of citizenship, and to expose the implications of the inclusionary/exclusionary boundaries embedded within it. Thus, it criticizes the normative version of citizenship and the unevenness of access to it, and argues that reinforcing existing rights will not in itself overcome the mechanisms of marginalization, partial inclusion and exclusion. So, whilst citizenship has been extended historically and geographically, it continues to encapsulate dominant power relations obscured by the political fictions of the de-contextualized and universal citizen operating in the public realm.

This study mainly argues that despite the extension of rights, particularly social ones, the children of Turkish immigrants in Germany still continue to experience diverse discrimination and functional marginalization within the all public domains of civil society and are trapped by an ‘ethno-cultural’ model by which they cannot become an integral part of broader society.

The receiver states’ legal-administrative control of the “belonging and not-belonging” of immigrants and their offspring shapes the social and political practices. In particular, the denial of citizenship to immigrants and, in the

countries whose citizenship laws and policies are informed by *jus sanguinis*, their native-born children sustains their identification with their home countries and constrains, or channels into an oppositional trajectory, their incorporation into the host society.

This dissertation explores citizenship status and its unequal results of Turkish guest-workers and their naturalized children in Germany. Third generation children of Turkish immigrants in Germany have mostly been seen as pro-Germans and accordingly have been subject to the assimilationist practices through the implementation of monolingual education and indoctrination of homogenous culture in Germany. However, recent studies suggest that the status and conditions of the children of immigrants are not as secure as their parents once were especially regarding their labor market position, economic marginalization and deprivation. Citizenship today is first and foremost about identity, the symbolic inclusion or exclusion of migrants through citizenship may have important material consequences, including the (de-) legitimization of xenophobia and the (de)marking of groups for discrimination and racism (Koopmans 1999).

Citizenship is usually defined as a form of membership in a political and geographic community. It can be disaggregated into four dimensions: legal status, rights, political and other forms of participation in society, and a sense of belonging. The concept of citizenship allows us to analyze the extent to which immigrants and their descendants are incorporated into receiving societies.

Accelerating immigration into nation-state challenges notions of national identity, sovereignty, and state control have historically been linked to citizenship. To some degree, this study tries to consider how legal dimensions of citizenship might affect immigrant integration by

investigating equality of participation in a host country's economy, education, and political system. It also examines more deeply how all dimension of citizenship interact with other dimensions of structural entities like discrimination within a more integrated approach. By doing this, it will also focus on normative political theory and debate the advisability of some integration philosophies from assimilatory to multicultural accounts.

Large-scale migration led political sociologists (e.g. Brubaker, Joppke) to research the civic versus ethnic bases of citizenship and the implications of different notions of belonging for immigrants' legal status, rights, and participation. Furthermore, there are some scholars (Kofman 2005; Castles 1996; Morris, 2001a) specifically concerned with social equality that discuss economic and social access in terms of "second-class" citizenship. The relationship between rights and community membership is also at the core of theoretical debates on multiculturalism, which ask to what degree rights should inhere in individuals or be granted to ethnic, religious, or other culturally differentiated groups within the nation-state.

Some studies ask how cultural, institutional, or ideological differences create different opportunity structures for migrants' subsequent incorporation and citizenship (Bloemraad 2006; Castles & Miller 1993; Favell 2001b; Ireland 1994; Joppke 1999; Kastoryano 2002; Koopmans et al. 2005).

However, regarding this study, citizenship is a dynamic concept and Turkish immigrants and their children are not only passive victims of structure. Citizenship as participation can be understood as representing an expression of human agency in the political arena, broadly defined; citizenship as rights enables people to act as agents. Such a conceptualization of citizenship is particularly important in challenging the

construction of marginalized groups as passive victims while keeping sight of the discriminatory and oppressive political, economic and social institutions that still deny them full citizenship. As Lister (1998: 6) puts, `rights are not set in stone; they are always open to re-interpretation and re-negotiation and need to *be* defended and extended through political and social action`.

In Europe and elsewhere, citizenship becomes a powerful instrument of social closure, shielding prosperous states from the migrant poor. But citizenship is also an instrument of closure within states, where each state establishes a legal and ideological boundary between citizens and foreigners. Thus, every state discriminates between citizens and residing foreigners, reserving certain rights and benefits, as well as certain obligations for citizens. For some immigrants the status of immigrant is sustained by maintaining them in a status that permits them to remain indefinitely in the country and, outside the political domain, to participate in social and economic life on virtually the same terms as citizens (Jorgensen, 2008).

As a nation state, Germany has always been an “undeclared immigration country” although the political elite have not accepted this as a “fact” up to 2000s. Germany, with its historical foundation principle, has always a tendency to approach immigrants as foreign in its “differential exclusion model” (Castles, 2002). As we know, Turkish immigrants are labeled as *Ausländer*, namely foreigner, in Germany. This study alleges that the post-war immigration process is evident for the differential exclusion structure towards immigrants and their children. Germany, like the rich countries, has a `stratified legal rights system` (Morris, 2003) which ultimately causes `hierarchical citizenship` (Castles, 2005) to emerge within which Turkish immigrants and asylum seekers- but not ethnic German and EU immigrants- are at the bottom for some issues like participating in family

reunions, naturalization, education support, having access to labor market and welfare benefits.

The speaker of the government continues to defend the principle of *jus sanguinus*, which means that large numbers of Poles, Romanians, and former Soviet citizens who do not speak German or have never lived on German soil, but can prove a German ancestor, are granted German citizenship. Turkish adults or even youngsters of the second or by now third generation, or young adults who spent all their lives in Germany and are thoroughly acquainted with the German culture, work ethic and life style are not able to acquire German citizenship unless they give up their own (Abadan-Unat, 1992: 408).

The hierarchy consists of immigrants and between them and the German nation, in which Turkish and asylum seekers are at the bottom while ethnic Germans and Germans are at the top of the hierarchy tier. Current German legislation lawfully discriminates in several areas against foreigners though they may have been living in Germany for many years. There are regulations that apply to foreigners: the reduction of claims to social services, though no such reductions are applied to Germans or holders of the European Union passport; the possibility of being deported because a claim for social welfare was filed; and the limited access to higher education. Thus, a young third generation German of Turkish descent who opts for Turkish citizenship while residing in Germany can, technically speaking, be deported when applying for welfare (Mueller, 2006: 429).

Moreover, the European Union as a supra-national agent has also a hierarchical structure based mostly on third country nation immigrants. In fact, discrimination is written into the very nature of the European Community, which in each country leads directly to the definition of two categories of foreigners with unequal rights. The developing European

Community structures—particularly if they give rise to thorny issues of individual movement, frontier controls, social rights, and so on—can only sharpen this trend and make the ‘difference’ between Community ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ as a locus of overt or latent conflict (Balibar, 1991: 6).

The literature on international migration has primarily focused on the challenge of immigration to the nation state, highlighting the concepts of sovereignty, territoriality and citizenship as membership (for example, Joppke, 1998; Soysal, 1994). This citizenship literature has paid less attention to the challenge of immigration to the welfare state and social citizenship, and its relation to migrants’ stratified social rights in several dimensions and civic stratification system which directly or indirectly results in consolidating institutional discrimination in the nation state. Moreover, comparative welfare state research has devoted little attention to the social rights of migrants or the ethnic/racial dimension, even though societies are becoming more ethnically diverse and hierarchical through increasing international migration.<sup>3</sup> This study will be no exception in presenting the comparative analysis of welfare states regarding social rights of migrants, but focusing, instead, on the particular analysis of German stratified immigration policies.

As Yurdakul (2007) points out that early studies of “new” post–World War II migration perceived immigrants in class terms and focused on social inequality (e.g., Castles 1986; Castles & Kosack 1973; Portes & Bach 1985), but today immigrants are often identified by their ethnic and racial differences and, increasingly, by religion (Alba 2005; Kastoryano 2002; Waters 1999). This study primarily follows the former path by focusing on stratified rights and its implications for citizenship’s promise of equality.

---

<sup>3</sup> See for exception Morissens & Sainsbury, 2005; Sainsbury, 2006; Morris, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003.



On the other hand, it does also discuss the implications of ethnic, religious, and racial pluralism within nation-state structure regarding integration debates which is not separable from the existing ideology and practice of discrimination and tolerance within nation-state.

Indeed, the nation-state paradigm does not only work as a racialized narrative which marks the borders of citizenship with loyalty, blood, soil. This simply shows how ideology works. On the practical level, the capitalist nation-state, from the very outset, determines also who are eligible and have rights to work, who benefits from welfare system by marking people as insiders and outsiders and about participation and access to political and socio-economic life.

I will follow the argument that the migratory process works in a similar way in all countries with respect to chain migration and settlement, labor market segmentation, residential segregation, ethnic group formation, racism and discrimination, although the intensity varies. The main differences are to be found in state policies on immigration, settlement, citizenship and cultural pluralism. The differences, in turn, are linked to different historical experiences of nation-state formation.

Although it is a big step to introduce a new citizenship law in Germany (put into force in 2000), which ends the complex status for millions of children of immigrants (of having a foreign status inspite of being born and educated in Germany) on paper, the ethno-cultural perception, of the historical entity of Germany, still seems to dominate the general institutional opinion.

The ethno-culturalist opinion sees citizenship as the parental tie to the German race which could be gained by being born (*jus sanguinis*). The evidence is to give ethnic-Germans (*Aussiedler*) all around the world

(especially in ex- communist and Soviet countries) automatic naturalization if they apply to settle in Germany. After the post-cold war and the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, a large number of ethnic-Germans immigrants came to the country entitled and treated as native Germans.

In the following chapters, I review critiques of citizenship theories and discuss alternative concepts of theorizing immigrant- host-society relations, specifically theories of civic stratification and segmented assimilation. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork in Goslar/Germany, I examine how citizenship discourses that host societies produce in political debates and in the everyday life and interactions between native-born residents and Turkish immigrants influence the construction of identities and shape social relations in immigrant-receiving societies.

### **1.5. Local, National and Global Contexts also Matter**

In terms of structural analysis, while the study proposes to treat each country and immigrant groups as a specific case, it also recognizes that there are some structural similarities in Northern/Western receiving countries which are affected by nation-state formation and its citizenship interpellations, neoliberal economic restructuring, globalization. This study tries, on the one hand, to elaborate the specific context of Germany with a special reference to experiences of Turkish immigrant`s children in Goslar within institutional and structural practices and narratives. On the other hand, it is a search for recognizing similarities and differences ( regarding) affecting supra-national entities like globalization, international migration processes, neoliberal economic restructuring and transnationalism. In a sense, globally structural formations matter as well as local and national contexts do.

Nation-state is still practiced with a strong assumption that there is a homogenous cultural society (communitarian) or political community (republican), which racializes the boundaries of both inside and outside territory. When this racialized boundary logic is implemented inside the territory, the result is a more stratified civic participation of immigrant groups and native groups in a given society. It defines the legitimate conditions and eligibility whether some groups access or participate in the labor market or other welfare promotions in a sense that citizenship is not for all but some! This is a part of our contextual analysis. Context matters and it works on a local and national level to construct citizenship practices, and legal rights. European Union as a supra-national institution over its members introduces another complexity and layer into the integration processes of children of immigrants.

#### **1.6. The Distinction between Formal and Substantial Citizenship**

Citizenship is generally defined as the rights and obligations that accrue to individuals as full members of a community, normally the nation-state (Kofman, 1995; Marshall, 1950). However, citizenship cannot be about only formal rights and obligations, *per se*. The other face of citizenship is related to *realpolitik*, that is, political practices, socio-cultural narratives, and imaginations on tolerance, respect, recognition and management of any given society. According to such re-reading of citizenship, this study concerns citizenship by not reducing it in its formal and institutional definition but recognizes socio-economic, political and cultural practices that challenge formal definition of citizenship. For example, immigration processes as constituted by a set of social practices, which put more and more pressure on the limits of formal definition of citizenship in the nation-state. It is because, this study claims, the formal citizenship rights (or naturalization) approach holds out the promise of full equality before

the law for all members of a state but leaves unresolved how to transform formal into substantive equality.

The naturalization “on paper” (formal citizenship) is not always enough. Downward integration of third generation Turkish youth in the labor market and education is the proof of that. German citizenship and naturalization practices revolve around complete assimilation and strong identification with German language, culture and values. However, the labor market and education and socio-cultural reception do not match those expectations. As a matter of fact, state policies and institutional practices, as well as common sense in Germany do not reflect inclusive membership practices. By emphasizing the distinction between formal and substantial citizenship, this study believes that if the institutional practices and structures regarding citizenship and integration do not fulfill an existing law`s promise; it is still possible to relegate a group to the margins of society through various segregation and discrimination practices in the labor market and other broader social dimensions.

It is clear that citizenship still remains meaningful in their struggle for mobility across borders, for equal protection under the law, and for equal access to social and political rights. However, there is a discrepancy between promises of equity and fairness associated with liberal democratic citizenship and the reality in which even naturalized migrants experience discrimination.

This study basically claims that formal equality as citizens does not in itself overcome economic disadvantage or social marginalization of third generation children of Turkish immigrants, nor does it give a share in power in major economic and political institutions. Being a citizen is also no guarantee of protection from discrimination or violence, which may block minority members from exercising their formal civil, political and

social rights. The experience of migrants and ethnic minorities is that established institutions will not be able to tackle a range of practices that block their full membership and actual participation in society. They may even be instrumental in upholding such practices, due to discriminatory rules, stigmatizing institutional ideologies or their habitual administrative routines; routines that may not be intentionally discriminatory, yet discriminatory in their effects.

According to Schierup (2004: 23) most European debates on migration and citizenship have focused on formal citizenship—that is on the rules for access to citizenship for migrants, or for *becoming* a citizen. Less attention has been paid to substantial citizenship or *being* a citizen—that is the actual capacity to exercise the rights and obligations, as embodied in the Marshallian trinity (social, political and civil) of rights, connected with being a ‘full member’ of society.

Indeed, it can be claimed that the rights formally held are not necessarily secured in practice by underlining the process of ‘implementation deficit’. It is necessary to distinguish between formal citizenship and substantive citizenship—that is, between one’s legal status and one’s ability to realize the rights and privileges of societal membership. It is clear that formal and substantial citizenship often do not correspond. First, some may not be formal citizens and yet have rights and obligations in a state. The illustration for this could be the immigrants in a guest worker system that have no political rights (and some other rights) and citizenship although they have been participating in the social security system in Germany. Second, members of ethnically or racially distinguished minorities may also formally be citizens (e.g. third generation Turkish youth), and yet be excluded from enjoying their rights due to discrimination or poverty. For the latter, the most outstanding examples are Blacks and Hispanics in United States, Pakistanis in England, Algerians in France and Turks in

Germany.<sup>4</sup> Poverty spells exclusion from the full rights of citizenship in the social, political and civil spheres and undermines a person's ability to fulfill the public and private obligations of citizenship (Lister, 1990). In other words, as Lister (1998: 8) says, "it can be corrosive of the human agency that lies at the heart of citizenship". It is because, this study claims, the formal citizenship rights (or naturalization) approach holds out the promise of full equality before the law for all members of a state but leaves unresolved how to transform formal into substantive equality.

Castles and Davidson (2000) clearly point out that formal equality as citizens does not in itself overcome economic disadvantage or social marginalization, nor does it give a share in power in major economic and political institutions. Being a citizen is also no guarantee of protection from discrimination or violence, which may block minority members from exercising their formal civil, political and social rights. The experience of migrants and ethnic minorities is that established institutions will not be able to tackle a range of practices that block their full membership and actual participation in society. They may even be instrumental in upholding such practices, due to discriminatory rules, stigmatizing institutional ideologies (Grillo, 1985) or their habitual administrative routines; routines that may not be intentionally discriminatory, yet discriminatory in their effects. This raises the issue of pervasive and complex institutional change aimed at bridging the gap between the universalist formality of rights and the actual reality of a 'truncated citizenship' (Cross, 1998; cited by, Schierup, 2004: 23) for many ethnic minority members.

---

<sup>4</sup> It is relevant to note here that in white dominated societies, poverty is racially determined among citizens. In both the UK and the US for instance, black and minority ethnic groups are overrepresented at the bottom of the income distribution.

Here, I have to refer to the existence or specific problems experienced by ethnic minorities or migrants with respect to rights to citizenship and the substantial utilization of formal rights when granted. For example, in Germany the naturalization process has been facilitated for immigrants themselves. The children of immigrants have become entitled to the rights of citizenship who were born (*jus soli*) after the new citizenship law in 1999. Yet their actual opportunities for substantially enjoying these rights have been blocked by institutional practice, organizational set-ups, and informal power relationships based on the host society's inherently biased premises, neglecting the particular social preconditions and needs of immigrants and their descendants. The "downward integration" trends in educational attainment and unemployment rate among the children of immigrants (who have German citizenship) that contribute to their marginalization, confirm that there is a big difference between formal and substantial rights. In a sense that the formal rights are not enough, as Glenn (2000: 3) meticulously indicates, they are only paper claims unless they can be enacted through actual practice. The actual practice of citizenship and the question of what material and social conditions are necessary for people to actually exercise their rights and participate in the polity must be defined. Thus, the three complementary elements in the construction of citizenship are membership, rights and duties, and conditions necessary for practice.

Furthermore, most Western models of citizenship link a sense of belonging to a territorial political community most often represented by the nation-state (Castles and Davidson, 2000). Citizenship, in this respect, offers a bounded equality that reflects the historical articulation of national communities. This boundedness poses a contradiction between individual, abstract, 'universal' rights and particularistic notions of cultural community and nation. Citizenship serves equally as a mode of inclusion and incorporation in society and as a legal and cultural framework for

excluding those who deviate from societal norms. Though immigrants and other ‘deviant’ groups may enjoy formal citizenship status (or many of the privileges and rights of formal citizenship), they often remain excluded in substantive terms from dominant sectors of society and from dominant representations of society (Nagel, 2009: 6).

In terms of the sense of belongingness of naturalized children of immigrants, it is necessary to introduce the concept of a “disjunctive form of citizenship.” This concept, which has haunted Europe for a couple of decades, is related to the issue of trans-nationalism and in some ways to longer-standing discussions about exclusion and marginalization of immigrants. When migrants have the feeling they will never be accepted into the host society—whether due to cultural or religious differences, media representations, or state actions—they experience the disjunction between legal categories of citizenship and the more expressive sense of belonging to, or identification with, the political community. For some people, this is expressed in the ‘long distance nationalism’ identified by Glick-Schiller and Fouron (2001), while for others it may take the form of a heightened attachment to the country of origin as a way of differentiating themselves from others in the country in which they live. In this context, one might well expect to see the kinds of ‘disjunctive’ forms of citizenship discussed by in which the rights and formal aspects of citizenship are extended, even as social and substantive rights are not (Nagel, 2009: 8).

It is not surprising, therefore, that an important concern in recent years has been with the issue of citizenship and the rights of minorities. In this environment there is a growing awareness of the gap between formal citizenship and a *de facto* restriction of the economic and social rights of minorities as a result of discrimination, economic restructuring and the decline of the welfare state. The relationship between identity, difference, and culture needs to be located within a broader re-conceptualization of



substantive democracy that can include a place for the ‘rights of minorities’. The value of such politics is that it makes the complicated issue of difference fundamental to addressing the discourse of substantive citizenship; moreover, it favors looking at the conflict over relations of power, identity and culture as central to a broader struggle to advance the critical imperatives of a democratic society (Shuster and Solomos: 2001: 7).

The construction of democratic nation-states often meant compulsory assimilation of minority cultural groups. Today, ethnic minorities may have formal citizenship rights, but they are often excluded from real political and social rights. Citizenship in nation-states remains deeply differentiated or fragmented which can be seen in Table 1 and Table 2. In the nation-state, citizenship being reserved to a privileged one-nation emphasizes the exclusionary status of immigrants who have been termed as “metics” (Balibar, 1988), “quasi-citizens” (Castles, 1996), “partial citizenship” (Brubaker 1989), “denizenship” (Hammer, 1990), second-class citizens (Lister 1998), and “truncated citizenship” (Cross, 1998) by some migration scholars.

**Table 1: Hierarchies of citizenship within the Nation-state**

<b>Full citizens</b>	People born in the country plus naturalized immigrants –but excluding certain minority groups
<b>Denizens and guest-workers</b>	Foreign immigrants who have obtained some social citizenship right on the basis of long-term residence but not given by political and civil right.
	Ethnic, religious and social minorities-Formally enjoy all legal rights ,but may not be able to claim them due to discrimination and social exclusion
<b>Asylum seekers or Refugees</b>	Very limited right under special regimes (in fact, the forms of protection available themselves constitute a subsystem or civic stratification , ranging from full recognition ,through humanitarian leave to remain, to toleration or temporary protection (Morris, 2003:87).
<b>Undocumented migrants</b>	Lack nearly all rights except those guaranteed by international human right instruments
<b>Indigenous peoples</b>	Mainly in white settler societies (U.S.A , Canada, Australia,New Zealand and Latin America) . Subject to historical processes of dispossession, legal discrimination and social exclusion
<b>Gender divisions</b>	Legal discrimination against women now rare in Northern countries, though still common in the South. Institutional and informal discrimination persists.

(Source: Prepared by the author, (see especially Castles, 2005)

Last but not least, we can argue that class origin remains a predictor of life chances, occupation and income mostly among immigrants (whether naturalized or not) throughout the Western world. Exclusion and inclusion operate at both a legal and sociological level through ‘formal’ and

‘substantive’ modes of citizenship<sup>5</sup>. It is a distinctly second class citizenship status that is achieved when migrants are exploited economically as a reserve army of labor and are denied full substantive and/or formal citizenship rights. Tighter, increasingly discriminatory immigration controls, harsher interpretations of the rights of immigrants and more exclusionary residence qualifications for welfare benefits and services are all part of the battery of measures that have been adopted (Lister, 1998: 9).

**Table 2: Distinction between Formal and Substantial Rights in Germany**

	<b>Formal Equal Rights</b>	<b>Substantial Equal Rights</b>
<b>Political participation</b>	<i>Legal distinction</i> between CITIZENS (including Germans, <i>Aussiedler</i> , Europeans, naturalized migrants) VS. FOREIGNERS (denizens)	1. <i>Limited</i> due to lack of possibilities in direct influence at both the local and central political level 2. <i>Limited</i> due to weak informal political channels
<b>Labor market</b>	Formal unequal access eligibility between citizens, denizens and foreigners Laws against treating people differently in the labor market	1. <i>Limited</i> due to background in education and human capital 2. Limited due to lack of social networks and social capital  3. Limited due to institutional discrimination
<b>Social integration</b>	Legal distinctions between citizens, EU citizens, denizens VS foreigners regarding educational support and family reunification	1. Limited due to negative opinions and prejudices, lack of contact, a clearly outspoken us/them perspective 2. Limited due to media misrepresentation

<sup>5</sup> Taken together, as Ignatieff (1987: 410) meticulously indicates, Marx’s indictment of bourgeois citizenship—that it confers formal legal equality upon citizens without conferring upon them the social and economic equality necessary for the exercise of the right—is surely correct; and, once again, much of the history of citizenship since the nineteenth century can be understood as the attempt to reduce the contradiction between real inequality and formal equality in the civic contract of modern society.

		3. Limited due to weak contact and prejudices 4. Limited due to religious prejudices
--	--	---

**Source:** Prepared by the author

### 1.7. Why Integration?

Settlement of immigrants and their successive generations in Germany and throughout Europe after World War II have provided migrant scholars with opportunities (and policy makers in those territories) for rethinking the relationship between civil society and state, the public and private, the mechanisms of exclusion and inclusion, participation of political sphere, accessing welfare benefits and the sharing meanings of cultural practices in society.

I prefer the terms integration and incorporation instead of assimilation and acculturation which only imply the cultural or psychological affairs. The former are broader and more related to the other dimensions of society like politics, social life, education and labor market. When trying to understand assimilation, I am, indeed, by following recent works on the term, agnostic about its directions, degrees, and modalities, and ambivalent about its desirability<sup>6</sup>.

---

<sup>6</sup> According to Portes, Parker and Cobas (1980), the core of the assimilation perspective is a focus on culture and on the process of consensus building among dissimilar populations. The assimilation perspective, Rumbaut and Portes (2001) write, assumes that there is a natural process by which diverse ethnic groups come eventually to share a common evolving culture and gain equal access the opportunity structure of society. This process consists of gradually deserting old cultural and behavioral patterns in favor of new ones; once set in motion, immigrant groups move inevitably toward assimilation. Thus, assimilation is clearly an inadequate conception of how immigrant cultures become reactionary, negotiative and inreactive towards the receiving society and institutions.

Integration in this sense refers to both structural aspects such as educational and labor market status as well as to a broader and at times fuzzier concept that includes ideas of culture, ethnic or religious identity and citizenship (Thompson and Cruikshank, 2007: 1025).

Today, immigration and integration policy should be seen as an inseparable entity where legal rights and the practice of regulation are fundamentally related with each other. Both legislation governing immigrants' entry and the practice of regulation are designed as a result of the welfare protectionism in national resources, and labor market and the cultural/political preservation of a supposedly homogenous native community. Hall (1991), for example, has identified a related cultural crisis whereby – in response to the erosion of the nation state – national economies and national cultures adopt a defensive and regressive exclusionism, most apparent in policies and attitudes concerned with immigration. Despite the supposed transcendence of the nation state, and the growth in institutions for the trans-national assertion of rights, we have seen pockets of racial violence, selective tightening of immigration controls and the demonization of immigrants and asylum seekers. Thus Smith (1995:15) writes, 'fears of immigrant waves have fuelled resentments and spurred renewed interest in cultural identity, national solidarity and defense of national interests.' (Morris: 2002: 3). Then, the most fascinating aspect of the entry or settlement of immigrants is, therefore, their impact on the substance of and criteria for membership, the rights that attach to inclusion and the mechanisms that lead to exclusion in nation-state.

Certainly, in Europe, the main emphasis is still on the costs and benefits for receiving societies, and on questions of migration control (or, more euphemistically, 'migration management'). One reflection of this is the renewed preoccupation with theories of assimilation. In the 1970s and

1980s, many countries had shifted away from assimilationist approaches to migrants and minorities. But the trend towards multiculturalism or pluralism came to a halt in the 1990s, in the face of political and media claims of supposed threats to national identity and security from migrants (especially Muslims) who allegedly refuse to get integrated and who carry on ‘parallel lives’<sup>7</sup> (Castles, 2008: 6).

The result has been a revamping of assimilationist theories to fit contemporary northern societies. Neo-assimilationist approaches (Alba and Nee 2003; Entzinger 2003; Joppke and Morawaska 2003) have recently been joined by discourses on social cohesion and social capital, which claim that diversity endangers the solidarity on which democratic nation-states are founded (see Vasta 2007). Such social scientific accounts have been linked to changes in national policies, such as the introduction of ‘integration contracts’ and citizenship tests in a range of states, including France, Germany, Britain, the Netherlands and Australia.

---

<sup>7</sup> Throughout this dissertation, “diaspora” and “transnational community” will not be used as conceptual tools or terms. Since diaspora – as well as transnational community – is too restrictive term, which imagines a rather homogeneous cross-border social formation. It repeats the same mistake as much migration scholarship which assumes a rather homogenous national, ethnic or religious groupings (Faist, 2007: 11). Diasporas tend to constitute a specific type of transnational community. History abounds with examples of diasporas. The Jewish experience is usually the first to come to mind as a prototype for diaspora formation; and could be extended to include African Americans, Armenians and Palestinians. In diasporas, a group has suffered some kind of traumatic event which leads to the dispersal of its members, and there is a vision and memory of a lost or an imagined homeland still to be established, often accompanied by a refusal of the receiving society to recognize in full the cultural distinctiveness of the immigrants. Diasporas frequently include a complete cross-section of community members who are dispersed in many diverse regions of the world. Thus, it is inappropriate to apply the term diaspora to settlers and labour migrants because they have not undergone traumatic experiences, nor can it be said that most of the members of these groups yearn to return to their lost homeland (Faist, 2000).

## 1.8. Assimilationist Paradigm of Integration in Germany

In analyzing immigrant and their children's integration into the host society, there are diversified theoretical frameworks which can be grouped as canonical assimilation, segmented assimilation, multiculturalism, cosmopolitanism, trans-nationalism, and diversity management. Some of these theories are practically inspired and implemented in some European countries. Specifically, when we look at Germany, because the guest-worker was expected to return home after a certain period (rotation principle), there was no proper and consistent integration policy up to the 1990s in Germany. Afterwards, when the German state recognized that Turkish guest-workers are not temporary and they became permanent settlers, German federal government introduced new citizenship laws in 1999 (implemented in 2001) to give new born children of immigrants a naturalization opportunity, although the ultimate aim of the German integration project is to assimilate or merge all immigrants into the German mainstream culture, tradition and society. The policy of Germany about integration can be defined as an assimilationist one, even though there were some changes recently especially in the Green-Social democratic coalition<sup>8</sup> (1997-2004).

---

<sup>8</sup> For the Minister of the Interior, Integration means "knowledge of the German language, and acceptance of the German constitution as well as of the political culture" (Schily, 2000: 1). The Commissioner for Integration defines Integration as a complex societal process that also entails efforts on the part of nonimmigrants. Although most parties go to great lengths to emphasize that "Integration does not mean assimilation. Its goal is not the complete adaptation of migrants to the culture and ways of life of the receiving state" (CDU, 2001, page 17) the same document also states that the "basis for living together in Germany is not multicultural arbitrariness, but the value system of Christian occidental culture" (pages 17-18). In this latter statement, an acceptance of a Christian and occidental value system and culture forms the necessary condition for Integration, an expectation that also emerged from formulations of a Christian and occidental Deutsche Leitkultur (German guiding culture) to which immigrants ought to adapt (Merz, 2000). These latter proposals suggest a higher level of adaptation to German society than the earlier statement implies, especially when we consider that about two thirds of Turkish immigrants are Muslims. But such notions are in no way limited to the CDU. Germany's Minister of the Interior, a member of the governing SPD party, stated in a recent interview that the assimilation of immigrants was "desirable, but not imperative" (die tageszeitung 2005, page 3). Although he rejected proposals of defining a Christian and occidental Leitkultur, he insisted that the cultural profile of German society needed to be protected (die

In Germany, the immigration and integration policies have only recently been seriously implemented, even though the history of labor immigration from underdeveloped countries can be dated back after World War II. The predominant form of integration policy is mostly parallel with assimilationist perspective with a special reference to German *leitkultur* (leading culture) by implying German superior identity and culture.

Thus, Germany has failed to produce a sustainable harmonious integration and practice by putting the issue merely as political debate in the hands of German scholars as policy-makers and politicians. One can recognize that this integration failure by the German state is also responsible for a reactionary identity formation of younger generations who concentrate more on their ancestry`s religion and ethnicity as identity sources.

### **1.9. “Segmented Integration” and “Divided Fates” of Children of Turkish Immigrants in Goslar**

This study is well aware that Turkish youth are not a homogeneous group nor is integration a linear process: Integration includes different groups of migrants categorized especially by their legal status (e. g. asylum applicants, civil war refugees, immigration of family members of labour migrants, ethnic Germans) and by their class, ethnic and religious background (upper, middle or working class Turkish, Kurdish, Alevi, Sunni peoples). These different groups move along in fairly different ways. Local governments face different Turkish migrant groups with different

---

tageszeitung 2005). Hence, although there are differences in the ways that different parties conceptualize Integration in Germany, these conceptualizations formulate assimilation discourses that is, expectations for immigrants to adapt to the host society. Differences in assimilation discourses depend on which dimension of adaptation (political or cultural) receives priority (cited by Ehrkamp, 2006: 1679).



legal rights and claims which are confronted with different problems of social, economic and political inclusion.

As is often said integration is a two way process. This is not only a moral or political claim, but a social reality. The “openness” of the receiving society is a necessary precondition for the integration of immigrants. Thus integration research must not only be on immigrants, but also on *natives and the openness of their institutions*. Barriers to integration- be it individual or institutional forms of discrimination are also fundamental parts of this research.

Integration is not linear, and “necessarily” progressing to a certain outcome. The process may be a curvilinear and have very different outcomes. The migrants receiving society is not homogenous and is stratified on a vertical dimension. It has also marginalized structures, like a subculture of poverty and welfare dependency, into which immigrants may be included on a material basis, but also with regard to language and values. This kind of integration beyond society’s core institutions has been basically formulated by “segmented assimilation” by Portes and Zhou (1993) and here may be called “segmented integration” in order to pay more attention to the processes of active participation of Turkish immigrants and their children.

Segmented assimilation theory rejects the assumption of a relatively linear unidirectional process of identification into the dominant group ethnicity (Rumbaut, 1996: 126) It says that there are distinct modes of immigrant adaptation corresponding with structural social contexts of reception; accordingly, it is unrealistic to talk about one homogenous and hegemonic culture-whether global or national (Rumbaut and Portes, 2001: 5-6). This theory contends that the assimilation process is likely produce different ethnic identities and new ethnic groups which subsequently assimilate into

other ethnic subcultures. While accepting segmented assimilation theory's acknowledgement of heterogeneity, my study shows that Turkish immigrants and their offspring might be better understood as a case of segmented integration to the labor market, education and mainstream culture while retaining their own reactionary and negotiative group identities of their own.

In terms of this study, the integration is not uni-linear and one-form but curvilinear, segmented and fragmented in various forms. Portes, Fernandez-Kelly and William Haller (2009) have shown that assimilation of the children of immigrants is very segmented and divided especially for the second generation in the United States in that exogenous factors like family composition, human capital, modes of incorporation (state-society and community), social contexts of receiving countries, and barriers confronting children of immigrant are all key determinants for their segmented integration patterns. The first determinant of integration is the pre-existing condition of the receiving society, that is, hostile or affirmative implications for the immigrant, which determines the openness of the host society to give them equal opportunity in education and the labor market. This reveals the degree of institutional discrimination in the receiving society. The second is about social class, family form and background of children of immigrants, which determines their social, human and cultural capital to survive and integrate in the (host) society. "Human capital, an important determinant, can be defined as formal education and occupational skills, translates into competitiveness in the host labor market and the potential for achieving desirable positions in hierarchies of status and wealth" (Portes, Fernandez-Kelly, Haller, 2009: 1079).

Those determinants will be the major factors whether the children of immigrants experience upward mobility, namely successful integration or not (if not, downward assimilation is the alternative way).

Followed the “segmented assimilation thesis,” the study argues that the children of immigrants in Goslar individually follow different paths in order to integrate into German society and construct their identity position, which depends on their family background, human capital, opportunity structures, and perceptions about the context of their reception in Goslar. Some Turkish youths prefer to connect with German society in a very positive and intensive way. Some others question the kind of positive relation by returning to their parents` cultural and national resources. While some Turkish youths choose to be involved in social and political affairs actively in Goslar, the others prefer to follow associational paths in which they have contact with inter-cultural or international groups. Finally, other Turkish youth directly define themselves by affiliating with cultural or religious organizations and behave accordingly. Thus, there are multiple individual paths to adapt to German society.

The study claims that the processes of integration and exclusion of Turkish immigrants are varied, and can and do occur through different mechanisms. Furthermore, it aims at accounting for the political, social, economic and physical patterns of exclusion via providing an analysis of the contemporary situation in the German society. In this way, I try to establish the basis for the exploration of the structural and cultural constraints that influence Turkish immigrants and their offspring`s desires and choices regarding and social mobility and integration.

Institutional discrimination refers to the rules, routines, attitude and behavior patterns in institutions, which are obstacles to ethnic or religious minorities in achieving the same rights and opportunities that are available

for the majority of the population. It can be emerged in open or unintentional ways.

In this study, I draw the conclusion that institutional discrimination can be found in the labor market, housing, politics, legal system, education, and welfare system, etc. Another conclusion is that there is a strong relation between the civic stratification system and institutional discrimination in so far as the former consolidates the latter in the nation-state structure where there is ethnic hierarchy and tension between immigrant community and native society. The denial of this stratified system naturally benefits those with the power to discriminate.

In Goslar, Turkish immigrants have predominantly experienced institutional discrimination in both the education process and labor market. Even though they are born and educated in Germany, it is often the case that the children of immigrants suffer from the high rate of unemployment and school drop outs, isolation, marginalization and segregation due to the individual and institutional discrimination which are supported by the ethno-cultural understanding of citizenship in Germany.

Due to the structural reasons caused by German society and institutions, the experiences and integration conditions of children of Turkish immigrants in Goslar are contaminated by a huge amount of unemployment, low education rate, early school dropout, crime and drug addiction as a kind of downward integration. Downward integration does not emerge from the stories of the Turkish respondents as a deliberate path in Goslar, but as an outgrowth of a web of constraints, bad luck, and limited opportunities.

“Participation” and “access” are major factors, which have to be understood when investigating immigrants and their descendants within

inclusionary and exclusionary conditions framed by citizenship implementations. Kofman (1995: 122) argues that the active participation in society which many progressive theorists of citizenship desire is predicated not just on resources obtained through the state, market or other social bodies, but also on the recognition by others as legitimate members of the society in question.

Therefore, the important part of this study involves analyzing the dimensions of participation of the political sphere, sharing meanings of cultural practices and accessing welfare benefits, political, social and civil rights by which the identity construction of Turkish immigrants and their descendants are mostly shaped. Needless to say, all these participation and access processes includes power relations on discourses and practices. The analysis of discursive construction of inclusion and exclusion and of implied fluid and shifting but at the same time rigid boundaries is also a challenging dimension which needs to be analyzed. The power to provide and regulate participation and access for immigrants and their descendants lies in the hands of bureaucracies and administrations on a national and transnational level.

Also, successful integration relies on multiple dimensions of the host society. Following Reitz, (2002: 1006) this study emphasizes four significantly inter-related dimensions as determinants of successful integration: 1.pre-existing ethnic or race relations within the host population; 2. differences in labor markets and related institutions; 3.the impact of government policies and programs, including immigration policy, policies for immigrant integration, and policies for the regulation of social institutions; and 4.the changing nature of international boundaries, part of the process of globalization. These four dimensions intersect one another in significant ways. In the analyses of these intersections, the additional concept of culture often plays a role.

On the other hand, if we follow Esser and Heckmann`s (Heckmann, 2006: 10) integration analysis; social inequality and social differentiation are both the central dimensions of social structure where integration of immigrants takes place. Social inequality has been and is being intensively studied in all countries with a sociological tradition and everywhere it is of high political relevance. Whereas structures of inequality and ethnic stratification are social aggregates, structures of social differentiation refer to different patterns of social relations along socially relevant lines. Functional, cultural or ethnic differentiation would be varieties of social differentiation. A division of labor would be an economic form of functional differentiation. Group formation on a cultural or ethnic basis that happens after immigration into a country would be examples of cultural or ethnic differentiation.

#### **1.10. Restructuring Global Economy: Welfare Chauvinism as an Emergence of the New Right**

Restructuring the global economy after the 1980s, neo-liberalism entailed de-industrialization, retreat from social welfare and bifurcation of the labor market not only in Germany but also all over the world. Germany, like any other rich country, moved some factories into the cheap labor countries, (Taiwan, China, Malaysia, etc.) which deepened unemployment and the economic crisis in the country. In these harsh conditions, chauvinism emerged together with the right extremist party, NDP (Nationalist Democratic Party), immigrants and their children were seen as the scapegoats of economic crisis and labeled as welfare cheaters and burdens. This process can be defined as `welfare chauvinism` in Germany. It is contaminated with xenophobia as a result of which there were many arson attacks against Turkish and Muslim communities, which peaked between 1987 and 1995 when unemployment and the cut of welfare benefit

conditions were increased by the neoliberal restructuring economy. However, academic studies (e.g. Gary Freeman) on economy and migration underline that those immigrants in the form of temporary guest-workers have been exact contributors in the process of industrialization of developed countries.

The rise of the extreme Right and the escalation of violence are obviously related to immigration, for anti-immigrant campaigns have been at the centre of rightwing mobilization. But these phenomena are also closely linked to economic restructuring and the decline of the welfare state, which lead to declining living standards and socio-economic insecurity for many people. The decline of the labor movement has been another factor which has created the 'social space' for the rise of the extreme Right (Wieviorka, 1993). European integration has been ambivalent in this context: on the one hand it has been seen as an attack on national identity, of which extreme right parties have become the self-appointed defenders. On the other hand, some far-right groups have seen themselves as the bearers of 'European values and culture' against the 'invading hordes' - especially those from Islamic countries. Finally, the end of the Cold War - which had after all provided a sense of political purpose and unity in both West and East - is a further factor of uncertainty clearly linked to extreme-right mobilization, particularly in Germany (Castles, 1996: 53).

In the old German model of long-term employment, the firm and the trade union had been sites of inter-ethnic communication and integration. Discrimination against migrants had been less pronounced at work than in other social areas. The decline of this model and its replacement with contract workers thus had negative effects on social integration and inter-group relations. This was no doubt one factor behind the increase in violence following German reunification (Hunger and Thränhardt 2001; cited by Castles, 2008: 16).

There is no one type of immigration but several types and not all of them are problematic regarding receiving states. The only problem seems about manual labor immigration without which the informal, service and agricultural economy of the countries would break down abruptly. Although the Northern states need such kind of manual labor (unskilled or semi-skilled) in the future, there has been no clear-cut or consistent immigration policy and program on this issue. However, the conditions of professional immigration are well defined and are a clear process when compared to manual labor. Here we can claim that the immigration policy of the Northern countries is highly selective and contaminated with a double standard in a sense that while tightening the border for low-skilled labor by not serving an elaborated immigration policy, it welcomes the professional immigrants and eases the whole process regarding permanent settlement.

Indeed, the sorry story of much migration to European countries in the second half of the twentieth century involved precisely the attraction, and confinement of, migrants to low-skilled sectors which subsequently suffered severe contraction in the face of international competition and technological change. This left migrants economically and socially marginalised, giving rise to severe problems in the second and even third generations (Boucher, 2008).

### **1.11. German *Leitkultur* as a Hatred View of Other (Immigrant) Cultures**

By means of retrospective analysis, one can recognize that perhaps more than elsewhere, in Germany the concept of race has become anathema as German society began to confront the crimes of the Nazi regime after World War II. As Stolcke suggests, it was the *Auslander*, the foreigner,



who became the polar opposite of the citizen. More clearly than in the case of France and Britain, whose large (post)colonial populations were somewhat ambiguous in their status as nationals, the legacy of the Third Reich's population policies and the fact that Germany had lost its colonies in World War I, meant that the *Auslander* seemed to combine unambiguously cultural and ethnic difference with the legal status as a non-national (Henkel 2008: 114-115).

Germany has traditionally followed the concept of an ethnic nation for decades and has denied its immigration reality. Since the end of the 1990s official migration policies changed as they now aimed to include immigrants into the society. The amendment of the Citizenship Law in 1999 and the implementation of the Immigration Act in 2004 reflect this new stance in migration policies and the concept of belonging. Nevertheless, they may not be interpreted as a comprehensive policy of multiculturalism as they are mainly based on the model of assimilation, meaning that the individual migrant has to adapt to 'German norms and values'. First, the fact that an increasing number of foreigners may gain German citizenship apparently results in a fear of loss of control and evokes a new debate about the criteria of 'Germanness' and how to enforce them. Second, evidence of social exclusion of migrants and members of ethnic minorities induced a debate about who is responsible for these phenomena. Third, the conflict between Islam and the Western world contributes to the construction of the "Muslim other" also within German society. Against this background the concept of *Leitkultur* and 'Germanness' as opposed to 'multiculturalism' has gained an immense attention. (Miera, 2007: 26) Thus, the immigrant culture and religion (Islam) is seen as inferior, backward, patriarchic etc. It is assumed that all these residues should fade away or amalgamate into the mainstream German culture (*leitkultur*). This situation creates institutional discrimination towards immigrant minority.

The public discourse on migrants and migration in Germany was characterised by the refusal to accept the commonness of immigration. As early as in the 1960s and 1970s a stigmatising “ghetto and dis-integration discourse” evolved which in part fell back to the nationalist and racist discourse about so-called ‘foreign worker’ (*Fremdarbeiter*) who were recruited or forced to labour during World War I. But it also drew on forced labourers under National Socialism. Migrants were called ‘guest workers’ (*Gastarbeiter*) or ‘foreigners’ (*Ausländer*), reflecting the general view that they did not belong to German society, and would once leave the country (Miera, 2007: 5).

This conflict-oriented approach on immigrants requests furthermore the acceptance of a German *Leitkultur* (guiding culture), a notion, which itself cannot be defined. Oberndörfer (2005) argues that there exists no German *Leitkultur*, which would give lifelong guidance to the *culturally distinctive foreigners*. In fact, how could it be possible to define the guiding culture of a democratic pluralistic society? How could we convince human beings in such a society to adjust themselves to customary rules of the native population or how could the traditional attitudes that they have taken over from their ancestors, be abandoned? What kind of incentives or predicaments should be used to achieve the acceptance of the *Leitkultur*? Could we then speak of a democratic society, if members of this society are urged to give up their national identities or religious faiths? Is the essential *Leitkultur* of a democratic society not the adherence to legal obligations, to democratic rules and compliance with fundamental and human rights? Such questions should surely be answered before seriously suggesting a social and even culturally heterogeneous group to adopt a certain *Leitkultur*, a highly notorious notion, which has different amorphous definitions, and which causes additional nuisance to an issue that nonetheless turned out to be complicated (Ünver, 2006: 30).

For instance, every nation-state, which has been forged by a process of linguistic ethnicization, is forced today, under the impact of globalization, to seek the means of going beyond exclusivism or racial ideology. Will Germans be compelled to find in the transformation of the European polity the means to abandon their national phantasms of blood, body, and language, ‘in order to communicate with the individuals of other peoples with which [they] share the same interests and, to some extent, the same future’? (Balibar, 1995: 105). Although the machinations of global capitalism produce ruptures, disparities, fluidities, and paradoxes that may serve as an impetus for linguistic transformation, such currents of change are always culturally mediated: systems of meaning, memory, and politics impose limits on the flexibility of national imaginaries. And while the fate of a multilingual Europe still remains uncertain, the push for national sovereignty and the promotion of ethno-linguistic racism has had a decisive impact on the turn toward the violently exclusionary politics of a United Germany (Linke, 2004: 223).

In general, one might seriously wonder’, Balibar (1998: 128–9). suggests, ‘how the formation of a “United Europe” – insofar as functions and symbols of the nation-state are transferred to the level of the “Community” – might affect the future production of fictive ethnicity and linguistic racism. Or stated differently, ‘will the community of European states favor the establishment of a European co-lingualism (and if so, adopting which languages) or lean toward the idealization of a European demographic identity, conceived mainly in opposition to the “southern populations”, that is, Turks, Arabs, Blacks’ (Balibar, 1995: 105). Furthermore, we might ask whether the political, administrative, and educational institutions of a united Europe will perceive Arabic, Turkish, and other immigrant Asian or African languages on equal terms with English, French, and German. Or will these languages be excluded as foreign?

The principle problem on the whole seems to be the lack of adequate approaches which recognize not only the cultural dispute, but also, with even greater attention, the economic and social circumstances that influence every member of the society irrespective of their cultural, religious or ethnic identity, and especially reconsidering the cultural supremacy and segregation paradigms with respect to social matching.

### **1.12. Reactive Identity Formation**

Portes and Rumbaut (1996, 2001) introduced the concept of “reactive ethnicity” to describe the rise of defensive identities and solidarities to counter confrontations with an adverse native mainstream. Moreover, the interviewees’ religious and ethnic identities were shaped and further strengthened by the post-September 11 hostility as well as the perceived threat to both Islam and their individual identities. According to Smith’s (1998) theory of sub-cultural identity formation, as long as the perception of a threat remains, personal identities and group solidarity will likely continue to be strong.

Practices of exclusion, discrimination or forced assimilation against immigrants can prevent integration and encourage a homeland orientation. In such cases, immigrant communities with their own economic, cultural, religious and political infrastructures may emerge. Where immigrants experience marginalization, their best chance of success lies in mobilizing community solidarity and transnational links – a sort of ‘reactive ethnicity’ (Castles 2002: 1161)

The “reactive identity formation” part of the study addresses how several problems and phenomena depicted as ‘ethnic’ and “religious” are often far more complex. In short, this is because social conditions, residential

legislation, legacies of discrimination, as well as, institutional or organizational structures and necessities, tend to contradict equal opportunities.

In Germany, policy makers and media have put strong emphasis on the boundaries between “us” and “them”, which makes for counter-identity formation, emerging as ethnic group solidarity and political mobilization. This process of forging a *reactive ethnicity or identity* in the face of perceived threats, persecution, discrimination and exclusion is not uncommon among second and even third generation Turkish people in Germany. It is one mode of ethnic identity formation, highlighting the role of a hostile context of reception in accounting for the rise rather than the erosion of ethnicity among both natives and the children of Turkish immigrants in Germany.

The discourse and practice on reactive identity formation can best be summarized by the help of the famous expression of social facts “reaping what you sow” Practices of exclusion, discrimination or forced one-dimensional assimilationist policies against immigrants can prevent integration and encourage a homeland orientation. In such cases, immigrant communities (e.g. enclave) with their own economic, cultural and political infrastructures may emerge. Where immigrants experience marginalization, their best chance of success lies in mobilizing community solidarity and transnational links – a sort of ‘reactive ethnicity.’

Negative attitudes on the part of receiving countries can also encourage transnational communities. Policies that accept linguistic and cultural maintenance are conducive to transnational linkages. On the other hand, anti-discrimination policies make it easier for immigrants to succeed in mainstream society. Since these are both aspects of multicultural policy, it seems that multiculturalism does not automatically encourage trans-

nationalism, but perhaps gives immigrants more choice on the degree to which they want to carry out cross-border activities (Castles 2002: 1161).

In the words of Portes, the ways immigrants are incorporated in the host society also affect their propensity to engage in transnational initiatives. The existing evidence suggests that immigrants who become dispersed and whose inconspicuous presence protects them from discrimination are less prone to engage in these ventures. On the other hand, transnational activities flourish in highly concentrated communities, especially those that have been subjected to a hostile reception by the host society's authorities and citizenry. Large co-ethnic concentrations create multiple opportunities for transnational enterprise, while extensive outside discrimination forces the group inwards encouraging durable contacts with its home communities (Portes, 2003: 880). It is very understandable that in such a context, homeland contact fundamentally contributes to the identification process in which homeland identity sources like religion and ethnicity or other traditional entities would be main sources of immigrants to define themselves.

The return to roots, or what has been aptly called “Euro Turkism,” or “Euro-Islam” can be seen as a functional adaptation of socioeconomic and cultural factors that lead to marginalization and discrimination by and from German society. This process is reinforced by linguistic factors that limit social interaction or integration between Turks and Germans, especially in leisure activities. Numerous studies report that primary interaction among Turks in Germany takes place within the context of the extended family, followed by contacts in the neighborhood. Being enmeshed in Turkish culture communities, with very few identifying themselves as “German,” and most expressing religious affiliation, many Turks live in a context that structurally inhibits social interaction outside their enclaves (Mueller, 2006: 432).

The process of “distantiation” of Turks from German society has been subsumed in Germany under the term re-ethnicization or re-identification, the return to the ethnic roots and the development of a corresponding cultural and, sometimes, religious framework.

Rather than viewing an enhanced ethnic consciousness as a political regression, the rise of a parallel Turkish society in Germany can be conceptualized as a logical response to two social processes of postindustrial society: privatization and the quest for a sense of identity. These processes can also be observed among other segments of German society, though paradoxically it is easier for a young Turk to satisfy a desire for identity in a Turkish neighborhood in a large German city than would be the case for a young German who lacks such an engulfing social web (Mueller, 2006: 434).

If not legend it is illogical to claim that there are a number of Islamist fundamentalists completely rejecting integration into Western society. Most German-Turks want economic integration and access to employment, housing, and other social services, and the desire for cultural and social incorporation but in their own way. As Cem Ozdemir, a former member of the German parliament, views it, as long as Muslims respect the German constitution, speak a bit of the language and accept the values of society that are universal and not specifically Christian, their readiness to fit in should not be questioned (The Economist 2002).

### **1.13. Youth Centers: between Violence and Normalization**

Based on my observation in the two youth centers, *Gleis 95* and *BGX* in Goslar, most Turkish youth who visit the youth center have problems with their parents at home because of high unemployment among immigrant

families. As their families are also unemployed, they have to live in small or narrow houses. These young people, rather than seeking their real cultural roots, are tempted to integrate into a community that does not follow the laws of the traditional adult society of their own, but the laws of what the media calls the "world of the young."

It can be stated that the behaviors of the youth represent neither a cultural conservatism nor a full assimilation but the statement of `integration by preserving multiple values` can probably define their situation. The Turkish youth` demands in Goslar can be classified as both aspirations of `not being subjected to external restriction` and "free cultural life as much as possible". These two demands demonstrate that they want to be normal and they want to be treated normally.

This fieldwork in Oker and Goslar exposes the structural exclusion mechanisms as an outcome of ghettoization process creates a youth typology within which the children of immigrants challenge the structural (restrictive) rules by trying to preserve their rights and identity to stay who they are. This youth typology is not far from the anarchist youth movement of Afro-Americans, Germans, Arabs and Turks who have anger against the structural rules. Those groups have the shared experiences of rage and humor.

The transformations experienced by new generations contribute to the development of a new situation in which German politics has also changed its perception from a `non-immigration country` into `a multicultural society` albeit it occurs gradually. German politicians and elites do not want to get rid of the integration philosophy of differentialist exclusionism that has been especially true for cultural and political issues and which remains the most challenging question in relation to the children of Turkish immigrants as equal partners. Although the differential exclusionist



policies were more valid for and functioned well against guest-workers, it is still accurate and concentrated in popular and official discourses which indirectly affect the children of immigrants.

Like their parents, the second and third generation of Turkish youth is not a homogenous group in Goslar. They come from a different class, ethnicity, religious sects, and occupations. Their citizenship statuses may be also different. Still, little is known about the contours of these new citizens because they have multiple resources (mixture of local, nationals and global) to construct the identification process. What we know today is that globalization creates new identity forms where culture and territory cannot be easily thought of as an overlapping entity. Culture increasingly become rootless, namely culture cannot be defined within a bounded territory with a special reference to one nationality. Identified by a bounded territory, culture is no longer a resource of collective identity.

Accordingly, there is also an affirmative picture in youth centers in Goslar, though it is relatively rare case. During my conversation, interviews and daily activities, I have recognized that some Turkish youth who are the children of middle class and professionals can express themselves freely and strongly mostly in German and by using their body language and gestures effectively. They can demand whatever they want, and can preserve their rights like most of the German youths. There seems to be no substantial differences between German and these Turkish youth in terms of self-esteem and self-confidence.

#### **1.14. Turkish Youth in the Labor Market and Education**

Guest-worker programs assuming that labor migrants as a temporary sojourn put Turkish immigrants into vulnerable conditions where they

deprived of fundamental civil, social and political rights as well as the deteriorated housing and working situations for a long time.

Research on the second and third generation of postwar immigrants is a relatively new phenomenon. Only in the past decade has it become a central focus in the study of immigrant educational and labor market integration. Initiated in the United States and then also more intensively discussed in Europe, a theoretical debate has evolved in which research on the second generation plays a fundamental role. The research began to emerge in the mid-1990s, and one of the first publications was *The New Second Generation*<sup>9</sup> (Portes, 1996).

Visibility of the children of the Turkish-Muslim immigrants in the public sphere thanks to the family unification, after which places of worship, the headscarf, children's education became the central issues in public after the very beginning of the 1980s. Indeed, hospitality, democracy, toleration, liberty and cordiality of receiving countries have become also corresponding political issues in Germany and other Western countries since then. The visibility of children of immigrants and their broader participation in the receiving society has shown the limitations of Western democracy and liberty where the (subordinated Eastern) people have not been seen as a really deserving one.

As a matter of fact, the question for the third generation is not whether integration will take place, but to what extent and to what segment of German society will they integrate. In other words, for children of Turkish immigrants, the question is no longer whether to stay or return but how to

---

<sup>9</sup> Accordingly, this new situation forces Turkey to change its perception of the Turkish immigrants in so far as Turkey can no longer see the children or grandchildren of immigrants as a "potential remittance sender or voter" like in the past.

secure permanent spaces for their intercultural skills and identities. The overview of education and labor market in Goslar provides an analysis of processes of differentiation, evident in education, pertaining to inter-ethnic relations, and how ethnicity plays a role in education and labor market. It also looks at official statistics regarding issues like school attendance, and particularly statistics disaggregated by ethnicity. Furthermore, it deals with the processes of 'othering', 'racialization', and 'minoritization' among second and third generation Turkish immigrants. The claim here is that integration of the Turkish Muslim population will be more difficult within the conditions of deprivation, lack of access and barriers to social and political participation they experienced directly and indirectly.

Today, overt restrictions on movement, access and entry are formulated not in terms of race or culture but in terms of citizenship, and discriminatory effects are inevitably indirect. Certainly, visa regulations, resource constraints and the informal operations of border control, internal regulation and policing tend to focus suspicion on third country nationals (and also the 'visibly different' minorities) and have the effect of eroding their legitimate rights, affecting both employment opportunities and access to services.

Immigration and integration policy concerns about the national management of welfare and the labor market, and reservations about the cultural or political character of migrant populations; sometimes encourages (especially high skilled professionals) entry because there is continuing demand for labor at both extremes of the class spectrum, and a commitment to international human rights, which can be restricted but rarely completely denied. There is a clear contradiction between equal treatment based on human rights commitments and the overriding desire to protect welfare resources alongside restrictions on entry. This contradiction

is accompanied by preservation of cultural and political unity of national society.

Germany is facing a period of economic stagnation and dwindling resources. In that context, the absence of effective immigration policies and anti-discrimination legislation will result in large segments of the German-Turkish communities becoming part of a permanent poor. The German governing elite is caught in the dilemma posed by the xenophobia of large segments of the German population, large “Christian” parties, and the objective need for policies fostering economic integration rather than the marginalization of German-Turks<sup>10</sup>. Framing the issues in terms of assimilation and acculturation or exclusion and segregation may be helpful, but ignores the socioeconomic and political context. Culture, religion, fundamentalism, the Koran, are readily invoked, deplored, or reconceptualized in order to avoid facing the emerging underclass claiming an ethnic identity of their own (Mueller, 2006: 440).

Why does migration occur? Neo-classic migration theories assume that migrants or their households/families generally do move to provide for themselves and for their children better education and career opportunities, or at least that they expect a betterment. Looking at the Turkish migrants in Goslar, we can witness that the first generation relatively they feel better in Germany than before in their life-style but while evaluating from structural perspective their children mostly stuck in terms of social mobility in education and labor market. The above expectation was not

---

<sup>10</sup> Though nobody can deny the numerical reality of immigration, the emphasis on Germany not being a "classical" immigrant country does accurately reflect a reluctance to invite immigrants to settle down permanently. It remains to be seen whether the grand coalition of Christian and Social Democrats under Chancellor Angela Merkel's leadership will meet the integration challenges that arise from the fact that Germany most definitely *is* an immigration country, whether "classical" or not. The integration of Turkish immigrants and their offspring is an important challenge for Europe, as reflected in the European Commission's Common Agenda for Integration -- and Germany should set a good example as a "motor of integration."

fulfilled. The children of Turkish immigrants have been seldom educated and have had lower careers when comparing with Germans.

What would be the reasons for the worse education degree and lower career or employment status (downward integration) of Turkish youth when compared with Germans in Germany? When we speak of the failure to integrate of the second and third generation, we can easily say that the some second generation and most third generation in Goslar grew with “street culture”, which includes drug addiction, materialism, violence, crime etc. Because their education level was not high, they also could not find appropriate jobs and had difficulties just as their parents had. Then they invented social welfare benefits due to having a long unemployment process. Such discrepancies are too great to be simply put down to cultural factors, human capital or less effective networks. It is vital to look also for other reasons, and here it is suggested is the need to look at institutional discrimination.

The Goslar case proves that school abandonment, failure of the educational process and deviant behavior that are part of this process consolidate the position of Turkish youth at the bottom of German society and reinforce racial/ethnic stereotypes among the native German population. Such stereotypes increase hostility and opposition to subsequent waves of labor migrants and reduce their chances for successful integration.

In Germany, large sectors of municipal and public employment are closed to non-EU citizens but there has so far been little public discussion of this issue. Many other countries also include the situation of the labor market as grounds to exclude foreigners from all kinds of employment. Informal discrimination can also be effective in preventing migrants from entering particular occupations or to progress within them In relation to the family,

third country nationals do not enjoy the same rights as citizens in most European states.

Also, pre-existing ethnic or race relations affect labor market processes because they shape cultural orientations and inter-group attitudes. Government policy is affected by labor market structures, and the ethnic composition of the host society population, as well as by broader cultural trends (Reitz, 2002: 1007). Pre-existing relations among ethnic and racial groups in a host society affect the reception of new immigrants, because such a reception is a matter of inter- group adjustment and accommodation. Pre-existing ethnic attitudes, as well as inter-group boundaries and hierarchies, provide the social framework within which integration processes occur. They may give rise to formal and informal institutional arrangements including laws, organizational policies and practices, interest groups, and popular culture, all of which may affect the opportunities available to newcomers and the constraints they face. It seems clear that, from the standpoint of immigrant reception, the pre-existing pattern of ethnic and racial relations is the most critical starting point for defining the host society (Reitz, 2002: 1010).

### **1.15. Turkish-Muslim Immigrant Organizations**

It is noteworthy that the gradual process of Islamization did not commence until the eighties, both in Germany and Turkey. In Turkey, failure of the political parties to offer meaningful alternatives opened the door for the Islamic party, which provided both political programs and a general account of the Turkish malaise. In Germany, after the completion of family unification, some third generation German- Turks turned to Islam as a satisfying system of religious meaning. Islam met their psychological and social needs: the needs of marginalized groups excluded from meaningful political and social participation in the larger German society.

As to the uprising of Turkish Muslim organizations in Goslar/Germany/Europe since the 1990s, there are several factors for the recent religious uprising: first, it is a parallel development of the political process in Turkey where the Islamist party has been rising up since the beginning of the 1990s.

Second, the negative context of reception in Germany socially and culturally ostracized the Muslim immigrants, which is also responsible for the high unemployment and educational failures of Turkish immigrants.

Third, in addition to social differences and cultural distance or confrontations between Germans and Turks, this religious uprising is closely related with other simultaneous affairs in the world. The retreat of leftist ideologies after the collapse of the Soviet Unions, the weakness of syndicates, the neoliberal economic restructuring and its compulsory results of unemployment have contributed tremendously to the strength of Islamic organization.

Fourth, we have to admit that the religious organizations have been successful organization principals and methods for mobilizing the immigrant groups because of various psychological and sociological reasons. They (especially some Sufi groups like *Gulen* community) become more flexible about dressing and modern life. Now you can confront young girls with very colorful and stylish headscarf, shoes and dresses. The Islamic women and girls in Goslar dress fashionably and beautifully. This is something different from the past. In the past Islamic women were so colorless as to be invisible but now they want to say we are here in the public sphere with our colorful and stylish dressing and headscarf. The veiling style has also been transformed in the hands of younger generations. As Mushaben (2008: 507) suggests, Islam has

become ‘young, chic and cool’ among ethnic minorities, often denied citizenship and opportunity in their country of birth owing to jus sanguinis and/or other complex naturalization requirements. Religiosity, in turn, is slowly giving rise to new types of civic engagement, leading more ethnic youth to pursue German citizenship.

Turkish-Islamic organizations do not transplant religious extremism from their countries of origin, nor do they necessarily conform to all of European liberal values. Rather Islamic organizations play an intermediary role, negotiating between the social and religious needs of Muslims and government policies on immigrants and Muslims. It can be first said these Muslim organizations (IGMG, DITIB and possible others) aim to negotiate the universal and particular aspects of Islam in the European context. It can be seen as a kind of Euro-Islam, although it is too early to decide if it is reformist or secularized Euro-Islam. This “Euro-Islam” limits itself to the private sphere, is pursued as an individual form of spirituality, and assures peaceful Muslim participation in European cultural pluralism. European political authorities support this model and call for the development of “French, German, or Dutch Islam” in their respective countries.

During this study, ‘integration’ is defined as a two-way-process which, on the one hand, is expressed in the interaction between national authorities and individuals and, on the other, in the interaction between national authorities and migrant associations. This also hints at the discursive dimension of interaction processes between the nation state and migrant associations. From this perspective ‘integration’ can be regarded as a public ‘definition struggle’ or as a public negotiation of cultural and identity boundary drawing processes.

The results of the participant observation in the two Turkish-Islamic organizations show that the differences between IGMG and DITIB have



some echoes of Turkish-Muslim people and their integration into German society. While DITIB seems to be more inclined to have a vision of intercultural dialog between Turks and Germans with separating religion from politics, the IGMG take a political position by contesting the separation of religion from public (and political) life. The members of IGMG claim that they want to be accepted with their religion and otherwise integration would mean nothing more than assimilation.

Religion became so important and controversial in the case of Muslim immigrants whose religious visibility in the public sphere emerged after family unification. Because very fundamental issues about public life, namely, building places of worship, minaret, headscarf, halal slaughter and such details have been intensively discussed in the media and newspapers, Muslim immigrants are supposed to be incompatible and thus inassimilable into Western culture. In their marginalization, Muslim immigrants are ultimately reduced to a threat to the Western world. This supposedly threatening climate towards Muslims, moreover, goes well with welfare chauvinism imposed by extreme-right political world-view with xenophobic anxiety against immigrants' existence (economic burden) with its foreign religion and ethnicity.

Like Europe, in Germany, the most controversial issue on immigrant is nowadays about their religion. In other words, immigrant religion, mostly Islam, becomes the major political issue when it entered the public sphere where religion and state are organized by including Christianity into social life as a corporate body of the welfare system (e.g. Diakonie, Caritas).

Popular media representation, natives' popular perception, political discourse of conservative or extreme right parties on immigrant (particularly Muslim one) are a relatively structural scheme which works well in each nation-state paradigm feeding the anxiety and xenophobia.

This paradigm lives with so many paradoxical conditions that stem from the irreconcilable discrepancy between the assumptions of national belonging –through citizens (deserving) and aliens (non-deserving) distinction- and moral universalism where `individual` is seen as having universal access to many rights.

In the post-September 11 Western world, political parties, some scholars and the media situate integration within a securitization framework which only represents Islam (and Muslims) as a threat. This securitization and criminalizing Muslim immigrants feed into the assimilationist logic and cultural essentialist view of political parties, policy makers and other interest groups, which then seek a return to a mono-cultural society based on cultural homogeneity. In respect to the cultural essentialist view, all the problems of the Muslim community come to be viewed through a religio-cultural lens and the socio-economic causes of exclusion and marginalisation are predominantly ignored.

The clear implication of 9/11 is that it is Muslims who are to blame for their lack of integration, an implication made absolutely explicit in (much of) the tabloid press where binary oppositions of Us/Them; the West/the Rest; the German/Muslims are routinely reproduced and Muslims are demonized. What is also significant is the almost complete neglect given by politicians and thereby the media to the economic disadvantages faced by Muslims (Peach, 2005). As Alexander (2002: 564) has pointed out, both within and outside the academy, ``Muslim communities [are] fast becoming the newest occupants of the `problem/victim' analytical space" (cited by Phillips, 2006: 26).

During the four decades preceding the terrorist attacks of 9/11 (2001), Europeans gave little thought to the religious orientations of countless guest workers who entered their countries to take on the dirty, dangerous

and difficult jobs of post-WWII industrialization. In recent years, however, headscarves, mosque construction and growing demands for Islamic instruction in public schools have come to signify not only potential youth attraction to Islamic activism but also the permanent nature of Muslim settlement. National politicians in Germany especially denounce new forms of religious activism as proof of ‘failed integration’ and the concomitant rise of ‘parallel societies’, ignoring the extent to which their own reluctance to embrace pro-active integration policies since the 1960s has fostered segregation and social exclusion.

It is safe to claim that the securitization and criminalization of migrant and their offsprings after 9/11 have constructed a tough barrier to integrate them. Thus, these policies have not helped them to experience a real normalization process in Germany.

When facing with external hostility and structural discrimination, Turkish migrants and their offsprings could not defend themselves with a cultural or social capital of which most of them lack. Thus, they embrace religious or nationalistic elements which have become very strongly a core element in their reactionary or negotiative identity.

#### **1.16. On Methodology**

This work is the product of field research I have conducted over the one year (between 2005- 2006) that has included observations, in-depth interviews, investigation of legal and popular texts, images, observations, and especially active involvement in two municipal youth centers and two Turkish-Muslim organizations in Goslar.

In this study, qualitative research methods were used, such as participant observation, interviews and focus group technique because they form an

efficient way to provide a better understanding of the perceptions, beliefs, feelings and ethnic and cultural characteristics of the children of Turkish immigrants. Qualitative research can be made more than exploratory, anecdotal or hypothesis-generating. The issue is systematic description, and we could equally well argue that the relationship works the other way around, that quantitative research reports could be just `suggestive` of actual social practices that would need to be validated through close observation and qualitative analysis (Freebody, 2003: 214).

It is a combination of fieldwork and documentary research. That is to say, in this research, participant observation, in-depth interviews and focus groups have been backed up with some quantitative data, mainly demographical indicators and statistical analysis. A participant observation with detailed note-taking for one year in Goslar will provide the study with an auxiliary qualitative method. The sample is chosen with the help of the snowball technique and quotas for ethnic and religious origins of the third generation in Goslar.

My primary research design is in-depth interviews. The author carried out interviews with different groups of people who live in Goslar: (1) third generation youth (2) first and second generation parents (3) executive committee and managing staff in Turkish-Muslim associations (4) clients or members (5) directors and teachers of three high schools (Hauptschule, Realshule and Gymnasium) (6) Social pedagogues, social workers and members in two youth centers. In all, I interviewed 60 people, which were then transcribed by the author. Some interviews were conducted in English and German but most were conducted in Turkish. I analyzed the interview transcriptions and participant observation notes by highlighting those themes which would be most relevant to my categories, concepts and discussions. In addition, I collected demographical and statistical facts of

educational process and labor market from Lower Saxony Statistical Office and Foreign Police Office of Goslar.

The main groups in this study are the youth who have immigrated or were born in the country as children or grandchildren of immigrants (second or third generation youth). Turks living in Goslar/Germany and Europe constitute a group characterized by great diversity (linguistic, ethnic, religious to quote but a few variables). The Turkish community in Goslar mirrors the ethnic and religious variety in the country of origin. There are about 70 percent ethnic Turks, 20 percent Kurds and a series of other ethnic groups such as Albanians, Georgians and Armenians. Most of the Turkish migrants are Sunnite Muslims; the share of Alevis amounts to approximately 20 percent. Thus, ethnic, religious and gender were the basic criterion for constructing a representative sample of informants. Turkish, Kurdish, Sunni, and Alevi people were proportionately chosen as informants in Goslar. The table of overall summary of the samples in this study can be seen in Appendix. In this study, the pseudo-names have been used because of various reasons about security.

Also, though not in systematic way, I drew upon other major sources of secondary data: newspapers, organizational pamphlets, government papers and websites of immigrant associates.

The researcher carried out 60 in-depth interviews with third generation children of Turkish immigrants (ranging between 14-25 age) and also 15 focus-groups with parents, German professionals, German social pedagogues, teachers, youth psychologists and school directors and youths<sup>11</sup>.

---

<sup>11</sup> I visited daily two Turkish mosques, the religious community organizations, Islamic Community for National Outlook (IGMG) and Religious Affairs for Turkish-Islam Community-DITIB both of which are very well organized and predominant in most European countries), municipal youth centers –Jugendzentrum- (Gleis 95 and BGX) and

Based on sociological inquiry, here we are trying to find some general patterns without neglecting the individual paths. As Portes and Fernandez-Kelly (2008: 21) contend, sociology deals with social facts, expressed in rates or averages, rather than with individuals. There are times, however, when the study of individual cases can say something important about how social outcomes come to be or how they can be modified. The structural forces leading to alternative paths of adaptation are clear and have been well documented. Yet, not all children advantaged by their parents' human capital, favorable contexts of reception, and stable families manage to succeed educationally, and not all growing up under conditions of severe disadvantage end up in permanent poverty or in jail. Some among the latter even make it to the top, achieving a college degree and moving into the professions. Those individual cases have sociological significance for the lessons they offer in how to overcome the power of structural forces. Put differently, exceptions are important insofar as they point to alternative social processes obscured in sample averages that, when present, can lead to unforeseen outcomes.

Due to the fact that there would be impossible to explain the diverse experiences of relatively new phenomenon of the (grand) children of immigrants within a single theory or model in globalizing world, the study applies multiple theories or methodologies as a complementary way if not overlapping.

In this study, I believe that a general theory of migration is neither possible nor desirable, but that we can make significant progress by re-embedding migration research in a more general understanding of contemporary

---

followed the "integration course for foreigners" in order to have a close understanding of conditions in Goslar.

society, and linking it to broader theories of social change across a range of social scientific disciplines. A conceptual framework for migration studies should take social transformation as its central category, in order to facilitate understanding of the complexity, interconnectness, variability, contextuality and multi-level mediations of migratory processes in the context of rapid global change (Castles, 2008: 2).

### **1.17. Macro-Meso-Micro Levels in Extended Case Method**

This study presents an analysis of a complex yet accessible picture of immigration and integration politics in Germany that play themselves out at the local, national, regional (EU), and global levels. These levels are interrelated and the vertical level is gaining in importance without necessarily undermining the sovereignty of the nation-states in the European Union.

This study offers three-step analysis in which firstly globalization, international conflicts, security politics, citizenship regime, national interest are questioned in relation with immigration and integration policies at global level. Secondly, it concerns analyzing modes of integration, multiculturalism, citizenship rights within the context of institutional and structural discrimination produced by the hierarchical structure of the nation-state, Germany. Last but not least, it will try to operationalize this theoretical framework by referring local analysis of Goslar town where the perceptions of youths, everyday life and practices and immigrant religious and secular organizations closely.

By following Burawoy's "extended case method," I have tried to construct a dialogue between local and global, micro and macro, participant observer and theory and empirical data so as to get rid of a monologue of ethnography and to introduce a dialogue between macro and micro worlds.

By criticizing objectifying techniques, Burawoy (1991; 2000) suggests a more relational ethnography.

Burawoy (2000) stresses on three dimensions: the extension of the observer into the world of the participant; the extensions of observations through time and space; the extension from micro processes to macro forces; and the extension of theory. First, according to Burawoy (2000), the observer should extend his/her life into the world of the participant. Thus, I lived in Goslar more than one year by leaving my secure and comfortable university campus in order to be part of the world of my participants in Goslar.

Second, the researcher should spend extended periods of time trying to discover the lives of research participants in their own space. To do this, I spend most of my time with my informants in their homes, youth centers, mosques, discotheques, cafes, and immigrant organizations and shared and observed their everyday life and routines. Instead of constructing a formal relation by interviewing people on the street corner, I became part of their world and family in order to capture the internal dynamics of their life and community formation. During this more than one year process, while extending time and space in Goslar, I tried to understand how specific conditions determined their social processes, beliefs, and the construction of the social structure.

Third, Burawoy (2000) believes that the research should extend out from micro processes to include macro processes. This implies that micro cases reflect macro phenomena while macro phenomena are also influenced by micro cases. This framework should be suitable for analysing relationships between various socio-spatial levels: local, national, regional and global. Global factors, such as the European Union, that shape migration have different local effects in various locations, due to the presence of mediating



historical experiences and cultural patterns. This principle also underpins the need for interdisciplinarity, since the various disciplines often address different socio-spatial levels. For instance, unlike previous mainstream studies on Turkish immigrant in Europe which have been mainly carried out in big cities or metropolis like Berlin, Koln, Frankfurt etc, in this respect, it is expected that this study also contributes to the migration literature by paying more close attention to internal dynamics, social cohesion/exclusion relations, opportunities and constraints of identity formation in the context of the locality of Goslar. Why is the locality important? Locality can be seen a dynamic interplay between structure, culture (of which ethnicity is a significant part) and personal agency. Structure and personal agency can be both particularly apparent at the local level. One can recognize how the structural process works through individuals by focusing on specific local conditions. Then, it is possible to address concerns that structure, culture and individual agency bring together. Thus, it becomes possible to analyze local, national and global processes-micro and macro- in dialectical and dynamic ways.

This extended case research method should also be able to incorporate both structure and agency. Structure includes macro-social structures (states, corporations, international agencies), micro-social structures (families, groups, social networks, local communities), and meso-social structures (intermediate networks or collectivities like the migration industry, transnational communities). Agency refers to individual and group action, which helps people to survive and cope in specific situations of change or crisis.

The 21<sup>st</sup> century is seen as an era of fluidity and openness, in which changes in transportation, technology and culture are making it normal for people to think beyond borders and to cross them frequently for many reasons. Movements for purposes of study, professional advancement,

marriage, retirement or lifestyle are assuming greater significance, so that older ideas on migration are thought to be no longer relevant.

In the past, research on migration has had little impact on core theories of social order and differentiation. However, in recent times, globalization has challenged national models in the social sciences and drawn attention to cross-border flows as key instruments of change. There are signs of a new emphasis on human mobility in social theory, and some major works on global change (such as; Held, et al. 1999) now stress the centrality of migration in contemporary social relations. This shift is not surprising: if the principle of the 'container society' in which all social relationships take place within the nation-state (Faist 2000) is no longer sustainable (even as a myth), then flows across borders become a crucial area of investigation for the social sciences (Castles, 2008: 11).

Contemporary social relations do offer great diversity, but it is diversity within increasingly universal relationships of power and inequality. Thus consciousness of complexity, diversity and contextuality does not mean that theory is unnecessary or impossible. Rather it makes it easier to understand what is required of social theory.

As migration and settlement are too diverse and multifaceted to be explained by a single theory, the incorporation/integration to the host society and reactions to the host societies policies have also been deeply affected on various levels of society from local to global, which could not be comprehended in a one-dimensional, canonical, mainstream theory. Migration and integration embraces all dimensions of social existence, and therefore demands an inter-disciplinary approach.

The methodological standpoint of this study is that migration and integration theory need to provide a framework for understanding the

multi-level dynamics of international migration and incorporation in a situation of rapid and complex transformation. But can a single (or general) theory do this? In view of the complexity of migration, Portes has pointed out that it is unrealistic to expect the emergence of a single all-embracing theory. A theory that took account of all the possible forms and variations of migration would be so abstract as to be without any useful explanatory content. Indeed it would end up 'redefining the problem until it was coterminous with its explanation' (Portes 1997: 811). The sociology of migration needs to abandon attempts at grand theory and to focus instead on complexity, contradictions and the unintended consequences of social action (Portes 1997; Portes and DeWind 2004). Portes (1999) argues for the idea of 'sociology as analysis of the unexpected.' This implies returning to Merton's concept of 'theories of the middle-range': 'special theories applicable to limited ranges of data – theories for example of class dynamics, of conflicting group pressures, of the flow of power and the exercise of interpersonal influence...' (Merton 1957, 9; cited by Castles 2008:9)

The social transformation in developed countries can be seen in the closure of older industries, the restructuring of labour forces, the erosion of welfare states, the fragmentation of communities and the reshaping of social identities. In less developed countries, forms of social transformation include intensification of agriculture, destruction of rural livelihoods, erosion of local social orders, rural-urban migration and formation of vast shanty-towns within new mega-cities. The recent upsurge in South-North migration can best be understood through examination of these complementary changes and their complex linkages.

Migration into Europe continues in a number of forms in the postwar process: the professional elite of technical and administrative experts, the families of the post-war labor reserve, growing numbers of asylum seekers

granted either refugee status or more commonly humanitarian leave to remain, the revival of a 'guestworker' system through a variety of bilateral agreements, and not least the persistence of undocumented workers. The result is an elaborate hierarchy of statuses with varying attendant rights, not easily captured by any single theoretical explanation. On the one hand, we cannot study people and cultures today through a magnifying glass – as if they were a fossilized 'ethnographic present' – without making the prism of contemporary cultural complexity visible. Nor, on the other hand, can we understand the dynamic of cultural diversity without relating it to the fragmenting, marginalizing and separating forces of social inequality. These forces operate behind the processes of 'othering', 'minoritization' and 'ethnicization' and identity-based sectarianisms of the present period (Moldenhawer, 2009: 48)

Massey and his collaborators point out that migration studies are split into research on the causes, processes and patterns of migration itself (they speak of 'determinants of migration'), and research on how migrants become incorporated into receiving societies ('immigrant integration') (Massey, et al. 1998: 3). The methodological route in this study, following by Lockwood (1996), starts from the assumption that the institutional unity of citizenship, market and bureaucratic relations is central to social cohesion, and then concentrates on the questions of how inequalities of class and status affect the institutionalization of citizenship and thereby its integrative function.

Accordingly, Beck argues that contemporary social theory is still trapped in the 'dead end of 'methodological nationalism'' (Beck 2007). The problem is particularly severe for migration studies (Wimmer and Glick-Schiller, 2003) because control of belonging to the national community has always been central to nation-state sovereignty. Today migration research still tends to be linked to specific historical experiences of managing

migration and diversity (Vasta and Vuddamalay 2006). The recent politicization of issues of migration and incorporation of migrants into receiving societies has sharpened the dilemma of policy-driven research.

Last but not least, it is important to note that this research supports methodological ideas of Castles (2008) who criticizes policy driven research where research questions, methods and even findings may be shaped by policy interests. Policy-driven research<sup>12</sup> often provides simplistic, short-term remedies to complex, long-term social issues. Much policy-driven research is not only bad social science – it is also a poor guide to successful policy formation, and one reason for the poor record of many governments in the area (Castles 2004; Cornelius, et al. 1994).

## **1.18. Overview of the Chapters**

In separate chapters, this study considers the impact of citizenship regime, institutional discrimination and racialization on the formal and informal processes of inclusion and exclusion of third generation children of Turkish immigrants in Goslar with a special reference to the two Turkish-Muslim organizations (DITIB and IGMG) and the two municipal youth centers (Gleis 95 and BGX). At this point, the study tries to advocate

---

<sup>12</sup> As Castles (2003) implies the key point is that policy-driven research can lead not only to poor sociology but also to bad policy. This is because narrowly focused empirical research, often designed to provide an answer to an immediate bureaucratic problem, tends to follow a circular logic. It accepts the problem definitions built into its terms of reference, and does not look for more fundamental causes, nor for more challenging solutions. Ministers and bureaucrats still see migration as something that can be turned on and off like a tap through laws and policies. By imposing this paradigm on researchers, the policy makers have done both social scientists and themselves a disservice. But we have to ask ourselves the uncomfortable question: why have so many of us accepted this role?

systematic analysis between the civic stratification system and institutional discrimination and reactive identity formation. Xenophobia especially in the form of Islamophobia are treated in a somewhat cursory manner and try to be integrated as the broader argument. In this manner, the more systematic treatment of the integration policy of diversity management and securitization and criminalization of immigrants after September 11 are also added to the discriminatory factors of civic stratification. It highlights the challenges, pitfalls, unintended consequences of legislation and discriminatory implementing policies to manage and control diversity not only in German but also in EU level.

In Chapter One, while introducing the study, I will basically discuss the theoretical and conceptual framework. Through this chapter, I have also discussed my basic research questions and epistemological concerns.

In Chapters Two and Three, respectively, I will go on to discuss the theoretical and conceptual background. In Chapter Two, I will focus on Germany's differential exclusionist model (Castles, 1995) and civic stratification system (Morris, 1997; 2000; 2001a; 2001b; 2002; 2003; 2007; Lockwood, 1996; Kofman, 2002; 2005). It is this model and stratification system, which affects a wide range of institutional and social factors that determines the migrants' position in society. It includes: immigration policy, family reunion and residence rights; labor market position; residential situation and community formation; social policy; and discrimination towards minorities. This chapter applies both the civic stratification perspective as a means of bringing together the operation of immigration legal rights and the practice of governance of integration and highlighting the institutional discrimination at play with a special reference to Turkish immigrants and third country nationals in general.

In Chapter Two, I argue that citizenship has been shaped by unequal structures within the nation-state as well as global divisions of labor within the hierarchical nation-states system. Also, it argues that the unequal status and practice of immigrants (non-citizens) is implemented by the conditions of “stratified legal rights” functioning within the political, economic and cultural domains of host societies. It examines whether immigrants’ life chances are equivalent to those of native non-immigrants, and how social, economic, and political participation and access are possible regarding stratified status and legal rights by conceptualizing citizenship. In Chapter Two, I also suggest that overt restrictions on movement, access and entry are formulated not in terms of race or culture but in terms of citizenship. Thus discriminatory effects are inevitably indirect. Certainly, visa regulations, resource constraints and the informal operations of border control disproportionately affect poor populations. Similarly, internal regulation and policing tend to focus suspicion on third country nationals (and also the ‘visibly different’ minorities) and have the effect of eroding their legitimate rights, affecting both employment opportunities and access to services. Chapter Two, while focusing on Morris’ civic stratification theory, further exposes differentiated structural opportunities and resources of the non-European guest workers and their descendants. Specifically, it focuses on hierarchical legal rights and their effect on labor market access, naturalization rules, family reunification, entry, educational support, etc. versus ethnic Germans and native Germans in Germany. Although some radical changes has been made on the *jus sanguinis* version of citizenship after the 1999 law, the citizenship regime still remains ethnically based, exclusionist and selective.

In Chapter Three, in addition to elaborating my theoretical framework, I have partially tried to operationalize my theoretical framework of segmented integration by addressing third generation Turkish youth’s experiences through the labor market and education sector at both global,

national (Germany) and local (Goslar) levels. To do this, Chapter Three basically stresses the unequal results of differential exclusionism and civic stratification in Germany while analyzing the social conditions of German citizens, ethnic Germans and Turks and other third country nationals comparatively regarding their legal status and rights.

Chapter Four, Five, Six and Seven will be based on my fieldwork in Goslar. In Chapter Four, I have given a general overview of Goslar, emphasizing the major challenges to the third generation in the locally economical and political opportunities and limitations. I have described my fieldwork site, Goslar, and explained the demographical, environmental and societal conditions of this town with a special reference to its ghetto district of Oker. Based on my ethnographic observations in Goslar, the chapter is also concerned with the diversity, friendship, marriage, (mis)trust, inter-group relations and racial tolerance within the context of Goslar. Chapter Three has concluded with the assertion that the diversity brings about a broad dissemination of distrust between German and Turkish people in Goslar.

Focusing on youth culture and family formation of third generation children of Turkish immigrants, Chapter Five explores reactive identity formation by concentrating on the linkages through which “immigrant” become “ethnics” or “pious” and the contrasting social and economic results of the process. In keeping with the focus on public policy, I will examine the ways in which state action affects the adaptation process of immigrant groups and the opportunities for economic mobility and social integration of racial and ethnic minorities. The chapter argues that this reactive identity formation framework informs how immigrants 'become' ethnics (Turkish) in the sense that immigrants and their children want to become a part of German society by challenging, negotiating or establishing a sense of permanence. When faced with structural discrimination by Germans, they strongly view themselves as “Turkish”



and part of German society rather than as “guest workers” who will leave eventually. Ethnic and religious mobilization of Turkish immigrants is mostly in the form of reactive behavior as a result of grievances, low status, discrimination, and alienation. They can also show a desire to advance group status in terms of the extent of integration in the broader society.

While focusing on the reactive ethnicity perspective, Chapter Five addresses that the social-structural differentiation associated with civic stratification may sharpen ethnic boundaries and thereby increase their importance as a basis for mobilization. Such ethnic connectedness is, however, largely involuntary, the reaction of peripheral groups to their disadvantaged position in the stratification system as a result of exclusion from the power center by the core group. According to this model, ethnic solidarity is the reaction of a culturally distinct periphery against exploitation by the center. Reactive solidarity also emerges as a reaction to continuing institutional discrimination and the cultural division of labor.

Chapter Six mainly addresses the challenges and opportunities within the structure of the labor market and education in Goslar. In the chapter six, I emphasize the institutional and structural reasons of discrimination which have caused the downward integration of children of Turkish immigrants in the labor market and education sector by criticizing the human capital theory which solely focuses upon the human capital of individuals and has neglected the "social embeddedness" of economic action. Chapter Six tries to elaborate my theoretical position that what this study devotes itself to is the segmented assimilation theory which emphasizes the exogenous (context of reception, structural discrimination, racialization, governmental incorporation, labor market, etc) and endogenous (human capital, family background) factors at the same time.

The Chapter Six deals with the structural integration (education and labor market participation) of the second and third generation children of Turkish migrants<sup>13</sup> in Goslar.

Chapter Seven is mainly concerned with the Islamic organizations (IGMG and DITIB) in Goslar and it refers in particular to Turkish immigrants in Goslar as an example, though the patterns identified here may be found in Muslim communities throughout Europe. The claim is that the first generation's debate focused on other points, had other themes, and led to other group constellations than did the new generation's (second or third) debate. Generational change played the key role in the orientation of Islamic movements in Germany. Although the older generation consistently organized in relation to what was going on in their country of origin, the new generation focuses on the local, and national, conditions of their settled immigrant communities. The chapter also suggests that the rise of Muslim narrative by the younger generation is not only a religious analysis but they have tried to transform the discourse of indigenous Islam into a language of political combat against the discrimination they have experienced. Of course, religion has a symbolic function universal and liberal claims-making of demanding equal treatment, freedom to wear the headscarf, places of worship or religious holidays etc.

Chapter Seven addresses that these migrant organizations are agents, which, apart from the cultivation of transnational bonds, also raise secondary socialization performances which can be labeled as supportive for a migrant's inclusion. It also argues that Goslar municipal institutions

---

<sup>13</sup> While the term "second generation" refers to young people whose parents immigrated and who themselves were born in Germany or entered the country before reaching school age, third generation mainly attributes to the young people whose grandparents immigrated and who themselves were born in Germany. They can hold a foreign or German citizenship.

increasingly cooperate with these migrant associations in order to legitimize their immigrant and minority politics. From this perspective 'integration' gains a public dimension and can be understood as a public negotiation of social boundaries.

How does integration transform religious beliefs and practices? Conversely, how does religion affect the outcomes of integration? These are some questions anchoring the Chapter Seven. When the Turkish immigrants crossed Turkey's border and settled in Germany, they were and are still forced to rethink who they are and how they are perceived in the areas of destination. To make sense of destabilizing experiences, they often resort to religious symbols and traditions. It is as protagonists of struggles prefigured in religious writings that immigrants can impose a higher meaning on victimization, belittlement, and economic strife. I see the religion, Islam, as a form of immigrant resistance to social amalgamation and erasure noting how ethnic and racial minorities use religiosity to sharpen their profile, affirm identity, and oppose market pressures. Consideration is given to Islamic organizations (DITIB, IGMG) that try to promote some immigrant rights.

In Chapter Seven, drawing on participant-observation in IGMG and DITIB mosques and interviews with personnel and members in the mosques in Goslar, I will try to contextualize the Islamic organizations with a special reference to their proper functions and political outlook for the integration of Turkish people into Goslar/German society. It seems possible to claim that events such as 9/11 and the securitization policies of Germany as a counterpart have accelerated both organization's affirmative approach to integration in Germany.

## **CHAPTER II**

### **CIVIC STRATIFICATION, HIERARCHICAL CITIZENSHIP AND DIFFERENTIAL EXCLUSIONISM IN GERMANY**

“Civilization should be judged by its treatment of minorities”

Mahatma Gandhi

#### **2.1. Introduction**

This chapter describes Germany’s differential exclusionist model (Castles, 1995) and civic stratification system (Morris, 1997; 2000; 2001a; 2001b; 2002; 2003; 2007; Lockwood, 1996; Kofman, 2002; 2005). It is this model and stratification system, which effects a wide range of institutional and social factors, that determines the migrants’ position in society. It includes: immigration policy, family reunion and residence rights; labor market position; residential situation and community formation; social policy; and discrimination towards minorities. This chapter applies both the civic stratification perspective as a means of bringing together the operation of immigration legal rights and the practice of governance of integration and highlighting the institutional discrimination at play with a special reference to Turkish immigrants and third country nationals in general.

Specifically, this chapter argues that citizenship has been shaped by unequal structures within the nation-state as well as global divisions of labor within the hierarchical nation-states system. Also, it argues that the unequal status and practice of immigrants (non-citizens) is implemented by the conditions of “stratified legal rights” functioning within the political, economic and cultural domains of host societies. It examines whether immigrants’ opportunities are equivalent to those of native non-immigrants, and how social, economic, and political participation and access are possible regarding stratified status and legal rights by conceptualizing citizenship.

A significant outcome of the postwar labor migration in Germany has been the incorporation philosophy of differential exclusionism that relies on ethnic citizenship (*jus sanguinis*) and accordingly the practices of a civic stratification system based on differentiated rights and duties. Despite concerns about the national management of welfare and the labor market, and reservations about the ‘cultural’ or political character of migrant populations, immigration policy sometimes encourages (especially high skilled professionals) entry because there is continuing demand for labor at both extremes of the class spectrum. In addition there is a commitment to international human rights that can be restricted but rarely completely denied. There is a clear contradiction between equal treatment based on human rights commitments and the overriding desire to protect welfare resources alongside restrictions on entry in an effort to preserve the cultural and political unity of the national society.

The civic stratification thesis implies that any given regime of rights reflects a balancing between a variety of constraints, most notably welfare resources, labor market management, and international obligations through the institutionalization of citizenship, bureaucracy and market. The unequal formation of citizenship and stratified legal rights has historically

overlapped the post-war process in construction of 'differential exclusionist' immigration policy in Germany (and most European states). In this chapter, after exposing the unequal content of citizenship structure in the nation-state, I examine the ways in which both citizenship policy and the stratified legal rights affect the marginalization and exclusion of non-European Third Country Nationals (TCNs), most notably Turks and Muslims, in accessing the opportunities for economic mobility and social integration in German society.

Following the basic idea of Morris' civic stratification concept, I further expose differentiated structural opportunities and resources of the non-European guest workers and their descendants. I especially focus on hierarchical legal rights and their effect on labor market access, naturalization rules, family reunification, entry, educational support, etc. versus ethnic Germans and native Germans in Germany. Although some radical changes has been made on the *jus sanguinis* version of citizenship after the 1999 law, the citizenship regime still remains ethnically based, exclusionist and selective. Last but not least, the hierarchical citizenship in the nation-state is seen as a structural basis for the systematic production of institutional discrimination and xenophobia against non-European immigrants accelerated by globally neo-liberal restructuring, securitization and criminalization of immigration policies in the form of Islamophobia in Germany especially after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

## **2.2. Categorically Unequal: The Logic and Structure of Citizenship in the Nation-state**

Citizenship just like nationality has been and will always be in the making. Balibar (2006: 4) suggests that citizenship is not a fixed notion, with a permanent essence that would become simply adapted to successive

political cadres, but is a permanently open problem, which has already been subjected historically to mutations, collapses, and redefinition.

In general, citizenship includes four different dimensions: legal status, rights,

(political) participation, and a sense of belonging. These dimensions can complement or stand in tension with each other. Scholars of citizenship as legal status examine who is entitled to hold the status of citizen. Citizenship can be based on place of birth (*jus soli*) or parental origins - blood- (*jus sanguinis*), or both. For residents who cannot access citizenship through birth—as is the case with the overwhelming majority of international migrants—citizenship must be acquired through naturalization. Countries differ in their naturalization requirements, but at a minimum these usually involve a period of legal residency and a demonstration of some knowledge about the country and its dominant language(s) (Baubock 2005, Bloemraad 2006, as cited in, Bloemraad et al, 2008:156).

A more expanded understanding of legal citizenship focuses on the rights that accompany citizenship. This perspective, dominant in much theorizing on citizenship, resonates with liberalism's understanding of the relationship between individuals and the state as a contract in which both sides have rights and obligations. To maintain the citizenship contract, the state guarantees basic rights to individuals, while the individual has the obligation to pay taxes, complete compulsory education, and obey the laws of the country. The citizenship rights approach holds out the promise of full equality before the law for all members of a state but leaves unresolved how to transform formal into substantive equality. Citizenship can also be understood as political participation in the governing of people within a territory. This privilege has historically been exclusionary by gender, race,

ethnicity, religion, and class. With time, such barriers were torn down, at least formally. A final dimension of citizenship, that of belonging, spans literatures ranging from philosophies of republican citizenship and community to the study of nation building. Notions of belonging inherently have exclusionary tendencies; some must fall outside the community in order for a “we” to exist. Such exclusions are often justified by the need for social cohesion, leading to the question of what sort of social cohesion is required for contemporary societies (Bloemraad et al. 2008, Brubaker 1992).

Admittedly, in the literature, there is seldom research on the multiple intersections of discrimination and the marginalization of different immigrant groups, notably as this occurs in unequal citizenship structure, stratification system and membership statuses of immigrants in Europe. It seems that migration research needs to become more concerned with the social productions of civic stratification on immigrants through class, ethnicity, religion, nationalism and gender divisions in the context of the host society with its welfare and citizenship framework<sup>14</sup>.

Although this study mainly focuses on citizenship as rights and status by examining its unequal structure within itself and the discriminatory practices applied especially on strangers, and foreigners as ethnic minorities in the nation-state, it certainly does not neglect that citizenship (as rights) potentially also gives people the possibility to act against discriminatory practices and oppressive conditions within the nation-state. From the point of view of this study, immigrants, within the nation-state structure, are not totally passive victims to be subjected to all discriminatory implementation but can act and speak against the

---

<sup>14</sup> (see for exceptions Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992; Yuval-Davis 1991; Kofman, 1995; Morris, 1997, 2000, 2002, Castles, 1996, 2005; Waters, 1989; Balibar, 1991; Wallerstein, 2003)



oppression by institutionalized unity of market, bureaucracy and legislations. Indeed, Stuart Hall and David Held (1989) have described the history of citizenship as one of successive attempts by those who benefit from its restriction, to limit citizenship to certain groups—e.g., men, Whites, and property owners. The other side of the history is of course that of struggle by those excluded—e.g., women, people of color, wage workers—to gain the rights of citizens.

Within the political left, suspicion of the concept of liberal citizenship comes directly from Marx, who pointed out that democratic rights were narrow and partial. Citizens voted, only every few years and in between had little political voice. More importantly, he pointed out that democratic rights did not affect economic inequality and, in many ways, helped legitimate it. Thus, democratic citizenship was a bourgeois concept that obscured economic and class division beneath a veneer of equality (Giddens, 1996: 66; Turner, 1993:3; as cited in, Glenn, 2000: 2).

Yet, despite the bourgeois, sexist, and white trappings of citizenship, the very groups that have been excluded have often been among the most eloquent proponents of the ideal of citizenship. Movements for social justice found the universalistic and egalitarian language of liberal citizenship the most effective rhetorical device to make their claims. It was in this language that blacks called for abolition of slavery, women for suffrage, and workers for the right to form unions.

These contestations on citizenship rights reveal the way in which citizenship could both create inequality and being a vehicle for struggles to achieve greater equality. For this reason, as Ruth Lister (1998) has pointed out, it is important not to abandon the "emancipatory potential" of universal citizenship. Lister (1998: 7) draws a distinction between two formulations: to *be* a citizen and to *act* as a citizen. To be a citizen, in the

sociological sense, means to enjoy the rights necessary for agency and social and political participation. To act as a citizen involves fulfilling the full potential of the status. Those who do not fulfill that potential do not cease to be citizens.

Citizenship as participation can be understood as representing an expression of human agency in the political arena, broadly defined; citizenship as rights enables people to act as agents. According to Lister, (1998) such a conceptualization of citizenship is particularly important in challenging the construction of marginalized groups as passive victims while keeping sight of the discriminatory and oppressive political, economic and social institutions that still deny them full citizenship. It draws on a dual understanding of power that social work also draws upon: people can be, at the same time, relatively powerless in relation to wider economic and political power structures, and yet exercise power in the 'generative' sense of self-actualization ( Lister, 1998). The ongoing dialectic between agency and structure is reflected in that between citizenship as a status and a practice. Citizenship is thus conceived of as a dynamic concept in which process and outcome stand in a dialectical relationship to each other. In fact, rights are not set in stone; they are always open to re-interpretation and re-negotiation and need to be defended and extended through political and social action.

It is important to note that this dissertation, while accepting the emancipatory potential of citizenship as agents, is primarily devoted to the radical critiques of the citizenship framework in the nation-state, which tend to highlight the flawed nature of citizenship, and to expose the implications of the inclusionary/exclusionary boundaries embedded within it. Thus it criticizes the normative version of citizenship and the unevenness of access to it, and argues that reinforcing existing rights will not in itself overcome the mechanisms of marginalization, partial inclusion

and exclusion. So, whilst citizenship has been extended historically and geographically, it continues to encapsulate dominant power relations obscured by the political fictions of the de-contextualized and universal citizen operating in the public realm. For instance, despite the extension of rights, particularly social ones, the immigrants in Germany still continue to experience diverse discrimination and functional marginalization within the all public domains of civil society and are trapped by an outdated 'ethno-cultural' model by which they cannot become an integral part of broader society.

The common thread that runs through the standard analysis of citizenship is not merely that it consists of rights and obligations but that it consists of *equal* rights and obligations distributed universally throughout a political community. The reforms constituted in extensions to citizenship, the mobilization of *de jure* rights to establish *de facto* guarantees of condition are argued to be the basis for a substantive equalization of condition. By contrast, the argument to be offered here is that citizenship, in the words of Waters (1989: 166), is a set of formally equal relationships between individuals and the state but that are substantively unequal and therefore yield an unequal substance of citizenship. This structure of inequality is stable, institutionalized and socially reproduced across generations.

Citizenship, in both the legal and more normative sense, is about determining who can access social, civil and political rights and curtailment of those who do not have access to rights. Thus, there is a stronger move away from universal rights to more targeted rights creating different classes of citizens. The concept of citizenship mainly refers the assumption that individuals are equal members of the state, although all do not have equal opportunity or resources regarding gender, ethnicity and class compositions within social, political and economical occupations. To such an extent, citizenship works like a myth in the sense that it assumes

all individuals who are affiliated to the nation-state as an equal individual by surpassing the gender, race/ethnicity and class inequalities experienced by them.

Indeed, inequality is a fundamental reality of the modern world-system as it has been of every known historical system. As Wallerstein (2003: 650) puts it, “what is different, what is particular to historical capitalism, is that equality has been proclaimed as its objective, and indeed as its achievement—equality in the marketplace, equality before the law, the fundamental social equality of all individuals endowed with equal rights. The great political question of the modern world, the great cultural question, has been how to reconcile the theoretical embrace of equality with the continuing and increasingly acute polarization of real-life opportunities and satisfactions that has been its outcome”. This study states that citizenship is an ambiguous political concept to compensate for some hierarchical distinctions or inequalities among class, gender and race/ethnicity in the nation-state by envisaging an abstract equality (in the marketplace and before the law) among people. As Glenn indicates:

Citizenship has been a critical and key nexus for creating both equality and inequality. I say equality because, in the liberal tradition, all those included in the status are presumed to have equal standing, despite individual differences in wealth, ability, and social standing. I say inequality because the process of defining membership and rights entails drawing distinctions that create the category of "non-citizens" who are not entitled to the same rights. Because of its relation to equality/inequality, citizenship has been the site of continual contestation Glenn (2000:1).

Both political philosophical and sociological accounts of citizenship stress equal rights and obligations (especially see Marshall, 1950). However, citizenship can be viewed as a vehicle by means of which the state structures social inequality in capitalist societies. According to Waters (1989:159) this occurs in three ways: by offering formal equality to those who are materially privileged; by the establishment of differential

citizenship statuses; and by the manipulation of political support. The consequent patterns of "unequal citizenship" are a contradiction and there is a continuous expansion and modification of citizenship practices as the contradiction is manifested.

There therefore resides in citizenship the possibility of unequal treatment by the nation-state. A more precise definition of citizenship, which encompasses these possibilities, is as follows: Modern citizenship is a set of normative expectations specifying the relationship between the nation-state and its individual members which procedurally establish the rights and obligations of members and a set of practices by which these expectations are realized (Waters, 1989: 160).

In terms of this study, the practice and logic of citizenship endanger expectations of equality and participation in public affairs. The concept, citizen, forced the crystallization and rigidification—both intellectual and legal—of a long list of binary distinctions which have formed the cultural underpinnings of the capitalist world-economy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: bourgeois and proletarian, man and woman, adult and minor, breadwinner and housewife, majority and minority, white and black, European and non-European, educated and ignorant, skilled and unskilled, specialist and amateur, scientist and layman, high culture and low culture, heterosexual and homosexual, normal and abnormal, able-bodied and disabled, and of course the *ur*-category which all of these others imply—civilized and barbarian (Waters, 1989: 652).

Therefore, the abstract equality of citizenship, it is relevant to note here, is open to some nationals rather than others meaning that there are so many institutional legal, political, cultural and economic obstacles to prevent some to be included in the `all` who have all rights, that is, who are `active` citizens. Equality of citizenship then becomes a moral principle or

official norm in which its realization intensively relies on the privileged conditions of juridical, political and economic and cultural characteristics of a nation-state. This is why Balibar (1988: 729) recognizes that there is such strong resistance to the enlargement of citizenship and to the very exploration of its modalities. The extent to which Wallerstein (2003: 653) alleges that liberalism, which would become the dominant ideology of the modern world, preached that virtue could be taught, and it therefore offered the managed progression of rights, the managed promotion of passive citizens to the status of active citizens, a road for the transformation of barbarians into the civilized. Since the process of legal promotion was thought to be irreversible, it had to be handled carefully, prudently, and above all gradually.

From its inception, therefore, citizenship was an exclusionary category, justifying the coercive rule of the included over the excluded. As Michael Walzer has pointed out, the rule of citizens over non-citizens, of members over strangers, is probably the most common form of tyranny in human history. (Ignatieff, 1987: 402) While modern citizenship seems to liberate people from divine hierarchies of the feudal system by labeling them as a free citizen-member of his/her nation, this liberation is limited because the new inclusions in the nation-states creates new hierarchies or stratifications among people within the nation-state by excluding others in this sharper, more apparent, and continuing set of new exclusions.

The concept of citizenship is, of course, historically and culturally specific. The modern, western notion of citizenship emerged out of the political and intellectual revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which overthrew the old feudal orders. The earlier concept of society organized as a hierarchy of status, expressed by differential legal and customary rights, was replaced by the idea of a political order established through social contract. Social contract implied free and equal status among those who

were party to it. Equality of citizenship did not, of course, rule out economic and other forms of inequality. Moreover, and importantly, equality among citizens rested on the inequality of others living within the boundaries of the community who were defined as non-citizens. According to Glenn (2000:3) the relationship between equality of citizens and inequality of non-citizens had both rhetorical and material dimensions. Rhetorically, the "citizen" was defined and, therefore, gained meaning through its contrast with the oppositional concept of the "non-citizen" as one who lacked the essential qualities needed to exercise citizenship. Materially, the autonomy and freedom of the citizen were made possible by labor (often involuntary) of non-autonomous wives, slaves, children, servants, and employees.

In the historical development of citizenship in the post-Westphalia period it is evident that citizenship lies on the border between an imagined community, the nation, and its discontents inside and outside the national territory. It defines those with privileged statuses who are eligible to access or use all rights in the territory. Citizenship is symbolically and materially an exclusive category in which some are more equal than others. In other words, citizenship creates a clear-cut distinction for some people to participate in a society and enjoy all legal rights in the territory where some aliens are excluded.

Indeed, the European nation has, at least in principle, grown up around an 'ideal' of cultural homogeneity, established and reinforced through state control over the transmission of literate culture (Gellner, 1983), as well as entry to the territory and the acquisition of citizenship. Thus the nation represents territorialized cultural belonging while the state formalizes and controls legal membership, though the extent of correspondence between the two has increasingly come into question (cited by Morris, 2002:3). As Smith observes (1995: 99): "Modern nations are simultaneously and

necessarily civic and ethnic. In relation to the national state, the individual is a citizen with civic rights and duties, and receives the benefits of modernity through the medium of an impersonal, and impartial, bureaucracy. In this scheme, inclusion in the political system is offered via two types of roles: the lay role of the voter and the professional role of the politician. Citizenship has not only a role, but also a status dimension. Citizenship is attributed to individuals by birth, either based on *jus sanguinis* (ethnic citizenship) or *jus soli* (civic or republican citizenship). In the political community (civic), all citizens are assumed as equal. The national community (ethnic), on the other hand, is based on shared possession of supposedly unique national characteristics. The formation of the both type of citizenship is often based on the assimilation of other ethnic groups in the territory.

In evolutionary perspective, according to Halfman (1998: 513), nation-states have been particularly successful in including individuals in the political system rather than welfare system by basing state rule on territoriality and by building up centralized state administrations. As a consequence, citizen state relations are immediate, permanent, and exclusive. Citizenship is ascribed by the state to a newborn person either on the basis of kinship (*jus sanguinis*) or of location (*jus soli*) or of a combination of both, as is the rule in most nation-states. States claim control over a population within a territory through the attribution of citizenship (as a status). As a general rule (with many exceptions), citizenship (as status) is immediate, exclusive and permanent. States cannot revoke membership acquired by birth (permanence); as a rule citizenship is possible only in one state (exclusivity); no other politically salient allegiances (such as to estates or churches) are allowed to interfere in the citizen-state relationship (immediacy) (Halfman, 1998: 522).



Thus, citizenship in modern democratic states has a dual character. First, it denotes inclusion in a self-governing political community. Second, it means belonging to a specific national community, defined both by territorial boundaries and cultural practices. The democratic state appears in the guise of the nation-state, whose citizens are also a national. Political citizenship is universalistic and inclusive, while national belonging is culturally specific and exclusive. Everybody in the country is meant to belong, while the rest of the world is excluded: foreigners cannot belong. Indeed, this dualism helps explain some contradictions such as how democratic states could justify the colonization of the rest of the world; and why democracy and discrimination are so often linked (Castles and Davidson, 2000).

A *citizen* is also always a member of a nation, or a *national in the nation-state*. The nation-state can be defined as having “an ideology of social unity, ‘imagined community’ ... which describes a so-called people who live within the boundaries of a nation-state ...” Nationalism holds that human groups be organized “into large, centrally educated, culturally homogenous units, coterminous within the nation state” (Castles et al., 1988: 103). Historically, this tension has been expressed in measures to incorporate minority groups into the ‘national culture’. In this sense, it mostly refers to certain privileged groups among nation-states and excludes others. Citizenship just like nationality has been and will always be in the making. It may be taken for granted for those who are identified as nationals of a state, but becomes visible as a precious political good at the external borders and internal boundaries that define the nation.

Citizenship has exclusionary and inclusionary sides within both a national and international framework. Within a national framework, the implications of citizenship’s ‘false universalism’ are explored as the basis for a recasting of citizenship in a way that addresses the tension between

universalism and particularity of difference. Lister (1998) demonstrates how it is all too often experienced as a force for exclusion by those living on the margins—be it the margins constructed by poverty, social divisions, or the power of nation-states—to exclude from both their borders and from full citizenship ‘outsiders’ living in or wanting to live in citizenship communities not originally their own.

Indeed, as sociologist Andreas Wimmer has observed, resident aliens experience the full force of the Janus-faced nature of the modern nation-state as both highly inclusionary and exclusionary at the same time—inclusionary based on universal principles, including equality based citizenship and the rule of law and exclusionary on the basis of nationality. The more rights immigrants are granted as denizens (or non-citizens)—in respect to family reunification, access to the welfare state and in terms of permanent residence—the more restrictive, he argues, the immigration regime becomes in regard to prospective migrants (Wimmer, 2002: 267-9).

Migration laws allocate different rights through various mechanisms—through classification and selection, admission procedures, conditionality, and restrictions; and they do so along various axes, notably nationality, skills level and socio-economic status, and gender. As Catherine Dauvergne has remarked, the criteria that immigration laws enshrine read as a code of national values, determining who some ‘we’ group will accept as a potential member. “The citizenship law—migration law dichotomy”, she continues, functions to ensure for citizenship law a rhetorical domain of formal equality and liberal ideals. (Dauvergne, 2008: 123; Kraler, 2010: 14) Accordingly, the simultaneity of exclusionary mechanisms and liberal norms of equality and the fundamental tensions between the two sides of the liberal ‘migration state’ are important to understand for the current dynamics of citizenship and social inclusion and exclusion in contemporary Europe.

In this context, it should be mentioned the inherent tensions of the nation-state with large-scale migration with the advent of globalization. Normally, nation-states mediate the inclusion of individuals in social systems as well as the political system. The nation-state as a welfare state mediates inclusion in social systems by managing the risks of exclusion. With the emergence of large-scale cross-border migration, the risks of exclusion from nation-state based forms of inclusion increase not only for legal aliens, but for citizens as well. Thus the nation-state reflects the frictions between functional and segmental differentiation of world society. Migration increases the existent disability of the nation-state on the governance of risks of exclusion from the welfare state, labor market and insurance system

Migration highlights the oddity that one might be included in the labor market or the health system, but not in the political system of a host country. As the modern nation-state has been a major agent in promoting the universalism of inclusion in social systems such as the economy or the educational system, the notion of citizenship, or more precisely: its restricted meaning of inclusion in the political system of a nation-state, becomes itself subject to debate (Halfman, 1998: 514). If citizenship has a universal character, citizenship should be made available to anyone who wishes to participate in the “good” society, but that neither the nation-states nor most human rights organizations are ready to invite every willing migrant into their national segment of the “good” society.

Citizenship is an odd form of inclusion as compared to membership in other social systems because it is assumed that it combines universalist and particularist criteria in the same process of inclusion. Citizenship is attributed to all individuals equally, but only insofar as they belong to a particular nation-state (Ibid: 514). From this point of view, citizenship is

selective because it offers inclusion into the political system, but not necessarily into (all other social systems of) society. It is universalist because, in principle, it provides everyone with membership in a nation-state.

However, the universalist idea of citizenship and modern social systems, especially the economic system has encouraged migration on a historically unprecedented level. Halfman (1998) indicates that migration is at the root of the two major problems in the nation-state, which emerge with the evolution of the modern concept of inclusion: the risk of exclusion from any form of membership in social systems and the risk of exclusion from a nationally defined community of citizens. The first problem involves the welfare state from the beginning of nation-state building; the second problem refers to the exclusionist universalism of nation-states, of how to deal with the migrant 'strangers'. The first problem is dealt with along the lines of expanding the equality principle that has been implicit in the republican idea of extending universal political inclusion to all other persons. The second problem was dealt with by abrogating, or bypassing, the sharp exclusionist effects of national citizenship through the mechanisms of naturalization and residence. Naturalization is granted to a select number of foreigners under the condition of shifting their political loyalty to the host nation. Residence is granted when inclusion in social systems other than the political system is deemed desirable or unavoidable. Thus, foreigners can remain members of the political system of their nation of origin and become members in the economic or educational systems of their host country (e.g., guest worker system).

Modern migration that lies at the roots of the formation of the nation-state has undermined the semantic and material basis of the welfare state. If we think of "capitalism" and "international division of labor" and "nation-state system" as related entities, the developed nation-state permanently needs to

have a labor force (highly skilled, semi- and unskilled) from relatively poor areas. Diversity is the de facto result of the capitalist world system (with its international division of labor) and the nation-state, although it undermines the nation and nation-state. The relation of universal citizenship to nation-state particularism is permanently strained. A truly universalist form of citizenship would be one in which the political lay and performance roles could be taken up irrespective of territorial location—that is, in which migration would not alter the conditions of inclusion. Nations limit citizenship to those persons who ‘belong’ to a particular state (Halfman, 1998: 527). Migration, therefore, is associated with the risk of losing the acquirable aspects of citizenship. This effect was enhanced by those state measures that *were* intended to improve the chances for individuals to *become* included in social systems other than the political system. The (European) welfare state was oriented from the beginning at ‘nationalizing’ the inclusion in the social systems by offering special incentives (such as social welfare programs, public school systems) to their citizens. The nation-state particularism contrasts with *the* inclusionary universalism of other social systems such as the economic or the scientific system (Halfman, 527).

Admittedly, current debates on citizenship revolve around this contentious tradition of human rights universalism and nation-state particularism of political inclusion. There seem to be two ways to break the impasse between the universalist and particularist components of citizenship. One option is obviously the perspective of neo-nationalist movements that wish to strengthen the (particularist) status aspect of citizenship. The alternative option is oriented at furthering the (universalist) role aspect of citizenship. This perspective would imply the overcoming of nation-state segmentation of the political system.

At a theoretical level, in tackling the exclusions from citizenship, identified earlier in a national context, we are faced with what Stuart Hall and David Held (1989) describe as ‘an irreconcilable tension’ between the ideals of equality and universality embodied in the very *idea* of the citizen, and the ‘post-modern’ emphasis on difference and diversity (Lister, 1998: 9). Thus, the issue of formal versus substantial citizenship is also closely interconnected with the intricate problem of universality and difference; one of the central issues for citizenship (Castles 1994: 10), which will not be discussed here because of the space limit.

As a matter of fact, all inhabitants of a country could enjoy in it the rights of *passive* citizens; all have the right to the protection of their person, of their property, of their liberty, etc. But all do not have the right to play an active role in the formation of public authorities; all are not *active* citizens. Women (in the past), children, foreigners, and those others who are assumed to contribute nothing to sustaining the public establishment should not be allowed to influence public life actively. Everyone is entitled to enjoy the advantages of society, but only those who contribute to the public establishment are true stockholders of the great social enterprise. They alone are truly active citizens, true members of the association. Accordingly, it is necessary to note that the *passive vs. active citizenship* signifies the distinction between *formal vs. substantial citizenship* that will be now discussed.



### **2.3. The Postwar Process of Germany**

In Western Europe, postwar migration has been marked by its magnitude and diversity, embracing ex-colonial subjects, ‘temporary’ migrant workers from the south and subsequently their families, and, increasingly refugees, asylum-seekers, and ‘irregular’ immigrants. An important element in the ‘age of migration’ is the growing gulf between countries of immigration and of emigration on the global economic margins, compounded by the impact of ‘globalizing’ economic forces.

In comparing highly developed immigration countries we can find important similarities for the postwar process: The dynamics of the migratory process, which transform temporary entry of workers and refugees into permanent settlers and formation of ethnic groups; Processes of economic and social marginalization, based on the immigrants’ weak economic position and lack of local social networks, which lead to labor market segmentation and residential segregation; Processes of community formation, through which ethnic groups develop their own economic, social and cultural infrastructure, and mobilize politically; Increasing interactions between immigrant groups and local populations, which (within each country) vary in character from peaceful co-existence, through to hostility and violence; The imperative for the state to react to immigration and ethnic diversity through policies concerned with employment, education, housing, citizenship, and public order (Castles and Miller 2003).

However, beyond these structural similarities, there are considerable differences and distinctive features in policies, attitudes and behavior towards immigrants in different countries from assimilation to pluralism and differential exclusionism.



Since the late 1980s, immigration to the European Union has become highly differentiated in terms of country of origin, entry status, educational levels and skills. In states of established postwar migration (France, Germany, UK) family migrants replaced labor migrants in the late 1970s as the largest category of those entering officially. From the late 1980s asylum seekers have constituted the fastest growing category and in the 1990s have added to the complexity and differentiation of migrant communities. This has partly been due to the break-up of states in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, conflicts in the Middle East, Africa and Southern Asia and increased global inequalities, which have caused upheavals and movements of population towards Western Europe. Together these flows have generated a much more differentiated migrant population in European states. The number of undocumented migrants has also grown in the past two decades due to strict conditions of entry for family and labor migration and the dramatically increased rate of rejection of asylum claims in most European states (Kofman, 2002: 1036).

Over the past few decades European societies have experienced a wide range of migration patterns. There have been distinguished four analytically distinct migration movements since 1945: “(1) of owners of wealth, along with managerial and technical staff of international companies; (2) of (industrial) workers; (3) of colonial subjects; and (4) of refugees” (Bovenkerk et al, 1990: 478). Given this diversity, it is worth emphasizing that the bundles of rights enjoyed by these four groups are also distinct. If we identify the most significant rights attached to *global* citizenship as, for example, free movement, representation and protection by and from states (the issue of welfare rights is dealt with below), then global citizenship would appear to be a status enjoyed by a limited number of people, in particular those belonging to the first group identified above. Though the other three groups can and do move around the globe—it is with progressively less ease, their interests are less well represented (if at

all) and they enjoy progressively less protection by and from states. For the majority of the world's population, global citizenship has little substantive reality (Shuster and Solomos, 2002: 49). Likewise nation state 'outsiders' stand in a hierarchy from those admitted to full legal citizenship, through those with legal resident status, down to asylum-seekers and then 'irregular' immigrants. However, for those physically prevented from entering a territory, exclusion does operate as an absolute (Lister, 1998).

The postwar period saw a huge of migration to Germany. Although German officials paradoxically regarded their country as not being a country of immigration, Germany has some of the largest inflows of any country since 1945: nearly 20 million people in all, including no less than 1.5 million per year in both 1991 and 1992—as many as to the USA! The largest groups were 'ethnic Germans' from East Germany, 8 million of whom arrived immediately after 1945, and now some 2 million since 1989. Especially in the light of figures which suggest that between 1945 and 1989, net immigration to the Federal Republic of Germany amounted to more than 18 million people, it is important to reach an understanding about why formal membership in German society has been so closely associated with 'Germanness' of the applicant. In comparison to Germany, the US received 16 million immigrants during the same period (Faist, 1994). The alarming difference between these two countries is that Federal Republic of Germany legally claimed not to be an immigration country whereas the US is a classic country of immigration (Canefe, 1998).

Once in West Germany, and now in the reunified Germany, despite the lack of acknowledgement of immigration as a prominent factor in the making of the German national polity, there has been three traditional sources of immigration: ethnic Germans who are expellees and refugees from former German territories in Eastern Europe (*Aussiedler*, *Vertriebener*, *Fluchtling*), migrant labor from the Mediterranean countries

(*Gastarbeiter*), and asylum seekers (*Asylant*). In this context, there are three fundamental questions to be answered. First, why did a *de facto* country of immigration choose to espouse a counter-factual ideology denying the presence and permanent effects of immigration? Second, how did this denial get reflected onto policy-making decisions? And third, what are the consequences of denying the reality of immigration for a reunified Germany today (Canefe, 525).

To answer these questions asked by Canefe, we have to understand how immigration becomes a challenging issue for some areas such as political unity, welfare system and homogeneity of the nation in the nation-state. The novelty is that the immigration and growing cultural diversity poses a several challenges and so many difficulties to the nation-states and their welfare system since the postwar process. First, immigration to the nation-state has challenged the idea of homogenous society and conventionally universal understanding of citizenship. In other words, admitting the *other* into the national community through citizenship appears as a threat to national cohesion and identity. Second, immigration to a wealthy nation-state has challenged the question of how immigrants could be included in the welfare system without giving them all privileges of native citizens. Because, sharing a shrinking social cake with new groups appears as a threat to the conditions of local workers. The second challenge is more likely about the legal stratifications between native citizens and immigrants. Furthermore, the social polarization brought about by economic restructuring and policies of privatization and deregulation leaves little room for minority rights. As known, especially in a socio-economic crisis, welfare chauvinism, right-extremist discourse easily emerges and it is much easier to turn immigrant groups into the scapegoats, by blaming them not only for their own marginality, but also for the decline in general standards.

In its guest worker system during the postwar period, the West German government had not considered itself as a 'country of immigration', despite the reality of a slowly growing community of 'denizens'. German integration policies have been based upon the historical foundation of *volk* (one nation, one culture), and represent the opposite of a multicultural policy. In particular, the state uncompromisingly insists on the teaching of the German language, and the denial of the centrality of other languages. The German state does not maintain a legally codified immigration policy, though a number of unstated preferences exist.

In the postwar period with increasing and diverse migratory pressures in Europe, European states have created an increasingly complex system of 'civic stratifications' with differentiated access to civil, economic and social rights depending on mode of entry, residence, and employment. These differential rights are also unevenly distributed in terms of the migrant's nationality, which paves the way to a racially determined immigration and integration policy. Here, we are much more concerned to draw attention to the general implications of such hierarchical distinctions regarding migrant's nationality and how it is deployed within an overall framework of immigration policy, welfare system and citizenship structure. In this regard, we can claim that the poor, non-European, Third World immigrants are more disadvantaged than others in order to participate in broader society and have access to labor market, welfare system and education in general.

All in all, the unexpected consequences of post-war immigration now demonstrate how the concepts of democracy, liberty and equality are European rather than universal when Europe copes with ex-colonial or poor eastern immigrants' settlement that have no chance to return because of various human reasons.

## **2.4. Civic Stratification: Different Layers of Rights and Discriminating Channels of Access**

“Tell me under which paragraph you arrive, and I’ll tell you who you are”

Migration into Europe continues in a number of forms in postwar process: the professional elite of technical and administrative experts, the families of the postwar labor reserve, growing numbers of asylum seekers granted either refugee status or more commonly humanitarian leave to remain, the revival of a ‘guest worker’ system through a variety of bilateral agreements, and not least the persistence of undocumented workers.

How do European nation-states and especially Germany respond to these diverse immigration flows increased by postwar economic restructuring period?

Faced with a huge amount of diverse immigrations and increasing tensions of economic needs in the postwar process, European states have responded in two ways: (1) constructing a tight control and selection mechanism of entry through policing and securing practices (detention, expulsion and deportation) (2) introduction of stratified or differentiated access to rights through legislation. My argument here is that a system of ‘control of entry’ and ‘stratified rights’ or ‘civic stratification are the two central ‘devices’ that member-states and the EU employ to manage migration and integration.

### **2.4.1. Constructing a Tight Control and Selection Mechanism**

The key migration policy issue has revolved around both the control of entry at the border and management of the immigrants inside. In relation to the former, there is a continuing struggle between those seeking entry and the capacity of the nation state to secure and police its borders through practices of detention, expulsion, and deportation.

Although free movement with rights of settlement has been extended to all nationals of member states in the EU, the treatment of third-country nationals is on the other hand, very much more restrictive, and they are mostly denied the employment and settlement rights associated with free movement. The EU and member-states could be criticized for having adopted contradictory measures that have hindered a more harmonious approach towards immigration. For example, legislation on entry seems to be influenced by ‘anxieties’ about cultural differences and the probable political affiliations of migrant populations.

Therefore, the control mechanisms of entry in all European states are highly selective in a sense that by differentiating between different types of migrants (high- and low-skilled labor, documented and undocumented migrants, family members, asylum seekers, refugees, EU citizens and third country nationals) and the legal frameworks that regulates their presence. This policy ensures that while there might be a drive toward limiting certain kinds of migrants, the doors remain relatively open for others. Some are welcomed more than others. As Tılıç and Erdemir (2008: 49) eloquently argue, in distinction to previous policy goals that sought to minimize immigration, EU- governments started to restrict not only labor migration, by only selectively supporting highly skilled labor, but also specifically insisted on controlling unplanned migration by refugees and

asylum seekers. Highly skilled laborers, meanwhile, are generally perceived to be easier to integrate.

It is not possible to ignore the importance of entry controls when examining migration, citizenship or integration. Entry controls by their very nature are selective, distinguishing between those who have the right to enter and those who don't, between welcome and unwelcome visitors. To argue that integration and societal harmony are dependent on entry controls is to ignore their divisive function (Castles and Miller, 2003) and enable governments to continue to focus on restrictions, to the detriment of policies to include minorities and migrants (Shuster and Solomos, 2002: 48).

The symbolic actions of the state toward immigration, which serve to maintain the electorate's faith in the state as a defender of territory and resources rather than actually stemming the flow of immigrants, carry a number of other important consequences. The strengthening of external borders, together with the increasing paucity of legal opportunities facing non-EU nationals who are seeking unskilled and semi-skilled work, is creating a situation in which two clear trends are emerging. First, people are more likely to attempt to gain illegal entry because the other options are foreclosed. This increases the risk of danger to migrants. Second, the constant deployment of symbolic actions generates its own ideological and material "autonomy." Because states and media normalize the idea that immigration is a source of danger and threat, citizens come to regard it as such. Those risking their lives to be illegal immigrants in Europe are overwhelmingly of African, Middle Eastern, and Asian origin (Garner, 2007: 76). Unfortunately, "Secure Borders, Safe Haven" (Home Office White Paper 2002) as being not only a motto of the British state but a global motto of the "age of migration" in the north will not seem to vanish in the foreseeable future.

In pursuing a set of racially oriented policies, Germany and also the other European Union states are generating inequality, desperation, and frustration among those most affected. The most significant and sustained challenge to the international human rights order Europe has seen since World War II is under way and “race” is at the heart of it.

Any rounded analysis of citizenship and of inclusion and exclusion in Germany or any other European country has to include a discussion of immigration controls, which are inseparable from the grounds for including some and excluding others. It is at the point of entry that distinctions between those who ‘belong’, who have an absolute right to enter, and ‘others’ are drawn. Those others may be permitted to enter, but it is at the discretion of the state issuing visas, and different conditions apply to different groups.

There are inherent tensions in nation-state between the logic of the market, in which not all labor move freely (the exception being associated with finance capital and highly skilled labor) and the bounded welfare state, in which access to services is limited to those deemed to be legitimate members of the “national community”. It seems clear that there are divergent interests pursued by employers seeking suitable workers and states seeking to regulate their borders.

The selective migrant policy functions at various levels but there are basically two underlying criteria arising from the features of nation-state: (1) cultural criteria that are related to cultural/political preservation of “national unity” and (2) economic criteria that are about preserving national welfare resources for “the nation”. Thus, the cultural preservation and welfare protectionism become two unavoidable criteria for the selective immigration policy in the nation-state. Both of these criteria will



be elaborately examined in the following chapters. However, problems emerge and the tensions of the nation-state become more visible when diversity is unavoidable because of labor market necessities, demographic deficits and other obligatory global incentives that arise from wars, ethnic battles, starvation, poverty, etc.

#### **2.4.2. The Practice of Management through Civic Stratification**

Migration still continues in different forms: the professional elite of technical and administrative experts, the families of the postwar labor reserve, growing numbers of asylum seekers granted either refugee status or, more commonly, humanitarian leave to remain, the revival of a ‘guest worker’ system through a variety of bilateral agreements and, not least, the persistence of undocumented workers. Thus, even those countries denying the fact of immigration are compelled to engage in the practice of management.

For some scholars, one vehicle for this process of management has been the expansion of statuses of partial membership to form a nascent system of civic stratification (Lockwood, 1996; Morris, 1997), which operates by means of differentiated access to rights. Other scholars such as Brubaker (1992), Heisler and Heisler (1991), Morris, (1997), and Layton-Henry (1992) have also examined the stratified and differentiated distribution of rights and argued that non-citizens who are resident in and enjoy some rights but not others are more accurately described as helots or denizens, that is, they enjoy a status that is less than citizenship.

Contemporary migration management of European nation-states largely operates through allocating differential rights to different categories of migrants and thus through legally discriminating against (certain categories of) foreign nationals through various mechanisms (classification and

selection, admission procedures, conditionalities, and restrictions) and along various axes, notably along nationality, skill level and socio-economic status, and gender—if often only indirectly. As a result, contemporary migration management involves a proliferation, fragmentation and polarization of different statuses and related bundles of rights with regard to admission, residence, work, social rights, and other domains, resulting in different forms of civic stratification (Morris, 1997). Civic stratification, a term borrowed from David Lockwood (1996), is a key concept guiding this chapter and the study.

This system is, according to Morris (2001b), largely spelled out through the relationship between residence status, employment rights and social rights, and hence functions both as a statement of rights and a mechanism of control. The outcome is an increasingly complex system of civic stratification, which raises a further set of contradictions—discriminatory exclusion alongside assertions of equal treatment. According to the civic stratification thesis, immigration is a very controversial political issue for national governments when they have to choose between commitment to equal treatment and the desire to protect national resources, and between the protection of fundamental rights and restrictive entry policies. Civic stratification becomes even worse when differences between member states are considered, seemingly in conflict with the unifying concept of European citizenship.

In terms of a structural point of view, the general aim of this study is to explore the contradictions inherent in migration and integration policy in Germany and the EU where the logic of the market is weighed against welfare protectionism; welfare and labor market regulation against demands for cheap labor; and national resource concerns against transnational obligations (Morris, 1997; 2002). The outcome is presented in terms of an increasingly complex system of civic stratification

(Lockwood, 1996), only hinted at in the conventional distinction between citizens, denizens and aliens. This nascent structure of inequality built upon the differing rights conceded by the state raises a further contradiction: discriminatory exclusion and partial inclusion set alongside assertions of equal treatment. The result is an elaborate hierarchy of statuses with varying attendant rights, not easily captured by any single theoretical explanation.

Generally in postwar Europe, it is clear that we have been witnessing the expansion of differentiated rights for immigrants through the complex system of legal status that delineates a system for the differential granting or denial of rights. In this stratified rights system, immigration regulations significantly constrain opportunities of immigrants and their children and shape their experiences in the host society by denying or restricting access to labor market, welfare benefits, resources, public funds and political rights, and other rights. In this civic stratification system, we are witnessing processes of highly selective inclusion that leave a great number of migrants with lesser rights or with none at all. Morris emphasizes (2007: 46) that the central device in an increasingly complex system for managing migration has been the designation of different legal statuses with different rights attached, according to the original purpose of entry and stay. The outcome provides another illustration of civic stratification as deployed in an aspect of governance in which rights to work and welfare are critical.

Migrant policies and practices in postwar Europe have inevitably reflected some of these tensions. One result has been the proliferation of statuses involving what has been termed 'partial membership' (Brubaker, 1989) wherein different bases of entry have different rights attached. These degrees of membership thus constitute a system of civic stratification, based on the rights and protections afforded by the state to different 'entry'

categories. Hammar (1990) has captured the key differences in his distinction between citizens, denizens and aliens, but a much more complex pattern is emerging. It is also important to note that the diversification of immigration, the interplay between migratory profiles and rights has been extended or restricted in recent years by national, European and international guidelines and regulations.

Following the civic stratification thesis, this study deals with the question of how far the provisions of citizenship constitute a system of inequality. Accordingly, three tensions are worth mentioning in the civic stratification system—formal inclusions and exclusions, informal gain and deficit, and the dynamic of expansion and contraction. The notion yields three sets of oppositions (Morris, 2002; 2007): inclusion and exclusion refer to the classification of formal statuses governing eligibility for particular rights; gain and deficit refer to enhanced or impaired enjoyment of rights through the informal influence of prestige and stigma; while expansion and contraction refer to the shifting character of a regime of rights, or a particular area of its application.

In this civic stratification framework, the important starting point is, as Lockwood (1996) proposes, the assumption that the ‘institutional unity’ of citizenship, market and bureaucracy is central to the delivery of social cohesion. According to Morris (2007: 41), Lockwood is interested in how class and status *inequalities* affect this integrative function of citizenship rights, and once we recognize their influence through civic stratification the question of cohesion arises anew. The extent to which, Rodger (2003) has pointed to the likely significance of such ‘social steering’ in shaping public feelings about the welfare state, and the dynamic element of civic stratification may thus be closely linked to political presentations and public perceptions of merit and demerit with respect to rights. This serves

to legitimize a model for social cohesion based on unequal status rather than full citizenship (Morris, 2007: 45).

This approach simply goes beyond a traditional citizenship framework (e.g., Marshall, 1950) in considering degrees of partial membership, but remains cautious with respect to claims about universal, transnational rights (Morris, 2000; 2002; 2003). Morris' work is rooted theoretically in the contributions that sociology has made to our understanding of the conditions for obtaining membership in the receiving community. T. H. Marshall's (1950) oft-cited work characterizes membership and inclusion as a sequential process, and it hails citizenship as the ultimate key to a level of membership that opens doors for unconditional access to the labor market, available social services, and full political participation. Nonetheless, a review of the rights accorded to migrants and aliens (third country nationals) in the European Union suggests that aliens especially those who are long-term residents can successfully lay claim to certain provisions by the welfare state even without citizenship (Brubaker, 1989; Hammar, 1990; Soysal, 1994). The significance of Morris' study lies in her analysis of how this presumed gap has been bridged (Uçarer, 2003: 261).

In his critique of Marshall's notion of citizenship, Giddens rightly points at the other side of citizenship entitlements: as the relationship between the state and the citizens was born out of conflicts over sovereignty, it is also one of surveillance (Halfman, 1997: 266). Marshall could not anticipate that the inclusionary politics of the welfare state would create new inequalities and disparities that do not follow the logic of class divisions. Immigration is a case in point. The political exclusion of foreigners may take place as a consequence of establishing those political rights for the formerly deprived social classes, a process which Marshall believed would lead modern society toward more equality. But more justice for the underprivileged segment of the citizenry coincided with a sharp separation from the foreign residents in a nation-state. European societies with

expansive welfare state systems face stronger discrepancies between political and state-mediated inclusion; nations with smaller welfare state programs such as the United States have fewer problems in accommodating immigrants (Ibid: 266).

Another line of critique of the Marshallian framework is its conspicuous lack of a perspective on cultural and social diversity. In this vein, a need to accommodate new plural forms of social movements and democratic agency has been stressed. It has been pointed out that Marshall departed, from the assumption of a unitary national state making no reference to the existence or specific problems encountered by women, or by ethnic minorities and migrants, with respect to rights to citizenship and the substantial utilization of formal rights when granted (Schierup, 2004: 22). Feminist scholars have criticized the theory's inherently male bias and extended and reformulated the Marshallian paradigm in order to accommodate a complex gender-perspective (e.g., Anthias and Yuval-Davies, 1992; Schierup, 2004: 22). Everywhere women have become entitled to rights of citizenship later than men, and when eventually included their actual opportunities for substantially enjoying these rights have been blocked by institutional practice, organizational set-ups and informal power relationships inherently biased on male dominant premises, neglecting the particular social preconditions and needs of women.

Other critics have drawn attention to the lack of any perspective on ethnic or cultural diversity in the Marshallian framework and stressed the importance of integrating theories of culture, identity and ethnic minority rights into a remodeled concept of citizenship (Castles, 1994, Favell, 1998). As in feminist studies, a central issue of dispute has been that of formal versus substantial rights. Most European debates on migration and citizenship have focused on formal citizenship—that is on the rules for access to citizenship for migrants, or for *becoming* a citizen. Less attention

has been paid to substantial citizenship *being* a citizen—that is the actual capacity to exercise the rights and obligations, as embodied in the Marshallian trinity of rights, connected with being a ‘full member’ of society (Schierup, 2004: 23).

Furthermore, in her attempt, following civic stratification theory, Kofman (2002: 1036) also tries to challenge the optimistic theorization of post-national citizenship for migrants (Soysal, 1994, 2000), which largely treated migrants as a homogenous group, whose rights had been extended by international regimes. That is to say, in contrast to the optimism of the thesis of the emergence of post-national citizenship arguing that social and civic rights are increasingly decoupled from formal citizenship in western countries (Soysal, 1994), legal status still matters, in terms of the access to basic rights, in terms of the scope of rights enjoyed and in respect to broader social, economic and political opportunities (for a critique of Soysal’s thesis and similar arguments advanced by Saskia Sassen and others<sup>16</sup>). Besides, the nation-state is still the sovereign exercising physical controls at the border and within the country and related policing practices (detention, expulsion, and deportation) remains important.

By following the “civic stratification thesis” (Morris, 2002, 2003; Kofman, 2002), this chapter argues that the conditions and restrictions exemplified by different migrant categories and rights regarding entry, family reunification, welfare benefits, and labor market access, go along with a particular legal status of those admitted migrants creating a hierarchy of stratified rights. It aims also at exploring the conditions within the civic stratification system in Germany. Here the stratified hierarchy of rights allocated to non-citizen immigrants, particularly Turkish immigrants, is also in conflict with the German concern facilitating the integration of the immigrants in Germany (and Europe more generally) with the objective

---

<sup>16</sup> see also Joppke, 1998; Kraler, 2010

promoting equal participation, rights, access and non-discriminative actions.

Different degrees of security/insecurity of a legal status is an important dimension of civic stratification, as is the degree to which the legal hierarchies of rights as reflected in the system of legal statuses available for migrants is closed, or conversely, open and the ease with which migrants may change from one to another status.

Perhaps unsurprisingly the integration of Europe's immigrants or ethnic minorities has proceeded in a halting and unsatisfactory manner. As a result of the civic stratification system, Hansen (2004) also indicates that migrants and their descendants are poorly represented in national parliaments; they suffer from disproportionately high levels of unemployment; and they draw disproportionately on welfare services. As a result of this process, there is also worrying evidence of racialization across Europe, which fails to ensure sufficient life chances for first-second and third generation migrants.

However, overt restrictions on movement and entry are formulated not in terms of race or culture but in terms of citizenship, and discriminatory effects are inevitably indirect. Furthermore, as Morris (1997) asserts, the criteria for citizenship vary across the EU, with different bases of inclusion affecting different national, ethnic and 'racial' groups. It is important to note that visa regulations, resource constraints and the informal operations of border control disproportionately affect poor, non-white populations. Similarly, internal regulation and policing tend to focus suspicion on third country nationals (and also the 'visibly different' minorities) and have the effect of eroding their legitimate rights, affecting both employment opportunities and access to services. Specifically, the generous policy and practice for ethnic Germans has been proved to be one of overt



discrimination based on racial/cultural interpretation of citizenship. That is to say, the acceptance of ‘ethnic Germans’ (*Aussiedler*) as citizens with all the attendant rights appears as a clear example of racially defined ‘belonging’ overriding other resource issues.

A key component in Lockwood’s approach to civic stratification is the construction of formal devices of inclusion and exclusion with respect to rights. The foundation for such a system in Europe is well known and to be found in the different legal statuses of belonging, the most obvious being national citizenship, citizenship of European Economic Area (EEA) countries, and third country nationals (TCNs) status. The nature of distinctions between these three categories varies between member states, but they represent the clearest formal markers of inclusion and exclusion with respect to key rights - free movement in the case of EEA membership and voting and absolute security of residence in the case of national citizenship. In addition to these formal citizenship distinctions, we have seen that TCNs fall into a variety of subgroups, some of which derive from Community law by virtue of various Association agreements (Staples, 1999), while others are rooted in international conventions such as the Geneva Convention and the European Court of Human Rights (Morris, 2003: 79-80).

The concept of civic stratification opens up the question of the structured differentiation of noncitizen populations and invites attention to the scope for mobility through the system. Implicit here is the further question of whose interests the system serves, and the rules of transition imposed in the different national regimes can be read as embodying both selection and surveillance (for state agents) and opportunity and constraint (for migrants). Generally speaking, the picture is one of selection in terms of permanency and varying degrees of restriction in terms of employment and social support. However, each national system of rights produces a

different 'shape' in terms of the rights, statuses and prospects for advancement of its noncitizen population. In Germany, for example, there is tight control over access to the labor market, which is often phased, and this therefore has impeded the possibility of achieving security for some (Morris, 2003: 90).

In relation to immigrants, civic stratification can be conceptualized as the hierarchy of stratified rights resulting from processes of exclusion and that classifies and sorts out migrants and the realization of rights formally associated with these locations (Morris, 2002: 7). The concept of civic stratification can also be used to evaluate the general expansion or contraction of rights in relation to specific groups of migrants. In this way, immigration regulations produce new forms of inequality, while frequently reinforcing "traditional" ones along the lines of class, gender and ethnicity and race. Although the rights of long-term migrants have been increasingly recognized, access to denizenship is increasingly restricted and tied to ever more demanding conditions (Kofman and Kraler, 2006: 10)

As a result of processes of civic stratification, some categories of migrants are left with almost no formal civic and social, let alone political rights. This applies in particular to irregular migrants who have—for whatever reasons—fallen outside the system of migration management and as a result, also largely outside the effective protection of the law of basic human and social rights (Kraler, 2010: 14).

In this way, immigration regulations produce new forms of inequality, but also reinforce "traditional" social inequalities and cleavages that are often of a gendered nature. Clearly, Kraler argues that legal statuses allocated to foreign migrants by immigration laws are important in constraining or enabling the scope for migrants' agency. In this sense, immigration legislation can be regarded as an important, if often neglected part of the

political opportunity structure and an important factor determining migrants' participation in the wider society.

As Morris (1997; 2001a; 2001b; 2002; 2003) underlines, most European countries have a system of 'civic stratification' that provides settled immigrants and new arrivals with different levels of rights. More importantly, she claims that there is a close relationship between different levels of rights and control of immigrants. In this civic stratification system leading to 'hierarchy of statuses', Morris suggests, there are informal deficits when accessing rights. For example, as Erdemir and Vasta (2007) indicate, some may have various rights on paper, but when it comes to claiming these rights, they experience great difficulties when they discover that access to rights is conditional. In addition, different value is given to rights in the system of civic stratification. Based on research in a Turkish community in England, Erdemir and Vasta's (2007: 9) study indicates that there is also a hierarchy of statuses among those who can claim regular or documented status and those pushed into irregularity. For example, some nationalities who enter on a tourist visa intending to work, may find it easier than others to gain self-employment visas, while others who do not have such an opportunity possibly because they come from Africa and other third world countries, for example, end up overstaying.

Now, it is safe to argue that formal and informal discrimination and exclusion for third country nationals remains substantial in some key areas. The wide range of statuses the minority groups occupy invites attention to the correspondence between civic stratification and the degrees of membership in the community. Racial, ethnic and cultural differences are often apparent in the pattern of access to rights. The racial, ethnic and cultural hierarchy between immigrants and natives is characterized by civic stratification whereby rights are granted differentially with a view to enabling or dissuading people from settling and becoming citizens.

Manifestation of the racial, cultural and ethnic conflicts in accessing legal rights permits us to analyze the structure of institutional discrimination and xenophobia in the nation-state. It is this institutional structure that enables the state to govern diversity of immigrants with the help of a differentiated set of rights. The elaboration of rights for categories of the noncitizen also provides the opportunity and the means for exercising surveillance and control.

Apparently, the stratified rights for immigrants are in conflict with a wide range of other policy goals including anti-discrimination law against all types of discrimination and exclusion and the full participation and integration of migrants in all spheres of society. What is more, the stratified rights in family reunification, labor market and naturalization and other social dimensions are in contradiction with more general policy objectives regarding integration, social cohesion, gender equality and anti-discrimination laws.

The point of departure for the argument of this chapter is to suggest that the stratified rights system consolidates the “structural discrimination” in which immigrants and even their children born in the host country become more and more marginalized. Institutional racism is best defined as the role played by the state and its institutions in reproducing the social exclusion of immigrants or ethnic minorities. In general terms, “the institutional dimension refers to cooperative systems forming part of the ruling apparatus” (Essed, 2002: 205). Thus, the power of the dominant group is sustained through its structures and institutions, such as laws, policies and administrative practices, education, and housing. All of this leads to the further marginalization of ethnic minority groups. Omi and Winant (1994: 76) argue that “the state is inherently racial” because it makes routine and natural cultural practices and terms. Discriminatory systemic trends such as continuous negative experiences for ethnic minorities in the labor market

or in educational performance can also fall within the scope of institutional racism (cited by Vasta, 2007: 728).


By developing the concept of “civic integration”, even the European Commission clearly recognizes that immigration regulations act as barriers to full participation and thus may have discriminatory effects (Bauböck, 2005). It is in this context that this dissertation will analyze the discriminatory consequences of civic stratification on migrants and its wider implications for social cohesion and social integration in the following chapters.

The increasing differentiation of migrant and refugee populations in the past decade and the bewildering array of legislation regulating the entry, residence and employment status of this population have given rise to discussions about the development of increasingly complex forms of differentiation and stratified rights, or civic stratification. This study examines civic stratification through legislative texts and policy implementation in Germany to produce a detailed hierarchy of statuses and rights as it affects Turkish migrants’ experiences of integration, settlement and access to rights.

Last but not least, we do not claim here that the hierarchy of the non-citizen and citizen in the nation-state is stable and subject to a never-changing process. Rather, we suggest that the contours of this nascent system of civic stratification—a system of inequalities structured by rights granted or withheld by the state—may shift over time. Thus there is a dynamic relationship between and among immigrants and the native society. Its forms are determined by the changes in immigration policy, integration goals, economic needs, and the welfare system at the local, regional, national and global levels. “Civic stratification” is, as a result, a system of failure to equate the different migrants who populate the


European landscape (different in terms of their primary motivations, length of stay, and skill sets) by introducing different sets of rights and privileges that result from the differences in their respective skill, nationality, race, and religion etc. In the other words, migration law and policies based on civic stratification encourage or fail to prevent a dualism between citizens (mostly non-poor) and immigrants or ethnic/racial communities (mostly poor).

*Table 4: Stratified Immigration Model*



Source: Table prepared by the author

**Table 5: Logically Available Responses to Stratified Rights and Discrimination**



Source: Prepared by the author



### **2.4.3. Control through Civic Stratification**

According to Morris' approach to civic stratification migrant rights are state concessions that are heavily shaped by competing control and surveillance interests. They differ significantly according to migrant group or category (Cited in Joppke, 2004: 775). Consequently the civic stratification system can, in practice, serve as both a statement of rights and as an apparatus of surveillance and control. The delivery of rights can itself offer an opportunity for surveillance, selection and control, as any welfare recipient will testify.

There is a close connection between public funds and security of residence that opens up the possibility that delivery of social rights can be harnessed as a vehicle of control and as a means of monitoring those lawfully present. Indeed, there are clearly established links for data exchange between the agencies of the state, as in Germany and Britain (Morris, 1998). These links can be brought to bear in checking the status of claimants, in validating transitions to a secure status, and as a possible means of detecting those unlawfully present, thus complicating the role of service delivery. However, while self-maintenance acts as the key criterion of residence, there is a prior dimension of inclusion/exclusion that operates by virtue of control over the right to work and, in some cases, the degree of labor market access granted. This, of course, can affect prospects of security, though the denial of transition to a more secure status does not necessarily mean the denial of a status, and thus TCNs can find themselves locked into a position with reduced rights while remaining present in a country for significant periods of time. This is a particular feature of the German system (Morris, 2003: 81).

The rather dark and Foucauldian picture that emerges here is that of monolithic states conceding only as many migrant “rights” as is commensurate with their control interests. For instance, the retention of a minimum level of social provisions for asylum seekers—presented as an area of “rights contraction”—is looked at as allowing states to keep migrants on their surveillance radar (Morris, 2002: 146; see also Joppke 2004: 775).

It is safe to claim that stratified rights are closely related to control mechanisms over immigrants in Germany where the fulfillment of certain conditions has been a prerequisite for the acquisition of further rights, and has therefore served as the basis for selection in the route to long term security, and ultimately citizenship. For instance, full employment rights may only be granted after a period of self-maintenance, while a claim for social support, though permissible, eliminates the claimant from achieving the next stage of security. Such a process also highlights the sometimes ambivalent nature of rights and their close association with mechanisms of control. The overall outcome is a complex hierarchy of statuses that represents an administrative system for the management of migration in the context of a political rhetoric of denial. Material presented below outlines the existing structure of the German system, noting the possibility of movement up or down the hierarchy of statuses, and highlighting the centrality of employment rights and social rights in this process. The granting or withholding of these rights has functioned as part of a system of selection, surveillance, deterrence and control, with implications for both individual prospects of advancement, and for societal prospects of cohesion. The new nationality law may now represent a final stage of integration for the original guest workers, but alongside this potential consolidation of their position we find a continuing elaboration of statuses

whose functioning highlights a set of complex interactions between rights and controls (Morris, 2000: 228).

## **2.5. The Uniqueness of the Guest Worker Incorporation: German Differential Exclusionism**

Differential exclusionism is the incorporation philosophy and the framework of immigration policy that is implemented through a civic stratification system whereby -legal rights and practices are regularized.

Some have labeled the German management of immigration and integration policy as ‘differential exclusionist’ (Castles, 1995), or ‘graduated selection’ (Morris, 2003).

German policy is thus characterized by an elaborately graduated system of statuses compounded by phased access to the labor market. This system is partly the outcome of an ad hoc elaboration of rights for a noncitizen guest worker population (Brubaker, 1992). One notable effect has been differentiated rules for family unification, which disadvantage long-term residents in relation to German and EU citizens by imposing tighter conditions of entry and stay. In addition to its guest worker history, Germany has historically had very high numbers of asylum seekers, though it now has limited the constitutional guarantee and to date has applied a rigorous definition of persecution by state agents. The result has been a variety of statuses of subsidiary protection with differing prospects of security, differential systems of social support and restricted employment opportunities. The weakest (tolerated) status at present grants minimal rights to those required to leave but unable to do so.

Generally speaking, the German regime has produced a proliferation of statuses of partial membership that in practice are not necessarily either

temporary or transitional. Although a new law was proposed to somewhat simplify the structure, it has been ruled unconstitutional (Morris, 2003: 83). For this reason, if no other, Germany has devised a highly complex system of “graduated selection” with a multiplicity of statuses, in which the transition from “partial” to full membership is extremely difficult, and in which an entire class of rejected but non-deportable asylum-seekers is relegated to the marginal dead-end status of being “tolerated” (*duldung*)

Germany is a very special case of a differential exclusionist system with a bureaucratic attempt to resolve contradictory postwar immigration pressures through a particularly elaborate system of classification and regulation. Its most overt effect has been a hierarchy of statuses that simultaneously represents a structure of opportunity for some migrants and a set of insuperable barriers for others. Among the reasons for the complexity of the German system has been the well documented descent based system of citizenship, the restrictive conditions for naturalization, and the limitation on dual citizenship (Brubaker, 1992; Morris, 2000: 226).

Migration to Germany as to Europe in general seems to be unavoidable. At best it can be regulated. The attribution of a different legal status to migrants and of connected entitlements upon social welfare is to be understood as forms of regulating migration. To grant or to deny social rights to immigrants delineates for immigrants the conditions of physical, social and cultural reproduction (Bommes and Radtke, 1996: 78). As a result of these various migratory trends and contradictory pressures, a complex hierarchy of civic stratification has arisen from the different categories of entry—labor (skilled and unskilled), family, including visitors, asylum seekers, refugees and students (Morris, 1997). Each category has different rights and levels of protection. In particular there is a widening gap between denizens, defined as long-term residents, temporary permit holders, those waiting for a decision about their status, and the

undocumented (Kofman 2002). These repressive conditions have become more constrained for marginalized immigrants (undocumented, third country nationals), especially in the light of the electoral success of far right parties and widespread anti-immigrant attitudes in a number of European Union states since 1990s.

As an incorporation philosophy, differential exclusion may be characterized as a situation in which immigrants are incorporated into certain areas of society (above all the labor market) but denied access to others (such as welfare systems, citizenship and political participation). Exclusion may be effected through stratified legal mechanisms (refusal of naturalization and sharp distinctions between the rights of citizens and noncitizens), or through informal practices (discrimination). According to Castles (1995: 295) the differential exclusion model seems most appropriate to former 'guest worker'<sup>2</sup> recruiting countries in Western Europe, such as Germany, Switzerland, Austria and Belgium. It also appears to fit the Gulf oil states, which have recruited workers within rigid contract labor systems since the 1970s.

On the one hand, broadly speaking, 'immigrants' are not be considered as legal citizens (thus they do not have full citizenry rights (the ability to vote) or employment rights (e.g., in the public sector, etc.)). In this sense, they are de facto socially excluded from various forms of participation in quasi-democratic European states. The same sort of complexity is witnessed in the differential exclusionist system of Germany where at least four legal categories of immigrants and asylum-seekers have been observed (Faist, 1995). Immigrants with varying degrees of legal rights are sometimes referred to as 'denizens' and many even share identical rights to the 'indigenous citizens' while maintaining their original nationality (Faist, 1995; Samers, 1998).

In such situations, immigrants become ethnic minorities (for “ethnosizing immigrants” see Costant, Gataullina and Zimmermann, 2009), which are part of civil society (as workers, consumers, parents, etc.) but are excluded from full participation in economic, social, cultural and political relations. Since such ethnic minorities are usually socio-economically disadvantaged, this situation implies a strong and continuing link between class and ethnic background. Moreover, migration rules and other policies towards immigrants are generally constructed on the basis of patriarchal stereotypes. Migrant women are usually particularly disadvantaged, so that gender becomes linked to ethnic background and class as a factor of differentiation.

On the other hand, many have argued that the term ‘ethnic minority’ is not without difficulty. In other words, ethnicity is not fixed or essential. It often implicitly excludes multiple identities shaped by age, gender, sexuality, class, and divisions of labor. As Samers (1998) notes, the use of the ‘ethnicity’ and ‘ethnic minority’ can be colonialist, victimizing and patronizing, and perhaps what is required is a more positive, celebratory conception of ‘marginality’, ‘peripherality’, or Diaspora.

The motivation for differential exclusive incorporation on the part of the government and population of the receiving country is generally the belief that admission of migrants is only a temporary expedient, such as recruitment of workers to meet transitory labor demands, or admission of refugees for temporary protection. Permanent settlement is seen as threatening to the receiving country for economic reasons (pressure on wages and conditions), social reasons (demands on social services, emergence of an underclass) cultural reasons (challenges to national culture and identity), or political reasons (fear of public disorder, effects on political institutions or foreign policy). The strategy adopted to keep immigrants temporary is usually based on restrictions on residence rights

and prevention of family reunion. In some cases, however, governments claim to want to keep immigrants out altogether (i.e., total exclusion) while in fact tolerating or even tacitly encouraging illegal labor immigration. Such policies have been used by France, the USA, southern European countries and Japan, and lead to differential exclusion by depriving entrants of nearly all basic rights (Castles, 1995: 295).

Germany tends to preserve these differential exclusionist ideas even in new immigration legislations for new guest workers by denying their status transition as a sustainable strategy for having cheap labor. Morris (2000: 232) asserts that the opportunity to earn security of residence was developed as a means of accommodating the original guest worker population, confirmed in the 1990 Foreigners Law and having its culmination in the new citizenship law. However, the other objective of the 1990 law has been to deny this possibility to certain other categories of migrant. The most overt restriction comes in the form of '*Bewilligung*' (denial of transition) a status that prohibits transition and from which it is impossible to move to a more secure position—except through marriage to a German. One common application of this status is for students, but more contentious has been its use to revive the guest worker pattern but with stricter enforcement of the rotation of workers. This stems, in part, from a wish to secure a supply of cheap labor, without any of the complications involved in a long-term stay. Clearly, this status is mostly for new guest workers to construct a strict rotation of workers for secure supply of cheap labor. The restricted permits for contract and seasonal workers provide the legal means through which to impose rotation and control numbers. Indeed, these laws are integral to the management of the German labor market, but a challenge to the operation of a European labor market. Morris (2000) underlines this as only part of the picture. While the workers are denied movement through the hierarchy of formal statuses, transition to

an undocumented status built on the contacts and experience accumulated during the stay are an inevitable by-product of the arrangement.

The current intake of temporary workers is under terms designed to prevent a repetition of the guest worker history (in which most of them stayed rather than returning), with strictly time limited employment opportunities and no social supports. For asylum seekers, a more complex set of constraints applies—to honor human rights obligations without encouraging entry or settlement, to minimize welfare costs without facilitating employment, and to withhold residence status without forcing clandestinity.

The representative case of civic stratification, that is, the guest worker program of Germany is based on the inferiority and the separation of the foreigner. A key feature in Germany is the guest worker regime, which gives immigrants secure residence but still considers them for the most part non-citizens. Through its system of stratified rights, Germany manages migration very cautiously without, however, precluding the possibility of full citizenship (Dell'olio, 2005: 418). In this system what is thus taking shape is a 'melting pot', or an unstable hierarchical complex of ethnic-social groups. It presupposes not the erasing of original nationalities but their perpetuation in a different gear. Germany like the other Western European societies did not integrate immigrants as equals, but as economically disadvantaged and racially discriminated minorities. As a result, immigrants tended to settle in specific neighborhoods, marked by inferior housing and infrastructure. Ethnic enterprises and religious, cultural, and social associations developed in these areas. Thus the inherent contradictions of the guest worker system led to today's ethnically diverse but socially divided European societies (Schierup, Hansen, and Castles, 2006). Since the 1980s, Europeans have become increasingly concerned about trends affecting ethnic minorities such as social exclusion, labor



market segmentation, residential segregation, and high unemployment as a result of such civic stratification system.

In the German guest worker regime, where citizenship has been more difficult to access (Brubaker, 1992), security is more likely to be through unlimited residence. Even though the New Citizenship Law in 2000 has changed some ironic fate of foreigners by easing naturalization rules with a reduction in the residence requirement from 15 years to 8, and to 3 years for the foreign spouse of a German citizen. This may enhance both eligibility for and take-up of citizenship, and will correspondingly facilitate family unification for many. However, as Morris (2000: 227) rightly notes that naturalization still requires proof of self-maintenance, and for non-citizens family unification remains conditional. At the same time restrictions on temporary workers continue, and the classification of asylum seekers becomes ever more elaborate.

In particular, there is a widening differentiation in entitlements between denizens, defined as long-term residents, temporary permit holders, those waiting for a decision about their status, and the undocumented. Differentiation between long-term and temporary has been used for the control and management of immigrants by regulating them in the specific conditions attached to temporary permits and protection and their conversion to a more secure status varies between states and mode of entry. As Kofman (2005: 456) eloquently observes, temporary permits were utilized for asylum seekers and beneficiaries of regularization programs that became an increasingly common measure in European states to deal with large numbers of irregular migrants. A temporary status is usually accompanied by limited access to economic, social and civil rights. Being on a temporary permit may mean that the residence is conditional; the migrant is placed in a probationary status subject to a willingness to assimilate and accept a common culture. These temporary permits may be

used to hinder or block access to citizenship, which generally requires continuity of residence. This reinforces the sense of the immigrant as a guest dependent on the conditional hospitality of the host.

One result has been that, with the notable exception of political rights, some of the rights of citizenship have been extended to resident non-citizens and in this context Soysal (1994) heralds the era of 'post national membership'. Different categories of residence, however, mean that key rights can still be withheld from certain groups, while definitions of citizenship and criteria of access are themselves open to change (Morris, 2000: 226).

In spite of the recent liberalization of the citizenship laws, most descendants of immigrant laborers have remained resident outsiders whether from the first, second, or third generation. Most of the Turkish minority in Germany has no civil rights, e.g., voting or adequate political representation. Though they constituted about two percent of the population, only three of the more than 600 members of the German parliament were of Turkish origin in 2002. Turks in Germany experience systematic discrimination in the employment, service, and housing markets, as numerous studies carried out by the Center for Turkish Studies have shown. In Germany it is against the law to publicly deride a foreign ethnic or national group, but there is little or no legal recourse if members of this group are refused access to employment, housing, and services, whereas the opposite holds for the United States. Though, by no stretch of the imagination is the United States a perfect role model in terms of race and ethnic relations (Mueller, 2006: 437).

All in all, in practice rights are highly differential and unequal. This creates the distinction of privileged citizens—German citizens, ethnic Germans, *Aussiedler*, EU, non-EU, privileged non-EU—are legally enshrined as

against non-privileged non-EU citizens. In the civic stratification system, the practice of rights functions in terms of nationality, residence length, status, and income level. Among these criteria, the country of origin/citizenship matters and makes a difference.

Last but not least, it should be mentioned that family immigrants of third country nationals in Germany are severely subjected by “devaluation” or “de-skilling” due to the non-recognition of former social position and diploma equivalence in the country of origin. This is again not a problem for ethnic Germans whose diploma equivalence in their country of origin has been completely accepted. Based on our interviews with Turkish youths in Goslar, we have to note that non-European country nationals always get more suspicion from the side of authorities and it is more difficult to get certain documents in job, family reunification or naturalization applications.

The hierarchical relationships between the host society and Turkish immigrant minority are generally determined by a hierarchical system in political, socio-economic and cultural domains in Germany. First, Turkish immigrants have no political participation rights and are thus disadvantaged regarding power relations in that they could not represent themselves properly and are reduced into passive obedience and have no possibility to change their conditions through political action. Moreover, within this hierarchical context, immigrants are deprived of some civil and legal rights versus host society and EU member state nationals (e.g., unequal family unification when comparing with EU nationals).

Second, the cultural sphere in nation-state-Germany seems also to represent a certain kind of stratification in which Turkish immigrant culture and religion (Islam) is seen as a backward, inferior, patriarchic and illiberal, assuming that all these anti-modern residues should fade away

and immigrants should adapt themselves to mainstream German culture (*leitkultur*). This situation feeds an existing institutional discrimination and xenophobia towards the immigrant minority.

Third, there is also an occupational hierarchy in which immigrants are mostly confined to working class positions as unskilled or semi-skilled workers without having a real 'structural possibility' to experience upward mobility. Even though, there are some highly skilled professionals among the second and third generation, the first and second hierarchical barriers above mentioned, although not compulsory, may also be at work against them. In other words, even highly skilled immigrants who are members of an ethnic minority with cultural distance from the host-society may encounter discrimination.

## **2.6. Immigrants and Citizenship: Methodological Principles of the Civic Stratification Analysis**

In Europe and elsewhere, citizenship becomes a powerful instrument of social insulation, shielding prosperous states from the migrant poor. But citizenship is also an instrument of definition within states, where each state establishes a legal and ideological boundary between citizens and foreigners. Thus, every state discriminates between citizens and residing foreigners, reserving certain rights and benefits, as well as certain obligations for citizens. For some immigrants the status of immigrant is sustained by maintaining them in a status that permits them to remain indefinitely in the country and, outside the political domain, to participate in social and economic life on virtually the same terms as citizens (Jorgensen, 2008).

According to Lockwood (1996) one reason social stratification has been so central to sociology is in illuminating the question of how much inequality

may be tolerated or rejected in a given society. However, he goes beyond traditional conceptions of social class to recognize citizenship and its attendant rights as one potential and neglected source of inequality. Thus the ethos and practice of citizenship is at least as likely as class relations to structure group interests and thereby fields of conflict and discontent.

Indeed, policy itself is an important factor in shaping both public perceptions and internalized identities, such that groups portrayed as dependent or deviant may fail to mobilize. Stigmatized by the policy process, they will often lack public support and hence the will or capacity to take collective action (Lockwood 1996: 46). In an argument that complements the civic stratification approach, Alexander (2001) suggests that we must rethink the law as a form of symbolic representation. Alexander recognizes that law often serves to legalize exclusion and domination, as in the formal aspects of civic stratification, and we have seen that there can be a degree of manipulation in this process.

The social analysis (of immigration) in this study, following Lockwood's civic stratification theory, starts not from the question of how class structure affects the unequal social class relations or formations, but from the question how socio-political and legal conditions, which regulate the institutionalization of citizenship, market and bureaucratic relations, determine the inequalities of class formation. The methodological operation is clear that it is a kind of inversion of the class analysis by starting from the super-structural (politics, religion, law, ideology) elements of society rather than infrastructural economy or mode of productions in order to understand social order or cohesion. This approach underlines that the structure of citizenship is central to social order and cohesion and then leads to the question of how in practice inequalities of class and status modify its institutionalization and thereby its integrative function. Civic stratification theory begins with the problem of social

integration by questioning features of the status formation of citizenship and legal rights rather than class structural analysis. The civic stratification analysis mainly focuses on the ways in which the structuring of life chances and social identities is the direct or indirect result of the institutionalization of citizenship under conditions of social and economic inequality. This is another way of saying, in the words of Lockwood (1996: 532), that the impact on social integration of changes in class structure is not direct, but mediated by institutions that regulate and legitimate a much wider range of inequalities and power relationships than those arising from class as defined by reference to the possession of marketable property and skill. Typical approaches to social inequality view it as primarily constituted in economic relationships. In the analyses of citizenship discussed above, for example, there is assumed to be a structural separation of economic from political life in which classes are generated within economic relations and equal citizenship is generated within political relations. Giddens (1981: 229), for example, makes explicit reference to the earlier work of Dahrendorf (1959) which identifies a series of stratification hierarchies, economic, political, religious, and recreational and so on, each of which is independent of the others. It is probably true to say that broadly revolutionist scholars also accept the existence of this separation (See for example, Jessop, 1982: 5; Rose et al., 1984; cited by Waters, 1989: 167). Within these arguments, the establishment of legal and civil rights performs two functions: formal and individualistic citizenship defends bourgeois interests against state interference in the exploitation of labor; and citizenship provides for status equality as a legitimating veneer for class inequality. Gramsci (1971: 131-3) describes the first part of this strategy of uni-national citizenship as one in which a hegemonic class can successfully combine patriotic ideas with its own class interests, and calls it the creation of a national-popular collective will (cited by Waters, 1989: 176).

In his article 'Propositions on Citizenship', Balibar (1988) argues that the definition of citizenship at any given point in time reflects only a temporary equilibrium in the society. His point is well taken; German citizenship laws need to adapt to the fundamentally changed social and political dynamics of the German society since the entrance of guest workers into its permanent work force. In other words, the preferential treatment and repatriation of ethnic Germans is based on the definition of German society at the very point of the constitution of a German nation-state, and thus is archaic—a criterion that is frozen in time (Canefe, 1998: 541).

According to Lockwood (1996: 531) the route followed here starts from the assumption that the institutional unity of citizenship, market and bureaucratic relations is central to social cohesion, and then concentrates on the questions of how inequalities of class and status affect the institutionalization of citizenship and thereby its integrative function. While its practice is heavily influenced by the structure of social inequality, citizenship can be seen to exert a force field of its own. According to him, four main types of 'civic stratification' are distinguished by reference to citizens' differing enjoyment of, and ability to exercise, rights, their social categorization by the rights themselves, and by their motivation to extend and enlarge them: namely, civic exclusion, civic gain and deficit, and civic expansion. Lockwood outlines two axes for plotting inequality with respect to rights; one refers to formal entitlement and is expressed in terms of the presence or absence of a right (inclusion/exclusion), the other refers to possession of moral or material resources—or more loosely social standing, which can enhance or reduce access to, or enjoyment of, a right (gain/deficit) (Morris, 2009: 606). It is also important to emphasize that they all have consequences for social integration.

**Table 6: Civic Stratification**

		<b>Moral and Material</b>	
		+	—
<b>Citizenship Rights</b>	+	<b>CIVIC GAIN</b>	<b>CIVIC DEFICIT</b>
	—	<b>CIVIC EXPANSION</b>	<b>CIVIC EXCLUSION</b>

**Source:** Lockwood, 1996

For Lockwood (1996), civic stratification is a system of inequality based on the relationship between different categories of individuals and the state, and the rights thereby granted or denied. Central to such a system are the formal inclusions and exclusions that operate with respect to eligibility for rights and the informal gains and deficits that shape delivery. Lockwood describes what he terms four types of civic stratification—civic exclusion, civic gain and deficit and civic expansion, which are in fact two sets of paired oppositions. Civic gain and deficit refer to the enhanced or impaired implementation of rights by virtue of largely informal processes. Civic exclusion refers to the formal denial of rights, while civic expansion may refer either to the expanding claims of particular groups or to the expanding terrain of rights more generally. Morris (2002) suggests a slight amendment, pairing exclusion with inclusion to denote formal access to rights, and introducing a third opposition, civic expansion and contraction, to refer to the shifting character of a regime of rights or of a particular area within its ambit.

As can be observed from the chart of civic stratification above, citizenship rights (+) denote ‘full citizenship’, namely that all citizens share the same



existing rights. Citizenship rights (-) denote either new rights that are aspired to but not yet achieved (civic expansion) or a lack of existing rights (civic exclusion). 'Moral resources' refers to advantages conferred by social standing and social networks, command of information, and general know-how, including the ability to attain one's ends through the activation of shared moral sentiments, whether or not the actor's orientation to such standards is sincere or disingenuous.

This is why the 'middle class', Lockwood (1996: 536) asserts, generally has the edge on the 'working class' in its ability to get more out of the same formally equal rights, particularly social rights. The former are not only equal or superior in status to those dispensing educational, medical and other public services, but better able to communicate their needs and more confident in discovering and influencing the choice of options open to them.

In terms of civic exclusion, the imperfections in the institutionalization of citizenship are most glaring and offensive when readily identifiable social categories are denied full citizenship rights or when their existing rights are abrogated. While systematic abrogation —as opposed to piecemeal erosion—of civil, industrial or social rights is unusual, the denial of full citizenship to ascriptively defined social categories is undoubtedly a major part of the explanation of the fact that from time to time conflict centering on civic disabilities attaching to race, gender and ethnicity has acquired something of the saliency and vitality that once characterized an earlier phase of 'class struggle'. In all such cases, the sense of relative status deprivation arises from civic disqualification of a fairly blatant kind: namely the de jure or de facto exclusion of some minority from the full range of civil, political and social rights enjoyed by the majority (Lockwood, 1996: 537).

As to civic deficit, the case in which minorities (social, not necessarily demographic) are denied the rights of full civil, political and social citizenship should be distinguished from that of civic deficit, which refers either to a situation in which a lack of resources prevents the exercise of rights that are formally enjoyed or to one in which the exercise of rights is derogating. In this context, Lockwood distinguishes three types of civic deficit: power deficit, stigmatized deficit, and fiscal deficit.

As a matter of fact, civic deficit created by the exercise of social rights within a system that not only legitimates the allocation of inferior resources to claimants, but also has the effect of reconstituting them as 'second class citizens'. The most important common feature of 'state dependants' is that they are no longer in a market- or class- situation, but in a status-determined situation that leads them in varying degrees to be regarded as lesser citizens. Most important, their life chances are determined by a status that defines them as deserving less than other citizen (Lockwood, 538).

Although it is possible to distinguish stigmatized from power deficits, naturally some individuals may belong to both categories. Indeed civic deficit may be combined with ethnic stigmatization and partial civic exclusion, as in the case of *Gastarbeiter* (guest workers) who pay taxes, contribute to and receive benefits from health and social security services, but who for various reasons are not naturalized in the host country. This condition may be "due to an unwillingness to compromise their national identity, refusal of many countries to allow dual nationality, the pressure from home governments not to give up their existing citizenship, the expense and complexity of naturalization, or the fear that they would still not be accepted even if they were naturalized" (Layton-Henry, 1992: 236).

It should be underlined that civic deficit which is determined by institutional discrimination is more likely to affect not only guest workers but also their descendants for a long time. “Civic deficit verges on exclusion, which is the result of personal and institutional discrimination against groups such as ‘guest workers’ and ethnic minorities, and which extends towards the second and third generations of immigrant families, even in Britain which is exceptional in having accorded postwar New Commonwealth immigrants full citizenship”, contends Lockwood. This fault line in civic integration is likely to widen under conditions of high unemployment, the voluntary or involuntary ghettoization of ethnic minorities, and uncertainty about, and therefore obsession with, national identity.

The question then is not why minorities protest against such discrimination but why protest does not take on a more widespread political form. One reason, according to Lockwood (1996: 544), is that ethnic groups vary in the extent to which they have become integrated in the host society, at least as measured by educational and occupational achievement. Whatever the reason for this, it has the effect of reinforcing invidious comparisons between minorities, and thereby preventing their coalescence as a united bloc. A more fundamental reason, however, is that in so far as minorities have ‘full’ citizenship, they are necessarily caught up in rules of the civic game which present a choice between legitimate remedial action, such as achieving supplementary rights, and action outside the rules, which provides grounds for increased prejudice and further discrimination.

One advantage of the civic stratification approach is that it allows inequalities related to age, gender and ethnicity to be incorporated within the same explanatory scheme that is significant for the analysis of aliens, immigrants, non-citizens, and women in the social cohesion of the nation-state. In this approach, specific social groupings become the focus of

attention. On the one hand, there are more or less well defined ‘classes’ identified through economic position, employment relations, life chances and ‘demographic’ density; on the other there are more or less well defined categories of ‘citizens’ identified through their different capacities to exercise various rights, their social categorization by the rights themselves and by their motivation to extend and enlarge them (Lockwood, 547).

It is also clear that, Lockwood eloquently emphasizes, while its practice is heavily influenced by the structure of class and status inequality, citizenship can be seen to exert a force-field of its own: in part through stratifying practices such as civic exclusion and stigmatization; in part through ethical exploitation as in civic activism; and, most generally, through providing a legitimization of inequality, and thereby the basis of whatever degree of social integration capitalist democracies possess—the measure (or more likely, measures) of which has still to be devised. Finally, unlike class analysis, the approach set out above allows inequalities related to age, gender and ethnicity to be incorporated within the same explanatory scheme.

The interdependence of capitalist or class relations and citizenship or status relations has always been full of tension, contends Lockwood. Since equality of civil and political rights is an absolutely basic requirement, constitutive of capitalist liberal democracy as such, the endemic contradiction between citizenship and capital has so far been managed by the fine-tuning of social rights: that is by seeking a balance between the system-integrative need for ‘efficiency’, and the social-integrative need to provide ‘acceptable’ or ‘tolerable’ levels of social welfare. In contemporary capitalist democracies, the ethos and practice of citizenship is at least as likely as class relations to structure group interests and thereby fields of conflict and discontent. This is because citizenship remains an ideal whose actualization is always less than complete, both because it sets

standards yet to be reached and because its existing institutionalization is usually impaired by force of circumstance and vested interests.

A crucial step in Lockwood's argument is the role of citizenship rights in securing social integration, in part through the legitimization of inequality, whereby equal citizenship status compensates for market inequalities (Marshall, 1950). However, Lockwood poses the question of when such integration might come under challenge, and explores the scope for inequality in entitlement and access to the basic rights which citizenship itself confers. Though the focus of his enquiry is the internal functioning of national citizenship, Lockwood's question becomes more pressing in the context of ongoing 'cosmopolitanisation', driven by the presence of non-citizens on national territory.

In this framework, Morris (2009: 621) indicates that immigrants or late claimers have been shuffled between the categories of 'dependent' and 'deviant' according to changes in government policy, and we have suggested the possibility of a consequent shift in their public standing. While the formal dimension of civic stratification is expressed in terms of legal entitlement, a further dimension refers to the informal status of a group in terms of public esteem. While the granting of a formal entitlement in some sense confirms the general standing of a group, the withdrawal of such a right, especially on grounds of fraudulent behavior, will inevitably reduce their public standing. However, this argument raises the corresponding possibility, that a series of successful challenges to the withdrawal of welfare from late claimers could go some way towards civil repair.

## CHAPTER III

### THE CONSEQUENCES OF CIVIC STRATIFICATION AND DIFFERENTIAL EXCLUSIONISM IN GERMANY

#### 3.1. Ethnic Germans (*Aussiedler*)

There are at present four categories of immigrants in Germany; the ‘ethnic Germans’ (*Aussiedler*)<sup>17</sup>, labor migrants from EU countries and those from

---

<sup>17</sup> Ethnic Germans are officially defined as *Aussiedler* who have descended from German parents outside of present German territories. If *Aussiedler* and their family member who used to live in Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union can prove their German ancestry, they have right to enter Germany as citizens on the basis of the Privileging Laws as follows:

**Table 7: Privileging Laws**

1949	Basic Law, Article 116, Paragraph 1	"A German in the sense of this Basic Law is -- pending other regulation —a person who possesses German citizenship or, as an ethnically German refugee or expellee, spouse or child who found refuge in the area of the German Empire in its borders of 31 December 1937."
1953	§1 BVFG	(1) "An Expellee is someone who, as a German citizen or ethnic German..." left the East Bloc.
1953	§6 BVFG	Someone who has "German ethnicity is, in the sense of this law, someone who acknowledged himself to belong to the German people, insofar as this acknowledgment can be confirmed through such specific characteristics as descent, language, upbringing or culture."
1955	Par 1 §6 StaReG	§6, Par 1: "Whoever is a German on the basis of Article 116 of the Basic Law without possessing German citizenship, must be naturalized upon his application, unless his naturalization would compromise the domestic or external security of the Federal Republic."

**Source:** Klekowski von Koppenfels (2003).

non-EU countries; refugees, asylum seekers, *de facto* refugees and undocumented immigrants. Those with unlimited residence permits in Germany are denizens, while asylum seekers, carriers of limited work or residence permits, and undocumented aliens are not.

As many observers have noted, government policy-makers still could continue to insist that Germany was not a country of immigration although Germany was a major country of immigration. This paradoxical situation emerged from the differential exclusionist philosophy of immigration and integration in which the exclusionary notion of German citizenship based on ethnicity or the *jus sanguinis* principle. For this reason, ethnic Germans deserve much more careful attention and will be discussed separately in detail. Officially defined as ethnic Germans, (*Aussiedler*), these are individuals with a German ethnic background from Eastern Europe and Central Asia who have entered Germany since 1950, about 4.4 million individuals. Between 1950 and 1986, annual flows were generally between 20,000 and 60,000. However, with the collapse of the Iron Curtain, these flows increased massively and in 1990, almost 400,000 ethnic Germans entered Germany<sup>18</sup> (Liebig, 2007: 15).

---

<sup>18</sup> People with ethnic German background from other countries can now only immigrate into Germany if they can prove that they suffered from disadvantages in their origin countries because of their German ethnicity. Ethnic Germans who entered before 1993 are classified *Aussiedler*, whereas individuals entering under the post-1993 framework are classified as *Spätaussiedler* (“late ethnic German immigrants”, of whom there are more than 1.3 million.

**Table 8: Migration to (West) Germany**

	<i>Aussiedler</i>	<i>Übersiedler</i>	<i>Asylum-seekers</i>
<b>1987</b>	78,523	22,838	57,379
<b>1988</b>	202,673	43,314	103,076
<b>1989</b>	377,055	388,396	121,318
<b>1990</b>	397,073	395,343	193,063
<b>1991</b>	221,995	249,743	256,112
<b>1992</b>	230,565	199,170	438,191
<b>1993</b>	218,888	172,386	322,599
<b>1994</b>	222,591	163,034	127,210
<b>1995</b>	217,898	168,336	127,937
<b>1996</b>	177,751	166,007	116,367
<b>1997</b>	134,419	167,789	104,353
<b>1998</b>	103,080	182,478	98,644
<b>1999</b>	104,916	195,530	95,113
<b>2000</b>	95,615	214,456	78,564
<b>2001</b>	98,484	192,002	88,287
<b>total</b>	2,881,526	2,920,822	2,328,213

**Sources:** Klekowski von Koppenfels (2004), INFO-DIENST *Deutsche Aussiedler* September 1998, at 4- 5; *Datenreport* 1998, at 43-45, *Datenreport* 2002, at 49, 51; Zimmermann 1998, at 522-523.



*Table 9: Number of Ethnic German Immigration by Country of Origin*

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Kazakhstan	---	117,148	92,125	73,967	51,132	49,391	45,657	46,178	38,653	26,391	19,828	11,206	1,760
Poland	2,440	1,677	1,175	687	488	428	484	623	553	444	278	80	80
Romania	6,615	6,519	4,284	1,777	1,005	855	547	380	256	137	76	39	40
Russian federation	213,214	71,685	63,311	47,055	41,054	45,951	41,478	43,885	44,493	39,404	33,358	21,113	5,189
Former Czechoslovakia	97	62	14	10	16	11	18	22	13	2	-	-	-
Ukraine	---	3,650	3,460	3,153	2,983	2,762	2,773	3,176	3,179	2,711	2,299	1,306	314
Other countries	225	17,157	13,382	7,770	6,402	5,518	4,658	4,220	4,269	3,766	3,251	1,778	364
Total ethnic Germans and their families (with and without German citizenship)	222,591	217,898	177,751	134,419	103,080	104,916	95,615	98,484	91,416	72,855	59,093	35,522	7,747
Of them ethnic Germans and their families with Germany citizenship	218,617	211,601	172,182	128,415	97,331	95,543	85,698	86,637	78,576	61,725	49,815	30,779	7,113

**Source:** Statistisches Bundesamt, Statistisches Jahrbuch 2006

According to Samers (1998), at least two effects stem from Germany's differential exclusivist policies that we have already mentioned in previous part: social citizenship (or social welfare) and specific racisms. Concerning the former, ethnic Germans have privileged access to a range of social

services stemming from the Federal law of Refugees and Expellees of 1953. In 1991-1992, the state eliminated and/or reduced some of these benefits (e.g., training and language courses). Nonetheless, the status of ethnic Germans in relation to these resources still remains privileged versus other categories of immigrants.

Why are ethnic Germans immigrants, *Aussiedler*, seen as full citizen (Germans) who have an immediate right to passports and all the privileges of being a citizen of one of Europe's richest countries, Germany?

Castles (1995: 206) answers this question by underlining the pre-existing ethnic and racial conditions of the citizenship regime of Germany:

.... Because, the principle of *jus sanguinis* (the law of the blood) still works as a basis of German nationality. You are German if you are of German blood. Since German blood is chemically no different from any other, the proof is a social one: you must be able to show cultural belonging through use of the German language and belonging to a German community—as demonstrated for instance through parish birth and marriage records. In other words, Germany is a *kulturnation*—which is not surprising in view of its turbulent history and late emergence as a nation-state in 1871. For centuries, the concept of the German nation was a cultural rather than a political one (Castles, 1995: 206)

Given the background of ethnic understanding of German citizenship, Canefe (1998: 521) argues that the problematic nature of the original ideological make-up of German unification in 1871 in many ways had a continuing legacy in post-war East and West Germany and in the reunified Germany. The cultural, social and political livelihood of immigrant communities in Germany and the growing ties between different segments of the German society with the passing of each generation makes the questioning of this legacy a historically justified moral impediment for the guaranteeing of equal access to full citizenship rights by all members of German society. Accordingly, the essentialist and culturally-specific idea of belonging to the 'motherland' as articulated by the 'right of return' for

ethnic Germans singularly perpetuates the denial of the essentially multi-ethnic and multi-cultural make-up of contemporary Germany.

This is another way of saying that a unified German national identity developed not in terms of boundaries that encapsulate communities with similar civic and political dispositions, but rather in terms of a chosen set of traditions and commonalities emphasizing who is a German and who is not. According to this definition, similar to many pan-nationalist movements, the former Habsburg territories continued to symbolize the 'natural' borders of the German motherland within which the German people resided. This imagined totality of a unified people divided by borders might have long lost its political validity. However, as to German immigration and citizenship regulations, it continues to be a significant part of the cultural politics of post-reunification Germany (Canefe, 1998).

What is interesting about the preference of ethnic Germans over other groups of de facto immigrants is the fact that it is an imagined concept of 'family' (*jus sanguinis*) that is employed to legitimize their admission (Faist, 1994a). According to the German immigration policies toward ethnic Germans, which are based on Article 116 of the Basic Law, ethnic Germans should be allowed to enjoy the same constitutional rights and duties as all other Germans, for instance, admission and mobility in the Federal Republic. Ethnic Germans deserve special help because they are compatriots who had to suffer tremendously under the harsh effects of World War II. They adhered to the German language and culture in adverse circumstances. In short, the powerful principle of ethnic solidarity is paramount in justifying a special status for ethnic Germans.

Then, the answer of the paradoxical question above seems to deal with the socio-cultural meaning of Germanness which is defined as a cultural entity rather than political membership in a German nation. This is what *jus*

*sanguinis* means. Owing to the foundations of *jus sanguinis* citizenship, which is still effective at some points in spite of radical modifications in citizenship law, ethnic Germans who return from Eastern Europe have quasi-automatic access to nationality and thus full citizenry rights. The *Aussiedler* have an automatic right to citizenship on the basis of *jus sanguinis*. However, the return of ethnic Germans is primarily a journey to a land that they or their remembered ancestors have not been to before. Thus, Canefe (1998: 530) asserts that for the ‘repatriated Germans’, the relationship between ethnicity, nationality and citizenship assumes a problematical uni-linearity. Ethnic citizenship or *jus sanguinis* has denied incorporation to immigrants of different national origins but encompassed immigrants of German descent or belonging to the German people.

Article 116 and subsequent legislation gave ethnic Germans during the Cold War and after, a quasi-automatic right of entry into the Federal Republic and access to German citizenship. In addition, they have received generous subsidies not available to other groups of de facto immigrants, e.g., language and vocational training courses to help them integrate into labor markets. Ethnic German immigrants, *Aussiedler*, not officially considered as immigrants, could claim citizenship upon arrival in Germany, which means, Abadan-Unat (1992: 408) underlines, that large numbers of Poles, Romanians, and former Soviet citizens who do not speak German or have never lived on German soil, but can prove to have a German ancestor, are granted German citizenship. Turkish adults or even youngsters of the second or by now third generation, or even young adults who spent all their lives in Germany and are thoroughly acquainted with the German culture, work ethic and life style are not able to acquire German citizenship unless they give up their own. Castles (1995) notes that their culture and values are in many cases worlds apart from those of the contemporary Federal Republic, and their social integration presents considerable difficulties. Castles and Miller write that while these

particular immigrants (ethnic Germans) “are highly privileged compared to other migrants”, because of their rural backgrounds and the culture shock they experienced once in an urban industrial setting, they have considerable problems of social adaptation and labor market entry (cited by Kivisto, 2002: 165).

The striking contrast between German-born Turks (speaking fluent German, often studying and working productively in Germany, yet not being granted citizenship) and the large numbers of ‘ethnic Germans’ (arriving with little to no knowledge of German language or culture, yet being granted citizenship automatically) was becoming more and more difficult to justify, either morally or economically (Howard, 2008: 43).

However, in the words of Sainsbury (1998) the exclusionary nature of the immigration regime has not only rested on an ethnic conception of citizenship but also on a complex permit system stratifying the rights of immigrants and restrictive measures aimed at guest-workers and asylum seekers from third country nations as early as the 1960s to such an extent that a myth of temporary sojourn shaped the legal status of foreigners for a half of century. Yet those from European Community countries and ethnic Germans enjoyed social and economic parity with German citizens.

Ethnic German immigrants have been in an even more advantageous position. Because they were regarded as permanent settlers, they have possessed special social rights not available to other immigrants. Among the most important were interest free loans, preferential housing treatment, special language and training programs, the right to employment, and the waiver of insurance contributions. The lack of the contributions requirement has provided them free access to pensions, unemployment and disability benefits (Heinelt, 1993; Ginsburg, 1994; Munz and Ohliger, 1998 cited by Sainsbury, 2006: 236). More importantly, Liebig (2007)

emphasized that being Germans, these ethnic immigrants have better access to the German labor market than other migrant groups. Ethnic Germans from the former Soviet Union may also receive a lump-sum “integration allowance” of about 2,000 or 3,000 Euros depending on their age. Indeed, the most comprehensive integration aid of any migrant group has been given to ethnic Germans. Other immigrant groups, notably family reunification migrants, only receive aid on a discretionary basis.

### **3.2. “The Blacks” of Germany: Turks**

On the other hand, for guest-workers, political refugees and other asylum seekers, the naturalization process is considerably more difficult, and they are required to demonstrate ‘cultural assimilation’ (knowledge of, and loyalty to the constitution, ‘adequate’ knowledge of the German language, ‘integration into German society’, and a commitment to the German state, as well as not being dependant on welfare benefits, etc.

As can be easily observed, the immigrants, except for ethnic Germans (you can read also as third country nationals), have faced very demanding requirements for permanent residence and naturalization. After 10 years of continuous residence, a foreigner became eligible for discretionary naturalization and could claim German citizenship after 15 years now 8 years. As a rule, naturalized citizens must renounce their previous citizenship, while an increasing number of ‘*Aussiedler*’ have dual citizenship. Furthermore, as Sainsbury (2006: 234) underlines that the diametrically opposed treatment of different types of immigrants dictated by this immigration regime has unsurprisingly influenced their social rights.

Alas, as Faist (1994b) underlines, the ethno-cultural understanding of membership could be used to reinforce a discourse that portrayed certain

groups of guest workers and asylum seekers as causes of unemployment during economic recession and as welfare cheaters. These exclusionary efforts appealed to the ethnic solidarity of the native population.

Regarding political rights, while political inclusion of guest workers has been contested and denied political participation rights, political incorporation of ethnic Germans has remained almost undisputed. Underlying the conflict over voting rights for guest workers and the unquestioned incorporation of ethnic Germans has been a debate over the definition of the ethno-cultural concept of citizenship. However, only with political rights, the immigrants could have a robust claims-making initiative to change their marginalized situation effectively. As a result, membership in the German national polity still imposes limitations on social and political citizenship for those who do not possess a blood-right to be German citizens, or the cultural privilege to be recognized as European.

It is not surprising to find out that the rate of naturalization is lower in Germany than other European countries affected by international labor migration. Canefe (1998) claims that a comparison between the three primary forms of acquisition of German citizenship—repatriation, naturalization, asylum—reveals that although ethnic Germans have almost direct access to citizenship papers, non-European guest-workers, European resident aliens and asylum seekers have to go through a lengthy process of examination and selection. Furthermore, as opposed to the attribution of citizenship based on one's 'Germanness' enjoyed by ethnic Germans, naturalization is a process that requires at least 10 years of permanent residency in Germany. There is also a considerable financial cost attached to the procedure.

In terms of guest workers, most now hold an unlimited residence permit (which means that they are denizens and share most of the same rights as citizens. However, there are some differences as related to social assistance, training, student assistance and child allowances. Moreover, a second division appears between EU and non-EU migrants. It should be noted that social insurance (unemployment and pensions) are based on contributions in Germany. While all guest workers from non-EU countries can claim social insurance (unemployment, work compensation, health benefits, and pensions, etc.), if they become unemployed, their claim to unemployment benefits can be rejected if the Federal Employment Agency (*Bundesanstalt für Arbeit*) thinks that the immigrant will not be able to find work (Samers, 1998: 133-134).

The differential exclusionary regime poses substantial hurdles for third country immigrants to become permanent residents and citizens without direct policy measures to help them meet the requirements. Knowledge of German is a requirement for citizenship, but official language programs were primarily offered to ethnic German immigrants. Similarly, self-sufficiency is a requirement for a permanent residence permit and citizenship, but a restricted work permit for third country nationals and their family members poses an extremely difficult set of conditions to achieve employment and an adequate income.

Here it should be also noted that there have never been any systematic language programs or integration courses planned and implemented for guest workers and their family members until intensive ethnic German immigration occurred in the 1990s. Mueller (2006: 429) exposes the double standard in a sense that whereas Germans spent about \$1.5 billion in 1997 to ensure integration of the 3 million ethnic Germans, funding for the integration of German-Turks fell far below the billions spent on ethnic



Germans. The same holds for German language training. In 2000, about \$150 million were used for that purpose, primarily for ethnic Germans and Jewish immigrants, with no significant funds spent on the Turkish community. Yet, according to the federal secretary for foreigners, meeting the language needs of that group alone will require close to \$600 million a year. The course structure for initial language training in 2002 and the new integration course can be followed by the Table 10, as follows:

**Table 10: Course Structure for Initial Language Training in 2002 and the New Integration Course**

SITUATION IN 2002				SITUATION SINCE 2005
	Language courses for foreign workers	Language courses for unemployed immigrants	Language courses for young immigrants	Integration courses under the new law
<b>Target group</b>	Guest workers and their families	Certain groups of the unemployed: ethnic Germans, recognised asylum seekers and families	Certain groups of people under 27 if not entitled to the courses for the unemployed: ethnic Germans, recognised asylum seekers and families	All new permanent immigrants with limited German up to two years after permanent immigration; earlier immigrants may participate depending on availability
<b>Ministry in charge</b>	Labor Ministry	Labor Ministry	Ministry for Family and Youth	Ministry of the Interior (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees)
<b>Hours of training per week</b>	4-20	35	35-40	5-25
<b>Duration</b>	Up to 640 hours	900 hours (6 months)	1200-1400 hours (10-12 months)	600 hours, flexible (plus 30 hours orientation course")
<b>Entitlement</b>	No	Yes, if the migrant was both unemployed and had been previously employed in the country of origin	No	Yes, unless the immigrant has already been resident for a number of years; or in the case of no apparent integration need (e.g., due to prior German knowledge). For

				certain groups, the course may even be compulsory.
<b>Budgeted costs</b>	25 million Euros (2002)	120 million Euros (2002)	23 million Euros (2002)	208 million Euros (2005)

**Sources:** Liebig (2007), FOKUS (2003) integration Officer (2002);

Ordinance on the Integration Courses.

Following the huge peak of ethnic German immigrants at the beginning of 1990s, several measures were introduced to control and to limit the immigration of ethnic Germans. The most important measure was the law on the Late Consequences of World War II of 1993, which virtually limited immigration of ethnic Germans to those who had lived in the successor states of the former Soviet Union, and then only under numerical limits. For example, since 1996, ethnic Germans who want to obtain the status of a *Spätaussiedler* also have to pass a language test. These and other measures have resulted in a steady decline in ethnic immigration flows since the mid-1990s. In 2004, less than 60,000 individuals entered Germany under the title “ethnic Germans”. However, as Liebig (2007) shows, only 20% of these had obtained the official status of being an ethnic German *prior* to entry. The majority of such entrants enters Germany as accompanying family and obtains German citizenship only after entry. This figure is in sharp contrast to the situation in the early 1990s, when more than 70% of all flows under this title entered as officially recognized ethnic Germans. At that time, the entire family was generally able to prove German heritage, mainly through some basic knowledge of the German language. The decline in the share of ethnic Germans with proven language skills among the immigrant flows under this title reflects growing deficits

of the German language, which appears to have increasingly hampered the integration of this group

More importantly, at a time of social stress and growing unemployment, the influx of *Aussiedler* became unpopular. Despite the principle of free admission, the German government introduced an annual quota. Entries of *Aussiedler* declined to an average of around 220,000 per year from 1991 to 1995. Then quotas were cut further with just 105,000 entries in 1999 (OECD, 2001: 170 cited by Castles and Miller 2003: 204).

At the same time, the German public questions the presence of ethnic Germans as members of German society because of their contaminated past with Russian culture and language which gives them confrontational attitude on the streets and in schools. Recently, there has been a reversal of previous policies to encourage their entry, a tightening of the language requirement, and a change in popular positive perceptions of this group (See Morris, 1997).

Moreover, the accommodation of over two million *Aussiedler* between 1988 and 1996—many of whom did not speak German well (if at all) and could only integrate into German society with great difficulty—was especially arduous for a German state that was already overburdened by the high costs of unification. In order to stem the tide of mass immigration of ‘ethnic Germans’, especially in the face of spreading rumors about the sale of fraudulent documents in order to ‘prove’ German ancestry, the German state imposed several stop-gap measures intended to reduce the number of *Aussiedler* coming into Germany. These included applying from abroad, passing a German language test and filling out a lengthy questionnaire. Furthermore, in 1992 the state restricted the maximum number of *Aussiedler* permitted to move to Germany to 220,000 per year,

in addition to curtailing their language and financial assistance upon arrival in Germany (Howard, 2008: 43)

Thus, there has been some deterioration with regard to the privileged rights of ethnic Germans and as Borkert and Bosswick (2007) contend, the hitherto well-funded integration provisions for ethnic Germans faced serious cuts during the nineties and an institutional re-setting. The privileged position of immigrants of German origin has eroded on several counts. Direct financial assistance was reduced, and language courses were cut from a year to six months. Pensions were slashed for ethnic Germans who were entitled to benefits in their countries of origin, first in 1991 and again in 1996. They received a pension comparable to 60 percent of native-born retirees. More recent immigrants of German origin (entering since May 1996) are only entitled to a minimum pension. Finally, since the mid-1990s ethnic Germans have lost benefits, such as preferential treatment regarding housing and professional qualifications (Sainbury, 2006: 236). Finally, *Aussiedler*, and after 2010 the descendants of ethnic Germans born after 1992, will no longer have an independent claim to this special status. Furthermore, as a result of the recent laws, regulatory measures have curtailed the number of ethnic Germans admitted into the Federal Republic (Faist, 1994b: 442).

However, it is still ambiguous whether the phasing-out of the privileged position of ethnic German immigrants eliminates the privileged treatment of immigrants on the basis of national origin. A more unflattering interpretation of Sainsbury (2006: 237) is that this change came about because of the increasing ‘otherness’ of the recent waves of ethnic German immigrants. Policy makers opted for an exclusionary rather than an inclusive solution: ethnic German immigrants are scheduled for exclusion on the same basis as all immigrants.

All in all, it is Canefe`s (1998) contention that being a full member of the reunified Germany cannot be decided primarily on the basis of one's ethnic and religious affiliations that match a static and archaic definition of the German society. In this respect, the right of return of ethnic Germans has to be balanced with further opening of access to citizenship for those who are internally part of the contemporary German society. Whether full citizenship rights would be immediately beneficial to migrant communities or that they would be fully utilized is not a concern that affects the merits of the debate on the necessity of coming to terms with the ethnic-essentialism that continues to border the legal-political definition of 'Germanness'.

Furthermore, Canefe (1998) urges an immediate need for an ethics of tolerance that would allow members of the German national polity to accept themselves as what they actually are rather than what German citizenship laws might dictate German society to be.

Otherwise, the expansion of the void in German culture and politics in terms of dealing with the internal status of 'foreigners' should be avoided at all costs since it will be detrimental for the conditions of integration of Turkish immigrants (including other TCNs) as well as for the German society's ability to reach a critical understanding of its own historicity. To do this, German politicians should decide immediately whether they want to pay the social costs of differential exclusionism which provides the settled Turkish immigrants with complex system of civic stratifications and unfair access to economic, political and social rights depending on mode of entry, residence and nationality accordingly.

**Table 11: Economic, Social Rights and Active Integration Policies (Modes of Governmental Incorporation in Germany)**

<b>AUSSIEDLER</b>	Positive (e.g. recognition of foreign certificates, job-related training programs, full-time German language courses free of charge & financial support above normal social-welfare level) but cuts during 1990s (ambivalent :initial assignment to housing in certain regions /towns)
<b>EU MIGRATION</b>	neutral
<b>FAMILY MIGRATION</b>	
<b>REFUGEES</b>	Exclusionary (e.g. no or limited access to legal employment , reduced health care & social welfare , limited freedom of movement)

**Source:** Table prepared by the author

### **3.3. The Unhappy Marriage between Europeans and TCNs: Family Reunification**

The significance of family migration is that it becomes the largest and most sustained source of permanent settlement migration all over the world. Family-related migration has been the dominant mode of legal entry into European Union for the past two decades .Today family-related modes of entry have become one of the main, and in many countries, virtually the only legal means (apart from asylum and certain highly skilled categories) to find admission. Within family-related migration, marriage is the principal act and stage in the life course engendering much of family-

related migration in Germany. It is both a cause and an effect of migration. However, as Kofman (2004: 244) indicates, in European states the criteria based on family ties have not been a priority in immigration policies and a highly restrictive definition of the family, normally limited to spouses and dependent children within the nuclear family, has been used as the basis of entry.

Because family migration has (alongside asylum related migration) become one of the most important modes of entry to European receiving states, family migration policy in turn has become an increasingly important source of civic stratification. With regard to family migration, EU legislation has become increasingly important, however, with paradoxical effects, as the legislation is clearly shaped by the tension that exists between the progressive agenda to strengthen migrants' rights, which in turn is based on human right norms of an understanding that superior rights are a necessary prerequisite for the attainment of full social, civic and eventually political participation of migrants ("civic integration"), on the one hand, and a continuing concern to control migration and to restrict the allocation of these rights to "deserving" migrants, on the other (Kofman and Kraler 2006: 11).

In the post-war context, the legal notion of a right to family reunification has been derived from an understanding of the family as a superior good that the state is obliged to protect. As such, the obligation of states to protect the unity of the family and the family life of its citizens has been enshrined in a number of instruments under international law, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the European Convention of Human Rights (1950, and subsequent protocols) and a number of other conventions and declarations and has, in various ways subsequently also entered national legislation. Instruments specifically relating to migration under international law reflect this basic understanding of the right to



family life as a fundamental right. Thus, although the ILO Migration for Employment Convention (C97 of 1949) does not provide for a right to family reunification, its several provisions mentioning family members clearly reflect an underlying thinking that states should respect the unity of the family and take into account responsibilities of migrant workers towards their families. The Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention (C149 of 1975) adopted 26 years later is more explicit and includes a provision (Article 13) encouraging states to facilitate the reunification of migrants with their families. This said, instruments under international law do not establish a right to family reunification and a related obligation of states to admit non-nationals for family related reasons. Nevertheless, family reunification is clearly established as something desirable and beneficial that states should aim to grant to non-nationals resident in their respective territories (cited by Kraler, 2010: 30). However, rights to family union are not equally enjoyed by all migrants. On the contrary, they are highly dependent on factors such the class, ethnicity, nationality, and gender of the primary migrant. With the increasing Europeanization of migration policy and the concomitant expansion of mobility rights of EU, EFTA and Swiss citizens and their family members, and within the EU, of long-term third country nationals, these inequalities have not disappeared. Rather, family migration policies increasingly pit European migrants against migrants from non-European countries, and poorer migrants against richer ones and thus reinforce civic stratification along the lines of class, race, and gender (Kraler, 2010: 31). Though family life is embraced as a universal right in the ECHR, it may legitimately be qualified with reference to national interests, which often means a resource consideration. There is also a potential for the layering of rights by virtue of the differing statuses of EU citizen, national citizen and TCNs. Certainly none of the member countries considered defines the family as broadly as EU legislation (Plender 1999: 379; cited by Morris,

2001a: 394), while the conditions of unification for EEA workers require only that adequate housing is available.

As a result in admitting young men as guest workers or post-colonial migrants in the 1950s and 1960s, European states had to commit themselves to admitting wives, children and sometimes grandparents later under the European Convention on Human Rights. Family reunification has been a major component of migration into the EU since the mid-1970s and EU citizens and EFTA9 nationals are granted this right under the Directive on free movement. Furthermore, the European Convention on Human Rights, to which all EU member states are signatories, asserts the *universal* right to respect for private and family life, and the right to marry and found a family, and provides a basis for claims by third-country nationals. However, the principles set out in the resolution are not legally binding, and do not afford grounds for action by individuals. The 1993 Commission Resolution on harmonization of national policies on family reunification has been described as a balance between “favorable admissions policies resulting from international Conventions and national laws ... and the need to control migration flows”. In practice, the conditions that attach to family reunification—notably the provision of adequate maintenance and accommodation—are quite restrictive, given the position of most non-EU migrants in the host society (Morris 1997: 248).

Furthermore, we have seen that rights of non-EU citizens are limited with respect to family reunification by virtue of the conditions of entry notably that the applicant should be in a position to provide reasonable accommodation and maintenance. Access to the labor market for migrant family ‘dependents’ is varied, and often phased, while the same is true of the different statuses linked to Association and Co-operation agreements between the EU and third countries. Here, access to the labor market and

social rights may be granted after a period of time, or may be strictly limited to a temporary permit (Morris 1997: 250).

Although the intentions behind EU-wide legislation for third country nationals as expressed in the Tampere Declaration in 1999 saw family reunification as facilitating integration and economic and social cohesion, by the time of the Directive in 2003 migrant families were seen as hindering integration and a burden to the welfare state. As a result, the initial proposal was considerably watered down and the resulting minimal consensus was established in the final—the third version—of the directive. In addition, while under the original proposal both third country nationals and citizens of EU member states not enjoying freedom of movement rights were covered, the final version of the directive only covered third country nationals and thus left rights to family reunion with EU citizens not covered by freedom of movement legislation at the discretion of member states (Kraler, 2010: 38).

Family reunification thus often is no option at all or can be achieved only at the cost of illegality for those joining the primary migrant already present and thus potentially reinforcing a positioning of individuals on the margins, socially, economically, and legally. The ability of migrants to reconstitute their families and to reproduce transnationally is stratified, which can be conceptualized under ‘stratified reproduction’, following Colen (1995). Contemporary family migrations thus have to be seen in the context of a proliferation, fragmentation, and polarization of different statuses and related bundles of rights with regard to admission, residence, work, social rights, and other domains. These political opportunity structures interact in complex ways with other social and economic structures, institutions and processes and result in different forms of partial memberships (Brubaker 1989) or civic stratification (Morris 2002).

As a consequence, as Kofman and Kraler (2006: 6) rightfully indicate, liberal family migration policies have come increasingly under attack, not just because the right to family reunification is perceived as an undue constraint of the power of the state to determine its admission policy, but also because processes of family migration are seen to be in contradiction with more general policy objectives regarding integration, social cohesion, gender equality and the preservation of national identity.

Family migration policies produce civic stratification along various axes and different mechanisms: restrictive conditions tied to the granting of family-related permits; through narrow and conservative legal concepts of the family that fail to accommodate non-conventional family forms; through differential entitlements and obligations for different modes of family migration (reunification, formation, marriage) and for different categories of migrants (long-term vs. short-term migrants; family members of nationals, third country nationals and EU-nationals).

Civic stratification is linked to, and interacts with ‘stratified reproduction’, a concept originally developed by Shellee Colen (1995). In the context of family related migration, ‘stratified reproduction’ is about the ability of migrant families to reconstitute their families during processes of migration. Legal entitlements—or civic stratification—are a crucial dimension in these processes, although other dimensions, including global asymmetries of power, resources and labor market opportunities, are important too and interact with legally established opportunities (or the lack thereof) for global mobility.

The various restrictions and conditions tied to family migration constrain migrant choices. As such, they can be expected to have concrete consequences on migrants migrating for family related reasons and other family members affected by these regulations. These consequences are not

necessarily limited to the immediate implications of these restrictions (as for example in the case of restricted or lack of access to the labor market), but may work in more indirect ways, for example in terms of psychological distress experienced by separated couples or a reluctance to change employment to avoid the risk of failing to reach minimum income requirements (Kraler, 2010: 15).

### **3.4. Special Context of Germany**

Constitutionally, family reunification policy is covered by Article 6 of Germany's Basic Law, which requires the state to protect the family. In practice, family reunification during the 1990s and the first years of the new millennium has been regulated by the 1990 Foreigners' Law (*Auslandergesetz*), which, together with its extensive secondary legislation, establishes in considerable detail under what circumstances dependants may immigrate to and reside in Germany. Thus, spouses are only allowed to immigrate if the already resident *Auslaender* (now frequently a Turk born in Germany) holds a full residence permit, if he/she is able to provide for the whole family, and if there is adequate living space (defined as 12 m<sup>2</sup> per person aged six or above). Minors are allowed to join their non-German parents up to age 16 (*Kindernachzug*), and until 1996, they were granted visa-free entry to the country, as well as exemption from the requirement to hold a residence permit (Green, 2003: 232).

Parallel to the high levels of asylum seekers from Turkey, dependant migration via family reunification (*Familiennachzug*) has developed as the principal route of legal entry for Turks to Germany since the end of labor recruitment in 1973. Although it is not possible to quantify this level of migration in the long term, it is likely that a large proportion of the almost two million Turkish citizens in Germany entered the country via this route;

between 20,000 and 25,000 family reunification visas were granted to Turks each year between 1996 and 2000 alone (Green, 2003: 231).

By the time new law introduced in 2000, time limited residence was the status occupied by the original guest worker population, most of whom have now established more secure residence, or more rarely citizenship. While time limited status may still be granted to a very small number of specialist workers, it has become the key transitional status for arrivals under family unification rules. German citizens and workers from EEA countries have an immediate and absolute right to family unification, but others must undergo a waiting period and demonstrate adequate accommodation and maintenance (FL, Para. 17. Also see. Probationary status: *Befristete Aufenthaltserlaubnis*/FL Para. 15; cited by Morris, 2000: 230). According to these paragraphs, the foreign spouse of a German citizen or an EEA worker has immediate access to a special (full) work permit, but the spouses of other foreign residents must wait one year before qualifying for even the general (restricted) permit, and four years for the full permit. Yet meeting the housing and maintenance conditions of residence is extremely difficult, and failure can mean the non-renewal of the spouses permit.

To date time limited status has also affected the second generation, who without the new nationality law did not unproblematically inherit the achievements of their parents and had to demonstrate good prospects of self-maintenance. Of course the possibility of citizenship at birth will remove this pressure, but only for children of a parent who has already undergone this selection process to achieve a minimum 8 years of legal residence. The new law (2000) will have a further effect in easing family unification, but with time limited status retaining its significance in cases of early divorce when the spouse has not established independent security of residence, and for family members of non-citizens (Morris, 230).

Ironically, most recent law introduced more restrictions on family reunification, which will deteriorate both the unification and integration process for TCNs especially with Turkish-Muslim background. On July 15th, 2007, a new amendment dealing with family reunion was put into effect in Germany. According to this change, the spouse who is abroad has to prove that he or she speaks basic German before being granted a visa. However, there are many exceptions to this amendment that make it discriminatory. Accordingly the citizens of the EU countries and the people from the countries that do not have to have a visa for Germany such as USA, Canada, Japan, and South Korea are exempted from this condition. Additionally, the spouses of qualified/highly skilled professionals such as senior academics are also exempted. As Sahin and Altuntas eloquently put it (2009: 34), when these exemptions are taken into consideration, most of the remaining immigrants to whom this law applies tend to be poor Turks.

Family reunification laws, like the other legislation on naturalization, labor market access, etc. are highly selective and discriminatory in Germany. The imposition of levels of social resources (housing, income) is a common feature of family reunification regulations. Effectively, socio-economic status has important implications regarding the nature and scope of the right to family union. Family reunification rights are often tied to the wealth and resource requirements restricted to skilled and permanent migrants. Where family reunion is also available for temporary and unskilled migrants, it is by and large granted under more unfavorable conditions, notably with regard to the right to remain in the case a marriage fails. Recently, immigration reforms in various European countries, including Germany have raised the cost of residence and made proof of integration more demanding.

Furthermore, this process involves family migrants that often have only limited social rights and are excluded from a range of social benefits. The social resources required have a disproportionate impact on women, both in using family reunification and acquiring more secure and long-term residence permits. This selective and discriminatory process also affects undocumented migration by those who cannot meet the requirements.

More importantly, third country family migrants' labor market access is also restricted in so far as those entering as spouses often only receive a temporary permit, which has implications for their participation in the formal labor force. There is no automatic right to have labor market access and one only becomes entitled after a number of years (1- 4 years) in Germany where this labor market access may depend on the nature of the residence permit and/or the current state of the labor market.

Ersanilli (2005: 5) pays attention to the distinctive implementations in the guest worker system in Germany in so far as he contends that during and after the guest worker era, Germany applied strict rules regarding family reunification especially compared to the Netherlands. It is hard for immigrants to get a permanent residence permit (*Aufenthaltsberechtigung*). They need to have lived in Germany for at least eight years and show language competence and socio-economic integration. Being on welfare can be grounds for not receiving a new permit. Until recently it was also very hard to acquire German citizenship. However people of German ancestry, *Aussiedler*, who lived outside of Germany could easily enter the country and gain citizenship.

Spouses of migrants holding limited permission to stay have to wait at least a year before they can work. But again, for migrants holding unlimited residence permits this is not the case. Especially for non-EU migrants, naturalization offers better employment opportunities for people interested



in becoming public officials. This might be a further incentive to naturalize for the better educated migrants who want to become teachers, for example (Diehl and Blohm, 2003: 142-143).

Family rights do offer the basis for a claim to residence under the ECHR, though as Guiraudon (1998) has demonstrated, this right has often emerged from national constitutional protections, as for example in Germany and Italy. In fact, there is an inherent ambiguity in the European Convention itself, which accepts interference with family life (only) “in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country . . .” (ECHR, Article 8(2)), and again distinctions are to be found between national citizens, EEA citizens and TCNs. While some countries grant nationals unconditional unification rights (usually limited to the immediate nuclear family, as in Germany, but possibly including dependent parents, as in Italy), for TCNs the 'right' is usually subject to a test of the original migrant's ability to house and maintain additional family members. This in effect excludes them from social rights for a transitional period—the duration of which is nationally variable. Family unification is not, therefore, established as a direct right, but may be made subject to a set of qualifying criteria that can themselves be open to interpretation and may change with national circumstances (Morris, 2003: 85-86).

Conversely, in Germany it meant establishing a distinction between German citizens, for whom the right is unconditional, as opposed to noncitizen migrants. While noncitizens there have always been required to meet certain conditions, further distinctions have been introduced between first and second generation migrants (Joppke, 1999). We may also note that one challenge to establishing an EU Directive on Family Unification has been that not all countries recognize this as a right *per se*—in Austria, for example, family unification is dealt with under the immigration quota (see Migration News Sheet, November 1999; cited by Morris, 2003: 86).

Significantly, there are strong clashes between universal human rights and minority rights at national level. Thus, while the right to family life is established as a universal right, in so far it is asserted in the ECHR, it is subject to qualifications commonly dictated by a desire to control and limit immigration. Family unification is governed by different rules for different categories of migrant, and there are common deficits in realizing these rights and meeting the associated conditions. Thus, as Morris (2003) underlines, the (qualified) right to family life is formally stratified with respect to the conditions of entitlement (inclusion and exclusion) and informally stratified with respect to its delivery in practice (gain and deficit).

It is clear that continuing family unification requests from the second and third generation also reveal the limits of integration. One guesses that there will be more spouses arriving in the foreseeable future from Turkey, for example. However, family members of German or EU citizens have full and immediate access to the labor market, in contrast to those of resident TCNs, who do not. It is here that we see the phased access to the labor market in operation, with the spouses of those on a time limited residence allowed no work for two years, but full access to the labor market thereafter. The spouses of those with an unlimited residence permit are immediately granted a restricted work permit, but acquire the full permit after only two years. Other statuses with restricted employment rights under German law are those with the subsidiary protection of *befugnis*, who are confined to a limited work permit for six years, those with the lesser status of 'toleration' (*duldung*), and asylum seekers, who were banned from employment completely for some years, but now have a waiting period of twelve months before possible access to a limited permit (Morris, 2001a: 391-392).

It is safe to say, from the very outset the German labor market is most tightly protected by virtue of its rigorous prioritizing system, supplemented by phased access to the labor market for all TCNs. In other words, the right to family unification is clearly stratified in Germany, with distinctions between German citizens, EEA citizens and TCNs, the latter group being further subdivided. Germany defines the family quite narrowly, requiring cohabitation for spouses, permitting children only under the age of 16, and parents only in exceptional circumstances, though same sex couples have recently been recognized for purposes of unification. Proof of a 'shared living community' is the only condition for German citizens who wish to bring a foreign spouse, in contrast with TCNs who must also show adequate income and housing.

Furthermore, Morris (2001) underlines that there is a generational distinction which requires foreign children either born in Germany or who entered the country as minors to have eight years' residence for family unification, or five years if there is already a child of the marriage (Foreigners Law 1997, Para. 18, 4(3)). In the latter case conditions are temporarily suspended but must be met before a transition to unlimited residence for the spouse. For recognized refugees—whose conditions of stay are largely governed by the Geneva Convention—the age limit for children is higher (at 18) and though family unification is granted in principle under conditions of self-maintenance, this can be waved at the discretion of the admitting authorities. Those with humanitarian leave are not permitted family unification until they achieve a residence title (possible after eight years), and then subject to the usual conditions. Those with toleration have no unification rights and only a slim chance of making this transition (Morris, 395).

The EC–Turkey agreement has not been interpreted as conferring a *right* to family unification, and prior to a family member meeting the conditions of

the agreement for access to the labor market their entry, residence and employment is subject to domestic law. Here, the transitions between residence statuses are a key element of control (see Morris, 2000). There is some variation between *laender* (states) but typically the incoming spouse of a TCN will have a limited permit for one year, renewed for a further two, before an unlimited permit is granted. This is a crucial transition, and one that may be denied if there is a reliance on means-tested social support (*Sozial Hilfe*). The most common cause of problems is unemployment for the settled spouse, and we should note that unemployment stands at 22 per cent for the Turkish population in Germany (Wilpert, 1999). There are particular difficulties if the resident spouse has limited permission, in which case (as noted above) the incoming spouse is denied employment for two years. Renewal of their residence permit will not necessarily be denied, but a transition to unlimited residence certainly will. The right of abode is the most secure status, requiring eight years' prior residence and five years' payment into a pension fund—which to a degree discriminates against women (Morris, 2001a).

It is important to note that despite the emphasis on self-maintenance in qualifying for transitions, the incoming family member is not actually denied access to support, but a claim can count against the grant of more secure residence. Divorce can pose a particular problem for incoming spouses (whether of TCNs or of German nationals), as they cannot achieve an independent residence status during the first four years of the marriage. If the marriage breaks down prior to this time the incoming spouse will be expelled, unless they can prove exceptional severity of suffering or exceptional hardship as a result of divorce—for example, the rejection of divorced women in their home culture. Under these circumstances a one-year renewal is granted. More recently independent status has been granted in cases of 'special hardship' after two years (MNS, May 2000; cited by Morris 2001a: 395). As with access to employment, the issue of family

rights shows Germany applying a more elaborate system of control, with phased steps to security that interact with employment and welfare constraints to pose something of a challenge to families of TCNs in the early years. While the controls in Britain are similar to those in Germany, British citizens are disadvantaged in relation to their German counterparts, but security for family members nevertheless comes much more quickly and unambiguously (Morris, 397).

More importantly there are other issues that create additional pressures on migrant families, often complicating how they fit—or do not fit—within the legal framework. Challenges include access to employment and labor market positions, the experience of de-skilling (particularly affecting female spouses), finding work-life balance, childcare and access to education. All these factors influencing the reality—rather than the policy-perceived reality—of migrants' lives are mutually reinforcing.

Admittedly, gender discrimination is also sustained by stratified sanctions of family unification policy against non-European immigrants, which contributes to the prevailing oppression of women. In accord with the notion of the male breadwinner in Germany, distinct from the US and Sweden, an arriving spouse was barred from employment for four years; the period was reduced to two years in 2000 (Morris, 2002: 35). In effect, the reunited family has had to meet the test of economic self-sufficiency based on the single income of the male breadwinner. However, the requirement of five years of social insurance contributions for a permanent permit discriminates against reunited wives without immediate access to the labor market. These rules negate individualized rights and prolong dependency on the male breadwinner. Traditional gender relations patterned both welfare and immigration regimes (Sainsbury, 2006: 235).

To sum up, family migration policies typically observe a very narrow understanding of the family, involving dependent children, spouses and, in some cases, registered partners. Parents are rarely eligible for family reunification, nor are other family members. In addition, states tie family reunification rights to a series of conditions. The most important are income requirements and related expectations that migrants will not have recourse to public funds, will find adequate housing and, more and more commonly, can meet integration requirements such as knowledge of the local language. As such, family migration policies are “socially selective”, particularly excluding more vulnerable groups from the right to family reunion. Who exactly is eligible for family-related admission and under what conditions, however, varies greatly according to the legal status of the sponsor. Much depends on whether the sponsor is a short-term migrant, a permanent migrant, a citizen of the country, a citizen from another EU member state or a citizen who has acquired EU mobility rights by residing in another EU member state.

In conclusion, family migration or reunification policies increase the overall burden on applicants and, more important, have differing impacts on various categories of migrants or citizens affected by family migration policies. There is a growing gap between the right to family reunion for family members of third-country nationals and those of EU nationals. In many countries, citizens may enjoy superior rights to third-country nationals when it comes to family reunion. Increasingly, however, citizens with family members from non-EU countries have fewer rights than citizens who have made use of mobility rights or other EU migrants and their family members.

### **3.4.1. The Increasing Visibility of Islam and Its Integration Problems through Family Reunification**

Since the 1950s, the Muslim element within the labor migration to Western European countries has reached over 6 million people. Europe has a total population of about 23 million Muslims, close to 36% of this population resides in France, Germany and Britain as migrant workers or foreign residents (SOPEMI, 1992; Peach and Gelebe, 1995 cited in Canefe, 1998:532) By 2015, Europe's Muslim population is expected to double, whereas Europe's non-Muslim population is projected to fall by at least 3.5 percent. Looking further ahead, conservative projections estimate that, compared to today's 5 percent, Muslims will comprise at least 20 percent of Europe's population by 2050 (Savage, 2004: 28).

Family unification immediately started after the guest-worker program was ended in 1973, which caused the visibility of Islam or Turkish migrants` culture to increase in German public spaces and streets. Particularly the arrival of women and children via family re-unification marked the beginning of Islamization of non-European immigrant communities in Europe. When the immigrant families began to have growing responsibilities of rearing their children in non-traditional environments, religious observation came into picture as one of the most feasible alternatives to the feared Christianization and 'alienation' of the younger generations from their migrant communities.

In this context, European countries, including Germany, have seen family migration as problematic by associating it with `forced` marriages, integration, chain migration, closure of ethnic community formation, that is, a parallel community, and uncontrolled migration. Recent migration

policy responses address that applicants have to prove that they deserve rights by underlining further the ideal of ‘good migrant’/‘good citizen’. Last but not least, these migration policies have to be seen in the context of the shift of emphasis from rights (focus of debate in late 1990s) to duties.

Although family-related migration has become virtually the only means of legal entry for people to gain admission, current immigration policy and debates increasingly perceive migrant related migration (especially focusing on TCNs) as a real obstacle to integration and as a situation characterized by the features of illiberal practices, patriarchal relationships, and customs like forced or arranged marriages. The migrant family is predominantly seen as a potential obstacle to integration for which the integration programs and pre-entry tests have been introduced to focus on family-related migration. This tendency concerns the patriarchal institutions of migrant families, which are seen as a contradiction to liberal democratic norms of gender equality and which is allegedly prone to forms of gender-based violence (e.g., forced and arranged marriages, domestic violence, and honor killings). This, in turn, has led to a number of countries adopting a variety of measures that implicitly or explicitly target family members, such as upping the age minimum of spouses, mandatory integration courses and pre-admission integration tests , and the other increasing restrictions imposed on this form of migration, highlighting the continuing role of the nation-state. For this reason, family-related migrations are directly related to integration failures and are more and more becoming subject to suspicions and restrictions.

As a result these restrictions, admission on grounds of family migration has declined in Germany and other European countries. As can be seen in the Table 12, over the past decade, the share of permits issued for family reunion decreased considerably especially among TCNs. When we have a closer look into family migration policies and implementation, it seems



clear that family reunification policies often explicitly adopt a certain 'integration' discourse but aim at quite different objectives cutting the number of immigrants with the primary function of a barrier policy.

Where the family is seen as introducing unwanted difference, the conditions of family migration have been tightened. Though the restrictions apply to all migrants, as multiculturalism has been challenged and Islamophobia has become more virulent, it is migrant communities where a high proportion of spouses are brought in from abroad, which are the actual targets. This is certainly the case of Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands. One could also argue that the latest limitations and surveillance of family formation in the UK are also due to the need to show that migration policy is being managed and under control in response to the media's stories of bogus and sham marriages (Kofman, 2005: 458).

**Table 12: Visa granted for the purpose of family reunification in Germany, 1996-2006**

Entry of...	Wives joining country national husbands	In %	Husbands joining their third country national wives	In%	Wives joining their German husbands	In %	Husbands joining their German wives	In%	Children below 18	In%	total
1996	19,253	34.4	9,479	17.0	8,603	15.4	6,958	12.5	11,593	20.7	55,886
1997	20,266	32.8	8,770	14.2	9,905	16.0	7,931	12.8	14,868	24.1	61,740
1998	19,275	30.6	7,990	12.7	13,098	20.8	8,038	12.8	14,591	23.2	62,992
1999	20,036	28.3	7,711	10.9	16,246	23.0	9,865	13.9	16,892	23.9	70,750
2000	19,893	26.2	7,686	10.1	18,863	24.9	11,747	15.5	17,699	23.3	75,888
2001	21,491	25.9	7,780	9.4	20,766	25.1	13,041	15.7	19,760	23.9	82,838
2002	21,609	25.3	8,164	9.6	20,325	23.8	13,923	16.3	21,284	25.0	85,305
2003	18,412	24.2	6,535	8.6	20,539	26.9	12,683	16.7	17,908	23.5	76,077
2004	14,692	22.3	5,439	8.2	20,455	31.0	10,966	16.6	14,383	21.8	65,935
2005	13,085	24.6	4,068	7.6	14,969	28.1	8,811	16.6	12,280	23.1	53,213
2006	13,176	26.2	3,712	7.4	14,075	28.0	8,622	17.1	10,715	21.3	50,300

Source: Federal Foreign Office

*Table 13: Visa granted for the purpose of family reunification in Germany by countries of origin 2002-2006*

Country of origin	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Turkey	25,068	21,908	17,543	15,162	11,980
Serbia and Montenegro	2,250	2,035	4,905	2,115	5,379
Russian Federation	5,523	5,329	5,462	4,558	4,333
Thailand	3,138	3,667	3,850	3,249	2,809
Morocco	3,794	2,200	1,957	1,810	1,704
India	1,617	1,673	1,851	1,412	1,448
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2,080	1,841	1,918	1,678	1,438
Ukraine	1,444	1,766	1,924	1,545	1,267
Kazakhstan	2,015	1,190	2,037	1,775	1,250
Vietnam	1,058	1,315	1,266	1,142	1,156
China	629	961	873	926	1,124
Macedonia	4,768	2,365	1,229	1,156	1,087
Tunisia	1,114	1,017	1,068	969	919
Pakistan	941	1,540	1,282	927	735
Iran	1,454	1,203	1,059	958	695
Brazil	792	751	701	688	680
Egypt	581	530	609	454	661
Romania	1,343	1,227	1,275	866	626
Lebanon	761	670	859	744	611
Philippines	794	748	541	556	609
Other	24,141	22,141	13,726	10,522	9,789
<b>Total</b>	<b>85,305</b>	<b>76,077</b>	<b>65,935</b>	<b>53,213</b>	<b>50,300</b>

Source: Federal Foreign Office

Because marriage migration often involves second and subsequent generations and is frequently characterized by ethnic marriage preferences, it can be seen as contributing to the formation and reproduction of ethnically defined immigrant communities, a process that is across Europe increasingly perceived as a threat to social cohesion and national identity. In addition, in the context of current integration debates, marriage migration is frequently seen as contributing to ethnic closure while reinforcing traditional attitudes and gender relationships within families (Kofman and Kraler, 2006: 6).

Consequently, family migration has a political significance that derives from the fact of the policy-makers concerns over ethnic closure or a parallel society of migrant communities who have failed to integrate. In the current context which is dominated by concerns over ethnic closure of migrant communities (or the emergence of so-called “parallel societies”) and a widespread view that integration of migrant communities has failed (often explicitly or implicitly referring to Muslim communities), the “migrant family”, by contrast, is increasingly seen as an obstacle to integration – as a situation characterized by patriarchal relationships and illiberal practices and traditions such as arranged and forced marriages, among others. In general, these debates are highly gendered and it is no coincidence that public debates on “the” migrant family centre on the role and status of women.

Suffice it to say, family-related migration is becoming more significant in terms of numbers. In a political climate wary of immigration, particularly from Islamic countries, it is also becoming more politicized. In contrast, the shortage of skills is leading certain states to open up the possibility of permanent migration, including for immediate family members of the privileged with desired skills (Kofman, 2004).

### **3.4.2. A Phased Access to Success: the Labor Market**

Indeed, modern nation-state system has been, for a long time, based on unequal social relations at the global level where the market relations that define capitalism, emphasize efficiency rather than fairness, competition rather than solidarity, and, once again, hierarchical rather than egalitarian forms of respect and welfare distribution (Alexander, 2001). The conditions of immigrants and their descendants are subjected to much more discrimination in the unequal structure of the nation-state.

There is a trend towards polarization; highly skilled personnel are encouraged to enter, either temporarily or permanently, and are seen as an important factor in skill upgrading and technology transfer. Low-skilled migrants are welcome as workers, but enter through family reunion, as refugees or illegally. Their contribution to low-skilled occupations, casual work, the informal sector and small business is of great economic importance, but is officially unrecognized (Castles and Miller, 2003: 235).

Also, labor market segmentation is part of the migratory process. When people come from poor to rich countries, without local knowledge or networks, lacking proficiency in the language and unfamiliar with local ways of working, then their entry point into the labor market is likely to be at a low level. The question is whether their fair chance of later upward mobility. The answer is often depends on state policies (Ibid: 235) and context of reception.

In contrast to the widespread assumption in the international migration or post-nationalism (Soysal, 1994) literature, there is little difference in the social rights of citizens and migrants who are legal residents. Morissens and Sainsbury's (2005) analysis found large disparities in how migrant and citizen households fare in welfare states. Furthermore, discrepancies widened with respect to migrants of nationality or color. Compared with citizens, migrants and ethnic minority migrants are less likely to enjoy a socially acceptable standard of living, even when the market is the main source of their income. They are less likely to be pulled out of poverty, and when benefits are their main source of income they run a greater risk of being poor than do citizens.

Carefully analyzed, one can find that Germany has a phased regulation of the labor market through highly formal and stratified differentiations between skilled and unskilled workers, as well as between native Germans,

ethnic Germans, EU member nationals on the one side and the nationals of other countries on the other. Each group draws formal rights from their status, resulting in a hierarchy of gradually expansive rights as one's residence status improves.

The heaviest burden of the civic stratification system is felt by discrimination manners in the labor market. Thus, there is a dramatic unemployment rate among Turkish immigrants and their children. A deficit in immigrant rights can arise, especially in Germany, as a result of labor market disadvantage and hierarchy, which can undermine the rest of the social dimensions and stability of family life. The evaluation in the labor market follows a hierarchy that is indeed determined by the civic stratification system and institutional discrimination in Germany. Thus, job search requirements and availability tests has been always tightened in Germany control of immigration, with exceptions for skilled migrants, was an established priority and the demonization of Turkish and other TCNs immigrants and asylum seekers, along with a reduction of their benefit rights, is well underway.

One of the advances made by the 1990 Foreigners Law was in granting progression to a more secure status as a right if people met a set of specified conditions. The full permit is granted after a wait, which varies from four to six years, and of course the applicant must survive the intervening period without significant reliance of welfare. The accommodation and maintenance conditions must be met at the point of application, and the applicant must also have a rudimentary knowledge of the German language. After achieving unlimited residence a welfare claim is unlikely to be damaging, and in fact, people holding such a permit may have their right to welfare protected by international convention. Officials were anyway unable to identify any circumstances under which someone

might routinely lose an unlimited permission, though welfare receipt could disqualify them from the right of abode (Green, 2003).

Self-maintenance is one condition for the next incremental step, the right of abode (*Aufenthaltsberechtigung*), which as a right rather than a permission offers a more robust basis for secure residence. The transition requires eight years with a residence permit (five years limited and three years unlimited, or eight years in a humanitarian status). It also requires some measure of ‘integration’, in the form of a five year record with a pension fund. So once again access to employment and related rights provides a pivotal point in the accumulation of security. As noted above, the citizenship at birth option is reserved for children of parents with 8 years residence, and therefore eligible for the right of abode (Green, 2003). Despite developments towards greater inclusion, Germany was still more restrictive in granting asylum, and it had the most stringent rules for a permanent residence permit, family reunification and becoming a citizen.

In fact, it can be claimed that the legal framework prior to the new Immigration Law of 2005 contained a variety of measures that kept foreigners out of the labor market. Until 1990, when a revised Foreigners’ Law came into force, the regulation of the residence of foreigners—including the prolongation of residence—was largely based on discretionary decisions by local authorities. The Foreigners’ Law of 1990 increased legal security for immigrants, but the resulting permit system was quite complex. Until 2005, six different categories of residence status and a corresponding system of labor permits co-existed. In addition to the legal uncertainty that this situation created, it also led to varying degrees of labor market access for foreigners. Only EU citizens and foreigners with an unlimited residence permit—which was generally only granted after at least five years of residence in Germany or for acknowledged refugees—did not need a separate work permit. For all others—i.e., about one third of

the foreign population—labor market testing applied. As Liebig (2007: 24) underlines, in addition to the residence requirement, a variety of other conditions had to be met, such as *inter alia* non-dependence on social welfare and at least basic German language knowledge. These and other conditions have led to a situation in which some people with more than five years of residence have not been able to obtain an unlimited residence permit.

This meant that they could only obtain a work permit for a particular job if neither Germans nor foreigners with a privileged status were available and if no “negative effects” on the regional labor market could be expected. Until December 2000, this applied also to a prolongation of the work contract. Between 1997 and 2000, asylum seekers and quasi-refugees could not work in Germany, whatever their length of stay. In 2001, this provision was abolished in favor of a one-year waiting period and the subsequent labor-market testing. A one-year waiting period and labor-market testing also generally applied to spouses that immigrated under the title of family unification (Liebig, 25).

Here it is important to note that the 1990 Foreigner`s Law ironically did not have any integration perspective, although guest workers and their families had already settled for several decades. Because of the lack of an explicit legal basis for the promotion of foreigners` integration, the Federal government has resorted to its constitutional powers in other areas, such as employment promotion, youth support and the financing of the welfare services. This situation was also responsible for creating a welfare dependent people that is subject to severe criticism by Christian Democrats and far right parties.

The 2005 Immigration Act simplified the permit system, but it did not alter the system`s basic principles: the importance of employment, self-



sufficiency and contributions in attaining a settlement permit—and these features continue to impinge on immigrants’ social rights. In short, different immigration regimes exhibit diverse responses, reflecting in part the strength of dissimilar policy legacies and differing policy logics of exclusion and inclusion. (Sainsbury, 2006: 240).

In 2000, at a time when shortages in the ICT sector were deemed to be an obstacle to growth, the German government introduced a so-called “Green Card” for foreign ICT workers, which paved the way for a new immigration law in Germany. After surmounting several obstacles and revisions, the final draft of the law was approved by a broad majority in both chambers of parliament. The new law, which entered into force on January 1, 2005, formally acknowledges integration to be a government task and assigns the key responsibilities in this respect to the Federal government. One of the key changes is the establishment of integration courses. (Liebig, 2007: 26). Modifications in the immigration law (*Zuwanderungsgesetz*) of early 2004 did not solve the problem of attracting highly skilled labor because it stipulated that the applicant needed sufficient capital to create at least ten new jobs. Some changes allowed foreign students to search for employment, as well as granting residency permits to top scientists and corporate managers. Yet preferential employment was given to workers from members of the European Union, thus discriminating against individuals holding Turkish and other foreign passports.

With respect to employment, it can be claimed that Germany has a protective system of “phased access” in the management of the national labor market. In the words of Morris (2001b: 390), Germany operates the most complex system of stratified access to employment. National labor market regulations sanction corporate transfers at the top end of the employment hierarchy (who are in fact allowed to progress to unlimited

residence), and considerable seasonal and temporary labor at the bottom end. There are also strictly time-limited admissions for skill shortages, confining workers to the employment for which they enter and suggestive of a rerun of the guest worker history.

A key feature of Germany's labor market management is the distinction between the privileged permit which allows full access to the labor market, and the limited permit which asserts the priority of EU, national and prior resident foreigners (Federal Employment Service, 1995). Holders of the latter will only be permitted employment subject to an active search (of up to six weeks) for alternative labor. This distinction reaches far beyond the conditions imposed on arriving workers, and affects all incoming TCNs by granting only phased access to the labor market, and expanding the reach of differentiated rights with respect to employment. TCNs, however, are further differentiated, with Turkish workers protected by the EC–Turkey agreement that secures residence after four years in the labor market. This agreement is of greater significance for Germany than for other member states since Turkey was the principal source of its guest workers (Morris, 2001b: 391).

As Miera (2008: 6) points out that in stratified German market system, only Germans, so-called 'privileged foreigners' (*bevorrechtigte Ausländer*) with a special work permit, and citizens from EU-countries or the European Economic Area have free access to the labor market. Third country nationals can obtain such permission after having worked for five years as employees liable for social insurance or after six years of permanent legal residence or if they have a permanent residency permit. Other third country nationals can only obtain a work permit for a certain job if there is no job applicant from one of these groups.

There are also other discriminatory criteria in the German labor market driven from German ethno-nationalistic understanding of citizenship in so far as only German citizens can become public officials in fields related to national sovereignty such as finance and law, and only Germans or EU migrants can become public officials in other areas (the police are an exception). All other jobs, even in the public sector, are open to noncitizens. There are minor differences between the rights of citizens and migrants holding a Work Allowance (*Arbeitserlaubnis*) with regard to the free choice of the work. Nonetheless, migrants who are entitled to citizenship almost always fulfill the requirements for a Work Entitlement (*Arbeitsberechtigung*), which authorizes them to engage in any occupation. To become self-employed as a dentist, physician, psychotherapist, or psychologist and pharmacist migrants must be German citizens or EU members, except if they finished high school in Germany or are married to a German or an EU citizen (Diehl and Blohm, 2003: 142-143).

All in all, in relation to the labor market (like family reunification, naturalization and other societal dimensions), third country nationals do not enjoy the same rights as citizens in Germany and most European states. Thus, the evaluation follows the hierarchy in this civic stratification system: Germans, ‘privileged foreigners’ followed by job seekers from EU-countries. Even when a migrant holds an unlimited work contract it must be evaluated whether there is any ‘privileged job seeker’ when the duration of their work permit has ended and is due for renewal. Applicants for asylum and ‘tolerated’ refugees (rejected asylum-seekers who may not be deported for humanitarian reasons), are generally prohibited from working during their first year in Germany; ‘tolerated’ refugees who have often been subjected to a chain of ‘tolerance’ (*Duldung*) are further prohibited from work, e.g., if they are suspected of hiding their identity to prevent their deportation. Migrants without legal documents are generally excluded from legal work. Finally, ‘foreigners’—in a legal sense meaning:

individuals holding passports other than the German passport—are excluded from certain jobs requiring German citizenship, such as in the civil service (Miera, 2008: 6).

As can be observed from above, in Germany large sectors of municipal and public employment are closed to non-EU citizens but there has so far been little public discussion of this issue. Many other countries also include the situation of the labor market as grounds to exclude foreigners from all kinds of employment. Informal discrimination can also be effective in preventing migrants from entering particular occupations or to progress within them. Institutional discrimination—we prefer to call it as institutional discrimination—is viewed by Miera (2008) as being caused by legislation, directives and institutional practices that may be directly aimed at a certain group, such as migrants, or seem neutral but have indirect effects on the group in question. The most significant form of employment-related institutional discrimination is constituted by the immigration law and regards access to the legal labor market.

### **3.4.3. “The Boat Is Full or the Welfare System”**

The literature on international migration has primarily focused on the challenge of immigration to the nation state, highlighting the concepts of sovereignty, territoriality and citizenship as membership (for example, Joppke, 1998; Soysal, 1994). This citizenship literature has paid less attention to the challenge of immigration to the welfare state and social citizenship, and its relation to migrants’ stratified social rights in several dimensions and the civic stratification system that directly or indirectly results in consolidating institutional discrimination in the nation state. Moreover, comparative welfare state research has devoted little attention to the social rights of migrants or the ethnic/racial dimension, even though societies are becoming more ethnically diverse and hierarchical through

increasing international migration. (See for exception Morissens and Sainsbury, 2005; Sainsbury, 2006; Morris, 2000, 2001a, 2001b, 2002, 2003). This study will be no exception in presenting the comparative analysis of welfare states regarding social rights of migrants, but focusing, instead, on the particular analysis of German stratified immigration policy and the welfare system.

The international migration literature has emphasized differences in the immigration or incorporation regime as a source of variation in migrants' rights across countries (Castles and Miller, 2003; Faist, 1995). The immigration or incorporation regime, which regulates migrants' inclusion in and exclusion from society, consists of rules and norms that govern migrants' possibilities to become a citizen, to acquire residence and work permits, to own property and run a business, and to participate in political life. Moreover, research on migrants' social rights also needs to consider the dynamics between welfare and immigration regimes (Morissens and Sainsbury, 2005: 654).

Like in other societal dimensions, the first concept of importance for our welfare dimension is again stratification. Esping-Andersen (1990) argues that, although the welfare state affects structures of inequality, it constitutes a system of stratification. He contends that a particular pattern of stratification is associated with each regime. In the German welfare system, our limited approach is more focused on the stratifying effects of conditions of eligibility and benefit levels. Conditions of eligibility stratify persons in terms of whether or they are entitled to particular benefits, and differentials in benefit levels lead to a stratification of beneficiaries.

Although Germany is known as a generous social welfare state, the immigration policy and welfare system are both determinants of the social rights of immigrants, where the conditions of welfare distribution and

rights are heavily based on the immigrant status and consequently are highly selective and stratified in its civic stratification system. Sainsbury (2006) claims that immigrants' social rights are not only affected by welfare regime type but also by the form of immigration and the immigration regime. Accordingly, there is a strong relation between welfare benefits and the immigrant status.

Across the countries, the social rights of immigrants are differentiated by entry categories associated with the form of immigration. The rights of convention refugees are usually on a par with those of citizens; and because of their legal status, refugees' rights are less vulnerable to retrenchment. To such extent, features of the immigration regime have impinged upon foreigners' social rights. Although foreigners have been formally eligible for social assistance, its utilization has endangered renewal of a residence permit. Long-term utilization can lead to expulsion and also disqualify immigrants from acquiring citizenship (Diehl and Blohm, 2003: 142–3). Sainsbury (2006: 230) argues that any reliance on welfare is especially detrimental before an immigrant has acquired an unlimited residence permit. Just as work has conferred social entitlements, employment has been a central condition for a residence permit and the right of abode. The foreigner with a restricted work permit has been especially vulnerable. Such a permit is limited to a specific type of job or employer, and on the condition that no other workers are available to do this work.

The German insurance system has hierarchically managed the status of immigrants and its stratification rules. The German insurance schemes have led to differentiated benefits for immigrants, and the entry categories further stratify their social rights. Asylum seekers have had limited access to insurance benefits because of vacillating conditions with regard to the right to work; their social rights have instead hinged on claims to public

assistance. Unsuccessful applicants have had a tolerated presence (*duldung*) or been granted humanitarian status (*befugnis*). Tolerated immigrants have similar social rights to assistance and accommodation as asylum seekers, while those with humanitarian status have more rights but their situation is still very insecure. They only have full employment rights after six years of residence, and only a discretionary right to social housing. They have neither entitlement to family allowances nor the right to family reunification (Sainsbury, 2006: 235). In the German case, the immigration regime has had a major impact on immigrants' social rights. Despite a welfare regime enshrining the principle of equivalence (benefits should match contributions), ethnic German immigrants were exempt from the contributions requirement. The exclusionary aspects of the regime have undermined non-German immigrants' utilization of social assistance (Sainsbury, 240).

Admittedly, In the German civic stratification system, the fulfillment of certain conditions has been a prerequisite for the acquisition of further rights, and has therefore served as the basis for selection in the route to long term security, and ultimately citizenship. So, for example, full employment rights may only be granted after a period of self-maintenance, while a claim for social support, though permissible, eliminates the claimant from achieving the next stage of security. Such a process highlights the sometimes ambivalent nature of rights and their close association with mechanisms of control.

German nationality law denies citizenship to immigrants who have inadequate incomes and rely on assistance, and non-reliance on assistance is a criterion for successful application in the permit system. Restricted work permits have deprived newcomers of full employment rights. The lack of full employment rights can have additional exclusionary effects by curtailing access to insurance benefits based on labor market participation,

which are the foundation of the German social protection system. In these ways the immigration regime and the welfare regime seem to be in tension. However, work has been a principal nexus between the regimes, producing a complementary logic favoring differentiation and exclusion. Similarly, contributions are central to both regimes. Contributions determine benefit levels, and they are a requirement for a permanent residence permit and accordingly citizenship (Sainsbury 2006).

According to Morissens and Sainsbury (2005), the German conservative corporatist regime is characterized by social insurance schemes that offer generous benefits based on rigorous work tests, and these work-related schemes are administered by corporatist structures representing employers and workers. The stratifying effects of social policies perpetuate traditional status relations, and decommodification<sup>19</sup> levels are relatively high for full-time workers permanently in the labor force. Overall, citizens are more likely to enjoy a socially acceptable standard of living than migrants.

Citizens in the (German) welfare state have claims to resources. For a large part these claims are founded on participation in the labor market. According to the prevailing equivalency principle (*Aquivalenzprinzip*), pensions, for example, are paid to those who have earlier contributed to the funds. In a situation in which these claims have become contested, it is not surprising that those who have not 'earned' their right, e.g., asylum seekers, are not considered to have legitimate claims on the resources of the welfare state. However, not all immigrant groups who have not

---

<sup>19</sup> Decommodification as a concept comes from the idea that in a market economy, citizens (and their labor) are commodified. Given that labor is a citizen's primary commodity in the market, decommodification refers to activities and efforts (generally by the government) that reduces citizen's reliance on the market (and their labor) for their well-being. In general, unemployment, sickness insurance and pensions are used to measure decommodification for comparisons of the welfare state (see Esping-Andersen 1990).



‘earned’ their right are thought to have illegitimate claims. For example, the claims of ethnic Germans have been much less contested so far than those of asylum seekers. In sum, the definition of citizenship and the understanding of membership do play an important role in who is admitted and who gets what set of citizenship rights - but also whose claims are contested (Faist, 1994b: 454-455).

For the most part researchers have looked ‘at the national (welfare) state’ as a closed system that has not been an integral part of transnational migratory processes. Thus, academic debates and research in Germany have neglected the foreign policy, international and transnational characteristics of migration (for exceptions, see Lohrmann and Manfrass, 1974 and the review of the state of the art by Blaschke, 1993; Cited by Faist 1994b: 455) Also, research on immigration in Germany has not placed the political debates on asylum, ‘multiculturalism’ and xenophobia in an interactive perspective that analyzes the unequal distribution of resources and its connection to ethnicization of politics in welfare states of the ‘north’ to emigration and socio-economic inequalities in countries of the ‘south’.

According to Faist (1994b: 450), one of the most challenging problems concerns the construction of boundaries between groups that are reflected in perceptions of ‘we’ and the ‘other’. After World War II immigration of expellees, ethnic Germans, labor migrants and asylum seekers into Germany has gone hand in hand with the construction of boundaries. In the 1980s and early 1990s the rise of rightwing populist parties, the discourse on racism, and the steep increase in violence against certain groups of migrants such as Turks and asylum seekers are only the most visible forms of an increased importance of boundary formation towards ‘others’. One example of boundary formation and mobilization is the use of religion and culture (Islam) in defining Turkish de facto immigrants: Muslims are

thought to be unwilling to assimilate to German culture and thus not deemed to be fit to become German citizens. Another example is the distinction between 'political' refugees and 'economic' refugees: only 'political' refugees are thought to have a legitimate claim to social benefits (e.g., *Sozialhilfe*). All these examples hint at boundaries that separate 'us' from 'them' (certain immigrant groups).

Closer at hand, German unification is a very good example to illustrate the structural conditions under which ethnicization of welfare state politics may take place. On the one hand, German unification may have led to an increased xenophobic reaction to 'others', for example asylum seekers and de facto immigrants of Turkish descent. On the other hand, the problems associated with unification, for example conflicts over the burdens of 'rebuilding' what used to be the German Democratic Republic, may lead to a regionally based ethnicization between the populations in the East and the West of Germany (Offe, 1992; Cited by Faist, 1994b). In both instances ethnicization is not necessarily associated with an outwardly aggressive nationalism in German politics. Thus, for example, some analysts have described nationalism after German unification not as a form of exaggerated national feeling or an ideology with externally expansionist tendencies. Rather, Funke speaks of a 'fragmented and defensive nationalism' that is directed against domestic and not external 'enemies'. The targets of this nationalism include selected groups of foreigners, such as Sinti and Roma, asylum seekers, and Turkish guest workers. In Funke's view this reactive form of nationalism arises in the context of the perception of crisis (e.g., unemployment and disorientation in the process of German unification, and latent dispositions of nationalism (Cited by Faist, 1994b: 451).

### 3.4.4. Downward Integration in the Labor Market

**Table 14: Unemployment Figures of Turks and Total Population in Germany 1979-2004**

	Germany	
	Turks	Total
1979	4.2%	3.2%
1980	6.3%	3.5%
1981	11.2%	5.4%
1982	14.9%	7.5%
1983	16.7%	8.6%
1984	14.4%	8.6%
1985	14.8%	8.7%
1986	14.5%	8.2%
1987	15.5%	8.4%
1988	14.5%	8.1%
1989	11.6%	7.3%
1990	10.0%	6.6%
1991	11.0%	6.0%
1992	13.5%	6.5%
1993	17.4%	8.3%
1994	18.9%	8.8%
1995	19.2%	9.0%
1996	22.5%	10.0%
1997	24.0%	10.7%
1998	22.7%	9.8%
1999	22.5%	11.2%
2000	20.2%	10.0%
2001	21.3%	10.0%
2002	22.9%	10.5%
2003	24.7%	9.8 %
2004	25.5%	10.5 %

**Source:** *Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Ausländerfragen*, cited by Zentrum für Türkeistudien <http://www.zft-online.de/deutsch.php>, (CBS Statline and Ersanilli 2005)

The table above demonstrates that, Turkish migrants and their children in Germany have a higher unemployment rate and a correspondingly more difficult time getting employment, or they have a weak

attachment to the labor market, compared to the general population. Today, we can quite safely assume a considerable intergenerational progress between parents and children for all second-generation groups. There is also progress of the second compared to the in-between generation. On the other hand, obvious deficits in relation to the structural position of autochthonous German age peers do remain, especially for Turkish youngsters and young adults (Worbs, 2003) as a kind of “downward assimilation” (Portes and Zhou, 1993).

With respect to employment and unemployment rates (of all Turkish generations), and particularly given their low educational attainment and the current economic situation, the labor market integration of the Turkish immigrant is relatively unfavorable in international comparison. Furthermore, immigrant women, and particularly those of Turkish origin, have very low employment rates. This is partly an outcome of policies that limited their labor market access, although some of legal obstacles have been removed under the new Immigration Act. Liebig (2007: 4) suggests that as the German labor market places substantial emphasis on formal qualifications, particularly of the vocational kind, educational attainment will be an additional focus, since this is likely to affect present and future employment prospects.

The situation of the so-called “second generation” is of concern, as they have very low educational outcomes. This hampers their access to vocational training, which appears to have an even stronger impact on their employment prospects than on those of natives. The low educational attainment of the second generation seems to be at least partly attributable to structural features in the German education system, such as the early streaming which puts migrants’ children in a lower track. Especially problematic is the relatively late starting age

for kindergarten and the prevalence of half-day education in kindergarten and school, which limits exposure to the German language at a crucial age. Immigrant access to self-employment is hampered by legal obstacles and a lack of information and subsequent access to financial credits (Ibid: 4). Worbs (2003: 1011) suggests that the achieved integration status of the second generation varies between areas: obvious problems in the educational system go along with considerable progress in the vocational training system and in the labor market. Children of Turkish migrants are the most disadvantaged group among the second generation.

Up to the early 1990s, the labor market situation of the foreign-born was quite favorable, and fairly similar to that of natives. A notable exception concerned immigrant women, who always had very low employment rates. Among this group, Turkish women stand out as having particularly low rates of well below 40%. However, over the past ten years, the integration performance of immigrants has been less favorable. This is linked to the economic stagnation that Germany has been suffering since then, with the exception of the years between 1998 and 2000. The economic stagnation began at a time of very high immigration inflows. Foreigners—and especially the Turks—were particularly affected by the decline in employment levels from 1992 to 1997, i.e. during and after Germany's recession of the early 1990s: whereas the employment rate of Germans declined by 3 percentage points, the employment rate of foreigners dropped by about 10 percentage points. Between 1997 and 2001—i.e., during the economic upswing, the gap between foreigners and German nationals narrowed. However, along with the worsening economic situation, there was again a strong decrease in foreigners' employment since 2001, and the current gap in employment rates is almost as large as in 1997. This higher sensitivity of immigrants compared to nationals, with respect to

changes in the economic situation, has been observed in many OECD countries (OECD, 2005: 60f.; Chiswick, Cohen and Zach, 1997; cited by Liebig, 2007: 19).

As Green (2003: 233) emphasizes, because of Germany's exclusive reliance on the principle of descent (*jus sanguinis*) prior to 2000, birth in Germany did not automatically confer German citizenship to those children with foreign parents. Instead, they have been subject to labor market and residence rules for non-nationals. In the guest-worker system, workers found that having entered the labor market at the bottom, it was hard to gain promotion. Migrants qualifications were often not recognized, forcing skilled workers into dead-end jobs. Typical workplaces for men were car assembly lines, construction sites, and foundry work; and, for women, clothing, textiles and food processing. Service occupations such as catering, refuse collection, office cleaning and unskilled jobs in public utilities also became known as 'migrant work' (Castles and Miller, 2003: 206).

From structural point of view, the segmented labor market and thus reserving certain jobs for migrants is not an exceptional case. There is a huge body of literature on discrimination inherent to the structures of society and the labor market. Heckmann (2006) analyzed the phenomenon of the incorporation of 'guest workers' at the lowest level of the labor system that has facilitated the social mobility of native workers (*ethnische Unterschichtung*). Structural economic change and globalization have intensified the processes of segmentation in the labor market. On one end there are the kind of monotonous and arduous jobs, that often involve health hazards, require few qualifications, and have few or minimal social and legal rights; the majority of workers within this segment are migrants, women and other low-skilled workers. In contrast, the other end of the

scale is characterized by stable employment relationships, higher incomes, upward mobility etc., and is reserved for highly skilled personnel and mainly native German men. The poor positioning in the labor market of people with a migration background is often explained by their insufficient educational level (Hönekopp et al., 2002).

However, it should be pointed out that the lack of human capital does not explain the phenomenon of de-skilling of certain groups of migrants upon their arrival in the host country. Additionally students with a migration background are disadvantaged in the German system of school education and vocational training. The poor conditions of Turkish immigrants and their descendants can be explained by a mix of factors: lacking social and cultural capital of the parental generation; an education system which does not foster the educational progress of children from disadvantaged families; the high importance of school degrees for access to the vocational training system and the labor market; and discrimination (whether or not it happens deliberately) in all areas dealt of social life (Worbs, 2003); context of reception; governmental modes of incorporation (Portes, 2006) and so on.

However, we should also not forget, in view of the first generation's socioeconomic background, that it is not realistic to expect equality with autochthonous Germans in the native-born migrant generation.

Thus, In addition to the high unemployment rate among Turkish migrants and their children, it should be mentioned that segmented occupational patterns (concentration in 3D jobs: dirty, dangerous and demanding/difficult) among Turkish immigrants have shown how deeply the labor market is shaped by complex stratified rights whereby Turkish immigrants have been subjected to explicit legal

discrimination (as shown in the following) and latent forms of institutional discrimination. The structural factors and discriminatory rules which led to initial low status caused enduring pattern of labor market segmentation.

Children of immigrants who have obtained education and vocational training in the receiving country often secure better jobs than their parents. However, second generation children of immigrants, with poor educational qualifications, have little chance of steady employment. For a couple of decades, many foreign children were failing in German schools although there has been a slight improvement in school achievement. As the Süßmuth commission found, there is still a substantial deficit in both schooling and vocational training for children of immigrants (Süßmuth, 2001; cited by Castles and Miller, 2003).

One can still recognize that there is no substantial change in the condition of the children of Turkish immigrants. Even now, the new generation of children of immigrants has a much higher unemployment rate than their parents in the past. Some individuals could break out of this situation but many are caught in a vicious circle; the process of racialization reinforces initial integration in low-skilled work and residential areas with poor educational opportunities. Referring to Hausserman and Kazapov, Castles and Miller (2003) claim that young job-seekers may be rejected because of the combination of poor educational credentials, ethnic appearance and living in certain neighborhoods has become a stigma, denoting marginality and unreliability.

One solution would be self-employment or ethnically based business, which becomes very important in developed countries. However, it



merges with another problem like 'ethnic niches' where the use of family labor, long working hours, cause small businesses to fail and insecure and poor social conditions become very dominant.

In addition, As Mueller (2006: 426) meticulously underlines, with the enlargement of the European Union, many under- or semiskilled German-Turks who decide not to be naturalized would rank second compared to workers from Poland and other East European countries. German-Turks would not be able to search for employment in other European Union countries. Unless there is a radical change in German laws governing citizenship, the eastward expansion of the European Union will dramatically increase unemployment among German-Turks, and also increase the size of the German-Turkish underclass.

Despite the limits of official statistical data, labor market statistics reflect the degree of structural discrimination. The unemployment rate among non-Germans increased from 17.1% in 2000 to 25.5% in 2005 (Bosch and Peucker, 2007: 17; Hönekopp et al., 2002). In 2005, the unemployment rate of 'foreigners' was higher by 13.5 percentage points than the general unemployment rate (Bosch and Peucker, 2007: 17). The poverty rate of people with a migration background has increased from 22.3% in 1998 to 27.9% in 2003 compared to a general poverty rate of 15.4 %. (Miera, 2008: 7). By the year 2002, the persistence of a large group of foreigners especially Turks continues despite their having an unemployment rate 22.9%, twice as high as the 8.8% rate experienced by ethnic German workers (Wall Street Journal, May 6, 2002: 15).

Nermin Abadan-Unat was one of the first to do extensive research among the Turkish guest worker populations. She found most had experienced downward labor market mobility compared to their positions in Turkey

(see, for example, Abadan-Unat, 1976). At the same time that family reunification was rising, many of the guest workers lost their jobs due to the restructuring of the economy that especially hit the sectors they were employed in.

Specifically speaking, Germany has a more strict family reunification policy and less secure residence status that limited Turkish migration to Germany and allowed the country to 'export unemployment' (Muus, 2003; Böcker et al., 2002; cited by Ersanilli, 2005: 17) The virtual absence of anti-discrimination legislation and targeted policies in Germany leads to the expectation that immigrant employment will be lowest in Germany. Also in combination with the fact that most civil service jobs are exclusively for nationals and citizenship is hard to acquire, making the civil service jobs out of reach for most immigrants (Ersanilli, 2005: 9).

As a final comment, it is necessary to mention the vulnerable social field and discriminative conditions for Turkish immigrants and their descendants at work because of institutional, direct, or indirect discrimination. Indeed, anti-discrimination measures have not been a main focus of integration policy in Germany, and there is currently no proper anti-discrimination law. In addition to anecdotal evidence, the literature and statistics also suggest that there is discrimination against immigrants in the German labor market although it is difficult to isolate its effects from that of other factors. Moreover, according to Liebig (2007) given the substantial structural disadvantage of immigrants and the second generation in Germany in terms of their lower educational attainment and reduced access to vocational training compared to natives, the issue of discrimination in the labor market tends to be masked. Economic theory suggests that the low attainment levels observed among the offspring of immigrant parents may be in part a response to a perception of discrimination or of likely low returns to education in the labor market.

However, since until recently public discourse was emphasizing the uncertainty in immigrant status (“Germany is not an immigration country”), the incentive to invest in host-country human capital may have well been reduced.

In this structure, labor market integration has traditionally not been the principle focus of integration activities for two main reasons. First, since Germany did not define itself as a “country of immigration”, most immigration was deemed to be of a temporary nature, without the need for further integration of migrants. Humanitarian migrants who did not obtain formal asylum faced some legal obstacles in labor market access. The notable exception has been ethnic Germans, who have always had full and immediate labor market access. Second, when integration measures have been taken, emphasis has mainly been on acquisition of the German language.

Therefore, the “ethnicization” (Faist, 1994b) and discrimination of labor market and welfare state are still major obstacles for Germany to deal with integration of the immigrants notably Turkish and other TCNs. Germany is currently in the process of a major restructuring of its immigration system. This change particularly affects the approach to integration, which is now a clearly established government task. Furthermore, in principle, all immigrants are subjected to the same broad integration structures. For the first time, with the new integration programs and the subsequent “initial integration advice”, a uniform approach with respect to integration is adopted for all migrant groups whose presence is not merely temporary. In contrast, prior to the new immigration act, there was a clear distinction between the main migrant groups, i.e. guest workers and their families, ethnic Germans, and humanitarian migrants, with respect to integration support and labor market access.

It is safe to say, there is still structural and institutional discrimination based on both formal legal regulations and informal social patterns. Institutional discrimination is viewed as being caused by legislation, directives, and institutional practices that may be directly aimed at a certain group, such as migrants, or seem neutral but have indirect effects on the group in question. The most significant form of employment-related institutional discrimination is constituted by the immigration law and regards access to the legal labor market. We include the category of 'legal discrimination' as suggested by Wrench into the category of 'institutional discrimination'; and we consider 'opportunistic discrimination' as part of 'direct' and respectively 'structural' discrimination' (Wrench, 2007: 115-122; Miera, 2008: 6).

On the one hand, the fact that German authorities do not formally recognize certain qualifications from other countries is an example of indirect institutional discrimination against migrants. Further, allegedly neutral offers of further training often exclude migrants as their specific skills, abilities, and difficulties are not taken into account. Similarly, certain application tests in some selective procedures indirectly disadvantage migrants, when, for example, questions are asked about figures particular to German history, despite this knowledge being totally irrelevant for the intended employment (Hönekopp et al., 2002).

In the form of direct discrimination, on the other hand,, individuals face with discrimination through features like names, religion, dressing, and so on that identify them. Individuals can be directly discriminated against by employers, fellow-employees, work councils or customers in the fields of job seeking and recruitment procedures, allocation of work, further training and promotion, dismissals, as well as by harassment or bullying in the workplace. Several surveys indicate that people with a migration background and people of color are often rejected in search for an

apprenticeship or a job because of their ‘foreigner’ status, their names or their clothes (headscarves, hijabs). Especially people of Turkish background, blacks and women wearing headscarves were significantly affected by this form of discrimination (EFMS, 2001; EUMC, 2006; Hönekopp et al., 2002).

In a study carried out by the International Labor Organization applying a method of controlled experiments, applicants with German and ‘foreign’ sounding names and identical qualifications applied for the same vacancies. ‘Germans’ were significantly more frequently invited to job interviews than those with ‘foreign’ names (Goldberg, et al., 1995). A recent similar survey on a small-scale basis included applications from women wearing headscarves. The survey showed that these women were rejected most frequently. Interviews with personnel managers revealed that their decisions are not only guided by factors like education, qualification and work experience, but also by certain cultural stereotypes and prejudices. This evidence is even more dramatic since it is often difficult to prove discrimination in the recruitment process; moreover, trade unions and work councils have very limited possibilities of interfering at this stage of pre-employment (Miera, 2008: 6).

In sum, due to these formal and informal discriminations, the labor market situation of Turkish nationals in Germany cannot be still described as anything other than poor. For Turkish immigrants and their descendants in German society, patterns of discrimination maintain disadvantages of low economic and social status, while also restraining social advancement. Ironically, despite relative long-term residency in Germany, Turks continue to face institutional discrimination and hostility in labor market. Naturalization and family reunification issues have intensified since the restructuring economy in the mid 1970s.

However, it should be noted that although integration into the labor market does not necessarily guarantee social integration, it is certainly a major step with respect to immigrants' ability to function as autonomous citizens in the host country and with respect to ensuring both acceptance of immigration by the host-country population and the sustainability of migration policy over the long term. Labor market integration is arguably the single most important instrument for contributing to the integration of immigrants, in whatever way this term is defined.

### **3.5. Conclusion: Lessons and Recommendations**

In general, various dilemmas emerge from the civic stratification system in which different layers of membership have access to all social systems of the host nation. The first dilemma concerns access to citizenship, namely, the rules governing the extent to which immigrants and their children can formally become members of the national political community. The dilemma is that failure to make immigrants into citizens undermines a basic principle of parliamentary democracy—that all members of civil society should have rights of political participation—but making them into citizens questions concepts of the nation based on ethnic belonging or cultural homogeneity. According to Castles (1996: 53) such ideas have been central to the historical processes of nation building and are still important, despite some attempt to develop purely political models of citizenship. This *dilemma of formal inclusion* is the main issue in many European countries that deny naturalization or dual citizenship to immigrants and do not readily confer citizenship to children born to immigrants in the country.

The second dilemma is about the sustained exclusionary and marginalized conditions that would be still accurate for the descendants of immigrants because of the institutionalization of discriminatory legislations and

practices. Thus, the second dilemma precisely concerns distinctions between *Formal and Substantial* citizenship. Of course, granting formal access to citizenship to immigrants is a necessary and important first step, but it does not ensure that they actually obtain all the rights regarded as part of modern citizenship. In particular, where immigrants have become socio-economically marginalized and are targets for violence, access to citizenship does not guarantee full civil, political and social rights. Some do have formal citizenship status but, and this applies especially to the young, still feel themselves marginalized in its exercise. It is clear that gaining citizenship or achieving full participation requires a whole range of policies and institutions concerned with combating discrimination, and improving labor market status, education and housing. Otherwise, in the absence of affirmative and anti-discriminative legislation and actions toward marginalized immigrants and their descendants, gaining formal citizenship could not overcome their marginalization. To conclude, individual access to formal citizenship will not be sufficient in itself, for it takes no account of the social and cultural rights that are necessary to guarantee “real” participation for ethnic minorities.

The third dilemma is about the strong cultural preservation and political closure of the host nation accompanied by institutional discrimination, in which immigrants cannot simply be incorporated into society as individuals. For this reason, if not others, immigrants construct a reactive identity and community formation as a way out. In many cases, a large proportion of immigrants and their immediate descendants cluster together, share a common socio-economic position, develop their own ethnic community structures, and seek to maintain their languages and cultures. This is partly an issue of cultural affinity, but it is above all a reaction to experiences of exclusion and marginalization. Culture and ethnicity are vital resources in the settlement process, which will not just disappear if immigrants are granted full rights as individuals. This is another way of

saying that immigrants cannot become full citizens unless the state and the national community are willing to accept—to some extent at least—the right to cultural difference. In the long run, this may make it necessary not only to change concepts of national culture and identity, but also to overhaul institutional structures that claim to be universal, but which are in fact based on certain cultural values and traditions.

In order to overcome the third dilemma, there must be cultural openness to treat different immigrants (who would have cultural, ethnic, religious, phenotypical, etc., differences) as equal individuals as well as institutional changes to erase the strong tendency for xenophobic implementation of the nation's laws. However, even the new logic of European citizenship, in its present form, seems very far from this ideal.

The fourth dilemma emerges in the form of 'welfare chauvinism' as a result of national protectionism on welfare and resources in which immigrants are seen as "undeserving", "welfare cheaters", although the reality is the reverse in so far as at least the guest workers in the post-war period have tremendously contributed to the industrialization process of the developed countries. Incorporation is not uncontested in any way in European countries that reveal significant signs of welfare chauvinism. According to Banting (2000) welfare chauvinism can take two forms: restrictive benefit policy, designed to deny resident foreigners access to social benefits; and restrictive immigration policy, designed to prevent foreigners coming into the country and having access to comprehensive social programs. Although both forms have figured in political discourse in European nations, the bigger impact in policy terms has been on immigration policy. Moreover, as Banting (2000:22) indicates, vulnerable sections of the host society—such as young, less educated, blue-collar workers—might be driven by 'welfare chauvinism' that supports the welfare state but rejects open immigration policies and the ready access of



foreigners to social benefits. On the other hand, a political backlash against immigration and multiculturalism might help fuel a more comprehensive neo-liberal attack on the welfare state, contributing to the emergence of new radical right parties and/or the retreat of established parties from social redistribution. All these welfare chauvinist reactions are occurring in western democracies, but the balance among them varies considerably from country to country.

Thus, we must be wary of producing a two-tiered system of citizenship one for the 'poor', who are locked into restricted spaces with second class rights, the other cosmopolitans and encompassing all levels for the dominant groups in Europe (Costa-Lascaux, 1992; 29; cited by Kofman, 1995) Apart from the absence of an international regime of rights, changes in civic stratification and rights are being determined at the macro regional and national levels while formal and informal discrimination and exclusion for third country nationals remains substantial in some key areas.

German immigration policies are selective towards all labor migrants in terms of nationality, class, religion, ethnicity, and race. They do not even match with the ideals of a democratic liberal state. In the name of preservation of cultural homogeneity and popular sovereignty, diversity within German society has been permanently neglected (if not repressed) in the sense that border-control combined with revitalized ethnic nationalism in re-unified Germany has undermined the substantial diverse membership within the society. In other words, border and immigration control accompanied by provisions of ethnic nationalism has caused legal inequality, erosion of substantial membership, and liberal democracy to consolidate. Also, this process troubles what should be loyalty to German citizenship rather than stabilizing or solidifying it. In conclusion, combined with the freedom of entry offered to 'returning' ethnic Germans, the treatment of non-German asylum seekers and non-European resident aliens

suggest that in the re-unified Germany (Canefe, 1998), the immigration policy or legislation and border control effectively encourage the admission of a particular group based on their ethnic affiliation as opposed to developing an egalitarian system of evaluation for admission to the territory of the German state.

Specifically, current German legislation lawfully discriminates in several areas against foreigners though they may have been living in Germany for many years. There are regulations that apply to foreigners: the reduction of claims to social services, though no such reductions are applied to Germans or holders of the European Union passport; the possibility of being deported because a claim for social welfare was filed; and the limited access to higher education (Keskin, 2002; cited by Mueller, 2006: 429). Thus, a young third generation German of Turkish descent who opts for Turkish citizenship while residing in Germany can, technically speaking, be deported when he applies for welfare. Current migration policy and legislation discriminate against vulnerable groups namely, third country nationals and female immigrants. The more attention should be paid to ensure the equal access to rights regarding race, ethnicity, class and gender, due account should be taken of family migrants and their sponsor's different social positioning. The policies should be aware of class and gender inequalities especially with regard to resource requirements. Since the effects of these policies are distributed unevenly, for instance, income thresholds required for family migration should be set at reasonable levels and provide broad definition to include diverse family populations.

What is more, for the growing numbers of those on humanitarian and temporary permits and the undocumented, who may never be able to acquire a secure status, their incorporation and rights are still to be resolved (Kofman, 2002: 1051). The weakest position in any hierarchy of statuses must, of course, be that of unlawful presence, which provides an

interesting test both of the reach of human rights and the steps countries are independently prepared to take to secure regularization or expulsion (Morris, 2001b: 403).

It can be recommended that German policy-makers or politicians should ensure the equal access to rights and abolish the strict rules that work through the distinctions of nationality, gender or wealth (income level) of individuals. The policy makers should be aware of the increasing gap between rights of EU nationals, citizens and third country nationals and its results like “reactive identity formation”(Rumbaut, 2008), “return of repressed” or “reverse prejudices”, which are natural barriers for the immigrants to merge with the broader segments of German society.

The access and participation of social life is highly unevenly distributed in German social, political and economic life. Politicians or policy-makers should narrow the rules on the eligibility for naturalization, family reunification and labor market access. Policy-makers should avoid creating a legal insecurity for non-citizens and the system of legal statuses should be designed in a way that allows switching between different statuses relatively easy.

Besides, naturalization conditions should not be designed in a way that locks certain persons in inferior and precarious positions. Yet, facilitating access to citizenship for immigrants in terms of universal social rights or naturalization rules in Germany should be backed up by anti-discrimination legislation with an aim at minimizing the intolerant practices. Not changing the equal political participation and the access to the labor market would likely produce nothing more than a second-class citizenship for immigrants and their children. To conclude, German state and society should recognize the legitimacy of communities with their own languages, religions, and cultural practices, while at the same time

adopting measures to ensure equal access especially to the labor market and education of services and protection against institutional discrimination minorities.

The policy-makers should be more aware of the increasing gap held between German citizens, ethnic Germans, EU citizens and third country nationals who are suffering from unfair legislation and the vulnerable in terms of freedom of movement legislations. In order not to consolidate further social inequalities, the system of legal statuses should avoid creating legal insecurity by locking certain ethnic groups (TCNs) and genders into vulnerable or precarious positions. As indicated before, more attention should be paid to the consequences of immigration policies, legislation and practices.

Alas, the conclusions above also indicate that formal legal structures tell only half the story—the implementation of the regulations is almost equally as important. In Germany this dimension has two main impacts: first, officials are never likely to favor the interests of a non-national over the higher concerns of the ‘non-immigration country’; and second, Germany’s federal structure has enabled a wide range of different interpretations of standards to flourish. Frequently, although by no means always, conservative-governed *Laender*, such as Bavaria and Baden-Wuerttemberg, have tended to be the most restrictive in their practice.

Today’s question is more about the formation of integration for Turkish-Muslim immigrants and other TCNs (downward or upward integration?) or how much cultural diversity Germany could embrace rather than how much assimilation will take place. One can say that improvement is in sight. In the words of Simon Green (2003), whatever forms an Immigration Law ultimately takes, it should provide more legal certainty for those who obtain a settlement permit, and thereby promote the formalization of many

Turks' de facto permanent residence status. In addition, the introduction of language and citizenship courses, providing their implementation takes account of the circumstances of non-nationals who may simultaneously have to work or raise a family and does not impose high costs on the participants, may also help Turkish non-nationals establish themselves in Germany. Also, naturalization levels have increased in the last few years, and the political parties began for the first time to target ethnic minority German voters, in particular ex-Turkish citizens, in the 2002 federal election. However, we do not know if naturalization and legal rights could guarantee the full-scale social integration or structural equality in practice.

As to returning to the question of how the nation state responds to diversity increased by post-war immigration we can briefly answer that both the traditional European models of nation building (i.e. republican-France and communitarian-Germany) are finding it difficult to respond to these new diversity or ethnic minority challenges which have been accelerated by September 11. Diversity still poses challenges for democratic management of society and the politics of representation, participation, human rights, social justice and social development in the nation-state. Political and cultural closures which tend to preserve one homogenous national community in the nation-state seems determine the institutionalization unity of citizenship, market and bureaucracy, all of which balance the immigration and integration policies, legislations, economic redistribution in term of the national community.

The exclusionary *jus sanguinis* approach as being one of the characteristics of the nation-state ideology in Germany and in similar European countries clearly did not facilitate the full-scale incorporation of immigrants into society in practice. Because of its historical and cultural baggage, the political ideology of the nation-state, and neo-liberal restructuring economic agenda, Germany (to be fair we should mainly refer to Christian

Democrat, far right and their equivalent traditions by excluding Greens and Social Democrats) seems to be very slow to accept the descendants of Turkish guest workers and is reluctant to embrace the children who were born and raised in Germany. It may well be too late to expect an alternative resolution. As Julius Caesar said in different context, “*alea jacta est* (the die has been cast)”. The settlement has already occurred and further migration from the South is at the gate.

They have to open a discussion (if not doors) on the two pressing issues: (1) the entry of economic migrants and (2) the legislation for fair management of integration (easing labor market access, family reunification and naturalization) including practical precautions against structural discrimination. As Seglow (2008) asserts, strictly closed borders could not be justified to those excluded, while open borders suffered from justification problems too, and in any case were not politically feasible. As a way out, he proposes a quota approach by which EU states would be obliged to admit an agreed number of migrants each year, that number being determined by fair criteria. Logically speaking, the quota scheme would be justifiable and politically feasible if carried out alongside measures to promote global justice, and if introduced gradually. Admittedly, it seems a moral solution rather than pragmatic one. As to the second issue, the question of whether Germany and other European states avoid the cultural and political definition of citizenship will be a determining factor in full-scale social integration of the Turks and TCNs.

It is true that citizenship as a formal legal status or naturalization is enjoying a resurgence in Europe. However, in the article ‘Citizenship with a Vengeance’, Catherine Dauvergne (2007: 489) asserts that this mirrors the paradoxical nature of globalization itself; along the vector of citizenship, both inclusions and exclusions are increasing at present. As states are increasingly unable to assert exclusive power in a range of policy

domains, immigration and citizenship law are transformed into a last bastion of sovereignty. Many shifts in citizenship law are explained through an understanding of how migration law and citizenship law work in tandem to form the border of the national community. According to Dauvergne, recent changes in citizenship law respond to two trends: a crackdown on extra-legal migration and a desire to reassert authority over immigrant populations. This process clearly signifies that the ultimate bifurcation of formal and substantive citizenship is untenable.

The real challenges confronting Germany and European countries will be how they include their own diversity into society within the nation-state paradigm. German policy makers or the European political elite are well aware that they have to reformulate—if not avoid—their motto (“Germany is not an immigration country” or “fortress Europe”) when faced with the increasing problems characterized by the shortage of unskilled and skilled labor, demographic deficit, aging, global competition and so on. This is the other way of saying that migration and integration, especially in northern Europe will always be issues. The recent reforms in Germany and the EU aim to address the deficits in the legal situation of non-nationals that have accumulated over many years. They will also take time to make an impact. Then we might start to speak of “civic repair” rather than civic stratification for the immigrants from the South in the foreseeable future.

## CHAPTER IV

### CHILDREN OF IMMIGRANTS IN GOSLAR: BETWEEN OPPORTUNITIES AND DISCRIMINATION STUCK IN CIVIC STRATIFICATION

#### 4.1. Introduction

Goslar is located in Northern part of the Harz Mountains surrounded by the big cities like Braunschweig, Hannover and Salzgitter. It lies in the North-central Germany. The neighborhood of Goslar has numerous Turkish restaurants, cafes, tea houses, doner kebab shops, discotheques, export textile and supermarket stores, Turkish physicians, translators, tax consultants, and as well as mosques that shape the urban, cultural, and economic landscapes of the town. Because of having such strong imprints of Turkish residents, Goslar was chosen as a case study town.

Turkish shops, kebab houses, teahouses, mosques, women wearing headscarves, Turkish pop music blasting from cars that drive by and even two Turkish discotheques have become integral elements of Goslar and Oker. Not only in Goslar but also the near cities of Hannover and Braunschweig reflect that Turkish immigrants have settled permanently and render the presence of Turkish immigrants highly visible. They illustrate that Turkish immigrants are creating a home for themselves in



German society and cities. Physically, one can recognize that Turkish immigrants feel themselves at home.

Since its founding in the 10th century, Goslar has been a mining center. Today, copper, lead, zinc, iron, and sulfur are mined. Manufactures of the city include textiles, clothing, and chemicals. Goslar is a tourist center, and it is an important gateway for tourists to the Harz Mountains. In addition, it produces chemicals, synthetic materials, building materials, paper, glass, metal products, textiles, foodstuffs, and electrical products.

The Turkish immigrant population was chiefly involved in connection with the Sulphur, Copper, Silver, and other mines in the town in the 1960s. Goslar had tons of ore mines like copper, lead and zinc in Rammelsberg which closed down only as recently as 1988, the mine and the old town of Goslar have been entered on the UNESCO World Cultural and Natural Heritage List for all Mankind. Rammelsberg was transformed into one of the largest and most original museums of mining labor in Germany.

Being a Lower Saxony (*Niedersachsen*) neighborhood, Goslar serves as a regional shopping centre to the Northern Harz region. Here department stores, several supermarkets, elegant boutiques and restaurants can be found. Once weekly, there is also a market, where farmers sell their local produce. There are many Turkish entrepreneurs whose main interest is gastronomy, supermarket and car dealer in Goslar, some of them serve mostly their Turkish customers.

Goslar was an industrial neighborhood that housed local workers of the steel, chemical and coal industries until the early 1990s. There are several zinc and lead processing plants especially located in Oker (5km away from Goslar) which produce zinc and metal oxides for the electronics industry. Until the early 1990s, Goslar and especially its ghetto region, Oker, were developing as a centre of mining neighborhood that housed much of the

Turkish immigrant and local working class. However, Goslar has experienced thousands of job losses in local industries because of economic restructuring since then. Unemployment and welfare participation rates soared, and numerous (German) residents and businesses left Goslar and Oker, which can be seen as a “German flight” from poor to rich neighborhoods.

Since the early 1990s, Goslar was intensively affected by global economic restructuring and the downscaling of the local economy caused some of the plants to move to third world countries. It resulted in thousands of job losses in local industries. As can be seen in the table 14, the unemployment and welfare participation rate is very high especially among the Turkish immigrants after such a de-industrializing process.

As can be observed from the Table 25 and Table 26 in the Appendix A of demographic data between the years 1968-2008, there is a demographic decline especially after the 1990s in Goslar. Many German and Turkish youth residents have left Goslar in search of a better future and economic prospects. Old persons, asylum seekers and welfare recipients are slow in moving from Goslar. Oker seems to fit the common stereotypes of neighborhoods in old industrial areas that are blighted and distressed. There has been a significant amount of “German flight” from the area contributing to the abrupt withdrawal of economic investments of local corporations leaving behind a working class of immigrants, aging people and unemployed.

To understand the present conditions of Turkish immigrants in Goslar/Germany, it is best to remember the political and economic changes that have occurred since the 1970s. Accelerated processes of globalization have resulted in the broad dissemination of information. Advanced technology has brought together people in distant parts of the world. Rapid

and cheaper transportation has exposed many to cultural and geographical novelties not known before. Most importantly, the relocation of manufacturing and other productive activities from advanced industrial countries to less developed areas of the world has had a significant impact on the opportunity structure both in advanced and less developed countries. In Germany, the success of welfare states in tandem with reconfigured economies has resulted in high levels of formal unemployment especially among Turkish immigrants.

Nowadays, the largest employers in Goslar are H.C. Starck (Chemistry Company), the tourism sector, and the civil service. Many residents of Goslar commute to Salzgitter, where car production, steel works and white collar jobs are based.

Having so many historical buildings and places, the tourism sector is a booming sector in Goslar. Several hotels and bed and breakfasts are located in or near the town's center. In addition, the town has become a popular resort for the elderly and there are many rest homes in town.

Based on the interviews and personal conversation, it should be noted that most Turkish migrants came from small villages in central Turkey or along the Black Sea coast, East and South East regions; those from large cities (Istanbul, Izmir and Ankara) are in the minority in Goslar. Thanks to “chain migration”, some districts in central Turkey delivered inordinate numbers of migrants over the years to Goslar. Most immigrants came from two (Kurdish) villages of Elbistan, Kahramanmaras in the South eastern part of Turkey. Even the two villages from Elbistan have more offspring living in Goslar than in the village itself. Other Turkish immigrants come from cities of the Trabzon, Bursa, Denizli, Giresun. This chain migration mostly realized by marriage with relatives. Also, some Kurdish refugees came to Goslar from the Eastern part of Turkey in 1990s. They were

mostly villagers, rural migrants with dreams of earning money and retiring to a small business and a secure life back in Turkey.

Turkish Muslims are divided along sectarian lines and lines of Islamic interpretation. Although the study included Alevi, secular and Kurdish immigrant people, the study is mostly limited to Turkish Sunni Muslims who constitute a significant community in terms of size and historical depth in Europe. In the 1960s, the first generation of Turkish Sunni “guest workers” arrived in Europe and established modest places of worship in warehouses and old factory buildings. After the 1980s, Islamic organizations from Turkey expanded into Europe and began transplanting their version of Islam. However, since the 1990s second and third generation European Turks have changed the agendas and strategies of Islamic organizations to fit their lifestyles and interests.

As can be seen tables 25 and Table 26 in the Appendix A, more than half come from Turkish families among immigrants; other nations of origin include Lebanon, Iraq, the former Yugoslavia, Russia, Poland, and Morocco in Goslar. The majority of Muslim immigrants tend to come predominantly from a single region of origin, (e.g. Turkey in the case of Germany the Maghreb in the case of France). This brings a superimposition of different dimensions of “otherness” that exacerbates issues of boundaries, accommodation, and incorporation. The immigrant, the religious, the racial, and the socioeconomic disprivileged “other” all tend to coincide (Casanova, 2006: 76).

Normally, the Goslar mining industry was in need of low-skilled labor at the time, and indeed the majority of these first-generation Turkish “guest-workers” was recruited from the lowest socioeconomic strata in their home countries and had very little education. In the rural areas where most of them grew up, educational opportunities were limited to the primary school

level. The first generation of Turkish guest-workers who settled in Goslar (like any other places in Germany) in the 1960s, were mostly religious people, but poor villagers from eastern Turkey, who were not model citizens of Atatürk's secular republic. They took up low-grade jobs that the booming post-war economy could no longer fill from the domestic labor market. The first generation made few advances in the Goslar labor market, indeed, the contrary occurred. Economic crises and industrial restructuring put many Turkish immigrants out of work. Despite this background, some members of the first generation did manage to start their own businesses or helped their children to do so.

The result of the fieldwork indicates that Goslar and especially the district of Oker are the centers of Turkish community life. Shops with Turkish names create a unique ethnospace. You can go into Turkish shops and smell the Turkish *doner* and bread (*pide*) coming out of the shops and ovens along the central streets. In Goslar, at the end of the market street (which is a very busy and crowded street) there is a small mosque that regularly fills the street, predominantly with Turkish men on Fridays. Turkish people watch Turkish news more often than German news and the majority regard themselves first and foremost as Turks. The more successful segment of the younger generation can be found in professions that confer status, such as economics, law, medicine or accountancy. The richest community members run wholesale businesses or job agencies. Such successful people still live very much within the community and observe its traditions.

Most children of the first generation immigrants were born in Goslar/Germany and grew up there. Many of them have moved on, to become anything from prominent European parliamentarians to European footballers. One Turkish girl from Goslar, Munise Demirel, married Sigma Gabriel who is now the leader of SPD, a former councilor of the town of

Goslar and a member of the environment committee of the Lower Saxony Land Parliament. Nevertheless, many children of immigrant families still speak poor or little German, even though they were born in Goslar. International test scores (PISA) suggest that Germany is raising a generation of second/third generation immigrants who are far behind the achievement curve.

At the time of the fieldwork between the years 2005-2006, Turkish everyday life in Goslar like any other places in Germany was undergoing a profound structural change. Since then, the former guest-workers have already become permanent residents. There are a number of transformations which are evident such as an increasing third generation youths, changes in language, in manners and consumer behaviour, in the living environment, or setting up some institutions to meet specific needs although the problems of education, unemployment and integration are still the major agenda.

In an era of electronic networking, a local space cannot be identified only with a physical neighborhood. Thus, thanks to electronic networking, local life-world of immigrants in Goslar lies between Germany and Turkey and also the rest of the world. As Vertovec (2001: 573) indicates, among certain sets of contemporary migrants, the identities of specific individuals and groups of people are negotiated within social worlds that span more than one place. The children of Turkish immigrants in Goslar have a rich experience characterized by multiple social and cultural practices which cannot be placed into only one national context or framework (Turkey or Germany). Focusing on the dynamic experiences of the children of immigrants, this chapter probes the immigration policy and integration situation in Goslar, examining the questions of identity and loyalty among the Goslarian youth, and explores the sociological and psychological consequences of varying modes of integration.

When I was in Goslar there were intensive discussions and panic in the mainstream German media about immigration and ethnic diversity with an assumption that Turkish Muslim immigrants do not want to integrate into German society. Such media representation of immigrants increases the feeling among young Muslims that they are broadly considered ‘outsiders’ even if they are German citizens. The media constructs reality as though there are dangers which come from the immigrants. Informed by the mainstream media, Germans become anxious about the immigrants. This anxiety is based on the hostile picture of immigrants which is reproduced by the media. Especially the city image which is reproduced by the mainstream media emerges from the cities of Berlin, Frankfurt and Cologne where Turkish immigrants are concentrated in some quasi-ghetto districts. This city image contributes to the notorious image of Turkish immigrants whose children are shown as violent students of inner city schools.

Traditional family values are still very important for older members of the Turkish and Kurdish community in Goslar. Nonetheless, spatial movements and thus settlement of Turkish immigrants and the reconstruction of traditional family structures in a culturally different atmosphere have inevitably challenged the resistance of the underlying family composition of the Turkish community (Küçükcan, 2004). No immigrant family and their descendants can avoid the transformative effects of migration. Most immigrants have a permanent residence visa and have settled for a long time in Goslar. This permanent settlement brings about some behavioral changes among Goslarian Turkish youth that are different from the past: the different use of language, consumer patterns, social networks, preferences of friendships and life-styles are all signs of the new era.

Today, integration studies (Çağlar, 2001; 2002, Kaya 2005; L. Soysal 2002) tend to perceive the children of immigrants as creative and active agents rather than seeing them as a lost generation squeezed between traditional and modern values. From this point of view, it is claimed that the new generation children and grandchildren of immigrants participate in all dimensions of social life, which contributes to a cosmopolitan German society. Thus, the children of immigrants are not seen any longer as passive victims of immigration or citizenship politics of the German state but as real negotiating partners in this society. This new approach is valuable because it does not see the immigrants and their children from a negative point of view but rather sees them as agents of changes.

Migration is indeed a transformation from one social system to another social system and a replacement of symbols, meaning worlds and behavioral patterns. This replacement naturally allows for the changing of old form of social roles, status and powering relations among immigrant families. One could trace these transformative outcomes in each immigrant family in Goslar. Each individual in a family has been differently affected by different steps of settlement. For example, I have observed that most children of immigrants have different ways of understanding and perception towards social relations, politics, economy and democracy. Their perceiving social practices are different from those of the country of origin of their parents. That's why each youth in Goslar mentions their alienation, boredom, and strange feelings if they visit Turkey shortly in holidays. It can be said that German and Western social values which the children of immigrant have been subjected to in their socialization process constructs their social and cultural practices.

The children of immigrants individually follow different paths in order to integrate into German society and construct their identity position, which depends on their family background, human capital, opportunity structures,



and perceptions about the context of their reception in Goslar. Some youths prefer to connect with German society in a very positive and intensive way. Some others question the kind of positive relation by returning to their parents' cultural and national resources. While some youths choose to be involved in social and political affairs actively in Goslar, the others prefer to follow associational paths in which they have contact with intercultural or international groups. Finally, other youth directly define themselves by affiliating with cultural or religious organizations and behave accordingly. Thus, there are multiple individual paths to adapt to German society.

It is interesting to note that the children of Turkish immigrants with German citizenship struggle for equality in the German public sphere by emphasizing sometimes their distinctiveness. That is to say, they try to include their differences in their German citizenship. By doing this, they speak German and participate in German politics and civil society. Although it seems paradoxical, they demand to use their native language, Turkish and German together without facing any barriers. They see this bilingualism as richness for further incorporation into German society. This condition indeed includes a different citizenship image potentially merging with Islam, German, Turkish and European values. Admittedly, the transformations created by the children of immigrants increases their power of negotiation in terms of involving politics cultural and social life as natural partners of these dimensions.

As Çağlar (1997) points out, the reality of multiple loyalty and multiple-identity of German-Turks, in addition to their multiple-cultural traditions and language agrees with the multi-culturalism rhetoric which developed in the 1990s and can be evaluated as a strengthening and enriching process rather than a pathological or negative one. It can be claimed that bifurcation of the labor market and thus unemployment, poverty and crime

(social context) are the main barriers of second and third generation children to adapt to German society and culture.

The practice of rights is highly differential and unequal, which creates the distinction of privileged citizens, (German citizens, ethnic Germans, *Aussiedler*, EU, non-EU, privileged non-EU) are legally enshrined vis a vis non-privileged non-EU citizens. In the civic stratification system, the practice of rights functions in terms of nationality, residence length, status, and income level. Among these criteria, the country of origin/citizenship matters and makes a difference.


It should be mentioned that family migration of Turkish nationals in Germany includes “devaluation” or “deskilling” process by the non-recognition of former social position and diploma equivalence in the country of origin. This is again not a problem for ethnic Germans whose diploma equivalence in country of origin has been completely accepted. Based on my interviews with Turkish immigrants in Goslar, I have to note that non-European country nationals always arouse more suspicion from the authorities and it is more difficult to get certain documents for job, family reunification or for a naturalization application.

Thus, we see in the Europe of today two contradictory approaches. First, individuals are confronting each other in a wide, open field of economic competition open to all, provided the qualifications exist. In the second approach, we see a secluded, carefully segmented social and political terrain in which different organizations and evidence of a pluralistic society are participating in the articulation and realization of societal demands. Entrance into this terrain is strictly reserved for European citizens. This explains why cultural barriers are so powerful: immigrants or citizens preserving a Muslim identity, when placing their religious affiliation in the forefront of their demands, are charged with being

unidimensional in their outlook and unable to achieve integration. (Abadan-Unat 1992:404)

Note that the ways of state action and the context of reception affect the adaptation process of immigrant groups and the opportunities for economic mobility and social integration of racial and ethnic minorities. The direct negative result of state action based on legal stratified rights on community formation is to transform “immigrants” into “ethnics” in the contrasting social and economic results of the process. Some define this process as (re-)ethnicization (Faist, 1994), reactive formation or reactive ethnicity (Portes, 1996) and the rebirth of nationalism (Abadan-Unat, 1992). The hierarchical implementation toward citizens and immigrants potentially creates a kind of ethnicization or reactive ethnicity among immigrant youth groups. It is important that this ethnicization is very sensitively effected by the hierarchy of citizenship in that the bottom of hierarchy would be the worst enemy (Turkish-Muslim or asylum seeker).

**Table 15: Logically Available Responses to Stratified Rights and Discrimination**



Source: Prepared by the author

Logically speaking, immigrants who faced with discriminative rights or external pressure in this citizenship framework, can respond in one of four ways, (1) they can either resist in various ways by emphasizing their differences (the most outstanding example would be the immigrant creative and resistant youth) (2) they can attempt to pursue accommodation individually (3) they can attempt to participate in political organizations or any other immigrant organization to negotiate their rights to be extended or defended through political or social action. (ethnic organization and political integration in host society have recently been analyzed in terms of *political opportunity structures* emphasizing power conditions and incentives for collective action (*Bengtsson: 2007:2*) can be given as an example). (4) They can do nothing.

The scope and intensity of the individual and institutional discrimination and structural hierarchies between immigrants and native population are the main factors of reactive identity formation. Variation in external pressures influences the process by changing the costs associated with different response strategies. As discrimination increases, the cost and relative attractiveness of strategies of resistance and accommodation can be expected to change. Suffice it to say that there are many individual and social factors that determine how people react when confronted with discrimination and structural hierarchies. However one should remember that there is no linear relationship between discrimination and reactive identity formation (or group solidarity and cohesion among minorities), but rather curvilinear relationships which vary with number of factors. Reactive identity formation is directly affected by two major factors: (1) the options or opportunity structures (political and discursive) available to a minority as it seeks to respond to institutional discrimination and structural hierarchy. (2) The costs associated with available options.

Based on in-depth interviews with Goslar residents, it can be claimed that practices of exclusion, discrimination or forced assimilation against immigrants can prevent integration and encourage a homeland orientation. In such cases, enclave communities or ethnic niches with their own economic, cultural and political infrastructures emerged in the district of Oker where they can be seen as a Turkish ghetto. As Castles (2002:1161) rightfully declares, where immigrants experience marginalization, their best chance of success lies in mobilizing community solidarity and transnational links – a sort of ‘reactive ethnicity.’

It is recommended that migrant policy-makers or politicians should ensure equal access to rights and abolish the strict rules that work the distinctions of nationality, gender or wealth (income level) of individuals. Policy makers should be aware of the increasing gap between rights of EU nationals, citizens and third country nationals and its results like “reactive identity formation”, “reactive ethnicity” or “return of the repressed”, which are natural impediments to meeting the broader segments of Germany.

To put in the words of Castles and Miller:

“At the one extreme, openness to settlement, granting of citizenship and gradual acceptance of cultural diversity may allow the formation of *ethnic communities*, which are seen as part of a multicultural society. At the other extreme, denial of reality of settlement, refusal of citizenship and rights to settlers, and rejection of cultural diversity, may lead to formation of *ethnic minorities*, whose presence is widely regarded as undesirable and divisive” (Castles and Miller 2003: 29).

Rumbaut and Portes (1996) has recently theorized that the reactive identity formation involves two critical components: (1) the encounter with native hostility, suspicion or discrimination along imposed group boundaries; (2) and the subsequent mobilization - often by members of the second generation - around those same boundaries.

Therefore, it is clear that the outcome of ethnic formation depends on the reaction of the state and the host society. Openness and acceptance of diversity drives immigrants toward the formation of ethnic communities that become an integral part of a multicultural structure. At the other extreme, denial and rejection of cultural diversity leads immigrants towards the formation of ethnic minorities. Germany fits somewhere between these two extremes. While Germany is relatively generous and open in economic distribution with a strong tradition of the welfare state, it tends to deny the cultural diversity and the undesirability to embrace the Turkish-Muslim immigrants due to having an ethno-cultural understanding of citizenship and differential exclusivist integration policy. Therefore, the children and grandchildren of Turkish immigrants easily become “ethnic” or “religious” agents.

The most important issue is the danger of poor conditions, particularly in the case of groups entering the social hierarchy at the bottom; the case of underclass formation or downward assimilation is not uncommon in Germany. Also, there are the divergent ways in which ethnic groups integrate into a receiving society. In the long journey of becoming German, their progress is largely contingent upon the human and financial capital that their immigrant parents bring along, the social conditions from which their families exist as well as the context that receives them, and their cultural patterns - including values, family relations, and social ties - reconstructed in the process of adaptation. The host society offers uneven possibilities to different immigrant groups. These unequal possibilities may limit the opportunities of immigrant groups, but they do not necessarily constitute a complete denial of opportunity.

Structural integration has now become more difficult than in the past. This increases the risk that the children of immigrants, especially those entering

the social hierarchy near the bottom, will fail to climb up the social ladder in the way that the second generation did in the past. One of the first scholars to predict a “second-generation decline” was Gans (1992). Secondly, as a consequence of globalization, children of immigrants are now less likely to assimilate. Rather than adopting the majority identity, they may develop bicultural or hybrid identities. The opposing group of scholars, many of them historians or social scientists with historical interests, argue that our image of past integration is both too homogeneous and too rosy (Crul and Vermeulen, 2003: 966).

Results from my case study in the Goslar town show the power of structural factors, educational attainments, labor market status, family human capital, family composition, and modes of incorporation in shaping the lives of these Turkish youths. It means “the context matters”. However, this does not exclude the opportunistic situation in Goslar for a successful career and a respected standing in a society that is widely divergent.

When I carried out the case study on the Turkish youth in Goslar, I always tried to find an answer to the question of what makes some immigrant groups susceptible to the downward path, or to the permanent trap, and what allows others to avoid it? Major determinants, Zhou (1997) maintains, can include factors external to a particular immigrant group, such as racial stratification, economic opportunities and spatial segregation, and factors intrinsic to the group, such as financial and human capital upon arrival, family structure, community organization, and cultural patterns of social relations. These two sets of factors affect the life chances of immigrant children not only additively but also interactively.



Segmented assimilation may be defined empirically as a set of strategic outcomes in the lives of young second-generation persons. One such outcome is educational attainment, in terms of both completed years of education and whether the person is still in school. A second includes employment, occupation and income; a third, language use and preferences. Indicators of downward assimilation include dropping out of school, social isolation, unemployment, premature childbearing, and being arrested or incarcerated for a crime (Portes et al, 2005: 1016). Downward assimilation does not emerge from the stories of the Turkish respondents as a deliberate path in Goslar, but as an outgrowth of a web of constraints, bad luck, and limited opportunities.

There are now three generations in Goslar/Germany, with varying degrees of fluency in either language and with widely disparate lifestyles. A variety of migrant organizations represents the political, social, and religious orientations and interests of the Turks. There are few centralized, representative immigrant organizations most of which are religiously organized in Goslar. Their existence is due to the lack of a German institutional system that prescribes and supports centralized organizations by migrants. In Germany, state funding for migrant organizations is funneled through local regional authorities, who allocate money mainly for specific projects, such as cultural organizations, youth job training, and women's centers.

Still, the history of religion and nationalism should remind us that the social process sometimes moves in dialectical ways, and that acculturative and assimilative actions by a majority occasionally generate revivalistic reactions by a minority. As a result, even ethnic aggregates in which the vast majority maintains its identity in symbolic ways will probably always bring forth small pockets of neo-traditionalism – of rebel converts to sacred and secular ways of the past. They may not influence the behavior

of the majority, but they are almost always highly visible, and will thus continue to play a role in the ethnicity of the future (Gans, 1979: 17).

Race, religion and ethnicity are not solely descriptive words; they are also a means to distinguish between insiders and outsiders; those who regard themselves as superior and those who are held as inferior. In other words, race, religion and ethnicity is socially constructed. It builds inequality on the basis of secondary physical and social characteristics. Color, hair texture, height, and other external features are used in order to build hierarchies of power and justify the dominance of particular groups. Race, religion and ethnicity would become, therefore, a part of ideological system. Hegemonic or dominant ideologies as a repository of beliefs and convictions, not necessarily based on fact fulfill two related functions: (1) ideological narratives explain phenomena in the natural and social world. Like science they seek to account empirical realities. By contrast to science, however, ideology does not depend on reasoned argument or rigorous research to reach conclusions. Its aim is not neutrality or impartiality. Instead, it produces narratives that (2) justify and legitimize the existing orders of domination. Even as they explain, ideological discourses aim to perpetuate structures of inequality.

Researchers have long recognized the boundary-crossing character of assimilation. The traversing of borders, some of them physical and most of them cultural, may be indisputable but, according to Richard Alba, one of the top scholars in the field, not all demarcation lines are the same. Alba builds on a comparison of second generation Mexicans in the U.S., Turks in Germany, North Africans in France to distinguish between bright and blurred boundaries; they are better able to negotiate avenues for social integration. This conceptualization has momentous implications for theory and policy--bright boundaries tend to produce marginalization, blurred ones augur integration (Alba, 2005).

Religion, in addition to race, language, citizenship, is a major factor creating distance between native and Turkish immigrant populations that I will discuss in detail in the following chapters. In European societies, argues Alba (2005) it has been a key institutional location for the differentiation between native-born citizens and aspiring immigrants.

The differentiation between blurred and bright boundaries may enable us to obtain subtle and precise understanding of the immigrant condition in Germany and other various geographical settings. Richard Alba's distinction between blurred and bright boundaries offers a way to rethink political and policy-related issues. At the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, when religious narratives have emerged as fertile arenas for the articulation of resistance against and imposition of Western domination, Christianity is increasingly presented in opposition to Muslim claims for vindication and redress. Alba's work shows how the high level of embeddedness of mainstream religions in European societies, despite their vaunted secular character, create greater difficulties than in the United States- as an ostensibly ultra-religious country- for the assimilation of Muslims. Unless countries like Germany and France enact policies aimed to blur the sharp lines around minority religions (most notably Islam) they face conflict and social disruption.

Muslims in European societies face a markedly difficult situation. Historically, religious conflicts in France and Germany were bloody and prolonged. The institutionalization of Catholicism in France and of Catholicism and Lutheranism in Germany were the resolution to centuries-long conflict. Both countries have reached accommodations with Judaism, which remains a minority religion and, in Germany, an uncomfortable one (Alba, 2005).

The role of religiously drawn boundaries in western European societies, says Alba, appears paradoxical since their mainstream is overtly secular. Levels of religious belief and practice are much lower in Europe than in the U.S.

According to Alba (2005), the German case is the most striking because in that country established religions receive financial support through the tax system, which allows each tax payer to designate one of them to receive a “church tax”. So far, however, Islam has not partaken of this benefit because its non-hierarchical, polyphonic nature does not entail a legally recognizable authority that can receive and distribute tax support. In other words, because Islam is not organized in the same way as the established churches it falls outside the state-supported mainstream. There is moreover, considerable resistance to granting Islam parity. According to 1996 survey data (Alba 2005), 60 percent of West Germans and 88 percent of East Germans are against Islamist religious instruction in schools.

Such tensions acquire epic proportions in public spaces. In locations like Bavaria crucifixes still hang in the majority of public school classrooms, despite court judgments that have found them in conflict with the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom. In Goslar like cities of Munich and Nuremberg, Christmas is an all-encompassing festivity. There are many Christian festivities in Goslar like *Weinneichtan* and *Christmast*. No residents in Goslar and other cities can be unaware of the open displays, a fact doubly significant to the mostly Turkish Muslim street cleaners who must sweep up the debris. Thus, class is also one the boundary makers, which lacks Alba’s analysis. Muslim guest-workers with their descendants in Germany are a predominantly lower class population.

Thus, it can be claimed that the overwhelming presence of Christian religiosity embedded in national institutions erase Islam, a predominant

minority religion among the members of second-, third-, and even fourth-generation Turks who have never been assimilated given the peculiar notions of national identity in the region.

There have been the political changes occurring during the 1990s. The collapse of Soviet Union in 1989 splintered and fragmented the world. For the previous 70 years, the world had been neatly divided in half. The confrontation between Western, capitalistic economies and Socialist/Communist Command economies paralleled alleged divisions of a symbolic and normative character. Since 1989 the ideological spaces created by the triumph of capitalism have been occupied by religious trends, most notably Islam.

Moreover, since September 2001, when the World Trade Center collapsed, war in Iraq, the continuing problems between Israel and Palestine in the Middle East and the rise of Al-Quaeda have contributed to universalize feelings of frustration among those who see the West as a threat.

In addition, recent developments, the Salman Rushdie affair, caricature crisis, murder of a film director, Van Gogh, terrorist attacks in New York City, Madrid and London have contributed to make boundaries brighter between the West and the East (Islam).

As to the uprising of Turkish Muslim organizations in Goslar/Germany/Europe since the 1990s, there are several factors for the recent religious uprising: first, it is a parallel development of the political process in Turkey where the Islamist party has been rising up since the beginning of the 1990s. Second, the negative context of reception in Germany socially and culturally ostracized the Muslim immigrants, which is also responsible for the high unemployment and educational failures of Turkish immigrants. Third, in addition to social differences and cultural

distance or confrontations between Germans and Turks, this religious uprising is closely related with other simultaneous affairs in the world. The retreat of leftist ideologies after the collapse of the Soviet Unions, the weakness of syndicates, the neoliberal economic restructuring and its compulsory results of unemployment have contributed tremendously to the strength of Islamic organization. Fourth, we have to admit that the religious organizations have been successful organization principals and methods for mobilizing the immigrant groups because of various psychological and sociological reasons. They (especially some Sufi groups like *Gulen* community) become more flexible about dressing and modern life. Now you can confront young girls with very colorful and stylish headscarf, shoes and dresses. The Islamic women and girls in Goslar dress fashionably and beautifully. This is something different from the past. In the past Islamic women were so colorless as to be invisible but now they want to say we are here in the public sphere with our colorful and stylish dressing and headscarf. The veiling style has also been transformed in the hands of younger generations. As Mushaben (2008: 507) suggests, Islam has become 'young, chic and cool' among ethnic minorities, often denied citizenship and opportunity in their country of birth owing to jus sanguinis and/or other complex naturalization requirements. Religiosity, in turn, is slowly giving rise to new types of civic engagement, leading more ethnic youth to pursue German citizenship.

Turkish-Islamic organizations do not transplant religious extremism from their countries of origin, nor do they necessarily conform to all of European liberal values. Rather Islamic organizations play an intermediary role, negotiating between the social and religious needs of Muslims and government policies on immigrants and Muslims. It can be first said these Muslim organizations (IGMG, DITIB and possible others) aim to negotiate the universal and particular aspects of Islam in the European context. It can be seen as a kind of Euro-Islam, although it is too early to decide if it is

reformist or secularized Euro-Islam. This “Euro-Islam” limits itself to the private sphere, is pursued as an individual form of spirituality, and assures peaceful Muslim participation in European cultural pluralism. European political authorities support this model and call for the development of “French, German, or Dutch Islam” in their respective countries. However, this is a normative projection, functioning as a “model for” Muslims to adopt, rather than a descriptive or analytical “model of” how Islam unfolds in Europe as a social phenomenon. There is limited empirical evidence to support the case for secularized “Euro-Islam”. The normative and optimistic projection of a monolithic Euro-Islam has been defied with the persistence of radical voices including violent acts committed in the name of Islam such as; the Madrid train bombings (2004), the London subway attacks (2005), and the murder of Dutch film-maker Theo Van Gogh in the Netherlands (2004). Despite these violent acts, there is empirical evidence for the development of an individualistic, pluralistic, and tolerant understanding of Islam among young Muslims (Yükleyen, 2009: 292).

Competition exists among non-governmental Turkish Islamic organizations to provide religious and social services to the Muslim community in a variety of fields—the Milli Görüş , work in the public sphere, the Gulen Community focus in education and interfaith dialogue. Each organization’s primary field of activism consumes most of its resources thus creating group distinction and claims of superiority over other organizations. The differentiation among the Islamic organizations leads groups to justify their activities through the prioritization of a particular field of activism. Despite the commonalities, Islamic organizations are in competition with one another through their services and activities.

Islamic organizations aim to mobilize ideas, social resources and money of Turkish immigrants in Goslar. The boundaries between Islamic groups are

strongly emphasized as they distanced themselves from, and battled with, one another. They even have different perspectives not only on domestic issues within Germany but also about Turkey, global politics and Islam. In general, Muslim immigrant organizations in Germany are very active, disorganized and very much decentralized (Ögelman et al, 2002).

Islamic organizations demand the state recognition of Islam as an equal religion compared to other established religions in Europe such as Christianity and Judaism. One obstacle to public recognition is the absence of a central representative Islamic authority that can negotiate with the state and represent Islam to the public. Competing interests among Islamic organizations and the absence of hierarchical clergy in the (Sunni) Islamic tradition, impede the formation of a central Islamic authority. (Yükleyen, 2010: 458).

Germany, following the multi-establishment model, has tried to organize a quasi-official Islamic institution, at times in conjunction with parallel strivings on the part of the Turkish state to regulate its diaspora. But the internal divisions among immigrants from Turkey and the public expression and mobilization of competing identities (secular and Muslim, Alevi and Kurd) in the German democratic context have undermined any project of institutionalization from above (Casanova, 2006). Schiffauer (2007:74) rightfully indicates that it would have been possible to have German society accept it as well, if the Islamic communities had come together and appeared in unity as a bargaining partner with German institutions.

This process also shows that the monopoly enjoyed by Diyanet (DRA) in Turkey has been broken in Goslar/Germany, even if the largest number of Turkish Muslims remains faithful to it. As Schiffauer (2007) argues pluralism of this sort provokes a more reflexive relationship with religion



than exists in Turkey, as one has an option between various communities. In Goslar, the Gulen community emphasizes consciousness and education raising through Koran courses and training programs; the DITIB, intercultural (religious) dialog and integration, the Milli Görüş, the parliamentary and political process; and the Kaplancı group-has no representative anymore- (It was banned in Germany in 2001).

Turkish Islamic organisations have institutionalized competing forms of worship and identification, including Sufism, political Islam, Turkish state-controlled ‘official Islam’ and revolutionary radicalism. Political Islamic organisations such as Milli Görüş, are more involved in negotiation between Muslims and the state and in seeking public recognition while serving the social and religious needs of their followers. This makes *Milli Görüş*, a significant case for examination because they are more responsive to state policies (Yükleyen, 2010: 446)

Neither the essentialist argument about the incompatibility between Islam and liberal democracy nor the rise of a monolithic and assimilated “Euro-Islam” can account for the diverse religious experience of Muslims in Europe. Islam does not develop in a monolithic form. While the majority of Muslims and Islamic organizations are tolerant, marginal Islamic organizations maintain radical views. Islam is neither inherently antagonistic to European values nor assimilated into European society, as the term “Euro-Islam”, suggests; but is practiced in multiple ways, such as political Islamism, Sufism, and radical fundamentalism. These competing forms of religiosity create an Islamic pluralism in Goslar and other European public spheres.

Then, why is the locality important? Locality can be seen a dynamic interplay between structure, culture (of which ethnicity is a significant part) and personal agency. Structure and personal agency can be both

particularly apparent at the local level. One can recognize how the structural process works through individuals by focusing on specific local conditions. Then, it is possible to address concerns that structure, culture and individual agency bring together. As Thomson and Crul (2007) rightfully indicate one locality compared to another may well display very different patterns of second-generation integration for a variety of reasons: the quality and funding of schools, the availability of post-educational opportunities, the incidence of crime, the level and nature of familial and community support networks, the degree of ethnic cohesion and so on. All these variables will potentially affect how younger residents in a particular area develop and adapt their personal aspirations and future expectations.

Migration, social transformation and integration researches must therefore give as much weight to the local as to the global, while not forgetting the national and regional levels in between. For most people, the pre-eminent level for experiencing migration and its effects is the local. This applies especially where social transformations linked to economic globalization make it necessary for people to leave their community and move elsewhere: for instance through changes in agricultural practices or land tenure, through reconfiguration of production by multinational corporations, or through a development project which physically displaces people. The departure of young active people, gender imbalances and financial and social remittances all transform conditions in the local community that is the focus of everyday life. Similarly, the impact of immigration in host areas is felt in the way it affects economic restructuring and social relations in local communities (Castles, 2007).

National and global dimensions should also be analyzed. Despite post-nationalist ideas about the erosion of the nation-state, the number of nation-states has increased four-fold in the last half-century. Nation-states remain important and will do so for the foreseeable future. They are the

location for policies on cross-border movements, citizenship, public order, social welfare, health services and so on. Nation-states retain considerable political significance and have important symbolic and cultural functions. But the autonomy of the national governments is being reduced, and it is no longer possible to ignore transnational factors in decision-making and planning. One result of this is the growing importance of regional cooperation on many issues including migration. Regional organizations like the European Union are rooted not only in spatial proximity and economic interests but also in historical and cultural affinities. (Castles 2007: 361)

#### **4.2. The Turkish Region of Goslar: OKER**

Why are some ethnic minorities performing better than others even when we control-albeit not perfectly-for 'structure'? What are the coping strategies adopted by different ethnic groups that could explain this? Should we be asking, as Modood (2004) has recently done, how and why ethnic minority children seem to react differently to racial discrimination?

The answer of these questions would deal with the local conditions. More nuanced answers to these questions are to be found in the dynamic interplay between structure, culture (of which ethnicity is a significant part) and personal agency. This is particularly apparent at the local level. By focusing on specific local conditions, it is possible to address concerns that structure only describes the more general, macro-level processes at work, that culture is all too easily reified, and that individual agency often appears to be neglected. One locality compared to another may well display very different patterns of second-generation integration for a variety of reasons: the quality and funding of schools, the availability of

post-educational opportunities, the incidence of crime, the level and nature of familial and community support networks, the degree of ethnic cohesion and so on. All these variables will potentially affect how younger residents in a particular area develop and adapt their personal aspirations and future expectations. (Thomson and Cruel, 2007: 1030).

Zhou (2005), for example, illustrates how the interplay of cultural and structural factors at the local level can affect mobility patterns. She distinguishes between ethnic enclaves and underclass ghettos in the US, both of which nonetheless display high levels of segregation by ethnicity, race and social class, and suffer from poverty, poor housing and few highly-paid jobs. The distinction lies in the strength of the social ties and networks in ethnic enclaves that facilitates social organization and is conducive to upward mobility, and which appear much weaker in ghettos.

Based on statistical evidence, Schönwälder and Söhn (2009) indicate that in Germany, among factors determining immigrant integration and the equal life chances, the ethnic mix of urban neighborhoods plays a minor role, at most. Within cities, ethnic neighborhoods are rare. Immigrants typically live in multi-ethnic environments. Although differences exist between national groups, the level of ethnic residential concentration is relatively low in Germany (Schönwälder and Söhn, 2009), when one compares it with a ghetto country like France. Different from France, strong welfare-state policies in Germany may help reduce the impact of inequalities and further ethnic segregation or ghettoization.

Then, it is suggestive but not accurate to use the term “ghettoization” for the Turkish community in Germany. It is clear that there is no forced residential segregation of the Turkish population, and their communities have a transparency and dynamism absent from ghetto settings. They permit exchange and interactions with the larger society in which they are

embedded. Apart from the work setting, there are cultural and social isolation issues vis-a-vis German society, but such isolation can also be observed among German blue-collar workers or the German underclass.

However, there are still quasi-ghetto neighborhoods concentrated especially in old industrial areas where the residents are mostly immigrants. Moreover, even if levels of segregation are low and immigrants thus do not live secluded from native Germans, they often live in areas where unemployment and dependence on welfare are widespread. Life chances may thus be more severely affected by contexts of deprivation, rather than ethnic concentration.

As Castles (2002: 1148) puts it, in immigration countries, newcomers become concentrated in industrial areas and urban centers where there are chances of employment and where previous migrants can provide help with settlement. In Europe, North America and Australasia, virtually all major cities have large concentrations of immigrants. Typically, certain neighborhoods become centers of immigrant settlement, marked by distinctive businesses, associations, social facilities and places of worship. Such neighborhoods are the basis for ethnic community formation and cultural and linguistic maintenance.

Patterns of ethnic segregation in housing, for instance, are being attributed not to government housing policies in the post-war period but to the cultural propensity of non-EU migrants to live 'parallel lives' in 'parallel communities'. There is concern that, as policy-makers misdiagnoses the roots of the problems that diverse Muslim communities face, policies that are set to fail will be adopted and funding wasted in divisive and counter-productive programs.

A better starting point would be to address the legacy of discrimination left by the guest-worker system and other types of post-war labor migration. Professor Stephen Castles, who wrote the first account of post-war labor migration to Western Europe in 1973, stresses that the guest-worker system was based on ‘the inferiority and the separation of the foreigner’. Post-war labor migrants were not integrated into western European societies as equals ‘but as economically disadvantaged and racially discriminated minorities. As a result, immigrants tended to settle in specific neighborhoods, marked by inferior housing and infrastructure. Ethnic enterprises and religious, cultural, and social associations developed in these areas’ (Fekete, 2008: 20).

Some researchers also indicate that the main field where ethnic residential concentrations might indeed, under certain conditions, have unwelcome consequences is education. Spatial segregation between the poor and the better-off, as well as between natives and immigrants, creates homogeneous learning environments of disadvantaged students and such environments have been shown to impact negatively on initially low-performing students (see Stanat, 2006; Schofield, 2006, cited by Schönwälder and Söhn 2009). In fact, we have to also admit that segregation in schools and kindergarten is higher than residential segregation.

Because old industrial areas are blighted and distressed, economic disinvestments and ‘German flights’ become the rule in these areas. Thus the results would be cheaper housing and a poor environment where working class immigrants enforced to live there because of their working place proximity.

Turks in Goslar disproportionately reside in more deprived areas, such as Oker, where schools are more likely to have fewer resources, more

disciplinary issues, and higher staff turnover. This echoes some of the notions in the downward mobility variant in the segmented assimilation theory.

Having some metal processing factories, Oker, a district of Goslar, has become a ghetto in the last 40 years. One can follow resident patterns in Goslar between immigrants and Germans in terms of economic stratification, namely middle or upper class residents mainly live in the centre of Goslar which has beautiful historical places but the majority of lower or working class immigrants reside in Oker which is characterized by worse housing, fewer facility areas, and a contaminated environment due to heavy metal industry. As a rule, economic opportunities for people seem the main determinant of residential patterns in Goslar. Closely analyzing the ghetto place like Oker, it can be said that there are potential links between, for example, labour market opportunities, education, language competencies and attitudes, on the one hand, and ethnic residential concentration, on the other.

Globalization, economic restructuring and the de-industrializing process have contributed to a surging unemployment rate of 10 to 20 percent among immigrants despite new production facilities like chemistry and metal recycling plants. The life of Turkish immigrants with lower social status has become more complicated and difficult due to de-industrializing, neo-liberal restructuring and increasing migration of privileged Aussiedler. The reduction in the manufacturing sector also contributed to a decrease of upward mobility which was more available among semi-skilled Turkish immigrants in the past. Many German residents and Turkish youths left Goslar and especially Oker district, in search for better housing and economic prospects leaving behind an aging population and those who cannot afford to move out of the neighborhood, that is, welfare recipients,

the unemployed, asylum seekers, and others who are unable to locate housing elsewhere.

Residential segregation of migrants has a double character: on the one hand, it can mean poor housing and social amenities, as well as relative isolation from majority population; on the other hand, it offers the opportunity for community formation and the development of ethnic infrastructure and institutions. (Castles and Miller, 2003: 209)

It can easily be recognized in Oker that there is class segregation and stratification with regard to the accommodation structure. Economic, cultural and social structures are determined by spatial segregation. In contrast to the majority of districts of Goslar, Oker is an *Auslander* district or “ghetto” like Wedding, Kreuzberg, NeuKölln, Schöneberg of Berlin. I carried out interviews with Turkish immigrant people with different ethnic and religious backgrounds. The district of Oker has also a majority of unemployed Turkish youth, some with a criminal potential. In general, there is high density of unemployment among migrants. This is not a random case for migrants in Berlin. Nationalities vary in Oker where Turkish people are predominant among other immigrants such as, Kurdish, Russian, Armenian, Greek and Africans.

Oker is the working class district for many Turkish inhabitants have lived here since three generations. The problem in Oker is that the earning isn't very high and the living conditions are very unhealthy. The living conditions are bad because of the heavy industry, which is ecologically harmful. Ecke (55, personal conversation, 2006), a teacher of natural science in Goslar said, that the consumption of products like vegetables, which were produced in the ground of Oker are very unhealthy for human beings. The cost of the flats in Oker is very low. Hans, a German youth, indicates that “I have a little flat with 40 qm<sup>2</sup> at the best position/ location



in the old state/ center Goslar for 330 € per month. With this money I can get a flat with 80 qm<sup>2</sup> without a problem in Oker (Hans, 17, interview, 2006)”.

Social pedagogue, Michael, who works in a youth centre, Goslar “BGX”, suggests:

“There is still a barrier between the Turkish and German community due to this spatial segregation in Oker. Clearly, this segregation is not an outcome of German law or political force but rather people voluntarily want to be together with people who look like them in common places. Of course, the other key factor is economic because those people move to Oker due to their limited economic possibilities, which results in some accommodation patterns in Goslar. It means that foreigners especially Turkish immigrants are not wealthy or rich enough to move and live in better places. This society is a class-based society in which rich people live in certain regions with better opportunities and possibilities. You can recognize which place contains what kind of people. As a result foreigners are not rich enough to live in better places than Oker” (Michael, 29, interview, 2006).

Michael underlines that the majority of migrants with a Turkish background are unemployed and get social aid, thus, spending most of their spare time in Turkish cafes or mosques and watching Turkish media.

The most visible evidence of this process in Oker is the establishment of Turkish shops, cafes, and agency markets which function for the migrant communities` special needs. Translators, lawyers, health practitioners exist to serve as `ethnic professionals`. There are several Turkish cafés (Tea House) which mostly serve Turkish unemployed and retired men. I visited these tea-houses regularly and recognized that the tea-houses are full with unemployed youth, and older people, which is often the case around Oker. Teahouses in Goslar are cafe`s that are for the most part geared towards the needs of the male immigrant population. Customers often spend large portions of time, up to entire days, in the teahouses. Each teahouse caters to a different group of immigrant men, reflecting the great heterogeneity of the local Turkish population. Several teahouses are closely associated with sports clubs or with fan clubs for a certain team in the Turkish soccer

league. Others are organized around immigrants' regions and places of origin. For example, the teahouse 'Bosporus' attracts men from the region of the Turkish Black Sea.

Like other cities or towns with large Turkish communities, social life abounds in Goslar and Oker. There are many days of religious celebration, social gathering and weddings. While the mosques attract 300- 500 people in the religious events, weddings commonly attract 700 to 1,000 guests. Relatives and former villagers visit each other almost daily, and people keep up with Turkish news through satellite television and regular cheap phone calls to family in Turkey. The strong social cohesion is also reflected in the high degree of membership in Turkish cultural, religious and sports organizations.

Although it can be said that Turks have the highest self-employment rate of any of the large ethnic minority groups in Goslar and Oker, unemployment is still extremely high among the second and third generation children of immigrants with short educational tracks, and discrimination in the labor market hits this group especially hard. Despite all this, the number of second-generation young people who have succeeded in getting a better education is growing, and they are now well equipped to seek employment. An important factor in their success has been the mutual help and support they have received from family and community networks. Kotler-Berkowitz argued that the social-structural location of ethnic groups affects their ethnic cohesion. There is maximum ethnic cohesion when all members of a group are concentrated at the same socio-demographic or economic location and minimum cohesion when they are distributed randomly. The level of ethnic cohesion increases proportionally to the degree of ethnic concentration in social structures. In addition, structural concentration enhances the maintenance of cultural activities (cited by Al-Haj, 2004: 19). It can be argued that those unemployed or with low job

status have stronger group ties. Mostly, ethnic survival may be reinforced by the development of religious or ethnic organizations, including ethnic media in Goslar. The relationship between ethnic survival and ethnic organizations is a two-way street. These organizations may respond to the group's cultural needs, but at the same time they have their own economic vested interest in its survival.

Some Turkish people prefer to live in family apartments where there are sons or daughters who live with his/her family in the same building in their separate flat. When they build a family apartment, the isolation from the broader German society becomes more dominant than other residence patterns. From this point of view, there are no substantial differences between the Oker and Berlin's Kreuzberg, Schöneberg, Wedding, Neuköln ghettos. As a result of such high unemployment rate, the crime and illegal cases seem to be slightly increasing in Oker.

“Oker is known as a stupid, ugly, boring and violent district”, Hans says. He maintains “I remember when I was twelve. My friend Christian had to go to home in the night time. He drove through Oker and had a terrible experience with five Turkish youths, who stopped and beat him. At that time, German youth didn't say good things about the Turkish youth in Oker, but especially Oker. I suppose that this is just the same today” (Hans, 17, interview, 2006).

According to Massey (2004: 17), as segregation concentrates poverty, it also concentrates anything that is correlated with poverty to create a uniquely disadvantaged social environment characterized by high rates of joblessness, welfare dependency, substance abuse, and single parenthood. Because crime is also associated with poverty, segregation likewise ends up concentrating social disorder and violence, yielding an unusually hostile and threatening environment to which poor people must adapt.

Admittedly, the ethnic segregation or ghettoization is not a result of political or juridical enforcement but it deals more with the socio-economic stratification. Besides, there are also other sociological and psychological reasons for people wanting to live among those who are similar, rather than different.

There is another ghetto region in Goslar, namely, Jurgenohl where *Aussiedler* and *Spataussiedler* are highly concentrated in this area as a result of the second migration wave after 1990s. Naturally, Goslar has also locally been affected by the magnitude of the *Aussiedler* migration. However, the fundamental inducements of ghettoization of the *Aussiedler* in Jurgenohl are somewhat different from Oker's ghettoization process. This time psychological and sociological aspects of living with similar people in a secure and isolated area seem to be reasonable explanations to understand the ethnic segregation of *Aussiedler* rather than socio-economic or heavy industrialization factors. As ethnic Germans have already been examined in other chapters, they have relatively advantaged positions in labor market, housing and welfare benefits. Thus, the sociological and psychological reasons for ethnic segregation of *Aussiedler* show the identificational tensions among *Aussiedler* although they are claimed to be pure German descendants.

In some conditions, Turkish immigrants and their children are the most disadvantaged groups and their isolated life-world is characterized by the institutional discrimination or structural ostracism contributing to their "hyper-segregated" (Massey and Denton, 1993) position. In Goslar and Oker, Turkish immigrants have the possibility to live without contacting with German society by attending the lowest scale and isolated school, *Hauptschule*, praying at the mosque, doing shopping from Turkish supermarket and groceries, eating and tackling with Turkish fast-food

shops and also constructing their ethnic niche economies. As Kivisto (2002) contends rightfully that the advance of the Muslim middle-class from the suburbs to the new neighbourhoods has left only the poorest of the poor behind – increasingly distanced from the urban economy at large, and deprived of the institutional support that allows a bare existence in the ghettos of a hostile world. In an age when industrial production is in rapid descent, these people cannot adapt to the changing economy, and fall into a state of constant exclusion and loneliness.

The other issue is about being a linguistically distinctive district in this segregated ethnic community formation of Oker. In this linguistically distinctive condition, as Zhou (1997: 979) points out, the immigrants and their children come into direct daily contact with the poor rather than with the middle class; they are also apt to encounter members of native minorities and other immigrants rather than members of the dominant majority, creating new obstacles for assimilation.

As can be recognized from the above, ethnic residential concentration should not be too readily discarded as a potential contextual influence on immigrant integration and thus as a relevant political and academic issue. Negative (and positive) effects of ethnic residential concentration might exist in specific heavy industrialized areas where a number of factors combine to produce specific results for the ethnic groups.

#### **4.3. Two Symbols for Economic and Political-Cultural Crisis**

In the last two decades there are two turning points in economy, culture and politics for German society: while the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 directly confronted Germany with an economic crisis and unemployment question because of intensive immigration from the East Germany and ex-Soviet unions, the tragic collapse of the World Trade Twin Towers in U.S.

in September 11, 2001 had influences on German politics and cultural perceptions. The fall of the Berlin wall made people move from the East to West Germany and caused more investments to be made in relatively undeveloped East Germany as well as the immigration (of ethnic Germans) from ex-Soviet Union to Germany which accelerated the economic crisis which became more serious after introducing the Euro in 2000s. First, the fall of the Berlin wall has become a symbol of the economic deterioration in the eye of both the immigrants and German society. Second, the collapse of the Twin Towers by terrorists who were Muslims and immigrants affected the security and immigration policies of the world. Culture and religion have become the determinant variables of criminalization and securitization of immigration and integration policies in all Western and Northern countries. Germany has been also deeply affected by this process because one of the terrorist who hijacked the plane, Mohammed Atta, grew up and was educated in Hamburg, Germany.

By 1991, a year after the Berlin Wall fell, the anesthetizing excitement had worn off and the painful effects of reunification were making themselves felt. Some respondents say that “everything changes after the fall of the Berlin wall and the Euro”, not only for Germans but also for Turkish and other immigrants”. In this process, we lost most of the socio-economic rights that we had been already given. We lost the social equality which we gained as a result of a long struggling process. Semih says:

“We have still paid for the cost of German unification all together, one respondent says, in order to develop the underdeveloped East Germany. The influx of ethnic Germans here has changed the balance of the economy and social life and brought cultural questions also’. For example, in shopping centers you can be confronted with the advertisements in the Russian language but not Turkish. This change in the language of trade is little bit strange because Germans are normally so conservative about the use of German language” (Semih, 19, interview, 2006).

The integration into German society is highly segmented in Goslar, there are some people who feel themselves very comfortable with their full-scale

integration on the one hand, but there are others who experience downward integration and thus often embrace their symbolic ethnicity with its extreme nationalist view on the other hand. There are some others in between.

The people who experience downward integration are mostly poor people potentially confronted with educational failure, school drop outs, drug addiction, early pregnancy etc. They fear becoming poorer, which accelerates and consolidates xenophobia of which the German government has done little to overcome it. Dilek says:

“The German governments do nothing except providing some money. There should have been a different educational system and control of society. Integration should have been implemented with an aim of living together rather than enforcing Germanization. For example, the Eastern border of Goslar (for instance, Vienenburg) has more xenophobic tendencies because they are also poor. The poverty increases the chauvinism in both German and Turkish sides. You can see the “reactive chauvinism” in the poor countryside, Oker where mostly poor Turks have experienced a religious uprising after the 1990s. This social rule works the same all around the world” (Dilek, 24, interview, 2006).

Like anywhere else in Germany, Goslar saw the uprising of religious organizations after the 1990s. As far as I have observed in Goslar, the Turkish religious movement in Germany has sharply increased after the 1990s. The religious communities seem very well organized. In addition to social differences and cultural distance between Germans and Turks, this religious uprising is closely related with other simultaneous affairs in the world. The retreat of leftist ideologies after the collapse of Soviet Unions, the weakness of syndicates, the neoliberal economic restructuring and its compulsory results of unemployment have tremendously contributed to the strength of Islamic organization. The fall of the Berlin wall caused the unemployment crisis to deepen. The difference between social classes has become more visible since then. Thanks to economic globalization, factories and mass production plants where the first generation worked, were moved to other cheap labor areas and most people lost their jobs.

Germany became the producer of high technology which does not need a big labor population. This produces imbalances between foreign people and the native society. This imbalance caused some people to turn to their ethnic groups and construct a different kind of community formation. In the Turkish case, it turns out to be a form of religious organizations”.

Dilek (24, interview, 2006) recommends an educational solution for stopping this religious uprising:

“I believe that if there is a strong education system which does not externalize the foreigners and less unemployment in Oker, these religious organizations would not take root and become very weak. However, if you are permanently externalized by the system, you have to find your way by participating in any organization and trusting your community. You can understand that most Turkish people tend to come together in their spaces, cafes, mosques, discotheques, shops, organizations, and associations etc. If you are externalized from outside life, you have to adapt yourself to alternative spaces” (Dilek, 24, interview, 2006).

Should one be optimistic or pessimistic for the future of the children of Turkish immigrants? Different types of societies have experienced different sorts of migrants, racisms, nationalisms and discriminations. As a corporatist social welfare state, Germany can prevent ghetto type social life by supporting immigrant people with strong social aid and health system. For example, England is very different in the sense that if you live in a ghetto, the state is not as concerned about you as much as Germany. U.S has ‘open prison’ ghettos in some areas. France seems not to be different from England and U.S on the ghetto issue.

One can say Germany is one of the peaceful countries who compromise with their immigrants. Each country has its own specific problems. It is relatively different in France, Sweden or Denmark. Nonetheless, Turks have felt the heavy burden of being the foreigner in Germany because of hair, color, skin, names, religion etc. Although Germany provides some social standard for its immigrants and their children when compared with



other countries, Turkish immigrants feel the heavy burden of being a stranger because of their gestures, colors, names, clothes, eating patterns, etc. which are recognized in their daily practice. Turks are forced to perceive and remember their differences. They have been directly or indirectly told that they are different and they don't belong to Germany, day by day. They can benefit from social services but they cannot reach every social service. There are special routes to reach them. "Germans always give us the feeling that we do not belong here" says Elif (Elif, 21, interview, 2006)

There is still a downward integration trend in which people become more and more marginalized and excluded. Turkish youth want to show that they are part of German society. They want to have attention and show themselves in two ways. Either they (mostly boys) develop their body by visiting fitness rooms. They want to pride themselves with their body. The second way is to show themselves by the help of creative arts like music, hip-hop, graffiti and etc. They have chances to express their feelings, resentments and slang words against unequal implementations of German society. However, their music may sometimes be discriminate against Germans. What is interesting in Germany is there have been no substantial riots among the immigrant youths like in France up to now. Some are very hopeless about the future. One cannot see any protest against the new economic restructuring which cuts most socio-economic rights. Rather than struggling with tiring and competitive conditions of Germany, even some educated youth want to return to Turkey, although they little know about living and working conditions in Turkey. It is interesting to note that some who were born and grown up in Germany see their future in Turkey.

#### **4.4. Trust, Inter-Group Relations and Racial Tolerance: Friendship and Marriage in Goslar**

Based on my ethnographic observations in Goslar it can be asserted that the diversity brings about a dissemination of distrust between German and Turkish people. For example, most Turkish youths express their distrust towards Germans by saying that “you can be a neighbor or friends with Germans but you cannot be a real buddy or companion with Germans.” They find Germans distrustful, cold and selfish. Admittedly, this kind of perception works with clichés rather than practical experiences or logical reasoning.

When Koray (16, interview, 2006) mentions his distrust of Germans, he indeed shares with the majority of Turkish youth in Goslar: “You cannot be accepted by the Germans, even if you shave each hour. They can say, ‘oh man, you have shaved but you have still some hairs on your face!’ Except professors or scholars, most Germans see us as a foreigner and enemy. It brings about competition not only between German and Turks but also between Turks and Turks in order to be a good German citizen.”

Mistrust and questioning of other immigrants' loyalties and identity were frequent themes in the interviews with a majority of younger generation Turkish youth. A common theme among Turks is the observation that a German even lends money to her father with a signed piece of paper! Germans are perceived to be individualist, egoist and too cold and rational on social issues. A majority of Turkish people strongly emphasize that Germans are not the ones you can trust completely: “In the last instance, they are not the right people you can trust.”

However, this kind of perception characterized by distrust among Turkish youth would have restrictive influences on their social life in schools and working places or other social dimensions. It is interesting to note that Turkish and German people have such distrust towards each other, although they share many relations in the public sphere.

On the other hand, it should be pointed out that the stratified rights and discriminative implementations towards immigrants could be responsible for this distrust. Sometimes, the youth are complaining about the unfair competitive conditions in which German citizen children of immigrants with Turkish background do more than German people to get a safe or appropriate status in the working place. It is such a tiring process for the youth that they feel themselves vulnerable in the conditions of institutional discrimination which does not give the children of immigrants equal opportunity of upward mobility.

In Goslar, most Turkish people know and greet each other on the street but the political or cultural problems between ethnic or religious groups prevailing in Turkey determine the social relations of the children of immigrants in Germany. For instance, Alevi and Kurdish questions become major social barriers between some Sunni, Alevi and Kurdish and Turkish youths in daily life. It is interesting to note that these ethnic and religious questions are also predominant among third generation youth who have little contact with an idea of the problems in Turkey. Some Alevi and secular people do not shop at a Supermarket which is labeled as Islamist while other Sunni people do not go to some restaurants of Alevi people by ostracizing them as a *kafir*, (non-muslim) because of selling pork. Thus, we can assert that social networks are still determined by the ethnic and religious boundaries even among new generation Turkish youths.

One Kurdish-Alevi, Hasan who is a hip-hop singer has referred to both the ethnic and religious boundaries when expressing his resentment of discrimination against his groups among the Turkish-Sunni population, saying that: “I will not hide my identity. I am Kurd, which Turkish nationalist should be aware of. I am Alevi and my necklace is a symbol of Saint Ali`s sword, which Sunni-Turks should know, and accept me for who I am” (Hasan, 16, interview, 2006). They have to respect my identity because I accept them and respect them for who they are. It is interesting that the ethnic and religious groups sometimes see each other as a real “other” within German society.

Similarly, Metin (19, interview, 2006) says:

“I have never hidden my identity, I am a Kurd from Turkey with a German passport. I am a Kurd and I am the person who my parents are. I visited a Turkish ultra-nationalist association in Oker in order to have an idea of how they felt towards Kurds. In this association, Turks sometimes distinguish themselves from Kurds by seeing all Kurds as supporters of the PKK. They said that all Kurds are extremist terrorist and PKK. I asked them ‘how do you know all Kurds are supporters of PKK’. They said my elder brother said so. They don’t read books to get real information. All their information is based on the ideas of others rather than their own experiences and thoughts. I don’t like Turkish nationalist either. This association is only a show. There is no important idea in back of it” (Metin, 19, interview, 2006).

For example, Kemal (20, interview, 2006) indicates the internal conflict among Turkish immigrants:

“Here in Goslar some Turkish families (from both Alevi and Sunni communities) can even accept a marriage between Turkish and Germans but they strongly resist the marriage between Alevi and Sunni. This is exactly an imported problem from Turkey. It is interesting to note that Alevi-Sunni religious-based conflict or Kurdish-Turkish ethnic separations are still a leitmotiv among third generation as are some issues like friendship and marriage. The Alevi-Sunni conflict among the third generation, which is transferred from the homeland, would continue to the fourth generation. Fifty

or sixty years is not long for the social transformation, development and integration to a form of new environment” (Kemal, interview, 2006).

On the other hand, Selim (18, interview, 2006) pays attention that the majority of sub-communities of Turks like Alevi and Sunni people have no close contact with each other. Some Turkish and Kurdish communities also have conflicts with each other. The social relations and cultural codes of these communities are very different from each other in German society. Accordingly, Alevi peoples are said to be more tolerant, peaceful and flexible adapting themselves to the conditions of Germany.

For example, Semiha (21, interview, 2006) defines herself as a Kurdish and Alevi woman saying that:

“Turkish people who are not Alevi could immediately recognize who is an Alevi person from his/her dress, posture and ways of behavior. Not only Germans produce prejudice about Turkish migrants, the immigrants also produce prejudices and clichés about each others as Turkish, Kurdish, Alevi and Sunni. One can assume that the third generation youth who has close associations with religious organizations will mostly likely harbor such conflicts” (Semiha, 21, interview, 2006).

In my personal conversation, Faruk proposes to use more sensitive term “*Türkiyeli*” for defining people from Turkey, rather than “Turkish” in order to pay attention to the existence of other ethnicities in Turkey. He says that “we have to be careful when using the terms like ‘Turks’ which ostracizes our Kurdish, Yezidi, Suryani, Alevi, Armenian friends in Goslar” (Faruk, personal conversation, 2006).

Rooted political and cultural contradictions in Turkey, these ethnic and religious problems still have influences on the social relations of the children of immigrants in German society. For instance, the youths mostly tend to prefer to marry within their ethnic and religious communities as they parents recommend doing.

When I asked about social relations and friendship, most youths seem to prefer to connect with the people who are in the same ethnic and religious groups. In addition, their friends are predominantly Turks. Of course, most youths have also German or other friends but they emphasized that they have “close and trustful” relationships only with Turks rather than other groups as well as underlying the distrust of most Germans.

Therefore, it is safe to say that the friendships characterized by the national, ethnic and religious boundaries are more important for the Turkish youths. Equally important is the assertion that ethnic, national or religious affiliation are not the only emotional or symbolic identity resources of Turkish youths, but they sometimes become major determinants to construct the social relations.

There are other independent variables which seem to affect the social relations of the youths in Goslar. Educational levels and gender sometimes strongly characterize the types of social relations. Generally males have more connections within their groups rather than outside groups by strongly underlying their close ties with Turkish people while females frequently connect with Germans. In addition, females can build multi-cultural and multi-ethnic relations with other different nations (Asian, African, Muslim and other nationalities) in Germany. This data is the evidence that further researches on the young with immigrant backgrounds should be more concerned on gender differences. As to the educational level, lower educational careers mostly mean less social contacts with outside groups, for example, Hauptschule students who are mostly composed of the children of immigrants have more intensive relations with their ethnic groups than those of students from Realschule and Gymnasium.

#### **4.5. 'Imported' Brides and Bridegrooms from Turkey**

Migration took a new upturn in the 1980s and 1990s, when the in-between generation reached marriage age and began choosing spouses from Turkey. One significant issue among Turks in Goslar is the increasing number of marriages with partners from Turkey. Lately, there has been a growing tendency for some Turkish families to favor their children marrying partners brought from Turkey. Such partners are known as 'imported' brides or bridegrooms.

First of all, marriage is still seen as an important institution for socialization. Therefore, considerable social pressure is brought on single individuals to get married. However, the marriage age of most Turkish youth in Goslar is becoming higher and higher.

What is significant about the Turkish community in Goslar is the withdrawal into traditional cultural and, sometimes, religious values. Thus, there is a "back to the Turkish roots" phenomenon as exhibited by the increasing number of young Turks from Germany who get their spouses from Turkey.

There are several reasons for importing brides and bridegrooms from Turkey. First, some families who are afraid of the street culture characterized by drug addiction, cultural contamination, early pregnancy, crime and so on, see marriage from Turkey as a solution for these complicated problems but it is indeed not the solution. This importation of brides and bridegrooms can be seen as an indirect means of resistance to assimilation and "cultural contamination" imposed by the streets of Goslar. The second reason is much related to traditional understanding of "family honor". They think the people from Turkey would be more virtuous,

respectful, honest, polite, obedient and virtuous than those in Germany, all of which are seen as fundamentals of a supposedly honorable family.

Third, the intermarriage between German and Turkish has not been successful so far due to the fact that divergent life styles as reflected in cultural and religious differences apparently doom many of these marriages to failure.

The rate of imported brides seems much more than imported bridegrooms. These arranged marriages are usually preferred by conservative families. Brides from Turkey are chosen as they are believed to be more culturally pure and thus capable of raising better-educated children. On the other hand, bridegrooms are usually chosen from among those candidates who fit into the occupational prospects of the extended family in question.

The traditional or conservative families want to preserve their cultural values by still being in contact with Turkey in this way. They mostly prefer to choose brides and bridegrooms from their relatives in Turkey so that they could control them easily. It is also related to the consideration of family honor. In conservative families, honor is not an individual entity but a social one. Parents who would like to arrange a marriage for their son, for example, are still seeking for intact 'honor' and 'reputation' of the prospective bride. Therefore, girls are encouraged to avoid situations which may damage their honor and family reputation.

The "traditional" behaviors that appear prominently in German discourse about the oppressiveness of the traditional Turkish family are arranged marriages, emphasis on girls' virginity and women's honor and the resulting restrictions on mobility, independent decision making, and pursuit of self-fulfillment. This kind of "traditional behavior" could be seen in conservative families, where daughters of Turkish origin were expected to marry at an early age in the belief that an early marriage would



ward off gossip and bring them status in the community back home (when close relatives in Turkey send their sons to Europe to be married). But we see that these traditional gender roles are changing, in the younger generations, and that earlier patterns of integration need not be a permanent feature of particular ethnic groups (Thomson and Crul 2007: 1034).

Although the meaning of 'honor' and 'reputation' is changing for the young generation that I have interviewed, their families in Goslar want to import the people who are a closely known relative because of the willingness of migrant families to have an obedient wife or husband for their children, which would preserve family honor. They think the people from Turkey would be more virtuous, respectful, honest, polite, obedient and virtuous than those in Germany, all of which are seen as fundamentals of a supposedly honorable family.

The male youths who support the custom of imported brides think that they could not find a proper candidate in Germany to start a family in Germany because of the more relaxed social conditions. That's why they prefer to find a candidate from Turkey assuming they would more actively preserve cultural values and the traditional functions of the family like child bearing. Most of the time, marriage with imported brides from Turkey could provide youths with some advantages, because the newcomers would be dependent on the youth in Germany owing to a lack of competence in German and the loosening of parental authority from both sides.

However, it is clear that the longer the immigrants stay in Germany, the more their children want to marry with someone in Germany rather than imported partners, which would slightly increase the rate of marriage within Goslar/Germany. Today, most youths seem to choose of their own free will to marry someone from Germany.

According to Küçükcan (2004), although there is no total rejection of traditional values, it appears that the young generation are developing different attitudes towards parental values. Although most of the Turkish young people agree with the preservation of parental culture, they seem to attribute different meanings to some of the elements of traditional values. There is a tendency among young Turks to see marriage, social relations and sexuality in a somewhat different way than that of their parents. The overwhelming majority of young people claim that they have disagreements with their parents over 'meeting and socializing with the opposite sex', 'type of clothing', 'spending time outside the house', 'restriction of freedom', 'friendship with non-Turks and non-Muslims' and 'the way marriages are arranged'.

There are some youths in Goslar, who don't want a partner from Turkey due to the disadvantages and burdens it would impose on them. They don't want to be a caretaker of their partners who would be totally foreign to German life. The youths resist bringing their marriage partners from Turkey. Because they think that they will have the extra responsibility, difficulty and burden to teach the language, official rules, if they find their partners from Turkey. The youths do not want to have the responsibility in Germany of taking them to doctors, state institutions, translation etc., when they have already given such help to their parents. They want to stop the tiring process and become comfortable with their new marriage. Thus, they prefer to marry with someone who is already in Germany.

It is safe to say that imported brides and bridegrooms have many difficulties in Germany. I have confronted dozens of unhappy marriages of the second generation all over the Goslar. There are lots of tragic divorce stories about brides especially who suffered from permanent neglect by their husbands who would flirt with `blonde` Germans outside or at

discotheques. Although it seems to be exceptional, there are cases where the brides are sometimes neglected, beaten, suppressed by husbands or his family due to their resisting these unfair conditions. Some could go to court or women associations where they can get help to stay in Germany safely.

However, there is another side of the coin which urges the responsibility of these marriage failures of imported partners in Germany where German is not typically spoken as the solution for Turkish communities in Germany. According to German law, a Turk who is a legal resident in Germany (even if naturalized) and “fetches” a bride from Turkey, is most likely to see his spouse moored at home for one year before she can apply for a work permit. This means she will spend most of her time at home, watching Turkish television programs transmitted via satellite, and will virtually have no exposure to Germans and their language. Given the recession in Germany, such a process is likely to continue for a couple of years when she has children. The children in turn will spend their formative years consuming Turkish television programs. To a large extent it is a vicious cycle (Mueller, 2006: 430).

Finally, because there are divergent life styles, perceptions and *habitus* as reflected in cultural and religious differences, most intermarriages between German and Turkish end in failure. Thus it is also responsible for the imported brides and bridegrooms from Turkey and the low rate of exogamous marriages between Turks and Germans which hovers around five percent. If exogamy is taken as an indicator for “integration,” Turks in Germany are probably the least integrated group. Mueller (2006: 432) notes that the micro census of 1995 revealed that 98% of married Turkish women and 95% of all married Turkish men had partners of the same nationality. Equally significant are the divorce rates among mixed marriages— German and a foreign-born spouse. Data from the 1991–1995

period show that Turkish and German couples had the highest divorce rates compared to Germans who married Yugoslav, Greek, Italian, Greek, or Spanish persons. Thus, 63.8% of all German women married to Turkish men sought divorces, and 31.2% of all German men married to Turkish women sought divorces.

Metin (19, interview, 2006) points out the contradictions of partnership between German and Turk: “I have dated several German girlfriends and enjoyed being with them but I would not consider marrying with them. There always comes one point of time when our cultures clash. Our culture and perceptions of relationships is somewhat different. Thus, the relations between a German and Turk are not long and enduring relations but temporary with an aim of entertainment.”

Let me finish this part with the words of Hans instead of making a final comment:

“For example, every third marriage breaks down in Europe. The Turkish youth know that the Western system is not ideal; nevertheless the dogma of the religion is not ideal, either. The youth stands on the bridge with a question mark on their future and don’t know in which direction they ought to go.”

*Hans, Goslarian German youth, (17, interview, 2006)*

#### **4.6. Locality and Global Mediaspaces**

When I got out of the train station (*Hauptbahnhof*) on my first day in Goslar, I was immediately confronted with Turkish people in a *Doner* shop next to the station where they were reading the German edition of *Hurriyet*, a Turkish newspaper.

In an era of electronic networking, the children of immigrants are not only squeezed between family and German culture; there is an extra dimension which cannot be identified with physical borders. Thus, the life-world of Turkish youth in Goslar lies between Germany and Turkey and also the rest of the world.

The identity formation of the Turks is determined by a result of balances and contradictions of multiple resources characterized by cultural conservation and traditional elements (which often comes from a mixture of family values and their national narratives) and the elements of German social life. Sometimes the socialization process of new generations includes some tensions within itself in so far as they are subject to multiple cultural resources that affect their identity formation. In the first step, the family culture and their traditional ethnic or national references become effective until the children enter the public life through schools and streets. In the second step, they confront the German social and cultural life in the public sphere. In the third step, due to an increasing process of globalization through internet and electronic networking, there is a third dimension that affects the socialization of all individuals. Immigrant communities tend to be more affected by this electronic network as they have close transnational ties with the country of origin.

In Goslar, numerous buildings and homes have satellite dishes attached to roofs or balconies. While the satellite dishes themselves have nothing obviously Turkish about them, they transform the faces of the neighborhood and have become a defining characteristic of its urban landscape. One cannot see the satellite dishes on German houses in Goslar where putting satellite dish is officially forbidden because of distorting the scenery of the neighborhood.

When directing me to their home address for the interview, Sevgi (26) and Kadir (28) personal conversation, 2006), a married couple, told me that

“you can easily find our flat by looking at the balconies of our apartment when you get in front of our apartment. There is only one satellite dish on the street. We don’t want to disturb the environment but we cannot help using the satellite which connects us to Turkey.” Sevgi complains about the cultural-blind practices of local government. “They don’t allow us to use satellite dishes either at balcony or on the roof in our apartment. This is a ban of communication. We cannot paint our houses with the color we like. They try to suppress anything Turkish here. They still don’t want to accept us living here with our different color. They don’t value our demands. Thus we had to put up this dish, although there is a strong legal ban. The aesthetic of the city cannot be distorted by a small dish!!” (Sevgi, personal conversation, 2006). This illustrates that the neighborhood is subject to rules that originate at different geographic scales. The satellite dishes thus gain significance in the neighborhood as symbols of a Turkish people, which can refer the term of ‘ethnoscape’ (Appadurai, 1996) that transcends boundaries of the nation-state, and intersects with Goslar’s local population and space.

Until the 1990s, the framework of Turkish popular culture in Germany was limited by the Turkish films on video-cassettes, and music cassettes brought from Turkey. Among them, the comedy films, on the problems of village life and urbanization, by the actors of Kemal Sunal, Sener Sen and drama films, about poverty and the outcomes of urbanization and internal migrations, by the actors and actress, Orhan Gencebay, Kadir Inanir, Turkan Soray were quite popular. They helped preserve common Turkish popular culture among the immigrants. Thus, it can be even claimed that those films would have functioned as a popular culture tool of Turkish socialization in Germany. The subjects of these films were predominantly about love, migration, (some critiques) of feudal and patriarchic relations, and the social outcomes of urbanizations. It can be asserted that these films

seriously contributed to the preservation of Turkish traditions and culture which would stay unchanged for a long time in Germany.

Only the arrival of video recorders and satellite transmission offered first-generation migrants the opportunity to experience the elaborated code of their mother tongue and to share - in Turkish - events in their home country and in world affairs. Printed media had a much more limited impact. Until the arrival of visual media, first-generation Turks depended on re-translations from German by their children, by professional translators or by social workers. The command of German among first-generation migrants was no less restricted. Only with the help of their children - who had grown up in Germany - translators or social workers, could first-generation Turks communicate with the 'German world' in which they lived.

Today, thanks to the revolution in electronic networking, satellite programs and internet access, Turkish media have some influences on Turkish immigrants. In addition to some private Turkish TV channels and radio stations in Germany, Turkish daily magazines and newspapers are broadly circulated in Goslar/Germany. Although it is thought that Turkish immigrant families watch Turkish media rather than that of their host country, this research in Goslar shows mixed results. The children of immigrants follow German media and newspapers as well as Turkish media. Based on the observations and answers of the respondent, I can say that most of the Turks in Goslar have frequently used the internet.

To mobilize constituents, all of these political migrants - whether pro-Kemalist, Turkish ultra-nationalist, Kurdish nationalist, Islamist, or Leftist - require props, symbols, images and information around which to frame collective action. Media technology is the glue linking associational advantages in the host country to ideological fuel from the sending

country. It enhances the ability of political migrants to structure their mobilization strategies in the host country using symbols and frames more relevant to the homeland institutional context. Consequently, immigrant communities more prone to consume homeland media are also more likely to act on homeland issues while living in the host country. Turks are Germany's premier consumers of home-land media. According to a 1996 survey, 86.6 percent of Germany's Turks claimed to read newspapers in their mother tongue (Mehrlander et al., 1996:296). An exceptional proportion of Germany's Turks also consumes homeland radio and television broadcasts. These proportions are greater than the corresponding figure for Germany's other Mediterranean-basin immigrants (Mehrlander et al., 1996). Germany's Turks also stand out in their use of newer media technologies: satellite and cable television ownership and Internet use is high for this immigrant community (cited by, Ögelman, 2003: 180)

As Kaya and Kentel (2005: 45) report that the major Turkish TV channels have had their own European units making special programs for Turks living in Germany and all around Europe. TRT International (state channel) is the first of these channels. The other channels are Euro Show, Euro Star, Euro D, Euro ATV, TGRT, Kanal 7, TV5 and Lig TV. All these TV channels apart from the TRT Int. can be received via satellite antennas. TRT Int. is already available on cable. The program spectrum of all these channels may differ greatly from each other. TRT Int. tends mainly to give equal weight to entertainment, education, magazine, movies and news. Since it is a state owned channel, it tries to promote the 'indispensable unity of the Turkish nation' by arranging, for instance, money campaigns for the Turkish armed forces fighting in the South Eastern part of Turkey.

There are also a lot of programs concentrating on the problems of the Euro-Turks. This channel can also be widely received in Turkey. Thus, in a way, it also informs the Turkish audience about the happenings of the



Euro-Turks, mainly that of the German-Turks, while connecting the modern diasporic Turkish communities to the homeland. Euro Show, Euro D and Euro Star are private channels making secular based programs. The majority of the programs are composed of old Turkish movies, American movies, comedy programs, dramas, Turkish and European pop charts, sport programs, reality-shows and news. On the other hand TGRT, Samanyolu, TV5, and Kanal 7 are the religious based TV channels. Besides the actual programs, these channels give priority to the dramas and movies with religious motives. Traditional Turkish folk music programs are also a part of the policy of these two channels. Kral Turk and Satel are other channels giving the Turkish and European pop charts. They are the favorite channel of the Turkish youngsters who have satellite antennae. Lig TV is, on the other hand, a pay TV broadcasting the Turkish Premiere League football matches.

Moreover, in the Turkish public sphere, namely Turkish mosques, cafes and teahouses (kahvehane) in Goslar offer TV, games and Turkish newspapers to their members or customers. During the weekends, the mosques and teahouses show the games of the Turkish soccer league that are limited to Lig TV, a pay-TV channel that most immigrants cannot afford for their own households.

Most of the major Turkish newspapers are also circulated in Goslar and Germany. *Hürriyet*, *Milliyet*, *Sabah*, *Cumhuriyet* and *Evrensel* are some of the Turkish papers printed in Germany. There are also many other sport and magazine papers from Turkey. Although the content of the papers is extremely limited in terms of the news about the homeland, they offer a wide range of news about Turkish communities in Europe. Turkish media partly shape the ‘worlds of meaning’ of the Euro-Turks.

The Turkish language newspaper, *Hurriyet*, is the most popular daily, followed by *Bild* (the German equivalent to the *Post*), and claims to be read by 80% of the German-Turkish community. The German RTL and Pro Sieben television channels, which are primarily entertainment-oriented, are the most popular in the German-Turkish community, with the Turkish state broadcast TRT-INT garnering third place with 34% of the German-Turkish audience (*Der Spiegel* 06/16/01: Online). The content of Turkish print and electronic media can contribute to the isolation of the Turkish community from larger German society unless alternative sources of information are used (Mueller. 2006: 434).

My observations based on visiting the houses of the immigrants in Goslar depict that the people who have a political world-view watch TV channels which have political engagements, which causes political socialization and mobilization to some extent. For example, the people who politically support Kurdish movement, PKK in Turkey follow Roj TV, Mezopotamia TV and Med TV while Islamist people mostly watch TV5, TGRT, Kanal 7, Samanyolu TV which have religious-based programs Kurdish, Islamic and Alevi networks that crisscross Europe, and link Turkey and Europe, are well documented in the literature on political trans-nationalization (Amiriaux 1998; Faist 1998). The border-crossing media networks which target Turkish immigrants in Germany and Europe, such as MED TV (a Kurdish satellite television station based in London and Brussels) and TRT-INT (the Turkish state broadcasting company), are mobilized in Turkish immigrants' attempts to define their presence and identity both within the country of residence and across the transnational space of Europe. Without a doubt, these media connections accelerate the transnationalization of Turkish immigrants' social space in Berlin and Germany (Çağlar, 2001: 607). Transnational Turkish or Kurdish TV is intricately linked to political identities, and the multitude of news, information and commentaries that television conveys provoke differentiated reactions in

viewers. TV is not simply good for (passive) consumption, but is one of the many complex negotiations of local and transnational lives and social relations that immigrants engage in, as the following episode shows.

But even if physical proximity is missing, the new electronic media permit Muslim cyber-communities and communicative interaction with other Turks. As Mueller (2006) states, the most prominent Turkish website, [www.muslimmarkt.de](http://www.muslimmarkt.de), provides informational services and has about 100,000 hits each month, with a noticeable increase after September 11.

Some scholars claim that the new mediaspaces gives the immigrant groups an opportunity to keep their transplanted political identities which are supposedly considered an obstacle for integration in Germany. Thus, the resilience of homeland media consumption presents political migrants with powerful symbols around which to consolidate support and define boundaries. Perceiving that Germany's institutions obstruct their ability to successfully mobilize constituents, many transplanted activists promote organization around - and instrumentalization of - identities reflecting homeland domestic, ethnic, religious and political developments instead of integrationist identities (Heitmeyer et al., 1997).

When "uncle" Muharrem (60, personal conversation, 2006) who is one of the first generation workers in Goslar, said to me "I can get by with speaking only 30 minutes of German a day, right here in Germany", it became clear to me that the institutionalized social infrastructure including mediaspaces in the Turkish community permits an individual born into a Turkish family to live in Turkish communities until death without ever speaking a word of German. These institutions range from soccer clubs to service industries such as the restaurant business, from locally produced media to satellite transmitted television and print media from Turkey, from religious institutions to computer and internet clubs. However,

transnational ties and engagement in the receiving society can be evaluated as a complementary entity rather than contradictory one. As Turkish immigrants transform the neighborhood into Turkish space, they take ownership and feel more comfortable being Turkish in the local place.

New mass media such as satellite TV are instrumental in fostering newly emerging cultural identities (Aksoy and Robins 1997), and provide migrants with sources of identification that stretch beyond the national and local contexts of their old and new homes (Becker 1996). Mass media, in particular, may contribute to the creation of alternative identities outside of an official understanding of Turkish identity. Aksoy and Robins (1997) show how new media and TV stations have helped transform Turkish national identity. Outside of Turkey, new opportunities brought about by satellite TV create alternatives to the official Turkish TV channels available through cable. Many immigrants prefer to watch private satellite channels.

According to Kaya and Kentel (2005) Turkish media mostly attempt to provide a stream of programs which is thought to suit the 'habitats of meaning' of the diasporic subject. For instance, the German-Turks are perceived by the Turkish media industry as a group of people who resist cultural change. This perception, for instance, is the main rationale behind the selection of the movies and dramas. In the beginning of the process, because TV programs from Turkey were made by the people who had no idea about the social life in Germany, Turkish media reproduced traditions, values and discourses of the country of origin.

A large number of the films on each channel are the old Turkish films which were produced in the late sixties and seventies. The performance of the old Turkish movies, which touch upon some traditional issues such as Anatolian feudalism, blood feuds, migration (*gurbet*), desperate romance

and poverty, reinforces the reification of culture within the Turkish diaspora. As Foucault noted such films attempt to ‘re-program popular memory’ to recover ‘lost, unheard memories’ which had been denied, or buried, by the dominant representations of the past experienced in the diaspora (Morley and Robins, 1993: 10, cited by Kaya and Kentel, 2005). Hence, identity is also a question of memory, and memories of home in particular. Before the private TV channels were opened, it was the VCR industry which used to provide those kinds of movies to the Turkish diaspora.

The experienced or imagined ‘home’ country thus is no longer just a memory in immigrants’ minds and narratives; it is present and part of their everyday lives. The transnational is inserted into and partially shapes the local place. Watching TV, for example, highlights the ways that immigrants create transnational ties as they consume Turkish pop culture. Turkish media seems to contribute to the reproduction of traditions, values, discourses brought from the homeland in the beginning of the migration process, because the programs have been produced mostly by those who do not have an insight about the conditions of Euro-Turks. However, recently there are some new initiatives held by the local Euro-Turks to run private TV channels and radio stations that are better equipped in understanding the social, political, and economic context of their communities.

Note that Turkish immigrant families in Goslar often watch television at home rather than any other activity and sometimes one can see TV running all day long. It can be said that the children of immigrants who follow Turkish media at home through newspapers, magazines, books and TV channels are more capable of speaking Turkish fluently than those who prefer to follow the German media. Put it differently, electronic networking and Turkish TV channels through the satellite function as a “socializing tool” or “box of language-acquirement”. However, it is still

too early to estimate complex and transformative results of the electronic networking and satellite media on the immigrants' social life.

In this context, the electronic networking provides a trans-national sphere in which belongingness and identity become separated from its bounded ties within a territory. What is necessary is that we need adjust our academic perceptions and discourses with the network society and migratory trends to understand the outcomes of trans-national life-styles, cultural practices, and institutional forms in addition to concern about the proceeding affects of the nation-state. On the one hand, we have to see how the identification process becomes fluid and multiple, on the other hand it is also necessary to understand the reactive formation process against this globalizing and migratory movement process.

#### **4.6.1. The Limits of Mediaspaces**

Benedict Anderson (1991[1983]) explained that a community or nation consists of linkages among people (and among their quite disparate activities), linkages that must be imagined since they cannot be experienced directly by people who may not know each other. We imagine community in large part by sharing the coherence of events and people created by the media. But the creation of a sense of simultaneity and coherence out of arbitrary events and images has gone beyond Anderson's print media to include mass media and popular culture, television and film, as well as the flow of people itself. What is imagined as community today is in large part a product of this movement of information, images, and people around the globe, resulting in shifting, interactive ethnoscapes (Appadurai 1991:192; cited by White, 1997: 755).

Appadurai theorizes globalization and the dispersal of migrants across the world advances concepts of ethnoscapes, mediascapes, and technoscapes

as resulting from migration and globalization (Appadurai, 1996). These different 'scapes' allow for an investigation of new forms of identification and the creation of community in a globalizing world. Appadurai, along with other theorists who argue that the nation-state is doomed even goes as far as arguing that global ethnoscaples that develop as results of international migration and increased global flows of information and cultural goods start to replace nation-states as geographical areas of identification (Appadurai. 1996). New mass media such as satellite TV have become available across national boundaries foster new emerging cultural identities (Aksoy and Robbins, 1997) and provide migrants with sources of identification that stretch beyond the national and local contexts of their old and new homes. Mass media, in particular, may contribute to the creation of "virtual neighborhoods" (Appadurai, 1996) that no longer rely on material space and allow for new identifications and community building that is de-territorialized (cited by Ehrkamp 2002: 30)

To put in the words of Ehrkamp (2002), there are a few problems, however if one chooses to consider ethnoscaples (or diasporas, for that matter) as references for identities. Both concepts are ultimately aspatial (despite diaspora's notion of attachment to a 'homeland'), and both only consider migrants and their viewpoints and experiences, thus leaving out the native population addition. Appadurai ( 1996) moves to separate ethnoscaples from media- and technoscaples which is questionable especially when one concurs with the idea that technology has no inherent value outside its mobilizations in specific discourses, practices, institutions and relations of power. Therefore, it can be said that technology may be enabling ethnoscaples because it supports transnational connections and forms a major shaping element for urban landscapes.

It can be true that watching Turkish TV in Goslar is more than just the passive consumption of 'home' culture. However, TV as source of identity

and information is important for Turkish expatriates, as Aksoy and Robins (2002) show for Great Britain, problematizing the 'banal transnationalism' of watching TV as often frustrating for immigrants who become passive recipients rather than being actively engaged in processes and events in Turkey.

#### **4.7. Conclusion: Lessons and Recommendations**

As J. Milton Yinger (1981: 261) writes in his article, "Toward a Theory of Assimilation and Dissimilation", that at this period in human history, at any rate, it is not matter of assimilation *versus* ethnicity, but of assimilation *and* ethnicity. The paradox can be described by an analogy: the force of ethnicity is like the earth's oil. Its production and use can, for a time, go up even as total amount goes down. Ethnicity is now a more prominent social force than it was a generation ago despite major assimilative processes that have brought groups within many societies, and even across societal lines, into closer action.

I expect that as new generations come, there will be various interactions between forces of integration (assimilation) and the forces of ethnicity and religion in Germany. Following Yinger's fruitful analogy, we can only speculate if ethnicity and religion are renewable resources forever being characterized by new contexts. Or we can speculate with Marxist incentives; if religion and ethnicity will in time be replaced by different modes of social relations or social organization.

In Germany, cultural mix, ambivalence and a synthesis of background or traditions remains socially unacceptable in the light of the pressures for cultural homogeneity which emanate from the tradition of the nation state. The host society continues to insist on its right to define the parameters of culture without incorporating the minorities' perspectives. In culture, as in



society, the position of the Turkish minority at the disadvantaged end of the spectrum, has been and remains decisive. The fundamental question is whether the mechanisms of social disadvantage will be consolidated and perpetuated, or whether they will be modified as a gradual equalisation of opportunities and social strata takes effect. Is there evidence that a Turkish middle class and Turkish elites are emerging in Germany? The answer cannot be straightforward: in a global perspective and compared to their country of origin, first-generation migrants have experienced improvements in their lifestyles and gained a sense of upward mobility. This generation lives in a state of inequality with German society which it broadly accepts and which has been called a 'harmonious' inequality. For the second and third generations, the point of comparison and reference has shifted from Turkey, the society of origin for their parents, to Germany, the society of immigration. This focus cannot but highlight the disadvantaged status of Turkish residents and their unfavourable place as an underclass in German society. At the same time, however, a slender elite is beginning to develop which, unlike comparable groups in other countries, remains almost completely unknown. Without a German-Turkish professional culture, without the contribution of a German-Turkish middle class and intellectual elite, German-Turkish everyday culture will tend to look back, retrench, segregate. Tan and Waldhoff (1996) underline that the future of German-Turkish everyday culture lies not in a fundamentalist, conservative or nostalgic clinging to the past, but rather in an innovative change through developing and retaining a bi-cultural approach, a German and Turkish cultural identity. The prospects for Turkish everyday culture and its innovative potential in Germany depend on such an emergence of bi-culturalism among the Turkish minority and no less strongly on the acceptance of bi-culturalism in the German society of immigration.

On the other hand, cultural or social integration of middle class Turkish people would not be a certain remedy to solve the integration problem.

Cultural and social integration have become relevant for upscale Turkish immigrants, but it is of secondary importance to most Turks with low incomes and to those who are part of Germany's underclass. To put it in the words of Mueller (2006) listening to Mozart and reading Schiller would appear strange to the more than 40% of the unemployed adult male Turkish population in Berlin. The same holds for the German lower class, though conservative politicians have never suggested that it adopt the German Leitkultur. Culture cannot be a top-down proposition and attempts to make it so will frequently fail.

Like their parents, the second and third generation of Turkish youth is not a homogenous group in Goslar. They come from a different class, ethnicity, religious sects, and occupations. Their citizenship statuses may be also different. Still, little is known about the contours of these new citizens because they have multiple resources (mixture of local, nationals and global) to construct the identification process. What we know today is that globalization creates new identity forms where culture and territory cannot be easily thought of as an overlapping entity. Culture increasingly becomes fluid, namely culture cannot be defined within a bounded territory with a special reference to one nationality. Identified by a bounded territory, culture is no longer a resource of collective identity.

Whether this process results in the total de-territorialization of identity due to the increasingly accelerated electronic networking is still a question which this study will leave to future research on network society. But what we can assert is that this globalization process is also accompanied by marginalization, poverty and downward integration of the Turkish youths, which forms the reactive identity formation. Thus, globalization and transnationalism does not help to improve the structural equality of the children of immigrants who have mostly experienced downward integration, school drop outs, unemployment, discrimination, etc.

Recently, accelerating the social movement and electronic networking, globalization has caused considerably multi-central social life to emerge in Northern countries where the emotions of hostility, resentment, and xenophobia become the social experiences among both immigrants and natives.

There is no doubt that the globalization process becomes more complicated and complex after the fall of the Berlin wall and the tragic collapse of the World Trade Centers. The immigration and integration policies have become more strict and confining in the light of September 11 which helps to consolidate the scholarly clichés like “clash of civilization”. It also changes the security concepts of the North where immigrants have been seen as a potential threat to the social order. This kind of security perception based on criminalizing the immigrants creates a fragile integration and a risky situation for both immigrant and natives. Tough legislation and strict implementations work with cultural prejudices towards (especially Muslim) immigrants and their descendants.

It is important to note that the children of immigrants have been deeply affected by marginalization, ostracism, and alienation as a result of the process of unemployment, poverty, inequality of opportunity in a globalizing world in addition to the successful integration stories.

Although Turkish youths are different from their parents in challenging and demanding equal rights and implementations and have partially moved ahead, they have to overcome the results of institutional discrimination, and xenophobia in German society. These processes have potential risks for some Turkish youths by putting them into a struggle with their unavoidable alienation and withdrawal in German society.

Most immigrant and their children`s stories are ruled by the same principle: an obligatory struggle with both poverty and hostility in Goslar/German society.

Germany has been facing a period of economic stagnation and dwindling resources for a couple of decades. In that context, the absence of effective immigration policies and anti-discrimination legislation will result in risking the large segments of the German-Turkish communities becoming part of a permanent underclass. The German governing elite is caught in the dilemma posed by the xenophobia of large segments of the German population, large “Christian” parties, and the objective need for policies fostering economic integration rather than the marginalization of German-Turks. Framing the issues in terms of assimilation and acculturation or exclusion and segregation may be helpful, but ignores the socioeconomic and political context. Culture, religion, fundamentalism, the Koran, are readily invoked, deplored, or reconceptualized in order to avoid facing the emerging underclass claiming an ethnic identity of their own.

The social and economic integration of the Turkish minority into German society reflects a systemic problem to which policy makers have not yet found a response. Marginalized by the larger society and separated by cultural and religious life styles, a significant proportion of the Turkish minority is becoming part of a “parallel society” reinforced by discrimination, restricted educational achievements, and a low socioeconomic status (Mueller, 2006).

Despite the fact that there is increasing racism, discrimination and xenophobia in the form of Islamophobia in Goslar, the Turkish population tries to integrate with German society while preserving their Turkish identity. There are several signs of it. For instance, the number of the Turkish population who consider applying and getting German citizenship

tends to increase after the 1999 citizenship law. Beyond that, the youth tend to buy property in Germany more frequently than those of parents who invested in Turkey. Some children of immigrants consider selling their parents` property in Turkey so that they could invest in Germany. There are thousands of Turkish self-employed companies which have already established and invested in Germany.

Those developments would be evaluated as a kind of eagerness to participate in all dimensions of the society without any hindrances. Citizenship is in fact an act by which the people promised to respect and obey the Constitution of Germany even if under conditions that it would have conflicts with Islamic values. What would integration be other than accepting the rules of living together? Participating in the economic life by investing in Germany certainly means that they see their future in Germany. Turkish population is an inseparable partner of European politics and society. Some Turkish civil society, cultural and educational associations and immigrant organizations all over Germany show that the Turkish community is ready to negotiate and live together. This is promising progress. Nonetheless, discrimination would still work against Turkish people who have German citizenship because of their names, religion and ethnic background, which negatively affect the process of integration in all European countries. Thus, getting German citizenship will not be a substantial solution, though it is a crucial step.

The question whether Oker, in the district of Goslar, stays a “Turkish village” as Karin (43, personal conversation, 2006), a German teacher in the Realschule Goslar, says, will be the determinant factor to change unequal structures in the neighborhood of Goslar.

## CHAPTER V

### REACTIVE IDENTITY FORMATION AND TURKISH YOUTH CULTURE IN GOSLAR

#### 5.1. Introduction: Bumpy Lines of Integration: Downward Mobility and Reactions of the Children of Turkish Immigrant

The reactive identity formation explores the linkages through which “immigrant” become “ethnics” or “pious” and the contrasting social and economic results of the process. In keeping with the focus on public policy, I will examine the ways in which state action affects the adaptation process of Turkish immigrant groups and the opportunities for economic mobility and social integration of racial and ethnic minorities.

This reactive identity formation framework informs how immigrants 'become' ethnics (Turkish) in the sense that immigrants and their children want to become a part of German society by challenging, negotiating or establishing a sense of permanence. When faced with structural discrimination by Germans, they strongly view themselves as “Turkish” and part of German society rather than as “guest workers” who will leave eventually. Ethnic and religious mobilization of Turkish immigrants is mostly in the form of reactive behavior as a result of grievances, low status, discrimination, and alienation. They can also show a desire to advance group status in terms of the extent of integration in the broader society.

The reactive ethnicity perspective argues that the social-structural differentiation associated with modernization may sharpen ethnic boundaries and thereby increase their importance as a basis for mobilization. Such ethnic connectedness is, however, largely involuntary, the reaction of peripheral groups to their disadvantaged position in the stratification system as a result of exclusion from the power center by the core group (Ragin 1979; Hechter 1975, 1978; cited by Al-Haj, 2004: 27). According to this model, ethnic solidarity is the reaction of a culturally distinct periphery against exploitation by the center. Reactive solidarity also emerges as a reaction to continuing discrimination and the cultural division of labor.

I use the term reactive identity or reactive ethnicity interchangeably with these three meanings to refer to a particular kind of social identity of children of Turkish immigrants, characterized by their opposition to mainstream values, norms and social groups of German society. From this point of view, reactive identification will be used to refer to a process by which new and lasting social identities are formed in response to discrimination and group ascription.

As this description suggests, reactive identity formation involves two critical components: (1) the encounter with hostility, suspicion or discrimination along imposed ethnic boundaries; (2) and the subsequent political mobilization - often by members of the second generation - around those same boundaries.

The best and most frequently cited example of reactive identity formation can be found in the emergence of the unassimilable Muslim and Turkish identity in post-war Europe. Consistent with the constructionist approach,

this theory holds that many Turkish-Muslim immigrants arrived in Germany after the WWII without a strong sense of belonging to any particular social group and actually developed their ethnic identities in response to the conditions that they encountered upon their arrival in German factories. Specifically, it holds that Turkish immigrants and their descendants frequently develop their social identities as a response to the experience of nativist prejudice and hostility.

Castles (1996: 69) claims that denied a voice in mainstream politics, Turkish immigrant organization often focuses around homeland politics or religious and cultural symbols. The choice in such countries is between sustaining national myths of culture and identity at the price of a divided society with a permanent marginalized minority, or alternatively incorporating immigrants at the price of rethinking national identity.

When faced with external hostility and structural discrimination, immigrants with a Turkish background could not defend themselves with a cultural or social capital which most of them lacked; they embrace religious or nationalistic elements which are a very strong core element in their education in Turkey.

The ways immigrants are incorporated in the host society also affect their propensity to engage in transnational initiatives. The existing evidence suggests that immigrants who become dispersed and whose inconspicuous presence protects them from discrimination are less prone to engage in these ventures. On the other hand, transnational activities flourish in highly concentrated communities, especially those that have been subjected to a hostile reception by the host society's authorities and citizenry. Large co-ethnic concentrations create multiple opportunities for transnational enterprise, while extensive outside discrimination forces the group inwards



encouraging durable contacts with its home communities (Portes, 2003: 880).

In such contexts, transnational cultural activities and civic associations offer a source of solace against external hostility and protect personal dignities threatened by it. The experiences of Haitians, Dominicans and Mexicans in the United States and of Indian and Pakistani migrants in Great Britain, Turks in Germany reported in numerous ethnographic studies, provide evidence of these tendencies (Portes, 2003: 880)

The return to roots, or what has been aptly called “Euro Turkism,” can be seen as a functional adaptation to socioeconomic and cultural factors that lead to marginalization and discrimination by and from German society. This process is reinforced by linguistic factors that limit social interaction or integration between Turks and Germans, especially in leisure activities. Numerous studies report that primary interaction among Turks in Germany takes place within the context of the extended family, followed by contacts in the neighborhood. Being enmeshed into Turkish culture communities, with very few identifying themselves as ‘German,’ and most expressing religious affiliation, many Turks live in a context that structurally inhibits social interaction outside their enclaves (Mueller, 2006: 432).

The process of “distantiation” of the Turks from the German society has been subsumed in Germany under the term re-ethnization, the return to the ethnic roots and the development of a corresponding cultural and, sometimes, religious framework.

Practices of exclusion, discrimination or forced assimilation against immigrants can prevent integration and encourage a homeland orientation. In such cases, enclave communities with their own economic, cultural and political infrastructures may emerge. Where immigrants experience

marginalization or exclusion, their best chance of success lies in mobilizing community solidarity and transnational links – a sort of ‘reactive ethnicity’ (Castles 2002: 1161).

However this approach deserves two main critiques. It overemphasizes cultural retention among minorities, and underemphasizes the impact of trans-nationalization on immigrant cultural adjustment. Cultural retention usually goes hand in hand with adaptation of new elements. Assimilation theory has painted perhaps too strong a picture in that immigrants supposedly get rid of their cultural baggage. It is equally unlikely, however, that immigrant cultures develop without some modification unless rigid seclusion prevails.

Immigrant culture can thus never be identical with country of origin culture. Much evidence points to the thesis that cultural practices and meanings do not simply disappear quickly, reduced to folkloric functions. Going even further, because of eased transnational exchange of meanings across social and symbolic ties, there is nowadays a higher potential that old patterns are transferred and go into a synthesis with new ones. As in the Turkish-German example, Islamic organizations such as *Milli Görüs* have gradually sought to re-adapt to German patterns. For example, not only do they attempt to be recognized as a religious organization with a special status, a quasi-public institution (*Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts*). They have also developed new ideas to reach second-generation Turks in Germany and thereby eased naturalization in addition to dual citizenship (Faist, 2000: 214).

In other words, the ethnic and religious forms and practices of Turkish-Muslim immigrants and their descendants are relatively different from those in Turkey. This reactive identity formation of Turkish immigrants is historically constructed by the social and cultural context of Germany.

Thus, the “repressed identity” which returns as a reaction contains other local (Goslar), national (German and Turkish) and global elements different from the elements of the country of origin. As a result, it is fundamentally syncretic and diverse. One can follow this transformation of reactive identity in Islamic (IGMG, DITIB), Kurdish and Alevi peoples.

Meanwhile , it is significant to note that indeed reactive community or identity formation is not just concerned with cultural preservation or maintenance, but is also a strategy to challenge (if not overcome) social marginalization and to provide a security or protection from discrimination and other exclusionary confrontations.

Reactive ethnicity occurs when real and/or perceived discriminatory treatment leads people away from thinking of themselves as part of receiving society and instead strengthens their ethnic and/or national origin identifications. Indeed, few studies have examined the consequences of reactive ethnicity with respect to this political engagement and affiliation.

Based on my observation of Turkish youth in Goslar, it is safe to suggest that traditional ideas and practices of Turkish immigrants and their descendants undergo a visible transformation in Goslar/Germany that includes their physical and symbolic magnification. Thus, the reactionary identity should not be the same as the identity in the home country, Turkey.

I also argue that reactive identity formation can be adequately understood with terms like “pan-ethnicization”, “symbolic ethnicity” or “symbolic religiosity”, which are different from the original meaning of ethnicity or religion. Reactive formation borrows its characteristics more from the receiving country`s political and social conditions than the sending country. `Symbolic ethnicity and religiosity` becomes a significant concept

when ethnicity and religion merely play a symbolic role rather than what it used to be traditionally. The reaction of ethnic immigrants is the result of the confrontations within the receiving country rather than returning to the original ethnicity or nationality.

“Symbolic ethnicity” is a term coined by Herbert J. Gans. It refers to ethnicity that is individualistic in nature and without real social cost for the individual. These symbolic identifications are essentially leisure time activities, rooted in nuclear family traditions reinforced by voluntary enjoyable aspects of being ethnic. In 1979, Herbert J. Gans published an article in this journal entitled 'Symbolic ethnicity: the future of ethnic groups and cultures in America', which described a stage in the acculturation of American ethnic groups centered around the consumption of ethnic symbols. Gans (1979) argued, in his article, that symbolic ethnicity - and the consumption and other use of ethnic symbols - is intended mainly for the purpose of feeling or being identified with a particular ethnicity, but without either participating in an existing ethnic organization (formal or informal) or practicing an ongoing ethnic culture. He was trying to make empirical observations, not to suggest that contemporary ethnicity was unauthentic, unserious, or meaningless, to use some of the synonyms that critics invented in discussing symbolic ethnicity. His hypothesis is that for third and later generations, ethnicity is often symbolic, free from affiliation with ethnic groups and ethnic cultures, and instead dominated by the consumption of symbols, for example at ethnic restaurants, festivals, in stores that sell ethnic foods and ancestral collectibles, and through vacation trips to the Old Country (Gans,1992: 44 ). For young people especially, immersion in their so-called host culture is easier and socially more rewarding than paying obeisance to an old culture that has little meaning for them, mainly to please their parents and grandparents (Gans 1994: 579).

Symbolic ethnicity can be expressed in a myriad of ways, but above all, it is characterized by a nostalgic allegiance to the culture of the immigrant generation, or that of the old country; a love for and a pride in a tradition that can be felt without having to be incorporated in everyday behavior. The feelings can be directed at a generalized tradition, or at specific ones: a desire for the cohesive extended immigrant family, or for the obedience of children to parental authority, or the unambiguous orthodoxy of immigrant religion, or the old-fashioned despotic benevolence of the machine politician.

People may even sincerely desire to 'return' to these imagined pasts, which are conveniently cleansed of the complexities that accompanied them in the real past, but while they may soon realize that they cannot go back, they may not surrender the wish. Or else they displace that wish on churches, schools, and the mass media, asking them to recreate a tradition, or rather, to create a symbolic tradition, even while their familial, occupational, religious and political lives are pragmatic responses to the imperatives of their roles and positions in local and national hierarchical social structures (Gans, 1979: 9).

Serkan, who is a father of two girls, wants to teach them all Turkish traditions and Islam in order to give them idea about their roots. He finds the religion, Islam the most important element in Turkish tradition to teach them. However, he agrees on the idea of giving them Islam instruction in German language. Ercan and his wife mostly speak with their girls in German at home. For him, religion is much more important than the ethnicity. (Serkan, 24, interview, 2006)

Turkish director of *Arbeiterwohlfahrt (AWO)* of Goslar, Tarkan (55, interview, 2006) points out the irony of the children of immigrants related to this symbolic ethnicity by saying:

“...there is a paradoxical condition in the issue that younger people here become more and more nationalist day by day, although they were born, educated and socialized in Germany. They cannot really speak Turkish well; they know German culture rather than the Turkish one. They know very little about Turkey or Islam but they become a fan of Turkishness or Islam. It would be the results of discriminative conditions where they are not easily accepted by Germans. Still their Turkish-flagged t-shirts become more and more magnified” Tarkan (55, interview, 2006).

The third generation can obviously attend to the past with less emotional risk than first and second generation people who are still trying to escape it, but even so, an interest in ethnic history is a return only chronologically. When I spoke with Fatma who is a second generation Turkish youth, she seemed to be very proud of Turkish history although she had not had a Turkish history lesson. “When comparing our Turkish history with the German one, I can say we have a long history of victories but we cannot benefit from this great past” (Fatma, 24, interview, 2006).

Gans (1979: 12) notes that identity cannot exist apart from a group and that symbols are themselves part of a culture, and in that sense, symbolic ethnicity can be viewed as an indicator of the persistence of ethnic groups and cultures. Symbolic ethnicity, however, does not require functioning groups or networks; feelings of identity can be developed by allegiances to symbolic groups that never meet, or to collectivities that meet only occasionally, and exist as groups only for the handful of officers that keep them going. By the same token, symbolic ethnicity does not need a practiced culture, even if the symbols are borrowed from it.

It is interesting to recognize during the interviews in Goslar that although many Turks, particularly those of the second and third generations who were born or raised in Germany, have only limited exposure to Turkey, Turkey retains the status of a geographical origin myth, kept alive through

the dream of final return, not only among the first generation but also second and third generation however it is unrealistic.

Hakan, who labels himself liberal-leftist second generation shared his experience with me about some nationalist friends of his:

“I asked some ultra-nationalist Turkish youths about Turkish history and the political meaning of Turkish nationalism. They cannot answer because they don't know the details of the nationalist ideals which they have. They don't know the meaning or content of the symbols of three-crescents or the grey wolf that they carry on their necklace. They only want to show how they feel like Turks” (Hakan, 23, interview, 2006).

In addition, education in Turkey was not primarily geared to conveying knowledge that would aid people in their peasant existence, or in breaking away from it. Its main aim was to transmit the Turkish national ideology and promote the cultural integration of the country (*see* Coenen, 2001:56-73, cited by Crul and Vermeulen 2003: 972). The people who don't know about the secular education process which gives the first generation immigrant people a strong nationalistic view and ideology even at primary schools in Turkey cannot understand why the Turkish population is so proud of their nationality. The cultural background and the strong nationalistic view of first generation immigrants may contribute to tight relations among Turkish immigrant as ethnic identity. This background would also be responsible for the `symbolic ethnicity` of the successive generations.

Also, Gans (1994) mentions the concept of “symbolic religiosity” which refers to the use of religious symbols, apart from regular participation in a religious culture and in religious affiliations - other than for purely secular purposes. As a sacred rather than secular activity, symbolic religiosity is presumably not as often a leisure-time activity as symbolic ethnicity, but none the less, it involves the use of religious symbols in such a way as to create no complications or barriers for dominant secular lifestyles.

As far as the performance of rituals is concerned, only a small number of Turkish young people observe prescribed Islamic practices. Young Turks know little about their religion and they generally do not fulfill the required religious duties. Yet most of them still believe in Islam. This means that a symbolic religiosity is developing among the Turkish youth who seem to be increasingly feeling the tension generated by the continuity of traditional values and changes in social and cultural environments. It appears that young Turks will experience this tension at least for the foreseeable future (Küçükcan, 2004: 251). For instance, the case that I have continuously experienced at the Goslar train station would explain how religion is symbolic for younger generation Turks. I saw four Goslarian Turkish girls who were waiting for the train to travel to Braunschweig, (a big city sixty kilometers away from Goslar) in the Goslar station (*Bahnhof*). They were smartly dressed (their ages from 14 to 18) and were speaking of a birthday celebration in their mixed German and Turkish words. One said: “I need first to celebrate my birthday in the mosque by praying with religious verses. I need to pray by reciting twice the *Yasin* verses for my birthday. I have to learn these verses” before going to the mosque. It was not clear in her conversation, however, why she has to celebrate her birthday in the mosque. Normally Muslim people do not celebrate their personal birthday festivities in the mosques.

## **5.2. Youth Cultures: Turkish Youth Want To Be “Normal”**

“Ah Germany is a place of complexity”. (“Deutschland ist eine grosse bunte Tüte!!”)

*Metin, 19, interview, 2006*

Today, many Turkish workers and their children seem willing to embrace reactionary ideologies. The following long quotation from a Turkish anti-



racist group tries to explain why, and also says a lot about the way Turkish workers experience German society:

“As the Turkish workers were recruited and later, as their families came, they discovered at first that they were welcome as workers but despised as human beings. Where they sought a dwelling, which they often only found with great difficulty, they had the experience that Germans moved out, because they did not want to live under the same roof as Turks. Where they were provided with dwellings by the state or their employers, these were often dwellings in which Germans no longer wanted to live because there was a lack of sanitary facilities, etc. The different culture of the Turks, their different socialization, was unilaterally rejected by the majority of the German left which puts emphasis on issues like the severe repression of Turkish women, without knowing its causes through their own experience, while ignoring for instance the significance of mutual neighborly help. This meant that foreign citizens were not treated humanely by the Germans, and were forced into a ghetto situation. At the same time, such treatment created the desire among Turkish citizens of at least maintaining a degree of national and cultural identity. The process of withdrawal from a society in which foreigners were only welcome as workers began. Turkish associations and tea – rooms were set up, in which it was possible to find some part of that emotional security which had been lost through emigration to an alien and hostile country. But exclusion from German society also created the conditions for the spread of mistaken nationalist feelings and even fascist ideas among foreigners. The idea that all Germans were bad arose for many people from the shattering experiences of daily life in Germany. Today German racist nationalism is therefore matched by nationalism on the part of the foreigners. Nationalism is in principle a mistaken and harmful idea, but it is necessary to differentiate between the nationalism of the oppressor and the nationalism of the oppressed which arises in response. The nationalism of the oppressed is wrong and harmful and must therefore be overcome through joint struggle; the nationalism of the oppressor is a crime” (Castles et al. 1984: 221).

German politics has failed on the immigration and integration policy. The integration failure has multiple sides and we have to admit that German politics has dealt with immigrants by seeing them as a labor force for industrialization and technological development. This approach has automatically neglected the human consequences of this process. Germans have not been concerned about the children of immigrants up to now.

Today, almost 10 percent of the German population is composed of *Auslander*, foreigners. Nonetheless German authorities still tend to reject the notion of Germany as a country of immigration. Germany still has difficulty viewing itself as permanent immigrant society or viewing the

native second generation or third generation Turkish immigrants as nationals, irrespective of their legal status. Though the children of Turkish immigrants offspring were born, raised, and educated in Germany, the ethnic conception of German nationhood (*volk*) based on common descent made it difficult for German authorities to accept their Germanness. Ethnic conception of German nationhood was challenged in the 2000 citizenship law. Despite the political resistance to accepting German-born Turks as German, the official label for immigrants has slowly shifted from *Auslander* to *Mitburger* (cocitizen) to incorporate the second generation, a change partially reflected in the new citizenship laws since 2000. Young generations can acquire German citizenship and participate in local politics, but this does not guarantee social recognition as ‘Germans’.

It is clear that both endogenous factors like human capital, family background and pre-migration class standing but also exogenous and structural factors such as racial discrimination, declining economic opportunities, and the exposure to the adversarial outlooks of native-born youths caused Turkish youth to have a reactive identity formation which Perlman and Waldinger (1997) called "the second generation revolt."

While Turks may become “co-citizens with equal rights” (*Gleichberechtigte Mitburger*), they can never become “German” or participate fully in German society, regardless of where their behavior falls on the scale. German ethnicity and national identity are based on blood, not on behavior. This is true regardless of citizenship status. One second-generation Turkish man who was born in Germany, had a German passport, spoke flawless German, and had a secure civil-service job was refused an apartment by a landlord who said, ‘I don't care what your passport says; you're not German’. The hidden impossibility of this premise perpetuates the image of the Turkish community as essentially other and unassimilable. Turks, as the Other, have always been considered

*Auslander*, and some argue that Germans consider Turks among the most inferior groups of foreigners (which also include long-term pockets of Italians, Spaniards, Greeks, and others), due in no small part to religious differences. Many of the *Aussiedler* lack familiarity with the German language and culture and are dependent on government support and training; they automatically receive German citizenship and full access to Germany's social welfare system. What had been a German-Turk dichotomy increasingly has taken on connotations of western versus eastern people"(White, 1997).

The political exclusion of foreign residents is frequently linked to socio-economic marginalization. Most were recruited as manual workers and have had few chances of upward mobility. Concentration in poor housing and discrimination in training and employment has carried this disadvantaged position over to much of the second generation. Such marginality and exclusion has fed into the stereotypes of difference and inferiority fostered by extreme-right groups, especially since 1989. One result is growing violence against both long-standing foreign residents and new asylum-seekers. Another consequence has been the growing mobilization of immigrant youth - especially Turks - to fight exclusion and discrimination. Since mainstream political expression is largely denied, mobilization is largely around cultural and religious symbols - further strengthening fears of 'otherness' and fundamentalism (Castles, 1996: 58).

Feeble and inconsistent social policies and genuine cultural relativism engender a serious hazard of cultural separatism. Anxious to produce an accelerated adjustment process for the second generation, parents and educators motivated by different motives are encouraged to construct new or old identities. What is emerging is religious fundamentalism in the name of freedom of worship; ultra-nationalism in the name of the right to difference or forms of over-integration involving rejection of and contempt

or hatred for one's own culture of origin. This again leads to alienation and may push some youngsters in despair to rebellious youth gangs.

Thus, we see in the Europe of today two contradictory approaches. In the first one, individuals are confronting each other in a wide, open field of economic competition open to all, provided the qualifications exist. In the second approach, we see a secluded, carefully segmented social and political terrain in which different organizations and evidence of a pluralistic society are participating in the articulation and realization of societal demands. Entrance into this terrain is strictly reserved for European citizens. This explains why cultural barriers are so powerful: immigrants or citizens preserving a Muslim identity, when placing their religious affiliation in the forefront of their demands, are charged with being unidimensional in their outlook and unable to achieve integration. However, one could equally say that they demand as much as they are forced into their role (Abadan-Unat 1992: 404).

From a sociological point of view, the third and fourth generation of Turkish youths both embrace the Turkish symbols and traditions coming from their home experiences and internalize German and Western values and cultures in general. At first sight, it seems a paradoxical and uncompromising identity form but once it is closely analyzed, it becomes clearer that they want to live together with German society by demanding to be accepted as equal partners. It seems that they are against alienation and the isolation of some neighborhoods they lived in rather than challenging German life-style or values. Thus, they seem to struggle with the discriminative and hierarchical conditions they faced with feeling like immigrants and citizens at the same time.

It can be stated that the behaviors of the youth represent neither a cultural conservatism nor a full assimilation but the statement of `integration by

preserving multiple values` can probably define their situation. The Turkish youth` demands in Goslar can be classified as both aspirations of `not being subjected to external restriction` and “free cultural life as much as possible”. These two demands demonstrate that they want to be normal and they want to be treated normally.

These transformations experienced by new generations contribute to the development of a new situation in which German politics has also changed its perception from a `non-immigration country` into `a multicultural society` albeit it occurs gradually. German politicians and elites do not want to get rid of the integration philosophy of differentialist exclusionism that has been especially true for cultural and political issues and which remains the most challenging question in relation to the children of Turkish immigrants as equal partners. Although the differential exclusionist policies were more valid for and functioned well against guest-workers, it is still accurate and concentrated in popular and official discourses which indirectly affect the children of immigrants.

For instance, the statements of a university student respondent show that it is necessary that German perception towards children of immigrants should be also transformed:

**Murat:** Whenever I say that I am a Turk, I become awful, but also whenever I say that I am German, I become outrageous again.

**F.G:** Why?

**Murat:** Once I said that I am German, my friends responded by questioning if I did my military service in Turkey. I said “Are you crazy man, I am German. All guys in the trains were laughing at me...Do you understand?”

**F.G:** Sure.

**Murat:** They thought that I was kidding but I was so serious.

**F.G:** You are a German citizen.

**Murat:** I meant it so. I said that I am German and I don't have to do military service in Turkey. They started to laugh again and again lying on the ground. So, I become terrible when I both say I am Turk or German (Murat, 24, interview, 2006).

This study is well aware of not treating the identity of Turkishness as a homogenous and closed entity rather it underlines that the identity formation of children of immigrants has multiple resources in so far as local, national and global values are all together affective in this process. That is why we don't need value-loaded identity definitions which are only based on ethnic or national features. We need to accentuate the affinities of seemingly incommensurable stages of 'host' and 'home' country cultures.

### **5.3. The Youth Centers in Goslar: 'GLEIS 95' AND 'BGX'**

In Germany the youth centers are designed to function for stopping youth crime and to give the youth some possibilities and perspectives. This center aims to socialize youth by helping them with social and psychological support. The youth who visit the youth centers mostly have problems with their parents or teachers or other authority figures. Most don't show respect to the older people. They quite often use slang words.

I visited two youth centers during the fieldwork between the years of 2005-2006: One is "BGX" which is located in central Goslar. The other youth centre is placed in Oker, which is called "Gleis 95".

Based on the observations in the youth centers, BGX and Gleis 95, one of the most interesting cultural transformations that I have recognized is the language use of second and third-generation Turks who, in contrast to their parents, have a firm command of German. Most youth speak German better than Turkish. When they speak Turkish, it is often with a German accent or even modelled on a German dialect. Some modify their Turkish by adding German grammatical and syntactical structures. By and large, these generations learn Turkish in their parental home, in the neighbourhood and their community. Most study Turkish as a foreign language, a subject now offered in many German schools.

Some Turkish youth prefer to speak a mixed language in which either Turkish or German is the dominant component. Language formation reflects the wide variety of ways in which the Turkish and German lifestyles touch or overlap and constitute the social environment and milieu for that generation. Concepts, ideas and patterns of feeling from the two spheres merge to produce their own peculiar mix of linguistic symbols and expressions. This applies to grammar and phonetics, and even to pitch, breathing and intonation. Some people prefer to use Turkish only to express certain experiences or feelings, using German for a different set of purposes. Many, for instance, who are fluent in German switch to Turkish when it comes to counting, whereas they will continue to speak German in a political debate, even if the topic is wholly specific to Turkey. Others think and write in German but opt for Turkish when caressing their children, partners or pets. Others again will change language on specific occasions, for instance switching to Turkish at dances and musical events, banquets and drinking sessions, or in situations such as states of fatigue, intoxication, intense joy, mourning, anger or rage. Such code-switching may occur during a conversation, sometimes even in mid-sentence; it usually happens automatically without a conscious decision by the speaker. To outsiders who are not familiar with both languages, the constant jumping from one to the other language can be irritating. Not surprisingly, its speakers are frequently deemed to have only a partial-command of language, what is known as *Halbsprachigkeit* (Tan and Waldhoff 1996: 145).

Violence with its both symbolic and practical forms through slang, bad words and fighting is part of some youths 'everyday life. This condition cannot be sustainable and this would result in more isolation for the youths even in their peer-groups. This isolation can be easily recognized if one analyzes closely the backgrounds of the attractive street words. It can be

said that the Turkish youth in Goslar just want to be normal in the eye of German and Turkish society.

It should be noted that youth centers are seen as a center of gangs, drug users, and vagrant people by both Germans and Turkish people, although the reality is somewhat different. Youth centers are the places which most children of immigrants and German youths regularly visit. Playing some games, chatting, listening to music, dancing, playing cards, getting help from social pedagogues on homework or writing curriculum vitae are the fundamental activities in the youth centers. Youth centers regularly help youth`s homework or writing a curriculum vitae, or applying for jobs and serve them social support if they demand to get help for their conflicts with parents or other people. Besides, they organize concerts, festivals and trips some of which are free of charge for the young, including girls. In youth centers, there are billiard tables, television, play station, kicker tables, tennis tables, internet facilities and small disco and music rooms for youth activities. Finally, the youth centers serve a creative class where 3-4 age children draw pictures, play games, do designing, wood carving, etc. once a week.

Some Turkish youth may face substantial conflict at schools, youth centers and streets by being subjected to verbal (e.g., ‘scheiss Turken’[damned Turks]) and physical abuse including gang fights with quite a few German and Russian-German gangs in their struggle for power and control of these areas in Goslar. As a result of these conflicts, the Turkish students formed an ethnic solidarity group on the basis of common religion, language, culture and physical appearance and found safety in their national (Turkish) identities. As a result, as Faas (2007) points out, this ethnically charged context would make it extremely difficult for first- and second-generation Turkish students to identify with Germany, let alone Europe.



For example, it is said that youth in Oker are more inclined to solve their problems with violence which would be an outcome of the psychological and structural conditions of the youths. In Oker, most people that I spoke with emphasized the poor condition of the district when compared with the other areas of Goslar. Most Germans, including the social pedagogue of the two youth centers, tend to emphasize the traditional structure and socialization process of those Turkish youth at home by neglecting the responsibility of German state and structural inequality. However, the approach of some German professionals (teachers and social pedagogues) seem to be paradoxical because the youth- if we think about third and fourth generation- have been educated or socialized by the German education system.

A Turkish social pedagogue, Nazmiye, who has worked in Goslar for a long time defines the situation of violence among Turkish youth as a phenomenon which has emerged from a mixed outcome of socio-economic conditions, socialization and lower education level. She explains the phenomenon as follows:

“It seems that some youth in Goslar and Germany tend to use violence as a normal way of behavior. Why do people use violence? It is a kind of problem solution method. However, the reality is more about `nested socialization` process between street culture and traditional family structure; they want to solve their problems through violence. It is somehow a tendency. The reasons are related with the educational level and their social class. We use different terms and terminologies to define this youth violence. Some claim that it is in relation to working class or proletarian culture. This evaluation is not wrong but it seems that it neglects that there are so many combinations and transitions between classes. However, the social, economic and cultural structure of many residents in Oker fit this working class explanation. Whether we are right in this interpretation is irrelevant but we can draw this picture” (Nazmiye, 45, interview, 2006).

The new generations of Turkish youth get their social roles from German society and practice them even in their family relations. It naturally includes some protests against traditional roles of the family. On the other

hand, parents do not accept the behavior which would mean breaking their authority and power.

Returning to strict traditions, emphasizing Islamic social rules and strongly referring to the past among Turkish immigrant families can be understood as an aspiration to challenge the new situation where parents` lost or decreased their power and authority in the process of immigration and settlement in Germany. These conditions would somehow turn out to be an opportunity for males (old parents and big brothers) in the family to gain their losing power again by renovating their traditional pressure via Islamic tools after suffering such a settlement process. Losing control of the children with decreasing power would enforce parents to return to their patriarchic roles.

Generally, the Turkish youth in Goslar represent themselves via life-styles which include the colors of social class, ethnicity, nationality, cultural and local features. Thus, identity formation is a very complex process in which multiple resources contribute to the process through class, gender, ethnicity, locality and globalism together.

Violence, crime and vandalism are also particular features which seem a part of most Turkish youth`s life. The reasons vary in crime and migration literature. In Goslar, we have observed that the ghetto district, Oker, has more Turkish youth gangs and violent groups than central Goslar. There is a close relation between socio-economic class, ethnicity and education level and the tendency of crime, violence and vandalism. When we consider that violence and crime tend to be related to age, anarchism or nihilism at early ages, they can be added as temporary factors for the violent or criminal cases of Goslarian youth.

In the youth centers the Gleis 95 and BGX, Turkish youth' expressions are often accompanied by violent gestures, bad language, and exaggerated words. They mention to each other how they fight with Germans and try to convince others how strong Turks are and weak Germans are by showing their pride in doing that. They also record some fighting at schools and put the videos on the *youtube*.

Hans who is a seventeen-year old German teenager exposes his experiences with Turkish youth in Gleis 95:

“The problem for me is that the behavior was too animal; they fought for jokes and to test their own strength. Another aspect is their topics. They talked very long about old fights with other people, and they were very proud about this; they talked about fashion and appearance. No conversations about religion or intellectual themes. The Turkish girl made a superficial impression, nevertheless kind” (Hans, 17, interview, 2006).

Hans served as an assistant Social pedagogue for two months in 2006. He says, “Turkish boys were friendly to me. I helped a Turkish youth write an application for a job. He was sent by the Federal Police Force to work in social affairs in the youth center because of violent actions in Goslar. He was involved in fights and shot with a gun at McDonalds. Nobody was injured” (Hans, 17, personal conversation, 2006).

Monika, who is a director and social pedagogue of Gleis 95 youth center in Oker exposes the perception of inhabitants of Goslar about the Turkish Youth, which is mostly negative:

“For a lot of people the hearing of loud Hip-Hop, which is played by cell phones, Ipod etc of Turkish boys is very interesting in the town. It is very unpleasant. Some Turkish youths are well-known in the town due to their distinct behavior. They go to bad schools and split every minute to the ground and make a lot of rubbish. Therefore, the time of parties is very difficult. Russian youth is against Turkish youth, Turkish youth from Goslar against Turkish youth from Brunswick Braunschweig) or Vienenburg. The Turkish youth always talked about who are the best street fighters in the meetings. For the inhabitants this is not enjoyable. But we know that this is only the bad view of the Turks. The view contrary to this is described in the first part” (Monika, 35, interview, 2006).

However, there is also an affirmative picture in youth centers in Goslar, though it is relatively rare case. During my conversation, interviews and daily activities, I have recognized that some Turkish youth who are the children of middle class and professionals can express themselves freely and strongly mostly in German and by using their body language and gestures effectively. They can demand whatever they want, and can preserve their rights like most of the German youths. There seems to be no substantial differences between German and these Turkish youth in terms of self-esteem and self-confidence.

The children of Turkish professionals in Goslar were described in an affirmative way by Hans as the following:

“Some Turks really have a different world-view and behavioral patterns. For example, some boys and girls go to high schools or secondary modern schools. They have decency and good behavior and they haven’t a bad reputation for an aggressive self-presentation. I have a friend named Serkan Kagan from Goslar who studies economics now in Great Britain; he is there because his family has a house and a firm in London. He is a friendly young man now and in the past. We went to school together and had nice adventures. Hakan, an acquaintance from Goslar, whose father is a doctor, is very active in soccer, in sport clubs and exercises with passion. We can say that these people have already adapted in the society, and are in contact with everybody” (Hans, 17, interview, 2006).

Youth center Gleis 95 regularly organizes a meeting per three months on “Youth Security and Violence in Oker” together with police stations, civil society associations, and representatives of the municipality. The meetings that I have participated in regularly were devoted to the problems of violence and security among Turkish, German and Russian gangs in Goslar. The major subjects among others were the illegal cases and criminal potential among Turkish boys. All official participants agreed to take urgent social precautions to socialize those youths who feel themselves excluded and marginalized but they did not formulate the precautions on precisely how to deal with the problem. The officials often pointed out that the violence; criminal and illegal cases were increasing in

Oker rather than decreasing, by giving some statistical numbers about the jailed immigrant youths in Oker and Goslar.

In the German public mind the image of immigrant Turkish youth is per se an irresponsible, alienated and subversive subject associated with crime and drug taking. The 'problematizing' of immigrant youth would serve the legitimation of the structural discrimination policies and its hierarchical outcomes.

How can the children of the second generation be expected to adopt the life styles and attitudes of their peers so despised by many sectors of the receiving society? These young people, rather than seeking their own cultural roots, are tempted to integrate into a community that does not follow the laws of the traditional adult society of their own, but the laws of what the media calls the "world of the young." Wherever this option is adopted, the likelihood of being rejected by the closest group a young person possesses, namely his family, is very high. Rejected by his family, loosely inserted in a vague terrain of marginal existence, entrance in marginal groups or criminal youth gangs seems to offer the only solution for survival (Abadan-Unat 1992: 406). From this point of view, high crime rates may be seen as a sign that basic rules and norms of a society are not fully accepted by the offenders, but they may equally be seen as an indicator that the offenders are not fully accepted as members of the society of which they are part. (Entzinger and Biezeveld, 2003: 25)

Contrary to an all-inclusive characterization of the 'mainstream', it is evident that what immigrants aspire to for their children, if not for themselves, are the levels of occupational status and income making possible the enviable lifestyles of the mostly white upper middle class (Portes, et al., 2005:1004). In the welfare state of Germany, some Turkish immigrants can have access to some opportunities which provide well-

remunerated professional and entrepreneurial careers and the affluent lifestyles associated with them. Nonetheless, one can recognize in Goslar and Oker that not everyone can have access to these positions and that, at the opposite end of society, there is a very unenviable scenario of youth gangs, drug-dictated lifestyles, premature childbearing, imprisonment, and early death.

Structural discrimination and institutional discrimination include building political and economic boundaries between people by preventing some people to gain access of information, housing, labor and education. Personal or individual discrimination can be also effective but it is different from group discrimination which curtails some people from accessing valuable sources like job and education. Racialization and discrimination is not about reality but emotions. Stereotypes are distortions of the reality. They are based on the distorted reality by media and public opinion about the “other.”

Metin tries to point out the process of racialization and distorting reality by media:

“Germans are always racist. When they see any foreign people on TV, they show me and say `look Ozan how the Turks are`. Not all Turks are the same! This is racism; they always speak of Turks in bad ways for instance, saying that Turks take our jobs away. If you want to know the reality they are always racist against us everywhere like outside, on the streets, in working places and shopping centers, schools etc. This is not fair. I don't like Germans, they are always the same and they simply think about Turks in negative ways. German people are not objective. And it starts from the way German teachers teach German children. Then how can we become equal?” (Metin, 19, interview, 2006).

Metin further emphasizes that:

“Although I was born and grew up in Germany, I have recognized that I will never be welcomed here!!! They always say why Turks or foreigners don't integrate this society, which irritates me. How can we integrate this society if they are against all dark hair and skin. I consider living in Turkey very much but I haven't decided yet” (Metin, 19, interview, 2006).

Also, Metin criticizes Germans of being racist:

“Germans say ‘Turks take our jobs’. These are prejudices and simply are a sum of information coming from book, newspapers, Television etc. For example, I found this training position in Real after sending 200 applications to other companies. Finally I found this. Imagine 200 applications! In this branch of Real supermarket in Goslar, there are 177 employees but no Turks except me. After recognizing that a Turk should be 10 times better than a German in order to get the same position, now I have become ambitious. That’s why I always listen to Hip Hop music which criticizes Germany very much” (Metin, 19, interview, 2006).

It seems that Turkish youth like any other counterparts in the world are faced with such difficult alternatives between upward or downward mobility in German context where structural inequality and institutional discrimination sometimes become rule rather than a contingency : “Princeton or prison, Yale or jail” in German context. Whichever the Germans want the Turks to become, however, still remains unclear.

Based on my observation in the two youth centers, *Gleis 95* and *BGX*, most Turkish youth who visit the youth center have problems with their parents at home because of high unemployment among immigrant families. As their families are also unemployed, they have to live in small or narrow houses. They come here to relax and have a break from their conflicts at home. They cannot resist their parents at home as much as they want because of their respect for them. They have also problems at schools. Their family cannot help them in the education process. Therefore, they cannot be successful in their educational career.

One can recognize that there is a gender difference about career planning in the sense that girls seem more sensitive to choosing their careers and take their responsibilities more seriously in the educational process than boys. Some Turkish boys like entertaining and enjoying their time without wanting to have so many responsibilities. One respondent, Ismail (36, interview, 2006) said me that “I can get money from the state without

having an education. My friends graduated from universities but most have no jobs”. He can get 345 Euro/month as a social aid. He did not seem to consider tomorrow and he was happy with this amount today. However, it is not about the Turkish mentality because they were born and grew up in Germany. The German state is responsible for not giving them perspective and it makes them dependent on the limited social aid.

In Goslar, youths have no close relationship with their relatives. They mostly gather with people who like the same sportive activities or entertainments. They spend their time with peer groups rather than relatives. The relationship with relatives is also depended on the tradition of their family. It is also important which regions of Turkey their parents come from. The people of the Eastern part of Turkey (mostly Kurdish), for example, seem to have more feudal relations in their family. They are relatively more conservative with relatives and family members compared with the people of the Western part of Turkey.

Serenay (16, interview, 2006) believes that Germany is her motherland rather than Turkey in the sense that she has grown up here. She feels that Turkey is a secondary land for her because she knows its language and her parents originally come from there:

“I cannot survive in Turkey, she says, because of political ambiguities and the lack of respect for human rights. Here, I know my democratic legal rights and how to defend myself however I don’t think democracy is developed in Turkey as much as here. I might even be imprisoned due to my political thought and ideals that I struggle for. I am afraid, human rights are not consolidated in Turkey yet. They still don’t value the life of a human being” (Serenay, 16, interview, 2006).



#### **5.4. Telling the Truth to Power: Aliens in Their Own Land**

This fieldwork in Oker and Goslar exposes the structural exclusion mechanisms as an outcome of ghettoization process creates a youth typology within which the children of immigrants challenge the structural (restrictive) rules by trying to preserve their rights and identity to stay who they are. This youth typology is not far from the anarchist youth movement of Afro-Americans, Germans, Arabs and Turks who have anger against the structural rules. Those groups have the shared experiences of rage and humor. For example, in the youth centers some German youth use several Turkish slang words like “*ulan*”, “*lan*” (dude) which shows a common rage and humor among German and Turkish youth. Some Turkish youth often add German slang to their Turkish conversations like *alter* (dude), *scheiss* (damned), or *scheissegal* (of no damned importance).

The growing trans-nationalization of immigrants’ activities encompasses all spheres of life. The ways immigrants are incorporated in the host society also affect their propensity to engage in transnational initiatives. The existing evidence suggests that immigrants who become dispersed and whose inconspicuous presence protects them from discrimination are less prone to engage in these ventures. On the other hand, transnational activities flourish in highly concentrated communities, especially those that have been subjected to a hostile reception by the host society's authorities and citizenry. Large co-ethnic concentrations create multiple opportunities for transnational enterprise, while extensive outside discrimination forces the group inwards encouraging durable contacts with its home communities (Portes, 2003: 880).

In such contexts, transnational cultural activities and civic associations offer a source of solace against external hostility and protect personal dignities threatened by it. In this ethnographic study, the experiences of Turks in Goslar can be reported as evidence of these tendencies.

The cultural sphere, especially the popular culture of German Turks, is highly trans-nationalized. Turkish youth cultures in Berlin and in Germany exhibit multiple and multi-local sources. For instance, several music groups such as Cartel, Culture Clash and Islamic Force are popular among the so-called second- and third-generation German Turks. A particular type of music, style of entertainment and collective identity has been formed around these bands and their music, which mixes various musical elements, instruments, styles and traditions from Turkey and Germany. However, it would be misleading to reduce the heterogeneity of this musical style to a simple crossover between Turkish and German elements. Rather, images, styles and elements from black, Asian and world pop music are part of the mixture as much as anything else. Thus, together with German and Turkish, the English language is an integral part of this style (Çağlar, 2001: 607). To put in the words of Elflein (1998), they used this new form of expression, influenced by American hip hop, to explore and deal with the idea of being "strangers" or "foreigners" even when they had been born German.

Also, Soysal points out the same process by implying that the youth culture is beyond traditional and national:

“...To complete the picture, let me briefly refer to the second-generation immigrants, who are seen as enigmatic producers of diasporic cultures and identities. Far from being simple extensions of their ‘homelands’, the second-generation immigrants-Maghrebins, Pakistanis, Turks, Caribbeans, Bengalis living in the immigration capitals of Europe-negotiate and map collective identities which are dissociated from ethno-cultural citizenships. They appropriate their identity symbols as much from global cultural flow as host or home country cultural practices. As ‘youth subcultures’, they are increasingly part of the global, in many ways bypassing the national or traditional. Thus, it should not come as a surprise that Turkish youth in Germany listen to the rap music as much as, if not more than they listen to Turkish *sarki* or German *Lied*. Or that the immigrant ‘youth gangs’ adopt names in English: Two Nation Force, Turkish Power Boys, Cobras and Bulldogs. Or that they form rap groups cleverly

called Cartel, Microphone Mafia, and Islamic Force, and that their graffiti on Berlin walls very much replicate the acclaimed styles of New York” (Soysal, 2002: 139).

In the journal *Kauderzanca*, published by second-generation immigrants (mainly of Turkish origin), the concept ‘German Turk’ is criticized on the ground that it still designates and discriminates people as ‘Turks’. In order to overcome this stigmatisation, *Kauderzanca*’s publishers explicitly stress that they want to identify themselves as simply belonging to Berlin-‘we are all Berliners’. The publishers express a desire to be treated and accepted like, and in no way different from, German youth (Çağlar, 2001: 608).

As it is known, Turkish hip hop in Germany has been much more than music. Rather, it is basically used to protest perception of world, politics, culture, emotions, expressions, gesture, posture, visibility, imagination which seek to emancipate the attributed roles and meaning of Turkish immigrants and their descendants.

A diversification exists in German-Turkish culture through creative works of hip hop music, film, theatre, literature, painting and academic research which are aimed at Turkish-speaking migrants in Germany, at German-speaking Turks, at Germans or more broadly at all of these groups. In addition, innumerable avant-garde works seem to owe little or nothing to the background of the artist, and Turkish origin no longer appears to matter.

A growing number of enthusiasts claim that under certain circumstances cultural diversity can lead to greater innovative potential, as exemplified in the ‘creative class’ of young, highly qualified professionals who congregate in ethnically mixed residential districts (Florida 2005). What is usually not highlighted is that these districts are also quite homogeneous regarding socioeconomic class positions; this time not at the lower end.

They name ethnic diversity as the actual cause of the desired or lamentable situation of social cohesion, without actually examining to what extent macro-structural changes, say, on the labor market, may affect people's scope to shape their leisure and community life. One could equally plausibly assume that the acceleration of work life and especially the financial necessity of taking on two jobs have given rise to behavioral change in political and community life (Kivisto and Faist 2007: 95-101). There is thus a failure to mention how diversity is structurally embedded and how diversity develops through macro-structural transformation and the changing landscape of social inequality (Faist, 2009: 179). The dynamism of the young generation designates a "risk population," who gives shape to a new language and street culture, finding an echo in German society. They constitute a pole of resistance and attraction in the face of the rise of nationalism and discrimination. Yet one should not forget, their emergence, within pretty narrow limits, coincided with the real oppression and isolation of immigrant workers.

Levent Soysal (2002), for example, sees Turkish rap, hip hop as a creative activity of children of immigrant and hails them a perfect sign of integration of the host society due to using the universal language of protest by overcoming German/Turkish dichotomy. However, seeing the Turkish youth as a creative class neglects the macro-structural determinant or factors which make them a fan (consumer) or producer of hip hop or rap music.

In his empirical study in Berlin, Kaya (2000: 34) says that most children of immigrants are active and decisive about their future instead of being passive victims of immigration and citizenship politics. This position can be seen as a common theoretical approach of contemporary migrant studies.

From this point of view, the children of immigrants present a rich repertoire with its multiple identity resources and subjectivities. The identity resources of the children of Turkish immigrants include different emotional, individual, social and cognitive dimensions which are not similar with those of German society. At the same time, their way of speaking, body language, expression, gesture and creative language usage is also not similar with Turkish society. It seems possible to speak of a transnational identity for the children of immigrants with Turkish background in Goslar.

Having a better educational background and better grasp of the German language than their immigrant parents, Turkish youth immediately recognize prejudice and discrimination when they see it. Much of the adjustment process involves finding ways to resist or combat these and other negative aspects of the immigrant experience (Kivisto, 2003: 17). Contemporary Turkish youth seek to preserve aspects of their heritage while simultaneously being open to the impact of the general way of life of the receiving nation. In short, they do not live, nor do they generally seek to live, in splendid isolation.

Hasan, an Alevi youth, who writes Hip Hop songs, asks the following questions and tries to answer it by the language of hip hop:

“Why do I – as a person with an immigrant background – have to have a specific value? Why am I not colleague x like my colleague y? Why do I have to represent this economic value? What happens if I don’t make it as a migrant? In Germany we need a new order or a justice system where people are valued for who they are not just what they do’. Our Hip Hop is against German racism and it aims at broken racial and national boundaries between all peoples. We want to resist German discriminative ideas and practices and express our international language by transcending borders” (Hasan, 16, interview, 2006).

The development of different attitudes of younger Turkish people may be attributed to the experience of “nested socialization” which is enriched by

German, Turkish and possibly global cultures. Being different from their parents, young people have to deal with German cultures and other multiple identity choices. Parents as the first generation maintain their original culture rather than adopting the host society's social and cultural values. Second or third generation Turkish youth seems to have ambiguous tendencies towards some of the values and habits of their Turkish community. They have a desire, on the one hand, to preserve parental values at home, and on the other, to adopt some elements of the host culture outside (Küçükcan, 2004). The younger Turkish generation undergoes “selective acculturation” (Portes et al, 2009), where the learning of German language and German ways takes place simultaneously with the preservation of key elements of the parental culture. Fluent bilingualism in the second generation is a good indicator of this eclectic path.

In other words, while they want to have German citizenship as an umbrella identity, they do not want to see a conflict in being Turkish as well as being German. They accept and desire both German and Turkish in a sense that German citizenship does not require them to get rid of their national, ethnic, religious and cultural identity. Selective acculturation or “nested socialization” requires a constant identity negotiation among Turkish youths who want both to be Turkish and German rather than being squeezed by the question of being “either Turkish” “or German”. Admittedly, this identity negotiation of the younger generation is not exclusively shaped by 'Turkish inspired perceptions', but rather it is increasingly based on 'local/German inspired perceptions'. It can be argued that there is an additional identity resources characterized by globalized electronic networking whose long-time affect has not been known yet.

## **5.5. `Homo Economicus` Turkish Migrant Family and the Loss of Power**

Migration involves a transformation from one social system to another and from one system of symbols to another. Such relocation also entails a sudden change of familiar status and power relationships, a devaluation of traditional skills and roles. The effect of these changes goes right across all migrant families.

Tan and Waldhoff mentions about the various stages of the migration process can be linked to various members of the migrant family:

“The children import the norms of German society into the family and interact with their parents according to these norms, i.e., following the model they have derived from their German environment. Such behaviour includes teenage protests against the parent generation or against society. Many parents, on the other hand, having themselves been brought up in an atmosphere dominated by pressures to succeed, will not tolerate dissent. They prefer their children to follow reliably in their footsteps and support the collective effort to accomplish better living conditions. Thus, parents tend to stress values such as obedience, tidiness and diligence. In addition, many parent-child relationships come under stress from physically demanding, monotonous shift work of the parents and the dual burden of the mother” (Tan and Waldhoff, 1996: 141).

In the difficult working and living conditions in the 1960s, the guest-worker families concentrated only on hard work and invested in Turkey as much as possible without finding the time to care take of their children and giving importance to their education. They saved money by limiting their fundamental costs like food, cinema, entertainment, etc. Their main aim was to accumulate enough money to buy a house and car and return to Turkey. The longer they stayed the more houses and land they became ambitious to buy. They did not concern themselves about the future of their children in this hard-working situation where both parents worked for hours by doing a second job besides the main job. Because of their village

background, most had no vision of preparing their children for a better educational life. In addition, in the early stages of migration, traumatic fears of separation are a common occurrence, exacerbated by uncertainties about the success of migration, the splitting-up of families and changes in the structure of power and authority within and between families. In contemporary society, these conflicts erupt as disagreements over issues of upbringing, moral codes, educational styles and norms between the various agencies involved in the educational process, not least between parents and their children.

According to Ebaugh and Chafetz (1999), migration and immigrant almost inevitably alter standards of gender inequality. In places of destination, men- especially working class men-tend to lose power vis a vis women. Women, on the other hand, tend to gain negotiating capacity when they are driven to work –and earn income- to maintain or improve standards of living. The result is a rich repertory of narratives in which men often remember home countries with nostalgia as places of true masculinity and women celebrate their new independence in places of destination, no matter how illusory that freedom may be.

Tenay (18, interview, 2006) mentions the loss of male authority in the settlement process of migrant family:

“Our father figure in our culture is the bread-winner, worker, and authority of the family. He protects and unites and gathers the family together. That is the image of my father in my mind. This father figure has been mostly transformed in Germany in the sense that some fathers become unemployed and cannot function as a bread-winner. The children are more educated than their fathers. Some fathers cannot speak and read German. Their children read official letters for the sake of their fathers and explain to them what to do. This is a process in which children become as though they were parent. This process weakens authority away from hands of men in the family. 70 percent of the fathers of immigrant families experience the loss of authority. Because men are unemployed, they lack power within the family. Thus, the new generation cannot see a father model like in the past. Fathers seem powerless. The male children of an immigrant family don’t have any proper father model to copy. It results in a strange male model, they want to compensate for their father’s authority but they cannot” (Tenay, 18, interview, 2006).



More importantly, honor killing could be partly explained by the loss of power of the man in the family. The increased emphasis on Islamic customs and social rules, the insistence on traditional cultural values and norms, and the strong reference back to one's place of origin, may in many instances be interpreted as an attempt by Turkish parents to recoup some of the authority they have lost through migration and to inhibit further changes. 'Retaining religious customs and an Islamic upbringing after migration provides a means for some Turkish families and in particular some Turkish fathers and brothers to protect the traditional family structure from unwanted social influences. Here, "living Islam" becomes a device to legitimise and prop up the patriarchal family' (Tan and Waldhoff, 1996: 141).

The example of the recent honor killing of Hatun Sürücü in Berlin (in 7 February 2005) can be explanatory to understand the logic of the "loss of power." One brother killed his sister because of "family honor". Hatun Sürücü was a German-Kurdish woman whose family was originally from Erzurum, the eastern part of Turkey. She was murdered at the age of 23 in Berlin, by her own youngest brother, in an honor killing. Hatun Sürücü had divorced the cousin she was forced to marry at the age of 16, and was reportedly dating a German man. In this case, it is reported that the girl, Hatun Sürücü, had a good relationship and got on well with her father. If her brothers were not at home, she could easily visit her parents. However, the brothers wanted to take the father or grandfather's role in order to punish their sister. They found their father passive and reluctant to preserve family honor. It is not appropriate that they want to live the way their grandparents lived in the past.

After narrating the case of Hatun Sürücü, Naile (27, interview, 2006), kindergarten teacher, exposed her ideas about the honor killing:

"How could an honor killing still be possible when a new generation of youths have been educated and socialized in Germany. Normally they would have learned a humanist and democratic culture in German schools. However, because

the education process conflicts with their internal world, the youths can adapt themselves neither to German socialization nor to their grandfather's culture. They accept neither the German male model, nor their powerless father. The male children of immigrants have more difficult problems than females" (Naile, 27, interview, 2006).

This problem seems again related to being the foreigner or lower class question. Immigrant children normally attend schools by showing their power. They can only show themselves with their physical strength. Thus, they tend to behave like 'We are strong enough to fight', 'we can beat everyone' by believing the clichés that 'German boys are so sensitive, feminine, light', 'they cannot fight' etc. This approach or the cliché works the same in the lower class of immigrants in U.S or England. However, these children have a lack of cultural baggage which would help them take the role of their father or grandfather. As far as I am concerned in Goslar, they tend to compensate for this lack of power by developing their body and physical strength or appearance. It can be claimed that this is an artificial compensation of the loss of power. More than half of the immigrant male children go to the "body building" centers, taekwondo, and other sport facilities to develop their body.

Especially youths from the lower classes do body building as a hobby. They go to sport centers to learn taekwondo, judo etc. Meanwhile, lower class families send them to the football clubs. 60 percent of Turkish youth go to football clubs. These aggressive sports seems more appropriate for children of the lower class where schools, home and working life turn out to be very difficult. They don't prefer other professional sport activities like swimming, skiing, etc. Also, we should admit that most professional sport activities do not welcome foreign children. High class people send their children to such professional sport activities.

Fatma, a cashier in a supermarket in central Goslar, explains the details of oppressive Turkish family and its relation to the process of "loss of power":

“Some Turkish families are oppressive towards both their male and female children due to the fear of drug addiction, early pregnancy and fighting and criminality in the streets. Admittedly, they are more oppressive towards girls. Because of a new environment and new rules, the parents fear loss of their power over the children. However, oppression brings about the reverse process. The children don’t want to be limited so much. Sometimes this family oppression may come from the will to integrate with German society. For example, the parents say you are seen as Turks, that’s why it is your responsibility to behave carefully. They become more curious about things which are strictly forbidden by the parents. The children look for love in the streets. I cannot tolerate this. The parents have been living here for many years. It is stupid. They don’t think that their children have autonomy and personality. The children are not robots and don’t want to be such. They don’t understand that if they oppress their children, the children start to become more and more German. I absolutely believe that the Turkish youths in Turkey are freer and more liberal than those of Germany” (Fatma, 24, interview, 2006).

The Turkish youth in Goslar are not squeezed between Turkey and Germany but they have experienced simple (and sometimes complex) paradoxes between family life and the order of the street. It becomes clear when we hear from a Turkish social pedagogue, Arif, as follows:

“Here the children would probably be criminal in the future because fathers work a lot day and night thus they cannot take care of their children enough. Sometimes, they have little idea about their life, education and socialization process. It means that the children of Turkish immigrants oscillate between obeying their family authority which is a symbolic power above all and hearing the voices from the streets. Families want to preserve their children against the streets; however, they sometimes oppress their children by transforming “home” into an “iron cage”. Turkish youth in Goslar mostly perceive home as a center of authority rather than a shared peaceful place, while their families perceive “street” as a place of threat, loss, and failure. Thus, as one of the respondent states, Turkish youth oscillates between being a Turk at home and being a German in the streets” (Arif, 33, interview, 2006).

Because of knowing no German, the first generation Turks were afraid of German laws which were stricter than now, and lived relatively harmonious ways in Germany. Now, the youths know the German language and their rights. They also know that if their family behaves badly to them they can be helped by the state institutions and they sometimes use this power against their parents. Some may become more uncompromising and rebel against their family because this possibility gives the youth a powerful position. Contrary to conventional wisdom, full

Germanization has the effect of loss of parent`s power, disconnecting youths from their parents and their family environments and depriving them of a cultural reference point on which to ground their sense of self and their personal dignity. Thus, the control exercised by Turkish families over their children (especially female members of their families) is also intended to prevent a potential loss of power, since the standing of a family and the esteem in which it is held is presumed to depend above all on the blameless behavior of its female members. This notion of 'honor' is the 'weak point' and at the same time the means by which the migrant community can force families to remain loyal and conform to the group norms.

Considering the dominant role the family plays in the socialization of the future working forces, it is impossible to overlook the fact that a strong adherence to the codes, values and norms of the culture and social life of the country of origin persists even if the child, born in the receiving country, has no direct knowledge of his parents' country. This pattern conflicts with the standardized school system and vocational training schemes of the receiving society, as well as the residual, destructed states of cultural codes brought from the country of origin. As Abadan-Unat (1992; 403-404) points out, these contradictory factors usually produce split personalities. Basically such split personalities can gain with adulthood certain distance and achieve their own cultural synthesis. But, due to the recent rebirth of nationalist aspirations, religious revival and powerful ethnic networks, what happens? The natural evolution of the individual, attempting to find his/her own degree of integration/adjustment is delayed, sometimes prevented.

Although the German educational system and street life have influenced the socialization of the children of immigrants, family tradition has also made a strong impression on the socialization of the youths, which creates

a kind of “nested socialization”. The strong family tradition is characterized by Turkish and Islamic elements which are the results of the contradictory situations in German society. This nested socialization process sometimes turns out to be an advantage enabling educated people to move ahead. On the other hand, nested socialization naturally has its contradictions where people are squeezed between home and street culture. In fact, most members of urban youth gangs would have learnt their code of values in Goslar/Germany, where they have been brought up.

Child-rearing and educational psychology literature have converged in preaching to parents a tolerant, patient non-authoritarian attitude toward their offspring, and in promoting openness to new experiences and intensive socializing among the young. In parallel fashion, schools and other mainstream institutions pressure immigrants and their children to acculturate as fast as possible, viewing their full integration as a step forward towards economic mobility and social acceptance (Alba and Nee 2003; Portes et al, 2009: 1094-1095)

However, Portes et al (2009), criticizes this mainstream approach on parenting and acculturation by arguing that parenting and acculturation will have different outcomes or implications in different environments, namely, the conditions of suburban environments and urban neighborhoods have different impacts on parenting and acculturation. Put differently, while freedom to explore and tolerant parental attitudes may work well in protected suburban environments, they do not have the same effect in poor urban neighborhoods where what there is to ‘explore’ is frequently linked to the presence of gangs and the drug trade.

Most Turkish immigrant families and youths find Goslar, as being a small town, is safer and more comfortable for their children compared with big cities. “Everything is relatively under control here, you know where your

children are, who they go with but you cannot find your children easily in Berlin” (Hakan, 23, interview, 2006).

On the other hand some youths state that a small town has many disadvantages most important of which is the huge amount of social control. Although it can be said that tightly knit social networks play an essential role in the Turkish community, it does not work in the same way for each family. Sometimes social control prevails, and the behavior of girls and young women can be closely monitored mostly by conservative families. For instance, Meral indicates:

“In Goslar, all people know each other and everybody knows who is who and what the people do and it sometimes becomes boring because youths cannot do whatever they want at the center of Goslar. However some say things have already changed in Goslar and Turkish youth can freely date with a German or any other partners without any hesitation of gossip”(Meral, 20, interview, 2006).

Social control and solidarity are experienced at the same time in Goslar where the close network of Turkish community constitute an important informal support system, on the other hand they exercise massive social control and constitute a rigid and conformist environment in which any kind of deviation elicits fierce punishment. These tensions and dynamics in Turkish youths and migrant families can of course only be understood with reference to the relationship developed by Turks with Germans, which has been characterised as a confirmation of 'the established and the Outsiders'. This configuration explains why many families remain close to their supportive kinship networks despite intolerable conditions and seriously disrupted relationships. As long as the outside world they perceive as German appears to be hostile, there is little chance of individual families shrugging off the traditional notions of authority and ignoring its guardians. On the contrary, the guardians of tradition are all the more likely to put social pressures on families in order to make them comply with their claims of dominance.

## 5.6. Headscarf: a Locus of Resistance and Opportunity

The resiliency of practices such as the donning of the veil, are part of the emergence of a “new communalism” used by new generations of Muslims to affirm their identity in environments where there is real discrimination concealed by denial and silence at the state level.

An exemplary demonstration of this can be made with reference to the role Paul Gilroy ascribes to the staging of bodiliness in the protest culture: The body has become, in various ways, a cultural locus of resistance and desires. All of this can be precisely applied to the politics of veiling (Schiffauer, 2007: 71). The *turban* or headscarf can stand for criticism of Western sexual morals and in particular promiscuity, for an ascetic bodily technique, or for a perceived need to profess Islam openly. Especially interesting and important is that wearing the turban becomes a prerequisite for argumentative rebellion (Schiffauer, 2007).

Many Goslar IGMG members demand the right to wear Islamic clothing to school or at work and desire that their limits of modesty be respected in swimming and gym classes. The fight for collective and public rights for the religious community is central to the IGMG members.

If you force people, saying this is the only way to live and integrate, then people will do the opposite. Action-reaction theory is not only about physics but our social life works in the same way. Indeed, many young girls began to cover their heads as a reactive action in order to show this is not the only way to live, which German determines the rules. If Germans continue to treat us (Muslims) like our boss without sharing common sense, then we have to choose the people of our own religion. We have been forced to stick to our religion and culture since September 11 (Temel, 23, interview, 2006).

Derya (22, interview, 2006) says “I am very involved with political affairs in Goslar. I am a member of the Green Party. I have recognized that the

religious affiliation among Turkish youth has been increasing in the recent 5 years when unemployment has also increased. The Islamist organizations successfully benefit from the failures of the Turkish and German states. Once we were at a conference giving information to the youths and explaining that they had the right to be represented in the municipal elections, if they were over 16 and German citizens. We spoke about the problems of youth in Goslar. One youth at this conference responded that ‘I don’t want to do anything, nothing gives me pleasure because I am unemployed. It would be better to shoot me in my head. It would be more appropriate. I can die beautifully in this way. I wouldn’t have to be concerned about anything then’. I was shocked because he was 17 years old. He is unemployed. He graduated last year. He could not find a job training place. He maintained that he applied to 60 companies and was refused or got no response. What are you speaking of? It doesn’t make sense for me in this condition”.

Nazmiye gives some details about the veiling process young girls in Goslar:

“All these Turkish girls that I know grew in Goslar. Some prefer to wear the headscarf after they are 13-14 years old. When I spoke with them, they say ‘it is my decision rather than my family’s. Some families insist they cover themselves but the parent does not threaten them. They have been socialized in this social network, thus most of girls prefer to wear the headscarf by themselves or they feel they should do so. You don’t need to force them to do it. These girls did not start to veil themselves from their childhood. After graduating from school, some could not find training or working places if they chose to wear the headscarf. When asked if they voluntarily use the headscarf, most say, yes. If they are not successful in being accepted outside, the only way would be veiling to be accepted at home. Veiling is a kind of bargaining for these girls. Since, if they wear the headscarf, they can easily go outside and become freer than before. This would help stop the generational gap and fights at home. Unfortunately, in this configuration modernity goes hand in hand with religion or tradition. The headscarf is for these girls, a mixture of old and new” (Nazmiye, 45, interview, 2006).

Esra (30, interview, 2006), who was wearing a headscarf during her high school period, says that:

“Some girls wear a headscarf because their fathers or brothers put pressure on them. Then, they react to their fathers’ control by making up their eyes or faces and embrace this style as a symbol of modernity or resistance to their fathers’



control forcing them wear the headscarf. Becoming both religious and modern is partly an outcome of such a process. They try to find the way in which they can live both with religion and modernity. They are both religious and modern individuals. Make up, and the stylish knotting, veiling and dressing become symbols of modernity” (Esra, 30, interview, 2006).

There are several factors for the recent religious uprising: first, it is a parallel development of political process in Turkey where the Islamist party has been rising up since the beginning of the 1990s. Second, the negative context of reception in Germany socially and culturally ostracized the Muslim immigrants. This is also responsible for the high unemployment and educational failures of Turkish immigrants. Third, we have to admit the successful organization principals and methods of the Islamic groups. They become more flexible about dressing and modern life especially some Sufi groups. Now you can confront them with very colorful and stylish headscarf, shoes and dresses. The Islamic women and girls dress fashionably and beautifully. This is something different from the past. In the past Islamic women were so colorless as to be invisible but now they want to say “we are here in the public sphere with our colorful and stylish dressing and headscarf”. It is a form of modern fashion.

Serpil (23, interview, 2006) underlines:

“We taught Germans what to wear and make up. They don’t understand how to be chic. Turkish girls are really well-groomed, wearing beautiful clothes. The girls with headscarves seem very different. One of the most important differences between the new generation and the older generation is that the new generation girls don’t wear a topcoat. Their way making a bun or head knot and their headscarf style is also very stylish and different from those of Turkey. For instance, conservative religious people criticize the girls who wear a stylish headscarf. They say, covering is to prevent attraction not the contrary. They find this kind of stylish veiling as sinful (Serpil, 23, interview, 2006).

In Goslar, one can differentiate the differences from Turkish girls in Germany and those in Turkey in the sense that Turkish girls in Germany have different kinds of gestures, make up, dress, posture, etc. I think Turkish girls who grew up in Germany have their own style.

## **5.7. Conclusion: Lessons and Recommendations**

Many foreigners perceive German society as a hostile monolithic block. The result is that many foreigners, especially Turks, adopt reactionary political and religious ideas and leadership. The Turkish-Muslim organizations are at present able to mobilize large numbers (between 500-700 people) of Turkish population in Goslar around Islamist ideas of ethnic superiority and Pan-Turkish expansionism. Clearly, such ideas find resonance because they help to transmute experiences of institutional discrimination and exploitation in Germany. But the consequence is a policy of cultural separatism which plays into the hands of the German right in their rejection of settlement and their call for repatriation. Within the Turkish communities in Goslar, the struggle is between such far-right tendencies, with their emphasis on Islam and Turkish nationalism. There are not any leftist, Alevi or secular-cultural immigrant organizations in Goslar. As Castles suggest (1984) the left in Germany is shifting towards assertion of the need for the development of autonomous organizations and cultural institutions in the struggle against discrimination and for civil and political rights. Turkish workers and youth have found that their interests are not adequately represented through German political and union organizations and that they must organize around their own demands to obtain support within their organizations as a whole. The focus of this struggle is the local community, where direct struggles against racism and exploitation can draw in people of varying ideological persuasions.

Conventional accounts of ethnic identity shifts among the descendants of Turkish immigrants, conceived as part of a larger, linear process of assimilation, have pointed to the “thinning” of their ethnic self-identities in Germany. For their descendants, at least, one outcome of widespread

socialization, social mobility and education in Germany was that ethnic identity became an optional form of “symbolic ethnicity”. This mode of ethnic identity formation, however, was never solely a function of social status and degree of acculturation to the majority group, but hinged also on the context of reception and the degree of discrimination experienced by the subordinate group. It is surprising that this process can be facilitated by an absence of prejudice and discrimination in the core society. Whether ethnicity will become similarly optional for the offspring of Turkish immigrants, or whether they will be collectively channeled into enduring, engulfing, racially marked subordinate statuses and forge oppositional identities and reactive political mobilizations, remain open empirical questions.

Needless to say, it is always possible that future economic and political conditions in German society will create a demand for new scapegoats, and if ethnics are forced into this role, so that ethnicity once more levies social costs, present tendencies will be interrupted. Under such conditions, some Turkish groups would try to assimilate faster and pass out of all ethnic roles, while others might revitalize the ethnic group socially and culturally if only for self-protection. Today in Germany it is necessary for Turkish immigrants and their descendants to give up their ethnicity or Turkish passport to gain upward mobility. They are still confronted by the German highest levels of the economic, political, and cultural hierarchies, although they meet economic and status requirements. Thus, ethnic behavior, attitudes, and even identity is determined not only by what goes on among the ethnics, but also by developments in the larger society, and especially by how that society will treat ethnics in the future; what costs it will levy and what benefits it will award them as ethnics. At present, the costs of being and feeling ethnic are not slight for Turkish immigrants and their descendants.

Third generation children of Turkish immigrants feel themselves as a “foreigner” or the “other” even though they belong to Germany. They feel that they are not the same and equal with German counterparts. When they feel themselves different in schools, kindergartens or working places, they withdraw into their ethnic community or religious organization. There have many difficulties and burdens because of being different.

A great deal of how tomorrow’s social contract between natives and newcomers is worked out, and how the commitment to democratic values of equity and inclusion is met, will hinge on the mode of political incorporation and civic engagement of the youth today (Tienda 2002; Tienda and Mitchell, 2006; cited by Rumbaut, 2008: 108)

Last but not least, the reactive identity theory has been widely accepted among sociologists studying immigration, ethnicity and identity, but it needs to be developed. Much about the process of reactive identify is poorly understood and several open questions remain. Chief among these is the question of when and under what circumstances the process occurs. In order to better contextualize some of these issues, this part of the chapter also examines research on integration and immigration policies with a special reference to political or civic mobilization and engagement among Turkish immigrant populations with a special reference to Islamic organizations in Goslar.

To put it differently, the theory of reactive identity formation does not offer a conceptual analysis by which scholars can state when and under what circumstances the process will mostly occur. Or it is not clear what determines whether the process will take place? Does it work in the same way for everyone? Why? What is the role of economic context except for the level of experienced hostility and discrimination? Though it lacks of such precision, it is safe to state that the experience of discrimination often

stimulates in-group solidarity which, under the right circumstances, can lead to the emergence of new collective identities.

Even though fairly frequently employed, the theory of reactive identity formation hasn't been very thoroughly developed. Its many virtues and popularity notwithstanding, the theory remains underdeveloped. The basic formulation offered here with its emphasis on both the experience of discrimination or hostility as well as political mobilization of the affected community - reflects the way the concept is employed by Portes and Rumbaut, but offers a more explicit explanation of the argument. The idea of reactive identity formation would seem to support the idea suggesting that applying greater pressure to immigrants in order to force them to assimilate will likely have the opposite effect and provoke greater in-group solidarity and identification, instead.

In addition, whatever happens in Germany in the near future, the study of how people construct, carry out, and feel about, their ethnic and religious lives, including their identities, is going to become ever more interesting.

## CHAPTER VI

### CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES WITHIN THE STRUCTURE of the LABOR MARKET AND EDUCATION in GOSLAR

*ülkemin ırmakları dışarı akar,  
neden bilmem can havliyle akar*

Cemal Süreya

“If emigration could have helped the working class to emancipate itself, it would have never existed.”

Marco Micone, *Two plays, Voiceless People and Addolorata*,

1988

#### **6.1. Introduction: The Context is Destiny**

Theories of labor market segmentation have claimed that discrimination by workers of ethnic majority groups and employers is the main cause of the disadvantages ethnic and racial minorities encounter in labor markets. In general, these explanations hold that the labor market is split or segmented into various, largely impermeable, parts. Labor migrants (cheap labor) can be found in the secondary or lower segments (Faist, 1994). On the other hand, enclave theories hold that immigrant entrepreneurs tend to employ and thus may also offer opportunities for on the job training of immigrants.

These theories emphasize that immigrant business persons are crucial "gatekeepers" in personnel recruitment. However, and this is an important caveat, not all immigrant businesses offer training that is desirable for second-generation immigrants.

The human capital theories emphasize that educational degrees and years of schooling explain later earnings. However, the exclusive focus upon the human capital of individuals has neglected the "social embeddedness" of economic action.' For example, human capital theory cannot explain why differences in hiring, given identical human capital but different ethnic background, have persisted and not waned in Germany (Faist, 446).

Basically, as of migration literature, there are two general starting points for an explanation of ethnic stratification and inequality in the labor market. On the one hand immigrants may lack the resources which are relevant for achieving higher positions in the labor market, i.e. productivity or human capital. On the other hand they may receive different returns for their capital due to overt or hidden, personal or institutional forms of discrimination. The third theoretical position that this study devotes itself to is the segmented assimilation theory which emphasizes the exogenous (context of reception, structural discrimination, racialization, governmental incorporation, labor market, etc) and endogenous (human capital, family background) factors at the same time.

The first aspect deals with the question of why immigrants may differ from natives with respect to their human capital. In the literature on economic assimilation there are three prominent arguments which we call 'standard explanations'. All of them refer directly to the migration experience. 1. Immigration might be highly selective with respect to human capital, either positive or negative (e.g. Borjas 1987). This selectivity may arise from average human capital differences between the home country and the host

country or from the fact that immigrants are drawn from the upper or the lower end of the ladder in the country of origin. 2. Some aspects of human capital (e.g. language skills) are country-specific, i.e. they are more productive in some societal contexts than in others. Therefore, the act of migration leads to a loss of these aspects and, as a consequence, to a certain devaluation of human capital (Chiswick 1978, 1991; Friedberg 2000). 3. Immigrants often consider their stay in the host country as being only temporary (Bonachich, 1972). Therefore they may be more reluctant to invest in human capital that is specific for the host country (cited by Kalter and Granato, 2002).

Surely, in the case of labor migration to Germany in the 60's and 70's all three mechanisms seem to be relevant. First, there is no doubt that – due to the specific historical demand – in-migration in the sixties and seventies was predominated by low qualified workers leading to an instant ethnic stratification in the labor market. Second, German is not spoken in Turkey and cultural contexts were rather dissimilar to the German society three and four decades ago. Third, the workers initially entered Germany under the conditions of the rotation principle which included return migration after a couple of years.

While these standard arguments may explain the situation in the German labor market of the sixties and seventies, they cannot totally account for the present situation. Most obviously, without additional assumptions all three explanations only hold true for the first generation of immigrants. In contrast to them their descendants who are born in the host country never experienced migration nor do they, empirically, stick to ideas of temporary stay and future return migration. However, taking the concept of capital seriously some additional arguments lie near at hand. Above all, there are multiple ways in which different forms of capital are transformed into each other (e.g. economic capital into human capital) and – either physically or



socially inherited – transmitted from generation to generation (Bourdieu 1977; Kalter and Granato, 2002).

As to the second point, the question of why immigrants may receive different returns on their human capital or productivity in the labor market. Here, economic theory has made great strides towards an understanding of the main mechanisms of discrimination and the conditions under which it is more likely to occur. Above all, the neo-classical approach clearly predicts that discrimination will not exist in perfect markets. Turning it the other way round this implies that market failure is a necessary condition for discriminative behavior to exist. Most prominent theoretical ideas may be fitted into this general idea.

The settlement of large foreign populations transformed the politics of Western Europe, giving rise to new social movements and political parties demanding a halt to immigration. Public opinion was by and large hostile to immigration, and governments were at a loss how to manage ethnic diversity. Problems of integration began to dominate the public discourse, amid perceptions that Muslim immigrants in particular posed a threat to civil society and to the secular (republican) state. The fear was (and is) that dispossessed and disillusioned youth of the second generation would turn to radical Islam, rather than following the conventional, secular, and republican path to assimilation (Kastoryano, 2004). European societies looked increasingly like the United States where older, linear conceptions of assimilation had given way to multiculturalism and an increasingly uneven or segmented incorporation, whereby large segments of the second generation, particularly among the unskilled and uneducated, experienced significant downward mobility (Portes and Rumbaut, 1996; Alba and Nee, 2003; Hollified, 2008: 73).

### **6.1.1. Segmented Assimilation: The Model for Education and Labor Market Integration**

Portes and Zhou (1993) have observed three possible patterns of adaptation most likely to occur among contemporary immigrants and their offspring: “One of them replicates the time-honored portrayal of growing acculturation and parallel integration into the white middle-class; a second leads straight into the opposite direction to permanent poverty and assimilation into the underclass; still a third associates rapid economic advancement with deliberate preservation of the immigrant community's values and tight solidarity.” These scholars refer to the divergent destinies from these distinct patterns of adaptation as "segmented assimilation," posing an important theoretical question of what makes some immigrant groups become susceptible to downward mobility and what allows them to bypass or to get out of this undesirable route (Zhou, 1997: 975).


The theory of segmented assimilation consists of three parts: a) an identification of the major exogenous factors at play; b) a description of the principal barriers confronting today's children of immigrants; and c) a prediction of the distinct paths expected from the interplay of these forces. Exogenous factors can be conceptualized as the principal resources (or lack thereof) that immigrant families bring to the confrontation with the external challenges facing their children. These factors are: 1) the human capital that immigrant parents possess; 2) the social context that receives them in the receiving states; and 3) the composition of the immigrant family. Human capital, operationally defined by formal education and occupational skills, translates into competitiveness in the host labor market and the potential for achieving desirable positions in the receiving state's hierarchies of status and wealth. The transformation of this potential into

reality depends, however, on the context into which immigrants are incorporated. A receptive or at least neutral reception by government authorities, a sympathetic or at least not hostile reception by the native population, and the existence of social networks with a well-established and prosperous co-ethnic community pave the way for the possibility of putting to use whatever credentials and skills have been brought from abroad.

Conversely, a hostile reception by authorities and the public and a weak or nonexistent co-ethnic community handicap immigrants and make it difficult for them to translate their human capital into commensurate occupations or to acquire new occupational skills. Modes of incorporation is the concept used in the literature to refer to these tripartite (government/society/community) differences in the contexts that receive newcomers (Haller and Landolt 2005; Portes and Rumbaut 2001). Lastly, the composition of the immigrant family has also proved to be highly significant in determining second-generation outcomes. Parents who stay together and extended families where grandparents and older siblings play a role at motivating and controlling adolescents have a significant role in promoting upward assimilation. Conversely, broken families, where a single parent struggles with conflicting demands leaving children to their own devices, have exactly the opposite effect (Portes et al, 2009: 1079).

The interaction among exogenous factors influencing second-generation adaptation and the barriers posed by discrimination, bifurcated labor markets, youth gangs and the drug trade do not translate in a straightforward fashion into the distinct adaptation paths portrayed in Table 16. Instead, there is a series of intervening outcomes reflected in the different pace of integration across generations.

**Table 16: Different Paths of Integration by Segmented Assimilation Model**



Source: (Portes et al., 2009)

The concept of *segmented assimilation* was coined to highlight the point that, under present circumstances, children of immigrants growing up in the receiving states confront a series of challenges to their successful adaptation that will define the long-term position in the society of the ethnic groups that contemporary immigration spawns. Facing barriers of

widespread racism, a bifurcated labor market, the ready presence of countercultural models in street gangs, and the drug culture, immigrants' success depends on the economic and social resources that they, their families, and their communities can muster (Portes and Zhou 1993). Immigrant professionals and entrepreneurs commonly possess the necessary human capital and economic means to protect their children. They can face the challenges posed by the host society with a measure of equanimity (Portes 2007: 88).

On the other hand, poorly educated migrants who come to fill menial positions at the bottom of the labor market and who lack legal status have greater difficulty supporting their youth. Because of poverty, these migrants often move into central city areas where their children are served by poor schools and are daily exposed to gangs and deviant lifestyles.

The trajectory followed by a number of children of immigrants trapped in this situation has been labeled *downward assimilation*. The term means that, in their case, acculturation to the norms and values of the host society is not a ticket to material success and status advancement, but exactly the opposite. Dropping out of school, adolescent pregnancies, incidents of arrest and incarceration, injuries or death in gang fights, and increasing conflict and estrangement from parents are all consequences and indicators of downward assimilation. Because of their condition of vulnerability, children of unauthorized immigrants are among the most likely to confront the challenges posed by the host society unaided and, hence, to see their fortunes decline.

For the most part, the children of professional immigrants move upward, achieving high-status positions on the basis of advanced education. Their success reflects back on their ethnic communities, reducing negative stereotypes and even creating positive ones as model minorities. In

addition, successful second-generation professionals and entrepreneurs can continue making contributions, material and intellectual, to the countries where their parents came from (Portes, 2007).

On the other hand, not all children of labor immigrants, not even the unauthorized, undergo downward assimilation in the receiving states. Nevertheless, a substantial minority is at risk of doing so, the negative behaviors and lifestyles in which they become socialized can play back on the countries of origin, compounding the problems that they already confront ((Portes, 2007: 90).

The above figure makes clear that several distinct paths of adaptation exist, including upward assimilation grounded on parental human or social capital, stagnation into working-class menial jobs, and downward assimilation into poverty, unemployment and deviant lifestyles. The latter two options are more common among the offspring of poor and poorly received migrants including, in particular, those who arrived without legal status.

The barriers that confront the children of immigrants can be summarized as racism, bifurcated labour markets, and the existence of alternative deviant lifestyles grounded in gangs and the drug trade.

With the onset of massive de-industrialisation and the advent of a service-based economy, the labor market has become progressively bifurcated into a top tier of knowledge-based occupations requiring computer literacy and advanced education, and a bottom tier of manual occupations requiring little more than physical strength. This bifurcation spells the end of the previous pyramidal structure of unskilled, semiskilled and skilled industrial occupations that served so well to promote the intergenerational mobility of immigrants and their descendants (Portes et al., 2009: 1080)

Failure to move ahead educationally and occupationally in the second generation carries an added risk. Under 'normal' circumstances, youths who cannot navigate the educational system could simply move laterally, entering jobs comparable to those occupied by their parents. Inter-generational lack of mobility and second-generation stagnation into working-class occupations actually happens and may well be the normative path for the offspring of immigrants disadvantaged by low parental human capital and a negative mode of incorporation

An even less desirable alternative befalls youths who, dissatisfied with the prospect of toiling at low-wage, dead-end jobs all their lives, look toward alternatives readily provided by deviant activities and organized gangs. Students attending poor inner-city schools are regularly exposed to these alternatives, which convey the lure of quick profits and a 'cool' lifestyle, bypassing the white-dominated mainstream mobility channels. This illusion quickly translates, for most, into a life of violence, drug use, jail sentences and even premature death. This path has been labeled downward assimilation because the learning and introjections of mainstream cultural ways do not lead, for these youths, into upward mobility-precisely the opposite (Fernandez-Kelly and Konczal 2005; Portes, et al., 2009: 1081)

Less universally recognized, but backed by considerable empirical evidence are the following assertion: The downward assimilation experienced by second-generation youth reinforces negative stereotypes about the migrant population in receiving countries raising the probability of its conversion into an impoverished caste-like minority.

It is clear that the school abandonment, failure of educational process and deviant behavior that are part of this process consolidate the position of Turkish youth at the bottom of German society and reinforce racial/ethnic

stereotypes among the native German population. Such stereotypes increase hostility and opposition to subsequent waves of labor migrants and reduce their chances for successful integration.

Whilst the idea that people 'assimilate' into more marginalized sections of society poses definitional issues about what integration actually refers to, it is useful to understand that second-generation integration may take different forms. The key point to bear in mind is where, i.e. in which social setting, integration takes place (Portes and Zhou 1993). In other words, into what section of society are young people integrating? Whereas through education and, to a lesser extent, in the workplace, there is the potential for 'formal acculturation' (Gans 1992) of the second generation into the mainstream, their more informal experiences outside school or work can be more significant, especially if they have been left disillusioned by poor schooling or low-paid and low-status employment. The values that we often assume are a prerequisite to integration, such as upward mobility through a good education and hard work may not be highly prized by some members of the second generation. This situation can bring conflict within households if parental expectations of their children are not fulfilled or are opposed, and especially when immigrant parents are unable, due to poor language skills and limited knowledge of the new culture, to control how their children are integrating a process which has been described as 'dissonant acculturation' (Portes 1997).

Gordon (1964) provides a typology of assimilation to capture the complexity of the process, ranging from cultural, structural, marital, identificational, attitude-receptional, behavior-receptional, to civic assimilation. In Gordon's view, immigrants begin their adaptation to their new country through cultural assimilation, or acculturation. Cultural assimilation, is for Gordon, a necessary first step and is considered the top priority on the agenda of immigrant adjustment. However, Gordon argues



that acculturation does not automatically lead to other forms of assimilation (i.e., large-scale entrance into the institutions of the host society or intermarriage), or that acculturation may take place and continue indefinitely even when no other type of assimilation occurs. Ethnic groups may remain distinguished from one another because of spatial isolation and lack of contact, and their full assimilation will depend ultimately on the degree to which these groups gain the acceptance of the dominant population (Zhou 1997: 977). Clearly, outcomes of adaptation vary, depending on where immigrants settle -whether in affluent middle-class suburbs or in impoverished innercity ghettos.

It can be claimed that immigrant children from less fortunate socioeconomic backgrounds had a much harder time than other middle-class children succeeding in school. Gans anticipated a dismal prospect for the children of the less fortunate who must confront high rates of unemployment, crime, alcoholism, drug use, and other pathologies associated with poverty and the frustration of rising expectation.

The past literature has identified three major challenges to educational achievement and career success by today's children of immigrants. The first is the persistence of racial discrimination; the second is the bifurcation of the labor market and its growing inequality; and the third is the consolidation of a marginalized population in the inner city (Portes and Zhou 1993; Portes and Rumbaut 2001)

To a greater extent than at the beginning of the twentieth century, second-generation youths confront today a pluralistic, fragmented environment that simultaneously offers a wealth of opportunities and major dangers to successful adaptation (Fernandez-Kelly and Schaufliker, 1995). In this situation, the central question is not whether the second generation will

assimilate to the mainstream society, but to what segment of that society it will assimilate.

It makes little sense to speak of a uniform assimilation path for the second generation when such different outcomes are observed. It is equally useless to adopt an optimistic outlook where ‘assimilation’ can be each and all things. The challenges and traumas confronted by many children of immigrants reflect the realities of the receiving society as it is today, on the ground. This divergence is not chaotic but follows, by and large, predictable channels: resources-intellectual, material, and social-build on each other and lead to ever greater advantages within and across generations; lack of skills, poverty, and a hostile context of reception also accumulate into frequently insurmountable difficulties (Portes, et al., 2005: 1032).

### **6.1.2. The Pessimism of Downward Assimilation Thesis**

Indeed, criticism of the theory of ‘segmented assimilation’ is that it fails to pay sufficient attention to internal differences within ethnic groups. There are also signs of polarization within ethnic groups that need to be explained by reference to a range of more clearly cultural or structural factors (Crul and Vermeulen 2003).

Let us give two examples. First, there is a tendency to speak of ethnic groups as homogenous groups, as many originally arrived as labour migrants from the same regions and even villages. This fails, however, to recognise better-educated professionals who sometimes came for study

reasons or because of political persecution. It also fails to bring to light clear ethnic and religious differences within migrant communities in Europe, like Syrian Christians or Kurds.

Nonetheless, some scholars criticize the American concept of “downward assimilation” by discussing that the term is a too striking in its pessimism and too definitive in its claim that downward assimilation is a permanent feature of certain immigrant communities. Even those children of some ethnic groups, like second-generation Turks, who are considered to do less well than other children of ethnic groups, are still upwardly mobile compared to their parents. The problematic behavior of boys in at-risk groups is often a feature of the in-between (or 1.5) generation, and is less an issue in the second generation. As time passes, and younger generations are born, these behavioral difficulties seem to lessen. (Thomson and Crul 2007: 1033)

However, there is a particular problem for many Turkish families because of both negative context of reception (ethno-cultural understanding of Germanness) and Turkish inheritance law, and as a consequence the rate of naturalization appears to have been very low in the Turkish second generation (Diehl and Blohm 2003). However, as of the late 1990s, the majority of second-generation Turks were not German citizens, and a sizable minority had no plans to naturalize .... Thus, in terms of bright versus blurred boundaries, Germany has until recently exemplified the former in the domain of citizenship, while the U.S. illustrates the latter. At the other end is the case of Turks in Germany. Given that a large fraction of them are not German citizens, it is perhaps unsurprising that only a minority of the German-born identify themselves as German and a substantial group, though not the majority, do not intend to stay in Germany (Alba, 2005: 29).

## **6.2. The Conditions of the Labor Market, Social Mobility and Entrepreneurs in Goslar**

At present there are still major legal barriers to the German labor market for legally residing migrants and their spouses from Turkey. One important restriction is that foreign citizens normally cannot hold civil service positions (*Beamtenstellen*). At present, for newly immigrated family members (spouses or children) of third country nationals, there is a waiting period of (at least) one year before being eligible to apply for a work permit, with the exception regarding youngsters in the case, where there is an apprenticeship contract. However, it should be also said that all measures promoting employment (e.g., extensive training and retraining programs) seem open to all legal residents, regardless of their nationality, although individual and institutional discrimination can still work at the same time.

Moreover, in the German state, where the government plays a much more central role, most jobs require German citizenship. I listened to the story of a youth who had studied to be a pharmacist in Germany; he was going to have to give up his job, because he had reacquired Turkish citizenship. Apparently, under German law, pharmacists must be German citizens. By enforcing such rules, the German government will only cause more resentment, which I was confronted with in the conversations and interviews with the Turks.

However, one has to also keep in mind, however, that the number of naturalizations, especially of Turks, has significantly increased over the last years. On the whole, more than 600,000 Turkish nationals have been granted German citizenship over the last 10 years (a trend that will still

increase in the future). This is an important fact for our analysis, as difficulties in labor-market access will not automatically disappear once a person has been naturalized.

Despite different histories of migration, Turkish Muslims have faced enormous conflict and marginalization in both European countries in terms of employment and education (e.g., Kagitcibasi 1991) and have often been the victims of racism and Islamophobia (e.g., Piper 1998; Archer 2003; Wilpert 2003; Dodd 2005; cited by Faas 2007: 576).

These unemployment conditions and the disadvantages of Turkish immigrants and their children in the labor market can be explained by a mix of factors: overrepresentation in less promising branches threatened by economic restructuring, insufficient education qualifications, lack of social and cultural capital equipment and institutional discrimination are still available as possible and main underlying factors for the detrimental labor market position of Turkish migrants and their children.

In its most extreme form of marginalization, the formation of an underclass or a group of ghetto poor, the excluded cannot be regarded as citizens fully participating in polity and economy although they formally have political and social citizenship rights or social citizenship rights. Underclass formation results in second-class citizenship (Faist, 1994: 455)

Indeed, it is not easy to obtain information about numbers and their socioeconomic position of the children of Turkish immigrants, as most statistical data distinguish only between foreigners and Germans in Goslar/Germany. However, all data we have shows that children of Turkish migrants are the most disadvantaged group among the second or third generation of the other guest-worker immigrants. The descendants of Turkish immigrant groups, second and third-generation Turks have faced

difficulties in access to job training and jobs. In Germany, Turkish youth have faced higher obstacles on quality training than Yugoslav and Greek youth, for example. Disadvantages of Turkish immigrant youth in access to training and jobs can result from the combination of the lower levels of human capital formation in secondary schooling, weak job networks, biased placement policies, and specific problems of immigrant entrepreneurial activity.

When we speak of the failure to integrate of the second or third generation, we can easily recognize that some of them grew with street culture, which includes drug addiction, materialism, violence, crime etc. Because their education level was not high, they also could not find appropriate jobs and had difficulties just as their parents had. Then they invented social welfare benefits due to having a long unemployment process. Such discrepancies are too great to be simply put down to cultural factors, human capital or less effective networks. It is vital to look also for other reasons, and here suggest the need to look at institutional racism (Vasta, 2007: 720). Admittedly, there have been an extraordinary number of studies about immigrants and crime, but very few studies about institutional discrimination and unemployment.

To understand the present (un)employment conditions of Turkish immigrants in Goslar/Germany, it would be better to remember the political and economic changes that have occurred since the 1970s. Accelerated processes of globalization have resulted in the broad dissemination of information. Advanced technology has brought together people in distant parts of the world. Rapid and cheaper transportation has exposed many to cultural and geographical novelties not known before. Most importantly, the relocation of manufacturing and other productive activities from advanced industrial countries to less developed areas of the world has had a significant impact on the opportunity structure both in

advanced and less developed countries. In Germany, the success of welfare states in tandem with reconfigured economies has resulted in high levels of formal unemployment especially among Turkish immigrants.

The impact of globalization also led to a reduction in a state's power to protect its labor force from the impact of the market economy. Impotent to deal with many rising economic inequalities, policy-makers moved from attempting to tackle poverty and inequality to managing the fragmentation of communities via strategies to promote social cohesion and social connectedness. (Fekete, 2008:78).

The chronic unemployment affected by internal and global factors in the national economy has deeper impacts on the relative vulnerable group of workers, namely migrants with low vocational qualifications. As Ünver (2006: 27) reports, in comparison to overall unemployment with an average rate of 10% at present, the unemployment rate among Turks in Germany was an alarming 32.1% by August 2005. Approximately, 200.000 Turks are registered as jobless by the Federal Agency of Employment in the first eve of 2006.

The calculations of the new generations of Turkish youths may not be fully understood without reference to economic changes affecting the larger society. Global integration has had sensible repercussions on the German economy in the beginning of the 1990s. Firm down-sizing and the relocation of manufacturing jobs to cheap locations have resulted in a decrease of traditional working-class channels for upward mobility. As Fernandez-Kelly and Konczal (2005: 1172) eloquently indicate, the expansion of certain services and high-tech industries calls for sophisticated information and skills not available to many youngsters whose modest levels of education prevent them from competing

effectively, but whose desire for success equals that of their more prosperous and cultivated counterparts.

However, given that one person with an immigrant family background is high-skilled and eligible to compete in that labor market but the person would still be faced with some social barriers like prejudices or discrimination. More important is that the entrance to the market is not equal as the entrance to the labor market is firstly and foremost strictly reserved for European citizens. The logic is clear here: first European come, first served. The West and the rest.

The truth is that rapid economic change and the introduction of flexible production and labor regimes to meet the needs of a deregulated market have radically changed traditional working-class employment patterns. Muslims, over-represented in those parts of the European labor market most severely affected by restructuring and industrial decline, are victims of trends beyond their control. Sociologists Stephen Castles, Carl-Ulrik Schierup and Peo Hansen (2006) have shown that, prior to the decline in manufacturing industries, immigrants actually enjoyed a higher rate of employment than national majorities. That their rate of participation in the labor force has declined is due not only to their previous over-representation in manufacturing and other sectors hit by restructuring, but also to their weaker bargaining power, which made them vulnerable to discrimination and mass dismissals. To put it another way, it was governments' failure to protect immigrant communities from racial discrimination in the labor market that led to disproportionate levels of unemployment, which were then blamed on cultural deficit within the affected communities (most notably Muslim ones).

Indeed, German labor market and training policies have been characterized by an active role of state institutions, unions, and employers' associations



in policy formation and implementation, a neo-corporatist policy network (Faist, 1994: 439). Then, how can we explain the high level of unemployment among young Turks in the Federal Republic of Germany?

While public policies determine the rate of job training, employer selection mechanisms shape processes of unequal access to training and jobs. Institutional factors, such as public policies and the organization of hiring and placement, mediate the outcomes of the transition process from school to work.

As Faist indicates (1994b: 443) Turkish youth have experienced high rates of exclusion from job training and higher rates of unemployment than German youth during the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s. More than two-thirds of all German youths receive formal job training. But compared to German youth the unemployment rate of Turkish youth was almost twice as high in the early 1980s, and enrollment of school-leavers in job training (in apprenticeship or the dual system of vocational training) was about three times lower than among the former group. Even compared to other immigrant youth in Germany, young Turkish men and women showed somewhat higher rates of unemployment and lower rates of enrollment in apprenticeship.

In regard to the insertion of immigrant minorities there are two important limitations of the corporatist system. First, training policies ensure an overall high rate of job training for school-leavers, but they do not guarantee that all apprentices actually get apprenticeships or skilled jobs in the adult labor market once they have finished training in the dual system. Therefore, it is hard to imagine the design and implementation of more comprehensive strategies to advance equality of opportunity for disadvantaged groups of school-leavers within this framework. One of the

main reasons is that the interests of immigrant groups, in this case Turkish immigrants, are not represented in class-based corporatist institutions.

### **6.3. Inequality, Downward Mobility and Institutional Discrimination in Goslar**

In Goslar and Oker, structural economic changes have affected non-German employees much more severely than German employees. Employment in manufacturing has been reduced considerably. As Hönekopp (2003) emphasizes, right from the beginning of the recruitment programs for so-called “guest workers”, the majority of foreign labor has been employed in manufacturing (mining, industrial production, construction), most of their occupations being unskilled and involving unfavorable working conditions. Technological progress and increased competition have led to structural economic changes and severe job losses in exactly those sectors where foreign labor had traditionally found employment. Consequently, these structural changes have affected non-German workers much more severely than Germans.

Considering some selected service activities, which are under discussion (increasing future demand, or regarding integrative character concerning foreigners, or as far as future employment possibilities especially for foreigners are concerned), one can see that non-Germans are substantially underrepresented in these fields. Compared with the share of foreign and Turkish employment in total employment, the respective shares in the employment of police inspectors, social work activities, teaching and health related activities are very low. That could be interpreted as de-facto discrimination in the labor market, which depends on the one hand again on missing qualification, but on the other hand also on a prejudiced recruitment behavior mainly in the public sector (Hönekopp, 2003: 82)

Educational achievement of Turkish migrants' children is considerably lower, due to the high concentration of foreign residents in Oker and the resulting high percentage of non-Germans (or pupils of the same nationality) in some school classes. But a successful school career and vocational qualifications are indispensable for good labor market chances.

Due to the high percentage of non-Germans (especially Turks) below the age of 6 years in the resident population, it can be assumed that the number of new entries from this group into the labor market will be disproportionately high over the next 10–15 years. Therefore it is essential – for employment, economic and general policy reasons – to increase substantially investments into the educational system, especially at the primary level and to step up efforts in order to integrate non-German children and youths better into education and vocational training systems (Hönekopp, 2003: 75). Moreover, it has to be emphasized that young non-German labor (or workers of non-German origin), due to their multiple language skills, could make an important contribution to Germany's export-oriented economy.

At the present, German employers select more and more better qualified school-leavers for training places within this system. That means, that the large number of foreign drop-outs from the schooling system has almost no chance of finding a way into promising sectors of the labor market

Unemployment and poverty rates among Turkish immigrants and their descendants are more than twice that of Germans and ethnic Germans. Continuous problems of poverty and joblessness may confound the "identity crisis" among second and third generation Muslims that leads them to embrace Islam as an alternative to German nationality.

Murat emphasizes unequal implications of individual and institutional discrimination at working places by giving his girlfriend's experience as an example:

“My Turkish friend, Sultan, was promised a higher position after 5 years and she worked extremely hard and did her best, then they said if we give this position to you the other Germans would not want this. Thus, we are so sorry that we cannot give this position to you. It looks like they show a ham to a dog and it runs after it for 5 years. Then they say, if we give this ham to you, the other dogs would bark too much. But if we give this position to another dog; the other dogs could bark but not that much. Sometimes they also want Germans to run for the ham but German have a chance to have a rest except the Turks. That's why you have to do something more to keep your motivation alive. This is endless. I claim that if any organization helped her at that time, she would have become a member of whichever organization that would be. Now, I can understand how one becomes radical. This is a rule of physics: Action-Reaction” (Murat, 24, interview, 2006).

Statistics show that the total unemployment rate in Goslar in 2003 was 10.1%, while the unemployment rate of foreigners was 21.5% (23.8% of the Turks; 17.7% of the Greeks; 18.2% of the Italians; 13.7% of the Portuguese; 13.5% of the Spanish; and 15.5% of the Yugoslavian). In 2003 about 26% of the foreigners (19% in 2000) and 14% of the natives (12% in 2000) lived in poor households (Landesbetrieb für Statistik und Kommunikationstechnologie Niedersachsen, 2009).

The main factor underlying these persistent disadvantages is to be found in insufficient qualification levels of non-German labor. The percentage of labor with low qualification levels is still more than twice as high among non-Germans as among German labor. The unemployment rate for non-Germans is twice as high compared to that of all employees. And once again it is Turkish employees that have been affected most severely by this development. If one compares different nationalities, unemployment is highest among Turkish labor, with about 23% in 2003. In addition, the gap between Turks and other non-German groups has been widening considerably since the beginning of the 1990s.

By the year 2006, unemployment in Goslar was 15 percent among Germans but it increased to 28 percent among Turkish population. These rates are given annually in the Goslar local newspapers at the end of each year.

Hönekopp (2003: 85) points out that age structure differences for total unemployment and for long-term unemployment are also quite substantial between Germans and foreigners or Turks. Concerning total unemployment, for persons in the age group up to 44 is for Turks ca. is 68%, about 10% higher than for Germans. Regarding long-term unemployment, the respective share is for Turks ca. 46%, i.e. 12% above that of Germans. These results mean that for foreigners, even younger workers are affected by unemployment (and long-term unemployment) more intensively than Germans. One conclusion might be that lower qualifications are primarily responsible for this worse situation.

It can be true that nationalities and working status reflects the general pattern of qualification structure differences between nationalities on the one hand, and on the other hand the fact that lower qualified people are relatively more often excluded from the employment process: in all cases the share of better qualified persons is higher in employment than in unemployment. But for Turks, the much higher percentage of low qualified people reduces their future chances on the labor market.

Moreover, Turkish apprentices are overrepresented in some companies that have difficulties in recruiting German apprentices because the work is physically exhausting and unattractive (for example, car repair, construction, coal mining) in Goslar. Small craft shops, such as painters and pipe-fitters, over-proportionally hire immigrant school-leavers, too. Major options for female Turkish school-leavers in Goslar include the continuation of general education, apprenticeship in "women specific"

occupations such as kindergarten teachers, sales, full-time vocational schools in the lowest rungs of such fields as education, health, and homemaking, work at home, and part-time, low-paying menial and service jobs. Those unemployment numbers demonstrate that migrants face numerous problems in the labor market and that they are in many ways at a disadvantage compared with members of the host society.

It is safe to claim that some of the problems are connected with objective factual handicaps such as inadequate education and training, non-recognition of qualifications gained abroad, or inadequate command of the host country's language. But, in addition, Turkish migrants experience serious discrimination on grounds of their nationality, name, and religion.

Downward assimilation or mobility is not only effected by individual or family background but also by structural institutions like the education system and labor market. Thus, a sizable number of second-generation Turks have fallen behind to the point where they now seriously risk becoming an underclass.

Kahraman (55, interview, 2006) points out the downward mobility of Turkish populations in labor market by emphasizing the German state's responsibility to take precautions:

“As we know, Turkish immigrants are at the bottom in Goslar, coming after other immigrants like Italian, Spanish, Yugoslavian and Greeks. Turks are even below Iranian but we can accept the Iranians as an exception because most migrated to Germany for political reasons and most of them are highly educated. Africans are another group who mostly come here by marrying with German women or men. Their number is quite few in Goslar. Among all these immigrants, Turks are the largest groups in working places, schools, and business. That's why when a German official speaks of foreigners, they mostly imply Turkish immigrants. Thus, Germans should pay more attention to Turks when they deal with establishing the educational politics or setting social peace” (Kahraman, interview, 2006).

Salih (40, interview, 2006), the only representative of the Turkish leftist organization DİDF, Demokratik İsci Dernekleri Federasyonu (The Federation of Democratic Worker Associations [Föderation demokratischer Arbeitervereine e.V.]) in Goslar, mentions the close relationships between social stratification, labor market positions and its social results in Goslar:

“Social stratification for the immigrants starts from spatial and educational segregation. Recently, except that unemployed people (who get social aid) want to preserve their status as social aid receptors, there is a dynamic process of upward and downward mobility among Turkish immigrants. There are many diverse Turkish groups who are socially, culturally, economically and politically different from each other. If they want to be a part of German society, they have to give education first priority. There is no alternative way to adapt here. Meanwhile they have to establish some religious or ethnic organizations which serve to preserve their benefits in terms of immigration and integration policies. Politics is not free from human life. As to religious behavior, religion should stay individual, they can live however they wish but they shouldn't dictate their religion to anyone else. If Turkish people cannot be affective on politics and cannot send their representatives to parliament, other people will always make a decision for their sake. If they want to choose the alternative path for being more secure and comfortable, they have to give importance to their education rather than staying in this bad position” (Salih, 40, interview, 2006).

Kemal states the paradoxical positions of Turkish immigrants in the social stratification systems of Turkey and Germany who are subjected to different social evaluation:

“Imagine a first generation immigrant here. He settled here, his children may attend school or work or be unemployed here. He might have a house here. He misses Turkey because his friends in Turkey are somewhat different from those in Germany. He cannot join with Germans because it would not give him pleasure as much as the relations in Turkey. That's why the first generation wants to spend half of their time of the year in Turkey. Although it seems a difficult process, I think it can also be thought as a good opportunity. The first generation decided to stay here because the immigration is a process in which political and economic issues are main determinants whether one stays or not. Turkish immigrants decided to stay because when they compare the advantageous conditions of economic and politics in Germany with Turkey. They recognized that Germany has a much more developed social system, such as, social aid and health system than Turkey. In addition, Turkey has also changed. Turkey is not the same Turkey of the 1960s. They know this and they are more familiar with living in Germany than this new Turkey. Due to the German welfare state system, which provides social security, qualified health system, and other benefits in social life for all migrants, they prefer to stay in Germany. Turkish people in Turkey unfortunately stigmatize all Turkish

immigrants in the same category by naming them as “*Almanci*” (quasi- German) without differentiating the unemployed or poor immigrants and rich ones. *Almanci* mostly refers to an economic category rather than cultural or social stigmatization. They see their *Almanci* relatives as the people who can easily lend money because they think they are automatically rich due to living in Germany. The term signifies a higher status in the eyes of Turkish people in Turkey. It signifies also asymmetric conditions of immigrants who gain higher status when they are seen as *Almanci* in Turkey but on the other hand, their social status definitely become decreased in the social matrix of being a labor migrant in Germany” (Kemal, interview, 2006).

On the other hand, Ezgi pays attention to the responsibility of Turkish immigrant for the construction of the stigmatization of the *Almanci* used for them:

“I think Turkish immigrants are also responsible for such a stigmatization of *Almanci*, in Turkey. Because when they go on holiday to Turkey, they represent themselves as very rich. I don’t know why. Sometime I also do the same things, for example, I don’t allow people to pay anything when we go out together with my relatives or friends during my visit in Turkey. Why does one go on holiday. To have a rest. I cannot have a rest when I go to Turkey because of intensive visits from our relatives. As a second generation, I find these close relations very abnormal and exaggerated. I cannot convince them that I am not a rich person whom they see as *Almanci*. I say to them that ‘I have to work as normally as you do in Germany. Please don’t compare your conditions with mine. In this class-based system, each country’s conditions differ from each other’. Even some people whom I visit in Turkey earn much more than me. For example, some people in Turkey say that ‘well, if you become unemployed, the state would support you by giving money or social aid’. They have so many clichés about our life. I said ‘you have the wrong impression of how this system works’. They always expect something from us. We should also accept our responsibility for constructing such perception towards Turkish immigrants, *Almanci*, in Turkey” (Ezgi, 19, interview, 2006).

It is safe to claim that there is a sharp asymmetry about the Turkish immigrant. On the one hand, their social status becomes higher in Turkey because of immigration to Germany. On the other hand, they start their life in the lower class in Germany meaning that their social status is at the bottom in Germany. That is to say, while their social status becomes higher in Turkey, but it stays below the average in Germany. However, the people who migrated to Germany were very weak in terms of their cultural and social capital. They haven’t developed themselves culturally in Germany because they live in their Turkish community having their Turkish TV, Newspaper, cafes, mosques, etc. When Turkish people in Turkey see them in the summer, they are surprised at some *Almanci*’s social behavior which



is relatively underdeveloped when compared with Turkish people in Turkey.

To illustrate this, Mehdi states that:

“It would have been interesting to know how many Turkish immigrants think about the countries other than Turkey. I think most of them are not curious about places other than Turkey. I don’t criticize them. It is their right. Our village-rooted population in Germany has no tourism tradition in the sense that they don’t wonder about other cultures but they travel to Turkey in convoys. They don’t know where the historical places are in Turkey. They don’t know Turkey, either. They know one thing: visiting relatives. They have to bring presents for their relatives, which sometimes cannot satisfy their relatives nor are they pleased to give up the habit of visiting their relatives” (Mehdi, 24, interview, 2006).

Mrs. Trautwein (54, interview, 2006), the director of Haupschule Goslar, states that “the unequal opportunities in the German system does not help Turkish youth to motivate themselves to continue their education in the sense that the youth recognize that even educated migrants have substantial difficulties finding an appropriate job in equal conditions. Therefore, Turkish youth think that they will be subjected to an unsuccessful process; even if they get a diploma from a German university. Some find education useless to overcome the structural differences.” Mrs. Trautwein maintains that:

“Some Turkish youth do not believe that education will help them to achieve upward mobility. They say that Turkish youths who were graduated from technical schools or universities are mostly unemployed. They see that most of Turkish population has difficulties getting jobs. For example, they say ‘our friends graduated from schools but work as cleaners or taxi drivers. We can earn the same amount of money without graduating from universities.” (Trautwein, 54, interview, 2006).

It is argued that unemployment and a severe lack of housing (in both east and west) contributed to a sense of social threat. Foreigners were blamed for taking resources. Asylum seekers were believed to be coddled by the state and were accused of theft.

Metin who works as a salesman in a hypermarket speaks about the common tendency in Germany:

“Even though Turkish and German are in the same position in a working place, Turkish people have to do more to gain a permanent position or upward mobility and they have to prove or show their obedience, eagerness, hard work more than Germans. This rule is not declared openly but it certainly functions in a silent way. They don't want to accept that we can be as successful as our German partners” (Metin, 19, interview, 2006).

In relation to the institutional discrimination, some Turkish respondents also complain about the double standard of the implementation of diploma equivalence in Germany. While the diploma equivalence of ethnic Germans is accepted by Germany, Turkish citizens cannot benefit from this opportunity. Since 2007 when the National Integration plan was introduced, German politicians have discussed the issue of giving the diploma equivalence of the university degree to immigrants, who total five hundred thousand people. However, there is no any meaningful development on this issue. Although the diploma equivalence of ethnic Germans (*Aussiedler and Spataussiedler*) can be accepted by Germany, Turkish and other TCNs cannot benefit from this implementation. European Union citizens and *Aussiedler* have privileged rights while Turkish immigrants have serious difficulties to get the equivalence. Based on some privileged laws, *Aussiedler* can demand to get equivalence for every kind of school degrees. Turkish teachers, doctors, engineers who have university degrees from Turkey work in other occupations which are not their professional areas (some work as taxi drivers).

For example although Angela Merkel together with sixteen Presidents of state governments promised to accept all equivalence of foreign diplomas in the Education and Qualification Summit in October 2008, nothing has been done on this issue up to now. There is no 'Clearing Institution' which can decide which government (State or Federal Government) is responsible to accept the equivalence. As in any other issue about integration, there is

no common policy about this issue at the Federal level. Each state has its own rules and routes in which there is no guaranteed way to get acceptance.

Governmental authority is aware that accepting the equivalence of foreign diplomas becomes unavoidable when they pay attention to the demographical deficit and the globalization trends in terms of economic and integration questions. The demographic data which is worrying the officials shows that the young population under 25 will have been sharply decreased by 2020. For the first time in Germany the number of 65-aged people was higher than the number of people who were under 20 in 2009. The Office of Federal Statistics expects that the population of Germany will decrease to 65 million by 2050 from 82 million today. Actively working people will decrease by 17 million to reach 33 million (*Zaman*, 8 January 2010).

As a result of these disadvantageous conditions, some Turkish youth are very indecisive and have conflicts surrounding vocational training. What kind of training do they want to choose? Should they choose on the basis of criteria derived from their parent`s country of origin or from the German society in which they are living? Should they be interested in the type of training which their parents envisage for them?

Thus, some youths say that they can look for a job and live in Turkey. Turkey is represented by the Turkish youths as a country of dynamism, while Germany is seen as a country of strict rules, monotonous life, hard working. However, they also emphasize the catastrophe in Turkey in the health and bureaucratic system by comparing it with Germany`s well-organized, regular system where welfare and health system function well. Their fear of Turkey can be summarized as lacking strong human rights, social insurance system, health system, welfare benefits and fair economic

distribution.

#### **6.4. Is Self-Employment and Ethnic Niches a Way Out?**

There is also a growing literature on the role of ethnic niches for the second generation. Such niches, particularly in the food and retail sectors through family-run ventures, can offer ready employment to the children of immigrants. Many immigrant children, however, will naturally aspire to greater personal and financial independence, and be reluctant to work in businesses where the wages are often low and the working hours long and unsociable (Thomson and Crul, 2007: 1028)

For instance, Zhou (1997: 979) sees ethnic niches as an anomaly which is the peculiar outcomes of contemporary immigrant adaptation. Because, in immigrant enclaves, ethnic commercial banks, corporate-owned extravagant restaurants, and chain supermarkets stand side by side with traditional rotating credit associations, coffee/tea houses, and mom-and-pop stores.

The number of self-employed Turkish people among non-Germans has risen considerably over the last 15 years. Nevertheless, the self-employment rate for this group is still significantly lower than the total rate. Should this increase in self-employment be considered as a new economic opportunity for non-German labor, or rather as a risky response to deteriorating chances on the labor market? Chronic unemployment was one of the incentives for the Turks among who were several unqualified former industry workers, looking for subsistence opportunities and commence as small business entrepreneurs. So, by the end of 2005 some

60.000 “Turkish” enterprises, supposedly employing more than 300.000 workers, among them Turks and other nationalities, were recorded by the Chambers of Commerce of the Federal Republic (Ünver, 2006).

Among these enterprises, a growing number of companies in the services and trade sectors, with an extensive profit level in different parts of the Federal Republic, contribute definitely to economic life of the country. Notwithstanding the fact that this kind of entrepreneurship mainly springs off an exacerbated employment market, it is an advantage for the national economy and a subsistence opportunity for investing/working individuals, perhaps even more beneficial for their children, who will grow up under better conditions and will presumably have a better education and professional opportunities than their ancestors. This development is, on the other hand, criticised by many observers, who deal with integration issues; Turks are accused of forming a hostile *parallel society* by their *ethnic niches*. This idea is highly related to *ethno-racial discriminatory evidence* in Germany and racial crime in different parts of the Republic, cannot be challenged totally in spite of effective government efforts (Deutscher Bundestag, 2006; cited by Ünver, 2006: 27).

The number of self-employed non-Germans has more than doubled since 1982, and almost risen five-fold for Turks; the initial figures, however, were extremely low. Therefore part of this development is due to the fact that these groups have had a lot of catching up to do, particularly because many non-Germans had not until a few years ago, been legally entitled to start their own business. In general, the increase in self-employment is a positive development, as new businesses create jobs not only for the owner, but often also for further persons (family members as well as other persons). Additionally, the newly set up businesses are to be found in several different economic sectors. Thus these businesses make an important contribution to economic growth.

However, as Hönekopp (2003) points out, the fact remains that the percentage of businesses in catering and retail (esp. small greengrocers) is disproportionately high. It can therefore be assumed that in many cases new businesses have been set up primarily in order to avoid unemployment, which can be quite risky in view of shortages of capital or insufficient qualifications necessary to secure lasting economic success.

So self-employed persons possibly run the risk of losing all their savings. Moreover, even though new jobs are being created, including employment opportunities for family members, these persons, especially children of the owners, may risk losing possibilities in attaining any formal vocational qualification.

In effect, these young people are given the opportunity to make a living for a limited period of time, but they have no possibility to improve their long-term chances on the general labor market. Furthermore, one has to keep in mind that even if self-employment rates of %7 for non-Germans, especially Turks, have increased considerably, they are still significantly lower than figures for all self-employed persons. Consequently, there is still scope for further development. This potential, however, will only be realized if the necessary pre-conditions are fulfilled. Good qualifications are indispensable in order to achieve lasting success as a self-employed businessman. But, as mentioned above, one major obstacle remains: non-German workers, especially Turks, still lack qualifications, and even young people, who are still at the beginning of their careers, have not yet managed to close this gap (Hönekopp, 2003).

Like any other places in Germany, Goslar is also filled with Kebab shops, Turkish stores, groceries, doctors, boutiques, cafes and small businesses. There are a total of 34 Turkish self-employed people who have shops,

boutiques, restaurants, etc in Goslar and Oker. Goslar`s main shopping streets convey the impression of a well-established Turkish economy that offers a variety of stores and services. Turkish residents have been taking advantage of the large number of empty stores in Goslar to start their own businesses. Many of them have opened fast-food restaurants that serve simple meals (Doner Kebab), cafes or greengroceries as well as luxurious restaurants. Other businesses are importing jewelers, textiles and clothes from Turkey.

The success stories of business could also be mentioned in Goslar: Turkish businesses in Goslar are mostly based on middle range or luxury shops like restaurants, supermarkets and boutiques. They seem to adapt themselves to the self-employment system especially in the gastronomy. As can be guessed, it helps to reduce the unemployment rate among Turkish immigrants because those companies work as a family-business creating the ethnic niche economies which are not always useful to the immigrants due to providing informal and heavy working conditions. Based on our observation in Goslar, these Turkish businesses often run with family labor. Even Turkish restaurants expand to the countryside and villages of Goslar. Besides, there are several Turkish car dealer companies at work in Goslar and a steel processing company in Salzgitter. In fact, these cases should be seen as a turning point for Turkish immigrants shifting from being guest to settlers. These cases also serve as a role-model for the rest of the immigrant population.

There is a large body of literature by Turks, often written in German, as well as locally produced Turkish film, art, and theater. Clubs, newspapers, and professional organizations are all very much concerned with Turkish art events occurring in Germany. Second and third-generation migrants, together with an influx of educated political exiles from Turkey, have done much to change the situation. Although Turks remain firmly located in the

bottom social strata, first signs of an emergent middle class and a distinctive intellectual development are evident.

As Turkish businessman, Haydar (42, interview, 2006) states:

“Of course, no society would be homogenous. Neither are immigrants. They are segmented and heterogeneous. There are many different immigrant groups, such as, business, academicians, workers, and unemployed peoples. If you consider the immigrant society as a pyramid, academicians are at the top and tend to get on well with German society. By tendency, I mean that they can benefit from the opportunities that are given by the German state. The workers and unemployed people cannot benefit from these opportunities very much” (Haydar, 42, interview, 2006).

There is no doubt that this process signs an upward mobility among the children of immigrants and they are represented also within the middle class. At the same time, there is a parallel process in which considerable numbers of Turkish immigrants have no any formal jobs and are thus increasing marginalization and poverty accompanied by high rate unemployment in Goslar. Some of them are eligible to benefit from the unemployment and the social insurance system. On the other hand, an increasing amount of the population can neither take social insurance benefits nor they are in the position to contribute into the social insurance system because of the permanently chronic unemployment.

It is clear that the conditions of children of immigrants are already different from their parents` in that they are not unskilled labor without their political representatives who can support their rights in the public sphere. On the contrary, despite relatively slow process, there are politicians, artists, businessmen, poets, singers, authors, journalists and even comedians who are second or third generation children of immigrants.



## **6.5. Educational Experience of Turkish Youth in Goslar: Downward or Upward Mobility?**

The current educational, economic and social situation of the Turks in Goslar/Germany that will be depicted in this chapter refers to a great extent not to their reluctance to integration or “integration deficits”, but to many of shortcomings and of measures to be taken by all partners of the migration/integration process. The high levels of unemployment, poor educational achievement and housing segregation are symptomatic of immigrant marginalization in Goslar. They cannot be explained simply by the argument that immigrants lack the necessary socio-cultural capital for educational achievement or having labor access. The high levels of downward mobility are, in part, the result of a specific type of discrimination against certain groups, characterized by racial, ethnic and religious markers in Germany. Through the discussions of labor market and education in Goslar, I try to show that there is a strong lack of commitment to full immigrant inclusion and participation that feeds into the structural discrimination in the labor market, in education and in the public discourse. The chapter will argue that German policy makers and some scholars have been unwilling to recognize the exclusionary practices and structures within German society that make it very difficult for immigrants to integrate. My argument is that it is not the immigrants’ refusal to integrate or the lack of socio-cultural capital or the generous welfare state that are the core issues, but rather processes of racialization within German society, an idea largely ignored in dominant political and academic discourses.

Education is the main prerequisite for the successful socioeconomic integration of immigrants and their offspring. The children and

grandchildren of Turkish immigrants find themselves in unfavorable positions throughout the different stages of school education, and their academic competences. The results of educational performances PISA studies have shown are worrying and clearly below average for Turkish children. This is a result of various factors: the institutional discrimination, selective German education system, the low socio-economic status and German language deficiencies of the average Turkish student. More importantly, the German education system fails to provide adequate language training for children who speak non-native mother languages and shows a strong tendency to reproduce social inequality.

In the migration and education literature, the reasons for these educational disparities are the subject of an extensive discussion. There are two major groups of explanatory approaches. While the first group points out characteristics of the migrant and their alleged “cultural distance” to the receiving society (Diefenbach, 2002; Worbs, 2003) the second group emphasizes the unequal conditions and individual and institutional discrimination in the German education system (Gomolla and Radtke, 2007). Former argument emphasizes usually low educational levels of the parents, information and integration deficits, the few resources (in terms of time and money) that can be invested in education, and return orientations that are believed to be detrimental to the children’s school career (Diefenbach, 2002; Worbs, 2003). Moreover, the education failures are related to Turkish group’s quite traditional Muslim background. Turkish immigrants are widely considered to be one of the “toughest” groups to integrate, so they constantly test the effectiveness of national policies aimed at the integration of newcomers (Crul and Schneider, 2009). However, in the latter argument, Gomolla and Radtke (2007, 278-85) claim that there are direct and indirect institutional discriminatory practices at work that maintain and reproduce social stratification, and systematically disadvantage children with migrant backgrounds. As Meier

(2010) emphasizes, the fact that, in Germany, children are streamed in segregated school types from the fifth grade (from seventh grade in Berlin), aggravates the “social stratification”, since children are not given enough time to develop their language skills before they are streamed.

The difference in achievement between migrant and non-migrant children in German school system can partially be explained by the unfortunate socio-economical situation of immigrant families and consequently, their possession of relatively little cultural capital in comparison to that of parents born in the host country. Previous research attempting to explain more of the differences followed various hypotheses, which were so far primarily based on characteristics and attributes of the migrants themselves or of their living conditions. (Gogolin, 2009: 94).

However, the superficial phenomena- nationality, religion and the features attached to it- could not ultimately be responsible for the differential distribution of educational success in the group of pupils. In her survey of the relevant studies, Heike Diefenbach concluded: It has not been empirically verified that the disadvantages of children and youth from migrant families can be explained mainly by the fact that their cultural predispositions would not match the expectations of German schools or by the comparatively poor socio-economic situation of their families” (Diefenbach, 2007; cited by Gogolin, 2009: 94). It should be pointed out that when compared with Germans, the Turkish family`s income is often relatively low, and many families live in substandard and cramped housing in Goslar and Oker. Turkish immigrants still represent sharp socioeconomic contrasts between them and the native populations in Goslar.

Ethnic minority groups in Germany, such as the Turks, disproportionately reside in more deprived areas where schools are more likely to have fewer

resources, more disciplinary issues, and higher staff turnover. (Thomson and Crul 2007: 1033). The international PISA study has highlighted the strong correlation between social stratum and educational success in Germany and the importance of German language proficiency for migrant children: language deficits negatively affect the acquired competences in specific subject areas. All these factors are certainly plausible. However, not all authors assess the effect of the parents' socioeconomic position the same way, and it is questionable whether language deficits are really the major obstacle for the second generation (Worbs, 2003: 1024). Since, one could recognize that developments within the second and third generations go clearly towards more interethnic contacts and a broader spectrum of self-perceptions and identifications.

Based on all these results, we can conclude that the educational disparities between the children of Turkish immigrants and autochthonous youth probably result from a combination of factors. A weighting of one of these single factors would be seriously wrong. It should be emphasized that educational disparities are the results of a combination of individual characteristics of the migrant family and institutional discrimination of the German education system. On the one hand unfavorable conditions in the migrant families, on the other hand an educational system which largely fails in the attempt to offer pupils with different prerequisites the same opportunities for success. Individual (e.g. by single teachers) and institutional mechanisms of discrimination certainly play roles as well, although it seems difficult to prove individual and indirect discriminations.

Do educational policies contribute to equal opportunities, to the recognition of cultural diversity, or rather to the exclusion or separation of certain minority ethnic groups in Germany? Are education and labor market access still big dividers among the minority ethnic groups in Germany like the other European states?

Institutional discrimination is so strong in Germany that substantial measures towards inclusion of the Turkish immigrant have still not been implemented. The administrative practices of the schools, the selection to certain school types or the settlement segregation of minority ethnic students, as well as schools remaining ignorant about their low school attendance, all point to the role of institutional discrimination. On the other hand, there are also some measures being established to prevent social disadvantages, which often disproportionately affect ethnic minorities. Institutional discrimination is often uncovered by the structures of inter-ethnic relations and by the patterns of ‘minoritization’ and ‘othering’ on ethnic grounds. Moreover, ‘recent studies have shown that ...being from a poorly educated, rural family does not necessarily hamper the chances of receiving a good education for the children of the second and third generation. If many of the Turkish children suffer today from underachievement, the reasons have first of all to be looked for in the educational system which is, at certain points, not yet able to respond to intercultural needs (Fekete, 2008: 50).

Across Europe, policy-makers, research, and school environments have repeatedly pointed to the growing importance of ethnicity in forging young people’s career paths and life chances in general. In spite of considerable investments in education by European welfare states, and political and legal efforts to promote equal opportunities in education, ethnic differentiation in schooling still result in significant inequalities in opportunities for meaningful participation and recognition in economic, social and political life. Differentiation in education contributes to socially determining minority positions on the basis of ethnicity. Hence, the ways in which educational institutions address ethnic differences is crucial in developing social inclusion based on equal citizenship rights and recognition (Miera, 2009: 16)

In general, the education system is divided into the elementary level (kindergartens for children between 3 and 6 years), primary level (the *Grundschule* covering the first to the fourth year), secondary level and tertiary level.

The transition from primary school into one of the school types of the secondary level is regulated differently in various federal states. The secondary level basically comprises three school types or streams. German education system is based on the three tier education system of secondary schools. In Germany, enrollment in one of the tiers of secondary school (lower secondary school, *Hauptschule*, intermediate secondary school, *Realschule*, academic secondary school, *Gymnasium*) shapes access to apprenticeships. The more prestigious training positions and thus increased employment opportunities accrue to intermediate and academic secondary school graduates. Children attend elementary school until grade 4, (in the Federal States Berlin and Brandenburg regularly until grade 6), after which they are streamed into different types of secondary schools (*Hauptschule*, *Realschule* or *Gymnasium*) on the basis of their school achievements at elementary/primary school. ‘Special-needs schools’ (*Sonderschulen*) (grades 1-9) are established for pupils “whose development cannot be adequately assisted at mainstream schools on account of disability” (Miera, 2008).

*Hauptschule* is a type of school at lower secondary level providing a basic general education, focusing on practical subjects (grades 5-9/10). *Hauptschule* is increasingly regarded as the ‘school for the rest’, namely socially disadvantaged children and migrant students. *Realschule* (grades 5-10) is also a type of school at a lower secondary level providing pupils with a more extensive general education and the opportunity to go on to upper secondary level courses that lead to vocational or higher education

entrance qualifications. Graduates from *Hauptschulen* and *Realschulen* (or *Gymnasium* after grade 10) may begin a vocational education and training within a dual system combining work and school, or attend various technical colleges for grades 11 and 12 (*Fachoberschulen*), which prepare students for *Fachhochschulen*, universities of applied sciences. *Gymnasium* covers both lower and upper secondary level (grades 5-13) and provides an in-depth general education aimed at gaining general higher education entrance. The *Länder* determine different core curricula for the respective school types. At present almost all *Länder* are reducing the required number of years of *Gymnasium* from nine years to eight, making the *Abitur*-level degree (graduation of years 11 to 13 courses preparing for University entrance) or *Allgemeine Hochschulreife* (University entrance qualification) possible after grade 12.

Although students may change school streams, these are in fact prevalingly only permeable in the downward direction (Miera, 2008: 2). Thus, secondary education in Germany is characterized by its three different tracks, i.e. school types, which lead to different certificates with a clear hierarchical order. Only the *Abitur* certificate, acquired at a grammar school (*Gymnasium*), provides entrance to university. The certificate of the lowest track (*Hauptschule*), acquired after the ninth or tenth grade, has been greatly devalued over the last decades, putting young adults in an unfavorable position when applying either for vocational training or a qualified job.<sup>12</sup> The intermediate type of secondary education, *Realschule*, takes up the position in between. The certificate gained at this type of school ensures better prospects for vocational training. Comprehensive schools (*Gesamtschule*), which exist in some *Länder* as a fourth type of school, integrate these three different tracks, facilitating movement between them.

The director of *Realschule* (at Goldenau, Goslar), Mrs. Schneider (38, interview, 2006) emphasizes the selective character of German education system:

“At the secondary level, the German education system clearly functions as a very selective system that permanently externalizes a certain group (which is especially the migrant community) from the rest of German society, which should be certainly revised by including intercultural elements. Hauptschule mostly serves educating people as a simple worker, while the Realschule functions for specifically qualified occupational workers. However, Gymnasium helps to create highly qualified professionals for the German labor market. The first type of school, Hauptschule, is well known as catering to lower class people and is a migrants` school” (Schneider, interview, 2006).

Pre-school education in kindergartens usually starts at the age of three. Since 1996, children of this age have the legal right to a place in kindergarten until they start school at the age of six. Attendance, however, is not mandatory. In the western part of Germany, where most migrants live, there is still a shortage of places in kindergartens for children in this age group. Kindergarten is often the only place where these children can learn German before they enter school. Despite the undisputed importance of pre-school education and child care for migrant offspring, hardly any systematic research has been done in this area so far.

In 2000, 47.1 percent of the foreign three-year-olds attended kindergarten compared to 56.3 percent of all children. The differences between the groups decrease with age, but there is still a gap between children aged five to six. Thus, foreign children still attend kindergarten less often, although the rate has increased and regional differences have to be taken into account. (Söhn and Özcan, 2006)

In general, the education system in Germany is characterized by two major conditions: First, education is under the legislature of the regional states (the *Länder*), not the federal state. Thus there are differences in the structure of the school systems among the 16 German *Länder*. Second, the



German school system promotes student selection according to school performance rather early in their school careers.

The decision on what type of secondary school is to be attended by a child is normally made at the age of nine or ten, based on the parents' wishes and recommendations given by the primary school teachers. As Miera (2009: 25) points out, the system of classifying students in the last year of primary education includes an individual assessment of the student by teachers who have not been properly trained for that task. Often teachers reify ethnic stereotypes or latently feel less responsible for their immigrant students. The student's future career depends on these recommendations although parents are not obliged to follow the recommendation. An unjustified referral to these schools for special education can be considered an indicator of indirect discrimination since the chances of achieving a higher school certificate are very low. The national report suggests that primary schools do discriminate against immigrant students in terms of their assessment and secondary school recommendation (Miera, 2009). Apparently, authorities attach disproportionate weight to the linguistic competence of students, since one of the key elements in the classification assessment is their proficiency in German language.

Söhn and Özcan (2006) argue that compared to the school systems in other countries, the German school system channels students into different tracks of secondary education at a very young age. This decision in a child's life strongly influences his or her future life chances and is hardly reversible at a later stage in a child's school career or in adulthood.

The special schools for learning disabilities (Sonderschule) are supposed to meet the students' particular needs. In contrast to the migrant children's special situation as second language learners, however, the teaching staff of these schools is rarely trained for teaching German as a second

language. An unjustified referral to these schools for special education can be considered an indicator of indirect discrimination since the chances of achieving a higher school certificate are very low.

Radtke strongly emphasizes that it is not migrant parents who choose segregated schools, but rather German parents of middle-class background who take decisions which lead to higher segregation. Additionally, Radtke studied how schools themselves initiate and reinforce ethnic segregation. In his case study, he found that (primary) schools tend to specialize as schools with a certain profile favored by German middle-class parents (e.g. focus on music, early learning of English, alternative pedagogical approaches) or as schools allegedly suitable for immigrant children (extra language tuition, social workers). These kinds of specializations tend to lead to ethnically and linguistically as well as socio-economically more homogeneous classes which form a more or less favorable learning environment for the children enrolled. Decisions by organizations (school administrations and local authorities) as well as individuals, i.e. parents, thus have the unintended consequences of enforcing ethnic segregation in schools, which is officially deplored by some and silently approved of by others. (Söhn and Özcan 2006: 107)

Already during primary education, selection of students into different school types takes place to a certain extent. Children who cannot meet the requirements of a regular school are thought of as having “special needs” and can be transferred to special schools for pupils with learning disabilities. Diefenbach makes the point that it is controversial and unclear how the decisions about this referral come about and, more importantly, whether these decisions are justified. When migrant children are sent to these school types, it might often be the case that language problems become mixed up with cognitive deficiencies as perceived by the teachers.

The teacher of the Turkish language, Sakine (42, interview, 2006) finds the recommendation (*empfehlung*) system unfair in the primary schools:

“Recommendation system is unfair. Most Turkish youth complain that the German children are recommended by German teachers for the highest or medium secondary school track and they are significantly higher compared to Turkish students. When we take into account the influence of the teachers’ recommendation, such as grades and the motivation of the pupils, these influences put Turkish students in marginal position. Yet, their socio-economic background is already below Germans. Thus, Turkish children’s risk of attending a special school (Sonderschule) is almost twice as high as German children in Goslar schools. For example, compared to Germans with the same grades, Turkish children but not ethnic Germans are still more likely to be recommended for the lowest *Hauptschule* track” (Sakine, 42, interview, 2006).

It can be argued that the children of Turkish migrant children are confronted with institutional discrimination both because of their ethnic background and their working class background, which cannot be easily separated. Even though, the recommendation of the teachers might be fair, the basic instruction given during primary education seems not to be enough. Because, it does not meet these students’ needs and does not enable them to fully develop their potential.

The current state of affairs in education of Turkish migrants in Germany is more than alarming. According to PISA 2003 of OECD (Programme for International Student Assessment), the school performance among Turkish second generation migrant children is in comparison to native children alarming.

The PISA studies reveal that the widest gaps in educational status between migrants and natives are still found in Germany. The recent PISA study, although highlighting the severe disadvantages youths with migration backgrounds faced, did not show that more exclusionary and more integrationist stances in the regional states were systematically related to educational disadvantages. Nevertheless, the situation with regard to employment and education is extremely worrying. For several years

experts consistently reported progress, i.e., a better formal education and improving positions in the labor market of second generation immigrants. More recently, however, developments are marked by stagnation and even a reversal of the positive trend. This can hardly be explained by the citizenship policy, but it also leaves us to wonder about the integrative effects of the education system. With regard to employment, the worsening situation is probably caused by a mixture of economic transformations with the effects of discrimination. As language and formal qualifications have become more important, in a situation when labor is scarce, discriminatory selection is more likely (Schönwälder, 2006: 90).

Schönwälder (2006: 96) states that in 1983, of youths with a non-German passport, 34% left school without formal qualifications; in 1989 their share was down to 20%, but in 1991 it was still 21%, and in 1998, 19%. Only about 65% of the 15 to 19-year-old foreign citizens are still in school – compared to 92% of the German citizens (1999 figures); participation in professional training (*Lehre*) is much lower than for German citizens. While among the 18 to 24-year-old German citizens 71% attend schools, universities or professional training, only 25% of the foreign citizens do the same (1999). Figures for 2000 are almost unchanged.

Only 19% of foreign students are able to attend the *Gymnasium*; the Turkish rate there is even lower. The deteriorated situation of these children with a migration background seems to be a consequence of the German trajectory school system with a relative early ramification that has a stronger impact on the migrant families. (PISA, 2003) The attendance rate to *Hauptschule*, the school for preparation to vocational training, is dramatically higher than the German students' rate of attendance: 50 to 21%. Less than 10% of Turkish students can reach *Abitur* (certificate necessary for higher education admission). The rate among German students is approximately 26% (Schierup, et al, 2006: 159).

The participation at vocational training rate among those with migration background is in addition lower than their German students of the same age (15 or 16): 68% of young Germans were 1999 in apprenticeship, whilst the young foreigners reached a rate of only 39% (ibid: 160). The majority of young Turks enrolled for vocational training lower qualification professions such as mechanics, hairdressers or retail clerks and will not have the opportunity of promotion after training.

It is possible to claim that the EU will urgently necessitate higher educational formation in its competitive labor market in the near future. However, when one focuses on the educational performances of the children of immigrants in the EU states by comparing them with the majority of native Europeans (especially in Germany), their success is quite below the standards that the European Union will require. Recent PISA studies also demonstrated that maintaining the marginalized position of Turkish children in Germany means that the country of origin or the immigrants background is still a barrier in having access to education and the labor market of Germany and the European Union.

Germany was reluctant to respond to the presence of ‘guest workers’ and fitting minority ethnic communities like the Turkish Muslims into its Europeanized concept of nationhood. ‘Integrating guest worker children’ into the German school system while preparing them for a possible return to their country of origin, known as ‘foreigner pedagogy’ (Ausländerpädagogik), was the guiding principle of education in the 1960s and early 1970s (Faas, 2007) The “*Ausländerpädagogik*” established in this period focused on education problems, and school attainment, vocational training and transition to the labor market continue to be major topics (Worbs, 2003).

Until recently, German policies towards immigrants and cultural diversity was characterized by the reality-contradicting notion that Germany was not an immigration country and migrants would eventually return to their home countries. On the other hand, some social workers and pedagogues confronted with increasing numbers of migrants and their children developed a certain attitude towards this clientele that was characterized by good-will and at the same time patronizing and stereotyping. There are some explicitly segregating practices, such as the categorizing of immigrants or children of immigrants according to their citizenship or their non-German mother tongue and concentrating these students in extra classes or in remedial classes, a legal administrative practice in some federal states until the late 1990s. Transfer to regular schooling from these classes was difficult. The approach found in core curricula and textbooks is dominated by a division between native Germans and immigrants and their descendants.

Despite mass immigration, it was not until the 1980s that a concept of multicultural education was developed in response to the presence of 'guest worker children' and it was only in 1996 that the KMK (Ministries of Education and Cultural Affairs [The Kultusministerkonferenz]) published the guideline 'Intercultural Education at School' (Interkulturelle Bildung und Erziehung in der Schule), stating that the federal states should 'overhaul and further develop their curricula and guidelines of all subjects with regard to an intercultural dimension; develop teaching materials which address intercultural aspects as an integral part of school and education; and only allow school textbooks that do not marginalize or discriminate against other cultures' (Faas 2007: 579).

Moreover, Germany has also recognized the need for teaching intercultural skills in schools. Following a surge of right-wing attacks on migrants in the 1990s, the German Conference of Education Ministers made

recommendations, among others, to place an emphasis on intercultural education. This document required schools to play an active role in the: ‘development of attitudes and behavior committed to the ethical principles of humanity, freedom and responsibility, as well as of solidarity, democracy and tolerance in all learners’ (KMK 1996, Meier, 2010: 428- the author`s translation).

The majority of schools in Germany continue to operate on a monolingual assumption, which Gogolin termed ‘the monolingual habitus in multilingual schools’. This means that schools largely ignore the fact that many children in multilingual urban centers speak diverse languages at school entry, and non-German language backgrounds are effectively seen as a problem (Meier, 2010: 427).

However, it is clear that mainstream schools in Germany lack an intercultural approach to a certain extent. In linguistic terms, it can be said that many native-speaking German teachers feel that migrant languages have no place in regular schools, apart from being used as auxiliary languages to accelerate the children`s learning of German. Therefore, from my observation from German teachers and directors in secondary schools in Oker and Goslar, it can be said that the German education system has a nation-state focus, twinned with ethno-centric thought patterns and practice. Furthermore, it can be argued that, in practice, Germany has followed an implicitly assimilationist and explicitly monolingual ideology which is in need of a fundamental reorientation.

It is safe to argue that current school practices institutionally discriminate against children of non-German origin. Thus, the German education system has been criticized for not sufficiently implementing equal opportunity (Gomolla and Radtke 2007) and intercultural learning

guidelines in mainstream education, and for adhering to the monolingual habitus.

As Miera (2009: 22) points out In October 1996, the Standing Conference of the Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs of the *Länder* agreed on a resolution, regarded as the most elaborate agreement on intercultural education of its kind in Germany. Most of the *Länder* have now designed general integration concepts and started to revise their educational programs and curricula, but this new approach is far from being widely implemented. The issue of accommodating culture-specific needs is quite contentious and often intertwined with the ideologically hardened debate about the compatibility of 'Western values' and 'Islam'. Although several federal Ministries acknowledge the importance of supporting the first languages of immigrant children and despite immigrant parents' organizations demanding respect and support of their native languages in schools, only some pilot schemes and projects have been developed, mainly in primary schools. Instead, German language acquisition is increasingly perceived as a remedy of current educational difficulties.

In Germany, the results of the PISA-surveys have intensified the perception that German language skills and good school performances were the main criteria for successful integration of immigrants and their descendants. Integration measures have therefore been focused on language acquisition, while bi- or multilingual teaching and multicultural or intercultural education is subordinated and often entirely dependent on the commitment of individual schools or teachers.

The German education system fails to provide adequate language training for children who speak non-native mother languages and shows a strong tendency to reproduce social inequality. So, it is meaningful to explain the significant features of the second-language program. The options and



practices of second-language education are many and varied, and there is still considerable debate about the best method for improving proficiency in official national languages. This has yielded a multitude of programs and methods, ranging from transitional bilingual programs to intensive instruction exclusively in the second language. No country appears to have clear-cut guidelines in place for the provision of second-language teaching (Crul and Vermeulen 2003: 980).

As a matter of fact, the educational system in Germany is ill-prepared for dealing with second language learners as “normal” students and a mainstream phenomenon. Training in teaching German as a second language is clearly insufficient. In the promotion of immigrant students’ native tongue, educational policies vary across the regional states. For instance, the typically mother tongue instruction, namely Turkish lesson, ranges from 2 to 5 hours per week, usually given in the afternoon. With the exception of the regional state of Hessen, attendance is voluntary (and not always possible, if there are too few students of the respective language group). In some Länder, mother tongue instruction is organized and financed by the consulates of countries like Turkey; in others, German state authorities are responsible.

Teaching the Turkish language is limitedly available in Realschule and Hauptschule in Goslar and Oker served by two Turkish teachers whose profession (without having a university degree in Turkish) to teach was decided by the State officials in Goslar in 1970s. However, it can be clearly observed that there are some problems because the courses are so amateurish and unorganized. Turkish students cannot be properly educated about the Turkish language within this amateurish condition and seem to be losing time from core classes. Thus, although Turkish language lessons as a second language program exist with limited hours in the Goslar

secondary schools (except Gymnasiums), they are not properly designed and taught both by teachers and the government.

In Germany, some federal states opted for intensive second-language programs, while others provided instruction in migrant languages, creating separate classes for the children. Even into the 1990s, however, methods of learning German other than the traditional approaches were still rare. Overall, then, the group we are focusing on here - the second generation above age 15 who attended primary school in the 1980s or early 1990s – did not profit from special language programs to any reasonable degree (Crul and Vermeulen 2003). Generally, the German state sees using the Turkish language as a hindrance to integration. They have forbidden Turkish children to speak Turkish in school. Recent studies about bilingualism, however, shows that people from very early age have the full capacity to learn many languages at the same time. People cannot learn a second language, if they cannot be given opportunities to develop their native language and identity in terms of a psychological dimension.

Obviously bilingual/bicultural teachers play a key role in a bilingual/bicultural education, and their contributions are manifold in the classroom: first, they play an essential part facilitating the transition between the minority culture and the school culture; second, they are expected to function both as mediators between the different principles and patterns of the cultures, and as positive role models for all pupils (Moldenhawer, 1995: 79)

## **6.6. Quo Vadis Goslar?**

The three tier education system in Goslar falls under Lower-Saxon legislation. The language of tuition at all schools is the German language. The nine primary schools are distributed across the entire municipality and the associated hamlets. There are two advanced secondary schools (5-

12/13), the Christian-von-Dohm-Gymnasium, and the more traditional Ratsgymnasium, both of which prepare their students for an academic career. Three intermediate level schools (5-10), the Andre-Mouton Realschule, the Realschule Hoher Weg, and the Realschule Goldene Aue prepare their pupils for a professional career. Furthermore, two vocational schools (5-9/10) exist: the Hauptschule Oker, and the Hauptschule Kaiserpfalz. The Sonderschule caters to children with learning difficulties and special needs. At the 10-12 level there are four job training colleges located at Goslar in crafts, economics, and care for the elderly for students from Goslar district and beyond.

The nearest University from Goslar is the old venerable Engineering and Mining School at Clausthal-Zellerfeld situated in the Upper Harz mountains some 21 km (13 mi.) South of Goslar within the Goslar district. Some 80 km to the South the highly acclaimed University of Göttingen (founded by King George II of Great Britain) is based. The Izmir University of Economics, an Izmir-based Turkish university, is on the way to establish an international university in Goslar. The two Community College (*Volkshochschule*) of the district of Oker and central Goslar give language courses, integration courses and life-long learning for both immigrants and the native population.

Ethnic minority groups in Europe, such as the Turks, disproportionately reside in more deprived areas where schools are more likely to have fewer resources, more disciplinary issues, and higher staff turnover. This echoes some of the notions in the downward mobility variant in the segmented assimilation theory. The residential areas in European cities are, however, not comparable in scale or in terms of their social problems with US ghettos, where the potential for downward assimilation is seen as greatest (Portes and Zhou 1993).

As can be seen in the Germany in general and Goslar education (Table 19, Table, 20, Table 21, Table 22, Table 23, Table 24 in Appendix C), there is no meaningful difference in Goslar from the general view of educational success when comparing with the other neighbourhoods or cities. That is to say, the education level is so limited and school drop outs are so high that their prospective future and possible career paths are directly affected by these negative educational outcomes.

Poorer levels of education and higher drop-out rates appear to be a general characteristic of the Turkish second generation in Goslar, although figures do conceal some undoubted success stories. In Goslar, Turkish youth are statistically much less likely to graduate from the higher educational streams than native Germans. This means that, in Goslar, children of immigrants are already selected out to vocational education at a young age, with the result that they go to schools where the majority of pupils are of immigrant background. Though school certificates are an important indicator of a group's educational structure, more crucial for the position on the labor market are vocational qualifications. In this context it is striking that Turks commonly remain without formal vocational training in Goslar.

The low attendance rate in kindergarten is due to somehow unaware or uninformed parents, but also the lack of opportunities to offer pre-school education to every child below six years of age, could outline some aspects of the German education predicament with regard to migrant children. The German *Sonderschule*, the school for children with learning handicaps, serves mainly foreign children. If not enrolled in these highly unprivileged schools, most of the Turkish students will attend lower levels of the secondary school (Ünver, 2006: 26).

Of course, plenty of well-educated and integrated immigrant families live in Goslar, but Germans and a few Turkish educators, especially in Oker, say they encounter many children whose parents are unemployed, poorly educated, and speak little German. German seems a second language for about half of all students in Goslar and the Oker district.

For instance, German and Turkish teachers tend to see parents as the most responsible and the most important agents of educational attainment for children of immigrants. Fatma, a third generation youth, states that “the parents want to control their children by implementing authoritarian precautions at home on the one hand but they are not concerned about their children’s educational development on the other hand. Thus, their control of children becomes harsh, useless and unbalanced” (Fatma, 24, interview 2006). Similarly, the director of Haputschule director, Trautwein mentions the lack of interest and irregular visits of the parents. They say “although they persistently invited the parents to the school's open houses and parent-teacher conferences, few of them are interested in their children's education and most don't interact with teachers or the other parents ” (Trautwein, 54, interview, 2006).

Another youth social pedagogue of the youth center Gleis 95, Eda (32, interview, 2006) pays attention to the responsibility of families in Goslar in educational attainment of their children, which cannot be neglected:

“Generally, because parents work hard, they cannot spare their time to keep an eye on their children. Most mothers have a primary school degree. They cannot speak German properly. They cannot understand the lessons and homework subject even they wanted to help them. If there is an emergency signing that their children would fail the class, then their immediate response is to run to the schools to solve the problem. What about youth’s approach towards school. They can study but they don’t. For instance, here I serve to help them with their homework in this youth centre from 3 to 6 pm on a daily basis. What do they do? They prefer to watch football, play backgammon. When I offer to study together with them, they produce lots of excuses. Females have more ambition and interest to study than males” (Eda, 32, interview, 2006).

School and occupational qualifications are the main components of the human capital and serve as important determinants of an individuals' position in the labor market. It can be said that when someone with an immigrant background meets with discrimination at the labor market, what is the point of working hard for success in school? The common problem of all German schools for the children of immigrants in Goslar is that educational curricula is unable to provide them with cultural capital so that they could turn it to economic capital after graduation. Thus, this condition also creates a barrier for them to further career possibilities and social and economic mobility which causes German society to label the culture of immigrants and their children as a `backward culture` and to consolidate the strong prejudices that define social, economic and educational problems in terms of this backward culture. This prejudice labels immigrant culture as backward and become a voluminous hinderance to change an unsustainable educational system into a more democratic, equal and inclusive system for all individuals in Germany.

As some respondents declare, like all other social relations, the relations in schools are also racialized and stratified. All individuals are perceived and stigmatized as supposedly having at least one ethnical identity, as if they have to have an identity. In other words, the schools label the students as immigrants and other discriminative categories, even though they were born and already socialized in these German schools. Ironically, even the third generation is blamed for not being integrated into German society, yet they cannot be evaluated within the paradigm of integration because they are not immigrants. For instance, some German teacher respondents define aggressive and dominant behavior of third generation males in Goslar with a special reference to Islam, patriarchy and ethnic features by completely neglecting their educational role on third generation youths in German schools.

Some scholars tend to explain the educational failure of Turkish pupils with their family tradition and Islam:

“A salient distinction between the two second generations as a whole is that the Turkish seem more inclined to adhere to the norms and values of their own ethnic community (in areas such as religious practice, marriage, gender roles and traditional customs). Tightly knit social networks play an essential role in the Turkish community. Strong social control prevails, and the behavior of girls and young women is closely monitored. Both traditional gender thinking in the Turkish community and the practice of early marriage pose formidable barriers to the education of second-generation Turkish girls. A quarter of them leave school without any secondary diploma, most to soon become full-time housewives” (Crul and Doornik, 2003: 1062).

Having gained experience with Turkish boys and girls in schools, German teachers frequently refer to the gender inequality among Turkish families in Goslar. The teachers of the Hauptschule and Realschule schools in Goslar argue family 'control' over the girls, in contrast to boys, has much to do with Turkish cultural practices, and is necessarily rooted in Islamic beliefs. Therefore, the justification for parental control is based totally on religious grounds. However, this family “control” over girls can also be seen as a cultural tradition rather than only a religious entity. As Küçükcan (2004:249) claims that, if Islam is only responsible for this treatment, the parents should have developed the same attitudes spontaneously for their sons as religious principles apply to both sexes equally.

From this point of above view, the behavior of Turkish third generation youth are evaluated in an ethnic and religious vacuum with its Islamist and Turkish character rather than contextualizing them within German society. Stigmatized as `belonging to another world` or being a non-European `foreigner` in Germany, the Turkish community has suffered from a lack of social acceptance. Even this lack of acceptance directly or indirectly influences their labor market opportunities and educational success.

One of the respondents, a Turkish social pedagogue in the *Gleis 95*, Christine (33, interview, 2006) points out the downward mobility of

Turkish children in education by underlining the urgent renewal of an education system in Goslar/Germany:

“I think there is no structural discrimination however, we have to see some facts: There are many of immigrants here and their children attend German schools. One has to consider the success level of these schools. Why does one go to school? They have to get some benefits and results from school experiences. Statistically we have witnessed from media and literature that children of immigrants only 5% of Turkish pupils graduated from high schools. This might be rising nowadays. Let me say 10 percent. When we add the unsuccessful story of secondary schools, some students have no possibility of having occupational training. Furthermore, the unemployment rate is so high among both the youth and the old Turkish immigrants in this messy structure. There must be an explanation for this downward process. For instance, we cannot say that the German education system functions perfectly and it gives anything whatever the pupils need, but the children of immigrants are idiots. That’s why they are idiots, they are unsuccessful. I cannot say this” (Christine, 33, interview, 2006).

On the other hand, Monika, a German social pedagogue in the *Gleis 95*, mentions the reasons of downward process of educational attainment in terms of the immigrant life-world:

“There must be a reasonable explanation! Why are they so unsuccessful? Perhaps, the children of immigrants cannot benefit from the opportunities that are given to them. It would be one side of the coin. The other side is the question of how important is education to an immigrant family in their children’s socialization process? Education needs work, patience, and close interests like a mission. You have to take responsibility and do whatever education needs. Some think that the social welfare system compensates for everything when they successfully finish school. This is what some people think. Another factor would be the background of the immigrant family. Admittedly, these immigrant families who were at the bottom of the social pyramid came here from villages or countryside of Turkey. Otherwise, why did they want to move here? As a final point, the German education system has not been developed or rectified by considering the foreigner or children of guest-workers which are about 12 percent of the German population. German politics, law and the education system seem very slow to adapt their educational system to this social reality where millions of children of immigrants have to be socialized” (Monika, 35, interview, 2006).

In general, the distribution across school tracks in the year 2000, 56.6 percent of Turkish pupils attended *Hauptschule* (versus 23.6 percent of those with a father born in Germany), 19.3 percent *Realschule* (versus 34.5 percent), 13.9 percent comprehensive school (versus 9.3 percent) and only 10.2 percent grammar school (versus 32.5 percent). Students of Turkish



origin showed the least favorable distribution compared to all immigrant groups.

Heiddard Metz (51, interview, 2006). youth psychologist and head of department of Parents, Children and Youth (*Leiter der Beratungsstelle für Eltern, Kinder und Jugendliche*) in Goslar municipality states the unequal conditions and contradictory results of education:

"It is clear that the education system of Germany is more selective than any other European countries. That is to say, the majority of migrants' children attend the lower class schools. The children of immigrants could not go to qualified high schools like Gymnasium and thus their future of attending university and better occupation possibilities is not more than a daydream. Of course, each German teacher has his/her political opinion and social view. Some would have discriminative views. However, if we think of the whole educational structure, the main aim of the German education system is to help all students develop themselves. This does not mean that the German education system functions well. It is useful to accept this: the German system has been developed by neglecting the foreigners who live in Germany. This is a big failure. German politicians and professionals should be concerned about this reality. There were many guest-workers who had to stay and settle in Germany. Naturally they had children to be educated" (Metz, 51, interview, 2006).

It should be mentioned that a powerful exclusionary force in discriminatory differentiation is the multi-track school system, which indirectly and negatively particularly affects immigrant students and children from a socially disadvantaged background. Institutional – or covert – discrimination results from routines, habits and established practices in internal school organization. Educators and administrations often inadvertently act in a discriminatory way, simply by following the organizational logic of the system. Streaming students appears to have a particularly negative effect on children from minority ethnic groups.

When dealing with cultural difference among the Turkish, Kurdish and German pupils, German teachers have a marked tendency either to describe or understand the Turkish and Kurdish pupils in terms of cultural stereotypes or to ignore their cultural background entirely in the actual

teaching. The cultural stereotypes are particularly noticeable in relation to gender roles and other rule sets with roots in Islam. These are often regarded as intrusive or plainly irritating and fundamentally irrational. Paradoxically, these teachers are in principle tolerant in their attitude to cultural difference, but they are still adamant in insisting, for instance, that all the parents must allow their children to participate in school journeys. They justify their irritation with reference to the well – being of the children and the cohesion of the class, but this is not the only problem they mention. From the school's point of view, the problem rather has to do with the teachers, feelings of impotence because there are no common regularities to refer to, nor do they have the time to give individual consideration to each immigrant family. These experiences are related to the time they spend trying to persuade reluctant immigrant families.

This means that the teachers can find it difficult to respect the immigrants, objections ('don't worry; we'll keep an eye on your daughters'). Furthermore, that they regard the cultural background as something which can be dealt with first and foremost by acquiring knowledge about the Muslim way of life, of relations between Turks and Kurds, of living conditions in the homeland, etc., since such knowledge may help them to a better understanding of the pupils' behavior. However, there is a tendency for the teachers to ignore the cultural background in cases where they have to relate to Turkish or Kurdish pupils whose foreignness is not apparent in their appearance or behavior. The Muslim girl who is not so strict about wearing a headscarf, for instance, who dresses like her German contemporaries and is in other respects more Western in her ways, is in general expected to behave like an ordinary German, and problems about her school performance will therefore be ascribed to personal circumstances or competence- shyness, problems with classmates, and such like. Whereas a third party might suspect a more complex problematization: perhaps what is seen as shyness may actually be a

culturally prompted reluctance to ask the teacher questions directly? And perhaps what is perceived as problems with classmates might be an expression of lacking a sense of belonging anywhere, either in the class or among the Turkish, German and Kurdish students?

Most German teachers ask the Turkish students about the family life, the status of women in Muslim family, education rights of girls, gender discrimination, and patriarchy by expressing some clichés about Turkish people. The questions of Germans revolve around measuring the modernity of Turkish life style with a special focus on the gender roles. They always ask about the headscarf, honor killing, patriarchic relations at home. Indeed, German teachers have little idea about Turkish family and life-style. They have still no multi-cultural formation and they need an urgent multi-cultural formation in order to connect with their pupils from different backgrounds.

On the other hand, one of the Turkish parents, Ismail, tried to explain some scientific explanations about the gender roles of boys and girls in their adolescent age when German teachers complained to him about the distanced behavior of his son against the girls, by asking if he was trained so at home in a Turkish family:

“Boys are naturally different from girls when they are playing with their friends especially in their adolescent ages. We cannot expect that our boys play like the girls. In the beginning of (the) adolescent age, boys may not be interested in their girl partners and could show their differences or macho character by distancing themselves from the girls. However, it is a temporary process. After a while they would start to become more polite and careful about the girls. They started to love them. Although it is necessary that you need to try to understand the different behavioral patterns between boys and girls, which is very special to their adolescent ages, you prefer to see the case with your prejudices. They are naturally different coming from their instincts in their adolescent age” (Ismail, 36, interview, 2006).

Ferdane also criticized the German teachers` manner by describing her interesting experience in her secondary school:

“Some teachers see all Turkish girls as having Islamist families who suppress them at home. They assumed all girls wear headscarves at home but take it off and make up their faces on the way to schools. However, some or maybe most Turkish families are open-minded towards their children like my family. One of my teachers called my father to complain about my close relations with male class-mates. I could not believe it. My father responded to her: ‘we are a modern family. Our daughter does not wear a headscarf. We trust my daughter and she can have contact with whoever she chooses’. Please don’t disturb us with such cases only for our daughters’ lessons” (Ferdane, 23, interview, 2006).

In Goslar, Germans and Turkish-Muslims often blame each other for the integration failure. Many Germans see the Muslim community as refusing to accept German norms and values and as wanting to stay apart from the majority population by imposing the backward characteristics of Islam by producing the headscarf, gender inequality, male domination and violence. It is quite interesting that the German director and teachers whom I interviewed at the *Realschule* in Goslar strongly believe that the Muslim immigrant students have different ways of behavior than Germans in the sense that they are characterized by those above problems. Even though, these students were educated in Germany, German teachers’ attitudes toward Muslim students put the problems into differences in culture and values without seeing the problem in terms of psychological and sociological perspectives which is so necessary in the social and economic problems of modern industrialized society.

It is clear that the school abandonment, failure of educational process and deviant behavior that are part of this process consolidate the position of Turkish youth at the bottom of German society and reinforce racial/ethnic stereotypes among the native German population. Such stereotypes increase hostility and opposition to subsequent waves of labor migrants and reduce their chances for successful integration.

Correspondingly, many Muslims view German society as unwilling to fully accept people of different culture, regardless of what they do.

Alienation is not an unusual case among second and third generation German born Muslims. Unemployment and poverty are much higher in the German Muslim community than in other segments of society, especially among Muslim youth. This structure tends to produce more marginalization which can be responsible for crime and violence.

One successful Turkish businessman of Goslar, Haydar, mentions his experience in relation to his daughter`s problems at school by saying that ‘German people are still not ready to accept us as successful people’:

“Germans are still not ready to accept us no matter how successful we are in integrating into their society. Let me give an example, “my daughter is very successful at school; she has high grades from all lessons except one. Once she was crying when she arrived at home from school, saying that `my teacher does not like me and asked me insulting questions about my family in the class. She asked me if my father and mother can speak German`. I made an appointment with the teacher and went to school and found this teacher in order to understand the situation. After speaking for an hour with each other, all of a sudden he asked me if I have a German passport. I said I spoke with you in German right, but still you questioned if I am German or not. It is irrelevant now. Because, I can speak easily with you in German. It doesn’t matter if I have a paper stating that I am German” (Haydar, 42, interview, 2006).

Many of the specialized works in the socio-cultural area mention exclusively Turks. This might be explained, on the one hand, by the quantitative importance of this group, but also by the fact that Turks are often considered as a particularly problematic group with regard to integration. However, it should be emphasized that at least in some of the areas mentioned recent empirical evidence speaks against the widespread perception of socio-cultural “integration deficits” of Turkish second-generation migrants. This concerns, for example, their command of the German language (Heckmann, Lederer and Worbs, 2001) and the use of Turkish versus German media. On the other hand, there is a certain consistency in research findings on social integration and feelings of belonging among Turkish migrants in Germany: the majority of both the first and second generations is part of an ethnically homogenous social networks and show little identification with the immigration country.

Another Turkish parent, Erdogan, draws pessimistic conclusions about the education system in Goslar:

“40 or 50 percent of foreign students in Goslar dropped out of schools. If you always let those specific groups of children of immigrants leave their schools and exclude them from society, you cannot expect a full-scale integration into this society. It is true, the welfare state provides people with a comfortable life but it does not function equally or the immigrant’s access is limited because of various reasons. The children of immigrants are still stigmatized by the same symbols like their guest-worker parents, which is, however, is not fair. They are stigmatized as nationalist, unable to integrate, backward, religious, etc. If the youth do not believe that they will be treated equally, they immediately return to their parents’ customs. Without any future hopes or perspectives, the only way to express yourself would be symbolic identity. You are 16 or 17 years old and you need to belong somewhere. Here in Goslar and Germany, there is a melancholic way of life especially among immigrant youth. However, you cannot deal with this problem and you cannot label that foreigners are religious or they like to behave in that way and it is their way of life. There are several determinants for this. The leading important factor is a socio-economic one that you can solve most problems only when you could solve socio-economic problems” (Erdogan, 39, interview, 2006).

On the other hand, Ismail warned Turkish pupils against the “reverse discrimination” towards German people:

“Turkish pupils should not think that every punishment by German teachers is due to being a Turk but rather they should concentrate on their responsibilities on the reasons for the punishments. Only then can they have a fairer and objective perception of the issues” (Ismail, 36, interview, 2006).

According to Söhn and Özcan (2006) migration biography, language and social class are the main predictors of variations of education performance. On the level of characteristics of individuals at least three categories of factors can be distinguished which generally influence the educational attainment of students with an immigrant background.

First, migration itself—especially age at immigration, length of stay, intent to stay or return as parts of an individual’s migration biography—has a number of possible direct and indirect consequences. There is overwhelming evidence that the earlier a child immigrated (or when born

in the receiving country), the higher his or her chances of a successful school career. Apart from the negative consequences of a school career interrupted by migration, the students' immigrant parents are less familiar than natives with the structure of the school system in the receiving country, as well as its formal and informal norms. They are less able to make the right choice for their children at the right time. Furthermore, the expectation or hope of one day returning to one's country of origin might keep some parents from supporting their children's school careers as much as they would if they knew they would settle for good.

Second, language itself forms an important part of a migration background: a migrant's first language often differs from the official language of the receiving society. Thirdly, it is the parents' own education and socio-economic status which is most commonly referred to when explaining the educational performance of immigrant children in Germany.

There are contrasting views on whether low performance by Turkish children and other migrant groups can be interpreted as a resulting of discrimination against immigrant children. Kristen believes that it is not teachers who actively discriminate against Turkish and other migrant pupils. Rather, their lower achievement is, in her view, due to structural factors like ethnically segregated schools, which offer a poor learning environment, or family resources, e.g. parents' limited knowledge of the German school system as well as their low level of education.

Consequently, a narrow focus on the characteristics of the individual and familial background of students might neglect what goes on in schools and to what degree schools are responsible for the below-average performance of students with a migration background.

Gomolla and Radtke (2007), for instance, highlight “institutional discrimination,” decisions and institutional arrangements of the school which result in unequal educational attainment of native and immigrant students. They stress the importance of decisions which lead to selection among students, like channeling migrant students more often to special education for children with learning disabilities and to lower secondary school tracks, thus fostering ethnic segregation (more or less) unintentionally. According to Gomolla and Radtke’s observations, these decisions do not only depend on the pupil’s performance or even the teacher’s possible prejudices, but they also arise from complex organizational interests.

### **6.7. Conclusion: Lessons and Recommendations**

One of the most important questions concerning the future of labor migrants in Western democracies is the integration of their descendants into socioeconomic, educational and political life.

Admittedly, it is felt almost universally that neither “a ghetto-like situation” nor a “fundamental feeling of hopelessness” prevails among young immigrants in Germany. Many voices do point out at the same time, however, that the group of those who “have nothing to lose” is growing. The educational situation and the circumstances on the apprenticeship and labor markets are so precarious that they could very well provide fuel for protest. If this development continues in coming years, then the danger of social unrest like in France in 2005 looms in Germany, too, warns Kenan Kolat: “Many young people not of German background feel themselves excluded and could vent their anger and hate in a similar fashion” (Gesemann, 2007: 1)



Based on my personal conversations, observations and interviews in Goslar, it can be claimed that second or third generation children of immigrants are well aware of the social crisis and discriminative actions against them. Increasingly they speak of their unfair conditions in education and the labor market, which brings about a resentment characterized by an anarchistic character which has a very special imprint at the age of youth. This anarchistic language of the children of immigrants only refers to itself as anarchist essentialism. That is to say, when the children of immigrants become aware of being a loser, they immediately turn their `we` feeling accompanied by fictive references. Thus, this anarchistic manner seems very particular to the youth with an immigration background in Goslar. For instance, one of the university student respondents, Murat, said that:

“Sometimes I feel myself hyper-isolated in this society and if any organizations provide me with a perspective of emancipation and help me get rid of this isolation, I would have immediately participated in such an organization without considering whatever organization it is” (Murat, 24, interview, 2006).

In Goslar/Germany, children enter school late, are selected early, and in the former two countries also have fewer contact hours and receive less supplementary support. Children should begin school earlier (kindergarten education) and have more hours of face-to-face tuition, and also have the most supplementary help and support available inside and outside school. They shouldn't undergo educational selection until a fairly late age. Native German youth graduate more often from *Realschule* or *Gymnasium*, whereas the Turkish respondents perform poorest of all immigrant groups including ethnic Germans in Goslar.

It may be claimed that the descendants of Turkish migrant workers and families have not begun to constitute a group of permanently excluded ghetto poor or an underclass. Because, the dual system of vocational training in Germany seems to be better suited for labor market integration,

especially because apprenticeships are more practice oriented and do count as work experience for later application procedures (Crul and Schneider, 2009). The dual system and remedial programs ensure that most school-leavers (age group sixteen to nineteen) are in training and/or are employed, although unemployment increases in the age group twenty to twenty-four. Income poverty does not seem to be widespread among Turkish labor force participants in the sixteen to twenty-four year old age group. Nevertheless, as Faist (1994) emphasizes the future prospects for insertion of Turkish immigrants in Germany are uncertain. Moreover, adult Turkish workers are also much more likely to be among the long-term unemployed than adult German workers. It is conceivable that a sizable section of Turkish immigrants will become permanently marginalized in a changing labor market competition.

We cannot safely claim a considerable intergenerational progress between parents and children for all second-generation groups, although there is some progress of the third compared to the in-between generations. On the other hand, obvious deficits in relation to the structural position of autochthonous German age peers do remain, especially for Turkish youngsters and young adults. This can be explained by a mix of factors: lacking social and cultural capital of the parental generation; an education system which does not foster the educational progress of children from disadvantaged families; the high importance of school degrees for access to the vocational training system and the labor market; and direct and indirect institutional discrimination in both educational areas and labor market.

Last but not least, as can be seen the unemployment rate of Turkish community in Goslar and Oker, it is not surprising that the structural problems of the German economy with a shrinking market for apprenticeships and high unemployment rates firstly hit migrants and their descendants harder than German autochthonous people.

It is clear that the school abandonment, failure of educational process and deviant behavior that are part of this process consolidate the position of Turkish youth at the bottom of German society and reinforce racial/ethnic stereotypes among the native German population. Such stereotypes increase hostility and opposition to subsequent waves of labor migrants and reduce their chances for successful integration.

Generally, as Söhn and Özcan suggest (2006) the three-tiered system of secondary education itself seems to be a major cause of ethnic and social segregation in schools. Reforming this hierarchical system would imply teaching all children together at comprehensive schools for a longer period than the usual four years of primary education. In addition, teachers should be better trained to adequately handle classes which are and will be culturally, linguistically and socially more heterogeneous than in the past. From these kinds of reforms, not only migrant children but all students with a disadvantaged background might benefit and German society would be able to profit from at present undisclosed talents and potential of these children.

Furthermore, it can be said that the German school system has clearly failed in compensating for the disadvantaged social background of Turkish children up to now. Because we cannot change socio-economic background of the children overnight, it is clear that the educational measures should concentrate on changing public institutions as well as school– parent relationship. Additionally, in order to overcome the racialization and institutional discrimination, the teachers should be trained with an intercultural formation which concentrates on the students with a migration background. German institutions should collaborate with Turkish organizations such as parents' associations and Germany-based Turkish media in supporting the educational integration of children of

Turkish background. Last but not least, Turkish parents should be offered more information about the German school system and counseling might help them take the right decisions on what kind of secondary education their children should strive for and how to continue thereafter.

Foreigners especially Turks have suffered much more than Germans from the restructuring of the economy and employment over time from manufacturing to services: foreigners found often only low paid jobs again in service industries or became unemployed; Educational integration and qualification levels of Turks are on average very low, even in areas with a quite good economic development. The labor market situation of Turks are also there appreciably worse compared with Germans.

The general conclusion from these empirical and anthropological findings in Goslar is: it is mostly discrimination (racial or similar) in employment practices which causes this situation. Also, there are observable economic reasons, which explain the negative employment situation of foreigners and in particular Turks in comparison with Germans. The majority of non-German workers, however, lacks the necessary qualifications and will thus not be able to compete successfully for these new jobs. It is therefore essential, first, to improve qualification levels of non-Germans who have already entered the job market. In addition, it is also essential that today's pupils leave the education system with the necessary qualifications.

It could be recommended that there should be specific programs for further education, allowing persons that have already entered the job market to obtain school certificates. Furthermore, there is a need for additional specific programs in active employment policy, especially regarding the improvement of employability of younger and middle age foreigners.

Public authorities and institutions of all kinds have to change their recruitment behavior which partly excludes foreigners from employment in the public sectors. Special legal regulations have to be adapted to this end (e.g. concerning official clerks). It can be suggested that especially the more integrative service sectors or activities like teaching, social work, public security (police inspectors etc.), health related occupations have to be opened for persons of immigrant background. Active recruitment policies for immigrant descendants should be developed. Successful examples in these fields will assist better performance.

As a result – instead of identifying single policies – an advantageous approach to avoid exclusion as well as non-recognition of difference would be fostered by continuously reflecting the processes of normalization and ‘othering’ – and by implementing resources and methods to develop this reflection among teachers, parents and students. What has also become clear is that several issues often depicted as being ‘ethnic’ are often far more complex – social conditions, residence legislation, legacies of discrimination as well as institutional or organizational structures counteract equal opportunities measures among minority ethnic students and majority students.

Ultimately, holding schools solely accountably for disparities among students and ensuing social conflicts in terms of schooling appears to be insufficient. Issues in, for example, immigration and integration policy (lacking of a proper anti-discrimination law), structural problems, social exclusion in society, administration and intercultural opening are also of an extreme importance.

Canefe (1998: 534) writes about the fragile and fragmented conditions of guest-workers which are still accurate by putting that combined with the rapid rise in the arrival of ethnic Germans and asylum-seekers from former

iron-curtain countries, as well as refugees from war regions and the former Yugoslavia, the current situation puts non-European migrant workers in a very vulnerable position. The combination of non-citizenship, relative lack of sufficient political representation, and taxation without equal return in some areas of social service such as financing of Islamic religious institutions creates an annoying picture of perpetual segregation of the 'guest-workers who stayed' from the rest of the German society.

Is the end of the guest-worker system as we know it? When we focus on the experiences of the children of immigrants, it is clear today, social and cultural marginalization, educational failures, school drop outs, the high unemployment rate and economic insecurities are still part of the daily reality of those second and third generation descendants in Goslar, although there are few success stories of them. Thus, it seems too early to draw a balance and affirmative picture on the descendants of guest-workers. Although their rights to reside and work have been recognized more or less on a permanent basis, they are for the most part dependent on the decisions made by 'external' political bodies and institutions regarding their basic needs in life such as education, health, housing and taxes. Large numbers of resident ethnic minorities, or denizens (Hammar, 1990) without citizenship, are considered to clash with the principles of representative democracy (Kofman, 1995: 127). It is paradoxical for parliamentary democratic system of Germany that they are not eligible for representation in most venues where the decisions are made that directly affect them.

Therefore, it can be recommended that German state should give high priority to provide the economic development, fair distribution of equal opportunities, participation in the political process, raising the standard of education, and engaging in a serious dialogue. These remedies suggested by the German State would be essential in resolving the dilemma of

integrating Turkish communities. In conclusion, the best prescription is effective policies leading to an improvement of the educational and occupational standing of the children and grandchildren of Turkish guest workers, which would go a long way toward their economic integration.

## CHAPTER VII

### TURKISH-MUSLIM ORGANIZATIONS IN GOSLAR

#### 7.1. Introduction: Islam, Organizations, and the Muslim Youth in Goslar

This chapter is concerned with the Islamic organizations in Goslar and it refers in particular to Turkish immigrants in Goslar as an example, though the patterns identified here may be found in Muslim communities throughout Europe. The claim is that the first generation's debate focused on other points, had other themes, and led to other group constellations than did the new generation's (second or third) debate. Generational change played the key role in the orientation of Islamic movements in Germany. Although the older generation consistently organized in relation to what was going on in their country of origin, the new generation focuses on the local and national conditions of their settled immigrant communities (Yavuz, 2006). The religious view of first generation can be defined as an 'Islam in exile'. As Schiffauer (2007) indicates for the first generation, Europe was *gurbet*, or foreign. The factions that developed reflected perceptions of the role that Islam should play in Turkey. However, the perceptions of Islam among the younger generation needed to come to terms with the new cultures they inhabit, without simply assimilating them and losing their identities completely'. Surprisingly, one can find different political Islamist positions like extremist (although it is rare), moderate and individualized Islamist at the same time among the younger generation. In



the 1990s, as Turkish labor migrants became permanent settlers, immigrant organizations like IGMG and DITIB began to reorient themselves to its constituency in Europe.

It is noteworthy that the gradual process of Islamization did not commence until the eighties, both in Germany and Turkey. In Turkey, failure of the political parties to offer meaningful alternatives opened the door for the Islamic party, which provided political programs and general account of the Turkish malaise. In Germany, after the completion of family unification, some third generation German- Turks turned to Islam as a satisfying system of religious meaning. Islam met their psychological and social needs: the needs of marginalized groups excluded from meaningful political and social participation in the larger German society.

One can recognize the evolution and separation of German Islam from Turkish Islam in response to divergent local needs and experiences. After having observed the IGMG organization during the fieldwork carried out in 2005-2006, it is possible for me to claim it has merged syncretic Turkish-Muslim socio-political movements into a Turko-German form of Islam. The harder the German state pushes Turkish immigrants, the more resistant it becomes in negotiations. It can be summed up as follows: 'If Germans treat Turkish immigrants mildly they will get a mild response; however, if the Germans treat them harshly, they will get tough immigrants'.

Turks are settlers of Europe whose position is at the bottom of the professional ladder and who slowly worked their way up over generations. Thus, Islam is not only the other religion per se, it was also often the religion of the worker, of the underclass, the outsider, and the ghetto-dweller. These two aspects distinguish the situation of Islam in Europe from its situation in other regions where Islam is in the minority (Schiffauer, 2007: 68).

In Germany, the question regarding the public recognition of Islam affects in a more complex way the status of Turks as an ethnic minority, based on both a Turkish national identity and a Muslim religious identity.

Although secularism has been represented as a fundamental value of Western societies, debate has made manifest an unresolved ambiguity in the concept and its establishment in the formation of liberal states. In Germany and elsewhere in Europe, the distinctions between private and public and the neutrality of the state regarding religion are sources of contradictions when the state confronts Islam.

Contrary to secularism in France, which excludes religion from public life, secularization in Germany constitutes Catholic and Protestant churches as corporate bodies in public law. In Germany, the churches are recognized in legal terms by their social and moral functions, and the state levies a tax on their behalf which is paid by all citizens who are members of these congregations. Churches therefore constitute semi-public, “semi sovereign” institutions and they enjoy an important role in the stability of German society. Relevant to this role, German churches and religious organizations assisted foreigners during the 1960s, when the needs of workers from the entire Mediterranean basin were handled by denominational charities. The Catholic *Caritas* was mainly concerned with Catholic immigrants from Spain and Italy, while the Protestant *Diakonisches Werk* dealt with Orthodox Greeks and Serbs. The *Arbeiterwohlfahrt (AWO)*, which was created in 1919 by the Social Democratic Party, introduced Turkish Muslims to the German welfare state. (Kastoryano, 2004: 1245)

In Germany, through the institution of church tax (Kirchensteuer), the state collects taxes in the name of each religious community officially recognised as ‘public law corporate bodies’ (Körperschaften des

Öffentlichen Rechts) and channels the revenues back to them. At present this status is confined to the Roman Catholic, Protestant, Greek Orthodox and Jewish communities; however, in principle, other religions can acquire public law corporate body status. For example, König(2005: 228) emphasizes, corporatist politics can be expected to lead to the development of hierarchically structured religious organizations, and recent attempts of Muslim organizations in Germany to form corporations of public law point in that direction.

The progressive, though highly uneven, secularization of Europe is an undeniable social fact. An increasing majority of the European population has ceased participating in traditional religious practices, at least on a regular basis, while still maintaining relatively high levels of private individual religious beliefs. In this respect, one should perhaps talk of the unchurching of the European population and of religious individualization, rather than of secularization. Grace Davie (1994b, 2000) has characterized this general European situation as “believing without belonging” (cited by Casanova, 2006: 65). Institutionally, the secular state is under pressure either to reshape its institutions so as to provide for the general recognition of Islam or, as Biku Parekh suggests, extending these institutions to include the newly emerging Islam in European societies (Kastoryano, 2004). The political approach strongly emphasizes the oft-stated argument that Islam and Western democracies are by definition “incompatible.”

Meanwhile, Islam is unable to meet these requirements due to a variety of technicalities. Unlike the Catholic Church, there is no central authority in Sunni Islam. Moreover, German authorities view a three-decade-long history of Islamic organizations in Europe as insufficient to fulfill the requirement of permanency. Some public figures have even argued that Islam is irreconcilable with the German constitution because it fosters

inequality between the genders and loyalties to religious authorities (Yükleyen, 2010, 449).

Coşkun, one of the previous leaders of IGMG Goslar, criticizes the double standard of German government:

“I am sure, Germans will not allow us to institutionalize Islam in Germany. I don't believe it. They do not easily accept us like Jews and Christians. They don't accept Islam as one of the big religions. Although we live and pay taxes here in Germany, they do not officially recognize Islam, which can give us the possibility of having our organizations like kindergarten, cemeteries, taxes, or membership payments. We want to trust the German government and see them approach everyone equally regarding religious and human rights. However, I am not sure about that. I don't want them to do anything other than implementing the same legal process that has been practicing for Christian and Jews” (Coskun, 38, interview, 2006).

Whether or not European states recognize Islam as an official religion Islamic groups are allowed to organize under public law as regular associations (‘verein’-German term- means ‘charity organization’). One consequence has been the proliferation of religious organizations that practice and advocate Islam in its sometimes radical forms. Another consequence, however, has been the recasting of Islam as an ethnicized political identity through attempts to foster a collective existence within the categories of European states (Soysal, 1997: 509).

Yükleyen (2009) argues that Islam is localizing in Europe, albeit slowly. Localization of Islam refers to the reinterpretation of Islamic texts (including the Qur'an, the holy book of Islam, and the Hadith, the recorded sayings and deeds of Prophet Muhammad) in accordance with the local conditions. Similarly, Amelina and Faist (2008) argue that the public positioning of migrant associations vis-à-vis demands for integration is part of a two-way process of accommodation involving both migrant organizations and groups of the ‘majority society’.

During this study, ‘integration’ is defined as a two-way-process which, on the one hand, is expressed in the interaction between national authorities and individuals and, on the other, in the interaction between national authorities and migrant associations. This also hints at the discursive dimension of interaction processes between the nation state and migrant associations. From this perspective ‘integration’ can be regarded as a public ‘definition struggle’ or as a public negotiation of cultural and identity boundary drawing processes.

It has to be acknowledged that the formation of migrant associations can also be supportive for two way accommodation processes. On the one hand, they represent and address the collective recognition concerns of migrants to the political authorities. On the other hand, the public authorities of nation states can voice their integration requests to representatives of migrant collectives. Subsequently, the formation of terms, strategies, ideas and rules concerning ‘integration’ does not occur in the top-down-way – e.g. invented by state and transferred to migrants – but in mutual negotiation processes which include both parts, institutions of the nation state and increasingly organized forms of migrant collectives (Amelina and Faist, 2008: 94).

How does integration transform religious beliefs and practices? Conversely, how does religion affect the outcomes of integration? These are some questions anchoring this chapter. When the Turkish immigrants crossed Turkey`s border and settled in Germany, they were and are still forced to rethink who they are and how they are perceived in the areas of destination. To make sense of destabilizing experiences, they often resort to religious symbols and traditions. It is as protagonists of struggles prefigured in religious writings that immigrants can impose a higher meaning on victimization, belittlement, and economic strife. I see the religion, Islam, as a form of immigrant resistance to social amalgamation

and erasure noting how ethnic and racial minorities use religiosity to sharpen their profile, affirm identity, and oppose market pressures. Consideration is given to Islamic organizations (DITIB, IGMG) that try to promote some immigrant rights.

Drawing on participant-observation in IGMG and DITIB mosques and interviews with personnel and members in the mosques in Goslar, I will try to contextualize the Islamic organizations with a special reference to their proper functions and political outlook for the integration of Turkish people into Goslar/German society. It seems possible to claim that events such as 9/11 and the securitization policies of Germany as a counterpart have accelerated both organization`s affirmative approach to integration in Germany.

Meanwhile, the aftermath of September 11 gave shape to two Muslim communities in Germany, from which two conflicting representations of Islam emerged: an Islam supported by the state and an Islam perceived as a threat to the state. A recent book by Mahmoud Mamdani (2004) refers to this split as “good Muslim, bad Muslim.” Following Yurdakul (2006b), it can be claimed that the Religious Affairs Turkish Islamic Union (*Diyanet İşleri Türk İslam Birliği*) is seen as the “good Muslim, while *Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görüş* is perceived as the “bad Muslim.” Thus, the former is mainly supported by the Turkish state and partially supported by the German state Authorities, while *Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görüş* is not supported by either state and, in fact, is considered a “threat” to both German and Turkish societies.

First generation Muslims kept their religious beliefs and practices a private matter; their children, on the other hand, accentuated those beliefs and practices. Given that Turkish Muslims have reached the third and even fourth generation, issues of concern have shifted from cultural assimilation

to social integration to religious identity and discrimination. In my conversations with younger generation of Turkish-Muslims, I have recognized that they have begun to question their parents` religious and cultural values. The increasing link between local and global capitalism has affected their perceptions as well.

The rise of Muslim narrative by the younger generation is not only a religious analysis but they have tried to transform the discourse of indigenous Islam into a language of political combat against the discrimination they have experienced. Of course, religion has a symbolic function universal and liberal claims-making of demanding equal treatment, freedom to wear the headscarf, worship places or religious holidays etc.

The basic attitude of Turkish immigrants and their children towards the 'modern' German environment can be called 'culturally defensive'. Since they condemn German society as 'decadent' and distance themselves from it, each deliberate or unintended conflict with that society serves to reinforce the internal stability of their own group. Other practising and conservative Muslims are often mistaken for fundamentalists although they merely seek the protection of religion and hope to achieve a balance which will allow them to live by their Muslim identity and beliefs in Germany (Tan and Waldhoff, 1996: 148). Of course, the boundaries and dividing lines between these various groups - fundamentalist, conservative and practising Muslims - are not sharply drawn. Conservative and practising Muslims tend to be interested in compromise, are looking for dialogue with other denominations, and favour a harmonious co-existence with other social groups, religions and ideologies. These 'Muslims who wish to make Germany their home' are the ones most likely to spearhead the emergence of a European Islam. There are many signs of such developments. Islamic religious meeting houses in Germany, for instance, do not just serve as

venues for the prescribed daily prayers, as is customary in Turkey, but have become community centres of sorts, ministering to both spiritual and social needs. Most centres have a dining hall, stalls for market traders, a *halla* butcher and a hall for funeral ceremonies. In addition, many Islamic meeting houses have sports facilities and offer vocational training for young people (Tan and Waldhoff, 148).

As in France and the United Kingdom, where more Muslims attend services in mosques than British citizens attend the High Church of England, there is a gradual process of “Islamization” taking place among the 3.1 million Muslims living in Germany today. For young Turks who joined their families during the second phase, the period of family unification, the Muslim faith can compensate for the weak links to the Turkish state and to Germany, and help shape a sense of identity and community among German-Turks. The third generation—young Turks who were born in Germany and are better educated than earlier generations—perceives and experiences more acutely discrimination and the status of being outsiders. They can achieve a sense of community by joining local mosques. This possibility is enhanced by the *umma* (the community of Muslims) principle, unknown in other denominations: a Muslim can join any mosque and benefit from the services it provides. Last, age plays a role since the longer German-Turks live in Germany, the more likely they are to embrace religion. It should also be noted that German-Turks consider religion an important factor in their lives much more frequently than do native Germans, among equal age cohorts (Mueller, 2006: 423).

Indeed, with the help of political options taken by the sending and receiving countries, individual aspirations were left unnoticed, community claims were given priority, and social control was massively reinforced. The demands articulated by these various communities culminated in the



emergence of organizations and networks reproducing religious orders, sects or groups for whom the main goal remains rejection of Western norms and modernity .

These religious groups challenge the value system of the Western world. The target of some Muslim groups is to restore the social order created during the first fifty years after the death of the prophet Muhammed. This reactionary attitude against all institutions of the modern world evidently finds more fertile soil in the receiving countries of Western Europe, where cultural values are interpreted as equal to religious affiliation. The dominant/dominated relationship, reflected by the status granted immigrants in European industrial societies, is also reflected in the attitudes toward the immigrants' culture. If there is only the mosque to give the immigrant back his human dignity, if he only will be respected and obtain his self-confidence in the midst of his countrymen, of course, this will be the choice taken. And this attitude may even influence the behavior of the second and third generation, even though their aspirations may be to enter mainstream society (Abadan-Unat 1992: 405).

Most Muslims in Goslar like in Germany are Sunnis, although there are also *Alevi* and *Suryani*. Overall, the majority of Muslims living in Goslar have been seen as religious moderates. Turkish and Yugoslav Muslims have traditionally not been drawn to radical forms of Islam.

Germany is increasingly concerned about radical clerics who may be preaching in German mosques. Religious practices and membership are often complicated by the organizational structure of mosque associations. Since there has been no training of Muslim religious leader, the imam or hoca, in Germany, most of them are imported from outside of Europe. These *hocas* of both religious communities, IGMG and DITIB are trained in Turkey, and have no ties to and little familiarity with Germany or the

West. They come to Germany for a limited number of years, which poses particular problems for some members of local communities because the *hoca* lacks insights into life in Germany. When local Turkish immigrants ask for guidance in questions of everyday life and raising children in Germany, the *hoca* does not know enough about the circumstances of the immigrants' local lives, and thus is not always able to provide members of the community with the guidance that they need. Furthermore, they have no opportunity to have contact with German society because of the language barrier. Also, they do not have a proper relationship with the mosque attending population particularly with the young regarding their social life problems in Goslar. Because of the lack of information about Germany, the *hocas* may contribute to reproducing negative and often hostile views of Western institutions and values.

The *hocas* helped the Turkish immigrants transmit moral values and identity by teaching extracurricular courses on the Koran to the children, usually on Saturday afternoon or Sunday. Moreover, the imams stayed long enough to become central figures of the community, particularly when it was necessary to pray following the death of relatives, prepare their coffins, and send their bodies back to the homeland. The *hocas*, who have been sent by their countries of origin within bilateral accords giving them official status or who represent political parties such as the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria or the religious party (*Saadet Parti*, now) in Turkey, have ordained themselves spokesmen for their "community." (Kastoryano, 2004: 1240)

As Ehrkamp (2005) underlines, the immigrant religious organizations contribute to religious identification, and they allow immigrants to feel a sense of belonging in the neighborhood although religious leaders are not necessarily bound to or are involved in the local place.

Participating in the religious organization and becoming a member of any religious community is a way of giving children exposure to Turkish and Islamic traditions. Thus, the male members of the religious community often participate in the community with their wives and children as much as possible. Ali, for instance, was trying to convince his son and daughters to visit the mosque by sending them to Quran and culture courses, conferences, camps, picnics and other religious and entertainment activities around the community. At the time of the interview her youngest son, Muhammet, was only eight years old, but had already been attending Koran school. He can fluently read Arabic verses in the Quran (Ali, 37, interview, 2006).

One can argue that migration experience might cause a 'paradigm shift'. This means that traditionally loaded meanings of some concepts and symbols may lose their importance with the fusion of novel ideas through acculturation, social interaction and schooling in Goslar. Such a paradigm shift is taking place between generations in the multicultural context where young people interact with the new cultural codes and social practices (Küçükcan 2004). As a result, Turkish male members of IGMG are deeply concerned with the transmission of Islamic and traditional values to the young generation in order to protect their identity from 'cultural contamination'. Thus, parents consistently put pressure on them to 'absorb' and 'internalize' the cultural values of the Turkish-Muslim community.

Since the end of 1970s, family reunion and the growth of the young generation led to the establishment of organizations and institutions that addressed the welfare, cultural and religious needs of the ethnic communities. Although the presence of Muslims in Europe is not a new phenomenon, it could be argued that the expression of Islamic identity has become more pronounced and Muslims have become more visible after the family unification process in the middle of the 1980s. Besides, as

Küçükcan (2004: 244) suggests, the growth of Western-educated young generations and the rise of global/trans-national Islamic movements are important sources of motivation for Muslims in Europe to express their identity in Western public spheres. For example, in recent years, Muslim organizations in Europe have become more concerned with the religious education of their children and have shown strong reactions against the prohibition of headscarves in schools and have demanded legal recognition on local levels.

Many of the studies of Muslims in Europe and North America fail to discuss the heterogeneity of these communities. They focus on Muslim communities as only a homogeneous group. In Germany, as in Turkey, this Muslim community was considered homogeneous; other features, such as the leftist, social democratic, and pro-integration characteristics of some Muslim immigrant communities, as well as class, gender, and ethnic differences, were mostly ignored.

The political migrants take their mobilizing cues from developments in Turkish politics, fueling the division of Germany's Turks along the political fault-lines of their homeland. Turkey is a sending country in which deep ethnic, religious, economic and political conflicts have created tensions between liberal political development and its nation-building agenda predicated on the six Western principles of Kemalism: republicanism, nationalism, secularism, statism, populism, and revolutionism (Ögelman, 2003: 178).

Why do some immigrant communities in democracies develop into cohesive political forces while others do not? Some analysts argue political cohesion is a function of ingrained ethnic, religious, and class identities imported from the homeland (Huntington, 1996; Forbes, 1997; Cohen, 1997). Others claim it is a function of host country contexts and incentives

(Hein, 1993; Ireland, 1994; Soysal, 1994). Neither explanation adequately accounts for the immigrant agency. To understand the political cohesion of the immigrant community, it is necessary to combine the two approaches above and study the influence of leadership in immigrant organizations (Heisler Schmitter, 1986; cited by Ögelman, 2003: 164). In short, the significant development in Germany's Turkish organizational landscape is that it remains fragmented primarily due to the persistent role of homeland political identities. An internal division over goals, strategies, and tactics weakens the Turkish community's potential to launch a successful incorporation movement.

According to Ögelman (2003), Germany has experienced considerable difficulties in absorbing Turks into its associations and broader society. There are four types of indigenous German organizations relevant to Turkish incorporation. Associations, such as the *Auslanderbeirete*, were created explicitly by the government to represent immigrant interests. Broader civil associations, such as the *Wohlfahrtsver-bande*, have an official mandate to represent interests of various immigrant communities. Organizations, such as labor unions and most political parties, lack a government mandate to represent immigrants' interests, but welcome their participation all the same. Finally, organizations such as the CSU, the *Republikaner* and the *Deutsche Volksunion* refuse to include immigrants for reasons of principle or strategy.

A few Kemalists within the Turkish community in Goslar like anywhere else in Germany, so dominate the Workers Welfare Organization (*Arbeiterwohlfahrt* -AWO) that other homeland ethnic and religious factions, such as Kurds, Islamist and pan-Turkish activists, cannot effectively use this organization for representation (Ögelman, 2003: 173). Germany is absorbing immigrants, such as the Italians with whom Germans share strong cultural bonds, into its organizational structure.

However, measures of perceived discrimination and social distances suggest that ethno-cultural conflict and resistance are driving the organizational behavior of Germany's Turks.

Transplanted factions promising a support network and security in exchange for membership are likely to achieve greater success if immigrants feel the host society is fundamentally and intensely hostile to their presence. Survey evidence suggests Turks more than any of Germany's other Mediterranean-basin immigrants perceive host society discrimination. According to a 1996 survey, one in three Turks claims to have experienced anti-foreigner hostilities over a twelve-month period (Mehrlander et al., 1996:321, cited by Ögelman, 2003: 175). Thus, associations based on homeland conflicts dominate the organizational landscape of Goslar's Turkish community.

A transnational contextual framework affording some politically active Turks better opportunities to rally support for Turkish causes in Germany rather than in Turkey plays a significant role in the dominance of homeland interests and contributes to divisions in Germany's Turkish community. For Germany's Turkish immigrant leaders, this context - which Ögelman calls (2003: 164) "the transnational political opportunity structure" - links a home country where there is little room to debate ethnic, religious, class, and other societal issues with a host country that grants immigrants considerable associational freedoms but fails to absorb foreigners rapidly into society.

An ethnically derived Islam helped to structure both the mosque system and networks for Turkish-Muslim communities in Europe. Almost all Islamic groups have branches in Germany, and there is a circulation of ideas, skills, and money back and forth. Religious or cultural associations function to protect and maintain homeland traditions, languages, and

folklore by establishing religious and cultural classes. Political associations serve a more complex mission where mostly their politics are more oriented to the receiving country rather than the sending country. Like elsewhere in Germany, in the domain of culture, language and religion, migrants were left to themselves to develop their own cultural, religious and linguistic institutions in Goslar. The Islamic organizations refer to clusters of associations, foundations, institutes, informal study circles, media outlets, and educational institutions through which each interpretation of Islam is produced and disseminated.

An adequate approach must also take account of these internal differences within the Turkish immigrant populations, based on characteristics like ethnicity, first-generation education levels and religion in Goslar. Some Turkish youths who are politically engaged seem to be in conflict with other Turkish groups rather than with Germans. For example, some Kemalist, leftist, secularist and social democrats criticize the Islamist groups in Germany for their negative views and rivalry against Atatürk, the Republican founder of Turkey, while some people with Islamist affiliation criticize leftist people as being militant secularists and opposed to the headscarf and Islamist life-styles in Turkey and Germany. It is interesting to note that whether being Islamist, Leftist, or Liberal, most Turkish immigrants and their children in Goslar support the Social Democrat Party (SPD) in Germany

The struggle between secularism and religious identity among Muslims is cast not only in terms of immigrant versus Germans. It is also cast, for example, in terms of Turkish history and the experience of mosque-state relation in the “homeland.” In a very fundamental way, the split between the “Kemalists” and the “Islamists” reflects a conflict with roots outside of Germany.

Finally, in Goslar there are also significant groups of Kurdish refugees who fled political persecution in Turkey or the armed conflict between Kurds and Turks. Most of them arrived in Europe later than the labor migrants, and their children are still young. Some Kurdish groups are very affiliated with the Kurdish question and thus politicized by supporting the Kurdish movement while others support some Islamic movements like the IGMG or Gulen community.

The liberal strand of Islam in Turkey, so-called *Alevi*s, are beginning to develop similar organisations and attempting to shape social developments in their country of immigration. In their conduct and appearance, these liberal Muslims are perceived as less alien by Germans than fundamentalists, and are therefore taken to be more Europeanised and integrated. Prevalent among Germans, however, is an image of Turks as fundamentalists, which means that Turks or Muslims in western dress and with apparently western lifestyles are seen as exceptions who have strayed from the fold. Alevism refers to, from a Sunni perspective, a heterodox religious persuasion within Islam, which is mainly spread among Anatolian Turks. Even though Alevism was created as a kind of Shia, it maintained pre-Islamic cultural elements and newly articulated them in an Islamic form.

For instance, the religious term *Alevi* seemed to be an additional signifier of the ethnic term *Kurd* irrespective of the fact that not all Kurds are Alevi, and that Turks can be Alevi too. For example Alevi people emphasize their distance from radical forms of religion, that is, from Islamic fundamentalism, which they blame for their persecution. So an image of the enlightened and liberal leftist Alevi emerged set against the conservative fundamentalist Sunni Muslims. The political categories of left and right were expressed in the dichotomous terms of *atheists/democrats* and *Muslims/fascists*. (Gürses et al, 2001: 41)



Like anywhere else in Germany, Turkish-Muslim people are not homogenous in Goslar. There are also signs of polarisation within ethnic groups that need to be explained by reference to a range of more clearly cultural or structural factors. Indeed, criticism of the theory of migration (including segmented assimilation theory) is that it fails to pay sufficient attention to internal differences within ethnic groups. For instance, Alevi people have their own religious tradition which is very secular, moderate, and humanist when compared with other Turkish groups. Alevi people in Goslar do not pray in mosques and Alevi women do not wear the headscarf. Their mode of incorporation into and negotiation with German society is different from Sunni counterparts.

In addition, I have been told by both Turkish and Kurdish people that Goslar saw few street fights between Turkish and Kurdish political factions and debates about the Kurdish question in Turkey and the role of Islam in German society in 1990s.

Ideologically contentious political migrants remain the primary agents in Germany's Turkish associations and continue to play a dominant role in the immigrant community. The Turkish state has failed to manage social conflict within its borders and has not traditionally emphasized the need to control its expatriates. Under these circumstances political migrants have exited Turkey and established contentious transplanted factions in liberal democracies, such as Germany, where they may exercise a voice directed back toward the sending country. Germany's Turkish community also maintains strong perceptions of victimization at the hands of host country actors. Moreover, a greater proportion of younger rather than older Turks perceive host country discrimination. Overall, this indicates that Germany is failing to reduce the selective incentives that transplanted factions can offer its Turkish community. Consequently, diverse home-land oriented

associations do not have to compete with native associations on an equal footing.

While confirming that host country institutions and authorities contribute to this fragmentation, I have shown that we need to modify our understanding of the contexts influencing immigrant politics. Amalgamation of various institutional and ethno-cultural factors emerging from the homeland as well as the host country has yielded this participatory pattern. The role of homeland institutional and host society ethno-cultural factors cannot be overstated. Too often, scholarly investigations have underemphasized these factors (Ögelman 2003: 181).

Generally, immigrant organizations are in the form of religious communities in Goslar and Oker. There are two types of religious organizations: IGMG (Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görüş [Islamic Community of National Outlook]) and DITIB (Diyanet Isleri Turk-Islam Birliđi [Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs]). In addition to this, there are several Turkish sport clubs and organizations in and around Goslar.

Mosques are allowed to be built in Germany, but their construction occasionally arouses hostile reactions in the respective neighborhoods. There are about 2,200 mosques and prayer rooms in Germany, most of which are built by Turkish organizations. The oldest mosque in Germany was built in Berlin in 1924. Mosque attendance in Germany is robust, when compared with the low Church regular attendance among both Catholics and Protestants in Goslar/Germany.

As in any other places in Europe, mosques and religious organizations in Goslar served local Turkish immigrant communities due to lack of governmental support from Turkey in establishing any social organizations

to help them in the past. Due to the lack supportive organization by their country of origin (Turkey) in Germany, in order to adjust to German society, Turkish immigrants established traditional Islamic religious, cultural and ethnic community organizations, with hometown associations. Although the history of such organizations and associations goes back to the 1960s, their mobility and visibility in the public sphere became available only after the 1990's in Goslar.

The *Diyanet İşleri* was established in Germany in 1984 as a result of the Turkish parliament's decision to establish religious centers for Turkish immigrants in Europe. The *Milli Görüş*, though present as an informal network in Europe even in the early 1970s, emerged in Germany as a diasporic association of the members of *Milli Selamet Partisi*, the party of Necmettin Erbakan, which was banned by the Turkish Constitutional Court. Erbakan is a former prime minister of Turkey and the spiritual leader of *Milli Görüş* ideology.

In general, the two mosques, DITIB and IGMG have served as social and cultural organizations in Goslar. This was later seen to create a type of separatism: DITIB and IGMG have politically different tasks and opinions in social issues in so far as they serve two different communities. The long-term competition among Turkish religious associations, institutions, and Islamic groups in the religious market still continues in several forms. While the IGMG aims to operate in the public and political sphere, the Gulen movement provides education and interfaith dialogue. The DITIB tries to construct an intercultural dialog with an emphasis on the principles of official Turkish state discourse of integration and religion. In Goslar, each organization of activism has its own rules of engagement that socialize its participants.

To put it more concretely, The IGMG and the Gulen Islamic organizations (although this organization is not strong in Goslar), try to make room for forming and speaking out on behalf of Islam in the public sphere of Germany and Europe, whereas in the case of the DITIB this does not happen. The rules of engagement in the public sphere lead the Islamic organizations to form Islamic interpretations in order to subvert stereotypes of Islam as oppressive of women, intolerant, and pro-violence. The experience of interfaith dialogue transforms Gulen community activists from actively seeking converts to Islam into living embodiments of Islamic ethics practiced through activities such as pursuing neighborly relations in everyday life

It can be said that the migrant organizations are agents, which, apart from the cultivation of transnational bonds, also raise secondary socialization performances which can be labeled as supportive for a migrant's inclusion. The majority of migrant organizations frequently offer, for example, introductory seminars which pass on the institutional regulations of the immigration country in areas such as economy, politics, health and education. At the same time, state institutions increasingly cooperate with migrant associations in order to legitimize their immigrant and minority politics. From this perspective 'integration' gains a public dimension and can be understood as a public negotiation of social boundaries.

As Germany turned into a new era in its history with the fall of the Berlin Wall, members of the DITIB and the IGMG have, just as the other immigrants, been affected by increasing unemployment in the immigrant population. Although they have been affected by the developments, there have been no joint protests in which both the *DITIB* and the IGMG were present.

## **7.2. Symbolic Ethnicity and Religion through the New Generation Turkish Youth in Immigrant Organizations**

While agreeing that ethnicity may be manifested by the third generation, Gans (1979: 1) argues that this type of ethnicity is mainly symbolic, since groups are “less and less interested in their ethnic cultures and organizations; instead they resort to the use of ethnic symbols.” According to Gans, symbolic ethnicity “is characterized by a nostalgic allegiance to the culture of the immigrant generation, or that of the old country; a love for and a pride in a tradition that can be left without having to be incorporated into every day behavior” (ibid, 9). This type of ethnicity is “effortless.” It does not require functioning groups or networks. Nor does symbolic ethnicity require practicing a culture, even if the symbols are borrowed from it (Al-Haj, 2004: 24).

Gans (1996: 152) argues that ethnic behavior, orientation, and even identity are determined not only by the characteristics of the ethnics, but also by developments in the wider society and in particular by how it relates to ethnics. In this sense, both “self-definition” and “other-definition” must be taken into consideration to understand ethnic formation among immigrants

It is important to note that, in nation-states, the reception of immigrants by the host society—both formal institutions and the public at large—may be affected by the immigrants’ perceived motivation. It has been argued that an ideological affinity between immigrants and the host society may facilitate their absorption and increase the possibilities of their assimilation into the new setting (Portes and Börocz 1989: 618). This situation is typical of ethnic diasporas that rejoin their co-nationals and enjoy a sympathetic and supportive reception. Gans’ symbolic ethnicity hypothesis explains that the new generation of children of immigrants are less and less

interested in their ethnic cultures and organizations - both sacred and secular - and are instead more concerned with maintaining their ethnic identity, with the feeling of being Jewish, or Italian, or Turkish, and with finding ways of feeling and expressing that identity in suitable ways. By identity, he means here simply the socio-psychological elements that accompany role behavior, and the ethnic role is today less of an ascriptive than a voluntary role that people assume alongside other roles (Gans, 1979).

According to Gans (1979:9), third generation ethnics can join an ethnic organization, or take part in formal or informal organizations composed largely of fellow-ethnics; but they can also find their identity by 'affiliating' with an abstract collectivity which does not exist as an interacting group. That collectivity, moreover, can be mythic or real, contemporary or historical. The third generation has grown up without assigned roles or groups that anchor ethnicity, so that identity can no longer be taken for granted. People can of course give up their identity, but if they continue to feel it, they must make it more explicit than it was in the past, and must even look for ways of expressing it. In other words, as the functions of ethnic cultures and groups diminish and identity becomes the primary way of being ethnic, ethnicity takes on an expressive rather than instrumental function in people's lives, becoming more of a leisure-time activity and losing its relevance, say, to earning a living or regulating family life. Expressive behavior can take many forms, but is often involves the use of symbols - and symbols as signs rather than as myths.

Since symbolic ethnicity does not depend on ethnic cultures and organizations, their future decline and disappearance must be expected, particularly those cultural patterns which interfere with other aspects of life, and those organizations which require active membership. Few such patterns and organizations are left in any case, and leaders of the remaining

organizations have long been complaining bitterly over what they perceive as the cultural and organizational apathy of ethnics. They also criticize the resort to symbolic ethnicity, identifying it as an effortless way of being ethnic which further threatens their own persistence. Even so, attacking people as apathetic or lazy, or calling on them to revive the practices and loyalties of the past have never been effective for engendering support, and reflect instead the desperation of organizations which cannot offer new incentives that would enable them to recruit members. Some cultural patterns and organizations will survive. Patterns which lend themselves to transformation into symbols and easy practice, such as annual holidays, should persist. So will organizations which create and distribute symbols, or 'ethnic goods' such as foodstuffs or written materials, but need few or no members and can function with small staffs and low overheads. In all likelihood, most ethnic organizations will eventually realize that in order to survive, they must deal mainly in symbols, using them to generate enough support to fund other activities as well. (Gans,1979: 17)

More importantly Gans implies that as ethnic cultures and organizations decline further; fewer ethnic roles are prescribed, thus increasing the degree to which people have freedom of role definition. Since ethnic identity needs are neither intense nor frequent in the third and fourth generation of immigrants, ethnics do not need either ethnic cultures or organizations; instead, they resort to the use of ethnic symbols. As a result, ethnicity may be turning into symbolic ethnicity, an ethnicity of last resort, which could, nevertheless, persist for generations. Identity cannot exist apart from a group, and symbols are themselves a part of culture, but ethnic identity and symbolic ethnicity require very different ethnic cultures and organizations than existed among earlier generations. Moreover, the symbols third generation ethnics use to express their identity are more visible than the ethnic cultures and organizations of the first and second generation ethnics. What appears to be an ethnic revival may therefore

only be a more visible form of long-standing phenomena, or of a new stage of acculturation and assimilation (Gans, 1979: 1)

Still, perhaps the most important factor in the development of symbolic ethnicity was probably the awareness, which Gans claims, many second generation people had already reached, that neither the practice of ethnic culture nor participation in ethnic organizations were essential to being and feeling ethnic.

The key term for understanding first-generation Turkish migrants' religious sentiments is the word *gurbet*, or foreign. Among first-generation migrants, stories circulated about Turkish workers who had 'gone to the dogs' in Germany (i.e. had relationships with women, become alcoholics, and thus lost their perspective on life). Islam offered a certain stable point against this trend of anomic experiences, not least because one found, in Islam, a community of like-minded people who could give each other mutual support. A second facet of this experience of foreignness was a crisis of meaning. Practically every migrant asks him- or herself at some point what s/he is actually doing in the foreign world which causes so much pain and whether it would not have been better to stay at home. Turkish migrants often expressed this feeling by complaining about the 'coldness' of Europe. Here, too, a religious orientation helps to deal with this question better, even if not to answer it. For example, such disorientation could somehow be eased with the argument that it does not make a difference for a Muslim where he fulfils his religious duty. And of course a community offers a certain degree of 'warmth'. A third, and indeed the most essential, aspect of the experience of the foreign was connected with the beginning of family reconstitution in the early 1970s. This meant, on the one hand, that one was preparing for a longer stay in Europe. On the other hand, it meant that one was now confronted with having to rear children in a foreign environment. One could no longer, as



in Turkey, rely on one's children picking up one's own norms and values from the broader environment. *Gurbet* here stands for the fear of losing one's children. In brief, the migration situation forced a refocusing on one's own norms and values (Schiffauer, 2007: 72).

The first generation's religiosity has a decidedly defensive touch; they focused on the maintenance and protection of their own values and life designs in a foreign environment. This contradictory situation reflects the inner turmoil of the migration situation and the distinctive experiences of new generations in Germany and Europe. Needless to say that exclusion and discrimination will strengthen the ultra-orthodox or reactive positions which emphasize that a dignified Islamic life is only possible within an Islamic state and society. This leads to an extremely unstable situation of integration for the younger generations.

Second- and third-generation Muslims are confronted with the situation that they, unlike their parents, are Europeans. They grew up in one European society or another, passed through its institutions and have built diverse relationships to the society. They are German, English, or French Muslims and not just Muslims in Germany, England, or France. This is nothing to be taken for granted, but a practical relationship, a task or project. They must situate themselves in the given society and develop an understanding of themselves in that situation. However, two factors complicate this task. First, both the immigration society and the first generation of migrants construct the relation between 'European culture' and Islam as a relation between the familiar and the foreign, and thus place it in an oppositional, rather than a complementary, relationship. The second complicating factor is that this relationship is not between two parties on an equal footing but is dominated by the European side (Schiffauer, 2007: 77).

Despite their better quality of life in comparison to their parents' and grandparents' experiences, they lack the benefits that their non-immigrant peers enjoy. Unemployment among Turkish Muslims is two and a half to more than three times higher than the rate for native German citizens with the same level of education. Nonetheless, young Turkish Muslims have higher expectations than their parents. The first generation's goals were to earn money to invest in their country of origin and eventually return home. They considered their move to Europe temporary and did not have much contact with Europeans outside of the work place. In addition, young generations of Sunni Muslims in Germany have a greater attachment to Germany than Turkey. The younger generations feel less connected to Turkey than the first generation immigrants. Unlike their parents, they prefer spending their visits to Turkey on the beaches and at historical sites, rather than in the villages of their parents. They are more fluent in Germany than Turkish. They are also more sensitive to social and institutional discrimination. Because of their high expectations for recognition and upward mobility, the younger generations have greater resentment and less tolerance for social discrimination (Yükleyen, 2009: 294).

By the 1990s, after years of ambivalence about building their homes in Europe, Turkish immigrants realized that they were in Europe for good. Second generation Muslims become oriented toward the German society. This recognition prompted questions about how to develop a religious identity that is compatible with their non-Muslim environment. The emergence of second generation leaders in Islamic organizations in the Germany has changed the questions and concerns of Islamic organizations. New leadership redefines the focus of Muslim organizations in terms of their relationship to the larger society in Europe and not according to political debates in Turkey.

Islamic organizations provide religious and social services according to the needs and concerns of Muslim constituents. Before the 1980s, members of the first generation were founding places of worship and using Islamic organizations to influence politics in their countries of origin. They regarded Islamic organizations as a place for themselves to be secluded from the larger society. However after the 1990s, with the emergence of the second generation, Muslims began asking for religious services that related to their European experiences such as: passing on religious and cultural values to younger generations; getting public recognition for Islam; and raising the socio-economic status of Muslims. They expected their financial support of Islamic organizations to return more directly to themselves, rather than to a country they had lost hope of returning to. Younger generations also acquired greater influence in the administration of the Islamic organizations. Institutional representation of these organizations in the public sphere and vis a vis official authorities required skills that second generation immigrants had—language, education, and knowledge about the official procedures and paperwork (Yükleyen, 2009).

The Turkish community established Islamic institutions as soon as they acquired sufficient resources. These institutions were meant to facilitate the transmission of religious values to young Turks. However, attitudes of young people towards religion are changing. Although the majority of young Turks still believe in the basic principles of Islam, it seems that religion is becoming a symbolic attachment for many of them.

The children and grandchildren of first generation immigrants from Muslim majority countries constitute the second and third generation of the young Muslim generations. These young generations grew up and socialized in their European surroundings. They enjoyed better educational standards than their parents and have had more opportunities for upward

social mobility. Their understanding of Islam and Turkishness are based on symbolic feeling rather than living/active practices.

The intellectual dimension of religious commitment among young Turks clearly indicates that young people know very little about Islam. The lack of knowledge about the basic principles of Islam might be attributed to several factors. It can be argued, for example, that they do not learn much about their religion in the schools because there seems to be no special provisions for the teaching of Islam and Turkish culture. Another reason may be the failure of Islamic institutions to address a larger young audience because of their mostly outdated teaching curriculum and methods.

Parents and religious organizations will continue to teach the young generation the importance of religion and will try to inculcate an Islamic belief in their sense of belonging to the Turkish-Muslim community. However, social and cultural effects of the context of Goslar and Germany will also influence the young generation throughout their life which will to a certain extent inevitably induce changes in the emergent Turkish identity among the young generation, which would enable them to accommodate a sense of belonging to the multicultural community in Germany (emphasis changed, Küçükcan, 2004).

The young generation is increasingly becoming disillusioned by the priorities of organizations established and run by their elders. They want to see more novel and diverse activities inspired by the local conditions. No longer do they want to see these organizations as the extensions of mainland Turkish organizations, but they want to see them as European organizations.

The *raison d'être* of Turkish organizations lies in the fact that settlement and post-settlement processes generated numerous problems for the community and these challenging problems needed to be addressed. The issues revolving around culture, language, religion, welfare and education of the young generation preoccupied parental and familial concerns. It can be argued that Turkish organizations emerged in response to these concerns which are related to the expression of ethnicity and identity (Küçükcan, 2004). It is a widely held view among the first generation that their children are exposed to the cultural influences of the larger society. Schooling, peer-group relations and media are constantly exerting cultural influences on young people and presenting new identity choices in conflict with the Turkish culture and Islamic values. The members of Goslar IGMG, for example, place priority on teaching the Turkish language and religious values as they are perceived to be the most effective means of communication with the culture which defines Muslim and Turkish identity. By this way, they want to hinder young Turks from losing their 'Muslim-Turkish identity'; therefore the first generation is trying to mobilize the Turkish community to prevent 'cultural contamination' of the children. However, despite parental pressure and organizational efforts, the meaning of a Turkish and Muslim identity is changing for the young generation and is becoming more and more a form of symbolic ethnicity and religiosity.

### **7.3. Islamische Gemeinschaft *Milli Görüş*, IGMG (National View of Islamic Community)**

The “Islamic Community *Milli Görüş* is, next to the DITIB, the most important Turkish-Sunni organization in Germany. The IGMG, according to its own account, on the local level incorporates 514 mosque communities, 323 of which are in Germany. The IGMG maintains a total number of 1833 local facilities and for the time being has got around

87,000 active members. Friday prayers are regularly attended by approximately 300,000 persons. (cited by igmg.de).

The IGMG maintains local mosque communities in Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Switzerland, Austria, Italy, England, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway. The local communities are structurally bound together under regional organizations, of which there are 30 altogether. 15 regional organizations are located in Germany. They are Hamburg, Bremen, Berlin, Hanover, Northern Ruhr Basin, Ruhr Basin A, Düsseldorf, Cologne, Hesse, Rhine-Saar, Stuttgart, Swabia, Freiburg, Northern and Southern Bavaria. In the remaining European countries (Switzerland, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Belgium, and England) the IGMG is represented by only one national organization each. On the one hand, the regional organizations constitute a linkage between the IGMG center and the associated local communities. On the other hand, they coordinate the work of the local communities. They are above all responsible for the coordination of religious and educational services and for the arrangement of cultural events. The cooperation between the associated local communities as well as their mutual exchange of experiences is among the tasks that the regional organizations undertake as well. Furthermore, they are in charge of coordinating the hocas in the communities (cited igmg.de).

IGMG is known as a parallel organization of a modest Islamic conservative political movement of Milli Görüş. The Milli Görüş was founded in the 1960s with the aim of Islamification of Turkey under the slogan 'The Just Order' (adil duzen). From this, a series of Islamic-conservative parties have developed (the Party of National Order, the National Salvation Party, the Welfare Party, the Virtue Party, and finally the Felicity Party). The sequence of names reflects the precarious legal position of this group in Turkey; its political formations have again and

again been prohibited and re-founded under new names: *Milli Selamet Partisi* (the National Salvation Party founded in 1972 and banned in the 1980 coup); *Milli Nizam Partisi* (National Order Party, founded in 1970 and banned from politics by the Constitutional Court in 1971); *Refah Partisi* (the Welfare Party, founded in 1983 and banned in 1998); *Fazilet Partisi* (the Virtue Party, founded in 1997 and banned in 2001); and finally, *Saadet Partisi* (the Felicity Party, founded in 2001) in Turkey.

In 1975 the Turkish politician Necmettin Erbakan published a manifesto that he gave the title *Millî Görüş*, ‘The National Vision’. It spoke only in the most general terms of moral and religious education but devoted much attention to industrialization, development and economic independence. It warned against further rapprochement towards Europe, considering the Common Market to be a Zionist and Catholic project for the assimilation and de-Islamization of Turkey and called instead for closer economic co-operation with Muslim countries. The name of *Millî Görüş* would remain associated with a religio-political movement and a series of Islamist parties inspired by Mr. Erbakan, one succeeding the other as they were banned for violating Turkey’s secular (*laik*) legislation. Following the ban of the Virtue (*Fazilet*) Party, a rift that had been developing in the movement resulted in two parties taking its place, the Felicity (*Saadet*) Party representing Erbakan’s old guard, and the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*) led by younger and more pragmatic politicians around Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who claim to have renounced on a specifically Islamist agenda. The AK Party convincingly won the 2002 elections and formed a government with a strong popular mandate, which brought Turkey closer to acceptance for membership in the European Union than any previous government had done.

*Millî Görüş*, or ‘National Vision’, is a Turkish Islamic movement that has clear political aspirations. Its aim is to Islamize the Turkish state and

society through democratic ways. *Milli Görüş*, is a political Islamic movement founded in Turkey by Necmettin Erbakan in 1969. *Milli Görüş* has become a political ideology that attempts to save the Turkish economy and society from Western imperialism and democracy, and founding a just society in the Islamic sense. Yükleven (2009: 299) notes that Erbakan's political agenda was to use the democratic system to come to power and change public behavior to be in accordance with Islamic law. In 1996, *Milli Görüş* movement came to power, but after two years the military establishment, the defenders of the laic regime in Turkey, pushed Erbakan-led Welfare Party out of the government. The *Milli Görüş* organization in Europe expedited reformulating their agenda in accordance with the needs of Muslims in Europe after the failure of the political Islamist project in Turkey.

Among the Turkish immigrants in Western Europe, the *Milli Görüş* became one of the major, if not the major, religious movement, controlling numerous mosques. Like the movement in Turkey, it went through some remarkable changes, not least because the first generation, which was strongly oriented towards what happened in Turkey, gradually surrendered leadership to a younger generation that grew up in Europe and was concerned with entirely different matters. The *Milli Görüş*' public profile shows considerable differences from one country to the next, suggesting that nature of the interaction with the 'host' societies may have as much of an impact on its character as a religious movement as the relationship with the 'mother' movement in Turkey.

The IGMG was a very affective organization in the 1990s. The movement reached its top point in the 1990s which was parallel to the political rise of Necmettin Erbakan's Welfare Party in Turkey. The name *Milli Görüş* refers to the political ideology created by Necmettin Erbakan. The ideology of *Milli Görüş* has been well represented in Turkey's political



arena by these religiously oriented political parties. During these various bans from political activities and the subsequent re-establishment of the party under new names, *Milli Görüş* grew in strength as a social and political network of Turkish Muslims in Europe, specifically in Germany.

But after the soft coup d'état in February 1997, by the Turkish military, they started to lose popularity amongst the Turkish immigrants. Beyond that, the fraud cases by Islamic holdings (*Yimpaş and Kombassan*) in IGMG and September 11 contributed to the member's withdrawal of their activity in this organization in the same period. Today, IGMG is increasingly less involved in Turkish domestic politics albeit it remains active amongst the immigrants in Goslar and Germany.

The central administration of IGMG in Germany is responsible for the coordination of all religious, educational, and social services within the community. It develops and provides the organization's general strategy regarding essential topics. Moreover the central administration organizes – in cooperation with the regional and local communities – religious and social services which cannot be accomplished locally or regionally, such as the hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca), the campaign of sacrifice, and prayer calendar services. The centre is also in charge of the assignment and the further training of the imams (here after hoca).

The “Islamic Community *Milli Görüş*” (IGMG) defines itself as an Islamic religious community which extensively organizes the religious life of Muslims. Apart from fostering the doctrine, preaching the Islamic religious denomination and the widespread fulfillment of the tasks defined by the denomination, the IGMG concerns itself with all matters of Muslims and represents their interests. The IGMG makes an effort to “improve the living conditions of Muslims and the protection of their fundamental rights (Amelina and Faist, 2008: 98).

### 7.3.1. The IGMG in GOSLAR

The organization of Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görüş was established in 1978 at the center of Goslar. Now, it has 120 active and registered members. They can mobilize 250-300 people in Goslar. IGMG was very strong in Goslar with its large membership and the capability to mobilize Turkish population in the beginning of the 1990s when the Refah party (now, the Saadet Party) was rising in Turkey.

Among all political Islamist groups, Milli Görüş is proportionately more strongly represented in Goslar. Many young Muslims in Goslar IGMG do not identify themselves with Germany and are increasingly motivated by pan-Islamic notions of Muslim humiliation around the world, the plight of the Palestinians, and perceived U.S. subjugation of Arab countries. It is within this group that Islamic countries like Saudi Arabia or Iran are most likely to find sympathy.

According to their respective tasks, the religious, cultural, and social services of the IGMG are either offered by the central administration or by the regional or local communities. The smallest units of this religious community are the local mosques. As a local unit, Goslar IGMG, for example, provides the necessary infrastructure – such as praying rooms and hocas – for the daily religious practices. In addition, the women's and youth departments also operate locally. Goslar IGMG not only carries out activities for general purposes but primarily focus on the needs of each of their target groups.

The *hocas* of Goslar and other IGMG mosques are sent by the *Saadet Party* networks in Turkey. They come to Germany with a temporary visa and stay 6 months at most. The imams from Turkey neither know the

features of German life nor the Turkish life-style in Germany, thus, except for serving at praying ceremonies in the mosques, they cannot further help with effective social and religious advice for the youth or older communities during their residence in Goslar. Ferit, a representative of youth section in the IGMG mentions the uselessness of bringing *hoca* from Turkey:

“Well, we bring here valuable hocas, but we cannot collaborate with them properly. First, they don’t speak German. They don t know Goslar and our way of life in Germany. Their perspectives did not overlap with ours. Or their perspectives were not appropriate for this society. They have to know our social surrounding and the psychology of our children and youth. They have to know what kind of social environment the youth live in. For example, the Islamic life that is lived in Turkey or the Islam that is lived in Germany is totally different from each other. We have to educate our hocas here in Goslar. Importing hocas do not solve our problems but reproduce them” (Ferit, 22, interview, 2006).

Goslar IGMG includes youth, women and university associations etc., like elsewhere in Germany as well as in Europe. IGMG emphasizes in its self-representation that it offers religious and social service for 4 million Muslims in Europe. The range of services covers the erection of prayer institutes, pilgrimages, up to religious schooling of children and young people, kindergartens etc. However, it would be wrong to regard “Milli Görüş” only as a charitable organization with a Muslim character, as the public representation of the organization suggests. (Amelina and Faist, 2008: 98)

German Milli Görüş, the IGMG, also seeks public recognition of Islam. They applied to the state to acquire ‘religious society’ status for this purpose, but were rejected. Because the German state does not provide an official consultative body or ‘religious society’, Milli Görüş leaders seek other means, such as religious education, through which to achieve public recognition of Islam. IGMG organizes pilgrimage (hajj), religious ceremonies in special days, conferences (mostly about family life, generational relations, partnership, respectful relations, etc)

The lack of formal political opportunities or public recognition of Islamic organizations by the German state might have led migrants to develop alternative and more civil society-oriented means of participation.

The IGMG organization works as a civil society (NGO) or charity organization with modest aid and social activities in conflict driven and poor Muslim countries. For instance, in emergency conditions like earthquake, flood, drought and other troubled situations, the IGMG mobilize its members to extend their hand to those who are in need.

The Goslar IGMG like any other branch demands members to donate to the *kurban* (*Muslim tradition of animal sacrifice*) campaigns (the cost of the *kurban* donation was 100 Euro for per person in 2006). After collecting the donations, they send them to the Central IGMG. Once *kurban* distribution is completed, photos, articles, commentaries and video records are made available to public through its website and publications as well as a CD that presents the project with facts and figures to donors. These films and photos are shared with the mosque communities and are sometimes shown at meetings or conferences. The IGMG's Islamic charity of *kurban* develops a sense of belonging to the Muslim world and consolidates a moral value all of which gives social and moral livelihood to the people.

Initially, these *kurban* donations were directed to Turkey up to the 1990s. Since then the IGMG mostly sends donations to Muslim and poor countries (mostly Africa and Latin American countries)

Kemalettin, a young engineer, one of the executive members of Goslar IGMG states that after the 1990s:

“IGMG started ambitious and successful relief projects (e.g. *kurban* donation) as an Islamic humanitarian activism in many poor Muslim countries and also

Turkey. It becomes clear that IGMG is a pioneer organization of humanitarian aid among Islamic organizations. The *kurban* unite us with *umma* (the idea that all Muslim are brothers all around the world)” (Kemalettin, 25, interview, 2006).

This identity often works in two ways helping each other. For those who donate their *kurban* to Muslims all over the world, it is the completion of an Islamic duty and gives the satisfaction that religious responsibility has been fulfilled. For those who receive this aid, it is a feeling that there are other Muslims who care about their problems, poverty and future. Islam is symbolically perceived as a source of pride for action independent from supposedly secular, cultural associations subsidized by public agencies.

Kemalettin (25, interview, 2006) says, “By donating *kurban*, we firstly fulfill our Islamic duty and satisfy that religious responsibility. Secondly, as a human being we feel ourselves responsible for other Muslim brothers who are in poverty”.

As can be recognized from above, Muslim religious institutions position themselves as an alternative to cultural associations and contribute to a withdrawal into their own circle, but in most cases they work alongside cultural associations when it is a question of their social utility. A “social division of labor” has been established between cultural and religious associations in immigrant neighborhoods: whereas the so-called secular associations are content dealing with social action, the religious ones address the issue of identity (Kastoryano, 2004).

Also, it is worth mentioning that the meetings, conferences, exhibitions, religious ceremonies usually take place in big conference places or football stadiums. Both cultural festivals and annual meetings are organized at the same time. If one considers the course of the events, the musical productions, the mood of the participants and the variety of activities, one can, without a doubt, confirm the festive character of the mass gatherings. Furthermore, the sub-groups, namely the women and youth’s groups,

celebrate their annual meetings as mass events. One should not forget a variety of political demonstrations to mark some occasions, such as the closure of the preacher schools in Turkey.

Although Islamic groups can operate as informal congregations or unofficial places for prayer, they in fact opt to organize formally. These organizations function as ethnic interest groups, claiming for their members not only religious but also political, social and economic rights. Like the secular immigrant organizations, they take stands on such migrant issues as, discrimination and integration. Especially the IGMG and the Gulen movement in Germany are involved small –scale enterprises, such as local broadcasting stations, travel and insurance agencies, import-export shops, integration courses, bakeries and grocery stores. They also operate as social clubs, and undertake non-religious cultural activities, such as courses, gatherings, conferences and camps(mostly about family issues to preserve their community as a strong entity) for women and youths, Goslar IGMG has a grocery store, courses, gatherings, camps, sport and donation activities.

Goslar IGMG`s members prefer to send their children to the lessons in the mosque as a traditional way of Islamic learning, religious socialization and education, which are considered to contribute to the construction of Turkish-Islamic identity. Activities held in Goslar IGMG are designed to reawaken Islamic identity among the group, and pass the traditional values onto the young generation. The growth of the young generation especially seems to be causing some changes in the traditional politics of the mosques. Some of the Islamic organizations, for example, seem to have recognized that classical teaching methods were not very fruitful within the Goslar context. Therefore, they introduced new strategies for teaching, recruiting and appealing to a wider audience. For example, Goslar IGMG sometimes tries to give some religious lessons to the children in German

language. Also, they offer youth camping, travels and other social activities to appeal to these children.

Of course, religious instruction in German schools serves the goal of integration better than instruction in the Turkish language in private Koran schools. Koran schools escape state supervision and their instruction could not be understood anyway since few German teachers have a working command of the Turkish language. This is also tied to the fact that Koran schools, as Islamic organizations, are not recognized under German corporate law. The failure to legally acknowledge the Muslim faith is in part caused by the fragmented nature of the Muslim communities in Germany. There appears to be no common denominator among the 2,400 mosques in Germany.

There is a religious friction between Turks and Germans. Though German basic law assures the right of all children to a publicly sponsored religious education, such education is provided only to Catholics and Protestants and, as of late, to some Jewish pupils. In 1987, the Islamic Federation of Berlin applied for permission to provide religious instruction in some public schools. It took more than twenty years to move the request through the German legal system until the highest administrative court handed down a decision in favor of the Federation. Today, in spite of this decision, there are only a few German public schools in Berlin offering religious education to Muslim students. Throughout Germany, virtually every Muslim student receives such training outside the school setting. Similar inequitable treatment can be observed in other areas. For example, German agencies do not provide financial support to the numerous self-help organizations, social service agencies, and other nonprofit groups operated by and for Turkish immigrants. Since the Muslim faith has no legal status in Germany compared to other major denominations for which the state collects church taxes, it is argued that Muslim religious communities are

not entitled to public services or subsidies. In an attempt to address the issue, the Süßmuth Commission suggested that “the introduction of regular Islamic courses in German represents an important step toward equal treatment compared to the already established religious communities in the area of schools offering general education... the Islamic religious courses play an important role in sustaining the identities of Muslim children and young people growing up here” (Mueller, 2006: 422).

Religious organizations in Goslar are not static. Especially interesting is the way in which religious practice is transformed by new generation immigrants. The Goslar IGMG mosque is very different from equivalent structures in Turkey; here it serves a dormitory, community center, the location for shopping including language courses, instruction, youth clubs, sport facilities, T.V, satellite, internet, etc. This Islamic community of IGMG does not just function as a distinctive political ideology but as a particular set of values and norms in everyday life: mutuality, cooperation, identification in social issues. The Goslar branch of IGMG proves that a lively Islam can only be possible with a lively community life. Intense social control is often accompanied by sanctioning of outsiders and dropouts. For fear of exclusion, contradiction is often not publicly formulated, but at best expressed behind one another’s backs. It would be a misunderstanding to reduce this to some kind of control from above. As Schiffauer (2007: 85) asserts, this control indeed comes from below and is quite voluntarily exercised, namely by community members who see a guarantee for the cohesion of the community in an intact leadership.

Until the 1980s, the Turkish state largely left the necessary social and religious needs of Turkish population to the communities of political Islam. This changed only in the beginning of the 1980s, when Turkey shifted from a policy of effectively ignoring the migrants to a conservative



cultural policy whose aim was to increase the tie of Turks abroad to the Turkish state.

Ali (37, interview, 2006), previous leader of Goslar IGMG, eloquently points out:

“IGMG filled a serious gap that existed for a long time in Germany in the middle of the 1970s. They served as an organization which helped to ease the daily life of Turkish guest-workers by providing them with social services like praying places, translation service, Turkish and religious teachers for their children. Of course, they demanded and got political support from the immigrant people for the party in Turkey (Refah Party) as a result of this process. Most Turkish immigrants who had been helped by IGMG voted for the Refah Party for a long time” (Ali Goktas, a previous leader of IGMG Goslar, (Ali, 37, interview, 2006).

The Goslar IGMG members insist that the DITIB was founded as a counter-organization of the IGMG by Turkish and German state. The *IGMG* criticizes the *DITIB*:

“When the German state recognized that the IGMG was a strong and popular organization having an Islamist political vision and sensitive to the Turkish people in the 1980s, German state demanded that Turkey establish a religious organization in Germany, which would be controlled by the state of Turkey. Also, the *Diyanet* was established in 1985 after Kenan Evren’s coup d’état to counter the rising Islamic trends in Europe . . . The result of this process was the establishment of the DITIB as a competitor organization” (Ali, 37, interview, 2006).

Admittedly, it is true that in order to prevent radicalization of the Turkish community in Germany and maintain their identity, the Turkish state has always insisted on maintaining religious education and services through the government-run Religious Affairs Turkish–Islamic Union (Yavuz, 2006: 248). The DITIB (‘Diyanet Isleri Turk Islam Birliđi’ – ‘Turkish Islamic Union of the State Office for Religious Affairs ’) was founded as the European branch of the DRA. It stands for an Islam that understands the role of religion as strictly restricted to the private realm.

Among the members of IGMG in Goslar, there are a number of middle class students and engineers, although the unemployed and lower class populations seem predominant groups. It should be noted that the students and youth members who prefer to visit IGMG mosque (their numbers ranging from 30-35) on daily basis are very conscious and careful in their religious interpretations and practices. On the other hand, it is clear that the young generations have difficulties finding a position themselves in the IGMG organization. They cannot easily gain leadership positions within Islamic organizations. First of all, age is an important sign of status and it is challenging when young organizational leaders try to establish authority over whole communities. Moreover, second generation Turkish Muslims are usually trained in fields such as economics, medicine, law, or engineering rather than theology or religious studies.

These youths seem to be different from the traditional and imitated religious habits of their parents. In this context, I observed that these youth read the Quran and interpret Islam with efforts of reasoning, thinking and analyzing rather than the interpretations of oral traditions. These youths try to answer the various questions that emerged from the context of German society through interpreting and analyzing Islam in very modest ways. It can be partially claimed that this kind of interpretation among Muslim youth is a relatively new process, which has been discussed as European Islam in the literature.

Note that these religious youths are subjected to a variety of suspicions, questions, and prejudices some of which emerge from a natural curiosity in German society. When faced with such questions and suspicions, the youth prefer to consider, read and discuss these questions analytically rather than producing ready-made short-coming answers due to the lack of such cultural background. This kind of analytical thinking on Islam also

underlines the borders and differences between the new generation and the old generation in Germany.

Suffice it to say that this kind analytical thinking on Islam developed by the children of immigrants can make possible a dialog for constructing a multicultural within Europe. This process might be defined as a re-socialization of Islam or re-culturalization of Islam in European borders. This kind of analytical thinking on Islam might be also affected and supported by the social conditions of Europe where individualism, critical and analytical thinking are predominantly the leitmotiv of public discussions.

### **7.3.2. The New Generations and the Changing Vision of the IGMG**

Generational change played the key role in the orientation of Islamic movements in Germany. Although the older generation consistently organized in relation to what was going on in their country of origin, the new generation focuses on the local, and national, conditions of their settled immigrant communities (Yavuz, 2006). When it comes to religious feelings and processes of identification, it seems that the context of living is slowly but efficiently organizing the distance with the political culture of the country of origin (Amiriaux, 2007: 200).

The IGMG cannot be seen anymore as a European branch of a Turkish political affiliation as it was in the 1970s and the 1980s, but it is a multidimensional German-based NGO representing Turkish Muslims in Europe against discrimination and assimilation by publicizing Islamic values without neglecting integration in German society.

A slowly change in leadership has occurred in the IGMG since the mid-1990s. Leading positions have been systematically filled with members of

the second generation, who grew up in Europe. Since then, the top leaders of the Milli Görüş have attempted to develop a vision that aims at the flexible adaptation of the Islamic organization in German conditions. They have declared the Turkey-related conflicts that divided the communities in the 1970s and 80s to be outdated. Today's task is to create a place for Islam in European public life. After the 2000s, the IGMG has concentrated on developing the lives of Turkish Muslims in Germany by demanding equal rights and generating public discourse for this purpose. In this connection, the community began to make a name for itself with a series of remarkable positions. It advocated courses in Islam in the German language, started a campaign among its adherents for them to acquire German citizenship, and issued statements encouraging the faithful to send their children (boys as well as girls) to German educational institutions, especially to the higher secondary schools (Gymnasiums).

In internal discussions, they tried to determine the role of Islam in the constitutional secular state, their relationship to Christianity, and the role of women in Islam. The difference between diaspora and exile Islam was explicitly driven home when Mehmet Sabri Erbakan, who was the organization's chairperson from 1999 to 2002, proclaimed in his inaugural address that Muslims in Europe have a privileged situation, because 90 per cent of all Muslims live in conditions of state oppression, material misery, or war. The privilege enjoyed by European Muslims, he said, entails a responsibility towards Islam throughout the world. In the Milli Görüş, the impression one gets concerning the development of an Islamic diaspora is the opposite of the one created by the situation in the DITIB.

While the DITIB lags behind developments in the communities, the leadership of the Milli Görüş is on the front line in these developments. At times, one got the impression that the compromises made in an effort to establish itself as an interlocutor went too far for the community's first

generation. The leadership emphasizes its growing independence from the Turkish parent party, the current Party of Felicity (*Saadet Partisi*) (Schiffauer, 2007: 91).

Milli Görüş began to reorient itself to its constituency in Europe. Milli Görüş is incrementally distancing itself from Turkish politics and seeking its path as a European Islamic organization. For its followers and leaders, making sense of living as Muslims in Europe has become more important and urgent than changing Turkish politics. This shift is reflected in their official name as well, which changed from Avrupa Milli Görüş, Teskilatlari, an all-Turkish name, to Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görüş, a half-German, half-Turkish name literally meaning ‘Islamic Community National Vision’. While some leaders are still interested in maintaining ties with Turkey, their activities and followers are increasingly concerned with raising their children with a Muslim identity in Europe. The reorientation of Milli Görüş, towards Europe has resulted in a focus on getting official recognition for Islam and Muslim identity. Milli Görüş, is the most responsive Turkish Islamic organization to state policies due to its activism in providing Islamic education, creating a representative body between Muslims and the state, and advocating the right to wear the headscarf in public schools (Yükleyen, 2010: 446).

The IGMG’s official message is pro-integrationist, cooperative and moderate, while *Bundesverfassungsschutz* reports describe Milli Görüş, as isolationist and extreme in religious views. This creates concerns that Milli Görüş, is producing a double discourse, an ‘extremist’ one for insiders and a ‘moderate’ one for outsiders.

Because the Kemalist establishment in Turkey has feared the IGMG’s financial and organizational means, it has been under close surveillance by the Interior Ministry of Germany. Milli Görüş says it represents the

interests of immigrants and promotes the integration of Muslims in Germany. It wants to exert its influence on as many Turkish people living in Germany as possible and eventually promote Islamic causes it favors in Turkey. In a globalized framework, its activities blur the distinction between national and transnational, between country of origin and new home country. Under the leadership of Mehmet Erbakan, the organization focused on a strong electoral presence in European countries and hence acquired a degree of political power that cannot be discounted. Thus, Milli Görüş organized campaigns to call on members to take their host countries' citizenship in order to obtain the right to vote. The organization also wants to be recognized as an Islamic "Church" in order to get legal protection and recognition, along with financial support, in line with Christian and Jewish denominations. However, the state-dominated DITIB opposes its recognition as the main representative body of Turkish Muslims, and the Turkish state claims that Milli Gorus supports sectarian and politicized religious groups in Turkey. Milli Görüş wants to be involved in German politics and Turkish politics at the same time (Yavuz, 2006: 249).

Also, it is relevant to note that if a European Islam or Western Islam emerges in the near future, it would arise on the basis of this kind of analytical interpretations of Islam used by some second and third generation children of immigrants. The children of immigrants in Goslar/Germany tend to perceive Islam as a belief or moral system instead of a basis of the political or juridical governance embellished by *Shariat* rules that encompass all dimensions of life. As a matter of fact, this new understanding of Islam would be a strong hindrance against the extremist interpretation of Islam, which existed throughout the 1980s and 1990s in Germany.

There have also been some radical fringe groups among the Turkish population in Goslar. For example, the *Teblig* movement (*İslami Cemaatler ve Cemiyetler Birliği*), also known as *Kaplanlı* movement, was a radical splinter group of the *Milli Görüş* movement. Its goal was the establishment of an Islamist Turkish state, using force if necessary. It strove for an Islamic revolution in Turkey according to the Iranian model. This radical Islamic group cannot organize in Turkey but could freely form a web of networks in Germany by utilizing the German legal system. Following the death of its spiritual leader Cemaleddin Kaplan in 1995, the organization broke up into different factions and lost their activity. The *Kaplanlı* movement was also a strong movement in Goslar where most members of IGMG once participated in this movement in the beginning of the 1990s. In Goslar, as far as I know, today there are no Muslims active within the two separate Kaplan factions. Thus, having different ideas and practices from such extremist Islamic organization, the new generation of Muslim youth in Germany would signal new trends for European experiences of Islam.

Beyond that, the mosques and their communities in Goslar sometimes function as a social solidarity network. That is, IGMG does not only serve as praying that opens the doors through the spiritual world but also finds practical solutions for the social-world by giving the members the possibility to marry or to have access to the jobs in the network of the community. It can be recognized that there are many marriages among the members of the Islamic community in Goslar. Note that the marriage age is outstandingly low among the IGMG community when compared with the non-member regular population in Goslar. One can often meet with many married people 21 or 22 years old who have three children in the community.

This community gives some Islamic cultural baggage with superficial ethnic references to its members. It provides a cultural framework within which the members' behavioral codes become similar features characterized by Sunni orthodox understanding of Islam, conservative opinion and exclusive social and political discourse. For instance one of the members of this community, Sertan, who became a pilot at 23, underlines the cultural codes or framework of the IGMG:

“..It can be managed...A person should be aware of himself. That is, on the one hand he should not go outside at night but rather give importance enough to education on the other hand. You cannot fill your spare time with meaningless activities. I did in my childhood. But, here in Germany we represent Turks before ourselves personally. When you did anything wrong, we would be criticized first by being Turks not as a person. Because, Germans don't want to see you as a person but as a Turk with your ethnic or religious origin. Thus, we have to be careful in our behavior due to the responsibility of representation. They have the right to do wrong because they are German and live in Germany” (Sertan, 23, interview, 2006).

As can be seen from this statement of Mehmet, the participation of an Islamic community directly affects the perceptions and cultural behaviors on the way of life in Germany.

However, there are other groups who were once members of such an Islamic organizations and then intentionally avoided to stay a member of these organizations because of the loss of trust, very strict understanding of social life, and conservative interpretations of political life and so on. Nowadays, it can be claimed that the immigrants could not easily devote themselves to the organizations except by trusting only themselves in Goslar. It is partly a result of nihilist trends in the world, which diminish the role of politics and organization.

An old member of IGMG and university student, Murat, shared his experiences about IGMG with me by exposing his nihilism:



“I did go discotheque at nights, I was so happy during the nights but in the morning I had a headache and had so many problems that were not solved. Now, you saw my room. Hundreds of the letters by the state are still waiting to be opened. It gives me stress. I finished up my social resources. In the past my resource was Islam. It gave me strength against the Germans. I said to myself at that times, ‘I am stronger than the Germans because I have a belief but they don’t have it’. However, my interpretation of Islam was not an ideology that had been used by IGMG, DITIB or Kaplanci movement. Do you understand dude? My Islam was against nothing. My Islam was a peaceful entity which found secularism right. It is so important because secularism is the best way to live. You can do whatever you wish at your home. Because the IGMG movement turned Islam into a strict ideology by distancing secularism, I got rid of them in order to take a logical decision for my life” (Murat, 24, interview, 2006).

### **7.3.3. Publicizing Islam: The Headscarf**

Many Goslar IGMG members demand the right to wear Islamic clothing to school or at work and desire that their limits of modesty be respected in swimming and gym classes. The fight for collective and public rights for the religious community is central to the IGMG members.

The Turkish Muslim immigrant organization, the IGMG, supports the idea that religious and cultural differences should be regarded as constitutional rights. Consequently, Muslim women should not be prevented from practicing their religion in the public sphere. Kemalettin, the member of executive committee of the Goslar IGMG, argues:

...“Although the religious freedom of Muslim people is symbolically guaranteed by the German constitution, Muslim teachers who wear headscarves are restricted, and as is their free entrance to jobs in public service. Indeed it is their right according to constitutional law, becomes impossible. This is a result of the prejudices against Muslims, encourages continued against Muslims in all social spheres, and negatively affects the integration efforts of Muslims. This ban is incompatible with a liberal state, Germany. The treatment of Germany towards Muslim people is not neutral” (Kemalettin, 25, interview, 2006).

In contrast, the immigrant organizations with social democratic leanings, such as most Alevi and Kurdish and secular immigrant organizations in

Germany support the ban of all religious symbols from the public sphere, a position that is in line with the Turkish state's secularism. They argue that wearing the headscarf in public places threatens the state's neutrality.

However, the leader of the IGMG, Ucuncu, stresses that the headscarf ban will exacerbate discrimination against Muslim women and hinder efforts to integrate Muslims. Moreover, he juxtaposes the two important concepts of the democratic state, freedom of religion and state neutrality, and argues that the judge misinterpreted the neutrality of the state in religious matters. Ucuncu stresses that neutrality in religious matters is to encourage religious plurality (Yurdakul, 2006 a: 162)

In fact, the leading German women of immigration politics, such as Marieluise Beck, Barbara John, and Rita Süßmuth, stated in an open letter on the banning of the headscarf from public places:

“Whether or not we should opt for a more strictly secular school system, we want to make religious plurality in our society visible. The equal treatment of all religions is mandated by the constitution. A different treatment of Islamic symbols as opposed to Christian or Jewish ones is problematic from the viewpoint of integration and exacerbates conflicts instead of reducing them”(Yurdakul, 2006a: 160).

#### **7.3.4. Symptoms of Post-September 11**

It seems possible to suggest that there are certain political results of 9/11 in terms of immigration policies in Europe and USA. 9/11 has had bad effects mostly on certain migrants' conditions and relations. The pessimistic atmosphere in the aftermath of 9/11 suggests that neither multicultural nor assimilationist policies guarantee rapid Muslim integration. For example, after 9/11 German society has tended to forget the problems produced by criminal and violent Russian youths and they mostly started to focus on the problems created by Muslim and Turkish youths in general.

Tufan, a university student and young member of the IGMG states:

“When *Aussiedler* came here after 1989, their children had many integration and social problems because most children of *Aussiedler* were not happy to move to Germany. They created many problems in Goslar and other places. Then, German people started to consider overcoming the integration problem of Russian children and Germans compared them with Turks by thinking Turks created fewer problems than the children of *Aussiedler*. Most scholars focused on the study of children of *Aussiedler*. However, after 9/11, all eyes again turned to Muslim immigrant. This was not 9/11 of America but 9/11 of the Muslim immigrants because its long-term effects have been felt by Muslim immigrants”. All Germans started to think that all bad things are connected with Islam. They forget the problem created by the children of *Aussiedler*” (Tufan, 19, interview, 2006).

There are always complex relationship between immigration and religion at different times and in various places. In the post 9/11 period, Muslims have been stereotyped as terrorists without respect for life who hate Christianity and Western Civilization. Islam becomes the shorthand way of referring to dread or hatred of the immigrants and, therefore, to fear or dislike of all or most Muslim. The picture produced by television news of Muslim migrants in Germany has mainly been marked by negativity since 11th September 2001. A special interest lies in the changes of the media discussion of “migration” and “migrants”, which were caused by the creation of the terrorism discourse. Thus, the constant warnings about suspected extremists living in Germany as well as Islamists immigrating to Germany make up a considerable part of news reporting. However, the publicly marked minority group does not have the same access to mass media resources and public situations, in which such definitions are created, as the majority. Under such circumstances the group defined as the minority is forced to voice itself as such in order to deal with this labeling.

Specifically, in the aftermath of 9/11, the German police and the mass media started to focus on Islam and Muslim communities. The gathering places of Muslims, such as mosques and religious associations, became the targets of state inspections and the subjects of flash newspaper headlines, both of which viewed them as possible shelters for terrorists. Muslims

from different backgrounds –from Moroccans to Turks , Egyptians to Pakistanis –became the victims of the same anti- Muslim discourse , which portrayed them as foreigners posing a threat to European democracy and society (Amiriaux 2003; Kastoryano 2004)

German Milli Görüş, has a confrontational relationship with the state; state intelligence reports portray them as ‘extremists’, and they are skeptical about adapting Islam to Europe. The Bundesverfassungsschutz (Germany’s Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution) considers Milli Görüş, as a threat to the German state and lists it as an ‘extremist’ organization. Its reports characterize the *Milli Gazete* newspaper as the mouthpiece of Milli Görüş, and as a promoter of anti-Western, anti-Semitic and isolationist ideology, despite the fact that, Mustafa Yeneroglu, Milli Görüş’s chief legal officer in Germany, admitted differences of opinion with the editor of the newspaper (Yükleyen, 2010: 455).

An example is the imam's Friday speech (*hutba*) at the Mevlana Mosque, a well established mosque in Kreuzberg directed by the *Islamische Föderation Berlin*. The imam was filmed by the German TV station ZDF during his anti-German speech to the Muslim men who came to the mosque for Friday prayer (23 November 2004 on Frontal 21, ZDF, available on website [www.zdf.de](http://www.zdf.de)). In his speech, the imam said that the Germans will go to hell, and they do not shave their armpits and they stink. After the broadcasting, the imam apologized, but the IFB decided to remove him from his position. As it is shown in this example, the pro-integration claims of *Milli Görüş* , can be destroyed by lack of organizational structure and insufficient control over the community members (Yudakul 2006b: 186)

The lack of communicative channels reinforces the distrust between *Milli Görüş*, and the German authorities. German *Milli Görüş* remains

conservative and confrontational due to the partially exclusionist German policies that fail to publicly recognize Islam, thus creating distrust between state authorities and *Milli Görüş* leadership.

Thus, the *Milli Görüş* is listed by the Bundesverfassungsschutz (Germany's federal office for the protection of the constitution) as a "threat" to German democracy. The main reason for the inclusion of the *Milli Görüş* on this list is that it is considered to be Islamic fundamentalist, preventing the immigrants concerned from full political participation in German society. The report states that the *Milli Görüş* pursues anti-integrative efforts, especially with respect to the Islamic education of children. Moreover, the report provides many examples of defamatory statements made in *Milli Görüş* publications, in particular anti-German and anti-Semitic statements in the *Milli Gazete*. The label of "threat" to German democracy largely restricts *Milli Görüş* activities and campaigns and makes *Milli Görüş* members objects of suspicion. *Milli Görüş* has no credibility among German politicians, they use different channels, different associations is the *Islamische Föderation in Berlin* (Islamic Federation of Berlin), which has been granted permission to teach Islam courses in German secondary education in the German language.

In addition to cases involving educational rights, the following legal cases have been introduced by the *Milli Görüş* to the German courts: the right to ritual slaughtering (affirmed by the courts in 2002), Muslim teachers' right to wear religious attire in schools (denied in 2003), the right to have religious education (affirmed in 1984), Muslim girls' right to withdraw from swimming courses when both sexes are present (affirmed in 1993), the right to add Muslim names in conversion to Islam (affirmed in 1992), the right to the availability of Muslim services in social and medical institutions (still in consideration), and the right of burial according to Muslim rituals (still in consideration). Germany's constitutional law did not

explicitly forbid the wearing of headscarves in the classroom in state –run schools” (the German station Deutsche Welle, September 25, 2003). However, the courts expressed fear that the headscarf, as a religious symbol, would in and of itself threaten the educational mission (Yurdakul, 2006a: 157-158).

At the peak of the headscarf discussions, leftist politicians were divided on the issue, and the political climate in Germany dramatically changed. Supporters of multiculturalism (e.g. Integrationsbeauftragte (government representatives for integration) and Marieluise Beck, a member of the Green Party) stood behind religious immigrant organizations in their efforts to defend multicultural rights, whereas supporters of state neutrality (e.g. Lale Akgun, parliament member from the SPD) were in the same camp as mainstream Christian Democrats, arguing against the politicization of Islam (Yurdakul, 2006a: 159).

The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution in Germany portrays IGMG as aggressive and uncompromising, invested in Turkish politics with limited confrontational interactions with European authorities. In the 1980s and 1990s, IGMG supported the election campaigns of the political Islamist Necmettin Erbakan in Turkey. The Justice and Development Party (*AK Parti*), led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, eclipsed Erbakan’s party in 2001 elections in Turkey. Erbakan’s failure in his home country resulted in the IGMG leadership, still under the control of Erbakan loyalists, to concentrate more on their local situation, particularly on their interactions with European authorities. Furthermore, in 1983, a former leading member of the *Milli Görüş*, Cemalettin Kaplan, split from Milli Görüş,. They set up a revolutionary Islamist group that claimed to be a state, the Caliphate State of Cologne, which was banned by German authorities in December 2001 (Yükleyen, 2009: 300).

The major event that pitted Muslim associations against German state authorities was September 11. All Muslim associations revised their policies and campaigns after this event. The religious, political and cultural differences between Muslims and German society started to become more regulated by the state authorities (Yurdakul 2006b: 178). The change within the activities of “Milli Görüş” was initiated by 11<sup>th</sup> September 2001. As mentioned above, after that date all activities in connection to Islam were strongly linked, in the public and political discourse, to questions of risk. While “Milli Görüş” showed their “religious-revolutionary” character before more or less openly at mass demonstrations, after 9/11 they had to signal a stronger distancing from bonds to the country of origin. The transnational activities, which IGMG before conducted in two languages with totally different main emphases in a German and Turkish national context, could not be maintained because of the increased attention of surveillance organs to the revolutionary Islam<sup>12</sup>. The careful self-representation as a religious community is a way out of this situation. The public pressure, which “Milli Görüş” experiences because of its connection to Turkish Islamism, leads to a public representation of its transnational references in terms of the globally operating *Umma* ideology. These changes in orientations of “Milli Görüş” can be also understood with reference to the thesis of the *deculturation* of Islam. It implies that the initially ethnic bound Islam detaches itself from its cultural roots and strongly develops itself to a universal belief.

To sum up, “Milli Görüş” particularly emphasizes its orientation towards the immigration society. Neither the history of the group, which was born of Islamist movements in Turkey, nor its Islamist symbols and goals, which are an obvious contradiction to public integration requests, are discussed today. Similar to DITIB, “Milli Görüş” is forced to publicly distance itself from acts of violence which are committed in the name of Islam. Thus, nowadays “Milli Görüş” focuses on activities which are

connected to the integration question. On the one hand, the association strives for a legal recognition as a religious community and, on the other hand, it fights for the recognition of Islamic religious education as a school subject. The organization cooperates with other Islamic organizations in Germany, such as DITIB, considering these questions. This cooperation mainly takes place within the scope of the *Islamic conference* (2006, 2007), organized by the federal Home Office (Amelina and Faist, 2008: 99).

The religious associations try to present their transnational bonds as no hindrance for integration. Moreover, particularly such associations as DITIB and IGMG prefer to avoid the discussion of their transnational activities especially since 9/11.

The dominant public assumption is that religious associations organize their political activities on the basis of religious principles. This suspicion is especially high in regard to the Sunni Muslim associations DITIB and IGMG, although one has to mention that the latter actually practices in such a way. However, the idea that the boundary between politics and religion can vanish, puts the central premise of western nation states into question. Concomitantly, the reference to transnational linkages in the cases of DITIB and IGMG would increase such suspicions and cause their labelling as not willing to integrate. In the public debate they would be defined as 'staying them' and not as 'joining us'. Secondly, some current trends in the global societal frame condition the connection between transnationality, religious discourse and global risk perception. Especially after 9/11 the perspective of western states on religious matters has been transformed, whereas religious questions become the priority of the political agenda. This global trend constrains also the activities of Turkish religious associations in Germany (Amelina and Faist, 2008:113).



Religiously oriented associations have always been popular among Turkish immigrants in Germany; however, in the aftermath of September 11, the new Muslim identity has been redefined both from within these associations and from outside, for example, by the German political class and the mass media. In the aftermath of September 11, German politicians and the German mass media began to look more closely at Islam in general and at Muslim communities in particular. Among these communities, the *Milli Görüş* and the *Diyanet* were the most important ones. Gathering places of Muslims, such as mosques and religious associations, became targets of state inspections and the subject of flashy newspaper headlines, such as "shelters for terrorists". In response, many Muslim associations, such as the *Diyanet*, opened their doors to the members of the majority population to demonstrate their "innocence" (*Der Tagesspiegel*, 23 July 2004). However, some Muslim organizations, such as the *Milli Görüş*, threatened by the police raids and the journalistic hype, minimized their interactions with them (Yurdakul, 2006b: 172).

Following Mahmoud Mamdani, Yurdakul (2006b) asserts that two forms of Muslim communities and two representations of Islam were shaped in the aftermath of September 11: a state supported Islam, on the one hand, and Islam as a threat to the state, on the other. In a recent book, Mahmoud Mamdani (2004) refers to this split as "good Muslim, bad Muslim"; after an unguarded reference to pursuing a "crusade," President Bush moved to distinguish between "good Muslims" and "bad Muslims." From this point of view, "bad Muslims" were clearly responsible for terrorism. At the same time, the president seemed to assure Americans that "good Muslims" were anxious to clear their names and consciences of this horrible crime and would undoubtedly support "us" in a war against "them." But this could not hide the central message of such a discourse: unless proved to be "good", every Muslim was presumed to be "bad." All Muslims were now under

obligation to prove their credentials by joining a war against "bad Muslims".

In this configuration, it can be said that, the IGMG is portrayed as bad Muslims, while the DITIB is pictured as a good Muslim. The IGMG frequently campaigns about discrimination, though exclusively about discrimination against Muslims. In fact, the historical background of the IGMG in Germany is characterized by this emphasis on Muslim mobilization. However, the DITIB is seen as a representative of mild and modest Muslim organization because its activities aim at contributing to privatization of the religious life.

One of the key debates that appeared in the aftermath of September 11 has been the debate on the removal of the Islamic headscarf from public places. The political positions of the *Diyanet* and the *Milli Görüş* have been different in this event. On the one hand, the *Diyanet* has only commented on the headscarf briefly in German newspapers. They downplayed the importance of the headscarf for Muslims in Germany. On the other hand, *Milli Görüş* supported the teacher, Fereshta Ludin, in her court cases. Eventually Ludin started to work as a teacher in the Islamic primary school in Berlin that is affiliated with the *Milli Görüş*. In other words, the *Diyanet* refrained from getting into arguments about the headscarf ban with the German state authorities; whereas the *Milli Görüş* took a firm political position against this ban. (Yurdakul 2006b: 179)

In fact, 65 Islamic organizations in Germany released a public declaration in April 2004. Supporting the headscarf, the declaration stated that "the woman is commanded to cover herself - hands, feet and face excluded. The covering of the hair unanimously is clearly a part of this." The *Diyanet* did not sign this document. In brief, the *Diyanet*, represented as the "good Muslims," did not make any statements that would offend its relations with

the German state authorities whereas *Milli Görüş* was portrayed as the "bad Muslims" by being against them. In either of the cases, their associations represent different understandings of Muslim integration into German society.

In addition, Nina Mühe highlighted the growing tendency in Germany to, similarly, refuse citizenship to long-standing Turkish residents on the grounds of affiliation to Islamist organizations. In her research on Muslims in Germany for the Open Society Institute, she exposed the growing rejection of naturalisation requests from members of the organization Milli Görüş, which represents a large number of Turkish-Germans. (In one case, four members of Milli Görüş, were even stripped of their German citizenship, although this was overturned on appeal.) Another similarity with France lies in Germany's new Immigration Amendment Act which paves the way for institutionalized discrimination against Muslim applicants. Under this law, public authorities are obliged to notify the aliens' department of, and exchange personal data, about foreigners 'in need of special integration', without defining what this 'need' entails, thus providing for unchecked powers of interpretation (Fekete, 2008: 55).

Under the anti-terrorism laws of 2001, authorities are no longer barred from monitoring what goes on inside mosques. Some German states have considered laws to make hocas preach in German. Some would like to see programs to train hocas in Germany. 'Candidates can be rejected on the grounds of insufficient assimilation, whether in their dress, their language, their travel outside the country, or the positions they have taken on Islam. (Fekete, 2008: 53)

For example, Abdullah (40, personal conversation, 2006), a member of the Goslar IGMG, complained about the difficulty of having German citizenship because of being a member of IGMG. However, he adds by

saying that “they did not give me a reason or explanation of the refusal of my application for the German citizenship. The reason would be my past membership in the Kaplanci movement (radical or extremist Islamic movement) which was very strong in Goslar in the beginning of the 1990s”. Then he concludes his conversation, ‘this is not fair”

### **7.3.5. The Cases of Yimpaş and Kombassan**

Goslar IGMG like any other branches in Europe has some capacity to circulate ideas, skills, and money back and forth. Fikret, an old executive member of the Goslar IGMG, explains the reasons of the loss of IGMG power, affection or popularity as follows in Goslar: the hegemony of old (first) generation, the corruption because of the Kombassan and Yimpaş cases, individual ambitions in the organization.

Temel who is the old follower of IGMG says:

“The IGMG benefited from the failure of integration. They had the opportunity to give the people a voice to express themselves in this difficult condition. Their resource was our failure of integration. It is simply what the Islamic organizations do. They call you with your correct name and surname. They say ‘we understand that you are not accepted by either Germany or Turkey’. They respect them. They show their respect if the immigrants visit them by serving tea, coffee, friendship and they ask about their family and life and by giving help to overcome some social problems” (Temel, 23, interview, 2006).

The popularity of IGMG in Goslar had lost its impact after September 11, 2001 which directly affected the community’s mobility and freedom at some points due to the close observation by the German state.

More importantly, based on the interviews with IGMG members and officials, it is possible to claim that the financial corruption caused by Islamic missionary and entrepreneur preachers (known as Yimpaş and Kombassan cases) within the organization also contributed to the decreasing impact of IGMG in Germany. In 1990s, community leaders,

religious teachers and preachers played a significant role in converting individuals to the idea of Islamic economic rejuvenation in Goslar and all over Germany. The most successful Islamic companies (Yimpaş and Kombassan) have certainly benefited from this notion as they were set up and managed by charismatic leaders, businessmen and teachers who preached narratives of Islamic 'just order' constructed around honesty, intelligence and moral superiority.

According to Özcan and Cokgezen (2006), the Islamic missionary zeal targeting Turkish workers in Germany and using a discourse of alienation, repression and fear of the 'other culture' managed to convince individuals to invest in Islamic companies. The number of converts to the mission increased and further diffused into neighborhoods and social network relations. The powerful narrative of Islamic missionary zeal perpetuates belief and trust among those displaced masses who seek political power, spiritual and material wealth. A preacher who played an intermediary role in money collecting activities states that in the meetings in Europe he swore that the owners of the companies are true believers and the returns they would obtain when they buy the 'shares' are approved by Islam. Many such preachers were involved in the process of collecting money from investors. In addition to small political organizations, representatives of the National Youth Foundation (*Milli Gençlik Vakfı*) in Germany and the Refah Party were involved in Islamic activities and their promotion.

These missionaries of the new Islamic revival collected money from the members of IGMG and delivered sermons on Islam, ethics and morals at the same time. Besides, they declared a new coming order under which moral supremacy, justice and fairness would reign.

However, although IGMG members invested millions of Deutsche Mark to these Islamic holdings, Yimpaş and Kombassan, most of them cannot get

their `shared` money back. Thus, this tragedy contributed to the loss of IGMG`s impact and trust in the eye of local Turkish immigrants and members in Goslar/Germany. Finally, their members and activities became more limited in the 2000s.

Today, it is clear that some Turkish girls wearing Islamic headscarves arrive in German schools amidst whistles and expressions of hostility. In all of these statements by Milli Görüş representatives, the main aim of the *Milli Görüş* is to bring some exclusively Muslim practice, such as wearing the headscarf, into German political discussions. Thus, one can undoubtedly describe the politics of *Milli Görüş* in Germany as a “struggle for recognition”. Whether *Milli Görüş* really creates a space for Muslims in Germany depends on its success of peeling off the “bad Muslim” label that came with being listed in the *Bundesverfassungsschutz*, and the attempts to become legitimate.

As Schiffauer (2007:79) states, the search for recognition is connected with a precarious relationship between same and equal, on the one hand, and other and different, on the other. One wishes to be recognized as equal, because every expression of inequality means exclusion and discrimination. Yet one also wishes to be perceived as something special and unique, or at least to be respected in one`s difference. It is clear that tension is present in this double desire for recognition. Indeed, it may well be something impossible to achieve. No sooner is one seen as different and special, than the problem of equality arises; and no sooner is one treated as an equal, than the question arises about the right to be different, the dismay that the dissimilar is handled as similar. This is sometimes raised as a paradox. The relation between equality and difference is indeed unproblematic when the special meets with recognition or at least well-meaning openness and curiosity.

#### **7.4. Diyanet Türk İslam Birliği, DITIB (The Directorate for Religious Affairs of Turkish Islamic Union [Türkisch Islamische Union der Anstalt fuer Religion])**

DITIB is the largest Muslim umbrella organization in Germany. The head office, to which almost 900 Mosque associations are incorporated into, is in Cologne. The umbrella organization was founded by the Directorate of Religious Affairs (*Diyanet İsleri Başkanlığı*) in 1982. They wanted to ensure that the practicing of religious duties in the European states would not be left to radical organizations (Amelina and Faist, 2008: 95).

In Germany, the Diyanet Türk İslam Birliği (here after DITIB) is the biggest organization for immigrants. DITIB was founded in 1987 in Oker where 800-850 Turkish people live. DITIB has 160 official members but they unofficially declared that they have 250 male members and 180 female members who can be easily mobilized in every activity. We read from the DITIB's website<sup>20</sup>, the first office was opened in Berlin in 1982 and the organization was established nationally with headquarters in Cologne in 1984. As of June 2009, DITIB had grown to represent 889 member associations, each registered as a non-profit cultural association.

Funded by Turkey, DITIB addresses an average Turkish religious people by adopting Turkish official state discourse on social and religious life. The religious leaders, the hocas, are sent by Turkey as an official civil servant. Because hocas are sent to mosques in Germany by the Directorate of Turkish Religious Affairs, they follow policies set by administrators in Turkey. In this way, a Turkish government agency plays a key role in shaping migrant religious practices on foreign soil, but there is currently no research that explicitly connects developments at the Directorate in Turkey with DITIB's actions and rhetoric on the ground in Germany. This

---

<sup>20</sup> See, ([www.ditib.de](http://www.ditib.de))

organization can be partly seen a transnational organization which have ties in both countries.

The degree of hostility experienced by immigrants in places of destination is one of the factors facilitating or diminishing involvement in transnational activities. This process is connected to the formation of linear or reactive ethnicities. High degrees of hostility-what Portes calls “negative modes of reception” -force groups to create protective boundaries that in turn lead to specific ethnic or religious identities. Transnational activities defined as those that take place on a recurrent basis across national borders and that require a regular and significant commitment of time on the part of participants. Such activities may be performed by powerful actors like states and corporations or by humble workers. They may include economic transactions but also other religious, cultural, and political exchanges.

Usually politicians of Germany and the other immigration countries regard transnational political practices of migrants as an integration hindrance. In general, transnational ties of immigrants are seen as detrimental to a successful integration of migrants into German society. This transnational tie would have been seen as a problem due to being supported by the foreign government of Turkey, which would risk full-scale integration to Germany. However, although the homeland ties of DITIB would have raised suspicions that migrants are uncommitted to becoming full participants in the host country and pose a security risk, the German state finds the organization cooperative and modest for the close religious or social incorporation. Thus, if the German state seeks partnerships with local representatives of Muslim communities in Goslar, they see DITIB organization as the more acceptable organization by giving them priority to cooperate with them among other Islamic organizations. Thus, the German state let DITIB become very active in Germany and the Directory of



Religious Affairs in Turkey has played an important role in guiding the organization up to now.

In order to understand the legacy of secularism and political importance of these Islamic institutions within the Turkish immigrant communities and also for the Turkish government, a short discussion is required to look into the history of modern Turkey. Of course this brief explanation will not cover most historical nuances. During the Ottoman empire, Islam and the state were completely interwoven. Atatürk's revolution was to change this and, after several smaller intermediate steps, in 1928 Islam as a state religion was abolished. From then on Turkey was to be a modern, secular state.

In order to get rid of the all symbolic elements (most notably Islamic symbols) of Ottoman Empire, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his associates introduced sweeping modern reforms from dressing to civil law designed to create a modern nation-state united by a Turkish identity rather than Muslim one. The leitmotiv of this secular understanding of nation-state was inspired by French nationalism and its militant Enlightenment model which tends to elitist modernization from top down. In accordance with a secular and modern nation-state, Atatürk wanted to keep Islam and Muslim identity out of the political arena. To this end, he established a Directorate of Religious Affairs (DRA). This directorate's task was and is to control and monopolize all religious activities in the republic. Religious parties, shrines and lodges were prohibited. Political and religious opposition to the secular state lived on but its influence on public life was limited.

Inspired by French positivism and Durkheimian social theory, Republican elites viewed religion as an obstacle to modernization but also recognized its potential to unite a diverse population, so they took steps to consolidate and extend institutional controls over religion that had been established

during the Ottoman Empire. To that end, the DRA was founded in 1924 to replace the Ottoman Ministry of Religious Law and Charitable Foundations. Sufi lodges and shrines were closed down, religious brotherhoods were outlawed, and the DRA assumed control over mosques, preachers, and religious teaching.

Today, the DRA remains at the helm of Turkish public religion and is the largest and most significant player in the Turkish religious market. The position of these organizations changed substantially when large numbers of Turks moved to Western Europe, to countries where state control of religion does not exist. Here religious opposition to the *DITIB* could be organized without interference from the official Turkish side.

According to Yükleven (2009) the DRA is a large organization running 77,151 mosques and 4,221 Qur'an schools with 155,285 students in Turkey. Several years after the 1980 military coup, the *DITIB* organized their activities in Europe to balance the Turkish political asylum seekers from left and right in Europe. Some of the leaders of political movements in Turkey fled to Europe and organized Turkish immigrants into labor unions and mosques. In Europe, the *DITIB* aimed to counterbalance dissident Islamist movements by promoting national solidarity and loyalty to the Turkish state. The goal was to "prevent opposition forces from exploiting the religious needs of Turkish migrants and mobilizing them against the interests of the Turkish republic".

*DITIB* representatives in Europe believe that other Islamic organizations are divisive, potentially threatening to the Turkish state, and hinder Turkish Muslim power in Europe. In 2005, the *DITIB* sent 1,027 imams, 678 of whom are in Germany, and the rest around the world, from Canada to Australia, wherever there are Turkish immigrants. In 2003, the *DITIB* had

around one hundred official imams in the Netherlands (Yükleyen, 2009: 297).

Turkish law from 1963, the committee of the Directorate of Religious Affairs acknowledges the system of religious belief “*Diyanet*”. From a theological perspective “*Diyanet*” covers three dimensions of Islamic religiosity: *Ibadet* (rite), *Itikat* (religious belief) and *Ahlak* (morals, morality). The services of DITIB are mainly directed to Turkish Muslims, even though the association is actually open for all kinds of Muslim. The imams working for the DITIB are civil servants of the Turkish state, who are sent from Turkey for a limited time period. The activities of DITIB are of interest for the research on transnational practices because this example shows that they not only create opportunity structures for transnational activities but can also act as transnational players. However, the assumption that DITIB acts as a state authority is not quite correct (Amelina and Faist, 2008: 96)

Yavuz (2006) states that in order to subordinate religion to the political establishment, as in the communist bloc, the new Kemalist Republic created its own version of “*Islamist state*” by establishing the Directorate of Religious Affairs (DRA). The goal was to control and domesticate Islam in accordance with the needs of the laicist or secular state by crafting a national (Turkish) and secular (European) religion. Islam was reconfigured as a Turkish ideology, and a component of Turkish identity. For instance, article 136 of the constitution states that the “*Directorate shall exercise its functions and duties in accordance with the principle of laicism.*” The state controls all 80,000 mosques in Turkey and employs their Imams as state functionaries. *Sunni-Hanefi* Islam constitutes the doctrine of the DRA, which does not recognize the autonomy of the Alevis or other sects. When the DRA opened a number of mosques to establish an ethno-religious

understanding of Islam among the Turkish workers in Europe, it was transformed by the European realities.

In 2000 and 2001, the DRA organized two conferences on the EU process and Islam. In these meetings, the DRA presented itself as the guardian of Turkish values, language, and institutions in Europe. It has over 300 mosques in different European cities and directly hires the Imams of these mosques. Although it benefits from freedoms in Europe to disseminate Islam and establish its institutions, the DRA has been against Christian missionary activities in Turkey. Moreover, it has been either against or very reluctant to allow Christians to open new churches in Turkey. During my interview with the head of the DRA, Ali Bardakoglu, he presented the DRA as a “national and state” institution to organize the national-religious affairs of Turkish citizens. The main source of conservatism in the DRA is the widespread insecurity among its clergy about Islamic knowledge, faith, and supremacy. The DRA wants to remain visible in the public sphere and also be important within the laicist state system by catering to the modern needs of the population by approving the more secular interpretations of Islam while reinforcing its position within the state by stressing religion’s role in national identity and deference to authority. The DRA is not very sympathetic to the overall assimilation of Europe’s large Turkish immigrant population. Its main objective is to keep Turkey’s Muslim population in contact with the mainland culture, whose one fundamental aspect is Islam. It continues to see Europe as most Turks did in the 1960s: Europe is a place to earn a living, so it is crucial to keep in touch with the mainland. There are many Turkish TV channels in Europe that simply rebroadcast Turkish programs, and newspapers and magazines published for Turks in Europe appeal to the same tastes as those sold in Turkey so that Turks do not feel “alien” in Germany or other parts of Europe (Yavuz, 2006: 241).

Two types of Islamic opposition against the *Diyanet's* hegemony and the secular principles of the Turkish state can be discerned. The organizations which can be characterized as primarily religious ones have little active interest in state politics. Although their ideas are not fully compatible with Turkish secular politics, they primarily want to run their own affairs and perform their rituals without interference from outside. In Europe, the *Suleymancilar* are the best known representatives of this type of opposition.

Although Islam was not allowed to enter the political arena, it was commonly known that a party like the *Milli Selamet Partisi* (the National Salvation Party) before the 1980 military *coup* was religiously oriented and was striving for a Turkish state based on the *sharia*, the Islamic law. It was the political arm of what is commonly known as the *Milli Görüş* movement. The Islamic *coup* in Iran was an inspiring example to a group of this party's supporters and they founded a militant and even more fundamentalist organization: *Islami Cemaatler ve Cemiyetler Birliđi*. Contrary to the *Milli Selamet Partisi* which strove for democratic change, the *Islami Cemaatler ve Cemiyetler Birliđi* sought revolutionary means to establish an Islamic Turkish state. Interestingly, this party was established in Cologne, Germany, by a former *Diyanet* mufti. All other forms of opposition against the *Diyanet* and the secular state had already existed covertly in Turkey, whereas the *Islami Cemaatler ve Cemiyetler Birliđi* needed the safe haven of Germany to be established. From there it seeks to export its ideology to Turkey.

Thus, Islamic Fundamentalists have centralized their organizations by creating federations of mosques like the Islamic Federation in Berlin and the Association of Islamic Cultural Centers in Cologne. In response, the Turkish government has established the Turkish Islamic Union of the Department of Religious Affairs (DITIB) and ordered it to counter the

influence of fundamentalists in Germany by winning as many mosques and Muslims as possible under its organizational roof. DITIB, for instance, "opposes any misuse of the Islamic religion... for political purposes" (O'Brien, 1988: 129).

DITIB's official state discourse is a mixture of secular nationalist ideology and official understanding of Islamic world-view. That's why members of the DITIB have mostly nationalistic view but are moderate in their Islamic interpretation. Thus, modesty, anti-extremism, and nationalism are the major characteristics of the DITIB organization. DITIB mosques in Germany are the official representatives of Turkish state after the consulate and embassy.

It is safe to say that German official institutions have more affirmative relations with DITIB rather than IGMG which has been on the dangerous organization list after September 11. If German state officials want to organize common events with Islamic communities in Goslar, they prefer to contact DITIB rather than IGMG. Sometimes in a year, German state officials, churches and DITIB organize "The day of open door" ("*Tag der offenen Tür*") events together so as to familiarize or introduce these different religious communities to each others. In this event, Germans visit the mosque and try to learn more about Islam and the Muslim community. There are also conferences, conversations, ceremonies and special praying in order to inform Germans about Islam. In such meetings the members of DITIB serve special Turkish foods, desserts and beverages.

Goslar DITIB organization collaborates with the representatives of the German authorities in the development of a so-called "National Integration Plan". Their collaboration issues deal with relevant integration issues, such as "integration courses", "German language", "education, apprenticeship, apprenticeship market", "position/situation of women and girls", "local

integration activities”, “integration activities for strengthening the common civil society” were formed. Their future proposals should be used for the elaboration of the current integration politics

Like the other mosque-affiliated groups in Goslar, Goslar DITIB offers housing, employment, education, and leisure services, which Turks have a difficult time accessing in the larger German community. That most religious organizations do not emphasize “integration” comes as no surprise. After all, the average German cannot reconcile “integration” with the status of a foreigner, an *Auslander*, and with being different in terms of appearance and lifestyle. Further, the largest agency providing services to Turkish immigrants is a Turkish governmental agency, the DITIB, the Turkish Islamic Union of the Institution for Religion. The agency is part of the Turkish government’s office for religious affairs and provides most of the Imams teaching the Koran in Islamic communities. As *The Economist* notes, “...the DITIB also does not do much for integration. On the contrary, since its main concern is the pursuit of Turkey’s national interest, it encourages Turks in Germany to think of themselves as Turks” (Mueller, 2006: 424).

Meanwhile, DITIB is a franchised Turkish organization promoting a moderate Islam acceptable to the Turkish regime, enjoys considerable success. DITIB uses a franchised authority structure to promote Kemalist-Islamic identity compatible with the Turkish regime and enjoys strong support within Germany's Turkish community. The representatives of *Diyanet İşleri* are careful not to make any statements in the group’s internal or external affairs that would offend official relations between Turkey and Germany. The political Islamic exile association, the IGMG, probably enjoys the second strongest support within the Turkish community. It also has a franchised authority structure. Although Ögelman (2003: 178) notes from his interview with one of German policymakers

claiming that it is difficult for the host government to establish a working relationship with DITIB because the Turkish organization frequently "circulates" its leadership between Turkey and Germany, the local authority of Goslar is more welcomed and has closer relations with DITIB than any other Turkish organizations. They officially contact with DITIB rather than the others for any public official or religious celebrations of both Christianity and Islam.

Therefore, DITIB did not initially formulate a political catalogue of demands directed to the German public. However, after having gained experiences with the German political representation regime and the growing public pressure after 9/11, the DITIB started to voice itself politically. To put it into other words, the institutional pressure for public representation of authentic belief, which has grown after 9/11, has changed the way the DITIB deals with the German public. Thus, DITIB's political activities, whose main emphasis is clearly on Germany, can be described as public discussion performances. The addressees of the public statements of the DITIB are German government authorities as well as the media public. The majority of activities consist of reactions to public debates related to "Islamist" acts of violence. After the world-wide well-known terrorist attacks as well as the murder of Theo van Gogh in the Netherlands, the expectation has been institutionalized in Germany that Muslim groups have to publicly distance themselves from them (Amelina and Faist, 2008: 96) Thus, the DITIB does not only have to issue press statements but also organize demonstrations (e.g. the DITIB's demonstration in Cologne in 2004) in order to distance itself from act of terrorism in the name of Islam.

Apart from intensified political articulations, a close cooperation between DITIB and other Islamic organizations in Germany can be observed after 2001. Subsequently, DITIB took part in the so-called *Islamic conference*,



which has been organized by the federal Home Office since 2006; additional meetings were held in 2007 and are planned for 2008. These events aim to give both, the German state authorities and the representatives of different Muslim associations, the opportunity to discuss questions related to religion, Islamism and integration problems of migrants.

One of the central issues of this initiative is the clarification of problems referring to the split between state and religion in Germany. Besides, the first *Islamic conference* (2006) meant to unite various Muslim associations into one contact organization. From the state's point of view, it has to represent the interests of all Muslims living in Germany. This organization was named the "Coordination Committee of Muslims". It connects DITIB with other Muslim associations, such as the "Islam Council" and the "Central Committee of Muslims". DITIB took also part in the *Integration Summit* which was initiated by the Federal Home Office 2006 (Amelina and Faist, 2008: 97).

The members and executive leaders of Goslar DITIB do not want to make any statements that would go against Turkish politics or stir up relations between Turkey and Germany; thus, they watched their words very carefully. The religious attachment and the *hocas* who are appointed by the Turkish state for five year terms cannot speak German and are not informed about the social, political and cultural events of Germany. The DITIB interprets Islam in a liberal fashion, leaving religious practice to individual conscience. It limits the role of Islam to the private sphere in which individuals' moral codes inform their personal lives and calls for accepting the state as the sole authority in the public sphere. For DITIB followers in Goslar Islam is a source of spiritual guidance on an individual level and the parts of Islamic law that affect public life, such as family or penal law, are left out of sermons.

Bahri, the previous leader of Goslar DITIB states:

“In Goslar we don’t want to bother our members with the political issues of Turkey. Other religious communities, such as *Milli Görüş* or the Gulen community have political positions and try to impose their political ideas and rules. *Turkish and German* state authorities know that these religious communities have a sacred political agenda which is not easily seen. As one of the previous leader of Goslar DITIB, I always challenged the political contamination of Islam. Hopefully, our community does not have political tendencies like other groups. We like both Turkey and Germany. However, our responsibility is to serve religious affairs not political ones. Our Islam is not against anything. We are a private association with the contribution of the *hocas* from the DRA in Turkey. We want to teach our Turkish people the ways in which they become conscious and religious people without mixing politics with religion. Politics can be made in the Party not in the mosque or religious community” (Bahri, 53 interview, 2006).

In the similar vein, Ferhat (39, personal conversation, 2006), the present *hoca* (2006) of Goslar DITIB “places himself in the peaceful struggle against discrimination, against any form of unequal treatment by regarding Islam as a private matter, a matter between the individual and God”.

The DITIB represents “official Islam” between Turkey and Europe. Its goal is to build citizens loyal to the secular Turkish state and promote national solidarity and integrity. Its duties are written in the law as running affairs related to the beliefs, rituals, and moral principles of Islam, informing the public on Islam, and administering places of worship. The DITIB promotes the loyalty of Turkish immigrants to Turkey and believes that Turkish nationalism does not present an obstacle to the integration of Turkish immigrants into German society

Like the *hocas* of the IGMG are sent by the *Saadet* Party and its related social network in Turkey, the *hocas* of the DITIB are still sent by the Turkish government. The temporary service of the *hocas* prevents them from learning about and addressing the needs of Muslims in Europe. Despite cultural orientation and language training programs, these *imams* lack knowledge of the local society and cannot always speak the language.

This communication barrier is even greater between appointed imams and the young generations of Turkish Muslims who speak German better than Turkish. Their *hocas* are not well equipped to address the concerns of the Muslim youth. And the DITIB's bureaucratic character and predominantly first generation constituency limits its capacity to engage in religious activism in the European context. DITIB's imams or *hocas* are willing to cooperate with the European authorities and instruct Muslims on the principles of secular public life.

The DITIB's message of Turkish national identity and unity resonates most with the first generation. However, when *hocas* give priority to their first generation constituency and lack linguistic capacity to communicate effectively with the younger generations, they have limited impact on the new formations of local religious identity. Nevertheless, Diyanet religious interpretation, referred to as "official Islam", creates fewer challenges for the European authorities because it limits Islam to the private sphere and uses Islam to promote individual moral responsibility.

Diyanet's "official Islam" is moderate and accommodating and does not demand much from its followers. Ritual observance is left to individuals without much communal pressure. This tolerant and relaxed approach is attractive to adherents seeking identification with the Turkish Muslim community without much religious obligation. Indeed, 13.4% of DITIB members consider themselves to be "non-observant" (*dindar*) (Yükleyen, 2009: 298).

The Arab-dominated version of Islam came either through the translation of Sayyid Qutb or Wahhabi financed institutions competing with a vernacular Turkish Islam. However, the influence of these works of Arab writers and Saudi Arabia has been minimal due to their negative stand on Sufism, their rigidity, and the condescending attitude of some Arab groups

toward Turkish Islam. Furthermore, the experiences of those Turkish workers in Europe and those in the Arab Gulf and Libya created a stark dichotomy. Many Turks felt alienated from the corruption and lack of social or legal justice experienced in many oil-rich Arab states.

This position is especially plausible for Muslims who regard Islam as a private matter, a matter between the individual and God: in other words, for Muslims who feel somehow close to the DITIB. Sibel's family can be a good illustration. Sibel is the daughter of Bekir who is the previous leader of DITIB organization. The women and daughters of Bekir's family seem a non-conservative, open-minded and easy-going in their social relations. The family members can be seen as the representatives of the 'conscious' Islam. I met with Sibel in the cafe where we were introduced to each other by her male friends. She was very easy going and her way of social contact was very warm and respectful. She does not wear the headscarf, while her elder sister does wear one. Sometimes, she goes to a disco, drinks alcohol. Her family allowed her to find her own way in religious matter. She has an open-minded worldview about social relations, friendship and working life. She graduated from Berufsschule as a kindergarten teacher but works as a waitress. She emphasizes that though her mother and sister prefer to wear the headscarf, they are open-minded, she adds. She says that she is rarely in conflict with her parents for her free choices in daily life, going to the disco, cafe and etc.

Sibel exposes her family's way of thinking of Islam or religion: "in our family everyone can believe and do whatever she or he wants. My father always tells about the good and peaceful sides of our religion. There is no enforcement or compulsion in Islam to which one turns by one's own decision and above all an Islam that one acquires individually and independently. This is a 'conscious' Islam that I believe. My parents do not force me to do anything about our tradition or Islam. It is not their

responsibility. Our family members deduce from their individual devotion to God that there is no compulsion in Islam. If one wants to veil or to pray, it should be her/his own decision. In my family, women are more dominant than men. My parents did not force us to wear the headscarf or go to Koran class in the mosque, although my father was the leader of the Goslar DITIB organization. They might want my brother to go Koran class but my parents can even tolerate, if I or my sister want to marry Germans. My parents pray regularly but we don't. We are all against politicization of Islam. Islam must be individual”

Serpil (23, interview, 2006) and her family sometimes go to the DITIB mosque to participate in special religious activities, ceremonies and meetings. They distance themselves from a blind and unconscious interpretation of Islam. The family gives importance to individual Islam rather than the public one. Serpil criticizes dogmatic manners of some people who blindly follow the *hocas* and trust religious authority too much. Sibel says “Islam does not recommend a blind praying or dogmatism which is one of the big mistakes of Islam followers. Everyone should find a conscious and good Islam individually” (Serpil, 23, interview, 2006).

The individualized stance is primarily to be found in the DITIB, and indeed because of this community's avowed profession of an Islam that views religion as a private matter between man and God. The orthodox collectivist committed position, on the other hand, is mostly to be found in the *Milli Görüş*. The ultra-orthodox anti-hegemonic position is represented in the Caliphate State. So while the attitude toward Turkey still remains decisive on the level between the organizations, within the communities (usually), members of the second generation support positions they developed with reference to the host society. Thus a complex web pattern is woven which also offers the possibility for new coalitions. The organizations have reacted to this shift in religious ‘demand’ in varying

degrees. The DITIB, which as far as its adherents are concerned could actually be the natural trustee of an individualised Islam, has failed so far with regard to the development of convincing positions of a diasporic Islam. This is because of its character as a state agency and its close ties with the Turkish state. This makes it more difficult for it to develop its own positions in reaction to developments in Europe. It is typical that in 2000, when lively discussions about the establishment of religion courses in Berlin's schools took place, the DITIB found itself unable to participate in the debates. In crucial questions, such as whether the courses should be in Turkish or German, the organization was not able to reach a consensus.

### **7.5. Conclusion: Lessons and Recommendations**

The *DITIB* was established in Germany in 1982 as a result of the Turkish parliament's decision to establish religious centers for Turkish immigrants in Europe. The *Milli Görüş* was present as an informal network in Europe even in the early 1970s. Although the *DITIB* and the *IGMG* share a common goal, that is to provide religious services to Turkish immigrants in Germany, they have different political perspectives. Contrary to the common belief that the *DITIB* is a formal representative of the Turkish state institution called Religious Affairs, the *DITIB* members emphasize that they have only an informal agreement with Religious Affairs. The *Diyanet İşleri* controls 800 mosques in Germany alone, whereas the *Milli Görüş* controls 514 mosques in Europe, most of which are located in Germany. Both have established a social service network over several decades in Germany, and both have youth and women's groups, Quran reading courses, and funeral funds<sup>21</sup>.

In Goslar, most people see *DITIB* as a representative of secularist and a modest religion supported by most Turkish nationalist people, while the

---

<sup>21</sup> see, [www.diyamet.org](http://www.diyamet.org) and [www.igmg.de](http://www.igmg.de)

IGMG is perceived as an extremist, irreconcilable, and anti-secularist. Supported by some Arab countries (Saudi Arabia), the IGMG and its members are said to be against the Turkish state and secularism. In fact, the *DITIB* members in Goslar do not agree with the politicization or publicizing of Islam.

Orhan who is now a supporter of the *DITIB* complains about his past in the IGMG:

“Whenever we had religious talk, the IGMG members and leaders blamed Turkish state. They spoke very rudely. They wanted to see everything within religion framework. I don’t support the *Milli Görüş anymore*. Because I believe that if Atatürk did not introduce some secular rules, Turkey would not have been peaceful and modern. I don’t support their views. They have radical views against secular life. Religion must be separated from politics. This is why I am here in the *DITIB*” (Orhan, 29, personal conversation, 2006).

Also, Baki, one of the executive members of Goslar *DITIB*, says:

“We work for the organization of the *DITIB*. We don’t support the *Milli Görüş* organization, because they have a political agenda, we don’t support their views. We want to keep religion in the private sphere but *Milli Görüş* politicizes Islam and benefit from it. They have politically motivated groups and they have a party in Turkey. Religion must be separated from politics. *DITIB* is very successful in serving a religious mission without touching politics. That’s why I prefer to work for the *DITIB* mosque” (Baki, 24, interview, 2006).

On the other hand, the members of the IGMG find the *DITIB* passive and ineffective in publicizing the claims-making of Islam. Some criticize *DITIB* as being representative of the secular states of Germany and Turkey.

Ali, the previous executive leader of Goslar IGMG states:

“We are not a hostile organization opposing the *DITIB* but they are extremely ineffective and non-active in supporting public or court cases of Islam and Muslim people. They are simply staying quiet when there is something against Islam in Germany. We participate in courts and express our opinions on every Islamic matter. We want to be recognized by the German state as Muslims. We

do not claim that the German state should recognize the IGMG but the whole Muslim people and rights in Germany. Our aim is not to provoke the German state, or politicize the IGMG's own rules. Every Muslim people should see the reality that if we do not take a firm position and we cannot come together, no one will give us rights. I don't understand why the German state and some secular Turkish organizations including the DITIB see us as a political threat. Right, we are conservative but not fundamentalist as they claim. We want our Muslim people to integrate this society with our Islamic values" (Ali, 37, interview, 2006).

There are many differences between DITIB and IGMG in terms of Muslim integration policies and political concerns in Germany. The major distinction between them lies in the interpretation of Muslim life. While DITIB sees Muslim life in Germany as a cultural difference between the Muslims and the non-Muslim majority, IGMG takes a holistic approach to Muslim life in Germany. Because of this holistic position, IGMG of Goslar has Muslim communities with different nationalities (among them Algerian, Tunisians, Moroccans, and Bosnians are the major groups). The IGMG want Islam to become more visible in German society by demanding Islamic education for Muslim children, ritual slaughtering of animals, and Muslim-only cemeteries. The DITIB does not want to publicly claims-making on the controversial issues such as headscarf, slaughtering, etc, whereas the IGMG intends to integrate the specificities of Muslim life into the German public sphere. However, the DITIB seems to agree with some claims of IGMG in principle or on paper, such as the right of religious education of Muslim children in public schools, and they do not raise legal claims in Germany.

Even the religious organizations' women groups have different tendencies. Although women have never been in the forefront of the window in the *Milli Görüş* movement, in the headscarf debate *Milli Görüş* appeared as the pioneering organization to defend women's rights to wear headscarf in public places. The activities of the *Diyanet* women's group are limited to



Quran reciting courses, German language courses and sewing and literacy courses for women. Interestingly, the Koran reciting courses in the *Diyamet* is funded by the Turkish state authorities, whereas the German language courses are paid for by the German state. The *Diyamet* or its women's groups did not make any public statements concerning the headscarf debate in Germany (Yurdakul 2006b: 177).

The religious groups can be divided into sub-groups in terms of their approaches to gender or social relations. There are three types of religious groups in Goslar. The first group is very religious and their gender relations and dress codes more conservative than other groups. This group can be seen as strict conservatives. IGMG is the representative of this type of religious group. Mostly, women of this group wear the headscarf leaving only their eyes visible. When I visit the houses of IGMG members, I cannot see the women of some families. As a rule, the women of some families don't show themselves to the (foreign) guests. If they serve anything like food or drink, they prepare and put them in the kitchen and their son or husband serves all prepared materials to the guests. The second group is very modest in dress codes and their gender or social relations. DITIB is representative of this group. Mostly, the women of this group wear the classic headscarf with long and loose covering dress. You can see the face of the women in this traditional dress. The third group is very modern and mild in terms of connecting religious concepts with modern life, dress codes, and social relations with Germans. New generation youths from both groups can be representative of these groups. For example, the girls can wear the headscarf but they wear jeans, pants, t-shirts, and sweats at the same time.

Of course these differences between IGMG and DITIB have some echoes of Turkish-Muslim people and their integration into German society. While DITIB seems to be more inclined to have a vision of intercultural dialog

between Turks and Germans with separating religion from politics, the IGMG take a political position by contesting the separation of religion from public (and political) life. The members of IGMG claim that they want to be accepted with their religion and otherwise integration would mean nothing more than assimilation.

The two organizations have different approaches towards integration in Germany: Following Yurdakul (2006b) it can be said that the model that the *IGMG* draws for itself is a multicultural *umma*, which can be described as a Muslim community that has members from different sects of Islam, nationalities, and ethnicities. The diverse members are bound together by their common Muslim background, their belief in the Koran, and the prophet Mohammed. As opposed to multicultural *umma*, intercultural dialogue is the ideology for integration that is favored by *DITIB* supporters. *DITIB* members claim that they do not have any political position and religion must be separated from politics. That is, they support the Turkish state's politics on Islam which favors state control over religious affairs through state institutions. This form of Islam is not considered to be a threat to the German society, because it is controlled by the Turkish state.

In the short term, the *DITIB* may be effective in providing religious services for Turkish Muslims. But many second-generation Muslims, who emphasize their permanence in Germany, also demand more rights than just the permission to hold religious services in backyard mosques. These rights would include, for example, large scale availability of the ritual slaughtering of animals, permission to wear Muslim attire in public places, and the establishment of Islamic theology institutes for the training of Muslim clergy. In this sense, the intercultural dialogue emphasizes the cultural component of religion: Muslims should enter into a dialogue with the majority society in order to introduce the cultural components of Islam.

Therefore, the major distinction in terms of integration politics between the DITIB and the *IGMG* is in their interpretation of Muslim life. The DITIB sees Muslim life as the cultural difference between the majority and the Muslims; whereas the *IGMG* has a holistic approach to Muslim life in Germany. They want to integrate the specificities of Muslim life into the German public sphere and claim some rights, such as Islamic education, ritual slaughtering of animals and Muslim-only cemeteries. For instance, Muslims of different nationalities don't have their community mosques. It is interesting to note that some Africans, Arabs and Balkans regularly go to the mosque of the *IGMG* but not the DITIB organization.

In contrast to DITIB, *IGMG* stands out for its intensive political activities. Its central goal, which is linked to Turkey, is the reorganization of the public sphere on the basis of Islamic religion. To put it into other words, "Milli Görüş" strives for a reconstruction of the social order in Turkey. The organizational and spiritual connection between "Milli Görüş" in Germany and its original conservative Islamist party (currently under the title of "Saadet Partisi") in Turkey shows that the success of this organization in Germany cannot solely be explained through endogenous (referring to the immigration country) reasons. (Amelina and Faist, 2008: 98)

As a consequence, the relations between the German state authorities and the *IGMG* have been contentious over the years; specifically because of the corporation of public law status has not been awarded to them. The *IGMG* claims have been successful to some extent; however, they have not started a systematic mobilization to claim rights. The DITIB, as the counterpart of the *IGMG*, has limited relations with the German state authorities. The *DITIB* has not raised any court cases or legal claims in Germany. Instead, the *DITIB* acts as a religious representative of the

Turkish state in Germany and refrains from making any statements that would offend German-Turkish state relations. While the *DITIB* acts as a relatively immobile and passive representative of the Turkish state authorities, the IGMG appears as an alternative association that negotiates rights for Muslims, however it also evokes suspicion because of its political activities.

All in all, both the *DITIB* and the IGMG have very different experiences with the Turkish state and politics. On the one hand, the *DITIB* is an association that supports the Turkish state in Germany, and in fact this relationship seems to legitimize and brings reliability to the *DITIB* activities. However, the IGMG have controversial relations with the secularist principles of Turkish state which make its religious and political activities suspicious.

## CHAPTER VIII

### CONCLUSION

“In 1729, the Irish clergyman and satirist Jonathan Swift put forward a novel solution to the economic problems of a society being ravaged by British colonialism: the poor should turn to ‘baby-farming,’ and earn a living by selling their children as fresh meat to the British landlords (Swift, 1955). Writing in the early 1980s, I suggested that baby-farming had indeed become a widespread practice not just in Ireland but also in many other countries on the periphery of areas of rapid economic growth. The difference was that the human exports sent to the booming industrial economies of Western Europe were consumed not as meat on the tables of the bourgeoisie, but as labor power in their factories.”

(Castles *et al.*, 1984:

1)

“Democracy is not an endpoint, it is a *process*, and to ensure the democratic nature of the EU, we should remember that, as Barbalet writes: A political system of equal citizenship is, in reality, less than equal if it is part of a society divided by unequal conditions.”

(Samers, 1998: 140)

“I think that migrant researches were more successful, if we are to draw a realistic and politically productive image of the migrants’ subjectivity, an image, to quote Honig, which allows us to come out of the dichotomy of the idea of migrant “as either a *giver* to or as a *taker* from the nation”. We might break the resulting vicious circle of xenophilia and xenophobia, Honig suggests, “by thinking about immigrants in relation to democracy, rather than the nation, and by thinking of taking as the very thing that immigrants have to give us”. Migrants’ subjectivity is neither to be reduced to the icon of the “individual”, nor to a “traditional” subject totally embedded within family and ethnic networks. What seems to be characteristic of the social experience of contemporary migration, remaining on a level of very abstract analysis, is that within that

experience complex systems of belonging and identity construction are experiencing deep transformations, are constantly undone, challenged, and rebuilt.”

(Mezzadra, 2005b: 4)

A basic impetus of this study is to understand why most of the third generation Turkish youth has still experienced downward integration and reactive identity formation, although they have been socialized in German schools and the German society?. When I was in the fieldwork carried out the study on the Turkish youth in Goslar, I always tried to find an answer to the question of what makes some Turkish immigrant groups susceptible to the downward path, or to the permanent trap, and what allows others to avoid it? Why do most Turkish immigrants and their children experience downward mobility, low labor access and failed educational attainment in Goslar/Germany? Why is the identity of the Turkish children more reactionary than the other immigrants in Germany though they are born, educated or socialized in the society? How has third generation Turkish youth been affected by the citizenship naturalization policies in Germany? What would be reasons for the worse education degrees and lower career or employment status (downward integration) of Turkish youth when comparing with Germans? I will try to answer these questions by focusing on a particular case of Turkish youth in two Turkish-Muslim organizations (DITIB and IGMG) and two municipal youth centers (Gleis 95 and BGX) in Goslar.

In this dissertation, my primary research design was in-depth interviews. I interviewed different groups of people who live in Goslar, a small German town: (1) third generation youth (2) first and second generation parents (3) executive committee and managing staff in Turkish-Muslim associations (4) clients or members (5) directors and teachers of three high schools (Hauptschule,

Realshule and Gymnasium) (6) Social pedagogues, social workers and members in two youth centers.

In this study, locality was seen a dynamic interplay between structure, culture (of which ethnicity is a significant part) and personal agency. Structure and personal agency can be both particularly apparent at the local level. One can recognize how the structural process works through individuals by focusing on specific local conditions. Then, it is possible to address concerns that structure, culture and individual agency bring together. Thus, it becomes possible to analyze local, national and global processes-micro and macro- in dialectical and dynamic ways.

In many conceptions of integration, 'the receiving society' is seen as a static entity –a space into which immigrants and ethnic minorities participate, rather than being parts in the production of space. What made this incorporation so complex? Family background, institutional opportunities and constraints, context of reception in receiving country and globalization processes are the most responsible for the form this incorporation takes. Taking this as the basis for the conceptualization of integration, I used the theory of segmented assimilation by Portes and others by reformulating it as “segmented integration.”

Followed the “segmented assimilation thesis,” the study argues that the children of immigrants in Goslar individually follow different paths in order to integrate into German society and construct their identity position, which depends on their family background, human capital, opportunity structures, and perceptions about the context of their reception in Goslar.

In terms of this study, the integration is not uni-linear and one-form but curvilinear, segmented and fragmented in various forms. Portes, Fernandez-Kelly and William Haller (2009) have shown that integration of

the children of immigrants is very segmented and divided especially for the second generation in that exogenous factors like family composition, human capital, modes of incorporation (state society and community), social contexts of receiving countries, and barriers confronting children of immigrant are all key determinants for their segmented integration patterns.

In this study, the proponents of the segmented integration model state that the integration patterns of the “new generations” are diverse. Which path is chosen depends on individual factors such as education, language skills, and age of arrival on the one hand and structural factors such as context of reception, family background and place of residence on the other hand. Segmented integration describes alternative paths of integration as depending on a number of factors, of which four are considered decisive: 1) the history of the first generation; 2) the pace of integration among parents and children and its bearing on normative integration; 3) the barriers, cultural and economic, confronted by second and third generation youth in their quest for successful adaptation; 4) the family and community resources for confronting these barriers. These factors determinate either integration takes downward or upward form. Major determinants can include exogenous factors to a particular immigrant group, such as racial stratification, context of reception, economic opportunities and spatial segregation, and intrinsic factors to the group, such as financial and human capital upon arrival, family structure, community organization, and cultural patterns of social relations. These two sets of factors affect the life chances of Turkish immigrant`s children not only additively but also interactively.

Indicators of downward integration include dropping out of school, social isolation, unemployment, premature childbearing, and being arrested or incarcerated for a crime (Portes et al, 2005: 1016). Due to the structural reasons caused by German society and institutions, the experiences and



integration conditions of children of Turkish immigrants in Goslar are contaminated by a huge amount of unemployment, low education rate, early school dropout, crime and drug addiction as a kind of downward integration. Downward integration does not emerge from the stories of the Turkish respondents as a deliberate path in Goslar, but as an outgrowth of a web of constraints, bad luck, and limited opportunities.

This study tried to explore Germany's differential exclusionist model (Castles, 1995) and civic stratification system with a special reference to the experiences of third generation children of Turkish immigrants in Goslar/Germany. It is this model and stratification system, which affects a wide range of institutional and social factors that determine the migrants' position in society. It includes: immigration policy, family reunion and residence rights; labor market and educational position; residential situation and community formation; social policy; and racism towards minorities.

Civic stratification refers to a system of inequality by virtue of the rights that can be claimed from the state. Following the civic stratification thesis, this study deals with the question of how far the provisions of citizenship themselves constitute a system of inequality. Accordingly, the three tensions are worth mentioning in the civic stratification system – formal inclusions and exclusions, informal gain and deficit and the dynamic of expansion and contraction.

In this differentialist exclusion system, permanent settlement of Turkish immigrants is seen as threatening to the receiving country for economic reasons (pressure on wages and conditions), social reasons (demands on social services, emergence of an underclass) cultural reasons (challenges to

national culture and identity), or political reasons (fear of public disorder, effects on political institutions or foreign policy).

The examination of the case study in Goslar indicates that as a result of the civic stratification system, Turkish immigrants and their descendants are poorly represented in higher education; they suffer from disproportionately high levels of unemployment; and they draw disproportionately on welfare services. As a result of this process, there is also worrying evidence of racialization across Goslar/Germany, which fails to ensure sufficient life chances for first-second and third generation Turkish migrants.

Evidence was provided on the institutional marginalization of immigrants in Goslar, which shows that such processes cannot be explained simply on the basis of claims that immigrants lack the necessary socio-cultural capitals or attributes for success. Racist prejudices, institutional discrimination in labour and housing markets, the transformation of welfare regimes, state triage in the realm of education, and abuse by immigration officers continue to plague Turkish immigrants and their children.

It is clear that the education system of Germany is more selective than any other European countries. That is to say, the majority of migrants' children attend the lower class schools. The children of immigrants could not go to qualified high schools like Gymnasium and thus their future of attending university and better occupation possibilities is not more than a daydream.

The case study in Goslar also reveals that the school abandonment, failure of educational process and deviant behavior that are part of this process consolidate the position of Turkish youth at the bottom of German society and reinforce racial/ethnic stereotypes among the native German population. Such stereotypes increase hostility and opposition to

subsequent waves of labor migrants and reduce their chances for successful integration.

The findings of this study in Goslar confirmed mainstream claims of the “segmented integration thesis” in that: The children of immigrants in Goslar individually follow different paths in order to integrate into German society and construct their identity positions, which depend on their family background, human capital, opportunity structures, and perceptions about the context of their reception in Goslar. Some Turkish youths prefer to connect with German society in a very “positive” and intensive way. Some others question the kind of “positive” relation by returning to their parents` cultural and national resources. While some Turkish youths choose to be involved in social and political affairs actively in Goslar, the others prefer to follow associational paths in which they have contact with inter-cultural or international groups. Finally, other Turkish youth directly define themselves by affiliating with cultural or religious organizations. Thus, there are multiple individual paths to adapt to German society.

Based on in-depth interviews with Goslar residents, it can be claimed that practices of exclusion, discrimination or forced assimilation against Turkish immigrants and their offspring can prevent integration and encourage a homeland orientation. In such cases, enclave communities or ethnic niches with their own economic, cultural and political infrastructures emerged in the district of Oker. As Castles (2002: 1161) rightfully declares, where immigrants experience marginalization or racism, their best chance of success lies in mobilizing community solidarity and transnational links – a sort of ‘reactive ethnicity.’

Some conceptualizations cannot capture realities or anomalies nowadays. For example there is still no single integration theory which could explain substantial experiences of immigrants and their children. Migration

theories have difficulties coping with the integration and identity construction processes of immigrants. For example, first generation immigrants with a Turkish background are well integrated into the labor market but still have limited civil rights or political rights. Today, as Castles (2002) implies, any attempt to forecast likely future patterns of integration and settlement of third generation children of Turkish immigrants needs to take into account the great global economic and social transformations of our epoch, as well as the way in which ordinary people cope with these shifts, and in so doing often subvert the plans of the mighty.

Integration of Turkish-Muslim immigrants and their descendants is still a `weak chain` of post war German society which has seen substantial development in economy, politics and civil society. Until now, the citizenship regimes in relation with immigration and integration policies are "misguided". Processes of inclusion and exclusion of migrants and minorities vary and can and do occur through different mechanisms. In addition, it should be evident from this study that some people experience more than one kind of exclusion. It is important to account for political, social, economic and physical patterns of exclusion while providing a comprehensive analysis of the contemporary situation in European societies.

A significant outcome of the postwar labor migration in Germany has been the incorporation philosophy of differential exclusionism that relies on ethnic citizenship and accordingly the practices of a civic stratification system based on differentiated rights and duties. There is a clear contradiction between equal treatment based on human rights commitments and the overriding desire to protect welfare resources alongside restrictions on entry in an effort to preserve the cultural and political unity of the national society.

The civic stratification thesis implies that any given regime of rights reflects a balancing between a variety of constraints, most notably welfare resources, labor market management, and international obligations through the institutionalization of citizenship, bureaucracy and market. The unequal formation of citizenship and stratified legal rights has historically overlapped the post-war process in the construction of 'differential exclusionist' immigration policy in Germany (and most European states). In this study, after exposing the unequal structure of the citizenship regime in the nation-state, I examine the ways in which both citizenship policy and stratified legal rights affect the marginalization and exclusion of non-European Third Country Nationals (TCNs), most notably Turks and Muslims, in accessing the opportunities for economic mobility and social integration in German society.

In conclusion, this research focuses on the citizenship status as the primary factor differentiating immigrants' integration conditions to their host land and where they imagine themselves in that society, and then it delves deeper into the reception context.

As can be seen in all of Europe, lack of affective immigration and integration policies with regard to increasing immigration is responsible for the resentment and hopelessness of the majority of immigrants. Aging Europe fears demographic deficit, de-securitization process, invasion of Muslim culture and the shrinking welfare. Young generations, on the other hand, suffer from high rate of unemployment, insufficient housing, deteriorating education and health services and social welfare benefits most of which are a direct result of neo-liberal restructuring economy. Nowadays, arising discourses of 'immigrant responsibility' have become a convenient cloak for structural barriers and assimilationist identities embedded within all European history and culture. Discrimination

reinforced by extreme right movements and parties in a “welfare chauvinism” form is still on the agenda of immigration countries in Western Europe, where immigrants have been subjected to various types of exclusion, humiliation etc.

This study indicates that as a result of the civic stratification system, Turkish immigrants and their descendants are poorly represented in higher education; they suffer from disproportionately high levels of unemployment; and they depend disproportionately on welfare services.

In conclusion, the narrative I constructed here suggests that Germany with its differential exclusionist integration philosophy and civic stratification legal practices has been very determined not to accept guest-workers as equal citizens. Other immigrants, like Europeans and *Aussiedler* have privileged rights. Even today, the German public is broadly hesitant as to whether children of Turkish immigrants who were born and raised in Germany are loyal and qualified citizens of Germany or not. Considering the citizenship practices in the past, especially those experienced by guest-workers, one may suspect that German citizens with Turkish background will also be subject to practices of institutional discrimination and xenoracism.

It is also reasonable to suspect whether the children of Turkish immigrants will also be regarded as their parents with regard to discrimination. At the moment, it is yet impossible to give a yes or no answer to such questions, chiefly because the traditional ethnic citizenship perception is still dominant and the image of Turks in media, academia and public perception of daily life as a `parallel society` unwilling for integration has not yet been overcome

This is another way of saying that it is yet difficult to argue that Federal Germany has entirely changed their claims about ethnic citizenship, leading culture (*leitkultur*), and assimilation. There are still few reasons to believe that German society lost its confidence in assimilating Turks. On the contrary, the alienation of the guest-workers and even their descendants from the broader German society or political community seems still maintained. Like any other nation-state, German state and its policy-makers do not want to avoid insisting on the ideal of a homogenous, monolingual political community within its borders. For this reason if no other, it is safe to say that none of the present perceptions (‘Typically Turks’) on guest-workers and their children will vanish in the foreseeable future. It appears in multiple pejorative images, namely, “Turkish children are an assimilable-German”, ‘Turks as a parallel society’ and “Turks as disloyal or pseudo-citizens” will, for some time, be working together as parallel images vis a vis superior images of Germans or Europeans.

Also, the results of the case study in Goslar shows that Turkish immigrants and their children from low-status minority groups can collectively cope with this situation in several ways. They can challenge their predicament, as an ethnic immigrant group under the banner of the German nation’s ideology of just pluralism and equal opportunity for all citizens (negotiation). They can “retreat” into their homebound (transnational) identities and participation to ease or avert the loss of status and to relieve the traumas of racial prejudice and discrimination experienced in the German society (reactive identity formation). Or, as often happens, they can combine these coping strategies.

Based on my participant observation in the two municipal youth centers (Gleis 95 and BGX), it can be concluded that both endogenous factors like human capital and family background but also exogenous and structural factors such as racial discrimination, declining economic opportunities, and

the exposure to the adversarial outlooks of native-born youths caused Turkish youth to have a reactive identity formation which Perlman and Waldinger (1997) called "the second generation revolt." The reactive identity formation could be, indeed, seen as a demand of immigrants or their children to become "normal" in the host society. Thus, suffice to say here that integration is basically a two-way and an interactive process. To such an extent, integration entails that the host society should also be ready to transform itself together with immigrants and their children.

The general position of the third generation children of Turkish immigrants in Goslar/Germany is still "tolerated but marginalized". As a matter of fact, a middling time-frame encompassing two-three generations recommends itself. It would not be so immediatist as to miss the forest for the trees; nor so elongated as to miss the many trees that fell by the side as the forest rebuilt itself. This is the reason why it is still too early to pass judgment on the effects of several contemporary flows, including those now arriving in new countries of immigration in Western Europe. Durable effects of such movements, as they evolve in an increasingly transnationalized global system, cannot be determined with certainty at present. As social scientists, we must have the patience to wait and see how they unfold.

(Grand)children of Turkish immigrants are now perceived as pseudo-citizens. A historical reading of citizenship practices in Germany indicates that ethnic interpretation of citizenship accompanied by differential exclusionist immigration policy and civic stratification system of legal practices, whereby most of Turks and their children are subjected to unequal, unfair and discriminatory practices. The structural result of these implementations is consolidation and reproduction of institutional discrimination, xenophobia and Islamophobia (rising abruptly after September 11).



This study also argued that the presence of non-citizen (or denizens) Turkish immigrants on national territory (Germany) has been accompanied by an expansion of distinctions in a system of civic stratification which also consolidates the institutional discrimination in the nation-state. In conclusion, in the civic stratification system, “market driven” migration law and policies encourage or fail to prevent a dualism between citizens (mostly non-poor) and immigrants or ethnic/racial communities (mostly poor).

Implicitly, this study claims that there are still illegitimate criterion for regulating rights and access of immigrants to naturalization, welfare benefits and labor market and other social rights. Furthermore, the study alleges that institutional discrimination and xenophobia are direct conditional results of such cultural essentialist migration policies upon which selective and discriminative and stratified rights are implemented against third country nationals.

The study traced the evolution of policies or managements of diversity in Germany and its consequences for the reconfiguration of citizenship. It also examined the development of the state`s reassertion of its national identity and sovereignty through constructing hierarchical rights and creating an increasingly complex system of civic stratifications with differential access to civil, economic and social rights depending on mode of entry, residence and employment.

High rate of unemployment of immigrant community in Goslar indicates that foreigners especially Turks have suffered much more than Germans from the restructuring of the economy and employment over time from manufacturing to services: foreigners found often only low paid jobs again in service industries or became unemployed; educational integration and qualification levels of Turks are on average very low, even in areas with a

quite good economic development. The labor market situation of Turks are also appreciably worse compared with Germans in Goslar.

In addition, it can be said that the German school system has clearly failed in compensating for the disadvantaged social background of Turkish children up to now. Because we cannot change the socio-economic background of the children overnight, it is clear that the educational measures should concentrate on changing public institutions as well as school– parent relationship. Additionally, in order to overcome the racialization and institutional discrimination, the teachers should be trained with an intercultural formation which concentrates on the students with a migration background. German institutions should collaborate with Turkish organizations such as parents' associations and Germany-based Turkish media in supporting the educational integration of children of Turkish background. Last but not least, Turkish parents should be offered more information about the German school system and counseling which might help them take the right decisions on what kind of secondary education their children should strive for and how to continue thereafter.

The general conclusion from these empirical and anthropological findings in Goslar is that it is mostly discrimination (racial or similar) in employment practices which causes this situation. Also, there are observable economic reasons, which explain the negative employment situation of foreigners and in particular Turks in comparison with Germans. The majority of non-German workers, however, lacks the necessary qualifications and will thus not be able to compete successfully for these new jobs. It is therefore essential, first, to improve qualification levels of non-Germans who have already entered the job market. In addition, it is also essential that today's pupils leave the education system with the necessary qualifications.

Immigrants especially Muslims and integration are meta-issues in German politics, as Faist said. Integration and immigrant policies has been always conflict-prone in Germany where the symbolic policy, as an outcome of a mismatch between de-facto challenges and political responses has been seen as a solution. The political answers would be very diverse for the integration question but the policy implications should revolve around constructing the process of immigrants being accepted into equal membership in Germany. Therefore, equating third country nationals with privileged citizens (EU. German, Aussiedler) in terms of rights to participation and access to substantial resources by abolishing the civic stratification system which allocates inferior status and rights to immigrants would be a first step to remove the absolute marginalization and social isolation. Government policies should also focus on getting rid of institutional racism as an extension of the civic stratification system by giving third country nationals the same access and educational and employment opportunities as privileged citizens. Only with accepting immigrants as equal members and fighting with the marginalization of poor immigrants by introducing a robust anti-discrimination law and affirmative action in school enrollment and hiring, institutional discrimination and its ruins could be demolished in this nation-state structure.

Inevitably, I have been constructing a narrative in this dissertation that seeks to present a coherent story about the Turkish immigrants and their children in Goslar/Germany (and Europe). Regarding this narrative, equality and diversity have been given much less priority in present cultural essentialist understanding of integration in overall Europe. In this climate, institutional discrimination take centre stage in discourse and practice of mainstream (tabloid) media, policy makers, and the peoples on the streets of Europe quite clearly address Muslims. In this context, while economic equality and diversity have been de-prioritized as an agenda

around integration by failing to address the poverty, marginalization and by ignoring legitimate demands of immigrants, the present integration discourse emphasizes much more cultural integration as a immigrant`s duty to the lead dominant German culture. Inadmissibility of forced marriage, male domination in the Muslim family, the importance of common allegiance to the constitution or law, speaking German, these are the obligations of immigrants. Also, the view of media demonizing Muslims or Turks with their culturally irreducible radical difference neglects the economic and educational disadvantages faced by them. In terms of mainstream media like Der Spiegel or Bild, inequality is not as noteworthy as cultural difference and the diversity is only noteworthy if it fits the stereotypes or cliché like familiar news of honor killing or wearing the headscarf. What should be noted in this context is the continuing production of a xenophobic climate by right-wing politicians, media and policy-makers in this process through which institutional discrimination is easily sustained in the everyday life of immigrants. Here it is important, however, not to overstate the negative sides.

After having observed the organization of Islamische Gemeinschaft *Milli Görüş* (IGMG) and Diyanet Turk İslam Birliđi (DİTİB) in Goslar from the perspective of the Turkish youth during the fieldwork carried out in 2005-2006, it is possible to claim that it has merged syncretic Turkish-Muslim socio-political movements into a Turko-German form of Islam. The harder the German state pushes Turkish immigrants, the more resistant they develop in negotiations. It can be summed up as follows: ‘If Germans treat Turkish immigrants mildly, they will get a mild response; however, if the Germans treat them harshly, they will get tough immigrants’.

The results of the participant observation in the two Turkish-Islamic organizations in Goslar also show that the differences between IGMG and DİTİB have some echoes of Turkish-Muslim people and their integration

into German society. While DITIB seems to be more inclined to have a vision of intercultural dialog between Turks and Germans with separating religion from politics, the IGMG take a political position by contesting the separation of religion from public (and political) life. The members of IGMG claim that they want to be accepted with their religion and otherwise integration would mean nothing more than assimilation.

It should be noted that researches on tolerance and inter-ethnic contacts demonstrate that a successful integration of Turkish-Muslims, Turkish migrants and the second and third generations in Germany still requires significant efforts on the part of the Germans as well as on the part of migrants and their families.

Charles Hirschman (2004) claimed that historically “immigrants become Americans by joining a church and participating in its religious and community life.” The same can be true in the twenty-first century of Germany, where “Germanization” means forced assimilation with reference not to religion but to language. For Turkish-Muslim immigrants it is difficult to claim that they would become Germans by joining religious and community life of Germany because the people cannot as easily change their religion as much as “changing their flags” (nationality or citizenship). Religion and especially Islam (but not nationality and citizenship) will remain the main paradoxical entity for integration of the new generations in the foreseeable future.

As Georges Balandier (1988) correctly emphasized, “it is in religion, especially its cultural or ecclesiastical institution, that tradition finds its most solid anchor.” When newcomers arrive in a new society, religion responds to the loss of past common references and establishes social bonds. In the early days of immigration, immigrants, especially those from rural areas, structured their communities around religion. They were trying

to maintain close relations with their homelands and extended families for as long as possible in order to ensure respect for their cultural traditions. Religion provided the most important components of moral and social order, ethnic pride, and “self-enhancement.” Such feelings led to a “defensive traditionalism,” which sheltered them from the “danger” of assimilation even when the religion of the immigrants was not different from that of the larger society (cited by Kastoryano, 2004: 1237).

Based on participant observations in the two Turkish-Muslim organizations, it can be said that the changing politics of Islamic organizations (the IGMG and DITIB) from “defensive traditionalism” into “affirmative integration” as a result of the experiences of the younger Turkish-Muslim generations seem to confirm Casanova’s (2001) observation that Muslim communities worldwide seem to undergo a process of *aggiornamento* (adjustment or updating)<sup>22</sup>.

As Yükleven (2009; 2010) implies in his recent studies, although it may still be early to talk about a distinct “European Islam”, the diverse activism among Turkish Islamic organizations in Goslar/Germany indicates that Islam is slowly and surely adapting and localizing. European Islam will not

---

<sup>22</sup> In a recent thoughtful article, Jose Casanova describes the current transformation in many Muslim communities as a Muslim *aggiornamento*. Casanova here draws a parallel between contemporary Islam and the historical transformation of Roman Catholicism. In a process that has become known as *aggiornamento* and that culminated in the Second Vatican Council of the 1960s, the Catholic Church committed itself to embracing universal religious freedom, to disassociating itself from political power, and to become one actor within a pluralistically constituted civil society. Given the profound anxiety within European society about contemporary Islam and its trajectory, Casanova’s suggestion is both bold and interesting. But is it accurate? As we have seen, in many ways it is. Over the past decades there has indeed, as Casanova suggests, been a widespread disenchantment in many Muslim communities around the globe with state institutions as guarantors of a Muslim way of life and, conversely, a growing emphasis on civil society-based religious networks and institutions. As Casanova’s observation of a Muslim *aggiornamento* suggests, it seems that many Muslim communities are prepared to join a newly negotiated national (or European) consensus based on constitutional patriotism. But this is as yet no foregone conclusion, nor is it clear if German and other European publics permit their Muslim neighbors to do so (Henkel, 2008: 121).

only continue to have a multiplicity of voices, but it will indeed have an increasing multiplicity of voices.

Is *Milli Görüş* trying to create a space for Muslims in Germany that is independent from Turkish politics? Is the *Diyanet İşleri* campaigning for intercultural dialogue, rather than promoting the Turkish-Islam as a religious ideology in Germany? Do Muslim associations really have a hidden agenda that they will reveal once they receive legal status? Considering the growing Muslim population in Germany and in Europe overall, it is clear that these questions will continue to yield provocative discussions. What we know is that the issues surrounding Muslim integration and their increasing number of claims will be far more complex in the future. As the *Milli Görüş* tries to peel off the “bad Muslim” label that came with being listed in the *Bundesverfassungsschutz*, and attempts to become legitimate, the present *Diyanet İşleri* services seem to be sufficient for many Turkish Muslims. Muslim communities in Europe may eventually require a supranational body to convince the European Union to meet Muslim immigrant needs. That supranational body may well be influenced by one of the two Turkish Muslim associations discussed here, but only time will show which association is more competent to fill that role (Yurdakul, 2006b).

The IGMG claims to establish a multicultural community; however, most of their members are Turks. On the other hand, the DITIB claims to campaign for intercultural dialogue, most of their campaigns and policies are promoting Turkish-Islam as a religious ideology in Germany. Therefore, these integration policies are ideals of these associations at this point, which have been postponed for the unknown future.

Kastoryano (2004: 1249) states that although not all Muslims necessarily recognize themselves within such an institutional representation, they

express their need for social and cultural inclusion and mobilize against discrimination, or any other form of exclusion. The question is then: does institutional justice compensate for social injustice? Can the demand for recognition be limited to official representation when other institutions, such as schools, are not fulfilling their function in integrating and promoting “civic values” as a basis for social, cultural and religious equality?

Time will show us whether the restrictive legislation will have the intended effect of stopping the spread of “radical Islam” or whether it is likely to bring forth the opposite result of radicalizing further an already alienated and maladjusted immigrant community. In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the answer to this question would determine not only the destiny of immigrant or minority cultures but also the nature of nation-state formation of Germany, where popular views have been based on the unitary nation-state, with one people, one language, one culture and well-defined territory.

The results of the case study in Goslar also prove that the receiver states’ legal-administrative control of the “belonging and not-belonging” of immigrants and their offspring shapes the social and political practices. In particular, the denial of citizenship to immigrants and, in Germany whose citizenship laws and policies are informed by *jus sanguinis*, their native-born children sustain their identification with their home countries and constrains, or channels into an oppositional trajectory, their incorporation into the host society.

Conversely, the acceptance or, as is more often the case, tacit tolerance of dual citizenship by the receiver state encourages immigrants or ethnics to engage in bi-national practices, contributing simultaneously to their attachment over time to the host society and to the preservation of



transnational commitments<sup>23</sup>. Next to political rights, participation in social citizenship or inclusion in the economic and welfare life of the receiver polity is next in importance. In highly regulated welfare states, such as Germany, immigrant groups that do not enjoy full citizenship are excluded from participation in policy decisions of vital importance to their advancement opportunities, such as job training programs. More market-based welfare states, such as the United States, where paths from school to work are much less regulated by public policies, allow more space for immigrants to incorporate themselves “on their own” by applying their cultural and social capitals<sup>24</sup>.

It is also important to note that the receiver states’ educational policies influence the form and “contents” of cultural assimilation or ethnicization of immigrants (if they arrive young enough to attend receiver-society schools) and their children. The proportioning and representation of national and multicultural components of school programs regulated by public policies can – contingent on immigrant students’ socioeconomic position, political status, and racial membership – either encourage their mainstream symbolic assimilation to the host society or motivate them toward cultural integration along an ethnic or bi-national path. As in the case of social entitlements, the political pressure by immigrant groups on national or, more often, local political institutions on behalf of their interests, can influence the outcomes of these educational policies (Joppke & Morawska, 2003: 26-27).

---

<sup>23</sup> (For empirical illustrations of these effects see, e.g., Hagan 1994 ; Van Hear 1998; Faist 2000; Shain 1999).

<sup>24</sup> (See Faist 1995 for a comparative analysis of immigrant social citizenship in Germany and the United States).

In German “*leitkultur*” logic, the prejudices of the majority (Germans) are universalized as cultural norms to which members of ethnic minorities (Turks) are expected to conform, or else. The forms of difference that are acceptable are theme park differences (Cesarani and Fulbrook, 1996: 11). The remedy in order to overcome the cultural assimilation of the children of immigrants is that “unconditional” cultural openness and structural change in a multi-cultural society where no one could be ever reduce an identity defined by ready-made cultural and religious terms. By accepting and supporting cultural rights, within a universal system of law and political institutions, we can encourage socio-economic and political participation, rather than forcing people to withdraw into closed-off - and possibly conservative - cultural enclaves. But this in turn requires a high degree of cultural openness and the willingness to change both institutional structures and notions of national identity.

The results of the case study in Goslar showed that Turkish residents do not feel at least the realistic chance of betterment for themselves or their offspring. In this context, the extension of citizenship rights and the struggle for a genuinely multi-cultural society in Germany can be evaluated as a part of the process of creating that 'single civilization'. For Europeans. However, for others, as we have noted, betterment is debarred or made prohibitively difficult.

In conclusion, a realistic understanding of the demographic and cultural make-up of contemporary Germany can indeed provide an open social and political environment which is not contaminated by the fear of 'foreigners' within the German society. Integration and acceptance of non-European resident aliens not only guarantees social peace for the migrants, but more importantly, for the German society and for the European Union at large.

Regarding this study, immigration and integration policies should include the priorities of 'economic development', 'fair distribution of equal opportunities,' 'participation in the political process,' 'raising the standard of education,' and 'engaging in a serious dialogue.' These remedies suggested by the German State Department to Islamic countries would be essential in resolving the dilemma of integrating Turkish communities. In conclusion, the best prescription is effective policies leading to an improvement of the educational and occupational standing of German-Turks, which would go a long way toward their economic integration (Mueller, 2006: 440). Among these remedies, it is essential that the starting chances of immigrants and young people must be ameliorated by concentrating on education and supporting them in pre-schools and schools.

To conclude, German state and society should recognize the legitimacy of communities with their own languages, religions, and cultural practices, while at the same time adopting measures to ensure equal access especially to the labor market and education of services and protection against institutional racism and discrimination minorities.

Therefore, equating third country nationals with privileged citizens (EU. German, Aussiedler) in terms of rights to participation and access to substantial resources by abolishing the civic stratification system which allocates inferior status and rights to immigrants would be a first step to remove the absolute marginalization and social isolation. Government policies should also focus on getting rid of institutional racism as an extension of the civic stratification system by giving third country nationals the same access and educational and employment opportunities as privileged citizens. Only with accepting immigrants as equal members and fighting with the

marginalization of poor immigrants by introducing a robust anti-discrimination law and affirmative action in school enrollment and hiring, institutional racism and its ruins could be demolished in this nation-state structure.

It is very critical regarding this study that an appropriate balance between principles of equal participation and access (regarding economic, social and political dimensions), diversity and social solidarity (cohesion) are so viable, which not only Germany but also all countries need. However, the welfare chauvinism in rich countries has been accompanied by increasing ideas and practices of securitization and criminalizing the immigrants ('war on terror') since 2001 help to undermine the principles of equality and diversity. We must not allow this to happen. In this globalizing world with increasing compulsory intercultural coincidences, we need not only be more pluralistic but also be more equal. We still need to ask the question of how the competing claims of difference and equality can be both at the same time recognized.

Turkish immigrants and their children will experience some problems for a long time within the complex stratified and hierarchical conditions of Europe where the sources of an incredible amount of pain as well as basis for a radical reinvention of freedom and equality have co-existed. Whether integration policies on immigrants and their children will still speak the language of citizenship and nationality or will struggle to invent new concepts and new worlds defined by equal participation and access, is one of the questions I would like to leave open for new migration researches.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abadan-Unat, N. (1976) "Turkish migration to Europe (1960-1975) A balance sheet of achievements and failures," In N. Abadan-Unat (ed.), *Turkish workers in Europe 1960-1975; a socio-economic reappraisal* (pp. 1-44). Leiden: Brill.

Abadan-Unat, N. (1992) "East-West vs. South-North Migration: Effects upon the Recruitment Areas of the 1960s", *International Migration Review*, Vol. 26, No. 2, Special Issue: The New Europe and International Migration (Summer), pp: 401-412

Aksoy, A. and Robins, K. (1997) 'Peripheral vision: cultural industries and cultural identities in Turkey', *Environment and Planning A*, 29(12), pp. 1937-52.

Aksoy, A. and Robins, K. (2002) "Banal Transnationalism: The Difference that Television Makes." Oxford: University of Oxford, Transnational Communities Programme Working Paper Series. Online at <http://www.transcomm.ac.uk/wp/02> retrieved December 2002.

Alba, R.D. and Nee, V. (2003) *Remaking the American Mainstream: Assimilation and Contemporary Immigration*. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press

Alba, R. (2005) "Bright vs. blurred boundaries: Second generation assimilation and exclusion in France, Germany, and the United States", *Ethnic and Racial Studies* Vol. 28 No. 1 January 2005 pp. 20-49

Al-Haj, M (2004) *Immigration and Ethnic Formation in a Deeply Divided Society: The Case of the 1990s Immigrants from the Former Soviet Union in Israel*, (Leiden;Boston: Brill)

Aleinikoff, T. A. and Klusmeyer (2002) *Citizenship Policies for an Age of Migration* (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)

Alexander, J. C (2001) "Theorizing the 'Modes of Incorporation': Assimilation, Hyphenation, and Multiculturalism as Varieties of Civil Participation", *Sociological Theory*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Nov.), pp; 237-249

Ålund A. and R. Granqvist (1995) *Negotiating Identities; Essays on Immigration and Culture in present-day Europe*. Amsterdam/Atlanta: Rodopi.

Amelina, A and Faist (2008) "Turkish Migrant Associations in Germany: Between Integration Pressure and Transnational Linkages," *Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales*, 2008 (24), 2, pp. 91-120

Amiriaux, V (2003) "Turkish Political Islam and Europe: Story of an Opportunistic Intimacy," in *Muslim Networks and Transnational Communities in and across Europe*, (ed.) S. Allievi and J. Nielsen (Leiden: Brill), pp. 146-169.

Amiriaux, V (2007) "Breaching the infernal cycle? Turkey, the European Union and religion, in Islam," in *Europe Diversity, Identity and Influence* Edited by Aziz al-Azmeh and Effie Fokas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press )pp. 183-208

Anderson, Benedict. 1991. *Imagined Communities*. New York: Verso.

Anthias, F. and Yuval-Davis, N. (1992) *Racialized Boundaries*. London: Routledge.

Appadurai, A. (1996). *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Balibar, E (1988) "Propositions on Citizenship," *Ethics*, Vol. 98, No. 4 (Jul., 1988), pp. 723-730

Balibar, E (1991) "Es Gibt Keinen Staat in Europa: Racism and Politics in Europe Today," *New Left Review* 1/186, March-April pp: 5-19

Balibar, E (2006) "Strangers as Enemies: Further Reflections on the Aporias of Transnational Citizenship, Globalization," Working Papers, [http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/ighc/0007550/f\\_0007550\\_6423.pdf](http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/ighc/0007550/f_0007550_6423.pdf), accessed 20.12.2009

Banting, K, G. (2000) "Looking in three directions: migration and the European welfare state in comparative perspective" in Bommes, M. and Geddes, A. (2000) *Immigration and Welfare Challenging the borders of the welfare state* (ed)(Routledge: London, NY)

Bauböck, Rainer (2005): *Civic Citizenship – A New Concept for the New Europe*, in: Rita Süßmuth und Werner Weidenfeld (eds.) *Managing*

Integration. The European Union's Responsibilities towards Immigrants, Bertelsmann Stiftung

Bengtsson, B (2007). "Ethnic organization, integration, and political opportunity structures— some theoretical Notes," in Comparative Studies of Political Integration in a Multicultural Europe, Elsevier Science, *Comparative Social Research*, Vol. 25. [The volume appears not to have been published (yet) but the article can be found here: <<http://www.ibf.uu.se/PERSON/bosse/csrtarticle.pdf>>.

Bloemraad, I et al. (2008) "Citizenship and Immigration: Multiculturalism, Assimilation, and Challenges to the Nation-State," *Annual Review of Sociology*, 34, pp:153–79

Bommes, M. and Radtke, O (1996) "Migration into Big Cities and Small Towns- an Uneven Process with Limited Need for Multiculturalism", *Innovation*, 9, 1, pp: 75-86

Borkert, M and Bosswick, W (2007) "Migration Policy-Making in Germany – between national reluctance and local pragmatism?" Working Paper No. 20 December, [http://migrationeducation.org/fileadmin/uploads/IMISCOE\\_Working\\_Paper\\_MigrationpolicymakinginGermany.pdf](http://migrationeducation.org/fileadmin/uploads/IMISCOE_Working_Paper_MigrationpolicymakinginGermany.pdf) accessed, 01.06. 2010

Bosch, N. and Peucker, M. (2007) "Ethnic Discrimination and Xenophobia in Germany, Annual Report 2006", NFP for Germany, RAXEN 7, report to the EUMC, December 2007, Bamberg: efms, [http://web.uni-bamberg.de/~ba6ef3/pdf/efms\\_Data\\_Collection\\_Report\\_2006.pdf](http://web.uni-bamberg.de/~ba6ef3/pdf/efms_Data_Collection_Report_2006.pdf).

Boucher, G (2008) "Ireland`s Lack of a Coherent Integration Policy, Translocations:The Irish Migration, *Race and Social Transformation Review*, Spring 2008 Volume 3, 1 pp. 5-28, Also [http://www.translocations.ie/http://www.imrstr.dcu.ie/volume3issue1/Vol\\_3\\_Issue\\_1\\_Gerry\\_Boucher.htm](http://www.translocations.ie/http://www.imrstr.dcu.ie/volume3issue1/Vol_3_Issue_1_Gerry_Boucher.htm) accessed 17/01.2010

Bourdieu. P (1977) *Outline of a Theory of Practice*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bovenkerk, et al, (1990) "Racism, Migration and the State in Western Europe: A Case Comparative Analysis," *International Sociology*., 5(4):475-490.

Bozorgmehr, M. (2000) "Does Host Hostility Create Ethnic Solidarity? The Experience of Iranians in the United States." *Bulletin for the Royal Institute of Inter-Faith Studies* Vol. 2, No. 1.

Brah, A (1993) "Re-Framing Europe: En-Gendered Racisms, Ethnicities and Nationalisms," in *Contemporary Western Europe. Feminist Review*, No. 45, Thinking Through Ethnicities (Autumn, 1993), pp. 9-29

Brubaker, R. W (1989). "Membership without Citizenship: The Economic and Social Rights of Noncitizens" *Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North America*. Ed. Brubaker. , 1989. 145-162. <http://works.bepress.com/wrb/24> accessed 14/02/2009

Brubaker, R.W. (1992) *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press).

Brubaker, R. W & Cooper F (2000). "Beyond 'identity,'" In *Theory and Society*, Vol. 29, 1-47.

Brubaker, R. W. (2001). "The Return of Assimilation? Changing Perspectives on immigration and its sequels in France, Germany, and the United States". In *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 24(4), 531-548.

Burawoy, M. et al. (1991) *Ethnography Unbound. Power and Resistance in the Modern Metropolis*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Burawoy, M. (2000) *Global Ethnography. Forces, Connections, and Imaginations in a Postmodern World*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Canefe, N. (1998) "Citizens versus permanent guests: cultural memory and citizenship laws in a reunified Germany", *Citizenship Studies*, 2(3), pp. 519-544.

Casanova, J (2001) "Civil Society and Religion: Retrospective Reflections on Catholicism and Prospective Reflections on Islam", *Social Research*, Vol. 68, No. 4, , pp. 1041-1080.

Casanova, J (2006) "Religion, European secular identities, and European Integration," in Timothy A. Byrnes and Peter J. Katzenstein (eds) *Religion in an Expanding Europe*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press ) pp. 65-93

Castles, S *et al.* (1984) *Here for Good: Western Europe's New Ethnic Minorities*, London: Pluto Press

Castles, S. and Kosack, G. (1973) *Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe*, Oxford: Oxford University Press  
Castles, S. (1986) "The Guest-Worker in Western Europe: An Obituary." *International Migration Review* 20(4):761-778.



Castles S, et al (1988), *Mistaken Identity: Multiculturalism and the Demise of Nationalism in Australia*, (Pluto Press: Sydney).

Castles, S. (1994) "Democracy and Multicultural Citizenship." In *From Aliens to Citizens: Redefining the Status of Immigrants in Europe*. Ed. R. Baubock. Avebury: Aldershot. pp. 3-27

Castles, S (1995) "How Nation-states Respond to Immigration and Ethnic Diversity," *New Community*, 21(3), pp: 293-308.

Castles, S (1996) "Democracy and multiculturalism in Western Europe", *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, 4: 8, p: 51-76

Castles, S. and A. Davidson (2000) *Citizenship and Migration: Globalisation and the Politics of Belonging*. London: Macmillan.

Castles, S. and Miller, M. J. (2003) *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World* (Third edition). Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan.

Castles, S. (2004a) "The Factors that Make and Unmake Migration Policy." *International Migration Review* 38(3):852–884.

Castles, S. (2004b). "Why migration policies fail". *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 27:2, 205-227.

Castles S (2005) "Nation and Empire: Hierarchies of Citizenship in the New Global Order," *International Politics*, 42, pp: 203-224

Castles, S. (2006a) "Back to the Future? Can Europe meet its Labour Needs through Temporary Migration?" International Migration Institute IMI Working Papers  
1. Oxford: IMI Oxford University.

Castles, S. (2006b) "Guestworkers in Europe: A Resurrection?" *International Migration Review* 40:4, 741-66.

Castles, S. 2007. "Twenty-first century migration as a challenge to sociology". *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 33.

Castles, S (2008) "Understanding Global Migration: A Social Transformation Perspective," Conference on Theories of Migration and Social Change *St Anne's College, Woodstock Road, Oxford*, July.

Çağlar, A.S (1997) “Hyphenated identities and the limits of ‘culture’ some methodological queries,” in Werbner, P. and Modood, T. (eds) *The Politics of Multiculturalism in the New Europe: Racism, Identity, Community*. London: Zed Books, 169-85.

Çağlar, A. S (2001) “Constraining metaphors and the transnationalisation of spaces in Berlin,” *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* Vol. 27, No. 4, pp. 601-613 (October)

Cesarani, D. & Fulbrook, M. (1996) (eds.) *Citizenship, Nationality and Migration in Europe*, Routledge, London.

Cheran , R (2001) “Xeno-Racism and international Migration, Canada`s Periodicals Refugees,” Special issue Refuge, <http://pi.library.yorku.ca/ojs/index.php/refuge/article/viewFile/21233/1990> 4, accessed date 23.04. 2010

Claussen, D & Werz, M (2009) *The Myth of Modern Identity as Ersatz Ideologies`in The modernist Imagination: Intellectual History and Critical Theory* (ed Breckman, Warran et all)

Colen, S. (1995) “‘Like a Mother to Them’: Stratified Reproduction and West Indian Childcare Workers and Employers in New York’, in Faye D. Ginsburg and Rayna Rapp (eds) *Conceiving the New World Order: The Global Politics of Reproduction*, pp. 78–102. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Constant, A. et al. (2009) “Ethnocizing Immigrants,” *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, Volume 69, Issue 3, pp: 274-287

Cornelius, W., Martin, P. L. and Hollifield, J. F. (1994) 'Introduction: the ambivalent quest for control', in W. Cornelius, P. L. Martin and J. F. Hollifield (eds) *Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Crul M. and Doornik J (2003) “The Turkish and Moroccan Second Generation in the Netherlands: Divergent Trends between and Polarization within the Two Groups,” *International Migration Review*, Vol. 37, No. 4, The Future of the Second Generation: The Integration of Migrant Youth in Six European Countries (Winter), pp. 1039-1065

Crul, M., & Vermeulen, H. (2003). “The second generation in Europe: Introduction,” *International Migration Review*, 37, 965–986.

Crul, M and Schneider, J (2009) "Children of Turkish Immigrants in Germany and the Netherlands: The Impact of Differences in Vocational and Academic Tracking Systems," *Teachers College Record* Volume 111, Number 6, June, pp. 1508–1527.

Dauvergne, C. (2007) "Citizenship with a Vengeance," *Theoretical Inquiries in Law*, Volume 8, Number 2, pp: 488-508

Dauvergne, Catherine (2008) *Making People Illegal. What Globalization Means for Migration and Law*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

De Beijl, R. Z(1992): "Although equal before the law ... The scope of anti-discrimination legislation and its effects on labour market discrimination against migrant workers in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Sweden," World Employment Programme working paper No. 56, Geneva.

Dell'olio, F (2005) 'Reviews', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 31: 2, 415 — 426

Diefenbach, H. (2002) Gender Ideologies, Relative Resources, and the Division of Housework in Intimate Relationships: A Test of Hyman Rodman's Theory of Resources in Cultural Context *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* February ,43, pp 45-64.

Diehl, C. and Blohm, M. (2003) "Rights or Identity? Naturalization Processes among "Labor Migrants" in Germany, *International Migration Review*, Volume 37 Number 1 (Spring ) pp:133-162

Ebaugh, H. R. and Chafetz, J. S. (1999) "Agents for Cultural Reproduction and Structural Change: The Ironic Role of Women in Immigrant Religious Institutions", *Social Forces*, 78, 2 (December) pp. 585-612

EFMS – european forum for migration studies (2001): Effectiveness of National Integration Strategies Towards Second Generation Migrant Youth in a Comparative European Perspective – EFFNATIS. Bamberg, 01.04.2007, <http://web.uni-bamberg.de/~ba6ef3/pdf/finalreportk.pdf>.

Ehrkamp, P. (2002) "Turkish Immigrants' Politics of Belonging: Identities, Assimilation Discourse and the Transformation of Urban Space in Duisburg\_/Marxloh, Germany," Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, Department of Geography, unpublished PhD thesis

Ehrkamp, P. (2005) "Placing identities: Transnational practices and local attachments of Turkish immigrants in Germany", *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 31: 2, pp: 345 – 364

Ehrkamp, P. (2006) "‘We Turks are no Germans’: assimilation discourses and the dialectical construction of identities in Germany," *Environment and Planning A*, 38, pages: 1673-1692

Elflein, D. (1998) "From Krauts with Attitudes to Turks with Attitudes: Some Aspects of Hip-Hop History in Germany." *Popular Music*, Vol. 17, No. 3. (Oct.), pp. 255-265

Entzinger, H. 2003 'The rise and fall of multiculturalism: the case of the Netherlands', in C. Joppke and E. Morawaska (eds) *Towards Assimilation and Citizenship: Immigration in Liberal Nation- States*, Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan.

Entzinger, H & Biezeveld, R (2003). *Benchmarking in Immigrant Integration*. Written for the European Commission under contract No. DG JAI-A-2/2002/006.

Erdemir, A. and Vasta, E (2007) "Differentiating irregularity and solidarity: Turkish Immigrants at work in London," Working Paper No. 42, University of Oxford  
<http://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/fileadmin/files/pdfs/WP0742-Vasta.pdf>, accessed 20/01/2010

Ersanilli, E (2005) "Missing a Link? The Relation between Immigrant Directed Policies and the Position of Turkish Immigrants in France, Germany, and the Netherlands", Submitted Paper in the Summer Institute on International Migration Center for research on immigration, population and public policy University of California, Irvine June 27-30, <http://www.cri.uci.edu/pdf/Ersanilli.pdf> accessed 12/02/2010

Esping-Andersen, G (1990). *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*. Cambridge: Polity Press & Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Espiritu, Y L. (1992) *Asian American Panethnicity: Bridging Institutions and Identities*. Temple University Press.

Essed, P (2002) "Everyday Racism: A New Approach to the Study of Racism", in *Race Critical Theories*, Philomena Essed and David Goldberg (Eds.). Malden, Blackwell

EUMC – European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (2006): *Pilot Study Migrants' Experiences of Racism and Discrimination in the EU* (May 2006), Vienna: EUMC, <http://fra.europa.eu/fra/material/pub/merx/Migrants-Experiences-web.pdf>.

Faas (2007) "Youth, Europe and the Nation: The Political Knowledge, Interests and Identities of the New Generation of European Youth," *Journal of Youth Studies*, Volume 10, Issue 2, (May ), pp. 161 - 181

Faist, T. (1994a) "How to define a foreigner? The symbolic politics of immigration in German partisan discourse, 1978-1992," *West European Politics-Special issue on The Politics of Immigration in Western Europe*, 17(2), pp. 50-71.

Faist, T (1994b) "Immigration, integration and the ethnicization of politics: A review of German literature", *European Journal of Political Research* 25: 439-459,

Faist, T (1994c) "States, Markets, and Immigrant Minorities: Second-Generation Turks in Germany and Mexican-Americans in the United States in the 1980s", *Comparative Politics*, 26, No. 4 (Jul.), pp. 439-460

Faist, T. (1995) Boundaries of welfare states: immigrants and social rights on the national and supranational level. In *Migration and European Integration: the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion*, eds R. Miles and D. Thranhardt. Pinter Publishers, London

Faist, T (2000). "Transnationalization in international migration: implications for the study of citizenship and culture", in *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 23 (2), 189-222.

Faist, T (2009)"Diversity - a new mode of incorporation?", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*,32:1,171-190

Favell, A. (1998) *Philosophies of Integration: Immigration and the Idea of Citizenship in France and Britain*, London: Macmillan

Favell, A. (2001) 'Multi-ethnic Britain: an exception in Europe?', *Patterns of Prejudice*, 35: 1, 35 — 57

Fekete, L (2008) *Integration, Islamophobia and civil rights in Europe*, London: Institute of Race Relations , also available, [www.irr.org.uk](http://www.irr.org.uk)

Fernandez-Kelly, P. and Schauffler, R. (1995) "Divided Fates: Immigrant Children in a Restructured Economy" *International Migration Review*, 28 4(Winter): 662-689.

Fernandez-Kelly, P. and Konczal, L. (2005) "'Murdering the alphabet': identity and entrepreneurship among second-generation Cubans, West Indians and Central Americans", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 28(6): 1153-81.

Fertig, M & Schmidt, C, H (2001) "First- and Second-Generation Migrants in Germany –What Do We Know and What Do People Think", <http://www.aueb.gr/conferences/espe2001/pdf/Fertig%20M.,%20Schmidt%20C.M..pdf>, accessed, 21.05. 2010

Flynn, D (2005) "New borders, new management: The dilemmas of modern immigration policie", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 28: 3, pp: 463-490

Florida, R. L. (2005) *Cities and the Creative Class*, New York: Routledge.  
Fordham, S and Ogbu. J. U. (1986) "Black Students` School Success: Coping with the Burden of 'Acting White'", *The Urban Review*, Vol. 18, No.3 pp.176-206

Freebody, P. (2003). *Qualitative Research in Education: Interaction and Practice*. London: Sage Press.

Gans, H. J. (1979) "Symbolic ethnicity: the future of ethnic groups and cultures in America", *Ethnic and Racial Studies Volume 2 Number 1 (January) pp.1-20*

Gans, H. J (1992) "Ethnic Invention and Acculturation, a Bumpy-Line Approach", *Journal of American Ethnic History*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Fall), pp. 42-52

Gans, H. J (1994) "Symbolic ethnicity and symbolic religiosity: towards a comparison of ethnic and religious acculturation", *Ethnic and racial studies*, vol: 17 pp: 577-591

Garner, S (2007) "The European Union and Racialization of the Immigration, 1985-2006", *Race /Ethnicity*, vol. 1, no. 1, pp:61-87

Gesemann, F (2007) "The Integration of Young Muslims in Germany – Education and training as key areas for social integration", cited in, [http://www.migrationeducation.org/fileadmin/uploads/Young\\_Muslims\\_in\\_Germany.pdf](http://www.migrationeducation.org/fileadmin/uploads/Young_Muslims_in_Germany.pdf) accessed 06.05.2010

Glenn, E (2000) "Citizenship and Inequality: Historical and Global Perspectives", *Social Problems*, Vol. 47, No. 1 (Feb), pp. 1-20

Glick Schiller, N. and Fouron, G (2001) *Georges woke up lauhing: long distance nationalism and the search for home*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Gogolin, I (2009) "'Bildungssprache'- The Importance of Teaching Language in Every School Subject" in *Science Education Unlimited*:

Approaches to Equal Opportunities in Learning Science, Tajmel T. and Starl K, (eds) (Waxmann Verlag GmbH, Munster) pp. 91-105

Gomolla, M., and Radtke, F, O (2007) Institutionelle Diskriminierung: Die Herstellung ethnischer Differenz in der Schule [Institutional discrimination: The production of ethnic difference in schools]. 2nd ed. Wiesbaden, Germany: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

Green, S (2003) Legal Status of Turks in Germany, immigrants & Minorities, Vol.22, Nos.2&3, July/November, pp: 228-246

Gürses, H. et al, (2001) "The Necessary Impossibility: Dynamics of Identity Among Young People of Different Backgrounds in Vienna", *JIMI/RIMI*, Volume 2 Number/numero 1 (Winter), pp. 27-54

Halfman, J (1997) "Immigration and Citizenship in Germany: Contemporary Dilemmas", *Political Studies*, XLV. pp: 260-274

Halfman, J (1998) "Citizenship Universalism, Migration and the Risks of Exclusion", *British Journal of Sociology*, Vol, 49 Issue no. 4 (December) pp: 513-533

Hall, Stuart, and David Held (1989) "Citizens and citizenship." In *New Times*, eds. Stuart Hall and Jacques Martin, 173-188. London: Lawrence and Wishart.

Haller, W. and Landolt, P. (2005) "The transnational dimensions of identity formation: adult children of immigrants in Miami", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 28(6): 1182\_214.

Hammar, T. (1990) *Democracy and the Nation-State: Aliens, Denizens and Citizens in a World of International Migration*. Aldershot: Avery.

Hansen, R (2004) "Migration to Europe since 1945: Its History and Its Lessons", *The Political Quarterly*, Volume 74, Issue 1 pp: 25-38  
Horrocks, D and Kolinsky, E(1996) *Turkish Culture in German Society Today*, (Oxford: Providence)

Heckmann, et al. (in cooperation with the EFFNATIS research team) (2001). *Effectiveness of national integration strategies towards second generation migrant youth in a comparative European perspective: Final report to the European Commission*, Bamberg, Germany.

Heinelt, H. (1993) 'Immigration and the Welfare State in Germany', *German Politics* 2 (1): 78-96.

Heisler, B. S. (1992) "The Future of Immigrant Incorporation: Which Models? Which Concepts?" *International Migration Review*, 26, 2, pp. 623-45

Heisler, M. O. and Schmitter-Heisler, B. (1991) "Citizenship? Old, New and Changing: Inclusion, Exclusion and Limbo for Ethnic Groups and Migrants in the Modern Democratic State." In *Dominant National Cultures and Ethnic Minorities*. Edited by J. Fijalkowski, et al. Berlin: Free University of Berlin. Pp. 98-128.

Heitmeyer, W. et al. (1997). *Verlockender Fundamentalismus. Türkische Jugendliche in Deutschland*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp

Held, D. et.al. (1999) *Global Transformations*. Cambridge: Polity.

Henkel, H (2008) "Turkish Islam in Germany: A Problematic Tradition or the Fifth Project of Constitutional Patriotism?" *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, Vol. 28, No. 1

Hirschman, C. (2004) "The Role of Religion in the Origins and Adaptation of Immigrant Groups in the United States," *International Migration Review*, 38(3): 1206-1233.

Home Office (2002) *Secure Borders, Safe Haven: Integration with Diversity in Modern Britain*. London: The Stationery Office.

Howard, M. M. (2008) "The Causes and Consequences of Germany's New Citizenship Law", *German Politics*, Vol.17, No.1, pp.41-62

Hollified, J, F. (2008)"The Liberal Paradox: Immigrants, Markets and Rights in the United States," *SMU Law Review*. Winter, 61/1 pp. 67-98.

Hönekopp, E. et al. (2002): "Migrants, minorities and employment in Germany. Exclusion, discrimination and anti-discrimination", RAXEN 3, Report to the EUMC by the RAXEN Focal Point for Germany, Bamberg: efms, [http://web.uni-bamberg.de/~ba6ef3/pdf/Employment\\_Raxen3.pdf](http://web.uni-bamberg.de/~ba6ef3/pdf/Employment_Raxen3.pdf).

Hönekopp, E (2003) "Non-Germans on the German Labour Market", *European Journal of Migration and Law* 5: 69-97.

Huntington, S. (1993) 'The Clash of Civilisations', *Foreign Affairs* 72(3): 22-49.

Ignatieff, M (1987)"The Myth of Citizenship", *Queen`s Law Journal*, vol 12, pp: 399-420



Ireland, P (1994) *Becoming Europe: Immigration, Integration, and the Welfare State*, Pittsburg Press: Pittsburg

Joppke, C. (1998) (ed.) *Challenge to the Nation-State*. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Joppke, C. (1999) *Immigration and the Nation-state: the United States, Germany and Great Britain*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Joppke, C (2004) "Managing Migration: Civic Stratification and Migrants' Rights", By Lydia Morris. (Book-review) *International Migration Review*, 38, 2 (Summer ) pp:775-791

Joppke, C. and Morawska, E. (eds) (2003) *Towards Assimilation and Citizenship*. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.

Jorgensen, M. B. (2008) *National and Transnational Identities: Turkish Organising Processes and Identity Construction in Denmark, Sweden and Germany*, unpublished PhD dissertation, <http://www.alevi.dk/ENGELSK/MBJ%20afhandling%20alevi%20org.pdf> accessed, 02/02/2010

Kahanec, M & Zimmermann, K. F (2008) "International Migration, Ethnicity and Economic Inequality", Discussion Paper No. 3450, <ftp://ftp.iza.org/dps/dp3450.pdf> accessed 02. 02. 2010

Kalter, F and Granato, N (2002) "Ethnic Minorities' Education and Occupational Attainment: The Case of Germany", Arbeitspapiere - Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung, <http://www.mzes.uni-mannheim.de/publications/wp/wp-58.pdf>, accessed, 08/04/2010

Kastoryano, R. (2002) *Negotiating Identities. States and Immigrants in France and Germany*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Kastoryano, R (2004) Religion and Incorporation: Islam in France and Germany, *IMR*, 38, pp. 1234-1255

Kaya, A (2000) *Sicher in Kreuzberg. Constructing Diasporas: Turkish Hip-Hop Youth in Berlin*. Bielefeld: Transcript.

Kaya, A (2005) 'Recoding Europeaness: A Comparative Study of German-Turks and French-Turks', *Hagar* 6 (1), pp. 87-108

Kaya, A and Kentel, F (2005) *Euro-Turks: A Bridge or a Breach between Turkey and the European Union?* Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies.

Kivisto, P. (2001) "Theorizing transnational immigration: a critical review of current efforts", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 24(4): 549-77.

Kivisto, P (2002) *Multiculturalism in a Global Society* (Oxford: Blackwell)

Kivisto, P. (2003) Social spaces, transnational immigrant communities, and the politics of incorporation, *Ethnicities*, Vol 3(1), pp.5-28

Kivisto, P and Faist T (2007) *Citizenship Discourse, Theory, and Transnational Prospects*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing

Klekowski von Koppenfels, A. (2003) "Aussiedler Migration to Germany: Questioning the Importance of Citizenship for Integration", Paper prepared for the Alumni Conference Common Global Responsibility Working Group 4: Migration Issues Washington, DC, 6-9 November  
[http://www.runder-tisch-usa.de/washington/site/reports/4WG\\_Koppenfels.pdf](http://www.runder-tisch-usa.de/washington/site/reports/4WG_Koppenfels.pdf) accessed, 29/11/2009

Klekowski von Koppenfels, A. (2004) "Second-Class Citizens? Restricted Freedom of Movement for Spätaussiedler is Constitutional", *German Law Journal*, 7, pp: 761-789

Kofman, E. (1995) "Citizenship for some but not for others: spaces of citizenship in contemporary Europe", *Political Geography*, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 121-137

Kofman, E (2002): "Contemporary European Migrations, Civic Stratification and Citizenship", *Political Geography*, 21, pp. 1035-1054

Kofman, E (2004) "Family-Related Migration: A Critical Review of European Studies", *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* Vol. 30, No. 2, March 2004, pp. 243-262

Kofman, E (2005) "Citizenship, Migration and the Reassertion of National Identity", *Citizenship Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 5, pp: 453-467

Kofman, E & Kraler. A (2006) "Civic Stratification, Gender and Family Migration Policies in Europe", Paper presented at Conference European Dynamics of Citizenship. Public policies and migrant activities IMISCOE Network Cluster B3 Legal Status, citizenship and Political Participation, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary, 31 May – 2 June 2006

Koopmans, R (1999) Challenging the Liberal Nation-State? Postnationalism, Multiculturalism, and the Collective Claims Making of Migrants and Ethnic Minorities in Britain and Germany, *AJS* Volume 105 Number 3 (November): 652-96

Koopmans, R, et. al. (2005) *Contested Citizenship: Immigration and Cultural Diversity in Europe*. University of Minnesota Press.

König, M (2005) "Incorporating Muslim Migrants in Western Nation States -A comparison of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany", *JIMI/RIMI*, Volume 6 Number/numéro 2 (Spring/printemps ), pp. 219-234  
Kraler, A (2010) "Civic Stratification, Gender and Family Migration Policies in Europe", Final Report, International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD)

Küçükcan, T (2004) "The Making of Turkish-Muslim Diaspora in Britain: Religious Collective Identity in a Multicultural Public Sphere", *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, Vol. 24, No. 2, pp. 243-258 (October)

Kürşat-Ahlers, E (1994) 'The Turkish Minority in German society', in D. Horrocks & E. Kolinsky (eds.), *Turkish Culture in German Society Today* (Princeton, Oxford, 1996), 113-135.

Layton-Henry, Z. (1992) *The Politics of Immigration*, Oxford: Blackwell.

Liebig, T. (2007) "The Labor Market Integration of Immigrants in Germany", *OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers*, No. 47, OECD Publishing.

Linke, U (2004) "Ethnolinguistic Racism: The Predicaments of Sovereignty and Nationhood Under Global Capitalism", *Anthropological Theory* 2004; 4; 205

Lister, R (1998) "Citizenship on the margins: Citizenship, social work and social action", *European Journal of Social Work*, Vol. 1, No.1, pp: 5-18

Lockwood, D (1996) "Civic Integration and Class Formation Source" *The British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 47, No. 3, Special Issue for Lockwood (Sep.), pp. 531-550

Mamdani, M. (2004) *Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: Islam, the USA and the Global War against Terror*, Delhi: Permanent Black.

Marshall, T. H. (1950) *Citizenship and Social Class*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Marx, Anthony W. (1998) *Making Race and Nation. A Comparison of the United States, South Africa and Brazil*.

Massey, D.S. and Denton, N. (1993) *American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Massey, Douglas S. et.al. (1998) *Worlds in Motion: International Migration at the End of the Millennium*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Massey, D (2004) "Segregation and Stratification: A Biosocial Perspective", *Du Bois Review*, 1, 1, pp: 7-25

Massey, D.S., and Bartley, K. (2005) "The Changing Legal Status Distribution of Immigrants: A Caution", *International Migration Review*, 34, pp: 469-484.

Meier, Gabriela S. (2010) "Two-way immersion education in Germany: bridging the linguistic gap", *International Journal of Bilingual Education and Bilingualism*, 13: 4, 419 — 437

Menjívar, C. (2002) "Living in two Worlds? Guatemalan-Origin Children in the United States and Emerging Transnationalism," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 28(3):531-552.

*Mezzadra, S (2005) Citizen and Subject: A Postcolonial Constitution for the European Union?, A version of this paper was presented as part of the 'Economies and Technologies of Affect' Seminar Series, CSISP, Goldsmiths College, 16th March 2005. It is was also presented at the Conflicts, Law, and Constitutionalism Conference, Paris, 16-18th February 2005.*

Miera, F (2007) "Labour Market Discrimination and Legal Challenges in Germany", *Emilie*, pp: 1-41, <http://emilie.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/wp4-germany-formatted.pdf> accessed 18/07/2009

Miera, F (2008) "Country Report on Education: Germany", [http://emilie.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2009/08/edumigrom\\_backgroundpaper\\_germany\\_educ.pdf](http://emilie.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2009/08/edumigrom_backgroundpaper_germany_educ.pdf)

Miera, F (2009) "Comparing the differentiation within educational systems according to ethnicity and the 'selected minority ethnic groups' in Moldenhawer, B et al, EDUMIGROM, pp. 16-27 [http://edumigrom.fss.muni.cz/doc/EDUMIGROM\\_D8\\_Comparative%20Report%20on%20Education.pdf](http://edumigrom.fss.muni.cz/doc/EDUMIGROM_D8_Comparative%20Report%20on%20Education.pdf) accessed, 02.02.2010

Modood, T (1997). "Introduction: The Politics of Multiculturalism in the New Europe". In Modood & Werbner (eds.) *The Politics of Multiculturalism in the New Europe: Racism, Identity and Community*. London: Zed Books Ltd, 1-26.

Modood, T. (2004) "Capitals, ethnic identity and educational qualifications", *Cultural Trends*, 13(2), pp. 87-105.

Modood, T (2005) *Multicultural Politics: Racism, Ethnicity, and Muslims in Britain*, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.

Moldenhawer, B (1995) “Discourses on Cultural Differences: The Case of Schooling” in Ålund A. and R. Granqvist (eds) *Negotiating Identities; Essays on Immigration and Culture in present-day Europe*. (Amsterdam/Atlanta: Rodopi) pp. 71-90

Moldenhawer, B. et al (2009), “Conclusion” EDUMIGROM, pp.43-51, [http://edumigrom.fss.muni.cz/doc/EDUMIGROM\\_D8\\_Comparative%20Report%20on%20Education.pdf](http://edumigrom.fss.muni.cz/doc/EDUMIGROM_D8_Comparative%20Report%20on%20Education.pdf) accessed, 02.02.2010

Mühe, Nina (2007). *Muslims in the EU: City Reports – Germany*. Monitoring Report done for the eumap.org.

Morris, L (1997) “A Cluster of Contradictions: The Politics of Migration in the European Union”, *Sociology*, 31, pp: 241-259

Morris, L. (1998) “Governing at a distance: rights and controls in British immigration”, *International Migration Review*, 32: 949–73.

Morris, L. (2000) *Rights and controls in the management of migration: the case of Germany*, *Sociological Review*, Vol. 48, May Issue 2, pp: 224-240

Morris, L. (2001a) “Stratified Rights and The Management of Migration: National distinctiveness in Europe”, *European Societies*, Vol. 3 Issue 4, pp: 387-411,

Morris, L. (2001b) “The Ambiguous Terrain of Rights: Civic Stratification in Italy’s Emergent Immigration Regime”, *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* Volume 25.3 (September), pp: 497-516

Morris, L. (2002) *Managing Migration: Civic Stratification and Migrants Rights*, London: Routledge

Morris, L.(2003) “Managing contradiction: Civic stratification and migrants' rights”, *The International Migration Review*, Spring . Vol. 37, Iss. 1; pp: 74-100

Morris, L (2007) “New Labour’s Community of Rights: Welfare, Immigration and Asylum”, *Journal of Social Policy*, 36, 1, pp: 39–57

Morris, L (2009) “Civic Stratification and The Cosmopolitan Ideal”, *European Societies*, 11:4, pp: 603-624

Morissens, A & Sainsbury D (2005) "Migrants' Social Rights, Ethnicity and Welfare Regimes", *Journal of Social Policy* (2005), 34: 637-660

Mueller, C (2006) "Integrating Turkish communities: a German dilemma", *Population Research Policy Review*, 25, pp: 419-441

Mushaben J. M (2008) "Gender, HipHop and Pop-Islam: the urban identities of Muslim youth in Germany", *Citizenship Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 5, October, 507-526

Nagel, C. R. (2009) "Citizenship, Identity, and Transnational Migration: Arab Immigrants to the United States", <http://www.colorado.edu/IBS/PEC/citizenship/Transnationalism.pdf> accessed 10/09/2009

O'Brien, P (1994) 'Identity crisis in the New Germany', *Debatte: Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe*, 2: 1, 64 — 81

Orgad, L (2010) Illiberal Liberalism Cultural Restrictions on Migration and Access to Citizenship in Europe, *American Journal of Comparative Law*, 58, Issue 1, Winter, pp: 53-105

Ögelman, N et al. (2002) "Immigrant Cohesion and Political Access in Influencing Foreign Policy", *SAIS Review*, Volume 22, Number 2, Summer-Fall 2002, pp. 145-165

Ögelman, N (2003) "Documenting and Explaining the Persistence of Homeland Politics among Germany's Turks", *International Migration Review*, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Spring), pp. 163-193

Özcan G. B. and Çokgezen, M. (2006) "Trusted Markets: The Exchanges of Islamic Companies", *Comparative Economic Studies*, 48, pp: 132-155. Also found, <https://secure.palgrave-journals.com/ces/journal/v48/n1/full/8100073a.html>

Park, R and Burgess, E (1921) *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, University of Chicago Press.

Perlman, J and Waldinger, R (1997) "Second generation decline? Children of immigrants, past and present – a reconsideration", *International Migration Review*, vol. 31, no. 4, pp. 893-922

Phillips, D (2006) "Parallel lives? Challenging discourses of British Muslim self-segregation", *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 24, pp: 25- 40

Pilkington, A (2008) "From Institutional Racism to Community Cohesion: the Changing Nature of Racial Discourse in Britain", *Sociological Research Online* 13(3)6 <http://www.socresonline.org.uk/13/3/6.html> accessed 29.04.2010

Portes, A and Curtis, J. V (1987) "Changing Flags: Naturalization and Its Determinants among Mexican Immigrants", *International Migration Review*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Summer), pp. 352-371

Portes, A and Borocz, J (1989) "Contemporary Immigration: Theoretical Perspectives on Its Determinants and Modes of Incorporation", *International Migration Review*, Vol. 23, No. 3, Special Silver Anniversary Issue: International Migration an Assessment for the 90's. (Autumn), pp. 606-630.

Portes, A and Zhou, M (1993) "The New Second Generation: Segmented Assimilation and Its Variants", *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 530, Interminority Affairs in the U. S.: Pluralism at the Crossroads (Nov.), pp. 74-96

Portes, A. (1996). *The new second generation*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Portes, A. (1997) "Immigration theory for a new century: some problems and opportunities", *International Migration Review*, 31(4): 799\_825.

Portes, A. and Rumbaut, R.G. (2001) *Legacies: The Story of the Immigrant Second Generation*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press and Russell Sage Foundation.

Portes, A. (2003) "Conclusion: Theoretical Convergencies and Empirical Evidence in the Study of Immigrant Transnationalism." *International Migration Review* 37, pp. 874-885.

Portes, A., & De Wind, J. (2004). "A cross-Atlantic dialogue: The progress of research and theory in the study of international migration", *International Migration Review*, 38, 828-851.

Portes et al. (2005) "Segmented assimilation on the ground: The new second generation in early adulthood", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 28 No. 6 November 2005 pp. 1000\_/1040

Portes, A. and R. G. Rumbaut (2006) *Immigrant America: A Portrait*. (Berkeley: University of California Press) (Third edition)

Portes, A (2007) "Migration, Development, and Segmented Assimilation: A Conceptual Review of the Evidence", *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 610, (March)

Portes, A and Fernandez-Kelly, P (2008) "No Margin for Error: Educational and Occupational Achievement among Disadvantaged Children of Immigrants", *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, November, 620, pp. 12-36

Portes et al. (2009) "The Adaptation of the Immigrant Second Generation in America: A Theoretical Overview and Recent Evidence", *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, Volume 35, Issue 7 (August), pp. 1077 - 1104

Reitz, J. (2002). *Host societies and the reception of immigrants: Institutions, markets and policies*. New York: Center of Migration Studies of New York.

Rumbaut, R. G (2008) Reaping What You Sow: Immigration, Youth, and Reactive Ethnicity, *Applied Developmental Science*, Volume 12, Issue 2, (April) , pages 108 -111

Saft, A. (2009) Oker, Eine Chronik 1882-2007, Ereignisse in der Stadt und im Goslarer Stadtteil Oker (Stadtbibliothek: Goslar)

Sassen, S. (1999), *Guests and Aliens*, The New Press, New York.

Şahin, B and Altuntas, N (2009) "Between Enlightened Exclusion and Conscientious Inclusion: Tolerating the Muslims in Germany", *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, 29: 1, pp: 27-41

Sainsbury, D (1998) "Immigrants' social rights in comparative perspective: welfare regimes, forms of immigration and immigration policy regimes", *Journal of European Social Policy*, Vol 16, 3, pp: 229-244

Sainsbury, D (2006) "Immigrants' social rights in comparative perspective: welfare regimes, forms of immigration and immigration policy regimes", *Journal of European Social Policy* 0958-9287; Vol 16(3): 229-244

Samers, M. (1998), "Immigration, 'ethnic minorities', and 'social exclusion' in the European Union: A critical perspective", *Geoforum*, 29, 123-144

Savage, T. M. (2004) "Europe and Islam: Crescent waxing, cultures clashing", *The Washington Quarterly*, 27: 3, 25 — 50



Schierup, C, U (2004) "Whither the Social dimension? Citizenship, multiculturalism and the enigma of social exclusion", in *Perspectives of Multiculturalism-Western and Transitional Countries* (ed) Mesic, M. (Zagreb: FF press) pp: 17-55

Schierup, C, U et al. (2006). *Migration, Citizenship, and the European Welfare State – A European Dilemma* (New York: OUP)

Schiffauer, W. (2007) "From Exile to Diaspora: The Development of Transnational Islam in Europe." In *Islam in Europe: Diversity, Identity and Influence*, edited by Aziz Al-Azmeh and Effie Fokas, pp.68-95. New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Schildkraut, D. (2004) "Identity, Perceptions of Discrimination and Political Engagement: The Causes and Consequences of Reactive Identity Among Latinos" Unpublished Conference Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, Sep 02,2004

Schönwälder, K and Söhn, J (2009) Immigrant Settlement Structures in Germany: General Patterns and Urban Levels of Concentration of Major Groups, *Urban Studies*, 46, 7, pp: 1439-1460

Schuster, L. and Solomos, J. (2001) 'Introduction: citizenship, multiculturalism, identity', *Patterns of Prejudice*, 35: 1, pp: 3-12

Schuster, L and Solomos, J (2002) "Rights and Wrongs across European Borders: Migrants, Minorities and Citizenship", *Citizenship Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp: 37-54

Seglow, J (2008)"Immigration and Citizenship Acquisition in the European Union: A Normative Approach" in *Challenges of Global Migration: EU and Its Neighborhood*(Ankara: Zeplin)pp: 13-30

Sivanandan, A. (1992)"Our Passports on Our Faces", *CARF*, No 6, January-February).

Sivanandan, A. (1991) 'Editorial', *Race and Class*, 32.

Soysal, L. (2001) "Diversity of Experience, Experience of Diversity", *Cultural Dynamics*, 13(1):5-28

Soysal, L (2002) "Beyond the 'Second Generation,' Rethinking the Place of Migrant Youth Culture in Berlin", in *Challenging Ethnic Citizenship German and Israeli Perspectives on Immigration* (ed) Levy, D and Weiss, Y.

Soysal, Y. N. (1994) *Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe* (Chicago: Chicago University Press).

Soysal, N, Y (1997) "Changing parameters of citizenship and claims-making: Organized Islam in European public spheres", *Theory and Society* 26: 509-527

Soysal, Y. N. (2000) "Postnational citizenship: reconfiguring the familiar terrain", in: K. Nash & A. Scott (Eds) *The Blackwell Companion to Political Sociology* (Oxford: Blackwell).

Soysal, Y, N. (2002). "Citizenship and Identity: Living in Diasporas in Postwar Europe?" In Hedetoft & Hjort (eds.). *The Postnational Self – Belonging and Identity*. University of Minnesota Press, 137-151.

Söhn, J. and Özcan, V. (2006) 'The Educational Attainment of Turkish Migrants in Germany', *Turkish Studies*, 7: 1, 101 — 124

Smith, A. (1995) *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Smith, A. (1998) *Nationalism and modernism: a critical survey of recent theories of nations and nationalism*, London: Routledge.

Starkey, H. (2003), "Education for Citizenship: Reinventing the French Republic" in S. Milner and N.Parsons (eds), *Reinventing France: State and Society in the Twenty-First Century*, Hampshire: Palgrave, pp. 110-26.

Statham P, et al (2005) "Resilient or adaptable Islam? Multiculturalism, religion and migrants' claims-making for group demands in Britain, the Netherlands and France", *Ethnicities*, Vol 5(4) pp. 427–459

Tan, D and Waldhoff, H.P. (1996) "Turkish Everyday Culture in Germany and its Prospects", in Horroks, D and Kolinsky, E.(eds.) *Turkish Culture in German Society Today*, (Oxford: Providence) pp: 137-157

Thomson, M and Crul, M (2007) "The Second Generation in Europe and the United States: How is the Transatlantic Debate Relevant for Further Research on the European Second Generation?" *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 7, September, pp. 1025 -1041

Tılıç, H and Erdemir, A (2008) "Migration Policies and integration in the European Union: Impacts on society and Politics", in *Challenges of Global Migration: EU and Its Neighborhood* (Ankara: Zeplin)pp: 43-54

Tribalat, M. (2002), “Cultural Assimilation of the Immigrants and Societal Integration in France”, *The International Scope Review*, Vol. 4, No. 7 (Summer).

Uçarer, E. M (2003) “Layers of Rights, Channels of Access”, *International Studies Review*, 5, 261–263

Ünver, O. C (2006) “Current Discussions in the German Integration Debate, The Culturalist Vision vs. Social Equity? *Revue européenne des migrations internationales*, vol. 22,3, pp. 23-38.

Van Dijk, T. A (2005) “Elite discourse and institutional racism”, [www.discursos.org](http://www.discursos.org) accessed in 23.09.2009

Vasta, E. (2007). “From Ethnic Minorities to Ethnic Majority Policy: multiculturalism and the shift to assimilationism in the Netherlands”. In *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 30(5), 713-740

Vertovec, S. (2001) “Transnationalism and identity”, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* Vol. 27, No. 4, pp. 573-582 (October).

Wall Street Journal, 5/6/2002, <https://www.wallstreetjournal.com>

Wallerstein, I (2003) “Citizens All? Citizens Some! The Making of the Citizen”, *Comparative Studies in Society and History* (2003), 45, pp: 650-679

Waters, M. (1989) “Citizenship and the Constitution of Structured Social Inequality”, *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* XXX, 3-4 pp: 159-179

White, J (1997) “Turks in the New Germany”, *American Anthropologist*, New Series, 99, No. 4 (Dec), pp: 754-769

Wimmer, A. and Glick Schiller, N (2003). “Methodological nationalism and beyond: nation-state building, migration and the social sciences”. In *Global Networks*, Vol. 2 (4), 301-334.

Wimmer, A (2002) *Nationalist Exclusion and Ethnic Conflict: Shadows of Modernity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Wieviorka, M. (1993) 'Tendencies to racism in Europe: does France represent a unique case, or is it representative of a trend?' in Wrench, J. and Solomos, J. *Racism and Migration in Western Europe* Oxford and Providence RI: Berg.

Wrench, J. (2007): “Diversity Management and Discrimination. Immigrant and Ethnic Minorities in the EU”, *Research in Migration and Ethnic Relations Series*, London: Ashgate.

Worbs, S (2003) “The Second Generation in Germany: Between School and Labor Market”, *International Migration Review*, Vol. 37, No. 4, The Future of the Second Generation: The Integration of Migrant Youth in Six European Countries (Winter), pp. 1011-1038

Yavuz. M. H (2006) “Islam and Europeanization in Turkish-Muslim socio-political movements”, in Timothy A. Byrnes and Peter J. Katzenstein (2006) *Religion in an Expanding Europe*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) pp. 225-256

Yinger, J. M (1981) “Toward a Theory of Assimilation and Dissimilation”, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 4, 3, (July), pp. 249-264

Yurdakul, G (2006a) “Secular Versus Islamist : The Headscarf Debate In Germany”, in *Politics of Visibility, Young Muslims in European Public Spaces* (eds. G. Jonker, V. Amiraux) pp: 151-168 (Bielefeld: Verlag)

Yurdakul, G (2006b) *Mobilizing Kreuzberg: Political Representation, Immigrant Incorporation and Turkish Associations in Berlin*, unpublished PhD, University of Toronto, Canada

Yuval-Davis, N. (1991). “The citizenship debate: women, the State and ethnic processes”, *Feminist Review*, 39, 58-68

Yükleyen, A (2009) 'Localizing Islam in Europe: Religious Activism among Turkish Islamic Organizations in the Netherlands', *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, 29: 3, 291-309

Yükleyen, A (2010) 'State Policies and Islam in Europe: Milli Görüş in Germany and the Netherlands', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 36: 3, 445 — 463

Zhou, M (1997) “Segmented Assimilation: Issues, Controversies, and Recent Research on the New Second Generation”, *International Migration Review*, Vol. 31, No. 4, Special Issue: Immigrant Adaptation and Native-Born Responses in the Making of Americans (Winter), pp. 975-1008

Zhou, M. (2005) ‘Ethnicity as social capital: community-based institutions and embedded networks of social relations’, in Loury, G.C., Modood, T. and Teles, S.M. (eds) *Ethnicity, Social Mobility and Public Policy: Comparing the US and UK*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 131\_59.

Zolberg, Aristide, R (2006) *A Nation by Design: Immigration Policy in the Fashioning of America*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

## **APPENDICES**

**APPENDIX A  
EXTRA TABLES**

*Table 17: Summary Table of Benefit Eligibility in Germany*

Status		Safety net				Social Insurance			Social Investments				Access to labor market
		Social assist.	Housing assist.		Child assist <sup>a</sup>	Health care and insurance	Old age pension	Unemployment insurance	Integration assist	Grant for higher education	Education for children	Job training	
			Rental assist	Social housing									
citizen	German nationals	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	For employed, registered unemployed and their families	After being employed for a certain time	After being employed for a certain time	N/A	Yes	Yes	Yes	Open
	Ethnic Germans	Yes	Yes	yes <sup>b</sup>	Yes	Yes	After being employed	After being employed for a certain time	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Open

							for a certain time						
Presumptively permanent	Settled foreign nationals with unlimited residence permit <sup>c</sup>	yes <sup>d</sup>	Yes	yes <sup>e</sup>	yes <sup>f</sup>	For employed registered unemployed and their families <sup>g</sup>	After being employed for a certain time (same as German citizens)	After being employed for a certain time (same as German citizens)	No	Yes	YES	YES	open
	Settled foreign nationals with limited residence permit <sup>h</sup>	Yes <sup>d</sup>	Yes <sup>f</sup>	Yes <sup>e</sup>	yes <sup>f</sup>	For employed, registered unemployed and their families	After being employed for a certain time (same as German citizens)	After being employed for a certain time (same as German citizens) <sup>i</sup>	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	restricted <sup>j</sup>
	Recognized refugees	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	After being employed for a certain time (same as German citizens)	After being employed for a certain time (same as German citizens)	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Open
Presumptively temporary	Asylum seekers and de facto refugees	Very modest <sup>l</sup>	Yes	Yes <sup>b</sup>	No	Emergency care only	No	After being employed for a certain time (same as German citizens)	No	Yes	Yes	No	Very limited <sup>m</sup>



	Temporary workers	No	No	No	No	Emergency care only <sup>n</sup>	No <sup>n</sup>	No <sup>n</sup>	No	No	No	No	closed
Supra-national	EU members <sup>o</sup>	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	open

- (a) Child assistance is only granted to those with certain types of residence permits (aufenthaltsberechtigung or aufenthaltsurlaubnis not aufenthaltsbewilligung or aufenthaltsbefugnis)
- (b) Ethnic Germans have first preference in the pool of apartments in the social housing stick asylum seekers must be housed by local authorities while their asylum application is pending.
- (c) This permit can be acquired at the earliest after 8 years of residence.
- (d) Use of social assistance or even fulfilling the conditions for it (that is 'lack of means) by noncitizens who have an ordinary (limited) permit (aufenthaltsbewilligung and aufenthaltsurlaubnis) may result in nonrenewal of residence permit. But even for holders of an Aufenthaltberechtigung the range of types of assistance to which they have a legal claim is limited: All other types of assistance may be granted "insofar as it justified in the individual case at hand"
- (e) No discrimination against noncitizens with respect to access to publicly subsidized housing.
- (f) Rental cash assistance or child assistance granted does not count as own income during the residence permit renewal process. Lack of sufficient income can lead to nonrenewal of the residence permit .in addition no child assistance for children (of citizens or noncitizens )living abroad (unless provided for on a reduced level in bilateral agreements).
- (g) No health insurance for family members (of citizens or noncitizens) living abroad (unless provided for in bilateral agreements)
- (h) The so-called aufenthaltsurlaubnis may be a limited or an unlimited residence permit in contrast the aufenthaltsberechtigung is always unlimited permit. An unlimited aufenthaltsurlaubnis can be acquired at the earliest after 5 years of residence .the so-called aufenthaltsbewilligung is granted to persons whose residence is presumably temporary; holders of this title may not acquire a permanent residence right.
- (i) If this worker is unemployed for more than one year and the Federal Employment agency determines that the individual will not be able to find a job the claim to unemployment insurance may be denied EU members and Turkish nationals are not subject to this scrutiny.
- (j) Restricted to occupational field or contract. Holders of an unlimited aufenthaltsurlaubnis are free to take up any employment
- (k) If asylum proceedings take longer than one year asylum seekers are entitled to benefits according to the federal law on welfare
- (l) Only asylum seekers and de facto refugees receive a kind social assistance instead of cash assistance asylum seekers and de facto refugees receive a limited form of aid to subsistence while their asylum cases are processed since July 1'1997 asylum seekers were given a time limit of three years for receipt of this form of assistance
- (m) Non-EU members can only accept a job if on German, EU member or migrant with equal status can fill the position.
- (n) Contract laborers may not claim social insurance benefits because they should be insured in their home country. However they may claim emergency medical care in necessary.
- (o)EU members are included in the German welfare state as soon as they or their spouse enters the German labor market.

**Description of benefit programs in Germany**

**Social assistance** (sozialhilfe) –composed of aid to subsistence (legal claim) and aid to subsistence for special circumstances (granting of some types of assistance under this heading is based on the discretion of the authorities).social assistance is means –tested cash assistance or assistance in-kind (for example, counsel, care, and others)for needy individual.

**Rental assistance** (wohngeld) ---means –tested allowance used towards private rental or self owned accommodations.

**Social housing** –The state subsidizes the building of new houses that have to be rented out to persons whose income does not exceed certain limits. Ethnic Germans have priority in the queue for social housing. Asylum seekers must be housed by local authorities while their application for asylum is processed, if no public housing is available for asylum seekers they may be housed in pensions /hotels ,private owned houses .public-owned buildings (for example ‘schools) or temporary accommodations .costs are covered locally and are party reimbursed by the lander and the federal government.

**Child assistance** (Kindergeld) –cash allowance provided to families whit children.

**Health care and insurance** (Krankenversicherung)-Contributory health care ,usually provided through the employer .The government provides emergency health care to temporary workers and asylum seekers/de facto refugees.

**Old age pension** (Rentenversicherung) –contributory pension for individuals in the labor force. Individuals may claim a government . provided old age pension after working a certain period of time.

**Unemployment insurance** (Arbeitslosenversicherung) –Contributory insurance for individuals in the labor force .individuals may claim this government –provided benefit when they are unemployed.

**Integration assistance** –German language courses and retraining

**Grants or loans for higher education** (ausbildungsforderung)-grants for higher education financed by the state .

**Education for children-** public education.

**Job training-**vocational training provided by individual employers .Although subject to governmental regulation employers decide who may obtain an apprenticeship so there is room for discrimination against noncitizens.

**Percentage of foreigners in total population:** %8.9 ( January 1, 2000)

**Sources:** Harald Waldrauch, ”The Right of Immigrant :Employment and Social Benefits :Tables prepared for the Transatlantic Workshop on Citizenship and the Rights of Immigrants”(Vienna: European Centre Welfare Policy and Research 2000) ; Thomas Faist “rights and the Recognition of Immigrants in Welfare States :A Comparison of Institutional Constitutions in Four European Countries “institute for intercultural and International Studies, University of Bremen, Bremen, Germany, 2000;Brayn Paul Christian, “Immigrant Welfare Entitlements in Cross-National Comparison: The Case of the united states and Germany,”unpublished’1998; Uwe Wenzel and Mathias Bos ,”Immigration and the Modern Welfare State :the case of the USA and Germany ,”New Community, vol.23, no.4 (1997) pp.537-48 Silvia Dorr and Thomas Faist, ”Institutional Conditions for the integration of immigrant in welfare states: A comparison for the Literature on Germany ‘France ‘Great Britain and the Netherlands, ”European journal of political research vol.31(1997), pp.401-26 Thomas Faist and Hartmut Haubermann immigration Social citizenship and housing in Germany (Abingdon,U.K; Blackwell Publishers 1996)Arne Gieseck et al., “Economic Implications of Migration into the Federal Republic of Germany 1988-1992 “International Migration Review vol.29 no.3(1995) pp.693-709 additional information provided by Harald Waldrauch based on the following two volumes Ulrike Davy ed “die integration von einwanderern band 1:Rechtliche Regelungen im europaischen vergleich”(The Integration of Immigrants’ volume 1:comparing legal rules in European states ) (Frankfurt ‘New York: campus verlag 2001) and Harald Waldrauch ed.”die integration von einwanderern band 2:ein index der rechtlichen diskriminierung (The Integration of Immigrants volume 2:an index of legal discrimination) (Frankfurt ;New York :Campus Verlag 2001) (Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer, 2001)

**Table 18: Conditions of Family Reunification in Germany by Different Status in Germany**

<b>Conditions/ Spouses Nationality</b>	<b>German</b>	<b>(non- visa)Citizens, EU, USA, Canada, Japan, and South Korea</b>	<b>Third Country Nationals</b>	<b>qualified/highly skilled professionals</b>	<b>Aussiedler</b>
<b>Resource Requirements</b>	The proof of 'shared living community' is enough No other requirements	The proof of 'shared living community' is enough No other requirements	Proof of adequate income and housing	The proof of 'shared living community' is enough No other requirements	The proof of 'shared living community' is enough No other requirement
<b>Restrictions: Age (for children)</b>	N/A	No restriction	16	No restriction	No restriction
<b>Restrictions: Basic Language Proof before moving to Germany</b>	No	No	Yes	No	No
<b>Probationary Period</b>	4 years-divorce before this duration, deportation	4 years-divorce before this duration, deportation	4 years-divorce before this duration, deportation	4 years-divorce before this duration, deportation	4 years-divorce before this duration, deportation
<b>Labour Market</b>	Immediate and full access	Immediate and full access	Waiting for 1-4 years depend on residence permit and current state of labor market	Immediate and full access	Immediate and full access
<b>Parents unification</b>	N/A	Yes	No	Unknown	Yes

Source: Prepared by the author

**Table 19: General Picture of Education (2008) Comparing Germans with Foreigners**

Level of graduation achieved	Graduates									
	Total		Of which							
			Germans				Foreigners			
			male		female		male		female	
	no	In %	No	In %	no	In%	no	In%	no	In%
Without graduation	75,897	7.9	38,905	8.7	22,426	5.3	8,952	19.2	5,614	12.7
Grade 9 (Hauptschulabschluss)	273,481	28.5	137,633	30.8	94,646	22.3	22,356	48.0	18,846	42.8
Grade 10 (Mittlerer Abschluss)	481,845	49.6	221,600	49.2	226,276	52.9	16,205	34.0	17,764	39.7
Grade 12 (Fachhochschulreife)	129,662	13.6	64,937	14.7	57,299	13.6	3,840	8.0	3,586	7.6
Abitur (Grade 13, university prerequisite)	285,456	29.9	123,409	28.0	152,397	36.3	4,285	8.9	5,365	11.4

Source: Educational Report 2008

**Table 20: School Types of Migrants in Germany**

Scholl type	Proportion of migrants	School with a proportion of migrants of		
		a)<25%	b)25-50%	C)>50%
	In %of all students	In % of the attended schools		
Hauptschule	35.8	43.6	28.2	28.2
Realschule	21.6	73.9	21.7	4.4
Integrated Comprehensive school	26.2	69.2	23.1	7.7
Gymnasium	16.2	70.2	27.1	2.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>22.2</b>	<b>64.7</b>	<b>23.4</b>	<b>12</b>

a)+b)+c)=100%

**Source:** Educational Report 2006(see also: <http://www.bildungsbericht.de/daten/h4.xls>)

**Table 21: Proportion of 15-year-old Students in 2000, with/without a Migration Background in Different School Types According to Their Countries of Origin or Background (in %)**

Migration Background/Country of Origin	Hauptschule	Realschule	Gesamtschule	Gymnasium
No migration background	16.6	38.6	11.6	33.2
Total number of students with a migration background	31.8	29.7	14.0	24.6
Turkey	48.3	22.1	17.0	12.5
Other countries involved in former guest-worker recruitment schemes	30.0	31.4	13.6	25.1
Ethnic Germans(spat)Aussiedler (former soviet union)	38.4	33.6	9.8	18.2
Other	20.5	29.3	15.5	34.6

**Source:** Educational Report 2006.

**Table 22: School Persons Leaving (all) in Goslar**

Schulträger insgesamt\*

Geschlecht und Staatsangehörigkeit: Schüler/-innen insgesamt\*

2008\*

Niedersachsen Statistische Region * Kreis* Einheits- /Samtgemeinde* Mitgliedsgemeinde*	Neuzugänge insgesamt	Höchster erworbener Schulabschluss der Neuzugänge										
		OA Ohne erfolgreichen Besuch bzw. Abschluss	AL Abschluss einer Schule für Lernhilfe	HA Hauptschulabschluss (einschl. qualifizierter)	HK Sekundarabschluss I - Hauptschulabschluss	SI Sekundarabschluss I - Real- schulabschluss	EI Erweiterter Sekundarabschluss I	FH Fachhochschulreife /schul. Teil der Fachhochschulreife	GH Fachgebundene Hochschulreife	AH Allgemeine Hochschulreife	XA Sonstiger ausländischer Schulabschluss	XS Sonstiger Schulabschluss
- Schulart/- form	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
153 Goslar												
Schularten insgesamt	2773	139	61	474	237	988	643	114	9	101	1	6
Berufsschule	1290	133	56	300	114	350	166	75	4	85	1	6
Berufsschule (Teilzeit) einschl. BGJ kooperativ	974	28	10	201	87	317	161	75	4	85	1	5
Berufsschule (Teilzeit)	974	28	10	201	87	317	161	75	4	85	1	5
Berufsbildungs- jahre	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

hr (koop erativ )												
Be rufsgr undbi ldung sjahr (schu lisch)	133	12	2	62	19	33	4	-	-	-	-	1
Be rufsei nstieg sklass e	98	28	28	33	8	-	1	-	-	-	-	-
Be rufsv orber eitun gsjah r	85	65	16	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
B erufs vorbe reitun gsjah r	85	65	16	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
B erufs vorb. (Sond erfor m f. Ausl. sowie Aussi edl.)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ber ufsf achsch ule	672	6	5	174	113	285	73	9	1	6	-	-
B1 - 1 J., kein Absch luss vorau sg. (Voll zeitfo rm)	101	6	5	30	15	41	4	-	-	-	-	-
B2 - 1 J., Vora uss.: Reals chula bschl. (Voll zeitf.)	154	-	-	-	-	137	15	2	-	-	-	-
B4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

- 1,5 J., Ziel: Beruf l. Abschluss (Vollzeit/Teilzeit)												
B7 - mind. 2 J., Ziel: Beruf l. Abschluss	242	-	-	42	27	105	54	7	1	6	-	-
B8 - 2 J., Ziel: Realschulabschluss (Vollzeitform)	175	-	-	102	71	2	-	-	-	-	-	-
Berufsaufbauschule	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Fac hoher schule	585	-	-	-	-	328	256	-	-	1	-	-
Vollzeitform 12. Klasse	291	-	-	-	-	161	129	-	-	1	-	-
Teilzeitform 12. Klasse	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Teilzeitform 11. Klasse	294	-	-	-	-	167	127	-	-	-	-	-
Berufsoberschule	26	-	-	-	-	1	3	20	2	-	-	-
Fac hgym	117	-	-	-	-	-	117	-	-	-	-	-



nasiu m												
Fac hschu le	83	-	-	-	10	24	28	10	2	9	-	-
F1 - 1 bis 1,5 Jahre (Voll zeitfo rm)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
F1 - 1 bis 1,5 Jahre (Teilz eitfor m)	18	-	-	-	-	2	3	9	2	2	-	-
F2 - 2 Jahre und länge r (Voll zeitfo rm)	65	-	-	-	10	22	25	1	-	7	-	-
F2 - 2 Jahre und länge r (Teilz eitfor m)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
F4 - Seefa hrt (Voll zeitfo rm)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Source: Landesbetrieb für Statistik und Kommunikationstechnologie Niedersachsen, 2001-2009.

**Table 23: School Persons Leaving (Ausländer) in Goslar**

Schulträger insgesamt\*

Geschlecht und Staatsangehörigkeit: Ausländische Schüler/-innen\*

2008\*

Niedersachsen Statistische Region* Kreis* Einheits- /Samtge- meinde* Mitglieds- gemein- de*	Neu- züg- linge insge- samt	Höchster erworbener Schulabschluss der Neuzugänge										
		OA Ohne er- folgrei- chen Be- such bzw. Abschluss	AL Abschluss einer Schule für Lernhilfe	HA Haupt- schulab- schluss (einschl. qualifi- zierter)	HK Sekundar- abschluss I - Haupt- schulab- schluss	SI Sekundar- abschluss I - Real- schulab- schluss	EI Erweiter- ter Sekun- darab- schluss I	FH Fachhoch- schulreife /schul. Teil der Fachhoch- schulreife	GH Fach- gebundene Hochschul- reife	AH Allgemeine Hochschul- reife	XA Sonstiger ausländi- scher Schulab- schluss	XS Son- stige r Schulab- sch- luss
Schulart/ -form	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
153 Goslar												
Schularten insgesamt	153	21	10	32	13	39	30	5	1	1	1	-
Berufsschule	77	20	10	19	7	13	5	2	-	-	1	-
Berufsschule (Teilzeit) einschl. BGJ kooperativ	37	1	1	12	4	12	4	2	-	-	1	-
Berufsschule (Teilzeit)	37	1	1	12	4	12	4	2	-	-	1	-
Berufsg rundbil- dungsjah- r (kooperativ)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Berufsg rundbil- dungsjah- r (schulisch)	7	2	-	2	2	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
Berufseinstiegs	15	3	5	5	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-

klasse												
Berufsvorbereitungsjahr	18	14	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Berufsvorbereitungsjahr	18	14	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Berufsvorb. (Sonderform f. Ausl. sowie Aussiedl.)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Berufsaufbauschule	35	1	-	13	6	11	2	2	-	-	-	-
B1 - 1 J., kein Abschluss vorausg. (Vollzeitform)	4	1	-	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
B2 - 1 J., Vorauss.: Realschulabschluss. (Vollzeitf.)	8	-	-	-	-	5	1	2	-	-	-	-
B4 - 1,5 J., Ziel: Berufl. Abschluss (Vollzeit/Teilzeit)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
B7 - mind. 2 J., Ziel: Berufl. Abschluss	9	-	-	3	-	5	1	-	-	-	-	-
B8 - 2 J., Ziel: Realschulabschluss (Vollzeitform)	14	-	-	9	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Berufsaufbauschule	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Fachoberschule	30	-	-	-	-	15	14	-	-	1	-	-
Vollze	11	-	-	-	-	6	4	-	-	1	-	-

itform 12. Klasse												
Teilzeitform 12. Klasse	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Teilzeitform 11. Klasse	19	-	-	-	-	9	10	-	-	-	-	-
Berufsoberschule	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-
Fachgymnasium	9	-	-	-	-	-	9	-	-	-	-	-
Fachschule	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
F1 - 1 bis 1,5 Jahre (Vollzeitform)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
F1 - 1 bis 1,5 Jahre (Teilzeitform)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
F2 - 2 Jahre und länger (Vollzeitform)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
F2 - 2 Jahre und länger (Teilzeitform)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
F4 - Seefahrt (Vollzeitform)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Source: Landesbetrieb für Statistik und Kommunikationstechnologie Niedersachsen, 2001-2009.

**Table 24: School Leaving in Goslar; Only Turkish**  
 Schulträger insgesamt\*  
 Schuljahr: 2007/08\*

Niedersachsen Statistische Region* Kreis* Einheits-/Samtgemeinde* Mitgliedsgemeinde*	Ausländische Schulabgänger/-innen*									
	insgesamt	davon aus der Schulart								
		Berufsschule, Teilzeit	Berufsbildungsjahr	Berufseinsteigsklasse	Berufsvorbereitungsjahr	Berufsfachschule	Fachoberschule	Berufsobererschule	Fachgymnasien	Fachschule
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
153 Goslar	86	24	6	1	14	29	9	-	3	-

Source: Landesbetrieb für Statistik und Kommunikationstechnologie Niedersachsen, 2001-2009.

**Table 25: Population in Goslar 1968-2008**

Land Statistische Region*, Einheits-/Samtgemeinde* Mitgliedsgemeinde*	Kreis*	Fläche in qkm	Bevölkerung am 31.12.	Einwohner je qkm	Bevölkerungsbewegung im Jahr						Bevölkerungszunahme/abnahme
					Geborene	Gestorbene	Geburtenüberschuß oder -defizit	Zuzugene 1)	Fortgezogene 1)	Wanderungsgewinn oder -verlust	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
153 Goslar											
1968	964,7	178957	185,5	2658	2542	116	15719	15721	-2	114	
1969	964,7	180353	186,9	2454	2591	-137	17446	15912	1534	1397	
1970	964,7	176089	182,5	2129	2602	-473	17072	15508	1564	1091	
1971	964,8	177307	183,8	2050	2471	-421	16597	14952	1645	1224	
1972	964,8	177455	183,9	1861	2500	-639	14788	14007	781	142	

1973	966,1	177671	183,9	1652	2533	-881	13877	12779	1098	217
1974	964,3	178122	184,7	1539	2513	-974	13229	11804	1425	451
1975	964,4	177513	184,1	1503	2510	-1007	11416	11018	398	-609
1976	964,9	176023	182,4	1481	2458	-977	10971	11484	-513	-1490
1977	964,8	174830	181,2	1365	2394	-1029	11392	11556	-164	-1193
1978	964,4	173722	180,1	1301	2443	-1142	11060	11026	34	-1108
1979	964,8	172252	178,5	1316	2338	-1022	10765	11213	-448	-1470
1980	964,8	171472	177,7	1412	2385	-973	10739	10546	193	-780
1981	964,8	170606	176,8	1336	2384	-1048	10741	10559	182	-866
1982	964,7	169746	175,9	1371	2388	-1017	10743	10586	157	-860
1983	964,8	168844	175,0	1252	2419	-1167	9926	9661	265	-902
1984	964,8	166533	172,6	1223	2311	-1088	7493	8716	-1223	-2311
1985	964,9	164626	170,6	1241	2328	-1087	7610	8430	-820	-1907
1986	964,9	163131	169,1	1304	2388	-1084	8352	8763	-411	-1495
1987	964,9	157407	163,1	1295	2210	-915	7858	8287	-429	-1344
1988	964,9	156773	162,5	1332	2277	-945	8297	7986	311	-634
1989	965,0	158692	164,5	1394	2367	-973	11302	8410	2892	1919
1990	965,0	162022	167,9	1498	2428	-930	13910	9650	4260	3330
1991	965,0	162820	168,7	1538	2264	-726	10763	9239	1524	798
1992	965,0	163149	169,1	1526	2297	-771	10586	9486	1100	329
1993	965,0	162721	168,6	1508	2382	-874	9862	9416	446	-428

1994	965,0	162380	168,3	1484	2247	-763	9782	9360	422	-341
1995	965,0	161549	167,4	1400	2323	-923	9869	9777	92	-831
1996	965,0	160273	166,1	1426	2300	-874	8663	9065	-402	-1276
1997	965,0	158979	164,7	1516	2248	-732	8532	9094	-562	-1294
1998	965,0	157955	163,7	1336	2178	-842	9034	9216	-182	-1024
1999	965,0	157013	162,7	1330	2166	-836	9129	9235	-106	-942
2000	965,0	156247	161,9	1283	2070	-787	8856	8835	21	-766
2001	965,0	155610	161,2	1220	2151	-931	8799	8505	294	-637
2002	965,0	154638	160,2	1132	2058	-926	9048	9094	-46	-972
2003	965,0	153825	159,4	1057	2021	-964	8901	8750	151	-813
2004	965,0	152758	158,3	1040	1948	-908	8285	8446	-161	-1069
2005	965,1	151452	156,9	984	1883	-899	7720	8119	-399	-1298
2006	965,1	149656	155,1	958	1975	-1017	6981	7767	-786	-1803
2007	965,1	148091	153,4	931	1963	-1032	7184	7718	-534	-1566
2008	965,2	146187	151,5	982	2116	-1134	7163	7943	-780	-1914

Source: Landesbetrieb für Statistik und Kommunikationstechnologie  
Niedersachsen  
Fläche, Bevölkerung und Bevölkerungsbewegung in Niedersachsen

**Table 26: Foreign people in Goslar (2008)**

Niedersachsen Statistische ----- Land der Staatsangehörigkeit	Region*,  Kreis*	Ausländische Bevölkerung		
		Insgesamt	Männlich	Weiblich
		1	2	3
153 Goslar				
Albanien		16	8	8
Belgien		7	2	5
Bosnien und Herzegowina		95	47	48
Bulgarien		39	11	28
Dänemark		23	10	13
Estland		2	1	1
Finnland		12	2	10
Frankreich		59	42	17
Griechenland		160	93	67
Irland		5	-	5
Island		1	1	-
Italien		489	322	167
Serbien und Montenegro (ab 2004)		155	88	67
Serbien (ab 2006)		124	66	58
Serbien (ohne Kosovo ab 2008)		200	108	92
Kosovo (ab 2008)		69	32	37
Montenegro (ab 2006)		63	31	32
Kroatien		46	20	26
Lettland		8	3	5
Litauen		18	4	14
Luxemburg		3	2	1
Mazedonien		22	12	10
Moldau, Republik		19	5	14
Monaco		-	-	-
Niederlande		116	68	48
Norwegen		7	2	5
Österreich		131	74	57
Polen		417	192	225
Portugal		66	36	30
Rumänien		60	18	42
Russische Föderation		176	69	107



Schweden	13	6	7
Schweiz	53	25	28
Slowakische Republik	2	1	1
Slowenien	4	2	2
ehem. Sowjetunion	1	-	1
Spanien	244	129	115
ehem. Tschechoslowakei	-	-	-
Tschechische Republik	20	5	15
Türkei	1772	889	883
Ukraine	100	38	62
Ungarn	16	8	8
Vereinigtes Königreich GB u. Nordirland, brit.abh.Geb	116	76	40
Weißrußland	21	11	10
Zypern	2	2	-
übrige europäische Staaten	-	-	-
Europa insgesamt	4972	2561	2411
Algerien	13	8	5
Angola	11	5	6
Ägypten	45	29	16
Äthiopien	4	2	2
Benin	1	1	-
Burkina Faso	-	-	-
Côte d'Ivoire	4	3	1
Eritrea	-	-	-
Gambia	1	1	-
Ghana	4	3	1
Kamerun	101	73	28
Kenia	2	1	1
Liberia	1	-	1
Marokko	7	5	2
Nigeria	24	18	6
Senegal	2	1	1
Sierra Leone	1	1	-
Somalia	-	-	-
Südafrika	5	4	1
Sudan	1	1	-

Togo	7	4	3
Tunesien	47	40	7
Kongo, Dem. Volksrepublik (ehem. Zaire)	5	3	2
übrige afrikanische Staaten	17	11	6
Afrika insgesamt	303	214	89
Argentinien	3	2	1
Bolivien	2	1	1
Brasilien	15	6	9
Chile	2	-	2
Dominikanische Republik	1	1	-
Kanada	8	3	5
Kolumbien	8	1	7
Kuba	6	-	6
Mexiko	10	5	5
Peru	10	3	7
Venezuela	4	2	2
Vereinigte Staaten	50	19	31
übrige amerikanische Staaten	10	6	4
Amerika insgesamt	129	49	80
Afghanistan	27	14	13
Armenien	41	14	27
Aserbaidshjan	44	21	23
Bangladesch	-	-	-
China	659	401	258
Georgien	25	10	15
Indien	40	26	14
Indonesien	20	9	11
Israel	4	3	1
Irak	28	19	9
Iran, Islamische Republik	110	69	41
Japan	4	1	3
Jordanien	7	4	3
Kasachstan	70	40	30
Korea, Republik	10	6	4
Libanon	85	46	39
Malaysia	5	1	4

Nepal	-	-	-
Pakistan	26	22	4
Philippinen	16	2	14
Sri Lanka	43	21	22
Syrien, Arabische Republik	71	48	23
Taiwan	4	2	2
Thailand	72	12	60
Vietnam	115	61	54
übrige asiatische Staaten	38	17	21
Asien insgesamt	1564	869	695
Australien und Ozeanien	9	3	6
Staatenlos	22	13	9
ungeklärt und ohne Angabe	87	52	35
Ausländer insgesamt	7086	3761	3325

Source: Landesbetrieb für Statistik und Kommunikationstechnologie Niedersachsen, 2009.

<http://www1.nls.niedersachsen.de/statistik/html/parameter eingabe.asp?DT=A1050002&CM=Ausl% E4nderzentralregister>

**APENDIX B**

**Overall Summary of the Study Samples, Characteristics of the (Turkish) Informants**

	<b>Nam es</b>	<b>Gend er</b>	<b>Ag e</b>	<b>Place of Birth</b>	<b>Community</b>	<b>Education</b>	<b>Mari tal statu s</b>	<b>Childre n</b>	<b>Occupati on</b>	<b>Natio nality</b>	<b>Pla ce</b>
<b>1</b>	Mura t	M	24	Germa ny	Turk/Sunni	Üniversity student	Singl e	-	Seller	Ger man	Oke r
<b>2</b>	Hasa n	M	16	Germa ny	Kurd/Alevi	Realschule	Singl e	-	-	Ger man y	Gos lar
<b>3</b>	Semi h	M	22	Germa ny	Kurd/Sunni	Realschule	Marri ed	2	Student	Ger man	Gos lar
<b>4</b>	Kora y	M	16	Germa ny	Turk/Sunni	Hauptschul e	Singl e	-	-	Ger man	Gos lar
<b>5</b>	Baki	M	24	Germa ny	Turk/Sunni	Hauptchule	Singl e	-	Unemploy ed	Tu rki sh	Oke r
<b>6</b>	Meti n	M	19	Germa ny	Kurd/Alevi	Realschule	Singl e	-	Seller	Ger man	Oke r
<b>7</b>	Kem al	M	20	Germa ny	Turk/Sunni	University	Marri ed	1	Student	Ger man	Gos lar
<b>8</b>	Selim	M	18	Germa ny	Turk/ Alevi	Hauptschul e	Singl e	-	Unemploy ed	Tu rki sh	Bad Har zbu rg
<b>9</b>	Serka n	M	24	Turkey	Kurd/Sunni	Hauptschul e	Marri ed	1	Unemploy ed	Tu rki sh	Gos lar
<b>10</b>	Tarka n	M	55	Turkey	Turk/ Alevi	Hauptschul e	Marri ed	2	Civil Cervant	Tu rki sh	Gos lar
<b>11</b>	Arif	M	33	Germa ny	Kurd/Sunni	University	Singl e	-	Social Pedagogu e	Ger man	Gos lar
<b>12</b>	Ismai l	M	36	Turkey	Kurd/Sunni	Hauptschul	Marri ed	3	Unemploy ed	Tu	Gos lar

						e				rki sh	
13	Temel	M	23	Germany	Kurd/Sunni	University	Single	-	Student	German	Goslar
14	Faruk	M	23	Germany	Kurd/Alevi	Hauptschule	Single	-	Worker	German	Goslar
15	Hakan	M	23	Germany	Turk/Sunni	Hauptschule	Married	2	Unemployed	Turkish	Oker
16	Muharrem	M	60	Turkey	Turk/Sunni	-	Married	3	Pension	Turkish	Oker
17	Kahraman	M	55	Turkey	Türk/Sunni	High school	Married	-	Unemployed	Turkish	Goslar
18	Tufan	M	19	Germany	Turk/Sunni	University	Single	-	Student	German	Oker
19	Sertan	M	23	Germany	Kurd/Sunni	University	Married	1	Pilot	German	Goslar
20	Salih	M	40	Turkey	Turk/Alevi	High school	Married	1	Unemployed	Turkish	Goslar
21	Kemal	M	25	Germany	Turk/Sunni	University	Married	3	Engineer	German	Goslar
22	Mehdi	M	24	Germany	Turk/Sunni	Hauptschule	Married	1	Worker	German	Goslar
23	Abdullah	M	40	Germany	Kurd/Alevi	Hauptschule	Married	2	Worker	Turkish	Goslar
24	Haydar	M	42	Turkey	Kurd/Sunni	Hauptschule	Married	1	Self-employed	Turkish	Goslar
25	Ali	M	37	Germany	Turk.Sunni	Hauptschule	Married	4	Unemployed	Turkish	Goslar
26	Ferit	M	22	Germany	Turk/Sunni	Hauptschule	Married	2	Self-employed	German	Goslar
27	Orhan	M	23	Germany	Turk.Sunni	Hauptschule	Marrried	2	Mechanic	Turkish	Oker

28	Coskun	M	38	Germany	Turk/Sunni	Hauptschule	Married	2	Unemployed	Turkish	Oker
29	Ferhat	M	26	Germany	Turk/Sunni	Hauptschule	Singl e	-	Unemployed	Turkish	Bad Har zbu rg
30	Bahri	M	53	Turkey	Turk/Sunni	-	Marri ed	3	Pension	Turkish	Oke r
31	Erdo gan	M	39	Germa ny	Turk/Sunni	Hauptschul e	Marri ed	1	Unemploy ed	Turki sh	Gos lar
32	Dilek	F	24	Germa ny	Turk/Sunni	Realschule	Marri ed	1	Unemploy ed	Ger man	Oke r
33	Seren ay	F	16	Germa ny	Turk/Alevi	Realschule	Singl e	-	Student	Ger man	Gos lar
34	Tena y	F	18	Germa ny	Turk/Sunni	Realschule	Singl e	-	Student	Ger man	Oke r
35	Serpi l	F	23	Germa ny	Turk/Sunni	Berufschul e	Singl e	-	Student	Turki sh	Oke r
36	Elif	F	16	Germa ny	Turk/Alevi	Hauptschul e	Singl e	-	Student	Ger man	Oke r
37	Sevgi	F	25	Germa ny	Turk-Alevi	Berufschul e	Marri ed	-	Secretary	Ger man	Gos lar
38	Semi ha	F	21	Germa ny	Turk/Alevi	Gymnasiu m	Marri ed	1	Seller	Turki sh	Gos lar
39	Dery a	F	22	Germa ny	Turk/Sunni	Hauptschul e	Singl e	1	Unemploy ed	Turki sh	Gos lar
40	Naile	F	27	Germa ny	Turk/Sunni	Berufschul e	Wido wed	-	Teacher	Ger man	Gos lar
41	Fatm a	F	24	Germa ny		Hauptschul e	Marrie d		- İşsiz	Turki sh	Gos lar
42	Naz miye	F	45	Turkey	Turk/Sunni	University	Widow	2	Teacher	Tu	Gos

							ed		rki sh	lar	
43	Meral	F	20	Germany	Turk/Sunni	Berufschule	Single	-	Seller	Turkish	Goslar
44	Sakine	F	42	Turkey	Turk/Sunni	University	Married	2	Teacher	Turkish	Goslar
45	Seyhan	F	32	Germany	Kurd/Sunni	Hauptschule	Married	3	Unemployed	Turkish	Goslar
46	Ferdane	F	23	Turkey	Turk/Alevi	Hauptschule	Married	-	Seller	Turkish	Oker
47	Ezgi	F	17	Germany	Kurd/Sunni	Realschule	Single	-	Student	German	Goslar
48	Sinem	F	16	Germany	Turk/Sunni	Hauptschule	Single	-	Student	German	Goslar
49	Tugba	F	17	Germany	Turk/Sunni	Hauptschule	Single	-	Student	German	Goslar
50	Hatic	F	19	Germany	Turk/Sunni	Hauptschule	Married	-	Unemployed	Turkish	Goslar
51	Hilal	F	17	Germany	Turk/Sunni	Hauptschule	Single	-	Seller	Türk	Goslar

**APENDIX C**

***Overall Summary of the Study Samples, Characteristics of the (German) Informants***

<b>Names</b>	<b>Gender</b>	<b>Age</b>	<b>Place of Birth</b>	<b>Community</b>	<b>Education</b>	<b>Marital Status</b>	<b>Children</b>	<b>Occupation</b>	<b>Nationality</b>	<b>Place</b>
<b>1</b> Ecke	F	37	Germany	German	University	Married	-	Teacher	German	Helmsted
<b>2</b> Monika	F	35	Germany	German	University	Single	-	Social Pedagogue	German	Goslar
<b>3</b> Karin	F	43	Germany	German	University	Married	2	Teacher	German	Goslar
<b>4</b> Christine	F	33	Germany	German	University	Single	-	Social Pedagogue	German	Goslar
<b>5</b> Schneider	F	50	Germany	German	University	Married	-	Hauptschule Director	German	Goslar
<b>6</b> Trautwein	F	54	Germany	German	University	Unknown	-	Gymnasium Director	German	Goslar
<b>7</b> Reusch	M	34	Germany	German	University	Married	2	Realschule Director	German	Goslar
<b>8</b> Hans	M	17	Germany	German	University	Single	-	Student	German	Goslar
<b>9</b> Metz	M	47	Germany	German	University	Married	2	Youth Psychologist	German	Goslar



## APPENDIX D

### QUESTIONAIRES

#### Derinlemesine Mülakat Formu

Bu çalışma, ODTÜ Sosyoloji Bölümündeki bir doktora tezinin alan araştırmasını gerçekleştirmek için yapılmaktadır. Derinlemesine mülakatta Almanya'nın Goslar kasabasında yaşayan üçüncü nesil gençlik olarak, Almanya'daki hayat deneyiminiz ve ait olduğunuz topluluğun entegrasyon yaşantılarıyla ilgili görüşleriniz alınacaktır. Çalışmamıza katıldığınız için teşekkür ederim.

Derinlemesine Mülakat No:

Tarihi:

Yapıldığı Yer:

Kişisel Bilgiler:

Adı Soyadı:

Mesleği:

Yaş:

Cinsiyet:

1. Genel olarak kendinizi tanıtır mısınız? (Kısa bir yaşam öyküsü)
2. Kısaca ailenizin geçmişinden bahseder misiniz?
3. Kimliğinizi, kendinizi nasıl tanımlarsınız? (Türk; Kürt; Avro-Türk; Türk-Alman; Alevi vb.)
4. Sizce, .....'üğün hala en önemli iki özelliği/geleneği/göreneği nedir?Hala uyguladığınız en önemli iki ..... geleneği nedir?

5. Bu gelenek/görenekler sizin için neden önemli?
6. Almanya'daki yaşantınızdan bahseder misiniz, Almanya da ..... olmak nasıl bir duygu?
7. Almanya'da kendinizi nasıl tanımlıyorsunuz, yabancı olmak ne anlama geliyor sizin için?
8. Alman kültürünün aklınıza gelen en belirgin özelliği size göre nedir?
9. Türkiye'lilerin Alman toplumundan farklı olduğunu düşündüğünüz en önemli özelliğinin neler olduğunu düşünüyorsunuz?
10. Türkler içinde kendinizi nerde görüyorsunuz?
11. Grubunuzun/topluluğunuzun diğer gruplar tarafından herhangi bir şekilde ayrımcılığa maruz bırakıldığını düşünüyor musunuz?
12. Eğer varsa, ne şekilde ayrımcılık yaptıklarını açıklayabilir misiniz?
13. Alman ya da Türklerle olan ilişkinizde herhangi bir ayrımcılığa maruz kaldınız mı? Nelerle karşılaştığınızı anlatabilir misiniz?
14. Herhangi bir şekilde kimliğinizden (yabancı olduğunuzdan) dolayı haksız bir davranışla ya da ayrımcılıkla karşılaştığınızı düşündüğünüzde ne yaparsınız?
15. Günümüzde Almanya'da yaşayan Türk gençler hangi açılardan Almanlar'dan farklı yaşıyorlar, örneğin siz?
16. Yeni kuşak gençler buradaki yaşantısında önceki kuşaklardan hangi açılardan farklılıklar taşıyor?
17. En çok hangi konularda annebabanızla anlaşmazlığa düşünüyorsunuz?
18. Siz kendinizi anne-babanızdan hangi açılardan farklı buluyorsunuz, neden?
19. Alman vatandaşlığına sahip misiniz?
20. Alman vatandaşlığı sizin için ne anlama geliyor?
21. Çok kimliklilik ve çok kültürlülük sizin için ne anlama geliyor?
22. Avrupa Birliği sizin için ne ifade ediyor?
21. Yaşadığımız yerde Türk gençlerinin yaşadığı en önemli sorun sizce nedir?
22. Türk'lerin Almanya'ya sağladıkları olumlu katkı var mıdır?

23. Bulduğunuz ülkede bir genç olarak Türklerle olan ilişkilerinizde en çok karşı karşıya kaldığınız sorun nedir?
24. Almanya`da yaşayan Türkiye kökenli insanlar tarafından herhangi bir nedenle ayrımcılığa veya baskıya uğradığınızı düşünüyor musunuz?
25. Almanyadaki Türkiyeli gençler ne gibi durumlarda birbirine yardımcı olurlar?
26. Sizinle karşılaştırıldığında sizden daha fazla dayanışma gösteren başka bir grup var mı?
27. En yakın arkadaşlarınız, komşularınız kimlerdir?
28. İş yada okul dışındaki boş zamanlarınızı en çok kimlerle geçirirsiniz?
29. Kendi vatandaşlarınız arasında en çok hangi gruplarla anlaşmazlığa düştüğünüz olur. En çok hangi konularda anlaşmazlık yaşadığınız oluyor?
30. Almanya`da Türkler arasında gruplaşma var mı?
31. Bu toplumsal gruplar arasındaki ilişkilerden bahsedebilmisiniz biraz?
32. Konuştuğunuz diller nedir, en çok hangi dilde kendinizi en iyi ifade edebildiğinizi düşünüyorsunuz?
33. Sizce Almanya`da bir Türk gencinin en belirgin özellikleri nelerdir?
34. Dedelerinizden, ninelerinizden, ya da anne-babanızdan, ya da büyüklerinizden Türklere özgü olan neler öğrendiniz, uyguladıklarınız varsa, anlatırmısınız?
35. Almanya`da Türkleri Almanya`daki diğer gruplardan ayıran nedir?
36. Evinizde Türkçe yayın organı (TV, Gazete, \_nternet) var mı, hangi yayınları ve ne kadar takip ediyorsunuz?
37. Ne tür müzik dinliyorsunuz, Türkçe mi Almanca mı İngilizce mi?. Dinlediğiniz müziğin sizdeki etkileri ne oluyor?
38. Türkiye hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz?
39. Goslarda Türk`lerin dernekleri hakkında ne düşünyorsunuz?
40. Bu derneklerin aktivitelerine, organizasyonlarına katılıyor musunuz?
41. Türkiye`ye gidip geliyor musunuz, kimlerle görüşürsünüz? Ne sıklıkta?
42. Almanya`dan Türkiye`ye geri dönmek istermisiniz ya da isteyen tanıdıklarınız var mı? Neden?

- 43 .Sizce Türkiye Türkleriyle Almanya Türkleri arasında farklılıklar var mı?
44. Goslardaki Türklerin birbirleriyle olan diyalogunu nasıl buluyorsunuz çok iyi anlaştığınız kişiler ve anlamadığınız insanların özelliklerinden bahsedersiniz?
45. Goslarda herhangi bir sorunla karşılaştığınızda kimlerden destek alırsınız?
46. Sizce Almanyada Türklerin birbirleriyle ilişkileri nasıl olmalı?
47. İş yaşamınızda veya okulda daha önce herhangi bir ayrımcılığa maruz kaldınız mı? okulda herhangi bir ayrımcılığa maruz kaldınız mı?
48. Diğer gruplardan (Alman, Rus, İtalyan, vb. arkadaşlarınız var mı? Bir arada yaşadığınız diğer grup gençlerinin (Alman, Rus, İtalyan ve diğer) özellikleri nelerdir?
49. Dini uygulamalar açısından burda herhangi bir sorunla karşılaşıyor musunuz? Türk Müslüman gruplar arasında bir fark var mı?
50. Arkadaşlarınızla ilişkilerinizi nasıl anlatırsınız, beraber neler yaparsınız?
51. Çevrenizdeki Türkiye'den diğer grupları nasıl tanımlarsınız?
52. Komşularınızla ilişkilerinizi nasıl tanımlarsınız? Birbirinizi ne kadar sıklıkla ziyaret edersiniz?
53. En yakın arkadaşınızın veya komşunuzun geldiği kökeni bilir misiniz?
54. Almanya'da geleceğiniz konusunda ne düşünüyorsunuz, etrafıca anlatırmısınız?
55. Gelecek için planlarınız neler? Gelecek için neler yapmak istiyorsunuz?
56. Başka bir şey söylemek ister misiniz?

## EBEVEYN ODAK GÖRÜŞME FORMU

(**Not:** Bu formdaki sorular görüşme sırasında birebir olarak sorulan sorular değil, moderatörün odak görüşme sırasında takip edeceği ana izlekler olarak düşünülmüştür)

Kısaca lütfen kendinizi tanıtır mısınız?

Kaç yıldır buradasınız?

Ne işle meşgulsünüz?

Almanlarla diyalogunuz var mıdır varsa ne düzeyde?

Sizce Goslar'daki Türkiye'li gençlerini nasıl görüyorsunuz? Türk gençleri hakkında genel görüşleriniz nelerdir?

Kız ve erkek ayrımını da düşünerek cevaplandırabilir misiniz?

Eğitim durumları, iş olanakları açısından mesela?

Sizce Türk gençlerle Alman gençler arasında farklar var mı? Varsa nelerdir?

Eğitim, aile ilişkileri, çalışma disiplini ve alışkanlıkları ve yaşam tarzları açısından ?

Yeni kuşak gençlerin yetiştirilme tarzları hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz?

Sizce Türk gençler burada herhangi bir ayrımcılığa uğruyorlar mı?

Ne tür alanlarda?

Sizin şahit olduğunuz ayrımcılık olayları oldu mu? Çevrenizden biraz bahseder misiniz?

Gençlerin Alman toplumunda nasıl bir imajları vardır?

Gençlerin aile, arkadaş ve iş arkadaşlarıyla ilişkilerini nasıl görüyorsunuz?

Sizce aileleriyle uyumları nasıl?

Aileleriyle en çok çatıştıkları konular sizce nelerdir?

Gençlerin Alman toplumuna uyum sağlayabildiklerini düşünüyor musunuz?

Hangi alanlarda gençler daha kolay uyum sağlayabiliyorlar?

Hangi alanlarda Alman toplumuna daha zor uyum saęlıyorlar?

Goslar gibi küçük bir kasabada yasamanın avantajları ve dezavantajlarından söz edebilir misiniz?

Gençler açısından Goslar gibi bir kasaba nasıl fırsatlar sunuyor ya da sınırlılıkları nelerdir?

Gençler arasında kızların ve erkeklerin yaşam tarzları arasında bir farklılık görüyor musunuz?

Nelerdir bunlar?

Gençlerin eğitim durumları ve eğitimlerine devam etmeleri konusunda neler düşünüyorsunuz?

Onların okul yasantılarından varsa gözlemlerinizi biraz bahsedebilir misiniz?

Gençlerin iş olanakları konusunda ve iş konusundaki başarı ya da başarısızlıklarını nasıl değerlendiriyorsunuz?

Türk ailelerin çocuklarına yaklaşımlarını nasıl buluyorsunuz?

Gençlerin aileleriyle ilişkilerini nasıl değerlendirirsiniz?

Gençlerin Almanlarla ilişkilerini nasıl buluyorsunuz?

Gençlerin diğer göçmenlerle ilişkisi?

Almanların Türkiyeli gençlere bakışını nasıl değerlendirirsiniz?

Alman devletinin/yasalarının göçmenlere ama özellikle de Türkiyeli gençlere yönelik politikalarını nasıl buluyorsunuz?

Gençlerin Alman vatandaşı olmasının sağlayacağı avantajlar ve dezavantajlar neler olabilir.

Gençlerin siyasi görüşleri ve dini yaklaşımları hakkında ne söylersiniz?

## APPENDIX E

### TURKISH SUMMARY

#### ÖZET

##### 1. ARAŞTIRMANIN TEMEL SORULARI

Bu tez, temel olarak, Almanya'da yurttaşlık, göçmen ve entegrasyon politikalarının ve yasal hakların, yapısal olarak hiyerarşik bir yurttaşlık fikri ve uygulaması ortaya çıkarıp çıkarmadığını ve bu süreçlerin üçüncü kuşak Türk göçmen çocuklarının entegrasyonunu nasıl etkilediğini sorgulamaktadır.

Küçük bir Alman kasabası olan Goslar'da yapılan ve niteliksel metodlarla gerçekleştirilen bu çalışma, temel olarak üçüncü kuşak Türk<sup>25</sup> gençliğinin Almanya'da doğup büyümelerine ve Alman okullarında eğitim almalarına

---

<sup>25</sup> Tez boyunca Türk kavramı, Türkiyeli göçmenleri ve onların çocuklarını anlatmak için genel bir tanımlayıcı kavram olarak kullanılmaktadır. Gerekli durumlarda, Türkiye'deki Kürt, Alevi, Sünni vb. diğer dini ve etnik terimler, bu farklı dini ve etnik kimlikleri tanımlamak için kullanılacaktır. Aynı zamanda, bu çalışma, kimliğin homojen ve kapalı bir bütünlük olarak değil, yerel, ulusal ve küresel değerler gibi çoklu kaynaklardan etkin olarak beslenen bir kavram olduğunu iddia etmektedir. Buna ilaveten kimlik, kendimiz ve başkaları tarafından sürekli olarak bir tanımlanma süreci içerisinde. Dolayısıyla, kimliğin tüm zamanlar için geçerli tek bir tanımı olamaz. Bu yüzden, kimliğin akıcılığı ve dinamizmi hakkında bağlamsalci (circumstantialist) iddiaları üzerinde düşünmeliyiz. Bu bizim neden sadece etnik veya ulusal özelliklere dayanan değer-yüklü kimlik tanımlarına ihtiyacımız olmadığını da ortaya koymaktadır. Esas olarak, "misafir" ya da "ev sahibi" ülke kültürlerinin açıkça indirgenemez eşiklerini vurgulayan bağlamsal tanımlarına ihtiyaç vardır.

rağmen, neden bu gençlerin büyük bir çoğunluğunun aşağıya doğru entegrasyon ve tepkisel kimlik biçimleri deneyimlemekte olduğunu sorgulamaktadır.

Goslar kasabası Braunschweig, Hanover and Salzgitter gibi büyük şehirlerin çevreleyen Harz dağlarının kuzeyinde, Aşağı Saksonya bölgesinde bulunmaktadır. Goslar'ın merkezinde ve çevresinde yer alan Türk restoran, kafe, kahvehane, camii, kebab salonları, süpermarket, diskotek, ve Türk avukat, çevirmen ve doktor gibi çeşitli hizmet sektörleri kasabanın kültürel, ekonomik ve mekansal arkaplanını şekillendirmektedir. Türkiyeli göçmenlerin kasabanın yerel dokularında yarattığı bu kültürel, ekonomik ve mekansal arkaplan aynı zamanda bu alan araştırmasının neden Goslar'da yapıldığının cevabı olmaktadır.

Goslar, tekstil, kimya ve maden işleme fabrikalarının yanısıra, sahip olduğu tarihi eserler ve kayak merkezleriyle Almanya'da bir iç turizm merkezidir. Aynı zamanda, Goslar, kurşun, çinko, demir ve sülfür gibi zengin maden yatakları ve işletmelerine de sahiptir. Özellikle 1988'de kapatılıp müzeye dönüştürülen Rammelsberg bölgesinde bulunan çinko, kurşun ve civa maden yatakları Türk göçmenlerin 1960'lı yıllarda çalıştıkları belli başlı işlerin en başında gelmekteydi. Goslar işçi etüdleri ve istatistiklerine göre, Goslar civarına yerleşen birinci kuşak Türkiye'li göçmenlerin çoğu maden işçisi olarak istihdam edilmiştir.

Braunschweig, Salzgitter ve Hannover şehirlerinin çevrelediği ve yaklaşık olarak toplam 45000 nüfusa sahip olan Goslar kasabasında ve civar köyler yaklaşık 3500 civarında Türkiyeli göçmen nüfus yaşamaktadır. Kasabada yürüttüğüm çalışma boyunca temel olarak, katılımlı gözlemlere dayalı antropolojik bir çalışma yöntemini benimsedim. Ayrıca, derinlemesine mülakat ve odak grup çalışması teknikleriyle veriler topladım. Çalışma boyunca gençlere çoğunlukla eğitim durumları, arkadaşlık ve dostluk



biçimleri, aile ilişkileri, çalışma hayatına yönelik olarak sorular üzerinden onların kimlik oluşum süreçleri analiz edilmeye çalıştım. Kimliklerinin sosyal olarak kurulmasını anlama sürecinde, onların kimliklerinin muhtemel kaynakları üzerine sorgulamalar yapmaya çalıştım. Üçüncü kuşağın kimliklerine kaynaklık eden temel etkenin esas olarak Alman toplumunun içinde kazandıkları sosyalleşme süreci olduğu belirtilmelidir. Bunun yanında eğitim kurumlarında kazandıkları kültürel değerlerin davranış ve düşünce biçimlerini şekillendirdiği de unutulmamalıdır. Ancak kimlik oluşum sürecini etkileyen tek faktör içinde buldukları toplumunun sosyalizasyon süreci değildir. Bu gençlerin gerek içinde yaşadıkları ailenin kültürel ve tarihsel kökenleri gerekse ailelerinin sosyal çevresi, yakın akrabalar vb. en azından Alman okullarında gerçekleşen sosyalleşme süreci kadar etkili olmaktadır. Bu durum paralel bir sosyalleşme (nested socialization) imkânı da yaratmakta ve bu zaman zaman üçüncü kuşak için bir avantaja zaman zaman da dezavantaja dönüşmektedir.

Saha çalışması boyunca sürekli olarak gençlerin ve ebeveynlerinin yaşadığı evler, çalışma ortamları, gittikleri okullar, camiiler, kurumlar, belediye, gençlik merkezleri, kafe ve diskoları ziyaret etmeye çalıştım. Onlarla kurduğum yakın ve samimi ilişkiler sayesinde bu çalışma için gerekli olabilecek tüm verileri “içerden” yani birinci elden doğrudan sağlama fırsatına kavuştum.

Goslar’ın demografik dağılımı açısından en çarpıcı durum, kasabasının nüfusunun çoğunluğunu Kahramanmaraş’ın Elbistan ilçesinin iki köyünden buraya gelmiş göçmenlerden oluşmasıdır. Yaptığım araştırmaların sonucu bu durumun bir tür “zincirleme göç” sayesinde gerçekleştiğini ortaya koymaktadır. Ve bu zincirleme göç çoğunlukla akraba evlilikleri yoluyla gerçekleşmektedir. Evlilik yoluyla göçler, bu iki köyden gerek damatların gerekse gelinlerin getirilmesi yoluyla gerçekleşmektedir. Goslar’daki Kürt

kökenli göçmenlerin bir kısmının da buraya 1990'lı yıllarda oldukça yaygın olan iltica başvurularıyla gelmiş olduğu göze çarpmaktadır.

Bu araştırma kapsamında tezin yazarı araştırma asistanı kendi olanaklarıyla ve Max Planck Enstitüsünün (Halle/Saale) davetlisi olarak misafir araştırma görevlisi statüsünde aldığı üç aylık bursla Almanya'da Goslar kasabasına gidip belli bir süre kalarak bu çalışmanın bir ön araştırmasını pilot çalışma olarak yapmıştır.

Bu çalışmada işaret edilen ve Goslar kasabesindeki Türk gençlerinin mevcut eğitimsel, ekonomik ve sosyal durumlarındaki olumsuzluklar, büyük ölçüde onların entegre olmak isteksizliğinden değil, ancak entegrasyonun bütün tarafları arasında var olan birçok indirgemeci önyargılar ve önlemlerden kaynaklanmaktadır. Yüksek düzeydeki işsizlik oranları, düşük düzeydeki eğitim başarıları ve sosyal yalıtım, Goslar kasabesindeki göçmenlerin ve onların üçüncü kuşak çocuklarının marjinalliğinin en önemli dışavurumlarıdır. Ancak, bu durum basitçe onların eğitim başarıları ve iş bulmak için gerekli olan sosyo-kültürel sermayeden yoksun olmalarıyla açıklanamaz. Bu yüksek orandaki aşağıya doğru olan hareketlilik kısmen bazı gruplara karşı gösterilen ve zaman zaman etnik ve dinsel çağrışımları da olan özel bir ayrımcılık biçimi olan kurumsal ayrımcılık uygulamalarının sonuçları olarak görülebilir.

Aslında üçüncü kuşak için temel sorun entegrasyonun gerçekleşip gerçekleşmeyeceği değil, fakat bu entegrasyonun Alman toplumunun hangi katmanında ve hangi boyutlarda gerçekleşeceği. Başka bir deyişle, üçüncü kuşak Türk çocukları için sorun onların Türkiye'ye dönüp dönmeyecekleri veya Almanya'da kalıp kalmayacakları değil, onların kültürler arası becerileri ve kimlikleri için daimi alanların nasıl sağlanacağıdır.

Kurumsal ayrımcılık, etnik ve dini azınlık ve göçmenlerin toplumun çoğunluğu için mevcut olan aynı haklara ve fırsatlara ulaşmalarını engelleyen, kurumlardaki kural, rutin, yaklaşım ve davranış kalıplarına işaret etmektedir. Bu kurumsal ayrımcılık açıktan veya bilinçsiz bir şekilde gerçekleşebilir. Kurumsal ayrımcılık hem yasal düzenlemelere hem de resmi olmayan sosyal kalıplara dayanmaktadır. Özellikle bazı göçmen grupları doğrudan hedefleyen kurumsal pratikler, yasalar, yönetmelikler tarafsız görünebilir ancak dolaylı etkilere sahiptir.

Emek piyasası ve eğitim tartışmaları boyunca, güçlü bir dahil etme (inclusion) veya uyum (integration) politikası eksikliği olduğunu ve bu durumun emek piyasasında, eğitimde ve hatta kamusal söylem alanlarında yapısal bir ayrımcılığı beslediğini göstermeye çalıştım. Esas sorun, ne göçmenlerin ve onların çocuklarının entegrasyon konusundaki isteksizlikleri, ne sosyal devlet anlayışının başarısızlığı ne de tamamen onların sosyo-kültürel sermayelerinin eksiliğidir; temel mesele Alman toplumunda var olan yapısal ayrımcılık uygulamaları ve bunun büyük ölçüde hakim akademik ve siyasal söylemler tarafından ısrarla görmezden gelinmesidir.

Goslar kasabesindeki bu çalışmayı yaparken neden bazı göçmen gruplarının aşağıya doğru entegrasyona (downward integration) veya sürekli olarak aşağıya doğru hareketlilik içine hapsolmaya eğilimli olduklarının ve bunun arkasındaki faktörlerin neler olduğunu cevabını bulmaya çalıştım. Eğer aşağı doğru entegrasyonun emek piyasasının ve eğitim sektörünün özel koşullarında nasıl gerçekleştiğini anlayabilirsek, Alman toplumundaki içirme ve dışlama süreçlerinin dinamiğini daha kolay anlayabiliriz.

Goslar'a 5 km uzaklıkta bulunan Türk mahallesi Oker yerelinde kültürel ve mekansal ayrışmayı vurgulayan, BGX gençlik merkezi uzmanlarından sosyal pedagoğ Michael şunları söylemektedir:

Oker'de (Goslara 5km uzaklıkta bir mahalle) Türk ve Alman topluluğu arasında hala bir kültürel ve mekansal bir engel bulunmaktadır. Açıkcası bu bölünme Alman yasalarının veya politik güçlerinin bir sonucu olmamaktadır; daha ziyade insanlar bilinçli olarak kendilerine benzeyen insanlarla birlikte yaşamayı ve onlarla benzer ortak mekanlarda olmayı tercih etmektedirler. Doğal olarak bir diğer faktör ekonomiktir çünkü bu Türklerin Oker'e gitmelerinin ve belli bir yerleşim kalıbı içerisinde hareket etmeleri onların sınırlı ekonomik imkanlarıyla doğrudan ilgilidir. Başka bir deyişle biz gözlemliyoruz ki, bu insanlar daha iyi imkan ve olanaklara sahip bir yere gidip yaşamaları için yeterince zengin değiller. Sonuçta, yabancılar ve özellikle Türkler Oker'den daha iyi bir yere taşınmak için yeterli koşullara ve olanaklara sahip değiller (Michael, interview, 2006).

Almanlarla veya diğer göçmen gruplarla karşılaştırıldığında neden Türk gençleri daha kötü eğitim başarısına, daha düşük düzeyde iş kariyerine ve meslek statülerine sahip olmaktadır? Bu durumun dışsal olarak temel belirleyicileri arasında Türk göçmen gruplarının kabul edilme koşulları, kurumsal dışlama ve ayrımcılık uygulamaları ve hiyerarşik yurttaş tabakalaşmasını sayabiliriz. Bu durumun Türk göçmen gruplarının kendilerinden kaynaklanan içsel temel belirleyicileri ise şunlardır: göç edilen zamandaki ekonomik ve insani sermaye durumları, aile yapısı, sosyal ilişkilerin kültürel kalıpları, topluluk organizasyonlarının yapısı gibi özellikler sırlanabilir. Bu iki düzeydeki dışsal ve içsel faktörler, Türk göçmen çocuklarını doğrudan etkilemektedir. Ayrıca, Almanya'da doğmasına, yetişmesine ve eğitim almasına rağmen, neden üçüncü kuşak Türk gençliği hala tepkisel bir kimlik biçimine sahip olmaktadır sorusu çalışmanın temel sorularından birisi olacaktır. Bütün bu soruları çoğunlukla Goslar kasabasına odaklanarak yanıtlamaya çalıştım. Ayrıca iki yerel gençlik merkezi (Gleis 95 ve BGX) ve iki Türk-Müslüman göçmen kurumundaki (İGMG [İslamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görüş]) ve DİTİB [Diyamet Türk İslam Birliği]) gençlerin deneyimlerini de analize dahil ettim.

## 2. METODOLOJİ

2005-2006 yıllarını kapsayan yaklaşık bir buçuk yıl Goslar kasabesindeki etnografik gözlemlerle oluşturulan bu çalışmada, katılımlı gözlem, derin mülakat ve odak grup gibi tekniklerden oluşan niteliksel araştırma metodunu kullandım. Çünkü, niteliksel metot, Türk göçmenlerinin çocuklarının etnik ve kültürel özelliklerini, inançlarını, duygularını ve algılarını daha iyi ifade edebilmelerini sağlayan en etkili yoldu.

Temel araştırma çerçevesi derin mülakatlardır. Araştırmacı, Goslar'da yaşayan farklı gruptan insanlarla mülakatlar yaptı: (1) üçüncü kuşak gençler; (2) birinci ve ikinci kuşak ebeveynler; (3) Türk-Müslüman göçmen kurumlarının üyeleri ile idare ve yürütmesindeki görevli ve sorumlular; (4) lise düzeyindeki üç tür okulun (Hauptschule, Realschule and Gymnasium) müdür, yönetici ve öğretmenleri; (5) gençlik merkezine devamlı gelen gençler ve merkezlerin sosyal pedagoğ ve sosyal çalışanları.

Ayrıca araştırmacı, Goslar kasabasında Türk gençlerinin yoğun olarak gittiği Gençlik merkezlerinde sosyal pedadog olarak çalışmış, katılımlı gözlemlerde bulunarak Türk gençlerini yakından tanıma fırsatı elde etmiştir. Gençlerin Goslar'daki eğitim alanındaki ve demografik dağılımının listesinin bilgileri ve detaylı bilgi akışı, Niedersachsen Eyaletine bağlı Goslar Auslaenderbehörde (Yabancılar Polisi) Dairesinden edinilmiştir. Braunschweig, Salzgitter ve Hannover şehirlerinin çevrelediği ve 45000 nüfusa sahip Goslar kasabasında ve çevresinde yaklaşık 3500 civarında Türkiyeli göçmen nüfus yaşamaktadır.

Örnekleme kartopu tekniği yardımıyla seçilmiş ancak örnekleme içindeki farklı etnik ve dini kimlik özelliklerine sahip insanların örneklemedeki temsilini sağlamak amacıyla kriterler kullanılmıştır. Sonuç olarak, etnik,

dini ve cinsiyet özellikleri örneklemedeki mülakat yapılan grubun seçiminde temel kriterler olmuştur. Türk, Kürt, Sünni ve Alevi kişilerin eşit bir sayıda seçimine özen gösterilmiştir.

Buroway'ın "genişletilmiş vaka metodunu" izleyerek, etnografinin tekdüzeliğinden kurtulmak ve mikro ve makro dünyalar arasında bir diyalog başlatmak amacıyla küresel ve yerel, mikro ve makro, katılımcı gözlem ve teori arasında bir ilişki kurmayı deniyorum. Nesnel teknikleri eleştiren Buroway (1991; 2000), daha ilişkisel bir etnografik araştırma metodu önermektedir.

Buroway (2000) üç boyuta dikkat çekmektedir: gözlemcinin gözlem yapacağı dünyaya nüfuz etmesi, gözlemin zaman ve mekan boyunca genişletilmesi, mikro süreçlerin makro güçlere doğru genişletilmesi; ve teorinin genişletilmesi.

Birincisi, Buroway'e göre (2000) gözlemci yaşamını gözlem yaptığı dünyaya genişletmelidir. İkincisi, araştırmacı, yaşamını saha araştırmasını yaptığı mekanın bir parçası haline getirecek şekilde genişletmelidir. Sonuç olarak ben de katılımcılarımın dünyasının bir parçası haline gelebilmek için güvenilir ve konforlu bir mekan olan üniversite kampüsünden uzaklaşarak Goslar'da yaşadım.

İkincisi, araştırmacı, katılımcıların kendi mekanlarındaki yaşamlarını keşfetmek amacıyla zamanını bu alanda geçirecek şekilde genişletmelidir. Bu amaçla, zamanımın çoğunu katılımcıların yaşadığı evler, gençlik merkezleri, camiiler, diskotekler, kafeler ve göçmen organizasyonlarında gündelik yaşam rutinlerini gözlemleterek ve paylaşarak geçirdim. Sadece köşebaşında mülakat yaparak katılımcılarla resmi bir ilişki kurmak yerine, onların topluluk formasyonları ve yaşamlarının içsel dinamiklerini yakalamak için ailesinin ve dünyalarının bir parçası haline gelmeye

çalıştım. Bu bir yıldan fazla geçen süre içinde Goslar'da araştırmanın zamanı ve mekanını genişletirken, onların toplumsal süreçlerini, inançlarını, ve sosyal yapının yapılandırılmasını özel koşulların nasıl etkilediğini anlamaya çalıştım.

Üçüncüsü, Burawoy (2000) araştırmanın genişletilmesinin mikro süreçlerden çıkarak makro süreçlere doğru dahil edilmesi gerektiğine inanmaktadır. Bu makro düzeydeki olguların mikro olgulardan etkilendiği kadar mikro olayların makro fenomenlerin bir yansıması olduğu anlamına gelmektedir. Bu çerçevede, bir çok sosyo-uzamsal düzeyler arasındaki ilişkileri analiz ederken uygun bir şekilde uygulanmalıdır: yerel, ulusal, bölgesel ve küresel.

Tarihsel deneyimler ve kültürel kalıpların mevcut yayılma etkisi yüzünden, göç ve entegrasyon olgularını bir çok yerel bölgede Avrupa Birliği gibi küresel faktörler şekillendirmektedir. Bu ilke, disiplinlerarasılığın bir ihtiyaç olduğunu ortaya çıkarmaktadır çünkü bir çok disiplin çoğu zaman farklı sosyo-uzamsal düzeylere işaret etmektedir.

Peki yerellik neden önemlidir? Yerellik, bireysel öznelerin, kültürün (din ve etnisite bunun önemli bir parçasıdır) ve yapının arasındaki dinamik ilişkileri gözlemleyebileceğimiz sosyolojik bir düzeydir. Bu anlamda bireysel özneler ve yapının her ikisi de ancak yerel düzeyde görünür hale gelebilmektedir. Yapısal makro süreçlerin bireyler üzerinde nasıl işlediği ancak özel olarak yerel koşullara odaklanıldığında farkedilebilir. Ancak ondan sonra, yapı, kültür ve bireysel ajanların bir araya getirilerek analizi mümkün olabilir. Sonuç olarak, yerel, ulusal ve küresellik süreçlerinin analizi mümkün olduğunda, makro ve mikro süreçlerin dinamik ve diyalektik bir analizi de mümkün olabilecektir.

### 3.1. TEORİK VE KAVRAMSAL ÇERÇEVE

İlk olarak, bu çalışma Almanya'daki göçmen politikaları, yurttaşlık yasaları ve bunların uygulamalarını 'yukarıdan aşağıya' bir perspektifle küresel ve uluslar arası göçmen ve entegrasyon politikalarını da içeren yasaları, devlet söylemleri ve kamusal tartışmalar üzerinden analiz etmektedir. İkinci olarak, çalışma "aşağıdan yukarıya" bir perspektifle Almanya'da fırsatlar ve sınırlılıklar karşısında Türk göçmenleri ve çocuklarının tepki, uyum, mücadele ve stratejilerini derin mülakatlar ışığında ve Goslar kasabasının yerel koşulları üzerinden incelemektedir.

Bu çalışmada, küreselleşen dünyada neo-liberal devletlerin kaçınılmaz olarak emek (yüksek ve düşük yetenekli) göçüne ihtiyaç duyduğunu ve dolayısıyla göçmenlerin ve çocuklarının üzerinden kültürel çeşitlilik ürettiğini iddia etmekteyim. Ancak, temel çelişki de bu paradoksal durumdan kaynaklanmaktadır, çünkü bu devletler aynı zamanda iktidarların bu göçten kaynaklanan kültürel zenginliği azaltmak ve göçmenleri "asimile" etmek yoluyla, ulusal birlik veya "hayali cemaat" anlayışı içinde sürdürme eğilimindedir. Bu koşullar, göç alan devletlerde sürekli bir açmaz üreten ulus-devletin ikili karakterini üretmektedir: ulus devlet, bir yandan ekonomik ihtiyaçlar açısından çok-kültürlü bir toplum olmak durumundayken, diğer yandan ulusal hükümlerlik açısından bu çok-kültürlülüğü törpülemek arasında gidip gelmektedir.

"Tabakalı yurttaşlık" (civic stratification) tezini takip eden bu çalışma, kabul edilmiş göçmenlere yönelik olarak özel olarak düzenlenmiş yasaların yanında emek piyasası, sosyal yardım ve aile birleşmesi açısından farklılaştırılmış yasal statülerin ve göçmen kategorilerinin, tabakalaşmış hakların hiyerarşisini yarattığını ileri sürmektedir. Emek piyasası açısından



denilebilir ki Almanya ulusal emek piyasasının idaresinde korumacı bir “aşamalı erişim” sistemine sahiptir. Sonuç olarak, tabakalı yurttaşlık tezi, Almanya’nın entegrasyon ve göçmen politikalarında “ayrımcı dışlayıcılık” sisteminin bir örneği olduğunu kanıtlamaya çalışmaktadır.

Almanya’daki mevcut etnik vatandaşlık felsefesi ve uygulamalarına dayanan bu ayrımcı dışlama sisteminde (differentialist exclusion system) Türk göçmenlerin sürekli olarak Almanya’da kalmaları ve yerleşmeleri ekonomik (refah devletinin gerilemesi, işsizlik ve ücretlerin üzerindeki baskılar), sosyal (sosyal hizmetlerdeki talepler ve fakirleşmenin artışı), kültürel (ulusal kültür ve kimliğin meydan okumaları) ve siyasal (kamu düzensizliği korkusu, dış politika veya siyasal kurumlar üzerindeki etkiler) nedenlerle bir tehdit olarak görülmektedir.

Bugün Goslar’da Türk göçmenleri ve çocukları yukarı doğru yükselebilmeleri ve başarılı bir uyum sürecini deneyimlemeleri ancak Türk vatandaşlığını etnik ve dinsel kimliklerinden vazgeçmeleri koşuluyla gerçekleşebilmektedir.

Goslar kasabesindeki Müslüman-Türk göçmenlerinin çocuklarıyla yapılmış yarı-yapılandırılmış derin mülakatlara (60) dayanan bu çalışma Türk göçmenlerinin üçüncü kuşak gençlerinin deneyimlerini büyük ölçüde karakterize eden tepkisel kimlik ve aşağıya doğru entegrasyon deneyimleri Almanya’daki bu tabakalı yurttaşlık formasyonunun sonuçları olarak görülebilir.

Goslar’daki Türk göçmenlerinin çocuklarının çoğunlukla emek piyasası ve eğitim göstergeleri açısından yukarı doğru entegrasyonun oldukça sınırlı kaldığını ve çoğunlukla aşağıya doğru entegrasyonu (downward integration) deneyimlediklerini ortaya koymaktadır.

Goslar'daki alan araştırmasının sonuçlarına dayanılarak, ikinci ve üçüncü kuşak gençlerin eğitim ve emek piyasasına entegrasyonun ve sosyal hareketliliğinin desteklenmesi veya engellenmesi konusunda, onların sosyal ve kültürel sermaye gibi grup özelliklerinden ziyade, yapısal ve kurumsal faktörlerin (yasa, hükümet politikaları, yurttaşlık pratikleri ve göç alan ülkenin kabul etme koşullarının) geniş bir şekilde etkili olduğu düşünülmektedir. Buna karşılık olarak, bu gençler sembolik ve tepkisel biçimlerde olsa da, ebeveynlerinin dini ve etnik kimlik referanslarını benimsemeye devam etmektedir.

Hem kurumsal/yapısal hem de kültürel faktörler, Alman devleti ve toplumu tarafından Türk göçmenleri ve onların çocuklarına sunulan fırsatlar ve sınırlamaların çerçevesini oluşturmaktadır ve bu iki faktör bu göçmen topluluğunun sosyal hareketlilik ve başarılı entegrasyonunda oldukça önemli bir yere sahiptir.

Goslar'daki bu çalışma Türk Müslüman göçmenlerin ve onların çocuklarının emek piyasasına ve eğitim alanında hızlı bir şekilde uyum sağlayamadığını ve Alman kültürünün içinde kolayca eriyip gitmediğini göstermektedir. Aksine, bu insanların uyumu/entegrasyonu, Almanya'daki koşulların bir ürünü olmakla birlikte, en az onların etnik ve dini kimlikleri kadar çeşitli ve bölünmüş bir görüntü (segmented integration) arz etmektedir.

Yurttaşlığın yasal eşitlik anlayışının kendisi, ne tek başına Türk göçmenlerin üçüncü kuşak çocuklarının sosyal izolasyonu ve ekonomik dezavantajlarının üstesinden gelmesini sağlar, ne de onların ekonomik ve siyasal kurumlarda bir güç olarak bulunmasının önünü açabilir. Yasal olarak yurttaş olmak veya göç edilmiş olan ülkenin tabiyetine geçmek, azınlık üyelerinin sosyal, siyasal ve sivil hakları kullanmasını engelleyebilecek olan ayrımcılık ve şiddetten korumayı garanti

etmemektedir. Bu göçmenlerin deneyimleri göstermektedir ki yerleşik kurumsal yapılar bu insanların topluma gerçek katılımını ve tam üyeliğini engelleyen pratiklerle ilgilenmemektedir. Hatta bu yerleşik yapılar, kurumsal ideolojilerin etiketleyici ayrımcı kuralları veya idari rutin alışkanlıklar yüzünden böyle pratikleri devam ettirmek konusunda işlevsel olabilir. Bu rutin alışkanlıklar bilinçli olarak ayrımcı olmayabilir ama etkileri ve sonuçları açısından ayrımcı olabilir.

Resmi düzeydeki yurttaşlık haklarını savunan yaklaşım hukuk önünde devletin tüm bireylerinin eşit olduğu idealine yaslanır ancak bu resmi yurttaşlık biçiminin gerçek eşitliğe nasıl dönüşeceği sorusunu çözümsüz bırakır.

Goslar'daki araştırmanın sonuçlarına bakılırsa, Alman vatandaşı olmalarına rağmen çoğu üçüncü kuşak Türk gençleri tez boyunca üzerinde durulduğu üzere, Almanya'daki "ayrımcı dışlayıcı sistem" yüzünden emek piyasası ve eğitim alanında aşağıya doğru entegrasyon yaşamaya devam etmektedir.

Tepkisel kimlik formasyonuna kısmen işaret ettiğim bu çalışmada etnik ve dini öğelerin göçmenlerin ve onların çocuklarının bu kimliklerin oluşumunda oldukça karmaşık süreçlere yol açtığını göstermeye çalıştım. Kısacası, Türkiyeli göçmenlerin bireysel ve grup özellikleri de Alman kurumsal yapılar ve gereklilikler, sosyal koşullar, ayrımcılık içeren yasalar kadar eşit fırsatları kullanmak konusunda çelişkiler yaratmaktadır. Ancak şu da söylenebilir ki Türkiyeli göçmenler ve çocukları ne kadar çok ayrımcılık ve izalasyona maruz kalırsa, grup dayanışmasıyla (dinsel, kültürel, siyasal ve ekonomik biçimlerde) bir çeşit tepkisel kimlik formunda- hareket etme olasılıkları o derece artmaktadır. Bu tür sosyal olayları anlatmak için kullanılan "ne ekersen onu biçersen" deyiimi bu durumu anlamamıza yardımcı olabilecektir.

Burada, son yıllarda oldukça büyük deęişikliklere uğramış olan anaakım göç teorilerinin kapsamlı bir özeti verilmedi. Bunun yerine, göç sonrasındaki Türk göçmenlerin ve çocuklarının yerleşikleşme (settlement) ve uyum gibi toplumsal süreçlerinin özelliklerine odaklandım. Bu amaçla, entegrasyon süreci analiz edilirken, kimlik oluşumu, yurttaşlık statüleri ve hiyerarşisi, kurumsal ayrımcılık, Goslar'ın yerel özellikleri, buradaki Türk-Müslüman organizasyonlarının, belediye gençlik merkezlerinin entegrasyondaki rolleri, aile ve grup özellikleri dikkate alındı.

Goslar'daki bu çalışma, din ve etnisiteye dayanan tepkisel kimlik oluşumunu Türkiyeli göçmenlerin algıladıkları "asimilasyon ve yok edilme tehdidine karşı" bir direnç biçimi olarak görmektedir. Bu anlamda, bu göçmen grubun etnik ve dini öğeleri kendi kimlik profillerini oluşturmak ve keskinleştirmek için nasıl kullandıklarının analizi oldukça önemli olmaktadır. Bu noktada Goslar'daki İslami organizasyonların Milli Görüş İslam Cemaati ve Diyanet İşleri Türk İslam Birliği (IGMG ve DİTİB) entegrasyon ve göçmen haklarını geliştirme konularında ne tür katkıları olduğu da dikkate alınmaktadır. Özellikle, entegrasyonun yeni özneleri olarak düşünölebilecek üçüncü kuşak gençlerin entegrasyona yönelik algıları ve davranış biçimlerini analiz ederek entegrasyon sürecini daha iyi anlamak mümkün olacaktır.

### 3.2. TABAKALI YURTTAŞLIK

Avrupalı devletler ve özellikle Almanya ikinci dünya savaşı sonrası göçmen akını sonucunda ortaya çıkan çok-kültürlülüğe nasıl bir tepki vermiştir. Büyük ölçekli göçmen akını ve savaş sonrası ekonomik ihtiyaçların yarattığı krizlerin artışıyla karşılaşan Avrupa devletleri bu duruma iki şekilde karşılık vermiştir: (1) Polisiye ve güvenlik tedbirleri yoluyla ülkelere girişlerde sıkı kontrol ve seçme mekanizmalar inşa etmek; (2) Yasalar yoluyla hakların farklılaştırılması ve tabakalı hale getirilmesi. Bu noktada, bu iki mekanizma, Avrupa ülkelerinin göçmen ve entegrasyon politikalarının ana iskeletini oluşturmaktadır.

Bu çalışma, Goslar kasabesindeki Türkiye’li göçmenlerin üçüncü kuşak gençlerine odaklanarak, Almanya’nın ‘ayrımcı dışlayıcılık modeli’ni (Castles, 1995) ve tabakalı yurttaşlık” (Morris, Lockwood) sistemini sorgulayacaktır. Almanya’nın misafir işçi programında izlerini görebileceği ayrımcı dışlayıcılık modeli ve tabakalı yurttaşlık anlayışı büyük ölçüde kurumsal yapıları belirlemekte ve göçmenlerin sosyal koşullarını doğrudan veya dolaylı bir şekilde etkilemektedir. Bu kurumsal yapılar arasında yurttaşlık ve göçmen politikaları ve yasaları, aile birleşmesi ve oturma yasaları, emek piyasası süreçleri ve eğitim vb. alanlar bulunmaktadır.

Tabakalı yurttaşlık, Lockwood’a (1996) göre, devlet ve bireylerin farklı kategorileri arasında ilişkilere dayanan bir eşitsizlik sistemidir ki haklar buna göre verilmekte veya reddedilmektedir. Resmi içerme ve dışlamaların, hakların uygunluğa göre işlemesi ve resmi olmayan kazanım ve kayıplar hakların dağılımını şekillendirmesi bu tabakalı yurttaşlık sisteminin temeli olmaktadır.

Tabakalı yurttaşlık tezi, verili her bir haklar rejiminin yurttaşlık, bürokrasi ve piyasanın kurumsallaşması üzerinden, esas olarak refah kaynakları, emek piyasası idaresi, ve uluslar arası yaptırımlar gibi çeşitli sınırlılıklar arasındaki dengeyi yansıtmakta olduğunu öne sürmektedir.

Lockwood (1996)'un tabakalı yurttaşlık tezinin önemli başlangıç noktası olan yurttaşlık, piyasa ve bürokrasi alanlarının kurumsal birliği sosyal tutunum ve entegrasyonun yönetimi için merkezi bir yer tutmaktadır.

Genel olarak Almanya'da özel olarak da Goslar kasabasında tabakalı yurttaşlık veya hakların tabakalı hiyerarşinin analizini yaparken, bu çalışmada Türk göçmenlerin ve onların üçüncü kuşak çocuklarının göçmen ve yurttaşlık yasalarının öngördüğü ve aile birleşmeleri, emek piyasasına ulaşma ve sosyal haklardan yararlanma vb konularda tabii oldukları farklı kategorilerin nasıl oluşturulduğu ve uygulandığını irdeleyeceğim. Bu anlamda, bu haklar hiyerarşinin ve tabakalı yurttaşlık sisteminin Türk göçmenler ve onların Alman vatandaşlığına geçmiş olan çocukları için ortaya çıkardığı ayrımcı sonuçlar ve bunların sosyal bütünleşme ve entegrasyon alanındaki geniş etkileri üzerinde odaklanmaktayım.

Sınırlarda veya ülke içerisinde fiziksel kontrol ve bununla ilişkili pratikler (sınırdışı etme, vatandaşlıktan çıkarma ve tutuklama vb.) hala önemini korumasına rağmen, çağdaş dünyada göçmenlerin yönetimi genellikle farklılaştırılmış hakların ve farklı göçmen kategorilerin dağıtılması yoluyla sürdürülmektedir. Bu farklılaştırılmış hiyerarşik hakların verilmesi çeşitli mekanizmalar yoluyla milliyet, beceri düzeyi, sosyoekonomik durum ve cinsiyet gibi odaklar -doğrudan olmasa da dolaylı yollardan- üzerinden yürütülmektedir. Sonuç olarak, günümüz göç ve entegrasyon politikaları ve idaresi, göçmenlerin kabulü, oturma, çalışma, sosyal haklar vb açılardan farklı statülerin ve ilişkili haklar grubunun çoğaltılması, birbirinden ayrıştırılması ve çelişmesini içeren tabakalı yurttaşlık sistemini ortaya

çıkarmaktadır. Dolayısıyla, tabakalı yurttaşlık kavramı bazı özel göçmen grupların haklarının genişletilmesi veya daraltılmasına yol açan bir sistem olarak değerlendirilebilir.

Goslar'daki istatistiki verilerle de desteklenen bu alan araştırmasındaki sonuçlar göstermektedir ki Türkiyeli göçmenlerin çocukları yüksek eğitimde oldukça düşük seviyede temsil edilmekte ve diğer gruplarla kıyaslandığında işsizlik oranları açısından oldukça yüksek ve dengesiz bir oranda işsizliği deneyimlemektedir. Türkiyeli göçmenler ve onların çocukları diğer yabancı ülke vatandaşlarıyla birlikte, hakların hiyerarşisinde ve tabakalı yurttaşlık sistemi içerisinde etnik Alman ve Avrupa Birliği vatandaşlarından sonra gelmekte ve alt sıralarda bulunmaktadır.

Türkiyeli göçmenlerin çocuklarının eğitim ve emek piyasasındaki dezavantajlı pozisyonları basitçe insan sermayesi eksikliği ve sosyal ilişkilerinin zayıflığı gibi faktörlerle açıklanamayacak kadar karmaşık bir durumdur. Burada tabakalı yurttaşlık tezini öne sürerek, yapısal dışlama ve ayrımcılık mekanizmaları gibi başka makro faktörlere bakmamız gerektiğini iddia ediyorum.

Tabakalı yurttaşlık tezi, yurttaşlık yasaları ve uygulamalarının devletin tarafından verilen haklar yoluyla nasıl bir eşitsizlik sistemi oluşturduğunu göstermektedir. Buna göre, üç gerilimli durumdan bahsetmek dikkate değerdir: resmi içirme ve dışlamalar, resmi olmayan dolaylı kazanımlar ve yoksunluklar ve hakların genişletilmesi ve sınırlandırılması.

Morris, statülerin hiyerarşisine yol açan tabakalı yurttaşlık sisteminde bazı yurttaşlar verilmiş olan haklara ulaşma noktasında resmi olmayan engeller ve yoksunluklarla karşılaşmaktadır. Örneğin, Erdemir ve Vasta (2007)'nin işaret ettiği gibi, bazı haklar yalnızca kağıt üstünde var olabilir, ancak bu

hakların kullanılması söz konusu olduğunda, bazı yurttaşlar büyük zorluklar yaşamakta ve bu haklara ulaşmanın duruma göre değiştiğini keşfetmişlerdir.

Bununla birlikte, burada yurttaş olanlarla olmayanlar arasında veya yurttaşlar arasındaki hiyerarşinin hiç bir zaman değişmeyecek ve durağan bir şey olduğunu iddia etmedim. Daha ziyade, tabakalı yurttaşlık sisteminin sınırlarını göstermeye ve devlet tarafından oluşturulan eşitsiz haklar hiyerarşinin nasıl dinamik bir şekilde işlemeye ve değişmeye eğilimli olduğunu anlatmaya çalıştım. Dolayısıyla, bu tabakalı haklar hiyerarşisi, yerel, bölgesel, ulusal ve küresel düzeylerdeki göçmen ve entegrasyon politikaları, ekonomik ihtiyaçlar ve sosyal güvenlik sistemindeki değişimler tarafından şekillendirilmektedir.

Alman tabakalı yurttaşlık sisteminde, daha ileri bazı hakların kazanılmasının önkoşulu belli koşulların gerçekleştirilmesine bağlıdır ve sonuç olarak uzun süreli güvenli oturma ve sonuç olarak yurttaşlığın kazanılmasına hizmet edecektir. Dolayısıyla, örneğin, tam çalışma haklarına yalnızca ekonomik olarak kendi kendine yeterliliğini ispatlamış olması şartına bağlanmıştır ancak eğer sosyal yardım- bu hakka sahip olsa bile- alıyorsa bir üst düzeydeki hakkın verilmesinden yoksun bırakılmaktadır. Bu süreç, hakların muğlak bir doğasının olduğunu ve hakların kullanılmasının bazı şartlara bağlı olduğunu ve bunların da göçmenleri kontrol etmeye yaradığına işaret etmektedir.

Bugün göçmen ve çocuklarının aile birleşmeleri, çalışma hakkı vb. bazı haklara ya da açıktan sınırlılıklara sahip olması, ırk ve kültür gibi kriterler yoluyla değil, yurttaşlık açısından tarif edilmektedir ve bu durumun kaçınılmaz etkileri daha dolaylı olmaktadır. Açıkcası, vize uygulamaları, kaynaklara ulaşma kısıtları ve sınır kontrollerinin resmi olmayan uygulamaları, ve güvenlik tedbirler daha çok üçüncü dünya uluslarının



vatandaşlarını hedef almaktadır ve onların çalışma fırsatlarını ve hizmetlere ulaşmalarını etkileyecek şekilde meşru haklarından yoksun kalmalarına yol açmaktadır.

Bu tez, yurttaşlığın göçmen özneler için muhtemel özgürleştirici potansiyelini kabul etmekle birlikte, yurttaşlık nosyonunun dahil edici ve dışlayıcı sınırlarının etkilerini açığa çıkarmak için ulus devletin yurttaşlık çerçevesini ve onun kusurlu doğasını analiz etmeye ve radikal olarak eleştirmeye adanmıştır. Sonuç olarak, bu çalışma yurttaşlığın kuralcı biçimi ve ona ulaşmanın eşitsizliğini eleştirerek, kağıt üstündeki mevcut hakların uygulamalarının marjinalleşme ve dışlama mekanizmalarının üstesinden gelemediğini öne sürmektedir. Bu yüzden yurttaşlık tarihsel ve coğrafi olarak genişletilmiş olsa bile, kamusal alanda işleyen evrensel yurttaşlık ideali gibi politik kurgular tarafından üstü örtülen hakim iktidar ilişkilerinin bir özetidir.

Başlangıcından itibaren yurttaşlık kavramı, bir ulusun baskıcı kurallarını o ulusun, dışarda kalanların üzerinde haklılaştırılmasını sağlayan dışlayıcı bir kategoridir. Michael Walzer'in söylediği gibi yurttaşların, yurttaş olmayanlar ve yabancılar üzerindeki tahakkümü, muhtemelen insanlık tarihindeki en barbar despotluk biçimidir.

Bugün Avrupa'da ve diğer yerlerde yurttaşlık, zengin devletleri fakir göçmenlerden koruyan ve toplumsal kapanımın güçlü bir aracı haline gelmiştir. Yurttaşlık aynı zamanda her bir devletin yurttaşla yabancı arasında meşru ve idelojik sınır oluşturması nedeniyle devletlerin içinde de kapanıma yol açan bir araçtır. Sonuç olarak, her devlet belli sorumlulukları olduğu kadar belli hak ve faydaları muhafaza ederek, kendi yurttaşları ve yabancı oturma olanlar arasında bir ayırım yapar. Çünkü bazı göçmenlerin göçmen statüsünde kalarak ülkede süresiz olarak kalmalarına izin verilmesi, ancak onları siyasal alanın dışında bırakarak ve toplumsal ve

ekonomik hayata ise neredeyse yurttaşlarla eşit koşullarda katılmalarını sağlayarak söz konusu olmaktadır.

Kağıt üstünde yasal yurttaşlık ya da tabiyete geçme her zaman yeterli değildir. Üçüncü kuşak Türk gençliğinin emek piyasasında ve eğitimdeki aşağıya doğru entegrasyonu bunun bir kanıtı olarak görülebilir. Yasal düzeyde Alman vatandaşlığına ve tabiyetine geçmek, tam bir entegrasyon ve Alman dili, kültürü ve değerleriyle güçlü bir özdeşleşmeyi gerektirmektedir. Bununla birlikte emek piyasası ve eğitimdeki sosyo-kültürel kabuller bu beklentilerle uyuşmamaktadır. Aslında Almanya'daki devlet politikaları ve kurumsal pratikler dahil edici bir mantığı yansıtmamaktadır.

Örneğin, 1999 yılında Almanya'da Türkiyeli ve diğer göçmenlerin yurttaşlığa geçişini kolaylaştıran ve Almanya'da doğan göçmen çocuklarını otomatik olarak yurttaş olmasını sağlayan yeni bir yasa yürürlüğe girdi. Bununla birlikte, göç edilen toplumda var olan önyargı ve kültürel kalıplara dayanan kurumsal pratikler, idari rutinler ve resmi olmayan iktidar ilişkileri bu göçmenlerin ve çocuklarının yurttaşlık haklarını gereği gibi kullanmalarını engellemektedir. Dahası bu kurumsal pratikler bu göçmenlerin ve çocuklarının özel durumlarını ve ihtiyaçlarını görmezden gelmektedir.

Vatandaşlığın kolaylaştırılması çok önemli bir gelişme olmasına rağmen Alman toplumunun sahip olduğu ve tarihsel köklere dayanan etno-kültürel (ethno-culturalist) vatandaşlık bakış açısı, toplumdaki kurumsal anlayışa hakim görünmektedir. Bu anlayış, vatandaşlığı, Alman ırkına kan ve akrabalık mensubiyetiyle ölçen bir anlayıştır. Bu anlayışın en belirgin göstergesi, 1950'lerde kabul edilen bir yasayla Alman ırkına mensup dünyadaki tüm insanların bu mensubiyetlerini veya soy-ağaçlarını bir kimlikle kanıtladıklarında otomatik olarak Alman vatandaşlığına

alınmasıdır. Bu yasadan yararlanarak Almanya'ya göç eden etnik Almanların (*Aussiedler*) sayısı özellikle 1990'dan itibaren Sovyetlerin dağılmasıyla birlikte ciddi bir artış göstermiştir. Dağılan Sovyetler Birliğinden ve eski komünist ülkelerden gelen etnik Almanların sayısının 3 milyona yaklaştığı tahmin edilmektedir.

Bütün bu gelişmeler Almanya'da alttan alta kurumsal bir ayrımcılık (institutional discrimination) olgusunun yaşanması ve kökleşmesine de katkıda bulunmuştur. Kurumsal ayrımcılık, açık ve doğrudan ayrımcılıktan farklı olarak, göçmen ve onların çocuklarının eğitim alanında veya iş piyasasında iş ararken karşılaştıkları sistematik olmayan ama işlevleri açısından göçmen çocuklarının ayrımcılığı hissettikleri ve sonuçlarını yaşadıkları bir durum olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Örneğin, göçmen olduğu başvurulardaki isimlerden anlaşılan göçmen çocuklarının mülakata çağrılmadıkları ya da mülakata çağrılrsa bile reddedilme oranlarının diğer eşit durumdaki insanlardan daha yoğun olduğu araştırmalarla ortaya konulmuştur (Miera, 2008).

Genel olarak Türk göçmenleri ve onların çocukları için iki tane önemli eleyici faktörden söz edilebilir: becerilere göre ayrımcı uygulamalara tabii olmak ve kültürel özcü anlayışla karşılaşmak. Birincisi, gelir düzeyi ve göçmen statüleri açısından farklılaştırılmış haklar üzerinden sınıflama, seçme ve tabakalandırmaya dayanan tabakalı yurttaşlık sisteminin devamını sağlamaktadır. İkinci eleyici faktör ise kurumsal ayrımcılığın ve dışlayıcı ayrımcılık anlayışın temelini oluşturmaktadır.

Abadan-Unat'a (1992: 404) göre Almanya ve Avrupa'da iki çelişkili yaklaşım söz konusudur. Birincisi, göçmen bireyler ve çocukları, gerekli nitelikleri taşıdığıında birbirleriyle geniş bir toplumsal alanda herkese açık ekonomik rekabet içine özgürce girebilmektedir. İkincisi, çoğulcu toplumun bir gereği olarak, toplumsal taleplerin gerçekleştirilmesi ve

ifadesinde ise farklı kurumların ayrıcalıklı ve dikkatlice bölünmüş sosyal ve siyasal alana katıldıklarını gözlemliyoruz. Bu alanlara katılımlar münhasıran büyük ölçüde Avrupalı yurttaşlara ayrılmıştır. Bu durum kültürel engellerin ne denli kuvvetli olduğunu göstermektedir: göçmenler veya yurttaşlar, taleplerinin önüne dini bir etiket koyduğunda Müslüman kimliklerini muhafaza ediyorlar ve entegre olmamakla ve tek yönlü bir bakışa sahip olmakla suçlanıyorlar. Ancak bu noktada, göçmenler ve çocuklarının bir bakıma karşılaştıkları sınırlamalar, engeller ve ayrımcılık sonucunda bu rolü oynamaya zorlanmaktadır denilebilir.

Bu noktada, Türklerle birlikte üçüncü dünya vatandaşları ve onların çocuklarını sosyal hayatın her alanına katılım hakları ve kaynaklara ulaşma açılardan Avrupalı vatandaşlarla (etnik Almanlar dahil) eşit hale getirmek, göçmenlere aşağı haklar ve statüler veren bu tabakalı yurttaşlık sisteminin yıkılmasının ve marjinalleşmenin ve sosyal izolasyonu ortadan kaldırabilmenin ilk adımıdır.

### **3.3. PARÇALI ENTEGRASYON (SEGMENTED INTEGRATION)<sup>26</sup> VE GOSLAR'DA TÜRK GÖÇMEN ÇOCUKLARININ BÖLÜNmüş KADERLERİ**

Bu çalışma ne Türkiyeli gençlerini homojen bir grup olarak varsaymaktadır ne de entegrasyonun düzçizgisel bir süreç olduğunu öne

---

<sup>26</sup> Asimilasyon kavramını çağrıştırdığı tüm olumsuz imaları dışarda bırakmak amacıyla çalışma boyunca entegrasyon ya da bütünleşme, uyum vb kavramları tercih ettim. Bu durumun mantıksal devamı olarak "segmented assimilation" yerine "segmented integration" kavramını kullanmayı uygun gördüm. Ayrıca, "segmented" kavramının Türkçe karşılığı olarak, entegrasyonun çoklu boyutlarını anlatan durumu en iyi anlatacak terim olduğunu düşündüğüm "parçalı" kavramını tercih ettim.

sürmektedir. Entegrasyon farklı göçmen gruplarının yasal statülerinin (misafir işçi, etnik Alman, mülteciler, iltica edenler vb) dikkate alınmasını gerektiren bir süreçtir. Üstelik bu göçmen grupların sınıfsal, etnik ve dini özellikleri de entegrasyon sürecini karmaşık ve kompleks bir hale getirmektedir. Örneğin yalnızca Türkiyeli göçmenleri ele aldığımızda, karşımıza etnik (Türk, Kürt, Süryani vb), dinsel (Alevi, Sünni vb) ve sınıfsal (alt, üst ve orta sınıf) gruplar karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Dolayısıyla bu farklı grupların deneyimledikleri entegrasyon süreci oldukça farklı yollar izleyecektir ve izlemektedir.

Bu çalışma açısından, entegrasyon düzçizgisel teleolojik tek bir biçimi olan bir süreç değil, başka sosyal olgularla iç içe geçen, parçalı ve bölünmüş (segmented) bir süreçtir. Portes, Fernandez-Kelly ve William Haller (2009) göstermiştir ki özellikle aile kompozisyonlarındaki farklılıklar, kültürel sermaye, göç edilen ülkedeki kabul edilme koşulları ve çeşitli karşılaşılan çeşitli engeller, göçmen çocuklarının uyumunun bölünmüş ve bölünmüş olmasına yol açan dışsal faktörlerdir.

Entegrasyon sürecinin belirleyici öğelerinden birisi, göç alan toplumun var olan mevcut koşulları yani göçmenlere eğitim ve emek piyasasında eşit fırsatlar sağlayacak olan açıklık düzeyini belirleyecek olan göçmenlere karşı olumlu veya düşmanca tutumdur. Bu aynı zamanda o toplumun kurumsal dışlayıcılık ve ayrımcılık derecesini gösterecektir. Entegrasyonu etkileyen ikinci unsur toplumsal sınıf, aile biçimi ve çocukların sosyal arkaplanı olmaktadır ki bunlar entegrasyonun yönünü ve devamlılığını etkileyen sosyal kültürel ve insani sermayeyi oluşturmaktadır.

Bu çalışma, bölünmüş entegrasyon modelinin en önemli önermesinin Türk göçmenlerin yeni kuşak çocuklarının entegrasyon sürecinin oldukça çeşitli olduğu iddiasına dayanmaktadır. Hangi entegrasyon biçiminin seçileceğini etkileyen bireysel (eğitim düzeyi, dil yeteneği vb) ve yapısal (kabul edilme

koşulları, aile yapısı, kurumsal destek ya da engeller) faktörler söz konusudur. Bölünmüş entegrasyon, bir çok faktöre bağlı olarak entegrasyonun alternatif yolları olduğunu tanımlamaktadır. Bu faktörlerden en önemli dört tanesini sıralamak gerekirse; 1) Birinci kusağın getirdiği özellikler; 2) entegrasyon süreçlerine çocukların uyum gösterme yeteneklerindeki hızları; 3) Başarılı entegrasyon için yaşanabilecek sorunlar yani ikinci ve üçüncü kuşakların karşılaştıkları kültürel ve ekonomik engeller; 4) Göçmen aile ve topluluğunun bu engellerle başedebileceği kaynakların olma(ma)sı. Bütün bu faktörler entegrasyonun aşağı mı yoksa yukarı doğru mu bir hareketlilik şeklinde gerçekleşeceğini belirleyicileri olacaktır.

Bölünmüş entegrasyon teorisi, üç bölümden oluşmaktadır: 1) Önemli dışsal faktörlerin betimlenmesi 2) göçmen çocuklarının bugün karşı karşıya kaldığı temel engellerin tanımlanması 3) bu güçlerin kendi aralarındaki ilişkilerinden doğan farklı entegrasyon yollarının tahmin edilmesi. Dışsal faktörler, göçmen ailesinin karşılaştığı ve onların çocuklarının da karşı karşıya kaldığı temel kaynaklar ya da eksiklikler olarak düşünülebilir. Bu faktörler 1) göçmen ebeveynlerin sahip olduğu insani sermaye 2) Göç edilen ülkenin kabul etme koşulları 3) göçmen ailenin genel kompozisyonu.

Parçalı entegrasyon kuramını takip eden bu çalışma üçüncü kuşak Türk gençlerinin kendi kimliklerini inşa ederken Alman toplumuna ayrı ayrı farklı yollarla uyum sağlamakta olduğunu iddia etmektedir. Bazı gençler Alman toplumuyla yoğun ve pozitif yollarla ilişki kurmayı tercih etmektedir. Diğer bazıları ise kendi ulusal, etnik ve kültürel kaynaklarına dönme konusunda olumlu bir tutum içine girebilir. Bazıları ise Goslar'da sosyal ve politik olaylara aktif olarak katılmayı tercih ederken, diğerleri ise kültürler ve uluslararası gruplarla ilişki kurma yolunu benimsemektedir. Son olarak diğer Türk gençleri grubu ise kendilerini doğrudan kültürel ve

dinsel organizasyonlarla tanımlar ve buna göre davranmaktadırlar. Dolayısıyla, Alman toplumuna uyum konusunda bir sürü bireysel yollar bulunmaktadır.

Goslar'daki kurumsal yapıların neden olduğu yapısal nedenler yüzünden, işsizlik, düşük eğitim düzeyi, okuldan erken ayrılma, suça bulaşma ve kısmen uyuşturucu bağımlılığı gibi olgular Goslar'daki üçüncü kuşak Türk gençlerinin aşağı doğru entegrasyon deneyimlerinin göstergeleri olmaktadır. Ancak bu noktada söylemek gerekir ki Türkiyeli göçmenlerin aşağı doğru entegrasyon deneyimleri bilinçli olarak seçilen bir yol değil, bir dizi sınırlılıkların biraradalığı, kötü şans ve sınırlı fırsatların bir sonucu olarak görülmelidir.

Türkiyeli göçmenlerin ve onların çocuklarının yoksul koşulları bir dizi karmaşık faktörle açıklanabilir: göçmen ailelerin sosyal ve kültürel sermayesi; dezavantajlı durumda olan çocukların eğitim sürecini desteklemeyen eğitim sistemi; emek piyasası ve mesleki eğitim sistemine ulaşmada okul derecelerinin çok yüksek önemde olması; sosyal yaşamın her alanında yaşanan bilinçli ya da bilinçsiz olarak gerçekleşen ayrımcı uygulamalar; kabul edilme koşulları ve entegrasyonun idare tarzları vb.

Saha çalışmasındaki etnografik gözlemler ve toplanan eğitim ve iş piyasasına ilişkin ayrıntılı istatistikler göstermiştir ki okulun terk edilmesi, eğitimdeki başarısızlık, işsizlik ve suç davranışlarının artışı Türk gençlerinin Alman toplumundaki aşağısındaki konumları pekiştirmekte ve ayrımcılık anlayışlarını kuvvetlendirmektedir. Bu basmakalıp anlayışlar gelecekteki kuşakların ve göçmen işçilerin entegrasyon başarılarının şansını azaltmakta ve düşmanlık ve tepkisel duyguları tırmandırmaktadır.

### 3.4. GENÇLİK KÜLTÜRLERİ, GENÇLİK MERKEZLERİ VE TEPKİSEL KİMLİK OLUŞUMU

Almanya’da “üçüncü kuşak gençlik”ten kastedilen, ebeveynleri Türkiye’den Almanya’ya göç etmiş ve orada yaşayan ikinci kuşak anne ve babaların çocuklarıdır. Bu araştırma için gencin evli ya da bekar olmasına ve yaşlarına bakılmaksızın sadece üçüncü kuşak kategorisine girmesi yeterli olmuştur. Ancak, gencin geldiği dini ve etnik köken çalışmanın dikkate alacağı kategorilerden biri olacaktır. Bu süreçte kız ve erkeklerin yaşadıkları deneyimler, kimlik gelişim süreçleri ve yaşadıkları topluma bakışlarındaki algı biçimleri cinsiyet farklılıkları dikkate alınarak izlenmeye çalışılacaktır. Bu çalışma aynı zamanda küçük ölçekli bir kasabada çok kültürlülük, entegrasyon ve yurttaşlık gibi konularda üçüncü kuşak gençliğin yerel açıdan nasıl deneyimlerinin olduğunu analiz etmeye çalışırken kimlik ve gençliği belli bir yerel bağlam içerisinde anlama hedefindedir. Bu sayede üçüncü kuşağın sosyalizasyon sürecinin de detaylı olarak izlenebileceği düşünülmektedir.

Gençler açısından, kasaba ölçeğinde yürütmüş olduğum çalışmanın verilerinden hareketle çalışmanın en önemli sonuçlarından birisi şöyle özetlenebilir: Artık Almanya’da yaşayan göçmen çocuklarının kendilerinden önceki kuşaklardan farklı boyutları ve özellikleri olan bir kimlik dönüşümünü deneyimledikleri ve bu deneyimlerin de farklı kimlik bileşimleri ortaya çıkardığıdır. Bir kere, üçüncü kuşak gençliğin kimliklerini meydana getiren kültürel referanslar ve kaynaklar çoğullaşmıştır. Gençlerin içine doğdukları ailenin baskın kültürü ister İslami değerler ister Kürtlük isterse Alevilik olsun, gençlerin bu değerleri içselleştirme ve yaşamlarına dahil etme biçimleri içinde buldukları Alman kültürünün ve sosyalizasyon süreçlerinin izlerini de beraberinde taşımaktadır.



Avrupa’da yasayan üçüncü kuşak gençler varlıklarıyla, yasadıkları toplumsal ve kültürel pratiklerle, geliştirdikleri aidiyet biçimleriyle herhangi bir ulusal bağlama ve kavramsal çerçeveye (Türkiye, Almanya) sığdırılmayacak kadar zengin bir tecrübeye sahiptirler.

Goslar’da 2005-2006 yılları arasında ziyaret ettiğim ve altı ay gönüllü sosyal pedagoğ olarak çalışma yaptığım iki gençlik merkezinde (Gleis 95, BGX) hem Alman hem de Türk gençlerini yakından tanıma ve gözleme fırsatı buldum. Gençlik merkezleri, Goslar belediyesinin bünyesinde faaliyetlerini sürdürüyordu ve bu gençlik merkezleri gençlerin muhtemel genç suçluluğunu önlemek ve onlara farklı bakış açıları ve imkanlar sağlamak hedefleriyle kurulmuşlardı. Gençler bu merkezlerde, çeşitli spor aktiviteleri, geziler, müzik, dans vb. faaliyetlere ücretsiz bir şekilde katılabilmektedir. Ayrıca, derslerinde ve iş başvuru dilekçesi hazırlama konularında yardıma ihtiyaç duyduklarında profesyonel destek alabilmektedirler. Türkiye’li göçmenlerin yoğun olarak yaşadığı Goslar ve Oker bölgelerinde faaliyet gösteren bu iki gençlik merkezi gençlere psikolojik ve sosyal destekler vermektedir.

Aynı zamanda gençlerin buluşma mekanı olarak işlev gören bu gençlik merkezleri, çocukların ve gençlerin sohbet ettikleri, televizyon izledikleri, oyunlar oynadıkları, kağıt oynadıkları, müzik dinleyip dans edebildikleri ve sosyal pedagoğlardan her konuda yardım alabildikleri yerlerdir.

Gençlik merkezinin ziyaretçileri genel olarak sosyal yönlendirme ve psikolojik destek ihtiyacında olan Alman ve Türk gençlerden oluşmaktadır. Gençlerden önemli bir kısmı ağırlıklı olarak Almanca konuşmakla birlikte bazen Almanca-Türkçe karışımı bir dil kullanımı tercih etmektedir. En göze çarpan özellikleri arasında özellikle bazı gençlerin etnik ya da dini köken farklılıklarını öne çıkararak, Türk milliyetçiliğine, Türklük ve Müslümanlıklarına yaptıkları özel vurgulardır. Biraz

sorguladıklarılarında, savundukları etnik veya dini özellikler ve geçmiş hakkında derin ve ayrıntılı bilgi sahibi olmadıkları da anlaşılmaktadır. Bu düzeydeki bir etnik ve dini sahiplenmeyi Gans (1979, 1992) “sembolik etnisite” ve “sembolik dinsel” gibi iki teorik kavramla açıklamaya çalışmaktadır.

Örneğin Hakan (23, interview, 2006) Goslar’daki üçüncü kuşaktan arkadaşlarının dinsel ve milliyetçi öğeleri, hakkında hemen hiçbir şey bilmeden nasıl kullandıklarının altını çizmektedir:

Ben aşırı milliyetçi arkadaşlarıma Türk milliyetçiliği, politika ve tarih hakkında sorular soruyorum. Ama, onlar sahip oldukları milliyetçi semboller ve onların anlamları ve fikirleri hakkında hiç birşey bilmedikleri için cevap veremiyorlar. Mesela, kolye olarak taktıkları veya sembolünü taşıdıkları üç hilalin, bozkurtun vb. sembollerin anlamlarını bilmiyorlar. Onlar sadece nasıl sanki Türk gibi hissettiklerini göstermek istiyorlar. (Hakan, 23, 2006).

Ayrıca, gençlik merkezlerine sıkça gelen gençler, birbirlerine yönelik olarak hem sözel hem de bedensel hareketlerinde şiddeti bir tarz olarak benimsemektedirler. Bu durum, sadece birbirlerine karşı değil özellikle Alman arkadaşlarına karşı da gerçekleşmekte ve bu aynı zamanda tepkisel kimlik oluşumunun da izlerini taşımaktadır.

Portes ve Rumbaut (1996, 2001) ‘tepkisel etnisite’ (reactive ethnicity) kavramını göç alan toplumun anaakım anlayışlarının, kültürel ve kurumsal yapılarının karşısında karşı bir muhalefet olarak savunmacı kimliklerin ve dayanışmaların yükselişini tarif etmek için ortaya atmışlardır. Örneğin Smith’in (1998) alt-kültür kimlik oluşumu teorisine göre de tehdit algısı sürdüğü sürece buna karşı oluşacak kişisel kimlikler ve grup dayanışması güçlü olmaya devam edecektir.

Goslar’daki çoğu Türkiyeli üçüncü kuşak göçmen çocuklarının Alman toplumuna karşı mesafeli bir ilişki içinde olmasına neden olan ayrımcılık ve sosyal izolasyon ve marjinalleşme konumlarının devam etmesi yeniden

etnikleşme (re-ethnicization), yeniden kimliğiyle özdeşleşme ve etnik ve dini referansları olan kimlik formlarına geri dönme olgularına işaret eden tepkisel kimlik oluşumunu ortaya çıkarmaktadır.

Göçmenlerin çocukların statüsü “daimi vatandaşlar” konumuna dönüşmüştür. Bu durumun Goslar gibi küçük bir kasabada bile artık görünür hale gelmiş olan onlarca kanıtını gözlemek mümkündür: dil kullanımındaki değişimler, vatandaşlığa geçişler, çeşitli tüketim alışkanlıklarındaki ve davranışlarındaki değişiklikler, tercih edilen arkadaşlık biçimleri, yaşanan çevre ve kurulan sosyal iletişim ağları ve en çok da değişen yaşam tarzları bu köklü değişimlerin değişik işaretçileri sayılabilir.

Çalışmada Almanya’daki Türkiyeli göçmenlerin çocukları olan yeni nesil gençler söz konusu olduğunda, bu gençlerin genel olarak geleneksel ve modern değerler arasında bir “arada kalmışlık duygusu” ile yetiştiklerini düşünen anlayışını sorgulamaktadır. Bu anlayışın, günümüzde literatürde oldukça tartışılan yanları mevcuttur. Örneğin, Türk göçmenler üzerine çalışan Kaya (2005) ve Soysal (2001; 2002) gibi sosyal bilimciler bu durumda olan göçmen kökenli gençlerin değişik kültürel pratiklerine bakarak bu “arada kalmışlık” durumunun karşısında pasif ve etkisiz olmadıkları, aksine kendi kimlik oluşum süreçlerine aktif olarak katılıp bu iki kültürün yeni bir sentezinin ortaya çıkmasında katkıda bulduklarını iddia ederler.

Hiçbir göçmen ailesi ve onun bireyi, göçün yarattığı dönüştürücü etkiden kaçamaz. Bu bağlamda geleneğin ve sosyal ilişkilerin bir boyutu olarak evlilik, namus/cinsel ilişki, kadın/erkek ilişkilerinde gençlerin sahip olduğu anlayışlar, kuşaklar arası ilişkiler açısından Alman dilinin ve Alman kültür ve eğitiminin gençler üzerindeki etkilerini izleyerek Almanya’daki geleneklerin üçüncü kuşakta göze çarpan değişikliklerini kuşaklar arası “dikey ilişkiler” ekseninde anlaşılmaya çalışılmıştır.

Bunun yanında aslında üçüncü kuşak gençlerin maruz kaldığı geleneksel değerler de birinci kuşağın ilelebet koruduğu ve muhafaza ettiği, dönüşüme uğramamış bir gelenek de değildir. Aksine Almanya’da yaşanan ve hem Hıristiyan kültürüyle ve hem de batılı değerlerle olan yaklaşık yarım asırlık bir diyalog, geleneksel Türk-Müslüman kültürünü ve onun öznelere olarak düşündüğümüz göçmenlerin kültürel pratiklerini de dönüştürmüştür.

Goslar’da üçüncü kuşak gençlerin buldukları çok kültürlü ortamda, kimlik edinme sürecinde izledikleri yollar oldukça çeşitlidir. Bir genç Alman toplumsal çevresine pozitif olarak dahil olmasının doğru olup olmayacağını sorguluyor olabilir. Başka bir genç de bu sorunu kendisini kendi ebeveynlerinin anavatanda sahip oldukları etnik ve kültürel kaynaklarına geri dönerek ve Alman toplumuyla olan bağını bilinçli şekilde zayıflatarak çözmek isteyebilir. Bazıları da aktif bir şekilde toplumsal ve politik olaylara katılarak Alman toplumunda yaşamayı tercih ederken, diğerleri de farklı toplumsal ve ulusal geçmişlerden gelen insanlarla kültürler arası bir arayışı tercih ederler. Bununla birlikte bazı gençler de doğrudan doğruya kendilerini etnik terimlerle tarif edip buna göre davranmaktadırlar.

Goslar’daki üçüncü kuşak gençler aynı anda hem Türklüğü (ya da Kürtlüğü veya başka bir etnik kökeni), hem Müslümanlığı (veya laikliği) hem de Alman vatandaşlığını farklı bileşimler halinde yaşıyorlar. Tüm içerdiği sorunlara rağmen, bu kimlikler farklı kültürel referanslardan beslenip farklı bir kimlik ve dolayısıyla da vatandaşlık biçimi oluşturuyorlar. İlginç bir şekilde yeni kuşak gençler hem Almanlarla ortak bir zeminde eşit olma mücadelesi veriyor hem de bunu zaman zaman farklılıklarını da dile getirerek yapıyorlar. Yani bir bakıma farklılıklarını Alman vatandaşlıklarının içine dahil etmeye çalışıyorlar. Bunu yaparken içinde buldukları toplumun dilini öğreniyorlar, siyasete ve topluma katılmaya çalışıyorlar. Bazen bir tutarsızlık gibi görünse

de aslında hem kendi anadillerini konuşmak hem de içinde buldukları toplumun dilini öğrenmeyi bir zenginlik talebi olarak öne sürebiliyorlar.

Üçüncü kuşağın Alman toplumundaki klişelere rağmen göçmen çocuklarının nasıl bir uyum içinde olduğu konusunda Nazmiye'nin ifadeleri oldukça çarpıcı görünmektedir.

Aslında benim durumunda olan bir sürü insan. Ama renksiz ve sessiz, yani medyatik değil. Olay da olmuyor, hiç kimse bunların ne kadar uyum sağladığını veya bunların köklü bir kuşak olduğunu kimse söyleyemiyor. Gerçekten de renksiz ve sessiz. Şimdi bir haber verildiğinde yabancılarla ilgili bakın haberlere, ilk verdikleri haber, yabancılarla ilgiliyse, başörtülü bir kadın gösterir; çok tipiktir bu. Hiçbir zaman böyle... Kadını göstermezler, ama doludur sokaklarda ya da bir sürü yerde ... Onların üzerinde tabii ki, bu onların normalleri olduğu için, her iki taraf için de normal olduğu için, her zaman söylüyorsunuz, ama sizi medyatik değilsiniz, olay değilsiniz, onun için bunun üzerine çok konuşulmuyor. Bu biliniyor, en azından bu işle ciddi anlamda uğrasan insanlar biliyor bunu. Ama ona rağmen Almanya'da genel bir soğuk iklim var yabancılar karşı. Bu ne zamandan beri de oldu diyebilirsiniz? 2001 olayları mıydı? (Nazmiye, 45, 2006)

Nazmiye, Almanya'nın göçmen çocuklarıyla ilgili sorunlar karşısında sorumlu olabileceğine işaret ederek:

Alman toplumu... Renksiz ve sessizleri ya da kendi renginde, kendi sesinde birilerini seçiyor. Bunun seyle de ilgisi olmayabilir, yani birisini dışlama anlamında da ilgisi olmayabilir. Bu sey de olabilir, kendisini korumak anlamında da olabilir. Ama ekonomi kötü olunca, siz sosyal olarak bir sey yapma gereğini de duymuyorsunuz, çünkü acil bir sorunuz var, onu çözmeye çalışıyorsunuz. Almanya'nın genel problemi, okuldan çıkan gençlerin hangi şekilde çıktığıdır, özellikle yabancıların. (Nazmiye, 45, 2006)

Gençlerin kimliğinin temel çerçevesini büyük ölçüde ailesinin değerlerini temsil eden kültürel muhafazakârlık ve içinde bulunduğu topluma uyum öğeleri arasındaki gerilimli sayılabilecek ilişkiler etkilemektedir. Yeni kuşaklar, çok kültürlü bir ortamda birden fazla kültürün etkisi altında toplumsallaşma süreci geçirmektedirler. Toplumsallaşma sürecinin ilk evresinde ev ortamında anne ve babanın kültürü etkili olmaktadır. Büyük

ölçüde kimliğin temel referansları bu dönemde oluşmaktadır. İkinci aşamada ise çocuklar veya gençler, okul ve sokak ortamında Almanya kültürüyle karşılaşmaktadırlar. Farklı seçeneklerle karşı karşıya kalan gençler, genellikle "ev kültürü" ile "çevre kültürü" arasında bir takım seçimler yapmak zorunda kalmaktadırlar. Bu durumda gençler kendilerini sürekli olarak bir gerilim ortamı içinde hissedebilmektedirler.

Ancak “ev kültürü” ve “çevre kültürü” etkilesimi açısından bu noktada su açıkça söylenebilir: Genel olarak bakıldığında Goslar’daki üçüncü kuşak gençlerin tutumları ne tam bir kültürel muhafazakârlık, ne de tam bir asimilasyon modeli çerçevesinde tanımlanabilir. Gençlerin kendilerini ifade biçimi olarak zaman zaman günlük yaşamında sıkça ifade ettikleri "kültürünü koruyarak entegre olma" ifadesi gençlerin anlam dünyalarında bir yere oturmaktadır. Ancak gençlerin bu ifade biçimi gençlerin, “dışarıdan sınırlandırılmamak” ve kendi istedikleri gibi kültürlerini olabildiğince “özgürce yaşamak” istediklerinin bir işareti olarak da okunabilir.

Doğaldır ki bu süreç, Alman toplumunun içinde ve çevresinde yaşayan üçüncü kusağın Türkiye kültürü ve yaşam biçimiyle de irtibatı birinci ve ikinci kuşaga oranla farklılaşmıştır. Dolayısıyla, üçüncü kusağın arkadaşlık ilişkileri, evlilik kalıpları, çalışma davranışları, eğitim durumları vb. gündelik hayat alışkanlıkları da önemli ölçüde değişime uğramıştır.

Örneğin bir görüşmecinin aktardığı bir tanıklık Alman toplumunun da entegrasyon algılarında bir dönüşümün gerekliliğinin altını çizmektedir. Şimdi bu kimlik çoğullaşmasının zor yanlarının da olduğuna işaret eden bu üniversite öğrencisi Murat’a kulak verelim:

Murat: Ben ne zaman desem Türküm desem rezil oluyorum, ne zaman Almanım desem yine rezil oluyorum.

F.G: Niye?

Murat: Bir kere trende dedim, Almanım ben dedim. Askerliğe gittin mi dedi Türkiye’de dedi, Alman arkadaşım. Dedim salakmısın ben Almanım dedim. Bütün trendekiler gülmekten yere yattı. Anlıyosun...

F.G: Anladım

Murat: Yani espri olarak anladı onlar. Halbuysa, ben ciddi söylemek istedim.

F.G: Alman vatandaşısın.

Genç: Öyle demek istedim. Ben Almanım onun için gitmeme gerek yok dedim. Hepsi gülmekten yere yattı. Trendekiler. Ne zaman desem Almanım desem rezil oluyorum, ne zaman Türküm desem yine rezil oluyorum (Murat, 24, 2006).

Yeni kuşak gençler, Alman toplumunun kurallarını aile ilişkilerine dahil ederler ve ebeveynleriyle bu kurallara göre iletişimde bulunurlar yani kendi Alman çevrelerinden türettikleri modeli izlemektedirler. Böyle davranışlar gençlerin topluma ya da ebeveynlerinin kuşagina karşı protestolarını da içerir. Diğer yandan, birçok anne baba kendileri baskı altında yetiştirmeleri yüzünden bu kopuşu kabullenmeyeceklerdir (Kürsat-Ahlers, 1994: 11).

İslami gelenekler ve toplumsal kurallara artan vurgu, geleneksel kültürel değerler ve normlar ve geçmisse yapılan güçlü referans ve birçok süreçler Türk anne babaların göçle kaybettikleri bazı otoritelerini, daha başka değişikliklerle yeniden müdahale etme olanakları olarak yorumlanabilir. Göçten sonra, dini gelenekleri sürdürmek ve İslami bir yenilenme Türk aileleri ve özellikle de bazı Türk babalar ve ağabeyler için göçün istenmeyen toplumsal sonuçlarından geleneksel aileyi korumak için araçlar sağlamaktadır. Burada İslam ataerkil ailenin meşrulasıtırılması için bir araç haline gelmektedir.

Goslar’da gençlik kültürleri esas olarak kendi üyelerinin kimliklerini stiller aracılığıyla ifade ederler. Bununla birlikte bu stiller sosyal sınıf, cinsiyet, etnisite, kuşaksal ve yerel özellikler taşımaktadır. Sonuç olarak bunlar kimlik formasyonunda bulunan karmaşıklığı yansıtırlar. Bu kimlik oluşumları gençlik tarzlarının deneyimleri üzerinden, hem sınırlanan hem de yüzergezen olan kimlik imkânlarından oluşurlar, ama aynı zamanda farklı kimlik oluşumlarının birbirleriyle olan ilişkiselliğini de vurgularlar. Bu çok

kültürlülük ve etnik kimliklerin sınıf, cinsiyet ve yerel kimlikler gibi diğer kimlik oluşum süreçlerinden ayrı olarak düşünölemeyeceđi anlamına gelir.

Göçmenlerin pratiklerinin giderek artan ulus-ötesileşme hayatın her alanını yönlendirmektedir. Kültürel alan ve özellikle Alman-Türklerin popüler kültürü oldukça yüksek düzeylerde ulus-ötesi karakter taşımaktadır. Almanya'daki gençlik kültürleri çok katmanlı ve çok-yerel özellikler göstermektedir. Örneğın, ikinci ve üçüncü kuşak gençlerin arasında Cartel (oldukça radikal bir Türkçülük perspektifiyle) ve Islamic Force (İslamcılık Perspektifiyle), Aziz A (Alevilik perspektifiyle) gibi kültürel kodlar taşıyan müzik grupları oldukça popüler bir durumdadır (Çağlar, 2001: 607)

Ulus-ötesi bir zaviyeden konuşacak olursak, üçüncü kuşak gençliği bağlamında, Almanya'da karşımızda henüz bütün boyutlarıyla anlaşılmayı bekleyen çok-biçimli çoğul-kimlikler ve öznellikler bulunmaktadır. Üçüncü kuşakta, beden dili, yüzselle ifadeler, duruş biçimleri bile görünür bir şekilde değişmiştir. Bu değişiklikler Alman ev sahibi kültüründen de değişik bireylerin duygusal ve bilişsel formlarını sunuyor. Dil üretiminin fizyolojik tarzı, dil, ifade ve duruşun kullanımını kadar ses yaratıcılığı da güçlü bir şekilde Alman dilinden etkilenmiştir.

Diğer yandan üçüncü kuşak gençlik arasında şiddet eğilimlerinin de oldukça belirgin bir özellik olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Bunun çeşitli nedenleri olduğuna dair literatürde oldukça fazla yayınlanmış materyal var. Goslar'daki ve özellikle de Oker'deki gençliğin şiddete olan yatkınlıklarının, onların yerleşim yerleri, sosyalleşme süreçleri, eğitim durumları ve sosyo-ekonomik düzeylerinin karışımı olarak ortaya çıkan bir fenomen olduğuna saptaması yapılabilir.



Oker'de Gleis 95 adlı gençlik merkezinde 3 ayda bir gerçekleştirilen kasabanın güvenlik kurumları ve polis ve belediye ve sivil toplum kuruluşlarının temsilcilerinin kasabanın güvenlik sorunlarının tartışıldığı rutin toplantılar yapılmaktadır. Katılmak fırsatını bulduğumuz bu toplantının büyük bir kısmı Oker'deki güvenlik sorunları ve şiddet olaylarına ayrılmıştı. Şiddet ve yasadışı olaylar başlığında konuşulanlar arasında ilk sırada Türkiye'li göçmenlerin çocukları gelmekteydi ve çoğunlukla küçük çete benzeri grupların büyük ölçüde göçmen çocuklarından oluştuğu raporlar ve örnek olaylarla konuşuldu. Goslar yakınındaki cezaevinde hatırı sayılır sayıda Türk genci olduğu da bu toplantının gündemini oluşturuyordu.

Uzun yıllardır Oker semtinde Gençlik merkezinde sosyal pedagog olarak çalışan Arif, gençliğin şiddete olan yatkınlıklarının onların sosyalleşme süreçleri, eğitim durumları ve sosyo-ekonomik düzeylerinin karışımı olarak ortaya çıkan bir fenomen olduğu saptamasını yapıyor:

Öyle görünüyor ki Goslar ve Almanya'da yaşayan gençlik, şiddete oldukça yatkın bir gençlik. İnsanlar neden şiddet kullanır? Şiddet bir insanın bir sorunu çözmede kullandığı bir metottur. Ancak gerçek şu ki, bu sokakta yaşayan gençler hem geleneksel yapılarından dolayı, hem sosyalizasyon süreçlerinde öğrendiklerinden dolayı yaptıkları bir olay var; problemlerini genellikle şiddetle çözmek isterler. Buna yatkın bir şey. Bunun nedeni, eğitim seviyesidir yüksek ihtimalle, sonra bir de içinde buldukları tabakadır. Burada yaşayan, biz literatürde farklı şeyler kullanırız, daha doğrusu kullanılır, denilir ki proletarya, lümpen proletarya, burjuvazi bilmem ne. Bunlar yanlış şeyler de değil tabii, ama çok doğru şeyler de değil. Böyle toplumda bütün sınıflar sınırlarla ayrılmış, bir taraflara koymuş, oradan oraya geçiş yasak gibi, böyle bir şey söz konusu değil. Ama bir realite ki, örneğin, Berlin'de çeşitli bölgelerde, semtlerde farklı sosyal yapılara sahip insanlar oturur. Bizim bu sokağımızda oturan insanların sosyal yapıları, ekonomik yapıları, kültürel yapıları bu, buna denk düşüyor. Biz bunu tarif ederiz, getto deriz belki, belki bunlara asosyal deriz, haklı mıyız, haksız mıyız, ayrı bir şey; ama böyle saptamalar yapabiliriz (Arif, 33, 2006).

Bu yapısal dışlama mekanizmalarıyla el ele giden bu süreç, sonuna kadar var olma savaşı veren, haklarını koruyan bir genç tipolojisi ortaya çıkarmaktadır. Ancak bu özelliğiyle Almanlara ya da Almanların sembolize edildiği sisteme karşı bilenen bu genç "Türk" olma özelliğini kaybetmektedir. İçinde

Arapların, Afrikalıların, Türklerin, Almanların olduğu ve “öfke” taşıyan bir gençliktir. Bir bakıma “Afro-Amerikalı” benzeri bir rol modele gönderme yapan bu gençlerin öfkesi paylaşılan bir öfke, mizahı paylaşılan bir mizahtır; örneğin Türkiye kökenli gençlerle birlikte ortak deneyimler yaşayan Alman kökenli gençlerin lügatçesine “ulan”, “lan” gibi kelimeler girebilmektedir.

Bu gençlerin sıkıştığı iki referans dünyası bir tarafta Almanya, diğer tarafta Türkiye değildir. Bundan daha basit (belki de gündelik hayatta söz konusu olduğu için daha karmaşık) bir ikilemdir ve “aile” ile “sokakların düzeni” arasındadır. Örneğin sosyal pedagoğ Metz bunu şöyle ifade ediyor:

Burada çocukların geleceğinde suça bulasmak var; çünkü baba gece gündüz çalışıyor; çocuğuna sahip çıkamıyor. (Metz, 47, 2006 )

Başka bir deyişle, çocuk kendisi üzerinde sembolik bir güç olarak var olan aile otoritesinin dışına çıkmamak ve sokağın sesini dinlemek arasında gidip gelmektedir. Aile çocuğunu korumak istiyor. Benzer şekilde, ev “disiplinli aile yapısını” özetlemekte; dışarıya ise tehditler ve başarısızlık ihtimalleriyle dolu, çok güçlü bir rekabete sahne olan bir mekân anlamına gelmektedir. Bu durumda yaşayan genç, bir görüşmecimizin ifade ettiği gibi “sokakta Alman, evde Türk” olmaktadır; ya da Alman gibi davranmak ve Türk gibi davranmak arasında gidip gelmektedir.

İnsanlar önceleri dil bilmiyorlardı. Babamız annemiz ‘aman kavga etmeyin’ diyorlardı. Şimdi kavga ediyorum. Eskiden ‘zavallı Türklerdi... Şimdi Almanca biliyoruz. Alman arkadaşlarım var. Sorun olunca şikâyet ediyoruz. Bizim nesilde özgüven var. Solingen’den sonra ‘biz Yahudiler gibi yanmayacağız’ dedik. (Nazmiye, 45, 2006)

Goslar genelinde ve özellikle BGX ve Oker Gleis 95 adlı gençlik merkezlerinde yaptığımız görüşmelere dayanarak, şiddetin, hem fiilen hem sembolik olarak, gündelik hayatın içinde olması, beraberinde travmatik davranışları da getirmekte olduğunu söyleyebiliriz. Bu durum sürekli yaşanabilecek, taşınılabilecek bir yük değildir ve sosyal olarak

“başaramamış” gençleri içinde buldukları gruplarda bile yalnızlığa itmektedir. Öyle anlaşılmaktadır ki, bu travmalardan çıkma isteği yaldızlı sokak söyleminin ilk katının hemen altında kendini gösterebilmektedir. Buradan çıkarılabilecek en önemli sonuç şu olabilir aslında: Gençler sadece normalleşmek istemektedirler.

Düşük sosyal statülü (özellikle Almanyalı-Türklerin) yaşamları endüstrisizleşme süreci (*deindustrialization*) ve eski Sovyetler Birliği ülkelerinden gelen etnik Alman’ların gelişi nedeniyle 1990’ların başından beri daha zor ve karmaşık bir hale gelmiştir. İmalat faaliyetlerindeki azalma, geçmiste uzmanlık sahibi olmayan işçiler için ulaşılabilir olan yukarı doğru hareketliliğe engel olmaktadır. Bazı durumlarda gerçekten Türkiye kökenli göçmenler, gerçek anlamda dezavantajlı konumdadırlar.

Dünya onlar için sadece yalıtılmış değil, bazı durumlarda ‘hiperyalıtılmışlık’ (Massey and Denton, 1993) kavramıyla açıklanabilecek bir yapısal dışlanmışlık ve yalnızlık durumuyla karşı karşıyadırlar. Şehrin kenar mahallelerindeki Türkler, yalıtılmış okullara devam etmekte, kendi camilerinde ibadet etmekte, kendi yalıtılmış dükkânlarından alışveriş etmekte ve kendi niş ekonomilerini oluşturmaktadırlar. Türk orta sınıfın şehrin kenar mahallelerinden yeni semtlere doğru akışı, geride sadece, geniş kent ekonomisinden gittikçe uzaklaşan ve saldırgan bir dünyada göçmen mekanlarındaki sakinlerinin ayakta kalmasına yardımcı olan kurumsal destekten mahrum kalmış yoksulların en yoksulunu bırakmıştır. Bu insanlar, endüstriyel üretimin hızla azaldığı bir önemde, değişen ekonomiye ayak uyduramayıp sürekli bir yalnızlık ve yalıtılmışlık içine düşmektedirler (Kivisto, 2002). Bu ‘aşırı yalıtılmış’ insanların dünyaya bakışını en iyi tanımlayan kavram *nihilizmdir*.

#### 4.1. GOSLAR'DA TÜRK-MÜSLÜMAN GÖÇMEN ORGANİZASYONLARI

Almanya'nın diğer şehirlerinde ve kasabalarında olduğu gibi, Goslarda da camii ve cemaat gibi örgütlenmelerin geçmişte bir boşluğu doldurduğundan kuvvetli bir şekilde söz etmek mümkün görünmektedir. Anavatan ve göç edilen ülke aralarındaki dayanışma bağının zarar görmesiyle birlikte, söz konusu yoksul kitleler, cemaat dernekleri, dini örgütler, hemşehri örgütleri, kültürel etkinlikler ve camiler gibi geleneksel oluşumlara yönelmişlerdir. Almanya'daki etnik/kültürel/dini derneklerin geçmişi, 1960'lara kadar uzansa da, yükselişleri ve yaygınlaşmaları 1990'larda çok daha güçlü bir şekilde kendini hissettirmiştir.

Goslar'daki Milli Görüş (IGMG) ve Diyanet (DİTİB) organizasyonları ne siyasal anlamda Türkiye'den dini aşırılık ithal eden kurumlardır ne de Avrupa İslamı olgusuna işaret edecek tarzda tüm Avrupa liberal değerleriyle zorunlu bir uyum içindedir. Daha ziyade, bu İslami göçmen organizasyonları, Türk-Müslümanların toplumsal ve dini ihtiyaçlarıyla devlet politikaları arasında müzakereler yürüterek aracı bir rol oynamaktadırlar. Söylenebilecek ilk şey, bu iki dini (ve muhtemel diğer organizasyonlar ) göçmen organizasyonları Avrupa koşullarında İslamın evrensel ve özel boyutlarını müzakere ederek bunların başarılı bir entegrasyon için kabul edilerek, Alman toplumunda İslama yer açılması gerektiğini iddia etmektedirler. Bu organizasyonların ortaya çıkarmaya çalıştığı müzakereci yaklaşımın reformist veya seküler bir Avrupa İslamı diye bir anlayışa evrilip evrilemeyeceği bir soru olarak ortada durmaktadır. Ancak görebildiğimiz kadarıyla, Goslar kasabesindeki bu iki organizasyon, İslamı bireyin ruhani dünyası olarak yaşaması gerektiği noktasında İslam anlayışının kendisini özel alanla sınırlamasını ve Avrupa'nın kültürel çoğulculuğuna barışçıl bir katkı yapmasını bir gereklilik olarak görmektedir.

Almanya ve özel olarak da Goslar’da Diyanet ve Milli Görüş organizasyonları toplumsal meselelerde siyasal olarak iki farklı cemaate veya gruba hizmet eden farklı tutum ve görüşlere sahiplerdir. Türk dini kuruluş ve organizasyonların ve İslami grupların arasındaki uzun vadedeki rekabeti bir kaç şekilde yürümektedir. Milli Görüş kamusal ve siyasal alanda çalışma yapmayı hedeflemektedirken, Diyanet Türk devletinin entegrasyon ve din konusundaki resmi söylemlerinin ilkeleri üzerinde durarak ve onlara vurgu yaparak, kültürler arası bir diyalog inşa etmeyi denemektedir. Goslar’da az üyesi olan Gülen cemaati ise eğitim yoluyla ruhani dünyalar arasında bir diyalogu öngörmektedir. Goslar’da her bir organizasyonun faaliyetleri kendi üyelerini toplumsallaştıran eylem kurallarına sahiptir.

Goslar’daki saha çalışmasının sonuçlarına bakarak denilebilir ki bu iki Türk-Müslüman göçmen organizasyonları “savunmacı gelenek” anlayışından “olumlayıcı entegrasyon” anlayışına ulaşma sürecindedirler. Daha genç Müslüman Türk kuşakların bu durumdaki katkısı yadsınamaz. Genç kuşaklar, Casanova’nın “Avrupa’da İslam’ın aggiornamento süreci” dediği İslamın yenilenmesi veya Avrupaya uyum yeteneğinin artmasındaki en önemli ajanları olmaktadır. Casanova’ya göre, her ne kadar Avrupa’nın Müslümanların Avrupa’daki varlığını olağandışı bir provokasyon olarak görseler de, burdaki Müslümanlar er geç bir adaptasyon ve yenilenme sürecine gireceklerdir.

Daha genç kuşaklar İslam’ın geleneksel söylemini deneyimledikleri ayrımcılığa karşı siyasal bir mücadele diline dönüştürmeye hevesli görünmektedir. Şüphesiz, bu noktada türban için özgürlük, ibadet yerleri ve dini tatil vb konularda eşit muamele talep eden liberal ve evrensel iddialar üzerinden sembolik bir işleve sahiptir.

Bu organizasyonlardaki genç kuşaklar, onların büyükleri tarafından kurulan ve yürütülen organizasyonların önceliklerinden giderek sıyrılmak istemektedirler. Onlar, bu organizasyonların giderek daha çok ve çeşitli yerel koşullardan ilham alan faaliyetlerde bulunmasını arzulamaktadırlar. Bu gençler bu orgnanizasyonların sadece anavatan Türkiye'nin sorunları üzerinden politika ve faaliyet geliştirmesinin yerine onları Avrupalı organizasyonlar olarak görme eğilimindedirler.

Her ne kadar, bir “Avrupa İslamı” veya “Avrupalı İslam”dan söz etmek için erken olsa da, farklı faaliyetlerle Alman toplumsal yaşamının içinde hareket eden bu Türk-Müslüman göçmen kurumları yoluyla İslam yavaş yavaş yerelleşme (localizing) yolunda ve uyum sağlama sürecini yaşamaktadır.

Goslar'daki İslami göçmen organizasyonlarının üyeleri arasında, çoğunlukla eğitim seviyeleri düşük insanlar olmakla birlikte, üniversite öğrencileri, mühendis ve yüksek statülü insanların da olduğunu belirtmek gerekir. Her şeyden önce, eğer gençler İslamı tercih etmisse, bunu çoğu zaman bilinçli bir şekilde tercih etmektedirler. Anne ve babalarında görülen geleneksel Müslümanlıktan farklı olarak gelenekle ve taklidi bir şekilde değil, daha çok okuma ve düşünmeye bağlı pratiklerle Müslümanlığı tercih ediyorlar. Bunun yeni bir İslam anlayışı olduğunu söylemek sınırlı da olsa mümkün görünmektedir. Bu gençler, içinde buldukları toplumda çeşitli sorulara muhatap olmaktadır. Almanların yönelttiği çeşitli sorular kimi zaman merak kimi zaman da gerçekten kafalardaki klişelerin bir tezahürü olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır.

Gençler bu sorularla karşılaştıklarında bu sorulara kendi kültürel bagajından hazırcevaplar sunma imkânına çoğu zaman sahip olmadıkları için bilinçli olarak düşünmeye, okumaya ve tartışmaya başlamaktadırlar. Bu bir bakıma onların Müslümanlık anlayışıyla ebeveynlerinin Müslümanlık anlayışı

arasındaki fark ve sınıra da işaret etmektedir. Gençlerin sahiplendiği İslam anlayışı, çok kültürlü bir ortamda farklı bir şekillenme imkânı yaratabilir. Buna İslamın yeniden toplumsallaşması ya da kültürleşmesi de denilebilir. Bu toplumsallaşma gençlerin İslam anlayışında bireycilik ve çoğulculuk gibi Avrupa toplumunda baskın olan eğilimlerden etkilendiği ve teşvik ettiği de ileri sürülebilir.

Tabii şunu da eklemek yerinde olacaktır. Bu aynı zamanda yeni tür bir Avrupa Müslümanlığı ya da Batılı bir İslam anlayışının da zemini olarak düşünülebilir. Çünkü üçüncü kusak gençler, azınlık ortamında İslami hukuksal ve siyasal bir düzenin yani şeriatın bir temeli olarak görmek yerine, daha çok bir inanç ve ahlak sistemi olarak algılama eğilimindedir. Bu aslında, Almanya ve Avrupa'da Kaplancılık gibi geçmiste oldukça radikal eğilimlere uç vermiş olan siyasal İslam anlayışının da tekrarlanma ihtimaline bir engel oluşturabilir. Sonuç olarak, camii cemaatinin içindeki yeni kuşak gençlerin ortaya çıkardığı bu yeni eğilimler Batılı toplumlarda İslam'ın farklı bir türünün işaretlerini de şimdiden göstermektedir. Bu nedenle olsa gerek ki, daha şimdiden kimileri, bu eğilimlerden hareketle "Batılı" bir İslam'dan (Euro-İslam) söz edebilmektedirler.

Ancak, burda karşımıza güncel bir sorun çıkmaktadır: 11 Eylül 2001 de Amerika'da yaşanan terör olayı ve onun tüm Batı dünyasında yarattığı travmalar, ve radikal İslamcı hareketlere yönelik tereddütler ve korkular. Çok açık ki 11 Eylül olayları sonrasında, Batı dünyasında siyasal partiler, bazı akademisyenler, medya ve kamuoyu Avrupa'daki ve Amerika'daki Müslüman göçmenleri ve entegrasyonlarına çok şüpheli ve tamamıyla güvenlik perspektifinden bakmaya başlamışlardır. Bu Müslümanlar üzerinden güvenlikleştirme ve suçlulaştırma (securitization and criminalization) süreci, siyasal partilerin, politik stratejistlerin ve diğer çıkar gruplarının kültürel bir homojenliğe dayanan tek kültürlülüğe bir dönüşün kapısını aralayan kültürel özcü anlayışı beslemektedir. Bu kültürel

özcü anlayış açısından, Müslüman toplulukların bütün problemleri dinsel-kültürel bir mercekten görülmeye başlanmış ve bu toplulukların marjinalleşme, dışlanma, yoksullaşma ve izolasyonlarının sosyo-ekonomik nedenleri büyük ölçüde görmezden gelinmiştir.

Türk-Müslüman kurumlarındaki katımlı gözlemin sonuçları göstermektedir ki Diyanet dini siyasetten arındırarak Türkler ve Almanlar arasında kültürlerarası bir diyalog oluşturma eğilimindedir, Milli Görüş organizasyonu ise siyasal (kamusal) yaşamla din ayrımını uzlaştırmaya çalışan politik bir tutum alma niyetindedir. Milli Görüş üyeleri, sahip oldukları dinleriyle birlikte kabul edilmek istiyorlar aksi halde entegrasyonun asimilasyon anlamına geleceğini iddia etmektedirler.

Goslar'daki İslami göçmen organizasyonları Türk göçmenlerin fikirlerini, sosyal kaynaklarını ve paralarını harekete geçirmeyi hedeflemektedirler. Bazı İslami gruplar arasında (örneğin, Diyanet ve Milli Görüş arasında) güçlü bir şekilde vurgulanan bir rekabet vardır. Bu organizasyonlar, sadece Almanya'daki yerel konularda değil, İslam, Türkiye ve küresel meseleler hakkında da ciddi bir perspektif farklılığına sahiplerdir.

Ancak İslami göçmen organizasyonlarının başarılı yükselişleri, Eylül 2001 terör krizinden sonra biraz değişmiş görünmektedir. Dini örgütlerin karşılaştığı krizler ve yolsuzluklar (Kombassan, Yimpas olayları), etnik ve dini temelli derneklerin göçmen çocuklarının değişen güncel taleplerini karşılamadaki başarısızlıkları, bu tür oluşumların etkisinin azalmasına neden olmuştur. Günümüzde bu sürecin getirdiği sonuç, göçmenlerin kendilerinden başka hiçbir şeye güven duymamalarıdır. Bu, siyasetin değerini küçümseyen nihilist eğilimlerin yükselişe geçmesiyle sonuçlanan bir tür proleterleşme sürecidir.



Bu konuda bir üniversite öğrencisi olan Murat'ın tanıklıkları Goslar'da İslami organizasyonların nasıl bir süreçten geçerek günümüze kadar geldiğinin somut ifadesi olabilir ve günümüzde gelinen bu nihilist durumu biraz daha aydınlatıyor:

“Gidiyordum diskoteğe içki. Mutlu oluyordum Sabah kalkıyordum başım ağrıyor, problemler çözülüyor hepsi daha duruyor ama daha çoğalmıs. Odamı gördün. Mektupları bile açmamışım. Stres veriyor çünkü bana. Bilmiyorum... kaynağım bitti. Eskiden İslam'dı kaynağım, oradan kuvvetimi alıyordum. Almanlara karşı oydu kuvvetim. Diyordum bunlardan daha kuvvetliyim çünkü benim inancım var. Onların inancı yok benim inancım var. Ama benim İslam anlayışım, ideoloji anlayışı degildi, ne Diyanet'ti, ne Cemalettin'di, ne şeydu ne buydu. İslam anlayışım kendime göre İslam'la. Anlıyor musun? Hiçbir şeye karşı olmayan bir İslam. Laikliği doğru bulan bir İslam. Bu da çok önemli çünkü. Laiklik güzel bir şey, doğru bir şey aslında. Çünkü herkes istediğini yapın evinde. Bunu ille yani devlet yapması gerek miyor ki yani. Çünkü devlet kim ki devlet biziz. Devlet bizim aynamız. Biz, o bizim aynamız aslında. Buna bakarsan Holismus..... Devlet hepsini toplarlarsan devlet olmuş olur. (Murat, 33, 2006)

#### **4.2. GOSLAR'DA GENÇLİK, EĞİTİM VE EMEK PİYASASI**

Avrupa Birliğinin gelecekteki rekabet koşullarında daha yüksek seviyede bir eğitim gerektireceği çok açık bir gidişat gibi görünmektedir. Ancak, Avrupa Birliği ülkelerindeki göçmen azınlıkların çocukları, genel çoğunlukla kıyaslandığında, eğitimdeki bu eğilimin ve gerekli olan performansın çok azına sahip oldukları görülmektedir. Örneğin tıpkı İngiltere'deki Pakistanlı gençler gibi, Almanya'daki Türk gençlere baktığımızda bu göçmen çocuklarının ekonomik başarı ve eğitim düzeyleri açısından hala geniş bir kesimin dezavantajlı koşullar içinde olmayı sürdürdüğü söylenebilir. Bu da demek oluyor ki eğitim ve iş koşullarına ulaşmada hala bireylerin sahip oldukları vatandaşlık kartının ya da içinden geldikleri toplumun özellikleri hala Avrupa Birliği'nde bir bariyer olarak işlev görmektedir.

Goslar’da bir hipermarkette satış görevlisi olarak çalışan Metin (19, 2006) yaptığımız mülakatta Alman toplumunun göçmenlere ya da onların çocuklarına yaklaşımda çok karşılaşılan bir durumu şu şekilde vurgulamıştı:

Türkler herhangi bir isyerinde Almanlarla aynı pozisyonda olsalar bile, daha iyi çalışmadıkça ve kendilerini kanıtlamadıkça asla kadrolu olarak ise alınmıyorlar. Bunu açıkça ifade etmiyorlar ama Almanlar içten içe Türklerin başarılı olmasını asla istemiyorlar (Metin, 19, 2006).

Eğitim konusundaki genel manzara açısından Goslar da Almanya’daki diğer şehirlerde gözlenen durumdan farklı bir görünüm arz etmemektedir. Bu gençler arasında üniversiteye gitme oranları da oldukça düşük kaldığı gözlenmektedir. Kasabadaki üçüncü kuşak gençlerin önemli bir kısmı ilköğretimi tamamladıktan sonra (Grundschule) en alt düzeydeki lise türü olan Hauptschule’ye, geri kalan küçük bir grup ise, mezun olduktan sonra üniversiteye gitme şansı Hauptschule’ye göre daha fazla olanak sağlayan Realschule ve Gymnasium düzeyindeki liselere gidebilmektedir. Bu durum bir çok açıdan gençlerin gelecekteki kariyerlerini ve iş bulma olanaklarını doğrudan etkilemektedir.

Alman eğitim sistemlerinin ortak paydası, göçmenlere ve çocuklarına mezuniyet sonrası kültürel sermayelerini ekonomik sermayeye dönüştürebilecekleri bir platform sağlayamamasıdır. Dolayısıyla, Almanya’da iş piyasasında göçmen ailelere karşı ayrımcılık uygulandığı söylenebilir. Bunun yanı sıra, Tribalat (2002) Müslümanların kamusal yaşamda kendilerini sosyal olarak mobilize edememe durumu, ülkede sosyal, ekonomik ve eğitimsel sorunları ‘geri kültürler’le tanımlayan güçlü zihinsel yapıların ortaya çıkmasına yol açmaktadır. Bu tür zihinsel yapılar, yurttaşlar için kapsayıcı bir eğitimin gerçekleştirilmesini oldukça zorlaştırmaktadır:

Okullardaki ilişkiler, bir bütün olarak toplumdaki ilişkiler gibi, giderek ırksallaşmaktadır. Bireyler, ‘etnik’ kimlik sahibi kişiler olarak algılanmakta ve

damgalanmaktadır. Daha basitçe söylemek gerekirse, okullar öğrencileri geçmiste işçi sınıfı çocukları olarak tanımlarken şimdilerde göçmen çocukları olarak tanımlamaktadır. Daha önceleri çocuklara babaları yoksul olduğu için sorunlu oldukları teşhisi konurken, şimdilerde, çocuk üçüncü kuşak olsa bile, babası göçmen olduğu için sorunlu olduğu teşhisi konmaktadır. Erkek çocuklarının davranışlarını geçmiste ‘saldırgan’ olarak tanımlarlarken, artık davranışın kendisi ‘etnik’ olarak tanımlanmaktadır (Starkey, 2003: 120).

Bu konuda yine Goslar’da yaşayan sosyal pedagoğ Arif Alman eğitimi ve göçmen gençlerin başarısızlık durumuyla ilgili sistemin kendisini yenilemesinin gerekliliği üzerine vurgu yapmaktadır:

... Bence yapısal bir ayrımcılık yok. Ama bir şeyi görmek lazım: Burada göçmenler var ve bu göçmenlerin çocukları okula gidiyor. Bu okullardaki başarıya bakmak lazım, yani niye okula gidilir? Sırf mecbur oldukları için değil, bir sonuç almaları lazım. Biz istatistik olarak bunu tespit edebiliyoruz, basında, literatürde şunu görüyoruz: Yabancı çocukların, özellikle Türkiyelilerin yüzde 5’i liseyi bitirebiliyor. Yüzde 5’i, bu belki biraz daha fazlalaştı, diyelim ki yüzde 10’u. 100 çocuktan 10 tanesi liseyi bitirebiliyorsa, Gene 100 çocuktan 70 tanesi ortaokul düzeyinde bir okulu bile bitiremiyorsa, bunların bilmem yüzde kaçını da hiç meslek yapma şansına sahip değilse, gene bu yapının içerisinde bilmem yüzde 50’si veya yüzde 45 civarındaki insanı, yaşlısı genci işsizse, bunun bir açıklamasının olması lazım. Biz şöyle diyemeyiz: “Bu çocukların hepsi aptal, Alman eğitim sistemi çok iyi, okullarda her şey veriliyor, ama bunlar aptal olduğu için başarısızlar”; en azından ben böyle bir saptama yapamıyorum. Sonuç olarak, Alman eğitim sisteminin nüfusunun % 10–12 sini oluşturan yabancıları göz önüne almadan geliştirilmiş ya da daha önceden var olan eğitim sisteminin devamı olarak sürdürülmekte olduğu söylenebilir. Alman olmayan ve göçmenlikten dolayı yaşamak zorunda olan ve onların çocuklarının da okula gittiği bir gerçeklik karşısında Alman siyaseti, Alman hukuku ve Alman eğitim sistemi bu realiteyi göz önünde tutmak ve eğitim sistemini buna göre geliştirmek konusunda yavaş davranmakta olduğu söylenebilir. (Arif, 33, 2006)

İşte gençlerin ebeveynlerinden biri olan Abdullah (40, 2006) bu durumun muhtemel sonuçları üzerine pek de iyimser olmayan görüşlerini aktarıyor:

Yabancı çocuklarının okulda çıkma biçimi, Goslar’da diyelim, yüzde 40 ya da yüzde 50’si hiçbir diploma almadan okuldan çıkıyor. Şimdi siz eğer öğrencilerinizi ya da belirli bir grubu bu haliyle hep okuldan çıkarırsanız, saltanatınızı bölüşmezsiniz. Eger bir grubu hep dışarıda bırakırsanız, entegrasyon olmaz. Almanya’nın getirdiği ya da Alman toplumunun yasadığı birtakım rahatlıklar ve zenginlikler var. Onu ama herkes eşit şekilde sahiplenemiyor ya da erişemiyor, çünkü o grubu siz dışarıda bırakıyorsunuz. Yabancılar da biraz o şey simgesini

taşıyor, halen ilk gelen kuşağın simgesini biraz taşıyor. Vasıfsız, iş yapamayan, gerici, çok fazla nasyonalist, ne bileyim, bütün simgeleri, bu önyargı, ama duruyor öylece. Perspektif olmayınca gençlerde, geriye dönüş oluyor. Ben hep onu söylemeye çalışıyorum, perspektif olmayınca mecburen geriye dönüş yapıyorsunuz, bir yere tutunmak zorundasınız. 16 yaşındasınız, 17 yaşındasınız, yani bir yerlere tutunmak zorundasınız. Böyle garip şey var, böyle arabesk yaşama biçimi de var aslında Almanya’da, özellikle yabancılarda. Ama bu böyle birbirini etkileyen faktörler, tek başına alamazsınız, yani siz şey diyemezsiniz, yabancılar ya da dinciler niye böyledir, suçlulardır diyemezsiniz. Onları buraya iten bir sürü faktör vardır. Bunlar sosyoekonomiktir ilk başta. Bunlar çözümlenince, siz başka sorunları çözebilirsiniz (Abdullah, 40, 2006).

Alman eğitim sistemi diğer Avrupalı ülkelerin eğitim anlayışından daha seçici ve eleyici olduğu söylenebilir. Bu durumun bir sonucu olarak, göçmen çocuklarının çoğunluğu daha düşük düzey okullara devam etmektedir. Türk gençlerin Gymnasium gibi daha üst düzey okullara veya üniversiteye devam etmeleri ve daha iyi çalışma koşullarına kavuşması şimdilik hayalden öteye geçememektedir.

Emek piyasasındaki değerlendirmeler tabakalı yurttaşlık sistemi ve kurumsal ayrımcılık tarafından şekillendirilen bir hiyerarşiyi izler. Sonuç olarak, iş başvuru gereklilikleri ve işe alma testleri yetenekli Avrupalı göçmenleri istisna tutarak, onlara öncelik tanımakta ve üçüncü dünya göçmenleri, mülteciler ve Türklerin dezavantajlı durumları devam etmektedir.

Miera’nın (2008) dikkat çektiği gibi Alman emek piyasasının aşamalı sisteminde sadece Almanlar ve özel çalışma izni olan “ayrıcılık yabancılar” (etnik Almanlar, EFTA, Avrupa Ekonomik Bölgesi vatandaşları) emek piyasasında serbestçe çalışmaktadırlar. Üçüncü dünya ulusları göçmenleri, ancak altı yıllık sürekli yasal oturma izninden veya sürekli yasal oturma iznini alabilirlerse böyle bir serbest çalışma iznine sahip olabilmektedir. Ve en önemlisi, üçüncü dünya ülkelerinin vatandaşları belli bir iş için çalışma izni alabilmeleri veya işe girebilmeleri, Alman vatandaşlarının ve ayrımcılık yabancılarının bu işlere başvurmamalarına bağlıdır. Üçüncü dünya göçmenlerinin işe alınmaları

ancak bu ayrıcalıklı grupların değerlendirilmesinden sonra mümkün olabilmektedir.

Bütün bu verilerden yola çıkarak söylenebilecek önemli bir sonuç; Almanya`da göçmen ve onların çocuklarının Almanya`da doğup, yetişip eğitim almalarına rağmen kurumsal bir ayrımcılığa maruz kalmalarının hala ciddi bir olasılık olarak karşımızda durmaktadır.

Göçmen çocukların kimlik oluşumunu etkileyen önemli faktörlerden birisi ailelerinin sahip olduğu sınıf özellikleri, kültürel değerleri iken bunun yanı sıra Alman kültür ve dilinin sosyalizasyon sürecinde kazanılmasının da kimlik oluşumunda etkisi olduğu görülmektedir. Gençlerin konuşma stilleri, beden hareketleri, davranış kalıpları açısından oldukça kendilerine özgü bir kimlik özelliği gösterdiği söylenebilir.

Ancak göçmen çocuklarının entegrasyon süreçlerinin ve biçimlerinin homojen olmadığı hatta oldukça parçalı (segmented assimilation) olduğu söylenebilir. Bu farklılaşmayı sağlayan öncelikle içinde bulunulan yerel çevrenin göçmenlere yönelik tavırlarıdır. Almanya`da kabul edilme düzeyi, gençlerin entegrasyon ve kimlik oluşumlarının ana etkenlerinden birisidir. Bunun yanında, gençlerin ailelerinin sosyal sınıfı, çocuğu destekleyici araçlara ve imkanlara sahip olup olmamaları (parcalanmış ya da çekirdek aile olmaları), kendi göçmen gruplarıyla ilişki ağı içinde olup olmamaları çocuğun deneyimleyeceği aşağı doğru bir entegrasyon (downward assimilation) ya da yukarı doğru (upward assimilation) bir entegrasyon süreci temel kriterleri olacaktır.

Goslar`da Türkiye`li göçmenlerin çocuklarının büyük çoğunluğu, düşük düzeyli eğitim, okuldan erken yaşta ayrılma, işsizlik, uyuşturucu ve suç deneyimleri göz önüne alındığında aşağı doğru bir entegrasyon (downward assimilation) süreci karşımıza çıkıyor.

Türk göçmen çocuklarının kimlik oluşumunun genel biçiminin `tepkisel` olduğu ve kendi etnik gruplarının dil, kültür ve ulusal özelliklerine atıf yapılarak şekillendiği ve bu yönüyle anaakım Alman toplumuna entegrasyonun nesiller geçtikçe gerçekleşeceğini varsayan ilerlemeci asimilasyon teorisine (Park 1950, Gordon 1964, Alba 1997) uymadığını tespit edebiliriz.

Göçmen çocukların kimlik oluşumlarının tepkisel olmasının arkasında içinde doğdukları ve yetiştikleri Alman toplumunda karşılaştıkları kurumsal ayrımcılıklar, hissedilen ayrımcılık, göçmenlere yönelik baskı-kalıp yargılar ve Almanların İslam'la ilişkili yabancı korkusu yatmaktadır. Göçmen çocuklarının kimliklerindeki tepkisel özellikler içinde buldukları toplumda `normal` olarak görülme yani `normalleşme` talebi olarak okunabilir.

## **APPENDIX F**

### **CURRICULUM VITAE**

#### **PERSONAL INFORMATION**

Name: Fuat

Surname: Güllüpinar

Place and Date of Birth: Icel, 14 July 1975

Address: Sosyoloji Bolumu, 06531 ODTÜ Ankara/TURKEY

Cell: (+90) 506 972 87 23

Office: (+90) 312 2103108

Fax: (+90) 312 210 7972

E-mail: [fgullupinar@gmail.com](mailto:fgullupinar@gmail.com)

#### **EDUCATION**

##### **GRADUATE**

- Middle East Technical University (METU), TURKEY, Institute of Social Sciences., PhD. In Sociology (December 2010)
- METU, Institute of Social Sciences. Ms. in sociology (1998-2002)  
(The title of MS thesis: The Ideology of Political Islamism in Ottoman-Turkish Modernization)
- METU, School of Foreign Languages, Department of Basic English (1998)

## **VISITING RESEARCHER**

- Princeton University, (USA), Department of Sociology, Center for Migration and Development, Visiting Researcher (September 2009-September 2010).
- Max-Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Halle/Saale, Deutschland (12/2005-03/2006)

## **UNDERGRADUATE**

- Anadolu University, Department of Sociology, Faculty of Arts and Sciences (1993-1997)
- Anadolu Universtiy, Faculty of Education, Pedagogy Certification Program, Eskişehir, (1996-1997)

## **FIELD OF ACADEMIC INTERESTS**

- Migration, Diaspora, Transnationalism, Identity, Citizenship, Youth, Relations of Generations, Xenophobia, Modernization, Political Islamism

## **LANGUAGE SKILLS**

- Turkish (native)
- English (fluent)
- German (basic reading and speaking)

## **WORK EXPERIENCE**

- Currently: Research Assistant in the Department of Sociology, METU, (Since 2003)



- Social Pedagogist in Youth Centre (Jugendzentrum gleis 95), Goslar, Germany (09/2006-12/2006)
- Research Assistant in the Department of Sociology, Anadolu University, Eskisehir (2001-2003)
- English Teacher, Mamak Anadolu High School, Ankara (2000-2001)  
Philosophy Teacher, Kirikkale Science High School, Kirikkale (1998-2000)

## **GRANTS**

- Abroad Fellowship, TÜBİTAK, (BİDEB, 2214) (2009-2010)
- Doctoral Fellowship, Max-Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Halle/Saale, Deutschland (12/2005-03/2006)
- Doctoral Fellowship, TÜBİTAK (Hızlı Destek), Ankara, Turkey (03/2008-11/2008)

## **WORKS AND PUBLICATIONS**

- Güllüoınar, F. (with Fatime Güneş) (2005) Eskişehir'de Belediyeden Yardım Alan Ailelerin Yoksulluk Durumu ve Yoksullukla Başa Çıkma Stratejilerinde Kadınların Rolü, Eskişehir: Anadolu Üniversitesi. 186 sy.
- Güllüoınar, F. (with Atilla Cavkaytar, Oya B. Cetin, Sema Batu, Bilhan Kartal) (2004) Gelişim Geriliğı Olan Çocukların Aile Özelliklerinin Betimlenmesi, 225 sy. (Anadolu Üniversitesi Yayınları: Eskişehir)
- Güllüoınar, F. (2002) “Osmanlı Türk Modernleşme Serüveninde İslamcılık İdeolojisi” (The Ideology of Islamism in Ottoman-Turkish Modernization Adventure), Unpublished MSc thesis.

## **RESEARCH SKILLS**

- Utilized SPSS statistical programs extensively

- Microsoft Office, especially Word, Excel, PowerPoint and Outlook

## **RESEARCH EXPERIENCE**

- Field leader, Türkiye’de Yerel ve Genel Seçimler ve Seçmen Davranışları, KONDA, 2006-2011 (Seçim Anket Çalışması)
- Researcher, Gençlerde Cinsel Sağlık ve Üreme Sağlığı Araştırması, Nüfusbilim Derneği ve Birleşmiş Milletler Nüfus Fonu (UNDP), 2007, Türkiye.
- Researcher, “Examination of Educational Opportunities at Primary and Secondary School by District, TÜBİTAK Project, 106K077, May 2007, Southeast Districts of Turkey
- Researcher, “Comparative Analysis of Cultural Perceptions of Solidarity among Immigrants in Berlin”, a project carried out by Assoc. Prof. Helga Rittersbeger Tılıç, Metu, BAP-06-07-03-04, June 2006 Berlin, Germany
- Researcher, “Yusufeli Barajı ve Hidroelektrik Santrali Çevresel Veri Tabanının CBS’ye Aktarılması ve Yeniden Yerleşim Eylem Planı Hazırlanması Projesi” DOĞUŞ İnşaat ve Ticaret A.Ş., ÇORUH KONSORSİYUMU 2005, Artvin, Turkey
- Researcher, “A Description of Experiences and Family Characteristics of Retarded Children”, 2004 in Eskisehir, Project Manager, Assistant Prof. Dr. Atilla Cavkaytar. Anadolu University, Eskisehir, Turkey

## **PRESENTED PAPERS**

- “The Women Question in Triangle of Capitalism, Patriarchy and Religion”, National Sociology Congress for Graduate Students, April 1996, İzmir, Turkey.

- “The Ideology of Islamism in the Ottoman-Turkish Modernization Adventure”, First World Congress for the Middle Eastern Studies, September 8-13, 2002, University of Mainz, Germany.
- “Family Characteristics of Retarded Children in Eskisehir”, 13th Congress of National Special Education, 12-14 Nov 2003, Anadolu University, Eskisehir, Turkey.
- “Social Exclusion and the Structure of Communication of the Family of Retarded Children”, First International Symposium on Eskişehir Throughout History; Political, Economical, Social and Cultural Aspects, Anadolu University, 12-15 March 2004, Eskişehir Turkey

### **SEMINAR**

- Lecturer, “The Education of Human Rights and Children’s Rights”, Şehit Albay İbrahim Karaoğlanoğlu Öğretmen Öğrenci Eğitimi, February 2008

### **TRANSLATIONS**

- Neo-Liberalism and Labor in an Emerging Market Economy: Turkey', by Sürhan Çam, in Capital and Class 77: 89-117, 28 pp (2002)

### **OTHERS**

- Jury, Turkey Development Marketplace Competition organized by World Bank, 3 May 2005, Ankara, Turkey
- Participant, Integrationkurs Deutsch, Bildungswerk Niedersächsischer Volkshochschulen GmbH, Goslar, Germany.