

RESTORING CLASS POWER OVER THE POLICE:
THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL IN NEOLIBERAL POLICE REFORM IN
TURKEY

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Prof. Dr. Meliha Benli Altunışık
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Pınar Bedirhanoğlu Toker
Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Prof. Dr. Meliha Benli Altunışık	(METU, IR)	_____
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Pınar Bedirhanoğlu Toker	(METU, IR)	_____
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Filiz Çulha Zabcı	(Ankara U., FPS)	_____
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Necmi Erdoğan	(METU, ADM)	_____
Assist. Prof. Dr. Işık Kuşçu Bonenfant	(METU, IR)	_____

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Name, Last name: Funda Hülügü Demirbilek

Signature:

ABSTRACT

RESTORING CLASS POWER OVER THE POLICE: THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL IN NEOLIBERAL POLICE REFORM IN TURKEY

Hülagü Demirbilek, Funda

Ph.D., Department of International Relations

Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Pınar Bedirhanoğlu Toker

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This thesis provides a critical analysis of the post-Soviet police transformation that has been on the agenda for about two decades in all over the world. To elaborate and rethink this analysis within a concrete historical process, the transformation of the police in Turkey is focused on. However, as the number of political science-based studies on the police are very limited, and as the dominant academic studies on neoliberal police reform have been determined by policy makers themselves, that state of affairs has necessitated a prior theoretical research to be made on the question of “what the police is”. For, it is proved to be impossible to produce critical knowledge on police transformation without developing a theoretical framework on the nature of the modern police and the tensions embedded in it. Hence, before analyzing the neoliberal period, the thesis attempts to develop a class-based theoretical framework on the formation of the modern police in the 19th century, and concludes that the modern police apparatus has been shaped by a specific political division of labour between the state power and the class power. The form of the police is defined according to by which of these powers it is determined more, a process which has been constituted since the 19th century by a transnational collective agency that includes various fractions of the ruling classes as well as police chiefs and police intellectuals. It is the historical materialist method that provides the theoretical toolset to make sense of the

transformation taking place in the police. Having analyzed the neoliberal police reform by the help of this theoretical toolset, the thesis maintains that in the neoliberal era the police apparatuses have been reintroduced to the political sphere as “anti-statist non-state” actors, and started making transformative interventions in the modern political field. The police restructured as a non-state actor has been dissolving the modern political field through various strategies. The thesis specifies these strategies on the basis of the police transformation process in Turkey. The police apparatus in Turkey has been constructing itself even as a “civil society” organization, and redefining the processes of legitimation, and mass participation of people in politics –which are necessary aspects modern political field- through its new police ideology. The main argument of the thesis is that this process as a whole is one that restores the class power of the capitalists over the police.

Keywords: Modern Police Formation, Bourgeois State Form, Class Power Internationalization of the Police, Neoliberal Police Reform, Police Apparatus in Turkey.

ÖZ

POLİS ÜZERİNDE “SINIF ERKİNİ” YENİDEN SAĞLAMLAŞTIRMAK: TÜRKİYE’DEKİ NEOLİBERAL POLİS REFORMU SÜRECİNDE ULUSLARARASININ ROLÜ

Hülagü Demirbilek, Funda

Doktora, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

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Bu tez Sovyet-sonrası dönemde tüm dünyada yirmi yıla yakın bir süredir gündemde olan polisin dönüşümü sürecinin eleştirel bir çözümlemesini sunmaktadır. Bu çözümlemenin detaylandırılması ve somut tarihsel süreç içinde yeniden düşünülmesi amacıyla da, Türkiye’de polisin dönüşüm sürecine odaklanılmaktadır. Ancak, polis üzerine siyaset bilimi temelli çalışmaların azlığı ve neoliberal polis reformu hakkında hâkim olan akademik yazının bizzat siyasa yapıcılarının belirleniminde olması, tezde öncelikle, “polis nedir?” sorusuna kuramsal bir cevap aranmasını gerekli kılmıştır. Zira, modern polisin doğasına ve ona içkin olan gerilimlere ilişkin kuramsal bir çerçeve geliştirmeden, polisin dönüşümü hakkında eleştirel bilgi üretmek mümkün olmamıştır. Bu nedenle tez, neoliberal dönemin incelenmesinden önce, 19. yüzyılda modern polisin oluşumu sürecine ilişkin sınıfsal bir kuramsal çerçeve denemesi sunmakta ve modern polisin devlet erki ile sınıf erki arasındaki siyasal bir iş yükü bölüşümüyle belirlendiği sonucuna varmaktadır. Polisin biçimini belirleyen, onun hangi erkin belirlenimine daha fazla girdiğiyle alakalıdır ve bu süreçte çeşitli yönetici sınıf fraksiyonlarının yanı sıra polis şefleri ve polis entelektüellerini de içeren ulus-ötesi kolektif bir irade 19. yüzyıldan bu yana kurucu rol oynamaktadır. Polisteki dönüşümü kavrama imkânı yaratan bu kuramsal araçları sağlayan tarihsel maddeci çözümleme yöntemidir. Tez, bu yöntemle geliştirilen kuramsal araçlarla neoliberal polis reformu sürecine odaklandığında, neoliberal dönemde polis aygıtının “devlet-karşıtı devlet-dışı” bir aktör

olarak siyaset alanına yeniden sokulduğunu ve bu şekilde yeniden tanımlanan polisin modern siyaset alanında dönüştürücü müdahaleler yapmaya başladığını tespit etmektedir. Bir devlet-dışı aktör olarak yeniden yapılandırılan polis, burjuva devlet formunun doğrudan bir sonucu olan modern siyaset alanını türlü stratejilerle çözmektedir. Bu stratejilere ilişkin tarihsel bilgiyi ise tez, Türkiye’de polisin dönüşümü sürecine odaklanarak derlemektedir. Türkiye’de polis adeta bir “sivil toplum” örgütü olarak kendini yeniden kurmakta ve dayandığı yeni polis ideolojisi üzerinden modern siyasal alanın yapıtaşları olan meşruiyet ya da halkın siyasete kitlesel katılımı gibi süreçleri yeniden tanımlamaktadır. Tezin temel iddiası, bir bütün olarak bu dönüşüm sürecinin, kapitalistlerin polis aygıtı üzerindeki sınıf erkini yeniden sağlamlaştıran bir süreç olduğudur.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Modern Polis İnşası, Burjuva Devlet Formu, Sınıf Erki, Polisin Uluslararasılaşması, Neoliberal Polis Reformu, Türkiye’de Polis Aygıtı

*To My Beloved Mother and Father, Lale and Tuncer
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(From the Prologue)

*Your stuffy notions
sit on a spongy brain pan
like a puffed up timeserver
on a standing committee
that never stands
except on ceremony.*

*The ego lands!
and it's me.*

*Big shots,
I promise to embolise
your expense- account complacency
with a clot from the infractions
of a broken heart,
and to sate
brash youthful
disregard when gangrene
sets in.*

Mayakovski 1914-1915 (adapted from Russian by Augustus Young)

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Just as there is no “pure exploitation”, there is “no pure antagonism” without materiality (that is, without unevenly distributed techniques and means of power). A discussion of the more or less necessary role Marx assigns to “violence” in his explanation of history and in his definition of revolutionary practice can begin from this point: this violence should no longer take on a metaphysical significance (*Etienne Balibar, 1994*).

In the year of 2008, during the Ramadan Month celebrations that were taking place in the main square of the city of Trabzon, the Turkish police organization opened a stand to improve its relations with the community. One of the activities prepared by the community police department of Trabzon was to collect citizen finger-prints with an automated finger-print system, which adds the collected information to the national database of the General Security Directorate of Turkey. Many people had volunteered to give their fingerprints and some interviewees even argued that “this is a very good exercise. Everybody should volunteer. It would be very nice to record the fingerprints of the whole 70 million people living in Turkey. This is for our safety” (*Radikal, 11.09.2008*).¹

In 1991, the Law on the Militia was introduced in Russia in accompany with “guiding values such as legitimacy, humanism, social justice, political neutrality, impartiality and respect of and observance of human rights” (Beck and Robertson, 2009: 53). In 1993, EU decided to reform the Palestinian police to sustain the Palestinian Authority (Celador et al, 2008). In 1999, a big police reform was undertaken in Korea to

¹ The Law of Police Powers and Duties (PVSK), enacted in the year of 2007, regulates the occasions when the police can fingerprint. One of these occasions, which are cited in the Article 5 of the Law, is stated as “volunteers”. A member of the Turkish police organization argues that considering that everybody does not possess fingerprints due to some occupational or other health reasons, taking the DNA of people under record should also be considered as an alternative (Deryol, 2008: 18).

implement community policing model that resulted in the establishment of around 3400 voluntary patrol organizations, which mobilized 92.000 citizens for policing (Moon and Morash, 2009). A new police law was introduced to Serbia in 2003, mainly to reform the police education (Stojanovic and Downes, 2009). By the 2000s, “United Nations police have re-assumed primacy for policing, making Timor-Leste the only sovereign state in which a non-national is in charge of a Police Service” (Peake, 2009: 141). In 2006, in India a police complaints authority was established to formally support citizen oversight of police (Verna, 2009: 134). In Brazil, the police was so resistant to change that “[m]any first world reformers have suggested that the solution lies in the improvement of police management techniques...in decentralization and localization of police resources so as to allow police departments to better connect to local communities” (Hinton, 2009: 223).

All these examples point out that the case of Turkey is not unique at all and there is a global phenomenon of change in the police in the 1990s and 2000s.² Interestingly, all these different police apparatuses appear to undergo a parallel transformation process, imbued with similar themes and objectives. The fact that police reform is a global phenomenon brings forth the following questions: Why has there been occurring a police reform all over the world? Who are these reformers that induce almost uniform reforms? What are the defining features of these police reform programs which have been applied in various countries in the post-Soviet neoliberal era -though through different national political struggles? What is the relation between these police reforms and the neoliberal world order? Last but not the least, what is the story of the Turkish police reform conceived within this broader international context and what does it tell

² These reforms are undertaken by many international actors such as United Nations (UN), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), United Nations Police Division (UNPOL), and United States of America linked state and non-state organizations and other non-governmental organization and think-thanks. For a complete list of police reformers including international organizations and non-governmental organizations see Marenin, Otwin (2005) “Building a Global Police Studies Community”, *Police Quarterly*, Vol.8, No.1, pp.99-136 and also, Marenin, Otwin (2007), “Implementing Police Reforms: The Role of the Transnational Police Community”, *Crafting Transnational Policing: Police Capacity-Building and Global Policing Reform*, Andrew Goldsmith and James Sheptycki (eds), Hart Publishing: Portland, Oregon, pp. 177-203.

about the post-Soviet era neoliberal police reform(s)? In short, the post-Soviet neoliberal police reform, in Turkey and abroad, is the main subject of inquiry of this thesis.

It is a fact that the existing literature on the police reform is highly determined by a policy-oriented approach, and most of the researchers and/or scholars are themselves part of the police reform processes. They are included in the collective agency involved in the implementation and development of the police reform programs. In fact, there is hardly any critical study on the police reforms implemented during the neoliberal era. Those which have a critical ambition somehow end up by reproducing the conventional wisdom that changing the police on the basis of core values such as democratic policing, professionalization, transparency, and public involvement is ultimately an appreciable aim. In contrast to such research, this study will try to develop a critical approach without taking for granted the affirmative attitude attributed to these now ubiquitously referred universal principles. In other words, the reform component of the police reform should not be categorically perceived as a change for the better; as an amelioration or progress in the existing state of affairs.

To go beyond the limits of the existing literature on the recent police reforms and develop a sound critical approach necessitates a strong theoretical and methodological framework of analysis that is capable of placing the modern police apparatus within the capitalist system. That is why this thesis will make use of the method of historical materialism to sort out the determining characteristics of the modern police apparatus by rethinking the modern police's historical origins both in Europe –where capitalism had first emerged- and Turkey. The analytical tools provided by such a historical-theoretical contemplation will facilitate to understand the eventual direction of the changes induced into the police apparatuses during the post-Soviet neoliberal era. It is essentially argued in this thesis that the neoliberal police reform implies *a fundamental change in the historical form of the bourgeois state* which took its principal shape in the 19th century. For, the post-Soviet neoliberal reform program is first and foremost an

attempt to re-define the police apparatus as a non-state, “civil society” actor, and this is indeed an attempt to make a fundamental restructuring in the established boundaries between the separated spheres of the economic and the political in capitalism- a separation, which is historically the hallmark of the bourgeois state form.

1.1 Theoretical Problematique of the Thesis

A quick literature review easily reveals that scholarly researches on the issue of police reform are made by the reformers themselves. Indeed, a plethora of articles and books exists on the police reform processes that have been ongoing all over the world, but the vast majority of them are written in order to ameliorate this or that element of the police reform programs.³ Others point out to the importance of the police reform for the well-being of the neoliberal international order. That is to say, almost all of the present research on contemporary police reform is policy-oriented and suffers from significant methodological and theoretical problems.

The main argument of these pro-systemic analyses of police reforms is that the police reform aims at the *democratization of policing practices* all over the world through widening the public participation in policing issues. They argue that further involvement of the people in policing, namely *the community-policing model* is a panacea to the loss of public trust in the police apparatuses. Moreover, they also argue that the police reforms should be promoted by the big powers of the world as parts of their foreign policy and that the international organizations should elaborate further on the details of a police reform program so that there would emerge “*good practices*”. Many of the pro-reform neoliberal scholars work for these international organizations that induce police reform programs in different countries. They prepare pre-reform field studies, develop new techniques for furthering the implementation of police reform

³ Many of these books and articles will be analyzed in the fourth chapter on the neoliberal police reforms. The two key examples of these policy oriented analyses are volumes edited by András Kádár entitled “Police In Transition” (2001), and by David Bayley entitled “Changing the Guard: Developing Democratic Police Abroad” (2006).

programs, and draw lessons from these implementation processes, etc. Therefore, their only criticisms on the issue of police reform are about the imperfections of the police reform processes.⁴

Despite the prosperous field of critical international security studies, the neoliberal police reform as a subject matter suffers from disinterest and has been looking for its own ‘Martha K. Huggins’s (1998), an academician who realized an excellent critical research on the role of the United States foreign police assistance in the remaking of the Latin American police apparatuses up until the early 1980s. Huggins conclusion is that the specific police apparatus model promoted by the US fostered authoritarian policing in these countries through professionalization of the police forces. Nonetheless, her analysis is based solely on the power of a single country and would not provide much help to understand the multitude of transnational actors and the new hegemonic spirit of police reform observed in the post-Soviet neoliberal era.

The governmentality literature, which provides a critical position on the issue of security and securitization, does not focus on the modern police apparatus as a separate concern of analysis. Indeed, a recent research agenda entitled as the New Police Science has been generated by scholars of governmentality. This new science “concerns itself with the police power as a general mode of governance, rather than with one of its specific institutional manifestations, the police department...” (Dubber, 2006: 108). Within this framework, the police power is made sense of with reference to the patriarchal power of the householder that dates back to the 18th century (Dubber, 2006). For the Foucauldians, this householder model (where the householder has to govern his property, household, family and servants) has since then been reproduced at the state

⁴ Some examples include the reports named as “Preparatory Assistance for Civilian Oversight of Policing and Law Enforcement”, prepared by Professor Andrew Goldsmith and Dr. İbrahim Cerrah in 2005 for the project of “Democratic Governance Thematic Trust Fund” under the UNDP/Turkey, Joint Assessment Mission; the “Collection of Policy Papers on Police Reform in Serbia”, authored by Markovic, Dordevic and Litavski in 2010 under the cooperation of three non-governmental organizations, which are Belgrade Centre for Human Rights; Centre for Civil-Military Relations and Forum for Security and Democracy with OSCE.

level while the core of the police studies is concerned with dismantling the underlying logic of that mode of government.

This New Police Science thus takes police power as a specific concept to analyze the rationality behind different forms of governmentality at different levels (i.e. national and international) as well as in different spheres of life (i.e. criminal law, the control of the traffic). Nonetheless, such an overextension of the concept of police does not provide us with to-the-point analytical tools, without which to understand the substance of contemporary transformations in police organizations all over the world become a very difficult job. In other words, the New Police Science does not supply the analytical tools that are necessary to analyze the police apparatus as a *unit-of-analysis* possessing its own historical peculiarities.⁵

Unfortunately, there is almost no historical materialist-critical work on the issue of police reform. This might be due to various theoretical, historical and conjunctural reasons. One of the reasons, which is not solely peculiar to historical materialists, is that the police apparatus of the capitalist state has been for a long time the “Cinderella of the political science” (Bowden, 1978: 70). Many political scientists, studying coercive apparatuses of the state, have been generally focusing on the political role of the military apparatuses, compared to which, says the general doxa, the police apparatuses “seem less likely to fall prey to praetorian urges and seize the state” (Bowden, 1978: 88). The police apparatus has at best been considered as a shadow force lurking behind

⁵ All the more, the overextension of the notion of police also results in an extended view of the state, whose power is very much idealized. The householder model, referred by the Foucauldians, depends on the policing powers of the householder and the introduction of the “meticulous attention of the father towards his family into the management of the state” is core to understand any sovereign’s policing powers (Foucault, 1991: 92). Therefore an analogy is established between the householder and the sovereign (the state). It is argued that this origin of the police power, which emanates from the status of the householder, or from the very status of the sovereign, determines the mode and volume of the discipline that will be inflicted upon the members of the household. Accordingly, crimes against the peace of the households are considered not solely as crimes committed against the citizenry but also against the king himself. Indeed, these crimes violate the very household of the state, its sovereignty (Dubber, 2006). Therefore, the policing powers of the state should expand to sustain its status as sovereign.

the ideological apparatuses of the state. This thesis will first and foremost criticize this position which equates the police with the state and does not seek even a historical distinction in between the development of these two. Without having a notion of the nature of the police, it is not possible to draw an accurate picture of the neoliberal police reform in general and the Turkish police reform in particular.

Marxian studies which do explicitly focus on the role of the police tend to highlight the constitutive role of the police in “the making of the social body” (Neocleous, 2006; Berksoy, 2007). Accordingly, the police organization is understood as one of the main apparatuses of the state, which acts with the intention to build up/construct the society through its coercive technique (Berksoy, 2007: 38-39). Although it is impossible to contest that the police apparatus regulate and control everyday life through its coercive power, such a theoretical approach risks replicating a sort of structuralist-bias. The police apparatus obtains a bewitching power and inevitably reproduces “structuralism’s approach on humanity as a bearer ... of commands emanating from structures” (Bonefeld, 1995:187). Moreover, the police apparatus’ activity is restricted to the social arena. The police act solely as an “apparatchik”, as a simple tool of the government and the ruling classes. The police apparatus is reduced to some of its functions tailored according to the needs of the capitalist market. In contrast to this perspective, this thesis will underline that the police apparatus is not determined solely by the arbitrary desires of the capitalist classes but by the total outputs of political struggles. These outputs may of course include this or that specific desire of the capitalist classes though with the reservation that these desires are always subject to contestation/negotiation/conflict ongoing between and among the classes before they can become influential on the police. In other words, the police apparatus is not the direct instrument of a particular class rationality. The police apparatus needs to be recognized as a bureaucratic political actor with a certain degree of autonomy from central governments (Ergut, 2001: 69).

Ferdan Ergut, in his pioneering piece of work on the history of the police in the late Ottoman/ early modern Turkey era, focuses on this political character of the police. He

however reaches to this conclusion through the assumption that any story that will be told on the formation or reformation of the police can be based either on society or on the state (Ergut, 2001: 60). Accordingly, whereas the society-based theories would focus on the role of social dynamics, the state-based theories would rather focus on the regulation of the social by the state. He, reproducing a state-society dichotomy in methodological terms, argues that for the case of Turkey, the state-based theories are of more theoretical relevance when compared to the society-based theories.

Nonetheless, Ergut does not perceive the state as a monolithic bloc that acts over a monolithic society. The merit of his contribution lies in his portrayal of “dual policing” which can shortly be summarized as such: the modern police represent the interests of social elites and rulers in a more subtle and perfect way while it has to reply to the requirements of citizens as well (Ergut, 2001: 59).

As Tilly (2001) argues, the state-formation period, namely the transition to direct rule created undesirable liabilities and constraints for the states. The states had to care about the feeding of their people and thus created extensive administrative apparatuses to lessen geographical inequalities within their territories. The representatives of central states were responsible from the equitable distribution of the means of survival among people. For the corruptive tendencies of the administrators triggered popular dissent. In this process, the expansion of state power required more negotiation with the people, which ultimately resulted in the expansion of citizenship rights. Inspired by this argument, Ergut argues that there is a positive correlation between the establishment of new bureaucratic state apparatuses (including the establishment of professional police forces) and citizenship rights.

Nonetheless, whereas Ergut’s analysis of the formation of modern police takes into consideration the pre-history of the modern police in terms of the pre-modern collective policing practices, he does not dwell on the issue of private policing, which in fact constitutes one of main reference points of this dissertation while attempting to understand the nature of the modern police. Ergut prefers to describe the modern police

on the basis of its independence from military apparatuses. The establishment of a police apparatus which is autonomous from the military is argued to represent a state whose “infrastructural power” can successfully penetrate the society (Mann, 1984). Therefore, Ergut’s analysis is based on a conception of state which is perceived as an autonomous structure that controls and disciplines society from outside. Questions such as what happens to that relation between citizenship rights and the new police, or how the dual-character of the police, as an entity shaped also by modern social conflicts, evolves are not problematised in Ergut’s analyses. This issue of the dual character of the police is portrayed as a historical fact, which happened once and got lost then in the dustbin of history. Ergut gives priority to the social struggles only to the extent that structures let them affirm themselves. Yet, this is a partial view of the state and reflects Ergut’s dichotomic perception of state-society relations. Contrary to this, it is possible to conceive structures as specific forms that political struggles give shape. In other words, structures are themselves constructed social realities.

Galip Yalman (2004) makes a detailed critique of, what he calls the dissident but hegemonic thesis that the Turkish social formation cannot be analyzed with the same theoretical constructs such as classes and/or society-based actors, which are used to analyze developed capitalist states. He argues that such approaches, which conceive Turkey as an irregular case, posit the Ottoman-Turkish state as the founding agent of the whole social formation and thereby the state apparatuses are considered as the real sources of political power, as the embodiments of a sacrosanct state idea. The state apparatuses hence appear as the expressions of a sublime substance (Yalman, 2004: 47). Furthermore, Yalman (2009: 118) states that “the remarkable thing about most of these studies is that they are primarily anti-state in inclination, their methodological penchant to treat the state as an independent variable notwithstanding”. This anti-statism makes these approaches to reproduce the idea that the Turkish state, conceived as a “*sui-generis entity*”, is an “obstacle initially blocking the emergence of capitalist relations of production in an indigenous manner; and subsequently distorting the development of these relations in accordance with an idealized Western model...” (Yalman, 2009: 118-

119). These criticisms are perfectly applicable to the limited number of academic studies made on the Turkish police transformation in the neoliberal era.

Berksoy (2007a), in possibly the only critical research hitherto made on the ongoing restructuring of the Turkish police organization, analyzes the post-1980 process in relation to the emergent neoliberal accumulation regime.⁶ Berksoy (2007a) argues that it is not possible to understand the restructuring of the Turkish police and its direction of change on the basis of the anti-democratic acts peculiar to the Turkish state. Therefore, she rightly refuses to limit her study on the police apparatus to the peculiarities of the state in Turkey. She also argues that police restructuring is not a unique process to Turkey but exists all over the world. Moreover, she underlines that many Foucauldian or post-structuralist approaches to the police have discarded the economic and social bases of political power relations by assigning them foundational metaphysical existence (Berksoy, 2007b: 37). As a panacea to this problem however, she proposes the theoretical approach of Mark Neocleous, who argues that state fabricates society through its own legal-administrative apparatuses which also include the police apparatus (Berksoy, 2007b: 37). Neocleous' model concerning the police apparatus is however based on a similar state-society dichotomy which has been reproduced by the Foucauldian and post-structuralist approaches. Berksoy argues that states have been reshaping *the social* during the neoliberal era with the help of the new dominant logics of government (Berksoy, 2007b: 40). Therefore, she reproduces that discourse on the state which conceives the latter as a *sui-generis* entity, ending up with a functionalist view of the state whose job is to remodel the society in accordance with the prevailing strategy of state power (such as neoliberal governmentality).

⁶ Two other recently concluded critical studies on the transformation of policing in Turkey are the MSc thesis of Çağlar Dölek (2011) and the PhD thesis of Evren Haspolat (2010). These studies focus on the issue of the privatization of security in general, and the implications of the recent establishment of immense number of private security companies in Turkey in particular. Haspolat (2010) argues that the issue of security privatization should be considered in tandem with the growing powers of the public police and these two developments together refer to the strengthening of the neoliberal state in Turkey with authoritarian implications over the subordinate classes.

According to Berksoy, police-restructuring in Turkey after 1980 should be understood as an aspect of state transformation taking shape in line with the neoliberal capitalist accumulation model. Berksoy (2007b: 50) argues that this new mode for the rule of capital is translated into the arena of the state in Turkey as the expansion of the executive and military powers of the state, which has certainly caused the expansion and militarization of the police apparatus. It has to be recognized that making use of the concept of “militarization” as an *explanan* reproduces the anti-statist uniqueness thesis that Yalman (2009) criticizes. The militarization concept is used in such a way as if the civil rule was an “ideal-typical form” (Yalman, 2009: 119). In fact making use of the militarization concept as an *explanan* is to employ the ideal-typical forms in a “negative mode” (Yalman, 2009: 120). In other words, the ideal-typical form -in our case it is the originally Anglo-Saxon idea that the police is a non-military/civil actor- is used in such a way to constantly point out to a normative truth or to a sublime norm, which should be reached by the degenerated socio-political forms -in our case it is the militarized police apparatus in Turkey.

Hence, it can be deduced that critical studies on the issue of police and police restructuring are shaped and limited by the historical political conjunctures in which the scholars as intellectuals find themselves. The idea of militarization in Turkey is so determining in the intellectual field that a lessening of the military powers through transferring them to the police apparatus is conceived as amelioration and as a victory for the restoration of civil order in Turkey. Especially this issue of neoliberal police reform is perceived in the positive sense of the term, as a project of progress and change for better in the police practices (See Cizre, 2005a; 2005b; 2007). Berksoy’s emphasis on the “militarization of the Turkish police” falls in the trap of reproducing the underlying assumptions of this dominant paradigm while trying to criticize it.

The very concern about the military, or the very existence of “such” a military in Turkey, signals for these dominant approaches the existence of a Leviathan State, an autonomous and authoritarian state differentiated from an aggrieved civil society (see

İnsel and Bayramoğlu, 2004). Such studies tend to blur the lines between the ‘militarists’ and the ‘military’ in such a way that civil society turns out to be a homogenous bloc, immune from militarist-authoritarian tendencies and victimized by the state-military nexus. The implication of this line of thought for the conventional perspectives on police restructuring in the aftermath of the Cold War has been the reconstitution of police apparatuses as *non-state civil actors* all over the world, an argument which will be discussed in detail in the following pages.

Another significant deficiency of police studies in both Turkey and abroad is the problematic view of *the International*. The dominant perception on the links between the national and the international in police restructuring is based on a relation of external and internal whereby the latter exports some models-to-be-applied at home from the former. The internationalization of the police is at best seen as a side-function of some transmission-belts (like police education abroad) (Berksoy, 2007b: 60-61). However, the internationalization of the police is a more intricate issue than it has been envisaged by this paradigm of policy transfers from abroad so that it will be carefully reproblemated in the following chapters

Given the theoretical and methodological limitations of the field of police studies today, deciphering the meaning of the post-Soviet neoliberal police reform requires the development of an almost totally novel theoretical toolset that would not lead one to repeat the methodological faults hitherto committed by many Marxists or critical thinkers. To this end, the thesis will start from the “fundamentals” by questioning firstly what the police is in a capitalist society and how the changes it undergoes should be conceptualized at both abstract and concrete/historical levels. Conclusions drawn from such an investigation will be rethought later within the contemporary Turkish context.

1.2 An Overview of the Main Arguments

In order to analyze the police apparatus as an institutional entity, which possesses a room of maneuver relatively independent from the governments-in-power and the ruling

classes, without positing a crude relation between the police functions and the necessities of the capitalist market and also by acknowledging the formative power of the subordinate classes on the police apparatus, the thesis will make use of historical materialism both as a method of inquiry and explanation.

Historical materialism provides the tools for the analysis of social phenomenon. Indeed, historical materialism is not solely equipped to deal with the workings of the capitalist system. Far beyond, it provides a far broader philosophy of things. Accordingly, the basis of every object, including the objectified social and political institutions such as the state and indeed the police apparatus is internally related to conflictual social relations. The police apparatus is indeed a form, an arena shaped by both inter- and intra-class struggles. This is one of the driving methodological assumptions of the whole thesis, whose aim is to become able to translate this quasi-abstract guide into the analysis of concrete facts.

Concerning the form analysis method of historical materialism, Bertell Ollman (2003:78) gives the following examples:

Marx brings into focus the appearance and function of any relation, that by which we recognize it, and most often it is its form that is responsible for the concept by which we know and communicate it. Hence, value (a relation) in its exchangeable form is called money; while in the form in which it facilitates the production of more value, it is called capital and so on.

Thus to treat things as forms implies to demystify the appearances that they assume (Hülögü, 2005). This implies that every surface phenomenon has an underlying social history that gives form to it.

Form analysis shows the temporality of things. It shows that there is nothing static. Everything is in flow and this flow has certain condensed moments. For instance, private property is a specific form that labour takes. Yet, it is likely to become another form in the flow of time. That is why Ollman adds that “form is also Marx’s chief way of telling us that he has found an identity in difference, as when he says rent, profit and

interest, which are clearly different in many respects, are identical forms of surplus-value”. Therefore, “to analyse capitalist society in terms of social forms is to see it from the point of view of its historical impermanence, to look at that which appears to be permanent as transient” (Holloway, 1995: 165).

Indeed, the form analysis of the police apparatus aims at displaying how this abstract conception of the police as a form of class struggles is at play in practice and how one can do induction and come up with more universal abstract conclusions out of the concrete state of affairs in different police apparatuses, which is a very messy issue in-itself. And yet, the aim of the thesis is not the verification of historical materialist method on the basis of a case study. On the contrary, the aim is to bring the fresh air of historical materialism to police studies, which have been under the tutelage of liberal analyses for many decades. In other words, one of the aims of this thesis is to reveal the many-layered nature of the police apparatuses in the capitalist system.

As Bertell Ollmann (2003: 127) states “the dialectical method of inquiry is a voyage of exploration that has the whole world for its object, but a world that is conceived of as relationally contained in each of its parts”. Therefore, our basic unit of analysis, namely the police apparatus as a form of social and political struggles, contains the whole characteristics of a social formation specific to a specific time-place nexus in its own body. That is to say, the police apparatus derives its functions not from the dictates of the capitalist market per se but from class antagonisms, as a whole. The police functions are dependent on the history of class struggles. In short, the police apparatus cannot be equated with bare force nor reduced to violence; it is a social form driven by the contradictions of class struggles.

That is why it will be argued that the birth of the police apparatus is closely related with the development of the bourgeois state form, the child of bourgeois revolutions. Although police studies have focused upon the historical process that gave birth to the modern police, they somehow ignore the role of the specific state form within which the

modern police was established. Actually, the transition from feudal private policing practices to the modern public police can be evaluated better if the whole process is rethought in relation to the 18th and 19th century class struggles in Europe and the specificities of bourgeois state form which those struggles had given way. Within this context, the thesis will argue that feudal private policing should be understood as both the anti-thesis and the birthplace of the modern police.

The bourgeois state form's tragic struggles with the ancien régime is another key to decipher the nature of the modern police since the latter's "modern" vocation and "coercive" character are in clash with each other. This contradiction was most apparent in the Napoleonic France. Whereas the police apparatus emerged as the child of modern mass politics, it was also the legacy of the political classes of the ancien régime. This paradox will help us understand the story of the modern police apparatus, indeed the dialectics of coercion.

Sublation is a concept, which will be frequently used throughout the thesis. Sublation refers to the fact that new historical forms of social struggles always contain previous forms in themselves.⁷ The fact that they are contained within new forms in negated ways does not mean that previous forms have sunk into the dustbin of history. That is why, while thinking about the evolution of the modern police, the legacy of the ancien régime will be conceptualized as always alive, and it will be argued that the police of the absolutist state have been living within the modern police though in a negated way.

Ollmann (2003: 28) claims that "to introduce the temporal dimension into the foregoing analysis, we need only view each social factor as internally related to its own past and future forms, as well as to the past and future of surrounding factors". Therefore, the

⁷ A similar but different concept that is used in the thesis is the notion of subsumption. As opposed to the sublation, when something is subsumed, it is no more contained in the thing that succeeds it. In other words, while "the other is preserved in a succession; when something is subsumed...it does not necessarily retain any autonomy - it is overcome (Empson, 2009: <http://www.generation-online.org/c/csubsumption.htm>).

continuities and changes in the form of the modern police apparatus should always be seen in a dialectical way. The pre-history of the modern police, indeed the private policing, is of crucial importance to understand the bourgeoisie's class power over the organization of political coercion in the capitalist society. The transition to modern public police means in fact a diminution in the bourgeoisie's class power over the organization of political coercion. The history of the modern public police is also the history of the subordinate classes' ability to set obstacles to the further expansion of bourgeois class power. Therefore, the history of the public police is closely related with the subordinate classes' power to make changes in the organization of the bourgeois political field. In fact, the lessening of the working class power throughout the 1980s has led been translated into the language of organized coercion as neoliberal police reforms. The capitalist classes' power over the field of political coercion has in contrast augmented, and particularly the post-Soviet police reform is the best expression of this.

To discuss the impact of (capitalist) class power on the organization of political coercion, and to measure the degree of this impact is however a difficult task. To measure class power over the organization of political coercion is difficult since the relations between these two are not observable as long as there are no direct interferences of the individual capitalists in it. That is why, in our case one has to develop theoretical guides to sort out the relation between the class power and the police apparatuses. In other words, the question of how one can rethink on the post-Soviet neoliberal police reform as an expression of class power expansion in neoliberalism is a legitimate one. This thesis will try to problematize this question through the notion of *the privatization of the political*, a term inspired from Wood (1995), which basically means the transfer of social issues (such as the organization of coercion in a society) that were previously belonging to the modern political field and thus open to the formative power of different classes including the working class, to the exclusive sphere of (capitalist) class power. Inevitably, the degree and mode of this transfer is equally determining for the nature of the modern political field.

This thesis will underline the importance of the internationalization of the modern police as the key mechanism through which the ruling classes secure their class power over the police apparatuses. In fact, since the early days of the modern police, many international mechanisms for police coordination and coalition have been built up. The ruling classes' fear from the "socialists and/or anarchists" whose struggles were condensed in 1848 revolutions as well as in the 1871 Paris Commune resulted in the development of international mechanisms of police coordination. The total impact of these mechanisms has been the further detachment of police apparatuses from the impact of the working classes and/or from the impact of the national political fields and struggles. This in turn has squeezed down the political field emanating from the introduction of the bourgeois state form to the scene of history. Therefore, it is argued that the internationalization of the police has been a direct intervention in the political as such. The internationalization of the modern police in the 19th century empowered the ancien régime legacy that had existed in the cement of the modern police and thus squeezed down the modern *political field*.

Indeed, the internationalization of the police has resulted in the privatization of the political. The internationalization of the police has been dependent on a multitude of actors which "have developed into a conscious class...under the conditions of a severe crisis of the bourgeois order" (Kees Van de Pijl, 1998: 137). The threat posed by the working class struggles and the need to sustain the social order while not putting into danger the issue of legitimacy have pushed the ruling classes to coalesce into international mechanisms of power to reproduce social order in different national contexts. Nonetheless, this has not meant that the ideological luggage of the transnational cadres which have been active in the making of police internationalization is immune from the impact of political struggles. If there have been pre-projected plans, ruse, intrigues prepared by transnational cadres, there have been also stupefaction, talking nonsense, indeed absurdity.⁸ Although this thesis does not aim at making a

⁸ About the formation of a bourgeois class consciousness, it is an affair of "life and death" says Lukàcs (1971). In other words, it is the horror of death for the bourgeoisie that motivates it to comprehend the historical peculiarities of the capitalism as the eternal laws of human existence. This is not to say that

detailed political-sociological analysis of these transnational cadres, it will nonetheless theorize their impact on the issue of policing and police (re)formation under the banner of *International Party of Order* (IPO). This concept will be proposed in the thesis to point out to the voluntary interventions of the transnational bourgeoisie into the sphere of police apparatuses.

The IPO has been a collective agent which aims at transgressing the limits of the modern political field and thus of the obstacles posited by the subordinate classes before the expansion of class power in the reorganization of public police. It is aware of the fact that there is an uneven development between the market and state spheres. In other words, a change in the market structure could not be translated into the sphere of the political in the exact way it is asked by the rule of capital. In other words, a change in the sphere of economy cannot be reproduced in the sphere of the state in a direct and smooth manner. The superstructural forms including the police apparatus are more difficult to change since they operate with a claim on legitimacy on the one hand, and the legitimizing effect of the value form is relatively limited on the coercive apparatuses of states in comparison to other state apparatuses. That is why the IPO is an agent, notwithstanding its own internal conflicts, confusions of mind, and inaptitude, which aspire at overcoming the limits posed by the modern political field to the breadth of class power exercised in policing. The post-Soviet police reform has been such a program generated by the IPO.

In the post-Soviet neoliberal era, the police apparatus has emerged as the beloved security apparatus of the IPO and by leaving the military behind, the police apparatuses come to the fore as the real “champions of change” for the new post-Soviet neoliberal world order.⁹ This is promoted by the de-Sovietization agenda of the transnational

bourgeoisie is not aware of the limits of the capitalist production but it perceives those limits in the form of capital: the only limit to capitalism is capital itself. “In this way the objective limits of capitalist production become the limits of the class consciousness of the bourgeoisie” (Lukàcs, 1971:64).

⁹ Police reforms can be categorized according to social and political contexts they are instigated: post-conflict (i.e. Ireland) and peace-keeping ones (South Africa; Bosnia-Herzegovina); state-building ones

capitalist classes. This de-Sovietization agenda has been combined with the degeneration of the bourgeois state form in line with the neoliberal ideology's hatred of it. The police apparatus has been promoted as an actor that even codifies itself as a "non-state actor" to decompose this old state form's labour-related legacies in the political field. The neoliberal police apparatus has not only squeezed down the political as was the case in the 19th century but also restructured and reshaped it.

In fact, it will be argued that different from the 19th century, the neoliberal era proceeds by "policarization". This term is used by Didier Bigo (2005) in order to denote the degree of change in the field of global security, where the old guards of the security field, namely the military, has been leaving most of their internal security functions to police-like apparatuses which internalized the military combating functions and have changed the notion of war from the authority to kill (associated with the military) to the power of conducting/guiding human lives (administration of human life as a policing job). This thesis makes use of this term albeit in a slightly different manner.

Bigo's definition is based on the notion of governmentality and the Foucauldian idea of pan-opticon. In this thesis, the notion of policarization will be used to point out not necessarily the relation between the police and the society (or human life), but between the police and the state. That is to say, although the thesis will recognize the impact of the policing apparatuses in the administration of everyday life (which has been in fact a very old attribute of the police apparatuses dating back to the absolutist state era), the term "policarization" is used in order to show the change in the bourgeois state form in the neoliberal era, whereby the police has been reconstructed as a "non-state actor" or even as a "civil society actor". In the post-Soviet neoliberal era, the police moves from the field of the state to the field of society, and there emerges a harmony between the

(i.e. Kosovo); the ones in advanced capitalist countries (UK; USA) and post-socialist ones (i.e. Ukraine, Serbia). Although the thesis tries to have a holistic perspective and decipher the underlying rationale behind all these police reform projects, the case of Turkey is argued to be rather similar to post-socialist police reform projects and also shares some characteristics of Latin American experiences. Therefore, the study on neoliberal police reform focuses rather on these experiences and draws some generalizations about the basic features of police reform projects.

internal ideology of the police apparatuses and some of the themes of the dominant ideology prevailing in the societies concerned. Therefore, policiarization does not essentially mean administration of the everyday life and thus production of a human-body that is shaped in accordance with the dictates of neoliberalism. It equally means to establish novel linkages with some of the elements of common sense to make them more hegemonic before the good sense.¹⁰ Finally, policiarization does not only mean engaging more people with the act of policing. It is also an attempt to move the police apparatus out of the contours of the state and resituate it within society. It is an attempt to transport that coercive apparatus of the state to the field of ideological apparatuses.

It has to be recognized that in terms of detailed historical analysis the thesis makes a big jump from the 19th century to the end of the 20th century, meaning that the Cold War era is not studied in detail.¹¹ Aside from some technical limits (such as the lack of access to state resources concerning the police apparatuses of the Cold War era), there is also a historical explanation to this. For, in contrast to impact of restructurings taking shape in the post-Soviet neoliberal era, many important changes that the Cold War police apparatuses should have gone did not lead to a radical departure from the notion of the bourgeois state form. In other words, the modern police apparatus preserved its 19th century-shape until the 1980s. Zedner (2005: 78-79) argues that “the modern criminal justice state may just be a historical blip in a longer-term pattern of multiple policing providers and markets in security”, and we are in an era of *after police* “in the sense that we have come to use the term”. In other words, approximately ten decades of modern bourgeois state-cum-modern police can be taken between the brackets without of course rejecting that this peculiar period of time deserves to be researched in terms of its own historical specificities.

¹⁰ Common sense is used in here in the Gramscian connotations of the word. According to Gramsci, common sense is a confused and mostly conservative structure of thought, an amalgam, which generally resists critical thinking. Nonetheless, there is also “good sense”, which, if cultivated by anti-hegemonic tendencies, might break in the shackles of the common sense (Robinson, 2005).

¹¹ To close this gap left by the dissertation, the case study on the transformation of the police apparatus in Turkey will include a short review of the state of affairs in the Turkish National Police during the Cold War era.

This change in the police's position within the broader state apparatus, and its becoming a neoliberal political actor which restructures the whole modern political field in accordance with the privatization of the political can be well-observed in the Turkish case. The neoliberal transformation of the police in Turkey first shows the extent of the importance attached to this transformation by the IPO. It illustrates how the police organization, which used to play a secondary role during the Cold War vis-à-vis the military, has become a main political actor in the neoliberal period. Hence, the post-Soviet police reform has easily found echo in Turkey due also to the internal ideology of the Turkish police apparatus, which took its primary shape during the military regime of the 1980s and then consolidated in the 1990s. The Turkist-Islamist ideology which was promoted by the military regime of the 1980s and became the internal ideology of the police apparatus in Turkey facilitated the establishment of a new police ideology within the TNP under the neoliberal police reform agenda.

This new police ideology in Turkey, which has been in the making since the early 1990s and promoted by young generation of police chiefs and police intellectuals, is such that the police apparatus has ended up by nearly promoting itself as a “non-governmental organization”, a “civil society” actor. It leans on the idea that the state in Turkey had been authoritarian and bureaucratic, and thereby assumes that the police reform is a way of dethroning that authoritarian state and bringing in back the people as the real source of legitimacy. This new ideology depends on many elements drawn from the Ottoman history and deduce out of them mythical components supporting the new transformation agenda. In conformity with the class-bias of the neoliberal police reforms in general, Turkish police reform is a direct interference to the modern political field in the country as it redefines the notions of state and society. In sum, the analysis of police reform in Turkey shows how and through which ways the neoliberal police reform program is refined and implemented in “Turkey's own way” and how and through which mechanisms this in return feeds back in the IPO's transnational politics of policing.

1.3 Methodology

The thesis depends on the following as its major primary resources: Police Magazine published by the General Security Directorate between the years of 1924-1950; Police Magazine (published by the Association of Retired Police Officers) for the years of 1952-1960; and Police Magazine (published by the Directorate of General Security) for the years of 1995-2010. The reason of this choice is manifold. First and foremost, even before the modernization of the Turkish police organization in tandem with the needs of the young Turkish Republic, a directorate of Police Magazine was established within the corps of the General Security Directorate by the year of 1924. This shows the importance attached to the ideological reformation of the police even before its technical and organizational modernization. Second, the police magazine reflects the spirit both of the organization and of the country as it is perceived by the organization. Third, it contains comprehensive information about the academically understudied Turkish police organization.

To study the Turkish police reform, many scholarly books edited and written by police intellectuals of Turkey are also consulted. Furthermore, although they are few in number, memoir books written by some Turkish police officers are also resorted to. Two other journals edited by the members of the Turkish police themselves are also used in the thesis: one is the journal published by Turkish Institute of Police Studies under the name of TIPS Online between the years of 2006-2008, and the other is the journal published by International Police Association's Desk of Turkey under the name of IPA New(s) Police, published since 2006. Besides, a symposium organized by the Police Academy of Turkey under the name of "New Developments in the Turkish Police Organization" in April 2010 was also followed; and questions developed through the analysis of these police works have been discussed in two semi-structured interviews by a retired police chief supervisor first, and by a foreign technical consultant of the United National Development Program's project of the Civilian Oversight of the Security Sector in Turkey.

It should be stated that the Turkish Police is so understudied that a detailed newspaper scanning for the years between 1980 and 2010 had to be made. The newspaper Milliyet is predominantly used because of the simple fact that it has opened its newspaper archives to online public service. However, a plethora of online news portals were also consulted to catch up with the recent changes in the police organization.

Finally, for the section on the neoliberal world-wide police reforms, not only secondary resources but also reports and publications prepared by international organizations which are involved in the making of police reforms all around the world were investigated in detail.

1.4 Organization of the Thesis

The thesis starts with a theoretical chapter which overviews both the Marxist/revisionist theories of police and Marxist state theories in terms of their conception of the coercive apparatuses of the state. In other words, it details down first the theoretical problematique of the thesis, mentioned very briefly above. It can be argued that Marxist theories on police reform and state hardly differ from each other in terms of their common methodological premises. Hence, a reductionist perception of coercive apparatuses within capitalist states, which assumes that the former simply act in accordance with the rule of capital, is a common stand followed by both. This thesis aims to take a step back from these stances and argue that the police apparatus is a much more complex political actor. This chapter will propose the concept of the “International Party of Order” in order to theorize the internationalization of the police since mid-19th century onwards.

The third chapter aims to provide a critical historical account of the modern police formation and the internationalization of the police. It not only deals with police internationalization in Europe but also overviews the historical inception of the modern Turkey’s police so as to provide the background for the analyses of the neoliberal period and in order not to fall into the trap of conceiving the Turkish police history as

one fundamentally different from the Western cases. Indeed, the modern police of the young Republic was very much imbued with the ramifications of the Western police formation processes. The roots of Turkey's modern police had been constructed in 1845 under the jurisdiction of the Ottoman Empire, in the very same period with the new police formation in the West. As there is no analytical historical narrative about the consolidation period of the Turkish police organization in Turkey, the section on Turkey aims to make a very modest start to write down the political history of the police apparatus in Turkey.

The fourth chapter focuses on the general characteristics of the neoliberal police reform in the post-Soviet neoliberal era. As already implied, conventional studies on police reforms have been cheering up these changes as progressive attempts and as a necessary aspect of the ongoing democratization processes in non-advanced capitalist countries. This thesis does not operate on an of axis democratization versus militarization. It rather argues that to capture the real meaning of the police reform occurring in the post-Soviet era, the issue of class power should be taken into consideration.

In the fifth chapter, the thesis attempts at depicting the essential ingredients of the ongoing police reform in Turkey. However, while the focus at the global level is on the post-Soviet 1990s, the Turkish analysis will start from the 1980s for the 1980 coup d'état was a significant historical moment in Turkey in the reorganization of the Turkish police in line with a pro-capital agenda so that police restructuring in the 1980s displays a continuity with the 1990s. To highlight these continuities, the internationalization of the Turkish police during the 1980s and early 1990s will be analyzed in detail. This chapter attempts at showing how the police apparatus of Turkey has differentiated itself from other administrative apparatuses of the state and put on a "civil society" dress, the early traits of which can be found even in the early 1990s

CHAPTER 2

A HISTORICAL MATERIALIST PERSPECTIVE ON THE THEORIZATION OF MODERN POLICE

Robert Reiner (2000), a famous scholar on the history of police, classifies the approaches that try to understand and explain the institutionalization of the modern police mainly in two categories: cop-sided theories and revisionist approaches. Reiner's classification is based on these approaches' view of history. How they give account of the change that had occurred in policing in the 19th century appears to be a core question in Reiner's literature review. He mainly focuses on those approaches that try to analyze the causes of the *police reform* in the mid-19th century in Britain. This police reform process, which is the main object of analysis for many scholars from different schools, is accepted in the police studies literature as the turning point in the formation of the modern state's internal security apparatuses. Whereas cop-sided theories perceive the mid-19th century police reform as the zenith of the human civilization in the establishment of public order, revisionist approaches perceive it as the institutionalization of the bourgeois notion of order and human nature, and their imposition on the dependent classes. Yet, the mid-19th century police reform is still a "reform", not a "coming into being" or a "start from the scratch". In other words it signals for many liberal scholars a progress in the mode of policing the daily life, the modern society.

Whether it is a progress or not, 19th century police reform for this thesis signals new class reconciliation among dominant classes, and a settlement between the bourgeoisie and the modern state on the issue of policing. The most important illustrator of this transformation is the establishment of state monopoly on legitimate coercion through the redefinition of policing as a public duty undertaken by the state rather than a private activity conducted by the ruling classes. This transformation took its most perfect

historical form in the mid-19th century as private policing had become relatively expensive and institutionally unbearable for the dominant fractions of the bourgeoisie. This however meant neither full elimination of private security concerns by the ruling classes nor a total transformation in the form of policing as private policing habits and institutions were somehow *sublated* into the public police.

Analyzing this turning-point in the organization of coercive apparatuses of the modern state gives chance both to understand the role and functions of modern police institutions, and rethink on theory of the modern state by focusing on the relations between the state and the classes. Focusing on the 19th century police reform processes gives also the opportunity to make sense of a significant period of social and political transformation as long as policing is theorized on the basis of its evolution from pre-modern, feudal policing modes to modern police and policing institutions. Thus, the *police reform* of the mid-19th century provides a sound access to the ideological and organizational core of the modern bourgeois state's coercive apparatuses.

However, cop-sided and revisionist theories, regardless of their being orthodox (liberal-utilitarian) or critical (Marxist), are all ignorant towards two important aspects of this rather comprehensive police reform process: its implications for the bourgeois state form, and its international character. This ignorance largely stems from their focusing on different country experiences as peculiar, authentic cases. The neglect of the transformative pressures taking shape at the international level inevitably limits their explanatory power though they provide important insights about the history of policing and of the police. As opposed to this rather particularistic mode of historical analysis, this chapter aims to direct attention to the political processes and social relations that give the police its *systemic characteristics* stemming from the class-based character of the bourgeois society, which facilitate its adaptation to different regimes. Hence the main question to be scrutinized is what the very systemic characteristics that give the police institution its essential and universal mandate are, notwithstanding the peculiar histories of different police apparatuses. After all, what is police?

Marxist/revisionist theories on the 19th century police reform should be closely scrutinized since they are, despite their deficiencies, still the sole critical approaches that try to focus on the systemic characteristics of the modern police. Their limitations lie in the fact that despite their focus on the role of class relations in the making of the modern police they do not consider the police apparatus in a holistic manner for they do not conceive it as a form shaped internally on the basis of class struggles. They rather focus on its external function in the containment of the working class for the sake of the bourgeoisie. The lack of such a relational perspective that characterizes a particular current of Marxist methodology leads revisionist theories of the police to reduce the police institution to its utmost apparent class functions non-problematically.

The lack of a relational perspective can also be observed in the underlying state perceptions of the revisionist police studies. This problem however cannot easily be overcome by the introduction of a better Marxist state theory to the scene. This is mostly because of the fact that Marxist state theories, though much more equipped in theoretical terms -when compared to Marxist police theories- do also lack a sophisticated historical perspective in their conception of the state-coercive apparatuses, including the modern police. Marxist theories of the state take for granted the essential class functions of the coercive apparatuses of the state, and thereby reproduce inevitably the fallacies of the Weberian approaches, which tend to reduce the state to organized violence, in its naked form. In short, Marxist state theories do not recognize the specific nature of the state coercive apparatuses on the basis of the historical processes that characterize them- a crucial example would be the transformation from the private police to the public police in the mid-19th century in the midst of the bourgeois revolutions in Europe.

Departing from these observations, this chapter attempts to analyze first the merits and the weaknesses of the Marxist/revisionist approach on the modern police, a discussion to be followed later by a critical account of the Marxist state theories in terms of their view of the coercive apparatuses of the state in general. This chapter hence will try to

bring together the two previously non-communicative literatures: the police theories mostly developed by Marxist criminologists, and the state theories developed by Western Marxism.

The chapter is built upon the insight that whereas the studies on police and policing are in need of a theoretical support from the state theories, theories of state are in need of a practical and also relevantly conceptual input from the field of police studies. That is why; the second task that this chapter tries to accomplish is a modest attempt to develop and offer a historical materialist perspective on the issue of policing with the help of a historically sensitive concept of bourgeois state form. The most important though also the most obvious result of this historical-theoretical synthesis will be that the state security apparatuses in general and the police in particular are subject to fierce *political* struggles taking place within as well as among classes.

An important concept which will be highlighted in the following lines is the concept of class power. The notion of class power is relatively underdeveloped in the field of Marxist state theories, whose main emphasis seems to be on the notion of state power. However, it will be argued that class power has an equally important explanatory power in making sense of the capitalist state. It is also the panacea to avoid the risk of over-expansion of the notion of state and making use of it as a key that explains everything. This corrective intervention becomes more important while examining “coercion” for the state emerges as the most immediate reference point in relevant discussions. This thesis will argue that taking into consideration the notion of class power both facilitates our understanding of the changes in the organization of state coercive apparatuses, and minimizes the risk of neo-statism, a tendency to fetishize the state and state power and make use of them as key explanatory reference concepts.

To differentiate between the notions of *state power- class power* is of crucial importance as the thesis looks at both the 19th century modern police formation and the era of post-Soviet neoliberal transformation which denotes a paradigmatic shift in the

politics of police organizations when compared to 19th century. This is also necessary for the modern police apparatus has been an internationalized organization since the mid-19th century onwards that needs to be analyzed within a wider world-historical perspective. The modern police apparatuses have persistently been shaped by the voluntary and even planned interventions of the ruling classes and the bourgeoisie which have at their disposal the specific transnational field, which is very much immune from the direct assaults of the ruled classes. In other words, national political actors, or more specifically national bourgeoisies and the ruling classes, do make voluntary and organized interventions at the transnational level to the nature of the national police organizations since the 19th century. Therefore to understand what the modern police is and to be able to develop a historical materialist perspective on the modern police, the International should also be theorized without falling into the trap of recognizing it *as an external factor*, and the notion of class power emerges as an important and helpful analytical tool to this end.

This thesis does not presuppose that once relatively closed nation-states –the 19th century examples- have become internationalized by time –especially by the establishment of the Bretton Woods System (Cox, 1981). The bourgeoisies of different countries have been trying to act on a coordinated manner since the 19th century onwards so that transnational class formation is not akin to the post-War era only. The post-war period can better be recognized as an era when such efforts reached their peak (Picciotto, 1991). Internationalization of state coercive apparatuses should also be understood within this context.

This thesis offers the notion of International Party of Order (IPO) as a concept that might help to understand the internationalization of the police. The concept is inspired from the studies of Amsterdam School, the most prominent example of which is Kees van der Pijl's (1998) research on transnational class formation. Through this concept of IPO, a detailed discussion of which will be made in this Chapter, not only a historical

materialist but also a *transnational* historical perspective on police studies will be proposed.

Finally, the internationalization of the modern police is a direct intervention not solely to the national political fields but to *the political as such*. The transnational class and their voluntary and organized interventions in the modern police do retrench and reshape the concept of the political as a modern phenomenon. As will be discussed, the modern political field as a place of struggle around the dream for the common future, or as a place of utopia building is castrated by the internationalization of the modern police.

2.1. Reviewing the Marxist/Revisionist Theories of the Modern Police

“Has the working class gained or lost bargaining power as a result of giving up the “right” to shake the duke’s carriage on his way to Parliament?”(Robinson, 1996a: 90)

Marxist/Revisionist theories of the modern police will be analyzed in two sub-themes. The first deals with the criticisms addressed at the liberal theories of the new police by the revisionist accounts. It will be mainly argued that the revisionist accounts’ critique of liberalism is right in their trial of removing the ideological veil that the liberal theories provide for the new police but still insufficient in their conception of the new police’s complex relationship with the working class in the 19th century. The second sub-theme is based on a detailed analysis of the main revisionist arguments on the nature of the new police, and argues that revisionist accounts suffer from a methodological fallacy. It is the non-dialectical perception of the working class, which is either seen as a perfect submissive body or as a class-in-itself endowed with spontaneous powers. Therefore, the revisionist accounts are insufficient in their conception of *inter-class* struggles, in the theorization of the impact of the struggle between the bourgeoisie and the working classes on the modern police. However, under this subsection it will also be showed that the revisionist accounts help better to decipher the *intra-class* relations in the 19th century that made up the modern police, especially the struggles between the urban bourgeoisie and the rural gentry.

The revisionists are named by Reiner (2000) as revisionists since they represent a challenge to traditional liberal or cop-sided theories of the police. This challenge is based on their refusal of the reification of the capitalist system in the form of industrial society. The liberal theories of the police explain the causes of the police reform that occurred in Britain in mid 19th century- accepted in the relevant literature as *the birth date* of New Police apparatus- on the basis of the growing urbanization and the existence of weak-corrupted figures of policing. According to them, ineffective security services necessitated a change when faced with the pressures of the industrial society.

Such an emphasis upon industrialization as the driving force of the new police is also based on a perception of the growing poor masses in the middle of the industrial towns, as the main causes of the growing crime in the cities. Moreover, the emphasis put upon the corrupt and ineffective practices of the old constabularies is highlighted as the main reason for the need of reform in policing. According to revisionist accounts, this rhetoric of corruption and the common sensual tendency to equate poverty with crime are only apparent causes of the police reform, underlined to legitimate the imposed transformations in police.

Orthodox liberal approaches to the English police history are criticized by Robinson (1996a) in his famous article “Ideology as History...” of promoting an ideological legitimation to the police institution. According to Robinson (1996a), liberal theories of the police are based upon the belief that “not all men are trustworthy” so there arises the need for the police force to take necessary measures against the “bas subjects of the king”.

Hence, an orthodox liberal theorist, Reith, sees policing as a preventive force established to eschew the risk of social disintegration. For Reith, the police should pay full-time attention to security and get paid in return. That said every citizen has the responsibility of policing for there is no much difference between a common citizen and the police. The latter represents civilization since the former represents the “the smooth

and orderly collection of Income Tax in Britain” (cited in Robinson, 1996a: 87). Citizenship contains the germs of modern policing. Moreover, the new modern police transmute the crude physical force (coercion) into public insistence on law observance (consent) which ensures public order (Robinson, 1996a: 88).

Revisionists criticize this concept of public order used by the liberals and decipher it as a form of appearance that only has a “soothing power” for the bourgeoisie (Engels, 1969). The revisionists perceive the growing class division and conflict as the main reasons behind the need for a new police even though not all liberals are silent on the role of the class struggle in the formation of the modern police and theorize it in their own manners.

For instance, Reith, while putting emphasis on the notion of a universal citizenship that covered everybody in a society, does not lose sight of the role of the classes. For Reith, police had the duty to protect the weak against the powerful. He mentions that the working class did not have the opportunity to provide its own security while the wealthy was using private policing for years (Robinson, 1996a: 87). Accordingly, the creation of a new police represented a benefit for the poorer classes, who had fought hard to gain their political rights. These political rights were started to be protected now by the police.

The revisionists, on the contrary, consider the new police as the building up of an oppressive apparatus in the hands of the capitalist classes to discipline both the work and leisure times of labouring masses. Revisionist theories do touch upon the roots of the issue of *criminalization* and do not consider the rising crime as a disease of the poor as the liberals do. A liberal would ask the following question without perceiving any problem in it: “Have not public bureaucracies eliminated plague, solved the enduring problems of urban sanitation, and prevented gross impurities in purchased foods? Why cannot the police similarly “clean up” crime and control violence?” (Silver, 1967:21). Alternatively, revisionist accounts of the modern police formation demonstrate in a

detailed manner how the old support mechanism named “the payment in kind”, for instance, is redefined as theft (Reiner, 2000:25). They not only show the social transformation but establish a link between the market formation (or widening and deepening of the capitalist market) and the formation of the new police. They consider the formation of the new police as the confiscation apparatus of the capitalist class which lays hand on the products provided by both the colonized people in the overseas and the labouring classes at home.

Although revisionist theorists of policing appear to put much weight on *the making of the social* by policing (i.e. criminalization of old leisure habits like street pastimes of the working classes by the new police), they do also *implicitly* shed light on *the formation of the political* by policing. Accordingly, the class conflict between the newly emerging bourgeoisie and the landed gentry gave a specific form to the new police as the former did not possess the necessary traditional social networks to protect their own property as did the gentry. The newly emerging urban bourgeoisie was not accustomed to take in hand the job of policing so that its members found the job as a burden (that had to be carried on by the national state) (Reiner, 2000:25).

According to the revisionists, concerns over the close relations of the old constabularies with their communities during the pre-police reform era and indeed the potential for closer relations between the police officers and the working class made the bourgeoisie anxious. The *deradicalization* of the policemen appeared to be the only solution to the risk of affinity between the police and the working classes (Robinson, 1996b). The professionalization of the police through their institutionalization as public force was proposed to enable further alienation of the policemen from the people as “one secret of modern-day control of the lower class by the ruling class is the control of one part of the working class by another part of the same class” (Robinson, 1996b: 201). This job of deradicalization appears to be a serious issue for the bourgeoisie since the old system of social control was too much enmeshed into informal and personal modes of policing.

Revisionists do not use alienation as a definitive moment in the formation of the new police. Nonetheless, their historical analysis implies that the need for impersonal rule was determinant in its formation. The new urban bourgeois classes were devoid of traditional means of protection which were akin to the landed gentry yet they also did not favor the establishment of a similar system for their own use since “the animosities created or increased, and rendered permanent by arming master against servant, neighbor against neighbor, by triumph on the one side and failure on the other, were even more deplorable than the outrages actually committed” (1839 Royal Commission on the Rural Constabulary cited by Reiner, 2000:27).

This move on the side of the bourgeoisie represented a moment of the separation of the economic from the political and thus threatened the extra-economic power that was accumulated at the hands of the landed gentry. Nonetheless, with the rise of the working-class movement, the conflict between these two classes transmuted into consent. The revisionist accounts of the theorization of policing rests upon a fundamental opposition between the new police and the working classes. Many Marxists in the discipline of police history have indeed underlined the constant overt fight between the new police and the working class during the long 20th century. So, for the revisionists, the establishment of the new police was against the benefits of the working classes. It was of and against them.

In opposition to the liberals, revisionists do not give credit to the rhetoric of people who control the police. Indeed, they see this as a pure ideological claim. Nonetheless, there appears to be a problem in such a conception as well. It is based on a conception of a fully active agency who gives shape to the social as to his/her own benefits. It goes away from a dialectical conception of class struggle and tends to bend the stick towards agency fetishism. Bourgeoisie appears to be all-mighty class, who foresighted reformers acting on her behalf. This is not to contest the basic idea of revisionism that the new police was an impersonal form of power created to oppress the working classes but to add to it a further glimpse: the new police was an impersonal power which gained

consent not only through coercion and through its “impersonal” appearance but also and mostly through its universal appeal, its appeal to the fact that everybody had his/her right to enjoy political rights (Ergut, 2004). In that sense, the new police institution was not only and purely shaping the social body as all revisionist accounts claim to do but was also a defining agent of the political arena.

Reiner (2000) rejects any reification of the new policing idea to a negative notion of ideology. He argues that the new police referred to a wider fact of the necessity on the side of human beings to construct a society based more on universal interests, even if these latter stayed in abstract. That is why Reiner names himself as a neo-revisionist since he sees some merit in the liberal cop-sided theories’ insistence on the claim that the poor were relieved from the job of policing themselves; at least they gained their nights from the extra job of night watching (Critchley cited in Robinson, 1996a: 89). However, of course Critchley does not look into the underlying reasons and processes that resulted in this achievement of the poorer classes but rather prefers to relate it to the smooth and civilized character of the English people reflected in the institution of the new police (Critchley cited in Robinson, 1996a: 89).

Though the new police was a form of institutionalized dominant ideology, this cannot be reduced to a homogenous block of ideas that tried to pervert the minds of those who were oppressed. Dominant ideology was open to the fists coming from the working class and affected by the latter’s struggle. In that sense, the new police apparatus was shaped by the 19th century’s social movements and revolutions. These latter were not just prime movers of the formation of an apparatus for the benefits of the wealthy classes to protect their properties from the mob violence but were also representative of the force of the labouring classes who obtained many social and political rights through these historical facts. Although mob violence is argued to be one of the reasons behind the police reform by some orthodox theoretists, it is also true that in the 19th century rioting was “normal” and perceived as a form of communication between the rulers and the ruled. Later however rioting became a threat to social and political order (Reiner,

2000:24). Hence, even though the formation of the new police apparatus was not a direct result of this, it of course brought about the de-normalization of riot as a communication tool in the hands of the masses.

The working-class resisted the police but did not resign from using it as a way of asking for prosecutions of the offenders against working-class victims (Reiner, 2000:40). That is not to say that working-class was behaving in an opportunist manner. On the contrary, it shows that police institution received some of its legitimacy from the idea of “universal law enforcement”. Moreover, “some radical leaders, and the emerging ‘respectable’ working-class strata, welcomed control of the most ‘dissolute and abandoned’ habits of the rougher elements, seen as not only an immediate menace in everyday life, but a threat to the political and social advance of the whole class” (Reiner, 2000:40).

The rather immediate relation established between the working class and the new police by the revisionist account appears to be based on a working class picture that exists in the writings of Marx and Engels. The role of the working class in the writings of these two revolutionary men is very much idealized especially up until the analysis of the 1871 Paris Commune in Marx’s *Civil War in France* and up until Engels writes a preface to that in the date of 1891. Until that time, Marx and Engels give lots of credit to the spontaneous power of the working class and tend to underestimate the ideological power of the capitalist system to contain that class. In fact, Marx assumes that the transformation in the objective conditions would inevitably bring a change in working class consciousness. The development of class consciousness is thought to be conditioned by the completion of the capitalist development. This approach has its echo in the Marxian theorization of policing. The mediations between the class consciousness and the institutions of the capitalist system are degraded and an immediate correlation is constructed in-between. Such immediacy assumes on the one hand a belief in the working class in-itself, whose agency is secondary to the formative power of the structural conditions. On the other hand, it assumes an optimism

concerning the ability of the working class to get over the mysticisms facing it once structural conditions get developed.

Such a methodological stance risks of perceiving the police institution as the anti-thesis of the working class, a class both idealized in terms of its transformative potential but degraded in terms of its actual power. Such an attitude in policing studies gets stuck in the following question: Police institution as an anti-thesis of the working class renders the capital-labour conflict more obvious. But still the institution becomes successful somehow in getting the approval of the working classes. Is it pure coercion that makes them to give acceptance? Is the ruse and wise of the policing powers which deceive them? If not, how the did new police apparatus obtain legitimacy from the working classes?

According to Storch (1975), the new police was not successful in obtaining legitimacy from the working classes due to the latter's class culture and common practices. In the 19th century, the working class was a class-in-itself. It had its own habits, ways of life, pastimes. All these became subject to the police power. Even the dog-fights were subject to police control and punishment (Storch, 1975: 72). The pubs were closed during the divine service times (Storch, 1975: 72). In that sense, 19th century working class had a wide cultural field, the firmness of which was limiting the power of the police. Indeed, the "proletarian public realm" played a constitutive role in the changing contexts of policing and social control, and this realm enforced the police to undertake two contradictory jobs, namely the expressive function of community welfare, and the repressive function of labour disciplining (Cohen, 1979:128).

For Storch, the policemen were domestic missionaries that gave shape to the morality of the working classes –by the translation and mediation of bourgeois values- as the withdrawal of the traditional forms of personal contract left a vacuum of social control. Accordingly, the new police was the inevitable agent that would fulfill this void through its formative power. The proximity between the employer and the employee in the

countryside helped the upper classes to restrain the lower ones. However, “the physical and spiritual withdrawal of the upper classes was seemingly so total and permanent, the way was open for the introduction of novel types of surrogates- modern bureaucracies of official morality: Somerset House and the new police” (Storch, 1975:73). The separation of the extra-economic means of coercion from the moment of production appeared to create a fear of a break in “the moral unity of the nation” on the part of the wealthy people (Storch, 1975:73), and the resulting void was filled by the new police.

For Silver (1967:12), the new police represented the penetration of the society by the state, the central authority. Accordingly, the new police institution was an apparatus through which the periphery was integrated to the center, and through which masses felt greater affinity with the values of central authority. Police were the personification of the values of the central authority. This argument, while indicating the apparent nation-state/citizen formation processes undertaken by the new police, equally runs the risk of overshadowing another argument of Silver:

at a time when the agrarian rich often sought to multiply and reconstruct the traditional means of self-defense against violent uprising and attack, those who sprang from the newer sources of wealth turned toward a bureaucratic police system that insulated them from popular violence, drew attack and animosity upon itself and seemed to separate the assertion of “constitutional” authority from that of social and economic dominance (Silver, 1967: 12).

The center-periphery antagonism might mask these class-based differences between the rural gentry and urban bourgeoisie that became observable under the appearance of local-central power fights. Furthermore, theorizing the formation of the new police and the process that accompanied it as the penetration of the central authority to the veins of the whole social formation assumes a very common sensual notion of *raison d'état*, which has the unlimited sense to grow its power at the expense of the public. However, the state, for instance the British state, did not always take the responsibility to suppress protests and riots. Home Office in Britain, during the 1840s resisted the demands from different counties for the detachment of police from the Metropolitan Police Division in London, for according to them: “It is the duty of the magistracy either by adoption of the Rural Police Act or by the swearing in special constables to preserve the tranquility

of the County and to put down outrages...Sir James Graham is not prepared to supply civil force at the public expense to put down these local disturbances” (Graham cited in Radzinowicz, 1981: 51). Although such a position of the central authority can be seen as a war to urge the localities to establish their own police forces, it also draws attention to the on-going class struggle between the urban bourgeois originated reformers and the rural gentry. As a final point, the police reform process of the 19th century was as much made of a struggle among the ruling classes as of a struggle between the bourgeoisie and the working classes. Although not in a direct manner, Marxist accounts implicitly recognize this character of the new police.

Even so, as both Storch’s and Silver’s arguments show, the revisionist theorization of policing suffers from a kind of *left idealism* whose core tenets is captured best in the following lines:

the consensus masks coercion; the crime statistics are sheer fiction, hiding the criminality of the rich; treatment is a cloak for punishment; the universalism of law is a rhetoric which hides particularism; ‘normality’ and ‘deviance’ are concepts of ideology; the differentials between various parts of the social control apparatus merely conceal an identity of purpose and a unity of form and discipline (Young, 1979: 17).

Criticisms directed towards the revisionist accounts did not indeed deny that the establishment of the new police was conditioned by the fear from the growing working class culture and movement. The County Police Act of 1839 in England transformed the police into a weapon of the employers to counter the trade-union power (Storch, 1975:76). However, the relation in between these two issues was not as *immediate* as it has been thought to be by many critical accounts of the police history. Storch (1976) himself defines the police with a metaphor (“domestic missionaries”) that refers to the colonial practice of the British Empire during the establishment of the new police in the homeland. It was mediated by international pressures, like the disentanglement of colonialism, the need to rationalize the governmental bureaucracy, the need to harmonize local self-government with the central government, and the central government’s strategic abilities to grow its state power at the expense of short-time

interests of some sections of the dominant classes. These pivotal points were not *external factors* having an effect on the process; they were integral to it.

Second, it is shown that revisionist accounts bend the stick towards the social formative role of the new police, its power to interfere into the daily lives of the people to coerce them to change. Yet, it is argued that such an analysis risks of losing from the sight impact of the political struggles upon the formation of the new police. The new police were as much representatives of the political rights as they were domestic missionaries and these two were not mutually exclusive categories. There was a dialectical relation between the struggle for political rights and the assimilation of the working class into the system. If the new police started gaining political legitimacy by the beginning of 20th century, this was partly due to this dialectic of universal and particular. The new police as a coercive apparatus could be successful as long as this coercion was represented as beneficial for the general public. On the other hand, this state of affairs was always prone to conflict as the particular interests sustained through coercion were in fact in contradiction with the “real” universal interests of the people. Nonetheless, this universal appearance of particular interests cannot be reduced to the alienation of the masses or their deception. Indeed, the political rights obtained by the working class were concrete enough to sustain this appearance of universality.

Ultimately, “the success of the police in securing the cooperation of the public depends less on keeping a rosy image of impartiality than on securing a near-monopoly over the market in violence and redress” (Ignatieff, 1996:80). So, whenever the *dialectics of coercion* is not working in an ideal form to the interests of the bourgeoisie, the monopoly of physical violence enters into the scene.¹² This latter is not only a form of appearance of the modern state but it has also some practical benefits for the working

¹² Dialectics of coercion refers to the specific relation between universal coercion and particular coercion. The coercion which is concentrated at the state appears to be universal in character. However the particular interests of the bourgeoisie ask for particularistic usages of this seemingly universal coercion, “the state’s coercive ‘essence’ already implies an ideological dimension’ unless there is domination on behalf of a class” (Hoffman, 1984:33). In other words, the state monopoly on violence is an ideological form of government, which still provides a room for the realization of working class demands.

class who does not possess its own mechanisms of security and is under the constant risk of becoming subject to the private policing mechanisms available to the wealthy people, or whose response to crime has been to look for help from *the services of the underworld*.

To the police reformers of the day, the establishment of the new police was a halt to the old parochial system where only those who could pay enjoyed protection and justice. The system of parochial policing was dependent on the victim both in terms of his/her abilities to follow, catch the offender and help in the prosecution process: "...in the older system, unless the party can produce the funds the parochial officer will not follow up the case, and it cannot be expected that he should do so at this own expense" (One of the Police Reformers of the Period, M'Hardy cited in Radinowicz, 1981:55).

On the other hand, if one reason for the move towards modern police was general public interest, the other one was irrefutably related with the demands of the market-based society. At the end, the long-resistant wealthy farmers had to accept the merits of the new police who "so effectively protected property peculiarly exposed to depredation as to have increased land values in the areas concerned" (Radinowicz, 1981: 58). In that sense, the new police represented the beginning of a specific period in the life of the modern capitalist state whereby the latter assumed the responsibility to protect its citizens from its other citizens not only through punishment of the offender but also through the effort to prevent crime. The prevention of crime is considered to be a national question rather than a local one as the link between the capitalist market and the nation became more and more linked.

The new police's role is defined by revisionists as the need to contain the working-class movement. This definition itself tells a lot when the character of the popular protests/mob violence in the 19th century is compared with the previous period's properties. According to Eric Hobsbawm (cited in Silver, 1969:16-17), the riotous actions of the pre-industrial mob had a "pre-political" character "since the riots were not

directed against the social system, public order could remain surprisingly lax by modern standards”. On the contrary, “the dangerous classes” challenged the foundations of the capitalist socio-economic formation. The birth of the new police coincided with a transition from a “pre-political” period of mob riots to a political one.

Another Marxist-revisionist theory about the origins of the police is provided by Mark Neocleous (2000), one of the recent pioneers of the critical police/security studies, who wrote a book on the police institution’s role in the fabrication of social order. According to Neocleous, the police organization emerged as a result of the dissolution of the estates that gave shape to the social body during the feudal period. The emancipation of serfs and slaves from the yoke of their lords made them unmastered men and thus aroused the need to reestablish the social order (Neocleous, 2006: 4). Hence, the origin of the modern police lied in its capacity to control the acts that threatened social order. Accordingly, police did not only protect and reproduce an already established social order but it took a preliminary role in the making of it. It was a *constitutive* rather than simply a *reproductive* force. Police in the 18th century is considered by Neocleous as a force that both conjugated the interests of the state with the interests of society, and sustained general welfare and happiness (Neocleous, 2006:20). That is why; the absolutist state was a period of “oeconomy” in the sense that the welfare of the state and the society were seen as non-separated.¹³ For instance, the police was constitutive especially of the grain market, as those who wanted to do grain trade should have been registered to the police. Traded commodities such as grain were too important to be left to the uncertainties and corruptive mechanisms of the market (Neocleous, 2006: 29).

The establishment of such an immediate relation between the police and the wealth inevitably meant that the opposite of wealth, poverty, became also the direct object of the police rule. Thus, the dissolution of the servage meant also the birth of the ancestry

¹³ Foucault (1991) also argues that in the *absolutist era*, police established a condition of continuity between the power of the sovereign and any other forms of power (such as family heads).The establishment of *the principle of continuity* between the political (the prince) and the economic (the family) is “the essential issue in the establishment of the art of government” (Foucault, 1991: 92). Police means the introduction of two different forms of government into each other: principality and family.

of the proletariat, and the have-nots who were free but without any means of subsistence were now object to the police rule which would mould them into labour power according to the needs of capital accumulation (Neocleous, 2006: 30).

Although Neocleous' approach differs from other revisionists in its bringing back the police apparatus to its absolutist roots, in the last instance it nonetheless limits the police to the administration of poverty and labour force.

In sum, revisionist/Marxist theories are very fierce critiques of the liberal theories of the police, they suffer from the same methodological fallacy: non-dialectical perception of reality. Sometimes liberals do approach to the creation process of the new police as the application process of the valuable ideas of the foreseeing elite. Accordingly, these elite reformers felt the requirements of an industrial society, and tried to establish a police force replying to these needs. These reformers are depicted as the "personalization of national genius" (Reiner, 2000:23). In other times, the police institution is depicted as the child of impersonal forces, the fruit of "second nature" created by the capitalist system. Such an approach tries to normalize the new police and shows it as the natural fruit of the wheels of human civilization. Similarly, revisionist accounts do also suffer from left idealism, where the police apparatus is reified to a power-over structure, to an unmoving mover. Hence, both the liberals and the revisionists create a transcendental power out of the police apparatus.

Besides these main methodological problems that have been directed towards revisionist accounts so far, the thesis will also argue that their failure stems also from their underestimation of the role of private policing in the period before the mid-century police reform. Private policing and private police agencies were operating for the urban bourgeoisie and the working class was bound to find some under-world people and pay them if they wanted to get some justice concerning the crimes they were subject to. Hence, to fully capture the characteristics of the public police, one should take notice of the vicissitudes of this previous paradigm of policing, namely the private police. In the second chapter, the role of private policing in the transformation to public police will be

considered in detail. Now, it is time to look at the Marxist theories of state in terms of their conception of the coercive apparatuses of the modern state.

2.2 Marxist Theories of State in Terms of their Conception of State Coercive Apparatuses

This section will first and foremost try to sort out whether there are any conceptual tools that will help us to study police in the Marxist theories of state. As there is hardly any specific Marxist study on the police, the perception of coercion by the Marxists will try to be blanché out of their different state perceptions. Indeed, the widespread silence on coercion in Marxist state theories tells a lot for “a problematic is as much constituted by what it is concerned with as by what it omits or excludes” (Geras, 1978: 245). The following subsection will argue that this silence in Marxist accounts leaves inevitably that field of state coercion [and coercive apparatuses of the state] to be dominated by the Weberian definition of the state as the legitimate monopoly of the use of physical force in the society.

Secondly, it will be underlined that *a theory of capitalist state per se* and a historical perception of *that capitalist state* are different in their analytical abilities to understand change in coercive apparatuses in general and the police apparatus in particular. While theories of capitalist state help us to understand through what mediations the state is subordinated to capital in general, analyzing *the capitalist state with respect to its different historical forms* enables one to make sense of different political projects to be tried within the limits set by the capital relation at a particular moment in time. It is a fact that in the abstract level, the organization of production under capitalism does not necessitate the state to intervene with its coercive apparatuses to secure the production processes. The market coercion is essentially what makes the labour to sell its own labour power willingly as a commodity and that is why the state coercion is not directly involved within the production process. It is an *extra-economic coercion*. This indeed represents the formal adequacy of the capitalist state. However, a discussion centered on *the formal adequacy of the capitalist state* does not allow us to problematize the

changes in state coercive apparatuses and modalities of state coercion as “coercion is excluded from immediate organization of labour process” and “value form and market forces, not force, shape capital accumulation” (Jessop, 2007:145).

Thirdly, it will be argued that *bourgeois state form* as a historically sensitive concept might help us develop sound critical arguments on police without reproducing a kind of “neo-statism” that capitalist state theories tend to do. Social sciences are dominated by ‘embedded statism’ since the 19th century (Bilgin and Morton, 2002) for naturalization of the nation-state has been a common stand of all. In other words, ‘[t]he state-centric nature of social science faithfully reflected the power containers that dominated the social world it was studying’ (Bilgin and Morton, 2002). Therefore the issue at hand dictates a mainly practical, and not necessarily theoretical, problem: studying coercion under the yoke of state theory leads one to reproduce a statist version of coercion analysis as one ends up with trying to explain the state by the state as long as the public police is in fact a state apparatus, and thus state *per se*. This is to argue that explaining the state by the notion of state might end up with a circular analysis that assigns a transcendental character to the *raison d’état*. This ends up by the formulation that the state is coercive because it is the state. This is not to deny that the capitalist state is at the end of the day the concentration of coercion that exists within a capitalist society. However, resuming a direct correlation between the police apparatus and the capitalist state leads one to underestimate the former’s non-linear and asynchronous historical development with respect to the capitalist state. Thus, what kind of a *theory of bourgeois state* would overcome this kind of statism through *the notions of state power and class power* will be the theme of the third subsection.

2.2.1 Weber's Monopoly of Coercion

As it has been just argued, Marxian accounts of state tend in general to tacitly acknowledge and even sometimes reproduce the ahistorical Weberian concept of state's claim on the monopoly of violence. A historical reason of this fallacy is that many capitalist state theories take for granted the state of affairs associated with the European parliamentary democracy as universal phenomena. Anderson (1976: 30) defines this type of democracy as the masses belief in their ability to exercise self-determination. Accordingly, especially under the social democrat or reformist governments and parties of the Keynesian era, the masses do not consider that they are ruled by a ruling class and they consider themselves as potent to shape their own future. However may be true this analysis, it is equally arguable that the specific conditions of the Western societies that took their shape in the 20th century, indeed during the period of Keynesianism, turn out to set the theoretical limits of the concept of coercion For instance a Marxian scholar, Perry Anderson argues that “[w]ith [the monopoly of legitimate violence by the State], [the system of cultural control] is immensely powerful- so powerful that it can, paradoxically, do ‘without’ it” (Anderson, 1976:43). Arguably, the very existence of coercion is itself an ideological tool that sustains the mass activity within certain limits. Therefore rather than the actuality of coercion, its deterrent force is considered.

However, one of the main problems with this quasi-Weberian account is that it tends to conceptualize coercion as the unchanging mover of history devoid from any social context, as an autonomous element that moves on its own. Similarly, it tends to fetishize the state and its relation to extra-economic coercion by way of stating a direct equation between these two.

The issue of “state monopoly of the force” can be understood as long as Weber's notion of rationalization is taken into account for the latter is argued to be the driving force of modernity and modern statehood by Weber. An approach that refers to this notion of monopoly without reference to Weber's conceptualization of modernity loses the meaning carried by the term. Indeed, under this sub-section it will be argued that the

issue of monopoly can be considered as an axis to weigh the role of coercion only if monopoly is considered as real appearance. What does it mean to consider monopoly as a real appearance? It is first and foremost to display historically the conditions of its reproduction. For a Weberian, that would mean referring to the changing forms of subjectivity.

Weber's famous lecture entitled "Politics as Vocation" is where he formulated his definition of the state as "the human community that, within a defined territory – and the key word is here 'territory'- (successfully) claims the monopoly of legitimate force for itself" (Weber, 2008: 155). This definition is installed within a broader aim of contemplating on the nature of political power in general and the question of political leadership in particular. This general context whereby a definition of the modern state is provided appears to be built upon an analogy with the capitalist production processes.

This analogy has two steps: the first is the analogy of 'separation'. According to Weber, just as the laborers are separated from the means of production, administrators in capitalism are separated from the means of administration. The second step is related with the comparison of state organization with the organization of a private enterprise.

Both processes refer to modern rationalization processes for Weber. In other words, they are rational processes whereby things are governed in a 'capitalist' manner. The incalculable stimulus for action like honor, duty, the feeling of responsibility, religious call is downgraded and replaced by calculation to reach the target, the end. Traditional action is replaced not by lust for eternal acquisition but rather with "restraint of these irrational impulses".

Market induces the need to calculate as pursuing profit in the market requires detailed knowledge of the prices etc. The need for classified knowledge appears. Apart from using information to obtain competitive advantage on the market, information is also used to discipline the production process. At this point, "military discipline" turns out to

be an ideal model for factory discipline, which is “fundamental for predictable calculation” (Sayer, 1991: 98).

Concerning the modern state, the rationalization process which for Weber is the *differentia specifica* of capitalism refers to a process whereby law provides calculability and guarantee for contract-making. Modern bureaucratic state provides not substantive regulation, which would mean tackling with the issue of justice in an essential manner. Rather, the modern state provides the place on which rational economic action could be pursued. It is the “force” that guarantees the free operation of the markets. In that sense, modern state is constitutive both of the rational economic activity and of the modern individual through its monopoly of physical coercion. The rational bureaucratic state is indispensable for the sustainability of market-based economic activities. Hence, as long as the market constitutes the main terrain of profit seeking, the state will be there with its monopoly of physical coercion to deter devastation that may be caused in the market by non-rational behavior.

This rather static approach is based on the assumption that “there is one kind of rationality” or “rational economic activity”, and that the market requires a static power lurking behind to provide armor for the smooth functioning of the formal law.

According to Weber, the bureaucratic rational state is made up of “trained officials” whose rational training gave them the power to construct the basis of the rational state. Besides, the modern state formation means the separation of the means of military equipment from the soldier. Thus, the rationalization process guided the formation of “modern” coercion techniques. It annulled the principle of self-equipment and the nature of the defense provision has changed from self-responsibility or co-responsibility to the state responsibility. It is because of this separation process that capitalism could develop. According to Weber, capitalism presupposes such a rationalization process. The rational organization of the state means that arbitrariness and “magic” will no longer be the axis of organization and state acting. The displacement of the old habits

and codes of morality- in one sense the dethroning of the feudal way of life with feudal economic activity- refers to rationalization.

This process is mostly concretized in the formation of a new subjectivity whose entire life becomes subject to an all encompassing method of living and behaving. The individual's behaviors became displaced from their particularistic contexts and replaced within a broader underlying morality. The moral discipline brought about by Protestantism, the making of the self or self-perfection became the roots of rationalization. A kind of man is born to sustain the heroic age of capitalism; they made a universe out of their own image.

This specific individuation process constructed the use of violence by the nation state (violence as a means) as legitimate. "Weber's disciplined subject is the moral ground upon which modern forms of power are constructed and conversely these in turn come to regulate what subjectivity is permitted to comprise" (Sayer, 1991: 128). The new subject has been both disciplined and empowered by Protestantism. In that sense, "it is exactly the self-confidence nurtured by its self-discipline which made Protestantism the devastation social force it become" (Sayer, 1991: 131).

However, once capitalism has gained its own speed and the rule of impersonality has established, capitalism could have dispensed with its former religious underpinnings. Nonetheless, this does not mean for Weber that this was only a historical issue. On the contrary, it is the elixir of modern society. *Homo economicus* has been released from the yoke of ascetic ideals but now subject to the second nature created by the dehumanized world of capitalism.

Rationalization process refers to a process of severance. Indeed, as mentioned previously, calculability necessitates getting rid of the traditional forms of power including that of military power. Previously, the soldier has owned his own arms, yet with the advent of modernity, the soldier is separated from the means. This severance

process happens in all spheres of life. Separation of the object and subject is the core of the modern life. According to Weber, the state formation is a process of separating the means of domination from the ruler. Severance of the material means constitutes the basis for all institutional rationalization.

This process of severance leads to the establishment of the bureaucratic discipline whereby persons apply the established rules and regulations. The job of administration is reorganized along the lines of this rule of impersonality. This refers for Weber to the despiritualization of the trained officers. The officer is compelled now to apply the orders. Weber argues that this self-denial is the clue to the proper working of the state apparatus. State apparatus is reproduced by the internalization of the discipline by the state officers. The modern state rises upon the shoulders of this disenchanting modern subject.

The state documents and regulates individual identity, and classifies these documents. Such a rationalized documentation facilitates the modern state's government over its population. This is indispensable for the modern state. This indispensability creates an "objectified", "disembodied" power. Whoever wants to rule is in need of this self-perfecting "impersonal" state machinery.

Weber defines the state 'in sociological terms' through the means at the disposal of the state. Indeed, he argues that "one can ultimately only define the modern state sociologically with reference to the specific means that is proper to it, as it is to every political association, namely physical force" (Weber, 2008: 156). This means-based definition of the modern state is opposed to a functional understanding of the state for Weber claims that the modern state can undertake any function; there is no function specific to the state.

Weber's approach disembodies the coercive apparatus from the social context within which it is engulfed. Therefore, Weber's materialism is an ahistorical materialism, whereby the modern rationality has the power to capture every corner of the modern life

and reify it. Despite his focus on 'political materialism' whereby the leadership appears to be a determinate process for political change, Weber's conception of rationalization process is leaning on a tacit structuralism whose traits can be summarized as follows:

1. Capitalist rationality becomes itself a coercive force: everybody has to submit to the 'bourgeois mode of thinking' (Löwy, 2007).
2. The reified structures of modern society become "armour of modern subjectivity" that encloses the individuals (Sayer, 1991: 144).

This conception of the modernity or 'capitalism' is reproduced in the works of many Marxists (such as Lukàcs and Frankfurt School) who rightfully asserted the colonizing force of rationalization/reification process for many other spheres of human life. Yet, problem emerges when this colonizing force is itself godified and disembodied from "political struggles". Hence, if we go back to the notion of police, it is possible to argue that such a conception is deficient as long as the issue of 'policing' is thought as an end in itself. Police is itself a specific form that the political struggles take. On the other hand, why some specific political struggles take such specific forms is itself an important question that cannot be made sense simply on a theoretical basis.

Meanwhile, the means are themselves the end product of a reification process. State apparatus is itself raised and reproduced by the 'process of rationalization' and with the help of bureaucrats who internalize the discipline of this irrational rationalization process (Sayer, 1991). Thus, despite the importance of the argument on 'the means defining the nature of the state', this argument cannot be taken at its face-value. These means are themselves alienated forms as they are the product of a continuously reproduced process of "severance".

For Weber, this severance process implies the rule of impersonality, whereby the traditional forms of power are muted into impersonal rule of the bureaucracy (Sayer,

1991). The process of rationalization refers to a process of abstraction, whereby people are dissocialized. Weber sees bureaucracy as a specific mode of domination, distinct from the traditional mode of personalized domination. This notion of impersonality is a result of this process of severance. Yet, to what extent the rule of impersonality is a substantial part of the capitalist state and to what extent it is a *form of appearance* is an important question to be dealt with in order to understand the capitalist state's relation to coercion and to its own coercive apparatuses.

A further point that should be mentioned about Weber's definition of the modern state is his tendency to posit the state as the sole authority of legitimate violence. He (2008: 156) argues that "[t]he specific characteristic of the present is that the right to use physical force is only granted to any other associations or individuals to the extent that the state itself permits this. The state is seen as the sole source of the 'right' to use force". Accordingly the rule of people by people, or power of Men over other Men, is established primarily through the claim on legitimate monopoly of physical force. The state is the culmination of this abstract notion of "power over". "Power over" is fetishized and cut from the dynamics of social relations of production. Coercion becomes the notion that "explains" but not that "needs to be explained". In fact, the state apparatus turns out to be the main ruler.

The disembodiment of the state apparatus from the personal rule renders the state machine stronger and "such a machine makes revolution, in the sense of forcible creation of entirely new formations of authority, technically more and more impossible, especially when the apparatus controls the modern means of communication...and also by virtue of its internal rationalized structure" (Weber cited in Sayer, 1991: 145). The problem with this conception of the state (on the basis of its means/apparatus) is to forget the very constitution of this reified structure and to annul its history. The state apparatus appears to be the main constituent not the constituted.

Next subsection will deal with the question of how this ahistorical Weberian analysis of the state as the legitimate monopoly on the use of physical coercion resonates with the state analyses provided by many Marxist schools of thought, two examples of which would be the Political Marxism of Ellen Meiksins Wood, and Open Marxism of Simon Clarke, who indeed openly negates the existence of a state monopoly on coercion.

2.2.2 Marxist State Theories' Limitations on the Conceptualization of Physical Coercion

Before elaborating on the inclination of Marxist state theories to reproduce the Weberian idea of state monopoly, it has to be underlined that the limitations of Marxist state theories concerning the issue of coercive apparatuses of the state are not limited to this. Another significant problem appears to be the over-interest of the Marxist scholars on the ideological apparatuses of the state at the expense of its coercive apparatuses. This focus on the ideological apparatuses leads many scholars to non-problematize the coercive apparatuses of the state, and then to reduce them to passive-repressive organs of the capitalist state. However, to make a separation between consent and coercion is also a problem in the theorization of coercion in its institutional forms. Another problem that can be identified in the Marxist conceptions of coercion is to think on the coercive apparatuses of the state only when there appears an extraordinary form of capitalist state such as fascism. This results in the reproduction of the Andersonian idea that even the coercive apparatuses' passive existence as at the backyard of the daily state practices is sufficient in normal times to secure the capitalist order. For instance, Anderson (1976: 32-33) sees the use of private violence as of "marginal importance compared with the central machinery of the State, in the advanced capitalist social formations". Hence, for Anderson, the Weberian ideal type of the state is the norm. However, taking Weber's definition as the norm and defining other cases as aberrations from that normal case does not facilitate to understand the characteristics of the coercive apparatuses of the capitalist state.

Marxist state theories bend the stick generally towards a market-based understanding of coercion. In other words, while trying to decipher the *differentia specifica* of capitalism, they point out to something more than physical coercion, something that is sustained by the market mechanism. Indeed, market is itself the very source of ‘coercion’ under the rule of capital. Hence, their non-problematisation of the issue of state-based coercion does not stem from a conscious ignorance but rather from their preoccupation with the *differentia specifica* of capitalism. Both Wood (1995) and Clarke (1991), for instance, refer to more subtle mechanisms of control at the level of production relations rather than problematizing the role of coercive apparatuses of the state in capitalist reproduction.

Wood (1995: 29) argues that the separation of the economic (*the market*) and the political (*the state*) in capitalism means that

[d]irect ‘extra-economic’ pressure and overt coercion are, *in principle*, unnecessary to compel the expropriated labourer to give up surplus labour. Although the coercive force of the ‘political’ sphere is ultimately necessary to sustain private property and the power of appropriation, economic need supplies the immediate compulsion forcing the worker to transfer surplus labour to the capitalist in order to gain access to the means of production. [italics added]

This refers to the process whereby the reproduction of the production process is sustained through the imperatives of the market and through the impersonal rule of the market. That is to say, the control of capital over the production process is more refined and the rule of impersonality applies. Thus the lack of direct coercion is what characterizes the controlling/authority process of surplus extraction. The state undertakes the responsibility of direct coercion and former political sphere of feudal production process is privatized. This is indeed what is meant by *the formal adequacy of the capitalist state*. As “coercion is excluded from immediate organization of labour process” and “value form and market forces, not force, shape capital accumulation”, the notion of capitalist state as an abstraction does not help one to understand the modalities that occurs in state coercion apparatuses. (Jessop, 2007:145).

According to Wood (1995), the separation of the economic and the political constitutes the basis of alienation in capitalism. This is mainly due to the fact that the commodification process becomes seemingly devoid of political coercion as opposed to feudal type of production process and becomes concentrated at the hands of a state. Thus the state becomes “autonomous as the special instrument of class coercion; derivative as a concentrated expression of economic force” (Hoffman, 1984: 90). That is to say, the capitalist market coercion is *reexpressed* in the state only in a disguised manner; in an alienated manner, not in a direct manner as was the case in the feudal type of political powers which were a direct expression of economic coercion. Extra-economic coercion is alienated from economic coercion. This makes difficult for labour to easily reveal their close inner-relations. “Capitalist exploitation is therefore conducted within the ‘private economic realm of civil society between appropriators and expropriated, capital and labour, which is presented as separate from the ‘public’ sphere linked to the coercive political realm of the state” (Bieler/Morton, 2003). That is why; the capitalist state is a reified form of social relations under capitalism since it sustains this illusion that the market and the state are two exclusive spheres. It helps to contain labour in its alienated form, which is capital. However, this reified form of state is subject to crisis since labour is limit to capital. In other words, capital is dependent on labour for its own existence and this dependency is also the main cause for crisis as labour is volatile and contains insubordination (Hülágü, 2005).

However, this crisis-prone nature of the capitalist state needs to be overcome and the limits to capital reproduction should be removed while not ending up by a legitimacy crisis. In other words, the separation of the economic and the political is not a self-generative process. It needs to be regulated by the capitalist state. Simon Clarke (1991: 34) argues that “the separation of the economic and the political cannot be seen as a given structural feature of the capitalist mode of production, nor can the form of that separation and the boundaries between the two be seen as a constant feature of the capitalist mode of production”. Thus, the separation of the economic and the political might not be equal to the separation of the moment of direct appropriation from the

moment of extra-economic coercion. This separation is historically constituted and contested by class struggle.

When one perceives the separation of the economic and the political as a historical fact that had solely occurred during the time-period of transition from feudalism to capitalism, this results in the illusion that this separation had frozen the division of labour between the state and the class. In other words, it ends up by a once and for all established institution of monopoly of coercion (extra-economic coercion), as if it was a timeless attribute of the capitalist state. Therefore, one should historicize the separation of the economic and the political to understand the modalities that occur in that state monopoly of coercion, which in fact overdetermines the coercive apparatuses of the state. In other words, one cannot account for the changes ongoing in the reorganization of the state apparatuses without historicizing the issue of state monopoly of coercion, thus the separation of the economic and the political.

However historicizing the separation of the economic and the political stays insufficient as long as it is not equipped with the notion of *real appearance*. The separation of the economic and the political is a “form of appearance” (Wood, 1995). This means that this separation is a surface form of appearance of the social relations of production which are deeply political indeed. Hence, the economic appears as if devoid of any political rule. However this separate appearance of the economic sphere is not a pure illusion or a false consciousness. It is very *real*, with many historically concrete repercussions. That is why, this thesis conceptualizes the state form not purely as the culmination of negative politics (a state of absolute alienation; capitalist states as a wholly reified creature) but of positive politics that opened the way for the working class movement to have a say on the formation of coercive apparatuses, specifically the modern police.

In other words, the capitalist state as an abstraction does not help to understand the story of the state coercive apparatuses as the “capitalist property is founded not on the rule of

law or on the supposed state monopoly of the means of violence, but on the capitalist social relations of production” (Clarke, 1991:187). However, it should also be noted that although the state cannot be derived from the immediate needs of capital (Wood, 1995 & Clarke, 1991), its necessity is a historical feature of the class struggle. The state is a historical necessity for the rule of capital. Indeed, it is the culmination of capitalist class domination and in that sense; it is the point of concentration of power in society (Wood, 1995).

Class struggle appears through different mediations in the state form except that in crisis times, there might appear more direct interventions to secure the subordination of the state form to capital. In other words, the domination of the capitalist class over the state is sustained through different mechanisms. Indeed, the reproduction of the state is dependent upon the reproduction of capital as the state needs ‘capital’ to sustain its own functions (Bedirhanoglu, 2008). These functions derive from the contradictions of capital accumulation process, namely from the class struggle process. These ‘economic’ contradictions are reflected also through the medium of political conflicts and the state apparatus and its changing form correspond to the way these contradictions find expression in the political conflicts. For instance, the restructuring process of the security apparatuses of the state should also be analyzed with reference to the contradictions of capital not only in the sense that the reproduction of such an apparatus is materially tied to the reproduction of capital but also because as Clarke (1991) argues “the working class is always the object of state power”. However, a dialectical perception would not suffice by saying that the working class is the object of state power but also add that the state is also the object of working class struggles, which means that the state’s exclusive right on the use of force is subject to contestation, it is shaped by the demands coming from the subordinated classes, as well. That is why, the state security apparatuses are beset with contradictions emanating from the capital reproduction process and the notion of the formal adequacy of the capitalist state is not enough to capture these contradictions and respond to the question on the changing modes of state monopoly of coercion.

So far it is argued that the separation between the economic and the political is a historical separation and takes different forms, or should be reproduced in a constant manner. Then, it is also argued that the state has not an ahistorical monopoly of physical use of force. It can be drawn from these two arguments that the use of extra-economic force is not an essential/static feature of the capitalist state but has different forms at different particular stages of the capitalist development and is contingently determined as a result of the particular struggles. However, Marxist state theories tend to underestimate the role of class struggles in the remaking of the capitalist state's security apparatuses.

The second limitation of the Marxist theories of the state on the issue of coercion is their emphasis on the ideological apparatuses of the state at the expense of its coercive apparatuses. For instance, Norberto Bobbio's (1979) analysis of Gramsci reproduces this idea that ideologies are primary to institutions (whose defining feature is their right to use physical force) in the establishment of capitalist order. Such a tendency stems first from the reproduction of Gramscianism as binary oppositions between the state and civil society, coercion and consent, domination and hegemony. According to Anderson (1976: 42) Gramsci argues that "the normal structure of capitalist political power in bourgeois-democratic states is in effect simultaneously and indivisibly dominated by culture and determined by coercion".¹⁴ Accordingly, the very existence of coercion is an ideological tool that sustains the mass activity within certain limits. Here rather than the actuality of coercion, its deterrent force is considered.

¹⁴ We shall note that Gramsci's refusal to define the state by reifying it to its coercive power cannot be understood in a correct manner unless it is conceived in the historical context Gramsci found himself. Gramsci's contest of the concepts such as 'the State as policeman', 'the gendarme-state' and 'state as *veilleur de nuit*' stems from his resistance to the liberal ideology of the time (Buci-Glucksmann, 1980: 69). Such definitions are masking the real class character of the capitalist state, which is undermined by the liberal ideology to a mere "state power". Hence, Gramsci's opposition to such a notion of the state defined over its master of coercive power is related with the tendency of such definitions to conceal the very social relations underlying this specific state power. Hence, the general Marxist disengagement with the problem of coercion is generally related with the latter's 'belonging' to the liberal ideology.

However, theoretical exaltation of the consensual form of domination (ideology) risks of reproducing its opposite: a fetishization of the state and its monopoly of force. Marxist theorizing on the issue of coercion tends to come and go between the two poles of such an axis: at one pole, there is exaltation of consensus (civil society) and at the other one, there is fetishization of state power.

Althusser's interest in the issue of ideology possesses also the same risk of non-problematizing the issue of state coercive apparatuses. According to Althusser (2003), for the Marxist classics the state is primarily the repressive state apparatus through which the domination of the ruling classes over the working class is secured. This state apparatus is made up of police, army and president, government and administration. Althusser makes a distinction between the state apparatus and the state power and argues that state apparatuses tell something only in relation with the state power. Thus, the state apparatus is reorganized according to the needs of class(es) holding the state power. Yet, Althusser argues that state apparatus is not only made up of these coercive apparatuses but also of many ideological apparatuses distinct from the previous ones yet whose last resort is always to coercion. Althusser continues by arguing that the bourgeoisie can hold state power in a permanent manner as long as it has hegemony over ideological apparatuses. Whereas it is easier to sustain the hold of coercive state apparatuses (for instance through law and regulations), it is more difficult and shaky to be hegemonic on ideological apparatuses. This is the point where the separation between the state apparatus and the capitalist state power turns out to be most problematic since it paves the way for neglect about the role of coercive apparatuses or for taking for granted their role in the rule of capital.

Therefore the general problem of Marxist thinking on the issue of coercion is not necessarily a case of silence or negligence but also and mostly is the problematic way of sorting out the relations between the state's coercive apparatus and other state activities (i.e. ideological activities). Poulantzas (2004: 38) argues that conceiving the state activity with reference to repression/ideology dichotomy may lead to make a nominalist

separation between different state apparatuses and he cites the example of the army, which during many military dictatorships worked as the political party of bourgeoisie and became an immediate ideological and organizational apparatus.

On the other hand, Poulantzas (2004:88) himself also defines the relation of the state to coercion as a relation of monopoly on violence. He (2004: 88) argues that the capitalist state, in opposition to the pre-capitalist state, takes at its hand the legitimate monopoly on physical violence and the ability of making use of open violence by different instances of private power, including the factory, and other instances of micro-power loses ground as the state monopoly on violence develops. Nonetheless, Poulantzas's concern with such a definition stems from his contemporaries' neglect of the state's claim on violence while getting involved more and more on micro-physics of violence. Poulantzas tries to restore the need to give necessary importance to the coercive character of the capitalist state. He identifies one of the reasons why many stay silent on the issue of coercive apparatuses of the state as the acceptance of that fact as a natural phenomenon. Actually, it turns out that attributing an exclusive capacity of coercion to the state and naturalizing this capacity (a Leviathan State), and thinking it as the last resort the state would make use of to repress an insurrection (the rule of law) are complementary conceptualizations. Both share the same bourgeois mode of thinking or more precisely, the same liberal ideology. In each case, the state and its relation to coercion is conceptualized as if the state would make use of violence less and less as long as it has more and more legitimacy on the monopoly on violence (Poulantzas, 2004: 89).

As one of the few scholars who spotlight overtly the role of the coercive apparatuses in *the making of the political rather than pointing out solely its role in the making of the social body*, Poulantzas do limit his study of coercive apparatuses to the analysis of extraordinary capitalist state forms (Poulantzas, 1980). Although making a differentiation between the ordinary and extraordinary forms of state open an analytical room for maneuver for the analysis of the role of coercive apparatuses, it nonetheless

reproduce Anderson's above cited perception of coercion: the coercive apparatuses of the state stay behind the ideological apparatuses even if they do not directly meddle with the latter's functioning (Poulantzas, 1980: 315). This categorization of normal and abnormal forms, though may be important in analytical terms to distinguish between different types of capitalist state, possesses the risk of turning out to be an organic separation, whereby the normal one is blessed when faced with the abnormal one. This is in fact the third limitation of the Marxist state theories concerning the issue of coercion.

Poulantzas (1980) argues that under fascism, the police's special internal ideology coincides with the dominant ideology. Indeed, the police apparatus' ideology becomes itself the dominant ideology. Accordingly, under fascism, a process of displacement occurs between ideological apparatuses and coercive apparatuses of the state. Ideological apparatuses move into the sphere of coercive state apparatuses. However, this process should not be necessarily conceived solely akin to the fascist era. Indeed, it is now a banal fact that all around the world the distance between the police as a coercive apparatus and the ideological apparatuses gets narrower.

To resume what has been argued so far, Wood's argumentation points out to the fact that social relations of production in capitalism should appear as 'natural' and this requires the abstraction of the moment of extra-economic coercion from the moment of economic. Hence, Wood's formulation amounts to the fact that the alienation process in capitalism is sustained through the retreat of coercion into the back of walls. On the other hand, when Clarke's formulation is followed, it is seen that coercion is one of the many regulatory functions of the state and its retreat into the back of the walls is a historical question not related with the logic of capital. However, these two moments (the logic of capital and the historical rise of capitalism) risks of being conflated in Wood. Whereas sometimes the state is derived from the logic of capital, in some other times the state turns out to be a collective agent that struggle with the capitalist class to retain its autonomy (or with whom the capitalist class made a deal and delegated some

of its political powers in return for some others). Yet again, although Clarke's formulation seems to point out to the right way when compared with that of Wood, it risks of reducing the question of coercion to one of many other regulatory functions of the capitalist state. Clarke (1991:187) argues that "while it may be true that under capitalism, as in all class societies, the state *codifies* property rights and *regulates* the use of force, it is by no means the case that the state *constitutes* property rights or *monopolizes* the use of force". Finally, although Poulantzas and Gramsci offers more nuanced views on the role of the coercive apparatuses of the state, their occupation with the ideological mechanisms of domination risks them of falling into the trap of making an ontological difference between extraordinary and ordinary forms of state.

2.3 Preliminary Efforts for a Historical Materialist Framework of Analysis

In both the revisionist accounts of modern police and Marxist state theories, there is a methodological lacuna on the issue of state coercion and coercive state apparatuses. In the former, working class is either seen as a transcendental actor or as a purely passive subject of state power and the police is reduced to its outmost apparent functions of labour administration. In the later, the coercive apparatuses of the state are either non-problematized, or problematized solely with respect to their relations with consent or ideological apparatuses. In this section, the main aim is to make use of many not-yet mentioned insights provided by the Marxist state theoreticians who are criticized in the previous section and adding new scholars to the research agenda and thus to develop a historical materialist account of the modern police as a coercive state apparatus.

The main argument of this section, which is also one of the major arguments of the thesis, is that such a research endows us with two concepts which are respectively *bourgeois state form* and *class power* which can be used in an effective manner to analyze the modern police formation process and the transformations it undergoes since then. Therefore, the next subsections present these two concepts and provide the sub-arguments to prove their explanatory powers.

2.3.1 The Bourgeois State Form and its Importance for Theorization of Modern Policing

This section is not about the capitalist state as such but rather about the concept of the bourgeois state form “which implies an idea of ‘bourgeois revolution’” (Gerstenberger, 2007:7). Bourgeois state form cannot be reduced to the liberal state endowed with the liberal governmentality. Indeed, as the rest of the pages will suggest, bourgeois state form is as much influenced by the idea of socialism as it is by liberalism. This is not to say that bourgeois state is a socialist state of course but to say that bourgeois revolutions paradoxically contained their anti-thesis within their own body: the idea of socialism, both as a threat and extortion.

Moreover, Heide Gerstenberger (1992: 154) argues that it is impossible to establish a synonymous meaning between the analytical concepts of the bourgeois state and the capitalist state. Indeed, the two analytical concepts help both to understand and explain different but internally related historical processes. This distinction is crucial to understand how the capitalist state can survive in the 21st century without the very same impersonal apparatuses provided by the bourgeois state as it used to be in the very 19th century.

The bourgeois state will be depicted with reference to its basic form in order to provide a foundation for a historical materialist study on the modern police formation. The modern police apparatus is both a result and a condition of this bourgeois state form. In that sense, it is not the issue of naked violence which determines the modern police apparatus but rather its form of appearance, namely its historical organization as state monopoly within bourgeois states, a process within which bourgeois revolutions were highly determining.

The bourgeois revolution is a revolution not made by a bourgeois class. It is bourgeois in the sense that its political and legal results set free the appearance of classes as such in the making of history. Indeed, “the depersonalization of power was the historical

precondition for the introduction of class as a structural category determining development” (Gerstenberger, 2007: 21). In that sense, the modern police is the first policing mode based on a society whereby classes behaving not by avid lust for feudal type of power but on the basis of depersonalized power structures appear in a clear and distinct manner. This birth of the “class as such” is crucial in the making of policing strategies; as well as the birth of a state monopoly of coercion (always as a real appearance of course) is crucial for the birth of a “class as such”.

This birth of “class as such” was as much a victory as the beginning of an endless feeling of weakness on the side of the bourgeoisie. On the one hand, the end of the personal rule meant the end of search for political power to invest in wealth, thus the end of political appropriation. In the ancien régime, “the ruling estates successfully defended against the social validity of abstract wealth, the social privileging of appropriation from land, office and marriage” (Gerstenberger, 2007: 659). On the other hand, the abolition of this system of privileges or “the expropriation of personal possession of power” (Gerstenberger, 2007: 662) meant that *the class is naked*.

Instinct taught them [the bourgeoisie] that the republic, true enough, makes their political rule complete, but at the same time undermines its social foundation, since they must now confront the subjugated classes and contend against them without mediation, without the concealment afforded by the crown, without being able to divert the national interest by their subordinate struggles among themselves and with the monarchy. It was a feeling of weakness that caused them to recoil from the pure conditions of their own class rule and to yearn for the former more incomplete, more undeveloped and precisely on that account less dangerous forms of this rule (Marx, 2003: 151-152).

The bourgeois state form implies that the lack of direct coercion is what characterizes the controlling/authority process of surplus extraction. The state undertakes the responsibility of direct coercion, and formerly political sphere of feudal production process becomes divested of extra-economic coercive powers. Such a separation relieves the capitalist class from the burden of diverting the productive forces (land, labour, tools) to unproductive labour (physically coercive methods). The class power, the power to surplus-extraction, becomes liberated from state power, the immediate need for direct use of force. The burden for the bourgeoisie of holding direct political power

makes itself felt in differing degrees in history. Indeed, Bonapartism is one of the forms this burden becomes transmuted into the power of an individual despot:

The bourgeoisie had a true insight into the fact that all the weapons it had forged against feudalism turned their points against itself...It understood that all the so-called bourgeois liberties and organs of progress attacked and menaced its class rule at its social foundation and its political summit simultaneously, and had therefore become "socialistic." ... Thus by now stigmatizing as "socialistic" what it had previously extolled as "liberal," the bourgeoisie confesses that its own interests dictate that it should be delivered from the danger of its own rule;...; that in order to save its purse it must forfeit the crown, and the sword that is to safeguard it must at the same time be hung over its own head as a sword of Damocles (Marx, 2003: 164).

During the bourgeois revolution, the whole old police regulations of the ancien régime were condemned not solely because they were regulating every minutiae of life but also because they were also representing a system of privileges.¹⁵ For instance, these old police regulations were even setting the rules of holding pigeons, determining who might hold them and on what conditions. The bourgeois revolution condemned this state because of its aspiration to common welfare (the well-being of each and all) through the government of things which was in fact hiding a strict class basis. However it is also argued that the police decrees and regulations create a social body made up of a population and individuals, not of estates (Pasquino, 1991: 114), hence the "Third Estate, in defense of their own corporate privileges, invoked the principle of the 'whole', and the 'harmonic' balance of corporate parts represented by the unifying 'will' of a centralizing monarchy, against the exclusivity and partiality of noble privilege" (Wood, 1991: 31). The privileges of the absolutist state, however transmuted

¹⁵ Foucauldians use the term police state in order to describe the ancien régime period and the absolutist state. The modern definition of the police as a crime-preventive force is comparatively new to the definition of police as the "concern to develop or promote happiness or the public good" (Pasquino, 1991: 109). In the 18th century, population emerged as the new object of *raison d'état*. The political government could no longer be sufficient with the well-being of families but it should be responsible from the well-being of *each and all*; every individual and whole population at the same time. Yet, to secure the well-being of each and all required a deep knowledge about them. The state had to be governmentalized.

Therefore, the police state's police science was also a response to the crisis of the Middle Ages as it aims at the restoration of order and giving form to a society of different estates (Pasquino, 1991: 111). Therefore, the police or the police state refers to a historical periodization whereby the state tries to police every aspect of life, to give a shape to the conducts of the population. The police notion of the police state is mainly related with the government of *things*. These things might be everything: "...the territory with its specific qualities, climate, irrigation, fertility, etc.; lastly, men in their relation to other kind of things, accidents and misfortunes such as famine, epidemics, death, etc." (Foucault, 1991: 93).

into a system of *raison d'état* which aims at the prosperity of every individual and the prosperity of each that would be muted into the prosperity of the state, were creating existential paradoxes for that same state.

That is why the bourgeois revolutions have changed the basis of legitimacy from *raison d'état* to “the people” as the sole origin power and to “the public sphere” as the sole locus of power (Gerstenberger, 2007:665).¹⁶ The recentring of political legitimacy onto people has a dual meaning:

1. This forced *the personal rule* to dissolve and the newly sovereign public power became institutionalized in different state apparatuses, i.e. the modern police/gendarmerie.
2. This *impersonalization* of power meant that new forms of political power, the state apparatuses, became themselves alienated forms, which were not belonging to any specific prince or lord anymore.

This duality is also what created the paradoxical character of the modern police. On the one hand, the state became a “citizen state” (Gerstenberger, 2007: 672) while possessing the right to refuse the privilege of citizenship to many others (i.e. women, slaves etc.). Thus, the modern police became the mechanism for the sustainability of this privileged citizenship like the police state which was the guarantor of the *ancien régime*'s privileges. Moreover, the modern police became an arena where the workers

¹⁶ This change in the basis of legitimacy does not mean of course the removal of the entire police state from the historical consciousness of ruling classes. With the crisis of the absolutist state, liberalism's victory in the 19th century made a paradigmatic change in the rationality of government whereby the state no more assumed the ability to be cognizant of each and every thing happening in life. Hence, *la raison d'état* was declared to be paradoxical as the police science could never capture the reality in its totality and thus was destined to crisis. Nonetheless, this does not mean the end of the police science. On the contrary, Adam Smith reserved the police for political economy and devalORIZED its previous extra-economic jobs like “the proper method of carrying dirt from the streets” (Gordon, 1991: 17).

could get united to ask for the fulfillment of the promises of bourgeois revolutions, namely of the human dignity.¹⁷

On the other hand, the modern police apparatus was also an alienated form, a form of containment of labour within the rule of capital.

If capitalist exploitation as a ‘hypocritical servitude’ perfects slavery through the exercise of a coercion which is implicit and indirect, what has happened to that ‘direct force’ which has such a prominent role during the ‘prehistory’ of primitive accumulation? It has become, says Marx, ‘concentrated’ in the form of the state (Hoffman, 1984:88).

In other words, the all-encompassing and pervasive coercion of the feudal era has concentrated into the bourgeois state form in two aspects. The first is the apparent state monopoly on violence. Such an appearance “...renders explicit the force which is merely implicit in civil society by monopolizing it as the state’s particular and separate responsibility” (Hoffman, 1984:88). The second is alienation for, as Wood would argue, the commodification process became seemingly devoid of political coercion as opposed to the case of the feudal era and got concentrated in the hands of the state. Wood’s argument is based upon this original separation whereby the military functions with other administrative functions were centralized by the state power in return for *the privatization of some other political powers for and by the class power*. This separation of the extra-economic coercion from the moment of economic coercion is posited as the *differentia specifica* of capitalist social formation.

This transition to bourgeois state form signals also the transition from the private mode of policing to new police apparatus as the crisis-prone nature of private policing in ancien régime, where the private form of domination became generalized in the form of privileges, provoked the claim to equal rights (Gerstenberger, 1992: 168-169). Nonetheless, this transition was not a *complete break* but became realized through *sublation* whereby “the coercive powers of personal domination were sanctioned by centralized means of government” (Gerstenberger, 1992: 162). For example, the fact

¹⁷ Ironically, this notion of human dignity, once dearest to the bourgeoisie under the yoke of the absolutist state, now had turned out to be “socialistic”.

that the state did no longer issue detailed degrees of regulation to govern conferred “*de facto* force of public law on the private jurisdiction of the entrepreneur” (Gordon, 1991: 26). In both France and England, “local magistrates’ courts regularly confer[ed] legal enforceability on the sanctions exacted by factory owners’ private penal codes” (Gordon, 1991: 27).

In that sense, private policing (feudal type of political power tied to private property) is sublated within the mode of public policing (directed by the bourgeois state form). Property-owning classes (of the ancien régime) lost their direct political powers to the state which sanctioned their mode of policing through generalization and rationalization. In that sense, private policing should not be conceived simply as a different mode of policing; it is indeed the productive root/the genesis of public policing.

The bourgeois revolution was the expropriation of personal domination, be it monarchical power, seigniorial jurisdiction, noble privilege or guild masters’ power. In the process, domination was being impersonalized. It is this constitution of the state as an impersonal- and therefore public- power which constitutes the separation of the political from the economic (Gerstenberger, 1992: 167).

In sum, the separation process of the economic and the political is closely related with bourgeois revolutions. The abstraction of the moment of coercion from the moment of exploitation was itself a result of social struggles, which focused on the privileges of property-owners rather than on their properties. Hence, the transition from private policing to public policing is representative of this transition *from privilege as a political rule to political rule as no-one’s privilege*. “Outside this historical context, equal rights of citizens do not form a functional necessity of capitalist exploitation” (Gerstenberger, 1992: 171).¹⁸

¹⁸ This point made by Gerstenberger is crucial to historicize the bourgeois form of the state and its fate under the neoliberal period. Indeed, bourgeois revolutions and the modern state have a paradoxical relation as they both relieved it from the yoke of personalized form of political power and assigned to it a universal character but also put it under the pressure to reproduce this universality despite its centrality in the reproduction of labour force for the surplus extraction. This paradox of the modern state display a historical fact: the divorceability of the modern state from its vocation for the sustainability of equal citizen rights.

Moreover, according to Gerstenberger (1992: 153), “the pre-bourgeois processes of social formation have to be seen as constitutive elements of the ‘bourgeois state’”. Indeed, the new police forces carry the print of these pre-bourgeois processes to the extent that these pre-bourgeois processes drag the relatively progressive bourgeois character (equal rights of citizens) of these forces backward. As Marx argues in the *Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, the bourgeois revolutions are destined to regress. He points out the continuity between the Louis Bonaparte’s regime and the absolutist state of 17th and 18th centuries. This continuity is crucial to understand the contradictory nature of centralized police institution and policing in the modern era.

The historical conditions of this continuity or the reversion of the post-revolutionary state to its absolutist antecedents lie in the fact that the absolutist state “was a kind of last bastion of the ‘feudal class’ against its demise, even though, to outward appearance, the crown had to assert itself against the nobility” (Anderson referred in Gerstenberger, 2007: 16). The post-revolutionary state in France displayed a similar envy for as the bourgeoisie were becoming “feudalized bourgeoisie” in its search for rents coming from the land, indeed for the politically obtained private property (like the purchase of different positions in the government) (Mooers, 2000: 77). But at the same time, “large landed property, despite its feudal coquetry and pride of race, was rendered thoroughly bourgeois by the development of modern society” (Marx, 2003: 151). In that sense, the bourgeois form of the state has to accommodate these contradictory tendencies, still dragging the bourgeoisie into the nostalgia of good old days. Marx’s (2003: 162) master passage on this question is as follows:

But it is precisely with the maintenance of that extensive state machine in its numerous ramifications that the material interests of the French bourgeoisie are interwoven in the closest fashion. Here it finds posts for its surplus population and makes up in the form of state salaries for what it cannot pocket in the form of profit, interest, rents, and honorariums. On the other hand, its political interests compelled it to increase daily the repressive measures and therefore the resources and the personnel of the state power, while at the same time it had to wage an uninterrupted war against public opinion and mistrustfully mutilate, cripple, the independent organs of the social movement, where it did not succeed in amputating them entirely. Thus the French bourgeoisie was compelled by its class position to annihilate, on the one hand, the vital conditions of all parliamentary power, and therefore, likewise, of its own, and to render irresistible, on the other hand, the executive power hostile to it.

There is a contradiction that lies at the heart of the issue of coercion (policing). Its isolation to the sphere of the political helps to sustain the idea of free exchange and contractuality of social relations. However, this retreat is never complete and cannot be so as the social relations of production have a crisis-prone nature. The underlying inequality can never be contained solely through the market mechanisms and hence the constant need for extra-economic coercion. Then, the bourgeois state form's apparent neutrality is also a source of constant tension which results in the need for forcefully maintaining the separation of the economic from the political. The history of French Revolution is exemplary in this sense.

The private hold of state offices in France resulted in patronage which tied the hands of the nobility down. At the same time, bourgeoisie was not excluded from the privileges totally; at least they were striving to capture privileges that were akin to noble privileges. However, the more the state in France depended on the sale of state offices to get loyalty from the ruling classes; the thinner got its basis. On the one hand, the state acted as an autonomous agent of economic appropriation; on the other hand it became more and more dependent on the loyalty of its rival, namely the nobility. This attracted the bourgeoisie more and more into the purchase of land and privileges. The bourgeoisie in France also bought the state debts and credits, thus getting the hold of the state more and more. The paradoxical and fragile structure of the absolutist state in France got weaker with the pressure created by Britain in economic and military terms. The state lost its legitimacy once the dynamics of political accumulation were started to be questioned by the end of American War of Independence (Mooers, 2000).

The bourgeois revolutions led first and foremost to a change in the form of state. Nonetheless, this change was not a change in the place the property occupies in the society but a change in the privileges that its holders were entitled to. Hence, this did not end the peasant revolts, who pushed the revolution further each time the bourgeoisie needed their company for this. The fear of counter-revolution also pushed further the revolutionaries' ambitions to erase the whole of the feudal privileges. However, the Napoleonic state brought back the paradoxes of the absolutist state. The taxes coming

from the peasantry got more and more important as it was in the period of absolutism and this resulted in a contradictory state power which was dependent on a new state aristocracy.

The Bonapartist State helped the development of capitalism in France more than ever. Accordingly, the modern Bonapartism was a kind of balance between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The state, still a form taken by the class struggles, appeared to be autonomous. The roots of the Bonapartist state can be found in the period of absolutist state as the privileges held by the landed gentry were muted into qualities of state power, and the feudal signs became paid state offices. Moreover as was the case in the absolutist period, the Bonapartist state showed that the development of capitalism in France did not separate the moment of coercion and exploitation in a clear and distinct manner (Mooers, 2000: 120-125).

Thus the state is subject to this tension between these two moments of the economic and the political as its form and essence does not coincide to each other in a perfect manner. That is to say, there is not a correct historical form of state that coincides with a specific phase in the process of capitalist development. Indeed, there appears to be an *uneven development* between the economic and the political. Althusser's notion of historical time is much helpful to decipher this notion of unevenness. There are differential times referring to distinct spheres (Geras, 1978: 253). The specific state form and the structure of the market should not be synchronic in their historical times.

This demonstrates that the separation of the economic from the political as the abstraction of extra-economic force from the moment of surplus production is a surface form of appearance and is part of the fetishized form of the state as a neutral administrative apparatus. For instance, the fact that the capitalist proprietors lost their direct political power might not necessarily mean that they have lost their control of extra-economic coercion as long as this coercion includes use of physical coercion. Indeed, the capitalist proprietors in England had long resisted delegating their extra-

economic powers to the state, at least until the fear of the working class became dominant in the bourgeois rationality.

Moreover, the very structure of the state institutions, the political scene, conditions political struggle. It is only in that sense that political coercion can be 'separate' from economic coercion. In other words, the relative autonomy of the political from the economic is theoretically correct only if it is conceived as a question of "how the institutional terrain of the state apparatus and its articulation to the wider public sphere shapes the forms of politics" (Jessop, 2008: 90). Thus, the delegation of extra-economic powers by the dominant classes to the state is a strategic move, which implies that the political scene is itself a 'factor'; it has its own effectivity (Jessop, 2008: 90). According to Jessop (2008: 86-88), Marx describes the political scene with reference to changing material circumstances, deciphers concrete class struggle with reference to strategies and tactics displayed in this struggle, and inspects closely the transformation of the state's institutional architecture whose different modes affect the strategies and tactics that have been pursued by political forces in different ways.

Thus, the concentration of the physical coercion in the hands of the bourgeois state, its apparent monopoly of legitimate use of violence, is a *historical-strategic move* on the part of the ruling classes. Indeed, transformations that are encouraged in the architecture of the state apparatus help or impede certain political forces to acquire certain political benefits. The history of modern police formation is meaningful when considered on the basis of the political struggles ongoing on the bourgeois state form.

Hoffman (1984: 28) argues that "if a 'servile' state appears to vie with a 'dominant' one or the state as a class instrument coexists uneasily with the state as a social power that, for Marx, is a consequence not of theoretical inconsistency, but of the nature of politics itself". Accordingly, the state is successful as the coercive instrument of the bourgeois class rule as long as the interests of that class are represented as universal public interest. State as a coercive apparatus can successfully rule as long as this coercion is

represented as it is in the needs of the general public. On the other hand, this state of affairs is always prone to conflict as the particular interests sustained through coercion are in fact in contradiction with the “real” universal interests of the public. Hence, unless the state is an alienated power, it cannot be a bourgeois state or “unless the state is parasitic, it cannot be servile” (Hoffman, 1984: 30).

Within this context, the concentration of coercion in the hands of the state (not the state monopoly of violence but the monopoly of violence as a real appearance) is a way of conveying this sense of ‘universality’. Nonetheless, this process is not a peaceful one, for whereas there is a permanent need for sustaining this sense/illusion of universality, the particular interests of the bourgeoisie ask for particularistic usages of this seemingly universal coercion.

However, the application of *naked force* by the state does not necessarily mean a crisis for the rule of capital. Whenever the sole existence of state monopoly on coercion at the back of all state practices does not suffice to restore the bourgeois order and open coercion enters to the scene, it is not a must that there will be break in the smooth functioning of the rule of capital and masses will contest that usage of open violence. Marx and Engels define the state as *organized* coercion. This emphasis upon the notion of *organization* is crucial as rather than the usage of open force, it is how it is organized that matters in order to obtain “positive endorsement from society” (Hoffman, 1984:33). In other words, the history of modern police is the history of this organization of coercion in and by the bourgeois state form. The regulative principle of the bourgeois state form is not its claim to monopoly of violence in society but its relation to the issue of violence through the mediation of class struggle. There is not such a pure relation between the state and coercion. This relation is always mediated through the forms of class struggle.

So far, it is argued that bourgeois state form acquired the monopoly of coercion as its specific form of coercion in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. This was mainly the

result of the ideological change led by bourgeois revolutions. The political rights were recognized and the modern police was in one way or another started representing these political rights at a universal level. Thus, it signified the expansion of the political sphere. However, as the historical process of Bonapartism indicates, the bourgeois revolutions were based on their anterior forms of state. The absolutist state or the ancien régime constituted one pole of the dialectics, and the bourgeoisie were always tempting to go to that pole.

A historical materialist account would conceive the relation between the absolutist police state and liberal bourgeois state form as a dialectical relation whereby the latter contains the former. *Liberalism is a sublated form of the police state.* The degree of latter's constitutive role in the modern police emanated from the character of social formation concerned. For instance, according to Adam Smith the big gap between the crime rates in England and France resumed from the latter's feudal remains. Indeed, the more a feudal type of life was conducted, i.e. the big number of servants in Paris, the more was there a tendency to laziness (Neocleous, 2006: 40-41). Hence, the strategy of policing was very much related with degree the feudal intrusion into the societies in the brink of capitalism. The more was the persistence of the ancien régime, the more there was need for policing; and the less was its persistence as in the case for England, the less there occurred need for harsher methods of policing.¹⁹

However, differing impact of the police state in the formation of the modern state might not depend, as Smith argues, *solely* on the uneven nature of the respective socio-economic formations in France and England (the latter being less feudal) but *rather on the capitalist system's power to dialectical hold of the past (indeed, the persistence of the ancien régime) within its own body.* Namely, the capitalist sublation process that goes beyond the feudal social formation never annuls this formation in absolute

¹⁹ This historical view would not possibly be shared by Nairn and Anderson for according to their theses, "the British state...has hardly evolved beyond its peak of development in 1688" staying with a "fundamentally untransformed 'superstructure', a pre-modern state and an anachronistic culture" (Wood, 1991: 12).

manners. “[T]here may be circumstances in which the survival of archaic forms can promote, rather than impede, capitalist development” (Wood, 1991: 16). That is to say, the old form of policing does not impede at all in an absolute manner the development of a “liberal” society in Smithian sense but on the contrary, it sometimes even facilitates its workings. In that sense, the preservation of the archaic forms is not solely a question of national peculiarities (notwithstanding that it is important to note whether in a country this persistence of the old forms is a substantial or symbolic one) but of “capitalism as such” (Wood, 1991: 18). The contradictory nature of the capitalist social formation (the class struggle in a capitalist society) is predestined to resurrect “old forms for new wine” (Wood, 1991:18).

A second argument of Smith is that the development of trade and production would lead to the formation of free labour, which is the best police (to prevent crime) (Neocleous, 2006: 41). This Smithian stance can be considered as a very good definition of modern policing, whose substance is the bourgeois state form. The bourgeois state form is sustained upon the separation of the economic and the political, namely *alienation*, which is a very advanced defense mechanism both for capital and for the capitalist nation state.

It is already argued that the separation of the economic and the political is not only a theoretical product, but also a practical issue since this separation is the very source of alienation, and thus in a way ‘coercion’ in capitalist society. The apparent separation of the spheres of the economic (the market) and the political (the state) is argued to be the most “effective defense mechanism available to capital” (Wood, 1995:20). Economic rights are separated from the political ones, and thus the process of production is depoliticized. Nonetheless, this issue of the separation of the economic and the political in capitalism should be reconsidered with reference to that previously stated concern about the fate of the traditional forms and apparatuses of coercion, namely *the determinative power of the police state in the formation of modern police*. Even if this argument is accepted, there is another historical question which waits to be resolved to

be able to understand better the formation of modern policing: *How these institutions of coercion (indeed policing institutions) were transformed during this process whereby a bourgeois social formation was becoming more and more dominant in all over the world, namely in Europe?* This will be indeed the main problematic of the next chapter, but to proceed properly with our theoretical/historical discussion, the significance of the bourgeois state form for the police apparatus will be further specified through the notion of political as such.

Hence in short, the transition from *the police state* to *the bourgeois form of state* was conceived by many liberals as an end to the despotic police power and to the idea of common welfare as the absolute political objective. Indeed, liberals demonized the constitutive role of the police in the making of common happiness/welfare, and argued for the establishment of a limited policing. Accordingly, police was only a facilitator of the smooth functioning of the market, the heaven of individual happiness. Moreover, this led to the transmutation of the police-state into the principle of rule of law. Neocleous (2006: 56-58) argues that this positioning of liberalism is both misleading and mistaken. Although, liberalism's project of police is based upon the duality of state and society in opposition to the police-state's organicity between state and society, this theoretical construct of liberalism, the duality between the state and society, should not be conceived as a mere ideological veil that disguises the reality- the reality that the police idea still holds on the new social formation. It is not just a negative ideology whose mission is to disguise, but rather a positive one that needs to and is forced to acknowledge the worker's discontent in the new social formation. *It is not merely the free market which leads to the formation of a liberal police project but also and mostly the coups of the workers' struggle.*

To sum up, the fate of the bourgeois revolutions was also the fate of the modern police apparatus. The modern police apparatus was not solely related with the institutionalization of the right to individual citizenship but also with the right to participate into the mass politics. However, this pro-popular expansion of the political

field created the very reasons of the modern police's fight against "the political" as such. Indeed, modern police, which was somehow the children of bourgeois revolutions, had to betray its own essence and start conducting anti-political politics.

2.3.1.1 The Political as Such

The Political as such, in this thesis, is used firstly with reference to the secular political field opened up with the coming of Bourgeois Revolutions, and secondly with reference to the political as something beyond and above *realpolitik*. Before moving into this discussion, it is necessary to make a clarification about the concept's place with respect to the bourgeois state form and the issue of the separation of the economic and the political.

First, it is previously argued that the political as a separate sphere from the economic is a form of appearance, and every social relation of production is itself a political relation. Nonetheless, it was also argued that this form of appearance is not a mere illusion, it is a real appearance. In other words, it has a life of its own, a field, not autonomous from the other forms of appearance yet subject to affections, passions and indeed struggles for taking over the political power.

Second, the political as such cannot be reduced to bourgeois liberal democracy. Historically speaking, the latter is fully established in advanced capitalist countries only after the World War I and in some of them even after the Second World War (Therborn, 1977). However, it can be argued that the advent of bourgeois state form in tandem with the rule of capital resulted in "the conditions favoring popular struggle" such as legal emancipation of labour and the creation of a free labour market (Therborn, 1977: 29).

A further impact of the bourgeois state form was the mobilization of masses for national unification. This nationalized mobilization resulted in the expansion of the political field toward the people; despite the fact that this popular expansion did not necessarily

resulted in the creation of progressive measures for political government (Therborn, 1977). Nevertheless, the opening up of the political field by the bourgeois revolutions and their end-results, bourgeois states, does not point at a willing bestowment of greater political rights to working classes by the bourgeoisie. The conquering of the political field more and more by the working classes became possible as the labour movement has filled in the gaps emerging from the paradoxes of the capitalist order (Therborn, 1977).

Third, *a historical materialist conception of the political* can be scented from the account of the Paris Commune written by Karl Marx (1968) in his manuscript entitled *Civil War in France, 1871*. According to Marx (1968), the Commune as a political form represents the anti-thesis of Bonapartism. In that sense, the bourgeois political field, which possesses a structural tendency to be dragged into a Bonapartist political regime, bears life to its opposite, to the Commune, as the political field of and for the emancipation of peoples. The Commune represents the emancipatory potential the political field possesses, and thus the emancipation of diverse promises of bourgeois revolutions from the violence of abstraction they bear under the bourgeois state form.

The bourgeois political field is the field whereby abstract universals such as *social republic* are dominant. As the political field is itself not totalizable by the bourgeoisie, it is subject to change induced by the oppressed classes attracted by these abstractions. The Political thus, though under the hegemony of the bourgeoisie, always possesses something uncontrollable by it, the potential for the concretization of the abstract universals.

Another feature of the political field that emanates from the experience of the Commune is that bourgeois parliamentarism is condemned to degenerate as the parliamentarians have been separated from the responsibility of executing the very laws they enact. In other words, the bourgeois parliament becomes subsumed under the *status-quo*, to passivity. However, the political has the potential to be a field in motion.

Furthermore, the abstract promise of the bourgeois political field about the separation of the means of administration from those who administer (the rationalization process in Weber's terminology) is realized by the Commune, which restored to the political field its emancipation from the yoke of *personal rule*. As Marx (1968) says, "the vested interests and the representation allowances of the high dignitaries of state disappeared along with the high dignitaries themselves. Public functions ceased to be the private property of the creatures of the Central Government". Thus, the impersonal rule of the bourgeois state form is by its nature destined to be corrupt and yet this does not mean that the political field is closed to a struggle for the elimination of this so-called "impersonal" personal rule. On the contrary, the political field is not closed to persons but allergic to personal rule, which is its anti-thesis.

It has been argued that the bourgeois revolutions have opened up a political field with many paradoxes. As Agness Heller (1991: 331) suggests, "modernity...did not produce a new political class proper; and the birth of modern mass democracy finally rendered obsolete the equation of the political class with political action". The emergence of the bourgeois state form, at least in theory, has announced the demise of political classes and their monopoly on politics. However, the fear of mob which had filled in the void created by the demise of the ancient political classes (Heller, 1991: 331), paralyzed the bourgeois state form and even resulted in the *resurgence of political classes*.

A further characteristic of the political field, which emanates from the Commune experience, is the issue of responsibility. Indeed, Commune does not put an end to the running of the governmental issues by elected people, by vote indeed. The concept of responsibility becomes a regulative element of the political field that is open to popular participation and deliberation. In that sense, the notion of responsibility does not convey a patriarchal meaning as it could have been under the bourgeois democracy. On the contrary, it envoys the senses of solidarity and fraternity, thus an envy to common life.

The political field, when just emanated from the bourgeois revolutions and became not yet subject to anti-revolutionary tendencies such as Bonapartism, led to important changes in the conduct of traditional political life. The emergence of vote as the untouchable human right for instance signaled the end of death (i.e. murdering of the political rivals) as a legitimate form of politics. The parliamentary system renounced “death as an instrument of decision” (Canetti cited in Mouffe, 2005: 22). However, the political field that had become subject to counter-revolutionary degeneration brought back death as an unfringeable armament of the bourgeoisie against working classes and the poor whose political acts and actions were already criminalized by the mid-19th century.

The political field is an antagonistic field and not a field of consensus and reconciliation (Mouffe, 2005). It cannot be subsumed to the ethical nor can it do at the expense of it. The antagonism that gives to the political field its characteristic is based on a struggle between “right and left” and not between “right and wrong” (Mouffe, 2005: 5). The political field, at least in theory, does not occlude the chance for people to express their “desires and fantasies” (Mouffe, 2005: 6).

Nonetheless, although it considers the political from a perspective above and beyond *the field of realpolitik*, this thesis does not sort out from the notion of political, as an Arendtian exegesis: a field of freedom over social equality since the latter has the potential to denigrate the former (Ingram, 2002: 16). On the contrary, the political signifies the possibility of a utopian thinking, a dream of *best life* inspiring the daily politics and bursting out of a “group”, where “Sartre uncovers the essence of the political in the spontaneous fusion of individuals in a revolutionary moment, such as when the otherwise passive working-class inhabitants of the Quartier Saint-Antoine attacked the Bastille (the fortress-prison overlooking their district) at the onset of what we today call the French Revolution” (Ingram, 2002: 20). For Sartre, the glue of the group, the oath or the pledge lies at the “origin of humanity” (cited in McBride, 2002: 142). The fraternity, as much as liberty and equality, is formative of the political field. It

can even be argued that, as this thesis is not concerned with a normative theory of the political, the political field under the conditions of capitalism is more determined with the “pledge” and the latter’s role in political struggles than the abstract universals of freedom and equality (before the law).

However, historically speaking, at the very moment the political field was unleashed from the yoke of the political classes, it became subject to an “obsession with exclusion” (Heller, 1991: 336). The “bourgeois thought” (Lukàcs, 1971) has built in on this obsession. It has been reifying diverse issues and modes of thinking and knowing such as *hoping*, *dreaming* that are brought to the political field by working classes on the basis of a question of “is” and has been trying to exclude the (revolutionary) “ought” from the political field since then.

The main axis through which it is possible to identify a *bourgeois thought*- as analyzed by Lukàcs - is the relation of that one to *irrationality*. In other words, the claim to rationality- “the universal method by which to obtain knowledge of the whole of existence” (Lukàcs, 1968:114) - implicates also a specific understanding of irrationality as this latter is conceived as a threat to the rational constellation of the world.²⁰

Therefore this irrationality cannot be left on its own since it may generate threats to the rational world. “In this event thought regresses to the level of a naïve, dogmatic rationalism: somehow it regards the mere actuality of the irrational contents of the concepts as non-existent” (Lukàcs: 1968: 118). This void between the phenomenon and

²⁰ The end of the police state and the coming into being of the bourgeois state form also coincides with the birth of the Kantian idealism. According to Kant, things cannot be known in their entirety and this means that there is an obscure part that lied beyond human perception, which he called as *noumena* (Gordon, 1991:16). This is beyond human rationality. However, claiming that there are impenetrable parts of an object other than its phenomenal existence, posits a severe methodological problem since each and every object becomes rational as far as it is *apparent*. Thus, the very relations that it enters into with other objects are taken into consideration as long as they are *rational- phenomenal*. Non-sensible relations in between things are considered as non-rational. A perfect example to this irrationality posited by bourgeois mode of thinking is the concept of alienation which signals that there is something beyond immediate perception and things are not just things but end-results of a process of production, which disappear from sight when these things enter into relation with each other in the market for instance.

the underlying substratum is the mirror in and through which the bourgeoisie sees itself and reflects on the world. Thus the persistence of the irrational constitutes always a problem or indeed, a threat for the bourgeois society since it reminds the bourgeoisie always the unknowable, thus the uncontrollable. Not only this uncontrollable creates fear but also it brings with itself a pressure. This pressure is that of the endless need to know- thus to appropriate- as if there was no other way of relating itself to the reality, as if the only relation with the reality must be a claim to know. Thus the relations within the bourgeois society become limited to the extraction of knowledge and other ways of cognition-like hope or utopian thinking- becomes degraded. In the similar vein, in the introduction to the Principle of Hope, Ernst Bloch (1986:4) states that the bourgeois existence becomes extended to other spheres of life and seems to be the essence of any life, thus it creates a *world after its own image*.

It is true that when the political field is considered in a relatively autonomous manner, there always emerges a risk of obviating the impact of the process of its detachment from the economic. In other words, conceiving the political field on its own, risks of omitting the role of alienation as an ontological factor in the formation of the political field. Notwithstanding this risk, this critique of the political, its being subject to an alienatory process, is again possible within the same political field. That is why the political field is a “real appearance”. Its appearance is determined by the dominant classes, indeed by capitalist class power yet its reality is dependent upon the power of dominated, their lust for utopia. This utopia, as something beyond the political field, denotes the latter’s limits; place those limits not at the borders of the political field but within it, at its very heart (Balibar, 2000: 11-22). This nowhere placed within the modern political field will emerge as the enemy of the modern police. The more nowhere broadens within the political field, the more the police will attempt at removing it from the center of the political field. The history of this relation between the modern police and the political will be provided in detail in the next chapter.

2.3.2 Class Power as an Explanatory Conceptual Tool in Police Studies

The separation debate (the separation of the economic and the political) maintains that there is *an institutional separation of state power from class power*; a historical division of labour between the capitalist class and the modern bourgeois state, which has acquired now monopoly over the use of legitimate coercive force. The fact that this is a historical development indicates that it is subject to change. Hence, this separation is not an abstract necessity that defines the capitalist state but a historical product that has been shaped by class struggles, which ultimately formed the bourgeois state. The implications of this argument for the coercive apparatuses of the bourgeois state is that capitalist proprietors' losing their direct political power over coercion does not necessarily mean that they have lost their control of extra-economic coercion, concentrated now in the hands of the state; their capability to control extra-economic coercion depends on their class power, defined primarily in relation to labour.

In other words, the abstraction of the moment of force from the moment of production is not and might not be an absolute separation for the capitalist state; it might take several different historical forms by class struggles simply because of the fact that “capitalist property is founded not on the rule of law or on the supposed state monopoly of the means of violence, but on the capitalist social relations of production” (Clarke, 1991:187). Thus, the state cannot be derived from the immediate needs of capital (Wood, 1995 & Clarke, 1991), its necessity is a historical feature of the class struggle. That is why a focus on the historical development of the bourgeois state and the changing modalities of capitalist “class power” might help to go beyond the Weberian trap of ahistoricism.

Wood (1995: 31) tells that the differentiation of the economic from the political has led to a disembedding of this “autonomous” private sphere from the weight of social functions. She argues that there has emerged a new sphere of power devoid of social obligations. This meant the allocation of *political powers* separately into economic and public spheres (Wood, 1995: 31).

Moreover Wood (1995: 40) suggests that “capitalism represents the ultimate *privatization of political power*” [italics added] and this amounts to a more effective capitalist production process. This refers to the process whereby the reproduction of the production process is sustained through the imperatives of the market and through the impersonal rules of the market. That is to say, the control of capital over the production process is more refined and the rule of “impersonality” applies. Thus the lack of direct coercion characterizes the controlling/authority process of surplus extraction. As the state undertakes the responsibility of direct coercion, formerly political sphere of feudal production process turns out to be privatized. This concept is of crucial importance to operationalize the notion of class power while making historical analyses. Indeed, it points out to the fact that the allocation of state and class powers is a historical and thereby contested process and there is always a possibility of reallocation, an improvement or retreat in the privatization of the political on behalf of the bourgeoisie.

Although Wood does not stretch this argumentation further, it is possible to argue that the allocation of power between state and class is subject to change, implying ultimately that *assignment of extra-economic coercion to the public sphere* is not a necessity and class struggle might break down the boundaries of this separation. This does not mean that the economic is bound up with the responsibility of providing a general service of security/military (as it was the case for the feudal lords) but might very well mean that the economic is willing to exploit and commodify these previously more *general, communal purpose based’ activities of the state*. The recent trend towards the privatization of security might be rethought within this context as a desire of the appropriating class to *reallocate the previously distributed political powers*.

However, a differentiation should be made between privatization as commodification of previously public-owned activities (i.e. creating a market for security) and privatization as redistribution of political powers, which were once distributed in a particular way under the bourgeois state form at the very beginning. The former, privatization as commodification, is a secondary theme for this thesis whereas *privatization as reallocation of previously political powers belonging to the state, indeed the state*

power itself is a crucial concept to decipher the change in state coercive apparatuses, namely the police reform processes.

Indeed, the modern police apparatus, as will be analyzed in the following chapter, is itself a political form, and a change in its constitution implies a change on the nature of the political field. *In that sense, police reform not only reflects not only a change in the relative powers of classes vis-à-vis each other, but also is a field of struggle to change the political field, to reallocate the previously distributed political powers.* Jessop (2008: 86-88), on the basis of “The Eighteenth Brumaire” argues that Marx describes the political scene with reference to changing material circumstances, deciphers the concrete class struggle with reference to strategies and tactics displayed in this struggle, inspects closely the transformation of the state’s institutional architecture whose different modes affect in different ways the strategies and tactics that have been pursued by political forces and assigns great role to the determining power of the interaction between the local, national and international economy over the political struggle.

Jessop’s textual exegesis on Marx refers to his strategic-relational approach, which implies that the political scene is itself a factor, though determined by many others as cited previously, which still has its own effectivity (Jessop, 2008: 90). Accordingly, the very structure of state institutions, the political scene, conditions the political struggle. It is only in that sense that the political coercion can be separate from the economic coercion. In other words, the relative autonomy of the political from the economic is theoretically correct only if it is conceived as “how the institutional terrain of the state apparatus and its articulation to the wider public sphere shapes the forms of politics” (Jessop, 2008: 90). Transformations that are encouraged in the architecture of the state apparatus help or impede certain political forces to acquire certain political benefits. In that sense, the changing modalities of state coercion should also be considered as part of a greater political struggle that both shapes this transformation and is shaped by it. Therefore, class power might not dispense with this institutional terrain of the state.

In most of the discussions on capitalist type of state, “class power is structural and obscure. Capitalist type of state is more likely to function for capital as a whole and depends less on overt class struggles to guide its functionality” (Jessop, 2007: 139). However, the study of the historical constitution of the state in capitalist societies display that the preservation of the state power in capitalism “depends ... on the willingness of the dominant class(es) to be satisfied with social domination (i.e., with the de facto subordination of the exercise of state power to the imperatives of capital accumulation) rather than press for the restoration of the earlier monopoly of political power” (Jessop, 2007: 141). Hence, the separation between the class and state powers is open to be challenged and does not necessarily facilitate the safety of the long-term interests of capital. On the contrary, this separation might also be imbued with problems for a smooth capital accumulation process. These problems lead the capitalist classes to generate new accumulation strategies, hegemonic projects and strategies. Indeed, class power is the ability of the capitalist class to overcome the obstacles that emanate from the modern political field, presented above. Indeed, it aims at enhancing its class capacity.

One structural feature of the class power is its wide range of impact compared with the state power. In other words, “state power is not the only form, not the only site, of ruling class domination” (Barrow, 2007: 102). The power of the capitalist class goes beyond the state power; it has a larger room than the state. The class power is more flexible and rapid than the state while moving/acting. This uneven development in-between, this ability of class power to overflow the banks of state power provides the former with a broader leverage; a leverage to force the state into change.

Indeed, hegemony, a concept that should be conceived beyond the limits of the concept of ideology, is helpful to understand how the class becomes able to translate its power into the state apparatuses. In fact, the class power denotes the ability of the bourgeoisie to generate myths and illusions, which are, according to Gramsci “ideological bluffs” of the bourgeois intellectual (Bates, 1975: 363). The most recurrent myth, which shapes the field of state coercive apparatuses, is that they can be controlled and managed by the

rule of law. The rule of law covers the fact that the violence of the whole capitalist society is concentrated in the state apparatuses while the notion of legitimacy becomes more and more subsumed under the notion of lawfulness (Poulantzas, 2004). For instance, the issue of neoliberal police reform reflects such a hegemonic constellation, where the notion of “rule of law” is posited against the state- defined as an authoritarian coercive apparatus. The class power is this structural ability to make the world appear through dichotomies, such as exemplified in the dichotomy of law and violence.

Moreover, the question of class power is neither a question of voluntarism nor of instrumentalism. It is the power to urge the other social actors to take their positions with respect to the capitalist class, thus the ability to asymmetrically define the political terrain of struggle. However, this relative power of the capitalist class does also signal an insecure position, a constrainful environment of operation.

The uneven development of class power with respect to state power leads into the creation of new projects and strategies in both power centers. The former has a tendency to open up to the market the formerly non-marketized parts of human life and the latter attempts at recovering the crises of this marketization process. Hence, though these different projects appear to be complementary, they are also under a risk of collision. This risk of collision urges the class power to accumulate more and more power, not necessarily at the expense of the state but rather through and in the state. For instance, various forms of vigilant groups of physical coercion, or their more legal forms such as private military armies are subsidized by class power and these groups are very much embedded into the state power.

Gramsci’s insight on the forces that operate outside the proper state apparatus (to attack the working class by the tacit coverage provided by the army and police) is helpful to further our conception of class power. Gramsci (cited in Anderson, 1976: 32-33) argues that: “[i]n the present struggles, it often happens that a weakened State machine is like a flagging army: commandos, or private armed organizations, enter the field to

accomplish two tasks- to use illegality, while the State appears to remain within legality, and thereby to reorganize the State itself". This notion of the reorganization of the state through the non-state-apparatus-proper forms refer to a process whereby the class power gives shape to the state anew.

Meanwhile, as already stated the state monopoly of violence (*statism*) is not pure illusion or a simple ideological tool that facilitates the workings of the ideological apparatuses in the form of a hidden weapon lying behind them. It is a *real appearance* in the sense that the sustainable existence of parliamentary system is dependent upon the existence of an institutionalized national army and police (Poulantzas, 2004:85-91). The latter institutions are not there only to sustain the rule of capital when the parliamentary system fails during a socio-political crisis but also to complement the parliamentary with the democratization of coercive mechanisms. In that sense, the concentration of violence in the hands of the state is closely related with the working class power. Hence, state monopoly of violence keeps the capitalist class power intact only in *negative* manner; by negating the further privatization of political.

Finally, it is a fact that putting the notion of class power at the center of an analysis is risky because there is an uneven development between the change in the class power and the corresponding transformation of the political structure; this is partly because of the resistance displayed by the state apparatus (Buci-Glucksmann, 1980: 100). A change in the class power and the concomitant social change results generally in a socio-political crisis which is refracted by the already established state apparatuses. However, the police apparatus depends, as already displayed in the chapter on police studies, on a historical basis wider than its actual members. In that sense, "...the police cannot be reduced simply to the 'technico-political element'" (Buci-Glucksmann, 1980: 101). Class power does affect the changes in public police due to and through the latter's wider historic basis, which includes, police intellectuals; private police agencies; self-help measures of policing; factory discipline; para-military organizations etc.

2.4. Theorizing the International in and for Police Studies

It has been showed that the foundation of the modern police is closely related with the fate of bourgeois revolutions in history. This sub-section departs from the fact that these bourgeois revolutions are international events in terms of both their reasons and repercussions. The character of the international in the 19th century is of crucial importance in the formation of modern police, an issue highly neglected by the police studies, including the liberal and revisionist theories alike. However, a perception of the international is vital to understand the nature of the beast, the modern police apparatus' paradoxical essence. Indeed, the dialectics of coercion that defines the core of the modern police apparatus is very much influenced by the internationalization of the police forces, a process not external to the police-formation processes. The international is a factor that mediates every component of the police form.

The international is specified in this thesis with reference to a field composed of national or international/transnational political actors that -not necessarily in a diligent manner- aim at producing strategies of policing for world-wide application. These political actors are part of a transnational bourgeoisie either in the making as is the case for the 19th century or in maturation as is the case for the late 20th and early 21st centuries.

There are theories concerning the meaning of the International for police studies which account for a more Weberian approach and thus bend the stick towards the detachment of police institutions from their respective political centers (Deflem, 2002: 20). Accordingly, the internationalization of the police is dependent upon the degree the latter possesses relative autonomy from its respective national political center. The autonomy signifies the ability of a police institution to perform duties of law enforcement not always under close scrutiny or dictates of the political center. This is both a quasi essentialist and oxymoronic point of view whereby the autonomy of the police refers to its bureaucratic and thus independent nature. The medium through which the police receives autonomy is its professionalism (its monopoly of knowledge

and techniques of policing) and this latter grants it an upper hand compared with “the political powerholder as amateur” (Deflem, 2002: 24). Thus, the internationalization of police is in close correlation with the degree to which it isolates the political power holders and thus establishes a detachment from the political field.

This perspective lacks a dialectical point of view and avoids problematizing to what extent the engulfment of the police power within the class power provides the former with a sphere of manoeuvre where to display strategic moves. Indeed, not the detachment from but the engulfment within provides the police institution the ascribed relative autonomy. Moreover, not solely the impersonal power of the police (its professionalization) institution makes possible its internationalization. The causation works in the reverse sense. The latter’s internationalization makes it a more alienated and professional, hence apparently non-political power, freed from the constitutive pressures that might come from the dependent classes at the national and local level, and coming under more direct control of the bourgeoisie at the global level.

On the one hand police apparatus’ professionalization strengthens the bases of the bourgeois state form and on the other hand, the internationalization of this impersonal body disempowers the state in favour of class power. That is to say, the internationalization creates a more personal, ancien régime type force at the global level. The internationalization of the modern police plays over the paradoxes of the bourgeois state form and confidently establishes a *non-impersonal but still alienated police power*. That is to say that the internationalization of the police de-makes the rule of impersonality ascribed into the bourgeois state form. The separation of the means of coercion from those who use these means (the rationalization or professionalization process of the modern state apparatus) is redefined by the internationalization process of the modern police. However, this decomposing effect of the international does not lead to a complete return back to ancien régime type of police powers, where the means of coercion and those who hold them were not separated, but one and the same. The de-impersonalization caused by the international does not annul the alienated form of the

bourgeois state at the domestic level, but reinforce it by endowing it a new legitimating capability on the basis of “the wider international experience”.

This non-impersonal character of the modern police is sustained through the internationalization of the police as *the latter disseminates specific powerfully imposed national or local, and/or commonly pursued global projects concerning policing and police community. The role of the police intellectuals acquires a particular importance within this context.* In that sense, the separation of the coercive means of control from the people that hold these means (as Weber defines rationalization and bureaucratization of modern state) acquires a globally operating class-based meaning that requires historical explanation. The international field sustains a very much personalized police force both *at the expense and on behalf of the* bourgeois state form. But how can one analytically make sense of the International as well as the internationalization of the police? This will be the main question problematized in the following sub-section.

2.4.1 Transnational Historical Materialism as a Guide in Theorizing the International

Didier Bigo and Anastasia Tsoukalas’s notion of the transnationalized security field is important in defining a field of security at the transnational level which has its own players, rules and practices. Bigo and Tsoukalas (2007) argues that to make an accurate analysis of the security issue without falling into the trap of voluntarism, it is necessary to define a field of professionals dealing with the management of the ‘unease’. Accordingly, “though the effects of this field are creating illiberal practices, they are not the result of exceptional decisions taken by the professionals of politics following a master plan” (Bigo and Tsoukalas, 2007: 4). This field is a field where different notions and practices of security collide, enter into a relation thus produce a contingent field effect, which results in “the transformation of the logic of violence”. In that sense, the field is not a planned or projected work of a global elite but rather an arena of struggle among and between different public and private transnational actors of policing to determine the changing logic of violence.

This field of course has some powerful generic tools in its own hands to shape the logic of security, the most common of these being statistics (Bigo, 2007:12). Thus, the accumulation of expertise and corresponding technologies of social control and surveillance result in a politics of technology highly powerful in determining the field effect. This politics of technology is closely tied to a struggle of who will determine “the legitimate unease” at the transnational level and thus get the upper hand not only at that level but also in their respective national domains (Bigo, 2007: 13). The transnational security field is not just an arena of struggle for different organizations of policing and security but also an arena where they draw “resources of knowledge and symbolic power” (Bigo, 2007: 13). The empowerment of national institutions of security such as police apparatuses through internationalization creates a set of interests for the new members of the transnationalized security field quite different from the interests defined while they were operating rather around the notion of national sovereignty and this state of affairs has ended up in the creation of transnational guilds (Bigo, 2007:15).

The notion of field also facilitates the contextualization of the internationalization of police institutions as different actors whose definition of job includes any kind of policing, i.e. private security companies, airline companies, and airports, in short all institutions covered within the contours of this field of (in)security (Bigo, 2007: 21). However, this does not mean that the security field has direct sanctioning power; it rather produces knowledge and related discourses of (in) securitization (Bigo, 2007: 23). In a nutshell, Bigo (2007) engages in a political sociological analysis of the security field. Bigo’s dynamic notion of the field covers also the people who are pro-active in the management of unease through neighborhood watch programs or community policing schemes. In that way, the notion of the field underscores the divisions set among different levels of analysis such as transnational/national and local, or political and social. “[T]he notion of the transversal field of (in)security makes possible the analysis of a space that is indeed social and political but transcends the division of

internal/external or national/international imposed by the territorial state of mind” (Bigo, 2007: 28).

Thus the internationalization of the modern police is only meaningful when it is understood from such a notion of transversality as it has an explanatory power only in relation to changes in different spheres of socio-political life such as colonial experience of policing, private policing, the role of the political classes, and the actions of the police officials themselves. However, this transnational political sociology is nonetheless subject to be limited in a descriptive mode of analysis as long as no connection is established between the overly-expanded notion of security field and class interests. In other words, to problematize the question of who determines “the legitimate unease”, there is a need to rethink on this transnationalized security field through the analytical tools provided by transnational historical materialism.

Transnational historical materialism argues that the world system of nation-states is not made up of relations between states but rather of transnationalized social forces that give shape to this system. In other words, as the capital accumulation processes are not bound by national borders but are world encompassing phenomena, analyzing accompanying class formation processes is indispensable in order to have an accurate understanding of both state formation and interstate politics (Overbeek, 2000).

Transnational historical materialism tries to understand the constellation of social forces/social relations of production that result in a strategic orientation of a transnational historical bloc in order to restore its hegemony. This hegemony projects a quasi-model of state-society complex into other parts of the world through different mechanisms like the Bretton Woods Institutions or NATO, and the emerging world order is supported by transnational elite groups or managerial classes (Overbeek, 2000: 177).

The mode of integration of a specific state into the established hegemony and the subsequent formation of a transnational order then depends upon “the dynamics of capital accumulation; institutional developments and ideological processes” (Overbeek, 2000: 178). This transnational order is the habitat of newly emerging types of global authorities as historic blocs are bound to generate different hegemonic projects to “articulate different visions of the world in such a way that their potential antagonism is neutralized” (Laclau cited in Bieling, 2000: 38).

Then the transnational bourgeoisie reproduces “the political” at the transnational level without being affected by the working class struggle as it is more often the case within national contexts. That is not to deny the existence of counter-hegemonic forces at the transnational level. However, the transnational is the *habitus* of the transnational bourgeoisie, whose detached power from the yoke of domestic forces enhances its class power. The transnational hegemonic structure unevenly affects different political constituencies; those who have a deeper grasp of this structure take the lead in national contexts. The transnational hegemonic structure empowers certain actors over the others. These can be some fractions of capital (i.e. money vs. productive capital), and/or some ruling classes as against the others, and/or some state institutions at the expense of others (i.e. industry ministries vs. treasuries or finance ministries) etc.

“[T]he class fractions which share common orientations, interest definitions, and collective experiences provide ingredients for a coalition of interests aspiring to represent the ‘general interest’. These formulations of the ‘general interest’ are called comprehensive concepts of control” (Overbeek, 2000: 174). A concept of control is “a structural constraint supported by a particular configuration of classes and fractions of classes galvanizing themselves behind a common strategic orientation, which then serves as the framework in which everybody defines ‘their interests’” (Van der Pijl, 2007: 626). These comprehensive concepts of control lead the formation of specific strategies on behalf of the transnational bourgeoisie. These strategic selections prevent the access of diverse social classes to the political field.

Concepts of control operate at the transnational level by exploiting the working-class-power-free nature of the international. They become operationalized and even more sophisticated in the international arena by and in the “planning groups” (Van der Pijl, 1998). In other words, “planning groups” are beds of transnational bourgeois class formation which benefit from the uneven reach of the working classes to the international politics. For example, even “(b)y 1872, there were about four million Freemasons [making up the *organized* transnational bourgeoisie] in the British Empire compared to half million trade unionists and 400.000 members of the co-operative movement” (Van der Pijl, 1998: 102). Indeed, the comparatively small number of the property owner classes as against the propertyless classes is revenged at and through the International and their small number becomes multiplied through their ability to get organized in “planning groups” such as Freemasonry.

Another important feature of these planning groups is that rather than comprising capital owners only, they also include many state figures. The relative remoteness that exists between the members of the capitalist classes and the bureaucrats of the capitalist state per se at the national level is eradicated at the international level, whereby they stand side by side. For instance, “already in [the late 19th century], one of the strongholds of masonry was *the police* and... the privacy and secrecy of masonry have all along provided a cover for intelligence operations as well” [Italics added] (Van der Pijl, 1998: 102).

These planning groups do also reinforce the institution of political leadership in capitalism: the concentration of the concept of control over the shoulders of *a single individual*. In bourgeois thought, “domestic politics falls easily prey to emotions and it is ‘the business of those outside politics to prepare the ground for the wiser politician’” (Angell cited in van der Pijl, 1998: 108). In that manner, these planning groups work for the strengthening of certain historical figures that could legitimize the works of these planning groups or provide the legitimate ground for the expansion of the rule of capital. The class power becomes fused not only into the technical experts, bureaucrats

or capitalist state functionaries but also in the non-technical political leaders. In that way, the class power and the state power find peace in a popular leader who is the concentration of class power; a leader to chop down the cold front of the impersonal state for the masses.

2.4.1.1 The International in the Politics of Police: *International Party of Order*

To constitute a link between the security field as described by Didier Bigo and the transnational historical materialism, this thesis offers the notion of *International Party of Order*.²¹

The notion of International Party of Order is proposed as a guide for the analysis of the role of many actors in the formation of international politics of police and police reforms indeed, of the “International Political Party” (Gramsci cited in van der Pijl, 2007: 628). Accordingly, social forces, indeed ruling classes that operate at the international level develop common political strategies that they pursue in different national contexts. These international social forces act as if concentrated in international political parties. This Gramscian concept will be supported in this dissertation by the notion of “Party of Order” as used in Marx’s analysis of post-revolutionary French politics. It will be argued that the internationalization of the modern police and various actors who are involved in that process can be best analyzed through the notion of *International Party of Order*.

The Party of Order was [a] party of reactionary bourgeoisie founded in response to the revolutionary movements of 1848. The party was built as a coalition of the two French monarchist factions – the Legitimists and the Orleansists – and lasted from the 1849

²¹ The architecture of such a concept has been stimulated by Maximilien Rubel’s (2002) detailed account of Marx’s notion of Bonapartism in his article entitled: “Karl Marx devant le bonapartisme”. In other words, the idea is that the Party of Order of the post-revolutionary France signifies more than a historical institution, namely an analytical category, which can be operationalized to understand different historical conjunctures and structures. As the notion of Bonapartism is used as an analytical concept of political science, the concept of Party of Order can also be similarly utilized as an analytical concept.

coup d'état until December 2, 1851, the date of Louis Bonaparte's coming to power. The Party of Order was where all different fractions of the dominant classes coalesce against the working classes. It was the organization, a perfect invention of the dominant classes to surmount the obstacles posed by their conflicting allegiances. However, these conflict allegiances were common in their dislike of modern politics and envy for a privileged class of politicians. In fact they were allergic to *res publica*. The Party of Order, in the aftermath of 1848, persuaded the parliament to self-annihilate. In fact, they even organized the masses all around Europe to compose letters asking for the annihilation of the national parliament (Marx, 2009: 37).

The Party of Order was a historical moment that contained the close past and the immediate future in its innermost part. The coup d'état of Louis Bonaparte (Napoleon III) in 1851, the beginning of the Bonapartist regime in France, was a defining characteristic of the Party of Order even though it was destroyed by the new regime. It was both a victory and a demise on the side of the bourgeoisie; both an advance in the *formation of bourgeois ideology* (whose defining trait was the hatred of the proletariat, independent from the latter's real historical political power), and a loss in its governmental capability. It was a recovery from the crisis, but it was itself a crisis as well. This paradoxical nature of the Party of Order was reproduced at the international level by various political actors, of course including the states themselves, who have international aspirations of power.

The International Party of Order as a concept does not point out to the infallible attempts of a self-proud invincible bourgeoisie. On the contrary, it allows sorting out the *melancholies* of the transnational(ized) bourgeoisie, the *parodies* it is subject to, its desperation and *absurd* responses given to that desperation. Indeed, the concept of International Party of Order helps to understand the misery of the bourgeoisie, which is easily convertible to a tragedy. In fact, the strategies of the transnational bourgeoisie are bound to become scandals for the whole humanity.

The concept of International Party of Order puts emphasis on the *adventurous nature* of the transnational bourgeoisie and its organic intellectuals. It shows to what extent the dialectic of domestic and foreign, or internal and external affairs may lead the political and social actors to run after new adventures to suspend the movement of this dialectic, to prevent the possible crisis, or overthrow of the established order. International Party of Order, as it may evoke easily, does not necessarily mean a recurrent restoration of *status quo ante* at all times; it means the attempt to *dis- and re-articulate the bourgeois state form through new ideologies* that feed up the capitalist system. It is a conservative power which acts as a pioneer of reform.

International Party of Order, as a concept, provides the tools to examine the *esprit de corps* that covers the technicians and experts who *govern the world*. It does help at revealing to what extent there lays a habit of scandal, extortion and defamation behind the veils of technique and expertise. It points out to the dirty world of *real politik*. Thus, the concept helps to focus not only on public speeches and acts of the international political actors, transnational bourgeoisie and its organic intellectuals but also on the intrigues and various forms of behavior and acts not perceived as reasonable enough to take place in plain public.

This thesis aims to depict the bourgeois class consciousness that can be read in the IPO' documents; practices; recommendations rather than attempting to demonstrate relations between statesmen, capitalists and their organic intellectuals. Indeed, such a political sociology of the transnational police reformers necessitates staying far from a "spasmodic view" of their acts, which would contradict with the historical materialist perspective of the thesis. Provoked by E.P. Thompson's (1971: 76-136) discussion on the 18th century's mob's social history and the concomitant riots, which argues that riots cannot be reduced to spasmodic reactions of a mob whose members are abbreviated to a *homo economicus*, who react whenever his/her stomach is empty, it will be argued that neither did the bourgeoisie react whenever its most immediate interests are at stake.

Indeed, class consciousness is more complex than both the immediate and calculated or rational reactions to disadvantageous situations facing the class as a whole.

There are as much rational calculations as irrational behavior, if it is correct to say so. Class consciousness is not immune from strong and stimulating feelings. International Party of Order, where the class consciousness of an epoch's leading classes is condensed, is defined also by feelings of anger; desperation; ambition and fear side by side by rational calculation. It is as much marked by *absurdity and comedy* as foresighted calculated class acts. One should refrain from an abbreviated view of a capitalist class, and the concept of IPO aims at encompassing these usually neglected parts of class consciousness.

International Party of Order points out to the ways political actor's attitudes and ideological commitments at home may diverge from the ones they pursue in the international arena or in other countries. Definitely, international party of order, as a concept helps to concentrate on reverse promises of various political actors concentrated under a same international party (which is representing transnational bourgeoisie) and to demonstrate either the hypocrisy of or sometimes the complementarities between differing, or even opposing acts of these political actors. "Indeed, organizations need hypocrisy to survive" (Avant et al, 2010: 20).²²

International Party of Order, as a transnational organization of the bourgeoisie and its *mandarins*, is active in the formation or deformation of states, indeed its constituency is very much interested in the capacity of various states, their statehood *per se*. Sometimes the constituents of that Party engage as *statehooders* in various projects, either through a war or through other policing methods. Moreover, the notion points out to a

²² It should be stated that many police reform programs enforced by the IPO invite police organizations to return back to the basics of policing such as law enforcement at the end of the day.(see van der Spuy, 2007: 281). One obvious reason seems to be the gap between the level of ambitiousness of IPO's reform projects and the field realities. Yet, another reason is that the focus on technocratic idealism (or namely on a change in the police culture) does not bring about a change in crime statistics neither in law enforcement performances. That is why, while reading on the police reforms, one should be aware of the fact that these reforms are not realized mot-à-mot as many members of IPO would like them to be but implemented on a rather *ad hoc* basis and in a contingent manner.

characteristic feature of those who compose it: to settle for better in fear from worse. In other words, historically speaking, fear from radical/revolutionary change spur into the acceptance of reactionary solutions, even though they are not appealing to the *likes* of the transnational bourgeoisie.

To sum up, the notion of International Party of Order will be used in this thesis with reference to a framework of analysis summarized as follows.

First, It points out to the fact that the labor discipline provided by market coercion, namely by the value-form or exchange value is not enough to understand the organization of political coercion in capitalism. Therefore it shows the strategies developed by a class conscious of the repercussions of the political as such. Indeed, International Party of Order is a collective agent, which points out to the importance of voluntarism in the reproduction of the international order.

Second, this party might undergo through drastic transformations, and the determining power that is placed at the very center of this party might change depending on changing class balances. Indeed, it will be argued that whereas the late 19th and early 20th centuries are guided through the logics of state power, shaped in response to powerful labour pressures, the post-Soviet neoliberal era is determined more by the capitalist class power. In other words, whereas the bourgeois state form is determinant in the 19th century in the making of international politics of police, in the neoliberal era capitalist class power emerges at the forefront of international police politics in an attempt to redefine the established boundaries within it.

Third, this party is subject to many contestations from within and other spheres of bourgeois politics. However this thesis does not aim at revealing the inner tensions of this party or the conflicts within it. Rather, this party will be taken as a structure in itself, as a field, and the thesis looks for the effects and implications of this structure. What makes many different agents a unifying whole under the wings of a same party? What is the underlying ideology of this party that makes it in turn a party? These

questions will try to be answered in the following chapters on the basis of police reforms from 19th century onwards.

2.5 Concluding Remarks

In Chapter 3, bourgeois state form will be used as an analytical concept to understand the dialectics of the modern police, which means both an advance (as it is developed as the anti-thesis of private policing practices) and a regress (as many policing techniques of the absolutist state will resurrect as part and parcel of the modern police). The bourgeois state form mainly refers to the modern state's monopoly of the legitimate use of coercion, the development of which had happened through severe intra-class battles. Moreover, the establishment of such kind of a state power is a partial victory on the side of the working classes as the state had to recognize them as political agents whose demands should be taken in serious.

The notion of class power will be referred more in the chapter on neoliberal police reforms in which the power of the capitalist class in the restructuring of the police apparatuses will be operationalized through the notion of the privatization of the political. To reiterate, the latter is not equal to the privatization of previously state-owned public assets. It can neither be reduced to the neoliberal era's privatization of security, where many individual capitalists are involved in the marketization of security. It rather points out to the restoration of the bourgeoisie's power over the organization of political coercion, as was the case in England in the early the 19th century. If the late 19th century presents a partial retreat in the privatization of the political, the 20th century is the full restoration of these state-seized class powers.

CHAPTER 3

RETHINKING ON THE HISTORY OF MODERN POLICE FORMATION

This chapter is firstly an attempt to reread both the birth and the internationalization of the modern police within the framework of dialectics of coercion, developed in the previous chapter. Indeed, what the implications of these theoretical debates for the modern police apparatus are is a legitimate question that was not answered fully in the previous chapter. Therefore, this chapter will make use of the conceptual tools developed above to rethink on the formation of modern police as well as to *deepen the analytical powers of these concepts*.

The issue of the separation of the economic and the political in capitalism should be reconsidered with reference to the fate of traditional forms and apparatuses of coercion, namely about *the determinative power of the ancien régime in the formation of modern police* side by side with the following question: *How these institutions of coercion (indeed policing institutions) are transformed during this process whereby a bourgeois social formation has been becoming more and more dominant in all over the world, namely in Europe?*

Such an investigation will provide us with a reference case to understand the changes ongoing in the nature of the modern public police in the post-soviet neoliberal era as well. In other words, this chapter is both an operationalization of the preceding theoretical arguments, and a historical case study which will provide us with a comparative basis to understand the nature and degree of change in the late 20th and the early 21st centuries. Indeed, this chapter will help us to understand *what police is* in its historical context.

Realizing both of these ambitions -theoretical and historical/descriptive- necessitates firstly looking at the concrete effects of bourgeois revolutions on the modern police institution. The specters of the 1789, 1848 and indeed of the 1871 Paris Commune is haunting the new police. Bourgeois revolutions and their aftermath are world-historical events whose impact on the formation of the new police both in terms of international pressures they unleash and in their determinative power in the formation of the modern state should be considered in more detail and through the lens of dialectics. In fact, as Andreas and Nadelmann (2006: 84) put it in a very clear manner: “[t]he revolutions of 1848, though more national than transnational in character, were the first in which the news passed from town to town by telegraph. In their wake could be seen the first real glimmerings of international police consciousness”.

However, it also should be mentioned that to look for the legacy of the internationalization and thus for the commonalities among different police institutions to define the modern police might trigger many historians’ refusals as the latter, especially in the arena of criminology, operate on the basis of a differentiation between the Anglo-Saxon and the Continental models of policing. In other words, the criminology literature assumes that there are two legacies in the institutionalization of the modern police. One is the more liberal British police tradition, and the other is the Continental model evolved under French supremacy. In fact, it is generally argued that “Anglo-Saxon police were ‘kin’ police whose authority came from people, and whose existence was a manifestation of successful democracy, while gendarmeries [which were a French origin institution] were essentially despotic, even totalitarian, since they represented force directed from rulers on to the ruled” (Emsley, 1999:3).

However, in this thesis, this categorical separation is not taken for granted as opposed to those scholars, who theorize this separation in a rigid manner and deduce reference points from this theorization to judge other cases of police formation such as the Turkish one which arguably pursue the Continental model (see Ergut: 2001, 2004). For ,

will be shown, these two so-called different traditions coalesced in time through internationalization practices.

Nonetheless, it of course a fact that England and France were different original cases deserving to be analysed in terms of their own peculiarities. The thesis does not deny these differences but argue for not to theorize these differences as if they were presenting two alternative modes of policing under capitalism. For, making such a theoretical differentiation results in the creation of a dichotomy of civil-military, which is spontaneously associated with police and gendarmerie. Alternatively, a separate section under the issue of 'civilness' of the police institution will be presented to demonstrate that identifying the Anglo-Saxon model with 'civilness' and the Continental model with 'military' is masking the class-struggles that gave shape to different police institutions.

Second, the historical reference point of the criminologists concerning the birth of the modern police, in other words, the police reform that occurred in England during the mid-19th century, will be placed within the broader 19th century history and thereby the police reform will be linked to world-historical issues, namely to *colonialism* as of core importance to the modern police formation. Hence, the aftermath of broadly speaking the date of 1870 is also a determinate point in the making of the new police and its becoming a coercive apparatus model as the international best practice of its time.

Third, the analysis of the modern police formation cannot be reconsidered without taking into account the *post-World War I police reform* incurred to Germany by the international community. This is also a time period when the international interventions become quasi-regulated with the consolidation of the nation-state form as the legitimate model for peoples' organizations on determined territories.

As a result of this historical study, it will be argued that the modern policing institutions are driven by many contradictions stemming from the social relations underlying the

capitalist socio-political formation concerned. Notwithstanding, the modern police organization is also marked by the fight it conducts with its own absolutist past.

This tension in between the pre-modern and the modern at the heart of the police organization and the issue of policing concretizes itself upon two axes. The first axis is placed in between the poles of the ancien régime and the modern nation-state. The former pole refers to *the reformation of a good old order* in terms of policing while the latter refers to *the creation and formation of a new order* for the police. This tension between the ancien régime and the new order has a determinative power on the nature of the modern police.

It unfolds itself in this second axis whose one pole is *the concern for the promotion of public welfare* and other pole is *the concern for the ill to come*. When the notion of policing expands, it includes the welfare of people and thus the notion of good government. Whereas whenever it narrows down, its public order role through preventative and investigative roles comes to the fore. The promotion of the common good (but always in a class-society whereby the happiness of the king is first among equals) and the envy for public security (the defense of the state against the internal enemies) is a defining tension of the class-society based policing.

The second argument of this section is that the modern police's paradoxical nature is resolved- though not in an absolute manner- in its "anti-political" stance. This stance is strongly sustained through the internationalization of the modern police institutions. The international's legacy in the issue of modern police shall be understood as a reactionary power that draws back *the political as such* into the power play of *a class of politicians*, as was the case during the period of pre-bourgeois state formation. Therefore the chapter will depict the birth and the development of the International Party of Order while opening up these two previously mentioned arguments.

3.1 Policing before the Century of Revolutions

In kinship or clan-based societies, the function of policing was undertaken by the members of the community but this policing function was completely different from class-based societies where police organizations have been mainly responsible from taking the social and political inequality under control. In non-class based societies, policing displays rather a democratic function as for instance, “policing of these hunts was of vital economic importanceand absolutely essential to prevent failure as a result of the behavior of any individuals who might be selfish enough to scare the herd off by individual action...” (Leod cited in Robinson, 1996: 18). The class-based societies display a sublation in this form of policing. In that sense, “the evolving capitalist state created an institution with conflicting loyalties” (Robinson, 1996: 41).

This sublation process is the basic mechanism of the police formation in class-based societies. This paradox finds expression through and in different forms. Robinson argues that the foundation of this paradox stems from “the desires, needs, history, and material working conditions of the police themselves, who often assert interests that are antagonistic to those of the ruling class” (ibid: 43). That is to say, for Robinson, the contradictory character of the new police arises from the policemen’s class origin and their affinity to the community they control on the name of the ruling classes. The next sub-section will alternatively discuss that the working class-in-movement and the political scene set by the bourgeois revolutions are the real reasons behind this contradictory nature of the modern police.

The pre-history of the modern police with respect to non-capitalist class based societies is illuminating in showing the kind of transformation policing functions underwent both in the medieval period and during the disintegration of the medieval society. In the medieval period, the kings’ power or their divine right emanated from their power to transform the feud/self-help system of policing into “an obligation owed to the king” (Rawlings, 2002: 11). In other words, “[a] wrong injured not just the victim but also the

lord or king within whose territory it occurred because it offended against that person's sovereignty" (Rawlings, 2002: 11). The foundation of policing which used to be placed within the community was removed from there outside to the space of the rulers. However, the decision to pursue an offender still rested with the victim who pursued his or her own private prosecution process this time on behalf of the state of the state.

In the system of frankpledge, all men of a community, of a town, who were not part of the clergy and wealthy people, were obliged to become members of a tithing (Rawlings, 2002: 15). This division of labour in a class-based society reveals that the communal policing (or the community policing) is underwritten by the class divisions existing in a society. The members of the frankpledge system swore an oath of loyalty to the crown. Moreover, the previously held method of local people's pursue of offenders, namely the system of hue and cry, evolved into a community type of policing under the control of the crown which created a revenue resource out of this system. "...[t]he hue was not simply a way of pursuing offenders, it was also a means of rendering the local community accountable for its policing work since every raising of the hue was inquired into by the hundred court and by the royal judges. If it was improperly raised or not properly pursued, fines were imposed" (Rawlings, 2002:17).

The court's strategy to gather the victim-based community policing under its own authority faced resistance from the people. The resistance was not openly directed against the king but displayed as foot-dragging in the job of active pursuit of offenders (which was still a community responsibility). The quasi-freedom of the people to undertake the job of self-policing began to dissolve, and formal policing was built on the incorporation of community policing by the court into the sovereignty of the court. Yet, this should not be perceived as the modern idea of state's monopoly on violence as "[t]he obligation to pursue the hue ad cry was reinforced by the requirement that adult males maintained arms" (Rawlings, 2002: 24). Moreover, the hue and cry benefited the political authority as the state, making use of local practices, transmuted them into *central* tools. For instance, in the 16th century England, a law was enacted to reinforce

“the obligation on places to which the hue had been brought by requiring contributing towards the damages obtained by a victim if the inhabitants did not join in the pursuit” (Rawlings, 2002: 32).

By the mid-16th century, the poor people became the primary object of policing as they were considered as responsible from the crisis undergoing within the feudal society. Yet, together with concerns for controlling the poor vagrants, a the poor relief system was also introduced as new policing methods. The poor relief system and policing has started to develop in a combined manner not only to discipline the social body in a specific manner but also to decrease the *costs*. For instance, in Britain in the 17th century,

[i]t was normal to allow resident paupers to beg since this reduced the cost of relief, and this also fitted in with notions of Christian charity, but it created problems in discriminating between licensed and unlicensed beggars. In York in 1541 resident paupers were licensed as beggars, but required to wear badges and only beg on Sundays and Fridays in the presence of a master of beggars appointed by the city (Rawlings, 2002: 49).

The disintegration of the feudal society and the development of capitalist mode of production asked for a more powerful moral policing as the causes of poverty were considered to be the outcomes of immoral activities of the poor like vagrancy, drunkenness, idleness etc (Rawlings, 2002: 52). The modern police’s function as form-processors did not stem from a mere dislike of the poor body, or from an envy of exclusion of the poor from the sphere of the wealthy people. This function demonstrated also the ambition of the absolutist state to keep everybody within the socio-political system and not to discard anybody, or not to acknowledge a margin of tolerable *sub-humans*, people who felt out of the society. In that sense, the formation of the new police contained the seeds of the formation of the new welfarist bourgeois state.

This welfarist tendency was as much fed by the *Smithian ideological atmosphere* as the socio-economic pressures emanating from a transition period (from a feudal to a capitalist society). In fact, the poor were considered to be the labouring classes, without whom a country would not be strong, economically prosperous and safe. This change in

the states of mind of the ruling classes reflected that labour became a *social value in itself*.

The same period witnessed also a change in community policing models. Indeed, one of the most common community policing models, the watch system underwent a qualitative change whereby the householders who were the traditional watch keepers during nights in a town, started to drag their feet in doing their traditional job which was the symbol of the so-called “liberty enjoyed by the freeborn Englishman” (Rawlings, 2002: 64-65).²³ Yet, the establishment of a compulsory rate for more professional watch did not satisfy the reluctant householders since the government asked money to look after them. But at the same time, this professionalization of the watch system consolidated the power of the local elite over the local government at the expense of the labouring masses. This happened not only because of the principle that who played the piper called the tune as well but also because of the fact that by the 18th century, the market for security started to become established. In fact, rather than depending on constables of the local government, people decided to pay to other private bodies for the watch (Rawlings, 2002: 71).

Still, the attempt to professionalize the watch system has met with a bigger resistance from the wealthy rural elite in the aftermath of the 1789 French Revolution. The attempts by the central government to oversee the policing of metropolises were countered by the following argument in Britain: “Our constitution can admit nothing like a French police; and many foreigners have declared that they would rather lose their memory to an English thief, than their liberty to a *Lieutenant de Police*” (*The Daily Universal Register* cites in Rawlings, 2002: 72).

²³ Liberal police theories claim that the police institution in England had their roots in the tradition of local self-government, which is argued to be unique to the English modern police institution. That said, liberal police theories argue that the national police in England is made for and of the people. In one sense, *all men were policemen*, every citizen has the duty to police yet the modern society inevitably asks for some professionalization which confines the business of policing to some special recruits.

Besides this transition from community policing to private policing in Britain, there happened another phenomenon remarkable in terms of the formation of the modern police: the establishment of private police forces by Dock Companies. The police forces established by these companies were not only deterrent forces but also, despite their private character, they were empowered to “stop and search persons and boats...arrest thieves” (Rawlings, 2002:75). By the beginning of the 19th century, these kinds of private policing measures started to pass into the governmental authority that used to partially fund some of these private initiatives without taking them in full-fledged control. Hence, a change in the balance of state and class power became observable. The latter’s initiatives were gradually internalized by the central authority. In fact, the establishment of the modern police as a form-processor or as the maker of the social body was not a state inventiveness per se. Indeed, the control of the labouring classes and their disciplining was first and foremost a defined job for the private police forces. The Thames Police, for instance, who were controlling the loading and unloading procedures of the West India ships, were responsible from eradicating “...the customary practice of ... taking any article whatsoever, whether sugar, coffee, or anything else, which may drop into the hold from the casks and packages” (Rawlings, 2002: 75). So, the bourgeoisie was brave enough to delegitimize the previously set rights of the workers. By 1780, following *the workers’ riotous acts* on this delegitimation process, the Thames Police became nationalized. In fact, the century of revolutions discouraged the bourgeoisie to carry out these kinds of social control jobs on its own.

In England, 18th century witnessed some practices of security provision where market ideology prevailed even over the foundational principle of the “free Englishmen” which used to dictate that policing and local government was an activity to be led by the free noble gentlemen voluntarily as a demonstration of civic pride.²⁴ The dissolution of the

²⁴ In the mid-19th century police reform process, police reformers were going to blame those who opposed the new police as “reactionary” (Reiner, 2000:19). Even some other called these opponents as parts of “gangsterdom”. They were thus trying to associate the opposition with the remnants of the ancien régime. Nonetheless, the despise with the ancien régime did not put an end to this principle of English pride which liberal police theoreticians claimed to base on the tradition of self-policing. In other words, despite

gentry resulted in a gap in justices of the peace, who were responsible from crime detection processes, which was filled in by the people who were not wealthy at all and who had to make a living out of this job through fees (Rawlings, 2002: 89). This led to the formation of a private sector of crime detection as these new justices of peace had to depend on “thief-takers” who were also conceived as “thief-makers” (Reiner, 2000: 17).²⁵

Hence, the formation of the new police should also be conceived as an attempt to reformulate the individual-based market ideology at the core of the nation-state. This need for reformulation did not emanate from the lust for power on the part of the state but from the bourgeoisie’s fear from the working class movement. Nonetheless, the state’s undertaking of the crime detection and the related policing activities was not a smooth process and the state insisted on *not monopolizing* the job of policing for long as in the mid-18th century the governments were still not willing to fund long-term policing strategies, which resulted in the flourishing of “thief-takers” who were dependent on various rewards to agree to come up with the job of detecting crime (Rawlings, 2002: 94-95). Not only rewards but also criminals were necessary sources of crime-detection, which resulted in the normalization of corruption as part of the policing job. This practice of crime-detection through informal means of information gathering and a close relation with the criminals themselves was established by the quasi private police, which nonetheless set the paradigm of decentring the previously victim and community centered job of crime detection and of the new “professional” police. Hence, the new police apparatus was born out of the private policing initiatives taken by the bourgeoisie.

However this issue of corruption was creating a problem for the governments not solely in England but also in France, where corruption was emanating not from private

its presentation as a complete break with the ancient elites, the new police was crowned with reference to a feudal habit.

²⁵ Thief-takers, who were dependent on the fees given by their customers to chase the thieves who had stolen their valuables, started to make deals with many thieves by making compromises with them or producing fake thefts to upgrade their revenues (Reiner, 2000).

policing initiatives but from the operations of the police state. Indeed, the storming of the Bastille, as the symbolic moment of the French Revolution, was also a blow at the ancien régime's Paris Police which was using that place as its main archive center (Denis, 2009: 121). These archives were symbolizing secret police informers that were tied to the police commissionaires of the ancien régime. These police commissionaires were made up of the King's image. They were given expansive authority and were able to make use of this authority on their own personal initiatives. Therefore there was no difference between the post of police commissar and the individual who was at this specific position.²⁶

Indeed, by the end of the 17th century, the attempts of the central state to reach the peripheries resulted in the creation of the "lieutenants généraux de ville" whose main function was to sustain the continuity of the "treasury of the king" (Emsley, 1999: 14). In that sense, neither crime nor disorder was the prime mover of the establishment of the police state in France; it was rather the need to find money for the king. These policing posts could be bought and sold as a *titre* by the feudal lords.

Therefore, in France policing posts and the lords who occupy these posts were one and the same and all the more, they were not just perceived by the masses as the additional infrastructure of the absolutist state to secure its own well-being but also as the reason of many other disorderly and immoral situations in society (Denis, 2009: 120). Indeed, police during the last days of the ancien régime for sure meant to be *anti-publique*.

Before the 1789 Revolution, the police meant not only the protection of the state nobility but also the social control of the poor and the supervision of the markets. In France, "[a]n edict of 1731 formally exempted nobles, clergy, secretaries du roi, and royal judges from the maréchaussée's [gendarmarie] civilian jurisdiction, though in

²⁶ As is the case in England, in France too there were practices of private policing. Indeed in the late 18th century, the absolutist state was not fully able to monopolize the use of force since the private police officers of the financiers, named as "gabelous, ...remained the responsibility of the independent financiers who ran the tax farms" (Emsley, 1999a:16).

effect it had always been concerned largely with offenders drawn from the poor” (Emsley, 1999a:28). As the decomposition of the feudal society in France asked for a social control mechanism for those who had started live on the roads, the new central police institution of the late absolutist state was modeled according to this need. That is why new policing functions comprised the control of the human movement. Indeed, vagrancy was defined as the common enemy both of the state and the land-owner lords. The state had the ambition to found a state of *status* in the society, to create its own possibility. This ambition on the side of the state coincided with the growing fear from and dislike of the vagrants who were in one way or another “young men and women walking into towns hoping to be hired as labourers or maids” (Emsley, 1991a:150).

It appears that before the 1789 Revolution, the insistence on the policing of beggars and vagrants aimed at changing the locus of political power from the sacred medieval authority to nascent capitalist market. Actually, the beggar was a sacred figure for the medieval state of mind and attacking this popular perception was also an attack on the foundations of the social relations of production. Yet the 1789 had fundamentally changed the police of the ancien régime by making out of it a subject of modern political sphere.

3.2 The Impact of the French Revolution on the Nature of New Police Apparatuses

This section discusses the impact of the bourgeois revolutions on the nature of the modern police institution. It discusses how the modern police apparatus was first an institution born out of intra-class struggles during the bourgeois revolutions and how this fact had affected its being conceived as a *civil* power locus since then. Then the question of how the post-revolutionary Europe espoused the new revolutionary policing apparatuses as if they were ancien régime apparatuses will be problematized.

19th century saw a change in the ideological atmosphere surrounding the issue of policing. Neither the state nor the bourgeoisie hesitated to accept that the issue of policing requires a central control and organization. Indeed, the police institution was

started to be considered not as an impediment to individual liberty as was the case in the pre-1789 France and pre-police reform England but as the very possibility of liberty in a “modern society”.

The 1789 Revolution has created a paradigmatic shift in the relation between the state and the policing institutions, and of course between the two former bodies and the people. “The maintenance of the rights of the citizen necessitated a public force (*une force publique*) which has to be funded, equally, by all citizens according to their means” (Emsley, 1999a:36).²⁷ The *maréchaussée* (gendarmerie) transformed into a *progressive force* by the French Revolution, a public force. Yet, the moment the *maréchaussée* was established as a progressive force, it was destined to become a *restorative force*, a force that tends towards the reproduction of the power structures of the *ancien régime*, as well.

In the aftermath of the Revolution, in 1790, the job of policing was devolved to the rule of the citizens themselves, who started to vote for the commissariat of the district they were living in. The leading police chiefs were also chosen by vote. Localization, elections, and openness to public scrutiny were the defining values of the post-revolutionary police in France (Denis, 2009: 117).

Similarly, the Gendarmerie was erasing the royal legacy while constituting the national. In the France of 1796, gendarmerie was already considered as a national embodiment of law. In that date, “the minister of police générale sends a circular to the administrators of provincial cantons requesting information on the scale of crime and mendacity and the state of the National Guard and the Gendarmerie....From the Ardennes came the criticism that not only was the corps inactive, it was also *unpatriotic...*” [Italics added]

²⁷ However, it should be mentioned that to be a “force publique” was meddled with a mission of policing morality. For instance, they were also pursuing husbands who were cheating their wives. In that sense, the line between form-processing and taking a position for and by the people was close. The latter risks of becoming a fancy disguise for anti-populist policies whereas the former tends to be viewed as the core of anti-populist mechanisms.

(Emsley, 1999a: 50-52). Within a decade after the Revolution, a kind of equality between law enforcement and patriotism, between justice and nation was established. However by 1798, a law stating that the essence of the service provided by the gendarmerie was ever-watchful *surveillance* was approved (Emsley, 1999a: 54). This was very much reminiscent of the kind of behavior endorsed by the ancien régime's "police state".

Second, while the gendarmerie was becoming open to populism, it was at the same time developing the dominion of the capitalist market at the expense of the populace. "The corps continued the moderate attitude towards beggars which had been emerging gradually...while the behavior of its members suggested that they were as much inspired by the ideology of the nascent Revolution" (Emsley, 1999a: 38). In 1789, *maréchaussée* "sought to repress crowds engaged in price-fixing or preventing the movement of grain, but it also sought to ensure that the markets were well stocked and initiated the prosecution of grain-hoarders" (Emsley, 1999a:38). Moreover, by the mid-19th century, factory-owners were willing to persuade many gendarmeries with attractive offers like "well-paid factory jobs for their children" to look after their properties and even to "be stationed in their factories" (Emsley, 1999a:221).

So the moment the gendarmerie became the child of revolution, it became forced to undertake a restorative role. The gendarme's role in the maintenance of internal order was re-emphasized by the new motif on the belts crossing his chest: "Respect aux personnes et aux propriétés". So the emphasis was changed from *law to propriety, from public safety to safety of individuals* within a few decades.

The constant reorganization or even reforms in policing institutions appear to be closely tied with the "restoration of old order" through the "expansion of state power at the expense of class power" to deny any chance of socialists and radicals to have a say in the organization of policing. For instance, "arguments that the Metropolitan Police should be brought under the supervision of the new London County Council

[LCC]...were vigorously opposed by the government [as] [f]ears were also expressed about the potential threat to central government from the police should the LCC ever have a majority of socialists and radicals” (Emsley, 2003:73).

In France, with the restoration of the “police state”, an increase in the number of gendarmes on foot was proposed to develop links with the people (until not even a single bush unrecognized by the new gendarmes rests) and the officers were urged to seek their model in the heroes of the ancient Rome (Emsley, 1999a:58). The role of the gendarmerie is rearticulated with a redefinition of the revolutionary vocabulary through their disembodiment from their revolutionary social contexts. The patriotism, a constituent ideology of the 1789 Revolution, appears to be replaced by statolatry: “...a new slant towards probity and the idea of personal sacrifice on behalf of fellow citizens and above all, the state” (Emsley, 1999a: 59).

The gendarmerie was very active in the formation of nationhood and national unity in France. They were hunting for deserters and refractory conscripts in various local districts and facing numerous kinds of resistances both from the local inhabitants and from the mayors who demonstrates “a greater sympathy for their neighbors than for the state” (ibid: 71). The localities had a definitive impact upon the forging of the policing job. The latter played an important role in mediating the class struggle and giving to the latter a form/a real appearance of local-central dispute. It encouraged the pervasion of the idea of “national interest” yet always with a residue: that of the ancient régime. In that sense, the gendarmerie was in advance of its contemporaries in its conception of the geographically erected nation-state yet always looking backwards in terms of the use of political power, analogous to the old order.

The dialectics of coercion got reinforced as the gendarmerie got involved in aid and assistance during natural or man-made disasters (Emsley, 1999a: 82). However, when the gendarmerie got involved in the obstruction of government-owned properties and forests’ depredation by local people in need of wood for building and fuel (ibid: 92), it

was not seconded by any other local policing organization. The infrastructural power of the nation-state at the beginning of the 19th century was strong but not sufficient to deter the struggle with the local elites. Hence, the resistance of the localities to the central authority forced the gendarmerie more and more to get rid of the populist sides of the 1789. What is interesting is that the gendarmerie's "publique force"ness was in continuous regress as the latter got tied to the capitalist state in an unabashed manner. For instance, "...however much [the gendarmerie] consider themselves neglected and ignored by the July Monarchy, when it came to the crunch towards the end of the regime the Gendarmerie proved both dependable and loyal" (Emsley, 1999a: 118). *Hence, the gendarmerie became a more systemic force as the regime restored itself.* Indeed, in France, after the coup d'état of 1851, the gendarmerie displayed an incredible ability to adapt itself to different and even hostile governments, placing at the heart of its being a hatred for socialism and for the left. Shortly after that same hatred became the basis of existence of policing institutions through which "the civilian police of Paris was significantly reorganized and greatly enlarged, drawing on the model of London's Metropolitan Police" (Emsley, 1999a:128), which must have been considered by Napoleon Bonaparte as a professional anti-socialist police force.

This anti-socialist modern nature of the new police/gendarmerie was indebted to the capitalist system's ability to internalize the previous systems' socio-economic formations and make use of them according to its own needs as "the gendarme [was] the expression most eloquent, most complete, and most true of the dedication and sacrifice that characterize[d] religion. The gendarme [was] the direct descendant of the orders of chivalry born in the twelfth century..." (Baron Ambert cited by Emsley, 1999a: 136). The shade of the past and of the traditional paternalist forms of the feudal life loomed over the modern policing even though that very same institution had to close down the schools of the Catholic Church. These kinds of paradoxes were constitutive of the nature of modern police forces.

Furthermore, modern police forces appeared to be crucial *transition forces* as they both helped to build the modern state and the nation at the same time. Bonapartist regime showed how useful were the gendarmerie to it while organizing and reorganizing the state to contain it within the bourgeois order.

The concept of the police had a wider meaning during the period of absolutism and got more and more limited with the rise of a capitalist nation-state. Whereas in the 18th century, police meant the general administration, during the 19th century, it was urged to have a more restricted meaning mostly because of the fact that the separation of the economic from the political necessitated a more professional policing function, which was not as wide as to run the risk of losing legitimacy in every different job it undertook. So, the wider notion of police had a more political meaning whereas the modern police institution was itself an attempt to depoliticize some vital policing functions and thus brought them out of the reach of the masses. Hence, a dual character arose for the modern police. On the one hand, it represented the expansion of political rights among different classes of the capitalist society. On the other hand, it was an effort to depoliticize coercive activity, which was heavily required by the bourgeoisie. The modern police were caught in between these two tendencies which displayed an asymmetrical relation at the expense of political rights as the bourgeois revolutions sank into the dump of history.

3.2.1 Is the Modern Police Apparatus a Civil Force?

The difference between gendarmerie and police apparatuses is not taken into consideration within the confines of this chapter, and both are considered as the policing institutions or law enforcement agencies of the newly born modern state. Nonetheless, the difference between them was bigger than a simple differentiation between civil and military forces. This binary structure has a specific history which hides the class character of these institutions. Whereas gendarmerie was the arms of the central state in the provincial and the rural areas, the police apparatus was at the mercy of the local ruling classes which were not yet prepared to share their power with the central state in

the governance of their city. Gendarmerie had been always at odds with the local elites who had preferred to run their own policing bodies. Whenever the state asked for cost sharing with the local elites for the central policing organizations, they rejected to share the cost, and the state had to take a step back in its plans to erect a police body in the local-urban areas. This situation lasted until the mid-19th century. It left its own prints on the persisting differentiation between the police and the gendarmerie. The inter- and intra-class struggles that shaped this differentiation should be underlined in order to avoid simplified analyses on these on the basis of the now conventional civil-military divide.

Under the bourgeois state, the “divine rights of the kings” and “the community policing” institutions of the feudal era were replaced by a single secular institution: the modern parliamentary. Hence, the new police became bounded to that secular political sphere. In that sense, the law took the place of legitimacy driven from the king’s paternalism. Moreover, direct control of the police by the local elites and/or the local governments left their place to the idea of autonomy of the policing organization. Therefore, the personal criterion of legitimacy (namely the idea of sovereignty of the king) was replaced by the rule of impersonality.

However, this transition from personal to impersonal rule was never complete and full of tensions emanating from the changing balances of power within the ruling classes. The police institution played down these ambiguities of the authority that controlled it. That is to say, they benefited from the power vacuum emanating from the local/central disputes and opened a room for maneuver for themselves as “law officers, accountable only to the law itself” (Weinberger, 1991: 85). Hence, the impersonal rule that appeared to qualify the modern police was also a result of the police apparatus’ own agency. The political power of the police force stemmed also from its ability to exist neither by and for itself, nor by and for the public, nor by and for the state. Seen from this aspect, the professionalization of the police, its monopoly of knowledge and know-how benefited from the environment of fierce class struggle to secure its own future. As the

bourgeoisie was not sure at the beginning of the New Police reform about who would really profit from the establishment of a public police, this process of struggle and non-decisiveness empowered *the state power, which ultimately crystallized in the police.*

However, although the police ordinances themselves had the law-making power, and the police institution was designed as an immediate apparatus of creating harmony between the common wealth (the state) and the happiness of individual families (Axtmann, 1992: 40-46) ever since the ancien régime, the new police was never the incarnation of the state power only but also a servant of the municipality/of the municipal forces (Emsley, 1989: 26). Indeed, the central authority always attempted at perfecting the image of the new police as part of the executive state power against the police as the “civil power” of local forces such as municipalities. There was a struggle between the state-centered ruling classes and those who held power at the localities. The latter were considered as “civil” forces and their envy to control the police apparatus or their preference of the police apparatus as close to their own governmental powers established a link between the idea of the police and “civility”. In other words, the local power’s (civil power) aspiration to control the police apparatus made this latter a civil apparatus, an adjective still used today in order to define the police apparatus with respect to military apparatuses such as gendarmerie.

Indeed, the established notion of the “civil”ness of the police in contrast to the military stems from this struggle among ruling classes. In reality, however, the new police was a militarized institution at its birth. All police chiefs and other police officers appointed by the central authority (even in Britain, whose police force is said to *be a civil force* when contrasted to the despotic/military continental powers) were belonging in their past to the military.

The perception of the Continental police as a military force was mostly caused by the Napoleonic expansion. Indeed, the French Revolution was very decisive in devolving powers to the localities, and despite the fact that the revolutionary Gendarmerie was a

national institution, its administration belonged to the departments (Emsley, 1999:38). In other words, to establish dichotomies such as central state power-local power; military-civil, and gendarmerie-police is a distortion of history, and therefore, to establish a positive correlation between the police force and the issue of civility works as an ideological discourse compatible with liberal ideology.

In fact, it is possible to give another counter-historical example to this liberal argumentation. Whereas the militarized gendarmerie was very much dependent on local forces in France; in Britain, the civil Bobby was more and more under the influence of the central authority. That is why, the dispute between the local and the central, and the civil and military powers took shape according to the class struggles of the period. Despite this fact, the ideological distortion that continued to promote the police as a “civil” power has helped facilitate the establishment of class power since then.

Moreover, “until the arrival of the French revolutionary armies during the late 1790s, policing in the Italian states was in the hands of armed men (*sbirri*) who were generally regarded as little better than the brigands they were supposed to combat...” (Emsley, 1999: 38). In that sense, the issue of ‘civil’ness might mask different forces in different contexts: Were brigand-like *sbirris* representing civil power in Italy?

Indeed, the modern police was appealing to many anti-centralization local forces because it was containing in itself the *ancien régime*/the tradition of the police state. In fact different countries’ reactionary regimes of post-revolutionary Europe quickly adapted to the new police ideology not because it suited their aspiration to create a just universal sphere but because “it was in the traditions of the old regime” (Emsley, 1999: 38). Hence, the new police were as much marked by the modern-nation state as by the remnants of the *ancien régime*. In fact, this has two major reasons:

1. Among all the modern institutions, the one mostly shaped by the controversies of the *ancien régime* was the new police; a liberal sublation of the police state.

2. The fate of the bourgeois revolutions, their tendency to regress as soon as they tended to progress, as represented in the case of Bonapartism.

For instance, in the wake of the 1848 bourgeois revolutions, during an era of fierce struggle between the ancien régime classes and the new bourgeoisie, the state military police established in Piedmont was replaced by a state civil force (Emsley, 1999:38). It will be misleading to tie this change on the “growth of liberal ideology” among the rulers of Piedmont, as would a study based on the notion of Democratic English Police and Totalitarian French Gendarmerie do. The attractiveness of the new English Model did not emanate from its ‘civility’ but mostly from its ability to “escape from the revolutionary upheavals of 1848” with the help of its “boosted civilian police” (Emsley, 2003: 72). Hence, the issue of ‘civility’ was closely tied to the new police’s ability to deter many “social disorders” without losing sight of the question of legitimacy. Nonetheless, calling for help from the police apparatus as a “civil power” did not guarantee that the contours of the state power were unchallenged.

There was a constant struggle between the state and the class powers whereby the latter carried the tendency to find alternatives to the national police whenever “they felt that they paid for policemen over whom they had no control” (Emsley, 1999:40). Hence, the state’s right to concentrate the use of legitimate physical coercion in its own hands was dependent on its willingness to pay for it. This pay policy of the policing institutions demonstrated the previously explained process of “separation”. In fact, the abolishment of the “ancien régime privileges” (like the purchase or inheritance of the titles) was translated into the sphere of coercive apparatuses as “officers as well as men of the maréchaussée [who] were becoming paid appointees of the central state” (Emsley, 1999a: 22). Hence, the formation of the bourgeois state asked for the professionalization of the policing functions, indeed for police reform.

Police development was dependent upon this division of labour between the state power and the class power, which was subject to change and which appeared quite often in the

form of local elite vs. national elite struggles. Each nationwide workers strike strengthened the hands of the central authority to push for more centralization in terms of the control over the police forces.

3.2.2 The Police Reform in England

The French case was different from the English case, where the English Police were propagated by the liberals as to be only uniformed citizens. For the superposing of the citizen with the police in England meant that policeman "...act[ed] not as an agent of a government exercising powers delegated from that source, but as a citizen representing the rest of the community and exercising powers which [were] possessed by all citizens" (Weinberger, 1991:76).²⁸

For the very laboratory of the famous police chief and intellectual, Colquhoun, one of the reformers influencing the formation of the new police in Britain, the semi-private Thames River Police was important in presenting an integrated approach to working class control and thus expanding the legitimacy of central policing activities for the dominant classes in England (Rawlings, 2002: 106-116). In fact, the once beloved community type of policing was seen dangerous because of the potential affinity between the community and the policemen. Thus, the new police was also considered as a strategy of disembodiment of policing from the community and to discourage any possible affinities between working-classes and the new police.

²⁸ According to Foucauldians, with the end of the absolutist/police state, liberty instead of police emerged as the new security mechanism for the survival of the political government. Indeed, bourgeois society was configured as the place where the government finds its mechanisms of security. Against *the established doxa* of conceptualizing civil bourgeois society as opposed to the central governmental will, Foucault argues that civil society should be understood as a "correlate of technology of government" (Gordon, 1991: 23). This time the police practices (including assistance to the poor) are not only undertaken by but also assigned to the civil society: "[S]ince it would be a vain ambition to provide for all the details of production through regulations issuing from the public power...the best expedient is to authorize those in charge of the conduct of labour to regulate everything that relates to it" (Interior Ministry of the Consulate of France cited by Gordon, 1991: 25). Laissez-faire of liberalism turns out to be an invitation to pro-activity not to a passive permissiveness. "Subjects were obliged to be free and were required to conduct themselves responsibly, to account for their own lives and their vicissitudes in terms of their freedom. Freedom was not opposed to government" (Rose et al., 2006: 91).

Moreover, all the resistances to central policing emanating from some vested interests of different local wealthy people were defied by accentuating the relation between the centralization of the police and the poor relief system. For instance, some localities were proposed -and thus seduced in England- *to fund the police apparatus from Poor Law funds* or poor rates originating from the central government (Rawlings, 2002:128).

In England, the landed gentry appears to have struggled to hold the new police within a reactionary mood during the 1830s, when the Continental Europe was badly shaken by the bourgeois revolutions. For instance, “[t]he game laws, which preserved the exclusive right of the gentry to hunt, had long been a point of conflict in the countryside and there was some resentment at the prospect of landowners shifting the burden of protecting game on to the New Police and, thereby, on to the county’s ratepayers, most of whom were prevented by the game laws from hunting” (Rawlings, 2002: 132). That is why the establishment of the new police met by resistance from “less wealthy householders and farmers” (Rawlings, 2002: 134).

Nonetheless, despite the fact that central control over the police was never settled down once and for all and that all the dominant classes were never on the same side about the issue of policing, the government’s acceptance to cover the most of the costs of the new police and to provide a uniform scheme for all police forces in the country through regulations, inspection, training and appointments helped the dominant classes to delegate “the simplest and most primitive duties of citizens to the agents of the Government” (Butler cited in Rawlings, 2002:141).

So, the new police’s twofold character took shape: laying the ground for a universal system of law enforcement whereas weakening the ideological ground of being a citizen *à l’anglaise*. Citizenship and the new police had a dialectic relation whereby the latter endorsed the former while regressing it to a more passive position. To curb the power of the working classes, the new police turned into a distracter to the idea of citizenship.

The same period witnessed harsh criticisms directed against some forms of private policing. Indeed, a paradigmatic shift occurred concerning the use of private policing in the protection of public places. By the late 1830s, in England the use of special constables by the railway companies was criticized as they were established in order to protect the company rather than its passengers (Rawlings, 2002:142). This shift had two important components. The first was that anti-private policing was stimulated by the movement of railway construction workers against whom the private police forces were established. *So, working class movement deligitimated the establishment of private policing despite the fact that it was considered to be the main responsible of social disorder.* Second, the state acknowledged that private policing harmed the bourgeois principle of serving to the whole public.

3.3 The Impact of the 1848 and its Aftermath

It has been shown that the foundation of the modern police is closely related with the fate of the bourgeois revolutions. This sub-section is built upon the fact that these bourgeois revolutions were international events in terms of both their reasons and repercussions. The character of the international in the 19th century was of crucial importance in the formation of modern police, an issue highly neglected by both the liberal and revisionist theories. However, a perception of the international is vital to understand the nature of the beast, the modern police apparatus' paradoxical essence. Indeed, the dialectic of coercion that defined the core of the modern police apparatus was very much determined by the internationalization of the police forces, a process not external to the police-formation processes. The international was a factor that mediated every component of the police form. The internationalization of the police "encouraged the belief that police co-operation had a role in maintaining political stability in central Europe" (Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006: 88).

The section argues that the international drove forward the ancient character of the modern police, undermining simultaneously the quasi-progressive promises of the bourgeois revolutions. It pushed the modern police to leave aside its public character.

It rendered the police out of the reach of the socially progressive struggles. It froze the form of the modern police to the advantage of the interests of the capitalist classes and made it hard for the working class to have an impact upon. During the formation of the modern police, the international shaped that process via different routes. The first one was that in the late 19th century, the international pressures fuelled the state's need to empower itself vis-à-vis the domestic power bases and this necessity created a bigger room for maneuver for the state. In fact, the state power expanded *in contravention of* the capitalist class power but surely *not against* it.²⁹ A further route through which the international infused upon the domestic struggles was the politics of reform. The world-historical events stimulated politics of reform everywhere.

The Napoleonic expansion in Continental Europe had deep impact on the formation of the police forces of different European nation-states as it was thought to be the bearer of revolutionary transformations in terms of state organization. Indeed, “this bringing of French cultural forms within the new départements and the Gendarmerie’s role in this could be popular particularly when it concerned equality before the law and a general attack on unpopular elements of the ancien régime” (Emsley, 1999a:160). Moreover, the establishment of gendarmerie barracks in the countryside, and their permanent establishment in these places as opposed to the mobile and weak forces of the ancien régime seduced the local opinion leaders as it demonstrated the merits of a central monopoly on the use of violence while it did not certainly appeal to the opinions of the aristocrats who were controlling brigand-like policing forces (Emsley, 1999a: 160-170).

In Italy, after the retreat of the French Gendarmerie, the Carabinieri followed a path of policing close to the populace. Protection of the state did not appear to become the first underlying principle of policing. Indeed, Carabinieri, “...were more likely to find themselves ordered to protect people by hunting pack of wolves rather than pursuing gangs of brigands” (Emsley, 1999a: 186). However, under the rubric of their being a

²⁹ That is to argue that state power and class power are not mutually exclusive. Similarly, Miliband (1992: 66) argues that “there are things which the state wants and does, and which are very irksome to the dominant class; but this is very different matter from there being a fundamental conflict between them”.

French invention and because everything French was very much disliked, gendarmerie in Italian territories underwent through serious periods of purge and destruction. The old bottles were restored and the gendarmerie was replaced by old forms of policing like *sbirri*. In fact, this emphasis on their Frenchness was a way to hide the dislike of a “force publique”. Even the liberals in Italy, who condemned the notion of police in its widest sense as political administration and political surveillance, “left the old *sbirri* intact and still responsible for day-to-day policing” (Emsley, 1999a:194). Yet, the revolutions of 1848 must have forced the liberals to establish an efficient police force, still not the gendarmerie, but a police force emulating the English Model, namely the Metropolitan Police Force (Emsley, 1999a: 196).

Hence, the systemic panacea to 1848 Revolutions was found in the *British example and not in the French one*. The 1848 revolutions triggered similar behaviors among the European states which stationed “uniformed police brigades in [their] principal cities to be prepared for political riots and insurrections” (Liang, 1992: 10). This move on the part of liberals of replacing the police with the gendarmerie is explained by Clive Emsley with reference to their dislike for the military-based gendarmerie and preference for civilian police forces. However, to analyze this historical process with reference to civil-military divide tends to mask many other important issues such that the mandate of the police in the 19th century was still defined with reference to its *ancien régime* inheritance of the issue of welfare.

On ideological grounds, the separation between the police and the gendarmerie had not been consolidated yet in the beginning of the 19th century and indeed, during the Napoleonic wars, police (as a word capturing the whole internal coercive apparatuses of the state) was still holding its 18th century legacy as the “maintenance of civil life and well-being among the subjects” (von Justi cited in Liang, 1992:1). Its proponents propagated that police was “charged with promoting the security and welfare of the subjects *in every instance where other branches of the state power prove[d] ineffective*” (von Berg cited in Liang, 1992:1). It appeared that the police as a state apparatus had an

articulative power: to operate as a force that filled in the gaps left by the state; an apparatus more flexible than the state itself due to its developed ability to conjugate different levels with each other.

Moreover, bringing in the British metropolitan model of police also shows that from the very beginning, the police apparatus' role was defined with respect to the international arena for the role of the gendarmerie was more based on national-local politics. Liang's (1992: 4) definition of the modern police claims that "police serve[d] the European state system by assuring the minimum of damage to civilian society during all the violent clashes- wars and revolutions- that inevitably accompany its perpetual movement toward improvement and reform". Therefore the police apparatus undertook a role on the brink of the national-international divide. It set and reset this divide. It helped them to coalesce sometimes and whereas to disarticulate in other times. To conclude, the modern police's system worshipping nature was internationally constituted.

A further international feature of the modern police was its being conceived as a demonstrator of the reliability of any state; whether it was internally stable or subject to be ruined. "What trust can one place in a government which is at the mercy of a pistol shot?" says William Pitt the Younger for the French Directory in 1799 (Liang, 1992:8). The place of a state in the international hierarchy was closely measured with the state of the police power at home. This turned out to be the ever recurring principle of the international sphere besides being also an ideological pretext to international interventions in other states. As a matter of fact, very much concerned about the spread of revolutionary ideology, Germany warned the French Government at Versailles in the aftermath of 1871 that "the German military government would not indefinitely respect the disorders in Paris as a French domestic affair" (Liang, 1992:85).

Liang (1992:19) argues that the forerunner of the international police collaboration was Metternich's police system which "worked for ideological compatibility throughout Europe", and the ideology it aimed at propagating all over Europe was the blessing of

monarchy as the legitimate ruling model. It also degraded the notion of modern politics since it claimed that people on the European continent were too much illiterate to found constitutional principles by themselves. The internationalization of the police system in Europe was founded on such a reactionary ideology. Similarly, the German Confederation's Central Investigations Commission founded during the late 1810s, reported by 1828 that "the chance for a successful revolution in Germany was expected to come in a national crisis originating from outside the Confederation and so beyond the power of any German authority" (Liang, 1992: 21). Thus, the insistence on the side of Germany for the establishment of police collaboration at an international scale was closely related with their envy to isolate Germany from the wind of 1830 revolutions.

The international wave of the bourgeois revolutions in 1848 led to the consolidation of the spirit of the modern police institution. First, the modern police institution was one of the principle conveyors of the bourgeoisie's class consciousness concerning the proletariat. For instance, in the aftermath of the 1848, the Emperor asked the renovation of the city of Vienna in such a mood to reflect the cultural sophistication of the city's bourgeoisie (Liang, 1992: 26). However, the military and the police resisted in a very resolute manner by arguing that "[o]nce the proletariat of a capital city... succeeded in one rebellion, it [could] no more be trusted than a wild animal after tasting blood. It [was] absolutely impossible to govern a country from a city which [was] accessible to this proletariat" (von Este cited by Liang, 1992: 26).

Second, the international aimed at the modern police institution's disembodiment from local social contexts and the constitution of isolation from the people. In fact, the institution of "the principle of ahistoricalness" (Liang, 1992:27) was a direct reversion of the habit of assigning police officers who were acquaintances of a locality as they would have known their habits and even language. According to this new principle, the absence of a common past between the police and local people was a warranty against fraternization (Liang, 1992:27).

Both examples show the extent to which the international revolutionary fever shaped the foundation on which the modern police rose. Furthermore, a division of labour emerged among the nation-states of the Continental Europe concerning the activity of policing. This was mostly due to the specific balance of power of that period of time. For instance, Switzerland was assigned by Austria, Russia, England and Prussia the job of guarding reactionaries from the fallen French Empire in the aftermath of the French Revolution (Liang, 1992: 37). Switzerland's response to this assignment was very informative about this division of labour:

The Swiss Confederation...to cultivate the relations that it entertains with the allied Royal and Imperial Courts and with His Most Christian Majesty; did not wait to be so invited before adopting a rigorous police system in regard to individuals who have been noted for their part in the latest conspiracy against the Royal Government of France and the rebellion that arose from it (cited in Liang, 1992:38).

Thus, the internationalization of the modern police was a process of allied powers to build a common set against the revolutionary fever. The Paris Commune fuelled the fears of the Continental Powers who launched a common policing strategy against the *Socialist International*.

In the aftermath of the 1871 and with the victory of the *order* over the revolutionaries, France paved the way for another trait of the internationalization of the modern police: its becoming a foreign policy actor. The modern police was from the beginning a foreign policy actor of the modern state and its first mission in the 19th century as a foreign policy actor was to set the inviolability of national territorial boundaries. Clemenceau, minister of interior of France in the early 1900s says that "What we want is a police for the defense of the national territory...which will extend to the interior and exterior to hunt down the enemies of France..." (cited in Liang, 1992: 45). This in turn made the modern police more and more tied to the *public order* at home, whoever fraction of the bourgeoisie was controlling the political power. For instance, the regime changes in France during the 19th century were each and every time regulated by the police institution. The police officials' political allegiances were even sometimes overlooked on the argument that they did "no more than to serve the public order" (The

minister of interior of France in 1815, Comte D'Angles cited by Liang, 1992: 49). To recap, the internationalization of the modern police institutions made them to become more and more engulfed within the establishment and preservation of capitalist public order. The conservative and reactionary character of the modern police at home was strengthened through its international missions.

The after effects of the 1871 Paris Commune were also remarkable for it increased the concerns of the states on the asylum-seekers.³⁰ Indeed, the issue of asylum took a place of first rank in the foreign affairs of the states. Asylum came out as a specific policing method against or for the revolutionaries of the late 19th century, which also helped for the consolidation of national identities and differences. Indeed, in Geneva of 1871, the following declaration was made by a group made up of ordinary citizens: “We, citizens of a free country, ask the federal council that the refugees coming from France following the latest events be received as victims of political misfortune with the right to asylum and hospitality...would be a deadly blow to our independence and to our Republic...” (cited in Liang, 1992: 86). Therefore, the police apparatus emerged as responsible from the foreign relations of the states, possessing the power to determine a country's relations with another one on the basis of their control upon the foreigners either by allowing them in the country or chasing them after.

Thereupon, the internationalization of the modern police started to provide it with the opportunity to gain relative autonomy vis-à-vis –if not quasi-supremacy over- the other departments of the nation-state. This enforced the common sensual view of the police institution as a fetishized form. The form of appearance of the modern police disguised its contradictory essence, thus its class character. The internationalization of the modern police furthered the alienation that sustained it in the capitalist system.

³⁰ For instance, “Belgian authorities regarded ‘the surveillance of refugees...[as] synonymous with preserving the working classes from utopian and egalitarian theories” (Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006: 69).

At the same time, the growing authority of the internationalized police force brought to the agenda of great powers the debates on foreign intervention in cases of national incapacitation. Questioning the ability of the national police forces to prevent the occurrence of internationally distrusted events like the International Socialist Congresses was an example. Indeed, prior to the gathering of such a Congress in 1879 in Marseille, a French newspaper says that “We may not believe that Germany will be pretentious enough actually to send its own agents to supervise our public meetings...even under the pretext that ‘Security Police’ truly stands for a higher, conservative, international service, whose needs our [police] organization can no longer fulfill” (cited in Liang, 1992: 96). One of the constitutive legs of the modern police organization was irrefutably their being an apparatus of foreign involvement to sovereign territories.

Under Bismarck, the ratification of the anti-Socialist Law greatly changed the balance of power in Continental Europe and thus the policing strategy of different countries. The ideological smokescreen of the period was the discourse of “emperor killers” or “those who aim at the lives of sovereign rulers”. Yet, there were others who resisted making a change in their policing strategies by arguing that “[n]o one {in Vienna} wants to support the proposition {of the Powers}... And there [was] even less fear of “emperor killers” because in no other monarchy [was] the bond between Kaiser and people as strong as in Austria-Hungry” (Cited in Liang, 1992: 110).

Hence, the late 19th century unleashed the “national interest” as a new ideological tool for the determination of policing strategies at the expense of “public interest”. The new legitimation strategy before the modern police was this notion of national interest. Indeed, police collaboration among a bunch of countries was even thought to be the most “neutral” way of setting a “diplomatic alliance” between the same countries without dealing with the legitimation process. For instance, one specific country that often faced such concerns about legitimacy was Switzerland who was very much pressurized by other European Powers on the grounds that she was hiding many

revolutionaries from different countries: “Why should Swiss policemen be made to enforce foreign laws that sanctioned actions that were permitted in Switzerland?” (Liang, 1992: 134).

This process strengthened the attempts to forge down a “police international” (Liang, 1992: 155). In 1898, The Rome Conference took place where “the foundations for an international network of police channels for rapid exchange of information on the activities of all known anarchists” were laid down (Liang, 1992:158). The revolutionary currents were criminalized and put at the forefront of police intervention. Indeed, the creation of international police collaboration was also aiming at constraining the countries whose police forces were not tailored according to the needs of anti-socialism. Countries whose police institutions were not reformed accordingly were under the threat of an international intervention. The words of a British Ambassador should be mentioned to demonstrate this state of affairs:

But my dear colleague, your Swiss police is a real scandal! It protects the anarchists...With rogues like these you have to fall back on the punishment of the Middle Ages...If you don't change your laws fast, your police system, you risk incurring an international intervention. In our country we also once had a police that wasn't too fabulous, but we have greatly improved it (Rumbold cited in Liang, 1992: 160).

Many participants of the police international required it to stay as a practical collaboration and not as a full-blown effort to cohort all different domestic legislations on a similar line. Yet, this practical collaboration inevitably contained in itself the risk of a growing inclination among different legislations to become *de facto* null and void and the *ad hoc* police practices to fulfill the emerging gap. The police international was the reproduction of the contradictory nature of the modern police at an international level: On the one hand, the common enemy was defined as anarchism and anarchists whose acts should be treated “like ordinary crimes without consideration of their motives” (From the final protocol of the Rome Conference cited in Liang, 1992: 165). On the other hand, some countries made some reservations based on the anxiety about the repercussions of this international agreement on their political constituencies: “We see here some political difficulties since public opinion could interpret this agreement as

tantamount to the establishment of a true international police service” (cited in Liang, 1992: 166).

Thus, the internationalization efforts of the nation state through collaboration at the level of the policing of anarchists resurrected the fear of the rulers about the dissent of their domestic constituencies. However the fear does not prevent the police international to further its cause of fighting the late 19th century anti-capitalist forces. Such an attempt was also be the best way to cut down the costs of militarization and appease the war agonizes:

Just as the medical doctor prevents the smallpox by inoculating patients with diluted does of this virus, so, I say, if you want to free the world from the scourge of war and militarism you must inoculate it with police. To replace soldiers with policemen, that’s what we must do. Not to give up all force, which would be sheer fantasy, given what people today are like (Steed cited in Liang, 1992: 171).

On March 1904, a “Secret Protocol for the International War on Anarchism” was signed by many states under the leadership of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia. Yet, many others including Switzerland showed outmost resistance to not be part of it by arguing that “[t]o the Swiss an association with the three conservative powers Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Russia may still be acceptable. But they can neither be proud of, nor enjoy, the idea of siding with Turkey, Serbia and Bulgaria when the liberal powers England, France, Italy and America refuse to adopt the police measures outlined in the Protocol” (Heidler cited in Liang, 1992: 173). Thus, the policiarization at the international level meant the formation of new alliances at the world scene, and the newly forged alliances shaped the policing strategies according to their needs, urging some others like the Switzerland to sign the agreement in secret from her own national political constituency.

3.4 The Impact of the Colonial Rule in the Making of the Modern Police

In the aftermath of the 1848 Revolutions, a new practice emerged in terms of the police internationalization, led this time not only by the hatred of socialism but also by the

desire to append this common hatred of different nations to a specific international hierarchic order. In October 1851, Britain invited police from all over Europe to police “the International Industrial Exhibition in London... [which] symbolized the triumph of capitalist free trade, technological progress, and British industrial supremacy” (Deflem, 2002: 48). Under the pretext that many socialists and communists would pour down to the exhibition, Britain invited many foreign police officials and thus started a new practice in the internationalization of the police: the police collaboration of many nationalities in the capital city of the biggest Empire of the 19th century. The internationalization of the police led by anti-socialist politics served at the same time to the recognition of the British supremacy on the organization of political policing and integration under her leadership. British Empire institutionalized many different police practices under a common ambition: How to buttress the dependency of the working classes and the colonized people?

Vernon Harris, onetime governor of Chatham convict prison, claimed there was always something peculiar about the eyes, ears and noses of habitual animals, ‘in the masculine character of the women and the feminine features of the men and the childishness of both sexes. Both men and women shared somewhat of the nature of the lunatic and somewhat of that of the savage (Knepper, 2010: 48).

Such attributes of the criminal classes defined through the colonial gaze were also used as the attributes of the poor at home. The poor were portrayed as people who lack the ability of self government and whose emotional status is in contradiction with the requirements of rational political sphere. The lower stratum of the society was depicted as “restrained by no principle of morality or religion” (Colquhoun cited in Williams, 2003: 329). Thus the criminalization both of the native people and poor at home was offered as an excuse to their exclusion from the public sphere. Not only their bodies were isolated from the public sphere, their affections were also labeled as unsuitable for the rational modern individual. A “criminal man [was] anachronism, a savage in a civilized country” (Bordier cited in Knepper, 2010: 48).³¹

³¹ Every day life of the bourgeoisie in the late 19th century tells another story since those “who plunge[d] into every excess” (Colquhoun cited in Williams, 2003: 329) was the bourgeoisie itself. The private

Decomposing the world of affections of the working classes and recomposing them under the new criminal type lied at the core of the strategic policing on the part of the capital against labour. However, modern policing was not solely the maker of the social body, as usually argued by revisionist police historians, but also as the constructor of the political field through the criminalization of previously legitimate affections, morals etc. *Modern police, as a political form of class struggle, struggled also with itself to disengage masses/working classes from the political realm, from itself indeed. The modern police apparatus, when considered with respect to the legacy of bourgeois state form, was self-annihilative.*

The case of Ireland was also very much demonstrative concerning the effect of the colonial rule in the making of the modern police. First, when Ireland was governed with the help of a paramilitary police under the control of the Metropolis, London was being parceled among partially government-funded different private police forces like the Thames River Police and the Bow Street Runners.³² In the metropolis, a central police would have meant an Ireland-type police or a military police, and was considered as unacceptable. Hence, those who were unable to govern themselves, the colonized, were deemed to the military type of police, and the colonizers should have been ruled by the civil police, namely by the private police. Thus during the formation of the modern police, the military-civil divide was essentially built on the difference between the colony and the colonizer. However, as the new police apparatus was established in the Metropolis, “the experience of organizing and recruiting the Irish police undoubtedly informed central English political elite of the feasibility of police...” (Hay and Snyder cited in Williams, 2003: 332). Ireland was used by the British Empire as a test-model for policing, and the adoption of the measures applied in that part of the Empire to the

police apparatus created by the bourgeoisie of the 19th century was the mirror where the very same class “saw in his class image a reflection of the enemy other” (Williams, 2003: 329).

³² To recap the story told in the first theoretical chapter, it should be mentioned that the Bow Street Runners were a small group of detectives who “employed many of the same methods later associated with Vidocq [a French detective famous with his undercover investigation methods] and received compensation from both the public purse and private employers of their services. Within a few years of their creation, they had become, as Leon Radinowicz wrote, ‘something of a national institution’” (Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006: 77).

very centre of the Empire invalidated the discussions of civil-military divide as the private policing strategies and the colonial type of policing converged more and more on ideational grounds. As stated by O'Reilly and Ellison (2008: 399),

When we consider the genealogy of policing from Colquhoun to Peel, it is clear that the impetus for the development of a system of police in the metropolis was influenced by *more* than a simple response to concerns about rising crime... In particular, it was the "spectre of colonial warfare" and Britain's growing status as an imperial power...

Colonial type of policing of the late 19th century and the related experiences are very much informative to understand post-Soviet neoliberal transformation that various police institutions have been undergoing around the world. For example, Catholics in Ireland were prevented to have a say in the affairs of governance until "the operative exclusion of Catholics from the spoils of surplus extraction...militated against the nonetheless imperative reliance on Catholics for local suppression of resistance to those same structures of exploitation and underdevelopment" (Williams, 2003: 337-338). The sole remedy to exclusion from the realm of subsistence emerged as incorporation at the political level. Hence, whereas the internationalization of the police conducted an *anti-political politics* which was based on the exclusion of working classes from *the political* through different methods, it at the same time tried to create *the arithmetic of the political* in order not to risk its own legitimacy. It counted on numbers, summed up, made deductions, and thus configured the political arena.

The colonial legacy further aggravated the cause of the internationalization of the police for the national political leaders of the international-imperial ordering as the internal order of the states was propagated to become more and more the determining force behind the sustainability of the international order. Theodor Roosevelt says that "it is a duty of civilized nations to secure the welfare of foreign states by ensuring that they are orderly and well administered in their domestic affairs" (cited in Levi and Hagan, 2006: 214). The rule of law was posited as conditional upon the institutionalization of the police and thus of the states' internal orders. Such a conditional relation between the internal order of a state and the international order pushed the nationally-based police

institution to be delinked more and more from its generative public and to reestablish the link between itself and the people over the idea of *not political but “good”- moral-citizenship*.

Roosevelt defined modern police over a traditional *conservative* notion of citizenship, which was very much in contradiction with the emergence of *the political as such*. In other words, one of the founding premises of the modern police, the idea that the police were citizens with uniforms and the citizen was a police without uniform, evolved into a quasi *religious* character, displacing the strong political tune it was containing.³³ Citizens should have facilitated the job of policing by becoming docile members of a society if the international did not intervene.

The bourgeois revolutions, and the colonial practices and the police reform that had happened in England point out to the emergence of a body at the international level for the development of international policing policies or a body which started designing specific politics of policing and specific mechanisms for the application of these politics. But what was the main rationality behind this Police International, which started programming police politics, and what kind of an international body did they make up?

3.5 The Formation of a Transnational Police Community and the Establishment of the International Party of Order

This section aims at portraying the main constituents of the IPO in the late 19th and early 20th centuries and thereby providing a portrait of its founding fathers. This portrayal also aims at presenting the foundational ideology of the IPO. The questions of

³³ The modern police tries to make political utopias subsumed by another field, that of ethics. In other words, modern police inhales the liberal critique of the political and tries to contain its own form, still inevitably dependent on the working class struggle for political rights, “between economics and ethics” (Mouffe, 2005: 12).

which constituents of the IPO effected the modern police in what ways, and what all these tells us in terms of the nature of the modern police will be clarified throughout the chapter. This part will also elaborate more on the concept of the IPO and illuminate its basic characteristics.

The historical constituencies of the IPO will be analyzed under three headings: police intellectuals; private policing agencies; and national leaders and police chiefs. These are chosen not on an *ad hoc* basis. On the contrary, they are developed on the basis of a historical research on the 19th century police internationalization. On the other hand, even though the components of the IPO might have changed in the course of historical developments, its main architecture and foundational ideology was crucial to understand the events of the late 20th and early 21st centuries. In the minimum, this historical analysis will provide us with a notion on the development of the internationalized police politics.

3.5.1 The Role of Police Intellectuals in the Making of the IPO

The police intellectuals of the 19th century were pioneers of professional private police forces in the British Empire. *The docks and train stations whereby the traded goods poured in from many colonies inspired them on the creative measures of professional policing.* As the founders of private policing agencies, they set the policing paradigm for the late 19th century around the idea that “riots and tumultuous assemblies were dangerous to the public peace...” and mob was a “licentious rabble” (McMullan, 1998: 139). They were delimiting the political arena and envying to exclude the masses that were entered there by force throughout the 19th century. In that way, they did not only attempt at firing masses from the political arena but they did also want to change the nature of the political and reduce it to a combination of “charity with coercion and *morality with money*” [italics added] (McMullan, 1998: 138). In that sense, they were calling reactionary forces and thoughts back to revert the modern and revolutionary tune encoded in the political, albeit in tandem with the market idea. That is why, these police intellectuals harnessed pre-bourgeois state self-help/policing measures of community

based policing to turn them into organized market-based private policing. They wanted to exploit self-help security measures generated by the very mob they wanted to exclude from the political arena.

The development of modern policing practices and their intrusion to the daily lives of the lower strata's of the society, the working classes and the poor, was a strategy of making up the social body in line with the requirements of the capitalist production processes. This intrusion of the modern police into the everyday life was an attempt on the part of the bourgeoisie to meddle into the imaginative life of people, their world of dreams and hopes. For instance, the regulation of street performers, occasions whereby people were collected together, was recommended by a police intellectual, John Fielding under the pretext of preventing the pickpockets (McMullan, 1998: 143). Yet, this case was a world-historic phenomenon, very much related with the governmental practices in the colonies in the late 19th century.

Another police intellectual, Colquhoun himself, was a London agent for sugar interests in St. Vincent, Dominic and the Virgin Islands, and he founded the Thames River (Private) Police to control the customary appropriation of goods and commodities by workers in the river work (McMullan, 1998: 149). He was one of the men who defined new crimes, and by that time theft and fraud were defined as practices akin to working classes. Not only the river police was a crime based institution but also it was a body endowed with greater powers like distribution of wages.

The fact that the public police's form is dependent upon the ongoing class struggles was recognized by Colquhoun, a commercial man himself and who "could said to have been the planner and theorist of class struggle in the metropolis" (Linebaugh cited in Williams, 2003: 327). Colquhoun represents a very different mode in the formation of modern police compared to his 21st century colleagues since he openly recognized working class as the main address of the policing practices as did many of his contemporaries. This recognition of the class struggle in such a bold manner was

demonstrative of a constitutive feature of the modern police in the late 19th century: working classes as *agents* of political and social change. As Therborn (1977: 41) argues, “in the 19th century political discrimination was by and large subsumed under class-based exclusion. It [was] striking that in none of these countries were the parties of the Second International actually illegalized... In this century, by contrast, bourgeois states ... frequently resorted to explicit political exclusion”.

Police intellectuals’ overt consideration of the working classes in the 19th century as political subjects was due to two reasons: the first one was the supremacy of the struggle they were leading, and their power to coerce the nation-states caught in the contradictions of the international politics and fractional wars within the bourgeoisie to concede in their political and social rights. Indeed, democracy was developed and sustained against the bourgeoisie (Therborn, 1977). The second was the contractualist perception of political power in the 19th century: with the coming of the bourgeois state form “punishment could no longer be justified as a personal act of vengeance on the part of being who was above the moral law. Rather, punishment had to be rethought contractually as the repayment of a debt that was owed to society at large” (Ingram, 2002: 29). That was why human being was not any more an object of monarch’s absolute power but a respectable subject who needed to repay his/her debt. However, with the regression of the bourgeois state form to *ancien régime* practices of power, the working classes were forced into the category of criminals to be rehabilitated, human beings whose political agency was under the threat of subversion.

The professionalization of the modern police added a new strategic tool to the anti-working class tool pool of the bourgeoisie: criminalization of the political problems. 19th century criminology added a new twist to these new means of criminalization: *deagentification*. With the advent of a positivist perception in criminal sciences, the end product of criminal acts were no longer considered to be questions of legal nature but rather questions of social life (Deflem, 2002: 95). That is to say, the criminal acts were started to be judged with regard to pre-crime concerns within which human being found

themselves rather than with regard to pre-crime situations. This meant the transformation of the status of the working classes within class struggle. They were not any more recognized as the legitimate counter-parts to other classes but rather depicted as deviant criminals to be disciplined. In that sense, internationalization of a professionalized policing and the concomitant understanding of crime meant a structural change in the bourgeois form of the modern police, which implied that the modern police apparatus began to fight with one of the very constituents of this form, the working classes.

As McMullan (1998: 155) states: “[t]he propertyless were eventually granted the juridical individuality of the worker, but it happened in the space defined between crime and pauperism, between the shadow of the police and the architecture of the workhouse”. The juridical individuality of the worker was inevitably the organic part of the new police whose very struggle with this organic part, and thus with itself, was supported by the international. Finally, not only the nation-based class struggles of the Age of Revolutions but also the environment created by the imperial economics created the new police.

3.5.2 The Role of Private Police Agencies in the Making of the IPO

A further component of the IPO in the late 19th and early 20th centuries was the international private police agencies which were assigned as representatives of national states in policing matters.³⁴ As already argued, private policing bodies were pioneers in the establishment of public police forces during the late 19th century.

³⁴ It should also be stated that the constituency of the transnational police community was not solely made up of public police officers. In reality, during the late 19th century, treasury agents and private police officers from the USA were important figures in this transnational community. The USA’s envy to control its borders and avoid smuggling and illegal traffic led it to assign treasury agents to police the trade routes over its borders (Nadelmann and Andreas, 2006: 111-112). The International’s role was important in that it extended the constituency of the police community and transformed various kinds of governmental bodies into policing bodies.

The role of the private policing agencies, which were transnationalized long before the public police agencies, is very much demonstrative of the nature of the international level. In fact, the detachment of economic power from the national -be it either through multinational corporations or private policing agencies- created another level of political government whereby the class power of the capitalist class was as big as, or even bigger than, the state power.

The transnationalization of the private police agencies and of the ideology of policing through the owners of private police agencies facilitated the formation of public police agencies anywhere in the world but especially in the colonized states, devoid or away from the formative power of the working classes. Hence, the internationalization of the police, especially of the private policing first and foremost, favored the empowerment of the capitalist class both at home and at the international level at the expense of the working classes.

Pinkerton Detective Agency was the most important policing agency of the late 19th century in the US. It was for the establishment of more professional police forces and was “elected to high positions in US police associations, notably the International Association of Chiefs of Police” (Nadelmann and Anderson, 2006: 115). Its main occupation was to spy on labour organizations and thus to lock in the content and job of modern professional policing around the notion of political policing. Pinkerton Agency was so active and proactive in setting the policing paradigm of the late 19th century that Europeans believed it to be the title of the US *national and public* Criminal Police (Nadelmann and Anderson, 2006: 116). Pinkerton Agency, whose agents were paid by industrialist customers from the ranks of capitalist class, was considered by the police officers in Europe as “fellow professionals pursuing the same ends” (Nadelmann and Anderson, 2006: 116). That is to say, a privately owned policing agency was among the forerunners of the formation of a transnational police community. That implies that the International signifies for the modern police institution a more direct class power

intruding into its formation and reformation, at the expense of the politics of the modern police embodied by the bourgeois state form.

The private appeared more *neutral* at the international level and the private policing as a market force turned out to be the leading actor which conveyed a sense of non-political coercion. Alienation which was sustained at the national level through the separation of the political from the economic was turned upside down at the international level, whereby there was not such a separation but instead an integration of political and economic powers. The international sphere created an arena where ruling classes become *de nouveau* political classes à l'ancien régime, meaning that they owned the political sphere at the exclusion of other dependent classes. This non-separative character of the International did not mean to set an end to alienation either at the international or national levels but rather determined the very reformation of the public political forces at various domestic levels, tuning the tone towards more and more on behalf of the capitalist classes.

The recognition of private policing agencies as legitimate members of a transnational police community also depended on the notion of market ideology of the early 19th century, disseminated by the Anglo-Saxon world. Indeed, private policing was one sector among many others driven by the market forces. This state of affairs whereby there was no urge on the part of the bourgeoisie to leave the issue of security to the monopoly of the capitalist state was symptomatic of a broader social idea: “the social disorder as the necessary price for liberty” (McMullan, 1996: 93). However, this notion was too loose to secure the ever expanding capitalist accumulation processes, and the growing private policing business replaced this common sensual idea with a new one: social disorder was caused by “the lower class immorality” and this was a threat to liberty (McMullan, 1996:93). In that sense, the germs of the security ideology that was going to take its speed in the 20th century was disseminated by the lucrative business of private policing in the 19th century. Private policing was not the *other* side of the state monopoly of physical coercion, but rather its founding father. At the international

scene, this perception has never lost ground to a conception of *private policing vs. public policing* and pushed its limits as much as it can. The international in the issue of modern police has never ceased to be home to private policing. It has always been the reserve sphere of mechanisms for the sustainability of bourgeois rule at home.

3.5.3 National Leaders and Police Chiefs as Driving Forces of the IPO

The internationalization of the modern police in the late 19th and early 20th centuries is respectively driven by two sets of different actors: national political leaders and bureaucrats from within the police institutions. In the late 19th century, the forerunners of the police reform, or reorganization, were leaders of the imperialist countries. They produced many agreements to tie in many semi-dependent or weak governments and to promote their own national laws at the international arena as the models to follow. In that sense, this period of police internationalization was mostly marked by Germany, England and USA.

During the late 19th century, Bismarck, who acted at the international level as the best representative of the German bourgeoisie, was himself a perfect example of a political leader on whose body class struggle came into existence under the rubric of *national interest as against socialism*. He molded the newly born modern police on the basis of this anti-socialism. He realized this through the internationalization of the “*polizeistaat* tradition” which was “translated into the international level as an information bank to be shared by all the capitalist countries” (Nadelmann and Andreas, 2006: 88).

Another area of national leaders’ involvement into the politics of modern police formation was the fight against anarchism, as already mentioned. The problem with anarchism was the latter’s being a constant threat against the class of politicians, which were making up an *anachronistic* entity in the aftermath of the bourgeois revolutions. Anarchists were targeting kings’, queens’, and presidents’ lives and this resulted in a further attempt on the side of the political classes to degrade anarchism’s social status and posit them as banal criminals. In his first speech in the US Congress in 1901,

former police constable, President Theodor Roosevelt told “the anarchist represented ‘one type of depraved criminal, more dangerous than any other because he represent[ed] the same depravity in greater degree’ and ...called for an international agreement to make anarchism crime ‘an offense against the law of nations’” (Knepper, 2010: 156-157).

However, once the police officers got involved in international conferences, diplomatic or informal relations among themselves, the internationalization of the modern police took an advanced road compared to the route followed by the 19th century’s national political leaders. The hatred of socialism led even various German states to unite their political policing efforts even long before the unification of Germany. This hatred was objectified against the international socialist organizations. The ultra-conservatist head of the Berlin Police Force, Karl Ludwig Friedrich von Hinckeldey pushed for the establishment of “Police Union of the more important German States” made up of Bavaria, Württemberg and Baden in 1851 (Deflem, 2002: 59-50). Thus, a police chief turned into a pioneer in the formation of a nation-state through the internationalization of the police. He did not only set an institutional framework of and for pre-integration but also established a practice of conservative leadership on the management of police forces at the international level.

Indeed, the Police Union secured the establishment of a wide network of information exchange. Thus the negative effects of the bureaucracy such as the slowing down of the information exchange were curtailed down by the practice of bypassing the national ministries of interior and exterior (Deflem, 2002: 59). In that sense, internationalization of the police cut down the political field emanated from the bourgeois revolutions with the advent of the notion of professionalization (i.e. establishment of networks of information). Moreover, the very products of bourgeois revolutions, the separation of the means of administration from those who administer as defined by Weber, provided paradoxically the very means of *de-politicization* or *de nouveau* personalization of the

politics.³⁵ An internationalized separation furthered the alienated form: and led to *the rebirth of the modern police as Oedipus*. Internationalization of the modern police pushed the new police to take revenge from its own sources of life, the age of bourgeois revolutions.

Another demonstration of the level of personalization of the politics of modern police, or the redefining of the policing (whose logic was long ago divorced from the rule of personalized coercion) was the formation of an International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) in 1901 in USA. IACP's foundation was based on the belief that only an international cooperation could be "part of remedies for the deficiencies of US policing" (Deflem, 2002: 104). The most critical deficiency of the US police arena was defined as political partisanship and corruption (Deflem, 2002: 104). Nonetheless, the remedy was again looked for among the very police officials who were accused of being politically engaged. In other words, the more personalized use of state apparatuses was defined as the core reason of corruption, the more international was called into help. Hence, the internationalization of the modern police meant furthering the Oedipus complex of the police. In that sense, the modern police institution faced the very limits of the policing field-cum-capitalist system.

These paradoxes of modern policing which were exacerbated through the internationalization processes signaled that the seeds of a nascent ordo-liberal ideology (a precursor of the late 20th century's neoliberal ideology) were planted into the skull and bones of the modern police long before it was operationalized in other modern political institutions.³⁶ A historical example to this intrusion and paradox was the First Conference of International Criminal Police that was held in Monaco in 1914 with the aim of improving the international police methods (Deflem, 2002: 103). However,

³⁵ As already explained in the following pages, severance of the material means constitutes the basis for all institutional rationalization. Moreover, this severance process implies the rule of impersonality, whereby the traditional forms of power are muted into *impersonal* rule of the bureaucracy (Sayer, 1991).

³⁶ Ordo-liberals, who were the ancestors of the neoliberals, were dominant in the field of law and economics during the mid-1890s in Germany. For them, "law was no longer a superstructural phenomenon, but itself became an essential part of the (economic-institutional) base" (Lemke, 2001).

[t]he Congress was still conceived on the basis of a model of formal law and politics that was rooted in 19th-century conceptions of sovereignty and national jurisdiction..., ... a European police culture had begun to develop that conceived of the proper means and goals of policing in terms no longer based *on legality but on professional information and expertise* [Italics added] (Deflem, 2002:110).

Moreover, the internationalization of the modern police is as much sustained by informal links and relations as international conferences. Rather than the declared end results of these annually held conferences on policing since the late 19th century (such as the Anti-Anarchist Conference of Rome held in 1898), informal communications determined the success of these international gatherings. The delegates of these conferences were “mostly diplomats and other government representatives who negotiated with one another in a language of formal systems of law... the anti-anarchist methods of information exchange that had successfully been worked out had been decided upon by police officials at meetings they held separately during” the very same conferences (Deflem, 2002: 72). *Informality or informal relations and exchanges* appeared as the best mechanisms of modern police internationalization.

The attained level of informality and the circumscribed emergence of an internationalized police field speeded up the depoliticization of the rulers’ discourse on anarchism defined as having “no relation to politics” (Final Protocol of the Anti-anarchist Rome Conference cited in Deflem, 2002:71). Therefore, the professionalization of the respective police forces in Europe facilitated the establishment of a harmonious transnational police community which could step over the respective political fields. “The cooperation, for instance, between the French police and the Gestapo was never closer and never functioned better than [when the French police were] under the anti-Nazi government of the Popular Front” (Arendt cited in Nadelmann and Andreas, 2006: 95).

Another example was the Russian political police service *Okhrana* which got support from its European counterparts to set up a special office in Paris, at the time even when the Tsarist autocracy was not at all popular among the European governments (Fijnaut,

1997: 110). The concrete presence of *Okhrana* in Europe was not just signaling the beginning of a police brotherhood at the international level but also the emergence of an authentic intervention made by the international in national institutions: *the most autocratic police force absorbed the relatively democratic ones*. In that sense, change that was internationally induced did not always emanate from the democratization conditionalities induced by the Allied Powers to post- First World War Germany (which will be explained in the following lines) but also from the police fraternity inculcated as did *Okhrana* “...by decorating useful friends in Berlin, Copenhagen, Paris, Hamburg and Stockholm as well as by paying them money” (Fijnaut, 1997: 111). That is to say, the international strengthened the police’s attachment to the *status quo*, not only because of certain police values such as anti-communism but also due to the associated benefits created by police professionalization.

The establishment of an International Party of Order over the shoulders of transnational police community was finalized when the International Criminal Police Commission (ICPC) - thereafter Interpol- was established during the International Police Congress held in Vienna in 1923. In the opening speech of the Congress, it was stated that “even in the midst of oppositions between the nations of the earth ‘the Congress would unite police’ above the political battle, ‘because police cooperation’ was not a political but a cultural goal” (cited in Deflem, 2002: 136). The International Party of Order created by the transnational police community hence acquired a self-assigned ideological role, a para-order mission, which aimed to keep the political field as minimized as possible. The internationalized modern police apparatus emerged as an important agent coming into the help of the transnational bourgeoisie to denigrate the very fruits of its own fight against the yoke of the feudal system. Internationalized modern police tried to keep the political away from the sight and became a pro-*status quo* partisan of the liberal order.

Indeed, the internationalized coercion assumed its alienatory anti-political power, not from being hidden under the veil of fetishization like the capitalist market did, but from the state of obviousness, openness, ‘*here and now*’ness of the coercion. That is to say,

internationalization of the modern police institution reversed the normal working of the fetishization processes. It is generally accepted that

...—likewise fetishistic- legal form of organized violence distracts attention from its potential presence in and behind every economic relation; that distinctions like law and violence, order and insurrection, legal and illegal force cause the common foundation in violence of every institution of class societies to fade into the background (Lukács, 1971: 241).

However, this process of fading into the background was traced to its other extreme through the internationalization process of modern police. The very obviousness of coercion, its being so conspicuous either through the public acts of famous police leaders or through the advancement of new policing techniques contributed to the normalization of criminalization processes and in the firing of *the political as such* from the field of politics. Working class struggle became separated from the political and this separation creates a commodified, a self-estranged *deagent*.

3.5.4 Police Reform as IPO's Strategic Project

The quasi-autonomous sphere attained by the transnational police community was fulfilled by the ideology of reform. For instance, the gathering of the healers of the US police system under IACP was called as a “police reform movement” (Deflem, 2002:104). Nonetheless, reform was compatible with its first dictionary meaning: “an improvement in the structure of something”. On the contrary, police reform was imbued with an ideology of improving direct police powers and overstepping the bureaucratic formalities which were considered to be one of the main causes of political partisanship in the police. However, bureaucratic processes denoted as bureaucratic formalities were in fact representing the say power of different ministries in police practices, and the cut of these formalities or the envy to cut them down was also an envy to skip the mediation of the political in the formation of policing politics.

Furthermore, police reform, within the context of late 19th and early 20th centuries, meant a constant search for professionalization, an endless attempt to reconcile the impersonal and personalized characteristics of the modern police so as to find a place

within the imperial-international ordering of states. The case of Germany in the aftermath of the World War I was demonstrative of this fact.

The Versailles Treaty that was signed between the Allied Powers and Germany on 11 November 1918 urged for the first time the democratization of German police forces as an international condition for Germany to be reaccepted into the international system of states. “Under conditions of a democratic constitution and the restrictions imposed by the Versailles Treaty, the German police institutions of the Weimar Republic were confronted with the difficult task of securing crime control and the maintenance of order under conditions of respect for democratic rights and ideals” (Deflem, 2002: 113).

The process of police reform in Germany was illustrative in many ways on the broader historical meaning the notion of police reform. In the Weimar Republic during the reform era, the political police officers were around every corner of the city of Berlin going after

secret stores of arms, violating the privacy of letters, and infiltrating clubs and associations. Their names were even mentioned in the daily news columns...In 1928; Deputy Police President Dr. Bernhard Weiss wrote a popular book presenting the case for a political police, which sought to dispel the public’s suspicion toward Department IA. (Liang, 1977: 6).

Thus appeared the use of “publicity” by the police reform. Police reform tried to foster “democracy” by making its operations publicly known and even transparent. This ruse usage and promotion of publicity/transparency as a way to foster the democratic government paradoxically enhanced the authority of the police. In other words, as opposed to the established common sense, it was not the mystery behind the political policing which rendered the latter more forceful. On the contrary, as an output of police reform, the openness, obviousness or the very nakedness of the policing issues aggrandized the power of the police apparatus.

Moreover, police reform was also helpful for the instigation of an *International Party of Order* as it was an attempt to adjust different police models to a common cause, so that they never got over the complex of Oedipus.

Once the democratization program was defined as a condition for Germany to enter into the post-World War I order, the German police officials appeared to get the message as they immediately made a call for an international police meeting to be held in Munich in December 1920 under the heading of ‘The International Struggle Against Bolshevism: An International Trouble’. Although the meeting was held against the threat of Bolshevism, the participants stated that they saw no real danger of communist uprising in Europe (Deflem, 2002:117). Hence, anti-communism turned out to be a consolidating motive, a necessary but not sufficient basis to be a member of the International Party of Order.

Finally, it appears that this pro-democratic police reform paradoxically facilitated the coming into power of fascism in Germany. Indeed, the police apparatus which was not fully under the control of the central government but rather placed under the direction of various local governments became the power locus of the national-socialist party in Germany (Poulantzas, 1980: 351). The political police had directly passed to the rule of Nazism and especially of Hitler. The political police was considered as the perfect embodiment of the “leader’s will” (Poulantzas, 1980: 351). Thus, the IPO’s democratic police reform efforts were succeeded by a perfect fascist machine in Germany.

3.5.5 The Role of the IPO in the Making of Modern Turkey’s Police Forces

Examining the period between 1845 and 1908 in Ottoman history was important in order to illuminate the impact of international forces in the making of a quasi-modern Ottoman police. Ottoman state differed considerably from the colonized states of the same period, yet as it was the case for all “police forces created by colonial regimes”,

Ottoman rulers “could not help conceiving of the police in political terms” (Bayley, 1971: 107). Ergut (2004) argues that this police organization was born out of the civil bureaucrats, leaning on the international conjuncture, with the envy to challenge the traditional authority of the Ottoman Sultanate and to take over the political power.

As already stated, the mid-19th century had been the date when the new modern police came into being in Europe. Such a process, as also largely argued in the chapter on the internationalization of the police in the 19th century, became interwoven with the idea of state sovereignty. Accordingly, the sustainability of the internal order and security of the state was a proof of its fit to the requirements of the international state system. That is why, the establishment of a police organization in the Ottoman Empire in the same period that the new police of Europe was formed, was first and foremost a strategy to keep the Empire intact and aloof from foreign intervention.

That is why the foundation of the Ottoman police was rather a strategic political manoeuvre than a response to growing social demands for the establishment of public policing. It was an attempt of the Ottoman reformers to get over the international pressures concerning the internal security governance of the Empire. Thus, the Police Assembly which was founded in 1845 had as an area of policing responsibility, the entourage of Galata-Beyoğlu district, where the great bulk of foreign embassies and consulates existed and many foreign merchants inhabited (Sönmez, 2005: 62).

Of course, this does not totally overrule the fact that the Ottoman everyday life was brought under close scrutiny by the newly established police apparatus. As was the case for their European colleagues, the Ottoman police had to discipline the poor. In the police regulation of the mentioned period, it was stated that the police had to prevent those who did not have any excuse for not working and begging and disturbing people (Sönmez, 2005: 263). Moreover, the idea of regulating the workforce according to the growing needs of the capital defined the character of this pamphlet. The regulation was both a symbol and promise of the Ottoman Empire’s commitment to the newly emerging international system. In the pamphlet it was stated that the formation of all

kinds of association aiming at distortion of the public order by way of encouraging the workers to give up the work were to be prevented and ways of annihilating any chance of a revolution were to be sought for (Sönmez, 2005: 264).

It should be stated that this police regulation was very much of a nation-state nature and its application to an empire was intriguing. The pamphlet covered a wide range of issues such as the prevention of continuous human displacement, settlement of people and regulation of transport, which were demonstrative of a nation-state type demographic policy. In the pamphlet, it was stated that police should help the poor, unemployed and sick people to return back to their hometowns and those who were newly coming out of the prison to go back again to their hometowns (Sönmez, 2005: 263).

Another indication about the international character of the newly established police in the Ottoman Empire was the invitation of General Valentine Baker from England to make suggestions about the situation of the internal security management of the Empire (Sönmez, 2009: 167). In the report prepared, Baker suggested to apply the Ireland model of gendarmerie with regard to multi-ethnic composition of the Empire (Sönmez, 2009: 168). In fact this Irish model was the model Britain had been using for its colonies. Concerning the issue of police, Baker suggested inviting somebody either from France or England. It was interesting to note that whereas Baker was sure of the necessity of applying Ireland model of gendarmerie in the Ottoman periphery, for him interestingly enough, French or English model of policing did not make such a difference in a period when the whole debate of policing in Europe was based on how big the difference was between the two models, respectively Anglo-Saxon and Continental. The British model was representing itself as the liberal anti-thesis of the French one, which was considered to be despotic. Baker's disregard of such a debate showed his inclination to see the reform of internal security apparatuses of the Ottoman Empire as a sort of colonial question. This also demonstrated that the IPO was

indifferent to this debate which rather masked the fusion between the two models ever since Napoleon's import of the London Metropolitan model of policing to Paris.

Again in this period, the international system demanded from the Ottoman Empire to include the minorities represented within the gendarmerie of their localities with respect to the rate of their population over the whole (Sönmez, 2009: 172). As already stated this principle also took the nation-state as a background political unit. This indicated that long before the formation of the Turkish nation-state, the police organization of the Empire had been structured according to the nation-state ideology.

All these point out the presence of a dual process merged to each other in the making of the police institution in the Ottoman Empire: the first was the model of colonial policing, and the second was the model of modern state. Yet, such an internationally dominated process of police formation before the development of the relevant political sphere created a problem in the Ottoman Empire. This not only happened due to the imposition of arbitrary decisions by the newly instituted police institution but also because of the very internationalized but yet not socialized structure of the police institution. The modern police institution's social base in the Empire was mainly foreign merchants and embassies.

The first police organization in the Ottoman Empire that had differentiated itself from the military as a separate institution took place in Sultan Abdülhamid's era. During that era, the police's establishment targeted the military and the elites in opposition to the Sultan. For instance, Istanbul Police uncovered the complot organized against the Sultan in the military academy, and a hundred of the involved military students were exiled to Trablusgarb (Ergut, 2004).

In such an atmosphere, the French police chief Lefoullon arrived to Istanbul to serve Abdülhamid as the "Sultan's Special Police Chief" in his effort to control and repress the opposition. Lefoullon was renowned for his ability in the political policing of the

anarchists. He was assigned to a high position in the Police Organization in Istanbul as the General Inspector of the Police (Lévy, 2009: 154). As already told in the second chapter, anarchists were primary movers for the internationalization of the modern police in the 19th century. They were considered as threat to most of the political leaders of the conservative European regimes. That is why European powers had resurrected the ancien régime type of policing. This was the very context and also the resource model of the police reformation in the Ottoman Empire.

As already argued, modern police was an institution whose ties with the ancien régime were very sound and which tended to reproduce the ancien régime practices once faced with progressive forces or revolutionaries. The modern Ottoman police was established in an Empire, where there had not yet occurred any bourgeois revolution.

This internationalized police of the Ottoman Empire, which was hitherto looking for its own revolution, became an important resource of path dependency in the future police form that would take place in the modern Turkey. The late bourgeois revolution of Turkey would take place under such an international context, which was already specialized in tying in the hands of the revolutionaries. That is why the bourgeois state form envied by the revolutionaries of Turkey was going to bear the mark of the ancien régime more than those of its European counterparts. Police Chief Lefoullon was the representative of the power of the international in tightening the room for manoeuvre for the late bourgeois revolutions: he was the perfect embodiment of counter-revolutionary ideology capturing Europe in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Lefoullon was going to be sent to Europe in many occasions by Abdülhamid to chase down the political opponents of Abdülhamid (Lévy, 2009: 157).

In the meantime, the European powers demanded a police reform from the Ottoman Empire in 1903 in the aftermath of the social rebellions in Macedonia. This police reform program was entitled Vienna Reform Program (Dikici, 2010: 76). The reform program could not reach all of its ambitions as it was faced with resistance from the

Ottoman state. Nonetheless some of its articles were realized: building up of gendarmerie stations; establishment of a school of gendarmerie and police education, the recruitment of Christians to the policing institutions, and the employment of the European officers as observers of the application process of the reform program.

This process had resulted in the creation of overlapping jurisdictions between the Ottomans and the Europeans concerning the issues of internal security. The internationalization of the police thus also meant a kind of colonization of the internal security of the Ottoman Empire. Hence, it was not a coincidence that the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 aimed to reestablish the damaged state sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire in the international system starting from the professionalization of the internal security apparatuses.

This urged the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) to undertake the job of creating the state monopoly of physical violence. To prevent the intervention of the international, the CUP had to realize one of the inviolable principles of the bourgeois revolutions: the state had to take care of the security of its citizens and provide security equally to all without rendering them in need of privately developed security measures and practices. That is why CUP had to force up some of the elements of the police reform introduced in 1903 such as the establishment of police centers and schools. It had to internalize and go beyond this reform program in order to fulfill the necessities of the now internationally recognized principle of state's monopoly of coercion.

This process also shows that the historical time of the modern police organization in Turkey differs from that of the establishment of the capitalist state in the country. The former preceded the latter. That is also shown in the separation of the policing powers from the bazaar (the market) under the reign of the Abdülhamid. Before the Abdülhamid era, the bazaar (*esnaf*) was partially responsible from the job of policing (Demirtaş, 2010). Although different from its European counterparts, this was pointing out to the unity of the economic powers (*esnaf*) and the political powers (policing). The

separation of these two during the Abdülhamid era was a start in the making of the modern state form and a corresponding police apparatus in the Empire.

The police organization of the Abdülhamid era was not solely a political policing force against the anti-Sultanate elites but also a force envisaged to bring *civilisation* to the society and to control the workers. Indeed, during this period the issue of drunkenness and vagabondism were posited as important social problems to deal with (Lévy, 2008).

Moreover, as was the case in England and many other European countries, a close connection was established between the governance of the poor and policing politics. Whereas the police institution was getting more professionalized, a regulation concerning the beggars and vagabonds was written down and a state house for the poor and needy (*Darülaceze*) was established. Therefore, many social agencies other than the police institutions were taken over the responsibility of various policing issues (Lévy, 2008). Abdülhamid's era of policing was known for its despotic and repressive character. Yet, the more despotic became the state coercion, the more coercion diffused into other bodies of social control. This also meant that the despotic power was diffuse all over the society, which could have resulted in the fortification of anti-state forces within the society through the diffusion of policing tools and authority to make use of these policing tools. That was pointing out to the basic dialectic that the more despotic the state becomes, the more policing powers are devolved into non-state bodies.

The CUP was aware of the problems of this dialectic and the first thing it aspired to do was the seizure of weapons that the population held in abundance (Ergut, 2004: 165). The seizure of these weapons contributed in the augmenting of the power of the central police organization. On the other hand, on the issue of policing the CUP had profited from the bazaar people, who were subject to a bourgeoisification process (Ergut, 2004: 171). That simply meant to let the market be determinant in the formation of the new police apparatus. That is why; the police apparatus during the CUP period very much involved in the job of developing capitalist relations of production in a detailed manner

through marketplace controls and the issuing of authorizations for many trade businesses (see Ergut for further details, 2004: 182-183).

But at the same time, the police organization was not content at all with all the changes the CUP was introducing. In the year of 1909, in the aftermath of the anti-CUP pro-Islamic regime rebellion of 31 March, the police had taken off their new modern hats and wore again the traditional fez (Ergut, 2004: 194). The legacy of Abdülhamid's counter-revolutionism was not erased so easily from the agenda of the police institution. In the first police training book written down in 1910 by Ibrahim Feridun (2010: 188), it was stated that in case the requirements of Muslimhood were fully realized, there would be no place for fear from the threat of socialism.

After the incident of 31 March, CUP founded the General Security Directorate (Ergut, 2004: 195). The demands about the professionalization of the police were again on the top of the reform agenda. CUP initiated an effort to build up a more "autonomous" police organization. To provide the police with a room for manoeuvre for itself was a must for the conservation of the new regime. Police should become more than a simple apparatus of the regime. It should be a systemic apparatus. Yet, to take this risk of a relatively autonomous police organization, the rule of capital should prevail in policing matters. That is why the first police superintendent of the CUP regime preferred to visit England in order to make some observations (Ergut, 2004: 202). For the CUP, who sang *Marseillaise* during the Revolution of 1908, the Revolutionary France's legacy was already discredited in the issue of policing in favour of the model capitalist country, England's more systemic policing politics.

Such a strategy concerning the police institutionalization turned out to be successful for when the CUP's power was over by 1912, the police apparatus, which had been displaying a pro-31 March stance, did not surprisingly give in the new government's policies. This cannot be solely explained on the basis of the police's allegiance to the CUP era. It can equally be argued that due to the impact of the internationalization of

the police, the police already became part of a broader structure of the (capitalist) international system of states. The International which found its bodily existence in the IPO cared about the allegiance of the police institutions to itself rather than to specific and temporary governments. That is also why the internationalization of the police meant the police's relative autonomy from its local context. Hence, the professionalization of the police in a country on the road to capitalism was closely related with the degree of its internationalization in the 19th century.³⁷

The Republican era continued with the police structure established by the CUP, and did not make a real legal-organizational change up until the mid-1930s. Nonetheless, by both the newly ratified Penal Code and the martial law of *Takrir-i Sükun*, police powers were very much expanded. In the new era, there was a duality concerning the limits of police powers. Whereas the police was assigned the task of regime protection, the Independence Courts were the real owners of this task. The police was staying in between the task of regime protection and public safety. Whereas the martial law assigned the police the task of preventing provocateurs and drunks to make politics safe in the traditional coffeehouses, the Ministry of Justice asked the police not to consider

³⁷ A not-very well researched issue concerning the police internationalization in the Ottoman Empire was the establishment of Allied Police Forces in Istanbul under occupation. To make a research on the legacy of these police forces on the Turkish Republic's police forces is beyond the reach of this thesis. Nonetheless, a report entitled "Constantinapolis Today" prepared by the American scholars who conducted a field research in the year of 1920 as a "Study in Oriental Social Life" describes the state of policing affairs in Istanbul under occupation. According to these descriptions, the allied police forces were not meddling into the affairs of Istanbul's local police except under the two following circumstances: one is that the local police should get their pay on time, and the second is that the local police officers which were detected of malpractice should be dismissed (Johnson, 1995: 103).

Moreover, it was stated that the allied police forces were rarely dealing with the issues of vagabondism and mendicity since in an "eastern country, it [was} not possible to make radical reforms" (Johnson, 1995: 104). Hence, the allied police forces tried not to bother themselves with the local people and concentrated more on the regulation of the life of foreigners. They established a parallel structure of criminal governance for the foreigners living in Istanbul and supervised the local police's capacity to govern since they did not prefer a degenerated local police force, incapacitated and irresponsible. Hence, the internationalization of Istanbul's local police was marked with the latter's becoming subject to a slightly revised ideology of colonization. As Alexis de Tocqueville argues, late colonization should not lose time by trying to change the local people, which was an inconclusive act, but rather should become concerned about the life of settlers, who really mattered for the welfare of the colonial regimes (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2006).

situations like drunkenness within the scope of the martial law (Ergut, 2004: 321-322). Thus the political role of the Republican police was not defined yet in a precise manner at the very early years of the Republic.

Some clues about the state of affairs in the post-Occupation Istanbul can be withdrawn from the memoirs of the first General Security Director of Istanbul in the aftermath of 1923, Ekrem Baydar. Before this mission, he was the head of Ankara Government's secret intelligence network in Istanbul under occupation. Baydar (2010) in his memoirs admits that the lack of a law regulating the police powers forced him to lean on his military background. He created a mythical police chief character to rule Istanbul, whose many districts, he says, were under the yoke of *kabadayis* and *külhanbeyis* (Baydar, 2010: 30-33). He argues that despite the bad reputation of the local police of Istanbul which submitted themselves to the rule of the colonial powers, he did not use the purge as a mechanism of establishing a new police organization. He says he preferred to embrace all of these officers (Baydar, 2010: 43). But it appears that Istanbul of post-occupation narrowed down the room of manoeuvre for the city's police chief who tried hard to make himself respected by the Istanbul population. To make that, he stopped the practice of foot patrol done by the gendarmerie, from which, he says, people were afraid of. But more than that, he had to become a constitutive part of the new social contract the young Republic tried to establish with the minorities living in Istanbul, who supported allied powers and the occupation.

The memoirs of Baydar, who was one of the revolutionary cadres of the early Republican era, show how much the police apparatus had become a foreign policy actor to tackle with the governance problems facing the post-Occupation Istanbul. The International was forcing down the police apparatus to uneven development with respect to other state apparatuses, or put it simply to an unbalanced growth. The police apparatus had to manage the process of Occupation powers' departure from Istanbul since every conflict that might have taken place in this process was perceived as a potential threat that in turn would damage the international recognition of the newly

born state. The police organization in Istanbul was looking after the properties of the allied powers so that they did not become subject to any assault but this however did not prevent the police to distribute on the other side a book entitled “The Greek Atrocities in Anatolia” to the tourists visiting Istanbul (Baydar, 2010: 103). Hence, the police apparatus inevitably turned into a political actor making the nation-state.³⁸ For instance, up until the establishment of a separate intelligence agency, the police apparatus was responsible from intelligence gathering about foreign spies in Istanbul (Baydar, 2010: 123).

It was getting clearer by time that the revolutionary reforms of this period could only be translated into policing job as *a civilisational* issue, which had already been the case for the police since the Abdülhamid Era.³⁹ The difference between the revolutionary reforms and the making of the social body according to the needs of the capitalist system was not so big. In fact, the police were somehow becoming “domestic missionaries”.⁴⁰ Among many other ideological reasons [such as the choices made by the revolutionary cadres of Turkey], the *subsumption* of the revolutionary reforms under the fetishisation process akin to capitalism was also caused by the structural constraints created by the Occupation period of the Ottoman Empire in the aftermath of the First World War and by the problems faced by the newly born Republic within the imperialist order. Indeed, the slight but important difference between the revolutionary

³⁸ In the early days of the Republic the role of the police was not limited to political policing. The police continued the practice of regulating every day life. Indeed, in Istanbul of 1924, the police were chasing those who were wearing hats instead of fez (this was before the Hat Reform of 1925 and Baydar argues that before the reform, the hat was symbolizing non-religiosity and one of the jobs of the police was to chase the non-religious people); announcing the start of the Ramadan month to the public ...etc (Baydar, 2010: 84-85).

³⁹ After the introduction of the revolutionary reforms by Mustafa Kemal and other revolutionary cadres during the early days of the Republic, the police apparatus had to expand the width of these reforms to everyday life and thus had to visit all the *tekkes* (dervish lodges) and *zāwiyas* (chief dervish lodges) in Istanbul to announce the new rules (Baydar, 2010: 95).

⁴⁰ Storch (1976: 481) argues that in the second half of the 19th century, the police were domestic missionaries who were “molding a labouring class amenable to new disciplines of both work and leisure”. To tame the “dogfights, cockfights, and gambling, popular fetes” was a cultural mission (Storch, 1976: 495).

reforms and the capitalist transformation was all the most lost in the job of policing.⁴¹ The atmosphere of the internationalized post-Occupation era created a police after the image of a “police state” à la Foucauldian, an entity preserved but also surmounted by the liberal state.

In 1920, the first general security director Mustafa Durak Bey, who was given the job of founding the police of Ankara government, referred to the *social contract* model as an inspiration for the foundation of the police organization (Ergut, 2004: 299). Meanwhile, the parliamentarian Necip Bey stated that whenever Ankara government aspired to form new institutions and organizations to govern people, a gendarmerie abused the most honorable person of the village; that is why for public safety it was better not to send any security officers to the villages and even better to the towns (Ergut, 2004: 305).

It is possible to find the repercussions of these two statements in the Ministry of Interior Ferid Bey’s way of thinking. He argued that whichever locality provided the necessary funding, it could have constituted a proper police institution and that the state could not bear the cost of establishing a police unit in each and every town (Ergut, 2004: 312). Ergut says that this idea was not put into practice. Nonetheless, all these are demonstrative of the fact that the hegemony of the Anglo-Saxon model of policing, whereby the localities own relatively bigger power in the formation of their own police forces compared to more centralized versions in the Continental Europe, was becoming influential in the Republican Turkey. Yet, the import of such a mode of thinking on the issue of policing to Turkey was itself an obstacle on the broader socialization and expansion of revolutionary reforms to the periphery because in one way or another this model encouraged local’s relative independence from the center or local’s immunity from the interventions of central power.

⁴¹This dissertation makes an analytical distinction between bourgeois revolutionary reforms and capitalism’s requirements of a making of a social formation in line with the requirements of capital’s reproduction. The former are not essential for the sustainability of capitalist reproduction.

That is why these ideas were also potential reasons of the revolutionary state's late intervention into the police institution. Police in Turkey was thoroughly considered neither as a forerunner of the late bourgeois revolution nor as a core mechanism for the realization of modern political rights. And the ever-lasting internationalization of the police since 1845 was one of the major causes of the tightening political sphere in Republican Turkey.

This argument sounds significant given the fact that the Turkish Police Organization became a member of Interpol in the 8th of January 1930, long before the Republican State made legal and organizational changes in the police apparatus and ideology. This membership date is very important if one considers the fact that these post-Independence War years of state-building in Turkey were almost closed to the foreign world (Koçak, 2009: 205). This is even recognized in the early 1950s by Azmi Yumak (1952: 12), a police commissioner responsible from the bureau of Interpol in Turkey, who stated that “despite the fact that we are far way from this circle [Group of European States], due to its many practical contributions, we derive benefits from the concomitant results”.

A further resource that reveals the internationalized mission of the Turkish police during the 1930s was the Reunion Proceedings of General Inspectors [Umumi Müfettişler Toplantı Tutanakları]. It was stated in these proceedings that as the workforce ever grew in the country, the workers' nests became numerous, and the currents of thought such as communism got popular all around the world, the role of the police in security, public order and intelligence issues became more crucial (Varlık, 2010: 37). For these purposes, in 1934, the Law of Police Duties and Competences (*Polis Vazife ve Selahiyet Kanunu, PVSK*) was sanctioned in the Parliament. The Act was extensively based on the idea of “preventive policing”, which led to the over expansion of the rights of police as well as the rights of local governors. For instance, the police had to check on the imported films, while film making in the country was dependent on issuing of a police permit. Moreover, the 18th article of the Law stated that

even in the case of a lack of a crime, during “extraordinary periods that might harm the country and the state” the police could take people who look suspicious under custody for much longer than the normally allowed 24-hours custody time. One of the other birthmarks of the Law was the heavy concern with public morality, which created risks for degeneration due to alcohol, prostitution and gambling. All these issues were dealt with in detail and prevention of such a moral degradation was mentioned for many times. Finally, the Law gave the police the right to check on the gender of employees in places such as cafés-chantants, bars and similar entertainment places. Women were banned from working in such places. The Law’s preamble stated that these precautions were necessary for the conservation of the family institution. In sum, the Law was very much tailored in accordance with the notion of preventive or administrative policing, the police ideology disseminated for long time by the Anglo-Saxon model of policing. Finally, the Law asked for the establishment of an organization specialized on fingerprint identification, a system required insistently by Interpol for a while [TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi].

Meanwhile, anti-communism was becoming a major issue for the Republican police. The police apparatus was also happy to have ideological support from the White Russians who had fled from the October Revolution to Istanbul, where they were making anticommunist propaganda and thus facilitating the job of the Turkish police apparatus which was also taking some advises on their policing techniques in the pre-revolutionary Russia (Baydar, 2010: 145-125/126). Istanbul’s police chief Baydar states in his memoires the event of 1926, when “the Turkish communists in Vienna ... prepared plans against Kemalist principles”, was one of the turning points in the establishment of a national security organization assigned for the job of intelligence gathering, and he adds that he was proposed to become the head of this organization, which was going to be built with the help of the German intelligence agency (Baydar, 2010: 107-109).

It should be noted that the Republican Police's process of institutional consolidation coincided with an international atmosphere whereby extraordinary mechanisms of power as well as fascist methods became very common and legitimate in policing.⁴² The growing powers of the police all around the world were addressed in the *Police Magazine* on the basis of fight against "City Bandits" emerging in the aftermath of the First World War (Eraydın, 1937: 3859). The referred article presented the German state's policing politics with appreciation and the German police apparatus is said to be the most developed police with regard to its relations with the public. Many public relations examples from German police practices were cited such as making informative films about the police, preparing police brochures where the police-children and police-poor people relations were explained (Eraydın, 1937: 3867).

In the second part of the same article, it was told that police powers were increased in all other European States. A new application developed in Europe was very much appreciated and proposed to be launched in Turkey: for cases related with some specific crimes, *police courts* where police officers could have the force of a judge should be established (Eraydın, 1937: 3870-71). This new application was legitimized with respect to the preemptive role that the police should have played and said to augment the prestige and authority of the police. Eraydın continued by saying that associating the police organization in Turkey with justice-related affairs was important to receive public confidence on it (Eraydın, 1937: 3871-71).

Eraydın (1937: 3872-3876) cited many more examples but the ones related with the fascist Italian police were noteworthy. He argued that even in one of the most liberal countries such as France, some public liberties were limited and some police powers were expanded. After telling the story of the Italian police, he went on arguing that the expansion of police powers in Italy showed the extent of the greatness of the value of policing job in that country.

⁴² Poulantzas in his book called "Fascism and Dictatorship" tells how fascism was standing on the shoulders of the police apparatus both in Fascist Germany and Italy. He tells that the main way for the fascist ideology to infuse into the state apparatus was the political police (Poulantzas, 1980: 351).

Not surprisingly, during the consolidation process of the Republican Police, the judiciary was represented as a potential obstacle. Again in an article published in the Police Magazine, Ş. 5 M. Necmeddin (1931: 955-56) tells that the judiciary could not take the liberty of letting something that the police administration did not dare to and it was the suspension of some laws in situations where it was deemed necessary for the internal affairs of a state which was important. In short, the police organization of the young Republic was getting consolidated in a period when fascist tendencies were restructuring the internal security apparatuses all around the world. Here is another example.

One of the police intellectuals of the young Republic, Hikmet Tongur (1946: 755) argued that the fourth article of the PVSK which resumed that the police could not be employed in a job other than the ones stated by police duties act was no more valid. He went on by stating that this article was a reaction to the general arbitrariness in the management of police officers by higher administrative offices in the Ottoman Era and this article constituted no more a necessity for the current police organization where in case of emergency or need, higher officers could ask the police to accomplish jobs other than their own. These ideas were demonstrative of the impact of this international reactionary atmosphere on the consolidation period of the police in Turkey.

While once the Republican era was presenting the Ottoman police its own anti-thesis and even depicting the Abdülhamid era's Police Department as similar to the "famous French Dungeon, Bastille" (Yazman, 1938: 17), it turned its back to these reference points in the 1930s and tacitly acknowledged that these quasi-liberal and progressive ideas were tying their own hands in policing matters. This was very reminiscent of the bourgeois reasoning under the Party of Order that had given way to Bonapartism in Napoleonic France.

The element of *left* -not solely national but also international- had already replaced the element of the Ottoman past in the making of the Republican police's ideological baggage by the late 1930s. For instance, a regulatory statute was published in the year of 1936 in the Police Magazine stating that all would-be participants to the Civil War in Spain from Turkey should be stopped. The police apparatus of the Republic was becoming internationalized in its mission and the IPO's weight in this process was getting more apparent by the 1940s.

Azmi Yumak, a police officer and intellectual in Turkey in the 1940s, wrote a comprehensive report on the first meeting of the Interpol in the aftermath of the Second World War and explained in detail the Turkish delegation's stance on the international police cooperation (Yumak, 1947). It appears that Turkey was more than welcoming these collaboration efforts and wishing to have a more institutionalized international police collaboration apparatus, which was perceived as both a material and moral support for the fortification of the police organization at home.⁴³

The trip report of Azmi Yumak about the Interpol reunion also reveals that such a trip strengthened the governments' hand concerning the police structure in Turkey. For

⁴³ In this report, it was asked for the publication of a magazine where issues concerning fight against crime would be treated in detail, including the presentation of newly developed anti-crime methods and techniques (Yumak, 1947: 33). Indeed, the Police Magazine of the early Republican era in Turkey was playing an educative role by the presentation of intriguing criminal fictions/detective stories and know-how on how crime cases could be solved. Many newly developed crime detection and analysis techniques were introduced in the same magazine by a foreign expert, Marc Payot, who was teaching criminology in the Police Academy by that time. The magazine, as already stated, was the major training source for the young Republic's police officers.

Furthermore, the magazine of the pre-Cold War era largely leaned on Turkish translations of foreign police-related articles. The magazine admitted frequently its ambition of becoming more popular among the Turkish police officers; and it appeared that the editors complain from the under-reading of the magazine by the rank-and-file police officers. Indeed, many techniques such as detective puzzles, whose results were published in the subsequent volume of the published story, were introduced to make a more interactive and usable magazine.

Yet a further mission of the magazine, more related with the issue of police internationalization was the publication of the identity information and photos of wanted criminals by the Interpol. It is thus both a training and an entertainment magazine which in the meantime focused on the official issues of policing such as the publication of official communications.

instance, the visit of police centers and facilities by the Turkish delegation in Brussels and the visit of police detention centers fortified the pro-detention center position of Yumak, who put forward the case of Brussels as a legitimate model against the anti-police detention center stance in Turkey (Yumak, 1947: 62). Moreover, the scope of the report concerning the structure of the Belgian police was demonstrative of the fact that the police apparatus in Turkey was still under configuration by the late 1940s as the observations of the Turkish delegation were explained in detail with amazement and curiosity, and all the habits of the Belgian police were introduced with great enthusiasm.

By the 1950s, the Turkish National Police (TNP) suspended the publication of the police magazine while another one, published by the Association of Retired Police Officers, started off its publication life. However, compared to the previous magazine where quasi-scientific articles were taking place, the new magazine became rather a kind of tabloid. This happened in parallel with the American model of politics getting the upper hand in the international arena, and Turkey did not stay immune from this change as the political sphere was now shared in between two parties (Democrat Party and Republican People's Party) similar to the case of the American Democrats and Republicans (Koçak, 2010: 22).

This new political process resulted in a stalemate concerning the state of affairs in and about the police organization. The restructuring of the police under this new trend of Americanization was conceived as liberalization. News such as “police would no more carry guns when they are off-duty” were taking place in the press under headings of celebration such as “Hele Şükür” [Thanks God!] (cited in Dikici, 2009: 63). Moreover, the amendment made in the Article 18 of the Law of Police Duties and Competences in the year of 1948 under the Democrat Party's leadership created an atmosphere of democratization. During the parliamentary discussions on the amendment proposal about the Article 18 of the Law, the pro-amendment side argued that the abolition of this article would show that the state trusted in its citizens and that the citizens of the

Republic would cause no harm to the state. This trust on the citizens was built on a conviction pronounced by a parliamentarian from the Democrat Party, Ahmet Tahtakılıç, during the discussions who argued that: “There is no anarchy in Turkey”, which would necessitate keeping the Article 18 within the Law’s scope.

And yet, the “communist threat” was becoming the major policing issue.⁴⁴ Moreover, fascism still possessed an ongoing legacy as could be seen in Menderes’ following words: “We do not see racism as an issue or a wave to be dealt with and eroded completely from the scene as we see the case of leftism. In the end, racism can be an indicator of a feeling or an idea. But this is not the case with leftism. We think that leftism is the agent of forces that work for the worse of our country. We are far from accepting it as a feeling or an idea” (cited in Dikici, 2009: 76).

The Americanization of the Turkish political scene had become more profound by the mid- 1950s. There were many US advisers in the Turkish National Police and Turkish police was providing these advisers with detailed information about the social structure in Turkey such as the areas of opium crop and its marketization processes; or the number of exported cars, where there were used, for which reasons etc. Yet, before this process began, there was already an acquaintance of the Turkish police with the American model. The police magazine was providing a lot of information about this model of policing and indeed, many articles of major criminologists or police-chiefs from Anglo-Saxon countries including US were published in the magazine.

In June 1943, a piece entitled “What is happening in the Universe of Police all around the World?” [Dünya Polis Aleminde Neler Oluyor?] was published in the magazine,

⁴⁴ It should be stated that already in the 1940s, before Democrat Party (DP)’s take-over of the power, anti-communism was becoming a routine issue of everyday policing. The arrest of many members of the Communist Party of Turkey in 1951, just after the DP’s rise to power, should also be considered with respect to this continuity with the previous era of single party regime. Already in the year of 1949, the Police Magazine was making “what to read?” suggestions to the police officers such as “Red Threat: We Should Fight With That Threat” [Kızıl Tehlike: Bu tehlikeyle mücadele edelim.]; “A Letter to the Workers of the World” [Dünya İşçilerine Mektup] which were telling the evils about communism and communist spies’ working methods in foreign countries as well as methods of fight against these spies etc.

where the whole story was built up on the experience of American policing and indeed on the newly established FBI (Eren, 1943: 10-26). Furthermore, the same volume included the New-York Police Department's handbook on "how to prevent burglaries and thieves?" as a guide for Turkish property-owners. In September 1944, a famous book of Edgar Hoover, a world renowned American criminologist, was translated and published as a serial in the police magazine. In the preface of the book, Frank Robrix was arguing that the most important thing about Hoover was his dislike of politicians (1944:88-89). Hoover (cited in Robrix, 1944:89) argued that *the political* was living on the back of crime and due to crime. According to Robrix (1944: 89), the biggest enemies of Hoover were politicians who encouraged criminals.

The embodiment of this *anti-political* stance of the modern police in a police chief and the promotion of the latter as a role-model all around the world should have met by a close welcome in the Turkish National Police. In fact, the import of these kinds of police ideologies (anti-politicianism) should have facilitated for the police chiefs during the Democrat Party era to easily turn their back to the "National Chief", Ismet İnönü, for whom they were pledging loyalty during the single-party era in Turkey. During the late Democrat Party era, İnönü was prevented from access to certain cities and had to face many assaults, where the police was directly or indirectly a collaborator or facilitator (Dikici, 2009).

The idealization of some international police role-models and their promotion appears to be a significant part of the police education in the young Turkish Republic. Ahmet Rifat Kemerdere (1948: 111), the director of the Police Institute and College during the 1947-48 period said in a speech delivered on the occasion of graduation ceremony that they, as police chiefs and college teachers, were hoping to see the rise of police stars like internationally famous Lawrences. While depicting how an ideal police officer should be, he referred to some ethical and political codes of the day. The most important danger to the state's integrity was cited as religious reactionaries even though at the same time the moral codes of the police officers were depicted with respect to the

country's traditional-religious background. For instance, Kemerdere (1948:111) stated that police should always be courageous because God loved courageous people. Similarly, he argued that the police organization was at the same time a hygiene institution that should cure the naïve people poisoned by evil propaganda. It should correct the poisoned people with the help of decent talks before punishing them. Similarly, a graduate of the institution claimed that the real police officer was a human being who was able stay in the cleanest, purest way despite the fact that he/she had to get involved into the dirtiest, darkest places ever (1948: 113).

This process of the idealization of the job of policing led to the idealization of the Turkish Police. This was partly an effort to contain the organization intact and motivated. Yet on the other hand, there appeared to be a kind of resentment to the Western police organizations' technical and material facilities and opportunities. The gap between the Western and Turkish police organizations in terms of technical expertise and facilities was filled up by a specific understanding of morality assigned to the Turkish police. The affinity between the German police organization and the Turkish one during the Second World War years did not only lead to an emulation of the German model. However, it fostered a feeling of aspiration and a defense mechanism whereby the moral-religious faith of the Turkish police was compared and contrasted with the money power of the Germans where the former was assigned a tacit superiority (see Pepeyi, 1950: 3-5).⁴⁵

It has been already stated that the police consolidation in Turkey took place during fascist ascendancy all over the world. On the other hand, Turkish police was not remodeled according to the German model. This might have had many reasons but one

⁴⁵ A crucial trip, which reflected the spirit of the police apparatus in the 1940s, was made to Nazi Germany by Nihat Haluk Pepeyi, appointed in the year of 1942 as Istanbul's General Security Director. Rifat Bali's research demonstrated that this trip was organized as a reply to an invitation of the Nazi Germany to "make counter-propaganda about the accusations directed against the Nazis' maltreatment of people" (Bali, 2011: 51). The trip most probably aimed at making the representatives of the Turkish National Police appreciate the security apparatuses of the Nazi regime and make the latter a reference model for the emulation at home.

of them was closely related with the ever increasing supremacy of the American model. A short report published in the Police Magazine about the state of the 1950 budget of the General Security Directorate in Turkey reveals that an American adviser was planned to be invited for the year of 1950 and a share from the budget was allocated for the foreign expert (see Taluy, 1949: 47). Moreover, the same report made frequent reference to the US budgeting system and the share of the American Police Budget was presented as a test-case to compare and contrast the Turkish case.

Furthermore, Democrat Party's concern to differentiate itself from the previous single party-era through the discourse of "dictatorship" seemed to make inroads into the Turkish police. The results of a survey made by the police magazine, published by the Association of Retired Police Officers, was illuminating in this respect. One of the questions of this survey, which was made among the police officers and others such as the lawyers, was about the difference between the previous era's policing and the current state of affairs. An answer to that question openly stated that the previous era was an era of dictatorship and the police was a dictatorship police, and the current era was representing a departure from these practices.

3.6 Concluding Remarks

Internationalization of the modern police in the 19th century signaled the beginning of a specific mode of thinking among the bourgeois classes about dealing with the "return of the archaic" (Mouffe, 2005: 24). As such they would perceive the modern political mass movements. The irony was that internationalized modern police was itself an archaic form of policing power, reminiscent of the ancien régime. In that sense, the bourgeois thought that was represented by the IPO was also structurally constituted that it was not built solely on strategic or pragmatic plans, or preemptive strikes. On the contrary, as Lukàcsian analysis unfolds, the bourgeois mode of thinking was structurally tied to the segregated phenomenal reality. Internationalized modern police was not a conspiracy but an inevitable result of this bourgeois mode of thinking.

Bourgeoisie is “unable to acknowledge the role of ‘passions’ as one of the main moving forces in the field of politics and finds itself disarmed when faced with its diverse manifestations” (Mouffe, 2005: 24). The internationalization effort of the modern police was an attempt to repress the passions to pop up in the field of politics. Hence, disciplining the working classes through the modern police was not just remaking the social body but also and mostly reshaping the political field.

However, it should also be stated that the modern police form displayed many paradoxes during its internalization of the bourgeois thought. It declared a war against its own form, which, even though in an asymmetric manner, was also shaped by the working class struggle. Such kind of self-war has resulted in a cyclical life of police institution: corruption-reform-corruption-reform... Neither corruption has been an exceptional moment of the modern police, nor is the reform an attempt to improve it.

The eradication of the working class effect from the modern police form has constituted a threat not solely for the working classes and the poor but also for the bourgeois state form. Police, while dealing with the throwing of the working classes out of the political field, have approached to a complete enclosure. The modern police apparatus has acted within the confines of the bourgeois state form and thus its universe has been limited with the existing ideals of the same form. In that sense, the bourgeois revolutions have unleashed class struggle and the utopias of the working classes though at the same time the very bourgeois state form has declared a war against these unleashed utopias (of the working classes).

The internationalized modern police apparatus has been an ideological embodiment of this struggle against socialist utopias, the political as such, to fire them from the field of the political, from its own body. The year of 1848 was significant both for the crisis of socialist utopias and for the starting of a harsh regime of police internationalization. The anti-utopianism of the modern police has further aggravated with the internationalization of the police forces.

The narrowing down of the issue of policing through its professionalization has also meant leaving the questions of “What is good life? What is the best political regime?” aside. Indeed the question of what is the “‘good police’ is concerned with the observance and furtherance of all aspects of public life that affected the population’s happiness” (Deflem, 2002: 35). The arbitrarily chosen new questions have been concerned rather with governing and proceeding ordinances on “regulating the colour of automobiles and the appropriate methods of purchasing fish and fowl” (Fosdick cited in Deflem, 2002: 37).

The modern police form’s partial dependence on the working-classes has made the institution’s intervention to them a problematic issue for the ruling classes. The working classes are co-constitutive with the bourgeoisie of the modern police form and the latter’s envy to tie down the working-classes to the system has been an issue of fierce struggle. Hence, the modern police’s pro-capital efforts have always been a suspect, non-guaranteed issue for the bourgeoisie which had found the remedy in the internationalization of the police.

CHAPTER 4

NEOLIBERAL POLITICS OF POLICE REFORM IN THE POST-SOVIET ERA

In the previous chapter, we have stopped our analysis by the beginning of the 20th century and concluded that by 1789 the police acquire a new form which was defined by the parameters set by the bourgeois state form. Nonetheless, this new police form did not signify a complete break with the past practices of policing, namely with the ancien régime and in the very first historical crisis that the ruling classes had encountered, the revolutionary legacy of the bourgeois state form was degraded and the heritage of the absolutist in policing had resurrected. This represented roughly the period around 1848 and 1871. This tension between the new revolutionary ideology, signifying the idea of “publicness” and the ancien régime’s legacy, usually used as a way to restore the bourgeois class power over the political field has been a basic tension, the basic dialectics of the police, since then. Although this basic dialectics posited by the emergence of the bourgeois state form does not undergo a radical change up until the neoliberal era, the dominant classes’ way of dealing and managing this tension has undergone significant changes during the 20th century. The populist basis of the police apparatuses that was originated from the formation of bourgeois state form and the requirements of the capitalist market (such as the imposition of value form of labour) have been colluding with each other since then, and the analysis of this collusion and with which mechanisms it has been dealt with is the subject matter of a historical analysis.

Indeed, the mechanisms that were produced during the Cold War era to manage this tension do not constitute the main subject matter of this thesis, as also mentioned in the introduction of the dissertation. However, it is also a fact that these mechanisms of the Cold War constitute a basis over which the neoliberal police reforms are introduced. Indeed, one of the main Cold War mechanisms of dealing with this tension was the

establishment of para-military policing apparatuses. Nonetheless, the para-militarization could not have erased the formative power of the working classes over the police apparatuses in the post-Second World War era where the police apparatuses were organized around the notion of public welfare and a bureaucratic police structure that supported this job of welfare had emerged.

The neoliberal era's police reform is in fact another mechanism to deal with that basic tension. However, the difference of the neoliberal era lies in its pushing the limits of the political field, way to much and redefining the separation of the economic and the political to such an extent that the revolutionary legacy of the bourgeois state form and the accompanied composition of the modern political field have become subject to a radical transformation. Will the powerful capitalist classes of the neoliberal era dare to divorce entirely from the bourgeois state form is of course still a matter of ongoing struggle. However, it is the argument of this thesis that there has been a big pressure on that direction and the police reform is a perfect indicator of this pressure, of the growing privatization of the political.

That is why; one of the first tasks of this chapter is to define in broad terms the heritage of the Cold War on the politics of police to deepen the arguments that will be produced in relation to the nature of the neoliberal police reform.

Indeed, by the beginning of the 1990s, the police started to be considered “more comfortable with the *constabulary ethic* than are the military” whose “skills are...less suitable for *the more delicate work of rebuilding civil society*” [italics added] (Linden et al, 2007: 150). That said, police has been associated with the establishment of “peace and prosperity” [reminiscent of the mission of the police state] whereas the military with “the killing job” (Goldsmith and Sheptycki, 2007: 2).

The emergence of this so-called “cosmopolitan or world-society view of policing” (Goldsmith and Sheptycki, 2007: 4) was synchronic with the collapse of the Soviet Union, since which a new practice concerning internal security issues has emerged and

indeed, “[r]ather than being seen *as a necessary evil*, a standing threat to freedom, police [has become] co-producers of a *desirable political order*” [italics added] (Bayley, 2006: 10).

IPO’s police reform has been based on the neoliberal intellectuals’ common wisdom that police are the representatives of the political regimes they are tied with.⁴⁶ Accordingly, police are accepted as the direct bearers of a regime’s characteristics, and to dismantle a regime, police show up would be an ideal candidate. To decompose a regime, decomposing first and foremost one of its dedicated apparatuses has been accepted as a post-Soviet era method of state restructuring. That is why to make out of the ever most statist bodies of states, namely the police apparatuses, *anti-statist forces* has emerged as the core aim of neoliberal politics of police reform:

In post-authoritarian and post-communist countries alike, the dismantling of regime policing and the establishment of democratic policing- policing that is professionally effective, accountable and legitimate- is an indicator of the consolidation of democracy (Caparini and Marenin, 2005: 2).

Therefore, a related neoliberal wisdom underlying the need to restructure the police apparatuses is that “government was too *remote* and *impersonal* to meet the needs of diverse communities” [italics are added] during the welfare state period (Bayley and Shearing, 2001: 25). The bourgeois state form has started to represent an obstacle to governance during the neoliberal era. In fact, the neoliberal intellectuals have promoted

⁴⁶ This thesis has not tackled with the discussion on the relation between regime change and police apparatus transformation until now and does not indeed aim to do so. Nonetheless, the widespread idea that there is a close correlation between the political regimes and the associated police apparatuses is important to understand the neoliberal ideology concerning the issue of the police.

It should also be stated that not every regime change entails a significant change in the police. This is mostly true due to the fact that the power of the international might happen to be far greater than the domestic forces in shaping the police forces. That is to say, if we draw a hierarchical map of the influences on the police apparatus, the international capitalist system’s power exceeds that of domestic forces. The historical times of the police forces and that of the regimes they serve might differ. As explained within the context of the formation of the modern police in Turkey, there is unevenness between the change in the state and the change in the Turkish police apparatus. Similarly, the after-independence police in India is said to bear much of the characteristics of Britain’s colonial system and the sole biggest difference between the pre- and post-independence periods in terms of the structure of the police organization lies in the leave of the foreign police chiefs in the aftermath of the independence (Mawby, 2001: 22).

the idea of minimal state, especially during the 1980s to overcome the crisis of Keynesianism. This demand of minimal state pointed out to the fact that they preferring “the liberty to democracy; the law to bureaucracy and the market to the planning” (Gamble, 1979) since these three were paralyzing the state’s ability to deal with the crises of capitalism (Gamble, 1979). Therefore, the idea of minimal state was deconstructed by the critical analysts of the neoliberal ideology as the need to restructure the state so as to posit it immune from the various implications of class struggle, which could have harmed the expansion of the class power.⁴⁷ Hence, the need to divorce the capitalist state from its historical form crystallized in the 19th century under the impact of bourgeois revolutions arose. Divorcing the capitalist state from its bourgeois form would imply the restoration of a full-blown economic republica since the dissidents (the insubordinate labour) would find nowhere to complain; no political ground to fight against the capital. This search for minimal state during the neoliberal reorganization of the whole state apparatus has resulted in the erection of the mechanism of state-shadowing while dealing with the restructuring of the police apparatuses all around the world. That is why a second task of this chapter is to posit the neoliberal police reform within this broader institutional change that has been occurring within the state.

The panacea to the obstruction which is argued to be caused by the bourgeois state form (containing in itself the legacy of the 19th century revolutionarism, albeit in its own way) has been found by the police reformers in the localization of policing on the basis of community and problem oriented policing (Bayley and Shearing, 2001: 26), which are also entitled as “democratic policing”. That is to say, transferring the point of weight from the state to people is the dominant conventional argument of the police reformers.

To this end, they propose the community policing which “is about integrating the concerns of citizens and communities into every level of policing policy, management

⁴⁷ Some critical thinkers who deconstruct the neoliberal ideology and its operationalization during the state restructuring processes include Harrison G. (2001); Gowan, P., L. Panitch and M. Shaw (2001); Chomsky, N. (1998); Bonefeld, W. (1995); Burnham, P. (1999), etc.

and delivery” (DCAF Backgrounder, 2009: 2). This model includes “effective community engagement- which includes consultation, marketing and communications and public involvement” (DCAF Backgrounder, 2009: 2). Moreover, the neoliberal police reformers argue that the police reform “involves using intelligence collection and analysis to inform decision-making at both the tactical-operational and strategic-corporate level” (DCAF Backgrounder, 2009: 2).

Another determining trait of democratic policing or neoliberal police reform is argued to be the establishment of *accountability to the law* rather than *to the government* (Greener, 2009: 110-120). That is why, it is argued that police reform processes might be hampered by “indigenous elites [who] may see reform as a threat because it limits their opportunities for illicit gain or threatens their cultural norms and values” (DCAF Backgrounder, 2009: 6). This is developed in parallel with another neoliberal argument that “[s]tatism opposes the creation of strong organizational autonomy” since it is based on the assumption that “an effective and impartial police would threaten the power of many politicians or security agencies” (DCAF Backgrounder, 2009: 6) and that is why it aims to diminish “the police to the status of a mere instrument” (Finszter, 2001: 131).

Police, as a state apparatus, has never been a simple tool in the hands of the government. It has always been a very much organized pro-systemic apparatus, attached to the international capitalist system and yet, this call for broader pro-active actorness on the side of *the neoliberals* is an intriguing question to be solved. Why are the police invited to become such a (independent; anti-political) political actor and how does this process contribute in the further privatization of the political in line with the strengthening of the capitalist class power?

Therefore, the utter objective of this chapter is to deconstruct these conventional arguments of the neoliberal reformers and their discourse on police reform through the notions of policiazation, peoplism and the replacement of the notion of legitimacy with the notion of public confidence. Throughout the chapter, frequent references will

be made to the 19th century modern police formation to evaluate the extent of change occurring in the modern police on a class basis. Therefore, the chapter attempts at depicting the main ideological arguments of the IPO on neoliberal policing and reveal the defining traits of the neoliberal police reform agenda. According to the would-be members of the IPO, the latter is based upon “core values” whose validity “is not much of an issue anymore” (Caparini and Marenin, 2005: 3).⁴⁸

In sum, this chapter focuses on the process whereby the police have become “champions of change” in the post-Soviet era. The section which succeeds the heritage of the Cold War era in the politics of police will provide a baseline to understand and analyze this process via conceptual tools developed with the help of (transnational) historical materialism. Indeed, the expansion of capitalist class power during the neoliberal era and the erosion of the working class power will be briefly discussed.

It will be argued that police reforms conducted by the IPO squeezes down the political as such. Hence, there has been a change in where the police apparatus finds itself in the axis of the IPO’s dialectic, which is placed between the pole of bourgeoisie’s direct rule and Bonapartism whereby the bourgeoisie willingly resumes from holding direct political power for the realization of its immediate interests. As the “danger” of the working class movements dissipates by the late 1980s, the IPO has started favoring a more direct rule. To sum up, two key points will be presented during the analysis of the neoliberal police reforms induced by the IPO all over the world:

First, to sustain and consolidate the class power in policing, the IPO induces a series of police reforms all over the world. Indeed, police reform is a way of locking in the class power. Second, the class power in policing is translated into the police reform processes

⁴⁸ It should be mentioned that the IPO is not a homogenous bloc. There is an ongoing process for the development of the IPO’s policing doctrine. Whereas one side is more inclined to work to empower the state (as do most of the UN Missions), the other side is more inclined to work with and through society (as tries to do UNDP). However, for the sake of clarity and sticking to the main aim of delineating the neoliberal police reform agenda, these inner tensions and differences of the IPO will be overlooked.

through two main leading principles: Anti-revolutionarism (which includes both de-Sovietization and the erosion of the legacy of 1789 in the formation of modern police apparatuses) and anti-para-militarism. Anti-para-militarism means to get rid of the usurped police apparatuses of the Cold war era which no longer fill in their promises for the betterment of class power.

4.1 The Heritage of the Cold War Politics of Police

In 1992, “the outspoken and allegedly racist chief of Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) was replaced by Willie Williams, a senior black officer from Philadelphia who was committed to a much more ‘community policing’ style” (Lea and Young, 1993: xxii). And the fact that a racist police chief was suddenly replaced by a black officer by the end of the Cold War was not a mere coincidence but demonstrative of the spirit of the new era concerning police politics. It was first and foremost a response to the crisis that many police apparatuses were undergoing as a result of their becoming over-loaded by the anti-working class fight, and the usurpation in the police institutions was hampering both the police-society relations and the reliability of the police for the ruling classes was becoming a suspect issue.⁴⁹

In fact, the crisis of the police apparatuses, which erupted by the end of 1980s, resulted in a wave of neoliberal change in the underlying logics of policing, especially in advanced capitalist countries, which resulted in the development of a police reform agenda by early 1990s as “a reaction to ...declining public satisfaction and also as a consumerist expression of managerialist policy” (Mawby cited in Newburn, 2003: 87).

⁴⁹ Indeed, by the beginning of 1990s, many class riots were happening around the world, such as Brixton riots of 1981 and 1985, and Los Angeles riot of 1992, which were giving the excuse to the New Right politicians’ to accentuate the military type of policing (Lea and Young, 1993: xxxv-xxxiv). During the miners’ strikes of 1985 in England, police were organized as “menacing teams of officers, unrecognizable in visored, ‘NATO-style’ carsh helmets and fireproof overalls...making search sorties in crowds of fleeing demonstrators for the purpose of arrest...” (Jefferson cites in Newburn, 2003: 86). However, the introduction of military policing was not providing the ruling classes with the necessary tools to overcome these political crises.

Nonetheless, this crisis in policing is only a short-term cause of the police transformation in the post-Soviet era. In fact, the heritage of the Cold War over which a neoliberal police reform is planned does contain two other long-term elements. The first is the not-any-more sustainable paramilitarism which was used as a way of containing both the labour militancy and the communist ideology which was associated with the radical working class movements. These para-military apparatuses were organized by national intelligence agencies and these counter-guerilla organizations were rather tied in directly to some special departments of the national armies organized under the leadership of NATO (Ganser, 2005). Yet of course the establishment of various paramilitary organizations pre-dates the introduction of the NATO to the scene. Indeed, the fact that the seeds of these counter-guerilla forces were planted before their becoming organic instruments of NATO's war against the Soviet Bloc is related with the civil wars that had happened in countries such as Italy, where the supporters of Mussolini were fighting with the anti-fascist forces (Ganser, 2005). With the participation of many countries to NATO, such as Greece in 1952 and others, the counter-guerilla forces that had been erected in these countries against the left were also subsumed under the NATO's fight against the Soviet Union.

However, the paramilitary apparatuses of the capitalist states were not essentially composed of public police apparatuses. On the contrary, the police apparatuses were of lower priority when compared with other counter-guerilla forces in that fight against the left. Except some of particular police departments, such as the department of smuggling and narcotics, the police apparatuses were rather less developed in terms of technical and operational capabilities when compared with these para-military organizations. The prioritization of the some departments of the police apparatuses over the others was done within the context of global prohibition regimes, which have been established since the very early days of the modern police formation. In fact, it is seen that at the beginning of the 20th century, as there was a very tight understanding of state sovereignty, "the internationalization of policing proceeded more rapidly and effectively with respect to counterfeiting than against any other type of criminal

activity” (Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006: 89). In a similar manner, with the establishment of Pax-Americana, by the early 1950s, the issue of narcotics and drug enforcement became “a high-level policy objective in Washington” (Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006: 130). The US had started to be the dominant constituent of the IPO and imposed the global regime of anti-drugs, which inevitably resulted in the strengthening of the narcotics departments of the police apparatuses.

All the more, the public police apparatuses were still representing one of the weaker sides of the capitalist state since they were open to the formative impact of the working class power, still intact during the 1960s and 1970s. Indeed, the police apparatuses were organized in the aftermath of the Second World War around the notion of welfare, which implied that the crime was a social issue which needed the care of the state (Zedner, 2006). The police apparatuses were still under the influence of this legacy of “publicness” dating from the time of the bourgeois revolutions and which in one way or another was reproduced under Keynesianism. By the end of the 1970s, it was clear that two issues related with the police apparatuses were not any more manageable. The first was the politicization of the police apparatuses in tandem with the ever-growing intenseness of the class struggles and the second was the “publicness” as a defining trait of policing politics. But still, this does not mean that the police apparatuses were exempt from the dirty war conducted against the leftists and the communists of the Cold War era. However, for the ruling classes, they were only “the necessary evils” of the capitalist order.

In fact during the Keynesian era, the strength of the working class struggles was determining to the extent that this resulted in the radicalization of the police officers and even caused the Ministry of Interior in England to complain about the militancy of the police officers and to declare in 1975 during Annual Conference of the Police Federation the following words: “you must not make me think I'm dealing with the International Marxists” (Reiner, 1978: 72).

Moreover, during the Keynesian era, the bureaucratic structure of the police apparatus was implying a reliance on the social institutions and agencies to govern the society (O'Malley and Palmer, 1996: 142). In other words, the police apparatus was configured as a responsible state apparatus from the wealth of the whole society. The bureaucracy was signifying the institutionalization of a “welfare problem requiring therapeutic or social-remedial interventions” (O'Malley and Palmer, 1996: 139). The welfare type of professional bureaucracy did also include accountability to the same professional institutional structure, therefore to the modern political field, itself.

However, that headache of the ruling classes concerning the issue of public police apparatuses continued to cause troubles to the smooth expansion of the capitalist class power until the end of Cold War, which had over-determined that headache. That is to say, the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union was a huge blow on the working class struggles all over the world and even more, it meant the emergence of a now disoriented bulk of para-military forces, which should be reintegrated to the system as they started to represent a threat to the smooth rule of capital rather than a favor. Therefore, the end of the Soviet Union facilitated the IPO to generate a comprehensive police reform both to deal with these ex-para-military instruments and to get rid of the “publiqueness” of the police apparatuses, making use of de-Sovietization as an ideological motive for the decomposition of the modern political field, in its bourgeois form. Therefore, this chapter argues that besides this inadequacy of the 1990s' Western police in dealing with class-based reactions, it was the dissolution of the Soviet Union that has triggered the IPO to engineer a new police model in the 1990s.

Nonetheless, de-Sovietization was not just an ideological veil, an instrument of consensus fabrication for the reorganization of the police apparatuses. It was also a real concern for the transnational bourgeoisie as the integration of the ex-communist states to the new world order was an issue of first priority. Therefore, the integration of these ex-communist states to the capitalist world have provided the IPO with a fruitful terrain;

a laboratory for the development of a neoliberal police reform program. In fact, the dismantlement of the ex-communist police apparatuses should be seen as a way of targeting at the revolutionary legacy (of course it refers to what it could have left from the 19th century) contained within the bourgeois state form, which facilitates the working classes to have a say on the formation of state apparatuses.

Therefore, de-Sovietization does not mean to erase the legacy of the Soviet Union-type of policing and yet it does not exclude that agenda altogether from the reform program, as well. De-Sovietization was a historical chance for the neoliberal police reformers since it provided the appropriate conjuncture to develop and refine the main tenets of neoliberalism with respect to the issue of police.

Moreover, the police apparatuses, as they were less usurped than the militaries were within the anti-communist fight of the Cold War and moreover as they were defined by the neoliberal reformers as the proper locus within the state, with whose help they would be able decompose the whole state. That is why, the police apparatuses were declared to be the new “champions of change”, the right leverage over which to attempt at restructuring the whole modern political field. Indeed, it is not a coincidence that police reform is argued to be a “major exercise in state building” in the post-Soviet era (DCAF Backgrounder, 2009: 3).

4.2 Class Power during the Neoliberal Era

Class power in the late 20th century displays a different existence than was the case in the 19th century, the formative century of modern state apparatuses. It is not as much limited as by the working classes whose struggles drove back the policing ambitions of the bourgeoisie in the 19th century. As stated earlier, the state monopoly on organized violence was as much a fruit of the struggles given by the working classes as it was a project of the bourgeoisie, which used this weapon against the landed aristocracy who used to control its own policing apparatuses. In other words, the state monopoly on violence was a result of both inter-class and intra-class struggle. It was not a project

emanating from the lust for more state power. This background shows that any consideration of change in the police apparatus of the modern state should take into consideration the class-based nature of policing issues, which were once tied closely to the class power rather than to the state power.

As opposed to the 19th century, the post-Soviet neoliberal era benefited from the leftist struggles' lean towards *the mean* at all times.⁵⁰ In other words, whereas in the 19th century the radical formative power of the working classes was very determining in the constitution of state apparatuses, i.e. in the formation of modern police, in the late 20th century, this formative power has been subsumed under a politics of self-curtailment. This self-curtailment has led to the establishment of the hegemony of conservative politics and “the restoration of capitalist class power” (Harvey, 2006) with a retreat from this 19th century won right to political field.

The victory of the neoliberal order upraises on the shoulders of the weak socio-political program of the Left in the aftermath of the 1970s capitalist crisis. Although the Left gained wide popular support in the aftermath of the crisis, many leftist parties found the solution to the crisis in the “politics of curbing the aspirations of their own constituencies” (Harvey, 2006:15). This self-destructive politics of the Left was easily converted into a neoliberal attack on “all forms of social solidarity” (Harvey, 2006: 16), including the mass democracy as a socio-political institution. In that sense, the hatred of the “mob”- a characteristic of the late 19th century- which was perceived as barrier to the free operation of capital has revived during the neoliberal period. The class power has consolidated over the shoulders of governance elites, an amalgam of private and public actors (Harvey, 2006).

David Harvey (2006) argues that the restoration of class power during the neoliberal era is caused by the process of “accumulation by dispossession” that has four components: privatization as transfer of public assets, common property rights such as national health

⁵⁰ Leaning towards the mean signifies that the “[t]he revolutionary sting was taken from the social demands of the proletariat, and a democratic cast was given to them” (Marx, 1996: 58).

care to private companies, financialization as “the redistributive activity through speculation, predation, fraud and thievery” (debt) crisis management, and finally state redistributions such as new housing schemes that give way to gentrification or tax deductions for corporate interests. Although Harvey’s depiction of the mechanisms of class power restoration is very much detailed and comprehensive, it should be stated that these mechanisms are not solely based on a constant commodification/marketization of previously non-commodified areas of human life. It has included also an active form-processing of the political field. Privatization does not only mean enhancing profits for the capital but also privatization of the broader elements of the political field.

In that sense, capitalist class power during the neoliberal era is not purely destructive. It is as much generative in the sense that once social movements are reconceptualized as mob activities, the task at hand turns out to be form-processing. Form-processing was a job defined for the state. It is argued by many Marxists rightfully that one should conceive social forms as form-processes. Therefore it is argued that, the capitalist state, as a social form, always reshapes the class struggle. It tries to give different forms to labour under different historical settings (i.e. citizenship) so as to secure the smooth reproduction of capital (Hülagü, 2005). “Inevitably, this reformulation [made by the state] is always a struggle to impose or reimpose certain forms of social relations upon society, to contain social activity within, or channel social activity into those (developing) forms” (Holloway, 1991). However, form-processing cannot be and should not be reduced to the state capacity or state power over the labour. It occurs through class power, as well. That is to say, the state does not exclusively play a role of social integration, enhanced public participation and welfare in the neoliberal era. The capitalist class also does, in its own way. This means that “corporatist institutions have not been abolished but rather maintained and strengthened to implement neo-liberal labour market reform while maintaining social consensus” (Apeldorn, 2001: 82).

This latter orientation of the class power is very much seen in many policy papers written by the representatives of the capitalist class. For example, augmenting the rate of high-skilled people emerges as a first-rank strategy of the 21st century's bourgeoisie. Thus, the formation of a new non-proletarianized pro-capitalist class is aimed out of the ashes of the welfare-state period white-collars. Second, class power sets the terms of 'fitness training that should enable everyone to assume personal responsibility' (Habermas, 1999: 53). Third, people are motivated to be 'studious'. The more you are educated, the better you have the chance of finding a job. The myth of education becomes widespread, an education where different abilities and interests are reshaped and where a uniform knowledge is spread. The Business Management departments of universities constitute a good example to this: "They therefore play an essential role in fuelling new ideas, supporting *entrepreneurial culture* and promoting access to and use of new technologies" (Lisbon Strategy Paper, 2000).

Rather than keeping on with the decommodification strategies of welfare states, higher commodification is favored during the neoliberal period. Indeed, people are seen as primary goods that need to be cultivated and formed according to the needs of the market. Consumption changes aspect. People consume their own abilities. The aim is to make people commodify themselves, willingly. Alienation becomes a conscious act, a decision of survival.

Bieling (2003: 203) states that 'of course, there is no guarantee that [above mentioned policy] papers and declarations have any serious impact'. Hence, class acts also might stay at the level of symbolic politics: lacking in terms of serious effort in order to realize the promised social policies. Yet, "the role of symbols in mobilizing human effort may become more important, and benchmarking can be part of this" (European Roundtable of Industrialists key message cited in Apeldoorn, 2000: 174). Indeed, we can argue that symbolic in concrete terms –lacking concrete reality, to be incremental- metamorphoses itself into symbolic politics which is about the replacement of the real by the unreal. A formal mentality becomes widespread. In other words, the new categorical imperative

of the bourgeois thought during the neoliberal era is the idea of bringing up a generation which takes care of itself without lamenting.

It appears that the restoration of class power is beyond the mere application of the dictates of a neoliberal doctrine. It does not rely on a formal neoliberal model; on the contrary, it does improvise on the very paradoxes of neoliberalism and the possible contradictions that it is imbued with.⁵¹ It is this room of improvisation or freedom from the pressure of acting on the legitimacy ground of the welfare state, which enhances the class power in the neoliberal era.

An important indicator of the expanding class power during the neoliberal era is “the frequent appeal to *legal action*” [Italics added] (Harvey, 2006). The augmentation of class power does concentrate its own power not solely in the executive but also and equally in the judiciary, which does not act as on the basis of social rights but on the basis of individual rights. In that sense, as more and more issues are privatized, the common motto critical of bourgeois separation of public and private, “the personal is political”, is turned upside down as “the political is personal”. The “personal is political” is the motto originated in the second wave of feminism, which was a critique of the liberal idea that “the state should not deal with what occurs within our bedrooms”. The second wave feminists argued that this was a way of keeping the social inequality between the men and women untouched and thus was of a way of giving a tacit approval to that inequality. This critique was also marked by the legacy of the leftist struggles against the idea of inequality since the late 18th century. All the more, the motto of “personal is political” was an attempt to widen the political field, squeezed down by the liberal state ideology. During the neoliberal times, these critiques

⁵¹ A good example of the paradoxes of neoliberalism over which the class power improvises is the neoliberal ideologues perception of modern state and society. On the one hand, neoliberals is afraid of society as the latter always contain the risk of expanding the political as such and organising under utopias. On the other hand, neoliberals are not content with the bourgeois form of state which is seen as the grand-father of the so-called totalitarian tendencies. Both society and state are disdained. Therefore, the ideologues of neoliberalism try to reconcile these two through various ways. Hayek (cited in Gamble, 1979:15) thinks that the trade unions have a social valuable function if we consider their service to friendly societies. However, he rejects that these must perform any role in the raising of absolute wages. Then the solution lies in deconstructing the labour as citizen on the one hand, reconstructing the citizen as a consumer since citizenship is thought to be a defective mechanism on the other.

addressed to the state by the leftist constituency (including of course the second wave feminists) have been used and even exploited by the growing class power, in the fight against the modern bourgeois political field. However, this is done in a very ruse manner. *The class power in the neoliberal period acts over the left's legacy; but by usurping and corrupting it.* This process subsumes *the political as such* into a field of ethics.

Thus, class power acts more on a created ethical field than on the political field. This ethical field is paradoxically closed to any alternative conception of ethics. Indeed, whereas the political field has been historically open to alternative conceptions of justice, as “provocateurs in political movements” (Harvey, 2006), the ethical field does rest on a closed circuit, from where it appears impossible to jump into the political field. The ethical field in the neoliberal era is a field of experience, heteronymous in the sense that it is compounded of a number of experiences which paradoxically aim at showing that individual human beings are dependent and weak creatures.⁵² It is based on a fight for the recognition of everyone’s tragedy and comedy, indeed paradoxically on a conception of the dignity of “everyday life”. However, Lefebvre (cited in Elden, 2004: 119) asks: “*Homo sapiens, homo faber and homo ludens* end up as *homo quotidianus*, but on the way they have lost the very quality of homo; can the *quotidianus* properly be called a man?”⁵³

⁵² The “optimism about flux [flux of life based on non-reducible plural human experiences] is only the reverse side of pessimism about actualities” (Dewey in Posnock, 1991: 109). The belief in flux displays a tacit pessimism that leads into passivity and uncertainty. For tacit pessimists refrain from thinking on concrete political activity, positing a distance between themselves and politics, which is reified to domination. The fact that the political is reduced to domination imprisons human beings into nowhere. That is to say, ethics (*utopos*) that might open up the rigidified categories of life collapse into a nowhere –in the true sense of the word- that refers to nothingness.

⁵³ With the permeation of everyday life by the new dominant ideology, the political field is also subsumed under a self-help security system. For instance, the right to personal armament has turned out to create an average number of 7 to 10 million of guns in use in Turkey (including licensed and unlicensed guns and excluding converted blank guns) [<http://www.umut.org.tr/en/page.aspx?id=1485>]. For a detailed study on the securitization of everyday life see Gambetti (2007).

4.3 The World-Historical Context of Neoliberal Police Reforms

Before presenting how and through which ways the class power in the neoliberal era reproduces itself among the various components of the IPO which do generate a police reform agenda all over the world, it is necessary to discuss briefly some of the important arguments of the literature on the transition to a new police structure during the neoliberal era. In fact, it appears that the transformation that the police apparatuses have been undergoing since the 1980s are never placed within a wider international perspective let alone the issue of post-Soviet order. The criminology literature discusses the police restructuring in the neoliberal era with reference to three main issues: change in the Keynesian-state rationality; changing conception of crime, and the urge for police modernization. These will be presented below and discussed so as to deduce some important insights for the rest of this chapter.

4.3.1 Neoliberal Transformation of Policing Structures: A Brief Literature Review

The question of “Why there is a neoliberal restructuring in the public police?” is answered in the relevant conventional literature on the basis of various non-class based arguments. This subsection will try to overview the main arguments developed in this regard.

The first argument is that of Jones and Newburn (2002: 130) who argue that the transformation thesis in policing literature “tends to overstate the novelty and the ‘epochal’ nature of current modern policing”. Nonetheless, they identify a reason behind the functional shift between different policing bodies (i.e. public and private policing): the decline of secondary social control occupations like bus conductors, railway station masters, train guards, etc. (Jones and Newburn, 2002: 141). This analysis points out to a paradox underlying the neoliberal politics of policing: on the one hand, the community-based control mechanisms associated with the welfare state regress, and on the other hand, police reform during the neoliberal era is based upon

community-policing schemes, where each citizen is induced to become a partaker in policing and intelligence-gathering processes.

According to Pat O'Malley and Darren Palmer (1996: 142), this results from “a shift in *political rationality* from government through social institutions and agencies to government through individuals and their families” [italics added]. In fact, community policing is not a creative project of neoliberal policing. It was an organic part of welfarism in the 1960s and 1970s, and campaigns such as “we care” were targeting “non-criminals- assisting the elderly and children, attending accident victims, comforting the victims of burglaries and so on” (O'Malley and Palmer, 1996: 138). Neoliberal policing practices are, in that sense, fulfilling the previous policing forms with a new essence, and thus pushing the previous forms' legacy to enable a neoliberal politics of policing.

Another move for the neoliberal transformation in policing politics is argued to be a search for a new contract between the police and the public (O'Malley and Palmer, 1996: 146). The weak relations in between the two are put under rehabilitation through “opening up” the police force to the market pressure. Indeed, “audits of various sorts come to replace the trust that social governments invested in professional wisdom and decision and actions of specialists...” (O'Malley and Palmer, 1996: 147). The welfare type of police professionalization differs from the neoliberal type of police professionalization. Whereas in the former, the institutional matrix of the welfare state is used as the author of professionalism, in the latter, various market model bodies emerge as the source of police professionalization. In that sense, neoliberal politics of policing acts on a basis of revenge, revenge from the past practices of social governments in policing, which are believed to erase the power of the localities and individuals, but at the same time, there is great tendency to increase “the autonomy of police managers to act as chief executive officers” (O'Malley and Palmer, 1996: 150). In other words, community based policing promoted by neoliberalism depends on a specific paradoxical but very effective strategy, which can be identified as “embedded

neoliberalism”. The latter is a class strategy that is based on the capitalist classes’ recognition of the social and political dangers emanating from the implementation of neoliberal policies. That is why the capitalist classes attempt at creating methods of social inclusion. For instance, women and older labor force are reincorporated to the capitalist market by the expansion in the service sector. In a similar way, the subordinated classes who cannot anymore determine the form of the police apparatus as they were able to do in the previous eras, both in 19th century and under the Keynesian state are incorporated into the field of policing by methods such as community policing.⁵⁴

An additional approach to the transition to neoliberal policing practices is based on an analysis of changing conceptions of crime by late 1960s. David Garland (1996: 450-451) argues that “[i]n contrast to earlier criminologies, which began from the premise that crime was a deviation from normal civilized conduct, and was explicable in terms of individual pathology...the *new criminologies* [italics added] of everyday life see crime as continuous with normal social interaction and explicable by reference to standard motivational patterns”. This meant that the need for a broader authority to restore the normal behaviour (either by punishment or through rehabilitation as was the case under Keynesian politics) was no more in the agenda. The criminal and the victim have become responsible from looking after the results of this act without recourse to an authority outside the normal course of daily life and this new criminology is translated into new policing practices through “the responsabilization strategy”. This strategy puts people under the responsibility of not only their own security but also of private prosecution of offences and offenders (Garland, 1996: 453). This also facilitates the life for the public police, who are now saved from social goals such as reducing crime rates and start to become responsible only from some internal, institutional goals (Garland, 1996: 458).

⁵⁴ For a discussion on the concept of “embedded neoliberalism”, see Apeldoorn (2001).

Therefore, *new criminologies* are bound to reproduce a police institution, which is *inward looking* and whose dynamism is tied to the faith of struggles ongoing within the institution. Ironically, the so-called outward-looking community-based police of neoliberal era are destined to create a more authoritarian police institution, inclined towards *inner-institutional struggles*. The reformed police apparatus limits the range of abilities akin to the political field and thus “[s]tate sovereignty over crime has thus been simultaneously denied and symbolically reasserted” (Garland, 1996: 462). This crisis-prone situation leads in an indirect manner to the expansion of class power. All the gaps left by state power are fulfilled in by direct class power.

A different view on the roots of neoliberal politics of policing is advanced both by Robert Reiner (2005) and Pat O’Malley (2005). The insistence on police reform during the neoliberal era is theorized as an attempt for the modernization of the police apparatus. Reiner (2005: 690) argues that “[t]he style of the contemporary chief correspondingly changed from bobby to bureaucrat”. In a similar manner, O’Malley (2005) argues that “...some of the changes now being attributed to postmodern influences- such as that concerned with commodification of police service- are intelligible not as the impact of postmodernity on modernist organization but more plausibly as the effect of managerially led efforts to turn the police into a modern institution”. This argument which implies that there is a need to “modernize” police forces in the midst of an era where neoliberalism asks for a restructuring in the very modern nature of the bourgeois state form requires wider problematization as it goes to the heart of the issue.

4.3.2 The Issue of Police Modernization under Neoliberalism

First, the modernization stance does strengthen the view that the historical time of the police apparatus is different from other state institutions, and neoliberal politics in policing target a professional police organization, a task which could not be achieved before due to the hitherto weakness of the bourgeoisie vis-à-vis the working classes. In other words, the paradoxical nature of new (modern) police, which has been subject to

the tension between the *ancien régime* and the modern political field poles of the dialectic, has always been a problem for the ruling classes, and it is now an appropriate time to correct this. Indeed, the modern police apparatus is a unity-in-contradiction. The neoliberal rationalization of the modern police should be read as an attempt to change the locus of police power from this age-old paradox to another one. In neoliberalism, the modern political field is replaced with the field of ethics and thereby the class power targets at the core of the basic dialectics that define the modern police apparatus and aims at re-defining it by removing the pole of the modern political field from that unity-in-contraction.

The basic mentality of police reforms is based upon this notion of uneven modernization of police forces. It is argued that the police apparatus is subject to corruption due to dependence on patronage relations and because of the lack of institutionalized forms of accountability (Hinton and Newburn, 2009: 15). It is argued that concentration of power in the executive creates problems for the police oversight and accountability. Yet, the whole point of neoliberal reform in the state structure can be listed as:

the subordination of the legislative branch to the executive, the abolition of the separation of powers, the rise of the administrative-bureaucratic state, the crisis of the rule of law...the decline of publicity and the formation of hidden centers of power... the crisis of political representation, the failure of the dominant mass parties to fulfill their traditional roles, and the significant accentuation of state repression (Kalyvas, 2002: 124).

This paradox stemming from the uneven development of police apparatus with respect to the broader institutional matrix of the state, the demand for the completion of modernization of the police forces whereas other state apparatuses are undergoing a fight with the bourgeois state form/modern state is illuminating to understand the defining traits of neoliberalism in police reform: *an interest in the legislative power rather than in the executive, understood as “vote”*. As Kalyvas (2002: 128) argues:

[T]he main function of the rule of law and legality is not to conceal state violence as it used to be; it is rather, to provide the necessary semantic, normative, and institutional framework for its full expression and exercise. In contemporary liberal-capitalist societies, organized state

oppression is not located below, next to, or against the law. It does not hide itself behind a veil of secrecy, nor does it represent an exceptional, extralegal moment of bourgeois hegemony. It exists mainly and in the law. ..Precisely because it is a legal form of violence, it manifests itself proudly in the light of day. The violence of the rule of law represents the normal situation of the contemporary liberal capitalist-state.

Therefore, it should be said that the hint to understand the neoliberal turn in police is hidden in the following words: “Frustration with the courts strain police performance and distort police attitudes. Police officers may feel compelled to take the law into their own hands and beat out confessions from suspects...” (cited in Hinton and Newburn, 2009: 16). Hence, the quest for police modernization under neoliberalism is appended to a critique of the judicial system or to a critique of the dominant logic underlying law enforcement. It results from such a point that the modernization of the police under neoliberal spirit does mean not a return of *police justice* powers back to where it belongs, to the judiciary system; but a quest for the perfectization of that police justice. The modernization outlook in the police reform turns out to be an attempt to make up of the police apparatus a professional body of prosecution; decision on the punishment and execution. That is to say, the separation between the police powers and the judiciary is quite blurred in the neoliberal modernization quests. Therefore the extra-judicial implementations of the police could have been easily reformulated as the justice brought by the police. To make the police “champions of change” necessitates removing from it the weight of the past injustices committed by the police apparatuses (i.e. the degeneration of public-police relations in the aftermath of the 1980s’s New Right politics of policing) and make as if they were caused because of the dysfunctional judiciaries. Accordingly, the neoliberal police modernization is an attempt to renovate the public image of the police, while augmenting its punitive powers.

Despite the persistent search for rationalization and modernization of the police forces under police reforms, the *personalistic rule* is reintroduced by the IPO over the assignment of big responsibility to police managers in leading the rank-and-file during the police reform processes. There are even international standards for civilian police forces about the ratio of supervisors/managers to rank-and-file. It is posited nearly as 1 to 1.3 and 1.5 (Bayley cited in Goldsmith et al. 2007: 82). Although it is recognized by

the police intellectuals that reaching to such a standard does not mean further amelioration of policing practices, they argue that “it is easier to change the behavior of police officers by telling them what to do than by telling them how to think. [Police] *managers can control behavior and that is what matters*” [italics added] (Marenin, 2007: 189). Without a doubt, this is not a change or reform at all but rather the fortification of a very much established organizational police tradition. The class in the neoliberal era wants its *Fouchés* back.⁵⁵

On the opposite side, it is also true that neoliberal policing models encourages devolving discretionary power to localities, including the front line officers and yet “[t]his approach contrasts with previous professional attempts to manage, direct and limit police power and discretion through bureaucracy, regulation and close supervision” (Murphy, 2007: 252). Hence, replacing bureaucratic type of professional policing with neoliberal policing model points to a radical change in the notion of rationalization/modernization, which has for long been associated with the bourgeois state form. The previous professional policing model is disdained as being authoritarian and anti-democratic (Murphy, 2007: 256), and that is why it is replaced by neoliberal policing. But, the modernization requirements upon which the neoliberal police reform stands should not be taken at face value.

For instance, various external mechanisms of oversight established to control the police organization, which are closely tied to the community based policing ideology, externalizes the governance of the police as opposed to the applications of professional policing, whereby the internal control and professional values and principles rule (Murphy, 2007: 254). The externalization of the police governance risks at

⁵⁵ Joseph Fouché is a famous police of Napoleon, whose fate is summed as: “In the three years following his appointment as Minister of General Police in the summer of 1799, Fouché’s reputation for police efficiency grew so rapidly that he appeared to threaten Bonaparte’s hold on power. Therefore, when the First Consul transformed the regime into a personal dictatorship in the summer of 1802, he removed Fouché from power by disbanding the entire police ministry. After a two-year hiatus, during which the Cadoudal- Pichegru conspiracy revealed the regime’s continuing vulnerability, the newly proclaimed Emperor restored both Fouché and the Ministry of General Police in July 1804” (Brown, 2006: 37).

reempowering local politics and paradoxically police's involvement in partisan politics (Murphy, 2007: 254). That is why neoliberal mode of modernization is indeed the modernization of class power on the security apparatuses of the state.

However, class power, which assigned the monopoly of physical violence to the state roughly in the beginning of 20th century, has been inexperienced in the organization of policing since then. Its latest memory of holding a security apparatus dates back to the mid-19th century private policing firms such as Bow Street Runners or Thames River Police. Despite these though the neoliberal police reform is a reinvigoration of the bourgeois memories, both a result and cause of the awakening of the bourgeois consciousness concerning the police apparatus.

4.3.3 Police Culture as the Passionate Idea of the IPO

Although there are more historical and structural reasons for the uneven historical time of the police apparatus, the *modernization* perspective does not solely rest on a precarious class consciousness that aims at a massive change in the 19th century's legacy of the public police. It is based also on an obsessive belief on *police culture* as the main determining factor of the police force's failure to become more effective in policing. A type of orientalism is reproduced here, whereby an essentialist account of police sub-culture becomes the main pretext of neoliberal reformers while explaining the failure of police reforms. For instance, a United Kingdom based international NGO, Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative tries to assess the situation of Kenyan police by blaming the current situation on the police's colonial birth. According to their assessment, the police's historical and cultural legacy ensures that "illegitimate political interference is embedded in its culture" (Hills, 2009: 247).

Hence, another feature of neoliberal police reforms is the *absurdity* created by the emphasis upon the notion of corruption.⁵⁶ Corruption is seen both as a motive for and a reason of the police reform failure (Hinton, 2009: 229-230). Therefore, transnational police community reformers ask for a more *decentralized* police force (Hinton, 2009: 223). However, in Brazil for instance, militia groups composed of police personnel and other security sector members “impose extraordinary protection ‘taxes’ on slum residents in addition to changing illegal user rights for alternate transport and poached electrical connections” (Hinton, 2009: 219). Hence, the principle of decentralization and localization is already at play in places whereby transnational community of police reformers asks for police reform on the basis of a myth of a lack of police-public connection and corrupt police sub-culture.

Furthermore, the issue of business-police relations makes up of the issue of corruption the Gordian knot for police reform. On one side of the coin, the paramilitary organizations, composed of police who are directly tied to some business groups involved in drug trafficking, constitute the major target of police reform (Hinton, 2009: 219). On the other side, the East African Police Chief’s Cooperation organization supports the “Eastern Africa Anti-Illicit Trade” Workshop, organized by the British American Tobacco in Uganda in November 2005 (Hills, 2009: 250). Thus, the growth of class power in the neoliberal era either through formal or informal ways pushes the reformers to concentrate more on an essentialist view of the problems perceived in police apparatuses. The growing class power does not only empower the reformers, as an instrumentalist logic would tell, but also restrains both their creativities and ideologies. The structural power of capital and capitalists leads their organic intellectuals *to talk nonsense* in the first sense of the word.

⁵⁶ It should be stated that corruption represents the most obstinate factor preventing the harmonization of national police organizations along the lines depicted by IPO’s reforms. Nadelmann (1993: 311) argues that “[g]overnments can change their laws to better accord with US preferences and *modi operandi*, and foreign law enforcement agencies can adapt US approaches to criminal investigation, but there is little the US government can do on to undermine the temptations presented by drug trafficker bribes and threats”. Hence, corruption is a kind of resistance to core states’ hegemony. It is perceived as a rival institution to the strategic interests of the hegemons. This is a question of power rather than culture.

A final note on the issue of corruption as the main terrain of struggle for police reformers is that the IPO proposes a solution to this issue through the “selection of less vulnerable officers” (OSCE’s Guide on Democratic Policing, 2008: 23). Indeed, those with bad financial backgrounds are targeted as potential corrupts. A very reactionary view of the cause of crime –the idea that the poor are more akin to be criminals than the rich- is again at work here. The analysis of police officers’ financial assets is identified as a main method for corruption prevention. It can be argued that the growing class power in era of neoliberal police reform is translated into the very famous liberal idea that there is a positive correlation between personal wealth and democratic behavior. Bayley (2006: 64) argues that “[i]n Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1996, the United Nations International Police Task Force tried to encourage democratic practices among police officers that did not have belts to hold up their trousers”. This is, indeed, another version of the belief in a close relation between poverty and criminality.

This obsession with the police culture as the focus of neoliberal reform programs posits the issue of training as the first mechanism of change. Training has become a market sector, in which many internationalized state and international non-state organizations as well as members of the transnational policing community and several academics sell their knowledge to local police/state departments. However, the problem is not limited to the commercialization of this sector. The problem is covered in these words: “[i]nternational organizations love to do training in drug trafficking..... We don’t need training in drug trafficking. We need training in how to solve social conflicts...” (One former senior policeman from Kyrgyz police quoted in Brogden, 2005: 71). First, this displays one of the characteristics of neoliberal training form: a comedy. Second, it shows to what extent the police reform is related with the requirements of transnational class power rather than with local needs.

However, this second critique stands in a razor’s edge since the interest of the transnational community in the local is not pure hypocrisy. On the contrary, the local is exploited by the same transnational community. For example, at an Abu Dhabi

conference (February 19, 2000), experts from Arab countries, Singapore, Taiwan, France, Britain, the United States, and Canada recommended the implementation of COP [community policing] within *Sharia* and *local cultural values* to reduce crime (Brogden, 2005: 72). In fact “the localization does not simply determine the site of delivery, but rather the nature and the content of service delivery” (O’Malley and Palmer, 1999: 142). In other words, the IPO advises to integrate the social control mechanisms (such as religious rules or traditional and even feudal/patriarchal habits) into the reorganization processes of the police apparatuses.

Finally, this neoliberal training form is argued to be a comedy since it resonates the tragedy of past colonial practices of policing. An example would be: “Bulgarian officers came to London to observe the policing of Afro-Caribbean and Bangladeshi communities- apparently on the assumption that they were the nearest peoples that Britain could find to the Bulgarian Roma” (Brogden, 2005: 72).⁵⁷

4.4 Two Pledges of the IPO in the Neoliberal Era: Anti-Revolutionary and Anti-Paramilitary

Class power is translated into the area of police transformation in neoliberalism through two themes. These are first the aspiration to erase the legacy of revolutionarism from the police apparatus’ form, and the other is the need to get rid of the para-military apparatuses of the Cold War era which were giving harm to the New Right’s new order either by falling outside the proper state control or by becoming special apparatuses of a specific bloc of the domestic ruling classes. Or simply put, they were presenting the “old elites” that should be removed from the political power (Bigo, 2005). How can one deduce all these from the proceedings of the IPO?

⁵⁷ In fact, this so-called democracy bearer community policing model of the neoliberal era is now incorporated into the counter-terrorism strategies of many states, the US being the forerunner. The US Department of Border and Transportation Security states that “[t]he community policing philosophy is an important resource for preparing for and responding to acts of terrorism” (cited in Ellison, 2007: 208). This will be exemplified in the chapter on the Turkish case.

The main reason cited by the IPO behind the police reform trials is the attainment of public confidence in the police as a “prerequisite for achieving acceptance of the state’s monopoly of force and forestalling vigilantism” (OSCE Report on South-Eastern Europe, 2008: 9). Hence, the need to rationalize the police to sustain either the state or the state building processes is mentioned as the main stimulus behind the police reforms induced by the IPO.

Nonetheless, the state monopoly of force here is not used to denote a state providing universal security service as it used to mean during the late 19th century in response to the struggles of the working classes. Indeed, the state monopoly of force is transmuted during the neoliberal era into a concept of fight against organized crime. The assassination of the then Prime Minister of Serbia Djindjic, a post-Soviet pro-European leader in 2003 is a symbolic moment for the IPO’s transmutation of the concept of state monopoly to a war against organized crime (organized used in the sense of organized by the old guards of the state). After the assassination, both the IPO and the Serbian government resolved that the old security apparatuses were still powerful and loyal to the communist era’s legacy and “a massive police operation, codenamed ‘Sabre’ took place during the 40-days long state of emergency [which] led to the arrest of more than 11.665 people ” and “the focus of the international community shifted towards the ‘control paradigm of policing’ such as the fight against organized crime” (Stojanovic and Downes, 2009: 86-90).

It has to be however recognized that this problem is in fact a product of age-old strategies to manage police power by the IPO. In the 19th century, the maintenance of the newly emerging international order comes to the fore as the main motivation behind the empowerment of the states through remaking their police power. The internationalization of the 19th century states meant the creation of a police force which had managed to struggle with its own form while fighting against the working classes. Nonetheless, once the police force gained superiority over its own form, new irreparable damages such as the overextension of the police power arose.

As damaged as such, there appears to be no guarantee for the capitalist class power to stay in health. On the one hand class power of the capitalists augments as a result of the internationalization of the police who fight with its own form most operative in national contexts, on the other hand there emerges the risk that such an authoritarian type of police might give equal harm to the class power while fortifying its backyard. Hence, curbing the power of working classes has paradoxically resulted in a dangerous situation for the capitalist class power especially when different state apparatuses, but most crucially the coercive ones that contributed to this weakening start to higher their voices.

The internationalization of the police since the 19th century and concomitant changes in its form, or namely its self-annihilative commitment made the modern police regress so back that there has emerged a police reform during the neoliberal era not solely to find new ways of social control and discipline as argued by many scholars of governmentality but as much for containing the Frankenstein created on behalf of the capitalist class power. Therefore, the need for rationalization/modernization of the police forces to sustain the capitalist class power emerges especially in countries where a fierce struggle has been conducted under the ideology of anti-communism during the Cold War as this struggle gave confidence to those who actively took part in it.

Hence, the rationalization of police forces in the capitalist countries and the police reform in post-socialist states in the 1990s have had differing logics. Whereas in the capitalist countries the police reform has aimed at the containment and curtailment of the power of Frankenstein, in the post-socialist states the aim has been to restore a police force, which is able to fight with its own form dating from the socialist times. However, both processes are intertwined as they have been feeding each other in terms of the strategies and tactics of reform making as will be discussed in the coming pages.

Thus, the IPO in the neoliberal era has two pledges: one anti-revolutionary and the other anti-para-military or anti-counter-guerilla. The first aims at eradicating the legacy of

1789 in policing, and the other of the remnants of Cold War paramilitary police apparatus, now violating even the class power of capitalists.

4.4.1 IPO's Politics of Police Reform under the Shadow of Soviet Legacy

This subsection is core to understand the politics of police reform during the neoliberal era as it argues that the neoliberal politics of police reform cannot be conceived without reference to the fierce struggle conducted against the legacy of Soviet Union in the sphere of policing. Three themes will be touched upon to demonstrate this argument. The first is that the neoliberal police reforms were initiated first and foremost in the post-Soviet states as a strategy to manage regime transition in these countries. It has been therefore an issue of anti-communism. Secondly, the legacy of the Soviet Union in the policing era is not completely negated but sublated in the new policing structure as long as they help to promote the neoliberal ideology. The community-policing issue emerges here as a perfect example. Thirdly and finally, the neoliberal police reform has caused a paradigmatic change in these countries' police training, crime and law mentality for it has comprised change towards *the privatization of security*, which emerges as a way to reshape the police apparatuses in the neoliberal era.

It is not by coincidence that a clear formulation of the need for a police reform happens to emerge by the early 1990s. In fact, even the total increase in the US foreign police assistance programs' costs (which includes the Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets Support Act of 1992, and the Support for East European Democracy Act in 1989) from \$147.7 million in 1993 to \$1.2 billion in 2004 (Bayley, 2006: 41) shows the importance of the post-Soviet world in the making of police reform programs.

To start with, a good example indicating the direction of the post-Soviet IPO practices in the ex-communist sphere is the "Safety Bear" costume prepared by the USA's main body responsible from post-Cold War police restructuring, International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), for police officers visiting

schools. This method to start the police reform with the kids cannot be seen as a side-issue as it is argued to be “vastly popular and ... a dramatic demonstration of the new orientation of the former- Yugoslavian police” and has been later imitated in different countries and contexts in order to initiate the police reform process (Bayley, 2006: 60).⁵⁸ This so-called public relations work generated by the IPO is not solely a symbolic work. It denotes an attempt at degrading the communist experience in policing by way of presenting it as if it was totally separated from the masses and subject to the political policing aspirations of the Yugoslavian “elite”. Whatever the real characteristics of the communist experience, the reform agenda aims at producing a specific make-believe” picture of it through the engine of the most basic ideological mechanism, false consciousness.

In the meantime, the legal-theoretical training base of the police officers in the Soviet successor states is presented as an obstacle to “effective management techniques” (Caparini and Marenin, 2005: 8). The fact that “[p]olice officers applying for management training at the National Academy of Internal Affairs in Kyiv, for example, are required to have a law degree” (Caparini and Marenin, 2005: 8) is presented as an anomaly. That is why there emerges a quasi-exaggerated neoliberal focus on police training. The issue of training in practical issues formulated in opposition to *theoretical issues related with law* can be conceived as a process of dis-indoctrination to erase the Soviet doctrine in policing. Cooper (1996:9) claims that “[a] significant issue among those concerned with crime fighting, particularly in the East [Germany], was how to ‘teach’ the principles of democratic policing to officers trained in an undemocratic system”. This issue of training has reached its zenith by the building up of an academy

⁵⁸ In Turkey, one of the publications of the pro-reform police officers and intellectuals in Turkey, IPA (June, 2008) Turkey, announced the launching of a campaign conducted through mascots called as “Polis-can and Polis-canan” to make popular the new Turkish police among the kids. It is argued by Önder Aytaç (2008: 8), the chief editor of the IPA magazine and columnist in the Taraf newspaper that “[I]t is a huge project. In every house, there will be a police-can/ polis-canan side by side with the kids inşallah!”

in Budapest in 1995 by the US to coordinate Western police reform initiatives.⁵⁹ The post-Soviet configuration of the police forces has been as crucial for the European Union as has it been for the USA.⁶⁰

It also appears that there had already been pro-police reform police officers engaged in the dismantlement of the socialist regime. For instance, it is argued that in Hungary,

[t]he police wanted to be rid of party control: high-ranking police officers were not happy with the priority given to state security and the arrogant sense of superiority it epitomized. Political expediency was replaced by the principles of professionalism, organizational independence, and decentralization of the police, all of which were in direct opposition to party control (Köszeg, 2001: 1).

Hence, the causes of corruption, overextended use of prerogatives, inefficiency, and clientalism in post-socialist police apparatuses are associated with the Soviet system. Beck (2009: 58) argues that “despite the collapse of the Soviet regime, much of this system continues to exist in one guise or another”.⁶¹ In another text, the policing legacy

⁵⁹ The IPO in policing in the neoliberal era is heavily involved in the implementation of *Police Academy* projects. Establishment of police training academies and training in areas such as community-based policing is directly related with managing the *transitions to new regimes*, “including charging some former leaders with criminal offences ...” [italic added] (Goldsmith and Sheptycki, 2007: 17).

⁶⁰ “What is the actual state of the police forces in Central and Eastern Europe? To what extent have they left their democratic past behind, and how much of it have they preserved? ...What does civil control of the police mean? To what extent does the government or the elected local authority control the police-how independent are the police, even from the government... These questions are of no less importance to European integration than the issues of the capacity of highways or the free flow of capital and labour” (Köszeg, 2001: 6). The issue of police reform, conceived as the internal reconfiguration of the police forces, has been introduced into the EU’s agenda by the Helsinki Foundation which is made up of the “delegates from some fifty human rights’ organizations from Central and Eastern Europe [who] participated in a seminar in Oxford organized by the Ford Foundation and the Constitutional and Legal Policy Institute (COLPI)- a Budapest based organization of the Soros Foundation engaged in legal research...” (Köszeg, 2001:6). This process had resulted in Budapest Recommendations, which can be accepted as one of the founding texts of IPO’s police reform projects.

⁶¹ Even though the Soviet System is put under attack through the new police reform, it is also a recognized fact that the police reform has been occurring not in and through socialist police organizations but rather in and through already decomposed police organizations. In fact, in the book entitled *Police in Transition* edited as a result of the efforts of Hungarian Helsinki Committee, it is stated that “[i]n many post-socialist countries- including Hungary- processes are ongoing which in some respects point back to pre-totalitarian, sometimes even to pre-police state systems of government, but it is obvious that some police institutions are worse now than before the political change” (Szikinger, 2001: 18).

of the Soviet regime is presented as indeed a form of “Continental model” (Shelley, 1999). Interestingly hence the disdain of communist policing has been linked to the disdain of Continental policing practices. The discourse that Anglo-American model of policing represents the anti-thesis of the Continental tradition reappears in the scene of world history. Blurring the lines between the continental type of policing and communist type of policing (which are in reality depending on two different class rationales) has been one of the strategies of the IPO, which in this way broadens its own room of manoeuvre by becoming capable of delegitimizing the working mentality of whichever state’s police force it wants to transform.⁶²

One of the problems the IPO associates with the Soviet-era police is explained by the argument that most of the police officers were indoctrinated party members under centralized tutelage, and their discretionary power were restricted and undeveloped (Caparini and Marenin, 2005: 4). Moreover, the low rates of crime reported by the socialist states are argued to occur because of the “officials” who “tended to actively discourage the reporting of crime” and who used “psychiatric evaluations for unsocialist thoughts and acts” (Caparini and Marenin, 2005: 4). Nonetheless, some other scholars question without recurring to slanderous arguments that “Can any police service or force hope ever to *win the fight against crime, rather than to manage the crime problems* they face by working with the broader policing family- including the general public? This aim itself is evocative of a Soviet approach...” [italics added] (Beck, 2009: 65) and this Soviet approach does not fit in the *new criminologies* of the neoliberal era. That is also why one of the first and immediate jobs defined for post-socialist states was to redefine crimes so as to remove any positive references to socialist rule of law (Caparini and Marenin, 2005: 5).

⁶² This can also be observed in the case of police transformation in Turkey. Despite the fact that Turkey was in no way part of the Soviet system of policing, the discourse of “communist state” and/ or “Soviet state” is used as a way of denigrating Turkey’s state structure. For example, Mehmet Kamış, a columnist in the Zaman daily newspaper, wrote that whereas it was very difficult to alter the *status quo* in Turkey which had been among the latest ones to sustain the Soviet tradition, Turkey had been undergoing a great transformation. He added that the Glasnost and Perestroika processes that Russia had underwent 20 years ago was occurring by then in Turkey albeit in different ways (Zaman, 07.04.2010). Similarly, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan makes frequent references to the “communist mindset” prevailing in Turkey in his speeches.

An example from East Germany might illuminate the demand for change in the crime system of the post-socialist countries even much long before asking for a through police reform. Both in the western and eastern parts of Germany, the practice of occupying and living in empty buildings by young people, called “squatting”, had been taking place before unification.

Until unification, the East Berlin police generally left the squatters alone, occasionally even protecting them when they came under attack by violent right-wing soccer fans and neo-Nazis. But in November 1990, following unification, the West Berlin government decided to use its extended police power over the eastern part of the city to force the squatters out (Cooper, 1996: 11).

Thus, a complete change of conception of people’s rights has underlined the change in policing practices in the 1990s.

Of course there has been a real change in the type of crimes in East Germany stimulated by unification, which meant the intrusion of capitalist type of social relations into the country. Yet, the Eastern police were claiming that they were not equipped to deal with these types of crimes and that the purge of the many former regime’s police officers from the force further downgraded their ability to have a control over criminal problems (Cooper, 1996). Thus, the transition processes from socialism to capitalism created a spiraling effect for the police reform. The more the previous regime was targeted as the cause of the problems in policing, the more the transition period resulted in a vacuum of power, and the more the transition processes resulted in chaos, the more the quest for police reform came to the fore of the political agendas.

On the other hand, it is also recognized that despite the “comparatively low rates under communism crime rates in societies in transition may be rapidly catching up with those in the West and for some offences may actually have overtaken them” (Mawby, 2001: 29). Hence, another discourse accompanies ‘the unreported or distorted crime rates in socialist countries’ discourse: there is a normal or accepted level of crime, represented by the crime rates in the West. It is not surprising then to hear that “[f]or the average [East German] police officer, this absence of violent crime meant that he or she rarely

confronted the situations faced by policemen in any large Western city. The fall of the Wall would change this literally overnight” (Cooper, 1996: 5).

This process appears to teach to the IPO many new strategies, one being to leave aside many practices that resonate with the colonial experiences (indeed, East Germans were feeling to be under a sort of colonial power when after the fall of the Wall, West German police started to control their streets (Cooper, 1996)), and develop some new ones such as community policing, which, at least in appearance, promises to involve local people and police into the reform process.

Ironically however, community based type of policing was already a very developed feature of the Soviet system, and the panacea to corruption in the post-Soviet states are advised to be found in community policing model of neoliberal politics. Of course, the two are not the same; the latter is a negation of the former, albeit using the very same form of policing. For instance, during the 1970s in Yugoslavia, there was a self management system whereby, “the freedom of local communities to appoint their local police chief” (Stojanovic and Downer, 2009: 76) was established as a principle of the community-based policing. Today’s depiction of community involvement in policing is restricted to a personal responsabilization strategy through which police officers aim at acquiring as much intelligence as possible from the local inhabitants. This inclusion of the past progressive habits of policing to neoliberal police reform is part of the neoliberal class strategy which alights on the leftist ideology by using it in a perverted manner.

The most important difference of the neoliberal type of community policing from the legacy of communism is that the former is not interested in the improvement of political field for broader public participation but rather with a colonial understanding of *the political as such* based on *the arithmetic of the political*. In fact, “community policing pilot programmes were initiated and efforts were made to improve the representation of

women and different ethnic groups within the police” (Stojanovic and Downes, 2009: 85).

Police reform recommendations by the IPO include the restructuring of Ministry of Interior (MoI). This restructuring is mainly based on the development of “modern human resources system” in MoI. Accordingly, a kind of demographic mathematics constitutes the core of the modern human resources system where, for instance, “[t]he composition was to be multi-ethnic, with at least nine per cent Serbian officers and seven per cent of officers belonging to other minorities. Twenty per cent of the officers were to be women” (OSCE Report on Southeastern Europe, 2008: 11). This counting with respect to the composition of the population in the country subject to police reform induced by the IPO is a neoliberal reproduction of “the dialectic of enlightenment”.⁶³ Those who are at war with the modern political field, the child of modern bourgeois revolutions are making use of it in its most denigrated form to produce a crude arithmetic of the political.⁶⁴

The issue of representation or participation in the political field is reduced to percentages and numbers. The anti-revolutionary/anti-socialist pledges of the IPO are translated into the field of police reform through the calculation of people in detail.

⁶³ Horkheimer and Adorno (2002: 4) tell in the first pages of the “Dialectic of Enlightenment that “[t]he mythologizing equation of Forms with numbers in Plato's last writings expresses the longing of all demythologizing: number became enlightenment's canon. The same equations govern bourgeois justice and commodity exchange. ‘Is not the rule, *‘Si inaequalibus aequalia addas, omnia erunt inaequalia*: [If you add like to unlike you will always end up with unlike] an axiom of justice as well as of mathematics? And is there not a true coincidence between commutative and distributive justice, and arithmetical and geometrical proportion?’ *Bourgeois society is ruled by equivalence. It makes dissimilar things comparable by reducing them to abstract quantities*” [italics added]. Therefore, the neoliberal police reform is an attempt to trace this legacy of the bourgeois mode of thinking to the neoliberal era, without giving any chance to the other side of the dialectic, the Copernican Revolution of Kant. Hence, *police form of the neoliberal era is the fight of the bourgeoisie against its own past*, as much as a fight against the working classes of the 21st century.

⁶⁴ The new recruitment strategies defined by the IPO during police reform programs, however, result in a stalemate for the reformers themselves. This is now recognized by some members of IPO as a result of experiences where “recruitment is treated as a job-creation scheme for ex-combatants (Liberia), as an enticement for minority buy-in to a peace process (Bosnia), or as a political indicator (Iraq)” (DCAF Backgrounder on Police Reform, 2009: 6).

Moreover, this arithmetic is proposed as a way of confidence building. It is argued by the representatives of transnational police reformers that “[w]ithout this trust the public will not be willing to report crimes and provide the police with the information needed to work successfully” (OSCE’s Guidebook on Democratic Policing, 2008: 17). Thus, designing the police apparatus in line with population rates of different ethnic groups is also planned as a method of intelligence gathering.

The dismantling of the old socialist regimes and the concomitant police reforms in these societies have resulted in a private security firm boom whose personnel is mainly composed of previous regimes’ police and army officials. By the late 1990s and early 2000s, in Hungary, there have been more than 60.000 private security officers whereas the number of police officers was about 42.000 (Finszter, 2001: 146). And this new sector is even said to be “more numerous, better armed and equipped and more visible than the state police sector, and it offers both legal and criminal services” (Caparini and Marenin, 2005: 10). However, it is also a fact that in ex-communist countries the privatization of policing was a major actor of the process where “[t]he effectiveness of policing and its legitimacy deteriorated as Serbia exited from communism and as it moved in the direction of an illiberal democracy” Stojanovic and Downes (2009: 78).

Nonetheless, in comparison with the non-para-militarisation of the security agenda, the privatization of security has not been solely a reactionary response of the IPO to the heritage of the Col War in policing. It has been indeed designed as a good practice, the mentality of which should reform the new police apparatuses. In other words, the privatization of security in neoliberalism appears not as a result of a situation where the Cold War era anti-communist state finds itself “in the situation of ‘the sorcerer who is no longer able to control the powers of [a] nether world... [that] he has called up by his spells’” (Marx and Engels cited in Huggins, 1998: 22). But rather, it is one of the main determinants, an essential constituent of the field of coercion, upon whose spells the public police will take shape.

4.4.1.1 Private Security as a Role Model for New Police Apparatuses⁶⁵

Private security firms were in the 19th century one of the founders of the IPO. They have continued to be so in the late 20th and early 21st centuries that they provide an ideological setting for the police reform programs. First, they represent the direct powers the capitalists possess in the shaping of the transnational security field. They underline that business principles, if applied to public police apparatuses, would reform them in the exact manner the IPO aspire to. Second, they argue for and remind the creativity of bourgeoisie in the making of security apparatuses, as was the case during the mid-19th century police reform in England. Finally and the most important factor for the argument of this thesis is that they are presented by the IPO as the concrete and correct form that the police apparatuses have to acquire for the modern state form is an obstruction to neoliberal governance. Therefore, they set an example for the police apparatuses in the midst of a reform process. Examining the direct involvement of the capitalist class in the police reform processes in this subsection will also mean providing an anatomy of the IPO in the neoliberal era.

A coordinated and voluntary involvement of the capitalist class members in the restructuring of police organizations first happened in Mandela's South Africa. A "Business against Crime" (BAC) project was founded with the coordinated effort of a national fast food franchise, the Star, Plascon and BMW (van der Spuy, 2007: 274). Indeed, BAC's mission was formulated as to "structure initiatives around sound business principles and to offer business skills (especially management skills) and resources to government in its efforts to reduce and effectively deal with criminal activity" (cited in van der Spuy, 2007: 275). For instance, it is argued in the website of

⁶⁵ Private security is a huge theme and issue that is not dealt with within the limits of this dissertation. Nonetheless, it is so defining in the neoliberal police reform processes that it is considered only with respect to its impact on the police apparatuses transformation under neoliberal ideology. In fact, this dissertation has posited private security as an independent variable since without referring to its existence, the modern public police formation process in the 19th century cannot be understood. Therefore, a structural change in the police apparatus in the neoliberal era cannot be understood without a reference to the state of affairs in the issue of private security.

American Chamber of Commerce (Amcham) in Jamaica that Amcham's lobbying efforts have benefited its own members and Jamaica in the following way:

In 2001, new U.S. Legislation was rushed through the U.S. Congress - in a record three months [*sic*] - which gave the USAID permission to fund "policing activities"— only in Jamaica. This resulted in the USAID facilitating the development of community policing in Grants Pen, which led to an unprecedented 13 months of no homicide or serious crime being committed in Grants Pen; the return of the delivery of goods and services to the community, resulting in Tropicair opening an outlet in the area and the discontinuation of guns shots which previously permeated the night air. Thereafter, Congress lifted the embargo on this type of funding, worldwide (http://www.amchamjamaica.org/success_focus.html, 2010).

Chambers of Commerce appears to be deeply interested in the maintenance of policing structures. Apart from the Jamaican example, the Bogota Chamber of Commerce in Columbia sponsors many policing programmes introduced by the Columbian Police Organization (Goldsmith et al, 2007: 97). This direct involvement of the class in the remaking of the coercive apparatuses is indeed not a voluntarist/contingent choice. It is one of the very structural factors of (capitalist) state-making.

As already explained in the second chapter, the involvement of bourgeoisie in this process through their creativity was the case in England during the late 19th century. During the neoliberal era, the business's dealing with the police is, in a similar way, perceived as a way of remaking the public sector under the light of the private sector's "innovation and courage" (Bhanu and Stone, 2004: 4). Thus, as was the case in the pre-new police years of the 19th century, the deadlock in state policing is tried to be solved with the direct interference of the capitalist class. Private policing has always been a stimulating experience for many practices of public policing in the 19th century. Indeed, it was one of its most determining sources. As such, in the 21st century, this issue of private policing is called back not solely under the rubric of private security companies or guards but also because of the need for the bourgeoisie's creative power. In that sense, it is not just the money power of the capitalist classes in the foundation of policing practices that matter as it is generally believed to be the case in private security issues. The role of the business is far greater in the restructuring of the police apparatus than the mere introduction of security commodification.

Moreover, in one of the short articles published by the Vera Institute of Justice, which is one of the core constituents of the IPO, it is stated that “[f]or a police organization, a partnership with the private sector to strengthen service to the citizenry can provide useful distance from *the partisan interests of a particular government administration...*” (Bhanu and Stone, 2004: 3) [Italics added]. Therefore, the direct involvement of the capitalist class into the police reform processes is proposed as a concrete method of locking-in the transnational class power and overstep the national executive’s which are considered as potential obstructers to the rule of capital. The police reform is perceived as a way of overcoming the national political field’s potentials for socialistic or social democratic kind of progressive political power quests.

Transnational corporations which are selling their consultancy on the issues of policing are other serious actors in the making up of the IPO, which affect the neoliberal police reforms. These corporations determine the risks for world business travelers and make “*Country Risk Forecasts*” and maintain a “situation room that is permanently manned by experienced consultants who respond to diverse security scenarios with which their clients may be faced” (O’Reilly, 2010: 191). These consultancy firms give training under police reform programs.⁶⁶ This training is based on “long-standing experience of low-intensity conflict” (O’Reilly, 2010: 195). In other words, the neoliberal era’s privatization of security stands on the Cold War era’s legacy of counter-guerilla type of policing. It is already stated that this legacy of the Cold War era is not that much praised by the ruling classes anymore, not because they are against the issue of para-military in itself but because they are tired of the usurped apparatuses of the Cold War. Therefore, the business involvement is seen as a way of restoring this very much usurped and even disdained legacy. It is a way of making a so-called fair copy of these past practices at

⁶⁶ Private consultancy firms are in fact kinds of international private security firms. Private security companies’ role in the composition of IPO in policing is crucial as it provides “the recruitment, training, deployment and discipline of US police contingents in US peacekeeping operations” (Marenin, 2005: 102). Nonetheless, this is not to deny that this strategy has been in use since the 1960s, when the Cold War made a hit. For instance, in Columbia, during the late 1950s, “[t]he use of private contractors was a deliberate ploy to ensure that actions forbidden to US military troops by US Congress would be carried out anyway” (Sheptycki cited in Goldsmith et al, 2007: 91).

least in shape and appearance. The Northern Irish Policing Model is the most telling example of this fact.⁶⁷ It is among the first creations of the IPO during the neoliberal era, which is retried during the state-building process in Iraq under occupation, “has successfully blended the seemingly incongruous components of counter-terrorism expertise derived from ‘the Troubles’, [a period of ethno-political conflict in Northern Ireland] with the template for democratic policing reforms provided in the 1999 Patten Report” (O’Reilly, 2010: 195).

Finally, despite the fact that these private security firms are thought to be involved in corrupt relations with the state and various state apparatuses, they are considered as a group of *non-state actors* which facilitate for the IPO to overcome its dependence on states as “the main authorizer[s] and provider[s] of security” (Caparini and Marenin, 2005: 10). However, on the other way around, O’Reilly (2010: 197) argues that the growing dependence of states on the privatization of security (such as devolving some of the intelligence functions to private security agencies) may take a “parasitic turn”.

Hoffman (1984: 30) argues that “unless the state is parasitic, it cannot be servile”. In other words, the dialectics of coercion is based on an asymmetry where the universal coercive character of the state is secondary in terms of determining power on the reproduction of that dialectic to the realization of the particular interests of the bourgeoisie. That is why, this parasitic existence points out to the fact that the state

⁶⁷ Northern Ireland is of core importance to the history of police transformation since the 19th century onwards. The Irish experience is selected out as a model case for the state-building process of Iraq under occupation. Indeed, the same colonial mechanism that had affected the formation of the New Police during the 19th century is at play here. The British colonies’ police forces were administered by the Irish police forces, who were themselves “a quasi-colonial niche” (Ellison and O’Reilly, 2008: 401). Similarly, “it is telling that there is even a branch of the Northern Ireland Retired Police Officers’ Association located in Baghdad- the only one of its branches located outside Northern Ireland” (Ellison and O’Reilly, 2008: 417).

Therefore, as also will be shown in the Turkish case, the late comers of the capitalist system appear to be forerunners in the police building processes all around the world. This is a quasi common practice for the late comers to bolster up their places within the international hierarchy. It also shows how bourgeoisie’s class consciousness is made up in the issues of policing: the colonial mode of police transformation is perceived as a guarantee in the face of the incalculability of the political field and the possible impact of various local forces on the formation of the police forces.

apparatuses will in one way or another resemble to the private ones on which they are primarily or rather asymmetrically dependent. If the state apparatuses do not fulfill their servile character, their comparative advantage for the realization of class power might fall into danger and thereby their existence, too. In this case, the police apparatuses of the state in the neoliberal era will and have to resemble the private security apparatuses so as to sustain their own *raison d'être*, to survive indeed. That is why, the police apparatuses of the state, suffering also from the birth of such a parasitic existence, finds the panacea in becoming itself a “non-state actor”. Police apparatuses emulate the role models posited by private security and emerge as key political actors (from within the modern state) to unlock the deadlock created by the bourgeois state form to the enhancement of the class power in the neoliberal era.

4.5 A Critique of the Main Characteristics of the Neoliberal Police Reforms

This section has two aims. The first is an in-dept analysis of the neoliberal police reform with respect to its main components and the second is, through this first task, come up with the ideological agenda of the IPO in the neoliberal era. That is to say, the IPO's ideological luggage will be analyzed with respect to the effects of the reforms that it promotes.

The IPO declares that it wants to transform the state power philosophy from *a force* perspective to *a service* perspective. Indeed, police reform is about “a fundamental change from police as ‘force’ to police as ‘service’, whereby a key objective of police reform is the reorienting of policing goals towards service to the community and responsiveness to its needs” (DCAF Backgrounder on Police Reform, 2009: 1). Beyond the market connotations of this emphasis on the notion of giving *service* to a community of consumers, it implies that the police apparatus will become more infused into the society. In short, making the issue of policing a *service* will mean the *policiarization* of society.

The notion of policiarization is previously mentioned in the introduction chapter of the dissertation as an alternative to the concept of militarization in order to highlight the growing role of the police apparatuses both in the national and in the international arena at the expense of the role of the military apparatuses. It is a fact in the post-Soviet world order, where as opposed to the Cold War era, police apparatuses' role are increased and these apparatuses have even taken over some roles from the military (Bigo, 2005). However, policiarization is not solely an exchange of missions among different coercive apparatuses of the state (between police and military), it also points out to a new relation between the police apparatus and the social, and inevitably between the police apparatus and the political. Before, ongoing with the presentation of the critical conceptual toolset that this dissertation makes use of, the section will repose the police reform within the broader state restructuring agenda of the neoliberal era and thus point to some commonalities and as well as to some crucial nuances.

4.5.1 State-Shadowing

This sub-section drives on two issues of state-shadowing, which mainly means the aspiration of the IPO to work with civil society as the main driving force for the police reforms. To discuss it, the issue of new constitutionalism will be discussed with reference to neoliberal intellectuals such as Buchanan and Hayek. Moreover, it will also be shown that where the IPO cannot work with the police apparatus itself and/or with some local stakeholders from the society concerned, it engages itself in the making of police reform by appointing *foreign police chiefs* at the top of the police apparatuses' of these countries.

That is reminiscent of the new constitutionalism literature's argument that the neoliberal era has been trying to tie in both the state and the society to the rule of law in order to overcome the obstructions that might be caused to the smooth working of the global capitalist system by this or that government, by politics indeed. Simon Clarke (1992: 146) argues that "...neo-liberalism has sought to impose fundamental changes in [the state] form particularly to secure the systemic subordination of the state and civil

society to the money power of capital *by subordinating political and social relations to the rule of money and the law*". Stephen Gill (1999) defines this neoliberal process as an intensification of the discipline of the capital via new constitutional and quasi – constitutional legal frameworks. He adds that during this neoliberal transformation process the political is redefined in ways that lock-in governmental commitments to disciplinary neo-liberalism (Gill, 2000). He sites the constitutions, laws, property rights and various institutional arrangements that are designed to have quasi-permanent status. The change in the police apparatuses is a perfect demonstration of the dominant logic behind new constitutionalism and the police apparatuses are the very transnationalized agents of this neoliberal government lock-in agenda.

Gamble (1979:7) states that the neo-liberal project dreams of “a state whose agencies are so constituted that they supply the least possible scope for interference by the temporary democratic majorities that inhabit legislatures”. Therefore neoliberal policing has been an endeavor to lock-in the wider neoliberal agenda in different national contexts via the agency of public police, an effort to change the balance of power in between different state apparatuses to empower a specific composition of class power, namely a specific historic bloc over others.

The fate of the police apparatuses under neoliberalism is also reminiscent of the rationality that underlies the establishment of the independent supreme boards in various countries. These independent bodies point out to the de-politization of the issues that were previously dealt with within the political field. These independent bodies, through their technical capabilities or authoritative knowledge on specific fields of government, invalidate the need for the rulers to get consent from the ruled while taking and implementing political decisions (Bayramoğlu, 2005). This is indeed another version of this dissertation’s main thesis that the police reform aims at changing the basics of the dialectics of coercion, which denotes the necessity for the bourgeois form of the capitalist state to permanently sustain the sense of universality conveyed by the bourgeois state form, indeed. In other words, it is a crude fact that “the state’s coercive

‘essence’ already implies an ideological dimension’ unless there is domination on behalf of a class” (Hoffman, 1984:33). Therefore, the attempt by the police reform to make out of police apparatuses “independent” bodies, as is the case with the establishment of supreme boards, refers to a radical change in that dialectics of coercion or in the modern relations set by the bourgeois revolutions between the ruler and the ruled.

This anti-political character of the police reform cannot be understood without reference to the IPO’s new and rather “absurd” jargon on the issue of police reform. Simply put, in the post-socialist era, police reforms have aimed to substitute politics by law in an open manner. For instance, during the transition period from socialism to capitalism,

[t]he ruling party in Hungary developed the concept of a non-political police. The task of the police should not be to represent the interests of the political regime or government, it transpired, but to ensure public safety. The police were no longer to take their orders from the ruling party but instead their responsibilities and powers, and the means of their supervision, were to be defined by law (Köszeg, 2001: 1).

And yet, law is no other than a *techne*, a know-how divorced from its socio-political context. It is well documented in the statement below.

The evaluation criteria [of a long-term police reform strategy] should be “smart” (specific, measurable, attainable, relevant, trackable) (OSCE Report on Southeastern Europe, 2008: 19). The designated HoM and HoLED should regularly consult during the planning process and the HoM should regularly be briefed by the HoLED during the pre-mission planning and the initial start-up phase (OSCE Report on Southeastern Europe, 2008: 18).⁶⁸

Thus, the IPO produces a jargon of its own in neoliberal policing with a plethora of institutions, affiliations, and accompanying abbreviations. Indeed, the abbreviations displace the real and create a feeling of unreality. This apparently cosmetic affair is of crucial importance since it well reflects the spirit of the IPO.

⁶⁸ HoLED means head of law enforcement department and HoM signified Head of Mission (OSCE Report on Southeastern Europe, 2008: 6).

According to Buchanan (1985), democracy has the individual as its foundation. As far as democracy is sought to be based upon a socially constructed value, upon the search for ‘the truth’, it loses out of its value or genuineness. That is to say, democracy is realized as long as it takes the individual as the sole criteria for its existence. Following such a criteria, the institutions of the democratic system, i.e. the police, must not be based upon the existence of an *a priori*, unchanging universal principle. Rather, they must be pragmatically oriented. Each case or each situation requires different and specific patterns of decision-making and execution in order not to challenge the requirements of the genuine democratic governance.

In the similar vein, Hayek (1992) thinks that democracy, as a term, has been usurped by distorted usages of the term. He complains that democracy has been described as an ideal, as everything that is positive about politics. He rather argues that democracy is a method. It does not have a foundation like the supreme good or the material equality of people. Indeed, for Hayek, as in Buchanan also, democracy is nothing but a technique of governance. And such a technique is well represented in the world of abbreviations created by the IPO in neoliberal era.

Besides this world of ideas and communication specific to the IPO, which does alienate the reform process from the social and political entourage where it is implemented; the reformers’ perception of “local counterparts” is subject to another but complementary alienation process. On the one hand, the support received from the local counterparts is found to be crucial both for the implementation and sustainability of the police reform programs. On the other hand, the local counterparts’ involvement in the process in such a way to halt it or to stop it is perceived not as a political programmatic act (a political decision) but as a failure or corrupt activity endemic to transition countries. In other words, the participation of the local counterparts is formulated solely as a stakeholding mechanism and any reluctance of the government in the implementation process is seen as a mal practice, a state of incapacity and not as a purposeful political decision. It is stated that “[i]n several cases, the working

relationships and support from the host governments deteriorated significantly after a change of government” and the prevention of such a blocking of reform process by the newly elected government is posited as an objective (OSCE Report on Southeastern Europe, 2008: 27).

Therefore, the aim is to lock in the internationally generated reform programs and make them immune from interference from an elected government. To illustrate, David Bayley (2006: 18) states in his book of advice entitled “Changing the Guard: Developing Democratic Police Abroad” that “any police, no matter how well trained, managed, or organizationally restructured, can be subverted by a determined government”. Many tricks are proposed by the IPO to overcome the situation of blockage created by the “elections”: the promise of new donations only when the ongoing projects are completed; international community’s messages about the status of the subject state within the international hierarchy of states, etc. As such, the internationalization of the police in the neoliberal era is part of the process of new constitutionalism whereby a class of “champions of change”, protected by the armor of law, and not subject to the power of the vote, should be created.

According to Buchanan (1985), there is a dependency relation between democracy and constitutionalism. In other words, democracy to be genuine needs ultimately a constitutional basis. The problem occurs when the question about the very design of this constitution, which would constitute the spine of genuine democracy. It appears that Buchanan dislikes ‘the spirit of politics’ since he thinks that this spirit consists in the contamination of the originally innocent thing (democracy) with the ambitious desires of big political institutions. He sees constitutionalism as the most accurate way of securing the non-political from being contaminated with the political, with conflict and struggle, indeed. Whereas Gill (2002) calls this process of constitutionalism as the redefinition of the political in ways that lock-in government commitments to neoliberalism. He sites the constitutions, laws, property rights and various institutional arrangements as institutions that are designed to have quasi-permanent status. The aim

of police reform is indeed no different than this. Indeed, United Nations' Brahimi Report (2000) has "recommended that a portable international criminal code be developed and ... suggested that an International Interim Penal Code could be used in cases where there is no functioning system of laws" (Linden et al, 2007: 156).⁶⁹

Transnational police reformers have a generic approach when they are faced with a not much enthusiastic approach from the MoIs or other governmental bodies for the implementation of the police reform process: to establish co-operation with different local civil society-based organizations. Indeed, to make police reform work "around the MoI", they identify "a small number of NGOs that were willing to promote the reform process in the local administrative structures..." (OSCE Report on Southeastern Europe, 2008: 37). This process is perceived by the IPO as an important constituent of democratic policing as it aims at the development of local-self government structures. This object of democratic policing might appear to counter one of the initial arguments of the thesis about the enfeeblement of the political field through the internationalization of the police. However, such an approach on the side of the IPO results not in the emancipation but rather in deeper policiazation of the political field.

For instance, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has organized Security Sector Reform *sensitization campaigns* (OECD DAC Report on "Security System Reform: What We Have Learned?" 2009: 8) in order to tailor the national political field for the needs of the IPO. Integration of women groups and minorities is one of the main strategies of the transnational community to steer the security sector reform.

⁶⁹ CIVPOL (UN Civilian Police), especially when it has an executive authority such as those in Kosovo, East Timor and Somalia, has faced the problem of which laws to apply, and the absence of national laws or, more correctly, legitimate laws, led CIVPOL to generate *ad hoc* responses such as combinations of ex-national laws with local customs or with Islamic law as it was the case in Somalia for instance (Linden et al, 2007: 154-156).

A further way of bypassing over this or that government resistant to the exigencies of the reform is to provide the translation of security reform into “the form of a national security strategy” (OECD DAC Report on “Security System Reform: What We Have Learned?” 2009: 9). Hence, national security strategies have become the locus for the transnational community to derive a longer-term power over the states for the reform programs.

Moreover, the IPO finds it crucial to engage in a regional approach to security sector reform. It is argued that “[i]ncreasing outreach to emerging donors, supporting the capacities and engagement of regional organizations in the South, and promoting South-South experience-sharing all represent means to enhance the sustainability and legitimacy of international SSR support” (OECD DAC Report on “Security System Reform: What We Have Learned?” 2009: 13). In fact, it is advised to advisors from the North not to discount the skills of the advisor police officers from the South, even though they are not as educated and professional as their Northern colleagues (Bayley, 2006: 100). Indeed, it is thought that “local officers [read as advisors from third-world countries] may be more effective at solving crime in local settings [read as recipient countries such as Bosnia-Herzegovina]” (Bayley, 2006: 100).

The argument of state shadowing appears to be controversial in other cases where the IPO is involved in state-capacity enhancement in a direct manner. For instance, “the Jamaican Minister of Security in 2005 appointed a British officer as deputy chief commissioner. This was followed by the appointment of another senior officer later that year, and the introduction of two other British officers announced in February 2006” (Uildriks, 2009: 103). Foreign police officers have themselves become public servants in Jamaica to further the policing capacity of the state. Furthermore, in places where foreign officials’ recruitment is considered to bolster negative feelings among the populace, such as in Columbia, the US implants its own favorite person as the head of the whole police organization:

In 1994, the US State Department pressured incoming president Samper to replace the then director of the CNP (Columbia's National Police), Octavio Vargas Silva, with Rosso Jose Serrano, a former commander of DIRAN (Direction of Anti-narcotics), who was then acting as police attaché in the Colombian Embassy in Washington... Serrano's installation as CNP director at the US behest enabled the maintenance of US counter-narcotic policy within Columbia, while also ensuring the political isolation of President Samper (Serrano and Crandall cited in Goldsmith, 2007: 91).

First, this trend is closely related with the ever-lasting war of the US against drugs. Drug enforcement has been providing the motivation to spread out the overseas US law enforcement presence since the early 1950s (Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006: 155). With the advent of the post-Cold War era,

“in 1994 the Center for Strategic and International Studies convened a conference of high-level law enforcement and intelligence officials, titled “Global Organized Crime: The New Evil Empire”... Formalizing this paradigm shift, in 1995 President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive 42, which officially defined transnational crime as a national security threat” (Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006: 158).

Second, the police, as was the case in the 19th century, have always been involved in foreign policy making and implementation processes of their governments because they were allowed to work on foreign territories with a tacit mutual agreement between various reactionary governments. In the late 20th century, this post has been legalized and made public under the rubric of “liaison officers”. These officers operate as “police ambassadors” and they argue that:

We're also competing to sell our police model outside Europe. You can make a packet that way. Criminal Investigation police officers are often less aware of national interests that we are. They have been working together for a long time and have learned from Interpol, but when it comes to terrorism, as for immigration and even drugs, it's a lot less straightforward. In fact, that's why we have been created (quoted in Bigo, 2000: 79).

It is true that the IPO's authority has been shaken by national constituencies from time to time under different circumstances. For instance, it was challenged by a very legislative force during the mid-1970s, namely by the US Congress, which abolished USAID's Office of Public Security (OPS) (1974) and prohibited assistance to foreign police except under limited circumstances (1975) (Bayley, 2006: 12). As an executive planning group, designed to stay beyond the reach of vote, the USAID was challenged

by the very vote it tries to bypass during the mid-70s and this is no historical coincidence

OPS was accused of rendering more repressive than the already repressive governments of Latin America, and it was dismantled as a result of 4 years of efforts of various US Congress members, Senator Abourezk being one of the most famous (Huggins, 1998: 187-196). However, the dismantlement of the OPS as a result of its assistance to paramilitary operations did not result in a happy end for the recipient countries where “new programs were made even more invisible than OPS operations had been by dispersing them throughout different government bureaucracies and in some cases by fully privatizing them” (Huggins, 1998: 195). In that sense, what appears as a state empowerment is part and parcel of this process of “privatized militia run privately by government officials” (Huggins, 1998: 195). Indeed, neoliberal reforms in the security sector have aimed to prevent the emergence of OPS-like situations after then.

4.5.2 Policiarization of Society

The rapid change of the composition of population in big cities is considered to be one of the main fields of intervention for the police in the neoliberal era (OSCE’s Guidebook on Democratic Policing, 2008:16). The police are depicted as the gatekeepers by the mentioned guidebook, which will make out of such a diversely composed population a coherent and integrated whole. The police apparatus or organized coercion is proposed as the main vehicle of the reconciliation of social conflicts in central cities. It is the one which will make the correct calculation for the provision of peaceful integration in a population. The neoliberal cities, centers of important population movements (migration, unemployment, gentrification, etc) are brought under the yoke of the police. This time, the police’s job is not solely to *make the social body* as was the case in the 19th century history of working classes experience with the modern police, but also and as much to make the *political body* by way of putting a calculator at the gates of the political field.

What is interesting is that these roles of gate-keeping, population integration and cohesion assigned to the police in the neoliberal era are operationalized through underlying, highlighting and even investing in some specific elements of the common sense belonging to a society. To select out some elements of the dominant ideology by the police apparatuses is also “[o]ne important step to win the trust of minority communities...Their integration not only serves as a confidence-building measure, but also provides the police with a range of knowledge and skills that are required for working in a multi-cultural environment” (OSCE’s Guidebook on Democratic Policing, 2008: 52).

Moreover, such a policiarization policy for the police aims to foster their “*task of being role models for society*” (OSCE’s Guidebook on Democratic Policing, 2008: 54) [italics added]. Thus, police apparatus does not both symbolize and determine the limits/borders of the political field, as was the case under the bourgeois state form. But rather, the police apparatus is placed within and indeed at the hearth of the political as such. It operates from within. It does not squeeze down the political as was the case under the bourgeois state form. It gets out of the bourgeois state arena and moves in the socio-political field to control it from within. This can be called as the policiarization of the political. The political field is no more the field akin to the bourgeois state form. The police reform read as policiarization aims at changing the basics of the political field.

4.5.2.1 Displacing the Notion of Legitimacy with Public Confidence

“Servicing” in neoliberal times has had an ideological meaning. It does not mean an expansion in the *public service* functions of the police apparatus but rather a change in the *police attitudes* towards people who are now considered as individual-consumers (European Code of Police Ethics, 2001: 32). The dialectic of consent and coercion is thus reversed. As already explained in the theoretical chapter, in Marx and Engel’s conception, state as a coercive apparatus can successfully rule as long as this coercion is represented as if it is in the needs of the general public. On the other hand, this state

of affairs is always prone to conflict as the particular interests sustained through coercion are in fact in contradiction with the “real” universal interests of the public. Within this context, the concentration of the coercion in the hands of the state (not the state monopoly of violence but the appearance of state monopoly on violence) is a way of conveying this sense of ‘universality’. Nonetheless, this process is not a peaceful one for while there is a permanent need for sustaining this sense/illusion of universality, the interests of the bourgeoisie asks for particularistic usages of this seemingly universal coercion. In that sense, “the state’s coercive ‘essence’ already implies an ideological dimension’ unless there is domination on behalf of a class” (Hoffman, 1984:33). Therefore, Hoffman (1984, 32) summarizes Marx’s conception of the issue of coercion as: “it is a coercion which is concentrated in the hands of the state, generalized in its scope and presented ideologically as a force for the ‘common good’”. However, neoliberal policing does not feel such a contradiction since the urge to present the particular as universal is an enlightenment way of codifying the dilemmas of bourgeois state power.

For the bourgeois state, this “common good” was an enlightenment concept since it was based on a notion of “humankind”. In fact, whereas Kant criticizes the role of religion and dogmas in constraining the freedom of thought, his main problematic is how to find our path in a world freed from the yoke of the traditional and familiar signposts like the traditional metaphysics, religious beliefs (Deveci, 2004: 21). In that sense, Kant was not interested in the particular- individual findings but rather with the whole humankind’s practical modes of reasoning. Indeed, in his essay named as “What is Enlightenment?” Kant often repeats the importance of social freedom, freedom that lies at the origin of a society. In other words, Kant’s search for a path in the absence of traditional signs requires the freedom of all humankind. Particularistic, subjective moves are not sufficient (Deveci, 2004: 21). The crucial emphasis of Kant about enlightenment, his original contribution to it, is the argument that human beings need to go beyond the world of particular experiences in order to understand the importance of guiding principles such as rationality and the idea of progress. The Copernican

Revolution of Kant is that he detaches Man from the field of experience, which is a heteronymous arena. However, the neoliberal policing reposit the man into the world of individual experiences as a way of policing. In fact, it points to a final retreat in the bourgeois state form due to the underlying concern to dispense with the legacy of *enlightenment*.

Although, historically there has never been an absolute monopoly of the state over physical coercion, this issue of monopoly has been used as an ideological tool in the hands of the modern state to receive legitimacy from the subjects living under its sovereignty. The monopoly of force has been an anti-thesis of the feudal type of coercion, in a way restoring the equality in terms of reach and use of coercion in the modern society. Indeed, historically speaking, monopoly of force has been a legitimating tool for the restoration of state power.

The obsessive neoliberal appeal to “building confidence between police and people” signals however that *the notion of the political* specific to 19th century state, which was upholding the monopoly of force as a symbol of equality and liberty (before the law) and as a symbol of dethroning of the pre-modern political classes is subject to a qualitative change. The notion of public confidence, widely refereed in the 21st century police reform documents including the ones related with *police ethics*, replaces this 19th century based notion of legitimacy.⁷⁰ Whereas the latter belongs to the political field; the former implies an ethical concern aiming at behavioral change by the neoliberal police reformers. Whereas legitimacy is closely related with the fate of political regimes, public confidence is a matter of public relations; an ability to manage public aspirations and complaints. Whereas legitimacy is closely related with the question of best political regime and about its possibilities, the issue of public confidence is a question of benefiting from the market. Whereas the latter is about manipulation and conformism, the former is about consciousness and struggle. In that

⁷⁰ There is a plethora of police ethics documents published by different constituents of the IPO. The most popular of them is the European Code of Police Ethics adopted by the Council of Europe in September, 2001.

sense, the IPO in the neoliberal era has a different conception of the state monopoly of force and this is well reflected in the police reform projects.

Furthermore, the issue of public trust is not solely an issue of ethics as such but also and mostly of conservative morality. It is seen as a panacea to the disenchantment of the world and the latter's negative implications for a rationalized bureaucracy. It is argued by some of the intellectuals of police reform that "[i]mproved performance of large institutions such as state bureaucracies is therefore dependent on the level of trust as it enables functionaries to cooperate better with each other and with private citizens" (Uildriks, 2009: 7). What is interesting though is that the very idea of police reform, the attempt at *modernization* of the police, appears to be at odds with this lean on these notions of confidence and trust. Paradoxically, increasing trust requires for police intellectuals a "personification of policing" (Uildriks, 2009: 19), an aim which is at odds with the arguable search for further rationalization of the police apparatuses in the neoliberal era.

4.5.2.2 Peoplism

It can be argued that there are two governing discourses of the neoliberal police reform prevailing against each other from time to time: The first one disdains the popular culture and perceives it as the reason of endemic corruption in the security apparatuses (as already presented under the sub-heading of police culture), while the second one assigns a nearly sacred character to the popular culture including the popular common sense and expectations, and reproduces a kind of populism that can be called as *peoplism*.⁷¹

⁷¹ Whereas the former discourse is much more used with reference to Latin American experiences where US founded police reform projects prevails, the second discourse is generally used in the EU founded police reform projects in Southeastern Europe. However, this is a broad categorization and the two discourses may be used interchangeably both by the EU and the US founded police reform attempts.

Peoplism as a concept generated in this thesis aims at showing how the IPO makes out of people a sociological cult. In that sense, it is not a movement but rather a eulogy of the common sense. Peoplism overstates the benefits of community policing by way of arguing that policing is devolved to the public, which is able to know the best for itself. The common sense of the public, as an amalgam of both progressive and reactionary elements, is praised and posited as the antidote of bourgeois state's formal ideology.

Moreover, peoplism aims at redefining the dominant ideology, which usually comprises “[t]wo conflicting conceptions of the world ... one drawn from the official notions of the rulers, the other derived from an oppressed people's practical experience of social reality” (Eagleton, 1994: 199). Peoplism broadens the room of maneuver for the class power as it does not connote to a conflict over the society's political future, as was the case in the 19th century, but means the blessing of daily life practices and habits of people as unquestionable “goods” while persistently highlighting different aspects of them according to the changing requirements of the neoliberal disorder.

To illustrate this argument on peoplism, the example of community-policing is fruitful. Some authors criticize community policing and its underlying conception of community as one of an idealized community, whereby the serious ethnic, class, religious and ideological fissures are discarded (Ellison, 2007: 208; Murphy, 2007: 250). Such an idealized and unrealistic conception of community cannot be considered solely as *a byproduct failure* on the side of the IPO in the implementation of police reforms.

Whether on purpose or not, community policing model serves to the validation of existing community boundaries, inequalities, and injustices for the arithmetic of the political on the issue of security (police) reform is built up on the following question “how do individuals and communities experience security and justice?” (OECD DAC Report on “Security System Reform: What We Have Learned?” 2009: 13). This emphasis on individual experiences inevitably results in a revision in the defining role

of the universal in the formation of consent, associated with the bourgeois state form. It has to be recognized that the political is reduced not solely to ethics, but to anti-political ethics here. This is a defining characteristic of the IPO discourse, which is under the heavy influence of Americanization in the post-Soviet neoliberal period. The Americanization means that the Continental tradition of dialectical reason is disdained, and replaced by an anti-intellectual intellectualism which is at the same time an appraisal of empiricism. This stance is represented by American pragmatism.

It appears that a famous American pragmatist, William James, dislikes ‘the spirit of politics’ since he thinks that this spirit consists in the contamination of the originally innocent thing with the ambitious desires of big political institutions (Coon, 1996: 89).⁷² Moreover, if he has any political stance, it appears to be hardly radical or against the corporate capitalism of his day. Mumford (cited in Livingston, 1996: 153) argues that James has a tacit “attitude of compromise with a civilization that honored business enterprise as its highest calling’ and that early pragmatists were docile children of industrialism”. Against the idea that empirical realm is a temporary world, or is a life of illusions and dependence, William James maintains the emancipatory effect of the empirical world. Hence, many conjunctions and relations between many facts and experiences are “faultlessly real” (James, 1912: 195). In other words, humanism celebrates the reality of the empirical world. It does not reduce the empirical life to a world of impurities and dependencies. On the contrary, the experience that we conceive and feel here and now is a non reducible and even non-translatable reality. Empirical world is a world where we are closest to realities. Therefore, it is not surprising that the question of political is imprisoned to the dictatorship of the empirical world depicted by the IPO in its pamphlets, proceedings, country reports, conference papers...etc.

⁷² William James, an early 20th century thinker, is very much representative of the American thought which has built itself as *the anti-philosophy*, as long as the philosophy is understood with respect to the Continental philosophy, which gave birth respectively to the thinking of enlightenment; dialectics and revolution by Kant, Hegel and Marx. The legacies of these three are erased through and in the pragmatist conception of reality and thus politics, dominating that ideological change called as Americanization.

Nevertheless, a negative conception of society reproduces itself in the evaluation of the reform processes. For instance, public support for *mano dura*, indeed for the use of harsher methods of policing, to provide the basic security in daily life and to combat with violent criminality pervasive in Latin America, and resistance from the all corrupted police organizations to the reform programs are cited as the main reasons behind the need for an external intervention to realize the police reform (Harriott, 2009). One of the reference points for the police intellectuals of Latin America is that “[w]hen asked if they would trade greater order for less freedom, 43.2 per cent of a representative sample of the population responses in the affirmative” (Powell cited in Harriott, 2009: 126). Therefore, the argument that these societies are conceived as incapable of generating a change in policing is recognized by the IPO as a legitimating factor for its own intervention.⁷³

4.6 Concluding Remarks

This chapter has aimed at giving a general portrait of the general characteristics of neoliberal police reforms as well as a critique of their ideological luggage. Thereby, the IPO’s main agenda all around the world is deciphered. Nonetheless, this study should be enriched with an in-depth analysis of a country case study in order to better substantiate these above mentioned arguments which can be reiterated as:

First, the IPO’s envy to make out of police apparatuses “champions of change” in order to foster the class power is translated into the field of police restructuring on the basis of de-Sovietization and/or anti-revolutionarism, and anti-paramilitary restoration.

⁷³ In places where police reforms do not work, IPO generates new mechanisms to compensate it. For instance, Jamaicans are held responsible from transnational criminal activities like drug trafficking and even of terrorism, and in between 2001 and 2004; a number of 13.413 persons were deported to Jamaica from the North (Harriott, 2009: 134). Another and even contradictory mechanism to deportation is extradition. For instance, by 1979 an extradition treaty entered into force between the US and Columbia, which was based on the “views among many US officials that the Colombian justice machinery was inadequate to the challenge of dealing with drug criminals” and thus Colombians who are found suspect of committing crime should be sent to the US so that they can be judged (Goldsmith et al, 2007: 89-90).

Second, neoliberal police reforms are part and parcel of the process towards new constitutionalism which codifies neoliberal intellectuals' view on democracy, society and law on the very constitutions of states around the world to lock-in the principles of the New Right in such a way to restrict national- and local-level political interventions.

Third, neoliberal police reforms can be deciphered with the help of the concept of policiarization, which affects both the society and the political alike. Moreover, concepts such as peoplism, which makes out of the public a sociological cult; public confidence, which makes a substantial change in the notion of modern legitimacy; and state shadowing, which points out to the specific mechanisms with which the IPO works in a country to operationalize the police reform model it aspires to are secondary concepts to detail down the notion of policiarization.

The augmentation of the class power on the issues related with the organization of political coercion within a society means further privatization of the political in that society. The police reform process is an augmentation of the class power in the neoliberal era as the impact of the working classes become close to null in the police reform processes. In other words, police reform is a class act organized and implemented by the IPO. This privatization of the political, which was already an issue in the 19th century internationalization of the police, has been receiving complementary missions. In fact, in the 19th century, the privatization of the political was translated into the police apparatuses as the squeezing down of the political. Working class power was controlled but limited only to some extent by the police apparatuses. In turn, police apparatuses were controlled and subject to change due to the working classes' effective power within the political field.

However in the neoliberal era, the privatization of the political does not hit on the working class power and therefore has a broader range of influence. It does not only mean to limit the political field through the police apparatuses but also (and even more) it means to make a substantial change in the nature of the political field. This chapter is

also the story of this transformation. Neoliberal police reform points out that further spheres of politics are now privatized (thus subsumed under capitalist class power) and thus rendered immune from the impact of working class' or subordinated classes' power.

However, while telling this story, there are many other crucial questions which are not left untouched such as: How do the police apparatuses respond to that transformation pressure and process? Do they really become "champions of change"? Through what mechanisms and which actors the police reform agenda of the IPO get reproduced in national contexts?

It should be mentioned that the members of the IPO are not restricted to people from advanced capitalist countries. Interestingly, many late-comer countries have turned out to be decisive reformers in various other late-comer countries.⁷⁴ For instance, "[a]t the end of 2007 the number of police contributing countries [PCCs] was 92 and according to the second edition of the UN Police magazine in terms of the numbers of personnel provided, the top ten PCCs in respective order were: Jordan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Senegal, Nigeria, India, Portugal, USA and Turkey" (Greener, 2009a: 112). Internationalization of the police forces by their deployment in countries other than their home countries and in different historical settings such as state-building missions turns out to be one of the main vehicles for the propagation of the neoliberal police reform agenda in the 21st century. In other words, making a national police force, which is perceived by the IPO as in need of comprehensive police reform, an accomplice in the enforcement of international neoliberal reforms appears to be a way of reforming that national police itself. The case of Turkey is illustrative of this fact. Turkey provides both a terrain of analysis for the details of neoliberal police reform and a perfect

⁷⁴ It should also be mentioned that this practice is not a purely new creation of the neoliberal era. It appears to be even the case during the late 1950s and 1960s as the case of Columbia demonstrates. "In order to deflect attention from US involvement in Columbia, the Special Team advocated the use of third country nationals contracted to the Columbian government but actually under covert US control to act as advisers to the security forces engaged in bandit/guerilla suppression operations" (Goldsmith et al, 2007: 85-86).

example to further decipher the working mechanisms of the IPO as well as to understand how the main characteristics of neoliberal police reforms such as peoplism get translated into national spheres.

CHAPTER 5

THE CASE OF NEOLIBERAL POLICE REFORM IN TURKEY

The previous chapter has focused both upon the anatomy of the IPO, namely its constituencies' contemporary ideological and practical agenda together with a general discussion on the essential elements of neoliberal police reforms. Yet, this analysis still needs to be complemented with a more specific one which would show how the general tendencies identified at the global level have been operationalized within particular historical contexts. In the previous chapter not so much have been told about the direction of change in the police apparatuses. Indeed, some of the elements of the police reform appear to be generic elements of the broader public sector reform programs that have been under application during the neoliberal era.⁷⁵ That is why one of the aims of this chapter is to refine the police reform analysis, both from a historical perspective on the relation between the state and the police apparatus, and from a perspective that does try to concentrate on the details of the reform process, akin to the area of neoliberal politics of police on the basis of the Turkish transformation. That is to say, one of the aims of the chapter is to reveal what is exactly meant by the police reform through analyses deduced from the transformation of the Turkish police in the neoliberal era.

However, it has to be recognized that although the thesis aims at deciphering the main tenets of the global neoliberal police reform process starting from the 1990s, in Turkey the aftermath of the 1980 *coup d'état* is of peculiar importance to trace down the changing nature of police organization in the country. Hence, a further aim of this chapter is to trace down the ancestral traits of the Turkish police organization of the late

⁷⁵ These include, mainly, the establishment of independent regulatory mechanisms of governance, immune from the direct interference of the governments and tied directly to the global centers of economic and social policy-making such as World Bank and IMF; redistribution of the power between the central and local state and finally of the marketization of the public services (Ataay, 2007).

1990s. To do so, the internationalization of the Turkish police in the late 1970s and 1980s will also be analyzed to grasp properly the patterns of integration of the Turkish Police to the IPO in the pre-1980 era. Then, it will be shown that the Turkish police reform initiated in the late 1990s displays a non-negligible degree of *continuity* with the period of police modernization conducted under the military regime of the early 1980s. A final note that needs to be made before analyzing the background of neoliberal police reforms in Turkey is that the international does not necessarily mean intervention from outside. For particular global class projects are not only internalized through domestic actors, but also internal class forces help shape global projects. As discussed before, in the case of the police reform the International acts in an organized manner through the operation of the IPO, which has started organizing new members especially from the former Soviet bloc countries since the 1990s. Degrading previous Soviet police practices as corrupt, ineffective and totalitarian discourse has been an important discursive strategy in this process. Interestingly enough, this discourse has also been reproduced in Turkey since the 1990s although she has always been part of the IPO. Defining many previous practices of the Turkish state as “communist” practices -as if Turkey had been part of the former Soviet bloc- , and representing the traditional owners of the security field as “communists” are easily observable strategies of the IPO in order to make the police the new “champions of change” in Turkey.

5.1 Internationalization of the Turkish Police during the Cold War Era

Two legacies shaped police practices in the world during the Cold War era. The first was the legacy of fascism in the formation of internal security apparatuses which had fused with anti-communism and the related “stay behind” apparatus ideology.⁷⁶ The

⁷⁶ The general opinion about the counter-guerilla organizations or “stay-behind” apparatuses is that they were built by the CIA under the supervision of NATO, and worked mainly through the collaboration of national intelligence agencies. This opinion contradicts however with the historical fact that these apparatuses were established just after the October Revolution, thus even before the NATO came into being. After the defeat of the White Army, supported by many capitalist countries in terms of military support, the big media in the USA had started to conduct a propaganda war against the USSR through banners like “Red Death”, or “The Bolshevik Attack against the Civilization” (Ganser, 2005). In fact, by the year of 1919, in the USA many creative rumors such that “the women were nationalized in the USSR”, or “people ate human babies” were diffused through a fierce ideological struggle against

second was the legacy and the ongoing reality of powerful working class struggles to bring back in “the political” at the hearth of the police institution. The paramilitarization of the police forces and the growing consciousness of the public role of the police were the two important processes that worked over these legacies. Thus, an analysis of the Cold War police transformations cannot dismiss these aspects of public policing in the post-War period. It has to be recognized that these two elements, namely paramilitary policing and welfare policing, are also the two poles of modern police dialectics, representing respectively the ancien régime and revolutionary public sides of policing.

The latter was symbolized for instance by the fight of the socialist feminists who declared that “personal is political”. Hence, the liberal idea that “[a] man beating his wife or lover as a response to the stresses of family life may feel that such violence within the family unit is a ‘purely personal matter’ and has nothing to do with crime” (Lea and Young, 1993: xiii) was delegitimated by the efforts of the second generation feminists, and the retrenchment of *the political* could be stopped even though partially. On the other hand, the liberal-conservative stance on policing continued to apply Cold War strategies at home up until the end of the Cold War. Indeed, in 1988 in the US,

communism (Ganser, 2005). These absurdities would be the founding ideology of these stay-behind apparatuses. On the other side, these stay-behind apparatuses were not completely US creations. They were built in Europe by the fascist organizations, which were conducting a dirty war against anti-fascists in Europe. The fascists founded their own intelligence networks and became very skilled in the job of undercover operations.

NATO’s stay-behind apparatuses have not solely depended on local fascist organizations but also and mostly on the Secret Committee of the Western Union founded in the year of 1948 by West European powers (Ganser, 2005). It was a coordination mechanism for disperse national intelligence agencies. It is not a surprise that this organization’s founding date corresponds to the foundation period of the European Union. Many European states were tied into this greater union of states not only through agreements of “coal and steel”, as the formal history of the EU tells us, but also through interwoven stay-behind apparatuses. These paramilitary organizations were considering the notion of “state sovereignty” as a potential threat to the future of capitalism in Europe since this notion was supporting relatively autonomous state policies. These apparatuses were tying in the states’ relative autonomy and locking in anti-communism as a state ideology.

“resembling ‘the search and destroy’ operations of the Vietnam War, thousands of surprised teenagers were forced to ‘kiss the sidewalk’ or spread-eagle against police vehicles...The result was 1453 arrests mostly for trivial offences like juvenile curfew violations and parking tickets” (Lea and Young, 1993: xxi).

The case of Turkey is not an exception, and the Cold War police organization was largely shaped by the global organization of anti-communism. Up until the 1960s, the total number of police officers did not augment in tandem with the increase in population, and stood apparently insufficient with respect to demographics changes. Moreover, there was no significant amelioration in the situation of the police officers despite the fact that the party in power (the Democrat Party) in the 1950s had a specific interest in the fortification of the police.⁷⁷ In the early 1950s, a US specialist was invited to depict a plan concerning possible ameliorations in the situation of the police officers such as the regulation of working hours (Dikici, 2009: 68). Yet, it appears that there was no significant change and the police officers had to rest and even sleep in police centers (*karakol*) during their rest days/hours as an auxiliary force (Dikici, 2009: 68). The miserable situation of the police officers was surely not contributing in their proletarianization. Indeed, this process should have harbored a feeling of resentment and an accompanying sense of “Turkishness”. During the 6-7 September Events in 1955, when non-Muslim population became target of daemonic masses in Istanbul, the police did not do their job on purpose and a police officer was reported to have said: “I am not a police today, I am a Turk” (Sönmez, 2009:78). The Ministry of Interior of the same era explained the impotency of the police in the face of the atrocious events as a natural result of the “national excitement” (Sönmez, 2009: 79).

⁷⁷ The police during the Democrat Party (DP) era were accused of working as associates of the DP and their involvement into an affair of conspiracy against the army created an atmosphere of army-police opposition. This event known as “9 Colonels Event” displayed close relations between the US and the police. In the aftermath of a fiasco where a major from the army, who was receiving help from the intelligence department of the Turkish National Police, could not manage to prove his claims that the army was preparing a coup d’état took shelter in the US embassy. CIA’s Istanbul chief made a call to the intelligence department to inform them about the shelter request of the army major (Özdemir, 2009: 38).

In the Police Magazine, published by the Association of Retired Police Officers, it is argued that the 5-6 September Events depended on a mob psychology and the mobs were neither communities nor organized movements and that was why they felt easily prey to the “evil aims” of some organized people. It was added to this analysis that the police could not have stayed immune from this over-excited mob psychology as it was part of the same people; it was made of the same tissue with the people who were provoked by the wrongdoings of some foreign politicians and some minorities at home. That was cited as the main reason why the police stood paralyzed by the events and did not interfere on time.

These gloomy days of Turkey were also demonstrating the changing ideological equipage of the police intellectuals with the onset of the Cold War. During the pre-Cold war period, the police apparatus was associated rather with the founding cadres of the Republic both in mission and in character. During the Cold war era, the Turkish police were presented as an organic part of the people (including excited masses or mob) who should be excused in cases when they showed impotency. Yet again the most important clue demonstrating the change in the ideological luggage of the police intellectual was the overt recognition of the existence of *classes* in Turkey and the confession that the 6-7 September Events could have turned into a *class struggle* if the police would not have intervened at the very last moment.⁷⁸

This was of course not solely a result of the Democrat Party’s politics of the police. It was also the result of the Turkification policies pursued in the country in the early Republican era. In this era, most of the policing politics were also shaped on the basis of Turkish/Non-Muslim differentiation. For instance, the Police Magazine of the 1930s includes various articles that prove the centrality of ethnic/religious questions in the treatment of crimes. One example was about the changing types of punishment for those

⁷⁸ In an article published in the police magazine of 1955, it is stated that in the background of the 5-6 September events lies a non-recognized and camouflaged method of class struggle and that if these events were not stopped in an immediate and abrupt manner, the events could have changed direction and lead into new levels (Tanyol, 1955: 6).

who were found guilty of prostitution. Those who were non-Muslims were expelled from the country while those who were deemed to be Turkish were just prohibited from practicing prostitution.⁷⁹

Yet, the internationalization of the police during the 1950s exacerbated this state of affairs in the police in different ways. Firstly, the intelligence department of the police was restructured by foreign advisors, mostly by the US officers. Mustafa Yiğit, a former police chief stated that (cited in Özdemir, 2009: 30) during the early 1950s,

Socialists who used to defend the cause of socialism but who had turned regretful of their pasts or communists who were afraid of and thus fleeing from the socialist regimes had been pouring into Turkey both from the Soviet Union and Germany. In the meantime, there were many Turkish communists, who first went abroad for educational reasons and then came back with a profound acquaintance with socialism. US government representatives were aware of these developments in Turkey and proposed to train the Turkish police on the fight against communism.

Secondly, the US started to develop its anti-drug politics as a pretext for the internationalization of its own criminal and policing structure all over the world, and Turkey became one of the places where the issue of opium crop turned out to be a major political issue. The cause of drug enforcement overwhelmingly provided the rationale to expand overseas the US law enforcement. Andreas and Nadelmann (2006: 128) says that:

[i]n late 1951, Federal Bureau of Narcotics opened a permanent office in Rome and a Second was opened in Beirut the following year. During the early 1960s, additional offices were established in Paris, Istanbul, Bangkok, Mexico City and Monterrey, Mexico. The men stationed abroad maintained contact with high-level police officials, developed informants, pressured local police and other officials.

In 1968, the USA gave Turkey an aid of three billion dollars in order for Turkey to build up sufficient number of police and gendarmerie units against drug smuggling. With the help of this aid, a department of narcotics was established for the first time

⁷⁹ In the 244th Volume of the Police Magazine published in 1930, there is a detailed list of non-Muslim women, which states their name and their ethnic or religious origin, who were deported from the new Republic.

within the Turkish General Security Directorate (Erhan, 1996: 88). The US was very insistent on the ban of opium agriculture in Turkey and she was even claiming that this abolition was much more beneficial to Turkey than Turkey's contribution in the military defense area (Erhan, 1996: 117). Despite the fact that this ban would have caused harm to the peasant class in Turkey and its replacement by other agricultural products would have taken time, the military government of 1971 gave in to the US pressures to put restrictions on the opium agriculture.

The military regime made use of *the International* as if it was an internal political constituency. In other words, the International filled in the legitimacy gap that the military regime was subject to in the internal political sphere and the police apparatus appeared to be vital as the *concentration of the power of the International Party of Order at home*. In fact, the US pressures to ban the cultivation of opium worked as a developed strategy of the IPO since through these pressures, any national resistance to the US's internationalized policing efforts was criminalized.

The issue of opium generated an uneven development between different departments of the Turkish National Police (TNP), fostering the development of a *police bureaucracy*. This has also helped the police organization to have a point of leverage in internal politics vis-à-vis other legal or illegal para-military internal security apparatuses. Hence, in line with the institutionalization of US hegemony in global capitalism, the internationalization of the Turkish police organization has started acquiring an American color. This was largely due to the fact that the narcotics bureau was working smoothly in accordance with the Cold War IPO's requirements as if it was not operating amidst the political crisis of the 1970s' Turkey.

The internationalization of the Turkish police as such through the global drug prohibition regime created a room of maneuver as well as the necessary conditions to obtain a relative autonomy from the national political field for the TNP. Moreover, despite the fact that 1970s' social and political struggles exhausted the Turkish police

organization in its entirety, the uneven development among different police departments within the Americanization process facilitated the rapid reorganization of the police force in the aftermath of the 1980 coup d'état in Turkey. In other words, the Cold War era's police apparatus created an appropriate base for the military regime of the 1980s over which to re-produce the police organization. The fruits of this long-standing cooperation was evident in 1981 when the UN Commission of Fight with Drugs claimed that due to the hard work of the Turkish police, the transit route of illicit drug trafficking had to change. Both Federal Germany and the US acknowledged this fact, and UN proposed to the TNP a technical aid worth of 250.000 dollars (Milliyet, 26.07.1981).

5.2 Turkish Police Internationalization during the Military Regime of the 1980s: Internationalization as a Rescue Strategy

The Cold War era had many effects on the reorganization of internal security apparatuses, mainly of the intelligence apparatuses. Many stay-behind organizations were erected by the CIA and NATO in many parts of the world. By 1978, the existence of these stay-behind organizations were formally acknowledged by the then Primary Minister, Bülent Ecevit, who instead of annulling these organizations, which he thought were almost conducting a civil war in Turkey against the left, had appeared to have decided to reinforce a parallel force, namely the technically poor and organizationally shattered police organization. Thus, parallel plans about the internal security apparatuses of the Turkish state were on the run from 1978 to 1980. Whereas Ecevit was pushing England as a model case for the reorganization of the Turkish police; the US and the Federal Germany were already very much involved in the reproduction of Turkey's internal para-militarized security apparatuses. The sole case of Mehmet Ali Ağca, the so-called assassin of both Abdi İpekçi and Pape Jean Paul II, is demonstrative of this involvement.⁸⁰

⁸⁰ The assassination of Pape Jean Paul II was an international complot organised by a network including CIA and Western Germany's Intelligence Agency, which trained many people from different nationalities in a decisive fight against communism, for details see von Rosques, Valeska (2007).

Ecevit's passive attitude towards the stay-behind organizations in Turkey and his non-supportive attitude towards the progressive forces within the police organization like the Association of Police (Pol-Der) was at odds with his supposedly "humanitarian stance" towards the issue of public order maintenance. Instead of fostering the power of the progressive police officers, he adhered himself to the notion of "neutrality" and leaned the stick towards the banning of all police associations including the Pol-Der.⁸¹

On the one hand, Ecevit's liberal conception of state, as a "neutral apparatus" was supported by the Scotland Yard police, a perfect example of the capitalist state police apparatus, whose legitimacy rises on the shoulders of this notion of neutrality. Nevertheless, this did not make Ecevit popular among the capitalist classes, who would not appreciate this quasi-liberal attitude but rather opt for the martial law and the coup d'état. The capitalist class of the late 1970s decided to discard with this notion of neutrality that was closely related with the legitimacy of the bourgeois state power in policing issues and preferred the martial law that facilitated the transition to the establishment of class power in policing issues. That is why, the capitalist class organized under the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen Association (TÜSİAD) published a report calling for a strong state and criminalizing the ongoing leftist struggles for social and political rights (Ataay, 2007: 228). The demand for the strong state, in return, was met from the leaders of the 1980 coup d'état in Turkey by an invitation asking the Turkish bourgeoisie to undertake the job of policing, at least by establishing private policing units within the work places and factories.⁸²

⁸¹ Pol-Der was a progressive association of police officers activated in 1976 as a "democratic mass organization" to first protect the social and economic rights of the police officers and to become the "people's police" [Halkın Polisi] in Turkey (Öner, 2003: 35). One of its first jobs was to go to the State Council in order to file a lawsuit against the bylaw enacted by the Nationalist Front Government in 1976 to let the graduates of *imam-hatip* schools to become police officers (Öner, 2003: 37).

⁸² Starting from the year of 1978, there appears to be a change in the Turkish state's perception of private security. During the early 1970s, the private security was codified as a mechanism that contradicts with the notion of state sovereignty and in 1974, a law proposal on the establishment of private security units within big private institutions was refused by the Justice Commission of the Turkish Grand National Assembly under the pretext that this would mean denying the state's exclusive right to legitimate use of force. However, in 1978 the General Security Directorate of Istanbul, Hayrettin Kozakçıoğlu stated that the state could not deal with the security needs of private corporations such as banks, which should

The 1980 coup d'état and the military regime that had lasted until 1983 in Turkey attempted, besides other security issues, at a broad restructuring of the police, which was considered to be unable to cope with the social and political transformations the country had been undergoing.⁸³ In a booklet published by the military and entitled the "Turkish Police in the 60th anniversary of the Republic" [Cumhuriyetin 60. Yılında Türk Polisi] published in 1984, the problems of the organization are listed as the following: lack of central planning; inadequacy of police stations and police powers to deal with crime; non-homogenous organizational structure in different regions and cities; overlapping jurisdictions among the different units of the police; uneven application of police responsibilities and powers among different cities; non-existence of the notion of logistics within the organization; inadequacy of the system of control and supervision; lack of education and training; absence of the specialization; neglect towards the crimes of smuggling, fight against drugs; usage of non-standardized weapons; inefficient policy of police employment; weak police management; lack of social and support programs for the welfare of police officers; and the loss of the binding authority of the regulations and directions.

An expansive plan of police modernization was put into work by the military regime, and the share of the investment expenditures for the police had risen from approximately to 10% to 37% of the general budget from 1982 to 1986 (Sözen and Çevik, 2004: 463). In 1983, riot police was established under the name of Rapid Action Units (Çevik Kuvvet) to replace the People's Police (Toplum Polisi) of the previous era.

establish private security units to guard themselves. This was the state's manifesto that a security market should be established to lessen the work-load of the police officers (Hülügü, 2009).

⁸³ The military regime of 1980 includes indeed the post 1978 era, when the martial law was declared and the military was largely involved in the administration of various cities. In that sense, 12 September 1980, the day of coup d'état, should be considered as the concentration moment of a larger period from 1978 to 1983. The reorganization of the police by the military regime of 1980 is also significant in terms of the military's condoning of the growing influence of religious sects within the police organization. Indeed, from the anecdotes of former police officers, it is understood that the influence of the religious sects within the police organization had started before the 1980 coup, during the years of 1978 and 1979 in the police college (Kındıra, 2001 and Adil Serdar Saçan cited in Yanardağ, 2008). It appears that the Turkist-Islamist ideology of the 1980 coup had found its first echo in the police organization.

New police stations were established, reaching a total number of 1.298 all around the country. A differentiation was made between some special statute cities and others in terms of police organization. The role of the police all along the country borders was brought to the fore. New police units were established in the airports with a focus on international crime. The job of inspectorships was given a more strict and respectable status.

The restructuring of the police by the military regime of the 1980-83 had placed at the center of the reform program the notion of “logistics”. The issue of logistics was a primary administrative issue for the military regime.⁸⁴ This was more than a quest for technical change. Similar to the previously described rationalization endeavors of the neoliberal politics of police reform, the military regime aimed at refounding the police, to rationalize the apparatus by separating the means of coercion from the police officers, and prevent excessive debureaucratization that might have turned into an impediment for the functioning of the police rather than an opportunity.

Another vital change introduced by the military regime of 1980 was the establishment of Foreign Relations Department to conduct a more engaged and devoted relation with the other nations’ police departments and international police institutions. The military regime was very ambitious to further the internationalization of the Turkish police in the aftermath of the coup d’état. It appears that there were visits in 1981 to Tunisia and Yugoslavia to develop cooperative relations between respective police organizations; in 1982 to Italy concerning the cooperation on the fight against drugs; in 1982 to the USA related again with the issue of war against drugs; many times to Interpol; and to Holland, Iraq and Federal Germany. The introduction of such a department should not be solely considered as an attempt to built-on the developments of late 1970s concerning the internationalization of the police. It was more than that.

⁸⁴ It is stated in the booklet prepared by the military regime that there were 55 kinds of different weapons in active usage within the police organization, some even dating from the year of 1900. The state of motorized vehicles used by the police organization was not much better.

A most important characteristic of the post-1978 era in Turkey is that the internationalization of the police was sought by different parts of the dominant classes as a rescue and self-promotion strategy. Nonetheless, this would not be sufficient to restore the rule of capital in Turkey.

In 1978, the Turkish government asked for help from Scotland Yard Police of England to deal with the “anarchy” (Devletoğlu, 2010: 127). Nonetheless, despite their experiences of a civil war waged against the IRA, the English police drew back when faced with the politicization level of the Turkish police (Devletoğlu, 2010: 128). The Scotland Yard police officers quitted the country just in the aftermath of the assassination of Cevat Yurdakul, the leftist chief of Adana police by “unknown offenders” (Devletoğlu, 2010: 232).⁸⁵ This was signaling that the West had abandoned its desires to keep the government intact; abort the coming of a military coup by appeasing the “anarchy”; and seemed quite persuaded of a need for such a military involvement. Moreover, it should be stated that the murder of Yurdakul was followed by a demonstration and met by the resistance of the leftist Adana police officers (Devletoğlu, 2010: 234)⁸⁶. This process also pointed out that the strategy of police internationalization as a rescue strategy was temporarily abandoned since it pre-required the erosion of all hopes in favor of a leftist re-establishment of the political field in Turkey, a task to be completed by the coup.

Nonetheless, the leave of the Scotland Yard police officers did not mean the end of initiatives on the part of the dominant classes concerning the reformation of Turkish police. Indeed, after the failure of Ecevit to bring the streets of the country under

⁸⁵ This leave of the Scotland Yard police officers coincided with the growing number of murders committed against the democrat-leftist intellectuals in Turkey like Abdi İpekçi as well as bureaucrats. This might not be pure coincidence as these assassinations were realized by the para-military organizations in Turkey, which were trained by the US since the 1950s. The Scotland Yard police officers were directly connected to Ecevit and were under his responsibility. Their quit meant that Ecevit had lost his hand in the reformation of Turkish security apparatuses.

⁸⁶ The practice of *resistance* is not foreign to Turkish police of the pre-coup d'état era. The Society Police of Ankara resisted for 3 hours in the aftermath of a killing of two police officers and the resistance was repressed by the military (Milliyet, 03.09.1980).

control, Demirel government tried first and foremost to secure the public order, and make the police to be able to get in the “no-police areas” (Devletoğlu, 1980: 254).

The establishment of public order was also cited by the IPO as a must whose non-fulfillment would then inevitably result in an international intervention, of course not anymore through the same means used by the 19th century Europe. That is why, the coup d'état of 1980 was also an international intervention into the policing politics of Turkey. Indeed, it is obvious from the English reports of the late 1970s that the concern about public order in Turkey was closely related with a bigger concern about the stability in the Middle East in general. The events before and around the 1979 Revolution of Iran is often mentioned as a case of anxiety due to their would-be effects on Turkey. Moreover, Turkey was often mentioned as an irreplaceable element of NATO due to its manpower. Thus, the policing politics of Turkey were of crucial importance to secure the interests of Western Powers, namely those of England, USA and Federal Germany in a wider geographical sphere.⁸⁷ Thus, even if not performed by international agents themselves, the military coup of 1980 as a policing plan of the ruling classes was a legitimate strategy of and for the IPO.⁸⁸

There is an incompatibility between the political and the international when the police apparatus is at stake in the capitalist system. It has been argued that the police apparatus is a form shaped by the struggle between working and capitalist classes. That is why; the modern police have to fight against an important historical component of its own form when it does fight against the working classes. The internationalization of the modern police facilitates this job of the police and reduces the pain of self-annihilation. Nonetheless, the late 1970s in Turkey was an aberration from this general state of affairs and the internationalization of the police did not work as a strategy no matter the

⁸⁷ The international aid of a million dollar donated to Ecevit by these three powers had not produced the expected results; could neither end or nor control the “anarchy” (Devletoğlu, 2010: 241).

⁸⁸ Bülent Orakoğlu, the former chief of police and former director of the Intelligence Department of General Security Directorate, argues that the CIA-supported 1980 coup d'état's first job was to annul Turkey's previous veto to the Greece's access to the NATO (2007: 15).

degree of it. That is because of the fact that the police organization had itself become a political field, a field of open struggle between two different police associations, one organized by the leftists (Pol-Der) and the other by the right-wing nationalists (Pol-Bir), thereby *realizing its own social form* in the utmost possible way.⁸⁹

The pre-coup d'état reports of the English Embassy stated that the major and nearly the only role of the Ministry of Internal affairs in Turkey was and should be to train the Turkish Police so that they could take over the job of policing from the army when the martial law was over (Devletoğlu, 2010: 181). Thus the panacea to the state of affairs in the Turkish Police was sought in their training and positioning not against but vis-à-vis the army. Moreover, the English reports on the state of affairs in Turkey by 1978 stated that the minimalization of the risk of ever-growing political polarization in Turkey, which involved not solely the militants but broader parts of the population, depended on the success of the army in detaining the militants both from the right and left (Devletoğlu, 2010: 190).

The IPO aimed at making the police a full blown pro-systemic state apparatus. Indeed, the IPO aimed at changing the nature of violence in Turkey, which was thought to be “feudal” (indeed, tribal) in the report prepared by the English embassy officers in Turkey (Devletoğlu, 2010: 188). The report associated the growing violent events in Turkey with the remnants of tribalism in the psychology of the Turks (Devletoğlu, 2010: 188).

That is also why the military regime's motto concerning the police apparatus was modernization, used in the sense that the police apparatus should not only be professionalized but also become a *political actor* itself, conscious of its systemic

⁸⁹ Pol-Bir is an organisation founded formally in 1978 order to counter the hegemony that the leftist police organisation had established within the police organisation. It was composed of nationalist police officers, mostly associated with the Natioanlist Movement Party (MHP), whose militants were conducting a fierce war against the leftists of the 1970s. Nonetheless, before the establishment of such an organisation, MHP associated police officers and some jorunalists were conducting a severe anti-Pol-Der propaganda (Öner, 2003).

mandates and own interests. Indeed, although the police apparatus was put under the command of the gendarmerie headquarters or even if the police college was put under the directorship of retired army officers, the police organization was not just taken under tight control of the military regime as a dependent parasitic body. On the contrary, it was also given an impetus to become a political actor, an authority with its own sphere of maneuver. It was professionalized so as to make it a respected element of the IPO. That is why; the military regime of 1980 issued a law to facilitate the purge of the leftist police within the organization, and ascertained the right to retirement to police officers who served at least for sixteen years.⁹⁰ The regime urged many to retire, using also the threat that if they did not retire, the regime would make use of their employment records to convince them. In fact, all members of Pol-Der were retired by force.

To make the police become adapted to its new role, the military regime gave to the police expanded executive powers like the right to interfere in personal liberties, privacy of personal life and of the home without asking permission from the judiciary in times of “emergency”. In the above mentioned report, it was also stated that “since September 12, 1980, there has been 41 laws either prepared directly by or commissioning some new functions to the police organization”. This was stated as a matter of proud and as demonstration of the changing nature of the police organization, where the regulations and other instructions had been disrespected for years. These changes were aiming the police to transform into a quasi-legislative body that was able to generate new rules, rather than simply executing them. In fact, the military regime was training/exercising the police in *new constitutionalism*, to make it able to sustain the capitalist system without being in need of any government whatsoever in power.

⁹⁰ Interview with an ex-police inspector. The interviewee said about the martial law and the military regime that “police could do nothing but to obey them since no matter you have guns you cannot risk of disobeying” [“Hiçbir babayiğit askerle çekişemez”]. Nonetheless, he also stated that the police had always benefited from the military regimes in terms of the improvement of police’s social and economic conditions. He gave the example of Kenan Evren who ordered the establishment of “Police Houses” [Recreational Facilities for Police and their families] in each and every city by way of granting lands from the state treasury to the Turkish National Police.

Among these *exercise* laws, the most encompassing one was EM-RE-MO (The Reorganization and the Modernization of the Security Organization), which was prepared as a 15 years' span strategic plan. Besides many topics of modernization such as the development of logistics mentioned before, the bill strongly suggested to undertake the job of "police housing". This latter was perceived as a vital issue to prevent the proletarianization of the police. The affinity between the police and people, indeed the fact that the police were living in shantytowns, had arguably created a vulnerability for the capitalist state's police by putting them under the direct exposition to leftist ideology. The bill argued that the prevention of this situation was only possible through the isolation of the police from people by building up police housing facilities since, it is argued, the police officers who lived in neighborhoods where different political fractions were dominant were coming under the influence of these political strands.⁹¹

All these changes should be analyzed with respect to the events of the 1970s, when the leftist police association was very influential within the entire organization and the leader of the right-wing Justice Party, Süleyman Demirel had to complain that "Töb-der, Pol-der and DİSK had been governing the state" (cited in Gürel, 2004: 2). Similarly, the police who were refusing to obey the governmental orders to repress workers and students were called as "communist police!" (Gürel, 2004: 9). The distinction between the rightist and leftist police officers was making the statesmen lose their temper and such sentences could have been pronounced by a right-wing former policeman: "I want the head of a policeman; there are no good or bad policemen; shoot them all!" (Gürel, 2004: 10).

⁹¹ One of the other important developments of this period was the improvement of the functions of the Strengthening of the Foundation for the Strengthening of the Turkish Police Organization [Türk Polis Teşkilatını Güçlendirme Vakfı], established in 1975 but which stood dysfunctional since then. This emerged as an important method of improving the class power over the police organization as the Foundation was made up of people from the police organization, people known for their scientific studies, and indeed of "distinguished" business men.

The police officers were even showing the courage to disrespect the martial law, where in Adana in 1979 for instance, they shouted slogans such as “Down with the martial law!” and “Long live the revolutionaries!” after the assassination of the chief of police in Adana, Cevat Yurdakul (Gürel, 2004: 12). In that sense, the police were, against the tide, showing an inclination towards the left side of the dialectic and choosing not to be self-annihilative but generative. This was controversial to the whole anti-political power of the police internationalization. It is then not surprising to see that the military regime had to lean towards whatever kind of police internationalization and increased its degree. Anyway, they were strengthening this strategy of the right-wing governments of the late 1970s.

It appears that the state had recognized the weakness and non-professionalism of the Turkish police as early as the mid-1970s. For instance in 1980, the Ministry of Interior Hasan Fehmi Güneş noted that “between 1966 and 1973, we had given uniforms and weapons to a number of 14 000 persons who had not had the least of any training and we told them that ‘you are police officers now’ and sent them at the very heart of suicide-like situations” (cited in Gourisse, 2008).

Federal Germany appears to be the leading actor of the Turkish police internationalization during the period of 1974-1980.⁹² Not only political but also cultural visits were organized between the two countries’ police forces. Moreover, Federal Germany gave aid to the Turkish police to beat the “anarchy” reigning in the country. In 1980, visitors from Federal Germany came to Turkey to make observations in the Istanbul police and declared that the Turkish police organization was in need of technical help to beat the “anarchy”, which was used to be a big problem for the Federal German police itself in the previous years (Milliyet, 11.06.1980). The direct involvement of Germany appears to be related with the Federation of Democrat

⁹² The first secretary of United Kingdom Embassy in Turkey during the years of 1975-87, David Lane argues that Germany had greater involvement in the coup abortion politics when compared with Britain and was more interested in the fate of Turkey (cited in Devletoğlu, 2010: 287).

Nationalist Turkish Associations in Europe, which acted as a side-organization of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) in Germany, whose membership in Germany had reached a number of 26.000 (Milliyet, 10.09.1980). Thus, Federal Germany's involvement into the restructuring of the Turkish Police in Turkey should somehow be linked with her desire to have a control on the nationalist movement both in Turkey and Germany as well as her desire to fight with communism.⁹³

The German experience in the fight against communism was very much admired by the then Turkish politicians. Turhan Feyzioğlu, a renowned Turkish politician of the 1970s, argued that the illegal organizations in Turkey should have been destroyed from the beginning like “Baader-Meinhof gang” in Germany (Milliyet, 24.07.1980). It is argued that the strategy of this gang to target the political leaders and members of the capitalist class had been used by some radical groups in Turkey. Indeed, the ever growing need for the restructuring of the police was also triggered by this new strategy of the left in Turkey. A member of the richest families in Turkey, Erol Sabancı told to English diplomats in 1979 that “until now the terrorists were not touching on the foreigners and businessmen and were killing each other. This had changed” and continued on by saying that his brother Özdemir Sabancı could not get out of home due to fear from terrorists and could not even go and visit the workplaces out of fear from death (Devletoğlu, 2010: 230). The fear of the dominant classes from becoming targets of the radical groups expanded the individual involvement of many capitalists into the policing issues. The expansion of the private policing in Turkey in the aftermath of the coup d'état was also demonstrative of this greater concern.⁹⁴

⁹³ The case about Federal Germany is very complex due to the fact that after the coup d'état of 1980, many nationalists entitled as “Bozkurts” associated with the MHP were granted asylum from Federal Germany in return for their intelligence service to, and hence protection by, the Federal Germany's Intelligence Service (von Ronques, 2008: 38). Moreover, the international aid to Turkish police continued to come from Federal Germany even in the aftermath of the coup d'état (Milliyet, 25.11.1980).

⁹⁴ In 1980, the state prepared a law draft whose preamble stated that the big private institutions such as banks should establish their own private security units to secure themselves against the “anarchy” and those institutions, which would not do so within six months from the enactment of the law, would be punished by the state. Moreover, these private guards were entitled to use guns and take criminals under custody and would be considered as public officers whenever it was deemed necessary. In other words,

The technically and administratively poor structure of the police organization was a pretext for the military regime which preferred to use the term of “logistics” to involve in the restructuring of the police.⁹⁵ Yet, this deprived situation of the police was also a crude reality. The poor police structure was in fact pointing out to the fact that other internal security actors were more appreciated during the Cold War than the police apparatus. The neglect concerning the situation of the police apparatus is astonishing when one hears police chiefs saying the following: “it is now very important that the state should provide the uniforms, equipment, heating and similar basic needs of the police officers rather than the neighborhood” (Milliyet, 18.08.1980). The police apparatus was not supported by the state and the police were dependent on people in terms of material and other survival equipments. Thus, showing still a dependency on the people which they were supposed to govern, the police was not at all in tandem with the requirements of a bourgeois state form. In fact, the formation of state monopoly of coercion (under the bourgeois state form) means that the state can thereafter be able to provide its own coercive apparatuses with necessary and basic survival equipments to sustain its credibility and administrative power.

But this state of affairs was also used by the military regime as an excuse to get rid of some specific tasks assigned to public police. It was argued that the police should be saved from the yoke of private policing tasks. The head of the military coup, Kenan Evren stated that the banks and similar firms should have their own private securities (Milliyet, 09.03.1980). Thus, the notion of national security defined by the 1980 coup d'état was already familiar with the notion of private security and its benefits for the former's establishment. National security and its repressive forms of government like

the capitalist classes of Turkey were asked and even were obliged to contribute in the organization of coercion in Turkey (Hülagü, 2009).

⁹⁵ IPO was also using the same language about the need to reform the Turkish police. For instance, in the report composed by the Scotland Yard police after a four months visit to the Turkish police in the year of 1978, it was stated that the Turkish police would possibly not be able to make use of the new technology due to the resilience of the past outmoded policing methods (Devletoğlu, 2010: 127).

martial law were not only encompassing the notion of private security in practice but also in theory as was the case in the US.⁹⁶

To resume the military regime's politics of police apparatus, it can be said that the military aimed at the modernization of the Turkish police apparatus to make it a pro-systemic political actor. To this end, it made use of different methods but furthering the internationalization of the police was among the preferred ones as one of the first jobs of the military regime was the establishment of a foreign affairs office within the police apparatus. Moreover, the military regime re-founded the police not solely through modernization, used in the neoliberal sense of the word, but also with small steps that introduced private policing into the agenda of the capitalist classes.⁹⁷ In that way, the police apparatus was tried to be made immune from the impact of anti-systemic forces. All these steps meant the expansion of class power in the issue of policing as the military regime's invitation to the capitalist classes to establish their private security units implied best.

⁹⁶ The private policing was gradually becoming a major constituent of the US national security strategies since the 1970s. By the 1990s, it was already acknowledged that private and public police were equal partners and the former should not be conceived as an auxiliary force. Rather, private police were equal both in status and in philosophy to the state police. With the advent of "anti-terrorism" as the major state strategy, the US started defining private policing as a major component of national security politics. As terrorism was defined as a threat to the "national resources" such as private industries, shopping malls and big groceries, private police that undertook the security of these places were considered part and parcel of national fight against terrorism. For further details on the adventures of private policing in the US, see Joh (2006).

⁹⁷ The introduction of private policing in the agenda of the capitalist class of Turkey was indeed an invitation to them to get concerned with the organization of coercion in Turkey. In that sense, the military regime trained the capitalist class of Turkey in the privatization of political. They had to learn how to transfer more and more issues that were previously dependent on the state to their own sphere of class power. In that sense, the military regime of 1980 opened the way for the expansion of class power in Turkey. This invitation to private security was a first step where the link between the class power and the public police was installed. The class power's expansion on the issues related with the public police was owed to this early acquaintance of the capitalist class in Turkey with the private security. This was also symptomatic of the general character of the relations between the state and the bourgeoisie in Turkey. The latter encouraged the military to become its political party in the 1980 because of its impotency of governing the crisis of the late 1970s (Öngen, 2004). Yet, this did not mean that the bourgeoisie was incapacitated in terms of its political power (Yalman, 2004).

5.3 Özal Years and the Restructuring of the Police as a Restorative Power

The military regime and the following Özal period in the beginning aimed also at controlling the non-legal security apparatuses of the state, inherited from the Cold War structures, through a restructured and strengthened police. This was also what was meant by making the police apparatus a “political actor”. In other words, the police apparatus emerged as a force to counter or absorb the negative effects of the non-legal security apparatuses of the state for the benefits of the rule of capital. The internationalization of the police during the early 1980s period aimed at the generation of new institutions via whom others would be bounded by. This was to take under warranty that the reorganization of the state via the paramilitary or stay-behind organizations could not cross the lines, indeed the lines of bourgeois state legitimacy. Therefore, during this *early phase* of neoliberal restructuring the police apparatus emerged as a superstructural valve.

In fact, for a state apparatus to be successful in the maintenance of order for the smooth functioning of the capitalist system there is need for something different than a close and harmonious cooperation between different security apparatuses. There should actually be a *well regulated struggle* in-between these security apparatuses. For instance, the transformation of the security apparatuses of the capitalist state in accordance with the neoliberal ideology is not a homologous process for different constituents of these apparatuses. Lack of such a homology exacerbates the struggles among them and between them and other political actors.

To ask for an absolute cooperation between security apparatuses can turn out to be a crisis for the capitalist state since the uneven development between these apparatuses is a historical- structural feature of the modern state, which also moves by exploiting this unevenness in its different jobs of suppression. That is why, as the modern state cannot abolish this uneven development of its own apparatuses, it needs to regulate and control it. Therefore, the police apparatus, which used to be itself a cause of crisis in late 1970s,

received such a restorative mission during the 1980s. This was a mission for constant restoration whenever the non-legal state security apparatuses cross the line of tolerability for the capitalist order itself.

For instance, the fight against drugs became paradoxically a fight against the paramilitary apparatuses, which had been established to fight against communism all around the world, since these very state-linked apparatuses had also engaged into the business of smuggling and drug trafficking. Therefore, whereas many capitalist states were supporting the establishment and operations of non-legal paramilitary apparatuses, they were at the same time trying to take them under control. The ruling classes of Turkey aimed at remodeling the police as the state's self-control apparatus, an apparatus to restore the fundamentals of a capitalist state whenever stay behind apparatuses degenerated. However, as will be demonstrated in the following lines, this restorative mission of the Turkish National Police (TNP) would retrieve back by the mid-1990s.

The Özal period was the first honeymoon of the IPO in Turkey ever since the early 1970s, when the IPO's anti-opium regime was put into force by the military intervention of 1971. As mentioned before, Turkey's efforts concerning the war against drugs were very much appreciated by the IPO at that time. Moreover, it was stated that the fight against terrorism had been added to the issues list of Interpol due to Turkey's dedicated case on demonstrating the link between the smuggling of weapons/drugs and terrorism, and therefore her proposal to add terrorism on the responsibility areas of Interpol (Milliyet, 16.04.1984).⁹⁸

The Özal era was in continuity with the military regime in terms of police restructuring. Not only was this caused by the envy of the military to sustain the basics of its regime after the army's quit from political rule, but also because of the commitments of the new so-called democratic regime to make out of the police apparatus an

⁹⁸ Turkey's ascendancy in its services to the Interpol coincides with a period when the head of the US Secret Service was elected Interpol president in 1984 (Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006: 141).

internationalized and thus ideologically locked-in apparatus.⁹⁹ As was the case during the military regime which established police attachés abroad¹⁰⁰, the Özal era witnessed the growing engagement of the Turkish police with the US police.

An agreement was reached with the US for the training of police officers (especially of the members of the Special Anti-Terror Teams) and for the provision of technical support and cooperation in the fight against terrorism (Milliyet, 26.07.1985 and Milliyet, 02.02.1986). Furthermore, it was stated that the airport and border police would be trained in the US and the system applied by the US in the Mexican border would be imported to Turkey (Milliyet, 27.07.1985).

Meanwhile during the Özal era, the Law on Police Duties and Responsibilities was rewritten. Despite the opposition of the European Economic Organization to the newly enacted Police Responsibilities and Duties Law, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Belgium declared that Prime Minister Özal had convinced him about the Police Law (Milliyet, 17.07.1985). The Police Law of 1985 turned out to be a big issue of discontent among the public and it was even represented by the press as the first issue ever since the coup on which the public had been re-politicized. The law was a very repressive law giving expanded rights to the police, including the right for the Ministry of Interior Affairs to establish Special Teams of Police whenever deemed necessary. Moreover, the police were entitled with the power to closely follow the political suspects, and before being refused by the Parliament the Police Bill included the right to detain those who were suspected of committing a crime in the near future.

The head of the Union of Bars of Turkey argued that this system was aiming at the creation of a “police bureaucracy” (Milliyet, 15.09.1986). This important foresight also

⁹⁹ It is often stated that during the military regime era the police organization was structured in such a way to sustain the militarization practices even in the aftermath of the martial law (Milliyet, 22.01.1982)

¹⁰⁰ Besides the establishment of such an institution of attachés’, the renowned police chief of the military regime, Şükrü Balcı was appointed for unknown reasons to a diplomatic mission to the US in the midst of a peak in his carrier in Istanbul. Balcı had served as the General Security Director of Istanbul in the years from 1977 to 1983.

signaled that the internationalization strategy of the military regime concerning the police, and its ambition to make out of the police “a tough political actor” worked during the Özal era, albeit in a degenerated manner since, as will be discussed, instead of a powerful “political actor”, a police bureaucracy emerged. This was also the result of a growing concern with the ideological formation of the police chiefs who were sent to the US to get the necessary training in 1986, whose content is still unknown to public.

The police apparatus was not solely reconfigured for the suppression of the masses and the disciplining of the labour according to the new neoliberal regime of accumulation but also and mostly for the restructuring of the whole state apparatus as a policing state, in the “international” meaning of the term. The policing state, in its international meaning, refers to becoming an active but also a legitimate partner of the IPO in dictating neoliberal policies. The TNP hence got articulated to the international. In fact, the US appeared to be grateful to Turkey for her propaganda of anti-terrorism in the international sphere in an era when the then US President Reagan had given impetus to the anti-communist struggle in countries like Nicaragua and Afghanistan. The US support to the state in Turkey was provided in return through international reports prepared on the state of police apparatus in Turkey which argued that there was no systematic torture in Turkey during the military regime era (Milliyet, 15.02.1981).

Meanwhile, the Özal era signaled the consolidation of class power in policing matters by building on the legacy of the military regime. Not only that the individual capitalists were more involved in the financing of the police organization through donations to the Foundation for the Strengthening of the Turkish Police Organization but also they were ideologically well adapted to that century old notion of the protection of the statesmen from the anarchists, very much promoted both first by Chancellor Bismark and thereafter by Theodor Roosevelt to consolidate the IPO’s mandate.¹⁰¹ For instance,

¹⁰¹ For instance, the Holding Company of Ahmet Veli Merger, made a donation of ten million Turkish lira to the (TPOF) in 1986. [Milliyet, 13.11.1986].

some protestors were subject to the anger of a businessman traveling with Özal, whose reaction triggered the publication of an ironic sub-heading in the journal Milliyet: “Businessman Support to the Police” [Polise İşadamı Desteği] (Milliyet, 25.08.1987). Indeed, the capitalist class was protecting the state in the example of this businessman. He was the concentration of the cultural and ideological state of the capitalist class during the Özal era.

By 1985, Special Operation Teams were established in Turkey against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party’s (PKK) activities in southeastern Turkey. By that time they were called “eagles” (Milliyet, 02.02.1986).¹⁰² The 1980s also witnessed operations within the police organization against the police chiefs who were accused of being involved in illegal and mafia activities such as smuggling. Indeed, the head of the Police Department of Smuggling and Intelligence, Atilla Aytek, was removed from his job as part of a bigger purge of police chiefs whose names were involved in similar crimes (Milliyet, 30.05.1988). That is to say, the establishment of these special teams in the police was happening during an era of failure on the previously famous and internationally beloved departments of narcotics and smuggling.

In the same period that those special teams were established, a new rhetoric somehow started to be heard within the organization: “There is no country who is a friend of us” (Milliyet, 30.05.1988). This was opposed to the internationalized but also and mostly Americanized language of the ex-popular departments of the General Security Directorate such the department of narcotics. The owner of these words, General Security Director of the year of 1988, Sebahattin Çakmakoğlu was complaining about the European states’ accusation of the Turkish police from crimes of torture and arguing

¹⁰² It should be noted that these special teams were putting on local outfits like *şalvar* and were also said to be involved in the social services like the establishment of restrooms in the villages (Milliyet, 21.09.1987). Thus, these highly militarized teams were still making use of the century old policing technique of bringing “civilization”. This does show that the Kurdish question was not solely criminalized in the 1980s but also and at the same time perceived as a question of lack of “civilization” as was the case during the 1930s’ Turkey.

that Turkish police organization was using the same interrogation techniques with the West.

This quasi-isolation period can be explained in relation to the end of the US Cold War strategy. The changing atmosphere of the Cold War gave a very short break to the internationalization of the police, a very short period of transition in the very end of 1980s. It is illuminating to observe how the retreat of the leverage of the International led to a rapid degeneration of the Turkish police force in this period. This partial stay away caused the police to become more and more tied to the internal political sphere, without a doubt to the political games of the ongoing intra-class war. Once the International retreated, the police had to find leverage among the dominant classes of Turkey for its own survival. It was not a coincidence that the mafia-ization of the police and the war against the renowned “God fathers” of Turkey went hand in hand in the same period. This process resulted in the purge of some police officers and in the ascendancy of some others.

The sublation of the TNP into a “police bureaucracy” happened also because of the close relations between the new rich of the Özal era and the police chiefs. The police chiefs turned into private security guards of the former. Yet this process further alienated the police from the job of routine policing and thus furthering its high-level ambitions to become a visible political actor. In other words, the military regime’s aspiration for the privatization of security and thus freeing of the police from the yoke of bodyguardship not much surprisingly backed fire. The police apparatus itself became the private security apparatus of the rich in Turkey.¹⁰³

¹⁰³ It should also be noted that this was a universally observed development for police apparatuses in many different countries turned out to be nearly private security apparatuses of the capitalist classes, as argued in the previous chapter and will be further mentioned in the following lines. However, this was not exactly the case in the Özal era, where this relation between the police and the rich of Turkey was putting the reliability of the police into risk. For the idea of the privatization of security did not lead to an ideological and systemic transformation over the Turkish police apparatus, which was more in a process of degeneration.

Moreover, the same period witnessed the hatred of the police from people, including the working classes, students, gays, and members of the press. All these were becoming subject to police cruelty, torture and beating.¹⁰⁴ The material empowerment of the police during and by the military regime was now combined with the new ideology of bodyguardship. This elevated the struggles internal to the police institution to the higher echelons of the political life as opposed to the pre-1980 era when these internal police struggles were taking place at the lower echelons, even at the public level indeed. The reproduction of the inter-police struggles at the top of the political sphere was also a consequence of the total abolition of the left from the police organization.

All these three factors, namely the temporary retreat of internationalization, the emergence of a police bureaucracy, and the police's hatred of people meant the loss of the relative autonomy of the police organization. This was due to the direct repercussions intra-capitalist class struggles had on the police. Hence, whereas the police of late 1970s was reflecting inter-class struggles in Turkey, the one in late 1980s was shaped by intra-ruling class struggles.

The retreat of the International due to the end of the Cold War also produced an effect of disburden on the police forces whose social demands increased by 1989. For instance, in Peru, Portugal and Greece, police organized demonstrations and strikes to make their voice heard by the political authorities and were repressed down by the freshly-built up anti-terror teams, indeed by their own colleagues. This process had also its repercussions in Turkey, where the pauperization of the police gave way to two things: hatred of the people, and further degeneration (i.e. corruption). In June 1991, many police officers using the police wireless network asked for the resignation of the Ministry of Interior while saying: "we are hungry; we need pay increase, pay increase..." (Milliyet, 17.06.1991).¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁴ For how the police treated these segments of society, see Milliyet, 05.05.1989.

¹⁰⁵ The mobilization of the police on the basis of their social and economic conditions evolved into a "plebian-fascist" reaction by the beginning of the 1990s as there was not any more a leftist legacy within the police, and all the more, the new political conditions (the intra-class struggles and the Turkist-Islamist

To sum up the general characteristics of the Özal era, it can be said that the initially assigned job to the police apparatus, which is becoming a superstructural valve that controls the inter-coercive apparatuses tension, did not work simply because the police apparatus degenerated in an unprecedented manner. In fact, this period also represented the early phase of the neoliberalisation of the police apparatus since the previous period's legacy (the politicization of the police under the impact of the Left) was completely erased and even replaced by a pro-rich stance among the police, where a police bureaucracy appeared more and more into the scene of high politics. Notwithstanding all these non-realized projects and despite the short break of police internationalization by the end of the Cold War, the TNP became more and more tied to the IPO, especially through the training of police chiefs from Turkey in the US (Milliyet, 10.02.1986). This is indeed the pre-history of the neoliberal police reform that will be applied during the late 1990s and since then on in the Turkish National Police.

5.4 Turkish Police in the 1990s: Internalization of the IPO's Neoliberal Post-Soviet Politics of Policing

This section aims at showing how the Turkish police apparatus consolidated its powers around a police bureaucracy and the ideology of Turkist-Islamism, and got integrated into the neoliberal reform agenda by the end of the 1990s.

5.4.1 Empowerment of the Police Apparatus through Neoliberalism

In the previous section, it is argued that the Turkish police apparatus rose up to the higher echelons of the ongoing political games in the country and yet this was just one side of the coin. On the other side, it was also argued that a process of decomposition of

ideology dominant within the police apparatus) were directing the reaction of the police officers to “those who were comfortable in their chairs”, “the intellectuals”, and “those who were in upstairs” most of the time associated with the leftists in Turkey (Bora, 2001). In fact, the plebian-fascist reaction of the police officers was pointing out to the gap left with the complete erosion of Pol-Der's legacy from the police organization. On of the most important declaration of Pol-Der, the 1976 declaration addressing the whole society in Turkey claims that “police should be relieved from the situation which is entitled as the complex of pariah so that a professional portrait of citizen could be established...” (Öner, 2003: 46).

the coercive apparatuses of capitalist states was on its way because of the end of the Cold War. That said the police apparatus of the early 1990s became the arena over which the heavily decomposed Cold-War era coercive actors (para-military and counter-guerilla units or members) were realigned/reorganized under the context of the 1990s “low-intensity civil war” in Turkey.

The 1990s in Turkey were marked by expanded social discontent. Kurdish issue, urbanization, and the awakening of the working classes (1989 Spring Movements, 1991 Zonguldak Strike) paved the way for a political crisis. The state’s response to this process was the establishment of the low-intensity war doctrine in Turkey. Indeed during the 1990s, the bourgeoisie was impotent at creating a common social-political hegemonic project leading to a void in “ideological” sphere and thus paving the way for the need for advanced modes of policing (Yalman, 2003). The 1990s was a period of “coercion” taking place in the political scene to compensate the “bourgeoisie’s impotency” (Öngen, 2003). This meant the degradation of the political sphere in terms of “ideas” (Cizre & Yeldan, 2005).

One of the reasons of this impotency is that the early 1990s were not only marked by the Kurdish movement and the increasing working class discontent but also with the overgrowth of the Islamist reactionism. The state was undergoing a crisis of being “too” much under the influence of different social forces (Öngen, 2003).¹⁰⁶ Hence, this socially-over-embedded-state could not manage to solve the crisis, and thus felt the need to recourse to “coercion”.

However, the fact that the state was over-embedded in conflicting social and political forces was also partially the result of the transition period in the remaking of the

¹⁰⁶ It is not then a coincidence that the Turkish police was held by one of these social forces. The then Ministry of Interior of the Ecevit government, Hasan Fehmi Güneş, declared that the deterioration of the police organization was mostly due to the 12 Eylül regime, which considered the restructuring of the Turkish police along the lines of Scotland Yard as a fantasy, and he added that the police organization had been under the influence of religious sects for a long time (Milliyet, 22.07.1990).

International, which was suffering from the void resulting from the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union. The reconfiguration of the IPO's politics of policing was crucial since "the new world order has made each of these three [state; civil society organizations and police themselves] actors less willing to tie their fate to each other in the same territorial space..." (Davis, 2006: 81). One of the first agendas of the IPO would be then to prevent the police apparatuses from becoming socially over-embedded.

Thus, by the mid-1990s on one side the state was undergoing a political crisis which was increasing the paralysis of its own organs to sustain the order in the country. The viability of the state power was at stake and the sole ability of the bourgeoisie at home was to come over this crisis with the empowerment of its own class power via furthering the institutionalization of private security in Turkey. Indeed, the ever growing role of the private security was signaling that despite the lack of a holistic project on the side of the bourgeoisie to restore the order through a whole-scale reconfiguration of state power, the bourgeoisie had started to lean the stick towards the enhancement of class power over the policing apparatuses to compensate its own impotency.¹⁰⁷

This dialectical relation between these two major issues, the impotency of the bourgeoisie to sustain the smooth functioning of the system because of a failure to generate "new governing ideas" and the strategy to tie one's own self to the new neoliberal post-Soviet world order created a profitable business of security. Security turned out to be the most profitable and indeed most advanced authority-granting "production" branch for the capital during the 1990s. Moreover, the polished police

¹⁰⁷ This period was different than the state of private security under the military regime. The military regime openly named the private institutions which should built on private security units and defined them by law. However in 1991 by a change in law on private security, many institutions were freed from the responsibility of establishing their own private security units within their work places. This, indeed, did not mean a retreat in the state's policies towards the privatization of security. Just the contrary, the new law facilitated the expansion of market on security as those institutions who were relieved from the job of self-protection could now purchase security from the market. In fact, by 1995 the number of private security firms had increased from twenty to two hundred (Hülagü, 2009).

bureaucracy of the 1980s had upgraded to the status of direct bearers of the lucrative accumulation opportunities. The basis of the 1990s undercover economy:

was arm and illegal drug traffic. The extraordinary fortunes made in these businesses (which are also called as black money) were invested again in the same business and money laundering was ongoing in the casinos. The power of that money was affecting the politics and the influential political figures were sustaining the working of this mechanism. While the fortunes were growing, the central figures were 'nationalists working for their homelands' (Köymen, 2007: 148-49).

Whereas the bourgeois state form was not coping with the political crisis of the 1990s due to the lack of "ideas", the police organization was able to stay intact and even empowered. In comparison to the previous police organizations in Turkey despite high degree of degeneration prevailing in it.

The most probable reason appears to be that the police apparatus was able to generate its own "ideas" or *internal ideology* around the notion of "Turkish-Islamic synthesis". As a demonstration of this fact for instance, the police organization singled out "imams" as the nexus of cooperation with the society. During the First Gulf War in 1991, seizing opportunity from the situation, the police decided to teach the imams the basics of civil defense to protect people from the possible effects of the chemical weapons in Southeast Turkey (Milliyet, 09.01.1991).

A further demonstration of the ideological tightness of the police organization was widespread protests displayed by the police officers during the funerals of their colleagues shot to death by both Dev-Sol, the illegal leftist organization of the 1990s, and the PKK. In these funerals, the police officers were shouting slogans after crying *Tawhid*: "Blood for Blood, Revenge... Damn with the human rights... İzmir will become grave to the communists..." (Milliyet, 23.02.1992).¹⁰⁸ The police were not only

¹⁰⁸ Moreover, the police chiefs of this period were repeating quite constantly that they had no fear other than the fear of God, and citizens should help the police in their case against the dissidents. Other slogans were such that "Ezans won't stop, Flags will not be lowered", "No matter how much blood will be shed, the victory is of Islam" (Ezan Susmaz! Bayrak İnmez!; Kanımız aksa da zafer İslamın!). The police even wrote down and distributed a declaration signed as "Turkish Police" where it was stated that it was the police officers who were the real offspring of the Turkish nation (millet) (Milliyet, 09.02.1992). Thus, they were positing the Turkish nation rather than the state as their point of reference.

behaving in a mood of hatred towards the people but were also quite angry with the state itself, which they thought, left them “abandoned”. This point is crucial in understanding the police reform of the late 1990s and early 2000s. Indeed, the police were not distancing themselves from *the idea* of an all-mighty sacred state but from the Turkish state in flesh and bones.

In that sense, the police apparatus was building its own internal ideology, not at all times in perfect harmony with the existing state and sometimes even at odds with the official ideology. The low intensity-war however hid this ever growing disparity between the police ideology of that period and the official ideology.

This period of growing police anger towards the people also saw, as mentioned, the expansion of police powers through such new institutions as Special Operation Teams to conduct the low intensity civil warfare against the PKK and Kurds in the southeastern Anatolia. Nonetheless, the opposition forces in the country did not give up their demands about the restructuring of the policing politics of the state, and asked for the taking away of the interrogation powers of the police, and transfer of these powers to the judges and public prosecutors (Milliyet, 25.02.1992). And yet the police were not happy at all with the changes in the justice sector reform, such as the limiting of the custody period to four days, and they argued for longer custody periods.

All around the world, police organizations have always been concerned with their relations with the public, and yet what look paradoxical about the 1990s’ Turkey, are the growing concerns of the police organization about police-public relations in a period when the police atrocity was at its peak. This cannot be considered solely as a search for the compensation of this loss of legitimacy, and prestige through other methods of dialogue. This paradoxical togetherness and search for a more close relation with the public appears to be the characteristic of the post-Soviet neoliberal policing, as explained in detail in the previous chapter. While the end of Cold War brought to the fore the need to sweep away the messy corrupt relations of anti-communist policing

years, it also asked for the reconfiguration of the existential element of the internationalized modern police, namely its anti-political character.

One of the former Security Directors of Turkey, Necdet Menzir, claimed in the 1990s that the police organization was the most open institution to novelties, and that in other state organizations people resisted to these changes more than it was the case with the police (Milliyet, 13.12.1992). It is not surprising then that the police emergency line of 155 was promoted during these years (Milliyet, 15.04.1992). A further effort of the early 1990s was to make people as well as the kids visit the police centers (*karakols*). Finally, the introduction of secret cameras to the urban life in order to watch the streets also started in these years.

In fact, this quick adaptation of the police organization to the newly emerging post-Soviet neoliberal policing regime and to the IPO's envy to bring to the fore the police apparatuses rather than the military armies to sustain public order, as depicted in the previous chapter, found its echo in the words of the then President of Republic Turgut Özal, himself one of the leading representatives of the transnational bourgeoisie of the 1980s, who argued that:

[a]s the world is now relieved from the fear of hot war which could have erupted in the Cold War era, the war hereafter is much of a special kind. There will always be evil people, bad people and the fight against these people is the job of the police. One should acknowledge this fact. Some people say that the special operation teams should be shot down. Why to do so? Special teams are specially trained...To say that the special teams should go is to say that we do want to fulfill the gap emanating from their leave. We cannot accept this (Milliyet, 11.04.1992).

As a matter of fact, the year 1993 saw fierce struggles among intra-security agencies in Turkey, and the General Security Directorate was powerfully supported by the ruling party's head, the then Prime Minister Tansu Çiller, who among other things established the Department of Special Operations, as an independent and differentiated body from the Departments of Terrorism and Public Order. She pressured the National Security Council to accept the General Security Director as a permanent member.

5.4.2 The Early Neoliberal Reform Era

It was a very common approach to argue that the police apparatus became militarized during the civil war conducted against the PKK and the Kurds in southeastern Turkey during the 1990s. However, the term militarization stays insufficient to capture the essence of change in the police apparatus of 1990s. Why and how?

First, the debate on the establishment of a “professional army” was very popular among the ruling classes in 1993. Still, it was thought to be in contradiction with the spirit of nation-state, and the examples from the Ottoman era and the Janissary system were cited to make notice of the uncontrollable character of a paid army. Hence, a full-blown professional special army was not established, and instead special teams were made up of paid and voluntary people who had done their military service as commandos. The police organization was also expanding the breath of its special operation teams by way of employing ex-commandos to fight with the PKK. The line between the army and the police was blurred and this was entitled by the Prime Minister of that period Tansu Çiller, as the “New Army”. This “New Army” was involved into the business of illegal weapons market. A commander, Erdal Sarızeybek (cited in Paker, 2010: 417), tells in his memories that

[o]nce the state could not provide us with the weapons we asked for; we did purchase them with our own money... Each squad and each *karakol* have provided their own weapons themselves... There was a weapon race among the teams. And the village guards were involved within this race too. And they even went ahead of us as they were buying anti-aircraft guns and mortar bombs. Not just us, all teams in the southeastern region, both the police and the gendarmerie, have followed that way.

This issue of one’s buying its own weapons in to fill the gap opened up by the state was not the same with the early Republican era’s state failure to provide each police officer with a proper gun; it was neither the same with one of the concerns of the 1980 military regime about the technical modernization of the police apparatus through the standardization of weapons used in the organization, which were dating from the early Republican era. That is to say, it did not point out to a state failure or inadequacy. It pointed out to a change in the notion of state monopoly of coercion, which requires the

state to be the legitimate supplier of physical coercion apparatuses. This war situation relaxed that notion of state monopoly and propagated indirectly the idea that private individual initiatives in the supply of security were welcome. Private security firms, whose number were augmenting in an unprecedented manner and who were operating in a law-free environment, were also part of this process.¹⁰⁹ They were presented in the dominant media as the “red berets”, a notion reminiscent of the special operations teams which were called as “maroon berets” (Hülagü, 2011). Therefore, they were included in the low-intensity warfare ongoing in Turkey.¹¹⁰

Indeed, the year of 1993 marks the beginning of a new phase in the history of the Turkish police organization. Besides the establishment of the Special Operation Teams, the period was also an era of reforms in the police, induced by the European Union (EU).

Indeed, the two, which were thought to be antithetical, were feeding each other in conceptual and theoretical terms. The demands of change made by the EU on the structure of the Turkish police organization was not completely at odds with the changes made in the police apparatus according to the needs of a civil war. The neoliberal character of these demands facilitated the endorsement of many authoritarian changes ongoing within the police organization.

The most obvious topic of the EU-induced police reforms was the issue of “decentralization”. The police chief of the low intensity civil war,

¹⁰⁹ Such a law which would determine, define, and regulate the legal status of the private security firms was not introduced up until the year of 2004.

¹¹⁰ Moreover, another state policy against “terrorism” was to practice the people in vigilance, which is a constitutive part of the ideology of security privatization. Village guardship was the most institutionalized form of vigilance in the 1990s and yet, other and more subtle mechanisms were involving the distribution of weapons into villages by city governors; the making of local people participate as audience in the real operations conducted by the police in their neighborhoods. This was also to blur the line between the police and citizens-acting-like-police.

Ağar was the first Director-General of the Turkish Police to use the term ‘decentralized management’ in discussions of police reform, in a statement just after being appointed on 9 July 1993. He said that policing would be managed locally by giving more powers to the provincial police forces and by sending the top police managers to the sub-units, or even to the local police stations, in order to free them from the need to look to the centre in Ankara for every operational decision (Aydın, 1997:124).

In his PhD thesis completed in the University of Leicester, Aydın (1997: 126-127), himself a member of the Police Academy during the late 1990s, argues for a decentralized system “to meet the demands of the community” and considers the village guard system as a form of effective decentralization.

Another topic was the downsizing of the gendarmerie and the paradoxical diminution of its powers in the midst of such a civil war period. This should be analyzed with respect to the changing parameters of the security field in Turkey where, for instance, the number of private security firms reached a very big number. In fact, aiming for the downsizing of the gendarmerie in the midst of a war-like period could have looked paradoxical if the state was still operating in full accordance to the framework set by the 19th century bourgeois state form, whereby the state power had been clearly differentiated from the class power in terms of its monopoly of physical violence.¹¹¹ However, the Turkish state suffering from an extended crisis of hegemony in the 1990s could only lead to the redefinition of the division of labour between the state and class powers. This redefinition signified a broader share of direct involvement for the class over the issues of policing, and the requests of the downsizing of the gendarmerie were closely related with this changing picture where the bourgeoisie directly intervened over the private security firms. In other words, the growing involvement of the bourgeoisie since the military regime era into the politics of policing led to a radical change in the structure of the policing field in Turkey as this bourgeoisie had to become more courageous in this restructuring to solve its impotency in the field of “ideas”. The privatization of security was both the most obvious expression and also the most straightforward mechanism of this transformation.

¹¹¹ The gendarmerie had always been one of the manifestations of the 19th century-born bourgeois state form. It is then not a surprise that the neoliberal reforms targeted it as the legacy of the bourgeois state form.

Businessmen in Turkey also showed great enthusiasm in the reformulation of the ideology of coercion. For instance, Rahmi Koç, the head of the advisory council of Turkish Industry and Business Association (TÜSİAD), made declarations that the lack of “ideas” in the political sphere should be remedied with the growing emphasis on the supply of human security and promised to do whatever they can in order to provide secure environment for human life. As a matter of fact, during the celebrations of the Police Day in 10 April 1993, the Ministry of State Cavit Çağlar presented his thanks to Vehbi Koç for the latter’s supports to the police organization after having kissed his hand (Milliyet, 11.04.1993).

The involvement of the capitalist classes into the politics of policing was not confined to the establishment of private security firms. A report prepared by the Young Businessmen Association of Turkey (TÜGİAD) in the mid-1994 asked for the strengthening of *preventive* policing. Moreover, the report demanded the reformulation of the police *force* as a police *service* and finally to think the resources allocated to the provision of security not as a cost but as an *investment* (Milliyet, 30.06.1994). The capitalist class was not asking for the restoration of the bourgeois state form and indeed, they were asking for the application of neoliberal rules *per se* in policing matters.

Their demands were supported by the USA, which started for the first time to bring to the fore the human rights abuses in Turkey as an obstruction to the US military assistance that will be provided to Turkey. They were putting the condition of not using the US military assistance in internal security and policing matters. This was in fact, an attempt on the part of the IPO to detach the neoliberal rationality already involved in the restructuring of the police forces in Turkey from the degenerated state of affairs in the police, who were beating up journalists and parliamentarians and who were not even declaring these frequent practices as “accidents” to appease the public anger against the police. There was incompatibility between the neoliberal police model of the IPO and that of Turkey as the former had started to work through *peoplism* method whereas the latter was leaning more and more towards public enmity.

However, for the IPO, it is not the public enmity *per se* which the greatest concern was but it was more the military's unavoidable interference into the police, which became uncontrollable and made the police fail. In other words, the police organization, which is the favored state security apparatus of the post-Soviet neoliberal era, could not become the dominant political actor in internal politics in accordance with the IPO's neoliberal dream for the military was once more driven to the area of policing. The 1995 Gazi Events were an indication of this mismatch.¹¹²

This state of affairs had led the police authorities to get some mentoring from international firms like Time Manager International (TMI) to train the police officers so that they could manage their own lives. The roots of the problem were determined as the frustration of the police officers, who were in need of psychological but definitely of behavioral help. This solution was part of the symbolic politics Turkey was conducting in order to repair its own image before the European Commission. Hence, the launch of the TMI's training program entitled "Human Being First" [Önce İnsan] first and foremost for the airport police was not a coincidence. The airport police was both symbolic and real tactical field of the internationalized police forces and indeed of the IPO, who would later broaden the airport policing mandate even to the civil employees of the aircraft firms themselves (Andreas and Nadelman, 2006). This project of "Human Being First" was also supported by a non-governmental organization, the Citizenship Consciousness Development Association of Good Morning İstanbul [Günaydın İstanbul Vatandaşlık Bilincini Geliştirme Derneği], which was headed by a member of one of the richest families of Turkey, Füsun Eczacıbaşı.

The capitalist class' direct involvement was not confined to these symbolic and even rather cosmetic politics of the police apparatus. 1996 was a stormy year in Turkish

¹¹² Gazi is a poor neighborhood of the city of Istanbul where a working class Alevi population lives. In March 1995, some traditional coffee houses were raked through and the police were ineffective and said to behave unbothered by the events. That is why, the Alevi population became mad at the police, who in turn behaved to them like an enemy and the military had to construct a barricade in between the police crowd and the protesters, to prevent the police aggression becoming fiercer and uncontrollable. During the events, seven civilians were shot to death and many others wounded by the bullets fired from the police guns.

politics, when all decomposed relations among the Mafiosi groups, police and politicians were revealed in a car accident which took place in Susurluk. This coming out of the dirty linen of the 1990s' historical bloc in Turkey and the indisposition of the latter to deal with the Susurluk Scandal by showing resistance to the demands coming from the society for a decent and respectable political sphere drove TÜSİAD to condemn the government and display a state of agitation by the end of 1996. TÜSİAD was openly declaring its uneasiness about the discharging of some specific police chiefs whom they thought could have contributed in the uncovering of the Susurluk accident (Milliyet, 07.12.1996).

However, this did not necessarily mean that TÜSİAD was positioned against the dirty war ongoing against the PKK and other leftist organizations in Turkey. Indeed, Sakıp Sabancı, who was the leading member of one of the richest families in Turkey, was giving full support to a police chief who, during the funeral of a police officer murdered by Dev-Sol, was blaming the coalition party, CHP (Republican People's Party), of lurking behind laicism and yet being profane and communist, disintegrating the political unity of the country, and of not stopping to complain about the Turkish police to the West.¹¹³ This process, not surprisingly, was followed by a "restoration" period endorsed by the military in which the National Security Council became a key coordinating power in security issues and even established civil-disguised military rule while bypassing the authority of the parliament to a great extent (Öngen, 2003).

During this period of "restoration" and the following AKP government period, the police organization has started to be revitalized on the basis of three major issues with the ever growing help of the IPO: the formation of new cadres, the refinement of the internal ideology of the police in accordance with the post-Soviet neoliberal policing

¹¹³ With the advent of the neoliberal police reform era, Sabancı became a symbolic value for the pro-reformer police officers and chiefs. During the initiation process of the police reform in Turkey, the idea that "people who were active, wise and benevolent like Sakıp Sabancı, Üzeyir Garih, Kadir Has should be involved in the supervision processes of the police institutions (such as police institutions of education)" (*Zaman*, 05.10.2000), was very popular.

politics, and the advent of legal-organizational-technical changes which has made the police apparatus a power non-reducible to the “police bureaucracy” of the 1990s. Moreover, the capitalist class has become much more involved in the police reform process as many projects are funded by local businesses. “For example the community policing initiative in the Bursa Police Department is partially sponsored by the community-business group, the Bursa Young Businessmen’s Association” (Lofça, 2007: 197).

5.4.3 Introducing the Police Reform Process in Turkey: A Preliminary Framework

Before proceeding with the analysis of the police reform process in Turkey, some historical and factual details needs to be presented to the reader so that the following narrative would be better comprehended. First and foremost, it should be stated that the Susurluk affair in 1996 brought under light the importance of the role of the police apparatus for the ruling classes in Turkey. It revealed the restorative power of the Turkish police, as an apparatus to regulate the inter-institutional fights and conflicts - which are indeed reflections of an intra-ruling class struggle in Turkey. For, although the police itself as an institution was involved in the dark Susurluk affair, this did not lead to a wholesale questioning of the Turkish police. Rather, new units of fight against organized crime were established within the Turkish National Police (Sözen and Çevik, 2004).

The building up of these new departments was indeed the start of a reform period within the Turkish police. It intended to empower the restorative power of the police by enhancing its ability to intervene in the corrupt political affairs through the mechanism of criminalization, now labeled as “fight against organized crime”. Interestingly, the political degeneration, which was widely called as corruption in Turkey, coincided with the by then new agenda of the Bretton Woods Institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank concerning the fight against corruption in late capitalist countries (Bedirhanoğlu, 2007). One of the direct results of this in Turkey was the establishment of the “Turkish International Academy against Drugs and Organized Crime” (TADOC)

in 26 June 2000 under the leadership of the UN, and with the cooperation of Turkey and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNDCP). A pro-reform police intellectual, Özcan (2002), stated that TADOC should have undertaken a big role in the fight against corruption and organized crime that started attracting increased attention in Turkey. That is to say, the police apparatus was encouraged to become one of the leading actors in the reshaping of the political field in Turkey by the IPO. Moreover, the police in Turkey, with the establishment of the TADOC, has also obtained an international mission (though to what extent these missions have reached their initial objectives is another discussion). That has meant a way of reforming the police in Turkey through the internationalization of its missions.

Apart from the establishment of units against organized crime, a major component of the reform process was concerned with the issue of police education in Turkey. In 2001, the police colleges were closed and transformed into vocational police high-schools. These vocational schools were tied to the Police Academy and the head of the Police Academy became responsible from the supervision of the education and training programs that have been implemented in these schools (Güloğlu, 2003). This change, which ensured the infrastructural power of the Police Academy over the general police education, was in harmony with the changes that have been incorporated in the neoliberal police reform in general. For the police academies' becoming pioneers in the police reform processes has been a common trend all over the world, but especially in the ex-Soviet region, during the post-Soviet era.

In tandem with this change in the education policy, many conferences on the issue of human rights were organised with the participation of many foreign actors ranging from the European Council to universities abroad such as the University of Warwick on the basis of projects and programs to induce police reform (Karaosmanoğlu, 2002). These conferences have in time evolved into in-service training courses. In 2004, human rights, community policing and police ethics were incorporated in these in-service training courses (Lofça, 2007). Lofça (2007: 240) underlines the centrality of the TNP's

school system as a way of diffusing the reform mentality; hence this should not be seen as a simple formal reform in the police education system. In other words, the internal culture of the police (which will be analysed later in this chapter as the internal police ideology) has been defined as the real vehicle for spreading and reproducing the reform atmosphere within the whole police organization. That is why this thesis focuses on this issue at the expense of structural and formal changes in the police education system. Nonetheless, many recent cop-written books, which have been designed for educational concerns and taught in the Police Academy, will be referred in the following section to detail down the internal police ideology.

Another aspect of the police reform process has been the change in the *dominant notion of policing*. Rather than a post-crime politics of policing (based on apprehension and punishment), a preventive politics of policing has been introduced to the police organization in Turkey. This process of change in the notion of policing mainly includes changing “the evidence policy” of the police organization (Sözen and Çevik, 2004). The policy of going from evidence to the criminal is adopted as opposed to the habit of targeting somebody as the criminal candidate and then looking for the evidence accordingly. Although the implementation of this transformation needs to be investigated in concrete police criminal procedures since the early 2000s, this dissertation refrains from engaging in this in an attempt to focus on the broader reform mentality that brings these kinds of changes to the fore. Indeed, the “crime” component of the police work is largely ignored in this thesis at the expense of its “state” component. That is to say, this thesis rather focuses on the relations between the state and the police apparatus.

In 2002, a project that aimed to make a change in the *existing/dominant notion of policing*, entitled as “Transition Program from Bureaucratic Culture to Citizen-oriented Public Service” was initiated by the Ministry of Interior. The argument was that the Turkish National Police was suffering from the traditional bureaucratic government tradition that had long identified the state in Turkey (Çevik, 2002). This tradition was

said to refer to top-down management, weak feeling of responsibility towards society, and a very tight commitment towards those who occupied higher echelons of the organisational hierarchy. This is further named as the “authoritarian model” which does not permit the participation of society to the policing processes, and which creates a distance between the police and the people (Çevik, 2002). That is why; the defining logic of the police reform has been formulated by the reformers in both direct and indirect ways as the aim of erasing the legacy of the strong state tradition over the police in Turkey. That is, indeed, the focus of this dissertation. The neoliberal police reform process in Turkey is analysed with the aim of deciphering the so-called tension between the state and the police reformers’ new policing politics.

A direct implication of this concern about the state tradition in Turkey is the idea that the police apparatus does not possess a relative autonomy as the military does in Turkey. This is argued to be the reason behind the interference of politicians in a direct manner to the police organisation concerning the issues of staff politics indeed. Therefore, the reform is also perceived as a modernization project. It is argued that the expanded impact of the politicians over the police organisation does not empower the police; on the contrary, it decreases its power and credibility among the people (Sözen, 2002). That is why the police reform process is also configured as a process of empowering the police through structural changes by delinking it from the executive, ensuring a bigger room of maneuver (Gültekin and Özcan, 2000). This aim of fostering the independence of the police organization vis-à-vis diverse political powers should also be read as the need to lessen the risk of political crises to contaminate police powers. In other words, the police’s restorative mission during the neoliberal era needs a relative insulation from the potential political crises that a capitalist society might be subject to. That is also why the police reform process in Turkey should be considered as a peculiar implementation of this now very much internationalized policy of making the police the “champions of change”.

It is also argued that the police apparatus can be strengthened by removing the authoritarian management style within the police organization, i.e. the idea that tighter the hierarchy is in the police the better it is governed (Sözen, 2002). Therefore, the modernization issue that is incorporated in the police reform does not mean restoring an organisational hierarchy and thereby improving the centralized power within the police, as one would have expected from a traditional reform process. On the contrary, modernization of the police is defined as the decomposition of that kind of hierarchy (reminiscent of the military) that dominates the police organisation. It is a way of showing that the police apparatus in Turkey is mature enough to administer itself. In the following pages, the issue of the police discretionary powers developed by the Law on Police Duties and Responsibilities (PVSK), and the changing ratio of police managers to the police officers (which show that the number of police officers augment vis-à-vis the police chiefs) will be associated with this transformation. These two structural changes within the TNP reveal the direction of change that is ongoing in the police apparatus. All the more, the issue of modernization, which is discussed in the previous chapter in general terms, will be refined on the basis of concrete examples. It will be shown that the neoliberal modernization aims at improving the discretionary capacity of the police officers by making them less dependent on the judicial.

This need to empower the police organization via the reform process is also associated with the need to improve “the strategic management” of the TNP (Lofça, 2007). This is arguably required by the fact that the TNP lacks an administration capable of “making any future plans to develop a mission and a vision for the coming years” (Lofça, 2007: 165). Therefore, it is reasonable to conceive the very neoliberal police reform process in Turkey as the attempt of the TNP to develop such “a mission”. It is also stated that the “lack of strategic management was one of the barriers against the reform process in the TNP” (cited in Lofça, 2007: 169). This thesis, therefore, conceives this reform process not as a change induced from without but rather as a process reflecting the new internal ideology of the police organization. In other words, the reform process should be read as the establishment of a new “mission” for the police apparatus in Turkey. On the other

hand, the chapter will not be able to overview all the relevant institutional changes made within the police apparatus due to the simple fact that many of these changes have been only very recently launched so that they require more observation for proper judgement. One such change is the establishment of citizen complaints commission within the Ministry of Interior in December 2010 under the name of “Law Enforcement Bodies Watch Body” [Kolluk Gözetim Komisyonu].

The global trend towards the so-called democratic policing has been appreciated only at the discursive level in Turkey. Nonetheless, it is still interesting to note that it has had manifold interpretations one of which is the idea that the police “should try to keep interventions into citizens’ personal lives to minimum” (Lofça, 2007:207). One should evaluate this quotation only with respect to the community policing practices in Turkey, which will be explained in the following pages. Nonetheless, an early analysis tells that one cannot take this non-interventionism as a “modern liberal institution” but rather should consider it with respect to changing elements of the modern political field, as explained in the previous chapter. Indeed, this principle-like-issue of democratic policing fosters the idea that ‘personal is personal and not political’; or to put in a crude manner, this issue of democratic policing is another way of arguing for the retreat of the state from the social life but imposing the “community” as the right agent for policing social issues (including the family life). However, the question of which subjects will be devolved to the community is an open question, which should be considered together with the fact that the police officers in Turkey are now furnished with increased discretionary powers. Their job is redefined by the reform process as interpreting “the situation in its own context” (Lofça, 2007). In the following pages, the combined effect of this notion of democratic policing (read as *community*-based policing) and the police discretionary powers will be demonstrated through some examples on the violence against women in Turkey.

In short, the crucial elements of the police reform process in Turkey have been identified as the needs to overcome “strong state tradition” in Turkey, to foster a

powerful police organization with defined “strategic missions”, and to re-establish a specific relation with the society in Turkey on the basis of the notion “democratic policing”. These three ideological motivations that underlie the police reform process in Turkey will be further problematized in the following sub-section. In this way, the question of how capitalist class power is restored over the Turkish police through neoliberal reforms will be clarified with reference to anti-revolutionarism and anti-paramilitarism, positions which have been reproduced in Turkey in specific ways.

It has to be underlined that in line with the basic questions of the thesis, this chapter will try to overview the state-related aspects of the police transformation process rather than provide a general account of this change. For instance, the establishment of motor-cycled units of social order department (the Dolphins) is not examined in this chapter. Indeed, the establishment of these units are analysed by Berksoy (2007) in a detailed manner. Berksoy (2007) argues that the transition to neoliberal accumulation regime in Turkey required the expansion of police powers, especially in mega-cities, where the problems that emanate from such an accumulation regime are most felt (i.e. unemployment). Accordingly, these kinds of units are built up so as to control the unwanted consequences of this economic transformation in Turkey. Although of crucial importance, such attempts to increase the conventional police capabilities will not be problematized. The increased control of the police apparatus over the society will be considered as long as the bourgeois state form-cum-political field has been transformed by the change concerned.

The chapter will also non-problematize some important international issues related to the police transformation process in Turkey such as Turkey’s Programme for Alignment with the EU *Acquis*. The *Acquis* includes a chapter on “Justice, Freedom and Security”, which bring many responsibilities to the Turkish police in areas of border management, asylum policies, and visa issues. In fact, these changes are important to the extent that the border management in Turkey is mostly the job of gendarmerie and the transfer of this responsibility to the police is a very recent project of the Ministry of Interior in

Turkey that merits close attention. The then Minister of Interior, Beşir Atalay told that they [the government] established a border security department within the Police Academy which would educate special teams of border security and that this new system would start to operate by 2014-2015 (Birgün, 27.08.2010). Moreover, the asylum policies of the EU are also equally important in defining the job of policing in Turkey as the latter has been involved in a committed job of pursuing illegal immigrants in Turkey.¹¹⁴

A further issue that needs to be mentioned before presenting a more detailed analysis of the police reform in Turkey is the issue of community policing in Turkey. The latter is a relatively new phenomenon and has been applied through pilot projects in various cities including Istanbul. It has been institutionalized within the police organization since 2006, with the establishment of a unit of community policing under the department of public order. All the more, many different examples of community policing have started to pop up, such as the application of “Trust Teams” in Istanbul [Emniyet Güven Timleri]. These teams are disguised police officers, such as flower girl, bagel seller [simitçi] etc, which are responsible from the observation of daily life in many city centers and identify criminals (such as pocket-thieves) and arrest them. These examples should be analyzed separately and within a different theoretical context. The chapter is hence interested in community policing practices as long as they reflect the ideological commitments of the police in Turkey in the police reform process. This implies that the police as “political actor” will be analyzed rather than the police as the “domestic missionary.”

For instance, the issue of “zero tolerance” policy, where no kind of police mal-treatment of people is allowed or permitted by the state authorities, will be evaluated only with respect to what it tells for the change in the dialectics of coercion in the post-Soviet

¹¹⁴ It is now a fact that the illegal immigrants in Turkey are subject to police brutality in Turkey. The murdering of Festus Okey, a Nigerian immigrant in Turkey, in the police center in Beyoğlu, Taksim, in 2007 by a police officer is telling in this regard. The police officer is somehow still doing his job of policing, and the investigation process about the murder is full of obstacles that prevent the trial from proceeding. (Radikal, 14.07.2011).

neoliberal era in Turkey. In fact, it is questionable whether the police misconduct and torture have ended during the reform era.¹¹⁵ Moreover, the push on the side of the government for the implementation of this policy cannot be solely evaluated as an act “to send a message to the European Union” to proceed in Turkey’s membership process. It is more than a cosmetic change. It fits into the new ideology of the police in Turkey, which tries to put a distance between itself and the state in Turkey, conceived in its authoritarian legacy.

All the more, it should also be stated that the state policies towards the Kurdish issue in Turkey has been shaping the structure of the police apparatus to a great extent since the mid-1980s. In fact, the police organization itself recognizes the fact that “intense circumstances [occurring during the fight against the Kurdish Separatist Movement] yielded to an organizational revolution of the TNP” (Temur and Yayla, 2005:347). Nonetheless, the chapter does not focus on the way “the security policies” developed around the Kurdish issue, or the way they have been influencing the police apparatus in Turkey.

Moreover the following lines focus on the books published by the Police Academy and police intellectuals, who teach in the Academy. Therefore, the chapter focuses on the products of the Academy at the expense of any other unit in the TNP. This is firstly due to the fact that the Police Academy in Turkey has been the most engaged unit of the police organization in the neoliberal reform process both ideologically and in terms of material and staff support; and secondly, the dominant idea within the police organization appears to be that the Police Academy signifies “the future leadership of the TNP” (Yayla and Temur, 2005: 348). Therefore, this chapter will examine various products (books; conferences; cadres) of the Academy (including works by various police intellectuals and books etc), which educates new cadres along the lines of the neoliberal ideology.

¹¹⁵ See the recent reports of the Human Rights Association on the violation of human rights in Turkey by the law enforcement agencies including the police. [online].www.ihd.org.tr.

Another limitation of the chapter can be conceived as the lack of a focused interest in the Law on Police Duties and Responsibilities (PVSK), which changed in 2007. Although, there is not an entire section devoted on this legal change, which is surely a concrete codification of the new police ideology in Turkey, the chapter refers to that text whenever the ideological components of the reform process are institutionalized in concrete institutions such as the issue of police discretionary powers. Nonetheless, it should also be mentioned that during the June 2007 (the enactment year of the Law) debates in the parliament regarding the substance of this new law, the spirit of that law becomes very much obvious: expanding the police powers to such an extent that the police apparatus becomes a quasi autonomous body; an entity which is assigned great room of maneuver to built on its internal ideology. An insatiable lust for power becomes apparent behind the debates since it is even argued during these debates that the fingerprint system won't be sufficient so that the palm prints should also be taken (Proceedings of the Parliament, June 2007). However, this issue of expansion of police powers is considered within the confines of this thesis only within the broader context of class power expansion during the neoliberal era. In other words, the autonomization of the police in Turkey and its getting more and more powerful does not occur at the expense of and independent from the changes in the whole class structure in Turkey. It is indeed very much shaped by the state of affairs in the class struggle in Turkey. That is why; the following sections will rather attempt to show how this quasi strong body is inherently and structurally open to the risk of implosion or degeneration. For instance, the lack of any consideration of the police personal rights within the limits of this Law or else (such as the right of the police to organize in trade unions) is very much demonstrative of the expansion of class power and the risk that this latter possesses. Therefore, the following lines consider the changes within the police organization with respect to the asymmetrical structure of the *social form* of the police and the impact of these changes over that asymmetry (such that the social form of the police becomes very much damaged by that expansion of capitalist class power at the expense of working class power).

As already stated this chapter focuses on the ideological motives of the transformation process at the expense of the organizational and legal changes that are part of this neoliberal police reform process. This is also due to the fact that the police intellectuals that lead the police reform process in Turkey have been largely involved in the daily politics of Turkey albeit in a different form from the mid-1990s onwards. During the mid-1990s, many police chiefs were involved in the daily politics of Turkey and some even became MPs. This process will be conceptualized as the establishment of a “police bureaucracy” in Turkey in the preceding lines. This process was a direct result of the low-intensity civil war period that has been prevailing since the mid-1990s in Turkey. The police reform process also aims at fostering the political capabilities of the police organization but now with and through a different conception of police- politics relation. In fact, the reform process refuses the police to get involved or incorporated to the established political order in Turkey as one of the various players but rather aims at its becoming a foundational institution for the political field itself. This can be illustrated in the words of Prof. Dr. Zühtü Arslan (2006), the current head of the Police Academy in Turkey, who argues that the security turns out to be a foundational principle in the contemporary world and the separation between the police and the military has lost sense. Zühtü Arslan (2006) proposes for a paradigm change that can meet the requirements of this new relation between policing (read as security) and the political field. He proposes to make a change from the modern notion of “public interest” [kamu yararı] to the post-modern notion of “human rights”, and from the “national security” to “individual-centered security”. This envy to substitute the “public interest” with the “human rights” is worth of consideration and a scholarly analysis is needed in terms of its implications for the police restructuring. That is why; the following lines will try to understand this new paradigm. What is meant by the substitution of the old axis of security defined along “common good” with “liberty and freedom”? What is this thing that is defined as “new” by the police apparatus in Turkey? What is new police ideology in Turkey? These questions will be the focus of analysis in the following discussions.

5.5 Police Reform in Turkey: Reproduction of the IPO's Mandate in and outside Turkey

One can find numerous references to quests for the restructuring of the police apparatus during the 1990s even in a superficial media research. Still the earliest attempt of the IPO in terms of a planned reconfiguration of the police apparatus in Turkey in tandem with the requirements of the international system started in 1997 with the preparation of a report by police advisors from the US headed by Jay L. Kriegel, an international mentor to Prime Minister Tansu Çiller in between 1994-1997. The report focused upon different issues such as corruption, war against drugs, relations with the gendarmerie, human resources politics, and human rights. Moreover, the US country report established a direct relation with the narcotics traffic and the Susurluk affair (Milliyet, 31.01.1997 and 01.03.1997).

An interesting point made in the report was about the rate of police officers occupying high offices. The report mentioned this as a defect to be cured reflecting a concern on the over-weight of the “police bureaucracy” within the political sphere. The IPO appeared to be very displeased concerning the police apparatus leaning on such kind of a “police bureaucracy”. The military intervention of 28 February 1997 to the political sphere in Turkey through the National Security Council, shared interestingly a similar rationale, which has been quite often conceptualized by well-known journalists such as Enis Berberoğlu or Sedat Ergin as the toppling down of the police party in Turkey (Hürriyet, 09.07.1997).

Post-28 February period in Turkey witnessed a fierce struggle between the “police bureaucracy” and the military, whereby endless projects of police restructuring were released by different constituencies, including the Çiller-Kriegel team. Whereas the military aimed at taking over the direction of special operation teams from the police; one of the members of the new generation of the police who was educated abroad and teaching in the police academy, Önder Aytaç, supported the anti-military stance of the

“police bureaucracy” and yet also argued for the application of different techniques than the brutal methods used during the 1990s by that same “police bureaucracy”. It is not surprising to read the words of Bülent Orakoğlu, one of the prominent members of the 1990s’ “police bureaucracy”, that many [including some military men and others] had tried to block the struggle of a young team within the police organization against the mafia, narcotics and terror (Milliyet, 05.07.1997).¹¹⁶

Before the launch of the police reform however, it appeared that the police apparatus was engaged in “peace” operations targeting mostly the travesties and prostitutes to compensate for the loss of its prestige.¹¹⁷ The aim was to appeal to the most conservative feelings of the public and to show them that the police apparatus was able to sustain the public order.

Turkish neoliberal police reform displays not a sharp turn from, but a grand continuity with many elements that made up the police apparatus during the post 1980 era.¹¹⁸ The reform has indeed been a refinement of some of these elements while dispensing with some others. This continuity has provided the Turkish police apparatus with a great

¹¹⁶ This surface crisis between the military and the police should be analyzed with caution. First, the police’s anti-military stance cannot be taken for granted as “the martial law conditions created by the military was of great interest to the police organization whose demands for longer interrogation hours etc were realized without any problem” (Police Chief Hanefi Avcı who is toppled down by the intervention of February 28 cited in Özdemir, 2009: 223). Moreover, despite the efforts of Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz, the supporter of the National Security Council stance about the rebalancing of many policing powers among the internal security apparatuses, these efforts appeared to be born dead. For instance, the transfer of the police intelligence department’s computers to the National Intelligence Agency (MIT), a plan of post-28 February to decapitate the police bureaucracy, could not be realized (Özdemir, 2009: 228).

¹¹⁷ With the neoliberal era, as the “petit bourgeois” inhabitants of the big cities were provoked by the bourgeois media to criminalize every social discontent; the police’s job became easier. Different units were established especially in Istanbul to deal with the “social”. At the beginning of the 1990s, motorized police teams (Dolphins) were established to intervene in “vagabondism”. Moreover, the envy to establish absolute rule over the mega cities led to an increase in the control and surveillance mechanisms of the police (like the mobile cameras) (Berksoy, 2007a).

¹¹⁸ It should be noted that this feeling of continuity is present among the agents of change, namely the police officers of the post-1997 police reform era. It is argued that TNP has been transforming since the 1983 Özal Government and the interview data [an interview conducted among the police officers] suggests that the police reform today is carried out with the same spirit of the 1980s (Lofça, 2007: 166).

room of maneuver since during the reform process, the police apparatus saw that many of main the motives of its internal ideology had found echo within the characteristics of the neoliberal police reform.

The neoliberal internationalization has not caused a trauma of change within the police. On the contrary, the police apparatus, as a coercive force, has been pioneering in the formation of a new dominant ideology in Turkey. In that sense, coercion escorts consent. Gramsci (cited in Anderson, 1976: 70) argues that “hegemony is rule by permanently organized consent”. This claim can be developed by arguing that consent is also organized by the very repressive state apparatuses: army and police. That is to say, coercion is not merely itself an ideological tool that deters people from doing something but also is very active in the daily formation of consent. It is not only a negative mode of intervention, but it is also a constitutive form, a form-giving form.

5.5.1 Development of a “New Police” Ideology

The police reform of the post-1998 era in Turkey has been founded upon a new ideology, which has been in formation ever since the early 1990s. Accordingly, the civilianization of the police is a must of a society freed from the yoke of the “official ideologies and centralized powers” (Findıklı, 1992: 133). It is stated that the importance of civil society comes to the fore more than ever with respect to the “latest events happening in Soviet Russia, which showed that from top to down governments had been incapable of making their people happy” (Findıklı, 1992: 134).

A second motive of these early formulations of a new police ideology has been an anti-“police state” stance. For the police intellectuals, this notion conveys a meaning of police isolation from people, to whom they should serve (Findıklı, 1992). That is why, civilianization of the police has been perceived as a way of bringing the civil people and the police in close contact and thus creating a “state police” as opposed to the “police state”.

A third element of this newly emerging ideology has been a specific view of the Turkish-Ottoman history, whereby the latter is considered to contain some important nubs of *civil society*. The guilds, lodges and religious sects that were places for social organization of the Ottoman people are considered as constituents of a notion of “civil society” (Fındıklı, 1992: 133). The reference to an Ottoman police body, the Police Assembly [Polis Meclisi] is posited as an example that can be reproduced in the modern era (Şahin, 2001). This example, as well as the practice of guild organizations, is praised as the past history of the “civil people’s participation to the police in the Turkish Society” (Cerrah, 2005). Moreover, these examples are represented as democratic alternatives to the Supreme Police Council, founded -after the example of Supreme Military Council- during the second half of the 1990s to supervise the nomination procedures in the police apparatus. The underlying rationale for police intellectuals to praise these old practices is based upon the idea that the security services would create a reciprocal notion of gratitude between the people and the police since people will receive the redress of what they pay for through their taxes in the form of policing services, and thus the police will be honored with the people’s thankfulness (Cerrah, 2005; Şahin, 2001). Thus, a blend of *bazaar and gratitude*, which were the basis of Ottoman pre-modern policing practices, have been adapted to the neoliberal police reform’s notion of *peoplism*.

A final notion that accompanies all these three elements has been the motto that “people are police without uniforms” [Halk, üniformasız polistir] (Fındıklı, 1992: 153). This notion does try to transfer the British Police’s founding principle that the police are citizens in uniforms and citizens are police without uniforms. However, this transfer has occurred in a context quite different from the 19th century. The transfer of this principle to Turkey and its reproduction within the context of neoliberal state transformation betrays to the semi-progressive aspects of this legacy, (where there was a close relation between the expansion of citizenship rights and the establishment of the public police) and broadens the class power.

Not only that the legacy of citizenship is replaced with *the policianization of society* but also and as much the political *as such* is subsumed under the abstract language of the capitalist market. To give an example: “If the market structure [for security] is homogenous, the politics of marketing [read as the politics of policing] that will be applied can be developed as a single program” (Taze and Kızıılışık, 2003). The Police Magazine of the early 2000s is replete with such kind of analyses, which are all concluded by the motto of “modern policing is policing where the police work as people in uniforms and people as police without uniforms”. It should be noted that this language sounds as an absurd theatre, for it is difficult to make a distinction between the Police Magazine and a journal of business management.

In order to decode further the meaning of citizenship as represented in the Turkish police reform process, a training book written by scholars from the Police Academy and published in 2009 should also be addressed. In the chapter entitled, “Good Human Being, Good Citizen and Good Police” [İyi İnsan, İyi Vatandaş, İyi Polis], the writers feel that there exists a tension between the notions of good human being and good citizen as these two do not always fit into one another. To solve this problem, they cite the example of Socrates, who despite the fact that he found the law of the city unjust in conception, obeyed it in order not to break the law of the police-state, the law of a good citizen (Göksu et al, 2009: 191). The authors continue with the case of H.D. Thoreau, for whom paying poll tax was an act against his conscience. Thoreau was convicted of not paying poll tax. Thoreau argued that he had accepted to go to jail since the prison was the right place for a good person to go in a state which was unjust towards its citizens (Göksu et al, 2009: 194).

The authors’ message is that these two stories show that a person can be against the injustices committed by the state yet should obey the rules in order not to break the commitment to the rule of good citizenship (Göksu et al, 2009: 195). It is argued that this same rule is also advised by the religion of Islam. Accordingly, even though the

rulers of a state do not obey the rules of Islam, one should obey these rulers anyway if there is a risk of social unrest.

Here many messages are conveyed to the police nominates or police students. First and foremost, the tension between a state and a citizen is solved by pointing out to the needs of social order. Regardless of the conflict in between the state and its citizens, the latter should commit. Moreover, they strengthen this argument on the basis of Islam's advices and point out to the fact that obeying a non-practicing ruler is not a false attitude as long as the good citizens contribute in the reproduction of social order. For the ideologues of TNP, order precedes ideology.

This has been indeed a way of defining the limits of police discretionary powers under the new neoliberal regime. Though it does not solve the tension between the idea of good police and good human being, it appeases the conscience of the police rank-and-file. This is a policy which shows that neoliberal reform process do not target solely the remaking of the police bureaucracy but also the rank -and-file. For instance, these principles (which are argued to be attributed by "Plato to the governors"!) are said to be universal principles which should be internalized by all police officers: "[t]o be courageous and wise, not to fear from death, to restrain oneself in the activities of eating and drinking, not to care about materiality and money, to treat someone well and look for the well-being of the state" (Alaç, 2004).

All these notions are developed and expanded by a new generation of police chiefs who call themselves as "Akademili" (meaning those police officers who graduated from the Police Academy) or as "Jön Polisler" (referring to an important agency of Ottoman modernization, Young Turks/Jeunes Turks). This new generation consisted of Police Academy graduates who were sent abroad for post-graduate education. For the first time, a group of people who were sent in the early 1990s to UK for graduate education, came back to Turkey in the second half of the 1990s and were entitled in the Police Academy as "those who came from England" (Milliyet, 10.07.1998). And the second

big wave of sending police officers abroad for post-graduate education took place in 1997 and this policy has been in use since then as part of Higher Education Abroad Policy. This second round targeted the USA as a center of police education and the project was entitled as “training of [police] managers” project (Özgüler, 2001). This project widened up first in the year of 2001 under the aim of “training of a core education group” for the Turkish Police Academy and then, made a big leap forward by the establishment of Turkish Institute for Police Studies (TIPS) in 2004 in the USA.

In 1998, those police chiefs who came back from the UK edited a book in Turkish entitled as “Police in the 21st Century: Basic Approaches- Contemporary Approaches”. This book is one of the first written templates, which reflects the main tenets of the neoliberal post-Soviet police reform in Turkey.¹¹⁹ In that book, the longest part is built up upon the argument that the new police in Turkey should be based on the notion of “Information Policing” [Bilgi Polisliđi] (Aytaç, 1998). Although what that notion means is not explained in an open and distinct manner, some of the subsections of the same paper reveal the core of this information policing: enhancing the intelligence capacities of the police.¹²⁰

The author makes reference to a phrase, which is said to be formulated by George Orwell: “The ultimate struggle will be fought between *the communists and the ex-*

¹¹⁹ It appears that the whole police organization is not committed to the same elements of the police reform in Turkey. It can even be argued that there has been competing visions concerning the police reform. These competing notions can be summed up in the debate around the establishment of a Supreme Security Council, named also as Police Council, which is planned to control the process of appointments and nominations within the police organization. The early processes of the police reform in Turkey appeared to be dominated by those who approved the establishment of such a Council, whereas the consolidation of the reform process after 28 February marginalized the owners of this very early process. One of the demonstrators of the ongoing ambiguity about the character and the owners of the police reform process during the early days of the reform was the publication of a short communiqué by the 1997 graduates of Police Academy in one of the big media, Milliyet News Paper, stating an oath about the fact they would continue to be the guarantors of democracy and laicism in Turkey (26.06.1998).

¹²⁰ The new police intellectuals appear to establish a positive relation between the intelligence-led policing and democracy. Burhan Kuzu, a constitutional lawyer who has also taught courses in police schools, explains the details of this relationship: “Both in all over the world and in Turkey, wiretapping has extremely contributed in the diminution of torturing. If the wiretapping becomes completely prohibited the cases of torture will resurrect” (sol.org.tr, 08.02.2009).

communists” (Aytaç, 1998: 252) [italics added]. Having quoted this phrase, Aytaç goes on with suggesting the importance of gaining the left militants for the benefits of the state. As such, he continues, “they will become heroes” (Aytaç, 1998: 255). Betrayal of ex-communists is proposed as a developed form of information policing. And yet, in terms of political policing techniques this does not solely point out to an age-old habit of the police apparatus to make police informers from within the communist/socialist organizations. But rather it aims at making out of the political field a self-toxic entity (where communists are driven out by the ex-communists as was the case in the post-Soviet world), an arena where the notion of modern “group”, as defined by Sartre, is damaged.

A further ideological motive presented in this book is the appreciation of the prominent figures of the capitalist class in Turkey such as Sakıp Sabancı -the owner of the Sabancı Holding and ex-head of the one of richest families of Turkey- as a perfect executive manager, who should be followed.¹²¹ This rather raw motive is however refined with the introduction of “Total Quality Management” concept to the Turkish Police Organization. This concept aims at importing improved management techniques of the private sphere to the public sphere. Interestingly, the Police Magazine of the early 2000s is full of discussions on the restructuring of the police organization along the concept of total quality management. The promoters of this new management style are police officers and chiefs themselves. Accordingly, the writers argue that there is a “security market” for the police and this market is not simply confined to the individual victims of crime and criminals. It does involve as much the detection of deviations within the organization (Taze and Kızıılışık, 2003). This latter process is entitled as “the internal customer satisfaction” and the former is entitled as “external customer satisfaction”. The internal customer satisfaction includes many things such as the training of police officers but also and most importantly the principle that “aside from

¹²¹ This pro- business stance will be institutionalized by time. For instance, some members of the new generation of the TNP participated in 2006 in a seminar entitled “Executives of the Future”. The seminar, provided by the founder of Young Guru Academy, aimed at bringing “a unique brand of imaginative business leadership tactics” into the TNP.

the police works related with the general security, those who ask for further police work should pay it” (Yılmaz, 2002).¹²²

Among other ideological themes, the notion of decentralization/localization has been a key theme that redefines all others in the last instance. The centralized structure of the police organization is criticized by the police intellectuals. It is claimed to be based on a bureaucratic government tradition which is characterized by the following features: governing from top-down; the introduction of reforms by the top managers themselves; the low level of responsibility feeling towards the society and tight hierarchical order (Çevik and Göksu, 2002). The police intellectuals argue that the problems in the police organizations stem from the fact that the state tradition in Turkey is authoritarian and this causes a state-society rupture. According to the police intellectuals, this authoritarian structure prevents the development of police discretionary powers.¹²³

This analysis coincides with the 1997 Report of US Specialists on the need to strengthen the police rank-and-file. Moreover, it copies down the British tradition of policing which is based on Common Law (Altıparmak et al, 2007: 10). In this tradition,

¹²² A recent proposal for a change in the Law of Police Organization argues for letting the police officers work in secondary jobs during their rest times. This proposal is first made by the Kayseri Security Directorate and it is included in the Strategic Plan of the term 2007- 2011 written by the General Security Directorate and sent to the State Planning Organization. Through this change, it is aimed at improving the life qualities of police officers (www.habervitrini.com, 12.06.2008). However, it should be stated that this application is a copy-model of the “moon-lighting” application of the police in the USA. According to this “moon-lighting”, the police officers could and do work off-office hours as private security guards. Moreover, during their moon-lighting, the police officers are not exempt from their public policing rights such as the right to carry guns etc. Therefore, the public police become the private guards of the capitalist classes during night-time.

¹²³ Police discretionary powers are a catch-all word for the police intellectuals of the neoliberal era. It generally refers to a degree of autonomy that the police organization should receive from the tight state hierarchy. But at the same time it refers to the decision-making powers of the police rank-and-file. Indeed, the 2007 Law on Police Duties and Responsibilities (PVSK) regulate police discretionary powers in a very large manner. The LPDR defines the individual police experiences and threat perceptions as a key point upon which a police can make a decision while policing. For instance, LPDR defines a new means at the disposal of the police: the police stop powers [Durdurma]. The Law states in article 4 that for the police to use its powers to stop, there should be a “reasonable cause” which is based on “the police’s experience” and “the police’s perception of the situation within which he/she finds him/herself” (Altıparmak et al, 2007: 9). However, these words are not detailed down and their meanings are very loose that they give the individual police officers a great sphere of maneuver free from many liabilities.

the notion of “reasonable doubt” is used by the police. However, police are also fiercely criticized of violating basic human rights on the basis of this notion, for instance, which is discriminately used towards minorities (Altıparmak et al, 2007: 10).

The personnel structure of the Turkish police organization in the early 2000s resembled to a militaristic type of organization as there is a big condensation of police chiefs when compared with the number of police officers (Sözen, 2002: 62). In relation to this problem, it is argued that “controlled discretion is what distinguishes the police from the military. Policing requires interpreting the situation in its own context” (Lofça, 2007: 179). The increased emphasis on police education/training has to be indeed rethought within this context. The aim to turn the police into “agents of change” has required the restructuring of the police training system inside Turkey besides sending future police officers abroad for there was a need for more and well-trained ordinary policemen. Hence, in 2001, the police schools were transformed into police vocational high schools, where the training now lasts two years under the direction of the Police Academy, the hub of the “new” police intellectuals in Turkey mentioned before. The training of the police rank-and-file, which is advocated by the IPO’s generic neoliberal police reform projects, has gone hand in hand with the formation of a new police organization in Turkey under the banner of “giving importance to the police base of the police organization”. Therefore, whereas in 1990 there were in total 87.160 police officers in the police organization among which 14.845 of them were high-ranking officers, in 2000 there were in total 165.358 police officers where only 14.733 of them were high-ranking officers (Çevik et al, 2009: 21). Thus whereas the total number of police officers doubled, the number of high status officers did not substantially change and even dropped.

Although the new police cadres of the TNP are not solely trained within the Police Academy, the Academy has a rather critical role in the training process which is best defined in a police chief’s doctoral research as follows: “Manning calls the American police process of learning the profession an act of ‘dramaturgy’, a theatrical

representation of the job, the Turkish case would better be termed *an act of learning wisdom* [italics added]” (Lofça, 2007: 205). Hence, police training is rather perceived as an education of moral knowledge. Therefore, the neoliberal police reform’s obsession with the corrupt police culture and the latter’s defects which cause in the degeneration of police apparatuses is translated into Turkish as a need to improve the police officers’ morality. For instance, the zero tolerance policy against police misconduct and torture introduced by the AKP [Justice and Development Party] government in 2002 is considered within the framework of “learning wisdom” and it is stated that “the commitment [of the TNP] was an outcome of the efforts of the highly educated and trained personnel who had sufficient experience in international organizations like the UN and the OSCE” (Lofça, 2007: 234).¹²⁴

Besides the question of police discretionary powers, another issue conveyed by the notion of decentralization is defined as the need to expand *the competitive pressure* upon the police organization. The local autonomy as well as subcontracting are said to lower the costs of security provision and improve policing conditions. This mode of decentralization is represented as a counter-tendency to the “totalitarian side” of the state and argued to be a facilitator for the internationalization of the police, which in a local-decentralized mode, will be able to bypass the state hierarchy and conduct vertical relations with the transnational field of policing (Özcan, 2001).

This recurrent theme of decentralization as a way to by-pass the “totalitarian” central state is indeed a Turkish way of reproducing the idea that the bourgeois state form is an obstacle to the furtherance of class power in the neoliberal era. Or indeed, it is the translation of the anti-revolutionary pledge of the IPO into Turkey. Not surprisingly, one of the methods improved by the IPO to get out of this state was the private

¹²⁴ Moreover, the same author argues that “the *‘informal communication’* is much more effective than formal communication in spreading the reforms. “This capability stems from the TNP’s unique school system” (Lofça, 2007: 240). Therefore, the moral education is based upon this unique characteristic of the TNP, where moral wisdom is transferred not necessarily via formal courses or police training books but rather through other informal mechanisms.

police/security as a “non-state actor”. It is the case with Turkey that the police organization aspires to becoming a self-sustaining actor, modeled after the image of private policing. It wants to enter into the lucrative business of selling security in a world where many police organizations have already started selling their policing experiences to police organizations under construction, such as the case of Iraq (Ellison and O’Reilly, 2008).

Another essential aspect of the decentralization of the Turkish National Police is the envy to increase the legitimacy of the police intervention into social life. According to the police intellectuals, in order to obtain such legitimacy, the policing politics should be in accordance with the political and sociological culture of the local society. “One of the standards of legitimacy is the question of whether the policing practices, including the “right to use force”, are in harmony with the person’s or mass’ culture subject to these practices” (Aydın, 1997: 160).¹²⁵ Hence, the decentralization perspective of the police organization aims also at redrawing the lines for the coercive apparatuses and coercion in accordance with the cultural habits of a population.

¹²⁵ The principle of use of “proportional physical force” [orantılı güç] should be considered with respect to this cultural relativism displayed by the police apparatus in Turkey. In one of the discussion papers prepared by the new police intellectuals of Turkey, it is stated that when compared to the USA, the police’s right to make use of physical force is very limited in Turkey. It is argued that whereas in Turkey, police’s use of gun against aggressors who do not possess guns is not permitted; the US police officers could make use of it in cases when it is deemed necessary even if the aggressor do not hold any gun. Therefore, it is advised that in Turkey too, the police should be able to expand the right to make use of deadly force (Şahin, 2008: 28-29).

Moreover, to justify this stance, the case of a husband who killed his wife in front of the police officers by stabbing her for 54 times in Adana in 2002 is presented (Şahin, 2008; Kün, 2008: 51). The author argues that the police did not intervene because of the limited rights in Turkey about the use of force. However, this is a counter-factual example as it does point out to another reality, the reality that the police officer did not intervene as he perceived the case as an issue of “family” and through the prism of patriarchy. Indeed, in Turkey culturalist stance of the police prevents it to make use of force when it is necessary to protect women from their husbands or male relatives.

Moreover, a more controversial issue about the issue of use of “proportional physical force” is illustrated in the following words of a member of the new generation of police officers: “During the last days, the media again discovered the issue of “disproportional use of force” with the case of Baran Dursun [who was shot to death by a police officer under the pretext that he did not obey the policeman’s warning to stop in İzmir in 2007]. Although this case only possesses a value of *third page news* [italic added], it is portrayed by the media as a streamer headline” (Kün, 2008: 53).

“Openness” is another notion added to the ideological luggage of the police reform to improve police legitimacy. Openness at first reminds the notion of transparency, which is a neoliberal motto produced against the issue of corruption. Yet, this notion of transparency is metamorphosed by the Turkish police intellectuals into a practice of “open coercion”, perceived as a way of social intimidation. It is argued that one of the best ways of defending human rights is “openness” which is exemplified in the police investigations conducted before the television cameras for those people who are convicted of serious crimes (Fındıklı, 1996: 105).¹²⁶ Hence, neoliberal ideology is reproduced within the police organization in Turkey in a peculiar form. Open observation of the police operations by the wider public is proposed as a way of increasing public trust in the police.

However, *alla turca* interpretation of the notion of transparency tells a crucial thing about how coercion works as an ideology. It is a reality that ideology does not work solely through misdirection and deception. It works also through “openness”, lucidity and demonstrativeness. In that sense, the neoliberal ideology’s element of transparency is used as an ideological weapon to deter people from committing the same faults others committed (as defined by the police apparatus).¹²⁷

A final twist in relation to the issue of openness is related with the nationalist ideology of the TNP.¹²⁸ Fındıklı (1996: 105) claims that, as the example of Ottoman guilds

¹²⁶ A further reference concerning the issue of openness is made by the police intellectuals to ex-communist countries, which are argued to have “closed” systems of government (Fındıklı, 1996: 108).

¹²⁷ Yet to be open to public has its own limits as police intellectuals argue that “secrecy is a must in order to prevent the public *leaking into the governance structures and affecting the governance decisions*” [italics added] (Fındıklı, 1996: 106).

¹²⁸ Nationalism has been the main determinant of security apparatuses in Turkey including the police. Besides, Turkish police apparatus has been always employed nationalists especially during the civil war of the 1990s in the special operation teams (Bora, 2001). Analyzing this issue exceeds the contours of this thesis. However, problematizing the question of how the recent neoliberal reform process has affected this legacy of the police organization is of crucial importance. In fact, the assassination of the socialist Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink in 2007 January has revealed the perpetuity of this legacy. The police officers of the Samsun Security Directorate took memory photos of Oğün Samast, the assassin of Dink, as a matter of proud (Milliyet, 05.08.2008).

demonstrate, the principle of “openness” has been used by the Turks in the very early Turkish states.

As illustrated by these examples, the neoliberal police reform’s claim to democratic policing is brought in the Turkish police apparatus through the redefinition of the Ottoman and the Turkic pasts as re-founding myths that can take various shapes in accordance with the needs of the police apparatus of the 2000s. Nonetheless, this eulogy to the Ottoman past has some intellectual references as well. Police intellectuals refer particularly to Cemil Meriç to substantiate their stance on the Ottoman past and its relevance to the ongoing police reforms.

One of the young generation police officers Yılmaz (2008: 16-17) claims that Cemil Meriç, a renowned Turkish philosopher who had criticized the Turkish ruling elite several decades ago for their equation of modernization simply with *Westernization* said that “...we have taken the fruit of the West and hung it on *our own* tree... [but] we have to know that ‘thought’ cannot be established overnight”. Yet, says Yılmaz, “I am proud to claim that since Meriç’s death in 1987, Turkey has been taking strides in incorporating the aforementioned values, resulting in an incessantly maturing democracy *sui generis*”. Some core ideas of Meriç hence helped the young pro-reform police intellectuals to translate the neoliberal police reform agenda of the IPO to their own language.

Cemil Meriç was an intellectual engaged in a critique of the Turkish intelligentsia who, he thought, quitted the Ottoman civilization for the sake of reaching the Greek one. Indeed, Meriç was an anti-intellectual to the extent that according to him, intellectuals hated people and they were disenchanted individuals whose ties with their own countries were detached (Meriç, 2005: 28). He accused many modern writers of the early 20th century of being part of a case which aimed at destroying the Ottoman Empire no matter what this costed to the country (Meriç, 2005: 14).

Second, Cemil Meriç (2005: 23) perceived modernization efforts as hopeless struggles since, for him, no civilization could replace another one. He also thought that the Western civilization suffered from positing irrationality as rationality, which gained body in *the bureaucracy*. Thus, the police intellectuals' definition of the yoke of the bureaucratic Turkish state as an impediment before the police organization should be considered with reference to this *Meriçian* background. In other words, the neoliberal police reform of Turkey has been a way of coming to terms with not only the Turkish police bureaucracy of the 1990s but also the cadres of 1923, foundation date of the Turkish Republic. Ahmet Aydın (2002: 107), one of the prominent police intellectuals, argues that it was the 1923, the founding date of the modern Turkish Republic, which created an authoritarian police organization in Turkey. This position of the pro-reform police intellectuals in Turkey has been also in line with the anti-bourgeois state form ambitions of the IPO during the neoliberal era, which perceived the latter and its child, the modern political field, as an impediment to the development of class power.

The police intellectuals argue that one of the causes why the police officers in Turkey are detached from the public and even see them as *the "other"* or make use of parameters of "us and them" while thinking on public-police relations is not solely related to the police culture but rather to the history of Turkish bureaucracy (Göksu, 2002: 78). Therefore, the pro-reform police intellectuals of Turkey put the blame on the bureaucratic tradition of the state in Turkey, which in turn redefined the police culture. However, Öztürk (2002), another pro-reform police intellectual, argues that the limits are already surpassed and the process of turning Turkey from a bureaucratic to a real democratic republic has started.

Moreover, there is a perfect match between the Turkish National Police's perception of its own institutional police culture and the neoliberal reformer's favorite issue of police culture. As already stated, police culture is depicted by the IPO both as the reason and the cure of police corruption, including the maltreatment of the people. The new generation of the IPO is proud of the police culture that they have been generating and

propose it as a model to be included in the reform agenda of the IPO. Indeed, the then leading chiefs of TNP's foreign relations department, Samih Teymur and Ahmet Sait Yayla (2005: 347), promoted the TNP's "organizational revolution" by stressing the personnel reform, during which "almost all of the students [of the police colleges] became bodies for a lifetime".¹²⁹ The institutionalization of police brotherhood in the TNP, the establishment of an "informal culture", a "non-hierarchical and therefore anti-militaristic way of communication" are proposed as the nub of developing a police culture in tandem with the spirit of neoliberal police reform agenda.

A final constituent of the new police ideology in Turkey is community-based policing which shows how the modern political field is transformed under neoliberalism. It was previously argued that the political field is not squeezed down in the neoliberal era by the internationalization of the police as was the case in the 19th century but rather has changed its nature. The case of Turkey is very illustrative of this state of affairs.

The 42nd issue of the Police Magazine has a dossier of community-based policing where various actors of the police reform process express their thoughts on the role of community-based policing in Turkey.

Former Minister of Interior, Abdülkadir Aksu and former General Security Director Gökhan Aydın introduce community based policing as an advanced method in the police's fight against crime, since they say, this process includes the participation of citizens. It is argued that the citizen support and cooperation, especially information – read as intelligence- provided by the people, are substantive in the fight against crime.

¹²⁹ This issue of "police solidarity" is among the most problematic issues since it leads primarily to covering up of police crimes. Pro-reform police intellectuals do not want to give up with this police solidarity and argue for the support of the Ministry of Interior even in cases of police crime. It is argued that the administrative authorities should show their support to the policemen even if they are accused of committing crimes so that they can prevent the emanation of a feeling of resentment among the police officers (Balçı, 2008: 63). In fact, this is very much the case in Turkey, where police crimes are hardly punished and even covered up by these administrative authorities such as city governors. Even Human Rights Commission of the Turkish Grand National Assembly exonerate the police from the accusation of using guns towards civilians in the Newroz celebrations in 2008 when four people died and many were wounded. The Commission's report states that the police did not exceed its powers though used "disproportional force" (www.sol.org.tr, 06.11.2008).

Moreover, Aydın (2004) points out that crime cannot be prevented solely through policing, so social methods should also be pursued.

However, what is understood from these social methods is *the policiarization* of the society, in its totality. The prevention of crime does not mean the elimination of social/economic or political conditions as root causes of crime. On the contrary, it aims at deciphering the *dormant* crime and preventing it from coming into being. Tülin İçli (2004) says that police's apprehension of a single beggar or alcoholic person might appear as unfair at first sight, but one should not forget that increased numbers of alcoholics and beggars might ruin the entire society. This method arguably lessens the costs of policing and shares responsibility in the elimination of crime with other social institutions. İçli (2004) also states that community based policing provides the police with the ability to invest in the *informal control mechanisms* of society without searching for extra resources. Investing in the informal control mechanisms of the society is indeed a kind of peoplism, where the common sense of the society is praised for. It is however also a return to the pre-modern practices of assigning the policing job to a community who is responsible from both detecting crime and chasing criminals. To resurrect this pre-modern practice damages the notion of the "group" associated with the modern political field.¹³⁰ Indeed, group is a community which is tied to each other with the bondage of fraternity, the founding principle of the modern bourgeois state form, which was always under the police threat. The police in the 19th century was allergic to this idea of group as the carrier of common utopian (political) goals. Nonetheless, the community of the 21st century is not the "group" that gave life to the French Revolution. It is rather a non-secular form of group, best understood in the context of Turkish police reform with reference to Ibn Haldun's notion of *asabiye*.

¹³⁰ As explained in the second chapter, under the heading of *Political as Such*, the notion of modern group is defined by Sartre with reference to that very moment when the crowds in Paris gathered to attack the Bastille, as the symbol of the ancien régime. These were disparate groups who yet together put on their stamp on the constitutive ideology of the French Revolution under the banner of fraternity.

Ibn Khaldun configures the notion of *asabiye* as the cement of the Umm. It is the spirit of people, the spirit that constitutes a tie among people. Dawood (2005) defines *asabiye* as solidarity, as “group feeling”, “group consciousness”. Accordingly, the society is not the sum of people, there is something that exceeds, something that is beyond calculation. Ibn Khaldun attributes to this concept a founding power. It is argued that “[n]o group can retain its superiority, nor any leader his dominant position in the group, when their former *asabiye* is no longer there to sustain them’ (Dawood, 2002). Peoplism, in Turkish version, is a kind of belief in *asabiye*, which is thought to be the defining element of the political field. Indeed, peoplism or *asabiye* is a way of *reenchanting* the disenchanting world of the enlightenment. It is the intrusion of religiosity as a determinant factor into the political field. Community-policing is indeed a way of displacing the legacy of enlightenment with sacralization of people, with a firm belief in *asabiye*.

On the other hand, this is not sufficient to remake the modern political field. In fact, community-based policing does equally aspire at increasing police’s involvement in “everything that damages the quality of social life”. The police are seen as “ombudsman of society”. This status of *wisemanship* attributed to the police officers is very much in line with the spirit of the localization or decentralization of policing, where local police centers and responsible police chiefs in these centers’ role in the formation of social body is reinforced. And yet, this socialization of the police and policianization of the social is a direct intervention to the political field, as well.

A police chief (Alaç, 2004) tells that *the political participation and the participation of the people are two separate things* that should not be mixed one with the other. Alaç (2004) defines the community-based policing as such: “a way of making the ruled have a role in the policing services without making *them fused with* the organs of policing or ruling”.¹³¹ Therefore, the policianization of the society aims at diffusing the police

¹³¹ There are many examples of how community policing has been applied in Turkey. Though the thesis is much more interested in the general ideology that makes up the police reform process, some of the concrete experiences of community policing might help to deepen this ideological analysis. For instance,

apparatus' internal ideology to all over the society. The new generations' police apparatus is ambitious to cover all ideological apparatuses and thereby change the nature of the political as such, making it devoid of modern mass politics but imbued with neoliberal *peoplism*.

The community-policing is argued to be an effective fight against terrorism method by the IPO. It is also true that the anti-terrorism departments of the police apparatuses are perfect places to reproduce *peoplism* as a fight against terrorism mechanism. The anti-terrorism department of the Turkish police organization has become very strong for the last couple of years. It has always been equipped with the Anti- Terrorism Act which has provided it with extensive powers, such that "the threshold between legality and illegality for both citizens and the police/prosecutors is blurred" (Berksoy, 2007a: 199). However, aside from this advanced role in coercive methods, it has also been active in the formation of this new police ideology. The following (abridged) example is retrieved from the internet site of the department of anti-terrorism which explains the ways of preventing young people from joining terrorist organizations:

Let see how a positive communication established by a school teacher with his (?) pupil prevents the negative results.

The school teacher has just started to his job in this high school. One day he sensed a dense smell of alcohol in a classroom. The class was waiting anxiously about the reaction of the teacher, who was wandering around the classroom. At the very back desks of the class, a student was looking very suspicious... The teacher has asked:

- How come that you are smelling alcohol?

- Me, said the young man, I work as a bartender in the pub [meyhane] that my father runs. Sometimes, I drink while working... This was the case the last night.

He was very nervous and he stared at the teacher to judge his attitude.

The teacher was very decisive and serious yet was not furious at all. He did not get angry with the student. He even held his shoulder as a gesture of empathy. He prepared a scenario and started to talk:

in the district of Zara, a booklet on the crimes of fraud is prepared and distributed thorough muftis to different mosques so that it can be read during the Friday payers (Alpkan and Palacı, 2008: 101-102). Moreover, in a NATO publication, a member of Turkish National Police argues that community policing is as an advanced method of fighting against terrorism (Ekici and Muş, 2009). They cite the example of "family police" recently introduced in the city of Erzincan as a model for "building terrorism resistant communities" (Ekici and Muş, 2009). According to this model, a police officer becomes responsible from a certain amount of families living in the same neighborhood. This new security culture of "debit" [polise zimmetlemek] is not restricted to families. Under the leadership of the Ministry of Education, elementary schools have been also debited to the policemen since 2009.

- I have lately read an interview realized by a very famous bartender. He was telling that he had not even put a drop of alcohol to his mouth in his life. He was telling that he knew how unsafe was to drink alcohol. These expressions drove my attention. It was for the first time that I was meeting with a bartender who does not drink alcohol while he serves his customers. He seemed to me to have a very strong personality. You have a similar character. You can be an alcohol-safe bartender as well...

If the teacher had not behaved in that way, there would not be probably a significant change in the student's life... This has led the young man to change attitude since to feel that he was different from other bartenders made him happy.

The "operation" of mind-making was successful.

This anecdote is signaling the supremacy of the department of anti-terrorism on creating links between different routine human psychologies and behaviours with young people's potential to become members of the so-called terrorist groups. This is not purely a psychological operation, one of the main jobs of security apparatuses since ever they are established. This is indeed cultivating many elements of the conservative common sense in Turkey for the rule of police apparatuses. It is collecting the social taboos and prejudices for depolitisizing many social and political demands of the oppressed classes. Tsoukalas (2002: 232-233) argues that new unorganized survival strategies of the desperate and largely unemployed masses are subject to "illegalization" and their demands are considered as "public nuisance".

The last but not the least, one of the authentic ways the Turkish police reform process improvises, always within the ideological reference points of the IPO's police reform agenda, is the relation of the police apparatus with kids in Turkey. Indeed, relations with children emerge as one of the nodal points of new politics of policing in Turkey. It is one of the ways developed by the police since mid-1990s to disseminate its internal ideology outwards. Indeed, the police apparatus does not have a socialization sphere as does the army possesses through the institution of military service. Likewise, the police apparatus undertakes a serious politics of children. This is a way to reproduce the policization and police apparatus' central role within the society. Then it is not mere coincidence that children have becoming more and more subject to police brutality.¹³²

This is not a paradoxical state of affairs but the nature of the dialectic of policing

¹³² In 2008, during the Öcalan protests that happened in the southeastern Turkey, 24 children were arrested. Many were severely wounded by the police truncheons (Radikal, 29.10.2008). In 2009, many children were again subject to police violence and one of them was crushed to death by police panzer.

politics. The more the police apparatus targets at a social segment –it was obviously the working classes in the 19th century- the more it is engulfed within a fierce struggle with that counterpart.

5.5.2 Reproduction Mechanisms of the Neoliberal Police Ideology in Turkey

Turkey's becoming a partner of the International Police Association (IPA) in 2000 is one of the major steps taken to incorporate the Turkish police to the reproduction mechanisms of the IPO. Recep Gültekin (2006), the founding police chief of the IPA in Turkey, argues that even though this association is of international nature and possesses a semi-formal structure, it undertakes many socio-political missions, even more than the amount that could be undertaken by various nongovernmental organizations.

The publication of a magazine tied to the Turkish branch of the IPA, *IPA New(s) Police*, makes a new start in 2006, where the editor represents the new spirit in the police organization with two pieces of poem, one from the famous communist poet Nazım Hikmet and the other from the famous conservative poet Necip Fazıl Kısakürek (Aytaç, 2006: 10). The poems convey both a feeling of being stuck within an environment and a feeling of hope for near future ameliorations. Moreover, the editor publishes a “letter to the editor” written down by a young police chief, brand-new in the police work, who complains from “the old ways of doing things” in the police organization. Hence, the IPA is perceived as one of the mechanisms to do away with the past previous practices and with the old police, and to form the new police. To struggle with the old police or to implement the neoliberal police reform in Turkey, this publication proposes to promote in the international arena “Turkey’s experiences on the fight against terrorism”.

These experiences are seen as key to make Turkey a leading country within the IPO. In that publication, it is stated that “[t]error is a notion which is foreign to the Turkish culture and Turkish society’s beliefs. Terror, as a method of combat is developed in the West and spread all around the world from the West” (Cerrah, 2006). However “foreign” terrorism is to Turkey, “Turkey possesses the potential to provide its region

with a new perspective on the basis of its historical and practical experiences of the fight against terrorism” (cited in IPA New(s) Turkey: 2006: 210). It is argued that the Turkish model in the fight against terrorism should be offered to the USA (Bal and Laçiner, 2003).

This aim has been materialized in the establishment of the Turkish Institute for Police Studies (TIPS) in 2004 in the University of Northern Texas. Although one of the aims of the Institute is to provide support to the members of Turkish Police Organization pursuing their post-graduate studies in the USA, the Institute’s mission is said to be opening up the experience of Turkey in the field of security to the whole world, and establishing a link between the US-based security organizations such as the FBI and the Turkish National Police.

TIPS posits itself as a transnational body undertaking the job of preventing “international terrorism” and “the first practical step was the organization of the International Istanbul Conference on Global Security and Democracy in June 2005 under the leadership of the Turkish National Police” (Teymur, 2006).¹³³ In the opening session of this Conference, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (2005) argued on the urge to “transfer the experience Turkey gained on fighting against terrorism in the last 25 years” in a world which “is in a transition stage of political restructuring”.¹³⁴

A second focal point to present the TNP to the members of IPO attending the Conference was the success of the TNP’s Intelligence Department which gathered “%95

¹³³ One of the many aims of this Conference was to declare one of new positions of the IPO on the issue of terrorism: “In this conference, both social scientists and representatives of different religions claim that instead of being a source for terrorism, religious systems serve for peace and confidence” (cited in TIPS Connections, 2006: 7). Hence, the IPO has widened its sphere of constituents, which have never been restrained to the direct bearers of policing policies, in order to include religious authorities.

¹³⁴ TIPS has been engaged in partnership with NATO on the issue of counterterrorism, and NATO funds TIPS projects on terrorism such as “Building Terrorism Resistant Communities” project developed by a TNP major.

of the intelligence ... used to carry out anti-terrorism operations ... over the last 15 years” (Temur and Yayla: 2005, 346). They also mentioned that a new culture was in the making regarding information sharing, and the motto of this new culture in the TNP was “information [was] for sharing and it must be shared unless otherwise stated” (Temur and Yayla: 2005, 351). The issue of information comes to the fore in every manifesto of the new generation of Turkish police officers. They describe the period after 1980 as an accumulation of information and to classify it, computer and information systems network, Pol-Net, was established in 1982. This system has been providing the police organization with an increasing agenda-setting power with ability to construct daily national politics. And yet, beyond these specific cases of agenda-setting, the police organization has created an addiction to “the intelligence” among the ruling classes and indeed thus feeds up the class power of the capitalist class in Turkey.

The fetishization of police data or info points out to a transformation in the political field. The latter becomes subsumed into empiricism, a defining characteristic of the IPO in the neoliberal era. The people making up the political field are deformed and reformed in terms of codes and databases. This harms the political field as the state apparatuses, rather than making analyses of the social and political data, concentrate on their accumulation and work over mountains of unprocessed data.

This fetishization of the information is also in line with peoplism as well as anti-intellectualism of the police intellectuals. The empirical world is taken as the guide of the police apparatus; it is the stream of experiences from where it drives its power. The political field is decomposed to its outmost constituents, the empirical facts, which are collected by the police apparatus as potential evidences of a not-yet born crime. In that sense, the empirical gains over the historical, the parts over the totality and the flux over the struggle. This state of affairs decompose the police organization as a form which expresses the asymmetrical relation between the bourgeoisie and the working classes, and recompose it as the expression of the class power of the capitalist classes, as the

19th century acquisition of the working classes, the notion of *public* police indeed, loses ground.

Apart from the Conference organizations, which can be seen as class acts, TIPS announced that it had reached to a consensus with the FBI to co-establish a Training Center for War on Terrorism in Turkey and “it will also offer police training services, especially to the police of the Middle East, the Balkans, and the Turk Republics” (Teymur, 2006: 15). These regional ambitions of the TNP to become a center of police training have also been ideologically supported by the new generation of police officers. For instance, in a short article on the importance of “Jön-Polisler”, Kaplan (2006) considers the issue of foreign students coming to the Turkish Police Academy from the post-Soviet Transcaucasia republics and claims that “[t]hese lovely people who had broken down the fences of the iron curtain showed that Turks cannot be contained within a cage even if it is made out of gold”.¹³⁵ This regional actorness of the Turkish police is also part of the new police ideology since it is argued by the police intellectuals who propagate their view in NATO publications that each police officer should become a

‘man of society’, which is something that each person should strive to be. To become this person, one must learn to understand the needs of both his regional area and his role within the global community, including the interdependency among all nations at the same time recognizing the inherent value of the individual himself. Being able to balance between individual needs and global responsibilities is a trait that all people will need in the era of globalization (Özsoy cited in Hançerli and Nikbay, 2007: 6).

Thus, TNP’s new generation of police chiefs and officers do not make use of the internationalization of the police simply as leverage in the internal politics of Turkey, which was the general mood during the period of 1978-1997. TNP assumes a leading role in the formation of the post-Soviet doctrine of policing, especially with the new mission assigned to the Police Academy concerning the police reform process in

¹³⁵ Nonetheless, to become an active member of the IPO, TNP has not been solely focusing on the closer regional sphere of Turkey. The then president of the TIPS, Teymur said that they had proposed their US colleagues to help them during the investigation processes that were taking place in the Guantanamo Prison (Hürriyet, 08.05. 2008).

Turkey. The foreign student profile of the Turkish Police Academy including participants from such countries as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Turkmenistan, Albania, displays the depth of this post-Soviet role assigned to Turkish police. (Arslan, 2002).¹³⁶ The Police Academy acknowledges this post-Soviet role in a clear and distinct manner and assumes that among many other advantages, this role will constantly energize the Turkish Police Academy's contribution to the transnational police reformers. It appears that this role is perceived as a moral leadership of these countries' police officers. An "International Police Follow-Up Project" is developed because "it is identified that despite the fact that these students return back to their home countries with positive impressions, having a good level of Turkish language knowledge and having acquired ethical values in Turkey, they lose these qualifications once the connection fades away between them and us" (Elmastaş et al, 2008). A further component of this post-Soviet role is the issue of Islam. This task is formulated as follows:

These post-Soviet regimes should realize that the growth of Islam in their territories is not a threat but actually an asset to their countries. The following actions should be taken to rectify the situation: Governments must protect the rights and freedom of religion of all citizens within their borders. They also must join forces with people of true Islamic faith to tap into the strength of Islam in fighting extremists and separatists. They must provide education for Russian people about the background and history of true Islam. Finally, due to the fact that Islam has political clout in the world, they should continue to cultivate relationships with countries with large Muslim populations, like they have with Turkey, in which case both sides benefited economically, through tourism and in security. (Hançerli and Nikbay, 2007: 7).

Turkey's becoming an organic part of the IPO and a major conveyor of its post-Soviet ideological formation is also realized through the United Nations Missions of Peace - Building which Turkey has been participating in since 1995, when a team of police officers were first sent to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Recently, Turkey has been participating to various UN or OSCE Missions, among which Kosovo comes to the fore in terms of

¹³⁶ The Project of National and International Police Training Center (UPEM is its Turkish abbreviation) is designed as a result of both Turkey's becoming a temporary member of United Nations Security Council in the year of 2009 and of Turkey's National Program for the Adoption of the EU *Acquis* which covers the title of "Justice, Liberty and Security" where it is stated that Turkey "will establish a new in-job training unit in tandem with the international standards". The aims of the project are listed as "exporting Turkey's policing experiences, becoming the center of world police training, coordination of different institutions such as Intelligence Academy of Turkey, UN Preservation for Peace".

furthering the ideological positions of the “New Police” of Turkey.¹³⁷ Police intellectuals themselves recognize the decisive function of these missions for the transformation of the TNP and argue that “the personnel who had experience in international organization missions became the agents of reform in the TNP” (Lofça, 2007: 198).

In structured interviews made by police officers assigned to the UN Kosovo Mission (UNMIK) and conducted by a graduate student of the Turkish Police Academy, many themes mentioned in the previous section come to the fore. One of them is the idea that as the Turkish police share the same values with the population in Kosovo, they are more active in the resolution of the problems, and the Kosovo people likes the Turkish police and feel an affinity to them (Güçlü, 2008: 82-83). Another complementary theme is the common historical past, namely the Ottoman Empire. It is argued that “Turkish and Kosovo peoples had lived in peace for hundreds of years during the Ottoman Empire era and now we are witnessing a similar harmony under the tutelage of the UN” (Güçlü, 2008: 83).¹³⁸

Hence, the Turkish police organization emerges as the advance guard of the IPO, making the latter’s sphere of influence bigger and deeper in the ex-sphere of influence of the Soviets. Turkish Police Force is itself an ideological force for the IPO, *the*

¹³⁷ This first mission to Bosnia should be considered in relation to the conflict that was ongoing in the Yugoslavia. Indeed, Turkey was considered to be deeply involved in the organized crime that was supporting the independence movements in the soils of Yugoslavia. The drug money that was determined to support various opposition movements such as Kosovo Liberation Army had its sources in a triangle of countries including Italy and Turkey, and the Western coalition was said to turn a blind eye to the circulation of this drug money that financed the mentioned organizations. Hence, Turkey’s police missions to the soils of Yugoslavia, both in 1995 and later in Kosovo are also significant in terms of the management of this global organized crime. Whereas the first mission does rather coincide with the training of the Bosnians against other parties of the conflict, the second mission coincides with the rehabilitation of Kosovo security sphere, which was deeply involved in the organized crime. For further details see Chossudovsky (1999/2011).

¹³⁸ The reference to the Ottoman Empire is made by the TNP officers quite often. For instance, a Turkish police officer from the European Union mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina gives the example of Fatih Sultan Mehmet’s Ahidname to reinforce his argument that “regardless of ethnical and religious background of people, Turkish police is in service of peace and stability of Bosnia- Herzegovina” (Poyraz, 2007: 20).

nucleus of its bourgeois ideology in the post-Soviet neoliberal era. What is important to mention is that this post-Soviet role of the TNP is not a clearly defined state project of Turkey. In those terms, the TNP leads the state, which is complained of not formulating specific policies for each mission and leaving vacuums of power due to lack of resolute state policies concerning these foreign police missions (Güçlü, 2008: 87).

The internationalization of the TNP through participation in the foreign missions create an expanded room of maneuver for the police apparatus within Turkey, which inevitably becomes first among equals in terms of foreign policy shaping. For instance, the interviewees argue that “the Albanians of Kosovo should take Turkey as an example on their road to independence and the local people should be informed about the fact that Turkey, the ‘big brother state’, will support them in unfavorable situations which are likely to happen” (Güçlü, 2008: 88).

Moreover, TNP promotes its own role in these “peacekeeping” missions as a kind of heroism since the officers participating in those missions “use their own money to cheer up children and elderly people... In another mission, a TNP member risks his life under severe cross fire to save the lives of his colleagues...Some other TNP personnel did fund-raising among their own contingent to buy food and other supplies for the locals in needy situations...” (Ekici, 2007: 3). These activities include the celebration of religious festivals with the local people such as the distribution of meat and organization of ifthars. This performance of the Turkish police officers is claimed to be a “perfect example of Community Policing” (Tekinbaş cited in Sarioğlu, 2007: 15). In that sense, the internationalization of the TNP attempts at producing a specific pattern of policiarization.¹³⁹

¹³⁹ Although it is beyond the limits of this thesis, the concept of neo-Ottomanism can be also discussed with respect to this new international role of the TNP. İlhan Uzgel (Evrensel, 17.10.2009) defines neo-Ottomanism not solely as a new foreign policy alternative of the Turkish state put into work by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government but also as a policy whose main terrain of struggle is the domestic arena *per se*. Indeed, it is argued that neo-Ottomanism does provide the AKP government with an ideological framework within which it reconciles the interventionist aggressions of its Western Allies with genteel diplomacy, to disguise the wolf under sheep’s clothing. The Kosovo mission of the Turkish police can be illustrative about the validity of such an argument. The Turkish police mission

What are the repercussions of this new police ideology for the “internal threats” defined by the police organization? How these are latter reformulated? These questions are legitimate questions that exceed the extent of this thesis and yet a short example shall be given to demonstrate the possible impacts of police reform on the reformulation of Turkey’s “old security problems”. In one of the volumes of the TIPS publication, democratic policing is advised as a method of counterterrorism in Turkey and it is stated that during the pre-police reform era, “[i]n line with the country’s general counter terrorism strategy, more emphasis was placed on gathering intelligence and hunting down the terrorists rather than developing strategies to prevent terrorist recruitment. By doing so, the police committed itself to the status quo and alienated itself from the society” (Durna and Hançerli, 2008: 21). Therefore, it is said that “considering the strength of tribal connections in the Southeast, the Turkish police should identify key community leaders and initiate contact with them to encourage citizen participation...” (Durna and Hançerli, 2008: 22). Hence, the police apparatus wants to remove its *status quo* face and engage in a pro-active state security regime change policy. The police apparatus becomes unevenly developed compared to many other state apparatuses under the post-Soviet neoliberal agenda and reproduced the latter’s discourse in Turkey “in its own way”. A “democratic policing” example related with this same topic can be traced from the following lines:

As a result of their [citizens of a district in Diyarbakır] trust, Captain O.E. was able to prevent a demonstration which could have had negative consequences in the city. He was informed by two retailers, with whom he had established a good relationship that retail owners and tradesmen would demonstrate against the police and government because of the increase in burglaries. A short time later, he was also informed by these two men that certain terrorist groups were supporting that demonstration and planning to create further violence in the city. He immediately took action and called approximately fifteen retail and store owners for a meeting at the police station. He explained them the steps he had taken to solve the burglaries and guaranteed that he would take all appropriate and necessary actions to prevent similar crimes in the district. He

undertakes a role of “community-policing” in Kosovo as it does at home. It makes use of a similar peoplism, where police invest in people by way of gestures such as “removing shoes while entering into houses” (Gültekin, conference presentation, 09.04.2010). Therefore, the contribution of the Turkish police force into the international police missions of the UN and the OSCE can also be rethought within this context.

showed them the statistics that revealed the number of criminals caught by the police. He also added that these criminals which are caught by the police are unfortunately released by the courts. Therefore, these people left the station with a more positive view of the police. They talked to other store owners and decided to cancel the demonstration. As a result of these community-based policing initiatives, a good communication system and relationship between the police officers and citizens which live within the jurisdiction of that Central Police Station was established (Gözübenli, 2008: 30-31).

5.5.3 IPO's Assessment of the Police Reform Process in Turkey: Restoring the basic dialectic?

Many members of the IPO have been directly involved in the police reform process of Turkey via different mechanisms such as Twinning Projects conducted in close cooperation with the EU member states, non-governmental organizations which are closely tied to organizations such as the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (Turkish Acronym *TESEV*) and Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), and projects developed by the UNDP.¹⁴⁰

Besides many different technical and organizational developments that the foreign experts associated to these above mentioned-organizations, what makes them part of the IPO while acting within the borders of Turkey is their emphasis upon the obstacles that might hinder the police reform process. Indeed, whereas the national members of the IPO give to the police reform its “positive” essence via the reproduction of the neoliberal post-Soviet ideology in their own ways, the IPO's foreign members' mission is rather “negative” in the sense that they reproduce a critique of the security structure in Turkey and let the void filled by the new generation of police officers in Turkey. One of the foreign experts in Turkey also mentions this division of labour by claiming that what they do is to help Turkey “finding her own ways”.¹⁴¹

¹⁴⁰ Since 2002, there have been 29 Twinning Projects, among which 12 have been concluded. Some of these projects include: strengthening the institutions fighting against human trafficking, strengthening of the TNP's criminal capacity, strengthening the responsibility, efficiency.

¹⁴¹ UNDP conducted between 2007-2010 a project entitled “Improvement of Civilian Oversight of Internal Security Sector Project” in close cooperation with the MoI of Turkey. One of the major aims of the project is to support the government's policy of “zero tolerance against violence and maltreatment”. Before the initiation of this project, a report was prepared by Andrew Goldsmith (International Expert) and Ibrahim Cerrah (National Expert) entitled “Preparatory Assistance for Civilian Oversight of Policing

Surprisingly though, the same expert says that the decentralization issue is not the direction that they are heading for since they try to be “realistic”. In that sense, one of the basics of the police reform process in Turkey, the issue of decentralization, has been metamorphosed into a different form for both national and transnational components of the IPO. The issue of decentralization rather means the fortification of the Ministry of Interior (MoI), as in the last instance the local actor participation in the new form of policing in Turkey is determined by the MoI (interview, February 1, 2010).

However, the strengthening of the MoI does not necessarily point out to the empowerment of the executive, the hallmark of neoliberal politics. The strengthening of the MoI can be better understood with reference to a further twist made in the Turkish police reform ideology. In the initial years of the new police ideology formation in Turkey, the notion of *citizen as a client* has been propagated widely within the police organization. And yet, the more nuanced becomes the police’s internal ideology, the more refined became this generic notion of seeing people as customers of security service. “Citizens are no more simply customers anymore, they are the owners of the business place, and they are the owners of the state” said a young Turkish Police Academy member during a 2010 Conference on the Developments in TNP (Gültekin, conference presentation, April 9, 2010). As such the executive is seen as the uncontested mirror image of people and the state is seen as a corporate body owned by people. This is the victory of class power, whereby the strengthening of the MoI is represented as if it was the establishment of direct democracy.

The same member of the Turkish Police Academy argued that the legitimacy ground had shifted from state to “people” and “those who could not realize this change have become rotten”. This analysis of this young police intellectual was pointing out how the

ad Law Enforcement” in 2005. In this report, the experts present the results of field studies they conducted among the governors and sub-governors on their capacity to supervise the policing bodies and they make some suggestions.

transubstantiation of the notion of legitimacy by the public confidence, as a determinant characteristic of the neoliberal police reform agenda, is translated to the Turkish case. Indeed, by the establishment of a discourse that posits “the people” as the owner of the state but not customers to be served by the state, the police apparatus turns out to be a non-state actor, a political actor that goes out from the field of the state.

In an interview realized with the main technical consultant of the previously mentioned UNDP project, Sébastien Roché, it is retained that the central concern about the ongoing security reform process in Turkey is the gendarmerie as a foot dragging institution to the reform process. Hence, transnational police intellectuals of the IPO consider the main axis of debate as one of overlap of jurisdictional responsibilities of the Turkish National Police and the Gendarmerie. For instance, the Gendarmerie’s right to withhold information from the public prosecutor is cited as a “curious right” that impedes the modernization of policing structure in Turkey (Sariibrahimoğlu, 2006; Goldsmith, 2009).¹⁴²

A related axis of debate, the military’s power to alter the policing structure in Turkey is also cited as an impediment to the realization of change in the police apparatus in accordance with the ideal police reform program. For instance, [i]n 1997, the General Staff of TAF and the Ministry of Interior has signed a secret protocol on Security, Public Order, and Assistant Units (known as EMASYA) which “allows for military operations to be carried out for internal security matters under certain conditions without request from the civilian authorities”; including the collection of intelligence” (European Commission 2006 Report cited in Goldsmith, 2009).¹⁴³ In a DCAF report

¹⁴² A further problem identified by the IPO is formulated as the low confidence of law enforcement agencies in the justice system, for this leads inevitably to the emergence of “police justice” (Jenkins, 2002).

¹⁴³ This secret protocol is removed in February, 2010. Despite the fact that it provided the military with *de facto* powers to intervene in internal social events, it has also helped the police apparatus during May Day celebrations since 2007. Military units were deployed in the Taksim Square during 2007, 2008 and 2009 on the basis of this protocol which allows civilian governors to ask for help from the military in social events like demonstrations (sol.org.tr, 22.01.2010). Moreover, retired General Edip Başer, who was nominated as Turkey’s special coordinator for combating PKK in 2006, declared that this EMASYA plan

prepared by Ümit Cizre (2007: 5), it is stated that “a democratic reform agenda cannot bring results unless it gives primacy to altering the underlying sources of power imbalance in the sector”, mainly between the police and the military forces.¹⁴⁴ She adds that “[p]olice officials privately defend the idea of reorganization in the form of a merger between the GGC (Gendarmerie General Command) and the police at the level of an ‘undersecretariat’, abolishing the ‘general directorate’ structure” and finally argues that for the security sector in Turkey to change in a positive way, the “conceptual morass defining threats and national security” should be “demystified and opened to civilian participation” (Cizre, 2007: 19-21).¹⁴⁵ In 2008, the National Security Council took the decision to transform General Security Directorate of Turkey into an Undersecretariat of the MoI, which has been a pervasive aspiration of the Turkish National Police (TNP) since Mehmet Ağar’s era of police directorship.

When reconsidered under the light of these theoretical nutriments of the IPO, whereby the issue of reform is seen from a dichotomy of civil vs military, it is not a surprise that the police apparatus –associated with the civil side of the equation- reproduces the discourse of “internal threats”, long-time used by the Turkish Military. Internal threat for the New Police is the “bureaucratic-military state”, as defined by the police intellectuals themselves.¹⁴⁶ Indeed, the positing of the militarized structure of Turkey as a threat to be overcome by the police apparatus stems partly from the fact that the police form of the bourgeois state which depends on the asymmetry of the capital-labour

was developed as a mechanism that could intervene in “extraordinary situations like worker strikes” (sol.org.tr, 22.01.2010).

¹⁴⁴ Cizre (2007: 13) identifies TESEV as the leading NGO in its role of “creating a security-conscious community capable of monitoring and overseeing the sector”.

¹⁴⁶ In a recent book edited by police intellectuals on the security governance, it is stated that there is a “learned helplessness” that blocks the minds of people and in Turkey, the coup d’états have caused learned helplessness in every area including politics, bureaucracy, business, science. All these sectors had always had to consider “what the military would say” while developing policies... To remove the learned helplessness, the society needs an *advanced leadership*” [italics added] (Çevik et al, 2009: 162). It is a fact that this advanced leadership is thought to be provided by the police apparatus restructured along the neoliberal reforms.

relations has been developing unevenly and thus expanding the asymmetry to the advantage of the capital.

In other words, the Oedipus complex, which the police form has been undergoing in the early decades of the bourgeois state form, where the working class component emerges as a self-annihilative power for the form of the police apparatus, has changed in the post-Soviet neoliberal era. The weakening of the working class struggle has caused an alteration in the dialectic of the police form, whereby the intra-class struggles became more dominant and apparent. In that sense, the civil-military dichotomy is a form of appearance for an intra-class struggle, where a party of order becomes of a more urgent need to restore the main dialectic in favor of the total class power: It is the IPO.

Hence the IPO's missions in Turkey are not solely to target and weaken the old representatives of the bourgeoisie but also to get over this divide of old and new by enabling the police apparatus and a new dominant ideology. In that sense, the gendarmerie is perceived as the security apparatus of another paradigm. It is thought to complete its historical mission, which is conceived as bringing the nation-state in the countryside. Meanwhile the Turkish National Police emerge as the real actor of a new paradigm based on the notion of "civilization", developed by Cemil Meriç and embraced by the police intellectuals. One of these police intellectuals, İbrahim Cerrah (2005) argues that the concept of police, in the ancient Greek, means city, which is in turn the root of the notion of civilization. Indeed, the nation-state, as a level of analysis is downgraded by the IPO and replaced by the notion of "civilization" in Turkey. This is Turkey's "nationally owned concept of security" produced during the police reform process (OECD, 2005: 23).

However, to get over the necessary but in long run harmful intra-class war, it is necessary to generate some preventive measures that prevent the metamorphosis of the security apparatuses into degenerated Mafiosi kinds of groups. The destructive power of the asymmetrical expansion of capitalist class power was formulated in the introductory

chapters as the self-annihilation of the modern police apparatus. The over-extension of the capitalist class power inevitably augments the degree of this self-annihilation. Thus, the neoliberal reform of the police apparatus in Turkey also produces discourses such as the end of maltreatment by the police.

Most of the twinning projects of the TNP simulate similar kind of quasi-progressive demands such as preventing the disproportionate use of force by the police, strengthening the accountability, efficiency and effectiveness of the TNP in a very technical manner. The police reform is in that sense a way of copying the working class setbacks to the bourgeois police form, which is a way of killing two birds with one stone. Thereby, the peaceful development of class power is secured. If a strong working class struggle would exist to push for the establishment of similar kinds of progressive demands, these steps would not come in the “technical” form they appear now under the yoke of neoliberalism but instead they would bring in back *the political as such*. A perfect example to that state of affairs is to establish a Human Rights Division within the Counterterrorism Department of the TNP in 1996, which is a very controversial affair since the impact of a human rights branch within the Department of Terrorism, which is known to be involved in serious human rights violations [as detected by Human Rights Association of Turkey], does not look too much promising.

The police apparatus, as already explained in the first chapter, contains two opposite poles in its own body, namely the tradition of the ancien régime and the modern politics, where masses become a major player in the political field. These two poles are non-arbitrary essential features of a police apparatus operating within the capitalist nation-state. It both sustains the rule of the capital and displays the resistance of masses to the anti-political politics of this rule. Hence, when the component of modern politics dissolves, the police apparatus cannot function properly. The case of the rapid action units in the late 1990s and the early 2000s is demonstrative of this fact. “After a vast and threatening demonstration of the Rapid Action Units in seven provinces in 2000, protesting the shooting of their police officer friends, units in forty-six provinces were

closed down in 2002 with the aim of downsizing the units to thirty provinces” (Berksoy, 2007a: 116). The police intellectuals argued that the demonstrations of the rapid action units were caused by the extreme unhappiness of the officers working within these units (Beren, 2001). The causes of the rapid action units’ rebel was searched in their psychology. Yet, the psychological situation of these units is not the cause of their discontent; it is a result of it. The rebellious activities of these units were rather caused by the paralysis that had been occurring in the very form of the police, on which the progressive impact of the working class struggles were nearly null.

In other words, the modern police form which depends on class struggles does not solely grow stronger in the absence of a powerful working class but it also contains the risk of implosion. Many members of the IPO recognize this risk of implosion under the notion of “police sub-culture” and tries to patch up the leaking by way of furthering internationalization. That is why, “police sub-culture” and police “education” becomes IPO’s fetishes in Turkey. It is hoped that the lack of the political as such can be substituted by police training in morality, an issue also dwelled on in the previous chapter.

Finally, it should be mentioned that the neoliberal obsession with police training and regeneration of a new police culture, as a way of overcoming the police corruption and police’s maltreatment of people has taken the form of a kind of popular psychologism as a way to develop the Turkish police culture. The officers making up the rank-and-file are entrusted to the “leaders” who manage the perceptions of their followers with the help of NLP (Neuro-Lingusitic Programming) (Çevik et al, 2009: 164). This latter makes part of the self-help or life coaching industry. Such kind of an approach to the police problems create an atmosphere where the job of policing is considered as “policemen’s burden”, which might be cured at least partially with the help of counseling and group therapy. Hence, the missionary role of the modern police is created *de nouveau*. An example might illuminate the argument presented with the help of that news entitled as “Police blows off stress with NLP experts” where it is stated

that “the Rapid Deployment Forces, who work for 24 hours and prevent illegal demonstrations in neighborhoods where many immigrants from Eastern and Southeastern parts of the country live, are relieved from the stress created by this work place with the help of the NLP experts” (PolisHaber, 23.10.2010).

Therefore, NLP of the neoliberal era replaces the political commitments that were proposed by the Pol-Der of the 1970s with moral education and popular psychologism. It is true that the new generation police officers also ask for a kind of police association/trade-union. However, they also ask for some kind of a tutorship. In other words, somebody from outside the organization should fulfill this gap. It is argued that “concerning the trade-unionization of the police, cases in the EU countries should be overviewed and a structure in harmony with the Turkey’s social fabric should be built up. Retired police officers or police families could become pioneers of this process...” (Bener, 2007: 110-112).

In all over the world, the question of the police officers’ social rights is a problematic one. It is stated that “[p]olice staff shall as a rule enjoy social and economic rights, as public servants, to the fullest extent possible. They shall have the right to organize or to participate in representative organizations” (OSCE’s Guidebook on Democratic Policing, 2008: 55). Indeed, no reference is made to the right to become a member of a trade union. The right to organization is vague and the representative organizations are solely depicted with reference to occupational groups. It is not difficult to conclude that for the new police generation, either the IPA’s Desk of Turkey (as an international occupational group) or NLP or some family members should fill in the gap emanating from the legacy of trade-unionism but not the trade-unions themselves.

The thesis has started with an intriguing example about the community policing method used by the police of Trabzon to fingerprint volunteers. As the end of the thesis approaches, another recent example will be very symptomatic about the total effects of all the elements of police reform process that have been explained so far. Under the

community-based policing scheme, the police organization of the city of Van organized a friendship football match with the local high school students. During the game, the students have communicated in Kurdish to ask for a pass. The police team could not tolerate this state of affairs and beat the students (sol.org.tr, 13.04.2009). This is not the result of police hypocrisy. Indeed, it shows how the police reform is translated into the daily politics of policing in Turkey. The police apparatus wants to become a major player in the vital issues of the country, which are surrendered to a politics of carrot and sticks. The Turkish police apparatus elaborates on this politics; it develops new techniques and methods and after a period of trial promotes them in NATO circles where the new generation of the Turkish police argues that

[t]hese new developments [policies which brought the “disenfranchised people to the center”] in Turkey have caused leaders in the radical Islamist and separatist Kurdish parties to stop emphasizing their ethnic and religious distinctions from the majority in Turkey and start preaching acceptance of pluralist values that benefit the whole of the population. Advances like these, which are desired by governments to reduce violence within their borders, should be a sign for all countries to pay attention and include the minority populations in the running of the country so that they would have some stake in it (Haçerli and Nikbay, 2007: 7).

The police apparatus of Turkey makes use of the most important political issues of the country to gain the upper hand at the international arena under the banner of “fight against terrorism”. This in turn empowers the police apparatus at home since “the agents of the security field can compete with politicians only if this security field exceeds the national political games... and constrain these politicians to give up their power to say the last word accorded to them by the notion of sovereignty” (Bigo, 2005).

5.6 Concluding Remarks

The analysis of Turkish police reform has shown that the neoliberal reform process and the internal ideology of the Turkish police apparatus have overlapped in a perfect manner. The new internal ideology of the police apparatus has been under formation since the early 1990s as it is shown in the publications of some police intellectuals as early as the year of 1992, where de-Sovietization is praised and where different social actors such as religious communities are categorized as civil society groups. Therefore, although the police reform process has stepped up during the AKP government since

2002, it has not started with it. The police apparatus precedes AKP in terms of the production of a new dominant-cum-official ideology in Turkey.

In fact, the analysis of the police reform process in Turkey shows that the Turkish National Police is an active component of the IPO in the neoliberal era. It is reformed while it reforms other country police forces. Therefore, a country's police forces become inducers of police reform elsewhere and in that manner the IPO induces change in that very same police sender country. Moreover, the case of the Turkish National Police demonstrates the importance of police intellectuals, as well as Police Academies, in the reproduction of the mandates of IPO.

This portrait of the police reform process in Turkey shows that the Turkish police apparatus has established a new police ideology and has been diffusing this internal ideology to the society. The formation of this new police ideology has become possible through the police internationalization under the leadership of the IPO in the neoliberal era. In other words, the police reform process fosters the formation of a new police ideology, which in turn translates the post-Soviet neoliberal police reform program to Turkey, in its own ways.

It should also be mentioned that decoding this ideology is not that easy since the police apparatus of the late 1990s has created a language of its own, which is difficult to capture. It is a discourse highly determined by the traditional codes of morality and it makes the reader feel him or herself in the midst of an education of religion and ethics. This is indeed a version of the neoliberal police reform's subsumption of the political under ethics. Moreover, the new police ideology is very much determined by a kind of psychologism that seeks to explain every failure in the police apparatus with reference to the psychological conditions of the police officers. This is indeed an authentic reflection of the neoliberal reformers' obsession with the police culture. But the most authentic contribution of the Turkish case of police reform to the neoliberal police reform program is its image of people. The Turkish National Police does sanctify the

people, to the extent that this so-called state tradition of Turkey where the state is seen as a *sui generis* entity, which has a transcendental substance, is reproduced in the new police ideology in a perverted manner. This time, the state is degraded and the people turn out to be the transcendental subject, which has an ability to determine every other thing that revolves around it. In that sense, the issue of public confidence, praised by the neoliberal police reformers, is reproduced in Turkey in an extreme form. All the more, this sanctification of the people is done through historical references that are peculiar to Turkey such as the tradition of guilds in the Ottoman era, which arguably constitute the nucleus of today's civil society. Meanwhile, the neoliberal police reform's anti-statism is reproduced in Turkey through notions such as "totalitarian state", "central-bureaucratic state", "authoritarian state", all of which make a blend of every negative attribute assigned to the communist states of the Cold War by the anti-communists.

It should also be stated that the class power over the police apparatus in Turkey has been growing thanks to this new police ideology which aims at a deep restructuring of the political field in Turkey, where the notion of legitimacy has made a change in its sources of origin. An amorphous object, the civil society, but in fact the people, has become the locus of legitimacy. Nonetheless, this does not mean at all an expansion of citizenship rights, nor does it mean the expansion of the modern political field.

Sabancı can present a real-life allegory since as the previous lines have already mentioned he is called in the supervision of the police apparatus at the very beginning of the police reform process in Turkey. In fact, police reform means to displace the notion of modern society (which represents the universal part of the dialectics of coercion) with that of Sabancı (which represents the particular part of the dialectics of coercion) an iconic figure for the society in Turkey. In other words, the *universal* is subsumed under the iconized Sabancı figure, since Sabancı is the iconic patron of Turkey's capitalism, a "father for the workers" (Adaklı, 2004). The dialectics of coercion has changed in Turkey where one of the constitutive parts of the dialectic, the universal associated with the universal benefits of a whole society, got erased and

replaced if not by the particular interests of the capitalist class, by the iconic figure of Sabancı. The iconization of Sabancı figure is first related with a process where in Turkey, the business firms and businessmen were considered by the society as institutions which are more trustful than trades union (Adaklı, 2004). This has caused indeed a perfect concentration of class power in the police apparatus, where *the universal-particular* dialectic has turned into a dialectic of universal subsumed under the iconic figure of Sabancı, and the *particular*, the bourgeois class interests, are perfectly represented by Sabancı himself.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

This thesis has mainly argued that the bourgeois state form has been decomposed in and through the police reform process, as the latter changes the borders set between the political and the economic established historically in the 19th century. The police reform means a fundamental restructuring of the modern political field, akin to the bourgeois state form. The neoliberal police reform, which is ultimately shaped in the post-Soviet era, aims at both eroding the legacy of 19th century revolutionarism from the form of the police apparatuses, and eliminating the negative effects of the Cold War paramilitarization from its organization. Nonetheless, the fight against the heritage of para-militarism is not the restoration of the bourgeois state form, as it appears to be at first sight. In fact, the neoliberal modernization agenda of the police apparatus is an attempt to permanently prevent the risk that emanates from the rise of para-military forces through the establishment of the rule of capital over the police. This is ensured through the strengthening of police discretionary powers (including the police powers in judicial processes), namely the police chiefs political actorness, on the one hand, and the police's close training and supervision by the IPO to set their operational limits in line with the class power on the other. In other words, the neoliberal police reform is not modernization defined with respect to the requirements of bourgeois political field (the separation of the means of violence from those who use or hold them) but rather the re-definition of modernization along neoliberal lines, where the empowerment of the police apparatuses vis-à-vis the Cold War-style military (or paramilitary) type of policing is definitive.

The neoliberal police reform takes place in an international atmosphere, shaped by the impact of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. De-Sovietization has thus emerged as a

fundamental agenda for the transnational capitalist classes, for whom the bourgeois state form -which is denigrated with the help of the neoliberal *anti-statist* ideology- appears to become an impediment rather than an advantage to further their power. To this end, police reform program proceeds by the policianization of society where the police apparatuses turn into “champions of change”, namely *anti-statist state apparatuses*. This process leads to the further privatization of the political, namely the expansion of capitalist class power on the social form of police apparatuses.

In other words, the neoliberal police reform is an expression of the growing class power in the field of policing. It denotes a direct intervention of the capitalist classes into the internal dynamics of modern coercion, which is based on a dialectical relation between the universal values sustained in and through the bourgeois state form. In this form, the progressive impact of working class struggles faces the particular interests of the bourgeoisie, which needs an organized political coercion to be sustainable over time. One pole of that dialectic which leans on the representation of the universal values in the modern political field (associated with the bourgeois state form) has been transmuted into *peoplism*, while the notion of legitimacy, the defining feature of the modern political field, has been reduced to a notion of public confidence, defined in ethical terms.

6.1 Recollecting the Theoretical Arguments of the Thesis

This thesis has started with a discussion on the social form of the modern police in order to show the police apparatus’ social constitution. The modern police apparatus emerged in an era where socialist utopias were pervasive as well as when working classes were envious to take over the power. It emerged both because of these issues and against them. It was both representing the idea of security provision as a universal right and the particular interests of the bourgeoisie. Therefore, it was based on a dialectics of coercion, which gave birth to the institutionalization of the monopoly of the bourgeois state on the legitimate use of physical violence. The monopoly of coercion was both an illusion and a reality, a “real appearance” indeed. It was providing an ideological

protective shield to the fact that the state was in fact representing the concentration of the coercive structure of the capitalist society but it was also the expression of a modern political field where subordinated classes could struggle for their own political and social rights. In other words, the state monopoly of coercion was a historical construct, not an essential characteristic of the capitalist state. It was indeed a feature of the bourgeois state form.

Meanwhile, the formation of the modern police was also dependent on intra-class struggles represented by those between the bourgeoisie and aristocracy in the 18th and 19th centuries. To put in a nutshell, the police apparatus has been subject to both inter and intra-class wars. Therefore, the police apparatus was not an apparatus belonging to the bourgeoisie and thus shaped exclusively by the latter's arbitrary desires and decisions but its establishment under the principle of state monopoly of coercion or under the bourgeois state form was a structural condition for the consolidation of bourgeoisie's hegemony. This meant that the bourgeoisie conceded some of its political rights by giving up the right to make use of extra-economic coercion to the bourgeois state. The differentiation of state and class powers was indeed a division of labour whereby the previously political issue of production was left to the impersonal rule of the market. This meant the privatization of the previously political issue of production. The class power was crystallized in its power to privatize this previously political issue of coercion. In other words, privatization of the political was a perfect expression of class power under capitalism.

However, as already stated the police apparatus was also an apparatus of working class control, to which the bourgeoisie reconciled itself to in order to secure its own hegemony. Therefore, the modern police's history is also the history of working class struggles. Whenever these struggles have fallen back, the bourgeoisie felt less compelled to depend on the bourgeois state form. This is the case with the neoliberal era, where there has emerged a redivision of labour between state and class powers and where the previously political issues of organization of coercion, for instance the police

apparatus, has become more and more subject to the privatization (of the political). The capitalist class power expanded so that it meant further privatization of the political issues.

This thesis has also shown that the police apparatus's internationalization is first and foremost an intervention to its own social form. Indeed, the internationalization of the police disembeds the police from the social forces giving shape to it, but especially from the impact of working classes. The internationalization of the police was a strategy of 19th century ruling classes for the criminalization of the idea of socialism and thus for the squeezing down of *the political as such*. The socialist utopias, which were materialized in the 72 days of Paris Commune, should have been subject to the rule of a police international.

The more the police international fires the *political as such* from the modern political field, the more the modern police suffers under the tension created by the growing asymmetry of its basic dialectics of particular and universal on behalf of the former. The deterioration of the police's social form is at the root of the "permanent policing reform" (Brodeur, 2005). The police apparatus has always asked for improved professionalization since its impersonal appearance has always been under the threat of the personal rule triggered by the international. In other words, the birth of the modern police meant the separation of tools of coercion from those who use it. It meant the end of political classes who owned the tools of coercion. Those who were using the tools of coercion were no more those who were buying this or that apparatus of the state and state titles associated with them. The end of this meant the end of the personal rule and the start of the impersonalization. However, this impersonalization, as was the case with the state monopoly of coercion, was not guaranteeing the immunity of the modern state apparatuses such as the police from the impact of subordinated classes. It was providing an ideological shield to make proof of the state's neutrality, however at the same time it was an impediment in the advancement of the particular interests of the bourgeoisie. Therefore, the internationalization of the modern police apparatus was an attempt to chop off the progressive elements of this impersonalization and bring in back the

personal rule, the ancien régime's political classes. The internationalization of the modern police has strengthened the ancien régime basis of the modern police, which was also a nothing but a sublated form of the absolutist state's policing idea. The internationalization of the police has meant the smooth erosion of the legacy of bourgeois revolutions within this institution.

That is why, the nature of *the International* when conceived with a focus on politics of policing is then best revealed by the dialectic of ancien régime and bourgeois revolutions. The police international was both an advanced form of bourgeoisie's class consciousness and a proof of the bourgeoisie's tragedy, Bonapartism. The internationalization of the police fostered the resurrection of ancien régime legacy in the modern police' social form in order to secure the bourgeois order. Therefore, the very agents or constituents of this internationalization process made up an International Party of Order, which aimed at giving the police apparatus a relative independence from the yoke of the political as such, namely from the utopias of working classes which pressurized the social form of the police apparatuses. Hence, the IPO's primary mandate was to de-agentify the working classes, to shut up their utopias.

One of the first activities of the IPO was the formation of an idea on how a national police apparatus look like and started to induce this idea and operationalize it in different national contexts via different methods ranging from colonialism to diplomacy. Police reform, as the highest form this idea has taken, entered into the international scene since the very early days of post-First World War period.

However, the issue with the post-Soviet neoliberal police reform differs from the earlier attempts at police reform since it occurs within a context where the dialectics of bourgeois state form has ceased to work in the way it used to in the 19th century, and when the security apparatuses are brought under the logic of class power, where the internationalization of the police does not only squeeze down the political as was the

case in the 19th century but restructures it through the policiarization of the social. The case of neoliberal police reform is the most observable proof of this process.

The growing interest of the capitalist classes during the neoliberal era in the security issues (including the ascendancy of the privatization of security through private security companies) cannot be solely reduced to the commodification of security. It rather shows that the roots of the modern police institutions, the early 19th century's bourgeoisie's private policing powers and mechanisms have resurrected. Of course, this is not a mere resurrection or a kind of new feudalism. This thesis has argued that this referred to an augmentation in the class power of the bourgeoisie in areas previously left to the state power. It denotes a change in the division of labour between the state power and the class power. It is a new level and type in the privatization of the political, which emerged as a structural feature of the new society during the transition from feudalism to capitalism.

It is within this context that the neoliberal police reforms take place. The police apparatuses get restructured along the themes of de-Sovietization and destatization, which are the very concrete forms the neoliberal era's class power take in the issue of police apparatuses' restructuring. Indeed, police apparatus, as a very state apparatus indeed, is used as a pioneer in the remaking of the political as such during the neoliberal times. It has turned into an agent of change; a pioneer apparatus in state-building and restructuring. The police reform's aim of making out of the police apparatuses "non-state actors" or even "civil society" actors as in the case of Turkey is a strategy of decomposing the bourgeois state from and the legacy of bourgeois revolutionarism in the social form of the police apparatuses.

6.2 Rethinking on the Post-Soviet Neoliberal Police Reform under the Light of the Turkish Case

The post-Soviet neoliberal police reform is a specific mode of police internationalization and the impact of the International in the making of Turkish police reform reveals that it helped to make the Turkish Police Forces a quasi-strong constituent of the International Party of Order. This empowerment of the TNP abroad facilitated the realization of its ambitions at home. In other words, there is a close link between the policiarization of the social sphere in Turkey with the establishment of international mechanisms through which the police from Turkey aspire to have a say; to determine the politics of policing both at home and abroad.

Through the establishment of international mechanisms such as The Turkish Institute for Police Studies (TIPS), the Turkish police apparatus strongly relates itself with the transnational field of security makers and it uses the international sphere as leverage for its political agency at home. The international is not only a simple leverage of course. It does help the police apparatus to sustain its Oedipus complex during the neoliberal era within reasonable limits. Indeed, the IPO's anti-political politics of the police does also try to secure the police from being over-determined by the diverse class fractions. This is, yet, a hopeless attempt on the side of the IPO, which argues for the establishment of democratic policing, since the privatization of the political does continuously cut down the preventive measures generated to sustain the police's degeneration into Mafiosi-like para-military groups that may give harm to the hegemony of the bourgeoisie.

These are the very paradoxes of the IPO. On the one hand, the disembedding of the police form occurs through internationalization. In other words, the police apparatus becomes relatively autonomous from the impact of domestic political struggles. On the other hand, this relative autonomy results in a recurring cycle of regression in the police form, which causes ancien régime to come back to the future. Thus, the International reintervenes to prevent this self-ruinous regression and it does generate mechanisms

such as *peoplism*. This restructuring of the political field through the police reform as a way of furthering the cause of the transnational class power is inevitably a way of redefining the state's structure and role within capitalism.

Poulantzas (1980) discusses the state apparatuses' role in the making of fascism in Germany and Italy. As a result he draws some theoretical conclusions. He argues that whereas in the bourgeois democratic form of the capitalist state, the ideological apparatuses (such as schools, universities, the church etc..) have a relative independence from the state apparatuses, in the fascist forms of the capitalist state, the ideological apparatuses lose their relative independence and become subsumed under the state apparatuses. Therefore, Poulantzas' analysis points out that a radical change in state structures cause the repositioning both of the state coercive and ideological apparatuses. Indeed, there occurs a movement, a displacement between and within these different apparatuses.

In the post-Soviet neoliberal era, the separation established between the state apparatuses and the ideological apparatuses within the context of bourgeois state also do change form. Whereas in fascism the ideological apparatuses become fused into the state power, during the post-Soviet neoliberal era, as exemplified in the case of Turkish police reform, the security apparatuses have become fused into ideological apparatuses. That is to say, the "champions of change", the neoliberal era's police apparatuses think of themselves as non-state actors or even more as civil society organizations rather than as bourgeois state apparatuses. Of course, their notion of "civil society" is reduced to two things, as demonstrated in the case of Turkey: to the ethical (and more appropriately religious morality) and to the market (and more appropriately individual capitalists).

The police reform processes facilitate the formation of a new police ideology as the Turkish case demonstrates and the police apparatuses become involved in the restructuring of *the political as such* via this new ideology. Indeed, during the neoliberal

era, the police's special internal ideology (the new police ideology as described in the case of Turkey) coincides with the dominant ideology (Poulantzas, 1980). The police apparatus' ideology becomes indeed the dominant ideology. This is definitely the policiarization process, worshipped by the post-Soviet neoliberalism.

This also shows that this process of change in the relation between the state coercive apparatuses and ideological apparatuses is not solely akin to the extraordinary state forms of 1940s but indeed is an inevitable process of the IPO's growing powers all around the world. However, different from these extraordinary forms of state, the class power during the neoliberal era is not erased from *appearance* as was the case under Bonapartism. To reinstate, the growing class power in the neoliberal era means the restructuring of the separation of the economic and the political akin to the bourgeois state form. The political becomes more and more privatized, therefore displacing the state apparatuses from the sphere of the state to the sphere of the economic or society.

As the case of Turkey demonstrates, the police apparatus has detached itself at least ideologically from the so-called state tradition of Turkey since the early 1990s. In other words, the police apparatus, as one of the defining apparatuses of the state, has ceased step by step to operate within the official ideology of the Turkish state since the early 1990s. This detachment of the police apparatus has coincided perfectly with the neoliberalism's anti-revolutionary and anti-paramilitary stances explained in the third chapter.

The internal ideology of the police apparatus in Turkey has been restructured along the line of Turkist-Islamic synthesis in Turkey since the late 1970s. Historically speaking, the military regime of the early 1980s and the Özal era in Turkey did not choose to deal with the religiosity as an organized movement that had just started to flourish within the Turkish police apparatus. Moreover, as told in the second chapter, the modern police apparatus in Turkey consolidated itself during 1940s, when fascism was inspiring many coercive apparatuses not only ideologically but also in terms of policing techniques and

methods. Aziz Nesin (cited in Bali, 2011: 81) who was one of the victims of the then nationalist police Chief Ahmet Demir, wrote an annunciation in the humor magazine Markopaşa to tease the police techniques used during his era:

İdaremiz için 1947-48 yılı ihtiyacı için 1800 kızılık sopası cinsinden odun alınacaktır. Taliplerin, muhtelif boy ve numarada kızılık sopalarıyla hususi ve gizli talimatı görmek üzere başvurmaları... [We will be buying wood in the form of cornel sticks for the policing requirements of the period from 1947 to 1948. The would-be suppliers should apply in order to consult the special and private order, and see the cornel stick samples...]

Emniyet Müdürü [Polis Captain]
Ahmet Demir

Indeed, this is not any more a humor as the Turkish Police Organization goes out to tender for ammunition. In the eve of the Nevruz and May Day demonstrations in Turkey, the General Security Directorate goes out to tender to buy “60.000 gas guns; 20.000 semi-automatic weapons and 50.000 handcuffs” for the Rapid Deployment Forces (Radikal, 17.03.2009).

As this latest example demonstrates, these methods get normalized and are considered business as usual. This is mostly caused by the pervasive issue of security privatization. The private security issue was fostered by the military regime of 1980 as already stated. They became exuberant during the civil war of 1990s in Turkey and reproduced the pattern of para-military warfare in Turkey. However, by early 2000s, they started to shape the wider arena of security in Turkey with the introduction of an understanding where security provision cannot be a free public service and must get paid according to the rules of the market. It is not then a coincidence that the recent discussions on the change in Police Organization Law – letting the public police officers work during their off-duty times as private security guards- are based on the ideological secretions released by the growing sector of private security.

The community based policing get also shaped over the ideology of privatization of the political. It is indeed a concrete example of the neoliberal era’s privatization of the political in the sphere of police apparatuses. In fact, as already explained in the

introductory chapters, community based policing is the pre-history of modern police, where policing was a collective responsibility. However, this collective responsibility was tied to the king under the rubric that those who provide security, the whole community indeed, are subject to king's sovereign rights. They were providing security in the name of the king and for the king. This close relation between the community type of policing and the political classes of the feudal times are reproduced under neoliberalism. A recent example from Turkey is the project prepared by the Antalya Police on the basis of the neighborhood watch model. Within the contours of this project, it is stated that there will be a contest named as "Neighbors are Competing!" This contest has many criteria among which there are whether the law on duty of citizens to provide their personal identity information is applied; whether residents do know each other; whether the valuable objects of the residents are marked with pencils which are sensible to ultraviolet rays... (sol.org.tr, 14.08.2009). The citizens are forced to look after their own properties in the name of the police apparatus, like was the case under the feud system where the self-help security measures were transformed into an obligation owed to the king (Rawlings, 2002: 11).

This process is named as policiarization of the social. However, this concept does not solely aim at providing a counter-part to the concept of militarization. On the contrary, it does aim at showing the modalities of the growing political power of the police apparatuses and their restructuring of the policing field in accordance with an ideologized morality, a phenomenon which does kick out the institution of *legitimacy* from the political field. By introducing *peoplism*, the police apparatuses replace the modern institution of legitimacy with a culture of public confidence. Thereby, the police apparatus itself fulfills the void of "ideas" left by the bourgeoisie of Turkey in the 1990s. It becomes a political legitimacy crisis prevention apparatus. Indeed, it acts as if it has been the political party of the bourgeoisie.

6.3 Rethinking the Essential Characteristics of the International Party of Order under the Light of the Turkish Case

The Turkish Police Reform process has demonstrated that the International Party of Order does not intervene in national settings from outside, as an external body. On the contrary, International Party of Order's strength comes from the fact that the national police forces are very much involved in the internationalization processes since the early days of the modern police formation. The police are argued to foster a common cause at the international sphere relatively in an easier way than compared with other state apparatuses. A systemic reason of this fact is the issue of informality. Police liaison officers are perfect examples to that. They are assigned by their states to other host states "to manage the flow of information between their respective agencies" (Bigo, 2000: 67). "Informally...a liaison officer spends his time with his colleagues in the host country, often hosted by and given an office in the local department" (Yön, 2010: 132). This fosters the decontextualization/ debureaucratization/ depoliticization of many domestic political problems and putting all of them under the rubric of organized crime or terrorism within the same bag. Criminalization is a big political strategy that shows the importance of police officers' agenda setting powers. Informality, thus reintroduces the institution of the personal rule akin to ancien régime, where "the particular power competences of private individuals became a rule *de facto* dependent on the crown" (Gerstenberger, 2007: 648).

Some specific departments of the Turkish National Police have become one of the most enthusiastic constituents of the IPO. Especially, the department of fight against organized crime and smuggling, anti-terrorism and intelligence departments are among these. Another actor is the Police Academy, which hosts the police intellectuals of the Turkey's police reform process. Nonetheless, the TNP's participation in the transnational structure of police powers is not limited to simple information cooperation. Neither is it limited as was the case in the early days of Cold War, to a status of passive dependence on the foreign police experts. During the neoliberal era,

TNP has become one of the executive arms of the IPO. This is especially the case since the then President of the Republic Turgut Özal, who captured the essence of neoliberal strategy of bringing to the fore the police apparatuses as the primary movers of the neoliberal agenda.

This fusion of external and internal in terms of policing practices is reminiscent of the era of colonialism. Although this thesis have not theorized the role of the IPO in terms of the theories of imperialism or neo-colonialism, it should be noted that IPO's new practices are of crucial importance to delineate the workings of neoliberal capitalism. Indeed, many private military companies have been acting as subcontractors of the new imperial states and penetrate "the new colonies" (Zabcı, 2007). They do not only fight with the resistance movements in Iraq and Afghanistan but they do also undertake the job of state-building in these countries. They do shape the police apparatuses after their own image. The stories of the TNP abroad shows that many police apparatuses are also engaged in the widening and deepening of the rule of capital in various places, mostly in the ex-Soviet sphere. Therefore, the IPO is very successful in the neoliberal era in the reproduction of police apparatuses as "foreign missionaries", "directly linked to the commercial interests of an expanding capitalism in search of new markets and resources. Colonial police history is essentially the history of that socialization of police work" (Broden, 2005: 77).

It should also be stated that the recurrent police operations organized against the al-Qaeda members claimed to live in Turkey should be reconsidered with respect to the position of the Turkish National Police (TNP) within the IPO. This thesis, has not been involved with the issue of counter-terrorism formulated by the IPO in the aftermath of 9/11 events. However, it is obvious that the 9/11 signifies a change in the structure of the transnational security field. The internationalization of the police in Turkey in tandem with these new codes emerging from the agenda of counter-terrorism is also important to decipher how the TNP reproduced the mandate of the IPO in and outside the domestic sphere.

The IPO's neoliberal police reform agenda is not restricted to the police apparatuses but also includes the restructuring of the gendarmerie all around the world. Indeed, within the IPO, it appears that a discussion is on its way concerning whether "there is a case for the existence of police organizations with military status in the twenty-first century European security apparatus" (Gobinet, 2008: 448). There appears that the case of Turkey could provide a test-case for the IPO since there is an IPO induced reform process in Turkey parallel to the police reform process (See Post-Consultation Report, 2009). What are the implications of that reform for the neoliberal change in the bourgeois state form is a question that needs to be answered since the gendarmerie was a policing apparatus whose fate was very much determined by the 19th century bourgeois revolutions.¹⁴⁷

It was previously stated that the IPO is not a conspiracy group that acts in accordance with previously designed plans. In addition, it is subject to the very absurdities and shallowness of the bourgeois form of thinking. One of the ideological components of the IPO's police reform agenda, making the traditional owners of the security field retreat from the social and political scene can turn out to become a weird obsession among the constituents of the IPO to the extent that they tend to see a shining rosy picture when they look at the workings of the police apparatuses. This obsession is well targeted by the journalist Ismail Saymaz who entitled one of his articles published on the Turkish police as "the Istanbul Police also gives E-Memorandums" [İstanbul Emniyeti de E-Muhtıra Veriyor]. There, he was pointing out to the fact that the Istanbul police was

¹⁴⁷ Another important issue that needs to be analyzed to better capture the position of the police apparatus in Turkey within the broader institutional matrix of the state is the relation between the police and the governors. It is a fact that the latter are very much involved in the making of the politics of policing and even more, in Turkey, there is a great mobility between the statuses of governorship and general security directorship. An additional issue that needs to be dealt with concerning the institutional matrix of the state security apparatuses is the establishment of new state apparatuses, which are guided by or in close relation to the police authorities, such as Telecommunication Communications Directorate (TİB) and Public Order and Security Undersecretariat (KDGM). The establishment of these parallel structures of policing as quasi-independent bodies of state superstructure should be reconsidered as part of the global neoliberal change in the politics of policing. In fact the neoliberal police reform in Turkey has not ended yet, it is still on process and this implies the need to observe the nascent changes such as the agenda of turning the General Security Directorate of Turkey into an Undersecretariat and the establishment of an independent police complaints body.

accusing the media of misrepresenting the police and while doing so it was using a very “threatful and distrustful” language and even castigating the journalists (Saymaz, 2009: 57-60). To return to our subject matter, the title of the article points out that not only the military but also the police is very much involved in the making of the political field in Turkey. The silence of the majority of the democratic national constituents of the IPO concerning the expansion in police powers also shows the IPO does not only proceed by ruse and reason but also by passion, lust and hatred.

Finally, it should be stated that against this tendency to underestimate the role of the police, the most primary intuition that guided me to undertake such a study has in fact been simply to show that the police organizations do matter. That is why; this dissertation has been a modest attempt to save this Cinderella of the political science from the ill-hearted stepmother and to recognize it as a worthy subject matter. To realize this aim, I had to write down a historical narrative concerning the police apparatus’ story in Turkey, which inevitably needs to be developed further and further.

* * *

The IPO is now fascinated by the class power as had been the political classes of the ancien régime with the state power. In the ancien régime, the state offices had been put on the market for the avid bourgeoisie of the 18th century, while in the neoliberal era the police officers equally look for a chance of becoming private security guards of the bourgeoisie. To dismantle the former, two revolutions had to take place. To come over the latter, the progressive people of the earth should ask for the abolition of all apparently democratic neoliberal forms of policing including the private security.

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APPENDIX A

CURRICULUM VITAE

FUNDA HÜLAGÜ DEMİRBİLEK

Middle East Technical University (METU), Department of International Relations,
Ankara, TURKEY. Tel: 0 312 210 30 94. E-mail: funda@metu.edu.tr

EDUCATION

- PHD. Department of International Relations, METU, February 2006- September 2011.
- M.A. Ecole des Etudes Politiques, University of Ottawa, September 2005.
- B.A. Department of International Relations, METU, June 2004.
- Certificate of Minor Study in History of Philosophy, Dept. of Philosophy METU, June 2004.
- Diploma of High School, Notre Dame de Sion French Lycée, June 1999.

FELLOWSHIPS, HONOURS, AND AWARDS

- Admission Scholarship, University of Ottawa, Sept. 2004- Sept. 2005.
- International Students' Scholarship, University of Ottawa, Sept. 2004-Sept. 2005.
- High Honors Degree in Graduation, METU, June 2004.

WORKING EXPERIENCE

- Research Assistantship, Dept. of International Relations, October 2005- .
- Conference Secretariat, Conference on "Developing the Diplomatic Relations between Turkey and Bulgaria: Past and Present", METU, March 2009.
- Conference Organization Committee Member, Seventh International Relations Conference on "Hegemony or Empire? Prospects for Contemporary World Order", METU, June 2008.
- Conference Secretariat, International Workshop organized by Turkish Social Science Association (TSSA) on "Transition to Neoliberalism in Middle Income Countries", February 2008.
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TRANSLATIONS

- Metamorfoz [Métamorphose], Bande Dessinée, Everest Yayınları, 2010; Goriot Baba [Père Goriot], Bande Dessinée, Everest Yayınları, 2010; Bir İdam Mahkumunun Son Günü [Le Dernier Jour d’un Condamné], Bande Dessinée, Everest Yayınları, 2009.
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APPENDIX B

TURKISH SUMMARY

POLİS ÜZERİNDE “SINIF ERKİNİ” YENİDEN SAĞLAMLAŞTIRMAK: TÜRKİYE’DEKİ NEOLİBERAL POLİS REFORMU SÜRECİNDE ULUSLARARASININ ROLÜ

Bu tezde tüm dünyada özellikle Sovyetler Birliği’nin yıkılmasının ardından, polis örgütlerinde meydana gelen değişim süreci ele alınmaktadır. Hemen hemen her ülkede, polis reformu olarak adlandırılan bu süreçte, polisler “değişimin şampiyonları” olarak görülmektedirler. 19. Yüzyıl’da doğan modern polis örgütü yeniden yapılandırılmakta, hem devlet hem de toplumla olan ilişkileri, “demokratik polislik”, “toplum-destekli polislik” vb. kavramlar üzerinden yeniden tanımlanmaktadır. Bu tez, bu dönüşüm sürecini yani diğer adıyla neoliberal polis reformunu anlamaya yönelik bir çabanın ürünüdür.

Öte yandan, Türkiye bu reformu anlamak için oldukça iyi veriler sunan bir ülke olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır. Türkiye’de polis örgütü, demokratik polislik, toplum destekli polislik gibi süreçleri çabuk benimsemiş ve bunu Türkiye’de yeniden üretmek konusunda özgün bir süreç yürütmeye başlamıştır. İşte bu nedenle, neoliberal polis reformunun temel bileşenlerini ya da ana özelliklerini önce tespit, ardından analiz etmek isteyen bu tez Türkiye vakasına yakından bakmaktadır. Fakat tüm bu ampirik çalışmanın belirli bir kavramsal bütünlük içinde değerlendirilmesi için, ve siyaset biliminde “bir devlet aygıtı olarak polis” konusunu ele alan çok az sayıda teorik çalışma bulunması ve bu alandaki kuraklığın kimi metodolojik eksiklikleri de beraberinde getirdiği düşünüldüğünde, tez “polis nedir?” sorusunu sormak durumunda kalmıştır.

Polis örgütlerinde, Sovyetler Birliği’nin çözülmesinin ardından yaşanan bu dönüşümü ölçmek için de bir kaldıraç görevi görecektir olan 19. Yüzyıl’daki modern polisin inşası

süreci bu nedenle de tezin geneli için yaşamsal gözükmetedir. “Polis nedir?” sorusunun cevabını modern polis inşasının tarihsel bir bağlamda ve tarihsel maddeci teorinin birleşik bir tartışmasında bulan bu tez, yöntem olarak de form analizi metodunu kullanmaktadır. Bu form analiz yöntemi üzerinden, modern polis inşası süreci 19. Yüzyıl’ın çalkantılı siyasi tarihi içerisinde yeniden değerlendirilmiş ve polis aygıtını belirleyen bir “zor diyalektiği” tez tarafından tanımlanmıştır.

“Zor Diyalektiği”

Bu çalışma esnasında kriminoloji kökenli Marksist/revizyonist polis teorilerine ve Marksist devlet teorilerine özellikle yakından bakılmıştır. Marksist polis teorileri, polisin işçi sınıfı ile olan ilişkilerine odaklanmış, polisin işçi sınıfının gündelik hayatını dönüştürmek ya da en basitinden kontrol etmek amaçlı ürettiği mekanizmaları ya da dayattığı davranış kurallarını tartışma zemini olarak belirlemişlerdir. Bu konular üzerine eğilen Marksist polis teorileri tarihsel olarak polisi kapitalizmin toplumsal dönüştürme biçimlerinden birisi olarak ifşa ettikleri için çok önemlidirler ancak metodolojik açıdan kimi zayıflıklar barındırmaktadırlar. Bunun en büyük sebebi, polisi bir devlet aygıtı olarak düşünürken devlet üzerine düşünmemeleridir. Böylesi bir eksiklik bir süre sonra ezen polis-ezilen halk ya da düşman polis- karşı koyan işçi sınıfı gibi ayrımların süreç analizinde hâkim kılınmasına yol açar. Bir yandan polis, fetişleştirilir ve işlevselci bir bakış açısına hapsolür öte yandan da işçi sınıfı edilgen, pasif bir aktör olarak kavramsallaştırılır. Bu sebeple tez, Marksist devlet kuramlarına başvurmuş ve Marksist devlet kuramlarının devletin zor aygıtları konusunda ne dedikleri hakkında kısa bir araştırma yapmıştır.

Buna göre, görünen odur ki Marksist devlet kuramları rıza- zor ikilisi arasında, rıza kısmına zor aleyhine daha fazla mesai ayırmış ve zorla devlet arasında doğrudan ve üzerinde pek de söz söylenmesine gerek olmadığı düşünülen bir tabloyla karşımıza çıkmaktadırlar. Bunun sonucunda, Marksist kapitalist devlet teorilerinin zorun aldığı devletli biçimleri tarihselleştiren, ya da zorun maruz kaldığı dönüşümlere ışık tutacak doğrudan bir teorik girdide bulunmadıkları tespit edilmiştir. İşte bu nedenlerle tez, yine

tarihsel materyalist metodun sunduđu form analizi çerçevesinde ve Ellen Meiksins Wood (1995) ve Heide Gerstenberger (2007) gibi kapitalist devleti kendi tarihi içinde deęerlendiren çalıřmalardan da faydalanarak iki kavramın polis kuramında önümüzü açtıđını iddia etmektedir. Bunlardan ilki “burjuva devlet formu”dur. İkincisi ise “sınıf erki”dir.

Burjuva devlet formu, burjuva devrimlerinin devlet biçimi üzerinde yaptıđı etkiyi kuramsallařtırmaktadır. Burjuva devlet formu, 19. Yüzyıl’ın siyasi mücadeleleri sonucunda kimi ilerici deęerleri bünyesinde barındırmak durumunda kalmıřtır. Evrensel olan bu deęerlerin, örneęin eřitlik; özgürlük ve kardeřlik gibi, kapitalistleřme süreçlerinde tırpanlandıđı ve yapısal olarak yeniden üretilememeyeđi malumumuz olsa da, burjuva devlet kendini, ancak bu deęerleri taşıdıđı iddiasıyla yeniden üretebilir. İřte bu nedenle, burjuva devlet kurumları da “ancien régime” [eski rejim] döneminin kurumları gibi olmaya devam edememiř, bir siyasi sınıfın mülkiyetinde olmaktan sıyrılmıř ve anonimleřmiřlerdir. Yine bu nedenle, devletin fiziksel řiddeti üzerinde meřru bir tekeli olduđu yönünde bir kurum ortaya çıkmıř ve bu kurum daha önce mülk sahibi sınıfların elinde bulunun özel polislik yetki ve araçlarına bir darbe indirmiřtir. Devletin řiddet tekelinin oluřumunda, burjuvazinin polislik iřiyle ilgilenmeyi bir angarya olarak addetmesi kadar, 19. Yüzyıl’da iřiçi sınıfının verdiđi mücadelelerin de payı büyüktür. Bu mücadeleler, devletin “evrenselleřmesini” saęlamıřlardır ve daha önceleri mülk sahibi sınıfların özelinde olan güvenlik temini evrensel bir hak olarak yeniden tanımlanmıřtır.

Ancak, burjuva devlet formu yine de kapitalist bir devlettir ve birçok gerilim yařadıđı pek malumdur. Bunlardan en önemlisi böyleleri bir evrensellik iddiasının, burjuva devletin burjuvazinin tikel ihtiyaçlarının temsilcisi olması, ya da burjuva toplumun řiddetinin burjuva devlette yoğunlařmasıyla karřı karřıya gelmelidir. İřte bu gerilim yani “zor diyalektiđi” farklı biçimlerde, devletin polis aygıtı baęlamında kendini yeniden üretmektedir. Ancak bu diyalektiđin polisteki yansımalarına bakmadan önce,

modern polisi onu önceki güvenlik aygıtlarından ayıran birkaç konu üzerinde daha ayrıntılı bir şekilde durmamız faydalı olacaktır.

Burjuva devlet formunun konsolide olmasıyla beraber değişen güvenlik tedariki meselesi, kurulan modern polis aygıtlarının da kamu polisi olarak ve özel polislik pratiklerinin dayandığı mantığının bir anti-tezi olarak şekillenmelerine sebep olmuştur. 19. Yüzyıl'ın ortalarından önceki dönemlerde polislik denilen kurum ticaret burjuvazisinin, sömürgelerle olan ilişkilerini hem ana kıtada (örneğin Londra'daki liman ve doklarda) hem de sömürge ülkelerde tedarik amacıyla geliştirilen özel polis örgütlerinden menkul bir kurumdu. Kapitalizmin gündelik hayatı fethi konusunda oldukça dönüştürücü kimi müdahaleler yapan bu özel polis kurumları, örneğin 19.Yüzyıl'ın ortalarına kadar liman işçilerinin göz hakkı olarak adlandırılabilen yüklenme- boşaltma esnasında etrafa dökülen mallardan kendilerine alma hakkını sona erdirdi. Ayrıca bizzat burjuvazinin şekillendirdiği bu aygıtların mülk sahipleri koruduğu ve bu bağlamda da işçi sınıfının güvenlik başlığında kendi kaderine bırakıldığı aleni bir gerçektir. Bu nedenle, kurulan yeni modern polis hem bu kurumun ideolojik bağlamda (evrensel güvenlik tedariki) aşılması ama hem de onun içerilmesi (gündelik hayata kapitalizmi derinleştirici şekilde müdahaleler yapmak) bağlamında değerlendirmek gerekmektedir. Kendinden önceki özel polislik formunu içerip aşan bir polis kurumu sonraki tarihi boyunca da böyle bir gerilimin esiri olacak ve onu çeşitli yollarla aşmaya çalışacaktır. Bu durum da aslında zor diyalektiği denilen şeyin olgusal düzlemde nasıl işlediğini gösteren kritik bir örnek, kurucu bir süreçtir.

Modern polisliğin özel polislik uygulamalarının hem bir değillenmesi hem de bir başka biçimiyle devam ettirilmesi sürecinde belirleyici olan ve zor diyalektiğinin başka görünümler almasına sebep olan başka süreçler de bulunmaktadır. Bunlardan birincisi işçi sınıfının tüm 19. Yüzyıl boyunca verdiği örgütlü siyasi mücadelenin etkilerinde aranmalıdır. İkincisi ise modern polis kurumunun “ancien régime” döneminden kalan polislik politikalarının ne derece mirasçısı olduğuyla ilgilidir. Henüz burjuva devrimlerinin damgasını vurmadığı kıta Avrupası'nda, polislik gittikçe merkezileşen bir

devletin erki altında şekillendi. Ancak burada polis bir kurum olarak önem kazanmaktan ziyade “polis devleti” bir yönetim zihniyeti şeklinde tarih sahnesinde kendine yer buldu. Bu yönetim zihniyeti kısaca mutlakıyetçi devletin hayatın her anını kontrol etmesi/düzenlemesi anlamına geliyordu. O nedenle tek bir kurumda değil tüm devlet aygıtlarında cisimleşiyordu. Ayrıca, eski rejimin polislik anlayışında, polislik görevini icra edenler devletin kimi kademelerini satın almış mülk sahibi sınıftan kişiler olabiliyorlardı. Modern polis, işte bu iki özelliğin de içerilip aşılması anlamına geliyor.

Bir yandan, eski rejimin müdahilliğini bünyesinde taşıırken bir yandan da modern siyaset alanının kurallarıyla hareket etmeye başlıyor, siyasetin siyasi sınıfların tekelinde bir oyun olmaktan çıkması ve kitlelerin siyaset sahnesinde meşru bir aktör olarak yerlerini almaları anlamına geliyor. İşte burada da zor diyalektiğinin bir başka biçimi, işçi sınıfının burjuvaziye karşı verdiği siyasi mücadeleler devreye giriyor. Polis denilen aygıt bu iki sınıf arasındaki mücadelelerin toplam etkisiyle şekilleniyor. Bu nedenle, polisin yapısında ister istemez işçi sınıfının da kاردığı siyasi harcın payı oluyor. Örneğin işçi sınıfı her ne kadar modern polis tarih sahnesine çıktığında ona direnmiş, kendi gündelik hayatını onun dayattığı kurallara teslim etmemiş olsa da, bir süre sonra kamu polisinin sağladığı gündelik mikro ölçekteki faydalardan yararlanmış ve bundan dolayı modern polis aygıtına başka bir düzlemde onay ve dolayısıyla şekil vermiştir. Ona taşıdığı evrensel güvenlik misyonunu sürekli hatırlatmıştır. Hal böyle olunca, işçi sınıfı modern polis aygıtının burjuva devrimi sonrası kazandığı ilerici anlamı, ona taşıtan yegâne toplumsal aktör olarak ortaya çıkar. Onun tarih sahnesinden geri çekildiği koşullarda polis, üzerinden türediği eski rejim pratiklerine ve özelliklerine rücu eder. İşte bu gerilimi, polisin eski rejimle modern arasında yaşadığı gerilimi çözmek için türlü yollar denenmiştir ancak bu gerilimin üzerinde oturduğu asimetric ilişkide (işçi sınıfı – burjuvazi) nihai bir kopuş, nihai bir yeniden şekillenme neoliberal dönemde yaşanmıştır. Bu iddiayı daha iyi açıklamak için sınıf erki kavramıyla devam edelim.

Sınıf erki kavramı bu tezde analitik bakımdan bize sağladığı geniş imkânlar açısından önemlidir. Burjuva devlet formu, devlet erkiyle sınıf erki arasında yapılan bir ayrışma üzerine kuruludur. Bu ayrışma, görüntüde bir ayrışma olduğu kadar gerçektir de. Diğer bir deyişle, ontolojik olarak siyaset (devlet) - ekonomi (piyasa) ayırımından söz etmek toplumsal gerçekliği ikilikler üzerinden bakmayı dayatır. Ancak, ontolojik düzeyde böyle bir ayırım olmasa da, devletle sınıf arasında tarihsel bu iş bölümünün gerçek kimi sonuçları vardır. Bu iş bölümünde devlet zor meselesini yüklenmiş, daha önce siyasi olarak tanımlanan birçok mesele (feodal üretim sürecinde ortaya çıkan siyasi sorumluluklar) siyaset alanında çıkarılmış ve özelleştirilmiştir. Bu nedenle sınıf erkini belirleyen, daha doğru bir ifadeyle onun çapını/gücünü/doğrudan hâkimiyet sınırlarını belirleyen “siyasetin özelleştirilmesi” meselesidir. Daha önce devletin tekelinde tanımlanan zorun örgütlenmesi meselesinin, neoliberal dönemde dönüşmesinin anahtarını siyasetin yeniden ve daha farklı bir şekilde özelleştirilmesinde, yani kapitalist sınıfın artan sınıfsal erkinde aramalıyız. Sınıf erkinin tarihsel belirlenimleri olduğunu ve bu tarihselliğin devletle sınıf arasında daha önce yapılan iş bölümünü yeniden tanımladığı ön kabulüne dayanan bu tez, bu nedenle sınıf erkinin zor aygıtlarına neoliberal dönemde nasıl ve hangi ideolojik motifler üzerinden nüfuz ettiğine bakmakta ve bunların eleştirel bir çözümlemesini yapmaktadır. Ancak, tüm bu alan analizlerinden önce tez kapsamında çözülmesi gereken ikinci bir mesele de *Uluslararasıının* gerek modern polis oluşumuna gerekse de dünya çapında polislik politikalarının inşasına yaptığı etkinin teorize edilmesidir. Zira modern polis örgütleri kuruldukları ilk andan itibaren onları ciddi biçimlerde şekillendiren tarihsel bir konjonktüre doğmuşlar ve hızla uluslararasılaşmışlardır.

‘Uluslararası’ı Kavramsallaştırmak: “Uluslararası Düzen Partisi”

19. Yüzyıl’da Kıta Avrupası’nda meydana gelen 1848 Burjuva Devrimleri ve 1871 Paris Komünü’nün etkileri dönemin siyasi liderlerinde polis örgütlerinin uluslararası alanda koordine olmasını saplayacak mekanizmalar yaratma itkisi yarattı. Nitekim, henüz modern polis örgütlerinin konsolidasyon döneminde bu uluslararasılaşma birçok

örgütün aynı kural ve yaklaşımları paylaşmasını sağladı. Ortak düşman olarak görülen sosyalistler ve sosyalist Enternasyonal karşısında, polis örgütlerinin sağlam yapılara sahip olup olmadığı meselesi bir uluslararası müdahale konusu olarak belirlendi. Diğer bir deyişle, ulusal polis örgütlerinin bir ülkeden diğer ülkeye akan sosyalist hareketi dizginleyip dizginleyememesi bir devlete yapılabilecek uluslararası müdahaleye sebebiyet verecek bir başlık olarak devletlerarası ilişkilerin bir kuralı haline getirildi. Bu süreçte, siyasi liderler, polis şefleri, özel güvenlik şirketleri polisin uluslararasılaşması konusunda hızlı bir süreci başlattılar ve ortaya polislik politikalarını belirleyen ve bu bağlamda ulusal polis örgütlerinin yapısına doğrudan müdahalelerde bulunabilecek bir uluslararası kolektif fail doğdu. Bu tez bu aktörün yapısını, nasıl hareket ettiğini anlamak için ulus-aşan tarihsel materyalizm [transnational historical materialism] yaklaşımına başvurmuştur.

Bu yaklaşım aslen ulus-aşan burjuvazinin oluşumuna odaklanmaktadır. Ancak odak noktası olarak zor aygıtları yaklaşım sahiplerinin gündeminde pek olmamakta, yine uluslararası güvenlik literatüründeki eleştirel çalışmalarla bu yaklaşım arasında bir bakışsızlık bulunmaktadır. Ulus-aşan burjuvazinin gündeminde yalnızca para piyasalarının olmadığı, polislik politikalarının da olduğu ve bu politikaların temel olarak durduğu yerin modern siyaset alanı bağlamında fazla “ileriye” giden burjuva devrimlerini hizaya getirmek olduğu tespitiyle hareket eden bu tez, Marx’ın Fransa tarihi çalışmalarından da etkilenerken, polislik alanında ulus-aşan bir aktörün oluşumuna Uluslararası Düzen Partisi (UDP) kavramıyla bakmayı önerir. Bu kavram, burjuvazinin kendi yarattığı burjuva devlet formunu artık taşıyamaması, Marx’ın da sık sık belirttiğinden hareket edersen kırk gün önce kendi değerleri olarak savunduğu değerleri kırk gün sonra sosyalist değerler oldukları gerekçesiyle karşı saflarda gördüğü, onlardan bu vesileyle kurtulmak istediği bir burjuva bilincine atıfta bulunmaktadır. Bir analoginin ötesinde bu kavram tarif edilen bu git-gelle, burjuvazinin zor diyalektiği ile başa çıkma yoluna ışık tutmayı hedefler. Ancak, tez Uluslararası Düzen Partisi’ni oluşturan unsurların detaylı bir analizine ancak 19. Yüzyıl bağlamında değinmekte, genel bir o gündən bugüne uzanan siyaset sosyolojisine girişmemektedir. Uluslararası Düzen

Partisi, özellikle neoliberal dönem analizi esnasında, temsil ettiği yapısal etkiler bakımından değerlendirilmekte, yaydığı ideolojiye yakından bakılmakta, polis reformu konusunda ürettiği türlü yayın vb incelenmekte ancak daha önce de belirtildiği üzere, bu partiyi oluşturan parçalar ayrıntılandırılmamaktadır.

Uluslararası Düzen Partisi'nin ulusal polislere dönük müdahalelerini anlamlandırmak için bir diğer kavrama ihtiyaç duymaktayız zira tez polisi bir devlet aygıtı olarak kavramsallaştığı oranda devletin dönüşümüne de ışık tutmaktadır. Tezde devletteki dönüşümü yine devletli kavramlarla açıklamaktan devlet kavramını fetişleştirme hatasına düşme tehlikesi nedeniyle imtina edilmektedir. Elbette polis aygıtındaki dönüşümü devlet kavramını anmadan anlayamayız ancak bize daha rafine, uluslararasılaşmayla gündeme oturan pratik dönüşümleri kendi aynasında daha doğrudan yansıtan başka bir ara kavram gerekmektedir. Burjuva devlet formunun doğrudan bir çocuğu olan modern siyasal alan, tez açısından, böyle bir kavramdır.

Modern Siyasal Alan ve Uluslararasılaşma

Devlet kurumlarının alınır satılır bir dönem olduğu eski rejimin ardından, bu kurumların kişiler üstü [impersonal] bir yapıya kavuşması modern siyaset sahasının doğuşuna da paralel ve birbirini besleyen bir süreçtir. Kitlelerin siyaset üzerindeki hakkı genişlemiş, bunun bir yansıması olarak da siyasi gelecek hakkında hayal kurmak kendisi siyasal alanı besleyen bir siyasi pratik haline gelmiştir. Ancak, modern siyasal alanın bağımlı sınıfları da kapsayacak ve onların hayalleri doğrultusunda şekillenecek kadar çok genişlemesi, devlet kurumlarını alıp satmaya, siyaseti bir sınıfın tekeli altında yürütmeye aslında hiç yabancı olmayan mülk sahibi sınıfların ve özellikle burjuvazinin pek de hoşuna gitmemiştir. İşte modern polisle- modern siyasal alan arasındaki gerilimli ilişkinin nedenlerinden birisini de bu oluşturmaktadır. 19. Yüzyıl'da siyasi liderlerin önderliğinde polisin hızla uluslararasılaştırılmasının amacı ve sonucu bu modern siyasal alanın cendereye alınması/sınırlarından içeriye doğru sıkıştırılması ve daraltılmasıdır.

Uluslararasılaşan modern polis, bizzat kendisini kuran bu siyasal alanı karşısına almıştır. Bu iddia da tezin çevresinde döndüğü ana hatlardan birisini oluşturmaktadır.

Modern polis- modern siyasal alan ilişkisinin uluslararasılaşma kapsamındaki önemli sonuçlarından birisi de, devlet aygıtı olarak polisin eski rejime pratiklerine dönmekle kalmayıp, eski rejimde hayli kişisel bir yapı olan devleti yeniden bu şekliyle üretmesidir. Diğer bir deyişle, uluslararasılaşan polis kişiler üstü bir yapıdan kişilerin (tekil polis şeflerinin) ve elbette burjuvazinin çok daha hâkim olduğu bir yapıya geçer. Ulus-aşan burjuvazi teorileriyle yola çıkan bu tez, bu ulus-üstü alanda, uluslararasılaşan kurumların ulusal kontekstlerinden koparıldıklarını, görece bağımsızlaştırıldıklarını ve böylece burjuva devlet formunun da dayattığı kimi dönüşümleri bu ölçekte aşabildiklerini iddia etmektedir. Kısacası, polis aygıtlarının uluslararasılaşması siyasal olana aykırı bir süreç olarak işlemekte, zor diyalektiğindeki eski rejim kutbuna hayat üfleemektedir.

Bu temel argümanları 19. yüzyıl bağlamında yapılan tarihsel bir analizden üreten tez, bu tespitler ışığında neoliberal polis reformuna bakmıştır. Neoliberal polis reformu, polisin özel bir uluslararasılaşma biçimi olarak, modern siyasal alanı daraltmakla kalmaz, onu yeniden yapılandırılır. Burjuva devlet formuyla neoliberal polis reformu arasında kan uyuşmazlığı bulunmaktadır. Bu hipotezlerin açılanmasıyla özetimize devam edelim.

Neoliberal Polis Reformu

Sovyetler Birliği'nin yıkılmasının ardından polis aygıtları hakkında UDP kapsamlı bir girişimde bulunmaktadır. Polis aygıtları “değişimin şampiyonları” olarak ilan edilmektedirler. İddiamız odur ki ordular, yeni döneme henüz ayak uydurmayan burjuva devlet formuna ait oluşumlar olarak görülür ve polis, *bir devlet aygıtı olarak devleti içeriden çözecek devlet karşıtı bir yapı* olarak tespit edilir. Polise atfedilen bu sorumluluk, onun da bir aygıt olarak yeniden düzenlenmesi ama bizzat bu yeniden düzenleme sürecinin kendisinin de burjuva devlet aygıtını çözen bir süreç olması olarak

şekillenir. Bu aynı zamanda neoliberal dönemde şekillenen sınıf erkinin de karakterine pek uygun düşmektedir. Polis reformunun kendisi, polis aygıtını burjuva devlet formunun dayattığı çerçevede hareket etmekten çıkarmak anlamına gelmektedir. Haliyle bunun da burjuva devlet formu ve onun çocuğu olan modern siyasal alan için dönüştürücü sonuçları ortaya çıkmaktadır. Bu ana argüman etrafında şekillen detaylı bir reform analizi için ayrıca tarihsel kimi saptamalar da kritik önem taşımaktadırlar.

Bu nedenle reform tartışmalarından önce, Soğuk Savaş dönemindeki polislik politikalarının kuş bakışı bir portresi çıkarılmıştır. Burada, tez açısından önemli olan, Soğuk Savaş döneminde öncelikle modern polisin hala daha burjuva devlet formu etrafında şekillenmesi ancak paralel güvenlik aygıtları olan kontrgerilla örgütlerinin de etkisiyle zor aygıtlarını belirleyen paramilitarizasyon esas belirleyici öge olarak meydana çıkmasıdır. Bu süreçte, devletin zor aygıtları oldukça yıpranmış, mafyatik gruplar ortaya çıkmış ve sadece alt sınıflar için değil burjuvazi için de artık taşınamayacak bir yük haline gelmişlerdir. İşte, Soğuk Savaşın sona ermesi bu yapıya bir müdahale fırsatını yaratmıştır.

Ardından, polisteki neoliberal dönüşüme dair var olan pek az sayıdaki değerlendirme gündeme alınmış ve buradaki literatürde öne çıkan şu iddia üzerine özellikle eğilinilmiştir: ‘neoliberal dönemde poliste başlayan dönüşüm post-modernleşme değil düpedüz modernizasyondur’. Bu önermenin içerdiği modernizasyon argümanı tezde tartışılmış ve polis reformuna içkin olan modernizasyonun da anlamsal bir kaymaya uğradığı, onun da burjuva devlet formunun dayattığı modernizasyon hattını boşa çıkaracak şekilde yeniden tanımlandığı iddia edilmiştir. Bu yeni tanımda öne çıkan, polisin olması gerektiği iddia edildiği gibi yürütme erkine yani halkın denetimine bağlanması, sosyal devlet bağlamında geliştirilen devletli denetim mekanizmalarına maruz kalması ve teknokrat bir bürokrasi üzerinden profesyonelleşmesi değildir. Modernizasyon daha ziyade polisin sözde siyasetin yozlaştırıcı etkilerinden arınması için özerkleştirilmesi ama bu esnada da yetki ve karar gücünün daha da güçlendirilmesi, gerektiğinde yargı süreçlerinde ortaya çıkan aksamaları telafi edebilecek bir yetkiye

sahip olmasıdır. Burada gösterilmeye çalışılan, poliste yapılan reformun ya da modernizasyonun kelimenin ilk anlamıyla anlaşılması gerektiğidir. Zira modern polis, kendisinin de varlık sebebi olan burjuva devlet formu zemininde hareket etmeyecek bir aygıt olarak yeniden tasarlanmaktadır.

Böylesi bir tartışmanın ardından, tez polis reformunun ana öğelerinin bir analiziyle devam etmekte bu süreçte polis üzerine sınıf erkinin nasıl arttığını iki kavramla açıklamaktadır. Birincisi anti-sovyetizm üzerinden kendini dışa vuran ancak temelde de 1789'u hedefe koyan karşı-devrimcilik; ikincisi anti-paramilitarizasyon üzerinden şekillenen Soğuk Savaş dönemi zor aygıtlarının restore edilmeleri meseleleri. Bu iki hat üzerinden şekillenen polis reformu, sınıf erkinin polis üzerindeki hâkimiyetinin daha doğrudan ve daha derin olmasına sebep olmuştur. Sınıfın doğrudan bir üretimi olan özel polislik uygulamaları da nitekim bu çerçevede ve tarihsel düzlemde sayıca artmış ve niteliksel bir sıçrama yapmıştır. Bu iki prensip etrafında da şekillenen özel güvenlik aygıtları ve onların yaydığı ideoloji de polisin yeniden yapılandırılırken bürüneceği biçim açısından için rol model sunmaktadır.

Tüm bu tarihsel-kavramsal çerçeve içerisinde, polis reformunun pratik kimi uygulamalarına bakılmış (Meksika'dan Kore'ye birçok ülke deneyimleri hakkında araştırma yapılmıştır) ve reformu hem kavramsal düzeyde üreten ve hem de ülke bazında uygulayanların ürettiği metinler göz önüne alınmıştır. Bu analizin ardından şu sonuçlara varılmıştır:

1. Polis reformu kapsamında topluma ama söylemsel düzeyde “halka” dair yeni bir imge yaratılmıştır. Toplumun da ötesinde cemaatler ve komüniteler merkeze alınmış ve bunların kendilerini yeniden ürettikleri kurallar ya da davranışlar manzumeleri esas alınarak, topluma için olan tüm gerici, tutucu vb öğeleri de içeren toplumsal sağduyu [common sense] tartışılmaz ve neredeyse kutsal ilan edilmiştir. Tez bu durumu “peoplism” kavramıyla açıklamıştır. Amaçlanan vurgu, polis reformuna için olan saplantılı bir toplum düşüncesi olduğu hissini

dile getirebilmenin bir yolunu bulmaya çalışmaktır. Bu kavram bu durumu kavramsallaştırmaktadır.

2. Polis reformu kapsamında, polis halkı yüceltme mekanizması yoluyla modern siyaset alanının özelliği olan meşruiyet kavramından ziyade toplumsal itimat kavramına kendini dayandırmaya başlamıştır ya da bu kavramı öne çıkarmayı amaçlamaktadır. Böylece, modern siyaset alanı yeniden şekillendirilmekte seküler bir kavram olan meşruiyet kurumu yerini –polis aygıtı bağlamında- güven/itimat gibi hem daha psikolojik hem de daha metafizik kavramlara bırakmıştır.
3. Polis reformu kapsamında, polisin toplumsal mentörler haline gelmesi hedeflenmektedir. Böylece polis, devlet alanından çıkar ve sivil toplum olarak tarif edilen alanı kendinin var oluşsal kaynağı olarak tanımlar. Polis kendi ideolojisini de topluma yaymakla yüklenir. Bu durumu tez toplumun polisariasyonu [policarization] olarak kavramsallaştırır. Ancak burada amaçlanan toplumsal hayatta herkesin ne derece birer polis haline geldiği gibi bir vurguyu ön plana çıkarmak değildir. Polisariasyon, polisin toplumsala taşınması, modern burjuva devlet formunun dayattığı sınırlardan çıkması ya da çıkma çabasına tekabül etmektedir.

Tüm bu analiz ve önermelerin daha derinleştirildiği ve inceltildiği çalışma ise Türkiye'deki polis reformu vakasıdır. Türkiye'de polis reformunun tarihini farklı dönemlerden başlatabiliriz. 1980'de meydana gelen askeri darbe ve onun akabindeki askeri rejim dönemi polis konusunda kapsamlı bir dönüşüme girişmiş, askeri rejimi izleyen Özal döneminde neoliberal dönüşümün ruhu Türkiye'ye tercüme edilmeye başlanmış, 1990'larda Avrupa Birliği'ne giriş çabaları kapsamında kimi değişiklikler zorlanmıştır. Ancak, gerçek reform sürecinin ilk ayağının hemen 28 Şubat askeri müdahalesinin ardından başlamıştır ve reform gündeminin yakıcı bir başlık olarak belirmesiye 2000'lerin başına denk düşmektedir. Tez, bu tarihsel sürece tezin yola

çıkacağı uluslararasılaşma hattını kaybetmeden ve kısıtlı kaynaklar üzerinden de olsa değinmiş ve Türkiye'deki neoliberal yeniden yapılandırılma sürecinin yine Türkiye'deki polis örgütünün siyasi tarihi kapsamında da bir bağlama oturtmaya çalışmıştır. Nitekim tezin ilk bölümlerinde de Türkiye'de polisin kuruluş dönemine dair kısa bir tarihsel anlatıya yer verilmiş ve ardından Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin kuruluşunun ardından modern polis kurumunun konsolide olması sürecinin dünyada faşizmin belirleyici bir güç olduğu döneme denk gelmesine, Polis Dergisi üzerinden gösterilen kimi kanıtlarla, dikkat çekilmiştir. Ayrıca, Soğuk Savaş döneminde Türkiye'de polisin içinde bulunduğu hali yansıttığı düşünülen kimi başlıklara da tezin kapsamı izin verdiği müddetçe yer ayrılmıştır. Ancak tezin odaklandığı süreç esas olarak neoliberal polis reformunun ideolojik ayaklarının Türkiye'de kurulmaya başladığı 2000'li yıllardır.

Türkiye Vakası

Türkiye üzerine olan bölümde tez, bir önceki kısımda geliştirilen, polisin bizzat bir devlet aygıtı olarak devlet karşıtı bir yerden burjuva devlet formuna, özellikle modern siyasal alan üzerine yaptığı müdahaleler sayesinde çözücü bir etkisi olduğu iddiasını, polis aygıtlarının kendilerini 'sivil toplum örgütleriymiş' gibi kurdukları, böyle bir noktadan hareket ettikleri iddiasıyla derinleştirmektedir. Diğer bir deyişle, neoliberal polis reformunun yarattığı "değişim şampiyonları", devlet-dışı bir aktör olarak kendilerini kurmanın da ötesinde birer sivil toplum aygıtıymış gibi yeni bir kurucu ideoloji oluşturmaktadırlar.

Türkiye'deki dönüşüm hikâyesinin ortaya çıkarttığı bu sonuca türlü yerlerden varılmaktadır. Bunlardan bir tanesinin, yeni bir polis jenerasyonunun kendini değişimin öncüsü, reformist bir grup olarak görmesi ve polis teşkilatını bu yönde örgütlenme çabaları yürütmeleidir. Yeni bir polis ideolojisinin yapı taşlarını inşa eden bu jenerasyona kurumsal bakımdan Polis Akademisi eşlik etmektedir. Ayrıca, UDP'nin polis reformunu şaşırtıcı bir biçimde içselleştiren ve öncü bir biçimde bunu Türkiye bağlamında yeniden üreten polis aygıtının, kurumsal olarak da sınırlarından taşıdığı ve kendine sürekli yeni kurumlar/gövdeler eklediği görülmektedir. Bunlar arasında en çok

öne çıkanlar, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nde 2004'te kurulan Turkish Institute for Police Studies (TIPS) adlı organizasyondur. Bir diğer örnek, International Police Association (IPA) Türkiye olabilir. Nitekim her iki kurumun da kendi yayınları vardır ve bu yayınlar yeni polis ideolojisini çözümlmek, onun temel özelliklerini tespit etmek açısından birçok veri sunmaktadırlar.

Kendisinin türlü görüntülerine polis tekilatının yayın organı olan Polis Dergisi'nde de rastlayabileceğimiz yeni polis ideolojisinin temel belirleyeni, polisin Türkiye'deki bürokratik, merkeziyetçi ve otoriter devlet geleneğinden kurtulma arzusudur. Türkiye'deki otoriter devlet geleneğini polisi de belirleyen ve onu geri çeken bir unsur olarak kodlayan bu yeni polis ideolojisine göre, polis artık halka hizmet eden bir kurum haline gelmelidir. Aynı ideolojinin bir diğer önermesi, merkeziyetçi modelin yerini âdemi-merkeziyetçi bir yapıya bırakması gerektiğidir. Nitekim Türkiye'de henüz çok yeni olmakla beraber hızla uygulanmaya başlanılan toplum-destekli polislik uygulaması bu ideolojiye hem pratikte hem de kuramsal düzlemde içerik kazandırma imkânı tanımaktadır. Yeni polis ideolojisinde, polis alt kültürünün kimi özelliklerinin altı çizilmekte, polisteki kardeşlik hukukunun, enformel ilişki biçiminin örgütsel dönüşümün anahtarı olduğu iddia edilmekte ve bu dönüşüm “organizasyonel bir devrim” diye adlandırılmakta ve Türkiye'deki polis entelektüelleri tarafından UDP'ye de bir model olarak sunulmaktadır. Bu yeni ideolojinin en büyük referansı Osmanlı dönemidir. Osmanlı dönemindeki ahilik ocağı, loncalık vb uygulamalara, Türkiye'de polisin aslında ne derece sivil bir kurum olabileceğinin bir göstergesi olarak sürekli atıfta bulunmaktadır.

Polisin bu ideolojisini yeniden üretmek için kurduğu araçlardan daha önce bahsetmiştik (TIPS, IPA vb). Bu araçlar haricinde, Türkiye'deki polis teşkilatı, iştirak ettiği uluslararası toplumun yürüttüğü barış ve devlet-inşası misyonları üzerinden de kendi durduğu noktayı konsolide etmekte, ideolojisini rafine etme olanaklarına sahip olmaktadır. Ayrıca yine Polis Akademisi'nde, Türkiye'ye yakın bölgelerden ve özellikle Sovyet ardılı ülkelerden birçok öğrencinin polis olarak eğitilmesi süreci

işletilmektedir. Benzeri birçok başka mekanizmayı harekete geçiren polis aygıtı, ideolojisinin inşasını aynı zamanda Türkiye'deki kimi sivil toplum örgütlerinin Türkiye'de güvenlik sektörü reformu üzerine yürüttüğü çalışmalar sayesinde de derinleştirme imkânı elde etmiştir. Örneğin, jandarmanın polise nazaran reforma daha direngen bir zor aygıtı olarak yinelenmesi; militarizasyonun polisin gücü göz ardı edilecek bir şekilde her şeyin bir üst-belirleyeni olarak tanımlanması vb. temalar üzerinden, polis “sivil”leştirilmektedir. Polise bu dışarıdan düşünsel destek sürecinde, polisin de bir zor aygıtı olduğu, kapitalist toplumda örgütlenmiş olan şiddetin bir taşıyıcısı olduğu tamamen ihmal edilir hale gelmiştir. Arzulanan azami noktanın polisin sebebiyet verdiği insan hakları ihlallerinin sona ermesi olarak formüle edilmesi, aslında Türkiye'de bir hayli zedelenmiş olan zor diyalektiğine, yine burjuva düzeninin istikrarı açısından bir “reform” yapılması anlamına gelmektedir. Reform, bu diyalektiği oluşturan içsel çelişkilerin (örn. evrensel- tikel) arasında açılan açının düzenin taşıyamayacağı denli fazla olduğu için de desteklenmektedir.

Tezin asıl metninde çok daha fazla çeşitlendirilen tüm bu tikel örnekler üzerinden tez birkaç şeyi göstermeyi amaçlamıştır. Birincisi, neoliberal polis reformunun Türkiye'de nasıl yeniden üretildiği, hangi temaların ön plana çıktığı, bunun Türkiye'nin uluslararasılaşmış polis örgütü açısından ne söylediğidir. Bir diğeri, tüm süreçte tarihsel bir sosyal form olarak polis aygıtı nasıl şekillendiği sorusudur. Ayrıca, “bu sosyal formu kuran diyalektikteki değişiklikler polis aygıtının dönüşümüne nasıl etki etmektedirler?” sorusu da cevaplanmaya çalışılmıştır. Sonuç olarak, böylesi bir zeminde dönüşen polis aygıtı, burjuva devlet formunu hangi saikler üzerinden zorlamakta ve onun çocuğu olan modern siyaset alanını nasıl dönüştürmektedir? Tüm bu başlıklarda varılan sonuçları tartışmak için 19. Yüzyıl'daki polis oluşum sürecini, o günden bu güne devam eden ve elbette kendini yeniden üreterek sürekliliğini sağlayan UDP'yi de tekrar gündemimize sokmamız gerekiyor. Buna sonuç kısmında kısaca değinmeye çalışacağız.

Sonuç

Neoliberal polis reformunun genişleyen bir sınıf erkine denk gelmesi, onu belirleyen temel prensiplerin de sınıf erkinin bu alana bir tercümesi anlamına gelmesi demek olduğunu daha önce iddia etmiştik. Bunun en büyük göstergesi, sermaye sınıfının Soğuk Savaş'ın bitmesini, artık bir hayli yozlaşmış olmuş zor aygıtlarını yenileme arzusuyla karşılaşmasıdır. Bu aynı zamanda, burjuva devlet formunun sınıf erkinin artık ihtiyaç duymayacağı unsurlardan arınma arzusu ile çakışmıştır. Bu süreçte, özel güvenlik ideolojisine yakınlaştırılmış, bu açıdan “kamu” özellikleri son derece tartışmalı polis aygıtları bu ikili gündemi yürütebilecek aygıtlar olarak suyun yüzüne çıkmış ve çıkarılmışlardır. Türkiye'deki polis aygıtı da bir “değişim şampiyonu” olmaya sadece itilmemiş aynı zamanda buna kendi entelektüelleri ve kurumlarıyla aday olmuştur. UDP'nin gündemiyle, Türkiye'deki polis aygıtının tarihsel gündeminin de sıkı bir uyuma göstermesi, Türkiye'deki süreci daha da hızlandırmıştır. Bu açıdan, UDP dışarıdan bir yapı olarak değil Türkiye'nin de organik bir parçası olduğu bir bileşen olarak Türkiye'deki reform sürecinde aktörlük etmektedir. Bu açıdan bakıldığında, Türkiye'de polis aygıtı, kendisinin de dâhil olduğu yoz siyasi yapıya rağmen, 1980'li yıllardan itibaren Özal'ın şahsında temsil olan siyasi-ideolojik hattın da erken öngörüsüyle, modern siyasi alanı düzenleyen, gerektiğinde onu restore eden aygıtlar olarak ön plana çıkmaya başlamışlardır. Bu açıdan bakıldığında, Türkiye'deki polis aygıtı son yıllarda şekillenen ideolojisinin bileşenlerini aslında uzun yıllardır yeşertmeye uğraşmaktadır. Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönem buna uygun bir zemin sağlamıştır. Kısacası, Türkiye vakası bize Türkiye'deki polis örgütünün eskilere dayanan uluslararasılaşmasının onun bu yeni neoliberal reform sürecine hızla iştirak etmesindeki önemli bir faktör olduğunu göstermiştir. Türkiye'de polis (elbette içerdiği tüm birimlerin eşit gelişimiyle olmasa da), uzun erimli uluslararasılaşma süreci sayesinde bir devlet kurumu olarak, “devlet dışında, devlet karşıtı” bir aktör olarak hızla sahbeye çıkabilmiştir. Türkiye'de ve tüm dünyada toplum-destekli polislik hem tematik olarak hem de pratikte bu dönüşümün ana bileşeni olarak belirmektedir. Polis, halkla ve bunun üzerinden de devletle yeni bir ilişki kurmaya çalışmaktadır.

Halk, kutsal bir şey olarak tasavvur edilmekte ve halkın sahip olduğu örf-adetler, hurafeler vb biçimsiz ve olkuçka heterojen bir toplam olan sağduyu [common sense], otoriter devleti yenecek bir güç olarak ön plana çıkarılmaktadır. Polis, bu anlamda bu duyuların derleyicisi, onları en doğru biçimde telaffuz eden bir aktör, halkın ‘ombudsman’ı olarak görülmektedir. Türkiye’de polis, sivillik diye adlandırdığı bu alana geçmiş ve buradan kendini temellendirmeye başlamıştır. Polisin iç ideolojisi ile halkın sağduyusu olarak görülen şeyler birbirlerine karışmış gibi hareket edilmekte, halkla polis arasında organik bir ilişki tasavvur edilmektedir. Bunun pratikte üretilmesi ise toplum destekli polislik uygulamalarında kendini gösteriyor. Türkiye’de polis, neoliberal ideolojinin sahip olduğu ve bu tezin “peoplism” olarak adlandırdığı özel bir halkçılık ideolojisini, modern siyaset alanının çizgilerini fazlasıyla esnetecek ve hatta onları yeniden belirleyecek bir şekilde kullanmaktadır. Örneğin modern siyaset alanının yapıtaşlarından birisi olan, beraber ortak bir gelecek kurgusu yapan, bunun için örgütlenen ve siyaset zemininde mücadele veren “grup” meselesi, siyaset bir gelecek kurgusundan uzak, dini-ahlaki zeminde örgütlenen ve meşruiyet aramak yerine itimat göstererek ilerleyen bir “grup” fikrine evrilmektedir. Kısacası, 19. Yüzyıl’da, modern grup fikrini karşısına alan, siyaset alanı dışarıdan bir güç olarak daraltmaya çalışan polis, 21. Yüzyıl’da bu alanın bizzat kalbine yerleşmiş ve buradan doğru salgıladığı ideolojik salgılarla onu dönüştürmeye uğraşmaktadır.

Bu durumu zor diyalektiği bağlamında şöyle dile getirmek mümkün gözükmektedir. Modern polis, bir eski rejim- modern siyaset alan gerilimi üzerinden temellenir. İlki, bir anti-tez olarak varlığını hep muhafaza eder. Modern siyaset alana hayat veren bağımlı sınıf mücadelelerinin geriye düşmesi, bu alanın da belirleyiciliğini etkiler ve eski rejimin modern polise içkin olan kısmının ağırlığı artar. İşçi sınıfı aleyhine genişleyen sermaye sınıfı erkinin polis aygıtı açısından anlamı budur. Ancak, eski rejiminin bu aygıtı belirleyiciliğindeki rolünün artması, bu aygıtın kendi modern doğasına da bir savaş açtığı anlamına gelir. Hal böyle olunca, polis reformu denilen müdahale aslında bu savaşı da dizginlemek, polisin sınıf erkine zarar vermeyecek ölçüler içinde hareket etmesini sağlamak anlamına da gelmektedir. Bu da burjuva devlet formunun dayandığı

siyaset- ekonomi ayrımının genişleyen sınıf erki bağlamında yeniden yapılandırılması ve bu formun neoliberal dönem öncesinde taşıdığı belirleyiciliğe artık sahip olamadığı anlamına gelmektedir. Örneğin, Türkiye’de çok kısa ömürlü ve sınırlı bir etkiye sahip olmuş olsa da Pol-Der gibi sol eğilimli bir polis derneğinin varlığı, polisin üzerinde oturduğu diyalektiğin bağımlı sınıflar tarafında olan ayaklarını sağlamlaştırmıştı. Böylesi kurumların ortadan kalkması, sadece bağımlı sınıfların aleyhine bir gelişme değildir. Bu aynı zamanda zor diyalektiğinin ve dolayısıyla modern siyaset zemininin de hızlıca dönüştüğü anlamına gelmektedir. Elbette, sınıf erki lehine.