

**FORCES OF LIBERALISM AND CONSERVATISM IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY ON
THE ITALIAN PENINSULA AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE**

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ABSTRACT

FORCES OF LIBERALISM AND CONSERVATISM IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY ON THE ITALIAN PENINSULA AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

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This thesis analyses the position of the Ottoman Empire and the Italian peninsula and their position in the international scenario during the 19th century. This work studies the developments in the Ottoman Empire and the Italian peninsula from the beginning of the *Tanzimat* (in the Ottoman Empire) and the *Risorgimento* (in the Italian peninsula), until the Crimean War, and evaluates the consequences of these events for the European balance of power.

These developments took place at a time when Europe was divided between conservative and liberal states, the formers being represented by Russia and the Habsburg Empire, the latter by Great Britain and France. This thesis, while focusing on the role played by these great Powers in influencing the Ottoman Empire and the Italian peninsula during the first half of the 19th century, also considers the international developments that followed the outbreak of the Crimean War.

The Crimean War in fact saw the Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom of Sardinia allying themselves with the liberal forces, a choice consistent with the political path these two states were following in their internal reforms, which they were undertaking to allow them to meet the challenges of evolving times.

Keywords: Ottoman Empire, Italy, Crimean War, Liberalism, Conservatism

ÖZ

19. YY'DA LİBERAL VE MUHAFAZAKAR GÜÇLER: İTALYAN YARIMADASI VE OSMANLI İMPARATORLUĞU ÜZERİNE KARŞILAŞTIRMALI BİR ÇALIŞMA

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Bu tez Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve İtalya yarımadasının 19. Yy boyunca uluslar arası senaryo içerisindeki konumlarını analiz etmektedir. Bu çalışma Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Tanzimat ve İtalya yarımadasında Risorgimento döneminden Kırım Savaşı'na kadar olan zaman dilimi içindeki gelişmeleri ve Avrupa güç dengesi için sonuçları değerlendirmektedir.

Bu gelişmelere Avrupa'nın muhafazakar ve liberal devletlere bölündüğü bir dönemde yer almaktadır. Muhafazakar devletler Rusya ve Habsburg İmparatorluğu ile temsil edilirken liberal devletler Büyük Britanya ve Fransa tarafından temsil edilmektedir. Bu tez 19. Yüzyılın ilk yarısı boyunca Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve İtalya yarımadasına etkiye bulunan büyük güçlerin oynadıkları role odaklanırken aynı zamanda Kırım Savaşı'nın baş göstermesi ile uluslar arası gelişmeleri de göz önünde bulundurmaktadır.

Kırım Savaşı'nda Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Sardunya Krallığı'nın liberal güçlerle ittifak olduğu görülmektedir. Bu seçim ilerleyen zamanın zorluklarını karşılamak için bu iki devlet tarafından yapılan iç reformları meydana getiren politik yol ile uyumlu olmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, İtalya, Kırım Savaşı , Liberalizm, Muhafazakarlık

To My Beloved Ones

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

It is well known to what extent the international order and the goals of the single nations affect the internal events of the single political entities. As to that which concerns the history of the Ottoman Empire, the extent to which the “Western influence” exerted over the *Tanzimat* reforms of the 19th century is recognized. The problem is that in this very assumption lies the silent orientalist conception of a feeble and passive “East”, vis à vis a strong and active “West”.

The present thesis will take under consideration the situation of the Italian peninsula during the same period of the *Tanzimat*, that coincides more or less with the *Risorgimento*, namely that lapse of time in which the Italian peninsula gradually left behind the *ancien régime* institutions¹ and in which took place the process which brought at the end the unification of the various Italian political entities, establishing in this way the Kingdom of Italy, freed from the Austrian, above all, and the French hegemonies. Before the unification, in the first half of the 19th century, the peninsula was divided into a number of different entities, mainly characterized by the *ancien régime* form of governments and feudal organization of the territory and economies. If we consider the “East” as “characterized by what it lacks: individual ownership of property, rational organization of market activity and rational bureaucratic forms of government”,² in that period the Italian peninsula could be said to be somewhere in the opposite side of what is considered as the “West”.

It is within this premise in which the present author thought that taking into account the influences of the European Great Powers (the “West”) both towards the Ottoman Empire, and the Italian peninsula would have been an interesting and original focus. The 19th century, and above all the period of time dating from 1839 (for the *Tanzimat*), and 1815 (for the *Risorgimento*), is

¹Lucy Riall, *The Italian Risorgimento*, (London: Routledge, 2004), p.1

²Huri İslamoğlu, “Modernities Compared: State Transformations and Constitutions of Property in the Qing and Ottoman Empires”, in Huri İslamoğlu and Peter C. Perdue (eds.), *Shared Histories of Modernity. China, India and the Ottoman Empire*, (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), p.109

to be considered if we want to understand the following developments of the two concerned entities.

As the history of the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century is thought to be heavily influenced by the external Powers, it would be interesting to make use of this same point of view for what concern the history of the Italian peninsula. The economy of the Ottoman Empire was declining, not being able to compete with the economies of the leading powers. Derek Beales wrote that in 1861 Italy's "great part of south and centre on the economical and structural plan were more similar to Egypt, Greece and parts of the Ottoman Empire than to that western Europe that the patriots admired so much."³

This is a demonstration of the fact that, as it is important to consider the leverage that the Western Powers had for the Ottoman affairs, by the same token we should consider the situation concerning the Italian peninsula: they shared both a particular position in the international politics as they were considered in order to maintain the European balance, and a "peripheral position for what concerned the economical integration, in a situation in which Great Britain and France were the most influential and active European Powers, therefore the most economically developed.

While for the Ottoman Empire the Tanzimat represented a period of reforms as an effort in order to keep the Empire independent and intact, the Italian *Risorgimento* consisted in a period of uprisings and constitutional reforms, all aimed at reaching civil rights and independence from foreign control. Despite these differences, "To preserve the Ottoman heritage, the Tanzimat statesmen crushed rebellion wherever they could, played off one great power against another when possible, and instituted measures of domestic reorganization."⁴

The above measures made the Ottoman methods very close, if not identical under a general perspective, to those of the statesmen of the Kingdom of Sardinia, the political entity that stood out between the others in the Italian peninsula because of its proximity with the Western Powers and its international dimension. So, in order not to preserve a "heritage", but to gain strategical and political power, Sardinian authorities clashed with radical democratic movements, favoring the monarchy vis à vis projects of reforms "from the

³Derek Beales and Eugenio F. Biagini, *Il Risorgimento e l'Unificazione dell'Italia*, (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2005), p.236

⁴Roderic Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp.5-6

masses”, they played the Great Powers against each other, above all trying to isolate the Habsburg Empire, and reformed the state, overall for what concerned the economic sector.

Starting from an introduction about the situation of the Ottoman Empire and the Italian peninsula in the first half of 19th century, I chose to focus on the Crimean War (1853-1856) and the consequent Congress of Paris in 1856. This war was the first international military campaign of the army of an Italian political entity, namely the Kingdom of Sardinia, and the Congress was the occasion in which the Ottoman Empire acquired the membership to the Concert of Europe, and at the same time a representative from the Italian peninsula participated for the first time to the negotiations of the European diplomacy.

The aim of this thesis is to demonstrate that historically, at least for the 19th century, the configuration of the international politics was not so much affected by conceptions like “West” or “East”, “Christianity” or “Islam”. The developments of the international order followed just the material and strategical interests of the states. The Hatt-ı Hümayun was strongly recommended by the great Powers for political and economical strategical reasons. In the same period, actually in that same Congress of Paris where the Islahat edict was formally recognized, the British and the Sardinian representatives expressed themselves very harshly against the Papal States government. Not to mention the fact that even before, in the 1830s, the great Powers sent an ultimatum to the Pope suggesting him to make use of reforms in order to make his dominion less exposed to popular uprisings.

The way in which the great Powers behaved in a context in which also religious questions were at stake (let’s just think about the Holy Places crisis before the Crimean War) is of significative importance, and also the alliances in the Crimean War are of great significance from this point of view. Great Britain and France were not reluctant at all to ally with the Ottoman Empire against Russia, which in those times defined itself the defender of the Orthodox population inside the imperial territories.

The correspondences of the Pope were also very beneficial to understand the position of a strong religious authority like the Catholic Church in the inter-

national arena. When Pope Pius IX reminded the French “Catholic Sovereign” Napoleon III the importance of sustaining Catholicism against other “false religions” in the Ottoman lands and to oppose “the spirit of indifference on the subject of faith [...] also between a number of Catholics”,⁵ the emperor answered with great pragmatism that in those territories the Christian interests were to be considered as a whole with the other Churches. Moreover, when Napoleon III saw suit, did not hesitate to ally with the Kingdom of Sardinia (the Italian arch-enemy of the Papal States) to enact war against the Habsburg Empire (1859), namely the historical ally of the Pope and guardian of the Italian status quo after the Congress of Vienna in 1815.

These elements suggest that studying history through the lens of culture (West vis à vis East) or religion (Christianity vis à vis Islam) cannot be a viable method to understand the real developments of international politics. On the contrary, as a matter of fact, it could jeopardize the objective perception of how historical events evolved.

In this context it is worthwhile to recall that on the international scenario the real struggle was between liberal and conservative Powers. The liberalism was represented by Great Britain and France. During the Crimean War the Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom of Sardinia stepped on their side against the conservative Russia. Also the Habsburg Empire was a conservative Power, but for strategic reason during the war was compelled to maintain a neutral position. This provoked the end of the Russo-Austrian alliance, undermining in this way the conservative front. Even before the Crimean War, the Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom of Sardinia chose the “liberal way”, although in different manners. The *Tanzimat* reforms begun as the ruling class understood that there was the need for improvements in military, economical and governmental sectors. The *Risorgimento* was the period in which the Italian middle classes begun to rebel against the old conservative order to gain political rights. In both these cases it is clear that, in a way or another, there existed the perception of the necessity to follow the liberal trend of the time.

⁵Pietro Pirri, *Pio IX e Vittorio Emanuele II dal loro carteggio privato. II: La Questione Romana (1856-1864)*, (Roma: Pontificia Università Gregoriana, 1951), Documenti, pp.5-6

CHAPTER 2

OVERVIEW

2.1 Ottoman Empire

2.1.1 The Tanzimat Period

In the case of the Ottoman Empire there were three fundamental factors that made reforms indispensable. After the French Revolution introduced the principle of equality through citizenship, mass conscription became essential to constitute an army in condition to face the modern armies of the enemies of the Empire. The economical power of the non-Muslims inside the Ottoman territories was a richness from which the state should have taken advantage in order to survive the economical challenges of the period. The internal nationalist turmoils was to be put under control, and to this aim the equality between the subjects seemed to be a suitable prescription.¹

2.1.1.1 Mahmud II

Mahmud II, supporter of the Nizam-i Cedid of Selim III (program of reforms at the end of the XVIII century, aiming at the reinforcement of the centrality of the state, both against the external and the internal enemies), necessitated the first 15 years of his sultanate (1808 - 1823) to consolidate his power², assigning his men both in the central administration, in the ulema hierarchy and in the army, and regionally (*ayans*), without taking under consideration the possibility of reforms. In order to suffocate Wahabi and Greek revolts, the Sultan had to turn to his powerful vassal, Mehmet Ali governor of Egypt.³ This was due to the discouraging situation of the Ottoman army, still represented by the obsolete Janissary corps. Mahmud II was convinced of the fact that any reform could be promoted if the ruling elites of the old system was still in charge, and because of this the authority of the Sultan was to be reconquered and strengthened.

¹Donald Quataert, *The Ottoman Empire 1700-1922*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p.67

²Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey. A Modern History*, (London: I.B.Tauris, 2004), p.30

³Robert Mantran, "Gli Esordi della Questione d'Oriente (1774-1839)", in Robert Mantran (ed.), *Storia dell'Impero Ottomano*, (Lecce: Argo, 2004), p.471

From 1814 to 1820 the Sultan could concentrate on reinforcing its authority on the Balkan provinces by diminishing the power of the local notables because of a period of appeasement with Russia. Mahmud II was forced to maintain a connection with the ulema class, one of the most influent group of the Empire by assuming a religious attitude, encouraging the traditional teaching and promoting the ulema which collaborated with the government. Two şeyhülislam supported his reformist policies: Seyyid Abdül Wahhab Efendi (1821 - 22) and Mustafa Asim (1818 - 19 and 1823 - 25).

During the last years of Sultan Mahmud II, the Greek and Egyptian crises showed the weakness of the Ottoman Empire, and Great Britain and the Habsburg Empire began to get worried about the Russian influence over the Mediterranean Sea. The European states were disturbed by the fact that the dismemberment of the Empire could damage the balance of power between the states, and this very international situation accompanied the development of the Tanzimat reforms.⁴

The Western powers both encouraged and hindered the reforms inside the Empire. They supported the aim of a reinforcement of the Ottoman state, but at the same time they wanted to protect their economic interests linked to the non-Muslim *millet*s, namely the autonomous groups of non-Muslims guided by a religious leader. So they gave life to a paradox standing both by equal rights for all the citizens, and by the refusal of the non-Muslim subjects to lose their privileges.⁵ Actually for the foreign Powers to support the non-Muslim *millet*s meant the extension of their influence inside the Empire, given the situation that French and Austrian protected the Catholics, Russians the Orthodoxes and the British the Druzes and the Protestants.

In order to reinforce the central state it were required a modern army, money from taxes, and an efficient and modern central bureaucracy were required. So the first step of Mahmud II was the annihilation of the Janissary corps in 1826, an event happened a day remembered as the *Vaka-i Hayriye*, the “Auspicious Event”. This put an end to the traditional autonomy of the corps of the Ottoman army, introducing the figure of the *serasker*, which in the future would be the Ministry of War, commanding the new western-style *Mansure* army trained with the help of first Prussian, and then German officials.

⁴Erik J. Zürcher, op. cit., p.38

⁵*Ibid.*, p.39

A consequence of this event was that the ulema lost their armed ally - the janissaries - and this let the Sultan centralize the control of the religious institutions by putting the pious foundations, the *evkaf*, under state control and placing the şeyhülislam at the head of the hierarchy of the ulema.⁶ Together with this, the 1826 event made easier the development of Ottoman economic liberalism, because the Janissaries constituted an obstacle for economic reforms as they also played a crucial role in the Ottoman urban economy, and had therefore interests in maintaining the status quo.⁷

Apart from the lack of trained people, the elitist character of the reforms, the strong patronal system, and the financial problems of the Empire, another between the troubles of the Tanzimat era was the coexistence of the reforms with the traditional establishments, and the failed abolition of the latter. The obsolete teachings of the ulema were sided with the new Western training schools, and the new rules based on European laws coexisted with the Sharia.⁸

According to Niyazi Berkes, the greatest innovation of Mahmud II was the conception of an Ottoman state with its secular idea of sovereignty, in opposition to the idea of an Islamic state. So the new entry of citizenship replaced the medieval idea of Umma, the community of believers. It was the new understanding of government by law and equality before the law irrespective of race, creed, or position.⁹

Mahmud II died in 1839, leaving to his successor Abdülmecit I a state conformation in which the centre of power leaned from the Palace to the Porte, giving in this way more power to the modern bureaucracy. After his death, the greatest inheritance of Mahmud II was that he left open possibilities for future reforms. Nevertheless, at the same time, with the extermination of the Janissary corps, removed an important check for the central power: this brought to the arbitrary rule of Abdülaziz after 1871 and Abdülhamid II after 1878.¹⁰

After five months the death of Mahmud II, the Gülhane edict was promulgated. Butrus Abu-Manneh wrote that it was the result of an internal

⁶*Ibid.*, p.40

⁷Donald Quataert, "The Age of Reforms, 1812-1914" in Suraiya Faroqhi, *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire - Volume II: 1600-1914*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p.764

⁸Erik J. Zürcher, *op. cit.*, p.46

⁹Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, (London: Hurst, 1998), pp.90-94

¹⁰Roderic Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp.30-32

reformist dynamic, as it did not contradict the Sharia: “even when the Gülhane promised ‘to introduce new legislation’ none of the acts and measures introduced in the first decade of the Tanzimat contradicted the Sharia.”¹¹ The Rescript was announced on 3 November 1839 by the Foreign Minister Reshit Pasha, ex ambassador of the Empire in London and Paris, experience that gave him a reformist knowledge. He raised Ali and Fuad Pashas, which in the future during the Crimean War would have important roles as diplomats and statesmen.¹² The edict contained the promise of equal rights between Muslim and Christian subjects of the Empire, and this was also a diplomatic move to gain the support of foreign Powers against the insurrection of Mehmet Ali, who wanted Mahmud II to give him the governorship of Syria as a compensation for his big loss at Navarino in 1827. At the same time it was also an attempt to curb the turmoil provoked by nationalism inside the Empire.

It is difficult to state how much the Gülhane edict contributed to the decision of the foreign Powers to help the Ottoman Empire against Ibrahim Pasha, son of Mehmet Ali, in Syria, eventually putting an end to the Egyptian crisis.¹³ It is anyway meaningful the fact that the Foreign Minister Reshit Pasha was the one charged with the promulgation and the elaboration of internal reforms, and this was a result of several factors: his competence for what concerned foreign languages and societies and the strict relation between external diplomatic pressure and internal efforts to reform.¹⁴ These factors made the Foreign Minister the most important state figure of the Tanzimat period, a role covered subsequently by, a part from Reshit, Ali and Fuad Pashas.

In 1843 was issued a new penal code which recognized equality between Muslims and non-Muslims, and established mixed courts for commercial cases which involved foreigners. In 1844 death penalty for apostasy (a prescription of the Sharia) was abolished. In 1850 a new commercial code copied by the French one was introduced.

The secularization of law was an attempt to avoid frictions inside the Ottoman Empire, attempting to introduce equality between all the subjects. But in the case of the non-Muslim *millet*s the result was just the opposite. Armenian and Greek bourgeoisie started to feel the need to be independent from their respective religious communities. The consequence was the elaboration

¹¹Butrus Abu-Manneh, “The Islamic Roots of the Gülhane Rescript”, in *Die Welt des Islams*, vol.34, n.2, p.201

¹²Roderic Davison, op. cit., pp.36-37

¹³Erik J. Zürcher, op. cit., pp.50-51-52

¹⁴*Ibid.*, p.58

of internal secular constitutions and administrations, and the fact that the reorganization was along *millet* lines helped to reemphasize the lack of homogeneity among Ottoman peoples,¹⁵ fostering in this way nationalist separatist movements.¹⁶

Contributing to the separatist desires was the educational situation in the Empire. In the 19th century, four kind of educational institutions existed: the Muslim *mektep*; the Tanzimat's secular schools, wanted by the reformers to form the new bureaucracy and military classes; the schools of various non-Muslim *millets*; and the Catholic and Protestant's missionary schools.¹⁷

The 1856 Hatt-ı Hümayun was also a consequence of the Crimean War (1853 - 1856) and the involvement of the foreign Powers into it. With the Paris Congress in 1856 the Ottoman Empire was formally admitted into the Concert of Europe, even though its financial and military weaknesses assured it a passive role in it. The Hümayun edict was officially recognized by the Concert, giving in this way the theoretical right of supervision over the internal reforms of the Empire to the foreign Powers, an hypothesis confirmed by the fact that the pledge of non intervention into internal matters was not respected in the following years.¹⁸

2.2 The Eastern Question

The Eastern Question originated during the XVIII century as the Ottoman Empire was experiencing a military and institutional decline and the Powers began to focus on it for their ambitions. This was a situation which lasted until the last days of the Empire. From 1830's onward Russia and Great Britain was the two Powers mainly active on that front. The Habsburg Empire became more interested in the Balkans after having lost German and Italian territories after the Austro-Prussian war in 1866. The European policy of France at that time was weak and she could not afford to be involved.¹⁹ Russia had in her hands an important tool to interfere into Ottoman Empire affairs: the Orthodox minority in Asia Minor and the Balkans, much more significant than the Catholic one which France could lean on. Beyond that, Russia shared frontiers

¹⁵Roderic Davison, op. cit., p.132

¹⁶Erik J. Zürcher, op. cit., p.62

¹⁷*Ibid.*, p.63

¹⁸Roderic Davison, op. cit., p.413

¹⁹Matthew S. Anderson, *The Eastern Question: 1774 - 1923. A Study in International Relations*, (Hong Kong:MacMillan, 1991), pp.388-389

with the Empire.²⁰ In fact, as the biggest threat came from Russia, from the beginning of the 19th century to 1878, the Ottoman Empire adopted a policy of good relations with Britain, against the Russian menace²¹ and in turn Great Britain adopted a policy of preservation of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.

The Crimean War provoked a change in the European political balance:

Until after the Crimean War Russian expansion in the Near East seemed dangerous to Britain mainly because it would increase Russian power in Europe as a whole, and thus threaten the balance of power there and weaken the forces of liberty and constitutional government. That war destroyed the conservative concert with the Habsburg Empire which [the Czar] Nicholas I had struggled so hard to maintain. The great changes in the political configuration of Europe which took place between 1859 and 1871 ended the possibility [...] of Russian dominance in the continent.²²

These rivalries existed in spite of the existence of the Concert of Europe, an entity founded on the balance of power between the states which composed it. Every time a state declared the intention to interfere in the internal matters of the Ottoman Empire for the purpose of defending the Christian communities, the other states were forced to intervene as well, in order to maintain the European balance of power. This was in practice the Eastern Question pattern, which characterized the Ottoman diplomacy until the end of its days. It was a very controversial one, since its consequence was the direct linking of the European equilibrium to the Ottoman destiny, displacing the battlefield from European lands to the Ottoman territories. So while European powers embraced the cause of the integrity of the Empire, they at the same time helped, or were at least involved in, its final disintegration.

An important aspect of the Eastern Question is the one regarding the internal reforms of the Ottoman Empire. The Empire needed to readjust its institutions in order to keep the pace with the European powers, and this was true above all for what concerned the military. But in order to reorganize and

²⁰*Ibid.*, p.390

²¹Besim Özcan, “Osmanlı Devleti’nin Rusya’ya Yönelik Dış Politikası (19. yy. ve 20. yy. Başı)”, in Mustafa Bıyıklı (ed.), *Türk Dış Politikası: Osmanlı Dönemi*, (Istanbul: Gökkuşbucağı, 2008), p.309

²²Matthew S. Anderson, op. cit., p.391-392

ameliorate it, it was necessary to face problems like the decline of the Timar system, the taxation system and the overall obsolete structure of the Empire. In the reforming process the Powers had their role, because of their interests in keeping the Empire alive.

2.2.1 International developments affecting the Ottoman Empire from 1815 to the Crimean War

At the Congress of Vienna of 1815 the Eastern Question was not a matter of debate because of the desires of the Czar, who thought to maintain the Russian supremacy for what concerned the Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless the interests of the great Powers in the Ottoman dominions was quite clear. Napoleon's conquest of Egypt in 1798 made Great Britain realize how strategically important was the control of the east Mediterranean region. This is also why Great Britain in 1815 received from France the bases in Malta and the Ionian islands. Russian focus on the Christian Slav Balkans and on the Straights and the consequent oppositions of Great Britain and France were some of the causes of the contrasts experienced by the European powers. The main conflicts were between the Habsburg Empire and Russia, Great Britain and Russia, Great Britain and France.²³

In 1814 the revolutionary Greek secret society Philiki Etaireia was founded in Odessa with the connivance of the Czar. Russian interests were in harmony with Greek nationalist forces, which succeeded in a rebellion in the Morea. Sultan Mahmud II asked for the help of his Egyptian vassal Mehmet Ali, who sent his son Ibrahim to reconquer Morea in 1825. Meanwhile in Russia, Czar Nicholas I took the place of Alexander. This Czar was much more concerned about the direct Russian interest than about helping a revolution. So in 1826 he sent an ultimatum to the Ottomans asking the right to protectorate over Moldavia, Wallachia and Serbia.²⁴ Great Britain was apprehended about the possible influence that Russia would gain had acted alone, thus the 1827 London treaty suggested a mediation through a naval blockade. But the Ottomans refused (at the time they were managing to reconquer Morea) and the same year the battle of Navarino took place between the Anglo-French and the Egyptian fleets, causing the destruction of the latter. Czar Nicholas was unhappy

²³René Albrecht-Carrié, *Storia Diplomatica dell'Europa. Dal Congresso di Vienna ad Oggi*, (Bologna: Cappelli, 1970), p. 71

²⁴Robert Mantran, "Gli Esordi della Questione d'Oriente (1774-1839)", in Robert Mantran (ed.), *Storia dell'Impero Ottomano*, (Lecce: Argo, 2004), p. 480

about how the events unfolded, and decided to declare war on the Ottoman empire on 26 April 1828. So Great Britain reinforced its Mediterranean fleet and the French agreed with the Egyptian troops to substitute them in Morea. In the meantime Russia conquered Kars and Erzurum, Moldavia, Bulgaria and after Edirne was also conquered on 22 August 1829, on 14 September 1829 the hostilities ended with the Edirne Treaty, that avoided the dismemberment of the Ottoman European provinces thanks to Great Britain and France, nevertheless autonomy was given to the Danubian Principalities and the Russians obtained the right to sail through the Straits for commercial purposes.²⁵

With the London Protocol of 1830, the Powers established an independent Greek state.²⁶ Mehmet Ali demanded Syria to be given to him as a compensation for his help in Morea. Great Britain and Russia were worried about a possible Ottoman strengthening because of Mehmet Ali, which was supported by France. In 1832 he managed to win against the Ottoman troops in Konya, an event whose consequences have been prevented by the Russian emissary, who went to Alexandria and warned Mehmet Ali explicitly. In 1833 Russian troops appeared on the Bosphorus, worrying in this way Great Britain and France, thus the latter decided to put their troops in the eastern Mediterranean region. In the end, this diplomatic tension was resolved by a direct Ottoman-Egyptian agreement. In the meanwhile, the Russians achieved to impose on the Ottomans the Hünkâr Iskelesi agreement in 1833, a defense alliance between the two parts. In the same year the Münchengrätz agreement guaranteed Russia's help in Austrian central European affairs in change for the Austrian help in Russian Ottoman affairs. However, this arrangement proved to be obsolete.

In 1838 Great Britain established its commercial influence on the Ottoman Empire through the Balta Limanı agreement. But this was not enough for the British. With the 1840 London treaty Great Britain tried to oppose the French influence over the eastern Mediterranean, acquired through the support to Mehmet Ali. The treaty actually represented an actual ultimatum toward Egypt that required its cession of Crete, the Arab possessions (except southern Syria), and the Ottoman fleet. Counting on the French support, Mehmet Ali refused. So Lord Palmerston decided to put an end to the crisis by bombing

²⁵René Albrecht-Carrié, *op. cit.*, pp.75-76; Robert Mantran, *op. cit.*, p.481

²⁶René Albrecht-Carrié, *op. cit.*, p.77

Beirut and forcing Ibrahim, son of Mehmet Ali, to pull back from Syria. After this episode, with the Straits Convention (13 July 1841) the Great Powers agreed that the straits would be closed to all warships during peacetime.²⁷ This was a clear victory for Great Britain because it managed to defend the Ottoman Empire, to increase the Sultan's authority, to thwart the French influence and to cancel the Russian privileged position in the Ottoman affairs.

The 1840's were a relatively calm period for the Ottoman Empire as international antagonisms became less acute.²⁸ Only two episodes are remarkable. The informal 1844 agreement between Great Britain and Russia against France is the first. An agreement that however, when Britain and France solved their territorial problems about Morocco and Tahiti, became null because Russian support did not seem necessary anymore, leaving Russia empty handed.

The second was the Hungarian and Polish revolutionaries escape into the Ottoman territories the next year after the European risings of 1848. Respectively, Austrian and Russian governments demanded their extradition.²⁹ When Russia and the Habsburg Empire broke off relations because of the Ottoman refusal, the latter appealed both for the support from British Stratford Canning and French General Aupick, and secretly to the Czar sending his favorite among the Ottoman diplomats: Fuad Pasha. So Russia, also as a reaction against Austrian arbitrary execution of some Hungarian generals which had surrendered to the Russian army, dropped her demand for the extradition, leaving the Habsburgs alone. However, even if this diplomatic crisis ended, it had the consequence to mobilize British and French fleets towards the Dardanelles, in this way planting the seed of the Anglo-French alliance of the Crimean War.³⁰

2.3 The Italian Peninsula

2.3.1 Situation at the time of the Congress of Vienna

After the Napoleonic invasions subverted the European order, the Congress of Vienna in 1815 restored the status quo ante bellum without paying attention to

²⁷Erik Goldstein, *Wars and Peace Treaties: 1816 - 1991*, (London: Routledge, 1992), p.25

²⁸Matthew S. Anderson, op. cit., p.110

²⁹*Ibid.*, pp.112-113

³⁰Alan J. P. Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848-1919*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954), pp.33-34

the nationalistic feelings, which in that period were beginning to grow strong. The foundation of the legitimate authority was the alliance between throne and altar. The revolutionary notion of statehood based on the concept of nation was rejected in favor of the restoration of dynasties, among which there were multiethnic empires.³¹

The main purpose of the Congress was the containment of France to its original frontiers, restoring also the legitimate position of King Louis XVIII, which Napoleon previously occupied. Great Britain, Habsburg Empire, Russia, and Prussia were the great Powers that had the fundamental roles at the Congress (France would be admitted to the Concert of Europe from 1818, after the payment of an indemnity, and the occupying forces retreated from its territories)³². Three were the basic principles of the Congress: compensation, legitimacy and restoration. The Czar obtained great part of Poland; the same did Prussia with Saxony. Britain did not claim anything in Europe apart its bases in Malta and Ionian islands. Holland gained the former Austrian Netherlands.³³

According to the legitimacy principle, for what concerned the Italian peninsula, the modifications that Napoleon brought to the monarchical systems between 1796 (when Napoleon invaded the Italian territories) and 1815, were to be considered as parenthetical, something the international system had to annihilate. The dynasties of Savoy and Bourbon came back to the throne from their exile in Sardinia and Sicily. Adding to their original territories, Vittorio Emanuele I gained Liguria, and Ferdinand IV obtained the territories of the Kingdom of Naples before 1806, after having accepted a defensive alliance with Austria.³⁴ The Papal States were recomposed with their former regions, the 'Legazioni', namely Umbria, Lazio, Marche, Romagna, and Emilia. The Duchies of Parma, Piacenza, Modena, and Reggio, the Granduchy of Tuscany as well, were all consigned to relatives of the Habsburg family. While in this zone the Austrian control was in a way mediated, in the central-eastern part of the north of the peninsula a direct control was implemented, as a compensation for its lost German and Belgian territories. The Lombard-Venetian Kingdom was directly given to a viceroy, member of the Habsburg royal family.

³¹Michael Burleigh, *Earthly powers: the Clash of Religion and Politics in Europe from the French Revolution to the Great War*, (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2005), p.116

³²René Albrecht-Carrié, *op. cit.*, pp.47-48

³³*Ibid.*, p.29

³⁴Marco Meriggi, *Gli Stati Italiani prima dell'Unità* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2011), p.115

Nevertheless Habsburg hegemony was not just based on the control wielded directly or indirectly over the peninsula, because the Habsburg Empire, according to the Congress of Vienna agreements, was furthermore considered to be the guardian of the status quo, a condition which permitted to maintain its garrisons spread in all the territory. The consequences of this situation were strikingly felt in the occasions of the 1820-21 constitutional risings in the Kingdoms of the Two Sicilies and Piedmont, and in 1831 with the rebellions in Modena, Reggio and in the provinces of the Papal States, when Habsburg troops crushed the rebels.³⁵

Napoleon brought in the peninsula different kinds of reforms and establishments. These consisted in the abolition of the feudal privileges, the codification and standardization of laws (introducing the French Commercial and Civil Codes), introduction of the representative government and of constitutions and between 1809 and 1814 the division of the peninsula in just three states³⁶ (unlike the former peninsular institutional organization of eleven little political entities³⁷). The Congress of Vienna reintroduced in the peninsula the old fragmented subdivision of the territory in little states, characterized by different structures and establishments, differences to be found both between the states themselves and inside their very territory.³⁸ Nevertheless the administrative reforms contributing to a more efficient central control, namely those reforms which gave more power in the hands of the governors, were maintained.³⁹

The newly acquired territory of the Kingdom of Sardinia, the former Republic of Genova, partially maintained the French civil, legal and military organizations, while in the rest of the Kingdom these same institutions were abolished. Even if formally banned in 1815, in the island of Sardinia feudalism existed until the end of 1830's; conscription was not enforced, and only in 1848 the codes already existing in Piedmont, Savoy and Liguria, were finally introduced. While Vittorio Emanuele I in the Kingdom of Sardinia confirmed its intentions to bring back everything to the pre-Napoleonic status quo, the establishment continued to maintain Napoleonic administrative features. A

³⁵Cristopher Duggan, *La Forza del Destino. Storia d'Italia dal 1796 a Oggi*, (Bari: Laterza, 2009), p.87

³⁶Derek Beales and Eugenio F. Biagini, *Il Risorgimento e l'Unificazione dell'Italia*, (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2005), pp.37-38

³⁷*Ibid.*, p.23

³⁸Marco Meriggi, *op. cit.*, p.117

³⁹Derek Beales and Eugenio F. Biagini, *op. cit.*, p.39

system of central ministers and a general treasury with its council were introduced, and governors and intendants were under the control of the State. Aristocracy and clergy were restored. In Sardinia only in 1847 there would be the return to a unique and hierarchical system of justice. A characteristic of the Kingdom of Sardinia was the clash between the former Napoleonic bureaucratic class and the aristocracy, caused by the firm intention of the rulers to ostracize the new administrative middle class, and this situation persisted until the 1848 revolutions. A similar situation, even if altered during the risings of the 1820's and 1830's, was to be found in the rest of the peninsular States.⁴⁰

The Kingdom of the Two Sicilies was what resulted from the fusion between the Kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, a configuration wanted by the Congress. Also in this case the territorial organization was not uniform, a greater independence was granted to the island of Sicily in the fields of appointments, justice, taxation and representative organs, and of the conscription for the military service. In Naples, capital city of the former Kingdom of Naples ruled by Napoleon's brother-in-law Joachim Murat⁴¹, the Napoleonic heritage was more intense, but in the periphery outside Naples the revolutionary French influence was replaced by the old feudal Bourbon structure. Likewise, in the island of Sicily the refusals of the local notables contributed to the sabotage of the councils of intendancy.⁴²

In the Pontifical States the conscription introduced by Napoleon was abolished for all the subjects and, on one hand, the Napoleonic heritage was still present in the juridical and administrative establishments in the states previously part of the Napoleonic Kingdom of Italy (Marche, Romagna, and Emilia), while on the other hand this same heritage was overturned in the regions formerly part of the French Empire (Lazio and Umbria), where fragment of feudal jurisdiction could be found until 1848.⁴³ The administration of the Papal States was basically centralist, with congregations in Rome which managed the civil and religious administrations. All the delegates were appointed by the Pope.⁴⁴ If in the XVIII century Roman theology was evolving in a rationalistic way, after the Congress of Vienna it became obscurantist,

⁴⁰Marco Meriggi, op. cit., p.118

⁴¹Spencer Di Scala, *Italy: from revolution to republic, 1700 to the present*, (Boulder: WestviewPress, 2009), p.34

⁴²Marco Meriggi, op. cit., pp.135-136

⁴³*Ibid.*, pp.119-120

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, pp.133-134

focusing on mysteries, miracles, and repressions of heresy.

Napoleonic reforms regarded also the abolition of the old privileges of aristocracy and of the clergy. Nevertheless Restoration keywords were order and hierarchy, and the re-establishment of the power of the Pope would have helped to maintain and reinforce the status quo. The Church was actually the source of the consensus for the lower classes, with its religious orders, missions, jubilees, pilgrimages, popular cults. The problem of the maintenance of the old status quo was actually represented by the cultured classes.

In the Lombard-Venetian Kingdom two governments coexisted, one in Milan and the other in Venice. They were coordinated by a Habsburg viceroy and were two parallel and similar structures divided in provinces, districts and municipalities. In the city of Milan a great resentment was felt against Austrian domination. Political measures like high taxes, custom duties against Piedmont and France, and appointments into the bureaucracy to German-speaking officials were under criticism.

Also the Padan Duchies of Parma and Modena and the Grand Duchy of Tuscany were characterized by a coexistence of Napoleonic and absolutist structures, with administrative and judiciary competencies mixed together (a phenomenon erased during the Napoleonic period).

Even if the declared intentions of the Congress of Vienna were to reintroduce the old system free from the Napoleonic heritage of administrative reforms, actually the result was a coexistence of traditional and new arrangements.

The Napoleonic model was not entirely refused. Eminent political personalities were aware of the positivity of the French codes, and managed to avoid their complete rejection. Substantially the old monarchical power was restored, maintaining however the Napoleonic elements of the state monopoly of the public power and the codification, this latter of course deprived of the elements which would have hindered the alliance between throne and altar. The centralization was a characteristic that in the long run fueled the emergence of the local identities. The old aristocracy suspended in the Napoleonic era was restored. Nevertheless, as feudalism was officially abolished, nobility was not anymore a title linked to jurisdictional capacity, and it became merely honorific. This factor actually contributed to a de facto continuation of the Napoleonic establishment, even if for what concerned the administration of

justice, there was ambiguity between judiciary and executive fields.⁴⁵

To epitomise, the French administrative innovations survived even after the Vienna Congress, with various degrees, in all the States of the peninsula, and they reached even the islands (Sardinia and Sicily), which formerly remained untouched by the Napoleonic transformation. There were also different realities, characterized by admixtures of executive and judiciary powers where form of feudalism survived.⁴⁶ Another factor of significance is that in the 1848 revolutions the public servants tended to participate in the popular upheavals and to challenge the establishment, demonstrating their distance with the Restoration regimes.⁴⁷ Only two States were really independent, the Kingdom of Sardinia and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. The Papacy was formally independent, but like the next years would demonstrate, it needed the Austrian and French armies in order to maintain its integrity.

It is worthwhile to recall the fact that the Napoleonic Wars exerted their influence over the Ottoman Empire, too. After Napoleon's military campaign in Egypt in 1798, there the villagers were conscripted for the first time into a modern Egyptian army and forced to pay the taxes to support it. When in 1822-23 artisans and peasants rebelled against these Napoleonic innovations, their uprisings were destroyed by military reinforcements led by European officers.⁴⁸ From the point of view of the international situation, the Napoleonic Wars transformed the balance of power in Europe, and the foreign Powers gained more opportunity to intervene on the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire, in a situation in which Russia and the Habsburg Empire had their interests in the Balkans, and Great Britain needed to safeguard its Eastern trade routes.⁴⁹

For the Habsburg Emperor the Italian peninsula was important for its revenues and conscription. Especially the Lombard lands were the place in which the Habsburgs and France confronted each other, and the Kingdom of Sardinia was the buffer state between them. Even if Metternich considered the

⁴⁵*Ibid.*, pp.125-129-137

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, p.143

⁴⁷*Ibid.*, p.151

⁴⁸Timothy Mitchell, *Rule of Experts. Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), pp.127-128

⁴⁹Caroline Finkel, *Osman's Dream. The Story of the Ottoman Empire 1300-1923*, (London: John Murray, 2005), p.402

peninsula as a strategical whole important for the international affairs of the Habsburg Empire, he was persuaded that Italian nationalistic unitarist spirit and the consitutional ideas had to be annihilated.⁵⁰

With respect to the European situation as a whole, France and Great Britain represented a liberal tendency, namely more attentive to nationalistic or constitutional desires of the European peoples. This was directly in opposition to the conservative spirit, represented by the Habsburg Empire, Russia and Prussia. Nevertheless Great Britain thought that for the moment balance and a peace settlement were much more important than reformer ideals.

Nationality was one of the dominant forces of 19th century, and the Habsburg Empire was the Power more directly influenced by the growing Italian demands for independence. Russia was straightly against the nationalistic movements, with the exception of those blossoming the Balkans, at the time under the Ottoman Empire. Significant is that according to the desire of Czar Alexander, during the Congress of Vienna the issues concerning the Ottoman Empire were untouched.

2.3.2 The *Risorgimento*

The *Risorgimento* was the name (translatable as “Resurgence”) given to that period covering the time span between the Congress of Vienna and the Italian unification. It can be defined as

the collapse of the ancien régime and the development of a parliamentary system, the breakdown of traditional rural society and the birth of modern, urban life, the transition from a feudal to a capitalist economy and the replacement of local or regional identities by a single national culture.⁵¹

The *Risorgimento* had its origins during the end of the XVIII century, thanks to the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Empire in the Italian peninsula, because they inspired the next generations of democrats and liberals, protagonists of that period of time.⁵²

The Italian unification was not the goal of these movements, because in the beginning all they wanted was independence from the foreign forces present

⁵⁰Derek Beales and Eugenio F. Biagini, op. cit., p.48

⁵¹Lucy Riall, *The Italian Risorgimento*, (London: Routledge, 2004), p.1

⁵²Derek Beales and Eugenio F. Biagini, op. cit., p.18

on the territories and from their hegemony over the peninsula, and internal constitutional reforms, in each Italian state. The idea of unification had born toward the end of the 1850s, when the reformers understood that in order to achieve their goals they needed either an Italian federation or a unified and centralized Italy.⁵³

To understand the entity of the *Risorgimento* it is useful to consider also the change concerning the ruling class: before it consisted basically in an aristocracy of landlords linked to the Church, but eventually in 1861 the new group of rulers, that was made up by traders allied with a new middle class of little landlords, took the lead.⁵⁴ This transformation means that eventually the situation in the Italian peninsula adjusted according to the European liberal trend, leaving behind the old conservative institutional and social structure.

Distinct from reformism, nationalism was another important component of the *Risorgimento*. The peninsula was never politically united since the sixth century, namely when the barbaric invasion put an end to the Western Roman Empire, and its territories were divided in a number of scattered little political entities. As a consequence, in this situation the nationalistic feeling was helped by the arbitrary boundaries that Napoleon put to his Kingdom of Italy, in the sense that their consequence was the breaking of the barriers with which the Italian peoples lived for centuries.⁵⁵

It is worthwhile to recall the figure of Giuseppe Mazzini. He was one of the most influential personality of the *Risorgimento*. He was not only interested in the destiny of the Italian peninsula, his ideal extended on an international level. He proposed a configuration of Europe based on democracy and national self-determination: revolutionary stances against the hereditary kingship and empires still present in the continent. According to Mazzini the nation was the only entity that could grant the democratic participation of the people, and it was also the means toward the “brotherhood” of the peoples.⁵⁶

Another important personality of the *Risorgimento* was Giuseppe Garibaldi. He was a military chief, he became the personification of the national idea when

⁵³*Ibid.*, p.20

⁵⁴Denis Mack Smith, *Storia d'Italia*, (Bari:Laterza, 2008), p.45

⁵⁵René Albrecht-Carrié, op. cit., p.139

⁵⁶Stefano Recchia and Nadia Urbinati, *A Cosmopolitanism of Nations. Giuseppe Mazzini's writings on democracy, nation building, and international relations*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009) pp.1-2

he tried to defend the Roman Republic in 1849. His acquired charisma was a fundamental factor in his 1860 battles for the unification of Italy. Strongly anticlerical nationalist, he used a revolutionary language, and for this reason he alarmed not just the conservatives, but also the liberal reformers.⁵⁷

The third among the three “founding fathers”⁵⁸ was Camillo Benso Count of Cavour. He was in contact with the liberal ideas of the European political circles, he “was devoted to the ideal of liberty”.⁵⁹ As Cavour covered an important political position in the Kingdom of Sardinia, this personality will be treated especially in the following pages.

2.3.3 The Uprisings of the Decades Following the Congress of Vienna

There were several causes which brought the uprisings into existence. The most common, shared by most of the reformist movements of the Italian peninsula, were the demands for representative governments and the fundamental freedoms of speech, association, and print. These were essential for the political and economic interests of the upper classes, challenging the protectionism of their regimes. Middle classes and aristocracy came together in an effort to reform the political systems, characterized by the absence of a safety valve for the discontent of the population, and in some cases by organizations that had still feudal characteristics.

2.3.3.1 The 1820s

On January 1820 in Cadiz, situated in the southern coast of Spain, a military revolt constrained the Spanish King to bring back the democratic constitution of 1812, which compelled the King to share his power with a chamber elected between the wealthier classes. This was inspirational for the events in the southern Italian peninsula.

After a revolt in Naples on July 1820, King Ferdinand was forced to concede a constitution, to institute a new assembly, and to appoint new ministries. He

⁵⁷John Roberts, “Revolution from Above and Below: European Politics from the French Revolution to the First World War”, in T. C. W. Blanning (ed.), *The Oxford History of Modern Europe*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p.34

⁵⁸Lucy Riall, op. cit., p.1

⁵⁹Arturo Carlo Jemolo, *Church and State in Italy*, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1960), p.16

was constrained to do so because he did not enjoy the support of the army.

Even if in those years the Italian liberals, the Carbonari, and other secret societies began to think about some project of a united Italy, they finally concentrated their forces just on claims about reforms within the existing States borders.

The whole situation was of direct interest for the Habsburg Empire, which had a certain degree of control into the Peninsula, with garrisons spread in the States. Thus, after a meeting of the Concert of Europe at Troppau in the month of November of the same year, Austria took charge in order to restore the situation. On January 1821 the King of the Two Sicilies asked formally the foreign intervention to bring back the *satus quo*. Eventually the liberals were beaten by the Austrian army in Rieti in the month of March.

In the Kingdom of Sardinia prince Carlo Alberto allied with the conspirators, and when the rebellion exploded on 12 March King Vittorio Emanuele I abdicated to his brother Carlo Felice. Prince Carlo Alberto, while in his role of prince regent, conceded the Spanish constitution, but once more the Austrian army put an end to the rebellions on May 1821, and Carlo Felice took the throne.

Great Britain and France preferred to stay outside the Troppau deal, as the first was against intervention, and the French government, afraid of its liberal public opinion, refused to take position against the Italian liberals.⁶⁰

2.3.3.2 The 1830s

In July 1830 in France, after a popular revolt, the Bourbon King Charles X was sent into exile and was replaced by Louis Philip d'Orleans. It was a victory for the bourgeois liberalism. The new king was no more the sovereign of Kingdom of France, but of the French people; he conceded a constitution more liberal than the previous one. This event was also a change in the international balance as now there was the possibility of a French support for the Italian rebellions.⁶¹

The Papal States and the Duchies of Modena and Parma, experienced internal rebellions aiming at reforms, not yet at Italian unity. Like the decade before, the Habsburgs sent troops in order to suppress the rebels. But this time France started to feel worried about the massive Austrian influence over the Peninsula. Thus, given the fear of a possible French intervention, the

⁶⁰Derek Beales and Eugenio F. Biagini, *op. cit.*, pp.60-61

⁶¹*Ibid.*, p.62

Austrians pulled back after having restored order and having issued an ultimatum asking the Pope for reforms in the administration of his territories. Nevertheless other rebellions in Bologna required again the Austrian troops, which stayed there until 1838 to protect the Papal order. Then, as a reaction, France sent by sea a garrison to the Adriatic coast port of Ancona to check the Austrian activity and protect its political leverage.

Even if also this time did not happen a real modification of the internal conditions of the Italian states, the presence of the French was a renewed encouragement for the Italian anti-Austrian and liberal rebels. Together with this, the events demonstrated how fragile was the Restoration structure of the Congress of Vienna, and at the same time how inadequate was trying to face Austria without even a coordination between the Italian entities.

A consequence of this wave of revolutions was the intensification of the Austrian control over the peninsula. The rebellions lacked of popular support and specific organization, but above all they did not attribute the suitable importance to the international situation, and because of this fundamental factor the Italian liberals and patriots of the time could not achieve success. Nevertheless two great novelties appeared: the 1831 Austrian memorandum to the Pope, and the French presence into the peninsula.⁶² Pope Gregorio XVI refused to adopt the reforms, according to the Vatican refusal to share the decision-making power with the middle class, limiting as much as possible its political force to a level that under the enlightened monarchs was reached almost a century before.⁶³

At the beginning of the 1840s, also the Ottoman Empire was facing internal uprisings. In Anatolia and Rumelia the peasant population revolted against the new taxation system of the Tanzimat and its application. In some zones the new taxes were introduced without removing the old ones, as the officials appointed to the implementation of the Tanzimat reforms had not been properly trained.⁶⁴ Nevertheless, the fact that these uprisings were led by peasants in a period in which in Europe the claims of the middle class were beginning to be stronger, is a signal of the fact that the Ottoman bourgeoisie did not shared the same needs of the European one, as the former (mainly constituted by non-Muslims) was already under the protection of the liberal foreign Powers,

⁶²*Ibid.*, pp.63-68

⁶³Rudolf Lill, *Il potere dei papi*, (Bari: Laterza, 2010), p.66

⁶⁴Ahmet Uzun, *Tanzimat ve Sosyal Direnişler*, (Istanbul: Eren, 2002), p.95

while the latter was struggling to gain rights in their homeland.

2.3.4 1848 Revolutions

During the decades following the Congress of Vienna, in the Italian peninsula the liberal reformers promoted agricultural companies, innovative school systems, savings banks, nurseries, insurances, and cultural magazines. They also supported technological innovations for the territory as drainages, railroads, and gaslight. For what concern the industry, they tried to revive the tissue production in the north of the peninsula, and enforced the abolition of custom duties. Florence was the heart of the technical and economical innovation, a meeting point for all the Italian liberals. Magazines, journals and scientific congresses spread. Despite the firmness of the restrictive censorship laws, publisher could manage in their work bypassing them taking advantage from the different legislations of every State, and in any case the smuggling “sector” was healthy.

In that period a northern middle class was blooming, and it was not a coincidence that this happened when the old aristocratic rights were gradually declining. This new social class took advantage from its contacts with the industrial Europe, making use of the international stocking market and benefiting from the technological innovations, so important for the transformation of the European industrial States. The old buying and selling of properties was not anymore in an “aristocratic key”: it was happening instead with the capitalistic strategies of risky and innovative, but profitable, choices.⁶⁵ Because of these changes, for the new middle class the right to freedom of association was not just a political claim, but something necessary to pursue the expansion of their material properties and interests. The bourgeois was a threat for the authority in the case he was not let free to follow freely his interests. And given the past experiences, now the governments were less confident on their direct and violent methods of repression.⁶⁶

Drafted by Austrian State Chancellor Metternich and his associates (Russia, Prussia) in 1833, the Münchengratz agreement consisted in the formal definition of the so called “Holy Alliance”. It put forward three arrangements: the first bounded Russia and the Habsburg Empire to maintain the status quo in the Ottoman Empire; the second was a mutual guarantee between Rus-

⁶⁵Derek Beales and Eugenio F. Biagini, op. cit., p.93

⁶⁶*Ibid.*, pp.89-90-91-92-93

sia and the Habsburgs about their Polish lands, and promised mutual aid in case of rebellion; the third and last consisted in a declaration against the doctrine of non-intervention if an appeal for help against liberalism came from an independent sovereign. In substance it showed the three chief weaknesses of the conservative system: the situation in the Near East was a source of tension for Russia and the Habsburg Empire, as they were afraid to clash by mistake because of it; a possible Polish rising, against which the three powers placed their garrisons; the fear of another French Revolution, causing the three despotic monarchies to look west cautiously towards France. The bulk of Austrian troops were in the northern Italian peninsula, and Prussia controlled the federal Germany.⁶⁷

The Congress of Vienna ideas were put at risk by the liberal regime originated by the 1830 July Revolution in France and three following whig governments in Great Britain (1830-34, 1835-41 and 1846-52). Both the strongest European powers were ideologically conflicting with the absolutism, the political doctrine on which Russia and the Habsburg Empire founded their governance. At the same time trade challenges were becoming more relevant: significant was the “commercial war”⁶⁸ between the Habsburg Empire and the Kingdom of Sardinia about the trade of wine and salt; or the dispute between Great Britain and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies about the concession of the monopoly of sulphur extraction in Sicily to France.⁶⁹

The 1848 revolutions were caused by shared social and economical challenges of the incipient industrialization and the end of “feudal rule”⁷⁰ together with demands of civil rights and constitutional reforms. The revolutions were against the international stability based on the system of the Congress of Vienna.

The second half of 1840’s was characterized by strong winters and disastrous harvests, which caused agricultural, food, and economic crisis, which in turn generated a political crisis. Italian northern landowners tried to sell the products to northern Europe, where prices were higher. The first turmoils against exportations appeared as the prices increased.

⁶⁷Alan J. P. Taylor, *op. cit.*, pp.2-3

⁶⁸*Ibid.*, p.73

⁶⁹*Ibid.*

⁷⁰Reinhart Koselleck, “How European Was the Revolution of 1848/49?”, in Axel Körner (ed.), *1848 - A European Revolution?*, (Basingtoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p.215

The fact that the Papal States were under unrest due to its lack of suitable police to control public order and law is to be underlined because it clarifies how much the central peninsula was at the mercy of the external forces. When in Galicia similar revolts appeared, the Austrian authority managed to suffocate them through an instrumental alliance with the local peasants, still serfs under a feudal regime. As a consequence hundreds of Polish landowners were slaughtered. The Austrians believed that these events had the potential to be a scary bogeyman also for the Lombard and Venetian middle classes. Nevertheless peasants and workers of the Lombardo-Veneto united under the leadership of the local liberal elites, which were waiting for a suitable occasion to pursue their reformist goals.⁷¹

Habsburg and Bourbon presence in the peninsula was felt as usurper forces. Even pope Pius IX seemed in agreement with the rebels.⁷²

On June 1947 there were turmoils in all peninsula caused by attempts to celebrate the anniversary of Pius IX election. In Milan, at the beginning of 1848 the liberals achieved to manipulate the tensions due to the agricultural crisis, high taxation and conscription. To protest against Austrian economical regulations, they proclaimed a “tobacco strike”, in a manner that recalled the actions of the Boston Tea Party. The brutal riots and clashes that followed increased the general dislike towards the Austrian troops among the population, as these uprisings were the result of an alliance shared between all the layers of the society.⁷³

The first great revolution of 1848 happened in Palermo on 12 January. It was caused by the great tension given by the coexistence of the old order based on nobility, and the new market oriented middle class. The King of the Two Sicilies asked Metternich for the Austrian intervention, who denied it given the internal pressing crisis he had to tackle. Because of that, at the end of January Ferdinand II conceded a constitution. In February the Grand Duchy of Tuscany and the King of Sardinia, and in March the Pope, they all promised a constitution: none of the Italian governments could resist the riots without the help of the Habsburgs, which in that specific period was busy taking care of its internal turmoils. Metternich fell from power and went into exile, and the Emperor Franz Joseph I met the requests of the people granting a constitution.

⁷¹Derek Beales and Eugenio F. Biagini, *op. cit.*, pp.115-116

⁷²Reinhart Koselleck, *op. cit.*, p.215

⁷³Derek Beales and Eugenio F. Biagini, *op. cit.*, p.121

It was the “spring of the people”, these were turmoils that indicated the need for satisfaction of liberal and nationalistic feelings in most of Europe: Germany, Hungary and France, where the liberal monarchy of Louis Philip became a democratic republic. People in Milan began to claim the same demands of the Viennese rebels, namely constitutional liberties, together with the demands of the peasant against heavy taxation system and the conscription. In Venice also occurred a victorious insurrection, after which a new independent republic was proclaimed.⁷⁴

2.3.4.1 The War with the Habsburg Empire

The 24th of March the Sardinian King Carlo Alberto decided to move war to the Habsburgs in support of the Lombardo-Veneto revolutions. He was driven to this by both the enthusiasm of his citizens and his dynastic ambitions. Actually it was as well a move directly against the Italian radical democrats, the bogeyman of the governments, trying to not let them overtake the hegemony of the Italian reformism. Thus Tuscany and Naples gave their symbolic support to the undertaking, and from all the peninsula thousands of volunteers marched north. There was a de facto alliance for some weeks in the summer of 1848 between Lombardy, Veneto, Modena, Parma, all together with the Kingdom of Sardinia. Nevertheless, after the Italians managed to acquire some territories, the Austrian commander in Italy, Radetzky, beat the Piedmontese in the city of Custoza in July. Carlo Alberto signed an armistice with which he gave back to the Habsburg Empire the annexed territories. The Piedmontese army was still intact, nevertheless the greatest fear of the King were the democrats, he feared them even more than the Habsburgs, especially after the Paris revolution. In this respect, it is worthy to remember the many workers protests of that period in Piedmont, Liguria, Lombard-Veneto and Tuscany.

Great Britain was worried about the privilege that France would have obtained had it intervened in the war. Even if Britain was not against an independent united Italy, she was concerned about the possible disintegration of Austria, necessary as a counterweight against Russia.

2.3.4.2 The Roman Republic

Pope Pius IX compromised his liberal image when refused to support the war against the Habsburg Empire, and on November 1848 went into exile for se-

⁷⁴*Ibid.*, pp.122-123-124; Alan J. P. Taylor, op. cit., p.7

curity reasons when his Prime Minister was assassinated.⁷⁵ On February 1849 a group of democrats proclaimed the Roman Republic. Religious and civil liberties were conceded to the minorities; the walls of the Jew ghetto were demolished. Following the tradition of the old Roman system, the government was composed of three “triumvirs”, and between them was Giuseppe Mazzini, leader of the democrat radical ideology during the *Risorgimento*. A democratic constitution was adopted: it proclaimed popular sovereignty, religious and civil equality, municipal autonomy and the brotherhood of nations. Nevertheless the new republic lacked diplomatic support, and the Catholic powers (the Habsburg Empire, Spain, the Two Sicilies and France) intervened to help the Pope. Austrian and French forces won over the Roman republic in July, and the absolutist Papal government was restored with their protection, which would have lasted until its end in 1870.

Meanwhile in 1849 the Russian army helped the Habsburgs invading Hungary, letting them free to concentrate their forces on the repression of the uprisings in the Italian peninsula. In Piedmont the parliamentary government survived and leaned to the left under the new Prime Minister Vincenzo Gioberti. Carlo Alberto again declared war on the Habsburg Empire on March 1849, but the Italian Piedmontese forces was immediately defeated. King Carlo Alberto refused the help of France because he was afraid of its revolutionary attitude;⁷⁶ in the end he abdicated in favour of his son Vittorio Emanuele II, who rejected the Austrian demands to abolish the constitution. Eventually in Lombard-Veneto the peasants revolted this time against the anti-Austrian landowners, because they were too much interested in protecting the property rights not to lose the support of the peasantry.⁷⁷ In August Venice felt as well under the Austrian attacks.⁷⁸

As a consequence the Italian democrats were disappointed by France, they hoped for a support in order to establish republics in the peninsula, but instead French troops helped to destroy their “sister” Roman Republic. Together with this a strong disappointment was also caused by Pope Pious IX, after he betrayed the liberal cause. Even the *Neoguelph* *Neoguelphism was the ideology*

⁷⁵Derek Beales and Eugenio F. Biagini, op. cit., p.131

⁷⁶René Albrecht-Carrié, op. cit., p.106

⁷⁷Derek Beales and Eugenio F. Biagini, op. cit., p.132

⁷⁸Alan J. P. Taylor, op. cit., p.8; Derek Beales and Eugenio F. Biagini, op. cit., pp.129-130-131-132

that counted on the Vatican for the Italian independence. In the next section it will be explained thoroughly Gioberti let his idea go, starting to look at the Piedmontese monarchy and the French republic for an Italian salvation, and to imagine a clear separation between the Church and the State. The Habsburg Empire occupied Tuscany, Parma, Modena and the Romagna until 1859 and began to implement its hegemony in a more direct way, using weapons more explicitly, attributing full power to the army, and imposing a high taxation on the middle class. And of course in this way in the following years the Habsburgs could not win the favor of the population.

Nevertheless the revolutions this time won a greater support among the people, more than any past episode of this kind, even if the division among both classes and parties, and the different motivations of the uprisings, demonstrated that the time was not yet ripe for a real unity of intents. It was the first time that a sovereign, King Carlo Alberto, offered its direct intervention to support the anti-Austrian revolutionaries. The Kingdom of Sardinia gained influence and credibility, and after 1849 it was clear that for a further consolidation of the parliamentary institutions it was necessary to limit the power of the Church.⁷⁹

In the end the old European system of legitimacy was reestablished during 1948-50, with the only exception of Napoleon III, whose coup d'état was accepted by the European balance of power.⁸⁰ In the end, all European hegemonic powers agreed on maintaining the status quo according to their interests against any notion of national self-determination.⁸¹

2.3.5 The Church during the Risorgimento

The Papal States occupied the middle third of the Italian peninsula, extending from the river Po in the north, confining with the Kingdom of Naples in the south. It was one of the largest among the Italian political entities, along with the Kingdom of Sardinia, the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, the Duchies of Tuscany, Parma and Modena, and the Austrian provinces of Lombardy and Venetia.⁸²

⁷⁹Derek Beales and Eugenio F. Biagini, *op. cit.*, pp.133-134-135-136

⁸⁰Reinhart Koselleck, *op. cit.*, p.210

⁸¹*Ibid.*, p.216

⁸²C. T. McIntire, *England against the papacy, 1858-1861: tories, liberals, and the overthrow of papal temporal power during the Italian Risorgimento*, (Cambridge: Cambridge

The Papal authority was based on the premise that temporal power was a necessity in order to achieve spiritual supremacy. Papal States citizens were bound to suffer from an illiberal and incompetent government. The Pope, given its universal dimension, neither could become a nationalist, nor could reform the State letting lay people take the control of the State.⁸³

The government of the Papal States, like the one of the Kingdom of Naples, could “stand the comparison with with that of the dominions of the Sultan [...] to the point that the Powers took steps to convince the Pope to reform, like they did with the Sultan.”⁸⁴

The Pope even refused the 1831 memorandum issued by the Powers: he resisted the introduction of representation in municipalities, the institution of a council to regulate finances, the admission of lay people to administrative and legal offices. Also important was the incapacity of the clergy to maintain order: banditry was very common and it could be tackled only with the Austrian intervention. Because of this the Pope always entrusted the respect of the law inside the State to foreign occupation forces or semi-private citizen groups.⁸⁵

The Papal States always sided with the conservative forces, a part from that short period of time in which Pius IX represented a liberal hope for the Italian patriots at the end of the 1840s. The Church was straightly against the liberal trend represented by the middle class:

The only organization which frankly undertook to resist [the bourgeois society] without qualification, the Catholic Church, merely isolated itself. The Syllabus of Errors of 1864 and the Vatican Council demonstrated by the very extremism of their rejection of everything that characterised the mid-nineteenth century, that they were entirely on the defensive.⁸⁶

Although Catholic propaganda invariably tended to support the principle of absolute monarchy, the Holy See had not pronounced officially in favor of any particular form of government. Like said above, it had condemned liberalism, and the sympathies of the Curia rested with the champions of

University Press, 1983), p.2

⁸³Derek Beales and Eugenio F. Biagini, op. cit., p.66

⁸⁴René Albrecht-Carrié, op. cit., p.142

⁸⁵Derek Beales and Eugenio F. Biagini, op. cit., pp.66-67

⁸⁶Eric J. E. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Capital, 1848-1875*, (London: Abacus, 1997), p.292

absolutism. Since the influence of the French Revolution started to be felt, the problem of the temporal power was raised: Sovereign Pontiff or Bishop of Rome? Should the Papal States be secularized (administered by laymen rather than ecclesiastics)?⁸⁷ And to these questions the very future of the Peninsula was connected, and as a consequence they interested all the Powers that wanted the maintenance of the political order of the 1815 Congress of Vienna. This is why the Church became more and more affected by the political conflicts of the time.

It is worthy to be underlined that even Metternich, the “spiritual leader” of the Congress of Vienna, was secretly tired of the Papal administration. He actually detested it,⁸⁸ but he considered its defense as a *conditio sine qua non* for the stability of the *Restoration* and the Austrian hegemony in the peninsula. Metternich sacrificed his critical ideas for the safety of the Habsburgs Empire. Apart from Great Britain, at the Congress of Vienna the European Powers declared that they would have maintained the status quo not just on a politic base, but also on a religious one by means of the Holy Alliance.⁸⁹

2.3.5.1 Neoguelphism

Vincenzo Gioberti was the “chief architect of the Italian *Risorgimento* in the realm of ideas”,⁹⁰ he was part of that small group of thinkers and writers who contributed to the materialization of the Italian national idea. With his *Del primato morale e civile degli italiani (Of the Moral and Civil Primacy of the Italians)* published in Bruxelles in 1843,⁹¹ he envisioned an Italy united and independent, organized in a confederation of States with the Pope as the president, as his ideology, called “*neoguelphism*”, imagined the papacy and Catholicism as the Italian leading forces. The term “*neoguelphism*” came from “*guelphism*”, namely the faction that in the middle ages defended the Pope against the Holy Roman Emperor during the investiture controversy.⁹² Nevertheless this book and his other works was placed on the Index (a list of prohibited publications) because they contained criticism against the order of the Jesuits.⁹³

⁸⁷Arturo Carlo Jemolo, op. cit., p.2

⁸⁸Berkeley, *Italy in the Making, 1815 to 1846*, (Cambridge, 1932), p.30, in Derek Beales and Eugenio F. Biagini, op. cit., p.69

⁸⁹*Ibid.*

⁹⁰Arturo Carlo Jemolo, op. cit., p.3

⁹¹Derek Beales and Eugenio F. Biagini, op. cit., p.86

⁹²*Ibid.*

⁹³Roger Collins, *Keepers of the Keys of Heaven: A History of the Papacy*, (New York: Basic Books, 2009), p.437

The election in 1846 of Pius IX was a relief for the Papal States population, because he started some reforms: he granted a political amnesty, announced his will to remedy abuses, and opened partially the administration to the laymen. The Italian patriots and liberals believed he would have helped the process of unification and pushed away the Austrians. Anyway his liberal commitment was caused both by the need to control the uprisings of those years in the Papal States, and by his inexperience. After this reformist beginning, the liberal hopes of the masses were too strong to be kept quiet, and gradually the liberal concessions appeared in all the peninsula. Pius IX became the first common point of reference shared by the Italians, something that after was replaced by the Kingdom of Sardinia.

It is worthwhile to recall that this *neoguelph* strategy was in a way shared also by Great Britain, both because it was believed that the figure of Pius IX could grant a balance inside the Italian peninsula, and because, fearing an European war between the Habsburg Empire and France over the Italian territories, supporting the Pope meant to favor a solution opposing Austrian domination and independent from the influence of Napoleon III.⁹⁴

Nevertheless Pius IX refused to participate in the war against the Habsburg Empire in 1848. After this decision, he went into exile in Gaeta until the intervention of the French and Austrian armies which stepped in to topple the Roman republic.

The only Italian state in which the 1848 constitution survived was the Kingdom of Piedmont. And it had the only “non-ephemeral” parliament if compared to the other Italian ones.⁹⁵ From now on it would have been the place in which anti-Austrian feelings developed more.

A similarity with the Ottoman political background, to be more precise with the *millet* system, was that the reformers were thinking about the emancipation of the Jews and Waldensians, religious communities from which political rights were withheld. Other than that, also an anti-Jesuit feeling was rising, due to their contrary attitude toward the liberal and anticlerical mood of the time. As a consequence, the Piedmontese parliament in 1848 passed

⁹⁴Saho Matsumoto-Best, *Britain and the Papacy in the Age of Revolution, 1846-1851*, (Rochester, NY: Editrice Pontificia Università Gregoriana, 2003), p.172

⁹⁵Arturo Carlo Jemolo, op. cit., p.8

laws that granted political rights to non-Catholics and suppressed Jesuitism. At the same time, the *neoguelphian* idea of Gioberti lost its appeal between the population, apart some circles close to Napoleon III that tried to revive it in 1859-60. After these events in the Kingdom of Sardinia the idea of modernizing Papal States decayed, the Holy See officially became a force against the constitutional and anti-Austrian movements.⁹⁶

The nine years from 1850 to 1859 were the last years of Catholic power in Europe.⁹⁷ The Church tried to reinforce its power in France, in the Habsburg Empire and in the Italian peninsula during the 1850s, namely the last decade of that period called *Risorgimento*. Especially after having resisted the revolutionary uprisings the European Catholic powers became more friendly and favourable towards the Church and agreeable to concede more freedom regarding religious matters.⁹⁸

Unlike the rest of Europe, in the Italian peninsula the contrast between Church and State was also on a temporal base because of the very existence of the Papal States. This is also why after 1848 Italian nationalism clashed with the Pope. Interesting is to notice that this clash in the future would have become a problem for the new united Italy: without the support of the Pope the Italians found themselves lacking of those religious cultural elements that united them at the social level (like the Neoguelphs envisioned), and this consisted in a strike against the liberal and secular Kingdom of Italy.⁹⁹

With the advent of new technologies, Pius IX was known like no other of his predecessors. He was aware of this and took advantage from this to foster the international authority of the Holy See.¹⁰⁰ It was the first time in history that the image of a Pope was subject to mass reproduction, boosting in this way the cult of the Papacy.¹⁰¹

The destiny of the Holy See was strictly connected to Napoleon III, because its power lied also on the consensus of the French Catholics, in fact part of his

⁹⁶*Ibid.*, pp.6-7-8

⁹⁷Owen Chadwick, *A History of the Popes 1830-1914*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p.95

⁹⁸Owen Chadwick, *op. cit.*, p.109

⁹⁹Lucy Riall, *op. cit.*, p.77

¹⁰⁰Owen Chadwick, *op. cit.*, pp.113-114

¹⁰¹Frances Knight, *The Church in the Nineteenth Century*, (London: I. B.Tauris, 2008), p.63

1848 electioneering was the liberty of the Pope (at the time of the turmoils in the Papal States). So Napoleon was in a way forced to maintain a French garrison in Rome (that remained there since 1849 to 1870 with two brief interruptions¹⁰²) for the freedom of action of the Pope.¹⁰³ Napoleon III was bound to keep safe the Pope in Rome not because of his faith, but because of the French political situation.¹⁰⁴ For this reason it was an agreement based on opportunity, not on a real community of interests, given also the very different views in internal and foreign politics.¹⁰⁵

In Great Britain the Church was gaining more leverage because of the great Irish immigration caused by the potato famine at the turn of the 1850's. In 1850 the Pope established a hierarchy of bishops, something fifty years before he could not even imagine to do without a previous discussion with the British government. This provoked a reaction, and the British government legislated against the titles of the Catholic bishops with the Ecclesiastical Titles Act,¹⁰⁶ so that they would be fined if they took the title of an Anglican see. All this situation caused a change in the relations between Great Britain and the Pope, who was interested to take advantage from the Catholic Irish massive immigration.¹⁰⁷

2.3.5.2 The 1855 Austrian Concordat

In the Habsburg Empire there was a friendly legal treatment toward the Catholic Church because they thought religion would help as unifying cement of the State, thinking above all to the Italians and the Hungarians. Moreover they needed the Pope as an ally for the government of Austrian Italian provinces and because he was against revolutionary war.¹⁰⁸ This is why, to much pleasure of the Pope, in 1855 a Concordat was signed between the Holy See and the Empire, which meant the end of “*Josephinism*” (which took the name from Joseph II), a system that took as legal basis for the control of

¹⁰²Giacomo Martina, *Pio IX (1851-1866)*, (Roma: Editrice Pontificia Università Gregoriana, 1986), p.153

¹⁰³Owen Chadwick, op. cit., p.96

¹⁰⁴*Ibid.*, p.101

¹⁰⁵Giacomo Martina, op. cit., p.153

¹⁰⁶Michael Burleigh, *Earthly powers: the Clash of Religion and Politics in Europe from the French Revolution to the Great War*, (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2005), p.314

¹⁰⁷Owen Chadwick, op. cit., p.114

¹⁰⁸*Ibid.*, p.105

the Church the sovereignty of the State and not the papal privileges.¹⁰⁹ Like in France, also in the Habsburg Empire the Church gained new privileges and influence on the government. The Concordat helped the Church in Lombardy and Veneto, and Austrians thought that it could hinder the influence of Napoleon III over the Italian peninsula.¹¹⁰

Even if it did not proclaim a State religion, the Austrian Concordat of 1855 was judged with severity by the Austrian liberal opinions. By repealing the whole legislation of Emperor Joseph II, it promised the episcopate complete freedom of communication with the Pope, the clergy and the Faithful, and let the episcopate be the final arbiter in all religious matters. The Concordat modified the 1811 civil code to acknowledge the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts in matrimonial disputes. It recognized the inviolability of sacred places, the State would help the bishops to ensure that the sanctions which they imposed on members of the clergy were duly enforced, ecclesiastical organizations were left free to add to their material possessions. Similar to this arrangements were the agreements that the Church had with Tuscany and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies.¹¹¹

With this Concordat, negotiated since 1851 and during the developments of the Crimean War, both the Habsburg Empire and the Holy See took advantage from the union between Throne and Altar: they both had the same enemies. In this way the Church allied with the arch-enemy of the aspirations of many Italians for unity and independence.¹¹²

It is clear how the Church took position on the side of the conservative forces in Europe. The Holy See was not even willing to stoop to compromises with the liberal forces that manifested themselves in the Italian peninsula during all the *Risorgimento* period. Other than that, also on an international level the Church strengthened its relations with the conservative Habsburg Empire, while it challenged the liberal Great Britain.

2.3.6 The Kingdom of Sardinia

Among the little political entities that constituted the Italian peninsula in the 19th century, in this thesis the Kingdom of Sardinia (called also Piedmont

¹⁰⁹VV.AA., *The New Catholic Encyclopedia*, (Detroit: Thompson/Gale, 2003), vol.7, p.1045

¹¹⁰Owen Chadwick, op. cit., pp.106-107

¹¹¹Arturo Carlo Jemolo, op. cit., p.9

¹¹²Giacomo Martina, op. cit., pp.187-192-204

because it was the northern region that constituted the more developed part of it) will be treated under greater consideration because it was both the most reformist after the 1848 revolutions, as it was the only state that maintained the constitution, and the one that eventually realized the Italian unification in 1861. As the Papal States were definitely against liberalism, which was one of the factors that mainly characterized Piedmont, it had to start a fight against the Pope, both through laws aimed at limiting the power of the clerics, and through a final war against the dominions of the Church. So in this situation, secularization meant also emancipation from the supporters of the old absolutist order which would have not allowed the unification of an Italy independent from the foreign Powers.

2.3.6.1 Piedmontese Restoration

The Kingdom of Sardinia geographical location gave it a singular position into the international affairs, and thus a strong tradition of foreign policy: it was situated in the western part of the north of the Italian peninsula, and included also the island of Sardinia. For centuries it was involved in the rivalries between France and the Habsburg Empire, taking advantage of its strategical position and changing alignment in the critical times, without missing the importance of maintaining a strong army, that constituted an important leverage in the questions of international politics of balance. With the acquisition of Genova after the Congress of Vienna, the Kingdom obtained an important strategic commercial position, with a coast facing directly towards the western seaside of the Italian peninsula. Vittorio Emanuele I (king from 1802 to 1821), sovereign during the Congress of Vienna, was even more conservative than Metternich, in the sense that the ideology of the Austrian diplomat was a consequence of his *realpolitik*, and not of his real believings. The King was a clerical obscurantist, who just took care of its Kingdom's position in the Italian scenario.¹¹³

King Carlo Felice succeeded Vittorio Emanuele and reigned until 1831. Keeping in mind the insurrection of 1821, he understood the danger of adopting intransigent policies against the population, and as a consequence his rule for the Kingdom of Sardinia meant ten years of moderate conservative reforms.¹¹⁴

After the 10 years of King Carlo Felice, Carlo Alberto became king in 1831, and he immediately signed an agreement with the Habsburg Empire and de-

¹¹³Derek Beales and Eugenio F. Biagini, *op. cit.*, pp.74-75

¹¹⁴John A. Davis, *Italy in the Nineteenth Century*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp.55-56

clared to be ready for a military intervention against the liberal France. Moreover, he did not concede amnesty to the rebels of 1821; suppressed harshly a 1833 conspiracy against him organized by Mazzini and Garibaldi, two eminent figures between the radical democrats; appointed in practice just aristocrats to the highest administrative offices; he was a pious Catholic who protected the Jesuits, committed to obtain a papal ambassador in Turin, the Piedmontese capital, and reintroduced the special jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts, the *forum ecclesiastico*. During his Kingdom intellectuals and oppositors who in the future would constitute the driving force of Italian unification, did not have it easy. The only field in which Carlo Alberto could be said to be a “liberal” reformer was trade. He reduced duties in general and considered the importance of having commercial treaties with other States.¹¹⁵ He eventually began to allow the middle class to manifest its interests in his Kingdom: scientific conferences were authorized in 1840 and 1846, in 1847 the nationalistic political magazine “*Il Risorgimento*” was published.¹¹⁶

2.3.6.2 The *Statuto Albertino*

On 4 March 1848 Carlo Alberto conceded a constitution similar both to the other Italian constitutional documents of that year, and to the 1814 French constitution, and reflected the Western debate over representative monarchy.

The *Statuto Albertino* provided for a bicameral parliament, with the lower chamber members elected according to their wealth, and the high one (the senate) appointed by the King. The Ministers were accountable to the King, not to the Parliament. The King was the head of state and the head of the executive power, and shared the legislature with the two chambers of the Parliament. He was the chief of staff and could declare war and conclude peace treaties without the permission of the Parliament. He could dissolve the low chamber and he was not accountable to his subjects.

The Parliament was divided in two fractions: the *Destra storica* and *Sinistra storica*. Their difference is better explained by their behaviour toward the Italian unification: the first was monarchist and supported a moderate process of unification, the second was republican and believed in a democratic process starting from the patriotic masses.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁵Derek Beales and Eugenio F. Biagini, op. cit., pp.76-77

¹¹⁶*Ibid.*, p.93

¹¹⁷Maurizio Cotta and Luca Verzichelli, “Ministers in Italy: Notables, Party Men, Technocrats and Media Men”, in Pedro Tavares De Almeda, António Costa Pinto and Nancy

Finally, even if the first article of the *Statuto* established Catholicism as the only religion of the state, the new constitution brought the equality before the law, including the end of the religious discrimination against the non-Catholics.¹¹⁸ Already on 17 February 1848 the legal prohibition against the Waldensians, namely Protestants present in Piedmont which suffered many persecutions in the former centuries, were abolished through the “*Lettere Patenti*”.¹¹⁹ The British and Prussian ambassadors sided with them, and important Piedmontese liberals followed suit. On 19 June the same happened for the Jews. These reforms could be perceived as one of the most important contribution of the 1848 uprisings¹²⁰, as they were the first step against the confessional state, establishment inherited by the Counter-Reformation and the time of the wars of religion, and to extend the civil liberties.¹²¹

2.3.6.3 Piedmont from the *Statuto Albertino* to the Crimean War

After the “betrayal” of the Pope and the incapacity of the Italian rebellions to resist external attacks, the Kingdom of Sardinia with its constitution (the only constitution surviving among the others in the peninsula after 1849), its representative government, its civil, religious, intellectual and press freedoms, and its independence from the Habsburgs, was the only left hope for the Italian liberals, who came there as exiles from the other Italian states.

Nevertheless the Savoy dynasty, namely the royal family of the Sardinian sovereigns, was in danger, with a leftist majority in the parliament and the city of Genua in the hands of the radicals. For the balance between the external Powers it was important to keep the buffer state of Piedmont wealthy, but it had also to be independent: had the Habsburg Empire invaded it, probably France and Great Britain would have felt compelled to intervene. So in order to preserve the equilibrium the only thing that the Habsburgs could do was to support Vittorio Emanuele II in its efforts to maintain control and stability. Furthermore, the armistice between Vittorio Emanuele and Radetzky was perceived as a conspiracy against the radical republicanism in the Kingdom of Sardinia and in the rest of the Italian peninsula. Finally, the constitutional regime of the Kingdom guaranteed the sympathy of Great Britain, the econom-

Bermeo (eds.), *Who Governs Southern Europe? Regime Change and Ministerial Recruitment, 1850-2000*, (London: Frank Cass, 2005), p.114

¹¹⁸Derek Beales and Eugenio F. Biagini, op. cit., p.128

¹¹⁹VV. AA., *Statuto Fondamentale del Regno*, (Torino: Stamperia della Gazzetta del Popolo, 1884), p.17

¹²⁰Derek Beales and Eugenio F. Biagini, op. cit., p.129

¹²¹*Ibid.*, p.143

ical and political superpower of the time.¹²² The result was that the existence of Piedmont and its liberal way was kept safe by the consensus of both the conservatives and liberals of Europe.

Piedmont represented a threat to the integrity of the Papal States because of its unitarian aspirations, and its free press and parliament made it the only Italian state in which dissent against religion or the Holy See could find a safety valve.

After the Vatican “betrayal” during the war against the Habsburgs, when Pius IX refused to participate on the side of the Italians, the formerly neoguelph Gioberti, Sardinian Prime Minister of that period, now believed that the State should exercise control in all matters pertaining to education, marriage, burial, holidays, and also mortmain, fields in which at that time the Church exerted its influence.¹²³ This change of view would have been embraced by the two following Sardinian Prime Ministers of the time, Massimo d’Azeglio and Camillo Benso di Cavour.

These ideas were reflected in the Siccardi laws of 1850, proposed by Count Giuseppe Siccardi, Minister of Justice and Ecclesiastical Affairs, and approved by the parliament on 9 April 1850 after Pius IX refused a proposal of Concordat with the liberal Kingdom of Piedmont.¹²⁴ The Pope actually was still opposing the Sardinian constitutional government, supporting the personal government of the King. Nevertheless the situation was not suitable for a change like this: the opposition of politicians like d’Azeglio or Cavour would have been too strong even for King Vittorio Emanuele II.¹²⁵ The Siccardi laws seemed to be against the concordat of 27 March 1841 between Pope Gregorius XVI and Carlo Alberto that regulated the immunity of the members of the clergy.¹²⁶ These laws also abolished the ecclesiastical tribunals and the asylum rights in the churches for the criminals. The Sardinian Government declared that these provisions were just consistent with the *Statuto Albertino*, namely that all the citizens are equal before the law, idea remembered also in the

¹²²*Ibid.*, pp.139-140-141-142

¹²³Arturo Carlo Jemolo, *op. cit.*, p.10

¹²⁴Pietro Pirri, *Pio IX e Vittorio Emanuele II dal loro carteggio privato. I: La Laicizzazione dello Stato Sardo (1848-1856)*, (Roma: Pontificia Università Gregoriana, 1944), pp.33*-45*-46*-49*

¹²⁵Giacomo Martina, *op.cit.*, p.444

¹²⁶VV.AA., *The New Catholic Encyclopedia*, (Detroit: Thompson/Gale, 2003), vol.3, p.313; Erminio Lora, *Enchiridion dei concordati: due secoli di storia dei rapporti chiesa-stato*, (Bologna: EDB, 2003), p.88

monument to the Siccardi laws in Savoia square, Turin.¹²⁷ It was during the parliamentary works for the Siccardi laws that the Minister of Agriculture and Trade Camillo Benso Count of Cavour, member of the *Destra Storica* attracted attentions over him as a possible Prime Minister.¹²⁸

In that same period Cavour arranged very broad economical reforms paving the way to free trade and then the entrance of Piedmont into the European markets, stimulating its exports, lowering tariffs, reorganizing the system of credit, arranging many economical agreements with European states. This practically brought the Kingdom of Sardinia from protectionism to free trade. Other than that, he expanded rail lines, modernized the port facilities of Genova, developed irrigation projects and builded new roadways, in turn stimulating the Piedmontese machine industry.¹²⁹ It is important to notice that lowering the tariffs permitted “English manufacturers and traders to profit from a sizeable 50 per cent increase in their exports to Piedmont from 1850 to 1853” and this actually reinforced the British vision of a reformist Piedmont vis à vis the despotic government of the Papal States, as the latter risked also to cause to the Italian peninsula a strongly unstable situation.¹³⁰ Furthermore Great Britain was interested in the stability because it considered important to maintain its interests over the peninsula and the Mediterranean Sea: there were British bases at Malta and the Ionian Islands, from which the fleet surrounded the entire peninsula, and were in charge to keep the ports and the seaways open for British merchants and defended their superiority at sea and thus “their access to the Middle East, Central Asia and above all, British India”.¹³¹

The Siccardi laws consisted of an important step for the modernization of Piedmont with the introduction of the legal civil equity, but this was violently opposed by the Church. The archbishop of Turin ordered to his priests to refuse to appear in the secular courts if required by law. As a consequence he was arrested and expelled from the state, and the Pope did not want to appoint his successor. The diplomatic relations would have been restored just on 1929,¹³² with the *Patti Lateranensi* during the fascist regime. In the same

¹²⁷Owen Chadwick, op. cit., p.134

¹²⁸*Ibid.*, p.133

¹²⁹John A. Davis, op. cit., pp.116-117

¹³⁰C. T. McIntire, op. cit., pp.19-35

¹³¹*Ibid.*, pp.58-59

¹³²Giacomo Martina, op. cit., p.446

way, the archbishop Frasoni was expelled from the Kingdom as he ordered to refuse to celebrate the funerals of Santa Rosa, a liberal politician member of the cabinet, unless he was to make a retraction of the acts against the Church. Even if it was not committed any illegal action, the Government decided to expel the Servites (the order of monks which followed the statement of archbishop Frasoni) from the Kingdom for the sake of public order, and by accusing unfairly the archbishop to have plotting links with the Habsburgs, he was exiled too.¹³³

Another law against the clergy passed: on 5 June 1850 the Parliament decided to prohibit to the ecclesiastical entities to buy building without the permission of the Government.

In 1851 another decision against the Pope was taken as a penalty for his attitude against the Siccardi laws: the government decided not to deliver anymore to the Vatican the gold chalice (worth 2,000 silver scudi of Roman currency) that Piedmont had been sending since 1741, in return for a feudal right.¹³⁴

In 1852 thanks to King Vittorio Emanuele II, a bill proposing the civil marriage did not pass. He had schemed against it to avoid a break with the Holy See, even if he was loyal to the constitutional Government.¹³⁵ This caused the collapse of the d'Azeglio government, and Camillo Benso Count of Cavour took office as Prime Minister, a role he held until 1861, a part from a brief interruption.¹³⁶

Cavour's idea regarding the relationship between State and Church was "a free Church in a free State". He thought that a coexistence between the two entities could be possible, nevertheless with a degree of control that reminded the Habsburg Josephism,¹³⁷ contrary to the trend that would have brought the concordat with Austria in 1855. The idea of Cavour was one of separatism between the two entities, limiting the Church competence on the individual's conscience and attributing the jurisdiction on the external acts of man to the State.¹³⁸

As far as politics in general was concerned, Cavour believed that the only

¹³³Derek Beales and Eugenio F. Biagini, op. cit., pp.150-151; Owen Chadwick, op. cit., p.134

¹³⁴Owen Chadwick, op. cit., p.135

¹³⁵Arturo Carlo Jemolo, op. cit., p.11

¹³⁶Derek Beales and Eugenio F. Biagini, op. cit., p.151

¹³⁷Owen Chadwick, op. cit., pp.135-136

¹³⁸Pietro Scoppola, *Chiesa e Stato nella Storia d'Italia*, (Bari: Laterza, 1967), pp.3-4

possibility to conceive political action was to do it according to the “forces of the time”, and not against them, like the Austrian statesman Metternich thought.¹³⁹

On 28 November 1854 the Government presented the Convents Act: it provided for the suppression of religious organizations present in the territories of the Kingdom, with the exception of those which were committed to education, preaching and health care. The properties of these institutions would have passed under the administration of the State, with the obligation to pay in the *cassa ecclesiastica* their proceeds, which would have been used to pay the pensions of the former member of the suppressed organizations. The Government justified this operation calling it a redistribution of the proceedings of the Church to the members of the clergy which were poorer and devoted to socially useful activities; it was as well a demonstration of the absolute sovereignty of the civil power.¹⁴⁰ King Vittorio Emanuele II was against this idea, and secretly wrote to the Pope trying to bypass the government and substitute it with a filo-clerical one.¹⁴¹

On 29 May 1855 the Convents Act became law, and Pious IX excommunicated all the responsables, including the Prime Minister and the King. The Convents law was a strong strike against the clerical and obscurantist Piedmont of the former king Carlo Alberto. In this way the secularization took a big step forward, the solidarity between clerical conservation and monarchy began to dissolve and the clerical party weakened.¹⁴²

Thanks to the strong resolution of Cavour against the privileges of the Church in Piedmont, (arriving also to manipulate electoral laws to exclude ecclesiastics from the Parliament and invalidate election results that he did not regard convenient) liberalism became associated with anticlericalism, provoking in this way the impossibility of compromise between State and Altar.¹⁴³

Eventually, one can deduce that, apart from its strategical geographical position, the Kingdom of Sardinia's advantage in respect to its Italian “broth-

¹³⁹René Albrecht-Carrié, op. cit., p.143

¹⁴⁰Francesco Ruffini, *Relazioni tra Stato e Chiesa*, (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1974), p.279; Rosario Romeo, *Vita di Cavour*, (Roma: Laterza, 2004), p.294

¹⁴¹Pietro Pirri, op. cit., pp.104*-155-156-157; Giacomo Martina, op. cit., p.58

¹⁴²Rosario Romeo, op. cit., pp.292-293-300-301; Arturo Carlo Jemolo, op. cit., p.12; Derek Beales and Eugenio F. Biagini, op. cit., pp.152-153

¹⁴³John A. Davis, op. cit., p.119

ers” consisted of the fact that its leaders was much more aware of the changing international situation and much more able to take advantage out of it. The events developed not merely because of the *Risorgimento* ideals, but overall thanks to the strategic capacities of its political class, that at the same time represented the emerging middle class of the period, constantly committed to maintain its equilibrium between the radical democrats reformers and the clerical monarchical conservatives. Nevertheless this strategy of equilibrium did not hinder the Kingdom of Sardinia to place itself on the side of the liberal forces of the time, a choice opposite to the one of the Holy See.

CHAPTER 3

THE CRIMEAN WAR

3.1 The Holy Places Crisis

In 1740 the Ottoman Empire conceded to France capitulations which granted a dominant position over the Holy Places. But in the 1830's the overwhelming Orthodox pilgrimages enriched much more Greek monasteries and clerics, and in the 1840's Russia and France became more inclined to protect their protégés.

In 1852 president Louis Napoleon acquired also the title of Emperor of the French, and took the name of Napoleon III. His new regime was made possible by the support of the bourgeoisie, thus for the internal support it was suitable to favor the investment of capital finding new outlet abroad¹. Therefore, counting also on his internal Catholic support, Napoleon III decided to demand the reassertion of the 1740 concessions. The Habsburgs supported France in this claim, but Czar Nicholas I wanted to keep the status quo.² In 1852 the Porte gave concessions to the Latins, in this way favoring France vis à vis Russia. This unhinged the Russian claim to be the most influential power over the Ottoman Empire.³ Actually both France and Russia chose the strategy of the religious fervor as a means to obtain the internal popular support.⁴ According to the Czar it was also a struggle between conservatism and the forces of "revolution", to which the future of German and Italian territories was strictly connected.⁵ Even if Chancellor Nesselrode made an effort to dissuade him, the Czar tried to involve Great Britain into the anti-France cause, just as a former attempt in 1844, through the so-called Seymour conversations. The Czar wanted the British support for his affairs in the Near East and was concerned about a possible partition of the Ottoman Empire. But Russell refused, as an Anglo-Russian agreement was likely to provoke a

¹Michelle Raccagni, "The French Economic Interests in the Ottoman Empire", in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 2, 1980, p.339

²Matthew S. Anderson, *The Eastern Question: 1774 - 1923. A Study in International Relations*, (Hong Kong:MacMillan, 1991), pp.114-116

³Alan J. P. Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848-1919*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954), p.49; Matthew S. Anderson, op. cit., p.117

⁴Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey. A Modern History*, (London: I.B.Tauris, 2004), p.53

⁵Alan J. P. Taylor, op. cit., p.50

war.⁶ As the Czar thought that the Habsburg Empire was already under his influence, he did not think to involve it in talks about Ottoman partition.

On 28 February 1853 Nicholas I sent Prince Menshikov, a prominent Orthodox clergyman⁷, to Istanbul in order to solve the Holy Places question. The Czar had to deal with the problem of prestige against France as if it was a religious one, in order to win the support of Russian Orthodox public opinion.⁸ So the first task of Menshikov was to restore Russian prestige over the Ottoman Empire through an Orthodox religious protectorate and the exclusion of Fuad Pasha from its office of Foreign Minister because he was the one that granted to the Latins the keys of the Holy Places, eventually achieving to bring about his resignation and replacement with Rifat Pasha.⁹ Had the Ottomans refused the proposals, as an alternative, Menshikov was to offer an alliance against France.¹⁰

Menshikov furthermore asked the right for Russia to protect the Orthodox laymen living in the Ottoman Empire, something France never asked (France just asked about the protection of monks and priests). Had this demand been conceded, Russia would have obtained the right to intervene strongly into the internal affairs of the Empire, as the Orthodox population amounted at two fifths of the total. The Porte (also advised by the British ambassador Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, as the independence of the Ottoman Empire was part of British policy¹¹) refused to sign the agreement, nevertheless promised to respect the rights of its Orthodox subjects and the immunities of the Greek Church. On 21 May Menshikov left Istanbul, and the relations between Russia and the Ottoman Empire were broken.¹² On the same day the Czar ordered the occupation of the two principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, and the Russian forces crossed the Pruth on 2 July 1853.¹³

The demands eventually were not accepted mainly for various factors: Menshikov was a soldier without diplomatic experience, and he could not avoid to injure the pride of the Ottoman Ministers; at that time the Ottomans could count increasingly on the support of both Great Britain and France; and the

⁶Matthew S. Anderson, *op. cit.*, p.119

⁷*Ibid.*, p.121

⁸Alan J. P. Taylor, *op. cit.*, p.51

⁹Matthew S. Anderson, *op. cit.*, p.121

¹⁰Alan J. P. Taylor, *op. cit.*, p.52

¹¹*Ibid.*, p.53

¹²Matthew S. Anderson, *op. cit.*, pp.122-123

¹³Alan J. P. Taylor, *op. cit.*, p.54

Russian demands triggered risings of popular fanaticism among the religious elites. On 13 June British and French fleets gathered in Beşik Bay, just outside the Dardanelles, showing their commitment to defend the Empire against Russia. Now that the Powers spread their forces, for both sides it was now difficult to withdraw without a consequent loss of prestige.¹⁴

With these events the Crimean War diplomatic pattern was created: both sides (Russia vs. Great Britain and France) began to attempt to involve the central European powers, namely Prussia and the Habsburg Empire.¹⁵ The former did not want to risk to become the battlefield of the struggle between revolution and conservatism, the latter feared of both siding with Russia and France: in the first case France could take its revenge in the Italian territories, in the second the Habsburg Empire would bear the main burden of a war against Russia, without considering the fact that Russian invasion of the Danubian principalities threatened directly Austrian trade down the Black Sea.¹⁶ So the Habsburgs had to pretend to support the western Powers, yet never give them real support.¹⁷ This was not what the Czar expected, after having helped the Habsburg Empire through the suppression of the Hungarian nationalists in 1849, and given their shared fear of revolution.¹⁸

Given this difficult situation Count Buol, the Austrian Foreign Minister, invited to Vienna representatives of Great Britain, France and Prussia (but the Russian ambassador did not attend as no instructions were given) in an attempt to settle the Russo-Ottoman controversy. Its outcome was the Vienna Note, which embodied the concessions which in the opinion of the four Powers the Ottoman Empire could make to Russia without risking its independence.¹⁹ The Note proposed that the Sultan should promise to observe the spirit and letter of the treaties of 1774²⁰ and 1829²¹ as regarded the rights of the Orthodox Church; to extend to the Orthodox all privileges enjoyed by member of other Christian sects; and not to make change in the existing position of his Christian subjects without the agreement of French and Russian governments.²² The document seemed to represent an agreement between all the

¹⁴Matthew S. Anderson, *op. cit.*, p.121-123-124-125

¹⁵Alan J. P. Taylor, *op. cit.*, p.54

¹⁶Matthew S. Anderson, *op. cit.*, p.125

¹⁷Alan J. P. Taylor, *op. cit.*, p.55

¹⁸Matthew S. Anderson, *op. cit.*, p.125

¹⁹Alan J. P. Taylor, *op. cit.*, p.55

²⁰Küçük Kaynarca

²¹Edirne

²²Matthew S. Anderson, *op. cit.*, p.126

involved Powers, apart from the Ottoman Empire, which was not consulted in the drafting, and was in the end reluctant to concede as much as the Powers wished. Advised by Stratford de Redcliffe²³, the Ottomans proposed an amendment: it had to be clear that the privileges to the Orthodox derived from the will of the Sultan, and not from agreements with Russia. Of course Russia did not accept, forcing on the contrary the meaning of the Note, stating that the document gave Russia the right to intervene in the Empire on behalf of the Orthodoxes.²⁴ Great Britain and France suddenly showed that they wanted to resist to Russian encroachments²⁵ letting know to the Ottomans that the Note did not provide a legal basis for any Russian invasion.²⁶ After the failure of the Vienna Note, Nicholas I tried with diplomacy to revive the Holy Alliance with Prussia and Austria, but the situation has changed, and they had nothing to gain in such an alliance with Russia.²⁷

During all these negotiations the Pope did not commit himself to a cause or another, he preferred to stay neutral, he neither encouraged France to protect Catholics in the Ottoman Empire, nor officially took a stance against the war because he feared persecutions of the Poles inside Russia. Even if constantly informed by his nuntios, Pius IX did not take side, above all he did not go along with the wishes of the Czar who thought the influence of Pope Pius IX could be used to help him to convince the Habsburgs to join his side. The Pope just specified to the Czar his worry about the situation of the Catholics in Russian territories.²⁸

3.2 The War

On 4 October 1853 the Ottomans declared war on Russia²⁹, and on 23 October they crossed the Danube and attacked the Russian troops. In its declaration of war, the Sultan was driven on by his public opinion, and was reassured by the presence of British and French fleets in the Bosphorus.³⁰ This started the conflict between Russian and the Ottoman Empire, that is the preliminary

²³René Albrecht-Carrié, *Storia Diplomatica dell'Europa. Dal Congresso di Vienna ad Oggi*, (Bologna: Cappelli, 1970), p.130

²⁴Matthew S. Anderson, op. cit., p.126

²⁵Alan J. P. Taylor, op. cit., p.56

²⁶Matthew S. Anderson, op. cit., p.126

²⁷Alan J. P. Taylor, op. cit., p.57

²⁸Giacomo Martina, op. cit., p.177

²⁹René Albrecht-Carrié, op. cit., p.131

³⁰Matthew S. Anderson, op. cit., p.128

phase of the Crimean War.³¹ Besim Özcan states that the real cause of the war was the conflict between Great Britain and Russia for the economical and political supremacy in the Middle East. In fact, if we consider with this respect Russia as the bogeyman for the rest of the European powers, it was a shared opinion that Great Britain played the main moves, France was just a tool in the hands of the British ally, while the Habsburgs behaved ungratefully as it was formerly saved by Russia during the 1848-49 revolutions.³²

On 30 November in the harbour of Sinop the Russians destroyed an Ottoman squadron, provoking in this way the entrance of British and French troops into the Black Sea, because they could not tolerate this affront for the fact that they were there to protect the Empire,³³ anyway assuring the Russians that it was just a demonstration, not an act of war.³⁴ Again the Czar tried to rebuild the Holy Alliance, but without success. Napoleon III, without alienating his good relationship with Great Britain, felt free to propose a direct negotiation between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, because as long as the Holy Alliance ceased to exist, he was not anymore interested in the Holy Places³⁵, but Nicholas I refused.

On 27 February 1854 Great Britain and France sent an ultimatum to Russia demanding the withdrawal from the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, but the Czar refused it, so they decided to declare war on 28 March³⁶: Great Britain did not want to permit a further Russian expansion, and France did not want to leave the task to stop Russia to Great Britain alone.³⁷ As it has been already recalled, once the conflict had been launched, the Powers involved could not retreat in order to not lose their prestige: Russia needed a subordinate Ottoman Empire for its security; Napoleon III needed success for his domestic position; Great Britain needed an independent Empire for the security of the Eastern Mediterranean.³⁸

With the Istanbul treaty of 12 March 1854 France and Great Britain for-

³¹Lord Kinross, *The Ottoman Centuries*, (New York: Morrow Quill Paperbacks, 1979), p.493

³²Besim Özcan, “Osmanlı Devleti’nin Rusya’ya Yönelik Dış Politikası (19. yy. ve 20. yy. Başı)”, in Mustafa Bıyıklı (ed.), *Türk Dış Politikası: Osmanlı Dönemi*, (Istanbul: Gökkuşbuğu, 2008), pp.323-324

³³Matthew S. Anderson, op. cit., p.130; Alan J. P. Taylor, op. cit., p.58]

³⁴Lord Kinross, op. cit., p.494

³⁵Alan J. P. Taylor, op. cit., p.60

³⁶Erik Goldstein, *Wars and Peace Treaties: 1816 - 1991*, (London: Routledge, 1992), p.27

³⁷René Albrecht-Carrié, op. cit., p.131

³⁸Alan J. P. Taylor, op. cit., p.60

malized their engagement with the Ottoman Empire to guarantee its integrity and the independence of the Sultan in exchange for egalitarian reforms.³⁹ This was probably to counteract the fact that the Czar tried to take advantage from the influence of pope Pius IX to convince the Habsburg Empire to participate to the war “on the side of the Christians and not to bolster a Muslim State”.⁴⁰

Austrian behavior was dictated by the dislike of the Russian occupation of the Danubian Principalities and at the same time by the fear that showing sympathy to Russia would have meant a French invasion of its Italian territories.⁴¹ On 20 April 1854 the Habsburg Empire signed a treaty of alliance with Prussia and therefore had the back covered for its territories in the Italian peninsula and on the lower Danube.⁴²

In the spring of 1854 a Russian army crossed the lower Danube and sieged to the Ottoman fortress of Silistria, but on late June the Ottomans managed to resist the attack and Russians renounced to continue.⁴³

On 14 June the Habsburgs signed an agreement with the Ottoman Empire which transferred the sovereignty of the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia to the Habsburgs, and on 20 August the Austrian troops occupied the territory once in the hand of the Russians. These events brought to an end the Russian expansionism toward Europe.⁴⁴

In respect to the other Powers involved, the Habsburg Empire was in the riskiest position and hoped in a fast ending of the war operations. So, in order to define French and British war aims⁴⁵, on 8 August 1854 the representatives of the Habsburgs, Great Britain and France reached a new agreement that was proposed as the basis for the negotiation with Russia. The Four Points established a collective protectorate over the Danubian Principalities; free navigation in the Danube; end of the Russian preminence over the Black Sea by a revision of the Straights Convention of 1841; renunciation of Russia about its exclusive protection of the Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire. Russia did not accept the four Points, and the allies decided to take the war to Crimea

³⁹Paul Dumont, “Il Periodo dei Tanzimat (1839-1878)”, in Robert Mantran (ed.), *Storia dell'Impero Ottomano*, (Lecce: Argo, 2004), p.545

⁴⁰Owen Chadwick, op. cit., p.102

⁴¹Matthew S. Anderson, op. cit., p.132

⁴²Alan J. P. Taylor, op. cit., p.64; Matthew S. Anderson, op. cit., p.132

⁴³Lord Kinross, op. cit., p.495

⁴⁴*Ibid.*

⁴⁵Matthew S. Anderson, op. cit., p.134

in September.⁴⁶ Great Britain was not satisfied with the Russian defeat in the Balkans, they wanted also the Russian maritime power annihilated. This is why they brought the war to Crimea: they aimed at the Russian arsenal of Sebastopol.⁴⁷

3.2.1 Participation of the Kingdom of Sardinia in the Crimean War

After the Anglo-French treaty of alliance against Russia in 10 April 1854, there was a crisis in the Cavour Government. The Prime Minister and the King Vittorio Emanuele II were in favor of the Sardinia participation to the war on the side of the allies even without any guarantee of compensation by the Powers, but the other ministers were against a treaty which did not grant anything at all. So Cavour in the end managed to convince his colleagues with the promise that if Sardinia decided for its participation in the war, he would have backed the law against the monasteries, the Convent Act. King Vittorio Emanuele II was constrained to choose between his two friends Pope Pius IX and Emperor Napoleon III, and at the end he decided to be on the side of the western European Powers.⁴⁸ After the war against the Habsburg Empire, this was the second time that the Kingdom of Sardinia took a strong decision at the international level. Even king Vittorio Emanuele II was committed to take place among the liberal forces of Europe, thus detaching increasingly the Kingdom of Sardinia from the conservative forces in Europe.

Great Britain and France wanted also the Habsburg Empire to participate in the war, which nevertheless in the end preferred to stay neutral. In Crimea France brought a bigger contingent than Great Britain, and this is why the latter took advantage by the participation of Sardinian army in the war, not to mention that this factor could work as a pressure for the Habsburgs to be involved into the war.⁴⁹ On 2 December 1854 they made an alliance with France and Great Britain to defend the Danubian Principalities⁵⁰ obtaining in this way guarantees for its Italian territories, conscious of the fact that had it

⁴⁶René Albrecht-Carrié, op. cit., p.132; Matthew S. Anderson, op. cit., p.134

⁴⁷Paul Dumont, op. cit., p.545

⁴⁸Pietro Pirri, *Pio IX e Vittorio Emanuele II dal loro carteggio privato. I: La Laicizzazione dello Stato Sardo (1848-1856)*, (Roma: Pontificia Università Gregoriana, 1944), pp.104-105

⁴⁹René Albrecht-Carrié, op. cit., p.133

⁵⁰Matthew S. Anderson, op. cit., p.135

displayed sympathy for Russia, maybe France would have attacked the Habsburg possessions in the Italian peninsula.⁵¹ On 22 December the Habsburg Empire and France concluded a secret treaty agreeing to maintain the status quo in its Italian provinces and providing that, in case of military cooperation in the Near East, their troops would also cooperate in the Italian peninsula. In this way Buol gained an alliance with Napoleon III to check Russia and not endanger the Habsburg Empire as a Great Power.⁵² This particular Austrian neutrality was given by the fact that had it moved to war against Russia, the price for British and French support would have been the withdrawing from Lombardy and Veneto.⁵³

Sardinian Prime Minister Cavour understood that this kind of agreement represented the end of the Italian hopes of freedom from the Habsburg ascendancy, nevertheless he considered important to keep the favour of the western Powers. But the colleagues of Cavour did not accept its view, and overruled him. Great Britain on 13 December 1855 tried again with a formal request to the Sardinian cabinet. Cavour would have accepted at once, but Damorbidia, the Foreign Minister, wanted to pose some condition, like a stance of the Powers against the sequestration from part of the Austrian authorities of the property of Lombard refugees in Piedmont⁵⁴ and their consideration of the Italian situation in time of peace, conditions that, had Great Britain been alone, would have been accepted. But France needed an agreement not in an anti-Austrian spirit, and threatened even to support the Austrian complaints on Piedmontese press. King Vittorio Emanuele took the occasion to break the stalemate by calling the conservatives by his side in order to participate to the war on the side of Austria. Nevertheless Cavour did not let this happen, he did not want to leave Sardinia to the conservatives, and on 10 January 1855 signed the Anglo-French alliance without conditions,⁵⁵ backed up also by Rattazzi, the leader of the Left, to whom Cavour promised his support for the Convents Act.⁵⁶

Moreover, after the Russian refusal to the Four Points, the relationships between the Habsburg Empire and the western Powers suffered a serious crisis.

⁵¹*Ibid.*, p.132

⁵²Alan J. P. Taylor, *op. cit.*, p.70

⁵³*Ibid.*, p.85

⁵⁴Alan J. P. Taylor, *op. cit.*, p.71

⁵⁵*Ibid.*, p.72; Rosario Romeo, *op. cit.*, p.284

⁵⁶Indro Montanelli, *Storia d'Italia. L'Italia del Risorgimento. Dal 1831 al 1861*, (Milano: RCS Libri,1998), p.346

Sardinian Prime Minister Cavour took advantage from the situation and in June 1855 Great Britain and France accepted his request of participation of the Kingdom of Piedmont at the peace conference at the end of the war.⁵⁷

Sardinia signed a military convention on 26 January 1855⁵⁸ hoping to win the goodwill of the allies in its claims against the Habsburgs.⁵⁹ In fact the decision of Sardinia to sign the convention with the allies and send an expeditionary force of about 18,000 men helped to keep the Habsburgs in the alliance and diminish the French ascendancy in Crimea.⁶⁰ It was also a way in which the Kingdom of Sardinia became a sort of representative entity of the Italian peninsula in the eyes of Europe, and thus a step toward the Piedmontese hegemony of the following years,⁶¹ and the fact that the Habsburg Empire chose neutrality and the Kingdom of Sardinia participated actively to the war, although its army had a secondary role, changed their respective position in the eyes of the allies.⁶²

On 10 September 1855 the allies managed to take the fortress of Sebastopol.⁶³ The hostilities ended on 28 November 1855, when the Ottoman fortress of Kars surrendered to the Russians.⁶⁴ On 14 November 1855 France and the Habsburgs agreed on an ultimatum to be presented to Russia. The document proposed the neutralisation of the Black Sea and the cession of part of the Bessarabia territories, and it would have been accepted without conditions by Russia on 16 January 1856.⁶⁵

The Crimean War was the greatest international conflict of the period:⁶⁶ it had cost the lives of nearly half a million men (two thirds of disease and hardship, not from battle), much more of any other European war a hundred years after the Congress of Vienna. As practically this war consisted in an invasion of the western Powers against Russia, a clear outcome was that after 1856 Russia became less important for the European balance.⁶⁷

⁵⁷Rosario Romeo, op. cit., p.306

⁵⁸René Albrecht-Carrié, op. cit., p.134

⁵⁹Erik Goldstein, op. cit., p.28

⁶⁰Matthew S. Anderson, op. cit., p.138; Derek Beales and Eugenio F. Biagini, op. cit., p.156

⁶¹Rosario Romeo, op. cit., p.288

⁶²*Ibid.*, p.306

⁶³Paul Dumont, op. cit., p.546

⁶⁴Selçuk A. Somel, *Historical Dictionary of the Ottoman Empire*, (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2003), p.66

⁶⁵Matthew S. Anderson, op. cit., pp.139-140-141

⁶⁶Erik J. Zürcher, op. cit., p.53

⁶⁷Alan J. P. Taylor, op. cit., p.82

3.3 Aftermath

3.3.1 The Congress of Paris

3.3.1.1 Ottoman Empire

From the point of view of the history of relationships between the Ottoman Empire and Europe, the Congress of Paris in 1856 ratified the entrance of the Empire in what was called the Concert of Europe. The Ottoman Empire was given the right to profit from European legal system and the unity and autonomy of the Empire was guaranteed.⁶⁸ At the Congress the Empire was represented by grand vizier Ali Pasha and Mehmed Cemil Bey, ambassador in France and in the Kingdom of Sardinia.⁶⁹ Nevertheless the Paris Congress did not managed to guarantee a period of peace for the Ottoman Empire. At the same time, this Congress established in Europe a new political balance.⁷⁰

Between the end of the Crimean War and the Congress of Paris, the British, French and Austrian ambassadors in Istanbul cooperated with the Porte to prepare the Hatt-ı Hümayun (or Islahat) edict, a move “promised” to the allies with the 1854 Istanbul treaty. It was important to prepare it before the beginning of the peace conference so that Russia would have no hand in Ottoman reforms.⁷¹ The British ambassador Lord Stratford was convinced that the Ottoman reform efforts were betrayed by the disinterest of France and Great Britain, concerned just with the peace and appeasement with Russia. He thought that without foreign pressure the edict would have been just an insignificant peace of paper.⁷² As a demonstration of his commitment, it is worthwhile to recall the solemn investiture of sultan Abdülmecid I with the Order of a Knight of the Garter by the same Lord Stratford de Radcliffe.⁷³

Unlike its predecessor, the Hatt-ı Şerif, this edict was essentially “made in Europe”, but originated basically from the same situation: the Ottoman

⁶⁸Necmettin Alkan, “Osmanlı Devleti'nin Batı Politikası-Tanzimat'tan II. Meşrutiyet'e (1839-1908)”, in Mustafa Bıyıklı (ed.), *Türk Dış Politikası: Osmanlı Dönemi*, (Istanbul: Gökkuşbuğu, 2008), p.155

⁶⁹Candan Badem, *The Ottoman Crimean War, 1853-1856*, (Boston:Brill, 2010), p.286

⁷⁰Besim Özcan, op. cit., p.327

⁷¹Roderic Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p.53

⁷²Lord Kinross, op. cit., p.502

⁷³*Ibid.*

Empire was dealing with the international events and it needed both to take under consideration European opinion and the internal need for reforms.⁷⁴

The Hatt-ı Hümayun was formally taken under consideration by the Powers in the article 9 of the Treaty of Paris, where they recognized its importance and adding that the edict did not give them the right to intervene in the internal affairs of the Empire.⁷⁵

The Hatt-ı Hümayun was much more elaborate and accurate of the 1839 Hatt-ı Şerif, that started the Tanzimat: it guaranteed to the non-Muslim communities the respect of their traditional immunities, their freedom of worship and their right to administrate their belongings without obstacles. These were measures which could hinder the attempts to impose the foreign protectorates over the Ottoman Christians. The members of every clergy would receive from their community a fixed contribution, in order to avoid abuses; all the subjects of the Empire will be considered equal for the taxation system, justice, education, military service (unless the payment of the *bedel* tax); in order to offer representation to all the communities, the provincial administrative system would be reformed. The state would establish annual budget and would control the public finances; it would support public works for general purpose; it would authorize the foundation of banks and other financial enterprises. The Hatt-ı Hümayun, together with bringing the standard of life of the non-Muslim to an upper level respect to that of the Muslim population,⁷⁶ put the basis for a greater penetration of the foreign Powers into the Ottoman Empire internal affairs.⁷⁷ As an example, the article 25 stipulated that European capitals should be used to increase the wealth of the Empire, and the right to own property was granted to foreigners.⁷⁸

An important novelty was that the edict did not contain anything about the sacred law, and was overall written in a clearer language than the Hatt-ı Şerif, which was instead characterized by a “split personality”.⁷⁹

The Islahat edict was aimed at the equality before the law of all the subjects of different ethnicity and religion, namely the new doctrine of Ottomanism introduced by Ali and Fuad Pashas in order to “to transfer the loyalty of the

⁷⁴Roderic Davison, op. cit., p.54

⁷⁵*Ibid.*, p.4

⁷⁶Besim Özcan, op. cit., p.327

⁷⁷Paul Dumont, op. cit., p.546

⁷⁸Michelle Raccagni, “The French Economic Interests in the Ottoman Empire”, in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 2, 1980, p.342

⁷⁹Roderic Davison, op. cit., p.55

non-Muslims from the local community and the Ottoman dynasty to the fatherland and the state.”⁸⁰ Actually the Hatt-ı Hümayun represented also an attempt to remove the *millet* system and substitute to it the notion of citizenship, nevertheless the edict treated the matter of the rights of Christian and other non-Muslim communities, thus without achieving its goal.⁸¹ Moreover, this attempt to end the desire for autonomy or independence from part of the non-Muslim *millets*,⁸² was hindered by the fact that, as the reforms were boosted from foreign pressure, the non-Muslim *millets*, knowing that the edict was prepared under foreign pressure, used to call foreign intervention into Ottoman internal affairs when they saw suit in order to maintain their privileges, at the cost of the association of the non-Muslim communities with foreign attack or treason.⁸³

It is interesting to notice that at the end of the ceremony of proclamation of the Hatt-ı Hümayun, which had place at the Sublime Porte on 18 February 1856 and at which there were representatives of the religious minorities, a famous preacher of Istanbul, made a prayer containing the exhortation to God to preserve the people of Muhammad, an event that could represent well the contradictions of the underlying mentality of the reforms.⁸⁴

The edict collected criticism not just because it was a result of the foreign pressures: moreover the şeyhülislam underlined the fact that not only the fleets, but also land armies were present in the territories of Istanbul. Reshit Pasha criticized the edict because in his opinion it was just constituted of concessions, and Ali and Fuad gave too much political privileges to the Christians.⁸⁵ Interestingly, also the higher Christian clergy was critic, because they thought the edict would consist in a loss of power of their positions inside their *millets*.⁸⁶

During the Crimean War the Ottoman Empire, in 1854 and 1855, for the

⁸⁰Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey Volume II: Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p.127; Butrus Abu-Manneh, “The Christians between Ottomanism and Syrian Nationalism : The Ideas of Butrus Al-Bustani”, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol.11, n.3, p.287

⁸¹Roderic Davison, op. cit., p.56

⁸²Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, op. cit., p.125

⁸³*Ibid.*, p.128

⁸⁴Roderic Davison, op. cit., pp.3-5

⁸⁵*Ibid.*, p.57

⁸⁶*Ibid.*, p.59

first time borrowed money from France and Great Britain, linking in this way its already bad finances to the more developed countries,⁸⁷ a move that, after twenty years and over a billion dollars of loans,⁸⁸ would have led to the formal declaration of insolvency in 1876,⁸⁹ due also to the administrative disorganization.⁹⁰ Ottoman bureaucracy was characterized by inertia and shortsightedness, there lacked incentives to advancement, and favoritism and bribery were common.⁹¹ These first loans were guaranteed by Great Britain and France, as they were explicitly aimed at strengthening the Ottoman Empire against Russia.

The borrowing of loans in the European financial markets consisted of the most important method adopted by the Ottoman government after mid-nineteenth century to deal with the recurring budget deficits.⁹²

These events were much more important for what they started than for the economical relief of the Ottoman Empire: the Crimean War loan control commission was just the ancestor of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration set up in 1882.⁹³

The loans and the subsequent default was the price the Ottoman Empire paid for the introduction of reforms, but the incapacity of the Ottoman statesmen to deal with modern economics paved the way as a pretext for the foreign intervention,⁹⁴ even if the reason that started this process of borrowing was just the will to keep the Ottoman Empire as a military ally against Russia.⁹⁵

Donald Blaisdell wrote that the Ottoman Empire incapacity to keep the pace at the economical level was for Europe a positive thing, because it represented a vast market for the consumption of European goods, products of the European expanding industry and commerce.⁹⁶ Significant is also the fact that the Ottoman Empire found itself in a situation in which, while loaning, it had

⁸⁷Besim Özcan, op. cit., p.327

⁸⁸Donald C. Blaisdell, *European Financial Control in the Ottoman Empire - A Study of the Establishment, Activities, and Significance of the Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt*, (New York: AMS Press, 1966), p.23

⁸⁹Benjamin C. Fortna, "The Reign of Abdülhamid II", in Reşat Kasaba (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Turkey Vol. 4 Turkey in the Modern World*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p.53

⁹⁰Donald C. Blaisdell, op. cit., p.9

⁹¹*Ibid.*, p.16

⁹²Şevket Pamuk, "From debasement to external borrowing: changing forms of deficit finance in the Ottoman Empire, 1750-1914", in Şevket Pamuk (ed.), *The Ottoman economy and its institutions*, (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), chapter IX, p.18

⁹³Sean Oliver-Dee, *The Caliphate Question*, (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2009), p.62

⁹⁴Michelle Raccagni, op. cit., p.369

⁹⁵Sean Oliver-Dee, op. cit., pp.62-63

⁹⁶Donald C. Blaisdell, op. cit., p.19

its fiscal powers limited by the capitulations,⁹⁷ which already put the great bulk of the trade in the hands of foreigners. Until the Crimean War there was balance between imports and exports; after that the balance shifted, causing the Ottomans a trade deficit in 1876.⁹⁸

In 1856 the Ottoman Bank was established already with a great control from part of Great Britain that continued also in the subsequent years. In the same year the Porte called for an Austrian financial adviser, which two years later in 1858 was joined by British and French delegates to form the High Council of the Treasury.⁹⁹

The Congress of Paris was opened on 25 February 1856 and lasted until 30 March; it was held in Paris instead of Vienna, the center of negotiation during the war, because the Habsburg Empire discontented everyone with its non interventionist policy.¹⁰⁰ It was the first time that the Ottoman Empire was invited as an equal to an international congress.¹⁰¹ The aim of the Treaty was to internationalize the guarantee of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and substitute European for Russian influence over it.¹⁰² The Treaty was apparently in favour of the Sultan, but the will of the foreign Powers to penetrate into the Empire was clear.¹⁰³

The more important conditions, agreed without consultation of the Ottomans, based on the Four Points of Vienna¹⁰⁴ and wanted mostly by France, Great Britain and the Habsburgs were: demilitarization of the Black Sea, even for the Ottoman coasts; end of the Russian influence on Moldavia and Wallachia; guarantee of autonomy and integrity of the Ottoman Empire on the part of the European powers. The Ottoman Empire was formally admitted into the Concert of Europe, even if in the future it would have played just a passive role into the European diplomatic intrigues, given its military and economical weaknesses. The Hatt-ı Hümayun was taken officially under consideration by the Peace Conference, and the Powers established that this edict removed every pretext of foreign intervention in the internal Ottoman affairs,

⁹⁷*Ibid.*, p.25-26

⁹⁸Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *op. cit.*, p.122

⁹⁹Donald C. Blaisdell, *op. cit.*, p.26

¹⁰⁰René Albrecht-Carrié, *op. cit.*, p.135

¹⁰¹Besim Özcan, *op. cit.*, p.324

¹⁰²Harold Temperley, "The Treaty of Paris of 1856 and its Execution", in *The Journal of Modern History*, vol. 4, n. 2, p.523

¹⁰³Paul Dumont, *op. cit.*, p.547

¹⁰⁴René Albrecht-Carrié, *op. cit.*, p.135

a promise that in the future would have been breached.¹⁰⁵

Article 7 of the Treaty established the participation of the Ottoman Empire into the Concert of Europe, a decision in a spirit contrary to that of the Vienna Conference in 1815,¹⁰⁶ when Russia refused to include the Empire into the negotiations. The article guaranteed to the Ottoman Empire the respect of its independence and integrity through the commitment of all the signing Powers, elevating at European interest every infringement of this agreement. This left to the Powers the freedom to take action arbitrarily, every time they saw fit. Limitations to the Ottoman sovereignty derived from the reestablishment of the Straits Convention of 1841 (closing the straits to all the warships during peacetime); the prohibition of the navigation in the Black Sea even of the Ottoman fleet; the agreement on the internationalisation of the Danube under a Commission set by the Powers, which navigation would have been regulated by the Vienna provisions of 1815;¹⁰⁷ the reorganization of the Rumanian principalities and Serbia. The Ottoman Empire did not loose territories, but its integration into the European system had to be payed.¹⁰⁸ Maybe its most important victory was to have Russia presence removed from the Black Sea. Ali Pasha, the Ottoman delegate at the Conference, referring to the 7th article, asked the end of the capitulations, obtaining a negative response from the participating Powers. This was important to understand the nature of the above mentioned article.¹⁰⁹

In the article 9 of the Treaty it was stated that the Powers recognized the high value of the Islahat edict, and that at the same time it could not be used by the Powers to interfere in the affairs between the Sultan and its subjects.¹¹⁰

All in all the real “achievement” of the Treaty of Paris was the liberation of the Danubian Principalities: both the Islahat edict and the neutralization of the Black Sea did not changed anything in the Balance of Power. The independence of Wallachia and Moldavia was due to the conflictual relationship between Russia and the Habsburg Empire, as the Habsburgs were not going

¹⁰⁵Erik J. Zürcher, op. cit., p.54

¹⁰⁶Hugh McKinnon Wood, “The Treaty of Paris and Turkey’s Status in International Law”, in *The American Journal of International Law*, vol. 37, n. 2, p.264

¹⁰⁷René Albrecht-Carrié, op. cit., p.136

¹⁰⁸Paul Dumont, op. cit., p.547

¹⁰⁹Besim Özcan, op. cit., p.326

¹¹⁰Candan Badem, op. cit., p.288

to withdraw from Lombardy and Venetia in order to pay the price for western support. So on the conclusion of the peace, they pulled back from the Principalities.¹¹¹

The Ottoman grand vezir Reshit Pasha criticized harshly the foreign minister Ali Pasha because of the little gains obtained from the Congress considered the disproportion with its great commitment to war.¹¹²

The state which obtained more advantages from the treaty was Great Britain: Russia was beaten and the British way toward East and the Eastern Mediterranean were preserved. France, even if had the greatest number of casualties (about 80000, against the British 20000) was the state that obtained less. The Kingdom of Sardinia took his place between the winner Powers and obtained the sustain of Great Britain and France for the unification of the Italian peninsula that occurred in 1861, 5 years after the Congress of Paris.¹¹³

It is possible to state that for the Ottoman Empire the Peace Conference did not promise a real guarantee for its future. The peace granted to the Empire was a critical one and was not meant to last.¹¹⁴ The Treaty succeeded just in reducing the strength of the Ottoman Empire vis a vis the role of Russia in the Near East. The diplomatic result of the Congress of Paris was the isolation of the Austrian Empire from the political point of view, because until that time the Habsburg security on the eastern front depended on Russia, from which the distance at the international level increased, as the Habsburg Empire passed to the Anglo-French side (see also the 15 April 1856 treaty, which meant to be secret, between France, Great Britain and the Habsburgs, and only transpired by accident:¹¹⁵ according to it every violation of the Ottoman integrity would have constituted a *casus belli*).¹¹⁶ Actually three years later from 1856 Napoleon III would have been at war against the Austrian Empire, and Russia would have rejoiced over the defeat of its old ally, beaten by the Sardinian army at Solferino in 1859.¹¹⁷

¹¹¹Alan J. P. Taylor, op. cit., p.85

¹¹²Selçuk A. Somel, op. cit., p.309

¹¹³Besim Özcan, op. cit., pp.325-326

¹¹⁴*Ibid.*, p.327

¹¹⁵Harold Temperley, op. cit., p.528

¹¹⁶René Albrecht-Carrié, op. cit., p.137

¹¹⁷Harold Temperley, op. cit., p.542

3.3.1.2 Italian peninsula

The Congress of Paris was the first international convention to which one politician from the Italian peninsula participated, that is the Sardinian Prime Minister Cavour; it was also a considerable goal since the little territorial dimensions and international status of the Kingdom of Sardinia.¹¹⁸

By participating to the Crimean War and thus to the Paris Congress, the Kingdom of Sardinia gained its place among the winner Powers, providing the help of Great Britain and France in the process of the Italian unification.¹¹⁹ Even if Cavour could not gain the direct involvement of France and Great Britain against the Habsburgs, it was important because now the Italian problem was raised to the international level of the Concert of Europe.¹²⁰ Foreign Secretary Lord Clarendon, the British representative, disturbed by the fact that their ally, the Kingdom of Sardinia, did not obtain anything from the Congress, on 8 April 1856 made a speech about the end of French and Austrian foreign occupation of Italian territories and talked about the Papal States as a scandal in Europe and that it needed to be reformed. After the Congress Lord Clarendon sent the British representative in Rome to tell Cardinal Antonelli, secretary of state to Pius IX, that Great Britain would like the foreign troops out of Rome and that the Pope should concede autonomy to the provinces of the Papal States autonomous.¹²¹ Great Britain was sympathetic with the Italian situation because of the economic advantage it would have obtained had the peninsula unified.¹²² From his part, Cavour talked about the Austrian occupation of the *Legazioni* as a violation of the peninsular balance against Piedmont.¹²³ But at the moment this stances did not provoked anything, except the fact that the Congress acknowledged the existence of the Italian question.¹²⁴

¹¹⁸Derek Beales and Eugenio F. Biagini, op. cit., p.126

¹¹⁹Besim Özcan, op. cit., p.326

¹²⁰Spencer Di Scala, *Italy: from revolution to republic, 1700 to the present*, (Boulder: WestviewPress, 2009), p.108

¹²¹Owen Chadwick, op. cit., pp.125-127

¹²²René Albrecht-Carrié, op. cit., p.140

¹²³Rosario Romeo, op. cit., p.327

¹²⁴René Albrecht-Carrié, op. cit., p.137

3.3.2 International Policies of the European Powers - Changes in the mid-19th century

It is worthwhile to analyze to what extent the Crimean War facts modified the international situation, with particular reference to the international policies of the great Powers involved into the war.

The 19th century was the century in which colonialism started to have a greater influence on the political choices and tendencies regarding the European political situation. The 1815 Congress of Vienna was a demonstration that Europe itself refused to be turned upside down by the European military campaigns of Napoleon I. This finds confirmation in the fact that the Ottoman Empire was for the moment kept out of the negotiations, likewise the Italian peninsula: these were strategical territories considered important for the maintenance of the European balance between States.

As Malcolm Yapp put it: “The Crimean War was essentially a European war in which the main issue was prestige. Its principal effects were to break up the conservative coalition of Russia, Austria and Prussia which had dominated European affairs since 1815, isolate Austria and convert Russia into a dissatisfied, revisionist power.”¹²⁵ The war also put an end to the Holy Alliance and the maintenance of the status quo, together with the fact that the main victim of this change was the Habsburg Empire.¹²⁶

The Crimean War was maybe the event in which the equilibrium shifted definitely toward the “liberal” forces of Great Britain and France. This is true also considering their influence in the future of both the Ottoman Empire and the Italian peninsula:

“[...] it [the Crimean War] followed from the events of 1848. British opinion would never have turned so harshly against Russia had it not been for Austria’s victory in Italy and, still more, Russia’s intervention in Hungary. The Crimean War was fought for the sake of Europe rather than for the Eastern question; it was fought against Russia, not in favor of Turkey”. “The real stake in the Crimean War was not Turkey. It was central Europe; that is to say, Germany and Italy.” “The Crimean

¹²⁵Malcolm Yapp, *The making of the modern Near East, 1792-1923*, (London: Longman, 1991), p.74

¹²⁶Matthew S. Anderson, op. cit., pp.145-146

War was fought to remake the European system. The old order of the Holy Alliance was destroyed; but no new system took its place [...]. Instead there opened a period of European anarchy which lasted from the Crimean War until the next great struggle in the Near East”¹²⁷

The Crimean War helped also Napoleon III to enforce his prestige between the Catholic French people and to curb Russian influence into the Balkans.¹²⁸ At the end of the war, on 8 February 1856, the Pope asked France and the Habsburg Empire to do the possible to protect the Catholics at East,

and his language expected that their political 'protection' would diminish Islam and Eastern Orthodoxy and foster the Catholic faith. He begged Napoleon not to allow the Catholic representatives at the Peace Conference to slide into indifference to religion, which is so 'common in our days'.¹²⁹

The Pope asked to Franz Joseph an effective protection of the Catholic Church at East, in order to assure it the “due preeminence, its freedom of worship, and an effective proselytism. While writing to Napoleon III, Pius IX was more confident about the fact that the French Emperor would have used all his influence in favor of the Catholics at East.¹³⁰

At any moment, as far as it is known, in Paris there will be a diplomatic Conference, suggested by the present most praiseworthy and commended clauses of peace. Between the serious matters that will be under debate, the Catholic interests in the East will not be disregarded. Now it is without doubt that a Catholic Sovereign, and a Sovereign as powerful as you, must treat these interests in preference to those of the other false Religions. And I say in preference, and I must say exclusively, because if the non true religions have to be opposed, at the same time we cannot miss the due possible concerns suggested by charity towards the peoples that to their disgrace profess false religions. The spirit of indifference on the subject of faith that unfortunately predominates also in these days, and sadly also between a number of Catholics, I would

¹²⁷Alan J. P. Taylor, op. cit., p.61

¹²⁸Owen Chadwick, op. cit., p.102

¹²⁹*Ibid.*, p.102; Pietro Pirri, *Pio IX e Vittorio Emanuele II dal loro carteggio privato. II: La Questione Romana (1856-1864)*, (Roma: Pontificia Università Gregoriana, 1951), Documenti, p.5

¹³⁰Giacomo Martina, op. cit., p.178

like it, and I would like it with all my heart, to be eliminated from the Conferences from part of the Catholic Plenipotentiaries: and this is why I strongly pray Your Majesty

Your Majesty, that gave so much proof of tender respect towards the Church of Jesus Christ, would like to, I believe, use his high and powerful influence so that this [the Church] could develop as it is her responsibility in those lands still covered by the darkness of infidelity, and there, where the schism rules, could be accomplished the freedom of worship in favor of the Catholics. Because, if the schism in the past centuries opened in the East, the road to the most pitiful infidelity, the protection granted from the Catholic potentates to the Roman Apostolic Church, with the help of God, will make sure that this unique true Church prevails over the hindrances that infidelity, the schism, and any other conflicting sides raise against her.¹³¹

Franz Joseph answered generically that he hoped for good dispositions from part of the Ottoman Empire, while Napoleon III on 4 April 1856 answered to Pius IX that, even if it was “his most serious preoccupation”, it was impossible to ask for privileges and securities just for the Catholics, as the guarantees in favor of the Christians were asked collectively from part of the great Powers, “what was claimed for the Catholics, was demanded at the same time for the dissenting worships”.¹³² The French Emperor was just content for the equality obtained for the non-Muslims, and “the concession of freedoms and privileges never reached until now”. It is worth to be underlined the contrast between the realist mentality of Napoleon III, satisfied of the Islahat, and the abstract one of Pius IX, who desired for the Church and its Faithful a privileged juridical condition. The Roman newspaper *Il Giornale di Roma* underlined the endeavor of the Powers to show the Ottoman reforms as a concession of the Sultan, and compared this situation with the one that the Pope experienced during the attacks against the Papal States of Clarendon and Cavour at the Congress of Paris. The journal *Civiltà Cattolica* hoped that the peace launched a “age of conversion” between the Muslims.¹³³

Worthwhile to recall is the fact that on 19 December 1856, the Pope wrote another letter to Napoleon III in which he explained his worries:

¹³¹Pietro Pirri, op. cit., pp.5-6

¹³²*Ibid.*, p.7

¹³³Giacomo Martina, op. cit., pp.178-179

Some appearances that came along aroused in me the doubt that in the imminent diplomatic Congress in Paris the affairs in Rome could be under debate [...] It is clear that the temporal Government of the Holy See it is an object against all the weapons of the Protestants, of the unbelieving, and of the revolutionaries of all the world, and especially of the dreamers of the unity of Italy, who presume, or believe to presume that the only hindrance to achieve it is the temporal Papal dominion. [...] It is for sure that this State cannot be governed with those theories of liberty tolerated in other countries, because exactly being the State of the Church it is necessary not to abandon totally that coercion that is of its competence to avoid the weakening of the Faith, and to restrain the corruption of the customs. [...] I thus rely on the experimented wiseness of Your Majesty who knows very well how much Italy is molested from the moral frailty of the human family, and there will be trouble if the ills of this peninsula realize to be supported by foreign forces [...] Let's see the Piedmont. I presume that King and that Government have not a firm intention to oppose the Religion and the Church: nevertheless in order to maintain themselves in some way they need once in a while either to exile some Bishops, or to expel some Religious Communities from its sacred enclosure, or to take possession of the assets of the Church, or to oppose or to show their opposition to this Holy See. [...] Let's not consider the most serious ills that would fall on the southern peoples of the peninsula had between them adopted the systems of the Subalpine Government [the Piedmont].¹³⁴

Napoleon III answered on 1 February 1857 that “your worries about the subject of the conferences in Paris are without foundation. Indeed it was not at all a matter at the last meeting of the plenipotentiaries that of the States of Italy”.¹³⁵

Interesting is that the “imminent diplomatic Congress in Paris” the Pope talks about cannot find any confirmation about its existence. The letter is anyway interesting because it explains well what were the concerns of Pius IX and his awareness of what was the international situation after the Congress of Paris.

Another question important for the European diplomacy was the project of unification of Wallachia and Moldavia supported by Napoleon III. Great Britain, the Habsburg and the Ottoman Empires were against. For Great

¹³⁴Pietro Pirri, op. cit., p.8

¹³⁵*Ibid.*, p.11

Britain the union of the Danubian Principalities under a foreign prince was equal to a detachment from the Ottoman Empire, and this was a consequence unacceptable according to the motivation why the Crimean War was fought. France, Russia and Prussia constituted the party in favor of the unification of the Principalities.¹³⁶ It is worthy to be remembered an informal agreement between Napoleon III and Cavour for which Wallachia and Moldavia would have been assigned respectively to the Duchies of Modena and Parma, while their territories should be conceded to the Kingdom of Sardinia. The plan was not put into practice due to the strong resistance of Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire.¹³⁷

3.3.2.1 The Ottoman Empire

In the European diplomacy, the Ottoman Empire was relevant for several reasons. It was both the passage to East for the trade of Great Britain with India, and at the same time the inevitable obstacle for Russian Mediterranean aspirations.¹³⁸ This, together with the British political and economical Mediterranean aims, was the cause of the community of interests between the Ottomans and Great Britain.¹³⁹ Britain improved its relationships with the Ottoman Empire first through the 1838 Balta Limanı agreement and then after 1856, when the British capital gained privileges and exemptions, and for this the integrity of the Empire became strictly necessary in British international politics. So Britain considered reforms as something essential to improve the resistance of the Empire to the Russian pressures, but nevertheless the British government did not elaborate a formal thesis to support them, leaving freedom of action to its ambassador in Istanbul:¹⁴⁰ Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Another important player on the international scene was France, keen to interfere in the British affairs in the Near East and to check the moves of Russia and the Habsburg Empire. The leaders of the Tanzimat thought that French influence would have balanced the ones of the other Great Powers.¹⁴¹ France as well took advantage of the Balta Limanı agreement in 1838, and like Great

¹³⁶Rosario Romeo, op. cit., pp.347-348

¹³⁷Alan J. P. Taylor, op. cit., p.87; Rosario Romeo, op. cit., pp.319-323-324

¹³⁸Mustafa Öztürk, “Batılı Devletlerin Osmanlı Üzerindeki Politikaları ve Bunun Osmanlı Dış Politikasına Etkisi (19. Yüzyıl)”, in Mustafa Bıyıklı (ed.), *Türk Dış Politikası: Osmanlı Dönemi*, (Istanbul: Gökkuşbu, 2008), p.358

¹³⁹*Ibid.*, p.359

¹⁴⁰*Ibid.*, p.360

¹⁴¹Michelle Raccagni, op. cit., pp.340-341

Britain considered fundamental the integrity of the Ottoman territories and reforms. To this aim, France thought that reforms in the Empire should have been actively encouraged,¹⁴² a policy consistent with the fact that especially after the Congress of Paris in 1856 Napoleon III desired to be the representative of the nationalistic ideas in Europe.¹⁴³ Important was also the fact that since the end of XVIII century Great Britain surpassed France for what concerned exports, while the amount of imports from the Ottoman Empire had steadily advanced. Since 1850 French authorities were worried about the discrepancy between imports and exports, and these were reasons why trade and investments in the Ottoman lands were to be encouraged.¹⁴⁴ France, together with Great Britain, were responsible of the introduction of the telegraphic lines into the Ottoman Empire during the Crimean War.¹⁴⁵

The Habsburgs tended to protect its position in center Europe and take advantage from the Ottoman territories in the Balkans. The Habsburgs as well tended to support the reforms of the Ottomans.¹⁴⁶

Both the two most significant edicts of the Tanzimat, the Gülhane of 1839 and the Islahat of 1856, supported the two important principles of equality of all the citizens, and administrative and economic development. Nevertheless, the European support for reforms produced the contradiction of the promise of both equality for all citizens and a special status for the non-Muslim *millet*s.¹⁴⁷

The European complaint that the promise of equality was not implemented was therefore unreasonable for it was impossible to carry out in both senses. In fact the Ottomans could not afford to implement the promise completely in either sense.¹⁴⁸

The Ottoman need of European consent was the cause of the decorative Tanzimat, namely those reforms presented just to throw a sop to the Great Powers.¹⁴⁹ Nevertheless the Hatt-ı Hümayun, at least on paper, was the concretization of the British settlement of the Eastern Question, that is a

¹⁴²Mustafa Öztürk, op. cit., p.363

¹⁴³*Ibid.*, p.364

¹⁴⁴Michelle Raccagni, op. cit., p.342

¹⁴⁵*Ibid.*, p.360; Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, op. cit., p.120

¹⁴⁶Mustafa Öztürk, op. cit., p.364

¹⁴⁷Malcolm Yapp, op. cit., pp.113-114

¹⁴⁸*Ibid.*, p.114

¹⁴⁹*Ibid.*

“viable Ottoman Empire reformed from within by its own efforts and protected against attack by an international guarantee”.¹⁵⁰

The Ottoman reforms were implemented very slowly, nevertheless the Ottoman international status was gained through: its formal recognition as a member of the European Concert; the tripartite treaty of 15 April 1856, in which Great Britain, France and the Habsburg Empire declared to guarantee Ottoman independence and integrity;¹⁵¹ its financial links to Europe, having raised loans to balance its expenditures for the Crimean War, a policy that in the future would have provoked its immense and unmanageable foreign debt. Internal resistance to reforms was also due to the foreign pressure of the European Powers. Moreover, Edmund Hornby, the British representative in the commission to supervise the second Ottoman loan, declared that “the Treaty of Paris [. . .] was a huge diplomatic blunder. It freed Turkey from the fear of Russia and left her to misgovern her Christian subjects as she pleased, which she forthwith proceeded to do.”¹⁵²

Even if Grand Vizier Ali Pasha and the President of the High Council of Reform (council created in order to control the developments of the reforms), Fuad Pasha, were genuinely committed to the reforms,¹⁵³ the Islahat edict was refused by the non-Muslims subject of the Ottoman Empire: they opposed to the equality with the Muslims, and in the following years this resistance caused different clashes internal to the territories of the Empire, letting the European Powers to not consider the Ottoman sovereign rights and taking side with the non-Muslims, protecting and increasing their advantages. It is in this way that the concessions contributed to the weakness of Ottoman government and put the basis for further fragmentation.¹⁵⁴

3.3.2.2 Italian peninsula

In the Congress of Paris, the Habsburgs wished to strengthen their hold on the Danubian Principalities. With Russia not anymore as an ally, the international situation was not in their favor, unless had they hand over Lombardy and Veneto to the Kingdom of Sardinia, gaining in this way the support of Great Britain and France, at the cost of giving up their leverage on the Italian

¹⁵⁰Matthew S. Anderson, op. cit., p.143

¹⁵¹Roderic Davison, op. cit., p.4

¹⁵²Matthew S. Anderson, op. cit., p.147

¹⁵³*Ibid.*

¹⁵⁴Besim Özcan, op. cit., pp.327-328

peninsula and ceding to the ambitions of Napoleon III and Sardinia.¹⁵⁵ Interesting is that Palmerston, the British secretary of State, suggested such an exchange (Danubian Principalities to the Habsburgs and the Lombardy and Venetia to the Kingdom of Sardinia) in 1854 and Napoleon III supported the idea in 1856, nevertheless without any consequence as the Habsburgs refused to consider it because in their opinion Moldavia and Wallachia were not a suitable compensation for their Italian territories.¹⁵⁶

Sardinia too had its wishes, that is to acquire the territories of the northern peninsula, plans of the Prime Minister Cavour not viable without the support of the Great Powers. Even if Sardinia did not obtain immediate benefit from the criticism against foreign occupation of Clarendon and Cavour on 8 April during the Paris Conference, it was an index of the growing isolation of the Austrian Empire¹⁵⁷ and of the fact that the European Powers did not consider relevant anymore the Treaty of Vienna and thus the Habsburgs role for the European balance.¹⁵⁸

In the years following the Congress of Paris the political strategy endorsed by Cavour was one of representing both European diplomacy in the Italian peninsula, and the will of independence of the Italians in Europe.¹⁵⁹

After having returned from the Congress of Paris, Cavour in the Parliament made a speech in which minimized the 15 April 1856 Treaty between Great Britain, France and the Habsburg Empire and disclosed a memorandum that he delivered to Great Britain and France on 16 April 1856 in which the Habsburgs were pointed out as the responsible both for the little result of the Congress about the Italian question, and for the uprisings that this could have provoked in the peninsula in the future. The document concluded asking for the attention of Great Britain and France in the interest of not just the Italians, but also of the European peace.¹⁶⁰ The Habsburgs were negatively surprised by that document and sent to the governments of Firenze, Roma, Napoli and Modena a note in which the Piedmontese claim of being the protector of the Italian interests was refused and the Foreign Minister Buol was also worried to guarantee the solidarity of the European Powers. Nevertheless this

¹⁵⁵Matthew S. Anderson, *op. cit.*, p.146

¹⁵⁶*Ibid.*, p.142

¹⁵⁷*Ibid.*

¹⁵⁸Alan J. P. Taylor, *op. cit.*, p.87

¹⁵⁹Rosario Romeo, *op. cit.*, p.338

¹⁶⁰*Ibid.*, pp.329-343

did not hindered their will to continue the discussion of the Italian question started by Clarendon and Cavour at the Congress of Paris on 8 April 1856.¹⁶¹

In the correspondence between monsignor Sacconi, the papal nuntio in Paris, to the Secretary of State Cardinal Antonelli, it is clear how after the Congress of Paris the statesmen of the Papal States felt a foreign pressure for internal reforms:

All these data bring me to believe that the news given by a good source is true: that they are working over a memorandum about the reforms to be proposed to the Government of the Holy See. Moreover, I have got more data to believe that the Governments of England and of France are already working over that of Austria to convince it to speak, to insinuate and to take action in Rome according to what the French Ambassador will do. And I have to consider that he will give his cooperation if the reforms to be suggested will be just administrative and not political...¹⁶²

Interesting is also a letter sent by Pius IX to Napoleon III in which the Pope tries to defend the administration of the Papal States:

I am about to finish My trip over the States of the Church. I have reason to thank the Lord about the respectful and friendly manner with which I was welcomed everywhere. This is a solemn denial to the eternal enemies of the Papal Government, who could print a thousand lies in their newspapers, but they will never be able to negate the truth with good results.¹⁶³

The future successes of Bismarck and Cavour were to be made possible by the isolation and relative weakness of the Habsburg Empire. Their foundations had been laid by the Crimean War,¹⁶⁴ remembering also the fact that after 1856 Russia became indifferent to the Habsburgs interests in the Italian peninsula, changing its attention toward Asia and considering the Black Sea only as a buffer for its defense.¹⁶⁵

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p.344

¹⁶² Pietro Pirri, op. cit., p.37

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, p.39

¹⁶⁴ Matthew S. Anderson, op. cit., p.146

¹⁶⁵ Alan J. P. Taylor, op. cit., pp.90-91

The Crimean War made indirectly possible the Italian war in 1859 and then the unification because it upset the arrangement of the Vienna Treaty. Russia, which in 1848-49 was the strongest supporter of the status quo, became a revisionist power. After having been abandoned by the Habsburgs, the Czar was not anymore willing to help his old ally. Moreover, Napoleon III desired to reestablish French hegemony over Europe, and then it became possible for him to ally with Sardinia against Austria.¹⁶⁶

After Cavour obtained nothing concrete at the Congress of Paris, his position as a politician was put at risk. This is why he chose to identify the policy of his liberal party with the national cause of the Italian unification.¹⁶⁷ In fact the Italian liberal opinion converged towards the Kingdom of Piedmont. Cavour assumed the role that in the 1848 uprisings the Italian would have liked to give to pope Pius IX.

The unification of Italy was in the end to have serious implications for the Papal States, as it was not thinkable that the center of the peninsula would have been excluded from a unitary government.¹⁶⁸ Nevertheless the survival of the Papal States was both in the interests of the Habsburg Empire and Napoleon III: in the first case the Austrians considered the Pope as an ally inside the peninsula in which they had much political interest, in the second case French Catholic voters were very much influenced by the behavior of their President toward the Pope.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁶Derek Beales and Eugenio F. Biagini, op. cit., p.159

¹⁶⁷Rosario Romeo, op. cit., p.339

¹⁶⁸Roger Collins, *Keepers of the Keys of Heaven: A History of the Papacy*, (New York: Basic Books, 2009), p.437

¹⁶⁹René Albrecht-Carrié, op. cit., p.140

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSION

The European balance of power was determinant in the developments of the 19th century, and this is why it cannot be underestimated in the study of historical events of that period of time. For this thesis it has been decided to take into consideration two territories in the periphery respect to the great Powers of the time: the Ottoman Empire and the Italian peninsula. As far as the time span was concerned, the Crimean War, the subsequent Congress of Paris and its consequences have been considered.

The Crimean War is a suitable perspective in order to understand the mechanics that lay under the international relations of that time between “Europe” and the Ottoman Empire. It was a time in which the economical and structural limits of the Empire were quite marked. It could not compete with its enemies both from the military and the economical point of views. For this reason it was always compelled to find suitable agreements with the allies, albeit damaging ones in the long term.

To the Crimean War was linked the Kingdom of Sardinia, whose army was sent to the Russian peninsula on the side of the French and the British contingents. For strategic reasons both King Vittorio Emanuele II and the Prime Minister Camillo Benso Count of Cavour were eager to make their Kingdom a recognized political entity among the great European Powers. At that time the Kingdom of Sardinia, which consisted of the island of Sardinia and the north-western territories of the Italian peninsula (the current regions of Piedmont, Liguria, and Valle d’Aosta), was the only liberal and constitutional between the other Italian political entities. For this reason the Kingdom became also the informal *de facto* representative of all the Italian liberals and nationalists that wanted to free their lands from the Austrian hegemony over the peninsula. As a confirmation, it is worthwhile to recall that in 1861 the unification of Italy was basically lead by the Kingdom of Sardinia.

The Congress of Paris in 1856 was the first time in which both Ottoman and Italian representatives participated in a peace conference, not to mention

the entrance of the Ottoman Empire as a member of the Concert of Europe. From the perspective of the Sardinian Prime Minister Cavour, his desire was to elevate the Italian question to the international level. Namely the Italian nationalistic drive against the foreign invaders, the Habsburgs.

The Crimean War was responsible for the change of the European equilibrium. The Russian hegemonic aims over the Ottoman Empire provoked the participation of the Great Powers into a process which concluded in the unhinging of the status quo ratified by the 1815 Congress of Vienna. Moreover, as Rosario Romeo writes, the way in which the Powers treated the Italian situation during the Congress of Paris was a commitment that would have brought important events on the diplomatic plan: now the question was to defend the “order” (of the Congress of Vienna) against the “revolution” (recalling the French revolution and the consequential Napoleonic wars) that in the future could have been caused by the discontent of the Italians under the foreign hegemony. Now in a diplomatic environment the Italian question was recognized, and it deserved the complaints of the inhabitants of the peninsula. It was not a coincidence that after two years, in 1858, Napoleon III offered an alliance to the Kingdom of Sardinia, known as the Plombières agreement, against the Habsburg Empire.¹

As far as the reforms in the Ottoman Empire were concerned, above all after the Hatt-ı Hümayun edict the Powers did not assume a consistent behavior about the content of the reforms, rather they just acted according to their interests. Actually the Powers in persuading the Ottomans to abolish economical restrictions, wanted to prevent the Ottoman Empire from protecting its national economy, as did the Americans and Russians already did, and Japan was soon to do.² This situation contributed to the ineffective implementation of the Tanzimat in order to make the Empire suitable to the challenges of the time.

As far as the situation in the Italian peninsula was concerned, in the end there existed a shared consensus of the strongest Powers: France and Great Britain. They both were on the side of the Kingdom of Sardinia, with the due diplomatic precautions, against the Habsburgs and their strongest ally in the

¹Rosario Romeo, *Vita di Cavour*, (Roma: Laterza, 2004), pp.332-333

²Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, (London: Hurst, 1998), p.139

peninsula, namely the Papal States. The French and the British support in the following years eventually fostered the Italian unification and the expulsion of the Habsburgs from the north of the peninsula.

One sees that the policies of the external Powers are strictly linked to the destiny of the two entities under examination in this thesis. Even if the Ottoman Empire became part of the Concert of Europe, it continued to suffer from its backwardness, taking also into consideration the loans it started to implement as a means to face the economic situation, while the Kingdom of Sardinia rose to a superior level of importance in the international diplomacy.

Even though beyond the temporal limits of this thesis, it is nevertheless significant to notice that the process of Italian unification between 1859 and 1861 can be interpreted in a different manner if it is considered as the result of the actions of the Sardinian Prime Minister Cavour or, more properly, as a circumstance of the revision of the European structure according to the projects of the great Powers of the time.³ Moreover, as Riall asserts, from 1815 to the unification, the States of the peninsula were under great influence from the European courts, and until the defeat of the Habsburgs in 1859, Italian destiny was barely in the hands of the internal Italian forces.⁴

By the same token, the pressures of the foreign Powers toward the Ottoman reforms resulted in a lesser consideration of the Sharia in formulating the Islahat edict. Together with this, there is also the fact that the Ottoman economical reforms produced impoverished peasantry, which took as refuge the medreses, and thus constituting a reserve army for reaction against the Tanzimat.⁵ This situation in the following years brought uprisings (the Kuleli incidents and the rising of the Young Ottomans) that condemned the neglect of the religious precepts and the equality between Muslims and non-Muslims, together with the desire to terminate the government of the time and replacing it with a constitutional, even if not secular one.⁶

It is worthwhile to recall the fact that the behaviors of the great Powers

³Ennio Di Nolfo, *Prima lezione di storia delle relazioni internazionali*, (Bari: Laterza, 2006), p.29

⁴Lucy Riall, *The Italian Risorgimento*, (London: Routledge, 2004), p.76

⁵Niyazi Berkes, op. cit., p.142

⁶Butrus Abu-Manneh, "The Islamic Roots of the Gülhane Rescript", in *Die Welt des Islams*, vol.34, n.2, p.203

towards the Ottoman Empire and the Papal States were strategically similar, in the sense that in both cases they acted strictly according to political aims. It could be affirmed that the great Powers did not give importance to which kind of religious entity they were facing, they just asked for reforms: in the case of the Ottoman Empire to support their economies, and in the case of the Papal States to prevent the continuous uprisings that those territories were facing since the beginning of the 19th century and that required the help of the Habsburg to bring back order.

This is the confirmation of the fact that the religious rhetoric is just a means that political leaders from time to time used to justify their strategic claims. The events of the Crimean War are characterized by this same pattern: the alliance of three Christian Powers (Great Britain, France and the Kingdom of Sardinia) plus the Muslim Ottoman Empire, against the Russians which claimed to be the defender of the Orthodox population; the request of the Catholic Church to protect the interests of the Catholics in the East and the pragmatic refusal of the Catholic sovereign Napoleon III; the entrance of the Ottoman Empire into the Concert of Europe vis à vis the criticism that the British and the Sardinian representatives directed toward the Papal States.

Comparing the Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom of Sardinia on the same level has been useful to understand that the course of history cannot be reduced to some clashes between groups of different “civilizations” or “religions”. On the contrary, this kind of perspective could be very dangerous as it could endanger a more objective approach for the study of historical subjects that involve the concepts of “East” and “West” and their contraposition.

During the 19th century economic liberalism remained the dominant Ottoman practice, even if the protectionists sporadically fought against its Ottoman and European advocates. For example the abolition of the Jannissary corps in 1826 and the Balta Limani Agreement in 1830 were two episodes that clearly put the Ottoman Empire on the side of the liberal forces of the time.⁷ This is a trend that continued in the following decades. The “first wholesale borrowing of Western law” was the adoption of the commercial law of 1850 largely copied by the French one; the French law provided also the basic model for the penal code of 1858, the codes of procedure for mixed commercial courts

⁷Donald Quataert, *The Ottoman Empire 1700-1922*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp.763-764

of 1861 and the one of maritime commerce of 1863.⁸

After the Congress of Vienna in 1815, the events in the Italian peninsula show that there was a strong and diffuse incongruence between the people, above all the middle class, and the conservative system established at the end of the Napoleonic Wars. The Italian state that mostly detached itself from the old system was the Kingdom of Sardinia. The uprisings of 1848 boosted its road toward liberalism: it enacted war against the Habsburg Empire and adopted the most liberal and wealthy constitution of all the peninsula, the *Statuto Albertino*. Afterwards it embraced liberal economic measures that strengthened its proximity with the European liberal Powers; it made laws against the Papal influence over the Sardinian territory, a move directly against the most important ally of the Habsburgs in the peninsula.

The alliance during the Crimean War was just consistent with the trend described above: the liberal European Powers, Great Britain and France, had on their side both the Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom of Sardinia. They took a political firm stand on the side of the liberal forces vis à vis the conservatives, namely Russia and the Habsburg Empire. On the international level this trend could be perceived as the continuation of the Napoleonic heritage: the Congress of Vienna and the desire of the old ruling classes were not enough to restrain those forces that in the end would have ratified the victory of liberalism.

⁸Roderic Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp.44-98-99

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Appendix A

STATESMEN OF THE PERIOD

Table A.1: Statesmen of the period

Ottoman Empire		Italian Peninsula			
Abdülmecid I	Sultan	1839-1861	Gregorius XVI	Pope	1831-1846
Reshit Pasha	Grand Vizier	1846-1848	Pius IX	Pope	1846-1878
		1848-1852	Vittorio Emanuele I	King of Sardinia	1802-1821
		1854-1855	Carlo Felice	King of Sardinia	1821-1831
		1856-1857	Carlo Alberto	King of Sardinian	1831-1849
	Minister of Foreign Affairs	1839-1841	Vittorio Emanuele II	King of Sardinia	1849-1861
		1845-1846	Cavour	Prime Minister	1852-1859
		1853-1854		Prime Minister	1852-1859
Fuad Pasha	Minister of Foreign Affairs	1852-1853			1860-1861
		1855-1856			
Ali Pasha	Grand Vizier	1852			
		1855-1856			
	Minister of Foreign Affairs	1844-1845			
		1846-1848			
		1848-1852			
		1854			
		1856			
France		Habsburg Empire			
Napoleon III	President	1848-1852	Franz Joseph	Emperor	1848-1916
	Emperor	1852-1870	Metternich	Foreign Minister	1809-1848
				State Chancellor	1821-1848
			Buol	Foreign Minister	1852-1859
Great Britain		Russian Empire			
Palmerston	Foreign Secretary	1846-1851	Nicholas I	Czar	1825-1855
	Home Secretary	1852-1855	Alexander II	Czar	1855-1881
	Prime Minister	1855-1858	Menshikov	Minister of the Navy	1836-1855
Clarendon	Foreign Secretary	1853-1858			

Appendix B

CORRESPONDENCES

Figure B.1: Letter from Vittorio Emanuele II to Pope Pius IX of 25 July 1852, from Pietro Pirri, *Pio IX e Vittorio Emanuele II dal loro carteggio privato. I: La Laicizzazione dello Stato Sardo (1848-1856)*, (Roma: Pontificia Università Gregoriana, 1944), pp.104-105-106-107-108-109-110-111

25.

Vittorio Emanuele a Pio IX

Stupinigi, 25 luglio 1852

Arch. Pio IX. Sard. I. N. 35. *Autografa*

Beatissimo Padre

Rincrescente al sommo della pena che sia io che il mio Ministero possiamo avere cagionata all'a Santità Vostra colla nuova legge sul Matrimonio; permetta però Beatissimo Padre che con tutto rispetto le faccia qualche osservazione.

Credevamo nel proporre questa legge, che è puramente legge civile, fare cosa necessaria a questo regno, e mai offendere Lei Beatissimo Padre, e mai fare cosa anticattolica, essendo noi tutti tanto di cuore affezionati alla nostra Santa Religione. Tanto più che erami stato detto in maniera che potevo

Figure B.1 (continued)

credere ufficiale ¹ che la Santità Vostra non considerava come ostile la proposta di questa legge. Vedo intorno a me altri Stati con leggi di tal genere molto peggiori che la nostra che pure godono l'affetto della Santità Vostra e che sono considerati anche dalla Santità Vostra per ben cattolici. — Onde Ella Beatissimo Padre veda la purezza delle nostre intenzioni nel fatto accaduto, le mando con questa lettera compiegato un sunto dei motivi pei quali la legge fu proposta ed i sentimenti del Ministero tutto in ciò fare, redatto questo scritto dal Ministero istesso.

Ora faccio osservare alla Santità Vostra che la legge non è passata ancora alla sanzione del Senato, nel qual corpo si radunano le primarie virtù e capacità del Regno ².

¹ All'apparire del disegno di legge Boncompagni sul matrimonio civile si levò una bufera di proteste. I vescovi di Savoia e quelli delle province subalpine e liguri levarono la voce con lettere collettive dirette al Re e al Senato. Sull'esempio dei pastori, anche i parroci si dettero attorno a raccogliere petizioni e ad istruire i fedeli sullo spirito che informava questo nuovo progetto di legge; visto che, a dispetto del risentimento dei cattolici, il parlamento s'era affrettato a discuterlo d'urgenza e l'aveva approvato con una grande maggioranza.

Si pretese che di mene politiche clericali (i «vili», gli «infernali raggiri» di cui parla Vittorio Emanuele; confr. VACCALLUZZO o. c. 218 e 398) cadessero in mano del governo documenti compromettenti; ma questi documenti non sono mai apparsi in luce. Ciò non vieta all'OMODEO, o. c. I 197, di attribuire ai cattolici «metodi demagogici».

Certo è che il Ministro Pernati, immaginando di vedere nelle file del clero tutta una falange d'intriganti, di mestatori, i quali a forza di raggiri, di minacce, di frodi e di calunnie, cercavano di creare ostacoli al governo, emanò una circolare, ch'era una diretta violazione del diritto di petizione (sembra infatti che tutto si riducesse all'azione svolta dal clero per raccogliere firme contro il progetto di legge sul matrimonio), e richiamava l'attenzione degli intendenti e dei carabinieri sui trasgressori. Non aveva torto il corrispondente torinese della *Civiltà Cattolica* (An. I vol. X 585) di dire: «vogliono tutto per loro il monopolio della libertà, ma sanno altresì che l'uso malaccorto o sfacciato mette in pericolo ogni cosa».

² Queste parole dimostrano che Vittorio Emanuele era ormai deciso a dare alla politica del governo un indirizzo diverso da quello del gabinetto D'Azeglio. Confr. COGNASSO, *Vittorio Emanuele II*, p. 75.

La situazione del ministero D'Azeglio era traballante da parecchio tempo. Il corrispondente della *Civiltà Cattolica*, An. III vol. XL p. 472) ch'era allora il celebre don Margotti, il 6 novembre enumerava le varie cause di debolezza che ne avevano resa precaria l'esistenza.

Figure B.1 continued

Permetta la Santità Vostra che osservi un fatto che viene di accadere e che fecemi una gran pena. Lei Beatissimo Padre

«Il signor D'Azeglio già da lunga pezza mostravasi infastidito delle cure da governo. Oltre lo scompiglio delle finanze gravate d'un debito di 700 milioni e d'un deficit annuo che forse toccherà i 50 milioni: oltre lo spinoso intreccio della quistione religiosa suscitata con tanta improntitudine, mantenuta viva con tanto scandalo delle coscienze e con tante turbolenze pubbliche, senza speranza di convenevole soluzione; oltre l'impotenza d'infrenare qualche partito estremo che altra volta non senza compiacenza lasciavasi scatenato contro Roma e i governi stranieri; oltre siffatte cause di disgusti, il signor D'Azeglio sentiva pure l'onta dello sfregio fatto a lui ed a' suoi colleghi da buon numero di municipii e consigli provinciali. Imperocchè questi, con edificante esempio di cieca obbedienza agli ordini ed agli inviti della lurida Gazzetta del Popolo, si mossero subito a decretare petizioni al Parlamento per lo incameramento de' beni ecclesiastici. Il Ministero, come scrissi altra volta, cercò d'opporvisi con una circolare del signor Pernati agli intendenti generali, a cui si notificava e la disapprovazione del ministero per tali progetti di incameramento e l'illegalità dell'atto cui venivano tali municipii, eccedendo i limiti delle proprie attribuzioni, che riguardano solo oggetti d'amministrazione locale. Il Ministero appoggiavasi ancora al voto del Consiglio di Stato. Credereste? A mostrare quanto sia ancor vivo fra noi il rispetto all'autorità, buon numero di municipii e consigli provinciali, protestando contro la circolare del Pernati come contro un atto icostituzionale, si levarono arditamente addosso al ministro e con burbanza da popolo sovrano votarono solennemente pel latrocínio de' beni ecclesiastici. Al riaprirsi della sessione parlamentare tutte queste petizioni, che in gran parte sono opera di appena quattro o cinque individui, sarebbero fioccate alle Camere, dove oratori già apprestati avrebbero ripetute le scene delle leggi Suardi. Il ministero D'Azeglio non ebbe coraggio d'affrontare Puragano, nè di secondarlo, e pentito forse d'averlo, se non provocato, almen lasciato sorgere, si appigliò al consueto spediente d'una volontaria dimissione. Era di que' di tornato da' suoi viaggi il Conte di Cavour e fu tosto chiamato dal Re, come pare che D'Azeglio stesso avesse consigliato al Re, a modo d'un nuovo esperimento. Certo è che dopo due giorni di conferenze e di pratiche, o il signor Cavour non credette di potersi acconciare alle intenzioni del Re su certi punti, ovvero non trovò Collegli che gli volessero dar mano; ed egli lasciando a mezzo ogni cosa, si ridusse in una sua villa ad aspettarvi gli eventi».

A queste ragioni estrinseche, il corrispondente aggiunge poi certi motivi segreti, di cui era pure trapelato qualche cosa nel pubblico:

«Parlossi ancora di una lettera autografa di S. S. al Re Vittorio Emanuele, per la cui autorità avrebbe questi manifestato a' suoi Ministri una risoluta volontà di veder ricomposti gli accordi colla Santa Sede, ritirata la legge del matrimonio civile e troncate le pratiche e le violenze delle fazioni irreligiose per lo incameramento de' beni ecclesiastici. Di che

Figure B.1 continued

diedemi la scelta sopra due Vescovi, onde uno servisse da amministratore alla diocesi di Torino. Questo Vescovo fu da me

sgominati i ministri, nè sapendo come trarsi d'impaccio, avrebbero preferito di pregare il Re a cercar altri consiglieri, non bastando loro l'animo nè di dare addietro, nè di spingersi innanzi a dispetto del Re. Certo è che corse voce essere il Re ben fermo sul proposito di non voler più sentirsi parlare nè di matrimonio civile nè d'incameramento».

Tali voci che correvano come indiscrezioni di corridoio, sappiamo ora essere state le vere cause moventi della crisi. Anche l'abate Roberti scriveva da Torino il 20 ottobre 1852 N. 649: «Ho saputo da buona fonte che S. M. il Re si sia lagnato vivamente col Ministro (D'Azeglio) pel progetto di legge sul matrimonio e del movimento eccitatosi nel suddetto incameramento, facendogli intendere che egli non vuole né l'uno né l'altro» (SDS. 257. 252). Conf. anche OMODEO, o. c. II pp. 199.

Il Re era deciso a farla finita con quella politica a doppio fondo, che gli procurava tanti dispiaceri domestici e tanti grattacapi. L'episcopato, il clero, i cattolici subalpini avevano già date prove eloquenti, che non erano per nulla disposti a lasciarsi schiacciare le noci in testa; e lungi dal cedere di fronte alle intimidazioni, divenivano sempre più agguerriti alla lotta. La campagna anticlericale durata con tanta pertinacia dalla stampa ultraliberale, a lungo andare poteva condurre le cose più là che non si bramasse, tanto più che la marea radicale s'ergeva anch'essa minacciosa e travolgente. La manovra delle petizioni per l'incameramento n'era l'esempio più recente. Anche le insurrezioni di Sardegna del marzo scorso erano foriere di sinistri presagi. Vittorio Emanuele ne era molto impressionato, tanto da sentirsi vacillare il trono sotto i piedi. La sua lettera del 20 aprile a Pio IX rivela che egli già aveva concepito il pensiero di cambiar rotta alla politica ecclesiastica, e molti documenti posteriori dimostrano che era rimasto fedele a questa idea.

Senza dubbio si riporta alla presente fase delle relazioni tra Stato e Chiesa, e non al novembre 1849, come suppone il VACCALLUZZO, quell'importante gruppo di biglietti senza data scritti dal Re al D'Azeglio, ch'egli per il primo ha tratto in luce dall'archivio Ricci di Macerata e pubblicato nel suo volume: *M. D'Azeglio*. Roma 1925 395-398 e 217. Vi si leggono allusioni palesi ad affari e a circostanze, che fanno riscontro con ciò che si leggerà nelle due lettere del Re e di Pio IX di cui ci occupiamo (p. c. «il compendio dei motivi per cui fu proposta la legge», gli «infernali raggiri», l'affare Charvaz, ecc). Dalle quali due lettere risulta poi un'altro fatto non meno importante, ed è che Vittorio Emanuele s'era appigliato al partito di fare, per le questioni religiose, una politica personale, trattando direttamente col Papa ad insaputa del capo del governo. Solo a cose fatte egli mandò la lettera pontificia del 2 luglio, con una minuta di risposta da lui stesso preparata, al D'Azeglio, che si trovava in vacanze alla Spezia, e l'accompagnò con questo curioso messaggio:

Caro Tapparelli,

Scusi se non ho più dato segno di vita. Parmi però che il dolore che

Figure B.1 continued

scelto, ne diedi la lieta notizia a persona di confidenza, videro in ciò principiare un'era più bella, ma qual fu la mia sorpresa

prova il Gran Visir della sua lontananza dal tiranno è mitigato dai piaceri di quaggiù; cose di questo mondo, mentre io sono nei tormenti egli gode le delizie della Spezia. Ora parmi necessario che scuota la sua cara pace e ascolti il mane tekel fares.

Le mando la lettera che mi scrisse il Papa e quella che io povero diavolo gli risposi, con ordine posta corrente di rimandarmela; unita alla mia mandai al Papa un dignitoso suntuo scritto dal Ministero non segnato dei motivi per cui la legge fu fatta e dei sentimenti di rispetto e di vero attaccamento che professa il Ministero tutto per la S. Sede. Vedremo come risponderà Sua Santità. Una copia dello scritto fu mandata al nostro Ministro che ho incaricato di mettere in mani proprie del Papa la mia lettera. Guerra acerrima ci è mossa da ogni parte come ben saprà dal partito pretino che spera darci il tracollo, non vi è mezzi che non s'impieghino per giungere allo scopo; io ne soffro tutte le conseguenze e se Lei non si dà un poco di elasticità e di premura con Roma, quello che finirà per ballarla sarò io e non loro indegni Ministri. Proteste furono fatte dai Vescovi al di qua e al di là delle Alpi e io feci rispondere loro una lettera chiara dall'abate Vacchetta in cui erano evidenti i loro torti verso di me e delle leggi dello Stato e facevo fortemente sentire iratus rex. La feci fare tale che si potesse stampare ovunque e da lui e non dal Ministero, affinché fosse più omogenea.

Molte firme furono carpite in varie diocesi, gran parte con lo spavento, la frode e l'inganno, e la cosa così cammina. Vedrà dalla lettera che scrissi al Papa il suntuo dei miei pensieri e Lei mi faccia risposta. Soprattutto bisogna lavorare perché altri lavorano molto e prepararsi a venire al chiaro, se è possibile, del tenebroso lavoro. Avrà osservato la frase dei Vescovi della Savoia al popolo Allobrogo (Le rapport ministériel proteste d'un grand respect pour la religion. C'est une dévotion qui ne saurait nous tromper). Quella a questa ora ci è rientrata nel collo. Ponderi quello che le scrissi e mi risponda.

Non entro in infiniti dettagli delle loro mene verso di me; sarebbe troppo lungo. Ciao. Il suo affezionatissimo amico

VITTORIO EMANUELE

Massimo si prese la libertà di rinviar la minuta corretta e accompagnata con qualche consiglio, di cui si può immaginare il tenore, che al Re non garbarono punto. Egli si vide arrivare questo breve e tagliente biglietto:

Quando io faccio una cosa so quello che faccio, e, per dirle la verità, non sono amatore di consigli. Quando ne avrò bisogno, glieli chiederò. Con tutto questo non mi voglia male, ciao Massimo. Il suo affezionatissimo VITTORIO EMANUELE.

Per quanto grande fosse la confidenza con cui il Re soleva trattare il D'Azeglio, pure in circostanze come quelle (si noti che da parecchio tempo Massimo era generalmente reputato come un ministro di parata. Il Fi-

Figure B.1 continued

quando la Santità Vostra non volle più di ciò. Se la Santità Vostra crede che gli imbrogli a terminare le cose vengano da parte nostra, osservi che ve ne sono anche da altra parte³.

schietto ci scherzava su e lo rappresentava nella veste di pavone, e dietro, cauto e sornione, come un gatto, Cavour, pronto a ghermirlo) era difficile non prendere quegli strani messaggi come un invito a rassegnare il ministero. E così infatti Massimo l'intese, e si affrettò a mandare le sue dimissioni in termini dignitosi, ma decisi.

Il Re cercò volgere la cosa in burla: «*Caro Massimo, non inferocisca tanto: e già capisco che mi scrisse quella bella epistola perchè le dicessi bravo. Bravo anche gli dirò se vuole: ma resterà sempre vero che Ella con quelle sue osservazioni mi dette una patente di asinità. Eppure, non credo di essere nè meno io uno sciocco!*» (ivi, 397). Dunque nessun segno di respicenza. Dietro a questo biglietto ne seguì un altro con cui gli rimanda «gli infernali raggiri», compiega «la lettera a Nono Pio» (non dice se corretta giusta i suggerimenti datigli), parla dell'«affare Charvaz», e finisce con espressione di gladiatoria ferezza: «Se il mondo intero mi precipiterà, canterò *alleluia*» (ibid.). Il 21 ottobre Vittorio Emanuele dichiarò nel consiglio dei Ministri, che non intendeva acconsentire ad una legge che dispiaceva al Papa. D'Azeglio il dì appresso chiedeva le dimissioni, — e questa volta definitivamente. COGNASSO, o. c. 79.

La crisi era aperta. I rapporti dell'abate Roberti riveleranno ulteriori sviluppi dell'azione personale del Re, col tentativo di un ministero Balbo-Revel, sino al suo fallimento e la costituzione del ministero Cavour.

³ Se non unico risultato della missione Sambuy a Roma, almeno il più importante fu la provvista dell'archidiocesi di Genova, la quale dopo quattro anni era tuttavia vacante. Pio IX accolse assai di buon grado la proposta di Monsignor Charvaz; il quale si indusse ad addossarsi tal peso, solo in vista di un bene generale che ne sarebbe dovuto derivare, giacchè Vittorio Emanuele gli faceva intendere che dalla sua accettazione dipendeva altresì la sistemazione delle altre due archidiocesi di Torino e di Cagliari, i cui pastori erano tuttora in bando. Dalle ottimistiche relazioni del de Sambuy il Re s'era persuaso che, mediante il ritorno di Marongiu a Cagliari e la nomina d'un amministratore apostolico a Torino, si sarebbe raggiunto un pieno accordo con Roma. Per l'amministrazione dell'archidiocesi di Torino egli proponeva Monsignor Giovanni Antonio Oddone, già arcidiacono e poi vescovo di Vercelli. Non risulta che per conto del candidato la Santa Sede avesse difficoltà; ma non poteva aderire a questa proposta del Re senza ferire l'onore di Monsignor Fransoni e il decoro di tutto l'episcopato subalpino, il quale vedeva in lui impersonata la sua propria causa.

L'abate Roberti, incaricato dal Cardinale Antonelli di esaminare diligentemente qual soluzione si offriva per la sede di Torino, rispondeva non poter essere «*la rimozione del Pastore dalla sua sede e la surrogazio-*

Figure B.1 continued

Dirò ancora alla Santità Vostra dell'ostilità continua che varj Vescovi ed altri membri del clero, sia Piemontese che Pontificio, muovono costantemente al mio Governo. Non credo che sia Religione il chiamare alla rivolta uno Stato contro il suo capo e le sue leggi, sia con iscritti che con vili raggiri, che sono tutt'altro che cristiani e cattolici⁴.

ne di altro soggetto. Una provvidenza di simil fatta, aggiungeva, riuscirebbe altamente dolorosa e sconsolante a tutti i veri e sinceri cattolici ed alle persone sacre ed assennate, le quali in tal caso preferirebbero piuttosto lo statu quo, o pure, volendosi in qualche modo provvedere, avviserebbero che venisse dato un maggiore impulso alla Curia Ecclesiastica».

Facendosi eco dell'opinione delle persone più eminenti dell'episcopato e del laicato cattolico subalpino, soggiungeva le seguenti savie osservazioni:

«Riflettendo essi allo stato morale e religioso del Piemonte trovano che il paese si trova sotto un certo punto di vista in miglior condizione ne' tempi presenti, che non lo fosse dieci anni addietro; per la ragione che il guasto che esisteva nelle massime e nelle dottrine relative a materie ecclesiastica e religiosa, era latente e coperto da una crosta d'ipocrisia, che impediva di vederne il marciume, e che la tribolazione in cui ora versa il paese non è che un vaglio per distinguere i buoni dai cattivi; e che mentre è sperabile che questi si disingannino, i buoni al contrario si consolidano sempre più e perciò si augurano che l'attuale persecuzione darà un giorno frutti di bene morale e religioso nel Piemonte» (Rapporto 15 febbraio 1853, N. 674. SDS. 257 '53).

Visto che la situazione per Torino rimaneva invariata e prevedendo che lo stesso potesse avvenire di Cagliari, Monsignor Charvaz il quale si era sobbarcato ad accettare la sede di Genova solo in vista di una intesa generale fra le due corti, credette inutile il suo sacrificio e scrisse a Roma e a Torino per ritirare il suo consenso. Gli giunsero però d'ambo le parti sì pressanti sollecitazioni che dovette arrendersi, e la nomina fu pubblicata nel concistoro del 27 settembre 1852.

Su questa nomina e sulle cause per cui la questione di Torino rimase sospesa, i documenti che pubblichiamo recano nuova luce.

⁴ L'abate Roberti, il 20 ottobre 1852 N. 649, informava da Torino, che il Ministro degli esteri aveva inviate circolari ai suoi rappresentanti per informare le corti presso le quali erano accreditati sulla natura dei dissensi con la Santa Sede, e per dolersi dell'attitudine ostile dei cattolici. Diceva che il Governo «gemeva sotto il peso della pressione clericale», e giustificava la politica adottata come «una soddisfazione ai pubblici voti». Quanto al progetto di legge sul matrimonio civile, in dette circolari si affermava, che «il S. P. aveva detto all'inviato sardo, il signor conte di Sambuy, che riferendosi quello ad un oggetto di amministrazione interna dello Stato, toccava al governo regolarne gli effetti», che intanto il detto inviato aveva fatto ritorno in Torino, e non si restituirà in Roma, «se la Santa Sede

Figure B.1 continued

I documenti sono in nostre mani Beatissimo Padre e credo che la politica non ha niente da fare colla Religione. Certe cose le soffro con pazienza perchè Cristiano, ma se vanno troppo oltre come Re non potrò passarle in silenzio.

Mi metto ai suoi piedi Beatissimo Padre, baciando la santa croce, per cui vorrei potere versare tutto il mio sangue, e col massimo rispetto ed affezione di figlio le chiedo la santa Benedizione.

Della Santità Vostra

L'umilissimo ed obbed. figlio
VITTORIO EMANUELE

Stupinigi li 25 luglio.

— Prego la Santità Vostra di volermi fare una risposta, ci terrei molto.

Figure B.2: Letter from Vittorio Emanuele II to Pope Pius IX of 9 February 1855, from Pietro Pirri, *Pio IX e Vittorio Emanuele II dal loro carteggio privato. I: La Laicizzazione dello Stato Sardo (1848-1856)*, (Roma: Pontificia Università Gregoriana, 1944), pp.155-156-157

37. *Vittorio Emanuele II a Pio IX*
9 febbraio 1855

Arch. Pio IX. Sard. I B. 45. *Autografa*

Beatissimo Padre

Nell'immenso dolore che provo, che distrugge tutto me stesso, sommo balsamo recano al mio tristo cuore, le parole di dolcezza e di carità, che Lei Beatissimo Padre volle inviarmi. Se più non scrissi per lo passato alla Santità Vostra, desidero che sappia che non è per non curanza per parte mia degli affari della Chiesa, ma invece perchè credetti dal canto mio esausti tutti i mezzi sia privati che pubblici onde giungere alla desiata meta¹. Rinresce immensamente al mio cuore di vedere le cose andare così, ma se dalla parte dei suoi ministri si fosse adoperata pel Piemonte una parte della carità che si adopera per gli altri regni e che fossesi stato un poco più di

contentarsi di ripetere che «nella Curia Romana la coscienza artefatta ha ucciso la coscienza naturale». Lo scritto di Massimo rivela le belle doti di polemista tempestivo ed accorto. In sostanza però è vero il giudizio del Roberti: esso riduce una grande questione di principii ad un meschino fatto personale.

¹ Vittorio Emanuele dopo un prolungato silenzio che durava dal 23 gennaio 1853, rinnovò gli approcci con Pio IX nel novembre 1854, per mezzo di tre vescovi, che si recavano a Roma. La notizia fu rivelata da Monsignor Billiet, ch'era uno dei tre, al Senato il 23 aprile 1855, come riferisce la *Civiltà Cattolica*, 10 (ser. II) 474:

«La bontà e condiscendenza della S. Sede e la durezza e slealtà de' ministri venne anche messa in chiaro da una lettera che l'Arcivescovo di Ciampieri lesse al Senato nella tornata del 23 Aprile. Questa lettera era stata diretta al nostro Re dai Vescovi di Genova (Charvaz), di Moriana (Vibert) e di Annecy (Billiet) sotto la data di Roma 26 Novembre 1854. Riferivano i Vescovi che giunti in Roma eransi occupati, conforme alle intenzioni di S. M., dei mezzi atti ad appianare la via ad un accomodamento colla S. Sede. «Avevamo trovato, dicono i Vescovi, le più benevole disposizioni sia nei Cardinali coi quali ne abbiamo conferito, sia nel Sommo Pontefice». Ma in questo tempo giungeva in Roma la proposta di legge Rattazzi, e mentre il Santo Padre allargava la mano in concessioni e beneficenze verso il Piemonte, il ministero coglieva quel medesimo istante per cagionargli una nuova afflizione, e meditava di spogliare la Chiesa».

Figure B.2 (continued)

buon volere da parte loro; questo Governo mediante un savio e rispettoso intendimento colla Santità Vostra avrebbe arrestato sua marcia, in fatti che dispiacquero alla Santità Vostra, che però erano chiesti dalle emergenze dei tempi e che sono riconosciuti come fatti compiuti in altri regni da Vostra Beatitudine stessa.

La Santità Vostra si ricorderà che non à guari, allorchè il Senato del Regno non votava la legge sul matrimonio, Ella ne fu avvertita, ed il mio Governo benchè questa legge fosse chiesta dalla Nazione, non più la riprodusse. Ora parlandole col cuore alla mano dirò alla Santità Sua che un fatto consimile era per accadere riguardo alla legge sui conventi, allorquando giunse la notizia delle parole dirette da Lei Beatissimo Padre al Piemonte in questa circostanza. Esse non servirono che ad inviperire gli animi e forse giungeremo allo scopo contrario. Mi scusi Santo Padre se le dico la verità ².

Prego la Santità Vostra di non dare ascolto a turpe genti che ricopronsi del manto della chiesa. Viaggiano da qui a Roma ed hanno adito alla corte sua, onde seminare il fiele della calunnia contro questo regno e chi lo regge ³.

Questo partito clericale dispregiato qui da tutti quelli che hanno senno, si crede più cattolico che il Papa, non ha che mensogne (sic) sulle labbra, ignoranza e superbia in testa.

² Vittorio Emanuele si riferisce a cose scritte al Papa nella lettera del 25 luglio 1852 a proposito del disegno di legge sul matrimonio civile: «Ora faccio osservare alla S. V. che la legge non è passata ancora alla sanzione del Senato...» e nell'altra del 23 gennaio 1853, con cui lo assicurava che avrebbe tenuto «nella maggior possibile considerazione» i consigli che su quel disegno di legge il Papa gli aveva dati nella sua del 19 settembre. Ripetutamente il Re afferma doversi alla propria azione personale se quel disegno di legge fu fatto naufragare in Senato.

Ora aggiunge che anche per la legge dei conventi egli aveva disegnato un piano somigliante, se non gli fosse stato guastato proprio dall'Allocuzione pontificia del 22 gennaio 1855.

³ La rovente allusione (*turpe genti*) non è certamente diretta ai tre vescovi piemontesi, che s'erano recati a Roma nel novembre del '54, ad informare la S. Sede sullo stato reale delle cose religiose in Piemonte (conf. il rapporto N. 802 del Roberti), poichè vi si recarono d'intesa col re; ma bensì a quei cattolici militanti che facevano capo ai tanto bersagliati giornali *Il Cattolico*, *Il Campanone*, *L'Osservatore ligure-subalpino*, e soprattutto alla battagliera *Armonia*. Ad essi, a torto o a ragione, il Re fa risalire la responsabilità della deprecata Allocuzione del 22 gennaio.

Figure B.2 (continued)

Se la Santità Vostra potesse vedere coi suoi occhi come è la Religione in Piemonte, che rispetto evvi per la Chiesa, come le Chiese sono zeppe di gente, forse non sarebbe così malcontento.

Faccia Beatissimo Padre con la sua carità di rappresentante di Christo (sic), tutto quello che potrà per questo regno; ed allorquando si ricomincerà a trattare, e questo spero fra breve, mi consoli finalmente e con me consoli quelle due anime Sante, che tanto desideravano vedere quel fatto compiuto sopra questa terra e che ne godranno certamente in cielo.

Baciandole il piede con profondo rispetto, sono, Beatissimo Padre,

della Santità Vostra

Umilissimo ed Obbedientissimo figlio
VITTORIO EMANUELE

Li 9 febbraio.

N. B.

Sappia la Santità Vostra che sono io che non lascio votare la legge sul Matrimonio dal Senato, che sono io che ora farò il possibile per non lasciare votare quella sui conventi. Forse fra brevi giorni questo ministero Cavour cascherà, ne nominerò uno della destra e metterò per condizione *sine qua non* che mi si venga al più presto ad un totale aggiustamento con Roma, (Mi faccia la carità di ajutarmi) io per parte mia ho sempre fatto quel che ho potuto. (Quelle parole al Piemonte non ci andavano adesso, ho paura che mi guasti tutto). Guarderò che la lege non passi, ma mi aiuti poi Santo Padre.

Bruci questo pezzo di carta per farmi piacere⁴.

⁴ Queste parole in tono tutto confidenziale scritte su di un taccolino di carta inserito nella lettera, conferma che la caduta del ministero era già predisposta dal Re molto prima che i noti incidenti dell'aprile in Senato mettessero Cavour nella necessità di rassegnare le dimissioni di tutto il gabinetto. Si ripeteva, più o meno, col ministero Cavour la medesima tattica adoperata per far cadere il ministero D'Azeglio.

Figure B.3: Letter from Pope Pius IX to Napoleon III of 8 February 1856, from Pietro Pirri, *Pio IX e Vittorio Emanuele II dal loro carteggio privato. II: La Questione Romana (1856-1864)*, (Roma: Pontificia Università Gregoriana, 1944), Documenti, pp.5-6

3.

Pio IX a Napoleone III

8 febbraio 1856

Arch. Pio IX: Sovrani. *Copia*

Maestà

Un oggetto di somma importanza tutto relativo alla unica e santa Nostra Religione Cattolica è quello che mi spinge a rivolgermi a Vostra Maestà per domandarle la Sua protezione a pro della stessa Religione. A momenti, per quanto si conosce, dovrà aprirsi in Parigi una Conferenza diplomatica, che viene consigliata dalle presenti lodolissime ed applaudite disposizioni di pace. Fra le gravi questioni che dovranno trattarsi non sarà certo trascurata quella che riguarda l'interessi dei Cattolici in Oriente; interessi che non può dispensarsi la Maestà Vostra di proteggere dall'alta posizione nella quale è piaciuto a Dio di collocarla. Ora è fuor di dubbio che un Sovrano Cattolico, e Sovrano così potente come Ella è, deve trattare questi interessi a preferenza di quelli delle altre false Religioni. E dico a preferenza, mentre avrei dovuto dire esclusivamente, giacchè se si debbono avversare le religioni non vere, non si deve mancare del pari ai dovuti possibili riguardi, suggeriti dalla carità, verso quelle genti che per loro disgrazia professano religioni false. Lo spirito d'indifferenza in materia di fede che purtroppo regna anche ai giorni nostri, e disgraziatamente anche in un numero di cattolici, vorrei, e lo vorrei di tutto cuore, che fosse eliminato per parte dei Plenipotenziarj Cattolici dal-

Figure B.3 (continued)

le Conferenze: ed è per questo che Io prego vivamente la Maestà Vostra.

Potrei discendere su questo argomento ad ulteriori dettagli, e palesare desiderj che nella loro esecuzione riempirebbero di gaudio tutti i fedeli, ma basta di aver accennato il principio, il quale quando sia sostenuto non può produrre che felici conseguenze. Vostra Maestà che ha dato tante prove di affettuoso rispetto verso la vera Chiesa di Gesù Cristo, vorrà, lo credo, adoperare l'alta e potente sua influenza affinché questa possa prendere lo sviluppo che le compete anche in quelle terre che sono ancora ricoperte dalle tenebre della infedeltà: e là dove regna lo scisma possa ottenersi il libero esercizio a favore dei Cattolici del proprio culto. Che se lo scisma aprì nei secoli scorsi la strada in Oriente alla più compassionevole infedeltà, la protezione accordata dai Potentati Cattolici alla Chiesa Apostolica Romana, farà sì coll'aiuto di Dio che questa unica vera Chiesa trionfi sugli ostacoli che le oppongono la infedeltà, lo scisma, e qualunque altra contraria parte.

Non posso tacere a Vostra Maestà che Iddio Mi fa sentire qualche lieta speranza, e Mi lusingo che voglia spargere nuove misericordie, le quali in molta parte scenderanno sopra di Lei a misura che spiegherà impegno per sostenere e proteggere quella Chiesa in mezzo alla quale Ella è nata. Per parte mia non ho altro stimolo che Mi fa parlare, scrivere e pregare, se non la Gloria di Dio, il bene delle anime, la dilatazione della Fede, e l'onore dei Principi Cattolici. Piaccia a Dio di farci vedere il proseguimento del nobile ed altissimo fine che Egli ebbe nella Incarnazione del Verbo, e cioè di vedersi adorato con una fede sola, con un Battesimo solo, giacchè Egli è un Dio solo.

Riceva l'Apostolica Benedizione che con effusione di cuore comparto a Lei, a Sua Maestà l'Imperatrice, al Suo portato, ed a tutta la Francia.

Dalle stanze del Vaticano li 8 Febbraio 1856

PIUS PP. IX

Figure B.4: Letter from Pope Pius IX to Napoleon III of 19 December 1856, from Pietro Pirri, *Pio IX e Vittorio Emanuele II dal loro carteggio privato. II: La Questione Romana (1856-1864)*, (Roma: Pontificia Università Gregoriana, 1944), Documenti, pp.8-9-10

5.

Pio IX a Napoleone III

19 dicembre 1856

Arch. Pio IX. Sovrani, *Copia*

Alcune apparenze che mi si parano innanzi m'ingrisono il dubbio che si possa parlare nell'imminente Congresso diplomatico in Parigi delle cose di Roma, ed è per questo che Io Mi rivolgo alla Maestà Vostra per esternarle in proposito i miei sentimenti.

Chiaro apparisce che il Governo temporale della Santa Sede è un oggetto contro il quale tutte si convergono le armi dei Protestanti, degl'inereduli, e dei rivoluzionarij di tutto il mondo, e specialmente dei sognatori della unità d'Italia, i quali suppongono, o credono di supporre che l'unico impedimento per conseguirla sia il dominio temporale Pontificio. Di qui nasce quel profluvio di accuse contro la Nostra Amministrazione, quasi che ogni altro Governo, eccettuato il Nostro, sia immune da qualsiasi difetto. Ma non è Mio scopo di esporre paragoni a Vostra Maestà. Mi limito solo a dire, che qualora la malevolenza e la imperizia abbia consigliato alcuni, come ho motivo di credere, ad emettere delle narrazioni sui disordini amministrativi dello Stato, è necessario, anzi è giusto di conoscere la verità prima di formarsi un criterio, giacchè se ancora l'infimo degli uomini ha diritto di conoscere le accuse che gli si fanno per poterle ribattere e confutare, chi vorrà presumere di condannare quasi sedente in tribunale l'amministrazione di uno Stato, e di uno Stato che è della Chiesa, governato dal Vicario di Gesù Cristo come Sovrano, senza prima conoscere con esattezza il suo interno andamento? Per parte della Maestà Vostra non posso, non voglio, e non debbo crederlo, tanto più che le assicurazioni datemi col mezzo del Signor Generale Gujon sono tali che stabiliscono per parte della Maestà Vostra la decisa volontà di lasciare intatto il Dominio temporale, e molto più la libertà e indipendenza del Capo della Reli-

Figure B.4 (continued)

gione Cattolica, delle quali assicurazioni sento tutto il bisogno di protestarle la più sincera gratitudine. Vivo pertanto non dirò nella lusinga ma nella sicurezza che nel futuro Congresso nulla vorrà trattarsi delle cose nostre, e che le memorie che si estesero, o si estendessero dai nemici di questo Dominio temporale saranno rese palesi perchè qualcuno possa contraporre alle esagerazioni le idee esatte, e alla menzogna la verità. Quel calunniare che continuamente si fa da una stampa passionata ed inquieta non può a meno di fuorviare la pubblica opinione, inducendola a formare i giudizi i più falsi della Nostra interna amministrazione. Certo è che questo Stato non può in tutto governarsi con quelle teorie di libertà tollerate in altri paesi, perchè appunto essendo Stato della Chiesa è necessario di non abbandonare totalmente quella coercizione che le compete a fine d'impedire l'indebolimento della Fede, e di trattenere la corruzione dei costumi. In un paese protestante come la Prussia si riconosce in questo momento stesso che la immoralità estendendosi oltre modo, è necessario di ricorrere agli opportuni remedii per arrestarne il progresso; fra i quali, per citarne uno, si vorrebbe trovare la maniera d'impedire o almeno diminuire la moltitudine dei divorzj, che toglie il vincolo delle famiglie.

Se dunque una religione sterile come è la protestante cerca remedio ai mali morali, non dovrà cercarli il Capo dell'unica vera Chiesa nei suoi Stati Cattolici? Ora questi remedii, quantunque miti, urtano i mal pensanti di tutto il mondo, i quali sono insofferenti di qualunque freno, urtano tutti i proclamatori della libertà di coscienza, i quali pretendono che sia agli uomini lasciata la libertà di adorare Dio come vogliono, e parlare, scrivere ed operare in materia di religione come meglio loro talenta. E' questo, se non erro, uno dei principali motivi di odio contro il Nostro Governo, screditandolo in ogni anche minimo inconveniente che qui succeda, aggiungendo esagerazioni, menzogne e calunnie, e Noi restiamo in silenzio, perchè fu questo sempre il Nostro stile per imitare il Divin Fonda-

Figure B.4 (continued)

tore della Chiesa, il quale in mezzo alle tante calunnie che gli si avventavano contro leggiamo scritto « Ipse autem tacebat ». Ma se la coscienza lo esige parleremo anche Noi, come in altre occasioni parlò Gesù Cristo.

Io confido pertanto nella sperimentata saggezza della Maestà Vostra la quale conosce benissimo quanto l'Italia sia molestata dalla morale infermità della umana famiglia, e guai se gli ammalati di questa penisola si accorgono di essere sostenuti da forze estere, sieno pure limitate alla sola dimostrazione morale, allora il parosismo diverrà pericoloso per tutti. Uno sguardo al Piemonte. Io suppongo che quel Re e quel Governo non abbiano una decisa intenzione di osteggiare la Religione e la Chiesa: eppure per sostenersi in qualche maniera abbisognano di tanto in tanto o di esiliare qualche Vescovo, o di espellere qualche Comunità Religiosa dal suo sacro recinto, o d'impadronirsi dei beni della Chiesa, o di avversare o far mostra di avversare questa Santa Sede. Eppure quel Re e quel Governo dicono di voler essere Cattolici, al che si aggiunge l'indole del popolo Piemontese più calmo, più riflessivo di qualunque altro popolo d'Italia.

Rifugge il pensiero dal considerare i mali gravissimi che piomberebbero sui popoli meridionali della penisola se venissero fra loro adottati i sistemi del Governo Subalpino. Si è già veduto cosa seppero fare negli ultimi anni i così detti moderati, i quali nella breve mostra che fecero di se furono tosto supplantati dai partiti estremi che presero barbaramente nelle loro mani la sommità delle cose, e le ripiglierebbero con impeto maggiore, e le tratterebbero per la ruina, e direi quasi per la distruzione di questa parte della umana società.

Se in ogni altra occasione, in questa più particolarmente comparto con effusione di cuore a Vostra Maestà, all'Augusta Imperatrice, e Figlio, non che a tutto l'Impero l'Apostolica Benedizione.

Dalle Stanze del Vaticano il 19 Dicembre 1856

PIUS PP. IX

Figure B.5: Letter from Napoleon III to Pope Pius IX of 1 February 1857, from Pietro Pirri, *Pio IX e Vittorio Emanuele II dal loro carteggio privato. II: La Questione Romana (1856-1864)*, (Roma: Pontificia Università Gregoriana, 1944), Documenti, pp.11-12

6.

Napoleone III a Pio IX

1 febbraio 1857

Arch. Pio IX: Sovrani. *Autografa*

Très Saint Père

Je n'ai pas pu répondre immédiatement à Votre Sainteté parceque le télégraphe lui a appris plutôt que je n'aurais pu le faire que ses préoccupations au sujet des conférences de Paris n'avaient aucun fondement. En effet il n'a été nullement question dans la dernière réunion des plénipotentiaires des Etats d'Italie. A ce sujet je sais combien le coeur de Votre Sainteté est plein de sollicitude pour le bonheur de son peuple et je ne doute pas que avec le tems Elle ne finisse par vaincre toutes les oppositions en satisfaisant les véritables intérêts de son pays. Malheureusement il y a bien des contrées d'Italie où l'avenir ne s'annonce pas sous des couleurs aussi satisfaisantes, et il nous arrive de Naples entre autres des nouvelles qui me font beaucoup de peine car j'y vois les germes de nouveaux troubles ¹.

En France heureusement l'état politique comme l'état religieux est satisfaisant; tous mes efforts tendent à empêcher les dissidences religieuses qui produisent toujours un mauvais effet et à recommander à tous les évêques de ne pas mettre les laïques dans la confiance ² de leurs petites querelles intestines.

J'ai appris avec bonheur que Votre Sainteté avait approuvé le choix du nouvel archevêque de Paris; nous sommes encore sous la pénible impression produite par l'horrible fin de son prédécesseur ³.

¹ Si allude alla spedizione di Sapri e alle agitazioni mazziniane scoppiate in varie città in questo tempo. Quanto alla parte avuta dalla questione romana al congresso di Parigi non è il caso di parlare qui.

² Ms. confidence.

³ Mons. Sibour assassinato a Parigi il 3 gennaio 1857. Suo successore fu Mons. Morlot vescovo di Tours.

Figure B.5 (continued)

Je prie Votre Sainteté d'être persuadé de mon désir sincère de conserver son amitié et de Lui donner des preuves de mon attachement inviolable au Saint Siège et de respect filial avec lequel je suis,

Très Saint Père,

Votre très dévot fils

NAPOLÉON

L'Impératrice présente ses hommages à Votre Sainteté et son filleul se porte très bien.

Palais des Tuileries le 1 Février 1857

Figure B.6: Letter from Mons. Sacconi to Card. Antonelli of 21 August 1857, from Pietro Pirri, *Pio IX e Vittorio Emanuele II dal loro carteggio privato. II: La Questione Romana (1856-1864)*, (Roma: Pontificia Università Gregoriana, 1944), Documenti, pp.34-35-36-37

12 d) Mons. Sacconi, nunzio, al Card. Antonelli

Parigi 21 Agosto 1857 N. 901

SdS. 248 1857. Parigi

L'Imperatore che ha sempre qualche idea particolare e propria sull'Italia, e che ritiene, come già altri Sovrani che qui l'hanno preceduto sul trono, essere nell'interesse e politica della Francia l'occuparsi specialmente dell'Italia, e l'esercitarvi un'influenza, parla, ascolta, e s'occupa con piacere di cose riguardanti la nostra penisola. Queste predisposizioni hanno fatto sì, che egli non rimanesse indifferente a quanto s'è scritto e rappresentato contro il celebre rapporto scritto dal sig. Conte di Rayneval a giustificazione del Governo della S. S.¹ e che prestasse anche l'orecchio a quelli che hanno procurato colla viva voce di combattere su varii punti tal rapporto, e di rappresentargli a loro modo lo stato attuale delle cose nostre. Il sig. marchese Pepoli, stretto parente del Murat, è, per quanto io sappia, quegli che ha trovato maniera di meglio insinuarsi sull'animo dell'Imperatore e d'intrattenerlo sopra tale argomento. Per riescire in tale intento il sig. Marchese si è mostrato, per quanto a me costa, avverso al sistema costituzionale parlamentare, non contrario in massima al nostro Governo, ma soltanto desideroso di riforme che ne rendessero regolare l'andamento, tranquillizzassero le popolazioni, ed assicurassero l'ordine, e non ostante che si abbiano forti dati per ritenerlo autore d'una confutazione stampata a fronte del suddetto rapporto, egli ha disapprovato varie cose della stessa che qui non potevano piacere, ed ha procurato di farla riguardare come

¹ Il celebre rapporto dell'ambasciatore francese a Roma in data 14 marzo 1856, scritto in difesa del sistema amministrativo della Santa Sede, e reso pubblico mentre Cavour presentava al Congresso di Parigi il suo Memorandum sulla questione italiana, dove faceva un'aspra critica del governo dello Stato ecclesiastico, e in cui ebbe gran parte il Minghetti. DE CESARE o. c. I 250.

Figure B.6 (continued)

parto del sig. Minghetti. D'altra parte nei mesi di maggio e di giugno il signor Pepoli è stato distinto molto più che per lo innanzi dall'Imperatore, mentre vi è stato frequentemente invitato ed ha passato una settimana con Sua Maestà nel castello di Fontainebleau. Narro con qualche particolarità queste cose del Pepoli, non solo perchè può essere per V. E. R. maggiormente utile il saperle, ma eziandio perchè sapendo quali sono le di lui tendenze e da chi è egli ispirato, può bene immaginare in qual senso abbia procurato qui esercitare la sua influenza.

Non appena m'accorsi di quanto il Pepoli stava facendo, e conobbi che l'Imperatore era inclinato a favorire nuove riforme da noi, procurai di far conoscere quel signore nel suo vero aspetto, e di far sentire per vie confidenziali ed indirette, che in lui, e forse qui in altri non v'erano tutte le cognizioni necessarie per decidere ciò che potesse convenirci, ed armonizzare colle nostre istituzioni; che doveva lasciarsi liberamente al Santo Padre il risolvere se, e cosa convenisse di fare, essendo egli più d'ogni altro informato dei bisogni de' suoi sudditi, ed essendo a tutti note le di lui buone intenzioni in loro favore; che l'esercitare qualche pressione sul Governo Pontificio, lungi di contribuire a fortificarlo e consolidarlo, non poteva avere per effetto che indebolirlo maggiormente, ed imbarazzarlo; e che se ciò non ostante si fosse nell'intenzione di proporre e procurar cose che si pensasse potessero convenire al Governo della Santa Sede, non si doveva avere difficoltà di parlarne con me ch'ero in grado di rischiararli e disingannarli; tanto più che non poteva qui sfuggire che un passo mal calcolato in Roma poteva esser causa di qualche dispiacenza e di qualche disaccordo tra li due Governi. Quest'ultima mia osservazione (che riguardava il solo caso in cui si fosse fermamente decisi a parlare) aveva per iscopo di combattere in dettaglio le cose, se per un giusto principio di massima non si volesse escludere il dare consigli e di esimere per quanto fosse in me il Governo della Santa Sede da imbarazzi e dispiacenze anche a costo d'assumermi odiosità.

Alcune buone parole che mi si erano dette, e la bontà che mi ha sempre mostrata l'Imperatore, non ostante quanto possa essersi fatto dal Ministro del Culto per alterarla, m'aveano fatto sperare che non sarebbe rimasto senza successo quanto m'ero studiato di dire e far riflettere. Ma in questi ultimi tempi sono venuto disgraziatamente ad assicurarmi di più cose, che mi devono portare a ritenere il contrario.

Figure B.6 (continued)

Non ostante quanto le riferii nel mio ossequioso rapporto delli 30 maggio N. 856 essermi stato detto da un Ministro (che fu quello degli Affari Esteri) intorno al viaggio del Santo Padre in luoghi occupati dai Tedeschi, mi sono dovuto persuadere, in conformità di quanto erasi proferito dal personaggio ivi indicato in genere, e ch'era la Principessa Matilde, che l'Imperatore non n'è rimasto soddisfatto, massime perchè gli è stato riferito Sua Santità siasi pronunziata con particolare benignità per gli Austriaci, si sia mostrata più soddisfatta delle loro truppe e di quelli che ne hanno il comando, che delle francesi e di chi oggi è alla loro testa, ed abbia fatto visita a due piccoli Sovrani che non hanno fatto nulla per la stessa, dopo essersi costantemente recusata di visitare la Francia, da cui l'è venuta protezione ed appoggio. A me non si è detto nulla di questo, ma viene quasi in conferma di quanto mi è stato riferito in proposito da più buone sorgenti, il non essermi nelle due ultime volte che ho visto l'Imperatore chiesto nulla da lui riguardo al Santo Padre, mentre in conformità anche dell'uso, non mancava mai di parlarne e di chiedermene nuove con premura.

Oltre che questo malcontento dell'Imperatore, e l'altro che s'è procurato di fargli concepire contro di lei, giusta quanto le riferii nella parte cifrata del mio dispaccio delli 24 giugno N. 871 col rappresentarla troppo propensa per l'Austria, potevano esercitare una qualche influenza nella determinazione in discorso di Sua Maestà, vi sono anche cose più gravi che deono avergliela suggerita ...

Mi si è assicurato, che tra le cose di cui l'Imperatore si è occupato in Osborne colli due principali ministri Inglesi, vi è stata la questione italiana: che lord Palmerston e lord Clarendon abbiano dichiarato allo stesso d'esser disposti a combattere ogni moto e tendenza rivoluzionaria, ma di voler agire nel senso delle riforme, che l'Austria stessa ha già loro promesso di voler fare; e che l'Imperatore li abbia assicurati di tutta la sua cooperazione finchè le cose rimarranno in tale linea.

Per tacere degli ottimi rapporti che or vi sono tra la Francia ed il Piemonte, e perciò delle disposizioni del Governo della prima a far cose grate a quello dell'altro, e per omettere altre osservazioni di minor conto che portano a credere esserci qui disposizioni per consigliarci riforme, io mi limito a notare che questo Governo è inquieto pel malcontento che si mostra nelle città e luoghi popolosi dell'Impero, segnatamente dal partito li-

Figure B.6 (continued)

berale. Ora non essendo questo Governo disposto a cambiare di sistema nell'interno, si è a ritenere, in conformità di quanto s'è altre volte praticato, che anche per politica di circostanze si determinerà a fare qualche cosa all'estero, che occupi lo spirito dei francesi e che soddisfaccia quelli che qui hanno tendenze liberali. L'Italia è il luogo che ora gli offre meglio tal campo, e le riforme nei domini pontificii invocate da tutti i liberali, e ritenute come un giusto risultato del viaggio del Santo Padre, gli presenteranno la prima opportuna circostanza d'occuparsene.

Tutti questi dati mi portano a credere esser vera la notizia datami da buona sorgente, che si stia lavorando una memoria circa alle riforme a proporsi al Governo della Santa Sede. Oltre a ciò ho più dati per credere che li Governi d'Inghilterra e di Francia agiscano già presso quello d'Austria per determinarlo a far parlare, dare insinuazioni ed agire in Roma in conformità di quanto farà l'Ambasciatore francese. E debbo ritenere che il medesimo presterà la sua cooperazione, se le riforme a suggerirsi saranno soltanto amministrative e non politiche...

La condotta seguitasi pel richiamo del signor di Rayneval e per la scelta e nomina del nuovo Ambasciatore in Roma viene a prestare nuovi argomenti e congetture in appoggio...

L'essersi fino alla vigilia negato il richiamo del Rayneval, l'essersi comunicato poche ore prima della firma del decreto di nomina del Gramont che ancora nulla erasi deciso, l'aver occultata preventivamente la nomina, non si possono riguardare come cose fortuite, ma come atti calcolati, tanto più stanti le mie buone relazioni col Ministro degli Esteri. Più, si assicura che Rayneval aveva a malincuore accolto il trasloco, e s'era scelto a successore proprio il ministro accreditato in Piemonte, intimo e simpatizzante per Cavour, e maritato a una protestante, figlia del parlamentare inglese Mac Hinnon».

Egli è persuaso « che per sentimento di propria dignità e per evitare più gravi disturbi, il nostro Governo, nel caso che volesse fare qualche riforma, o dovesse accordarla subito, o per lo meno annunziarla, onde prevenire qualunque istanza, o che dovesse far sentire, al primo discorso che glie se ne promovesse, che si sta già occupando di far qualche cosa ... ».

Figure B.7: Letter from Pope Pius IX to Napoleon III of 29 July 1857, from Pietro Pirri, *Pio IX e Vittorio Emanuele II dal loro carteggio privato. II: La Questione Romana (1856-1864)*, (Roma: Pontificia Università Gregoriana, 1944), Documenti, pp.38-39-40

13.

Pio IX a Napoleone III

Bologna 29 luglio 1857

Arch. Pio IX, Sovrani, *Copia*

Maestà

Le recenti vittorie riportate dalle Armate di V. M. in Africa ¹, M'inducono a pregarla di voler portare un suo pensiero a quel vastissimo possedimento, ove si recherà nuovo numero di Europei, procurando la erezione di un

¹ Allude alla repressione delle tribù Kabilia ribelli di Algeria.

Figure B.7 (continued)

altro Vesovato almeno, essendo pressochè impossibile ad un solo Vescovo di provvedere ai bisogni spirituali di tante anime sparse in una così estesa superficie. La M. V. (che) per tante beneficenze fatte a tante Diocesi di Francia, si è resa così benemerita, spero che vorrà aggiungere questo nuovo beneficio alla Chiesa di Francia, ed Io per ottenerlo esterno le più efficaci preghiere.

Altra grazia. Avendo combinato colla Chiesa Cattolica del Nord-America di aprire in Roma un Collegio composto di giovani chierici delli Stati-Uniti², si va a comprare il Monastero che fu già delle Salesiane, conosciuto sotto il nome della Umiltà alle radici de Quirinale. Siccome però è presentemente occupato dai soldati che formano parte del corpo di truppe di V. M., così sarebbe necessario, se è possibile, di vederlo sgombrato, affinché possa servire per l'uso anzidetto. E qui mi cade in acconcio di prevenirla di essermi posto di concerto con S. M. l'Imperatore di Austria, di diminuire in Bologna ed in Ancona una parte della Truppa Austriaca, e perciò potrebbe la M. V. prevalersi di questa occasione per ordinare qualche diminuzione della Sua truppa, la qual cosa darebbe luogo a render libero con più facilità il suddetto Monastero.

Io sto per finire il Mio giro nelli Stati della Chiesa. Ho motivo di ringraziare il Signore della maniera rispettosa e cordiale colla quale sono stato accolto dovunque. E' questa una smentita solenne alli eterni nemici del Governo Pontificio, i quali hanno saputo stampare mille menzogne nei loro giornali, ma non potranno mai contraddire con buon risultato alla verità. Tutti hanno potuto parlar-mi, e nessuno ha presentato domande o indirizzi relativi a forme amministrative, o miglioramenti di quelle, come si è asserito con impudenza dai suddetti scrittori. Non dirò che alcuni bisogni non esistano, ma questi non si soddisfano colle forme più libere, ma sì coi denari in parte,

² Il Pont. Seminario dell'America del Nord fu inaugurato nel 1859.

Figure B.7 (continued)

e in parte con altri mezzi. Per parte Mia procurerò di fare tutto per il ben essere di queste popolazioni.

Intanto Io Mi compiaccio della visibile protezione che il Signore in mille guise Le accorda, e Le comparto con effusione di cuore unitamente all'Augusta Consorte, al Principe ereditario, e a tutti i Suoi sudditi l'Apostolica Benedizione.

Bologna, 29 Luglio 1857

PIUS PP. IX

Appendix C

LETTERE PATENTI

Figure C.1: *Lettere Patenti* of 17 February 1848

