

**THE POLITICAL IR/RELEVANCE OF FREEDOM
IN THE PHILOSOPHIES OF SARTRE AND ARENDT**

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ABSTRACT

THE POLITICAL IR/RELEVANCE OF FREEDOM IN THE PHILOSOPHIES OF SARTRE AND ARENDT

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This study examines the concept of freedom in the philosophies of Jean Paul Sartre and Hannah Arendt in the context of their relevance or irrelevance to politics in the context of political freedom, political activity, rights and responsibilities, individuality, plurality and humanism. The major concern is to question the possibilities of political reflection of their conceptions of freedom. In this respect, the study explicates densely enough Sartre's and Arendt's conceptions of freedom respectively and includes propositions and arguments that Sartre's and Arendt's conceptions of freedom have more conjunctions than disjunctions in certain points. This closeness and commonality in the meaning of freedom between two thinkers continue in politics. In that sense, the thesis put forwards that the conceptions of freedom in the philosophies of Sartre and Arendt are relevant to politics and also competent to derive a different spirit of political freedom. Their relevance to politics and their potency or adequacy to enable a new form of political freedom are based on their conjunction in the points of *action*, *humanism*, *initiation* and *responsibility*. To make explicit such political freedom, the study also compares it with liberal negative conception of freedom.

Keywords: Freedom, Jean Paul Sartre, Hannah Arendt, Political Freedom, Liberalism

ÖZ

SARTRE VE ARENDT'İN FELSEFELERİNDEKİ ÖZGÜRLÜĞÜN SİYASAL UYGUNLUĞU/UYGUNSUZLUĞU

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Bu çalışma, Jean Paul Sartre ve Hannah Arendt'in felsefelerindeki özgürlük kavramlarını, siyasal uygunlukları ya da uygunsuzlukları yönünden incelemektedir. Bu inceleme, siyasal özgürlük(ler), siyasal eylem, hümanizm, haklar, sorumluluklar, birey ve toplum gibi bağlamlarda yapılmaktadır. Temel mesele, Sartre ve Arendt'in özgürlük kavramlarının siyasete yansıtılabilme olanağını merak etmek ve sorgulamaktır. Bunun için çalışma, Sartre ve Arendt'in özgürlük kavramlarını yeterince yoğun bir şekilde açıklıyor ve şu iddiayı ortaya koyuyor: Belli noktalarda, Sartre ve Arendt'in özgürlük kavramları arasında, farklılık ve uzlaşmazlık değil, daha ziyade bir ortaklık ve çakışma vardır. İki düşünürün özgürlüğe verdiği anlamlar arasındaki bu yakınlık ve ortaklık, siyasette de devam etmektedir. Bu noktada tez, Sartre ve Arendt'in özgürlük kavramlarının siyasete uygunluğunu ve farklı bir siyasal özgürlük anlayışı türetmeye yetkin olduğunu iddia etmektedir. Siyasete olan bu uygunluk ve yeni bir siyasal özgürlük için yetkinlik iddiası, bu özgürlük kavramlarının *eylem*, *hümanizm*, *başlatma* ve *sorumluluk* gibi temel noktalarına dayanmaktadır. Ayrıca bu siyasal özgürlük, daha belirgin kılınması adına, liberal negatif özgürlük kavramı ile karşılaştırılmıştır.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Özgürlük, Jean Paul Sartre, Hannah Arendt, Siyasal Özgürlük, Liberalizm

To My Mere Listener Bahar

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ABBREVIATIONS:

BN: Being and Nothingness, J. P. Sartre

TE: Transcendence of the Ego, J. P. Sartre

E: Existentialism, J. P. Sartre

EHE: Existentialism and Human Emotions, J. P. Sartre

HC: Human Condition, H. Arendt

BPF: Between Past and Future, H. Arendt

OR: On Revolution, H. Arendt

OV: On Violence, H. Arendt

OT: Origins of Totalitarianism, H. Arendt

LM: The Life of the Mind, H. Arendt

LKP: Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, H. Arendt

RJ: Responsibility and Judgment, H. Arendt

CR: Crisis of Republic, H. Arendt

EJ: Eichmann in Jerusalem, H. Arendt

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The concept of freedom occupies an important place in the history of philosophy and thought. There is probably no great philosopher who does not think about what “freedom” is or who underestimates the meaning and importance of freedom. This is because freedom, in any sense of the term, is one of the essential intentions of human beings individually or collectively and because freedom lies in human existence. Besides, the concept of freedom is always related with almost all other human and worldly issues; it is difficult to comprehend them perfectly without taking “freedom” into account. In other words, usually thoughts and discussions about any kind of human affair are easily tied to “freedom”. In that sense, political philosophy is also comprised of theories, thoughts and discussions about freedom in the context of political freedom, political activity, rights and responsibilities, individuality, plurality and humanism. Political philosophy generally conceives the concept of freedom in the field of practical philosophy. As a general question, what does freedom as a concept or as a value mean for politics and human togetherness constitutes the most general context of this thesis?

The concept of freedom and its connections to politics were also central and living in 20th century. “Freedom” was still problematic for philosophers and political scientists. Two of them who gave further importance to think about freedom were Jean

Paul Sartre (1905-1980) and Hannah Arendt (1906-1975). They lived almost in the same period and witnessed the same great events and important episodes of history such as 2nd World War, fascism in Europe, social and political turmoil of the 1960s, etc. These facts had probably important impacts on the formation of their thoughts and specifically their conceptions of freedom. Their conceptions of freedom were not the same with the dominant and ruling practice and thought of political freedom. They both diverged from the dominant liberal conception of freedom for example. In that sense, I would like to focus on Sartre's and Arendt's conceptions of freedom since they were proponents of "freedom" through all their lives, since they were respective for politics in that era and since they also emphasized active, living and dignified existence of human beings individually and collectively. Specifically, I will examine Sartre's and Arendt's conceptions of freedom in the context of politics by asking whether their conceptions of freedom are relevant to politics or not. To accomplish this, I will confine myself with Sartre's and Arendt's thoughts and arguments on freedom regarding their reflectivity and relations on politics. In that sense, I will take into consideration the early period of Sartre which is existentialist par excellence, but not his Marxist period defined by his attempt to combine existentialism with dialectical materialism. Therefore, the sources, besides others, will mainly be *Transcendence of the Ego* (1936), *Being and Nothingness* (1943) and *Existentialism Is a Humanism* (1946). As for Arendt, her republican conception of freedom will be our main point of focus by regarding her theory of "action" which explicates her conception of *the political* as well. Here the main sources, besides others, will be *Human Condition* (1958) and the well-known article titled "What is Freedom?"

in the book *Between Past and Future* (1961).

It is true that Sartre's existentialism in general and his existentialist freedom were mostly conceptualized in his masterpiece *Being and Nothingness* and this book is densely philosophical and not directly related with politics. Sartre's conception of freedom was really radical by declaring that “human is condemned to freedom” and such a radical declaration appeared at the worst moments of occupied Paris and also Europe where freedom, in any sense, was conceived as impossible or as an illusion. However, Sartre could politically declare that the essence of human being is suspended in his freedom, that is, we are all free. Besides this, Sartre himself was a political activist throughout his life for the sake of freedom of the people and the independence of the nations. In that sense, I argue that his existentialist conception of freedom is not only philosophical by presenting only concepts, ideas and images which remain aloof and alien to politics. I wondered whether it is possible to derive an understanding of political freedom from Sartre's existentialism and whether his conception of freedom is relevant or irrelevant to politics with its further context of political activity, human togetherness, rights, etc.

Arendt was another widely recognized, original and influential figure even if she had no systematic philosophy like Sartre. Arendt is critical to Western tradition of political thought because she thinks that it is this tradition absorbed with philosophical truth claims and ideologies which had brought fascism to Europe. In her studies on

various topics, the major problem in modern era was people's alienation to each other, to human togetherness and to the world. This kind of alienation, according to Arendt, also means apolitical and anti-political mode of life, while *the political* only guaranties freedom. Additionally, all these were connected to her theory of *action*. Arendt dealt with the reasons behind the closure of the political and so death of freedom for humanity, which means totalitarianism for her. She was always a proponent of “action” in the sense of taking initiative and responsibility to keep existence and human dignity alive and to leave a mark on history and on the world. These remarks made me think that Arendt's conception of freedom gets close to existentialism regarding its emphasis on freedom in the sense of action and responsibility. All these were motivating factors to elaborate Sartre's and Arendt's conceptions of freedom together with a search for similarities and differences between two thinkers.

To introduce the context of the study, there will be three main chapters. In the second chapter, I will document my interpretation of Sartre's conception of freedom. In general, it is accepted that Sartre's thought was broken into two, as early and late periods. While in the early period, Sartre's philosophy is defined as existentialism par excellence, the late one is characterized with Marxism or dialectical materialism. Whether it is accepted or denied by Sartre himself, there is such a fact that Sartre's philosophy can be divided into such two categories because his early studies like *Transcendence of Ego*, *Existentialism is a Humanism* and *Being and Nothingness* are densely based on the themes of *consciousness*, *nothingness*, *phenomenology* and

freedom, but not *Marxism*, *materialism* and *dialectics*. Therefore, this study will restrict itself to Sartre's existentialist conception of freedom in his early period when he was densely concentrated in freedom. I thought that Sartre's conception of freedom is like a roof at the top over his all studies and thoughts. This means that it is necessary to find out the philosophical basis and conceptual backgrounds of his conception of freedom. To accomplish this, in the second chapter, all essential conceptions, main ideas and critical points will be conceived and uncovered necessarily. This will explicate the skeleton of his existentialist conception of freedom. In this line, certain conceptions like *consciousness*, *nothingness*, *transcendence*, *responsibility*, etc. will be used to draw the framework and the foundation of Sartre's "freedom". This will be the first part of that chapter and it will be based on certain clarifications, descriptions and explanations. In the second part of the same chapter, a new dimension will be there devoted for the political reflection of Sartre's conception of freedom. In that part, I will examine the ways to examine the relevance of what I obtained from Sartre's philosophy of freedom to politics in general. Besides general points on the relation between politics and freedom, this relation will specifically be tried to be found on *humanism*, *action in politics* and *political responsibility* because these are the points that make Sartre's existentialist conception of freedom political, that is, connecting his existential freedom to politics, and this necessitates to derive an understanding of political freedom from Sartre's existential conception of freedom. I try to do this at the end of first chapter.

The second chapter will follow a similar method and line by examining firstly

Arendt's studies in detail to display her conception of freedom. Arendt usually abstains from defining herself as “philosopher” because she thinks that philosophy deals with human in particular. Instead, she chooses to call herself “political scientist” because she deals with human togetherness as plurality and worldliness as a situation. However, I thought that Arendt's conception of freedom is mostly philosophical, deep and extensive in the sense of its backgrounds that reach Ancient Greek and Roman thoughts and practices. In that sense, in the first part of the chapter, the effort is to bring out Arendt's philosophy of freedom. This effort includes an examination of her theory of action which she values more than other human conditions “*labor*” and “*work*”. Her defense of opinions as opposed to “truth (truth claims)”, love of this world as opposed to the spiritual world of eternal life or other planets, existence in plurality and human togetherness rather than in isolation or uniformity will be discussed in detail. These are points where her conception of freedom is mostly explicated and examining them will allow us to display the lines of the relevance of her conception of freedom to politics in general. It is true that Arendt did already show what she means by *freedom* and what *the political* is for her. However, this study examines them together in order to discuss their relevance or irrelevance to politics and aims to see and evaluate the picture that will appear once such a reflection is actualized. In this line, for the political freedom, the relevant points will specifically be on political activity, freedom of speech, freedom as initiation, in appearance and participation despite of all predicaments of freedom like its *frailty*, *indeterminacy* and *boundlessness*. The effort is to conceive Arendt's republican conception of freedom together with general phenomena of politics like human

togetherness, plurality and public life.

In the third chapter, I will compare and contrast the findings in the previous chapters, that is, I will discuss the points of conjunction or disjunction between Sartre's and Arendt's conceptions of freedom and their reflections on politics. I will examine whether they are far from each other or they get close in several points. In that sense, their presumptions on the existence of human beings and human togetherness, their imagination of political freedom will be discussed correspondingly. Indeed, I will claim that Sartre's and Arendt's conceptions of freedom are not alien to each other. On the contrary, it is very possible to think them in the same line of political freedom, especially once their concerns about human beings and their perception of the society or human togetherness are taken into account and also that they both underline the value of “*existence*” in the sense of becoming, action, performance and project or dignify the disclosure of *the possible* existences of human beings individually or collectively by performing freedom in *this* world. Additionally, in the second part of this last chapter, I will examine these themes with respect to present instance of liberalism, liberal politics and liberal conception of freedom. This is because I acknowledge that both Sartre and Arendt are not in agreement with liberal conception of freedom because they find it inadequate to realize action and so to actualize freedom. In this context, we define the liberal conception of freedom as an instance of “liberation”, “negative freedom” or “freedom from”. At this point, the addressee will be Isaiah Berlin because he conceptualized “negative liberty”, he was accepted as a successor of the liberal tradition

and he claimed being one of the contemporary proponents of liberalism. This discussion will also allow us to evaluate Sartre's and Arendt's conceptions of freedom with respect to their “positiveness” and “negativeness” as defined and formulated by Berlin.

CHAPTER II

FREEDOM IN SARTRE'S PHILOSOPHY AND ITS POLITICAL REFLECTIONS

In this chapter, I will examine Sartre's understanding of freedom within consideration of its political relevance or irrelevance. I will try to argue that Sartre's conception of freedom is quite suitable to be reflected on politics. It has certain essentials and characteristics that can properly be interpreted, discussed and theorized in relation to certain political issues such as political freedom, political activity, individuality, structuralism, society and state relation, etc. However, in order to accomplish this, freedom in Sartre's philosophy must be examined in detail regarding its foundation being explicated in *Transcendence of the Ego* (1936), *Being and Nothingness* (1943) and *Existentialism Is a Humanism* (1946).

2.1. Freedom in Sartre's Philosophy

One may begin by underlining that freedom constitutes the whole structure of Sartre's philosophy, rather than being a mere part of it. To understand his conception of freedom, one would need to grasp all the basic related ideas, terms and the arguments in Sartrean thought. In order to accomplish this, brief explanations of certain key concepts such as consciousness, *being-in-itself*, nothingness, transcendence, *being-for-itself*, anguish; responsibility, project and bad faith are needed at the very beginning. Let me pursue such presentation in the order given above.

2.1.1. Consciousness

Consciousness, for Sartre, is central to human reality and it is the very reason of freedom of human beings. In Sartre's philosophy, the concept of consciousness is taken into consideration of phenomenology. Consciousness is different from its ordinary use and also from both Husserl's and Descartes' conceptions of consciousness. As opposed to memory or mind, consciousness is not *something*, it is not a container for the preservation of the knowledge that has been obtained or experienced. According to Sartre, consciousness, like nothingness and *being-for-itself*, is derived from being and it is prior to *nothingness* (BN, lvi)¹. It is the way and the resource of negation and then recognition of the possibility of the free act that will be realized now and in the future. For Sartre, "consciousness has nothing substantial; it is pure 'appearance' in the sense that it exists only to the degree to which it appears. However, it is precisely because consciousness is pure appearance and because it is total emptiness (since the entire world is outside it) -it is because of this identity of appearance and existence within it that it can be considered as the absolute" (BN, lvi). Sartre has acknowledged the importance of Husserl's argument that all consciousness is consciousness of something. However, Sartre thinks that Husserl attempts to take consciousness as essential and that he defines consciousness *precisely* as transcendence. For Sartre, the transcendence of consciousness is possible only if consciousness becomes its own object, that is, if there exists consciousness of consciousness, which refers to the second-level of consciousness. According to Sartre, there are two levels of consciousness. First level

1 After that, references for the books of Sartre and Arendt will be given as abbreviations. Please find the list of abbreviations in page xi.

consciousness is pre-reflective and positional, while the second-level consciousness is the result of reflection; it is both positional and non-positional (Fretz, 1999: 74). The former is ordinary understanding of consciousness; it means to be aware of or to perceive the objects out there, the people, facts and events outside us. It is not *cogito*, but perception and recognition. It is the very nature of us and in common use always in our life. In this level of consciousness, *the I* or *Ego* does not realize itself because what is recognized or what I am conscious of is the objects like tree or car. Even if I think about them, the object of the thought is not “*the I*” or “*Ego*”. The latter, the reflective consciousness, is the consciousness of consciousness. It is “a complete consciousness directed toward something which is not it; that is, toward consciousness as object of reflection. It would then transcend itself and like the positional consciousness of the world would be exhausted in aiming at its object. But that object would be itself a consciousness” (BN, lii). In this second level, *The I* is the object of consciousness, thinking or cogito. I am not just conscious of the tree for example; rather I am conscious of *the I* which is thinking and conscious of the tree.

“There is no I on the unreflected level. When I run after a streetcar, when I look at the time, when I am absorbed in contemplating a portrait, there is no I. There is consciousness of the streetcar-having-to-be overtaken, etc., and non-positional consciousness of consciousness. In fact, I am then plunged into the world of objects; it is they which constitute the unity of my consciousnesses” (TE, 48-49).

The “I” only exists in the consciousness reflected-on only through reflection (Morris, 2008: 68) because “if my consciousness were not consciousness of being consciousness of the table, it would then be consciousness of that table without

consciousness of being so” (BN, lii). These are conclusions that Sartre derives from the fact that “consciousness can always pass beyond the existent”, that is, a fundamental characteristic of being's transcendence is to transcend the ontic toward the ontological (BN, lxiii). This is the reason why human is condemned to freedom; we are conscious of our being conscious; that means, I can manage my acts because I know it is me that will freely act or direct my consciousness towards what it is not. For example, a dog as an animal has pre-reflective consciousness of a car as the threat coming towards it and then it escapes to live. However, it has not reflective consciousness and it is not conscious of its consciousness. Only human has reflective or second level consciousness and in that example, only human can resist the passion to live and choose not to escape. It can only be human who is conscious of being conscious, in other words, this second level of consciousness, that is self-consciousness, belongs to human kind only.

According to Sartre, all consciousness is consciousness of something. This proposition has multiple meanings and explanations which help us to understand the relation between consciousness and freedom in Sartre's philosophy. On the one hand, if all consciousness is consciousness of something, “there is no consciousness which is not a positing of a transcendent object, or if you prefer, that consciousness has no ‘content’” (BN, li). Here Sartre's claim is that all consciousness is positional when it transcends itself in order to reach an object. The consciousness is obviously directed toward the outside and all present inclinations transcend themselves because they aim at the object of the consciousness and are absorbed in it (BN, li, lii). On the other hand, if all

consciousness is consciousness of something, it means that consciousness is a relation between subject and object. Here the subject, neither Husserl's transcendental ego nor Descartes' immaterial mind, but a "body subject" (Morris, 2008: 62) is *being-for-itself* and the object is *being-in-itself* as an unconscious thing that is completed, positive and frozen. *Being-for-itself* consciously intends towards the objects, the others and the world. These two types of being are in compulsory relation within the context of freedom; that is, *being-in-itself* as *facticity* rather than contingency is still a condition of freedom for *being-for-itself*. In its existential and transcendental journey, *being-for-itself* intends or goes towards the future and it leaves behind itself as *being-in-itself*, in other words, life of being accumulates in the past as *in-itself*. In that sense, *being-in-itself* provides a base, a history or a body-subject for *being-for-itself*. To examine such a compulsory relation between *being-in-itself* and *being-for-itself* is very important to understand Sartre's conception of freedom. Let me focus on this context in the next part.

2.1.2. Being-In-Itself and Being-For-Itself

In Sartre's existentialism, incompleteness of being is explained or proved by the gap or the void between *being-in-itself* and *being-for-itself* and this incompleteness of being is what makes freedom possible. In that sense, freedom should be understood by dealing with this gap -that makes the relation possible as well- *being-in-itself* and *being-for-itself*.

If it is possible to explain the basis of Sartre's conception of freedom in one

sentence, one should say that *being* is “which is what it is not and which is not what it is”, the types of being can be understood easily. The second part of the phrase saying “being is not what it is” requires dealing with “what it is”. In its very special meaning, “what it is” refers to “*in-itself*” in Sartrean terminology. “*Being-in-itself* is said to be so identical with itself, so filled with itself. The *in-itself* has nothing secret; it is solid (massif) (BN, lxvi). It is totally undifferentiated and thus can enter into no connection or relation with any other being. In that sense, *being-in-itself* is a being -like a table or chair- for other beings. The *being-in-itself* is always the object of the consciousness. It has no future life, it is indifferent to itself and the others, and it has no conscious and free relation or connection to the other beings (BN, lxvi). Moreover, it is incapable to act or do for itself. *Being-in-itself* is a full positivity which contains no non-being (BN, lxvi; BN, 7) and its being is in itself, not a part of, nor derived from, consciousness (Anderson, 1993: 12). In the context of human reality, “*in-itself*” is equivalent to what has happened to a human being, the past/lived time of being, the *facticity* and also the situations that being is subjected to. According to Sartre's existential philosophy, being is not something to be known and defined. While it is possible to perceive or to know one's “*being-in-itself*” with reference to one's previous actions, one can never be defined by one's past, the conditions given by nature or the values injected by religion or society.

As opposed to *being-in-itself*, *being-for-itself* existing towards the future is “what it is not” (BN, lxiii). In other words, *being-for-itself* is the nothingness or the consciousness of “what it is not”. While *being-in-itself* cannot even be what it is not and

it can encompass no negation and knows no otherness (BN, lxvi), *being-for-itself* is its own nothingness and cannot coincide with itself (BN, 78). The solid formula that can be formed regarding the relation of in-self with *for-itself* is that *for-itself* detaches from *in-itself* by *nihilating* the *facticity*, past and the situations that human reality is subjected to. Here “what it is not” refers to the contingent, fragile and spontaneous being of the *for-itself* and his/her actions that still are motivated, not determined, by freely chosen projects of the *Self* as the unity of *being-for-itself* and *being-in-itself*. *Being-for-itself* is pure contingency (BN, 79). As it is not being that is *in-itself* and it is capable of transcending its existence by its *nihilation*, human reality involves the nothingness within its own conscious intentionality (BN, 28). “Non-substantial consciousness is totally contentless and empty; it is nothing but intentional acts that are totally in relation to objects” (Anderson, 1993, 11). Actually, according to Sartre, this nothingness is the most important part of *for-itself* to found man's freedom because *for-itself*, as a *nihilated in-itself*, is a foundation itself. He says that “there is no difference between the being of man and his being-free” (BN, 25) and “I ... am the nothingness, the absence which determines itself in existence from the standpoint of this fullness (of *being-in-itself*)” (BN, 177). *Being-for-itself* is the subject of non-substantial, contentless, spontaneous, free self-conscious actions. In other words, man is identified with nothingness as much as consciousness and freedom. Let's look at this “nothingness” in much detail.

2.1.3 Nothingness

Within reference to these all, non-positionally and reflectively conscious human

beings can be there for themselves. Because consciousness involves nothingness, that is, being is not completed and frozen totally, consciousness can negate the given *facticities* -those can be conceived as obstacles preventing becoming and closing *for-itself* into being- in our life. *Being-for-itself* is able to transcend the past and current factual realities as *being-in-itself*. This serves the way for freedom because when consciousness negates or eliminates the determinative power of the *facticity* or any cause behind our acts, there remains nothing to determine human's acts and thoughts. It has been acknowledged that there is nothing to *determine* human being; there is no determinative *connatus* like passions, unconsciousness, libido, survival, etc. behind the human acts. However, for Sartre, there is also nothing to be *determined* in human reality. The consciousness of being is not *something*, there is no *essence* in human reality coming from birth or given by the God. Human beings have no *character* -in the sense of Freudian psychoanalysis- that is the center of individual's decisions and choices. Human being is only conscious of being conscious and human reality involves the lack or non-being as much as being and in-self. This fact makes *for-itself* intent nothingness towards outward and all *facticities* to be free and to realize its projects, to live its values and to perpetually construct by itself and for itself. This means there exists nothingness that refers to the authentic existence for human to choose or to invent the actions that are very conditional for his/her fundamental projects (E, 34-35). It is *being-for-itself* that carries the *non-being* and contains negation. This is Sartre's argument that a being can *nihilate* itself perpetually (BN, 27). Here the negation is a kind of relation of man, in the form of *being-for-itself*, to the world (BN, 7) and this gives *fragility* to human being

because “it carries in its being a definite possibility of non-being” (BN, 8). Non-being is the other side of the being; however, it does not refer to any negativity but a lack of being or emptiness of being that is to be fulfilled by actions and values rather than determinations. According to Sartre, every negation refers to determination, not in the sense of identification or definition but of motivation. It is the being, prior to nothingness, which establishes the ground for it. This means that “being has a logical precedence over nothingness but also that it is from being that nothingness derives concretely its efficacy” (BN, 16). Nothingness gets its being from being and stays within the limits of being; it is consciousness of being that creates nothingness, *nihilation* or negation and make non-being exist in order to transcend over the being. “Non-being exists only on the surface of being” (BN, 16). In other words, being can be surpassed only in nothingness and by negation; this is the time when *being-in-itself*, the *facticity* or the world is “suspended” by consciousness of being (BN, 18). In a dialectical manner, the fact that people are conscious of nothingness makes their existence reality; the nothingness gives being its reality and its being of consciousness. Nothingness is there at the heart of being in order for us to apprehend particular realities (BN, 22) and negation is the condition of reality as positivity (BN, 21). As nothingness surrounds being everywhere, being carries the possibility to transcend itself. This is the *nihilation* of being by itself and also of nothingness by itself. In other words, what we see in this process is the refusal of the world that is given and can be called as in-itself. This also implies *transcendence* of being by the conscious and free for-itself because “it is nothingness which is at the very heart of transcendence and which conditions it” (BN,

18).

It is the being again that can *nihilate* the nothingness and this is the way of freedom. It can be claimed that freedom in that sense is the next stage as foundation of being; that is, freedom is the *nihilation* of nothingness by *for-itself*. This happens by *being-for-itself* because *being-for-itself* is not full, not completed, it is the being of consciousness and it is always in the future. On the other hand, nothingness cannot be produced by *being-in-itself* because it is the being as full positivity and it does not contain nothingness as one of its structures (BN, 22). *Nihilation* of nothingness is the proof of the existence of *being-for-itself* because it is a being by which nothingness comes to things (BN, 22). By nothingness, the *being-for-itself* can disengage from the being and the rest constitutes *being-in-itself*. Such disengagement is part of human reality according to Sartre because it is human being as non-being who can cause nothingness and negation to arise in the world and over all *facticities* (BN, 23-24). In other words, the *nihilating* activity of *being-for-itself* creates nothingness and when that nothingness is *nihilated*, being rises in a new discovered world. That is, man is the being through whom nothingness comes to the world and again it is being that *nihilates* that nothingness to make freedom possible and real. So, there is a consciousness as the *nihilation* of its past being (BN, 28) and “if freedom is the being of consciousness, consciousness ought to exist as a consciousness of freedom” (BN, 29). Therefore, it is freedom that is “the human being putting his past out of play by secreting his own nothingness” (BN, 28). To remember, in freedom the human being is his own past as in

the form of *nihilation* (BN, 29).

The important point to be emphasized is the difference between determination and motivation. According to Sartre, human's actions are not *determined* by “what it is” or *facticities* like unconscious facts or our hidden character as it is in the case of Freudian psychoanalysis. In Sartre's existentialism which claims that existence precedes essence, “one will never be able to explain one’s action by reference to a given and specific human nature; in other words, there is no determinism—man is free, man is freedom” (E, 32). Instead, our actions are *motivated* by our freely chosen projects. In Sartre's philosophy, while determination is based on the power of reason or a cause behind and before the action, motivation is related with choices and projects as the ends of the actions. Sartre is against determinism because once determination acknowledges the causative or initiative power of *in-itself* realities, objects, given things and also social and political structures, it also undermines the view that human can act *freely*. Sartre's claim that there is no determination is meaningful with his conceptualization of motivation. For him, all beings have one original or fundamental project. “Man is, before all else, something which propels itself towards a future and is aware that it is doing so. Man is, indeed, a project which possesses a subjective life” (E, 29). The fundamental project means any kind of end or aim that *being* has chosen for itself because he/she has *thought* that he/she can realize his/her values, ideals, beauties in that way. McInerney, thinking on Sartre's conception of fundamental project, indicates that it “does not determine which specific action I will choose, but it does limit the possible

choices to those which can be considered to be concrete instantiations of my fundamental project” (1979: 667). That is, our fundamental projects motivate us to choose, rather than our actions are determined by some other powers over our consciousness. However, once determinism is replaced with motivation, one important question is raised initially; how can one choose one's project? The answer lies in the transcendence of the Ego. Let's look at Sartre's thoughts on transcendence that I think is another principle in the way of existentialism, action and freedom.

2.1.4 Transcendence and Bad Faith

In his very important essay titled “*Transcendence of the Ego*”, Sartre criticizes the view that the Ego is an inhabitant of consciousness as if it was a unification of experience or a material center of desire or action (Caws, 1999: 51). On the contrary, Sartre claims that “the ego is neither formally nor materially in consciousness: it is outside, in the world. It is a being of the world, like the ego of another” (TE, 30). According to Sartre, Ego is capable of transcending the consciousness and creating meanings and values by itself. Sartre is critical to Husserl in that he presupposes or accepts as truth that ego is transcendental. According to Sartre, this statement is a claim for certainty or a claim for substance or nature. The supposition that the Ego is capable to the transcendent is different from the truth claim that the Ego is transcendental. While Husserl initiates “transcendental Ego” as substantial (Caws, 1999: 52), Sartre claims the priority of existence to essence for human reality; that is, the existence precedes the essence. In his definition, essence is not a natural substance or spiritual heritage, but

one's realization of choices, values and ideals that are authentically created or constructed. Likewise, consciousness and its nothingness -that is transcendence of the ego- comes to the world by non-being of human beings, by for-itself and freedom.

In Sartre's philosophy, the second-level of consciousness, which can be defined as "*the consciousness of being conscious*", is equivalent to one's thinking about one's own being; that is, the second-degree consciousness is self-consciousness not in the sense of "awareness of himself" but "awareness of being awareness". For Sartre, this is the transcendental capability of the Ego and that capability is common to all human beings as long as they do not lie to themselves, that is, as long as they do not fall in bad-faith. Bad faith, the most original concept in Sartre's existentialism, is to lie to oneself. If it is acceptable that "the human being is not only the being by whom *negatites*² are disclosed in the world; he is also the one who can take negative attitudes with respect to himself" (BN, 47), bad faith becomes a negative attitude that consciousness develops towards itself. That is, bad-faith is an attitude in which consciousness turns negation towards itself, instead of directing it outward. Actually, the fact behind the lie implies that there is a truth which the liar possesses and hides. This is the truth that one is free and "in bad faith it is from myself that I am hiding the truth" (BN, 49). Therefore, bad-faith refers to one's denial to transcend the ordinary consciousness and go up towards the second-level of consciousness or being conscious of consciousness. This means that one

2 The French *negatite* should be rendered literally as "negativity" but Sartre means both deficiencies and existing absences. According to Sartre, negativity has double nature; while man can disclose negativities" (*negatites*) in the world by the transcendence of free and conscious *for-itself*, he can also take negative attitudes with respect to himself that is the way of "bad faith".

cannot stand to see or to be conscious of that he/she is conscious. In bad-faith, one accepts the existence of narrow limits of our factual essence (BN, 57), one does not choose “to choose” or “to be authentic” and one does ignore the fact that one is conscious of being conscious. In bad faith, “I flee from myself, I escape myself, I leave my tattered garment in the hands of the fault-finder. But the ambiguity necessary for bad faith comes from the fact that I affirm here that I am my transcendence in the mode of being of a thing. It is only thus, in fact, that I can feel that I escape all reproaches” (BN, 57). Thus, bad-faith is only meaningful with the acceptance of the existence of transcendental ego and second-degree consciousness. The bad faith is the image of the fact that human reality is not what it is and is what it is not because “if man is what he is, bad faith is forever impossible and candor ceases to be his ideal and becomes instead his being” (BN, 59). In that sense, while bad faith is an insistence to ignore the fact that one is not what one is; this is a truth that one hides from oneself. For example, the waiter is not a waiter totally or wholly, he/she is not *being-in-itself* like a table or a chair because the waiter is conscious of his/her conditions and the obligations and / or the advantages of being a waiter and he/she can form reflective judgments concerning the situation, that is, he/she can reflect on his/her being conscious of such a life. A waiter is precisely the person who one has to be and who one is not (BN, 60). One plays at being a waiter in a café, imagines to oneself that one is a waiter. What one attempts to actualize is the *being-in-itself* of being the café waiter. However, one has the power to reflect about all these values. It was one's free choice to get up early or to continue to sleep, it is possible to transcend the role in existence and it is human being that constitutes itself as one

beyond one's condition. One is a waiter in the mode of “*being what I am not*” (BN, 60). That is the reason why one's *being-for-itself* can affect being waiter with nothingness. All these reflections or reflective judgments refer to one's capability to transcend this *facticity* or one's capability for the consciousness of freedom. In this respect, Sartre founds the relation between consciousness, bad faith and responsibility. Let me examine this relation in the next part.

2.1.5 Bad-Faith and Responsibility

Bad-faith is applicable only for human beings, it is a human product and it does not come from outside to human reality because it is only human beings who are capable of being conscious of being conscious. “The condition of the possibility for bad faith is that human reality, in its most immediate being, in the intra-structure of the pre-reflective cogito, must be what it is not and not be what it is” (BN, 67). Accordingly, this second-level of consciousness is the reason why Sartre loads responsibility to the human beings. Once we are conscious of being conscious of what we are doing, saying or feeling, every action of us is an image of our making a choice that is intentionally towards an original project. This means that in such a level of consciousness, the will behind our actions belongs to us. If the will is mine, that means I am free and all responsibility belongs to me as well. According to Sartre, freedom is always equivalent to responsibility and this is not limited with one's own actions and choices but across all humanity. As for the relation between freedom and responsibility, Sartre claims that it is such a relationship that makes human beings fall in bad-faith. The beings that are

conscious of their freedom are also conscious of their responsibility; that means, it is himself/herself who must struggle for the results and consequences of his/her conscious and free actions. If one chooses freedom with its responsibility, this is the virtuous side of freedom and consciousness because there is an affirmation of life and realization of individual consciousness. However, if one escapes from such a struggle for responsibility, this means one does not choose to be free and falls in bad-faith. What if one accepts bad faith as something good? As Sartre points on “choice” for freedom, such a question can be raised to challenge the existentialist conception of freedom. However, this question is irrelevant and a product of misunderstanding of Sartre because he conceives freedom as a value. Sartre thinks that bad faith is the opposite of freedom as consciousness or at least far from being free. That is, it cannot be claimed that one in the condition of bad-faith is not free. To remember, for Sartre, being is condemned to freedom; therefore, one in bad-faith is also free in principle. However, he/she lies to himself/herself and does not choose “to act” in the way of freedom, that is, does not realize or perform his/her freedom that he/she is conscious of. In that sense, for Sartre, the issue is not goodness or badness. He values freedom initially and theorizes the “existence” of freedom and its possibility, realization and way to be lived. In that sense, it cannot be claimed that one who is in the condition of bad-faith is not free. One might choose bad-faith. This means that one only escapes the realization or actualization of freedom that one is aware of consciously and ontologically. To Sartre, acceptance or choosing bad-faith just means escaping the action to realize the freedom and existence. Since the action for freedom is always related with responsibility, bad-faith refers to not

only escaping from responsibility but also staying in the first-degree consciousness and always lying to himself/herself. In addition, according to Sartre, first-degree consciousness does not give us the pride of being human because the difference from animal and also from *being-in-itself* arises only in second-degree consciousness. Bad-faith refers to acceptance of living in self-deception. While it seems escaping only from responsibility, it is indeed renunciation from freedom as well because responsibility should be another way of proving the fact that human beings are free. Responsibility refers to the fact that there is no determinative power but the consciousness of being itself and that being is free. Within specific reference to Sartre's atheistic existentialism, the human being is solitude before his/her decisions, alone in creating his/her own values or projects to be realized and he/she is in authenticity to choose his/her ways and the actions. In that sense, responsibility is the inevitable consequence of the lack of outside determination and the existence of free consciousness or will. According to Sartre, "man being condemned to be free carries the weight of the whole world on his shoulders" (BN, 553). Because he is free, he is responsible for the world and for himself as a way of being. If one's life is composed of one's choices or actions that are freely projected by oneself, then freedom refers to the fact that man is the author of his own life and he is responsible for the consequences or situations of freedom. In other words, "what happens to me happens through me" (BN, 554). There is no exterior, spiritual or material power to which human can load the whole responsibility; "there is no non-human situation" (BN, 554). Therefore, the famous declaration that man is condemned to be free means that he is condemned to be wholly responsible for himself.

Additionally, Sartre insists that one is also responsible for the entire world, that is, all people. Any human being shares the responsibility for the events, situations and formations that humanity is subjected to, experienced and lived (BN, 556). So, it can be accomplished that human being who is conscious of his/her freedom is also conscious of this responsibility, and according to Sartre, such a heavy responsibility makes human being feel anguish. Anguish is mostly the consequence of second-level of consciousness. Let me now examine Sartre's conception of anguish.

2.1.6 Anguish (*Angoisse*)

In the reflection, “anguish is born as a structure of the reflective consciousness in so far as the latter considers consciousness as an object of reflection; put it still remains possible for me to maintain various types of conduct with respect to my own anguish-in particular, patterns of flight” (BN, 40). Anguish, as the reflective apprehension of freedom by itself, is a mediated consciousness of itself and it arises from the negation of the appeals of the world. Freedom manifests itself through anguish, because freedom includes an obligation to reconstitute the *Self* which designates the free being and refers to total unity of human reality. So, it can be maintained that anguish is not only the proof but also the image of freedom. This means that “it is in anguish that man gets the consciousness of his freedom” or “anguish is the mode of being of freedom as consciousness of being; it is in anguish that freedom is, in its being, in question for itself” (BN, 29). Before the moment of action, when *being-for-itself* recognizes his/her free will as opposed to the *facticity*, he/she also recognizes the *possibility* of acting or

doing in the way to realize the choice or to achieve the projected aim; that is, he/she knows or is aware of acting in his/her own way. In Sartre's own words, "freedom is nothing other than a choice which creates for itself its own *possibilities*" (EHE, 63) and "anguish is the recognition of a possibility as *my* possibility; that is, it is constituted when consciousness sees itself cut from its essence by nothingness or separated from the future by its very freedom" (BN, 35). That is, anguish is the result of consciousness that enables us to see everything as possible once one regards his capability of action and transcendental capability of freedom towards nothingness. This consciousness of acting or doing makes *being-for-itself* *anguish*, in other words, "anguish is precisely my consciousness of being my own future, in the mode of not-being" (BN, 32). In that sense, it is in anguish when I am conscious of being conscious of total freedom. This is the time of anguish when *being-for-itself* *nihilates* the determination of the outside and the past because "the anguish is *me* since by the very fact of taking my position in existence as consciousness of being, I make myself *not to be* the past of good resolutions *which I am*" (BN, 33). This is the time of anguish when *being-for-itself* is conscious of the necessity to create an authentic value and of all the responsibility being on his/her own shoulders. In that sense, freedom carries anguish because anguish is revealed before and during the foundation of values itself without foundation and because values are essentially revealed to a freedom. While this foundation of values and appearance of freedom is densely connected, one put values into question as *my* possibility. Anguish before values "is the recognition of the ideality of values" (BN, 38).

Anguish also results from the ambiguity of the action, the indeterminacy of the future which is the crucial component of being free. Sartre gives such an example:

“The sentence which I write is the meaning of the letters which I trace, but the whole work which I wish to produce is the meaning of the sentence. And this work is a possibility in connection with which I can feel anguish; it is truly my possibility, and I do not know whether I will continue it tomorrow; tomorrow in relation to it my freedom can exercise its *nihilating* power. But that anguish implies the apprehension of the work as such as *my* possibility. I must place myself directly opposite to it and realize my relation to it” (BN, 36-37).

That is, the future and outcomes of action that are related with my freely chosen values and projects potentially carries the possibility of indeterminacy about my intentions that might also turn into opposition to my freedom. However, this indeterminacy in my freedom that creates anguish does not come to me as an external power but my interior complexity. In that sense, it can be indicated that *anguish* is not *fear* because while fear results from external facts and stimulants, the anguish is the consequence of purely interior dynamics, the consciousness of doing and acting. While you are afraid of something or someone exterior to or outside you, in the feeling of anguish it is your consciousness of freedom that makes you force to choose and to act. Therefore, while you are the only object of the fear and you are passive because something or someone makes you afraid, you are the subject of anguish because you are active in creating such a feeling. “Fear is unreflective apprehension of the transcendent and anguish is reflective apprehension of the self; the one is born in the destruction of the other” (BN, 30). Therefore, I can say that fear is natural and inauthentic that is felt in first-level of consciousness that can also be found in animals, while anguish that appears once fear is avoided belongs only to human being who can go up to the second-level of

consciousness regarding the negating and transcending capability of the ego towards freedom. Let me give an example to distinguish fear from anguish. Think about being on a high wall and looking down to floor. You are afraid when you *think* you may fall; however, you feel anguish because you *think* that you can jump down from the wall to the ground. *To think* in the first case is not same with that in the second one because in the first case, one is in the first-level of consciousness and he/she is aware of the danger and he/she is conscious of bodily existence only, while in the second case, one is conscious of the *I* that can choose to jump down. Thus, the case of anguish is the case of appearance of the *I*, Ego or self-consciousness and freedom. Actually, anguish regarding all these is the feeling or an intuition that being is not limited with *in-itselfs*, the givens or facts and that being can transcend the *facticities*. In that sense, *facticity* seems another important conception of Sartre to understand his existentialist conception of freedom. Let me examine this relation in the next part.

2.1.7 Facticity

It is obvious that there is an important relation between *facticity* and freedom. According to Sartre, *facticity* appears with freedom. That is, conscious intentionality of *being-for-itself* creates the *facticity* only when the freely chosen project of *being-for-itself* is concerned and tried to be realized. The objects, the outside world, the situations are just *in-itselfs* as far as there is not consciousness of freedom. However, they all become components of the *facticity* in the sense of being an obstacle only when *being-for-itself* tries to overcome them in order to act towards the fundamental and original

project. Since Sartre employs phenomenology to prove the existence of being, his ontology rests on the intentionality towards the phenomenon. The appearance of being is not different from its essence, that is, what we see is real and there is no hidden substance that is needed to be disclosed or manifested. Being manifests its essence by its appearance. In this line, Sartre insists that our intentionality discloses the essence. That is, the *facticity* of the situations or things can be disclosed or manifested only when there is a conscious and free intention towards them; conscious intentionality and freedom creates or gives characteristic of *facticity* to things, structures, frozen situations as in-itself. The importance of such an idea lies in its relation with nothingness as well because nothingness is the result or product of second-level of consciousness and its intentionality. Sartre gives the example of the difference between “non-presence” of someone and his/her “absence”. Absence of someone can exist only if I wait for him/her to see here. I expect he/she will be present here at the moment; however, he/she is not here. In this case, his/her non-presence is not just his/her non-presence, but his/her absence because my expectation intends to see him/her, rather than anyone else.

In that sense, freedom is the product of an intention and this intention by second-level of consciousness and negating and transcending capability of the Ego is what gives existence to freedom. The performance or realization of freedom is possible only when one is conscious of such an intention, negation and transcendence. All these are what create the *facticitities* as *in-itselfs* in a relation with for-itself that is here to negate and transcend them.

2.1.8 Concluding Remarks

To conclude, it can be asserted that freedom, for Sartre, is an intrinsic condition of *Being* as *for-itself* (*pour-soi*), regardless of the *facticity* and *situation* that are *in-itself* (*en-soi*). “Freedom is impossible to distinguish from the being of human reality... there is no difference between the being of man and his being-free” (BN, 25). *Being* is ontologically conscious of his/her freedom *to act* towards the *projects* (fundamental or ordinary) and *consciousness* is phenomenologically *transcendental* rather than being *localized* in the *Ego*. The opposite of freedom is not captivity or restriction, but *bad faith* which refers to escaping from *responsibility* and insisting on *self-deception*. Freedom in Sartre's thought is not a value or an essence as *end-in-itself*, but a mode of being that consciously and authentically creates *values*, *essences* and *projects* by which *being-for-itself* realizes himself/herself, the other(s) and the world. There is no essence in freedom; rather, “it is freedom which is the foundation of all essences since man reveals intramundane essences by surpassing the world toward his own possibilities” (BN, 438). Freedom is possible by *nilhilating* the attitude of consciousness towards facticity; that is, nothingness makes freedom possible. *Nothingness*, for Sartre, comes to the world by *being-for-itself*. It is uncovered by *intentionality of consciousness* and the values, and *projects* are intentions to fill up that nothingness or *lack of being*. More importantly, the *act* of making a choice is imminent and inevitable condition of freedom. Freedom is the faith of human beings, it is always possible and it is a principle of existentialism and humanism in the sense of becoming, acting, realizing the self and following the possibilities for adopting being to becoming.

Freedom in Sartre's philosophy has certain stages. Firstly, being, by the inevitable consequence of second-degree consciousness, recognizes *for-itself* in relation to *in-itself*. Then, *being-for-itself nihilates* the given, factual position or any kind of situations. To be, for *for-itself*, means to *nihilate in-itself* and this *nihilation* refers to the destruction of any *facticity* and the body that Sartre says includes my birth, race, nationality, physiological structure, class, my character, my past and environment (Anderson, 1993: 17). This is the image of the transcendence of the *for-itself* or consciousness. Now there exists nothingness between *for-itself* and the outside world, people, any kind of given *facticity* and *in-itself*s. This nothingness is the consciousness of non-being of the being. Such a transcendence and its consequent nothingness opens the way for *for-itself* to chose, or create a value authentically, consciously and without any determination because at the moment *for-itself* is in nothingness, it is conscious of this and so it is free to decide. At this stage, the conscious *for-itself* is about to project this value into the future intentionally to make itself be realized in this way, in this authentic existence and in this free life. With recognition of consciousness of *the I*, the intentionally free *Ego* or conscious being, here the feeling of anguish and responsibility does exist for *for-itself*. However, freedom involves motivation to be realized for human being by projecting their freely-defined and consciously-chosen values.

2.2. Political Reflection of Freedom

2.2.1 Humanism as Subjectivity

As it can be claimed, Sartre's understanding of freedom within relation of his

existentialism is dramatically *humanistic* in the sense that everything in the world is based on human actions, it is human being who shapes its own life and human being can do, have or act freely. Such humanism can be interpreted as strictly opposed to (or against) structuralism. It is obvious that Sartre's great deal is to show that all kind of structures -political, social, and historical or religious- are human products, they are constructed by people. In Sartrean terminology, it is not wrong to define all structures and structural elements as *in-itself* in the sense of *facticity* or an object. In that sense, people and their consciousness represents the *for-itself* that can *nihilate* the structures, transcend all their meanings, norms or restrictions and surpass them towards new paths of existence. That is, people can never be the objects of family, education, social or moral norms, political regimes, laws and modes of productions. Instead, people are the subjects that create, manage and finish their existence. Such a humanistic theory is important to acknowledge the dignity of man, because according to Sartre humanism “is the only one which does not make man into an object” (E, 38). However, he thinks that all kinds of materialism treats every man oneself as an object—that is, “as a set of pre-determined reactions, in no way different from the patterns of qualities and phenomena which constitute a table, or a chair or a stone.” In that sense, Sartre declares “our aim is precisely to establish the human kingdom as a pattern of values in distinction from the material world” (E, 38-39). To consider politics within *in-itself*s and their relations means to make politics non-human and to treat man as an object. Structural understanding of politics ignores the conscious existence of people in the form of *for-itself* and underestimates the fact of freedom.

Freedom, in Sartre's philosophical approach to politics, tends to criticize the understanding that politics is the relation of *facticities* as if there were no conscious and free subjects in political arena. Actually, human being must not be forced or subjected to being determined and defined by *in-itself* structures and by certain natural or social laws. In that sense, politics in Sartre's philosophy must be in relation with human freedom. Any human being who is conscious of his/her freedom is the constructor and actor of politics and its reflection on human life. Actually, Sartre opens the way towards contingent existence in politics or fragile understanding of society that is the collective entity of free human consciousnesses. Such a contingent understanding is also supported by Sartre's understanding of freedom and projection in temporality. That means, the freely chosen fundamental projects in human life is temporal rather than permanent to the death. If they are not voluntary anymore and if they do not consider it valuable, human beings are free to change their choices, their fundamental and long term projects. Essence or character of human being is not given naturally, "it becomes in time by those projects that human beings can change freely" (Webber, 2009: 5). Sartre appreciates the meaning and the role of the "subject" in politics and connectedly gives importance to the performance of subjects' freedom in any kind of change, destruction, reshape or reconstitution in politics. This is a highly revolutionary point in the sense of that human beings are capable to nihilate what is given to them, what is currently powerful and forceful; human beings are capable of creating freely chosen temporal projects in order to realize their essence and to accomplish the consciousness of existence. People are not condemned to live under such structures; nobody has to endure traditions in society,

truths in politics or hegemony in social and economic relations. People are free to attempt to modify, change or enjoy them for the sake of their valuable projects and self-motivating life.³ Even if it is true that people are immersed in the historical situation, *facticities* or *in-itselfs*, and even if people are subjected to failures and lacks in a political organization or determining economic forces; the reason is not that they are condemned to them, but that they cannot even imagine that they can live or exist otherwise (BN, 434). On the other hand, a worker suffering from current mode of production can motivate himself to end this situation as *facticity*. Sartre states that “it is by a pure wrenching away from himself and the world that the worker can posit his suffering as unbearable suffering and consequently can make of it the motive for his revolutionary action” (BN, 436). That is, such a situation can create a consciousness for the permanent possibility of a rupture with the past and consciousness to be able to change, renew or reestablish it himself freely for the sake of his valuable project. No circumstances or situations as *in-itselfs* can produce an act or posit an end unless it creates consciousness of freedom and value for action.

Similarly, the consideration of people, citizens or individuals in relation with the state orients us to the point that the state -whether its abstract sense of whole entity or supreme being or its concrete sense of apparatuses, structures, power relations or

3 Here it can be claimed that “value” -that has been conceived as essential in existentialism and Nietzsche- is also in the core of Sartre's existentialism because it is value as a meaning that has power to make human beings to move or to act towards their projects. The importance of “value” is related with action for the sake of freedom. That is, second-level of consciousness of freedom needs “value” to perform the freedom within action to realize the projects.

authoritarian obligations- represents the general *in-itself* in politics. However, Sartre's conception of freedom allows to formulate that the meaning of politics is declared as becoming, i.e., repetitively *nihilation*, transcendence and then construction activity of free, conscious and intentional human beings because free human beings as for-itself always desire and go towards the new formations in politics, new beginnings in their future life and intentionally towards their fundamental projects and ideals. Generally, states realize themselves as the service of security for the citizens but at the same time sustain monopoly of violence against other possible sources of violence. In that sense, states are conceived by individuals and political subjects as completed, full and frozen beings, this is because state must be signed as *in-itself* within human life and social existence. I think it can be claimed that states are originally the constructions of people as *beings-for-itself* and intentionally set institutions with their temporal projects for freedom. However, in time, states become *in-itself* that tries to prevent political actors from realizing their freely chosen political projects if these projects are against the ideologies, values and truths of that state. Still, states, like all other *facticities*, can never prevent being's political freedom because according to Sartre, being's freedom and subjectivity cannot be restricted, eliminated or suppressed psychically and concretely (Blackham, 2002: 123). In that sense, Sartre's conception of freedom liberates individuals from the ideology that state is the constitutive power of politics and that state is the guarantor of individuals' freedom or that political activity can be repressed or frozen. Generally, state as *in-itself* intends to keep people, social beings and individuals *stat(e)ical*; it concerns them constant and completed beings as if whose meanings and

values were the same, common and unchangeable or traditional. In that sense, in its policies and implementations, state behaves or evaluates all people as *being-in-itself*. Of course, this cannot be claimed as a general principle for all states or political regimes and this is not necessarily valid for all kind of politics. However, in the reflection of Sartre's conception of freedom into politics, it can be claimed that states -as founded by and based on a constitution- are initially in the space of and the products of *for-itself* that can be conceived as political action and they in time turn into in-itself and become frozen, structural and defined *facticities*. I think that such a reading is much possible between Sartre's existential conception of freedom and the essence of political freedom. However, it must also be indicated that in Sartre's conception of freedom, politics intends to be concerned as the issue of conscious human beings whose *for-itself* renews their being, whose freedom is the base for their action -political or individual- to recreate and refresh their being and whose non-being transcends all given, determined and essentially constructed meanings, situations and *facticities*.

From Sartre's conception of freedom and its reflection on politics, it is also possible to derive that politics cannot be based on economic determinism, cultural or social facts, ethnic or religious identities, nationalities, races or sexes because human beings as non-beings are nothing in the sense of no thing. For Sartre, the consciousness of human beings are not something to be determined by the material facts like social and economic conditions, necessities, unconsciousness developed in childhood, libido complexes or passions. In that sense, "Sartre's view radically differs from any theory of

wholly exterior conditioning, such as he takes those of Freud and Marx to be” (Caws, 1999: 130). Also it is always impossible to define human being as it *is* this or that. As it has been mentioned, human being as *for-itself* is not a thing to be defined by its *in-itself*. In that sense, freedom in politics requires struggle against any kind of identification by *facticities* and situations. This view refers to the value of equality in Sartre's theory of freedom and its relation with politics. Regardless of its any kind of *facticity* coming from its past, body, nationality, etc., each human being is equally free and can manifest its free projects and realize its existence by its actions. When we remember that Sartre's conception of freedom is at the center of existence of human being regardless of being's privileged state, such a principle of equality can possibly be conceived. Poster's argument is also in the same line; “freedom was not available only to an elite because it possessed some special quality, whether it was reason or the prerogatives of birth” (Poster, 1975: 79-80). In that sense, it can be claimed that political freedom derived from Sartre's existential freedom is radically democratic since such a reflection is based on the value that every human being is at every moment of existence and nothingness.

To remember the non-being of *for-itself*, a waiter is not a waiter completely, a worker is not a worker totally or permanently and a Turk is not a Turk naturally. Thus, as far as all human beings as *non-beings* are equal to freedom, they are equal to politicize their existence by putting their non-being or *for-itself* as political *being-within-others*. This argument surpasses the identity politics, class struggle, nationalism, racism or feminism as far as these politics and ideologies insist on staying as *in-itself* or *facticity*

and resist to renewing, adopting, changing or becoming that are seen as free actions of *for-itself*. Human being is identified only with its freedom, its non-being or nothingness and its *nihilating* or transcending capability in reflective level -that is, second level- of consciousness. So, Sartre's attitude to being allows such a political freedom within which one who is conscious of his/her political freedom, will or is expected to *nihilate* or transcend his/her in-itself identifications and *facticities* and to formate their essence in political relations with the world and the others.

2.2.2 Action in Politics

Another relation of Sartre's understanding of freedom with politics can be found in the point that the basic principle of freedom is to act. Sartre equates the free consciousness with *for-itself* and then he mentions about the *for-itself* as the being which is defined by *action* (BN, 431). Actually, this consideration has multiple reflections. For example, Sartre defines freedom in *performative* sense. Conscious and intentional human beings or *being-for-itself* has to perform their freedom, that is, to act and do something in order to realize himself/herself in free existence. On the other hand, freedom is prior to act, as well. That is, “the indispensable and fundamental condition of all action is the freedom” (BN, 436). Freedom can appear in *for-itself's* conscious, intentional and transcendental actions, while it is only freedom that allows *for-itself* to act because an act refers to “projection of the *for-itself* toward what is not”. This means that there is a reciprocal relation between freedom and act and in Sartre's words “freedom makes itself an act” (BN, 438). In the political reflection, it can be evaluated in

the way that political freedom is realized only by or in action. Social groups, formations, parties or individuals themselves can act in political arena for political ideals, aims and projections because they are capable and free to act. Moreover, they also have to act in political arena for their political ideals in order to perform their freedom. Without action, no political individual or group can say that they are free. As it has been theorized, freedom in Sartre's understanding is *performative*. According to Sartre's existential conception of freedom, political freedom must be performed in order to realize political action.

On the other hand, such a reciprocal relation between action and freedom can be interpreted in the way that individuals or social groups must have the right to act, in order words, there has to be freedom to act for people in political arena. That is, Sartre From Sartrean understanding of freedom, it can be derived that politics must have compromise freedom of action or act freely, that is, political freedom involves the action -people's intentional movements, protest, objections or resistances to *facticities* as *in-itself* and supports for change, revolution, etc. as *for-itself*- for their individual or collective projections. In that sense, freedom in Sartre's philosophy comprises free political actions⁴. If a political formation or a regime does not recognize such a right, this means that there are *facticities* and situations as *in-itself* to close the possibility of political freedom. In such condition, actions for disclosure of the possibility of such right

4 At this point, it can be claimed that such a political freedom derived from Sartre's existentialism is different from liberal conception of freedom in the sense of that it indicates that freedom is not a right given by nature or it is something given and guaranteed by state. Regarding its comprehensive context, we will hang on examination and discussion on this difference in fourth chapter.

will become political freedom and political action from Sartre's perspective. It is clear that such an understanding of political freedom derived from Sartre codes political authority or any power as *in-itself* or the *facticity* -that is, current situation in politics- in the sense of obstacle for freedom. In political formations, inevitably there are structures, norms, ideologies and discourses. Because they are all forms that are fulfilled with given meanings and values, they refer to the completed forms and *in-itself* or non-human *facticities*. However, according to Sartre, human being is always non-being, that is, one implies one's lack of being. Being is always not enough and that is why there are projects, values or aims that one follows or tries to realize by *nihilating* -that is, transcending- the *in-itselfs*. To be free in politics means to *nihilate* this factuality and their being of obstacles for action.

Furthermore, the basic idea that the principle of freedom is to act means that freedom is not based on *the end*, rather freedom is to act towards our possibilities. In other words, freedom does exist in the process of struggle rather than at the moment of achieving the end or the aim. "It is a mistake to assume that a project must have some definite future objective that is not yet already the case" (Webber, 2009: 48). Action is a process starting from projecting a value or an ideal to the future and freedom is the form of such a process. Therefore, regarding its political meaning, freedom does not mean that individuals or collective groups can do, have or possess whatever they wish in political arena; such an understanding of freedom would be idealistic and goal oriented. Freedom must be concerned regardless of the ends or aims and it is wrong to trivialize human

freedom by giving importance to the end or to the achievement of an aim. Freedom appears in the action for consciously created, authentically invented and intentionally chosen possibilities that are called projects. In that sense, freedom is the consciousness and enjoyment of the possibilities in politics. When these possibilities are undermined and ignored in politics, it can be said that there is no freedom in politics and that subjects or groups are in self-deception or in bad faith. Freedom is the activation and updating of the possibilities in politics, such a consciousness is necessary to make politics humanistic and optimistic because there is no legislator but human being himself/herself and because it asserts the action that has always *nihilated* the despair.

2.2.3 Political Responsibility

Another important point for political reflection of freedom in Sartre's philosophy is its relation with responsibility and choice. He asserts that the first effect of existentialism is responsibility, that is, “it puts every man in possession of himself as he is, and places the entire responsibility for his existence squarely upon his own shoulders” (E, 29). One's responsibility manifests one's freedom; that is, if one feels responsible for something or others found him/her responsible for that, it must be understood that one's freedom, will or decision constitutes the reason totally or partly. In a word, “the extent of its responsibility is precisely that of its freedom” (Flynn, 1986: 16), and vice versa. Sartre insists on that once one chooses one's freedom, one also chooses the world. This is a moral and political interpretation of freedom, rather than philosophical. It is moral because it is the collective “constitutive of personhood along

with selfness and world”, that is to say, “the ‘myness’ of the world and of every feature in it implies that I am responsible for it” (Flynn, 1986: 13). Sartre claims that everyone as conscious of his/her freedom is not only responsible for his/her own life, but also other's lives and their free existence: “When we say that man is responsible for himself, we do not mean that he is responsible only for his own individuality, but that he is responsible for all men” (E, 29). Every freedom manifests itself with being's choice of his/her self. However, such choice of self is the choice of an image of “what we believe every person *should be*” (Flynn, 1986: 14). In other words, once the individual determines his own morality, he determines everyone else's as well (Caws, 1999: 119). One makes himself by the choice of his/her morality, and he cannot but choose a morality (E, 42). On the other hand, it is political because it denotes sort of collective understanding of the world, the social or human life. In making the collectivity real, the *for-itself* assumes responsibility of the collectivity so constituted. For example, “in accepting his Jewishness, for example, the individual Jew, in Sartre's theory, accepts that abstract ensemble which anti-Semite labels the Jew. This individual responsibility for collectives is close to the notion of collective responsibility (Flynn, 1986: 29). Here it is also important to remember Sartre's claim made in occupied France in 1943: “We have the war we deserve” (BN, 555). Here, Sartre thinks that because everyone is radically free to do anything to prevent the war -that is most evil situation for each human being-, every one of us is responsible for the consequences of the war. Moreover, he thinks that choosing is kind of affirmation of the value of that which is chosen and nobody can choose the worse, that is, “what we choose is always the better; and nothing can be

better for us unless it is better for all” (E, 30). Therefore, it is a declaration of collective responsibility coming from radical freedom of all individuals. Individuality, in Sartre's philosophy of freedom, does not mean that one can be free only in solitude. Rather, because freedom is unconditional, one is also free in solitude. This is because one is responsible for the lives and conditions of the other(s) that happens outside, even if he/she is in his/her private sphere. Sartre explains this view with an example:

“If I am a worker, for instance, I may choose to join a Christian rather than a Communist trade union. And if, by that membership, I choose to signify that resignation is, after all, the attitude that best becomes a man, that man's kingdom is not upon this earth, I do not commit myself alone to that view. Resignation is my will for everyone, and my action is, in consequence, a commitment on behalf of all mankind. Or if, to take a more personal case, I decide to marry and to have children, even though this decision proceeds simply from my situation, from my passion or my desire, I am thereby committing not only myself, but humanity as a whole, to the practice of monogamy. I am thus responsible for myself and for all men, and I am creating a certain image of man as I would have him to be. In fashioning myself I fashion man” (E, 30).

Therefore, such universalistic vision manifests the fact that our responsibility is in great extent because it concerns the others and the mankind as a whole because one's freely chosen projects are not realized in isolation or another world and by detaching ourselves from other people; rather, freedom is active relation with this world and the other(s). In Sartre's terminology, being cannot be defined by one certain characteristic and being of individuals appears depending on the relation with other's. In addition to *being-in-itself* and *being-for-itself*, Sartre also defines *being-for-others*. Once one becomes the object of the consciousness of the other, he/she turns *being-for-others* for the other and at the moment the other recognizes his/her own consciousness of being,

existence and also freedom. In that sense, one's responsibility of freedom is not restricted to oneself, it extends to others and also to the world. Such an understanding of responsibility makes all individuals politically responsible for political freedom. One cannot discard the responsibility or justify himself/herself from some politically evil situations in such an existence that is within other free human beings.

These all mark the relation between freedom, responsibility, the others and the world; actually this concerns another political dimension. Once an individual wants freedom in politics, he/she wants freedom for all human beings because in Sartre's view, "man is a being rooted in the world" (Poster, 1975: 84) and here the "world" is inevitably one part of freedom because freedom is possible only in this world. In that sense, political freedom will encompass freedom for everyone. Moreover, conscious human beings who give struggle for freedom in political arena carry the responsibility not only for themselves but also for others. This can be derived from the universal characteristic of responsibility coming from being free. Sartre indicates that "I am obliged to will the liberty of others at the same time as mine. I cannot make liberty my aim unless I make that of others equally my aim" (E, 43). Consequently, if one recognizes that human is a free being that will his freedom, at the same time he/she will realize that he/she cannot will the freedom of others. That is, in the name of that will to freedom, one is conscious of the value of freedom of the others for their existence and self-realization. In that sense, freedom in politics makes subjects responsible for the freedom of others. As for its relation with morality, Sartre claims that "a certain form of

this morality is universal” (E, 43). In a particular example, Sartre clears the relation between freedom, responsibility and others in this paragraph:

“A man who belongs to some communist or revolutionary society wills certain concrete ends, which imply the will to freedom, but that freedom is willed in community. We will freedom for freedom’s sake, and in and through particular circumstances. In thus willing freedom we discover that it depends entirely upon the freedom of others and that the freedom of others depends upon our own” (E, 42-43).

Therefore, it is obvious that freedom, according to Sartre, is possible concern for the relation with others because human being is the being-with-others, a being that exists in the world and a being that gains its own consciousness of existence within the relation of others. For Sartre, human beings discover themselves in the *cogito*, and then all the others, and then recognizes them as the condition of his own existence. Once others recognize us, they give us our being. Otherwise, we cannot be anything. Therefore, freedom is possible in this “inter-subjective” world of humanity. Sartre says that “we find ourselves in a world which is, let us say, that of ‘*inter-subjectivity*’” (E, 39). That is, the discovery of myself and the revelation of the other's freedom appears concurrently.

2.3. Conclusion

Although our examination is expected to reach the judgment whether Sartre's conception of freedom is relevant to politics or not, I think this should be deferred for last chapter where we will conclude by regarding all what we have examined as far. Still, some conclusions are possible to dedicate at this stage. For example, even if Sartre's conception of freedom can be regarded in two senses like freedom as consciousness and

freedom as action, they are densely connected with themselves. On the one hand, Sartre thinks freedom in relation with *nihilating* and transcending wind of consciousness, creation of values that compose fundamental and freely chosen projects, moving or performing for the sake of discarding any kind of *in-itselfs* and catching or grasping the life of *for-itself*. On the other hand, all these are realized with action among the *facticities* and among the others; that is, freedom cannot exist or be lived without action. In that sense, it had to be evaluated within consideration of politics and it had to be reflected on practical and phenomenal life that is characterized with action. In this context, our examination of freedom in relation with action will continue in studying on Arendt and her conception of freedom that is mostly based on her conception of action as the most valuable human condition. In that sense, next chapter is dedicated to examine Arendt's conception of freedom and its political reflection.

CHAPTER III

FREEDOM IN ARENDT'S THOUGHT AND ITS POLITICAL REFLECTIONS

3.1. Freedom in Arendt's Philosophy

In this chapter, I will examine Hannah Arendt's concept of freedom and evaluate it within the context of her political thought which is mainly derived from ancient Greek and Roman life of politics and which is mostly evaluated as *republican*. Although it is obvious that Arendt's concept of freedom must be conceived in relation to her theory of *action*, its groundwork is really deep and its framework is quite extensive. I argue that Arendt's concept of freedom is philosophical and I will submit her philosophy of freedom to be evaluated as an existentialist interpretation to today's politics. In other words, the content would be the modern political subjects who make themselves *appear* and taste freedom and love the world in which they live together with other equals.

Freedom in Arendt's philosophy is a factual, phenomenal and practical condition of humanity, rather than being a feeling, an inside will, a state of mind or something spiritual / metaphysical. Only in certain concrete circumstances does freedom appear as a phenomenon among people. There is a specific, clearly defined and meticulously explicated realm for freedom to be exercised, performed and experienced by individual(s) in common and shared public life. Arendt acknowledges what freedom is not as much as she formulates what it is. Therefore, it is required to examine the circumstances for and the outside the realm of freedom in order to understand Arendt's

concept of freedom and its contextual and factual relationship with *action*, that is *politics*. In this context, this chapter will be comprised of two main parts. In the first one, I will examine Arendt's extensive frame for the concept of *freedom* by explicating the essentials and characteristics of *action*. In the second part, those characteristics of the concept of freedom will be examined to find out whether it is relevant or irrelevant to politics in several senses. To accomplish all these, it is essential to begin with Arendt's concept of freedom within specific relation to *action* as the most special human condition. In this line, I will confine myself to examine and discuss freedom with its appearance in action. The reasons why Arendt's conception of freedom are important today's world and the main points where it is differed from other and especially liberal conception of freedom will be studied in next chapter.

3.1.1. Freedom in *Vita Activa*

In her major study “*The Human Condition*”, Arendt claims that human life can be categorized into two as *vita activa* that is practical / active mode of life and *vita contemplativa* that is mental way of life. In this book, Arendt is extensively concerned with *vita activa* and she pursues phenomenology in defines three fundamental modes of existence for human beings in *vita activa* namely *labor*, *work* and *action*. While the conditions of *labor* and *work* are considered as pre-political and they seem close to the category of *the social*, *action* is defined as *the political* mode of human beings. In the variety of such considerations, Arendt emphasizes the fact that it is *action* that makes

human freedom *appear*. Therefore, here the general afford will be to clarify the essentials of *action* in order to display the essence(s) of freedom.

3.1.2. Freedom(s) of Action

Action, in Arendt's own words, “is the only activity that goes on directly between men without the intermediary of things or matter, corresponds to the human condition of plurality, to the fact that men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world” (HC, 7). This means that action is the praxis of human beings within which they, as citizens or equals of the plurality, *appear* in the public realm, communicate with others and explain their own opinion / *doxa* about worldly realities and human issues as *res publica* or public things. As based on this definition, it is certain that there are several characteristics of action that must be clarified at the first hand. She emphasizes the speech and discussions of opinions, the plurality and the participation or appearing into the public realm. To her, their opposites are *truth claims*, solitude and being represented by staying at home that was undoubtedly the private sphere in both the sense of being a shelter (the human condition of *labor*) and a working place or production area (the human condition of *work*). In that sense, the next parts will serve these substances of Arendtian freedom in the extensions of her thought of action.

3.1.2.1. Freedom in Speech within Plurality

The peculiarity of action is its engagement or alliance with *speech* as much as *deeds*. According to Arendt, “action and speech are so closely related because the

primordial and specifically human act must at the same time contain “who” we are” (HC, 178), that is, our *eudaimmia*⁵, qualities, gifts, talents, and shortcomings. Action cannot be performed without speech. “Without the accompaniment of speech, action would lose its subject, which means that there would no longer be an actor. Then, speechless action would no longer be action” (HC, 178). In Arendt's thought, everyone is unique and distinct from each other and “speech and action reveal this unique distinctness” and with action and speech “we insert ourselves into the human world” (HC, 176). The togetherness of action with speech is not resulted from necessity or utility as in the *labor* and *work*, but from humans' intention to join into plurality and realize his/her distinctness. “This disclosure of who somebody is implicit in both his words and his deeds” (HC, 178).

First of all, it can be asserted that freedom, in the sense of its being the principle of action, is speech. According to Arendt, *speech* is not a pure physical activity. In its togetherness with action, speech, but not our consciousness or intelligence, provides human's difference from animals. Its primary importance lies in its service to make people express their opinions that appoint their difference and uniqueness among other unique equals. People must express their opinions so as to feel and taste freedom. However, lips on their own are not sufficient for one to taste freedom. There must be ears as well. That is, action in speech is to talk and communicate with others in public

5 *Eudaimmia* (*Eudaimonia*), according to Arendt, means kind of blessedness without any religious overtones, and it means literally something like the well-being of the *daimon* who accompanies each man throughout life, who is his distinct identity, but appears and is visible only to others. *Eudaimmia* is unchangeable identity of the person that discloses itself intangibly in act and speech (HC, 192-193).

realm. Therefore, one can never be called free until one is able to actualize the capability of language and sound his/her opinions and until the other equals hear that sound and listen and mind that opinion. In other words, “to reveal one’s “whoness” is to act for the sake of both oneself and others whose sense of reality depends upon the recognition of a distinctively human presence” (Hansen, 1993: 53). In that sense, it can be claimed that freedom is not only being capable of making a speech but also being recognized, felt and listened by other equals.

This brings the fact that freedom needs *plurality* in order to be experienced. “The other”, in Arendt's understanding, is neither an evil nor a stranger; it mostly means “different one”. However, this “difference” and “uniqueness” come out only in the *public realm* because one's *opinion* –in the sense of “it-seems-to-me”- and one's particular experience of life makes him/her partial, different and unique. Public realm is the realm of plurality and in that sense; plurality is the togetherness of different people, their distinct opinions and particulars. Arendt says that “revelatory quality of speech and action comes to the fore where people are with others and neither for nor against them - that is, in sheer human togetherness” (HC, 180). This means that freedom is not *against* someone “*other*”, but within *others*. Freedom with the companion of action and speech needs plurality; in other words, it is only plurality that is capable of acting and action lies in plurality.

Besides all these, a question like “what do people talk and discuss in plurality or what is this speech based on?” can be asked relevantly. The answer is *doxa*, that is, opinions. *Doxa* signs appearance, fame and existence at the same time, which are the major particulars of action for Ancient Greeks. It refers to noticing one's opinion that is generally defined as *dokei moi* (“it-seems-to-me”). It is not simply a “perspective” or “view” in the modern or post-modern sense. *Doxa* defines pure sight, authentic and unique opinions of individuals that are not shaped, structured or manipulated by anything else. Greeks believed that only the combination / synthesis / plurality of different *doxa* (knowledge of phenomenon) can disclose the pure reality or factuality and Arendt agrees with this belief. In that sense, freedom is to see and being able to say what you see. If it is recognized that one's opinions make him/her authentic and unique in a sense, possession of opinions makes one free in the sense that he/she becomes one of the holders of the reality or factuality. One gains *freedom* because he/she gains an opinion about a point in question. Freedom in expressing an opinion is capability to create a power once opinions come together because the plurality of different opinions gives the accuracy, truthfulness or wholeness of the factuality. For Arendt, opinions are important to reach this truthfulness and to save the individuality and authenticity of people in the plurality. In that sense, opinions and speeches based on *doxa* in plurality never close, freeze or bind the discussions about any kind of factuality. This freedom in speech, feeling the existence by expressing the opinions and appearing in plurality bring us to another future of action which also arrives at another phenomenon of freedom in Arendt's thought. It is the *initiative* character of action.

3.1.2.2. Freedom as *Initiation*

As action is *initium*, Arendt says “to act, in its most general sense, means to take an initiative, to begin to set something into motion” (HC, 177). Action is an intention to start a new process; it is a phenomenon of people's intention to create something new whereby opening a discussion in public realm and even to establish new constitutions.

Actually, Arendt's attitude to freedom as *initium* is considerably profound. Freedom as *initium* means that freedom is being out of the past and its determination. The idea that every act of us is determined by something else and that everything is the continuum of something previous is very strong in our minds. Arendt's argument signals a counter-argument against this strong idea of determinism because she claims that action can independently start or authentically initiate something new that is no longer a continuum of the past and previous events. Creation of the action might be absolutely new and novel as in the example of revolutions. “It is in the nature of beginning that something new is started which cannot be expected from whatever may have happened before” (HC, 177-178). Of course, the concept of freedom here does not imply that action is *causa sui* or it is capable of *creatio ex nihilo*. Instead, it is capable of being out of determination of the previous facts, the existing conditions and the forthcoming expectations, aims or ideals.

In the sense of its being initiation, freedom, in Arendt's thought, is the central characteristic of human beings because it is human that can initiate new processes or

start a moment to create originalities. With her own words, “with the creation of man, the principle of beginning came into the world itself, which, of course, is only another way of saying that the principle of freedom was created when man was created but not before” (HC, 177). Arendt thinks that such a kind of initiation is like a *birth*, that is, new beginning. Each human being symbolizes a new beginning in Arendt's thought and each is *initium* on their own. Each is also crucial with her/his potentiality to take initiative and be prompted into action: “the most elementary and authentic understanding of human freedom” is the element of beginning in action (HC, 224-225). Then, it is not wrong to claim that freedom, in Arendt's mind, is the ability/potentiality of plurality in action to give birth. In other words, Arendt considers freedom in the context of the birth of new men and the new beginning that is natality. Freedom is the phenomenon of creating miracles like a miracle of birth or natality that “saves the world, the realm of human affairs, from its normal, "natural" ruin and bestows upon human affairs faith and hope” (HC, 247).

Besides these main characteristics, there are certain other essential predicaments and conditions for action to appear. As freedom is the *principle* of action, these predicaments are also essential conditions for freedom to be seen in action and to be experienced by the actors. These are the *frailty* embedded in human affairs and action, *irreversibility* of the process of action and *unpredictability* or *boundlessness* of the outcome, effects and consequences of action that are potentially existing in its nature. Now, let me examine these essentials in the next section.

3.1.2.3. Freedom and Predicaments of Action

According to Arendt, the *frailty* of human affairs is what makes action possible. In other words, action is such a phenomenon that it finds its moment from this frailty of human togetherness. It is also freedom whose existence is based on this fact. In a stable, unchangeable and timeless formation, everything would be determined, certain and fixed; freedom as something involving indeterminacy and uncertainty would not be possible. In that sense, freedom is a characteristic of the human togetherness as public realm which differs from any other artificial formations and constructions. Freedom appears within this frail characteristic of the human togetherness, that is, in publicity (publicness).

As for the *irreversible* characteristic of the process of action, Arendt thinks that this is another predicament of action. The fact that the process of action is not reversible means that it is not possible to go back to the starting point of the action in which nothing had happened yet. *Irreversibility* tells us that action is not a mechanical process; it is not something that can be controlled like an experiment in a laboratory. *Irreversibility* also means that action is a path of no return. It can be said that action is a starting point of change, reform and revolution in social togetherness. Since action is always related with a new beginning, the *irreversibility* involved in action becomes much more meaningful. In that sense, freedom requires being conscious and courageous to go in a way that has no return. Freedom is a way of no return. Freedom is lived in the process of action that is a pass from somewhere to another place, from a certain time to

another time and from a mode of existence to another. It can be argued that freedom implies that human beings -as both particular units and togetherness- change, evolve, move towards the future or new lives and transcend the things standing there. Freedom refers to a journey for a new life or a fresh existence. If you are still in the same place after your journey or if you can turn back to the starting point, it can be said that it was not freedom that you lived. In that sense, the satisfaction of passions like having sex, eating, etc. is not freedom because the bodily desires for these passions never end. After the satisfaction, one generally finds himself/herself at the starting point for a new desire. I will discuss this point in the fourth chapter which I will examine liberal conception of freedom.

In relation with *irreversibility*, the other predicament of action is *unpredictability* of outcome and consequences of action. For Arendt,

“the unpredictability ... is of a twofold nature: it arises simultaneously out of the “darkness of the human heart” ... and out of the impossibility of foretelling the consequences of an act within a community of equals where everybody has the same capacity to act” (HC, 244).

Although action is based on some principles, it is quite chaotic and complex phenomenon resulting from its being a product of human plurality. Action in its time and place is always unique and neither actors nor spectators can estimate or know its possible results and effects. Actors join into the action with their particularities, partial views and opinions and they share them with other equals. Their intention is not to impose this partial opinion as if it was a *truth*, but to go towards complete *truthfulness*

through discussions, talks, movements, judgments and imaginations. The real actor should doubt his/her opinion and partial existence; he/she should open them to others for falsification, criticism and so reconstruction together with those of others. In such a process which carries an inevitable uncertainty, it is impossible to talk about the predictability of its results and effects. In that sense, freedom as the principle of action seems to be related with unpredictability and uncertainty. As I have mentioned before, in an environment where all results of any action are determined, freedom would not be possible because without action, freedom ceases to exist. Additionally, freedom can appear only in the context of such chaotic actions and freedom is to create such an action whose results and effects are not really predictable and programmed.

Another predicament of action is the *boundlessness* of its effects. This means that the fate or consequence of the action is uncertain and that the effects of action do not end. In other words, the moment of action is always comprised of a chain of new moments and the consequences of action can start another action and there can be a chain of actions. She says that “the smallest act in the most limited circumstances bears the seed of the same boundlessness, because one deed, and sometimes one word, suffices to change every constellation” (HC, 190). It is difficult to draw the extension of the effects of action and hard to anticipate where action stops and how it will conclude because action is a human affair and human affairs generally are in a contingent, frail and dynamic becoming. It is difficult to bind the effects of action, to stop its ongoing process and to prevent its authentic existence. It is true that in human togetherness, every

event or movement causes or starts a new event. However, action in the sense of its power to create new beginnings and its *boundlessness* is the unique and special human condition to cause great changes, reforms and revolutions. In this line, it is understandable why freedom is the principle of action because freedom cannot arise in boundaries that stop or prevent the continuity and increase of the effects of action. As action “has an inherent tendency to force open all limitations and cut across all boundaries” (HC, 190), it is freedom to open these boundaries in public life and human togetherness as well.

As it has been shown above, the predicaments of action generally result from its immanence within plurality and human togetherness. As she acknowledges such a fact, her suggestions concerning the “remedies for these predicaments” are also derived from the potentialities of action and the faculties of human togetherness. For her, “the possible redemption from the predicament of *irreversibility* is the faculty of forgiving... The remedy for unpredictability, for the chaotic uncertainty of the future, is contained in the faculty to make and keep promises” (HC, 237). On the one hand, the *faculty of forgiving* in the culture and tradition of the society gives courage or contributes to the existence of action in that society. In her own words:

“Without being forgiven, released from the consequences of what we have done, our capacity to act would, as it were, be confined to one single deed from which we could never recover; we would remain the victims of its consequences forever” (HC, 237).

This means that people as the members of togetherness should forgive the actors if the results of the action are undesirable and wicked. On the other hand, *the faculty to make*

and keep promises indicates that people as members of the togetherness know and accept “the unpredictability of human affairs and the unreliability of men as they are” (HC, 244) and the function of this faculty is to master this twofold darkness of human affairs. At the same time, these remedies for the predicaments of action refer to moral characteristics of human togetherness in Arendt's mind. They will encourage the appearance and existence of action in that society. In that sense, these moral precepts are also conditions that will facilitate freedom to exist when the actors know that they will possibly be forgiven and they live in a society which is based on a promise or a contract which “arises directly out of the will to live together with others in the mode of acting and speaking” (HC, 246). In other words, “only through this constant mutual release from what they do can men remain free agents, only by constant willingness to change their minds and start again can they be trusted with so great a power as that to begin something new” (HC, 240). So freedom relies upon not only the presence of action and free actors but also the existence of human togetherness having such moral precepts and culture. It can be said that togetherness which has such faculties and moral precepts will make members of the community free and at least courageous to act and live freedom because these remedies will make actors free from the responsibility of unpredictable consequences of action. Also, for Arendt, the absence of these faculties in a society may possibly lead to vengeance, resentment and hostility among people. It can be said that the existence of such evils in a society will cause struggle among people, mastership in society and domination or superiority of one(s) over other(s). In that sense, the faculties of forgiving and promising can also free all members of society from these evils that

harm and threaten the togetherness of that society. Freedom is to act to format and also to live in such a plurality that is emancipated from these evils. In Arendt's mind, such a freedom and a free plurality with the faculties of forgiving and promising is the only alternative to sovereignty, that is “a mastery which relies on domination of one's self and rule over others” (HC, 244). This means that freedom is not sovereignty; the phenomenon of freedom is quite different from that of sovereignty. This differentiation is important to clarify and understand more about freedom. Let me devote the next section to accomplish tasks of clarifying and understanding freedom better.

3.1.2.4. Freedom is not Sovereignty

According to Arendt, sovereignty means one's domination or superiority over other. This dominating relation can result from any kind of strength, ethnic or national differences or any kind of economic inequality. Such a relationship can be seen between individuals, sexes, social and ethnic groups, classes and nations or countries. The central and most important characteristic of such a relationship is that it requires a separation, that is, there must be at least two sides or two parties and these sides or parties are in clash; one is dominated and the other dominates or they are struggling against each other in order to dominate (establish superiority over) the other. However, for Arendt, this refers to absence of togetherness and plurality because it is obvious that a society based on such a relation is either divided into these parties/groups or it is on the way towards this division. Additionally, any togetherness established and maintained by sovereignty is a serious hindrance for freedom and action. Human togetherness, in Arendt's mind,

should be based on equality and plurality which is the variety of differences that human beings have authentically. In that sense, freedom is not sovereignty. On the contrary, sovereignty is the result of escape from freedom as the principle of action. In Arendt's own words, "the only salvation from this kind of freedom seems to lie in non-acting, in abstention from the whole realm of human affairs as the only means to safeguard one's sovereignty and integrity as a person" (HC, 234). Regarding the principles of freedom such as speech, plurality and equality, it seems quite mistaken to identify freedom with sovereignty because in sovereignty relationship, neither master nor slave is free. It is common-sensical that slave is not free because he/she is not actor of his/her own life, acts and thought, he/she is controlled or dominated. However, the claim that master is not also free is interesting. Master is not free because he/she does not see others as equals, lives in a hierarchical order, closed to others and their difference and he/she is in a very controlled and determined relationship with his/her acts. Master cannot live freedom alone as sovereign because freedom is only possible in equality and difference of human plurality in action with its all predicaments and remedies for these predicaments.

Moreover, for Arendt, sovereignty also means "*being able to control or even foretell consequences of action*". As it has been discussed above, it is not possible to control and determine fully the results and effects of action and even to know them. The argument in the Western tradition of philosophy is that if there is no such sovereignty for the consequences of action, there is no freedom. In other words, it is argued that freedom

requires being master on our acts and the future unknown and uncertain fate of our intentions. Such a view is quite deterministic and even positivist actually. Arendt argues the contrary view that it is because there is no sovereignty in action, freedom is possible in human togetherness: “it is indeed as spurious to deny human freedom to act because the actor never remains the master of his acts as it is to maintain that human sovereignty is possible because of the incontestable fact of human freedom” (HC, 235). One may argue that the predicaments of action are generally the conditions that create non-sovereignty but at the same time make freedom incontestable. According to Arendt, the notion that “freedom and non-sovereignty are mutually exclusive” is defeated by reality and action has certain potentialities “which enable it to survive the disabilities of non-sovereignty” (HC, 235-236). In that sense, freedom comes from being non-sovereign over the acts and from being non-sovereign or non-superior over other(s). The former saves the fragile, irreversible, boundless and unpredictable characteristics of action, while the latter is required for the plurality, *inter-hominess-esse* or “to be among men” (LM, 74) as very base of the appearance of action.

The view that sovereignty is not freedom within the context of these two meanings of sovereignty can also be interpreted in the way that freedom is not the end but the process itself. That is, the sovereignty not also implies a struggle, competition or a war before itself, but it also emphasizes the result of that struggle or war. Sovereignty as the mastership implies the winners and losers; yet, according to Arendt, freedom is outside such an understanding and it can be lived only in the process of action,

regardless of its ends. This view is quite important to learn more about freedom in Arendt's thoughts, so in the following, I will focus on the process character of action and its implications for freedom.

3.1.2.5. Freedom in the Process of Action

As it has been shown above, action is not end-oriented even if it is an intention towards certain aims and purposes. It is “the way” or “the process” that makes action be action and that gives action its uniqueness. Arendt's emphasis on the process character of action prevents it from being a tool and a trivial phenomenon. Action is outside means and ends relationships. The means to achieve the end can turn into being the end even if this "end" cannot be seen as a means. Therefore, actualities themselves in the process of action are higher than anything that is a means or an end. The actualities here in action are the living deeds and the spoken words that are the greatest achievements of human beings. “It is from the experience of this full actuality that the paradoxical "end in itself" derives its original meaning; for in these instances of action and speech the end (telos) is not pursued but lies in the activity itself” (HC, 206). That is, the important thing is the process itself because all human capabilities, power of human togetherness, beauty of plurality and *natality* of speech appear in that process, in the time of action. This makes the process of action an end-in-itself, rather than being a way that brings us to a higher, a supreme and holy end(s). This process character of action is opposed to the instrumentalization in *work* that “implies a degradation of all things into means” (HC, 156) and as it becomes the process itself, action avoids being a production whose

products are the only essentials. On the contrary, Arendt says that “action can result in an end product only on condition that its own authentic, non-tangible, and always utterly fragile meaning is destroyed” (HC, 196). That is, as it is seen as production, action loses its essential meaning and uniqueness in human life. The instrumentalization of action harms its substantial meaning and importance.

Furthermore, the process character of action also implies the importance of the performance rather than the result. That is, the emphasis is given to the performance of the actors, how well they actualize themselves and how sincere they act, not for the sake of the result but for the action itself. According to Arendt, “the specific meaning of each deed can lay only in the performance itself and neither in its motivation nor its achievement” (HC, 206). This seems to be referring to a standpoint which disregards the result of the game but which privileges only the well-playing. Of course it can be claimed that well-playing brings good results. However, as it has been mentioned earlier, here the intention is important and action has such an intention as well-playing rather than good result. In other words, the bad result cannot harm the beauty of the performance of the loser actors. In today's world, this may be seen as utopia because our intention is to win, to succeed, to achieve the goal and we generally care only about the result, the financial gain or social status. This kind of view is open to intend to instrumentalize all acts, all human relations in the process and deeds and speech as well; to ignore the beauty of the performance and to trivialize all processes that comprise bigger and essential part of any acts and *action* itself. In that sense, Arendt's argument

can be interpreted as an opposition to and even an attack against such success-oriented intentions which are dominant for the most part in today's working life, social relations, politics, cultural and sport activities.

As for the relation of all these with freedom, it can be said that freedom is also for the sake for itself, rather than for something else. Freedom cannot be seen as a chance, strength or motivation that is desired in order to achieve certain goals. Freedom, appearing in the process of action, is not an end of action either; rather it is the principle of action. In her own words, “action insofar as it is free is neither under the guidance of the intellect nor under the dictate of the will, but springs from something altogether different which I shall call a principle” (HC, 150). This principle as freedom is also the power created with human togetherness during the process of action and that power appears in the performance, in the deeds and speeches regardless of the end and the results of the action and the performance remains indifferent to success or failure. In that sense, freedom seems to include being indifferent to the rules of production, utility and cost. Rather freedom orients itself towards the beautiful.

Freedom or action as ends in themselves, the importance of performance and indifference of freedom to utility and cost remind us of the aesthetic character of action or its resemblance to art. Actually, Arendt says that “the performing arts, on the contrary, have indeed a strong affinity with politics” (BPF, 152). Action, like theater for example, has performers or actors who *courageously* intend to make their uniqueness appear by

uttering, noticing or publishing their unique opinions. Action has also audiences that are *spectators* interpreting the importance and the meaning of the act for the community -not for particular group-, humanity -not for humans-, and the world -not for life. Action, like art, is an end itself; “the source of art work has neither an end nor an aim outside itself” (HC, 170). People decide to communicate and act without a desire to make a decision, make a law or reach an end, even if it can have such results. Motivations or achievements are not primary concerns because desire for an aim can cause the ignorance of or suppression on the process character of action. In that sense, freedom is performance and appearance in and for the plurality, it is existence in the world by joining into the human togetherness. Freedom is to create commonly something new, open to all humanity and unforgettable within the affection of enthusiasm and without an anxiety or fear about the results, costs and benefits.

As these all have shown, the aesthetic character of action has allowed us to evaluate action within its resemblance with art. Another affinity between action and art is their intention of *immortality*. Works of art, for Arendt, leave non-perishable traces behind. Likewise, action always leaves durable and lasting marks created by mortal hands in this world for other mortal human beings. According to Arendt, “works of art are the most intensely worldly of all tangible things; their durability is almost untouched by the corroding effect of natural processes” (HC, 167). This claim is very interesting because it says that the works of art will be permanent and durable as long as they are worldly, that is, as long as they are created for the sake of this world and people as

worldly human beings. Art and action resemble in their intention towards immortality and the important thing here is that “immortality means endurance in time, deathless life on this earth” (HC, 18); it is not the immortality of the soul or of life but of “*something immortal achieved by mortal hands*”; it does not have divine meaning like continuity of life in other world(s) and it “has become tangibly present, to shine and to be seen, to sound and to be heard, to speak and to be read” (HC, 168). These imply the worldly characteristic of immortality embedded in action and freedom. According to Arendt, human beings are worldly and action is intention to catch such immortality in this world. In that sense, freedom as the principle of action comes from intention to act and to be immortal in our world. Freedom should be thought and practiced within the *worldly* character of human beings and their intention for immortality. Freedom for human beings is to create or construct something new that is their own and something they had in common with other equals in order to stay with worldly beings, to continue to be a citizen of this world, to be immortal or more permanent than this earthly life because as Katep comments “freedom and worldliness are the values that alone make life worth living” (1977: 142).

In the light of these all, it can be said that the aesthetic character of action and intention of immortality through freedom is based on the consciousness of *worldliness*. According to Arendt, the perception of human beings that they belong to this world, that they are the equals of human plurality and that they are citizens of the earth are the foundations of their consciousness of and desire for action and to live freedom. Such

consciousness saves human beings from *alienation*. Alienation means to be isolated from this world, human togetherness, public and human plurality, action, speech and freedom. Alienation is the opposite phenomenon of worldliness, action and freedom. In addition to speech, that is to voice, the other requirement of being worldly, possibility of becoming immortal in this world among other equals relies on appearing in the world, that is, to be visible among plurality. Appearance in the Arendtian sense is very important because appearance of human beings gives them the consciousness that they do exist, that they live in this world with, among and for other equals. “In acting and speaking, men show who they are, reveal actively their unique personal identities and thus make their appearance in the human world” (HC, 179). To be seen, like to be heard, means that others recognize me and that I am one of these equals:

“To men, the reality of the world is guaranteed by the presence of others, by its appearing to all and whatever lacks this appearance comes and passes away like a dream, intimately and exclusively our own but without reality” (HC, 199).

This means that “speech and action have a revelatory quality: they reveal the “whoness” of the doer” (Benhabib, 1988: 33). Appearance gives reality or it is the basis of reality. In that sense it can be said that for Arendt, reality is the gain of freedom. In other words, one who does not appear cannot be free and also cannot taste reality. Freedom is to make one's own being, existence and uniqueness appear in the public realm. In her own words, “the curse of slavery consisted not only in being deprived of freedom and of visibility, but also in the fear of these obscure people themselves that from being obscure they should pass away leaving no trace that they have existed” (HC, 55). Thus, freedom as opposed to slavery is to make visible one's being by the courage to act, to join into

human plurality and to leave permanent traces behind as worldly being with intention of immortality. Freedom in relation with visibility and appearance is a phenomenon that must be seen, heard and shared by others in action. Alienation means hiding from plurality, isolation from human togetherness, withdrawing from action, individual existence and loneliness; this means, alienation is definitely against freedom.

All the efforts thus far have examined *action* as her central concern theory and I think that this was very helpful and even necessary to clarify Arendt's conception of freedom. Freedom is the principle of *action* and action is the praxis of political life of human togetherness appearing in the world within plurality. Therefore, there is a strong relation between *freedom* and *politics*. In that sense, the next section is dedicated to examine this relationship and to discuss what the possible reflections of freedom on politics can be and to question how Arendt finds this relation in the sense of political power, political action, participation, citizenship, state-society relations, structures-subject relations, laws, etc. To accomplish this, it will be meaningful and functional to delineate the framework of politics in Arendt and then to examine its relation with freedom with its peculiar characteristics, predicaments, conditions and principles of actions that have been clarified in the first part.

3.2. *Freedom and Politics in Arendt*

As it has been shown before, the relation between freedom and politics comes from the fact that politics is the equivalence of action and that freedom is the principle of

action. Arendt summarizes this view with these words: “*the raison d’être of politics is freedom, and its field of experience is action*” (BPF, 145). She thinks that in all political matters, human freedom is a self-evident truth. This means that it is not possible to conceive action and politics without assuming that freedom exists. Arendt has declared such relation in the following passage;

“If we understand the political in the sense of the polis, its end or *raison d’être* would be to establish and keep in existence a space where freedom as virtuosity can appear. This is the realm where freedom is a worldly reality, tangible in words which can be heard, in deeds which can be seen, and in events which are talked about, remembered, and turned into stories before they are finally incorporated into the great storybook of human history” (BPF, 153).

Actually, this passage summarizes the equivalence of action with politics and the importance of politics/action for freedom to exist by speech, appearance and deeds in permanence of its results and in immortality of its effects. The life in the *polis* refers to politics of Ancient Greek which has been practiced on actions and speeches of free and equal citizens. In this line, political reflection of freedom should firstly be related with freedom in speech, action and appearance. In other words, this inherent and inseparable relation between freedom and politics must be examined by discussing freedom of speech and appearance which constitutes the phenomenon of political activity in Arendt’s thought.

3.2.1. Freedom in Political Activity

If speech means action and action includes freedom of speech, then this means that politics is mostly based on speech. According to Arendt, people join into politics or

become political once they choose talking to others about worldly and human concerns. One can become political subject -that is *citizen* according to Arendt- only if he/she keeps on talking and discussing in public sphere. Talking or discussion is obviously based on people's opinions which merely belong to individuals who are necessarily partial and in a partial existence. This is because everything shows itself different to everyone regarding their position in life, their conditions and their intentions as well. Arendt's view on participation to political and public sphere and discussion is mostly misunderstood or misinterpreted in the way that people go into political action so as to create a "community", a "union" or a "we" that is like an homogeneous unity or a sect. This is not the case. Arendt insists that people go into public and political discussions as being partial, subjective and authentic particulars. She does not try to formulate a homogeneous and congregational society which is intended to be "total" in the sense of "mass society".⁶ Arendt thinks that such social formations intend totalitarianism because they intend the closure of *the political* whose *raison d'être* is the human plurality. Indeed, everyone has his/her own opinion that signs a differentiation, originality or an authenticity and people join into political action so as to be criticized but not for coincidence or to be approved by others because they know that they can be falsified by others. The opinions are expressed to be examined, discussed and evaluated by the others. They can be rejected, reshaped, corrected or accepted by other participators who are there with same consciousness and same intentionality.

⁶ In this context, Arendt criticizes Hobbes' Leviathan, Hegel's idea of "state" and Rousseau's "general will" which are based on the similarity/uniformity of particular/individual wills and coincidence of "the particular" with "the general". This, she thinks, opens the way to totalitarian form of life and politics and constitutes the end of the World in the sense of worldliness we share.

Here the communicability as *publicity* and *the public freedom* stays as a principle of freedom in politics. The importance of such a politics is to create *togetherness* that is based on variety of opinions, multitude of voices and plurality of differences. This is the political form of human togetherness for Arendt and it implies freedom for plurality at the first hand. In other words, political freedom exists not by the exclusion of the others in a society but by the coming together and inclusion of all kind of differences, ethnic or religious minorities, sexes, etc. Therefore, freedom in plurality can be interpreted as freedom for those who cannot find a place or even representation in society and worldly issues. Political freedom necessarily includes the plurality of opinions and inclusion of all differences.

As it is the plurality of opinions, political freedom in the Arendtian sense also includes freedom of speech. She thinks that freedom of thought and its publication in the form of speech is the most important political action and a great political freedom. If we remember the meaning and importance of speech in Arendt's thought, it can be claimed that such form of political freedom creates a public sphere for individuals and groups to realize their existence and uniqueness. Arendt thinks that “freedom of speech and thought is the right of an individual to express himself” (LKP, 39). In that sense, it can be claimed that politics in a society must include freedom of speech and this must be recognized, protected and saved as a right both in political action and also in the legal framework that defines the public realm. This point reveals another important dimension

of freedom of speech. It is the enlargement of *the political*. Freedom for speech or expression of opinions that are various regarding the variety of individuals is freedom to inject various opinions into politics or to enrich and increase the possibilities of *the political*. I think that this is what a human togetherness is capable to give shape and also what human dignity deserves because human beings differ from animals with their capability to speech. This is also crucial when we remember Arendt's insistence that speech is what makes human beings political in the sense of action and appearance.

3.2.2. Freedom vs. Representation

Arendt's insistence of the importance of appearance by speech and action brings us to her critics to parliamentary democracy and to her suggestion of the participatory and deliberative form of democracy. According to Arendt, representation as the principle of parliamentarian regimes or party system is an obstacle for the appearance of the political, freedom or action among people because representation prevents the participation of individuals into political processes and representation restrains their political activity. Actions and opinions as the very being of freedom cannot be represented and representation adheres to groups or crowds, rather than individuals. The representative model maintains “the conflict between government and the people, between those who are in power and those who help them into it, between representatives and the represented and the age-old distinction between rulers and ruled” (OR, 233). It contributes to the formation of political rulers, the bureaucratized and elitist forms of politics that is characteristic of the modern epoch (D’entrèves, 2001: 64)

and obviously removes and kills the plurality characteristic of the political that is inalienable base of democratic political life. According to D'entrèves, representative system blinds the capacities for politics and capabilities of people because “when representation becomes the substitute for direct democracy, the citizens can exercise their powers of political agency only at election day” (1993: 161). This means that representation numbs people by closing them into private sphere outside elections or referendums. In that sense, it can be claimed that for the existence of the political freedom, “it is not enough to have a collection of private individuals voting separately and anonymously” (D'entrèves, 1993: 152). That is, Arendt never sees freedom for people in representation system. Freedom is to participate into political and decision making processes by deeds and speeches. Freedom is to create publicness and to act in that way. This is also necessary for people to “become the subject of democratic debate” (D'entrèves, 1993: 152). Therefore, according to Arendt, the representative model is the very opposite of participatory political existence. Arendt’s example for freedom and participation is the council system that occurred in “all revolutions, in the French Revolution, with Jefferson in the American Revolution, in the Parisian commune, in the Russian revolutions, in the wake of the revolutions in Germany and Austria at the end of World War I, finally in the Hungarian Revolution” (CR, 231), even if most of them could not keep the council system permanent in long term. The council system enables the experiences of actors to participate into development of public affairs. The council system corresponds to political action because she thinks that the councils say: “We want to participate; we want to debate, we want to make our voices heard in public, and

we want to have a possibility to determine the political course of our country” (CR, 232). Arendt goes further and suggests a new form of state that is called “a council-state” and that is suited to federative system where “power would be constituted horizontally and not vertically” (CR, 233). Actually, Arendt's insistence on this model is quite consistent with her assertion that politics is based on deeds and speech in public realm and her claim that freedom is to appear, to be heard and listened, rather than merely to vote for the representative.

Arendt's insistence on active participation -that is to act and to talk- for political freedom comes from her precision concerning the difference between the public and private spheres, that is, the primacy of publicness over private life. As it has been examined earlier, publicness is indispensable principle of *bios politicos* and freedom. In that sense, Arendt never accepts the argument that one can live freedom in one's private sphere and personal life. Human togetherness, plurality and publicness are necessary for freedom to exist. Because freedom is tied to action and action in turn may be reached only in so far as it is performed, such performance requires others to be seen. In that sense, Arendt criticizes the political regimes that force people to stay in the private sphere and that closes the public sphere, the possibilities of *the political* and people's political activity based on speech and deed. She thinks these kinds of regimes have potentiality to turn into totalitarian systems because she believes that “deprived of public speech and action, people have only ideology to guide them in belief and behavior” (Nelson: 1978: 273). In that sense, Arendt's criticism of totalitarianism is important to

examine and to interpret *freedom* as the principle of political in the context of such anti-political and non-political concrete realities. Let me talk a bit in this context.

According to Arendt, the main characteristic of totalitarian regimes is that they have “truth claims”. Totalitarian rules are far from being “lawless” or “arbitrary”; on the contrary, they are based on positive laws that receive their ultimate legitimation from supra-human forces, from “*the law of History or Nature*” (OT, 461-4). Dana Villa, who is an important interpreter of Arendt, gives some examples like “all history is the history of class struggle (Marxism) or a natural development resulting from the struggle between the races (Nazism)” (Villa, 2000: 3) as laws that are derived from truth claims and then turned into ideologies. These “truths”, for Arendt, are generally originated from the activity of *philosophical thinking* and life of philosophy. This *philosophical thinking* should not be confused with Arendt's conception of thoughtfulness as representative thinking, judging on the based on *enlarged mentality*⁷ and thinking in the sense of de-sensing that have political and moral essence and importance for public life in Arendt's politics. On the contrary, she locates *philosophical thinking* against politics because philosophical thinking is the practice of contemplation that requires withdrawal from the

7 Arendt borrows “enlarged mentality” from Kant to imply a broadened way of thinking. This enlarged mentality makes possible the faculty of judging that is essentially moral in Kant and principally political in Arendt. It refers *thinking representatively*, that is, to compare our judgment with possible judgments of others, with imagining conditions of the others and putting ourselves on the positions of the others who are not here now. In that sense, the capacity to judge as a political ability enables public life with its particulars and differences. Enlarged mentality including the faculty of judging refers thinking politically and thoughtfulness as well. It implies thinking on the base of particularities, opinions, factualities and commonsense, but not a given general laws, truth claims or divine rules. In that sense, enlarged mentality -in its relation with judging- is the opposite of and against the existence of totalitarianism or closing of the politics that enables freedom and action.

world. She says that for philosophical thinking, “withdrawal from the world of appearances is the only essential precondition” (LM, 78). In other words, philosophers think at the level of concepts and ideas and so the practice of philosophical thinking creates and claims truths that are generated from the world of ideas, transcendental and abstract states of mind. This is inevitable because thinking is at the same time de-sensing the *factuallities* and phenomena. She thinks that this tradition of philosophical hostility to politics starts with Plato because he “designed his tyranny of truth, in which it is not which is temporally good, of which men can be persuaded, but eternal truth, of which men cannot be persuaded, that is to rule the city” (Arendt, 1990: 78). That is, *philosophical thinking* in the form of contemplation intends to “find” the holly truths like absolute goods, unquestionable rights and unchanging ideals. However, this kind of thinking requires the withdrawal of philosophers from *common sense* that “discloses us to the nature of the common world” (Zerilli, 2005 172) and it causes the ignorance of the practical, phenomenological and factual world of people and it insults *common sense*, that is “the world of opinions and views” (LM, 1978: 8, 80). Because of their withdrawal from the real, practical and common-sensical world, their ideal good, their morality, their understanding of human, history and politics are necessarily alienated to the judgment of “ordinary” people who think on the level of *opinions* and behave in *sensus communis* and by staying at the earth. In other words, the claim of certainty, truth and absoluteness close the way of views or opinions, oppositions, criticisms and judgments. For Arendt, these are the bases and pre-conditions of the disappearance of the political, action and freedom in public life and this prepares the appearance of totalitarian

regimes. In other words, totalitarian regimes with unquestionable truths absorb the political and its potentialities for freedom. They are anti-political and against freedom of the members of the society because they do not permit to go out of the framework drawn by these truths, objectivities and indisputable benefits that are believed to be divine and transcendental. It can be said that *the reason d'être* of the totalitarian states is to conserve the truths, to glorify the present ideology and to protect them from the critics, oppositions and questionings of free and active members of politics. In other words, the oppression of free and political movements, to force people to be silent and passive in their private sphere is considered as important components of totalitarian states.

Another important feature of totalitarian regimes is the fact that violence is their “principle”. Arendt says that “truth carries within itself an element of coercion, and the frequently tyrannical tendencies” (BPF, 235). This means that all truths and truth claims include force and violence in themselves naturally because truth forces everyone to believe itself, it attacks opinions as mistakes or lies and it uses violence to fulfill its tenets and laws. Additionally, truth claims generally find place in the ideologies of the states and they become the agents of the violence. As it can be seen, all these violent ways mute and oppress over and pacify people and so they are intentions to kill, dissipate and preclude *freedom* of people and so the politics, action and speech. Additionally, the opposition of totalitarian regimes to political freedom can be seen in their intention to kill and eliminate the *differences* and *uniqueness* of people and to duplicate them in the way of the truths it claimed and tried to conserve. Totalitarian

regimes treat society as homogeneous entity (OT, 466-467) and as a big family and they force their members to obey the state as the head of this family (HC, 40). Arendt indicates that as a form of *social* life, family life includes force, dictates and ruling of the head in a despotic way. Here it displays the fact that this kind of life is pre-political (HC, 27) and it never gives birth to freedom. Duplication or simulation of individuals is a kind of murder because this is to kill the potentials and plurality of the political that will be based on these differences and uniquenesses and to blind the political capabilities of people. This seems to search for immortality in a future attempt and what if immortality under totalitarianism can be questioned. However, Arendt emphasizes a collective immortality but a personal fame. She values to leave a trace that plurality will share and try not to forget. Even if terror, violence and genocides create big injuries and leaves deep traces on people and they are never forgettable, people try to grave them into the history because they are against appearance of human diversity that is the essence of politics. It should be remembered that this is why Arendt argues that genocide seen in Nazi Germany is a crime against human diversity as the very nature of mankind and humanity in the human status of Jews. They wished to make the entire Jewish people disappear from the earth (EJ, 268–269).

In that sense, firstly it can be said that the states and their regimes that are marked by totalitarianism, based on truth claims and identified as violence, are generally against political freedom in Arendtian sense because political freedom is to live the differences and equality in public and common life. Arendt says that “human plurality,

the basic condition of both action and speech, has the twofold character of equality and distinction” (HC, 175). This means that while plurality as the differences between individuals implies not only freedom of collective existence, but also provides freedom for individuals or it can be said that it is an affirmation of the value of individual freedom. Therefore, political freedom in Arendtian sense can be tasted in plurality of the individual voices and quality of actors in politics. While the duplication of the members of the community is presented as equality in totalitarian regimes, Arendt offers the *equality* together with *difference*. It is obvious that “if political actors were not equal they could not understand each other and work together and if they were not distinct from each other, they would not need words or deeds to make themselves understood” (Katep, 1977: 154). Therefore, equality should not be understood as uniformity, affinity and homogeneity, but plural existence of differences because equality in the political sense or political equality is the opposite of equality before death as in the case of human condition or equality before God as in Christianity. These imply sameness which means “unitedness of many into one” and which is “the very opposite of the togetherness” (HC, 214) and so anti-political. All these bring us to think that political equality is not something given to us but gained in political and free existence. Arendt always acknowledges that “to be free meant to be free from the inequality present in ruler-ship and to move in a sphere where neither ruler nor being ruled existed” (HC, 33).

Secondly, it can be said that freedom is to question, shake and deconstruct these kinds of truths because the nature of the politics and freedom of speech bring this kind

of questioning, shaking and deconstruction of the truths that are claimed to establish an ideology and a politically closed regime. The questioning of the truths of totalitarian regimes means taking the truths down to earth and to the level of *opinions*, phenomena and factual realities of people that sign worldliness. According to Beiner⁸, Arendt believed that opinion has a distinctive dignity over truth and she tried to recover this respectability against the kingdom of truths. This is also important for the recovery of human plurality, *bios politicos* and freedom as well (Beiner, 1992: 108-9). Here exists the importance of *speech* as action in political freedom. As the questioning of the truths can be performed by speech without applying to violence, force or terror, the political essence of speech is critical and vital in freedom. Speech is capable to shake the divinity of the truths although they are rooted into the deeps of the culture. This is because speech itself is freedom and one main base of political action and this is because Arendt puts everything opposing and preventing speech into the clash with freedom and politics. In that sense, politics and political regimes that exist with or within violence are contrary to her understanding of political freedom and action. In other words, Arendt sees totalitarianism and violence as organized struggles against political freedom of human togetherness.

In that sense, one political system can be free only when it ensures a public realm for the people; when it obtains laws or a legal frame to enable publicness and deliberation and when it gives people rights to speak and to express their opinions freely.

⁸ He is well-known interpreter of Arendt's uncompleted study titled *Lectures On Kant's Political Philosophy*.

According to Arendt, political bodies, laws and culture must give such guarantee and fair circumstances for publicness that intends to action, plurality and freedom for politics. The contrary case means that the political is closed and there is no publicness, so no freedom. Because of this, Arendt pays attentions to individual or collective efforts and struggles for the disclosure of the political and freedom. In the Arendtian sense, political action in collaboration with freedom implies giving struggle to open a way for the political, to enable equality, to make the differences be recognized and to intend always towards new beginnings because freedom maintains the shaky ground of politics, indeterminacy and unpredictability of free existence based on views, opinions and discussions. While totalitarian states try to freeze and fix the political capabilities of people and fragile-dynamic flow or becoming of human togetherness, freedom maintains all these and offers to mobilize people to act, talk, appear and create public and political existence. Hence, overall Arendt can be understood as a figure that politicizes the existential aspects of human togetherness against rigid eternal and solid aspects of same togetherness.

Arendt regards these struggles for disclosure and existence of political freedom as an important political responsibility. She considers these efforts as the requirements of being the *citizen* of a society, plurality and human togetherness. For her, citizenship “is the core of the quest for political freedom” (Hansen, 1993:50) and it includes the responsibility for acting for the public interests, the active use of public reason, being worldly and *inter-hominess-esse*, appearance in public sphere with opinions, etc. This

responsibility of being a citizen is a political responsibility, but not personal responsibility that is based on conscience, pity, love, etc. She claims that “personal responsibility must be understood in contrast to political responsibility” (RJ, 27). For example, she thinks that the totalitarian regimes in 20th century like fascism, Nazism and Stalinism (OV, 53) were mostly resulted from people’s avoidance of political responsibility and participating in ideologies (OT, 9). Non-participators in totalitarian regimes were not *individually* responsible because they did not support the banal evil and terror of the regime and participators of the regime were not *individually* responsible for all the violence and terror of the regimes because they just obeyed to laws, they were just ruled and they full filled the commands. However, they were still responsible *politically* because they obeyed the truth claims, they killed freedom of the political and human togetherness and they escaped from respect to worldliness characteristic of people and the plurality that is the law of earth. Even if they were successful to save their conscience, they were politically responsible for doing nothing for active resistance / rebellion to the regime and the establishment of universal justice. In that sense, for Arendt, political responsibility requires “actively caring for the affairs of the political community” (D'entrèves, 1993: 157). She clearly declares that “there is no such thing as obedience in political and moral matters” (RJ, 47-48) and this implies that political freedom lies in political responsibility and being active and integral citizens for resistance and rebellion against all kind of totalitarian regimes that are primary evil of political freedom.

Therefore, it can be claimed that political freedom is also experienced in the struggle against any kind of totalitarian regimes. Individual or collective struggles against any kind of truth / ideology, against non-political and anti-political systems, regimes, social formations, policies, structures and illegal/legal rooted and deep organizations devised for fighting against oppositions or critics would be struggles for freedom and for disclosure of the political in Arendtian sense because regarding its reflective and resisting characteristics, political freedom also implies the efforts to open the ways for the political and to green its possibilities. The importance of the existence of public sphere lies in the fact that political freedom, the realization of the individuals and the practice of action are possible only here. In that sense, social movements, protest meetings or strikes of collectivities or individuals will be the practices of free actions that are political themselves and for the sake of the political as well. D'entreves evaluates the following facts and actions as examples for this kind of publicness of freedom or freedoms in publicness: the case of revolutions, the efforts to change some specific piece of legislation or policy, i.e. saving a historic building or a natural landscape, extending the public provision of housing and health care, protecting groups from discrimination and oppression, fighting for nuclear disarmament, town hall meetings, worker's councils, demonstration and sittings to struggle for justice and equal rights, etc. (D'entréves, 1993: 148). For Arendt, human togetherness has “capacity for action that is capacity for changing reality” (BPF, 246). This means that freedom cannot exist by living in, believing and obeying to an ideology, instead by revealing the realities, facts and opinions although they are opposed to the truth and ideology because “for men, living in

company, the inexhaustible richness of human discourse is infinitely more significant and meaningful than any One Truth could ever be” (BPF, 229). All these efforts to create publicness and open the political are naturally the exercises of freedom itself and for the political freedom as well. Although Arendt points on the closing and suppressive threat of totalitarian regimes, she never says that any totalitarian regimes can totally and completely close the possibilities and potentialities of the political because “action always establishes relationships and therefore has an inherent tendency to force open all limitations and cut across all boundaries” (HC, 190). The nature of human togetherness and political action within fragility, indeterminacy and boundlessness constitute *the power* potentially. This *power* inherent in human togetherness can never be oppressed eternally. Power of freedom and political action includes the intention to be liberated from violence, pressure and truth regimes or ideologies of the states. Popular revolt against One Truth, tyranny of One Man or strong rulers may engender an example of almost irresistible power because power is boundless, “it has no physical limitation in human nature” and it “corresponds to the condition of plurality to begin with” (HC, 201). According to Arendt, popular revolts and social movements within principles of the political are “active and efficient ways of action ever devised” (HC, 201). In short, the *power of political freedom* in action is always more powerful than the force and violence of ideologies based on truth or totalitarian regimes because power, as appearance of freedom, can be recreated by action and “comes into being wherever men are together in the manner of speech and action” (HC, 199). Arendt thinks that power, as opposed to violence, can exist only in actualization of freedom and its loss implies the

death of the political and plurality. Totalitarian regimes are marked by their powerlessness; in other words, when *power* disappears in a society, it means that the political is under the earth, freedom is in another world and there is nothing to compensate them.

In case of misunderstanding that we drew a picture in which political power and freedom are always against the laws or constituting a legal framework, it is important to point on the fact that they are valid in the case of that these laws or legalities are totalitarian and anti-political. On the contrary, Arendt never sees the existence of the laws, norms or constitutions in a society as an obstacle for the existence of political freedom and power as long as these laws and the regimes are not totalitarian, anti-political and against freedom. Arendt thinks that the legal framework is necessary for the existence of publicness and political freedom. Laws in a constitutional government can be designed to erect boundaries and establish channels of communication between men. Laws can assure freedom of movement, freedom of speech, freedom of plurality, freedom of association, a common world and political participation of citizens, etc. that are claimed to be positive laws for the existence of the political. Even action can engage in creating a constitution, founding and preserving political bodies as well. This constitutive power of freedom and political action is very important because the laws and constitution as a legal framework that is instituted politically will provide the potentiality of publicness, create a public sphere and give permission to plurality and political freedom based on action, speaking and deliberation. However, Arendt says that

“the limitations of the law are never entirely reliable safeguards against action from within the body politic” (HC, 191). This means that she never imagines the laws or constitutions as stable and something as in-itself. Related with the frailty of action in human togetherness, it should be said that any kind of human institution, law or constitution arise from the power of freedom in the condition of becoming. In that sense, power and political freedom are productive. Arendt’s understanding of freedom can be criticized in the way that it tends to stay as an *aesthetic*. It seems aimlessness that makes freedom and power meaningless and emptiness in political arena and it is true that something aesthetic cannot create something new, cannot start a new process and cannot change anything else. However, political freedom or power also tends to create commonly something new, open it to all humanity and make it unforgettable. All these are the backgrounds and bases of the relation between the political freedom and the capacity of action to change, to deconstruct and to constitute social formations, political bodies, rights for all humanity in plurality and the world itself. This is because action is always a dynamic or initiative and constitutive power in politics for plurality. In that sense, we must say that “Arendt’s understanding of freedom is inseparable from power, the ability to begin” (Birmingham, 2006: 55) and her emphasis on the power of freedom is meaningful and very consistent.

In short, *power*, as the opposite of *violence* and different from *strength* and *force*, is the most special potency that is inherent in political action. *Power* appears where human togetherness acts in public sphere and “where word and deed have not parted

company, where words are not empty and deeds not brutal, where words are not used to veil intentions but to disclose realities, and deeds are not used to violate and destroy but to establish relations and create new realities” (HC, 200) because these all imply the existence of political freedom. Therefore, *political action* is the actualization of *power of freedom*. More importantly, *power*, as inherent in together action, paralyzes with freedom to create new realities and to establish new relations for that human togetherness. Let me talk about this characteristic of power as the actualization of political freedom.

Arendt acknowledges that truths and divinities may be functional to maintain togetherness and collectivity. However, “the reality of truths is powerless in the public and political realm” (BPF, 223) because political freedom enables people to discuss, question and criticize everything in human relations. As truth ideologies tend to turn into obstacles for political action and freedom later on, human togetherness cannot be established on truth claims, divinities, ideologies because it has power that includes the moment of change, evolution or revolution in itself. As they are against freedom and political existence of plurality; totalitarian and anti-political regimes try to eliminate the power of human togetherness that can also be defined as beginner characteristic of people. They tend to eliminate “the very source of freedom which is given with the fact of the birth of man and resides in his capacity to make a new beginning” (OT, 466). However, related with its characteristic of “*beginning*” and “*natality*”, freedom in action includes the potentiality to create “new beginnings” and to start new processes for the

re-establishment and re-structuring of the states and also the society and state relations. The action and the political freedom, as *initium*, always appear with “*new beginnings*”. In other words, “freedom as an inner capacity of man is identical with the capacity to begin, just as freedom as a political reality is identical with a space of movement between men” (OT, 473). Actually, beginning that is marked by freedom can imply much more things related with the political. Simply saying, it implies that freedom has refreshing or regenerative power to originate action. In that sense, *freedom that comes with power* or political action will bring something new like new social formations, it will provide the appearance of a new truthfulness as a result of deliberations and clashes of opinions and it will give way to stronger and more effective changes like revolutions as did in the case of American Revolution and more durable norms, laws and legal frameworks like constitutions such as Bill of Rights.

Arendt thinks that *initium* is inherent in the fact of *natality* that implies the initiator characteristic of human beings. “With each new birth, a new beginning is born into the world; a new world has potentially come into being” (OT, 465). This means that there is a motion in human affairs and this motion can never end as long as men are born and die. Her emphasis on power, political freedom and action is in relation with new beginnings as well. Arendt evaluates *power* inherent in political freedom as self-determination in the foundation of a constitution. In that sense, the political freedom in the Arendtian sense can concretely be seen in the example of “human rights”. Within consideration of her thoughts on American Revolution, its Constitution and then Bill of

Rights, her approach to Human Rights is quiet meaningful to embody all of her concepts of the political, power, authority, creating something new, initiate new beginnings, democratic participation, worldliness and living in plurality/human togetherness, avoiding from alienation and individualism, thinking with an *enlarged mentality* all together. We should remember that freedom for human beings is to create or construct something new that is their own and something they had in common with other equals in order to stay worldly beings, to continue to be a citizen of this world, to be immortal or more permanent than this earthly life. For Arendt, Human Rights or any constitution that has *authority* can be founded in mutual compact without any reference to nature, divinity, any kind of absolute truth or a prince and king. Constitutions, laws and new social formations need always to be *politically* instituted within plurality, relationships or actors that are empowered and in the realms of power (Birmingham, 2006: 43). This plurality and political freedom in combination with power will make the laws and constitutions not sovereign and dominating, but the marks of action like works of art, more powerful and *res publica* that is common thing or what is ours. As in the case of freedom, power, as the actualization of freedom, is not based on *sovereignty* as well. Even if “power is always associated with sovereignty and unity” (Birmingham, 2006: 43), for Arendt, it is far from being sovereign because the unified sovereign will of the individual or the unity of the general usually exists in the figure of the ruler. However, power is not the domination or greatness of the state or any kind of force in a society. It is not the “general will of the people” and no government is the power even if it was elected and took the consent of most of the people. While sovereignty means the

centralization, concentration or unity of individual liberties or consents and while it is singular, power can always be realized in the plural and we can talk about centers of power in a society.

According to Arendt, *power* has shown itself most distinctively in the form of revolutions in human history as in the cases of American and French Revolutions. As *power* is always political and includes freedom to start *new beginnings*, to establish new form of political lives and to generate new foundations, it is the base of the revolutions as well. In Arendt's mind, a revolution means to make a new constitution with free participation of citizens by acting and speaking among plurality and togetherness in the public realm. Although here political freedom can be seen simply as law making or taking decisions for a new form of togetherness, this constitution is the product of appearance of *power* in political freedom and it is a common and shared reality established on freedom through the actions of ordinary, worldly and plural opinions and factuallities of people⁹. According to Arendt, this creation of human togetherness and power of freedom is what deserves respect and so it gains what Arendt says *authority*. As different from any kind of tyranny, totalitarianism and sovereignty, *authority* implies respect of the people because of its foundation by them in free and collective action. In that sense, *authority* is never opposed to *freedom* in the Arendtian sense of politics and

9 Interestingly, such definition of a revolution is valid for Arendt in the case of American Revolution, but not of French Revolution. To her, this is because French Revolution lost its “power”, its being “action” and political essence, its “plurality”, its being for the sake of freedom and it turned into a terror, while American Revolution succeeded to keep the power by definition with its being based on speech, action and plurality.

even public freedom can only be lived and performed within the *authority* of the constitution as well. Regarding these characteristics of freedom, it can be said that freedom is the *power* to found a new constitution that will be legal framework and boundaries of the public life and *bios politicos*, that it is the *power* to act, speak and discuss human and world concerns in this collectively created political life and that it is also the *power* to demolish any given social formation and transcend present constitutions as well.

3.3. Conclusion

To conclude, what we see in Arendt's concept of freedom is quiet relevant to reflect them into politics. This is especially if we are able to attach her conception of freedom with power, publicness and acting in concern. Otherwise, it is true that her freedom remains *aesthetic*. Freedom in Arendt is not just an idea or a concept that cannot be evaluated, interpreted or practiced in the political realm. Although it is true that the political is also defined and conceptualized by Arendt herself, it is not a utopia or unreal, abstract and just an imagination. With its all characteristics, phenomena and practices, it will be quiet meaningful and consistent to derive a way of “political freedom” from Arendt's thoughts on politics, freedom and their relationship. Indeed, when we understand that it is not merely existential, it is indisputable to say that freedom is only political.

Moreover, when Arendt's *the political* was conceived with her definition of

citizenship, power, appearance of individuals in public life, etc., it should be said that her conception of freedom is identified with *republicanism* originating in Aristotle and living today as humanistic and democratic political experiment. Republicanism, in principle at least, proposes that citizens can act for the sake of politics and freedom, come together in public realm and deliberate the matters of collective concern. In that sense, political activity in republicanism is important to enable citizens to realize their capacities of agency, which also enables the birth of power in plurality. In that sense, what makes Arendt close to republicanism is her definition of power, citizenship, action and political freedom.

Beneath all Arendt's ideas on political freedom lies the motion and becoming of human togetherness whereby its dynamic power of freedom and action. This motion of politics comes from the nature of human togetherness, becoming in plurality, a great intention of human beings to realize their existence, a hybrid sense of beauty of *bios politicos* and more importantly the power of freedom in action. As for the relation between freedom and the political, this relation forces us to conceive power, action, deliberation of opinions, revelation of realities, creating something new, initiate new beginnings, resisting against violence/tyranny of truths, democratic participation, avoiding from alienation, being worldly, living in plurality/human togetherness and freedom all together. It may be difficult to understand what Arendt tries to say and explain with political freedom. However, I think it might be because we live in a very different practice and ideology of freedom today. Arendt's efforts to relate and

collaborate the political, power and freedom between certain phenomena, notions, practices and human conditions is quite different from our modern and contemporary understanding of politics and so freedom. In that sense, our derivation of “the political freedom” is needed to compare and contrast with today's philosophy and practices of “freedom”. It will be liberal understanding of freedom because we will accept today's general understanding of freedom as mostly similar with that of liberalism and because it is most dominant and common political philosophy in most of societies. Therefore, the next chapter will be dedicated to evaluate all what we derived from Arendt's and Sartre's conceptions of freedom by comparing them to liberal understanding of freedom and its political meaning.

CHAPTER IV

COMPARING AND CONTRASTING ARENDT'S AND SARTRE'S CONCEPTIONS OF FREEDOM AND THEIR DISTANCE FROM LIBERALISM

In the previous two chapters, I have studied Sartre's and Arendt's conceptions of freedom and tried to reflect the findings on politics. In this chapter, I aim to continue examining the same issue of reflection by comparing and contrasting their conceptions of freedom. Is it possible to find some aspects of freedom upon which Sartre and Arendt can agree? Are there certain point(s) where they segregate or oppose each other? This means analyzing the relation between the concepts of freedom of Sartre and Arendt and their practicality in politics. After this analysis, we will call upon Liberalism which dominates today's political and social worlds. With this acknowledgement, I will compare the liberal conception of freedom with those of our figures. We will see that neither Sartre nor Arendt is satisfied with liberal conception of freedom and at certain points they are in opposition with it. Reference for the liberal conception of freedom will be “negative concept of freedom” defended by Isaiah Berlin. In that sense, we should evaluate both the “positive” and “negative” sides of the conceptions of freedom in Sartre and Arendt.

Having examined their conceptions of freedom and their political reflections, it can be claimed that there are various points of agreement between arguments about and definitions of Arendt and Sartre. I think that it is more plausible to consider them close and congruent with each other, even if they seem clashing and opposing in certain

values, principles of and ways to political freedom. In that sense, it will be better to start where and how they can be conceived as differing from each other. Then I will focus on the points of agreement. Lastly I will discuss the political relevance of each conception of freedom.

4.1. Conjunctions Rather Than Disjunctions in Sartre and Arendt

Indeed, one can claim that there are certain disjunctions between Sartre and Arendt. For example, Sartre is mostly dealing with “being”, while Arendt emphasizes human togetherness. While Sartre cares for the “self”, Arendt seems to value making a collectivity. Additionally, freedom in Sartre is very radical in the sense that it is unquestionably and absolutely there, people are condemned to it and it is almost indispensable like an imperative. However, freedom in Arendt is more mild and understandable in the sense of that there are some requirements to achieve freedom, it is not always there. Still Arendt's concept of freedom is more practical in politics and also it is more political, while freedom in Sartre is not directly political if one regards politics as the actual life of human togetherness.

These above mentioned disjunctions are not obstacles to collocate two thinkers. Here my motivation is not to engage two thinkers by establishing their resemblance. However, it is certain that there are similarities more than divergence between them. Especially once we take into account what they problematized and what they really desired for politics and humanity, I think it is possible to evaluate Sartre and Arendt as

closely relevant and combinable for freedom and especially undermining political dimension of freedom. Let me explicate this similarity in four points namely *action*, *humanism*, *initiation* and *responsibility*.

4.1.1 Action in Sartre and Arendt

My first point for conjunction of these two figures is about the relation between freedom and action. I think that both Sartre and Arendt come together in the point that freedom is relevant to politics because freedom is in a deep relation with action. We have already seen that Arendt founds her conception of freedom on *action*. Action is central to Arendt's imagination of freedom and politics. She never conceives of freedom as related with *inside* of being, will, consciousness, etc. She completely *externalizes* freedom. That is, freedom is outside, it should be seen, performed and shared with others. This makes freedom not only existential but also political in the sense that it has an inherent relation with action, power, de/re-construction of the politics, etc. It is true that Sartre emphasizes that freedom is *based on* consciousness. To him, freedom starts at the level of consciousness which enables one to see the fact that I am conscious of being conscious. That is, second-level of consciousness makes *my* consciousness or the *I* or the Ego its object of consciousness. In such a stand, I am aware that I can *do* anything. This means that I am totally free or that freedom is inevitable. It can be claimed for Sartre's conception of freedom that consciousness, especially second-level of consciousness, is necessary for freedom. However, this is the ontology of freedom according to Sartre. In other words, this is somehow a proof that we are condemned to freedom. On the other

hand, Sartre concludes that freedom needs action to be realized. Existence of freedom and the project created by free being depends on action as much as on consciousness. Action, in Sartre, is motivated, not determined, by freely chosen projects of *being-for-itself*. In other words, *being-for-itself* is the subject of free self-conscious actions that are conditional for the realization of fundamental projects and actualization of freedom. Action in that sense is the fulfillment of the lack of being that is created by *nihilation*, transcendence and consciousness of the Ego. One has to act and perform as a being free to realize his/her projects and so existence. This means that without action, freedom remains as mere consciousness. While it is possible to say “yes, I know that I am free”, which means being conscious of *for-itself*, freedom still needs action or needs to be performed to *nihilate* the *factualities* / situations / the *in-itselfs*, to exist / realize the freely chosen projects and to re-construct being in authenticity. Therefore, action is important and central in the philosophy of Sartre as much as for Arendt. Since action, called as *project* or realization of freedom in Sartre, corresponds to the most valuable human condition in Arendt, it can be seen as a common point in two figures. Interestingly, Biskowski has already argued that “Arendt's concept of action resembles the existentialist concept of the project” (1993: 880). In that sense, it can be claimed that the first point where a conjunction can be seen is that both Sartre and Arendt ground their conceptions of freedom on “action” in the sense of existence and *performance*. Such relation of freedom with action is also the proof that Sartre's and Arendt's conceptions of freedom are relevant to politics for the most part. In other words, without its relation with practicality or performance, it cannot be claimed that freedom is

political. Action in Arendt and Sartre means performing freedom in politics.

I think that both figures are critical against the static and inert form of politics and society. This means that such a form of politics insulates freedom and it does not provide proper bases and means for action and project or *becoming* and *existence* of people individually or collectively. Stagnation, fixity or inertia can be ensured only by a power to conserve the present position, that is, to determine and protect given factuality. Once the contingency of human togetherness and indeterminacy of the political existence are tried to be frozen by positive laws, divinities, traditions, rational or philosophical truth claims, the form of politics can turn into *being* itself; that is, it becomes a body that tries to preserve itself, it becomes entrenched and rooted and it does not provide proper bases and means for action and project. In such an insight, Sartre's and Arendt's ways of criticism and their attacks towards such conservatism are founded on action because action has inherently the great power to shake the grounds of any structure and to show that any structure is indeed a reality that is socially constructed. Action is inevitably integrated into their conceptions of freedom, because freedom need becoming or existence and it is action that will open the way for political existence or becoming in the middle of a fixed and stagnated form of politics. In that sense, I think that the most fundamental problem concerning our human situation (condition) for both Sartre and Arendt is "alienation" among human beings and also between people and the world. Alienation, for Sartre, is the ceasing of "becoming" or existence because being, in such a situation, is far away from its actual and true condition of life, that is, motion and

becoming which are essential for human beings. In other words, alienation means staying as *what we are* and distancing from *what we are not* potentially. In such a situation of stagnation or *facticity*, alienation means the death of “being-for-itself”. However, both Sartre and Arendt agree that human beings find, meet and know themselves in the processes of becoming, acting, projecting or simply during their existence for the sake of freedom.

Can we relate “*the capability to act*” in Arendt which is inherent in human beings with the reality of “*being conscious*” that Sartre claims about human beings? Whatever the answer is, I think that these two suggestions constitute the starting point in both Arendt and Sartre respectively in their efforts to conceptualize freedom. However, “why” questions never end. Question like “why does one has responsibility for politics or other people?” will challenge both figures unless they have a *value* behind their theories and arguments. In that sense, one may say that Sartre and Arendt always need to put forward a *value* which will motivate or move people towards freedom. If this is accepted, we find similar value in them. I think it is *existence* itself in the sense of *becoming* for Sartre and *action* for Arendt. The *value* is the journey towards the end of the *possible*. Freedom is becoming itself, it is the *process* of existence or action. Freedom needs becoming and becoming needs freedom; freedom to act and freedom to renew the being. Action is at the same time valuation (Adler¹⁰, 1949: 287). This is why

10 Franz Adler is an early critic of Jean-Paul Sartre. His article “The Social Thought of Jean-Paul Sartre” was written in 1949. I included it in this study because I thought it is one of rare and important studies emphasizing social and political side of Sartre’s existentialism.

freedom itself is the *value* in both figures. Indeed, *the political* for Sartre and Arendt has such a meaning and definition in the sense of opening the ways of existence for individual and collective freedom in a society. Arendt sees *factuallities* as contingent, unpredictable, unconditioned and changeable. In that sense, Nelson sees the kinship between Arendt and existentialism in which freedom is unconditioned (1978, 282). Additionally, Schulman also defines Arendt as an "existential thinker" because she "holds that the humanness of human beings is not guaranteed with birth but is contingent" (2006: 76). According to him, Arendt writes from the existentialist side; rejects the importance of the actual conditions and situations or *in-itselfs* and never undervalues the abilities of human beings to promote radical change. This is also apparent in Sartre because the embodiment of human projects -that is human freedom- in existentialism of Sartre corresponds to action, realization of individual uniqueness and appearance as self in publicness in Arendt¹¹. It is true because Sartre emphasizes action in the sense of realization of freedom and the self as well. He declared "man exists only in so far as he realizes himself, he is therefore nothing else but the sum of his actions, nothing else but what his life is" (E, 36).

4.1.2 Humanism in Two Thinkers

I think that this nexus among freedom, existence, action and politics

¹¹ Nelson also proposes what my thesis aims to achieve. He argues in a footnote that "Arendt's concern with freedom is rather existentialist in character. Her difficulties with the conceptualization of freedom should be compared to those of Jean-Paul Sartre" (1978, 283).

demonstrates itself in the emphasis of Sartre and Arendt on humanism¹². In other words, in both figures, we see an affirmation of agency and their conceptions of freedom are deeply humanistic because action implies the fact that human can act in such a way that they enter into realm of politics. Their valuation to human action signs that human, as free being, can act to change something frozen and closed by truths (Arendt) or bad-faith attitudes (Sartre), de-construct the structures / *facticities* and values that had been constructed by human beings. Also human reestablishes freely chosen projects in the way of *immortality* (Arendt) or *for-itself* (Sartre) eternally. That is to say, they both believe in people to act, create, establish and more importantly change what seems structural, stable and fixed. Sartre thinks that human beings are the subject of History by affirmation of action and projects and by transforming the world. The project, for Sartre, “retains and unveils the surpassed reality” (Priest, 2001: 308). In that sense, they both attribute highest importance to human beings, individuals and people as power. In its reflection on politics, this relation implies political activity in explicit manner. *The political* for both figures is always related with freedom and human action. Interestingly, Arendt herself, in her short article named “French Existentialism” in the book *Essays in Understanding*, recognizes that “Sartre seems to be working toward some new positive philosophy and even a new humanism” (Arendt, 2005: 192) and she argues that existentialism indeed operates “in a certain spirit of rebellion” (HC, 235). Even if

12 It is disputable what humanism means here and calling Arendt and Sartre as humanist may be criticized. For they both never attribute a substance to human being and in that sense, their highest value seems not human life. For them, it cannot be claimed that human being is an end-in-itself in Kantian sense. However, contemporary humanism is conceived as based on openness of human being and it values to active, contingent, renewing, dynamic and initiative characteristics of human power. Here humanism and my argument that Sartre and Arendt are humanistic should be understood in this framework.

Arendt, in *On Violence*, criticizes Sartre because he celebrates violence for revolution, she acknowledges that Sartre's existentialism analyses the situation of man in the world and it figures out possible guides for a new political existence, not just a literary movement (Arendt, 2005: 188). In Sartre, political importance and meaning of existence is to open all possibilities for freedom in politics. That is, existence of human beings needs a society or a politics that is never closed or frozen by laws or truth claims. Their imagination of the political lies in “becoming” which is a kind of establishing and re-establishing. Once there exists a threat to close the possibilities of the political, both figures would be against this because their conception of freedom needs openness, spontaneity and indeterminacy of political activity which is always pregnant to something new. Arendt always emphasizes existentialism in the sense of which responsibility for political action which assumes to build new foundations, ethical as well as political and to establish new political thought (Arendt, 2005: 189). In same line, Sartre is also against structuralist dissolution of agency or human action. He always conceives social structures as *being-in-itself*s that are frozen synchronies that can potentially construct or shape people as organisms without interest, or any impulse for freedom (Fox, 2003: 124). Reflection of Sartre's conception of freedom on politics carries the fact that freedom predicts destruction or demolition of old *facticities*, laws, truths, structures, etc. if they turn into being totalizing and if they start to become obstacles for political freedom, action and the freely chosen projects. Sartre's emphasis on “*we are not what we are*” should also be conceived in the same context. Sartre's conception of freedom involves recognizing conditions (*being-in-itself*) and limits

(*facticity*) that have made us what we are. However, it also states that these limits or conditions can be negated and transcended through projects of freedom. In other words, “the elimination of the subject and the reification of the structure are equally unthinkable” (Caws, 308). This implies the prevalence of a strong humanism in Sartre. Therefore, it can be said that Sartre and Arendt criticize and also fear of any freeze in social and political fusion, that is, *existence*. Here we come to another important point that Sartre and Arendt share in conceiving freedom, politics, action in the perspectives of humanism and existentialism. It is clear that they both consider freedom always in relation to “creating” or “establishing” something new.

4.1.3. The Themes of Initiation and Creation in Two Thinkers

Even if we find the above mentioned relation in different terms in them, “*natality*” for Arendt and “*for-itself*” for Sartre seems refer to similar human condition, which is, action. Although this similarity is claimed to be superficial, I think they come together in the sense of initiation for or creation of new things. “*Natality*” displays the existentialist ground of Arendt because action derives its free characteristic from its capability to create something new, to start a new process, to destroy the given and re-establish the new ones. This refers to “becoming” and it is indeed what Sartre would certainly accept for freedom and “*for-itself*” because for Sartre, “*being-for-itself*” always desires new beginnings, new existences and new *selves* and it is only *being-in-itself* that is incapable to act or do for itself. When we think all these themes in relation to politics, the conjunction keeps its importance as well. For Sartre and Arendt, political activity

where freedom and humanism are actualized and felt is the process of opening the possibilities of existences of human beings individually or collectively. Of course, this opening may not always require renewing the established political culture, rules or structures. Still, the opening always needs updating to authentically created values and freely chosen fundamental projects. In that sense, political freedom lies in political activity rather than in legally fixed rights and liberties. Here it can be claimed that Sartre's attempt here is to open the way to struggle against existing political choices for exploring the imaginative possibilities of new modes of politicization (Fox, 2003: 136). For him, social changes come by free political projects of human beings because they are comprehensive and revolutionary (Bondy, 1967: 27).

It is true that in terms of locating political activity, while Sartre seems more individualistic, Arendt postulates human togetherness and plurality. This may be seen as divisive in respect to the thoughts of two thinkers at first glance. However, this does not necessitate the clash of Sartre's and Arendt's conceptions of freedom in the context of performativity of freedom and action. To Sartre, one free being is capable enough to act individually or resist something that is practically anti-liberal, against freedom or pressing and coercive in politics. In the context of freedom and initiation or creating something new, Sartre openly says that “you are free, therefore choose—that is to say, invent” (E, 34-35). In this sense, both Sartre and Arendt are optimistic. They know that freedom does not bring happiness and it may even make human beings anxious and subject to frailty, unpredictability or indeterminacy of the action and project. However,

they still give value to freedom itself and the life of action because this is the way of *existence* or *becoming* which is the most authentic form of life for not to cause alienation for human beings. This is the extent of freedom and humanism that Sartre enlarges. He thinks that even an individual can act politically once he/she as always free being acts for the sake of freedom and in order to realize his/her freely chosen project. This extent of freedom and humanism brings responsibility as well and here we come into the context of *political responsibility* as another point of conjunction between the thoughts of Sartre and Arendt.

4.1.4. The Idea of Responsibility in Two Thinkers

As for responsibility, I think, we should begin by focusing on the indeterminacy or contingency inherent in *publicness* or in politics because responsibility results from the ends of free action and freedom which includes indeterminacy, frailty or contingency in themselves. Sartre and Arendt agree on the “indeterminacy of the future which is the crucial component of being free”, “contingent existence in politics or fragile understanding of society”, “temporality” and “the process characteristic of action rather than being an end”. We understand that Sartre's and Arendt's imaginations of society and politics are similar. Both Sartre and Arendt think that freedom brings responsibility to individuals and this responsibility is what makes human beings political. To Sartre, as the extent of freedom is large, responsibility enlarges correspondingly. He thinks that a free individual -living in her/his warm home, listening to music and reading a book- is responsible for the freedom of the others because one can only desire or imagine

freedom for himself/herself as long as it is for everyone. In other words, my conscious action to realize my freedom cannot do this without a desire for freedom for the others. On the one hand, Sartre's conception of freedom in the context of responsibility comprises a universal understanding of morality. On the other hand, it also extends to the individual existence (private sphere in Arendt). Responsibility bothers individual to be political or to act for freedom of others. Indeed, this implies that political freedom, responsibility and activity always necessitate human togetherness that is composed of *the others*. In that respect, we should say that “the other” has great importance for both Sartre and Arendt. For both, “the others” make freedom possible and also political because “the other” makes possible for one to recognize his/her existence. It must be acknowledged that for Sartre, the relation with “the other” is problematic because he thinks that *being* of “the other” can repress one's freedom, cause one to remain as “*being-in-itself*” and such position prevents the disclosure of “*being-for-itself*”. However, he emphasizes the meaning of “the other” in its relation with responsibility which provides freedom from being understood as an individual, selfish or egoistic desire. In that sense, one's freedom together with consciousness of responsibility towards “the others” opens the way to read Sartre's conception of freedom not only as an individual issue but also as something that provides possibility to be evaluated in collective and political reflection. It is always true that Sartre follows a project of collective freedom, solidarity and commitment in his early years when he published *Being and Nothingness* (Fox, 2003: 136).

Additionally, the others' role in one to recognize his/her existence, that is, such a relation between the other and politics establishes not a clash or opposition in politics for Arendt who emphasizes the other as the different one in plurality and as the founding element necessary for the possibility of action. This means that in both Sartre and Arendt, affirmation of existence of "the others" and being responsible for them are important for political freedom and political activity as well. In other words, regarding the relation of freedom with "the other", responsibility is a very important theme to which Sartre and Arendt both pay attention for the possibility of collectivity and politics. In the context of responsibility, politics and freedom, I think that Sartre and Arendt share an ethical principle: we are responsible for others, even if we are not the cause of any harm to them. This principle is different from the one that you are responsible for me, even if you are not the cause of any harm to me and they do not support such a sacrificial moral claim. While the former is an ethical principle, the latter is a moral law.

It can be argued that both Sartre and Arendt try to show that freedom is possible. Their optimism comes from their recognition of the fragile, contingent and temporary nature of all structures, *facticities* and truth claims as soon as there are projects and actions that involve power of freedom and possibilities of resistance. In political sense, Sartre's optimism gains a body in his activist and humanist stance to change the world, to negate the givens, to re-establish and to project of human action. I think that freedom in Sartre and Arendt is revolutionary in its essence and walks with a motto that everything is human art and so everything is possible.

4.2. Distance of Sartre and Arendt from Liberalism

Besides all these, it is important to note that the conceptions of freedom in Sartre and Arendt address a rupture from the liberal conception of freedom in the sense of “inner freedom” or “negative freedom” which is central to the liberal tradition. Negative liberty has been defended by Isaiah Berlin in his well-known article *Two Concepts of Liberty* (1958). In the next section, we will examine this rupture and see that Sartre's and Arendt's conceptions of freedom are not “negative” even if it cannot be said they are “positive” according to Berlin's classification. To accomplish this, it is necessary to introduce Berlin's liberal / negative conception of liberty before questioning how Arendt's and Sartre's freedom is positive.

4.2.1 Liberal / Negative Conception of Freedom

According to Berlin, negative liberty implies “*freedom from*” any coercion. He defines it by considering an area that is left to individual(s) to do or to be what they are able to do or be, without interference by others. That is, “*liberty from*” means “absence of interference”. The degree of non-interference is the degree of “normal” -that is his own word- and also political freedom. That is, “you lack political liberty or freedom only if you are prevented from attaining a goal by human beings” (Berlin, 1958: 169). It can be claimed that Berlin in particular and liberalism in general tries to preserve a minimum space of personal freedom that will never be invaded by others. Berlin also emphasizes the free-will and individual choice as the values of liberalism. In his own words; “For Constant, Mill, Tocqueville, and the liberal tradition, no society is free

unless it is governed by at any rate two interrelated principles: first, that no power, but only rights and that there are frontiers within which men should be inviolable, these frontiers being defined in terms of rules” (1958: 201) According to him, freedom of a society refers to the strength of these barriers. In that sense, for Berlin and liberalism, liberty can only be experienced individually and this is an ultimate end for everyone (Berlin, 1958: 172).

Regarding these explanations, Sartre's conception of freedom cannot be defined as negative and it can be said that Sartre does not conceive freedom in the private sphere or as an inward/inner issue. First of all, I think Sartre's rejection of “inwardness” for freedom begins with his phenomenology. Recalling that Sartre insists that consciousness is not inhabitant in Ego brings that consciousness is always extroverted, it has always an object and it recognizes the world. Fretz indicates that “as an intentional being directed at it posits the transcendent object, whereas as inwardness, though conscious of its positing activity, it does not posit this activity as a transcendent object” (1999: 74). That is, freedom in its relation with consciousness is not inwardness and it needs transcendence, nihilation and action for realization. We are self-interpreting and also world-interpreting beings. Man acts and all action is intentional and directed toward a change in the outside world (Adler, 1949: 287). However, negative freedom as strong privacy implies a kind of isolation from “the other”, the outside world and the public. According to Sartre, the world is an inter-subjective area and man is a being rooted here. He never defines the area of freedom as a private sphere even if one is also free there.

Sartre affirms the world as an external field outside human consciousness as part of freedom. Individuals cannot be isolated from outside, ongoing life and also politics in order to be free. Conversely, Sartre -as an action theorist (Hornsby, 1988: 745)- finds the realization of freedom in outside, in the street, in direct contact with the world and others. There is a strong rejection of the dualism of self and world. Sartre says that “there can be a free for-itself only as engaged in a resisting world” (BN, 484). Resistance is opposite of “negative freedom” which implies escape from the outside, the struggle for freedom, existing within others, acting for the sake of realization of the freely chosen projects.

As the liberal / negative conception of freedom proposes, Sartre's conception of freedom can also be interpreted as “individualistic” because it does not say much about society, human togetherness or politics. Priest claims that Sartre's existentialism “is an individualistic libertarian philosophy of consciousness and subjectivity” (2001: 302). Priest also defines existentialism as alienation and determines the tenets of existentialism as “the emphasis on the individual not society, freedom of choice not economic determinism, the present projected into the future, not the burden of history” and indicates existentialism can be a product of capitalism because these tenets are “all presuppositions of capitalism” (2001: 304). I accept that Sartre’s conception of freedom is open to be conceived in agreement with the liberal conception of freedom in the sense of free-choice, individualism and responsibility. Indeed, his existentialism is generally conceived as entailing liberalism (Priest, 2001: 300) because Sartre's and liberal

conception of freedom get closer in the doctrine that human beings have freedom of choice. It is true that Sartre claims that there is no in-human condition; we are responsible for our life whether it is bad and full of difficulties and we are the actors of our own life. Likewise, liberalism claims that the individual is responsible for his/her choices, he/she is free and there is no coercion over him/her; nobody hinders no one and so nobody who is free is responsible for another's captivity. However, even if humanism and the theme of responsibility are strongly underlined in Sartre's conception of freedom, it is not crystallized in individualism because Sartre always indicates that freedom is not something for which one can act for only himself/herself. One has to wish freedom for everyone and also one is responsible for everyone. This is what makes Sartre universalistic and moralistic. It is not possible to reduce Sartre's freedom into the limited framework of individualism if one interprets his conception of freedom within politics, project, action and responsibility. Additionally, Sartre's conception of freedom is different from the liberal one. In liberalism, freedom is conceived together with rights and laws; freedom is a right that is naturally given by nature and legally recognized by the state. Liberty and its degree is something demanded from an authority and laws maximize or minimize the liberty of citizens. However, similar to Arendt's conception of freedom, for Sartre, freedom is not given by nature and it is not a right given or taken. It is not something for which people will declare a war. Rights cannot encompass the scope of freedom both in the sense of existing and action.

As for the examination of Arendt's conception of freedom in liberalism, we see

that it is very different from and also opposite to the negative concept of freedom. In addition to the explanations above, negative liberty necessitates a division, even an opposition, between the areas of private and public life. This can be acceptable because Arendt also intends to preserve this distinction for the sake of the realization of the political and public sphere. However, liberalism justifies and celebrates the private sphere and private/individual life while it despises and humiliates the public and political life. The negative conception of liberty is based on this celebration and despise. However, Arendt thinks that negative liberties “by no means the actual content of freedom” (OR, 32) because they do not motivate people to participate in public affairs. In this line, it can be argued that Arendt criticizes too much emphasis on negative liberty in Liberalism.

For Arendt, the great philosophical and metaphysical tradition has hold that “freedom begins where men have left the realm of political life inhabited by the many” (BPF, 155). It has conceived freedom as “free will” in the sense of “I-will” and freedom was conceived in a dialogue or a relation between “me” and “myself”. Freedom has always been taken into consideration as an inward, emotional and mental issue by reference to concepts such as being, nothingness, the soul, nature, time and eternity. Free will or freedom was experienced in complete solitude, it was believed to be something that is “felt” and it is always examined in inward domain. Arendt calls this “inner freedom” which refers to cynicism and the result of efforts to estrange from the worldly issues. Such an inwardness which Arendt criticizes strongly is tied to “negative

freedom” of Berlin because Berlin clearly defines negative freedom as “inner emigration” once “I have withdrawn into myself; there, and there alone, I am secure” (1958: 182). However, Arendt thinks, as in *bios politicos* of Greeks, original field of freedom is the realm of politics, human affairs in general, in intercourse with others in deed and word. She indicates that “only where the I-will and I-can coincide does freedom come to pass” (BPF, 159). That is, the I-will does not immediately paralyze the I-can. Freedom cannot appear without action. In other words, freedom and politics are like two sides of the same coin. In that sense, political freedom is to do what one ought to will. Therefore, she criticizes such an “inner freedom” lived in inward space in which man thinks he can be “free from” (negative freedom) or escape from external coercions and *feel* free. Such freedom has to be irrelevant to politics. Indeed, inwardness or inner freedom, Arendt thinks, addresses those who are alienated to politics or human affairs and who thinks they have no place in this world (BPF, 145).

Arendt thinks that what Berlin calls “negative freedom” can only be lived in the private sphere and it implies an apolitical mode of life because there is no action, plurality, human togetherness, appearance in publicness, speech and so freedom. Living in the private sphere and feeling freedom negatively mostly at home -which is the place of *labor* or leisure time in modernity for Arendt- and at marketing or working places - that include the human condition of *work*- imply “*silence*” in the sense of cynicism, passivity and apolitical existence because for Arendt, the opposite condition of speech is silence in society and the lack of public sphere. A silent form of life is generally

apolitical, inactive and it is hidden. It is “*apathy*” to politics. Apathy implies “negative freedom” and suggests an apolitical existence for people at the same time because “*apathy*”, for Arendt, implies people's indifference and *alienation* to worldly and human issues, their withdrawal from public and political sphere, staying at their private sphere and dealing with their own business and caring for their own life. According to Arendt, all these forms of life and practices refer to the category of “*the social*” which she thinks generally opposes to “*the political*”. The bases of *the social* form of life reach the human conditions of *labor* and *work* that are not political and outside the action. In the social, the idea of usefulness, utility, individualism, conformism and cynicism which turn into a meaning of life causes fateful consequences to the political because these ideals create a competition, isolation, alienation and *otherization* among people; it harms the plurality of society. People or group in such ideals will approach to public sphere with the intention of manipulating it for their own benefit. This also means the instrumentalization of the politics. According to Arendt, today's political experience does not include the coincidence of politics and freedom (BPF, 147). Today's people are atomized and isolated from each other; they are forced into a terrible loneliness and inwardness that is free from politics. They rarely share a common world to any significant degree (Nelson, 1978: 284). Arendt thinks that this is dangerous indeed because people lose their own self which can only be confirmed in its identity by trustworthy company with other equals (OT, 477).

Regarding their non-political and non-public characteristics, Arendt never hopes

that “negative” and *the social* form of life can fire the light of freedom. She thinks that the process of *work* and the conditions of *labor* are there only for a life in the private sphere which Berlin describes as the place of “negative freedom”. Arendt saves the difference between private and public sphere and she thinks that the private is not the political and so not the place of freedom. She criticizes the happiness achieved in isolation from the world, the existence in private sphere. She insists that politics and freedom depend on human togetherness and the human condition of action performed in the public sphere with love of the world. The social form of life existing in the private sphere is not capable of establishing a common world and it gradually prepares the ground for “worldlessness”.

People within *the social* can think that they are *free from* public issues, politics, the predicaments of action, etc. For Arendt, however, *the social* is not a valuable form of life because first of all people cannot gain the knowledge of their existence, cannot feel the reality of being in the world, cannot catch the immortality by leaving durable and lasting marks behind them and they also deprive the beauty of *bios politicos*. In such deprivation, freedom is not possible to be lived and to be performed. She says “nothing ejects one more radically from the world than exclusive concentration upon the body's life, a concentration forced upon man in slavery or in the extremity of unbearable pain” (HC, 112). This implies that *the social* form of life is an image of servitude or enslavement, but not freedom. Arendt associates such a form of life and understanding of freedom to stoicism because to her, “stoicism rests on the illusion of freedom when

one is enslaved” (HC, 234). The life of *zoe* as the place of “negative freedom” enslaves people into loneliness, *labor* and *work*, it causes cynicism or alienation and prevents human togetherness. It causes human plurality lose their capability to be free and to create power. It does not give way to action, political existence and so freedom. In that sense, freedom, but not liberation, become possible only when *the social* form of life and “negative liberty” are transcended and when political freedom based on action, initiation and publicness is established. For example, from the perspective of Liberalism, it is possible to conceive of “freedom of speech” as a negative liberty in the sense that everyone could express his opinion and thought and no one would interfere, prevent or restrain such freedom. However, Arendt would probably conceive freedom of speech as something “positive” freedom in the sense of action and initiation. She would defend it because she sees speech as expression and deliberation of opinions and in that sense it would be valued as public, inter-subjective and so political activity rather than being individual or selfish act.

According to Arendt, a society characterized by apolitical and private formation gives way to the appearance of administrative despotism and totalitarianism. Arendt thinks that the rise of totalitarianism -as subordination of all spheres of life, non-recognition of civil rights as “the right to freedom from politics- is related with the liberal credo “the less politics, the more freedom” (BPF, 148). She thinks that one of the sources of totalitarianism is this restriction and erosion of publicness and political realm. She indicates in *Origins of Totalitarianism* that a society composed of isolated or

atomized individuals precedes totalitarianism because such an apathy and carelessness for politics means lack of power, human togetherness and plurality. (OT, 474) Once such a path is taken, it is potential that the state, terror, military or any kind of “force” which is following a truth, an ideology, a positive law or divine insight initiates and takes the control, independently of opinions, decisions, expectations or experiences of human togetherness.

Indeed, the idealization of *the social* over *the political* implies an attempt against “democracy” and also action, speech and freedom as the essentials of *the political* (HC, 220). Arendt thinks that one of the main reasons behind the growth of fascism as totalitarianism in Europe in 20th century was the erosion of public sphere, apolitical existence of society and submission of mass society (Villa, 2000: 4-5). The bourgeoisie which lives “negative freedom”, as the class in the mood of *the social* and which regards mere success, competition, wealth and profit had exploited the public sphere for its own interests and it manipulates the state in this way. The result was the prevention of citizens to participate into public life and the disruption to human togetherness that the political requires inevitably. According to Villa, this means “the complete attenuation of the idea of citizenship, and a pervasive cynicism toward public institutions” (Villa, 2000: 5), that is, the invasion of public sphere by “negative freedom”, the private values and interests and the victory of *the social* over *the political*. This creates the individuals who are in apathy to publicness, live in cynical mode, generally in loneness and atomized unities and who had felt themselves “free”. This is what Berlin calls “negative freedom”

for today's societies as well. However, for Arendt, the distinction between *the social* and *the political* implies the distinction between the private and the public, the opposition of necessity and freedom, of futility and permanence and also of shame and honor (HC, 73). However, Berlin thinks that it is the “positive” form of freedom which mostly brings totalitarianism. Let me explain how he founds this correlation.

4.2.2 Non-liberal / Positive Conception of Freedom

Positive liberty, Berlin indicates, is generally “freedom to do”. In that sense, positive freedom is in relation with autonomy of the agent in the sense of self-rule. It also addresses the wish to be master of my own life and act but not as an instrument of external forces. It involves a desire to be a subject, not an object, motivated by conscious purposes but not by causes from the outside. It refers to willingness to be acting or active being to realize my *self* and to bear responsibility for my choices. Berlin directly indicates these all to define positive liberty. Indeed, in this sense Arendt's and especially Sartre's conception of freedoms are “positive” for the most part because both figures are proponents of free development of individuals by freedom to do, to act, to realize themselves, etc. However, I think Berlin sees this fact as the source of the problem though he does not declare it explicitly.

Berlin evaluates positive freedom as “the sacrifice of individuals for the freedom of society” (Berlin, 1958: 212). In that sense, he worries that positive liberty can destroy many of “negative liberties” because he thinks that positive freedom comes together

with desire for “sovereignty” of collectivity over individuals and it turns into being a “tyranny” (1958: 210). He equated positive freedom with self-rule in obedience to a “general will”. He conceives of the French Revolution as the great form of desire for “positive freedom” because it intends to collective self-direction and liberation as a nation (1958: 209). In the same line, he thinks Rousseau's theory of freedom is dangerous because in Berlin's account, once the common or public interest was independent of wills of individuals, what we will see is totalitarianism and in liberal theory it is called “tyranny of the majority” and negative liberty mostly means being free from this “tyranny” (Berlin, 1958: 210). In that sense, the liberal conception of freedom is against “positive freedom” because it brings holistic form of society and politics, rather than individualism and pluralism. In that sense, it may not be argued that Sartre's and Arendt's conception of freedoms are “positive”. First of all, both figures are against such a holistic form of social or individual life and totalitarian form of politics. Especially, Arendt criticized the motivation behind the French Revolution as well; however, she conceived it as a desire for “liberation from” needs and poverty, but not a desire for “positive freedom”. Additionally, she has clarified that sovereignty is not freedom because sovereignty invades or restrains the freedom of the others that are the sources of the plurality and human togetherness where freedom can exist. As for Sartre, he agrees that sovereignty is not freedom and also it is not possible because the freedom of the other cannot be invaded physically. His conception of freedom never indicates a form of social and political life that is hierarchical, despotic, tyrannical and that is based on economic, political or social dominance of some over others. Neither Sartre nor

Arendt accepts that there exists such a “general will” or “tyranny of the majority” over free and conscious human beings as individuals. Especially Sartre emphasizes revolts against all order and his conception of freedom includes certain forms of anarchism in the sense of a society without structures of authority and viewing hierarchy and organization as obstacles to existence and freedom (Fox, 2003: 118). Additionally, Sartre’s and Arendt’s conceptions of freedom do not exclude and despise the freedom of others. Conversely, both define their freedom together with responsibility in the sense of freedom for others. Sartre approves the recognition of the freedom of the other as part of the recognition of one's own freedom and he acknowledges that his world is inhabited by other human beings (Adler, 1949: 288-290). In that sense, it can be said that Sartre's freedom is democratic, rather than despotic or tyrannical because it is for every human being (Morris, 2008: 79-80). Therefore, all these show that Sartre's and Arendt's conceptions of freedom cannot be identical with “positive freedom” as defined by Berlin.

4.3 Conclusion

To conclude, Arendt’s and Sartre’s conceptions of freedom can be considered as resembling each other at certain points; their common emphasis on action, initiation, responsibility and humanism. All these four themes are performative in the sense that they need action to become part of reality (being actualized) and to enable people to realize their *selves*. They are intended towards something new both in the sense of renewing one’s self and also renewing the politically organized world. In that sense,

action, initiation, responsibility and humanism emphasize the agency of human beings and belief that people are the subjects of history. Finally, these are not indifferent to the other's freedom, to collectivity and to the world because all these (the other's freedom, collectivity and world) make freedom possible.

As for their relation with liberalism, what we see is that Arendt's and Sartre's conceptions of freedom are non-liberal, affirmative and enabling. They are not negative though it is disputable whether they are positive in the sense of Berlin's conceptualization. For both figures, it is clear that action as performance is *sine qua non* of the realization of freedom and I think that a conception of freedom which inherently includes action or performance can surely be evaluated as "positive" in the sense of "freedom to do". According to Adamson, who is dealing with the idea of "revolution" in Arendt, she is a radical thinker because she obviously emphasizes positive freedom and she "is the property intrinsic to positive, publicly-expressed freedom" (Adamson, 1978: 448). It has been shown that Berlin finds the sources of positive freedom in Rousseau. Likewise, Adamson thinks that such positive-ness in Arendt's conception of freedom heavily comes from the modern republican tradition, especially Rousseau. However, while Berlin criticizes positive-ness in/of freedom in the way that it brings society and politics to totalitarianism, Arendt thinks that it has "a reality-testing function, a self-activity function, and a self-disclosure function" -all these should be conceived by considering the relation between freedom and action. Interestingly, while Berlin relates positive freedom with totalitarianism, Arendt, as we have seen above, finds negative

freedom as the source and background of totalitarianism.

We agree with Berlin in the fact that contemporary liberalism is mostly based on negative conception of freedom in the sense of being free from coercion. However, according to Arendt and Sartre, “*freedom from*” does not imply that we are free. Freedom from coercion neither implies “action” nor guarantees “project”. Freedom needs action, in addition to mere liberation. The status of being liberated from coercion does not bring automatically the act of liberation (OR, 29). In other words, although it is true that Arendt and Sartre defend freedom from state coercion or any kind of coercive forces, they are not contented with this. “Freedom from” itself does not provide the realization of the *self*, does not offer action or existence for the sake of freely chosen projects and does not carry political life. “Freedom from” may, in certain contexts, solely mean cynicism, alienation and loss of worldliness. In that sense, it is clear that even if Sartre and Arendt are not in opposition with negative liberty, they think negative liberty is not relevant to politics and it is not adequate to bring political freedom based on action, humanism, initiation and responsibility as explicated above.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

At the beginning, my motivating insight was that both Sartre's and Arendt's conceptions of freedom were characterized by a rebellion against their time's perception of politics, freedom, human, power, etc. Their conceptions were criticized as too abstract, far from being embodied and so far from political minds and were not paid attention as potential and alternative source of political freedom. In other words, there is a common opinion that their existentialist and phenomenological conceptions of freedom are merely philosophical. However, I thought their conceptions are both performative, based on action and very political. This encouraged me to examine them in comparison with politics and in this study, my overall search has been to examine whether Sartre's and Arendt's conceptions of freedom, though they were formulated philosophically, are really relevant to politics in the sense of human intercourse, actual life contacts and human togetherness. In other words, this was a quest to witness the scenery that appears once their conceptions of freedom are reflected on and conceived within politics. Hereby, it can be said that the explanations, examinations and discussions that I have sorted throughout the study have enabled the conclusion that politics and political existence can be regarded within the rank of these conceptions of freedom and conceived as alternative forms of political freedom and political action in various forms of politics, social organization, types of political regime and system. While concluding, it will be convenient to summarize my thesis with two main points of the study.

Firstly, I intended to explicate Sartre's and Arendt's conceptions of freedom. In the second and third chapters, I defined and clarified them together with their philosophical bases, their other main concepts and arguments and then I attempted to conceive them in relation and collaboration with politics. In that sense, I intended to see whether they are relevant to politics or they are just speculative and non-realistic. After all discussions, what I tried to show is that both Sartre's and Arendt's conceptions of freedom are relevant to politics and what I brought out in this study is the possible framework and relevant context of their understanding of political freedom. By all means, it can undoubtedly be said that Sartre's and Arendt's conceptions of freedom and their arguments can be reflected on and conceived in certain political issues and discussions. The most important and strongest evidence enabling to claim such a reflection rests on the fact that both conceptions of freedom are deeply rooted in *action*. Freedom, for both figures, is performative and this performance can also be realized in political existence. That is, their conceptions of freedom can also become political. Moreover, I tried to indicate that the potentiality of these conceptions of freedom to be converted as political can also be seen in Sartre's and Arendt's optimism to change, reconstruct or re-new "*being-in-itself*". Additionally, they emphasize political action realized by human beings individually and collectively; they have intention to keep alive all the possibilities of politics appearing by freedom and they defend ethics in the sense of political and individual responsibility by conceiving freedom not for certain classes, groups, races, sex, nations, but for all human beings. Structuralism, for example, was in

the agenda of Sartre in order to contribute and also to go beyond it. Sartre's examination of *being-in-itself*, *bodies*, *structures* and *situations* are contributive explanations for structuralist point of view to understand human beings and also their existence in society. However, Sartre goes beyond and opposes structuralism in order for human beings to realize freedom. That is, although there are some contrary claims that I have met in examining Sartre's philosophy, I think that Sartre's existentialist philosophy which is characterized by its conception of freedom had normative sights, values and judgments in the way that human beings can and should overcome the structural obstacles, *situations*, *being-in-itselfs*, etc. I tried to show that this is a strong political vision and also effective insight to encourage people to act as free beings for the sake of their dignified, chosen and valued projects and existences. Similar political encouragement was also included in Arendt's conception of freedom. What she opposed was the fact that human togetherness and plurality were despised or underestimated in the Western political tradition since Plato. Arendt refused that freedom is an inside issue and lived privately in isolation and that no one can trust in power delegated to collectivity and freedom assigned to human plurality. In that sense, Arendt was against the restriction of politics into representative means and bodies and limitation of freedom to the private sphere. This was her rebellion to passive, cynical and apolitical existence loaded on human existence. Arendt's conception of freedom and understanding of the political also implied the fact that there is a strong existentialist core in her theories.

Secondly, in the first part of fourth chapter, in order to understand their

originality, I thought that it is important to compare and contrast their conceptions of freedom in themselves and also in the context of politics. As we have seen, certain disjunctions could be claimed between two thinkers. While Sartre conceives freedom more individualistic, related with consciousness and making self, Arendt's point is on freedom in human togetherness, as public phenomenon and as an intention of collectivity. However, they were not strong enough to prevent their collaboration because several conjunctions are there between them. In that sense, I clarified these conjunctions both in the sense of freedom as a concept and its relation with politics. Some conspicuous points that gather them together are those that can directly be reflected on politics. I drew this path with the fact that they are both inseparable from action, performance, appearing among people in practical life and efforts to realize the possibilities of the political. I claimed that freedom is not just a concept or an idea but something to be performed, realized and lived for both. This correlation between freedom and action is a kind of affirmation of life, power of human(s) and the beauty of political existence and the politics appearing only by acting as free and for freedom as well. In this correlation, both figures think, there is also a carnivalistic and enthusiastic sense that activate all senses and faculties of human beings and this provides an intuition of being alive and being agency even if these also cause *angst* (for Sartre) and have *predicaments* (for Arendt). If it is true that lack of an intuition for being an actor is a symptom for the lack of self-confidence and depression as learned helplessness, Sartre's and Arendt's efforts are also important to bring people courage and optimism. They emphasize that we learn to behave helplessly, to be passive victims because we do not

perceive that we are free and we can live freedom. However, they say that such a perceived absence of control over our lives is not true and people are the subjects of their life, their destiny and their freedom. So, there is a strong optimism and this optimism is also related with their humanistic view-points, initiation in politics and also their ethics in the sense of responsibility for other's freedom. Both Sartre and Arendt are far from the feeling of regret because regret is a kind of anguish, bad faith or sadness about consequences of action that is realized by consciousness and free will even if the feeling of regret includes the consciousness or a view that one could have acted for, changed and control over the things in the past. In that sense, their conceptions of freedom take human with his/her choices and intentions as central political power for change, for demolishing and re-establishing new forms and modes of life.

Lastly, in the second part of fourth chapter, to harden such a reflection and also their originality, I thought that it is important to distinguish their conceptions of freedom from other forms and conceptions of freedom in history and I tried to show this by comparing them to certain points of liberal negative conception of freedom that is mostly theorized by Isaach Berlin as contemporary theoretician and proponent of Liberalism. It should be acknowledged that "negative liberty" is important to protection of people from state oppression, abuse of fundamental rights and pressure of masses and it is crucial especially in the protection of violation of human rights. However, from the viewpoints of Sartre and Arendt, freedom as "liberation", "negative liberty" or "freedom from" in Liberalism becomes irrelevant to and disinterested in politics. Negative liberty

never guarantees political freedom in the sense of action and initiation in politics. It seems rather apolitical, too individualistic and isolating too much privacy. The most important point in this difference from Liberalism is that Sartre's and Arendt's conception of freedom can never be called as *negative* because according to them, being free from "interference" or "authority" does never guarantee political freedom that is based on political activity. They think that "negative liberty" is inadequate to motivate people to initiate political freedom or to act for the sake of protection of certain fundamental rights. Even one can say that a political action to be liberated or free from interferences or violations of any kind of authority or anti-political force would be evaluated as an instance of positive liberty. In that sense, one can claim that establishment of "negative liberty" needs priority of political freedom and action that Sartre and Arendt suggested. Still, it should especially be remembered that Sartre's and Arendt's conceptions of freedom are not "positive" as conceptualized by Berlin because Berlin correlates "positive freedom" with "totalitarianism". His blackmail was based on the fact that he almost reduces the defense of positive freedom to the defense of totalitarian and absolute form of politics. Therefore, it cannot even be talked that Sartre and Arendt are proponent of positive freedom in terms of Berlin. Rather, it seems that they go beyond this duality of "negative" and "positive" freedom. They are critical to these two categories and they propose a new spirit of political freedom in which I thought they become similar in criticism of inadequacy of liberal negative conception of freedom. While Liberalism seems giving priority to security and it collaborates freedom with feeling of satisfaction of basic necessities of life, Sartre's and Arendt's conceptions

of freedom dictates that freedom is possible only when one can *transcend* (in the sense of nihilation for Sartre as in the case of going towards “*being-for-itself*” and underestimation for Arendt as in the case of “action”) his/her necessities and fears of body which are particular and private. One can claim that Sartre's and Arendt's antagonism and allergy to Liberalism is different because while Sartre mostly seems to be underlining the value of individualism, Arendt's matter is almost all about human togetherness and plurality. However, as I have shown, there is no radical conjunction in their criticism of liberal conception of freedom because at least they conceive it *negative*, far from political action, politically free existence and so affirmation of life. According to them, freedom does not mean *emancipation* as in the case of eschatological expectancy or liberation as in the case of liberal negative conception of freedom. It is not something that can only appear in the future once the obstacles of the past die. Both Sartre and Arendt emphasized temporality and its relation with freedom and they agree on the impotency of the past (as *factuality* and *being-in-itself*) to prevent the existence of freedom. Likewise, they are not proponents of delaying freedom to one day in the future; they do not hope for a “*justice*” that will come in the future. Rather, they know that freedom is potentially there and we can act with such a consciousness, we can realize, practice and live it now and here individually or collectively. In brief, the basic aim in the second and third chapters was to deepen, discuss, embody and prove this common politically optimistic side in Sartre's and Arendt's conceptions of freedom and in the fourth chapter I attempted to empower this common political tendency in two thinkers by comparing them with liberal conception of freedom.

In that sense, it should be recognized that such kind of political freedom that I have derived from Sartre's and Arendt's conceptions of freedom is open to new studies and discussions and I think it waits to be examined comparatively with any kind of specific topics and issues of politics. For example, it can be claimed that such kind of political freedom can inspire or motivate especially new-social movements, alternative political actions and certain political struggles outside traditional political processes, representative and parliamentary politics. This is because political freedom derived from Sartre's and Arendt's philosophies is performative, intended to transcend and change the situations and to re-new politics with free action and also for the sake of freedom. This means that it proposes indeed a dynamic and fluid political existence in the sense of “let's initiate”.

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