

A STUDY ON MIGRATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

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## **ABSTRACT**

A STUDY ON MIGRATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

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This thesis aims to investigate both the causes and effects of migration in the Middle East and North Africa with a view to identifying the patterns and trends that characterize migration phenomena in the region. It is argued that migration is a significant variable to understand the economic, social and political dynamics of the development that the MENA countries have experienced since imperial and/or colonial times. In its different variants, migration has been conditioned primarily by economic vicissitudes. With the exception of the Gulf states, all of the MENA countries have experienced significant levels of immigration as well as emigration especially since the 1980s when the structural effects of the oil crisis (1973) surfaced. The Iraq-Iran War of the 1980s and the Gulf War of the 1990s enhanced the existing trends of migration. In the absence of political reform and economic restructuring, the economies of the region have rejuvenated the conditions of migration. Having drawn upon sociological theories, political histories and economic analyses to identify and discuss the patterns and trends of migration, the present study argues in complete contrast to a policy-oriented Western scholarship that

migration is far from being a stimulus for economic growth across the MENA countries.

Keywords: The Middle East, North Africa, Political Economy of Migration, Migration Theory, Oil Reserves.

## ÖZ

### ORTADOĞU VE KUZEY AFRİKA BÖLGESİ'NDEKİ GÖÇ ÜZERİNE BİR ARAŞTIRMA

Yüksek Lisans, Ekonomi Bölümü

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Bu tez, göç kavramını oluşturan kalıpları ve eğilimleri irdeleyerek Orta Doğu ve Kuzey Afrika (ODKA) Bölgesi'ndeki göçün hem sebeplerini hem de etkilerini ortaya koymaktadır. İmparatorluk ve/veya kolonileşme döneminden bu yana göçün ODKA bölgesindeki gelişmenin ekonomik, sosyal ve siyasi dinamiklerini anlamlandırabilmek adına önemli bir değişken olduğu tartışılmaktadır. Göç aldığı farklı biçimlerle ekonomik dalgalanmalardan etkilenecek ortaya çıkan bir gelişmedir. Körfez ülkeleri haricinde bütün ODKA ülkeleri Petrol Krizi'nin (1973) etkilerinin hissedilmesiyle beraber 1980lerden bu yana dışarıya göç vermekle beraber belirgin düzeyde göç almışlardır. 1980lerin İran-İrak Savaşı ve 1990ların Körfez Savaşı varolan göç eğilimini arttırmıştır. Siyasi reformların ve ekonomik yeniden yapılanmanın eksikliğinde, bölge ekonomileri göç koşullarını yeniden üretmiştir. Bu çalışma sosyolojik teorilerden hareketle siyasi tarihi ve ekonomik analizleri kullanarak göç kalıplarını ve eğilimlerini tanımlamış ve Batı merkezli öğretinin aksine göçün ODKA bölgesinin ekonomik büyümesi için teşvik edici bir unsur olmadığını ortaya koymuştur.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Orta Doęu, Kuzey Afrika, Gcn Ekonomi Politigi, Gc Teorisi,  
Petrol Rezervleri

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## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

EC: European Community

EEC: European Economic Community

EU: European Union

GATS: General Agreement on Trade in Services

GCC: Gulf Corporation Council

GCH: Global City Hypothesis

HDR: Human Development Report

IDP: Internally Displaced Person

ILO: International Labor Organization

IMF: International Monetary Fund

IOM: International Organization for Migration

ISI: Import Substitution Industrialization

MENA: The Middle East and North Africa

NAFTA: North American Free Trade Agreement

NGO: Non-governmental Organizations

OECD: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

ONI: Office National D' Immigration

OPEC: Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries

OPT: Occupied Palestinian Territory

SEM: Southern and Eastern Mediterranean

UAE: United Arab Emirates

UK: The United Kingdom

UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNODC: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

USA: The United States of America

USSR: The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WWI: World War I

WWII: World War II

WB: The World Bank

WST: World System Theory



Figure 1: THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

The long history of the Middle East<sup>1</sup> and North Africa (hereafter MENA) as a broad region was dramatically altered with the discovery of oil at the dawn of the twentieth century. At a time when countries, borders and economies all began to expand, major industrialized countries of the western world intensified their efforts to get more resources for their own economic sustainability. With this

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<sup>1</sup> The term “Middle East”, obviously a political construct, has been in use since WWII. Before that, the region was often called “Near East” a term coined by the American naval historian A.T. Mahan. With the WWII, the term “Near East” was converted into the “Middle East” via the British forces’ influence on the USA and Europe (Alasdair & Blake, 1985).



objective, these countries increasingly transferred the economic resources of their formal colonies and other countries—via trade agreements and wars etc.—into their own economies, causing in turn the economic underdevelopment of the greater part of the world. The MENA with its rich oil resources were organically linked to the core countries of the world economy. A political framework, characterized firstly by colonial administrations then by authoritarian or monarchical governments, to sustain this process came into being throughout most of the region. During most of the twentieth century, political oppression was combined with economic underdevelopment that led to the deterioration of the living conditions for the greater majority of the populations in the MENA countries. In the midst of wars, political persecution, poverty, low wages, few jobs, high fertility rate, both internal and international migration became a perennial feature of the region. In some countries, particularly Iraq and Turkey, forced migration was also devised by governments to certain political ends. Accordingly migration as a multi-faceted issue has become one of the central themes to understand the political and economic conditions of the MENA societies. Most recently the unanimous rise of mass movements throughout the relatively bigger countries of the MENA, such as Egypt, Libya and Syria, has turned the attention of many scholars to major domestic problems that have been generating migrants of different sorts. The present thesis situates itself in this wave of scholarship that views migration in terms of economic and political transformation experienced by the region over the years.

In this respect, political economy seems to offer effective tools to identify and then analyze the dynamics of the political and economic framework within which migration occurs in different forms across the borders. Besides, it calls for a systematic gathering of related facts and figures to fathom the effects upon the MENA societies, of public policies determining the allocation of resources as well as the political consequences of these policies. Accordingly, the present thesis aims to describe and analyze the nexus of relations between migration, public policies and institutions, and economies of the MENA countries. In pursuit of this goal, I am inclined to identify certain patterns and trends regarding migration across the MENA countries and offer some comparative insights with a view to deconstructing overt generalizations on the subject as found in a wide range of scholarly writings, including those of the most serious scholars such as Waterbury and Richards (2008).

### **Geographic Parameters**

At the outset, it is important to clarify the geographical frontiers of the current study. As the MENA consists of the Middle East and North Africa, the following countries are generally included in the generic definition of the region: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Palestinian Territories, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Yemen (Richards & Waterbury, *A Political Economy of the Middle East*, 2008). Analysts do still have different opinions as to which countries to include in the MENA. Some depict Turkey and Cyprus as parts

of the Middle East, thus the MENA, whereas others do not even consider Palestinian territories as one of the countries in the region. This is a contentious issue due to the fact that Palestinian Territories (OPT) have their organic links with the region since ancient times. Thus, it is included in our working definition. Before I present my definition, I should also mention yet another geographical categorization which divides the region into three broader units.

The three broad units that make up the MENA region are the Maghreb, the Mashrek and the Gulf Corporation Council (GCC) states (Baldwin-Edwards, 2005). The Maghreb consists of Morocco, Tunisia, Libya and Algeria. The Mashrek countries are Egypt, Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen. The GCC states are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Iraq and Iran are left out of these broad regional categories owing to the historical geographical limitations. Although this classification has its obvious problems, I will incorporate it into my analysis simply because the existing literature has widely used it. But, my working definition of the region operates through existing classifications and also makes some slight revisions in those classifications. Thus, my list contains Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Turkey and Cyprus.

### **Historical Background**

Having explained the regional setting, it is important to pinpoint major historical developments that played an important role in the making of the region.

Thus, a brief historical survey would be helpful to comprehend the background against which social, political and economic dynamics of the MENA were constituted.

Throughout history, the MENA region provided home and the gateway to many societies, economies and civilizations and was able to preserve its geopolitical importance in such a setting. The Ottoman Empire incorporated the greater part of the MENA into its vast territories as early as the first decades of the sixteenth century. Thus it came to dominate the four river systems, namely the Nile Delta, Euphrates, Tigris and Jordan River. Major urban centers of the Ottoman Empire flourished around these river systems around which agricultural production developed and turned into the mainstay of the imperial economy. The territory was also the gateway for the trade between the West and the East. In this respect, transportation of silk and spices, imports and exports of slavery, gold and ivory took place throughout the Ottoman imperial territories.

Ottoman economy functioned effectively well into the eighteenth century until its interactions with the rapidly developing economies of Western Europe intensified leading to the demise of the Ottoman Empire economy. The decline of Ottoman economy coincides with the beginning of colonization throughout the Ottoman Middle East. Capitulations that were once given as a privilege to increase the volume of trade with the European countries were expanded. The expansion affected the Ottoman economy adversely and the Empire became largely indebted to the European countries to finance its own subsistence. Under

such an economic pressure, the Ottoman Empire could not preserve its territorial integrity in the region and the European countries began to colonize the provinces of the Empire. Especially, France and Great Britain became the most influential European countries in the region through economic privileges gained via the capitulations. After WWI, Egypt and Sudan got under the control of Great Britain. Russia remained in relation with the Orthodox community in the region. France and Britain turned their attention to Syria by provoking the communities there against the Ottoman Empire. Libya came under the Italian control. In brief, the Ottoman Empire totally lost control in the MENA. During the interwar period (1918-1939), the colonization process continued. It was not until the Turkish Independence War that any serious resistance against the imperialist Western countries emerged. This event inspired the countries of the MENA region against the colonizing powers that had been exploiting the region economically for so long. After WWII, liberation movements in the MENA region came one after another.

The foundation and consolidation of Israel in 1948 marked another watershed event in the history of the region. Thenceforward, as the world was defined as a bipolar political system primarily shaped by the USA and the USSR, the newly liberating countries of the region chose to align themselves with the Socialist system of the USSR with a view to establishing presumably more egalitarian economic regimes (Richards & Waterbury, *A Political Economy of the Middle East*, 2008). These regimes adopting socialist institutions and policies paved the way for the introduction of “social welfare states” where needs of

people such as education and health were covered by the state. In addition, state-led growth was adopted as the development strategy of the countries under the Socialist regime. However, this period could not last long enough to recover the MENA region countries from economic deficiencies of the colonization period. The Cold War disrupted economic development of the region countries under socialist regimes. With the weakening of the USSR and the USA gaining power, economic order in the world depended on the economic activities of the USA. By consolidation of its hegemonic rule over the world economy, the USA also began to dominate the political systems in the MENA region as well as the world political order. The MENA countries being integrated into the global system where liberal economic policies were adopted became the number one victim of this system. Owing to the globalization process, certain non-governmental organizations such as the Open Society Institute and the leading international companies of the West began to penetrate into the MENA region. These companies descended upon the resources of the MENA region such as oil to sustain their own existence. They transferred the incomes from their economic activities in the region to their homelands. Simultaneously, the MENA region countries implementing Import Substitution Industrialization policies, privatization and liberal and neo-liberal strategies for their economic growth experienced an economic decline. Similar to the colonization period, the MENA region being exploited by the major political actors of the world began to get poorer when compared to its strict socialist times.

The economic collapse of the region caused political turbulence among the populations of the countries as well. As this disturbance continued, first the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and then the US intervention caused significant alterations in the regional economic and political dynamics. In the midst of the accelerating decline in economic welfare and political stability of the region, people began to search for better living conditions and safer places to live, making migration a chronic feature of the region over the past two decades.

### **Migration: The Nomenclature**

Since migration is one of the most significant indicators of economic and political changes in the region, it is important to elaborate the concept of migration in the beginning. Migration takes place in two major forms; “emigration” and “immigration”. The term, migration itself refers to the physical movement of people from one place to another by permanent or temporary means due to several reasons. Emigration, being a subset of migration is literally leaving one’s country or home in order to settle in another one. On the other hand, immigration is leaving one’s country or home in order to settle in another country. Despite emigration and immigration seem to be the same thing, they are not. If we take up a country as a pivotal unit, migration into the country is immigration and migration out of the country is emigration. We combine these two sub contexts under the main title of “migration” and further analyze the migration theories in sociology whether they are relevant to the migration in the MENA region or not.

## **Method and Data**

The sociological theories that are relevant to my thesis subject, migration, are Ravenstein's laws of migration, Lee's push-pull approaches, new economic approaches, dual labor market and labor market segmentation approaches, structuralist (political economy) approaches and the structurationist perspective. We would better understand and identify the migration patterns of countries in the MENA region in light of these approaches considering the fact that the second method to analyze migration, focusing on the economic aspect, establishes the relevancy of the economic and sociological theories for the MENA region.

Collecting the economic data and establishing their relevancy with the subject has been a challenging task. I employed several methods to this effect. One of them was finding the related data, graphs, tables or charts and directly using it in my thesis. I applied this method when the graph or chart I have found fit the framework of the study. These were mostly from the World Bank (WB) website concerning economic indicators. Or, they were taken from the OECD website or UNODC reports if concerning any humane dimensions like feminization of labor force or human trafficking. Signifying the economic aspect, charts and graphs that I have used from the WB website helped me sort out the trends in migration in the MENA region.

The trends about migration in the region can be classified into four main groups respectively as "territory of asylum" or "territory of origin", "net migration" and "international migrant stock". Territory of asylum is taken to be



the territories where refugees expatriate in order to sustain their lives. Territory of origin is where the asylum-seekers' nationalities belong to. These are neither complements nor substitutes for each other. They define two mutually exclusive conditions where a country might be both a strongly asylum-seeking country and a refugee giving country at the same time. Net migration is the difference between numbers of people emigrating out of a country and immigrating into the country. International migrant stock is the number of people born in a country other than which they or their parents live in.

If we analyze these concepts against the background of the MENA region expressed at the end of my thesis, trends that were observed are as such: Trend of "territory of asylum" in the MENA region has an increasing pattern in general. Varying from one country to another, we observe that political and economic conditions of each country are influential in the duration of immigration into the country or being an asylum-seeking country. Trend of "territory of origin" has a steeply increasing pattern. It means that inter-regional or intra-regional migration occurs at a high frequency around the MENA region. The pattern of the MENA region being a territory of origin has drastically increased especially in the last decade. On the one hand, if we come up with "net migration" amount and "international migrant stock" ratios, we observe these results: There remain 18 countries to analyze when Palestinian territories are excluded due to our dataset. Among these countries, nine of them have negative net migration and the other half have positive net migration. When we classify the countries with negative net migration, we realize that these countries are the ones which have a lot of political

and economic turbulences like Iran, Algeria or Egypt. On the other hand, when we classify the countries with positive net migration, we realize that these countries are the ones whose internal political or economic stabilities were obtained somehow like Jordan, Kuwait or UAE<sup>2</sup>. Lastly, “international migrant stock” ratios for these countries have an increasing pattern. When we observe the dataset given in appendices, we realize that countries like Jordan, Kuwait or UAE -oil rich countries which have capital inflow when compared to other countries- have increasing international migrant stock ratios whereas countries like Algeria, Egypt or Morocco have decreasing international migrant stock ratios<sup>3</sup>. According to these results, we may suppose that in countries with higher capital inflow, there would be high immigration amounts. When we control this supposition with net migration, we do realize that in most of the countries that have increasing international migrant stock ratios, net migration has an increasing trend as well. We might state that these two concepts are correlated with each other by this result. Through analysis of trends as such, I would be able to identify the economic reasons behind the social dynamics of migration. Thus, these patterns are going to be my tools in analyzing migration in the MENA region. However, if we do not combine these economic indicators with sociological perspectives, we would be left with the kind of data that would have no meaning at all. In order to avoid this, I am inclined to carry out a thorough reading of the existing literature on the sociology and history of the MENA region as well as the economic aspects

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<sup>2</sup> <http://www.tradingeconomics.com/world-bank-by-indicator-list-by-country>

<sup>3</sup> <http://www.tradingeconomics.com/world-bank-by-indicator-list-by-country>

of the countries concerned. I believe that a careful synthesis of these results with graphs, charts and tables would enable the MENA region to speak for itself.

### **Thesis Structure**

While doing the analysis of migration in the MENA region, my thesis will consist of two chapters which have nine separate sub-headings. The first chapter is introduction where the general aspects of the thesis are laid out. In this part, I give brief information on the historical, geographical and economic background of the MENA region. In this respect, I define what migration is and provide some information as to how I am going to incorporate it into my thesis formed around sociological and economic perspectives.

Having defined the concept of “migration” and given out its relations with other social factors, the second chapter moves from that point on. In the second chapter, I will first discuss migration, its definitions and the classifications. Then, I will focus on the sociological theories concerning migration in the MENA region and examine the results of migration in the region with respect to these theories. Results of migration concerning the MENA region are classified as below in a different chapter:

- How is migration problematized?
- Human trafficking
- Migrants as the labor force

- What kind of institutions do work on migration?
- What are the policies implemented by these institutions and countries

to prevent migration and its effects?

When these results are presented with the facts and figures, I will particularly pay attention to the conditions generating these results and the dynamics upon which they depend. This would lead us to the epilogue, the fourth chapter. Epilogue presents the conclusions of the thesis and also answers some of the unanswered questions about the dynamics of migration in the region.

To fulfill the research objectives stated above, I rely primarily upon secondary literature for sociological concepts, historical formations, economic infrastructure and political systems of the MENA region. As for studying the economic picture, it is necessary to form data charts, graphs and tables to visualize the observed trends. Additionally, the sociological and political analysis of the region or the institutions of the region will be done through the combination of information on the political systems from the books and articles.

While doing this study, there are several methods used. A thorough understanding of the secondary literature is a prerequisite to proceed with the methodical coverage of the subject under question. Since I use the lenses of political economy to study a largely sociological phenomenon, namely, migration, I had to do plenty of readings to be able to retain a sound background in various genres of scholarly writings on the subject. Thus I focused my readings in four major fields; history, sociology, economics and politics. Analysis of migration in the MENA region with a political economic perspective will come out to be a

result of the synthesis of these four perspectives since the relations between the institutions, state and economics could only be established as such. World Systems Theory (hereafter WST), Ravenstein's laws of migration and Lee's push-pull approaches were the basic cornerstones of my thesis which formed the idea of "The Super Trio" on my mind. The reason behind this formation was that these theories complement each other where each one filled the ideological gap that another one left unanswered.

Having done away with the literature survey, I move on to the analysis of migration in the MENA region with a view to identifying certain patterns to the migratory phenomena in different countries of the MENA. For this purpose I heavily rely on statistical information drawn upon the secondary literature as well as the data provided by international organizations such as the World Bank. This information is translated into graphs, tables and charts. We should be able to discern certain patterns to the people's mobility and also model it with these tools.

With this study, I attempt to carry out a thorough analysis of migration in the MENA region largely through the lenses of political economy. In that respect, I address a series of related questions such as why migration takes place in the MENA region, what affects people's decisions to migrate, what forms of migration can be identified, what are the facts and figures of the migratory movements. Having addressed these issues both at factual and theoretical levels, the study looks at the dynamics that are behind the riots taking place across the MENA at present, and see what role migration plays in the big picture.

## CHAPTER II

### VISITING MIGRATION THEORIES

This chapter offers a general overview of the migration theories and a brief discussion of these theories in terms of their relevance to the specific geographical unit under discussion. The working definition of “migration” is adopted from that of the International Organization of Migration (IOM from now on) which defines it as ‘the movement of a person or a group of persons, either across an international border, or within a state. It is a population movement, encompassing any kind of movement of people, whatever its length, composition and causes; it includes migration of refugees, displaced persons, economic migrants, and persons moving for other purposes, including family reunification.’ (International Organization for Migration, 2011). Since this definition underlines three major dimensions of migration, that is, spatialization, economic migration and social migration, it is important to briefly go over these aspects of migration and explain some of the concepts before setting out to review the theories relevant to the purposes of the present thesis.

Spatialization refers to both “**internal**” and “**international**” dislocation of people. While internal migration means the movement of peoples within their own countries from rural to urban or from cities to other cities, international migration involves movement across international borders from the country of

origin to another country. International migration can typically take two forms. The first one type is “emigration” which means changing residence across state borders where persons leave the pivotal country and reside to live in another country. The other type is “immigration” where persons migrate to the pivotal country rather than migrating from there (Harzig & Hoerder, 2009).

In modern times, economic motives overpower other reasons of migration. The MENA region is one of the best settings to testify to this fact. People here are generally forced to migrate because of poverty or low wages. They escape from unemployment, below subsistence wages, chronic diseases, malnutrition or a combination of all. Thus, *‘forced economic migration’*, a type of economic migration, is a feature of people’s mobility across greater part of the MENA region. There is also a “voluntary” type of economic migration which involves *‘bogus’* asylum-seekers. Since the term “economic migrants” seem to have a pejorative connotation, these migrants are called bogus which means “pseudo” though they are not (Samers, Migration , 2010).

In order to make sense of migration-related concepts within the framework of the MENA region, we should also take into account the social basis of economic migration in the MENA region. Therefore, the following section aims to go over major sociological theories about migration and pinpoint their relevance to uncovering the social and economic dynamics of migration in the MENA region.

## 2. 1. Migration Theories and Their Implications for MENA:

There are obviously many theories about migration. For the purposes of the present thesis, only five of these theories are considered worthy of discussion. Starting with Ravenstein's Laws of Migration, the current discussion focuses on these theories with a special emphasis on their implications and their applicability to analyze the migratory phenomena in the MENA countries.

### 2.1.1. Ravenstein's Laws of Migration:

A nineteenth-century English geographer, E. G. Ravenstein was inspired by the migration dynamics between Ireland, England and Scotland, and developed a set of laws to describe migration. He based his analysis on **“methodological individualism”**<sup>4</sup> (Samers, Migration, 2010). In his first paper on migration, Ravenstein classified migrants as “local migrants”, “the short-journey migrants”, “migration by stages”, “long-journey migrants” and “temporary migrants” with respect to migrants' period of stay in the county that they had gone to. He also looked at certain patterns such as from which counties people had migrated and to where, and which gender had the most percentile in migration, etc. He concluded that migration was a phenomenon leaning from rural to urban where centers of industries were developed. In that sense, Ravenstein's laws were characterized by an emphasis on economic conditions. These laws were (Ravenstein, 1885):

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<sup>4</sup> Methodological individualism: Individuals function as the unit of analysis.



- 1) Migration occurs in short distances where people lead to the closest centers of commerce and industry. People's displacement during this process is called **“currents of migration”**.
- 2) A town becomes a center of attraction and the inhabitants of the country flock into it. Thus, the rural population migrating into the town fills up the more remote districts.
- 3) There is the process of dispersion<sup>5</sup> and absorption<sup>6</sup>. These are the inverse processes whereas they carry out similar properties as well.
- 4) Each main current of migration produces a compensating counter-current as well.
- 5) Migrants travelling long distances generally go to great centers of commerce and industry.
- 6) The natives of towns are less migratory than those of the rural parts of the country.
- 7) Females are more migratory than males.

In a follow-up article, Ravenstein aimed to extend his scope from migration in the UK to principal countries of Europe and North America. He claimed that similar conditions had produced similar patterns in migration. He classified the similar conditions as “elements” and sorted them in range of countries as United Kingdom, Germany or Belgium, etc. In his concluding

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<sup>5</sup> Dispersion: Is the action of people migrating from a county; emigration of people from their environs or borders.

<sup>6</sup> Absorption: is the action of people migrating into a county; absorbing migrants from their environs.

remarks, there had been no different migratory pattern results indeed. Thus, what he had done in the second paper just formed to be the extension of the first paper's concern into continental Europe, North America and Canada. He pointed out the similar results migration caused in these countries (Ravenstein E. , 1889).

woronly.

*Population and Birthplaces.*

The population with which we have to deal numbered in 1871 31,484,661 souls, in 1881 34,884,848 souls, distributed as follows:—

	1871.	Per Cent.	1881.	Per Cent.	Increase, 1871-81.
England and Wales....	22,712,266	72·1	25,974,439	74·4	Per cent. 14·4
Scotland .....	3,360,018	10·7	3,735,573	10·7	11·2
Ireland .....	5,413,377	17·2	5,174,836	14·9	—4·9
United Kingdom ....	31,484,661	100·0	34,884,848	100·0	10·8

\* It is to be hoped that by the time the next census is taken, so-called "Registration Counties" and "Counties proper" will have been assimilated. The registrar's districts or unions undoubtedly present the most suitable unit for summarising the ages, birthplaces, and occupations of the people. The present complex system of the territorial divisions is most confusing, and increases the volume of the returns without adding anything of real use to the information they furnish.

Figure 2: Population and Birthplaces of people according to Ravenstein's first article on migration between the counties and the central England

	Proportion of Migrants Enumerated in		
	Border Counties.	Elsewhere in same Kingdom.	Sister Kingdoms.
Migrants of Anglo-Welsh birth .....	52·4	45·1	2·5
„ Scotch birth .....	46·0	29·8	24·2
„ Irish „ .....	16·2	24·1	59·7
„ British „ .....	46·2	39·9	13·9

Figure 3: Ratio of migrants in England and other territories of the United Kingdom

	Population.	Natives.	Subjects or Citizens.	Difference.
United Kingdom .....	34,884,848	34,535,095	34,859,240	+ 324,145
France.....	37,930,759	36,969,573	36,804,228	- 165,345
German Empire .....	46,855,704	46,421,179	46,482,912	+ 61,733
Hungary .....	15,642,102	15,400,677	15,502,976	+ 102,299
Italy .....	28,459,628	28,358,807	28,410,592	+ 60,785

Figure 4: Data on the natives and the immigrants<sup>7</sup>

The figures above reveal the significant changes in Ravenstein's perspective in terms of how he expanded his analysis of migration dynamics from a regional to a continental framework.

It is our contention that Ravenstein's seven laws of migration help make sense of the situation in the MENA region as well. Given the economic circumstances of the region today, we can clearly observe that migrants do move principally because of economic reasons. Additionally, the historical classification of the migrants that Ravenstein had formulated can be applied to the migrants from the MENA region with some slight changes. "Local migrants" and "the short-journey migrants" would go under internal migration, and "long-journey migrants" would go under international migration. In this respect, Ravenstein's economic-based argumentation does help explain the situation in the MENA region as well. It is in fact this particular aspect of Ravenstein's theory that

<sup>7</sup> The figure is taken from Ravenstein's second paper to show the difference among regions and countries he includes to analyze migration.

persuaded to include his approach among the sociological theories that we benefit in our analysis of migration in the MENA region.

#### 2.1.2. Push-Pull Approaches:

Push-pull approaches are essentially drawn upon economic-based theories such as those of Ravenstein. It would be not too far-fetched a claim that Ravenstein's laws and Lee's Approach complement each other. According to Lee's Push-Pull Approach, there are economic factors that push people out and there are other factors which pull -attract- people in. This perception simplifies the complex societal dynamics and intercultural settings as migrants migrate to wherever they go because of limited economic options and coercive social orders they face with. In that sense, the wage differentials explained migration dynamics in the MENA region as people migrated to where wages were better.

According to Arab Human Development Report (HDR) 2009, the push reasons are insecure environment of states, volatile economic growth, high unemployment, persisting poverty, hunger, food insecurity, health security challenges, military interventions and occupations (HDR, 2009). There are not many pull reasons though. The most specific pull reason might be the rich capital flow of the GCC countries in the region as Sassen explains: '*... very intense capital expansion at the periphery.*' (Sassen-Koob, 1980). Individuals evaluating these conditions are assumed to be rational decision makers where they would like to maximize their income. Thus, it is the best for them to migrate where wages are

higher and pull reasons are quantitatively more than the push reasons (Harzig & Hoerder, 2009).

### 2.1.3. New Economics Approaches:

New economics approach is put forward by Massey et al. (1993,1998). Here, opposing the neo-classical economists, the new economists support historians' empirical findings about migration from rural regions of Europe or China. Thus, the theory actually stems from specific regional findings (Harzig & Hoerder, 2009). The theory relies on families. In theory, families allow maximization of income but try to realize the minimization of risk related to the problem of labor and other markets, too. Maximization of income is realized through diversifying sources of income via making some of the family members emigrate as the labor force and making the rest stay in the country of origin. If the economic conditions in the country of origin deteriorate, the members abroad compensate the others with remittances. Massey et al. (1993) also state that migration is used as a strategy among families where families are not just interested in maximizing their incomes per se but also interested in maximizing their incomes with respect to other families.

As income maximization is one side of the theory, another aspect is the minimization of risk associated with the labor diversification. Moreover, as the families tend to diversify the labor force in the country of origin and abroad through several channels like seasonal labor migration, medium-distance jobs or long-distance occupations, it contributes to minimization of risks as well (Harzig

& Hoerder, 2009). Basically, the origin of the theory is the behavior of the labor force and the movement of remittances.

Depending on the theory, labor force in the MENA region is inclined to migrate because of insufficient economic conditions in the region and the rise of unemployment. The migrating population of the region displays the same characteristics that have been discussed in Ravenstein's laws of migration and Lee's push-pull approach. This reveals the connection of the new economics approach with the previous theories and its relevance within the framework of the MENA region.

#### 2.1.4. Dual Labor Market and Labor Market Segmentation Approaches:

Dual labor theory basically depends on the differentiation of two labor markets. The supposedly founder of the dual labor market theory, Piore, argues in his book, *Birds of Passage*, that actually, it is not the push factors that cause migration but the pull factors in richer countries that cause emigration from poorer countries. As a result of emigration, migrants are discriminated in the countries they go and the discrimination is also reflected onto the labor market. According to Michael Piore, the dual labor market includes two sectors which are named to be primary and secondary sectors. In the primary sector, there are "native" workers who are paid higher wages due to their better conditioned and more stable jobs. They have a greater possibility of promotion. In this sector, employers

may invest in education of the worker which makes it harder for the employer to fire the worker. The secondary sector is opposite to the primary sector in that here migrants dominate and relatively poor jobs are given. Also, working conditions are worse and jobs are unstable as well as little promotion possibilities. Thus, firing workers are easier in the secondary sector than replacing a worker in the primary sector. Depending on the poor working conditions in this sector, it is very difficult to attract “native” workers for the jobs in the secondary sector (Samers, Migration , 2010).

We must not forget that there are other variables and dynamics that influence migration worldwide. International migration is built upon internal migration and the economic and social background it creates. In spatial terms, globalization and economic liberalization become effective in globally connected cities to regulate international migration. Moreover, information asymmetries between immigrant workers and the employers form another source of complication for the migration model in these cities (Cushing & Poot, 2004). All of these factors contribute to the formation of migration dynamics worldwide as well as the MENA region. This formation consisting of global relations between the cities establishes the sociological approach called Global Cities Hypothesis (hereafter GCH). This approach is developed by Sassen. According to Samers, GCH implies a dangerous situation for the increase in informal labor, deregulation and global competition. Other researchers along the lines of the global city hypothesis also look for the relation between informal employment and the migrant groups if these groups are involved with low-paid and exploitative jobs.

It is an important contribution to sort out if informal labor force is developed in advanced economies or rather everywhere else. It does not matter where it develops, there is deregulation caused by it though. There are several informal working channels such as sexual trafficking/prostitution of women, informally employed construction workers, plumbers or workers in sweatshops, etc. in these “global” cities (Samers, Immigration and the Global City Hypothesis: Towards an Alternative Research Agenda, 2002).

Another form of global-city type theories is “immigrant or ethnic entrepreneurship” or its spatial manifestation to be “ethnic enclaves”. There are several definitions related to migration studies that are expressed in spatial concepts. These are enclaves, communities and ghettos. The definition of ghetto is that a particular racial or an ethnic group or majority of its members are forced to live in special districts because of discrimination or segregation on the behalf of the host community. On the other hand, ethnic enclaves are formed through free will as residency is voluntary and the members have the option to leave the enclave. Thus, ethnic enclaves respond to the needs of the minority group whereas the ghettos only behave on behalf of the majority so can never match with the needs of the residents (Walks & Bourne, 2006).

Forming ghettos or ethnic enclaves varies on the country basis in Europe. Though not all the migrants are welcome, in some countries they are given some privileges. One of the worst cases among the European countries is France. Ghettos formed by the former MENA residents in France are very well known with the riots that took place such as 2005 Algerians’ Riot in France. Smith states



that France had been dealing with years of growing unrest among the second or third generation immigrants, mostly North African Arabs who had experienced decades of high unemployment and marginalization (Smith, 2005). On the other hand, it is also very well known that Turks in Germany have been living there forming the ethnic enclaves and establishing the immigrant entrepreneurship relations since 1960s (Harzig & Hoerder, 2009).

As a result, European countries are skeptic about how to react against migration from the MENA region. When one country accepts the situation and grants immigrants some privileges, another country might not be recognizing the rights of immigrants. Despite these differences in European countries, even the seemingly more favorable situation creates a difference in labor force depending on the ethnicity. Thus, it leads to direct application of dual labor market theory and labor market segmentation theory to the MENA region migrants pointing out the social results as in France or as in Germany.

#### 2.1.5. Structuralist Approaches and Related Understandings:

Structuralist approaches are sometimes labeled as “macro” or “political economy” approaches as well. These approaches can be traced back to Marxist or Neo-Marxist readings through historical or social foundations of capitalism. Wallerstein’s World Systems Theory, Andre Gunder Frank’s Dependency Theory, Sassen’s GCH, globalization arguments, neo-liberalism or today, the most current

issue of “migration-development” nexus are included in these types of foundations counted above.

#### 2.1.5.1. Wallerstein’s “World Systems Theory” and André Gunder Frank’s “Dependency Theory”:

Wallerstein’s World Systems Theory (hereafter WST), which has led to the formation of a World System Analysis in social sciences, helps us articulate the general framework of migration through its proposed model of international division of labor on a global scale. This division is firstly functional and secondly geographical. The functional division is formed by the three layered country system of the theory: core countries, semi-periphery and periphery countries. According to the theory, the core countries are the richest of the world, semi-periphery countries are the buffer zones between the core and periphery countries and the periphery countries are the poorest of the world. Depending on this distinction, each country set produces goods and sells them with respect to their modes of production. Apart from the functional division, the geographical division provides another scheme of stratification. The geographical limitations of countries make them bound to such classifications because of climate, land forms and fertility of the land. Countries lacking the appropriate climate, land form and fertility properties fall in the periphery whereas the others distinguish themselves between semi-periphery and the core countries with respect to their abilities in utilization of production factors. Thus, “... *the range of economic tasks is not*

*evenly distributed throughout the world system.*” states Wallerstein (Wallerstein, 1974).

Despite certain nuances, the Dependency Theory, and particularly the early works of André Gunder Frank, echoes the geographical and functional aspects of the World System Analysis. The theory states that resources of the poor countries are transferred into rich countries and rich countries help the poor countries to survive. The poor countries depend on the rich countries in satisfying their vital needs even in maintaining the economies or politics of these countries.

*‘In order to understand the system of dependent reproduction and the socioeconomic institutions created by it, we must see it as part of a system of world economic relations based on monopolistic control of large-scale capital, on control of certain economic and financial centers over others, on monopoly of a complex technology that leads to unequal and combined development at a national and international level... The productive system in the underdeveloped countries is essentially determined by these international relations... The unequal and combined character of capitalist development at the international level is reproduced internally in an acute form.’* (Spivey, 1990)

As stated above, the poor countries develop as well but at a rate allowed by the rich countries via technologies and institutional facilities they supply. Depending on this fact, development of the less developed countries is called “The Development of Underdevelopment”. It means that even the underdeveloped countries develop in economics but by depending on the sources rich countries provide. As a consequence of this underdevelopment, the system induces migration from one part of the system to a better part. It is generally from the

semi-periphery countries or periphery countries to an upper class, the semi-periphery or the core countries.

Having experienced the aforementioned production and development patterns and being mostly the members of the semi-periphery and periphery countries, migration dynamics in the MENA region can be explained by the WST<sup>8</sup> and Dependency Theory. We observe that migration in the MENA region possesses the properties below (Spivey, 1990):

- 1) The problem of underdevelopment was not due to a lack of modernized technology or culture but was the result of the external division of labor at the international level
- 2) The division of labor was one between center and peripheral areas of the world
- 3) Economic surplus was drained from the peripheral areas towards the center
- 4) The loss of economic surplus in the periphery kept it from developing while centralization of the lost economic surplus in the center promoted growth; thus, capitalism was the culprit for the development of underdevelopment
- 5) Therefore, the world system was not “dualistic”- feudal vs. capitalist-but was totally capitalist

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<sup>8</sup> WST is the generic term for the theory; however its application on the MENA region needs to be called as an “analysis” -World Systems Analysis, WSA- where we sort out the migration dynamics in the region and analyze them through the WST.

6) Because of the pattern established between 1 and 5, the only solution for periphery was to break away from the capitalist world system via socialist revolution.

As a result, the WSA and the Dependency Theory converge to the point that some countries remain poor and others get richer at the expense of some other countries. They state that core countries are responsible for underdevelopment of countries such as Yemen, Algeria or Sudan as they exploit the natural and capital resources there. The exploitation leads to transfer of these resources to other regions. This culminates in the relatively less or slow development of these countries since they are not able to fully utilize their own resources. And hence, the region becomes more prone to underdevelopment rather than development.

#### 2.1.5.2. Globalization, Neo-Liberalism and The Migration-Development Nexus Go Together:

Globalization, Neo-Liberalism and the Migration-Development Nexus are connected to each other in economic and political dynamics since they explain and govern the world via organizational dynamics.

By definition, globalization is the increasing unification of the world economic order through reduction of barriers to international trade such as the quotas, tariffs, etc. The objective of globalization is to increase material wealth of people or institutions through international division of labor via promoting the

efficient production of goods and services. It is the process to serve these aims by integrating regional economies, cultures and societies by communication, means of transportation and trade.

Neo-liberalism goes together with globalization and capitalism; thus, they are dealt with together. There are two types of neo-liberalism according to Peck and Tickell (2006). The first type is “roll-back neo-liberalism”. This type takes place in richer countries via cutting or severely reducing social aid programs associated with public housing, food provision, unemployment insurance, medical care and public health. “Flexibilization” of labor markets is permitted and trade union power is curtailed. Thus, it is an economic system which is a very severe type and cuts off social state perception at all. The second type of neo-liberalism is “roll forward neo-liberalism”. It takes place in both richer and poorer countries and leads the societies to have their own individual welfare which is called “individualization of responsibility” meaning that everyone is responsible for his/her welfare. The system is concerned about the privileging of markets and market competition is preferred to government managed and government funded social systems as the most effective and efficient means of allocating resources of society (Menz, 2009).

Both of the systems above pay attention to efficiency of the markets. For this reason, international division of labor is important for these theories and this concept links them to the WSA of Wallerstein where the specialized labor force leads to international division of labor and by the way to migration-development

nexus. Thanks to globalizing world and neo-liberal economic policies, facilities of transportation and integration of economies have gained impetus. These factors increased internal and international migration where people tended to migrate to developed regions of the world naturally.

All of these theories above found their counterparts within the MENA region. Globalization provided the integration of the region economy with the world economic system. The integration caused trade relations to evolve. Evolving trade relations established such a model that market economies began to be preferred to governmentally funded economies and social systems. It was a condition of neo-liberalism. Based on the integration of world economies and evolving market economies, the labor force in the region began to migrate where living conditions were better than the region's. Migration from the region generally took place towards European countries and the USA, the developed countries of the world. Thus, migration route was inclined to developed regions of the world from a less developed region.

As a result, in the MENA region, it was once believed that migration could stimulate economic development in several ways. One of the ways was that if the ones working abroad should be sending remittances or should be turning back home with skills or knowledge they gain. Another method would have been that a poor country in the MENA region would have prospered if the brain drain worked the opposite way. The situation would have been "brain gain" then. Focusing on migration with such a perception that it was actually the mobility of the labor

force, migrants were seen as development agents for their countries and providers of economic development by contributing to economies of their countries (Samers, Migration , 2010).

#### 2.1.5.3.Social Network (or Migrant Network) Analysis:

“Migration systems paradigm” is a perception based on the historical bondages, network-based social, cultural, economic and political linkages between the countries of origin and destination. For example, migration between North Africa and France or Britain. There were colonial bondages between these countries and these bondages maintained sharing of culture.

Migrant networks are more like migration chains. The definition is that migrants of the previous generation are linked to the migrants of a generation later and so on. Thus, there forms a link among the migrants between the countries of origin and destination. It forms to be a web or a network. Such called “migrant networks” (Massey et al., 1987) or “network-mediated migration” (Wilson, 1993) include kin and friendship ties since they come from the same villages, cultures or ethnicities, etc. Another factor which contributes to network analysis is the mutual trust of the members forming the network. According to Massey et al., next generation of migrants could lower the costs and risks of migration via building their future on existing social networks that the previous generation had constructed. This is provided via the mutual trust that the previous generation of



migrants had created among the citizens of the destination countries and the citizens of the migrant countries.

On the other hand, though mutual trust is beneficial in most of the cases of forming networks, it is hazardous in some ways. For instance, smuggling and human trafficking are done through these networks as well. This is the utilization of good will for bad and they have ambiguous consequences for migrants. Smuggling is transporting someone illegally across an international border. It is common between Latin American countries and the U.S. but also between east Africa, central Asia and the EU. In addition, human trafficking is a more advanced version of smuggling in the manner that after migrating, to pay back the smuggling debt is necessary. Some of the countries that smuggling is done are Myanmar and Thailand. However, in these countries, type of smuggling is mostly done on women by sexual trafficking (Samers, Migration, 2010).

There is a unique property of this theory involving the MENA region. Migrant network analysis is built upon migration from the MENA region and the relations among the migrant institutions in countries such as France, Belgium or Britain. The reason of creating a theory for a specific region is that immigrants from the MENA region are the most populous minority of the EU. Thus, the population of immigrants, and their institutions, cultural and social networks attract attention. However, the fact that there is a theory created regarding the migration in the MENA region, does not mean this situation is favorable. When we consider that most of the human trafficking and smuggling cases take place

between the MENA region and the EU countries, and the MENA countries both act as the source countries and the mediating countries, it is obvious that having inspired a sociological theory cannot be considered as a good thing at all.

#### 2.1.6. Structurationist Perspectives:

Giddens combines social action theory and social structure theory to form “structuration theory”. Social action theory tries to understand how individuals determine and negotiate between their personal desires and the needs or expectations of the society. The theory also tries to understand the relationship between social structures and the individuals whose actions determine them. Principles of social action theory were first established by Max Weber. Social structure theory focuses on relations between the society and the institutions. Via setting up the relation between the individuals and structures, the theory has both constraining factors and motivating factors by its nature. The constraints are the limits that social structures, meaning the institutions, apply the actions that individuals perform. On the other hand, the motivating factors that the theory adds up to an individual is that social structures in the society makes it easier to achieve common goals since it occurs to be a collectivity of actions.

Formed of the two theories above, Giddens’ theory focuses on the idea that “... *social systems have no purposes, reasons or needs whatsoever; only human individuals do.*” (Giddens, 1979).

Regarding migration in this perspective, the theory views migration networks in the MENA region via the economic and political institutions established with the rise of capitalism, globalization and neo-liberalism. At last, the theory examines the economic and social effects of these global institutions on people and how migration is shaped in the MENA region.

#### 2.1.7. Conclusion:

The discussion above on migration theory was intended to show the relevance of theories to the study of migration in the MENA region. Ravenstein's theory, pull-push approach, new economics approach, dual labor market approach, structuralist approaches and the structuration theory were the theories which could be directly applied to the analysis of migration phenomena in the region. Ravenstein's theory and push-pull approach showed us that economic-based causality could help understand migration in the MENA region and it was actually the whole motive behind the migration phenomenon in the region. New economics approach and dual labor market theory had different but economically reasoned foci. New economics approach was a microeconomic approach and dual labor market theory was a macroeconomic approach to migration in the MENA region. Structuralist approaches were political economic approaches where we analyzed the relation of economic and political institutions with the migrants from the MENA region. Apart from those theories, structurationist theory was a mixture of structuralist approaches- political economy approaches- and social

action theory where we analyzed the structures on the basis of individual-here, migrants.

From all the separate approaches focusing on similar aspects of migration in the MENA region, some specific results could be drawn. These results actually pointed out the socioeconomic condition of the region today. The first result is that though Ravenstein's theory is too old, it is the most explanatory theory to discuss the economic motives of migration in the region. Adding up Lee's push-pull approach to Ravenstein's theory completes the economic basis of the story but at the end, being the first theory to be implemented on migration does not make laws of migration the most primitive one, but actually the building block of the whole migration story in the region. It even occurs that structuralist approaches are constructed upon Ravenstein's economic determinism where migration influences economic and political institutions as well. The second result is that rich countries attract people. It implies the continuity of economic determinism again. The last result that can be deduced from the analysis of migration in the MENA region is that globalization and the related trends are on the rise. Economic and political institutions are influenced by the globalizing world economic order and this process triggers migration, not only in the MENA region but in the entire world, showing that migration is not solely caused by an economic dynamics. And hence, it is actually socioeconomic.

In conclusion, sociological theories reveal that economic disadvantages are the most important factor behind migration in the MENA region. However, as it is

a vicious cycle, economic reasons trigger migration; migration occurs and brings about further economic outcomes. Thus, migration forms a never-ending loop. What we should understand from all this is that, in the end, migration is not a flaw in the system. It would occur and it cannot be fixed. But it would be accommodated through a major system change in the economic and political institutions of the states across the MENA region.

## **CHAPTER III**

### **MIGRATION IN THE MENA PROBLEMATIZED**

We blame everything on governments adopting wrong economic policies and thereby causing migration; however, causes of migration vary depending on economic, social and political properties of the countries. Migration in a country might be caused by wrong economic policies but in another country, the economic reasoning behind migration would totally be different. In this section, what I do is problematizing migration in the MENA region and directing questions for the main issues like changing employment patterns in the region, state formations and attitudes of former colonizing states towards the MENA region.

After sociological, economic and political analysis of the MENA region, there should be several questions formed in order to identify the patterns in the MENA region. The questions below are classified in two groups from the perspectives of the MENA region countries and the European or the imperial countries. They are the key points that explain the critical migratory phenomena in the MENA region.

The first question is actually the most basic one. Despite the region's rich oil reserves and natural resources, why does economic migration exist in the region? What gives migration such a distinctive character?

The second question about the subject reflects another structural problem about the MENA countries. In most of the oil-rich countries like, Kuwait, Qatar or the UAE, we observe that there is migration of educated workforce. Why would this happen? Logically, the educated workforce would be formed by the ones we call “white-collar workforce” and these men should gain good salaries to sustain their lives. Then, why do the educated men also migrate? These questions circumscribe the economic aspect of the migration in the MENA region mostly. Although these are economic-based questions, they give way to sociological and political questions as well. For example, continuing from the previous question we should ask: “Who do fill the gap that is created by migration in the MENA region?”. This question is a two-sided question which deals with both an economic aspect and a sociological aspect. Firstly, I will look at the question of why these people immigrate to the MENA region economically and then I will explore the ways in which the pattern of movement is shaped and adopted as such in the MENA societies. That will be the sociological side of the question. While trying to document and analyze the economic aspect, one specific subject that becomes obvious in the last years is “feminization of migration”. It means that among the people who migrate for labor force, the ratio of women increases day by day so the gender patterns are changing. If so, what was the ratio of women migrating in the region yesterday and what is it today? What are the fields that women tend to work after migration?

The questions above deal with micro-level sociological issues. If we look at the big picture though, there are more structural problems to address. In every

context- women, men, children, labor force, human trafficking, smuggling, etc.- migration in the MENA region increases day by day. If so much migration occurs, will the region be able to preserve the “nation states” or will countries facing so much migration opt for a different form of governance? Will there be “borderless” countries or if the concept of “borders” will be demolished, what will be the mechanism holding peoples together? Will there still be states to govern or some other organizations? That might be the most crucial sociological question coming up on migration. Once movement of peoples begins, it sweeps the organizations that are established to maintain the order. Thus, it is important to sort out what the new order will be like.

Lastly, the questions we should ask should be from rich countries’ perspectives to understand their point of views and perceptions on migration. Firstly, we need to know the economic aspect of migration on their sides. At this point, it is important to ask this: “What are the effects of policies of rich countries on poor countries?” Actually knowing that migration in the MENA region is mostly because of economic consequences of policies adopted by European countries, we have to ask several more questions to document and analyze the subject better. The most important problem of migration is human trafficking. A lot of people die in the seas while trying to cross the borders or they live in very bad conditions when they step on a new territory. Knowing these, it is important to query the actions of European countries or organizations founded by them on preventing human trafficking. What are the policies implemented to prevent migration or human trafficking or clandestine labor force? On the other hand, if



they try to prevent migration or human trafficking, do they keep statistical records on this issue? Even if they keep records, may we trust them in accuracy since European countries are mostly xenophobic?

### 3.1. Facts and Figures:

In the second half of the twentieth century, a worldwide population explosion became a great threat for allocation of scarce world resources. As the population increased with a high fertility rate and a declining mortality rate in the developing world, it was a question whether sustainability of economies would continue or not. People were concerned as to how long the existing resources would last. On the other hand, in the developed parts of the world, the phenomenon was decreasing fertility rates. With the sustainable mortality rates, or in some regions of the world with the increasing life span, “greying”<sup>9</sup> of the population began to be considered. In most of the countries except those of the Sub-Sahara, during 1995-2000, 64 countries reported fertility rates below 2.1 that is the replacement rate<sup>10</sup>. The trend is expected to remain as such in developed countries where average fertility rate is 1.56 per woman in between 2005 and 2010 and is expected to be 1.85 between 2045 and 2050 (IOM).

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<sup>9</sup> “Greying” of the population: increase in the life span and denotes to the fact that most of the population is formed of aging people.

<sup>10</sup> Replacement rate: Replacement fertility is the total fertility rate at which newborn girls would have an average of exactly one daughter over their lifetimes. In simple terms, women have just enough babies to replace themselves.

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Total\\_fertility\\_rate#Replacement\\_rates](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Total_fertility_rate#Replacement_rates)




Figure 5: United Nations World Population Growth Rate, 2002

Asia	Western Europe	Countries with Economies in Transition	Americas
Japan (Hong Kong SAR)	Austria Belgium Denmark Finland Germany Greece Italy Netherlands Poland Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerland United Kingdom Yugoslavia	Belarus Bosnia and Herzegovina Bulgaria Croatia Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Romania Russia Slovakia Slovenia Ukraine	Cuba

Table 1: Countries and Areas whose Population is Expected to Decline Between 2000 and 2050

As seen from the table above, the countries of the MENA region are not on the list. Not only that but also, the results below will show that the young population in the MENA region is forecasted to increase.




Figure 6: The Working Age Population in the MENA\* region and the EU-27, 2000-2030

MENA region here is expressed with an “\*” meaning that it includes some countries and does not include others. The migrant sending countries are included whereas Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Libya are not. Since the latter countries are led by oil economies and oil industries, welfares of these countries are not under threat and they are mostly the countries of destinations for migrants from other regions of the world like India, Philippines or Southeast Asia or within the region itself as can be remembered from the introduction and economics parts of my thesis. The working age population of the region is expected to increase and for this reason the labor market of the region is subject to high discontent for not meeting the demands of the incoming labor

force. These negative consequences would cause social protest and political unrest where it occurred. There has been a tide of riots in the MENA region because of economic incompetence and social protest caused by it. The inadequate economic policies of the countries were signified in the light of the graph below (Fargues, 2008).




Figure 7: The Working Age Population in the MENA\* region and the EU-27, 2000-2030

The reason is that the graph indicates the working age population ranging from 15 to 64 where the situation would be comprehended as making the MENA region social life worse. The working age population will need to confirm itself with the labor market and will try to satisfy its needs. However, in the self-insufficient system of the MENA region, this is impossible. Thus, people will tend to migrate.

Today, the main concern of European labor market is the excessive emigration of the young MENA labor force to Europe. It is beneficial to replace the aging labor force of Europe but excessive migration from the MENA region

causes overpopulation in the area. Dealing with excessive migration from the MENA region, and overpopulation in Europe will, of course, create problems in both the MENA region and the EU-27 area. The most important problem is that this may create an imbalance between the populations of regions. EU-27 population is expected to fall by 233000 between 2005 and 2030 whereas the population in the MENA region is expected to increase by 321000 per year within the same period. The numbers seem to improve the condition of the two regions; however, Europe is still the primary endpoint holding most of the migration as given below (Fargues, 2008):

<b>Table 2. Migrants Originating from Selected MENA Countries by Region of Residence</b>				
<b>Country of origin (year for data)</b>	<b>Region of residence</b>			
	<b>Europe</b>	<b>MENA</b>	<b>Other</b>	<b>Total</b>
Algeria (1995)	991,796	66,398	14,052	1,072,246
Mauritania (2004)	26,000	31,000	193,000	250,000
Morocco (2005)	2,718,711	213,034	253,641	3,185,386
Tunisia (2005)	779,200	128,900	25,800	933,900
Egypt (2000)	286,000	1,912,729	538,000	2,736,729
Lebanon (2001)	157,030	123,966	325,816	606,812
Iraq (2007)	150,000	2,000,000	150,000	2,300,000
Yemen (1999)	n/a	810,000	n/a	1,000,000
Iran	n/a	n/a	n/a	750,000 to1,500,000
Palestinian territories 2004**	n/a	4,435,273	n/a	4,983,354
<b>Total</b>	<b>5,108,737</b>	<b>9,721,300</b>	<b>1,500,309</b>	<b>18,1093,427</b>

\*First-generation migrants. No estimates based upon solid records were found for Jordan, Sudan, and Syria.

\*\*Palestinian refugees; most of them are not first-generation but second- or third-generation migrants.

Sources: Consular records and other national sources compiled in Fargues, Philippe, "International Migration in the Arab Region: Trends and Policies" (United Nations Expert Group Meeting on International Migration and Development in the Arab Region, Beirut May 2006, 35 p.),

[http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/EGM\\_Ittmig\\_Arab/P09\\_Fargues.pdf](http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/EGM_Ittmig_Arab/P09_Fargues.pdf)

Table 2: Migrants Originating From Selected MENA Countries by Region of Residence

In the above table, we do not see some of the MENA countries such as GCC countries or Libya though these countries are either origin countries or residence countries for international migrants because of their oil-rich industries. Instead, we can claim that today, having oil industries does not make such a big difference because economically most of the countries in the region directly or indirectly depend on oil economies. Despite this fact, if unemployment is not resolved and people continue to migrate, it would only be caused by growing inadequacy of jobs to employ nationals. On the other hand, from the table above it is deduced that there is still migration within the region although the turnover in employment is not efficient. It means that a citizen of a country emigrates and resides in another country in the region if s/he becomes able to sustain his/her living.

After the 1990s, with the globalizing world, emigration from the MENA countries begins to increase though it had fallen during the 60s and the 70s and was relatively lower in the 80s. 20 million people migrated from the region after this period and they dispersed over four source countries, namely Turkey, Morocco, Iraq and Egypt (Fargues, 2008). Other countries of emigration are Iran, Algeria, Yemen, Sudan, Tunisia and Lebanon in decreasing order of emigrant numbers.

The destination of these emigrants varies according to the country of residences. People from Maghreb and Turkey go to Europe whereas those from Mashrek countries prefer to reside in the other countries of the region or to they

tend to migrate to North America. At this point, people's migration in the Mashrek can be divided into two types. One is the "permanent" migration and the other is the "temporary" migration. Here, migration to the Gulf states or Libya is considered as temporary and migration to the West is considered as permanent (Fargues, 2008).

Immigration to SEM<sup>11</sup> countries is another aspect of migration from the MENA region. Though these countries were migrant sending countries before, they became migrant receiving countries in the last decade or so. There are several types of migrants in these countries. The first type is labor migrants who are both legal and illegal. The second type is the refugees coming from Sudan and Iraq as well as the Sub-Saharan Africa countries. Lastly, the third type is transit migrants who are delayed on their way to their destinations (Fargues, 2008).

In the final analysis, even though I began my thesis with a supposition like "MENA region consists of countries those are in the periphery or in the semi-periphery of the world strata. Thus, these countries should be sending out migrants", the case did not turn out to be like this. There are three sides to migration in the MENA region. The first one is that the region actually draws in migrants from other countries in mostly the periphery stratum of the world or the ones from the less developed countries. The second one is that there occurs a vast amount of internal migration within the region from one territory to another. The last aspect of the migration from the region is that there occurs a respectable

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<sup>11</sup> SEM: Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries

amount of migration from the region to Europe, the USA and Canada as I have predicted at the beginning of my thesis.

There are three sets of countries in the MENA region. These are the Maghreb, the Mashrek and the GCC countries. Division of migrants among these sets is not equal but carries out a logical distribution.

By 2010, total number of international migrants in the world was estimated to be 214 million people. This figure has shown an increase by 0.1 percent from 2005 to 2010 as going up to 3.1 percent from 3.0 percent (IOM, 2010). In 2005, number of international migrants for the MENA region was estimated to be 19 million (Report, 2008). If calculated from the percentages above, it makes that nearly 10 percent of the world migrant population is in the MENA region which really surprised me as the economic situation of the region countries generally stumbles and under the prudent observation of world economic institutions.

**Stock of migrants in the Arab Mashrek, by destination, 2000 and 2005**

**Part A: Total number of migrants**




Figure 8: Stock of migrants in the Arab Mashrek by destination, 2000 and 2005



**Part B: As a share of total population**





Figure 9: Stock of migrants in the Arab Mashrek as a share of total population, 2000 and 2005

The graphs above point out that migration in the Mashrek countries should not be underestimated. From 2000 to 2005, all the Arab Mashrek countries have an increasing trend in international migrant stocks except Iraq since it experienced the second Gulf War and the American invasion in the region. Another interesting case among the countries occurs to be the OPT (Occupied Palestinian Territories). Here, migration is significant because the number includes refugees coming under the mandate of UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). By 2008, the total number of registered refugees in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank happens to be 1.06 million and 754,263 respectively (Report, 2008). On the other hand, the Mashrek is a source of emigrating countries as well. Number of people emigrating from the Mashrek countries to GCC states is also significant. In 2005, 461,211 people emigrated from Syria to Saudi Arabia. 2.45 million Syrians entered Lebanon. Moreover, Europe and the

U.S. are other destinations for emigrants from the Mashrek. The numbers considered in this part are also significant.



**Note:** \* Data for countries of destination were collected from countries providing the latest available census data on foreign residents by country of nationality/birth. Some of the world's major destination countries for overseas temporary workers, such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE and other Gulf states could not be included for lack of accurate data.

**Source:** Fargues, 2006.

Figure 10: Emigrants from the Arab Mashrek

Other sources of migrants in the regions are the refugees and the IDPs<sup>12</sup>. In mid-2005, there were 1.8 million refugees in Jordan and most of them were Palestinian. Moreover, nearly one million people who were displaced because of the conflict in the Middle East in 2006 were mostly from Lebanon (Report, 2008).

The second region included in the Middle East part of the region is the GCC states. GCC states are the third largest region among migrant-attracting

<sup>12</sup> IDP: Internally displaced person: Someone who is forced to flee his/her home but who remains within own countries' borders. They are often referred as refugees but do not express the current legal definition of refugees.

countries after North America and Europe. Among these GCC countries, the most popular countries are Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and Bahrain respectively. However, while comparing the number of non-nationals living in these countries, we must consider the size of the countries as well. The reason is that population living in the country should better be proportional to the size of the country for the GDP per capita to remain stable over settlement.

### Stock of non-nationals in individual GCC countries, 2000 and 2005

#### Part A: Population of non-nationals





Figure 11: Stock of non-nationals in individual GCC countries, 2000 and 2005

### Part B: As a share of total population



Source: UN DESA, 2005.

Figure 12: Stock of non-nationals in the GCC countries as a share of total population

As seen above, the GCC economies mostly depend on migrants because after WWII, development of oil production in the GCC countries led to an increase in labor demand and an urgent need for foreign workers in Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain. The labor demand was met through two methods. The first method was to provide interregional labor force coming from Yemen, Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Jordan. The second method was taking advantage of the Asian migrants from the former British states such as Pakistan and India through historical connections of the colonization era. There was a third method indeed; the labor force dynamics produced it within the supply-demand scheme of the labor market in the GCC states. It was the East Asian countries supplying labor force. Asian migration to GCC states increased during 1980s. Countries they

had been emigrating were South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand (Thiollet, 2011).

In the North Africa, migration has its worst reflections. There are Sudan, Libya, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia in this region. The most specific property of this region is that it is rather a transit gateway for the Sub-Saharan African migrants to destination countries than a residential region. Relatively poor economic background of the area is the cause of it. Nevertheless, in recent years, these countries began to experience a different type of migration because of migration polices and control measures that European countries apply in the borders. Migrants who cannot trespass the borders from Algeria or northern Mauritania may become residents of these countries while hoping to pass to the European side.

**Stock of migrants in North Africa, by destination, 2000 and 2005**

**Part A: Total number of migrants**





Figure 13: Stock of migrants in North Africa by destination, 2000 and 2005

### Part B: As a share of total population



Source: UN DESA, 2005.

Figure 14: Stock of migrants in North Africa by destination as a share of total population

When the residents pass to the other side, Europe, they form the migrant population there. According to World Migration Report 2008, Moroccans, Algerians and Tunisians were scattered into France, Spain, Netherlands, Italy and Belgium respectively due their population densities. Out of the seven million migrants born in Africa and living in OECD countries, nearly half of them are from North Africa and they reside in France, Belgium, Spain and Netherlands.

Apart from the specified regions of the MENA area, there are the Sudan and Israel which remain out of these country sets with their specific properties. If we think of the countries, they are like two opposite poles. Sudan is a country where agricultural production relations still reign over the oil industry that has a three decades long history. Since its discovery in 1978, there had been a continuous war on oil among the power centers in the country. The government

alarmed the military forces, the tribal militias had been armed and civilians had been air-bombed in order to obtain their exodus from the villages close to oil fields. The idea of being a stakeholder to any profit coming from oil divided the country into several different sections and the civil war in Darfur was instigated through ethnicity to take advantage of the oilfields. Before the Darfur incident had burst out, in January 2000, Foreign Minister of Canada John Harker stated that ground and air attacks by the government on civilians had been increased significantly as a result of oil exploration, drilling and pipeline construction (Verney, 2006). This shows how global forces have an interest on oil and the interior relations of a country by the way.

As a result of these incidents in Sudan, there had been several kinds of dislocations for people. One type was forced relocation in which people were forced to live in camps. These camps had been continuously raided by the police and houses were demolished in order to make the settlers go away and to place the new ones instead. Kofi Annan stated that: ‘Thousands of people have been forcibly moved to sites in desert areas tens of kilometres outside Khartoum where there are no, or wholly insufficient, life-sustaining services. These relocations, and the violence accompanying them, increase tensions in the greater Khartoum area, violate the right of the displaced to return voluntarily, and in dignity and safety, and also have the potential to undermine the transition towards peace and stability in the whole country.’ (Verney, 2006).

Not surprisingly, another type of dislocation was outward migration. Over half a million Sudanese people fled the country during the civil war. Among these migrants some remained in Africa continent whereas the others crossed borders and migrated to the West. Migration to the West especially increased after the 1989 coup d'état in the country. The numbers grew to be worse and worse with the political oppression in the country and the intensification of war after the 1990s. The locations to be settled down were mostly the UK for the Sudanese people due to the British NGO's involvement within the country through oil. However; the UK government tried to get rid of these refugees via claiming that Khartoum was a safe place to go. Second location preferred by the Sudanese migrants was the USA. They had been considered as the 'lost boys' and the 'lost girls' there (Verney, 2006).

On the other hand, Sudanese people were not welcome in the Arab world as well. In Lebanon, Syria and Egypt, refugees from Darfur and South Sudan were treated badly even by the local UNHCR<sup>13</sup> officers. There had been several events undermining the rights of Sudanese refugees in the region:

*'As early as June 2002, Caroline Moorehead reported: 'Asylum seekers reaching Cairo face a series of hurdles, involving profound uncertainty, confusion, and some two years' wait, before they can even hope for their first interview. Many are put off from applying at all, preferring to live, and wait, in the slums and shanty towns that encircle the city, so that UNHCR has no record of their existence.'* (Caroline Moorehead, *New York Review of Books*, 7 November 2002, responding to a letter on her article 'Lost in Cairo', *NYR*, 13 June 2002). In

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<sup>13</sup> UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees



*October 2005, students at the Forced Migration and Refugee Studies Programme in Cairo published a report on the protesters, entitled 'Sudanese refugees in Cairo: "We'll wait here; we'll die here" '. (Verney, 2006).*

As a result, Sudanese people were the most exploited ones among all the MENA people. The state did not protect their rights and exploited them. That gave way to other states exploiting and belittling them.

Contrary to the Sudanese case, Israel is a prosperous country attracting migrants over Asia and Europe for several purposes. The first reason of immigration to Israel is the people of Jewish ancestry returning to Israel via the "Law of Return" of 1950 and its subsequent amendments. Ethiopian Jews, nearly 85000 people, constituted an important part of the migrant group as estimated by the Israel Association for Ethiopian Jews in 2005. Moreover, the largest immigration flow to Israel had been experienced during the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Approximately, 900000 Soviet Jews settled in Israel (Report, 2008). Lastly, non-Jewish and non-Palestinian immigrants from Southeast Asia and Eastern Europe were accepted into the country as low-skilled workers. They were from Philippines, Thailand and China. They have been working in health care, agriculture and construction sectors in respective order with the countries mentioned before.

The analysis of data shows that there are several generalizations to be made about the MENA countries on migration. All MENA countries have their unique properties with respect to geographic and geopolitical locations, economic and political structures. Secondly, international pressures and balances over the

countries in the region change from country to country. Thus, what they experience through migration changes. Lastly, there is not only emigration from the region; but, also a huge amount of immigration into the region.

In the Mashrek part of the MENA region, there are countries economically and politically turbulent but somehow manage to survive within the existing capitalist system. The countries in this part both have a high amount of immigration and, there is also a high amount of emigration taking place in different countries.

As far as the GCC countries are concerned, there is a totally different story. Immigration into these countries is especially high because of oil revenues. Immigration into this area occurs from all over the world including the capital-rich European countries and the U.S. Moreover, these states are also capital-rich depending on the turn-over speed of oil revenues into capital. Emigration from these countries occurs as well but it is realized in the pattern that migrants leaving one of the GCC countries go to reside in another one. Thus, it forms a circular pattern for emigration from the capital-rich GCC countries.

In North Africa, there is mostly emigration to Europe and the U.S. due to lower economic conditions. However, there is also an immigration pattern in this part depending on the utilization of the North Africa route as a gateway to Europe by the Southern Africa migrants. The migrants who can't cross the borders stay in the countries where they plan to make their final departure.

As a result, migration in the MENA region is one of the most important social dynamics that determines other dynamics in the region. Demographics, economic conditions of the countries such as the attendance of NGO's into the region, savings of capital in the region by multinational corporations and political advancements in the region are all determined by the social dynamics that migration creates as a mere fact in the region. Thus, as a pivotal factor, migration affects other social dynamics that change the existing economic patterns in the region.

### 3.2. Political Economy of Migration:

The biggest issue about migration is the ways in which it is problematized. Actually, problems that migration creates are linked to each other as a consequence of one and other. It is possible to change the order of problems via altering the logic sequence. At the end, what you would have at hand will be the same, though.

On the other hand, there are several policies implemented by European countries and the USA to prevent the negative effects of these problems. There are several institutions to regulate migration dynamics in the world. Under control of these institutions, immigration and emigration are permitted with several constraints through the treaties signed among countries or institutions and the countries.

Due to the policies applied and the realities of the world, there are several consequences of migration mostly of economic nature. These are (Keeley, 2009):

- 1) Changes in the labor force
  - 2) Changes in productivity
- and
- 3) A supply of remittances.

These consequences reflect some characteristics of migration economics. For example, “brain drain” forms a “change in the labor force”. These characteristics will be elaborated in the following pages.

### 3.2.1. Labor Force:

The labor market in the MENA region is the fastest growing labor market but it has the lowest female labor-force participation rate. It has the largest share in public employment sector and the second highest unemployment rate in the world. The labor force growth rates accelerate where they have a lower level of start. It is known to be the “catch-up effect”<sup>14</sup>. The countries are Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Syria and Yemen. The ILO states that the MENA region growth rates rose from 3.3 percent a year in 1993-2003 to 3.4 percent a year in 1994-2004. These high rates are applied to the larger bases resulting in “demographic momentum” which means absolute additions to the labor force. (Rivlin, 2009).

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<sup>14</sup> Catch-up effect: The idea of convergence in economics stating the idea that poor countries start with a lower level of welfare but their economies speed up and converge to rich countries' economy levels. The economic indicators of poor and rich countries approach each other.




Figure 2.4. International Labor Market Indicators, 2000. *Source:* World Bank, *Jobs, Growth, and Governance in the Middle East and North Africa* (2003).  
\* Arab States and Iran

Figure 15: Demography and Economics at a worldwide scale




Figure 2.5. The Labor Force, 1970–2020. *Source:* World Bank, *Unlocking the Employment Potential in the Middle East and North Africa* (2004).

Figure 16: Distribution of the labor force in the MENA region, 1970-2020

Table 2.3. Labor-force participation rates, 1980–2003 (percentage of 15–64 year olds)

	1980			1990			2003		
	Total	Female	Male	Total	Female	Male	Total	Female	Male
Egypt	56.4	29.3	83.5	56.9	31.5	83.4	59.0	38.9	82.3
Iraq	48.7	16.2	80.1	46.0	15.0	76.1	48.2	20.9	76.3
Jordan	47.7	14.7	78.6	48.4	17.9	75.9	55.3	29.3	79.7
Morocco	61.0	38.1	84.7	61.7	40.4	83.4	63.2	44.6	82.3
Saudi Arabia*	53.6	9.7	86.3	58.0	16.4	85.9	57.1	23.9	78.8
Syria	52.9	23.5	82.5	52.3	24.6	80.4	54.8	31.7	80.7
Tunisia	59.5	34.5	84.7	58.5	34.4	82.8	62.1	41.3	83.0
West Bank and Gaza	37.0	6.5	66.2	38.0	6.6	67.4	41.4	11.0	72.0

\* Including non-nationals.

Sources: World Bank, "Unlocking the Employment Potential in the Middle East and North Africa," 2004, and "World Development Indicators," 2003.

Table 3: Labor force participation rates in the MENA region, 1980-2003

The labor force participation rate in the MENA region rose from 54.5% to 57% from 1970 to 1990 and it was expected to reach 61% by the year 2010. However, it reached the level of 64.7%<sup>15</sup> by 2009 due to the WB data meaning that it performed much better than expected. On the other hand, female labor-force participation rate remained the lowest in the world by 25% in 1995 and 29% in 2005 (Rivlin, 2009). Despite the inconsistency between the data because of including different variables or countries, I must specify that though the data in Rivlin's book are not in line with the WB data, the pattern seems to be compatible. According to the WB dataset, labor force participation rate above age 15 in female labor is 23.9% in 1995, 25.9% in 2005 and lastly 26.6% in 2009<sup>16</sup>.

<sup>15</sup> <http://data.worldbank.org/topic/labor-and-social-protection>

<sup>16</sup> <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.CACT.FE.ZS/countries/ZQ?display=graph>

The reasons that lie behind the increasing pattern in the female labor participation rate are the improved education, operation of economic incentives and other developments that encourage women to work outside home. In addition, economic necessity and rising living standards are other factors contributing to the working of women. For example, the female participation rate for young women (aged 25-29) increased by 50% in Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen. However, this increasing ratio fell between 1980 and 1990 due to escalating unemployment in the region (Rivlin, 2009).

Most of the MENA region economies still depend on public sector employment though the region moved away from the socialist model after the 1980s and privatization gained momentum. In Egypt, civil service accounted for 19% and 24% of total employment in 1988 and 1998 respectively. In Algeria, in 1995, 32% of the labor force was employed in public sector enterprises and the public sector itself. In Saudi Arabia, there were 232000 civil servants in 1981 whereas this number was counted to be 900000 people in 1999, 12.8% of the total labor force. As seen from the pattern in here, though there is a separation between the economic perceptions of the GCC countries and the rest of the MENA region, the high level of public sector employment is the general pattern throughout the whole region. Thus, governments in the Arab world are oversized.

Opposing these employment figures, the MENA region has the second highest unemployment rates in the world. The overall rate began to increase with the changing world economic order twenty years ago and it holds true for all the

countries in the region: for the GCC countries, the North Africa countries and the Middle East countries.

Agriculture was once the main locomotive of the MENA region economies. Yet, reforms implemented on agriculture or additional labor force did not contribute to efficient production. At the same time, despite rising levels of education, the unemployment rate among young people has not yet declined but on the contrary has risen. As a result, migration from the rural to urban or urban to other countries speeded up (Rivlin, 2009). Since migration occurs from the less developed countries to developed countries in order to find an occupation to work, the developed areas in the world, Western Europe and North America, were preferred by the MENA region citizens.

The MENA region fits into the general patterns of the world migration. Migration from North Africa (Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco) was regulated due to a specific status despite the fact that Algeria was not the subject to it. It was ONI<sup>17</sup>. Since Algeria was not subject to the authority of ONI, emigration from the country was vast in amount and emigration from Morocco and Tunisia was less extensive. However, after the 1960s, emigration to France from even these countries augmented and Moroccan residents caught up with the Algerians in number. The enormous size of emigration from North Africa to France was explained by the wage remittances and other revenue flows from France (Castles, 1998).

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<sup>17</sup> ONI: Office National d'Immigration: France established this office to regulate the migration of workers from Southern Europe after WWII.



Nevertheless none of the MENA countries give out accurate records for emigration. For this reason, we use the records of immigration from the OECD (America) including the USA and Canada and OECD (Europe) excluding America and Asia. In addition, there is no data available for the migration to the Persian Gulf.

TABLE 2. STOCK OF EMIGRANTS FROM THE MIDDLE EAST, NORTH AFRICA IN OECD (AMERICA) AND OECD (EUROPE): 2000

Country	Emigrants in OECD (America)	Emigrants in OECD (Europe)	Total Stock of Emigrants	Emigrants as Percent of Total Labor Force in MENA Country
Algeria	23,818	582,941	606,759	4.5
Bahrain	--	--	--	--
Djibouti	--	--	--	--
Egypt	128,014	93,630	221,644	0.9
Iran	304,119	195,871	499,990	1.9
Iraq	91,149	134,054	225,203	2.7
Israel	102,554	31,923	134,447	4.1
Jordan	42,425	13,921	56,346	2.8
Kuwait	16,070	5,581	21,651	1.8
Lebanon	151,041	95,889	246,930	15.0
Libya	8,289	11,494	19,783	0.9
Malta	--	--	--	--
Morocco	51,713	1,042,112	1,093,825	7.6
Oman	516	658	1,174	0.1
Qatar	903	598	1,501	0.5
Saudi Arabia	11,549	4,574	16,123	0.2
Syria	61,132	49,932	111,064	1.9
Tunisia	9,841	253,762	263,603	5.4
United Arab Emirates	1,612	1,189	2,801	0.2
West Bank, Gaza	25,450	4,625	30,075	2.9
Yemen	12,309	8,276	20,585	0.4

NOTES: OECD (America) includes 2 countries: Canada and United States (no data available for Mexico). OECD (Europe) includes 18 countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom (no data available for Greece, Iceland, Poland, Slovak Republic and Turkey). Emigrants include all working age (25 years or older) foreign-born individuals living in an OECD country.

Source: Docquier and Marfouk (2005)

Table 4: Stock of Emigrants from the Middle East, North Africa in OECD (America) and OECD (Europe), 2000

According to the data taken from the OECD (Europe), over 70% of the emigrants from the three North Africa countries- Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia- have less than 8 years of education whereas the migrants from the GCC countries-

Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates- is oppositely highly educated with 13 years of education (Adams, 2006).

TABLE 3. EMIGRANTS FROM THE MIDDLE EAST, NORTH AFRICA TO OECD BY LEVEL OF EDUCATION: 2000 (IN PERCENT)

Country	Low-skilled (less than 8 years of schooling)	Medium-skilled (9 to 12 years of schooling)	High-skilled (13 years and more of schooling)	Total
Algeria	76.7	9.2	14.1	100.0
Bahrain	--	--	--	--
Djibouti	--	--	--	--
Egypt	18.3	22.9	58.9	100.0
Iran	17.0	24.5	58.5	100.0
Iraq	34.8	26.6	38.6	100.0
Israel	14.7	27.6	57.6	100.0
Jordan	16.4	28.0	55.6	100.0
Kuwait	11.9	20.2	67.8	100.0
Lebanon	30.4	25.1	44.5	100.0
Libya	22.9	23.0	54.1	100.0
Malta	--	--	--	--
Morocco	70.6	16.5	12.9	100.0
Oman	21.9	15.4	62.7	100.0
Qatar	15.2	15.2	69.6	100.0
Saudi Arabia	13.4	22.0	64.6	100.0
Syria	31.0	24.7	44.3	100.0
Tunisia	73.0	12.1	14.9	100.0
United Arab Emirates	16.8	15.8	67.3	100.0
West Bank, Gaza	15.8	29.1	55.0	100.0
Yemen	33.7	31.9	34.5	100.0

NOTES: OECD includes the 20 countries listed in Table 2, plus Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Republic of Korea and Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Emigrants include all working age (25 years or older) foreign-born individuals living in an OECD country.

Source: Docquier and Marfouk (2005)

Table 5: Emigrants from the Middle East, North Africa to OECD by Level of Education, 2000 (in percent)

In recent years it has turned out to be that women became a greater part of migration. Since migration forms to be an ever-lasting dynamics, economists debate whether or not migration is helpful for expansion. Richards and Waterbury state that migration is crucial to expansion. Via migration, the local highly skilled workforce is replaced with the migrant low-skilled workers. Thus, without elasticity of replacement for the workers, bottlenecks and inflationary tendencies

in the market would have been developed. Nevertheless, some other economists express that immigration reduces the incentive for rationalization of keeping low productivity firms viable and not transforming the companies or the industries into more capital-intensive and efficient forms of production (Castles, 1998).

Highly skilled labor migration began to increase after the 1980s and during the 1990s. It occurred to be a key element of globalization in some places whereas in some other places it was realized because of the capital investment done by companies throughout the world. International migration is a case that is, actually, a global business.

### 3.2.2. Remittances:

Migration from the MENA region supplies the region with worker remittances. Depending on this, it is not accurate to state that remittance data taken from the region countries are reliable because the countries either do not want to give out the 'real' migration data or they include different variables in the accountancy of remittances.

TABLE 5. TRENDS IN WORKER REMITTANCES RECEIVED BY COUNTRIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST, NORTH AFRICA: 1990 TO 2004 (MILLIONS OF US DOLLARS)

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	Annual Percent Change, 1990-92 to 2002-04
Algeria	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bahrain	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Djibouti	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Egypt	4284	4054	6104	5664	3672	3226	3107	3697	3370	3235	2852	2911	2893	2961	3341	(-3.70)
Iran	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Iraq	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Israel	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Jordan	499	448	844	1040	1094	1244	1544	1655	1542	1497	1660	1810	1921	1981	2058	+10.53
Kuwait	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Lebanon	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2544	3964	5183	-
Libya	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Malta	37	15	3	1	5	6	7	3	2	4	1	1	1	1	1	-
Morocco	2006	1990	2170	1959	1827	1970	2165	1893	2011	1938	2161	3261	2877	3614	4221	+4.71
Oman	39	39	39	39	39	39	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Qatar	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Saudi Arabia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Syria	385	350	550	426	868	923	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	743	690	+4.33
Tunisia	551	525	531	446	629	680	736	685	718	761	796	927	1071	1250	1432	+7.33

Table 6: Trends in Worker Remittances Received by Countries in the Middle East, North Africa: 1990 to 2004 (millions of US Dollars)

TABLE 6. TRENDS IN WORKER REMITTANCES RECEIVED BY COUNTRIES (continued)

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	Annual Percent Change, 1990-92 to 2002-04
United Arab Emirates	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
West Bank, Gaza	-	-	-	-	-	54	51	62	80	85	65	28	-	-	-	-
Yemen	1498	998	1018	1039	1059	1080	1134	1169	1202	1223	1288	1295	1294	1270	1283	+0.75

NOTES: Worker remittances reported here follow the IMF definition of "worker remittances," as listed in code 2 391 of various publications of IMF, *Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook*. This definition includes the amount of migrants' earnings sent back to related persons or into personal bank accounts from the labor-receiving country to the labor-sending country. Following recent IMF conventions, this definition of worker remittances does not include "compensation of employees" or "other current transfers," which are of a more irregular nature. This definition of worker remittances also does not include the large - but unknown - amount of remittance funds that are transmitted through informal and unrecorded channels.

Source: International Monetary Fund, *Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook*


Table 7: Trends in Worker Remittances Received by Countries in the Middle East, North Africa: 1990 to 2004 (millions of US Dollars)

The tables above are taken from the IMF Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook. Though it is the most comprehensive dataset on remittances, it is obvious from the table above that there are missing data in the sections of several countries. It is caused by the countries not giving out data on migration and related subjects. Under these circumstances, it would be harder for institutions to

approximate a dataset for remittances because approximation occurs via estimation of remittance figures. Institutions differ in terms of what they include in the concept of remittances. For this reason, it is mostly probable that even the same year data on remittances should vary when done by two or more different institutions. Thus, the basic problem here occurs to be not having a standardized set of contents in remittances. For example, some of the central banks count remittances as only the money that flows through the financial sector. On the other hand, other institutions count it as including the value of cash and goods which are brought home by the migrants (Adams, 2006). Another problem with the remittance data is that it might be counted only as the official bank transfers into the homeland countries. They might not be solely composed of these money. There might be other informal and unrecorded channels for the money transfers. Thus, the official amount recorded and the realized amount would be different indeed.

Putting all of these facts aside, it is a well-known truth that world migration economies advance mostly over remittance revenues. Total remittances in the world are estimated to be USD 414 billion of which 316 billion (2009) was addressed to developing countries (IOM, 2010). During the same period of time, the fourth biggest remittance sending country in the world becomes Saudi Arabia as seen in the figure below:

Figure 8: Remittance outflows from Gulf Cooperation Council countries in 2006–2008 (in USD millions)



Note: Values for 2008 are estimates.  
Source: Ratha et al., 2009.

Figure 17: Remittance Outflows from the GCC countries in 2006-2008 (in USD millions)

TABLE 7. TRENDS IN WORKER REMITTANCES PAID BY GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL (GCC) COUNTRIES: 1990 TO 2004 (MILLIONS OF US DOLLARS)

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	Annual Percent Change, 1990-92 to 2002-04
Bahrain	251	369	335	395	431	500	559	635	725	856	1012	1287	871	1082	1120	+10.23
Kuwait	450	426	829	1229	1331	1354	1376	1375	1611	1731	1734	1784	1925	2144	2402	+11.76
Oman	884	910	1220	1423	1365	1537	1371	1501	1467	1438	1451	1532	1602	1672	1826	+4.48
Qatar	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Saudi Arabia	11637	13746	13397	15717	18102	16616	15513	15339	14934	13958	15390	15120	15854	14783	13555	+1.09
United Arab Emirates	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

NOTES: Paid worker remittances reported here follow the IMF definition of "worker remittances," as listed in code 3 391 of various publications of IMF, *Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook*. This definition includes the amount of migrants' earnings paid to related persons or into personal bank accounts from the labor-receiving country to the labor-sending country. Following recent IMF conventions, this definition of worker remittances does not include "compensation of employees" or "other current transfers," which are of a more irregular nature. This definition of worker remittances also does not include the large – but unknown – amount of remittance funds that are transmitted through informal and unrecorded channels.

Source: International Monetary Fund, *Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook*


Table 8: Trends in Worker Remittances Paid by the GCC Countries 1990 to 2004 (millions of US Dollars)

When we compare the figure and the table above taken from different resources, ignoring the fact that remittance revenues might include different variables, we realize the pattern that remittances sent out by the GCC countries increase each year. It means that remittances flowing out of the region help in the development of other economies.

There is another side to remittance issue. As remittances can be flown out, they can be flown in as well. There are several academic papers on how remittances influence poverty and development of countries.

In one of the papers, '*Adams and Page, 2005*', they gather data from the national representative households and make a survey over 71 developing countries. According to this paper, remittances reduce the depth and severity of poverty in the developing world. The paper also points out that a 10% increase in the remittances per capita leads to a 3.5% decline in poverty in the economy of the country (Adams, 2006).

As a result, remittances constitute one of the most important revenue resources for the developing countries. Changing from country to country, they sometimes refer to nearly half of the GDP of a country as given below (IOM, 2010).



Source: Ratha et al., 2010.

Figure 18: Percentage of GDP in 2008 represented by remittances



### 3.2.3. Human Trafficking:

Table 4-5 Incidence of reporting trafficking in persons according to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) citation index (alphabetical order)*					
Countries	Country of origin	Country of transit	Country of destination	Profile of victims	Purpose of trade
Algeria	Medium	Low	Very low	Women and children	Sexual exploitation
Bahrain	NR	Very low	Medium	Women and children (girls and boys)	Forced labour and sexual exploitation
Egypt	Very low	Medium	Low	Women	Sexual exploitation
Djibouti	Low	NR	Very low	Women and girls	Sexual exploitation
Iraq	Low	NR	Low	Women and children (girls and boys)	Forced labour and sexual exploitation
Jordan	Low	Very low	NR	Women	Sexual exploitation
Kuwait	NR	NR	Medium	Women and children (girls and boys)	Forced labour and sexual exploitation
Lebanon	Low	Very low	Medium	Women and children (girls and boys)	Forced labour and sexual exploitation
Libya	NR	NR	Low	Women	NR
Morocco	High	Low	Very low	Women and girls	Sexual exploitation and forced labour
Oman	NR	NR	Low	Children (girls and boys)	Forced labour and sexual exploitation
Qatar	NR	NR	Medium	Women and children (girls and boys)	Forced labor and sexual exploitation
Saudi Arabia	NR	Very low	High	Women and children (girls and boys)	Forced labor and sexual exploitation
Somalia	Low	NR	NR	Women, children (boys and girls), men	Forced labor and sexual exploitation
Sudan	Low	NR	Very low	Women, men and children (mainly boys)	Sexual exploitation and forced labour
Syria	Very low	NR	Medium	Women	Sexual exploitation
Tunisia	Low	NR	NR	Women and children	Sexual exploitation
UAE	NR	NR	High	Women, children (girls and boys), men	Sexual exploitation and forced labour
Yemen	Very low	NR	Low	Women and children	Forced labour and sexual exploitation

Source: UNODC 2006.  
\*NR: Not reported.

Table 9: Incidence of reporting trafficking in persons according to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) citation index (alphabetical order)

It is an unfortunate story that most of the human trafficking incidents depend on social network analysis. Social network analysis evolves over kinship relations, based on historical, cultural, economic and social bondages. However, mutual trust that has been developed through being dependent on each other historically brings along the possibility that trust would be abused.

Smuggling and trafficking are the most obvious examples of this misuse. It is a multi-billion dollar multinational industry that operates underground because of being illegal. Actually, some part of the industry operates under the name of working agencies as “middlemen”. In formal definition, these middlemen connect their clients with the proper labor market or the employer. Victims of the fraudulence are women, men and children. For men, trafficking ends with working under dehumanizing conditions. For women, the situation is not fortunate as well. They mostly end up in domestic service ranging from housing services to sexual exploitation such as working in nightclubs. Lastly, children are the most adversely affected elements of human trafficking. They are utilized as camel jockeys, itinerant vendors or even for sexual exploitation including child pornography. Some of them are taken into armed combats by official militias as well. In Sudan, there had been cases of children’s army forces.

*‘Third, it is not simply the ‘strong ties’ of family, kin and hometown associations which constitute the social networks of migration, but also other networks that involve a whole range of actors operating both legally and illegally from large employers and their sub-contracted employment agencies, to smugglers and traffickers.’ (Samers, Migration, 2010).*

As a result, smuggling is neither a misuse nor an abuse. It is the nastiest form of organization and trade and, migration networks are obviously abused for serving this purpose. There are several ways of committing such an outrageous activity:

- 1) Debt bondage and other financial strings to keep victims in a state of dependence, including holding back wages “for safekeeping”.
- 2) Quarantine from the public: limiting and monitoring victims’ contact with outsiders.
- 3) Isolation from their families, kinsfolk and religious communities
- 4) Confiscation of passports, visas and/or identification documents
- 5) The use of threat or violence towards victims and/or their families
- 6) The threat of humiliation by exposing victims’ circumstances to their families
- 7) Telling victims they will be imprisoned or deported for immigration violations if they contact authorities.

Thus, preventing the migrants from being able to do any legal action like reporting the crime or misuse is the notion of human trafficking (HDR, 2009).

This violent crime is generally committed in the Arab countries. They have certain traits in human trafficking. They might be the source countries for migrants, they might act as a transit point or they might be the destinations of human trafficking. As expected the Gulf countries are the destinations. Jordan and Lebanon are destination countries to a certain extent as well. Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Jordan and Lebanon are mostly the transit countries for trafficking. As we do realize, Jordan and Lebanon have a two way task for trafficking. Lastly, the source countries are Algeria, Jordan, Morocco, Somalia, Sudan and Tunisia. Here we observe the fact that countries may comprise different characteristics on

human trafficking as they lay in between the periphery and semi-periphery countries in the MENA region (HDR, 2009).

For the final analysis on human trafficking, we need to elaborate the policies of the European countries and the USA on human migration and trafficking. It is important to mention here that human trafficking is considered as a security issue by the European countries and the USA. The phenomenon became one of the most important issues of the Barcelona Process but both the European Union and the USA use their power to violate the articles of the treaty through several manipulations according to their own interests.

#### 3.2.4. Islam, Security and Migration:

There was a moment in history that affected the whole world political order. If it were not to happen, everything would have been different now. The year 1989, the fall of the Berlin Wall changed everything in the world political and economic order and even affected the dynamics related to the MENA region. The change in world dynamics influenced the conceptions and the sense of security changed with new definitions like “terrorism”.

Guild states that: ‘In liberal democracies, measures taken in the name of security are taken for the good of the collectivity, that is the individuals who are entitled to voice within the community. That these measures may reduce the security of any one individual is inevitable. ... Changes to social benefits rules

will result in great social security for one individual but not necessarily for another.’. He also adds that: ‘The stronger the state institutions are, the greater the possibility of effective accountability in the inter-state system for human rights obligations.’ (Guild, 2009).

From the above quotations, we understand that there is a double standard to security indeed. Firstly, we may deduce that while some are benefitting from security, others may be harmed and it is comprehended to be casual. Thus, powers to maintain the security of all may not be able to do so and there may be harmed ones but these can’t be from the majority. It means that if you are from the minority, you would be oppressed or harmed for the sake of security and it is not important to the state even if it is a liberal democracy where everyone should have a right to act as long as not harming the free zone of others. Secondly, it is told that for human rights to be properly implemented in a state, there should be strong state institutions. When we combine these two ideas, we conclude that whereas security should have been universal for everyone in liberal democratic countries like the EU countries or the USA, it works for the benefit and the good of the majority at the cost of oppressing the minority. This is exactly what happens in the EU countries against the immigrants from the MENA region and it is such a double standard.

It is true that a migrant state should ensure its citizens’ safety and economic well-being but it should not be at a rate conducive to create xenophobia or racism as Margaret Thatcher once expressed ‘*being swamped*’ by certain kinds

of migrants (Samers, Migration, 2010). As easier said than done, the civilized nations of the EU and the USA called the less developed countries as the “third world other” or “inferior” denoting the exact opposite of theoretical liberalism.

After the 9/11 incident, an excessive panic of Muslim immigrants began. After that time two terrorist attacks stood out in Europe. One of them was the bombing of the Madrid train station on March 2004 and the other was the London Underground bombings of 7 and 21 July 2005. Both of them were attributed to Islamic groups and the image of “extreme Islamic violence” was carved on each Muslim individual though they are innocent and far away from terrorism. Depending on this situation, Islamic violence was not put in the category of political religious violence but foreigner violence in the minds of people (Guild, 2009).

Moreover, the EU’s police agency, EUROPOL, classified terrorist attacks in four groups as Islamist, ethno-nationalist and separatist, left-wing and anarchist and right-wing terrorism. Within this classification, there were 4 Islamist (no casualties), 532 separatist (2 casualties), 21 left-wing and 1 right-wing attacks. It is obvious that Islamist terrorism was not as severe as propagandized negatively.

To sum up, making people perceive Islam as a terrorist religion and the populations of these countries as potential terrorists is nothing more than trying to protect the new world order where the MENA region and the Muslim countries are expected to maintain their colonial statuses for the economic benefit of the hegemonic powers of world history.

### 3.2.5. EU Policies of Migration and MENA:

It would be proper to distinguish between two time periods while evaluating the policies on migration implemented by the EU countries. Periods can be classified as “pre 2000” and “after 2000”. Even though the policies change through time, one basic principle of the policies never changes. It is the condition that even social dynamics like migration and its regulation through policies depend on economic policies adopted.

The migration dynamics towards Europe began after the Cold War. There had been emigration from the MENA region and Turkey to European countries. As the formation of EU was once EEC<sup>18</sup>, international trade and migration was promoted to increase the trading capacities of the countries. With the 1972-3 oil crises, Germany and France decided to stop immigration due to worsening economic systems. They just let “unwanted family reunification” happen owing to the moral and legal rights of labor migrants.

Times changed and globalization speeded up under control of the USA and the EU under the USA’s remote control during 1990s. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the USSR were indicators of another world order, globalization and liberalism leading to a neo-liberal world economic order. For this purpose, economies had to be integrated through conventions and treaties though they seemed socially concerned. In 1991, the Maastricht Treaty was set up to establish European citizenship for the immigrants providing the conditions of

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<sup>18</sup> EEC: European Economic Community

the member state countries. It also let the free movement of people but it failed in implementation. On March 26 1995, the Schengen Agreement was tried to put up for the second time but the UK refused to join continuing the strict border controls (Castles, 1998). In 1999, for the first time, the EU achieved to implement a common policy for the migrants with the Amsterdam Treaty. According to the Amsterdam Treaty, the EU was given the power to adopt laws on asylum, borders and immigration including the family reunification and irregular migration.

As of 2000, there had been several more changes within the policies adopted and the reasons why they had been adopted as such. The world entered into a stage of neo-liberalism and stratification within the country groups and these groups had been severely edged due to economic conditions of countries. Immigrants from the non-EU countries began to be named as “third country nationals” with the increasing integration of global economic institutions. It was especially adapted to denote the newcomers of the semi-periphery or periphery countries.

Migration policy during these times underwent a process of “up-scaling” or “down-scaling”. Up-scaling was consistent with the politics of globalization and internationalization with the conversion of nation-states to supra-national institutions like the EC<sup>19</sup> or the Council of the European Union. This policy was also called as “globalization”, “internationalization” or “post-nationalization” of migration control. On the other hand, down-scaling was the transfer of power of

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<sup>19</sup> EC: European Commission



decision-making to local governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and charities which acted at the local level.

Up-scaling and down-scaling were related with the integration of institutions and the economic policies. Economic policies applied with respect to these processes were classified within the perspectives of “supra-nationalization of migration policies to and within the EU”, “supra-nationalization of asylum and refugee protection” and “if the international trading blocs have an influence on national politics of migration” (Samers, Migration , 2010).

Within the first perspective, it has been argued if there had been supra-nationalization of migration to or within the EU. It has both a “yes” and “no” as an answer to this dilemma. There is the EC centered in Brussels that is now responsible for devising migration policies for the EU member states. However, there is not a full commitment to this policy whereas the member states still devise their own policies relating to migration.

In the second perspective, we analyze the supra-nationalization of asylum and refugee protection. Within the EU borders, the Geneva Convention was established as the first cornerstone in human rights in 1951. Later on, the 1967 (New York) Protocol was established and stamped out the racist and exclusionary character of the convention. It privileged the asylum-seekers and refugees to have claim about political and civil rights.

Lastly, within the third perspective, we do realize the fact that there is an economic reasoning behind the social migration policies. With the integration of

world economics and world labor markets through the free travel of labor with the permission of the Schengen visas since 2006, institutions such as GATS (General Agreement on Trade in Services) and NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) intervened with the world migration politics. However, the intervention should not have been more than setting up standards for countries' decisions. It is a mutual action where at one part GATS recognizes the power of sovereign states in applying immigration measures and on the other part, the countries have to limit their power with respect to GATS obligations of the market access and equality within the market. 'Thus, national sovereign powers are only consistent with the GATS commitments so long as they do not interfere too substantially with (i.e. nullify or impair) the benefits which other members are entitled to under the agreement.' states Guild in his book, *Security and Migration in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century* (Guild, 2009). It means that GATS principles include migration policies among the EU member countries as well as the free trade principles. According to the GATS agreement, there is "equal treatment with nationals as regards market access" principle. Nevertheless, how this "equal treatment" is defined varies due to sovereign states and the migrant labor policies they adopt. Even though there is such an objective of GATS to make over world economic system via the migration policies, immigration control in liberal democracies of Europe depend on two limiting aspects such as:

- The length of time which the individual can spend on the territory (for instance tourists and visitors are limited to three months out of every six months in the EU)

- The economic activities which the individual can enter into (in the EU tourists and visitors are prohibited from engaging in economic activities except in very limited ways) (Guild, 2009).

These principles are in conflict with GATS in equal treatment with own nationals.

As a result, the perspective in handling migration by the EU countries is derived in the circumference of economic understanding. Despite the limitations of migration, they take a stand to point out the idea that ‘while immigration should be recognized as a source of cultural and social enrichment, in particular by contributing to entrepreneurship, diversity, and innovation, its economic impact on employment and growth is also significant as it increases labor supply and helps cope with bottlenecks’ (Menz, 2009). It is briefly asserting the point that the most important thing to sustain market and growth dynamics is the labor force and the approach to migration might be a pragmatist one then. Thus, it does not carry much importance how the migrants are treated when we evaluate migration policies adopted in the EU countries and the bodies since they are actually based on economic reasons but not on social ones.

- Conclusion:

As a result of political economic evaluation of the region, I am able to identify several patterns relating to migration in the MENA region from economic, social and political perspectives.

The economic perspective consists of several subcategories like labor participation rate, feminization of labor, unemployment rate and the rate of public employment etc. When we analyze the MENA region in terms of these factors, we do not reach a satisfactory conclusion. Despite the increasing labor force participation rate in the region, it has the highest unemployment rate in the world. As linked to this, the female labor participation rate is the lowest in the world. These, of course, contribute to emigration from the region but we must not forget the fact that there is also migration from the poorer parts of the region to the richer parts. This might go in “migration from rural to urban” classification as well. The only good side of the story here is the high ratio in public employment. It is the inheritance of state-led growth years in the region although the region wants to involve itself with the world economy. Rather than looking at this event as the dominance of former state-led economics, it would be helpful to comprehend it as lowering the rate of unemployment a little bit. At least, we might think of it as a method to decrease unemployment. Unfortunately, such little efforts to reduce migration in such a populated region do not work and migration lasts as an ongoing phenomenon in the region.

Migration, notwithstanding its negative connotation, also contributes to the region economies. Remittances occupy most of the share in most of the MENA region countries since the migration rate is too high. However, there is a problem with the ways data on remittances are recorded. Accounting principles of countries differ and because of that each country might change some variables

included in calculation of remittances. Thus, there is not a standard set of contents valid for remittances, something that would make us question its reliability.

As for the issues of human trafficking or smuggling, the worst case is that migrants who are abused by the middlemen see it as normal since it is a long, accustomed way of reaching welfare for them. These migrants generally become victims through social networks like kinship. Additionally, the real “victims” are generally women and children in human trafficking and smuggling. Despite the situation is as serious as making women and children victims, the EU countries and the USA try to implement policies to prevent human migration. They decide on the actions they take via the treaties they signed in common relating to migration and asylum policies. Or, they rather prefer to be comprehended as accepting the migrants in the name of human rights and democratization by pointing out the rules of these treaties. However, when the number of migrants and their acceptance rates are compared, acceptance rates remain “too” small.

One of the excuses behind not accepting migrants is that the ones from the MENA region are mostly Muslims and the religion, Islam, contains barbaric attitudes such as the tendency for “terrorism”. This perception actually depends on the xenophobia of imperial countries. In reality, when the migrants get into these countries, they mostly become the oppressed ones as the majority rules over the minority. Thus, judging someone with a “Muslim identity” is only the excuse of imperial countries hiding behind the 9/11 incident aiming for not accepting migrants into their countries for security purposes.

Given the situation above, I am unsure as to how much of the migration data I gather from the European or American based institutions is reliable. On the other hand, I get the impression that the policies implemented for migration is only for show. We might divide these policies as “pre-2000” and “after 2000”. In the “pre-2000” policies, they openly declare that migration is unwanted since it ruins the population balance and economies of capitalist countries. By covering these overt ideas in the “after 2000” policies, these countries claim that they adopt integrating economic and social policies. Depending on this, they would let asylum, refugee and migrant protection policies. Ultimately, the actual reason of this tolerance occurs to be economic since there is the graying of European population and there is a need for a young labor force in order for their economies to sustain.

In conclusion, although I tried to leave aside my presuppositions about the capitalist countries, the insincere attitudes and policies they adopt just to protect their own interests raises big question marks on my mind about these countries. Documenting and analyzing migration in detail reveal the attitudes of the host societies as well as those of the migrating societies. Thus we are able to see the extent to which migrant sending and migrant receiving societies accept migration.

## CHAPTER IV

### EPILOGUE

In the light of the discussion above:

*“How is the situation today? First of all, it is certain that migration which has been explicitly promoted since 1970 has impaired the militant power. When it is possible to earn more by working a couple of months more in the GCC, Libya or Iraq, where is the necessity to struggle for a slight increase in the wages? As always, migration brought along individualistic solutions and decreased the willpower of a collective action.”* (Amin & El Kenz, 2006).

The major point that emerges from my thesis research is that if emigration from the MENA region and migration in the MENA region is promoted, it works for the benefit of the capitalist countries trying to penetrate into the region. Migration creates an inevitable dynamics of endless questions relating to why it happens and an order of disorder by creating an ever-lasting loop of mobility in the world. But why would such a phenomenon be supported by the capitalist states?

Beginning with the 1960s, EC countries and the USA began to interfere with the MENA region. Before the Cold War period, the EC left the high politics issues to the national governments; however, at the end of the Cold War, rise of the USA made the European security measures decline from the high politics to low politics involving the manipulation of parameters such as mass migration, overpopulation, underdevelopment and political violence beginning to arouse.

With such an involvement, the EC aimed to partially clarify the medium of instability in the region. The sources of instability in the region were economic problems mostly. These were the control of key energy supplies, demographic change, population movements, Islamic revivalism and cultural difference, terrorism, drugs, trafficking, depletion of natural resources and the dissemination of conventional weapons. Problems which concern me the most are the control of key energy supplies, population movements and depletions of natural resources. Although these problems seem distinct from each other, they have a common ground.

The problems above are combined as follows: depletion of natural resources in the USA and Europe makes these capitalist countries take measures about their futures. These measures are taken at the expense of exploiting the relatively poor countries and their natural resources. Thus, control of key energy supplies pass onto the foreigners. These corporations manipulate the labor force in the nearby regions and cause migrations. In other words, they cause population movements at a larger scale.

From the beginning of the 1970s, a transition period in the world economic order began to take place. The transition was from semi-capitalist economic structures to capitalist economic structures. One of the most powerful organizations that were formed during this period was OPEC. OPEC integrated the world economy by selling oil and petroleum related products and broke down the monopoly of the USA. Moreover, the accelerating reduction in the USA oil



resources made the capitalist countries in need of the MENA region more. The capitalist countries penetrated into the MENA region to fulfill this feeling of need. After this process, newly adopted global and liberal economic policies affected the region governments in an adverse manner. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the USSR and lastly the rise of the Gulf Crisis in 1991, the neo-liberal system completely took over. When we consider the fact that in 1950s, the USA was only in need of import of 10% of its oil, in 1990s it has been 42%, in 1997 49% and in 1998 50% for the first time, we do realize why the times of non-governmental organizations<sup>20</sup> penetrating the MENA region overlaps with development of globalism and liberalism or neo-liberalism in economics and politics (Oguz, 2011).

In the past two decades, number of NGOs in the MENA region increased by five to ten times varying on the country basis. NGOs established in the MENA region occur to be nearly 55000 in Algeria, 15000 in Egypt, 18000 in Morocco and in the whole Arab world, it is nearly more than 100000 (Amin & El Kenz, 2006). These NGOs are funded by several resources. The most important one of these resources is the financial support of the international corporations such as Ford Company or the Open Society Institute. With the Gulf Crisis in 1991, intervention of these forces with the countries turned out to be not just political but economic as well.

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<sup>20</sup> NGO: It is a legally constituted organization created by natural or legal persons that operates independently from any government. When we consider the NGOs in the MENA region, we observe that most of these organizations are connected to George Soros' Open Society Institute or the Ford Company through funding. Nevertheless, there are other 'real' NGOs like the Red Cross or the Red Crescent established during this period as well.

Till this day, as migration from the region has been promoted and political and economic situation in the region has been presented to be so turbulent since 1980s, people of the world began to think that the MENA region was doomed to be one of the less developed regions in the world and it is because its own incompatibility with the world dynamics. Nevertheless, there are facts which should be covered and given as the opposite in media sources as well. This is the reason why everybody perceives the MENA region as too far away from its real potential. The MENA region has a real potential to grow; yet, migration isn't always the tool for economic development. This idea forms the backbone of my thesis.

**Table 1: Crude Oil Imports EU-15, 2004 (in million tones)**

Origin	2000	2001	2002	2003	Share 2002 (%)
Former USSR	89.5	101.2	123.2	140.1	26.0
Norway	114.8	107.2	101.6	104.5	21.5
Saudi Arabia	65.1	57.5	53.1	61.2	11.2
Libya	45.5	43.1	38.8	44.9	8.2
Iran	35.5	31.4	25.9	34.9	5.5
Middle East not spec.	13.1	18.7	19.6	11.9	4.1
Other origin	121.5	122	110.7	94.5	23.4
Total Imports	485.0	481.1	472.9	492.0	100.0
in Million Barrels	3540.5	3511.8	3452.2	3591.4	

Table 10: European Union, Energy and Transport Figures, 2004 ed., Directorate General for Energy and Transport<sup>21</sup>

<sup>21</sup> [http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/energy\\_transport/figures/pocketbook/doc/2004/pb2004\\_part\\_2\\_energy.pdf](http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/energy_transport/figures/pocketbook/doc/2004/pb2004_part_2_energy.pdf)

**Table 2: Gas Imports EU-15, 2004 (in million cubic meters)**

Origin	2000	2001	2002	2003	Share 2002 (%)
Former USSR	78 484	73 909	68 807	74 169	32.7
Norway	46 714	49 925	61 351	64 746	29.1
Algeria	56 644	50 364	53 162	54 431	25.2
Non spec. origin	6 808	8 575	15 966	43 171	7.6
Nigeria	4 283	5 369	6 276	9 013	3.0
Qatar	293	646	2 070	1 893	1.0
Other origins	1 857	2 457	2 972	1 666	1.4
Total Imports	195 083	191 245	210 604	29 089	100.0

Table 11: European Union, Energy and Transport in Figures, 2004 edition, Directorate General for Energy and Transport<sup>22</sup>

**Table 4: European Union's Imports from the Middle Eastern Countries (2004)**

Products (Six Sections) by order of importance	Mio euro	%	Share of total EU imports
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>44 381</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>4.3</b>
Mineral fuels, lubricants and rel. materials	15 638	35.2	8.6
Miscall. manuf. articles	7 722	17.4	5.0
Machinery and transport equipment	5 445	12.3	1.5
Manuf. Goods classif. chiefly by material	4 056	9.1	3.8
Chemicals and related products	2 841	6.4	3.3
food and live animals	2 596	5.9	5.0
Crude materials inedible, except fuel	1 183	2.7	2.8
Animals, vegetable oils, fats, waxes	508	1.1	13.9
Commodities and transactions n.e.c	211	0.5	0.7
Beverages and tobacco	56	0.1	1.0

Source: Eurostat

Table 12: European Union's Imports from the Middle Eastern Countries (2004)

<sup>22</sup> [http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/energy\\_transport/figures/pocketbook/doc/2004/pb2004\\_part\\_2\\_energy.pdf](http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/energy_transport/figures/pocketbook/doc/2004/pb2004_part_2_energy.pdf)

**Table 5: European Union's Exports to the Middle Eastern Countries (2004)**

Products (Site Sections) by order of importance	Mio euro	%	Share of total EU imports
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>53 541</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>5.6</b>
Machinery and transport equipment	21 345	39.9	4.9
Manuf. goods classif. chiefly by material	11 417	21.3	9.3
Chemicals and related products	7 001	13.1	4.6
Miscell. manuf. articles	4 631	8.6	4.1
food and live animals	3 177	5.9	9.5
Minerals, fuels, lubricants, rel. materials	2 028	3.8	7.3
Crude materials inedible, except fuel	1 197	2.2	7.1
Beverages and tobacco	364	0.7	2.5
Commodit and transactions n.e.c	300	0.6	1.3
Animals, vegetable oils, fats and waxes	250	0.5	10.6

Source: Eurostat

Table 13: European Union's Exports to the Middle Eastern Countries (2004)

The EU imports nearly 29% of its crude oil and 30% of its gas from the MENA region. It means that the largest share in hydrocarbon and oil products belongs to the MENA region in trade. In addition, the EU imports hydrocarbon related products of mineral fuels and lubricants with 35.2% and chemicals by 6.4% to make 41.6%. These numbers mean that the MENA region has the largest share in imports of hydrocarbon related products as well in trade with the EU. On the other hand, what MENA exports from the EU at great amounts is machinery and transport equipment with nearly 40% covering the largest share. Here, the logical outcome is that the MENA region gains over oil resources and through its

imports and invests the money in machinery and equipment as the tools of technology for further development in production.

Moreover, the figures below will show how Arab economies really evolve in time and at which rate to cause what:

**► Ten Top FDI recipients of 2009 (\$m)**

COUNTRY	FDI Inflows	(%) Chg	As (%) of	FDI Stock	FDI Stock	As (%) of
	2009	2008	MENA Total	(2009)	(%) of GDP	MENA Total
Saudi Arabia	35,514	-7.0	41.0	147,145	39.8	23.7
Qatar	8,722	112.3	10.0	28,184	33.6	4.5
Turkey	7,611	-58.0	8.8	77,729	12.6	12.5
Egypt	6,712	-29.3	7.7	66,709	35.0	10.7
Lebanon	4,804	10.8	5.5	32,085	95.5	5.1
UAE	4,003	-71.8	4.6	73,422	32.0	11.8
Iran	3,016	86.7	3.5	23,984	7.2	3.8
Algeria	2,847	7.6	3.3	17,344	12.3	2.8
Libya	2,674	-3.5	3.0	15,508	25.6	2.5
Jordan	2,385	-15.7	2.7	18,705	81.7	3.0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>78,288</b>		<b>90.0</b>	<b>500,815</b>	<b>37.5</b>	<b>80.4</b>

Weighted average for 10 MENA countries. Source: World Investment Report 2010.

Table 14: Top ten FDI recipients of 2009 (\$m)

**► Country distribution of FDI inflows, by range, 2009**

Range	Number of countries	Recipients
More than \$10bn	1	Saudi Arabia
\$5bn to \$9.9bn	3	Egypt, Turkey and Qatar
\$2bn to \$4.9bn	7	Algeria, Libya, UAE, Iran, Lebanon, Oman and Jordan
\$1bn to \$1.9bn	4	Morocco, Tunisia Iraq and Syria
Below \$1bn	4	Yemen, Bahrain, Kuwait and Palestinian Territory

Source: World Investment Report 2010.

Table 15: Country distribution of FDI inflows, by range, (2009)

► Middle East: Cross-Border M&As by Industry (\$m)  
(Excluding North Africa)

	Sales		Purchases	
	2008	2009	2008	2009
<b>TOTAL INDUSTRY</b>	16,287	3,543	22,099	26,843
<b>PRIMARY</b>	3	8	417	52
<b>MANUFACTURING</b>	5,286	199	2,212	142
Food, beverages & tobacco	1,720	91	862	113
Coke, petroleum & nuclear fuel	2,050	-	-	-
Chemicals & chemical products	62	-56	48	-4
Motor vehicles & transport equip	27	1	1,172	-
Non-metallic mineral products	213	-44	-	-
Metals & metal products	941	110	130	33
Machinery & equipment	114	-	-	-
<b>SERVICES</b>	10,998	3,336	19,470	26,648
Electricity, gas & water	51	2,361	4,259	724
Trade	3,393	85	447	85
Construction	528	78	-3,124	-
Transport, storage & telecoms	2,918	41	7,831	1,645
Finance	3,682	550	15,657	24,510
Business services	206	120	3,785	253


Source: UNCTAD, cross-border M&A database.

Table 16: Middle East: Cross-border mergers and acquisitions by industry (\$m) excluding North Africa

Depending on the financial crisis in 2008, the FDI in 2009 decreases in all countries except Algeria, Iran, Kuwait, Qatar and Lebanon. In all of these countries, the sector to be invested in becomes the oil production sector. Moreover, the top three destinations for FDI in the region become the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Qatar which forms 70% of the FDI into the region. Basically, the GCC seems to be the most favorite destination for international firms to invest in the region. It also means that the GCC harbors great potential for employment in the region.

**Figure 6:**

**Labour force growth in the GCC, 1990-2020**



Source: Baldwin-Edwards, 2006.

Figure 19: Labor force growth in the GCC between 1990 and 2020

However, the great employment potential in the region is not utilized by the Arab labor force indeed. The majority of the labor force in the GCC is counted to be the non-nationals. There are 7.5 million Asians which count for 74% of the migrants in the region (Report, 2008). These people are used as the labor force in the MENA region rather than its own nationals because they work at a payment basis less than the MENA labor force.

Economic Context

Country/Year	Pop. (millions)	GDP per Capita (US\$)	GDP Growth (%)				Inflation (%)					
			2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Egypt	78.3	2,789	6.8	7.1	7.2	4.7	5.1	7.2	8.6	20.2	10.0	10.7
Sudan	40.1	1,705	11.3	10.2	6.8	6.0	5.1	15.7	8.8	14.9	11.5	15.4
Algeria	36.1	4,435	2.0	3.0	2.4	2.4	3.3	3.8	4.8	4.9	5.8	4.5
Iraq	32.0	2,564	6.2	1.5	9.5	4.2	0.8	64.8	4.7	6.8	-4.4	3.3
Morocco	31.9	3,249	7.8	2.7	5.6	4.9	3.2	3.3	2.0	4.2	-1.6	2.2
Saudi Arabia	26.1	16,996	3.2	2.0	4.2	0.6	3.7	2.9	6.5	9.0	4.2	5.4
Yemen	24.4	1,282	3.2	3.3	3.6	3.9	8.0	7.9	11.2	10.8	8.8	12.5
Syria	20.6	2,877	5.0	5.7	4.5	6.0	3.2	6.7	4.8	15.4	1.7	6.3
Tunisia	10.5	4,200	5.7	6.3	4.5	3.1	3.7	3.3	5.1	4.0	4.0	4.1
Libya	6.6	11,314	6.7	7.5	2.3	-2.3	4.2	7.2	7.6	9.7	2.8	2.4
Jordan	6.1	4,500	7.9	8.5	7.6	2.3	3.1	7.5	5.1	9.1	2.7	6.1
U.A. Emirates	5.1	59,717	8.8	6.6	5.3	-3.2	3.2	10.2	11.7	6.6	1.2	2.7
Lebanon	3.9	10,044	0.6	7.5	9.3	8.5	7.5	7.2	6.0	6.4	3.4	4.5
Kuwait	3.6	36,412	5.3	4.5	5.0	-5.2	2.0	3.6	7.5	9.0	1.2	4.1
Oman	3.0	18,657	5.5	6.7	12.9	1.1	4.2	4.7	9.3	7.8	3.4	3.4
Qatar	1.7	76,168	18.6	26.8	25.4	8.6	16.3	11.8	13.8	15.0	-4.9	0.4
Bahrain	1.1	20,475	6.7	8.4	6.3	3.1	4.1	2.7	4.0	5.1	2.8	2.0

Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook

Notes: GDP Growth:   
↓ Negative Growth   
→ Between 0% and 3%   
↑ Higher than 3%   
Inflation:   
✗ Higher than 10%   
! Between 5% and 10%   
✓ Positive and Lower than 5%

Table 17: Economic context of the MENA region in general

With the economic indicators of the MENA region given above, the perception of region economics in peoples' minds should change. The former picture was that the MENA region needed to develop under the guidance of the developed countries. However, the situation turned out to be different as the MENA region has been developing and further advancing in capital-intensive industries to employ most of the migrants. Now, we can find the answers of the questions we have been seeking for. Despite the high potential the MENA region has, why do the GCC countries employ immigrants from outside mostly and why are the amount of emigrants from the Arab Mashrek and Arab Maghreb also high despite the developing oil industries in these regions?

*“All MENA countries, except for the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and Libya, are both origin and destination countries for international*



*migrants. This represents a marked shift from the 1960-1990 period, during which the MENA region was sharply divided between destination countries, namely the capital-rich, oil-producing states in the gulf and Libya, and migrant-origin countries, the rest of the region.*” (Fargues, 2008).

There are two basic points of the above discussion relating to the peoples rioting in the MENA region today. One is the properties of the GCC countries and Libya. The other point is the time period, 1960-1990. In the time period, 1960-1990, there has been the transition of socialist authoritarian regimes and the kingdoms into capitalist economies, then into liberal and neo-liberal economies via the NGOs in the region. The other point is related to the properties of countries in which Libya stands apart from the GCC countries as being the only country, which is a member of the GCC and also at the same time has a positive net migration. The reason lying behind this fact is that Libya has a unique position in production of oil. According to Ogan, oil production of Libya is not as high as the GCC countries that could really affect the production levels; however, the quality of Libyan oil makes it unique and really wanted. In the same article, it is stated that if the crisis in the MENA region continues, the oil production will decline and this would increase the prices over \$130 (Ogan, 2011). In brief, a crisis in energy would arise though it can be easily compensated by the extra production of Saudi Arabia.

However, at this point, we should understand that the real crisis could not be easily tackled with overproduction of oil by Saudi Arabia. The real crisis only ends whenever the capitalist countries like the EU countries and the USA decide

not to claim rights over the MENA region oil resources for their own countries' sustainability. When we analyze the relations between the riots that have been happening lately and the oil-exporting countries, we observe a pattern in which the riots all happen in actively producing countries like Syria, Libya, Saudi Arabia or Algeria. The main point is that migration is not only a social event triggered by regional dynamics but it is initiated through international dynamics where economic power is the main determinant regarding where migration is oriented to.

Ogan states that as long as the totalitarian regimes in the MENA region have the power to manipulate oil resources, they would use this power to condemn the rest of the globe to the instability of economic markets. The instability in the economic markets would affect the daily lives of the region peoples because of deteriorating employment conditions. Or, as we see in Libya, unsuccessful riots aiming to end up with a revolution takes place in the name of bringing democracy to the region. Both of the factors cause disturbances among peoples and they tend to migrate as a result (Ogan, 2011). In such a case, the capitalist countries lose the control of economic stability and the MENA region countries lose their workforce.

In the final analysis, Ogan emphasizes the fact that neither the capitalist countries nor the MENA region countries will benefit from the ongoing crisis in the region. The capitalist countries oppress the MENA countries to gain access to natural resources benefitting from the turmoil. However, what the capitalist countries do could bring about reduction of oil production in the oil-producing

MENA region countries. It is not because they have the chance to threaten the imperial countries via cutting oil production; but, it is the natural result of political and economic disturbance among the peoples in the region. When people are anxious about their lives, they respond to the intervention by rioting. Yesterday, it was in the form of economic rioting to the order through migration and today it is in the form of political rioting to existing political turmoil. No matter which path is followed, they both lead to the same conclusion of disturbance. The cut in production of goods and services, especially oil, leads to a decrease in the world stocks of oil and the price increases via demand-supply mechanism. Neither the oil buying imperial countries nor the oil selling MENA countries benefit from the turmoil. Then, it means that manipulating world economic order via several channels is in vain although you would like to benefit over it. It only causes riots and brings about the congestion of peoples on the country borders. There, people tend to migrate with a view to saving their lives. Nevertheless, migration does not end so happily ever after.

Migration is an extremely contentious subject. There are points that we can approve of the authors who state that migration is always good because it stimulates economic growth through several ways. On the contrary, we must never forget that migration is not always favorable because it is not always an investment accumulating capital as occurs in the MENA region. It causes brain drain and the accumulation of human capital declines. Thus, migration no longer becomes an economic growth factor for the MENA region, as traditionally upheld by an extensive literature.

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