

SPATIO-ADMINISTRATIVE DIMENSIONS OF URBAN GROWTH: THE CASE  
OF CITY OF DENIZLI

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## **ABSTRACT**

### **SPATIO-ADMINISTRATIVE DIMENSIONS OF URBAN GROWTH: THE CASE OF CITY OF DENIZLI**

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It has been widely acknowledged that boundary problems resulting from urban growth is one of the persistent issues at the local level. At least three main problem areas have been identified: fragmentation of the planning system, inefficiency in the service provision and the scale of local participation. The main objective of this thesis is to analyze the restructuring of the organizational structure and statutes of local authorities in terms of boundary changes, amalgamation and annexation with reference to the Turkish case. The city of Denizli has been taken as a case study as there has been a recent change in the municipal boundaries which brought the annexation of small-sized municipalities to the Denizli Municipality. The thesis problematizes the Denizli case in terms of planning processes, service provision and local participation. The experience of other countries and the literature on this issue are to be used in order to provide a yardstick against which the case of Denizli could be measured.

Keywords: local government reform, annexation of municipalities.

## ÖZ

### KENTSEL BÜYÜMENİN İDARİ-MEKÂNSAL BOYUTLARI: DENİZLİ KENTİ ÖRNEĞİ

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Yerel yönetimlerin kentsel büyümeden kaynaklanan ölçek ve sınır sorunları ile karşı karşıya kaldıkları bilinen bir durumdur. Bu konudaki üç temel sorun alanı, planlama sisteminin parçalanması, hizmet sunumunda yetersizlikler, yerel katılımın ölçeğinde yaşanan sorunlar olarak tanımlanabilir. Bu tezin temel amacı: Türkiye örneğinden yola çıkarak sınır deęişiklikleri, bütünleşme ve birleşmeye referansla yerel yönetimlerin statü ve örgütsel yapısının yeniden yapılandırılmasını incelemektir. Yapılan yasal düzenlemelerle, Denizli kentindeki belediyelerin Denizli Belediyesine katılması kararı alınmış ve bu yönde bir süreç başlamış olması nedeniyle Denizli Kenti örnek olay olarak alınmıştır. Bu tez Denizli örneğini planlama süreçleri, hizmet sunumu ve yerel katılım açısından sorunsallaştırmaktadır. Bu konudaki diđer ülke deneyimleri ve konuya ilişkin yazında öngörülen modeller Denizli örneğini tartışmasında dikkate alınacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: yerel yönetimler reformu, belediyelerin katılması

To my family

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## **CHAPTER 1**

### **INTRODUCTION**

The rate of population of those living in settlements governed by a municipal authority has been increasing very rapidly in Turkey. This increase is due to two distinct processes. The first one is rapid population growth in municipal areas. The second one is the establishment of new municipalities at the settlements that exceed the minimum population level required for being designated as a municipality.

This rapid increase creates a considerable number of problems ranging from unplanned urban growth, ineffective administrative structures, and inadequate and inefficient service provisions. However, municipalities have different kinds of problems according to their particular characteristics. Small-scale municipalities established in rural areas have different problems such as ineffective administrative structures and inadequate and inefficient service provision; however, municipalities established in metropolitan regions have problems such as unplanned urban growth, uncoordinated service provision, and sometimes inefficient service provision. Although the establishment of Metropolitan Municipalities is one of the administrative solutions to deal with this kind of complicated problems, it cannot be applicable to all metropolitan regions due to legal limitations (metropolitan municipality law).

Within this context, the government has interfered with these conditions by making a new municipality law. There are three main strategies in the new municipality Law about rescaling municipalities: the first one is to close down the municipalities having a population of less than 2000, the second one is to annex or to consolidate the municipalities in a metropolitan region, and the third one is to increase the scale of municipalities by increasing minimum population size required for the establishment of a municipality.

The government has applied the first strategy by making a special law about closing down municipalities instead of applying the related article of municipality law. The

second strategy has been applied in several settlements including Denizli. However the application of the second strategy is more permissive because it is depended upon the government's preferences. The third strategy is a general criterion to be applied to all settlements that desire to be a municipality.

The aim of this study is to evaluate rescaling of municipalities on both the national and local level to go beyond what is seen on the surface in order to find out the real aims and intentions. On the national level, the study aims to test every hypothesis about municipal scale that is available in terms of the availability of data. It may be the first empirical study of municipalities considering their scales. On the local level, the case study analyzes the annexation of surrounding municipalities to Denizli municipality. Denizli has been selected as the case study area because it is highly emphasized as an example of a politically fragmented urban area. The intention here is to analyze the annexation process as a political rather than a technical process, what is usually considered for efficient and effective management of urban areas. Consequently it is planned to reveal the hidden agenda(s) behind the annexation process.

The body of the thesis will include six chapters. The literature review chapter will include normative values of local governments, theoretical approaches to local governments, urban growth and political fragmentation in metropolitan areas, policies for political integration, and the politics of integration. In the municipal context chapter, the historical development of municipalities, a literature review of Turkish academia on the Turkish municipal context, and political processes of municipal reformation in national politics are investigated. The research design chapter will identify the hypothesis to be tested for and against small-scale municipalities. Additionally it includes the sources, content, method of gathering, and quality of data used for a national level study, policy analysis and local level study. The national level study chapter will analyze municipal scales in terms of financial structure, economic structure, population dynamics, and political participation in local elections. The policy analysis chapter will consider a comparison of economic and political papers of government regarding their arguments about municipalities and municipal scale. And finally, the local level study will focus on current conditions in the Denizli urban area, a history of

fragmentation, technical issues about fragmented structure, the political process of integration, a comparison between old and new forms of consolidation, idealized ways for the management of Denizli's urban area, and future expectations of municipal structure in terms of being a metropolitan municipality.

On the national level, most of what the government argues about small-scale municipalities with respect to their efficiency and effectiveness is shown to be false through an empirical analysis. Therefore it can be argued that there is political motivation behind reorganization of municipalities by increasing their scale rather than technical reasons like improving efficiency and effectiveness in their operations. The financial structure of municipalities is always criticized by national and international actors. Consequently, the government feels compelled to do or pretend to do something about it. Therefore to create minimal political tension it has targeted small-scale municipalities by attempting to close them down.

On the local level, when surrounding municipalities and Denizli Municipality are considered, the most important problem area is the management of urban growth by using a spatial planning tool. Annexation of surrounding municipalities to Denizli Municipality is very essential for Denizli municipality because it enables single-handed management of urban lands by using planning authority. Consequently, to control urban rents is the main motivation behind the annexation policy. In addition to this concrete conclusion, the way of managing integration process is a conflicting situation both at the local level and at the national level between Denizli and other provinces. Both local and national political actors have tried to direct and manage the process of integration, and in this way they aim to make moral and material profit from this process. However, what determines the winner of this conflict is the quality of the relationship between these actors and government.

National and local-level analyses show that reorganization of local governments both at the national and local level is brought up by political rather than technical incentives, and therefore becomes an area of manipulation.

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW**

#### **2.1. Normative Values of Local Governments**

Local governments are an important section of the general organization of the modern state apparatus. In the course of time, the importance attributed to them has increased and the role played by them becomes the focus of attention. Due to these tendencies, local governments are always one of the key figures of reorganization or reformation of public administration to respond to the changing requirements of modern times. Therefore it is necessary to explain values attributed to local governments in order to understand the nature of reform arguments.

##### **2.1.1. The Values of Local Governments**

National governments cannot deal with every necessity of all their citizens. Therefore it is inevitable to define local needs and to let them be provided by those living in that place (Sharpe, 1970:154). Additionally Sharp (1970:155) argues that a central government is not capable of grasping the unique settings of each locality, therefore local government is needed because local institutions with their own staff are better organizations to recognize and meet local needs. On the one hand, the problem of coordination is an important aspect. Central government can organize local agencies staffed by local people who know their locality well, though these agencies can not coordinate their activities with each other (Sharpe, 1970:166). On the other hand, the difficulties with service combination and priorities are the other problem areas. The definition of local needs objectively is not enough, subjective consideration of local needs must be taken into account. As well as a subjective definition of local needs, there is also the difficulty of giving priority to these needs according the varying conditions of localities. Justifiably, the central government is incapable of dealing with these conflicting jobs of defining and prioritizing the local needs according to each unique case (Sharpe, 1970:168).

Marshall (1965:5) notes that a local authority can be regarded as having three essential characteristics: operation in a restricted geographical area within a nation or a state; local election or selection; and the enjoyment of a measure of autonomy, including the power of taxation.

Additionally, Maass et al. (1959:9-10) have described the values of local governments as liberty, equality and welfare.

To promote liberty governmental power can be so divided as to protect the individual and groups against arbitrary governmental action and against great concentration of political and economic power. To promote equality governmental power can be so divided as to provide broad opportunities for citizen participation in public policy and to promote welfare governmental power can be so divided as to assure that governmental action will be effective in meeting the needs of society.

However, the framework of Maass et al. about values of local governments is criticized. It is argued that by the value of equality, political equality rather than economic equality is meant. Additionally, local governments can cause economic and social inequality since the performance of local governments in service provision can bring about inequality at the national scale. The value of welfare is also criticized by arguing that although welfare is an important concept in itself, it does not fit in with the obligations of local governments because local governments are only service-providing devices. The concept of efficiency is also more related to practical performances of local governments for service provision. Moreover, welfare and efficiency cannot coexist because they refer to different values. Consequently, Dupre (1967) defines the values of local governments as liberty, participation and efficiency (cited in Sharpe, 1970:156).

### ***Liberty***

The free market school of economists perceives local government as the next best thing to a free market because they see the central government as a threat to individual liberty. In other words, local governments are the next best solution because they compete with each other for service provision therefore they provide equality and effectiveness in these services. This interpretation assumes that people are mobile between local governments as consumers are mobile between producers

in the market. However, in reality local governments are monopolies in service provision in their own areas.

Local governments provide various types of services. Lees (1961), therefore, argues that this tendency is a supplementary reason in terms of recognizing liberty because it broadens available choices (cited in Sharpe, 1970:158).

However Sharpe (1970:158) says that the same tendency is also the source of optimal service provision because local governments are in competition. Therefore, it can be concluded that the market view's argument of local governments as a source of individual liberty is a weak one.

### ***Participation and democracy***

It may be argued that local governments are better than national governments in democratic terms because at that level individuals can really participate to government (Sharpe, 1970:159). In other words, local governments are more democratic than national governments because they facilitate the participation of people in their own government (Sharpe, 1970:160).

Local government is seen as democratic because it is thought that it provides opportunities for wide public participation, close relationship between councilors and citizens, local policy making and control of local officials (Dearlove, 1979:50). Dearlove (1979:51) indicates that according to traditional orthodoxies, local elections are the main means to satisfy the condition mentioned above.

However, it is argued that the key question is *participation in the government of what?* A local government can be perfectly democratic but at the same time it can be incompetent in doing anything important. Therefore the quantity and quality of participation should be considered (Sharpe, 1970:160).

Additionally, the other problem is that local elections do not work as proposed because people vote according to their assessment of national politics. Evidence

suggests that most councilors are aware that their fate is not dependent on their performance.

Dearlove (1979:26) indicates that none of the description and explanation of democracy is related to the reality of local governments and politics, and those interested in the reorganization of local governments misinterpret and exaggerate the democratic quality of local governments. Dearlove (1979:26-27) explains the role of traditional commitments to local self-government as following

- Traditional commitment to local self-government has encouraged a situation in which local political reality has been defined, and explained, in terms of prescriptive theory and the liberal justifications for democratic local self-government. This commitment has also been at the root of selective attention to the 19<sup>th</sup> century history of reorganization. In effect, 20<sup>th</sup> century orthodoxy has involved systematically underestimating the utilitarian reforms and minimizing the extent of central control in that period (Wickwar, 1970). In this way a mythical golden past is created which can then be used as a stick to beat what are seen as the evil of contemporary practice to be eliminated through reform.
- Traditional commitment to local self-government has been the mainspring of the conventional assessment of the problems of the established system
- Traditional commitment to local self-government has taken the edge off, and set unconscious limits on the nature of empirical enquiry into local politics. Problems and shortcomings of democracy within local authorities going unnoticed, unstudied, or misinterpreted.

### *Efficiency*

Sharpe (1970:166) argues that local governments are the most efficient agents for providing local services. The reason behind this is that local governments have an advantage compared to the central government in identifying the unique characteristics of each locality and adjusting service provision consequently.

However, Dearlove (1979:73) argues that the services provided by local governments cannot be produced in factories and distributed to people. Most of the services provided by local governments need geographical proximity between service units and people; therefore this naturally inhibits the concentration of services at a few points. Furthermore, local government services are labor intensive. In other words, local governments provide services under constant cost conditions where cheaper, large machine-inputs cannot take labor's place as more output is produced. Therefore it can be argued that there are limits of economies of scale in local government.

Dearlove (1979:74-75) also explains why market logic is not applicable to local government as following

They are area monopolist; they are not attempting to, and neither could they, maximize profits; and they lack unambiguous indicators of standards of performance. Some of the goods produced by local authorities are public goods where each individual's consumption leads to no subtractions from any other individual's consumption. In this sort of situation pricing is next to impossible. Since an efficient allocation of resources occurs when price is equal to marginal cost, it is clear that the production of non-priced goods at an efficient level can only occur by chance (Brown, 1974). Moreover, if you are serious about trying to estimate cost functions then you have to hold constant the quality of the product. This problem can, in principle, be coped with when we are dealing with the products of private manufacture, but is impossible to hold constant, or measure, the differences in quality when we are dealing with the services provided by local authorities (Thompson, 1965; Hirsch, 1970). For single-product plants the economies of scale are the potential reductions in average unit costs of production associated with higher levels of production capacity. For multi-product plants scale is a multi-dimensional concept and may be changed not only by altering the overall capacity but also in other ways. Local government is a provider of many services and so dealing with the issue of economies of scale is a very tricky exercise.

### **2.1.2. Orthodoxies about Local Governments**

Dearlove (1979:3) argues that there is a conventional view of local governments and a well-known discourse about all current problems with them. This determines the content of debates about local governments. After describing and explaining how local governments work and identifying their faults, the tradition suggests reforms to improve democracy, efficiency, effectiveness and coordinated rationality in practices of local government.

Consequently, Dearlove (1979:3) indicates that some characteristics of these orthodoxies about local governments are that they are widely shared and long-established, and therefore they are not often questioned. Even when they are questioned, the critiques rarely create a true challenge because they come from within the boundaries of the same but wider tradition by indicating currently ignored aspects of this wider tradition.

The reluctance to theorize about institutions of local governments and the poor quality of much research are both effects and causes of the survival of these orthodoxies (Dearlove, 1979:4).

Similarly Çınar et al. (2009:278) note that people make arguments about local government reform; these arguments are mostly based on predetermined

assumptions. However, due to the lack of supporting empirical studies about these arguments, these arguments turn into normative and fictive explanations.

### **2.1.3. Reorganization of Local Governments**

An example of the influence of these orthodoxies is the reorganization of local governments aiming at increasing democracy, efficiency and effectiveness to create better local government for public interests. A critique of this statement is missing because reorganization is considered as an apolitical and neutral reform. The only criticism about reform is that it is political, irrational, or narrow-minded. Therefore the critique is to a certain extent out of established thoughts (Dearlove, 1979:5-6).

Orthodox statements provide a limited view of local governments; therefore reorganization proposals also have a limited frame (Dearlove, 1979:7-8). Moreover, there is no societal consensus about it, therefore, the need for reorganization is never explained and it is never self-evidently necessary. Similarly there is no agreement about what is wrong with the local governments and what proposals should be employed to change the existing conditions (Dearlove, 1979:12).

MacKenzie (1961:5) implies that there is no theory of local government. There is no normative general theory from which we can deduce what local government ought to be; there is no positive general theory from which we can derive testable hypotheses about what it is.

### **2.1.4. Basic Problems of Local Governments**

Dearlove (1979:22) argues that the local government system is described as inefficient, subject to intense central control and dominated by low caliber councilors and officers. Then he explains the descriptions;

- The system has become increasingly **inefficient** because it is out of step with the modern age. There are too many, too small authorities. These can neither reap the economies of scale which business practice has shown to be so important, nor secure the services of man of calibre as officers or councilors.
- The massive extent of **central control** is partly explained by the rise of a national public opinion and the demand for minimum, or even uniform, standards of service across the country. More important, however, is the increasing financial dependence of local

governments upon the central exchequer. With the central government paying the piper, is it so surprising that it calls the tune.

- The issue of **declining calibre** is more tricky and complex. Part of the blame lies at the door of social and economic changes. Even so, men of calibre are deterred from becoming councilors or officers because they lack the opportunity to take truly important decisions in a situation where many local governments are small and where the whole system is dominated by central government. Party politics, the time-consuming way local governments conduct their business, and the established boundaries of local governments also deter good men from standing for council. A career in the local government service is unattractive because the scope for official action is invariably restricted by meddling councilors.

Dearlove (1979:23) points out that inefficiency, too much central control and declining caliber are seen as the main problem areas that need to be solved through reform.

However, Dearlove (1979:23-24) argues that there are rules of reform. The first rule is related to the relationship between democracy and efficiency. The rule is simply that large is efficient and small is democratic. It is argued that to attain both criteria at the same time is impossible. With respect to the problem of inefficiency, the inevitable proposal is to increase the size of local governments. The second rule is that to decrease central control and to increase local autonomy local governments should be less dependent on the central exchequer, therefore, new revenue resources should be provided to local governments. The problem of caliber may be the most difficult to solve through reform efforts.

## **2.2. Theoretical Approaches**

There are different approaches to local governments emphasizing different values or combination of values of local governments. Public choice, liberal, bureaucratic demand and radical approaches are some of the main threads of arguments. Theoretical explanations shed light on how the values attributed to local governments are realized.

### **2.2.1. Public Choice Approach**

Keating (1991:108-109) argues that public choice theory is an extension of the neo-classic model of the market to political life. A rational and informed individual making choices according to market signals is the unit of analysis. Collective choice

through voting is the topic of traditional theories of local democracy; however, individual choice through the market is the focus of public choice theory: the citizen turns into a customer. In support of this idea, public choice theory makes two important arguments that individuals evaluate public policy in terms of their utility functions and that these functions include the only possible conception of public good.

Fleischmann (1986:129-130) notes that the fundamental assumptions of this approach are methodological individualism, self-interests, individual rationality, and scarcity. Tiebout (1956:422) argues that on the production side, it is assumed that communities are forced to keep production costs at a minimum either through the efficiency of city managers or through competition from other communities. Local governments compete with each other to attract residents and business that will look for the best place in terms of tax and service levels (Dolan, 1990:32; Bunch and Strauss, 1992:615). In other words, if there is a large number of local governments competing for residents, it gives a set of price and quality signals to residents like those given by retailers in the consumer market. Therefore, metropolitan fragmentation is desirable for residents because this structure provides opportunity for citizen-customers to maximize their utility (Keating 1991:109-110). Consequently, this competition forces municipalities to be efficient in their expenditures to be successful in this race (Dolan, 1990:30).

Tullock (1970:30) argues that the public choice paradigm has two constituents. The first one is concepts like social costs, externality, and public goods; the second one is application of economic analysis to the functioning of government. Additionally, Bish (1971:159) indicates that this paradigm provides a descriptive device and has considerable usefulness in understanding the structure and functioning of American public economy of metropolitan areas.

Public choice theory has gained popularity in recent times. Phares (1989:6) says that this popularity is due to the explanation that the market, competition, and freedom of choice provide better opportunities to resolve problems than a more comprehensive, coordinated approach. Additionally, this approach gained credibility because James M. Buchanan won the 1986 Nobel Prize in economics for his studies in developing

that theory, and lastly, in public administration operations market-type solutions were ideologically widely accepted for a wide variety of social and economic problems.

Additionally, it is argued that public choice theory is related to some wider social thoughts. Newton (1975:245) has pointed out that public choice theory has a tendency to borrow from economic theory and to view the political field as a market marked by competition, knowledge of the market place and individual rationality in the pursuit of self-interest.

However there are some revisions in public choice theory. Sharp (1984:67) argues that two options specified by Clark and Ferguson are of central importance to students of urban politics, partly because political participation (voice) in all its many forms has been such a central concern in the study of urban politics. In addition, residential relocation (exit) became a salient phenomenon for urban politics with Tiebout's model of the metropolis as a marketplace of local governments where citizens "vote with their feet." However, Sharp, (1984:68) also argues that the exit-voice linkage also has ramifications for "who gets what" in urban political system. The urban underclass is less likely to use either exit or voice while advantaged urbanities are both vocal and potentially mobile. Therefore, the underclass faces a double disadvantage.

Additionally, there exist the critiques of public choice approach. Cooke (1983:39) indicates that ends are associated with means synoptically along *homo oeconomicus* lines and the best value plan results from various degrees of rational arguments. However, individuals' preferences are culturally and structurally conditioned and the market can provide distorted signals (Keating, 1991:109). Another weak point about public choice theory is that it relies on perfect information and perfect mobility (Keating, 1991:110). However, perfection in information and mobility is not satisfied.

Tkacheva (2008:156) argues that since it is assumed that municipal services are paid for by users, in Tiebout's arguments it is important that efficient provision of public services can be accomplished by communities' preferences for tax-services

packages. However, Tkacheva (2008:167) argues that new municipalities are established to shift the cost of financing municipal services to nonresidents. Wealthier people form new municipalities because they want to consume more municipal services, but at the same time they also want to pay less for this desire. Although income and property taxes are paid by residents of new municipalities, taxes of retail sales can be exported to shoppers who live in other municipalities. Therefore such an attitude distorts the basic assumption that he who consumes the services pays the cost. Furthermore, fiscally motivated incorporations also make the financing of local services more regressive, therefore the “tax burden” is higher on people who consume less municipal services. Additionally, fiscally motivated incorporations increase the volatility of municipal tax revenues because retail sale taxes are conjectural. Therefore it can be concluded that one of the basic assumptions of Tiebout that all residents pay for public goods and services according to their preferences of goods and services is not a valid one.

Additionally, Cox and Nartowicz (1980:197) note that in the public economy competitive relations between demanders and suppliers are not very strong. Competitiveness assumes demand revelation but in the case of public goods, the collective characteristic of consumption creates incentives for hiding preferences because of the problem of the free-rider. Similarly, governments are monopoly suppliers of public goods and services, and monopoly suppliers do not have to be responsive to the demands of those they are responsible for. Nishkanen (1971) emphasize that competition for power provides some constraints for monopoly power and bureaucracy (cited in Cox and Nartowicz, 1980:197) but a two-part relationship is more likely to create oligopoly rather than competition.

### **2.2.2. Liberal Approach**

Cox and Nartowicz (1980:198-199) argue that the liberal approach suggests a more inductive theory and is more concerned with equity compared to the deductive approach of the public choice approach. The liberal approach considers homogeneous utility functions of residents as essential to municipal fragmentation. The departure point for the liberal critique is empirical observation about municipalities; especially the correlation between municipal boundaries within

metropolitan areas and social well-being indicators of residents (Newton, 1975:250-251; Danielson, 1972:145; Cox, 1973:28-31, cited in Cox and Nartowicz, 1980:198-199).

Decentralization of power of education provision and revenue raising gives motivation to the wealthy section of a population to come together and establish their own municipality. Therefore they can benefit from the fiscal and social externalities they mutually offer each other (Cox and Nartowicz, 1980:199). Wingo (1973:13) also notes that exclusionary zoning in the United States is designed to segregate geographically the poor from the rich, creating and maintaining artificially homogeneous social areas. Therefore, the the spatial decentralization of local government facilitates inequality within society (Cox and Nartowicz, 1980:199). The possibility of exclusion offered by decentralization of zoning provides another incentive for municipal incorporation (Cox and Nartowicz, 1980:199). Cox and Nartowicz (1980:199) argue that fragmentation is a middle-class solution to problems because it tries to guarantee that other people's problems do not enter one's own suburb. Newton (1975:246) indicates that far from contributing to an open, pluralist and democratic system, fragmentation contributes to a closed, elitists and undemocratic system.

### **2.2.3. Bureaucratic Demand Approach**

Fleischmann (1986:130) argues that bureaucratic demand models assume that bureaucrats try to increase their control over municipal resources. Bureaucrats attempt to minimize competition with other agencies or local governments to promote their own self interest and therefore they prefer annexation of suburbs instead of incorporation in suburbs as a means of preventing the emergence of rival institutions. This argument might be valid for politicians also.

Buchanan (1971:13-14) notes that the criterion upon which the urban fiscal structure should be based is its relative efficiency in retaining its high-income, high-demand participants. He (1971:15) also argues that municipal governments from which outmigrations have taken place should insure that all sales of goods and services to newly-formed suburbs or to private individuals and groups are made on an explicit

recognition of the monopolistic powers of the parent unit. This suggests that central municipalities can arrange the cost of services such that people living in suburban areas can optimize their benefit by being annexed.

#### 2.2.4. Radical Approach

Fleischmann (1986a:63) argues that most government reorganization studies focus on the collective costs and benefits of incorporation, consolidation and annexation. Cox and Nartowicz (1980:201-202) argue that the radical perspective tries to understand institutional forms with respect to modes of production, and to the contradiction inherent to the production and modes of production. Cox and Nartowicz (1980:202) note that capital is not monolithic, and three forms of capital are relevant to understand municipal fragmentation. These forms of capital are industrial capital, merchant capital and property capital.

- **Industrial capital** has imposed a distinctive stamp in the form of tax enclaves or preemptive incorporation in order to retain control of land-use regulation.
- As far as **merchant capital** is concerned, incorporation has often been a means of securing control of the land-use regulation mechanism in order to restrict competition; also, as a result of market interests, local chamber of commerce have frequently lent their weight to the attempts of property capitals to develop and this often necessitates incorporation.
- By **property capital** we understand those capitals centrally involved in, and accumulating on the basis of, urban development process.

Due to competition, each property capital is an obstacle to another property capital because it hinders the reproduction of the other one. Decentralization of local governments is a means for property capitals to overcome barriers mutually imposed (Cox and Nartowicz, 1980:202-203).

Roweis and Scott (1978:58) argue that urban land is not a commodity in the sense that its use value is not produced by individual capitalists, but through the state intervention and collective effects of many individual social and economic activities. Specially, in the process of production of urban land, the state provides major infrastructural services and various public goods, therefore, property capitals struggle for the publicly-provided physical infrastructure essential to the development of their property. This can lead to annexation, independent suburbs, or the creation of special districts, depending upon the specific situation. However the relationship between property capital and local state intervention is mutual. Although property capital uses

boundary changes as a means of redistributing development costs to local governments, products of property capital provide property tax and other benefits to local governments (Fleischmann, 1986:136). Neiman (1975:33) notes that politics and political power, not the local government reformers, decide on the quality and quantity of metropolitan reorganization (cited in Fleischmann, 1986a:72). Boundary changes represent the use of governmental authority to gain locational advantage, and are basically redistributive.

### **2.3. Urban Growth and Political Fragmentation**

There is a close relation between urban growth and political fragmentation. In particular, the pattern of this growth has determining effects on political fragmentation. Whether or not this growth is unplanned growth, whether or not it is within the boundaries of an existing local authority, whether or not the areas where this growth happens are served by an authority and what the crucial factors are that affect the relation between growth and political fragmentation are key to the relation. In addition to this relation, there is a close relation between the factors that affect urban growth like suburbanization, migration to cities, industrialization or deindustrialization etc. and political fragmentation.

#### **2.3.1. Political Fragmentation and Its Reasons**

Dolan (1990:29) defines local government fragmentation as proliferation of government units that may exist within a given region. The forms of fragmentation can be

- Proliferation of incorporated communities within the metropolitan area
- Overlapping of city and county functions and responsibilities
- The existence of special districts, public authorities, and school districts in a metropolitan area
- Extension of boundaries of a metropolitan area without concern for state lines. (Schiltz and Moffitt,1971:88)

Dye (1988) interprets that proliferation of independent governmental units within a single metropolitan area as an urban problem (cited in Dolan, 1990:29).

Bourne (1992:511) states that the relative ease (and short-term benefits) of relocation to low-cost locations on the suburban margins of American cities has allowed many producers (and consumers) to avoid paying their share of the global social and environmental costs of their locations, particularly as these are felt in the areas of origin (the inner city, older suburbs). Schiltz and Moffitt (1971:90) argue that housing developers are the main determiners of housing locations, and they prefer to select the most profitable areas. Different local governments have different zoning regulations and therefore one local government cannot control the whole housing market. These different regulations create different advantages or difficulties for housing developers. To avoid these restrictions, the developers choose areas beyond existing development for future investments. Therefore the expansion of a metropolis destroys the countryside, while appropriate lands within existing boundaries remain unused. Similarly, Razin and Rosentraub (2000:834) emphasize that basic differences between national the political land market/planning system and land values explain variations in residential sprawl. Furthermore, Wood (1961:173-174) notes that the system which is subsumed under the title of local governments is ineffective in the aggregate principally because its parts tend to cancel out one another. The system of quasi-governmental agencies, the authorities and public corporations supports the marketplace because considerations of institutional survival often lead to programs which accelerate trends already underway. But at the end public policy seems to be ineffective in controlling patterns of urban growth and economic development. Razin and Rosentraub (2000:828) emphasize that in the large metropolitan areas with high land prices, urban sprawl is seen less. Metropolitan areas with a high level of residential sprawl are mid-size and smaller ones, because land is cheaper than in large metropolitan areas. Razin and Rosentraub (2000:829-834) enumerate the factors affecting urban sprawl as population density, median rent of housing units, population size, land values, a large metropolitan area, and being a central part of broader metropolitan region.

Phares (1989:7) argues that residents of new residential subdivisions prefer to incorporate in order to keep control over planning, zoning, and land use rather than

to be dependent on county regulations or to have the same tax base as the neighboring city government. Inter-governmental funds are also important because they are not available to unincorporated areas. Additionally, Schiltz and Moffitt (1971:89) note that widespread agreement on local values, strong personnel involvement encompassing the entire community, well organized community leaders with adequate resources, a variety of social organizations which provide a communications network, and an effective campaign for incorporation are among the causes of fragmentation. They also found that upper-class suburbs are more likely to incorporate, whereas, lower-class suburbs prefer to be annexed to the central city. Additionally they emphasize that the threats to community values, a demand for services, or the presence of some problem can provide the initial impetus for incorporation. Furthermore, Miller (1981) emphasizes that wealthy communities use incorporation to minimize the redistribution of tax revenues to poor neighborhoods (cited in Tkacheva, 2008:155-156).

Musso (2001:150) argues that

Incorporation proposals were more likely to emerge, and to get voter support, in rapidly growing counties, suggesting that one motivation was regulatory concerns regarding local land use policy, rather than traditional fiscal concerns. To the extent that incorporation allowed greater local land use control, it would also be considered to be efficiency enhancing. These regulatory incentives typically have been given insufficient attention by empirical studies.

The concept of rent is useful to understand the political economy of city formation because residents and developers can use boundary changes as a tool for generating rent for themselves. Burns (1994) shows that developers are the key actors in the development of jurisdictions and special purpose governments (cited in Tkacheva, 2008:155-156). By establishing new municipalities developers can control the spatial development of suburbs and by using this control capacity they can prevent the poor and racial minorities from coming into suburbs.

Razin and Rosentraub (2000:829-834) argue that factors that affect fragmentation are age of metropolitan area, annexation method, and large population and high proportion of poor. Cutler (1958:9) notes that in most states the statutes are largely silent as to the type of land which may be legally incorporated as a new municipality or be annexed to or consolidated with an existing municipality. Therefore it is easy to

incorporate. Additionally, Razin (1998:326) implies that intensifying competition (for the development of industrial and employment areas on green-field open space sites) leads to more dispersed patterns of suburban and ex-urban development. Processes of urban sprawl may further intensify if national planning mechanisms continue to lose strength and market influences--including those of competing local authorities-- assume an even greater role in shaping spatial patterns of development.

### **2.3.2. The Effects of Political Fragmentation**

Marando and Whitley (1972:181) emphasize that many related urban problems have been attributed to local government structure in metropolitan areas; consequently it is argued that there is a relationship between local government structure and urban-crisis.

It is argued that fragmentation leads to confusion in responsibility for service provision, reductions in political scrutiny and control, political unresponsiveness, duplication of effort, inefficiencies in service provision, higher per unit costs, larger government expenditures, units of government concerned only about their own problems, fragmented and unstable metropolitan government structure in policy making to manage money and implement programs effectively (Ecker-Racz, (1970:7-13); Baird and Landon, (1972:183); Hahn and Levine, 1980; Yates, 1980; Schneider, 1980; Grant and Nixon, (1982:425-428); Chicoine and Walzer, 1985, cited in Dolan, 1990:30).

Likewise, Grant (1970:60) argues that a fragmented metropolitan structure causes and contributes to urban problems such as unequal distribution of financial resources in metropolitan areas, the segregation of population on the basis of race or wealth, and a lack of an area-wide governmental authority responsive to the multitudes of interrelated area-wide problems (cited in Marando, 1974:229)

There are also some social consequences of a fragmented structure of local governments. Hill (1974:1567) argues that the political incorporation and municipal segregation of classes and status groups in the metropolis tend to divorce fiscal resources from public needs and serve to create and perpetuate inequality among

urban residents in the United States. Similarly, Miller (1981) emphasizes that in L.A. metropolitan area municipalities are differentiated along racial and income lines (cited in Fleischmann, 1986a:64-65). Schneider and Logan (1982:103) noted that affluent families tended to concentrate in communities with stronger local property tax bases, while the poor tended to be excluded from such communities.

It is argued that many services need specific geographical areas or population base but existing local governments are too small to carry out many of their duties because technological developments require higher costs to provide these services in small-size municipalities (Keating, 1991:103).

A fragmented structure leads to intensive competition among attracting jurisdictions within a metropolitan region. Under-taxation or subsidization of business etc can result in this competition becoming more attractive to business or residents. Nevertheless, this competition can reduce the competitiveness of a metropolitan region as a whole in national or global scale by wasting resources of the individual interests of jurisdiction or discouraging cooperation and collaboration among jurisdictions (Keating, 1991:113). A fragmented structure also causes a narrow concept of public interests. Especially, electoral process forces local leaders to define public interests with respect to just their own community; therefore they may disregard the metropolitan or regional interests (Keating, 1991:115).

Additionally, Rehfuss (1968:91-92) defines two more problem areas of a fragmented political structure in metropolitan areas. These are quality of life and process of government. Supporters of quality of life perspective are often social critics and intellectuals. Their focus is the livability of cities rather than specific service provision or a purely governmental structure (Rehfuss, 1968:101). Rehfuss (1968:105) argues that the conventional way of developing regional consensus is area-wide agreement. However, it is difficult to reach this kind of agreement and in the case of agreement it is difficult to trust it. The supporters of the process of government approach demand a stronger relation than this type of weak intergovernmental cooperation can provide, especially in areas such as land-use planning or water supply that need tough and binding action.

## **2.4. Proposed Solutions to Political Fragmentation**

As mentioned previously, political integration is the most dominant proposed policy against political fragmentation by indicating the negative side of fragmentation or positive effects of integrated structures. Providing coordinated development, reducing fiscal disparities, solving problems in area-wide service provision, increasing capacities of local governments, providing inter-jurisdictional equity, reaching scale economies, increasing quality of services, internalizing externalities, increasing the caliber of politicians and staff are some of the main arguments for integration of fragmented political structures. Apart from the arguments for integration, some argue for functional rather than political organizations for area-wide metropolitan services.

However, in addition to cases that support the arguments for the benefits of integration, some cases show that there is no proof for these arguments and there are even some indications for the reverse conclusions. There is also some ontological opposition to integration by emphasizing the features of small local authorities.

Policies designed to impede the emergence of new local authorities are quite different from integration policies applied after fragmentation occurs.

### **2.4.1. Political Integration (Why)**

Marando and Whitley (1972:181-182) say that to remedy the present chaos of local government structures in the USA with its so-called “crazy-quilt” pattern of authority, many have stressed the need for the reorganization of local government. Carver (1973:216) argues that by the mid-1960s the foundations of the political system were being destabilized. Crises, involving a wide range of social and political issues, happen almost at the same time and start to shake all social, political and economic settings of society, and thus open a way for a restructuring of governments and a reordering of priorities. Peirce (1993:309) points out that American cities are at a disadvantage unless they control unnecessary land consumption and establish minimum densities, locate work places and residential areas closer to each other, and make mass transportation an ever-larger factor in regional planning.

Frisken (1973:395) points out that political fragmentation (the proliferation of local and special purpose governments with similar or overlapping responsibilities) stays as a major barrier to systematic administration and planned development of American metropolitan areas. Frisken (1973:395) suggests that the problems of the city center (declining tax revenues, physical deterioration, and the needs of expanding low-income populations) were initially considered in isolation from their metropolitan context. However, there is an increasing trend to handle them in relation to wider problems of unplanned metropolitan growth and the absence of centralized political control, to connect their solution to accomplishment of metropolitan political unity.

Gustely (1977:350-351) notes that arguments in favor of consolidation frequently refer to fiscal disparities between jurisdictions as evidence. Brazer (1962: 68-69) suggests that the differences in size and industrial-residential composition of the property tax base between municipalities have serious implications for inter-governmental equity in public service financing (cited in Gustely, 1977:350-351). Margolis (1957:232) argues that the major differences among the fiscal structures of the various types of cities are also in their levels of expenditures. The results of these income and expenditure disparities are separation of public service needs and resources along fragmented government system. Kirp and Cohen (1972:30) suggest that there are also disparities between suburbs (cited in Gustely, 1977:350-351). Bunch and Strauss (1992:615) underline that consolidation has been occasionally suggested as a means for local governments to deal with their declining revenues.

Hutcheson and Prather (1979:166) emphasize that fragmentation and local government “jungle” are featured as the sources of crises in municipal service provision. Dolan (1990:28) notes that officials in communities dealing with increasing levels of fiscal stress and decreasing levels of service delivery argue for consolidation of local governments within the same metropolitan area or centralization of service provision as a possible solution. Boyne (1992:317-318) says that in 1974 in England, the all-purpose boroughs were replaced by a two-tier structure of local government that separated service responsibilities between county and district councils. It has been argued that the new structure has resulted in less

efficient service provision. Increased costs may have resulted from problems of service coordination and duplication of tasks. There is an emerging consensus that the two-tier structure should be eliminated and service responsibilities combined in a single authority. Marcou and Verebelyi (1992:36) argue that small-scale local governments isolated from adjacent local governments have difficulties in accomplishing their duties with their limited capacities. Richards (1978:34) notes that the main fault of the pre-1972 system in England was that local authorities were too small. Specialized services requiring highly qualified staff, purpose-built accommodations, and expensive equipment can only be economically provided to a large population. Planning also cannot be carried out in small areas. Keating (1991:105) indicates that fragmentation and functional inadequacy of local governments can lead to the transfer of function to higher levels of government, and an increase of supervision, and a high degree of centralization.

Grant (1968:104) argues that there is strength in unity, there is weakness in fragmentation, competition, confusion, and disunity. Furthermore, Grant (1968:107) notes that one important achievement of the metropolitan government in Nashville and Davidson is the achievement of an area-wide view of problems by officials and citizens. Bennett (1993:133) argues that a metropolitan government is based on centralist arguments. These arguments are as follow

- centralized authority is needed in order to provide services equitably and to redistribute tax-base resources;
- centralized production of resources is needed in order to capture scale economies;
- centralized coordination is needed for effective management of area-wide services;
- a centralized perspective is needed in metropolitan land-use planning and public policyformation;

Similarly, Cooke (1983:57) notes that planning authority has a claim to possess special expertise in grasping the public interests, thereby enabling a representative set of aims to be set for the city.

Bennett (1993:110-111) points out that the impact of being large in a fight for survival is considered by small scale governments, and amalgamation and joint regulations are well known forms of increasing the capacity of local governments. Bollens (1966:74-75) argues that no longer do fragmented governments, limited jurisdiction, and restricted tax resources prevent the required action (cited in Carver, 1973:212).

Gustely (1977:349-353) summarizes the benefits of consolidation. Consolidation can bring inter-jurisdictional equity by decreasing the differences in “tax burdens” between different areas.

Additionally, consolidation results in decreasing average costs and, therefore, expenditures of public services. Therefore public services can be provided more efficiently. Economies of scale are one of the most important results of consolidation because one of the disadvantages of small-scale municipalities is that they are too small to benefit from the advantages of scale economies like technological improvements. Another effect of consolidation is the cost-saving resulting from internalization of benefit spillovers. Hutcheson and Prather (1979:164-165) emphasize that due to the interdependence of governmental units in metropolitan areas, incorporation of small-size jurisdictions into a metropolitan government facilitates economy and efficiency in the provision of public services. Similarly, Richards (1978:32) argues that technical requirements demand large-scale production to achieve economies of scale, and in consequence, large-scale production demands fewer and bigger organization units.

Furthermore, consolidation leads to the provision of better quality services. Gustely (1977:353) emphasizes that consolidated governments can produce services that fragmented government are incapable of. Besides, Thompson (1965: 267) emphasizes that the idea of scale increase in service provision is related to quality rather than cost. Similarly, Tiebout (1960:443) argues that without a higher level of government, it is difficult to render the right quality (kind) of service. This, not economies of scale, is the issue involved when planners, civic leaders, and others, call for consolidation.

Brazer (1962:74-75) and Hirsch et al. (1964) note that governmental fragmentation causes a spillover of service benefits and costs to adjacent areas (cited in Gustely, 1977:353). Rothenberg (1970:34) argues that public decision-making is faulty insofar as important interactions either cannot be coordinated or must be disregarded due to jurisdictions being too small. Scott (1964:258-259) argues that the net effect of benefit spillovers is underproduction of services (cited in Gustely, 1977:353).

Tiebout (1961:94-95) gives an example of underproduction: residents of community A are better off without paying any extra taxes for spraying against mosquitoes when community A does not spray where all communities surrounding a town decide to spray against mosquitoes. Tiebout (1956:423) notes that in cases in which the external economies and diseconomies are of sufficient importance, some form of integration may be indicated.

Committee for Economic Development (1966:47) argues that metropolitan areas have many area-wide problems that need over-all planning and central management. Wheatley (1969) even emphasizes that cities should be planned on a regional scale including the rural hinterland (cited in Keating, 1991:102). Keating (1991:101-102) notes that coherent urban and regional planning is critical to the movement for metropolitan consolidation, because without authoritative control over resource allocation, plans are difficult to implement. Metropolitan governments are able to combine planning with the necessary resources.

The Royal Commission on Local Government in Greater London (1960) points out that there does seem to be some relationship between the size and scope of the authority and the capacity of the councilors and officials attracted (cited in Dearlove, 1979:15). In consequence, Keating (1991:106) argues that if the municipal boundaries cover bigger areas, a larger pool of talent could be reached. In a similar manner, more efficient, powerful, and businesslike councils would attract professional and business elements. This in turn would improve the quality of local administration.

Keating (1991:107) also points out that a larger and strengthened local government is supported as having counter-balance to business influence and to promote a new type of politics. Larger units are seen as having a great potential for politicization since they would be more socially heterogeneous and would be forced to make policy choices.

#### **2.4.2. Alternatives to Political Integration**

Frisken (1973:397-398) notes that local autonomy is one of the vital topics in metropolitan political reform discussions. Changes which guarantee the survival of existing units are more supported by advocates of reform.

Mueller (1982:68) defines three type of inter-local functional realignment. Government consolidation has been one option that cannot gain widespread use because voters resist it. Inter-local service agreements (metropolitan cooperation) have been used as a means to coordinate the provision of a service in a metropolitan area without government consolidation. Consolidation of delivery of a particular service under one authority (special districts) is the third option.

Frisken (1973:398) argues that metropolitan cooperation creates little or no conflict with existing governmental organizations. However, this depends upon the willingness of local governments to act collectively for common purposes. Establishing cooperative organizations is more successful than other arrangements because it creates little tension with the status quo. Hanson (1966:20) also points out that advocates of cooperation assume that suburban governments will be more informed about the needs of the metropolitan region by the creation of cooperative organizations (cited in Frisken, 1973:399).

Dolan (1990:31) emphasizes that the creation of special districts has been emphasized as one of the solutions to overcome the inabilities of local government units to provide area-wide services.

Metropolitan federation is another proposed solution to problems resulting from metropolitan fragmentation. Frisken (1973:398) notes that metropolitan federation is the creation of a two-tier political system in metropolitan areas. It involves transfers of some governmental responsibilities to the metropolitan-level government. Federation also implies delegation of some local governmental power. The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (1962:83) argues that there is an increasing interest in two broad approaches which incorporate two common basic elements: a two-level structure of government, and the assignment of certain general-

purpose responsibilities to both levels. Functions not assigned to the area-wide government are retained by municipalities. The federation plan also contains these features but it has lacked political and public acceptance. Elazar (1966:2) defines federalism as a political organization that unites smaller polities under one framework by distributing power among general and constituent governments in a manner designed to protect the existence of authority of both the national and sub-national political system, enabling all to share in the overall system's decision-making and executing processes. Weiler (1971:413) emphasizes that federation should be seen as the sharing of power rather than division of function; otherwise it loses its importance. Similarly, The Second White Paper of Bureau of Municipal Research (1944) argues that the establishment of an overriding municipality governed by an elected council with responsibility for the administration of metropolitan services and having responsibility for city planning through a single board is an alternative (cited in Rose, 1972:16).

Marcou and Verebelyi (1992:51) argue that there can be intermediate levels of government to overcome the problems of fragmentation. They define intermediate levels as

All intermediate levels are based on very stable territorial patterns which have been fixed for a long time and have originally formed the division of the territory for the authorities subordinated to central power; size and boundaries are determined by functionality rather than by community areas.

Marcou and Verebelyi (1992:51-55) also indicate that it is possible to differentiate four types of intermediate levels of local government; these are department or province, county, district and region.

The **department or province** is of French origin. Although endowed with an elected body by the Constituent Assembly, it has been bound up with the institution of the prefect since the First Empire...The new pattern of departments resulted from a compromise between rationality and tradition with the purpose of providing an adequate scale for the municipal administration of the kingdom...But the department was never thought to be a level of self-government; although elected, the authority had to be subordinated to the executive power for the purpose of the municipal administration of the kingdom.

The **county** is the second type of intermediate level of local government...It is possible to consider that counties, like departments or provinces, are an upper-tier local government, as opposed both to lower-tier local government and to regional government, but this overlooks the fact that counties can be found only in countries characterized by a so-called dual system, that is to say a detached hierarchy system with government committees, where central government is dependent on local government for policy implementation or by a so-called split hierarch system, where local government is independent of state field agencies.

The **district** is the smaller government unit. It was used under that name under the French Revolution, but later it survived only as the constituency of the sub-prefect. However, it was established in German countries as a resort for local self-government in rural areas under the king's control as represented by the landrat, appointed by him; later on it developed as a

genuine local self-government level, and is vested nowadays in the Federal Republic Germany with duties delegated from the communes and from the Land government. The district was introduced too in most central European countries and was used as a lower level relay of central government authority in former socialist regimes.

The **regional government** has a more recent history. It is an upper-tier of government which with very different features in various countries where it has been established, appears indeed in two very different forms. Political and administrative regionalism must be distinguished. In some countries, regional government is the political expression of a community that can be distinguished by history, culture and even language in specific cases; the claim for regional autonomy is based on this regional identity... The essence of political regionalism is that the loyalty to the nation state is challenged by the regional identity, which claims to reflect an underlying national or quasi-national self-consciousness; this regional feeling can be satisfied with regional autonomy or with a federative state structure, but it can also underpin the claim for independent statehood if the benefit of belonging to a wider statehood are thought to be smaller than those expected from independence... It must be emphasized that federalism, at the opposite end, does not imply political regionalism, as evidenced by Germany and Austria.

### **2.4.3. The Consequences of Political Integration (Examples)**

#### *Positive Consequences*

Carver (1973:220) argues that in the case of Jacksonville the pattern of power in the community has been changed considerably by consolidation and subsequent changes. First, professional considerations have taken the place of personal considerations. Second, conscious efforts have been made to incorporate the black community completely into the political system, and thus to make government sensitive to its desires. Finally, the council has been structured to consider the needs of the poor and minorities. Carver (1973:221) also notes that community leaders see the new consolidated structure as more accessible than the previous fragmented structure.

Grant (1968:108) notes that the experiences of two of three cities (Miami, Nashville and Toronto) show that consolidated government can be considered as a means for getting things done more than it is for reducing costs. Bunch and Strauss (1992:617) argue that under consolidation, nine jurisdictions (in Pittsburg metropolitan area) could overcome their operating difficulties.

Bunch and Strauss (1992:627) argue that the case study (Pittsburgh metropolitan area) shows that consolidation may decrease the tax burdens of people living in small and fiscally distressed municipalities. Gustely (1977:362-363) points out that the results (Dade County, Florida) show that government consolidation is likely to

decrease the large fiscal disparities among municipalities in metropolitan areas. Additionally, he adds that imposing area-wide taxation and providing a certain minimum level of services in all jurisdictions results in a redistribution of tax burdens and expenditure benefits.

### *Negative Consequences*

It is argued that many of the empirical and case studies in the literature on government consolidation do not support the hypothesis that consolidation of government results in cost reduction. It is generally concluded that larger governments do not provide non-capital-intensive governmental services at lower cost than smaller governments do. (Hester, 1970; Wilken, 1976; Horan and Taylor, 1977, cited in Bunch and Strauss 1992:616). Similarly Grant (1965:40) argues that metropolitan governments have already eliminated many duplications and has some economies, however at the same time, they have caused increased expenditures which deteriorate the economies. The foundation of a metropolitan organization provokes recommendations which lift the horizons of citizens and officials alike, and initiates budget requests and appropriations to move in the direction of these new horizons. Therefore rising expectations can results in an upward stimulus on expenditures and taxes.

Hirsch (1968:508) argues that for vertically integrated services like electricity, sewage plants, gas, average unit cost is declining as the scale of services increases; for circularly integrated services like school administration, the average unit cost is U-shaped as the scale of services increases; for the horizontally integrated services like primary education, secondary education, police protection, fire protection, and refuse collection, the average unit cost is horizontal as the scale of services increases. These results suggest that many of the proposed cost decreases due to governmental consolidation may not occur in reality.

Hutcheson and Prather (1979:167) point out that some argue that diseconomies of scale may result. Bish and Ostrom (1973:79) conclude that conclusions regarding diseconomies of scale cast substantial doubt upon the presumptions that increasing the size will yield decreasing average costs and/or increasing efficiency. The

opposite conclusion is supported by the predominant weight of evidence: increasing size beyond a moderate level yields diseconomies for many services, especially those which are highly labor intensive. Hutcheson and Prather (1979:172) also argue that state-level analysis also support the diseconomy of scale thesis.

Hutcheson and Prather (1979:167-168) say that if efficiency can be defined as serving the same population with fewer employees, economies of scale might be achieved by a relative decrease in the size of bureaucracies as city size increases. However, increasing complexity and differentiation can cause increases in bureaucracy and this increase in bureaucracy can result in decreasing efficiency, because it is possible to be lax in carrying out duties in larger bureaucracies. There is a correlation between population and bureaucracy size and besides that bureaucracy size increases faster than population (Hutcheson and Prather, 1979:168). Additionally, Hutcheson and Prather (1979:174) point out that in larger cities demand for public goods and services increases disproportionately relative to population because of economic, social, demographic, cultural, and political characteristics of larger cities. Weiler (1971:419) suggests that it also possible that the larger cities can be, in some respect, politically over-centralized as well.

There are also some critics of the way in which the problems of fragmented metropolitan areas are defined. Marando (1974:234) argues that the problems identified are abstract in nature (lack of a comprehensive governmental control), reform-oriented (duplication of functions), or determined by an expert's definition (lack of a comprehensive metropolitan growth plan). The problems and their degree of seriousness are defined according to normative and value-biased ideals about what a community should be. Nonetheless, the real needs and desires of community are neglected. The problems are also defined by a limited number of people who consider themselves to be qualified to speak on behalf of the total community. Similarly, Dolan (1990:28) emphasizes that generally criticisms of fragmentation are based on political ideologies and impressionistic views. Schiltz and Moffitt (1971:91-92) argue that due to the reformist approach of many writers dealing with governmental fragmentation, there is little or no apparent concern for objectivity and empirical evidence expected in social science inquiries, therefore the reviewers tend to conclude that alleged problems are invented rather than actual.

Additionally, Dye (1988) argues that fragmentation allows communities to maintain their independent identity. Separate identity enables having many occasions for expression of political criticism, playing a much more active role in local decision making, creating a life-style that meets the demands of the community by isolating themselves from the demand of others (cited in Dolan, 1990:32-33). Similarly Marcou and Verebelyi (1992:49) argue that the greatest disadvantages of amalgamation are that it weakens the local sense of community: the line between urban and rural regions is blurred; urban majority prevails even in rural affairs.

Warren (1966) in his case study of LA concludes that problems of fragmentation have been greatly overstated and that the capacity of a fragmented government structure has been understated (cited in Schiltz and Moffitt, 1971:91). Piven and Cloward (1967) suggest that government structure has nothing to do with the incapability of the metropolitan area to solve its problems; the only missing part is political will (cited in Schiltz and Moffitt, 1971:91).

Rosenbaum and Henderson (1973:259) argue that in both communities (Jacksonville and Tampa) the opposition to consolidation most likely refers to the concentration of too much power in the authority of the mayor as the major critical shortcoming of governmental reorganization.

Bish and Ostrom (1973:29) argue that a unit of government can occupy a monopoly position when that unit is the exclusive supplier of a good and or service for local residents. Government organizations operating under monopoly conditions have little incentive to innovate or reduce costs. DiLorenzo (1983:206) concludes that a reduction in the degree of inter-jurisdictional competition tends to increase the cost of providing local public services. Sjoquist (1982:85) finds that expenditures per capita in the central city fall as the number of jurisdictions in a metropolitan area increases. Schneider (1986:260) says that competition between municipalities leads to slower growth in total expenditures, common expenditures and the number of social services. DiLorenzo (1981:576) argues that the empirical test of the last section supports the monopoly-enhancing view of special districts' growth restrictions and leads him to reject the alternative reformist hypothesis that

consolidating or annexing special districts leads to an improved hierarchical organization of local government and diminishes the cost of providing local public services. Cook (1973:589-590) has shown that operating expenditures per capita including debt charges were \$16.50 higher in the Toronto Municipality than the control municipalities. Excluding debt charges they differed by \$14.39 per capita. He (1973:590) also argues that any contribution of possible economies of scale to reducing fiscal squeeze will be swamped by other effects.

Bennett (1993:133) makes the case that arguments against a metropolitan government are largely based on the decentralist point of view. Decentralized government is needed to guarantee citizen participation and political proximity to people; decentralized government is needed to respond to the needs and preferences of a diverse population; decentralized government is needed to protect and further local community interests. Bennett (1993:111-112) also point out that reduction in the scale of government can take place by dividing existing territories to create more effective democratic control over overgrown bureaucracies.

Nelson and Foster (1999:319) find that city-county consolidation shows a positive association with income growth, although it is not statistically significant. On the other hand, Carr and Feiock (1999:481) find no evidence of a link between consolidation and economic developments. The research on the relation between economic development and consolidation shows that economic development is a result of broader economic trends, not governmental reorganization (Savitch and Vogel, 2004:775).

Cho (1969: 371) discovered in a case of annexation by Texas cities during the 1950s that to a moderate degree annexation is associated with higher taxes, higher expenditures for fire protection, but lower expenditures for highways. MacManus and Thomas (1979) find that cities that annexed have lower increases in per capita taxes than cities that do not annex (cited in Fleischmann, 1986a:64). Benton and Gamble (1984:196) point out that in the Jacksonville-Duval County merger in 1967, city/county consolidation had produced no measurable impact on the taxing and spending policies of the consolidated government. In fact, both taxes and

expenditures increase as a result of consolidation. This result is completely contradictory to the main reform hypothesis.

#### **2.4.4. The Preventive Action Taken Against Political Fragmentation**

Tkacheva (2008:155) argues that policy makers try to reform state laws that regulate the formation of municipalities to prevent the establishment of new jurisdictions. Each state makes a different reformation according its needs.

In California, legislators altered the powers and the membership at state planning agencies (California Senate, 1998; Cortese-Knox-Hertzberg Act 2000). In Arizona and Tennessee, they temporarily suspended city consent requirement for the incorporation of municipalities (Chap. 204 of Arizona Public Acts 1997, Chap. 98; section 7 10 of Tennessee Public Acts 1997). In Missouri and Wisconsin, legislators established Boundary Review Boards (Chap. 72, section 401–403 of Missouri Public Acts 2000; Act 171, of Wisconsin Public Acts 2003).

The power to establish municipalities was reallocated to counties and cities in the US in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century by passing the constitutional amendments that outlawed the incorporation of municipalities by a special act of legislature. State legislators took action correspondingly by enacting general laws on incorporations and authorizing county judges and officials to administer them (Anderson, 1922, Chap.1; Iowa Const. article III, section 30; Ohio Const. article XVIII, section 2; Oregon Const. article XI, section 2, cited in Tkacheva, 2008:157).

#### **2.5. Politics of Integration**

One of the obvious consequences of political integration is the changes in boundaries of authorities. This kind of change results in not only administrative but also political outcomes. Therefore power relations in particular play a central role in the fate of integration efforts. In addition, the factors that affect the political integration process are integration laws, restrictions on local taxations, local political conditions, interests of local officials, interests of local business, racial factors, particularities of proposed organization, characteristics of existing organization, characteristics of communities, income structure of residents, expectation of voters, existing regional agencies, media and NGOs, local political party leaders, content of political campaigns, and approval process are among the factors that influence political the integration process. Lastly, the attitudes of national state are another factor.

### **2.5.1. Importance of Boundary Changes**

Bennett (1993:110) argues that scale may be defined as the size in terms of area and population while in public administration territory represents scale. No government organization exists without a territory. Territory is being used as an instrument of change to adjust governments and their administrations.

The boundaries of a particular local government represent a particular regulation at a given scale at a specific point in time. As time moves on, these boundaries may change. Scale adaptation can be in both directions: enlargement or scaling down. Bennett (1993:126) points out that

The development of administrative geography in westerns Europe may be characterized as a clash between two opposite forces: scale enlargement and scale reduction. Scale enlargement is a feature of rationality, of increasing efficiency, effectiveness and control... Scale reduction is a feature of territorial democracy and better management... Scale reduction is also a feature of decentralization: powers are shared by more units. In some cases powers may also shift from a higher to a lower level of government. In such a case autonomy may increase.

Feiock and Carr (2001:383) argue that boundaries determine who is included within a jurisdiction, the local arrangement of production and provision of local services, patterns of economic development, and the practice of political power. Moreover, boundary changes also cause significant distributional effects because they define whose preferences will be critical to public choice. Because boundaries define costs and benefits that people face, it is inevitable that boundary changes are a subject of political conflict between different interests. Therefore boundary change can be considered as a product of actors acting within a defined context in terms of settings determining the boundary changes (Feiock and Carr, 2001:383). Fowlkes and Hutcheson (1979:39) point out that the changing of jurisdictional boundaries causes alterations in the political, social and economic structure of communities. Likewise Çınar et al. (2009:10) say that changing the boundaries of metropolitan regions and consequent changes in the reorganization of administrations is also used to change the power relations in a metropolitan region.

Feiock and Carr (2000:229) suggest that arguments for consolidation traditionally focus on the collective gains from improved service delivery, reductions in

duplicative efforts and other administrative inefficiencies, and more professional public management. However, collective benefits have a limited capacity to explain incentives for boundary changes (Feiock and Carr, 2001:385) because boundary changes are also the subject of individual interests.

### **2.5.2. The Relation between Power and Political Integration**

Consolidation has three key variables: territory, management and political rules. Territoriality is an important factor for consolidation or annexation. Sack (1986:25) argues that geography's concern with multiple uses and conceptions of space, and the historical geographies of different peoples, presents space as a complex framework in which individuals and groups are situated, through which they interact, and by which they make statements. Yet these interconnections between space and behavior rest on territoriality. The space that we live in gives us identity, and the boundaries limiting that space determine how we organize our economic, social, political and cultural lives (Savitch and Vogel, 2004:761). Realigning management is important for consolidation efforts because it legitimizes the consolidation (Savitch and Vogel, 2004:762). Perhaps the most important one is the realignment of political rules. Process of election, mayoral power, legislative prerogatives, and allocation of political resources are all parts of political rule. Changing these rules is directly related to power, but it is unspecified. Changes in political rules not only reorganize internal relations but also external relations. Municipalities use it to strength their position within a locality and can enhance their influences on other governmental units.

Moreover, Agger, Goldrich, and Swanson (1964:683) argue that a comparative study of a large number of communities, controlled for size, might show a relationship between size and type of regime and power structure. Similarly, Sjoquist (1982:85) mentions that several authors have shown that the equilibrium that results from the interaction of the median-voter decision and the Tieboutian migration is Pareto optimal. However, that analysis assumes no strategic behavior. It is possible that when strategic behavior is incorporated, the resulting equilibrium may not be Pareto optimal.

Lowndes (2001:1966) concludes that institutional arrangements embody power relations. Dearlove (1979:12-13) argues that reorganization may be an overt policy designed to place the control of government in particular hands. The reorganization of local governments is so fundamental to the political world of organized power for particular advantage that it must have consequences for the ongoing struggle to control government. Similarly, Savitch and Vogel (2004:758) argue that local reorganization causes changes in the political structure because boundary changes affect the kinds of issues that are important to decision makers as well as the relative power of different groups within boundaries.

It can be argued that most of the theoretically proposed consequences of governmental reorganization do not happen in reality, therefore there should be another reason behind consolidation efforts. Savitch and Vogel (2004:780) argue that to think of consolidation in terms of efficiency, equity, growth, or sprawl is a mistake, but that reorganization is better explained in terms of pragmatic logic that promotes economic and political interests. Savitch and Vogel (2004:782) point out once more that consolidation is better explained by the logic of opportunity. Similarly, Savitch (1994:565) emphasizes that changes in organizational structure can be an influential tool for shaping priorities. Schattschneider (1960:20) argues that partisans of large-size and small-size organizations differ passionately, because the outcome of the political game depends on the scale on which it is played.

### **2.5.3. The Factors Affecting Political Integration**

Wheeler (1965:357) argues that the more favorable the law, the more likely cities are to annex. Martin and Wagner (1978:410) find that substantial differences exist among states in the institutional framework governing community formation, but very little is presently understood about the consequences of alternative institutional and contractual stipulations.

MacManus (1981:1208) emphasizes that another widely cited reason for creating special districts is to avoid state constitutional and statutory restrictions on local government taxing and borrowing powers. In other words, creating a special district is a way for local governments to expand their revenue sources, particularly in urban

areas. MacManus and Thomas (1979) find that cities tend to annex more as states put greater limitations on their taxation autonomy (cited in Fleischmann, 1986a:63-64).

Dye (1964:435) also finds that manager (reformed) cities are more likely to annex than non-manager cities. And he (1964:441) also argues that annexation activity declines consistently when increases in social differential favor the suburbs.

Teaford (1979:185) argues that in the hope of uniting the metropolis without yielding local rule, suburbanites had suggested federative forms of government. Such schemes would allow suburbanites to maintain their superior schools and exclusionary zoning codes while satisfying hopes of central-city growth and metropolitan efficiency. Federation would fulfill the dreams of central-city boosters while placating the local spirit in the suburbs.

Grant (1968:109) summarizes the main reasons for the failure to create metropolitan governments as follows:

- The strong mutual distrust of the suburbs and core cities of each other militates against political union.
- Political party cleavages between Democratic core cities and many Republican suburbs almost guarantee the opposition of at least one group of party leaders to area-wide government.
- The American tradition of a guaranteed veto power for all units of government stacks the cards heavily against the adoption of area-wide government.
- The popular fear of “big government” and the tendency to equate the metropolitan government concept with big government places two strikes against any proposal for area-wide government, regardless of how careful the proponents are to guarantee the continuation of all existing government.
- One other deterrent to the adoption of area-wide government for metropolitan communities is the failure of political scientists, for the most part, to distinguish between the problems of older, larger, more complex metropolis, and that of the newer, smaller, less complex metropolis.

Friskien (1973:400) also summarizes the major impediments to political integration as

- The great difference between central cities and surrounding jurisdictions in terms of size
- Insufficient communication and lack of mutual understanding between central cities and suburbs
- The absence of area-wide leadership.

Moreover, Friskien (1973:412) adds wide disparities in goals, attitudes, and social characteristics in metropolitan areas between jurisdictions as another obstacle to metropolitan political unification. Official actions that contribute to these disparities

such as regulations making dispersion of central-city inhabitants throughout metropolitan areas easy, contributions towards the decline of the central city, or policies maintaining economic disparities between citizens are the main sources inhibiting the creation of metropolitan common interests.

Marando (1974:230) argues that metropolitan reorganization, where accepted, has been influenced more by political conditions than the objective of a metropolitan-wide approach to metropolitan-wide problems. Similarly, Rosenbaum and Henderson (1973:261) note that the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations warns urban reformers not to deal as much with technical and administrative details of consolidation proposals so that they pay no attention to the play of vested interests that might determine the outcome of a consolidation process.

Feoick and Carr (2001:389) argue that elected officials play a central role in annexation, foundation of special districts, and consolidation. Burns (1994); Fleischmann (1984); Messinger (1989); and Miller (1981) imply that government personnel such as city and county managers, and employees from bureaucracies such as school, police, and fire departments can be important informal players in reorganization decisions (cited in Feoick and Carr, 2001:392). Burns (1994) and Miller (1981) also note that public officials from the county and nearby city governments try to prevent the formation of new municipalities because the formation of new municipalities causes a decrease in current and future revenues (cited in Feoick and Carr, 2001:392). Therefore, public officials find municipal annexation and the formation of special district governments preferable to city-county consolidation for the rearrangement of service provisions (Feoick and Carr, 2001:394). Porter et al. (1992) point out that public officials prefer the creation of special districts because it is enough to avoid debt and expenditure limitations on municipalities and to alter service provisions (cited in Feoick and Carr, 2001:394). Additionally public officials prefer special district governments because in this type of government they can not lose their power (Feoick and Carr, 2001:395).

Fleischmann (1984) argues that business interests were active players in annexation decisions between 1940 and 1980, whereas, Carr and Feoick (1999:478) suggest that business interests may be active opponents of consolidation proposals because

consolidation may result in the elimination of structures that provide distributive benefits to existing manufacturing and development interests. Burns (1994) indicates that manufacturers play the role of concerned entrepreneurs in a new municipal government, and developers show the similar attitude in the arrangement of special districts (cited in Feoick and Carr, 2001:389). It is widely argued that business organizations are well organized and well financed institutions. These features of business organizations make them advantageous in translating their preferences to boundaries (Feoick and Carr, 2001:396). Schneider (1989) also argues that one of the advantages of business organizations in boundary definitions is their supposed role in economic development (cited in Feoick and Carr, 2001:396).

Racial factors are important in consolidation issues. Bollens and Schmandt (1965:503) argue that black political leaders consider the reorganization of local political systems as unfavorable because their political power lies in the central city. The consolidation of the central city with suburbs poses a threat to their political dominance because these suburbs have mostly white inhabitants. However, Grant (1971) states that whites perceive government consolidation as an attempt to make them finance other people (cited in Marando and Whitley, 1972:189). On the other hand, minority groups do not vote against consolidation in all cases. Zimmerman (1970:537) states that

Motivations for consolidation are many and varied. Although the growing political power of blacks in central cities may predispose a number of whites to favor consolidation, it must not be overlooked that the deep and growing fiscal crisis of many central cities is a major reason why certain groups favor consolidation. If conditions in the central city, which increasingly is becoming black, are to be improved, new financial resources must be found. A metropolitan government would be in a position to mobilize considerably larger resources than a central city to solve the most pressing problems in the area.

Additionally, a sufficient level of minority representation in consolidated governments may lessen the opposition (Marando and Whitley, 1972:190).

Marando and Wannmaker, (1972:521) argue that electing administrators facilitates support for consolidation. Voters also favor a consolidated government if the selected legislative body is enlarged. The explanation could be that citizens desire to have a representative who knows and can represent their interests. Therefore increasing the number of representatives can satisfy this desire (Marando and Whitley, 1972:191).

Existing governmental organizations (special districts) is another factor that influences voters negatively for city-county consolidation because, as Bollens and Schmandt (1965:441) argue, despite their functional restrictiveness, metropolitan district governments accomplish impressive work. They alleviate or satisfy some of the most urgent area-wide needs of metropolitan areas. Therefore it can be argued that special districts may lessen the need for city-county consolidation. (Marando and Whitley, 1972:193).

Marando and Whitley (1972:197) also suggest that the unique community conditions have an important effect upon voter reaction to city-county consolidation. Without these unique and critical conditions, consolidation efforts can not conclude successfully.

Oates (1972:204) argues that the income variable, which is statistically significant, suggests that wealthier countries tend to be more decentralized in their public finance than poorer ones. This is significant because decentralization is expensive and can only be afforded by prosperous countries (Tanguay and Wihry, 2008:327). Nelson (1990:452) says that strong support is observed for the theory that the number of jurisdictions in a metropolitan area is directly related to the degree of heterogeneity of individual preferences for locally-provided goods. Greater income variation leads to more local governments of all types.

Filer and Kenny (1980:184) find that the city voter, who supports consolidation, should expect community income to increase by approximately 9 percent on average as a result of consolidation. On the other hand, the suburban resident, who strongly opposes the merger, can expect the community's family income to fall by 6 per cent with consolidation. Voters who believe that de-merger will cause an increase in prices of public goods and services oppose holding a referendum and de-merger in the referendum. Voters who believe that there will be an increase in public expenditures support the holding of a referendum and de-merger in the referendum (Tanguay and Wihry, 2008:340).

Sayre and Kaufman (1960:11-12) indicate that some regional development agencies (Metropolitan Police Board (1857), and Board of Health & Board of Excise (1866)) established before the consolidation were considered by many as an indicator of necessity of complete consolidation.

Sayre and Kaufman (1960:12) point out that the New York press and Municipal Union Society were the greatest supporters of Andrew H. Green, the best known and most determined force for consolidation.

Sayre and Kaufman (1960:13) summarize the story of consolidation in New York as

Long-range aspirations for a Greater City, the sentiment for an independent Brooklyn, and the social and economic interdependence of the metropolitan districts all become inextricably interwoven with short-range incentives of the main actors in the contest. In the end, it was the party leaders and the public officials who brought the tangled issues to decision. The central and crucial actor among these was Thomas C. Platt, long the leader of the Republican state party organization.

Sayre and Kaufman (1960:13-14) argue also that

The charters of 1897 and 1901 were framed in the midst of, and as a products of, a complex political contest involving not only the creation of the Greater City but also the stakes of the political system of New York State and the of the nations as well.

The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (1962:7) observes that careful oversight of the design of a reorganization proposal increases the chances of the approval of a reorganization proposal but imprecision of specification of some significant issues can cause failure (cited in Rosenbaum and Henderson, 1973:257). However, Marando (1974:237) argues that there is no relationship between the quality, and depth of a reorganization proposal and the acceptance of reorganization. In most cases, very few voters know the details of a proposal because people do not actively participate the studies of a reorganization proposal (Marando, 1974:238).

The typical governmental reorganization campaign uses the mass media (Marando, 1974:238). Savitch and Vogel (2004:778) suggest that the city's newspaper was central to integration's success. However, most campaigns are organized around loose coalitions of groups (Marando, 1974:239). The campaign approach to inform the public of reorganization turns into polarized campaigns using for and against slogans about consolidation broadcast through mass media (Marando, 1974:240). Rosenbaum and Henderson (1973:257-258) argue that it is not details but the broad

slogans and generalized benefits which citizens mention about campaigns for consolidation. Marando (1974:240) points out that in comparison to generalized benefits mentioned by proponents of consolidation, the opposition forces exploit the fears of the black community by saying that it will lose control of the city-center, and the fears of white suburbs by saying that tax levels will increase. In all cases the strengths and weaknesses of reorganization were reduced to simple and most probably incorrect slogans (Marando, 1974:240).

Marando (1974:244) argues that unique conditions specific to a particular reorganization effort is the most important factor affecting the consequences of reorganization efforts.

In addition, political acceptance of reorganization is more difficult to achieve if two sets of political processes are required such as local and national approval (Marando, 1974:249).

Furthermore, Rosenbaum and Henderson (1973:254) indicate that the reason behind the success of reorganization is the community's influential upper class support for reorganization.

### ***The Role of National State***

Fowlkes and Hutcheson (1979:39) argue that both central-city and suburban voters often oppose integration, therefore some people start to suggest that state or national government should take an active role in the metropolitan integration effort.

Sengstock (1960) determine five type of state's approach to annexation:

- Popular determination: states allow the affected electorate or property owner to determine if a boundary change will take place.
- Municipal determination: states allow the municipality to unilaterally extend its boundaries
- Legislative determination: states permit annexations through special acts of the legislature
- Quasi-legislative determination: state grant an independent, non-judicial agency or board the authority to determine whether or not annexation take place
- Judicial determination: the courts determine whether or not annexation takes place, generally using guidelines established by the legislature (cited in Facer II, 2006:698).

Facer II (2006:700-702) determines the constraints created by the state as the following:

- Judicial oversight and review: involving the judiciary is an alternative to using an independent board, such as a boundary commission, for resolving annexation concerns
- Election: one way that states limit the ability of municipalities to annex property is by requiring a referendum
- Public hearing: many states require public hearing as part of their annexation procedures, which may be viewed as a way to limit annexation by opening up the process to greater scrutiny and input.
- Service plan: service plans are generally detailed outlines of goals of extending and providing services to areas proposed for annexation.
- County governing authority approval: it provides county officials with a formal input mechanism in the annexation process
- Boundary agency: it is an independent review body that either oversees the entire annexation process or serves as an appeal or oversight body to ensure that annexation procedures are followed.
- Impact reports: it generally require an assessment of the financial implications of the annexations, including the estimated revenue that would be generated, as well as the estimated expenditures including any necessary capital expenditures.

However, Facer II (2006:703-705) argues at the same time that a state can facilitate the reorganization:

- Local resolution: most states allow municipalities to initiate annexation through a local resolution or ordinance.
- Property owner initiation: most states allow a property owner to initiate an annexation; this approach is essentially the property owner's alternative to annexation by resolution.
- Unincorporated islands: they are areas wholly surrounded by one or more municipalities. To serve these areas, the service provider often must pass through other jurisdictions to deliver services.
- Municipally owned land: municipalities often purchase lands outside their corporate boundaries for infrastructure development or for recreation facilities.
- Cross-county annexation: it occurs when a municipality in one county annexes land in an adjoining county.
- Noncontiguous annexation. All states that have annexation procedures also have some type of contiguity requirement, meaning that the land annexed must be adjacent to the municipality in some defined way. Some states also allow noncontiguous land to be annexed if certain criteria are met.
- Health and safety concerns: several states have special annexation provisions for health and safety hazards; they are provided for extraordinary circumstances where the normal annexation procedures make it difficult to respond to critical situations
- Legislative initiated: if the state legislature is specifically authorized to make changes to municipal boundaries through annexations, then the state is classified as having state legislature annexations.

#### **2.5.4. The Dominant Form of Political Integration in the US: Annexation**

Annexation is not considered as a significant form of governmental reorganization. Lineberry (1970:684) argues that annexation is a limited solution, both because of the rather stringent requirements established by most state legislation and because of the general absence of unincorporated land adjacent to most major cities. Maranda

(1974:249) suggests that political reorganization is more difficult if there is a need to set the political process differently at local and central level. However, reorganization by annexation requires political process at only one level. Moreover, Marando, (1974:250) argues that annexation is a non-ideological method of metropolitan reorganization. Grant (1970) supposes that annexation is not a reflection of the middle-class/public administration ethic which emphasizes that area-wide government is a rational way of managing metropolitan areas (cited in Marando, 1974:250). Annexations are responses to real problems, they are not imagined needs of a metropolitan area based on the middle class tendency for efficiency, economy, and rationality (Marando, 1974:250). Marando (1974:250) argues that Annexation is an extremely flexible tool both in terms of extent of reorganization and extent of ideology. Because of its limited political, social and economic consequences, annexation is referred as the main form of reorganization.

#### **2.5.5. The Differences between Expected and Attained Consequences in Political Integration Attempts**

Savitch (1994:565) argues that conflicting values often explain unanticipated consequences. Efforts to reconcile these values can result in worsening effects. Reorganization represents a strategy designed to accomplish multiple values. These values are products of long-time experiences. According to the scope of reorganization and its long term frame, some values are more suitable than others for different sections of society; therefore there could be some contradiction between values. Within this framework, reorganization can produce unpredictable outcomes, because reorganization is full of conflict that can invalidate the intent of decision makers (Savitch, 1994:567-568). Although not all unanticipated consequences threaten intended actions, some in the end become undermining effects (Savitch, 1994:570).

Savitch (1994:568) points out that context is the other factor affecting reorganization, because change does not happen in a vacuum and is shaped by context. However, context also changes and the consequence of an action cannot be the same under another condition. Additionally, political culture, institution and practices determine the way in which the reorganization is understood (Savitch, 1994:569).

Savitch (1994:569) argues that proposed action for reorganization can include both stated arguments (administrative efficiency) and unstated arguments (political dominance).

Savitch (1994:586-588) explains the importance of structure for the unanticipated consequences of reorganization.

Contrary to the view that minimizes structural impact or insists that personal abilities can override structure, **structure counts, and it counts a great deal** (Eulau, 1963; March and Olsen, 1983; Heineman and Hessler, 1980). Organizational structure defines and establishes patterns of authority. These patterns determine who is boss, and they allocate authority to constituencies. Structure then throws weight onto individuals who are animated by particular motives and special interests...**Structure also determines how functions relate to one another.** Functional relationships not only are boxes connected by arrows on organizational charts but are a way of linking means to ends that are bound to shape outcomes. Functional divisions convey norms and behavioral expectations. Explicitly or implicitly, they furnish cues about discretionary bounds and individual relationships. More broadly, they set a mood that shapes attitude and underlies whether to emphasize, underplay, or ignore a mandate...**Structure counts in determining unanticipated consequences.** The layering of authority and creation of multiple organizational enclaves are levers for the selection of value. How subgroups respond to this and how they interpret their role create consequences for further action...**Structure counts differently in different context and in different system.** Given another type of system, structural impact may not be uniform...**Structure also creates opportunities and allows for their selection.** Political transformations enable new elites to bend structures toward regime priorities. Some elites stress coordination and enhanced services; others stress policy innovation and new opportunities. Some elites underscore the necessity of control; others encourage free interplay...Those who run structures select what they believe to be the most advantageous functions. **Down through the organizational pyramid, structures takes a life of its own...** Agencies will avoid some power vacuums and fill others. They will slough off roles that do not enhance their profile and absorb those that do...**Structures do not always perform roles for which they have been suited.** They fill roles that suit their best performance...Reorganization is an ongoing process. **Structures continually interact and make adjustment to each other's power and discretion.** Like armies on the field, agencies develop mechanisms and tactics for offsetting the other's advances. The record of reorganization is replete with inter-agency tactics and counter-tactics, organizational shields, and measures to penetrate those shields.

## 2.6. Summary and Conclusion

Local governments have a growing importance in modern public administration. Due to this growing importance they are always subject to reorganization or reformation. These reorganization or reformation attempts have two aims: the first one is to respond to the changing demands of the population, and the second one is to improve these local governments in their operations. However, there are some key values that guide the reformers while they reorganize or reform local governments. These values are the basics values of local governments.

Liberty, participation or democracy, and efficiency are described as the three basic values of local governments. The value of liberty has roots in the liberal economic approach. In this approach the central government is seen as threat to individual liberty. In contrast to the central government, local governments are assumed to be in competition with each other to attract people by providing different quality and quantity of services. As a result of this competition people can choose the local government that best fits their demand. These options satisfy the condition of liberty. Consequently, liberty is considered as one of the key values of local governments.

Local governments at the same time are also considered as more democratic than central governments because it is thought that it is easier to participate in government at the local level. It is also argued that at the local level the political distance between rulers and ruled is less. However, the value of participation can be criticized from the perspective that, in sum, the critical question is *participation of what?* A local government can be democratic but incompetent to do anything. Therefore quality of participation is as important as the concept of participation itself. Additionally, it is argued that local elections do not work as assumed because rather than a local government's performance, the central government's performance determines the behavior of the local voter. It is also argued that the democratic aspects of local governments are exaggerated.

Efficiency is regarded as another basic value of local government as well. The reason behind this understanding is that local governments can recognize the unique characteristics of each locality and change their service provision accordingly. However, the value of efficiency in local governments is criticized as well. The basis of this critique is that the concept of efficiency belongs to the operation of factories that produce unique products and use capital-intensive production methods. Nevertheless, local governments provide labor-intensive services and differentiated products. Therefore the logic of efficiency is not applicable to local governments.

Of course none of these assumptions are without criticisms but they are widely accepted as the basics of local governments. In most reform or reorganization efforts, these basic values become the main guides for the content of new regulations. These values are also considered as orthodoxies of local governments. It is noted that they

are commonly shared and long-established, therefore they are beyond question. Even if they are questioned, they can be hardly challenged, because the logic of critiques also does not come from any external understanding.

As mentioned above, the aims of any reorganization or reformation of local governments are to improve the democratic aspects of local government, and to increase efficiency and effectiveness of local public service provision. Due to the absence of any substantial critique of these orthodoxies, any reform or reorganization attempt is considered as apolitical or neutral.

Different theoretical approaches to local governments emphasize different values or different combination of values of local governments. Public choice, liberal, bureaucratic demand and radical approaches are some of the main threads of theoretical approaches. Theoretical approaches are important to understand how the normative values of local governments are put into practices.

The public choice approach assumes that if there are large numbers of local governments, there will be competition among them to attract residential units and business. Costs and benefits provided by each local government give signals to any potential residential or or business investment like those given by retailers or sellers to any consumer in the market. Therefore political fragmentation in metropolitan regions is supported by this idea because it gives opportunity to people to act according to their own economic, social, cultural and political conditions. As a result of this competition, local governments are forced to do their best.

However, there are critiques of the public choice approach. First, the public choice approach is based on the acts of economically rational behavior. However, behaviors of human beings are culturally and structurally conditioned. In addition to that, the market can give distorted signals instead of perfect signals. The other weak point of the public choice approach is its assumption about people's perfect mobility capacity. However, the condition of perfect mobility can not be satisfied by residents due to their other disadvantages. In this approach it is assumed that the cost of municipal services is paid by the users. However, establishment of new municipalities can shift the cost of municipal services to nonresidents. For example,

although people live in suburban areas and pay property tax to their own local governments, they can benefit from services provided by the inner city municipality. Therefore people living in the inner city may shoulder the extra tax burdens. Additionally, the demand revelation according to price is the logic of individual consumption; however the collective characteristic of municipal services can be a reason to hide the individual preferences. Moreover, local governments have a monopoly in supplying public goods and services; therefore they can be unresponsive to demands of local people due to their monopolistic status.

The liberal approach argues that people who have similar utility functions should live together, and therefore municipal boundaries should be drawn accordingly. The difference between the liberal approach and the public choice approach is that the public choice approach comes from a more deductive understanding; however the liberal approach comes from a more inductive understanding. The beginning of the liberal approach is empirical observation about municipalities where people who have similar preferences cluster within municipalities.

However, the liberal approach is also criticized. It is mentioned that this approach leads to the concentration of poverty in some areas and facilitates segregation among social class. Additionally, it is interpreted as a middle class solution to keeping out the problems of other people. Instead of an open, pluralistic and democratic system, political fragmentation along social and economic lines contributes to a closed, elitists and undemocratic system.

The bureaucratic demand approach argues that municipal bureaucrats try to maximize their control on municipal resources; therefore they choose annexation of suburbs rather than incorporation in the suburbs. Incorporation in the suburbs leads to the emergence of new local governments and thus competition between old and newly established local governments. Competition disturbs the means of expenditure or use of power among bureaucrats. Instead of competition, they prefer monopoly in their decision making process.

The radical approach states that most governmental reorganization studies focus on the collective costs and benefits of incorporation, consolidation or annexation;

however it argues that institutional rearrangements should be interpreted with reference to modes of production and to contradictions inherent to the capitalist system.

One of the most important topics of local government reformation/reorganization attempts is political fragmentation in metropolitan areas. Political fragmentation can be defined as the proliferation of independent government units within the same metropolitan region. There is a close relation between urban growth and political fragmentation. In particular, the pattern of this growth has decisive effects on political fragmentation. Suburbanization as a form of avoiding social and environmental cost of the inner city or older suburbs, the aim of housing developers to find the most profitable area for housing development out of existing municipal boundaries, the strategy of institutional survival of quasi-governmental agencies which accelerates the trends that are already underway, median rent of housing units, population density, population size, land values, being a central location within metropolitan regions are listed as the main factors of urban growth.

After the development of new residential areas, people living in these areas tend to incorporate to keep control over their tax-base, planning, zoning, land use decisions etc. Inter-governmental funds are also important because these funds are not available to unincorporated areas. In addition to these, widespread agreements on local values, strong personal involvement in social issues, strong community leadership are also central factors of political fragmentation. The income level of suburbs, existence of any threats to community values, a demand for services, or the presence of some problems can provide motivation to incorporate.

Confusion in responsibility for service provision, reductions in political scrutiny and control, political unresponsiveness, duplication of efforts, inefficiencies in service provision, higher per unit costs, larger government expenditures, units of government concerned only about their own problems, fragmented and unstable metropolitan government structure in policy making are summarized as the consequences of political fragmentation. In addition to these, unequal distribution of financial resources in the metropolitan region, the segregation of population on the basis of race or wealth, and lack of an area-wide governmental authority responsive to

interrelated area-wide problems are mentioned as the other disadvantages of a fragmented governmental structure. It is also argued that many services need a population base to be provided however existing local governments are too small due to political fragmentation. Moreover, a fragmented structure leads to competition among jurisdiction to attract residents and business by tax-reductions or subsidies. Conversely, this competition can reduce the competitive capacity of a metropolitan region as a whole because it discourages cooperation and collaboration among neighboring jurisdictions.

Political integration is the most dominant policy proposition against political fragmentation by referencing to the disadvantages of fragmentation or the advantages of integration. Coordinated development, reducing fiscal disparities among jurisdictions, solving problems of area-wide service provision, improving capacities of local governments, increasing the size of local governments to benefit from economies of scale, increasing quality of services, internalizing externalities, increasing the caliber of politicians and municipal staff are the main arguments to support the idea of political integration.

An alternative to political integration is change that guarantees the survival of existing units. An inter-local service agreement (metropolitan cooperation) is used as a means to coordinate the provision of a service in a metropolitan area. Consolidation of delivery of a particular service under one authority (special districts) is another alternative to the consolidation of local governments. Moreover metropolitan federation is another proposed solution to political fragmentation in metropolitan regions. Metropolitan federation is defined as the creation of a two-tier political system in metropolitan areas. It includes the transfer of some responsibilities to the metropolitan-level government. Additionally, the creation of intermediate levels of government is another alternative to political integration. Intermediate levels of government are subordinated to the central power, and their size and boundaries are determined by functionality rather than jurisdictional divisions.

It is noted that there are both positive and negative consequences of political integration. On the positive side, professional consideration in the management of government, incorporation of disadvantages into the political system, more

accessibility to representatives, overcoming operational difficulties, decreasing people's tax-burden, decreasing fiscal disparities among local governments among metropolitan region, increasing efficiency, and reducing externalities and providing effective planning are among the positive consequences of political integration.

On the negative side, there is no reduction in costs, perhaps, even an increase in expenditures due to rising expectations from government, emergence of diseconomies of scale especially in labor intensive services, and efficiency due to increasing bureaucracies in large governments are among the negative consequences of political integration.

Change in the boundaries of authorities is an obvious outcome of political integration efforts. However, this kind of change leads has not only administrative but also political consequences. Therefore power relations play a central role in integration efforts. Additionally, integration laws, restrictions on local taxation, local political conditions, the interests of local officials, interests of local business, racial factors, characteristics of communities, residents' income structure, voters' expectations, existing regional or area-wide agencies, the attitudes of local media and NGOs, local political leaders' thoughts, the content of political campaigns for and against political integration, and the voting process are among the factors that influence the political integration process. In addition to these the attitude of the national state is another important factor.

Although it seems an administrative or a technical solution to problems emerges due to political fragmentation in metropolitan regions, it is rather a political effort. The reason behind this argument is that political fragmentation does not result from some natural processes. Social, economic, cultural, and political factors lead to fragmentation processes. Therefore any policy that intervenes with any outcome resulting from these factors is obviously subject to politics.

Understanding these theoretical explanations is important because they are a guide to the appreciation of ongoing reform efforts in the Turkish local government system both on the national and local scale. Most of the supporting arguments or opposing ideas are based upon them. The central government, as the reformist-side, most

frequently uses theoretical arguments supporting the reform efforts emphasizing an economic rationale to increase the scale of local governments. Conversely, the opposition party as the antireformist-side employs ideas emphasizing democratic values of local governments to prevent the reform efforts. In addition to theoretical explanations, empirical findings are also important in understanding the local cases especially because theoretical explanations are sometimes not enough to comprehend what is taking place on the local scale.

All of the theoretical and empirical arguments emphasized for and against local government reform are going to be tested through the chapters focusing on the national and local levels. Therefore it will be possible to reveal the real motivation behind the reform efforts of the political party in power. Empirical findings and their consequent interpretations will also be a contribution to the literature.

## **CHAPTER 3**


### **MUNICIPAL CONTEXT**

#### **3.1. Introduction**

The government has tried to increase the scale of municipalities in Turkey by enacting legislations since it came into power in 2003. These legislations include the Municipality Law (5215, 5272, and 5393) and Special Laws (5025 and 5747) which propose the closing down of municipalities that have a population of less than 2000 people. The government's basic argument to legitimize these reorganizations is that the existing municipal structure has too many small-scale municipalities and this is an obstacle to the efficient and effective operation of the system. The aim of this section is to present the development of existing conditions and the proposed reasons for it, to look through the evaluation of existing conditions from the inside in terms of its problems and possible solutions to overcome its small-scale characteristic, and to summarize the basic arguments of political parties expressed for and against the laws mentioned before and during the legislation process in the National Parliament. In other words, this section aims at shedding light on the context of recent development in the reorganization of municipal structure.

#### **3.2. Historical Development of Municipalities**

There were approximately 400 municipalities inherited from the Ottoman Empire at the emergence of the Turkish Republic. However the number of municipalities reached 3228 at the beginning of the millennium. Especially after the mid 1980s there was a sharp increase in the number of municipalities.



**Figure 3.1. The Number of Municipalities**


*Source: Turkish Statistical Institute (2005:8.)*

In accordance with the increasing number of municipalities and migration to urban areas, the proportion of the population living in a municipality increased from 25.8% in 1935 to 78.8% in 2000. Therefore only one fifth of the total population lives under a village administration today.

**Table 3.1. Proportion of Population Living In a Municipality**

year	total population	Population living in a municipalities	proportion of population living in a municipality
1935	16,158,018	4,174,542	25.8
1940	17,820,950	4,753,304	26.7
1945	18,790,174	5,145,020	27.4
1950	20,947,188	5,768,665	27.5
1955	24,064,763	7,804,354	32.4
1960	27,754,820	9,994,644	36.0
1965	31,391,421	12,787,663	40.7
1970	35,605,176	16,753,979	47.1
1975	40,347,719	20,500,442	50.8
1980	44,736,957	25,523,604	57.1
1985	50,664,458	31,223,447	61.6
1990	56,473,035	37,884,455	67.1
2000	67,803,927	53,404,784	78.8

*Source: Turkish Statistical Institute (2005:8)*



**Figure 3.2. Proportion of Population Living In a Municipality**


Source: Turkish Statistical Institute (2005:8)

In the Turkish municipality structure there are two different kinds of municipalities. In fact there are two different laws regulating the administration of municipalities. The Metropolitan Municipality Law defines the functions, authorizations, and responsibilities of metropolitan municipalities (see appendix-1). The Municipality Law identifies the powers and privileges of the municipalities (see appendix-2).

**Table 3.2. Type of Municipalities**

Within the Metropolitan Municipality boundary	
yes	no
*Municipality of district center	*Municipality of province center *Municipality of district center *Sub-district and village municipalities.


Within the boundaries of metropolitan municipalities, the relationship between the metropolitan municipality and district municipalities can be seen as a two-tier system because there is a division between metropolitan municipalities and district municipalities in terms of responsibilities and authorities.



**Figure 3.3. Categories of Municipalities (after Law 5747)**

Source: [http://www.mahalli-idareler.gov.tr/Home/Dokumanlar/5747\\_gore\\_bel\\_son\\_durumu.doc](http://www.mahalli-idareler.gov.tr/Home/Dokumanlar/5747_gore_bel_son_durumu.doc).

In addition to the increase in the number of municipalities from 549 in 1940 to 3228 in 2000, within this total, the proportion of sub-district and village municipalities increased continuously from 20% in 1940 to 70% in 2000. In other words sub-district and village municipalities became the dominant forms of municipalities in the Turkish municipal structure in terms of number.




**Figure 3.4. Proportion of Sub-districts and Village Municipalities in Total Number of Municipalities**

Source: Turkish Statistical Institute (2005:8)

Because of the enormous increase in the number of small-size municipalities, although the population living in a municipality increased from 4.2 million in 1935

to 53.4 million in 2000, the average population size of Turkish municipalities decreased from 32.000 in 1935 to 20.000 in 2000.



**Figure 3.5. Average Municipality Population**  
*Source: Turkish Statistical Institute (2005:8.)*

### 3.3. Literature Review of Turkish Academia on Turkish Municipal Context

#### 3.3.1. The Reasons behind the Increasing Number of Municipalities

Turkish academicians have proposed different reasons for the establishment of new small-size municipalities. Yıldırım (2006) argues that the reason for the increasing number of municipalities is that although the conditions for the establishment of the municipalities are defined, there is no obvious clause in the previous Municipality Law (1580) about ending juristic personality of municipalities. In other words, the conditions under which a municipality can be closed down is not defined in the previous law. Therefore the establishment of new municipalities results in an increasing number of municipalities. On the other hand, Torak (2003) argues that political parties are not organized in villages because, according to the 31<sup>st</sup> article of Political Parties Law, the general center of a political party should be in Ankara, provincial and sub-provincial centers should be in their related province and sub-province centers, and municipal organizations should be where there is a municipality. Thus political parties cannot organize in villages. Consequently, to extend their organizational structure, parties need new municipalities. However,

Akdede and Acartürk (2005) note that political preferences determine the outcomes. Local or national politicians give promises to establish municipalities to their constituents in those small settlements to gain their support. Similarly, Güler (1992) interprets the continuous establishment of new municipalities as a form of political bribery. Villages want to become municipalities to get rid of collective labor obligation and the head tax (Dönmez, 2005) and to benefit from the central financial resources which are only available to local governments. According to the 15<sup>th</sup> article of the Village Law, most of the needs of a village should be fulfilled by villagers collectively, and according to the 17<sup>th</sup> article, the main resource of a village is the head tax collected from villagers. According to the 16<sup>th</sup> article, if the income of a village coming from villagers and properties of the village are insufficient to pay for necessary expenditures, the council of village elders can collect additional money from villagers according to their welfare. Apart from the argument of political bribery Güler (1992) also argues that if there is an adequate amount of capital accumulation that needs the support of the state to be activated, in those settlements the sources of the state can be utilized to support the capital accumulation processes by municipalities. Therefore if the establishment of municipalities is made difficult, it will be impossible to activate the capital accumulated in these settlements. Additionally the rural settlements are integrated to capitalist production relations by becoming a municipality. Therefore capitalist relations determine the content of relation in rural areas. Consequently, rural areas are not to be the source of reactionary impacts. Another economic approach to the establishment of new municipalities is that the establishment of local governments as a public economic unit is done together with the development of capitalism. The main purposes are to set the wage level as low as possible for production and to encourage urban life for consuming the materials produced in market (Sarıoğlu, 2007).

To summarize there are five main arguments about the increasing number of municipalities.

1. municipality law
2. political organization
3. political bribery
4. capital accumulation
5. articulation to capitalist relations

### **3.3.2. Disadvantages of Small-size Municipalities**

State Planning Organization, 8<sup>th</sup> Five Year Development Plan, Specialized Commission of Local Governments (2001), Geray (2000a), and Topal and Özyurt (1999) define the disadvantages of small-scale municipalities as follows:

1. Small settlements that have municipal authorities have rural characteristics. However, municipal authorities are for urban settlements. Since the incomes of municipalities are generated from urban activities, the income base of small-scale municipalities is weak.
2. The means and ends of municipal activities are based on urban public services therefore they are inelastic for providing rural services. In other words, the domain of municipal responsibilities and authorities does not cover rural services.
3. In small-scale municipalities, it is impossible to create scale economies due to an insufficient demand for urban public services. Therefore expenditure per capita is high.
4. Small-scale municipalities are not attractive to skilled staff and politicians. Even if they are, they cannot employ much technical staff.
5. People living in small-scale municipalities located around a central municipality can benefit from services provided by the central municipality without any payment. This means that the externalities of services go beyond the boundaries of the municipality. In other words, the catchment area of services does not overlap with the boundaries of municipalities.
6. By increasing the number of municipalities, the central financial aid given to municipalities becomes fragmented into smaller pieces. This causes financial deficits in municipalities. Therefore, the income of small-scale municipalities is insufficient with respect to their duties.
7. Municipalities employ more than the required personnel therefore the expenditure on employees' pensions becomes a large proportion of total expenditures.
8. There is no difference between urban and rural municipalities in terms of duties and there is no division in duties of municipalities like elective duties and obligatory duties. Therefore the moral and material contributions of local

people to these predetermined municipal activities become restricted. If municipalities are given the responsibility of providing services required by local people it increases the participation level of people to municipal activities because these services are more directly related to local demand.

Additionally, Canpolat (1998) comments that many small-scale local authorities have negative impacts on planning activities and have difficulty in keeping up with recent social and economic developments due to their financial and personnel conditions.

Among the alleged disadvantages of small-size municipalities, arguments about the low caliber of officers and politicians, non-existence of difference in duty and responsibility among different sizes of municipalities, and disintegrated planning activities are the three different kinds of disadvantages. However the rest of the emphasized disadvantages of small scale municipalities are based upon an economic rationale.

### **3.3.3. Proposals to Overcome the Alleged Disadvantages of the Small-scale Municipalities**

Different proposals have been put forward in respect to the small-size of municipalities. KAYA (Public Administration Research Project) (1991), Geray (2000a) and Keleş (2000:258) argue that municipalities can be grouped, with respect to their different kinds of duty and authority, according to their population size, characteristics of population and the size of the area under their control. Similarly, the State Planning Organization, 8<sup>th</sup> Five Year Development Plan, Specialized Commission of Local Governments (2001) says that instead of a unique model of municipality for all kinds of settlements, there should be a new model of municipality applicable to rural settlements with specific responsibilities and authority. Furthermore, KAYA-Local Government Research Group (1991) notes that at the beginning of the Republic four layers of local authorities were outlined: Village municipalities, town municipalities, city municipalities and metropolitan municipalities. [The concept of municipality is used here as a general term for the authorities established in all kinds of settlement]. However the municipality law (1580) enacted in 1930 excluded the village municipalities and made no distinction

between town, city and metropolitan municipalities. Therefore one of the solutions to small-size rural municipalities is to redefine their duties and responsibilities.

KAYA-Local Government Research Group (1991) also emphasizes that the authorities of these small municipalities can be used by sub-provincial local governments. However, 5th Five Year Development Plan 1984-1989 (cited in Geray, 2000b) argued that the principle of establishing municipalities is not giving way to the establishment of lots of small-scale municipalities and consolidating them later. Instead, branches of growing central municipalities should be established in small-size settlements. Therefore there will be efficiency and effectiveness in service provision. Alternative organization models are the second solution to the same problems.

Canpolat (1998) argues that to establish more effective and efficient municipal authorities is the main purpose of annexation/consolidation of municipalities in Europe. Additionally, Topal and Özyurt (1999) summarize the advantages of municipal annexations as follows:

- Increasing scale leads to increases in productivity due to the greater division of labor and specialization. Division of labor and specialization enables the usage of more sophisticated equipment in local governments. This technological development decreases the cost of production of local government services and increases the quality of the product. (Division of labor and specialization)
- Small-scale local governments provide services in limited quantities. Therefore it is not possible for them to decrease the cost of production by using hi-tech techniques. (Technology)
- Small-scale local governments cannot attract educated professionals for employment due to their financial weakness. For this reason the administrative capacity of small-scale local governments is limited. However, by increasing the scale of municipalities, they can pay more and provide a career opportunity for their high-skilled professionals. At the end, large-scale local authorities can be a magnet attracting professionals. By employing high-skilled professional the capacity of municipalities in service provision increases.

- Due to scale economies, the inputs used in service provision can be purchased at a lower cost. Purchasing large amounts of inputs gives more bargaining power which results in higher discounts. Therefore increasing scale causes a decrease in input cost.

Therefore annexation or consolidation of small-size municipalities are the third solution recommended for scale problems of municipalities.

Although it is not related to existing small-size municipalities, Yaşamış (1993) states that the main policy aim in establishing municipalities should be to establish large local authorities which are able to accomplish all the responsibilities that a local government should have and benefit from scale economies instead of establishing many small municipalities responsible for small areas which are ineffective in service provision. The fourth solution to the scale problem of municipalities is to change the policy for establishing municipalities.

The State Planning Organization, 8<sup>th</sup> Five Year Development Plan, Specialized Commission of Local Governments (2001) notes that instead of annexation that does not keep the juristic personality of municipalities and creates a new authority, associations that keep the juristic personality of municipalities and transfer some authorities to upper level, can be built up. The other solution to the scale problems of municipalities is to create new organizations in addition to existing ones.

Even though it says nothing about existing small-size municipalities, the 7<sup>th</sup> Five Year Development Plan 1996-2000 (cited in Geray, 2000b) argued that criteria for the establishment of municipalities should be defined according to optimum scale based on economic, cultural, historical, geographical and social features of settlements. Similarly, Toprak (2003) states that instead of population, the level of sectoral development should be used as a determining criterion. In rural areas, where agricultural activities are dominant, municipalities should not be established. Therefore changing the conditions for the establishment of municipalities is the sixth answer to the problem of scale in municipalities.

Canpolat (1998) and Polatoğlu (1996) note that studies about defining the size of optimal-scale municipalities are needed. Therefore to launch studies concerning the

optimum scale of municipalities is another solution to the scale problem of municipalities.

To sum up, it can be argued that there are seven different policy recommendations about the scale problem of municipalities. Furthermore the proposed solutions can be divided into two: some suggest solutions to the existing situation, others propose future applications.

**Table 3.3. Proposed Solution to Problem of Scale**

About future applications	About present conditions
1-Establishing big municipalities.	1-Differentiation in duty and authority.
2-Creation of new establishment criteria	2-Establishment of new organizations.
3-Definition of optimum scale	3-Annexation or consolidation.
	4-Establishing associations

### 3.3.4. Optimum Scale

Topal and Özyurt (1999) emphasize the implication of the scale economies literature to local government reform. In the long run, due to increases in production scale, the marginal cost of production decreases. However beyond a point the marginal cost of a production unit increases. This turning point for marginal costs of production is called optimum point. This argument of scale economies has some implications for local government reform and implies that increasing the scale of municipalities creates scale economies in municipalities.

According to Canpolat (1998) the pressure to establish optimal-scale municipalities is to overcome the deficiencies of small-scale municipalities. Similarly, Akdede and Acartürk (2005) note that to use public resources efficiently and effectively is the main force behind optimum scale argument. However, Torak (2003) states that the main argument for scale increase is to improve the coordination of planning activities.

Polatoğlu, (1996) identifies criteria that should be used in defining optimal-scale municipalities as follows:

- The size of population and the distance between the municipalities should not be the only criteria for defining the optimal-scale of municipalities.

- Municipalities are local governmental authorities providing services for the common needs of local people. Therefore the optimal scale of municipalities should be defined by recognizing the services that municipalities have to provide.
- In addition to these, regional characteristics and the size of the area of the municipality should also be included in measures of optimality.
- Services that are provided by the central government like health and education should also be included in studies of defining optimal-scale municipalities. To make the provision of these services efficient and effective is as important as the provision of municipal services.

### **3.3.5. Counter Arguments**

There are also arguments against making the establishment of municipalities difficult and supporting the consolidation/annexation of municipalities. Pirler (1988) explains why establishing new municipalities should not be difficult:

- To provide services for the common needs of local people and to prepare the development plan of that locality.
- If the minimum population level for establishing municipalities is raised, the settlement that could be a municipality remains a village.
- Municipalities produce services according to people's necessities in the most appropriate way.
- What is really needed at a local level can be defined better by locally elected representatives, and local authorities are quicker in service provision compared to the central government.
- If the requirements of establishing a municipality are made difficult, fewer people will benefit from the resources available to municipalities. This creates a kind of inequality between people who live in a municipality and those who do not.

Moreover, Geray (2000a) states that the real problem about the establishment of municipalities is not to encourage or create difficulties for the establishment of municipalities but to prevent the establishment of new municipalities being used as a political bribe.

According to Topal and Özyurt (1999), the negative effects of consolidation of municipalities include:

- Consolidation of small municipalities can lead to a less democratic structure.
- Big local governments have negative effects on local identity.
- People become less sensitive towards local events in big local governments.
- The social and political distance between inhabitants and politicians increases in big local governments. Small local governments provide better participation opportunities because they are more convenient for face-to-face relations. This makes small municipalities more democratic than big ones.
- The cost of political participation for inhabitants also increases in big municipalities. Local governments are not only the administrative structures providing local public services but also the basic element of democratic governmental processes. Local governments provide alternative participation opportunities to people.

In conclusion, the arguments against increasing the scale of municipalities can be grouped into two regarding the negative effects of the enlargement of scale of municipalities or the closure of small scale municipalities.

**Table 3.4. Arguments against Consolidation and Closure of Municipalities**

About big municipalities	About closure of municipality
1-creating less democratic structures (less political participation)	1-inhibiting urbanization of settlements
2-abolishing local identity	2-causing production of services less sensitive to local needs by central government
	3-creating inequality between people benefiting and not benefiting from financial resources dedicated to local government

### **3.4. Political Processes**

The reorganization of scale of local governments was on the agenda of the Justice and Development Party when it got into power. Between the end of 2003 and the beginning of 2008, the government made five key regulations directly affecting the scale of municipalities: municipality laws (5215, 5272 and 5393) (See appendix-3 for establishment of municipalities according to Municipality Laws, see appendix-4 for

consolidation of municipalities according to Municipality Laws, see appendix-5 for ending legal personality of municipalities according to Municipality Laws) and laws about closing down some municipalities (5025, 5747). Although the initial attempts were vetoed by the President of the Republic and Council of State as being against the constitution or for some technical reason, the government persisted in its demand. Sometime at the second or sometimes at the third attempt it reached its aims. The determined efforts of the government on this issue can also be seen from the shortness of the approval time for these laws in the parliament. This mind-set of the government was criticized by the opposition party also. It is argued that the hasty attitude of the government resulted in the inadequate evaluation of the regulations.

In the following section, the legislation process of laws mentioned above will be analyzed. For this purpose, rationales of the laws put forward by the government, reports of the commissions constituted in national parliaments, and the ideas of Members of Parliament expressed by the government and opposition party for and against the regulations will be examined in order to understand the positions taken by the various political parties.

**Table 3.5. Laws Regulating Establishment, Consolidation or Closing Down Of Municipalities**

	5025	5215	5272	5393	5747
Title	Law about closing down some municipalities	Municipality Law	Municipality Law	Municipality Law	Law about establishing sub-provinces within the boundaries of metropolitan municipalities and making changes in some laws (including regulations about closing down some municipalities)
Term-legislation year	22-2	22-2	22-3	22-3	23-2
Sessions	32	109-110-111-112	28	123-124-125	72-73-74
Date of arrival in parliament	16/12/2003	3/3/2004	22/07/2004	31/05/2005	26/02/2008
Rationale			3 <sup>rd</sup> , 14 <sup>th</sup> and temporary 4 <sup>th</sup> articles of Municipality Law (5215) are renewed		
Discussions in Parliament				The opposition party did not participate to parliament to protest the government.	
Date of approval	21/12/2003	9/7/2004	7/12/2004	3/7/2005	6/3/2008
Duration of approval	(1 week)	(4 months)	(3,5 mounts)	(1 month)	(1 week)
Decision of President of Republic	Vetoed (Found against the constitution)	Vetoed (Found against the constitution)	Approved (Cancelled by Council of State by technical reason)	Approved	Approved

In general, the government used economic reasons to legitimize their proposal for the laws about municipalities and the closing down of municipalities having less than 2.000 populations, and this economic rationale was based on efficiency and effectiveness arguments. However, the opposition party opposed the government by

using political arguments emphasizing the democratic and responsive characteristics of municipalities (see appendix-6 and appendix-7).

**Table 3.6. The Main Character of Arguments Expressed By Government and Opposition Party about the Laws**

	Municipality Laws	Laws About Closing Down of Municipalities
Government	Economic reasons	Economic and political reasons
Opposition party	Political reasons	Political reasons

### **3.5. Conclusion**

In Turkey, the number of municipalities has sharply increased during the last twenty years. The reason for this increase is the establishment of many small-scale village and sub-district municipalities.

The small-scale characteristic of the existing municipal structure is frequently criticized by both academicians and government agencies. The critique's fundamental arguments are: these small-scale municipalities have inadequate income generating capacity therefore they are dependent on revenues from central states; when compared to their duties and responsibilities, municipalities have lower revenues than they require because an increase in the number of municipalities results in dividing the total amount of the central fund dedicated to local governments into smaller units; due to their limited population, these municipalities cannot create scale economies to provide public goods and services cheaply; high caliber politicians and administrative staff do not want to take positions in small-scale municipalities due to quality and quantity of municipal activities and capacities.

At the same time, academicians and government agencies also make some recommendations for this municipal structure. The main proposals to address the problem of small-scale municipalities are these: municipalities should be differentiated with respect to their authorities and duties according to their population; small-scale municipalities that are near each other should be consolidated or annexed to create scale economies; new regional authorities should be created over the existing municipalities to provide public services that cover wider area than a municipality; the establishment criteria for municipalities should be improved in terms of qualitative and quantitative characteristics.

However, the government's regulations of this issue are criticized in terms of its content and its handling in the national parliament. As the government has tried to legitimize its attitude by giving reference to economic reasons, the opposition has criticized the government by accusing it of being against the democratic development of society. It seems that the fundamental dualism of economy and democracy in the discussions of local authorities does not easily lose its attractiveness in Turkey.

## CHAPTER 4

### RESEARCH DESIGN

The research focused on two different levels of investigation. The first one was the national level in chapter-5 and chapter-6, and the second one was the local level in chapter-7.

The aim of the national level study in chapter-5 was to compare municipalities with respect to their population size. Hypotheses for and against small-scale municipalities are listed in table4.1.

**Table4.1 Hypotheses tested for and against small-scale municipalities**

Against small-scale municipalities	For small-scale municipalities
Small-scale municipalities are highly indebted.	The main reason for the financial deficiencies of small-scale municipalities is the government policy of decreasing the proportion of general (national) budget tax revenues dedicated to municipalities, not the municipalities' expenditure pattern.
Small-scale municipalities spend most of their incomes on personnel expenditures.	Population size can not be the only criterion to evaluate the dynamics of municipalities.
Average scale of municipalities in Europe is bigger than Turkey.	Small-scale municipalities are more suitable to practice the fundamentals of participatory democracy
Small-size municipalities have also been losing population; therefore there is no need for any governmental organization at these settlements.	Defining the optimum scale of municipal services is difficult
Small-scale municipalities are more dependent on revenues from the central government	
Large scale municipalities have a higher capacity to create their own incomes.	
Small-scale municipalities spend their incomes on current expenditures much more.	

To reach the aim of comparing municipalities with respect to their population size, secondary data was used for all 3209 municipalities. The use of universe was the strongest point of this method. However, it has been impossible to test every argument, because accessibility to relevant variables restricted the content of hypothesis testing. Additionally, missing data was another weak point of using secondary data. Source, content, way of gathering and quality of data used in the national level study are summarized in table4.2. To compare means of municipalities

grouped according to population intervals (0-2.000, 2.000-5.000, 5.000-10.000, 10.000-20.000, 20.000-50.000, 50.000-100.000, 100.000-250.000, 250.000-500.000 and 500.000-over), a one-way ANOVA technique was used due to the non-normal distribution of values using SPSS program.

**Table4.2 Source, content, way of gathering and quality of data used in the national level study**

Source	Content of data	Way of data gathering	Quality of data in terms of municipalities
Turkish Statistical Institute	Municipal Revenues and Expenditures (2004)	Taken from institute	individual
Revenue Administration	General budget tax revenues dedicated to local governments (1985-2007)	Internet search	Aggregate
Turkish Statistical Institute	Municipal Revenues and Expenditures (1995-2004)	Internet search	Aggregate
Turkish Statistical Institute	General Census (2000)	Taken from institute	Individual
Turkish Statistical Institute	Building Census (2000)	Taken from institute	Individual
Committee On Local And Regional Authorities In Europe (1995)	The Size of Municipalities, Efficiency and Citizen Participation (1950 and 1992)	Taken from book	Aggregate
Turkish Statistical Institute	General Census (1997 and 2007)	Internet search	Aggregate
Dönmez, M. (1998)	Cumhuriyetin 75. Yılında Belediyelerimiz (1997)	Taken from book	Individual
Public Administration Institute for Turkey and Middle East	Participation in Local Government Elections (2004)	Internet search-web site of each municipality was visited one by one in <a href="http://www.yerelnet.org">www.yerelnet.org</a>	Individual
Ministry of Interior-General Directorate for Local Authorities	Garbage Collection Services (2004)	Internet search-web site of each municipality was visited one by one in <a href="http://www.yerelbilgi.gov.tr">www.yerelbilgi.gov.tr</a>	Individual

In chapter-5, most of the government's arguments about small-scale municipalities were shown to be false. Then the need for the investigation of other factors that can lead to reorganization of municipalities emerged. In chapter-6 the aim was to discover the hidden motivations behind the government's intentions towards local governments and the ways in which its intentions turned into policy.

The main method in this chapter was text analysis. Attempts to uncover the government's hidden agenda were attempted by displaying the conflicting arguments

about local governments in policy documents. Source, content, way of gathering and quality of data used in text analysis are summarized in table4.3. The arguments about local governments in political and economic papers have been coded as arguing for and against local governments.

**Table4.3 Source, content, way of gathering and quality of data used in policy papers analysis**

Source	Content of data	Way of data gathering	Quality of data in terms of municipalities
Prime Ministry	Government Programs (55 <sup>th</sup> , 57 <sup>th</sup> , 58 <sup>th</sup> , 59 <sup>th</sup> and 60 <sup>th</sup> )	Internet search	political statements on local governments
State Planning Organization	Five Years Development Plans (8 <sup>th</sup> and 9 <sup>th</sup> )	Internet search	Political statements on local governments
Undersecretariat of Treasury	Letters of Intents (IMF) (July-2002, July-2003, July-2004, April-2005, November-2005)	Internet search	Economic statements on local governments
State Planning Organization	Report on Local Governments' Financial Structure (2006)	Internet search	Economic statements on local governments
State Planning Organization	Report on Local Governments' Financial Structure (2006)	Internet search	Aggregate data on municipal revenues and expenditures
Undersecretariat of Treasury	Statistics about Treasury receivables	Internet search	Aggregate data on municipal debts
Newspapers	News	Internet search	News about the importance of municipal finance in IMF negotiations

The main aim of the local level study in chapter-7 is to identify the rationalities of different local actors in terms of the annexation of municipalities. The policy of municipal annexation was applied 13 times in different regions of Turkey between 03.07.2007 (approval date of new municipality law) and 06.09.2010. Denizli is one of the places that annexation of municipalities was put into practice after the last local elections which took place in March 2009.

**Table4.4 Municipal boundary changes according to the 11<sup>th</sup> article of municipality law**

Date	Province	Municipality to be annexed	Annexing municipalities and villages
19/06/2006	Kırıkkale	Kırıkkale Municipality	Hacılar, Ahılı, Çullu, Aşağımahmutlar and Hasandede <b>Municipalities</b>
19/06/2006	Kütahya	Kütahya Municipality	Ağaçköy, Çalca, Yeni Bosna, Siner, Alayunt, İkiyüzük, Zığra, Perli, Kırkıllı, İnköy, Parmakören, Bölcek, Dumlupınar, Kirazpınar, Güveçci, Okçu, Sofu, Aydoğdu and Kumarı <b>Villages</b>
04/07/2006	Balikesir	Sındırgı Municipality	Kocakonak <b>Village</b>
01/08/2006	Aksaray	Aksaray Municipality	Aratol <b>Municipality</b>
11/08/2006	Denizli	Denizli Municipality	Akkale, Bereketli, Gümüşler, Kayhan, Kınıklı, Servergazi Hallaçlar, Üçler, Korucuk, Bağbaşı, Başkarıcı, Gökpınar, Göveçlik <b>Municipalities</b> and Bozburun, Eskihisar, Goncalı, Hisar, Kadılar, Karakurt, Saruhan, Şirinköy, Güzelköy (Yiğenağa) ve Karakova <b>Villages</b>
13/08/2007	Antalya	Serik Municipality	Gedik, Cumalı and Kürüş <b>Villages</b>
22/01/2008	Malatya	Malatya Municipality	Dilek, Hanımınçiftliği, Konak, Orduzu and Topsöğüt <b>Municipalities</b>
02/02/2008	Kütahya	Tavşanlı Municipality	Çukurköy <b>Municipality</b> and Beyköy, Dedeler <b>Villages</b>
05/02/2008	Bolu	Bolu Municipality	Karacasu <b>Municipality</b> and Alpağut, Karaağaç, Berk, Civril, Çakmaklar, Dodurga, Doğanacı, Kasaplar, Kılıçarslan, Küçükberk, Ovadüzü, Paşaköy, Salıbeyler, Sandallar, Sarıcalar, Seyitköy, Yukarısoku <b>Villages</b>
29/02/2008	Düzce	Düzce Municipality	Konuralp <b>Municipality</b> and Bostanyeri, Beslanbey (Akınlar) Sarayyeri, Çamköy, Esenköy, Darıcı, Dedeler, Yukarı Yahyalar, Sallar, Kazukoğlu, Çavuşlar <b>Villages</b>
29/02/2008	Denizli	Çivril Municipality	Kızılcaşöğüt <b>Municipality</b> and İğdir, Yeşilyaka <b>Villages</b>
25.08.2008	Aksaray	Aksaray Municipality	Hamidiye <b>Municipality</b>
29.08.2008	Karabük	Karabük Municipality	Belen <b>Village</b>
23.12.2008	Bursa	İnegöl Municipality	Alanyurt <b>Municipality</b>
26.12.2008	K.Maraş	Kahramanmaraş Municipality	Karacasu, Kavaklı <b>Municipalities</b> and Kılavuzlu, Hasancıklı <b>Villages</b>
26.04.2009	Aydın	Nazilli Municipality	İsabeyli <b>Municipality</b> and Dalıca, Ocaklı, Bozyurt, Sevindikli, Güzelköy, Durasallı <b>Villages</b>
27.08.2009	Antalya	Alanya Municipality	Cikcilli, Oba, Çıplaklı, Tosmur, Kestel <b>Municipalities</b> and Asmaca, Paşaköy, Mahmutseydi <b>Villages</b>
12.05.2010	Kütahya	Kütahya Municipality	Andız, Geven, Enne, Cıvli and Yoncalı <b>Villages</b>
06.09.2010	Trabzon	Trabzon Municipality	Akyazı, Akoluk, Çağlayan, Çukurçayır, Gürbulak, Pelitli, Yalıncağ <b>Municipalities</b> and Ağıllı, Ayvalı, Akkaya, Aktoprak, Beştaş, Bulak, Çamoba, Çilekli, Çimenli, Düzyurt, Dolaylı, Doğançay, Fatih, Geçit, Gölçayır, Gözalan, Gündoğdu, İncesu, Karakaya, Kavala, Karlık, Kireçhane, Kutlugün, Subaşı, Tosköy, Yeşilbük, Yeşiltepe, Yeniköy, Yelişyurt <b>Villages</b>

Denizli has been chosen for this case study for two reasons. First, before the application of the annexation policy according to Municipality Law, there was a special law for Denizli accomplishing a similar function, enacted by National Assembly but later vetoed by the President of the Republic for being against the constitution. Second, Denizli is identified in the rationale of a related article of Municipality Law as an example of the most relevant case for the annexation of municipalities.

Chapter-7 has two sections. The aim of the first section was to reveal the current context of Denizli region particularly in terms of a comparison of Denizli and surrounding municipalities. The mentioned dichotomies of Denizli and its surrounding municipalities are summarized in table4.5. The technique used here was based on the analysis of secondary data.

**Table4.5 Mentioned dichotomies of Denizli and surrounding municipalities**

Categories	Denizli	Surrounding Municipalities
Urban growth	Not growing	Growing
Type of place	Work-center	Living-suburb
Working condition of population	Unemployed	Employed
Type of working	Urban	Rural
Administrative capacity	Strong administrative capacity	Weak administrative capacity
Service capacity	Strong service capacity	Weak service capacity
Relation between municipalities	Dispatcher	Receiver
Planning	Integrated approach	Disintegrated approaches

As mentioned previously, the data limited the investigation. Additionally, missing data was one of the chief difficulties not easily overcome. To surmount these difficulties, the variables employed in the secondary data analysis were enriched to get a detailed picture of the situation. Source, content, way of gathering and quality of data used in secondary data analysis of chapter-7 are tabulated in table4.6. Municipalities were just compared in terms of their absolute values.

**Table4.6 Source, content, way of gathering and quality of data used in local level study**

Source	Content of data	Way of data gathering	Quality of data in terms of municipalities
Public Administration Institute for Turkey and Middle East	The comparison of municipalities between each other in terms of social and institutional character	Internet search-web site of each municipality was visited one by one in <a href="http://www.yerelnet.org">www.yerelnet.org</a>	Individual
Turkish Statistical Institute	The comparison of municipalities in terms of social and economic structure	Taken from institution	Individual
Ministry of Interior-General Directorate for Local Authorities	The comparison of municipalities in terms of service provision	Internet search-web site of each municipality was visited one by one in <a href="http://www.mahalli-idareler.gov.tr">www.mahalli-idareler.gov.tr</a>	Individual
Denizli Municipality	The support of Denizli Municipality to surrounding municipalities	Taken from institution	Individual
Denizli Municipality	Relations between municipalities in terms of service provision	Taken from institution	picture

The main aim of the second section was to represent different segments of society and to gain different perspectives of the annexation process. Interviews and a text analysis were the two research methods employed in this section. The main problem during interviews was the inaccessibility of all proposed interviewees due to a lack of time or their refusal. Additionally, some interviewees refused any type of recording and therefore note-taking was used. Table 4.7 summarizes the segments of society which the interviewees represent. The first one is those whose interviewing was necessary due to their administrative positions. This group includes heads of villages, mayors or vice-mayors, municipalities' technical staff from their planning departments, and presidents or general secretaries of NGOs for whom annexation of municipalities is a topic of interest. The second group was more electively chosen. This group includes an ex-governor, an ex-MP, an ex-mayor of Denizli, an ex-member of the general provincial council, an ex-member of Denizli Municipality Council, academicians from a local university who study local governments, members of the general provincial council and members of Denizli Municipality Council. The main criteria for selecting these people were whether or not they were/are an active political element in the development of current municipal structure or whether or not they were/are active in planning and urbanization issues. The interviews included a semi-structured questionnaire aiming at gathering

information about the history of municipal fragmentation, evaluation of current condition and the future of the annexation policy. The evaluations of interviewees were coded under main headings.

**Table4.7 Representation of Institutions and Different Segments of Society**

Segment of society		Interviewee number
Villages	Village headmen	26-32
Surrounding municipalities	Technical staff	25
	Mayor or vice-mayor	15-24
Denizli municipality	Technical staff	5
	Mayor or vice-mayor	4
	Member of municipal council from opposition party	3
Governorship		2
Special provincial administration		6-7
Organization of business		10
NGO- UCTEA (Union Of Chambers Of Turkish Engineers And Architects)		14
Opinion leaders	Ex-mayor of Denizli	11
	Ex-member of Denizli municipal council	12
	Ex-member of General Provincial Council	13
Ex-members of parliament	From power	1
	From opposition	-
Local University	Academics	8-9

The reason behind the use of texts in addition to interviews is to supplement the content of data retrospectively. In the text analysis, published materials and materials gathered from internet searches were used. Published materials included articles, a meeting report, a press statement, national assembly records, an Ms Thesis, and court expert reports. The basic strategy for the internet survey was to research using key words such as “bütünşehir” (integrated-city) and “belediyelerin bağlanması” (annexation of municipalities). However, only the arguments of local actors were taken into consideration, while the interpretations of journalists or documents were not. Actors, institutions and sources of texts are tabulated in table4.8. The arguments in the texts were coded according to interview codes.

**Table4.8 Actor, institution and source of texts**

Actor	Institution	Source
PLATFORM	Denizli Industrialists, Traders and Businessmen Platform	Press statements
Ali Aygören	Ex-mayor of Denizli (DYP)	Meeting report
Hüseyin Özgür	Local university	Article
Faruk Boyacı	Ex-president of Denizli Branch of Chamber of Architects	Meeting report
Turgay Üçyıldız	Ex-vice-president of Denizli Branch of Chamber of Architects	Meeting report
The experts	Administrative court	The expert reports for lawsuits on annexation
The experts	Administrative court	The expert reports for lawsuit on a part of development plan
MPs	National Assembly	National Assembly Records of legislation process of Denizli Integrated-city Law (5026)
Mısra Ciğeroğlu	Local University	Ms Thesis
Fikret Serçe	Candidate for nomination for mayoralty of Denizli Municipality from AKP	Internet-search
Gazi Şimşek	Governor of Denizli	Internet-search
İbrahim Tefenlili	President of Denizli Stock Exchange of Trade	Internet-search
Mehmet Yücel	President of Denizli Chamber of Trade	Internet-search
Mehmet Yüksektepe	Ex-member of Parliament from Denizli (AKP)	Internet-search
Müjdat Keçeci	President of Denizli Chamber of Industry	Internet-search
Nail Kalemci	Spokesman of Platform of Industrialist, Traders and Businessmen of Denizli	Internet-search
Nihat Zeybekçi	Mayor of Denizli from Justice and Development Party	Internet-search
Şahin Tin	Denizli Provincial Chairman of Justice and Development Party	Internet-search
Zekeriya Öz	Mayor of Akkale Municipality (MHP)	Internet-search

## CHAPTER 5

### NATIONAL LEVEL ANALYSIS ABOUT MUNICIPALITIES

#### 5.1. Introduction

According to the 11<sup>th</sup> article of Municipality Law (5393) a municipality that has less than 2000 population is closed down by shared decree after taking the opinion of the Council of State about that municipality and then a proposal of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. However this process has to be repeated for each individual municipality. Instead of following this procedure for each municipality, 862 municipalities that have a population under 2000 which compose approximately one fourth of all municipalities, were closed down by legislation of a special Law (5747) simultaneously. During the legislation process in the parliament, the government and the opposition party argued for and against the law. In the following sections the arguments of the government and the opposition party will be tested empirically as far as possible to assess the validity of the arguments.

The Law (5747) brings about two main territorial regulations. The first one is to close down the sub-district municipalities and to establish district municipalities in metropolitan municipalities. The second one is to close down 862 municipalities that have a population under 2000 and convert them into villages. However, the main opposition party applied to the constitutional court to cancel the law. The main reasons put forward by the main opposition party were these:

- The regulation is not for public interests; instead it is for the interests of a certain political party or individuals.
- Just before local elections, to establish new districts, changing the neighborhoods of or villages of districts or to change the boundaries of districts in metropolitan municipalities was done for the purpose of gaining advantage in these local elections.
- By this law, municipalities that have a population under 2000 are closed down however;

a-There are suspicions in public opinion about the accuracy of the population census conducted in 2007 by which the municipalities that are to be closed down are determined,

b-There are many objections to the way jurisdictions were resorted,

c-Some municipalities applied for a recount of their population.

- The Law put some restrictions on the authorities of municipalities that are to be closed down. However, these restrictions impede the execution of municipal duties. As a result, some public damage emerged.

The constitutional court did not find the articles of the law related to metropolitan municipalities against the constitution. On the other hand, it canceled the articles of the law related to municipalities that had a population under 2000.

The main reasons the Constitutional Court provided for the cancellation of the articles of Law no 5747 related to the closing down of the municipalities that had a population under 2000 are:

- Some municipalities objected to their census results at the right time (the publication of the census results in the official journal is accepted as the declaration of census results to these municipalities).
- Some municipalities exceeded the minimum population of 2000 by annexation of surrounding settlements according to 8<sup>th</sup> article of municipality law just before law no 5747 entered into effect (March 2008).
- Some municipalities are in the development region for tourism declared by the Ministerial Cabinet according to the advice the Ministry of Tourism.
- Some municipalities are in the priority region for tourism declared by the Ministry of Public Work and Settlements.

In addition to the Constitutional Case, Kovanlık Municipality went to the Council of State to cancel the circular letter about application of law no 5747. The Council of State also canceled the circular letter about the application of law no 5747 due to the reasons mentioned below

- Census results were not announced to municipalities.

- The case about the cancellation of the circular letter of law no 5747 is within the first condition of the Constitutional Court for cancellation of some articles of law no 5747.

Additionally, the beginning of the period for going to court about census results was accepted as not the time of entry into effect of law no 5747 (March 2008) but as the publication of decision of the Constitutional Court in the official journal in December 2008. In this way, all 862 municipalities had the right to go to court.

According to the decision of the Council of State, the Supreme Committee of Election declared that only 25 of the 862 municipalities would not go to local elections.

Today the total number of municipalities is 2949 (1976-sub-district and village municipalities, 749-municipalities of district centers, 143-district municipalities in metropolitan municipalities, 65-municipalities of province centers, 16-metropolitan municipalities).

In addition, this section also aims at revealing the economic and social characteristics of municipalities in detail to provide an opportunity for better analysis of policies about future municipal reform studies.


## **5.2. Financial Structure of Municipalities**

Financial difficulties and deficiencies of small-scale municipalities are the most emphasized arguments to legitimize the closing down of these municipalities. As mentioned above, in the following section the financial structure of municipalities will be analyzed with reference to these arguments.

### **5.2.1. Expenditure-Revenue Balance**

There is a condition of imbalance among municipalities in terms of expenditures and revenues. In general the ratio of expenditure to revenue is 11:10, because the 15<sup>th</sup> article of Municipality Law defining the powers and privileges of the municipality

states that to receive loans and to accept donations are within the powers and privileges of the municipality. Additionally, to decide on indebtedness of the municipality is one of the functions and powers of the municipal council. However, there is no difference in the ratio of expenditures to revenues between municipalities with respect to their size ( $ANOVA=0.715>0.050$ ). This is a common condition of all municipalities. The government used the indebtedness of small-size municipalities as a legitimizing condition for increasing the scale of municipalities. However, as seen in figure 5.1, all sizes of municipalities have debts and even middle-size municipalities are more indebted than small-size municipalities on average. Therefore the condition of indebtedness cannot be a reason to legitimize the closing down of small-scale municipalities.




**Figure 5.1. Expenditure-Revenue Balance (2004)**

*Source: Turkish Statistical Institute*

## 5.2.2. Revenues

### General Budget Tax Revenues

The larger the municipality, the lower the proportion of their income that is derived from general budget tax revenues ( $ANOVA=0.000<0.050$ ). This means that small size municipalities are more dependent on transfers from central governments. For that reason, the argument emphasizing the dependence of small-size municipalities on general budget tax revenues is difficult to disregard.




**Figure 5.2. The Ratio of General Budget Tax Revenues to Total Municipal Revenues (2004)**  
 Source: Turkish Statistical Institute

### Municipal Tax Revenues

As the size of municipalities increases the ratio of municipal tax revenues to total municipal revenues increases (ANOVA=0.000<0.050). This means that large-size municipalities have a higher capacity to create their own income. Thus, the argument indicating the small-size municipalities' lower capacity of income generation seems valid.

However, Ersoy (1999:89) reached a conclusion after an empirical study that the people living in small settlements with less than 5000 inhabitants pay more relative to their income as municipal revenue when compared to settlements in other population groups.




**Figure 5.3. The Ratio of Municipal Tax Revenues to Total Revenues of Municipalities (2004)**


*Source: Turkish Statistical Institute*

### Other Revenues


Other sources of municipal revenues include three items: domestic borrowings, external borrowings, and other kind of revenues. In terms of the ratio of domestic borrowings to total revenues, although there is a differentiation between municipalities (ANOVA=0.027<0.050), it is unrelated to the scale of municipalities. In terms of the ratio of external borrowings to total revenues, there is no differentiation between municipalities (ANOVA=0.192>0.050). In terms of the ratio of other kinds of revenues to total revenues, again there is no differentiation between municipalities (ANOVA=0.116>0.050). Hence against the argument that small-scale municipalities are highly indebted, the evidence of figures 5.4-5.6 shows one more time that small municipalities are not much more indebted than the large ones. Consequently this argument can not legitimize the closure of small-size municipalities.



**Figure 5.4. The Ratio of Domestic Borrowings to Total Revenues of Municipalities (2004)**  
*Source: Turkish Statistical Institute*



**Figure 5.5. The Ratio of External Borrowings to Total Revenues of Municipalities (2004)**  
*Source: Turkish Statistical Institute*




**Figure 5.6. The Ratio of Other kinds of Revenues to Total Revenues of Municipalities (2004)**  
*Source: Turkish Statistical Institute*

### 5.2.3. Expenditures

#### Current Expenditures

The ratio of current expenditures to total expenditures decreases as the size of municipalities increases (ANOVA=0.000<0.050). This gives bigger-sized municipalities opportunities for investment or for other kinds of purchasing. Therefore the argument that small-size municipalities use most of their revenues for current expenditures and consequently they have no capacity to make investment expenditures is a valid one. Investment capacity is important for municipalities because this capacity creates an opportunity for them to improve their quality and quantity of services.




**Figure 5.7. The Ratio of Current Expenditures to Total Expenditures of Municipalities (2004)**

*Source: Turkish Statistical Institute*

#### Personnel Expenditures

There is a difference between municipalities in the ratio of personnel expenditures to total expenditures (ANOVA=0.015<0.050). However, municipalities that have a population between 0 and 100.000 have a similar percentage (45%) for personnel expenditures. The ratio of personnel expenditures to total expenditures decreases for


municipalities that have populations over 100.000. Therefore the argument that small-size municipalities spend most of their revenues on personnel is also valid for medium-size municipalities and can not be used to legitimize the closing down of small-scale municipalities.



**Figure 5.8. The Ratio of Personnel Expenditures to Total Expenditures of Municipalities (2004)**  
*Source: Turkish Statistical Institute*

#### 5.2.4. Historical Development of Municipal Revenues

Because of the economic crisis that happened in Turkey in 2001, to decrease the public spending, the government decreased the proportion of general budget tax revenues going to municipalities and metropolitan municipalities. In 2005, the proportion of general budget tax revenues going to metropolitan municipalities reached its previous level but the proportion of general budget tax revenues going to municipalities did not. Revenues from general budget tax revenues constitute 54% of total municipality revenues. Therefore a decrease of 33.3% (from 9% to 6%) in proportion of general budget tax revenues means an 18% loss of total revenues to the municipalities.



**Figure 5.9. The Percentage of General Tax Revenues Dedicated To Local Governments (1985-2007)**

Source: [http://www.gib.gov.tr/fileadmin/user\\_upload/VI/GBG/Tablo\\_14.xls.htm](http://www.gib.gov.tr/fileadmin/user_upload/VI/GBG/Tablo_14.xls.htm)


Furthermore, there was no local tax introduced to compensate for the revenue decrease resulting from the decrease in the proportion of general budget tax revenues dedicated to local governments. As shown in figure 5.10, tax revenues of municipalities and municipal tax revenues from general budget tax revenues follow the same pattern. Therefore the argument that the decrease in the proportion of general tax revenues going to municipalities is the main reason for municipalities being in financial difficulties seems a convincing argument. Therefore one of the reasons behind the financial difficulties of municipalities is the national government's own financial decisions not a decision by municipalities themselves. Closing down small-scale municipalities can not be legitimized by arguing that they are in financial difficulties because the government's own financial decision is the reason for these difficulties.

**Table 5.1. General Budget Tax Revenues and Municipal Revenues from General Budget Tax Revenues (1995-2004)**

	general budget tax revenues	tax revenues of municipalities	municipal revenues from general budget tax revenues	%
	a	b	c	c/a
1995	1,084,350,504	109,674,767	84,337,800	7.78
1996	2,244,093,830	220,024,883	181,311,299	8.08
1997	4,745,484,021	449,056,108	379,395,672	7.99
1998	9,228,596,187	926,817,633	730,423,004	7.91
1999	14,802,279,916	1,436,008,365	1,148,203,528	7.76
2000	26,503,698,413	2,424,467,211	1,997,655,264	7.54
2001	39,735,928,150	3,711,404,953	3,096,817,304	7.79
2002	59,631,867,852	4,880,263,563	3,771,678,793	6.32
2003	84,316,168,756	6,374,560,219	4,351,931,131	5.16
2004	101,038,904,000	8,026,624,785	6,151,339,587	6.09

Source: [http://www.tuik.gov.tr/VeriBilgi.do?tb\\_id=34&ust\\_id=10](http://www.tuik.gov.tr/VeriBilgi.do?tb_id=34&ust_id=10)

[http://www.gib.gov.tr/fileadmin/user\\_upload/VI/GBG/Tablo\\_13.xls.htm](http://www.gib.gov.tr/fileadmin/user_upload/VI/GBG/Tablo_13.xls.htm)



**Figure 5.10. Indexes of general budget tax revenues, tax revenues of municipalities and municipal revenues from general budget tax revenues (1995-2004)**

Source: [http://www.tuik.gov.tr/VeriBilgi.do?tb\\_id=34&ust\\_id=10](http://www.tuik.gov.tr/VeriBilgi.do?tb_id=34&ust_id=10)

[http://www.gib.gov.tr/fileadmin/user\\_upload/VI/GBG/Tablo\\_13.xls.htm](http://www.gib.gov.tr/fileadmin/user_upload/VI/GBG/Tablo_13.xls.htm)

### 5.3. Economic Structure of Municipalities

One of the arguments against this regulation (Law 5747) is that the criterion of population alone is insufficient to delineate whether a municipality should be closed down or not. Therefore new measurements should be developed for qualifying the selection of municipalities that are to be closed down. These kinds of new measurements can also be significant for an annexation policy because the distance to the central municipality is the only criterion in the municipality law. For that purpose an evaluation of the economic structure of municipalities can be the first

step. The economic structure of municipalities can be assessed with respect to two indicators: the labor market and built environment as the spatial outcome of economic life.

### **5.3.1 Labor Market Dynamics**

The labor market is one of the most important factors that reflect the conditions of economic life directly. Labor market dynamics can be evaluated by analyzing labor market participation, unemployment, and the type of work done by people.

Figures in appendix-8 show the distribution of some key labor market figures among the municipalities of different scales. Although there is differentiation between groups (ANOVA=0.000<0.050), there is also differentiation within groups. This means that municipalities cannot be categorized easily with respect to their population size. In other words, municipalities that are in the same population group can have different labor market characteristics.

### **5.3.2. Built Environment**

The built environment also gives a hint of the economic life of the settlements because categories of buildings tend to be in accordance with economic and social activities.

Figures in appendix-9 show that, as for labor market conditions, even though there is differentiation between municipalities (ANOVA=0.000<0.050), there is also differentiation within municipalities. The population size of municipalities is not enough to give a detailed picture of the municipalities. Municipalities that are in the same population group can have different economic characteristics. Some of the municipalities that are going to be closed down are in the coastal zone of Turkey and they have a very developed tourism infrastructure. Although their settled population is small at winter time, they serve a huge number of tourists during the summer time. If we consider only their population size they are in the group of municipalities that allegedly have financial deficiencies etc. however they contribute to the national economy by earning foreign currency. Figures in appendix-9 provide detailed

information about the built environment of municipalities to give a picture of their economic and social life. According to these data population size is not enough to perceive the internal structure of municipalities and to decide whether a municipality should be closed down or not.

#### **5.4. Scale Structure in Western Countries**


The majority of European countries have reduced the number of their municipalities in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. However Turkey witnessed a tremendous increase in the number of its municipalities during that period. Furthermore the number of municipalities increased approximately 33% only between 1992 and 2000. However, there were only four countries where average populations per local authority were higher than Turkey. While the reduction of the number of municipalities in Europe is used to legitimize the Law (5747) that closed down the municipalities that have less than 2000 population, except for four countries (Sweden, Portugal, Bulgaria and UK) all other European countries have a smaller average population per municipality.

In terms of municipal size, figure 5.12 shows a huge diversity among European countries. Turkey is in the same group (having an average population of 1000-5000) as Austria, Italy, Luxemburg, and Hungary. However, there is a group of countries whose municipalities have an average population of 0-1000 in general. Therefore Europe cannot be taken as a unique case to support increasing the scale of municipalities by closing down small-scale municipalities.

**Table 5.2. The Number of Municipalities in Europe**


	1950	1992	rate of decrease
Bulgaria	2178	255	88.3
Sweden	2281	286	87.5
Denmark	1387	275	80.2
Belgium	2669	589	77.9
UK	2028	484	76.1
Czech Republic	11051	6196	43.9
Austria	3999	2301	42.5
Norway	744	439	41.0
Netherlands	1015	647	36.3
Finland	547	460	15.9
Iceland	229	197	14.0
Spain	9214	8082	12.3
Luxembourg	127	118	7.1
France	38814	36763	5.3
Switzerland	3097	3021	2.5
Greece	5959	5922	0.6
Portugal	303	305	-0.7
Italy	7781	8100	-4.1
Turkey	628	2378	-278.7

Source: Committee On Local And Regional Authorities In Europe, No:56, (1995) p:16



**Figure 5.11. Average Population per Local Authority**

Source: Committee On Local And Regional Authorities In Europe, No:56, (1995) p:18



**Figure 5.12. Cluster of Western Countries in Terms of Size of Municipalities**  
 Source: Committee On Local And Regional Authorities In Europe, No:56, (1995) p:12

### 5.5. Population Dynamics

Between 1997 and 2007 Turkey’s general population increased 12.3%. Although the rural population decreased 5.2%, the urban and municipal populations increased 21.7% and 17.8% respectively during this period.


**Table 5.3. Population Increase in Turkey between 1997 and 2007**

	1997	2007	%
urban	40,882,357	49,747,859	21.7
rural	21,983,217	20,838,397	-5.2
total	62,865,574	70,586,256	12.3
municipalities	48,689,977	57,376,009	17.8

Source: [http://www.tuik.gov.tr/VeriBilgi.do?tb\\_id=39&ust\\_id=11](http://www.tuik.gov.tr/VeriBilgi.do?tb_id=39&ust_id=11)

The mean rate of population increase in municipalities was almost 0%. The municipalities that had lost population during 1997-2007 had populations between 2001 and 5000, and 5001 and 10000. And municipalities that had population less than 2000 had shown no population increase during the same period. The argument that small-scale municipalities already have been losing population is used to legitimize the closing down of small-scale municipalities. However, losing


population is not only the problem of small-scale municipalities but is also an existing trend for medium-scale municipalities. If migration trends continue and the policy of closing down municipalities that have less than 2000 is applied by special laws like 5747 regularly, there will be many more closures of municipalities in the near future in Turkey.



**Figure 5.13. Population increase in Municipalities Between 1997 and 2007**  
*Source: Dönmez, M. (1998) Cumhuriyetin 75. Yılında Belediyelerimiz, Seçkin: Ankara*

## 5.6. Participation in Elections

As the scale of municipalities increases, the level of participation in local elections decreases. The higher level of participation in local election results from the close relation between the administration of municipalities and local people. Therefore the argument that to close down the small-scale municipalities will increase the gap between people and administration thereby causing an adverse effect in terms of development of representative democracy is a valid one.



**Figure 5.14. Participation in local elections in 2004**

Source: [www.yerelnet.org](http://www.yerelnet.org)

## 5.7. Conclusion

The Government has used the closing down of municipalities that have less than 2000 population as a tool to increase the scale of the existing municipal structure. It has used many economic arguments to legitimize the application of this strategy. Empirical analysis based on the economic and social characteristics of municipalities regarding their scale, summarized in table 5.5, shows that most of the normative statements about small-scale municipalities are either also valid for municipalities that are not small scale or are not valid statements for small-scale municipalities. Therefore it can be concluded that although the government insists that there are economic reasons behind this policy, it appears as though the government's political interests are the determining factor behind this policy. At this point the argument that by transferring all the responsibilities and resources of municipalities to special provincial administrations, the government is trying to recentralize power and it will use this power as a tool of political bribery just as previous governments used the establishment of municipalities is convincing.

Basic Law of Public Administration (no.5227) and Special Provincial Administration Law (no. 5197) both aim to give weight to special provincial administrations as dominant local administrations. Therefore special provincial administrations are

being strengthened and furnished with broader authorities. Basic Law of Public Administration (no.5227) gives all the authority and responsibility of more than ten ministries' local branches to special provincial administrations.

- Issues of education, health, industry, public works, culture, tourism, agriculture and forestry become the responsibility of special provincial administrations.
- Issues of the environment, sport, and social work become the responsibility of municipalities if they are within the boundaries of a municipality; if not, they become the responsibility of special provincial administrations.
- Rural services will be provided by special provincial administrations excluding İstanbul and Kocaeli.

All municipalities that are going to be closed down will be managed by special provincial administrations for 10 years. Rather than selected members, appointed members of special provincial administration councils are more powerful and therefore all of these municipalities will be controlled by government. Consequently it is impossible to say that closing down small scale municipalities is a rational choice in terms of efficiency and effectiveness by emphasizing that most of the municipalities that are going to be closed down are governed by a mayor from the party in power.

**Table 5.4. The Summary of Empirical Testing of Government's Arguments**

Against government's arguments	For government's arguments
It is argued that small-scale municipalities are highly indebted; however, the condition of indebtedness is common for all sizes of municipalities. (figure 5.1, 5.4, 5.5, 5.6)	The small-scale municipalities are more dependent on revenues from the central government. (figure 5.2)
Large scale municipalities have more capacity to create their own incomes. (figure 5.3) however people living in small settlements pay more relative to their income to municipalities.	The small-scale municipalities spend their incomes for current expenditures much more. (figure 5.7)
Although it is argued that small-scale municipalities spend most of their incomes for personnel expenditures, municipalities that have a population of up to 100.000 have a similar ratio of personnel expenditure to total expenditures. (figure 5.8)	
It is argued that the main reason for financial deficiencies of small-scale municipalities is the government policy for decreasing the proportion of general (national) budget tax revenues dedicated to municipalities, not the municipalities' expenditure pattern. (figure 5.9, 5.10)	
Figures 5.11-5.24 show that although there is a difference between different scales of municipalities in terms of their economic structure there is also differentiation within same scale municipalities. Therefore population size can not be the only criteria to evaluate the dynamics of municipalities.	
It argued that most of the European countries increased their scale of municipalities between 1950 and 1990. It is true but there are only four countries with higher average population per municipality than Turkey, and in Germany, Spain, Switzerland, Slovakia, The Czech Republic, Iceland and France the dominant scale of municipalities is between 0-1000 (it is 1000-5000 for Turkey). (figure 5.25, 5.26)	
It is argued that in addition to their small-scale, small-size municipalities also have been losing population; therefore there is no need to any governmental organization at these settlements. However, not only municipalities that have a population less than 2000, but also municipalities that have a population between 2000 and 10000 have been losing population. (figure 5.27)	
It is argued that small-scale municipalities are more suitable to practice the fundamentals of participatory democracy, and people are closer to local politicians and local officials in small-scale municipalities. Although this is not a direct indicator of the relation between local politicians and people figure 5.28 shows that the smaller the scale of municipalities, the bigger the proportion of participation in local elections. It can concluded indirectly that the relation between people and power that corresponds to the political interests of people is higher in small-size municipalities. (figure 5.28)	

## CHAPTER 6

### INCREASING SCALE OF MUNICIPALITIES AS PUBLIC POLICY

#### 6.1. Argumentations on Local Governments in Policy Documents

##### 6.1.1. Political Papers

Local governments are often highlighted as an important political topic in national political papers. Political statements that mention the improvement of local government are frequently emphasized in these papers.

##### *Government Programs*

In government programs there are always similar statements about local governments and these statements include decentralizing some responsibility and authorities of the central government to local governments, making local governments more efficient and effective, and strengthening local governments both in terms of administrative and financial terms.

**Table 6.1 Statements about local governments in Government Programs**

55 <sup>th</sup> government program	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• We will deal with the improvement of public administration and the strengthening of local administrations. We will rearrange the sharing of tasks, powers and resources by local and central administrations, make sure that certain services are carried out by local administrations and create efficient monitoring mechanisms. Red tape will be reduced and trust in the public will be our basic guideline.</li><li>• We will make the necessary arrangements for local administrations to have their own sources of income, particularly through real estate taxes by categorizing items, thus increasing revenues. We will also assist local administrations to adopt information systems based on geographical data bases.</li></ul>
57 <sup>th</sup> government program	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Confusion in the inspection of public enterprises will end. The scope of the authority of local administrations will be expanded and effective control will be achieved. To this end, a 'Local Administrations' department will be established within the structure of the Court of Accounts.</li><li>• Our government will rearrange the distribution of responsibilities and sources between local and central administrations by promulgating "The Local Administration Law".</li></ul>
58 <sup>th</sup> government program	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• The public administration will be restructured, and a comprehensive local administration reform will be undertaken.</li><li>• The public administration system should adopt a modern administration understanding and the government is determined to make this transformation come true. To this end, the services which must not be carried out by the central government will be transferred to the local administrations along with their resources.</li></ul>
59 <sup>th</sup> government program	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• During the tenure of our Government a comprehensive reform of the local authorities will be carried out in line with the principles of participatory and pluralist democracy and efficiency in administration.</li><li>• We will align national priorities and local differences and adopt the basic principle of providing services locally; we will transfer all services, apart from those which have to be carried out by the central government, with their resources to the local administrations.</li><li>• We will attach importance to democratization at the local level and limit the control authority of the central administration on local institutions established by elections with control of conformity to law.</li><li>• In the framework of the Reform of the Local Authorities, we will redefine the distribution of functions, responsibilities and resources between the central administration and local authorities based on our understanding of a unitary state and in accordance with the principles of efficiency, productivity and modern administration.</li></ul>
60 <sup>th</sup> government program	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• To improve the service capacity and financing means of local governments made up of special provincial administration, municipalities and villages will be one of the main priorities of our new government.</li><li>• The new law of revenues of special provincial administration and municipalities whose arrangements were completed in the previous government will be enacted and our local governments will also be strengthened in financial terms. The law of village will be renewed.</li></ul>

### ***58<sup>th</sup> Government Urgent Action Plan***

When the Justice and Development Party came to power for the first time in 2003, it prepared an urgent action plan to reveal its aims and priorities. There are three important political statements in that document which target the local governments.

Similarly, this urgent action plan shares the same supportive approach with local governments.

**Table 6.2 Statements about local governments in 58<sup>th</sup> Government Urgent Action Plan**

Law of Local Government Reform will be enacted	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Local governments will be restructured as contemporary administrative units that make their own decisions to meet local common needs, create their own resources, and are open to inspection of local people in line with principles and standards defined by central government, and national and regional development plans.</li> </ul>
The human resources of local governments will be improved	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The quality and quantity of staff working in the local governments is inadequate. To work properly, strengthened local governments with personnel deficiencies should be supplied with skilled staff. Especially, the regulation that enables the appointment of qualified personnel to higher administrative positions should be arranged.</li> <li>Any human resources plan addressing governorships, special provincial administrations or municipalities has not yet been put into practice. This condition creates problems in providing services. In some cases, the number of personnel that provide services to a local government with a population of 2000 can be the same as a local government with a population of 20000.</li> <li>For that reason, a new human resources plan for local government will be made by considering their population size, and accordingly, labor mobility between local governments will be permitted.</li> </ul>
Financial structure of local governments will be improved.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As a part of the local government reform is to increase local governments' authorities and number of skilled personnel, the other part of the reform is to strengthen their financial structure.</li> <li>To strengthen their financial structure, local governments' tax revenues from general budget tax revenues will be redefined and increased.</li> <li>The authority to decide the rates of some local taxes within a limited range will be transferred to local governments.</li> </ul>

***National Development Plans***

Although there are some differences in their details, the last three national development plans have similar perspectives emphasized in other political documents towards local governments.

**Table6.3 statements about local governments in Five Years Development Plans**

8th FYDP (2001-2005)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• 1828. Rapid developments in science and technology require reforms in central and local organization and functioning of the public administration established for meeting the needs of the society.</li><li>• 1903. Under the principle of the unity of administration and decentralization, balance of services and resources could not be sufficiently established between central and local administrations, and the lack of coordination persisted. Local administrations could not be reinforced regarding tasks, authorities, responsibilities and resources.</li><li>• 1904. It is expected that the ratio of total resources allocated to the local administrations out of General Budget to the GNP, which was realized as 1,54 percent in 1996, will rise to 1,93 percent in 2000.</li><li>• 1905. It is estimated that the share of the revenues of municipalities and special provincial administrations in the GNP which was 3,17 percent in 1996, will rise to 4,18 percent in 2000; and that the share of expenditures which was 3,25 percent to 4,35 percent.</li><li>• 1906. Despite the increase in the demand for urban services with the population increase, local administrations' resources, in particular the municipalities have not increased sufficiently. Therefore, municipalities resorted to utilizing foreign loans to fund investment projects.</li><li>• 1908. The problems led by faster urbanization and a highly centralized administrative structure require improvement and strengthening of local administrations.</li><li>• 1909. Legal arrangements are still needed to set out the principles which are to serve for an effective distribution of tasks, authorities, responsibilities and resources between the central and local administrations.</li><li>• 1911. For a more effective service provision and rational use of resources, public services should be supplied locally.</li><li>• 1912. Pursuant to the principle of unity of administration, central and the local administrations shall be restructured on the basis of division of labor and coordination. The distribution of tasks, authorities, responsibilities and resources among these administrations, and the organization, finance and personnel structures of the local administrations shall be revised.</li><li>• 1914. Public services for the common local needs shall be provided by the local administrations and these services shall become effective, efficient and fast.</li><li>• 1915. Local administrations shall enjoy a revenue structure required for their tasks so that their revenue sources shall be regular and continuous to enable them to supply local public services and to make financial planning; hence they will become less dependent on the central administration.</li><li>• 1918. Special Provincial Administration shall be restructured to enable it to plan the needed services and resources of the province, to provide cooperation and coordination between local administration units within the province and carry out public service regularly. And a District Local Management Model to organize these duties at district level shall be drawn-up.</li></ul>
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**Table6.3 statements about local governments in Five Years Development Plans (continued)**

8th FYDP (2001-2005)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• 1919. The present local administration system consists of a number of small-scale units thus adversely affecting efficiency by wasting resources and shall therefore be reformed.</li><li>• 1920. A new set of criteria for establishing the administrative units as province, district and municipality shall be designated by taking into account economic potential, structure of population, historical, geographical and cultural specifications of settlements.</li><li>• 1921. A uniform municipal model shall be left aside and different principles for the establishment, revenue, duties and operation shall be set out for cities, districts, provinces and tourism site municipalities.</li><li>• 1924. Local administration unions shall be developed to provide more efficient services through the strengthening of their financial and administrative structures.</li><li>• 1927. Within the framework of human power planning, studies shall be conducted concerning norm cadres to ensure the employment of qualified personnel as required by the local administrations.</li><li>• 1929. It will be ensured that local administrations shall provide cost-effective services and that these services shall be priced on the basis of their costs and the amount of service needed. Beneficiaries of these services shall be made to pay for these services.</li><li>• 1930. The shares of local administrations within the total General Budget tax revenues shall be increased and local councils shall be conferred the authority in the determination of the rates and amounts of the taxes and charges to be collected, on condition that minimum-maximum figures shall be quoted by the central administration.</li><li>• 1937. Local Administrations shall use foreign loans, grants and technical aids within the framework of the procedures and principles to be specified by the central administration.</li><li>• 1940. Pursuant to the principle of administrative unity, the central and local administrations shall be restructured on the basis of division of labor and coordination. Distribution of tasks, authorities, responsibilities and resources among central and local administrations and the organization, finance and personnel structures of the local administrations shall be rearranged.</li><li>• 1941. Necessary legal arrangements shall be made to provide regular revenue resources for local administrations.</li><li>• 1942. Legal arrangements shall be made for Special Provincial Administration and District Local Management Model.</li><li>• 1943. A new set criteria for the establishment of province, district and municipality shall be designated by a legal arrangement.</li><li>• 1944. Municipality and Metropolitan Municipality models shall be redesigned.</li><li>• 1945. The legal framework concerning local administration unions and companies shall be redefined.</li><li>• 1947. The procedures and principles concerning the use of foreign credits for projects by the local administrations and companies shall be laid down by a legal arrangement.</li></ul>
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**Table6.3 statements about local governments in Five Years Development Plans (continued)**

<p>Preliminary DP (2004-2006)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• In accordance with the principle of administrative integrity within a unitary structure, the central administration and local administrations shall be redesigned to have a structure that is based on allocation of tasks and effective coordination. Efficiency of the local administration services shall be enhanced, and these administrations shall be provided with firm income sources. (p.77)</li> <li>• It is of vital importance to restructure public administration with the aim of reducing expenditures and ensuring efficient allocation and utilization of resources according to strategic priorities. To this end, allocation of responsibilities between the central and local administrations will be redefined and the restructuring process aiming to increase the authority and responsibilities of the local administrations will continue. (p.95)</li> </ul>
<p>9<sup>th</sup> FYDP (2007-2013)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 304. In spite of the legal regulations realized to organize the duties, authorities, resource sharing and service relations among central and local administrations in recent years, the administrative, financial and personnel problems related to local administrations still continue. Furthermore, there is still the requirement for the central government to determine the necessary standards in order to reach a certain level of service in the country in the framework of these regulations and to supervise compliance with these standards.</li> <li>• 457. In order to benefit from the advantages of economies of scale in the realization and operation of environmental infrastructure investments, collaboration and coordination will be improved among local administrations and in this scope, the establishment of unions of local administrations will be supported.</li> <li>• 672. Support will be given for having a sufficient number of qualified technical personnel and equipment in local organizations, primarily in local administrations. Project preparation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation capacities of institutions and agents having a role in the development process will be increased. Efficiency in resource utilization will be ensured.</li> <li>• 679. In order to accelerate development in rural areas, efficient use of resources will be ensured by giving priority to district centers, village municipalities and other central settlements with a potential to develop and provide services to surrounding areas. Moreover, this practice will be extended throughout the country.</li> <li>• 684. The technical, financial and institutional capacities of local administrations and unions, primarily of special provincial administrations, will be strengthened in order to increase their efficiency in the field of rural development.</li> <li>• 690. Establishment of municipalities will be based on objective criteria. Only those settlements that meet these criteria will be accepted as municipalities.</li> <li>• 689. Delegation of powers and duties from the central government to the local administrations will be realized in accordance with the principles laid down by the European Charter of Local Autonomy. However, before the transfer of authorities and duties, measures to strengthen local administrations in administrative and financial terms will be taken.</li> </ul>

### 6.1.2. Economic Papers

Although local governments are always ideologically supported in political papers, the content of economic papers seems different from political papers in terms of its arguments about them. In economic papers, local governments are mentioned as a

financial problem area due to their debts. Therefore in economic paper more restrictive arguments replace the supportive arguments that take place in political documents.

***Letters of Intent Submitted to the IMF***

Letters of intent submitted to the IMF that show the intent of the government in economic issues are one of these economic papers. In these papers governments describe how they will reorganize or restrict the financial operations of local governments.

**Table 6.4 Statements about local governments in letters of intention submitted to the IMF**

January-2002	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The cabinet is going to decide that the proportion of consolidated budget tax revenues dedicated to metropolitan municipalities is decreased (from 5% ) to 4.1%</li> </ul>
July-2002	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Fiscal discipline is going to be accomplished in public economic enterprises and local governments. By the support of the new Debt Management Law, the issue of reckoning of municipalities to the national treasury is being followed. Additionally, a detailed plan for unpaid tax debts of municipalities is being developed. This plan will necessitate the reorganization of main public economic enterprises and municipalities in financial terms.</li> </ul>
July-2003	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The new laws regulating municipal issues are going to make the fiscal system of local governments more effective and control their borrowings.</li> </ul>
July-2004	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Continuity of budget discipline is sustained also in relation to enacting new legislation that delegates some responsibilities of the central government to local governments. This regulation is going to limit the amount of their debt in relation their annual income. The amount of debt of metropolitan municipalities is going to be limited to one and half of their annual income. If it is necessary, the limits of amount of debts will be reconsidered and lessened in relation to the new law regulating the relations between the central government and local governments. New internal borrowings of local governments that exceed 10% of annual income will be dependent on receiving permission from the central government. The new law regulating the relations between central and local governments is going to simplify the financial monitoring by enforcing local governments' regular reporting of their financial data. This regulation is going to be strengthened by a separate law regulating financial relations between local governments and the central government. An already established committee is preparing a report about local governments' debt level including public enterprises controlled by local governments.</li> </ul>

**Table 6.4 Statements about local governments in letters of intention submitted to IMF (continued)**

April-2005	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• New laws about local governments are going to bring strict borrowing and debt limit criteria. The debt limit of local government is not going to exceed their annual income. The debt limit of metropolitan municipalities is going to be limited to one and half of their annual income. New borrowings of all local governments that exceed the 10% of annual income is going to be dependent on receiving permission from the central government. These limits are going to be scrutinized and if necessary they will be decreased. A detailed report on the debt level of local governments including public enterprises is going to be completed and published by September 2005. unpaid debts of municipalities and metropolitan municipalities are going to be handled for each municipality individually according to its payment capacity and any agreement between borrower and lender is going to be announced. Debt payments of local governments are going to be guaranteed by cutbacks from local governments' general budget tax revenues.</li> </ul>
November-2005	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• One of the main targets in the local government's sphere is on the one hand to sustain strict financial discipline and financial sustainability of local governments, and on the other hand to increase the effectiveness and accountability of expenditures. The sustainability of the financial equilibrium of municipalities is going to be accomplished by obeying the limitations of personnel expenditures, borrowings and sustainability of debt that are brought by new laws, and by improved financial management, accountability and additional income and expenditure measures... Although it is improving more slowly than expected, studies of restructuring municipal debts have been continuing and a detailed report on restructured debts of local governments is going to be published at the end of June-2006.</li> </ul>

***Report of State Planning Organization***

The report called “Financial Structures of Municipalities and Financing Their Expenditures” was published in June-2006 by State Planning Organization as mentioned in the last letter of intent (November-2005) submitted to the IMF. As can be seen from the table below, the financial deficiencies of local governments especially resulting from small-scale were identified as one of the most important areas of problems to be overcome.

**Table6.5 Statements about local governments in State Planning Organization’s Report on Municipal Finance**

page	statement
1	One of the reasons behind the deficiencies of the financial structure of municipalities is the municipalities’ population size. The existence of numerous small-size municipalities leads to providing services with higher costs and to poorly managing scarce resources. When combined with deficient financial capacity, scale disadvantages make the problem unsolvable.
14-15	Population size appears as one of the main reasons affecting the financial structure of municipalities. Only 10 percent of urban populations live in municipalities having a population less than 5000 that form 63 percent of the total number of municipalities. Financial capacity of these municipalities most of which are big villages or consist of integration of villages precludes providing their services with a healthy financial structure, even if their financial resources are sufficient, they became deficient in terms of administrative capacity. Therefore small-scale municipalities cause the squandering of resources.
16	Operational surplus [(municipal revenues + revenues from general budget tax revenues) – (current expenditures + transfer payments) = operational equilibrium] of municipalities increased in 1980s. Between 1990 and 1993, when many small scale municipalities were established, operational surplus turned into operational deficit. Additionally, in this term, the financial deficit of municipalities increased rapidly and also reached its highest point during 1990-2005. However, the deterioration in the operational surplus was not balanced by a decrease in investment expenditures, contrarily, investment expenditures also increased in this term. Only metropolitan municipalities could generate operational surplus in this term, nevertheless, foreign borrowings became a dominant tool to finance increasing investments.
81	Turkey witnessed the establishment of many small-scale municipalities in the 1990s. Nowadays, small-scale municipalities are the weakest point of the municipal structure. Most of these municipalities, many of which are in the underdeveloped regions of Turkey, are in an unbreakable cyclic condition with deficiencies in financial capacity and expenditure disadvantages of small-scale. 31.2 percent of municipalities that have a population less than 5000 faced a decrease in population between 1990 and 2000. This population decrease is also one of the threats to the financial structure of municipalities.
84-85	At this point the definition of local governments’ responsibilities and authorities becomes important. The unity of responsibility and authority among municipalities without considering their differences such as population and development level leads to problems in service provision as mentioned before. Local services that need economies of scale should not be undertaken by small-scale municipalities. Magnitude of population and territory which are big enough to include externalities will increase the efficiency in service provision.
100	A high level of regional disparities in Turkey affects the provision of services in terms of finance and quality. Migration and rapid urbanization create pressure on expenditures related to infrastructure investments in cities, and this causes some problems even in the municipalities that have higher financial capacity. The unity of responsibility and authority among municipalities without considering their differences deepens this kind of problems in municipalities that are small-scale and have limited financial capacity.
100	On the other hand, administrative deficiencies of small-scale municipalities are also one of the reasons that contribute to an increase in differences in financial capacities between municipalities. Institutional organization, personnel policy, and strategy development are important issues for effectiveness in collecting revenues. However, the existing conditions of municipalities are very distant from these necessary conditions.
129	The importance of a transfer system on local budgets makes amendments on the transfer system critical. A positive regulation will help to increase effectiveness of the local administration; negative interference will lead to interruption in service provision at the very least. Firstly, the other issues of local governments such as responsibilities and authorities, resources, financial management and borrowing should be restructured, then the system of financial transfers should be arranged. The financial transfer system should be organized in a way that political interventions to the system are minimized. However, at the same time, responsibility and accountability in using resources should be strengthened. The financial transfer system cannot be a solution to structural problems of local governments, it can only provide temporary relief.

**Table 6.5 Statements about local governments in State Planning Organization's Report on Municipal Finance (continued)**


page	statement
149	Another tool for overcoming scale problem is the creation of differentiation in responsibility and authority among municipalities according to their population size. In areas where economies of scale are necessary, the union of municipalities should be strengthened.

## 6.2. The Context of Local Government Finance

Local governments become key figures in public finance especially with reference to their expenditure pattern. That is why they are mentioned frequently in economic policy papers. However, a deeper analysis is needed to understand why local governments are reorganized in terms of financial issues.


### 6.2.1. The Importance of Municipal Expenditures

The proportion of municipal expenditures to GDP has increased steadily for 30 years. The proportion of municipal expenditures to public expenditures doubled between 1975 and 1995, and has remained constant at that level for 10 years. Similarly, the percentage of municipal investments in the total amount of public investments has gradually increased since 1975. In 2005, more than a quarter of total public investment was made by municipalities. Therefore we can argue that municipalities are an important source of public expenditure.




**Figure 6.1 Municipal expenditures as percentage of GDP**

Source: Kurtuluş, (2006:5)



**Figure6.2 Municipal expenditures as percentage of public expenditures**

Source: Kurtuluş, (2006:6)




**Figure6.3 Municipal investments as % of public investments**

Source: Kurtuluş, (2006:44)


### 6.2.2. Municipal Borrowings

How these increased expenditures of municipalities have been financed is an important issue.




**Figure6.4 Financial Structure of Municipalities**

When the expenditure pattern of municipalities is considered, it is observed that between 1975 and 2005 the percentage of the current expenditures of municipalities gradually decreased, at the same time the percentage of debt payments steadily increased. In terms of revenues, the proportion of revenues other than taxes decreased and the proportion of borrowings increased over the same period. Therefore it can be concluded that the issue of borrowings and debt repayments have become two important issues in local government finance.




**Figure6.5 Expenditure pattern of municipalities between 1975-2005**  
*Source: Kurtuluş, (2006:35)*



**Figure6.6 Revenue pattern of municipalities between 1981-2005**  
*Source: Kurtuluş, (2006:49)*


### 6.2.3. The Effects of Municipal Borrowings

Municipal debts is one of the national treasury's worst problems of the. More than one third of the stock of treasury receivables as of 28.02.2009 belongs to local governments. In addition to debts that are not yet due, although the percentage of local governments in outstanding overdue treasury receivables as of 28.02.2009 has been changing, the amount that belongs to local governments is always around 10 billion NTL. Especially in 2008 and 2009, more than four fifths of total overdue receivables belongs municipalities.




**Figure6.7 The stock of treasury receivables as of 28.02.2009 (\*1000 NTL)**

Source: [www.hazine.gov.tr/irj/portal/anonymous/AlacakVerileri](http://www.hazine.gov.tr/irj/portal/anonymous/AlacakVerileri)



**Figure6.8 Outstanding overdue receivables as of 28.02.2009 (\*1000 NTL)**


Source: [www.hazine.gov.tr/irj/portal/anonymous/AlacakVerileri](http://www.hazine.gov.tr/irj/portal/anonymous/AlacakVerileri)



**Figure6.9 Outstanding overdue receivables as of 28.02.2009 (percentage of local governments)**


Source: [www.hazine.gov.tr/irj/portal/anonymous/AlacakVerileri](http://www.hazine.gov.tr/irj/portal/anonymous/AlacakVerileri)

Moreover, payments undertaken by the treasury due to treasury guarantees is also another issue. Although the amount of payments undertaken by the treasury due to treasury guarantees has decreased since 2001, between 1992 and 2008 on average one third of payments undertaken by the treasury due to treasury guarantees belong to local governments.



**Figure6.10 Payments undertaken due to the treasury guarantees (\*1000 \$)**

Source: [www.hazine.gov.tr/irj/portal/anonymous/AlacakVerileri](http://www.hazine.gov.tr/irj/portal/anonymous/AlacakVerileri)



**Figure6.11 Payments undertaken due to the treasury guarantees (percentage of local governments)**

Source: [www.hazine.gov.tr/irj/portal/anonymous/AlacakVerileri](http://www.hazine.gov.tr/irj/portal/anonymous/AlacakVerileri)

#### 6.2.4. The Last IMF Negotiations

Between the end of 2008 and the beginning of 2009, an IMF committee was working in Turkey with bureaucrats responsible for financial issues with the aim of making an agreement on a new letter of intent that would be submitted to the IMF to get financial aid from it. However the agreement has not yet been made. It was argued that one of the key topics discussed in the meetings was municipal debts. It was also argued that the IMF insisted on new regulations addressing the financial structure of municipalities. This event also shows the seriousness of the issue of municipal debt.

**Table6.6 Newspaper news about IMF Negotiations and Debt of Municipalities**

date	newspaper	title
28.11.2008	Zaman	IMF ile faiz dışı fazla ve belediye ödeneği pazarlığı
23.12.2008	Habertürk	Türkiye değişti, IMF de değişsin
23.01.2009	Hürriyet	Hükümet IMF görüşmesinde şok gelişme
28.01.2009	Referans	Başbakan teknik mutabakata onay vermedi, IMF evine döndü
28.01.2009	Hürriyet	Anadolu'da üreten tekstilci krizi daha kolay atlatacak gibi
26.02.2009	Taraf	IMF görüşmesi vergiyle kilitlendi
26.02.2009	İlgazetesi	İşte IMF'nin üç zor şartı

#### 6.2.5. Conclusion

The government handles the issue of local government differently in economic and political policy papers. In political papers it is mentioned that local governments will be improved in financial and administrative terms by the support of the central government. However, in the economical papers local governments are mentioned as

a source of financial burden, and therefore they are to be strictly controlled in terms of their expenditures.

Consequently, it can be argued that the central government has two different--even to some extent conflicting--sets of arguments considering local governments. Therefore any regulations that affect the local governments should be considered with respect to both of these rationales.

### **6.3. The Evaluation of Closing-down the Small-scale Municipalities in Terms of Public Policy and Policy Making**

The issue of small-scale municipalities was interpreted differently by the government and the opposition party. Similarly, Jones (1970:9) argues that in societies events are interpreted in different ways by different people at different times. Although the opposition party (Republican People's Party) emphasized their democratic aspects, the government (Justice and Development Party) focused on financial deficiencies of small-scale government.

However, the public policy literature argues that there are homogeneous ideas about particular problem areas on the side of decision makers. Lindblom (1970) argues that in any stable society there is a unified set of beliefs which are communicated to the population through the media or other mechanisms, and these beliefs appear to be spontaneous because they are so much taken for granted (cited in Hill, 2005:150). Hill (2005:160) also argues that the size of municipalities has been regularly on the agendas of many nations over a long period of time, and that there has been a comparative similarity, or at least a clustering, of policy responses, that is, a reorganization of the scale of municipalities. Thus the government also gave the same response to the same problem.

Nonetheless, how something is done is as important as what is done. In other words, how the problem of small-scale municipalities was defined is as important as it being defined. Majone (2006:228) implies that knowing how a problem has been defined is essential to understanding the process of agenda setting. Small-scale municipalities were defined as a financial burden on the central government because it was argued

that they have no capacity to generate income, they are inefficient and ineffective in their operations, and therefore they are sources of financial deficiency.

Due to economic and political pressures over local governments, the government has felt that it has had to do something about the problems of local governments. At that point, by targeting the small scale municipalities, which are the weakest point of the local government structure, the government has formulated the content of local government reform such that it has aimed at both showing its responsiveness to the problem areas while reducing political tension at the same time.

How a problem is defined is inevitably dependent upon who defines it. Majone (2006:234) also argues that in the United States the president, his political appointees, and congress turn out to be central to agenda setting and also to alternative perspectives with the help of their staff. The problem of local governments with small-scale was defined by the government in a particular way as mention before. McKelvey (1976) and Schofield (1976) show that the absence of majority-rule equilibrium implies that virtually any policy outcome is possible, hence those who control the agenda can engage in all sorts of manipulation (cited in Majone, 2006:229-230). This is important because the Justice and Development Party had come in to power alone before the regulation and it had complete power to shape the content of policy.

Some other powerful factors are also as important as governments' intentions. Changes in economy and international bodies are two important factors here. Ham and Hill (1984:24-25) argue that the state's political activities are inextricably bound up with economic developments within society. From a historical perspective, much of the growth of state intervention can be explained in terms of changes in the economy. It is always argued that Turkey is highly dependent on outside financial sources. Therefore international financial institutions like the IMF become more important in that respect. Similarly, Majone (2006:247) argues that international bodies like OECD, IMF, UN-FAO, and WHO are aimed at influencing the process of agenda setting in some countries. Turkey declared in the letters of intent submitted to the IMF that it would restrict and more strictly control the operation of municipalities.

In addition to the conditions under which the agenda is set, policy formulation is another key issue to understanding the nature of policies. Knowledge is the main source upon which a policy is formulated. For that reason policy makers want to get more information about social, economic and other conditions of society. Establishing statistical indicators has a critical role for information because they are basic units of data presentation. However, Henriot (1970) argues that they are loaded with a bias in favor of state intervention: in setting up indicators, an agenda is being set for what problems should be addressed (cited in Parsons, 1997:416). The data presented by the government showed its intention about small-scale municipalities. The government presented figures of the financial deficiencies of small-scale municipalities and this presentation also brought about efficiency and effectiveness arguments. Similarly, Miles (1985:94) warns that we need to be mindful of how data is actually presented. Some data are not published; and what are published are the result of a process of selection and interpretation (cited in Parson, 1997:418). Consequently the government laid the groundwork to legitimize the policy of increasing the scale of municipalities which is relevant to the policy that the government intended to implement.

It is also argued that there could be a difference between the reasons that force the policy changes and the reasons that are used to legitimize the policy. Pal (1987:7) argues that it is difficult to uncover the real reasons, though it is assumed that the actors are aware of them but prefer to keep them hidden. Although the government used the argument that increasing the scale of municipalities aims at reaching efficiency and effectiveness in municipal service provision as to legitimize the policy the main reason may be that the government tried to control and regulate the expenditures of municipalities by closing down small-scale municipalities which composed one fourth of the total number of municipalities and which were also accused of being highly indebted. Similarly, Pal (1987:13) argues that public policies are presented as technical solutions to specific policy relevant problems, so political goals are often downplayed.

Instruments or means are the most important issue in implementing the policy decisions. Pal (1987:14) emphasizes that defining a policy problem and determining

a solution are frequently overshadowed in the policy making process by the question of “how?”. The government’s decision to close down municipalities with a population under 2000 dominates the arguments for efficiency and effectiveness. Even Smith and May (1993:200) argue that means often precede ends, become ends, even cause ends. Due to reasons mentioned in the previous paragraph, the government decided to close down the municipalities that have a population under 2000 and formulate the ends afterwards. Though the problems of small-scale municipalities are emphasized on many occasions such as conferences, articles, books, reports etc, closing them down is never proposed as a solution.

## CHAPTER 7

### THE CASE STUDY: DENIZLI

The main aim of this section is to identify the hidden rationales behind the annexation of surrounding municipalities to Denizli Municipality. To achieve this aim, the chapter begins with an evaluation of the current conditions of municipalities in terms of their social and economic characteristics, administrative and service provision capacities, and the relation between them. Then it concentrates on the history of fragmentation to explain the beginning of the problem and then evaluates the attitudes of actors towards it. Later the chapter focuses on several topics which are heavily discussed in the annexation literature to classify the actors' reactions. However, it is possible to divide these issues into technical and political issues. In the technical part, the chapter sheds light on general problem areas such as inefficiencies in planning and municipal service provision, inapplicability of the master plan, inefficiencies in collaborations between municipalities, using the master plan as a legitimizing tool, indeterminacy of urban development, and delays in decision making. Later on the chapter concentrates on more specific problem areas, especially four different issues: planning and urbanization of the urban area, efficiency and effectiveness in service provision in the urban area, relations between municipalities, and participation in local politics. However, in addition to these technical issues, the study will also focus on some political issues such as the relations between local and national politics, urban actors' attitudes towards annexation, and an evaluation of alternative annexation regulations. After analyzing the actors' arguments concerning technical and political issues, the chapter concentrates on the struggle among urban elites, then the actors' opinions of the ideal way to manage urban areas and finally, the actors' future expectations. As stated previously, the main objective of this chapter is to manifest the real ends expected from annexation.

## 7.1. The Current Condition in Denizli Urban Area


### 7.1.1. Introduction

Akkale, Bağbaşı, Başkarcı, Bereketli, Gökpınar, Göveçlik, Gümüşler, Hallaçlar, Kayhan, Kınıklı, Korucuk, Servergazi, Üçler Municipalities and Bozburun, Eskihisar, Goncalı, Hisar, Kadılar, Karakurt, Saruhan, Şirinköy, Güzelköy (Yiğenağa) and Karakova Villages were annexed to Denizli Municipality according to 11<sup>th</sup> article of Municipality Law (5393) by a shared decree in 11.08.2006. These municipalities and villages would have lost their juristic personality at the following election.



**Figure 7.1** Map of Denizli Municipality and Surrounding Municipalities

Source: Google Earth (1/150.000)



**Figure 7.2 Boundaries of Denizli Municipality and Surrounding Municipalities**

*Source: Denizli Municipality (1/150.000)*

When we consider the dates these municipalities were established, we observe that among these thirteen municipalities only three municipalities (Başkarcı, Gümüşler and Korucuk) were established before 1994. Therefore most of these municipalities were relatively recently established.

**Table7.1 Establishment Years of Municipalities**

Municipality	Establishment Year
Denizli	1876
Akkale	1999
Bağbaşı	1994
Başkarcı	1960
Bereketli	1995
Gökpınar	1997
Göveçlik	1998
Gümüşler	1988
Hallaçlar	1999
Kayhan	1994
Kınıklı	1995
Korucuk	1992
Servegazi	1999
Üçler	1999

Source: [www.yerelnet.org](http://www.yerelnet.org)


### 7.1.2. Social and Economic Conditions of Municipalities

After becoming municipalities these settlements became adjacent to Denizli and the main roads were faced with a rapid population increase. These population increases in surrounding municipalities were inevitable because, as can be seen from the above map, Denizli's growth is impeded geographically (rocky mountains) in addition to the existence of surrounding municipalities. Therefore 41.4 percent of the population growth in the metropolitan region occurred in the surrounding municipalities.

**Table7.2 Population of Municipalities**

Municipalities' populations	1997	2000	2007	1997-2007	%
Denizli	233651	275480	323151	89500	58,6
Surrounding Municipalities	67174	82557	130466	63292	41,4
Akkale	2582	4198	6753	4171	2,7
Bağbaşı	8030	11995	21437	13407	8,8
Başkarcı	2265	2782	2433	168	0,1
Bereketli	2055	2866	10203	8148	5,3
Gökpınar	3144	2739	3533	389	0,3
Göveçlik	1800	1990	2064	264	0,2
Gümüşler	17424	16008	24558	7134	4,7
Hallaçlar	3167	3580	4336	1169	0,8
Kayhan	4197	5716	8168	3971	2,6
Kınıklı	15271	19699	25413	10142	6,6
Korucuk	1680	1836	1809	129	0,1
Servegazi	3160	5588	10469	7309	4,8
Üçler	2399	3560	9290	6891	4,5
Total	300825	358037	453617	152792	100,0

Source: [www.yerelnet.org](http://www.yerelnet.org)



**Figure7.3 Population of Municipalities (index) (1997:100)**


Source: [www.yerelnet.org](http://www.yerelnet.org)

Similarly, the number of buildings according to their completion years shows that there is a rapid increase in the number of buildings especially between 1990 and 2000 in some of the surrounding municipalities. This trend is also in line with the population increase.

**Table7.3 Number of Buildings in Municipalities**

	1990	2000	2000-1990	%
Denizli	30392	41776	11384	62,6
Surrounding municipalities	7265	14068	6803	37,4
Akkale	529	939	410	2,3
Bağbaşı	1017	2269	1252	6,9
Başkarcı	547	645	98	0,5
Bereketli	137	447	310	1,7
Gökpınar	206	507	301	1,7
Göveçlik	320	476	156	0,9
Gümüşler	1980	3732	1752	9,6
Hallaçlar	206	322	116	0,6
Kayhan	542	1116	574	3,2
Kımkılı	881	2008	1127	6,2
Korucuk	291	420	129	0,7
Servegazi	396	551	155	0,9
Üçler	213	636	423	2,3
Total	37657	55844	18187	100,0

Source: Turkish Statistical Institute



**Figure7.4 Number of Buildings in Municipalities (index) (1980:100)**

Source: Turkish Statistical Institute

The percentages of residential and industrial buildings are higher in surrounding municipalities; however, in Denizli Municipality the percentages of commercial and mixed-residential & non-residential buildings are higher. Therefore we can conclude that surrounding municipalities provide housing for the metropolitan population and work places for blue-collar workers.

**Table7.4 Municipality-Type of Housing Relation (2000)**

	residential	% residential	mix-residential & non-residential	%	commercial	% commercial	industrial	% industrial	Total
Denizli	32485	78.5	3590	8.7	3331	8.1	1955	4.7	41361
Surrounding Municipalities	11831	84.6	742	5.3	684	4.9	732	5.2	13.989
Akkale	797	86.8	41	4.5	35	3.8	45	4.9	918
Bağbaşı	2103	93.1	89	3.9	36	1.6	31	1.4	2259
Başkarcı	567	88.7	61	9.5	3	0.5	8	1.3	639
Bereketli	423	96.6	2	0.5	2	0.5	11	2.5	438
Gökpınar	494	97.1	3	0.6	12	2.4	0	0	509
Göveçlik	396	85.5	23	5	8	1.7	36	7.8	463
Gümüşler	2666	70.8	142	3.8	469	12.5	490	13	3767
Hallaçlar	265	82.8	41	13	0	0	14	4.4	320
Kayhan	1046	92.2	48	4.2	14	1.2	26	2.3	1134
Kınıklı	1684	84.9	236	12	49	2.5	14	0.7	1983
Korucuk	315	84.7	18	4.8	23	6.2	16	4.3	372
Servegazi	481	88.6	33	6.1	28	5.2	1	0.2	543
Üçler	594	92.2	5	0.8	5	0.8	40	6.2	644
Total	44316	80.1	4332	7.8	4015	7.3	2687	4.9	55350

Source: Turkish Statistical Institute

The proportion of people who do not participate in the labor market to total labor force is the highest in Denizli. Additionally, the percentage of unemployed people within the percentage of people who participate to the labor market is also the highest. If we consider table7.6 and figure7.5, it is clear that agricultural activities are the means of employments for people living in surrounding municipalities. Therefore we can conclude that surrounding municipalities have mostly rural characteristics.

**Table7.5 Employment status of population in Municipalities (2000)**


	not participating labor market	% not participating labor market	participating labor market	Employed	% employed	unemployed	% unemployed	total labor force
Denizli	113629	51.7	106129	95484	90.0	10645	10.0	219758
Surrounding municipalities	13235	20,5	51357	50659	98,6	698	1,4	64592
Akkale	1643	17.8	7568	7481	98.9	87	1.1	9211
Bağbaşı	393	17.5	1851	1838	99.3	13	0.7	2244
Başkarıcı	516	23.6	1669	1641	98.3	28	1.7	2185
Bereketli	207	12.7	1425	1422	99.8	3	0.2	1632
Gökpınar	1742	14.4	10338	10269	99.3	69	0.7	12080
Göveçlik	558	19.2	2351	2289	97.4	62	2.6	2909
Gümüşler	603	13.9	3744	3716	99.3	28	0.7	4347
Hallaçlar	5003	31.1	11103	10826	97.5	277	2.5	16106
Kayhan	317	22.0	1122	1113	99.2	9	0.8	1439
Kınıklı	341	15.7	1832	1827	99.7	5	0.3	2173
Korucuk	1072	24.8	3248	3193	98.3	55	1.7	4320
Servegazi	353	11.0	2859	2822	98.7	37	1.3	3212
Üçler	487	17.8	2247	2222	98.9	25	1.1	2734
Total	126864	44.6	157486	146143	92.8	11343	7.2	284350

Source: Turkish Statistical Institute

**Table 7.6 Employment Categories of Population in Municipalities (2000)**

	Scientific, technical, professional and related workers		Administrative and managerial workers		Clerical and related workers		Commercial and sales workers		Services workers		Agricultural, animal husbandry, forestry workers, fishermen and hunters		Nonagricultural production and related workers, transport equipment operators and laborers		Total
Denizli	11695	12.3	2459	2.6	9001	9.4	11069	11.6	10009	10.5	913	1.0	50278	52.7	95424
Surrounding municipalities	3430	6,8	723	1,4	2148	4,2	2819	5,6	2720	5,4	24565	48,5	14235	28,1	50640
Akkale	473	6.3	85	1.1	300	4.0	475	6.4	425	5.7	3699	49.5	2022	27.0	7479
Bağbaşı	39	2.1	19	1.0	91	5.0	62	3.4	48	2.6	1193	64.9	385	21.0	1837
Başkarcı	171	10.4	24	1.5	107	6.5	101	6.2	94	5.7	750	45.7	393	24.0	1640
Bereketli	13	0.9	18	1.3	43	3.0	41	2.9	54	3.8	595	41.8	658	46.3	1422
Gökpınar	222	2.2	99	1.0	298	2.9	446	4.3	565	5.5	4953	48.3	3681	35.9	10264
Göveçlik	198	8.7	31	1.4	107	4.7	132	5.8	96	4.2	1196	52.3	527	23.0	2287
Gümüşler	88	2.4	18	0.5	104	2.8	140	3.8	235	6.3	1694	45.6	1435	38.6	3714
Hallaçlar	1690	15.6	314	2.9	635	5.9	914	8.4	588	5.4	4695	43.4	1988	18.4	10824
Kayhan	31	2.8	7	0.6	33	3.0	55	4.9	93	8.4	658	59.1	236	21.2	1113
Kınıklı	55	3.0	28	1.5	102	5.6	92	5.0	138	7.6	965	52.9	444	24.3	1824
Korucuk	298	9.3	46	1.4	174	5.4	208	6.5	128	4.0	1557	48.8	782	24.5	3193
Servergazi	54	1.9	16	0.6	85	3.0	79	2.8	165	5.8	1352	47.9	1070	37.9	2821
Üçler	98	4.4	18	0.8	69	3.1	74	3.3	91	4.1	1258	56.6	614	27.6	2222
Total	15125	10.4	3182	2.2	11149	7.6	13888	9.5	12729	8.7	25478	17.4	64513	44.2	146064

Source: Turkish Statistical Institute




**Figure 7.5 Employment Categories of Population in Municipalities (2000)**  
 Source: Turkish Statistical Institute

Since agriculture activity is the dominant activity in surrounding municipalities, most of the working people are unpaid family workers or self employed in these municipalities. Therefore it can be said that the surrounding municipalities are dependent on Denizli Municipality in all other non-agricultural services because these types of facilities are concentrated in Denizli.

**Table7.7 Employment type of population in Municipalities (2000)**

	paid worker	%	employer	%	self-employed	%	unpaid family worker	%	total
Denizli	78361	82.1	4614	4.8	10194	10.7	2312	2.4	95481
Surrounding municipalities	21444	42.3	1620	3.2	10535	20.8	17060	33.7	50659
Akkale	1393	49.4	31	1.1	490	17.4	908	32.2	2822
Bağbaşı	3049	40.8	236	3.2	1613	21.6	2583	34.5	7481
Başkarcı	481	26.2	54	2.9	482	26.2	821	44.7	1838
Bereketli	734	44.7	31	1.9	339	20.7	537	32.7	1641
Gökpınar	758	41.5	46	2.5	378	20.7	645	35.3	1827
Göveçlik	745	52.4	31	2.2	236	16.6	410	28.8	1422
Gümüşler	4529	44.1	206	2.0	1890	18.4	3644	35.5	10269
Hallaçlar	860	37.6	50	2.2	603	26.3	776	33.9	2289
Kayhan	1788	48.1	29	0.8	672	18.1	1227	33.0	3716
Kınıklı	4539	41.9	700	6.5	2463	22.8	3124	28.9	10826
Korucuk	523	47.0	19	1.7	214	19.2	357	32.1	1113
Servergazi	1259	39.4	159	5.0	660	20.7	1115	34.9	3193
Üçler	786	35.4	28	1.3	495	22.3	913	41.1	2222
Total	99805	68.3	6234	4.3	20729	14.2	19372	13.3	146140

Source: Turkish Statistical Institute



**Figure7.6 Employment type of population in Municipalities (2000)**

Source: Turkish Statistical Institute

### 7.1.3. Administrative Conditions of Municipalities

In the legislation process of the new municipality law, especially for the sections related to increasing the scale of municipalities, it is argued that small scale municipalities' administrative capacity is weak. In this section, the administrative capacity of Denizli Municipality and surrounding municipalities will be compared with reference to their financial, personnel, and equipment capacities.

#### Revenues and Expenditures

Financial structure can be one of the indicators of municipalities' administrative performance. Although Akkale, Bereketli, Kayhan and Kınıklı municipalities have higher expenditures than revenues, Bağbaşı, Gümüşler, Servegazi and Üçler municipalities have a rate of expenditures to revenues under 100%. Therefore we can say that while some of the municipalities are in debt, some of them can save. The generalization of indebtedness of small scale municipalities is not completely valid in Denizli.

**Table 7.8 Revenues and Expenditures of Municipalities (2004)**

	Total Revenues	Total Expenditures	exp / rev
Denizli	59137157	58896963	99.6
Surrounding municipalities*	17490628	18123071	103.6
Akkale	996765	2355010	236.3
Bağbaşı	2455819	2047743	83.4
Başkarıcı	509459	494469	97.1
Bereketli	717512	801903	111.8
Gümüşler	4139621	3761007	90.9
Kayhan	1039844	1180459	113.5
Kınıklı	2922821	3790892	129.7
Servegazi	2680553	1974932	73.7
Üçler	2028234	1716656	84.6
Turkey-mean			108.8

\*It does not include Gökpınar, Göveçlik, Hallaçlar and Korucuk municipalities

Source: Turkish Statistical Institute

Bereketli and Kınıklı Municipalities are dependent on the tax revenues from the central budget. However, Başkarıcı, Gümüşler, Kayhan, Korucuk and Üçler municipalities have the capacity to create their own incomes. Therefore, dependency

of small scale municipalities to the central government in terms of revenues coming from the general budget is not completely convincing in the Denizli case.

**Table 7.9 Sub-divisions of Municipal Revenues (2004)**

	<b>Total Revenues</b>	<b>Tax revenues</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>Revenues other than taxes</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>Special aids and funds</b>	<b>%</b>
Denizli	59137157	29032563	49.09	30057094	50.83	47500	0.08
Surrounding municipalities*	17490628	10242492	58.60	6613824	37.80	634312	3.60
Akkale	996765	645770	64.79	335887	33.70	15108	1.52
Bağbaşı	2455819	1630575	66.40	794744	32.36	30500	1.24
Başkarıcı	509459	289487	56.82	207472	40.72	12500	2.45
Bereketli	717512	534517	74.50	170995	23.83	12000	1.67
Gümüşler	4139621	2109121	50.95	1951338	47.14	79162	1.91
Kayhan	1039844	596946	57.41	415192	39.93	27706	2.66
Kınıklı	2922821	2305469	78.88	592352	20.27	25000	0.86
Korucuk	2680553	1310456	48.89	1355545	50.57	14552	0.54
Üçler	2028234	820151	40.44	790299	38.96	417784	20.60
<b>Turkey-mean</b>			66.20		30.00		3.80

\*It does not include Gökpınar, Göveçlik, Hallaçlar and Korucuk municipalities

Source: Turkish Statistical Institute

When the proportion of current expenditures to total expenditures is considered, Başkarıcı and Servergazi Municipalities have a value that is above Turkey's average. This means that they have less capacity for investment expenditures. However, when the proportion of current expenditures to total revenues is considered, Akkale and Başkarıcı Municipalities have a lower capacity to invest than Turkey's average. Therefore the rest of the municipalities have the capacity to make investment expenditures with respect to Turkey's average. In sum, the assumption of an incapacity of small scale municipalities is not applicable to Denizli.

**Table7.10 Sub-divisions of Municipal Expenditures (2004)**

	Total Exp.	Total Rev.	Current Exp.	%	%	Invest. Exp.	%	Transfer Exp.	%
	a	b	c	c/a	c/b				
Denizli	58896963	59137157	34813933	59.1	58.9	16955381	28.8	7127649	12.1
Sur. Mun*	18123071	17490628	9675488	53.4	55.3	5523757	30.5	2923826	16.1
Akkale	2355010	996765	900945	38.3	90.4	1094110	46.5	359955	15.3
Bağbaşı	2047743	2455819	830124	40.5	33.8	540163	26.4	677456	33.1
Başkarcı	494469	509459	410441	83.0	80.6	29585	6.0	54443	11.0
Bereketli	801903	717512	410535	51.2	57.2	375031	46.8	16337	2.0
Gümüşler	3761007	4139621	2311194	61.5	55.8	880356	23.4	569457	15.1
Kayhan	1180459	1039844	463208	39.2	44.5	534623	45.3	182628	15.5
Kınıklı	3790892	2922821	1529198	40.3	52.3	1318194	34.8	943500	24.9
Servegazi	1974932	2680553	1569590	79.5	58.6	299126	15.1	106216	5.4
Üçler	1716656	2028234	1250253	72.8	61.6	452569	26.4	13834	0.8
Turkey				74.3	81.0		16.1		9.6

\*It does not include Gökpinar, Göveçlik, Hallaçlar and Korucuk municipalities

Source: Turkish Statistical Institute

### Staff

Personnel structure can be considered as another indicator of the administrative capacity of municipalities. Population per administrative staff varies between 87 and 3956 among municipalities. In terms of this indicator, there are better and worse municipalities than Denizli Municipality. The indicator of population per worker has values between 41 and 1400 and there are better and worse municipalities than Denizli Municipality if this indicator is taken into consideration. In terms of population per any municipal personnel, Denizli Municipality has a value near the regional average. In a quantitative analysis, personnel capacity of surrounding municipalities changes considerably. Therefore it is difficult to reach a clear conclusion about personnel inefficiencies of small-scale municipalities in Denizli.

**Table7.11 Municipal staffs**

	pop-2005	Adm. Per.	population per administrative personnel	workers	Pop. per workers	total	Pop. per municipal staff
Denizli*	304374	322	945	472	645	794	383
Surrounding municipalities**	87859	66	1331	191	460	310	283
Akkale	6362					23	277
Bağbaşı	19782	5	3956	33	599	38	521
Başkarcı	2322	6	387			18	129
Gökpınar	3258	4	815	14	233	18	181
Hallaçlar	7652	3	2551	14	547	17	450
Kayhan	23796	11	2163	17	1400	28	850
Kınıklı	1826	21	87	45	41	66	28
Korucuk	10114					18	562
Servegazi	4124	5	825	24	172	29	142
Üçler	8623	11	784	44	196	55	157
Total	392233	388	968	663	563	1104	355
*it does not include employment by service procurement							
**it does not include Bereketli, Göveçlik and Gümüşler Municipalities							

Source: Denizli Municipality

In terms of personnel numbers in planning and urbanization issues, Denizli Municipality has superiority considering surrounding municipalities. While surrounding municipalities have one or two personnel in the planning and urbanization departments in general, Denizli Municipality has thirty-four personnel. Additionally if we take the size of the area of responsibility into account, Denizli Municipality is one of the municipalities that have minimum area per personnel.

**Table.7.12 Municipal Staff in relation to planning and urbanization**

	technical personnel	area of responsibility (ha)	area per technical personnel (ha)
Denizli	34	11069	325.6
Surrounding municipalities*	18	18890	1049.4
Bağbaşı	2	3467	1733.5
Başkarcı	1	1832	1832.0
Bereketli	2	300	150.0
Gökpınar	2	2640	1320.0
Göveçlik	1	1590	1590.0
Gümüşler	4	1700	425.0
Kayhan	1	584	584.0
Kınıklı	2	375	187.5
Korucuk	1	750	750.0
Servegazi	1	2857	2857.0
Üçler	1	2795	2795.0
Total	52	29959	576.1
*It does not include Akkale and Hallaçlar Municipalities			

Source: Denizli Municipality

## Equipment

The condition of equipment assets is another important indicator of administrative capacity because municipalities need equipment to fulfill their responsibilities. Denizli Municipality differs from other municipalities in the amount of municipal equipment and other vehicles, however, when population is considered, Denizli Municipality has the second worst average. Bearing in mind equipment as an indicator of administrative capacity, there is no obvious conclusion that is in favor of large scale municipalities.

**Table7.13 Number of pieces of municipal equipment and other vehicles (2004)**

	Car + delivery car + van + jeep + hearse + motorcycle	tip lorry + tractor + refuse wagon	Buses + minibuses	Bulldozer + compressor + excavator + road roller + loader + digger + grader	vacuum truck + water tanker + pumper + fire engine	Other vehicles	total	Population (2007)
Denizli	93	52	70	24	29	12	280	323151
Surrounding municipalities	62	46	24	30	23	10	195	130466
Akkale	4	3	1	2	0	1	11	6753
Bağbaşı	3	4	0	2	2	0	11	21437
Başkarıcı	2	5	5	2	2	1	17	2433
Bereketli	4	3	2	1	1	0	11	10203
Gökpınar	1	1	0	2	1	2	7	3533
Göveçlik	3	1	0	1	1	0	6	2064
Gümüşler	19	9	8	7	4	3	50	24558
Hallaçlar	4	1	0	0	2	0	7	4336
Kayhan	3	3	0	2	2	0	10	8168
Kınıklı	9	7	1	4	4	2	27	25413
Korucuk	2	4	3	1	0	0	10	1809
Servegazi	4	2	1	2	1	1	11	10469
Üçler	4	3	3	4	3	0	17	9290
Total	155	98	94	54	52	22	475	453617

Source: [www.yerelbilgi.gov.tr](http://www.yerelbilgi.gov.tr)

**Table7.14 Population per pieces of municipal equipment and other vehicles (2004)**

	car + delivery car + van + jeep + hearse + motorcycle	tip lorry + tractor + refuse wagon	buses + minibuses	bulldozer + compressor + excavator + road roller + loader + digger + grader	vacuum truck + water tanker + pumper + fire engine	Other vehicles	total
Denizli	3474.7	6214.4	4616.4	13464.6	11143.1	26929.3	1154.1
Surrounding municipalities	2104.3	2836.2	5436.1	4348.9	5672.4	13046.6	669.1
Akkale	1688.3	2251.0	6753.0	3376.5		6753.0	613.9
Bağbaşı	7145.7	5359.3		10718.5	10718.5		1948.8
Başkarcı	1216.5	486.6	486.6	1216.5	1216.5	2433.0	143.1
Bereketli	2550.8	3401.0	5101.5	10203.0	10203.0		927.5
Gökpınar	3533.0	3533.0		1766.5	3533.0	1766.5	504.7
Göveçlik	688.0	2064.0		2064.0	2064.0		344.0
Gümüşler	1292.5	2728.7	3069.8	3508.3	6139.5	8186.0	491.2
Hallaçlar	1084.0	4336.0			2168.0		619.4
Kayhan	2722.7	2722.7		4084.0	4084.0		816.8
Kınıklı	2823.7	3630.4	25413.0	6353.3	6353.3	12706.5	941.2
Korucuk	904.5	452.3	603.0	1809.0			180.9
Servegazi	2617.3	5234.5	10469.0	5234.5	10469.0	10469.0	951.7
Üçler	2322.5	3096.7	3096.7	2322.5	3096.7		546.5
Average	2926.6	4628.7	4405.1	8320.0	8558.8	18014.1	955.0

Source: [www.yerelbilgi.gov.tr](http://www.yerelbilgi.gov.tr)

#### 7.1.4. Municipal Services

It is widely argued by local government reformers that small scale municipalities are weak in their capacities for municipal service provision. In this section service capacities of Denizli Municipality and surrounding municipalities will be evaluated to have an idea of their relative performance in service provision. Garbage collection, sewage system, water provision, and city planning services will be considered as the basis of this comparison.

##### Garbage Collection

Density of settlement, type of garbage, frequency of service, whether whole or some part of the garbage collection process is sub-contracted, number and technological quality of garbage collection trucks, number of containers, garbage elimination method, number of personnel, and weekly working hours in cleaning affairs can be

considered as some of the factors that directly affect the quality of garbage collection services. Table 7.15 gives some information about these factors for Denizli and surrounding municipalities. Considering the multitude of these factors, it is difficult to compare garbage collection services among municipalities. However if workers are considered as the most important input and the amount of garbage collected and eliminated as the most important outcome, the amount of garbage collected per garbage collection worker (tons/month) or amount of garbage collected per working hour of garbage collection worker (tons/month) can be regarded as the basic comparison criteria for the performance of service provision. In terms of both, Bereketli and Kayhan Municipalities show better performance than Denizli Municipality. Therefore, the argument that small scale municipalities have weak service capacity is not convincing in the Denizli context.

Table.7.15 Some qualities of garbage collection service (2004)

	density (person/ha)	domestic	trade and institutional	Others	total	amount of garbage collected per garbage collection worker (ton/month)	frequency of service	collection is let out	street cleaning is let out	transportation is let out	sorting is let out	elimination is let out	number of garbage lorry	number of tractor	number of container	garbage elimination method	number of officials	number of permanent workers	number of temporary workers	number of contractual personnel	total number of staff	total working hours in cleaning affairs	number of shift
denizli	71.8	11000	0	208	11208	131.9	every day	yes	yes	no	no	no	28	0	3500	regular storage	9	45	31	0	85	42	2
akkale	10.4	70	30		100	33.3	once in two days	no	no	no	no	no	2	0	300	regular storage	0	0	3	0	3	45	
bağbaşı	43.7						every day	no	no	no	no	no	2	0	3000	other	0	0	6	0	6	44	
başarcı	12.2	50			50	16.7	every day	no	no	no	no	no	1	0	0	other	0	0	3	0	3		
bereketli	34.0	900	2		902	300.7	once in two weeks	no	no	no	yes	yes	1	0	250	regular storage	0	0	3	0	3	24	
gökpınar	27.6						once in two days	no	no	yes	no	no	1	0	0	other	0	1	3	0	4	44	1
göveçlik	10.6	40	25	2	67	22.3	once in two days	no	no	no	no	no	1	0	170	other	0	0	3	0	3		
gümüşler	17.5	700	500	10	1210	93.1	every day	no	no	no	no	no	5	1	700	regular storage	1	0	12	0	13	45	1
hallaçlar	17.3	40			40	13.3	every day	no	no	no	no	no	1	0	80	burning	0	0	3	0	3	20	1
kayhan	64.8	420	16		436	145.3	once in two day	no	no	no	no	no	1	0	130	wild storage	0	0	3	0	3	30	1
kınıklı	67.8	1200	100		1300	56.5	every day	no	no	no	no	no	3	3	1000	regular storage	0	0	23	0	23		1
korucuk	16.9	30	12		42	14	once in three days	no	no	no	no	no	1	0	0	burning	0	0	3	0	3	16	
servergazi	26.2	174	15		189	63.3	every day	no	no	no	no	no	1	0	300	other	0	0	3	0	3	50	1
üçler	5.0	90			90	30	every day	no	no	no	no	no	1	0	0	composting	0	0	3	0	3	45	1

Source: [www.yerelbilgi.gov.tr](http://www.yerelbilgi.gov.tr)

**Table 7.16 Garbage Collection Service in Municipalities (2004)**

	total amount of garbage collected (tons/month)	total number of garbage collection workers	amount of garbage collected per garbage collection worker (tons/month)	amount of garbage collected per working hour of garbage collection worker (tons/month)
Denizli	11208	85	131.9	0.8
Surrounding municipalities*	4427	63	70.3	0.9
Akkale	100	3	33.3	0.2
Bağbaşı		6		
Başkarcı	50	3	16.7	
Bereketli	902	3	300.7	3.1
Gökpınar		4		
Göveçlik	67	3	22.3	
Gümüşler	1210	13	93.1	0.5
Hallaçlar	40	3	13.3	0.2
Kayhan	436	3	145.3	1.2
Kınıklı	1300	23	56.5	
Korucuk	42	3	14.0	0.2
Servegazi	190	3	63.3	0.3
Üçler	90	3	30.0	0.2
Total	15635	148	105.6	

\*it does not include Bağbaşı and Gökpınar Municipalities

Source: [www.yerelbilgi.gov.tr](http://www.yerelbilgi.gov.tr)

### Sewerage System

Akkale Municipality has no sewerage system. The proportion of the populations benefiting from a sewerage system shows a variance between 30% and 100% among the municipalities. A likely reason for this variance is the partial installation of the network. However, some of the surrounding municipalities have a better network than Denizli Municipality in terms of the proportion of the population benefiting from a sewerage system.

**Table7.17 Proportion of population benefiting from a sewage system (2004)**

	proportion of population benefiting from a sewage system
Denizli	90
Surrounding municipalities	75
Akkale	0
Bağbaşı	90
Başkarcı	100
Bereketli	100
Gökpınar	80
Göveçlik	95
Gümüşler	30
Hallaçlar	85
Kayhan	98
Kımkılı	99
Korucuk	60
Servergazi	80
Üçler	80

Source: [www.yerelbilgi.gov.tr](http://www.yerelbilgi.gov.tr)

### Water System

Servergazi Municipality has no water loss in its water networks. But the proportion of water loss in the network varies between 2% and 35% among the other municipalities. Even Denizli Municipality has the greatest rate of water loss in the network. In addition to water loss, the price of water per m<sup>3</sup> for houses varies from 0.15 NTL to 0.72 NTL. Also, Denizli Municipality sells the water for the highest price. The high rate of water loss in Denizli municipality can be a result of the old age of the network. The average water price for water (per m<sup>3</sup>) is 0.30 NTL in surrounding municipalities. The explanation for higher prices in Denizli Municipality can be that the revenues earned from water provision can be used to finance other municipal services. Therefore we can conclude that surrounding municipalities perform better than Denizli Municipality in water provision service.

**Table7.18 Proportion of water loss in the network (2004)**

	Proportion of water loss in the network (%)	Price of water (per m3) (NTL)
Denizli	35	0.72
Surrounding municipalities	7	0.36
Akkale	5	0.23
Bağbaşı	5	0.30
Başkarcı	10	0.22
Bereketli	15	0.15
Gökpınar	10	0.20
Göveçlik	20	0.24
Gümüşler	5	0.58
Hallaçlar	20	0.25
Kayhan	4	0.47
Kınıklı	2	0.34
Korucuk	10	0.23
Servegazi	0	0.46
Üçler	20	0.27

Source: [www.yerelbilgi.gov.tr](http://www.yerelbilgi.gov.tr)

### City Planning Services

In planning office, if 1/1000 scaled planned area per technical personnel (c/a) as a measure of area of responsibility; proportion of area on which application of 18th article of development law is made to area of 1/1000 scaled plan (d/c) as a measure of finalization of development plan; and construction permits given per technical personnel as a measure of personnel performance is considered, it is clear that there are municipalities having better values than Denizli Municipality. Thus, it could be argued that sometimes small scale municipalities perform better than large-scale municipalities in certain services.

**Table 7.19 Planning Services in Municipalities**

	number of technical personnel in planning office	number of administrative personnel in planning office	size of 1/1000 plan area (ha)	size of area on which application of 18th article of development law is made (ha)	total construction permits given last year	Population (2007)			
	a	b	c	d	e	f	c/a	d/c (%)	e/a
Denizli	37	11	4500	157	554	323151	121.6	3.5	15.0
Surrounding municipalities	21	21	6470	4275	719	130466	308.1	73.8	34.2
Akkale	1	1	650	180	9	6753	650.0	27.7	9.0
Bağbaşı	2		490	490	135	21437	245.0	100.0	67.5
Başkarıcı	1	1	200	118	12	2433	200.0	59.0	12.0
Bereketli	2	1	300	250	29	10203	150.0	83.3	14.5
Gökpınar	2	2	128	127	11	3533	64.0	99.2	5.5
Göveçlik	1	1	195		2	2064	195.0		2.0
Gümüşler	4	1	1400	900	136	24558	350.0	64.3	34.0
Hallaçlar	2	2	250	106	11	4336	125.0	42.4	5.5
Kayhan	1	2	126	126	41	8168	126.0	100.0	41.0
Kınıklı	2	6	375		117	25413	187.5		58.5
Korucuk	1	1	107		13	1809	107.0		13.0
Servegazi	1	2	400	300	114	10469	400.0	75.0	114.0
Üçler	1	1	1849	1678	89	9290	1849.0	90.8	89.0
Total	58	32	10970	4432	1273	453617	189.1	40.4	21.9

Source: [www.yerelbilgi.gov.tr](http://www.yerelbilgi.gov.tr)

### 7.1.5. Cooperation between Denizli Municipality and Other Municipalities

The aim of this section is to show that although the region is fragmented politically, in terms of certain public services it works with unity. Furthermore in terms of certain services, the relation between Denizli Municipality and the surrounding municipalities looks like the relation between a dispatcher of services and receivers of services.

## Water and Sewerage System Services


Denizli Drinking Water Project was approved by İller Bank (a public institution providing services for municipalities by cutting back some part of municipalities' revenues from the general budget for its services) in 20.01.1994 and started to be constructed in 06.09.1995 included Denizli, Gökpınar, Bağbaşı, Kayhan, Kınıklı, Servergazi, Hallaçlar, Bereketli, Üçler, Gümüşler, Akkale and Korucuk Municipalities. The protocol indicating that this project is a collective one and the amount of water that each municipality will get was signed on 08.12.1999 by Servergazi, Göveçlik, Kayhan, Kınıklı, Bağbaşı and Üçler Municipalities because these settlements were villages when construction of the project began.



**Figure7.7 Main Lines of Drinking Water Network**

*Source: Denizli Municipality (1/150.000)*

Denizli Basin Sewerage System Application Project and Sewage Treatment Plant Project that must be handled on basin scale because of topographic reasons will take place in Denizli Akkale, Başkarcı, Bereketli, Cankurtaran, Gökpınar, Göveçlik, Gümüşler, Hallaçlar, Korucuk, Pınarkent, Servergazi, Üçler Municipalities and Kadılar, Hisarköy, Şirinköy, Yeşilyayla, Altındere, Karakova, Goncalı, Çeltikci, and Eskihisar villages. The protocol about this project was signed on 27.05.2005 by municipalities and the governorship on behalf of villages.



**Figure7.8 Main Lines of Sewerage System Network**  
*Source: Denizli Municipality (1/150.000)*


The protocol for the main-collector and sub-collectors of Bağırsak Watercourse Basin Sewerage System Application Project was signed to protect Gökpınar Dam Lake by Denizli, Kınıklı, Kayhan, Bağbaşı and Gökpınar Municipalities in 26.06.2003.

### Natural Gas System Services

Bidding on Denizli region natural gas distribution license took place on 21.07.2005 by Energy Market Regulatory Authority. Kentgaz Denizli Doğal Gaz Dağıtım Corp obtained the contract and started to work on 16.02.2006. The distribution region includes Denizli, Kaklık, Kocabaş, Gökpınar, Bağbaşı, Pınarkent, Kayhan, Kınıklı, Gümüşler, Üçler, Bereketli, Hallaçlar, Göveçlık, Servergazi, Başkarcı, Akkale and Honaz Municipalities. It was difficult for the municipalities to be represented in the corporation Therefore the municipalities transferred their rights to shares to Denizli Municipality by a protocol signed on 01.04.2006. Therefore, Denizli Municipality will represent the other municipalities in dealing with the firm.

### Transport Services

There are 16 minibus lines registered in Denizli Municipality and there are 679 minibuses working in these lines. Half of these minibus lines operate between municipalities surrounding Denizli Municipality and Denizli Municipality.



**Figure7.9 Minibus Lines**

Source: Denizli Municipality

In addition to minibuses, there are also 74 private buses working in 34 different bus lines under the control of Denizli Municipality. Forty seven of these 74 private buses work in lines going to 8 surrounding municipalities. These bus lines are:

- Kınıklı Municipality: 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 16, 17, 21, 23, 25, 26, 28, 29, 31 and 34 numbered bus lines.
- Servergazi Municipality: 15 and 24 numbered bus lines.
- Bereketli Municipality: 1, 9, 13, 14, 17, 18, 21, 23, 25, 29, 33 and 34 numbered bus lines.
- Hallaçlar Municipality: 14, 18, 21 and 29 numbered bus lines.
- Kayhan Municipalities: 6, 14, 19 and 22 numbered bus lines
- Bağbaşı Municipality 14,19 and 22 numbered bus lines
- Gökpınar Municipality: 14,19 and 22 numbered bus lines
- Üçler Municipality: 33 numbered bus line

### Cleaning Services

The agreement enabling twenty surrounding municipalities to pour their solid wastes into the storage area of Denizli Municipality was signed on 30.12.2002. The municipalities signing the agreement are Akkale, Aşağışamlı, Bağbaşı, Başkarcı, Bereketli, Cankurtaran, Gökpınar, Göveçlik, Gümüşler, Hallaçlar, Karahayıt, Kayhan, Kınıklı, Korucuk, Pamukkale, Pınarkent, Servergazi, Üçler, Honaz and Irlıganlı Municipalities. However, Honaz and Irganlı Municipalities do not use the storage areas.

Denizli municipality arranges for educational sessions about solid wastes and waste management for surrounding municipalities with the help of Dokuz Eylül University.

Denizli municipality also collects the medical waste of Akkale, Bağbaşı, Başkarcı, Bereketli, Gökpınar, Göveçlik, Kayhan, Korucuk and Servergazi Municipalities.

### Park and Garden Services

Denizli Municipality constructed basketball courts in Hallaçlar, Gümüşler, Gökpınar, Kayhan and Göveçlik Municipalities according to the protocol signed on 12-13.10.2006.

A modern graveyard in Denizli Municipality also provides services for surrounding municipalities. However it is said that a new graveyard will be arranged according to the region's development plan because the Denizli graveyard is almost fully used.

### Intervention in Some Cases in Other Municipalities by Denizli Municipality

Between 2000 and 2007 Denizli Municipality helped surrounding municipalities in certain cases. This is another example of the role of dispatcher on the side of Denizli Municipality.


**Table7.20 Intervention of Denizli Municipality in some cases in surrounding municipalities**

	fire cases	water flood cases	traffic accident cases	flues cleaned	fire security certificates given
Akkale	68		8	32	39
Bağbaşı	46	19	6	168	18
Başkarcı	9			18	2
Bereketli	63			63	27
Gökpınar	6				7
Göveçlik	11				2
Gümüşler	160	11	7	141	160
Hallaçlar	25			9	1
Kayhan	71	14	3	21	8
Kınıklı	44	44	13	175	51
Korucuk	41		4	11	4
Servegazi	48		2	78	28
Üçler	26			23	19
Total	618	88	43	739	366

Source: Denizli Municipality


### Spatial Planning Services

Spatial plans are only an issue of inconsistency between municipalities especially around the borders between municipalities.




**Figure7.10 A Building on the Borders of Three Municipalities**


Source: Denizli Municipality



**Figure.7.11 Shrinking Road between Two Municipalities**  
*Source: Denizli Municipality*




**Figure.7.12 Shrinking Road between Two Municipalities**  
*Source: Denizli Municipality*



**Figure7.13 Discontinuity of a Road between Municipalities**

*Source: Denizli Municipality*



**Figure7.14 Inconsistencies between different municipalities' plans**  
*Source: Denizli Municipality*

The main reason behind the inconsistencies between municipalities is Planning Law (no. 3194) defines the means and content of preparation of spatial plans by municipalities. Some critiques of Planning Law as follows:

The Ministry of Public Work and Settlement (2009:35) argues that

- Spatial planning system and strategies are not integrated with national development plans.
- In the current planning system, there is no vertical and horizontal integration and coherence between institutions that have authority to make plans.
- There is confusion over planning authority and availability of partial executions in the planning system.
- There are inconsistencies between planning areas and territories over which planning authority is exercised.
- The lack of participatory mechanisms in all level of planning practices: the existing participatory mechanisms are not institutionalized and there are inequalities in participatory mechanisms in terms of social groups.
- Effective control mechanisms do not exist in the current planning system.
- Financial, legal and technical tools of the planning system are inadequate to put planning decisions into practice.
- Monitoring and feedback mechanisms in the current planning system are inadequate.
- National and local institutions that have authority to make plans have inefficient capacities to do their jobs.

Altaban (1985:14) notes that although the name of regional, metropolitan, land use, implementation plan and the responsible institutions are indicated in the law, the content of these plans are not well-defined. Günay (1985:17) points out that instead of defining the general physical pattern of the cities, plans become tools to transform cadastral areas to areas having construction permits. Ertaş (1986:98) states that penal sanctions are defined only for the owner of the property, the engineer of record, and the contractor in the law; however there are no open penal sanctions for the acts of elected or appointed officials responsible in local governments. Eke et al (1986:132) say that the law brings about decreasing bureaucracy and rapid decision making processes in planning and construction affairs. Güler (1989:140) emphasizes that it is

not defined in the law how the coordination between different level/scale plans is ensured. Ersoy (1999: 234-235) argues these:

- The current model converts the planning system into a middle-management practice that has no references from upper ranks, and gives no clues to lower ranks.
- Urban development is considered as an integration of constructions in the individual plots designed for small contractors.

Chamber of City Planners says that (March-2004: 21-22) planning is not handled as achieving a plan or application process, it is considered as a problem of authority; (May-1985:1-2) the draft law of planning lacks any principles to guide institutions that have authority to make plans. These principles should be based on public interests; (February&March-1986:2) the law defines a planning process which is highly integrated with political processes. State Planning Organization (2001:169) emphasizes that locational changes in plans and location plans outside the boundaries of the planning zone are causes for the collapse of the integrity of planning decisions and sometimes lead to illegal developments.

## **7.2. History of Fragmentation**

In this section, the history of fragmentation is brought up. The factors that lead to fragmentation also influence the integration process because the process of integration is a counter movement to forces that cause fragmentation. The explanation of the history of fragmentation makes the position of political actors more understandable. This part of the chapter includes reasons put forward for the fragmentation of the municipal structure and previous attempts for the integration of this structure based on the establishment of a metropolitan municipality.

### **7.2.1. Reasons for Political Fragmentation**

Six different reasons arose from the case study for the emergence of a fragmented structure in Denizli urban area. Essentially, these are political actors' motivations, dissatisfaction with municipal services, economic and political independence, preparation for becoming a metropolitan municipality, private interests, and appropriation of urban rents.

### 7.2.1.1. Political Actors' Motivations

Political actors' motivations are one of the main reasons for the establishment of municipalities around a central municipality. Especially having political power by reorganizing the municipal structure is the main factor behind this motivation.

Turgay Üçyıldız (Ex-vice-president of Denizli Branch of Chamber of Architects) (2001:26) tells a brief history of urban development and incorporation in the Denizli urban area:

”There was a process of industrialization in Denizli after the 1980s. Due to that process, there was a rapid population increase. This population needed houses to live in and people spread around the city to find a suitable place. Denizli Municipality let them use the areas of central villages within the boundaries of Denizli Municipality for residential purposes. Therefore the population of these central villages increased. However, Denizli Municipality could not provide services to these villages. Consequently this issue was used by some political actors and the people living in these villages were mobilized to be a municipality because they had a population over 2000 which is the minimum level of population required to be a municipality. The basic arguments used to mobilize these people were that ‘you will get financial resources from the central government and you will control the usage of your own territory if you can become a municipality.’ These villages became municipalities as a result of a referendum that took place in these villages. Some local political actors and mayors of these municipalities have responsibility in the establishment of municipalities in these villages.”

Interviewee-14 provides the reason for political fragmentation in Denizli:

“The reason for the establishment of surrounding municipalities was not due to basic needs. Because of migration, the population of surrounding villages increased. Then these villages were motivated to have a municipality. The political rationale was to get the political power in those independent municipalities and to have a voice in the development of Denizli.”

Interviewee-1 argues for the establishment of municipalities around Denizli.

“The establishment of municipalities around Denizli Municipality was totally political. Denizli Municipality was governed by left-wing parties. Right-wing parties were more powerful in rural areas; therefore they attempted to break the dominance of the left-wing parties in Denizli Municipality by establishing municipalities in villages that were in the adjacent area of Denizli municipality.”

Interviewee-4 suggests that the political motivation behind the establishment of municipalities was that

“People who had lost the elections in Denizli Municipality created new municipal units to say that we won the election in these municipalities.”

Interviewee-9 explains the reasons for political fragmentation as follows:

“One of the factors that affects the establishment of municipalities around Denizli is Halil Özgün. He wanted to be the mayor of Denizli, but he could not. During his membership in the Special Provincial Administration Council, he mobilized villagers living in the “adjacent area” of Denizli Municipality to establish municipalities in their settlements.”

As can be seen from above statements, the establishment of new municipalities is used to change the political equations in urban spaces.

### **7.2.1.2. Dissatisfaction with Municipal Services**

The mayors of municipalities that were villages in the adjacent area of the responsible municipality argued that receiving insufficient services from the responsible municipality is an important issue.

Interviewee-13 argues that the reason for mobilization in the villages to be a municipality is that

“When these municipalities were villages, village heads went to the mayor of Denizli and told him ‘we need refuse containers, we need water, we need municipal services’. However, the mayor at that time responded to these requests by saying, ‘we cannot provide services to fifty four parishes of Denizli Municipality. Our income and our staff are not sufficient. You should take care of yourself.’ Therefore villages decided to become municipalities.”

Interviewee-16 emphasizes the determination of villages to be a municipality by saying:

“Here was a village within the adjacent area of Denizli Municipality. After the foundation of the university, the village started to develop. Although it grew, it did not get services from Denizli Municipality. Then village people decided to be a municipality on their own. It was not a desire of someone else. Before the referendum for the establishment of a municipality we held a referendum for being a parish of Denizli Municipality but people did not participate in this referendum.”

Özgür (2008b:243) argues that the reason behind the establishment of municipalities in Denizli urban area is insufficient municipal services provision by Denizli Municipality because he argues that by the annexation of villages in the 1970s,

Denizli Municipality became excessively big and this created problems in service provision.

“Mayor Hasan Gönüllü put the issue of the management of Denizli urban area on the agenda in the late 1970s through the rearrangement of the adjacent area of Denizli Municipality. With this rearrangement thirty four villages surrounding Denizli Municipality were annexed to an adjacent area of Denizli Municipality. And most of these villages became municipalities later individually or by consolidating with neighboring villages. If the population increases of Denizli Municipality, the transport capacity of internal roads, the sprawl of Denizli Municipality, and the need of space for public services are considered, it could be argued that a considerably large area was annexed to Denizli Municipality in the late 1970s”

Özgür (2008b:244) also states that the annexation of thirty four villages to Denizli Municipality was a debatable issue at that that time because of the extent of the annexed area.

The insufficient amount of municipal services that villages in the adjacent area of Denizli Municipality received is emphasized as a second reason that caused the establishment of these municipalities in Denizli.

### **7.2.1.3. Economic and Political Independence**

A desire for economic and political independence among citizens is stated as a reason for the establishment of municipalities.

Interviewee-25 argues that the desire for economic and political independence is the main motivating factor among villagers to be a municipality.

### **7.2.1.4. Preparation to Become a Metropolitan Municipality**

As a third reason, it is also argued that the establishment of municipalities was thought to be used as a means for establishing a metropolitan municipality in Denizli because, according to the previous metropolitan municipality law, there must be at least three lower-level or district center municipalities in order to establish a metropolitan municipality in a region.

Interviewee-12 argues that

“During the campaign for the establishment of surrounding municipalities, it was said that the establishment of these municipalities is a means for the establishment of a metropolitan municipality. For that reason people said ‘yes’ in the referendums.”

Similarly interviewee-8 notes that

“Surrounding municipalities were established as a preliminary step towards becoming a metropolitan municipality.”

Preparation to become a metropolitan municipality is noted as another factor for the establishment of municipalities in villages around Denizli Municipality

#### **7.2.1.5. Private Interests**

Interviewee-9 gives private interests of industrialists as one more reason for the establishment of a surrounding municipality:

“There was one more reason which was quite different from the others. This was the private interests of industrialists. The typical example of this was the consolidation of Şemikler and Gümüşçay villages in order to be a municipality. There were industrialists or artisans behind this movement, because they thought ‘if our villages become a municipality, all the council members and technical staff will be our relatives. Therefore we can easily get construction permits for our new factories and we will not have to deal with Denizli Municipality’.”

Private interests can be a factor that motivates people to establish municipalities in their own settlements.

#### **7.2.1.6. Appropriation of Urban Rents**

A final reason for the establishment of surrounding municipalities is the appropriation of urban rents by the controlling planning authority.

Interviewee-2 emphasizes that

“As a consequence of a rapid population increase in the 1980s, the value of land increased around Denizli. The establishment of municipalities was used as a means to appropriate this rent by the preparation of development plans”

Interviewee-7 argues that

“The prices of land in areas where these municipalities were established were high because there was a high demand for these areas. The establishment of municipalities was done in order to share rents resulting from the high demand for these areas.”

To control already emerging land rent is another reason for the establishment of municipalities around Denizli Municipality. The use of the authority to prepare development plans is the main way of doing this because people in municipal power can control density and functional arrangements of urban space by intervening in the plan preparation process.

### **7.2.2. Previous Attempts to Solve Fragmentation Problems**

The decision of annexation of surrounding municipalities to Denizli Municipality according to 11<sup>th</sup> article of Municipality (5393) in 2006 and the Law known as Denizli Integrated-city Law (5026) in 2003 were not the only attempts to solve the problem of political fragmentation in Denizli. There have been several attempts since the mid-1990s. Although, the annexation of municipalities was legislated in 2006, it has been a product of long-term political efforts.

**Table7.21 The Bills which were given to parliament to establish metropolitan municipalities in Denizli**

no	date	who	how
1	09.09.1993		to change the decree law numbered 504 that establishes 7 new metropolitan municipality at Antalya, Diyarbakır, Erzurum, Eskişehir, İzmit, Mersin and Samsun by adding the name of Denizli to the list
2	13.09.1994	Hasan Korkmazcan (MP, Motherland Party-Denizli)	To give a bill to parliament to change the decree law numbered 504 that establishes 7 new metropolitan municipality at Antalya, Diyarbakır, Erzurum, Eskişehir, İzmit, Mersin and Samsun
3	15.01. 1996	Hasan Korkmazcan (MP, Motherland Party-Denizli)	To give a bill to parliament to change the decree law numbered 504 that establishes 7 new metropolitan municipality at Antalya, Diyarbakır, Erzurum, Eskişehir, İzmit, Mersin and Samsun
4	15.10.1996	Mehmet Gözlükaya (MP- True Path Party-Denizli) Haluk Müftüler (MP- True Path Party-Denizli) Kemal Aykurt(MP- True Path Party-Denizli)	To give a bill to parliament to establish four sub-provinces called Sevindik, Gökpınar, Gümüşler and Başkarcı within the boundaries of central sub-provinces.
5	14.03.1997	Hilmi Develi (MP, Democratic Left Party-Denizli)	To give a bill to parliament to establish a metropolitan municipality in Denizli and to establish four sub-provinces called Sevindik, Kınıklı, Gümüşler and Başkarcı within the boundaries of central sub-provinces.
6	24.05.1999	Beyhan Aslan (MP, Motherland Party-Denizli) Salih Erbeyin (MP, Nationalist Movement Party-Denizli) Mehmet Gözlükaya (MP- True Path Party-Denizli)	To give a bill to parliament to change the decree law numbered 504 that establishes 7 new metropolitan municipality in Antalya, Diyarbakır, Erzurum, Eskişehir, İzmit, Mersin and Samsun
7	09.07.2004	Harun Akın (MP, Republican People's Party-Zonguldak). M. Akif Hamzaçebi (MP, Republican People's Party-Trabzon). Mustafa Gazalcı (MP, Republican People's Party-Denizli).	To add the statement that municipalities are turned into metropolitan municipalities according to their level of industrialization to the 4 <sup>th</sup> article of draft law of metropolitan municipalities

Although the strategy of creating a unified system in Denizli based on the establishment of a metropolitan municipality in Denizli goes back to 1993, it was never successful. It could be argued that the reason behind the failure of these attempts is that they are based on a wrong strategy. To make Denizli a metropolitan municipality is the basic idea of these attempts. However, the consolidation of municipalities came along with annexation of municipalities not with the establishment of a metropolitan municipality. The second reason for these failures

could be the extent of relations between local political actors and government. It might be that the influence of local political actors on the government was not as strong as it is today.

### **7.3. Technical Issues**

#### **7.3.1. General Problem Areas**

Administrative fragmentation is widely argued as one of the causes of deficiencies in urban planning and service provisions, or in other words, in the management of urban areas. It is generally emphasized that urban areas should be governed by a single authority to overcome the difficulties of managing urban areas.

Disadvantages that emerge from the lack of a single powerful authority can be grouped as follows:

- Deficiencies in Planning and Municipal Services
- Decreasing Applicability of Master Plans
- Deficiencies of Collaborative Techniques
- Using Master Plans as Legitimizing Tools
- Indeterminacy of Urban Development
- Delays in Decision Making

##### **7.3.1.1. Deficiencies in Planning and Municipal Services**

Deficiencies in planning and municipal services are reported as the two main problem areas due to the lack of a single authority in the urban areas.

Denizli Industrialists, Traders and Businessmen Platform<sup>1</sup> declared after a meeting that

“This fragmented structure results in disintegrated planning decisions, conflicts and confusions in providing services, and obscurity in the identification of final authority.”

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<sup>1</sup> Press release in 13.07.2005

Interviewee-2 explains the problems caused by the lack of single authority as follows:

“The fragmented structure of Denizli has created many problems, and these problems can be easily observed. Unplanned urbanization, infrastructural problems, and lack of coordination are the most obvious ones.”

Interviewee-8 gives examples of the effects of multiple authorities:

“There is a fragmented structure in Denizli. It creates problems in planning and infrastructural work. For example, a road opened by a municipality does not continue in the next municipality. Responsibilities are not clear. Especially if mayors are from different political parties they try to hinder the other municipality’s work. Municipalities do not complete their share in infrastructural networks. We have clear problems in providing municipal work.”

### **7.3.1.2. Decreasing Applicability of Master Plans**

It is argued that the applicability of a master plan in a fragmented political structure is low because none of these fragmented units has responsibility for the application and sanction of other units. The expert reports<sup>2</sup> for lawsuits on annexation of surrounding municipalities to Denizli Municipality say that

“If a master plan is not supported by an administrative process, and if it is not embraced by the authorities included in it, the odds of approval of the application of that master plan will be lower. Although there is a rule that higher scale plans (1/25.000) have a determining authority on lower scale plans (1/5.000), municipalities insist on not complying with decisions of master plans. To develop a proper administrative organization in order to enforce master plans is a valid attitude in politically fragmented but economically, socially and spatially integrated areas.

All municipalities that will be annexed to Denizli Municipality are within the boundaries of the master plan. However it is uncertain how the integrity of the master plan is satisfied, because each municipality has autonomous authority to prepare its development plans. This problem is solved in metropolitan municipalities because metropolitan municipalities have the right of inspection on lower level municipalities. There is no such administrative organization in Denizli; therefore to satisfy the integrity of the planning practices of municipalities is difficult.

Similarly the expert reports<sup>3</sup> for a lawsuit on a part of development plan of Denizli state that

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<sup>2</sup> Council of State, 8<sup>th</sup> Department, 2006/5249-5250-5251-5252-5253-5402-5404, 2007/4653-4654-4656.

<sup>3</sup> Council of State, 8<sup>th</sup> Department, 2005/1089

“One of the other most important problems in this issue is planning decisions which are contrary to decisions of the master plan of other municipalities, which are in the proposed housing and development area of Denizli Municipality. Denizli municipality is not a metropolitan municipality. Planning decisions of Denizli Municipality can be restrictive and directive to other surrounding municipalities only by the preparation of the master plan because development plans must obey the decisions of the master plan. The master plan prepared by the Denizli Municipality was approved by The Ministry of Public Works And Settlement on its own motion. Although there is a regulation about hierarchy of plans in the 6<sup>th</sup> article of development law (small scale plans (ex:1/1000) should be consistent with large scale plans (ex:1/5000)), municipalities insisted on not obeying the decisions of the master plan... this is a result of a fragmented administrative structure within the boundaries of the master plan”.

Interviewee-9 argues that

“There is no serious difficulty in the preparation of a master plan. However there are problems in application. One of the municipalities opens the road but the same road does not continue in the other municipality. However both of them have this road in their plans.”

There is a close relation between applicability of master plans and the existence of a responsible authority for it. In particular, a politically fragmented structure is an obstacle to the application of master plans that direct the development pattern of an urban area because there is no authority responsible for this issue. Therefore master plans turn into nominal documents.

### **7.3.1.3. Deficiencies of Collaborative Techniques**

To overcome the deficiencies of fragmented structure in urban areas, techniques based on collaboration between municipalities are applied. However, the success of this kind of solution is questionable. In particular, the absence of legal sanctions for breaking the rules of agreement is a dominant reason for this.

The expert reports<sup>4</sup> for lawsuits on the annexation of surrounding municipalities to Denizli Municipality say that

“There have been two mechanisms to overcome these kinds of problems of coordination and inspection. The first one is the agreements between municipalities. Of course agreements become a tool if there is no better mechanism. However, if agreements are not supported by legal sanctions, they can be easily collapsed by the parties. Therefore the restrictive aspects of agreements are a little weak.”

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<sup>4</sup> Council of State, 8<sup>th</sup> Department, 2006/5249-5250-5251-5252-5253-5402-5404, 2007/4653-4654-4656.

Interviewee-5 addresses agreements between Denizli Municipality and other municipalities, arguing that

“The integrity in service provision will be satisfied with agreements signed by municipalities. But some municipalities hesitate to sign these agreements. Additionally, some municipalities, although they sign agreements, do not obey the conditions of these agreements.”

Due to the deficiencies of collaborative techniques, administrative unity becomes a preferable alternative to solve the problems resulting from fragmented political structures.

#### **7.3.1.4. Using Master Plans as Legitimizing Tools**

It is argued that if there is no responsible authority in the preparation and application of a master plan, the master plan produced under the condition of existence of many authorities can only legitimize the development plan of each individual municipality. The reason behind this process is that there should be an agreement between municipalities to produce a master plan; however municipalities stipulate the approval of their own plan as a condition of this agreement. Therefore under this condition, a master plan produced by the leading municipality should accept the development plans of other municipalities as they are. Consequently, what the master plan does is to legitimize already existing development plans rather than to determine a consistent and coherent master plan.

The expert reports<sup>5</sup> for lawsuits on annexation of surrounding municipalities to Denizli Municipality say that

“In master plans prepared in 2005 and 2007 Denizli Municipality showed maximum respect for the demands of other municipalities during the preparation process. For that reason master plans were problematic in terms of integrity of plan decisions. Consequently proposed development areas were much bigger than those of other cities with similar development potential. Although Denizli Municipality had responsibility for the coordination of the preparation of the master plan, its administrative weakness before other municipalities made it more sensitive to the desires of other municipalities.”

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<sup>5</sup> Council of State, 8<sup>th</sup> Department, 2006/5249-5250-5251-5252-5253-5402-5404, 2007/4653-4654-4656.

Similarly the expert report<sup>6</sup> for the lawsuit on annexation of Servergazi Municipality to Denizli Municipality notes that

“Denizli municipality’s attitude on accepting development plan decisions of all other municipalities has resulted in changes in decisions of the 1994 master plan about Servergazi Municipality in 2005 and 2007 master plans.”

Due to the lack of authority in preparation and application of master plans, master plans turn into a legitimizing plan merging all the development plans of independent municipalities eclectically, and eventually have no consistency and coherence.

### **7.3.1.5. Indeterminacy of Urban Development**

The expert reports<sup>7</sup> for lawsuits on annexation of surrounding municipalities to Denizli Municipality say that a lack of coordination in the field of planning creates problems in defining the development pattern.

Similarly Nail Kalemci<sup>8</sup> (Spokesman of Platform of Industrialist, Traders and Businessmen of Denizli) explains the condition as follows:

“There are more than twenty municipalities surrounding Denizli municipality and this hampers the planning and coordinating activities and also causes chaos. Municipalities are adjacent to each other and the preparation and application of a development plan of each municipality at the same region creates problem for citizens, investors and service demanders. When we consider the development of Denizli, it has the responsibility for coordinating the preparation and application of development plans. Therefore the efforts for enacting Denizli Integrated-city Law by the member of parliament for Denizli are invaluable. Consequently, if one authority provides services and prepares a master plan, the development of Denizli will be accelerated.”

Nihat Zeybekçi<sup>9</sup> (Mayor of Denizli from Justice and Development Party) notes that

“An integrated-city means a united structure for a planning and development regime.”

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<sup>6</sup> Council of State, 8<sup>th</sup> Department,206/5251

<sup>7</sup> Council of State, 8<sup>th</sup> Department, 2006/5249-5250-5251-5252-5253-5402-5404, 2007/4653-4654-4656.

<sup>8</sup> 16.12.2003, www.denizlili.net, “Bütünşehir’e Destek”

<sup>9</sup> 15.07.2005, www.arkitera.com, “Denizli Bütünşehir Olmak İçin Isırlı”

During the legislation process of Denizli Integrated-city Law (5026)<sup>10</sup> (vetoed by the President of the Republic due to it being against the constitution) the need for a single authority for urban development was also emphasized.

“When the development of Denizli is considered, it is important to satisfy unity of planning, coordination and execution of decisions. Therefore to annex the municipalities around the Denizli Municipality to Denizli Municipality is required because it is impossible if there is more than one authority.”

It can be concluded that the consistency of urban development patterns is strongly associated with an existence of a single authority. Otherwise, the tendency of competition between municipalities for development creates an indeterminate condition when the entire urban area is considered as a unity.

#### **7.3.1.6. Delays in Decision Making**

Ciğeroğlu (2007:26) argues that the fragmented structure decelerates the process of decision making about the topics concerning the entire urban area. There are differences between municipalities in terms of administrative capacity. Additionally, municipalities could have different interests in the same issue. Therefore, to achieve agreement under this condition is difficult. Consequently, this difficulty results in delays in decision making.

#### **7.3.2. Specific Problem Areas**

In this section the effects of annexation on planning and urbanization of settlements, efficiency and effectiveness of municipal services, relations between municipalities and, participation in local politics are considered.

##### **7.3.2.1. Planning and Urbanization**

In terms of planning and urbanization, discourses about annexation of municipalities can be grouped into two: positive aspects of annexation and negative aspects of annexation. The following table summarizes the negative and positive aspects of

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<sup>10</sup> National Assembly Records, term:22/2, session:32

annexation considering planning and urbanization. The variety of arguments indicates that planning and urbanization is the most important issue being focused on. The following pages will discuss these aspects in detail.

**Table 7.22 Negative and Positive Aspects of Annexation in terms of Planning and Urbanization**

Positive aspects	Negative aspects
To Overcome the Barriers to Urban Growth	To Control the Development of Wider Areas
To Eliminate Inconsistencies between Development Plans	To Open Up Agricultural Lands to Urban Development
To Increase the Competence of Planning Departments	To Have Unsuccessful Metropolitan Municipality Experiences
To Facilitate Planned Growth	
To Control Excessive Urban Growth	
To Prevent Illegal Urban Growth	
To Improve the Quality of Development Plans	

### 7.3.2.1.1. Positive Aspects of Annexation in Terms of Planning and Urbanization

- **To Overcome the Barriers to Urban Growth**

One of the reasons specified for annexation of municipalities is to overcome the barriers to urban growth. Mehmet Yücel<sup>11</sup> (President of Denizli Chamber of Trade) complains about the lack of industrial zones in Denizli Municipality and says that

“We have been advocating the integrity of planning activities since the beginning. Denizli’s industry is restricted to the region between Sarayköy and Çardak. Everywhere should be planned and this planning activity should not be restricted to the adjacent area of Denizli.”

Ali Aygören (Ex-mayor of Denizli from True Path Party) (2001:15) explains the situation of Denizli.

“We all know that the planned area of Denizli municipality in the 1960s was 3600 hectares. It increased to 7000 hectares in the 1980s and 15000 hectares in the beginning of the 1990s. However, after the emergence of municipalities in the mid 1990s, the planned area of Denizli municipality decreased to 3400 hectares. It means that the total planned area is 200 hectares smaller than the planned area of the 1960s. In other words, Denizli Municipality is a stuck municipality. Because of these municipalities Denizli has become a declining municipality.”

Interviewee-7 argues that

“The development and urbanization of Denizli is slaughtered by the establishment of these small municipalities.”

<sup>11</sup> 14.08.2006, www.drthaber.com, “Denizli Bütünşehir Sevinci Yaşıyor”

As is stated in many cases, the existence of a neighboring municipality can be an obstacle to the growth of another municipality. Consequently, the annexation process is used as tool for overcoming the problem of urban growth.

- **To Eliminate Inconsistencies between Development Plans**

To eliminate the inconsistencies between development plans of neighboring municipalities is noted as another reason for annexation. Interviewee-12 and interviewee-5 give examples of irregularity in built environment resulting from inconsistencies of development plans of neighboring municipalities:

“Let’s assume that a road is on the border of two municipalities. There are 3-storied buildings on the one side of the road, and there are 5-storied buildings on the other side. Let’s assume that there is a road passing through two municipalities, in one municipality the width of the road is 12m, in the other municipality the width is 25m. People object to these conditions.”

“There is no consistency of planning practices between municipalities. A road that has 50m width in one municipality’s plan has 30m width in another municipality’s plan. And sometimes there is no road in the other municipality’s plan.”

In the legislation process of Denizli Integrated-city Law (5026)<sup>12</sup> (vetoed by the President of the Republic due to it being against the constitution), it is stated that due to neighboring municipalities there could be different planning decisions about the same area thus it creates problems for people and investors who have thoughts about this particular area. Similarly, Faruk Boyacı (Ex-president of the Denizli Branch of the Chamber of Architects) (2001:1) notes that a fragmented structure is worrying in terms of the integrity of the planning practice.

Each autonomous municipality has the right to prepare its own development plans. However, this multiplicity of authorities can create a chaotic situation in the field of planning because each municipality can make different decisions about nearby areas. It is argued that a unique authority provides the continuity of planning decisions.

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<sup>12</sup> National Assembly Records, term:22/2, session:32

- **To Increase the Competence of Planning Departments**

The quality of planning staff is another factor that is emphasized in the annexation of municipalities because it is argued that small scale municipalities do not have qualified planning personnel on staff.

Interviewee-14 addresses municipalities surrounding Denizli Municipality, arguing that

“The planning and construction departments of these surrounding municipalities do not employ skilled staff. Denizli Municipality provides this service with city planners, architects or civil engineers, however surrounding municipalities do the same jobs with technicians. These technicians have become the responsible persons for the development of a municipality.”

Increasing the capacity of planning departments is also stated as a reason for annexation, because it is argued that small scale municipalities do not employ skilled personnel in their planning and construction units and that Denizli Municipality can compensate for this deficiency with its skilled and qualified planning and construction staff.

- **To Facilitate Planned Growth**

Unplanned urban growth is emphasized in many cases as a critical issue in annexation discourses. In many occasions similar statements are made for Denizli. In the expert report<sup>13</sup> for the lawsuit on annexation of Akkale Municipality to Denizli Municipality, it is stated that

“Akkale municipality was established in 1999. However it has never followed the decisions of the master plan approved in 1994 to direct its own spatial development.”

Mehmet Yüksektepe<sup>14</sup> (Denizli Ex-MP from the Justice and Development Party) explains the aim of the Denizli Integrated-city Law (5026) (vetoed by the President of the Republic due to being against the constitution) as follows:

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<sup>13</sup> Council of State, 8<sup>th</sup> Department, 2006/5253

<sup>14</sup> 31.12.2003, Zaman Newspaper “Denizli Yeniden Büyükşehir Olmanın Yollarını Arayacak”

“We want people to live in a modern municipality and with a modern appreciation of Denizli. To achieve this purpose we prepare the necessary physical conditions.”

İbrahim Tefenlili<sup>15</sup> (President of Denizli Stock Exchange of Trade) after the decision of annexation of the surrounding municipalities to Denizli Municipality, said that

“This decision is very important for the healthy urbanization of Denizli. The decision will contribute to the development of Denizli.”

Denizli Industrialists, Traders and Businessmen Platform<sup>16</sup> declares that

- The members of the platform agree that urgent measures should be taken about Denizli because it is rapidly turning into a shanty town.
- Denizli, incorporating all industrial, agricultural, natural, historical, cultural values, is a victim of flawed and uncontrolled urbanization. It will lose all its potential unless some measures are taken. Although there should be geographical, social, and economic integrality, Denizli seems to be a puzzle consisting of lots of neighboring small-scale municipalities.
- Denizli, growing randomly because of the impossibility of directing the growth of the city by a strategic plan, is urbanized irregularly.

Özgür (2008b:251) cites the report of 1/25.000 scaled master plan of Denizli approved in 2007. The report states that

“Like other cities where industry is the main sector, the most serious problem in Denizli is that planning practices cannot keep pace with urban growth. In addition to this problematic structure, political fragmentation in the urban area of Denizli makes the planned growth impossible. The existence of nineteen municipal authorities in a planning area covering 30 km in the direction of north-south and 20 km in the direction of east-west and their different approaches to planning issues brings about unplanned development in urban areas.”

Interviewee-11 explains the emergence of the unplanned spatial structure of Denizli as follows:

“Denizli municipality prepared development plans for these surrounding municipalities when they were villages in adjacent areas of Denizli municipality. However, after these villages became independent municipalities the integrity of the development plan started to getting destroyed. Municipalities started to change plan decisions according to clientelist relations. Consequently, administrative fragmentation caused fragmentation in planning practices.”

Interviewee-14 explains the reasons for unplanned spatial development as follows:

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<sup>15</sup> 14.08.2006, www.drthaber.com, “Denizli Bütünşehir Sevinci Yaşıyor”

<sup>16</sup> Press release in 13.07.2005

“The population of Denizli was 205.000 in the 1980s, and it is 465.000 now. This means it has doubled. All of this population increase has taken place in surrounding municipalities because Denizli Municipality was almost full. However, the development plans for these municipalities were not prepared properly; consequently there have only been housing developments in these municipalities. Small municipalities have only considered the urban rents therefore they have not given any importance to other public functions like governmental offices, schools, sub-centers etc. As a result of this approach, the current condition of Denizli has emerged.”

Interviewee-5 says that the planning practices of surrounding municipalities are defective:

“The planning authority of surrounding municipalities was restricted until the following elections (March-2009) because surrounding municipalities made serious mistakes in their planning practices. They converted green parks into trade development area; they shrank the width of roads, for example, from 20m to 7m. There are many differences in surrounding municipalities in terms of planning permissions and the actual conditions of buildings. Surrounding municipalities are more flexible in changes of planning permissions but Denizli Municipality is more careful about it.”

According to a survey, participants from Denizli Municipality and NGOs strongly agree with the idea that new regulation will make area-wide planning easy. However, although some participants from the other municipalities (to be annexed) agree with the idea, the others do not.

**Table7.23 New regulation will make the area-wide planning easy**

	Denizli municipality	other municipalities	NGOs	village heads	Total
don't agree	0	23	0	2	25
%	0.0	35.9	0.0	20.0	21.0
slightly agree	1	6	0	2	9
%	2.8	9.4	0.0	20.0	7.6
agree	2	16	0	2	20
%	5.6	25.0	0.0	20.0	16.8
quite agree	10	2	2	0	14
%	27.8	3.1	22.2	0.0	11.8
strongly agree	23	17	7	4	51
%	63.9	26.6	77.8	40.0	42.9
Total	36	64	9	10	119
%	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Ciğeroğlu (2007:139)

As seen in the above statements, unplanned urban growth is a frequently mentioned topic in annexation discussions, and a fragmented structure is noted as the main reason for this pattern. Therefore it is argued that the annexation of municipalities will automatically solve this problem.

- **To Control Excessive Urban Growth**

Excessive urban growth is another problem areas emphasized in annexation discussions. The expert reports<sup>17</sup> for the lawsuit on annexation of Akkale Municipality to Denizli Municipality states that

“Akkale municipality, although it has a population of 6.362, has prepared a plan for a population of 70.000 in the next 50 years.”

Similarly the expert reports<sup>18</sup> for the lawsuit on a part of development plan of Denizli states that

“In the 1994 master plan the proportion of proposed housing area (1694 ha) to existing housing area (4100 ha) was 41.3%, however in the 2005 master plan the same proportion was 155.6%. Consequently it is necessary to question the changes in the growth tendency of the city. By considering the growth pattern of the city, the size of proposed housing development areas brings about an uncontrollable widespread urban growth pattern.”

Each individual municipality tries to maximize its development area by planning the whole area which is under its control. In this way they can attract housing or other kinds of investors because they provide a variety of options to investors in terms of location, environmental factors and planning permissions. However, when the development areas of all municipalities are considered, there emerges excessiveness in development areas in an urban area. It is argued that the annexation by municipalities can be a means to stop excessive urban growth because competitiveness among municipalities will be ended, and a more rational approach can be applied to planning practices.

- **To Prevent Illegal Urban Growth**

Due to the absence of one authority that is responsible for the preparation and application of a master plan, individual municipalities can prepare development plans which may conflict with the master plan. Although when development plans are considered in themselves there can be no problem in terms of coherence, when the

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<sup>17</sup> Council of State, 8<sup>th</sup> Department, 2006/5253

<sup>18</sup> Council of State, 8<sup>th</sup> Department, 2005/1089

relation between master plan and development plan is considered, there can be a problem of illegality. This illegality problem results from the lack of coherence between them because the land use decisions of development plans have to be in harmony with the decisions of the master plans according to the development plan law.

Expert reports<sup>19</sup> for lawsuits on annexation of surrounding municipalities to Denizli Municipality state some conclusions about unplanned or illegal planning decisions of these surrounding municipalities against the Master Plan approved in 1994.

“In the master plan approved in 1994, in total 9000 ha were defined as agricultural area, and buildings that would be constructed on it should have had rural characteristics. However, some municipalities were established after the date of approval on these agricultural lands, and these municipalities took development decisions that were against the regulations of the master plan.”

The expert report<sup>20</sup> for the lawsuit on the annexation of Bağbaşı Municipality to Denizli Municipality clearly notes that

“Locational development plans were prepared outside the 1994 master plan boundaries.”

Interviewee-14 argues that

“Small scale municipalities condone illegal development and construction for a bribe.”

Therefore to stop illegal urban growth is another aim of the annexation of municipalities. It is argued that the new structure that will emerge after annexation of municipalities will not allow any illegal urban development.

- **To Improve the Quality of Development Plans**

In quantitative terms, preparing development plans is a good point for a municipality, however, the quality of those plans is as important as whether they are prepared or

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<sup>19</sup> Council of State, 8<sup>th</sup> Department, 2006/5249-5250-5251-5252-5253-5402-5404, 2007/4653-4654-4656.

<sup>20</sup> Council of State, 8<sup>th</sup> Department, 2007/4653

not. Sometimes, a plan prepared improperly can cause irreversible mistakes in the development of municipalities.

The expert report<sup>21</sup> for the lawsuit on annexation of Servergazi Municipality to Denizli Municipality says that

“There is rapid housing development in Servergazi municipality but the same thing is not true for social facilities like schools, parks, health centers etc.”

It can be concluded that the quality of development plans of surrounding municipalities is another problem area. These municipalities only focus on housing development and neglect other necessities of urban life. This is an example of external economy in neighboring municipalities because a municipality can benefit from social facilities of other municipalities without any cost and can provide only housing facilities to its residents. However this creates an unfavorable condition for the other side because its service provision is insufficient for its own residents. Therefore one aim of the annexation of municipalities is to end these kinds of externality.

#### **7.3.2.1.2. Negative Aspects of Annexation in Terms of Planning and Annexation**

- **To Control the Development of Wider Areas**

One of the critiques of annexation of municipalities is that the aim of the municipality that annexes the surrounding municipalities is to control wider areas rather than to improve the integrity of planning practices or the efficiency and effectiveness in service delivery.

During the legislation process of Denizli Integrated-City Law (5026)<sup>22</sup> (vetoed by the President of the Republic due to it being against the constitution), MPs from the opposition party implied that there is another reason behind this law rather than accomplishing the integrity of planning practices.

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<sup>21</sup> Council of State, 8<sup>th</sup> Department, 2006/5251

<sup>22</sup> National Assembly Records, term:22/2, session:32

“The unity of planning activities of Denizli Municipality and municipalities around it is given as a reason for the law. However a development plan, prepared according to an agreement made between Denizli Municipality and municipalities around it, is already in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and waiting for approval.”

In the expert report<sup>23</sup> for the lawsuit on annexation of Başkarcı Municipality to Denizli Municipality, it is argued that annexation of Başkarcı Municipality to Denizli Municipality is unnecessary. One of the reasons for this is that there is no need to control urban developments in Başkarcı Municipality because there is no internal or external dynamic that threatens the agricultural lands.

“The possible growth area of Başkarcı Municipality is agricultural lands. But it will not be a matter of discussion to develop in agricultural land because the population of Başkarcı has been stagnant for many years. Therefore there is no pressure of development on it. Başkarcı Municipality has a different condition than other more dynamic municipalities.”

In general, the municipality that wants to annex surrounding municipalities is accused of desiring to control an area as wide as possible. Therefore there is no public interest in an annexation policy such as efficiency and effectiveness in service provision or integrity of planning practices but in the self interests of the annexing municipality.

- **To Open Up Agricultural Lands to Urban Development**

The risk of opening up agricultural lands for development after annexation by the municipality that annexes the surrounding municipalities is expressed on many occasions as a critique of annexation policy. In the case of Denizli, Zekeriya Öz<sup>24</sup> (Spokesman of mayors and village headmen summit / Mayor of Akkale Municipality from Nationalist Movement Party) questions that

“Denizli is surrounded by fertile agricultural land. Will these areas be opened for settlement and destroyed?”

In the rural part of the annexed municipalities a worry is expressed about the opening of agricultural lands to urban development. There could be two reasons behind this. The first one is that agriculture is the way that people living in villages earn their

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<sup>23</sup> Council of State, 8<sup>th</sup> Department, 2006/5249

<sup>24</sup> 24.12.2003, www.denizlili.net, “Bütünşehir Cezadır”

livelihood. Therefore they see the urban development as a threat to their income-generating assets. The second one is that they want to control rents on their own without any intervention from outside.

- **To Have Unsuccessful Metropolitan Municipality Experiences**

It is argued that the aim of the establishment of metropolitan municipalities is to manage urban areas where there are many independent municipalities in one region. It is established as a higher level of municipal organization that it will be responsible for coordination of region-wide municipal services and development practices. However, after twenty five years of experience, the performance of metropolitan municipalities has not been found to be successful. For that reason some scholars are suspicious of the success of the annexation of municipalities.


Interviewee-8 argues that rather than political structure, the attitude and mentality of political actors are more important in planning and urbanization.

“Administrative structure is not important but mentality is. We have metropolitan municipalities where planning problems still continue”.


Due to the experience of metropolitan municipalities, some scholars emphasize the political processes in municipalities rather than their administrative structure. The idea behind this thought is that whatever the structure is, it is people who manage these structures. Especially if legislative codes are loose, this provides greater room for politicians to maneuver in all level of politics. Therefore politics becomes the most determining factor rather than rules and regulations in administrative structures.

### **7.3.2.1.3. Implementation Plans Before and After Consolidation**


Before the annexation of surrounding municipalities to Denizli Municipality, Denizli Municipality had a fragmented implementation plans structure as can be seen from figure 7.15. After annexation, the implementation plans of surrounding municipalities (figures 7.16-7.21) have been integrated into the implementation plans of Denizli Municipality (figure 7.22). During the integration process, all functional and technical incoherence between plans have been corrected.



**Figure7.15. Denizli Implementation Plans before Consolidation**  
 Source: Denizli Belediyesi 2009 Yılı Faaliyet Raporu (p:56-60)




**Figure7.16. Implementation Plans of Kınıklı and Kayhan Municipalities**  
 Source: Denizli Belediyesi 2009 Yılı Faaliyet Raporu (p:56-60)




**Figure7.17. Implementation Plans of Gökpınar and Bağbaşı Municipalities**

*Source: Denizli Belediyesi 2009 Yılı Faaliyet Raporu (p:56-60)*




**Figure7.18. Implementation Plans of Hallaçlar and Bereketli Municipalities**

*Source: Denizli Belediyesi 2009 Yılı Faaliyet Raporu (p:56-60)*




**Figure7.19. Implementation Plans of Göveçlik and Korucuk Municipalities**

*Source: Denizli Belediyesi 2009 Yılı Faaliyet Raporu (p:56-60)*




**Figure7.20. Implementation Plans of Gümüşler and Üçler Municipalities**

*Source: Denizli Belediyesi 2009 Yılı Faaliyet Raporu (p:56-60)*




**Figure7.21. Implementation Plans of Servergazi and Akkale Municipalities**  
 Source: *Denizli Belediyesi 2009 Yılı Faaliyet Raporu (p:56-60)*



**Figure7.22. Denizli Implementation Plans after Consolidation**  
 Source: *Denizli Belediyesi 2009 Yılı Faaliyet Raporu (p:56-60)*

If we look at the master plans of municipalities which were in use before the annexation and implementation plans of Denizli Municipality (which have been operative since annexation), it is observable that Denizli Municipality has overcome its growth difficulties. Particularly, Akkale Municipality's administrative, industrial and recreative areas; Gökpınar Municipality's residential areas; Hallaçlar Municipality's residential and recreative areas, Kayhan Municipality's business, municipal service and residential areas, Kınıklı Municipality's educational and technical infrastructural areas, Korucuk Municipality's industrial and residential areas, Üçler Municipality's sanitation, industrial, municipal service and recreative areas have been used to overcome the inadequacies of Denizli Municipality in those particular land use functions.



**Figure7.23. Denizli Metropolitan Region Development Pattern**

**Table7.24. Percentages of Land Use Functions**

hectar (%)	administration	business	education	health	industry	infrastructure	municipal services	other	housing	recreative	religious
Akkale	2,7	1,7	0,5	0,0	32,2	0,0	0,4	1,3	45,5	15,5	0,2
Başkarıcı	2,7	2,7	1,4	0,1	2,4	0,0	1,7	0,5	74,3	13,3	0,8
Gökpınar	0,6	2,4	1,0	0,6	0,9	0,0	0,0	2,2	80,3	11,8	0,4
Hallaçlar	0,2	0,4	1,9	0,5	0,0	0,0	0,1	7,8	65,0	23,7	0,4
Kayhan	0,0	18,2	1,3	0,1	3,1	0,0	2,0	0,0	62,2	12,8	0,3
Kınıklı	0,8	5,2	39,0	0,0	1,0	0,3	0,0	0,0	46,3	6,8	0,5
Korucuk	1,5	4,8	3,0	0,3	18,1	0,0	0,0	1,3	64,3	6,0	0,6
Üçler	1,3	2,0	2,8	1,5	17,9	0,1	1,6	16,2	36,5	19,8	0,3
Average	1,4	2,8	5,4	0,9	16,0	0,1	1,1	9,9	45,0	17,0	0,4
DENİZLİ*		9,8	4,7	0,7	16,7				54,7	13,4	

\*after consolidation

Source: Master Plans of Surrounding Municipalities and written response of Denizli Municipality to a petition.

In addition to fulfilling the needs of Denizli Municipality in terms of land use functions, after annexation the density of Denizli Municipality in terms of persons per hectare has decreased from 71,8 persons per hectare to 41,3 persons per hectare.

**Table7.25. Persons per hectare before and after annexation**

	area (ha)	population	Density (persons per ha)
Denizli (before annexation)	4500	323151	71,8
Akkale	650	6753	10,4
Bağbaşı	490	21437	43,7
Başkarıcı	200	2433	12,2
Bereketli	300	10203	34,0
Gökpınar	128	3533	27,6
Göveçlik	195	2064	10,6
Gümüşler	1400	24558	17,5
Hallaçlar	250	4336	17,3
Kayhan	126	8168	64,8
Kınıklı	375	25413	67,8
Korucuk	107	1809	16,9
Servegazi	400	10469	26,2
Üçler	1850	9290	5,0
Total (after annexation)	5491	378169	41,3

Source: [www.yerelbilgi.gov.tr](http://www.yerelbilgi.gov.tr)

To sum up, the annexation of surrounding municipalities to Denizli Municipality has become beneficial to Denizli Municipality in terms of its growth problems. It has satisfied the need of insufficient land use functions and at the same time it has approximately halved the overall density of the metropolitan region. Therefore it could be argued that urbanization and planning issues are the most serious

motivating factors behind the annexation of the surrounding municipalities to Denizli Municipality.

### 7.3.2.2. Efficiency and Effectiveness in Municipal Service Provision

Efficiency and effectiveness are two of the most used concepts in any local government reform. Therefore any discourse of annexation of municipalities also uses both of them. However they are not as powerful as planning and urbanization arguments because most of the arguments are based on theoretical conceptualization or hypothetical assumptions.

It is argued that annexation of municipalities creates economies of scale and consequently efficiency in a bigger municipality. It is also stated that annexation solves problems resulting from the disorganized structure of fragmented municipalities. Unified systems gain from coordination and provide effective services.

However, the reactions to annexation reflect both positive and negative ideas about annexation in terms of efficiency and effectiveness. The following section will discuss the details of these positive and negative ideas.

**Table 7.26 Negative and Positive Aspects of Annexation in terms of Efficiency and Effectiveness in Municipal Service Provision**

<b>Positive Aspects</b>	<b>Negative Aspects</b>
To Make Region-wide Infrastructure Investments	To Be Self-sufficient
To Provide Services Properly	No Need for New Investment
To Coordinate Service Provision	Decreasing Level of Services after Annexation
To Provide Services to Areas That Are Devoid Of Services	Increasing Cost of Municipal Services
To Cut Current Expenditures on Public Service Provision	New Bureaucracy
To Manage Natural Resources	No More Competition Between Municipalities
To Solve the Conflicts between Municipalities	Already Collective Service Provision
To stop Economic Externalities	Embedded Knowledge of Workers
To provide equality between settlements	Clientelism in Service Provision
	Economic Relations between Municipality and Society

### 7.3.2.2.1. Positive Aspects of Annexation in Terms of Efficiency and Effectiveness

- **To Make Region-wide Infrastructure Investments**

An inability to make region-wide infrastructure investment due to a politically fragmented structure in urban areas is one of the reasons used for an annexation of a municipality. This situation is emphasized by many actors in many occasions.

The same issue is used to legitimize the legislation process of Denizli Integrated-city Law (5026)<sup>25</sup> (vetoed by the President of the Republic due to being against the constitution) by MPs from government.

“There are problems with providing local services especially in accomplishing investment activities in Denizli Municipality and the municipalities around it.”

Nail Kalemci<sup>26</sup> (Spokesman of the Platform of Industrialist, Traders and Businessmen of Denizli) says that

“Denizli has rapid economic development rates. It has a high capacity in textile and manufacturing. However especially in accomplishing the investments in local public services, there are several problems in Denizli and surrounding municipalities.”

Similarly, Nihat Zeybekçi<sup>27</sup> (Mayor of Denizli from Justice and Development Party) says

“We cannot apply projects that we have in our prospective plans in other municipalities. When the annexation of municipalities is approved, most of the problems will disappear.”

It is stated that a fragmented structure is an obstacle to region-wide investments because municipalities do not accept any project that does not directly benefit them materially or morally. Municipalities use their objective conditions as a source of bargaining if they have a more advantageous position with respect to Denizli Municipality. For example if Denizli Municipality needs the permission of a

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<sup>25</sup> National Assembly Records, term:22/2, session:32

<sup>26</sup> 16.12.2003, www.denizlili.net, “Bütünşehir’e Destek”

<sup>27</sup> 09.04.2009, www.tumgazeteler.com, “Zeybekçi, Denizli Belediyesine Katılan Belediyelerin Çalışanlarına İş Güvencesi Verdi”

surrounding municipality to make a region-wide investment in terms of using its territory to install pipeline, that surrounding municipality can use the demand of Denizli Municipality as a chance to satisfy its own needs. Because of this bargaining process, region-wide investments are not accomplished properly.

- **To Provide Services Properly**

In addition to the existence of urban public services, the quality of these services is also another topic of debate, and it is argued that a fragmented structure also decreases the quality of services due to several reasons. We can analyze the effects of a fragmented structure on proper service provision by focusing on three capacities: service provision capacity, financial capacity, and personnel capacity.

#### Service Provision Capacity

It is emphasized that the service provision capacity of small municipalities is variable but always weaker than that of Denizli Municipality. Consequently, these differences among municipalities and between surrounding municipalities and Denizli Municipality cause chaotic conditions in service provision.

Özgür (2005:475) notes that there are serious breakdowns in service provision in urban areas where there is a fragmented administrative structure. Similarly Cigeroğlu (2007:26-27) argues that a fragmented political structure deepens the problems in the fields like the provision of fresh water, drainage of rainwater and floods, mass housing, management of solid waste, etc.

Interviewee-6 states that

“The thing that Denizli needs most is the modernization of its infrastructure, because according to information that we get from authorized people, Denizli loses 60% of its water before usage in pipelines.”

Interviewee-25 gives an example of inadequate service provision in terms of its unity.

“The boundary between Gümüşler Municipality and Denizli municipality is a divided road. The road on the Denizli municipality side is covered by asphalt; however, the road on the side of Gümüşler Municipality is not. This is not acceptable”.

Interview-9 gives a specific example of the lack of capacity in service provision.

“There are lots of streams in Denizli and most of them are risky in terms of a flood. In 1999, due to floods, Denizli wanted to be declared as disaster region. Small scale municipalities have no capacity to deal with these floods.”

Interviewee-14 explains the reasons for inadequate service provision with an example:

“When the municipalities were established, they had no capacity for municipal works. For example, in Kınıklı Municipality and Bağbaşı Municipality, the main infrastructure was set up by Denizli Municipality before they became municipalities. When you want to subscribe for water, you need to go to Denizli municipality because Denizli Municipality provides water for them. This creates administrative confusion. For example, the personnel of Kınıklı Municipality do not know the locations of the pipelines. There are lots of problems like this.”

It is implied that annexation will unify the service provision capacity for the whole urban area, and improve the level of services provided.

### Financial Capacity

It is argued that the reason behind the differences of service provision capacities of municipalities is their different financial capacities. Municipalities get their revenues from the central budget according to their population size and this revenue constitutes 53% of total revenues of municipalities on average; however the smaller the scale of municipalities, the greater the proportion of revenues from the central budget to total municipal revenues. Therefore, municipalities that have less population get less money, and therefore have lower financial capacity. The differences in this capacity reflect themselves directly into the executive work of municipalities.

Interviewee-6 pays attention to the financial capacities of small municipalities.

“It is impossible to make infrastructure investments in Kınıklı Municipality, a municipality that has a population of over 50,000 with the revenues that come from the central government. This is similar for Gümüşler Municipality that has a population of over 15,000.

The sum of money including revenues that come from the central government and municipalities' own incomes is only sufficient to pay personnel salaries. Therefore small municipalities cannot provide services smoothly.”

Interviewee-10 gives an example of inadequate service provision due to insufficient financial capacity of municipalities:

“Denizli Municipality opens the road but small municipalities cannot keep the road going because these small municipalities have no financial capacity. Denizli Municipality continues to open the road only if it makes an agreement with the neighboring municipality. Sometimes agreements are not made; sometimes it could be a financial burden on the shoulder of Denizli Municipality.”

Interviewee-4 explains why small scale municipalities are in financial difficulty.

“These surrounding municipalities became an obstacle to provide services properly in many fields like transportation, cleaning, planning, flood, infrastructure etc. because surrounding municipalities can make only their salary payments with their revenues. They have no capacity to deal with other municipal works. Mayors of these municipalities became heads of villages when these municipalities were villages. They prioritize personal relations, and due to these relations they do not increase charges or prices of municipal services as much as they should. They keep the prices low. They could not create revenues from their services. Additionally, their revenue from the central budget is also low. Therefore they do not provide services due to economic deficiencies.”

### Personnel Capacity

The lack of skilled personnel is noted as another reason for inadequate service provision. It is argued that after annexation, skilled personnel of Denizli Municipality will provide services for all urban areas under a unified structure.

Interviewee-9 argues that

“According to a survey, most of the small scale municipalities do not have any civil engineers. They employ technicians graduated from high school instead, and some of them don't even have a technician. Therefore in terms of technical staff, they are inefficient.”

Similarly interviewee-3 states that

“There is one mayor, two officers, one driver, but no skilled staff in these municipalities. They waste money. For example, as far as I know, there is no city planner in these municipalities. What they do is to try to manage a municipality with these people who have no education or technical skills.”

Interviewee-25 emphasizes that annexation could solve the problem of insufficient personnel.

It is widely believed that annexation will make a positive contribution in terms of increasing the general level of technical staff in all urban areas.

According to a survey, participants from Denizli Municipality strongly agree that the new regulation will increase the efficiency in providing municipal services. However, the other municipalities (to be annexed) do not agree with this statement.

**Table 7.27 New regulation will increase the efficiency of municipal services**

	Denizli municipality	other municipalities	NGOs	village heads	Total
don't agree	0	42	0	4	46
%	0.0	65.6	0.0	40.0	39.0
slightly agree	0	3	1	1	5
%	0.0	4.7	12.5	10.0	4.2
agree	6	6	0	2	14
%	16.7	9.4	0.0	20.0	11.9
quite agree	8	2	2	0	12
%	22.2	3.1	25.0	0.0	10.2
strongly agree	22	11	5	3	41
%	61.1	17.2	62.5	30.0	34.7
Total	36	64	8	10	118
%	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

*Source: Ciğeroğlu (2007:140-141)*

Similarly, participants from Denizli Municipality strongly agree that the new regulation will increase the quality of municipal services. However, the other municipalities (to be annexed) do not agree with this idea.

**Table 7.28 New regulation will increase the quality of municipal services**

	Denizli municipality	other municipalities	NGOs	village heads	Total
don't agree	1	40	0	4	45
%	2.8	62.5	0.0	40.0	37.8
slightly agree	1	5	1	1	8
%	2.8	7.8	11.1	10.0	6.7
agree	4	6	0	2	12
%	11.1	9.4	0.0	20.0	10.1
quite agree	7	2	2	0	11
%	19.4	3.1	22.2	0.0	9.2
strongly agree	23	11	6	3	43
%	63.9	17.2	66.7	30.0	36.1
Total	36	64	9	10	119
%	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Cığeroğlu (2007:141-142)

- **To Coordinate Service Provision**

By coordinating service provision it is argued that the main aim is to provide effective and efficient services.

Mehmet Yücel<sup>28</sup> (President of Denizli Chamber of Trade) notes that

“All thirteen municipalities within the boundaries of the integrated-city provided services in their territory according to their financial capacities. Now all activities will be coordinated centrally.”

Faruk Boyacı (Ex-president of Denizli Branch of Chamber of Architects) (2001:1) states that

“As a result of inadequate coordination between Denizli Municipality and other municipalities, there emerge unsolvable problems in provision of municipal services such as transportation, sewage system, provision of fresh water, drainage system, planning practices etc.”

During the legislation process of Denizli Integrated-city Law (5026)<sup>29</sup> (vetoed by the President of the Republic due to being against the constitution) it is stated that

“By annexing the municipalities around Denizli Municipality to Denizli Municipality, it is aimed that the fragmented structure of service provision and disagreements in authority and duty will be removed and efficiency and effectiveness will increase.”

<sup>28</sup> 14.08.2006, www.drthaber.com, “Denizli Bütünşehir Sevinci Yaşıyor”

<sup>29</sup> National Assembly Records, term:22/2, session:32

Interviewee-24 notes that

“There are four municipalities that are obstacles to Denizli Municipality. All of them have separate infrastructure and development plans.”

“Now the infrastructure of Gümüşler Municipality has to be changed. Why does it have to be changed? It has used pipes with a diameter of 20 cm. However there are settlements in the forward direction. Therefore the capacity of the pipes is not enough when we consider all municipalities.”

Interviewee-5 says that

“There is a lack of coordination between municipalities. Municipalities can bring water from the same sources with different pipelines. This results from the the lack of integrated service provision.”

Interviewee-4 gives an example of the lack of coordination between municipalities:

“Before annexation, we tried to prepare every infrastructure plan by considering the whole region. For that purpose we asked surrounding municipalities to send their infrastructural plan to us. Although there was an agreement between municipalities, Denizli Municipality and İller Bank, they did not send their infrastructural plans.”

The issue of a lack of coordination is another topic emphasized in annexation discourses. It is stated that for that reason, each individual municipality tries to provide services individually although they could be well provided collectively. It is argued that this collectivity brings about efficiency and effectiveness in service provision because it avoids the repetition of the same work, and furthermore, due to the collective planning of infrastructure, the need for amendments in the infrastructure system is reduced.

- **To Provide Services to Areas That Are Devoid Of Services**

It is argued that there are areas especially in the border regions of two municipalities that have difficulties in receiving services due to the neglect of both sides. Therefore it is stated that after annexation there will be no such areas because they will be at the center not the border of the new municipality.

Fikret Serçe<sup>30</sup> (Candidate for nomination for mayoralty of Denizli Municipality from the Justice and Development Party) says that

“There are lots of ignored spaces where neither Denizli Municipality nor other municipalities provide services. Therefore people living in these spaces suffer due to these disagreements. There will be no such difficulties if Denizli becomes an integrated-city because it will provide services to the whole area.”

Interviewee-6 argues that

“Nobody objected to the consolidation of municipalities because the main aim was to provide services to every location in the municipality. There will be no underdeveloped parish within the urban area.”

A fragmented structure also creates a no man’s land to which none of the municipalities provide or are incapable of providing services. Especially disagreement or lack of coordination between municipalities is the main cause of this. Therefore it is argued that after annexation there will be no untouched area under the consolidated structure.

- **To Cut Current Expenditures on the Public Service Provision**

It is argued that there is redundancy in staff employed in service provision because each municipality has to employ their own staff. Through annexation, the organization of municipal staff working in service provision will be more effective and efficient.

Ali Aygören (Ex-mayor of Denizli from True Path Party) (2001:16) argues that

“Twelve municipalities have twelve mayors, twelve directors of technical and construction affairs, twelve directors of planning, etc. The amount of money that comes from the central government is defined according to population. Therefore most of this money goes to current expenditures like personnel salaries. If we are integrated, this will be enough for all kind of expenditures of the integrated-city municipality.”

Denizli Industrialists, Traders and Businessmen Platform<sup>31</sup> declared after one of its meeting that

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<sup>30</sup> 02.01.2004, www.denizli.net, “Bütünşehir Şart”

<sup>31</sup> Press release in 13.07.2005

“It is impossible to benefit from scale economies in a fragmented municipal system. It is well known that these small scale municipalities use most of their revenues for current expenditure and could not employ skilled personnel. Apart from making investment expenditures, because of inefficient financial resources, they could not accomplish their routine jobs.”

The reorganization of municipal staff after annexation is implied as another supporting point for annexation. It is argued that reorganizing municipal staff will result in an efficient and effective use of staff due to reduced duplication in the consolidated structure.

- **To Manage Natural Resources**

The management of natural resources that are critical for more than one municipality is used as another reason for the annexation of municipalities.

The expert report<sup>32</sup> for the lawsuits on annexation of Gökpınar Municipalities to Denizli Municipality states that

“Although each municipality insists that they have their own water sources, Gökpınar Dam located within the boundaries of Gökpınar Municipality is the main fresh water source for all municipalities...The control of this kind of a source that is important for more than one settlement by a single [powerful and equipped] authority is essential for future projections and control of building regulations around the dam.”

Nihat Zeybekçi<sup>33</sup> (Mayor of the Denizli Municipality from Justice and Development Party) adopts a similar approach to this issue.

“Cankurtaran water basin, which supplying water to 1.5 million people, cannot be left to the authority of a small municipality.”

Interviewee-9 notes about fresh water resource management that

“There is a problem with fresh water. There are wasted water sources. There are four main water sources and some of them are outside the boundaries of Denizli Municipality. Consequently Denizli Municipality faces problems in using these sources. The small municipalities do not let Denizli municipality use these sources or they want something in return. They bargain with Denizli Municipality. Denizli Municipality should be responsible for the management of these sources.”

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<sup>32</sup> Council of State, 8<sup>th</sup> Department, 2007/4657

<sup>33</sup> 15.07.2005, www.arkitera.com, “Denizli Bütünşehir Olmak İçin Isırlı”

Interviewee-2 focuses on the management of the natural resources

“In addition to the management of the urban area, the urban area should be controlled also in order to preserve natural resources.”

The management of region-wide resources by a single authority is argued as necessary. It is assumed that annexation will bring effective and efficient management of these sources, and at the same time, monopolistic attitudes by municipalities towards these resources will be precluded. Technical and financial capacities of central municipality are seen as the sign of efficiency and effectiveness.

- **To Solve the Conflicts between Municipalities**

The disagreements between municipalities could directly affect the lives of people. In a politically fragmented structure, people can not punish the administration of their municipality in the next election because their municipality does not have any direct responsibility for deficiencies in service provision if the neighboring municipality is responsible for it.

Cigeroğlu (2007:28-29) notes that

“There could be disagreements between Denizli Municipality and surrounding municipalities in the provision of some services. These disagreements can affect the production and provision of urban services, and create dissatisfaction among people.”

Similarly, Denizli Industrialists, Traders and Businessmen Platform<sup>34</sup> says that

“Due to the municipalities that behave independently, disagreement in planning, coordination and administration cause deficiencies in service provision.”

Interviewee-11, interviewee-24 and interviewee-3 give three examples of conflicts between municipalities that affect service provision.

“Denizli had an important solid waste management project. The place of the facility was in one of the surrounding municipalities. Therefore we needed to make an amendment in the development plans to construct that facility. However, that municipality refused to make this

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<sup>34</sup> Press release in 13.07.2005

amendment. It created a big difficulty for us. Later on, the ministry made the amendment on the plan on its own motion.”

“Annexation is necessary to pave the way for Denizli. I want to tell you a story. Denizli Municipality wanted an intercity bus station in Üçler Municipality. This bus station was not built due to conflicts between Üçler and Denizli Municipality.”

“There is a ring-road in the master plan. However, the actual road exists in some municipalities but not in other municipalities because after its establishment some municipalities has made changes in development plans and gave different planning permissions to areas where the ring-road passes. For example, to complete the construction of this ring road Denizli Municipality wrote a text to Servergazi Municipality because there were a few built houses on the route of this ring-road within the boundaries of Servergazi Municipality. After this text we recognized that the number of houses on the route had started to increase.”

Municipalities are governed by the same Municipality Law, and there is no differentiation between duty and responsibility between municipalities in terms of their scale. Therefore they have the same authority over their territory. Consequently it is unsurprising that there could be conflicts between municipalities, even in projects that will benefit the whole region.

- **To Stop Economic Externalities**

The existence of economic externalities is an unavoidable condition in politically fragmented urban areas. Both municipalities and people can be free-riders of a neighboring municipality. Although they benefit from the services provided in the adjacent municipality, they do not pay for it. Therefore this creates inefficiencies in service provision in the municipality whose services are used by other municipalities.

Ciğeroglu (2007:28) argues about Denizli Municipality that

“In the urbanized area, large scale urban services are provided for by Denizli Municipality. Other municipalities benefit from these services but they do not contribute to the provision of these services. This results in the mismanagement of resources for Denizli Municipality.”

“People living in surrounding municipalities benefit from services provided for by Denizli Municipality but they do not pay for these services. When the people living in Denizli Municipality are considered, this creates an injustice and also decreases the quality and the quantity of these services.”

To internalize these externalities is noted as one of the gains that annexation will bring. It is argued that the level of externalities will be minimized and this creates

efficiency and effectiveness as a consequence of proper design and application of services.

- **To Provide Equality between Settlements**

Interviewee-20 focuses on the economic differences between municipalities and then argues that annexation will bring a kind of equality between municipalities.

“I think annexation will be useful for the equitable distribution of investments. There are socio-economic differences between municipalities. Some of them are in need of money, but some of them live in opulence. After annexation investment will be made according to needs.”

As a consequence of a consolidation of budgets, it argued that the differences between municipalities in terms of incomes and expenditures will disappear; therefore the investment decisions will not be based on the economic capacities of municipalities, rather it is implied that they will be according to needs.

#### **7.3.2.2.2. Negative Aspects of Annexation in Terms of Efficiency and Effectiveness**

- **To Be Self-sufficient**

Self-sufficiency is one of the counter arguments used in annexation discourses in terms of efficiency and effectiveness. The municipalities that will be annexed strongly argue that they are self-sufficient.

During the legislation process of Denizli Integrated-city Law (5026)<sup>35</sup> (vetoed by the President of the Republic due to being against the constitution) it is stated by the opposition that

“The municipalities that are annexed to Denizli Municipality do their jobs well in their own area.”

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<sup>35</sup> National Assembly Records, term:22/2, session:32

The expert report<sup>36</sup> for the lawsuits on annexation of Başkarı Municipalities to Denizli Municipality (vetoed by experts) notes that

“Due to its stable population, there will be no need to increase its number of staff. By employing an additional architect or engineer or city planner, it can improve its staff capacity.”

Interviewee-25 argues that

“We have no problem in planning services.”

Interviewee-17 notes that

“When we were in an area adjacent to Denizli Municipality, a development plan that covers half of the municipal areas was already prepared. We have almost no problems with infrastructure.”

Interviewee-24 says that

“I have completed all the infrastructure and planning work.”

Interviewee-18 argues that

“We completed most of the infrastructure investments. There is no inadequacy in infrastructure.”

Interviewee-15 states that

“We have no problem in service provision. We try to provide every service with the latest technology. Additionally, we are one of the rare municipalities that has no debt to the market or state.

Interviewee-22 emphasizes that

“There is no problem in the water or sewage infrastructure in our municipality. We can stand on our own feet. We have no debt at the moment. We have cash in our bank account. We can provide every service to anywhere in our municipality. We do not get help from Denizli Municipality in these issues.”

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<sup>36</sup> Council of State, 8th Department, 2006/5249

According to a survey, when participants from Denizli Municipality and other municipalities (to be annexed) consider the adequacy of their own administrative staff, technical staff and equipment it can be concluded that the other municipalities find themselves more adequate than Denizli Municipality.

**Table7.29 The Evaluation of adequacy of administrative staff, technical staff and equipment**

	administrative staff			technical staff			equipment		
	municipality			municipality			municipality		
	Denizli	others	Total	Denizli	others	Total	Denizli	others	Total
don't agree	0	5	5	1	3	4	1	1	2
%	0.0	7.8	5.0	2.8	4.7	4.0	2.8	1.6	2.0
slightly agree	10	7	17	7	7	14	1	3	4
%	27.8	10.9	17.0	19.4	10.9	14.0	2.8	4.7	4.0
agree	14	16	30	13	18	31	13	19	32
%	38.9	25.0	30.0	36.1	28.1	31.0	36.1	29.7	32.0
quite agree	7	4	11	12	7	19	13	5	18
%	19.4	6.3	11.0	33.3	10.9	19.0	36.1	7.8	18.0
strongly agree	5	32	37	3	29	32	8	36	44
%	13.9	50.0	37.0	8.3	45.3	32.0	22.2	56.3	44.0
Total	36	64	100	36	64	100	36	64	100
%	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Ciğeroglu (2007:111)

One of the counter arguments against annexation is self-sufficiency. Annexed municipalities argue that they are self-sufficient in their own territory.

- **No Need for New Investment**

One of the arguments expressed against annexation is that there is no need for new investment or new regulation in service provision.

The expert report<sup>37</sup> for the lawsuits on annexation of Başkarcı Municipalities to Denizli Municipality (rejected by experts) emphasizes that

“Başkarcı Municipality has rural characteristics and needs rural services. Due to its stable population, there is no pressure to increase the quantity of public services. There is no need for extra investment on infrastructure after an initial investment is made.”

<sup>37</sup> Council of State, 8th Department, 2006/5249

Stability of existing conditions is implied as a reason against annexation. It is argued that there is no need to change in stable conditions. Change is only necessary in growing settlements.

- **Decreasing Level of Services after Annexation**

The most common argument used by the opponents of annexation is the worry of a decrease in the level of service that they receive.

Zekeriya Öz<sup>38</sup> (Spokesman of mayors and village headmen summit / the Mayor of Akkale Municipality from Nationalist Movement Party) says that

“We provide public services like garbage collection, waterworks, road maintenance, sewerage, and development plan accurately. However, we worry about how successful Denizli Municipality, which has deficiencies at providing public services in its area, will be in providing services in a wider region.”

Interviewee-25 says that

“Extension of boundaries makes service provision difficult. The way to produce services quickly is to provide services by a nearby local authority.”

Interviewee-17 argues that

“At the beginning, there could be some problems in adaptation, however later everything will go well for large scale municipal services. However, in daily work there could be serious problems. For example, if there is a death certificate, we provide burial service as quickly as possible due to religious reasons. However in Denizli Municipality, there are long delays.”

Interviewee-13 notes that

“It is argued that economic efficiency is one of the purposes of the regulation but you only eliminate the mayors [because assets, equipments, revenues, debts and personnel of surrounding municipalities will belong to Denizli Municipality]. If there is no elected authority over these personnel you cannot provide services with them. Personnel in the municipalities look like children in the school. When there is no authority they tend to be unoccupied.”

Interviewee-12 argues that

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<sup>38</sup> 24.12.2003, [www.denizlili.net](http://www.denizlili.net), “Bütünşehir Cezadır”

“Some of the municipalities that will be annexed to Denizli municipality are 15 km away from the city center. What will Denizli Municipality do in these places? Most probably, it will open branches there, and employ a few municipal police, repairmen, and tax-collectors. However I could not understand that if Denizli municipality opens branches in these annexed municipalities why we would close them down. If we keep municipalities, there will be a mayor, a politically responsible person. Therefore at least the internal democratic control mechanism works. You replace an elected person with an assigned person.”

Interviewee-1 emphasizes that

“People are worried that there would be an interruption or deficiencies in service provision after annexation, or those services would be delivered late.”

Interviewee-19 argues that

“The extension of boundaries of Denizli municipality without being a metropolitan municipality is a handicap because population will be doubled and the area under the control of Denizli Municipality will be five times bigger than the existing area. It is difficult to provide services to the whole of this area with the current revenue level of Denizli municipality”.

Interviewee-22 says that

“Services will not be provided at the right time, there will be delays. I know this due to an experience. Since Denizli municipality provides water services, when there is a problem with water we call them. Last time, they came here twenty-two days after notice. They say that ‘we have problems in our own municipality, we cannot do our own work, we cannot help you immediately.’ You collect the money for water, you provide services, and therefore you have to deal with these issues. After annexation how will Denizli Municipality provide services to the newly annexed municipalities if it has difficulties in helping us?”

According to a survey, participants from Denizli Municipality and NGOs strongly agree with the idea that Denizli Municipality has the capacity to provide service to the area that emerges after the annexation of municipalities. On the other hand, participants from the other municipalities do not agree with the idea.

**Table7.30 Capacity of Denizli Municipality to provide service to the area that emerges after the annexation of municipalities**

	Denizli municipality	other municipalities	NGOs	village heads	Total
don't agree	0	48	1	3	52
%	0.0	75.0	11.1	30.0	43.7
slightly agree	3	0	1	0	4
%	8.3	0.0	11.1	0.0	3.4
agree	8	9	2	5	24
%	22.2	14.1	22.2	50.0	20.2
quite agree	9	4	3	1	17
%	25.0	6.3	33.3	10.0	14.3
strongly agree	16	3	2	1	22
%	44.4	4.7	22.2	10.0	18.5
Total	36	64	9	10	119
%	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: *Ciğeroğlu (2007:144-145)*

The belief that there will be a decrease in level of service provision after annexation is widely spread. Denizli municipality has made no declaration about its future plans about these kinds of issues. Therefore there is uncertainty about them, which creates doubt among people.

- **Increasing Cost of Municipal Services**

The increasing cost of municipal services is another point of objection to annexation. It is argued that the bigger the municipality, the higher the cost of services.

During the legislation process of Denizli Integrated-city Law (5026)<sup>39</sup> (vetoed by the President of the Republic due to being against the constitution) it is emphasized that

“People living in villages will have to pay new municipal taxes and they will receive the same services more expensively.”

Interviewee-11 argues that price increases in municipal services are unavoidable.

“Let’s assume that the price of water for one m<sup>3</sup> is 5.00 NTL in Denizli Municipality, but it is 1.00 NTL in other municipalities. There is a 4.00 NTL difference between them. Denizli Municipality will collect this difference without differentiating among consumers whether they live in Denizli or a distant village because it has no right to charge different prices in its territory. Additionally, municipal charges will also increase. All of these increases will create some burden for consumers.”

<sup>39</sup> National Assembly Records, term:22/2, session:32

Interviewee-26 complains that

“The cost of water and property tax will be based on Denizli Municipality’s tariff. We have the source of water but we will use water more expensively. People worry about this.”

Interviewee-12 emphasizes that

“Let’s assume that people now pay 0.30 NTL for each m<sup>3</sup> in surrounding municipalities. However they will pay 3.00 NTL for the same amount of water after annexation. They could not recognize this issue now but they will understand after annexation happens.”

Interviewee-22 states that

“People who live here are lower-income people. People will have to pay the additional cost of 2.20 NTL to go to Denizli by bus to pay their 15.00 NTL water bill if they go to Denizli. The price of water is 0.45 NTL for one m<sup>3</sup> here; however it is 1.50 NTL in Denizli municipality. Other municipal charges are also low here. We know our society and define the charges according to our people’s income level. We do not know Denizli municipality’s criteria. Lower-income people will be affected by this”.

Interviewee-8 complains about water prices.

“I live in Kınıklı Municipality, which is one of the municipalities that will be annexed to Denizli municipality. After annexation we will pay triple for the same amount of water. There is a cost of being an integrated-city. Municipal services will be expensive but the quality of services will not increase”.

Interviewee-3 explains his efforts at the municipal council to decrease the price of water .

“People living in surrounding municipalities will be hurt due to the increasing cost of municipal services and increasing taxes. I objected to the increasing of municipal tariffs in council discussions but they are defined with higher prices.”

According to a survey, participants from the villages and the other municipalities (to be annexed) strongly agree with the idea that the annexation of municipalities will increase the costs of municipal services per capita. Although some participants from Denizli Municipality agree with the idea, others do not.

**Table7.31 Annexation of municipalities will increase the costs of municipal services per capita**

	Denizli municipality	other municipalities	NGOs	village heads	Total
don't agree	14	10	3	1	28
%	38.9	15.6	33.3	10.0	23.5
slightly agree	3	0	0	0	3
%	8.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.5
agree	13	11	2	1	27
%	36.1	17.2	22.2	10.0	22.7
quite agree	3	9	2	1	15
%	8.3	14.1	22.2	10.0	12.6
strongly agree	3	34	2	7	46
%	8.3	53.1	22.2	70.0	38.7
Total	36	64	9	10	119
%	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: *Ciğeroğlu (2007:143)*

Increasing the cost of municipal services and municipal charges are two source of objection among opposing people.

- **New Bureaucracy**

It is argued that as the scale of local governments increases, it brings about more bureaucracy, and that this reduces rather than increases the efficiency of service provision.

Interviewee-17 says that

“After annexation, bureaucracy will increase for people.”

Interviewee-18 states that

“People can settle their affairs easily in the municipality. But this will not be the case after annexation to Denizli Municipality.”

According to a survey, participants from the villages and the other municipalities (to be annexed) strongly agree with the idea that new regulation will create bureaucratic and technical difficulties for villagers. Additionally, some participants from Denizli Municipality agree with the argument while others do not.

**Tablo7.32 New regulation will create bureaucratic and technical difficulties for villagers**

	Denizli municipality	other municipalities	NGOs	village heads	Total
don't agree	11	12	1	0	24
	30.6	18.8	11.1	0.0	20.2
slightly agree	6	2	0	1	9
	16.7	3.1	0.0	10.0	7.6
agree	12	6	2	0	20
	33.3	9.4	22.2	0.0	16.8
quite agree	7	2	4	0	13
	19.4	3.1	44.4	0.0	10.9
strongly agree	0	42	2	9	53
	0.0	65.6	22.2	90.0	44.5
Total	36	64	9	10	119
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Ciğeroğlu (2007:145-146)

As a consequence of increasing the scale of municipalities, increasing bureaucracy in municipal procedures is another issue of doubt. People think that increasing bureaucracy will make municipal matters more difficult.

- **No More Competition between Municipalities**

It is argued that if there is more than one municipality in an urban area, it creates competition between municipalities because people compare the performance of their municipality with the other municipality and reflect their approval in the ballot boxes. Therefore it is stated that competition increases efficiency and effectiveness in municipalities.

Interviewee-1 argues that

“My point is this: there should be a competition in every field. Denizli municipality becomes a single municipality in the urban area. However, there should be a condition of comparability among municipalities.”

Interviewee-15 states that

“There is a competition between mayors of small municipalities. Therefore I can compare myself with other mayors. This competition is a reason for better service provision. After annexation there will be a single municipality and no competition.”

It is argued that competition among municipalities forces the administrations of municipalities to compete with each other. Consequently, this competition results in efficiency and effectiveness in service provision, whereas the absence of competition causes laziness in that single authority.

- **Already Collective Service Provision**

It is stated that municipalities already provide services collectively in Denizli; therefore the problem of collectivity is not a real problem.

Interviewee-15 emphasizes that

“Services like public transport, the sewage system, and the fresh water system are already collectively provided by Denizli Municipality. Whether we are annexed to Denizli Municipality or not, we have a joint infrastructure system. If there is a problem with public transport, the sewage system, the solid waste or the fresh water system, we solve the problem together.”

“There is already integrity between municipalities because there are agreements between Denizli Municipality and other municipalities about provision of services like transport, fresh water, sewage etc. Therefore it is unclear what the contribution of annexation will be.”

Interviewee-22 explains the integration between a municipality and Denizli Municipality.

“Public transport is provided by Denizli municipality. We were a parish of Denizli municipality before being a municipality. At that time transportation was provided by Denizli municipality. After becoming a municipality we preferred to not provide this service in order to not create a second authority in this field.”

“In terms of water provision, as I said before, we were a parish of Denizli Municipality and it has provided water and still does. However, we have searched for water resources around and found some. If this annexation decision was not taken, we would construct our own water network, but after the decision annexation we canceled our plans.”

Interviewee-9 talks about solid waste management as a collective action.

“There is no serious problem in solid waste management because there is an agreement between municipalities. This agreement started with eighteen municipalities but it has reached twenty one municipalities. There are twenty two municipalities in the central district. They all drain their solid wastes in a common solid waste storage area.”

It is argued that coordination and integrity of municipal service provision is emphasized as the main reason to legitimize annexation of municipalities, however, some already have an integrated and collectively coordinated infrastructure system. Therefore there must be some other reason apart from these.

- **Embedded Knowledge of Workers**

The personnel of each municipality know their place best because they deal with that settlement for a long time. It is argued that if these personnel are fired or replaced by a new group of personnel from Denizli Municipality, it would create problems especially in the management of the system.

Interviewee-24 argues that

“Denizli municipality has to employ the workers that are transferred from the surrounding municipalities because workers working in Denizli Municipality do not know the routes of the infrastructure in surrounding municipalities. Only workers of these municipalities can know.”

It is stated that information about surrounding municipalities is important for Denizli Municipality. Municipal works are done by municipal workers in an unsystematic, even in an eclectic way. Therefore, there emerges a dependence on workers’ local knowledge. It is argued that if Denizli Municipality rejects the contribution of these workers, it will create delays at the problem-solving stage of municipal services.

- **Clientelism in Service Provision**

It is mentioned that there are clientelist relations in Denizli Municipality. These clientelist relations are an obstacle to efficient and effective service provision.

Interviewee-18 says that

“In Denizli Municipality, all tenders are won by people from Siirt. You know that the Prime Minister’s wife is from Siirt and the Prime Minister is a Siirt MP. The public transport is privatized. The company (Turex) that wins the tenders belongs to people from Siirt. Due to that procurement, 700 municipal buses are now decaying. All the private minibus routes were changed because of this. None of them can now enter the city center. All the minibus owners are now bleeding.”

It is implied that due to clientelistic relations of Denizli Municipality (of Nihat Zeybekçi; Mayor of Denizli from Justice and Development party) annexation will not bring efficiency and effectiveness in service provisions, because tenders are not won by the most appropriate people.

- **Economic Relations between the Municipality and Society**

The economic effects of annexation on municipal staff and local tradesmen are emphasized many times in interviews. It is argued that annexation will have negative effects on both of these groups.

Interviewee-25 states that

“We have forty five personnel in the municipality. Six out of forty five are permanent staff. There are worries of unemployment among temporary workers.”

Interviewee-17 argues that

“In the fragmented structure, municipalities procure some services. Generally the people who provide services are local tradesmen. However, due to its scale, Denizli Municipality procures the same services from national providers. Consequently, annexation of municipality will have negative effects on the local economy in annexed municipalities.”

“We are thirteen municipalities. We buy our diesel oil from thirteen different gas stations. We go to thirteen different mechanics to repair our cars. We buy our equipment from thirteen different sellers. However, Denizli Municipality will buy these services by public procurement and only one provider will benefit from this. Local people will lose one of their sources of income. Additionally, in these thirteen municipalities there are approximately three hundred workers. Who can promise that these workers will continue to work?”

Interviewee-15 emphasizes that

“We have thirty staff in our municipalities. Only four or five of them are permanent staff. Therefore for them there is no risk of losing their job. What will happen to the other employees? If you consider all municipalities there are approximately 650 employees in total. All of them ask what will happen to us after the election?”

Interviewee-22 says that

“Staff of small municipalities will be transferred to Denizli Municipality; however Denizli Municipality has privatized most of its services. I wonder where it will employ these staff.

Most of them will be fired. Workers are anxious about their conditions, and every time they ask ‘what will be our end?’”

The effects of annexation on local tradesmen and municipal workers are a humanistic side of the issue and a source of objection against annexation.

### **7.3.2.3. Relations between Municipalities**

In fragmented municipal structures the investments or departments of a municipality can be in another municipality. These can result from an already fragmented structure due to a lack of space or inherited from the structure where fragmentation did not take place. One way or other these create unavoidable relations between municipalities. These indispensable relations between municipalities can be a source of legitimization of integration arguments.

The Expert<sup>40</sup> reports on annexation of surrounding municipalities to Denizli Municipality state similar situations in Denizli

“There are housing investments (for 464 housing units) of Denizli Municipality in Servergazi Municipality.”

“There is housing investment (for 6740 housing units) of Denizli Municipality in Üçler Municipality...Zaire market and a vegetable market of the Denizli Municipality is located in Gümüşler Municipality near the border of Üçler Municipality.”

“The asphalt and stone-breaking unit of Denizli Municipality is located in Hallaçlar Municipality.”

Interviewee-5 argues that

“It is impossible to provide some region-wide services within the boundaries of Denizli municipality, consequently they must be provided in other municipalities’ areas. However some other municipalities do not let the provision of these kinds of services in their areas.”

Therefore the management of an urban area and the provision of services in this type of fragmented structure are difficult for the municipalities, some of whose units or departments are within the boundaries of other municipalities.

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<sup>40</sup> Council of State, 8<sup>th</sup> Department, 2006/5251, 5252, 5402

#### 7.3.2.4. Participation

There are different views on the effects of annexation in terms of participation. The argument that annexation contributes to participation and the argument that the process and results of annexation are not participatory are the two main groups in annexation discussions. The following table summarizes the negative and positive aspects of annexation in terms of participation. In the next section these aspects will be discussed in detail.

**Table 7.33 Negative and Positive Aspects of Annexation in terms of Participation**

Negative Aspects of annexation	Positive Aspects of Annexation
Not Conducting a Referendum	Full Participation
Design of Annexation	Institutional Participation
Representation in Local Politics	Different Results of Referendums
	Relations Between Municipality and People

##### 7.3.2.4.1. Negative Aspects of Annexation in Terms of Participation

- **Not Conducting a Referendum**

The absence of a referendum is one of the critiques of an annexation process. In general it is argued that people are asked for their ideas about the establishment of a municipality in their settlement, therefore similarly they should be asked about their decision about annexation of their municipality to another municipality.

In the case of Denizli, Zekeriya Öz<sup>41</sup> (Spokesman of mayors and village headmen summit / Mayor of Akkale Municipality from Nationalist Movement Party) says that

“Democracy is the self-government of people. We should hold a referendum and see the results. If people accept the regulation we have nothing to say.”

Nihat Yeniyo<sup>42</sup> (Mayor of Servergazi Municipality from True Path Party) complains about the contradictory attitude of the Prime Minister about respecting the ideas of citizens.

<sup>41</sup> 24.12.2003, www.denizlili.net, “Bütünşehir Cezadır”

<sup>42</sup> 09.01.2008, www.hizmetgazetesi.com, “Bütünşehir Fayda Sağlamaz”

“The Prime Minister always says that he will be respectful of citizens’ decisions. However nobody is respectful of mayors or people living in these municipalities. I declare that all of the people living in Servergazi are against the law.”

Interviewee-18 is angry about annexation and says that

“There was no referendum. People were not asked. I am a founding member of the Justice and Development Party in Denizli however I resigned after the decision of annexation. There is no democracy in the party. People should be asked.”

Interviewee-18 states that

“There were referendums for the establishment of municipalities at the beginning about whether they want to be a municipality or not. These settlements became municipalities because most of the people said ‘yes’ to this question. Why aren’t they asked again? Maybe they accept annexation. For the establishment of municipalities people decide, however for the closing down of municipalities the cabinet decides. This is wrong.”

Interviewee-15 argues that

“People always find the right thing to do. You should put the ballot box before them and show the alternatives. People make the best decision.”

Interviewee-22 emphasizes that

“A referendum should be held because we became a municipality according to the results of a referendum. People should be asked. If people accept annexation we have nothing to say.”

Not holding a referendum about annexation of municipalities is highly criticized. People argue that we should be closed down as we are established. It is found antidemocratic to be closed down by the decision of a central authority.

- **Design of Annexation**

The content of the annexation decision is also criticized by many. In particular, it is argued that participation in discussions of the content and the way in which the annexation process is carried out will increase the quality of the application.

Zekeriya Öz<sup>43</sup> (Spokesman of mayors and village headmen summit / Mayor of Akkale Municipality from Nationalist Movement Party) says that

“Local people who will lose their local identity are not asked for their advice about the law.”

In the legislation process of Denizli Integrated-city Law (5026)<sup>44</sup> (vetoed by the President of the Republic due to being against the constitution), it is argued that

“The way that the problem is dealt with is wrong... The new regulation should be based on scientific evaluations and should include the participation of non-governmental organizations. However the regulation is made according to political calculations due to the next local elections... It is said that this proposal is discussed in Denizli by the participation of all NGOs. But this is not true. Only Members of Parliament from Denizli, the President of Denizli University and Nihat Zeybekçi (it is said that he will be a candidate for Mayor of Denizli from Justice and Development Party in the incoming elections) know the proposal.”

Ali Aygören (Ex-mayor of Denizli from True Path Party) similarly says that

“It would have been better if the thoughts of municipal council members were asked for during the preparation of the bill for the integrated-city law (5026) (vetoed by the President of the Republic due to being against the constitution) because we know the problems of municipalities, obstacles before the development of Denizli, the proper solution to these problems better than the central government” (cited in Özgür, 2008b:270).

Interviewee-9 argues against Denizli Integrated-city Law (vetoed by the President of the Republic due to being against the constitution), saying that

“Although Denizli MPs from the Republican People’s Party were in the group, later they decided to leave the group because they felt indisposed due to the content and the way of designing it. Therefore they opposed the bill in discussions in the parliament by arguing that we should study it more, that the bill should not come to discussion in this way.”

According to a survey, participants from Denizli Municipality agree in general that the method of defining municipalities and villages that are to be annexed to Denizli Municipality is participatory. However, participants from the villages and the other municipalities do not agree with this idea.

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<sup>43</sup> 24.12.2003, www.denizlili.net, “Bütünşehir Cezadır”

<sup>44</sup> National Assembly Records, term:22/2, session:32

**Table7.34 The method of defining of municipalities and villages that are to be annexed to Denizli Municipality is participatory**

	Denizli Municipality	other municipalities	NGOs	village heads	Total
don't agree	1	45	3	10	59
%	2.8	70.3	33.3	100.0	49.6
slightly agree	5	2	0	0	7
%	13.9	3.1	0.0	0.0	5.9
agree	15	14	3	0	32
%	41.7	21.9	33.3	0.0	26.9
quite agree	9	2	0	0	11
%	25.0	3.1	0.0	0.0	9.2
strongly agree	6	1	3	0	10
%	16.7	1.6	33.3	0.0	8.4
Total	36	64	9	10	119
%	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Cığeroğlu (2007:136-137)

Similarly, participants from Denizli Municipality quite agree with the idea that the ideas and thoughts of the municipalities and the villages are considered adequately. However, participant from the villages and the other municipalities do not agree with the idea.

**Table7.35 The ideas and thoughts of municipalities and villages are considered adequately**

	Denizli municipality	other municipalities	NGOs	village heads	Total
don't agree	2	45	4	10	61
%	5.6	70.3	44.4	100.0	51.3
slightly agree	5	5	0	0	10
%	13.9	7.8	0.0	0.0	8.4
agree	9	9	2	0	20
%	25.0	14.1	22.2	0.0	16.8
quite agree	13	2	1	0	16
%	36.1	3.1	11.1	0.0	13.4
strongly agree	7	3	2	0	12
%	19.4	4.7	22.2	0.0	10.1
Total	36	64	9	10	119
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Cığeroğlu (2007:138)

In sum, participation in the preparation of the law is another criticized point. It is argued that participation in this process will contribute to solving the problems caused by political fragmentation.

- **Representation in Local Politics**

Representation in local politics and access to power are two critical issues emphasized in the annexation literature. A decreased level of representation and access to the mayor are argued to be the consequences of increasing scale in municipal organizations. Similar anxieties are also expressed in Turkey.

The expert report<sup>45</sup> for the lawsuit on annexation of Başkarcı Municipality to Denizli Municipality (annexation is rejected) argues that

“Başkarcı Municipality has different characteristics than other municipalities both in terms of its spatial dynamics and development potential. Additionally, Başkarcı Municipality is an old municipality; it was established in 1960. People have more deeply-rooted relations with the municipality. Therefore, closure of this municipality creates participation problem for local people. Additionally, due to its low level of integration with Denizli Municipality, participation in the issues of Denizli Municipality will have minor importance to them.”

Özgür (2008b:278) similarly notes that participation and accessibility of power could be new areas of struggle, and he (2008b:285) says that

“The solution of annexation of surrounding municipalities to Denizli Municipality to management problems of the urban area is debatable because it seems that there are problems in terms of democracy... and participation.”

Interviewee-17 argues that

“People can come to me like they go to a coffeehouse. Here is a small municipality. We have 8000 population. We can be easily informed about problems. However they could not make contact with the mayor of Denizli.”

Interviewee-1 states that

“People expect that they could easily access power and tell their desires. Therefore small municipalities are better in this sense because everybody knows each other in small settlements. In this respect I think it is better to keep them as they are.”

Interviewee-16 says that

“This is Mr. Mehmet, he is a civil engineer and he can directly contact me. However, if he goes to Denizli Municipality, he can never talk to Nihat Zeybekçi (mayor of Denizli). I do

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<sup>45</sup>Council of State, 8<sup>th</sup> Department, 2006/5249

not mean that this is due to Nihat Zeybekçi, but Denizli Municipality is a huge municipality; it is not an easy job.”

Interviewee-15 emphasizes that

“It is impossible to go to Denizli Municipality. We think that the municipality building is like people’s home. As you see my door is always open during working hours. People can come whenever they like and we try to help them. However it is impossible when an integrated-city is realized. People will suffer from this.”

“As a mayor, I have not been able to get an appointment from Nihat Zeybekçi (mayor of Denizli) for three months. How do people get access to him? How do people explain their problems.”

Interviewee-22 says that

“I have not talked with Nihat Zeybekçi (mayor of Denizli) for twenty days as a mayor of another municipality, how can ordinary people talk with him?”

Representation and access to power in local politics are argued to be two critical points in terms of weaknesses of an annexation process.

#### **7.3.2.4.2. Positive Aspects of Annexation in Terms of Participation**

- **Full Participation**

Although many negative aspects of annexation are stated in terms of participation in politics, there are counter arguments about the same issue from a different point of view. The expert reports<sup>46</sup> for lawsuits on annexation of surrounding municipalities to Denizli Municipality state that there is a positive side of annexation in terms of participation.

“The fragmented structure in Denizli prevents the participation of people in local matters. Although people are affected by all the developments taking place outside their own municipality, they can only express their ideas on the issues about the municipality in which they live. Therefore this creates an obstacle for full participation.”

In general, it is argued that participation in local politics should not be restricted to where people live. It must cover all the area where people are interacting.

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<sup>46</sup> Council of State, 8<sup>th</sup> Department, 2006/5249-5250-5251-5252-5253-5402-5404, 2007/4653-4654-4656.

- **Institutional Participation**

It is argued that increasing scale in local governments leads to the participation of organized people. In that sense large-scale municipalities are more convenient for democratic practices.

Interviewee-2 argues that to increase the scale of local governments has positive effects on participation.

“In my academic studies, institutional participation is observed in cities that are above a certain limit. The other kinds of participation are individual. Individual participation is based on personal relations and in that sense is not democratic. In institutional participation, to be the mayor’s friend or relative is not important. Non-governmental organizations and councils are important and institutional mechanisms work. Otherwise participation turns into a feudal practice.”

It is stated that large-scale municipalities are better in terms of people’s participation in local politics.

- **Different Results of Referendums**

It is emphasized that it is meaningful to achieve integration in the whole area if all thirteen surrounding municipalities are annexed to Denizli Municipality. If the results of particular referendums in each municipality are different, this means that some municipalities will be annexed, some will be not and, therefore, a new form of fragmented structure will emerge. And this is not a desired end at all.

Interviewee-20 states that the results of a referendum can be different in different municipalities.

“There can be paradoxes if you go to a referendum. For example if some municipalities say ‘yes’ and some municipalities say ‘no’, what will be the consequences of this?”

- **Relations between Municipality and People**

It is also argued that in large-scale municipalities the organizational structure of municipalities is more favorable to healthy relations between people and institutions. Due to the internal control mechanisms of large-scale institutions, people are more powerful with respect to small-scale municipalities in protecting their rights.

Interviewee-5 argues that there are more democratic relations between technical staff of large-scale municipalities and people.

“There are technical personnel deficiencies in surrounding municipalities. A technical staffer runs all of the business related to built environment. This gives that technical staffer a very powerful position within the municipality. However, in Denizli Municipality there are forty technical staff and there could be differences in their views. This makes people more powerful against the municipality. People are oppressed in small municipalities.”

#### **7.4. Political Issues**

##### **7.4.1. Relations between Local and National Politics**

The way the state intervened is the result of the interplay between local and national political actors and/or institutions whatever the technical reasons are about the issue. Therefore to investigate the actions of both parts can offer invaluable contributions to understanding this relationship.

How local politics transmits their desire to national politics and how government responds to these desires are the main headings under which the relations between local and national politics can be analyzed.

**Table 7.36 Relations between Local and National Politics**

Local Desires and Reactions	National Responses
Agenda setting	To use local arguments
Pressure on government	To keep motivation of local people high
	To gain supports of opponents

### 7.4.1.1. Local Desire and Reactions

#### 7.4.1.1.1. Agenda Setting

Trying to set the agenda is the first step that local actors take to reach the desired end. Although there has been a continuous struggle to be a metropolitan municipality since 1993, Denizli could not succeed in this. The so-called “Denizli Integrated-city Law” that twenty two municipality and twenty five villages would be annexed to Denizli Municipality was enacted on 21.12.2003, but the President of the Republic vetoed this law one week later because he found it against the constitution. The decision of annexation of surrounding municipalities to Denizli Municipality was taken in August 2006, however, indications that the government was again trying to put this issue on its agenda started to appear in mid 2005.

Müjdat Keçeci<sup>47</sup> (President of Denizli Chamber of Industry) said that

“We should prepare a well-documented report and attract Turkey’s attention. We should prepare this document with consensus. Therefore, we can take the Denizli Integrated-city Law (vetoed by the President of the Republic due to being against the constitution) and come back from Ankara.”

Similarly, Mehmet Yücel<sup>48</sup> (President of Denizli Chamber of Trade) noted that

“We should start a campaign for the Denizli Integrated-city Law. We bring up this topic because remedies to the problems of Denizli lie in that law (vetoed by the President of the Republic due to being against the constitution). We should agree on this and show our decisiveness. We have a chance to pass a law special to Denizli therefore we should derive a benefit from it”.

Nihat Zeybekçi<sup>49</sup> (Mayor of Denizli from the Justice and Development Party) states that

“We all should do our best to make Denizli an integrated-city. Thus we can put the topic into the agenda of the national assembly and get results quickly.”

Interviewee-19 says that

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<sup>47</sup> 03.06.2005, Yeni Asır Newspaper, “Denizli Bütünşehir’de Israrlı”

<sup>48</sup> 03.06.2005, Yeni Asır newspaper, “Denizli Bütünşehir’de Israrlı”

<sup>49</sup> 15.07.2005, www.arkitera.com, “Denizli Bütünşehir Olmak İçin Israrlı”

“I made a study of establishing a metropolitan municipality in Denizli. This study was based on the establishment of three or four districts in the Denizli urban area. I made this study in 2005 and presented it to everyone including Denizli MPs, the Governor of Denizli, the Prime Minister etc. This study was carried to parliament by my brother (Mehmet Yüksektepe, who was a Denizli MP at that time).”

Agenda setting is the first step of the process that goes to a desired end. Then pressure on the government starts to get a response from the government.

#### **7.4.1.1.2. Pressure on the Government**

In addition to the efforts to set the agenda, the effort to create pressure on the government started coincidentally in mid 2005.

Şahin Tin<sup>50</sup> (Denizli Provincial Chairman of the Justice and Development Party) said that

“Denizli Integrated-city Law (vetoed by the President of the Republic due to being against the constitution) should be put on the agenda of parliament again. This is one of the problems expressed in the files given to the Ministry of State during their visit to Denizli.”

Platform of Industrialist, Traders and Businessmen of Denizli<sup>51</sup> declared after one of its meeting that

“The government and MPs have a historic mission to stop this tendency. A legal regulation is an unavoidable action for the salvation of Denizli. The platform thinks that the law known as the integrated-city law (vetoed by the President of the Republic due to being against the constitution) that annexes some municipalities and villages to Denizli Municipality should be revised and enacted again.

The platform deserves the support of the government and parliament for legislation of the law that enables the provision of services in an integrated fashion by hoping that the government and the parliament will not let Denizli get worse.”

Pressure on the government is the second step of the process. The pressure strategy can include both threatening and persuasive statements at the same time.

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<sup>50</sup> 01.07.2005, Yeni Asır Newspaper, “Bakan’dan 14 İstek”

<sup>51</sup> Press release in 13.07.2005

## **7.4.1.2. National Responses**

### **7.4.1.2.1. To Use Local Arguments**

The government has used the arguments of local actors as a means of legitimization of the Law so-called Denizli Integrated-city Law (vetoed by the President of the Republic due to being against the constitution). In the legislation process<sup>52</sup> it is argued that

“Ali Aydođan (Ex-mayor of Denizli) says in a report that the municipalities around Denizli Municipality should be annexed to Denizli Municipality due to deficiencies and general problems including earthquakes, air pollution, garbage collection, etc.”

“There are two topics discussed in the meetings with NGOs during the visit of the Prime Minister to Denizli. The first one is the ring road. The second one is that the municipalities surrounding Denizli Municipality hinder the development of Denizli Municipality. Therefore all of them should be annexed to Denizli Municipality.”

The government tries to rationalize its decision by referring to arguments of local actors who desire that government action.

### **7.4.1.2.2. To Keep the Motivation of Local People High**

As said before, the President of the Republic vetoed the law because he found it against the law. After the decision of the president of the republic, Denizli MPs from the ruling party tried to stop the emergence of any disappointment among local actors and tried to remotivate them.

Mehmet Yksektepe<sup>53</sup> (Ex-Denizli MP from the Justice and Development Party) said that

“The return of the law by the President of the Republic is an end for the moment. However we won’t give up. We will follow up the matter in the next legislative period.”

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<sup>52</sup> National Assembly Records, term:22/2, session:32

<sup>53</sup> 31.12.2003, Zaman Newspaper, “Denizli Yeniden Bykehir Olmanın Yollarını Arayacak”

To stop any disappointment among local people, after any attempt's failure, local political actors from the governmental side try to remotivate people to keep their own respect alive. Otherwise, they lose their popularity in the local constituency.

#### **7.4.1.2.3. To Gain Opponents' Support**

The opposition party also gives messages to local actors. It tries to gain the support of the opponents of annexation by constructing a discourse based on them. During the legislation of the Integrated-city law<sup>54</sup> (vetoed by the President of the Republic due to being against the constitution) the Denizli MPs from the opposition party said that

“It is a truth that mayors of these annexed municipalities did not join the Justice and Development Party and remained in their own political party. Therefore they are being punished by ending their municipalities' legal personality.”

An opposition party tries to motivate people who are affected negatively to get their support against the government.

#### **7.4.2. Relations between Political Actors**

The relations between local and national political actors are important particularly in shaping policies. According to the extent of these relations the government can respond to local demands or not. In addition to that, the content of responses can change. In the case of Denizli, the old regulation including the annexation of 22 municipalities and 25 villages would have been revitalized instead of the new regulation which included the annexation of 13 municipalities and 10 villages. The government could have enacted a special law as it had done before to establish a metropolitan municipality in Denizli. But none of these happened.

The relations between political actors can be analyzed as

- a struggle between political elites
- a struggle between provinces
- a clientelist relation

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<sup>54</sup> National Assembly Records, term:22/2, session:32

### 7.4.2.1. Struggle between Political Elites

The efforts to establish a metropolitan municipality in Denizli has become a political struggle between powerful local political actors. It can be argued that according to local interests these political actors take positions in national politics.

Interviewee-1 says that

“I was in conflict with the Prime Minister (Tayyip Erdoğan) that I thought that instead of Integrated-city Law (5026) regulating annexation of twenty two municipality and twenty five villages to Denizli Municipality which was vetoed by the President of the Republic due to being against the constitution, a metropolitan municipality system based on the establishment of three district municipalities was a better solution for Denizli. When I insisted on my project, the Prime Minister (Tayyip Erdoğan) berated me. But I did not act out on this issue due to party discipline because in the Justice and Development Party, the Prime Minister’s word is the final word.”

Interviewee-19 argues that

“The bill establishing a metropolitan municipality in Denizli proposed by my brother became out of date in the parliament. One of the reasons behind this is that Nihat Zeybekçi (mayor of Denizli) did not support this bill because I prepared the bill, and if this bill was enacted by the parliament, the political popularity of this legislation would benefit me. Therefore, I would be the Justice and Development Party’s candidate for mayoralty of Denizli Municipality in the next election. Nihat Zeybekçi saw the political risk and prevented the emergence of support for the bill in the Justice and Development Party. It was a betrayal. Denizli lost a big opportunity.”

Interviewee-12 states that

“Nihat Zeybekçi (Mayor of Denizli) prevented the deputization of Mehmet Yüksektepe again (Ex-Denizli MP from the Justice and Development Party), because Mehmet Yüksektepe criticized the integrated-city model and insisted on the metropolitan municipality model.”

“Ümmet Kandoğan (Ex-Denizli MP from the Justice and Development Party) criticized Nihat Zeybekçi (Mayor of Denizli) that he constructed underground passages for roads before the construction of a ring-road. Due to this reason Nihat Zeybekçi also prevented the deputization of Ümmet Kandoğan again.”

Therefore it could be argued that some public issues can be a topic of competition or struggle between local elites. Although the annexation of municipalities is a public issue, political actors use this for personal political interests by enabling or disabling the processes.

#### **7.4.2.2. Struggle between Provinces**

The establishment of a metropolitan municipality is not only a local phenomenon because other metropolitan municipalities are directly affected by this decision. Therefore other metropolitan municipalities took a position against Denizli according to their own interests on the national political level.

Interviewee-19 notes that

“The bill establishing a metropolitan municipality in Denizli became out of date in the parliament. The second reason was the resistance of existing metropolitan municipalities because if Denizli became a metropolitan municipality, the amount of money that is dedicated to metropolitan municipalities would be divided into more pieces. Therefore the share of other metropolitan municipalities would shrink.”

Interviewee-3 argues that

“I heard that that there is a serious lobby against the establishment of a new metropolitan municipality in the parliament because the establishment of a new metropolitan municipality will result in a decrease in shares of other metropolitan municipalities due to dividing the cake into more pieces.”

It could be argued that other localities take positions in national politics according to the nature of issues that take place in other localities. Competition among localities is primarily the reason for this kind of a close watch between localities.

#### **7.4.2.3. Clientelist Relations**

It is argued that the relation between Nihat Zeybekçi (Mayor of Denizli) and Tayyip Erdoğan (Prime Minister) has determining effects on the fate of Denizli.

Interviewee-24 argues that

“The reason behind the increased level of investment in Denizli is the close relation between Nihat Zeybekçi (Mayor of Denizli) and the Prime Minister.”

Interviewee-14 states that

“Due to the close relation between Nihat Zeybekçi (mayor of Denizli) and Tayyip Erdoğan (Prime Minister), a statement was added to the municipality law that the authority for any kind of planning practice was taken away from the annexed municipalities until the next local election when annexation will be put into practice.”

Similarly Interviewee-5 emphasizes that

“Nihat Zeybekçi (mayor of Denizli) told everyone that the government and planning authority of surrounding municipalities will be restricted until the following elections.”

Interviewee-20 says that

“Of course personal relations make communication easier, therefore the problems of Denizli can be easily explained to the Prime Minister. “

Interviewee-4 states that

“Denizli has so many problems that we sometimes have difficulties dealing with all of them. However there is good dialogue between our mayor (Nihat Zeybekçi) and the Prime Minister, therefore we can overcome our difficulties.”

Interviewee-8 argues that

“Personal relations are important in Turkey. When I was working at Ankara Metropolitan Municipality, I recognized that the political party of a lower-level municipality’s mayor is a determining criterion on relations between the metropolitan municipality and the lower-level municipality.”


The content of relations between local and national political actors can have direct effects on policy outcomes. It could be concluded that the relationship between Nihat Zeybekçi (Mayor of Denizli) and Tayyip Erdoğan (Prime Minister) is a determining factor in the annexation of surrounding municipalities to Denizli Municipality. However, it is important to remember that actors are in a web of relations therefore they have to consider the effects of their actions on the whole web. In other words, actors try to maintain balance in their relations. This prohibits them from acting completely in favor of someone or something by neglecting someone or something else.

### **7.4.3. Technical Issues versus Political Issues**

Technical reasons provide a legitimate base for policies because political actors' real agendas do not provide legitimacy for policies. However, the content and the way in which policy is applied are defined by political actors and the relations within which these actors are situated. Decisions about urban growth are political because powerful actors always feature their own interests. This is the reason behind the discordance between political and technical rationalities. Political rationale approves what technical rationale rejects. Because of this conflict between political and technical rationales, there emerge deadlocks in urban space. As mentioned before, these deadlocks constitute the technical bases of policies; nonetheless, the content and the way of applying these policies are determined by political motivations.

### **7.5. Comparison between First and Second Regulation**

There have been two important attempts to annex the surrounding municipalities to Denizli Municipality. The first one is the Law known as Denizli Integrated-city Law (5026). It was enacted at the end of 2003; however it was vetoed by the President of the Republic due to being against the constitution. This law included the annexation of twenty two municipalities and twenty five villages. The second attempt was made according to 11<sup>th</sup> article of Municipality (5393) in 2006. This includes the annexation of thirteen municipality and ten villages. The area covered by the first regulation is wider. The aim of this section is to evaluate how actors perceive the scale of Denizli's problems by considering the old and the new regulations in terms of area covered and their potentials, and their reasons for doing so.



**Figure 7.24** Municipalities and villages that would have been annexed to Denizli Municipality according to Law 5026 and 11<sup>th</sup> article of Law 5393

Local actors have different thoughts about whether the first or second regulation is better considering Denizli’s most critical problems. Obviously, there are two groups, the first one supports the old regulation, and the second one backs the new regulation.

### Supporters of the First Regulation

Interviewee-17 argues that

“If we consider the long long-term, the area that is controlled by Denizli Municipality should be wider. However, most of this area is agricultural land. Therefore Denizli Municipality should be careful about protecting these agricultural lands because you can reproduce a built environment but not natural environment.”

Interviewee-9 notes that

“The area which will emerge after the annexation of municipalities seems to be a little small because there is a maximum radius of 5 km. However, there are some municipalities outside the boundaries of the new Denizli Municipality like Pmar Kent, which is integrated with Denizli. The previous regulation including twenty two municipalities and twenty five villages is better than this new one because Denizli Municipality can control some economic and physical sources like hot water sources in Gölemezli Municipality and touristic facilities in Pamukkale.”

Interviewee-7 states that

“The geography of Denizli is dish-shaped. It is surrounded by mountains. Therefore the boundaries of Denizli Municipality should cover the inside of this entire dish. As I know, the previous regulation covers almost the inside of this dish. I think the previous regulation is more advantageous than this one.”

Interviewee-14 emphasizes that

“The new regulation (including 13 municipalities and 10 villages) is enough for short-term problems but it is not for long-term problems. Denizli is an industrial city; you have to organize management, infrastructure, the transportation network, railway etc. related to this industrial development. It had 1.5 million tourists last year in Pamukkale. You have to consider Pamukkale in your strategic development plans. But you cannot construct a strategy on a source that you do not control.”

“It will be much healthier to widen the area of Denizli municipality, but maybe the government did not want this intentionally. Maybe they do not want to deal with such a wide range of issues suddenly.”

Interviewee-5 argues that

“The first regulation was special to Denizli however the second one is according to municipality law. The first regulation covered all the area of the master plan and the probability of being a metropolitan municipality was much higher. It covered a wider area therefore its population was closer to the minimum that is necessary to establish a metropolitan municipality.”

Interviewee-4 states that

“The wider the area, the more beneficial the system is, because it creates integrity in infrastructure, superstructure, and planning.”

The supporters of the first (wider) regulation argue that Denizli municipality should control a wider area in order to both solve region-wide problems and provide economic development by using all available development potentials.

#### Supporters of Second Regulation

Interviewee-11 emphasizes that

“The new arrangement is better, I think, because Denizli is not a metropolitan municipality therefore it is unnecessary to cover wider areas.”

Interviewee-1 notes that

“If the mayor of Denizli has no vision about the future of Denizli’s urban area, consolidation of a wider area can be problematic.”

Interviewee-16 says that

“If the first regulation was put in to practice, the management of the area will be difficult, because it would cover a wider area. However, the municipalities that will be annexed to Denizli Municipality are closer settlements.”

Supporters of the second (smaller) regulation argue that the extent of the area should be defined according to the capacities of the annexing municipality. Otherwise, there could be negative consequences especially in terms of service provision, rather than positive developments.

## **7.6. Prospective Idealized Ways for Management of Denizli**

People’s thoughts about the best way to manage the urban area of Denizli also gives clues about their position in the annexation process because each option has different costs and benefits for different groups. In addition to individual thoughts, the tables below show the responses of different segments of Denizli society to the way in which Denizli urban areas should be managed.

Interviewee-6 argues that

“I want Denizli Municipality to be a metropolitan municipality based on the establishment of four districts around Denizli Municipality. These districts will be Kınıklı, Gümüşler, Sevindik and Göveçlik.”

Interviewee-25 states that

“Instead of closing the municipalities down, to provide services locally, municipalities that are annexed to Denizli municipality can be turned into branches of Denizli Municipality.”

Interviewee-24 says that

“I discussed this issue with Nihat Zeybekçi (Mayor of Denizli). I told him: ‘In the first step you should annex the most necessary municipalities. You solve the immediate problems with them, and then in the second and even third step you should annex the other municipalities.’”

Interviewee-12 emphasizes that

“The establishment of municipalities was wrong. However annexation of municipalities is also wrong. The main aim is to provide integrity of planning practice among municipalities. Instead of annexation of municipalities, Denizli Municipality can take responsibility for preparing development plans for surrounding municipalities... The main municipal services like the management of the main water network, main sewage network, sewage refinement unit, and solid wastes can be provided by Denizli municipality. Surrounding municipalities can pay for their share. However, they can remain separate municipalities and provide some local services.”

Interviewee-1 argues that

“There are problems in municipal services and planning due to the fragmented structure of municipalities. However to create three or four bigger municipalities by consolidating a few small ones around Denizli municipality is better than to annex all of them to Denizli Municipality. Although this is only available in the establishment of metropolitan municipalities, we thought that we are in power and we are enacting a law special to Denizli, therefore it should be a proper law. By this way there will be a central municipality (Denizli) and three or four lower-level municipalities. Consequently both coordination among municipalities and closeness of municipalities to people will be satisfied.”

Interviewee-22 states that

“A consensus can be created. Three or four bigger municipalities can be created through the consolidation of small municipalities. These kinds of alternatives have never been tried. The approach of government is “I do, it is done” or “we know the best.”

Interviewee-8 says that

“I think if the population-increase trend continues, Denizli will meet the conditions of a metropolitan municipality. What will happen then? Will new municipalities be established? There are already established municipalities. Instead of closing them down, we can transfer small municipalities’ responsibilities for planning and infrastructure to Denizli Municipality. Therefore they keep their institutional structures.”

Interviewee-3 states that

“Denizli should be a metropolitan municipality based on the establishment of three or four districts around Denizli municipality.”

According to a survey, participants from Denizli Municipality do not agree with the idea that the existing fragmented structure should continue. Some participants from

the other municipalities slightly agree that the existing fragmented structure should continue, however, others strongly agree with the idea.

**Table7.37 Existing Fragmented Structure Should Continue**

	Denizli municipality	other municipalities	NGOs	village heads	Total
don't agree	34	26	7	5	72
%	94.4	40.6	77.8	50.0	60.5
slightly agree	0	9	1	0	10
%	0.0	14.1	11.1	0.0	8.4
agree	1	3	1	2	7
%	2.8	4.7	11.1	20.0	5.9
quite agree	1	0	0	0	1
%	2.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.8
strongly agree	0	26	0	3	29
%	0.0	40.6	0.0	30.0	24.4
Total	36	64	9	10	119
%	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Ciğeroğlu (2007:121-122)

Participants from Denizli Municipality do not agree with the idea that union of municipalities or organizations with a special purpose should be established in the region. Some participants from other municipalities and participants from NGOs strongly agree with the idea of municipal unions or a special organization, while others slightly agree with this idea.

**Table7.38 Union Of Municipalities Or Organizations With a Special Purpose Should Be Established**

	Denizli municipality	other municipalities	NGOs	village heads	Total
don't agree	9	12	1	2	24
%	25.0	18.8	11.1	20.0	20.2
slightly agree	6	10	1	0	17
%	16.7	15.6	11.1	0.0	14.3
agree	6	8	2	5	21
%	16.7	12.5	22.2	50.0	17.6
quite agree	3	6	3	2	14
%	8.3	9.4	33.3	20.0	11.8
strongly agree	12	28	2	1	43
%	33.3	43.8	22.2	10.0	36.1
Total	36	64	9	10	119
%	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Ciğeroğlu (2007:122-123)

Participants from Denizli municipality do not agree with the idea that area-wide public services should be provided by agreements signed between municipalities.

However, participants from the other municipalities and NGOs strongly agree with the idea.

**Table7.39 Area-Wide Public Services Should Be Provided By Agreements Signed Between Municipalities**

	Denizli municipality	other municipalities	NGOs	village heads	Total
don't agree	9	12	1	2	24
%	25.0	18.8	11.1	20.0	20.2
slightly agree	6	10	1	0	17
%	16.7	15.6	11.1	0.0	14.3
agree	6	8	2	5	21
%	16.7	12.5	22.2	50.0	17.6
quite agree	3	6	3	2	14
%	8.3	9.4	33.3	20.0	11.8
strongly agree	12	28	2	1	43
%	33.3	43.8	22.2	10.0	36.1
Total	36	64	9	10	119
%	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Ciğeroğlu (2007:124)

Participants from Denizli Municipality and NGOs strongly agree with the idea that the adjacent area of Denizli Municipality should be extended. Some participants from other municipalities quite agree with the idea however the others do not agree with the idea.

**Table7.40 Adjacent Area Of Denizli Municipality Should Be Extended**

	Denizli municipality	other municipalities	NGOs	village heads	Total
don't agree	1	29	1	1	32
%	2.8	45.3	11.1	10.0	26.9
slightly agree	2	3	0	2	7
%	5.6	4.7	0.0	20.0	5.9
agree	6	13	2	7	28
%	16.7	20.3	22.2	70.0	23.5
quite agree	2	4	1	0	7
%	5.6	6.3	11.1	0.0	5.9
strongly agree	25	15	5	0	45
%	69.4	23.4	55.6	0.0	37.8
Total	36	64	9	10	119
%	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Ciğeroğlu (2007:126-127)

Participants from Denizli Municipality and NGOs agree (quite and strongly respectively) with the idea that Denizli Municipality and other municipalities like

Denizli Municipality should be made metropolitan municipalities by a special law. However, participants from the other municipalities do not agree with the idea.

**Table7.41 Denizli Municipality And Other Municipalities Like Denizli Municipality Should Be Made a Metropolitan Municipality With A Special Law.**

	Denizli municipality	other municipalities	NGOs	village heads	Total
don't agree	0	18	1	0	19
%	0.0	28.1	11.1	0.0	16.0
slightly agree	0	0	0	1	1
%	0.0	0.0	0.0	10.0	0.8
agree	2	2	1	0	5
%	5.6	3.1	11.1	0.0	4.2
quite agree	2	2	0	0	4
%	5.6	3.1	0.0	0.0	3.4
strongly agree	32	42	7	9	90
%	88.9	65.6	77.8	90.0	75.6
Total	36	64	9	10	119
%	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Ciğeroğlu (2007:128)

Although the degree of acceptance is different, participants from the other municipalities, NGOs and Denizli Municipality agree (strongly and quite respectively) with the idea that a metropolitan municipality should be established to protect the identities of all the other municipalities.

**Table7.42 Metropolitan Municipality Should Be Established to Protect The Identities Of All the Other Municipalities**

	Denizli municipality	other municipalities	NGOs	village heads	Total
don't agree	14	12	2	5	33
%	38.9	18.8	22.2	50.0	27.7
slightly agree	4	0	1	0	5
%	11.1	0.0	11.1	0.0	4.2
agree	5	4	2	1	12
%	13.9	6.3	22.2	10.0	10.1
quite agree	4	2	1	0	7
%	11.1	3.1	11.1	0.0	5.9
strongly agree	9	46	3	4	62
%	25.0	71.9	33.3	40.0	52.1
Total	36	64	9	10	119
%	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Ciğeroğlu (2007:129-130)

It can be concluded that every political actor or segment of society defines the best way according to their own interests. However, this interest is relatively defined according to available choices.

## 7.7. Future Expectations

Becoming a metropolitan municipality has been on the agenda of Denizli since the early 1990s. Because of this desire the idea of “integrated-city” has not been widely accepted by local actors. The decision about annexation of surrounding municipalities to Denizli Municipality was taken in August 2006. Nihat Zeybekçi<sup>55</sup> (Mayor of Denizli) expresses a negative view about the possibility of becoming a metropolitan municipality.

“To become a metropolitan municipality is difficult for Denizli. To become a metropolitan municipality you have to have 750.000 inhabitants. It is impossible now.”

However, after the annexation decision was taken, Nihat Zeybekçi<sup>56</sup> (Mayor of Denizli) started to revitalize the dream of becoming a metropolitan municipality and even stated that being an integrated-city is a preliminary stage for becoming a metropolitan municipality.

“The most important achievement is the approval of “Denizli Integrated-city Law” and going one step further to becoming a metropolitan municipality.”

By stressing the impossibility of becoming a metropolitan municipality, the mayor tried to increase the level of acceptance of annexation among people, because a high expectation of becoming a metropolitan municipality was created among people through discourses of local actors. However, it has been not accomplished. Afterwards, the idea of a metropolitan municipality was again brought forward as a political dream for local people. Instead of accepting the defeat, a new expectation was created. Therefore all the credit lost in the annexation decision has been regained.

In Denizli, political actors have both positive and negative expectations about becoming a metropolitan municipality in the future. But the condition that proponents of becoming a metropolitan municipality emphasize is the minimum

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<sup>55</sup> 15.07.2005, [www.arkitera.com](http://www.arkitera.com), “Denizli Bütünşehir Olmak İçin Isırlı”

<sup>56</sup> 05.03.2008, Tercüman Newspaper, “Şehit Yakınlarına Ev”

population threshold required to be a metropolitan municipality should be decreased. However, negative thinkers argue that this is the last point for Denizli.

- **Positive Thinkers**

Interviewee-11 argues that

“Annexation of municipalities is a positive step for me. Denizli will proceed toward becoming a metropolitan municipality. There will be a change in municipality law. Denizli can become a metropolitan municipality by decreasing the minimum population threshold to 500.000 to become a metropolitan municipality. The existing or future Mayor of Denizli should comprehend this.”

Interviewee-10 notes that

“Denizli is an entrepreneurial city; therefore it will try again to become a metropolitan municipality.”

Interviewee-12 says that

“At this point the dream of becoming a metropolitan municipality seems to have disappeared. But this will never end. I believe that Denizli will overcome this obstacle. It is in parliament’s power. The government can prepare a bill and decrease the minimum population required to establish a metropolitan municipality from 750.000 to 500.000. The problem of Denizli can be dealt with.”

Interviewee-9 emphasizes that

“To become a metropolitan municipality, the minimum population limit of 750.000 seems high but I think the idea of a metropolitan municipality should be kept. Because after annexation the population will be 500.000, it is difficult to get another 250.000 by extension but there can be a change in the metropolitan municipality law in the future. I think one year before the next local election, Denizli will try to become a metropolitan municipality one more time, and it seems to want to try.”

Interviewee-19 argues that

“The way to becoming a metropolitan municipality is still open. The target is becoming a metropolitan municipality. However, this depends on the attitude of the next government.”

All proponents of becoming a metropolitan municipality state that it is difficult to become a metropolitan municipality with the existing Metropolitan Municipality Law, because it indicates that the minimum population required to become a

Metropolitan municipality is 750.000. However, they hope that the government can change this minimum, and then Denizli can become a metropolitan municipality.

- **Negative Thinkers**

Interviewee-17 mentions that

“Denizli Municipality has started to lose population for three years. Therefore to reach 750.000 population is difficult for Denizli. If the minimum population is decreased to 500.000 what would otherwise be possible in terms of becoming a metropolitan municipality is difficult for Denizli.”

Interviewee-1 argues that

“To become a metropolitan municipality is difficult for Denizli because to reach the minimum population of 750.000 is a dream for Denizli. If it is 500.000, it will be possible. But the Prime Minister has kept the bar up intentionally, because he does not want anymore metropolitan municipalities.”

Interviewee-16 notes that

“To be a metropolitan municipality is difficult for Denizli Municipality from now on because the law requires a population of at least 750.000. It is impossible. We will continue as a normal municipality”.

Interviewee-5 says that

“If the metropolitan area was not fragmented, there would be a chance to be a metropolitan municipality like Samsun and Eskişehir. But now it is difficult.”

Interviewee-22 states that

“They argue that we will make Denizli a metropolitan municipality. The requirements for being a metropolitan municipality are defined by your party. Your government says that the minimum population is 750.000. The population of the whole Denizli province is 900.000. It means that you can not make Denizli a metropolitan municipality even if you annex the entire province to Denizli municipality.”

“This is the last point. It continues to annex other municipalities but we can never be a metropolitan municipality. If you want so much to make Denizli a metropolitan municipality, you will decrease the minimum population required for the establishment of a metropolitan municipality from 750.000 to 500.000. This is not so difficult because you are in power.”

Interviewee-21 notes that

“This is the end of the process. Denizli will never become a metropolitan municipality. The population of Denizli after annexation is 460.000 therefore it needs 300.000 more people to become a metropolitan municipality.”

According to a survey, participants from Denizli Municipality and NGOs strongly agree that annexation of municipalities will contribute to the process of becoming a metropolitan municipality in the future. However, participants from the other municipalities do not agree with this idea.

**Table 7.43 New Regulation Will Contribute to The Process Of Becoming a Metropolitan Municipality In The Future**

	Denizli municipality	other municipalities	NGOs	village heads	Total
don't agree	0	32	0	1	33
%	0.00%	50.00%	0.00%	10.00%	27.70%
slightly agree	1	3	1	0	5
%	2.80%	4.70%	11.10%	0.00%	4.20%
agree	2	3	1	4	10
%	5.60%	4.70%	11.10%	40.00%	8.40%
quite agree	11	4	2	0	17
%	30.60%	6.30%	22.20%	0.00%	14.30%
strongly agree	22	22	5	5	54
%	61.10%	34.40%	55.60%	50.00%	45.40%
Total	36	64	9	10	119
%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

Source: *Ciğeroğlu (2007: 148-149)*

Özgür (2008b:291) explains the only possible way for Denizli to become a metropolitan municipality through a policy of repeated annexation until it reaches a population of 750.000 the minimum population requirement to become a metropolitan municipality.

The opponents of becoming a metropolitan municipality in the future emphasize that Denizli Municipality can never reach the minimum population of 750.000 required to become a metropolitan municipality; therefore the only way of becoming a metropolitan municipality is to decrease the minimum population required from 750.000 to 500.000. However, it is also argued that the government intentionally put the minimum level high to hinder the emergence of new metropolitan municipalities. Consequently it is impossible to become a metropolitan municipality for Denizli.

## **7.8. Conclusion**

The analysis of the emergence of a fragmented structure is also a contributing attempt to understand the dynamics of that structure. The factors that affect the creation of a fragmented structure can also affect the annexation of municipalities positively or negatively.

The establishment of new municipalities in an urban area is used as a means of changing the political structure of the urban area, to get enough municipal services, to gain economic and political independence, to prepare a base for another administrative structure, to satisfy individual or group interests, or to appropriate already existing rents. Sometimes one of these sometimes a couple these together can be the determining factor. However annexation of municipalities can be a means for similar purposes but this time for different political actors.

In general, it can be stated that annexation discourses can be grouped under two headings: technical and political. Technical issues can be categorized as general statements and special statements. Political discourses can be classified as relations between national and local politics and actors' attitudes. Furthermore opposition to annexation also has technical and political aspects in the same way that annexation discourses have. Relations between political actors show that annexation of municipalities is also a field where political elites try to dominate each other. An evaluation of the idealized way of managing urban areas and future expectations helps us strengthen our understandings of the positions held by political actors.

The problem of single authority and the problem of boundary definition are argued as two general technical issues. It is generally stated that to overcome deficiencies in service provision and planning practices, to increase the applicability of higher scale master plans, to get over deficiencies of collaborative techniques, to overcome the use of master plans as legitimizing tools of development plans, to determine the urban development pattern and to respond to urban problems as quickly as possible are the main advantages of a single authority in an urban area.

In addition to administrative integrity, spatial integrity is another significant factor that directly affects the management of urban areas. If there is a mismatch between boundaries of administrative integrity and boundaries of an urban area where there is a high degree of interaction between settlements, the condition for effective and efficient provision of municipal services can not be determined.

In addition to general technical problems like the problem of single authority and the problem of boundary definition, there are specific technical problems also. These specific technical problems include issues of planning and urbanization, efficiency and effectiveness in service provision, participation, and administrative relations between municipalities. There are both positive and negative evaluations of annexation in terms of these specific technical issues.

In terms of urbanization and planning, to overcome the difficulties related to urban growth, to include important growth factors, to eliminate the inconsistencies between development plans, to provide planned growth, to control excessive urban growth, to prevent illegal urban growth, to increase the competence of planning departments of municipalities and the quality of development plans are positive aspects of annexation. However, opponents of annexation argue that annexation can be used as a tool to appropriate already existing rents in the next municipality, to control the development of wider areas or to open unsuitable lands such as agricultural lands of annexed municipality to urban development. These are argued to be the hidden agenda of annexation rather than its positive aspects.

In terms of efficiency and effectiveness of service provision, to accomplish region-wide infrastructure investments, to provide urban services properly, to coordinate service provision in the whole urban area, to provide services to areas that were devoid of services previously, to decrease the current expenditures on service provisions, to manage natural invaluable resources, to eliminate conflicts between independent municipalities, to stop economic externalities due to being next to each other, and to provide equality between settlements are emphasized as positive aspects of annexation. However, challengers to annexation state that municipalities in a fragmented structure are already self-sufficient; there is no need for new investment in the urban area; the level of service provision will decrease after annexation; the

costs of municipal services will increase; the degree of bureaucracy will increase for people in the new structure; the competition between municipalities will end; services are already collectively provided in the urban area; workers have embedded knowledge of the infrastructure of their municipalities, therefore there will be problems in the transition period or there will be more serious problems if the workers of the annexed municipalities are fired; the clientelist relations in annexing municipality will hinder efficiency and effectiveness; there is a close economic relationship between local service providers and small municipalities, annexation will have negative effects on these local service providers because large-scale municipalities prefer to procure their needs from national providers rather than local providers due to scale of procurement.

In terms of participation, there are weaknesses in the annexation process such as not conducting a referendum on it; nonparticipation in the content of annexation and decreased political representation and access to the mayor in municipalities. However, supporters of annexation argue that in a fragmented structure people can participate in political issues only related to the municipalities that they live in but political processes taking place in neighboring municipalities also directly affecting their lives, therefore participation in local politics should be organized among the whole urban area. Furthermore, the increasing scale of local governments brings about participation of organized people rather than individual participation. Participation of organized people is considered as the basis of democracy. It is also argued that in institutionally developed organizations, the relationships between people and institutions are more democratic than in underdeveloped ones, because there are internal auditing mechanisms in large-scale institutions.

Representation in local politics and access to key figures are two critical issues emphasized in annexation literature. A decreasing level of representation and the accessibility to power are argued as the consequences of increasing scale in municipal organizations. Similar anxieties are also expressed in Turkey.

Due to a lack of space, municipalities sometimes have to establish some of their facilities in neighboring municipalities; however this issue creates problems for the municipality that has to make an investment outside its borders. However making

these investments is always a matter of bargaining between municipalities and this process has negative effects in service provision especially for a municipality that needs help from other municipalities. Therefore in terms of administrative relations between municipalities, annexation of municipalities eliminates these kinds of difficulties.

In terms of political issues there are three different topics. These are relations between national and local politics, political actors' attitudes toward annexation and opposition to annexation. To scrutinize these issues sheds light on the dynamics of annexation in terms of its political aspects.

In terms of the relations between national and local politics, agenda setting and pressure on government about consolidation of municipalities are the first two steps. If the annexation decision is taken, people who support the annexation of municipalities appreciate the government or national actors for their decision or efforts. However, people who oppose annexation show their disapproval to other local actors that support the annexation. The above issues address local concerns. In addition to the two clashing sides among local actors, the supporters and the opponents, there are also two sides among national actors. Supporting and opposing national actors use the discourses of supporting and opposing local actors to rationalize their own arguments. If the supporting national actors fail in accomplishing an annexation decision, they motivate the supporting local actors again. Conversely, if opposing national actors fail in stopping the annexation decision, they accuse their counter part: other national actors that support the annexation.

The unwillingness to support annexation is a result of economic and political factors. In terms of economic factors, if the benefit of annexation is lower than the cost of annexation, reluctance for annexation emerges. Similar to the economic dimension, if the political cost of annexation is greater than the political benefits of annexation, there will be opposition to it.

In terms of relations between political actors, firstly it can be concluded that some local public issues can be topics of political struggle among urban elites. Every political actor wants to use this public issue to maximize his or her own interests. Secondly, it can be stated that each individual locality takes a position on the local level by considering the aims of other individual local units. Especially competition between localities is a determining factor in this position taking. If localities detect any risk in other localities' attempts they start to protect themselves by using their local actors on the national scene. Thirdly, it can be concluded that a strong relationship between a particular local political actor and a particular national political actor can be an influential factor on attitudes of both other local political actors and national political actors.

One more time, political actors define the best way of solving any particular problem according to their subjective position in the field. However, choices are defined according to available options.

Both those optimistic and those pessimistic about prospective events make predictions on the basis of possible attitudes of the central government rather than their own action plans.

As it is in the emergence of a fragmented structure in the establishment of municipalities, local actors take positions in the consolidation of municipalities according to their short term interests because, as in the case of Denizli, a politician who had taken a position in favor of the establishment of new municipalities when he had not been in power in the central municipality, was also the leader of the annexation of municipalities when he was in power.

In sum, first of all, the policy of municipal annexation is applied in province centers generally. These areas are usually where economic, social and cultural activities concentrate, and thus due to these concentration, urban rents increase. Secondly, the mayors of all municipalities whose surrounding municipalities are going to be annexed are from the political party that is in power. Thirdly, according to the last local election results, after annexation, hypothetically there is no risk of losing an election because the sum of total votes that the political party in power receives is

enough to remain in power. Fourthly, it is well known that the technical reasons used to argue for annexation in these municipalities are also valid for other settlements. However, although the political party in power has mayors in these other settlements; there is a risk of losing power after annexation. Therefore the annexation policy is not applied to those settlements. It cannot be argued that political power has an intention to solve technical problems that emerge in politically fragmented urban areas. Instead, it can be concluded that the main aim of municipal annexation is to make local agents of power dominant over a wider area. The potential area for manipulation is enlarged because all of the planning authority is concentrated in one hand. The case of Denizli is a typical example of the accomplishment of this aim.

## **CHAPTER 8**

### **CONCLUSION**

There have been important new regulations in the field of local governments in Turkey during the last few years. Most of these regulations include increasing the scale of local governments. In other words, one of the aims of local government reform is to increase the scale structure of local governments. The objective of this thesis is to investigate the policy of increasing the scale of local government to understand the real motivation of the central government beyond the argument widely expressed for the reform.

As stated earlier, the study of local governments on a national scale exposes that most of the arguments stated against small scale municipalities are not valid. It raises doubts about governments' intentions for or expectations of scale reform. An investigation of policy documents of the central government makes it clear that the real incentive behind the scale reform is not to reach efficient and effective service provision in local governments as is argued but to restructure the debts of municipalities to the central government. To accomplish this purpose, the weakest links in the chain, small scale municipalities, are targeted, because small scale municipalities do not have much capacity to create strong political tension. By increasing the scale structure of local governments, the central government can respond to both national and international demands on making the financial structure of the Turkish municipal system healthy.

The findings of the local-level study are not very different from the national-level study. Most of the arguments stated against small scale municipalities surrounding Denizli Municipality are not convincing. The local-level study investigating the annexation of the surrounding municipalities to Denizli Municipality exposes that the aim of annexation is to concentrate the authority in one hand to control the urban growth and to use the spatial planning tools to appropriate urban rents.

Most of the municipalities surrounding the Denizli Municipality were established between 1994 and 1999. As it is stated by the interviewees, the main reason behind the establishment of those municipalities was to appropriate the merging rents due to rapid population increase in Denizli. Due to high land prices in inner city, immigrants preferred to settle down in settlements surrounding Denizli. Therefore to control the rising rents resulted from high demand by establishing municipalities in those settlements was the real motivation. However the same motivation was the main reason for municipal integration approximately ten years later. Denizli municipality exhausted all of its capacity for new development within ten years. Therefore new urban development happened within the boundaries of surrounding municipalities in Denizli Metropolitan region. Consequently to control these available capacity for new development become the most important incentive for political integration in Denizli metropolitan region.

If we look at the processes of political fragmentation and integration in the Denizli metropolitan region, we observe that there is a strong struggle among local elites. Because who will control the urban development, and consequently urban rent, and how is very important. It is very obvious that there is a close relation between boundary changes and power structure at the local level. Because these changes define who is in and who is out of the game.

Another finding of the local-level study is that there is not a simple government versus opposition enmity over the annexation of surrounding municipalities to Denizli Municipality. Every section of society develops an attitude towards annexation to maximize its combination of benefits.

Some social groups are positive about annexation because they believe annexation will increase their social, economic and cultural capital. Politicians from Denizli Municipality, other active (local) politicians, the central government representative, bureaucrats from Denizli Municipality and bureaucrats from surrounding municipalities are positive about annexation because they think that annexation will increase their social capital. Denizli Municipality will be a more powerful institution after annexation. It will control a broader region and have greater financial resources. To be active and supporting actors of this process will increase their esteem in the

eyes of local people. Additionally they will be a part of a more powerful municipality directly or indirectly. Technical professionals (engineers, architects and city planners) and academicians from local university are also the supporting annexation process because it will improve their cultural capital. The reason for this is that to control a metropolitan region by a consolidated power is a rational and technically valid action. As technical and academic personnel, it is obvious that they will support an assumed rational and technically valid action. Business representatives are supporting the annexation policy most probably because they do not want to run counter to any policy of the central government because there is a mutual benefit for them. However, social groups that believe annexation will be detrimental in terms of social, cultural and economic capital are against annexation. Politicians from surrounding municipalities and other politicians are against the annexation policy because for one of two reasons: Either they will be out of the policy process that will bring prestige to whoever is in it or they will lose political and financial power at the end of this process.

Some generalizations concluded at the end of the local- and national- study investigation policy of increasing the scale of local governments are these: hiding the real motivation for reform, targeting the points that create the least political tension, insufficient technical analysis, creating new and powerful local authorities, increasing symbolic capital on the government's side and stating to increase efficiency and effectiveness as a reason.

Finally, it can be concluded that local governments are not seen as an administrative problem area but as a political manipulation area. The reason for this perception of local governments is their dependence on the central government. Similarly, Keleş (2000: 270) argues that in centralist countries like Turkey, central governments aim to keep local governments dependent on the central government and to keep them under pressure use the reorganization of the local government structure as a tool for their own sake. Therefore it can be concluded that reform efforts have a political nature rather than a technical one (Çınar et al., 2009:284).

Central government supported establishment of new municipalities (political fragmentation) between 1994 and 1999 in Turkey. However, it put into practice the

policy of scale increase in local governments in 2005 by changing The Municipality Law. Therefore we can see two contradictory policy, fragmentation and integration, in local government structure within ten years. Therefore it can be stated that rather than technical reasons such as efficiency and effectiveness or rational policy analysis, political interests like changing the power structure at the local level or economic interest like controlling urban development through local actors is one of the main motivation of central government. The policy of political integration in Denizli metropolitan region was put into practice in 2009 after the first local election according to the Municipality Law changed in 2005. However, just after two years later, Prime Minister made a promise in his general election speech about establishment of Greater Municipality in Denizli. As it is noted before local governments are seen as an political manipulation area by the central government.

To improve the local government reform efforts in Turkey, two points should be focused on. First one is to rearrange the relationship between central government and local governments. The other one is to reorganize the relationship between municipalities. To rearrange the relationship between central government and local governments, the financial dependence of municipalities to central government should be weakened. For this purpose, municipalities should have much more and effective tools to create their own income.

If municipalities have power to raise their own income, this capacity will bring two important consequences. First of all, municipalities will use their resources more efficiently and effectively otherwise electors will punish the municipal administration by not selecting them again. Therefore at the end this risk will make municipalities more careful about their expenditures. Secondly, as citizens scrutinize municipal spending, there will be a stronger relation between municipality and citizens in democratic terms. In addition to that to prevent the reproduction of social and economical inequalities between municipalities due to their income potentials, there should be a kind of fund and by the making use of it; it will be possible to transfer financial resources from rich municipalities to poor municipalities (Keleş, 2000:27).

In terms of relationship between municipalities, especially metropolitan regions should be considered. Two aspects should be regarded here. First one is existing relations between municipalities within the same region; the second one is the possible future relations. For existing relations, to provide efficient and effective services in planning and infrastructural works, dual structures should be created (such as special districts in American examples). Some responsibility of services that should be provided on regional scale should be given to these upper level structures (Keleş: 2000:27). Therefore problems resulted from political fragmentation in metropolitan regions would not be solved by an antidemocratic policy such as ending legal personality of surrounding small scale municipalities by annexing them by law to central big municipalities. Keleş (2000: 51) notes that Council of Europe is against to annexation of surrounding communities to central municipality. These structures should be financially and administratively independent from existing municipalities. The administration of these structures could be selected by local people. More importantly, these structures should have the authority to create their own incomes or revenues like municipalities. Fiscal independence and responsibility is the first and the most important step to reorganization of Turkish local government system. In addition to create upper level structure to provide region-wide services, some of the responsibility of municipalities in a politically fragmented metropolitan region can be delegated to local branches of central government to overcome the difficulties resulted from this fragmentation in terms of efficiency and effectiveness (Keleş: 2000:27). The second aspect of relationship between municipalities is the consolidation of new municipalities within a metropolitan region. One possible policy here could be make consolidation of a new municipality in a metropolitan region difficult.

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## APPENDICES

### **1: Functions, Authorizations and Responsibilities of the Metropolitan Municipalities;**

- a) To prepare strategic plan, annual targets, investment program and budget of the metropolitan city municipality in consultation with county and first degree municipalities,
- b) To prepare zoning/construction plan in every scale between 1/5.000 and 1/25.000 within metropolitan city municipalities and contiguous, or to delegate other to perform this task, and to approve the prepared plan if it complies with the environmental plan; to approve, as it is or by making revisions, the applied construction plans to be prepared according to zoning plan by the municipalities within the metropolitan city, as well as the modifications to be made in these plans, parceling plan and construction improvement plants, and to control the implementation of these plans; to persuade the county and first degree municipalities to prepare their construction plans and parceling plans or to delegate others for this task, if failed to prepare the said plans within 1 years as of the date on which the zoning plan is put into force.
- c) To undertake preparation of projects, development plans in ever scale, and parceling plans relating to construction, maintenance and repair works and to ensure realization of all kinds developmental implementations and to issue licenses with the powers granted to the Metropolitan City municipalities by the Laws to enable performance of the undertaken duties and services; to use the authorization conferred upon by the Shanty Housing Law Nr. 775 and dated 20.7.1966.
- d) To issue license and to control business places in the areas operated by and under the responsibility of metropolitan city municipality.
- e) To act with the powers conferred upon by Articles 69 and 73 (Amended Phrases: 5335 - 21.4.2005 / Article 28/ Article 2) of the Municipal Law.
- f) To prepare metropolitan city transportation plan or delegate other to undertake this task; to plan transportation and mass transportation services and to establish coordination on this subject; to determine the quantity of all kinds of service and mass transportation vehicles operated on land, sea, water and railways, ticket fees and tariffs, timing and routing of these services; to designate, operate and let others to operate or to lease bus stops, parking places on the highways, streets, roads, squares and similar other places; to perform all the works conferred upon by the laws for regularization of traffic.
- g) To construct the squares, boulevards, streets and main roads in the areas under the responsibility of metropolitan city municipality, or to delegate others to undertake this task, to engage in maintenance and repair of these places; to impose liabilities in compliance with the urbanization projects on the buildings facing to these places; to designate the locations, formats and dimensions of the bill boards and other advertisement posting places; to perform the works relating to naming

- and numbering of squares, boulevards, streets, roads , as well as numbering of the buildings on these areas.
- h) To establish geographical and urban data systems.
  - i) To enable protection of the environment, agricultural areas and water basins according to applicable development plan; to undertake planting of trees; (Additional Phrases: 5393 - 3.7.2005 / Article 85 /(d)) “ to gather unhygienic work places, places of amusement places, other work places, which have affect on public health and environment, in designated areas of the city”; to designate storage areas for “building supplies, collection and sale of junk,” excavated earth, debris, sand and pebbles, coal and wood sales and storage places, to take measures avoiding environmental pollution during transport of the same; to prepare refuse management plan for the metropolitan city , or to delegate other to undertake this task; excluding the works relating to accumulation of the wastes in the well and transport to the transfer places, to undertake services relating to recycling, storage and disposal of wastes , to establish and operate or let others to establish and operate plants for this purpose; to perform the services relating to industrial and medical refuses, to establish and operate or let others to establish and operate plants for this purpose; to undertake collection and purification of refuses discharged from sea carriers by preparing regulations on this subject.
  - j) To issue license and to control first class non-sanitary institutions, including those engaged in production or sale of foodstuff; to establish and operate laboratories for analysis of food products and beverages.
  - k) To perform public security services at places under the control and administration of metropolitan city municipality.
  - l) To construct or let others to construct, or to operate or to issue license for passenger and cargo terminals, indoor and outdoor parking places.
  - m) To construct and operate, or let other to construct or operate social facilities, regional parks zoos, animal shelters, libraries, museums, sporting, recreation, entertainment and similar other resorts; where deemed necessary, to supply equipment and to render the necessary support to amateur sports clubs, to arrange sporting competitions between the amateur sports clubs, to grand awards to the sportsmen/sportswomen who are successful and obtained the highest score in domestic and international competitions under the decision of the municipal council.
  - n) Where deemed necessary, to construct buildings and facilities for educational and cultural services, to undertake all kinds of maintenance and repair works for the buildings and facilities belonging or used by public institutions and corporations during performance of such services.
  - o) To enable protection of the cultural, historical places, natural resources and areas of great importance from the aspect of urban history; to ensure that places are operated according to the regulations; to undertake maintenance and repair works and to restore the buildings of which the protection is not possible.
  - p) To perform mass transportation activities within the metropolitan city municipal boundaries and to construct and operate or let others to

- construct and operate facilities for such purpose; to issue license for to the mass transportation vehicles, including land and sea taxi and service vehicles within metropolitan city boundaries.
- r) To undertake water and sewage services, to construct and operate or to let others to construct and operate dams and other plants for such purpose; to engage in improvement of rivers, marketing of spring waters and purified waters.
  - s) To designate cemetery areas, to construct and operate, or let others to construct and operate cemeteries, to perform burying services.
  - t) To construct and operate or to let others to construct and operate all kinds of whole sale markets and slaughter houses, to issue license for the whole sale markets and slaughter houses to be build in the areas designated according to the construction plan.
  - u) To prepare plans relating to natural disasters in conformity with provincial plans and to undertake other preparations in consideration of requirements of metropolitan city; To render relief services by sending rescue vehicles, equipment and material to other disaster areas; to detect the production and storage areas of explosives and flammable substances; To control houses, business places, entertainment places, factories and industrial organizations and public institutions to determined the measures to be taken against fire and other disasters; to issue license or to grant permission on this subject as required by the laws and regulations.
  - v) To construct or operate health centers, hospitals, mobile health units and to undertake all kinds of social and cultural services for adults, old and young people, disabled persons, woman and children; to establish social facilities for welfare purposes and to develop the existing ones, to open and operate or let others to operate courses for improvement of skills and gaining professions; To establish cooperation with universities, higher education institutions, technical high schools and civil community organizations while performing these activities.
  - y) To establish and operate, or let others to establish and operate central heating systems.
  - z) To ensure evacuation of buildings that are found risky for living of people both physically and materially; where deemed necessary, to demolish the buildings carrying disaster risk.

The metropolitan city municipalities are obliged to use the powers set-forth in paragraph (c) of first subsection in compliance with the construction plan and to notify the relevant municipalities about the activities. The metropolitan city municipalities may delegate these powers to county and first degree municipalities, or perform these works jointly with these municipalities.

Functions and authorizations of county and first degree municipalities;

- a) To perform the tasks exclusively conferred upon the metropolitan city municipality by the laws and to use powers and to undertake services other than those listed in the first subsection.
- b) To collect and to transport the refuses to the waste transfer station in compliance with the refuse management plan of the metropolitan city municipality.

- c) To issue license for health centers, 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> class non-sanitary institutions, public recreation and entertainment places and to undertake control of these places.
- d) Among the services listed in the first subsection; (Additional Phrase:5393-3.7.2005 / Article 85 / (d)) “to exercise the authorization given by Shanty House Law Nr. : 775;” to construct parking places, sporting, recreation and entertainment places and parks; to render social and cultural services for adults, disabled persons, women, young ones and children; To open courses improvement of skills and to gain a profession, to construct buildings and facilities to be used for health, educational, cultural services, to undertake maintenance and repair of these places; to protect natural resources and historical and cultural places; to render services aimed to develop the areas and buildings of great importance from the aspect of urban history and to ensure that their functions are improved to serve the purpose.
- e) To undertake burying services.

(Amended last Phrase: 5538 - 1.7.2006 / Article 23) The powers and responsibilities conferred upon the Ministry of Industry and Commerce and organized industrial zones by the Law Nr. 4562 For Organized Industrial Zones “and airports open for civil air transportation and all facilities included in these airports” are beyond the scope of this Law.

## **2: The Powers and Privileges of the Municipality**

- a) To carry out all kinds of activities and venture in order to meet the common requirements of the inhabitants of the county.
- b) Within the limits of authority conferred upon the municipality by the laws, to publish regulations, to give orders, to take and to implement restrictive measures, to impose the punishments defined in the laws.
- c) To grant the permissions and to issue the licenses deemed necessary in the laws for the real persons and legal entities.
- d) To impose, assess and collect the taxes, duties, levies, support and participation shares due to the municipality pursuant to the special laws; to undertake assessment and collection of the amounts payable according to the provisions of the special law excluding the taxes, charges and levies against the services such as natural gas, water, waste water.
- e) Without prejudice of the vested rights; to supply utility and industrial water; to enable disposal of waste water and rain water; to construct or let others to construct and operate plants for such purposes; to enable the facility of benefiting from spring waters, or to let others to undertake operation of spring waters.
- f) To engage in public transport activities; to establish and operate all kinds of public transport facilities including procurement of bus, sea and water carriers and construction of tunnels and railway system.
- g) To render all kinds of services related to collection, transportation, decomposition, recirculation, removal and storage of solid wastes.
- h) In order to perform the locally required public services, to acquire, immovable property within the municipal boundaries and contiguous areas, to deal with expropriation, sale, lease, exchange, allocation of the same; to institute limited real rights on this property.
- i) To borrow loans and to accept donations.
- j) To build, operate wholesale and retail sale markets, bus terminals, exhibition centers, slaughterhouses yacht harbors and, quays according to the relevant legislation and to give permission to the real persons and legal entities to do the same.
- k) Excluding those related with taxes, levies and charges, to make agreements for amicable settlement of the disputes subject to claim.
- l) To issue license for non sanitary institutions, public resorts and entertainment places and to control the same.

- m) In order to improve and take under control regional economy and commerce, to restrict the activities of the street sellers who work without license; to transfer the foodstuff confiscated by the municipality to the nutrition banks if not taken back within two days against payment of fine; to distribute the other stuff to the people in destitute if not taken back within thirty days against payment of fine.
- n) To bring standards to the bill boards and introductory door-plates.
- o) To assemble non sanitary workplaces, entertainment places and other workplaces that have an effect on public health and environment in a certain part of the city, to determine excavation and debris disposal areas; storage areas for liquefied petroleum gas (LPG); storage and marketing areas for construction material, wood, coal and scraps: to take the necessary measure in order to avoid environmental pollution during transportation of the same.
- p) To determine all kinds of vehicles and mass transportation vehicles operated on land, sea, water and rail as well as the number of cabs, ticket prices and tariffs, schedule and route; to determine, operate, rent out wayside stations and parking places for vehicles on highway, land, road, street, square and similar places or let the same be operated; to carry on all of the work required by traffic regulation provided by the laws to the municipalities.

Licensing and control of first class non-sanitary institutions mentioned in paragraph (I) shall be undertaken by the special province administration in places outside the boundaries of great city municipality and central provincial municipality.

Pursuant to decision of the Ministry of Interior and based on appropriate opinion of the Supreme Council, the municipalities may transfer the services mentioned in paragraphs (e), (f) and (g) for a period not exceeding forty-nine years by granting franchise; the municipalities may undertake mass transportation services either by issuing licenses or by renting out mass transportation lines or purchasing service according to the principles set-forth in Article 67, provided that this may not constitute a privileged right or monopoly.

Under the decision of the council, the great city municipalities within the provincial boundaries, municipalities within the boundaries of province and contiguous areas the population of which is above 10.000, may undertake, gratuitously or against payment, infrastructure works of the tourism, health, industrial and commercial investments and educational institutions, such as supply of water, thermal water, natural gas, electricity and construction of sewage system, roads etc. for a period of ten years without charging any interest; or may assign others to render these services; or may participate in the plants constructed for this purpose; or may allocate land, gratuitously or at a low price, for the projects aimed at promoting health, educational, social and tourism services subject to the approval of Ministry of Interior.

The municipality may engage in popular vote or public research activities to find out the opinion of the inhabitants of the county.

Those who commit offence against the municipal property shall be assumed to have caused damage to the State property. The provisions of article 75 of the Public Procurement Law Nr. 2886 shall also be applied to immovables of municipality.

The income obtained by the municipality through indebtedness on project basis, conditional donations, the properties physically used in public services and taxes, levies and charges collected by the municipality shall not be subject to attachment proceeding.

### 3: Establishment of Municipalities According to Municipality Laws

	Criteria	1580 (Apr 03 <sup>rd</sup> , 1930)	5215 (Jul 09 <sup>th</sup> , 2004)	5272 (Dec 07 <sup>th</sup> , 2004)	5393 (Jul 03 <sup>rd</sup> , 2005)
Where municipalities can not be established		--	Drinking and usage water basins. Historical and natural protection areas. Locations closer than 5000 m to an already existing municipality.	Drinking and usage water basins. Historical and natural protection areas. Locations closer than 5000 m to an already existing municipality.	Drinking and usage water basins. Historical and natural protection areas. Locations closer than 5000 m to an already existing municipality.
Where the establishment of municipalities is compulsory		At province and sub-province centers	At province and sub-province centers	At province and sub-province centers	At province and sub-province centers
Establishment of municipalities by consolidation of villages or parts of villages	Population	More than 2000	More than 5000	More than 5000	More than 5000
	Distance to central settlements	Shorter than 500 m	Shorter than 5000 m	Shorter than 5000 m	Shorter than 5000 m
	Application to governorship by village council or by more than half of inhabitants, or by the decision of governor	+	+	+	+
	Referendum	+	+	+	+
	Investigation by province council	Province council decides on whether the incomes of municipality will be sufficient to complete its duties and whether there will be a general public benefit of it	--	--	--

	Sending files about establishment of municipality to Ministry of Internal Affairs with the opinion of governor	+	+	+	+
	Decision of Council of State about files	+	+	+	+
	Approval by	President of Republic	President of Republic. Prime Minister. Minister of Internal Affairs.	President of Republic. Prime Minister. Minister of Internal Affairs.	President of Republic. Prime Minister. Minister of Internal Affairs.
Establishment of municipalities in resettlement areas	Population	More than 2000	More than 5000	More than 5000	More than 5000
	Proposal by Ministry of Internal Affairs	+	+	+	+
	Approval by	President of Republic	President of Republic. Prime Minister. Minister of Internal Affairs.	President of Republic. Prime Minister. Minister of Internal Affairs.	President of Republic. Prime Minister. Minister of Internal Affairs.

#### 4: Consolidation of Municipalities According to Municipality Laws

Conditions	Process	1580 (April 03, 1930)	5215 (July 09, 2004)	5272 (Dec 07, 2004)	5393 (July 03, 2005)
The settlement area of a municipality or a village or their some parts reaches to the settlement area of neighboring municipality.		+	+	+	+
The distance between settlement areas is shorter than 5000 m.		--	They are accepted as consolidated or annexed	They are accepted as consolidated or annexed	+
	Application of inhabitants to governorship to annex or consolidate to neighboring municipality.	--	--	--	+
	Referendum at demanding side	+	+	+	+
	Files are sent to municipalities that are to be annexed or to be consolidated	+	+	+	+
	If decision of municipalities that are to be annexed or to be consolidated are positive, annexation or consolidation is completed	+	+	+	+
	If decision of municipalities that are to be annexed or to be consolidated are negative	By the objection of demanding side, the files with the opinion of governor are transferred to Council Of State by Ministry of Internal Affairs. If the decision of Council of State is positive, the	By the objection of demanding side, the files with the opinion of governor are transferred to Council Of State by Ministry of Internal Affairs. If the decision of Council of State is positive, the	By the objection of demanding side, the files with the opinion of governor are transferred to Council Of State by Ministry of Internal Affairs. If the decision of Council of	No consolidation or annexation

		annexation or consolidation process is completed by shared decree.	annexation or consolidation process is completed by shared decree.	State is positive, the annexation or consolidation process is completed by shared decree.	
	If decision of municipalities that a part of it wants to annex to any other municipalities are negative	--	--	--	No consolidation or annexation
	Population limit of remaining part of existing municipalities	More than 2000	More than 5000	More than 5000	More than 5000

## 5: Ending Legal Personality of Municipalities According to Municipality Laws

Conditions		Process	1580 (Apr 03 <sup>rd</sup> , 1930)	5215 (Jul 09 <sup>th</sup> , 2004)	5272 (Dec 07 <sup>th</sup> , 2004)	5393 (Jul 03 <sup>rd</sup> , 2005)
Boundaries of municipality	Being closer than 5000 m to boundaries of province center municipality or sub-province center municipality or a municipality having more than 50000 inhabitants		-	+	+	+
Settlement area of municipality			-	+	+	+
		Taking opinion of Council of State	-	+	+	+
		Proposal of Ministry of Internal Affairs	-	+	+	+
		Shared decree	-	+	+	+
Municipalities having less than 2000 inhabitants		Taking opinion of Council of State	-	+	+	+
		Proposal of Ministry of Internal Affairs	-	+	+	+
		Shared decree	-	+	+	+

## 6: Economic, Political, Social, and Technical Arguments Expressed For and Against the Municipality Laws

	5215-5272-5393-municipality laws	
	For	Against
economic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*-In small-scale municipalities, the management capacity does not improve, municipalities use most of their resources for current expenditure and could not make enough investment expenditure.</li> <li>*-The scale problem causes insufficient and ineffective resource usage.</li> <li>*-To increase the scale of municipalities will cause efficiency and effectiveness in resource usage.</li> <li>*-To increase the minimum population level from 2000 to 5000 results in employing skilled personnel and providing services more seriously.</li> <li>*-Small-scale municipalities have deficiencies in service provision.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*-To decrease the marginal cost of production in those small-scale municipalities field-management techniques can be used such as bringing small municipalities together to provide some common services.</li> <li>*-It is impossible to employ skilled personnel in municipalities by increasing the minimum size of population for establishment from 2000 to 5000.</li> <li>*-Annexation of municipalities means annexation of their debt therefore municipalities become more indebted. Thus their deficiencies in service provision will increase.</li> </ul>
political	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*-The number of municipalities that have less than 50000 inhabitants is 3000. This shows the scale problem of municipalities.</li> <li>*-The limit of 2000 inhabitant becomes meaningless with respect to population increase.</li> <li>*-The number of municipalities increases in Turkey contrary to the trend in western countries.</li> <li>*-Increasing the minimum population size of municipalities from 2000 to 5000 increases the scale of municipalities.</li> <li>*-It is a realistic approach.</li> <li>*-Villages are made municipality for political reasons in previous periods.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*-To establish municipalities at small-scale settlements will foster urbanization in those settlements.</li> <li>*-Municipalities that have less than 2000 inhabitants should not be closed down.</li> <li>*-The statement in the 8<sup>th</sup> article that the people living in a municipality that is being annexed are not consulted with about their opinion should be changed. The referendum opportunity should be satisfied at those municipalities.</li> <li>*-The statement in the 11<sup>th</sup> article that the people living in a municipality that its juristic personality will be ended are not consulted with about their ideas should be changed. The referendum opportunity should be satisfied at those municipalities.</li> <li>*-The statement in the 8<sup>th</sup> article that the people living in a municipality that is being annexed are not consulted with about their opinion is against the principle of local autonomy.</li> <li>*-The statement in the 11<sup>th</sup> article that the people living in a municipality that its juristic personality will be ended are not consulted with about their ideas is against constitution.</li> <li>*-There should be a balance between democracy and efficiency/effectiveness. Democracy is sacrificed for efficiency and effectiveness by this regulation.</li> <li>*-Local governments are important for the participation of people to governments. It is observed that the rate of participation in local elections is higher</li> </ul>

		<p>in municipalities that have less than 2000 inhabitants. However regulation increases the minimum size of population to 5000.</p> <p>*-It is meaningless to close down the municipalities that have less than 2000 inhabitants when it is accepted as general rule that authorities should be shared with smaller units.</p> <p>*-The municipalities that have less than 2000 inhabitants will be villages according to law. However there are no new regulations about administration of villages. The problems of small-scale settlement cannot be solved by this way.</p> <p>*-The distance between villages or parts of villages and the central settlements to establish a municipality is increased to 5000 m. This will cause the emergence of new municipalities but there is no any calculation about it. There would be much more new municipalities than the municipalities that are closed down.</p> <p>*-There is no explanation about how the new minimum population size of 5000 is calculated or defined.</p> <p>*-There should be differentiation between municipalities according to their population size in terms of authority and duty.</p> <p>*-Mayors can be selective in service provision by neglecting new areas because they did not vote for them in the previous elections.</p> <p>*- Annexation policy is applied in Europe after all of municipalities had completed their infrastructure investments.</p> <p>*-It is argued that small-scale municipalities are in debt to the National Treasure. Why are small-scale municipalities that don't have any debt closed down?</p> <p>*-If we cannot stop migration from rural to urban there will be many more municipalities to be closed down in the future.</p> <p>*-If a municipality has 1999 inhabitants it will be closed down but if it has 2001 inhabitants it will remain. This is a meaningless situation.</p> <p>*-If flawed urbanization is a reason for closing small-scale municipalities metropolitan municipalities should be closed down also for the same reason.</p> <p>*-In some municipalities people contribute to municipalities by making school, health center or donating ambulance etc. Thus this regulation affects the relation between locality and people negatively.</p>
social		*-To close down the municipalities that

		have less than 2000 inhabitants creates a lack of motivation among small-scale municipalities.
technical	<p>*-The rule that a newly establishing municipality cannot be closer than 5000m to a already existing municipality will stop the emergence of municipalities that are one within other (ex: a street divides two municipality from each other).</p> <p>*-Increasing the distance from 500m to 1000m between villages or parts of villages and the central settlements to establish a municipality will cause that municipalities will cover a wider areas and foster urbanization of settlements.</p> <p>*-It is not defined how the juristic personality of a municipality will end in the previous law. Therefore municipalities that lost its establishment conditions survived. However it causes ineffective resource use.</p> <p>*-If small-scale municipalities are turned back into villages they can benefit from services provided by central government.</p>	<p>*- The distance between villages or parts of villages and the central settlements to establish a municipality can be over 1000 m.</p> <p>*-To increase the minimum size of population from 2000 to 5000 to establish municipalities does not solve the problem of small-scale in Turkish municipal structure. Because this regulation will be applied for new municipalities, not for existing municipalities.</p> <p>*-In addition to population some additional criterions should be also considered in closing municipalities down.</p>

## 7: Economic, Political, Social, and Technical Arguments Expressed For and Against the Laws closing down municipalities

	5025-5757-laws closing down municipalities having less than 2000 population	
	For	Against
economic	<p>*-Changes in technology increase the scale of service provision.</p> <p>*-It is highly costly to provide services in settlements that do not have significant size and there are a huge number of municipalities that don't have significant size.</p> <p>*-Municipalities spent most of their income on current expenditures such as salary of personnel therefore they could not provide services as it must be and they use their sources in an irrational way.</p> <p>*-These municipalities have financial deficiencies.</p> <p>*-Municipalities should be established by considering optimum scale.</p> <p>*-Small-scale municipalities have also the problem of employing skilled staff.</p> <p>*-Small-size municipalities have no capacity to create revenues therefore they are dependent on general budget tax revenues.</p> <p>*-The total amount of money destined to municipalities is distributed according to their size therefore small-scale municipalities are in financial difficulties.</p> <p>*-These municipalities are highly indebted. However, due to the financial resource difficulties total amount of debt increases in these small-size municipalities.</p> <p>*-It is impossible to provide services requiring highly costly hi-tech technologies.</p> <p>*-By closing down some municipalities both there will be an important amount of saving in administrative expenditures and it will be possible to provide more qualified services by transferring these funds to a higher level organization of special provincial administration (which will be responsible to provide services in those municipalities).</p> <p>*-The aim is to provide local services more efficiently and</p>	<p>*-These small-scale municipalities have public investments/facilities like post office, dispensary, etc. beneficial to villages around them. By closing them down, you make all of these investments idle.</p> <p>*-It is said that small-scale municipalities are highly indebted but metropolitan municipalities have more debt than small-size municipalities.</p> <p>*-If a small amount of money sent to metropolitan municipalities is spent in small-scale municipalities there could be no migration from rural to urban.</p> <p>*-It is argued that small-size municipalities are dependent on central budget tax revenues but it is stated that the same amount of money will be transferred to special provincial administration for ten years to keep providing services to people. It is a source of contradiction with respect to logic of reform.</p> <p>*-People made investment in their hometown due to existence of a local government there. All of these investments will be wasted.</p> <p>*-Municipalities provide services that are underpriced therefore people can afford buying these services like providing buses to carry children to their school in another municipality or settlement.</p>

	<p>effectively.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*-The costs outweigh the benefits with respect to cost-benefit analysis.</li> <li>*-Turkey has scarce resources thus we have to use these resources efficiently and effectively and make an economic reform regarding size of municipalities.</li> <li>*-Mayors of small-size municipalities demand extra financial support from ministers to provide services in their own municipality.</li> </ul>	
political	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*-There has been a general trend to increase the scale of local government in Europe since 1950s.</li> <li>*-The regulation serves the public interests and it is not for any other political purposes.</li> <li>*-The limit of minimum 2000 inhabitants is arranged according to conditions of 1930s. Therefore it is a necessity to redefine the minimum level of inhabitants for a municipality.</li> <li>*To be established as a municipality, villages show their population higher than they are by bringing people to live in urban areas during the census. Thus it impedes the fair division of national resources among municipalities.</li> <li>*-It takes a long time to close down these municipalities by the decision of Council of State for each municipality.</li> <li>*-This regulation is an important part of local government reform.</li> <li>*-This regulation will put an end to the fragmented structure of local governments.</li> <li>*-This regulation will increase the quality of life in municipalities.</li> <li>*-The number of municipalities increased from 1702 in 1984 to 3225 in 2004.</li> <li>*-Due to migration from rural to urban areas these small-size municipalities lose their population.</li> <li>*-Small-size municipalities have infrastructural problems in addition to their debts.</li> <li>*-Due to the administrative and organizational deficiencies, small-size municipalities have difficulties in bureaucratic processes especially in planning practices.</li> <li>*-It is impossible for small-size municipalities to complete the growing responsibilities due to new</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*-The regulation is not discussed well due to haste of government.</li> <li>*-The government did not give enough information about the regulation. Therefore it is impossible to have an idea about its content.</li> <li>*-It is necessary to have a juridical personality to provide services to local people according to their needs.</li> <li>*-It is not a solution to close down the municipalities. The solution is to increase the scale of municipalities by consolidating them with villages around them.</li> <li>*-the census taken as the base for population of municipalities is wrong.</li> <li>*-Municipalities are considered as private firms when their efficiencies and effectiveness are discussed.</li> <li>*-Municipalities are necessary organizations for the development of localities.</li> <li>*-By closing down small-scale municipalities government contradicts its proposal that local governments should be strengthened.</li> <li>*-Municipalities can borrow if their incomes are not sufficient.</li> <li>*-The problems of municipalities cannot be solved by administrative regulations such as increasing or decreasing the number of municipalities.</li> <li>*-The regulation will impede the urbanization of Turkey.</li> <li>*-In foreign countries the number of municipalities can be reduced because they have completed their infrastructure investments. However this is not the case for Turkey.</li> <li>*-Municipalities are one of the most important components of welfare state.</li> <li>*-In the countries that have regional inequalities, municipalities should not be closed down.</li> <li>*-Municipalities are not a burden for central governments. They are the cradles of democracy.</li> </ul>

<p>municipality law.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*-Small-size municipalities have no contribution to even its inhabitants.</li> <li>*-We should reach the optimum scale in every service area.</li> <li>*-Small-size municipalities are also problematic in term of democracy that manipulation is easy; there can be tensions between relatives and the most important issue becomes which family will govern the financial sources of municipality.</li> <li>*-Populist pressures inhibit the mayors and council members to take rational decisions in small-size municipalities.</li> <li>*-The closure of small-size municipalities does not trigger migration to bigger settlement because they are already losing their population. The main dynamic behind the migration is that people can not receive necessary services in small-size municipalities.</li> <li>*-We guarantee the continuation of service provision in municipalities that are to be closed down by law.</li> <li>*-The census (on which the regulation is based) is made with a proper technique.</li> <li>*-The aim is not to transform municipalities into villages. Additionally application of KÖYDES (project of supporting villages) will provide better services in villages. Therefore municipalities that are converted into villages will be more urbanized.</li> <li>*-Municipalities are not established according to scientific criterions up to now but according to political concerns.</li> <li>*-Some small-size municipalities can not function except for becoming a source of employment.</li> <li>*-Ankara Metropolitan Municipality has debts but it has not changed mien of Ankara.</li> <li>*-Size of population is world-wide criterion to establish scale policies.</li> <li>*-Debt of poor deteriorates poor, but debt of rich enriches rich. Debt of poor is not identical with debt of rich (regarding the debts of Ankara Metropolitan Municipality and debts of small-size municipalities).</li> <li>*-To keep municipalities having less than 2000 population open is populist politics.</li> <li>*-Peoples' expectations about</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*-We can create solutions without closing municipalities down.</li> <li>*-It is impossible to make differentiation between municipalities that are governed well and bad. Since there is no objective criteria.</li> <li>*-This regulation undermines the logic of local governments.</li> <li>*-To close down local governments will trigger migration to bigger settlements.</li> <li>*-It is necessary to go to referendum in municipalities that are to be closed down.</li> <li>*-Municipalities are necessary to introduce/utilize and protect the natural resources of nation.</li> <li>*-Although it seems a technical regulation, this is a political disposition.</li> <li>*-In some European countries the number of municipalities is higher and the average population size per municipality is lower than Turkey.</li> <li>*-Municipalities developed their capacities in service provision in the course of time.</li> <li>*-Municipalities are also important tools to mobilize non-governmental organizations.</li> <li>*-In some municipalities to be closed down the population really increases in summer time.</li> <li>*-The effects of regulation on urbanization, life-style of people, culture of democracy, legal status of municipal officials, waste of resources resulting from transfer of estates and equipments, and local economic development is not considered well.</li> <li>*-Instead of servicing the public interest, to benefit from political and urban rents is primary aim in this regulation.</li> <li>*-Municipalities are more flexible in comparison with local central-government units in service provision.</li> <li>*-The destiny of people is determined by prime minister's words.</li> <li>*-There is no good reason in the rationale of law.</li> <li>*-The closure of small-size municipalities is in contrast with development discourse of government in terms of diffusion of development outcomes.</li> <li>*-The debt of Ankara Metropolitan Municipality is higher than the total amount of debt of small-size municipalities that are to be closed down.</li> <li>*-The entertainment expenditures of grater municipalities are higher than the total amount of debt of small-size municipalities.</li> <li>*-Planning and coordination problems in</li> </ul>
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	<p>municipal services are changed in terms of quality and quantity..</p>	<p>Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality are never seen in other municipalities.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*-The institutions such as NGOs or universities could make some investigations about this issue to prepare a base for the application of the policy before the legislation of law.</li> <li>*-The prime minister's declaration that government will transfer more financial resources to municipalities is in contradiction with closure of municipalities due to their debts. This additional resource can be used for improvement of financial structure of municipalities.</li> <li>*-During the preparation process of the law the public opinion is not allowed to be reflected to parliament.</li> <li>*-Identical conditions of each municipality should be discussed to decide on it.</li> <li>*-To increase scale of municipalities causes democracy and participation problems in municipalities.</li> <li>*-Government program does not include such a purpose.</li> <li>*-The optimum size for municipalities can not be determined without considering the quality and quantity of services.</li> <li>*-The government prefers closing down the municipalities instead of trying to solve their problems.</li> <li>*-Government could give a handle to small-size municipalities to amalgamate with surrounding villages to increase their size but it did not.</li> <li>*-The government cannot legitimize the policy by indicating 57% of municipalities to be closed down are governed by a mayor from JDP. By giving the responsibility of service provision to special provincial administrations that their administration staff will be assigned by central government the government will achieve full control in these localities.</li> <li>*-The only savings that government can make is the salaries of municipal mayor because government will continue to transfer resources for ten years to special provincial administrations instead of municipalities.</li> <li>*-The municipalities were used for political bribery purposes, now the special provincial administrations will be used for political bribery purposes.</li> <li>*-The aim of this regulation is to bypass the Council of State. Because in the Municipality Law the approval of Council</li> </ul>
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
		<p>of State is a necessary condition for closure of any municipality. The investigation of Council of State enables each municipality to be evaluated according to its identical conditions.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*-Prime Minister wants to close down a municipality that he opened its facility two months ago.</li> <li>*-There is no evidence about municipalities' inefficiency and being a source of wasteful expenditures.</li> <li>*-There are state investments such as mass housing or nuclear power plant in municipalities to be closed down.</li> <li>*-Deductions in financial resources that municipalities take from central government are the main reason for the lack of service provision in small-size municipalities.</li> <li>*-In some municipalities it is difficult to provide services by central government units due to physical conditions. In other words it is difficult to access to these regions therefore it is better to serve these regions by local units.</li> <li>*-This regulation is not based on scientific and participatory evaluations.</li> <li>*-There is no regulation about financial auditing of municipalities.</li> <li>*-Financial amnesties about municipal debts encourage municipalities about making bad use of financial resources.</li> <li>*-Municipalities are necessary for planned urbanization.</li> <li>*-Population loss in small-size municipalities does not result from quality of municipal services but from social and economic policies of government.</li> <li>*-Municipalities are more efficient and effective administrative units than special provincial administrations.</li> <li>*-It is a recentralization process.</li> <li>*-Small-size settlements are where the municipal service provision is mostly needed.</li> <li>*-Not only small-size municipalities but also all executive public institutions have debts.</li> <li>*-In each year government dispenses coal that costs 300 million NTL. It should not be found strange because it is a necessity of social state apprehension. Similarly debt of small-size municipalities that costs 200 million NTL can be considered as such.</li> <li>*-Government talks about cost-benefit analysis of municipal expenditures. But it is a theoretical assumption. Government has no empirical evidence about this</li> </ul>
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		<p>argument.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*-government causes inefficiencies in municipalities itself by turning temporary workers into permanent staff.</li> <li>*-Permanent staff of municipalities to be closed down will be transferred to special provincial administrations. But this brings about inefficiency because these personnel will be employed in jobs for which they lack the necessary skills</li> <li>*-It is argued that small-size municipalities are highly indebted. However most of these municipalities are governed by a mayor from the same political party in the power. Therefore it is illogical to let them being indebted first then close them down due to their debts.</li> <li>*-Corruptions in municipalities should be stopped to provide efficiency and effectiveness in them instead of closing down.</li> <li>*-It is argued that small-size municipalities have technical staff problems. However there is no attempt to solve the same problem on the special provincial administration level. Therefore the same problem will continue.</li> <li>*-The aim of the regulation is to transfer right of control of public resources (meadows, public lands, water resources etc.) from small-size municipalities to central government via special provincial administrations.</li> <li>*-To mention the ideas of people living in municipalities to be closed down is not populism. It is the actual duty of a member of parliament.</li> </ul>
social		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*- Closing down their municipality wounds people's pride.</li> <li>*-The municipalities that are 30-40-50 years old could not be closed down, because a local identity and culture will be destroyed.</li> <li>*-Municipalities are the transition areas from rural to urban life.</li> <li>*-It is meaningless to use population as a criterion in countries such as Turkey that have a high degree of population movement.</li> <li>*-The psychology of people living in municipalities that are to be closed down will be affected negatively by this law.</li> <li>*-It is not acceptable to close down municipalities that lose their populations. Because some of these municipalities were established a long time ago and they are historical heritages.</li> <li>*-In addition to their administrative duties, municipalities have some social missions like conciliating the disputing</li> </ul>

		families, helping people in their official matters etc.
technical	<p>*-There is no division among (small and big) municipalities in terms of authority and duty and this works against small-size municipalities.</p> <p>*-These settlements cannot benefit from services of other institutions of central government due to being a municipality.</p> <p>*-The closure of municipalities that have less than 2000 population is already existing in Municipality Law and just the process that has to be followed according to municipality law is overcome.</p>	*-It is wrong to consider only populations of settlements to close down municipalities.


## 8: Labor Market Dynamics Figures According to Scale of Municipalities

**Ratio of Participation in Labor Market within Working Age Group (2000)**




Source: Turkish Statistical Institute

**Ratio of Unemployment within Working Age Group (2000)**




Source: Turkish Statistical Institute

**Ratio of Agricultural, Animal Husbandry, Forestry Workers, Fishermen and Hunters (2000)**




Source: Turkish Statistical Institute

**Ratio of Non-Agricultural Production and Related Workers, Transport Equipment Operators and Laborers (2000)**




Source: Turkish Statistical Institute

**Ratio of Service Workers (2000)**




Source: Turkish Statistical Institute

**Ratio of Scientific, Technical Professional and Related Workers (2000)**




Source: Turkish Statistical Institute

**Ratio of Commercial and Sales Workers (2000)**




Source: Turkish Statistical Institute

**Ratio of Clerical and Related Workers (2000)**



Source: Turkish Statistical Institute


**Ratio of Administrative and Managerial Workers (2000)**



Source: Turkish Statistical Institute


## 9: Built Environment Figures According to Scale of Municipalities

**Ratio of residential buildings (2000)**




Source: Turkish Statistical Institute

**Ratio of mixed residential and non-residential buildings (2000)**




Source: Turkish Statistical Institute

**Ratio of commercial buildings (2000)**




Source: Turkish Statistical Institute

**Ratio of industrial buildings (2000)**



Source: Turkish Statistical Institute

**Ratio of agricultural buildings (2000)**



Source: Turkish Statistical Institute

## **10: Local Governments in United States**

State governments are given the power to set up lower levels of government, to decide their political and administrative organization, to determine their duties and authorities and to regulate and to abolish them. This is how local governments in US are formed; through borrowed powers from the state government (Burns et al., 1996).

### **1. Units of Local Government**

Bureau of Census separates local governments into five categories, there are:

- 3.034 county governments,
- 16.504 town or township governments,
- 19.429 municipal governments,
- 13.506 school districts
- 35.052 special districts governments

Counties in some states are merely administrative divisions of land and not units of local government. Town or township governments are found in some states, as administrative divisions of county government. Municipalities are the most common and autonomous units of local government, which are categorized according to their degree of autonomy and the extent of the services they provide, Special districts are created by the state government to provide specific services across different units of local government and school districts are the most common and most powerful kind of special districts.

#### **1.1. Counties**

Counties are the major divisions of state territory. These units of government are rooted in the historical English shire, which served a dual function as the extension of the national government and as the unit of local self government. Although they were conceptualized as extensions of the state government at the beginning, population growth and increased suburbanization after World War I strengthened their functions as local governments and increased the range of services they provide ([www.naco.org](http://www.naco.org)).

#### **1.2. Town or Township Governments**

Towns and townships of this kind were originally organized for judicial purposes (Anderson et al., 1960). A town or a township referred to every 36 square mile area of the county, later expanded or retracted for geographical or demographic reasons. While they do not exist at all in some states, they are organized as local self governmental units in others. The Bureau of Census applies the term "town or township governments" to governments in 20 states (Connecticut, Minnesota, Ohio, Illinois, Missouri, Pennsylvania, Indiana, Nebraska, Rhode Island, Kansas, New Hampshire, South Dakota, Maine, New Jersey, Vermont, Massachusetts, New York, Wisconsin, Michigan, North Dakota). Their responsibilities and the degree of autonomy vary in each state.

### **1.3. Municipalities/ Incorporated Places**

Each state creates municipalities for government of urban centers with a special charter that specifies their organization and powers. A municipality indicates the self government of a city. However, it is not expected for every city in a state to require the same degree of self government or the same range of services. As a result, municipalities are categorized according to size and autonomy (Babcock, 1962). The Census Bureau defines "municipal governments" as: "political subdivisions with which a municipal corporation has been established under state law to provide general local government for a specific population concentration in a defined area, and includes all active government units officially designated as cities, boroughs (except in Alaska), towns (except in the six New England States, and in Minnesota, New York, and Wisconsin) and villages. "The original category of municipalities is the city. Village and borough municipalities are miniature city municipalities, providing similar services for smaller urban centers. Town municipalities are the smallest municipalities, they are different from city and village municipalities In terms of organization and they are less powerful in self government because their territories are usually rural and therefore requiring a smaller number of services.

### **1.4. Special Districts**

Special Districts are created for more efficient provision of certain services. Special district governments are independent, special-purpose governmental units that exist as separate entities with substantial administrative and fiscal independence from other local governments. They provide specific services such as fire protection, water supply, or sewerage. Majority of these districts are school districts, organized to provide public elementary, secondary, and/or higher education.

## **2. Political and Administrative Organization**

Every state is independent from others in its system of local government. Since the federal constitution does not organize local governments, states do it by their constitutions, statutes and charters. Although this creates a wide range of organizational structures, there exist basic categories and common features.

### **2.1. Counties**

The national association of Counties identifies three basic forms of county government out of the great organizational variety. The first form, the commission plan, is distinguished by an elected commission or board that exercises both the legislative and the executive powers. The commission/administrator plan indicates the existence of an administrator that is appointed by the commission and has vested powers by this commission. The third form, the council/executive plan, is based on the separation of the legislative and the executive bodies.

In all three forms there is an elected board of commissioners. There are larger boards and smaller boards, the former consisting of township representatives and the latter elected by at large elections (Burns et al., 1996). While an elected executive does not exist in most counties, the board usually shares its powers with a group of elected

officials. The sheriff, the county prosecutor or the district attorney, the county clerk, the coroner and the auditor are the most common elected county officials. The remaining offices and department heads are appointed by the board or the executive where it exists. In the commission/administrator form the board usually gives the authority of these appointments to the administrator ([www.naco.org](http://www.naco.org)).

## **2.2. Municipalities**

Municipalities are incorporated, whether as a city, a village or a town, by the state with a charter. Babcock classifies municipal charters into five types: the special charter, the general charter, classification system, home rule and optional charter (Babcock, 1962). The special charter system requires a special charter for each municipality. On the contrary, the general charter system creates one charter to govern all municipalities in a state. The classification system groups municipalities according to population and creates charters for each group. These systems have their own deficiencies, favoritism in the first and over generalization in the second; as well as a common problem. In all three systems, the charter is created and altered by the state legislature, without any input from the citizens or local elected officials. This problem, the lack of self government and autonomy gave rise to the home rule system, which authorizes the municipality to create its own charter to be approved by the state. Another solution was the optional charter system where state legislature creates three or four charters and municipalities adopt one with their own decision (Babcock, 1962).

In spite of the huge diversity, the organizational structures of municipalities can also be categorized. There are 4 historical forms of municipal organization: the mayor/council plan, council/manager plan, commission plan and the town meeting ([www.nlc.org](http://www.nlc.org)). The first one, the mayor/council plan, is based on the separation of legislative and executive powers, similar to the commission/executive form of county government. This structure is adopted usually by older and larger or very small cities. There are variations within this system in terms of the powers of the mayor. When the mayor shares executive powers with the council and does not have veto power over the council it is a weak mayor plan, as opposed to a strong mayor plan where all executive powers are given to the mayor. The council/manager plan is similar to the commission/administrator form of county government. The council chooses the mayor within itself, usually in a rotating basis, and sometimes hires a city manager to carry out everyday operations. This plan also contains variations in the mayor's powers, determined by the council and the charter.

The commission plan, although the oldest, only exists in a few municipalities today (nlc). In this system, an elected commission, whose members are specialized in services such as fire or health, holds both the executive and the legislative powers. One of the members is designated as the chairman or mayor, to run the meetings. The last plan is also found rarely, the town meeting, only in very small municipalities as a result of its basis on direct democracy. In this system, all citizens can attend town meetings and the elected representatives are only responsible for implementing policy decided here.

### **2.3. Special districts**

Special districts have simple structures, as a result of their limited functions (Babcock, 1962). After the state government defines the district, the establishment is affirmed by popular vote within the district, a board is elected to make the policy and experts are hired by the board. As the oldest form of special districts, boards of school districts tend to be larger and politically stronger than others (Babcock, 1962). Some public schools have some or all of their board members appointed by the mayor and/or governor.

### **3. Duties and Authorities**

Local governments in the US have two official duties; providing government within their boundaries as self government units and carrying out state functions as state created instruments. Until recently, most county governments existed to enforce state laws and perform functions assigned to them by the state (Burns et al., 1996). These traditional functions, such as highway construction and maintenance, tax collection and keeping legal records, are still the only responsibilities some counties have. They act as administrative subdivisions and implement state policies. However, over the past generation, there is a visible increase in the services counties provide. The services delivered by county governments vary between states. Especially in the South, they are taking over urban functions like transportation, water or sewer services and land use planning as well as social services. This increase arises partly from the suburbanization trends, as people that move to suburbs continue to demand urban services (Burns et al., 1996).

Municipalities also have both local and state responsibilities; however, the emphasis is usually on their local functions. Depending on the municipal charter, municipalities usually provide urban services like sewage, garbage and waste management; distribution of water, gas and electric; construction and maintenance of streets, parks, libraries, museums and zoos, harbors and airports; as well as social services like health and education. As a part of the municipal organization, the attorney is responsible for prosecuting offences against municipal ordinances. The fire, police and planning departments are also in the municipal organization. The police department includes both traffic and criminal work

While municipalities are the major providers of urban services and counties are in the process of gaining more power, special districts are still very popular instruments (Burns et al., 1996). As a result of the very complicated web of local governmental units, and the lack of a standard division of territory, provision of most services is inefficient through municipalities. Special districts are imposed over local government units by the state, for instance, when a service extends over the limits of a municipality or when one part of a county requires a service that the rest do not need. In some cases, they have separate authority to tax and levy fees. They can be established for a wide range of jobs, from fire to conservation, most commonly for education. Once a special district is established for a specific service, it can acquire other powers and responsibilities through voting. Occasionally, these districts acquire enough power to become municipalities (Babcock, 1962).

## **4. Finance**

State constitutions and municipal charters determine revenue sources for local governments. These sources are mainly taxes, federal aids and service fees. Although taxes are the most important source of their revenues, local governments do not have inherent taxing powers; these powers are state given and subject to many restrictions. Generally, larger municipalities rely more heavily on state and national funds for their revenues than smaller ones, because these cities deliver a wider range of services on behalf of state and national governments ([www.naco.org](http://www.naco.org)).

### **4.1. Taxes**

Taxes are the most important financial sources for all levels of government. Tax collection in the US is regulated by the federal constitution and state constitutions. While the US constitution restricts taxing powers of the state governments; state constitutions determine the procedures of tax collection for local governments. For example, some states leave the entire revenue from property taxes to local governments while others also allow taxation of businesses, liquor establishments or tobacco products. However the general distribution of taxes between levels of government is as follows: income tax is the major source for the national government, state governments rely on general sales, income and motor fuel taxes, and property tax is usually left to local governments (Grant, 1975).

According to the NACo 2001 (National association of Counties) Study, property tax is the most important source for counties, constituting %30,6 of their total revenue, followed by sales tax with %14 and other taxes with %13,6. On the other hand, property tax accounts for %21 percent of the total revenues and %84 of the total tax revenues of municipalities ([www.naco.org](http://www.naco.org)).

### **4.2. Grants-in-aid**

Following taxes, grants are important sources of income for local governments. Grants come from the Congress either directly or through the state government, and from the state to the local units. There are four types of grants from the Congress, differing in procedure (Burns et al., 1996). Categorical-formula grants are given to states and local governments, for specific categories of services, according to a formula and with detailed conditions. Project grants are given to states, local governments and non-governmental organizations by application. Block grants are allocated to states for prescribed activities without many conditions. Revenue Sharing programs, which were abolished by the second Reagan administration, used to grant substantial amounts to states and local governments to be used at their discretion with very general conditions.

### **4.3. Borrowing**

Another important financial issue for local governments is borrowing. Like all other powers of local governments, authority to borrow money and issue bonds is given to local governments by state constitutions.

## **5. Relations with the State and the National Government**

Legally, local governments in the US are creatures of the state, subject to its alterations, regulations and abolishment. The administrative relations between states and local governments are based on functionality. State governments usually do not have a department that deals with local governments; rather, state department of education handles school districts while state department of health watches the activities of the municipal department of health. State supervision of these different functions is generally limited to financial issues. States especially watch activities that involve state grants-in-aid, federal grants-in-aid under state supervision and direct interest of the state (Adrian, 1972).

The procedure of state supervision usually starts with requiring reports from local departments. This procedure does not require any action and it is usually not taken seriously. The next step in supervision is providing advice and information, which is very useful for small communities. Beyond advice, state government can also provide technical aid in a variety of fields. Coercive power is the last resort; state agencies can issue rules and regulations, withhold permits and grants or review decisions. In most states, it is even possible to create substitute administrations, especially in the fields of finance, education and health (Adrian, 1972).

The national government does not have authority over local governments outside of its utilization of grants-in aid. The complexity of urban problems and tendency of pressure groups and researches to consider these national problems resulted in the formation of federal agencies such as the National Committee on Urban Transportation and the National Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission.

## CIRRICULUM VITAE

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### EDUCATION

Period	Degree	University	Area of Education
2004-2011	PhD	METU	Urban Policy Planning and Local Governments
2008-2009	PhD	University of Kent	Urban Studies (Exchange Student)
2001-2004	M.S.	METU	Urban Policy Planning and Local Governments
1997-2001	B.S.	METU	City and Regional Planning
1995-1997		METU	English Preparatory School

### ACADEMIC EXPERIENCE

Period	Appellation	University	Department
2003-	Research Assistant	METU	Urban Policy Planning and Local Governments

### RESEARCH ACTIVITIES

Period	Projects
2006-2008	“Local Economic Development: The Case of Amasya”, directed by Prof. Dr. Melih Ersoy and Assoc. Prof. Dr. H. Tarık Şengül.
2004-2006	“Urbanization of Unhealthiness: A Case Study on Health Problems in Cities of Ankara and Diyarbakır” directed by Prof. Dr. Melih Ersoy and Assoc. Prof. Dr. H. Tarık Şengül.
2003-2004	“Local Governments and Representation: The case of Altındađ, Keçiören and Yenimahalle Municipalities,” directed by Assoc. Prof. Dr. H. Tarık Şengül

### ADMINISTRATIVE EXPERIENCE

Period	Position	Organization
2010-	Member of Administrative Board (accountant)	Chamber of City Planners (Ankara Branch)
2006-2008	Member of Administrative Board (general accountant)	Chamber of City Planners
2004-2006	Member of Administrative Board (accountant)	Chamber of City Planners (Ankara Branch)

## PUBLICATIONS AND TRANSLATION

<i>Year</i>	
2008	“Member Profiles of Chamber of City Planner” in 31st Colloquium Book of Chamber of City Planners, p: 25-51 (in Turkish)
2007	“An Evaluation of Performance of Departments of City and Regional Planning with Reference to University Entrance Exam” in Journal of Planning (the Journal of Chamber of City Planners), 2006/4, p: 165-173 (in Turkish)
2006	Translation to Turkish “Metropolitan Institutional Reform and the Rescaling of State Space in Contemporary Western Europe” (Neil Brenner, European Urban and Regional Studies, 10 (4) p: 297-324) in Journal of Planning (the Journal of Chamber of City Planners), 2006/1, p: 113-137
2006	“An Evaluation of Internal Structure of Private Planning Service Market” in Journal of Planning (the Journal of Chamber of City Planners), 2006/1, p: 53-61 (in Turkish)
2005	With Miray Özkan “Re-naming Streets as a Memorial Projects: the Case of Ankara” in Journal of Planning (the Journal of Chamber of City Planners), 2005/4, p: 54-60 (in Turkish)
2004	With Prof. Dr. Melih Ersoy, “Chapter 1: Introduction” in Assoc. Prof. Dr. H. Tarık Şengül and Prof. Dr. Melih Ersoy (eds) Urban Poverty in Şanlıurfa, p: 1-15, METU: Ankara (in Turkish)
2003	“Chapter 2.4 Social Infrastructure and Social Services and Aids” in Prof. Dr. Melih Ersoy and Assoc. Prof. Dr. H. Tarık Şengül (eds) Şanlıurfa Province Development Studies, METU: Ankara p: 111-136 (in Turkish)

## EDITORIAL WORK

<i>Year</i>	
2006-2010	Journal of Planning (the Journal of Chamber of City Planners)
2006	With Prof. Dr. Melih Ersoy, Assoc. Prof. Dr. H. Tarık Şengül and Res. Assis. Gülçin Tunç “Urbanization of Unhealthiness: A Case Study on Health Problems in Cities of Ankara and Diyarbakır”, METU: Ankara

## CONFERENCE ORGANIZATION

<i>Year</i>	
2007	“Field of Planning Profession” 31 <sup>st</sup> Colloquium of Chamber of City Planners (executive committee)
2006	“Planning, Politics and Policy” 30 <sup>th</sup> Colloquium of Chamber of City Planners (executive committee)
2004	“Changing/Transforming City and Region” 28 <sup>th</sup> Colloquium of Chamber of City Planners (executive committee)
2003	“Reform in Urbanism” 27 <sup>th</sup> Colloquium of Chamber of City Planners (executive committee)

## TURKISH SUMMARY

Türkiye’de bir belediye sınırı içinde yaşayan nüfus oranı hızla artmıştır. Bu nüfus artışının iki nedeni vardır. Bunlardan birincisi hâlihazırda belediye olan yerleşimlerdeki nüfus artışıyken; diğeri belediye olmak için gerekli nüfus büyüklüğünü aşan yerleşimlerde hızla yeni belediye kurulmasıdır.

Bu hızlı büyüme plansız kentsel büyümeden etkisiz yönetsel yapıların oluşumuna ve yetersiz ve verimsiz hizmet sunumuna kadar değişen çok çeşitli sorunların ortaya çıkmasına neden olmuştur. Ancak belediyeler kendi özgün koşullarına göre farklı problemlere sahip olabilmektedirler. Diğer bir değişle kırsal özellikler gösteren küçük ölçekli belediyelerce yönetilen yerleşimler ile metropoliten alanlarda bulunan yerleşimlerin problemleri farklıdır. Büyükşehir belediyelerinin kurulması metropoliten alanlarda yaşanan sorunlarla başa çıkmak için geliştirilen bir yöntem iken, yasal sınırlılıklar yüzünden bu siyasanın her yerleşimlerde uygulanması pek olanaklı değildir.

Yerel yönetimler alanında yaşanan sorunlara (hem kırsal belediyelerin küçük ölçekli olması hem de metropoliten alanlarda ve aynı zamanda büyükşehir belediyesi kurulmayan yerleşimlerde görülen siyasi olarak parçalanmış yapı) hükümet yaptığı yeni belediye yasasıyla müdahale etmiştir. Bu çerçevede üç temel stratejinin olduğundan bahsedilebilir: bunlardan birincisi, nüfusu 2.000’in altına düşen belediyelerin kapatılması; ikincisi, nüfusu 50.000’den büyük olan belediyelere 5.000m’den yakın olan belediyelerin bağlanması ve üçüncüsü, yeni kurulacak belediyeler için nüfus eşiğinin 5.000’e yükseltilmesi,

Temel olarak bu üç stratejinin üç farklı zaman dilimini ve iki yerleşim tipini hedeflediği söylenebilir: nüfusu 2.000’in altına düşen belediyelerin kapatılması geçmiş zamanı hedeflemektedir çünkü geçmişe ait bir süreci (kuruluşlarından sonra belediyelerin nüfus kaybetmesi) hedef almaktadır; metropoliten alanlarda nüfusu 50.000’den fazla olan belediyelere 5.000m’den yakın olan belediyelerin bağlanması ise şimdiki zamanı hedeflemektedir çünkü güncel bir ilişki ve sorunu hedef almaktadır; yeni kurulacak belediyeler için nüfus büyüklüğünün 5.000’e

yükseltilmesi ise geleceği hedef almaktadır çünkü amaç gelecekte yeniden bir küçük ölçekli yerel yönetimler sorunu yaşanmamasını amaçlamaktadır. Bununla birlikte nüfusu 2.000'in altında olan belediyelerin kapatılması ve yeni kurulacak belediyeler için minimum nüfus ölçeğinin 5.000'e yükseltilmesi genel olarak kırsal yerleşimleri hedeflerken; nüfusu 50.000'den büyük yerleşimlere 5.000m'den yakın belediyelerin bağlanması ise kentsel yerleşmeleri hedeflemektedir.

Burada ayrıca bu üç stratejinin uygulama alanı ve biçiminden kaynaklanan farklılıkları da dikkate almakta fayda vardır. Nüfusu 2.000'in altında kalan belediyelerin kapatılması stratejisi tüm Türkiye genelinde ve belediyeler arasında fark gözetilmeden, belediye kanununda uygulama süreci farklı olmasına rağmen çıkarılan özel bir yasayla uygulanmıştır. Bununla birlikte nüfusu 50.000'den büyük yerleşmelere 5.000m'den daha yakın belediyelerin bağlanması ise üçlü kararnamele ile daha seçici süreçler sonucunda yerel düzeyde uygulanmaktadır ve dolayısıyla bu stratejinin uygulanması oldukça sınırlıdır. Yeni kurulacak belediyelerde aranacak nüfus büyüklüğünün 5.000 olması da yine ilk stratejide olduğu gibi tüm ülke genelinde fark gözetilmeden uygulanacaktır.

Bu çalışmanın amacı ise hem ulusal hem de yerel ölçekte yerel yönetimler yapısının yeniden ölçeklendirilmesi siyasasını inceleyerek görünenin gerisindeki gerçek motivasyonları ve amaçları su yüzeyine çıkarmaktır. Ulusal düzeyde yapılan çalışma (nüfusu 2000'in altına düşen belediyelere yönelik) büyükşehir belediyeleri dışındaki tüm belediyeleri (3209 belediyeyi) dikkate almışken; yerel düzeyde yapılan çalışma (nüfusu 50.000'den büyük yerleşmelere 5.000m'den yakın belediyelerin bağlanmasına yönelik) Denizli örneğini ele almıştır. Denizli belediyesinin seçilmesinin nedeni hem yeni Belediye Kanunu'nun geliştirilme sürecinde kendisine referans verilemesi hem de metropoliten alanda siyasi yapının parçalanmışlığı adına en iyi bilinen örneklerden biri olmasıdır. Ulusal düzeyde yapılan çalışmalarda niceliksel veriler kullanılmışken Denizli örneği incelenirken hem niceliksel hem de niteliksel veriler (derinlemesine görüşmeler) kullanılmıştır.

Cumhuriyetin kuruluş döneminde 400 olan belediye sayısı zamanla artarak 2000'li yıllarda 3.200'ü aşmıştır. Özellikle 1990 sonrasında yaşanan artış dikkat çekicidir çünkü 1990'lı yıllarda belediye sayısı yaklaşık 2.000'dir. Buna bağlı olarak da 1935

yılında bir belediye sınırı içinde yaşayan nüfusun toplam nüfusa oranı 1/4 iken bu oran 2000 yılında 4/5'e yükselmiştir. Ancak belediye sayısındaki artış dikkate alındığında bu artışın nedenin özellikle belde belediyelerinin sayısındaki artış olduğu dikkati çekmektedir. 1940-2000 döneminde belde belediyelerinin toplam belediyeler içindeki oranı %20'den %70'e çıkmıştır. Özellikle belediye sayısındaki artışın belde belediyelerindeki artıştan kaynaklanması nedeniyle belediye başına düşen ortalama nüfus büyüklüğü zaman içinde azalmıştır. 1935 yılında belediye başına düşen ortalama nüfus büyüklüğü 32.000 civarında iken bu ortalama 2000 yılında 20.000'e gerilemiştir. Tüm bu gelişmeler belediye ölçek yapısının gittikçe küçüldüğüne ilişkin yeterince ipucu vermektedir.

Ulusal akademi bu artışın nedenlerini çeşitli şekillerde açıklamaya çalışmıştır. Bunlardan birincisi “**belediye kanunu**” modelidir: buna göre önceki belediye kanununda belediyelerin kapatılmasına ilişkin herhangi bir hüküm olmadığı için belediye sayısı daimi olarak artmıştır. Diğer bir açıklama biçimi “**siyasi organizasyon**” modelidir: buna göre bir siyasi partinin bir yerleşimde siyasi örgüt birimi kurmasının koşulu o yerleşimin en azından belde olmasıdır. Dolayısıyla siyasi partiler kendi örgütlerini genişletmek anlamında yerleşimlerin belde olmasını teşvik etmişlerdir. Diğer bir açıklama biçimi ise “**siyasi rüşvet**” modelidir: buna göre siyasi partiler kendi iktidarları döneminde yerleşimleri belde yaparak yerel halka rüşvet vermiş ve karşılığında oy talep etmişlerdir. Yerleşimlerin belde olması halk açısından cazip bir tekliftir çünkü yerleşimin köy statüsünden çıkması yerleşim için yapılacak harcamaların halkın kendi cebinden değil merkezi hükümetim gönderdiği kaynaklardan karşılanması anlamına gelmektedir. Diğer bir açıklama biçimi “**sermaye birikim**” modelidir: buna göre eğer bir yerleşimde yeterince sermaye birikimi varsa bu sermayenin hareketlenmesi için devlet desteğine ihtiyacı vardır. Devlet o yerleşmeyi belediye yaparak sermaye birikim sürecine hem dolaylı yoldan hem de doğrudan müdahale edebilir. Diğer bir açıklama biçimi ise “**kapitalist ilişkilere eklenme**” modelidir: buna göre yerleşimler belediye yapılmak suretiyle kırsal özelliklerinde kopartılarak kapitalist ilişkilere bütünleşmiş hale getirilmektedirler. Bu süreç sonunda hem ücret düzeylerini azaltacak yeni işgücü kapasitesi oluşturulmuş hem de piyasanın ürettiği mallar için yeni bir tüketim odağı meydana getirilmiş olmaktadır.

Ulusal akademi yeni belediyelerin oluşturulma nedeni yanında oluşan küçük ölçekli yapının dezavantajları konusunda da bazı sonuçlara varmıştır. Birincisi, belde belediyelerinin çoğu kırsal karakteristiktir. Belediyeler ise kentsel yerleşimlerin yönetimi için geliştirilmiş bir modeldir. Belediyelerin gelirlerin büyük bir bölümü kentsel eylemlerden alınan vergilerden oluştuğu için küçük ölçekli belediyelerin mali yapısı zayıftır. İkincisi, belediyelerin sundukları hizmetler ve hizmet sunum araçları kentsel nitelikte olduğu için küçük ölçekli yerleşimlerdeki kırsal ihtiyaçlara yanıt üretememektedir. Üçüncüsü, küçük ölçekli yerleşimlerde yeterince talep olmadığından hizmet sunumunda ölçek ekonomisini yakalamak imkânsızdır. Bu da birim başına hizmet maliyetlerini arttırmaktadır. Dördüncüsü, küçük ölçekli belediyeler donanımlı teknik ve idari personel ile siyasetçiler için çekici değildir. Beşincisi, büyük bir belediye etrafında kurulmuş küçük bir belediyede yaşayan halk büyük belediyenin sunduğu hizmetlerden faydalandıkları halde bu hizmetler için vergi ödemezler, diğer bir deyişle hizmet sunum alanı ile idari sınır çakışmadığında ekonomik dışsallıklar oluşmakta bu da belediye hizmetlerinin planlanmasını zorlaştırmaktadır. Altıncısı, toplam belediye sayısının küçük ölçekli belediye sayısının atmasına bağlı olarak büyümesi, merkezi hükümet tarafından belediyelere ayrılan toplam payın daha fazla parçaya bölünmesine neden olmaktadır. Bu durumda küçük belediyeler görevlerine yerine getirecek kaynaklardan yoksun duruma gelmektedirler. Yedincisi, küçük ölçekli belediyeler siyasi nedenlerle gerekli olduğundan daha fazla personel istihdam ettiklerinden ve harcamalarının büyük bölümü personel harcamalarına gittiğinden sunması gereken hizmetleri yeterince sunamamaktadırlar. Sekizincisi, kanunu açıdan belde belediyeleri ve diğer belediyeler arasında sorumluluk ve yaptırım açısından farklılık olmadığı için belde belediyelerinde yerel halkın belediye hizmetlerine katılımı sınırlı kalmaktadır. Bunun yerine belediye hizmetlerin tanımlanmasında yerel ihtiyaçların (kırsal özellikli de olsa) daha fazla dikkate alınması halkın belediye aktivitelerine katılımını daha çok motive edecektir. Dokuzuncusu, çok sayıda küçük ölçekli belediye olması özellikle planlama alanında aynı bölge özelinde çelişen kararların ortaya çıkmasına neden olmaktadır. Aynı zamanda küçük ölçekli belediyelerde ekonomik ve idari yetersizlikler yüzünden son gelişmeleri takip etmek ve hizmet sunumunu güncellemek de oldukça zordur.

Küçük ölçekli belediyelerin yukarıda tanımlanan dezavantajlarını aşmaya dönük önermeler de geliştirilmiştir. Bunlardan ilki, belediyelerin nüfus büyüklüğü, nüfusun yapısı ve yönetilen alanın özelliklerine göre gruplandırılması ve bu gruplar arasında görev ve sorumlulukla açısından farklılaşmaya gidilmesidir. İkinci bir öneri ise şudur: belediyelerin bazı görevlerinin ilçe düzeyinde oluşturulacak yeni yapılar tarafından yerine getirilmesidir. Bu noktada merkezi hükümetin taşra teşkilatları da görev alabilecektir. Diğer bir öneri ise belediyelerin birleştirilmesidir. Küçük ölçekli belediyeler bir araya getirilerek ölçek ekonomisinden faydalanan, etkin ve verimli yeni yapılar meydana getirilebilir. Bu noktada önerilen diğer bir model ise büyükşehir belediyesi modelinde olduğu gibi ikili bir yapı oluşturmaktır. Burada belediyelerce yerine getirmesi gereken içme suyu sağlama, planlama vb. gibi bazı yetkiler daha geniş bir alandan sorumlu ve sadece belli bir hizmeti üretmekle yükümlü bu yapılara devredilecektir. Burada amaç verilen hizmetin niteliğine bağlı olarak hem ölçek ekonomisinden faydalanmak hem de hizmet sunumunda koordinasyon sağlamak ve olası dağınıklıkların önüne geçmektir. Bunlar mevcut yapıya ilişkin çözüm önerileridir. Bununla birlikte geleceğe dönük öneriler de mevcuttur. Bunlardan ilki ilke olarak büyük ölçekli belediye kurulmasının benimsenmesidir. Başka bir öneri ise belediyelerin kurulmasında aranacak koşulların nüfus büyüklüğünün ötesine geçerek belediye hizmetleri de göz önüne alınarak yeni koşulların oluşturulmasıdır. Bunlardan biri belediye kurulmasından göz önüne alınabilecek olan optimum ölçeğin tanımlanmasına ilişkin çabalardır.

Bununla birlikte belediyelerde ölçek arttırmanın dezavantajlı yönlerine ilişkin savunular da mevcuttur. Büyük ölçekli belediyeler aleyhine olan argümanlar şöyle sıralanabilir: birincisi, büyük ölçekli yerel yönetim birimlerinin oluşturulması daha antidemokratik yapıların oluşmasına neden olacaktır. Çünkü bürokratik yapı büyüdükçe halkın kendi yöneticilerine ulaşımı ve belediyenin yönetimine katkı koyması zorlaşacaktır; ikinci yerel yönetimin sorumlu olduğu alan büyüdükçe yerel kimlikler/özellikler zaman içinde yok olacaktır.

Küçük ölçekli belediyelerin kapatılmasının dezavantajları ise şöyle sıralanmıştır: birincisi belediyelerin kapatılması yerleşimlerin kentleşmesini engelleyecektir çünkü belediyeler yerleşimlerin kentleşmesi ve kentsel hizmetlerin sunulmasıyla ilgili yegâne kuruluşlardır. Belediyelerin kapatıldığı yerlerde halka hizmet sunumu

merkezi hükümetin birimlerince yapılacaktır. Ancak merkezi hükümetin yerel birimlerinin yerel ihtiyaçlara belediyeler kadar hassasiyet göstermesi beklenemez. Dolayısıyla yerel ihtiyaçlar tam olarak karşılanamayacaktır. Aynı zamanda bir belediye örgütü tarafından yönetilen yerleşimlerin sayısının azaltılması belediyelere aktarılan merkezi kaynaklardan faydalanan halk ile faydalanmayan halk arasındaki eşitsizliği arttıracaktır. Çünkü köy yerleşimlerinde yerel ihtiyaçların karşılanması için halk kendi cebinden para ödemek ya da kendi emeğini ortaya koymak durumunda kalacaktır.

AKP hükümeti iktidara gelir gelmez 2003 ile 2008 arasında belediyelerin ölçeğini arttırmaya ilişkin beş düzenleme yapmıştır: bunlardan üç tanesi yeni belediye kanunu (5215, 5272, 5393) iki tanesi ise nüfusu 2.000'in altına düşen belediyeleri doğrudan kapatmaya yönelik kanunlardır (5025, 5747). Hem yeni belediye kanununa yönelik hem de küçük ölçekli belediyelerin kapatılmasına yönelik kanun girişimlerinin anayasa mahkemesinin iptali veya Cumhurbaşkanı'nın iade etmesine rağmen ısrarla tekrar edilmesi hükümetin bu konudaki ısrarını göstermektedir. Hatta bu ısrar ve acelecilik muhalefet partisi tarafından da defalarca eleştirilmiştir.

Bu konuda yukarıda ifade edilen kanuni düzenlemelere ilişkin parlamento çatısı altında yapılan konuşmaların incelenmesi önemli ipuçlarını ortaya çıkarmaktadır. Genel olarak ifade edilecek olursa hükümet kanadı yerel yönetimlerde ölçek arttırılmasına ilişkin girişimlerini verimlilik ve etkinlik bağlamında ekonomik rasyonaliteye bağlı olarak meşrulaştırmaya çalışırken, muhalefet yerel yönetimlerin demokratik değerlerini vurgulayarak bu siyasa karşı çıkmaya çalışmaktadır.

Parlamento çatısı altında yapılan değerlendirmelerin incelenmesi aynı zamanda ulusal ölçekte yapılacak ve tüm belediyeleri kapsayan çalışma açısından test edilecek hipotezlerin formülasyonu aşamasında oldukça katkı sağlayıcı olmuştur. Ulusal ölçekte yapılan çalışma sonunda küçük ölçekli belediyeler aleyhine doğrulanan sadece iki hipotez vardır. Bunlar ise şöyledir; küçük ölçekli belediyeler merkezi yönetim tarafından gönderilen mali kaynaklara daha bağımlıdır ve küçük ölçekli belediyelerin yaptığı harcamaların çoğunluğunu cari harcamalar oluşturmaktadır. Buna karşın küçük ölçekli belediyeler lehine doğrulanan hipotez sayısı ise çok çok fazladır. Küçük ölçekli belediyelerin oldukça borçlu olduğu iddia edilmektedir,

ancak borçlu olma durumu sadece küçük ölçekli belediyeler için değil her ölçekteki belediye için geçerli bir durumdur. Büyük ölçekli belediyelerin kendi gelirlerini yaratma kapasiteleri daha çoktur ancak küçük ölçekli belediyelerde yaşayan vatandaşlar kendi gelirleriyle kıyaslandığında belediyelere daha büyük oranda ödeme yapmaktadırlar. Küçük ölçekli belediyelerin gelirlerinin büyük bir bölümünü personel harcamalarına ayırdıkları ifade edilmektedir ancak 100.000 nüfus büyüklüğüne kadar personel harcamalarının toplam harcamalar içindeki oranı tüm belediyeler için aynıdır. Belediyelerin mali sıkıntı içinde olmalarının nedeni belediyelerin kaynak harcama biçimleri değil, genel bütçe vergi gelirlerinden belediyelere ayrılan payın kısılmasıdır. Ekonomik yapı bağlamında farklı ölçekteki belediyeler arasında fark vardır. Ancak aynı ölçek grubundaki belediyeler kendi içinde değerlendirildiğinde de oldukça farklı bir durum olduğu görülmektedir. Dolayısıyla sadece nüfus büyüklüğü belediyeler hakkında karar vermek için yeterli bir ölçüt değildir. Avrupa’da 1950-1990 arasında belediyelerde ölçek artırımına ilişkin çeşitli uygulamalar olmuştur ancak ortalama belediye büyüklüğü Türkiye’den büyük sadece dört ülke mevcut iken Almanya, İspanya, İsviçre, Slovakya, Çek Cumhuriyeti, İzlanda ve Fransa’da baskın belediye ölçeği 0-1.000 kişidir ki bu değer Türkiye için 1.000-5.000’dir. Küçük ölçekli belediyelerin aynı zamanda nüfus kaybetmeye devam ettiği bu nedenle bu yerleşimlerde bir yönetim birimine ihtiyaç olmadığı belirtilmektedir. Ancak nüfusu 10.000’e kadar olan belediyelerde de nüfus kaybı görülmektedir ve hatta büyüklüğü 2.000-5.000 arasında olan yerleşimlerde nüfus kayıp oranı nüfus büyüklüğü 0-2.000 olan yerleşimlerden daha büyüktür. Son olarak küçük ölçekli belediyelerin katılımcı demokrasi açısından daha uygun olduğu ve küçük birimlerin yönetenle yönetilen arasındaki mesafenin daha kısa olduğu birimler olduğu vurgulanmıştır. Yerel seçimlere katılım oranı yukarıda ifade edilen ilişkilerin tam temsilcisi olmasa da siyasi çıkar temsilinin bir göstergesi olarak değerlendirildiğinde ulaşılan sonuç şudur: belediyelerde ölçek arttıkça yerel seçimlere katılım oranı azalmaktadır. Dolayısıyla çıkar temsilinin küçük ölçekli birimlerde daha canlı olduğu ve bu anlamda daha demokratik olduğu ifade edilebilir.

Küçük ölçekli belediyeler aleyhine olan hipotezlerin büyük bir çoğunluğunun reddedilmesi ve lehteki hipotezlerin doğrulanması küçük ölçekli belediyelerin kapatılarak belediye yapısında uygulanmak istenen ölçek artırımını siyasasının arkasında başka nedenlerin bulanabileceği düşüncesini gündeme getirmiştir.

Bu niyet ya da niyetleri anlamak amacıyla hükümete ait hem ekonomik hem de siyasi metinler incelenmiştir. Hükümet programları, acil eylem planları, ulusal kalkınma planları gibi siyasi metinler incelendiğinde yerel yönetimlerin hem ekonomik hem de görev ve yetki anlamında geliştirileceğine ilişkin ifadelerin sıkça yer aldığı görülmektedir. Diğer bir deyişle yerel yönetimler siyasi metinlerde desteklenecek yönetim birimleri olarak ifade edilmektedir. Ancak, IMF'ye verilen niyet mektupları, Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı tarafından hazırlanan raporlar gibi ekonomik metinler incelendiğinde yerel yönetimlerin merkezi hükümetin sırtında birer mali yük oldukları vurgulanmaktadır. Özellikle yerel yönetimlerin hazineye olan borçları, gayri safi milli hasıla içinde artan yerel yönetimler harcamaları, ve yine toplam kamu harcamaları içinde artan yerel yönetim harcamaları oranı bu tür bir algılamının başlıca sebebidir. Dolayısıyla siyasi metinlerde söylevsel olarak desteklenen yerel yönetimler ekonomik metinlerde birer borç batağı olarak ifade edilmektedir. Ekonomik metinlerde ifade edilen bu nitelikleri nedeniyle yerel yönetimler en önemli ekonomik müdahale alanlarından biri haline gelmektedir. Yerel yönetimlerin mali tablosunu düzeltmeye yönelik (belediyeleri kapatmak yoluyla ekonomik sorunun kaynağını yok etmek) bu müdahalenin yerel yönetimler yapısı içindeki en zayıf halka olan küçük ölçekli belediyeleri hedeflemiş olması siyasa üretme biçimi yönünden anlamlıdır.

Dolayısıyla ulusal ölçekte yapılan çalışma sonucunda yerel yönetimler alanında ölçek arttırma siyasasının arkasında etkinliği ve verimliliği arttırmaktan çok yerel yönetimlerin merkezi bütçe üzerindeki olumsuz diye nitelenen etkisinin azaltılmasına dair bir niyet olduğu kolayca okunmaktadır. Bu anlamda yerel yönetimler alanı teknik bir müdahale alanı olmaktan çok arkasında ekonomik nedenler yatan siyasi bir müdahale alınıdır.

Daha önce ifade edildiği gibi nüfusu 50.000'den büyük belediyelere 5.000m'den yakın olan belediyelerin bağlanması siyasasına yönelik olarak Denizli örneği incelenmiştir. Belediye Kanununun (5393) 11. maddesi uyarınca Denizli Belediyesi'nin etrafındaki 13 belde belediyesi Denizli Belediyesi'ne katılmıştır. Kanunun uygulaması ise 2009 yılında yapılan yerel seçimlerden sonra gerçekleşmiştir.

Bağlanacak belediyelerin kuruluş yıllarına bakıldığında üç tanesi hariç diğerlerinin 1994 yılı sonrasında kurulduğu görülmektedir. Dolayısıyla metropoliten alanda yaşanan siyasi parçalanma süreci oldukça yakın zamanda meydana gelmiş bir durumdur. Aynı zamanda Denizli’de yaşanan sürecin Türkiye’de yaşanan süreçle (Türkiye’de belediye sayısının artması) aynı zamanda meydana geldiği görülmektedir.

Metropoliten alandaki mevcut yapıyı anlamak adına belediyelerde yaşayan halkın sosyal ve ekonomik durumu incelendiğinde şu sonuçlara erişilmektedir: Belediyelerdeki nüfus artışı dikkate alındığında 1997-2007 arasında metropoliten alandaki nüfus artışının %59’u Denizli Belediyesi sınırları içinde olurken %41’i çevre belediyelerin sınırı içinde gerçekleşmiştir. Benzer şekilde bina sayılarındaki artış dikkate alındığında 1990-2000 arasında metropoliten alanda yeni yapılan binaların 3/5’i Denizli Belediyesi sınırları içinde yapılmışken 2/5’i çevre belediyelerde yapılmıştır. Yapılan binaların türleri incelendiğinde çevre belediyelerde yapılan yeni binaların genellikle konut ve endüstriyel binalar olduğu görülmektedir. Dolayısıyla çevre belediyelerin metropoliten nüfus için yaşama ve çalışma mekânı olduğu iddia edilebilir. Çevre belediyelerde ve Denizli Belediyesi sınırları içinde yaşayan nüfusun çalışma durumu ve biçimi incelendiğinde ise çevre belediyelerin daha çok kırsal özellikli bir çalışma yaşamı olduğu gözlenmektedir. Dolayısıyla Denizli Metropoliten alanın Amerikan kentlerinde yaşanan alt-kentleşme (suburbanization) sürecine benzer bir sürecin yaşandığı görülmektedir.

Metropoliten alandaki belediyeler ve Denizli Belediyesi yönetsel koşulları açısından değerlendirildiğinde ise şu sonuçlara erişilmektedir: Küçük ölçekli belediyelerin borçlu olma durumu Denizli örneğinde tamamıyla geçerli bir durum değildir. Gelir gider dengesinde Denizli Belediyesinden daha kötü durumda olan belediyeler olmasına karşın daha iyi durumda olan belediyelerde mevcuttur.

Küçük ölçekli belediyelerin merkezi bütçe vergi gelirlerinden gelen paya bağımlı olma durumu da tam anlamıyla Denizli örneğinde geçerli değildir. Genel bütçe vergi gelirlerinin toplam gelirler içindeki oranı Denizli Belediyesi’nden daha çok olan belediyeler olduğu gibi daha az belediyeler de mevcuttur.

Küçük ölçekli belediyeler için ifade edilen diğer bir nokta ise cari harcamaların toplam harcamalar içindeki oranının yüksekliğidir. Daha önce olduğu gibi bu oranın Denizli Belediyesi'ne göre daha yüksek olduğu belediyeler olduğu gibi daha düşük olduğu belediyeler de mevcuttur. Dolayısıyla bu konudaki genelleme Denizli özelinde tam anlamıyla geçerli değildir.

Hem yönetsel personel hem de işçi sayıları dikkate alındığında personel başına düşen kişi sayısı göz önüne alındığında Denizli Belediyesi'nin ortalamasından daha yüksek ortalamaya sahip belediyeler olduğu gibi daha düşük ortalamaya sahip belediyeler de mevcuttur. Ancak mevcut idari personelin teknik kapasitesi değerlendirildiğinde Denizli Belediyesinin bariz bir üstünlüğü vardır.

Belediyelerin idari kapasitelerini belirleyen önemli unsurlardan biri de araç parkıdır. Yapılan inceleme sonucunda küçük ölçekli çevre belediyelerin araç parkı açısından büyük ölçekli Denizli Belediyesi'nden daha kötü durumda olduğu yönünde bir genelleme yapılamaz (araç başına düşen nüfus). Ancak personelin teknik kapasitesinde olduğu gibi araç parkının özelleşmesi (specialization) anlamında Denizli Belediyesinin açık bir üstünlüğü vardır.

Metropolitan alandaki belediyeler hizmet sunum kalitesi açısından değerlendirildiğinde ise durum şudur: çöp toplama alanında hizmet kalitesini etkileyen birçok faktör olmasına rağmen çöp hizmetlerinde çalışan personel başına toplanan çöp miktarı hizmet verimliliğinin bir göstergesi olarak değerlendirildiğinde, çöp toplama hizmetini Denizli Belediyesi'nden daha verimli şekilde sunan belediyeler mevcuttur. Kanalizasyon hizmetleri değerlendirildiğinde ise kanalizasyon hizmetlerinden faydalanan nüfus oranının Denizli Belediyesinden daha yüksek olduğu belediyeler olduğu gibi daha düşük olduğu belediyeler de vardır. İçme suyu hizmetleri değerlendirildiğinde hizmet verimliliğinin bir ölçütü olarak su fiyatları alınacak olursa (en verimli hizmet üretim koşullarında su fiyatı en düşük olacaktır) su fiyatının en yüksek olduğu belediye Denizli Belediyesidir. Bununla birlikte şebekedeki en yüksek su kaybı oranı da yine Denizli Belediyesinde görülmektedir.

Planlama hizmetleri dikkate alındığında teknik personel başına düşen planlı alan, 18. madde uygulaması yapılan alanın toplam planlı alan içindeki oranı ve teknik personel başına verilen inşaat ruhsatı sayıları birer hizmet verimliliği değerlendirme ölçütü olarak alınırsa; değerleri Denizli Belediyesi'nden daha iyi olan belediyeler mevcuttur.

Denizli metropoliten alanındaki belediyeler ekonomik koşullar, idari ve teknik personel durumu, araç parkı ve hizmet sunum kalitesi gibi değişkenler üzerinden değerlendirildiğinde basitçe “küçük ölçekli belediyelerin durumu büyük ölçekli Denizli Belediyesi'ne göre daha kötü durumdadır” genellemesi yapılamaz. Ancak teknik kapasite açısından Denizli Belediyesi'nin diğer belediyeler karşısında bariz bir üstünlüğü vardır.

Denizli metropoliten alanı yeni belediyelerin kurulmasına bağlı olarak siyasi olarak bölünmüş olsa da içme suyu ve kanalizasyon sistemi, doğal gaz sistemi ve ulaşım sistemi, diğer bir deyişle ağ biçiminde çalışan altyapı hizmetleri, açısından hala bir bütün olarak çalışmaktadır. Bunun yanında temizlik hizmetleri, park ve bahçe hizmetleri ve bazı acil durumlarda müdahale anlamında çevre belediyeler ile Denizli Belediyesi arasında tam bir anlaşma vardır.

Denizli Metropoliten alanında Denizli Belediyesi ile çevre belediyeler arasında çatışma yaşanan tek alan “planlama” alanıdır. Özellikle belediyelerin birbirine komşu olduğu alanlarda gözlemlenen uyumsuzluklar bunun en açık kanıtıdır.

Sonuç olarak Denizli metropoliten alanında hizmet verimliliği ve etkinliği açısından küçük ölçekli çevre belediyeler aleyhine kabul gören varsayımların çok da doğru olmadığı, metropoliten alanda en önemli sorun alanının ise planlama hizmetinin sunumunda olduğu ortaya çıkmıştır. Dolayısıyla bütünleştirme siyasasının arkasında metropoliten alanda hizmet verimliliğini ve etkinliğini sağlama dışında başka faktörlerin etkisinin olabileceği şüphesine akıllara gelmektedir.

Bu noktada Denizli metropoliten alanında yapılan derinlemesine görüşmeler hem mevcut durumun ortaya çıkış hikâyesini, hem mevcut durumun kendisini, hem

bütünleştirme siyasasının şekilleniş biçimini, hem de siyasanın uygulanması ardındaki gerçek motivasyonu anlamak açısından önemlidir.

Bu noktada öncelikle bakılması gereken süreç mevcut parçalı yapının ortaya çıkışıdır. Mevcut parçalı yapının ortaya çıkışında 6 temel nedenin etkili olduğu söylenebilir. Bunlardan ilki siyasi aktörlerin yerel halkı belediye olma konusunda motive etmesidir. Bazı yerel siyasi aktörler, o zamanki belediyenin siyasi gücünü kırma ve yerel siyaset alanında kendilerine yer açmak için Denizli Belediyesi'nin mücavir alan sınırları içinde yer alan ve nüfusu 2.000'i aşan yerleşmelerdeki halkı belediye olma konusunda motive etmişlerdir. Yeni belediyelerin oluşması ise o zamanki yerel siyasi yapıyı oldukça değiştirmiştir.

Bu noktada önemli olan diğer bir etken ise o zamanki belediye hizmetlerinden duyulan hoşnutsuzluktur. Denizli Belediyesi'nden yeterli miktarda hizmet almama insanları kendi belediyelerine sahip olma konusunda itici güç olmuştur.

Diğer bir önemli neden ise ekonomik ve siyasi olarak bağımsız yerleşim birimlerinde yaşamaktır.

Denizli metropoliten alanında yaşanan siyasi parçalanmaya neden olarak ifade edilen diğer bir etken ise Denizli metropoliten alanında bir büyükşehir belediyesine sahip olmaktır. Yapılan açıklama ise şudur: metropoliten alan içinde Denizli Belediyesi dışında başka belediyelerin de olmasının büyükşehir belediyesi olma noktasında kolaylık sağlayacağı düşünülmüştür.

Öne sürülen diğer bir neden ise sanayicilerin özel çıkarlarını kovalamalarıdır. Denizli Belediyesi'nde endüstriyel binalardan alınan vergiler çok olduğu için sanayiciler özellikle hemşerilerinin yaşadığı köylerde belediye kurulmasını sağlayarak ve fabrikalarını bu belediye sınırları içinde kurarak ağır vergi yükünden kaçmaya çalışmışlardır.

Vurgulan diğer bir ve bekli de en önemli neden oluşan kentsel rantlara el koyma amacıdır. Denizli'nin yaşanan hızlı göç sonucunda nüfusu hızla artmıştır. Ancak Denizli merkezinde konut fiyatları çok fazla olduğu için yeni gelenler çevredeki

yerleşim yerlerini tercih etmeye başlamıştır. Bu talep ise çevre yerleşimlerde mevcut rantın artmasına neden olmuştur. Bu yerleşimlerde belediye kurulması, oluşan yeni rantı yönlendirme yetkisini ele almak suretiyle bu ranta el koyma için en önemli araçtır.

Yukarıda ifade edilen açıklamalar Denizli metropoliten alanında siyasi parçalanmanın oluşumu arkasındaki temel nedenleri göstermektedir. Ancak bu parçalanmanın üstesinden gelinmesi çabaları daha önce de ortaya konmuştur. Bu çabaların çoğu Denizli metropoliten alanında bir büyükşehir belediyesinin kurulmasını öneren kanun tekliflerinin parlamentoya sunulması şeklinde olmuştur. Ancak bu çabaların tamamı başarısızlıkla sonuçlanmıştır. Bu başarısızlıkların ardında yatan neden zamanın yerel aktörlerinin zamanın merkezi hükümeti üzerindeki siyasi etkisinin veya yerel aktörler ile ulusal aktörler arasındaki ilişkinin şimdi olduğu kadar güçlü olmamasıdır.

Mevcut bütüncül uygulamaları (çevre belediyelerin Denizli Belediyesi'ne bağlanması) anlamaya ilişkin olarak iki farklı tür konudan bahsedilebilir. Bunlar teknik konular ve siyasi konulardır. Teknik konular içindeki genel sorun alanları ise şunlardır: belediye hizmetlerinin sunumunda ve planlama alanında yaşanan yetersizlikler, mastır planın uygulanabilirliğinin azalması, işbirliğine dayalı tekniklerin yetersizlikleri, mastır planın bir meşruiyet aracı olarak kullanılması, kentsel büyümenin biçimsizliği ve karar alma süreçlerindeki gecikmeler.

Metropoliten alandaki parçalı yapı hem planlama hizmetlerinin sunumunda hem de diğer hizmetlerin sunumunda yetersizliklerin oluşmasına neden olmaktadır. Metropoliten alandaki otorite çokluğu aynı zamanda mastır planı uygulayacak olan otoritenin oluşmasına da engel olmaktadır. Çünkü mastır plana uyulmaması durumunda belediyelerin karşılaşacağı cezai yaptırımlara ve bu yaptırımları uygulayacak makama ilişkin bir düzenleme yoktur. İşbirliğine dayalı teknikler de yetersiz kalmaktadır, çünkü daha önce bahsedildiği gibi işbirliğinin koşullarına uyulmaması durumunda belediyelerin maruz kalacağı yaptırımlar konusunda belirsizlikler mevcuttur. Mastır planın yapılması ve uygulanması, bu konudan sorumlu tek bir otoritenin olmamasından kaynaklanan nedenlerle belediyelerin kendi alt ölçekli planlarını meşrulaştırdıkları bir araca dönmüştür. Çünkü bir belediye diğer

belediyeleri kendi planı kabul edilmediği zaman mastır planın ilgili kısmını uygulamamakla veya mastır plan aleyhine çalışmakla tehdit etmektedir. Dolayısıyla mastır plan metropoliten ölçekte iç tutarlılığı olan ve kentsel büyümeyi ve gelişmeyi yönlendirebilecek bir metin olmaktan uzaklaşmaktadır. Benzer şekilde metropoliten alandaki çok başlılık metropoliten düzeyinde herhangi bir tutarlı büyüme deseninin ortaya çıkmasını engellemektedir. Aynı zamanda metropoliten alandaki çok başlılık metropoliten ölçüğünde alınacak kararlarda gecikmelere neden olabilmektedir.

Teknik konular içindeki özel konular ise şunlardır: planlama ve kentleşme, hizmet sunumunda etkinlik ve verimlilik ile katılımıdır. Planlama ve kentleşme konusunda belediyelerin birleştirilmesi ile ilgili söylemler iki grupta toplanabilir: bunlar birleştirmenin olumlu yanlarını vurgulayan düşünceler ile olumsuz yanlarını vurgulayan görüşlerdir.

Planlama ve kentleşme açısından belediyelerin birleştirilmesine pozitif yaklaşanların vurguladığı ilk nokta birleşme sonucunda Denizli Belediyesi açısından kentsel büyümenin önündeki engellerin kalkacağıdır. Mevcut durumda Denizli Belediyesi dört bir yanından çevrelenmiştir ve artık yeni kentsel gelişmenin yönelebileceği alan kalmamıştır. Bu nedenle de yeni gelişmelerin tamamı çevre belediyelerin sınırları içinde gerçekleşmektedir. Dolayısıyla birleşmenin gerçekleşmesi sonucunda Denizli Belediyesi kendisi açısından kentsel büyümenin önündeki engellerden kurtulmuş olacaktır.

Birleşmenin getireceği diğer bir olumlu yön olarak metropoliten alanda farklı belediyeler tarafından yapılan imar planları arasındaki uyumsuzlukların giderilmesidir. Metropoliten aladaki her belediye kendi planını yapma yetkisine sahip olduğundan her biri kendi çıkarları ya da öngörüsü çerçevesinde imar planlarını hazırlamaktadırlar. Ancak bu planlar bir araya geldiğinde bir tutarlılık göstermekten oldukça uzaktırlar. Dolayısıyla birleşme sonucunda oluşacak tek otorite tüm metropoliten alan için tek bir perspektif geliştirecek ve buna göre planlar arasındaki fiziki ve mantıksal tutarsızlıkları giderecektir.

Birleştirmenin doğuracağı olumlu sonuçlar ile ilgili bir diğer nokta ise planlama birimlerinin teknik kapasitesinin gelişeceğidir. Daha önce söylendiği gibi

metropolitan alan için personelin teknik kapasitesi açısından en gelişmiş birim Denizli Belediyesi'dir. Çevre belediyelerde planlama konusunda ya hiç teknik personel yoktur ya da varsa bir tanedir. Birleştirme sonucunda oluşacak yeni yapı bu anlamda çevre belediyelerin planlama personelinin katılımı ile daha gelişkin bir planlama ofisine sahip olacaktır. Bu da daha nitelikli planların üretilmesine neden olacaktır.

Planlı gelişmenin sağlanması ise bütünleşmenin planlama alanında getireceği bir diğer olumlu sonuç olarak değerlendirilmektedir. Daha önce ifade edildiği gibi metropolitan alanda kendi planını yapma yetkisine sahip on dört birimin olması kentsel büyüme dokusu açısından oldukça dağınık bir görüntü ortaya koymaktadır. Bu nedenle birleşme sonrasında ortaya çıkacak tek otoritenin kentsel büyümeye tek bir perspektif vereceği düşünülmektedir.

Kentsel büyümenin biçimi yanında otorite çokluğundan kaynaklanan aşırı kentsel büyüme eğiliminin de oluşacak yeni tekil yapı çatısı altında kontrol edileceği ve çok başlıklılıktan kaynaklı aşırı büyüme eğiliminin son bulacağı ifade edilmektedir. Metropolitan alandaki her belediye kentsel gelişme için ayrılan alanı mümkün olduğunca geniş tutarak olası yer taleplerine kendi bünyesi içinde cevap vermeye ve bu şekilde kentsel rantı yönlendirmeye çalışmaktadır. Bu da tüm metropolitan alan değerlendirildiğinde aşırı kentsel büyüme potansiyelinin ortaya çıkmasıyla sonuçlanmaktadır.

Bütünleşmenin getireceği bir diğer olumlu yan olarak yasadışı kentsel büyümenin önlenmesi olarak vurgulanmaktadır. Buna göre, her belediyenin hazırladığı plan kendi içinde tutarlı olabilir ve buna göre de diğer yasal işlemler yürütülebilir. Ancak belediyeler arası çekişmeden kaynaklanan şekilde çevre belediyeler mastır plana uymayı reddedebilirler ki bu durumda uygulanacak herhangi bir yasal yaptırım yoktur. Yapılacak mastır plan ile belediyelerin hazırladığı planlar arasında uyumsuzluk olması durumunda uyumsuzluk olan alanlarda oluşacak gelişmenin yasadışı olma ihtimali ortaya çıkmaktadır. Metropolitan alanda bütünleşme bu tür yasa dışılıkları önleyecektir.

Planlama alanında vurgulanan diğerk bir olası olumlu nokta ise planlama ofislerinin kalitesinin artmasına bağılı olarak üretilecek yeni büyüme planlarının niteliğinin de artacağıdır.

Bütünleşmenin planlama açısından getireceğı olumlu yönleri vurgulayan kişiler yanında yapılan görüşmeler boyunca planlama açısından oluşabilecek olumsuzlukları vurgulayanlar da olmuştur. Vurgulanan bu olumsuzluklardan ilki Denizli Belediyesi'nin amacının metropoliten alanda uygulanan planlanma pratiğini iyileştirmek değıil sadece daha geniş bir alanın gelişme dinamiklerini kontrol etmek olduğudur. Böylece metropoliten alanda oluşan tüm rantı Denizli Belediyesi yönlendirebilecektir.

Vurgulanan diğerk bir olumsuz nokta ise tarımsal arazilerin kentsel gelişmeye açılma riskidir. Çevre belediyelerin, halkın temel geçim kaynağı tarım olduğü için tarımsal arazileri koruduğı ancak Denizli Belediyesi'nin aynı hassasiyeti göstermeyeceğı ve tarımsal arazileri kentsel gelişmeye açabileceğı vurgulanmıştır.

Bütünleşmenin planlama açısından pek de olumlu gelişmeler getirmeyeceğı de ifade dilen olumsuzluklardan biridir. Burada verilen temel örnek ise mevcut büyükşehir belediyeleridir. Söylenen şudur: Denizli Belediyesi'nde önce on altı metropoliten alanda büyükşehir uygulamasına geçilmiştir ancak bu örneklerin hiçbirinde planlama alanında beklenen gelişme sağlanamamış hatta bazı yerlerde durum daha da kötüye gitmiştir. Dolayısıyla bütünleşmenin planlama alanında olumlu sonuçlar doğuracağı asılsız bir beklentidir.

Görüşmeler sırasında bütünleşmenin getireceğı olası olumlu ve olumsuz yanlara ilişkin görüşler ifade edilmiştir. Ancak şurası kesindir ki bütünleşme sonrasında ortaya çıkacak yeni idari yapılanma Denizli Belediyesi'nin içinde bulunduğu büyüme ve alan kullanımı sorunlarının aşılması noktasında çok önemlidir.

Daha önce söylendiğı gibi teknik konular içinde yer alan diğerk bir konu başlığı da hizmet sunumunda etkinlik ve verimlilik. Planlama ve kentleşme konusunda olduğü gibi bütünleşme sonrasında oluşacak yeni yapının etkinlik ve verimlilik

alanında olumlu katkısı olacağına düşünenler olduğu gibi olumlu katkısı olmayacağını düşünenler de vardır.

Bütünleşmenin hizmet sunumunun etkinliği ve verimliliği açısından getireceği ilk olumluluk olarak bölgesel altyapı yatırımlarının yapılabilir hale geleceğidir. Burada ifade edilen durum şudur: metropoliten alandaki siyasi parçalanma bu tür bölgesel yatırımların yapılmasını engellemektedir. Çünkü yatırımın geçeceği belediyeler bu olayı Denizli Belediyesi ile yapılacak birer pazarlık konusu haline getirmekte ve imkânsız taleplerde bulunmaktadır. Metropoliten alandaki çok başlılığın ortadan kaldırılması bölgesel yatırımların tek elden yürütülmesini ve daha sorunsuz bir şekilde hayata geçmesini sağlayacaktır.

Bütünleşmenin hizmet sunumu açısından getireceği diğer bir katkının sunulan hizmetin kalitesinin artmasıdır. Bu noktada hizmet kalitesindeki artışın nedenlerinden biri hizmet sunum kapasitesindeki artıştır. Özellikle küçük ölçekli çevre belediyelerin hizmet sunum kapasitesinin yetersiz olduğu ve birleşme sonrasında bu yetersizliğin aşılacağı umulmaktadır. Bunun yanında mali kapasite artışı da hizmet kalitesini arttıracak diğer bir unsur olarak vurgulanmaktadır. Metropoliten alan genel bütçe vergi gelirlerinden ayrılan payın on dörde bölünmek yerine tek kaynaktan birikmesi belli bir mali kapasite artışına neden olacaktır. Tüm bunlara ek olarak personel niteliğindeki artış da hizmet kalitesini arttıracaktır. Denizli Belediyesi'nin iyi yetişmiş teknik personeli bütünleşme sonunda tüm metropoliten alanın hizmetine girecektir.

Hizmet sunumunda etkinlik ve verimliliği sağlayacak diğer bir unsur metropoliten alanın genelinde verilen hizmetlerin koordinasyonudur. Bu koordinasyon sağlandığında çevre belediyelerin birbirinden habersiz şekilde sundukları ve çoğu durumda birbiriyle çakışan hizmetler tekrara düşmeden ve tek elden sunulmuş olacaktır.

Hizmet verimliliği ve etkinliğini sağlayacak diğer bir unsur ise bütünleşme öncesinde hizmet sunumundan mahrum kalan bölgelere hizmet götürülmesi olacaktır. İki belediyenin sınırında olan bölgelerde belediyelerin diğer belediyeyi sorumlu saymasından kaynaklanan bir anlaşmazlık olabilmekte ve bu durumda söz konusu

bölgeler hizmetten mahrum kalmaktadırlar. Bütünleşme sonrasında sınırlar ortadan kalkacak ve tek bir idari bölge oluşacaktır. Bu durumda bu tür hizmet almayan bölge kalmayacaktır.

Hizmet verimliliğini artıracak diğer bir etken ise bütünleşme sonrasında yapılacak yeni personel planlamasıyla personel harcamaları azalacaktır. Parçalanmış yönetsel yapıda on dört bağımsız birim olduğu için her birimde belli bir işi yapan bir personel istihdam edilmek zorundadır. Ancak bütünleşme sonrasında iş ve emek gücü arasındaki ilişki daha rasyonel bir biçimde planlanacak ve bu da personel harcamalarında bir azalmaya neden olacaktır.

Hizmet sunumunda verimlilik ve etkinliği sağlayacak diğer bir nokta ise doğal kaynakların daha verimli bir şekilde kullanılmasıdır. Bu durum özellikle su kaynaklarının etkin ve verimli kullanımı konusunda çok önemlidir.

Bütünleşme özellikle belediyeler arasında oluşan ve halkı yakından ilgilendiren çatışmaların giderilmesinde etkili olacaktır. Özellikle belediyelerin hizmet sorumluluğunu komşu belediyeye attığı durumlarda halk gerçekten de mağdur olmaktadır. Bunun da ötesinde bu mağduriyetten dolayı halk kendi belediyelerini cezalandıramamaktadırlar çünkü belki de gerçekten hizmet sunumundaki aksaklığa ilişkin kendi belediyelerinin bir sorumluluğu yoktur.

Bir önceki konuyla da ilişkili şekilde hizmet etkinliğini ve verimliliğini arttıracak diğer bir konu ise ekonomik dışsallıkların giderilmiş olacağıdır. Siyasi olarak parçalanmış metropoliten alanda halk bedelini ödemediği komşu belediyenin sunduğu hizmetlerden faydalanabilir. Bu durum ise söz konusu hizmetlerin planlanmasını oldukça güçleştirmektedir. Bütünleşme sonrasında ortaya çıkacak olan tekil yapı bu tür dışsallıkların ortadan kalkmasına neden olacaktır.

Buna ek olarak farklı belediyelerin aynı hizmeti farklı niteliklerde sunması olasıdır. Bu durum ise halk arasında bir tür eşitsizliğin doğmasına neden olacaktır. Bütünleşme sonrasında oluşacak yapı bu tür hizmet farklılaşmasını engelleyecektir.

Bütünleşik yapının hizmet sunumunun etkinliği ve verimliliği konusunda pozitif katkıları olacağını düşünenler yanında olumlu katkısının olmayacağını düşünenler de mevcuttur. Bu grubun öne sürdüğü ilk düşünce mevcut yapıda tüm belediyelerin kendine yeter durumda olduğudur. Bununla ilişkili olarak bölgede altyapı ve hizmet sunumu açısından yeni yatırımlara ihtiyaç olmadığı vurgulayanlar da olmuştur. Birleşme sonrası hizmet sunum düzeyinin azalacağı da ifade edilmiştir çünkü hâlihazırda Denizli Belediyesi'nin hizmet sunum düzeyinin küçük ölçekli çevre belediyelerden daha düşük olduğu vurgulanmıştır. Hizmet sunumunun etkinliğinin ve veriminin bütünleşmeden olumsuz etkileneceğini ifade edenlerin vurguladığı bir diğer nokta ise bütünleşme sonrasında belediye hizmetlerinden alınan ücretlerin artacağıdır. Bunun nedeni ise Denizli Belediyesi'nin benzer hizmetler için talep ettiği ücretlerin çevre belediyelerden çok daha fazla olmasıdır. Bununla birlikte birleşme ile büyüyecek olan belediye bürokrasisinin hizmet sunum etkinliğini ve verimliliğini olumsuz yönde etkileyeceği de düşünülmektedir. Bu noktada ifade edilen diğer bir görüş ise bütünleşme sonrası metropoliten alanda belediyeler arasındaki rekabetin ortadan kalkacağı ve bunun da hizmet performansında bir düşüşe neden olacağıdır. Aynı zamanda bütünleşmenin zannedildiği gibi hizmet sunumunu etkilemeyeceği çünkü özellikle altyapı alanında zaten kolektif şekilde hizmet verildiği de vurgulanmıştır. Bu konuda görüşülen kişilerin vurguladığı bir diğer nokta ise çevre belediyelerde çalışan işçilerin o belediyenin çalışmasına dair edindikleri gömülü bilgilerinin bütünleşme sonrası o işçilerin işten çıkarılmasıyla kaybolup gideceğidir. Örneğin altyapı işlerinde sistemde yapılan değişikliklerin sadece o belediyede çalışan personel tarafından bilindiği ve herhangi bir yerde kaydının olmadığı vurgulanmıştır. O belediye sınırları içinde çıkacak olası bir arıza durumunda resmi bilgilerin pek de işe yaramayacağı ifade edilmiştir. Hizmet sunumundaki etkinlik ve verimliliğin artışıyla ilgili bir diğer olumsuz yorum ise şudur: Denizli Belediyesi bünyesinde yapılan hizmet alım ihalelerinde adam kayırmacılık olduğu için hizmet sunumunda etkinliğin ve verimliliğin artmasının imkânsız olduğu çünkü ihaleleri hak edenlerin değil belediye başkanına yakın grupların aldığı ifade edilmiştir. Bu konuyla ilgili ifade edilen bir diğer nokta ise şudur: çevre belediyelerin ihtiyaçlarını genellikle o belediyedeki esnaftan karşıladığı bunun da o belde içinde bir ekonomik canlılık yarattığıdır. Buna mukabil birleşme sonrasında Denizli Belediyesi'nin büyüyen talep ölçeğinden dolayı ulusal ölçekte ihalelere çıkacağı ve bunun yerel esnafın durumunu olumsuz etkileyeceği de vurgulanmıştır.

Teknik konular içindeki bir diğer başlık ise bütünleşme siyasasının siyasi katılım süreçlerini nasıl etkileyeceğidir. Diğer konularda olduğu gibi bu konuda da görüşülen kişiler ikiye ayrılmıştır. Bütünleşme siyasasının katılım açısından olumsuzluklarını vurgulayan görüşler şöyledir: bütünleşmeyle ilgili herhangi bir şekilde halkın görüşlerinin alınmaması çok eleştirilmektedir. İkinci bir eleştirilen nokta ise bütünleşme siyasasının içeriğinin ve uygulama biçiminin daha değişik olabileceği noktasındadır. Eğer katılım süreçleri uygulanmış olsaydı sürecin daha sorunsuz ve etkin ilerleyeceği vurgulanmıştır. Katılım meselesiyle ilgili vurgulana bir diğer olumsuz nokta ise büyüyen idari yapı ile yöneticiler ve halk arasındaki mesafenin artacak olmasıdır. Görüşülen kişiler küçük ölçekli çevre belediyelerde kolaylıkla belediye başkanına ve meclis üyelerine ulaşılabilindiğini ancak bunun Denizli Belediyesi'nde imkânsız olduğunu vurgulamışlardır. Bütünleşmenin iktidar ile halk arasındaki mesafenin artmasına neden olacağını vurgulamışlardır.

Bütünleşmenin katılım açısından olumlu sonuçlar doğuracağını ifade edenlerin vurguladıkları noktalar ise şunlardır: bütünleşme sonrası tam katılım olanakları doğacaktır. Siyasi olarak parçalanmış bir metropoliten alanda diğer bir belediyenin aldığı kararlar sizin hayatınızı doğrudan etkileyebilecekken sırf siz o beldenin sınırları içinde yaşamıyorsunuz diye o belde ile ilgili bir söz hakkınız olmamaktadır. Bütünleşme sonrasında oluşacak yapıda ise metropoliten alanın tümüne ilişkin olarak karar süreçlerine katılım olanaklı hale gelecektir. İfade edilen diğer bir görüş ise bütünleşme sonrasında oluşacak yeni yapının daha örgütlü bir topluluk doğuracağıdır. Bu tür bir yapıda kişisel temsilden ziyade kurumsal temsil ön plana çıkacaktır. Bu da katılım süreçlerinin daha gerçekçi işlemesine neden olacaktır. Bu konuda dile getirilen bir diğer konu da referandum meselesidir. Herhangi bir referandum sonucu bazı belediyelerdeki vatandaşların bütünleşmeyi kabul etmesi ve diğerlerinin kabul etmemesi durumunda Denizli metropoliten alanında daha içinden çıkılmaz bir durumun ortaya çıkacağı ifade edilmiştir. Bu nedenle konunun halkın görüşlerine başvurmadan halledilmesi olumlu karşılanmıştır. Vurgulanan diğer bir nokta ise küçük ölçekli belediyelerde kurumsallaşma gelişkin olmadığı için işler kişisel ilişkiler üzerinden yürümektedir. Bu da bazen bazı vatandaşlar için olumsuz sonuçlar doğurmaktadır. Bu nedenler bütünleşme sonrasında daha gelişkin bir

kurumsal yapı ortaya çıkacağından kişisel ilişkiler değil kurumsal süreçler ön plana çıkacak ve vatandaşın hakkı yenmeyecektir.

Yukarıda ifade edilen teknik konular kadar siyasi süreçlerde Denizli metropoliten alanında uygulanan bütünleşme siyasasını anlamak açısından önemlidir. Bu konudaki ilk başlık ulusal ve yerel siyaset arasındaki ilişkidir. Burada yerel siyasein yaptığı şey çeşitli şekillerde Denizli metropoliten alanında yaşanan sorunları hükümetin gündemine getirmek ve konunun çözümü için hükümete baskı yapmaktır. Ulusal hükümetin tavrı ise, eğer gelen yerel talep hükümet nezdinde kabul görmüş ise, yerel argümanları siyasayı meşrulaştırmak için kullanmaktadır. Eğer süreç içerisinde anayasa mahkemesinin yasayı iptal etmesi veya Cumhurbaşkanı'nın kanun teklifini geri göndermesi gibi olumsuz gelişmeler olursa yerel halkın motivasyonunu yüksek tutmak için uğraşmaktadırlar. Hükümet kanadı nasıl bütünleşme siyasasının taraftarlarının motivasyonunu yüksek tutmaya çalışıyorsa muhalefet de bütünleşme karşıtlarının motivasyonunu yüksek tutmaya çalışmaktadır. Diğer bir değişle süreç boyunca yerel siyaset ile ulusal siyaset arasındaki bağ kopmamaktadır.

Siyasi süreçler konusundaki ikinci mesele ise siyasi aktörler arasındaki ilişkilerdir, özellikle siyasanın şekillenme sürecinde bu ilişkiler çok önemlidir. Bu noktada tartışılması gereken ilk konu siyasi elitler arasındaki mücadeledir. Denizli metropoliten alanının siyasi olarak parçalanmışlığı hükümetin gündemine gelince yerel siyasi aktörler süreci kendilerine göre yönlendirmek istemişlerdir. Çünkü bu süreci yönlendirecek kişi halk nezdinde önemli bir saygınlık kazanacaktır. Bu nedenle süreci yönlendirme talebi hükümete yakın farklı yerel aktörler arasında bir rekabet konusu olmuştur. Ancak bu konu sadece yerel bir konu olarak kalmamış aynı zamanda iller arasında da bir mücadele konusu olmuştur. Özellikle Denizli metropoliten bölgesinde bir büyükşehir belediyesi kurulmasına ilişkin girişimler başlatıldığında bu girişimler hâlihazırda büyükşehir olan illerin milletvekilleri tarafından engellenmeye çalışılmıştır. Çünkü Denizli'de bir büyükşehir belediyesi kurulması genel bütçe vergi gelirlerinden büyükşehir belediyelerine ayrılan payın daha çok parçaya bölünmesi anlamına gelecektir. Ancak bütünşehir siyasasının uygulanmasında en önemli faktörlerden biri zamanın belediye başkanı Nihat Zeybekçi ile Başbakan Tayyip Erdoğan arasındaki yakın ilişkidir. Denizli'de birçok

kişi belediye başkanı ile başbakan arasında bu denli bir yakın ilişki olmasaydı bütüncül uygulamaların gerçekleşmeyeceğine inanmaktadır.

Burada teknik meseleler ile siyasi süreçler arasındaki ilişkiye de değinmekte fayda vardır. Teknik meseleler konunun gündeme getirilmesi aşamasında meşrulaştırıcı araçlar olarak kullanılırken, sorunun çözümüne ilişkin içerik ve yöntem ise siyasi süreçler tarafından belirlenmektedir.

Son yıllarda Türkiye’de yerel yönetimlerin ölçeklerini arttırmaya ilişkin önemli müdahaleler olmuştur. Bu tezin amacı ise bu müdahalelerin arkasındaki gerçek niyeti ortaya çıkarmaktır.

Daha önce söylendiği gibi ulusal ölçekte yapılan inceleme küçük ölçekli belediyeler lehine söylenen argümanların çoğunun doğru olmadığı göstermiştir. Hükümetin yayınladığı ekonomik metin incelenmesi aslında yerel yönetimlerin birer mali kara delik olarak algılandığını ve yerel yönetimler alanına yapılan müdahalenin yerel yönetimlerin işleyişinde etkinlik ve verimliliği arttırmaktan ziyade yerel yönetimlerin genel merkez bütçesi üzerindeki ağırlığını hafifletmeye dönük bir müdahale olduğunu göstermiştir. Bu amaçla da yerel yönetimler alanındaki en zayıf halkalar olan küçük ölçekli belediyeler hedef alınmıştır.

Yerel ölçekte yapılan çalışmanın sonuçları da ulusal ölçekte yapılan çalışmadan çok da farklı değildir. Denizli metropoliten alan içinde kalan küçük ölçekli çevre belediyeler aleyhine üretilen savların da çok geçerliliğinin olmadığı görülmüştür. Yapılan inceleme temel amacın metropoliten alan yönetiminin tek elde toplanarak alanda üretilen rantı tek el tarafından el konulmasıdır. Dolayısıyla bu sürece müdahil olma amacı yerel aktörler arasında bir siyasi çekişmenin doğmasına neden olmaktadır.

Alanda yapılan görüşmeler siyasi aktörlerin nasıl tavır takındığını anlamak açısından da önemlidir. Genel olarak bir iktidar muhalefet karşıtlığından bahsetmek oldukça güçtür. Her aktör kendisi açısından durumu değerlendirmekte ve kendine en yüksek çıkarı sağlayacak şekilde tavır takınmaktadır.

Hem yerel hem de ulusal çalışma sonucunda bazı ortak kanılara varmak mümkündür. Gerçek niyetleri gizleme; siyasa uygulama sürecinde en az siyasi tansiyon çıkaracak noktaları hedefleme; yetersiz ve eksik teknik analiz; yeni ve daha güçlü bir siyasi otorite yaratma isteği; hükümet kanadında sembolik sermaye arttırma isteği ve siyasaları teknik gerekçelerle rasyonel kılma çabası hem ulusal hem de yerel ölçekte yapılan çalışmanın ortak bulgularıdır. Bu çerçevede yerel yönetimler birer yönetsel sorun alanı olarak görülmekten ziyade birer siyasi manipülasyon alanı olarak algılanmaktadır. Bundan 10-15 yıl önce (1994-1999 arası) Türkiye’de yeni yerel yönetimlerin kurulmasını teşvik eden merkezi hükümet bugün onları kapatmaya çalışmaktadır. 15 yıllık bir zaman diliminde merkezi hükümet birbirinin zıttı olan iki siyasayı uygulayabilmektedir. Denizli’de 2009 yılında yapılan yerel seçimler sonrasında uygulama giren belediyelerin birleştirilmesinin üzerinden daha iki yıl geçmeden 2011 genel seçimleri sırasında Denizli ziyaretinde Başbakan, Denizli’de Büyükşehir belediyesi kurulacağını vaat etmiştir.

Türkiye’de yerel yönetimlerde reform çabalarının sağlıklılaştırılması için iki nokta üzerinde durulması gerekmektedir. Bunlardan ilki merkezi yönetim ile yerel yönetimler arasındaki ilişkinin yeniden düzenlenmesidir. İkincisi ise yerel yönetimler arasındaki ilişkinin yeniden düzenlenmesidir.

Merkezi hükümet ile yerel yönetimler arasındaki ilişkinin yeniden düzenlenmesi konusunda yapılacak ilk şey yerel yönetimlerin merkezi yönetime olan mali bağıllılığının ortadan kaldırılmasıdır. Bu anlamda belediyelere kendi kaynaklarını yaratmak için daha fazla olanak tanınmalıdır. Bunun iki temel çıktısı olacaktır. Birincisi, belediyeler halktan topladıkları gelirlerle kendi bütçelerini oluşturdukları için harcama konusunda daha etkin ve verimli yöntemleri tercih edeceklerdir. İkincisi, halk belediye bütçesine daha fazla katkı sağladığı için belediyenin işleyişini daha fazla kontrol edecektir. Bu da demokratik işleyişin güçlenmesini sağlayacaktır. Ancak bu yapılırken aynı zamanda belediyeler arasında gelir yaratma açısından doğacak farklılıklar yüzünden ekonomik ve sosyal eşitsizliklerin oluşmasını engellemek için belediyeler arası fon transferini sağlayacak bir mekanizma da geliştirilmelidir.

Yerel ynetimler arasındaki iliřkinin yeniden dzenlenmesine konusunda zellikle metropoliten blgeler dikkate alınmalıdır. Burada hem gncel durum hem de gelecekteki olası durumlar gz nnde bulundurulmalıdır. Gncel duruma iliřkin siyasi olarak paralanmıř metropoliten bgelerde belediyelerin bazı grevleri (altyapı, planlama vb.) hizmet etkinlięi ve verimlilięi aısından tm blgede hizmet gsterecek ve kendi z gelirlerine sahip hizmet birimlerine devredilebilir. Bylece belediyelerin kapatılması gibi antidemokratik yntemler uygulanmamıř olur. Benzer biimde metropoliten alanda bazı hizmetlerin sunumu merkezi ynetimin tařra teřkilatlarına bırakılabilir. Mevcut duruma ek olarak metropoliten alanlarda yeni belediyelerin oluřmasını engelleyecek ya da zorlařtıracak nlemler de metropoliten alanlarda belediyeler arası iliřkileri dzenleyecek nemli bir uygulamadır.