

A COMPARISON OF THE NATION-BUILDING PRACTICES OF  
UZBEKISTAN AND TURKEY

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO  
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES  
OF  
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

MUSTAFA MURAT YURTBİLİR

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS  
FOR  
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY  
IN  
THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

MAY 2011

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

\_\_\_\_\_  
Prof. Dr. Meliha Altunışık  
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı  
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Prof. Dr. Süha Bölükbaşıođlu  
Supervisor

**Examining Committee Members**

Prof. Dr. Süha Bölükbaşıođlu (METU, IR) \_\_\_\_\_  
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Pınar Akçalı (METU, ADM) \_\_\_\_\_  
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Pınar Bilgin (Bilkent U., IR) \_\_\_\_\_  
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Oktay F. Tanrısever (METU, IR) \_\_\_\_\_  
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Zana Çıtak Aytürk (METU, IR) \_\_\_\_\_

**I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.**

Name, Last name:

Signature:

## **ABSTRACT**

### **A COMPARISON OF THE NATION-BUILDING PRACTICES OF UZBEKISTAN AND TURKEY**

Yurtbilir, Mustafa Murat

Ph.D., Department of International Relations

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Sha Blkbaıođlu

May 2011, 358 pages.

This dissertation compares nation-building practices of post-Soviet Uzbekistan and post-Ottoman Turkey. In both cases the legitimacy principle of collapsed imperial polities which was largely based on universal ideologies or on the dynastic and religious principles, had to be replaced by the nationality principle. The politics of nation-building thus served first and foremost to reinstitute the legitimacy. The dissertation analyzes three aspects of nation-building; ideology, history and language. The general argument in the dissertation is that the policies of nation-building are among the ingredients of constructing a novel legitimization base for the elites. For this purpose Uzbekistan and Turkey constituted perfect cases to analyze the nation-building practices such as rewriting histories, creating and molding languages, religious policies in order to clarify the relationship between the nation-building and the construction of an overall legitimization principle. Secondly Uzbekistan in 1920s and 1920s and then after 1991, Turkey in the first fifteen years after the declaration of the republic used nation-building policies primarily to satisfy the political needs of the ruling elites.

**Keywords:** Nation-building, legitimacy, Turkish, Uzbek, Soviet Union

## ÖZ

### ÖZBEKİSTAN VE TÜRKİYE’NİN ULUS YARATMA SÜREÇLERİNİN BİR KARŞILAŞTIRMASI

Yurtbilir, Mustafa Murat

Doktora, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Süha Bölükbaşıoğlu

Mayıs 2011, 358 sayfa.

Bu tez Sovyet sonrası Özbekistan ile Osmanlı sonrası Türkiye’nin ulus yaratma süreçlerini karşılaştırmaktadır. Her iki örnekte de evrensel ideolojiler ile dini ve kalıtsal kurallara dayanan meşruiyet ilkesi milli bir meşruiyet temeli ile değiştirilmiştir. Bu bağlamda ulus yaratma politikaları herşeyden önce meşruiyeti yeniden sağlama amacına hizmet etmiştir. Tez ulus yaratma sürecini üç boyutuyla, ideoloji, tarih ve dil boyutlarıyla ele almaktadır. Tezin ana savı söz konusu ulus yaratma politikalarının seçkinlerin yeni bir meşruiyet temeli oluşturmalarının aracı olduğudur. Bu meyanda Özbekistan ve Türkiye meşruiyet ve ulus yaratma ilişkisinin analizi için çok uygun iki ülke olarak sivrilmektedir. Ulus yaratma 1920lerde ve ardından 1991 sonrası Özbekistan ile cumhuriyetin ilanını izleyen onbeş yılda Türkiye’de herşeyden önce yönetici elitlerin siyasi ihtiyaçlarına göre şekillenmiştir.

**Anahtar kelimeler:** Ulus yaratma, meşruiyet, Türk, Özbek, Sovyetler Birliği

**For my father, Ali İhsan Yurtbilir...**  
**Babam Ali İhsan Yurtbilir için...**

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor Prof. Dr. Süha Bölükbaşıođlu for his support in the whole process of my PhD work. I am also grateful to my distinguished examining committee members, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Pınar Akçalı, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Pınar Bilgin, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Oktay Tanrısever and Assoc. Prof. Dr. Zana Çıtak Aytürk for their valuable comments and suggestions. The thesis benefited much from the reading and comments of Assoc. Prof. Dr. Pınar Akçalı.

I would also like to express gratitude to Refiye and Alim Ergül, Nilay, Erdoğan and Sude Ceren Görgülü for their exceptionally thoughtful and kind attitude throughout the last and the key period of the thesis writing.

I would like to thank Ayşe Ömür Atmaca, Aslıgöl Sarıkamış Kaya, Ceren Katipođlu, Tolga Candan, Altuđ Yalçıntaş for their friendship and help. I am grateful especially to Berna Özen Süer for her smiling face and generous help.

My most heartfelt thanks are for my family. I thank my dear mother Güler Yurtbilir for her love and unconditional support all through my life. Metecan Yurtbilir provided me his calm and sober motivation especially in the most crucial moments of the dissertation. The most unfavorable part of the writing process was being far away from both of you. I am beholden to Aslı Ergül Yurtbilir for her constant trust and encouragement. Thank you my dearest Aslı for your never-ending patience and invaluable support in the long İzmir days and nights passing with the boring tone of the keyboard. You, Tarçın and ‘the front door gull’ provided me the most needed comfort and warmth in the truly anxious days. This dissertation would not be in the appearance as it is now without your careful overview of the format.

Finally I dedicate this dissertation to my father Ali İhsan Yurtbilir who was bothered about the fate of this work even in his last days. He was the one who had first dreamt of me as an academician.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT .....	iv
ÖZ .....	v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .....	vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS .....	viii
LIST OF TABLES .....	xi
LIST OF MAPS .....	xii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .....	xiii
CHAPTER	
1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
2. THEORY.....	15
2.1. Formulas for Legitimacy: Fear, Power, Religion, Ideology .....	15
2.2. Legitimacy through Nation-Building .....	25
2.3. From Empire to Nation-State: New Legitimation.....	47
3. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW.....	56
3.1. Legitimation in Turan and Iran .....	57
3.2. Islam for Legitimation.....	63
3.3. Return of Turanian Legitimacy: Yasa of Genghis Khan.....	67
3.4. Day Dream of Osman: Legitimacy in Early Ottoman State.....	70
3.5. The Perfect Mélange of Islamic and Neo-Genghisid Legitimacies: Timur .....	73
3.6. Ottoman Meets Timur in Ankara .....	78
3.7. From Ankara to Cairo: Centralization and Consolidation .....	81
3.8. Desolate Caravanserais and Archaic Khans: Legitimation of Ignorance.....	86
3.9. Legitimation of Foreign Rule: Power and Ideology.....	88



3.10. Legitimacy in Decadence: Late Ottoman Era .....	96
4. IDEOLOGY .....	100
4.1. UZBEKISTAN.....	100
4.1.1. New Khan over Clans .....	100
4.1.2. Fancy Laws, Fake Elections, Puppet Parties.....	110
4.1.3. New Grand Narrative: Ideology of National Independence.....	123
4.1.4. Homogeneity and Social Control: Mahalla .....	145
4.2. TURKEY.....	149
4.2.1. Kemalism as an Ideology of Modernisation .....	151
4.2.2. Nine Principles and Six Arrows .....	156
5. HISTORY.....	168
5.1. UZBEKISTAN.....	171
5.1.1. Evolution of Soviet Historiography .....	172
5.1.2. Return of Amir Timur .....	177
5.1.3. Loading History with the National: Hamid Ziyaev, the Official Historian .....	186
5.1.4. Histories for Practical Needs.....	190
5.2. TURKEY.....	192
5.2.1. The Ottoman Historiography .....	192
5.2.2. Early Years of Republic to the Foundation of Turkish Historical Society .....	201
5.2.3. ...And Turks Migrated All Over the World: Turkish History Thesis.....	204
5.2.4. History Textbooks of the “Thesis” .....	211
5.2.5. History Congresses.....	217
6. LANGUAGE.....	222
6.1. UZBEKISTAN.....	226
6.1.1. Ak Padishah in Central Asia .....	226
6.1.2. Red Padishah in Uzbekistan.....	230
6.1.3. Independence and Enthusiasm for Uzbek Language .....	237
6.2. TURKEY.....	255
6.2.1. Linguistic Blend: Arabic in Mosque, Persian in Court, Turkish at Home .....	255

6.2.2. Ottoman Blend of Languages.....	257
6.2.3. The Alphabet Reform.....	261
6.2.4. Radical Purism and Language Congresses.....	268
7. CONCLUSION .....	275
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	288
APPENDICES	
Appendix 1 .....	330
Appendix 2 .....	331
Appendix 3 .....	334
Appendix 4 .....	336
Appendix 5 .....	337
Appendix 6 .....	338
Appendix 7 .....	339
Appendix 8 .....	340
Appendix 9 .....	342
Appendix 10 .....	343
Appendix 11 .....	344
Appendix 12 .....	345
Appendix 13 .....	346
TÜRKÇE ÖZET.....	348
Curriculum Vitae.....	357

## LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Breuilly's Classification of Nationalist Movements.....	47
Table 2: Main Features of Turkish History Sections and Pages .....	209
Table 3: Uzbek, Sart and Tajik Population under Russian Empire.....	228
Table 4: Literacy Rates for Central Asian Peoples .....	230
Table 5: Common Turkic Roman Alphabet.....	247
Table 6: Roman Alphabet Adopted in 1993.....	248
Table 7: Roman Alphabet Adopted in 1995.....	250

## LIST OF MAPS

Map 1 - Uzbekistan in 2000.....	xvi
Map 2 - Contemporary Central Asia .....	xvii
Map 3 - Turkey in 1938.....	xviii
Map 4 - Rise of the Ottoman Empire .....	85
Map 5 - Soviet Union before National Delimitation in 1922.....	93
Map 6 - Soviet Union .....	95
Map 7 - Dissolution of the Ottoman Empire between 1798-1923 .....	99
Map 8 - Migration from Central Asia .....	211
Map 9 - Population Groups in Contemporary Central Asia .....	227

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CUP .....	Committee of Union and Progress ( <i>İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti</i> )
KGB.....	Secret Service of the Soviet Union
RPP.....	Republican People's Party ( <i>Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi</i> )
TBMM.....	Grand National Assembly of Turkey ( <i>Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi</i> )
TTAH.....	Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatları (General Outlines of Turkish History)
USSR.....	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

**Map 1 – Uzbekistan in 2000**



Source: <http://geology.com/world/uzbekistan-map.gif>

Map 2 - Contemporary Central Asia



Source: [http://www.japanfocus.org/data/rus.central\\_asia.jpg](http://www.japanfocus.org/data/rus.central_asia.jpg)

Map 3 – Turkey in 1938



Source: The University of Texas at Austin, Electronic Library,  
[http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle\\_east\\_and\\_asia/turkey\\_pol83.jpg](http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/turkey_pol83.jpg)



## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

The term “Central Asia” literally implies a rather vague region referring to the center of the Asian landmass without specifying clear boundaries. “Central Asia” was occasionally used to denote a vast area including the Russian steppes, Afghanistan, Tibet and Xinjiang regions of China and even the north of Pakistan alongside the Transoxiana.<sup>1</sup> Quite the opposite, the conventional Russian practice detach Kazakhstan from the remaining four countries and the term Central Asia came to indicate the quite limited area of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.<sup>2</sup> Besides several alternative terms such as Turkestan and the Inner Asia, were also used to indicate more or less the same geographical area. Despite the fact that a reasonable geographical delimitation of Central Asia should encompass at least Afghanistan, Xinjiang, the southern steppes of Russia and perhaps Mongolia together with Turkestan, a political definition of the region became prevalent particularly after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In Kort’s words the Russian Turkestan now partitioned as five independent republics of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan came to be known as the Central Asia.<sup>3</sup> In the same manner

---

<sup>1</sup> Transoxiana meaning “beyond the river Oxus (Amu Darya)”, was the most ancient geographical term to denote the hearth of the Central Asia. Normally the term was used to refer to the region between the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers. Michael Kort, *Central Asian Republics*, New York: Facts on File Inc., 2004, p. 18.

<sup>2</sup> Russian literati and academics habitually use “Kazakhstan and Central Asia” while speaking of the region.

<sup>3</sup> Kort, *ibid.*, p. 6.

throughout this dissertation Central Asia would refer to these five independent countries which cover an area of roughly four million sq. km and is inhabited by just about 60 million as of 2010.<sup>4</sup>

Central Asian peoples had been politically and economically vigorous actors in the long course of the history as warriors and merchants. The warrior nomads and their tribal confederations led by a great khan could emerge as huge political empires more than once. In addition Central Asian traders were able to create wealthy merchant cities along the ancient Silk Road. However, once the era of legendary Turco-Mongol khans of the Asian steppes stretching from the east of the Caspian Sea and the Ural Mountains to the shores of the Pacific Ocean had passed, Central Asia politically turned out to be one of the most neglected regions of the world. Furthermore, as the new sea route from China to Europe through the Atlantic and the Indian Oceans had distracted increasingly the larger share of the trade as of the sixteenth century, Central Asia also lost its economic liveliness. Then the region had appeared as a passive object in the struggle of two outside powers, the Great Game between the British and Tsarist Empires resulted in the acknowledgement of the Russian dominance in the region. Afterward Central Asia turned out to be an insignificant adjunct of the Russian and then the Soviet history in the last two centuries. Central Asia was the black hole in the “grand chessboard” at the time of the Soviet dissolution.<sup>5</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup> Total area of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan is 4,003,400 km<sup>2</sup>. The Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations estimated the total population of five Central Asian countries as 60.726,000 in 2010. <http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/unpp/p2k0data.asp> reached on April 22, 2011.

<sup>5</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Büyük Satranç Tahtası: Amerika'nın Önceliği ve Bunun Jeostratejik Gereklere*, İstanbul: Sabah Kitapları, 1998, pp. 81-111.

Uzbekistan was the most populous of the Central Asian countries that found themselves independent after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Last Soviet censuses of 1989 revealed that Uzbekistan had a population of 19,906,000 which was larger than any of the neighboring Central Asian countries.<sup>6</sup> This meant that at the time of the declaration of the independence almost 40% of the Central Asian population was the citizen of Uzbekistan. Although Uzbekistan's territory of 447,400 sq. km encompasses only one ninth of whole Central Asia, its share in the total population increased in the two decades of independence. In the absence of an official population census, estimated figures of July 2011 held that the country had a population of 28,128,600.<sup>7</sup> It is striking that the population of the country increased 50% after the declaration of the independence. Furthermore since 26% of the population was below 14 years old, the population growth seems to continue in the following decades.<sup>8</sup> According to the 1989 censuses 71.4% of Uzbekistan's population was ethnic Uzbek, 8.3% Russian, 4.7% Tajik, 4.1% Kazak and 2.1% Karakalpak.<sup>9</sup> The trend however was the increase in the share of Uzbeks at the expense of emigrating Russian population. The percentage of the ethnic Uzbek population reached to 80% in 1996 while Russians were then just 5.5%.<sup>10</sup>

The significance of Uzbekistan in Central Asia was even magnified due to the share of ethnic Uzbek population in the region. According to 1989 censuses ethnic

---

<sup>6</sup> In the same population census Kazakhstan's population was found 16,538,000, while the populations of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan were 5,112,000, 4,291,000 and 3,534,000 respectively. Valery Tishkov, *Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in and After the Soviet Union: The Mind Aflame*, London & Thousand Oaks & New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1997, p. 41.

<sup>7</sup> CIA World Factbook <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/uz.html> reached at April 3, 2011. CIA World Factbook releases mid-year population estimates in the beginning of each year.

<sup>8</sup> CIA World Factbook, *ibid*.

<sup>9</sup> A. J. Armanini, *Politics and Economics of Central Asia*, New York: Novinka Books, 2002, p. 45.

<sup>10</sup> CIA World Factbook, *ibid*.

Uzbek population in whole USSR was 16,686,000 while ethnic Kazaks were only 8,138,000. The same census determined ethnic Turkmen population as 2,718,000, Tajiks as 4,217,000 and lastly the Kyrgyz as 2,531,000.<sup>11</sup> Thus leaving the shrinking Russian population in the region aside, nearly half of the local population in Central Asia was ethnic Uzbek in 1989. Due to higher population growth rates in Uzbekistan throughout last twenty years, it is likely that the percentage of ethnic Uzbek population in Central Asia is still around 50%.

The fact that Uzbekistan is one of the two double landlocked<sup>12</sup> countries of the world may bear in the mind that the country is isolated and strategically negligible. However, the country stretches in the very heart of the Central Asia from the traditional cultural and economic hubs of Bukhara and Samarkand to the ancient center of numerous civilizations Khiva. In addition, the center of Russian colonial administration in Central Asia, Tashkent and the largest part of the fertile Ferghana Valley were included in the Uzbek country. Due to its favorable location in the center of the region Uzbekistan is the only Central Asian country that has common border with all other newly independent states of the region. What is more all of the neighboring states found sizable Uzbek minorities within their territories after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. 1989 Soviet Census demonstrated that 23.5% of Tajikistan's population was ethnic Uzbek while Uzbeks constituted 12.9% in Kyrgyzstan, 9% in Turkmenistan and 2% in Kazakhstan.<sup>13</sup> Hence Uzbekistan appears as the most powerful state in the "black hole" of the American strategist Brzezinski

---

<sup>11</sup> Tishkov, *ibid.*, p. 41.

<sup>12</sup> Double landlocked is used to denote that neither the country nor any of its neighbors have access to open seas. The only other double landlocked country in the world is Liechtenstein. CIA World Factbook, *ibid.*

<sup>13</sup> Annette Bohr, *Uzbekistan: Politics and Foreign Policy*, London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1998, p. 50.

that may resist any future Russian attempt to renew hegemony in Central Asia.<sup>14</sup> In addition, the geographically central position of Uzbekistan and the existence of Uzbek minorities scattered in Central Asia provide Uzbek leaders the opportunity to exert influence upon other Central Asian countries to a certain degree.

Most scholars agree that at least the “creation of proto-nations”<sup>15</sup> in Central Asia was realized in the early Soviet era. Zanca argued that Uzbek modernization in which the Uzbek nation-building had been the core ingredient, passed through three phases. The first phase was the epoch of the Jadidists. The Jadidists, more or less being the counterparts of the Young Turks, primarily defended a more secular conception of life style for the Turkestani people, a reformed and modernized version of Islam, and more timidly national ideals influenced by the Western notion of national state. Although the impact of the Jadidists was rather limited the second phase of the Soviet national delimitation and the subsequent communist rule was the decisive period in the formation of the Uzbek identity. For Zanca, it was the Soviet era in which the Uzbek identity took its shape.<sup>16</sup> In fact Uzbekistan as a political entity was a genuine creation of the Soviet leaders. The leader of the Bolshevik Revolution Lenin claimed that reaching to the level of socialism was bound to the establishment of the Central Asian national-bourgeoisie states. Stalin drew the boundaries and turned out to be the chief initiator of the creation of literary languages in Central Asia. Lastly in Khrushchev period and especially in the Brezhnev era, local elites consolidated their position within the communist hierarchy of respective Soviet Republics as well as in the Uzbek state. In this period the Bolshevik rhetoric had well-

---

<sup>14</sup> Brzezinski, *ibid.*, p. 110.

<sup>15</sup> Resul Yalcin, *The Rebirth of Uzbekistan: Politics, Economy and Society in the Post-Soviet Era*, Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 2002, p. 82.

<sup>16</sup> For Zanca’s arguments please look at Russell Zanca, “Three Phases of Uzbek Modernism: Jadidist, Stalinist, and Post-Soviet”, *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora*, pp. 13-26.

fitted to the clannish elites of Uzbekistan. Indeed the ruling stratum of the Soviet Uzbekistan was bred in line with the ideological premises of the Communist Party.

Finally according to Zanca the third phase of modernization in Uzbekistan has been the period of the independence from 1991 to the present. In this period Uzbek leaders attempted to transform the greenhouse state of the Uzbek SSR founded by the Soviet leaders into a nation-state. For this reason, the period was characterized by an ideological de-sovietization and replacing the Marxism-Leninism with the new Uzbek national ideology. Zanca was right that intelligentsia of the independent Uzbekistan has been busy to rescue Turkic cultural heritage from the remnants of the Soviet influence and they were increasingly caught up by the modernist genre of the Jadidist era. Similar to the Kemalist Turkey of the 1920s and 1930s, independent Uzbekistan would greet westernization as modernization and attempted the creation of a national identity around the titular ethnic group. Though even this sort of Uzbek national revivalism had to acknowledge the national territories of Uzbekistan in the form the Soviet leaders had drawn for them seventy years ago. Yet again, Kemalist Turkey had also conceded to manage its nation-building process on the remaining lands of the Ottoman Empire and closed eyes to the external Turkish co-nationals.

In 1920s and 1930s Turkey pursued policies to found a national state upon the residues of the dissolved Ottoman Empire. The boundaries of the country emerged after the First World War and the following Turkish-Greek War. The Kemalist elites had initiated one of the most comprehensive modernization projects of the twentieth century in the country. After the liquidation of rival dynastical and religious bases of legitimation through the abolition of, first the sultanate and later the caliphate, new regime came to legitimate itself as the true representative of the Turkish nation. In fact, the leaders of the Turkish nation-building process were the disappointed successors of the Young Ottoman and then the Young Turk generations, they were disappointed since Islamism and Ottomanism had proved incapable to prevent the

Empire's collapse. As a result Kemalist nation-building had to concede as the late Unionists that the only remaining ideological solution was the Turkish nationalism. In this sense the Turkish experience included no 'Soviet impasse' so to speak, as the Uzbek nation-building process did; it was rather a continuation of the earlier Unionist nationalism of the late Ottoman Empire.

After the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire the Kemalists had only the Anatolian peninsula and a tiny piece of the Balkan territory with a quite small population as the scene of the Turkish national identity construction. The figures found in the first census after the independence revealed that the population of Turkey was only 13.648.270 on October 20, 1927.<sup>17</sup> However as Uzbekistan would experience in 1990s and 2000s, Turkish nation-building process was accompanied by a huge population growth. In the first fifty years of the Republican era the population of Turkey had tripled<sup>18</sup> and the new regime had to opportunity to sculpt the large number of the youngsters. Besides since the Turkish Republic was founded as the direct heir of the Ottoman Empire, the Republican elites faced the prospects and challenges in relations with all neighboring countries as a result of the traditional ties and hostilities as well. While the two western neighbors, Greece and Bulgaria had sizable Turkish minorities, there were long standing religious and cultural bonds with the southern Arab people. Both Uzbekistan and Turkey consciously abstained from exploitation their advantageous positions in geographical, historical and demographical terms vis-à-vis neighbors. Both countries gave intentionally the priority to their internal nation-building efforts.

---

<sup>17</sup> The results of the population census of October 20, 1927 were derived from [www.belgenet.com](http://www.belgenet.com) which compiled the data from the State Planning Organization on May 4, 2006.

<sup>18</sup> The population of Turkey was 40.347.719 in 1975 according to the censuses carried on October 26, 1975. The census data were reached at [www.belgenet.com](http://www.belgenet.com) on May 4, 2006.

One striking resemblance between Uzbekistan and Turkey was the feature of the cadres that were managing the nation-building processes. Uzbek and Turkish nation-states were not the outcomes of the movements of ‘popular nationalism’ or bourgeois revolutions, but of deliberate actions by the state elites. It is noteworthy that the nation-states in these countries were also consequences of the legitimacy crisis faced by the traditional authority structures. Once operating within a completely different ideological framework, more or less the same leading cadres came to justify their authority in another paradigm. In Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov who had replaced Nishanov just before the proclamation of independence was a communist party apparatchik for decades. Khojaev and Ikramov, national Bolsheviks of 1920s had elevated to the posts of the Party Secretary and the President in Uzbekistan as descending from the influential clans of the country on balance. Similarly all the members of cadre reforming Turkey in its first two decades were army commanders, civil servants and intellectuals at the Ottoman era. Moreover the same cadre was all among the Unionists who were ruling the Empire during Second Constitutional Period.

Until the 1990s the regime in Turkey carefully abstained from the pan-Turkist claims and kept such irredentist rhetoric out of the official discourse. The demands for the Central Asian Turkic ‘brothers’ were voiced in 1940s and 1950s in the journals published by the racists and pan-Turkist circles around Nihal Atsız and Reha Oğuz Türkkan and later in 1960s and 1970s by the marginal Nationalist Action Party.<sup>19</sup> Immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, pan-Turkist statements diffused

---

<sup>19</sup> Nationalist Action Party could gather only 2.2% in 1969 elections in 3.02% in 1965, 3.38% in 1973 and 6.42% in 1977. For the election results please look at [tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/milliyetçi\\_hareket\\_partisi](http://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/milliyetçi_hareket_partisi). Please notice that in 1965 elections the party’s name was the “Republican Peasants’ Nation Party”; then the name was changed into “Nationalist Action Party” before the elections in 1969.



into the speeches of several senior politicians in Turkey.<sup>20</sup> In the same period the Central Asian leaders declared one after another that they would prefer the secular Turkish way as opposed to the fundamentalist Iranian model. Besides being a secular state, as all Central Asian leaders would prefer, at least at the outset Turkey also meant a bridge for the Central Asians to the West.<sup>21</sup> As Greenberger noticed the United States were promoting the Turkish model in Central Asia and the “ties with Turkey and the West and also foreign investment from the US”<sup>22</sup> seemed to be the shortest way to develop backward economies of Central Asia in early 1990s. President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov stated at a visit to Ankara that “[our] example was Turkey; we would establish [our] state according to this example”.<sup>23</sup> Similar to the other Turkic neighbors, Uzbek elites perceived Turkish nation-building process which accomplished the foundation of a secular nation-state while preserving the stability and order at the same time, as the most suitable pattern for their post-Soviet transformation.

Although Uzbek leaders maintained at several occasions that Turkey would be the model of their country in nation-building and modernization, only a few works had dealt with comparing the Uzbek and Turkish experiences. Moreover all the works on the Uzbek and Turkish nation-building practices focused on only specific areas such as history-writing or linguistic policies. For example in his short essay Andrew

---

<sup>20</sup> For instance the President of Turkey Turgut Özal maintained that gathering of the leaders of all Turkic states at the Republic Day of Turkey would be a great chance and added that “the 21st century would be the century of Turkey and of the Turks”. *Hürriyet*, October 17, 1992. Similarly the Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel claimed that Turkey was the model country in a huge region from Adriatic Sea to China where 600 million people were living. *Hürriyet*, April 6, 1993.

<sup>21</sup> “Muslim States Look to Turkey as a Moderate Model”, *The Economist*, April 25, 1992.

<sup>22</sup> Robert S. Greenberger, “‘Turkish Model’: Baker Tours Central Asia Seeking Promises and Ties”, *The Wall Street Journal Europe*, 14 February 1992, p. 12.

<sup>23</sup> İdris Bal, “The Turkish Model and the Turkic Republics”, *Perceptions*, Vol: 3, No: 3, September-November 1998, p. 118.

Segars compared the Uzbek and Turkish policies regarding the language and historiography.<sup>24</sup> Likewise Büşra Ersanlı's article compared the Uzbek history textbooks of 1990s and Turkish history textbooks of both 1930s and 1990s.<sup>25</sup> Thus the aim of the dissertation is first of all to fill the gap in the literature of a broad comparison of the Uzbek and Turkish nation building processes.

The following question is whether Uzbekistan and Turkey, the two cases to be analyzed in order to illuminate the primary argument of the dissertation provide a realistic ground for comparison. Despite Uzbek and Turkish nation-building projects had been realized in different historical periods, distinct geographical places and afterwards of diverse historical accumulations, the recipe implemented seems similar, if not the same. Before all, in both countries the previous grounds for legitimacy of ruling classes dissolved. Universalistic ideologies of multi-national empires were replaced by nationalist ideologies supported by a set of similar policies. While both countries represented an ideological discontinuity with their pasts, particularly the Uzbek case appeared to be institutional heir of the Soviet era. Most of the institutions in Uzbekistan only changed their names, while Kemalism represented a more thorough institutional break with the Ottoman past.

The general argument of the dissertation is that the policies of nation-building should be considered as an ingredient of constructing a novel legitimization base for the elites. Uzbekistan and Turkey constituted perfect cases to analyze the nation-building practices such as rewriting histories, creating and molding languages, religious policies in order to clarify the relationship between the nation-building and the

---

<sup>24</sup> Andrew Segars, "Nation Building in Turkey and Uzbekistan: The Use of Language and History in the Creation of National Identity", p. 94 in Everett-Heath, Tom (eds), *Central Asia: Aspects of Transition*, London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003.

<sup>25</sup> Büşra Ersanlı, "History Textbooks as Reflections of the Political Self: Turkey (1930s and 1990s) and Uzbekistan (1990s)", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol: 34, No: 2, Special Issue: Nationalism and the Colonial Legacy in the Middle East and Central Asia, May 2002, pp. 337-349.

construction of an overall legitimation principle. Post-Empire contexts generally display genuine legitimation crises. Because the legitimacy in imperial polities which was largely based on universal ideologies or on the dynastic and religious principles should be replaced by a national principle. The politics of nation-building thus serve first and foremost to reinstitute the legitimacy.

The second more narrow argument of the dissertation is this: Uzbekistan in 1920s and 1930s and then after 1991, Turkey in the first fifteen years after the declaration of the republic used nation-building policies primarily to satisfy the political needs of the ruling elites. Even under the banner of Marxist-Leninist ideology the first phase of the Uzbek nation-building made use the typical methods of history writing and linguistic manipulation. For sure, the Turkish experiment of nation-building was extremely radical compared to the post-independence Uzbekistan. But the difference was a matter of degree not of content; because the striking passion and the extra commitment of the Kemalist top leadership left aside, the policy areas and the methods used in both nation-building ventures were same. First of all Turkish and Uzbek nation-building projects elaborated specific ideologies in order to justify their ‘operations’: Kemalism in Turkey and the ideology of national independence in Uzbekistan. Kemalism had included extensive use of language and history as a tool of nationalist project. Turkish History Thesis and the Sun Language Theory had been two examples of this usage. Likewise, post-Soviet Uzbekistan experienced rewriting the history and implementation of new language laws in the line of national project of Karimov government. Thus, Uzbekistan in post-Soviet period and Turkey in the first decades after the proclamation of the Republic provide extensive examples to the use of ‘standard policies’ of nation-building. As a result, in order to shed light on the above-mentioned argument, the dissertation focuses on the following three themes:

- Ideology
- History
- Language

The dissertation consists of five chapters together with the introduction and the conclusion. After the introduction, the second chapter commences with a brief overview of the legitimation procedures and their evolution in the history. Because as stated in the afore-mentioned argument of the dissertation, the nation-building practices implemented in particularly post-Empire contexts were also part of the legitimation strategies of the ruling elites. In the chapter, modes of legitimation in dynastical, religious and legal/procedural terms will be overviewed. Then the emergence of the nation-state with a novel base of legitimation will be briefed via a summary of mostly political theories of nationalism and nation-building. Lastly Rogers Brubaker's institutional approach to the post-Soviet nationalisms will be summarized; the central proposition at this point will be that the Ottoman millets and the Soviet republics turned out to be the institutional frameworks of the later nation-building projects.

The third chapter will provide the overview of the historical background of Uzbek and Turkish cases. The history, pieces of which were used selectively by the Turkish and Uzbek nation-building projects, will also be overviewed selectively. The criteria of selection will be in line with the choices of the elites who initiated the nation-building projects. In Uzbekistan and Turkey the elites had opted for a territorial scheme which was carefully limited with their existing borders. Thus the chapter will primarily deal with the historical epochs and heroes that were active exclusively in Anatolia and Transoxiana. Moreover the chapter shall not come up with a chronological history but a history of the legitimation methods used before the establishment of the Uzbek and Turkish nation-states. Accordingly the antagonisms between urban and nomad, aristocratic and autocratic and also Islamic and Genghisid legitimation procedures will be overviewed. The presupposition of the dissertation is that the influences of all these legitimation methods may be seen in the nation-building practices of Uzbekistan and Turkey.

The fourth chapter of the dissertation will deal with the official ideologies of Turkey and Uzbekistan that are Kemalism and the ideology of national independence respectively. In the very beginning the institutional structure of the Uzbek regime shall be analyzed. Then main features of the ideology of national independence such as the unity of all powers in the personality of the President, continuous perception of threat and the accompanying obsession of stability and security will be examined. It will be striking to see that *O'zbekchilik*, the Uzbekism, of the ideology of national independence had also overlooked the ethnic diversities within the people as in the Kemalist nationalism. Kemalism on the other hand was an ideology of modernization and westernization. It was presented as a transcendental ideology. In the first subsection on Turkish ideology, the intra-elite struggle and the emergence of the political principles of Kemalism will be reviewed. Lastly the implications of the Kemalist six arrows which are populism, republicanism, nationalism, secularism, etatism and reformism will be briefed.

In the fifth chapter the role of historiography in Uzbek and Turkish nation-building practices will be analyzed. The Soviet historiography stood for the first attempt to craft a peculiar Uzbek history. The contents of the Uzbek histories written in the Soviet period had varied considerably from the revolutionary attitude of the Pokrovsky School of 1920s to the national-communist historians of the Brezhnev era. However post-independence Uzbekistan took over the territorial approach of the Soviet history-writing. One of the most prominent historians of the independent Uzbekistan, Hamid Ziyaev's method of history-writing will be reviewed in the chapter. Afterward a summary of the works of a selected group of semi-official Uzbek historians will be presented. The part on the Turkish case will begin with an outline of the emergence of the history-writing in the Ottoman Empire. In the last two sections of the chapter main points of the Turkish History Thesis and the key arguments put forward in the First and the Second Turkish History Congresses will be summarized.

The sixth chapter will focus on the function of the linguistic policies in Uzbek and Turkish nation-building. While the Tsarist rulers did not impose a general linguistic policy in Central Asia, the Soviet leaders attempted to standardize the Central Asian languages and created a distinct language for the people of the Uzbek SSR. During the last years of the Soviet Union, the status of the Uzbek language was the hottest topic in the protests of the Uzbek popular movements of Birlik and Erk. However as Karimov secured his rule he successfully cooled down the heightened tension and marginalized popular movements. Meanwhile, demands on status of the Uzbek language were incorporated into the state rhetoric and finally the reform process on alphabet and the purification of the Uzbek had slowed down. Turkey experienced a dissimilar pattern in the sphere of linguistic. Turkish language was not a top priority in the agenda until Mustafa Kemal and his cadre secured their position in 1928. Beginning with the alphabet reform of November 1928 Turkey went through one of the most radical language reforms. The later part of the chapter will concentrate on the Sun Language Theory and the related presentations in the First and the Second Turkish Language Congresses.

## CHAPTER 2

### THEORY

#### 2.1. Formulas for Legitimacy: Fear, Power, Religion, Ideology

Hereby it is manifest that during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war as is of every man, against every man.

Thomas Hobbes<sup>1</sup>

The absence of a “common power” in the form of an authoritative government or a superior law, limiting the initial unrestricted human liberty through binding decrees and even violent punishments corresponds to the pre-political epoch. In other words, the first political relation has set the first limit to the human liberty. Hobbes portrays absolute human liberty as the “state of nature” where everlasting insecurity prevails, ceaseless fear is in the hearts of all; “danger of violent death” is an immediate threat, human life is short and cruel facing pervasive menace from his own kind. Every human being is the enemy of the other in his desire for command, wealth and reputation.<sup>2</sup> The only way for men to escape this terrifying “war of all against all”,

---

<sup>1</sup> Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, London & Glasgow: Collins, 1969, p. 143.

<sup>2</sup> in the introduction written by John Plamenatz, *ibid.*, p. 23.

as Hobbes labels, is “to confer all their power and strength upon one man or upon one assembly of men”.<sup>3</sup> The omnipotent sovereign obtains his legitimacy from a hypothetical covenant, made by “everyone with everyone” in the *commonwealth*, that the assembled people transmits their right of governing to the sovereign power.

Nothing would illustrate better the sovereign of Hobbes’s *commonwealth* than the Biblical monster Leviathan.<sup>4</sup> Hobbesian sovereign is no less than an earthly God; the “mortal god” with no comparable power upon earth, watching and guiding ego-centric human slaves: “Big Brother is Watching You!”<sup>5</sup> Judd Owen comments that Hobbes had firmly believed in the absolute right of the sovereign over the lives and the actions of his subjects; covering “to censor speech and writing, to ban any associations he sees fit, and to demand conformity to a prescribed mode of worship and profession of faith”.<sup>6</sup>

Imagination of a horrifying “state of nature” in which all is enemy of all, consequently legitimates leaving a portion of initial human liberties to a supposedly neutral and insensitive sovereign. The state power and its coercive dictate to sustain peace are legitimated through an aggressive portrait of the innate human nature. Fear legitimizes obedience to the authority. While “homo homini lupus”<sup>7</sup> is the maxim in

---

<sup>3</sup> *ibid*, p. 176.

<sup>4</sup> The Leviathan is the monster depicted in several verses throughout the Bible. Hobbes refers to the following verses in order to illustrate his “sovereign” in *Leviathan*, p. 284:

*Job41:33 Upon earth there is not his like, who is made without fear.*

*Job41:34 He beholdeth all high things: he is a king over all the children of pride. (Bible: King James Version)*

<sup>5</sup> George Orwell’s *Big Brother* is comparable to Hobbes’ Leviathan. George Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, London: Harcourt Inc., 1949.

<sup>6</sup> J. Judd Owen, “The Tolerant Leviathan: Hobbes and the Paradox of Liberalism”, *Polity*, Vol: 37, No: 1, January 2005, p. 136.

<sup>7</sup> Latin phrase meaning “man is a wolf to (his fellow) man” used by Hobbes in his *De Cive*.



the state of nature, total submission to the Leviathan would guarantee security and order.

“The primitive condition of independence”, counters Rousseau, was not an age of horror and insecurity; men, though isolated, were enjoying their common liberty instead of searching for a common power. Neither a Leviathan to shelter against selfish savages nor a covenant to legitimate the dominance of men over men! Before all else, the primitive men were inherently innocent and good prior to the establishment of the civil society.<sup>8</sup> What’s more, the primitive condition was not apt for men to establish regular interaction beyond his immediate family or kinship.

While Rousseau agrees with Hobbes that “all legitimate authority among men must be based on covenants”<sup>9</sup>, for him the social contract, as the first political act, appeared only after the emergence of the idea of property. As cultivation of land has become widespread and man attempted to establish a personal right over the land he was farming, mankind has encountered Hobbesian state of nature.<sup>10</sup> According to Rousseau invention of property has led to degeneration of the innocent men living happily in the state of nature, since the society was exposed to endless conflicts due to increasing disparity between men’s fortunes. All men, uncomfortable with the mounting tension and particularly the wealthier scared of losing their possessions, pushed for the authority of law which would be enforced by the “General Will”.

---

<sup>8</sup> David Boucher & Paul Kelly (eds.), *Political Thinkers: From Socrates to the Present*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 241. Rousseau rejects “the original sin” dogma of Christian theology that has had an immeasurable effect on medieval political thought.

<sup>9</sup> Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, Middlesex, UK & Baltimore, US & Victoria, Australia: Penguin Books, 1968, p. 53.

<sup>10</sup> “The first man who, after hedging a piece of land in order to take it upon himself, and then, said “This belongs to me” and found people naive enough to believe him, was the true founder of the civil society” in Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *İnsanlar Arasındaki Eşitsizliğin Kaynağı*, Rasih Nuri İleri (trans.), Say Yayınları, March 1995, p. 135.

Rousseau's "General Will", though more benevolent, is as hypothetical as Hobbes' Leviathan.

Transformation of possession to property and the "right of the first occupant" as Rousseau labels, to property rights have institutionalized the inequality in wealth and power. So, the advent of the political society was no less to legitimize the inequalities:

Such was, or should have been, the origin of society and laws, which gave new fetters to the weak and new forces to the rich, irretrievably destroyed natural liberty, established forever the law of property and of inequality, changed adroit usurpation into an irrevocable right, and for the profit of a few ambitious men henceforth subjected the entire human race to labour, servitude and misery.<sup>11</sup>

This institutionalization meant the dawn of a new political realm not limited to the palace. Rejecting to identify a people in the name of a dynasty or elite and equalizing the "nation" with the "people" Rousseau welcomed masses into politics and become the founder of the modern nationalism.<sup>12</sup>

The idea of social contract has indeed implied a shift in the basis of legitimacy: a shift from divine will to general will. Galileo Galilei has already repudiated the earth-centered cosmology of Catholicism, Martin Luther has hung his ninety-five theses on the entrance of the Wittenberg Cathedral, a dropping red apple has greeted Newtonian universe of the Enlightenment and last but not the least, James Watt's steam engine was manufacturing Indian cotton cheaper than the Indian weavers<sup>13</sup>. The indisputable dogma of the long Medieval Age, Scholasticism, had been largely

---

<sup>11</sup> David Boucher & Paul Kelly (eds.), *The Social Contract from Hobbes to Rawls*, London & New York: Routledge, 1994, p. 7.

<sup>12</sup> Edward Hallett Carr, *Milliyetçilik ve Sonrası*, Osman Akınhay (trans.), İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1993, p. 20.

<sup>13</sup> William H. McNeill, *Dünya Tarihi*, Alaeddin Şenel (trans.), Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2006, p. 491.

discredited facing the Reformation and the Enlightenment. Scholastic theology, based on the mystical and intuitional philosophy of St. Augustine, has had a firm faith that the God was interfering in the daily lives of human beings and guiding all their actions.<sup>14</sup> The monarchs, previously ruling as elected by the God, now had to find a formula to persuade their subjects in the legitimacy of their authority. The magic formula was to transform the subjects into citizens. The maxim of the “age of nationalism” would not be anymore “Omnis Potestas a Deo”<sup>15</sup>, but Omnis Potestas a “Demos”.<sup>16</sup>

The magic of the new formula was hidden in the unconditional comradeship alleged by the nationalism, the sole principle that could replace the religious brotherhood in sustaining a novel source of legitimacy. Christian children would be christened at their national churches and the *ummah* could kneel on prayer rugs at the mosques listening to the address of the *imam* who was sent by the National Administration of Religious Affairs.<sup>17</sup> After all the nation was imagined in the place, and often as a partner, of the religion being “deep, horizontal comradeship regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail”.<sup>18</sup> Nonetheless, every single individual encounters the crudeness of the reality; as the sorrowful singer croons “everybody knows the dice were loaded and Old Black Joe was still picking cotton for

---

<sup>14</sup> *ibid.*, p. 497.

<sup>15</sup> “All Power Comes From God”.

<sup>16</sup> *Demos* means “people” in Greek as *demos*+ *kratie*, the root of the word democracy, means rule by the people.

<sup>17</sup> In Turkey and Uzbekistan similar to almost all Muslim countries nation-states found organizations to direct the religious affairs.

<sup>18</sup> Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*, Verso, London & New York, 1991, p. 6-7.

ribbons and bows” of the charming young rich lady.<sup>19</sup> That crude reality of inequality should be normalized through a process of legitimation by any power-holder in order to stabilize the existent:

“The fates of human beings are not equal. Men differ in their states of health or wealth or social status or what not. Simple observation shows that in every such situation he who is more favored feels the never ceasing need to look upon his position as in some way ‘legitimate’, upon his advantage as ‘deserved’, and the other’s disadvantage as being brought about by the latter’s ‘fault’”.<sup>20</sup>

It follows that any dictionary definition of “legitimacy” predictably carries connotations of conservatism. Both of the definitions in Webster’s dictionary that are “the possession of title or status as a result of acquisition by means that are or are held to be according to law and custom” and “a conformity to recognized principles or accepted rules and standards”<sup>21</sup> imply the prior existence of certain norms. Legitimacy then is gained through imposed obedience to such norms and consent given by the disadvantaged. The poor and the powerless may be coerced to obey; they may internalize the *status quo* and find “good reasons for the existence of some form of stratified social order”<sup>22</sup> or the hope of being in the upper side of the ladder in the future may keep them submissive to the authority. Since legitimation denotes “normalization”, politics as the acts and processes to legitimate authority of men over men and unequal distribution of wealth, searches to normalize the authority and inequality.

---

<sup>19</sup> “Everybody Knows” was released by Leonard Cohen in his album “I’m Your Man” on February 1988.

<sup>20</sup> Max Weber, *Economy and Society vol: 1*, Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich (eds.), Berkeley & Los Angeles & London: University of California Press, 1978, p. 953.

<sup>21</sup> Philip Babcock Gove (eds.), *Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language*, Cologne: Könemann, 1993, p. 1291.

<sup>22</sup> L. Richard Della Fave, “Toward an Explication of the Legitimation Process”, *Social Forces*, Vol: 65, No: 2 December 1986, p. 477.

The third definition in Webster's, "the right to rule possessed by a monarch as a result of strict adherence to the hereditary principle"<sup>23</sup> indicates the medieval procedure of legitimation. In fact, before nationalism the prerequisite of legitimacy was to be the member of the ruling dynasty, preferably as the eldest son of the king or the sultan. While the dynasty was imposing its right to rule on the people mostly by force blended with a sauce of sacredness, being the "lawful descent from the previous legitimate monarch"<sup>24</sup> was essential for legitimacy inside the royal house. Louis XIV, the "Sun King" of Bourbons was confident of his legitimacy when he replied "l'état, c'est moi"<sup>25</sup> and Mehmed, *the Conqueror* became the Ottoman sultan not because he was the most capable among *shahzades* but just because of being the eldest of all. The hereditary procedure was immunized with sacredness as French royalist de Maistre once claimed that "the legitimacy of a royal line cannot be 'invented' by the puny will of human beings" since it is granted "as a sacred truth; the expression of God's inexorable will".<sup>26</sup>

If Weber's first and foremost prerequisite of the statehood is the actual "monopoly of legitimate physical violence in a specific territory"<sup>27</sup>, then the immediate second condition would be to elaborate a justification of holding that monopoly by a circle in the society. For Weber legitimation as the "normalization" of the power

---

<sup>23</sup> Webster's *Third New International Dictionary*, p. 1291.

<sup>24</sup> Quoted from G.H. Sabine's *A History of Political Theory* in John Fraser, "Validating a Measure of National Political Legitimacy", *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol: 18, No: 1, February 1974, p. 117.

<sup>25</sup> "State, it is me". Perhaps 72 years of reign in Bourbon House has much added his confidence. Özgür Atakan, *Tarih ve Milliyetçilik*, unpublished MA thesis, Ankara: Ankara University Faculty of Political Science, 2006, p. 2.

<sup>26</sup> Stephen Holmes, "Two Concepts of Legitimacy: France after the Revolution", *Political Theory*, Vol: 10, No: 2, May, 1982, p. 168.

<sup>27</sup> Max Weber, *Political Writings*, Lassman, Peter & Speirs, Ronald (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, pp. 310-311.

relations in a society may occur on three grounds. First of all, the authority may legitimate itself on traditional grounds. De Maistre's aforementioned beautification of hereditary legitimacy corresponds perfectly to Weber's traditional category. The sovereign, to be more exact the reigning dynasty, was legitimate as ruling from an unknown distant past, from the golden ages of glorious ancestors. Traditional society was characterized by a shared value system mostly around a religious canon<sup>28</sup>. While the religious allegation of sacredness to the prevailing order has naturalized the authority, the antiquity of the rule ensured the conventional and habitual obedience to the sovereign. Secondly Weber argues that the *status quo* may also be legitimated by the use of devotion to the extraordinary charisma of a leader. In the charismatic rule the attachment of the masses is neither to conventions nor to worldly laws or institutions but to the personal charisma of a prophet, a war-lord or an exceptional demagogue.<sup>29</sup> Nevertheless the charismatic legitimation is transitory by its very nature and evolves into traditional or legal/rational methods of legitimation in time. Lastly Weber defines the legal/rational legitimation in terms of obedience to the "legally established impersonal order".<sup>30</sup> While the legality of the order requires fulfilling reciprocal responsibilities and duties by both citizens and the state, the impersonal order is mostly characterized by hierarchical perfunctory bureaucracies.

The Weberian conception of legitimacy was fundamentally depended on domination and force, since in the final analysis domination of men by other men should be supported via the availability of "the legitimate violence" on the side of the superior.<sup>31</sup> Lipson concurred with Weber in the preeminence of violence as well. After all, legitimacy is

---

<sup>28</sup> Cemil Oktay, *Siyaset Bilimi İncelemeleri*, Istanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 2003, pp. 12-13.

<sup>29</sup> Weber, *ibid.*, p. 312.

<sup>30</sup> Max Weber, *Economy and Society Vol: 1*, p. 215.

<sup>31</sup> Mikyung Lee Chin, *Legitimacy Crisis In Authoritarian Regimes*, Ph.D. thesis, Berkeley: University of California, 1988, p. 78.

the consent given by the people to the monopoly of the political authority to use violence in accordance with a previously existing contract.<sup>32</sup> Craig argues that authority based solely on violence and coercion would be expensive for the power-holders due to unfruitful and continual costs of maintaining gendarmerie and police, construction of new prisons and the frequent renewal of armament. Similarly reward-based legitimation institutionalizes a kind of Pavlovian reflex: perpetual remuneration by the authority to the people in return for obedience. Hence Craig's "cost and benefit" perspective in the assessment of various ways of legitimation posits that "obedience motivated by a belief in legitimacy" would absolutely be the preference of any rational ruler.<sup>33</sup> The belief that the ongoing "relation of command and obedience is rightful or legitimate" can be built on eight different bases: convention, contract, conformity to universal principles, sacredness, expertise, popular approval, personal ties and personal qualities.<sup>34</sup>

Herz comprehends legitimacy via a functional perspective that is in terms of states' external and internal efficiency. The legitimacy of the state – and it follows that the ruling elite as well – depends on its efficiency, externally to provide feelings of group identity and internally to maintain security of its subjects and ensure a certain level of welfare.<sup>35</sup> Sabine's aforementioned definition of dynastic legitimacy as the "lawful descent from the previous legitimate monarch" was the basic legal method of legitimation in the Middle Ages. Modernity has replaced this medieval manner of legal legitimacy with procedural legitimacy of constitutionalism. Fraser noted that many political scientists have defined legitimacy of authority so narrowly as "satisfying some

---

<sup>32</sup> Bülent Daver, *Siyaset Bilimine Giriş*, Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 1993, p. 38.

<sup>33</sup> Craig Matheson, "Weber and the Classification of Forms of Legitimacy", *The British Journal of Sociology*, Vol: 38, No: 2, June 1987, p. 200.

<sup>34</sup> *ibid.*, p. 205.

<sup>35</sup> John H. Herz, "Legitimacy: Can We Retrieve It?", *Comparative Politics*, Vol: 10, No: 3, April 1978, p. 317. Herz argued that state were losing legitimacy as a result of their failure to succeed their functional duties internally and externally.

legal criteria”.<sup>36</sup> This strictly legalist account claims that an authority would be legitimate as long as it operates under the general scheme of the constitutions, conducts policies delimited by the provisions of laws and respects the electoral process of power change. Nevertheless legitimacy obviously requires more than strict legality. Yet Nieburg’s claim that legitimacy “is won” by the performance of the ruler in balancing different interest, distributing the wealth and maintaining security and order still overlooks the normative aspect.<sup>37</sup>

Lipset enlarges the definitions of legitimacy by adding the subjective aspect that is the capability of the system to reproduce the belief that the existing order and institutions are the best.<sup>38</sup> Rawls’ definition that legitimacy involves political power that is “fully proper or appropriately exercised in accordance with given norms” incorporates the normative aspect to the concept of legitimacy.<sup>39</sup> Then a scale to measure the rightfulness of the policies is needed to decide on what is held to be proper, and to what extent is the exercise of power fit the norms of the time. As Gilley noted since legitimacy would arise as the authority “rightfully holds and exercises political power” where “right” means being “in accordance with accepted standards of moral or legal behavior, justice”.<sup>40</sup> The pre-modern comprehension of “right” was religious as a rule, being right was solely to behave within the heavenly set moral standards and religiously prescribed norms of justice.

---

<sup>36</sup> John Fraser, *ibid.*, p. 118.

<sup>37</sup> *ibid.*, p. 118.

<sup>38</sup> Marchin Seymour Lipset, *The Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics*, Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1960, pp. 77-96.

<sup>39</sup> Bruce Gilley, *States and Legitimacy: The Politics of Moral Authority*, PhD thesis, Princeton University, January 2007, pp. 6-7.

<sup>40</sup> *ibid.*, p. 6.



The counterpart of the word “legitimacy” in Middle Eastern languages, such as *meşru* in Turkish, *meşruc* in Arabic both of which from the same root of *sher* or *sherc* as the word *shariat*; means accordance to the religious law as in Koran and *sunna* of Mohammed.<sup>41</sup> On the other hand, in the era of post-religious legitimation worldly legal/constitutional arrangements and ideological paradigms beneath all formal setting came to normalize power relations. In other words religious legitimation were tamed and incorporated into grand ideological narratives of the regimes. It is worthy of note *en passant* that for Habermas legitimation crises are unavoidable as the discrepancy between the forces of production and the political and administrative regime claiming to be the representative of whole society increases. In such a case legitimating world views, the grand ideological narratives can sustain the society integrated only for a certain time.<sup>42</sup> Finally the widening discrepancy would dictate a new *Organizationsprinzip*<sup>43</sup> in the society.

## 2.2. Legitimacy through Nation-Building

“A large aggregate of men...creates the kind of moral conscience which we call a nation. So long as this moral consciousness gives proof of its strength by the sacrifices which demand the abdication of the individual to the advantage of the community, it is legitimate and has the right to exist.”

Ernest Renan<sup>44</sup>

---

<sup>41</sup> Cemil Oktay, *Siyaset Bilimi İncelemeleri*, İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 2003, pp. 8-9. Ferit Devellioglu, *Osmanlıca-Türkçe Ansiklopedik Lugat*, Ankara: Aydın Kitabevi, 2006, p. 631.

<sup>42</sup> Jürgen Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, Thomas Mc Carthy (trans.), Beacon Press, 1975, p. 19.

<sup>43</sup> Organization principle of a society is the paradigm dominant in a regime and during a particular time period. Jürgen Habermas, *ibid.*, p. 7.

<sup>44</sup> Ernest Renan, “What is a Nation?” in Geoff Eley & Ronald Grigor Suny (eds.) *Becoming National: A Reader*, New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 53.

Almost 130 years have passed since Ernest Renan asked his well-known question, “What is a Nation?” in his famous lecture delivered at Sorbonne in 1882. All through these 130 years the rulers had repeatedly demanded their subjects’ lives to testify the legitimacy of their community. And their call did not fall upon deaf ears. Countless men have sacrificed their lives in order to substantiate their nations’ right to exist. Number of nations has increased as the number of soldier cemeteries. Each nation has invested in their monuments: Mausoleums of huge concrete blocks for national heroes and tombs for unnamed soldiers. Kaiser Wilhelm in his military uniform was shouting the old Roman rhyme together with the German mothers of middle and low classes preparing their sons for military service: *Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori*.<sup>45</sup> Needless to say, the by-product of this investment was the legitimation of the rulers as the true representatives of the nation. Kaiser Wilhelm and his iron chancellor Bismarck would build the German nation in the lead of Prussian Junkers, camouflaging all social and economic inequalities existing east of the Rheine.<sup>46</sup>

“All societies that maintain armies maintain the belief that some things are more valuable than life itself”<sup>47</sup> writes Michael Billig, in the first sentence of his *Banal Nationalism*. For Renan the thing that is more valuable than the life is the moral consciousness called nation, a kind of all-encompassing solidarity abstracted from the wills of its individual members. Nation is defined extremely abstract, without any concrete criteria, neither race, language, religion and nor “direction taken by mountain

---

<sup>45</sup> An epigram from the Roman poet Horace's *Odes (III.2.13)* meaning “It is sweet and good to die for one's country”.

<sup>46</sup> E.H.Carr's brilliant argument: “Bismarck had showed German workers that they had much to gain from a merciless and sharp nationalism” citing Borkenau's plain comment on the German victory against French in 1870: “Without Sedan there would be no health insurance”. Edward Hallett Carr, *Milliyetçilik ve Sonrası*, Osman Akınhay (trans.), İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1993, p. 33.

<sup>47</sup> Michael Billig, *Banal Nationalism*, London: Sage Publications, 1995, p. 1.

chains”. The total of subjective individual memories of common past, full of joys, but more of sufferings, and the desire to sustain this commonality in the future, is the principle that materializes the nation. In the opinion of Renan, the confirmation of nationhood is a “daily plebiscite” through which the individuals routinely find themselves performing “the national”.<sup>48</sup>

The humiliation of *la grande nation* in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 and the subsequent loss of Alsace-Lorraine was perhaps the most passionate common memory of suffering for Renan and his contemporaries in 1882.<sup>49</sup> In fact, the Sorbonne lecture, neglecting the language, blood, race as the basis of nationhood, was the reflection of ideas prevalent in the “French Centre” that was contending the Frenchness of German-speaking Alsations. The choice of people should be consulted as “the sole legitimate criterion” says Renan and argues “a nation never has any real interest in annexing or holding on to a country against its will”.<sup>50</sup> Since Alsations have mostly felt loyalty to France; for Renan, they were French as any Parisian, regardless of their actual language and ethnic origin: “How happy to say I am French!”

In the meantime Heinrich von Treitschke from the other side of the Rheine was calling the Prussian state to forcibly remind Alsations their German identity.<sup>51</sup> As a disciple of German Romanticism of 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> centuries Treitschke held that nationality was not an issue of choice or belief: Given that Alsations were of same ethnic stock as the peoples of other German states and spoke German language; then they were Germans! Indeed, Treitschke, a prominent member of National Liberal

---

<sup>48</sup> Renan, *ibid.*, p. 54.

<sup>49</sup> Krishan Kumar, “Nationalism and the Historians” in Gerard Delanty & Krishan Kumar (eds.), *The Sage Handbook of Nations and Nationalism*, London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2006, p.12.

<sup>50</sup> Renan, *ibid.*, p. 53.

<sup>51</sup> Ayşe Kadioğlu, *Cumhuriyet İradesi Demokrasi Muhakemesi*, Istanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1999, p. 57.

Party<sup>52</sup> in *Reichstag*, has already convinced himself in the pivotal role of Prussia in the unification of the German states. Renouncing the confederative and federative alternatives for numerous German states he has firmly favored the *Einheitsstaat*, a unitary state in the form of an extended Prussia:

“Every Prussian must feel it to be quite right that the best political institutions should be extended to the rest of Germany.....the will of the Empire can in the last instance be nothing else than the will of the Prussian state.”<sup>53</sup>

Despite being grown up as the eldest son of another leading figure of the National Liberal Party in the peak decades of German nationalism, German sociologist Max Weber had a deviant attitude towards Alsace issue. Even though Weber admitted that the dominant tendency was to “consider a shared common language as the normal basis of nationality in the age of language conflicts”<sup>54</sup>, he has avoided any objective criteria to become the determinant of the national identity (*Nationalgefühl*). For Weber, language, tradition, ethnic elements, common blood and ancestry, religion or any other objective norm may be basis for national claims in different contexts; alas this was common political memories in the case of Alsace:

“Many German-speaking Alsatians feel a sense of community with the French because they share certain customs and some of their “sensual culture”...and also because of common political experiences. This can be understood by any visitor who walks through the museum in Colmar, which is rich in relics such as tricolors, *pompier* and military helmets, edicts by Louis Philippe and especially memorabilia from the French Revolution...these have sentimental value for the Alsatians”.<sup>55</sup>

---

<sup>52</sup> National Liberal Party (Nationalliberale Partei) originally founded in 1867, has been the major support base of Bismarck in the Reichstag between 1871 and 1879, that is the period immediately after the German unification. The party was advocate of an ideology blended with national liberalism, *laissez faire* capitalism and nationalism as the voice of flourishing German industry and commerce. [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National\\_Liberal\\_Party\\_\(Germany\)](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Liberal_Party_(Germany))

<sup>53</sup> Montserrat Guibernau, *Nationalisms: The Nation-State and Nationalism in the Twentieth Century*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996, p. 10. For a summary of Treitschke’s ideas: *ibid.*, pages 7-13.

<sup>54</sup> Max Weber, *Economy and Society Vol: 1*, Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich (eds.), Berkeley & Los Angeles & London: University of California Press, 1978, p. 395.

<sup>55</sup> *ibid.*, p. 396.

As Birnbaum maintains, replacing “common language” with “common political memories” was so brave for a German intellectual in the post-unification Germany since it has legitimized French territorial claims for a land inhabited mostly by German speaking population.<sup>56</sup> Nevertheless, Weber has already renounced the validity of empirical qualities to mold a nation, since, for him, to be counted as a nation “it is proper to expect from certain groups a specific sentiment of solidarity in the face of other groups”.<sup>57</sup>

While “old Weber” has convinced himself that the nationality belonged to the subjective realm, to “the sphere of values”; the “young Weber” was addressing in the shoes of a nationalist zealot in his well-known Freiburg Speech of May 1895. Weber has actually been an affiliate of *Verein für Socialpolitik*<sup>58</sup>, a research society concentrating especially on agrarian economics and social policy, since 1888. His main research topic was the *Ostflucht*, the migration of poor Polish peasants to the East Prussia in order to work as cheap day-laborers at farms, a process accompanied by the flux of German population to cities searching for jobs at boosting German industry. According to Weber, despite having encountered the same conditions on the same land for centuries, Germans and Poles “differ in their ability to adapt to the varying economic and social conditions of existence” due to their racial characteristics.<sup>59</sup> Weber, the German nationalist, was regretful that the Polish

---

<sup>56</sup> Pierre Birnbaum, “Sosyolojik Kuramlar ve Milliyetçilik” in *Milliyetçiliği Yeniden Düşünmek: Kuramlar ve Uygulamalar*, Alain Dieckhoff & Christophe Jaffrelot (eds.), Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2010, p. 114.

<sup>57</sup> Max Weber, *ibid*, Vol: 2, p. 922.

<sup>58</sup> *Verein für Socialpolitik*, founded in 1873, is still one of the prominent academic associations in Germanophone economists.

<sup>59</sup> Max Weber, “The Nation State and Economic Policy (Inaugural Lecture)” in *Political Writings*, Peter Lassman & Ronald Speirs (eds.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 5.

population has gaining ground because of their “habitually low physical and intellectual standard of living”.<sup>60</sup> A counter “process of selection” was the case in Eastern Germany since the Poles, even “prepared to eat grass”, were developing into the majority as Germans whose “character was identical with high level of economic sophistication and a relatively high standard living”<sup>61</sup> were pouring into Western Prussia and Rhineland. The German Reich, to act as the nation-state of the German people, should cope with the Polonization of the east by “closing of the eastern frontier and buying up land systematically”.<sup>62</sup>

Whether the nationalist dose has lessened in Weber’s political writings as Birnbaum suggests<sup>63</sup> or the national question has continuously been the background of his thought from the beginning as implied by Paul James<sup>64</sup>, it is clear that for Weber the term nation is first and foremost related to politics and prestige. The national feeling emanates from the prestige appetite of the “petty bourgeoisie masses” that demand a reorganization of the power positions between their own polity and the neighboring states favorable to their own. The ruling strata in a given polity both displays themselves as embodying all-encompassing national fervor and subsequently demands an absolute loyalty from the subjects. Although Anthony Smith is uncomfortable with Weber’s “political bias”, he acknowledges that Weberian thought has inspired many scholars of nationalism including Giddens and Breuilly.<sup>65</sup> In any case, by downgrading the significance of the objective traits in the formation of

---

<sup>60</sup> *ibid.*, p. 10.

<sup>61</sup> *ibid.*, p. 5.

<sup>62</sup> *ibid.*, p. 12.

<sup>63</sup> Birnbaum, “Sosyolojik Kuramlar ve Milliyetçilik”, p. 119.

<sup>64</sup> Paul James, *Nation Formation: Towards a Theory of Abstract Community*, London & Thousand Oaks & New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1996, p. 90.

<sup>65</sup> Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism*, London & New York: Routledge, 1998, p. 14.

nationality, Weber points us “the political” and quest for legitimacy: “Time and again we find that the concept ‘nation’ directs us to the political power”.<sup>66</sup>

Emile Durkheim was born in 1858 in Épinal, a small town in the eastern part of Lorraine and thus has come across the French national vehemence against German annexation of Alsace-Lorraine in his formative years. Yet, nationalism did not attract Durkheim’s academic interest; rather he mostly focused on religion and its role on social cohesion. For Durkheim, religion provides both the rationale of being a society through separation of the sacred and the earthly, and also set of practices to worship for the sacred; a cult to be prayed shoulder to shoulder, rituals to be performed in unison, duties to be observed cooperatively. Accordingly, it is true to argue that “religion creates the society than it is created by the society”.<sup>67</sup> Anthony Smith once proposed that the Durkheimian analysis of religion constituted the framework for the later modernist accounts of nationalism in the sense that nationalism has turned into a “political religion”.<sup>68</sup> Nationalism has become the new cement for societies with its own cults, rituals and duties:

“Under the influence of the general enthusiasm, things purely laical in character were transformed by public opinion into sacred things: these were the Fatherland, Liberty, Reason. A religion tended to become established which had its dogmas, symbols, altars and feasts”.<sup>69</sup>

In fact, linguistic nationalism was deep-rooted in German political thought since early 18<sup>th</sup> century the German language was exalted to a transcendental status as the carrier of the German nationality between generations. It was treated as transcendental by the forerunners of German nationalism since the language was the

---

<sup>66</sup> Max Weber, *Economy and Society Vol: 1*, pp. 397-398.

<sup>67</sup> Montserrat Guibernau, *ibid.*, p. 27.

<sup>68</sup> Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism*, pp. 15-16.

<sup>69</sup> Quoted in Anthony D. Smith, *ibid.*, p. 15; from Emile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, London: Allen & Unwin, 1915, p. 214.

most apparent bond linking the peoples of numerous German polities. Herder has considered separate German principalities artificial since “the most natural state is one nation, an extended family with one national character.”<sup>70</sup> For Herder every nation has its myths, sagas, legends and above all its unique *Geist*, that is the national spirit, which was transmitted through language as the mother whispers fairy-tales to her ignorant child’s ear.<sup>71</sup> So the authenticity of the national *Geist* should be protected by regarding the national language as the apple of one’s eye; by defending foreign infiltrations: “Spew out...the Seine’s ugly slime! Germans, speak German!”<sup>72</sup>

J. G. Fichte, disciple of cosmopolitan philosopher Immanuel Kant, gave a series of lectures at Berlin University in 1806 when Napoleonic French armies were in control of all German cities including his native Prussian capital. The lectures, then titled as *Addresses to the German Nation*, has become the *magnum opus* of nationalists soon after.<sup>73</sup> Influenced by Herder, he stresses on the importance of language throughout the *Addresses*: “Wherever a separate language is found, there a

---

<sup>70</sup> Johann Gottfried von Herder, “Ideas for a Philosophy of History of Mankind”, in Vincent P. Pecora, *Nation and Identities: Classical Readings*, Malden, MA, USA & Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers, 2001, p. 91.

<sup>71</sup> Herder, *ibid.*, p. 88.

<sup>72</sup> Herder’s poem is quoted in Kedourie Elie, *Nationalism*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1993, p. 53:

And You German alone, returning from abroad,  
Wouldst greet your mother in French?  
O spew it out, before you door  
Spew out the ugly slime of the Seine  
Speak German, O you German.

It is not surprising to see that, Turkish romantic nationalists of late Ottoman period, similar to German Romantics, were also dreaming for a grand political union based on the language in the place of vanishing Ottoman Empire: (writing in the first year of World War I) “No more any alien would be between us and Turkistan. We will unite our ideals and consciences as our common language when we reach to motherland Turan by our ships passing through the Caspian, our trains going by the southern shore of the Caspian.” Ömer Seyfettin, *Türklük Üzerine Yazılar*, Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1993, p. 74.

<sup>73</sup> J.G.Fichte has spent his whole life as a cosmopolitan believing that the ideas of French Revolution would pave way to liberty and freedom until he transformed into a German nationalist under French occupation.



separate nation exists, which has the right to take independent charge of its own affairs and to govern itself'.<sup>74</sup> Fichte, well aware of the political partition among German principalities and duchies, advises his fellow Germans to consider themselves as "double citizens of the state where they were born and of the whole common fatherland of the German nation".<sup>75</sup>

Conflicting French and German approaches to the self-definition prevalent deep across the two banks of the Rheine throughout 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries and specifically the opposite manners by which the nationality and, *a priori* the status, of Alsace has been handled after German unification, have set the base of the first typology in the theory of nationalism: Western Nationalism (French) versus Eastern Nationalism (German).<sup>76</sup> Friedrich Meinecke has led the way through his classification of the "kulturnation" and "staatsnation" in his *Cosmopolitanism and the National State*<sup>77</sup> of 1907. For Meinecke, the *staatsnation* was the outcome of individual wills of its single citizens<sup>78</sup> and set upon subjective criteria of inclusion mostly preceding the appearance of the 'nation'. On the contrary, the *kulturnation* has

---

<sup>74</sup> Quoted from J.G.Fichte's *Addresses to the German Nation*, in Margaret Canovan, *Nationhood and Political Theory*, Cheltenham, UK & Brookfield, US: Edward Elgar, 1996, p. 8.

<sup>75</sup> J. G. Fichte, "Addresses to the German Nation" in Vincent P. Pecora, *Nation and Identities: Classical Readings*, Malden, MA, USA & Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers, 2001, p. 125.

<sup>76</sup> A good review of the so-called French and German types of nationalism through a comparison of Fichte and Renan can be found in Ozan Erözden, *Ulus-Devlet*, Ankara: Dost Kitabevi, 1997, pp. 91-97. Erözden finds the initial theoretical categorization of nationalism as French and German types irrelevant since the nationalisms of Rheine's two sides have resembled each other in content and practice, contrary to the widespread tendency to place them in polar opposites as French being the civilian and German being the ethnic.

<sup>77</sup> Friedrich Meinecke, *Cosmopolitanism and the National State*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970.

<sup>78</sup> Of course the similarity with "Rousseau's general will" was only theoretical.

evolved onto some objective criteria like language, religion or race and the state was typically founded by the ‘nation’.<sup>79</sup>

The most influential classification, however, has been the “Kohn Dichotomy”. Hans Kohn has argued that the Western type of nationalism has “built the nation into political reality” while the Eastern<sup>80</sup> nationalists created a fatherland “out of myths of the past and dreams of the future”.<sup>81</sup> Writing during the Second World War in New York as an émigré from Nazified Europe it is predictable that Kohn’s frontier separating East and West passes alongside the Rhine leaving Germany in the sphere of Eastern nationalism. In Kohn Dichotomy the nation-states in England, France, the USA and the Netherlands were characterized to be open societies, founded through the union of individualistic and self-assured citizens with the support of the bourgeois. On the other hand, in Russia and Germany, states have been established on closed societies by the support of aristocracy. The distinctive feature of these societies was collectivism and inferiority complex towards the West.<sup>82</sup> Rogers Brubaker has

---

<sup>79</sup> A summary of Meinecke’s position regarding the political and cultural nations can be found in Ben Mobius, *Die Liberale Nation: Deutschland Zwischen Nationaler Identität und Multikultureller Gesellschaft*, Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 2003, p. 47-49.

<sup>80</sup> Tom Nairn once argued that in Kohn’s analysis “East” means “the rest of the world” except the above-mentioned four countries plus perhaps Switzerland. Tom Nairn, *Faces of Nationalism: Janus Revisited*, London & New York: Verso, 1997, p. 59.

<sup>81</sup> Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origins and Background*, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1961, p. 330.

<sup>82</sup> The features of the Western and Eastern nationalisms are quoted in Ben Mobius, *ibid*, p. 53. Liebich argues that Hans Kohn’s personal experiences as an emigré of Jewish origin has caused the articulation of the Kohnian classification. The Kohn Dichotomy between benevolent nationalisms of USA, UK, France and the Netherlands and malevolent nationalisms of Germany and Russia reflected the intellectual mood of the World War II. For him the evil ideologies of Nazism and Communism could take root only in countries under the influence of the malevolent nationalisms. Liebich pointed out that while Kohn was initially arguing before the World War that in the Rhine region and south-west Germany liberal western type of benign nationalism was existent, during the war this provision dropped from Kohn’s analysis and Germany was definitely included in the camp of evil by Kohn. However after the war Kohn again added Western Germany as the home of benevolent nationalism as opposed to the non-liberal nationalisms to the east. Andre Liebich, “Searching for the Perfect Nation: The Itinerary of Hans Kohn (1891–1971)”, *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol: 12, No: 4, 2006, pp. 579-596.

recently followed the footsteps of Kohn, comparing the practices of citizenship based on different perceptions of nationality in France and Germany. He also distinguishes differentialist and Volk-centered nationalism of Germany and state-centered and assimilationist nationalism of France.<sup>83</sup>

The echoes of respective public spheres have always been heard in the definitions of nationality and the proposed classifications as in the Franco-German dispute over Alsace. Flowerpots both provide the soil, in which the plant flourishes but also fortify the furthest edges the roots can reach. So as the public spheres! Renan had no other alternative than defining nation subjectively otherwise it would not be plausible to legitimate the right of France to govern Alsace-Lorraine.<sup>84</sup> Herder could only wave the flag of linguistic nationalism embarrassed by the political division of his German audience and Treitschke could just speak of Prussian's legitimate right to spread its hegemony and institutions to all German lands as a member of Prussian Reichstag. Weber, warning against the Polish migrants, was certainly speaking in the tongue of the unified German nation-state. Similarly Kohn was at ease to finger Eastern nationalism as the responsible of the Nazi catastrophe immediately after the Second World War, as if there might be "benevolent nationalisms" in the West. The 'national public opinions' murmur behind the definitions of intellectuals, the actuality of the political dictates the direction of the interpretations.

Even worse, as Erözden suggests, most definitions of nation and nationalism which are seemingly objective and frequently referenced, are in actual fact proposed

---

<sup>83</sup> Rogers Brubaker, *Fransa ve Almanya'da Vatandaşlık ve Ulus Ruhu*, Ankara: Dost Kitabevi, December 2009, p. 23.

<sup>84</sup> Ozan Erözden, *Ulus-Devlet*, Ankara: Dost Kitabevi, 1997, p. 93. Rustow has also mentioned that Renan's speech was under deep impact of the loss of Alsace-Lorraine which has been of utmost importance in French national opinion in Dankwart A. Rustow, *A World of Nations: Problems of Political Modernization*, Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1967, p. 22.

for specific political ends or in the context of a political polemic ongoing at that time.<sup>85</sup> Erözden counts Stalin's well-known definition of nation together with Renan's afore-mentioned position. Stalin who would decidedly be influential in the national issues after the October Revolution as the head of People's Commissariat of Nationality Affairs (Narkomnats) has defined nation in 1913 as "a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture".<sup>86</sup> Nevertheless this definition was just an argument by Stalin in the polemic between Jewish Bund movement and the Bolsheviks. Leaving aside religion and common history among the criteria for nationality, Stalin has aimed at disproving Jewish claims of nationhood.<sup>87</sup>

Kohn was indeed well aware that claims of nationhood and conflicts between nationalist movements were allied with the quest for legitimation by the elites. French Revolution has set the nationalism as an overarching principle of loyalty transcending all other self-definitions including religion, class, tribe and sect. This novel overarching loyalty has meant that ancient method of legitimation was no more valid. For nationalism would be "inconceivable without a complete revision of the position of ruler and ruled, of classes and castes" accompanied by a revision of the legitimation base into a secular one.<sup>88</sup> While Lord Acton was writing on nationalism, for him the boundary between the civic and rude has not shifted to Rheine yet, but still oscillating between Calais and Dover. Acton argued that while national idea was initially "a

---

<sup>85</sup> Ozan Erözden, *Ulus-Devlet*, pp. 104-105.

<sup>86</sup> Joseph Stalin, "The Nation" in John Hutchinson & Anthony D. Smith (eds.), *Nationalism*, Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 20.

<sup>87</sup> Erözden, *ibid.*, p. 105.

<sup>88</sup> Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origins and Background*, p. 3.

contest for legitimacy”<sup>89</sup> for different ethnic groups first against Napoleonic invaders then the oppressors restored after Vienna Accord, French version of nationality later came to sacrifice individual liberties for the sake of the absolutist collective will.<sup>90</sup> Following the footsteps of Lord Acton, Kedourie was exceedingly uncomfortable with this novel principle of legitimation and has blamed nationalism to metamorphose Kant’s universal principle of self-government into an ideology of particularism.<sup>91</sup> In this sense nationalism appeared to Kedourie as “a principle of disorder” which despite its pretension to provide “a criterion for the legitimate exercise of power in the state”<sup>92</sup>, could not afford a sufficient alternative to the bygone divine legitimation of pre-modernity.

Generally speaking approaches to nationalism has been increasingly grouped into two broad groups since 1960s; the primordialist position and the modernist paradigm<sup>93</sup>. In fact primordialism has had great semblance with the original position of a standard nationalist agitation that nations were natural, God-given, ethnicity-based, popular and supposedly homogenous societies existent from the time immemorial. Özkırıklı classifies the primordialist position under naturalist, socio-biological and cultural sub-groups.<sup>94</sup> Smith, on the other hand, prefers the term perennialism in the place of extremely radical and largely discredited position of primordialism, especially the naturalist approach. For him, while perennialism was

---

<sup>89</sup> John Acton, *Essays on Freedom and Power*, New York: Meridien Books, 1955, p. 155.

<sup>90</sup> *ibid.*, p. 159.

<sup>91</sup> Pachalis M. Kitromilides, “Elie Kedourie’s Contribution to the Study of Nationalism”, *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol: 41, No: 5, September 2005, p. 661.

<sup>92</sup> Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1993, p. 9.

<sup>93</sup> Jonathan Hearn, *Rethinking Nationalism: A Critical Introduction*, Hampshire, UK & New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, p. 7.

<sup>94</sup> Umut Özkırıklı, *Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction*, Hampshire UK & New York USA: Palgrave, 2000, p. 66.

admitting that nations were not God-given and natural, they were recurrent throughout the history and the existing nations were descendants of their medieval forerunners.<sup>95</sup> Yet the modernist account has been the dominant paradigm in nationalism studies since the end of the-World War II. Anthony Smith acknowledged that the preeminence of nation-building theories in the era of de-colonization has naturally popularized the modernist approach.<sup>96</sup> Modernist paradigm contends that nations were modern political communities constructed by the elites. In line with nation-building theories a widely-held viewpoint of the modernist scholars has been to treat nations as instrumentally created to ensure political legitimacy in post-empire polities. A conciliatory position between primordialism and modernism was ethno-symbolism. Ethno-symbolist scholars such as Anthony D. Smith, John Hutchinson and John A. Armstrong concede that nations are novel as tools for popular sovereignty and political legitimation, but also they insist that national identities are embedded in the history<sup>97</sup>:

“If nations are modern, at least as mass phenomena legitimated by nationalist ideology, they owe much of their present form and character to pre-existing ethnic ties which stemmed from earlier ethnies in the relevant area”.<sup>98</sup>

Gellner considered nationalism “as a theory of political legitimacy”<sup>99</sup> that emerged intrinsic to the great transformation of human societies from agrarian to industrial, from peasant to urban and from traditional to modern. The modern, urban and industrial would be organized as nations replacing the multinational empires

---

<sup>95</sup> Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations and Nationalism*, London & New York: Routledge, 1998, p. 23.

<sup>96</sup> Anthony D. Smith, “History and National Destiny: Responses and Clarifications”, *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol: 10, No: 1/2, 2004, p. 195.

<sup>97</sup> Anthony D. Smith, *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era*, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1995, p. 157.

<sup>98</sup> Anthony D. Smith, *ibid.*, p. 57.

<sup>99</sup> Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, Oxford UK: Basic Blackwell Publisher, 1983, p. 1.

dominant in the deceasing era of pre-modernity. Nationalism would call for a re-organization of the political space since whole population, the ruler and ruled, the city dwellers and the peasants should all perform the same High Culture. Since a disharmony in language, culture, traditions and sometimes even the style of dressing would hamper the legitimacy of the regime on the divergent section, “ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones”.<sup>100</sup> This in turn would mean that each nation, or to be more concrete those who hold the right to act on behalf of the nation, has come up to see themselves as to be endowed with the legitimate right to claim political unification with suffering fellow nationals under the cruel rule of the illegitimate alien. What is more, the power-holders almost always has seen the minority ethnic affiliations as potential threats to their authority and attempted to impose their culture as the High Culture. In this sense for Gellner, nationalism is a process of standardization and homogenization. In a typical Gellnerian style, Guibernau basically categorizes the states into two groups; the legitimate states that are identified fully with a specific nation and illegitimate states consisting of population sections with diverse national affiliations. Since the legitimation of authority in a nation-state requires the general will of the titular nation to be satisfied, heterogeneity of the population would hamper the cohesion in the popular will and mean in any case roughness in the legitimacy process of the state authority.<sup>101</sup>

For Gellner in the traditional society culture was the status signifier that was drawing up the boundaries of hierarchical standing. The Ottoman palace aristocracy and the bureaucracy were nurtured as being acquainted with the Ottoman language and culture, not the numerous vernaculars and local mores within the Empire. In the Europe of serfs and plebs, and later, of medieval empires “the ruling class, consisting

---

<sup>100</sup> Ernest Gellner, *ibid.*, p. 1. E. J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*, 2nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 9.

<sup>101</sup> Montserrat Guibernau, *Nationalisms: The Nation-State and Nationalism in the Twentieth Century*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996, pp. 59-60.

of warriors, priests, clerics, burghers and administrators was using the culture to differentiate itself from the 'low culture' of large agricultural population".<sup>102</sup> Industrial revolution, melting of the agrarian population due to massive influx of peasants into cities, secularization and the resulting new base for political legitimacy necessitated an all-inclusive formulation of the culture.<sup>103</sup> Culture would serve to homogenize even the remotest slices of the population under the modern nation-state, not to differentiate as in the traditional society.

"Ein Zollverein ist keine Heimat, but an educational system and its medium of instruction"<sup>104</sup> wrote Gellner somewhere. The status of official language and compulsory national education were the primary tools for the power-holders to homogenize or so to speak to "nationalize" their population. In the modern society only the state has the capacity to initiate the diffusion of the high culture to the furthest segments of the society: "The maintenance of the kind of high culture...is linked to the state as a protector and usually the financier or at the very least the quality controller of the educational process which makes people members of this kind of culture."<sup>105</sup> While Gellner's account has related the inauguration of national legitimacy with the transition from traditional to modern society, Hroch envisioned a legitimation crisis foregoing the national consolidation. Hroch's Phase A of national agitation was initiated always in a crisis situation and by the enlightened portion of the subordinate "candidate nation". The crisis was a legitimation crisis and the political

---

<sup>102</sup> Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca: NY, 1983, pp. 9-10.

<sup>103</sup> Ernest Gellner and Anthony D. Smith, "The nation: real or imagined?: The Warwick Debates on Nationalism", *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 2, No. 3, 1996, pp. 367-368.

<sup>104</sup> Ernest Gellner, *Thought and Change*, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1964, p. 163. "Ein Zollverein ist keine Heimat" literally means "a Customs Union is not a fatherland". Zollverein was used to denote the Customs Union between numerous German Principalities and largely seen as the harbinger of the German unification of 1871.

<sup>105</sup> Ernest Gellner and Anthony D. Smith, *ibid.*, p. 368.



power confronted the fact that the very basis of its legitimacy, the firm religious truth of centuries has now become shaky.<sup>106</sup> The enlightened, who immediately perceived the legitimation crisis of the imperial centre, would turn into new political elites of their new-born national states.

Eric J. Hobsbawm approves Gellner's definition that nationalism is "a principle which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent."<sup>107</sup> Each nationalism aims to create a nation-state of its own<sup>108</sup> or to ensure obedience to the existing nation-state and to achieve coherence of the population through liquidation of ethnic and cultural variances. Again similar to Gellner, Hobsbawm maintained that nationalism was needed seeing the erosion of the political legitimacy in a period of upheaval caused by increased social mobility, and during an epoch of transition from one life style to another. Hobsbawm maintained that a fresh justification was the vital necessity not only to replace the already weakened dynastic and religious legitimacy but also to guarantee the political loyalty of the population especially of the workers who became more active in the process of urbanization and industrialization.<sup>109</sup> Patriotism has then served as the secular religion that would restore the loyalty of the masses to their fellow-national rulers. Folksongs, festivals, flags, choral performances, sports allegedly peculiar to the specific ethnies, now each in a national-ized form served to ensure the loyalty via rituals; all these "inventions of traditions" orchestrated

---

<sup>106</sup> Miroslav Hroch, *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups Among the Smaller European Nations*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2000, pp. xiv-xv.

<sup>107</sup> Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalisms since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 9.

<sup>108</sup> For Hobsbawm, nationalism became meaningful in a certain epoch of the history as a political movement only with the aim of achieving a nation-state of its own: "Nations only exist as functions of a particular kind of territorial state or the aspiration to establish one, but also in the context of a particular stage of technological and economic development". Hobsbawm, *ibid.*, pp. 9-10.

<sup>109</sup> Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalisms since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp. 84-85.

the legitimacy through repetition for the new power-holders.<sup>110</sup> Stokes indicated that nationalism was a new base of legitimacy invented by the nineteenth century politicians in order to legitimize their authority and engender popular mobilization behind their cause.<sup>111</sup>

Thus in Hobsbawm's theory of nationalism, both nations and nationalisms are products of social engineering. Elites should fabricate a sense of community for the newly enfranchised and mobilized masses who had to be incorporated in the urban high culture.<sup>112</sup> The urbanization and proletarianization of the agrarian masses called for a novel legitimation for the authority relations. Hobsbawm predicted the gradual demise of the nation-states after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. For him the post-Soviet reality of multitudinous small states was not compatible with the needs of the global capitalism. The boundaries of the nation-states have become riddled by the multi-national corporations and a new method of global legitimation would be necessary for the globalizing capitalism.<sup>113</sup> In this respect Smith blamed Hobsbawm of underestimating the ongoing power of the nationalism and noted down that nationalism was indeed continuing to flourish.<sup>114</sup>

---

<sup>110</sup> Hobsbawm defines the 'invented traditions' as "a set of practices normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behavior by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past". Eric J. Hobsbawm & Terence Ranger (eds.), *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge, 1983, p. 1.

<sup>111</sup> Gale Stokes, "Cognition and the Function of Nationalism", *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, Vol: 4, No: 4, Spring 1974, pp. 525-542.

<sup>112</sup> Hobsbawm and Ranger (eds.), *The Invention of Tradition*, chapter 7.

<sup>113</sup> Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalisms since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993, p. 183.

<sup>114</sup> Cited in Umut Özkırımlı, *Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction*, Hampshire UK & New York USA: Palgrave, 2000, pp. 126-127.

Greenfeld argued that nationalism was an authentic English invention, an invention by the Tudor aristocracy who ascended power in the sixteenth century. Tudors elevated the status of commoners to be included in the “nation” which up to that time narrowly denoting an elite group in the English socio-political ladder.<sup>115</sup> Equation of the elite and the commoners under the banner of nation has paved way to the creation of the first nation ever. Whole people were converted into the “bearer of the political sovereignty” to where rulers should search consent for their legitimacy.<sup>116</sup> While claiming that modern nations had their ethnic origin in the past, Hutchinson also acknowledged that nationalism as an ideology was a modern phenomenon that “legitimized the rise to power of new social classes”.<sup>117</sup>

Benedict Anderson articulates his definition of nation through a well-known statement: “Nation is an imagined political community, imagined as both limited and sovereign”.<sup>118</sup> In fact the imagined nature of the nation does not serve to differentiate nation from other communities, since according to Anderson all communities except small villages where face-to-face interaction is possible, are imagined. This claim stems from the fact that the image of the community of which the individual had situated himself as a member lives in the mind of the same individual. It is obvious that such an understanding of nation stands very close to Renan’s “spiritual soul”. Both the imaginational approach of Anderson and the national spirit view of Renan reach an abstract and de-materialized conceptualization of nation.

---

<sup>115</sup> Liah Greenfeld, “Nationalism in Western and Eastern Europe Compared” in Stephen E. Hanson and Willfried Spohn (eds.), *Can Europe Work? Germany and the Reconstruction of Postcommunist Societies*, Seattle & London: University of Washington Press, 1995. The whole argument can be found in Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*, 1992, especially pp. 6-9.

<sup>116</sup> Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*, p. 14.

<sup>117</sup> John Hutchinson, “Myth Against Myth: The Nation as Ethnic Overlay”, *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol: 10, No: 1/2, 2004, p. 109.

<sup>118</sup> Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*, London & New York: Verso, 1991, p. 5.

However, unlike Renan, Anderson incorporates an analysis of modernization, secularization and capitalist transformation in his articulation of national genesis. The transformation of time perception with the modernization had left its impact on Benedict Anderson's account of nations and nationalism. In his influential book "Imagined Communities" of 1983, Anderson proposes that in order to an imagination of nations to be possible, three conceptions of antiquity should be transformed into their pro-modern formulation: sacred script communities, sacred monarchical centers and the understanding the cosmological time. While the decline of the religious communities and the power of dynasties were emptying the space on which the rising up of the nations would be possible, secularization of the "Christian time" had enabled the human agents to dream a sociological organism progressing its own '*telos*'. For this reason, Soviet national delimitation needed vernaculars to be created below the literary Chaghatai and in the place of sacred Arabic. Similarly Kemalism imagined Turkishness through purification of language to get rid of artificial Ottoman and translating Qur'ans into Turkish instead of sacred Arabic.

The imagination of nation as a community masking all inequalities behind a feeling in a same "comradeship of equal fellows" directs Anderson to assess nationalism as in the same category as religion or kinship rather than a political movement. Anderson holds that nationalism, like religion, is not an 'ideology', being neither a coherent doctrine nor a form of 'false consciousnesses'. After the desanctification of religious institutions, decline of dynasties and transformation of time conception, the bases for the imagination of the nation had been laid down through capitalist processes. The print capitalism had produced books in vernacular languages after the saturation of the market of Latin books. This paved way the institutionalization of print languages as the bases of national consciousness. So, for Anderson, the interaction of economic system of capitalism, print technology and the

reality of human diversity has made the new community imaginable.<sup>119</sup> The role of the elites of a peculiar nation is crucial in imagining the national political community through generating a sense of commonness among the people who never see each other.<sup>120</sup>

Anderson interestingly arguing that the Creole communities of Latin America as being the first nationalists, also proposes that only with the threat of popular nationalist movements the dynasties of Europe designed a nationalism of their own. Instead of classical east-west dichotomy of Acton, Kohn, and many others, Anderson proposes two sets of dichotomies; popular versus official nationalism and also Creole nationalism opposed to nationalism of imperial centers.<sup>121</sup> Anderson noted that from the sixteenth century onwards Spanish America was divided into administrative divisions through boundaries drawn initially rather arbitrarily and sometimes in accordance with the military needs of Madrid. Anderson claimed that the long-standing administrative boundaries first turned into separate economic spheres of their own and then the population led by Creole pioneers, developed a national feeling fitting Spanish-made boundaries.<sup>122</sup> Hroch hints the importance of being a distinct administrative unit as well in the case of Finland. Finnish national identity increased remarkably after Finland was annexed to the Russian Empire in 1809 as an autonomous unit in contrast to be attached to Sweden proper without any specific qualification.<sup>123</sup> Soviet territorial engineering which lasted until 1936, left ready

---

<sup>119</sup> Anderson, *ibid.*, pp. 44-45.

<sup>120</sup> Anderson, *ibid.*, chapters 2-3.

<sup>121</sup> Benedict Anderson, "Western Nationalism and Eastern Nationalism: Is There a Difference That Matters?", *New Left Review*, Vol: 9, May-June 2001, pp. 33-37.

<sup>122</sup> Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*, London & New York: Verso, 1991, pp. 52-54.

<sup>123</sup> Miroslav Hroch, *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups Among the Smaller European Nations*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2000, p. 62.

institutional constructs to be filled with national imaginations for the Central Asian leaders after their unexpected independence. According to Wallerstein as well, almost all times statehood has preceded the nationhood, in the sense that nationalist movements emerged within previous administrative divisions and their vision has been mostly consistent with already existing territories.<sup>124</sup>

Paul Brass maintained both ethnicity and nationalism were crafted instrumentally by the elite groups with the intention of utilizing them in their competition for authority and scarce resources. Every aspect of cultural forms, every piece of ethnic make-up could be exploited by rival elite groups to facilitate a legitimate support base for their own claims.<sup>125</sup> The elite competition may occur between local aristocracy and alien colonial power, between different religious leaders within same polity, or among different segments of the population benefited disproportionately from the modernization and industrialization.<sup>126</sup> The elite competition might possibly be a struggle for hegemony, the winner would speak in the shoes of whole nation and “represent the national essence”.<sup>127</sup> Or it might happen to be just a battle of definition of nationhood; the triumphant elite group would gain the upper hand in deciding who the people were. As noted in an old saying “the people cannot decide until somebody decides who the people are”.<sup>128</sup> John Breuilly, a

---

<sup>124</sup> Immanuel Wallerstein, “Halklığın İnşası: Irkçılık, Milliyetçilik ve Etniklik”, in Etienne Balibar & Immanuel Wallerstein, *İrk, Ulus, Sınıf: Belirsiz Kimlikler*, İstanbul: Metis, 2000, p. 103.

<sup>125</sup> Paul R. Brass, *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison*, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1991, p. 15.

<sup>126</sup> Özkırımlı, *ibid.*, pp. 111-112. A summary of Brass’ instrumentalist understanding of nationalism by Tom Donahue: “According to Brass, ethnicity and nationality are (i) socially constructed by (ii) elites for (iii) instrumental and materialist reasons, and are (iv) ineluctably implicated in the modern state.” in nationalism project

<sup>127</sup> Michael Billig, *Banal Nationalism*, London: Sage Publications, 1995, p. 27.

<sup>128</sup> Cited from Jennings in Dankwart A. Rustow, *A World of Nations: Problems of Political Modernization*, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1967, p. 35.

modernist in his attitude to the nations and nationalism, denies the perennialist and ethno-symbolist arguments on behalf of the existence of nations in the pre-modern era.<sup>129</sup> For him nationalism should be dealt within the perspective of power politics; and the distinguishing feature of nationalist movements were their seeking or exercising state power and justifying such actions with nationalist arguments.<sup>130</sup> The nature of the nationalist movements are determined by their aim whether separation, reform or unification and their rival being whether nation states or non-nation states.

**Table 1: Breuilly’s Classification of Nationalist Movements**<sup>131</sup>

	<i>(Opposed to) Non-nation states</i>	<i>(Opposed to) Nation states</i>
Separation	Magyar, Greek, Nigerian	Basque, Ibo
Reform	Turkish, Japanese	Fascism, National Socialism
Unification	German, Italian	Arab, Pan-African

### 2.3. From Empire to Nation-State: New Legitimation

Rogers Brubaker symbolizes the institutional approach in the nationalism studies which became influential after the ending of the Soviet era in Eurasia. The Soviet Union was not unique only as the first socialist state but also due to its comprehensive institutionalization of numerous nationalities. Soviet institutionalization of ethnicity was not limited to fifteen Soviet republics but below

---

<sup>129</sup> Atsuko Ichijo, & Gordana Uzelac (eds.), *When is the Nation? Towards an Understanding of Theories of Nationalism*, London & New York: Routledge, 2005, p. 15.

<sup>130</sup> John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, second edition, 1993, p. 2.

<sup>131</sup> Breuilly, *ibid.*, p. 9.

republican level a comprehensive “state-sponsored codification and institutionalization of nationhood and nationality exclusively on a sub-state level” was initiated”.<sup>132</sup> What is more, Soviet institutionalization of national identities were not just fixing the borders and labeling the territory surrounded synonymous with the titular ethnic group. In conjunction with territorial and political delimitation and its supporting cadre policy, the Soviet regime also institutionalized nationality in the ethno-cultural and personal levels.<sup>133</sup> While for Brubaker, institutionalization on the basis of ethnicity and national affiliation’s outstripping of the class attachment was “unintended and unplanned”, Slezkine claimed that nationalism has become “a sacred principle of Marxism-Leninism”<sup>134</sup> particularly after 40s in the “Soviet communal apartment”: “It was official; classes and their “ideologies” came and went, but nationalities remained”.<sup>135</sup> Tishkov similarly noted that under the cover-up of internationalism Soviet state established ethnic states according to blood and language.<sup>136</sup>

Brubaker, in his well-received argument, stated that upon the ruins of the Soviet Union a triadic nexus emerged: National minorities, newly nationalizing states and external homelands. In fact, Brubaker asserted that all states of the Eastern Bloc were nationalizing states compared to the civic nationalisms of the West, escaping from a non-national ideology all would establish cultural and linguistic norms in line

---

<sup>132</sup> Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 26-27.

<sup>133</sup> Rogers Brubaker, “Nationhood and the National Question in the Soviet Union and Post-Soviet Eurasia: An Institutional Account”, *Theory and Society*, Vol: 23, No: 1, February 1994, p. 47.

<sup>134</sup> Yuri Slezkine, “The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism”, *Slavic Review*, Vol: 53, No: 2, Summer 1994, p. 414.

<sup>135</sup> Slezkine, *ibid.*, p. 449.

<sup>136</sup> Valery Tishkov, *Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in and After the Soviet Union: The Mind Aflame*, London & Thousand Oaks & New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1997, p. 250.



with the titular groups.<sup>137</sup> Nevertheless elites of every titular nation have confronted ethnic minorities and the threat posed by neighboring homelands. Brubaker classified three types of nationalisms that account for the tension between the above-mentioned three actors in the vast Soviet landscape and also in Eastern and Central Europe:

- “Nationalizing nationalisms” are the ideology of now independent titular nations. Feeling humiliated and suffering mostly of inferiority complex titular nations attempt hastily to impose their ethnic and cultural forms over all ethnic minorities. They felt themselves as the “legitimate owner” of the state as Brubaker argued, and do not hesitate to enforce republic-wide campaigns of nationalist vigor.
- “Homeland nationalisms” are in fact the ideology of the very same nationalizing elites. The elites of a particular titular nation try hard to protect and whenever possible, to unite with its co-nationals living in other nationalizing states.
- “National minority nationalisms” demand the recognition of certain cultural and minority rights by the titular ethnic group.

Taras Kuzio accurately criticizes Brubaker in his overlooking of the nationalism of the western nations. For him Brubaker’s classification between civic and nationalizing nationalism was irrelevant since every state in the west had also nationalized its population in the history.<sup>138</sup>

On the other hand, Szporluk claimed that both nationalism and Marxism were of the same wave of revolutionary ideology, both were surfing on the wave of

---

<sup>137</sup> Rogers Brubaker, “Nationalising States in the Old, “New Europe” and the New”, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol: 19, No: 2, p. 433.

<sup>138</sup> Taras Kuzio, ““Nationalizing States’ or Nation-Building? A Critical Review of the Theoretical Literature and Empirical Evidence”, *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol: 7, No: 2, 2001, p. 144.

industrialization. Echoing Tom Nairn, Szporluk maintained that Soviet Marxism-Leninism had the same mission with the nationalism that is to achieve rapid industrialization for the late-comers. Hence Soviet Union and the states of the so-called Eastern Bloc were all “national communists”, in other words Marxism-Leninism was transformed into an ideology of industrialization both to expel the imperialists out and then to catch up the advanced West: “Marxism won in Russia, but only by becoming a nationalism”.<sup>139</sup>

While Brubaker, Grenoble, Brandenberger<sup>140</sup> were in agreement with the widely held opinion in the field that at least the first two decades of Soviet rule prior so to speak to the Second World War were characterized by internationalism, Mevius insisted that legitimation through national ingredient was never removed from Soviet Marxism-Leninism since the very outset of the October Revolution. Nevertheless, claimed Mevius, after the Second World War Marxist-Leninist internationalism was completely replaced by a new ideological formulation, the socialist patriotism.<sup>141</sup> Positioned against bourgeoisie nationalism of the West, socialist patriotism rhetorically included workers, peasants and other ‘progressive elements’ of the society among the ranks of compatriots. Mevius noted that socialist patriotism practically

---

<sup>139</sup> Roman Szporluk, *Communism and Nationalism: Karl Marx Versus Friedrich List*, New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988, p. 230.

<sup>140</sup> Brubaker’s argument that “the first years of communist rule were characterized by “internationalism” was cited in Marchin Mevius, “Reappraising Communism and Nationalism”, *Nationalities Papers*, Vol: 37, No: 4, July 2009, p. 390. For Brandenberger the ideology of the two decades preceding the 1930s could be labeled as “militant proletarian internationalism.” David Brandenberger, ““...It Is Imperative to Advance Russian Nationalism as the First Priority”: Debates within the Stalinist Ideological Establishment, 1941-1945”, p. 276 in Ronald Grigor Suny & Terry Marchin (eds.), *A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin*, Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 200. Grenoble similarly maintained that “pushing of the non-Russian population toward the Russian was intensified in the post-World War II period under the guise of Communist internationalism” Lenore A. Grenoble, *Language Policy in the Soviet Union*, New York & Boston & Dordrecht & London & Moscow: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003, p. vii.

<sup>141</sup> Marchin Mevius, “Reappraising Communism and Nationalism”, *Nationalities Papers*, Vol: 37, No: 4, July 2009, p. 377.

caused a mutation in all communist parties within the Soviet sphere of influence; the “national” turned out to be prioritized against the “communist” under the smokescreen of ongoing socialist internationalism.<sup>142</sup>

Tahk & Lawson argued the legitimacy of the communist rule and also of the subsequent post-communist leaders were dependent on “the way communist rule was imposed and maintained”. They explained the survival of certain ex-communist leaders in the post-Soviet era as the head of their states while a couple of them were quickly repulsed, via the degree of embeddedness of the communist rule into national identity. In the cases where pre-communist national identity was powerful or the communist rule was seen as an alien rule the leaders lost control immediately after the Soviet yoke disappeared.<sup>143</sup> Since national identity was very weak in pre-Soviet Central Asia, most leaders including Karimov, could retain power as national leaders.

Another triadic nexus proposed by Levinger and Lytle, however, was considerably different than Brubaker’s nexus. For this account despite their huge variety of place and time all national movements incorporate a portrayal of glorious past, degraded present and utopian future.<sup>144</sup> Whilst the nation had proved the existence of its limitless potential in the golden era of the past, the precious gem lying in the depth of the national essence was unfortunately suppressed and even worse corrupted by the aliens and local compradors in the present. Luckily the national essence shall be rejuvenated and golden era be reestablished in the future under the guidance of genuine nationalist movement. Uzbek nation, capable to create

---

<sup>142</sup> *ibid.*, p. 390.

<sup>143</sup> Alex Tahk, Chappell Lawson, *The Ghost of Europe Past: Nationalism, Regime Legitimacy, and Democracy in the Post-Communist World*, January 9, 2003, pp. 2-3.

<sup>144</sup> Matthew Levinger & Paula Franklin Lytle, “Myth and Mobilization: The Triadic Structure of Nationalist Rhetoric”, *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol: 7, No: 2, 2001, p. 178.

Timurs, Ulughbegs and Bukharis was saved from the alien rule of Soviets by its autocrat, Karimov: “Kelacagi Buyuk Devlet”<sup>145</sup> is on scene.

If Slezkine were to write on the Ottoman Empire instead of the Soviet Union, he would have not hesitated to use the same phrase of “communal apartment” for the *Devlet-i Âliyye*. In actual fact the Ottoman state was another case of “institutionalized identity” but this time not based on nationhood at least in the original version of the system, but on religion. In the Ottoman system the millet initially was “a religious community, specifically, non-Muslim religious minorities represented within the empire by an official political leader”.<sup>146</sup> The traditional Ottoman rule has officially recognized three *millets* except the ruling Muslim (*millet-i hâkime*); the Greek Orthodox, the Armenian Apostolic and the Jewish. Unlike the Soviet system, all these *millets* were organized without delimiting a specific territory, but around formal leadership of their religious leader the ecumenical patriarch in Fener for Greeks, Armenian patriarch of Istanbul for Armenians and the *hahambaşı* for the Jewish *millet*.<sup>147</sup> Accurately claiming that *millet* did not correspond to ethnicity but based on religious conviction, Ortaylı informed that the status of *millet* was granted to the religious communities of monotheistic religions in return for their acquiescence of Sultan’s supreme authority. The Sultan was issuing an accord, the *ahidname* that acknowledged the internal autonomy of the *millets*.<sup>148</sup>

The *millet* system was a replication of the Islamic ummah conception of the Caliphate state. The state was based on the recognition of societal autonomy, an

---

<sup>145</sup> One of the major slogans of Uzbek regime meaning “State with Great Future”.

<sup>146</sup> Gábor Ágoston & Bruce Masters (eds.), *Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire*, New York, NY: Facts on File, 2009, p. 383.

<sup>147</sup> *ibid.*, p. 383.

<sup>148</sup> İlber Ortaylı, *Ottoman Studies*, Istanbul: Bilgi University Press, 2004, pp. 18-19.

institutionalized segmentation on the basis of religious variances. Each recognized religious community in the Ottoman Empire has the right to regulate personal matters of its members including legal problems on marriage, divorce and inheritance. The judgments of the courts established at the churches or synagogue of these *millet*s have been executed by the Ottoman state.<sup>149</sup> Karateke maintained that although the Ottoman Empire had a parallel court system consisting of both the *sharia* courts and the *millet* courts at the same time, the legal application was not rigid. Hence non-Muslims might have applied to sharia courts for their personal disputes and also sometimes Muslims were applying to consular courts just because they were charging lower fees.<sup>150</sup>

Greek rebellion of 1819-1830 was the breaking point since the Greeks, hierarchically the second *millet* of the Ottoman system, have established their own national state after a bloody and long war. The Greek rebellion has ignited a more “secular” definition of the subjects of the Sultan. Mahmud II, who was the pioneer of reform and centralization in the Empire, had also been the harbinger of the future ideology of Ottomanism just before his death in 1839: “From now on I do not wish to recognize Muslims outside the mosque, Christians outside the church, or Jews outside the synagogue.”<sup>151</sup> While in Tanzimat Fermanı (Reorganization Edict) of 1839 all *millet*s were declared equal regarding the government actions, 1856 Islahat Fermanı (Reform Edict) has directly dealt with non-Muslim *millet*s and all non-Muslim population was declared equal before the law. The status of *millet*s was

---

<sup>149</sup> Cevdet Küçük, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda “Millet Sistemi” ve Tanzimat”, p. 393-394 in Halil İnalçık & Mehmet Seyitdanlıoğlu (eds.), *Tanzimat: Değişim Sürecinde Osmanlı İmparatorluğu*, Ankara: Phoneix, 2006.

<sup>150</sup> Hakan T. Karateke, “Legitimizing the Ottoman Sultanate: A Framework for Historical Analysis”, pp. 39-40 in Hakan T. Karateke & Maurus Reinkowski (eds.), *Legitimizing the Order: The Ottoman Rhetoric of State Power*, Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2005.

<sup>151</sup> M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*, Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008, p. 74.

untouched, indeed the number of the *millets* was increased through new *ahidnames*, and however both edicts were aimed at creating a supra-millet, the Ottoman millet to prevent centrifugal demands: homo Ottomanicus par excellence.<sup>152</sup>

Nevertheless both the Muslim population and the individual *millets* were displeased with the equality before law as being Ottomans. The *millets* were insisting that the new arrangements should be in conformity with their communal privileges and new privileges, if any, “must be conferred upon them as a distinct community”. Muslims on the other hand were uneasy with their so to speak degradation *vis-à-vis* the “infidels”.<sup>153</sup> Especially in Arab lands of the Empire, disturbances erupted and the Muslim majority of Syria and Lebanon attacked the Christian population and in Jidda consul-generals of France and Britain were killed in the riots.<sup>154</sup> The Ottoman state then had to confirm the status of the *millets* through adopting separate laws for each of them regarding the Greek Orthodox in 1862, the Armenians of the Apostolic Church in 1863, and the Jews in 1865.<sup>155</sup>

The backbone of the *millet* system was religious segmentation surpassing ethnic and linguistic affiliations. While the *millet-i hâkime*, the dominant Muslim *millet* has

---

<sup>152</sup> Halil İnalçık, “Tanzimat Nedir?”, p. 29 in İnalçık & Seyitdanlıoğlu (eds.), *Tanzimat: Değişim Sürecinde Osmanlı İmparatorluğu*, Ankara: Phoneix, 2006.

<sup>153</sup> Remember that the Tanzimat Edict was largely known in Turkish popular language through its article saying “Bundan böyle gavura gavur denmeyecek” meaning “From now it is not allowed to say infidel to infidel”.

<sup>154</sup> Cevdet Küçük, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda “Millet Sistemi” ve Tanzimat”, p. 400 in Halil İnalçık & Seyitdanlıoğlu (eds.), *ibid.* Göçek noted the Arab reaction to Tanzimat Edict: “Some Muslims upon hearing of the decree, incited others to riot by informing them that “the Turks have become Christians and Franks, you should carry out a holy war against them. There is no doubt that those who die among you in such an endeavor will reach heaven and those you kill will go to hell”. Fatma Müge Göçek, “Ethnic Segmentation, Western Education, and Political Outcomes: Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Society”, *Poetics Today*, Vol: 14, No: 3, Cultural Processes in Muslim and Arab Societies: Modern Period I, Autumn 1993, pp. 517-518.

<sup>155</sup> Hanioglu, *ibid.*, p. 76.

also included Arabs and Kurds with Turks, Armenian speaking population could be divided into different *millets* corresponding to their religious sects.<sup>156</sup> However, the gravedigger of multinational empires, nationalism has become the norm of the statehood in the 19<sup>th</sup> century and the domains of Habsburg, Romanov and Ottoman dynasties were under the fatal assault of riots and/or independence wars. The backbone of the Empire crackled beginning with the Christian and Balkan ethnic groups who were more prone to influence of Western aura and so nationalism. Bulgarians demanded to be recognized as separate *millet* in 1870 and the Sultan had to appease them by instituting the Bulgarian Exarchate distinct from the Greek Orthodox millet.<sup>157</sup> Protestants were not granted a special millet status under Ottoman jurisdiction like the Orthodox Greek and Armenian population and Jews as well. In the second half of the 19th century Ottoman government has become increasingly uncomfortable with the American missionaries active throughout the Empire. Deringil recorded a palace memorandum recommending Protestant population should be recognized as a distinct *millet* in order to guarantee immunity from foreign governments that were posing themselves as the spiritual champions of the Protestant Ottomans”.<sup>158</sup>

---

<sup>156</sup> While all Armenians whether Orthodox, Catholic or Protestant were grouped under the Apostolic Church which headed the Armenian *millet*, Catholic Armenians were recognized as a separate nation in late 19th century. İlber Ortaylı, *The Last Empire: Ottoman Empire*, Istanbul: Timaş Press, 2006, pp. 87-89.

<sup>157</sup> Hanioglu, *ibid.*, pp. 75-76.

<sup>158</sup> Selim Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire 1876-1909*, London, UK & New York, NY: I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd, 1999, p. 125.

### **CHAPTER 3**

#### **HISTORICAL OVERVIEW**

Searching via a post-“Age of Nations” lens the ‘nation-historians’ of the Modern Ages constantly dug the muddy past in order to find their own nations. They dreamed up a nation in existence from the time immemorial, progressing through time. They focused on discovering the unique features of their people and attempted to write histories of the nations rather than the dynasties or Empires by making use of what they could identify. Alas not all could find their nations; those who found, not in the form they hoped. They discovered that the sacred national homeland was filled by a distinct and in some occasions regrettably hostile “nation” or the polities they admitted to be their ancestors might not possess even the most basic features of their nation such as linguistic or religious affinity. Yet all nations have their own glorious histories as today. It has been a major blow for ‘nation-historians’ in constructing their narratives whether to follow the venture of their selected ethnicity or to fix the history around a specific territory, which is the Fatherland.

Both of the Turkish and Uzbek historical narratives had a wide array of candidates as possible historical forebears. Soghdian, Margianan and Bactrian states, Kushan, Parthian, Sassanid, Seleucid, Timurid Empires; Kokand, Khiva Khanates, and also numerous transitory tribal confederations in Khorezm and Fergana Valley are among the choices of the Uzbek historians. Likewise ancient Sumerian, Hittite and Phrygian polities, Karahanid, Gaznawid and Akkoyunlu states or Kök Turk, Seljukid and Ottoman Empires were a few of candidates for the Turkish historiography. National histories were framed by picking out from the



possible candidates to satisfy the needs of the elites for legitimation. So, one way to overcome the setback of choosing between the “history of ethnicity” and the “history of the territory”<sup>184</sup> is to follow the claims of the nation-state narratives of Uzbekistan and Turkey.

### 3.1. Legitimation in Turan and Iran

Iranian mythology provides several sketches of the endless struggle between Iran and Turan mostly on how the cities of the sedentarized Iranian civilization have been threatened by the nomadic tribes of the northern steppes. Throughout these legends while “Iran” was symbolizing the cultured and the civilized, “Turan” was used to label the ignorant and the savage.<sup>185</sup> Amu Darya, as the border between two realms, was separating the Iranian urban administration and the Turanian tribal freedom.<sup>186</sup> In Avesta, for instance, the urban centers of Soghdian and Margianan states, Gava and Mouru were counted among the best places created by Ahura Mazda, the Zoroastrian God.<sup>187</sup>

Leaving aside the exaggerations of mythology, main axis of the Central Asian history was actually the divide between the nomad and the urban since the emergence of first sedentary populations before middle of the First Millennium

---

<sup>184</sup> For the problematique of choosing between the “history of ethnicity” and the “history of the territory” please look Khurshidbek Inomjonov, *Die Außenpolitik der Republik Usbekistan im Spannungsfeld von Staatsbildung und regionaler Integration*, Fachbereichs Gesellschaftswissenschaften Justug-Liebig-Universität Gießen, PhD thesis, 2005, pp. 24-26.

<sup>185</sup> In one of the renowned monuments of Persian literature, the Shahname, Firdawsi explains the long struggle between Afrasiyab (known as “Alp Er Tunga” in Turkish mythology), the khan of the northern tribes and the Iranian Shah, Keyhusrev. For more information please look Tarik Demirkan, *Macar Turancıları*, Istanbul: Tarih Vakfi Yurt Yayınları, 2000, pp. 21-22.

<sup>186</sup> K. de B. Codrington, “A Geographical Introduction to the History of Central Asia”, *The Geographical Journal*, Vol: 104, No: 1/2, July-August 1944, p. 32.

<sup>187</sup> F. Max Muller & James Darmesteter (eds.), *The Zend-Avesta*, James Darmesteter (trans.), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1883, p. 123.

BC.<sup>188</sup> The “Father of History” Herodotus, writing in Fifth Century BC, had mentioned Central Asian urban centers of Bactria, Soghdiana and Khorezm several times. After conquering Central Asia between 545-539 BC, Persian Achaemenid ruler Cyrus II founded Samarkand city in order to divert agricultural trade from the established local cities. At that time vast northern steppes were inhabited by the Huns, Scythians and other Turkic nomads and also various Mongol groups. The oasis and the steppe with diverse socio-economic conditions initially set by the nature and the availability of water had become habitats of two different political organizations. Adshead argues that even though *nomadic pastoralism* and *oasis agriculture* were seemingly “two sharply contrasting ecologies” in overt conflict, their relationship was more symbiotic with a considerable degree of “complementarity and compenetration”.<sup>189</sup>

As stated by Roudik, necessity to build and maintain a system of irrigation and the need for a common defense against the plunder of northern nomads had paved way the emergence of state-like formations in the oasis.<sup>190</sup> Moreover trade among those agricultural polities required both an organization for the security of trade routes and a common standard for exchange guaranteed by some sort of political authority. Searching for the causes of eastern despotism, Wittfogel’s “irrigation theory” proposed that the need for irrigation systems in the scarcity of water dictated a highly centralized power and administrative control.<sup>191</sup> So the city

---

<sup>188</sup> S. Akiner & R. U. Cook & R. A. French, “Salt Damage to Islamic Monuments in Uzbekistan”, *The Geographical Journal*, Vol: 158, No: 3, November 1992, p. 257. Roudik claims that first cities were established earlier, around eighth to sixth centuries BC in Peter L. Roudik, *The History of the Central Asian Republics*, Westport, Connecticut & London: Greenwood Press, 2007, p. 13. Since Persians had come across established cities in Central Asia in the middle of fifth century BC, Roudik’s claim seems plausible.

<sup>189</sup> S. A. M. Adshead, *Central Asia in World History*, London: Macmillan, 1993, pp. 24-26.

<sup>190</sup> Roudik, *ibid.*, p. 13.

<sup>191</sup> Quoted in Peter A. Lambert, *The Political Response of Soviet Republican Leaders to the Challenge of Nationalism*, PhD Thesis, Coral Gables, Florida: University of Miami, May, 2004, p. 255. One minor objection comes from W. F. Wertheim who tones down the extreme centralization claim and describes these sedentary societies as “patrimonial bureaucracies”. Wertheim’s suggestion is cited in Doğan Avcıoğlu, *Türklerin Tarihi-Birinci Kitap*, Istanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1997, p. 100.

state of Central Asia had typically developed around a chief, later a monarch, with the basic bureaucracy including *satrabs*<sup>192</sup> and *mirabs*.<sup>193</sup> Then an autocrat, who could decently manage the water distribution and efficiently collect the taxes in return for building the irrigation infrastructure and also ensure the security, had been most fitting in the Central Asian oasis. In this sense the legitimation of the authority was “relatively unproblematic, largely economic and generally accepted”.<sup>194</sup>

Nomadic pastoralism, on the other hand, had involved seasonal migration of small tribal units in order to “follow water wherever it could be found”.<sup>195</sup> Countless horse-breeding Turco-Mongol tribes have been wandering along massive Eurasian step belt from wide forests of Siberia in the East to the low pastures of *Dasht-i Kipchak*<sup>196</sup> in the West. While in the oases the farmer society had depended on the land, the herd has been the main property in the steps. Adshead summarizes two prominent positions on the configuration of political organization and state authority among tribal societies. The ecological view maintains that, composed of small self-sufficient units, the tribal order was anarchic and stateless. Moreover since the military activity would be ruinous to the

---

<sup>192</sup> *Satrabs* were a sort of regional administrators who were prominent especially during the Persian and Achaemenid era.

<sup>193</sup> Literally meaning the “water chief”, *mirabs* were the most important Central Asian “bureaucrats” directly responsible for the distribution of water to farmers. Gleason tells that when a new mirab was selected in the place of a deceased one through a regional contest, the losers were killed to prevent future conflict in water distribution. This symbolizes the significance of water in oasis society and also clarifies the intolerance towards possible “power contenders”. For more information please look Gregory Gleason, *The Central Asian States: Discovering Independence*, Boulder & Oxford: Westview Press, 1997, p. 38 and Gülşen Aydın, *Authoritarianism versus Democracy in Uzbekistan: Domestic and International Factors*, MA thesis, Ankara: METU, January 2004, p. 82.

<sup>194</sup> Adshead, *ibid.*, p. 23.

<sup>195</sup> Adshead, *ibid.*, p. 15.

<sup>196</sup> *Dasht-i Kipchak* was a geographical term, meaning “the Land of the Kipchak”, used by Persian-speaking sedentary people to denote the land of northern Turkic nomads. *Dasht-i Kipchak* has corresponded to the north of the Caspian Sea and the basins of Volga and Don.

herd, the tribe was peaceful except certain imperative moments. As a result, authority structure was customary and transitory. Conversely the sociological view holds that war is functional in tribes because the unit needed “heroes” to become the *khan*. The authority was legitimized through violence in the “absence of legitimacy and clear rules of succession”.<sup>197</sup> Continuous mobility and atomistic structure of tribes had led many scholars to define nomadic political organization as “tribal democracy”<sup>198</sup>, “spontaneous democracy”<sup>199</sup> or “naturally anarchic”.<sup>200</sup>

Contrary to recent beautification of the tribal society as democratic, it is clear that Turco-Mongol tribal structure was aristocratic in the sense that a hierarchical divide had prevailed both inside the tribe and among the tribes.<sup>201</sup> Each tribe had a *royal* lineage which was named as the *ak budun*, from which the *bey*, the chief, of that particular unit was recruited. Under the *ak budun* there were dependent lineages called the *kara budun*.<sup>202</sup> In addition, as certain tribes had in time acquired the status of the royal tribe among other tribes through war, conquest, and alliances as well, the conquered realm had become the common property of the ruling tribe’s *ak budun*.<sup>203</sup> Although most of the tribes could not

---

<sup>197</sup> Adshead, *ibid.*, pp. 18-20.

<sup>198</sup> Gleason, *ibid.*, p. 117.

<sup>199</sup> Avcıoğlu, *ibid.*, p. 235.

<sup>200</sup> Adshead attributes this remark to John Mason Smith in Adshead, *ibid.*, p. 19.

<sup>201</sup> French orientalist Leon Cahun, writing in the anti Ottoman/Turkish mood of late 19th century Europe, argued that Turkish ideal was neither democratic nor aristocratic, but hierarchial bureaucracy: “They turned into stationer barbarians and bureaucrats when get off their horse, sold their freedom to a superior in return for rank and medal.” Leon Cahun, *Asya Tarihine Giriş: Kökenlerden 1405’e Türkler ve Moğollar*, Istanbul: Seç Yayın Dağıtım, January 2006, p. 57.

<sup>202</sup> Throughout the Kök Turk inscriptions of 8th century found in southern Siberia, all the mass in the tribe except the lineage of the chief was called as the *kara budun*. In this sense the *kara budun* was used to denote the ordinary people. Please look for the inscriptions: Talat Tekin, *Orhon Yazıtları*, Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları, 2008.

<sup>203</sup> It is remarkable that independent *Ak Bolak* tribe became known as *Kara Bolaks* after they were defeated and subjugated by the Kipchaks. Subsequent to their victory over Kipchaks they were re-named as the *Ak Bolak*. Ziya Gökalp, *Türk Uygarlığı Tarihi*, Istanbul, İnkılap Kitabevi, 1991, p. 202. The same was true for the *Akkoyunlu* and the *Karakoyunlu*, the so called White Sheep and Black Sheep Turcomans.

create socio-political organizations, or in other words a nucleus state; a few of them had succeeded to found poly-ethnic confederations of tribes including the royal tribe at the core. The rulers of such confederations were titled as the Khan or the Qaghan and the succession of a deceased Qaghan had regularly been problematic as most members of the dynasty might legitimately claim the Qaghanate.<sup>204</sup> It is noteworthy that all through the K k Turk inscriptions of Orkhun only the chiefs of T rghesh, Krygyz, Hazar, Chinese and Tibetans together with the K k Turk Khan were called as the Qaghan.<sup>205</sup>

Before the eleventh century the royal house among Turco-Mongolic tribes was the *A-shih-na* or *Ashina*<sup>206</sup> dynasty from which all Qaghans of K k Turk, Hazar, Krygyz, T rghesh and Qarluk confederations were derived.<sup>207</sup> It is even suggested that the term *Turk* which later gained an ethnic meaning, was initially the name of the military segment of the A-shih-na lineage.<sup>208</sup> Nearby being a member of the A-shih-na, the legitimate Qaghan should also be son of a mother from a noble lineage such as the A-shih-te.<sup>209</sup> Divit iođlu convincingly names the Inner Asian regime as *stepocracy*. This regime was characterized by a nomad-shepherd-military tribal confederation ruled by the royal tribe at the centre and a plenty of tribute paying dependent tribes. This confederation consistently plunders

---

<sup>204</sup> Nicola di Cosmo & Allen J. Frank & Peter B. Golden, *The Cambridge History of Inner Asia: The Chinggisid Age*, Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 109-110. Peter B. Golden suggests that one of Muqan Khan's sons was denied the Khanate because of his mother was not of the ruling Ashina clan.

<sup>205</sup> Sencer Divit iođlu, *Orta-Asya T rk İmparatorluđu VI.-VIII. Y zyullar*, Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2005, pp. 235-236.

<sup>206</sup> Zeki Velidi Togan argues that A-shih-na leaders had secured a moral supremacy and acted as arbitrator-Qaghans over Turco-Mongolic tribes. Quoted in  mit Hassan, *Eski T rk Toplumuna  zerine İncelemeler*, Ankara: Dođu Batı Yayınları, 2009, p. 272.

<sup>207</sup> Divit iođlu, *ibid.*, pp. 160.

<sup>208</sup> Roudik, *ibid.*, p. 24.

<sup>209</sup> Sencer Divit iođlu, *Orta Asya T rk Tarihi  zerine Altı  alıřma*, Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, April 2006, p. 41.

the value-producing sedentary population of the southern belt. Since feeding a regular army against the northern nomads proved expensive, the sedentary population had by and large looked for collaboration with different nomadic tribes. In this sense stepocracy was a plunder-commerce relationship between constantly falling and re-establishing nomad confederations under a Qaghan from the legitimate A-shih-na and *petit* city monarchies of agricultural sedentaries.<sup>210</sup>

The rule and sovereignty of the A-shih-na ruler was also legitimated through a belief in the sacredness of the Qaghan. The Qaghan was referred as *tengri teg tengride bolmuş*<sup>211</sup> in both Kül Tigin and Bilge Qaghan inscriptions. The Uighur inscriptions of Kül Bilge and Bayan Çor also contain the same label *tengride bolmuş* in front of the name of the Qaghan. *Kök Tengri*<sup>212</sup> was believed to lend its *kut*, *küç* and *ülüğ*; that were sacredness, power (of warriorship) and productivity respectively, to the Qaghan who in turn was ruling as the shadow of the Divine.<sup>213</sup> Saydam observes that when the tribes were summoned under a confederation, the military-administrative power of the ruling clan was backed by a conceptualization of an all-powerful *Kök Tengri*. Similarly *Kök Tengri* was replaced by a set of lesser Gods as soon as the central confederation dispersed or lost its strength.<sup>214</sup>

Last but not the least the Qaghan was legitimate as long as his confederation could generate wealth through raids to southern sedentary cities or other neighboring states. Continuous war and *savga*, that is the distribution of the spoils obtained through plundering of other tribes or empires, had been

---

<sup>210</sup> Divitçioğlu, *Orta-Asya Türk İmparatorluğu VI.-VIII. Yüzyıllar*, pp. 240-242.

<sup>211</sup> God-like (Heaven-like), Heaven-born. Talat Tekin, *Orhon Yazıtları*, Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları, 2008, p. 44 & 73.

<sup>212</sup> *Kök Tengri* was the pagan God of ancient Turks.

<sup>213</sup> Divitçioğlu, *Orta-Asya Türk İmparatorluğu VI.-VIII. Yüzyıllar*, pp. 84-85.

<sup>214</sup> M. Bilgin Saydam, *Deli Dumrul'un Bilinci: "Türk-İslam Ruhu" Üzerine Bir Kültür Psikolojisi Denemesi*, İstanbul: Metis, 1997, p. 90.

fundamental for Qaghans' legitimacy. Given that the *Kök Tengri*, the "heavenly mandate that makes his rule legitimate also makes him responsible for the people's welfare"<sup>215</sup>, the Qaghan should even behave extravagantly in distributing the *savga* to both to the chiefs of dependent tribes and also to the *kara budun*. Kül Tigin praises himself since "he turned the naked into clothed, the poor into rich and made the few people many".<sup>216</sup> As maintained by Divitçioğlu, the Qaghan and the *ak budun* felt obliged to this extravagant distribution, first to ensure the loyalty of dependent chiefs and secondly to secure later participation of the ordinary people, the *kara budun* as warriors of the next campaign.<sup>217</sup> In addition to *savga*, Khans periodically arranged a pillage ceremony, the *yağma*, in which the chiefs (beys) of dependent tribes plundered the tent of the Khan including all jewelry, food, and even clothes.<sup>218</sup> Divitçioğlu notes the *yağma* as a reward procedure for the loyalty of the tribal chiefs.<sup>219</sup>

### 3.2. Islam for Legitimation

While Bumin Khan had gathered numerous Turco-Mongolic tribes wandering through the step-belt from the Oxus to the inner Mongolia under the Kök Turk Confederation in 552, two great empires of the Occident, the Sassanid and Byzantine Empires were just at the beginning of their century long struggle over the hegemony of the Middle East and the Caucasus. At the same time as Mesopotamia was left ruinous after the decisive Byzantine victory at the Battle of

---

<sup>215</sup> Svat Soucek, *A History of Inner Asia*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 92.

<sup>216</sup> "Yalın budunu tonlu, çigan budunu bay kıldım; az budunu üküş kıldım" in Tekin, *ibid.*, pp. 32-33.

<sup>217</sup> Divitçioğlu, *Orta-Asya Türk İmparatorluğu VI.-VIII. Yüzyıllar*, pp. 220-221.

<sup>218</sup> In epic Dede Korkut the *yağma* arranged by Salur Kazan Khan was explained in detail. When some of the Oghuz beys were not invited to the *yağma*, they revolted against the Khan. Muharrem Ergin, (eds.), *Dede Korkut Kitabı*, İstanbul: Hisar Kültür Gönüllüleri, 2003, pp. 142-147.

<sup>219</sup> Divitçioğlu, 2005, pp. 205-206. More information on *yağma* can be found in Ziya Gökalp, *Türk Uygarlığı Tarihi*, İstanbul, İnkılap Kitabevi, 1991, p. 156-158 and Abdülkadir İnan, *Makaleler ve İncelemeler*, Vol: 1, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1998, pp. 645-648.

Nineveh in 628, Arabs were preparing for the first raids outside their historic peninsula. Fueled with the *gaz'a* ideology of their new religion, Arabs came to dominate Syria and Iraq just four years after the death of Muhammad. The victory over Sassanids at the Battle of Qadisiyyah securely included Mesopotamia into the *Dar al-Islam*<sup>220</sup> in 636. Subsequently Battle of Nihawand of December 641 broke the last resistance of the Sassanid Empire against invading Arabs.

Ahnaf ibn Qais, the commander of the Arabic armies, had glimpsed from the western bank of the Oxus towards the *Turan* in the winter of 643-644 after his rapid conquest of all Persia. What he saw at the eastern bank was the loose Türgesh tribal confederation split from the Kök Turks, and beyond, Western Kök Turks weakened by chronic internal turmoil. Eastern branch of the Kök Turks, already a vassal of the Chinese since 630, would be revived by Kutluğ Qaghan in 682 to reign until Uighur, Qarluq, Kirgiz, Basmil and Oghuz broke up the confederation in 745.<sup>221</sup> As Frenkel maintains, the legendary Persian dichotomy between Iran and Turan had continued to survive, but this time in an Arabic wording, as *Dar al-Islam* and *Dar al-Harb*.<sup>222</sup> “Rival political and legal systems” based on two different procedures of legitimation would endure until the middle of 8th century.<sup>223</sup> Indeed, despite whole Mesopotamia and Persia had fallen under the rule of the Caliphate in only two decades, Arabs had to struggle more than a century to conquer Central Asia.<sup>224</sup> Six years after the collapse of last Kök Turk Confederation, Talas War of 751, established the absolute rule of the Abbasid Caliphate in Central Asia.

---

<sup>220</sup> *Dar al-Islam* literally means the “Abode of Islam”.

<sup>221</sup> Ümit Hassan, “Siyasal Tarih: Açıklamalı Bir Kronoloji” in Sina Akşin (eds.), *Türkiye Tarihi I: Osmanlı Devletine Kadar Türkler*, Istanbul: Cem Yayınevi, July 1997, pp. 147-157.

<sup>222</sup> *Dar al-Harb* refers to the “Abode of War”.

<sup>223</sup> Yehoshua Frenkel, “The Turks of the Eurasian Steps in Medieval Arabic Writing” in Reuven Amitai & Michal Biran (eds.), *Mongols, Turks and Others: Eurasian Nomads and the Sedentary World*, Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2005.

<sup>224</sup> Soucek, *ibid.*, p. 56.



In bolstering the centrality of the power, Islamic legitimation considerably differs from stepocracy's dispersion of power. Whereas the Qaghan was the sacred and thus the legitimate leader of the nomadic governance the political realm had also included many micro-khans as legitimate and authoritative in their respective tribes as the Qaghan. On the other hand, Islamic legitimation had recognized the oneness and indivisibility of the power; as all the dominion was God's, the authority centralized and condensed in a monarch would be legitimate as long as the ruler applied "divinely bestowed knowledge".<sup>225</sup> Barthold once observed that the concept of all-powerful single ruler was alien to the nomadic Turks, for them the state belonged to all family of the Qaghan. While in some Seljukid cities Friday *khutbahs* were in the name of Togrul Beg, the other Seljukid mosques were including Chagri Beg's name in their *khutbahs*.<sup>226</sup>

The Sunni interpretation of the fifty-ninth verse of the Nisa Surah, which is "believers are instructed to obey God, the messenger and 'those of you who are in authority'"<sup>227</sup> as a divine requirement for obedience to the political rulers had bestowed consequential legitimacy for the khans and qaghans. Quickly identified themselves with the "central Islam", that is the orthodox Sunni Hanafi tradition, Seljukid Togrul Beg had terminated Shi'i Buwayhids' hegemony in Baghdad and over the Caliph<sup>228</sup> and was recognized by the Caliph as the *Malik al-Mashriq wa-al-Maghrib*.<sup>229</sup> Seljukid Sultans could henceforth enjoy their heavenly legitimacy. Karakhanid rulers and Mahmud of Ghazna were also careful to decorate

---

<sup>225</sup> Paul L. Heck, "Politics and the Qur'ān", *Encyclopaedia of the Qur'ān, Vol: 4*, Jane Dammen McAuliffe (eds.), Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2004, p. 128.

<sup>226</sup> V. V. Barthold, *Moğol İstilasına Kadar Türkistan*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1990, p. 327.

<sup>227</sup> Wadad Kadi, "Authority", *Encyclopaedia of the Qur'ān, Vol: 1*, Jane Dammen McAuliffe (eds.), Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2004, pp. 189-190. The Shia tradition on the other hand, has identified "those of you who are in authority" with the "infallible imams".

<sup>228</sup> Soucek, *ibid.*, p. 89.

<sup>229</sup> "King of the East and West"

themselves with titles by the Caliph. Following the foundation of their states Karahanids continuously used the title of *Mawla of Emir-ul-Muminin*.<sup>230</sup> Likewise Sultan Mahmud of Ghazna was vigilant to appear as a devout Muslim and to acknowledge the Caliph in khutbas all over his country.<sup>231</sup> The Caliph who in fact had neither a decent army nor a political power could only serve the monarchs in legitimating their power. What is more, Karakhanid khans who were not of the royal Turkic lineage, the *ak-budun*, had attempted a symbiosis of hereditary and Islamic legitimation through claiming their ancestry directly to the Prophet Muhammad's cousin Ali.<sup>232</sup>

Furthermore Islam had provided warrior Turkish nomads the promise of heaven: "And do not consider those who have been killed in the way of God as dead; they are alive with their lord, well-provided for".<sup>233</sup> All through the centuries the *gaz'a* ideology and martyrdom would provide all Muslim rulers the golden recipe for mobilization, especially in wars against non-Muslims and some occasions against Islamic heterodoxies. After Alp Arslan of the Seljukids had appeared triumphant over the Byzantine Emperor Diogenes in Manzikert, *hadiths* were discovered all of a sudden appraising Turks' "friendliness, good manners, modesty, dignity and bravery": "Learn the tongue of the Turks, for their reign will be long".<sup>234</sup> Seljuks girding their swords as the *Selâtin-i Islam*<sup>235</sup> would be followed by Ottomans fighting the infidels in the name of God.

---

<sup>230</sup> "Aide of Amir of all Muslims", Barthold, *ibid.*, p. 291.

<sup>231</sup> Barthold, *ibid.*, p. 290.

<sup>232</sup> Soucek cites a Karahanid inscription on the wall of a Bukharan mosque: "The just, the very great khaqan Jalal al-dunya wa 'Idin Alp Kilich Tonga Bilga Türk Toghrul Qara Khaqan al-Husayn ibn al-Hasan ibn Ali, God's elect, helper of al-Nasir, Commander of the Faithful, the King...The ultimate kingdom is God's" Soucek, *ibid.*, p. 85.

<sup>233</sup> *Qur'an*, Baqara: 154.

<sup>234</sup> Soucek, *ibid.*, p. 91.

<sup>235</sup> V. V. Barthold, *Orta-Asya Türk Tarihi Hakkında Dersler*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2006, p. 89. "Selâtin-i Islam" literally means the "sultans of Islam". This title was granted by the Caliph to the rulers that would struggle against non-Muslim armies to protect the Islamic lands and the Caliphate.

### 3.3. Return of Turanian Legitimacy: Yasa of Genghis Khan

The land of the Great Seljuk Empire from Transoxiana to the Asia Minor was gradually partitioned during the first half of the 12th century among a few chiefdoms and emergent dynasties, none of which could any more ignore Islam and the sharia as a prominent base of their legitimacy. Concomitantly, Turco-Mongol tribes of the northern Central Asian steppe found themselves in a power vacuum after the overthrow of the Khitan-Liao Empire by Chinese, despite the subsequent foundation of a loose Kara Khitai federation.<sup>236</sup> The legitimacy procedure in those northern tribes, not yet been Islamized, had still included power politics among the tribal aristocracy, violence and wealth distribution in return for loyalty. Temüchin was born as a member of the royal *altun urugh* (Golden Tribe) in this nomadic north to Yesügei, chief of Kiyat branch of the Borjigit clan in 1162.<sup>237</sup>

Even with such a promising birth as the eldest son of the clan chieftain, Temüchin had to face against severe deprivation and later extreme political struggle from his childhood. After Yesügei's poisoning by Tatars when Temüchin was only nine, the bulk of their clan declined to be ruled by a widow and her siblings.<sup>238</sup> Notwithstanding Cahun's implication in explaining this denial, that the aristocratic society had ended since the political and military leadership was seen

---

<sup>236</sup> Di Cosmo & Frank & Golden, *ibid*, p. 26. Please notice that the "kara" prefix indicates that the succeeding Kara Khitai state was established by a non-royal clan.

<sup>237</sup> *ibid.*, p. 28. Leon Cahun also accepts 1162 as Temuchin's birth year in Cahun, *ibid.*, p. 137. Alternatively Soucek claims Temüchin's birth year to be 1167 in Soucek, *ibid.*, p. 104.

<sup>238</sup> Leon Cahun noted that just about one quarter of the 30000 nomad families had stayed along with Temüchin's family. Cahun also asserted that Temüchin was 13 when he has deprived of his father. Please look Cahun, *ibid.*, pp. 138-139.

superior to the hereditary clan aristocracy and its legitimate prince<sup>239</sup>; the situation proved transitory. As Temüchin grew up he could steadily summon once dependent clans of his father through continuous warfare and political manoeuvres mostly guided by his mother. Finally, in 1182, after Temüchin had married Börte, daughter of the chief of the Qonggirat tribe, he secured himself as the Khan of Yesügei's former clan confederation. Then Temüchin both initiated a series of campaigns against neighboring clan confederations, first to Merkits, next Tatars, Kereits and lastly the Naiman and also carried on his contention against Jamuqa for the leadership of all Mongol tribes. Barthold argues that the long struggle between Temüchin and Jamuqa was among the step aristocracy, the followers of the *altun urugh* and the step democracy, referring to the mass, the "people".<sup>240</sup> Conversely Gumilev assesses Temüchin as the royal leader who convened "the commoners, class outsiders, even slaves" in his bid for leadership.<sup>241</sup> Yet it is clear that Jamuqa's demand for leadership was seen legitimate by the Mongol chieftains since he was the leader of another lineage in the royal clan, the Jajirat. Only after Temüchin had defeated and executed Jamuqa in 1205, all Mongol tribe chieftains had acknowledged him as the Great Khan in the 1206 *kurultai*.<sup>242</sup> Now Temüchin could launch the Mongol outburst of 13th century with this new title of "Genghis Khan".

The Yasa of Genghis Khan, together with the shariat, had been the foremost principle of legitimacy for the rulers of all dynasties in Central Asia and Middle East until the late 18th century.<sup>243</sup> The Khans had to use a dual legitimation

---

<sup>239</sup> Cahun, *ibid.*, p. 138.

<sup>240</sup> V. V. Barthold, *Orta-Asya Türk Tarihi Hakkında Dersler*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2006, pp. 126-127.

<sup>241</sup> Quoted in Adshead, *ibid.*, pp. 54-55.

<sup>242</sup> "Assembly" in Mongol and Turkic.

<sup>243</sup> McChesney highlights that Shah Murad abandoned the Genghisid legitimation as late as 1785 when he founded the Amirate of Bukhara. Moreover the Ming tribe who founded the Khanate of Khokand in 1798 has been the first non-Genghisid ruler that could adopt the title of "khan" for the

strategy; legitimation through shariat towards urban patrimonial leaders and the *ulama*, the bulk of Islamic scholars and also legitimation through Yasa among tribal leaders that formed the essence of their military strength.<sup>244</sup> The Yasa was a compilation by Genghis Khan, of nomadic customary practices and Turco-Mongol tribal conventions on military organization, and judicial, institutional and social affairs as well.<sup>245</sup> İnalçık and İnan agreed that the Yasa was solely the customs of pre-Genghisid Turkic tribes in Central Asia and thus the Genghisid code represented the revival of Turanian legitimation procedures.<sup>246</sup>

According to Barthold, Yasa of Genghis Khan constituted the first written Mongol text.<sup>247</sup> Although no copy survived today, we became familiar with pieces from the Yasa through Juvayni's history, *Secret History of Mongols* or writings of some chronicles such as Ibn-Arabshah.<sup>248</sup> Yasa, recognizing the Khan as the supreme political authority, had set the paramount principle of legitimacy that the Khanate should belong to a descendant of Genghis Khan. Kurultai to be summoned annually or biennially was institutionalized as the supreme body for the tribes under the confederation. Secondly, the Yasa required that the sovereignty

---

first time since 13th century. R. D. McChesney, *Central Asia: Foundations of Change*, Princeton & New Jersey: Darwin Press, 1996, p. 140.

<sup>244</sup> Paul Georg Geiss, *Pre-Tsarist and Tsarist Central Asia: Communal Commitment and Political Order in Change*, London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003, pp. 126-127.

<sup>245</sup> Barthold argues that the Yasa, inscribed on the leaves in Uighur alphabet, was the first written Mongol text. He informs that even though no copy of the Yasa has survived, several chroniclers such as Juvayni, Egyptian historian Makrizi and Rashiduddin have discussed certain parts of Yasa in their works. V. V. Barthold, *Moğol İstilasına Kadar Türkistan*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1990, p. 44.

<sup>246</sup> Abdülkadir İnan, "Yasa, Töre-Türe ve Şariat, p. 221 in Abdülkadir İnan, *Makaleler ve İncelemeler, Vol: 2*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1998. Halil İnalçık, "Kutadgu Bilig'de Türk ve İran Siyaset Nazariye ve Gelenekleri, *Türk Kültürü Araştırmaları*, pp. 259-271.

<sup>247</sup> V. V. Barthold, *Moğol İstilasına Kadar Türkistan*, p. 43.

<sup>248</sup> Aladdin Ata-Malik Juvayni, *History of the World Conqueror*, John Andrew Boyle (trans.) Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1958. The comments by Ibn Arabshah in his *Fakihat al-Khulafa* was derived from Robert G. Irwin, "What the Partridge told the Eagle: A Neglected Arabic Source on Chinggis Khan and the Early History of the Mongols", pp. 5-11 in Reuven Amitai & Michal Biran (eds.), *Mongols, Turks and Others: Eurasian Nomads and the Sedentary World*, Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2005.

did not individually belong to the Khan, but collectively to all his family.<sup>249</sup> The state was endowed the right to levy a uniform tax upon its subjects called the *thamga*. In addition, Yasa had included provisions on both issues of governance such as the organization of the army and palace protocol and also issues regarding the daily life of people like marriage, divorce, adultery and theft. In this framework, the *yargucu*<sup>250</sup> was entitled to decide on legal problems in accordance with the Yasa.<sup>251</sup> Yasa and the Islamic legal code, the shariat, had been in conflict in many polities of Middle East and Central Asia until 19th century. In any case as Bernard Lewis stated that after two generations, khans of pax-Mongolica had to utilize an amalgamation of both legitimation procedures:

“Yasa was first applied at first in all spheres of human activity, and then, after the Mongols were Islamized in the third and fourth generation, in the political and criminal spheres, leaving to Islamic law, the Shari’a, jurisdiction over personal and contractual matters.”<sup>252</sup>

### **3.4. Day Dream of Osman: Legitimacy in Early Ottoman State**

The western march of Oghuz/Turcoman tribes toward the plateaus south of the Caucasus during the 10th century and then to the Anatolian peninsula after the Seljukid victory of 1071 in Manzikert was the first stage of Turkification in Asia Minor.<sup>253</sup> However the second and the most populous migration was due to Genghisid explosion. Numerous Turcoman tribes had escaped to Anatolia in front of the destructive and merciless Mongol armies especially after abundant pastures

---

<sup>249</sup> McChesney, *ibid.*, p.135.

<sup>250</sup> “Judge” in Mongol and Turkic languages.

<sup>251</sup> Robert G. Irwin, *ibid.*, pp. 8-9.

<sup>252</sup> McChesney, *ibid.*, p.122.

<sup>253</sup> In the period after Manzikert the first generation of *Beyliks*, the Turkic chiefdoms were established in Anatolia such as Chakaogullari in Izmir, Artuklu or Artukogullari in Mardin and Danishmend in Sivas.

of Azerbaijan were confiscated in early 13th century.<sup>254</sup> Numerous Turcoman tribes had also migrated to Anatolia as soldiers and collaborators of the same Mongol armies.<sup>255</sup> Facing a massive influx of nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes, the Anatolian Seljukid state, a split from weakened Great Seljuks, was alleviating the demographic pressure through sharing out certain pastures to the Turkish tribal conglomerates. By this way, Anatolia was covered up by tribal chiefdoms nominally dependent on the Sultan of Konya, seasonally rotating among winter quarters and summer pastures, plundering villages at times, combating with each other and also with the Byzantine city governors. The conventional Ottoman historiography upholds that grandfather of Osman was given the Söğüt region by the Anatolian Seljukid Sultan Alaeddin Keykhubad.<sup>256</sup> In the end Anatolian Seljukids turned out to be a Mongol vassal together with the *Beyliks* after Mongol commander Baycu destroyed Seljukid army of Gıyaseddin Keyhüsrev at the Battle of Kösedag in 1243.

Osman was legitimate inside his fiefdom primarily as a tribal chief distributing to his *kara budun* the spoils of ceaseless raids and granting to his *alps*<sup>257</sup> the administration and tribute of a specific region.<sup>258</sup> Secondly Osman was

---

<sup>254</sup> Halil İncalcık, *Devlet-i 'Aliyye Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Üzerine Araştırmalar-1: Klasik Dönem (1302-1606)*, İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2009, p. 4.

<sup>255</sup> İncalcık notes that in the beginning of the 14th century 200,000 tents of Turkoman population were around Denizli, 100,000 tents around Kastamonu and 30,000 tents in Kütahya. Halil İncalcık, *ibid.*, p. 4.

<sup>256</sup> Fuad Köprülü insisted that the Kayıs to which Osman's clan belonged had migrated to Anatolia with the Seljukids after the Manzikert War of 1071 Fuad Köprülü, *Osmanlı'nın Etnik Kökeni*, İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1999, pp. 91-92. In his unconventional comment Divitçioğlu argued that Osman's clan was placed around Söğüt not by the Seljukids but by the Mongols. Sencer Divitçioğlu, *Osmanlı Beyliğinin Kuruluşu*, İstanbul: Eren, 2008, p. 31. Likewise Lindner tagged the placement of Osman's tribe in Söğüt as "an integral part of Mongol enterprise". Rudi Paul Lindner, "How Mongol were the Early Ottomans?", in R. Amitai & M. Biran, *ibid.*, p. 282.

<sup>257</sup> Leading warriors of *ga'za* were mostly leaders of sub-clans.

<sup>258</sup> "[Early Ottomans] had a tendency to allocate regions-in reality just directions-to their subordinate tribes/groups for continuous raids after establishing a strong base." Mesut Uyar and Edward J. Erickson, *A Military History of the Ottomans: From Osman to Atatürk*, Santa Barbara, California & Denver, Colorado & Oxford, England: ABC Clio, 2009, p. 14.

held the legitimate ruler of a region around Söğüt first owing to his ancestors' prior appointment by the Seljukid Sultan and next due to his submission to the Mongolid Ilkhan ruler's authority. For İnalçık, Osman's political authority was legitimate within a hierarchical chain; he was dependent to chief of Chobanogullari residing in Kastamonu who in turn was among the subjects of the Seljukid sultan in Konya. Needless to say Ilkhanid khans were on the top of the ladder.<sup>259</sup> Last but not the least, the gha'za ideology provided an excellent justification of the raids directed to Christian Byzantine. In fact the tale of holy war, a well-known position to explain the origins of Ottoman statehood, was originally posited by Paul Wittek. According to his "ghazi thesis" Ottoman state was established and institutionalized by a group of religiously motivated warriors whose chief goal was to enlarge the *Dar-al Islam*.<sup>260</sup> However, it is noteworthy that Osman's tribe was under the influence of heterodox Sufi dervishes like Sheikh Edebali, Geyikli Hoca and İleri Hoca instead of more conventional and conservative commentaries of Islam.<sup>261</sup>

Conversely Z. V. Togan once claimed that "Orhan Bey's comprehension of state order and law had been just *töre* and *yasa*".<sup>262</sup> It is true that compliance to the tribal customs and wealth generation through plunder were of utmost importance for nomadic legitimation. Even contemporaneous Byzantine chronicler Pachymeres had reported that the victory and the consequent booty in the Bapheus War were echoed among Turkic populations of other Anatolian chiefdoms and several clans together with remnants of the Seljukid bureaucracy, merchants and

---

<sup>259</sup> İnalçık, *ibid.*, p. 12.

<sup>260</sup> The gha'zi thesis was elaborated by Wittek mostly in Paul Wittek, *The Rise of the Ottoman Empire*, London: The Royal Asiatic Society, 1938.

<sup>261</sup> Uyar, Mesut and Erickson, Edward J., *ibid.*, p. 14. Uyar & Erickson claimed that "the legends on the terms Gaza and Gazi were the clear legacy of the warrior dynamics of the Arab-Byzantine frontier of South Anatolia and the Arab-Turk frontier of Trans-Oxiana."

<sup>262</sup> Halil İnalçık, "Türk Devletlerinde Sivil Kanun Geleneği", *Türkiye Günlüğü*, Vol: 58, November-December 1999, p. 8. "Töre" and "yasa" in minuscule letters were referring Central Asian customs and practices while "Yasa" with capital letter denoted directly to Genghis Khan's law. Osman's son Orhan Bey was the second ruler of Osman's chiefdom.



dervishes had rushed to join Osman's terrain.<sup>263</sup> Nevertheless İnalcık objected Togan's position over his underestimation of the Islamic ingredient in the early Ottoman make-up by demonstrating the existence of a dual legal system, the Islamic and the customary, throughout 14th century.<sup>264</sup>

### 3.5. The Perfect Mélange of Islamic and Neo-Genghisid Legitimacies: Timur

“Hegel remarks somewhere that all great world-historic facts and personages appear, so to speak, twice. He forgot to add: the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce”.<sup>265</sup>  
Karl Marx

Napoleon III definitely turned out to be a “farce” after the tragedy put on the stage by Napoleon Bonaparte. Previously Genghis Khan has already performed the leading role in the bloodiest tragedy of the history, though Timur was not farce for sure. While dividing vast Mongol Empire out to his heirs just before his death in 1227, Genghis Khan had given Central Asia to his second son, Chaghatai. The Barlas tribe, to which Timur's grandparents belonged, was among several warrior tribes assigned to Chaghatai from the legendary Mongol army as well. After the dismissal and the subsequent execution of the Chaghataid khan Tarmashirin by the Kurultai in 1336<sup>266</sup>, Central Asia fell in chronic instability caused by both tensions between the nomads and the urban population and also by ceaseless struggles among tribes. Born in early 1330s, Timur's early life was marked first his

---

<sup>263</sup> Colin Imber, *The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650: The Structure of Power*, Hampshire, UK & New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, pp. 8-9.

<sup>264</sup> İnalcık, “Türk Devletlerinde Sivil Kanun Geleneği”, pp. 8-9.

<sup>265</sup> Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972, p. 10.

<sup>266</sup> Tarmashirin was found guilty by the Kurultai in his violation of Yasa which was ordering khans to visit the Almalik region on a yearly base. Tarmashirin was accused of not visiting the region in the last four years of his rule and life. Hayrünisa Alan, *Bozkırdan Cennet Bahçesine Timurular 1360-1506*, İstanbul: Ötüken, 2007, p. 20.

contention for the leadership of his clan, Barlas and then long struggle to establish his ascendancy over other tribes of the Chaghataid realm. After two decades of effort in order to create a personal backing, maneuvering to form inter-tribe alliances and an enforced exile Timur had succeeded to unite Chaghataid tribes under his leadership in 1370.

Manz noted that despite the lack of the central authority of a great khan, during the era of instability “common loyalty to house of Chaghatai and use of its remaining administrative and military structure” by tribes, had survived.<sup>267</sup> Since Amir Timur had installed himself as the new great khan upon the ongoing legacy of the Chaghataid rule, he had to legitimate his power in accordance to the Yasa. He arranged a *kurultai* as in the Genghisid practice in 1370 and ensured the submission of all tribes in *Chaghatai Ulus* to his puppet khan Soyurgatmish, one of the descendants of Genghis Khan’s son Ögedei.<sup>268</sup> Accordingly, ruling in the name of Soyurgatmish, Timur never used the title “khan” instead he had to be satisfied with “amir” in front of his name. Moreover, following killing of his main rival Amir Husayn he married Genghisid Saray Hanum from the harem of his now deceased ex-foe and added the title *güregen* in front of his name.<sup>269</sup> In the outset, thus, Amir Timur was only a second Chaghatai keen to secure his ascendancy over the loose tribal confederation, still to wait for a decade to turn into a second Genghis.

Timur was wise enough to understand the need for a different way of legitimation for the sedentary population of craftsmen and traders living in major urban centers of Bukhara, Samarkand and Ferghana. Facing the extensive web of Sufi orders among sedentary population and increasingly Islamized urban life in

---

<sup>267</sup> Beatrice Forbes Manz, *The Rise and Rule of Tamerlane*, Cambridge & New York & Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 39.

<sup>268</sup> Beatrice Forbes Manz, “Temür and the Early Timurids to c. 1450” in Nicola di Cosmo & Allen J. Frank & Peter B. Golden, *ibid.*, p. 184.

<sup>269</sup> Meaning the “royal son-in-law, “Güregen” was implying Timur’s inclusion to Genghisid lineage. Beatrice Forbes Manz, *ibid.*, p. 184.

Central Asia, the sole option for Timur to legitimate his rule was Islam. Before his decisive war against Amir Husayn, he was careful to accept the “drum and standard” presented by Sayyid Baraka an influential religious leader<sup>270</sup> in a very similar manner with Osman Bey who married the daughter of Sheikh Edebali. Timur had always provided protection for local Sufi orders including Yasawiya and Naqshbandiyya whose members were mostly urban tradesmen and artisans. The building of an magnificent tomb for the late Sheikh Ahmad Yasawi<sup>271</sup> and his patronage for Islamic scholars such as Muhammad al-Jazari and Sayyid Ali Jurjani<sup>272</sup> were less due to his own piety, but rather in order “to enhance his charisma”<sup>273</sup> and his wish to be acknowledged as a Muslim ruler by the Sufi orders. In addition any reputation of being a non-Muslim, an infidel fighting against the will of God, would have seriously been disastrous in his military campaigns against Muslim states such as the White Sheep Turkomans, the Mamluks and the Ottomans. Nevertheless, Barthold rightly pointed out that although Timur had “cleverly exploited the traditions of Islam and Islamic culture to justify his actions”; Islam was of secondary importance for Timur compared to Genghisid Yasa.<sup>274</sup> For Timur, as İsmail Aka maintained, religion was primarily a tool to be used in order to reach to certain political ends; loyalty of military chiefs and tribes was more important than the loyalty of the ulama.<sup>275</sup>

---

<sup>270</sup> Manz, *The Rise and Rule of Tamerlane*, p. 56.

<sup>271</sup> Emrullah Tekin, *Timur ve Devlet Yönetim Stratejisi*, Istanbul: Burak Yayınevi, April 1994, p. 24-25. E. Tekin asserted that because of high esteem Amir Timur felt for Yasawi the Amir even participated himself in the building of the tomb for a while. *ibid.*, p. 24. If Tekin’s information was right, it was a perfect showpiece for Timur to send message to the ulama.

<sup>272</sup> Beatrice Forbes Manz, “Temür and the Early Timurids to c. 1450”, p. 196.

<sup>273</sup> *ibid.*, p. 17.

<sup>274</sup> Syed Jamaluddin, *The State Under Timur: A Study in Empire Building*, New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 1995, p. 60.

<sup>275</sup> İsmail Aka, *Timur ve Devleti*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2000, p. 107. Aka claimed that for a portion of the Islamic *ulama* and also for the historian Ibn Arabshah, Timur was an infidel because of his preference of Yasa over shariat. Aka, *ibid.*, p. 106.

Timur's outstanding ability had been to balance the conflicting interests and expectations of the nomadic and sedentary populations. In fact Amir Timur, whose religious orientation was a mixture of the Turco-Mongolian shamanistic beliefs and the Sunni Naqshbandiyya order, was personally the perfect *mélange* of the Ghengisid and Islamic traditions of legitimacy.<sup>276</sup> The nomads motivated by the Yasa and the Mongol imperial ideology were put in a situation of a never-ending war. While they were plundering the conquered lands, the sedentary population of Central Asia was benefiting from the trade route secured by these warrior nomads.<sup>277</sup> Under Amir Timur the Silk Road was active for the last time in the history as a result of the policy of "peace at home war abroad":

"The system of externalizing the violence of *oboghs* and swordsmen and making it serve the interests of the townspeople and merchants. The sedentary population would get peace at home, trade and the capacity to pay *thamga*...The nomads, especially the rank and file outside the tribal oligarchies would get war beyond frontier: the kind of mobile, destructive, booty gathering war they liked".<sup>278</sup>

Although Amir Timur preferred his grandson Pir Muhammad as his successor in his deathbed, his younger son Shahrukh, the governor of Khorasan, was able to establish himself as the new Amir after a series of battles.<sup>279</sup> Manz argued that contrary to his father Shahrukh had never ruled in the name of a Genghisid puppet khan and proclaimed himself as the Sultan and Padihsah-i Islam, not just the amir.<sup>280</sup> Transferring Timurid capital from the Central Asian city of Samarkand to Herat far away from the Mongol homeland, Mirza Shahrukh<sup>281</sup>

---

<sup>276</sup> Manz argued that Timur's religious practices were an admixture of Turco-Mongolian shamanistic rituals and Sufi practices Naqshbandiyya being the prominent. Manz, *The Rise and Rule of Tamerlane*, p. 17.

<sup>277</sup> Adshead, *ibid.*, p. 109.

<sup>278</sup> Adshead, *ibid.*, p. 109. *Obogh* means "tribe".

<sup>279</sup> Regardless of two living sons, Miranshah and Shahrukh, Timur bequeathed Pir Muhammad to become the new Amir just because this shahzade was a Genghisid through his maternal lineage. This preference was also an indication that Timur was before all a Yasa-men, a Turco-Mongolic nomad. Alan, *ibid.*, p. 270.

<sup>280</sup> Manz, "Temür and the Early Timurids to c. 1450", p. 196.

<sup>281</sup> "Mirza" was the abbreviation of "Amir-zade" meaning the son of the Amir.

possibly felt less bounded by Genghisid Yasa and inclined towards Islam ever more. Nonetheless Shahrukh never abandoned the strategy of dual legitimacy employed by his father. He retained two divans<sup>282</sup> in Herat, each corresponding his Genghisid and Islamic legitimation procedures respectively: *Divan-i buzurg-i emaret* or the Turkish divan was dealing with the military and administrative issues together with problems of Turco-Mongolic tribes which were still the heart of army. *Divan-ı mal* or the Sart divan was responsible for problems of any non-military issues and also of non-Turkic population, Persian, Arabic or Georgian.<sup>283</sup> Furthermore, during the reign of Shahrukh Genghisid tax *thamga* also continued to make up the bulk of the state revenues. İsmail Aka maintained that especially the collection of *thamga* was resulting in serious conflict between the Timurid state and the people, because the Genghisid tax was seen as a violation to shariat and thus illegitimate.<sup>284</sup>

The tension between Yasa and shariat had reached its peak when the grandson of Timur, Ulughbeg was killed in a conspiracy by his devout Muslim son Abdallatif and the ulama. The fatwa of Sunni ulama was authorizing Ulughbeg's execution "for his non-shariat activities and adherence to Yasa over shariat".<sup>285</sup> Abdallatif was promising to abandon *thamga* and absolute implementation of shariat to gain the support of the ordinary people and ulama.<sup>286</sup> In fact, Ulughbeg was keen to act in accordance with the Yasa especially in the military affairs while he was acting as the governor in Samarkand during Shahrukh's sovereignty and

---

<sup>282</sup> Divan meaning the "council of state" had been main body of governing in Turco-Persian and Islamic Empires.

<sup>283</sup> İsmail Aka, *Mirza Şahruh ve Zamanı (1405-1447)*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1994, pp. 188-190.

<sup>284</sup> İsmail Aka, *ibid.*, p. 190.

<sup>285</sup> Nurten Kilic-Schubel, "Balancing 'Yasa' and 'Shariat' in the Shibanid-Uzbek Khanate in the 16th Century", p. 19 in Gabriele Rasuly-Palaczek & Julia Katschnig (eds.), *Central Asia on Display: Proceedings of the VII. Conference of the European Society for Central Asian Studies*, Wien: Lit Verlag, 2004.

<sup>286</sup> Aka, *Timur ve Devleti*, p. 113.

also in his short reign of 1447-1449. Like his grandfather Ulughbeg was cautious to rule in the name of a Genghisid puppet khan whom he reinstated after the death of his father Shahrukh.<sup>287</sup> A long period of succession struggle and killing of two mirzas, Abdallatif and Abdallah one after another brought Abu Said to the Timurid throne. Abu Said was able to form a sort of balance between tribal and religious ways of legitimation. While he could install himself as the leader of the Arghun tribe, he succeeded to convince influential Naqshbandi sheikh Ubaydullah Ahrar to support his bid for the Amirate.<sup>288</sup>

### 3.6. Ottoman Meets Timur in Ankara

While first three rulers of the Ottoman state, Osman, Orhan and Murad I led their *ghazis* to the west to conquer as much as possible at the expense of the Byzantine Empire and also the Bulgar and Serbian Kingdoms, they applied an extremely cautious policy towards east. As a matter of fact Ottoman policy would be conciliatory in Anatolia: Murad I would obtain Kütahya and Tavşanlı nonviolently from Germiyanogullari as trousseau after marrying his son Bayezid with the daughter of the Germiyan chief and simply purchased Akşehir and Seydişehir from Hamidogullari.<sup>289</sup> When Bayezid I was declared as the new Ottoman Sultan at the Kosovo battlefield in 1389, the Ottoman state had turned out to be a Balkan Empire.<sup>290</sup> The first reason of this shy eastern policy was that the gha'za ideology which proved effective in the justification of the Balkan

---

<sup>287</sup> Barthold, *Orta-Asya Türk Tarihi Hakkında Dersler*, p. 191.

<sup>288</sup> Stephen Dale, "The Later Timurids c. 1450-1526", in Nicola di Cosmo & Allen J. Frank & Peter B. Golden, *ibid.*, p. 202.

<sup>289</sup> Dimitri Kantemir, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Yükseliş ve Çöküş Tarihi, Vol: 1*, Istanbul: Cumhuriyet Kitapları, 1998, p. 90.

<sup>290</sup> İnalcık labels the Ottoman state as "Murat's Balkan Empire". İnalcık, *Devlet-i 'Aliyye Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Üzerine Araştırmalar-1: Klasik Dönem (1302-1606)*, p. 63. Murad I was killed by a wounded Serbian soldier while touring the battlefield after his victory in Kosovo.

expansion was useless against Muslim Anatolian chiefdoms.<sup>291</sup> Secondly and more importantly, Ottoman rule would face a legitimation crisis beyond the eastern borders. The Mongol legacy was still a constraint for Ottoman rulers who were lacking any religious and tribal justification of their rule. Being non-Genghisid, non-sayyid and even not from a prominent Oghuz tribe<sup>292</sup>, Ottoman dynasty consciously stayed back in east and nominally accepted the overlordship of Ilkhanid khanate.<sup>293</sup>

Bayezid, the thunderbolt, altered radically the eastern policy of the Ottoman State then possessing sizeable land in Europe.<sup>294</sup> Overlooking the neo-Genghisid hurricane of Timur approaching from the east, Ottoman Sultan marched into Anatolia and annexed emirates of Germiyan, Saruhan, Aydın and Mentеше right after his enthronement. He also demanded from the Abbasid Caliphate to recognize himself as the *Sultan-ur Rum* a title used by Seljukids to demonstrate their overlordship in Anatolia.<sup>295</sup> Similar to the Ottoman State, all Anatolian emirates were organized around a tribal dynasty and in a specific region originally given them by Seljukids. Moreover like Osman's emirate all of them were operating under the nominal overlordship of the Ilkhanid Khanate. Hence Bayezid's policy of transforming Anatolia from a "loose confederation of

---

<sup>291</sup> When Murad I had to counteract against Karamanoglu's invasion of Ankara he was careful to proceed with the *fatwa* of prominent sheikhs declaring Karamanoglu as traitors who were cooperating with the infidels against the holy war of the Ottoman ghazi sultan. Hasan Basri Karadeniz, *Osmanlılar ile Beylikler Arasında Anadolu'da Meşruiyet Mücadelesi (XIV-XVI. Yüzyıllar)*, İstanbul: Yeditepe Yayınevi, May 2008, pp. 249-251.

<sup>292</sup> Cornell H. Fleischer, *Tarihçi Mustafa Ali: Bir Osmanlı Aydın ve Bürokrati*, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, September 1996, p. 286.

<sup>293</sup> Ottoman State which has already annexed all southern Marmara and conquered footholds in Thrace was continuing to pay tribute to the weakened Ilkhanid state as late as 1350. Tuncer Baykara, "Osmanlıların Selçuklu ve İlhanlı Kültür Kökenleri Üzerine", *Doğu Batı*, Vol: 51, November, December, January 2009-10, p. 34.

<sup>294</sup> Bayezid was given the nickname "thunderbolt" due to his swiftness in military operations.

<sup>295</sup> Hayrünnisa Alan, *Bozkırdan Cennet Bahçesine Timurlular 1360-1506*, İstanbul: Ötüken, 2007, p. 73.

emirates” to a part of his more centralized empire had been a violation of the “Mongol order” in Asia Minor.

In addition, Bayezid’s campaign against Muslim Anatolian emirates was also a conversion of traditional Ottoman gha’za ideology. Kastritsis noted that Bayezid had to use an army “consisting largely of slaves and Christian vassals”, since the operation against Anatolian emirates was exceedingly unpopular among Muslim subjects of the Ottoman state.<sup>296</sup> Bayezid’s sending of captive chevaliers taken prisoner at the Battle of Nicopolis in 1396 to be demonstrated to public in the streets of main Islamic cities such as Cairo, Baghdad and Tabriz<sup>297</sup> was certainly to reinstate Ottoman’s ghazi image in the east. However, Timur successfully exploited the situation in his pre-Ankara political manoeuvres claiming that he would restore the emirates and prevent cruelty of Bayezid committed against Muslim brothers.<sup>298</sup>

For Timur Ottoman State was just a border-amirate of his grandiose empire and should be dependent on his son Miranshah who was appointed as the governor of former Ilkhan lands.<sup>299</sup> So what Timur primarily demanded from Bayezid was to declare obedience to his supreme authority as the Seljukids and the early Ottomans did previously to Genghisid Ilkhanate. Being a Genghisid universal khan, Timur was insisting on his legitimate right to govern Ottomans who were of a humble and non-royal ancestry: “Your ancestors are well known for

---

<sup>296</sup> Dimitris J. Kastritsis, *The Sons of Bayezid: Empire Building and Representation in the Ottoman Civil War of 1402–1413*, Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2007, p. 1.

<sup>297</sup> Karadeniz, *ibid.*, p. 241.

<sup>298</sup> When the chiefs of Anatolian emirates arrived at Timur’s court to make complaint for Bayezid’s campaign, Timur sent his warning message to the Ottoman sultan: “You are not a decent ruler since you fought against our coreligionist Turks. It is respectable to combat against infidels but not against Turks of our Prophets’ umma”. Karadeniz, *ibid.*, pp. 233-234. As expected Timur had gained the support of the Anatolian chieftains and all of them would be in the Timur’s army at the Ankara Battle of 1402.

<sup>299</sup> Alan, *ibid.*, p. 73. Karadeniz noted that chroniclers in the Timurid court had mentioned the Ottoman Sultan as “Rum governor Yıldırım Bayezid”. Karadeniz, *ibid.*, p. 233.



everybody”.<sup>300</sup> Writing in 16th century, Ottoman bureaucrat and historian Mustafa Âli was exceptionally aware of the legitimation crisis faced by Bayezid. In his re-consideration of the clash between Timurids and Ottomans, Mustafa Âli acknowledged the Turco-Mongol idea of sovereignty which was distinct from the Islamic legitimation.<sup>301</sup> For Fleischer, Mustafa Âli’s assessment was remarkably performance-based: Even the non-Muslim Genghis Khan’s rule was legitimate since undeniable victory was an obvious sign of divine consent. Âli also acknowledged Timur’s position that “an orthodox Muslim hegemon was superior to a regional ghazi”.<sup>302</sup>

### 3.7. From Ankara to Cairo: Centralization and Consolidation

After the disastrous defeat at the Ankara War and the subsequent civil war (fetret), the Ottoman State was finally reunited by Mehmed I in 1413. However during the next fifty years following the Ankara War, the Ottoman State would be extremely alert to developments beyond its eastern borders and operate under Timurid patronage.<sup>303</sup> Mehmed I’s coins were minted with Timur’s and then Shahrukh’s names on them, his son Murad II was excited to persuade Shahrukh in Ottoman’s respect to Timurid order in Anatolia.<sup>304</sup> In this period all of a sudden

---

<sup>300</sup> Timur was hinting the inferior ancestry of the Ottoman dynasty in his letter to Bayezid. Sahibkiran Emir Timur Muhammed Tarağay Bahadıröğlü, *Timur’un Günlüğü: Tüzükat-ı Timur*, Şakirov, Kutlukhan & Aslan, Adnan (eds. & trans.), Istanbul: İnsan Yayınları, 2010, p. 65.

<sup>301</sup> Fleischer, *ibid.*, p. 294.

<sup>302</sup> Fleischer, *ibid.*, p. 297.

<sup>303</sup> Halil İncalcık, “Osmanlı Tarihinde Dönemler”, *Doğu Batı*, Vol: 51, November, December, January 2009-10, p. 18. Mehmed’s mints in the name of Timur might have been from the era of civil war, especially from the era of Mehmed’s regional rulership in Tokat and Amasya. İncalcık maintained elsewhere that Mehmed secured the legitimacy of his rule in Amasya-Tokat region through his recognition of the patronage of Timur. İncalcık, *Devlet-i ‘Aliyye Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Üzerine Araştırmalar-1: Klasik Dönem (1302-1606)*, p. 84.

<sup>304</sup> Baykara argued that Ottoman state has acknowledged the overlordship of Timurid state until the death of Shahrukh in 1447. Baykara, *ibid.*, p. 34. İncalcık noted down Murad II was writing to Shahrukh in the style of a vassal ruler. İncalcık, “Osmanlı Tarihinde Dönemler”, p. 18-19.

Ottoman rulers discovered their ancient origins going back to the Oghuz tribe of Kayi: a genealogical invention or remembrance of long-forgotten lineages. In the reign of Murad II, the brand of the Kayi tribe was added to the Ottoman coins, Ottoman rulers adopted the title of “khan”, part of Rashid-al-din’s history book dealing with the history of ancient Turks was translated from Persian to Turkish<sup>305</sup> and the Oghuz legend was included in the official history of the Ottoman dynasty.<sup>306</sup> Allegedly descending from a mythological Oghuz Khan who in turn was from Noah’s offspring, the house of Osman was now sure of their nobility; a prophetic dignity would make them nobler than Timur and even than Genghis.<sup>307</sup> The *Turk-i Basit* movement of mid and late 15th century which preferred a simpler Turkish in literature and Sultan Cem’s order of a book on the Oghuz traditions were just feeble repercussions in the later generation.<sup>308</sup> Although Bernard Lewis had seen an increase in the Turkish national consciousness in the post-Ankara era, the Oghuz revival was only a response to Timurids’ automatic self-legitimation through the Genghisid lineage.<sup>309</sup>

A supplementary response to Timurids’ universalist claim was an Islamic one: Murad II had appointed Molla Fenari as the first *sheikh-ul-islam* of the state in 1424. Even though the office of *sheikh-ul-islam* was initially low profile as PRIXLEY demonstrated, the Ottoman Sultan might have been in need of religious

---

<sup>305</sup> Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 331.

<sup>306</sup> Lewis, *ibid.*, p. 9.

<sup>307</sup> Lindner summarized dynastic lineages devised by various chroniclers that related Ottomans to Oghuz Khan and Noah. Rudi Paul Lindner, *Explorations in Ottoman History*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2007, pp. 15-34. Kantemir also listed the whole list of ancestors from Osman, Ertuğrul and Süleyman back to Noah via Oghuz Khan and Kayi Khan. Kantemir, *ibid.*, pp. 52-53.

<sup>308</sup> Köprülü, *ibid.*, p. 74-75.

<sup>309</sup> Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 9

approval for his political acts through *fatwas*.<sup>310</sup> Mehmed II, the conqueror, who was supported by the “party of conquest” of the Palace in his first sultanate, initiated his siege without delay to conquer Constantinople in the first days of his second ascendancy.<sup>311</sup> On May 29, 1453, on the very day the city fell in the hands of the young Ottoman Sultan, pacifying grand-vizier Chandarli was dismissed and then executed. With the prestige of the conquest and the vanishing of Timurid threat in the east Mehmed II had transformed the Ottoman from a regional state to a multinational but centralized empire. Contrary to widely held Islamic practice Mehmed II confiscated the *waqf* land owned for centuries by local aristocratic families, religious brotherhoods and sheikhs in order to terminate the influence of the periphery.<sup>312</sup> Mehmed II’s legitimacy was initially based on power and achievement; but he also promoted himself as the heir of the Roman Empire. İnalçık argued that Mehmed II incorporated the Roman tradition of Empire besides the Islamic and tribal Oghuz legitimations of sovereignty.<sup>313</sup>

The centralization of power by Mehmed II and then gradual conversion of local sovereigns into governors of the Sublime Port was consolidated in the long and stable reign of Bayezid II. Selim I who was also exploiting genealogical ways of legitimation<sup>314</sup> brought a new tool from Cairo to strengthen Ottoman claims for

---

<sup>310</sup> Michael M. Pixley, “The Development and Role of the Şeyhülislam in Early Ottoman History”, *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, Vol: 96, No: 1, January-March 1976, p. 92.

<sup>311</sup> Zaghanos Pasha the leader of the “party of conquest” was advocating a policy of conquest and positing that western states could not unite against the Ottomans. On the contrary Chandarli Halil Pasha was preferring a collaborative and peaceful policy against the Byzantine Empire and the western world. İnalçık, *Devlet-i ‘Âliyye Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Üzerine Araştırmalar-1: Klasik Dönem (1302-1606)*, p. 110.

<sup>312</sup> İsmail Tokalak, *Bizans-Osmanlı Sentezi: Bizans Kültür ve Kurumlarının Osmanlı Üzerindeki Etkisi*, İstanbul: Gülerboy, 2006, p. 251.

<sup>313</sup> Halil İnalçık, *ibid.*, pp. 110-111.

<sup>314</sup> Selim I was writing to Mamluk sultan Tumanbay “You are a Mamluk, who is bought and sold, you are not fit to govern. I am a king descended through twenty generations of kings”. Hakan T. Karateke, “Legitimizing the Ottoman Sultanate: A Framework for Historical Analysis” in Hakan T. Karateke & Maurus Reinkowski (eds.), *Legitimizing the Order: The Ottoman Rhetoric of State Power*, Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2005, p. 25.

authority: the Caliphate. After the invasion of Egypt in 1517, the Caliph al-Mutawakkil living up that time under Mamluk patronage was transported to live in Istanbul. First treated as a puppet caliph, al-Mutawakkil's title of "the Caliph" was then transferred to Ottoman Sultans beginning with the era of Süleyman, the magnificent.<sup>315</sup> Colin Imber argued that sooner than 16th century the genealogical legitimation based on the Kayi tribe and Oghuz Khan had turned out to be unnecessary and "remained deep-frozen within the tradition until resurrection in early republican era".<sup>316</sup> For him, by then legitimacy based on sharia and Islamic tradition became prominent. But, in spite of incorporation of the most notorious Islamic title of the Caliphate into the Ottoman Palace and a resulting increase in religiosity in administration, Ottoman Sultans abstained reluctantly in sharing any piece of their authority with any contenders whether religious or secular. Selfish to preserve dynastic authority over *ulema* and particularly the *sheikh-ul-islam*, Ottoman Sultans constantly reminded their political power: between 1599 and 1703 thirty of the forty-two *sheikh-ul-islams* were dismissed by the Sultans.<sup>317</sup>


---

<sup>315</sup> Colin Imber, *The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650: The Structure of Power*, p. 126.

<sup>316</sup> Colin Imber, "Frozen Legitimacy", Hakan T. Karateke & Maurus Reinkowski, *ibid.*, p. 106.

<sup>317</sup> Pixley, *ibid.*, p. 94.

### Map 4 - Rise of the Ottoman Empire



Source: <http://www.zonu.com/images/0X0/2009-12-25-11478/Ottoman-Empire-at-its-greatest-extent-1683.png>

### 3.8. Desolate Caravanserais and Archaic Khans: Legitimation of Ignorance

Ulughbeg, in his short reign, and the subsequent Timurids were constantly challenged by raids of the Uzbek<sup>318</sup> tribes of Dasht-i Kipchak. In establishing his “loose confederation of aristocratic led nomad tribes quartered on various cities”<sup>319</sup>, Shaibani Khan of Uzbeks as a descendant of Genghis, was legitimate by birth especially for the tribal chiefs. However, the cities were under the authoritative influence of Sufi sheikhs and the *ulama* well then and trade was being mostly carried in the hands of their disciples. Thus Shaibani could not achieve the full restoration of the Genghis but a combination of shariat and the Yasa: A second Timur instead of a second Genghis. While the Shaibanid state emerged as the “secular arm of the Yasawiyya”<sup>320</sup>, Shaibani Khan had become a pragmatic political leader from the outset reflecting the eclecticism of Yasa and shariat. He efficiently cooperated with the *ulama* that while declaring Kazaks as infidels and war on them as holy war, *gaz’a*; also issued fetwas affirming the meat pillaged from Kazaks was *halal* since the Kazakhs were Muslim.<sup>321</sup> Shaibani Khan’s poems consisted of numerous illustrations of Genghisid and Islamic amalgamation:

Shiban yalغان dimas kim hak ani sahib-kiran kildi  
HasebdeTingride kul min nesebde Chingizidur min<sup>322</sup>

Shaiban does not lie that God made him sahib-kiran (ruler)  
Slave of God by personal choice, Genghisid by birth”

---

<sup>318</sup> The name Uzbek is attributed to the Ozbeg Khan, one of the grandsons of Genghis Khan’s elder son Jochi, who ruled Jochid share of the Empire between 1312 and 1342. The Jochid realm included all western steppes of Dasht-i Kipchak, contemporary central and western Kazakhstan and north of the Caspian Sea. Another assumption on the origin of Uzbek holds that the Qangli, Qunggirat and Manghit tribes that splitted from the Jochid khans and migrated towards south and south-east were given the name Oz-beg literally means “free-man” Adshead, *ibid.*, p. 151-152.

<sup>319</sup> Adshead, *ibid.*, p. 154.

<sup>320</sup> Adshead, *ibid.*, p. 153. Kilic-Schubel notes that posthumous fabled accounts of Shaibani Khan’s rule even attributed his success to an initial pilgrimage to the tomb of Ahmad Yasawi. Kilic-Schubel, *ibid.*, p. 22.

<sup>321</sup> Kilic-Schubel, *ibid.*, p. 26.

<sup>322</sup> Kilic-Schubel, *ibid.*, p. 23. (translation is by me)

“No caravan had come through from China for three years” reported a visiting British from Bukhara in 1558.<sup>323</sup> The new trade route going round the Cape of Good Hope was sterilized of nomadic plunders and tributes to khans and the caravanserais remained increasingly desolate along the legendary Silk Road, the ancient trade route of west-east axis. Shaibanids were the last to unite Central Asia under one sovereign until the Russian hegemony. Bukhara, Khiva, Kokand turned into minor khanates, or in other words enlarged city states ruled by despotic dynasties. The ruling dynasties were legitimate first as the chiefs of a powerful tribe, that were Manghit in Bukhara, Qunggirat in Khiva and Ming in Kokand accompanied by highly Islamized ideology. Boundaries separating the khanates were rather vague and large areas remained as no-man lands in between these khanates.<sup>324</sup>

Upon his enthronement Shah Murad of Khanate of Bukhara refused to employ a Genghisid puppet khan first time in 1785.<sup>325</sup> Shah Murad, a conservative disciple of the Naqshbandiyya order, also married a bride from Prophet’s lineage and added the title *sayyid* in front of his name.<sup>326</sup> Alim Khan of the Khanate of Kokand followed the suit and abandoned the custom of installing puppet Genghisid.<sup>327</sup> The Genghisid custom would continue only in procedural practices;

---

<sup>323</sup> Adshead, *ibid.*, p. 181.

<sup>324</sup> Yuri Bregel, “Bukhara, Khiva and Khoqand: c. 1750-1886” in Nicola di Cosmo & Allen J. Frank & Peter B. Golden, *ibid.*, p. 404.

<sup>325</sup> İnan noticed that traditional Genghisid Palace protocol and hierarchy was modified to some extent that in the left side of the khan the naqıbs were given the top position upon tribal chiefs and in the right side the *sheikh-ul-islam* was elevated to the primary seat. Since the naqıbs were mostly alleged to be sayyids from Caliph Ali’s lineage, the Genghisid procedures had become considerably Islamized. A. İnan, “17. Asırda Özbek Hanları Saraylarında Merasim”, İnan, *Makaleler ve İncelemeler*, Vol: 1, pp. 546-554. DeWeese noted that “all the princes, including the heir to the throne” happened to sit below the rank of naqıbs. DeWeese, Devin, “The Descendants of Sayyid Ata and the Rank of Naqıb in Central Asia”, *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, Vol: 115, No: 4, October-December 1995, p. 612.

<sup>326</sup> Geiss, *ibid.*, p. 127

<sup>327</sup> Geiss, *ibid.*, p. 146.

the new khan was to participate in the enthronement ceremony on a white-felt carpet according to Yasa, however this time the carpet being sprinkled with Zamzam.<sup>328</sup> As heavenly legitimation replaced hereditary legitimation, Khans became more vulnerable to the sheikhs to be certified as a just, pious and thus legitimate ruler strictly obeying the sharia.<sup>329</sup> American envoy was surprised when he met the Kokand Khan “surrounded by mullahs, busy with praying and who forbade all amusement like games, dancing, jugglery or comic performances at his court”.<sup>330</sup> The curtain had fallen on Central Asia as Caroe said, “the fanatical exclusiveness” and extreme religiosity of the elites together with the dried up trade.<sup>331</sup> Khan of Khiva, the ignorant, was proudly informing the British ambassador in the middle of 19th century that he had twenty guns to be used against advancing Russian artillery.<sup>332</sup>

### **3.9. Legitimation of Foreign Rule: Power and Ideology**

The centuries after the fall of Kazan to the Russian Empire in 1552, witnessed Tatar caravans moving back and forward between Russian and Central Asian markets. After the diminishing of trade along the Silk Road, in 18th and 19th centuries, Central Asian cities became more and more dependent on the new northern Russian trade route, even though being not busy and wealthy as the old

---

<sup>328</sup> R. D. McChesney, “The Chinggisid Restoration in Central Asia: 1500-1785”, in Nicola di Cosmo & Allen J. Frank & Peter B. Golden, *ibid.*, p. 283. Zamzam is the holy water brought from Mecca.

<sup>329</sup> Paul Georg Geiss, “The Problem of Political Order in the Khanate of Khokand: Between Tribalism and Patrimonialism” in Gabriele Rasuly-Palaczek & Julia Katschnig, *ibid.*, p. 61.

<sup>330</sup> Paul Georg Geiss, *ibid.*, p. 62.

<sup>331</sup> Cited in Geoffrey Wheeler, *The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia*, New York & Washington: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1964, p. 29.

<sup>332</sup> Roudik, *ibid.*, p. 68.



Silk Road.<sup>333</sup> The fall of Sevastopol in 1855 and the defeat at the Crimean War signaled a halt in the western aspirations of Tsar's Empire. The same year also saw the end of long and repressive reign of Nicholas who has ruled Russian Empire since 1825.<sup>334</sup> The new Tsar Alexander had to find new lands for the booming Russian textile industry severely hampered by the decline world cotton production after the American Civil War. Central Asian cotton plants should have been serving directly and uninterruptedly to the Russian market. Hence following the fall of Tashkent in 1865, Samarkand in 1868, and lastly southernmost oasis of Merv in 1884 all Central Asia was taken under the Russian control swiftly and smoothly.<sup>335</sup>

Under the rule of Tsar, the tribal customs and the religious practices remained intact particularly at the local level. While the northern Kazakh steppes were to be commanded through Governor-generalship of Steppes, the architect of Tsarist administration in Turkestan, General K.P. von Kaufman founded the Governor-generalship of Turkestan with its headquarters in Tashkent. The *yarim-padishah*<sup>336</sup> residing in Tashkent would be in charge of five oblasts (provinces) Syrdarya, Semireche, Feghana, Samarkand, Zakaspie and together with the Khanate of Bukhara and Kokand as Tsar's procerates.<sup>337</sup> The five oblasts which

---

<sup>333</sup> Soucek, *ibid.*, pp. 196-197.

<sup>334</sup> The reign of Tsar Nicholas was one of the most oppressive periods of the Russian history which was characterized by Count Uvarov's ideological formula: Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality. Lionel Kochan, *The Making of Modern Russia*, Middlesex: Pelican Books, 1963, p. 148. Kochan also noticed the threefold expansion of Russian population in the 19th century. Kochan, *ibid.*, p. 131.

<sup>335</sup> Wheeler noted that Russians had suffered only 400 dead and 1600 wounded in all their Turkestan operations between 1847 and 1873. Wheeler, *ibid.*, p. 56. Moreover, the capture of Tashkent was achieved rather painless for the Russian army: just 25 deaths and 89 wounded. Wheeler, *ibid.*, p. 60.

<sup>336</sup> During the period of Tsardom's hegemony in Central Asia, the local people was referring the Tsar in Petersburg as "ak padishah" meaning the "white sultan/ruler" and the Governor-generals as "yarim-padishah", meaning "half sultan/ruler".

<sup>337</sup> Soucek, *ibid.*, p. 201. Syrdarya oblast's center was Tashkent, Semireche's Vernyi, Feghana's Skobelev, Samarkand's Samarkand and Zakaspie's Ashgabad.

were incorporated to direct Russian rule were divided further into smaller units called *uezds* (district) and *volosts* (counties) and villages.<sup>338</sup> Beneath the level of *uezds*, Russian administration had used the *aqsaqals*<sup>339</sup> and certain subordinate servants derived from local people in both tribes and the settled population. The khans of proclerates had to play a traditional despot inside as before the Russian conquest and pawn of Russian power outside.<sup>340</sup> By this way, *yarim-padishah* killed two birds with one stone: Russia would save the cost of ruling directly<sup>341</sup> and the khan, who came to be seen illegitimate as the traitor by his own people, would incessantly be dependent to Russian support. In addition, Russian attitude towards Islam was “to neglect it”, even von Kaufman prevented activities of the Orthodox missionaries and establishment of a bishopric in Tashkent.<sup>342</sup>

On the other hand, Russian administration never abstained to use military power in a situation of disorder that threatened the “Russian stability”. They were extremely watchful to secure raw material supply and ensure safety along the trade routes. In his memorandum to Britain, Russian Foreign Minister Gorchakov would attempt to justify Russian invasion of Central Asia by “raids and acts of pillage” directed to the Russian caravans.<sup>343</sup> Likewise the treaties signed by General von

---

<sup>338</sup> Nadira A. Abdurakhimova, “The Colonial System of Power in Turkistan”, *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol: 34, 2002, p. 241.

<sup>339</sup> Literally means “the white beards”, *aqsaqals* were elder people who were elected by tribal and sedentary populations of certain size to administer local affairs. They were responsible for collecting of taxes. Geiss, *ibid.*, pp. 200-201.

<sup>340</sup> Seymour Becker, *Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865–1924*, London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2004, p. 154.

<sup>341</sup> Becker, *ibid.*, p. 63. Gen. von Kaufman was defending his position of letting the khanates to survive: “it was deemed important for Russia to have in Bukhara a ruler who had learned to recognize Russian supremacy and who had lost all taste for further hostilities.” Reed E. Peoples, *Slavic Power and Turkic Nations: A Survey of Western Scholarship on the History of Russian Central Asia*, MA thesis, Clemson University, August 2007, p. 17.

<sup>342</sup> Geiss, *ibid.*, p. 209.

<sup>343</sup> For the Gorchakov memorandum of 1864, November 9, please look Appendix IV.

Kaufman and the flunky khans<sup>344</sup> were predominantly to guarantee Russian commercial interests in a sense of a commercial *Nizam-ı Alem*.<sup>345</sup> The supremacy of Tsar's authority was enforced first of all as a result of military power based on technological superiority and more efficient administrative skills. Gorchakov was sure that those "half-savage Asiatic nomads possessing no fixed social organization respect nothing but visible and palpable force".<sup>346</sup> Secondly the Russian rule could install itself in Central Asia through incorporation of local people especially in *uezd* level and permitting *sheikhs*, *waqfs*, and *mullahs* to operate but only outside the political realm. In this sense, Abdurakhimova rightly labeled the Russian colonial rule as "military-popular administration".<sup>347</sup>

At the outset Lenin had initially proposed, before the Bolshevik Revolution, the abolishment of Tsarist administrative divisions and reorganization in line with "the requirements of present-day economic life and national composition".<sup>348</sup> Subsequent to Red Army's victory over Denikin and Kolchak's White Army, Lenin ordered the foundation of Turkestan Sub-Commission and on June 13, 1920 requested the sub-commission both to prepare an ethnographic map of Turkestan demarcating Uzbek, Kirgiz and Turkmen lands and also to "identify conditions of merging or dividing these three parts".<sup>349</sup> The reorganization of Central Asia as national republics was ideologically a prerequisite for the Bolsheviks since the emergence of the national bourgeoisie was a step *en route* to

---

<sup>344</sup> For the texts of Russo-Bukharan Commercial Convention of 1868, Russo-Bukharan Friendship Treaty and Treaty of Khiva both signed in 1873, and also the Treaty of Commerce Between Russia and Kashgar of 1872 please see the Appendices I, II, III, IV.

<sup>345</sup> Russian administration had enforced a customs regime that forbade the import of Anglo-Indian, Afghan, Persian, Turkish and Western European goods except a few items and set Russian traders and exports free of any custom duties. See Appendix IV.

<sup>346</sup> For the Gorchakov memorandum see Appendix IV.

<sup>347</sup> Abdurakhimova, *ibid.*, p. 241.

<sup>348</sup> V.I. Lenin, "Theses on the National Question", *Lenin Collected Works Volume 19*, (trans.) George Hanna, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977, p. 248.

<sup>349</sup> Alisher Ilkhamov, "Archaeology of Uzbek Identity", *Central Asian Survey*, Vol: 23, No: 3-4, December 2004, p. 306.

communism. In the process Jadidists and national communists served as a transitory buffer for the emerging Soviet regime as previous khans did for the Tsars' governors. Dreaming of a modern and national Central Asia the leading Uzbek Jadidists Ryskulov and Khojaev turned into national Bolsheviks and promptly allied the new ideology of Moscow. Together with Akmal Ikramov, they were the local guides who "applied key symbols of language of legitimacy"<sup>350</sup> in Uzbekistan: The Russian colonizers were of bourgeoisie stock, all colonized people together with the exploited Russian peasants and workers were proletarians and thus the October Revolution paved way a just future for all oppressed.<sup>351</sup>

By 1936 Soviet territorialization in Central Asia was concluded and Uzbekistan's boundaries were fixed as an enlarged Bukhara Khanate. Finally the Great Purge had replaced the first generation of Central Asian Jadidists/Bolsheviks with the so-called class of 38.<sup>352</sup> Soviet Uzbekistan would be administered henceforth by the Class of 38 which was largely composed of engineers, and economist/bureaucrats. Soviet style modernization achieved in Uzbekistan the creation of a technocratic Uzbek elite and a native intelligentsia both of which were converted into "ideological apparatuses of state"<sup>353</sup> tightly stuck to the imperatives of the Soviet ideology. If truth be told new Uzbek elite had metamorphosed into managers of cotton plantations responsible to fulfill yearly quotas while repeating the ideological maxims of the Soviet communism as obedient parrots. Indeed as Küçük noted Marxism-Leninism had mutated into "a Sunday rite repeated hypocritically on certain days of calendar with utmost

---

<sup>350</sup> Patryk M. Reid, *Central Asian Bolsheviks: Mediating Revolution, 1917-1924*, MA thesis, Ottawa, Ontario: Carleton University, Institute of European and Russian Studies, 2006, p. 82.

<sup>351</sup> Reid, *ibid.*, p. 85.

<sup>352</sup> Class of 38 was used to denote the first Soviet educated literate elite group that was born just before the Revolution and came to power in all republics after Stalin's purges of 1938.

<sup>353</sup> The concept of "ideological apparatuses of state" was developed by Louis Althusser to explain non-state institutions such as family, media, religious organisations and the education system, which inculcate the premises of the hegemonic ideology to individuals. Louis Althusser, *İdeoloji ve Devletin İdeolojik Aygıtları*, İstanbul: İthaki Yayınları, 2006.

seriousness” all over the Soviet Union.<sup>354</sup> Communism, portrayed as the culmination of the human’s past experiences had provided a tautological legitimation through fatality in the sense that Soviet Marxism-Leninism was legitimate as the inevitable end point of the humanity’s progress in contrast to archaic reactionary deviations.

**Map 5 - Soviet Union before National Delimitation in 1922**



Source:

<http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/f/f5/SovietCentralAsia1922.svg/778px-SovietCentralAsia1922.svg.png>

<sup>354</sup> Yalçın Küçük, *Sovyetler Birliği'nde Sosyalizmin Çözülüşü*, İstanbul: Mızrak, December 2010, p. 175.

Agricultural modernization and *kolkhoz*-based cotton production consolidated the already existing regional identities. Moscow's loss of "control in cadre appointments, particularly at local levels in oblasts and raions" resulted in appointments to be consistent with regional and clannish affiliations.<sup>355</sup> In the Brezhnev era, the policy of cadre stability further strengthened the nepotism and regional patronage in Uzbekistan. Rashidov was able to stay as the Uzbek party secretary for twenty-four years since he was able to sustain political stability through his adjustment of clan politics to the needs of Moscow. In the meantime Rashidov was able to pump up the cotton production at least on paper:

"From the highest republican political posts in Uzbekistan to the most minor raion level posts, Uzbek officialdom is involved in the cotton commerce. At the highest administrative level the criterion of performance is two-fold: first, to maintain political functioning consonant with the regime by averting any disquieting ideological diversions; second, to turn out cotton harvest."<sup>356</sup>

The so-called Cotton Affair was the turning point for the Soviet Uzbekistan. Majority of the Uzbek elite was discovered to engage in a sort of cooperative corruption. The sequence of events in fact started with Andropov's rise to the Soviet leadership after the death of Brezhnev in November 1982. The investigation that commenced due to allegations to Yuri Churbanov, Brezhnev's son-in law for accepting bribes from Uzbek officials, disclosed a republic-wide corruption. Uzbek leaders have been inflating cotton production figures for personal benefit and also in order to divert more Soviet resources into Uzbekistan.<sup>357</sup> Subsequent purges in the top Uzbek leadership undermined the long

---

<sup>355</sup> İdil Tuncer Kılavuz, *Understanding Violent Conflict: A Comparative Study of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan*, PhD thesis, Bloomington: Indiana University Department of Central Eurasian Studies, August 2007, p. 126. Tuncer Kılavuz maintained that "during the reign of Brezhnev the republics had achieved a kind of "quasi-autonomy" from the center."

<sup>356</sup> Gregory William Gleason, *Between Moscow and Tashkent: The Politics of the Uzbek Cotton Production Complex*, PhD thesis, Davis: University of California, 1984, p. 13.

<sup>357</sup> Staples noted the estimation of 1987 by *Literaturnaia Gazeta* that Uzbek cotton production had experienced no real growth since 1969. Uzbek party leaders on the other hand consistently reported cotton production figures above the pre-set targets in the five-year plans. For instance in 1980 a yearly increase of 1,245,000 tones of cotton production has been reported to Moscow! John Staples, "Soviet Use of Corruption Purges as a Control Mechanism: The Uzbekistan Case", *Past Imperfect*, Vol: 2, 1993, pp. 35-36.

term stability of the Rashidov era. Cutler argued that the purges after the Cotton Affair had also weakened legitimacy of the Soviet centre and its ideology.<sup>358</sup> Because, while the campaign gained an increasingly ethnic tone the Soviet press continuously identified Uzbekistan with corruption.

Map 6 - Soviet Union



<sup>358</sup> Robert M. Cutler, “De-authoritarization in Uzbekistan?: Analysis and Prospects,” in Irina Morozova (eds.), *Towards Social Stability and Democratic Governance in Central Eurasia: Challenges to Regional Security*, Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2005, p. 131 available at <http://www.robertcutler.org/download/html/ch05im.html>, accessed on August 29, 2010.

### 3.10. Legitimacy in Decadence: Late Ottoman Era

Ottoman ideology regarded stability and order as the foremost preconditions of a legitimate rule. In fact, the Ottoman state originally developed as a revisionist state aiming to take root at the junction of the Mongol and Byzantine imperial domains. However as the house of Osman developed into a *status quo* force in the Anatolian and Rumelian heartland, the Ottoman ideology of legitimation opted for conservative recipes first through incorporating both imperial traditions to the ideology of the Ottoman but then more importantly by absorbing increasingly conformist religious sects. The heterodox Islamic views held by the court of first Ottoman rulers disappeared and by 16th century Naqshbandiyya became dominant in the capital.<sup>359</sup> The pax-Ottomanica was legitimized through Islam but the *nizam-ı alem*<sup>360</sup> was first and foremost was the ideology of state order and permanence. Kaynar also pointed out that pax-Ottomanica required more than just “balance and order” but a continuous reproduction of a strict status society.<sup>361</sup> Moreover the Sultan, previously acting as a war leader before other viziers and chieftains, had gradually become secluded from the state and military bureaucracy and also from the ordinary people.<sup>362</sup> Islamic ceremonies such as visit of tomb of Abu Eyyub and later the Friday prayer ceremony served both to enhance dynastic and religious legitimacy but also set “occasions for the people of Istanbul to acclaim the sultan”.<sup>363</sup>

---

<sup>359</sup> “Ottoman’s first religious partners were the modernist Mevleviyya and the authoritarian semi Shiite Bektashiyya, at the opposite pole to the traditionalist Naqshbandiyya. As the empire evolved from a radical party state to a conservative party establishment, the Naqshbandiyya advanced.” S. A. M. Adshead, *Central Asia in World History*, London: Macmillan, 1993, p. 166.

<sup>360</sup> The term which was the leitmotif of Ottoman state ideology meaning the “order of the realm”.

<sup>361</sup> Mete K. Kaynar, *Tarihin İnşası ve Siyaset: Yazılar*, Ankara: Adımlar Yayınevi, 2009, pp. 461-466.

<sup>362</sup> Well-known Ottoman proverb “Nâs ile istinas alâmet-i iflaştır” (becoming closer with the people is the sign of failure) was condemning the contact of the bureaucracy and the sultan with people.

<sup>363</sup> Colin Imber, *The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650: The Structure of Power*, pp. 118-119.



Colin Imber argued that sooner than 16th century the genealogical legitimation based on Kayi tribe and Oghuz Khan had turned out to be unnecessary and “remained deep-frozen within the tradition until resurrection in early republican era”.<sup>364</sup> For him, by then legitimacy based on sharia and Islamic tradition became prominent. Beforehand Crimean Khans were respected highly at the Ottoman Palace as the descendants of Genghis Khan and also were seen as the substitute for the Ottoman dynasty.<sup>365</sup> Koçi Bey in his treatise presented to Murad IV as late as 1631 was suggesting the Sultan to behave Tatar Khans of Crimea henceforth in the manner of his attitude towards other ordinary people.<sup>366</sup> Elsewhere Imber maintained that the Ottoman dynasty utilized various legitimation tactics in different times<sup>367</sup>: during the very early years of the chiefdom “as a leader in war”, then by 1400s this leadership was “sanctified” and the Ottoman Sultan appeared as “a leader of holy war”. After the Ankara War the Oghuz genealogy and Kayi antecedents were invented then a claim to be heirs of the Seljuks followed in 1500s. After 1453 title of the Roman Emperor and lastly after the 16th century the office of Caliphate were used in legitimation of the Ottoman authority. Imber stated that “Of these legitimizing devices, those of Holy Warrior, successor to the Seljuks and Caliph were to survive into the twentieth century”.<sup>368</sup>

---

<sup>364</sup> Colin Imber, “Frozen Legitimacy”, Hakan T. Karateke & Maurus Reinkowski, *ibid.*, p. 106.

<sup>365</sup> Kantemir, *ibid.*, pp. 52-54. Kantemir wrote down that during the riots against Sultan Mustafa in early 18th century, replacement of the Mustafa by the descendant of the Crimean Khans was declared legitimate by the sheikh-ul-islam.

<sup>366</sup> *Koçi Bey Risaleleri*, Seda Çakmakcıoğlu (eds.), Istanbul: Kabalcı Yayınevi, 2008, pp. 135-138. Erler in his research on Ottoman archives of 19th century had showed that descendants of Crimean Khans were salaried by the Ottoman state in a very late date of 1837. Mehmet Yavuz Erler, “Osmanlı’da “Asil Kan” Aristokrasinin XIX. Yüzyıldaki Yansımalarına Dair Birkaç Örnek: Cengiz Han ve Ramazanoğlu Soyuna”, *Uluslararası Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi*, Vol: 1-2, Winter 2008, p. 145.

<sup>367</sup> Colin Imber, *The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650: The Structure of Power*, pp. 126-127.

<sup>368</sup> Imber, *ibid.*, p. 127.

Similar to the *kut* of earliest Turkic tradition but this time bedaubed with the Islamic cover, Ottoman tradition recognized the Sultanic power as the benevolence of the God. At the outset of each reign, respective Sultans were procedurally announcing that the throne was granted to them by God.<sup>369</sup> Nevertheless the last and the longest century of the Ottoman Empire witnessed the emergence of the public and appearance of a novel base for political legitimacy: the people and then the nation. First the Sultan had to face against the centrifugal forces; central authority vested in the Sublime Port was challenged by the *ayâns*, powerful local families and the governor pashas of the peripheral provinces. *Sened-i İttifak* of 1808 symbolized state's obligatory recognition of the existence and rights of local despots along with a considerable limitation of Sultan's authority.<sup>370</sup> Tanzimat had sought for recentralization around enlightened monarchy; Sultan would be bound by law and respectful to the equality of all people before law regardless of nationality and faith. The first imperial edict of Abdülaziz in 1861 would not include references to "God's benevolence and prophet's spirituality" and the term "kavanini mevzua"<sup>371</sup> was used instead of "sharia".<sup>372</sup>

---

<sup>369</sup> Enver Ziya Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi VIII. Cilt: Birinci Meşrutiyet ve İstibdat Devirleri 1876-1907*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1983, pp. 193-194.

<sup>370</sup> Enver Ziya Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi V. Cilt: Nizam-ı Cedid ve Tanzimat Devirleri 1789-1856*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1983, p. 93.

<sup>371</sup> "actual law".

<sup>372</sup> Enver Ziya Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi VII. Cilt: Islahat Fermanı Devri 1861-1876*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1983, p. 116.

**Map 7 - Dissolution of the Ottoman Empire between 1798-1923**



Source:

<http://jspivey.wikispaces.com/file/view/Ottoman.jpg/35895707/Ottoman.jpg>

## CHAPTER 4

### IDEOLOGY

#### 4.1. UZBEKISTAN

##### 4.1.1. New Khan over Clans

Clans proved to be the most durable and flexible social unit in Central Asia. They were most durable because the rank within a particular clan together with the status of any clan among numerous competitors has been the chief norm of political ascendancy since prehistoric times. The clans have also been the most flexible owing to their ability to survive and keep on functioning under diverse regimes like tribal nomadic confederations, great empires, archaic feudal khanates, the Soviet Marxism, and lastly autocratic nation-states. Despite the term immediately bears the blood tie in mind, a relatively narrow group of extended family all linked consanguineally, Uzbek clans should be conceptualized as “regional solidarity networks”<sup>373</sup> consisting of lesser clans as well and natives of the specific region bound to the clan via nepotism and clientelism. Likewise expressions such as “solidarity groups”<sup>374</sup> and “informal authority structures”<sup>375</sup> indicate that clan meant more than a genealogical tie it was rather a group-

---

<sup>373</sup> Jonathan Kelley Zartman, *Political Transition in Central Asian Republics: Authoritarianism versus Power-Sharing*, PhD thesis, University of Denver, 2004, p. 28.

<sup>374</sup> Vitaly Naumkin, “Uzbekistan’s State-Building Fatigue”, *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol: 29, No: 3, 2006, pp. 127-140.

<sup>375</sup> Gregory Gleason, “Fealty and Loyalty: Informal Authority Structures in Soviet Asia”, *Soviet Studies*, Vol: 43, No: 4, 1991, p. 618.

identification around a specific place of origin with the expectation of favoritism. As a matter of fact a clan is normally larger than a family as Collins noted ranging from “two thousand to twenty thousand individuals”.<sup>376</sup> Collins observed elsewhere that “clans seemed deeply rooted in both the informal (village) and formalized (kolkhoz) socio-economic structures”, even acting as the ultimate source of the authority especially in the villages.<sup>377</sup>

In Uzbekistan six separate regions exist with their distinct clannish networks: (1) Tashkent, the capital and the main industrial center, (2) Ferghana, most densely populated region producing the main crop of the country, cotton, (3) Samarkand and Bukhara, two historical centers of ancient civilization, (4) Surkhandarya and Kashkadarya, briefly named as the Sur-kash, the most backward regions in the southernmost part of the country, (5) Khorezm, the site of ancient Khivan civilization which is separated from rest of the country by deserts, and lastly, (6) Karakalpakstan Autonomous Republic.<sup>378</sup> While the clans from the first three of the above-mentioned regions, Tashkent, Ferghana and Samarkand/Bukhara were traditionally the strong contestants for power, clans stemming from Sur-kash, Khorezm, and Karakalpakstan were largely excluded from political struggles of the capital. Throughout the Soviet years the two most powerful posts of First Secretary of Uzbek Communist Party and Chairmans of the

---

<sup>376</sup> Kathleen Collins, “The Logic of Clan Politics: Evidence from the Central Asian Trajectories”, *World Politics*, Vol: 56, No: 2, January 2004, p. 232.

<sup>377</sup> Kathleen Collins, “The Political Role of Clans in Central Asia”, *Comparative Politics*, Vol: 35, No: 2, January 2003, p. 187. Collins cited the field research conducted in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in 1997 and 1998 which provided valuable insights on the power of clan networks. To the question “when you need a conflict (other than a violent crime) resolved, where do you turn for help?” 2% of Uzbek respondents replied as mosque, 2% as kolkhoz committee and 96% as family/clan connections. Similarly the question “what factor is most important in getting a job, economic advancement, and political advancement?” was replied by 31% as money and bribe, by 69% as family/clan connections. Collins commented that individuals in Uzbekistan “avoid the procurator and courts”, where “clan elders and notables govern according to local traditions”. Collins, “The Logic of Clan Politics: Evidence from the Central Asian Trajectories”, p. 178.

<sup>378</sup> Daria Fane, “Ethnicity and Regionalism in Uzbekistan: Maintaining Stability through Authoritarian Control”, p. 278, in Leokadia Drobizheva & Rose Gottemoeller & Catherine McArdle Kelleher & Lee Walker (eds.), *Ethnic Conflict in the Post-Soviet World: Case Studies and Analysis*, Armonk, N.Y. & London, England: M.E. Sharpe, 1996.

Council of Ministers switched among representatives of Tashkent, Ferghana and Samarkand regions without exception.<sup>379</sup> Furthermore more than one “politically influential” clan might stem from a single region like the Jurabekov and Rashidov clans of Samarkand, and the Alimov and Sultanov clans of Tashkent, though all operate within their well-specified spheres of socio-economic hegemony.<sup>380</sup>

Central Asia had learned the Soviet Revolution first from the Russian traders and newspapers and then, after the Red Army’s victory in the Civil War against Whites, the new regime established itself owing to the alliance of Bolsheviks with local Jadidists. Territorially resembling an enlarged Bukharan Khanate, new Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic was ruled by Bukharan ex-Jadidists under Faizulla Khojaev and the Tashkent group of national communists of Akmal Ikramov until the Great Purge of 1938. Nearby their Jadidist/Bolshevik leanings both Khojaev and Ikramov were surely from the powerful networks of their respective cities.<sup>381</sup> Then Moscow had cleansed the reminiscents of most politicized and national-minded generation of Central Asia with the Great Purge which also meant the extermination of Bukhara-Tashkent alliance. Ferghana clan rose to monopolize the power after 1938 with Osman Yusupov, the First Secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party during the Stalin years. Ferghana increasingly allied with the Tashkenteers while the Bukharans were ultimately expelled from government posts. Roy was accurate that a government career in 1950s should be in line with the formula of power: “from Tashkent to Tashkent passing via

---

<sup>379</sup> Please look at Appendix 5 for the list of the First Secretaries of the Uzbek Communist Party and the Chairmans of the Council of Ministers and their regions of origin.

<sup>380</sup> Aslan Yavuz Şir, *Political Modernization and Informal Politics in Uzbekistan*, MSc thesis, Ankara: Middle East Technical University Department of Eurasian Studies, July 2007, p. 117. Rashidov clan was in fact a legacy of the patronage network created by the Uzbek leader Sharaf Rashidov in his long tenure.

<sup>381</sup> Otherwise it would be difficult to rationalize in a society of *aqsakals* how Khojaev became the head of the Bukharan Peoples’ Soviet Republic at the age of just 24 and the Prime Minister of Uzbek SSR at age of 29. Similarly Ikramov was only 27 years old when he became the First Secretary of Uzbek Communist Party in 1925. Roger David Kangas, *Faizulla Khodzhaev: National Communism in Bukhara and Soviet Uzbekistan, 1896-1938*, PhD thesis, Bloomington: Indiana University, 1992, p. 324.

Ferghana”.<sup>382</sup> It is worthy of note *en passant* that both the nationalities policy and the collectivization via *kolkhozes* (collective farms) and *sovkhoses* (state farms) had created suitable ways for clans to consolidate their position. While clans competed to fill thereafter Uzbekised party posts with their clients in disguise of loyal apparatchiks, the collective farms turned into genuine clan farms.<sup>383</sup>

Khrushchev’s union-wide campaign of de-Stalinization resulted in changes in all Central Asian leaders between 1959 and 1961, and in Uzbekistan Sharaf Rashidov a pro-Russian man of letters without a clan support was elevated to the post of Party First Secretary. Rashidov, born in small Jizzak village of Samarkand, was an outsider for the Tashkent/Ferghana hegemonic axis.<sup>384</sup> Howland argued that Rashidov’s appointment was a “temporary compromise between competing factions in Moscow, Uzbekistan, or both” in the years of turmoil.<sup>385</sup> In the first years of his rule Rashidov slowly but surely created his own patronage network from his fellow countrymen from Samarkand while keeping balance between still powerful rivals of Tashkent and Ferghana clans. In 1969 the Pakhtakor incident<sup>386</sup> provided him much sought opportunity and he liquidated all the contenders from other clans. Besides Samarkand, he turned his own town Jizzak to a center of a

---

<sup>382</sup> Olivier Roy, *The New Central Asia: The Creation Nations*, New York: New York University Press, 2000, p. 111.

<sup>383</sup> Kathleen Collins, “The Logic of Clan Politics: Evidence from the Central Asian Trajectories”, *World Politics*, Vol: 56, No: 2, January 2004, pp. 258-259.

<sup>384</sup> Sharaf Rashidov was born in 1917, the year of Bolshevik Revolution in Jizzak. He joined in the Communist Party as early as 1939. Rashidov graduated from the Samarkand University and then worked as teacher and newspaper editor. In World War II he was at the front as a Soviet soldier until he was wounded in 1943. In 1949 he became the head of UzSSR Writer’s Union where he appeared in the role of a bona fide loyalist to Moscow as a major proponent of Russian education. This position was awarded through promotion to the prestigious but ceremonial post of Chairman of the Presidium of the UzSSR in 1950. The early career of Rashidov could be found in James H. Howland, *Political Power, Clientelism, and Reform in the USSR*, MA thesis, Edmonton: University of Alberta, 1990, pp. 75-76.

<sup>385</sup> Howland, *ibid.*, p. 76.

<sup>386</sup> A football match in Tashkent between Russian and Uzbek teams turned into anti-Russian riots in May 1969. Neil J. Melvin, *Uzbekistan: Transition to Authoritarianism on the Silk Road*, Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 2000, p. 51.

newly created oblast and appointed a close relative as the regional First Secretary.<sup>387</sup> Especially in the Brezhnev era Rashidov seemed like a pre-Soviet khan governing as the proterate of Russian Tsar. In Vaisman's words he acted as the "republic's khan or emir; and the party bureau as viziers".<sup>388</sup> During Brezhnev's stagnation his rule was legitimate for Moscow as long as he could give the impression that Uzbekistan's "patriotic duty to contribute friendship of peoples" through cotton production was being realized. It follows that as long as cotton production seemed fulfilled, internal policy and cadre appointments were left to the Rashidov and his clan. As Gorbachev would later complain, Moscow had lost control over individuals and territories in Central Asia.<sup>389</sup>

Death of Brezhnev in November 1982 and the subsequent rise of ex-KGB chief Andropov to the Soviet leadership ignited "the cotton affair" or "the Uzbek affair". The campaign disclosed that cotton production figures were constantly inflated by Uzbek officials in order to extract as much resource as possible from the Soviet system and to satisfy party bosses in Moscow as well.<sup>390</sup> The Moscow-led campaign was directed primarily against Rashidov's Samarkand clan together

---

<sup>387</sup> John Glenn, "Contemporary Central Asia: Ethnic Identity and Problems of State Legitimacy", *European Security*, Vol: 6, No: 3, 1997, pp. 140-141.

<sup>388</sup> Demian Vaisman, "Regionalism and Clan Loyalty in the Political Life of Uzbekistan", p. 107 in Yacoov Ro'i, (eds.), *Muslim Eurasia: Conflicting Legacies*, London: Frank Cass, 1995. Seiple tagged Rashidov as the "latter-day Uzbek khan with a party card" in Seiple, Chris, Uzbekistan: Civil Society in the Heartland, p. 253, obtained from [www.fpri.org/orbis/4902/seiple.uzbekistancivilsociety.pdf](http://www.fpri.org/orbis/4902/seiple.uzbekistancivilsociety.pdf) on March 17, 2007.

<sup>389</sup> Gleason, *ibid.*, p. 616.

<sup>390</sup> The cotton issue had in fact turned into a parade during the Brezhnev years. Everybody was performing his role in the corruption of production figures. Brezhnev's son-in-law Yuri Churbanov was convicted and prisoned as the head of the Moscow leg of the cotton affair. A striking conversation between Brezhnev and Rashidov in a Tashkent conference denoted that they were also performing their best: "Rashidov vowed to produce more than 5 million tons of cotton a year, to which Leonid Ilyich replied, "Sharaf, my friend, round it off to 6 million!" Rashidov answered: "Six million it is Leonid Ilyich." The next day, the slogan resounded throughout the republic." Howland, *ibid.*, p. 83. Critchlow provided an interesting comment on the cotton affair and widespread corruption in Uzbekistan: "Corruption had its positive side, boosting the morale of Uzbeks a kind of de facto autonomy that enhanced the role of local population in handling its own affairs." James Critchlow, *Nationalism in Uzbekistan: A Soviet Republic's Road to Sovereignty*, Boulder & San Francisco & Oxford: Westview Press, 1991, p. 45.



with officials from the Jizzak oblast and the Bukhara clan which cooperated with the closer city of Samarkand during Rashidov's tenure. Inamjon Usmankhojaev of Ferghana clan and then Rafiq Nishanov, "the slave of Moscow"<sup>391</sup> were appointed as the party leaders to conduct the campaign which comprised removal or arrest of 30,000 officials<sup>392</sup> and also dismissal of 58,000 party members.<sup>393</sup> The campaign which later continued under Gorbachev consisted of purges, convictions, assaults to the families of the purged officials, abolition of the Jizzak oblast and more importantly the *krasnyi desant*<sup>394</sup>, transfer of Russian bureaucrats from other republics to Uzbekistan for several posts. This was the real assault against all clans of Uzbekistan and caused the divorce from Uzbekistan to Moscow.<sup>395</sup> Moreover, accompanying media coverage especially in Moscow press equating the name "Uzbek" with the corruption and mafia, contributed the alienation of Uzbek elites from the Soviet rule.

Under normal conditions the announcement of Islam Abdu'ganiyevich Karimov as the new Uzbek party leader in June 1989 would be unexpected since the "new boss" was a nameless party apparatchik for most Uzbek intelligentsia. At the time of his appointment Karimov was the First Secretary of distant Kashka-Darya oblast to where he was exiled in 1986 from the post of the Ministry of Finance. An economist by training Karimov was serving as a non-political

---

<sup>391</sup> Collins, "The Logic of Clan Politics: Evidence from the Central Asian Trajectories", p. 241.

<sup>392</sup> Kathleen Collins, *Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia*, Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 114. Collins noted that between 1985 and 1987 Uzbek party bureaucracy and state administration was struck severely from the top party positions to the level of raion and kolkhoz.

<sup>393</sup> Anita Sengupta, *The Formation of the Uzbek Nation-State: A Study in Transition*, Lanham: Lexington Books, 2003, p. 237.

<sup>394</sup> Literally means "red landing", a term used for landing of several thousand non-Uzbek, mainly Russian officials by Moscow to replace the native bureaucrats after the corruption scandal.

<sup>395</sup> Roy, *ibid.*, p. 125.

bureaucrat at the Ministry of Finance since early 1960s.<sup>396</sup> Moreover although he had an affinity to Rashidov clan through his birth place Samarkand, Karimov was an outsider for the dominant clans and power networks. When the Ferghana riots of 1989 discredited Nishanov, Uzbek elites, most notably the leaders of the Jurabekov and Rashidov clans of Samarkand, the Alimov and Sultanov clans of Tashkent, the Gulomov and Azimov clans of Ferghana together with Shukrulla Mirsaidov a prominent member of Tashkent elite linked to city's clan network had come to an agreement around the name of Karimov for the post of First Secretary.<sup>397</sup> Uncomfortable with the *krasnyi desant* and resulting deterioration of their status, clan leaders sought after a neutral non-clan person both acceptable to Moscow and also would be responsive to clans' demands. Two most powerful figures representing Samarkand and Tashkent groups, Ismail Jurabekov and Shukrulla Mirsaidov respectively, organized the accession of Karimov.

Hence Karimov's rise to power in 1989 has much in common with Rashidov's accession in 1959. An extraordinary situation of political turmoil, numerous purges and intervention from Moscow that threaten the balance among clans enforced clan leaders to approve for the moment the non-aligned Karimov. Thus the new First Secretary was a "legitimate power broker"<sup>398</sup>, who was temporarily let to govern and possibly seen by clan leaders in the beginning as "their puppet".<sup>399</sup> However, similar to Rashidov, throughout the following quarter century Karimov managed to endure in power through cleverly balancing clannish interests. Particularly in the first days of the independence, Karimov's cadre policy

---

<sup>396</sup> For Karimov's career and rise to power: Peter A. Lambert, *The Political Response of Soviet Republican Leaders to the Challenge of Nationalism*, PhD Thesis, Coral Gables, Florida: University of Miami, May, 2004, pp. 273-275.

<sup>397</sup> Aslan Yavuz Şir, *Political Modernization and Informal Politics in Uzbekistan*, MSc thesis, Ankara: Middle East Technical University Department of Eurasian Studies, July 2007, p. 117.

<sup>398</sup> Kathleen Collins, "The Logic of Clan Politics: Evidence from the Central Asian Trajectories", *World Politics*, Volume: 56, No: 2, January 2004, pp. 224-261.

<sup>399</sup> İdil Tuncer Kılavuz, *Understanding Violent Conflict: A Comparative Study of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan*, PhD thesis, Bloomington: Indiana University Department of Central Eurasian Studies, August 2007, p. 134.

signalized a return back to the clan balance firmly established in Rashidov's tenure. All clan leaders were distributed influential posts in the government. Ismail Jurabekov, who had been the Minister of Water Management under Rashidov, was appointed as the Minister of First Deputy Prime Minister responsible of the Water Resources. Timur Alimov who was the Chair of Tashkent Oblast Executive Committee during the Rashidov rule became the President's Advisor. Shukrulla Mirsaidov, the ex-mayor of Tashkent city, initially appeared as the most powerful person after Karimov, became first the Prime Minister then the Vice-President. Last but not the least, Abdulaziz Kamilov, a relative of Rashidov who was previously serving as a senior official in republican KGB, was fixed as the Minister of Foreign Affairs.<sup>400</sup>

Jack be nimble, Jack be quick; Karimov was also slick and quick to foster a specific clan for his own power base. He re-established Rashidov's Jizzak oblast and revived the severely hit clan network of Rashidov for his own purposes. At the same time Karimov initiated the crusade to rehabilitate Rashidov as of late 1990: The Lenin Street was renamed as Sharaf Rashidov Street, a bust of him was placed in the center of Tashkent and his 75th birthday was celebrated cheerfully with the participation of Islam Karimov.<sup>401</sup> Meanwhile the ruling clan alliance turned out to be shaky as the Tashkent group led by Vice-President Shukrulla Mirsaidov appeared uneasy with the ever-increasing weight of Karimov's Samarkand/Jizzak clan in the bureaucracy. Karimov found the golden opportunity to debase Mirsaidov in 1991 after the failed August coup in Moscow. Through a series of judicious manoeuvres against the Tashkent clan he succeeded to marginalize Mirsaidov. First on August 24 Karimov resigned from the Communist Party of Uzbekistan and then nationalized all property of the Party. Next, he revised the ruling party with a new name as People's Democratic Party and with a new central

---

<sup>400</sup> Alisher Ilkhamov, "Neopatrimonialism, Interest Groups and Patronage Networks: The Impasses of the Governance System in Uzbekistan", *Central Asian Survey*, Vol: 26, No: 1, 2007, p. 83.

<sup>401</sup> Neil J. Melvin, *ibid.*, pp. 44-45. A selection of place name changes in Tashkent can be found in Laura L. Adams, *The Spectacular State: Culture and National Identity in Uzbekistan*, Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2010, p. 32.

committee.<sup>402</sup> Lastly on August 31 independence of Uzbekistan was declared. In October 1991 Mirsaidov's response came: 200 deputies of the Uzbek legislative mostly from Tashkent region signed an open letter and demanded Islam Karimov to resign. In addition, student demonstrations erupted in Tashkent seemingly due to economic situation and high prices in Tashkent but in fact organized by Mirsaidov's clan network.<sup>403</sup> Fane argued that the struggle continued for several months since the opposition of the powerful Tashkent clan was the first real threat to Karimov's rule.<sup>404</sup> Finally in January 1992 Karimov achieved to depose Mirsaidov from Vice-Presidency and appointed him to powerless post of State Secretary. Mirsaidov resigned from the post and eventually was forced out of politics.<sup>405</sup>

The elimination of Mirsaidov however could not set free Karimov from clan politics. On the contrary in the absence of any meaningful democratic procedures Karimov's regime continued to be dependent on major clans. Ismail Jurabekov, who was the master figure in Karimov's nomination to the post of first secretary, obtained the lion's share for his Samarkand based clan. The Grey Cardinal's clan had been dominant in Uzbekneftgas and managed the import and export of country's gas and oil. Nearby this vast fortune the clan has also hegemonic control in the bazaars and in the cotton complex. Alimov clan of Tashkent was in charge of the finance system of the country including "the Central Bank and many joint venture banks based in Tashkent". Nicknamed as the "Grand Timur", Timur Alimov had also monopoly in country's shadow economy. The

---

<sup>402</sup> Lambert, *ibid.*, pp. 277-278.

<sup>403</sup> Marchin C. Spechler, "Authoritarian Politics and Economic Reform in Uzbekistan: Past, Present and Prospects", *Central Asian Survey*, Vol: 26, No: 2, 2007, p. 195.

<sup>404</sup> Fane, *ibid.*, p. 281.

<sup>405</sup> Melvin, *ibid.*, p. 32. After his dismissal Mirsaidov was convicted of corruption in order to prevent him to appear as candidate in the forthcoming Presidential elections. Karimov arranged the election law to eliminate Mirsaidov and banned the candidacy of convicted people. Mirsaidov then attempted to establish a political party but continuous physical attacks prevented him to contend for political power anymore. Fane, *ibid.*, p. 281.

spheres of Alimov and Jurabekov clans left aside, most of the remaining government posts and fiefdoms were distributed via the network of Karimov's own Jizzak/Rashidov clan.<sup>406</sup> Only once Karimov made an effort to crack down "the clan pact", when in 1999 he attempted to dismiss Ismail Jurabekov from his governmental post and then purge his entire clannish network as his previous ouster of Mirsaidov.<sup>407</sup> However days after Jurabekov's ouster, Karimov could slightly escape an assassination attempt in Tashkent and then after back-door negotiations Jurabekov was surprisingly reinstated to his ex-post in the government. Although the Uzbek government openly accused Islamic groups related to Turkey; local people in Tashkent were speculating that Jurabekov's men were the organizers.<sup>408</sup>

Once in power Karimov had no choice but to mould himself as a powerful khan on the top of league of clans. The khan who inevitably relied upon a specific clan would favor his own power base but should also maintain a viable balance between major clans in the distribution of posts and resources. Ilkhamov correctly claimed that Karimov's rule was "less stable than it might appear to an outside observer".<sup>409</sup> Because while major clans should continuously be satisfied through economic and political concessions, the possible crack of the fragile balance between Tashkent, Samarkand and Ferghana might cause severe conflicts and produce potential contenders. "Clans are the first thing I think when I get up in the morning"<sup>410</sup> Karimov was reported to say. As long as regime's legitimacy would be dependent informally on only Karimov's ability to keep the clan pact intact, he

---

<sup>406</sup> Şir, *ibid.*, p. 119.

<sup>407</sup> Collins, "The Logic of Clan Politics: Evidence from the Central Asian Trajectories", p. 253.

<sup>408</sup> Cornell noted that "220 Uzbek students were recalled from Turkish universities less than a month before their final examinations, and over 20 Turkish schools in Uzbekistan were closed down by government decree." Svante E. Cornell, "Uzbekistan: A Regional Player in Eurasian Geopolitics?", *European Security*, Vol: 9, No: 2, 2000, pp. 131-132.

<sup>409</sup> Alisher Ilkhamov, "Neopatrimonialism, Interest Groups and Patronage Networks: The Impasses of the Governance System in Uzbekistan", *Central Asian Survey*, Vol: 26, No: 1, 2007, p. 161.

<sup>410</sup> Seiple, *ibid.*, p. 254.

should also incorporate the clans in his nightmares beside just thinking in the mornings and then in the day time.

#### **4.1.2. Fancy Laws, Fake Elections, Puppet Parties**

“Democracy is our main route!” said President Karimov pompously in the first session of the Parliament formed after the elections of December 1994. Acting this time in the shoes of a firm democrat, he was proudly alleging that “the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan met all the requirements of democracy”.<sup>411</sup> The Constitution which was adopted in December 1992 actually contained abundant references to terms such as democracy, rule of law, freedom of thought and speech, civil rights and self-government. Uzbek Constitution is comprised of a preamble and 128 articles organized in 26 chapters and six parts.<sup>412</sup> The preamble, the first part which is on the fundamental principles, the second part with the title of “Basic Human and Civil Rights, Freedoms and Duties” and lastly the third part titled “Society and Individual” remind you of typical Western Constitutions. The Uzbek people was declared to be the sole source of the sovereignty (Article 7) and the equality before the law was assured for all Uzbek citizens (Article 18). In the same way, freedom of thought and speech (Article 29), freedom of conscience (Article 31) and freedom of economic activity, entrepreneurship and labour (Article 53) were guaranteed for every citizen of Uzbekistan. The rhetoric continues with political rights: While all Uzbek citizens would have the right to form trade unions, political parties and any other public associations and to participate in mass movements (Article 34), political parties would express the political will of various layers and groups of the population through their democratically elected representatives (Article 60).

---

<sup>411</sup> I.A. Karimov, *Basic Principles of Social, Political and Economic Development of Uzbekistan: Report at the First Session of the Oliy Majlis of the Republic of Uzbekistan*, February 23, 1995, Tashkent: Usbekiston, 1995, p. 6.

<sup>412</sup> *Uzbekiston Respublikasining Konstitutsiyasi*, Tashkent, 1992.

Nevertheless, fourth and fifth parts of the Constitution with titles “Administrative and Territorial Structure and State System” and “Organization of State Authority” respectively, bear clear imprints of an omnipotent President. The foremost principle of any democratic polity, the separation of powers was seemingly sustained in the Constitution. Karimov also claimed that first the legislative branch, the “*Oliy Majlis* was elected on multi-party basis and thereof juridical and executive branches were created”.<sup>413</sup> However, the *Oliy Majlis* is entitled to elect all judges of the three top courts of the Republic of Uzbekistan; the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court and the Higher Economic Court only “upon recommendation of the President” (Article 80; clauses 2, 3, 4). What is more the legislative is entitled of “ratification of the decrees of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan on the appointment and removal the Procurator-General of the Republic of Uzbekistan and his deputies” (Article 80; clause 6). Thus the separation of judiciary from the executive expires and judicial system filled up with “the President’s men” becomes extremely alert to the considerations of the President.

In addition, despite the fact that the Cabinet of Ministers is authorized as the executive power in the Constitution it is simply in a subordinate position *vis-a-vis* the President. Since the President is declared as the ultimate head of the state and the executive authority (Article 89), the Cabinet of Ministers turns out to be an aide of the President helping his office to administer daily work. In any case the Cabinet would be formed after the appointment of a deputy to the post of Prime Ministry by the President and even after the Cabinet is established the President is bestowed the right to take decisions within the jurisdiction of the Cabinet including abolishing and revising Cabinet resolutions (Article 98). Therefore the President of Uzbekistan enjoys much more constitutional authority than the conventional presidential systems.<sup>414</sup> Another function of the Cabinet seems to

---

<sup>413</sup> I. A. Karimov, *ibid.*, p. 6.

<sup>414</sup> Attila Özer, *Türk Cumhuriyetlerinin Hukuki Yapısı (Yasama-Yürütme-Yargı)*, Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 2008, p. 42.

play the role of the scapegoat while Karimov acts out the benevolent ruler. In a televised meeting of cabinet, all ministers were listening as timid and naughty children to their angry overlord who was scolding for the increasing prices and hard economic conditions.<sup>415</sup>

The Constitution recognizes the intermediary authorities of *Kengesh*, the provincial parliaments and also the *hokims*, regional governors of the oblasts, between the central government and the immediate neighborhood of the *mahalla*. The country is administered as 14 regions; 12 oblasts<sup>416</sup>, Karakalpakstan Autonomous Republic which has virtually no difference from oblasts and Tashkent city. 14 *hokims* are endowed a good deal of power in the Constitution that shall cause them practically act as regional bullies. They were granted executive power to “ensure the observance of laws, maintain law and order, and ensure security of citizens, direct the economic, social and cultural development within their territories” (Article 100). Furthermore the same article authorizes *hokims* to “propose and implement the local budget, determine the local taxes and fees”. *Kengeshes*’ juridical power of “passing normative acts in conformity with the Constitution” looks like a concession given to the local interests. Moreover Karimov and his protégés propagate that the Uzbek regime achieved one step further in democratization through the decentralization of power to the local initiatives. However while the *Kengeshes* have little power, the *hokims* who are appointed by the President, act merely as the representatives of the President.<sup>417</sup> Moreover in order to prevent the formation of a local power base potentially threatening his own power, Karimov consistently purges the local cadres and

---

<sup>415</sup> Andrea Berg & Anna Kreikemeyer (eds.), *Realities of Transformation: Democratization Policies in Central Asia Revisited*, Hamburg: Nomos, 2006.

<sup>416</sup> The twelve oblasts are Andijan, Bukhara, Ferghana, Jizzak, Kashkadarya, Khorezm, Namangan, Navoi, Samarkand, Surhandarya, Syrdarya and Tashkent.

<sup>417</sup> Arne Tesli, “Political Mobilisation and Development in Uzbekistan”, p. 100 in Arne Tesli & Jorn Holm-Hansen (eds.), *Building the State: Political Mobilisation, Rhetoric and Social Differentiation in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Ethiopia and Somalia*, Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research, 1999.



constantly replaces *hokims*.<sup>418</sup> Ilkhamov observes that average tenure for *hokims* was just 3 years between 1993-2002, the *hokims* of crucial provinces of Samarkand, Ferghana and Tashkent city could enjoy an even shorter tenure of 2, 2.7 and 2 years respectively.<sup>419</sup> As a result these local Karimovs behave as if an economic blank cheque was given to them to exploit the resources of their regions in the short term available to them.

Whilst the Constitution and alleged local rule via *Kengeshes* and the *hokims* were absolutely decorative, the zenith of parade in Uzbekistan has surely been the elections and the political parties. Because all elections had been fake and all political parties represented in the Oliy Majlis were puppets after the split of the Birlik in 1989 and marginalization of Birlik and Erk together with the Islamic Rebirth Party and the Adolat movements both of which originated from more religious Ferghana/Namangan region. In fact Birlik had the political initiative in the country through mass demonstrations and nationalistic demands similar to the popular fronts spread all the Soviet republics as the Soviet Union was dissolving. Until August 1991 Karimov was cautiously dancing on a slippery ground both trying to adapt certain demands of the mass movement to appease the popular and clannish elites and also being wide awake developments in Moscow.

After the slaughter of Meskhetian Turks by an Uzbek mob in Ferghana in June 1989 and the following riots in Samarkand and Tashkent, Karimov government blamed Birlik to incite the disorder. Government's increasingly repressive policy towards the mass opposition sparked the split in the Congress of Birlik on November 11, 1989 and a more moderate group separated to form Erk. While Abdurahim and Abdumannob Polat brothers and the bulk of the Birlik opted

---

<sup>418</sup> Pauline Jones Luong, *Institutional Change and Political Continuity in Post-Soviet Central Asia: Power, Perceptions and Pacts*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 124-126.

<sup>419</sup> Alisher Ilkhamov, "The Limits of Centralization: Regional Challenges in Uzbekistan", p. 168-169 in Pauline Jones Luong (eds.), *The Transformation of Central Asia: States and Societies from Soviet Rule to Independence*, Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 2004. Ilkhamov argues that only the *hokim* of Andijon was left intact for a longer time since the oblast has reported to the center much revenue of cotton meeting and even surpassing the targets. For the average terms of the *hokims* please look Appendix 6.

to continue as a mass movement, Muhammad Salih and Erkhin Vahidov argued for a parliamentary path naively hoping that they could sustain a meaningful opposition to Karimov.<sup>420</sup> Poet Erkhin Vahidov was rejecting mass demonstrations to any further extent and insisting that “Erk movement advocated dialogue, not bloodshed”.<sup>421</sup> Erk leader Muhammad Salih was awarded in February 1990 through election to the Parliament with the permission and support of government.<sup>422</sup>

When the August coup in Moscow required the declaration of independence on August 31, 1991, Erk appeared as the modest opposition that would serve to legitimize his rule in the upcoming Presidential elections for Karimov. Communist Party then re-named as the People’s Democratic Party<sup>423</sup> was founded in November 1991 and the authorities automatically recognized the party as complied the registration requirement of the Uzbek law on political parties. In consequence Islam Karimov was shown as the candidate of the People’s Democratic Party in the Presidential elections. Erk was also registered in September 1991; however Birlik was denied to be registered as a political party but just as a movement in November 11, 1991.<sup>424</sup> Muhammad Salih was then allowed to be the only candidate in the Presidential elections of December 1991.<sup>425</sup> The election, despite being extremely far from democratic standards, was the only

---

<sup>420</sup> Fane, *ibid.*, p. 283.

<sup>421</sup> “New Public Organisation in Uzbekistan”, *BBC Monitoring Service*, 28 February 1990.

<sup>422</sup> Abdumannob Polat, “Can Uzbekistan Build Democracy and Civil Society?”, p. 140 in M. Halt Ruffin & Daniel Waugh (eds.), *Civil Society in Central Asia*, Seattle & London: Center for Civil Society International, 1999.

<sup>423</sup> “Ozbekistan Xalq Demokratik Partiyasi” in original.

<sup>424</sup> Vladimir Babak & Demian Vaisman & Aryeh Wasserman (eds.), *Political Organization in Central Asia and Azerbaijan: Sources and Documents*, London & Portland: Frank Cass, 2004, p. 366 for Birlik and p. 374 for Erk.

<sup>425</sup> Abdumannob Polat, the brother of Birlik leader Abdurahim Polat argued that the government was tolerant to Erk compared to all other political movements as Erk was allowed to print its newspaper in the official printing house of the state and also the movement was permitted to have an office. Polat, *ibid.*, p. 140.

occasion that Karimov compete with a real contestant. Karimov attested Stalin who is alleged to utter that “it was completely unimportant who will vote, or how; but what is extraordinarily important is who would count the votes, and how”<sup>426</sup>. In the elections of December 29, 1991, Karimov was elected president by 86% of votes against Muhammad Salih’s 12%.

The victory in the Presidential elections and then the elimination of Mirsadiov’s clan-based opposition in early 1992 were due to consolidation of the clan pact behind Karimov. Karimov, then legitimate as the “popularly elected president”, had no need of a true opposition. Civil War in neighboring Tajikistan and the student demonstrations of early 1992 were used as the pretext for increased repression. Then a wave of assaults, physical attacks, bombings by “unknown hooligans” flamed up against all opposition figures.<sup>427</sup> Birlik leader Abdurahim Polat was beaten first in June 1992 by iron sticks then in October 1992 by armed men while walking on the street<sup>428</sup>, his brother Abdumannob Polat was captured by Uzbek security forces illegally in a foreign country, Kyrgyzstan and accused of insulting the Uzbek President.<sup>429</sup> Leader of the Islamic Rebirth Party Abdulla Utaev was taken in custody in December 1992 and never seen again.<sup>430</sup>

---

<sup>426</sup> Martha Olcott, “Regional Study on Human Development and Human Rights-Central Asia”, *Human Development Report Background Paper*, 2000, p. 23. The following quotation is attributed to Stalin in Boris Bazhanov’s *Memoirs of Stalin’s Former Secretary*, published in 1992: “You know, comrades, that I think in regard to this: I consider it completely unimportant who in the party will vote, or how; but what is extraordinarily important is this—who will count the votes, and how.” [http://urbanlegends.about.com/od/dubiousquotes/a/stalin\\_quote.htm](http://urbanlegends.about.com/od/dubiousquotes/a/stalin_quote.htm) January 10, 2010.

<sup>427</sup> Fane noted that the tactic of beatings by “unknown hooligans” was used widely against the opposition. She cited the Helsinki Watch that in just one month from December 1991 to January 1992 there were four beatings of opposition figures. Fane, *ibid.*, pp. 286-288.

<sup>428</sup> Center for Studies on Turkey (eds.), Akkaya, Çiğdem (project director), Ismailov, Khamid (project assistance), *Uzbekistan: Current Political and Economic Developments*, Essen: Önel-Verlag, Working Paper 15, May 1994, p. 26.

<sup>429</sup> Dilip Hiro, *Between Marx and Muhammed: The Changing Face of Central Asia*, London: Harper Collins Publishers, 1994, p. 187.

<sup>430</sup> Resul Yalcin, *The Rebirth of Uzbekistan: Politics, Economy and Society in the Post-Soviet Era*, Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 2002, p. 55.

Muhammad Salih of Erk was denied the right to speak in the parliament, forced to resign.

Finally, the resolution by the Uzbek Cabinet invalidated all previous registrations by political parties and movements in March 1993 and set October 1, 1993 as the deadline for all movements and parties should re-register.<sup>431</sup> Tashkent city fire brigade closed the office of Birlik just before the deadline due to alleged lack of necessary precautions against fire and then Birlik was denied registration.<sup>432</sup> The Election Law adopted in late 1993 also required that only registered parties could participate in parliamentary elections and nominate candidates for the presidential bid. The law also obliged political parties to apply six months before the elections with 50,000 signatures to designate a candidate.<sup>433</sup> All these provisions were effectively used by the government to eradicate any meaningful opposition. In addition the Constitution of Uzbekistan adopted in December 1992 counted among the criteria of eligibility for the Presidency of “being resided in Uzbekistan for at least 10 years immediately preceding the elections” (Article 90). All opposition leaders including Polat brothers and Muhammad Salih were actually exiled out of Uzbekistan via threats to their lives, and thus they also happened to be constitutionally ineligible for any future candidature.<sup>434</sup>

Karimov’s regime subsequently proceeded to create two of the earliest puppet parties, the Social Progress Party and the Progress of Motherland Party<sup>435</sup> whose chairman was Karimov’s former advisor on Problems of Youth, Usman

---

<sup>431</sup> Fane, *ibid.*, pp. 289-290.

<sup>432</sup> Olcott, *ibid.*, p. 26. According to the Election Law, all political parties and movements should inform the government on the place of their headquarters to be registered.

<sup>433</sup> Gregory Gleason, “Uzbekistan: The Politics of National Independence”, p. 582.

<sup>434</sup> Murat Kayıkçı, *Bağımsızlık Sonrası Özbekistan’da Siyasal ve Anayasal Yapılanma*, MA thesis, Kocaeli: Kocaeli Üniversitesi, 1997, p. 62.

<sup>435</sup> Ozbekiston Watan Teraqqiyati Partiyasi.

Azimov. Although the Oliy Majlis was dominated by the People's Democratic Party, 14 deputies were elected from the list of Progress of Motherland Party in December 1994 elections. The Party has no ideological difference compared to the majority People's Democratic Party; in fact both parties had no ideology other than Karimov's personal views. After the Parliamentary elections of December 1994, an additional set of pro-regime parties were crafted so as to give the impression of a multi-party regime. Among them the Uzbekistan National Revival Democratic Party<sup>436</sup> and the Justice Social Democratic Party<sup>437</sup> continued to have seats in the parliament for the following two decades.

The Constitution of Uzbekistan which was adopted in December 1992 prescribed the term of the presidency as five years and limited any candidate to run not more than two consecutive terms (Article 90). The new Parliament right after its first meeting in February 1995, called for the prolongation of the Presidential term. In the referendum of March 26, 1995, Uzbek people voted almost unanimously on behalf of a longer term for Karimov: %99.3 of the people extended Karimov's term until 2000 which would initially last in December 1996.<sup>438</sup> Karimov, the bighearted democrat, asked Oliy Majlis graciously in May 1995 "this prolongation to be counted for his second term". However the Parliament performed superbly its part in this parody by a commission to search the opinion of the electorate and in the end resolutely proclaiming that Karimov could be candidate in 2000 for a "second term".

The *Law on the Elections to the Oliy Majlis*, which was adopted on December 28, 1993, was in fact a compromise between the central leaders and the regional leaders. The clannish local leaders had recognized central government's right to supervise elections through the Central Electoral Committee and manage

---

<sup>436</sup> Ozbekiston Milliy Tiklanish Demokratik Partiyasi.

<sup>437</sup> Adolat Sotsial Demokratik Partiyasi.

<sup>438</sup> Melvin, *Uzbekistan: Transition to Authoritarianism on the Silk Road*, p. 34. The turn-out was 99.6% of the all eligible voters.

the procedure of party registration. In return the compromise had included the recognition of regional leaders' right to designate non-party candidates at the elections. Moreover the *hokims* had ensured that the electoral divisions would correspond to the administrative/regional divisions and not be changed.<sup>439</sup> This enabled large number of non-party deputies to be elected to the Parliament nearby the deputies from Karimov's pocket parties in 1994 elections. Before the Parliamentary elections of 1999 a fifth pro-Karimov party was created the Self-Sacrifice National Democratic Party.<sup>440</sup> Karimov's aim was to enlarge his power-base in the Parliament and to install a new cadre of parliamentarians dependent more on himself rather than clan connections. In addition he aimed at splitting the power in the Parliament once more in order to render any future Parliament-based dissidence impossible. Nevertheless, regional leaders were able to save their power in the Parliament after the elections. While the People's Democratic Party of Uzbekistan received 48 seats, the Progress of Fatherland 20 seats, the Justice Social Democratic Party 11 seats and the National Revival Democratic Party 10 seats, his new puppet *Fidokorlar* could obtain only 34 seats. But regional based 136 deputies were elected with the backing of the regional leaders.<sup>441</sup>

Political regime in Uzbekistan had evolved as a parody. The only candidate permitted to run in the Presidential elections of December 2000 was Abdulhafiz Jalolov, an ex-communist apparatchik proudly announced in front of ballot box that he voted for Karimov: "I voted for democracy and stability. I do not make it a secret that I voted for Karimov".<sup>442</sup> Karimov might feel legitimate after another ballot fantasy with 95.1% of Uzbekistan's 12.7 million registered voters including his only rival, while 4.1% of voters still chose Karimov's men Jalolov. Political

---

<sup>439</sup> Pauline Jones Luong, "After the Break-up: Institutional Design in Transitional States", *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol: 33, No: 563, 2000, p. 587.

<sup>440</sup> *Fidokorlar Milliy Demokratik Partiyasi*.

<sup>441</sup> Martha Olcott, "Regional Study on Human Development and Human Rights-Central Asia", *Human Development Report Background Paper*, 2000, p. 26.

<sup>442</sup> "High Turnout for Uzbekistan Vote", Timofei Zhukov, Associated Press, January 9, 2000.

regime in Uzbekistan moreover, is not a Presidential system for sure, but a president-*ist* regime. The Constitution and the laws are hierarchically under the president in practice, whenever Karimov needed a change; the legal system matched his demands. Even the *Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan on the Central Election Committee of the Republic of Uzbekistan* which designs the duties and responsibilities of the Election Committee was amended five times after its first adoption.<sup>443</sup>

Karimov suspicious that *Oliy Majlis* might turn into clan-based opposition as in Mirsaidov's attempt of late 1991 and uncomfortable with the failure of his newly-created personal party in the 1999 elections proposed a two-chamber Parliament. Karimov put forward the bicameral "professional Parliament" as a further move towards democratization; for him a professional Parliament would "strongly foster people's rule and the foundations of civic society, which will result in the emergence of a democratic state".<sup>444</sup> The claim of further democratization was of course a juggling for foreign audience; the primary reason of Karimov's move to restructure the Parliament as immune as possible from regional demands.<sup>445</sup> On January 27, 2002, 93.65% of the Uzbek people voted in favor of restructuring of the Parliament in two-chambers. An additional question was attached to the referendum whether the Presidential term to be extended from five years to seven years. Appreciative Uzbek voters confirmed the prolongation with a 91.78% of vote.<sup>446</sup>

---

<sup>443</sup> The Law was amended on 25.12.1998, 19.08.1999, 26.05.2000, 27.08.2004, 25.12.2008.  
[http://elections.uz/eng/legislation/law\\_of\\_the\\_republic\\_of\\_uzbekistan\\_on\\_the\\_central\\_election\\_committee\\_of\\_the\\_republic\\_of\\_uzbekistan.mgr](http://elections.uz/eng/legislation/law_of_the_republic_of_uzbekistan_on_the_central_election_committee_of_the_republic_of_uzbekistan.mgr)

<sup>444</sup> Dubnov, *ibid.*, p. 2.

<sup>445</sup> Alisher Ilkhamov, "Controllable Democracy in Uzbekistan", *Middle East Report*, No: 222, Spring 2002, p. 10.

<sup>446</sup> Alisher Ilkhamov, "Controllable Democracy in Uzbekistan", *Middle East Report*, No: 222, Spring 2002, p. 8.

On December 2004, deputies for the newly-reduced Legislative Chamber of the Uzbek Parliament were elected. The Legislative Chamber which had 250 deputies before the referendum of January 2002 would comprise of only 120 deputies. The Senate which was created with the approval of the referendum would function as the second chamber of the *Oliy Majlis*. The Senate would be formed by 100 senators, 16 of whom would be directly appointed by the President and the remaining 84 be elected by regional councils. The introduction of bicameral parliament enabled Karimov to insulate the legislative branch from regional influences. The regional based deputies were delimited in the Senate which was envisaged as a professional body. Only five parties were permitted to compete in the elections. Two newly established parties, the Free Peasants Party<sup>447</sup> and the Party of Agrarians and Entrepreneurs were denied registration together with Birlik by the Ministry of Justice.<sup>448</sup> Karimov's new favorite Uzbekistan Liberal Democratic Party won 41 seats, while President's first love Uzbekistan People's Democratic Party secured 28 seats, Self-Sacrifice National Democratic Party 18 seats, Uzbekistan National Revival Democratic Party 11 seats, Justice Social Democratic Party 10 seats and non-partisans 14 seats.<sup>449</sup>

After the Presidential elections of January 9, 2000 Karimov's five-year term commenced following his oath on January 22. The extension of the Presidential term to seven years after the referendum obliged a new Presidential election to be held in January 2007. However, only three months after the referendum Uzbek Parliament decided that Presidential elections would be on the first Sunday of the third week of December 2007, *de facto* meaning extra-11 months for Karimov's presidency.<sup>450</sup> The Constitutional Court not surprisingly

---

<sup>447</sup> Ozod Dehkonlar Partiyasi.

<sup>448</sup> "Parliamentary Elections, 26 December 2004 Republic of Uzbekistan", *OSCE/ODIHR Final Report*, Warsaw, March 7, 2005, p. 4.

<sup>449</sup> For the results of all Parliamentary Elections in Uzbekistan please see Appendix 8.

<sup>450</sup> "Presidential Election 2007 Republic of Uzbekistan", *OSCE/ODIHR Needs Assessment Mission Report, 28-30 November 2007*, Warsaw, December 4, 2007, p. 3.



paid no attention to human rights activist Djakhongir Shosalimov's application pointing out Uzbek Parliament's violation of the Constitution's provision lastly amended in order to extend Karimov's term two years.<sup>451</sup> Perhaps Shosalimov who was still presuming that the Constitution might restrict the President, who is reaching to the end of his twenty-one year term in Uzbekistan, was highly disappointed by eleven months prolongation. But the worst frustration was still ahead: Although Article 90 of the Uzbek Constitution prohibited more than two consecutive terms, Uzbekistan Liberal Democratic Party appointed Karimov unanimously as the party's nominee for the presidential bid at the party convention on November 6, 2007.<sup>452</sup> And what a chance for the Uzbek people and what a favor for the Uzbekistan Liberal Democratic Party; Karimov accepted party's appointment contrary to the Constitutional provision setting the time limit for the Presidential term. Hence the Constitutional Court ordered that Karimov had served only one seven-year term meaning that the President was eligible for a second seven-year.<sup>453</sup>

Karimov's candidacy from Uzbekistan Liberal Democratic Party was in fact the indicator of the irrelevancy of different parties since he was nominated in the third presidential elections from the third different party. He was elected from Uzbekistan People's Democratic Party in 1991, from Self Sacrifice National Democratic Party in 2000 and this time nominated by the Uzbekistan Liberal Democratic Party. The Election Committee permitted the candidacy of Asliddin Rustamov from Uzbekistan People's Democratic Party, Dilorom Toshmuhamedova from Justice Social Democratic Party. Furthermore an independent candidate, Akmal Saidov was given permit to participate in the Presidential elections. The results were as expected; Karimov was elected president with a 90.77% of vote while Rustamov gained 3.27%, Toshmuhamedova

---

<sup>451</sup> Dubnov, *ibid.*, p. 2.

<sup>452</sup> Omar Sharifov, "Islam Karimov Agreed to Remain the President Another Seven Years", 07.11.2007, <http://enews.fergananews.com/article.php?id=2216> reached on April 23, 2008.

<sup>453</sup> Sharifov, *ibid.*

3.03% and Saidov 2.94% of the voters.<sup>454</sup> Then Karimov might happily comment on the results of the 2007 Presidential elections that Uzbekistan's "thoroughly thought-out model is based on international standards, advanced experience of democratic states and entirely reflects the values and mentality of Uzbek [our] people".<sup>455</sup>

Finally Parliamentary elections of 2009 demonstrated yet again that the "pseudo-democracy game" will go on until Karimov leave office due to physical reasons or death. Before the elections the structure of the Parliament was altered once more, the number of deputies was increased from 120 to 150, 15 of which were reserved for a new government puppet party, the Ecological Movement of Uzbekistan. The party became a new toy for Karimov to demonstrate regime's compassion for the environmental problems. The critical point was however that 15 deputies were directly appointed by the party after implicit approval of the President and by this way Karimov secured a new leverage on the Parliament.<sup>456</sup> The first round of the elections was on December 27, 2009 and the second round was on January 10, 2010. Uzbekistan Liberal Democratic Party secured 53 places in the Parliament, Uzbekistan People's Democratic Party 32, Uzbekistan National Revival Democratic Party 31 and Justice Social Democratic Party 19 deputies, all of which had no political difference.<sup>457</sup> In Uzbekistan parties continue pretending to represent the Uzbek people who in turn pretend to elect the President. The President then pretends to be a democratic leader bound by the Constitution, respectful freedom of speech and basic human rights.

---

<sup>454</sup> See Appendix 7.

<sup>455</sup> Anna, Matveeva, "Legitimising Central Asian Authoritarianism: Political Manipulation and Symbolic Power", p. 1111.

<sup>456</sup> [http://elections.uz/eng/political\\_parties\\_and\\_movements/ecological\\_movement/](http://elections.uz/eng/political_parties_and_movements/ecological_movement/)

<sup>457</sup> See Appendix 8.

#### 4.1.3. New Grand Narrative: Ideology of National Independence

Whether just as phony rituals or due to sincere ideological enthusiasm all cadres of Uzbek elite and certainly Karimov in person were piously practicing Marxism-Leninism until the very last minute before the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Like all of his fellow countrymen, Karimov was exposed to the official Soviet ideology which was alleging that the Soviet Union was the *telos* of the history, realization of the truth, the end of all class inequalities and Uzbekistan SSR was the embodiment of the Uzbek proletariat, workers, farmers, and ‘progressive’ intelligentsia. Forty years career as an Uzbek apparatchik-technocrat surely involved annual participation in the Worker’s Day Ceremonies on every May 1, and then as the First Party Secretary, delivering thrilling speeches on the brotherhood of the toiling masses. His bureaucratic career required serious ideological service under the silver hammer and sickle of the Uzbek SSR flag, all for the Soviet Marxism-Leninism, the regime legitimator. He repeatedly saluted Lenin and the communist ideology in forty years, regularly invited the workers of the world to unite, pretended to pay the same workers pretending to work at a state farm<sup>458</sup> and certainly benefited from the teachings of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism. Moreover, while eschewing all ‘nationalist bourgeois deviations’, Karimov had to pass the scientific atheism course in order to graduate from the university. In November 1986, when Gorbachev was insisting on “a determined and pitiless combat against religious manifestations in Central Asia”<sup>459</sup> in a Tashkent visit Karimov the First Secretary of the Kashka-Darya oblast was in all probability among the applauders. In addition contributing to the illusionary pumping up the cotton production or at least turning blind eye was conceivably among Karimov’s ideological duties in his long years at the Ministry of Finance.

---

<sup>458</sup> It is a well known Brezhnev era joke from the mouth of workers: “they are pretending to pay us, we are pretending to work”.

<sup>459</sup> Sabrina Petra Ramet, “Religious Policy in the Era of Gorbachev”, p. 33 in Sabrina Petra Ramet (eds.), *Religious Policy in the Soviet Union*, Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

Right after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent discrediting of the Soviet Marxism-Leninism, Karimov was among the first to feel the ideological vacuum, the urgent need to reinstall a novel narration to legitimate the new situation. Facing the popular nationalist opposition of Birlik and ever-increasing appeal of Islamic messages in Uzbekistan, Karimov had to create an alternative formula for legitimation. Since the state apparatus was inherited from the Soviet rule as a whole and also used to be legitimate under the banner of then discarded Marxism-Leninism, his regime was extremely viable to the twin “pan” challenges of pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism. All the cadres were almost the same since the purges after the cotton affair of mid 1980s. Hence the deputies of the ex-Supreme Soviet, the members of the now defunct Presidium, the ex-party secretaries of *oblasts*, *obkoms*, *raions*, and, of course Karimov himself, had to justify their position in line with a new grand narrative. This new narrative should pocket nationalist demands but to be strictly defined as *O'zbekchilik*<sup>460</sup> avoiding any aspirations beyond the borders of Uzbekistan. In addition, the new ideology should also incorporate Islam but in a secular and local version. Nearby supra-national “pan” alternatives, the new legitimacy base which had to be congruent with the national lines, should cover up competing political and economic demands of clans, tribes, regions and also provide “a mechanism for dealing border disputes”.<sup>461</sup>

Article 12 of the Uzbek Constitution of 1992 maintained that no ideology would have been granted the status of state ideology and the “public life would develop on the basis of the diversity of political institutions’ ideologies and opinions”.<sup>462</sup> The outwardly liberal article implied that diversity of competing ideologies would be the norm in Uzbekistan and no ideology would be permitted

---

<sup>460</sup> Uzbekism

<sup>461</sup> Alan J. DeYoung & Charlene Santos, “Central Asian Educational Issues and Problems: Internet Coverage and Sources”, p. 69 in Stephen P. Heyneman & Alan J. DeYoung (eds.), *The Challenges of Education in Central Asia*, Greenwich: IAP, 2004.

<sup>462</sup> *Uzbekiston Respublikasining Konstitutsiyasi*, Tashkent, 1992, Article 12, p. 11.

to establish hegemony similar to Marxism-Leninism once enjoyed. Writing as late as 2004, Pottenger naively believed in Karimov's statement that "human values, universally recognized norms of genuine democracy, freedom and human rights" would ensure legitimacy for Uzbek regime.<sup>463</sup> After all, following the suit of Article 12, Karimov had explicitly rejected "adherence to a single ideology" and declared his faith in "ideological diversity based on principles of morality and humanism".<sup>464</sup> But even the "official intellectuals" of Karimov's court were well aware of the need for an instrumental ideology, a mast for bureaucracy to be stucked, an eclecticism for the Uzbek literary to be toyed with and a gizmo for Uzbek youngsters otherwise to be targeted by alien ideas. Uzbekistan Council for Research in Values and Philosophy published volumes of pseudo-philosophical works under the supervision of Said Shermukhamedov once the Minister of Education, to illuminate President Karimov's suggestion for revival of "national-spiritual culture as the most important factor in social progress"<sup>465</sup>: "The creation in Uzbekistan of an ideology of national independence is founded upon national origins, language, customs, traditions and human values".<sup>466</sup> Similarly Abdulkhafis Jamolov, the Director of the Philosophy and Law Institute identified the need for a new ideology in early 1993:

"We should carefully think over and elaborate the future ideology, which would best meet the national psychological spirit of Uzbekistan's people and which would meet the requirements of the political situation".<sup>467</sup>

---

<sup>463</sup> John R. Pottenger, "Civil Society, Religious Freedom, and Islam Karimov: Uzbekistan's Struggle for a Decent Society", *Central Asian Survey*, Vol: 23, No: 1, March 2004, p. 61.

<sup>464</sup> *ibid.*, p. 61.

<sup>465</sup> Said Shermukhamedov, "Preface", p. 3 in Said Shermukhamedov & Victoriya Levinskaya (eds.), *Spiritual Values and Social Progress: Uzbekistan Philosophical Studies I, Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Change Series IIIC, Central Asia Vol: 1*, Tashkent: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy obtained on July 9, 2008 from <http://www.crvp.org/book/Series03/IIIC-1/contents.htm>.

<sup>466</sup> Khakim Tukhtaev, "The Continuity of Knowledge in the Socio-Cultural Progress of Independent Uzbekistan", p. 48 in Said Shermukhamedov & Victoriya Levinskaya (eds.), *ibid.*

<sup>467</sup> Cited in Resul Yalcin, *The Rebirth of Uzbekistan: Politics, Economy and Society in the Post-Soviet Era*, Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 2002, pp. 86-87.

Karimov was also fully conscious at the outset about the necessity to frame a novel base of legitimation and maintained that “the state system, its operation and accompanying policies should above all be constructed on the basis of a concretely formulated ideology”.<sup>468</sup> Elsewhere he repeated that like every nation caring for its survival the Uzbek nation should also have an ideology of its own.<sup>469</sup> The decisive phrase in this statement was “of its own” since Karimov’s *milliy mustaqillik g‘oyasi*<sup>470</sup> was portrayed as the sum of innate values of the Uzbek people, the reflection of sanctified natural order in the Uzbek land and also as the culmination of centuries however distorted temporarily by the alien Soviet ideology. Thus the connotation of the word “ideology” in the Constitution does not embrace *milliy mustaqillik g‘oyasi*, and the diversity of opinions and the competition between ideologies envisioned in the Constitution were delimited within the sphere pre-set by the national ideology. The ideology of national independence was blessed, in March’s words, as “pre-political consensus which is necessary to be accepted before entering into competitive politics”<sup>471</sup> and from where any political and socio-cultural opinion should originate. As Karimov insisted the practical needs of nation-building required the Uzbek elites to construct independent statehood on the native values of Uzbekistan while purging elements of foreign Marxism-Leninism:

“The necessities of national culture and spiritual revival, socio-economic and political renovation of the state structure, sovereignty and independence strengthening have brought us to the national independence ideology”.<sup>472</sup>

---

<sup>468</sup> Andrew F. March, “The Use and Abuse of History: National Ideology as Transcendental Object in Islam Karimov’s ‘Ideology of National Independence’”, *Central Asian Survey*, Vol: 21, No: 4, 2003, p. 373.

<sup>469</sup> Birgit N. Schlyter, “Language Reform and Language Status in Multilingual Uzbekistan”, *Asian Cultures and Modernity*, Research Report, No: 13, Stockholm University, April 2007, pp. 19-21.

<sup>470</sup> “ideology of national independence”.

<sup>471</sup> Andrew F. March, “State Ideology and the Legitimation of Authoritarianism: The Case of Post-Soviet Uzbekistan”, *Journal of Political Ideologies*, Vol: 8, No: 2, 2003, p. 211.

<sup>472</sup> Cited in Resul Yalcin, *The Rebirth of Uzbekistan: Politics, Economy and Society in the Post-Soviet Era*, Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 2002, p. 87.

Ghelman Akhmedov, senior lecturer at the National University of Uzbekistan argued that the ideology of national independence was based on three ideas, paternalism, collectivism, and the priority of public opinion, which were the core of Uzbek values and thus “can not be ignored and rejected”.<sup>473</sup> If truth be told Akhmedov was simply parroting Karimov who argued in his opening speech of the Oliy Majlis that Uzbek democracy should be based on “collectivism, paternalism and priority to public opinion”.<sup>474</sup> Another “official intellectual” Said Ahmad argued that ideology of national independence was merely the “world culture decorated by Uzbek spirituality” which would counteract “public fear, ideological instability, lack of independent thinking, and spiritual dependence”.<sup>475</sup> Ahmad indeed well summarized the scapegoats of the Karimov regime; fear from insecurity, instability and dependence on alien ideological infiltrations such as pan-Turkist and Islamic movements. For Ahmad, the ideology of national independence would be sufficient to provide Uzbek people the framework of independent thinking. Narzulla Jorayev another official academician and a parliamentary official even claimed that the ideology of national independence should diffuse inside the lives of individuals in order to prevent “destructive ideologies”:

“From the individual point of view, national ideology is my personal ideology; it’s an ideology which relates to my independence, my honor, dignity, national pride, personal self-esteem. Anyone who opposes this ideology is my personal enemy and the enemy of my family and child. This is how we should look at the matter. Then, we can respond to destructive ideologies and prevent them”.<sup>476</sup>

---

<sup>473</sup> Ghelman Akhmedov, “Civil Nation in the Context of National Consciousness: The Republic of Uzbekistan”, *Central Asia & Caucasus Online Journal*, p. 6.

<sup>474</sup> I. A. Karimov, *Basic Principles of Social, Political and Economic Development of Uzbekistan: Report at the First Session of the Oliy Majlis of the Republic of Uzbekistan*, February 23, 1995, Tashkent: Usbekiston, 1995, p. 10.

<sup>475</sup> Peter L. Roudik, *The History of the Central Asian Republics*, Westport, Connecticut & London: Greenwood Press, 2007, pp. 184-185.

<sup>476</sup> “Uzbek Official Urges Personal Approach in Fighting ‘Destructive Ideologies’”, 6 May 2006 *BBC Monitoring Central Asia* translated from an interview from Uzbek State Radio broadcast of May 4, 2006.

The ideology of national independence evolved as a patchwork of diverse attitudes and opinions such as nationalism isolated from any irredentist claims, conservatism seen in the obsession of the regime for order, discipline and traditions, and a corporatist outlook that prioritize collectivism over individualism. The Uzbek ideology perfectly exhibited a pragmatic non-ideology: Pragmatic in the sense that it served perfectly in keeping up the political routine of the country and a non-ideology since it successfully de-legitimized alternative ideologies through embezzling bits and pieces of their claims. Tesli identified three doctrines of the regime repeated over and over by the President, Cabinet Ministers, bureaucrats, academicians, teachers and the ordinary people: the need to maintain national security and stability, gradualism and step-by-step approach and lastly the idea that history was given and true<sup>477</sup>. Islam Karimov himself defined the so-called Uzbek model in five items:

- “1) a gradual approach to all of the reforms
- 2) the de-ideologisation of the economy
- 3) state regulation during transition period
- 4) supremacy of law
- 5) and the implementation of a strong social policy”<sup>478</sup>

The regime was indeed a collage of hagiocracy as if under a reincarnated khan of pre-Tsarist style, neo-patrimonialism backed by the alliance of clan leaders and a repressive clientelism accompanied by President’s dense rhetoric on the virtues of democracy, human rights and freedom of speech. Uzbekistan displays a slogan regime; Soviet-style long boulevards of Tashkent were always filled up with panels of slogans, television and radio programs echoed repeatedly the same slogans and high schools, universities, printing houses, cultural institutions, even the local *chaikhana*s,<sup>479</sup> all ideological apparatuses of the state routinized the dissemination of the principles of the Uzbek path through relevant

---

<sup>477</sup> Arne Tesli, “Political Mobilisation and Development in Uzbekistan”, p. 105-106 in Arne Tesli & Jorn Holm-Hansen, *ibid.*

<sup>478</sup> “Biography of I.A. Karimov”, *Press Service of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan*, [http://2004.press-service.uz/eng/president\\_eng/president\\_eng.htm](http://2004.press-service.uz/eng/president_eng/president_eng.htm) reached on April 2, 2008.

<sup>479</sup> Literally meaning “tea-house”, *chaikhana* is the habitual meeting point of mahalla residents.



slogans. Karimov permanently appeared confident that his ideology was based on “the centuries-old traditions, customs, language, and spirit of our people”.<sup>480</sup> Yet the people should be reminded continuously through such slogans:

- The country’s “own road of independence and progress”
- Uzbekistan is a state with a great future
- Ideas against ideas, education against ignorance
- National program of training
- Molding a perfect personality
- Spirituality and enlightenment
- From a strong state to a strong civil society
- Turkestan is our common home
- To globalism via regionalism
- Grain independence
- Energy independence
- Export-oriented economy<sup>481</sup>

In the same way, Laura Adams observed that Uzbekistan as a “spectacular state” actually performed the ideology of national independence since its unexpected independence through slogans covering state buildings and panels, activities at the anniversaries of the Uzbek cities and thinkers, lively holiday rites, ceremonies for special occasions such as Navruz and the Independence Day.<sup>482</sup> The regime attempted to replace the Soviet culture with the “authentic Uzbek culture” and to install the Uzbek national identity blended with both ethnic and civic themes in the place of international, or to be more precise non-national

---

<sup>480</sup> Schlyter, *ibid.*, p. 22.

<sup>481</sup> Farkhad Tolipov, “Uzbekistan: Soviet Syndrome in the State, Society and Ideology, *Central Asia & Caucasus Online Journal*, p. 10.

<sup>482</sup> Laura L. Adams, *The Spectacular State: Culture and National Identity in Uzbekistan*, Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2010, pp. 120-121.

Soviet identity.<sup>483</sup> Promoting authentic Uzbek culture and developing a national idea was first of all necessary to render people of Uzbekistan ‘ideologically immune’ to the alien ideological distortions.<sup>484</sup> Hence *O‘zbekchilik*, the principle of Uzbekism became one of the main pillars of the Karimov regime. The status of Uzbek language was elevated, selected figures from Central Asian history were heroised as the forerunners of contemporary Uzbeks and most importantly Karimov strove for an Uzbek identity to minimize the attachment to clans and regions: “There is only one Uzbek nation state in the world, and there are no political differences between the descendants of Khorezm, Ferghana, or Surkhandarya: they are all Uzbeks”.<sup>485</sup> Karimov warned that regional and clannish groups were promoting their own interests rather than the priorities of the state and via favoritism of the kins for the state posts they had the tendency to exploit public goods for the benefit of their specific clans.<sup>486</sup>

Merry claimed that the leaders of all Central Asian countries solely changed the brands of their names from Soviet to national; though the same leaders and the cadres have been continuing to rule through unchanged Soviet methods of authority.<sup>487</sup> Perhaps Merry might be correct in his statement that the “Uzbek is truest to its Soviet roots”<sup>488</sup>, however since *koreniizatsiya* Uzbekhood turned out to be the norm of the legitimacy and the socialist element in the famous Stalinist slogan “socialist in content, nationalist in form” became intermingled with sizable national content. Furthermore Uzbek leaders and then the people were

---

<sup>483</sup> Adams enlists themes of both universal, civic nationhood and also particularistic and ethnic nationhood in the Uzbek ideology and analyzes tensions between them in Adams, *ibid.*, pp. 133-152.

<sup>484</sup> I. A. Karimov, *The Idea of National Independence: The Key Concepts and Principles of Uzbekistan*, Tashkent: Uzbekiston, 2001, pp. 44-45.

<sup>485</sup> Islam Karimov, *Uzbekistan on the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1998, p. 64.

<sup>486</sup> *ibid.*, p. 60.

<sup>487</sup> Merry, E. Wayne, “The Politics of Central Asia: National in Form, Soviet in Content”, p. 31.

<sup>488</sup> *ibid.*, p. 39.

made fit to their Uzbek form above all by the October Revolution and the Soviet regime. Bell accurately noted that, together with the Marxist-Leninist official idiom, the Soviet authority and its legitimation depended on the preceding creation of the Uzbek SSR with its titular genuine Uzbeks:

“[In the Soviet period since] the social mobility and political legitimacy of native elites depended almost exclusively on the existence of an Uzbek nation, the identity and status of elites was closely tied to the representation of Uzbek nationhood in both official policy and through popular mediums”.<sup>489</sup>

Within the national skeleton pre-set by the Soviets via national delimitation, Uzbek leaders found a multi-ethnic society including substantial Russian and Tajik ethnic groups. Karimov admitting that Uzbekistan was a multi-ethnic state affirmed the existence of over a hundred different ethnic nationalities comprising of more than twenty percent of the population.<sup>490</sup> The leaning of the Uzbek leaders was initially to locate Uzbekhood as an umbrella over ethnic and regional differences. *O'zbekchilik* was not devised in racial or ethnic terms, but, in Matveeva's terminology, as a state nationalism.<sup>491</sup> Uzbek definition of national identity as bound to the state was akin to the official Turkishness in modern Turkey, based on the citizenship tie; both allegedly not ethnic. At the same time, such a civil definition of nationhood conferred the Uzbek leadership practical assistance in overlooking ethnic diversity. The ethnic tags that all Soviet citizens were carrying nearby as internal passports and the national categories in censuses were all disappeared. In independent Uzbekistan no specification whether regional, ethnic or linguistic, exists in the official documents. Furthermore Uzbek authorities eschewed to organize a national population census; as Ferrando noted

---

<sup>489</sup> James Bell, “Redefining National Identity in Uzbekistan: Symbolic Tensions in Tashkent's Official Public Landscape”, *Cultural Geographies*, Vol: 6; 1999, p. 187.

<sup>490</sup> Islam Karimov, *Uzbekistan on the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century*, p. 42.

<sup>491</sup> Anna Matveeva, “Democratization, Legitimacy and Political Change in Central Asia”, *International Affairs*, Vol: 75, No: 1, January 1999, p. 29. Matveeva also argued that Uzbek state-centric nationalism has acquired more ethnic tone as the time passed after the independence.

Uzbekistan is the “only former Soviet republic that has not yet carried out a population census since independence”.<sup>492</sup>

Karimov might appear at first glance as a liberal-democrat leader in his numerous speeches full of tributes to the ethnic diversity of his country. “Even the smallest nation or ethnic nationality, contributes to the richness of mankind and deserves to be preserved” wrote in his *magnum opus* the tolerant President.<sup>493</sup> Nevertheless Karimov quickly adds that political loyalty of non-titular ethnic nationalities is a prerequisite for the stability and security and, unfortunately for the President multi-ethnicity turns into the most destructive force as soon as it threatens the inter-ethnic harmony.<sup>494</sup> Karimov identified two versions of nationalism among the threats to stability and security of Uzbekistan, the “excessive nationalism” and the “politicized nationalism”.<sup>495</sup> Hence ethnic nationalities in Uzbekistan should contribute to the richness of the country without passing the threshold of extremity set by the regime and after renouncing any demands that might be labeled as “political”.

Karimov’s appraisal of multi-ethnicity was in fact repercussions of the Soviet ethnos theory that every ethnic group and nation had an ethnic core, an ethnos. Akhmedov, a post-Soviet *apparatchik* of Karimov, distinguished between the autochthonous minorities such as Kazakhs, Tajiks, Kyrgyz and Turkmen and the scattered minorities such as Russians, Byelorussians, Koreans, Jews, and Ukrainians. For him the ethnoses of the autochthonous minorities had a great deal of resemblance with the Uzbek ethnos as a result of living alongside the Uzbeks for centuries and thus they could practically adopt the Uzbekness. The scattered minorities however continue to live with “the illusion of mastering their national

---

<sup>492</sup> Olivier Ferrando, “Manipulating the Census: Ethnic Minorities in the Nationalizing States of Central Asia”, *Nationalities Papers*, Vol: 36, No: 3, 2008, pp. 491-492.

<sup>493</sup> Islam Karimov, *Uzbekistan on the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century*, p. 44.

<sup>494</sup> Islam Karimov, *ibid.*, p. 41.

<sup>495</sup> Islam Karimov, *ibid.*, p. 44.

consciousness”.<sup>496</sup> Akhmedov recommends an understanding of civic nationalism to be incorporated in the ideology of national independence for the “scattered minorities”. Therefore each ethnos was recognized with its peculiar values, ensured the right of education in its own language providing that there would be no political mobilization on behalf of ethnic demands.

Kaiser over and over again came across the ubiquitous slogan “Barqarorlik eng katta boyligimiz”<sup>497</sup> in his visit to Tashkent in early 1999. He considered the ever-present slogan as a state reaction to the Tashkent bombings of February 1999 which was propagated by the regime to be performed by foreign Islamists who aimed at destroying the stability and the security of Uzbekistan.<sup>498</sup> Nonetheless what perhaps seemed transitory to Kaiser was the never-ending obsession of the Uzbek regime to security and stability. Once the regime and the authority of the President and his clique were consolidated, it is logical for the regime to pay tribute to both internal and external stability. Fetishization of stability superbly served Karimov regime to pacify and liquidate all opposition internally. Berg rightly stated that after the immediate turmoil following the collapse of the Soviet Union all post-Soviet Presidents in Central Asia turned into “*de facto* guardians of the stability”.<sup>499</sup> “Social, political and economic stability is a preeminent achievement of unsurpassed value” proudly declared in this vein Karimov while assessing his rule after the independence.<sup>500</sup> Cult of stability certainly proved to be

---

<sup>496</sup> Ghelman Akhmedov, “Civil Nation in the Context of National Consciousness: The Republic of Uzbekistan”, *Central Asia & Caucasus Online Journal*, p. 6.

<sup>497</sup> “Stability is our greatest wealth”.

<sup>498</sup> Markus Kaiser, *Formen der Transvergesellschaftung als gegenläufige Prozesse zur Nationsbildung in Usbekistan*, Bielefeld: Bielefeld University Sociology of Development Research Centre, Working Paper No: 334, 2000, pp. 5-6. On February 17, 1999, eight car-bomb explosions occurred in Tashkent while Karimov going to cabinet meeting, 13 people was dead and 80 people were wounded, Karimov escaped uninjured. Daniel Williams, “13 Die in Uzbek Bombings; President Escapes”, *The Washington Post*, Washington, D.C.: Feb 17, 1999, p. A11.

<sup>499</sup> Paul Georg Geiss, “State and Regime Change in Central Asia”, pp. 32-33 in Andrea Berg & Anna Kreikemeyer (eds.), *Realities of Transformation: Democratization Policies in Central Asia Revisited*, Hamburg: Nomos, 2006.

<sup>500</sup> Karimov, *ibid.*, p. 5.

of unsurpassed value for Karimov himself in providing a priceless tool to marginalize all dissidents. Externally Karimov was quick to announce the principle of indivisibility, meaning the constancy of all borders in Central Asia, as the premium motto of the Uzbek foreign policy.<sup>501</sup> Although all neighbors of Uzbekistan embraced substantial Uzbek minority groups, Karimov's regime persistently displayed little interest in Uzbek co-nationals abroad. Fumagalli noted that, the situation of the Uzbek population in neighboring countries was discussed neither in the Uzbek Parliament nor in media and the Uzbek regime seemed to forget those co-nationals altogether.<sup>502</sup> Consolidated authority naturally disdains any possible challengers whether internal or external; "Peace at Home, Peace Abroad" is a brilliant formula for preserving the existing authority.

The regime's success in the fetishization of stability and the endurance of repressive authoritarianism in Uzbekistan might be explained as the natural consequence of the established cultural values in the society. Akiner for instance argued that the conservative nature of the society, widespread emphasis on consensus and all-embracing sense of community were only apt for a stable authoritarian regime.<sup>503</sup> Holmatov identified Karimov as the "representative of the conservative technocratic elite" and celebrated his able realization of the idea of "political stability at any cost" in a region full of bloody conflicts and threatening sources of instability.<sup>504</sup> Likewise Lambert argued that the Karimov regime was by and large legitimate in the eyes of the ordinary Uzbeks, on the grounds of a survey worthy of note in its demonstrating the popularity of the concepts like order and stability. To the question "what is the best political system", almost 50% of

---

<sup>501</sup> Karimov, *ibid.*, p. 5.

<sup>502</sup> Mateo Fumagalli, "Etnisite, Devlet Yapılanması ve Dış Politika: Özbekistan ve 'Ülke Dışındaki Özbekler'", *OAKA*, Vol: 2, No: 4, 2007, p. 209.

<sup>503</sup> Shirin Akiner, *Central Asia: Conflict or Stability and Development?*, London: Minority Rights Group, 1997, p. 40.

<sup>504</sup> Ulugbek Holmatov, "State Administration in Uzbekistan and Need for Decentralization?", p. 3.

Uzbeks gave the answer “anything that brings order”. 91% of Uzbeks chose “strengthening order and discipline” as the measure that should be done in order to improve living conditions. Furthermore 52% of Uzbek respondents chose Karimov as the most respected leader from a questionnaire including 14 options.<sup>505</sup>

Howland once complained that Uzbek political culture caused serious handicaps for him in organizing a field survey on political topics. In his survey arranged in the last days of Uzbek SSR, Howland encountered chief Uzbek cultural values; obsessive pursuit of control and security, prevalent lack of trust to anyone and resulting transitory social relations.<sup>506</sup> Islam Karimov indeed provided only clues on his perception of the ideology of national independence in *Uzbekistan on the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century*, a 1998 book which seemed to be written for an international audience rather than domestic propogandation. However, the clues provided were enough to notice the centrality of security and threats in his thinking. “Are we sufficiently aware of the threats to our stability and security?” asks Karimov provocatively in the very beginning of the book.<sup>507</sup> And then in the first part of the book, titled “Threats to Stability and Security”, Karimov enlists these threats under seven headings in order to increase the awareness of the Uzbek citizens:

- Regional conflicts,
- Religious extremism and fundamentalism
- Great power chauvinism and aggressive nationalism
- Ethnic and inter-ethnic relations
- Corruption and criminality
- Regionalism and clan influence

---

<sup>505</sup> Peter A.Lambert, *The Political Response of Soviet Republican Leaders to the Challenge of Nationalism*, PhD thesis, Coral Gables, Florida: University of Miami, May, 2004, p. 290-291. The other leaders were Lenin and Nursultan Nazarbaev both were chosen by 15% of the respondents. Rashidov, the long-term leader of Soviet Uzbekistan who died in 1983 could still receive 7.7% of the ethnic Uzbek vote.

<sup>506</sup> James H. Howland, *Political Power, Clientelism, and Reform in the USSR*, MA thesis, Edmonton: University of Alberta, 1990, pp. 72-73.

<sup>507</sup> Karimov, *ibid.*, p. 2.

- Ecological challenges

The second part of the book carries the title “Toward Stability and Security” in which Karimov instructs the Uzbek people on the methods to ensure stability and security. Facing frequent references to the creation of democratic institutions and civil society, respect for human rights, establishing free market economy and promoting social policy and active citizenry, any foreign reader may become confused whether Kyrgyzstan or Uzbekistan was labeled as the Switzerland of Central Asia by many Western analysts. However in the Uzbek experience “forming a market economy and class of owners” meant in practice to distribute state firms to the clannish networks in trade for political support and to ensure that the class of owners should be Karimov’s family and network. “The revival of spiritual values and national self-consciousness” which is of vital importance for Karimov is in truth to educate Uzbek people to fit regime’s own vision of Islam, Uzbekhood and state-building. Likewise creating democratic institutions in practice stands for to decorate the *Oliy Majlis* with puppet parties and to organize fake elections. It is needless to say creating civil society and promoting active citizenry was to make docile any potential divergent attitude at the very outset in the neighborhood stage via regime’s civil society, *mahalla*. “Three words stability, security, sustainability have deep meanings to be continually remembered” warns Karimov in *Uzbekistan on the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century*.<sup>508</sup> It is clear for Karimov that sustainable development, the third pillar of his ideology depends on the prolongation of the *status quo*. The last part of the book titled “Promise of Progress” commences with a long oratory of two chapters on Uzbekistan’s potentials: Mineral richness including fuel and energy resources, deposits of coal, gold, silver, copper, uranium, and the agricultural fertility especially in cotton production; in addition large young population accompanied by a high population growth rate. Finally, this oratory and then *Uzbekistan on the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century* end up

---

<sup>508</sup> Karimov, *ibid.*, p. 4.



unsurprisingly with remarks on the immense worth of stability and significance of overcoming destabilizing threats already listed in the previous parts of the book.<sup>509</sup>

As Andrew March maintained legitimation of the authoritarian rule through fetishization of security and stability was self-defeating since both security and stability are “negative goals that depend on some ‘other’”.<sup>510</sup> The “other” of Karimov was the entire political claims based on Islam including not only Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan or Hizb-ut Tahrir but all Islamic factions. After the non-religious regime of the Soviet era collapsed and then the atheism campaign of 1980s expired, Uzbek regime had to tackle with its progressively more devout population yearning for a more Islamic life. The regime should elaborate a feasible solution to curb future demands for Islamic legitimation. Consequently the Uzbek elites opted to incorporate Islam selectively into their formulation of the national identity and relevant Islamic attitudes into the ideology of national independence. While Islam’s favor for traditional life, order, respect for elders, and submission to authority were included in “our Islam” by Karimov, politicized Islam was “used by terrorists to turn the youth into zombies, involving it in the illegal activities”.<sup>511</sup> Olcott & Ziyaeva stated that a sort of “national Islam” was promulgated as the antithesis of both the Soviet era atheism which “destroyed the Uzbek people as a historical nation, its culture and sacred religion of Islam”<sup>512</sup> and also the alien radical Islam.

Buzan & Wæver & de Wilde proposed the concept of securitization as extreme politicization of a situation via crafting a threat or magnifying an already

---

<sup>509</sup> Karimov, *ibid.*, pp. 180-182.

<sup>510</sup> Andrew F. March, “State Ideology and the Legitimation of Authoritarianism: The Case of Post-Soviet Uzbekistan”, *Journal of Political Ideologies*, Vol: 8, No: 2, 2003, p. 225.

<sup>511</sup> Natalie Rochelle Koch, *Nation-Building, Geopolitics, and the Andijon Uprising: Securitizing Discourses in Uzbekistan*, MA thesis, University of Colorado, 2009.

<sup>512</sup> Martha Brill Olcott & Diora Ziyaeva, *Islam in Uzbekistan: Religious Education and State Ideology*, Carnegie Papers: Washington D.C., No: 91, July 2008, p. 14.

existent minor danger in order to use extra-legal means. The securitization is performed by a “securitizing actor” who claims to protect the “referent object” which is a sanctified object such as state, nation or religion.<sup>513</sup> In this account, the violence, torture, human right abuses and ideological manipulation were seen legitimate to the extent the threat toward the referent object was magnified. The “securitizing actor” Karimov skillfully points out extremism and the radical Islamism as the threats to the “referent objects” which are the independence of Uzbekistan and order in the country. While a well-defined religious orientation might contribute to the formation and strengthening of the national identity<sup>514</sup>, Karimov insisted that “false devotional principles of religiousness”<sup>515</sup> would split the country as happened in Afghanistan and Algeria. As noted earlier Islamic fundamentalism was consistently depicted as foreign and outsider:

...Outside our country there are aggressive and fundamentalist forces who, exploiting the sacred value of the Islamic faith of our people, using the religion of our forefathers as a mask want to stop and reverse the democratic and spiritual progress of Uzbekistan”.<sup>516</sup>

In this account dissident groups inside the country were charged of being poisoned by alien destructive ideologies or as dishonest people obtaining \$100 from Islamic organizations such as Hizb-ut Tahrir to distribute extremist leaflets and magazines.<sup>517</sup> In Karimov’s scheme native opposition movements such as nationalist Erk or Birlik which have undeniable secular credentials, were portrayed

---

<sup>513</sup> Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998, pp. 35-40.

<sup>514</sup> Karimov, *ibid.*, p. 23.

<sup>515</sup> Koch, *ibid.*, p. 228.

<sup>516</sup> Nick Megoran, *The Politics and Pain of Nationalism and Identity along the Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan Ferghana Valley Boundary, 1999-2000*, PhD thesis, Cambridge: Sidney Sussex College, September 2002, p. 89.

<sup>517</sup> Stuart Horsman, “Themes in Official Discourses on Terrorism in Central Asia”, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol: 26, No: 1, 2005, p. 205.

as “false democrats” and “opportunists”.<sup>518</sup> Megoran noticed that the securitization prevalent in the Soviet era via crafting an external threat remained the same after the independence.<sup>519</sup> Although the “outside extremists and fundamentalists” replaced the “Western bourgeoisie deviations”, both were constructed as foreign to the “essence of Uzbek people”.

In Karimov’s discourse, Islamist threat was regularly cited together with drug trafficking and smuggling, all threats from outside, and Karimov legitimized his authoritarian rule and harsh measures against opposition as being “the last bastion against Islamists, drug traffickers and other criminals”.<sup>520</sup> Horsman notes that the Uzbek government continuously attempted to blame extremists as ordinary criminals rather than as opposition forces or fighters of an ideology. Islamist fundamentalists were described as terrorists, rapists, evil forces, and extremists were accused of stealing clothes and even killing a dog.<sup>521</sup> Claiming that he did not deny Islam even in the Soviet period and as the First Secretary of the Uzbek Communist Party, Karimov hypocritically tagged extremists as unbelievers and infidels: “Extremists do not practice any religion [and there are] those among them who do not believe in God at all”.<sup>522</sup> In addition Uzbek regime made use of the legal instruments to stuff all dissidents into the same basket with the genuine terrorist organizations. Horsman was right that the definition of terrorism as ‘socially dangerous wrong doing’ in the Bill on Terrorism adopted in 2000, was extremely vague and consciously left imprecise.<sup>523</sup>

---

<sup>518</sup> Cited from official/popular magazine *Halq So’zi* published on June 25, 1999 in Nick Megoran, *ibid.*, p. 89.

<sup>519</sup> Megoran, *ibid.*, p. 90.

<sup>520</sup> Matveeva, Anna, “Legitimising Central Asian Authoritarianism: Political Manipulation and Symbolic Power”, *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol: 61, No: 7, 2009, pp. 1101.

<sup>521</sup> Stuart Horsman, “Themes in Official Discourses on Terrorism in Central Asia”, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol: 26, No: 1, 2005, pp. 204-205.

<sup>522</sup> Stuart Horsman, *ibid.*, p. 204.

<sup>523</sup> Stuart Horsman, *ibid.*, p. 201.

The attacks to the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001 turned out to be a golden opportunity for repressive Karimov regime. The “war on terrorism” and operations against Taleban who were ruling neighboring Afghanistan since 1997 added new fuel to Karimov’s repression against all dissidents as Islamist radicals. The terror discourse which was increasingly used by the Uzbek leader since early 1990s as the ultimate legitimizer, had then acquired more currency among the international audience too. Karimov announced his pleasure that Americans started realizing the problem posed by the Islamic fundamentalism only now and would not be able to disregard it anymore.<sup>524</sup> Uzbek leadership succeeded to turn into a close ally of the United States in the War on Terrorism, providing the Karshi Khanabad air base to be used by the US army in military operations in Afghanistan and obtaining financial aid and a blind eye for his operations against opposition in return.

Nevertheless the Andijon events of May 13, 2005 became the zenith of Karimov’s obsession against Islamists. In the beginning 23 Andijon businessmen whom Karimov intended to liquidate possibly because of their increasing wealth and widening power base in the region, were accused of religious extremism. Beforehand Karimov had already called the Parliament “not to be soft on Islamic extremists” in preparing the Law on Religion.<sup>525</sup> The court trial of these local businessmen turned into a mass demonstration “against poverty, unemployment, and political repression” in Uzbekistan<sup>526</sup> and the gathering mass supported by several gunmen invaded government buildings and took over *de facto* control of the Andijon city. Armed soldiers with tanks and helicopters under the personal

---

<sup>524</sup> Cited from the online Press Service of the President of Uzbekistan in Koch, *ibid.*, p. 227.

<sup>525</sup> Yılmaz Bingöl, “Nationalism and Democracy in Post-Communist Central Asia”, *Asian Ethnicity*, Vol: 5, No: 1, February 2004, p. 53.

<sup>526</sup> Pyati argued that the demonstrators whom were attacked by Uzbek army were thousands of unarmed people. Archana Pyati, “Karimov’s War: Human Rights Defenders and Counterterrorism in Uzbekistan”, *Human Rights Defenders and Counterterrorism Series No: 3*, Neil Hicks (eds.), New York: Human Rights First, 2005, p. 13.

control of Karimov, who hastily arrived at the city, attacked to the protesters and opened fire to the crowd. Despite official report of the events estimated that 70 to 187 people all from the ranks of “rioting Islamist terrorists” were killed, eyewitness accounts suggested the number of casualties up to a thousand.<sup>527</sup> While Uzbek officials were keen to ensure all killed people to be found with guns nearby them, President Karimov was uttering his famous sentence: “Islamist extremists must be shot in the head and if necessary I’ll shoot them myself”.<sup>528</sup> Laz mummies tell their naughty children the fairy tale that *Gemakochi* the wild beast wandering in the mountain forests, shall come, kidnap the disobedient children to eat in the mountains and devastate their home. Islam is the *Gemakochi* of Islam Karimov, wandering outrageously just nearby the borders, radical Islamists are the ‘other’ that Uzbek regime desperately need to keep their legitimacy fresh.

A further pillar of the ideology of national independence was its claim of authenticity and uniqueness for the Uzbek people. The regime constantly portrayed the ideology of national independence as the culmination of past experiences of ancestors and as the distillation from the values peculiar to Uzbek people. Thus claim of authenticity and uniqueness became central in turning regime’s narration into an above-ideology or as March notes in elevating to the status of pre-political societal consensus before the political competition of diverse ideologies. Karimov clearly sets the distinction between the Western and Eastern types of democracy. For Karimov Western understanding of democracy is based on the selfish individual who is alienated due to disruption of social ties. Moreover Karimov sees the right of individual for participation in political processes as unfit for the Uzbek people since in such a situation open ideological competition may stimulate rivalry among segments of society. Karimov and his power elite declared their adherence to multi-party democracy but to an “Eastern democracy” based on “Eastern

---

<sup>527</sup> Pyati, *ibid.*, pp. 13-14.

<sup>528</sup> Horsman, *ibid.*, p. 208.

spirituality”.<sup>529</sup> The Eastern democracy of Karimov depended on principles such as the priority of people over individual, collectivism, discipline, respect for elders and submission to authorities, in brief on the “traditional Oriental culture that the Uzbek people have been nurturing for thousands of years”<sup>530</sup>:

“Democratic institutions must reflect the mentality and peculiarity of the culture of our people. It is known that the Western model of democracy is founded on the philosophy of the individual and excessive politicisation of the masses. On the other hand, the East assumes democracy based on the idea of collectivism, paternalism, and the priority of social opinion”.<sup>531</sup>

On the other hand, the same traditional mind set was held responsible for the lack of democracy and the endurance of authoritarianism by many Western analysts. Melvin summarized the cultural accounts of the Central Asian authoritarianism and cited that “traditions of patriarchy, popular submissiveness, deference to authority and to elders, and weak democratic institutions” were the background causes of the persisting authoritarianism.<sup>532</sup> “But is “traditionalism” a bad thing?” asks melodramatic Karimov and adds that his ideology of national independence would prevent the “harmful influence of excessive individualism”<sup>533</sup> and spread Eastern cooperation. Regime’s leaflet *Halq So’zi* supported Karimov in an article that being democrat without Uzbek values would hinder to develop into *komil inson* (perfect person):

“We cannot describe a man who has acquired profound knowledge of democracy and armed himself with it but has no national values in his heart an Uzbek and a perfect person (*komil-inson*). It seems that to understand these values one must be born an Uzbek”.<sup>534</sup>

---

<sup>529</sup> Masaru, *ibid.*, p. 361. Abundant references to democracy by the Uzbek elites mostly included the qualification of being “*sharqona demokratiya*” based on “*sharqona manaviyat*”.

<sup>530</sup> Bruce J. Perlman & Gregory Gleason, “Cultural Determinism versus Administrative Logic: Asian Values and Administrative Reform in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan”, *International Journal of Public Administration*, Vol: 30, No: 12, 2007, p. 1332.

<sup>531</sup> Masaru, *ibid.*, pp. 361-362.

<sup>532</sup> Neil J. Melvin, “Authoritarian Pathways in Central Asia: A Comparison of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan”, p. 9.

<sup>533</sup> Masaru, *ibid.*, pp. 361-362.

<sup>534</sup> Cited from the article “Loyalty to the National Spirit”, *Halq So’zi*, December, 16, 2006 in Tolipov, *ibid.*, p. 10.

While several times the Uzbek regime was categorized as “decent society”<sup>535</sup>, “controllable democracy”<sup>536</sup> or a regime characterized by a “better degree of freedom compared to Soviet era”<sup>537</sup>, Karimov’s rule had been simply a repressive authoritarianism. The inclination towards repression and authoritarianism were implicit in another pillar of the ideology of national independence; unconditional discipline and expectation of submission to the order. Karimov, who was uncomfortable with the emergent disorder under Gorbachev, even welcomed the August 1991 coup attempt in Moscow, and maintained in a local party meeting that “we have always been supporters of firm order and discipline”.<sup>538</sup> The fear of insecurity was frequently instigated through reminders that repression and authoritarianism would always be preferable to civil disorder and bloodshed. Karimov notoriously repeated that after all “it was better to have hundreds of arrested than thousands killed”.<sup>539</sup> Even implicitly accepting tyrannical features of the regime, medieval Islamic theologian al-Mawardi’s statement that “a thousand years of tyranny were better than one night of anarchy” was reminded in most semi-official articles.<sup>540</sup> Karimov himself justifies the authoritarian methods of regime on the basis of need for stability once again:

“I admit perhaps in my actions there are signs of authoritarianism. But this I explain as follows: in certain periods of history, especially during the construction of statehood, strong executive power is

---

<sup>535</sup> John R. Pottenger, “Civil Society, Religious Freedom, and Islam Karimov: Uzbekistan’s Struggle for a Decent Society”, *Central Asian Survey*, Vol: 23, No: 1, March 2004.

<sup>536</sup> Alisher Ilkhamov, “Controllable Democracy in Uzbekistan”, *Middle East Report*, No: 222, Spring 2002, pp. 8-10.

<sup>537</sup> Marchin C. Spechler, “Authoritarian Politics and Economic Reform in Uzbekistan: Past, Present and Prospects”, *Central Asian Survey*, Vol: 26, No: 2, 2007, p. 186.

<sup>538</sup> K. Warikoo, “Soviet Central Asia in Ferment”, p. 77 in K. Warikoo & Dawa Norbu (eds.), *Ethnicity and Politics in Central Asia*, Denver, Colorado: International Academic Publishers Ltd., 2000.

<sup>539</sup> Anna Matveeva, “Legitimising Central Asian Authoritarianism: Political Manipulation and Symbolic Power”, p. 1109.

<sup>540</sup> Froese, *ibid.*, p. 373.

necessary. It is necessary in order to avoid bloodshed and conflict, to preserve in the region inter-ethnic and civil harmony, peace and stability, for which I am prepared to pay any price”.<sup>541</sup>

Karimov strongly opposed to any wholesale change, shock therapies initiated in several post-Soviet countries and revolution which he labeled as the “primitive and barbaric form of social progress”.<sup>542</sup> A swift and comprehensive reform might have result in disturbances and thus disruption of the stability, the apple of the eye in Karimov’s self-legitimation. The civil wars in neighboring Afghanistan and Tajikistan were attributed to their inability to adapt to the speed of the change after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Thus, gradualness and consistency both of which presented among the wisdoms of the East as usual had been made main pillars of the ideology of national ideology. The step-by step approach employed by the Karimov government in the sphere of economic reform was also a reflection of the gradualness.

Masaru noted that Karimov portrays Uzbekistan as “a state with a great future” and depicts an “image of developmentalist state” similar to the developed Asian tigers such as South Korea. Karimov insists that contrary to the ruinous Soviet central economic planning, independent Uzbekistan was on the way of transforming into a market economy. The five principles of economics which was supposedly freed from politics are as follows:

- Economy above politics
- State is the main reformer
- Supremacy of law
- Strong social policy-step by step

---

<sup>541</sup> Andrew F. March, “The Use and Abuse of History: National Ideology as Transcendental Object in Islam Karimov’s ‘Ideology of National Independence’”, *Central Asian Survey*, Vol: 21, No: 4, 2003, pp. 371-372.

<sup>542</sup> I. A. Karimov, *Basic Principles of Social, Political and Economic Development of Uzbekistan: Report at the First Session of the Oliy Majlis of the Republic of Uzbekistan*, February 23, 1995, Tashkent: Usbekiston, 1995, p. 9.



- Continuous and stable reform<sup>543</sup>

Contrary to the negative goals of security and stability the discourse of developmentalism constitutes the only positive goal orientation of the regime that does not require a continual designation of threat.<sup>544</sup> Pottenger welcomed de-ideologization of economics in Uzbekistan, and praised Karimov's encouragement of privatization together with incentives provided for the foreign investors.<sup>545</sup> Nevertheless since politics is above all about who will obtain how much of the wealth, de-ideologization in practice means those Uzbek elites will distribute the wealth first to their clients and then political allies. As a part of the enforced pre-political consensus on the ideology of national independence, distribution of wealth is carried on in the pre-political level, the political competition is carefully isolated from economics:

“Our people have a proverb: “First food, then talk”. That is, first feed the people, establish favorable conditions for the family and only then talk about politics”.<sup>546</sup>

#### 4.1.4. Homogeneity and Social Control: Mahalla

otang mahalla, onang mahalla!  
Uzbek proverb<sup>547</sup>

Karimov's above-mentioned preference of Eastern collectivism rather than Western individualism was mirrored in the local level through the

---

<sup>543</sup> Suda Masaru, *The Politics of Civil Society, Mahalla and NGOs: Uzbekistan*, obtained from [http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/coe21/publish/no10\\_ses/12\\_suda.pdf](http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/coe21/publish/no10_ses/12_suda.pdf) on March 14, 2007, p. 341-342.

<sup>544</sup> Andrew F. March, “State Ideology and the Legitimation of Authoritarianism: The Case of Post-Soviet Uzbekistan”, *Journal of Political Ideologies*, Vol: 8, No: 2, 2003, p. 226.

<sup>545</sup> Pottenger, *ibid.*, p. 63.

<sup>546</sup> March, *ibid.*, p. 225.

<sup>547</sup> “Mahalla is your father and also mother too”.

institutionalization of *mahalla*. The originally Arabic word *mahalla* was widely used in all languages throughout the Middle Eastern and Islamic countries. The word traditionally used to denote a neighborhood, parts of a city or town, or a quarter around one's own place of residence. The *mahalla*, possibly evolved from a kind of tribal affinity after being settled in Middle Ages, had typically comprised of ten to two hundred families. *Mahalla* informally institutionalized sedentarized communal cooperation with socially sanctioned punishments and reward mechanisms under an *oqsoqol* or *aksakal*<sup>548</sup> who was the eldest of the community by convention.<sup>549</sup> While *mahallas* remained intact and depoliticized as informal neighborhoods under the Khanates of Bukhara, Khiva and Khokand and also the Tsarist Russia, the Soviet regime was the first to formalize this local gerontocracy. A circular issued in July 1922 made *mahalla* commissions responsible in tax collection and conscription together with local party organization. In 1932 *mahalla* regulation was adopted by the Soviet regime and *mahallas* were defined as “supplementary social organizations under the district or city Soviets”.<sup>550</sup> *Mahallas* well functioned under the red flag with hammer and sickle as a defensive zone of ideological security for “pre-emptive correction of deviations within the community”.<sup>551</sup>

*Mahalla* was given the constitutional status after the independence. Article 105 of the December 1992 Constitution recognized *mahallas* as “local self governing bodies” and ordered that residents of *kishlaks* and *auls* and also residential neighborhoods in cities and towns would decide themselves on all local matters at general meetings.<sup>552</sup> A standard *mahalla* committee includes an *oqsoqol*,

---

<sup>548</sup> Literary means “white beard” denoting the old age.

<sup>549</sup> In rare occasions the most respected among a few elders acted as the *oqsoqol*. However the important thing is the traditional Uzbek respect to old age.

<sup>550</sup> Masaru, *ibid.*, pp. 346-347.

<sup>551</sup> Chad D. Thompson, *Epistemologies of Independence: Technology and Empire in the Post-Soviet Borderlands*, PhD thesis, Toronto, Ontario: York University, February 2008, p. 240.

<sup>552</sup> *Uzbekiston Respublikasining Konstitutsiyasi*, Tashkent, 1992, Article 105, p. 36.

a younger assistant, so to speak *vice-oqsoqol* helping the *oqsoqol* in administrative duties, the *pesbon* who is responsible for the security and also attached *otinchalar*, the female members of the community who teach Qu'ran to the children and other women. The number of guards and the assistants depend on the size of the *mahalla*, for instance in densely populated areas such as the Ferghana valley *mahalla* committees may reach up to twenty persons.<sup>553</sup> Indeed all *mahalla* residents are expected to contribute voluntarily in the communal daily work. All *mahallas* have a tea-house called the *chaikhana* and the male residents notably the elder males gather regularly there to socialize.

Kandiyoti was clear that although *mahallas* have pre-modern roots, in contemporary Uzbekistan they are the direct heirs of “local soviets or councils”.<sup>554</sup> Elsewhere she also maintained that at the moment *mahallas* are just “refashioning and reinterpreting existing repertoire of routines and relations established during the Soviet period”.<sup>555</sup> It is true that *mahallas* have been performing a genuine ideological duty very similar to its function in the Soviet era as the “quasi arm of government” in Hanks’ words.<sup>556</sup> In addition the organizational structure was quite similar in the sense that *mahallas* continued to function under careful supervision of central government and were ruled by a committee led by an elder. However, one major difference of contemporary *mahalla* is its new all-encompassing range. While in the Soviet era highly urban residential areas such as apartment blocks were not practically considered to be included in *mahallas*, after independence no

---

<sup>553</sup> Reuel Hanks, “Civil Society and Identity in Uzbekistan: The Emergent Role of Islam”, p. 168 in M. Halt Ruffin & Daniel Waugh (eds.), *Civil Society in Central Asia*, Seattle & London: Center for Civil Society International, 1999.

<sup>554</sup> Deniz Kandiyoti, “Post-Soviet Institutional Design and the Paradoxes of the ‘Uzbek Path’”, *Central Asian Survey*, Vol: 26, No: 1, 2007, p. 36.

<sup>555</sup> Deniz Kandiyoti, “Rural Livelihoods and Social Networks in Uzbekistan: Perspectives from Andijan”, *Central Asian Survey*, Vol: 17, No: 4, 1998, p. 562.

<sup>556</sup> Reuel Hanks, *ibid.*, p. 168.

place was left without a *mahalla* committee; as Noori states now “being a citizen of Uzbekistan means being a member of mahalla”.<sup>557</sup>

The estimates on the number of *mahallas* throughout Uzbekistan in early 1990s were revolving from ten thousand to twelve thousand. In September 1993 the *Mahalla Foundation* was established as a steering body which initiated a process of unification and reorganization of *mahallas*. Official statistics revealed that as of 2003, August 1, the “organs of self government of citizens” in Uzbekistan decreased to 9615.<sup>558</sup> Karimov regime declared 2003 as “the year of *Mahalla*” and the propaganda campaign in favor of *mahallas* via the “Mahalla Initiative” reached its apex in 2003. On the other hand, Noori argues that the *Mahalla Foundation* had limited, if any, contact with *mahallas* around country, rather the Foundation served as a “think-tank of the government” for its local policies and in order to market the *Mahalla Initiative*. *Mahallas* were entitled responsibility to prevent criminality, ensure obedience to the law, distribution of welfare payments.

Mahallazation of localities provides the regime an effectual tool to reach every margin of the society. The practical function of *mahallas* is to keep an eye on every individual, as in the Soviet era any possible threat to the stability of the regime is to be marginalized at the very local level. In this sense mahallazation indicates localization of the state power and repression in the case of disobedience. *Mahalla* committees force consensus and homogeneity, both internal homogeneity within the neighborhood and also external homogeneity as conformity with state policies.<sup>559</sup> The *mahalla* also promotes a specific version of Islam as understood by the regime through its inner training by *otinchalar*. Moreover, paid by the state,

---

<sup>557</sup> Neema Noori, *Delegating Coercion: Linking Decentralization to State Formation in Uzbekistan*, PhD thesis, New York: Columbia University, 2006, p. 8.

<sup>558</sup> Please look at Appendix 8, from Masaru, *ibid.*, p. 370.

<sup>559</sup> Eric W. Sievers, “Uzbekistan’s Mahalla: From Soviet to Absolutist Residential Community Associations”, *The Journal of International and Comparative Law at Chicago-Kent*, Vol: 2, 2002, pp. 136-137.

*mahalla* committee members practically behave as the local agents of the central government.

## 4.2. TURKEY

Ahmet Celal: How a man, being Turk, did not support Kemal Pasha?

Bekir Çavuş: But sir, we aren't Turks!

Ahmet Celal: Oh, what else are you?

Bekir Çavuş: We are Muslims, thanks be to God, those of whom you speak (Turks) live over in Haymana.

Yakup Kadri, *Yaban*

Yakup Kadri's *Yaban* tells a story of encounter from the years of the National Independence War between Greek and Turkish forces (1920-1922). Expecting to find the "national essence" in the Central Anatolian villages, Ahmet Celal, an idealist Ottoman-educated semi-intellectual encounters with Sheikh Yusuf the *imam* of the village, Salih Ağa, the land owner and remaining exploited illiterate Turkish villagers. Ahmet Celal, a product of urban and Western values was extremely disappointed seeing that any piece of the modernizing reforms of the last century from Tanzimat to 1920s did not touch upon the traditional, static lives ongoing in the mostly isolated village. Initially tagging the countryside as the *yaban*, literary meaning "the stranger", "the primitive alien", at the end Ahmet Celal discovers that the true *yaban* in Anatolia was himself. Even worst, the "Turks" who were living outside, in Haymana, were seen alien to the traditional village.<sup>560</sup>

---

<sup>560</sup> Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, *Yaban*, Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1999, p. 173. This stood for Sunni-Alevite split in Anatolia; the dominant traditional Anatolian villagers saw the Alevite population as "Turks", while themselves being Muslim. Eissenstat also cites *Yaban*'s above-mentioned dialogue in his claim that the "Turk", being devoid of political and national meanings, might simply refer "a yokel" for the majority of Anatolian population. Howard Eissenstat, "History and Historiography: Politics and Memory in the Turkish Republic", *Contemporary European History*, Vol: 12, No: 1, 2003, p. 99.

Kemalism was first and foremost the heir of the reforms implemented throughout the last century of the deceased Ottoman Empire. Desperately searching a recipe to overcome the chronic backwardness and humiliation *vis-a-vis* the West, the Ottoman intellectuals oscillated between Tanzimat's formal Westernization seen in implantation of Western military and educational institutions, Young Ottoman's idea of Ottoman citizenship, Abdülhamid's reactionary Islamism and Ottomanism and lastly Unionists' increasing Turkism. Finally, weary and defeated, Ottoman intellectuals had to set off to the steps of Anatolia in order to find the "Turk" as the last resort to rely on. What they found was indeed discouraging: almost completely illiterate population, a closed agriculture economy yet based on ploughs and a tiny unmechanized industry using extensively hand-work. In this sense, Kemalism was the uninvited answer to the questions of the Unionist elite generation who were unfamiliar to the traditional life style in Anatolia and still aspiring a revival of larger Empire. Even after the fatal defeat in the World War, Enver Pasha was still dreaming of a version of Turan Empire in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Kemalism was the uninvited answer since the founders of the Republic, all being Unionists a decade ago, were long dreamed to save and enlarge the Empire. Now they were obliged to create Turkey from Anatolia and Turkish people from ignorant Anatolian peasants.

Kemalism's ultimate target was to transform Muslim and traditional "Bekir Çavuş" into Turkish and modern "Bekir Bey". Similar to Tsarist Russia, the Ottoman Empire was a late-comer to the modernization and industrialization. Commenting on the Russo-Turkish war of 1768-1774, Prussian Emperor Frederick II noted that the "one eyed men have beaten the blind thoroughly".<sup>561</sup> The one-eyed and the blind, were on the margins of "real" Europe and both of them were considerably belated to the modernization. Perhaps Nairn was right that

---

<sup>561</sup> Victoria Aksan, "The One-Eyed Fighting the Blind: Mobilization, Supply, and Command in the Russo-Turkish War of 1768-1774", *The International History Review*, Vol: 15, No: 2, May, 1993, p. 224.

nationalism was the “socio-historical cost of the rapid modernization and industrialization”<sup>562</sup>, but the “socio-historical cost” had appeared as Marxism in Soviet Russia and as Kemalism in Turkey.

#### 4.2.1. Kemalism as an Ideology of Modernisation

The adjective “ideological” has acquired its current pejorative daily meaning since Napeleon Bonaparte who usually tagged his opponents as ideologues ailing with false consciousness and struck in their ivory towers.<sup>563</sup> Maintenance of hegemony in a societal unit and the permanence of the mass consent to the regime, whether autocratic, totalitarian or even liberal-capitalist, require both the naturalization of the regime’s parameters and also the widespread perception of practicality. The ruling ideology presented as a particular “system of thought” among many, bears immediate connotations of the existence of alternative systems of thought. The naturalization of the ruling ideology is to rule out any alternatives as being “ideological” that is irrelevant and alien to the essence of the nation. The ruling paradigm should claim to be built upon a transcendental ideology, as Mustafa Kemal, who was alleged of transcending “the ordinary life of eating, drinking, hearing, thinking” in person, had “amassed the collective conscience and genius of Turkish nation on him”.<sup>564</sup> The naturalized ideology could then easily claim the impracticality of alien ideologies condemning them of being merely fantasies of eccentric ideologues. Islam Karimov was to

---

<sup>562</sup> Umut Özkırımlı, *Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction*, Hampshire UK & New York USA: Palgrave, 2000, p. 90.

<sup>563</sup> Sinan Özbek, *İdeoloji Kuramları*, İstanbul: Bulut Yayınları, 2000, pp. 44-45.

<sup>564</sup> M. Saffet Engin, *Kemalizm İnkılabının Prensipleri: Büyük Türk Medeniyetinin Tarihi ve Sosyolojik Tetkikine Methal Cild II*, İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaası, 1938, p. 79.

blame Ab'ulfeyz Elchibey of Azerbaijan and Zviad Gamsakhurdia of Georgia of being men of books not of the realities.<sup>565</sup>

The initial position of Mustafa Kemal Pasha and his court was perforce to elaborate a practical stance including even using the Sultanic symbols at the Erzurum Congress and calls to save the Caliph. Mustafa Kemal was well-received by the then headless Unionist body which comprised of the city governors, military corpses and wealthier landlords once the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) relied on. Mustafa Kemal Pasha participated the CUP relatively late and never became a prominent figure in the movement. But after all he was a member of the CUP and served as an army commander under Enver Pasha and the other prominent Unionists. In addition he was well aware that the support of the *ulema* in particular and the overall public in general could only be secured through references to the Sultan and Caliph. Mustafa Kemal should then proclaim that the nationalist movement would struggle to save the Caliph from the yoke of infidels. Thus the necessity to appease both the Unionist body and the religious public opinion had obliged Kemalist cadre to an extremely eclectic rhetoric.

Afterwards the political struggles among the elite group of pashas and also between the so-called “second group” and the Mustafa Kemal’s “first group” in the Grand National Assembly were all symptoms of replacing the first team of the Committee of Union of Progress with so to speak, the substitute cadre. The bulk of the Kemalist assembly came to argue that Kemalism, if existed was the practical outcome of the Turkish National Independence War. Mustafa Kemal himself would name his actions in the National Struggle as “practical and safe”, although he was acting according to the practical necessities of the day “some of his companions with whom they initiated the National Struggle, had turned to resist and oppose Mustafa Kemal as they reached the maximum extent of their

---

<sup>565</sup> “Karimov Interview with Russian Newspaper”, *Rossiyskiye Vesti*, Moscow, in Russian, May 24, 1994; translated and transmitted by BBC Monitoring Service on June 1, 1994.



vision”.<sup>566</sup> Prime Minister İsmet İnönü, the National Chief of post-Mustafa Kemal era, would testify in the inauguration ceremony of the chair of the History of Turkish Revolution on March 20, 1934 that “the revolutionary content of their lives would prevent them to be bound any dogma”.<sup>567</sup> Mustafa Kemal himself was aloof to the idea of molding an ideology. While discussing on the program of the Republican People’s Party, Mustafa Kemal rejected the novelist Yakup Kadri, who held the existence of an ideology as a must and argued that an ideology for the party would “freeze them”.<sup>568</sup> Depiction of Kemalism as a sum of pragmatic policies which was ceaselessly implementing the feasible and the realistic, provided immunity for the official arguments. After all wide-ranging Kemalism incorporated all possible and logical solutions for the sake of the nation: “Kemalism could not fit in the narrow frameworks of leftist and rightist ideologies”.<sup>569</sup>

Likewise most of the Kemalist corpus of the later years would praise Mustafa Kemal for his positivism and scientific outlook contrary to the ideological prejudices of rival foreign ideologies. Anıl Çeçen argued that Atatürk was not a doctrine man and he did not freeze “his ongoing revolution within pre-set frameworks”; rather he consciously followed certain principles in the reform process: ideological independence meaning immunity against alien ideologies which were unfit to the realities of the conditions in the country, realism, scientific outlook, eclecticism and ability to build coherence between diverse principles from

---

<sup>566</sup> Gazi Mustafa Kemal, *Nutuk*, p. 14. The pronouns in the original wording were adopted by the author of the actual thesis in order to make the quotation fit to the context.

<sup>567</sup> Şerafettin Turan, *Atatürkçülük/Kemalizm*, p. 46 in Nazife Güngör, (eds.), *Atatürkçü Düşüncenin Bilimsel ve Felsefi Temelleri*, Ankara: Gazi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2007, p. 39.

<sup>568</sup> “Yakup Kadri: This is a revolution party, and revolutionary parties could not advance without an ideology, a doctrine” Mustafa Kemal: “No, in that case we will be frozen” in Utkan Kocatürk (eds.), *Atatürk’ün Fikir ve Düşünceleri*, Ankara: Edebiyat Yayınevi, 1971, p. 91.

<sup>569</sup> Words of the Minister of Interior under Mustafa Kemal’s presidency, Şükrü Kaya; cited in Tekinalp, *Kemalizm*, İstanbul: Toplumsal Dönüşüm Yayınları, May 1998, p. 40.

different ideologies and the realities of the country.<sup>570</sup> In this vein, Kemalist pragmatism would serve as a shield against alien ideologies. Giritli, one of the aides of the self-styled Kemalist restoration of 1980 would also claim that Kemalism was not a dogmatic system as “Marxism-Leninism, national socialism and theocracy”, but based on “the axis of intelligence, knowledge and national sovereignty”.<sup>571</sup> The emphasis on the knowledge, science, technical practicality was to render Kemalism immune from the alternative ideologies and to sustain its ideological hegemony.

In fact especially in the first decade after the victory in the National Independence War, the regime had to place itself in a flexible paradigm. Still the authority of the “substitute team” was not secure and Mustafa Kemal himself adopted highly flexible policy orientation. Alas, the epoch was the era of grand ideologies such as communism and fascism. Self-portrayal of Kemalism as a pragmatic “non-ideology” could not sufficiently struggle against regime’s powerful challengers. Anyhow the term Kemalism was being used by the foreign press and academia, and also in the correspondence of intelligence services of World War I’s Central Powers since the early stages of the War of Independence.<sup>572</sup> However the term was used to denote a specific movement and most of the time devoid of ideological connotations. According to Uyar, Ahmet Cevat Emre was the first to use the term inside Turkey in the summer 1930 issue of *Muhit* journal. For Emre, “Kemalism was a school of democracy with all principles were well-known”. Later in the same year Ali Naci Karacan made use

---

<sup>570</sup> Anıl Çeçen, “Atatürk ve İdeoloji”, *Türk Dili*, Vol: 359, November 1981, pp. 298-300.

<sup>571</sup> İsmet Giritli, “The Superiority of the Kemalist Ideology over Dogmatic Ideologies”, p. 126 in Ayşegül Amanda Yeşilbursa (trans.), *A Handbook of Kemalist Thought*, Ankara: Atatürk Research Center, 2004.

<sup>572</sup> Hamza Eroğlu summarizes all these early uses of the term Kemalism, in Hamza Eroğlu, *Atatürkçülük*, Ankara: Olgaç Matbaası, 1981, pp. 10-54.

of the term again: “We should have a Kemalism as communism in Russia and fascism in Italy”.<sup>573</sup>

Until 1935 Kemalism was not used to denote the official ideology of Turkey neither in party programs and statutes of Republican People’s Party (RPP) nor in bureaucratic documents of the state. In 1935 RPP declared in its program that all the principles of the party are the “principles of Kemalism”.<sup>574</sup> Then Şeref Aykut’s *Kamalizm* and Tekinalp’s *Kemalizm* both first published in 1936 become the earliest books on Kemalism as a specific ideology.<sup>575</sup> Decades after historians of the Kemalist restoration would also recognize Kemalism as a full-fledged ideology. Widely renowned definition was to identify Kemalism as an instrument for westernization and modernization.<sup>576</sup> “Ideology never says I am ideological” Althusser once claimed.<sup>577</sup> Ideologies are hegemonic as long as they were internalized by their subjects without necessarily being affirmed as the official dogma, but are reproduced unconsciously in the minds and performed routinely in the behaviours of the most ordinary individual. Although Kemalism could be comprehended in terms of its well-defined six-arrows, its position was not hegemonic in Turkey even in the most audacious decade of 1930s.

---

<sup>573</sup> Hakkı Uyar, “1930lar Türkiye’inde Kemalizm Algılamaları”, p. 162 in Nazife Güngör, (eds.), *Atatürkçü Düşüncenin Bilimsel ve Felsefi Temelleri*, Ankara: Gazi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2007.

<sup>574</sup> Hakkı Uyar, *ibid.*, p. 159.

<sup>575</sup> Notice Şeref Aykut’s use of “Kamalizm” in the place of Kemalism.

<sup>576</sup> Numerous definitions of Kemalism summoned by Şerafettin Turan focused on the modernization and civilization (Westernization) aspect of the ideology. For instance according to Giritli Kemalism was a “national modernization ideology with a pragmatic-democratic ingredient”. For Tunaya, it first and foremost meant Westernization. Turan even noted foreign academicians such as Manacorda labeling Kemalism as an “ideology of industrialization and modernization” in Şerafettin Turan, *ibid.*, pp. 46-50.

<sup>577</sup> Althusser, *ibid.*, p.175.

#### 4.2.2. Nine Principles and Six Arrows

“The Turkish state is republican, nationalist, populist, etatist, secular and reformist.”  
Article 2 of 1924 Constitution as amended in 1937

“Nine principles” which were proclaimed by Mustafa Kemal Pasha before the 1923 elections were the earliest declared framework for the party program. In December 6, 1922, Mustafa Kemal informed the press that he had the intention to found a political party with the name of People’s Party and based on the principle of “populism”.<sup>578</sup> The first Parliament which convened under extraordinary conditions at the very beginning of the independence war had included parliamentarians with diverse political orientations. As a result of this despite the priorities of the first Parliament were the formation of a national army and the defence of Anatolia against advancing Greek forces, several political groupings had appeared. Güneş identifies seven different groups some which even announced their peculiar program: People’s Group, Independence Group, Solidarity Group, Reform Group, Unionist Group, Protection of the Sacred Group and lastly Mustafa Kemal’s loyalists Defense of Law Group.<sup>579</sup>

Hence 1923 elections were of utmost importance for Kemalist leaders in order to create a loyal Parliament which would approve the pact to be reached at the ongoing Lausanne negotiations.<sup>580</sup> For this reason, Mustafa Kemal Pasha tried hard in person for the election of the candidates from his “first group”. Tunçay maintains that Mustafa Kemal even explained his proposal on the establishment of

---

<sup>578</sup> Taha Parla, *Türkiye’de Siyasal Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları III: Kemalist Tek-Parti İdeolojisi ve CHP’nin Altı Oku*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1991, p. 196.

<sup>579</sup> The original names of the groups were Halk Zümresi, İstiklal Grubu, Tesanüd Grubu, Islahat Grubu, İttihatçı Grup, Muhafaza-i Mukaddesat Grubu and Müdafa-i Hukuk Grubu respectively. For more information on these groups please look İhsan Güneş, *Birinci TBMM’nin Düşünce Yapısı (1920-1923)*, İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1997, pp. 175-214.

<sup>580</sup> Tunçay, *ibid.*, p. 42.

the People's Party at Balikesir Pasha Mosque after his well-known *hutbah*.<sup>581</sup> He was also very keen to ensure the support of the Alevite population for his list.<sup>582</sup> As a result of this, the “nine principles” were extremely pragmatic, even in the form of catchall election promises which were devised obviously by the politician Mustafa Kemal, not the army commander Mustafa Kemal Pasha:

- 1) Sovereignty belongs to the nation without any condition and the Turkish Grand National Assembly is the only and the true representative of the nation,
- 2) The sultanate was abolished; the Caliphate is an exalted post of inter-Islam respect and to be supported by the Grand National Assembly.
- 3) The utmost duty is to safeguard security and order.
- 4) The courts and laws will be improved in order to ensure just and swift trials.
- 5) The fifth principle incorporated ten economic premises of the People's Party which included the reform of *aşar* taxation, providing both agricultural machines and easy credits to farmers and construction of railways.
- 6) The term of compulsory military service will be shortened.
- 7) Discharged soldiers and war veterans will be offered a higher standard of living.
- 8) The state offices and bureaucracy will be improved, the problems of the civil servants will be solved.
- 9) The foundation of firms and the private enterprise will be encouraged.<sup>583</sup>

Therefore, since “populism” has been set as the founding principle of the People's Party, it has appeared as the first of the “six arrows”. Together with the

---

<sup>581</sup> Tunçay, *ibid.*, p. 42.

<sup>582</sup> Tunçay, *ibid.*, p. 47.

<sup>583</sup> Taha Parla, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları III*, pp. 197-202. A summary of the principles in plain Turkish is in *ibid.*, pp. 208-209.

second arrow, which would be the republicanism, populism was primarily defined as the principle that upheld that the national sovereignty would be used “for the people and by the people”.<sup>584</sup> The second article in the “General Principles” of People’s Party Statute which was devised in 1923 after the foundation of the party, has set delimitations of the concept of “people”: “For the People’s Party the concept of people does not derived from any class. All individuals who accept absolute equality before law and do not demand any privileges, are of the people”.<sup>585</sup> In 1927, the section of General Principles was rephrased, this time populism was added with new two arrows, republicanism and nationalism. The definition of populism in 1927 was to recognize absolute equality without any privileges to a family, class, group or individual.<sup>586</sup> The people was then to be comprehended as an indivisible entity.

Taha Parla, in his assertive argument that whole political culture throughout the Republican era including different variants of rightist and leftist movements have been corporatist in Turkey, referred more than else the populism of the six arrows. Corporatism of Kemalism in its solidarist version which was inspired by Ziya Gökalp depicted a “people” consisting of professional groupings functioning in a organic coherence.<sup>587</sup> In 1931 and 1935 RPP programs, populism was defined with a clearly corporatist content. The “people” was envisioned as an indivisible marble-like unit including no classes but a division of labor based on professions.<sup>588</sup> Many prominent figures repeated this corporatist classless ideal of

---

<sup>584</sup> The first article in the section of “General Principles” of the 1923 People’s Party Statute has stated that “People’s Party’s main aim is to ensure that national sovereignty shall be used by the people and for the people”. Cited in Taha Parla, *Türkiye’de Siyasal Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları III: Kemalist Tek-Parti İdeolojisi ve CHP’nin Altı Oku*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1991, p. 25.

<sup>585</sup> Taha Parla, *ibid.*, p. 25.

<sup>586</sup> Çetin Yetkin, *Türkiye’de Tek Parti Yönetimi*, İstanbul: Altın Kitaplar, 1983, p. 93.

<sup>587</sup> Taha Parla, *Ziya Gökalp, Kemalizm ve Türkiye’de Korporatizm*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1989.

<sup>588</sup> The related parts of the party programs were included in Parla, *Türkiye’de Siyasal Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları III: Kemalist Tek-Parti İdeolojisi ve CHP’nin Altı Oku* pp. 35-39. Remember the

the regime. For instance, Recep Peker clarified that the populism of People's Party was both against those who aimed at the emergence of class consciousness and also the liberalism which made "boss and the worker to come up against each other": If there are certain differences among citizens in Turkey then these should be taken as the requirements of life".<sup>589</sup>

Mustafa Kemal implicitly reminding the political cleavages of the Second Constitutional Period: "The catastrophic consequences of the establishment of different political parties as if there were different classes in the country, are well-known".<sup>590</sup> Since there were no clashing classes the People's Party would include every segment of the society. *Tarih IV* history textbook was defining the principle of populism as being democrat, renouncing all privileges to an individual or a group except the general rights of the nation and to reject the class struggle.<sup>591</sup> Thus the essence of the populism was to neglect the existence of different classes in the society in order to claim the unification of the regime and the people. The governing elite could only behave as if representing the whole nation on the condition that the people were pre-defined as classless. Populism of Kemalism was a kind of state narodnism<sup>592</sup> serving to guarantee harmony with the people and the "their sole party". Last but not the least, as one important critic noted every revolution pretended to be done by the whole nation against a narrow exploiters or

---

reaction by the late leader of the ultra-nationalist Nationalist Action Party in a televised election debate in 1990s claiming that "the Turkish people were not a mosaic but a marble".

<sup>589</sup> Çetin Yetkin, *Türkiye'de Tek Parti Yönetimi*, İstanbul: Altın Kitaplar, 1983, p. 102. Recep Peker, *İnkılap Dersleri*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1984.

<sup>590</sup> Ergün Aybars, *Atatürkçülük ve Modernleşme*, İzmir: Zeus Kitabevi, 2006, p. 205.

<sup>591</sup> *Tarih IV*, p. 184.

<sup>592</sup> Narodnism was a Russian intellectual movement of the second half of the 19th century originated from middle-class bourgeoisie and university circles of St Petersburg. Urban intellectuals were leaving cities in order to find a political base against the Tsar in the peasant class which was hoped to become "revolutionary". Their slogan was "to the people". For much information please look Avrahm Yarmolinsky, *Road to Revolution: A Century of Russian Radicalism*, New York: Macmillan, 1959, especially the chapter 9 titled as "Populism".

usurpers.<sup>593</sup> French Revolution was carried on by whole French people against a parasite aristocracy who was advising the poor suffering of bread shortages to eat cake. October Revolution was against a working class masses of proletariat and the peasants. Similarly Kemalist ideology was for all time attentive to speak in name of people's sovereignty against treachery of the sultan.

After the election of 1923, on October 29 Grand National Assembly adopted that the type of the state would be "republic". Whether due to the existence of opposition both in the Parliament and Istanbul press or because of the unpreperadness of the people for the idea of republic as classical Kemalist canon utters, up to that time the word "republic" was not heard from the leaders of regime.<sup>594</sup> Even only after the rumours that the first opposition party would include the phrase "republic" in its name had become widespread, the elites swiftly altered the name of the People's Party into Republican Pople's Party just days before of the foundation of the Progressive Republican Party.<sup>595</sup> Nevertheless, the regime was a republic in practice after the abolition of the sultanate, in the sense that an elected Parliament was strong enough to abolish the centuries-old monarchy.

The rhetoric of Kemalism regularly placed the republican rule and the sultanate at the two opposite poles. While the "Republic was based on virtue, sultanate was based on fear and threat".<sup>596</sup> Whereas the sultan was treacherous, the republic was representing the essence of the Turkish people as being the "most suitable regime to the nature and mentality of Turkish nation".<sup>597</sup> Mustafa Kemal claimed on October 14, 1925 that the republican rule would overcome the split

---

<sup>593</sup> Emin Türk Eliçin, *Kemalist Devrim ve İdeolojisi (Niteliği ve Tarihteki Yeri)*, İstanbul: Ant Yayınları, 1970, p. 320.

<sup>594</sup> Kani Sarıgöllü, *Atatürk İlkeleri*, İstanbul: Eko, 1972, p. 35.

<sup>595</sup> Zürcher, *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*, p. 245-246.

<sup>596</sup> Şerafettin Turan, *ibid.*, p. 66.

<sup>597</sup> Osman Güngör Feyzoğlu, *Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılabımız*, İstanbul: M.E.B. Devlet Kitapları, 1981, p. 58.



between the sultanic government and the people, from then on “government is the nation; nation is the government”.<sup>598</sup> As early as 1930s republicanism turned into a well-established truism which in Webster’s words became a “nonchalance no more than an axiom”.<sup>599</sup> The ideological content of republicanism was the minimum, referring only to a sultanless regime without a democratic content. The regime had indeed no sultan, nonetheless Mustafa Kemal of 1930s had more power than the last sultan Vahdeddin or previous sultan Mehmed Reşad.

Nationalism has become the third arrow and was included in the RPP program of 1927 together with populism and republicanism.<sup>600</sup> Nationalism has been the defining character of the regime since it represented the change in the legitimation base from the Ottoman blend of dynastic legitimation with the sanctification via the Caliphate to recipe of legitimacy based on national identity. It would not be an exaggeration to claim that the paramount aim of the Kemalist single party period was to craft a Turkish Anatolia; in other words to inculcate Yakup Kadri’s Bekir Çavuş as to define himself being Turkish instead of Muslim or more importantly Kurdish, Laz or else. Self-definitions based on diverse ethnic minority identities could create cracks on the marble of Turkish people which would also mean fractures in the legitimation base of the regime. The ruling elite has placed itself as the representative of the Turkish people which in turn equated with the homogenous nation. Thus Turkishness was situated as if a supra-identity over diverse ethnic affiliations or otherwise defined in terms of non-ethnic formulae particularly in the first decade of political instability. For instance the well-known definition of “Turkish people who founded the Republic of Turkey is

---

<sup>598</sup> E. Semih Yalçın & Mustafa Turan & Mustafa Ekincikli & Şarika Gedikli, *Türk İnkılap Tarihi ve Atatürk İlkeleri*, Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 2003, p.

<sup>599</sup> Donald Everett Webster, *The Turkey of Atatürk: Social Process in the Turkish Reformation*, Philadelphia: The American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1939, pp. 163.

<sup>600</sup> “Republican People’s Party is a republican, populist, nationalist political organization founded according to the Law of Organizations with its center in Ankara”. First article of the 1927 RPP General Principles in the Party Statute cited in Taha Parla, *Türkiye’de Siyasal Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları III*, p. 26.

called the Turkish nation” was exclusively non-ethnic”.<sup>601</sup> Both supra-identity and non-ethnic definitions of Turkishness were leaning to civil nationalism based on citizenship; as said by Taha Parla this version of Kemalist nationalism was rather peaceful without any irredentist and aggressive claims.<sup>602</sup>

1930s have been the heyday of Turkish history thesis claiming that all civilizations were of Turkic stock and Sun Language Theory alleging Turkish was the source of all other languages. In this period quite a few racial aspects were incorporated in the definition of Turkish nation. *Tarih IV*, the most ideologically charged textbook of the era was teaching that since Turkish nationalism aimed at preserving the “specific character of Turkish people”, its utmost goal was to avoid “unnational movements to enter and spread within the country”.<sup>603</sup> The nature of the “specific character” was clarified by new addendums to the definition of the nation as could be seen in Mustafa Kemal’s list of requirements of being a nation: “(1) Unity in political existence, (2) Unity in language, (3) Unity in Fatherland, (3) Unity in race and origins, (4) Historical proximity, (5) Ethical proximity”.<sup>604</sup> In the same period, Mustafa Kemal acknowledged that “within current political and social society of Turkish nation there were citizens and co-nationals who have been “propagated with the ideas of Kurdishness, Circassianness even Lazness and Bosniacness.” He added however, being products of the past despotism and also instruments of foreign powers these propaganda had no imprint in the indivisible nature of the Turkish nation.<sup>605</sup> Lastly it is remarkable that, even in the zenith of history and language theories, Kemalist nationalism has deliberately stayed away from any pan-Turkic adventures which were widespread in the last years of the Unionist epoch.

---

<sup>601</sup> Afet İnan, *Medenî Bilgiler ve M. K. Atatürk’ün El Yazuları*, 1969, s. 18.

<sup>602</sup> Taha Parla, *Türkiye’de Siyasal Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları III*, p. 183.

<sup>603</sup> *Tarih IV*, p. 182.

<sup>604</sup> Afet İnan, *Medenî Bilgiler ve M. K. Atatürk’ün El Yazuları*, 1969, s. 455.

<sup>605</sup> Afet İnan, *Medenî Bilgiler ve M. K. Atatürk’ün El Yazuları*, 1969, p. 23.

The most classical definition of secularism which official ideology of Turkey also concurred was the divorce of state affairs from religious rules. Parla and Davison noted that Kemalism was characterized by both the positivist belief in the unilinear progress of the history and also in the development based on human rationality and technical transformation.<sup>606</sup> Kemalists were firm that scientism and developmentalism should replace the religious dogma in order to “go beyond the level of contemporary civilization”.<sup>607</sup> The founding elites and the latter-day Kemalists have constantly explained the ideological secularism and the secularizing reforms on account of the contradiction between the real Islam and the Islam distorted by religious reactionaries. “Atatürk has saved the real religion from the fake piety based on superstition and awakened our nation against religious exploiters” wrote Vehbi Tanfer.<sup>608</sup> According to Dağıstanlı, theocratic Ottoman Empire was struck in the discussions on Islamic theology, while “Western societies have applied rationalist principles of Renaissance and Reform to their state structure”.<sup>609</sup> Turhan Feyzioğlu referred to Mustafa Kemal in his argument that “religious principles should be scrutinized through rational interpretation”.<sup>610</sup>

In fact the most decisive reforms of Mustafa Kemal were those that aimed at depriving religion of its position of power and prestige in the state administration and also within the society. In this sense Gellner was right that

---

<sup>606</sup> Taha Parla, & Andrew Davison, *Corporatist Ideology in Kemalist Turkey: Progress or Order?*, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2004, p. 139.

<sup>607</sup> “To go beyond the level of the contemporary civilization”, or in Turkish “muasır medeniyet seviyesinin üzerine çıkmak” was the *sine qua non* of the Kemalist ideology.

<sup>608</sup> M. Vehbi Tanfer, “Atatürk'ün Din ve Laiklik Anlayışı”, *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi*, Vol: 15, No: 43, March 1999 reached at <http://www.atam.gov.tr/index.php?Page=DergiIcerik&IcerikNo=349> on January 29, 2011.

<sup>609</sup> Adil Dağıstanlı, “Laiklik”, p. 461 in Ayten Sezer (eds.), *Atatürk ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Tarihi*, Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, August 2003.

<sup>610</sup> Turhan Feyzioğlu, *Atatürk's Rational, Scientific and Realistic Approach to the Modernization of Turkey*, Istanbul, 1982, p. 39.

Kemalism has been the sole nationalist movement in Islamic world that was not blended with religion, indeed that took on a shape against religion.<sup>611</sup> The master stroke of the secular reforms has come on March 3, 1924. The Caliphate was abolished and all members of the Ottoman dynasty were expelled out of Turkey. In addition all education which was at the hands of religious brotherhoods up to 1924 was unified under the control of the state. The unification of education has meant the implementation of a secular uniform education all over the country. Lastly, the Ministry of Sharia and Waqfs was abolished, and all the *waqfs* came to be ruled by a special directorate in Ankara. *Waqfs* which were the chief financial resource of the religious brotherhoods were then subdued by the central state. In the same year all *medrasahs* were abolished which was followed by the closing of the dervish lodges in 1925. Latimer reports his astonishment that all these radical reforms “produced remarkably little reaction among the general public”.<sup>612</sup> Both 1921 and 1924 constitutions identified Islam as the official religion; the Article 2 in these constitutions stated that “the religion of the Turkish Republic is Islam”.<sup>613</sup> Even after the abolition of the caliphate in 1924 Islam has constitutionally remained as the official religion until the amendments of 1928. On April 10, 1928 Article 2 of the constitution that acknowledged the status of Islam as the state religion was removed together with the Article 26 which held the Parliament responsible to fulfill the provisions of the *sharia*. Lastly, the religious aspects in the oaths of the deputies were replaced with a secular text.<sup>614</sup>

---

<sup>611</sup> Gellner’s chapter on Kemalism, in Ernest Gellner, *Encounters with Nationalism*, Oxford & Cambridge: Blackwell, 1994, pp. 81-91.

<sup>612</sup> Frederick P. Jr. Latimer, *The Political Philosophy of Mustapha Kemal Atatürk: As Evidenced in his Published Speeches and Interviews*, PhD thesis, Princeton University, 1960, p. 127.

<sup>613</sup> For the complete text of 1921 Constitution please look at <http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/index.php?l=template&id=21&lang=0&hlkey=1921> and for the 1924 Constitution please see <http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/index.php?l=template&id=20&lang=0&hlkey=1924>.

<sup>614</sup> Ergun Özbudun, “Atatürk ve Laiklik”, *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi*, Vol: 8, No: 24, July 1992 reached on January 29, 2011 at <http://www.atam.gov.tr/index.php?Page=DergiIcerik&IcerikNo=560>

Feyzioğlu once asserted that secularism was “the keystone of Turkish revolution”.<sup>615</sup> Secularism was indeed the key pillar in the transformation of the legitimation base from dynastical to national, from heavenly to earthly. Nonetheless more than the aforementioned scienticism as the motive of Kemalist secularism, the chief purpose was to terminate any rival legitimation principle that might challenge Kemalist ideological premises. Mustafa Kemal logically saw in the caliph a threat against the national sovereignty which he and his court were representing. For the sake of ensuring the indivisibility of the sovereignty in the hands of Ankara, Mustafa Kemal could not be “polite to a dynasty and its members praying every morning for the sun of sultanate to rise above the horizon”.<sup>616</sup> Moreover the international *ummah* ideology represented in the personality of the Caliph was at odds with the nationalist ideology of Kemalism thus, “secularism was also imperative to break with the whole supra-national Islamic institutions”.<sup>617</sup>

The last two arrows, etatism or statism and reformism (revolutionism) were included in the Republican People Party program in 1931. Finerock maintained that Turkey was the first among the Third World nations to adopt a state-planned economic development program with the statism policy.<sup>618</sup> In fact after the Izmir Economics Congress held in early 1923, the economical orientation of the Republic was characterized by the liberal *laissez-faire* system. In August 1924 the first public bank of Turkey, İş Bank was founded, later Prime Minister Celal Bayar being the founding general director. In the period of *laissez-faire* certain state

---

<sup>615</sup> Cited in Ayten Sezer (eds.), *Atatürk ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Tarihi*, Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, August 2003, p. 461.

<sup>616</sup> Ozankaya, *ibid.*, p. 204-205.

<sup>617</sup> Webster, *ibid.*, p. 169.

<sup>618</sup> Michael M. Finefrock, “Laissez-Faire, The Izmir Economic Congress and Early Turkish Developmental Policy in Political Perspective”, *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol: 17, 1981, p. 375.

monopols were privatized; a Polish firm took over the monopoly of alcoholic drinks and Standard Oil from the United States assumed the fuel-oil monopoly.<sup>619</sup>

Hence statism was in truth forced by the overall economic situation of the country. After the proclamation of the republic, chronic deficiency in savings and capital was to be overcome through foreign and local private capital. In the program private enterprise was declared as the norm in the management of the economy. However, the party had to affirm that the state would be involved in the “works which were required due to general and high interests of the country, particularly in economical field”.<sup>620</sup> Korkut Boratav claimed that economic policies pursued in 1923-1931 period have proved inadequate for “rapid industrialization” and “economic independence”.<sup>621</sup> Perhaps Turkey was seen by the foreign capital as an insecure place to initiate large investments which the country desperately needed at that moment. Anyhow Great Depression of 1929 has obliged world capital to return their home countries. On the other hand, local capital was so negligible to complete infrastructure, mining and energy investments. Prime Minister İsmet Pasha was informing in an article of the era that “so many enterprises, even those thought to be the most liberal”, could only survive with the support of the state.<sup>622</sup> In this sense, statism was to protect and raise a class of wealthy entrepreneurs in the greenhouse of state.

Both 1931 and 1935 party programs of RPP defined its reformism as being loyal to the reforms already achieved by Mustafa Kemal: “Party is bound with the principles which emerged and then developed from within the reforms our people

---

<sup>619</sup> Hasan Yüksel, “Atatürk’ün Devletçilik Anlayışı”, *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi*, Vol: 12, No: 35, July 1996 reached on January 29, 2011 at <http://www.atam.gov.tr/index.php?Page=Dergiler&IcerikNo=742>

<sup>620</sup> Taha Parla, *Türkiye’de Siyasal Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları III*, p. 36.

<sup>621</sup> Çetin Yetkin, *Türkiye’de Tek Parti Yönetimi*, İstanbul: Altın Kitaplar, 1983, p. 105.

<sup>622</sup> Yetkin, *ibid.*, p. 107.

has accomplished through numerous sacrifices”.<sup>623</sup> Thus the reformism was not formulated as an unceasing evolution similar to supposed in the common sketch of positivism or radical revolution as in French and the Russian instances. On the contrary, the reformism of Kemalism instinctly included a pro status quo stance. The preservation and popularization of the reforms were the target.

Throughout the following decades the arrow of “reformism” proved to be for “general use”, a chameleon like notion which would be incorporated into a wide array of political movements from left to right. The political atmosphere of 1960s up to early 1970s was prone to the left and RPP has adopted itself a new understanding of reformism. Ecevit’s so to speak social-democratization of RPP in early 1970s has proposed a different reformism. For Ecevit, there were two kinds of Kemalist reforms; the concrete reforms that Mustafa Kemal accomplished in his life time and abstract or future reforms which would follow Atatürk’s suit.<sup>624</sup> For this re-definition, Kemalist reformism should involve continual modernization and ceaseless update of the policies, of course within the overall framework settled by Mustafa Kemal: a statist perpetual revolution, though not by Trotsky but by Ecevit! Kemalists of post-1980 era turned this 1970 model Kemalism on its head, including the original conceptualization of reformism. The chief goal of the reformism became again to save and perpetuate six arrows and Kemalist reforms as they existed.<sup>625</sup>

---

<sup>623</sup> 1931 RPP Party Program in Taha Parla, *Türkiye’de Siyasal Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları III*, p. 36.

<sup>624</sup> Bülent Ecevit, *Atatürk ve Devrimcilik*, İstanbul: İş Bankası Yayınları, 2009.

<sup>625</sup> Bekir Tünay, “Atatürk’ün İnkılâpçılık İlkesi”, *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi*, Vol: 3, No: 9, Cilt III, July 1987. Reached at <http://www.atam.gov.tr/index.php?Page=DergiIcerik&IcerikNo=28> on January 29, 2011.

## CHAPTER 5

### HISTORY

Chroniclers had noted down the legends of the Emperors and Khans, while modern historians of nations. Juvayni<sup>626</sup>, wandering by the giant nomad tent of Hülegü Khan, grandson of Genghis Khan, had recorded tales from the cruel conquests of Mongols. Tacitus left invaluable texts on the power struggles, as the Roman Palace and Senate being the focal points of his history.<sup>627</sup> For Tabari<sup>628</sup>, writing in the Baghdad of Abbasid Caliphate, producing a history of humanity from the genesis in accordance with the Quranic verses and the hadith was utmost target. Bloch maintained that both the ancient Greek and Latin forerunners of Western civilization and also the Christian tradition were always keen on history-writing due to their insatiable obsession for the search of the origins. For Bloch even the holy book of Christianity was a history book.<sup>629</sup> On the other hand, Eastern Empires had their own chroniclers mostly embedded in the palaces in order to record the successes of the rulers.

---

<sup>626</sup> Alaidin Ata-Malik Juvayni (1226-1283) Persian historian and author of *History of the World Conqueror* (Tarikh-i Jahan-Gusha).

<sup>627</sup> R. G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983, p. 38. Publius Cornelius Tacitus (56-117) a historian in the Roman Empire who wrote the *Annals* and the *Histories*.

<sup>628</sup> Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari (838-923) Persian historian and theologian renowned with his *History of the Prophets and Kings* (Tarikh al-Rusul wa al-Muluk).

<sup>629</sup> Marc Bloch, *Tarihin Savunusu ya da Tarihçilik Mesleği*, Ankara: Gece Yayınları, 1994, p. 2.



Whether palace chroniclers of Eastern Empires or tale narrators as in the Greek/Christian tradition; Juvaynî, Taberius, Tabarî, Pachymeres<sup>630</sup>, Zuo Qiuming<sup>631</sup> and many others were part-time historians who were occasionally presenting their stories to their khans and emperors. All these historians knew where the basis of the legitimacy in their respective polities was laying; so as the modern historians. Once *liberté*, *égalité* and *fraternité* were made the dictum of France by the *Third Estate* speaking in the shoes of whole French nation and as the repercussions of the Revolution were transported to all European countries by subsequent Napoleonic conquests, the legitimacy, then was to be found where the General Will reside: the nation.

If nations and nationalisms were children of the Enlightenment, official historiographies were the grandchildren from the same stock. History previously written for the rulers and dynasties were came to be written for nations by professional full-time historians employed in universities and other academic institutions such as “History Institutions” as in Turkey. Iggers was surprised that “professionalization in the historical science and accompanying glorification of scientific ethos and positivist methodology” had resulted in excessive ideologization of history-writing.<sup>632</sup> It is no surprise since nation-states require an official history for mass-scale consumption and the national narrative should be derivative first of the political ideology, only then of the “facts”. History of the imagined communities would naturally be fictive including forgotten episodes as Renan identified, manipulated stories, and created occurrences. Forgetting, manipulation and tale-production were also among the regular performances of the old palace chroniclers. But this time historians were to dig archives in order to discover verification for nationalist claims. Hamid Ziyaev could only mine the past in order to dust an Uzbek past and Pokrovsky’s history might advance over the

---

<sup>630</sup> Pachymeres was a prominent Byzantine chronicler.

<sup>631</sup> Zuo Qiuming was the court historian of the Chinese Lu State of 5th century BC.

<sup>632</sup> Georg G. Iggers, *Bilimsel Nesnellikten Postmodernizme Yirminci Yüzyülda Tarih Yazımı*, Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2000, pp. 28-29.

struggles between exploiters and the exploited. All historiography is subjective; even the chronological listing of events without any comments is subjective in its preference of the enlisted chronological events.

In this chapter the historiography in Uzbek SSR under the impact of first the Pokrovsky School and then the national communism of the post-Stalin era will be briefed. Later in the second sub-section of the first part the creation of the myth of Amir Timur in the independent Uzbekistan and its use to legitimate the autocratic rule of Islam Karimov will be reviewed. Finally, the first part will end with two sub-sections on the novel but distorted national Uzbek history written by the professional historians of the Uzbek regime. In these sub-sections the loading of the Uzbek history with the national essence by Hamid Ziyaev and other ‘official historians’ will be summarized. The second part of the chapter commences with the overview of the Ottoman history-writing. Re-writing of a genuine national history by the newly founded Turkish History Institution and the pseudo-scientific Turkish History Thesis will then be analyzed. In the last sub-section the Turkish History Thesis will be examined through the discussions at the First and the Second History Congresses.

## 5.1. UZBEKISTAN

Look 'round thee now on Samarkand,  
Is she not queen of earth? her pride  
Above all cities? in her hand  
Their destinies? with all beside  
Of glory, which the world hath known?  
Stands she not proudly and alone?  
And who her sov'reign? Timur he  
Whom th' astonish'd earth hath seen,  
With victory, on victory,  
Redoubling age! and more, I ween,  
The Zinghis' yet re-echoing fame.  
And now what has he? what! a name.

Edgar Allen Poe<sup>633</sup>

The “proud and alone queen of the earth”, the once magnificent capital of Timurid Empire, Samarkand, has been greeting the resonant fame of Timur since the unsought independence on August 31, 1991. Indeed the name of Timur has been re-echoing at every corner of Uzbekistan: in the Amir Timur Museum of downtown Tashkent, at the Amir Timur Hiyoboni replacing the Karl Marx Square in central Tashkent, in the play on Timur’s wife Bibihanum at the Samarkand Theatre of Opera and Ballet<sup>634</sup>, last but not the least, among the words of Islam Karimov in Shakhrisabz: “If anybody would like to know who the Uzbek is then they must remember the personality of Amir Timur”.<sup>635</sup> Remember, Mustapha Mond was repeating the message from the God of the *Brave New World*, the sublime Ford: “History is bunk! History is bunk!” The World Controllers needed a bunk history to *bokanovskify* their subjects in order to realize their motto: Community, Identity, Stability.<sup>636</sup> Karimov’s regime, obsessive with stability, was in burning need of an

---

<sup>633</sup> Edgar Allen Poe, “Tamerlane”, in *Tamerlane and Other Poems*, 1827, p. 19.

<sup>634</sup> Laura L. Adams, *The Spectacular State: Culture and National Identity in Uzbekistan*, Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2010, p. 41. Adams also provides a selection of changes in names of streets, squares, cities, etc. in *ibid.*, p. 32.

<sup>635</sup> Robert Rand, *Tamerlane’s Children: Dispatches from Contemporary Uzbekistan*, Oxford, UK: Oneworld Publications, 2006, p. 24.

<sup>636</sup> In Aldous Huxley’s world state which has the motto, “Community, Identity and Stability” the citizens were transformed into individuals obedient to the system, to “standard men and women; in

apposite and utilizable, if not bunk, history. The quest for a fit history for the *Ideology of National Independence* offered posthumous fame for the cruel conqueror of 14th century. In any case, history politically selects its heroes to perform on the stage of grand ideological discourses of the present.

### 5.1.1. Evolution of Soviet Historiography

The founder of the Soviet historiography Michael N. Pokrovsky was absolutely convinced that “history was politics projected into the past”.<sup>637</sup> Pokrovsky school that dominated the historiography in the Soviet Union throughout the first fifteen years after the Revolution, developed a ‘pure Marxist’ version of history founded largely upon economic determinism. For this old Bolshevik, history should be analyzed as socio-economic phases surpassing each other. The general trends which were set by economic determinants and certainly the class struggle at the very core of these historical trends were the motor of history. Reducing the importance of chronology Pokrovsky’s socio-history envisioned past as a socio-economic unilinear progress from primitive society towards communism passing through feudalism, varieties of capitalism and socialism. As a result the Pokrovsky approach has produced a heroless history, ignoring “the impact of the institutional structure of the state, the historic personages involved and the ideologies inspiring them”.<sup>638</sup> Accordingly national and ethnic categories were dropped from historical analysis and Pokrovsky labeling nationalism as “bourgeois device” rejected any “glorification of Russia in his works”.<sup>639</sup> After all the Russian “autocracy was the

---

uniform batches”. This process was called as the Bokanovsky’s process and included the creation of a bunk history.

<sup>637</sup> Anatole G. Mazour & Herman E. Bateman, “Recent Conflicts in Soviet Historiography”, *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol: 24, No: 1, March 1952, p. 58.

<sup>638</sup> Rudolf Schlesinger “Recent Soviet Historiography I”, *Soviet Studies*, Vol: 2, No: 1, April 1950, p. 298.

<sup>639</sup> Mazour & Bateman, *ibid.*, p. 58. Powell quotes the ironic reply of Pokrovsky to a speech by Makharadze, himself a Georgian communist praising Russian influence to Georgia: “Comrade

embodiment of commercial capitalism's dictatorship"<sup>640</sup> from which the Russian proletariat took over the power through the October Revolution. Under the impact of the zealous Pokrovskian historiography, Russian history courses were removed from school curricula<sup>641</sup> and many historians were purged with allegations of being Great Power chauvinists and in bourgeoisie nationalist deviations.<sup>642</sup>

By 1930, Trotsky was compelled to go to exile; Bukharin, Tomskey, Zinoviev, Rykov and Kamanev were ousted first from the Central Committee and then from the Party; the Politburo of the Revolution was liquidated. *Pravda* published birthday congratulations to Stalin for five days in December 1930: now it is time for a new history for the new unrivaled hero of Soviet Russia "who wished to see himself as the Peter of the Communist pseudo-church".<sup>643</sup> Pokrovsky's narration of history in abstract sociological schemes and especially his "grave fault" to deny the role of nations and heroes should be corrected. Stalin muttered at the Politburo gathering in 1934: "'The feudal epoch', 'the epoch of industrial capitalism', 'the epoch of formations'-it's all epochs and no facts, no events, no people, no concrete information, not a name, not a title, and not even any content

---

Makharadze has shown us Russians too much indulgence. In the past we have been the worst plunderers one can imagine." Powell, A. "The Nationalist Trend in Soviet Historiography", *Soviet Studies*, Vol: 2, No: 4, April 1951, p. 377.

<sup>640</sup> Samuel H. Baron, "Plekhanov, Trotsky, and the Development of Soviet Historiography", *Soviet Studies*, Vol: 26, No: 3, July 1974, p. 391.

<sup>641</sup> According to Brandenberger & Dubrovsky until September 1931 Russian history was not part of official school curriculum; even after 1931 "all aspects of the pre-revolutionary Russian past" were taught in an exclusively negative manner up to 1934. D. L. Brandenberger & A. M. Dubrovsky, "'The People Need a Tsar': The Emergence of National Bolshevism as Stalinist Ideology, 1931-1941", *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol: 50, No: 5, July 1998, pp. 874-875.

<sup>642</sup> In July 1929, 530 academics from Leningrad University and in early 1930, 130 historians mostly from Kiev were ousted from their posts, majority of which were harassed, arrested and exiled. The allegations also included planning "to overthrow the regime and establish a constitutional monarchy", being "thoroughly saturated with anti-Soviet theories" or simply being Trotskyite. Pokrovsky was the main architect behind "the historian purges" as the head of the Institute of Red Professors and the Society of Marxist Historians. Robert F. Byrnes, "Creating the Soviet Historical Profession, 1917-1934", *Slavic Review*, Vol: 50, No: 2, Summer 1991, pp. 305-306.

<sup>643</sup> Geoffrey Hosking, *A History of the Soviet Union*, Revised Edition, Glasgow: Fontana Press/Collins, 1990, p. 183.

itself”.<sup>644</sup> The decree “On the Teaching of History in Secondary Schools” of May 16, 1934 demanding “a return to concrete facts, patriotism, and the role of the individual”<sup>645</sup> was clear indication of new line in Soviet historiography; the national bolshevism.<sup>646</sup>

Early Bolshevik narrative considered the Russian expansion to the East and to the Central Asia in particular, as colonialist. Even with recognizing Central Asian societies as backward and feudal, Pokrovsky School has acknowledged that indigenous resistance in Turkestan against Russian tsarism and despotism was heroic.<sup>647</sup> Nonetheless “the lesser evil theory” of the new Soviet historiography proposed that integration with Russian Empire was more progressive compared to absolute evils such as invasion of Caucasus by reactionary Ottomans or Iran, conquest of Ukraine by Polish or German exploiters and annexation of Central Asia by British imperialists. Against local despots and foreign imperialists, toiling masses of Central Asia, Ukraine or Georgia were voluntarily opted for the rightest choice possible for them!<sup>648</sup> By early 1950s even the lesser evil theory was abandoned and the Russian annexation was referred as of “tremendous progressive significance” for Uzbeks that enabled “closer contact with the most revolutionary

---

<sup>644</sup> Brandenberger & Dubrovsky, *ibid.*, p. 875.

<sup>645</sup> Byrnes, *ibid.*, p. 307.

<sup>646</sup> The term “national bolshevism” was introduced by M. N. Ryutin to describe the Russophil patriotic ideology floated up after early 1930s. Brandenberger & Dubrovsky, *ibid.*, p. 873.

<sup>647</sup> Shoshana Keller, “Story, Time, and Dependent Nationhood in the Uzbek History Curriculum”, *Slavic Review*, Vol: 66, No: 2, Summer 2007, p. 262.

<sup>648</sup> Lazzarini summarizes the lesser evil theory of Stalin era historiography in Tatar case: “Had the Tatars not placed themselves voluntarily under the benign protection of the Russian state, they most assuredly would have remained victims of a despotic native regime supported by a parasitical social structure and reactionary clergy. More than this, they would have been forced in all likelihood to suffer Ottoman Turkish domination. By welcoming Ivan IV’s troops and administrators, however, the Tatar “laboring population” chose the only “correct historical path” and avoided a great deal of unpleasantness as a result.” Lazzarini, Edward J., “Tatarovedenie and the “New Historiography” in the Soviet Union: Revising the Interpretation of the Tatar-Russian Relationship”, *Slavic Review*, Vol: 40, No: 4, Winter 1981, pp. 628. The “honour” to revise the lesser evil theory was attached to Central Committee secretary A. A. Zhdanov in Brandenberger & Dubrovsky, *ibid.*, pp. 877-878.

proletariat in the world and the progressive Russian culture”.<sup>649</sup> Besides “the elder brother theory” upheld that the Russians had benignly guided the Uzbeks from feudalism and oppressive regime of khans towards more advanced social form of communism as a “guardian elder brother does for a dutiful and respectful youngster”.<sup>650</sup>

Furthermore during the Stalinist national bolshevism and later, Uzbek history was taught as a supplement to the Russian history, in other words “the textbooks were mapping ‘Uzbek’ history onto Russian history”.<sup>651</sup> This mapping partially elucidated why medieval conqueror Timur, previously depicted as a blood-thirsty feudal despot by early Bolsheviks, was rehabilitated to some extent by late Stalin era historians. The pioneer of Timur’s rehabilitation Professor Yakubovsky acknowledged Timur positively due to his foundation of centralized state in Middle Asia but more importantly his “relieving of the pressure that the Tatars applied to Russians”.<sup>652</sup> While admitting the cruelty of Timur, creation of a centralized state represented for Yakubovsky *a leap forward* in the Marxist historiographical scheme from nomadic vandalism to oriental despotism.<sup>653</sup> In this vein Shaybanid Uzbeks, who had raided from Golden Horde to destroy Timurids and created the first state of people with the “Uzbek” ethnoname, were denied.

*The History of Uzbekistan SSR* published in 1958 envisioned a territorial history; not the history of Uzbeks but a history bound to the territory of the

---

<sup>649</sup> The article published in Uzbek newspaper *Pravda Vostoka* on February 12, 1954, cited in the anonymous booklet *Uzbekistan: A Study of Soviet Communist Rule in Central Asia*, June 1956, pp. 20-21.

<sup>650</sup> *Uzbekistan: A Study of Soviet Communist Rule in Central Asia*, p. 20.

<sup>651</sup> Keller, *ibid.*, p. 272.

<sup>652</sup> Edward A. Allworth, *The Modern Uzbeks: From the Fourteenth Century to the Present – A Cultural History*, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1990, pp. 242-243.

<sup>653</sup> Yakubovsky refers directly to Marx’s comments on Timur: “He gave his new kingdom state structure and laws, making a great contrast with those beastly and inhuman sorts of destruction which the Tatar hordes committed.” Cited in Allworth, *ibid.*, p. 243.

Uzbekistan SSR.<sup>654</sup> The historical narrative was moving forward from the primitive society, slave-holding society, and development of feudalism, emergence of bourgeois relations under feudal-autocratic rulers to the October Revolution and the foundation of socialism in Uzbekistan throughout the *History of Uzbekistan SSR*. Regardless of the ethnic composition of the dynasties or the ruling tribe, the book was focusing on the territories corresponding to Uzbek SSR. Soviet historians were in fact obliged to discern a history bounded to Uzbek SSR since only through this way specific histories could be assigned to separate Kazakh, Tadjik or Turkmen ethnoses. Moreover territorial history was essential to legitimate the Soviet republican boundaries set by national delimitation. While the 700 pages book was consisting of only twenty-two pages on Timurids, the Great Patriotic War<sup>655</sup> was seen worth of sixty-six pages and the October Revolution of sixty-eight pages. Largely influenced by Yakubovsky's rehabilitation of Timur, however, the authors have elaborated a more positive attitude for Timur since "uniting people living around Aral Sea around a center had been undoubtedly progressive occurrence".<sup>656</sup> Only a rehabilitated Timur could serve both putting forward a long-standing Russian-Uzbek cooperation and also darkening long and bloody wars between Uzbek and Tatar tribes of Golden Horde and Muscovite Russia. Thus, in 1969, Uzbek apparatchiks, Communist Party sycophants, official party historians, all have lined up to celebrate the 2500th anniversary of Timur's capital Samarkand.<sup>657</sup>

---

<sup>654</sup> Gulomov, Y. G. & Nabiyev, R. N. & Vahabov, M. G., *Uzbekiston SSR Tarihi*, Tashkent: Uzbekiston SSR Fanlar Akademiyasi Nashriyati, 1958.

<sup>655</sup> Great Patriotic War was the official name of Second World War used in the Soviet period. The struggle against Nazi invasion was propagated by Soviet leaders as the heroic struggle of hom-sovieticuses against aggression of imperialists.

<sup>656</sup> Gulomov, Y. G. & Nabiyev, R. N. & Vahabov, M. G., *ibid.*, p. 178. In its Uzbek language version the statement was as follows: "Aral Dengizine yakin bulgan territoriyalarda yashavish halkan bir markaz ustude birlestirishi shubhasiz progressiv bir vakaa idi".

<sup>657</sup> Allworth, *ibid.*, p. 245.



### 5.1.2. Return of Amir Timur

Just thirty-eight years later, on August 25, 2007, President Islam Karimov was addressing to his compulsorily de-Sovietized *approtchiks* together with an international audience invited from all over the world at the celebration of the 2750th anniversary of Samarkand: “Thanks to our valorous forefather Amir Timur’s wit and intellect, resoluteness and determination that turned Samarkand into one of the most beautiful cities in the world”.<sup>658</sup> The replacement of the head of Karl Marx with a huge statute of Timur in downtown Tashkent had beforehand signaled the new track in Uzbek historiography in September 1993.<sup>659</sup> The year 1996 which was declared as the “660th anniversary of Amir Timur” was the zenith of the zealous and cultish campaign for the Samarkander conqueror.<sup>660</sup> In his preface written for the international conference titled “Amir Timur and His Place in World History”, the fraudulent President Karimov even claimed that “Amir Timur had regarded tolerance and peace-making as the most important traits of the state rulers”.<sup>661</sup> It is bizarre that brutal and ferocious Timur who was purportedly responsible for the death of more than ten million people in his campaigns was turned into a tolerant and peaceful ruler.

In fact, leaving aside the mythologizing exaggerations that any nationalist historiography desperately needs, selection of Amir Timur as the forebear of Uzbeks reflected a sort of continuity with the Soviet historiography. Without doubt

---

<sup>658</sup> *Jahon News Agency*, “Address by the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan H.E. Mr. Islam Karimov at the Festive Ceremony Dedicated to the 2750th Anniversary of the City of Samarkand” reached on February 4, 2009 at [http://www.jahonnews.uz/eng/president/addresses\\_speeches/address\\_by\\_prez\\_at\\_ceremony\\_dedicated\\_to\\_2750th\\_anniversary\\_of\\_samarkand.mgr](http://www.jahonnews.uz/eng/president/addresses_speeches/address_by_prez_at_ceremony_dedicated_to_2750th_anniversary_of_samarkand.mgr)

<sup>659</sup> Neil J. Melvin, *Uzbekistan: Transition to Authoritarianism on the Silk Road*, Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 2000, p. 46.

<sup>660</sup> Laura Adams points the ridiculousness of 660th year celebrations, however since 650th anniversary has unfortunately coincided the Soviet era and the 675th anniversary was so far away, Uzbek regime had to celebrate the 660th anniversary. Adams, *ibid.*, p. 42.

<sup>661</sup> *Materials of the International Scientific Conference “Amir Temur and His Place in World History”*, Tashkent: Uzbekiston Publishing House, 1996, p. 4.

Soviet historians have never washed Timur's hands of bloodshed he had caused as their Uzbek colleagues would do in independent Uzbekistan. By doing so, though, the Uzbek historiography had to disregard Timurids' antagonism towards Uzbek nomads and to ignore Timurid Babur's hostile reflection for Shaybanid Uzbeks: "For almost 140 years the capital of Samarkand belonged to our family. From where came the Ozbeg foreigner and enemy who made himself master of it?"<sup>662</sup> Then, Uzbek historiography followed the Soviet trend in placing the consolidation of first Uzbek state and also genesis of Uzbek identity in the Timurid era. For instance, Abdurahmanov claims that the formation of Uzbek people was completed in the 14th century which corresponded to the Timurid era.<sup>663</sup> Adams has noted down that choice of Timur as the forefather of Uzbeks was reminiscent of Soviet view since the historical-materialist view of Soviet historiography once appraised Timurids as sedentary and more civilized compared to nomadic Shaybanid Uzbeks.<sup>664</sup> Olivier Roy on the other hand asserted that new Uzbek historiography had to "Uzbekise" Timur and his descendants Ulughbeg and Babur instead of making use of the Shaybanids, the first truly Uzbek dynasty, simply because the former had reigned previously.<sup>665</sup> For Roy, Timurid forefathers would enable contemporary Uzbek historians to claim more ancient roots in Central Asia.<sup>666</sup>

Islam Karimov was complaining at the official unveiling of Amir Timur bust in Tashkent that "the name of Amir Timur was deleted in the pages of Uzbek [our] history by colonialist oppressors in order to terminate the Uzbek feelings of national

---

<sup>662</sup> *The Baburnama: Memoirs of Babur, Prince and Emperor*, Washington, D.C.: Freer Gallery of Art, Arthur M. Sackler Gallery & New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.

<sup>663</sup> G. A. Abdurahmanov, *Özbek Halqının Etnogenezi va Özbek Tilinin Şakllanişi*, pp. 4-5.

<sup>664</sup> Laura Adams, "Cultural Elites in Uzbekistan: Ideological Production and the State" in Pauline Jones Luong (eds.), *The Transformation of Central Asia: States and Societies from Soviet Rule to Independence*, Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 2004, p. 110.

<sup>665</sup> Olivier Roy, *The New Central Asia: The Creation Nations*, New York: New York University Press, 2000, p. 167.

<sup>666</sup> Roy, *ibid.*, p. 168.

pride and honor”.<sup>667</sup> Probably all-triumphant commander Timur possessed more material to boost national pride than Shaybani Khan who was captured and killed by Safavid Shah Ismail at the battlefield. Adams also acknowledged that Timur’s “greater international reputation and lasting monuments” have played a significant role in the preference of Timurids in the place of Shaybanid Uzbeks.<sup>668</sup> What is striking is the absence of Ozbeg Khan of Golden Horde in the primary, secondary and university history books as the forebear of Uzbek people, despite the fact that his name was inherited by the modern-day Uzbekistan and the Uzbek people.<sup>669</sup>

The impact of Soviet historiography, search for elder ancestors and need for a victorious and legendary forefather, all played their essential parts in the brightening of Amir Timur, yet the fundamental motive has been the crucial function of a mythic all-powerful Timur figure in the *Ideology of National Independence*. The slogan *Kuvetlik adalettir*<sup>670</sup> accompanying Amir Timur busts all over the country signifies that only unquestionable power of an Amir/Khan and unconditional obedience to it could ensure just administration in Uzbekistan. Though not lame, Karimov was propagated as a reincarnated Timur; a modern Khan that would lead Uzbeks towards great prospects.<sup>671</sup> The chain of authority legitimation through history operates this way: (1) Amir Timur, the forefather, had united Uzbeks under his undisputable authority first time in the history, (2) Amir Timur had founded his vast empire through power and stability (3) Uzbeks need

---

<sup>667</sup> I. A. Karimov, “Ehtiram”, *Bizdan Azad va Abad Vatan Kalsin*, Tashkent: Uzbekiston, 1994, p. 91.

<sup>668</sup> Adams, *ibid.*, p. 110.

<sup>669</sup> Büşra Ersanlı, “Yeni Bağımsızlık ve Ulusun Adı: Özbek Milliyetçiliği”, *Akademik Araştırmalar Dergisi*, Vol: 2, No: 6, August-October 2000, p. 70. Ozbeg Khan ruled the Golden Horde between 1313 and 1340.

<sup>670</sup> Power (strength) is justice!

<sup>671</sup> For a detailed and refined analysis of the function of Amir Timur myth in the ‘Ideology of National Independence’ please look Andrew F. March, “The Use and Abuse of History: National Ideology as Transcendental Object in Islam Karimov’s ‘Ideology of National Independence’”, *Central Asian Survey*, Vol: 21, No: 4, 2003, pp. 371-384. Adams concurs with March that “Karimov promoted himself by association with Timur” Adams, *The Spectacular State: Culture and National Identity in Uzbekistan*, p. 40.

stability, power and undisputable authority which Islam Karimov currently represents.

Karimov's authority legitimation through historiography would be imperfect if it were limited just the lionizing of Amir Timur. *Ideology of National Independence* should discover a substantial array of brilliant predecessors and the "history as the genuine tutor of the nation"<sup>672</sup> was the place to pick likely figures. The *ex post facto* Uzbekisation of selected historical figures has entailed the transformation of mostly bilingual personalities defining themselves via their religion, birthplace, clan or family name into authentic Uzbeks and national property of Uzbek people:

[Our] great ancestors Imam Bukhari, At-Termizi, Naqshband, Ahmad Yassavi, Al Khorezmi, Beruni, Ibn Sina (Avicenna), Amir Timur (Tamerlane), Ulughbeg, Babur profoundly contributed to the development of *our* national culture. They became the national pride of *our* people."<sup>673</sup>

The Soviet regime had also initiated the so-called *ex post facto* Uzbekisation via making use of select Central Asian scholars in a sovietized and secularized version. For instance, in only Russian language more than fifty volumes<sup>674</sup> on Ibn Sina were published revealing scholar's "democratic views and progressive attitude".<sup>675</sup> Associating Ibn Sina with Uzbek SSR, the Soviet narrative was informing that for this sovietized version of "freedom-loving" Ibn Sina, it was "inconceivable to serve reactionary Sultan Mahmud Gaznevi".<sup>676</sup> In the similar vein independent Uzbekistan re-transforms Ibn Sina, Ulughbeg, and Babur into

---

<sup>672</sup> Islam Karimov, *Uzbekistan on the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1998, p. 88.

<sup>673</sup> Karimov, *ibid.*, p. 89. Italics are mine.

<sup>674</sup> A. İrisov, *Abu Ali İbn Sina: Hayatı va İjadi Mirosı*, Tashkent, Uzbekistan SSR, Shah Neshriyatı, 1980, p. 26-30.

<sup>675</sup> Yu. A. Atabekov & Sh. Kh. Khamidullin, *Abu Ali İbn Sinanın İlmi Asaslangan Haykal Obrazının Yaratışı (A Bust of Abu Ali İbn Sina: A Scientific Construction of the Great Scholar's Image)*, Tashkent: Medizina UzSSR, 1980, p. 74.

<sup>676</sup> *ibid.*, p. 73.

national heroes. While Karimov was celebrating “the age of Timurids as a period of Eastern Renaissance”; Timur’s grandson astronomer-sultan Ulughbeg has turned out to be the prominent representative of the Uzbek Renaissance.<sup>677</sup>

Uzbek historiography has also inherited the exceptionally territorial narrative of the Soviet history-writing. Uzbek history curriculum mirrored the cautious and a sort of consolidationist policy of the regime which was pursued particularly in the first decade after the independence. Karimov had understandably eschewed raising any territorial issue until his leadership was secured upon the balance of clans and the post-Soviet turmoil stabilized. *Teaching Principles for “Uzbekistan History” Course*, published by the Ministry of High and Secondary Education in order to outline history curriculum in all post-primary schools, has framed a narrative staunchly loyal to boundaries of Uzbekistan.<sup>678</sup> In the proposed 90-hours course plan, prehistoric Soghdian, Bactrian, and Kushan Empires were tagged sympathetically as “our ancient antecedents”.<sup>679</sup> However, the Kōk Turk state and the Arab Caliphate were considered only regarding their affects on the Uzbekistan territories. While the Kōk Turk state has comprised far too much territory than the current Uzbekistan, including all Central Asia, the political, social and economic situation of solely *Uzbek territories* under Turkish Khanate became subject in history books.<sup>680</sup> The coming of Islam to Uzbekistan was portrayed within the context of invasion of Central Asia by the Caliphate state and the struggle against the Arabic dominance. Arabs have said to “left behind themselves the Islamic religion and the Arabic writing in the territories of Uzbekistan”.<sup>681</sup>

---

<sup>677</sup> Karimov’s speech was quoted in Andrew F. March, “The Use and Abuse of History: National Ideology as Transcendental Object in Islam Karimov’s ‘Ideology of National Independence’”, *Central Asian Survey*, Vol: 21, No: 4, 2003, p. 375.

<sup>678</sup> “*Uzbekiston Tarihi*” *Kursu Ūkuv Dasturu*, Tashkent: Uzbekiston Respublikasi Ali ve Orta Mahsus Talim Vazirligi, 1992.

<sup>679</sup> *ibid.*, p. 7.

<sup>680</sup> *ibid.*, p. 8-9.

<sup>681</sup> The title of the proposed section “Islam Dininin va Arab Yazımının Uzbekiston Hududunga Tarkedilişi” *ibid.*, p. 9.

Evaluating Islamization of Central Asia and particularly Uzbekistan as the invasion by an alien power was thoroughly striking to denote the secular credentials of the regime.

As stated above Soviet historiography had to envision a territorial narrative in order to legitimate the partition of Central Asia into five republics with the national delimitation. Thus the Soviet approach to Central Asian history was consistent in its denial to attribute any ethnic or national meaning to the more comprehensive term “Turk”. Authors of *The History of Uzbekistan SSR* were adamant to warn pupils studying the Kōk Turk Khanate that “the term Turk was not an ethnic name but just a political phrase denoting Turkic-speaking tribes unfamiliar to each other”.<sup>682</sup> Similarly, Soviet historian Azizian was resolute that Uzbeks were not of Turkic origin but offspring of the ancient Soghdian civilization.<sup>683</sup> Kırımlı pointed out that authorities of independent Uzbekistan were sharing the Soviet attitude to dissociate “Uzbek” from “Turk”, because “too much emphasis placed upon the nature of ‘Turkic’ would make the concept of ‘Uzbek’ meaningless and soulless”.<sup>684</sup> This attitude has been coherent with Islam Karimov’s constant rejection of any sympathy for the idea of greater Turan and pan-Turkism. Karimov underlined that while Uzbek people had just linguistic and historical bonds with other Turkic nationalities, their cultural and historical affinity with Tajiks stood for a “unique synthesis of Turkic and Persian elements”.<sup>685</sup>

*Teaching Principles for “Uzbekistan History” Course* which was published in 1992 as the first initiative to frame Uzbek history courses, persisted on the

---

<sup>682</sup> Y. G. Gulomov & R. N. Nabiyev & M. G. Vahabov, *Uzbekiston SSR Tarihi*, Tashkent: Uzbekiston SSR Fanlar Akademiyası Nashriyati, 1958, p. 86.

<sup>683</sup> A. K. Azizian’s article of 1962 in *Voprosi İstorii* was cited by Lowell Tillet, *The Great Friendship*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969, p. 93.

<sup>684</sup> Meryem Kırımlı, “Uzbekistan in the New World Order”, *Central Asian Survey*, Vol: 16, No: 1, 1997, p. 56.

<sup>685</sup> Karimov, *Uzbekistan on the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century*, p. 91.

territorial approach while dealing with Medieval Empires of Gaznawid, Seljukid, Karakhanid and Samanid. Mongolian invasion from the North under Genghis Khan's nomads was advised to be examined together with the resistance of Celaleddin Mangiberdi in Horezm.<sup>686</sup> Albeit prepared just after the declaration of independence, the proposed Uzbek History Course allocated a considerably large part to the Soviet period: 22 hours of the 90 total, while all the era of Timurids was assigned only 4 hours. The approach in the proposed section on the Second World War was particularly sovietish. The courage of Uzbek soldiers who were mobilized for the defense of motherland were to be highly extolled.<sup>687</sup> In addition, the last heading of the history curriculum took account of new movements and parties such as Birlik and Erk, without mentioning the name of President Islam Karimov.<sup>688</sup> Perhaps over-emphasis on the Soviet era and referring to the nationalist parties of opposition indicated that Karimov could not be able to secure his position thus far.

Last but not the least, especially in the first decade of the independence, Uzbek historiography has remained adherent to the Soviet trend in historical periodization. Edward Allworth accurately observed that Soviet era terminology and structure were prevalent even after the independence and the course of history was still streaming from the primitive and slave-holding societies to feudal and capitalist epochs.<sup>689</sup> One of the earliest attempts of post-Soviet history-writing was Ahmadali Askarov and his three-volume book *History of Peoples of Uzbekistan* which had "all the prestige of an official history".<sup>690</sup> Askarov's account started up

---

<sup>686</sup> "Uzbekiston Tarihi" Kursu Ükuv Dasturu, p. 16.

<sup>687</sup> *ibid.*, p. 31.

<sup>688</sup> *ibid.*, p. 34.

<sup>689</sup> Edward Allworth, "History and Group Identity in Central Asia" in Graham Smith & Vivien Law & Andrew Wilson & Annette Bohr & Edward Allworth (eds.), *Nation-Building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands: The Politics of National Identities*, Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 74.

<sup>690</sup> *ibid.*, p. 74.

with an analysis of the first primitive societies in the territories of Uzbekistan.<sup>691</sup> After the struggle of primitive Central Asians against conquering Alexander's armies the slave-holding society had emerged around III century BC. The Hephthalites and the Kök Turk Empire were the first feudal states in Central Asia according to Askarov. *History of Peoples of Uzbekistan* maintained that continuous immigration of Turkic tribes to Central Asia, plus economic and social interaction between sedentary locals and the incoming Turkic population along with flourishing feudalism, had set bilingualism as the norm in Uzbekistan territories.<sup>692</sup> What is worthy of note is the non-ethnic tone in this account claiming the heritages of both Turkic and Persian speaking forerunners. For Askarov, Timurids had epitomized the peak of the feudal era.<sup>693</sup> Then in the second volume the narrative continued with increasingly capitalistic relations with Russia, struggles of exploited people against despots and colonizers.<sup>694</sup>

G. A. Hidayatov's *My Beloved History* published in 1992<sup>695</sup>, remained faithful to Soviet-style periodization. The book was inaugurated by the ancient primitive societies as usual and after that the feudal era was even split into two sub-epochs; the military imperial feudalism of Timurids and the military bureaucratic feudalism of Shaybanids.<sup>696</sup> It is worth mentioning *en passant* that Hidayatov's historical narrative ended in 1905, the year of the February 'Bourgeoisie' Revolution. It seemed that Hidayatov had consciously abstained from incorporating the Soviet era to *My Beloved History* presumably because of uncertainty caused by

---

<sup>691</sup> Ahmadali Askarov, *Uzbekiston Halklari Tarihi I Jild*, Tashkent: Uzbekiston Respublikasi Fanlar Akademiyasi "Fan" Nashriyati, 1992, p. 3.

<sup>692</sup> Askarov, *ibid.*, p. 5.

<sup>693</sup> Askarov, *ibid.*, pp. 153-160.

<sup>694</sup> Ahmadali Askarov, *Uzbekiston Halklari Tarihi II Jild*, Tashkent: Uzbekiston Respublikasi Fanlar Akademiyasi "Fan" Nashriyati, 1992.

<sup>695</sup> Edward Allworth informs that the book was first published in Russian in 1990 and than in Uzbek in 1992. Allworth, *ibid.*, p. 75. The translation of "Mening Canacan Tarikhim" as "My Beloved Country" is borrowed from Allworth.

<sup>696</sup> G. A. Hidayatov, *Mening Canacan Tarikhim*, Tashkent, 1992, Ükitivci, pp. 122-128.



the dissolving Soviet Union and personal anxiety for the future. *Teaching Principles for “Uzbekistan History” Course* also proposed Uzbek teachers to initiate their course with the primitive society, slave-holding society and then proceed with the feudal society. However, after the feudal stage, using capitalistic and socialist stages in the historical curriculum was disavowed by the Ministry. Instead the remaining part of Uzbekistan history curriculum was organized as the history of tribes, states and heroes.<sup>697</sup>

The heroes of the early Bolshevik era history books were the classes, the deterministic promotion to communist society was to be achieved by class struggle. After Pokrovsky School was discredited in mid 1930s, the class struggles came to be accompanied by proletarianized heroes peculiar to their respective republics in the journey towards more advanced epochs.<sup>698</sup> The post-Soviet Uzbek historiography, on the other hand, has increasingly included national heroes. Ersanlı accurately claimed that history books in current Uzbekistan bared both continuities and discontinuities with the Soviet historiography. While the economic and social narratives were emulating the Soviet approach, the discontinuities were in shape of “contextual implants of heroic resistance to Russian and the early Soviets and reformist movements in education, morals, conduct and, traditions”.<sup>699</sup> In this sense Islam Karimov’s directive to the historians that “all competence of the historical science should be mobilized to

---

<sup>697</sup> “*Uzbekiston Tarihi*” *Kursu Ükuv Dasturu*, pp. 12-17.

<sup>698</sup> Keller notes that Uzbek children have learned that “foreigners had invaded for 2500 years, but working-class natives have always risen up against the oppressors. Heroes included the Scythian shepherd named Shiroq and Spitamenes” who fought against Persians and Alexander the Great respectively. Shoshana Keller, “Going to School in Uzbekistan” in Jeff Sahadeo & Russell Zanca (eds.), *Everyday Life in Central Asia: Past and Present*, Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2007, p. 257.

<sup>699</sup> Büşra Ersanlı, “History Textbooks as Reflections of the Political Self: Turkey (1930s and 1990s) and Uzbekistan (1990s)”, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol: 34, No: 2, Special Issue: Nationalism and the Colonial Legacy in the Middle East and Central Asia, May, 2002, p. 338.

serve the national independence goal”<sup>700</sup>, was taken seriously and national heroes were implanted in selected epochs of the new Uzbek history. The territory of independent Uzbekistan was rearranged retrospectively as the stage of the saintly mystic Alisher Novai, great military commander Amir Timur, the distinguished philosopher-king Ulughbeg, sultan of hadith Al-Bukhari, legendary Alpamish, freedom fighter Dukchi Ishan<sup>701</sup> and many others. New national idols poured into the Uzbek history which still continued to be under the impact of the Soviet methodology especially in the first decade of the independence: Soviet in method, Uzbek in content.

### **5.1.3. Loading History with the National: Hamid Ziyaev, the Official Historian**

Hamid Ziyaev, as the semi-official historian of independent Uzbekistan has been the leading figure in loading the Uzbek history-writing with “the national content”. First of all, the communist society which was depicted as the ultimate end of all human progression in any standard Soviet history book was replaced by the Uzbek national state. The *telos* of whole history within the Uzbekistan territory became the independent Uzbek state for Ziyaev, the Uzbek Hegel.<sup>702</sup> Thus Ziyaev has portrayed all history from the 10th century BC to August 31, 1991 as an incessant struggle for the independent Uzbek state in *The History of Struggles for the Independence of Uzbekistan*.<sup>703</sup> Dissolution of the Soviet Union and the subsequent declaration of Uzbek independence on August 31, 1991, seemed to

---

<sup>700</sup> D. A. Alimova (eds.), *Tarikh Şahidligi ve Saboklari: Çarizm va Sovyet Müstemlekeçiliği Devrinde Uzbekiston Milli Bagliklarining Izleshtirilişi*, Tashkent: Şark Neshriyati, 2001, p. 3.

<sup>701</sup> Dukchi Ishan was the nickname of Muhammad Ali Halfa who was the leader of Andijon Uprising of 1898.

<sup>702</sup> German philosopher Hegel once labeled the Prussian state as the apex of the history.

<sup>703</sup> Hamid Ziyaev, *Uzbekiston Müstakilligi İçin Kuraşlarnin Tarihi (Miladdan Oldingi Asirlardan 1991 Yili 31 Avgustgaça)*, Tashkent: Uzbekiston Fanlar Akademiyası Tarih Institutu, 2001.

conclude the long-standing strife between two sides of history: Foreign invaders ruthless and evil, alien and exploiter at one side and the heroic natives of Uzbekistan resisting bravely at the other side.

*The History of Struggles for the Independence of Uzbekistan* glorified the insurgences of local people under the Achaemenid rule and their resistance against the campaigns of Cyrus and Alexander between 1000 and 800 BC.<sup>704</sup> Arab Caliph's *mujahidun*<sup>705</sup> and Genghis Khan's Mongolian nomads were both described as foreign aggressors. Ziyaev paid tribute to Celaleddin due to "sacrificing himself for the sake of motherland"<sup>706</sup> and Mahmud Turabi as the "warrior of independence"<sup>707</sup> in their struggles against Arabs and Mongols. Yet, in line with Karimov's regime, Ziyaev lionized Timur extravagantly as the "savior of people"<sup>708</sup> and the first leader to establish independent Uzbek state under the motto of "either independence or death".<sup>709</sup> After Timurid era Ziyaev proceeded to expansion of Russian Tsardom and the fighting of Uzbek Khanates against colonialism and tyranny.<sup>710</sup> Ziyaev performe overlooked the initial collaboration between Jadidists and the Bolsheviks and presented Jadidists and the Basmachi riots against Soviet rule as the genuine national independence struggles.<sup>711</sup> The other aspects that were compulsorily overlooked by Ziyaev were the referendum of April 17, 1991 that 93.7% of Uzbek voters opted for the continuation of the Soviet Federation and the declaration of sovereignty by Uzbek Parliament only within a

---

<sup>704</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 10-22.

<sup>705</sup> Quranic term to denote "the warriors for Islam against infidels".

<sup>706</sup> Ziyaev, *ibid.*, pp. 59-60.

<sup>707</sup> *ibid.*, p. 68.

<sup>708</sup> *ibid.*, p. 72.

<sup>709</sup> *ibid.*, p. 77.

<sup>710</sup> *ibid.*, p. 157-158.

<sup>711</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 331-372.

renewed Soviet Federation.<sup>712</sup> Logically only such a negligence would allow Ziyaev to identify the period between 1989 and 1991 as the struggle for independence.

While Achaemenids, Alexander, Arabs, Genghis Khan, Russian Tsardom and the Soviet state, all executed the “most horrible cruelties and pillages”<sup>713</sup> in Uzbekistan, for Ziyaev only three sovereigns could have attained independence: Ismail Samani, Amir Timur and predictably Islam Karimov. The years 900, 1370 and 1991 were sanctified as the three splendid years in which the respective *hukumdars*<sup>714</sup> had realized independent Uzbek state.<sup>715</sup> Later Ziyaev’s historiography develops into a hagiography through exalting ballads for these three figures: “Courageous, intelligent, patriotic, wise, able organizers come once in several hundred years...Ismail Samani, Amir Timur and Islam Karimov were such great leaders that achieved independence and established powerful progressing countries”.<sup>716</sup> It is once again noteworthy that Ziyaev made no mention of Shaybani Khan’s Uzbeks, while Persian-speaking Samanid dynasty was considered as one of the initiators of the Uzbek independence. In *Istiklol-Manaviyot Negizi*, Ziyaev even skipped over Ismail Samani and tagged only 1370 and 1991 as the “two great years”.<sup>717</sup> According to Ziyaev the spirit of Uzbek states founded on these years, that is to say the Timurid Empire and the existing Uzbekistan were exactly the same.<sup>718</sup> As clarified in the very beginning of the

---

<sup>712</sup> Times informed that Uzbek officials had clarified that Uzbekistan’s “Declaration of Sovereignty within a Renewed Soviet Federation” did not mean to secede from the Soviet Union. “Uzbekis Approve a ‘Declaration of Sovereignty’”, *The Times*, June 21, 1990.

<sup>713</sup> Ziyaev, *ibid.*, p. 6.

<sup>714</sup> Here Ziyaev uses the word “hukumdar” meaning the monarch, the sovereign ruler. It is remarkable that Ziyaev counts Karimov together with other medieval *hukumdars* and *khans*.

<sup>715</sup> Ziyaev, *ibid.*, p. 7.

<sup>716</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 7-8.

<sup>717</sup> Hamid Ziyaev, *Istiklol-Manaviyot Negizi*, Tashkent: Manaviyot, 1999, p. 53.

<sup>718</sup> Ziyaev, *ibid.*, p. 58.

book this authoritative spirit prescribes full submission to an all-powerful leader and unification under him for independence.<sup>719</sup>

In line with the aforementioned perspective, Ziyaev completely revised the previous favorable account of Soviet-Uzbek historians, including himself, on the Russian conquest of the Central Asia and Uzbekistan:

“Uzbek people played its progressive role in annexation of Central Asia to Russia. Great Russian people, in turn, offered brotherly help to Uzbek people. Uzbek people overcoming the cruelty of slavery, feudalism and capitalism, lives in prosperity under the guidance of the Communist Party.”<sup>720</sup>

In the preface of *Struggle against Russian Hegemony in Turkistan*, Ziyaev harshly criticized Russian history-writing due to its colonialist standpoint and the above mentality of Soviet historiography both because of its denial of the rich heritage of Turkestan and downgrading the struggles of Central Asians against Russian advance.<sup>721</sup> Instead the vulgar populism of Ziyaev’s account could only repeat the typical story: Facing the epic resistance of the ordinary Turkestanis driven by thirst for independence, the Russian army could only become victorious owing to “ignorant khans and a group of traitors”.<sup>722</sup> Critchlow observes in the same way that, for Ziyaev, “it is ‘natural’ for the upper classes of any country to commit treason in the face of foreign aggression while it was the common people who were the heroes”.<sup>723</sup> Regretful of his own writings in the Soviet era, Ziyaev also apologized especially for his earlier use of the term “annexation” instead of “occupation” to name the Russian advances of late 19th century.<sup>724</sup>

---

<sup>719</sup> Ziyaev, *ibid.*, p. 27.

<sup>720</sup> Y. G. Gulomov. & R.N. Nabiyeu & M.G. Vahabov, *Uzbekiston SSR Tarihi*, Tashkent: Uzbekiston SSR Fanlar Akademiyası Nashriyati, 1958, p. 7.

<sup>721</sup> Hamid Ziyaev, *Türkistan’da Rus Hakimiyetine Karşı Mücadele*, (Ayhan Çelikbay trans.), Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2007, pp. 2-3.

<sup>722</sup> Ziyaev, *ibid.*, p. 1.

<sup>723</sup> James Critchlow, *Nationalism in Uzbekistan: A Soviet Republic’s Road to Sovereignty*, Boulder & San Francisco & Oxford: Westview Press, 1991, p. 133.

<sup>724</sup> Ziyaev, *ibid.*, p. 4.

Ziyaev uncovered his views on the inevitability of the Soviet dissolution as well. Ziyaev argued that first of all the pre-conditions for a socialist regime was lacking in Uzbekistan and the groundless regime could only rely on totalitarian methods. Secondly, appeared to discover the virtues of the capitalist system, our Soviet-trained historian became aware that without private property and free market the Soviet system would collapse in any way. Last but not the least, according to Ziyaev the atheist regime was operating in violation to the centuries old customs and traditions of Uzbek people.<sup>725</sup> As the archetypal official historian of independent Uzbekistan, Hamid Ziyaev serves in canonizing existing regime as the antithesis of the ‘evil’ Soviet administration. Highly responsive to the modern khan living in the Tashkent Presidential Palace, Ziyaev has been busy in stuffing the Uzbek regime with “history and life” as demanded by Islam Karimov:

“I do not consider the history written in the Soviet period as the History...Being history-less means being lifeless”.<sup>726</sup>

#### **5.1.4. Histories for Practical Needs**

In the opening article of *New Approaches to the Complex Mysteries of Uzbekistan History*, Azamat Ziya severely criticized Uzbek historiography for its failure to appreciate Uzbek tradition of statehood even after the independence.<sup>727</sup> The article published by the Uzbekistan Academy of Sciences asserted that whilst all the states hitherto established in an interrupted sequence were directly related to the motherland and the Uzbek society, the history books did not properly tell their

---

<sup>725</sup> Hamid Ziyaev, *Tarihning Achilmagan Sahifalari*, Tashkent: Mehnat, 2003, pp. 167-169.

<sup>726</sup> Hamid Ziyaev, *Uzbekiston Mustemleke va Zulm Iskenjesinde (XIX Asir Ikkinci Yarmi – XX Asir Bashlari)*, Tashkent: Uzbekiston Fanlar Akademiyası Tarih Institutı, 2006, p. 10.

<sup>727</sup> *Uzbekiston Tarihinin Dolzarb Muammalariga Yengi Çizgilar*, Tashkent: Uzbekiston Fanlar Akademiyası Tarih Institutı, 1999.

history.<sup>728</sup> Ziya has related this failure due to the affect of continuing Eurocentricism, the influence of communism dictating a history based on class-states and lastly the impact of Russian great power policy and chauvinism. For Ziya, since the Russian ethnogenesis happened as late as IX century, the earlier Uzbek tradition of statehood was passed over throughout the Soviet era.<sup>729</sup>

Karim Shaniyezov was quick to response in illuminating the immemorial ethnogenesis of Uzbeks in his *Formation Path of the Uzbek People*.<sup>730</sup> Adapting late Soviet anthropologist Bromley's ethnos theory to Uzbek case, Shaniyezov located Uzbek ethnogenesis in a significantly old and lengthy period, from third century BC to fifth century AD. For him, Turkic speaking ethnoses migrating from North and East gradually intermingled with the Persian speaking indigenous ethnos of Uzbekistan in the course of long centuries through socio-economic relations.<sup>731</sup> By this way Uzbek people were figured as the autochthonous population of modern-day Uzbekistan. In addition, alleged primordality of Uzbek identity paved way to claim that Uzbeks were the heir of a great state tradition and civilization compared to the Russians whose ethnic formation was far late. Similarly Adhamjan Aşirov asserted that modern Uzbek culture had relics of prehistoric belief systems such as totemism, Shamanism and Zoroastrianism. Aşirov's *Ancient Beliefs and Rituals of Uzbek People* seemed to claim that psychological and cultural make-up of Uzbek nation was the culmination of all preceding civilizations.<sup>732</sup> Attaching Uzbek culture to the most ancient cultures of the Central Asia was certainly a genuine way to claim the ownership of the territory of Uzbekistan.

---

<sup>728</sup> *ibid.*, p. 6.

<sup>729</sup> *ibid.*, p. 8.

<sup>730</sup> Karim Shaniyezov, *Uzbek Halkining Shekillenish Jereyani*, Tashkent: Uzbekiston Respublikasi Fanlar Akademiyası Tarih Instituti & Achik Jamiyat Instituti Uzbekistonga Madad Fonu-Soros, 2001.

<sup>731</sup> *ibid.*, p. 84.

<sup>732</sup> Adhamjan Aşirov, *Uzbek Halkinin Kadimi Ibtikad ve Marasimlari*, Tashkent: Alisher Novai Nomidagi Uzbekiston, Milli Kutuphanasi Neshriyati, 2007.

The historiography in modern Uzbekistan had increasingly adopted a negative stance regarding the Russian hegemony and the Soviet experience. The narrative turned into a standard post-colonial account: Russians had invaded Uzbek lands by means of violence and cruelty in order to exploit the white gold, the cotton. Then Soviet regime was basically a continuation of the exploitation.<sup>733</sup> Uzbeks were leading the world civilization and even the source of the European Renaissance of the 15th and 17th centuries could be found in the Middle Eastern and the Central Asian civilizations of which the Uzbek culture laid at the very core.<sup>734</sup> Unfortunately the Russian invasion and subsequent exploitation had impeded further flourishing of Uzbek culture and economy. The anti-Russian stance has been noticeable particularly in new history textbooks to the extent that phrases of ‘Russian spies’, ‘Russian oppressors’, ‘Russian subjugators’ and ‘the Russian monsters’ were repeated 292 times in a textbook of 316 pages.<sup>735</sup>

## 5.2. TURKEY

### 5.2.1. The Ottoman Historiography

Ottoman historiography also started through the works of embedded chroniclers who were following the Persian literary tradition of palace historians. First Ottoman chroniclers appeared in early 15th century, more than a century after the establishment of Osman’s chiefdom around Söğüt. Yahşi Fakih, the son of

---

<sup>733</sup> D. A. Alimova (eds.), *Tarikh Şahidligi ve Saboklari: Çarizm va Sovyet Müstemlekeçiliği Devrinde Uzbekiston Milli Bagliklarining Izleshtirilişi*, Tashkent: Şark Neshriyati, 2001, p. 3.

<sup>734</sup> M. M. Hayrullaev, *Orta Asiyada IX – XII Asirlarda Madani Tarakkiyat (Uyganish Davri Madaniyyati)*, Tashkent: Uzbekiston Respublikasi Fanlar Akademiyasi “Fan” Nashriyati, p. 9.

<sup>735</sup> “Russian Envoy Voices Discontent over Uzbek History Textbooks” *Delovaya Nedelya Web Site*, Almaty, in Russian 2003, 22 March, translated and transmitted by BBC Monitoring Service on 2003, 25 March.



Orhan Bey's *imam İshak Fakih*, was largely accepted as the first Ottoman chronicler. Although no piece of Yahşi Fakih's chronics remained today, Aşıkpaşazade's *Tevarih-i Ali Osman* included long references to Yahşi Fakih.<sup>736</sup> Ahmedî's *İskendername* was another late 14th century chronic. Ahmedî who was initially a chronicler attached to the Germiyan court became affiliated with the Ottoman sultan after the annexation of Germiyan lands by Bayezid I. Akdağ maintained that Ahmedî was the pioneer of the Ottoman history-writing since his work had been influential on the chroniclers of the later generations such as Şirvanlı Şükrullah and Edirmeli Ruhi writing in the reigns of Murad II and Mehmed II.<sup>737</sup>

Early Ottoman chronicles were a mixture of facts with legends, eyewitnessed events with palace gossips. The chronicles were written in a literary style and included long parts flattering the Sultan in an artistic fashion. Presented to the Sultan mostly in Persian and from time to time also in Arabic and Turkish the chronicles were authored in expectation of prestige among the *ulema* of the era and an economic reward from the sultan or his court. In 1550s Süleyman I, the magnificent, institutionalized the office of the court historian in the name of *şehnameci* at the Ottoman Palace for the first time.<sup>738</sup> It is noteworthy that the Palace did not feel the need to employ a permanent chronicler all through three centuries when the Ottoman armies were the mightiest of Europe and Middle East and the Sultans one after another were gaining brilliant victories in all fronts. Woodhead once claimed that the office of *şehnameci* was created by ageing Süleyman I toward the end of his reign as a result of his perception of threat from increasing popularity of his two sons, the *shahzades* Mustafa and Bayezid. Then

---

<sup>736</sup> Sencer Divitçioğlu, *Osmanlı Beyliğinin Kuruluşu*, Istanbul: Eren, 2008, p. 17. Divitçioğlu notes that Aşıkpaşazade fell seriously ill while passing via Gebze in 1413 and hosted by Yahşi Fakih. In his *Tevarih-i Ali Osman* Aşıkpaşazade quoted passages from Yahşi Fakih's text which he read during his convalescence period at Fakih's house.

<sup>737</sup> Havva Akdağ, *Tek Parti ve Demokrat Parti Dönemi Lise Tarih Ders Kitaplarının Muhtevası*, MA thesis, Konya: Selçuk Üniversitesi, 2005, pp. 2-3.

<sup>738</sup> Taner Timur, *Osmanlı Kimliği*, Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, October 2000, pp. 105-106.

during the reigns of Süleyman I, his son Selim II and especially his grandson Murad III, court historians produced accounts of “proven ability of dynasty to rule justly” and also on the personal qualities of the Sultan.<sup>739</sup> Therefore Ottoman histories of the pre-Tanzimat era were exclusively chronological narratives which were produced for the consumption of narrow elite.<sup>740</sup>

Kodaman noticed three stages in the development of Turkish education system. First, the *madrasah* stage corresponded to the period before the *Tanzimat*. The *madrasah* education was supported by *waqfs* which were independent organizations financed by donations of local wealth-owners and aimed at the dissemination of religious practices and theological ethics.<sup>741</sup> Thus the system which was completely out of the control of the state could not specialize on the earthly history. At most the *madrasahs* might train barely the *ehl-i siyer* who were authoring their “*siyer-i nebevî*”, history of prophets, and lastly the life of Muhammad as their masterpiece.<sup>742</sup> Moreover the education system was highly segmented because beside the absence of a central authority of education for Islamic *madrasah*, non-Muslim minorities also had their distinct religious schools with different curricula. The second stage in Turkish education comprised of the years between 1839 and 1918, beginning immediately after the *Tanzimat* and consisted of the long reign of Abdülhamid and then rule of the Committee of Union and Progress to the end of the First World War. The period was marked by efforts for centralization and westernization in education. For Kodaman in this period

---

<sup>739</sup> Christine Woodhead, “Murad III and the Historians: Representations of Ottoman Imperial Authority in Late 16th Century Historiography”, p. 97 in Hakan T. Karateke & Maurus Reinkowski (eds.), *Legitimizing the Order: The Ottoman Rhetoric of State Power*, Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2005.

<sup>740</sup> Mehmet Ö. Alkan, “İmparatorluk’tan Cumhuriyet’e Modernleşme ve Ulusçuluk Sürecinde Eğitim”, Kemal H. Karpat (eds.), *Osmanlı Geçmişi ve Bugünün Türkiye’si*, İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2005, p. 143.

<sup>741</sup> Bayram Kodaman, *Abdülhamid Devri Eğitim Sistemi*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1991, p. ix.

<sup>742</sup> Siyer is the Islamic histories on the lives of the prophet and his close circle and *ehl-i siyer* were the group of religious practitioners who were specialized on writing the lives of Prophets.

while *madrrasah* had become increasingly marginalized for the state, *mekteb* created a class of bureaucrats and intellectuals timidly secular and mimicking western counterparts.<sup>743</sup> *Mekteb* historians were to write the first histories revolving around states, not of prophets or dynasties. But although the novel *mekteb* education achieved to reach a relatively wide population, until the Republic centralization and uniformity in education system could not be achieved. The *okul* replaced both *madrrasah* and *mekteb* after the education was standardized and centralized without any exception via one of the first regulations of the Republic, the *Tevhid-i Tedrisat* Law of 1924. The *okul* would then be the arena in which the national history to be taught via official uniform textbooks.

Mostly in line with Kodaman's periodization of Ottoman education, Azmi Süslü classified Ottoman historiography in four periods. In the first period, the structure of the pre-Tanzimat Ottoman society, which was characterized by "a conservative, pacifist and passive life style" and an unchallenged belief in the eternity of the Ottoman order, left its imprint on the Ottoman historiography. Hence Ottoman historians were delimited within the "traditional Islamic history" and could not pay sufficient attention to true Turkish history. The second period of Ottoman historiography was the Tanzimat era and the religious history has been accompanied by a "state history". According to Süslü, Tanzimat historiography was an "Ottoman state historianism". The third period was between the Tanzimat and the First Constitutional Period in which the ideology of Ottomanism was influential in history-writing. The fourth period was from the Second Constitutional Period to the fall of the Empire. In this period Turkish history was dealt together with the Islamic history and for the first time pre-Islamic Turkish states became subjects of several history books. Nevertheless, all these works included numerous factually untrue data.<sup>744</sup>

---

<sup>743</sup> Kodaman, *ibid.*, p. xiii.

<sup>744</sup> Azmi Süslü, "Atatürk and History, pp. 163-164, in Ayşegül Amanda Yeşilbursa (trans.), *A Handbook of Kemalist Thought*, Ankara: Atatürk Research Center, 2004.

Mengüç concurred Kodaman and Süslü that the Tanzimat had been a turning point in the Ottoman education and historiography. For him Ottoman history-writing passed through three consecutive periods: the beginning, development and reform periods. The beginning period was characterized by Perso-Islamic tradition and was in form of a military history. The victories of the Ottoman army and the skillful commandership of Ottoman sultans were the major topic in these histories. The development period commenced with, so to speak, the stagnation of Beyazıd II.<sup>745</sup> Royal events, births, deaths, circumcision ceremonies of *shahzades*, daily lives of Sultan and the dynasty were the standard subjects of histories in this period. The last period of Ottoman historiography starting from middle of 19th century was characterized by ever-increasing influence of the West. Reports and experiences of the Ottoman embassies opened in 1790s, publication of first newspaper *Takvim-i Vekayi* and official gazette after 1830s, foundation of the Academy of Sciences (Encümen-i Daniş) and then the Translation Office (Tercüme Odası) in 1851 paved way new history-writing. This Tanzimat historiography would also include the European and the world history.<sup>746</sup>

Without resorting to periodisation Kemal Karpat distinguished two tendencies in historiography of school books in 19th century Ottoman Empire. The first tendency was the official approach which situated Ottoman history in the general context of Islamic history. The second tendency according to Karpat was to concentrate specifically on the Ottoman history. As the centrifugal nationalisms of various *millets* increased and several of them separated in order to found their nation-states the Turkic ingredient was multiplied within the latter perspective.<sup>747</sup> Tekindağ was in agreement with Karpat that particularly after the Selim I's conquest of Syria and Egypt and the subsequent incorporation of the Caliphate into

---

<sup>745</sup> Murat Cem Mengüç, *Historiography and Nationalism: A Study Regarding the Proceedings of the First Turkish History Congress*, MA thesis, Montreal: McGill University, September 2002, p. 25.

<sup>746</sup> Mengüç, *ibid.*, pp. 33-35.

<sup>747</sup> Kemal H. Karpat, *Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Kimlik ve İdeoloji*, İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2009, p. 30.

Ottoman dynasty, history-writing turned out to be within the framework of Islam; “History of Ottoman” became an extension of “History of Islam”.<sup>748</sup> The *Zeitgeist* required religio-political histories as the dynasties were being sanctified by traditions intermingled with religious practices. In addition, the intellectual make-up of the *ulama* who were being nurtured in *madrasahs* with extensively religious curriculum, were merely apt to craft Islamic histories.

History lessons were first put in the school curricula just before the First Constitutional Period. The first regulation on education, *Maarif-i Umumiye Nizamnamesi* was adopted in September 1, 1869 with the initiative of Saffet Pasha. Through the new school programs adopted by the regulation, two history courses were introduced in the primary schools (*sıbyan mektebi*); one was ‘General History’ and the other being ‘Short Ottoman History’. In addition the regulation concluded that a course titled ‘General History and Ottoman History’ would be mandatory at secondary schools and a ‘General History’ course at high schools.<sup>749</sup> In the early years of Abdülhamid II’s long reign, the Tanzimat atmosphere was still persistent. Süleyman Pasha’s *Tarih-i Alem* written in 1876 was used as the history textbook in military schools. In the book Turks were described as the descendants of Yafes, one of the three sons of Noah. Karpaz observed that toward the end of 19th century the notion that Turks were the founders of the Ottoman Empire gained prominence in history books.<sup>750</sup> Mehmed Tevfik Pasha’s *Telhis-i Tarih-i Osman-i* which was published in 1884 similarly claimed that Yafes and thus Prophet Noah were the forerunners of Turks.<sup>751</sup> Ottoman intellectuals were searching for “a people” as French, German, Italian elites were crafting one for

---

<sup>748</sup> Şahabettin Tekindağ, “Osmanlı Tarih Yazıcılığı”, *Belleten*, Vol: 35, No: 140, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1971, p. 656.

<sup>749</sup> Tuba Şengül, “Political Idea Movements and Intellectual Changes in the History Curricula (1908-1930)”, *Ankara University Journal of Faculty of Educational Sciences*, Vol: 40, No: 1, 2007, p. 77.

<sup>750</sup> Kemal H. Karpaz, *Osmanlı’dan Günümüze Kimlik ve İdeoloji*, İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2009, p. 30.

<sup>751</sup> Timur, Taner, *Osmanlı Kimliği*, Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, October 2000, p. 110.

themselves at that time. Nevertheless yet the Ottoman elites were not ready to come across the *etrak-ı bi idrak*, but rather a sanctified Turk descending from a Prophet.

Alkan claimed that the origins official history in the Ottoman Empire could be traced in the Abdülhamid era. The Sultan was eager to spread education to the furthest provinces of the Empire and founded numerous *idadis* and *rüştiyes* all over the empire.<sup>752</sup> However, Abdülhamid was also very watchful of the school curricula in order to breed a conservative bureaucrat class loyal to the sultan and immune to the “destructive ideas” such as *liberté*, *égalité* and *fraternité* diffusing into the Empire. For instance, Mizancı Murad’s history book *Tarih-i Umumi* was removed from the curriculum and then banned because of large place given to the French Revolution.<sup>753</sup> In addition in the Abdülhamid era history courses were abolished in primary schools together with geography and ethics courses; instead religious ingredient in the primary school program considerably mounted.<sup>754</sup>

Young Ottomans were hoping that the idea of the Ottoman fatherland would unite different ethnic groups of the Empire under the supra-national Ottoman identity. Accordingly next to the Islamic history, first history textbooks had focused on the Ottoman fatherland. Then again duties to fatherland were replaced by duties to the Sultan in the Abdülhamid era.<sup>755</sup> Abdülhamid II initially

---

<sup>752</sup> Mehmet Ö. Alkan, “İmparatorluk’tan Cumhuriyet’e Modernleşme ve Ulusçuluk Sürecinde Eğitim”, *ibid.*, p. 8. While the *idadis* were more or less in the same status as today’s high schools, *rüştiyes* were schools for secondary education. The Hamidian period saw in 1884 Bursa, Yanya, Edirne and Çanakkale *idadis* to be opened. It was surprising that two ex-capitals of the Empire, Bursa and Edirne did not have *idadis* until 1884. Enver Ziya Karal claims that even if twenty-three additional *idadis* were decided to be established in cities such as Izmir, Trabzon, Kastamonu, Adana, Konya, Skopje, Aleppo and Jerusalem, in 1908 there were only thirteen *idadis* throughout the Empire. Karal insists that “it is hard to assert that in Hamidian era high school education has advanced.” Enver Ziya Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi VIII. Cilt: Birinci Meşrutiyet ve İstibdat Devirleri 1876-1907*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1983, p. 392.

<sup>753</sup> Alkan, *ibid.*, p. 143.

<sup>754</sup> Alkan, *ibid.*, p. 126.

<sup>755</sup> Alkan, *ibid.*, p. 108.

hoped that increasing religiosity in education would re-produce absolute monarchy and create a generation loyal to sultan.<sup>756</sup> Halil İnalcık accurately noted that long-term political reward of history-writing was well understood by Ottoman rulers; history would be basis for future claims and demands.<sup>757</sup> In its promoting of religious and sultanic authority, Hamidian ideology intended to prevent dissolution at least in the Islamic portions of the Empire.

Director of Istanbul Darülmüallimin, the Teacher School, Satı Bey who was appointed just after the ouster of Abdülhamid II in 1908, argued that patriotic feelings and loyalty to fatherland should be promoted in the history books.<sup>758</sup> However, the above-mentioned fatherland did not have any Turkic connotations; on the contrary, the multi-ethnic Ottoman fatherland was in the mind of Satı Bey. Satı Bey, the Unionist has not become Sati al Husrî, the Arab nationalist at the moment yet.<sup>759</sup> It is striking to see in this future ideologue of Arab nationalism that the two pillars of Hamidian ideology Ottomanism and Islamism were highly influential among the Unionists especially in the early years of the Second Constitutional Period. Similarly Şengül in her analyses of the contents of the history books in the last decade of the Ottoman Empire revealed that three ideological currents, Islamism, Ottomanism and Westernism were dominant in the late Ottoman and early Republican periods.<sup>760</sup>

---

<sup>756</sup> The aim of the education in the Abdülhamid period was formulated as to create *ubudiyet gösteren bendegân* that is an elite loyal to (political) authority. Alkan, *ibid.*, p. 117.

<sup>757</sup> Halil İnalcık's argument was quoted in Büşra Ersanlı Behar, *İktidar ve Tarih: Türkiye'de "Resmî Tarih" Tezinin Oluşumu (1929-1937)*, İstanbul: Afa Yayınları, 1996, p. 43.

<sup>758</sup> Şengül, *ibid.*, p. 78.

<sup>759</sup> Satı Bey who was an Ottoman citizen of Arabic origin, turned into one of the major Arab nationalist thinkers as Sati al-Husrî after the dissolution of Ottoman Empire. Sati al-Husrî would be Minister of Education first in Syria then in Iraq. Lastly he would serve at the Cultural Directorate of the League of Arab States until mid-1960s.

<sup>760</sup> Şengül, *ibid.*, p. 83.

Following the 31 Mart Incident and the ouster of Abdülhamid II, the Committee of Union and Progress came to rule the dissolving Empire, first by sharing power with pasha *nomenclatura* of the Ottoman bureaucracy and the army, then single-handedly after 1913. The idea of the Ottoman fatherland continued to be influential in the Unionist policy of *ittihad-ı anasır*<sup>761</sup> to unite different ethnic groups under the Ottoman identity. The history courses returned to the primary schools in the Second Constitutional Period; so were the French Revolution and its revolutionary ideas against Bourbon monarchy to the history textbooks. The impact of Western historiography and particularly of the French *école* was at its zenith. “After the declaration of the constitutional monarchy the ‘history fasting’ came to an end, history writers and translators have increased. These historians were merely translators of the French history books in general, and Seignobos in particular. With constitutional monarchy the reign of Seignobos has started in Ottoman schools”<sup>762</sup> said Yusuf Akçura who had personally become a student of Seignobos in Paris. Arıkan maintained that Ali Reşat’s history books which were mostly produced by translation from French historians were the principal textbooks in secondary and high schools during the Unionist period. It was remarkable that the French Revolution was taught in these books through long pages by analogy reminding overthrow of Abdülhamid II and establishment of the Unionist authority.

Authority demand obedience and loyalty. Sultan Abdülhamid promoted loyalty to the Sultan and the dynasty; for Hamidian ideology as long as the sultanic government operated within the jurisdiction of *sharia*, obedience to the Caliph was a must. All through the Hamidian era official historiography endorsed the religious and sultanic legitimacy. At the outset, the Unionist elite had to apply the last resort for the continuation of the Empire which was the equality of different ethnic

---

<sup>761</sup> “Ittihad-ı anasır” literally meant the “unity of the components”. The Committee of Union and Progress initially favored the policy of *ittihad-ı anasır* to prevent the dissolution of the Empire.

<sup>762</sup> Zeki Arıkan, “Ders Kitaplarında Avrupa Tarihi”, Özbaran, Salih (eds.), *Tarih Öğretimi ve Ders Kitapları: 1994 Buca Sempozyumu*, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1995, p. 152. Arıkan, *ibid.*, pp. 155-156.



groups before the law and priority of law over all earthly or heavenly bases of legitimation. Hence as Nuri Doğan stated that the religious law and the Sultan had lost their priority regarding obedience under the CUP government. The CUP era also demanded loyalty to the sultan and *sharia* but the newly reinstated constitution, *Kanun-i Esasi* was elevated to the utmost authority. In the school textbooks of the Second Constitutional Era there was no glorification of the Sultan Mehmed Reşad who was enthroned after Abdülhamid II.<sup>763</sup>

### 5.2.2. Early Years of Republic to the Foundation of Turkish Historical Society

“Turks could not establish an empire in Anatolia as being nomads. There must be another explanation of this. Historical science should reveal this.”

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk<sup>764</sup>

The new regime left intact the Ottomanist history-writing in the first decade of the Republic. Ahmed Hamid and Mustafa Muhsin Bey’s book titled *Turkish History* was the primary history book until 1929 at secondary schools.<sup>765</sup> However, Hamid and Muhsin Bey’s *Turkish History* was devoted entirely to the Ottoman Period. What is more the book was narrating that before Islam Turks were living as more or less primitive tribes, then the Ottoman state was established by one of these tribes, by mid-15th century Byzantine influence was also effective in Ottoman state together with the Seljukid legacy.<sup>766</sup> These theses were completely at odds with the

---

<sup>763</sup> Nuri Doğan, *Ders Kitapları ve Sosyalleşme (1876-1918)*, İstanbul: Bağlam, 1993, pp. 71-72.

<sup>764</sup> Enver Ziya Karal (eds.), *Atatürk'ten Düşünceler*, İstanbul: Çağdaş Yayınları, 1991, p. 125.

<sup>765</sup> Since the signature on the cover of the book was read as Hamid Muhsin, Poulton wrote “Hamid Muhsin” as if one person authored the book. In fact the book was co-authored by Ahmed Hamid and Mustafa Muhsin. Hugh Poulton, *Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic*, Washington Square, New York: New York University Press, 1997, p. 104. Please look Zeki Arıkan, “Ders Kitaplarında Avrupa Tarihi” p. 155 in Salih Özbaran (eds.), *Tarih Öğretimi ve Ders Kitapları: 1994 Buca Sempozyumu*, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1995.

<sup>766</sup> Ersanlı Behar, *ibid.*, pp. 101-102.

forthcoming Turkish History Thesis. In addition, Ali Reşat's aforementioned history textbook which was originally written in the Unionist Era was updated and used in high schools throughout the first years of the Republic.<sup>767</sup> On the other hand, after the Law on Unification of Education of 1924, the first school curricula of the Republic included the "pre-Islamic history of Turks, which was carefully avoided during the Ottoman period".<sup>768</sup> Moreover with the initiative of Ziya Gökalp a new course, 'History of Turkish Civilization' was added in the school curricula.<sup>769</sup> Although the dominant perspective of prioritizing the Ottoman era in history-writing persisted, pre-Ottoman history of Turks began to find place in the school programs in the first half decade of the Republic.

Meanwhile, Suavi Aydın found the first clues of Turkish Historical Thesis as early as 1922 in the negotiations of the Lausanne Peace Treaty. In Lausanne negotiations countering Greek representative Venizelos who argued that Greeks were in Anatolia and Thrace for twenty centuries, İsmet Pasha replied that "most competent historians had accepted that since the most ancient times Anatolian people was Turkic".<sup>770</sup> The second early instance of the Turkish history thesis was the book titled *Pontus Mes'alesi* (The Pontus Problem) printed by an official printing house in 1922. Predictably the book was typically propagating the Turkishness of Pontus region, the north-eastern piece of Anatolia since ancient ages; it was predictable because at the same time Turkish army was at war with Greek forces in Western Anatolia.<sup>771</sup> Aydın remarked that the practical use of Turkish History Thesis was its instrumentality to prove the historical seniority of

---

<sup>767</sup> Arıkan, *ibid.*, p. 157.

<sup>768</sup> Ahmet Eskicumalı, *Ideology and Education: Reconstructing the Turkish Curriculum for Social and Cultural Change, 1923-1946*, PhD thesis, University of Wisconsin Madison, 1994, p. 153.

<sup>769</sup> Eskicumalı, *ibid.*

<sup>770</sup> Suavi Aydın noted that İsmet Pasha was referring to French historian Maspéro. Suavi Aydın, "Resmî Tarihin Temeli: Ulusal Tarih Yazımı ve Resmî Tarihte Mitlerin Kaynağı", p. 59 in Fikret Başkaya (eds.), *Resmî Tarih Tartışmaları-I*, Ankara: Özgür Üniversite Kitaplığı, 2005.

<sup>771</sup> Aydın, *ibid.*, p. 59.

Turks in Anatolia where Kemalist Republic aspired to establish the Turkish nation-state.<sup>772</sup>

After the consolidation of his authority by 1928/29, Mustafa Kemal devoted most of his time and energy to activities on Turkish language and history. The standard story posits an episode between Mustafa Kemal and his adopted daughter Afet İnan who was lecturing as a history teacher. In 1928, İnan showed Mustafa Kemal a French geography book that was labeling Turks as of yellow race and thus *secondarie*, second class human type. Mustafa Kemal fiercely opposed this classification and ordered her to work on this and later he personally set about hard work on history.<sup>773</sup> Mustafa Kemal was uncomfortable with the widespread attitude in Western academia depicting Turks as primitive and barbarian tribes. Ironically the Western tendency was in line with the dominant Ottoman prejudice that viewed Turks as *etrak-ı bi-idrak*.<sup>774</sup> Mustafa Kemal was also distrustful about the Young Ottoman myth that a tribe of three hundred tents had created a worldwide empire. For him a relatively small group of nomads could not create such a large empire, on the contrary there should be a legacy of advanced civilization and thousands of years' statehood.<sup>775</sup> Writing in early 1930s one of the earliest Kemalist protégés, Şevket Aziz argued that a new approach inspired by zoological and anthropological features of humanity was flourishing in the world academia. According to him, Mustafa Kemal was the first to “apply this new historical approach to a large nation and a long history”.<sup>776</sup> Then Şevket Aziz proceeded to count views of various racist historians and anthropologists and their

---

<sup>772</sup> Aydın, *ibid.*, p. 57.

<sup>773</sup> Afet İnan, “Atatürk ve Tarih Tezi”, *Bellekten*, Vol: 3, No: 10, April 1939, p. 244.

<sup>774</sup> Eskicumalı, *ibid.*, p. 176. *etrak-ı bi-idrak* literally meant “Turks, without comprehension”.

<sup>775</sup> İnan, *ibid.*

<sup>776</sup> Şevket Aziz, “Türk Tarihi ve Asya'nın Biodinamik ve Antropodinamik Kudreti”, *Ülkü*, Vol: 3, No: 18, August 1934, p. 413.

pseudo-scientific theories which were popular in Europe during the inter-war period.<sup>777</sup>

After two years of extensive reading and searching on history, particularly regarding the ancient roots of Turks and regular discussions at his famous Dolmabahçe Palace and Çankaya dinners, Mustafa Kemal ordered a Turkish History Committee to be established under the Turkish Hearths. In April 1930 Turkish History Committee was founded and Mustafa Kemal personally set a research agenda for the committee in order to illuminate the earliest local inhabitants of Anatolia and Turks' role in world civilization and also in Islamic history.<sup>778</sup> Tevfik (Bıyıkoğlu) was the president of this first history committee, while Yusuf Akçura and Samih Rıfat were appointed as vice-presidents; Reşit Galip was acting as the general secretary.<sup>779</sup> In June, however the Turkish Hearths were abolished and the members were ordered to function within the Republican People Party. As a result of this, history commission was also incorporated into the party. Almost one year after the foundation of the first history commission, on April 15, 1931 Turkish History Research Society was established with two urgent tasks.<sup>780</sup> The first task of the Society was to create hurriedly a history book for the high schools. Secondly Mustafa Kemal demanded from the Society to organize a history congress.

### **5.2.3. ...And Turks Migrated All Over the World: Turkish History Thesis**

Ruşen Eşref Ünaydın, a long time guest of Mustafa Kemal's famous dinner table, made a note that the first central board of the Turkish Historical Society who

---

<sup>777</sup> Şevket Aziz, *ibid.*, pp. 414-421.

<sup>778</sup> Eskicumalı, *ibid.*, p. 178.

<sup>779</sup> Ersanlı Behar, *ibid.*, p. 95.

<sup>780</sup> Ayten Sezer (eds.), *Atatürk ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Tarihi*, Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, August 2003, p. 302.

would later propose the “Turkish History Thesis” after their meeting at the quarters of Turkish Hearts, had initially summoned at the Çankaya dinner under Mustafa Kemal’s patronage. In fact after 1928, but especially in 1930s Mustafa Kemal dedicated himself to reading and researching Turkish history and language. In this period Mustafa Kemal ordered major history books to be brought from Europe and translated into Turkish including H. G. Wells’ *Main Features of World History*. Kabapınar argued that Wells’ book would inspire at least the name of the history book authored by the Turkish History Research Society, the *Main Features of Turkish History* or in its original name *Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatları* (hereafter TTAH).<sup>781</sup> Ünaydın noticed that for a while terms such as Sumerian, Akkadian, Babylon, Iberian, Hittite, Celtic and Breton were being echoed in Mustafa Kemal’s mind and speeches.<sup>782</sup>

Most accounts of Kemalism attach a pragmatic value to regime’s and specifically Mustafa Kemal’s extreme interest in history. All Kemalist cadres who were ex-Unionists and also military and civil bureaucrats of the Ottoman Empire had bad memories of territorial demands by the irredentist minorities in their then dissolved state. Arıkan claimed that Mustafa Kemal’s interest in history was not causeless since he was fully aware that the Ottoman state was partitioned on the basis of a certain understanding of history. In addition, Mustafa Kemal’s generation saw the triumphant powers declaring their ‘historic rights’ on pieces of the Ottoman land at the negotiations of the Sevres Treaty, the funeral procession of the Empire. Arıkan lined up: “Greeks were producing statistical data to prove that Western Anatolia had been Hellenic, Italians were alleging that they were the grandchildren of the Romans who were the hegemonic power in Anatolia for centuries. Even the French was claiming ‘historical right’ over Anatolia.”<sup>783</sup> The

---

<sup>781</sup> Yücel Kabapınar, “Başlangıcından Günümüze Türk Tarih Tezi ve Lise Tarih Kitaplarına Etkisi”, p. 144.

<sup>782</sup> Ruşen Eşref Ünaydın, *Atatürk Tarih ve Dil Kurumları-Hatıralar*, Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1954, p. 55.

<sup>783</sup> Zeki Arıkan, “Atatürk ve Tarih”, *Çağdaş Türkiye Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi*, Vol: 2, No: 6-7, 1997, p. 20.

claims of seniority on a particular territory and the alleged majority of a certain ethnic group in population, or in other words “the Wilsonian trauma”, paved way to the partition of the Empire.<sup>784</sup> Thus, Mustafa Kemal should refute all competing claims of seniority over Anatolia through Turkish History Thesis.

Another widely held account of the Turkish History Thesis argued that the thesis was proposed as a correction to the failure of Ottoman historiography in defining accurately the Ottoman people with its Turkish essence. İhsan Akay, for instance argued that the Ottoman Empire deleted all imprints of Turkishness during its long reign of six centuries. For him, despite Turkish history was as old as the history of humanity, Ottomans completely abandoned self-definition as “Turk”; only foreigners were naming Turks with their proper ethnic name.<sup>785</sup> Ünaydın denounced two historical approaches which were influential before the Turkish History Thesis. The first was the traditional historical account of Ottoman ideology that the nation had originated from the Kayi tribe which in turn descended from Oghuz Khan. The second historical approach was Ziya Gökalp’s nationalist approach which gained prominence in the Second Constitutional Period with the rise of the CUP. Ünaydın condemned Turkic historiography of Gökalp as mystic and metaphysical due to his search for roots in Turanian legends and mythology.<sup>786</sup> For Ünaydın, Kemalist history-writing properly rejected to assess the Turk as both merely a branch of a tribe or an extended family and also as a group of intruder struck deep in the darkness of Asia and being late-comer barbarians broke forcefully in the European civilization.<sup>787</sup>

---

<sup>784</sup> Undoubtedly Ottoman Empire has been the sick man of Europe for at least a century due to its historical miss of the industrialization and modernization. However, World War I and the Wilsonian principle of national self-determination were the gravediggers of the Empire.

<sup>785</sup> İhsan Akay, *Atatürkçülüğün İlkeleri*, İstanbul: Varlık Yayınları, 1973, p. 139.

<sup>786</sup> Ünaydın, *ibid.*, pp. 55-56.

<sup>787</sup> Ünaydın, *ibid.*, pp. 58-59.

As noted in the previous section for the reason that the Kemalist regime could not consolidate itself safely until late 1920s, ideological super-structure would be built for the most part after 1928-1928. While history textbooks were still Ottoman-centric between 1924 and 1929, TTAH symbolized a radical break away from the Ottoman past and a thorough attempt to discover the pre-Ottoman past in Anatolia and Central Asia.<sup>788</sup> Yusuf Akçura, a prominent member of the commission that prepared TTAH, maintained that Turkish historiography should distance itself from the European perspective and “stop looking at world history through the eyes and the mirror of the French historians”.<sup>789</sup> Similarly the authors of TTAH complained in the first sentence of the book that

“Most history books published in Turkey and the French books which have inspired these books consciously or unconsciously minimized Turks’ role in world history. The chief aim of this book is to correct these failures and to take the first step towards the creation of a national history...The second aim is to overcome incorrect considerations on the formation of the universe, emergence of the first human being and the phases of humanity before the historical ages. These considerations which initially originated from the legends sacred for the Jewish have lost all their validity after recent scientific discoveries of our era”.<sup>790</sup>

The book was authored by a commission formed under Turkish Hearths through translation, compilation and also original contribution after an overview of 125 history books written in four foreign languages, English, German, French and Russian. As Ersanlı Behar noticed that not a single part of any Ottoman history book was used in the book, it seemed that the authors principally ignored the Ottoman history together with its historiography.<sup>791</sup> The commission consisted of Afet (İnan), Mehmet Tefvik (Bıyıköğlü), Samih Rıfat, Yusuf (Akçura), Reşit Galip, Hasan Cemil (Çambel), Sadri Maksudi (Arsal), Şemsettin (Günaltay), Vasıf (Çınar)

---

<sup>788</sup> Cemil Öztürk, *Tek Parti Döneminde Eğitimde Devlet ve İdeolojinin Rolü*, MA thesis, Afyon Kocatepe Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2008, pp. 156-157.

<sup>789</sup> David. S. Thomas, *The Life and Thought of Yusuf Akçura (1876-1935)*, PhD thesis, Montreal: McGill University, 1976, p. 189.

<sup>790</sup> *Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatları: Kemalist Yönetimin Resmi Tarih Tezi*, İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1999, p. 25.

<sup>791</sup> Büşra Ersanlı Behar, *İktidar ve Tarih: Türkiye’de “Resmi Tarih” Tezinin Oluşumu (1929-1937)*, İstanbul: Afa Yayınları, 1996, p. 104.

and Yusuf Ziya (Özer) all of whom were from Mustafa Kemal's close circle. Moreover, the group constituted a selected group from the political elite of the republic.<sup>792</sup> Samih Rıfat, Yusuf Akçura, Hasan Cemil, Sadri Maksudi, Şemsettin, Vasıf and Reşit Galip, all served as deputies at the Grand National Assembly respectively from Çanakkale, Istanbul, Bolu, Giresun, Sivas, Izmir and Aydın. Mehmed Tevfik was the General Secretary of the Presidency and Afet was Mustafa Kemal's adopted daughter. It was striking that TTAH was written hastily; upon the orders of Mustafa Kemal the research notes prepared by the initial Turkish history commission were transformed into a voluminous book in a few months in 1930.<sup>793</sup>

In the cover it was noted that the book was printed only a hundred copies in order to hear criticisms from the other associates of Turkish Historical Society and related people. The distribution of the subjects was noteworthy since TTAH put very little emphasis on the Ottoman and Islamic histories while dealing with China, India or ancient Anatolian and Greek civilizations in specific chapters. The Ottoman history was explained only in fifty pages as a sub-section of the last chapter titled "Central Asia". The history of the Turkish Republic which was established in 1923 after an eventful independence war and seven years before the writing of the TTAH was pressed into just one page. Ersanlı Behar's comment may be true that the need to discover the roots in Central Asia and ancient epochs should be imperative at the moment.<sup>794</sup>

---

<sup>792</sup> The surnames of Samih Rıfat and Reşit Galip was not included above, because they passed away before the adoption of the Law on the Surnames.

<sup>793</sup> Despite some members of the Commission had shyly informed Mustafa Kemal on the difficulty to prepare a genuine history book in months, upon insistence of Mustafa Kemal, TTAH was published in 1930 after a work day and night. Azmi Süslü, *ibid.*, p. 179.

<sup>794</sup> Ersanlı Behar, *ibid.*, p. 106.



**Table 2- Main Features of Turkish History Sections and Pages**<sup>795</sup>

<b>Title</b>	<b>Pages</b>
Introduction to the History of Humanity	34
Introduction to Turkish History	22
China	54
India	33
Kalde, Elam, Akkadian	25
Egypt	32
Anatolia	32
Aegean Basin	50
Old Italy and Etruscan Civilization	14
Iran	60
Central Asia	205
total	605

All of the hundred copies of TTAH were distributed to prominent historians and the Commission demanded reports including critics and suggestions. Most importantly, Mustafa Kemal himself first read the book carefully and then examined the reports sent by experts.<sup>796</sup> The general approach of the book was well appreciated by Mustafa Kemal and his court intellectuals. Hence TTAH would be the skeleton of Turkish History Thesis and the inspiration for the forthcoming high school history textbooks. Nevertheless, since written in haste, the book included numerous factual errors and Mustafa Kemal, asserting the book as a superficial compilation ordered the commission to elaborate a careful and more comprehensive textbook for the high schools.<sup>797</sup> Yusuf Akçura, the head of Turkish History Research Society, maintained that although there might have been faults in details in the history books authored by the Society, the main orientation of the attempt was right in its denial of the European perspective. Akçura averred that for the first time “Turkish race has become the axis of the history”.<sup>798</sup> Likewise Zorlu-Durukan argued that TTAH set the framework within

---

<sup>795</sup> Ersanlı Behar, *ibid.*, p. 103.

<sup>796</sup> Süslü, *ibid.*, p. 180.

<sup>797</sup> Süslü, *ibid.*, p. 179-180.

<sup>798</sup> Kabapınar, *ibid.*, p. 149.

which the primary, secondary and high school textbooks would be written. For her, history textbooks written in line with TTAH aimed at the “popularization of the Turkish History Thesis” among the young generation.<sup>799</sup> The principles of the Turkish History Thesis which were in line with the general approach of TTAH were briefed by one of the major figures of Kemalist elite, Reşit Galip:

1- The cradle of humanity is Central Asia; the life first emerged in this region.

2- The first civilization was founded by Turks in Central Asia who were the earliest and the autochthonous population of Central Asia.

3- Turkish race belongs to brachycephalic alpine type.

4- Considering Europe and Asian population movements, historically large migrations were not from West to East, but from East to West.

5- Because of the ever-increasing drought in Central Asia, Turkish people had to migrate to diverse places of the world and established the ancient civilizations at all these places. All ancient civilizations despite coming from the same source, developed according to the specific conditions of their new locations.

6- Turkish language is the mother language. Without analyzing the paleontology and archaic form of Turkish linguistic explorations cannot advance in the right direction.

7- Similar to the ancient civilizations Turks were the prominent creators of the more recent civilization which unfairly called as the Islamic civilization.

8- Since the Anatolian plateau is climatically the most similar place in the West to Central Asia and also geographically a bridge between Syria, Egypt, Palestine and Europe it has been a center of dense settlement and crossing by all migrant populations. Thus Anatolia entered a phase of Turkification in the Paleolithic era, then in the Chalcolithic era Turkification reached to its maximum extent. Lastly towards the end of the Seljukid era as a result of migration of thousands years Anatolian peninsula turned to inhabit one of the racially purest thoroughbred populations of the world.


9- Turkish people’s failure in fulfillment of its historical role of leadership in the development and rise of the world civilization during the last few centuries was a temporary period stemming from temporary causes. The racial essence with its all creativeness is still healthy.<sup>800</sup>

---

<sup>799</sup> Şefika Akile Zorlu-Durukan, *The Ideological Pillars of Turkish Education: Emergent Kemalism and the Zenith of Single-Party Rule*, PhD thesis, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2006, p. 133.

<sup>800</sup> Reşit Galip, “Türk Tarih İnkılabı ve Yabancı Tezler”, *Ülkü*, Vol: 9, 1933, pp. 167-168.

## Map 8 - Migration from Central Asia



Source: <http://www.polatkaya.net/SpreadFromTuran.jpg>

### 5.2.4. History Textbooks of the “Thesis”

Whilst the TTAH was disappointing for Mustafa Kemal, determined work to produce textbooks in concordance with Kemalist history thesis continued uninterrupted. In the first instance a shortened version of TTAH was prepared as the *Main Features of Turkish History-Introduction*<sup>801</sup> and printed in 30,000 copies in order to be distributed to all schools as an auxiliary to the ordinary textbooks in 1931-1932 school year. Finally in the following school year, new high school history textbooks which were prepared by the Turkish History Research Society

<sup>801</sup> *Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatları-Methal Kısmı*

under close supervision of the President replaced old history books. New textbooks were organized in four volumes each for a single year in high schools under the titles of *History I: Pre-historic Times and Ancient Times*, *History II: Medieval Times*, *History III: New and Recent Times*, *History IV: Republic of Turkey*.<sup>802</sup> In the preface of the books, the committee clarified its intention in crafting *Tarih* textbooks as to get rid of the infiltration of negative imputations towards the “Turk” via three dominant historical perspectives: The Euro-centric perspective that perceived Turkish history in the context of Christian-Islam conflict, the Islamic perspective subordinating Turkish history under history of the *ummah* and finally the Ottomanist historiography writing the history of the supra-national fictive Ottoman not the history of Turks:

“Under the influence of the animosity generated by the over 1000 years old confrontation between Islam and Christianity, conservative historians strove hard to present the history of the Turks, who were the upholders of Islam for centuries, as merely consisting of adventures full of blood and blaze. On the other hand, Turkish and Muslim historians have fused Turkishness and Turkish civilization with Islam and Islamic civilization; they regarded it a necessity of *ummah* politics and duty of faith to make people forget the pre-Islamic epochs of thousands of years. In more recent times, the policy of Ottomanism dreamt of creating one nation out of the numerous elements in the Ottoman Empire. In addition to the above-mentioned two, it contributed as a third factor to cloak the name Turk and, not only to neglect, but also erase National History from the pages it was already written on”.<sup>803</sup>

*History I: Pre-historic Times and Ancient Times* commenced with the earliest possible phase of history, the emergence of life on earth, then advances with the birth of the Turkish civilization and the early states in Turkish motherland, Central Asia. Later the most ancient civilizations of India, China, Aegean Basin, Egypt, Mesopotamia and Anatolia were included as the offshoots of the most ancient Central Asian civilization. The book inaugurated with an overtly

---

<sup>802</sup> The original titles were *Tarih I: Tarihten Evelki Zamanlar ve Eski Zamanlar*, *Tarih II: Ortazamanlar*, *Tarih III: Yeni ve Yakın Zamanlar*, *Tarih IV: Türkiye Cumhuriyeti*

<sup>803</sup> *Tarih I: Kemalist Eğitimin Tarih Dersleri (1931-1941)*, Istanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, November 2003, p. xi. This preface existed also in other volumes of the serie. The translation is derived from Şefika Akile Zorlu-Durukan, *The Ideological Pillars of Turkish Education: Emergent Kemalism and the Zenith of Single-Party Rule*, PhD thesis, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2006, p. 137.

evolutionist outlook; while rejecting religious explanations, *History I* stated that the life had evolved as a chain from the very first, so to speak semi-life in the seas to the homo-sapiens. In the same context the materialist thesis that “nothing vanishes in the nature and nothing comes from nothing” was repeated.<sup>804</sup> The first chapter was concluded with the most secular statement of the all history textbooks produced in Turkish history of education: “Religion and the idea of God are the constructions of human mind”.<sup>805</sup> Afterwards *History I* expanded “the migration thesis” that the civilization was carried by migrating Turks from Central Asia to every part of the world. Chinese people were fortunate, because of the proximity to Central Asia they were the first to benefit from the spread of the Turkish civilization. So, “Turks led the native Chinese to go forward out of the Stone Age”.<sup>806</sup> Similarly lower basin of Nile had learned the advanced level of civilization from immigrating Turks. *History I* confessed regrettably that brachycephalic Turks had mixed racially with dolichocephalic Samis.<sup>807</sup> Similar to the Egyptian region, neighboring Eastern Mediterranean lands became civilized only after Turks had arrived up to BC 2800.<sup>808</sup> In this way the inventors of the alphabet, the Phoenicians were discovered to be of Turkic origin. Most critically the authors were using the Central Asian Turkic phrase “Great Qaghan” for the Hittite ruler Mutavalla.<sup>809</sup>

*History II: Medieval Times* included the history of the Turkish confederations of Hun, Avar, K k Turk, Karluk, Uighur, and Seljuk. Egyptian Mamluk state together with the Mongol Empire and the Timurids were declared as

---

<sup>804</sup> *Tarih I*, pp. 2-3.

<sup>805</sup> *Tarih I*, pp. 23-24.

<sup>806</sup> *Tarih I: Kemalist Eđitim Tarih Dersleri (1931-1941)*, Istanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, November 2003, p. 59.

<sup>807</sup> *Tarih I*, p. 106.

<sup>808</sup> *Tarih I*, p. 146.

<sup>809</sup> *Tarih I*, p.130.

states founded by Turks. Contrary to the Ottomanist and Islamist historiographies *History II* was highly apathetic to the emergence of Islam: “When Muhammad became forty years old, he declared his prophecy and invited his fellows to the religion that he personally found. Afterwards although he has invited people of Mecca to his religion only 150 men had accepted Islam in first twelve years”.<sup>810</sup> Nevertheless *History II*'s secular stance was most noticeable in its earthly explanation of the origins of the religion and its rejection of the divine source: “The book in which Muhammad’s principles was assembled, was called as Qur’an”.<sup>811</sup> *History II* told a sheer political history of Islam from the era of Muhammad to the Abbasids, a history purified of every kinds of hagiography and legends as seen its description of the death of Muhammad: “Political concerns were so tense that nobody had neither time nor desire for the funeral of Arabia’s powerful sovereign”.<sup>812</sup>

The third volume of the textbooks *History III* was devoted to Ottoman history. Parallel to the Ottoman history, developments in Europe including the Renaissance and the Reform, birth of mercantilism, 1789 and 1848 revolutions and the spread of nationalism, were included in *History III*. Of 310 pages *History III* spared only 70 pages for the foundation and expansion periods of the Ottoman Empire, but it explained in details the periods of retreat and collapse together with declining power of the Empire in comparison to Europe. Zorlu-Durukan discerned that “emphasis on Turkishness” instead of Ottomanness was preferred in *History III* and especially in telling the events of Empire’s last century the term “Turk” was used increasingly in the place of “Ottoman”.<sup>813</sup> The Ottoman dynasty was

---

<sup>810</sup> *Tarih II*, p. 89.

<sup>811</sup> *Tarih II*, p. 90. The same approach was also evident in explaining other religions: “Moses was inspired by the local beliefs widespread south of Palestine and formed his religion”. *ibid.*, pp. 80-81.

<sup>812</sup> *Tarih II: Kemalist Eğitimin Tarih Dersleri (1931-1941)*, Istanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, March 2005, p. 115.

<sup>813</sup> Zorlu-Durukan, *ibid.*, p. 156.

constantly assessed negatively; similar to Sultan Abdülaziz who “wasted the loans obtained from the Western bankers in superfluous constructions and luxury”<sup>814</sup>, in the reign of Abdülmecid “luxury expenses and dissipation in Palace had been at its utmost degree”.<sup>815</sup> The rule of Abdülhamid II, “the other” of the Republican ideology, was described as “arbitrary, unsuccessful, dishonorable and boring”.<sup>816</sup>

*History IV* dealt with the Independence War and the Republican Era. The book included numerous quotations from the *Speech* and the program of governing Republican People’s Party. The negative stance against the Ottoman dynasty recommenced in blaming Vahdeddin of treachery due to his escape from Istanbul in an enemy battleship. *History IV* stated that the last Sultan was not venerable even as the last emperor of Byzantine Empire, Konstantin who had fought in the streets of Istanbul until death.<sup>817</sup> In addition, despite claiming to be a history book *History IV*, was definitely a hagiography for Mustafa Kemal from the pens of embedded historians of Çankaya who replaced the dynastical embedded historians. Throughout the book, as Zorlu-Durukan identified, the name of “Mustafa Kemal” was used interchangeably with the “Turkish nation”:

“In every respect, Mustafa Kemal is the greatest man that the Turkish nation has raised...With his spirit, the unique abilities of his soul, his genius, his will, his tenacity, in short with his entire spiritual self, Mustafa Kemal personifies the great Turkish nation in his being”.<sup>818</sup>

Furthermore, since the period overviewed was the very recent past, personal cleavages and envies of the Ottoman years could also be seen in the pages of *History IV*. Mustafa Kemal seemed to take the revenge from Enver Pasha through the hands of his court historians and via their re-writing of history full of

---

<sup>814</sup> *Tarih III*, p. 253.

<sup>815</sup> *Tarih III*, p. 251.

<sup>816</sup> *Tarih III: Kemalist Eğitimin Tarih Dersleri (1931-1941)*, Istanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, March 2005, p. 297.

<sup>817</sup> *Tarih IV*, p. 158.

<sup>818</sup> Zorlu-Durukan, *ibid.*, pp. 170-171.

falsifications. For instance, it was claimed that the Committee of Union and Progress was initially founded by Mustafa Kemal as the Fatherland and Independence Society in Damascus (Vatan ve Hürriyet Cemiyeti); and after the inauguration of the Second Constitutional Period, Mustafa Kemal's party changed its name.<sup>819</sup> It was really odd that this falsification has occurred in the presence of numerous ex-Unionists who survived in the Republican Peoples Party and even a few worked in the commission preparing the history textbooks. Enver Pasha, who was acknowledged as the "Hero of Edirne" throughout 1910s due to his re-capture of the city from Bulgarian forces in the Second Balkan War, was relegated from the post of the "Conqueror of Edirne". Not surprisingly *History IV* claimed that in truth Mustafa Kemal "organized and led the Bolayır army division, the first Turkish forces that entered Edirne in the recapture of the city after the Balkan Wars, were the cavalymen of this division".<sup>820</sup> Enver Pasha according to the authors was deliberately impeding Mustafa Kemal's advancement in his military career:

"Mustafa Kemal demanded an operational duty from the General Commandership of Ottoman armies. Being aware of the extraordinary military talent and authority, and also unequalled respect and devotion shown to Mustafa Kemal in the army, General Commandership rejected Mustafa Kemal's demand for a more active task. Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Enver Pasha was bewareing of this man, who always saw the truth, always said the truth, never missed the mistaken ideas and behaviors, and by no means hesitated to express those mistaken ideas, stood out successfully in every task he performed".<sup>821</sup>

İsmet Parlak examined history books taught in schools from the instigation of Turkish History Thesis and the change of the school curricula in 1930 to the end of single party rule in 1946. According to his research between 1930 and 1946, 18.85% of the subjects discussed in the history textbooks were ancient Greek and

---

<sup>819</sup> *Tarih IV*, p. 18. In another falsification, neglecting the initial foundation of the *Himaye-i Etfal Cemiyeti* (Society for the Protection of Children) by Unionist government in 1917, *History IV* declared that the Society was founded in 1921 "under the high protection of Gazi, support and leading of Prime Minister İsmet". *Tarih IV*, p. 342.

<sup>820</sup> *Tarih IV*, p. 21.

<sup>821</sup> *Tarih IV: Kemalist Eğitimin Tarih Dersleri (1931-1941)*, İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, November 2004, p. 21.



Roman Empires. It was extraordinary since in the same period history of the Ottoman Empire was comprised of 17.98% and Kemalist revolutions, the Independence War and the Republican Era all together, of 15.95%. In addition, 12.95% of history textbooks were spared for the ancient civilizations of Egypt, Mesopotamia, Persia and Anatolia including Hittites, Phrygians and Sarts.<sup>822</sup> Tiregöl compared three primary school curricula under Atatürk's presidency. 1924 school curriculum arranged that history courses were introduced in the third grade after intense alphabet and writing lessons in the first two years. In 1926/27 curriculum and the 1936 curriculum special history courses were retarded to the fourth grade, but the general course "Knowledge for Life" (Hayat Bilgisi) was put from the first grade onwards. "Knowledge for Life" courses which were consisting of very basics of geography, history, civics and nature. Tiregöl stated that 1936 curriculum was the most ideological one into which the six arrows were incorporated.<sup>823</sup> Sakaoğlu also labeled 1936 curriculum as "racist, Turkist and partisan". The curriculum included the six arrows of the Republican People Party and set "breeding republican, nationalist, populist, statist, secular and revolutionist citizens" as the utmost target of the curriculum.<sup>824</sup>

### 5.2.5. History Congresses

First Turkish History Congress convened on July 2, 1932 at Ankara People's House. Until the last day of the Congress on July 11, fifteen conferences, each followed by opinions of selected participants on the preceding conference, were

---

<sup>822</sup> For the distribution of subjects please see Appendix 9.

<sup>823</sup> Jessica Selma Tiregol, *The Role of Primary Education in Nation-State-Building: The Case of the Early Turkish Republic (1923-1938)*, PhD thesis, Princeton University, June 1998, p. 90.

<sup>824</sup> Necdet Sakaoğlu, "İlkokul Tarih Programları ve Ders Kitapları", p. 138, Özbaran, Salih (eds.), *Tarih Öğretimi ve Ders Kitapları: 1994 Buca Sempozyumu*, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1995.

presented.<sup>825</sup> The audience comprised of 198 high school teachers, 12 of which from military high schools, 18 university professors and assistants from *Darülfünun*<sup>826</sup> and also 25 members of the Turkish History Research Society.<sup>827</sup> Minister of Education Esat clarified the purpose of the Conference as both to illuminate the high school teachers through the advises of the authors of the *Tarih* textbooks which were incorporated in all high school programs in the last school year, and also to share teachers' experiences in teaching history via new textbooks.<sup>828</sup> Thus of the 15 conferences, 14 were delivered by the members of Turkish History Research Society, only one titled "Among Indian Relative Peoples" by Hungarian scholar Zayti Frenç<sup>829</sup> was out of the close circle of Mustafa Kemal.

In the first conference Afet İnan summarized the basic premises of Turkish History Thesis and argued that Central Asia was the cradle of humanity, Turks were the autochthonous population of the Central Asian plateau, the highest level of civilization spread with the emigration of Turks from Central Asia to every corner of the Eurasian and African continents and "our ancient Hittites" were the first inhabitants of Anatolia.<sup>830</sup> Subsequently Hasan Cemil Bey claimed that the Aegean and the ancient Greek civilization to be of Central Asian origin<sup>831</sup> and then, Yusuf Ziya Bey alleged the Egyptian civilization, too, of the same stock.<sup>832</sup> Reşit Galip in

---

<sup>825</sup> For the list of speakers and their conferences please look at Appendix 12.

<sup>826</sup> Istanbul University

<sup>827</sup> *Birinci Türk Tarih Kongresi Müzakere Zabıtları*, Ankara: T.C. Maarif Vekaleti, pp. vii-xiii. Also in Behar Ersanlı, *ibid.*, p. 119.

<sup>828</sup> "Maarif Vekili Esat Beyefendinin Açma Nutku", *Birinci Türk Tarih Kongresi Müzakere Zabıtları*, p. 12.

<sup>829</sup> Zayti Frenç was the only international participant of the conference. He was the director of the Eastern Arts section of Budapest City Library at the time of Congress.

<sup>830</sup> Afet İnan, "Tarihten Evel ve Tarihin Fecrinde", *Birinci Türk Tarih Kongresi Müzakere Zabıtları*, pp. 18-41. Afet İnan used the label of "our ancient Hittites" *ibid.*, p. 41.

<sup>831</sup> Hasan Cemil, "Ege Medeniyetinin Menşesine Umumi Bir Bakış", *ibid.*, pp. 199-214.

<sup>832</sup> Yusuf Ziya "Mısır Din ve İlahlarının Türklükle Alakası", *ibid.*, pp. 243-260.

his conference titled “A General Evaluation of Turkish Race and Civilization” discussed the spread of specific racial features over the world. Through an overview of popular racist pseudo-scientists of 1930s and their examinations of the head range of the skeletons, he decided that Hittites, Sumerians, Ionians were all descending from brachycephalic Turanid race.<sup>833</sup> The same racial comments also prevailed in Şevket Aziz’s presentation who after an analysis of chins and heads of Turks, concluded that Turks were racially alpine.<sup>834</sup> The Congress lastly consisted of a presentation on the method of history teaching by Yusuf Akçura.

On the second day of the Congress, a timid critic was directed by Zeki Velidi Togan; the critic was timid due to highly political nature of the Congress but it was crucial as being to the very heart of the Turkish History Thesis. Zeki Velidi denied the drought thesis, for him the out migration from Central Asia could not be caused by drought and disproved the purported existence of depopulated cities whose leftovers lying under the sand. On the contrary, for Togan the emigration might have happened as a result of overpopulation and inter-tribe clashes.<sup>835</sup> Reşit Galip, Sadri Maksudi and the future Prime Minister Şemsettin (Günaltay) all questioned the validity of Zeki Velidi’s resources<sup>836</sup> and defended the official thesis that waves of Turkish tribes had migrated from Central Asia as a result of desiccation. For example, Zeki Velidi’s use of Russian Turcologist Barthold was severely criticized by Reşit Galip as blaming Barthold to be in constant effort to minimize the role of Turks in history.<sup>837</sup>

---

<sup>833</sup> Reşit Galip, “Türk Irk ve Medeniyet Tarihine Umumi Bir Bakış”, *ibid.*, pp. 99-161.

<sup>834</sup> Şevket Aziz, “Türklerin Antropolojisi”, *ibid.*, pp. 271-278.

<sup>835</sup> Nadir Özbek, “Zeki Velidi Togan ve ‘Türk Tarih Tezi’”, *Toplumsal Tarih*, Vol: 8, No: 45, September 1997, p. 22. For Zeki Velidi’s speech please look *Birinci Türk Tarih Kongresi Müzakere Zabıtları*, p. 167-176.

<sup>836</sup> Ersanlı Behar, *ibid.*, p. 147.

<sup>837</sup> *Birinci Türk Tarih Kongresi Müzakere Zabıtları*, p. 178-179.

Second Turkish History Congress summoned between 20 and 25 September 1937 in Istanbul Dolmabahçe Palace. Compared to the First History Congress there was a considerable number of international academicians as conference speakers or just participants.<sup>838</sup> In the Congress archeological research carried on the last five years were briefed by several academicians so as to display ancient Turkishness of Anatolia. Remzi Oğuz Arık in his presentation “On Proto-Hittites” argued that Anatolia was the home of large and wealthy settlements even as early as three thousand BC. Arık argued that Sumerians and Hittites were relatives as coming from the same roots geographically both from Central Asia via Transcaucasia.<sup>839</sup> Both “Prehistory of Ankara Region” by Şevket Aziz and Hamit Zübeyr Koşay’s presentation on the Alacahöyük excavations carried by the Turkish Historical Society, aimed at proving the Turkish nature of Hittites and Anatolia.<sup>840</sup> İsmail Hakkı İzmirli went even further in his claim that Prophet Muhammad was Turkish and “Evs and Hazrech tribes of Arabia were of Turkic stock” that migrated from Sumerian countries.<sup>841</sup> In the last day of the Congress a dinner were given at *Sumer Palas*, at which all the participants attended with rosettes including Hittite King emblem. In addition two archeological site visits were incorporated to the Congress, one to Troy the other to Alacahöyük and Boğazköy for Hittite remnants.<sup>842</sup>

Ersanlı Behar concluded that at the Congress there was a uniform support to the Turkish History Thesis and the discussions happened in the first congress completely disappeared. Ersanlı Behar noted that the academic qualification of the

---

<sup>838</sup> For the list of conferences presented at the Second History Congress please see Appendix 13.

<sup>839</sup> Remzi Oğuz Arık, *İkinci Türk Tarih Kongresi İstanbul 20-25 September 1937: Kongrenin Çalışmaları, Kongreye Sunulan Tebliğler*, p. 868.

<sup>840</sup> Remzi Oğuz Arık “On Proto-Hittites”, pp. 863-874, Hamit Zübeyr Koşay, “The Results of Turkish History Society’s Alacahöyük Excavations” pp. 21-32 both in *İkinci Türk Tarih Kongresi İstanbul 20-25 September 1937: Kongrenin Çalışmaları, Kongreye Sunulan Tebliğler*.

<sup>841</sup> İsmail Hakkı İzmirli, *ibid.*, p. 280 and p. 1013.

<sup>842</sup> *İkinci Türk Tarih Kongresi İstanbul 20-25 September 1937: Kongrenin Çalışmaları, Kongreye Sunulan Tebliğler*, İstanbul: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1943, p. liii.

presenters were “insufficient to counter the scienticism of political leadership”.<sup>843</sup> The Congress as in the first one had a specific political purpose: to prove historical rights of Turkish people over Anatolia. Bernard Lewis argued that Mustafa Kemal had two purposes in his promotion of the Turkish Historical Thesis: the first was to use it as an instrument of national government through encouraging self-respect and pride of Turks and the second was to counterbalance pan-Turkic sentiments widely held among the Ottoman intelligentsia especially by the First World War years.<sup>844</sup> Indeed although origins of Turks were placed in Central Asia, Anatolia was consistently presented as the home of Turks. Mete Tunçay claimed that historical works in the early republican era were a continuation of the cultural pan-Turkism of the Union and Progress. While it is true that the chief ideologue of the CUP, Ziya Gökalp had also been the main source of inspiration for Kemalist reforms, Tunçay also identified two divergences in the historiography of the Republic. First in the Kemalist historiography racism turned out to be useful as a unifying component instead of being Unionists’ discriminatory utilization. Secondly the focus of the Kemalist historiography was more and more directed to Anatolia and irredentist tendencies were carefully curbed.<sup>845</sup> For Taşkın Kemalist elites once again showed the pragmatism of their movement in their attitude towards history. The pragmatic elaboration of a grand migration of Turks from Central Asia made possible the existence of two versions of history thesis, one based on Central Asian view and the other on Anatolian view.<sup>846</sup>

---

<sup>843</sup> Ersanlı Behar, *ibid.*, p. 191.

<sup>844</sup> Eskiçalı, *ibid.*, p. 194-195.

<sup>845</sup> Mete Tunçay, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nde Tek-Parti Yönetimi’nin Kurulması (1923-1931)*, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2010, p. 310.

<sup>846</sup> Yüksel Taşkın, “Kemalist Kültür Politikaları Açısından Türk Tarih ve Dil Kurumları”, p. 419-420 in Ahmet İnel (eds.), *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce II: Kemalizm*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001.

## CHAPTER 6

### LANGUAGE

Ge11:1 And the whole earth was of one language, and of one speech.

Ge11:6 And the LORD said, Behold, the people is one, and they have all one language; and this they begin to do: and now nothing will be restrained from them, which they have imagined to do.

Ge11:7 Go to, let us go down, and there confound their language, that they may not understand one another's speech.

Ge11:8 So the LORD scattered them abroad from thence upon the face of all the earth: and they left off to build the city.

Old Testament King James  
Version

Once the inhabitants of the fabled city Babel had attempted to reach the Heaven through erecting a gigantic tower they were sanctioned by mixing their languages. The fairy tale tells that diversification of languages would set barriers of comprehension between peoples and prevent cooperation among them to construct of any future Tower of Babel. Yet linguistic difference would not avoid distinctive peoples to adhere to the same Emperor or to fight for the same causes in the course of history. Certainly not a Tower of Babel, but numerous multi-ethnic empires were established to govern linguistically heterogeneous populations over centuries. As Seljukid bureaucracy was Persian-speaking, their conquering armies were overwhelmingly Turcoman. Similarly throughout the 18th century the Palace of the Russian Empire in St. Petersburg was Francophone, while provincial aristocracy was speaking German in contrast to Russian speaking mass.<sup>847</sup> Henry

---

<sup>847</sup> Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*, London & New York: Verso, 1991, p. 87.

IV of France, addressing representatives from his newly acquired lands after Franco-Spanish War, was convinced that the French speaking lands should belong to him: “As you speak the French language by nature, it is reasonable that you should be the subject of the King of France. I quite agree that the Spanish language should belong to the Spaniard and the German to the German. But the whole region of the French language must be mine”.<sup>848</sup> However Henry IV, “the French”, was a member of the same Bourbon dynasty as the Spanish King Philipp. Even the founders of the Finnish Literature Society and the language of initial Finnish cultural nationalism were Swedish.<sup>849</sup>

Linguistic nationalism arrived to the dynastic empires of Europe in the first years of the 19th century with the waves of the French Revolution.<sup>850</sup> Once mighty Empires began to decline as their dependent peoples, fervently shouting three principles of the French Revolution, *egalite*, *fraternite*, and *liberte*, demanded to become citizens of their own states. The basic nationalist claim was that the rule of a polity was legitimate as long as its boundaries were congruent with linguistic boundaries, especially with the titular language. Fichte’s century old formula was at the heart of all nationalist demands in the 19th century: “Wherever a separate language is found, there a separate nation exists, which has the right to take independent charge of its own affairs and to govern itself”.<sup>851</sup> When nation-states increasingly consolidated themselves as the legitimate body of governing in the 20th century, languages were identified as the foremost legitimacy base of nation-states. Linguistic boundaries started to denote the “natural” terrain over which a

---

<sup>848</sup> Joshua A. Fishman, *Language and Nationalism: Two Integrative Essays*, Rowley, Massachusetts: Newbury House Publishers, 1972, p.1.

<sup>849</sup> E. J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*, 2nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 104.

<sup>850</sup> Benedict Anderson, “Western Nationalism and Eastern Nationalism: Is There a Difference That Matters?”, *New Left Review*, Vol: 9, May-June 2001, p. 40.

<sup>851</sup> Margaret Canovan, *Nationhood and Political Theory*, Cheltenham, UK & Brookfield, US: Edward Elgar, 1996, p. 8.

nation-state could claim sovereignty. Moreover acting as the “power-container”<sup>852</sup> of the titular national elite most nation-states performed their self-asserted right to homogenize any contested piece of land: Wherever a separate state exists there a history of assault to standardize its titular language and to assimilate minority languages also exist.

Central Asia was too remote geographically and too secluded by the barriers set by the Shiite Iran and the Christian Russia in order the waves of the French Revolution to reach. If truth to be said, in the absence of a nationalist movement or a nation-state in Central Asia, erecting a ‘linguistically national’ Tower of Babel was both inconceivable and also impractical. Indeed under the Tsarist dominance Central Asia was not exposed to central linguistic planning. The sole attempt was the mostly intellectual efforts of rather marginal Jadidists to introduce the Chaghatay dialect as the common literary language. Nevertheless in the Soviet period Central Asian languages were standardized and illiterate masses had encountered with their new written ‘high languages’ beside the ever-increasing influence of Russian. After the declaration of independence although Uzbek language was elevated to the status of the sole state language, the timid linguistic policy could not prevent the ongoing influence of the Russian particularly in academia and private business. On the contrary the Ottoman elites were extremely prone to the principles brought by the waves of the French Revolution. Turkish nationalism was from the beginning in the form of a linguistic nationalism. Naturally first decades of the Republic saw an enthusiastic campaign of literacy and linguistic purification. In the end, the Ottoman language which had been the tongue of the elites for several centuries was replaced by a simpler Turkish.

In the first two sections of this chapter the legacies of the Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union regarding the status of the Central Asian languages and

---

<sup>852</sup> Anthony Giddens famously labels modern nation state as the “power-container”.



specifically the Uzbek language, will be briefed. The widening of the political realm after the glasnost gave the intellectuals the opportunity to voice demands for the status of the Uzbek language. Until the liquidation of all political contenders by Karimov in 1992, linguistic nationalism was the of the popular opposition movements of Birlik and Erk. Later the political demands on the status of the Uzbek language were absorbed by the ruling elite and as Birlik and Erk were being marginalized their linguistic claims were incorporated into the ideology of national independence.

The second part of this chapter shall also commence with an overview of the legacies of the Seljukid, and the Ottoman periods. First in the Seljukid times while the ordinary people of Anatolia were speaking in the local dialects mostly in Turkic and also Greek, the Persian language became dominant in cultural sphere and the Arabic in religious and then legal spheres. Later the Ottoman elites were to speak and write in an artificial language called Ottoman language which was a blend of Persian, Arabic and Turkish. Alphabet reform was a crucial step in order to create a Turkish nation distinct from other Islamic peoples and it was implemented swiftly and in a thorough manner. Then era of radical purism comprising of the purge of Arabic and Persian elements from the Turkish language will be analyzed. The last section will summon the arguments that were put forward in the First and the Second Language Congresses.

## 6.1. UZBEKISTAN

### 6.1.1. Ak Padishah<sup>853</sup> in Central Asia

When English-Russian Commission fixed the border between British Afghanistan and Russian Turkestan in 1887, the authority of the White Tsar upon the *inorodtsy*<sup>854</sup> living in recently conquered Turkestan was recognized by his rival in the Great Game<sup>855</sup>. The “inorodsty”, being Muslim as the typical self-definition, was indeed alien to the idea of nationality contrary to the expectations of Uvarov-inspired Russian nationalists. The urban population was by and large bilingual; Turkic and Persian or Uzbek and Tajik were spoken interchangeably. As Sengupta points out for centuries “various Turkic groups lived in intense symbiosis with non-Turkic groups without assimilating them” and it became difficult to distinguish Uzbek and Tajik.<sup>856</sup> In addition Tsar’s officials surprisingly discovered that the majority of the settled population appeared to define themselves as “Sarts”. (Table 3) The Sarts, virtually always bilingual, were the urban dwellers dealing with trade and craftsmanship.<sup>857</sup> The nomads surrounding the cities were mostly speaking Turkic, though in the dialect of their tribes which is related to Oghuz, Kipchak or Uighur branches.

---

<sup>853</sup> Central Asians mostly referred the Russian Tsar as the “Ak Padishah” meaning the “white ruler”.


<sup>854</sup> Pejorative term mostly used for non-Christian subjects of the Russian Empire meaning “alien people”.

<sup>855</sup> Michael Rywkin, *Moscow’s Muslim Challenge*, pp. 13-14.

<sup>856</sup> Anita Sengupta, *The Formation of the Uzbek Nation-State: A Study in Transition*, Lanham: Lexington Books, 2003, p. 137.

<sup>857</sup> Ilkhamov discusses in length the opinions of various scholars about the connotation of the term “Sart” in pre-Soviet era. He suggests that despite the term combines both “ethnic and class attributes” it was a “social rather than an ethnic category”. Alisher Ilkhamov, “Archaeology of Uzbek Identity”, *Central Asian Survey*, Vol: 23, No: 3-4, December 2004, pp. 296-305.

**Map 9 - Population Groups in Contemporary Central Asia**



Source:

[http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/fullMaps\\_Sa.nsf/0/9E20BC784C8A673885257014005A85F8/\\$File/unep\\_POP2\\_fer300405.jpg?OpenElement](http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/fullMaps_Sa.nsf/0/9E20BC784C8A673885257014005A85F8/$File/unep_POP2_fer300405.jpg?OpenElement)

The rhetoric by a handful of Russian officials mimicking the British and French colonizers left aside; there were little missionary zeal of “civilizing the primitive” *inorodsty* in the Russian expansion towards inner Asia. Since chief Russian concern in Turkestan was the extraction of raw materials, especially cotton for textile industry, the Tsarist administration did not develop a comprehensive linguistic policy aimed at Russification of the Central Asia. Although Russian was the official language, “the language of administration, court, army and education”<sup>858</sup> throughout the Empire, the Russian government

<sup>858</sup> Vladislava Reznik, “Language Policy and Reform in the Soviet 1920s: Practical Polemics against Idealist Linguistics”, *BASEES 2001 Annual Conference*, Fitzwilliam College, Cambridge,

established only a few schools for teaching Russian language, mainly for the newly settled ethnic Russians.<sup>859</sup> While there were only 10 Russian elementary schools in 1876, 18 additional elementary schools were opened in 1884 under the bilingual education program of Russian government. Compared to 1800 *maktabs* and 180 *madrasas*<sup>860</sup> just in the Bukharan Khanate around middle of the 19th century, Russian language education was simply negligible.<sup>861</sup> Nevertheless *maktabs* and *madrasahs* had little effect to increase literacy or to contribute the literary language of Turkestan, the *Chaghatay*. Because, the education consisted of no more than memorizing Quranic verses and various religious texts in their Arabic original texts and inculcation of certain religious and societal rituals.<sup>862</sup>

**Table 3 – Uzbek, Sart and Tajik population under Russian Empire<sup>863</sup>**

	Uzbeks		Sarts		Tajiks	
	1897	1914	1897	1914	1897	1914
Ferghana Province	153,780	30,000	788,989	1,320,000	114,081	115,000
Samarkand Province	507,587	566,400	18,073	28,800	230,384	259,200
Syrdarya Province	64,235	37,000	144,275	426,000	5557*	0

\* Along with Turkmen

---

7-9 April 2001; reached on 6 July 2010 at  
<http://www.arts.gla.ac.uk/Slavonic/Epicentre/langpolicy.htm>.

<sup>859</sup> Rywkin, *ibid.*, p. 14.

<sup>860</sup> *Maktabs* and *madrasahs* were traditional religious schools. *Maktabs* were a four-year elementary school for pupils between 6 and 15, and at *madrasas* advanced Islamic theology was studied.

<sup>861</sup> The statistics on both Russian schools and also *maktabs* and *madrasahs* can be found in Edward H. Thomas, “The Politics of Language in Former Colonial Lands: A Comparative Look at North Africa and Central Asia”, *The Journal of North African Studies*, Vol: 4, No: 1, 1999, p. 13-14.

<sup>862</sup> For the details of the curriculum in the Central Asian religious schools during the second half of the 19th century please look B. Tümen Somuncuoğlu “19. Yüzyılın İkinci Yarısında Türkistan’da Yerli Eğitim Kurumlarının Durumu”, *Orta Asya ve Kafkasya Araştırmaları OAKA*, Vol: 2, No: 3, 2007, pp. 105-134.

<sup>863</sup> *ibid.*, p. 301.

Even though the literacy rates were slightly higher among the bilingual city dwellers than the Turkic nomads, only 1.9% in 1897 and 3.6% in 1926 of Uzbeks were literate, meaning the bulk of the population could not read and write (Table 4). Dickens also holds that in 1897 the literacy rate was 3.6% in the region matching to contemporary Uzbekistan, 5.6% among men and 1.2% among women.<sup>864</sup> In one of the Soviet propaganda booklets of 1960 published to praise the successes of the communist regime, Alimov suggested that pre-revolutionary literacy rate was just 2%.<sup>865</sup> Thus the literary language of Central Asia, Chaghatay, could penetrate only an insignificant portion of the population. In this vein Segars relates Chaghatay to Ottoman of pre-Kemalist Turkey, being heavily “distorted by the assimilation of Arabic and Persian vocabulary and grammar”, both could be used barely by a narrow circle.<sup>866</sup> Furthermore, printing and publishing, which arrived to Central Asia with Russian colonizers too late in 19<sup>th</sup> century, had long remained within a rather narrow circle.<sup>867</sup>

---

<sup>864</sup> Mark Dickens, “Soviet Language Policy in Central Asia”, 1988, p. 20, reached at [http://www.oxus.com/Soviet\\_Language\\_Policy\\_in\\_CA.pdf](http://www.oxus.com/Soviet_Language_Policy_in_CA.pdf) on May 11, 2011.

<sup>865</sup> Arif Alimov, *Uzbekistan: Another Big Leap Forward*, London: Soviet Booklet No: 60 D, March 1960, p.17. Arif Alimov was the Chairman of Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers in the date of booklet’s publishing.

<sup>866</sup> Andrew Segars, “Nation Building in Turkey and Uzbekistan: The Use of Language and History in the Creation of National Identity”, p. 94 in Everett-Heath, Tom (eds.), *Central Asia: Aspects of Transition*, London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003. Baldauf quotes the opinion of one Central Asian respondent on who was the Chaghatay: “Toğik bulib Toğik bulmajdi, Uzbek bulib Uzbek bulmajdi” (being a Tajik he is not a Tajik, being an Uzbek he is not an Uzbek). Ingeborg Baldauf, “Some Thoughts on the Making of the Uzbek Nation”, *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique*, Vol: 32, No: 1, 1991, p. 83.

<sup>867</sup> For detailed information on the coming of printing to Central Asia: Adeeb Khalid, “Printing, Publishing, and Reform in Tsarist Central Asia”, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol: 26, 1994, pp. 187-200.

**Table 4 - Literacy Rates for Central Asian Peoples**<sup>868</sup>

Nationality Percent Literate			
	1897	1926	1959
Kazakhs	1,0	25.0	97.0
Kirghiz	0,6	4,5	*
Tajiks	3,9	2,3	96,0
Turkmen	0,7	7,8	95,4
Uzbeks	1,9	3,6	98,0

\* No figure available, but presumably between 95% and 100%.

### 6.1.2. Red Padishah in Uzbekistan

In a *Proleterskaya Pravda* article published in 1914, Lenin has already carried out one of his fiercest pre-Revolution political attacks against Russian liberals and nationalists denouncing the installation of an official language:

“Russian Marxists say that there must be *no* compulsory official language that the population must be provided with schools where teaching will be carried on in all the local languages, that a fundamental law must be introduced in the constitution declaring invalid all privileges of any one nation and all violations of the rights of national minorities”.<sup>869</sup>

Following the October Revolution Bolsheviks affirmed that all languages had an equal status and declared that Russian would no more remain as the official language. Fueled by both their pre-revolutionary understanding of the nationalities problem and also due to ongoing struggle to consolidate communist rule in the civil turmoil, Bolsheviks recognized the right of education and cultural

---

<sup>868</sup> Dickens, *ibid.*, p. 20.

<sup>869</sup> V.I. Lenin, “Is a Compulsory Official Language Needed?” *Lenin Collected Works Volume 20*, (trans.) Bernard Isaacs & Joe Fineberg, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972, p. 73.

development in native languages for every minority group.<sup>870</sup> Uneasy with Stalin's harsh measures at the *Georgian Affair*<sup>871</sup>, Lenin warned from his sickbed that "the strictest rules must be introduced on the use of the national language in the non-Russian republics of [our] union, and these rules must be checked with special care".<sup>872</sup> This signaled the "linguistic liberalism"<sup>873</sup> in the first decade of the Bolshevik rule.

Widespread illiteracy accompanied by the lack of a written form by most minority languages posed considerable problem for linguistic planners. Thus the era of linguistic liberalism primarily involved "language construction" as Soviet nations were being constructed in the Central Asia through national delimitation. Linguistic commissions were sent to rural areas to pick the purest terminology from peasants along with an ambitious literacy campaign.<sup>874</sup> New alphabets, mostly based on Latin<sup>875</sup> were prepared and standard literary languages were created for each national group to be used in education, administration and publishing. While Soviet school books were printed in 25 languages in 1924,

---

<sup>870</sup> Reznik, *ibid.*,

<sup>871</sup> Lenin had criticized the invasion of Menshevik Georgia by the Red Army when he was sick after his first stroke. Lenin was especially critical of Stalin and Orjonikidze in behaving like Great Russian Chauvinists for their cruelty and physical violence against Georgian Menshevik leaders. In his suppressed testament, dictated under the impact of the Georgian Affair, Lenin "proposed to his comrades to find a way to remove Stalin from the office of the General Secretary" because of his rudeness. Lenin's testament reached on April 8, 2011 at <http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1922/dec/testamnt/autonomy.htm>

<sup>872</sup> V.I. Lenin, "The Question of Nationalities or "Autonomisation"", Lenin's testament *ibid.*

<sup>873</sup> Ornstein labels the era until the early 1930s as the period of linguistic liberalism in Jacob Ornstein, "Soviet Language Policy: Theory and Practice", *The Slavic and East European Journal*, Vol: 3, No: 1, Spring 1959, pp. 1-24.

<sup>874</sup> *ibid.*, p. 2. Ornstein argues that the new Soviet science *lingvotexnika* was created to single out proper terms from the "pristine dialects of remote areas".

<sup>875</sup> The Cyrillic alphabet was seen as the symbol of Russian imperialism by many ethnic groups. Correspondingly a Soviet article defending the double shift in the alphabet once argued that "the demand to transfer to the Russian script in the first years of the Soviet regime might have been interpreted as a relapse into the old Russifying policy of Tsarism" in Robert Conquest (eds.), *Soviet Nationalities Policy in Practice*, London & Sydney & Toronto: The Bodley Head, 1967, p. .

school pupils could reach textbooks in 104 different languages in 1934, as the written form of more languages were designed towards the end of the period of linguistic liberalism.<sup>876</sup>

Meanwhile, Central Asia was the ground of the controversy over language and alphabet between modernist/Jadidist intelligentsia who was in favor of a reformed alphabet more fitting to the Turkic tongues and the conservative/traditional *mullahs* fiercely resisting any attempt to change sacred Arabic alphabet. The *Regional Uzbek Language and Orthography Congress*, convened in Tashkent in January 1921 was the first attempt to discuss the orthography and the vocabulary of the “new” Uzbek language. At the Congress the group *Chaghatay Gurungi* led by Abdurauf Fitrat promoted a reformed version of the Arabic alphabet which would “make writing and printing easier”.<sup>877</sup> In March-April 1922, at *The Second Congress of Education and Civilization Workers* which was also held in Tashkent, Fitrat proposed a Turkic literary language for all Turkic nationalities of Central Asia, based on old Chaghatay and purified of Arabic, Persian and Russian infiltrations.<sup>878</sup> As a proponent of the conservative cause arguing that any alphabet reform would break the ties with the Islamic people outside Turkestan, the Ministry of Education of Bukhara replied in a regulation of 1922: “In Bukhara region Turkish language is written with the Arabic letters. The Arabic letters will never be changed”.<sup>879</sup> However, after *The Orthography Congress of Central Asian Turks*, held in Bukhara in October 1923 the reformed Arabic alphabet was accepted. Although Fierman argues that this reform was achieved by local intelligentsia with little Bolshevik interference<sup>880</sup>, most of the

---

<sup>876</sup> Michael Kirkwood, “Glastnost, ‘the National Question’ and Soviet Language Policy”, *Soviet Studies*, Vol: 43, No: 1, 1991, p. 62.

<sup>877</sup> William Fierman, *Language Planning and National Development: The Uzbek Experience*, Berlin & New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1991, pp. 61-62.

<sup>878</sup> *ibid.*, p. 73.

<sup>879</sup> Mehmet Uzman, “Romanisation in Uzbekistan Past and Present”, *Journal of Royal Asiatic Society*, Series 3, Vol: 20, No: 1, 2010, p. 50.

<sup>880</sup> Fierman, *ibid.*, pp. 57-58.



conservative officials in Turkestan had already been removed from their offices before the reform by the Bolshevik-Jadidist alliance.<sup>881</sup> Even though Moscow linguists had little effect on the content of the reform, it was obvious that Bolsheviks welcomed the reform in expectation of weakening bonds between Central Asia and other Islamic peoples.

Yet *The Baku Turcological Congress* of 1926 was the true milestone in the debate not only because of the triumph by the modernist linguists and intelligentsia but also due to then noticeable backing of Bolsheviks for union-wide Latinization. The final resolution of the Congress ordered that “transition to instruction and implementation of the new alphabet was the duty for every republic and people in each and every Turkic republic”.<sup>882</sup> The Latin alphabet was declared as the “alphabet of Lenin”<sup>883</sup> and Uzbekistan completed the transition to Latin letters by November 1930.<sup>884</sup> The Latinization was accompanied by the process of purification of the Uzbek language by means of purging Arabic and Persian vocabulary.<sup>885</sup> Besides during late 1920s and 1930s many Uzbek epics including

---

<sup>881</sup> Uzman, *ibid.*, p. 50.

<sup>882</sup> Uzman, *ibid.*, p. 51.

<sup>883</sup> In 1930, Soviet Commissar of Enlightenment Anatoly Lunacharsky had argued that Lenin was in favor of Latinization of the Russian language as well. The Soviet campaign of Latinization declared the Latin letters as the “alphabet of October” and “alphabet of Lenin”. William Fierman, “Identity, Symbolism, and the Politics of Language in Central Asia”, *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol: 61, No: 7, 2009, p. 1211.

<sup>884</sup> William Fierman, *Language Planning and National Development: The Uzbek Experience*, p. 107.

<sup>885</sup> Dunn & Dunn noted that a linguistic research on Tashkent newspapers in 1923, 1924 and 1940 to determine the comparative frequency of loan-words had shown that “whereas in 1923, 37.4% of the words were of Arabic and Persian origin, and 2% of Russian origin the corresponding figures in 1940 were 25% and 15%”. Stephen P. Dunn & Ethel Dunn, “Soviet Regime and Native Culture in Central Asia and Kazakhstan: The Major Peoples”, *Current Anthropology*, Vol: 8, No: 3, June 1967, p. 158.

*Alpamish* and *Gülнар Peri* were compiled by folklorists wandering the steps of the Central Asia and published for the first time.<sup>886</sup>

Nevertheless fading of the *korenizatsiya* by the middle of 1930s and Stalin's annihilation of all political rivals after the purges of 1934 and in the Great Purge of 1938 meant a clear shift in the linguistic policy. The foremost indicator of the shift was the decree of March 13, 1938 compelling that teaching of Russian to be compulsory in all national-minority schools throughout the USSR.<sup>887</sup> Following the liquidation of the first generation of Uzbek elite including the national communists Faizulla Khojaev and Akmal Ikramov<sup>888</sup> together with *Chaghatay Gurungi's* Abdurauf Fitrat, newly-appointed first secretary Osman Yusuphov commanded the Uzbek part of the new linguistic campaign. Several articles appeared in *Pravda Vostoka* declaring that although "remnants of the bourgeois ideology" were resisting the Cyrillicization of the alphabet, the Uzbek People had realized that "Russian language was the most revolutionary and progressive of all the world's languages".<sup>889</sup> The Latin alphabet once declared as the "alphabet of Lenin" discovered to be anti-proletarian and decree of May 8, 1940 ordered the shift from the Latin to the Cyrillic alphabet in Uzbekistan.<sup>890</sup> In contrast to the temporary "more lenient policy towards the expression of national identity" during the Great Patriotic War, a Russophone Soviet identity was promoted through harsh

---

<sup>886</sup> Selami Fedakar, "Özbekistan'da Destan Çalışmalarının Tarihçesi", *Milli Folklor Dergisi*, Vol: 62, Summer 2004, p. 68.

<sup>887</sup> *Uzbekistan: A Study of Soviet Communist Rule in Central Asia*, June 1956, p. 24. Even though published as an anti-Soviet propaganda booklet, a plenty of useful quotations from Uzbek press of Stalin years can be found in this anonymous booklet.

<sup>888</sup> Both Faizulla Khojaev, the President of Bukharan People's Soviet Republic, then the Prime Minister of Uzbekistan SSR, and Akmal Ikramov, First Secretary of Uzbek Communist Party were accused of "rightist-bourgeois nationalist deviation" together with Bukharin at the Show Trials of 1938, sentenced to death and executed. More information on F. Khojaev's life and thought can be reached in Roger David Kangas, *Faizulla Khodzhaev: National Communism in Bukhara and Soviet Uzbekistan, 1896-1938*, PhD thesis, Bloomington: Indiana University, 1992.

<sup>889</sup> Fierman, *ibid.*, p. 136.

<sup>890</sup> Dunn & Dunn, *ibid.*, p. 158.

measures against “bourgeois-nationalist deviations” under Stalin.<sup>891</sup> As expected, “brave and friendly” Alpamish of 1920s had already turned out to be “reactionary, tyrannical and blood-thirsty”; then the epic was expelled out of textbooks and disappeared from libraries.<sup>892</sup>

Khrushchev’s optimistic declaration that ethnic differences and republican boundaries would be insignificant under socialism<sup>893</sup> for the *homo-sovieticus*<sup>894</sup> had gone together with the 1958-59 school reform. Article 19 of the School Reform Law stated that “education in the mother tongue would no longer be compulsory; parents could choose any language”.<sup>895</sup> Thwarting Lenin’s principle of compulsory education in native language, Article 19 certainly meant a crucial setback for the national minorities. Ideological passion of Khrushchev years, formulated in two words, *sblizhenie* (rapprochement of Soviet peoples) and *sliyanie* (fusion of Soviet nationalities) was to elevate Russian as the “second mother tongue”<sup>896</sup> for all non-Russian *homo-sovieticus*. So the reform both raised the status of Russian vis-à-vis Uzbek and other republican languages and also increased enrollment rate in Russian-teaching schools<sup>897</sup> especially in urban areas of Uzbekistan.

---

<sup>891</sup> Fierman, *ibid.*, pp. 256-257.

<sup>892</sup> At its convention on March 28-31, 1952, Uzbekistan Writer’s Union declared that the epic “Alpamysh was directed against the people”. Naim Karimov, “Exposing the Murderer of Alpamysh” in H. B. Paksoy, *Central Asia Reader: The Rediscovery of History*, Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1994, pp. 43-58.

<sup>893</sup> Fierman, *ibid.*, pp. 257-258. Hosking reports that the new program of the Communist Party prepared by Khrushchev pointed out that USSR has already reached the stage of socialism and set the year of 1980 to pass to the stage of communism. In theory this meant that all classes would merge, all national and religious differences would become archaic. In practice however it led to the elevation of Russian to the status of language of inter-ethnic communication. Geoffrey Hosking, *A History of the Soviet Union*, Revised Edition, Glasgow: Fontana Press/Collins, 1990, p. 348.

<sup>894</sup> Communist Soviet man of no ethnic and religious affiliation.

<sup>895</sup> Kirkwood, *ibid.*, p. 64.

<sup>896</sup> Kirkwood, *ibid.*, p. 65.

<sup>897</sup> Kirkwood, *ibid.*, pp. 64-65.

Immediately after Khrushchev was ousted from office Brezhnev denounced the *sliyanie*, the merging of Soviet nationalities, and later admitted the endurance of ethnic identities though a rhetoric upholding integration (*edintsvo*) continued.<sup>898</sup> Hosking notes that 1970 Soviet census was quite disappointing for Soviet leaders since, in spite of all rhetoric of *sliyanie* and later *edintsvo*, there were no sign of emerging Russophone Soviet man especially in Central Asian and Caucasian republics.<sup>899</sup> While 98.6% of Uzbeks confirmed Uzbek as their first language, only 14.5% of the population admitted Russian to be their second language.<sup>900</sup> USSR Council of Ministers decree of October 13, 1978 was both a major ‘leap forward’ in Russian teaching and also alarm bell for the elites of national republics as well. With this decree Russian language teaching would be compulsory at the pre-school level throughout the Union.<sup>901</sup> Brezhnev backed bilingualism in his message sent to *Tashkent Conference on Russian*<sup>902</sup> arguing that nearby “one’s own native language, Russian was serving as the language of international communication in the building of communism”.<sup>903</sup> On the other hand Rashidov, First Secretary of Uzbek Communist Party, while celebrating “Russian language as the language of the great Lenin, the language of the giant people...possessing rich democratic and

---

<sup>898</sup> Karen A. Collias, *Heroes and Patriots: The Ethnic Integration of Youth in the Soviet Union during the Brezhnev Era, 1965-1982*, unpublished PhD Thesis, N.Y.: Columbia University, 1987, p. 65-67.

<sup>899</sup> Hosking, *ibid.*, p. 429.

<sup>900</sup> J. M. Kirkwood, “Russian Language Teaching Policy in Soviet Central Asia 1958-1986”, p. 136 in Shirin Akiner (eds.), *Cultural Change and Continuity in Central Asia*, London & New York: Kegan Paul International, 1991.

<sup>901</sup> Roman Solchanyk, “Russian Language and Soviet Politics”, *Soviet Studies*, Vol: 34, No: 1, January 1982, p. 30.

<sup>902</sup> The full name of the conference was *All-Union Scientific-Theoretical Conference on the Russian Language-the Language of Friendship and Cooperation of the Peoples of the USSR*. The Tashkent Conference convened on 22-24 May 1979 with the attendance of many academicians and high level politicians from all Republics.

<sup>903</sup> Yaroslav Bilinsky, “Expanding the Use of Russian or Russification? Some Critical Thoughts on Russian as a Lingua Franca and the ‘Language of Friendship and Cooperation of the Peoples of the USSR’”, *Russian Review*, Vol: 40, No: 3, July 1981, p. 317.

revolutionary traditions” also underlined that “bilingualism did not connote any denationalization of non-Russian languages or their Russification”.<sup>904</sup>

### 6.1.3. Independence and Enthusiasm for Uzbek Language

As Micallef maintains, the official policy of Brezhnev era, that is Russian-national language bilingualism, had offered the room for the development of national cultures and topics related to national identity began to permeate into Uzbek literature during 1970s and early 1980s.<sup>905</sup> Policies of *perestroika* (restructuring) and *glasnost* (openness), initiated by the new Soviet leader Gorbachev in 1986, allowed larger political space for more ambitious demands on behalf of national languages. At the very outset Uzbek Writers’ Union decided to establish a commission to examine and the re-publish the works of Jadidists Abdurauf Fitrat and Abdulhamid Cholpan in October 1986.<sup>906</sup> At the same time numerous articles appeared in the Uzbek press on the importance of mother tongue: While Mirza Kencabayev was complaining that the Uzbek language had lost its purity as a result of Soviet policy of bilingualism<sup>907</sup>, Mahmud Sattarov suggested especially “works on Uzbek language, literature, culture, custom and

---

<sup>904</sup> Bilinsky, *ibid.*, p. 318. In his opening speech, Sharaf Rashidov proudly informed the participants about the ‘Uzbek success’ which was revealed by the preliminary results of the 1979 Soviet Census. The proportion of Uzbeks declaring Russian as their second language mounted from 14.5% of 1970 to 49.2% in 1979. The figures seem to be “artificially inflated”, as Kirkwood notes, similar to inflated cotton production figures of the same decade.

<sup>905</sup> Roberta Maria Micallef, *The Role of Literature and Intellectuals in National Identity Construction: The Case of Uzbekistan*, PhD thesis, Austin: The University of Texas, August 1997, p. 176.

<sup>906</sup> Halim Kara, “Reclaiming National Literary Heritage: The Rehabilitation of Abdurauf Fitrat and Abdulhamid Sulaymon Cholpan in Uzbekistan”, *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol: 54, No: 1, January 2002, p. 128.

<sup>907</sup> Mirza Kencabayev, “Dildaşlık”, *Özbekistan Adabiyatı ve San’atı*, 22 January 1988, Tashkent, p. 4-5. cited in Çağatay Koçar, *Türkistan ile İlgili Makaleler*, Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1991, p. 5-6. Ç. Koçar presents a selection of articles from Uzbek press on the language issue in *Türkistan ile İlgili Makaleler*, p. 1-9.

pedagogy should be carried in Uzbek language”.<sup>908</sup> Meanwhile academics and literati from all peripheral republics were challenging the official policy of bilingualism especially after the round table discussion on linguistic at the *Union-wide Presidium of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR* in March 1987. At the *Plenum of USSR Union of Writers* of March 1988 Kyrgyz writer Genghis Aitmatov strongly argued against the abolition of compulsory education in native languages.<sup>909</sup> Despite the fact that the Resolution of the 19th Party Conference of June 1988 strongly backed the official line of national-Russian bilingualism, intellectual mood in non-Russian republics inclined henceforth towards “the declaration of the local languages as the State Language of the Republic”.<sup>910</sup>

In this atmosphere of enthusiasm for Uzbek language, *Birlik* (Unity) Popular Front was established through the initiatives of 15 intellectuals gathered around the Writer’s Union in November 1988.<sup>911</sup> While the first article of *Birlik*’s programme laid utmost emphasis on “national education and cultivation of national language”, in the third article the movement declared itself to “fight in order to bring Uzbek under the protection of the state, gain for it the status of Uzbekistan’s state language”.<sup>912</sup> Just after the establishment of *Birlik*, on December 3, 1988, an academic convention at Tashkent University turned into a nationalist agitation demanding Uzbek to be declared as the state language with placards “Don’t Let Our Language and Cultural Heritage Be Turned into a

---

<sup>908</sup> Mahmud Sattarov, “Dile Etibar – Ele Etibar”, *Özbekistan Adabiyatı ve San’atı*, 25 December 1987, Tashkent, p. 5. cited in Çağatay Koçar, *ibid.*, p. 4.

<sup>909</sup> Devendra Kaushik, “Cultural Aspects of Soviet Nationalities Policy in Central Asia: Recent Trends”, in K. Warikoo & Dawa Norbu, *ibid.*, p. 125.

<sup>910</sup> Devendra Kaushik, *ibid.*, p. 128.

<sup>911</sup> Muhammed Salih, the then secretary of the Writer’s Union notes that *Birlik* had evolved from the *Aral Committee* of 1986 and instantly became the centre of the national movement after its foundation. Muhammed Salih, *Devlet Sırları*, Istanbul: Toker Yayınları, 1997, p. 34-35. The full name of the movement is *Birlik (Unity)–Movement for the Preservation of Uzbekistan’s Natural Material and Spiritual Riches*.

<sup>912</sup> Babak, Vladimir & Vaisman, Demian & Wasserman, Aryeh (eds.), *Political Organization in Central Asia and Azerbaijan: Sources and Documents*, London & Portland: Frank Cass, 2004, p. 367.

Graveyard”.<sup>913</sup> Inspired by the popular fronts in the Baltic Republics, on March 19, 1989 Birlik organized its first public demonstration in front of the office of newly appointed Uzbek President, Mirzaolim Ibrahimov, to support Uzbek as the state language.<sup>914</sup> Regardless of Ibrahimov’s announcement to the crowd that a commission would be established on the language issue, Birlik carried on another demonstration on April 9, both to repeat their demand for Uzbek as the state language, introduction of old Arabic alphabet in the place of Cyrillic and also to request official recognition.<sup>915</sup> Uzbek government, alarmed after the developments in Baltic Republics<sup>916</sup>, announced the decision to propose a language bill on May 18, to cool down the heightened tension. Critchlow, considering the language bill as “an obvious attempt to defuse nationalist agitation against Russification and linguistic discrimination”<sup>917</sup>, notes widespread distrust among Uzbek intelligentsia that Uzbek leadership deliberately planned the timing of draft’s publication in order the public debate on the language bill to coincide with the summer vacation of the universities.<sup>918</sup>

Nevertheless while the commission was working on the draft of the language bill, ethnic violence erupted in the Ferghana region on the weekend of June 3-4, as an armed Uzbek mob attacked Meskhetian Turks and burned their houses. After ten days of ethnic bloodshed leaving 99 Meskethians dead and around 1000 wounded, Uzbek First Secretary Rafik Nishanov was removed from

---

<sup>913</sup> Dilip Hiro, *Between Marx and Muhammed: The Changing Face of Central Asia*, London: Harper Collins Publishers, 1994, p. 166.

<sup>914</sup> “Several Thousand Demonstrate in Soviet Uzbekistan”, *Reuters News*, 20 March 1989.

<sup>915</sup> Yaacov Ro’i, “The Soviet and Russian Context of the Development of Nationalism in Soviet Central Asia”, *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique*, Vol: 32, No: 1, January-March 1991, p. 132. Ro’i notes several estimates guessing the number of demonstrators around 100,000.

<sup>916</sup> Latvian, Lithuanian and Estonian were declared as the state languages in their respective Baltic homelands in late 1988 and early 1989 after huge street demonstrations and riots.

<sup>917</sup> James Critchlow, *Nationalism in Uzbekistan: A Soviet Republic’s Road to Sovereignty*, Boulder & San Francisco & Oxford: Westview Press, 1991, p. 101.

<sup>918</sup> James Critchlow, *ibid.*, p. 102.

the office by Kremlin.<sup>919</sup> Just before Islam Karimov was announced as the new Party Secretary on June 23, the draft of the language bill titled as *Uzbekiston Sovet Sotsialistik Respublikasining Qonuni: Uzbekiston SSRning Davlat Tilleri Haqida*<sup>920</sup> was published on June 18.<sup>921</sup> The draft, prepared by Uzbek communist apparatchiks perhaps contemplating themselves to operate still in the Brezhnev stagnation, was a replica of official bilingualism of Brezhnev status-quo.<sup>922</sup> Before all, the title of the draft was a real shock for Birlik and independent Uzbek intelligentsia. The plural phrase “davlat tilleri”, that is “state languages” caused several criticisms in Uzbek media and academia. Discovering that the word “Russian” was cited more than the word “Uzbek” throughout the draft, poet Erkin Vahidov even claimed that the draft was translated from Russian.<sup>923</sup> In the words of Muhammad Salih of Birlik:

“A draft that is published to give the Uzbek language the standing of the state language, and in reality makes the Russian language the state language and gives it legal standing”.<sup>924</sup>

Islam Karimov, proposed for the party secretary post after conciliation between influential Ferghana, Tashkent and Samarkand clans, was lacking a personal powerbase as a party bureaucrat from peripheral Kashkadarya region. The ongoing debate over the language bill turned into a golden opportunity for

---

<sup>919</sup> After investigations at the region, Soviet Premier Nikolai Ryzhkov accused the Uzbek government officials of providing “gasoline, vodka and transport for attackers” and “tarnishing the party’s prestige in Soviet Uzbekistan”. “Premier Says Officials Helped Attackers in Uzbek Violence”, *The Associated Press*, 14 June 1989.

<sup>920</sup> “Law of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Uzbekistan: On the State Languages of the Uzbek SSR”.

<sup>921</sup> James Critchlow, *Nationalism in Uzbekistan: A Soviet Republic’s Road to Sovereignty*, Boulder & San Francisco & Oxford: Westview Press, 1991, p. 115.

<sup>922</sup> Main objection was that both Brezhnev’s official bilingualism and the draft bill’s alleged bilingualism had in practice implied one-way bilingualism in Uzbekistan as Sengupta claimed. Russian-speakers were never eager to learn the local languages and official bilingualism would be applicable to only native Uzbeks who would feel obliged to learn the language of success, the Russian language. Please look Sengupta, *ibid.*, p. 157 and Critchlow, *ibid.*, p. 102-103.

<sup>923</sup> Critchlow, *ibid.*, p. 103.

<sup>924</sup> Critchlow, *ibid.*, p. 104.



Karimov. He could easily adopt the position of Birlik and nationalist intelligentsia to a large extent in order to create a legitimacy base for himself as the true champion of the national cause. Karimov in “a sense of real-politic”<sup>925</sup> gave his support to a modified version of the language bill and quickly declared his choice for the title as “*davlat tili*”, the state language in singular. Determined to balance interests of different clans upon a shaky power base Karimov momentarily borrowed from Birlik’s nationalist discourse. Being an advocate of a tighter version of the language bill both ensured the clan leaders to line up behind his leadership and also assisted him to marginalize Birlik.

Moscow had to acknowledge *de facto* situation particularly after the rejection of bilingualism in favor of national languages in Baltic and Caucasian Republics: *CPSU Platform on the Nationalities Policy of the Party in Present-Day Conditions* accepted on September 20, 1989 that “it should be within the jurisdiction of the republics to declare the language of the nationality which gave a Union or Autonomous Republic its name the State Language.”<sup>926</sup> Relieved Karimov led a slightly modified version of the initial draft to be adopted as *Uzbekiston Sovet Sotsialistik Respublikasining Qonuni: Uzbekiston SSRning Davlat Tili Haqida*<sup>927</sup> on October 21, 1989. On the very same day Karimov’s presidential decree banned street demonstrations for the sake of “stabilization of the sociopolitical situation in the republic”.<sup>928</sup> Just two days ago Birlik had already arranged a large demonstration of approximately 50,000 people with the intention of preventing Russian to be the state language together with Uzbek.<sup>929</sup> Harsh

---

<sup>925</sup> William Fierman, “Independence and the Declining Priority of Language Law Implementation in Uzbekistan” in Yacoov Ro’i (eds.), *Muslim Eurasia: Conflicting Legacies*, London: Frank Cass, 1995, p. 206.

<sup>926</sup> Kaushik, *ibid.*, p. 128.

<sup>927</sup> “Law of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Uzbekistan: On the State Language of the Uzbek SSR”.

<sup>928</sup> Muhammad Salih, *The Opponent*, Hakan Coşkunarslan (eds.), Istanbul: Kömen Publications, 2006, p. 196.

<sup>929</sup> “Leader of Uzbek Group Arrested”, *The Associated Press*, 20 October 1989.

assault of police towards demonstrators and consequent arrest of 300 people including the leader of Birlik, Abdurakhim Pulatov, signaled a novel situation: From that time on Birlik's program belonged exclusively to the Uzbek state and its leader Islam Karimov.

The law included an all-purpose Preamble on the importance of language for the nation and thirty articles. In the first article Uzbek was declared as the only state language of Uzbekistan. Yet the same article granted Russian the distinctive status of "language of interethnic communication".<sup>930</sup> Still being highly sensitive to Kremlin as the First Secretary of the Communist Party, Karimov was striving to appease both Moscow and the Russian minority and also native Uzbeks. Thus in fact both languages had acquired legal status. Furthermore, the authority of Karakalpakstan Autonomous Republic on deciding "all linguistic issues within its own territory" was guaranteed in the Preamble of the law.<sup>931</sup> In this way the autonomy granted to Karakalpakstan in the Soviet era remained intact. The successive articles of the law contained provisions intending to expand the use of Uzbek language in education, bureaucracy, businesses and public sphere as well:

"Articles 5 through 12 and Article 22 raise the status of Uzbek in public meetings, provide for use of Uzbek in the preparation of the republic's laws, and enhance the role of Uzbek in office work, accounting and financial documentation in enterprises, establishments and organizations...they also provide that such documents as birth and death certificates, marriage registration and personal identity documents be issued in Uzbek".<sup>932</sup>

Articles as of 13 to 18 were devoted specifically to raise status of the Uzbek language from primary and secondary education to university curriculum. It is worthy of note that Article 16 ordered that Arabic-based script which was used

---

<sup>930</sup> Fierman, *ibid.*, p. 208.

<sup>931</sup> Birgit N. Schlyter, "The Karakalpaks and Other Language Minorities under Central Asian State Rule", pp. 84-85 in Birgit N. Schlyter, (eds.), *Prospects for Democracy in Central Asia: Papers Read at a Conference in Istanbul, 1-3 June 2003 and Additional Chapters*, Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul.

<sup>932</sup> Fierman, *ibid.*, pp. 208-209.

before the first Latinization of late 1920s, would be taught in primary and secondary schools. This was an obvious borrow from demands uttered at Birlik's demonstrations.<sup>933</sup> Article 19 and 20 set Uzbek as the 'primary' language to be used in university textbooks, newspapers, magazines, TV and radio broadcasts.<sup>934</sup> The remaining articles consisted of arrangements in favor of Uzbek regarding names of towns and streets, and also clauses to denote the responsible government bodies to implement the law.

*The Law on the State Language of the Uzbek SSR* was seemingly a victory for Birlik and nationalist minded intelligentsia who were promoting the idea of Uzbek as the state language for a long time. As a matter of fact Uzbek became official language of an independent state in 1989 for the first time in the history.<sup>935</sup> On the other hand, almost all articles that apparently promoted the Uzbek language carried special qualifications for Russian as well. While identity cards and marriage certificates were prescribed to be in Uzbek, the same article made addendum Russian translation compulsory<sup>936</sup> (Article 12). Although teaching of the Uzbek language was made mandatory in all minority schools, the Russian language was assured to continue as a part of curriculum in Uzbek and non-Russian minority schools<sup>937</sup> (Article 15). After all Russian language was referred thirty-two times in a law of thirty articles.<sup>938</sup>

---

<sup>933</sup> Muhammed Salih of Birlik was even proposing that the ancient Turkic runic alphabet should be studied in Uzbek schools. The discussion on switching to Arabic script and Salih's views on the runic alphabet please look Yaacov Ro'i, *ibid.*, pp. 137-139.

<sup>934</sup> Fierman, *ibid.*, p. 209.

<sup>935</sup> In the brief period of Leninist nativization (korenizatsia) policy Uzbek language was actually declared as the official language of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic at the Congress of All-Union Soviets in 1924. However the decision taken by Moscow was a temporary concession to consolidate Soviet power in Uzbekistan and was repealed in 1939. Please look Uzman, *ibid.*, pp. 56-57. Medieval Khanates of Bukhara, Khiva and Kokand were using Persian and Arabic in their courts and bureaucracies.

<sup>936</sup> Fierman, *ibid.*, p. 209.

<sup>937</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>938</sup> Annette Bohr, "Language Policy and Ethnic Relations in Uzbekistan", p. 201 in Smith, Graham & Law, Vivien & Wilson, Andrew & Bohr, Annette & Allworth, Edward (eds.), *Nation-Building in*

Articles 4, 7 and 8 of the Language Law could be decisive for the “Uzbekization” of Uzbekistan since they required managers and workers to learn Uzbek (Article 4), along with office work (Article 7) and statistical/financial documentation (Article 8) to be carried out in Uzbek.<sup>939</sup> Nevertheless, anxious to prevent mass exodus of qualified Russian labor force, Karimov government set a transition period of eight years for the full implementation of these three articles. In spite of eight years of postponement, Articles 4, 7 and 8 of the Language Law caused substantial resentment among Russian population and other minority groups. Hence moderate language law of 1989 could not prevent rapid emigration trend of Russians: 800,000 Russians left Uzbekistan between 1985 and 1993 labeling the law as “the law on emigration”.<sup>940</sup>

Both the declaration of sovereignty on June 20, 1990 and then the declaration of independence on August 31, 1991 were to some extent enforced to the Uzbek authorities by the course of events in the process of dissolution of the Soviet Union. As of early 1990, the immense activism of 1988-1989 for the status of the Uzbek language was effectively cooled down and the Uzbek state apparatus gradually established its ascendancy on the issue of Uzbek language. The Parliament of Uzbekistan included the clause concerning the status of the Uzbek language in the new Constitution of Uzbekistan adopted on December 8, 1992. Article 4 of the Constitution settled the question of the state language without any specific provisions for Russian or Tajik: “the state language of the Republic of Uzbekistan is the Uzbek language”.<sup>941</sup> Yet the same article also upheld that the Republic of Uzbekistan had to maintain “a respectful attitude towards the languages, customs, and traditions of the nationalities and peoples living on its

---

*the Post-Soviet Borderlands: The Politics of National Identities*, Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

<sup>939</sup> Fierman, *ibid.*, p. 210.

<sup>940</sup> “Plight of Russian in Newly Independent Muslim States”, *The Economist*, 8 August 1992.

<sup>941</sup> Uzbekiston Respublikasining Konstitutsiyasi, Tashkent, 1992, p. 9.

territory and ensures conditions for their development”.<sup>942</sup> On the other hand, Article 90 set “fluent command of the state language” as the precondition of candidacy for the Presidency.<sup>943</sup> This provision was probably set to prevent certain possible rivals of Karimov’s presidential bid. This “highly personal prerequisite” left aside, the constitutional setting for the languages was “fairly tolerant of non-Uzbek languages” as Spechler noted, since no Uzbek language test was required for the appointment to official posts unlike neighboring Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.<sup>944</sup>

As noted earlier, switching back to the Arabic script in the place of Cyrillic alphabet was among the demands voiced by *Birlik* in the street demonstrations of 1988 and 1989.<sup>945</sup> In this period, the utmost emergency for the activist Uzbek intelligentsia was to discard Cyrillic as soon as possible, which was seen as the foremost sign of Russian domination. Arabic script, in which Chaghatay, the literary language of pre-Soviet years was written, seemed initially the most plausible alternative. The September 1989 issue of the influential literary magazine *Sharq Yulduzi* included an Arabic script course and *Uzbek Tili va Adabiyati* published Uzbek texts written in Arabic letters in 1990.<sup>946</sup> Moreover, Uzbek schools started to teach the Arabic alphabet to third and fourth grade pupils since 1991.<sup>947</sup>

---

<sup>942</sup> Marc Leprêtre, “Language Policies in the Soviet Successor States: A Brief Assessment on Language, Linguistic Rights and National Identity”, *Papeles del Este*, Universidad Complutense Madrid, No: 3, 2002, p. 24.

<sup>943</sup> Leprêtre, *ibid.*, p. 24.

<sup>944</sup> Marchin C. Spechler, “Authoritarian Politics and Economic Reform in Uzbekistan: Past, Present and Prospects”, *Central Asian Survey*, Vol: 26, No: 2, 2007, p. 190.

<sup>945</sup> Press was informing widely on the demands by *Birlik* for “the wider use of Arabic script”. Ahmad Rashid, “Uzbeks Call for Gradual Independence”, *The Independent*, 28 May 1990.

<sup>946</sup> Jacob M. Landau & Barbara Keller-Heinkele, *Politics of Language in the Ex-Soviet Muslim States*, London: Hurst & Company, 2001, p. 135.

<sup>947</sup> Fierman, “Independence and the Declining Priority of Language Law Implementation in Uzbekistan”, *ibid.*, p. 225. Fierman makes a note that the textbook for the course of Arabic script, *Alifbe* was printed in 550,000 copies and distributed to schools. Fierman, *ibid.*, p. 230. Perhaps thinking the chronic deficit of school textbooks in Uzbekistan due to lack of enough sources,

In the meantime, fueled by both pan-Turkist ambitions and also economic concerns, Turkey was eagerly pressing for Latinization in newly independent Turkic Soviet Republics. Besides numerous congresses to promote a common Turkic alphabet and language, Turkey also promised to provide Latin-based textbooks, typewriters and printing equipment to Turkic Republics.<sup>948</sup> Uzbek delegates attended all the congresses including the Istanbul Summit of November 18-20, 1991 where representatives from several Turkic states and autonomous regions<sup>949</sup> decided on switching to the Latin alphabet in principle. Later this decision would be confirmed at the Ankara Congress convened on March 8-10, 1993.<sup>950</sup> Nevertheless the most crucial step was the consensus reached at the workshop organized by Marmara University's Turcology Institute<sup>951</sup> on the Latin-based common Turkic alphabet.

The 34-letter common alphabet was an enlarged version of the alphabet used in Turkey: 29-letters of Turkish alphabet plus five extra letters Ä or Ə, Ñ, Q, W and X.<sup>952</sup> Turkey's keen effort in favor of a Latin alphabet as similar as possible to her existing alphabet surely played its part in. However, the consensus on a common alphabet could only be reached on account of Central Asian leaders' vital

---

Landau & Keller-Heinkele implied that an external state might have financed the printing of such a large amount of books. Landau & Keller-Heinkele, *ibid.*, p. 135.

<sup>948</sup> Jacob M. Landau, *Pantürkizm*, Mesut Akın (trans.), Istanbul: Sarmal Yayınevi, 1999, p. 305.

<sup>949</sup> Milletlerarası Çağdaş Türk Alfabeleri Sempozyumu, Istanbul: Marmara Üniversitesi Türkiyat Enstitüsü Yayınları, 1992. The Uzbek representatives at the Summit were historian Holcigit Sanagulov and linguist Berdiyur Yusupov. In addition to the independent republics of Kazakistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Turkey, autonomous republics of Daghestan, Tataristan, Bashkurdistan, Chuvasia, Karachai-Balkar, Gagauz Republic and Crimean Tatars sent representatives to the Summit. For the list of the participants Nadir Devlet (eds.), *ibid.*, pp. 4-5.

<sup>950</sup> Landau, *ibid.* p. 305.

<sup>951</sup> The workshop was on December 18-20, 1991 in Istanbul.

<sup>952</sup> Even all the remaining letters with possible exception of W, were once proposed to be included in Turkish alphabet. Q was omitted by Mustafa Kemal personally in the last minute and the necessity of the letters Ä, Ñ, X were expressed repeatedly by pan-Turkists of early Republican era such as Nihal Atsız.

desire of distancing themselves from Russian ex-bosses in dawn of their independence. Furthermore, as stated by Mesamed, “Uzbekistan authorities’ intention to choose a pro-Western orientation” and their appraisal of Latin alphabet as prerequisite of Westernization were also among the major motives behind Latinization.<sup>953</sup> Last but not the least the Arabic alphabet was rejected by Uzbek leaders in order to quarantine external Islamic fundamentalists behind a linguistic barrier.<sup>954</sup>

**Table 5 - Common Turkic Roman Alphabet<sup>955</sup>**

A a	B b	C c	Ç ç	D d	E e	Ä ä Ə ə	F f	G g	Ğ ğ	H h	I ı
I i	J j	K k	L l	M m	N n	Ñ ñ	O o	Ö ö	P p	Q q	R r
S s	Ş ş	T t	U u	Ü ü	V v	W w	X x	Y y	Z z		

Cutler once claimed that the interval of 1992-1993 signified in Uzbekistan the “end of intra-elite struggle and the beginning of regime’s elite-motivated ‘renewal’ through the submission of organized officialdom” to Karimov.<sup>956</sup> However, as Karimov ensured the loyalty of bureaucracy, pacified the civil unrest and became persuaded about the safety of ‘his’ Uzbekistan’s independence vis-a-vis Russia, the pace of the “renewal” regarding particularly the Uzbek language slowed down. On September 2, 1993, Uzbek Parliament approved the Latin-based Uzbek alphabet consisting of 31 letters and one apostrophe. The commission set to prepare the new script was initially instructed to introduce an alphabet proposal

<sup>953</sup> Vladimir Mesamed, “Linguistic Policy and the Process of Democratization in Uzbekistan”, p. 239 in Yacoov Ro’i (eds.), *Democracy and Pluralism in Muslim Eurasia*, Oxon, UK: Frank Cass, 2004.

<sup>954</sup> Karimov felt unsecure facing developments in two adjacent states: Taliban’s rise in Afganistan and Tajik civil war between the Islamic rebels and the government.

<sup>955</sup> Mehmet Uzman, “Romanisation in Uzbekistan Past and Present”, *Journal of Royal Asiatic Society*, Series 3, Vol: 20, No: 1, 2010, p. 57.

<sup>956</sup> Robert M. Cutler, “De-authoritarization in Uzbekistan?: Analysis and Prospects,” in Irina Morozova (eds.), *Towards Social Stability and Democratic Governance in Central Eurasia: Challenges to Regional Security*, Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2005, pp. 133-134; available at <http://www.robertcutler.org/download/html/ch05im.html>, accessed on August 29, 2010.

“as close as possible to the Uzbek Latin script practiced in the 1930s”.<sup>957</sup> However, as Schlyter maintained the alphabet adopted by the *Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan: On the Introduction of an Uzbek Alphabet Based on the Latin Script*<sup>958</sup> diverged both from the Latin alphabet of 1930s and slightly from the common Turkic alphabet as well.<sup>959</sup> Schlyter even stated that the new Uzbek alphabet was just a scheme for Cyrillic-Latin transliteration.<sup>960</sup>

**Table 6 - Roman Alphabet Adopted in 1993**<sup>961</sup>

A a	B b	C c [ts]	Dd	E e	F f	G g	H h
I i	J j [dz]	K k	L l	M m	N n	O o	P p
Q q	R r	S s	T t	U u	V v	X x	Y y
Z z	Çç [ch]	Ğ ğ	J j	Ñ ñ	Õ õ	Ş ş [sh]	

The law prescribed a seven-year transition period for the switch in government and private sector documents, printing, publishing and teaching all levels of education except the first year pupils to be attending schools in the upcoming semester. The *Alifbo*, textbook for the new alphabet was printed in 100,000 copies for first year students of primary schools who would be instructed using new Latin alphabet.<sup>962</sup> However the pace of transition in daily life, and particularly for the adult population, was outstandingly slow. Transition to Latin-

<sup>957</sup> Schlyter refers to her personal communication in November 2005 with Prof. Baxtiyor Karimov, who was a member of the above-mentioned commission. Birgit N. Schlyter, “Language Reform and Language Status in Multilingual Uzbekistan”, *Asian Cultures and Modernity*, Research Report, No: 13, Stockholm University, April 2007, p. 18.

<sup>958</sup> Uzbekiston Respublikasining Qonuni: Lotin Yozuviga Asoslangan Uzbek Alifbosini Joriy Etish Tughrisida

<sup>959</sup> Schlyter, *ibid.*, p. 18.

<sup>960</sup> Birgit N. Schlyter, “Language Policies in Present-Day Central Asia” *International Journal on Multicultural Societies*, Vol: 3, No: 2, 2001, p. 130.

<sup>961</sup> Uzman, *ibid.*, p. 57.

<sup>962</sup> Landau & Keller-Heinkele, *ibid.*, p. 136.



based alphabet left aside, most Ministries and State Departments were hesitating even to conduct correspondence in Uzbek language by 1994. The Prime Minister of Uzbekistan, Abdulhashim Mutalov was condemning some bureaucrats for “lack of a sense of national dignity, patriotism and respect for their motherland and the people” regarding the use of Uzbek language.<sup>963</sup>

The Uzbek Parliament revised the first post-independence Latin-based alphabet of the country on May 6, 1995.<sup>964</sup> Then, on August 24, 1995, Uzbek government issued the *Resolution Concerning the Ratification of the Principal Orthographic Rules of the Uzbek Language*<sup>965</sup> to standardize grammatical rules of the Uzbek language written in the new alphabet. The revised alphabet consisted of 24 letters, plus three letter combinations, two letter-apostrophe combinations and an apostrophe. At first glance, it seemed that the revision was carried out in order Uzbek children to chat and surf easily. As a matter of fact, all letters that a standard English language keyboard was lacking such as Ç, Ş, Ğ, Ñ and Õ were removed. Considering the linguistic principle that a single sign should correspond to a single sound, Uzman argued that the word combinations installed in the place of the removed letters such as Sh, Ch, O', G' and Ng were deficient.<sup>966</sup> It looked as if the Uzbek authorities opted for Anglicized<sup>967</sup> version of the Latin instead of common Turkic alphabet or Russian Cyrillic. Muhammad Salih, the exiled leader

---

<sup>963</sup> “Premier Demands More Rigour in Application of Uzbek Language Law”, *Narodnoye Slovo*, Tashkent, in Russian, June 15, 1994; translated and transmitted by BBC Monitoring Service on June 20, 1994. Mutalov complained that “None of the 129 documents sent to the government over the past four months by the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations was in Uzbek and neither were any of the 67 documents forwarded by the State Property Committee.”

<sup>964</sup> O‘zbekiston Respublikasining Qonuni: O‘zbekiston Respublikasining “Lotin Yozuviga Asoslangan O‘zbek Alifbosini Joriy Etish To‘g‘risida”gi Qonuniga O‘zgartishlar Kiritish Haqida (Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan: Concerning Changes to the Law on the “Introduction of an Uzbek Alphabet Based on the Latin Script” of the Republic of Uzbekistan) Birgit N. Schlyter, “Language Reform and Language Status in Multilingual Uzbekistan” p. 18.

<sup>965</sup> <http://www.oxuscom.com/orthography.htm#part%20I> reached at February 3, 2010.

<sup>966</sup> Mehmet Uzman, “Romanisation in Uzbekistan Past and Present”, *Journal of Royal Asiatic Society*, Series 3, Vol: 20, No: 1, 2010, p. 59.

<sup>967</sup> For the sake of accuracy perhaps one must say Americanized in the place of Anglicised.

of the Erk Party, argued that the new alphabet should be appropriate to the nature of the Turkish languages, namely to the consonant harmony and also should serve to approximate different Turkic languages.<sup>968</sup> Contrary to Salih’s anticipation, Uzbek authorities were not concerned much in the consonant harmony as well as any of the other Turkic languages.

**Table 7 - Roman Alphabet Adopted in 1995<sup>969</sup>**

A a	B b	Dd	E e	F f	G g	H h	I i
J j [dz]	K k	L l	M m	N n	O o	P p	Q q
R r	S s	T t	U u	V v	X x	Y y	Z z
O’ o’	G’ g’	Sh sh	Ch ch	Ng ng	’ apostrophe		

Later Karimov amended the 1989 language law on December 21, 1995 through *The Decree of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan On Alterations and Amendments to the Law on “Official Language of the Republic of Uzbekistan”*.<sup>970</sup> While the amended language law comprised of only twenty-four articles, the preamble of 1989 law was entirely abrogated. In this sense new 1995 language law was a condensed version of the initial 1989 *Law on the State Language*. In the first article Uzbek was declared as the sole official language of Uzbekistan and status of “language of interethnic communication” formerly granted to Russian was annulled. The law right after assured in the second article that setting Uzbek as the only official language should not lead any violation of the “constitutional rights of nations and ethnic groups residing in the territory the

<sup>968</sup> Muhammed Salih, “Türkistan Şuuru”, Istanbul: Ötüken Neşriyat, 199, pp. 142-145.

<sup>969</sup> Uzman, *ibid.*, p. 58. 1995 version of the Uzbek Latin alphabet can be also found at <http://www.oxuscom.com/orthography.htm#part%20I> reached at February 3, 2010.

<sup>970</sup> *The Decree of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan On Alterations and Amendments to the Law on “Official Language of the Republic of Uzbekistan* amending 1989 Law on State Language was reached on 4 July 2010 at <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b4d328.html>. Another unofficial translation can be found in Anita Sengupta, *ibid.*, pp. 293-295. All references to the law in above discussion would be to the UNICEF translation.

Republic of Uzbekistan to use their native languages.” After that Article 3 made use of a narrower wording on the status of Karakalpak language: While Karakalpak government’s jurisdiction on all linguistic issues in Karakalpak territory was guaranteed in 1989 law, in the amended law only “questions relating use of language” were left to the authority in the Karakalpakstan Autonomous Republic (Article 3). Schylter predicts that Karimov government started to employ a stricter control on Karakalpak linguistic issues after the 1995 modification of the third article.<sup>971</sup>

The new wording of the Language Law was quite tolerant since Uzbek citizens would have both the right to choose language of education (Article 6) and also the right “to write own name, family name and surname according to their national and historical traditions” (Article 15). Besides while the state was entitled to provide teaching of the Uzbek language for all citizens free of charge (Article 4), pre-school education in native languages would be offered by the state “in the territories of dense residence of ethnic groups” (Article 5). The concluding article of the law once more warned against “disturbing citizens’ right to choose the language for intercourse, education and training in official or other languages” (Article 24).

The most remarkable modification by the 1995 amendment was the cancellation of Article 4 of the 1989 law. There is no obligation to learn Uzbek for office workers and managers in the amendment. Another striking contrast between the amended 1995 version and the initial 1989 Language Law was the frequency of references to the Russian language. Numerous qualifications provided for Russian in 1989 were almost disappeared in 1995. Russian was cited only once in Article 12 granting that upon request notary documents could also be issued in Russian.

---

<sup>971</sup> Schylter, *ibid.*, p. 85.

On the same day of the Presidential decree on the Language Law, the Parliament of Uzbekistan, the *Oliy Majlis*, adopted a resolution<sup>972</sup> putting off the implementation of Articles 9 and 10. Due to resolution the date set for full use of Uzbek in clerical work at state bodies (Article 9) and in accounting, statistical and financial documentation at any enterprises, institutions, establishments and public societies (Article 10) were envisaged to be on September 1, 2005, matching the foreseen date of switching from Cyrillic to Latin.<sup>973</sup> On October 9, 1996 Uzbek government issued a decree on the measures to be taken in the implementation of the 1995 Language Law.<sup>974</sup> This decree assigned state bodies a comprehensive list of duties that promote the status of Uzbek language including:

- to perform the explanatory and propaganda work among the population on the introduction of the Law on the State Language;
- to annually celebrate the Day of Uzbek Language;
- to organize annual the Olympics on the Uzbek language for the schoolchildren and students of all nationalities;
- to create conditions for learning the Uzbek alphabet based on Arabic script;
- to constantly organize national and inter-regional conferences on teaching the Uzbek language;
- to establish a foundation of pedagogical programmatic means for teaching the Uzbek language with the use of computers;
- to introduce the automatic translation systems of scientific-technical texts in foreign languages into Uzbek<sup>975</sup>

In spite of aforementioned tasks set by the governmental decree and the adoption of the Language Law to raise the status of the titular language, there was little, if any, sign of linguistic nationalism neither in the discourses of Uzbek elite nor in the implementation process. Quite the opposite, the regime slowed down the process and as of 2010 full implementation of 1995 Language Law and the Latinization could not be accomplished. Fierman made a list of likely causes of the

---

<sup>972</sup> Full name of the resolution adopted on December 21, 1995: *The Resolution of Oliy Majlis of the Republic of Uzbekistan on Procedure to Put the New Wording of Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan "on Official Language" in Force.*

<sup>973</sup> <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b4d328.html> accessed on July 4, 2010.

<sup>974</sup> *Decree of Cabinet of Ministers: The State Program on Granting the Implementation of the Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan On the State Language*, October 9, 1996. Extracts form the decree was reached at <http://www.osi.hu/fmp/laws/> on September 8, 2009.

<sup>975</sup> <http://www.osi.hu/fmp/laws/> reached on September 8, 2009.

lag including the severe financial constraints, lack of qualified Uzbek teachers, scarcity of textbooks, little intention among Russian speakers to learn a “backward language”, absence of terminological standardization, and the lack of a supervising body responsible specifically for the implementation of the Language Law.<sup>976</sup> Nonetheless he rightly pointed out the chief reason as the “apparent decline in importance on the agenda of Uzbekistan’s political leadership”, of the Language Law.

In fact Uzbek language was of utmost importance for Karimov in the period between 1989 and 1991 when he was appointed as the Secretary of Communist Party which was already in a process of losing its all legitimacy. The burning priority of the opposition was to elevate the status of Uzbek *vis-a-vis* Russian and playing the Uzbek language card ensured the propping stool for Karimov, the “lame duck”. Liquidated all rivals and secured himself as the new khan of Uzbeks he could think little of the status of the Uzbek language. In an interview with a Russian newspaper, Karimov contended that Uzbek language law was liberal and authorities did not demand fluent knowledge of Uzbek. In the manner of the ex-Soviet *apparatchiks* he added that Uzbekistan set “an example of respect for the great Russian language”.<sup>977</sup> Likewise, in 1996 Karimov apologized for the Language Law of 1989:

“Our parliament adopted recently the new wording of the law on languages. The law that was adopted in 1989 appeared during troubled times. At that time, nationalism threatened the future of Uzbekistan. In its first draft, the law infringed the rights of many people belonging to minorities, especially of those minorities who spoke Russian. We have survived a dangerous period, but now our conditions of life have become considerably gentler. Now our society has ‘matured’ we have decided to pass a new law...The eighth point of the old law, which demanded that people would have to learn Uzbek or to lose the right to hold official posts, has been repealed. Further, the language qualification that was practiced widely in the Baltic states has also been repealed. Since the change has not provoked any public response, we must conclude that the time for the decision was chosen correctly. Finally, the restrictions for the

---

<sup>976</sup> William Fierman, “Independence and the Declining Priority of Language Law Implementation in Uzbekistan”, pp. 213-217.

<sup>977</sup> “Karimov Interview with Russian Newspaper”, *Rossiyskiye Vesti*, Moscow, in Russian, May 24, 1994; translated and transmitted by BBC Monitoring Service on June 1, 1994.

education of people who do not know Uzbek have also been rescinded – I consider this fact to be a very important achievement”.<sup>978</sup>

Annette Bohr carried out a survey in four provinces<sup>979</sup> of Uzbekistan to measure the attitudes towards language legislation. Even 57% of Russians denied any affect of language legislation on their professional life and 54% on the other spheres of life. She also noticed that “70% of Russians with poor or non-existent Uzbek skills had no intention of learning that language”.<sup>980</sup> All efforts favoring Uzbek language seems to make little impact especially on the Russophone population. Finally the transition period envisaged until September 1, 2005 both for the complete switch from Cyrillic to 1995 version of the Uzbek alphabet and also for the full implementation of the Language Law was extended to 2010 through a new resolution of April 30, 2004.<sup>981</sup> *The Illustrative Dictionary of Uzbek Language* could be published almost two decades after the independence in 2008.<sup>982</sup>

---

<sup>978</sup> V. M. Alpatov, “Multilingualism in Modern Tashkent” in Gabriele Rasuly-Palaczek & Julia Katschnig (eds.), *Central Asia on Display: Proceedings of the VII. Conference of the European Society for Central Asian Studies*, Wien: Lit Verlag, 2004, p. 219.

<sup>979</sup> These four provinces were Tashkent, Ferghana, Samarkand and Harezm.

<sup>980</sup> The findings of the survey can be found in Annette Bohr, *ibid.*, pp. 214-223.

<sup>981</sup> Birgit N. Schlyter, “Language Reform and Language Status in Multilingual Uzbekistan”, p. 19.

<sup>982</sup> “O‘zbek Tilining Izohli Lug‘ati”, *O‘zA, Oz‘bekiston Milliy Axborot Agentligi* 13.08.2008.

## 6.2. TURKEY

### 6.2.1. Linguistic Blend: Arabic in Mosque, Persian in Court, Turkish at Home

“...türük begler türük atın itti  
tabgaççı begler tabgaç atın tutup...”  
Orkhun inscriptions Kül Tigin East Side<sup>983</sup>

Around the middle of 8th century Bilge Qaghan of Kök Turks was complaining that his nomadic warriors, adopting Chinese names and traditions, were melting away among the sedentary and crowded Eastern neighbors, the Chinese. As a matter of fact it had been frequent in the course of history that as nomads dismounted from their horses, sedentary culture and languages prevailed over step habits. Yet Turkic nomadic tribes would encounter the most influential cultural and linguistic blend *en route* to West less than a century later: Islam approaching upon the horses of invading Arabic cavalymen and Persian culture and statesmanship matured through centuries in Parthian and Sassanid Palaces. Throughout the period between Talas War of 751 and the Genghisid hurricane of 13th century all Turkic Empires founded one after another came increasingly under the influence of Persian-Islamic culture. Despite ruled by dynasties of Turkic origin, Khwarezmshah, Karakhanid, Ghaznavid Palaces turned into centers of Persian art and literature.<sup>984</sup> Finally under Alp Arslan and then Sultan Melik Shah, Seljukid Palace definitely turned out to be the home of highest Persian literature and statesmanship, epitomized respectively by Omer Khayyam’s verses

---

<sup>983</sup> “...turkish rulers dismissed turkish names (under chinese hegemony) rulers adopt chinese names...” in Talat Tekin, *Orhon Yazıtları*, Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları, 2008, p. 26.

<sup>984</sup> Ehsan Yarshater stated in Encyclopedia Iranica that, Turkic Ghaznavid dynasty had become more Persianized compared to ethnic Persian Buyid dynasty in the sense that the former was the champion of Persian literature and language, while the latter preferred the Arabic letters in their court. <http://www.iranica.com/newsite/articles/unicode/v13f3/v13f3001b.html> reached on December 21, 2008.

and Grand Vizier Nizam-al Mulk's skill of governance. In the meantime Islamic faith was spreading more and more in Central Asia, Khorassan and Anatolia, fostering its Arabic terminology to infiltrate into Turkish. Through numerous volumes of theological books and lectures at Nizamiyyah Universities of Baghdad and Nishapur<sup>985</sup>, al-Ghazali became the symbol of Arabic dominance in religious and legal spheres.

Persian remained as the official language in Sultanate of Rum<sup>986</sup>, principal successor of the Seljukid Empire. Bosworth notes that "while the Arabic language retained its primacy in such spheres as law, theology and science, the culture of the Seljukid court and secular literature within the Sultanate became largely Persianized".<sup>987</sup> Mongol invasion of Central Asia and Khorassan added the Persianization of culture and literary language in Anatolian Palaces since numerous artists and scholars had fled into the Asia Minor from the classical centers of Persian-Islamic culture such as Nishapur, Belkh and Bukhara.<sup>988</sup> Thus well before the Ottoman ages duality between the high culture of the literary and the bureaucracy and low culture of the ordinary people had been fixed: The language of *crème de la crème* in the *Empire of Megalomania* happened to be Arabic and Persian while *Ruritania* was still speaking Turkish.<sup>989</sup>

---

<sup>985</sup> Both universities were founded by Seljukid Grand Vizier Nizam-al Mulk.

<sup>986</sup> The state reigned in Anatolia between 1077-1307, also known as "Anatolian Seljukid State" or "Sultanate of Iconium". Sultanate of Rum was founded by Kutalmishoglu Suleyman, a cousin of Seljukid Sultan Melik Shah, as Iznik and then Konya capital cities.

<sup>987</sup> C. E. Bosworth, "Turkish Expansion towards the West", *UNESCO History of Humanity IV: From the Seventh to the Sixteenth Century*, UNESCO Publishing, Routledge, p. 391. Bosworth remarks that many Anatolian Seljukid Sultans had carried Persian epic names like Kay Qubad or Kay Khusraw.

<sup>988</sup> Mehmed Fuad Köprülü, *Early Mystics in Turkish Literature*, Gary Leiser & Robert Dankoff (trans.), Routledge, 2006, p. 149. The *magnum opus* of the Persian literature Masnawi, was written in Konya after Mawlana Jalal al-Din Rumi's family had escaped from Balkh in front of the Mongol menace.

<sup>989</sup> In Gellner's well-known depiction of pre-modern Empire of Megolomania, while ordinary people, the Ruritarians were speaking local dialects in their rather limited regions, elites of the Empire were typically speaking an unrelated language, totally different from that of Ruritarian. Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993, p. 58.



As the Anatolian Seljukid power declined after the battle of Kösedag in 1258, *Oghuz Beys*<sup>990</sup>, formerly dependent to Konya, gained further autonomy in their regions. The era of Beyliks until the consolidation of the Ottoman rule in Anatolia in the late 14th century was a renaissance for Turkish language. Being semi-nomadic warlords largely shielded against the influence of Arabic and Persian, Oghuz Beys backed Turkish language in their courts. Certainly not because of their “national awakening”, but these local warlords were in no need to underline their status through linguistic differentiation: They were legitimate as aristocratic clan chiefs in their fiefdoms provided that they were distributing pillage to fellow warriors. Hence Anatolian Beyliks such as Germiyanoglu, Aydinoglu, Inancoglu promoted the translation of Arabic classics including *Kelile and Dimne*, *Kaabus-name*, Taberi’s works and also *Qur’an* into Turkish.<sup>991</sup> Besides Mehmed Bey of Karamanoglu in his well-known decree ordered that Turkish would be used in all correspondence at courts, councils, bazaars.<sup>992</sup>

### 6.2.2. Ottoman Blend of Languages

Consolidation of the Ottoman power in entire Anatolia meant then again recovery of duality in language and culture. Similar to Latin of long Middle Ages in Europe, the Ottoman language which was a fusion of Arabic, Persian and

---

<sup>990</sup> Oghuz was the common name for several Turkic tribes migrating from south of the Aral Sea to Anatolia together with the conquering Mongols during the 12th and 13th centuries. Oghuz tribes had organized around a clanish family and a *Bey* upon the tribe as the tribal chieftain. Anatolian Seljukid policy was to settle these clans in Anatolia through granting fiefdoms.

<sup>991</sup> Zeynep Korkmaz, *Cumhuriyet Döneminde Türk Dili*, Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih ve Coğrafya Fakültesi Yayınları, 1974, p. 22.

<sup>992</sup> Yusuf Ziya Öksüz, *Türkçe'nin Sadeleşme Tarihi Genç Kalemler ve Yeni Lisan Hareketi*, Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu, 2004, p. 7. Although Öksüz notes that the original copy of Karamanoglu Mehmed Bey’s decree of May 15, 1277 could not be unearthed so far and also it was not clear whether the decree was implemented effectively, he considered the decree as a milestone showing that Turkish language was used in state affairs even before the Karamanoglu era. Öksüz informed that the decree was also cited in Persian chronicles and a contemporaneous narrative, *Selçukname* written by Yazıcıoğlu.

Turkish, had gradually secured its position as the tongue of the enlightened and bureaucracy until mid-15th century.<sup>993</sup> The societal status in the Ottoman society was first and foremost signified by acquaintance of snobbish and complicated Ottoman language while getting rid of “vulgar” and “humble” Turkish of the *Evlad-ı Fatihan*.<sup>994</sup> *Türk-i Basit* movement<sup>995</sup> of late 15th century and Turkish grammar book of Bergamalı Kadri<sup>996</sup> were sporadic attempts to close the gap between two linguistic realms.

Facing continuous defeats against the West and the break up of ethnic groups one after another, the Ottoman elites in despair had to fashion an Ottoman ideal for the society. Slowly realizing that just the Turkish mass remained as the last resort for saving the state, Istanbul and Salonica intellectuals voiced more far-reaching arguments for language and alphabet reform. In 1862 Münif Pasha proposed a slight reform of the Ottoman-Arabic letters in order to overcome problems in printing and education.<sup>997</sup> In the following year Azerbaijani author Mirza Fethali Ahundzade submitted his own alphabet proposal based on Latin and Cyrillic to Grand Vizier Fuad Pasha.<sup>998</sup> *Geist der Zeit*<sup>999</sup> in the 19th century Ottoman Empire was reform in every sphere of life but arguments for an alphabet reform were still extreme even for the radical young generation, the Young

---

<sup>993</sup> Zeynep Korkmaz, *Türk Dilinin Tarihi Akışı İçinde Atatürk ve Dil Devrimi*, Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih ve Coğrafya Fakültesi Yayınları, 1963, pp. 10-11.

<sup>994</sup> “Sons of the Conquerors”

<sup>995</sup> The pioneers of the *Türk-i Basit* movement, Edirneli Nazmi and Tatalı Mahremi have attempted to use pure Turkish in their poetry written in classical *aruz* format of Ottoman Palace literature. Öksüz, *ibid.*, p. 9.

<sup>996</sup> Öksüz, *ibid.*, p. 10. Bergamalı Kadri’s *Müeyyiretü’l-Ulum* was one of the first Turkish grammar books.

<sup>997</sup> The text of Münif Pasha’s speech which was delivered at Ottoman Society of Science (Cemiyet-i İlmiye-i Osmaniye) can be found in Hüseyin Yorulmaz (eds.), *Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete Alfabe Tartışmaları*, İstanbul: Kitabevi, 1995, pp. 25-28.

<sup>998</sup> Hüseyin Sadoğlu, *Türkiye’de Ulusçuluk ve Dil Politikaları*, İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, October 2003, pp. 216-217.

<sup>999</sup> Hegel’s famous phrase meaning the “spirit of the time”

Ottomans. For instance, Namik Kemal would strongly oppose demands for Latinization hoping the sacred letters of Qur'an could serve to hold at least Muslim subjects of the Caliph under the sway of Ottomania.<sup>1000</sup> Numerous articles appeared on the alphabet reform and then purification of the Ottoman language in the pages of first Ottoman newspapers such as *Ikdam*, *Terakki*, *Tasvir-i Efkar* during the 1860s. The harvest of the language debate was the 18th article of the first Ottoman Constitution, *Kanun-i Esasi* of 1876, declaring Turkish as the official language of the Empire.<sup>1001</sup> The same article also “made proficiency in Turkish a precondition for employment at a public institution while Articles 57 and 68 obliged the parliamentarians to acquire a basic knowledge of the official language”.<sup>1002</sup> Karal notes that discrepancy between the written language and countless variety of spoken dialects of deputies in the first Ottoman Parliament had put forward once again the necessity to reform the language.<sup>1003</sup>

After dissolving of the first Ottoman Parliament and the annulment of the *Kanun-i Esasi* in 1878, Abdulhamid II criticized Sait Pasha for resisting his plans to declare Arabic as the official language in the constitution.<sup>1004</sup> Perhaps the Sultan was at the outset expecting to sustain closer relations among his Muslim subjects through Arabic, though later in his reign the position of Turkish language in education and bureaucracy was consistently enhanced.<sup>1005</sup> Nevertheless official “Turkish” of the state was still largely unintelligible for the public. Last years of

---

<sup>1000</sup> Sadoğlu, *ibid.*, pp. 218-219.

<sup>1001</sup> Enver Ziya Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi VIII. Cilt: Birinci Meşrutiyet ve İstibdat Devirleri 1876-1907*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1983, p. 402.

<sup>1002</sup> İlker Aytürk, *Language and Nationalism: A Comparative Study of Language Revival and Reform in Hebrew and Turkish*, PhD thesis, Waltham, Massachusetts: The Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Brandeis University, Near Eastern and Judaic Studies, February 2005, p. 50.

<sup>1003</sup> Karal, *ibid.*, p. 402-403.

<sup>1004</sup> Karal, *ibid.*, p. 403.

<sup>1005</sup> As a crucial step Turkish was made part of curriculum at all local and minority schools in 1894, Abdülhamid II ordered that the education should be carried out in Turkish purified as much as possible from Arabic and Persian words and phrases. Sadoğlu, *ibid.*, pp. 91-95.

Abdulhamid II had witnessed a heightened debate on the broad gap between written and spoken languages. Shemseddin Sami, the author of the most comprehensive Ottoman dictionary of that time, *Kamus-i Turki*, called to “end excessive borrowing from Arabic and proposed using instead the discarded words from our Eastern Turkish language”.<sup>1006</sup> More importantly, Shemseddin Sami’s Latin-based alphabet for Albanian language which was adopted by various Albanian communities in the Balkan cities also set the model for Ottoman-Turkish intellectuals for a future alphabet change.<sup>1007</sup>

Young Turks and the related *Young Pen* movement became the bearer of the literary and linguistic nationalism in the Second Constitutional Period. The editor of the *Young Pen* magazine, Ömer Seyfettin was stressing on “the need for a national language that would bring the masses and the elite together”.<sup>1008</sup> He plainly set up two criteria, first linguistic and second religious, for being included into the Turkish nation: “All Turkish-speaking Muslims are of Turkish nation”.<sup>1009</sup> Similarly Ziya Gökalp diagnosed the “language disease” to be cured: “The duality in language, as Istanbul dialect, spoken but not written and Ottoman language written but not spoken, should be overcome through absolute purging of Ottoman and making the spoken Istanbul dialect as the sole official language”.<sup>1010</sup> During the First World War Ottoman commander in chief Enver Pasha made an attempt to overcome practical difficulties of Arabic script by compelling military correspondence to be in “Huruf-u Enver”, a modified version of the traditional

---

<sup>1006</sup> Aaron Johnson, *The Road to Turkish Language Reform and the Rise of Turkish Nationalism*, MA Thesis, Montreal: McGill University, August 2004, p. 43.

<sup>1007</sup> More information on Shemseddin Sami Bey’s Albanian alphabet and its impact on the Turkish Latinization can be found in Frances Trix, “The Stamboul Alphabet of Shemseddin Sami Bey: Precursor to Turkish Script Reform”, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol: 31, No: 2, May, 1999, pp. 255-272.

<sup>1008</sup> Ayşegül Aydingün & İsmail Aydingün, “The Role of Language in the Formation of Turkish National Identity and Turkishness”, *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, Vol: 10, No: 3, 2004, p. 418.

<sup>1009</sup> Ömer Seyfettin, *Türklük Üzerine Yazılar*, Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1993, p. 81.

<sup>1010</sup> Ziya Gökalp, *Türkçülüğün Esasları*, İstanbul: İnkılap ve Aka, 1978, pp. 98-99.

letters.<sup>1011</sup> However the cure of the “language disease” had to wait for the foundation of the national state in 1923 and the following language reform.

Mardin had once argued that two different cultural realms separated by a Chinese wall survived side by side in long Ottoman centuries: The realm of partly oral literary traditions, epics, popular poetry and folklore and also the realm of high culture of the Palace administration and intellectuals.<sup>1012</sup> Öztürk disagrees that there was no rigid barriers, but constant interaction, between the Palace language and culture and common peoples’ language and culture: Shahzades and Ottoman elites were acquainted in their early ages with epic folklore and traditional music and theater were enjoyed by both elites and common people.<sup>1013</sup> In the final analysis the language reform and switch of the alphabet should be understood as the alteration of the language of prestige and power with a new one. The high culture embodied in bureaucratic, cultural and religious elite was speaking a specific language to underline its status. *Enderun* had to speak Ottoman in order to divorce from the *etrak-ı bi-idrak* similar to the Uzbek apparatchiks and cultural elites who spoke Russian, the language of power and status.

### 6.2.3. The Alphabet Reform

The reform of the then existing Arabic-based Ottoman alphabet and the Latinization were two recurring themes in the debates among the intellectual circles in the last fifty years of the collapsing Ottoman Empire. As the Young Ottoman idea of constitutional monarchy based on Ottoman citizenship became

---

<sup>1011</sup> G. L. Lewis, ‘Atatürk’s Language Reform as an Aspect of Modernization in the Republic of Turkey’, in Jacob M. Landau (eds.), *Atatürk and Modernization of Turkey*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1982, p. 196.

<sup>1012</sup> Cited in Öztürk, Serdar, *Osmanlı’da İletişimin Diyalektiği*, Ankara: Phoenix, February 2010, p. 104.

<sup>1013</sup> Öztürk, *ibid.*, pp. 144-145.

antiquated and was replaced by the Turkish nationalism of the subsequent Young Turk generation; support for Latinization became widespread among the enlightened, instead of merely reforming the Arabic alphabet. In a meeting with Istanbul press as early as 1923, Mustafa Kemal came across Hüseyin Cahid's proposal of Latinization to which he replied cautiously: "It is not the right time yet".<sup>1014</sup> Likewise even before the international recognition of the new Turkish state in Lausanne and the declaration of the Republic, two worker representatives also proposed switching to Latin letters at Izmir Congress of Economics on March 1923. President of the Congress, Kazım Pasha<sup>1015</sup> fervently countered Latinization:

Is it possible to adopt this Latin? The day it is adopted, the country will be in complete chaos. Besides everything else, while all our holy books, chronicles, writings and thousands of volumes that fill our libraries have been written with this [Arabic] alphabet, we shall meet the greatest disaster the day we adopt a completely different alphabet. And in this way we shall have provided the Europeans with a superb weapon immediately. They will announce to the Islamic world that the Turks adopted the foreign script and have converted to Christianity. This is the devilish idea that our enemies are working for".<sup>1016</sup>

Language together with history, providing "major standards of comparisons"<sup>1017</sup> to assess the existing and the preceding order, might pave way to the disobedience against the authority. Since legitimation is to normalize the *status quo* and the authority relations, an indisputable authority in need for legitimacy should already be established before policies of the regime stabilization. First the abolition of the Sultanate in November 1922, then of the Caliphate in March 1924 and lastly exile of 150 prominent figures of the old Ottoman regime were the first steps to eliminate remnants of the Ottoman era. Suppressing of the Kurdo-Islamic Sheikh Said Rebellion, the *Takrir-i Sükun Law* of 1925 and the Izmir Conspiracy

---

<sup>1014</sup> G.L. Lewis, *ibid.*, p. 48.

<sup>1015</sup> Later Kazım Karabekir.

<sup>1016</sup> The original Turkish version of the whole speech as compiled by Hüseyin Yorulmaz from the daily newspapers of the following day can be found in Yorulmaz, *ibid.*, pp. 90- 93. The above quotation is from Aytürk, *ibid.*, p. 216. The translation of above piece is by Aytürk.

<sup>1017</sup> Duygu Ersoy, *Manipulation of History and Language in Three Dystopias*, MSc Thesis, Ankara: METU, September 2006, p. 5.

of 1926 enabled Mustafa Kemal and his collaborators to liquidate or pacify all challenging Pashas. The *Speech* read by Mustafa Kemal at the Grand National Assembly on September 15-20, 1927, was a declaration of his victory in the “Pashas Struggle”. The political arena, tidied up from all political contenders as of 1927, was ready to normalize the new authority. Mustafa Kemal, relaxed and self-confident, visited Istanbul for the first time after leaving in 1919 and settled in Dolmabahçe Palace.

Actually Şükrü Saracoğlu has already brought the alphabet issue before the Turkish Parliament at the session over the budget of the Ministry of Education on February 25, 1924. In the opinion of Saracoğlu low literacy rates were persistent because Arabic letters were not suitable to write the Turkish language. Korkmaz notes the harsh reaction by the conservative deputies still present in the Parliament up till then, protesting the assault to the ‘sacred’ Arabic alphabet.<sup>1018</sup> Low literacy, closely related to the problem of duality in language and culture, was a grave legacy from the Ottoman past. First population census of the Republic indeed revealed that the literacy was 8.16%, approximately %2 of which in minority and foreign languages.<sup>1019</sup> In fact Mustafa Kemal had previously disclosed his backing for the purification of Turkish after personally reading a *khutbah* in Turkish at Balıkesir Pasha Mosque on February 7, 1923: “The person who reads the *khutbah* in mosques should use the language understood by the public... Therefore all *khutbahs* will be completely in Turkish”.<sup>1020</sup>

---

<sup>1018</sup> Korkmaz, 1974, pp. 53-54.

<sup>1019</sup> M. Rauf İnan, “Atatürk Devrimleri ve Yazı Değişimi, Yazı Devrimi” in *Yazı Devrimi: Yazı Devrimi'nin 50. Yılı Münasebetiyle Düzenlenen Yazı Devrimi Konuşmaları*, Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları, 1979, p. 51.

<sup>1020</sup> Şerafettin Turan, *Atatürk ve Ulusal Dil*, Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları, 1981, p. 22.

Özerdim once truly claimed that the government seemed to have decided in 1927 to instigate its plans on Latinization.<sup>1021</sup> At the outset on December 17, 1927, the name of the official newspaper of the state was modified from *Ceride-i Resmîyye* to *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Resmî Gazete*.<sup>1022</sup> Then on May 20, 1928 the Roman numbers replaced the Arabic numbers.<sup>1023</sup> Three days later, on May 23 with the order of the President Mustafa Kemal, a language committee was set up to frame a Turkish alphabet based on the Latin characters. The committee consisting of “three MPs, Falih Rıfki (Atay), Yakup Kadri (Karaosmanoğlu), and Ruşen Eşref (Ünaydın); three bureaucrats, Mehmet Emin (Erişirgil), İbrahim (Grandi), and İhsan (Sungu); two language experts, Ragıp Hulusi (Özdem) and Ahmet Cevat (Emre); and a teacher, Fazıl Ahmet (Aykaç)” worked in close collaboration with Prime Minister İsmet Pasha and provided their final report to the President on August 1.<sup>1024</sup> Mustafa Kemal, subsequent to a careful scrutiny of the report and a slight modification in the alphabet, acted swiftly.<sup>1025</sup> On August 9, 1928 he introduced the new alphabet to the public at Istanbul Gülhane Park in the same place the *Tanzimat* had been announced in 1839:

“Fellow countrymen! In order to express our beautiful language we are adopting new Turkish letters... We have to emancipate ourselves from the incomprehensible signs that had placed our minds in an iron frame for centuries. We want to understand our language by all means. We shall understand it surely with these new letters in the near future... Today, one of our tasks is to learn quickly the new Turkish letters and teach them to the whole nation... If at least 80% of our nation is still illiterate, the fault

---

<sup>1021</sup> Sami N. Özerdim, *Yazı Devriminin Öyküsü*, Istanbul: Cumhuriyet, August 1998, p. 19. Aytürk is of the same opinion that Mustafa Kemal’s final decision to adopt the Latin alphabet came in Fall 1927. Aytürk, *ibid.*, p. 225.

<sup>1022</sup> While both *Ceride-i Resmîyye* and *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Resmî Gazete* included words of Arabic and Persian origin; the first phrase was grammatically structured in the old Ottoman style.

<sup>1023</sup> Tutkun Akbaş (eds.), *Gün Gün Cumhuriyet Tarihi: Türkiye’nin 77 Yılı 1923-2000*, Istanbul: Tempo, 2000, pp. 39-41.

<sup>1024</sup> Aytürk, *ibid.*, p. 225. Falih Rıfki and Yakup Kadri were renowned novelists and Mehmet Emin was a university professor in philosophy.

<sup>1025</sup> The modification was removal of the “q” letter from the new Turkish alphabet after Mustafa Kemal’s disapproval. Moreover Mustafa Kemal rejected two alternative plans of implementation one including fifteen years of long transition and the other five years, proposed by the commission. Instead he insisted on a “shock transition” only in three months. Geoffrey Lewis, *Trajik Başarı: Türk Dil Reformu*, Istanbul: Gelenek Yayıncılık, 2004, pp. 49-51.



is not ours. The fault lies with those who, not understanding the Turkish character, have chained our heads with iron bands”.<sup>1026</sup>

After the inauguration of the new alphabet Mustafa Kemal charged İbrahim Necmi to teach new letters to the deputies, bureaucrats, academicians, novelists in a classroom set up at the Dolmabahçe Palace, the residence of last Ottoman Sultans. Prominent figures of the era were being examined on the new alphabet by the President in person.<sup>1027</sup> In the meantime Mustafa Kemal, who was enthusiastic about the Latinization, was touring around Turkey with a blackboard until the first day of the new legislation year. Immediately after returning to the capital, Kemal had echoed his experiences of lecturing the crowds on the new alphabet in Tekirdağ, Çanakkale, Bursa, Sinop, Samsun, Amasya and Sivas, which meant a few additional modifications in the writing with the new alphabet.<sup>1028</sup> The regime concurrently initiated a zealous crusade for Latinization: Mustafa Kemal requested from Osman Zeki (Üngör) to compose the “March of the New Turkish Letters” consisting of the new letters as its lyrics. Pro-government daily *Cumhuriyet* printed its last page in Latin letters on September 29, even before the law specifying the new alphabet was adopted.<sup>1029</sup> Similarly, all school teachers were being examined on the new alphabet all over Turkey after a short course.<sup>1030</sup>

---

<sup>1026</sup> Quoted in Yılmaz Çolak, “Language Policy and Official Ideology in Early Republican Turkey”, *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol: 40, No: 6, November 2004, p. 87 from “‘Mustafa Kemal Pasha’ Address on Launching the New Characters”, Lutfy Levonian, *The Turkish Press 1925–1932*, Athens: School of Religion, 1932, pp. 90-91.

<sup>1027</sup> Zeynep Korkmaz, 1963, pp. 43-45. Margaret Wood writing in 1929 from Istanbul noted the passion of the President: “Whomever he came in contact with, whether great or small, was sure to be asked if he had learnt the new alphabet and to be given a lesson forthwith if he had not” in Margaret M. Wood, “Latinizing the Turkish Alphabet: A Study in the Introduction of a Cultural Change”, *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol: 35, No: 2, September, 1929, p. 199.

<sup>1028</sup> Korkmaz, *ibid.*, p. 46.

<sup>1029</sup> Özerdim, *ibid.*, p. 34. The notes of the “March of the New Turkish Letters” were also printed at the same issue of *Cumhuriyet*.

<sup>1030</sup> Özerdim stated that failed school teachers were given a second chance of examination after fifteen days and were ousted from national education in a case of failure in the second attempt. He informed that around 5% of all teachers were unsuccessful in those alphabet examinations. Özerdim, *ibid.*, p. 34-35.

Turkish Grand National Assembly had adopted the *Law on the Adoption and Implementation of Turkish Letters* on November 1, 1928.<sup>1031</sup> The law consisted of eleven articles and an appendix listing the new letters in their majuscule and minuscule forms. In the first article it was stated that “attached Turkish letters adopted from the Latin original, were accepted in the place of Arabic letters used hitherto to write Turkish.” Article 2 obliged all state institutions together with private and social organizations, and businesses to use Turkish letters no later than the day of publication of the law. The third article ordered a definitely short transition period allowing marriage and birth certificates, military and civil identity cards, all register of title deeds to be acceptable until January 1 of 1929. The fourth article was the most radical provision since new letters was set mandatory after June 1929 in all petitions and requests to any government body by the ordinary people. The same article additionally forced all newspapers and magazines to turn to the Latin letters in just one month by December 1928. The following article imposed that all books in the Turkish language to be printed in Latin-based Turkish alphabet by January 1, 1929. Another unusually drastic clause, the Article 9 compelled teaching to be entirely in new alphabet at all national schools and forbade education using books printed in old letters no later than the commencement of the upcoming semester.

The “master stroke”<sup>1032</sup> in the passionate campaign of Latinization was the opening of the *Millet Mektepleri* (nation-schools). The regulation on the establishment of the nation-schools which titled Mustafa Kemal as the head-teacher of the nation was adopted on November 11, 1928.<sup>1033</sup> The regulation

---

<sup>1031</sup> For the full text of the *Law of the Republic of Turkey, No: 1353, Law on the Adoption and Implementation of Turkish Letters* please see Bahir Mazhar Erüreten, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devrim Yasaları*, Istanbul: Cumhuriyet, 1999, pp. 88-89. The articles summarized in the above paragraph were quoted and translated from the full text provided by Erüreten.

<sup>1032</sup> The term was used by Margaret Wood to describe the opening of the *Millet Mektepleri*. Wood, *ibid.*, p. 202.

<sup>1033</sup> Detailed information about the content and the implementation of the regulation can be found in Mehmet Kayıran & Mustafa Yahya Metintaş, “Latin Kökenli Yeni Türk Alfabesine Geçiş Süreci ve Millet Mektepleri”, *Dumlupınar Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, Vol: 24, August 2009, p. 201.

obliged all citizens between 16 and 40 ages to attend the nation-schools unless they could pass an examination on the new alphabet.<sup>1034</sup> According to data provided by the Prime Ministry Directorate of Statistics, the number of people who attended the nation-schools between 1928 and 1936 was 2,546,051.<sup>1035</sup> Thus the literacy rate found in 1935 population census significantly reached to 20.4%.<sup>1036</sup> At the same time, Kemalist missionaries<sup>1037</sup> were dressing up streets of larger cities such as Istanbul, Izmir and Edirne with charts writing “Citizen, Speak Turkish”.

In any case, Sadri Maksudi’s<sup>1038</sup> book *Türk Dili İçin* (For the Turkish Language), which was published in 1930 upon the request of the Turkish Hearts, was the harbinger of the new stage after the Latinization: Extreme purism in language and purge of foreign words. While Ziya Gökalp had argued in his influential *Principles of Turkism* that any word understood and used by the Turkish people should be considered as Turkish,<sup>1039</sup> Sadri Maksudi was a radical purist, advocating purge of all Arabic and Persian words. Sadri Maksudi proposed

---

<sup>1034</sup> Sadoğlu, *ibid.*, p. 229.

<sup>1035</sup> Kayıran & Metintaş, *ibid.*, p. 203. The total number of people who passed the examinations on the new alphabet at the nation-schools was 1.394.484.

<sup>1036</sup> Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 310-311.

<sup>1037</sup> Senem Aslan, ““Citizen, Speak Turkish!”: A Nation in the Making”, *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, Vol: 13, No: 2, 2007, pp. 245-272. The term “Kemalist missionaries” was chosen by Senem Aslan implying that the campaign was by and large executed by non-governmental organizations such as Law Faculty Students’ Association of Istanbul University, Turkish Hearts and students of the Teachers’ College [Muallim Mektebi] in Izmir. Contrary to Aslan’s argument that the “nation-building in Turkey was not a process that originated solely from the state’s center and that was imposed through coercive legislation” (p. 252), all the participants of the campaign were the genuine ‘ideological apparatuses of the state’.

<sup>1038</sup> Born to a Tatar family in a small village close to Kazan as Sadreddin Nizamettinovich Maksudov in 1878, Sadri Maksudi (Arsal) was the representative of Kazan Tatars in the first and second Duma of Tsarist Russia. Later he became the first President of the Idil-Ural Republic founded in Kazan in October 1917. Than he had to migrate out of Soviet Russia as the Bolsheviks secured power in Tatar lands. He died on February 20, 1957 in Istanbul.

<sup>1039</sup> Gökalp, *ibid.*, p. 121.

foundation of a *Language Academy* to steer searching of words or roots from Central Asian Turkic languages in the places of the purged words.<sup>1040</sup> Mustafa Kemal initially showed his backing for these theses in his introductory note to Sadri Maksudi's book:

“A rich national language has great influence on the development of national feeling. The Turkish tongue is one of the richest of all; it only needs to be intelligently cultivated. The Turkish nation, which knows how to establish its government and its sublime independence, must also *free its language from the yoke of foreign words*”.<sup>1041</sup>

#### 6.2.4. Radical Purism and Language Congresses

July of 1932 was an eventful month. *First Turkish History Congress* had convened on July 2-11, 1932 and the President of the Congress summed up that the earliest civilization was created in Central Asia by ancient Turkish people and spread thence to lay down the basis of all ancient societies.<sup>1042</sup> On the last day of the Congress, Mustafa Kemal invited a group of academics and MPs including Sadri Maksudi and Yusuf Akçura for dinner and gave orders to establish a society on the Turkish language.<sup>1043</sup> On the very next day, July 12, *Turkish Language Research Society*<sup>1044</sup> was established after appointment of Samih Rıfat as the head by Mustafa Kemal. The urgent task of the Society was set to organize a wide-ranging congress on Turkish language as quick as possible. One of the most

---

<sup>1040</sup> Sadri Maksudi (Arsal), *Türk Dili İçin*, Ankara: Türk Ocakları İlim ve Sanat Heyeti Yayınları, 1930, pp. 443-444.

<sup>1041</sup> Çolak, *ibid.*, p. 75. The translation from Turkish is by Yılmaz Çolak. Italics are by the author of this thesis.

<sup>1042</sup> *Birinci Türk Tarih Kongresi Müzakere Zabıtları*, Ankara: T.C. Maarif Vekaleti, p. 6. The President of the Congress was the Minister of Education Esat. For more information please look at chapter 5.

<sup>1043</sup> Korkmaz once maintained that Mustafa Kemal even presented his guests a chart showing the fields that he wished the Language Society should focus on such as syntax, etymology. Korkmaz, 1963, pp. 53-54.

<sup>1044</sup> “Türk Dili Tetkik Cemiyeti”.

radical reforms followed: On July 18, 1932 the prayer, *ezan* was converted to Turkish.<sup>1045</sup> Turkification of *ezan* certainly served to downgrade the Arabic language the influence of which was to be eliminated.

*First Turkish Language Congress* assembled between September 26 and October 5, 1932 at Dolmabahçe Palace. The sessions of the Congress were transmitted live by radio to all provinces where loudspeakers were established at crowded squares and streets to make people willy-nilly to follow the debate.<sup>1046</sup> If truth be told, however, there was not much debate, at the Congress, but a homogeny: All theses presented at the Congress were double scrutinized beforehand by both the congress committee and Mustafa Kemal himself.<sup>1047</sup> The “spokesmen of Mustafa Kemal” as Hatipoğlu precisely labeled<sup>1048</sup>; Ruşen Eşref, Ahmet Cevat, Reşit Galip, İbrahim Necmi presented their theses one after another to the audience: Turkish was the language of the most ancient cultures including the Sumerian and Hittite<sup>1049</sup>, it was the root of even the Sanskrit, Greek and Latin<sup>1050</sup>, Turkish as the origin of Indo-European language family, was once the common language of all humanity<sup>1051</sup>, Turks were of pure Alpine race and their language belonged to the Indo-European group rather than the Ural-Altai

---

<sup>1045</sup> The Turkish version of the call for prayer can also be found in Tutkun Akbaş, *ibid.*, pp. 51-52. The calls for prayer from the minarets were in Turkish for eighteen years until 1950.

<sup>1046</sup> Ruşen Eşref, the general secretary of the Turkish Language Research Society maintained that “just in İstanbul eight to ten locations were arranged with loudspeakers” for the public. İsmail Uluçgür, “50. Yıla Değın Kurultaylar”, *Türk Dili*, Vol: 45, No: 367, July 1982, p. 32.

<sup>1047</sup> Uluçgür, *ibid.*, pp. 31-33.

<sup>1048</sup> Vecihe Hatiboğlu, *Cumhuriyetin 50. Yılında Ölümsüz Atatürk ve Dil Devrimi*, Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları, 1973, p. 34.

<sup>1049</sup> Ahmet Cevat Bey’s presentation at *Birinci Türk Dil Kurultayı: Tezler-Müzakereler-Zabıtlar*, İstanbul: Devlet Basımevi, 1933, pp. 81-94.

<sup>1050</sup> Concluding speech by Ruşen Eşref, *Birinci Türk Dil Kurultayı: Tezler-Müzakereler-Zabıtlar*, İstanbul: Devlet Basımevi, 1933, pp. 470.

<sup>1051</sup> Hakkı Nezihi Bey’s presentation at *Birinci Türk Dil Kurultayı: Tezler-Müzakereler-Zabıtlar*, İstanbul: Devlet Basımevi, 1933, pp. 129-139.

language family.<sup>1052</sup> In his lengthy speech Samih Rıfat had compared the Aryan-Semitic languages with Turkish contending that Turkic word roots had formed the origin of Semitic languages.<sup>1053</sup> Definitely expressing Mustafa Kemal's views, Samih Rıfat argued that even if Arabic words survived as certain daily clichés or in various Turkified forms in spoken Turkish, they should be get rid of as they were referring a scholastic way of thinking.<sup>1054</sup>

On the sixth day Hüseyin Cahit Bey had come up with the single counter argument of the Congress. For him, the complaints on foreign words were exaggeration, since Turkish language has largely ousted foreign phrases since the Second Constitutional Period. He also argued that as “a social mechanism and a natural organism” language should be immune from state intervention. Mustafa Kemal dissatisfied from Hasan Ali, Ali Canip, Fazıl Ahmet and Şükrü's immediate responses to Hüseyin Cahit, ordered Samih Rıfat to reply.<sup>1055</sup> Samih Rıfat, together with Köprülü Fuat Bey's response, had blamed Hüseyin Cahit with fatalism and argued that human will was the only agent to frame the language; the human intervention that inflicted Turkish with foreign words would also purify it.<sup>1056</sup>

In brief the Congress had two implications, largely consistent with the earlier History Congress: First most speakers attempted to prove linguistically that, being relatives of ancient Sumerian and Hittite civilizations Turks were the

---

<sup>1052</sup> Agop Martayan's presentation at *Birinci Türk Dil Kurultayı: Tezler-Müzakereler-Zabıtlar*, Istanbul: Devlet Basımevi, 1933, pp. 94-104. Agop Martayan was given the surname *Dilaçar* by Mustafa Kemal after the *Law on Surnames* and has long worked at Turkish Language Society until his death in 1979.

<sup>1053</sup> Samih Rıfat's presentation at *Birinci Türk Dil Kurultayı: Tezler-Müzakereler-Zabıtlar*, Istanbul: Devlet Basımevi, 1933, pp. 20-63.

<sup>1054</sup> Samih Rıfat's opening speech at *Birinci Türk Dil Kurultayı: Tezler-Müzakereler-Zabıtlar*, Istanbul: Devlet Basımevi, 1933, p. 9.

<sup>1055</sup> Samih Rıfat was seriously sick before and during the Congress, he could deliver his opening speech sitting on a couch. He died two months later in early December. Sadoğlu, *ibid.*, p. 239.

<sup>1056</sup> Samih Rıfat, *ibid.*, p. 320. Köprülü Fuat Bey's response is at *Birinci Türk Dil Kurultayı: Tezler-Müzakereler-Zabıtlar*, pp. 410-415.

indigenous population of Anatolia. Yet the authentic Turkish language had lost its purity since the Seljukid and Ottoman Palaces and their *Ulema* had preferred Arabic and Persian. So, secondly, the Congress affirmed that state intervention would be necessary to get rid of the Arabic and Persian words from Turkish. The Congress also signaled the “radical purist period”<sup>1057</sup> that would extend until 1935. Commissions were set in all districts to compile local words; 129,792 words sent to Turkish Language Society were classified and among them possible substitutes for the foreign words were determined. In March 1933, 1382 widespread Arabic and Persian words were extensively announced in media and people were invited to propose alternates in language questionnaires. Furthermore terminological purification went together with word compilation; 32,302 new terms were proposed in almost all professional fields including agriculture, banking, metallurgy, physics and medicine.<sup>1058</sup>

The Wagon-Lits Incident of February 1933 demonstrated that regime’s militant fervor on linguistic purification had spread at least to university youth. When the press publicized on February 24 that the director of international railway company Wagon-Lits had insulted one of his servants due to speaking Turkish at Beyoğlu office, mob of university students gathered in a spontaneous protest rally, had broken down the doors, shutters and most office material of Beyoğlu and Karaköy branches of the firm.<sup>1059</sup> Then, just before the Second Turkish Language Congress, the Law on Surnames was adopted on June 21, 1934, through which all citizens were obliged to embrace a Turkish family name.

---

<sup>1057</sup> Çolak named the period between the First (1932) and the Third (1936) Turkish Language Congresses - as radical purist period. Çolak, *ibid.*, p. 80.

<sup>1058</sup> The activities of the Turkish Language Society after the First Language Congress were summarized by the general secretary of the Society, İbrahim Necmi in the opening speech of the Second Language Congress. For İbrahim Necmi’s speech: *Türk Dili, Türk Dili Tetkik Cemiyeti Bülteni*, No: 8, September, 1934, pp. 17-37.

<sup>1059</sup> For the details of the Wagon-Lits Incident please look Şaduman Halıcı, “Vagon Li Olayı: Türkçe’ye Yapılan Hakarete Basının ve Gençliğin Tepkisi”, pp. 63-77.

*Second Turkish Language Congress* that convened in Istanbul between August 18 and 23, 1934, symbolized the zenith of purism. Striving to prove the antiquity of Turkish, most Congress presentations had comprised pseudo-scientific comparisons between Turkish and other world languages. At the outset Naim Hazım Bey argued that the Semite languages had developed through extensive borrowing of Turkish roots and words.<sup>1060</sup> Subsequently Yusuf Ziya Bey avowed that the Ural-Altai languages including Finnish, Mongolian and Manchurian were diversified from the oldest of all languages, Turkish.<sup>1061</sup> Tahsin Ömer Bey astonishingly listed 120 words of Turkish origin existed even in ancient Maya language once used in Mexico.<sup>1062</sup> The main theme of the Congress was that the oldest language of humanity, Turkish had lost its purity through mixing especially with Arabic and Persian words as well as the French and English terminology. Thus, as Saim Ali Bey maintained “linguistic purification was an indispensable requirement of the nationality principle”.<sup>1063</sup> Needless to say all presentations were checked beforehand by muckrakers of Mustafa Kemal and no cracked voice was permitted to harm the total harmony. Present at all sessions<sup>1064</sup> Mustafa Kemal was applauding the concluding words of the last presenter: “The victory was certain in the war started by the Great Chief against the invasion of foreign words”.<sup>1065</sup>

*Third Turkish Language Congress* that commenced on August 24, 1936, was dominated by presentations about the regime’s<sup>1066</sup> new toy, the Sun-Language Theory. The inspiration of the theory was a French text of 47 pages by Austrian

---

<sup>1060</sup> *Türk Dili*, Türk Dili Tetkik Cemiyeti Bülteni, No: 8, September, 1934, pp. 58-59.

<sup>1061</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 59-60.

<sup>1062</sup> *ibid.*, p. 71.

<sup>1063</sup> *ibid.*, p. 53.

<sup>1064</sup> Mustafa Kemal disapprovingly left the conference hall after Caferoğlu Ahmet Bey started his presentation titled “First Turkish Remembrances in the Russian Language”. Then Caferoğlu Ahmet was invited to leave the rostrum by the President of the Congress. *ibid.*, p. 57.

<sup>1065</sup> *ibid.*, p. 87.

<sup>1066</sup> “The regime” is synonymous with “Mustafa Kemal” here.



orientalist Dr. H. F. Kvergič<sup>1067</sup> titled *La Psychologie de quelques elements des Languages Turques*.<sup>1068</sup> Kvergič argued that the primitive man was first and foremost aware of his own existence and psychologically supported his pre-speech gestures with voices related to himself and immediate surroundings. Kvergič was supporting his attempt to discover the birth of first language through Turkish pronouns.<sup>1069</sup> At first, in 1935, Kvergič sent his text to Ahmet Cevat Emre, who found the hypothesis “groundless and worthless.”<sup>1070</sup> Without a reply for two months, Kvergič decided to send his thesis directly to Mustafa Kemal who in turn found the psychological approach valuable and ordered his “official linguists” in the Turkish Language Society to analyze the text.<sup>1071</sup> According to the Sun-Language Theory the primitive man, a natural sun-worshipper defined the glorious sun with the simplest voice coming out of his throat, that is *a* or *a-a*. Then as the mouth and throat of the man developed, first single syllable voices like *ay*, *ag*, *ah*, *ak* and afterward more complex roots such as *ay-ak*, *ağ-ay*, *ağ-ah* were produced.<sup>1072</sup> As expected zealous “official linguists” had discovered Sumerian and Hittite languages to consist of words based on these roots.<sup>1073</sup>

---

<sup>1067</sup> For more information on Hermann Feodor Kvergič, please look Laut, Jens Peter, “Noch Einmal zu Dr. Kvergič”, *Turkic Languages*, Vol: 6, 2002, pp. 120-133.

<sup>1068</sup> “Psychology of Certain Elements in Turkic Languages” Sadoğlu, *ibid.*, pp. 246-247.

<sup>1069</sup> Geoffrey Lewis briefed Kvergič’s thesis that M, N, Z vowels were the first voices that established relation between the self and the nearby: “M indicates oneself, as in men, the ancient form of ben ‘I’, and elim ‘my hand’. N indicates what is near oneself, as in sen ‘you’ and elin ‘your hand’. Z indicates a broader area, as in biz ‘we’ and siz ‘you’”. Geoffrey Lewis, *The Turkish Language Reform: A Catastrophic Success*, Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 57.

<sup>1070</sup> Emre, Ahmet Cevat, *İki Neslin Tarihi: Mustafa Kemal Neler Yaptı*, Istanbul: Hilmi Yayınevi, 1960, p. 342-343.

<sup>1071</sup> Lewis, *ibid.*, p. 57.

<sup>1072</sup> H. R. Tankut, Ankara University Faculty of Language, History and Geography (D.T.C.F.) lecture notes, p. 30-31. Sun Language Theory was included in the curriculum at DTCF until the death of Mustafa Kemal in 1938.

<sup>1073</sup> Remember that Turkish History Thesis was contending that the Sumerian and Hittite civilizations were Turkic.

Aytürk truly maintained that Kvergiç's contribution to the Sun-Language Theory was negligible and he was "used as cover for the ownership of the Sun-Language Theory".<sup>1074</sup> Sun-Language Theory was for the most part invented by Mustafa Kemal himself as İbrahim Necmi, the General Secretary of Turkish Language Society wrote in one of his letters: "The theory was born last summer [the summer of 1935] at the Florya sea resort in the exalted mind of our national Genius".<sup>1075</sup> At the Congress Ahmet Cevat Emre who had "drunk deep of Mustafa Kemal's sun" in the meantime, was hastily providing fake-evidence that the word *filozofi* has spread to all languages from Turkish.<sup>1076</sup> General Secretary of Turkish Language Society İbrahim Necmi had gladly acknowledged that "Sun-Language Theory provided considerable comfort and easiness in our practical language studies, since the necessity to sacrifice words supposed of being foreign origin, had been overcome through this theory".<sup>1077</sup> Accordingly, the Congress that was closed on August 31, 1936, was signaling the end of the radical purism era.

---

<sup>1074</sup> Aytürk, *ibid.*, p. 121.

<sup>1075</sup> Aytürk, *ibid.*, p. 121.

<sup>1076</sup> Ahmet Cevat Emre attempted in his presentation at the Third Turkish Language Congress that French *philosophie*, English *philosophy*, German *philosophie* and Russian *filosofia* were all Turkic origin. *Üçüncü Türk Dil Kurultayı: Tezler, Müzakere Zabıtları*, İstanbul: Devlet Basımevi, 1937, pp. 190-201. He concluded his speech with a poem:

Atatürk, Atatürk antlıyız sana (Atatürk, Atatürk we are pledged to you)

Güneşinden içtik hep kana kana (We have all drunk deep of your sun) The translation is from Lewis, *ibid.*, p. 61.

<sup>1077</sup> *Üçüncü Türk Dil Kurultayı: Tezler, Müzakere Zabıtları*, İstanbul: Devlet Basımevi, 1937, p. 12.

## CHAPTER 7

### CONCLUSION

One of the first realities of the human consciousness beyond the physical essentials is to face inequality. Human beings are taught to respond the reality of inequality in wealth, opportunities and power through strategies of normalization. Knowing the life is finite and after seventy years at most we will be all dead, then why merely watch the *dolce vita* of a few of our co-specimen? Why do the majority of human beings tolerate their poverty seeing a minority to exploit the blessings of the earth? What causes the majority of population to remain obedient facing the exercise of power by a very small group seemingly in the same quality as themselves? Every authority needs a *raison d'être* to excuse its use of common power as every kind of inequality requires a justification. The sense of deserved deprivation, charismatic leadership, legal procedures such as constitutionalism and elections, fear, violence, alleged divine power, dynastical right served as the *raison d'être* in different political settings.

Ideologies are grand narratives that incorporate generally more than one of the above-mentioned justifications. Despite no regime eschews the use of violence against a vital challenge to its hegemony, use of crude force to subdue the disadvantaged signals the weakness of the ideological narrative. Ideologies are for ensuring consensual legitimacy which was guaranteed through the subjective belief of the subjects in the regime. Gramsci's proposition that the "national identity and patriotism combined in an ideological system may act as a cement binding all social forces" under the authority was largely testified in the twentieth

century. In both Uzbekistan and Turkey, the previous grounds for legitimacy of ruling classes have been dissolved. Universalistic ideologies of multi-national empires had to be replaced by nationalist ideologies supported by a set of similar policies. New histories and novel linguistic policies together with the categorical principles of ideologies were the excellent tools of consensual legitimacy. Thus nation-building was first and foremost necessary to bind the population to the state's authority.

The evident reality in the politics of Uzbekistan is the influence of the clan networks. Mostly stemmed from a regional power base and deeply diffused into the state institutions the clannish patronage networks proved extremely flexible in adapting to diverse political settings ranging from the religious monarchies of the medieval khanates and then the modernizing Soviet Marxism to the independent Uzbekistan under the ideology of national independence. As long as the maintenance of the clan balance was ensured, the legal provisions are not binding for Karimov, and the elections are just performed to support regime's discourse of democracy.<sup>1078</sup> Uzbek nation-building project under Karimov claims authenticity based on a state nationalism different from pan-Turkic ideals or irredentist nationalisms and a state religion distinct from the 'alien' Islam of the fundamentalists. As March noted the separation of the 'national ideology' from 'political ideologies' is vital for the Uzbek regime since by this way the ideology of national independence is elevated to the "status of immunity" *vis-à-vis* the political ideologies which are reflecting the demands of narrow foreign elements instead of whole Uzbek people.<sup>1079</sup> Furthermore the regime created a cult of stability and security through continuously comparing of the neighboring Afghanistan and Tajikistan with Uzbekistan. While 'aggressive' nationalists and

---

<sup>1078</sup> Remember that the above-mentioned democracy of the Uzbek regime is the "sharqona demokratiya", the eastern democracy, far from the universal standards of democracy.

<sup>1079</sup> Andrew F. March, "State Ideology and the Legitimation of Authoritarianism: The Case of Post-Soviet Uzbekistan", *Journal of Political Ideologies*, Vol: 8, No: 2, 2003, pp. 220-221.

Islamists in these countries were blamed for the chaos and bloodshed, the ideology of national independence is glorified to keep Uzbekistan in order.

Kemalism was primarily an ideology of modernization which was for the most part in the form of Westernization. Kemalist premise of modernization was particularly manifest in its goal of building a nation-state and industrialization as rapid as possible in order to catch up the advanced Western countries. In this respect Kemalist ideology is comparable with the Soviet Marxism which in Nairn's words provided the ideological recipe for the late comers of the industrialization.<sup>1080</sup> The nine principles which were proclaimed before the elections of 1923 were no more than an election manifesto. While the nine principles consisted of pragmatic promises such as the shortening of the compulsory the military service, improving the living standards and the quality of public services, they did not provide any ideological framework for the regime. The 'arrows' which would be the fundamental principles of the regime were introduced step by step consistent with the political struggles among the rival elite groups as in republicanism and also with the socio-economic situation as in etatism and secularism. In the decade after the reading of the *Speech* by Mustafa Kemal in 1927 to the death of the President in 1938, was crucial "to create fifteen million youngsters of all ages in ten years"<sup>1081</sup> who were framed by the ideological principles of the new republic.

The major similarities and differences of the Uzbek and Turkish cases in institutional and ideological spheres may be briefed along these lines:

---

<sup>1080</sup> For Nairn's argument please look at pp. 49-50.

<sup>1081</sup> Although the first two verses of the Tenth Year March claimed that the Republic created fifteen million youngsters in the decade after 1923, the ideological infrastructure of the regime took its shape particularly between 1928 and 1938.

“Çıktık açık alınla on yılda her savaştan  
On yılda onbeş milyon genç yarattık en baştan”  
“We succeeded in all wars in ten years  
In ten years we created 15 million youngsters of all ages”

- Uzbek and Turkish nation-building projects had placed a state-centric nationalism at the very heart of their ideological premises. Both regimes needed legitimacy within the existing boundaries, not a point of departure for irredentist claims. For this reason both Kemalism and the ideology of national independence excluded any demands regarding the co-nationals living outside the state territories.

- Both Kemalism and the ideology of national independence were to provide a legitimacy base for the existing cadre of rulers. All of the founders of the Turkish Republic were ex-military officers and bureaucrats of the collapsed Ottoman Empire. The nation-building in Turkey was an elite-led enterprise, the nation was built by the elites before all else for themselves. In this sense nation-building based on the dominant Turkish character was imperative for Kemalist elites who recently experienced the severe disappointment from former alternatives of Ottomanism and Islamism. On the other hand in Uzbekistan, Uzbek identity and the ‘national form’ of the Uzbek state had been established by the Soviet rule. The class of bureaucrats and technocrats who were the products of the Soviet modernization of 1930s together with the clan leaders had been recruited by the communist administration and in return they were well fit to the ideological rhetorics and practices of the Soviet Marxism. The unexpected independence forced these local elites to rely on the Uzbekness which had been already standardized and promoted in the Soviet period.

- Both the ideology of national independence and Kemalism imposed a sort of supra-politics consensus under which all political parties would operate. The political ideas might turn diverse only within the limits set beforehand by the regime. In both cases the ideologies were immunized through claims of realism and scienticism in Kemalism and claims of authenticity in the Uzbek case. Kemalist policies were constantly portrayed as the only logical solutions to the practical needs of the society. Being the

heirs of the positivism of the Union and Progress, Kemalists' claim of being scientific and realistic allowed them to declare alternative political prospects as irrational. On the other hand, the ideology of national independence made use of the authenticity claim arguing that the national ideology has born from the innate values of the Uzbek people and reflected the centuries old traditions of the society.

- Stability and order are the key concepts for all power-holders as after all stability means the endurance of the existing ruler-ruled relations. In Uzbekistan any rival political arguments could be easily denounced as alien to the Uzbek people and threats to the stability and the order. Uzbek regime needs a widespread threat perception in order to constitute itself as the savior of the stability. The myth of the Kemalist ideology was the indivisibility of the people and for this myth as long as the totalistic unity of the society was preserved the threats to the stability of the country could be overcome.

- In Turkey the regime established its ideology contrary to the 'evils' of the Ottoman Empire and against every kind of monarchy whether constitutional or not. The official discourse employed the mechanism of binary opposition in the form of 'benign republic versus wicked empire' in every prospect. Karimov regime also condemns the Soviet past as the era of colonialism and cruelty. In addition the ideology of national independence has also utilized the contrast between the security and stability inside the Uzbek territories and the chaos just in the other side of the border.

Ever since 1860s the historical materialist method and the revolutionary Marxist approach to the Russian historiography had gained prominence among the Russian intelligentsia and then, within the intellectual circles close to the Bolshevik faction of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party.<sup>1082</sup> Hence, in the

---

<sup>1082</sup> Baron, *ibid.*, pp. 382-383.

first years after the October Revolution, Pokrovsky as an old Bolshevik led the fashioning of a heroless history, progressing through socio-economic phases in a unilinear mode. The Pokrovsky School designed a history of ‘the Uzbek proletariat’ and ‘the exploited Uzbek toiling masses’ excluding the ethnic category the ‘Uzbeks’ and the heroic figures such as Amir Timur. Stalin’s consolidation of power and the impact of the Second World War brought the revision to the Uzbek historiography. The incorporation to the Russian Empire was ‘the lesser evil’ for the Uzbeks compared to the annexation by the British imperialism and Russians as the ‘progressive elder brother’ guided Uzbeks in their march towards socialism. Although a sort of progressive features of several Uzbek heroes such as forward-looking Ibn Sina was discovered, the Uzbek history turned out to be an addendum to the Russian history. The history-writing in the independent Uzbekistan has been the continuation with the Soviet historiography of post-Stalin years regarding the unilinear method, stress on the territorial history and the rehabilitation of Uzbek heroes but in a highly exaggerated mode. Hamid Ziyaev and other Uzbek historians portrayed the Uzbek history as an incessant independence struggle of ‘the Uzbek people’ since the ancient times against all kinds of foreign aggressors.

Influenced by the Persian-Islamic tradition, the Seljukid and Ottoman historiographies were in the form of chronics full of religious tales, legendary description of the wars and also lengthy glorifications of the Sultans and their dynasties. The official chroniclers, the *şehnamecis* which were formally employed at the Ottoman Palace beginning with the Suleyman I, remained in line with the above-mentioned Persian tradition until the 19th century. *Tanzimat* and the rising impact of the Western methodology of historiography in the Ottoman capital fostered ‘the state history’ at the expense of the old style dynastical and sultanic histories. However, the first official history of the Ottoman era which was written in the long reign of Abdülhamid II had ‘the Ottomans’ and ‘the Muslims’ as its principal actors instead of ‘the Turks’. Although the weight of the Turkish element was expanding in the Unionist period and the early Republican era, the methodology was still Eurocentric and the narrative has not turned out ‘national’



yet. The Turkish History Thesis which was extremely influential in the First and then the Second History Congresses symbolized one of the most radical transformations of the Kemalist Turkey. All Anatolian civilizations hitherto established were claimed to be Turkish in order to fit to the framework of the territorial historiography of the Kemalist nationalism. It is needless to note that the Ottoman era being 'the other' of the young Republic was regarded as corrupt and degenerate in the history books of the new regime.

The similarities and differences between the Uzbek and the Turkish cases regarding the history-writing can be summed up as follows:

- Both Uzbek and Turkish historiographies were strictly territorial. Uzbek history-writing disregarded any 'pan claims' towards neighboring Turkic countries. In addition, all preceding inhabitants of the present day Uzbekistan were claimed to be the ancestors of the Uzbek people, whatever ethnic origin or religious orientation they might come from. Similarly the Turkish History Thesis alleged ancient Anatolian people of Hittites and Sumerians were of Turkic origin. The claim of seniority within the existing boundaries served both regimes to legitimate their contention for the possession of the seized lands, certain parts of which might be the target for competing nationalisms.<sup>1083</sup> The very same claim of the ancient roots in Anatolia and Uzbekistan also served to secure the construction sites for Turkish and Uzbek nation-building processes.

- History-writing in independent Uzbekistan treated the Russian dominance in Central Asia as foreign aggression and colonialism. Without making a distinction between the Tsarist and the Soviet rules, 'the Russian' served as the scapegoat of the Uzbek historiography. The Turkish History Thesis was first and foremost elaborated in order to discard the Western

---

<sup>1083</sup> Remember the South-Eastern region of Anatolia where a sizeable Kurdish minority was the majority and, for Uzbekistan, the Tajik claims on Samarkand and Bukhara.

influence on Ottoman/Turkish histories and the Eurocentric perspective increasingly prevalent after Tanzimat. ‘The West’ turned out to be ‘the other’ of the Turkish History Thesis and the focus of the new Republican history was completely revised as the Turks being at the center.

- In addition most of the Ottoman history was written as an addendum to the Islamic history particularly until Tanzimat and also in the Abdülhamid II’s official history books. Similarly the Uzbek history was attached to the history of the Russian elder brother in the Soviet period. Thus both Turkish and Uzbek nation-building policies aimed at crafting histories of the Uzbek and Turkish heroes.

- Both Uzbek and Turkish historiographies shared the same target of encouraging the self-confidence of their respective people. Turkey inherited the feeling of humiliation against the West which was reinforced by the numerous defeats in the last three centuries of the Ottoman Empire. Uzbek history-writing also desperately needed Uzbek heroes. Hence Ibn Sina, Al-Farabî, Ahmad Yassavi, Al Khorezmi, Birunî were Uzbekised and all civilization flourished along the Silk Road was claimed to be Uzbek. Turkish History Thesis was even more radical. For the thesis, the whole human civilization was created by the forerunners of the Turks; the architects of all ancient civilizations including the prehistoric Chinese, Egyptian, Mesopotamian, Greek, and as well as the Anatolian civilizations were the Turks.

- Furthermore the new Uzbek and Turkish narratives had a firm belief in the ‘noble essence’ of the Uzbek and Turkish people. Although Uzbek people had struggled honestly to attain the independence for hundreds of years, only a few traitors and ignorant khans caused the subordination. Similarly Turkish historiography blamed the Sultans and a narrow parasitic group around them for the countless defeats.

- Methodologically Uzbek history-writing remained more or less faithful to the practices of the Soviet historical science. The progress of humanity from the primitive society to the industrial capitalism via several intermediary stages had been left intact. However, the content of Uzbek history books were filled with Uzbek national heroes. In Turkey the methodology and the content were amended all together.

- Until the declaration of the independence in 1991 the Uzbek people learned their history from the Russian historians and their Uzbek disciples. In this sense, the school children and literati all were the passive receivers of historiography prepared by the Russian hegemons. On the contrary in spite of the impact of Persian and later the Western historiographies Turkish history-writing was based on the narratives produced by native people. Ottoman Palace and the Istanbul intelligentsia were the promoters of their own histories.

- Both historiographies developed typical retrospective narratives in order to satisfy the political needs of the ruling elites. Consistent with Renan's view that Uzbek and Turkish history books deliberately forgot several episodes while incessantly they were reminding a few carefully selected topics and figures.

- Uzbek history-writing in accordance with its strictly territorial stance declared that the Uzbek Islam had been the culmination of centuries of traditions and beliefs including the ancient religions of the Central Asia. The approach to promote a secular version of Islam as the Uzbek Islam was instrumental to differentiate with the fundamentalist Islam, the nightmare of Islam Karimov. In Turkey the historical narrative developed in the official school textbooks was indifferent to Islam and other religions. In this vein, the religious explanations on especially the transformation of pre-

historic human beings were rejected and an evolutionist stance was adopted.

In times gone by the merchants were traveling back and forth alongside the Silk Road and the people of Central Asia whose lives necessitated constant interaction with the traders were multilingual by norm. Even though the Russian language was penetrating into the region as the share of the northern trade route had expanded in the Central Asian trade *vis-a-vis* the then deteriorating Silk Road, the multilingual composition of the Central Asian cities continued until the Soviet era. Although the Chaghatay dialect had developed as the literary language in Central Asia, it was used only by a rather limited literati. Contrary to the Tsarist administration which did not impose a linguistic policy in Uzbek territories, the Soviet rule pursued a consciously designed policy to construct the standard Uzbek language distinct from the other Turkic dialects. Accompanied by the enthusiastic literacy campaign and also with the efforts to purge Arabic and Persian words from the Uzbek language, the alphabet changes were the chief instruments to detach the Uzbeks from the Islamic world and then neighboring Central Asian peoples. The Karimov regime also changed the alphabet after the independence in order to minimize the impact of the Russian language and on the whole the Russian culture in Uzbekistan. Nevertheless, the pace of alphabet reform was very slow and also Karimov who was favoring a specific Uzbek alphabet, rejected the common Turkic alphabet.

Similar to the Chaghatay, the Ottoman language had developed as the literary language in the Ottoman Empire. However while Chaghatay had never attained the status of the state language, the Ottoman language was used in the extensive state bureaucracy of the Ottoman state. The alphabet reform of 1927 had served for two related purposes; first to thwart the impact of the Islamic way of thinking in the young Turkey and second to cut off the ties with the Ottoman past. In addition, the subsequent radical purification of the Turkish language and the

First and the Second Language Congresses were efficient instruments for the Kemalist nation-building to shape the Turkish identity.

The main points of comparison in Turkish and Uzbek linguistic experiences may be summarized as follows:

- The Kemalist zeal for the language reform was comparable with the Soviet campaign to create standard written languages and increase literacy during the 1920s and 1930s. In both periods commissions were set to search villages to discover authentic Uzbek and Turkish words in the daily lives of the peasants. Furthermore the Soviet and the Kemalist regimes had achieved significant increases in literacy rates, which meant the inclusion of the mass into the cultural spheres of respective languages. On the contrary, in the independent Uzbekistan even the complete change of the alphabet has not been realized. After almost two decades of the independence, the use of the Cyrillic Uzbek alphabet continued by several ministries and particularly by the adult population.

- In 1930s Kemalist Turkey implemented one of the most radical linguistic purification policies in the world. Albeit used extensively in the daily speeches of the people many Arabic and Persian words were eliminated from the language as an essential part of Turkish nation-building. On the contrary Uzbekistan did not pass through such a drastic transformation.

- The Jadidist intellectuals had promoted the Chaghatay language in order to create a literary language which would also function as the national mass language in Central Asia. Their chief aim was to end the split between languages of the elite who were largely using the Arabic and Russian languages and the public who were speaking various Turkic dialects. Likewise the Young Ottomans and then the Young Turks had

aimed at to disclose the gap between the elite and the mass cultural spheres. Although the influence of Arabic language had been limited in the Soviet rule, the status of Russian as the language of culture and inter-ethnic communication had continued even after the termination of Soviet sway in Uzbekistan. In contrast, radical linguistic policies of the Kemalist era had largely eradicated the Ottoman language and accomplished to instill Turkish as the language of culture in Turkey.

- Both Uzbek and Turkish language policies aimed at specific political ends. Uzbekistan initiated the alphabet change primarily to curtail the influence of Russia. In addition, the adoption of a distinct Uzbek alphabet was to strengthen the territorial definition of the Uzbek identity. By this way the Soviet practice of separation of Turkic republics of Central Asia via linguistic policies persisted after the independence. In Turkey language policies served to restrain the influence of the rival elite groups who upheld the continuation of the religious/dynastic legitimation.

- In Turkey the alphabet reform and the subsequent purification was set off only after the new ruling cadre felt secure in their new authority position. In Uzbekistan, however, the heightened demands for the status of the Uzbek language was taken over by Karimov in order to acquire the upper hand in political situation and finally to marginalize the nationalist opposition. Once Karimov felt confident of his power at the Uzbek Presidency, the reforms regarding the Uzbek language slowed down. Even the alphabet change could not be completed and the Cyrillic based alphabet still visible in the streets after twenty years of independence and the Russian language is used by not a few private firms and public institutions.

Both Uzbekistan and Turkey have experienced radical modernization processes. Soviet Marxism and Kemalism almost at the same time initiated to craft states based on the nationality principle. The authorities in Uzbekistan declared at

several occasions that the Turkish nation-building would be the best model for their own project. The comparison between the nation-building processes of Turkey and Uzbekistan which was the main topic of this dissertation also hoped to open way for speculations on the future of Uzbekistan. Future research might concentrate on whether Turkey's transformation into multi-party and progressively democratic country could shed light on the future of Uzbekistan. The crucial question is whether Uzbekistan will achieve to establish a democratic regime after Karimov, or a new clan-based autocrat will replace the ageing despot.

Kemalism proved to endure after the death of its founder. In fact the pragmatism of the ideology enabled it to fit in the frameworks of diverse ideological positions. By this way Kemalism could easily adapt itself into the multi-party regime as a supra-ideology and as an efficient tool of regime legitimation. In Uzbekistan "ideology of national independence" aspired to place itself as a supra-ideology, a general framework pre-set within which all opposition should operate. The external opposition was successfully marginalized and the propositions of the ideology seem to be hegemonic. However the existence of dissidence and extensive use of violence against even little divergences imply the weakness of the legitimation in the country. Perhaps post-Karimov years shall experience a novel ideology formulation. Whether nation-building implies a specific momentum through which all "pro-nations" had passed during their journey in the direction of their 'linear progress' or it is a set of policies adopted as a part of indoctrination of masses by the elites in their "legitimation crisis", the elite legitimation was the primary goal of all these policies of nation-building.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

### Books

#### *in English*

Acton, John, *Essays on Freedom and Power*, New York: Meridien Books, 1955.

Adams, Laura L., *The Spectacular State: Culture and National Identity in Uzbekistan*, Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2010.

Adshead, S. A. M., *Central Asia in World History*, London: Macmillan, 1993.

Akiner, Shirin (eds.), *Cultural Change and Continuity in Central Asia*, London & New York: Kegan Paul International, 1991.

Alexander, Catherine & Buchli, Victor & Humprey, Caroline (eds.), *Urban Life in Post-Soviet Central Asia*, Oxon & New York: University College London Press, 2007.

Allworth, Edward A., *The Modern Uzbeks: From the Fourteenth Century to the Present - A Cultural History*, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1990.

Alimov, Arif, *Uzbekistan: Another Big Leap Forward*, London: Soviet Booklet No: 60 D, March 1960.

Amitai, Reuven & Biran, Michal (eds.), *Mongols, Turks and Others: Eurasian Nomads and the Sedentary World*, Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2005.

Anderson, Benedict, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*, London & New York: Verso, 1991.

“anonymous”, *Uzbekiston*, Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House.



“anonymous”, *Uzbekistan: A Study of Soviet Communist Rule in Central Asia*, June 1956.

Armanini, A. J., *Politics and Economics of Central Asia*, New York: Novinka Books, 2002.

Atabaki, Touraj & O’Kane, John (eds.), *Post-Soviet Central Asia*, London & New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 1998.

Barker, Rodney, *Legitimizing Identities: The Self-Presentations of Rulers and Subjects*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

Berg, Andrea & Kreikemeyer, Anna (eds.), *Realities of Transformation: Democratization Policies in Central Asia Revisited*, Hamburg: Nomos, 2006.

Brubaker, Rogers, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe*, Cambridge, UK & New York USA: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Babak, Vladimir & Vaisman, Demian & Wasserman, Aryeh (eds.), *Political Organization in Central Asia and Azerbaijan: Sources and Documents*, London & Portland: Frank Cass, 2004.

*The Baburnama: Memoirs of Babur, Prince and Emperor*, Washington, D.C.: Freer Gallery of Art, Arthur M. Sackler Gallery & New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.

Becker, Seymour, *Russia’s Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865–1924*, London & New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004.

Billig, Michael, *Banal Nationalism*, London: Sage Publications, 1995.

Boucher, David & Kelly, Paul (eds.), *Political Thinkers: From Socrates to the Present*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.

Boucher, David & Kelly, Paul (eds.), *The Social Contract from Hobbes to Rawls*, London & New York: Routledge, 1994.

Brass, Paul R., *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison*, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1991.

Breuilly, John, *Nationalism and the State*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, second edition, 1993.

Buzan, Barry, Wæver, Ole, De Wilde, Jaap, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998.

Cagaptay, Soner, *Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern Turkey*, London & New York: Routledge, 2006.

Canovan, Margaret, *Nationhood and Political Theory*, Cheltenham, UK & Brookfield, US: Edward Elgar, 1996.

Collingwood, R. G., *The Idea of History*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983.

Collins, Kathleen, *Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia*, Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Conquest, Robert (eds.), *Soviet Nationalities Policy in Practice*, London & Sydney & Toronto: The Bodley Head, 1967.

Cosmo, Nicola di & Frank, Allen J. & Golden, Peter B., *The Cambridge History of Inner Asia: The Chinggisid Age*, Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Critchlow, James, *Nationalism in Uzbekistan: A Soviet Republic's Road to Sovereignty*, Boulder & San Francisco & Oxford: Westview Press, 1991.

Cummings, Sally N. (eds.), *Power and Change in Central Asia*, London: Routledge, 2002.

Çarkoğlu, Ali & Hale, William (eds.), *The Politics of Modern Turkey Volume I: Historical Heritage of Politics in Modern Turkey*, Oxon, UK: Routledge, 2008.

Delanty, Gerard & Kumar, Krishan (eds.), *The Sage Handbook of Nations and Nationalism*, London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2006.

De Rachewiltz, Igor (trans.), *The Secret History of the Mongols: A Mongolian Epic Chronicle of the Thirteenth Century*, Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2004.

Deringil, Selim, *The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire 1876-1909*, London, UK & New York, NY: I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd., 1999.

Dilorom, İbrahim, *The Islamization of Central Asia: A Case Study of Uzbekistan*, Leicester, UK: The Islamic Foundation, 1993.

Drobizheva, Leokadia & Gottemoeller, Rose & Kelleher, Catherine McArdle & Walker, Lee (eds.), *Ethnic Conflict in the Post-Soviet World: Case Studies and Analysis*, Armonk, N.Y. & London, England: M.E. Sharpe, 1996.

Eickelman, Dale F. (eds.), *Russia's Muslim Frontiers: New Directions in Cross-Cultural Analysis*, Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993.

Eley, Geoff & Suny, Ronald Grigor (eds.), *Becoming National: A Reader*, New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.

Everett-Heath, Tom (eds.), *Central Asia: Aspects of Transition*, London & New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003.

Ferdinand, Peter (eds.), *The New Central Asia and Its Neighbours*, London: Chatnam House Papers, 1994.

Feyzioğlu, Turhan, *Atatürk's Rational, Scientific and Realistic Approach to the Modernization of Turkey*, Istanbul, 1982.

Fierman, William, *Language Planning and National Development: The Uzbek Experience*, Berlin & New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1991.

Fishman, Joshua A., *Language and Nationalism: Two Integrative Essays*, Rowley, Massachusetts: Newbury House Publishers, 1972.

Geiss, Paul Georg, *Pre-Tsarist and Tsarist Central Asia: Communal Commitment and Political Order in Change*, London & New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003.

Gellner, Ernest, *Encounters with Nationalism*, Oxford & Cambridge: Blackwell, 1994.

Gellner, Ernest, *Nations and Nationalism*, Oxford UK: Basic Blackwell Publisher, 1983.

Gellner, Ernest, *Thought and Change*, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1964.

Gleason, Gregory, *The Central Asian States: Discovering Independence*, Boulder & Oxford: Westview Press, 1997.

Grenoble, Lenore A., *Language Policy in the Soviet Union*, New York & Boston & Dordrecht & London & Moscow: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003.

Guibernau, Montserrat, *Nationalisms: The Nation-State and Nationalism in the Twentieth Century*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996.

Habermas, Jürgen, *Legitimation Crisis*, Thomas Mc Carthy (trans.), Beacon Press, 1975.

Haugen, Arne, *The Establishment of National Republics in Soviet Central Asia*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.

Hearn, Jonathan, *Rethinking Nationalism: A Critical Introduction*, Hampshire, UK & New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.

Hesli, Vicki L., *Governments and Politics in Russia and the Post-Soviet Region*, Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Co., 2007.

Heyneman, Stephen P. & DeYoung, Alan J. (eds.), *The Challenges of Education in Central Asia*, Greenwich: IAP, 2004.

Hiro, Dilip, *Between Marx and Muhammed: The Changing Face of Central Asia*, London: Harper Collins Publishers, 1994.

Hobbes, Thomas, *Leviathan*, London & Glasgow: Collins, 1969.

Hobsbawm, E. J., *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*, 2nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

Hosking, Geoffrey, *A History of the Soviet Union*, Revised Edition, Glasgow: Fontana Press/Collins, 1990.

Hroch, Miroslav, *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups Among the Smaller European Nations*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2000.

Hutchinson, John & Smith, Anthony D. (eds.), *Nationalism*, Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.

Ichijo, Atsuko & Uzelac, Gordana (eds.), *When is the Nation? Towards an Understanding of Theories of Nationalism*, London & New York: Routledge, 2005.

Imber, Colin, *The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650: The Structure of Power*, Hampshire, UK & New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.

Jamaluddin, Syed, *The State Under Timur: A Study in Empire Building*, New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 1995.

James, Paul, *Nation Formation: Towards a Theory of Abstract Community*, London & Thousand Oaks & New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1996.

Juvayni, Alaidin Ata-Malik, *History of the World Conqueror*, John Andrew Boyle (trans.) Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1958.

Karateke, Hakan T. & Reinkowski, Maurus (eds.), *Legitimizing the Order: The Ottoman Rhetoric of State Power*, Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2005.

Karimov, I.A., *Basic Principles of Social, Political and Economic Development of Uzbekistan: Report at the First Session of the Oliy Majlis of the Republic of Uzbekistan, February 23, 1995*, Tashkent: Usbekiston, 1995.

- Karimov, Islam, *Uzbekistan on the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1998.
- Kastritsis, Dimitris J., *The Sons of Bayezid: Empire Building and Representation in the Ottoman Civil War of 1402–1413*, Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2007.
- Kavalski, Emilian (eds.), *Stable Outside, Fragile Inside?: Post-Soviet Statehood in Central Asia*, Surrey: UK & Burlington VT, USA: Ashgate, 2010.
- Kedourie, Elie, *Nationalism*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1993.
- Kochan, Lionel, *The Making of Modern Russia*, Middlesex: Pelican Books, 1963.
- Kohn, Hans, *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origins and Background*, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1961.
- Kulchik, Yuri & Fadin, Andrey & Sergeev, Victor, *Central Asia after the Empire*, London & Chicago, IL: Pluto Press, 1996.
- Landau, Jacob M. (eds.), *Atatürk and Modernization of Turkey*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1982.
- Landau, Jacob M. & Keller-Heinkele, Barbara, *Politics of Language in the Ex-Soviet Muslim States*, London: Hurst & Company, 2001.
- Lewis, Bernard, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
- Lewis, Geoffrey, *The Turkish Language Reform: A Catastrophic Success*, Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- Lindner, Rudi Paul, *Explorations in Ottoman History*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2007.
- Lipset, Martin Seymour, *The Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics*, Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1960.
- Louw, Elisabeth Maria, *Everyday Islam in Post-Soviet Central Asia*, London & New York: Routledge, 2007.
- Luong, Pauline Jones, *Institutional Change and Political Continuity in Post-Soviet Central Asia: Power, Perceptions and Pacts*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
- Luong, Pauline Jones (eds.), *The Transformation of Central Asia: States and Societies from Soviet Rule to Independence*, Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 2004.

- MacFadyen, David, *Russian Culture in Uzbekistan: One Language in the Middle of Nowhere*, London & New York: Routledge, 2006.
- Manz, Beatrice Forbes (eds.), *Central Asia in Historical Perspective*, Boulder & San Francisco & Oxford: Westview Press, 1994.
- Manz, Beatrice Forbes, *The Rise and Rule of Tamerlane*, Cambridge & New York & Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
- Marx, Karl, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972.
- McChesney, R. D., *Central Asia: Foundations of Change*, Princeton & New Jersey: Darwin Press, 1996.
- Meinecke, Friedrich, *Cosmopolitanism and the National State*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970.
- Melvin, Neil J., *Uzbekistan: Transition to Authoritarianism on the Silk Road*, Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 2000.
- Nairn, Tom, *Faces of Nationalism: Janus Revisited*, London & New York: Verso, 1997.
- Nazarov, Bakhtiyar A. & Sinor, Denis (eds.), *Essays on Uzbek History, Culture and Language*, Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies, 1993.
- Nove, Alec, *An Economic History of the USSR 1917-1991*, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1992.
- Olcott, Martha Brill, *Central Asia's New States: Independence, Foreign Policy and Regional Security*, Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996.
- Ortaylı, İlber, *Ottoman Studies*, Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi University Press, 2004.
- Ortaylı, İlber, *The Last Empire: Ottoman Empire*, Istanbul: Timaş Press, 2006.
- Orwell, George, *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, London: Harcourt Inc., 1949.
- Özkırımlı, Umut, *Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction*, Hampshire UK & New York USA: Palgrave, 2000.
- Paksoy, H. B., *Central Asia Reader: The Rediscovery of History*, Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1994.

- Parla, Taha & Davison, Andrew, *Corporatist Ideology in Kemalist Turkey: Progress or Order?*, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2004.
- Pecora, Vincent P., *Nation and Identities: Classical Readings*, Malden, MA, USA & Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers, 2001.
- Plato, *The Republic*, G.R.F. Ferrari (eds.), Tom Griffith (trans.), Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
- Poulton, Hugh, *Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic*, Washington Square, New York: New York University Press, 1997.
- Ramet, Sabrina Petra (eds.), *Religious Policy in the Soviet Union*, Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
- Rand, Robert, *Tamerlane's Children: Dispatches from Contemporary Uzbekistan*, Oxford, UK: Oneworld Publications, 2006.
- Ro'i, Yacoov (eds.), *Democracy and Pluralism in Muslim Eurasia*, Oxon, UK: Frank Cass, 2004.
- Ro'i, Yacoov (eds.), *Muslim Eurasia: Conflicting Legacies*, London: Frank Cass, 1995.
- Roy, Olivier, *The New Central Asia: The Creation Nations*, New York: New York University Press, 2000.
- Roudik, Peter L., *The History of the Central Asian Republics*, Westport, Connecticut & London: Greenwood Press, 2007.
- Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, *The Social Contract*, Middlesex, UK & Baltimore, US & Victoria, Australia: Penguin Books, 1968.
- Ruffin, M. Halt & Waugh, Daniel (eds.), *Civil Society in Central Asia*, Seattle & London: Center for Civil Society International, 1999.
- Rustow, Dankwart A., *A World of Nations: Problems of Political Modernization*, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1967.
- Sengupta, Anita, *Frontiers into Borders: The Transformation of Identities in Central Asia*, Haryana: Hope India Publications, 2002.
- Sengupta, Anita, *The Formation of the Uzbek Nation-State: A Study in Transition*, Lanham: Lexington Books, 2003.

Sahadeo, Jeff & Zanca, Russell (eds.), *Everyday Life in Central Asia: Past and Present*, Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2007.

Salih, Muhammad, *The Opponent*, Hakan Coşkunarslan (eds.), Istanbul: Kömen Publications, 2006.

Shams-Ud-Din, *Nationalism in Russia and Central Asian Republics: Unfinished Democratic Revolution*, New Delhi: Lancers Books, 1999.

Shaw, Stanford J. & Shaw, Ezel Kural, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey Volume II: Reform, Revolution and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey 1808-1975*, Cambridge & New York & Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1977.

Smith, Anthony D., *Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations and Nationalism*, London & New York: Routledge, 1998.

Smith, Anthony D., *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era*, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1995.

Smith, Graham & Law, Vivien & Wilson, Andrew & Bohr, Annette & Allworth, Edward (eds.), *Nation-Building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands: The Politics of National Identities*, Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Soucek, Svat, *A History of Inner Asia*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

Spechler, Martin C., *The Political Economy of Reform in Central Asia: Uzbekistan under Authoritarianism*, Oxon, UK & New York, NY: Routledge, 2008.

Suny, Ronald Grigor & Martin, Terry (eds.), *A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin*, Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.

Szporluk, Roman, *Communism and Nationalism: Karl Marx versus Friedrich List*, New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988.

Tesli, Arne & Holm-Hansen, Jorn (eds.), *Building the State: Political Mobilisation, Rhetoric and Social Differentiation in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Ethiopia and Somalia*, Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research, 1999.

Tishkov, Valery, *Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in and After the Soviet Union: The Mind Aflame*, London & Thousand Oaks & New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1997.

Tokhtakhodzhaeva, Marfua, *The Re-Islamization of Society and the Position of Women in Post-Soviet Uzbekistan*, Kent, UK: Global Oriental, 2008.



Uyar, Mesut and Erickson, Edward J., *A Military History of the Ottomans: From Osman to Atatürk*, Santa Barbara, California & Denver, Colorado & Oxford, England: ABC Clio, 2009.

Vassiliev, Alexei (eds.), *Central Asia: Political and Economic Challenges in the Post-Soviet Era*, London: Saqi, 2001.

Vryonis, Speros JR., *The Turkish State and History: Clio Meets the Grey Wolf*, Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1991.

Warikoo, K. & Norbu, Dawa (eds.), *Ethnicity and Politics in Central Asia*, Denver, Colorado: International Academic Publishers Ltd., 2000.

Weber, Max, *Economy and Society, Vol: 1&2*, Roth, Guenther & Wittich, Claus (eds.), Berkeley & Los Angeles & London: University of California Press, 1978.

Weber, Max, *Political Writings*, Lassman, Peter & Speirs, Ronald (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

Webster, Donald Everett, *The Turkey of Atatürk: Social Process in the Turkish Reformation*, Philadelphia: The American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1939.

Wheeler, Geoffrey, *The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia*, New York & Washington: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1964.

Wittek, Paul, *The Rise of the Ottoman Empire*, London: The Royal Asiatic Society, 1938.

Yalcin, Resul, *The Rebirth of Uzbekistan: Politics, Economy and Society in the Post-Soviet Era*, Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 2002.

Yarmolinsky, Avrahm, *Road to Revolution: A Century of Russian Radicalism*, New York: Macmillan, 1959.

Yeşilbursa, Ayşegül Amanda (trans.), *A Handbook of Kemalist Thought*, Ankara: Atatürk Research Center, 2004.

Zürcher, Erik J., *Turkey: A Modern History*, London & New York: I.B.Tauris, 2004.

Zürcher, Erik J., *The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building: From the Ottoman Empire to Atatürk's Turkey*, London, UK & New York, NY: I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd, 2010.

*in Turkish*

Ahmad, Feroz, *Modern Türkiye'nin Oluşumu*, İstanbul: Sarmal Yayınevi, 1995.

Aka, İsmail, *Mirza Şahruh ve Zamanı (1405-1447)*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1994.

Aka, İsmail, *Timur ve Devleti*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2000.

Akbaş, Tutkun (eds.), *Gün Gün Cumhuriyet Tarihi: Türkiye'nin 77 Yılı 1923-2000*, İstanbul: Tempo, 2000.

Akiner, Shirin, *Sovyet Müslümanları*, İstanbul: İnsan Yayınları, January 1995.

Akşin, Sina, *İstanbul Hükümetleri ve Milli Mücadele: Mutlakiyete Dönüş (1918-1919)*, İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1992.

Akşin, Sina (eds.), *Türkiye Tarihi I: Osmanlı Devletine Kadar Türkler*, İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, July 1997.

Alan, Hayrünisa, *Bozkırdan Cennet Bahçesine Timurlular 1360-1506*, İstanbul: Ötüken, 2007.

Alikılıç, Dünder, *Osmanlı'da Devlet Protokolü ve Törenler: İmparatorluk Seremonisi*, İstanbul: Tarih Düşünce Kitapları, March 2004.

Althusser, Louis, *İdeoloji ve Devletin İdeolojik Aygıtları*, İstanbul: İthaki Yayınları, 2006.

Anadol, Cemal, *Orta Asya Türk Devletleri Tarihi (Selçuklulara Kadar)*, İstanbul: Kamer Yayınları, 1996.

Anderson, Benedict, *Hayali Cemaatler: Milliyetçiliğin Kökeni ve Yayılması*, Ankara: Metis, October 1995.

Avcıoğlu, Doğan, *Türklerin Tarihi-Birinci Kitap*, İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1997.

Aybars, Ergün, *Atatürkçülük ve Modernleşme*, İzmir: Zeus Kitabevi, 2006.

Balibar, Etienne & Wallerstein, Immanuel, *İrk, Ulus, Sınıf: Belirsiz Kimlikler*, İstanbul: Metis, 2000.

Barthold, V. V., *Moğol İstilasına Kadar Türkistan*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1990.

- Barthold, V. V., *Orta-Asya Türk Tarihi Hakkında Dersler*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2006.
- Başkaya, Fikret (eds.), *Resmi Tarih Tartışmaları-I*, Ankara: Özgür Üniversite Kitaplığı, 2005.
- Berkes, Niyazi, *Batıcılık, Ulusçuluk ve Toplumsal Devrimler*, İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2007.
- Bloch, Marc, *Tarihin Savunusu ya da Tarihçilik Mesleği*, Ankara: Gece Yayınları, 1994.
- Brubaker, Rogers, *Fransa ve Almanya'da Vatandaşlık ve Ulus Ruhu*, Ankara: Dost Kitabevi, December 2009.
- Brzezinski, Zbigniew, *Büyük Satranç Tahtası: Amerika'nın Önceliği ve Bunun Jeostratejik Gerekleri*, İstanbul: Sabah Kitapları, 1998.
- Bozkurt, Mahmut Esat, *Atatürk İhtilali*, İstanbul: Altın Kitaplar, 1967.
- Cahun, Leon, *Asya Tarihine Giriş: Kökenlerden 1405'e Türkler ve Moğollar*, İstanbul: Seç Yayın Dağıtım, January 2006.
- Carr, Edward Hallett, *Milliyetçilik ve Sonrası*, Osman Akınhay (trans.), İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1993.
- Coşkun, Vahap, *Ulus-Devletin Dönüşümü ve Meşruluk Sorunu*, Ankara: Liberte, 2009.
- Daver, Bülent, *Siyaset Bilimine Giriş*, Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 1993.
- Demirkan, Tarık, *Macar Turancıları*, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2000.
- Deringil, Selim, *Simgeden Millete: II. Abdülhamid'den Mustafa Kemal'e Devlet ve Millet*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2007.
- Dieckhoff, Alain & Jaffrelot, Christophe (eds.), *Milliyetçiliği Yeniden Düşünmek: Kuramlar ve Uygulamalar*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2010.
- Divitçioğlu, Sencer, *Orta-Asya Türk İmparatorluğu VI.-VIII. Yüzyıllar*, Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2005.
- Divitçioğlu, Sencer, *Orta Asya Türk Tarihi Üzerine Altı Çalışma*, Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, April 2006.
- Divitçioğlu, Sencer, *Osmanlı Beyliğinin Kuruluşu*, İstanbul: Eren, 2008.

- Dođan, Nuri, *Ders Kitapları ve Sosyalleşme (1876-1918)*, İstanbul: Bağlam, 1993.
- Ecevit, Bülent, *Atatürk ve Devrimcilik*, İstanbul: İş Bankası Yayınları, 2009.
- Eliçin, Emin Türk, *Kemalist Devrim ve İdeolojisi (Niteliđi ve Tarihteki Yeri)*, İstanbul: Ant Yayınları, 1970.
- Engin, M. Saffet, *Kemalizm İnkılabının Prensipleri: Büyük Türk Medeniyetinin Tarihi ve Sosyolojik Tetkikine Methal*, İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaası, 1938.
- Ercilasun, Ahmet Bican, *Türk Dünyası Üzerine İncelemeler*, Ankara: Akçağ, 1992.
- Ergin, Muharrem, (hazırlayan), *Dede Korkut Kitabı*, İstanbul: Hisar Kültür Gönüllüleri, 2003.
- Erođlu, Hamza, *Atatürkçülük*, Ankara: Olgaç Matbaası, 1981.
- Erözden Ozan, *Ulus-Devlet*, Ankara: Dost Kitabevi, 1997.
- Ersanlı Behar, Büşra, *İktidar ve Tarih: Türkiye’de “Resmi Tarih” Tezinin Oluşumu (1929-1937)*, İstanbul: Afa Yayınları, 1996.
- Erüreten, Bahir Mazhar, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devrim Yasaları*, İstanbul: Cumhuriyet, 1999.
- Feyzođlu, Osman Güngör, *Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılabımız*, İstanbul: M.E.B. Devlet Kitapları, 1981.
- Fleischer, Cornell H., *Tarihçi Mustafa Âli: Bir Osmanlı Aydın ve Bürokratı*, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, September 1996.
- Frye, Richard N., *Antik Çağlardan Türklerin Yayılmasına Orta Asya Mirası*, Ankara: Arkadaş Yayınevi, 2009.
- Hassan, Ümit, *Eski Türk Toplumunu Üzerine İncelemeler*, Ankara: Dođu Batı Yayınları, 2009.
- Hatibođlu, Vecihe, *Cumhuriyetin 50. Yılında Ölümsüz Atatürk ve Dil Devrimi*, Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları, 1973.
- Heyd, Uriel, *Türkiye’de Dil Devrimi*, İstanbul: IQ Yayıncılık, September 2001.
- Gazi Mustafa Kemal, *Nutuk*, Memiş, Şefik & Şen, İsmail (prepared), İstanbul: İstanbul Ticaret Odası, 2010.
- Giritli, İsmet, *Kemalist İdeoloji: Siyasi ve Ekonomik Yönleri*, Yaşar Eğitim ve Kültür Vakfı Yayınları, 1981.

- Golođlu, Mahmut, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Tarihi-II (1931-1938): Tek Partili Cumhuriyet*, İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2009.
- Gökalp, Ziya, *Türkçülüğün Esasları*, İstanbul: İnkılap ve Aka, 1978.
- Gökalp, Ziya, *Türk Uygarlığı Tarihi*, İstanbul, İnkılap Kitabevi, 1991.
- Güneş, İhsan, *Birinci TBMM'nin Düşünce Yapısı (1920-1923)*, İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1997.
- Güngör, Nazife (eds.), *Atatürkçü Düşüncenin Bilimsel ve Felsefi Temelleri*, Ankara: Gazi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2007.
- İnalcık, Halil, *Devlet-i 'Âliyye Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Üzerine Araştırmalar-I: Klasik Dönem (1302-1606)*, İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2009.
- İnalcık, Halil & Seyitdanlıođlu, Mehmet (eds.), *Tanzimat: Deđişim Sürecinde Osmanlı İmparatorluğu*, Ankara: Phoneix, 2006.
- İnan, Abdülkadir, *Makaleler ve İncelemeler*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, Vol: 1 & 2, 1998.
- İnan, Afet, *Medenî Bilgiler ve M. K. Atatürk'ün El Yazıları*, 1969.
- İnan, A. Afet, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ve Türk Devrimi*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1998.
- İnsel, Ahmet (eds.), *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce II: Kemalizm*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001.
- Kadıođlu, Ayşe, *Cumhuriyet İradesi Demokrasi Muhakemesi*, İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1999.
- Kantemir, Dimitri, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Yükseliş ve Çöküş Tarihi, Vol: 1*, İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Kitapları, 1998.
- Kaplan, İsmail, *Türkiye'de Milli Eğitim İdeolojisi*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2009.
- Karadeniz, Hasan Basri, *Osmanlılar ile Beylikler Arasında Anadolu'da Meşruiyet Mücadelesi (XIV-XVI. Yüzyıllar)*, İstanbul: Yeditepe Yayınevi, May 2008.
- Karal, Enver Ziya (eds.), *Atatürk'ten Düşünceler*, İstanbul: Çađdaş Yayınları, 1991.

Karal, Enver Ziya, *Osmanlı Tarihi V. Cilt: Nizam-ı Cedid ve Tanzimat Devirleri 1789-1856*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1983.

Karal, Enver Ziya, *Osmanlı Tarihi VII. Cilt: Islahat Fermanı Devri 1861-1876*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1983.

Karal, Enver Ziya, *Osmanlı Tarihi VIII. Cilt: Birinci Meşrutiyet ve İstibdat Devirleri 1876-1907*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1983.

Karpat, Kemal H., *Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Kimlik ve İdeoloji*, İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2009.

Karpat, Kemal H. (eds.), *Osmanlı Geçmişi ve Bugünün Türkiye'si*, İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2005.

Kaynar, Mete K., *Tarihin İnşası ve Siyaset: Yazılar*, Ankara: Adımlar Yayınevi, 2009.

Kocatürk, Utkan (eds.), *Atatürk'ün Fikir ve Düşünceleri*, Ankara: Edebiyat Yayınevi, 1971.

Koçar, Çağatay, *Türkistan ile İlgili Makaleler*, Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1991.

Kodaman, Bayram, *Abdülhamid Devri Eğitim Sistemi*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1991.

Korkmaz, Zeynep, *Cumhuriyet Döneminde Türk Dili*, Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih ve Coğrafya Fakültesi Yayınları, 1974.

Korkmaz, Zeynep, *Türk Dilinin Tarihi Akışı İçinde Atatürk ve Dil Devrimi*, Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih ve Coğrafya Fakültesi Yayınları, 1963.

Köprülü, Fuad, *Osmanlı'nın Etnik Kökeni*, İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1999.

Küçük, Yalçın, *Sovyetler Birliği'nde Sosyalizmin Çözülüşü*, İstanbul: Mızrak, December 2010.

Küçük, Yalçın, *Türkiye Üzerine Tezler V (1908-1998)*, İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1992.

Landau, Jacob M., *Pantürkizm*, Mesut Akın (trans.), İstanbul: Sarmal Yayınevi, 1999.

Lewis, Geoffrey, *Trajik Başarı: Türk Dil Reformu*, İstanbul: Gelenek Yayıncılık, 2004.

- McNeill, William H., *Dünya Tarihi*, Alaeddin Şenel (trans.), Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2006.
- Mumcu, Ahmet, *Tarih Açısından Türk Devriminin Temelleri ve Gelişimi*, İstanbul: İnkılap Kitabevi, 1996.
- Nayır, Yaşar Nabi, *Atatürkçülük Nedir?*, İstanbul: Varlık Yayınları, 1980.
- Nizamü'l-Mülk, *Siyasetname*, Mehmet Taha Ayar (trans.), İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2009.
- Okday, Cemil, *Siyaset Bilimi İncelemeleri*, İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 2003.
- Ozankaya, Özer, *Türkiye'de Laiklik: Atatürk Devrimlerinin Temeli*, İstanbul: Cem Yayınları, 1990.
- Öksüz, Yusuf Ziya, *Türkçe'nin Sadeleşme Tarihi Genç Kalemler ve Yeni Lisan Hareketi*, Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu, 2004.
- Özbek, Sinan, *İdeoloji Kuramları*, İstanbul: Bulut Yayınları, 2000.
- Özdemir, Emin (eds.), *Dil Devrimimiz*, Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları, 1969.
- Özer, Attila, *Türk Cumhuriyetlerinin Hukuki Yapısı (Yasama-Yürütme-Yargı)*, Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 2008.
- Özerdim, Sami N., *Yazı Devriminin Öyküsü*, İstanbul: Cumhuriyet, August 1998.
- Öztürk, Serdar, *Osmanlı'da İletişimin Diyalektiği*, Ankara: Phoenix, February 2010.
- Parla, Taha, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları I: Atatürk'ün Nutku*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1991.
- Parla, Taha, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları II: Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1992.
- Parla, Taha, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları III: Kemalist Tek-Parti İdeolojisi ve CHP'nin Altı Oku*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1991.
- Parla, Taha, *Ziya Gökalp, Kemalizm ve Türkiye'de Korporatizm*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1989.
- Parlak, İsmet, *Kemalist İdeolojide Eğitim: Erken Cumhuriyet Dönemi Tarih ve Yurt Bilgisi Ders Kitapları Üzerine Bir İnceleme*, Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi, 2005.
- Peker, Recep, *İnkılap Dersleri*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1984.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, *İnsanlar Arasındaki Eşitsizliğin Kaynağı*, Rasih Nuri İleri (trans.), Say Yayınları, March 1995.

Sadođlu, Hüseyin, *Türkiye'de Ulusçuluk ve Dil Politikaları*, İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, October 2003.

Sahibkıran Emir Timur Muhammed Tarağay Bahadırođlu, *Timur'un Günlüğü: Tüzükat-ı Timur*, Şakirov, Kutlukhan & Aslan, Adnan (eds. & trans.), İstanbul: İnsan Yayınları, 2010.

Salih, Muhammed, *Devlet Sırları*, İstanbul: Toker Yayınları, 1997.

Salih, Muhammed, *Türkistan Şuuru*, İstanbul: Ötüken Neşriyat, 1997.

Saydam, M. Bilgin, *Deli Dumrul'un Bilinci: "Türk-İslam Ruhu" Üzerine Bir Kültür Psikolojisi Denemesi*, İstanbul: Metis, 1997.

Seyfettin, Ömer, *Türklük Üzerine Yazılar*, Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1993.

Sezer, Ayten (eds.), *Atatürk ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Tarihi*, Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, August 2003.

Taheri, Amir, *Kızıl Gökte Hilal: Sovyetler'de İslam'ın Geleceđi*, İstanbul: Sel Yayıncılık, November 1991.

*Tarih I: Kemalist Eğitimin Tarih Dersleri (1931-1941)*, İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, November 2003.

*Tarih II: Kemalist Eğitimin Tarih Dersleri (1931-1941)*, İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, March 2005.

*Tarih III: Kemalist Eğitimin Tarih Dersleri (1931-1941)*, İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, March 2005.

*Tarih IV: Kemalist Eğitimin Tarih Dersleri (1931-1941)*, İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, November 2004.

Tekin, Emrullah, *Timur ve Devlet Yönetim Stratejisi*, İstanbul: Burak Yayınevi, April 1994.

Tekin, Talat, *Orhon Yazıtları*, Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları, 2008.

Tekinalp, *Kemalizm*, İstanbul: Toplumsal Dönüşüm Yayınları, May 1998.

Timur, Taner, *Osmanlı Kimliđi*, Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, September 2000.



Tokalak, İsmail, *Bizans-Osmanlı Sentezi: Bizans Kültür ve Kurumlarının Osmanlı Üzerindeki Etkisi*, İstanbul: Gülerboy, 2006.

Toynbee, Arnold, *Türkiye: Bir Devletin Yeniden Doğuşu*, İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları.

Tunçay, Mete, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek-Parti Yönetimi'nin Kurulması (1923-1931)*, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2010.

Turan, Şerafettin, *Atatürk ve Ulusal Dil*, Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları, 1981.

*Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatları: Kemalist Yönetimin Resmi Tarih Tezi*, İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1999.

Ünaydın, Ruşen Eşref, *Atatürk Tarih ve Dil Kurumları - Hatıralar*, Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1954.

Ünlü, Mahir & Özcan, Ömer, *20. Yüzyıl Türk Edebiyatı: 1900-1940*, İstanbul: İnkılap, 2003.

Yavuz, Ünsal, *Atatürk: İmparatorluktan Milli Devlete*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1999.

Yetkin, Çetin, *Türkiye'de Tek Parti Yönetimi*, İstanbul: Altın Kitaplar, 1983.

Yılmaz, Salih, *XVI.-XX. Yüzyıllarda Karakalpak Türkleri Tarihi*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2006.

Yorulmaz, Hüseyin (eds.), *Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete Alfabe Tartışmaları*, İstanbul: Kitabevi, 1995.

Yücel, Tahsin, *Dil Devrimi ve Sonuçları*, İstanbul: Can Yayınları, 2007.

Ziyaev, Hamid, *Türkistan'da Rus Hakimiyetine Karşı Mücadele*, (Ayhan Çelikbay trans.), Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2007.

Zürcher, Erik Jan, *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1998.

### ***in Uzbek***

Ahmad, Ashraf, *Muhammad Taragayi Ulughbek (1394-1449)*, Tashkent: Abdulla Kadiri Nomidagi Halk Mirasi Nashriyati, 1994.

- Aka, İsmail, *Büyük Temür Davleti*, Tashkent: Cholpan Nashriyati, 1996.
- Alimova, D.A. & Golovanov, A. & Juraev, M. & Ziyamov, Ş.S. & Ishakov, M.M., *Mustakil Uzbekiston Tarihining Dastlabki Sahifalari*, Tashkent: Şark Nashriyati, 2000.
- Alimova, D.A. (eds.), *Tarikh Şahidligi ve Saboklari: Çarizm va Sovyet Müstemlekeçiliği Devrinde Uzbekiston Milli Bagliklarining Izleshtirilişi*, Tashkent: Şark Neshriyati, 2001.
- Askarov, Ahmadali, *Uzbekiston Halklari Tarihi I Jild*, Tashkent: Uzbekiston Respublikasi Fanlar Akademiyası “Fan” Nashriyati, 1992.
- Askarov, Ahmadali, *Uzbekiston Halklari Tarihi II Jild*, Tashkent: Uzbekiston Respublikasi Fanlar Akademiyası “Fan” Nashriyati, 1992.
- Aşirov, Adhamjan, *Uzbek Halkinin Kadimi İbtikad ve Marasimlari*, Tashkent: Alisher Novai Nomidagi Uzbekiston, Milli Kutuphanasi Neshriyati, 2007.
- Atabekov, Yu. A. & Khamidullin, Sh. Kh., *Abu Ali İbn Sinanın İlmi Asaslangan Haykal Obrazinin Yaratışı (A Bust of Abu Ali İbn Sina: A Scientific Construction of the Great Scholar's Image)*, Tashkent: Medizina UzSSR, 1980.
- Berezikov, Evgeni, *Büyük Temür: Roman-Vadia*, Tashkent: Şark, 1996.
- Gulomov, Y. G. & Nabiyev, R.N. & Vahabov, M.G., *Uzbekiston SSR Tarihi*, Tashkent: Uzbekiston SSR Fanlar Akademiyası Nashriyati, 1958.
- Hayrullaev, M. M., *Orta Asiyada IX – XII Asirlarda Madani Tarakkiyat (Uyganish Davri Madaniyyati)*, Tashkent: Uzbekiston Respublikasi Fanlar Akademiyası “Fan” Nashriyati.
- Hidayatov, G. A., *Mening Canacan Tarikhim*, Tashkent: Ukutuvcu, 1992.
- Irisov, A., *Abu Ali İbn Sina: Hayati va İjadi Mirosi*, Tashkent: Uzbekistan SSR, Shah Neshriyati, 1980.
- Irisov, A., *Abu Ali İbn Sina: Felsafi Kissalar* Tashkent, 1963.
- Karimov, I. A., *Bizdan Azad va Abad Vatan Kalsin*, Tashkent: Uzbekiston, 1994.
- Mannanov, B. & Ostonova, G. & Kamoloddin, Ş., *Amir Temirning Turkii Yarliği*, Tashkent: Uzbekiston Respublikasi Fanlar Akademiyası, 2005.
- Mirzaev, C., *İbn Sinanın Şarkşinaslık İnstitutunda Mavjut Asarlari (bibliografiya)*, Tashkent, 1955.

Naimov, Hüsratulla, *Men Yashashni Istaman!*, Bukhara: Bukharo Nashriyati, 1994.

Nishanova, Sanovar, *Manaviyat Darslari: Orta Maktablaring 10-11. Siniflari İçin Majmua*, Tashkent: Ukutuvcu, 1994.

Razzak, Jabbar, *Vatan Kadri*, Tashkent: Ozbekiston, 2007.

Shaniyezov, Karim, *Uzbek Halkining Shekillenish Jereyani*, Tashkent: Uzbekiston Respublikasi Fanlar Akademiyasi Tarih Instituti & Achik Jamiyat Instituti Uzbekistonga Madad Fonu - Soros, 2001.

Shodmonova, Sanobar, *Nemis ve Turk Tarihçinasliginda Sovet Müstemlekeçiline Karşı Kurash Masalalari*, Tashkent: Abu Matbuot Konsalt, 2008.

Tashkendi, Salahuddin, *Temurname: Amir Temur Güregen Jengnamesi*, Tashkent: Cholpan, 1991.

*Uzbekiston Respublikasining Konstitutsiyasi*, Tashkent, 1992.

*“Uzbekiston Tarihi” Kursu Ükuv Dasturu*, Tashkent: Uzbekiston Respublikasi Ali ve Orta Mahsus Talim Vazirligi, 1992.

*Uzbekiston Tarihinin Dolzarb Muammalariga Yengi Çizgilar*, Tashkent: Uzbekiston Fanlar Akademiyasi Tarih Instituti, 1999.

*Uzbekiston Tarihinin Ukutush ve Urganish Büyça Materyaller*, Tashkent: Uzbekiston Respublikasi Fanlar Akademiyasi “Fan” Nashriyati, 2009.

Yazdii, Sherafeddun Ali, *Zafername*, Tashkent: Şark Neshriyati, 1997.

Yeşonkul Jabbar, *Folklor: Obraz ve Talkin*, Karshi: Nasaf Nashriyati, 1999.

Ziyaev, Hamid, *Istiklol-Manaviyot Negizi*, Tashkent: Manaviyot, 1999.

Ziyaev, Hamid, *Tarihning Achilmagan Sahifalari*, Tashkent: Mehnat, 2003.

Ziyaev, Hamid, *Turkistonda Rossiya Tecavuzu va Hukumranligina Karşı Kuraşlar (XVII-XX Asr Başları)*, Tashkent, 1998.

Ziyaev, Hamid, *Uzbekiston Müstakilligi İçin Kuraşlarnin Tarihi (Miladdan Oldingi Asirlardan 1991 Yili 31 Avgustgaça)*, Tashkent: Uzbekiston Fanlar Akademiyasi Tarih Instituti, 2001.

Ziyaev, Hamid, *Uzbekiston Mustemleke va Zulm Iskenjesinde (XIX Asir Ikkinci Yarmi – XX Asir Bashlari)*, Tashkent: Uzbekiston Fanlar Akademiyasi Tarih Instituti, 2006.

### ***in German***

Mobius, Ben, *Die Liberale Nation: Deutschland Zwischen Nationaler Identitat und Multikultureller Gesellschaft*, Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 2003.

Peters, Richard, *Geschichte der Türken*, Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1966.

Price, Philips M., *Die Türkei: Vergangenheit und Gegenwart*, Nürnberg: Verlag Hans Carl, 1958.

Steinbach, Udo, *Geschichte der Türkei*, München: Beck, 2000.

### **Articles**

#### ***in English***

Abdurakhimova, Nadira A., “The Colonial System of Power in Turkistan”, *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol: 34, 2002, pp. 239–262.

Adak, Hülya, “National Myths and Self-Narrations: Mustafa Kemal’s *Nutuk* and Halide Edib’s *Memoirs* and *The Turkish Ordeal*”, *The South Atlantic Quarterly*, Vol: 102, No: 2/3, Spring/Summer 2003, pp. 509-527.

Adams, Laura L., “Invention, Institutionalization and Renewal in Uzbekistan’s National Culture”, *European Journal of Cultural Studies*, Vol: 2, 1999, pp. 355-373.

Adams, Laura L., “Modernity, Postcolonialism, and Theatrical Form in Uzbekistan”, *Slavic Review*, Vol: 64, No: 2, Summer, 2005, pp. 333-354.

Akiner, S. & Cook, R. U. & French, R. A., “Salt Damage to Islamic Monuments in Uzbekistan”, *The Geographical Journal*, Vol: 158, No: 3, November 1992, pp. 257-272.

Akiner, Shirin, “Uzbekistan: The Hostile Earth of the Friendly People”, *Index on Censorship*, Vol: 19, No: 1, 1990, pp. 27-29.

Aksan, Victoria, "The One-Eyed Fighting the Blind: Mobilization, Supply, and Command in the Russo-Turkish War of 1768-1774", *The International History Review*, Vol: 15, No: 2, May 1993, pp. 221-238.

Aktürk, Şener, "Reflections on a Central Eurasian Model: A Foucauldian Reply to Barfield on the Historiography of Ethno-Nationalisms", *Central Eurasian Studies Review*, Vol: 5, No: 2, pp. 19-25.

Aneschi, Luca, "Integrating Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy Making: The Cases of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan", *Central Asian Survey*, Vol: 29, No: 2, 2010, pp. 143-158.

Anderson, Benedict, "Western Nationalism and Eastern Nationalism: Is There a Difference That Matters?", *New Left Review*, Vol: 9, May-June 2001, pp. 31-42.

Aslan, Senem, "'Citizen, Speak Turkish!': A Nation in the Making", *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, Vol: 13, No: 2, 2007, pp. 245-272.

Aydınün, Ayşegül & Aydınün, İsmail, "The Role of Language in the Formation of Turkish National Identity and Turkishness", *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, Vol: 10, No: 3, 2004, pp. 415-432.

Aytürk, İlker, "Turkish Linguists against the West: The Origins of Linguistic Nationalism in Atatürk's Turkey", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol: 40, No: 6, November 2004, pp. 1-25.

Baldauf, Ingeborg, "Some Thoughts on the Making of the Uzbek Nation", *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique*, Vol: 32, No: 1, 1991, pp. 79-95.

Baron, Samuel H., "Plekhanov, Trotsky, and the Development of Soviet Historiography", *Soviet Studies*, Vol: 26, No: 3, July 1974, pp. 380-395.

Bell, James, "Redefining National Identity in Uzbekistan: Symbolic Tensions in Tashkent's Official Public Landscape", *Cultural Geographies*, Vol: 6; 1999, pp.183-213.

Bilinsky, Yaroslav, "Expanding the Use of Russian or Russification? Some Critical Thoughts on Russian as a Lingua Franca and the 'Language of Friendship and Cooperation of the Peoples of the USSR'", *Russian Review*, Vol: 40, No: 3, July 1981, pp. 317-332.

Bingöl, Yılmaz, "Nationalism and Democracy in Post-Communist Central Asia", *Asian Ethnicity*, Vol: 5, No: 1, February 2004, pp. 43-60.

Brandenberger, D. L. & Dubrovsky, A. M., "'The People Need a Tsar': The Emergence of National Bolshevism as Stalinist Ideology, 1931-1941", *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol: 50, No: 5, July 1998, pp. 873-892.

Brubaker, Rogers, "Nationhood and the National Question in the Soviet Union and Post-Soviet Eurasia: An Institutional Account", *Theory and Society*, Vol: 23, No: 1, February 1994, pp. 47-78.

Brubaker, Rogers, "Nationalising States in the Old, "New Europe" and the New", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol: 19, No: 2, pp. 411-437.

Byrnes, Robert F., "Creating the Soviet Historical Profession, 1917-1934", *Slavic Review*, Vol: 50, No: 2, Summer 1991, pp. 297-308.

Carney, Christopher P. & Moran, John P., "Imagining in Central Asia: Nationalism and Interstate Affect in the Post-Soviet Era", *Asian Affairs*, pp. 179-198.

Codrington, K. de B., "A Geographical Introduction to the History of Central Asia", *The Geographical Journal*, Vol: 104, No: 1/2, July-August 1944, pp. 27-40.

Collins, Kathleen, "The Logic of Clan Politics: Evidence from the Central Asian Trajectories", *World Politics*, Vol: 56, No: 2, January 2004, pp. 224-261.

Cornell, Svante E., "Uzbekistan: A Regional Player in Eurasian Geopolitics?", *European Security*, Vol: 9, No: 2, 2000, pp. 115-140.

Çolak, Yılmaz, "Language Policy and Official Ideology in Early Republican Turkey", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol: 40, No: 6, November 2004, pp. 67-91.

Della Fave, L. Richard, "Toward an Explication of the Legitimation Process", *Social Forces*, Vol: 65, No: 2, December 1986, pp. 476-500.

DeWeese, Devin, "The Descendants of Sayyid Ata and the Rank of Naqīb in Central Asia", *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, Vol: 115, No: 4, October-December 1995, pp. 612-634.

Dunn, Stephen P. & Dunn, Ethel, "Soviet Regime and Native Culture in Central Asia and Kazakhstan: The Major Peoples", *Current Anthropology*, Vol: 8, No: 3, June 1967, pp. 147-208.

Eissenstat, Howard, "History and Historiography: Politics and Memory in the Turkish Republic", *Contemporary European History*, Vol: 12, No: 1, 2003, pp. 93-105.

Ersanlı, Büşra, "History Textbooks as Reflections of the Political Self: Turkey (1930s and 1990s) and Uzbekistan (1990s)", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol: 34, No: 2, Special Issue: Nationalism and the Colonial Legacy in the Middle East and Central Asia, May 2002, pp. 337-349.

- Ferrando, Olivier, "Manipulating the Census: Ethnic Minorities in the Nationalizing States of Central Asia", *Nationalities Papers*, Vol: 36, No: 3, 2008, pp. 489-520.
- Finefrock, Michael M., "Laissez-Faire, The Izmir Economic Congress and Early Turkish Developmental Policy in Political Perspective", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol: 17, 1981, pp. 375-392.
- Fierman, William, "Glasnost in Practice: The Uzbek Experience", *Central Asian Survey*, Vol: 8, No: 2, 1989, pp. 1-45.
- Fierman, William, "Identity, Symbolism, and the Politics of Language in Central Asia", *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol: 61, No: 7, 2009, pp. 1207-1228.
- Fierman, William, "Independence and the Declining Priority of Language Law Implementation in Uzbekistan" in Yacoov Ro'i (eds.), *Muslim Eurasia: Conflicting Legacies*, London: Frank Cass, 1995.
- Fraser, John, "Validating a Measure of National Political Legitimacy", *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol: 18, No: 1, February 1974, pp. 117-134.
- Gleason, Gregory, "Fealty and Loyalty: Informal Authority Structures in Soviet Asia", *Soviet Studies*, Vol: 43, No: 4, 1991, pp. 613-628.
- Glenn, John, "Contemporary Central Asia: Ethnic Identity and Problems of State Legitimacy", *European Security*, Vol: 6, No: 3, 1997, pp. 131-155.
- Göçek, Fatma Müge, "Ethnic Segmentation, Western Education, and Political Outcomes: Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Society", *Poetics Today*, Vol: 14, No: 3, Cultural Processes in Muslim and Arab Societies: Modern Period I, Autumn 1993, pp. 507-538.
- Herz, John H., "Legitimacy: Can We Retrieve It?", *Comparative Politics*, Vol: 10, No: 3, April 1978, pp. 317-343.
- Holmes, Stephen, "Two Concepts of Legitimacy: France after the Revolution", *Political Theory*, Vol: 10, No: 2, May 1982, pp. 165-183.
- Horsman, Stuart, "Themes in Official Discourses on Terrorism in Central Asia", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol: 26, No: 1, 2005, pp. 199-213.
- Hutchinson, John, "Myth Against Myth: The Nation as Ethnic Overlay", *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol: 10, No: 1/2, 2004, pp. 109-123.
- Ilkhamov, Alisher, "Archaeology of Uzbek Identity", *Central Asian Survey*, Vol: 23, No: 3-4, December 2004, pp. 289-326.

Ilkhamov, Alisher, "Controllable Democracy in Uzbekistan", *Middle East Report*, No: 222, Spring 2002, pp. 8-10.

Ilkhamov, Alisher, "Neopatrimonialism, Interest Groups and Patronage Networks: The Impasses of the Governance System in Uzbekistan", *Central Asian Survey*, Vol: 26, No: 1, 2007, pp. 65-84.

Kara, Halim, "Reclaiming National Literary Heritage: The Rehabilitation of Abdurauf Fitrat and Abdulhamid Sulaymon Cholpan in Uzbekistan", *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol: 54, No: 1, January 2002, pp. 123-142.

Keller, Shoshana, "Story, Time, and Dependent Nationhood in the Uzbek History Curriculum", *Slavic Review*, Vol: 66, No: 2, Summer 2007, pp. 257-277.

Khalid, Adeeb, "A Secular Islam: Nation, State, and Religion in Uzbekistan", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol: 35, No: 4, November, 2003, pp. 573-598.

Khalid, Adeeb, "Printing, Publishing, and Reform in Tsarist Central Asia", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol: 26, 1994, pp. 187-200.

Kirimli, Meryem, "Uzbekistan in the New World Order", *Central Asian Survey*, Vol: 16, No: 1, 1997, pp. 53-64.

Kirkwood, Michael, "Glasnost, 'the National Question' and Soviet Language Policy", *Soviet Studies*, Vol: 43, No: 1, 1991, pp. 61-81.

Kitromilides, Pachalis M., "Elie Kedourie's Contribution to the Study of Nationalism", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol: 41, No: 5, September 2005, p. 661-663.

Kurzman, Charles, "Uzbekistan: The Invention of Nationalism in an Invented Nation", *Middle East Critique*, Vol: 8, No: 15, 1999, pp. 77-98.

Kuzio, Taras, "'Nationalizing States' or Nation-Building? A Critical Review of the Theoretical Literature and Empirical Evidence", *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol: 7, No: 2, 2001, pp. 135-154.

Lazzerini, Edward J., "Tatarovedenie and the 'New Historiography' in the Soviet Union: Revising the Interpretation of the Tatar-Russian Relationship", *Slavic Review*, Vol: 40, No: 4, Winter 1981, pp. 625-635.

Levinger, Matthew & Lytle, Paula Franklin, "Myth and Mobilization: The Triadic Structure of Nationalist Rhetoric", *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol: 7, No: 2, 2001, pp. 175-194.



Lewis, G.L., "Atatürk's Language Reform as an Aspect of Modernization in the Republic of Turkey", in Jacob M. Landau (eds.), *Atatürk and Modernization of Turkey*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1982.

Liebich, Andre, "Searching for the Perfect Nation: The Itinerary of Hans Kohn (1891–1971)", *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol: 12, No: 4, 2006, pp. 579-596.

Lloyd, Sarah J., "Land-locked Central Asia: Implications for the Future", *Geopolitics*, Vol: 2, No: 1, 1997, pp. 97-133.

Luong, Pauline Jones, "After the Break-up: Institutional Design in Transitional States", *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol: 33, No: 563, 2000, pp. 563-592.

Marat, Erica, "Nation Branding in Central Asia: A New Campaign to Present Ideas about the State and the Nation", *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol: 61, No: 7, 2009, pp. 1123-1136.

March, Andrew F., "State Ideology and the Legitimation of Authoritarianism: The Case of Post-Soviet Uzbekistan", *Journal of Political Ideologies*, Vol: 8, No: 2, 2003, pp. 209-232.

March, Andrew F., "The Use and Abuse of History: National Ideology as Transcendental Object in Islam Karimov's 'Ideology of National Independence'", *Central Asian Survey*, Vol: 21, No: 4, 2003, pp. 371-384.

Markowitz, Lawrence P., "How Master Frames Misperceive: The Division and Eclipse of Nationalist Movements in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol: 32, No: 4, 2009, pp. 716-738.

Matveeva, Anna, "Democratization, Legitimacy and Political Change in Central Asia", *International Affairs*, Vol: 75, No: 1, January 1999, pp. 23-44.

Matveeva, Anna, "Legitimising Central Asian Authoritarianism: Political Manipulation and Symbolic Power", *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol: 61, No: 7, 2009, pp. 1095-1121.

Mazour, Anatole G. & Bateman, Herman E., "Recent Conflicts in Soviet Historiography", *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol: 24, No: 1, March 1952, pp. 56-68.

McGlinchey, Eric M., "Islamic Leaders in Uzbekistan", *Asia Policy*, No: 1, January 2006, pp. 123-144.

McGlinchey, Eric M., "Searching for Kamalot: Political Patronage and Youth Politics in Uzbekistan", *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol: 61, No: 7, 2009, pp. 1137-1150.

Melvin, Neil J, "Patterns of Centre-Regional Relations in Central Asia: The Cases of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan", *Regional & Federal Studies*, Vol: 11, No: 3, 2001, pp. 165-193.

Mesamed, Vladimir, "Interethnic Relations in the Republic of Uzbekistan", *Central Asia Monitor*, No: 6, 1996, pp. 20-26.

Mevius, Martin, "Reappraising Communism and Nationalism", *Nationalities Papers*, Vol: 37, No: 4, July 2009, pp. 377-400.

Naumkin, Vitaly, "Uzbekistan's State-Building Fatigue", *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol: 29, No: 3, 2006, pp. 127-140.

Noori, Neema, "Expanding State Authority, Cutting Back Local Services: Decentralization and its Contradictions in Uzbekistan", *Central Asian Survey*, Vol: 25, No: 4, 2006, pp. 533-549.

Ornstein, Jacob, "Soviet Language Policy: Theory and Practice", *The Slavic and East European Journal*, Vol: 3, No: 1, Spring 1959, pp. 1-24.

Owen, J. Judd, "The Tolerant Leviathan: Hobbes and the Paradox of Liberalism", *Polity*, Vol: 37, No: 1, January 2005, pp.130-148.

Perlman, Bruce J. & Gleason, Gregory, "Cultural Determinism versus Administrative Logic: Asian Values and Administrative Reform in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan", *International Journal of Public Administration*, Vol: 30, No: 12, 2007, pp. 1327-1342.

Perry, John R., "Language Reform in Turkey and Iran", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol: 17, No: 3 August 1985, pp. 295-311.

Pixley, Michael M., "The Development and Role of the Şeyhülislam in Early Ottoman History", *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, Vol: 96, No: 1, January-March 1976, pp. 89-96.

Pool, Jonathan, "Developing the Soviet Turkic Tongues: The Languages of the Politics of Language", *Slavic Review*, Vol: 35, No: 3, September 1976, pp. 425-442.

Pottenger, John R., "Civil Society, Religious Freedom, and Islam Karimov: Uzbekistan's Struggle for a Decent Society", *Central Asian Survey*, Vol: 23, No: 1, March 2004, pp. 55-77.

Powell, A. "The Nationalist Trend in Soviet Historiography", *Soviet Studies*, Vol: 2, No: 4, April 1951, pp. 372-377.

Ro'i, Yaacov, "The Soviet and Russian Context of the Development of Nationalism in Soviet Central Asia", *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique*, Vol: 32, No: 1, January-March 1991, pp. 123-141.

Salmoni, Barak A., "Ordered Liberty and Disciplined Freedom: Turkish Education and Republican Democracy, 1923-50", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol: 40, No: 2, March 2004, pp. 80-108.

Schatz, Edward, "The Politics of Multiple Identities: Lineage and Ethnicity in Kazakhstan", *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol: 52, No: 3, 2000.

Schlesinger, Rudolf, "Recent Soviet Historiography I", *Soviet Studies*, Vol: 2, No: 1, April 1950, pp. 293-312.

Schlyter, Birgit N., "Language Policies in Present-Day Central Asia" *International Journal on Multicultural Societies*, Vol: 3, No: 2, 2001, pp. 127-136.

Shnirelman, Victor, "Aryans or Proto-Turks? Contested Ancestors in Contemporary Central Asia", *Nationalities Papers*, Vol: 37, No: 5, 2009, pp. 557-587.

Sievers, Eric W., "Uzbekistan's Mahalla: From Soviet to Absolutist Residential Community Associations", *The Journal of International and Comparative Law at Chicago-Kent*, Vol: 2, 2002, pp. 91-158.

Slezkine, Yuri, "The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism", *Slavic Review*, Vol: 53, No: 2, Summer, 1994, pp. 414-452.

Slezkine, Yuri, "Commentary: Imperialism as the Highest Stage of Socialism", *Russian Review*, Vol: 59, No: 2, April 2000, pp. 227-234.

Smith, Anthony D., "History and National Destiny: Responses and Clarifications", *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol: 10, No: 1/2, 2004, pp. 195-209.

Solchanyk, Roman, "Russian Language and Soviet Politics", *Soviet Studies*, Vol: 34, No: 1, January 1982, pp. 23-42.

Spechler, Martin C., "Authoritarian Politics and Economic Reform in Uzbekistan: Past, Present and Prospects", *Central Asian Survey*, Vol: 26, No: 2, 2007, pp. 185-202.

Staples, John, "Soviet Use of Corruption Purges as a Control Mechanism: The Uzbekistan Case", *Past Imperfect*, Vol: 2, 1993, pp. 29-48.

Stokes, Gale, "Cognition and the Function of Nationalism", *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, Vol: 4, No: 4, Spring 1974, pp. 525-542.

Şimşek, Sefa, ““People’s Houses” as a Nationwide Project for Ideological Mobilization in Early Republican Turkey”, *Turkish Studies*, Vol: 6, No: 1, March 2005, pp. 71-91.

Tachau, Frank, “Language and Politics: Turkish Language Reform” *The Review of Politics*, Vol: 26, No: 2, April 1964, pp. 191-204.

Tahk, Alex & Lawson, Chappell, *The Ghost of Europe Past: Nationalism, Regime Legitimacy, and Democracy in the Post-Communist World*, January 9, 2003.

Thomas, Edward H., “The Politics of Language in Former Colonial Lands: A Comparative Look at North Africa and Central Asia”, *The Journal of North African Studies*, Vol: 4, No: 1, 1999, pp. 1-44.

Trix, Frances, “The Stamboul Alphabet of Shemseddin Sami Bey: Precursor to Turkish Script Reform”, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol: 31, No: 2, May, 1999, pp. 255-272.

Uzman, Mehmet, “Romanisation in Uzbekistan Past and Present”, *Journal of Royal Asiatic Society, Series 3*, Vol: 20, No: 1, 2010, pp. 49-60.

Wood, Margaret M., “Latinizing the Turkish Alphabet: A Study in the Introduction of a Cultural Change”, *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol: 35, No: 2, September, 1929, pp. 194-203.

Zanca, Russell, “Explaining Islam in Central Asia: An Anthropological Approach for Uzbekistan”, *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, Vol: 24, No: 1, 2004, pp. 99-107.

Zelkina, Anna, “Islam and Security in the New States of Central Asia: How Genuine is the Islamic Threat?”, *Religion, State and Society*, Vol: 27, No: 3, 1999, pp. 355-372.

Zürcher, Erik J., “The Ottoman Legacy of the Turkish Republic: An Attempt at a New Periodization”, *Die Welt des Islams, New Series*, Vol: 32, No: 2, 1992, pp. 237-253.

### ***in Turkish***

Altier, Semiha, “Bir Sanat Hamisi Olarak Muhammed Şiban Han ve Maveraünnehir’deki Kültür Politikası”, *Modern Türklük Araştırmaları Dergisi*, Vol: 5, No: 4, December 2008, pp. 143-162.

Arıkan, Zeki, “Atatürk ve Tarih”, *Çağdaş Türkiye Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi*, Vol: 2, No: 6-7, 1997, pp. 19-32.

Arifhanova, Zoya, “Çağdaş Özbekistan’da Geleneksel Topluluk”, *Avrasya Dosyası*, Özbekistan Özel Sayısı, Vol: 7, No: 3, Autumn 2001, pp. 69-80.

Aziz, Şevket, “Türk Tarihi ve Asya’nın Biodinamik ve Antropodinamik Kudreti”, *Ülkü*, Vol: 3, No: 18, August 1934, pp. 413-418.

Bal, İdris, “The Turkish Model and the Turkic Republics”, *Perceptions*, Vol: 3, No: 3, September-November 1998, pp. 105-129.

Baykara, Tuncer, “Osmanlıların Selçuklu ve İlhanlı Kültür Kökenleri Üzerine”, *Doğu Batı*, Vol: 51, November-December-January, 2009-10, pp. 30-34.

Bayur, Hikmet, “1918 Bırakışmasından Az Önce Mustafa Kemal Paşa’nın Başyaver Nuri Bey Yolu ile Padişaha Bir Başvurması”, *Belleten*, Vol: 21, No: 83, 1957, pp. 561-565.

Bingöl, Yılmaz, “Kimlik Tartışmaları Işığında Türk Dil Politikası”, *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi*, Vol: 59, No: 1, pp. 27-58.

Çeçen, Anıl, “Atatürk ve İdeoloji”, *Türk Dili*, Vol: 359, November 1981, pp. 296-300.

Elmacı, Mehmet Emin, “Cumhuriyetin İlanının İlk Yıldönümü Kutlamaları”, *Çağdaş Türkiye Araştırmaları Dergisi*, Vol: 3, No: 8, 1998, pp. 49-59.

Ersanlı, Büşra, “Yeni Bağımsızlık ve Ulusun Adı: Özbek Milliyetçiliği”, *Akademik Araştırmalar Dergisi*, Vol: 2, No: 6, August-October 2000, pp. 67-79.

Erler, Mehmet Yavuz, “Osmanlı’da “Asil Kan” Aristokrasinin XIX. Yüzyıldaki Yansımalarına Dair Birkaç Örnek: Cengiz Han ve Ramazanoğlu Soyu”, *Uluslararası Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi*, Vol: 1-2, Winter 2008, pp. 141-153.

Fedakar, Selami, “Özbekistan’da Destan Çalışmalarının Tarihçesi”, *Milli Folklor Dergisi*, Vol: 62, Summer 2004, pp. 67-79.

Fumagalli, Mateo, “Etnisite, Devlet Yapılanması ve Dış Politika: Özbekistan ve ‘Ülke Dışındaki Özbekler’”, *OAKA*, Vol: 2, No: 4, 2007, pp. 202-224.

Galip, Reşit, “Türk Tarih İnkılabı ve Yabancı Tezler”, *Ülkü*, Vol: 9, 1933, pp. 164-177.

İnalcık, Halil, “Kutadgu Bilig’de Türk ve İran Siyaset Nazariye ve Gelenekleri”, *Türk Kültürü Araştırmaları*, pp. 259-271.

İnalcık, Halil, “Türk Devletlerinde Sivil Kanun Geleneği”, *Türkiye Günlüğü*, Vol: 58, November-December 1999, pp. 5-11.

İnan, Afet, "Atatürk ve Tarih Tezi", *Bellekten*, Vol: 3, No: 10, April 1939, pp. 243-246.

İnan, Afet, "Büyük Nutuk'ta Atatürk'ün Gençliğe Hitabesi", *Türk Tarih Kurumu Dergisi*, Vol: 30, No: 120, pp. 515-523.

Kabapınar, Yücel, "Başlangıcından Günümüze Türk Tarih Tezi ve Lise Tarih Kitaplarına Etkisi",

Kayıran, Mehmet & Metintaş, Mustafa Yahya, "Latin Kökenli Yeni Türk Alfabesine Geçiş Süreci ve Millet Mektepleri", *Dumlupınar Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, Vol: 24, August 2009, pp. 191-206.

Koç, Mustafa, "Cumhuriyet Döneminde Türkçe Etrafında Oluşturulan Dil Tezlerinin Osmanlı Kökeni: Feraizcizade Mehmed Şakir'in Persenk Açıklaması", *Kutadgubilig Felsefe-Bilim Araştırmaları Dergisi*, Vol: 10, October 2006, pp. 239-318.

Köksal, Duygu, "Türk Edebiyatında İki Kuruluş Anlatısı ve Milli Kimlik: Devlet Ana ve Osmancık", *Toplum ve Bilim*, No: 81, Summer 1999, pp. 44-60.

Okur, Mehmet, "Türkiye'de Milli ve Modern Bir Eğitim Sistemi Oluşturma Çabaları (1920-1928)", *Çağdaş Türkiye Araştırmaları Dergisi*, Vol: IV, No: 11, 2004-2005.

Özbek, Nadir, Zeki Velidi Togan ve 'Türk Tarih Tezi'", *Toplumsal Tarih*, Vol: 8, No: 45, September 1997, pp.15-23.

Özbek, Nadir, "Modernite, Tarih ve İdeoloji: II. Abdülhamid Dönemi Tarihçiliği Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme", *Türkiye Araştırmaları Literatür Dergisi*, Vol: 2, No: 1, 2004, pp. 71-90.

Somuncuoğlu, B. Tümen, "19. Yüzyılın İkinci Yarısında Türkistan'da Yerli Eğitim Kurumlarının Durumu", *Orta Asya ve Kafkasya Araştırmaları OAKA*, Vol: 2, No: 3, 2007, pp. 105-134.

Şengül, Serdar & Kardeş, Fuat, "Türk Tarih Yazımı ve Kürt Tarih yazımı", *Toplum ve Bilim*, Vol: 96, Spring 2003, pp. 39-46.

Şengül, Tuba, "Political Idea Movements and Intellectual Changes in the History Curricula (1908-1930)", *Ankara University Journal of Faculty of Educational Sciences*, Vol: 40, No: 1, 2007, pp. 63-97.

Tekindağ, Şahabettin, "Osmanlı Tarih Yazıcılığı", *Bellekten*, Vol: 35, No: 140, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1971, pp. 656-657.

Ulçugür, İsmail, “50. Yıla Değın Kurultaylar”, *Türk Dili*, Vol: 45, No: 367, July 1982, p. 29-42.

### *in German*

Benzing, Johannes, “Das Turkestanische Volk im Kampf um seine Selbständigkeit”, *Die Welt des Islams*, Vol: 19, 1937, pp. 94-137.

Laut, Jens Peter, “Noch Einmal zu Dr. Kvergic”, *Turkic Languages*, Vol: 6, 2002, pp. 120-133.

### **Theses**

#### *in English*

Aydın, Gülşen, *Authoritarianism versus Democracy in Uzbekistan: Domestic and International Factors*, MA thesis, Ankara: METU, January 2004.

Aygül, Hasan Hüseyin, *Türk Modernleşme Sürecinde Dil Olgusunun Sosyolojik Analizi*, MA thesis, Isparta: Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Sosyoloji Anabilim Dalı, January 2008.

Aytürk, İlker, *Language and Nationalism: A Comparative Study of Language Revival and Reform in Hebrew and Turkish*, PhD thesis, Waltham, Massachusetts: The Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Brandeis University, Near Eastern and Judaic Studies, February 2005.

Chin, Mikyung Lee, *Legitimacy Crisis In Authoritarian Regimes*, PhD thesis, Berkeley: University of California, 1988.

Collias, Karen A., *Heroes and Patriots: The Ethnic Integration of Youth in the Soviet Union during the Brezhnev Era, 1965-1982*, PhD thesis, N.Y.: Columbia University, 1987.

Ersoy, Duygu, *Manipulation of History and Language in Three Dystopias*, MSc thesis, Ankara: METU, September 2006.

Eskicumalı, Ahmet, *Ideology and Education: Reconstructing the Turkish Curriculum for Social and Cultural Change, 1923-1946*, PhD thesis, University of Wisconsin Madison, 1994.

Gleason, Gregory William, *Between Moscow and Tashkent: The Politics of the Uzbek Cotton Production Complex*, PhD thesis, Davis: University of California, 1984.

Gilley, Bruce, *States and Legitimacy: The Politics of Moral Authority*, PhD thesis, Princeton University, January 2007.

Johnson, Aaron, *The Road to Turkish Language Reform and the Rise of Turkish Nationalism*, MA thesis, Montreal: McGill University, August 2004.

Howland, James H., *Political Power, Clientelism, and Reform in the USSR*, MA thesis, Edmonton: University of Alberta, 1990.

Kangas, Roger David, *Faizulla Khodzhaev: National Communism in Bukhara and Soviet Uzbekistan, 1896-1938*, PhD thesis, Bloomington: Indiana University, 1992.

Koch, Natalie Rochelle, *Nation-Building, Geopolitics, and the Andijon Uprising: Securitizing Discourses in Uzbekistan*, MA thesis, University of Colorado, 2009.

Lambert, Peter A., *The Political Response of Soviet Republican Leaders to the Challenge of Nationalism*, PhD thesis, Coral Gables, Florida: University of Miami, May, 2004.

Latimer, Jr., Frederick P., *The Political Philosophy of Mustapha Kemal Atatürk: As Evidenced in his Published Speeches and Interviews*, PhD thesis, Princeton University, 1960.

Megoran, Nick, *The Politics and Pain of Nationalism and Identity along the Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan Ferghana Valley Boundary, 1999-2000*, PhD thesis, Cambridge: Sidney Sussex College September 2002.

Mengüç, Murat Cem, *Historiography and Nationalism: A Study Regarding the Proceedings of the First Turkish History Congress*, MA thesis, Montreal: McGill University, September 2002.

Micallef, Roberta Maria, *The Role of Literature and Intellectuals in National Identity Construction: The Case of Uzbekistan*, PhD thesis, Austin: The University of Texas, August 1997.

Noori, Neema, *Delegating Coercion: Linking Decentralization to State Formation in Uzbekistan*, PhD thesis, New York: Columbia University, 2006.

Peebles, Reed E., *Slavic Power and Turkic Nations: A Survey of Western Scholarship on the History of Russian Central Asia*, MA thesis, Clemson University, August 2007.



Reid, Patryk M., *Central Asian Bolsheviks: Mediating Revolution, 1917-1924*, MA thesis, Ottawa, Ontario: Carleton University, Institute of European and Russian Studies, 2006.

Swartz, Avonna Deanne, *Textbooks and National Ideology: A Content Analysis of the Secondary Turkish History Textbooks Used in the Republic of Turkey Since 1929*, PhD thesis, Austin: University of Texas, May 1997.

Şir, Aslan Yavuz, *Political Modernization and Informal Politics in Uzbekistan*, MSc thesis, Ankara: Middle East Technical University Department of Eurasian Studies, July 2007.

Thomas, David. S., *The Life and Thought of Yusuf Akçura (1876-1935)*, PhD thesis, Montreal: McGill University, 1976.

Thompson, Chad D., *Epistemologies of Independence: Technology and Empire in the Post-Soviet Borderlands*, PhD thesis, Toronto, Ontario: York University, February 2008.

Tiregol, Jessica Selma, *The Role of Primary Education in Nation-State-Building: The Case of the Early Turkish Republic (1923-1938)*, PhD thesis, Princeton University, June 1998.

Tuncer Kilavuz, Idil, *Understanding Violent Conflict: A Comparative Study of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan*, PhD thesis, Bloomington: Indiana University Department of Central Eurasian Studies, August 2007.

Zartman, Jonathan Kelley, *Political Transition in Central Asian Republics: Authoritarianism versus Power-Sharing*, PhD thesis, University of Denver, 2004.

Zorlu-Durukan, Şefika Akile, *The Ideological Pillars of Turkish Education: Emergent Kemalism and the Zenith of Single-Party Rule*, PhD thesis, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2006.

### ***in Turkish***

Akdağ, Havva, *Tek Parti ve Demokrat Parti Dönemi Lise Tarih Ders Kitaplarının Muhtevası*, MA thesis, Konya: Selçuk Üniversitesi, 2005.

Atakan, Özgür, *Tarih ve Milliyetçilik*, MA thesis, Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, 2006.

Kayıkcı, Murat, *Bağımsızlık Sonrası Özbekistan'da Siyasal ve Anayasal Yapılanma*, MA thesis, Kocaeli: Kocaeli Üniversitesi, 1997.

Öztürk, Cemil, *Tek Parti Döneminde Eğitimde Devlet ve İdeolojinin Rolü*, MA thesis, Afyon Kocatepe Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2008.

### ***in German***

Bachner, Christian, *Das Vordringen des Zaristischen Rußlands nach Zentralasien und der Aufbau der Russischen Verwaltung von 1865 bis 1890*, Philosophischen Fakultät III (Geschichte, Gesellschaft und Geographie) der Universität Regensburg, Inaugural-Dissertation, 2001.

Inomjonov, Khurshidbek, *Die Außenpolitik der Republik Usbekistan im Spannungsfeld von Staatsbildung und regionaler Integration*, Fachbereichs Gesellschaftswissenschaften Justug-Liebig-Universität Gießen, PhD thesis, 2005.

### **Conference Papers**

#### ***in English***

*Materials of the International Scientific Conference “Amir Temur and His Place in World History”*, Tashkent: Uzbekiston Publishing House, 1996.

Rasuly-Palaczek, Gabriele & Katschnig, Julia (eds.), *Central Asia on Display: Proceedings of the VII. Conference of the European Society for Central Asian Studies*, Wien: Lit Verlag, 2004.

Reznik, Vladislava, “Language Policy and Reform in the Soviet 1920s: Practical Polemics Against Idealist Linguistics”, *BASEES 2001 Annual Conference*, Fitzwilliam College, Cambridge, 7-9 April 2001 reached on 6 July 2010 at <http://www.arts.gla.ac.uk/Slavonic/Epicentre/langpolicy.htm>

Schlyter, Birgit N. (eds.), *Prospects for Democracy in Central Asia: Papers Read at a Conference in Istanbul, 1-3 June 2003 and Additional Chapters*, Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul.

#### ***in Turkish***

*Birinci Türk Dil Kurultayı: Tezler-Müzakereler-Zabıtlar*, Istanbul: Devlet Basımevi, 1933.

*Birinci Türk Tarih Kongresi Müzakere Zabıtları*, Ankara: T.C. Maarif Vekaleti.

*İkinci Türk Tarih Kongresi İstanbul 20-25 Eylül 1937: Kongrenin Çalışmaları, Kongreye Sunulan Tebliğler*, İstanbul: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1943.

Kara, Abdulvahap & İşbilir, Ömer (eds.), *Ölümünün 600. Yılında Emir Timur ve Mirası Uluslararası Sempozyumu 26-27 Mayıs 2005*, İstanbul: Mimar Sinan Güzel Sanatlar Üniversitesi Fen Edebiyat Fakültesi, Tarih Bölümü, 2007.

*Milletlerarası Çağdaş Türk Alfabeleri Sempozyumu*, Nadir Devlet (eds.), İstanbul: Marmara Üniversitesi Türkiyat Enstitüsü Yayınları, 1992.

Özbaran, Salih (eds.), *Tarih Öğretimi ve Ders Kitapları: 1994 Buca Sempozyumu*, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1995.

Sarıkoyuncu Değerli, Esra, “Amerikan Basınında Türk Harf ve Dil Devrimi”, *80. Yılında Türk Harf İnkılabı Uluslararası Sempozyumu*, Yeditepe Üniversitesi, 10-11 Kasım 2008.

*Türk Dili*, Türk Dili Tetkik Cemiyeti Bülteni, No: 8, Eylül, 1934.

*Üçüncü Türk Dil Kurultayı: Tezler, Müzakere Zabıtları*, İstanbul: Devlet Basımevi, 1937.

*Yazı Devrimi: Yazı Devrimi'nin 50. Yılı Münasebetiyle düzenlenen Yazı Devrimi Konuşmaları*, Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları, 1979.

## **Reports & Working Papers**

### ***in English***

Center for Studies on Turkey (eds.), Akkaya, Çiğdem (project director), Ismailov, Khamid (project assistance), *Uzbekistan: Current Political and Economic Developments*, Essen: Önel-Verlag, Working Paper 15, May 1994.

Dannreuther, Roland, “Creating New States in Central Asia: The Strategic Implications of Soviet Power in Central Asia”, *Adelphi Paper*, No: 288, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1994.

Gravingholt, Jörn, “Statehood and Governance: Challenges in Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus”, Briefing Paper, No: 2, German Development Institute, 2007.

Leprêtre, Marc, "Language Policies in the Soviet Successor States: A Brief Assessment on Language, Linguistic Rights and National Identity", *Papeles del Este*, Universidad Complutense Madrid, No: 3, 2002.

Olcott, Martha, "Regional Study on Human Development and Human Rights-Central Asia", Human Development Report Background Paper, 2000.

"Parliamentary Elections, 26 December 2004 Republic of Uzbekistan", *OSCE/ODIHR Final Report*, Warsaw, March 7, 2005.

Polat, Abdumannob, "Reassessing Andijan: The Road to Restoring U.S-Uzbek Relations, Occasional Papers", *Occasional Papers*, The Jamestown Foundation, June 2007.

"Presidential Election 2007 Republic of Uzbekistan", *OSCE/ODIHR Needs Assessment Mission Report, 28-30 November 2007*, Warsaw, December 4, 2007.

Pyati, Archana "Karimov's War: Human Rights Defenders and Counterterrorism in Uzbekistan", *Human Rights Defenders and Counterterrorism Series No: 3*, Hicks, Neil (eds.), New York: Human Rights First, 2005.

Schlyter, Birgit N., "Language Reform and Language Status in Multilingual Uzbekistan", *Asian Cultures and Modernity, Research Report*, No: 13, Stockholm University, April 2007.

Thurman, J. Michael, "The 'Comman-Administrative System' in Cotton Farming in Uzbekistan: 1920's to Present", *Papers on Inner Asia*, No: 32, Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies, 1999.

### ***in German***

Gumpfenberg, Marie-Carin von, *Studien zur landerbezogenen Konfliktanalyse: Usbekistan*, Berlin & Bonn: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung & Gruppe Friedens-Entwicklung, Herbst 2002.

Kaiser, Markus, *Formen der Transvergesellschaftung als gegenläufige Prozesse zur Nationsbildung in Usbekistan*, Bielefeld: Bielefeld University Sociology of Development Research Centre, Working Paper No: 334, 2000.

Olcott, Martha Brill & Ziyaeva, Diora, *Islam in Uzbekistan: Religious Education and State Ideology*, Carnegie Papers: Washington D.C., No: 91, July 2008.

Scherrer, Christian P., *Ethno-Nationalismus als Globales Phanomen: Zur Krise der Staaten in der Dritten Welt und der Früheren UdSSR*, Institut für Entwicklung und Frieden der Gerhard-Mercator Universität GH Duisburg, 1994.

## Newspapers

### *in English*

“Karimov Interview with Russian Newspaper”, *Rossiyskiye Vesti*, Moscow, in Russian, May 24, 1994; translated and transmitted by *BBC Monitoring Service* on June 1, 1994.

“New Public Organisation in Uzbekistan”, *BBC Monitoring Service*, February 28, 1990.

“Premier Demands More Rigour in Application of Uzbek Language Law”, *Narodnoye Slovo*, Tashkent, in Russian, June 15, 1994; translated and transmitted by *BBC Monitoring Service* on June 20, 1994.

“Russian Envoy Voices Discontent over Uzbek History Textbooks” *Delovaya Nedelya Web Site*, Almaty, in Russian, March 22, 2003; translated and transmitted by *BBC Monitoring Service* on March 25, 2003.

“Uzbekis Approve a ‘Declaration of Sovereignty’”, *The Times*, June 21, 1990.

“Uzbeks Call for Gradual Independence”, *The Independent*, May 28, 1990.

“Uzbek Official Urges Personal Approach in Fighting ‘Destructive Ideologies’”, Uzbek State Radio, Tashkent, in Uzbek, May 4, 2006; translated and transmitted by *BBC Monitoring Central Asia* on May 6, 2006.

“O‘zbek Tilining Izohli Lug‘ati”, *O‘za, Oz‘bekiston Milliy Axborot Agentligi*, August 13, 2008.

Williams, Daniel, “13 Die in Uzbek Bombings; President Escapes”, *The Washington Post*, Washington, D.C.: Feb 17, 1999, p. A11.

Zhukov, Timofei, “High Turnout for Uzbekistan Vote”, *Associated Press*, January 9, 2000.

## Electronic Resources

***in English***

*Address by the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan H.E. Mr. Islam Karimov at the Festive Ceremony Dedicated to the 2750th Anniversary of the City of Samarkand*, Jahon News Agency reached at [http://www.jahonnews.uz/eng/president/addresses\\_speeches/address\\_by\\_prez\\_at\\_ceremony\\_dedicated\\_to\\_2750th\\_anniversary\\_of\\_samarkand.mgr](http://www.jahonnews.uz/eng/president/addresses_speeches/address_by_prez_at_ceremony_dedicated_to_2750th_anniversary_of_samarkand.mgr) on February 4, 2009.

“Biography of I.A. Karimov”, *Press Service of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan*, [http://2004.press-service.uz/eng/president\\_eng/president\\_eng.htm](http://2004.press-service.uz/eng/president_eng/president_eng.htm) reached on April 2, 2008.

*CIA World Factbook: Uzbekistan* reached on April 3, 2011 at <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/uz.html>.

Cutler, Robert M., “De-authoritarization in Uzbekistan?: Analysis and Prospects,” in Irina Morozova (eds.), *Towards Social Stability and Democratic Governance in Central Eurasia: Challenges to Regional Security*, Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2005, pp. 120–141 available at <http://www.robertcutler.org/download/html/ch05im.html>, accessed on August 29, 2010 .

Dickens, Mark, “Soviet Language Policy in Central Asia”, 1988 reached at [http://www.oxus.com/Soviet\\_Language\\_Policy\\_in\\_CA.pdf](http://www.oxus.com/Soviet_Language_Policy_in_CA.pdf) on May 11, 2011.

Dubnov, Arkady, “The House that Islam Karimov Built”, *Russia in Global Affairs*, No: 1, January-March 2010 obtained on June 22, 2010 from [http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n\\_14786](http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_14786).

Lenin’s testament reached on April 8, 2011 at <http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1922/dec/testamnt/autonomy.htm>

Masaru, Suda, *The Politics of Civil Society, Mahalla and NGOs: Uzbekistan*, obtained from [http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/coe21/publish/no10\\_ses/12\\_suda.pdf](http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/coe21/publish/no10_ses/12_suda.pdf) on March 14, 2007.

Seiple, Chris, *Uzbekistan: Civil Society in the Heartland*, obtained from [www.fpri.org/orbis/4902/seiple.uzbekistancivilsociety.pdf](http://www.fpri.org/orbis/4902/seiple.uzbekistancivilsociety.pdf) on March 17, 2007.

Sharifov, Omar, “Islam Karimov Agreed to Remain the President Another Seven Years”, *Fergananeews*, 07.11.2007, obtained from <http://enews.fergananeews.com/article.php?id=2216> on April 23, 2008.

Shermukhamedov, Said & Levinskaya, Victoriya (eds.), *Spiritual Values and Social Progress: Uzbekistan Philosophical Studies I*, Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Change Series IIIC, Central Asia Vol: 1, Tashkent: The Council for

Research in Values and Philosophy obtained on July 9, 2008 from <http://www.crvp.org/book/Series03/IIC-1/contents.htm>.

*The Decree of Cabinet of Ministers: The State Program on Granting the Implementation of the Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan On the State Language, October 9, 1996* reached at <http://www.osi.hu/fmp/laws/> on September 8, 2009.

*The Decree of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan On Alterations and Amendments to the Law on “Official Language of the Republic of Uzbekistan”* reached at <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b4d328.html> on July 4, 2010.

The article on the National Liberal Party (Nationalliberale Partei) [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National\\_Liberal\\_Party\\_\(Germany\)](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Liberal_Party_(Germany)) reached at April 28, 2011.

*The Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan on the Central Election Committee of the Republic of Uzbekistan* reached on 2010, September 12 at [http://elections.uz/eng/legislation/law\\_of\\_the\\_republic\\_of\\_uzbekistan\\_on\\_the\\_central\\_election\\_committee\\_of\\_the\\_republic\\_of\\_uzbekistan.mgr](http://elections.uz/eng/legislation/law_of_the_republic_of_uzbekistan_on_the_central_election_committee_of_the_republic_of_uzbekistan.mgr)

“Statistics on the Populations of Central Asian Countries”, *The Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations* reached on April 22, 2011 at <http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/unpp/p2k0data.asp>.

*The Republic of Uzbekistan Cabinet of Ministers Resolution Concerning the Ratification of the Principal Orthographic Rules of the Uzbek Language* reached at <http://www.oxuscom.com/orthography.htm#part%20I> on February 3, 2010.

### ***in Turkish***

Özbudun, Ergun, “Atatürk ve Laiklik”, *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi*, Vol: 8, No: 24, July 1992 reached on January 29, 2011 at <http://www.atam.gov.tr/index.php?Page=DergiIcerik&IcerikNo=560>.

Tanfer, M. Vehbi, “Atatürk'ün Din ve Laiklik Anlayışı”, *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi*, Vol: 15, No: 43, March 1999 reached on January 29, 2011 at <http://www.atam.gov.tr/index.php?Page=DergiIcerik&IcerikNo=349>.

*Teşkilât-ı Esasiye Kanunu*, Kanun Numarası: 85, Kabul Tarihi: 20.1.1337 (1921) reached on January 30, 2011 at <http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/index.php?l=template&id=21&lang=0&hlkey=1921>.

*Teşkilât-ı Esasiye Kanunu*, Kanun Numarası: 491, Kabul Tarihi: 20.4.1340 (1924) reached on January 30, 2011 at

<http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/index.php?l=template&id=20&lang=0&hlkey=1924>.

Tünay, Bekir, “Atatürk'ün İnkılâpçılık İlkesi”, *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi*, Vol: 3, No: 9, Cilt III, July 1987 reached on January 29, 2011 at <http://www.atam.gov.tr/index.php?Page=DergiIcerik&IcerikNo=28>

Yüksel, Hasan, “Atatürk'ün Devletçilik Anlayışı”, *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi*, Vol: 12, No: 35, July 1996 reached on January 29, 2011 at <http://www.atam.gov.tr/index.php?Page=DergiIcerik&IcerikNo=742>

### *in Swedish*

Ahunov, Pulatjan & Mosén, Gunilla, “Klanerna i Uzbekistan”, reached at <http://www.aralsjon.nu/readmore/Klanerna-i-Uzbekistan.pdf> on January 12, 2009.

## **Encyclopedia**

### *in English*

*Encyclopedia Iranica*

<http://www.iranica.com/newsite/articles/unicode/v13f3/v13f3001b.html>  
reached on December 21, 2008.

*Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire*,  
Gábor Ágoston & Bruce Masters (eds.), New York, NY: Facts on File, 2009.

*Encyclopaedia of the Qur'ān*

Jane Dammen McAuliffe (eds.), Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2004.

*History of Civilizations of Central Asia*

Volume VI: Towards the Contemporary Period: From the Mid-nineteenth to the  
End of the Twentieth Century

Palat, Madhavan K. & Tabyshalieva, Anara (eds.), Paris: UNESCO Publishing,  
2005.

### *in Turkish*

*Türkler*



Güzel, Hasan Celal & Çiçek, Kemal & Koca, Salim (eds.), *Yeni Türkiye Yayınları*,

*in German*

*Fischer Weltgeschichte Band 16: Zentralasien*  
Hambly, Gavin (eds.) Frankfurt: Fischer, 1975.

**Dictionaries**

Devellioğlu, Ferit, *Osmanlıca-Türkçe Ansiklopedik Lugat*, Ankara: Aydın Kitabevi, 2006.

Gove, Philip Babcock (eds.), *Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language*, Cologne: Könnemann, 1993.

Marufov, Z.M. (eds.), *Uzbek Tilinin İzahlı Lugati*, Moscow: Uzbekistan SSR Fanlar Akademiyası A.S. Pushkin Nomidagi Til ve Adabiyat Instituti, 1981.

# Appendix 1

## Russo-Bukharan Commercial Convention of 1868<sup>1084</sup>

1. All Russian subjects, whatever their religion, are granted the right to travel for purposes of trade wherever they wish in the khanate of Bukhara, just as all subjects of the emir of Bukhara have always been, and will in future continue to be, permitted to trade throughout the Russian Empire.
2. His High Eminence the Emir pledges himself strictly to guard the security and safety of Russian subjects, their caravans, and, in general, all their property within the borders of his dominions.
3. Russian merchants will be permitted to have caravansaries in which to store their merchandise in any Bukharan towns they wish. Bukharan merchants will enjoy the same right in Russian towns.
4. Russian merchants are granted the right to maintain, if they so desire, commercial agents (caravan-bashi) in all the towns of the khanate of Bukhara to look after the regular course of trade and the legal collection of duties. This right is also granted to Bukharan merchants in the towns of the Turkestan Krai.
5. The same duty will be levied on all goods going from Russia to Bukhara or from Bukhara to Russia as is levied in the Turkestan Krai, i.e., 2½ percent ad valorem; in any case, the duty will not be more than that collected from Moslem subjects of Bukhara.
6. Russian merchants and their caravans are granted free and safe passage across Bukharan territory into adjacent lands, just as Bukharan caravans are permitted to cross Russian territory.

These conditions dispatched from Samarkand, May 11, 1868. (Signed)  
Adjutant General von Kaufman I, Governor General of Turkestan and Commander  
of the Troops of the Turkestan Military Okrug. The Emir affixed his seal in  
Karshi, June 18, 1868.

---

<sup>1084</sup> Cited from *Pravitelstvennyi Vestnik*, October 31/November 12, 1872 in Seymour Becker, *Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865–1924*, London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2004, p. 244.

## Appendix 2

### Russo-Khivan Peace Treaty of 1873<sup>1085</sup>

1. Saiyid Muhammad Rahim Bohadur Khan acknowledges himself to be the obedient servant of the Emperor of All the Russias. He renounces the right to maintain direct and friendly relations with neighboring rulers and khans and to conclude with them any commercial or other treaties; he will not undertake any military actions against them without the knowledge and permission of the supreme Russian authority in Central Asia.
2. [Article two traces the Russo-Khivan boundary on the east, north, and west of the khanate.]
3. The entire right bank of the Amu-Darya and the lands adjoining it, until now considered Khiva's, shall pass from the khan into the possession of Russia together with all their settled and nomadic inhabitants. The plots of land on the right bank that are at present the property of the khan and have been granted by him to the dignitaries of the khanate for their use shall at the same time become the property of the Russian government, free of any claims on the part of the former holders. It is left to the khan to compensate their losses with lands on the left bank.
4. If, by the imperial will of His Majesty the Emperor, a part of the right bank should be transferred into the possession of the emir of Bukhara, the khan of Khiva will recognize the emir as the legal ruler of this part of his former possessions and renounce any intentions of restoring his authority there.
5. Russian steamboats and other Russian ships, governmental as well as private, are granted free and exclusive navigation on the Amu-Darya. Khivan and Bukharan ships may enjoy the right of navigation only with special permission from the supreme Russian authority in Central Asia.
6. Russians have the right to construct wharves in those places on the left bank of the Amu-Darya where it may prove necessary and convenient. The Khivan government is responsible for the security and safety of these wharves. The approval of the places selected for wharves rests with the supreme Russian authority in Central Asia.
7. Aside from these wharves, Russians are granted the right to maintain trading posts on the left bank of the Amu-Darya for the deposit and storage of their goods. In those places indicated by the supreme Russian authority in Central Asia, the government of the khanate promises to allot for trading posts a sufficient amount of unpopulated land for wharves and for the construction of shops, of lodgings for those serving in the trading posts and those having business with the trading posts, premises for mercantile offices, and land for the establishment of farms. These trading posts, together with all the people living on them and all the goods stored

---

<sup>1085</sup> Cited from *Pravitelstvennyi Vestnik*, November 30/December 12, 1873 in Seymour Becker, *Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865–1924*, London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2004, p. 245-247.

on them, will be under the direct protection of the government of the khanate, which will be responsible for their safety and security.

8. In general all the towns and villages of the khanate of Khiva are henceforth open to Russian trade. Russian merchants and Russian caravans may travel freely throughout the khanate, and they shall enjoy the special protection of the local authorities. The government of the khanate is responsible for the security of caravans and warehouses.

9. Russian merchants trading in the khanate are exempt from the payment of zakat and any other kind of commercial duties, just as Khivan merchants have not for a long time paid zakat, either on the road through Kazalinsk, in Orenburg, or in the ports of the Caspian Sea.

10. Russian merchants are granted the right of duty-free passage for their goods across Khivan territory into all neighboring lands.

11. In Khiva and in the other towns of the khanate, Russian merchants are granted the right to maintain, if they wish, agents (caravan-bashi) for handling relations with the local authorities and for superintending the conduct of commercial affairs.

12. Russian subjects are granted the right to have real property in the khanate. Such property is subject to the land tax by agreement with the supreme Russian authority in Central Asia.

13. Commercial obligations between Russians and Khivans shall be held sacred and inviolable on both sides.

14. The government of the khanate pledges itself to investigate without delay the complaints and claims of Russian subjects against Khivans and, if they prove well-founded, to satisfy them immediately. In a case where debts are due to Russian subjects and to Khivans, the claims of the Russians shall have priority.

15. The complaints and claims of Khivans against Russian subjects, even in cases where the latter are within the borders of the khanate, shall be handed over to the nearest Russian authorities for examination and satisfaction.

16. In no case will the government of the khanate admit persons coming from Russia without exit permission from the Russian authorities, whatever their nationality may be. Should any criminal who is a Russian subject take refuge from the law within the borders of the khanate, the government of the khanate promises to apprehend and deliver him to the nearest Russian authorities.

17. Saiyid Muhammad Rahim Bohadur Khan's proclamation, published the 12th of June last, concerning the emancipation of all slaves in the khanate and the abolition for all time of slavery and the trade in human beings, shall remain in full force; the government of the khanate pledges itself to follow up with all the means in its power the strict and conscientious execution of this matter.

18. An indemnity in the amount of 2,200,000 rubles is imposed upon the khanate of Khiva to defray the expenses of the Russian treasury for the conduct of the recent war, provoked by the government of the khanate and by the Khivan people. [The remainder of article eighteen concerns the payment of the war indemnity plus interest at the rate of 5 percent per annum, in Russian paper currency or Khivan coin, in annual installments due each November 1 according to the following schedule: 1873–100,000 rubles; 1874–100,000 rubles; 1875–125,000 rubles; 1876–125,000 rubles; 1877–150,000 rubles; 1878–150,000 rubles; 1879–175,000

rubles; 1880–175,000 rubles; 1881–1892–200,000 rubles per year; 1893–73,557 rubles.]

(Signed) Governor General of Turkestan, Adjutant General von Kaufman. Saiyid Muhammad Rahim Khan signed the Turkish text of this treaty by affixing his seal in the presence of the Governor General of Turkestan, Adjutant General von Kaufman I, on the 12th day of August, 1873.

## Appendix 3

### Russo-Bukharan Friendship Treaty of 1873<sup>1086</sup>

- 1 [Article one concerns the Russo-Bukharan and Bukharan-Khivan boundaries.]
2. Since the separation of the right bank of the Amu-Darya from the khanate of Khiva, all caravan routes leading from Bukhara northward into Russian territory pass through Bukharan and Russian lands exclusively. Both the Russian and the Bukharan governments, each within its own borders, will guard the safety of movement of caravans and trade along these routes.
3. Russian steamboats and other Russian ships, governmental as well as private, are granted free navigation on an equal basis with Bukharan ships on that part of the Amu-Darya River which belongs to the emir of Bukhara.
4. Russians have the right to construct wharves and warehouses for goods in those places on the Bukharan banks of the Amu-Darya where it may prove necessary and convenient. The Bukharan government takes upon itself to guard the security and safety of these wharves and warehouses. The approval of the places selected for wharves depends on the supreme Russian authority in Central Asia.
5. All towns and villages of the khanate of Bukhara are open to Russian trade. Russian merchants and Russian caravans may travel freely throughout the khanate, and they enjoy the special protection of the local authorities. The Bukharan government is responsible for the security of Russian caravans within the borders of Bukhara.
6. In Bukhara a duty of 2½ percent ad valorem will be levied on all goods, without exception, belonging to Russian merchants and going from Russia to Bukhara or from Bukhara to Russia, just as one-fortieth part is levied in the Turkestan Krai. No supplementary duties will be levied above this zakat.
7. Russian merchants are granted the right of duty-free transport of their goods across Bukharan territory into all neighboring lands.
8. Russian merchants will be permitted to have in Bukharan towns, where it proves necessary, their own caravansaries in which to store their goods. Bukharan merchants will enjoy the same right in the towns of the Turkestan Krai.
9. Russian merchants are granted the right to have commercial agents in all Bukharan towns to supervise the regular course of trade and the legal collection of duties, and also for relations with the local authorities on mercantile matters. This right is granted also to Bukharan merchants in the towns of the Turkestan Krai.
10. Commercial obligations between Russians and Bukharans shall be held sacred and inviolable on both sides. The Bukharan government promises to see to the conscientious execution of all commercial transactions and the conscientious conduct of commercial affairs in general.

---

<sup>1086</sup> Cited from *Pravitelstvennyi Vestnik*, December 18/30, 1873 in Seymour Becker, *Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865–1924*, London & New York: Routledge Curzon, 2004, pp. 248-250.

11. Russian subjects in Bukhara are granted the right to engage in the various industries and handicrafts permitted by the Sharia on an equal basis with Bukharan subjects; Bukharan subjects in Russia enjoy the same right in regard to industries and handicrafts permitted under Russian law.

12. Russian subjects are granted the right to have immovable property in the khanate, i.e., to buy houses, gardens, and fields. This property is subject to the land tax on an equal basis with the property of Bukharan subjects. Bukharan subjects will enjoy the same right within the boundaries of the Russian Empire.

13. Russian subjects shall enter Bukharan territory with passports issued to them by the Russian authorities; they have the right to travel freely throughout the khanate, and they enjoy the special protection of the Bukharan authorities.

14. In no case will the Bukharan government admit persons coming from Russia without exit permission from the Russian authorities, whatever their nationality may be. Should any criminal who is a Russian subject take refuge from the law within Bukhara's borders, he will be apprehended by the Bukharan authorities and delivered to the nearest Russian authorities.

15. In order to maintain an uninterrupted, direct relationship with the supreme Russian authority in Central Asia, the emir of Bukhara will appoint from among his retinue an agent to act as his permanent envoy and plenipotentiary in Tashkent. This plenipotentiary will live in Tashkent in the emir's house and at the emir's expense.

16. The Russian government may likewise have its own permanent representative in Bukhara at the court of His High Eminence the Emir. The Russian plenipotentiary in Bukhara, like the emir's envoy in Tashkent, will live in the house of, and at the expense of, the Russian government.

17. To please his Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, and for the greater glory of His Imperial Majesty, His High Eminence the Emir Saiyid Muzaffar has decreed that henceforth and for all time the shameful trade in human beings, which is contrary to the laws of humanity, is abolished within the borders of Bukhara. In accordance with this decree, Saiyid Muzaffar shall at this time circulate to all his begs strict orders to the following effect: if, despite the emir's injunction about the end of the slave trade, slaves should be brought from neighboring countries to Bukharan frontier towns for sale to Bukharan subjects, said slaves will be taken from their masters and immediately set free.

18. His High Eminence Saiyid Muzaffar, desiring in all sincerity to develop and strengthen the good neighborly relations that have now existed for five years to Bukhara's benefit, shall be guided by the seventeen articles set forth above, which constitute a treaty of friendship between Russia and Bukhara.

This treaty has been signed in two copies, each in the two languages, Russian and Turkish. As a sign of his ratification of this treaty and of his acceptance of it as a guide for himself and his successors, Emir Saiyid Muzaffar has affixed his seal. In Shahr, the 28th day of September, 1873, the 19th day of the month of Shagban, 1290.

## Appendix 4

### Customs Regulation in Russian Turkestan in May 1889<sup>1087</sup>

I. All imports from other parts of the Russian Empire, and all merchandise and products from Bukhara, Khiva and China are admitted free of customs duties into Russian Turkestan, with the exception mentioned in III.

II. The importation of Anglo-Indian, Afghan, Persian, Turkish and Western European goods not enumerated in III, and also of powder and warlike stores, is forbidden.

III. The following articles may only be imported on payment of duty as set forth:

- 1) Precious stones, real and imitation, pearls, garnets, and unworked coral at 4 roubles 8 kopecks per pud.
- 2) Laurel leaves and berries at 2 r. 21k. per pud.
- 3) Spices at duties varying between 5 r. and 24 r. per pud.
- 4) Sugar products, mainly confectionery and preserves, at 1 r. 65 k. per pud.
- 5) Tea at 14 r. 40 k. per pud.
- 6) Indigo at 6 r. per pud.
- 7) Boots and shoes of Indian leather at 1 r. 19 k. per lb.
- 8) Muslin at 1 r. per lb.
- 9) Coral, worked and threaded, at 6 r. 72 k. per lb.

---

<sup>1087</sup> Sarah J. Lloyd, "Land-locked Central Asia: Implications for the Future", *Geopolitics*, Vol: 2, No: 1, 1997, pp. 128-129.



## Appendix 5

### Leaders of Uzbekistan under Soviet Union<sup>1088</sup>

<b>First Secretaries of Uzbek Communist Party</b>	<b>Place of Birth</b>	<b>Chairman of Council of Ministers</b>	<b>Place of Birth</b>
A. Ikramov 1925-1937	Tashkent	F. Khojaev 1925-1937	Bukhara
U. Yusupov 1937-1950	Ferghana Oblast	S. Segizbaev 1937-1938	Tashkent
		A. Abdurahmanov 1938-1950	Tashkent
A. Niiazov 1950-1955	Ferghana	A. Mavlianov 1950-1951	Kazakhstan
		N. Mukhiddinov 1951-1953	Tashkent
		U. Yusupov 1953-1954	Ferghana oblast
N. Mukhitdinov 1955-1956	Tashkent	S. Kamalov 1955-1957	Tashkent
S. Kamalov 1957-1959	Tashkent	M. Mirzaahmedov 1957-1959	no data
Sh. Rashidov 1959-1983	Jizak, Samarkand oblast	A. Alimov 1959-1961	no data
		R. Kurbanov 1961-1971	Bukhara
		N. Khudaiberdyev 1971-1984	Jizak, Samarkand oblast
I. Usmankhojaev 1983-1988	Ferghana	G. Kadurov 1984-1989	Tashkent
R. Nishanov 1988-1989	Tashkent	M. Mirkasymov 1989	Tashkent
I. Karimov 1989-1991	Samarkand	Sh. Mirsaidov 1989-1990	Leninabad, Tajikistan

<sup>1088</sup> Demian Vaisman, "Regionalism and Clan Loyalty in the Political Life of Uzbekistan", in Yacoov Ro'i, (eds.), *Muslim Eurasia: Conflicting Legacies*, London: Frank Cass, 1995, p. 122.

## Appendix 6

### Regional Hakim Turnover in Uzbekistan, 1993-2002<sup>1089</sup>

Region	Number of Replacements	Avarage Number of Years Served by Each Hokim
Andijan Oblast	1	8,0
Bukhara Oblast	3	2,7
Ferghana Oblast	3	2,7
Jizzak Oblast	3	2,7
Karakalpakstan Autonomous Republic	3	2,7
Kashkadarya Oblast	4	2,0
Khorezm Oblast	3	2,7
Namangan Oblast	2	4,0
Navoi Oblast	3	2,7
Samarkand Oblast	4	2,0
Surhandarya Oblast	4	2,0
Syrdarya Oblast	3	2,7
Tashkent Oblast	3	2,7
Tashkent (city)	4	2,0
Average	3	3,0

<sup>1089</sup> Alisher Ilkhamov, "The Limits of Centralization: Regional Challenges in Uzbekistan", p. 170 in Pauline Jones Luong (eds.), *The Transformation of Central Asia: States and Societies from Soviet Rule to Independence*, Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 2004.

## Appendix 7

### Presidential Elections in Uzbekistan

#### 29 December 1991 Uzbekistan Presidential Election Results

Candidates	Parties	Votes %
Islam Abdug'aniyevich Karimov	Uzbekistan People's Democratic Party O'zbekiston Xalq Demokratik Partiyasi	86
Mohammad Salih	Erk Democratic Party Erk Demokratik Partiyasi	12

#### 9 January 2000 Uzbekistan Presidential Election Results

Candidates	Parties	Votes %
Islam Abdug'aniyevich Karimov	Self-Sacrifice National Democratic Party Fidokorlar Milliy Demokratik Partiyasi	91.9
Abdulhafiz Jalolov	Uzbekistan People's Democratic Party O'zbekiston Xalq Demokratik Partiyasi	4.1

#### 23 December 2007 Uzbekistan Presidential Election Results

Candidates	Parties	Votes %
Islam Abdug'aniyevich Karimov	Uzbekistan Liberal Democratic Party O'zbekiston Liberal Demokratik Partiyasi	90.77
Asliddin Rustamov	Uzbekistan People's Democratic Party O'zbekiston Xalq Demokratik Partiyasi	3.27
Dilorom Toshmuhamedova	Justice Social Democratic Party Adolat Sotsial Demokratik Partiyasi	3.03
Akmal Saidov	independent	2.94

## Appendix 8

### Parliamentary Elections in Uzbekistan

#### December 1999 Supreme Assembly of Uzbekistan Election Results

Party	Seats
Uzbekistan People's Democratic Party O'zbekiston Xalq Demokratik Partiyasi	48
Progress of the Fatherland Party Watan Terakkiyati Demokratik Partiyasi	20
Self-Sacrifice National Democratic Party Fidokorlar Milliy Demokratik Partiyasi	34
Justice Social Democratic Party Adolat Sotsial Demokratik Partiyasi	11
Uzbekistan National Revival Democratic Party O'zbekiston Milliy Tiklanish Demokratik Partiyasi	10
Non-partisans	110
Citizens' groups nominees	16

#### 26 December 2004 and 9 January 2005 Supreme Assembly of Uzbekistan Election Results

Party	Seats
Uzbekistan Liberal Democratic Party O'zbekiston Liberal Demokratik Partiyasi	41
Uzbekistan People's Democratic Party O'zbekiston Xalq Demokratik Partiyasi	28
Self-Sacrifice National Democratic Party Fidokorlar Milliy Demokratik Partiyasi	18
Uzbekistan National Revival Democratic Party O'zbekiston Milliy Tiklanish Demokratik Partiyasi	11
Justice Social Democratic Party Adolat Sotsial Demokratik Partiyasi	10
Non-partisans	14
Total	120

**27 December 2009 and 10 January 2010 Legislative Chamber of  
Uzbekistan Election Results**

<b>Party</b>	<b>First Round</b>	<b>Second Round*</b>	<b>Total Seats</b>
Uzbekistan Liberal Democratic Party O'zbekiston Liberal Demokratik Partiyasi	33	20	53
Uzbekistan People's Democratic Party O'zbekistan Xalq Demokratik Partiyasi	22	10	32
Uzbekistan National Revival Democratic Party O'zbekistan Milliy Tiklanish Demokratik Partiyasi	25	6	31
Justice Social Democratic Party Adolat Sotsial Demokratik Partiyasi	16	3	19
Total	96	39	135**

\* In 39 out of 135 electoral districts where no candidate polled more than 50% of the vote in the first round.

\*\*15 deputies to the Legislative Chamber were also elected by the Ecological Movement of Uzbekistan in indirect elections.

## Appendix 9

### The Distribution of Topics in Turkish History Textbooks in Single Party

Konulara Göre Dağılım	Resim Sayısı	Genel (%)	1930-1946 (%)	1939-1946 (%)
Tarih Öncesi Dönem	201	3,18	3,42↑	2,71↓
Eski Mısır	183	2,9	2,65↓	3,76↑
Kalde, Elam, Asur vb.	182	2,88	3,14↑	4,04↑
Fenike ve İbraniler	151	2,39	2,02↓	2,5↑
Eski İran/Pers/ Med İmp.	131	2,08	1,91	2,08
Anadolu Uygarlıkları (Hitit, Frikya, Lidya)	173	2,74	3,23↑	4,8↑
Hint ve Çin	165	2,61	3,06↑	2,7↑
Orta Asya Türkleri ve Göçler	555	8,79	9,32↑	7,4↓
Eski Yunan, Isparta, Girit, İskender	564	8,93	9,25↑	11,0↑
Eski Roma İmparatorluğu	589	9,33	9,6↑	11,5↑
Yunan ve Roma İmp. Beraber	1153	18,3	18,85↑	22,5↑
Bir kategori altına alınamayanlar	9	0,14	0,07↓	0,18↑
Arap-İslam tarihi ve medeniyeti	295	4,67	4,39↓	4,26↓
İslam ve Türkler	102	1,62	1,72↑	1,77↑
Osmanlı İmparatorluğu	1255	19,9	17,98↓	16,9↓
Orta Çağda Avrupa ve Haçlılar	156	2,47	2,39↓	3,82↑
Kemalist Devrimler, İstiklal Savaşı öncesi ve sonrası ile cumhuriyet dönemi	857	13,59	15,95↑	7,82↓
Bizans	20	0,32	0,19↓	0,17↓
İlerleme ve Medeniyet	32	0,51	0,69↑	0↓
Avrupa ve Avrupa'da gelişmeler	163	2,58	1,66↓	2,05↓
14. yy. – 16. yy. da Avrupa	117	1,85	2,43↑	2,18↑
17. yy. – 20. yy. da Avrupa	232	3,68	2,22↓	4,58↑
Selçuklular	180	2,85	2,71↓	3,91↑
<b>TOPLAM</b>	<b>6312</b>	<b>100,0</b>	<b>100,0</b>	<b>100,0</b>

# Appendix 10

## Statistical Data on the “Organs of Self-Government of Citizens” (Mahalla) in Uzbekistan (as of August 1, 2003)

	Administrative districts		City (shahar)		Settlement (shaharcha)		Qishloq-type village		Ovul-type village			Mahallas as 'social units' (total)	Mahallas as 'social units' (total)	Mahallas as 'social units' (total)	Mahallas guard associations (total)	Mahalla guard members (total)
	Mahallas	Mahallas as 'social units'	Mahallas	Mahallas as 'social units'	Mahallas	Mahallas as 'social units'	Mahallas	Mahallas as 'social units'	Mahallas	Mahallas as 'social units'	Mahallas as 'social units'					
Andijon Province	14	91	5	20	95	707	28					918	818	28	790	4082
Namangan Province	12	167	12	48	99	521	40					847	736	40	736	5046
Farg'ona Province	16	174	11	78	163	546						972	798		972	5808
To'shkent Province	15	194	18	154	65	901	384					1431	1249	449	747	6649
To'shkent City	11	448	5									448	448	5	448	3896
Sirdaryo Province	9	5	5	5	77	278	104	16				370	288	104	220	1250
Jizzax Province	12	61	8	30	104	187	130					390	278	141	148	619
Samarqand Province	19	288	6	46	6	678	51					1149	1012	63	1012	7147
Novoy Province	9	81	5	6	40	181						329	268		271	963
Buxoro Province	13	115	2	3	121	147						388	265		298	2384
Qashqadaryo Province	14	200	5	9	152	159						525	368		514	3080
Surxondaryo Province	14	92	5	15	115	571	34					798	678	34	678	4406
Xorazm Province	10	52	7	59	112	505	379					736	617	388	181	465
Republic of Qonqalpoqiston	15	133	16	30								314	174		303	2118
<b>Total</b>	<b>183</b>	<b>2101</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>111</b>	<b>503</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>1367</b>	<b>1150</b>	<b>140</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>9615</b>	<b>7997</b>	<b>1262</b>	<b>7318</b>	<b>47911</b>	

Source: Suda Masaru, “The Politics of Civil Society, Mahalla and NGOs: Uzbekistan”, *Reconstruction and Interaction of Slavic Eurasia and Its Neighboring Worlds*, 21st Century COE Program Slavic Eurasian Studies, No.10, 2006, p. 370.

# Appendix 11

## 1908-1930 Yılları Arası Orta Öğretim Ders Programları

OKUL ADI	YIL	DERS ADI	TARİH DERSİNİN PROGRAM İÇİNDEKİ SİRASI	ETKİN SİYASİ DÜŞÜNCE AKIMLARI	SINIF						TOPLAM		
					I		II		III		FÖNÜN	EDERİYAT	
					FÖNÜN	EDERİYAT	FÖNÜN	EDERİYAT	FÖNÜN	EDERİYAT			
İlme 2. devre	R.1326-1910	Tarih	19. sıra	İslamcılık Bencilik Osmancılık	1	1	1	1	1	1	3	3	3
7 Yıllık İhtidatlar	R.1327-1911	Tarih	13. sıra	İslamcılık Osmancılık Bencilik	2	2	2	2	2	2	7	7	7
İstanbul Sultanıyesi	R.1328-1912	Tarih	6. sıra	İslamcılık Bencilik	2	2	2	2	2	2	6	6	6
Sultaniler	R.1329-1913	Tarih	3. sıra	Bencilik İslamcılık	2	2	2	2	2	2	6	6	6
Sultaniler	R.1330-1914	Tarih	3. sıra	Bencilik İslamcılık	2	2	2	2	2	2	6	6	6
Mekteb-i Sultanıye*	R.1331-1915	Tarih-i Kadim	3. sıra	Bencilik İslamcılık	-	1	-	1	-	1	0	3	3
Mekteb-i Sultanıye*	R.1331-1915	Tarih	4. sıra	Bencilik İslamcılık	2	2	2	2	2	2	6	6	6
Ehok / Kaz Lisesi	R.1336-1922	Tarih	4. sıra	Bencilik İslamcılık Türkçülük	4	4	2	4	2	4	8	12	12
Sultanı (Yeni Medrese)	R.1336-1922	Tarih	6. sıra	İslamcılık	3	2	2	2	2	2	7	7	7
İlme	R.1340-1924	Tarih	3. sıra	Bencilik	2	2	2	2	2	2	6	8	8
İlme	R.1343-1927	Tarih	2. sıra	Türkçülük	2	2	2	2	2	2	6	7	7

Source: Tuba Şengül, "Political Idea Movements and Intellectual Changes in the History Curricula (1908-1930)", *Ankara University Journal of Faculty of Educational Sciences*, Vol: 40, No: 1, 2007, p. 91.



## Appendix 12

### Participants of the First Turkish History Congress (1932)

Name of the Participant	Title of the Conference
Afet Hanım (Muallim)	Tarihten Evvel ve Tarih Fecrinde
Samih Rifat Bey (Türk Tarihi Tetkik Cemiyeti Azası Çanakkale Mebusu)	Türkçe ve Diğer Lisanlar Arasındaki İrtibatlar
Dr. Reşit Galip Beyefendi (Türk Tarihi Tetkik Cemiyeti Genel Katibi Aydın Mebusu)	Türk Irk ve Medeniyet Tarihine Umumi bir Bakış
Hasan Cemil Bey (Türk Tarihi Tetkik Cemiyeti Azası Bolu Mebusu)	Ege Medeniyetinin Menşesine Umumi bir Bakış
Prof. Yusuf Ziya Bey (Darülfünun Müderrisi Eskişehir Mebusu)	Mısır Din ve İlahlarının Türklükle Alakası
Ağaoğlu Ahmet Bey (Darülfünun Müderrisi Kars Mebusu)	İptidai Türk Aile Hukuku ile Hindo-Avrupai Aile Hukuku Arasında Mukayese
Dr. Şevket Aziz Bey (Darülfünun Müderrisi)	Türklerin Antropolojisi
Şemsettin Bey (Türk Tarihi Tetkik Cemiyeti Azası Sivas Mebusu)	İslam Medeniyetinde Türklerin Mevkii
Köprülüzade Fuat Bey (Darülfünun Müderrisi)	Türk Edebiyatına Umumi bir Bakış
Prof. Sadri Maksudi Bey (Türk Tarihi Tetkik Cemiyeti Azası Şarki Karahisar Mebusu)	Tarihin Amilleri
Zayti Freñç	Hint Akraba Kavimleri Arasında
Afet Hanım	Orta Kurun Tarihine Umumi bir Bakış
Avram Galanti Bey (Darülfünun Müderrisi)	“Yeni Tarih Kitabı” (Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatları hakkında Mülâhazat
Yusuf Hikmet Bey (Türk Tarihi Tetkik Cemiyeti Azası Manisa Mebusu)	Şarkta İnhitat Sebepleri
Halil Etem Bey (Türk Tarihi Tetkik Cemiyeti Azası İstanbul Mebusu)	Müzeler
Prof. Akçuraoğlu Yusuf (Türk Tarihi Tetkik Cemiyeti Reisi İstanbul Mebusu)	Tarih Yazmak ve Tarih Okutmak

## Appendix 13

### Participants of the Second Turkish History Congress (1937)

Name of the Participant	Title of the Conference
Eugene Pittard	Kongreye İştirak Eden Yabancılar Adına Kongreyi Açış Nutku
Afet Hanım	Türk Tarih Kurumunun Arkeolojik Faaliyetleri
Hamit Zübeyr Koşay	Türk Tarih Kurumu Tarafından Alacahöyük'te Yapılan Hafriyatın Elde Edilen Neticeler
Şevket Aziz Kansu	Ankara ve Civarının Prehistoryasında Yeni Buluşlar
Eugene Pittard	Neolitik Devirde Küçük Asya ve Avrupa Arasında Antropolojik Münasebetler
İbrahim Necmi Dilmen	Türk Tarih Teorisinde Güneş-Dil Teorisinin Yeri ve Değeri
Yusuf Ziya Özer	Son Arkeolojik Nazariyeler ve Subarlar
Abdülkadir İnan	Altay'da Pazırık Hafriyatında Çıkarılan Atların Vaziyetini, Türklerin Defin Merasimi Bakımından İzah
Von Der Osten	Anadolu'da Milattan Önce Üçüncü Bin Yıl
Güterbock	Etilerde Tarih Yazıcılığı
Arif Lütfi Mansel	Ege Tarihinde Akalar Meselesi
Barndestin	Etrüsk Meselesinin Şimdiki Durumu
Hasan Reşit Tankut	Dil ve Irk Münasebetleri Hakkında
Kerim Erim	Sümer Riyaziyesinin Esas ve Mahiyetine Dair
İsmail Hakkı İzmirli	Şark Kaynaklarına Göre Müslümanlıktan Evvel Türk Kültürünün Arap yarımadasındaki İzleri
Geza Feher	Turko-Bulgar, Macar ve Bunlara Akrafa Olan Milletlerin Kültürü, Türk Kültürünün Avrupa'ya Tesiri
Reşit Rahmeti Arat	Türklerde Tarih Zaptı
Ernst Von Aster	Felsefe Tarihinde Trükler
Marguerita Dellenbach	Türklerin Antropolojik Tarihlerine Dair Vesikalar
Bossert	Tabı Sanatının Keşfi
Şevket Aziz Kansu	Selçuk Türkleri Hakkında Antropolojik Bir Tetkik ve Neticeleri
Henri V. Valois	Garbi Asya'nın Irklar Tarihi
Henri A. Alföldi	Türklerde Çift Krallık
Kont Zici	Macar Kavminin Menşesine Dair
T. J. Arne	Türkmen Stepinin Kabile Tarihi, Nüfusu ve Bunun Anadolu ile Münasebetleri

H. H. Sayman	Riyaziye Tarihinde Türk Okulu
W. Keppers	Halk Bilgisi ve Cihanşumul Tarih Tetkiki Karşısında Öz Türklük ve Öz İndo-Germenlik
H. Schell	Eski Vesaik İlmî
Sabri Atayolu	Türk Kırmızısı
Saffet Engin	Eti ve Grek Dini Sistemlerinin Mukayesesi
C. Bosch	Tarihte Anadolu
Nevzat Ayas	Türkler ve Tabiat Kanunu
Fatin Gökmen	Eski Türklerde Heyet ve Takvim
Sadi Irmak	Türk Irkının Biyolojisine Dair Araştırmalar, Kan Grupları ve Parmak İzleri
Nurettin Okur	Kan Grupları Bakımından Türk Irkının Menşei Hakkında Bir Etüt
Ş. Akkaya	Sümer Dilinin Babil Diline Tesiri
Remzi Oğuz Arık	Proto-Etilere Dair
Pralty	Türklerde Hıristiyanlık
A. Von Gabain	Hun-Türk Münasebetleri
T. H. Baltacıoğlu	Edremit Civarında Türk Aşiretleri
Kamil Kepecioğlu	Türklerde Spor
İsmail Hakkı İzmirli	Peygamber ve Türkler
W. Brandestain	Limni'de Bulunan Kitabe-Etrüsklerin Anadolu'dan Neşet Ettiklerine Dair Dil Bakımından Ehemmiyetli Delil
Sadri Maksudi Arsal	Beşeriyet tarihinde Devlet ve Hukuk Mefhumu ve Müesseselerinin İnkişafında Türk Irkının Rolü
L. Deloporte	Eti (Hatti)nin Aşağı Mezopotamya ile Siyasi ve Kültürel Münasebetleri
İsmail Hakkı İzmirli	Şark Kaynaklarına Göre Müslümanlıktan Evvel Türk Kültürünün Arap Yarımadasındaki İzleri

## TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Bu tez çalışmasında Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun yıkılmasının ardından kurulan Türkiye ile Sovyetler Birliği sonrası ilk defa bağımsız bir birim olarak ortaya çıkan Özbekistan'ın ulus yaratma politikaları karşılaştırılmaktadır. Aslında ulus devletlerin meşru siyasi birimler olarak ortaya çıkması nispeten yeni bir gelişmedir. Gerçekten de Fransız Devrimi'nin ardından geçen sadece iki asırdan biraz fazla sürede millet giderek başlıca siyasi meşruiyet dayanağı haline gelmiştir. Bugünden bakınca yönetme erkinin meşruluğunun milletlere dayandırılmasının ve daha da önemlisi milletlerin kendilerinin yeniliği oldukça şaşırtıcıdır. Zira bugünün ulusal tarihleri kendi uluslarının köklerini aramada hiç mütevazı değildirler. Öyle ki bu tarihleri okuyanların kendi uluslarının bilinmeyen en eski zamanlardan beri mevcut olduğu konusunda şüphesi kalmamakta, kendi ulusal dillerinin ise neredeyse tıpkı bugünkü haliyle binlerce yıl önce de konuşulduğuna inançları pekişmektedir. Oysa çok iyi biliyoruz ki dine ya da hanedana atfedilen kutsiyete dayalı siyasi meşruiyet de, klan aristokrasisine veya sadece çıplak korku ve silah gücü üzerinde temellenmiş bir meşruiyet de ulus devletten hem çok daha eskidir hem de halen zayıflamış da olsa pek çok bölgede etkilerini sürdürmektedir.

Ulus devlet kurma ve yaratılan devletin ilk elden sahibi olacak ulusu yaratma amacını taşıyan usuller, örnekler arasında farklılık gösterebilen kimi politik öncelikler ve tarihsel bazı şartlar bir yana bırakılacak olursa neredeyse standarttır. Yeni bir tarih yazma, amaca uygun bir dil politikası yoluyla mevcut lehçelerden birini ulusal dil haline getirme, ulusal bir din yorumunu oluşturma ve yayma, mitler, efsaneler ve kahramanlar yaratma, büstler, anıtlar, törenler, merasimler yoluyla yaratılan mit ve efsaneleri berkitme, ve en önemlisi tüm bu bileşenleri kapsayan ulusal bir ideoloji şekillendirme ulus devlet yaratma sürecinin değişmez unsurlarıdır. Bu çalışma başlıca ulus yaratma siyasalarının herşeyden önce yönetici seçkinlerin yeni bir meşruiyet dayanağı oluşturma çabalarının bir parçası olduğunu

iddia etmektedir. Farklı tarihlerde ve deęişik coğrafyalarda denenmiş ulus yaratma projelerinin şaşkırtıcı derece benzer yöntemlerden yararlanması ve neredeyse birbiriyle aynı içeriklerde ‘menüleri’ kullanıma sürmesi ulusların kendilerine özgülüğü savından ziyade bu politikaların yönetici yeni ulusal seçkinlerin benzer siyasi meşruiyet taleplerinin gereęi olduęu savını destekler görünmektedir.

Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nin ilk yıllarındaki ulus yaratma, pek çok yönüyle yeni devletin mirasçısı olduęu Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun son dönemindeki Genç Osmanlı ve Genç Türk entellektüel birikimi ile İttihat ve Terakki deneyiminin devamı niteliğindedir. Son dönem Osmanlı aydınları başta Fransa olmak üzere herbiri çoktan ulusal devletler haline gelmiş Batı Avrupa ülkelerinde belli süreler bulunmuş, yetiştikleri Bâb-ı Âli’nin Tercüme Odası’nda Fransızca, İngilizce ve Almanca kaynakları takip edebilme yetisine sahip olmuş kişilerdi. Bu meyanda İngiltere ve Fransa’daki devletlerin milli yapısını ve Batı Avrupa’da toplumlarında milliyetçiliğin gücünü yakından biliyorlardı. Ayrıca Orta ve Doęu Avrupa’nın dięer çok uluslu imparatorlukları olan Habsburg İmparatorluğu ve Çarlık Rusyası gibi yönetimleri altındaki azınlıkların milliyetçi isyanları ve ayrılıkçı talepleriyle karşılaşmışlardı. Her ne kadar Osmanlılık veya İslamcılık gibi sarsılan devleti birarada tutma amacını taşıyan ulus üstü kimlik tanımlamaları bir dönem yaygın olsa da nihayetinde İmparatorluğun aydınları Viyana ve St. Petersburg’daki benzerleri gibi milli bir meşruiyet temeline sahip ulusal bir devlete evrilmenin zarureti ile yüzleşmek zorunda kaldılar. Bu çerçevede 1923 sonrası Türk ulus devleti yaratma siyasaları uygulanmalarının öncesinde oldukça çekingen bir şekilde olsa da denenmiş, ve lider kadronun da aşına olduęu uzun tartışma evrelerinden geçmiş uygulamalardı.

Özbekistan’da ise Özbek ulus yaratma süreci iki aşamada gerçekleşmiştir. Her ne kadar ulus-üstü Sovyet Marksizmi toplumsal gelişmenin düzeyi ilerleyip sosyalizm ve komünizm aşamalarına erişilince ulus devletlerin ortadan kalkacağını ve milli kimliklerin anlamsızlaşacağını iddia etse de tarih sahnesine Özbekistan adıyla ilk devlet Sovyet döneminde çıkmıştır. Sovyet yönetimi yalnız bugünkü

Özbekistan sınırlarının çizilmesini sağlamamış ayrıca komşu Türkmen, Kırgız, Kazak ve Tacik dillerinde olduğu gibi standart bir Özbekçe'yi diğer Orta Asya dil ve lehçelerinden grameri ve söz varlığıyla ayırtırmaya yönelmiştir. Bu amaçla her bir bağımsız Orta Asya cumhuriyeti için birbirinden farklı Kiril temelli alfabeler üretilmiş, alfabeler dillerin farklılıklarının artmasının aracı olarak kullanılmıştır. Özbek Sovyet Sosyalist Cumhuriyeti okullarında öğretilen tarih ise 1930'ların sonunda şekillenmiş sınırları bağlamında bir Özbek tarihi biçimindedir. Aynı şekilde Sovyet Özbekistan'ında bürokratik yükselme ve zenginlik dağıtımı kadroların 'sosyalist ama öncelikle Özbek' olmaları gözetilerek gerçekleştirildiğinden, bu dönemde feodal ve soya dayalı yerel toplumsal ilişkiler Sovyet-Özbek kimliği ile uyumlu hale gelerek etkilerini devam ettirebildiler. 1990 sonrasının bağımsız Özbekistan'ında ise Sovyet döneminde Komünist Parti'nin güvenilir memurları olan kadro Özbekistan'ın yeni devlet yapılanmasını ve ulusal ideolojisini şekillendirdiler. Özbekistan'da yönetici seçkinlerin statüsünün devamlılığı komünizmden milli/bağımsız devlete geçişin gerçekleştiği çalkantılı dönemde dahi şaşkırtıcı derecede istikrarlıdır.

Esasen her iki ülke de eldeki sınırlarıyla uyumlu uluslar şekillendirme konusunda geç kalmış durumda idi. Özbekistan ve Türkiye özellikle Fransız Devrimi sonrasında ortaya çıkan milliyetçilik akımına değişik nedenlerle geç maruz kaldılar ve dini ve kalıtsal meşrulaştırma usulleri kullanılarak oldukça geç bir tarihe dek yönetildiler. Bu çalışmanın ikinci bölümünde tezin genel teorik çerçevesi sunulmaktadır. Siyasi birimler arasında ve tek tek bu birimler dahilindeki iktidar ilişkilerinde ulusal meşruiyet genel norm olmadan önce erk kullanımındaki eşitsizlik korku, çıplak güç kullanımı, din, soy hiyerarşisi ve ideoloji gibi değişik unsurlarla haklı kılınmaya çalışılıyordu. İnsanoğlunun güvenlik ve düzen için özgürlüklerinin bir kısmını devrettiği Leviathan ve bu arada Leviathan'ın gücünü kullanma olanağına haiz olanlar, tam da düzen ve güvenliği sağlayabilme iddiasıyla meşruiyet sağlıyorlardı. Dini meşruiyet yani Ra'dan, Zeus'dan, Allah'dan veya göklerden meşruiyet devşirme de insanlararası iktidar ilişkilerinin kurulması ve devamlılığının sağlanmasında en eski usullerinden birisidir.

Hanedanların meşruiyeti de çoğu zaman hakim ailenin mensuplarının dinsel söylemlerle kutsiyet halesi içinde korumaya alınmasıyla sağlanagelmıştır. Devrim öncesi Fransız monarşistlerin savunduğu gibi hanedan ailesinin yönetme hakkı kutsal bir gerçeklikti ve Tanrı'nın iradesinin yansımasıydı. Ulusal meşruiyet, yönetim birimi dahilindeki halkın türdeşliği iddiası ve iktidarın bu türdeşliği temsil eder biçimde kullanılması ısrarına sahiptir. Bu bağlamda Türkiye ve Özbekistan da çok uluslu imparatorlukların yerini alan çoğu ulusal devlette yaşandığı gibi kendi baskın etnik kimlikleri çerçevesinde bir siyasi meşruiyet ve yurttaş bağlılığı inşa etmenin yollarını aramışlardır.

Tezin üçüncü bölümünde Özbek ve Türk ulus yaratma süreçlerinin tarihsel çerçevesi sunulmuştur. Yukarıda belirtildiği gibi ulusal devletler ve onların 'resmi' tarihleri kendi uluslarının geçmişlerini mümkün olan en eski zamanlarda ararlar. Halbuki en eski zamanlarda şimdiki anayurtlarında bulabildikleri çoğu kez mevcut ulusal dillerden farklı lehçelerde konuşan ve daha önemlisi lehçe farklılığını önemsemeyen, kendilerini milli bir aidiyetten ziyade soy ya da kabile aidiyetiyle tanımlayan insan topluluklarıdır. Ulus tarihçileri için daha vahimi anayurdun geçmiş sakinlerinin ırksal ve inançsal olarak da mevcut vatandaşlardan ciddi anlamda farklı oldukları gerçeğidir. Ne var ki ulusal tarihçiler, bu tabiri caizse 'gayri-milli' geçmişle yüzleşmezler; hatta tam tersine tüm tarihi milli bir kahramanlık mersiyesi olarak yeniden geriye dönük olarak kurgularlar. Renan'ın ifadesiyle resmi tarihçiler geçmişteki olayları bazen unutarak, bazen yeniden yorumlayarak, bazen de olmayan olayları gerçekleşmişçesine tarihlerine dahil ederek uluslarının bugünkü talepleri dahilinde bir ulusal tarih yaratırlar.

Bu nedenle üçüncü bölümde bugün Özbekistan ve Türkiye olarak adlandırılan coğrafi bölgelerdeki savaşların, imparatorlukların, kahramanların ve dervişlerin başlarından geçen olayların kronolojik bir dökümü yapılmamaktadır. Bunun yerine Özbekistan ve Türkiye'de tarih yazımının mevcudu meşrulaştırma amacı doğrultusunda tercih ettiği, öncelik verdiği tarihsel an ve devletler incelenmiştir. Ayrıca söz konusu inceleme anlatılan dönem ve devletlerde

kullanılan meşrulaştırma süreç ve pratikleri bağlamında sunulmaya çalışılmış, gelip geçen hanlar ve padişahlar ile birbirini izleyen savaşların tekdüze bir tarihinin anlatılmasından kaçınılmıştır. Gerçekte Özbekistan ve Türkiye’de resmi tarih yazımının içinden seçim yapabileceği tarihi miras oldukça zengindi. Kadim Sogd ve Baktrian devletleri; Sasanî, Kuşhan, Gazne, Timur, Moğol İmparatorlukları, Buhara, Kokand ve Hiva Hanlıkları ile Orta Asya’da hayat bulmuş sayısız kabilesel federasyon Özbek tarihçilerinin seçebileceği öncülerdi. Aynı şekilde Türkiye’nin resmi tarihleri Sümer, Hitit, Frig medeniyetlerinden, Karahanlı ve Akkoyunlu devletlerine; Artuklular ve Danişmedler gibi Anadolu’nun ilk akıncı Oğuz beyliklerinden Selçuklu ve Osmanlı İmparatorluklarına geniş bir yelpazede seçim olmağına sahiptiler. Bu bölümde bağımsız Özbekistan ve Türkiye’nin siyasi meşruiyet ihtiyaçları doğrultusunda yapılan tarih seçimlerine sadık kalınarak, söz konusu birim ve dönemlerde meşruiyetin mahiyeti analiz edilmiştir.

Ulusal olsun ya da olmasın tüm devletler iktidar ilişkilerini doğallaştırmak ve kabul edilebilir kılmak için genel bir ideoloji çerçevesi oluşturmak durumundadır. Bu ideoloji çerçevesi, en nihayetinde toplumun kaynaklarının daha büyük bölümüne erişme ayrıcalığına ve yasal zor kullanma yetkisinin fiili kullanımı hakkına sahip seçkinlerin durumlarını yönetilenler nezdinde meşru kılma amacı güder. Milli ideolojiler, seçkinlerin bu hakları tüm milletin temsilcisi olmaları hasebiyle kullandıkları ön kabulü ile hareket ederler. Tezin dördüncü bölümünde Özbekistan’daki “milli müstakillik gayesi” ile Türkiye’deki Kemalizm’in mahiyeti gözden geçirilmiştir. Özbekistan’da klan temelli ilişki ağlarının varlığı ve gücü yüzleşilmesi gereken ilk siyasi gerçekliktir. Kurumsal olarak klanlar arası dengeleri sağlamak, etkili klanların liderlerine ve onların yakın çevrelerine küçük iktidar alanları sunmak ve bu alanlarda çeşitli mali imtiyazları bu klan liderlerinin kullanımına bırakmak Özbekistan’da istikrarlı bir idarenin kurulmasının ön koşuludur. İslam Kerimov da klanlar arası dengeyi korumaya ve kendisi açısından tehlikeli olabilecek bir muhalif hareketin ortaya çıkabileceği tek odak olan klanları memnun tutmaya sürekli dikkat etmiştir.



Kemalizm öncelikle Genç Türklerin ve İttihat Terakki geleneğinin mirasçısı olarak bir modernleşme ve batılılaşma ideolojisidir. Kemalizm ileri Batı ülkelerini mümkün olan en kısa sürede yakalamayı ve Batı tarzı ulusal bir devlet yaratmayı temel amacı olarak belirlemiştir. Esasında Kemalizm bu iki ana hedefe erişmek için oldukça pragmatik bir ideolojik şemadır. Öyle ki Kemalizmin genel ilkelerini ortaya koyan altı ok dahi cumhuriyetçilik ve halkçılıkta olduğu gibi günün siyasi gereklerine, laiklik ve devletçilikte olduğu gibi sosyo-ekonomik şartlara uygun zamanlarda ve biçimlerde peyderpey ortaya konulmuştur. Özbek ve Türk ulus yaratma projeleri devlet merkezli bir milliyetçilik bağlamında gelişmiştir. Zira her iki rejim de halihazırda mevcut olan sınırlar dahilinde ve bu sınırlar içerisindeki halk nazarında meşruiyete ihtiyaç duyuyorlardı. Bu durum her iki ideolojinin de ulusal sınırları dışındaki kandaşlarını kendi ideolojik perspektiflerinden dışlamaları sonucunu vermiştir. Kemalizm tıpkı Özbekistan'daki “milli müstakillik gayesi” gibi üzerinde anlaşmanın zorunlu olduğu siyaset üstü bir ideolojik hareket alanı dayatmakta, bu alan dışından feyizlenen herhangi bir alternatif ise çabucak “yabancı”, “kökü dışarda”, “zararlı” gibi ifadelerle yaftalanabilmektedir. Alternatif siyasi tahayyüllerin akıl dışı olmakla itham edilmesi hem mevcut hegemonik ideolojiye dokunulmazlık kazandırmakta hem de yasal zemin içinde muhalefet imkanlarının önüne set çekmektedir. Yasal çerçeve dışındaki muhalefet girişimleri ise rejimce kolayca marjinalleştirilebilmektedir.

Çarlık yönetiminin son dönemlerinden başlayarak tarihsel maddeci yöntem Rus tarih yazımında hakim konuma yükselmiştir. Ekim Devrimi'nin ardından Pokrovsky'nin etkisi altındaki Rus tarih yazımı Orta Asya'da uluslarının tarihlerini yazarken de etkili olmuştur. Her ne kadar Sovyetler Birliği altında bir Özbek Cumhuriyeti oluşturulmuş olsa da Sovyet Özbekistanı'nda tarihin öznesi Özbek milleti değil Özbek emekçileri ve ezilenleri idi. Bu durum tarihsel bir kategori olarak Özbek milletini yadsımakla beraber Çarlık dönemindeki Rus yayılcılığı karşısındaki direnişlere ezilen bir milletin karşı koyuşu olarak sempatiyle bakabilmekteydi. Ancak Stalin döneminde başlayan ve ardından Khruşçev ve

Brejnev dönemlerinde Sovyet rejiminin resmi görüşü haline gelen yeni tarih anlayışında Orta Asya halklarının Rus Devleti'ne dahil olması olumlanmakta, bu sürecin Orta Asya'nın Rusya'daki ilerici ve devrimci Sovyet Devrimi'nin etkilerinden yararlanması sonucunu doğurduğu ileri sürülmekteydi. Özbek tarihi bu kapsamda Rus tarihine eklemlenmiş, Rusya merkezli tarih yazımının figüranı olmak durumunda kalmıştır. 1991 yılındaki bağımsızlığın ardından Özbek tarih yazıcıları öncelikle Özbekistan'ı merkez alan bir tarihi oluşturmaya girişmişlerdir. Hamid Ziyaev'in çalışmaları başta olmak üzere Özbekistan'ın resmi tarih yazımı tüm tarihi Özbek milletinin bağımsızlık yolunda mücadelesi olarak yeniden kurgulamışlardır.

Selçuklu ve Osmanlı tarih yazımı geniş ölçüde saray vaka'nüvislerinin sultanın yaptığı seferleri efsane biçimde anlatmaları ve dini hikayelerin de bu olayların gerçekliği içerisine karıştırıldığı kronolojik bir dizin şeklindedir. Osmanlı'nın son asrında Tanzimat dönemi Batı etkisinde bir Osmanlı resmi tarih yazıcılığına cevaz vermiştir. İlk defa sultanın ya da hanedanın tarihinden ziyade Osmanlı devletinin tarihi yazılır olmuştur. 2. Abdülhamid döneminde ise artık okullarda okutulan ve devletin ideolojisini yansıtan resmi bir Osmanlı tarihinden söz etmek mümkündür. Ne var ki bu resmi Osmanlı tarihi milli olmaktan çok uzaktır; Abdülhamid rejiminin ideolojisi olan Osmanlıcılık ve İslamcılık'ın etkisi altındadır. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin kuruluşunu izleyen ilk yıllarda yeni bir tarih yazımına girilmemiş, Osmanlı'nın son yıllarının muktedir fırkası İttihat ve Terakki'nin döneminde yazılmış olan tarih kitaplarıyla öğrenime devam edilmiştir. Ancak 1930'lu yıllar Anadolu merkezli yeni bir tarih yazımının devletçe benimsendiği bir dönem olmuştur. Bu yıllarda Avrupa merkezli tarihçilik tamamen reddedilmiş, Türklerin başat aktör olduğu yeni bir tarih kurgulanmış, hatta daha da ileri gidilerek tüm dünya medeniyetinin temelini Türkler tarafından atıldığı ileri sürülmüştür. Birinci ve özellikle İkinci Türk Tarih Kongreleri bu görüşün yaygın bir tevecüh gördüğü toplantılar olmuşlardır.

Çarlık döneminde Orta Asya’da kapsamlı bir dil politikası mevcut değildir. Sovyet döneminde ise Ekim Devrimi’ni izleyen ilk yıllardan itibaren hırslı bir okuma yazma seferliğinin eşlik ettiği bilinçli bir dil politikası uygulanmıştır. 1917 sonrasındaki Sovyet yönetimi Orta Asya’da ulus devletlerin şekillenmesinde ve ulusal dillerin bugünkü biçimiyle oluşmasında başlıca amil olmuştur. Önceden tarihte hiç varolmamış Özbekistan yaratıldıktan sonra, genel dil politikası araçları olarak eğitimin yaygınlaştırılması, okuma-yazma seferberliği, alfabe değişiklikleri, yeni sınırları içerisinde Özbek kimliğini pekiştirmek için en kuvvetli silahlar olmuşlardır. İronik olarak Özbek kimliğini güçlendirmek için kullanılan aynı araçlar, hem Rus dil ve kültürünün yaygınlaşması hem de Özbekistan’ın komşu Türk-dilli halklardan ayrışması amacıyla da etkin olarak kullanılmıştır. 1989’da Sovyetler Birliği dağılırken Özbek milliyetçilerinin caddelerde haykırdığı ilk taleplerin Özbek diliyle ilgili olması şaşırtıcı değildir.

Tezin bu bölümünde Birlik Halk Hareketi tarafından ısrarla dillendirilen Özbekçe ile ilgili talepler İslam Kerimov rejimi tarafından sahiplenilirken Birlik’in giderek marjinal bir hareket haline dönüşmesi ele alınacaktır. Özbekistan’da rejim kendini güvende hissedene dek Özbekçe ile ilgili talepleri benimser görünmüş, bu talepler devamlı olarak hükümetin gündeminin ön sıralarında yer almıştır. Bu dönemde Özbekçe tek resmi dil ilan edilmiş, tüm devlet yazışma ve görüşmelerinin Özbekçe yapılması kararlaştırılmış ve eğitimde ise Latin temelli Özbek alfabesinin kullanımına geçileceği ilan edilmiştir. 1993 yılında tüm muhaliflerin tasfiyesi ve Kerimov’un iktidarını emin görmesini takiben Özbekçe iktidarın öncelikleri arasından düşmüştür. Bağımsızlığın ardından geçen yirmi senelik süreye rağmen henüz eğitimde Kiril alfabesinin kullanımı yer yer sürmekte, bazı devlet dairelerinde de bu alfabeye dayalı Özbekçe yazışmalar yapılmaktadır. Ayrıca Rusça’nın Özbekistan’daki etkisi tam anlamıyla aşılamamıştır.

Türkiye’de ise dil politikalarının seyri Özbekistan’ın tam tersi istikamette gerçekleşmiştir. 1927’ye dek Mustafa Kemal ve çevresindeki kadro gerek Türkiye

Büyük Millet Meclisi içindeki İkinci Grup başta olmak üzere muhalif çevrelerle gerekse Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun son döneminin güçlü İttihatçı ekibinin devamı mahiyetindeki rakipleriyle mücadeleye öncelik vermiştir. Bu dönemde dilde sadeleşme ya da tarih yazımı gibi riskli konularda eyleme girişilmemiştir. 1927 sonlarından başlayarak ise önce tarih ardından da dil alanlarında oldukça köktenci politikalarla geçmişin ideolojik mirasından kopuş hedeflenmiştir. 1928 yılındaki alfabe değişikliği ve yeni harflerin yaygınlaşması için Mustafa Kemal ve arkadaşlarının giriştiği kampanya çok hızlı gerçekleştirilmiş bir reformdur. Ardından gelen Dil Kongreleri dilde sadeleşme evresinin işaretlerini vermiş, 1930'larda Arapça ve Farsça kelime ve gramer kuralları dilden tasfiye edilmeye çalışılmıştır. Bu dönemde savunulan ve dünyadaki tüm dillerin kökeninde Türkçe'nin olduğunu iddia eden Güneş Dil Teorisi gibi absürd denemeler bir yana bırakılacak olursa, Türkçe'nin sadeleşmesi yalnız Özbekçe'nin durumu ile karşılaştırıldığında değil dünyadaki pek çok diğer dilsel denemeye kıyasla da kökten ve hızlı bir biçimde gerçekleştirilmiştir.

Hem Özbekistan hem de Türkiye radikal modernleşme süreçleri yaşamışlardır. Sovyet Marksizmi ve Kemalizm modernleşme bağlamında birbirine benzer iki ideolojidir. Bağımsızlık sonrası Özbek liderleri de defalarca Türk ulus yaratma sürecinin kendileri için Sovyet sonrası dönemde uygulanacak en münasip model olduğunu ifade etmişlerdir. Bu çalışmada Kemalist ulus yaratma politikaları ile Özbekistan'ın iki aşamada, Sovyet devrimi sonrası ve bağımsızlık sonrası gerçekleştirdiği ulus yaratma politikalarının büyük oranda birbirine benzediği ortaya çıkmıştır. Zira her iki ülkenin elitleri de öncelikle kendi yönetimlerinin istikrarı ve meşruiyetini sağlamlaştırmak için ulus yaratma politikalarını uygulamışlardır. Zorunlu olarak terk edilen eski çok uluslu ideolojik meşruiyet temelinin yerine dil, tarih ve ideoloji alanlarındaki benzer uygulamalarla yeni bir meşruiyet temeli oluşturulmaya çalışılmıştır. Şüphesiz ulusal bir kimlik yaratma yoluyla meşruiyet sağlama tüm bu politikaların nihail amacıydı.

# Curriculum Vitae

## PERSONAL INFORMATION

Surname, Name: Yurtbilir, Mustafa Murat  
Nationality: Turkish (TC)  
Date and Place of Birth: 11 May 1976, Kırşehir  
e-mail: yurtbilir@yahoo.com

## EDUCATION

Degree	Institution	Year of Graduation
MA	Uppsala University, Development Studies	2006
MA	Istanbul University, Faculty of Political Sciences International Relations	2002
BA	Boğaziçi University, Political Sciences and International Relations	1999
High School	Sakarya Anadolu High School, Adapazarı-Sakarya	1994

## WORK EXPERIENCE

Year	Place	Enrollment
October 2010	ECORYS & Ministry of Environment of Turkey IPA Coordination and Implementation Centre, Ankara	Short Term Expert
February 2007 – September 2009	European Union Information Centre, Ankara	Senior Information Officer
October 2006 – January 2007	“External Evaluation of Girls’ Education Campaign”, Ankara & Sakarya	Data Collector and Field Researcher
October 2004 – March 2005	Global Strategy Institution, Ankara	Expert at the Central Asia and Caucasus Department

## FOREIGN LANGUAGES

Advanced English, Fluent German, Intermediate Uzbek, Intermediate Swedish

## **PUBLICATIONS**

- 1) “An *a la Turca* Camp for European Youngsters”, *Levant Report Series*, No: 2, December 2008, Netherlands Alumni Association of Turkey, Ankara.
- 2) “Birth and Transformation of Arab Nationalism: A Historical Overview” (in Turkish), *Global Strateji*, Volume: 10, 2007, Ankara.
- 3) “Turkey’s Caucasian Policy in the Aftermath of the Cold War: a) Abkhazia, b) Adjara, c) Nagorno Karabakh” research paper prepared for Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Center for Strategic Research, August 2002.

## **CONFERENCE PAPERS & PRESENTATIONS**

- 1) “Crafting an Identity: Soviet Language Policies and the Formation of the Uzbek Identity” (in Turkish), The Turkish Political Science Association VIII. Graduate Conference December 4, 2010, Okan University, Istanbul.
- 2) “Population Factor in EU-Turkish Relations: Trouble or Opportunity?” (in Turkish), 50 Years of Turkey-European Union Relations Conference Ankara University European Communities Research and Practice Centre (ATAUM), April 16, 2009, Ankara.
- 3) “Creative Approaches to Development, Entrepreneurship and Innovative Design” (in Turkish), Panel Rappoeurtuer, National Agency 2009 Innovation and Creativity Year Turkey National Conference, 9 April 2009, Ankara.
- 4) “Emergence and Transformation of Arab Nationalism: A Historical Overview” Conference Paper presented at “The Sixth METU Conference on International Relations: Middle East in Global and Regional Perspectives” June 15, 2007, Ankara.
- 5) “Dilemma of Critical Security Studies: How to Reconcile Security with Emancipatory Project of Critical Theory?”, Conference paper presented at “The Fifth METU Conference on International Relations: International Security Old Issues and New Challenges”, June 16, 2006, Ankara.
- 6) “Nationalism and Legitimacy” (in Turkish), Conference presentation at Student Conference of METU Historical Society, “Lesson: History, Topic: Nationalism(s)”, May 16, 2007, Ankara.

## **HOBBIES**

Chess, Movies, Walking, Traveling, Backgammon