

RUSSIA AND THE WESTERN MISSILE DEFENSE INITIATIVES:  
TOWARDS A PARTNERSHIP IN THE MAKING?

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## **ABSTRACT**

### **RUSSIA AND THE WESTERN MISSILE DEFENSE INITIATIVES: TOWARDS A PARTNERSHIP IN THE MAKING?**

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This thesis analyzes the Western missile defense initiatives and their role in Russia's relations with NATO and the U.S. The main question of this thesis is whether the Western missile defense initiatives have paved the way for a new era of cooperation between Russia and the West or not. The main argument of this thesis is that Russia has failed to collaborate with NATO in a meaningful manner on missile defense issue as Russia has not adjusted its security policies and nuclear strategy, which are still based on the Cold War thinking, to the changing conditions of global security in the post Cold-War era. The missile defense initiatives have a negative impact on the relations between Russia and the West due to the intransigent stance of Russia on this issue. A robust cooperation can only be achieved between Russia and NATO if Moscow changes its Cold War mentality about global security issues.

This thesis consists of four main chapters apart from introduction and conclusion. The first main chapter focuses on the theoretical debates on the concept of nuclear deterrence. The following chapter explains the U.S. and Russian nuclear strategies from a historical perspective. The next chapter examines the historical evolution of the Western missile defense projects and Russia's negative reactions to the evolving projects. The last chapter focuses on the current Western missile defense projects, that have been developed since 2008 and Russia's reactionary positions.

Keywords: Missile Defense, Deterrence, Nuclear Strategy, NATO, Russia.

## ÖZ

### RUSYA VE BATI'NIN FÜZE SAVUNMASI GİRİŞİMLERİ: YENİ BİR ORTAKLIĞA DOĞRU MU?

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Yüksek Lisans, Avrupa Çalışmaları Bölümü

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Bu tez, Batı'nın füze savunması girişimlerini ve bu konunun Rusya'nın NATO ve ABD ile ilişkilerindeki rolünü analiz etmektedir. Tezde cevap aranan esas soru, füze savunması girişiminin Rusya ve Batı arasında yeni bir işbirliğinin yolunu açıp açmayacağıdır. Tezin başlıca argümanı, Rusya'nın, halen Soğuk Savaş anlayışına göre belirlediği güvenlik politikası ve nükleer stratejisini, Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemdeki değişen küresel güvenlik koşullarına göre uyarlayamaması nedeniyle, füze savunması konusunda NATO ile etkin bir işbirliğini sağlamada başarısız olduğudur. Füze savunması girişimleri Rusya'nın bu konudaki uzlaşmaz tutumu nedeniyle Rusya ve Batı arasındaki ilişkileri olumsuz etkilemektedir. Rusya ve Batı arasında sağlam bir işbirliği ancak Rusya'nın küresel güvenlik konularındaki Soğuk Savaş zihniyetini değiştirmesiyle mümkün olabilecektir.

Tez, giriş ve sonuç dışında dört ana bölümden oluşmaktadır. İlk bölümde, nükleer caydırıcılık kavramına ilişkin kurumsal tartışmalar ele alınmaktadır. İkinci bölümde, ABD ve Rusya'nın nükleer stratejileri tarihsel olarak incelenmektedir. Bir sonraki bölüm, Batı'nın füze savunması projelerini ve Rusya'nın bu projeye yönelik olumsuz tepkisini ele almaktadır. Son bölüm ise, Batı'nın günümüzdeki füze savunması projeleri ve Rusya'nın bu konudaki uzlaşmaz tutumuna odaklanmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Füze Savunması, Caydırıcılık, Nükleer Strateji, NATO, Rusya.

To My Wife, IŞIL

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM.....	iii
ABSTRACT.....	iv
ÖZ.....	v
DEDICATION.....	vi
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....	vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	viii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.....	x
CHAPTER	
1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
2. CONCEPT OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND ITS APPLICABILITY.....	10
2.1 Term of Nuclear First Use and Its Relevance to Nuclear Deterrence.....	13
2.2 Debate on the Applicability of Nuclear Deterrence and the Relevance of International Relations Theories.....	15
2.3 Alternatives of Nuclear Deterrence.....	20
2.4. Evaluation of Nuclear Deterrence.....	23
3. EVOLUTION OF THE U.S. AND RUSSIAN NUCLEAR STRATEGIES AND THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL.....	27
3.1 History of the U.S. Nuclear Strategy.....	28
3.2 Soviet/Russian Response to the Evolution of U.S. Nuclear Strategy.....	40
3.3 Nuclear Arms Control.....	48
3.4. Non-Proliferation Regimes and Counter Proliferation Measures.....	55
4. EVOLUTION OF THE U.S.-NATO MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAM UNTIL OBAMA ADMINISTRATION AND SOVIET/ RUSSIAN MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY AS A RESPONSE.....	58
4.1. Origins of Current U.S. Missile Defense.....	59
4.2. Origins of Soviet/Russian Missile Defense Projects.....	69
4.3. Missile Defense of NATO until Lisbon Summit.....	71
	viii



4.4. Cooperation and Challenges Between Russia and the West Until Obama Administration.....	74
5. CURRENT WESTERN MISSILE DEFENSE PROJECTS AND RUSSIAN RESPONSE.....	79
5.1. U.S. Current Missile Defense Projects.....	81
5.2. Russian Reaction to the U.S. Missile Defense.....	84
5.3. NATO’s Missile Defense since Lisbon Summit.....	90
5.4. Russian Negative Stance on Recent Developments Regarding the Western Missile Defense System.....	92
6. CONCLUSION.....	101
REFERENCES.....	106
APPENDICES	
A. THE ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY.....	117
B. TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU.....	123

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABM	Anti Ballistic Missile
BMDO	Ballistic Missile Defense Organization
EPAA	European Phased Adaptive Approach
GPALS	Global Protection against Limited Strikes
HOE	Homing Overlay Experiment
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICBM	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
INF	Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces
IRBM	Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile
JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JSOP	Joint Strategic Objectives Plan
MAD	Mutual Assured Destruction
MDA	Missile Defense Agency
MIRV	Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicle
MRBM	Medium Range Ballistic Missile
NACMA	NATO Air Command and Control System Management Agency
NC3A	NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency
NMD	National Missile Defense
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
NRC	NATO Russia Council
NSC	National Security Council
PSI	Proliferation Security Initiative
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty
SLBM	Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile
SDI	Strategic Defense Initiative
SIOP	Single Integrated Operations Plan
SORT	Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty

SRBM	Short Range Ballistic Missile
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
THAAD	Theatre High Altitude Area Defense
TMD	Theatre Missile Defense
USAAF	United States Army Air Forces
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

#### 1.1.Scope of the Thesis:

This thesis endeavours to illustrate the various perspectives of the western missile defense initiatives and the role of this issue in relations between Russia and the western world, namely the United States and NATO. This thesis also puts forward that missile defense issue has created another source of conflict in relations between Russia and the West due to the intransigence of Russia.

As a result of examining the historical background of nuclear policies of Russia as well as the West, I came to a conclusion that Russia sees the Western missile defense initiatives from the perspective of Cold War era and realist theory which stresses balance of power among states and puts military power into the centre of its theory. Russia's concerns over the Western missile defense initiatives have centred on whether this programme will lessen Russian deterrence capacity. In this regard, one has to know the concept of deterrence.

It is intended by deterrence to prevent someone from doing something. The objective of deterrence is to make the adversary not to implement a certain action or policy. In this regard, nuclear deterrence targets the enemy not to wage a war by using nuclear weapons. For many scholars, the main reason that there existed no nuclear world war was the nuclear deterrence between the U.S. and Russia. Michael Howard defines deterrence "as a policy that seeks to persuade an adversary through the threat of military retaliation that the costs of using military force to resolve political conflict will outweigh the benefits."<sup>1</sup> Bernard Brodie, the author of the

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<sup>1</sup> Arpit Rajain, *Nuclear Deterrence in Southern Asia: China, India and Pakistan*, London: SAGE Publications, 2005, p. 63.

book titled *The Absolute Weapon* stresses that “all sides would lose in any nuclear war meaning that only war avoidance was acceptable.”<sup>2</sup>

International Relations Scholar John Lewis Gaddis states that nuclear weapons created deterrence between the blocs during the Cold War era, but he adds that the non-existence of war between the U.S. and Soviet Union was not only driven by nuclear weapons. Non-proliferation scholar Ward Wilson comes to the point that “the practical record of nuclear deterrence shows doubtful successes and proven failures”.<sup>3</sup> Thomas Schelling believes that “in deterrence there always exists an element of unpredictability.”<sup>4</sup>

During the Cold War, deterrence was between two super powers, namely between the east and west. The U.S. was the main guardian of the western world and in order to prevent any nuclear attack, the U.S. introduced different type of nuclear strategies due to the fact that the Soviet Union obtained nuclear weapons and formalized strategies accordingly. Nuclear strategies were one of the main features determining the relations between the West and Russia. The end of the Cold War brought the collapse of the Soviet Union which was the central focus of the U.S. nuclear policy. The new challenges after the Cold War were the proliferation of nuclear weapons as a result of the acquisition of nuclear weapons by third countries. In new world order, the U.S. developed a programme, namely missile defense with a view to safeguarding itself, its deployed forces and its allies around the world.

It is worth noting that the missile defense programme dates back to the end of the Second World War. The historical background has to be understood with a

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<sup>2</sup> Donald M. Snow, *National Security for a New Era: Globalization and Geopolitics*, New York: Pearson, 2007, p. 222.

<sup>3</sup> David Cortright and Raimo Vayrynen, *Towards Nuclear Zero*, New York: Routledge, New York, 2010, p.89

<sup>4</sup> Rajain, *op.cit.*, p. 70.

view to grasping the various aspects of the current missile defense program. During the Cold war, rather than averting a global nuclear war, the intention of the missile defense projects of the U.S. and the Soviet Union was to prove their superiority against each other. In 1946, the U.S. initiated programs to this end. The launching of the first artificial satellite by the Soviets in 1957 created a new atmosphere for supporting anti ballistic missile systems. However, until 1980s, all missile defense projects were not considered cost effective and had major technical problems. Even Strategic Defense Initiative (Star Wars Project of the U.S. President Reagan) remained a research and development project. President Bush came to Presidency with commitment to develop a missile defense system. September 11 attacks ensured an atmosphere conducive to introduce such a system. After September 11 attacks, the U.S. President Bush stated that a missile defense system would be necessary for the security of the U.S. During that time, Russia was not seen as a threat and it was envisioned that the ballistic missile threat would drive from other countries. The focus was on terrorism and rogue states. At the same time, NATO developed its own missile defense project and the proposed U.S. system was considered as a significant contribution to the protection of the alliance.

When the U.S. President Obama came to power, the missile defense program of Bush administration was changed on the basis of revised evaluations. In this regard, a phased adaptive approach was adopted with time limit on each phase and this system becomes the contribution of the U.S. to NATO effort in this regard. As a result of the endorsement of the Strategic Concept at NATO Lisbon Summit in November 2010, NATO defined the establishment of a missile defense system to defend the member states territories and populations against ballistic missile attack as a main pillar of NATO collective defense.

The issue of missile defense has been one of the decisive factors in relations between the West and Russia. The U.S. and NATO officials have been endeavouring to convince Russia that this system is not against this country and does not aim at reducing the Russian nuclear deterrence. The U.S. and NATO have

been trying to seek the ways for cooperation with Russia on missile defense projects and stress that this system will create an opportunity to work together to build the mutual security. It is put forward by the Western states that the purpose of this system is to strengthen defense against the growing missile threats and all citizens of Europe as well as Russia are protected with this system. However, Russia has still approached missile defense issue from the Cold War perspective and is not cooperating with the West in missile defense despite all these assurances.

Stephen J. Cimbala states in his book titled *Nuclear Weapons and Cooperative Security in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: The New Disorder* that “deterrence seemed to have worked...the absence of war does not prove the success of deterrence.”<sup>5</sup> He approaches the issue of missile defense from defense dominance while at the same time advocates missile defense creates an opportunity for the cooperation between Russia and the West if Russia agreed to participate in this initiative.

David Cortright and Raimo Vayrynen emphasize in their book named *Towards Nuclear Zero* that “missile defense programs also provide a means of reinforcing alliance and security relationships that have weakened with the rise of multi-polarity...the destabilising impacts of missile defense will continue.”<sup>6</sup> Nikolai Sokov puts forward in his article titled *Nuclear Weapons in Russian National Security Strategy* that “Russian view of missile defense is informed by the traditional view of strategic deterrence built around mutual vulnerability,”<sup>7</sup> while Andrei Shoumikhin stresses in his article titled *Nuclear Weapons in Russian Strategy and Doctrine* that “Russia will most probably continue sticking to its

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<sup>5</sup> Stephen J. Cimbala, *Nuclear Weapons and Cooperative Security in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: The New Disorder*, New York: Routledge, 2010. p.11.

<sup>6</sup> Cortright and Vayrynen, *op.cit.*, p.151-152.

<sup>7</sup> Nikolai Sokov, “Nuclear Weapons in Russian National Security Strategy”, in Stephen J. Blank (ed.), *Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present and Future*, 2011, p. 230, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1087.pdf> (accessed on 26 December 2011)

opposition to BMD and the need to restore formal linkages between strategic offensive and defensive systems in line with the classical model of MAD.”<sup>8</sup>

In this thesis, it is advocated that deterrence is still valid concept as Russia approaches missile defense from this perspective and states that stability between Russia and the West is based on threat to use nuclear weapons. When one looks at the recent statements of the Russian officials on missile defense, it is explicit that this issue has potential to generate a problem in Russian relations with the West rather than creating an area of cooperation. The irreconcilable stance of Russia prevents cooperation with the West on this issue.

## **1.2. Argument of the Thesis:**

Unlike the scholars who state that Russia could cooperate with NATO in the creation of common missile defense system, this thesis argues that due to Russia’s failure to adjust its security policies and nuclear strategy to the changing conditions of global security in the post Cold-War era, Moscow has failed to cooperate with NATO in a meaningful manner on this issue. Russia’s cooperation could only be possible if this country changes its Cold War mentality about global security issues. However, when we look at the security policies implemented by Russia recently, this country is far from moving ahead towards this way.

Russia still thinks of the missile defense issue from the Cold War perspective and considers itself as one of the super powers in the world. Russia believes that the U.S. could obtain the capacity to remove Russian capability to respond to an attack against itself and worries about that this capacity could be used

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<sup>8</sup> Andrei Shoumikhin, “Nuclear Weapons in Russian Strategy and Doctrine”, in Stephen J. Blank (ed.), *Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present and Future*, 2011, p. 139, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1087.pdf>. (accessed on 26 December 2011)



as a means to exert political pressure despite the fact that there is almost no possibility for a large scale nuclear war. In Russia, it is still believed that this system is intended against Russia despite all the U.S. guarantees that this system is not aimed at this country. Thus, this stance of Russia prevents cooperation on missile defense with NATO.

NATO and the U.S. offered Russia to cooperate on NATO's missile defense system and emphasized several times that this system would be targeted against rogue states which are challenging the new world order and creating a threat to the West. NATO and the U.S. gave Russia an opportunity to integrate with the West as a signal of their goodwill. However, Russia does not cooperate with the West and tries to impose its rules on the West in this regard. Russian offers regarding this issue such as introducing a joint missile defense system or signing a legally binding agreement should be perceived from this perspective.

Russia brought to the attention that this country would be interested in a joint system with NATO. It was stated by Russian officials that Russia and NATO could introduce a joint defense system with a view to safeguarding Europe against missile threats from rogue states. However, Russian proposal was not accepted by the U.S. and NATO on the grounds that this would be a violation of the Article 5 of NATO Treaty on mutual defense as Russia is not member of this organization. This Russian approach indicates that Moscow still considers NATO as a threat.

Russia also offered a legally binding agreement specifying that no elements of the missile defense programme are aimed at Russia. It was not accepted as this would allow Russia determine the defense doctrine of NATO. In return, the U.S. offered written assurances instead of an agreement, but this was not admitted by Russia. Thus, the negotiations between Russia and the West seemed to have no progress on this issue due to Russian stance. It is clear that Russia does not aim at reaching a compromise with the West and will implement its own missile defense programme. When one examines the recent address of Russian President Medvedev

thoroughly, it appears that Russia is proceeding towards this way. As the presidential elections will be held in 2012 in Russia and the U.S., domestic political considerations will have influence over this issue. So, the reset policy which was set up with a view to creating a partnership between the U.S. and Russia will come to an end if Russia continues not to adjust its security policies, which are still based on the Cold War thinking, in accordance with the facts of new world order. As a result, Russia will miss an opportunity to integrate with the Western system by not accepting the cooperation offer of NATO on missile defense issue.

### **1.3. Methodology:**

In this thesis, the influence of the missile defense issue over the relations between Russia and the West, whether this matter has made positive contributions in this regard and Russian reactionary position on this issue were examined through the official statements and the documents which are available on the internet. In order to get the most updated information on this issue, relevant news and remarks of the high ranking military and Foreign Service officials as well as policy makers were used in this study. It was put special emphasis on scrutinizing the views of all officials from the U.S., Russia and NATO with a view to preventing to give a one sided view on this issue.

In addition, I also surveyed the secondary literature concerning the subject. This literature includes mainly the key books and articles on the development of the missile defense programme and Russia's reactions to this programme. Historical references were also used in this regard. The theoretical background was scrutinized through the books and articles which were written on deterrence. Nuclear strategies of the U.S. and Russia were examined by way of relevant books and articles explaining the historical background. The main official documents which were released by the relevant Ministries were referred. I also examined the military texts on this issue such as the ones prepared by the U.S. Army War College

and U.S. Missile Defense Agency. The military doctrines and the reports of the U.S. Congress were studied in a detailed way as well.

#### **1.4. Organization of Chapters:**

This study is composed of six chapters. It starts with the introduction. The second part focuses on the theoretical debates on the concept of nuclear deterrence. In this regard, the term of deterrence was defined and the prerequisites for a deterrence to work were laid out. In addition, the relevance of the term nuclear first use to nuclear deterrence was discussed. I also analyse the relevant international relations theories and concentrate on their views regarding the concept of deterrence. Also, the alternatives of nuclear deterrence were studied and in the end, the question of whether nuclear deterrence, itself has averted the nuclear war was argued. In this chapter, the objective is to question whether deterrence is a still valid concept to explain the relations between Russia and the West and Russian reactionary position in terms of missile defense.

The following part aims at explaining the U.S. and Russian nuclear strategies from a historical perspective. In this chapter, the history of the U.S. nuclear strategy was explained starting from the second half of the 1940s until today. I also examined in this chapter the Soviet/Russian response to the U.S. nuclear strategy. In order to understand the role of nuclear weapons in U.S.-Soviet/Russian relations, I also studied nuclear arms control and non proliferation regimes as well as counter proliferation measures. To explain the history of nuclear strategies is useful with a view to understanding the current nuclear policies of Russia and the West.

The fourth part examines the historical evolution of the Western missile defense projects and Russia's negative reactions to the evolving projects. In this chapter, the special emphasis was put on the role of missile defense programme over the relations among the U.S., Russia and NATO. In this regard, while the

Soviet missile defense program and the Soviet missile defense projects introduced as a reaction to the U.S.'s were explained, I also analysed the attempts of NATO to develop such a system. In order to give the current perspective on this issue, I made classification and reviewed the latest developments in the following chapter.

The fifth part focuses on the current Western missile defense projects and the intransigent attitude of Russia in this regard. The U.S. missile defense program which is a national contribution to NATO was explained. NATO's current attempts on this issue were also scrutinized. In this chapter, whether the missile defense issue creates an opportunity for enhancing the relations between Russia and the West or paves the way for another concern of dispute was also discussed by referring to Russian inflexible stance and the efforts exerted by the U.S. to convince Russia that this program is not against this country. The recent statements of the Russian President Medvedev and the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to NATO, Rogozin were systematically analysed in order to make assumptions in this regard.

In conclusion, I put forward that the issue of missile defense is far behind creating an area of partnership between Russia and the West due to Russian negative response to Western proposals and negatively impacts the relations of Russia with Western states in this regard. This chapter also claims that a solid cooperation can only be succeeded between Russia and NATO if Moscow develops its security policies and nuclear strategy considering the changing conditions of global security in the post Cold War era.

## CHAPTER 2

### CONCEPT OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND ITS APPLICABILITY

This chapter focuses on the theoretical debates on the concept of nuclear deterrence. In this context, I will explain the term of deterrence and lay out its prerequisites. In addition, I will also discuss the relevance of the term nuclear first use to nuclear deterrence while analysing the relevant international relations theories by way of concentrating on their views in relation to this concept. In this chapter, the alternative regimes of nuclear deterrence will be studied and in the end, the question of whether nuclear deterrence, itself has averted the nuclear war will be argued. In this chapter, the main intention is to question whether deterrence is a still valid concept to explain the relations between Russia and the West in terms of missile defense and inflexible stance of Russia regarding this issue.

Deterrence can be defined as averting someone to do something.<sup>9</sup> The action which will be averted has to be clearly identified and the enemy's calculations must be explicitly grasped.<sup>10</sup> The driving force in deterrence is that the actions of the aggressor would be responded by way of retaliation. Deterrence becomes unclear when it does not have credibility. There are certain prerequisites for party B is deterred by party A.<sup>11</sup> The actions and thoughts of Party B have to be recognized by party A. Thus, party A will be able to find out how to deter party B not to take action. Party B has to consider and act in coherence with the understanding of party A. There has to be no likelihood for confusion between the parties. Therefore, party

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<sup>9</sup> Andrew J. Goodpaster, C. Richard Nelson and Seymour J. Deitchman, "Deterrence: An Overview", in Naval Studies Board Commission on Physical Sciences, Mathematics and Applications National Research Council (eds.), *Post Cold War Conflict Deterrence*, Washington D.C.: National Academy Press, 1997, p.12.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p.13-15.

<sup>11</sup> Donald C. Whitmore, *Revisiting Nuclear Deterrence Theory*, 1998, [http://www.abolishnukes.com/short\\_essays/deterrence\\_theory\\_whitmore.html](http://www.abolishnukes.com/short_essays/deterrence_theory_whitmore.html) (accessed on 26 December 2011)

B has to be acquainted with what actions will give rise to retaliation and understand that the results would not be satisfactory when compared to the rewards to be obtained from the banned deed.<sup>12</sup>

Researchers and politicians have tried to explain the power of nuclear weapons with regards to their damaging capacity to deter states from wishing to obtain them since the invention of these weapons. In fact, “the non-use of these weapons has made them simply deterrents.”<sup>13</sup> The basic foundation of nuclear deterrence is that nuclear weapons would not be employed by any state against the other states as long as the potential target maintains the capacity to inflict unacceptable damage.<sup>14</sup>

A nation that is intimidating the possible enemy must be prepared and competent of employing its nuclear weapons and has to make this fact grasped by the state to be deterred for the accomplishment of the deterrence. The deterrent state has to have the capacity to impose unacceptable destruction as well as assure the security of its nuclear armoury. There has to be no opportunity to eradicate the deterrent capacity of the threatening state by the opponent.<sup>15</sup>

In order to assure a successful deterrence, there has to be a will to employ nuclear weapons and it relies on psychological factors such as perception and communication. Both states should come to know that there exists a possibility that the threatening state will fulfil the assured act when necessary.<sup>16</sup> Deterrence

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<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>13</sup> Saira Khan, *Nuclear Weapons and Conflict Transformation*, London and New York: Routledge, 2009, p.31.

<sup>14</sup> David Barash and Charles P. Webel, *Peace and Conflict Studies*, Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2009, p. 77.

<sup>15</sup> Deterrence, <http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/history/cold-war/strategy/strategy-deterrence.htm> (accessed on 25 December 2011)

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*

succeeds if it is backed by a convincing pledge to pre-empt and when it does not have a bad record of assurance.<sup>17</sup>

“There are three important distinctions in deterrence threats: deterrence by denial, deterrence by punishment and deterrence by reward.”<sup>18</sup> Under deterrence by denial, a defender has the capacity to beat an assault or make an assault so damaging that the adversary would abstain from aggression. Deterrence by denial depends on each party’s military capacity.<sup>19</sup> Denial has coercive features but mainly it inclines to control, in which the aim of the threat is to control the circumstances with a view to rejecting the opponent from its strategic choices.<sup>20</sup> The basis of the deterrence by denial is the collapse of deterrence. In this case, it is tried to avert assault by persuading adversary via defense preparations that its assault would confront with assured breakdowns and there have to be strategic defensive and offensive forces, a control and command system and a community that is ready for a nuclear conflict.<sup>21</sup> On the other hand, deterrence by punishment is intimidation. In this case, the opponent is given strong motivation to behave in a specific manner.<sup>22</sup> Under deterrence by reward, an enemy is convinced to fulfil specific acts by ensuring motivation.<sup>23</sup>

Deterrence is used by states in order to guarantee their security. Thus, deterrence can also be defined as a policy that states employ to safeguard their

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<sup>17</sup>Colin S. Gray, *Maintaining Effective Deterrence*, 2003, p. 32, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=211>(accessed on 26 December 2011)

<sup>18</sup> Terence Roehrig, *From Deterrence to Engagement: The U.S. Defense Commitment to South Korea*, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2006, p. 12.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>20</sup> Lawrence Freedman, *Deterrence*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004, p. 37.

<sup>21</sup> Rajain, *op.cit.*, p. 62.

<sup>22</sup> Freedman, *op.cit.*, p. 37.

<sup>23</sup> Roehrig, *op.cit.*, p. 13.

countries from assault. In case of timing, there are two different cases in which deterrence policies take place: immediate and general deterrence. Immediate deterrence takes place in time of crisis. The defender understands that an assault is possible and reacts by retaliation to prevent the attack. In this case, the attacker has formulated or is going to formulate its choice to assault and the defender has to deter the attacker not to assault by way of immediate and specific counter threats. In general deterrence, the defender knowing the opponent would consider resorting to force maintains its forces and offers warnings to take action against any assault. In this case, since the assault is not about to happen soon, specific counter threats are not needed.<sup>24</sup>

States may encounter security risks to their allies in addition to themselves. This differentiation points to another division in deterrence theory. Trying to avert an assault against the state itself is primary deterrence and to deter an assault towards an ally is extended deterrence.<sup>25</sup>

## **2.1 Term of Nuclear First Use and its Relevance to Nuclear Deterrence:**

A first strike occurs when a state considers that it has adequate nuclear weapons to beat its enemy and attain a success. A related term pre-emptive strike means starting to use nuclear weapons when a state foresees its opponent is planning a first strike. The term second strike (retaliatory strike) refers to a state's capacity to impose intolerable destruction against its enemy after it takes the first strike.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 14-15.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 16.

<sup>26</sup> Joseph M. Siracusa, *Nuclear Weapons: A very short introduction*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, p.64.



First strike stability refers to a situation where no states with nuclear weapons have a robust advantage to strike first. The benefit for the first use is not enough to encourage a reasonable aggressor for a first strike.<sup>27</sup> “If one side has a second strike capability, the other, by definition, lacks a first strike capability.”<sup>28</sup> The outcome is regarded as strategic stability, a case in which none of these states has the advantage to strike first. In this case, conflict would not take place. Even this situation is not considered as peace; nevertheless it is a kind of situation in which warfare is delayed.<sup>29</sup>

Advocates of no-first use claim that taking the superior conventional forces of the Allied countries into consideration, resorting to nuclear weapons in a conventional attack would not be necessary. They say that a conventional reaction to a limited strike could be more balanced. They also put forward that this policy would create a significant non proliferation attempt by making nuclear deterrence more credible.<sup>30</sup>

Opponents of this policy state that no first use pledge would give confidence to the aggressor state, because this state believes that it could follow conventional hostility to succeed its political and territorial intentions with no danger of going across the nuclear brink, thus this policy would increase proliferation, since it would indicate that a chemical or biological strike would by no means give rise to a nuclear attack. They also stress that this policy would weaken the basic opinion that nuclear weapons are employed to prevent major assault in general.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> Cimbala, *op.cit.*, p.2

<sup>28</sup> Barash and Webel, *op.cit.*, p. 77.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>30</sup> Bruno Tertrais, *Nuclear policies in Europe*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, p.42-43.

<sup>31</sup> Bruno Tertrais, *Nuclear policies in Europe*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 43.

## 2.2 Debate on the Applicability of Nuclear Deterrence and the Relevance of International Relations Theories

While some scholars adopt the term of deterrence, others are doubtful whether deterrence could work under all circumstances. Scholars, such as Waltz, argue that in every situation where states obtain nuclear weapons, deterrence would work.<sup>32</sup> According to Waltz, instead of escalation, de-escalation might occur owing to the fears that the nuclear conflict might escalate since the loser state may employ larger warheads. He also states that “the likelihood of war decreases as deterrent and defensive capabilities increase.”<sup>33</sup> Advocates of this approach say that the stability in relations between super powers has been strengthened by nuclear deterrence.<sup>34</sup>

They say that one does not reject the idea that the existence of nuclear weapons and the likelihood of nuclear destruction, namely nuclear deterrence might have averted a general war during Cold war era.<sup>35</sup> They presume that the collapse of the Soviet Union and fall of communism were also caused by nuclear deterrent capacity of the West which avoided the occupation of the Western Europe by the former Soviet Union.<sup>36</sup> They argue that states try to deter other states from defying the status quo by intimidating to use force. In this view, deterrence relying on nuclear weapons intimidates to punish the enemy in ways so terrorizing that the adversary does not attempt a challenge.<sup>37</sup> Advocates say that during the Cold War

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<sup>32</sup> Khan, *op.cit.*, p.32.

<sup>33</sup> Kenneth N. Waltz, *Realism and International Politics*, New York and London: Routledge, 2008, p. 261-262.

<sup>34</sup> Robert J. Art, *America's Grand Strategy and World Politics*, New York: Routledge, 2009, p. 129.

<sup>35</sup> Stephen J. Cimbala, *the Past and Future of Nuclear Deterrence*, London: British Library, 1998, p. 11.

<sup>36</sup> Barash and Webel, *op.cit.*, p. 80.

<sup>37</sup> Avery Goldstein, *Deterrence and Security in the 21st Century: China, Britain and the Enduring Legacy of Nuclear Revolution*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000, p. 28.

and post Cold war era, the states with nuclear weapons hesitated to use these weapons against the U.S., since they thought that the U.S. would do what it said and devastate them.<sup>38</sup>

According to opponents, during the Cold War, there emerged a dialogue of shared expectations and deterrence worked successfully as a result of various factors such as strategic nuclear bipolarity, shared learning about the implementation of deterrence and the running of nuclear operations, a supportive legal and political framework with numerous talks on arms reduction, the readiness of other states to acknowledge the nuclear defense assurance of the U.S. or Soviet Union rather than following their respective nuclear program. However, in the post Cold War era, as Cimbala says;

New or aspiring nuclear powers lack the restraints of nuclear bipolarity, the experience in nuclear policy and strategy making and the time for shared nuclear learning among potential adversaries that was provided the Cold War Americans and Soviets.<sup>39</sup>

Opponents, such as William Potter stress that deterrence may not work even among the nuclear states. Potter stated that as deterrence characterizes the U.S.-Soviet relations, it does not describe the real situation.<sup>40</sup> They say that it would not work in a post Cold War world. They argue that the U.S. and Soviet Union understood one another's nuclear strategy and policies thanks to numerous rounds of negotiations on nuclear arms control.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> Tod Linnberg, "Nuclear and Other Retaliation after Deterrence Fails", in Henry D. Sokolski (ed.), *Getting Mad: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, Its Origins and Practice*, 2004, p. 330, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=585> (accessed on 26 December 2011)

<sup>39</sup> Cimbala, *op.cit.*, p. 11.

<sup>40</sup> Khan, *op.cit.*, p.32.

<sup>41</sup> Cimbala, *op.cit.*, p.11.

They stress that nuclear deterrence was a justification for living with nuclear threat that should have been removed via arms control or disarmament. They also say that throughout the Cold War, defense industry and military demands for bigger budgets were reinforced by deterrence.<sup>42</sup>

Opponents believe that there are several factors which make deterrence inefficient. They summarize these factors as non existence of communication among enemies, statesmen who are not notified about military capacities or main intentions of their enemies, leaders who are provoked by religious or nationalistic values, bureaucracies which are not able to take swift decisions, convictions depending on pre-emption and offensive strategies, pre-war misperception which is driven by secret agendas of the leaders and poor diplomacy.<sup>43</sup>

They argue that nuclear weapons caused caution in relations between the East and the West to a certain extent, but were not the only factors for the non appearance of the war between two blocs. They say that there is not any proof that states take decisions regarding the acquisition of nuclear weapons in terms of deterrence.<sup>44</sup> Some of the opponents such as Barash and Webel also argue;

The absence of a war between the United States and its NATO allies, on the one hand, and the former Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies, on the other hand, was not primarily due to nuclear deterrence, but to other factors, such as the absence of any wars between America and Russia prior to the advent of the nuclear age and to internal domestic considerations within each country.<sup>45</sup>

After I give general information concerning the debate on nuclear deterrence, I will explain the relevant international theories applicable to nuclear

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<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, p.34.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 12.

<sup>44</sup> Cortright and Vayrynen, *op.cit.*, p.89

<sup>45</sup> Barash and Webel, *op.cit.*, p.80.

deterrence. These are realism, neo-realism, liberalism, neoliberal institutionalism and constructivism.

The balance of power among states is emphasized by realism. The priority of military power and readiness for war are the main pillars of realist thought. Realists say that states look for reinforcing their power against their enemies. They stress that states obtain nuclear weapons when they think that they might confront with a nuclear attack. They also note that states might obtain nuclear powers for prestige or great power status.<sup>46</sup>

In realist theory, as there is a hypothesis that power is measurable, it says that when more military and economic power is gained by one state, then other states get the point that the former state has more benefit in a potential conflict. For realists, there is a relationship between peace and nuclear powers, because “nuclear weapons make power commensurable.”<sup>47</sup>

Neorealists believe that states strive for reinforcing their power against other states to guarantee their survival in an anarchic world. According to them, this causes states to make safe the balance of power and nuclear weapons can succeed it by strengthening security.<sup>48</sup> According to neorealist theory, “because of the enormous destructive power of nuclear weapons, any state that seeks to maintain its national security must balance against any rival state that develops nuclear weapons by gaining access to a nuclear deterrent itself.”<sup>49</sup> This tendency may create two

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<sup>46</sup> Cimbala, *op.cit.*, p. 100.

<sup>47</sup> Cimbala, *loc.cit.*, p. 91.

<sup>48</sup> Etel Solingen, “The political economy on restraint”, in Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote JR., Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller (eds.), *Going Nuclear: Nuclear Proliferation and International Security in the 21st Century*, London: The MIT Press, 2010. p. 38.

<sup>49</sup> Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?”, in Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote JR., Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller (eds.), *Going Nuclear: Nuclear Proliferation and International Security in the 21st Century*, London: The MIT Press, 2010. p.6.

situations: First, strong states do whatever they are able to by pursuing their own nuclear agenda. Second, weak states do what they are obliged to. They can take part in an alliance that provides balance with a nuclear power, using the commitment of nuclear reprisal by that ally. Having a nuclear ally may be only feasible option for weak states.<sup>50</sup>

Neorealism gives more emphasis on structural distinctions in international system on the happening of war and peace than realism. In this theory, internal politics, government system and leaders are not the driving force for the states to go nuclear. “What really matters is an understanding of the balancing dynamic in which one state’s pursuit of nuclear weapons begets another.”<sup>51</sup>

Liberals underline the importance of international institutions to decrease the possibility of any conflict. The centrality of states in international political system is not rejected by liberals. They acknowledge the state centric world, but they also claim the effects of non state actors in international politics.<sup>52</sup> Liberals also accept the theory of democratic peace. This theory argues that international peace is most likely to occur, because more states adopt democracy. Advocates of this theory state that democratic regimes do not wage a war against other democracies.<sup>53</sup> According to this theory, democratic states would not build their security on nuclear weapons. They say that the collapse of nuclear deterrence could cause total destruction and such risk would not be reasonable in the milieu of a relationship among democracies. It is argued that if a democratic state confronts with a non democratic enemy, this state can act in a different way. In this case, a

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<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>51</sup> William C. Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, “Divining Nuclear Intentions”, in Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cote JR., Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller (eds.), *Going Nuclear: Nuclear Proliferation and International Security in the 21st Century*, London: The MIT Press, 2010. p. 92.

<sup>52</sup> Cimbala, *op.cit.*, p. 100

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*

democratic state which is encouraged by the hatred of authoritarianism could deter non democratic enemies via nuclear weapons.<sup>54</sup>

Neoliberal institutionalists put more emphasis on the function of economics and they are hopeful about the prospect for reducing security dilemmas and succeeding enduring collaboration among states. In this theory, it is believed that international organizations are key elements for reaching cooperative results by way of easing information sharing about other's aims and capacities. They argue that countries take part in non proliferation attempts to tackle their security concerns instead of directly resorting to obtain nuclear weapons.<sup>55</sup> Constructivists adopt a different approach. As Cimbala states;

Constructivists would warn about the danger of a paradigm shift from the proliferation-averse behaviour by the major powers during the Cold War, to a more proliferation acceptant stance on the part of leading actors in the twenty first century.<sup>56</sup>

The influence of international norms on the policies of states is more emphasized by constructivists. They argue that norms and institutions may give rise to the existence of normative bans against using and obtaining nuclear weapons.<sup>57</sup>

### **2.3 Alternatives of Nuclear Deterrence:**

“Nuclear primacy is the opposite of a condition of nuclear deterrence based on assured retaliation.”<sup>58</sup> In this case, one state has a nuclear capability to strike first and can embark on a first strike against the enemy. This means that the state to

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<sup>54</sup> Solingen, *op.cit.*, p.42.

<sup>55</sup> Potter and Mukhatzhanova *op.cit.*, p.94.

<sup>56</sup> Cimbala, *op.cit.*, p. 102.

<sup>57</sup> Potter and Mukhatzhanova *op.cit.*, p.96.

<sup>58</sup> Cimbala, *op.cit.*, p. 13.

strike first can extremely damage nuclear forces of another state and this state will not have the capacity for an efficient second strike.<sup>59</sup>

In today's world, the state with exclusive control of nuclear weapons might abuse its power and aspiration would draw opposition from both nuclear powers and non nuclear states that worry about unilateral supremacy of this state. Their efforts to increase their power might lead to a war.<sup>60</sup> In case of nuclear primacy, some states try to struggle against the nuclear hegemon rather than forming nuclear arms group. They might try to go beyond the existing technology which is required for nuclear weapons. They can also develop advanced non nuclear technologies to this end. Thus, nuclear primacy could give rise to non nuclear armament.<sup>61</sup>

“If the continuation of a regime of deterrence based on assured retaliation is problematic and the aspiration to nuclear primacy is self defeating, a third alternative regime is defence dominance.”<sup>62</sup> Defense dominance is generally related with Star Wars Projects of the U.S. President Reagan in 1980s.<sup>63</sup> In defense dominance, the challenge is that this system creates new offenses rather than reinstating them.<sup>64</sup>

If nuclear deterrence, nuclear primacy and defense dominance do not successfully work, nuclear abolition might be another alternative. In this case, all nuclear weapons are removed and states cannot use them. The distrust on this regime is that nuclear proliferation and the possibility of nuclear war are the only substitutes of nuclear abolition. The supporters of nuclear abolition state that if all

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<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 13-14.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 20.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 17.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, p.20-21.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, p.21.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 23.



nuclear weapons are not removed, nuclear plentitude will be unavoidable. They emphasize that if nuclear weapons are not removed, all attempts will result in a less manageable global system and nuclear devices will be attained by terrorist groups.<sup>65</sup>

Advocates accept the fact that weapons can be invented, but they oppose referring to this as an excuse for why it is not possible to remove all nuclear weapons. They say the fact that these weapons could be recomposed after their elimination enables a form of a virtual deterrence.<sup>66</sup> Separation of warheads from launchers constitutes the basis of this theory. In this case, nuclear weapons are not set up anymore.<sup>67</sup> Nuclear weapons continue to be accessible, but assembling warheads and delivery vehicles take certain time. Thus, the prospect of first strike would be diminished and the role of nuclear weapons in international system would be lessened.<sup>68</sup> According to this theory, deterrence still continues with the understanding that states would have the capability and power to collect and set up nuclear weapons when deemed necessary in a certain time.<sup>69</sup>

Despite all international support for nuclear abolition, there has been an intellectual resistant. According to Waltz, more is better regarding the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is argued that new states with these weapons will take action vigilantly in the same manner with the ones who already have had nuclear weapons. The interactions between states regarding nuclear crisis management would diminish the possibility of a nuclear conflict.<sup>70</sup> According to Waltz, when more states have nuclear weapons, arms competition may slow down instead of speeding

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<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 25-26.

<sup>66</sup> Cortright and Vayrynen, *op.cit.*, p.155.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, p.149.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, p.24.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, p.149.

<sup>70</sup> Cimballa, *op.cit.*, p. 27.

up.<sup>71</sup> He also stresses that these weapons provide caution particularly in weak countries.<sup>72</sup> However, opponents of this approach state that as a result of changes in international system after the Cold War, culture plays a significant role in taking decisions and keeping rogue behaviours under control is not always likely given the fact that terrorists are not trying to obtain nuclear weapons with a view to making contribution to a process of nuclear crisis management.<sup>73</sup> They argue that nuclear plenitude might cause a less controllable international system; limited nuclear wars might turn into a reality among states with nuclear weapons and this might induce a global nuclear war.<sup>74</sup>

## **2.4 Evaluation of Nuclear Deterrence:**

The character of deterrence and the role of nuclear weapons have been changed by the proliferation challenges in the post Cold war period. During Cold war, deterrence was between two super powers namely, between two blocs. In today's world, deterrence is on triads rather than two blocs.<sup>75</sup> Unconventional security threats have hampered to have stability and non proliferation in the post Cold War era. The intent of the terrorist groups in obtaining nuclear weapons is to employ them, which means that with these non state actors; deterrence might not be considered as operative.<sup>76</sup> There is a valid basis to suspect nuclear weapons could deter or pre-empt a nuclear attack to be realized by terrorist groups, because a retaliatory assault against terrorist groups would not be easy to conduct. "The

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<sup>71</sup> Waltz, *op.cit.*, p. 263.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 265.

<sup>73</sup> Cimbala, *op.cit.*, p. 27.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 31.

<sup>75</sup> Cortright and Vayrynen, *op.cit.*, p.17.

<sup>76</sup> Khan, *op.cit.*, p.36.

central challenge in targeting terrorists is to locate them; no weapons, nuclear or otherwise, is useful if it cannot be directed to the relevant target.”<sup>77</sup>

There are some factors which have undermined the anticipated target of nuclear deterrence. These factors are quantity, credibility, vulnerability, human psychology and the risk of obtaining nuclear weapons by terrorist groups. Quantity is related with the fact that how much is considered as adequate for nuclear deterrence. There is no quantitative measure to ensure the leaders acknowledge that adequate retaliatory force is obtained for the deterrence of an enemy. A second problem with deterrence theory is credibility. Considering one side would be unreasonable to assault its enemy with nuclear weapons that has a capacity to retaliate, the other state would be similarly illogical to respond with nuclear arms.<sup>78</sup> In this theory, it is anticipated that the party which is deterred is always clever and rationale in decision making. However, this understanding could give rise to the idea that deterrence will succeed, yet in crisis situations, this could be deceptive.<sup>79</sup> So, deterrence must fulfil three prerequisites in order to be credible: “Firstly, the opponent must have vital interests, secondly the nuclear threat to be declared must be credible and thirdly, the opponent has to be susceptible to be deterred.”<sup>80</sup>

Deterrence preconditions that the states are not vulnerable against an assault or the likelihood of devastation in a first strike is very low. However, as nuclear missiles are improving, one raises anxiety about the rising vulnerability of nuclear weapons.<sup>81</sup> Deterrence theories presume rationality among decision makers or at

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<sup>77</sup> George Perkovich and James M. Acton, *Abolishing Nuclear Weapons*, New York: Routledge, 2008, p.32-33.

<sup>78</sup> Barash and Webel, *op.cit.*, p. 77-78.

<sup>79</sup>Whitmore, Donald C., *Revisiting Nuclear Deterrence Theory*, 1998, [http://www.abolishnukes.com/short\\_essays\\_/deterrence\\_theory\\_whitmore.html](http://www.abolishnukes.com/short_essays_/deterrence_theory_whitmore.html) (accessed on 26 December 2011)

<sup>80</sup> Rajain, *op.cit.*, p. 96-97.

<sup>81</sup> Barash and Webel. *op.cit.*, p.78.

least, the officials who have the right to conduct nuclear program will not change under hectic conditions. It also presumes that leaders will by all means control their feelings and their decisions will be based on a prudent cost and benefit evaluation. However, this theory pays no attention to the fact that many people think illogically under hectic situations. They might be poorly informed or have not sufficient information which induces them to get wrong conclusions regarding others' objectives.<sup>82</sup>

Nuclear deterrence theory does not have certain relevance for terrorist groups who are intended to attack. It could not be possible to deter terrorists, because they do not have worries and martyrdom may even be greeted.<sup>83</sup> It is not supposed that nuclear threat would be successful against terrorist groups, because it is not possible to set up a nuclear deterrent relationship with them.<sup>84</sup>

The failure of deterrence could cause proliferation of nuclear weapons. As Siracusa says;

If deterrence works reliably, as optimists argue, then there is presumably less to be feared in the spread of nuclear weapons. But if nuclear deterrence does not work reliably, pessimists maintain, more nuclear weapon states will presumably lead not just to a more complicated international arena but a far more dangerous one.<sup>85</sup>

To conclude, I come to a point that deterrence still has a significant role in relations between Russia and the West in terms of missile defence. One might suspect about the use of the deterrence in deterring a terrorist attack or an assault from a rogue state and it can be argued that deterrence does not have any significant role to this end. However, Russia still tries to keep its strategic deterrent power and

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<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, p.79-80.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, p.80.

<sup>84</sup> Rajain, *op.cit.*, p. 94.

<sup>85</sup> Siracusa, *op.cit.*, p.110.

acts uncompromisingly regarding the issue of missile defense. Thus, it could be concluded that deterrence still works in this regard despite all its inefficiencies. As deterrence is actually a Cold War concept, the stance of Russia on missile defense issue indicates that Russia perceives this issue from Cold War perspective and aims at ensuring deterrence against the West instead of making collaboration. I will explain the U.S. and Russian strategies from a historical perspective in the next chapter to indicate that Russian nuclear strategies are still based on the Cold War thinking giving priority to ensure deterrence.

## CHAPTER 3

### EVOLUTION OF THE U.S. AND RUSSIAN NUCLEAR STRATEGIES AND THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL

In this chapter, I will focus on the U.S. and the Soviet Union/Russian nuclear strategies starting from the Cold War era until today. Firstly, I will examine the making up of the U.S. nuclear policies from historical perspective and the Soviet response against the evolution of this strategy. I will also explain nuclear arms control and non proliferation regimes as well as counter proliferation measures. In this chapter, the main objective is to comprehend the role of nuclear weapons in the relations between the U.S. and Soviet Union/Russia.

The U.S. was the main protector of Western Europe and other parts of the world against communist threat during the Cold War. In this period, the U.S. policy had two main strategies about deterring an adversary from launching a nuclear war. One of these strategies was assured destruction, which means any adversary state would understand that an assault would be suicidal and be deterred from attempting such an act so long as nuclear power is able to react to a nuclear assault. A secure second strike capability is entailed in this case. Mutually assured destruction takes place if both parties have this capacity.<sup>86</sup> In this case, since both sides are vulnerable to possible retaliation, neither party can attempt to wage a war. This credibility entails both the acquisition of nuclear weapons and the ability of commanding, controlling, training and exercising of nuclear weapon delivery systems. In this case, the adversary knows in case of starting a nuclear assault; it would experience destructive retaliation.<sup>87</sup>

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<sup>86</sup> Amos A. Jordan, William J. Taylor JR., Michael J. Meese and Suzanne C. Nielsen, *American National Security*, Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2009, p. 348.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*

Massive retaliation was more apparent regarding the threat of punishment with a view to deterring the Soviet Union. The U.S. capacity to respond after enduring a first strike of the Soviet Union was the main concern for the U.S. “This added the term second strike to the growing nuclear literature.”<sup>88</sup>

Counterforce nuclear strategy is more determined than the first one. In this case, to deter the adversary, one has to go beyond retaliation and military forces must have the capacity to retaliate as well as to beat the adversary in case of a nuclear war. It preconditions several weapons with the capacity of devastating nuclear forces of adversary.<sup>89</sup>

### **3.1 History of the U.S. Nuclear Strategy:**

The accessibility of nuclear weapons has been a key matter in U.S. national security strategy since 1945.<sup>90</sup> The policy of the U.S. President Truman was uncertain regarding the military and political effectiveness of nuclear weapons. These weapons were considered as weapons of terror instead of weapons which were belonged to military artillery. Nuclear war plans were launched by the administration with a view to counterbalancing the nuclear capability of the Soviet Union. The U.S. President Truman intimidated the Soviet Union to deploy nuclear weapons during the Berlin crisis (1948) and the Korean War (1950-1952) even though both threats were uncertain and vague.<sup>91</sup>

The idea of nuclear deterrence was attempted to get connected to the new policy which was called containment by Truman administration with the intention

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<sup>88</sup> Rajain, *op.cit.*, p. 61.

<sup>89</sup> Jordan, Taylor JR, Meese and Nielsen, *op.cit.*, p.348-349.

<sup>90</sup> Sam C. Sarkesian, John Allen Williams and Stephen J. Cimbala, *U.S. National Security: Policy Makers, Processes and Politics*, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002., p. 281.

<sup>91</sup> David S. McDonough, *Nuclear Superiority: The New Triad and the Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, New York: Routledge, 2006, p. 14-15.

of averting the Soviet expansion. The administration expected its monopoly on nuclear weapons could drive the Soviet Union to withdraw from Eastern Europe.<sup>92</sup>

During his time, the framework for U.S. nuclear strategy was made. The National Security Council (NSC)-30 on U.S. Policy on Atomic Weapons was endorsed by the NSC in 1948. This document stressed that the national military establishment had to be prepared to use all means at the state's disposal in an efficient way, including atomic weapons for national security of the country. The administration institutionalized nuclear war planning in 1952. As McDonough states;

The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) governed wartime operations for the fiscal year, the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP) governed force requirements for the next three to five years and the Joint Long Range Strategic Estimate governed research and development requirements past the five-year JSOP plan.<sup>93</sup>

These three plans laid the foundation of the first Single Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP) in 1960 which considered the utility of nuclear weapons as a last resort. Steps that would start the making of thermonuclear super bombs and tactical nuclear weapons were also acknowledged. Nuclear components were positioned in Guam while non nuclear elements of nuclear weapons were set up in Morocco and Britain.<sup>94</sup>

The fact behind these decisions was the progress in Soviet nuclear arsenal. It was calculated that the Soviet Union would have 200 nuclear bombs with the capacity of destroying the U.S. During that time, several plans and reports were prepared highlighting nuclear and conventional weapons as integral war fighting elements with a view to devastating the industrial and military capabilities of the

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<sup>92</sup> Siracusa, *op.cit.*, p. 66.

<sup>93</sup> McDonough, *op.cit.*, p. 15.

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*



Soviet Union despite the unwillingness of the U.S. President Truman to consider the utility of nuclear weapons.<sup>95</sup>

Soviet Union was perceived as an aggressive ideological enemy that aimed at changing the status quo by Eisenhower administration and the U.S. Secretary of State Dulles. As McDonough says;

Rather than posing a conventional and thereby symmetrical challenge, Eisenhower announced an asymmetrical new look strategy that would rely on reacting to an adversary's challenges by applying one's strength against the other side's weaknesses.<sup>96</sup>

The crucial element in this approach was the massive retaliation doctrine which was codified in NSC 162/2 on Basic National Security Policy. This document stated that the U.S. had explicit determination to utilize its nuclear weapons and massive retaliatory striking power with a view to deterring an assault to be launched by the Soviet Union in Europe. Deterrence here was described as the capacity to deter the Soviet Union by way of superiority in nuclear weapons.<sup>97</sup> The U.S. Secretary of State Dulles argued in his Article titled A Policy of Boldness that "regional allies must be supported by massive retaliatory power," the idea which was the core of this theory.<sup>98</sup>

Eisenhower administration practised nuclear policies based on the massive retaliation doctrine. In this regard, the nuclear weapons stockpile increased to 18,000 from 1,000 at the end of this administration. NSC-162/2 specified three priorities and these were revealed in three year defense programme of 1953 which were offensive striking power, tactical nuclear weapons and strategic defense capabilities. American pre-emptive nuclear attack in case of an impending attack to

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<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 15-16.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*, p.17.

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 16-17.

<sup>98</sup> Siracusa, *op.cit.*, p. 67.

be launched by an enemy was the core element. In Eisenhower's review of the U.S. Policy in the event of War endorsed by the NSC in 1959, the pre-emptive strike to an imminent Soviet assault was kept as an alternative.<sup>99</sup>

From 1950s, as a result of challenging the Soviet Union to the U.S. defense policies by way of joining the nuclear rivalry, the U.S. President Eisenhower set up a commission to evaluate the nation's vulnerability in this regard. It was argued in the Report titled *Deterrence and Survival in the Nuclear Age* dated 1957 that a dozen intercontinental ballistic missiles would be gained by the Soviet Union within a year and the U.S. would need two or three years to reach the Soviet's position. In 1958, the U.S. President Eisenhower confronted with two scenarios. The first was Soviet nuclear assault which would exterminate the government and devastate the economy and the second was the Soviet attack which would devastate all military bases. "Eisenhower views changed dramatically-in a general war- he concluded, there could be no winners, thus thermonuclear weaponry could only be used to deter."<sup>100</sup>

U.S. policy makers sought for alternative responses to possible military attacks of the Soviet Union due to the lack of flexibility in massive retaliation. The alternate option was flexible response which encompassed theatre nuclear forces and conventional military forces. This strategy which was announced by the U.S. President Kennedy's Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara permitted the use of conventional forces to halt a Soviet attack. If defense with conventional weapons did not work, this strategy allowed the escalation to tactical nuclear weapons. Escalation to strategic nuclear forces was permitted by this strategy only if deterioration took place in the theatre of war, culminating assured destruction of both sides.<sup>101</sup>

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<sup>99</sup> McDonough, *op.cit.*, p. 18-19.

<sup>100</sup> Siracusa, *op.cit.*, p. 68.

<sup>101</sup> Bert Chapman, *Military Doctrine: A Reference Handbook*, Oxford: ABC Clio, 2009, p.8.

This strategy reduced dependence on nuclear weapons to deter an assault and concentrated on the necessity to strengthen conventional capacity of the country. In this regard, the Poodle Blanket Plan was endorsed as National Security Action Memorandum 109 in 1961. This plan determined four phases of reaction to any Soviet assault and only the fourth phase contained the use of nuclear weapons as a last resort.<sup>102</sup>

The flexible response strategy put an emphasis on conventional forces and defended a more credible and flexible nuclear options to supersede massive retaliation strategy. As a result, the nuclear artillery was developed to turn nuclear war more limited and nuclear deterrence more credible option. Increasing of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons installments to the Pacific was launched with a view to deterring the Soviet Union and China. Establishing the U.S. nuclear advantage was the outcome of flexible response strategy. This strategy gave rise to a nuclear policy that tended to the idea of city avoidance. As the U.S. Secretary of Defense McNamara stated in 1962, “the principal military intentions in the event of a nuclear war...should be the destruction of the enemy’s military forces, not of civilian population.”<sup>103</sup>

Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) superseded city avoidance due to the prompt reaction of Soviet Union and the knowledge that the annihilation of missiles would not be feasible while the Soviet artillery was dramatically developing. This doctrine referred to the assured destruction capacity of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. That meant the capability to deter an assault through the capacity to have a first strike while still having the ability to cause destructive damage in return. This doctrine was a total departure from the 1950s deterrence theories which were relied

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<sup>102</sup> McDonough, *op.cit.*, p. 19.

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 19-20.

on U.S. nuclear superiority. From 1967, the nuclear strategy of the U.S. was led by mutual assured destruction.<sup>104</sup>

As a result of massive expansion of strategic nuclear weapons of the Soviet Union and protests against counterforce targeting strategies, the U.S. President Nixon pursued strategic sufficiency policy which was a limited doctrine targeting adequacy rather than superiority.<sup>105</sup> The likelihood of a Soviet assured destruction capacity caused the idea of sufficiency which referred to the requirement to have forces that had the capacity to give sufficient response with a view to deterring an enemy. In this case, four conditions were emphasized. As McDonough classifies, these were;

A secure second strike capability, avoidance of provocative measures assurance that the U.S. damage and destruction did not exceed that of the Soviet Union in any attack and deployment of defences to limit the damage of small or accidental attacks.<sup>106</sup>

The doctrine of the nuclear triad which necessitated each leg of the triad of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM) and bombers to have a second strike capability was presented by the U.S. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird.<sup>107</sup>

During 1970s, as a result of increasing in Soviet nuclear capacity, the flexible response strategy was questioned by the U.S. politicians. Then U.S. President Nixon's Secretary of Defense Schlesinger stated that adversary states would not consider MAD as employable because the U.S. lost its nuclear

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<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 21.

<sup>105</sup> Jordan, Taylor JR, Meese and Nielsen, *op.cit.*, p. 350.

<sup>106</sup> McDonough, *op.cit.*, p. 23.

<sup>107</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 23-24.

dominance over Soviet Union which acquired a secure second strike capability. As Chapman states;

He urged the United States to obtain more selective targeting options which were less likely to involve major mass destruction, maintain a capability to deter an enemy's desire to inflict mass destruction on the United States and its allies and reduce U.S. targeting to enemy military targets in order to reduce potential counterattacks against U.S. cities.<sup>108</sup>

In this doctrine, in order to ensure a reliable nuclear deterrence, four criteria should be fulfilled. One of these was assured destruction capability, while the other three new criteria were essential equivalence, a force that could react promptly with a view to deterring more assaults that the adversary might think of and lastly, a capacity that would make one understand the U.S. and Soviet Union were on a par in the rivalry.<sup>109</sup> These matters were all elaborated in 1974 NSC Decision Memorandum.<sup>110</sup>

The U.S. President Carter ordered the making up of nuclear retaliatory forces which were adequately flexible and resilient with a view to fighting extended or limited nuclear war and the expansion of nuclear command and control systems. This would allow the U.S. to battle a nuclear conflict until victory and the Soviet Union would be deprived of this capacity.<sup>111</sup>

The Presidential Directive 59 on Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy, dated 1980 stressed the continuation of the U.S. policy that concentrated on military targets of the adversary in place of the cities in adversary state. This would enhance

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<sup>108</sup> Chapman, *op.cit.*, p.8.

<sup>109</sup> Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003, p.342.

<sup>110</sup> Chapman, *op.cit.*, p.8.

<sup>111</sup> Sarkesian, Williams and Cimbala, *op.cit.*, p. 283.

the U.S. nuclear deterrence capacity.<sup>112</sup> The U.S. would have countervailing strategic options, thus assault would bring intolerable costs that go beyond gains. Having this capacity against the Soviet Union would provide that the U.S. would completely deter the Soviet Union to attempt an assault.<sup>113</sup>

During the time of the U.S. President Reagan, MAD was questioned as a political doctrine. This culminated to the 1983 Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) that the U.S. pledged to develop a space based ballistic missile defense system with a view to safeguarding the country and its allies from any ICBM assaults. SDI was a significant feature of the U.S. nuclear doctrine as the significance of creating an effective defense system against nuclear missile attacks was emphasized. SDI revealed the inflexibility of MAD as a feasible option to safeguard the security of the U.S. and paved the way for the U.S. to depart from MAD to a more resilient policy which encompassed ballistic missile defense systems.<sup>114</sup> During that time, countervailing strategy was superseded by a prevailing strategy.<sup>115</sup>

As a result of the Cold war, the Soviet Union which was U.S. nuclear policy's main focus was collapsed. The new challenges after the Cold War for the U.S. have become the threats such as nuclear proliferation and acquisition of nuclear weapons by other states or non state actors.<sup>116</sup> In new international order, the dangers of acquisition of nuclear powers by regimes such as India, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran and North Korea appeared and this was the main focus in decision making process regarding security matters during Bush Administration. In National Security Directive 70 dated 1992, the emphasis was on non proliferation endeavours. In 1992, the U.S. President Bush publicized that a unilateral

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<sup>112</sup> Chapman, *op.cit.*, p.9.

<sup>113</sup> McDonough, *op.cit.*, p. 25.

<sup>114</sup> Chapman, *op.cit.*, p. 9-10.

<sup>115</sup> McDonough, *op.cit.*, p.25.

<sup>116</sup> Jordan, Taylor JR, Meese and Nielsen, *op.cit.*, p. 351.

moratorium on nuclear weapons testing was initiated by the U.S. This was continued in 1993 and 1994 by the U.S. President Clinton.<sup>117</sup>

During Clinton Administration, the nuclear posture of the U.S. slightly modified. 1994 Nuclear Posture Review assessed the strategic nuclear forces of the U.S. and demanded force reductions. Presidential Decision Directive dated 1997 featured the intentions of U.S. nuclear forces and shed light on operation plans for the use of nuclear weapons. Even though deterrence was referred as a Cold War term, this document left previous principle that the U.S. had to remain vigilant for a nuclear war and asserted that nuclear weapons would have a smaller but fundamental role.<sup>118</sup> The U.S. first use policy was confirmed and nuclear weapons were considered as the cornerstone of U.S. national security by this document.<sup>119</sup>

In Clinton doctrine, Cold War security doctrines were replaced with the idea of enlargement which signified the integration and development of market economies. The U.S. President Clinton argued that with a view to ensuring stability, the U.S. and its allies had to employ their power and stressed the use of multinational forces to get involved in the parts of the world where volatility might cause turmoil or war.<sup>120</sup> In National Security Strategy which was published in 2000, the retaliatory feature of nuclear weapons was stressed and it was stated that the U.S. would give a devastating response against any use of weapons of mass

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<sup>117</sup> Chapman, *op.cit.*, p. 10.

<sup>118</sup> Charles W. Durr Jr., *Nuclear Deterrence in the Third Millennium*, p. 4-5, [http://www.iwar.org.uk/military/resources/nuclear/Durr\\_C\\_W\\_02.pdf](http://www.iwar.org.uk/military/resources/nuclear/Durr_C_W_02.pdf). (accessed on 26 December 2011)

<sup>119</sup> Jacqueline Cabasso, "Putting Nuclear Weapons in Context: The Hidden Architecture of US Militarism" in David Krieger (ed.), *The Challenge of Abolishing Nuclear Weapons*, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2009, p. 125.

<sup>120</sup> Daniel Wirls, *Irrational Security: The Politics of Defense from Reagan to Obama*, Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2010, p. 113.

destruction. During Clinton administration, the strategy regarding nuclear weapons was based on mutual assured destruction.<sup>121</sup>

The U.S. President Bush developed its National Security Strategy after September 11. The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) introduced four new policy objectives which were assuring, dissuading, deterring and defeating. This document was modified to reflect the security ramifications emerged after the September 11 terrorist attacks. With this document, the U.S. nuclear strategy departed from a threat based approach to capabilities based approach.<sup>122</sup> As Cross and Bolt state;

The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review represented an important first step toward balancing traditional concerns over the nuclear forces of peer competitors (unnamed but clearly understood to be a declining Russia and a rising China) with emerging threats including nuclear proliferators such as Iran and North Korea and non state actors like Al-Qaeda terrorist network.<sup>123</sup>

2002 Nuclear Posture Review was released by the Department of Defense with the objective of introducing a roadmap for the future progress of nuclear weapons. This document stated that the U.S. Cold War artillery was not enough in face of the new threats. Thus, the Department introduced a new strategic triad to supersede the old strategy. This triad encompassed the previous triad and inserted non nuclear and non kinetic weapons.<sup>124</sup> As Jordan, Taylor JR, Meese and Nielsen state;

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<sup>121</sup> Durr J., *op.cit.*, p. 5-6.

<sup>122</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9-10.

<sup>123</sup> Sharyl Cross and Paul J. Bolt, "Nuclear Weapons in a Changing Threat Environment", in Paul J. Bolt, Su Changhe and Sharyl Cross (eds.), *The United States, Russia and China: Confronting Global Terrorism and Security Challenges in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, London: Praeger Security International, 2008, p. 42.

<sup>124</sup> Jordan, Taylor JR, Meese and Nielsen, *op.cit.*, p. 362.



The first leg of the new triad is the reminiscent of flexible response policy of Kennedy administration and clearly recognized that nuclear weapons have a major role, although they need not to be the initial weapon of choice, in future military planning. The second leg of the new triad consists of passive and active defensive measures. These methods seek to deter adversaries from the pursuit of nuclear weapons technology, dissuade those states (and potentially non state actors) that seek to possess nuclear weapons from acquiring them and deny or reduce the effectiveness of nuclear assaults if they occur. The aim is to add deterrence by denial to deterrence by retaliation. The third leg is an improved nuclear weapons infrastructure designed to improve the development and procurement of weapons systems as well as to improve communications and intelligence capabilities. This leg of the triad acknowledges the need to modernize the Cold War nuclear force using current technologies that make nuclear forces safer and more effective.<sup>125</sup>

The triad posture aimed at enabling the deterrence capacity of the U.S. more effective and intimidating the use of its strategic capabilities more convincingly as a result of its combination of its nuclear weapons and missile defense.<sup>126</sup> According to this document, the U.S. was permitted to employ nuclear weapons in case of unexpected military incidents, against targets able to resist assaults by non nuclear weapons and as a retaliatory against an assault with nuclear weapons.<sup>127</sup>

According to this document, deterrence was of significance, but had to be enhanced by other means. In the new world where terrorists and rogue states had the capacity to acquire nuclear weapons or already possessed them, the main supplement to deterrence had to be military pre-emption which implied that the initiator recognized that it had the capability to put an end to an impending assault.<sup>128</sup> In 2008, the report which was called National Security and Nuclear Weapons in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century was released. In this report, the centre of attention was

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<sup>125</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 362-363.

<sup>126</sup> McDonough, *op.cit.*, p. 44.

<sup>127</sup> Erika Simpson, "The New US Doctrine of Pre-emptive Warfare and Its Implications for Nuclear Deterrence and Disarmament" in David Krieger (ed.), *The Challenge of Abolishing Nuclear Weapons*, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2009, p. 141.

<sup>128</sup> Wirls, *op.cit.*, p. 111.

on the U.S. military deterrence and on guaranteeing its allies and deterring states from military rivalry with the U.S. and dissuading them to launch an assault against the U.S.<sup>129</sup> Nuclear strategy during Bush administration reflected the move from deterrence to pre-emption. In this strategy, the U.S. had to take action pre-emptively if deemed necessary with a view to averting any hostile actions.<sup>130</sup> During Bush administration, containment and deterrence were not totally eliminated but enhanced at the same time. Deterrence was considered as a proper strategy for some threats, but the emphasis was on regime change and use of force.<sup>131</sup>

With the U.S. President Obama coming to power, he stressed nuclear dangers of the 21st century and announced that “the US will seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons” in his speech that he delivered in Prague in 2009.<sup>132</sup> In line with this view, the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review stressed the Administration’s tactic to encourage the President’s programme to ease nuclear dangers and to follow the aim of a world, where there would be no nuclear weapons.<sup>133</sup>

2010 Nuclear Posture Review specified five targets on nuclear weapons policies as:

Preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism, reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy, maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at lower nuclear force levels,

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<sup>129</sup> Chapman, *op.cit.*, p. 11-12.

<sup>130</sup> Freedman, *loc.cit.*, p. 453.

<sup>131</sup> Wirls, *op.cit.*, p. 113.

<sup>132</sup> Department of Defence of the U.S., *Nuclear Posture Review Report*, Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, 2010, p. 1.

<sup>133</sup> *Ibid.*

strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring U.S. allies and partners and sustaining a safe, secure and effective nuclear arsenal.<sup>134</sup>

In this review, it was emphasized that the U.S. would continue to guarantee the security of its allies through strong acts such as the positioning of U.S. forces in regions of strategic importance. It was also stated that U.S. nuclear weapons would have an important function in extending deterrence to U.S. allies against nuclear assaults to be launched by states that would have or try to obtain nuclear weapons.<sup>135</sup> This review stipulated that while decreasing the function of nuclear weapons in deterring nuclear assault, the U.S. would maintain reinforcing conventional capabilities. The only purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons would be ensuring deterrence. In addition, the U.S. would only think resorting to nuclear weapons in extreme situations when the fundamental interests of the U.S. or its allies would be at stake.<sup>136</sup>

In 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review report, it was stated that the U.S. would maintain a secure, safe and effective nuclear artillery to deter assault against the U.S. or its allies and emphasized that the U.S. would have to be ready to react with a view to safeguarding U.S. interests if deterrence did not work and enemies defied the U.S. interests by way of the intimidation of use of force.<sup>137</sup>

### **3.2 Soviet/Russian Response to the Evolution of U.S. Nuclear Strategy:**

The Soviet leaders handled the nuclear irony through introducing different principles and strategies. At foreign policy and diplomacy level, destructive results and dangers of nuclear war were identified by the Soviet leaders and the doctrines

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<sup>134</sup> *Ibid.*, p.2.

<sup>135</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 31.

<sup>136</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 17.

<sup>137</sup> Department of Defence of the U.S., *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, 2010, p. 14-15.

such as peaceful coexistence, detente, arms control and crisis management to prevent the consequences of a nuclear war were adopted. These doctrines were designed to prevent the U.S. and its allies from using their economic power and technological superiority to attain strategic hegemony against this country.<sup>138</sup> At military level, deterrence was considered as the main target of the strategy, but at the same time the Soviet leaders sought to develop war fighting forces to make deterrence possible and to keep the likelihood of victory open. As Ermarth state, this strategy involved:

Diverse survivable counterforce capabilities in intercontinental and theatre nuclear strike forces, active and passive (civil) defense of the homeland, very massive theatre land combat, combined arms forces, especially for the conquest of Europe in nuclear conditions.<sup>139</sup>

Until the mid of 1950s, the Soviet Union stressed the use of conventional forces to get an advantage over the U.S.<sup>140</sup> Moscow did not depend on nuclear deterrence as Soviet military did not have sufficient delivery systems. The Soviet Union's tendency for preventing the war was mainly political. During pre-nuclear years, Soviets implemented defensive military plans. However, deterrence was brought in theory starting from the mid 1950s and the Soviet Union joined the nuclear rivalry.<sup>141</sup> Explosion of an H-bomb in 1955, testing an intercontinental ballistic missile in 1957 and launching the first orbiting artificial satellite (Sputnik) were examples of this departure.<sup>142</sup>

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<sup>138</sup> Fritz W. Ermarth, "Russian Strategic Culture in Flux: Back to the Future?", in Jeannie L. Johnson, Kerry M. Kartchner and Jeffrey A. Larsen (eds.), *Strategic Culture and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Culturally Based Insights into Comparative National Security Policymaking*, New York: Palgrave Mac Millan, 2009, p. 89.

<sup>139</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>140</sup> Charles H. Fairbanks Jr., "MAD and US Strategy", in Henry D. Sokolski (ed.), *Getting Mad: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, Its Origins and Practice*, p.153, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=585> (accessed on 26 December 2011)

<sup>141</sup> Siracusa, *op.cit.*, p. 71.

<sup>142</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 67-68.

In 1955, nuclear weapons reinstated conventional ones as the strategic weapons and these weapons were considered within the Second World War military theory. With the Soviet leader Khrushchev coming to power, a new strategy was introduced and nuclear weapons gained significance while other forces were decreased to a great extent. At that time, Soviet nuclear strategy was relied on the pre-emptive strike against the U.S and its allies. “A key to this strategy was the assumption that the U.S. opponent could be pre-empted from using nuclear weapons.”<sup>143</sup> In 1960s, the doctrine of strategic nuclear pre-emption was introduced with a view to averting a possible U.S. assault against Soviet territory.<sup>144</sup> During that time, a war only with conventional capabilities was not considered as rational and the focus was on the war with nuclear weapons. The results of a strategic nuclear exchange were understood by Soviet leaders.<sup>145</sup>

While both countries had assured second strike capability, the Soviet Union was not at par with the U.S. on the number of strategic weapons and delivery systems under Khrushchev administration. However, this came to an end with the Soviet leader Brezhnev’s coming to the power and from 1965 to 1966 new missile sites emerged and by the 1970s, the Soviet Union achieved numerical equality with its ICBMs and was about to get to equal numbers in terms of SLBMs. By 1975, the Soviet Union not only got to the equality with nuclear forces of the U.S., but its land based forces went beyond the U.S.’s.<sup>146</sup>

Soviet nuclear strategy was to retaliate with a full nuclear attack before 1970s, while after that time; there was much emphasis towards a controllable nuclear war policy. According to this new strategy, pre-emptive strikes were not

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<sup>143</sup> Fairbanks Jr., *op.cit.*, p. 153-154.

<sup>144</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 158.

<sup>145</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 154.

<sup>146</sup> McDonough, *op.cit.*, p. 22-23.

considered as sole option while retaliatory strikes were feasible alternatives. From 1980 to 1985, the option of limited war was endorsed by the Soviet leaders. Different strategies were considered feasible for the limited use of nuclear weapons such as: “only on the battlefield, only against military targets, limited strategic strikes and proportional retaliation to limited strikes.”<sup>147</sup>

With the Soviet leader Gorbachev coming to power, strategic separation doctrine was started to be implemented and the importance for the necessity to change the military doctrine of the Soviet Union based on defensive sufficiency and offensive operations was emphasized.<sup>148</sup> During that period, defense doctrine was acknowledged taking the fact that it would not be possible to win a nuclear conflict into consideration. Thus, pre-emptive strikes were rejected and only retaliatory strike kept as an option. The new nuclear strategy was based on “deterrence, war prevention and limited war.”<sup>149</sup>

After the Cold War, nuclear weapons were considered as one of the few remaining indications for great power in Russia.<sup>150</sup> Huge nuclear artillery having a second strike capability was left to Russia by the Soviet Union. However, Russia’s nuclear deterrence deteriorated during that period. It was due to bad economic conditions which decreased the resources for nuclear forces at Russia’s disposal and at the same time the nuclear system of the U.S. was developed reaching to virtual nuclear primacy.<sup>151</sup>

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<sup>147</sup> Fairbanks Jr., *op.cit.*, p. 154-155.

<sup>148</sup> Jacob W. Kipp, “Russian Military Doctrine: Past, Present and Future”, in Stephen J. Blank (ed.), *Russian Military Politics and Russia’s 2010 Defense Doctrine*, 2011, p. 87-88, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1050>. (accessed on 26 December 2011)

<sup>149</sup> Fairbanks Jr., *op.cit.*, p. 155.

<sup>150</sup> David S. Yost, *The U.S. and Nuclear Deterrence in Europe*, London: Oxford University Press, 1999. p. 14.

<sup>151</sup> Birthe Hansen, Peter Toft and Anders Wivel, *Security Strategies and American World Order: Lost Power*, London: Routledge, 2009, p. 32.

With draft military doctrine of Russia dated 1992, Soviet no first use commitment was left.<sup>152</sup> According to this doctrine, Russia reserved the right to use nuclear weapons in a conventional assault to be launched against either itself or its allies. This doctrine aimed at strengthening deterrence in a time of weakness of Russian military.<sup>153</sup> In the document titled Principle Guidance on the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, it was emphasized that in case Russia's survival was at danger, this country would be ready to employ nuclear weapons.<sup>154</sup>

It was stated in National Security Concept endorsed by the Russian President Yeltsin in 1997 that nuclear and conventional wars were averted by nuclear deterrence and stressed that the lack of threat against this country whilst it maintained its deterrent capability would enable the allocation of the resources for settling its domestic problems. However, in 1998, Russia's inclination to resort nuclear weapons as a response to an assault by conventional means was pronounced by Russian Foreign Minister Primakov.<sup>155</sup> A document titled Main Provisions of Russia's Nuclear Deterrence Policy was endorsed by Russian President Yeltsin in 1999. This document stated that nuclear forces of this country were regarded as the guarantor for the national security of Russia.<sup>156</sup>

Nuclear capacity of Russia was regarded as symbol of the country's survival as a nation state, significant feature of world power status of Russia and guarantee

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<sup>152</sup> Yost, *op.cit.*, p.15.

<sup>153</sup> Dmitri Trenin, "Russia's Nuclear Policy in the 21<sup>st</sup> century environment", in *IFRI Proliferation Papers*, Paris, 2005, p. 13, [http://www.ifri.org/files/Securite\\_defense/prolif\\_12\\_Trenin.pdf](http://www.ifri.org/files/Securite_defense/prolif_12_Trenin.pdf) (accessed on 26 December 2010)

<sup>154</sup> Dale R. Hersping, "Russian Nuclear and Conventional Weapons: The Broken Relationship", in Stephen J. Blank (ed.), *Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present and Future*, 2011, p. 4, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1087.pdf> (accessed on 26 December 2011)

<sup>155</sup> Yost, *op.cit.*, p.15-16.

<sup>156</sup> Hersping, *op.cit.*, p. 8.

of its national security under former President's Putin era. Russian President Putin considered nuclear capacity as a prerequisite for strategic equality with the U.S. and in this regard, he was in favour of modernization and maintenance of nuclear weapons.<sup>157</sup>

The military doctrine 2000 stated that the "Russian Federation regards nuclear weapons as a means of deterrence of an aggression, of ensuring the military security of the Russian Federation and its allies and of maintaining international stability and peace".<sup>158</sup> This doctrine approved that Russia would keep the right to resort nuclear weapons against a conventional or nuclear assault in case there occurred a critical situation for the national security of this country and its allies. This implies that nuclear weapons could be resorted in either regional or large scale war.<sup>159</sup> The first use of nuclear weapons was accepted in Military Doctrine 2000 in face of an assault against Russia with conventional weapons as a result of weakness of conventional military forces of this country.<sup>160</sup>

National Security Concept dated 2000 acknowledged the necessity of employing nuclear weapons under certain conditions. This document stressed that non strategic nuclear forces (tactical nuclear weapons) could be employed with a view to countervailing a conventional assault without causing a full scale nuclear conflict and Russian nuclear forces could be resorted to deter other countries from turning a conventional conflict into a nuclear one. In this case, Russia might intimidate to react excessively if nuclear weapons were attempted to be employed

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<sup>157</sup> Shoumikhin, *op.cit.*, p. 115-116.

<sup>158</sup> Cross and Bolt, *op.cit.*, p. 39.

<sup>159</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 39-40.

<sup>160</sup> Marcel De Haas, "Russian Military Doctrine Development", in Stephen J. Blank (ed.), *Russian Military Politics and Russia's 2010 Defense Doctrine*, 2011, p. 53, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1050> (accessed on 26 December 2011)



by the enemy.<sup>161</sup> Dependence on nuclear weapons was anticipated as a temporary fix until Russia achieved to recover its conventional capacity in this document.<sup>162</sup>

After the approval of 2000 doctrine, the strategies regarding the use of nuclear weapons were gone through an evident change which was a response to the terrorist attacks against the U.S. in September 11, 2001 and several terrorist attacks in Russia. It was proclaimed by the Russian military that Russia would be prepared to hit against terrorist bases which were located outside of Russian territory if deemed necessary.<sup>163</sup>

In 2003, Russian Defense Minister Ivanov presented a document titled Current Tasks of the Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation upon the order of Russian President Putin. It was considered as “de facto military doctrine with no label.”<sup>164</sup> Russian Defense Minister Ivanov brought the need to merge conventional forces with strong nuclear artillery to the attention. It was emphasized that nuclear forces of Russia could avert the U.S. or any other countries from starting an assault against Russia.<sup>165</sup>

This document stressed the strategic deterrence forces to avert political pressure against Russia, to have the capacity to de-escalate assault and to show determination by way of military deployments exercises.<sup>166</sup> The likelihood of technical progresses generating new nuclear weapons that would increase their

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<sup>161</sup> Richard Weitz, *Russian American Security Cooperation after St. Petersburg*, 2007. p. 6-7, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub775.pdf> (accessed on 26 December 2011)

<sup>162</sup> Nikolai Sokov, “Evolution in Nuclear Strategy in U.S. and Russia and its Implications in Arms Control”, *IFRI Proliferation Papers*, Paris, 2003, p.11, [http://www.ifri.org/?page=contribution-detail&id=4222&id\\_provenance=97](http://www.ifri.org/?page=contribution-detail&id=4222&id_provenance=97) (accessed on 26 December 2011)

<sup>163</sup> Cross and Bolt, *op.cit.*, p. 40.

<sup>164</sup> Kipp, *op.cit.*, p. 107.

<sup>165</sup> Weitz, *op.cit.*, p. 5- 6.

<sup>166</sup> Trenin, *op.cit.*, p.13.

influence was emphasized in the document and it was stated that since nuclear weapons would not deter the assault of an enemy with modernized conventional weapons, deterrence would be credible if the deterring state obtained “combat ready conventional forces.”<sup>167</sup> In 2006, Defense Minister Ivanov brought to the attention that defense priority of Russia would be to develop and maintain strategic deterrent forces at the level which would be necessary to ensure deterrence against any present and future military threats in the period of 2006-2010.<sup>168</sup>

During Putin’s Presidency, nuclear weapons were put in the centre of the country’s military and foreign policy agenda. By way of giving more emphasis on nuclear weapons, Putin indicated the Western countries, namely the U.S. that Russia would not stay aloof while others were reinforcing their own nuclear capacity.<sup>169</sup>

With Russian President Medvedev coming to power, new National Security Strategy was introduced in 2009. In this document, it was acknowledged that the strategic stability with the U.S. was a prerequisite for secure development of Russia. Russia’s stance on arms control reflected its continuing desire for the equality with the U.S. By way of deterrence, Russia aimed at averting the U.S. to pursue policies against its interests.<sup>170</sup> According to this strategy, the U.S. first strike capability was considered as the most serious external military threat.<sup>171</sup> The 2010 Military Doctrine acknowledged the use of nuclear weapons as a means of

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<sup>167</sup> Kipp, *op.cit.*, p. 110.

<sup>168</sup> Weitz, *op.cit.*, p. 7.

<sup>169</sup> Shoumikhin, *op.cit.*, p. 118.

<sup>170</sup> Stephen J. Blank, “No Need to Threaten Us, We are Frightened of Ourselves, Russia’s Buleprint for a Police State, the New Security Strategy”, in Stephen J. Blank and Richard Weitz (eds.), *The Russian Military Today and Tomorrow: Essays in Memory of Mary Fitzgerald*, Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 2010, p. 113.

<sup>171</sup> Stephen J. Blank, *Arms Control and Proliferation Challenges to the Reset Policy*, 2011, p. 8, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1085> (accessed on 26 December 2011)

deterrence against conventional and nuclear assaults to be launched against Russia and its allies, but pre-emptive attack was not pronounced.<sup>172</sup> The new doctrine did not allow the use of nuclear weapons in case of a local conflict. While this doctrine was not the removal of the old policy, it constrained nuclear weapons role and sets a new tone for security policy of Russia.<sup>173</sup>

In new military doctrine, nuclear weapons were considered as a significant element in the avoidance of nuclear and conventional wars. This doctrine only permitted the use of nuclear weapons in situations when Russia's survival was at stake. "This mission assumes the maintenance of strategic stability and nuclear deterrence capability at the level of sufficiency."<sup>174</sup> This new doctrine put more emphasis on conventional forces while reducing the role of nuclear ones.<sup>175</sup> In this doctrine, nuclear weapons were considered as a significant element with a view to averting nuclear conflict and military conflicts, using conventional weapons. This doctrine gave the authority to maintain nuclear capability at a sufficient level.<sup>176</sup> New military doctrine clearly confirms that Russian nuclear policies have still been based on the Cold War thought.

### **3.3 Nuclear Arms Control:**

In new world order, the challenges have been more diverse for the national security of the U.S. Thus, U.S. politicians have to give attention to deter the threat driven by new states with nuclear weapons and non state actors with this intention

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<sup>172</sup> Kipp, *op.cit.*, p. 64.

<sup>173</sup> Candice DeNardi, *START/Russian Nuclear Policy*, p.2., [http://nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/issues/policy/Russian-nuclear-policy/PDFs/denardi\\_treaty\\_overview.pdf](http://nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/issues/policy/Russian-nuclear-policy/PDFs/denardi_treaty_overview.pdf) (accessed on 26 December 2010)

<sup>174</sup> Nikolai Sokov, *The New 2010 Russian Military Doctrine: The Nuclear Angle*, p.1-3, [http://cns.miis.edu/stories/100205\\_russian\\_nuclear\\_doctrine.htm](http://cns.miis.edu/stories/100205_russian_nuclear_doctrine.htm) (accessed on 26 December 2011)

<sup>175</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>176</sup> Sokov, *op.cit.*, p. 210.

instead of only focusing on the danger stemming from a single superpower. In this case, traditional nuclear strategies have to be supplemented with several foreign policy instruments such as “arms control, counter proliferation measures and non proliferation strategies.”<sup>177</sup>

The objectives of arms control regime are to decrease the prospect of war via ensuring crisis stability and enhancing communication, to limit the damage in case of war and lessen the economic burden for war preparations. During the Cold War, arms control agreements became a significant feature of nuclear policy of the U.S.<sup>178</sup> Arms control agreements can be categorized as confidence building measures, restrictions on the development and testing of weapons and limitations on the weapons themselves. The examples of the first group include the Hot Line Agreement (1963) and the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (1986). Examples of second group encompass the Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963) and the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (1974). Last group include the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT/1970), Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT-I/1972), the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty (1972) SALT-II (1979, never ratified), the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (1989) and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START/1991)<sup>179</sup>.

In 1950s, arms control initiatives were not significant traits of the U.S. and Soviet nuclear policy. At that time, negotiation on a comprehensive test prohibition did not seem achievable, because no party believed that there was no cheating. The U.S. President Eisenhower only had an unofficial moratorium regarding testing of nuclear weapons while the U.S. President Kennedy was resolute to discuss a comprehensive prohibitions on prohibiting tests of nuclear weapons. However, Soviet leader Khrushchev did not accept the idea of onsite inspections which were a

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<sup>177</sup> Jordan, Taylor JR, Meese and Nielsen, *op.cit.*, p. 355.

<sup>178</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 356.

<sup>179</sup> *Ibid.*

prerequisite of such a treaty. Nevertheless, in 1963, the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons test in the Atmosphere, Outer Space and Under Water was initialled by the U.S. and the Soviet Union in Moscow.<sup>180</sup>

In 1969, the U.S. President Nixon stressed the need for negotiations in which the nations would look for to decrease the burden of arms and strengthen the peace. According to him, this aim could be reached by detente. Thus, the U.S. President Nixon, with his advisor Kissinger was ready to talk about the issues regarding strategic arms control. In 1969, bilateral talks started between the U.S. and the Soviet Union delegations and these negotiations gave rise to two strategic arms limitation treaties (SALT I and II), the intermediate range missile pact and the strategic arms reduction talks (START I) that were concluded in 1991. The 1972 SALT I Pacts encompassed the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), an Interim Agreement on strategic systems and Basic Principles accord.<sup>181</sup> Under the provisions of ABM Treaty, each party was allowed to deploy ABM systems only at two locations. One system would be positioned around ICBM silo launchers and the other would be deployed at the capital city. This Treaty permitted each party to have no more than 100 ABM interceptor missiles and 100 ABM launchers. The development, deployment and testing of mobile land, sea, air and space based ABM systems and its constituents were prohibited in the treaty.<sup>182</sup> With this Treaty, it was aimed at rendering the balance of terror generated as a result of arms race and deterrence durable. This Treaty was the outcome of delicate balance of deterrence during Cold War and thanks to this balance; neither party could risk striking first knowing that they would confront with retaliation.<sup>183</sup>

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<sup>180</sup> Siracusa, *op.cit.*, p. 75-76.

<sup>181</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 77.

<sup>182</sup> Steven A. Hildreth, *Ballistic Missile Defense: Historical Overview*, Washington D.C.: The Library of Congress, 2007, p.2.

<sup>183</sup> Mustafa Kibaroglu, Amerikan Ulusal Füze Savunma Sistemi, in *Avrasya Dosyası-Amerika Özel Sayısı*, Volume 6, No. 3, Fall 2000, p. 9-10,

In 1974, the U.S. President Ford and Soviet leader Brezhnev approved a protocol that each party would be constrained to have 2400 ICBMs, SLBMs and long range bombers. Only 1320 bombers could have multiple warheads. However, the leaders were not able to finalize SALT II. In 1979, the U.S. President Carter approved SALT II, but he did not succeed to get it ratified. The U.S. President Reagan was totally rejected these kinds of treaties and the U.S. conformity to SALT II was put an end by him. As Siracusa states;

As he began preparing for re-election in January 1984, President Reagan faced a multi-faced dilemma- how to ease tensions with Moscow, deflect the criticism of the anti-nuclear protestors both at home and abroad, and appease the hard-liners in the Senate eager to chastise the Soviets for alleged arms-control violations.<sup>184</sup>

In 1986, the removal of all ballistic missiles within 10 years was proposed by the U.S. President Reagan at the Reykjavik summit. In 1987, the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty that encompassed the first reductions on nuclear weapons and a detailed on site inspections to be conducted by the U.S. and Soviet Union was concluded. In 1991, START I, which was the first treaty, that stipulated significant reductions in strategic arms was signed by the U.S. and the Soviet Union.<sup>185</sup> The aim of this treaty was to stop arms competition. As Baylis and Smith state;

Under the provisions of the treaty, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to reduce their nuclear arsenals to 1600 strategic delivery vehicles and 6000 warheads (of which 4900 would be ballistic missile warheads with a ceiling of 1100 Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) warheads.<sup>186</sup>

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<sup>184</sup> Siracusa, *op.cit.*, p. 78-79.

<sup>185</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 80-81.

<sup>186</sup> John Baylis and Mark Smith, "The Control of Weapons of Mass Destruction", in John Baylis et al (eds), *Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 236.

The U.S. President Clinton and Russian leader Yeltsin agreed on arms control efforts by signing START II in 1993 (but never entered into force). As Baylis and Smith explain;

The Treaty involved two main phases. Phase one was designed to run in parallel with the seven year timetable for START-I, with each side limited to between 3850 and 4200 warheads at the end of the period. Phase two aimed to limit both sides to between 3000 and 3500 warheads by January 2003 (including the elimination of all ICBMs).<sup>187</sup>

In 1997, the protocol to the START II was concluded by the U.S. and Russia which would postpone the implementation of SALT II reductions by 2007. Beginning the negotiations for START III was also acknowledged by the U.S. At the same time, Russia consented to start talks on tactic nuclear weapons, the issue that they have tried to keep away from since the demise of the Soviet Union.<sup>188</sup>

In 2001-02, the U.S. and Russia sought to conclude a new agreement on arms control. Both countries aimed at enforcing further decrease in strategic forces via this agreement. This attempt was culminated with the Treaty of Moscow on strategic offensive reductions (SORT) which was signed in 2002. “This agreement calls for reduction of the number of operational nuclear warheads to the level of 1700-2200 by 2012.”<sup>189</sup> However, this Treaty did not bring any protection mechanisms and did not specify the number of vehicles and warheads per vehicle which would mean that in forming of nuclear forces, each party was unbound. With the cancellation of 1972 ABM Treaty by the President Bush in 2001, the nuclear

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<sup>187</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 237.

<sup>188</sup> Alexander A. Pikayev, “Arms Control and US-Russian Relations”, in Stephen J. Blank (ed.), *Prospects for US Russian Security Cooperation*, 2009, p. 125-126, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=892> (accessed on 27 December 2011)

<sup>189</sup> Cross and Bolt, *op.cit.*, p. 40.

balance between the U.S. and Russia was not regulated by a treaty for the first time in 15 years.<sup>190</sup>

Until the call from Putin for a new dialogue with the emphasis on superseding START I before 2009, the year that this Treaty expired, the relations between the U.S. and Russia on nuclear arms control were under stagnation. Bush administration was not in favour of a detailed treaty on strategic arms control. The U.S. President Bush considered the risks driven by transnational terrorist organizations and the proliferation of nuclear weapons more significant than the confrontation between the U.S. and Russia. The U.S. administration acknowledged that SORT should be enough for arms control because this Treaty ensured important reductions in nuclear artillery of both parties. Thus, Bush administration rejected Russian endeavours to restrain nuclear forces deployment and expand agreements on operational arms control.<sup>191</sup>

With Obama Administration, agreements on arms control appeared again. Russia aimed at decreasing its offensive nuclear weapons below SORT level due to economic problems. However, when the significance of nuclear arsenal in Russia's foreign policy and defense considered, Russia was not able to keep on independently to this end.<sup>192</sup> In 2009, negotiations on a new, detailed and binding agreement which would supersede the START I was started by the U.S. President Obama and Russian President Medvedev. As Goure explains;

The Joint Understanding the two governments adopted at their July presidential summit in Moscow commits the United States and Russia to reduce their strategic warheads to between 1500-1675 and their strategic

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<sup>190</sup> Richard J. Krickus, *Medvedev's Plan: Giving Russia a Voice but not a Veto in a New European Security System*, 2009, p. 26, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=958> (accessed on 7 December 2011)

<sup>191</sup> Weitz, *op.cit.*, p. 2-3.

<sup>192</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 4.



delivery vehicles to between 500-1100. Both parties made commitments to try to conclude an agreement before START expired in December 2009.<sup>193</sup>

In 2009, Presidents Obama and Medvedev decided to expedite the process for negotiations to fulfil this target. The New Start Treaty was signed by the U.S. and Russia on April 8, 2010. As Nichol brings to the attention;

This Treaty limits each side to no more than 800 deployed and non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers and deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear armaments. Within that total, each side can retain no more than 700 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear armaments. The Treaty also limits each side to no more than 1550 deployed warheads.<sup>194</sup>

This Treaty included various monitoring provisions that would ensure each side confirm the other side's conformity with the treaty. New START Treaty was ratified by the U.S. Senate on December 22, 2010.<sup>195</sup>

During 2010, hearings regarding new START were held at Duma. In the hearings, it was stated that this treaty would not be endorsed until the U.S. Senate proceeded with such an action. Thus, after the U.S. Senate ratified the Treaty, the process for the ratification was started at Duma and this treaty was endorsed on January 25, 2011. New START was unanimously endorsed by the Federation Council the next day and on January 28, 2011; the law regarding the ratification was signed by Russian President Medvedev. The Treaty became effective by way of exchanging the instruments of ratification on February 5, 2011 at a meeting between U.S. Secretary of State Clinton and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia

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<sup>193</sup> Daniel Goure, "Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces and Arms Control: Deja Vu All Over Again ", in Stephen J. Blank and Richard Weitz (eds.), *The Russian Military Today and Tomorrow: Essays in Memory of Mary Fitzgerald*, Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 2010, p.301.

<sup>194</sup> Jim Nichol, *Russian Political, Economic and Security Issues and U.S. Interests*, Washington: Congressional Research Service, 2011, p.51.

<sup>195</sup> *Ibid.*

Lavrov on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference.<sup>196</sup> Although signing New START was a positive development in the relations between Russia and the U.S. within the framework of reset policy, Russia has not continued making cooperation with the U.S. and NATO despite its commitments in this regard.

### **3.4 Non-Proliferation Regimes and Counter-Proliferation Measures**

Non-proliferation regimes and counter-proliferation measures have been a significant element in nuclear relations between the U.S. and Soviet Union/Russia. The examples of these regimes and measures are Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Cooperative Threat Reduction, The Nuclear Suppliers Group and The Proliferation Security Initiative.

Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty is the most important multilateral accord on nuclear weapons. This Treaty became effective in 1970. This Treaty pledges the states with no nuclear weapons not to obtain or employ nuclear weapons and the states with nuclear weapons to remove their weapons with nuclear capacity. Under the provisions of this Treaty, all parties have to recognize the safeguards of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regarding all nuclear activities. This Treaty has been effective in constraining nuclear weapons spread.<sup>197</sup>

The Nunn-Lugar Act was endorsed by the U.S. Senate in 1991 with a view to helping the former Soviet Union states in dismantling their mass destruction weapons. As Jordan, Taylor JR, Meese and Nielsen state;

The objectives of cooperative threat reduction are to destroy nuclear, chemical and other weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), transport, store, disable and safeguard weapons in connection with their destruction, establish verifiable safeguards against proliferation of

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<sup>196</sup> *Ibid.*, p.47.

<sup>197</sup> Jordan, Taylor JR, Meese and Nielsen, *op.cit.*, p. 357.

such weapons, prevent diversion of weapons related expertise, facilitate demilitarization of defense industries and conversion of military capabilities and technologies and to expand defense and military contacts between the United States and the former Soviet Union.<sup>198</sup>

The Nuclear Suppliers Group is a 45 state association that has acknowledged making coordination on export controls with a view to averting the transfer or sale of nuclear related materials or technology to the states with no nuclear weapons. Preventing nuclear exports for peaceful aims from being diverted to production of nuclear weapons is the main objective of this group.<sup>199</sup>

The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) which was established in 2003 aimed at halting the international shipment of materials of nuclear weapons and the technology related with these weapons. As Jordan, Taylor JR, Meese and Nielsen explain;

The focus of PSI is interdicting nuclear materials during transfer between the country of origin and the country or non state actor that is the intended recipient. States that are party to PSI voluntarily agree to provide intelligence, law enforcement and diplomatic cooperation to combat the spread of nuclear weapons, utilizing force if necessary.<sup>200</sup>

PSI combined two main policy goals which were counterterrorism and counterproliferation. “It has pushed for increasing transparency and common operational pictures, to ensure timely interdiction and the creative use of national regulations to ensnare cargoes and ships.”<sup>201</sup>

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<sup>198</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 358.

<sup>199</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>200</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 359.

<sup>201</sup> Catherine McArdle Kelleher, “The United States and Europe: Waiting to Exhale”, in Thierry Tardy (ed.), *European Security in a Global Context, Internal and External Dynamics*, London: Routledge, 2009, p. 124-125.

The U.S. has started to engage in deeds which can lower the effects of the spread of nuclear weapons. Reducing the threat of state and non state actors with nuclear weapons or that may obtain these weapons is as complicated as halting the proliferation. Nevertheless, there can be some initiatives in this regard as strengthening initiatives on arms control, reinforcing IAEA mechanism, exerting international pressure against nuclear states and actors, deploying sensors for the detection nuclear weapons and lastly developing missile defense systems<sup>202</sup>. (Details of missile defense will be scrutinized in the next chapter)

In this chapter, I conclude that nuclear weapons have played a significant role in relations between the U.S. and Soviet Union/Russia and in formulation of foreign policies of both countries. Although there is a change in the U.S. nuclear policy with Obama Administration, Russia still formulates its nuclear strategies as a response to the U.S.'s and in terms of Cold War concepts focusing on ensuring deterrence against the West. In addition, nuclear arms control is still important for Obama administration and Russia is in favour this regime aiming at averting the U.S. to have nuclear dominance over itself. The ratification of New START could be evaluated as a positive outcome of the U.S.-Russia reset policy. However, Russia has not continued making cooperation with the U.S. and NATO despite its commitments in this regard. I also come to the point that the missile defense system could be evaluated in the context of counter-proliferation measures with a view to averting the proliferation of nuclear weapons even if Russia does not perceive this system from this perspective. After explaining the U.S. and Russian nuclear strategies, I will examine the historical evolution of the Western missile defense projects and Russia's negative reaction to the evolving projects in the following chapter.

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<sup>202</sup> Jordan, Taylor JR, Meese and Nielsen, *op.cit.*, p. 359.

## CHAPTER 4

### **EVOLUTION OF THE U.S.-NATO MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAM UNTIL OBAMA ADMINISTRATION AND SOVIET/RUSSIAN MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY AS RESPONSE**

In this chapter, I will scrutinize the role of missile defense in relations between the Russia and the West. In this regard, I will explain the missile defense programmes of the U.S., NATO and Russia until Obama administration, as with the U.S. President Obama coming to power, the U.S. policy on this issue totally changed. Also, in this chapter, I will question whether missile defense issue created a partnership or source of conflict in relations between Russia and the West and explicate that Russia refrains from making collaboration on this issue.

Missile defense can create risks if it is used for force application. As Johnson-Freese states;

Missile defence falls into the category of space control as a defensive system. However, if a country can technologically accomplish missile defense, it can also use that system for force application missions. The potential dangers of blurring the line between space control and force application are further intensified by the possibility of using the technology in pre-emptive, force projection situations, force projection here meaning unleashing the military element of the U.S. national power from the continental United States to another part of the world.<sup>203</sup>

There are various categories of missile defense systems: The general categories are the theatre missile defense (TMD) and national missile defense (NMD). The main objective of TMD is to stop missiles at short ranges with a view to safeguarding small areas and troops<sup>204</sup> while NMD aims at defending the U.S. territory against a danger of ballistic missile assault to be launched by a rogue state. There is another category, ballistic missile defense which covers TMD and NMD

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<sup>203</sup> Joan Johnson-Freese, *Space as a Strategic Asset*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2007, p. 114.

<sup>204</sup> *Ibid.*

intends safeguarding the U.S. territory, its deployed forces and its allies against dangers of ballistic missile assaults.<sup>205</sup>

Developing missile defense system is very complicated. As Cottey stresses;

Missile defense is technically extremely challenging - akin to trying to hit a speeding bullet in flight – and there are serious doubts about the effectiveness of any systems that might be deployed. Missile defenses are also like to be very (perhaps prohibitively) expensive, especially in the case of systems for the defense of territory and population centres.<sup>206</sup>

#### **4.1. Origins of Current U.S. Missile Defense:**

The necessity for a defense system against arms such as the German A-4 (named V-2 afterwards) was grasped by the U.S. army during World War II.<sup>207</sup> After the end of the war, U.S. officers' team was designated to work on responding the V-2 and they examined the methods to identify, chase and devastate the V-2 Missiles in Europe.<sup>208</sup> The idea of creating a defense system against ballistic missiles by way of more technologically superior weapons system than existing conventional weaponry was encouraged by the U.S. Army Ground Forces Equipment Review Board, which was led by Major General Gilbert R. Cook. The first report of the Cook Board was presented on June 20, 1945 suggesting that “high velocity guided missiles, capable of intercepting and destroying aircraft flying at speeds up to 1000 miles per hour at altitudes up to 60000 feet or destroying missiles of the V-2 type, should be developed at earliest practicable date.”<sup>209</sup> Likewise, in 1946 War Department Equipment Board led by General Joseph W. Stilwell

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<sup>205</sup> Hakkı Burak Sağ, *Political and Security Dimensions of the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense, A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate School of Social Sciences of Middle East Technical University*, Ankara: METU, 2003, p.40.

<sup>206</sup> Andrew Cottey, *Security in the New Europe*, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007, p. 166.

<sup>207</sup> Missile Defense Agency, *Missile Defense: The First Sixty Years*, Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, 2008, p.1.

<sup>208</sup> *Ibid.*, p.3.

<sup>209</sup> *Ibid.*, p.4.

acknowledged that intercontinental missiles which could carry atomic explosives were to be developed soon.<sup>210</sup>

In 1946, two related programs, which were Projects Wizard (MX-794) and Thumper (MX 795), were commenced by the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) to develop a basic draft for an antiballistic missile. “Initially, Wizard and Thumper planners envisioned designs for two stage, liquid fuel interceptors armed with conventional blast fragmentation warheads.”<sup>211</sup> These programmes were accepted as the first endeavours for developing a missile defense system. In 1949, USAAF united these two programs by omitting Thumper. An official prerequisite for a Theatre Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) system was set up by the Army and this paved the way for Project Plato in the beginning of 1950s which was the first endeavour of the Army to this end.<sup>212</sup>

Soviet missiles created a challenge to safeguard the U.S. against an assault in 1950s. In 1957, the U.S. army created Nike Zeus ABM interceptor which had the nuclear capacity and it was set to be an element of an integrated defense system. Nike Zeus ABM program was criticized for its deficiencies and prohibitive costs. Launching of Sputnik by the Soviets in 1957 ignited the missile gap between two blocs. This caused alarm about U.S. weaknesses in case of an assault to be launched by the Soviets and made a convenient atmosphere, conducive to supporting ABM systems.<sup>213</sup> In 1958, the army was given the authority to assume strategic defense mission by the U.S. Secretary of Defense McElroy after a long dispute over the competition between the army and the USAAF. That year National Security Council Position Paper (NSC 5802) ordered an anti-ICBM weapons system as a matter of the highest national priority. In 1962, Cuban crisis brought the U.S. and

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<sup>210</sup> *Ibid.*, p.5.

<sup>211</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>212</sup> *Ibid.*, p.5-6.

<sup>213</sup> *Ibid.*, p.6-7.

Soviet Union to the threshold of a nuclear conflict when medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles were positioned in Cuba to intimidate the U.S. by the Soviet Union. However, the U.S. coerced the Soviets to yield and withdraw its missiles. This crisis provided an impetus to advance the ICBM program of the Soviet Union.

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Although the tests of Nike Zeus indicated the system's capacity to stop the warheads of the adversary, its operational and technical deficiency prevented it to be a practical ABM system. In 1963, the U.S. Defense Department accelerated its endeavours to create an effective and stronger system which was culminated with Nike-X. It was stated in the publication of Missile Defense Agency as:

Initially, the key components of the Nike-X ABM system included advanced phased array radars that could detect and track a large number of objects simultaneously; a new nuclear armed, high acceleration terminal defense missile called the Sprint, which made possible the use of atmospheric filtering to discriminate between decoys and warheads; and the longer-range Nike Zeus interceptor, which was subsequently modified and renamed Spartan, for high altitude targets.<sup>215</sup>

This system would have employed ground based interceptor missiles with nuclear weapons which were positioned in cities with a view to safeguarding these places in case of a missile assault by the Soviet Union. However, it was stated that such defense would be constrained as the Soviet Union could make the system ineffective with offensive warheads which could cause huge destruction against targets like cities.<sup>216</sup> The dispute on deploying the Nike-X ABM system was resolved by the U.S. Secretary of Defense McNamara in 1967. Explosion of hydrogen bomb by the Chinese and the collapse of arms control initiatives with the

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<sup>214</sup> *Ibid.*, p.7-8.

<sup>215</sup> *Ibid.*, p.9.

<sup>216</sup> Hildreth, *op.cit.*, p.3.



Soviets during Johnson administration ignited McNamara to declare an ABM system relied on Nike-X in September 1967.<sup>217</sup>

In November 1967, new ABM system was called Sentinel. The Sentinel system was reoriented by the U.S. President Nixon in 1969 with a view to safeguarding the strategic deterrent silo-based Minuteman ICBMs of the U.S. against an assault of the Soviet Union and the system was renamed as Safeguard. However, the deployment of any strategic space and sea based or mobile ABM systems was constrained by the ABM Treaty which was signed in 1972. Safeguard played a bargaining role during the ABM Treaty negotiations.<sup>218</sup> The Safeguard site which was located near Grand Forks, North Dakota functioned between October 1975 and February 1976 and then closed as a result of the direction of the U.S. Congress as it had significant technical problems and considered to be not cost effective.<sup>219</sup> Until the end of 1970s, the expansion of Soviet ICBMs intimidated the survivability of land based ICBMs which were belonged to the U.S. as the U.S. could not develop a reliable system at that time. This gave rise to the possibility of the deployment of a missile defense system which was equipped with non nuclear interceptors. The idea of formulating a non nuclear hit to kill interceptor was focused by the U.S. Army. To this end, several tests were held in 1983 and 1984 named Homing Overlay Experiment (HOE) to show the system's capacity. In 1984, the HOE vehicle accomplished to capture a warhead which was outside the atmosphere.<sup>220</sup>

The allocation for defense systems which was started by the U.S. President Carter was further increased by the U.S. President Reagan.<sup>221</sup> The U.S. President

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<sup>217</sup> Missile Defense Agency, *op.cit.*, p. 10.

<sup>218</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 11-12.

<sup>219</sup> Hildreth, *op.cit.*, p. 3.

<sup>220</sup> Missile Defense Agency, *op.cit.*,p. 12-13.

<sup>221</sup> Hildreth, *op.cit.*, p. 3.

Reagan tried to find a strategic alternative to nuclear deterrence and mutual assured destruction that caused the U.S. to become defenseless against possible assaults of the Soviet Union. The U.S. land based ICBMs were getting weaker against possible first strikes of the Soviets. These caused the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1983 that the President start to follow a national security strategy with attaching more importance to strategic defenses.<sup>222</sup> The U.S. President Reagan declared that a major new program which was called the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) would be started under his administration in a nationally televised speech in March 1983. The next day, U.S. Senator Edward M. Kennedy qualified Reagan's speech as reckless Star Wars Schemes. "Senator Kennedy's remark, however, gave the term new meaning and SDI became widely identified thereafter as Star Wars."<sup>223</sup> "This was a direct move away from the policy of mutually assured destruction to a policy of strategic defense as a means of deterrence".<sup>224</sup>

Reagan administration reduced its aims for SDI as a result of the increase in cost estimates and technical problems. The U.S. President Reagan declared that the system would start with Phase I which was the deployment of land-space based interceptors and sensors. Although this system would not ensure total protection in case of an assault to be launched by the Soviet Union, this would try to prevent the assault by improving deterrence while the US tried to find a means to reinstate deterrence with defense.<sup>225</sup>

After the demise of the Soviet Union, a review of SDI programme was instructed by the U.S. President Bush. "The review, completed in March 1990, recommended reorienting the program to develop strategic defenses against limited

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<sup>222</sup> Missile Defense Agency, *op.cit.*, p. 13.

<sup>223</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 14.

<sup>224</sup> Dave Webb, "Space Weapons: Dream, Nightmare or Reality?" in Natalie Bormann and Michael Sheehan (eds.), *Securing Outer Space*, New York: Routledge, 2009, p. 32.

<sup>225</sup> Hildreth, *op.cit.*, p. 3-4.

attacks on the United States and theatre defense against attacks by short range ballistic missiles on overseas forces.”<sup>226</sup> In 1990, Kuwait was invaded by Iraq and in 1991; the U.S. and its allies launched Operation Desert Storm. Scud missiles were employed by Iraq against targets in Saudi Arabia and Israel. These missile attacks gave rise to a milestone as it was the first reciprocation of a missile defense system (Patriot) against a ballistic missile (Scud). In 1991, the U.S. Department of Defense started to concentrate on the SDI program by attaching more significance to defense against limited strikes rather than defense against a heavy missile assault to be launched by the Soviet Union.<sup>227</sup>

With the end of the Cold War, missile defenses were considered as an integral part of the U.S. strategic position. Ballistic missile defense was assigned to have an important function for the principal targets of deterrence.<sup>228</sup> In this context, Global Protection against Limited Strikes (GPALS) was officially proclaimed in 1991 and this was aimed at safeguarding the U.S. against limited missile assaults and defending the U.S. forces overseas and its allies against any short range ballistic missiles. “GPALS was an integrated architecture with three components: a global, space-based system of Brilliant Pebbles interceptors; a force of ground-and sea-based theatre missile defenses; and a limited, ground based national missile defense element.”<sup>229</sup>

GPALS was considered as plain form of the SDI. The main assumption for the adoption GPALS was that with the collapse of Soviet Union, the possibility of a large scale assault reduced, while the possibility of a minor accidental one increased. It was contemplated that the system would encompass up to 1.000 land

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<sup>226</sup> Missile Defense Agency, *op.cit.*, p. 15.

<sup>227</sup> History Resources, [http://www.mda.mil/news/history\\_resources.html](http://www.mda.mil/news/history_resources.html) (accessed on 27 December 2011)

<sup>228</sup> New Deterrent Working Group, *U.S. Nuclear Deterrence in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: Getting it Right*, Washington D.C.: Centre for Security Policy Press, 2009, p.39.

<sup>229</sup> Missile Defense Agency, *op.cit.*, p. 15-16.

and 1000 space based interceptors. The U.S. started negotiations with Russia as this was going beyond the limits specified in the ABM Treaty.<sup>230</sup>

With the U.S. President Clinton coming to power, intentions for a national missile defense program were not attached importance and the negotiations with Russia were terminated.<sup>231</sup> Nevertheless, the missile defense program continued as the congressmen showed enthusiasm.<sup>232</sup> Under Clinton Administration, GPALS architecture was divided into individual elements and the name of Strategic Defense Initiative Organization was changed into Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO). Several Army, Navy and Air force programs were included in the theatre missile defense component of BMDO. As Snow explains;

These included improvements in the Army's Patriot missile, known as Patriot Advanced Capability-3 or PAC-3; and a new army missile initially known as the Theatre High Altitude Area Defense or THAAD. Also included were the Air force's Airborne Laser Project; and the lower tier Navy Area Defense and upper tier Navy Theatre Wide programs, both of which were based upon significant modifications to the ship borne Aegis air defense system and Standard Missile interceptor.<sup>233</sup>

The assumption during the U.S. President Clinton's era was that the threat of a ballistic missile defense to be launched against the U.S. might have occurred in the future whilst the risk of a regional ballistic missile assault had already been present. 1995 Missile Defense Act set the Clinton's nuclear policy. The main features of this policy were setting up a reasonable and efficient theatre missile defense system at the earliest convenience, the deployment of national missile defense system to be efficient against accidental or limited ballistic missile assaults to be launched against the U.S., starting negotiations with Russia to make national

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<sup>230</sup> Hildreth, *op.cit.*, p.4.

<sup>231</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>232</sup> Snow, *op.cit.*, p. 227.

<sup>233</sup> Missile Defense Agency, *op. cit.*, p.16.

missile defense system operative and taking the possibility of withdrawing from the ABM Treaty into consideration in case the negotiations did not work.<sup>234</sup>

According to 3+3 strategy which was endorsed in 1996, a national missile defense system would have been developed with a view to safeguarding the U.S from unauthorized or accidental launch of Chinese or Russian missiles or ballistic missile attacks to be launched by hostile nations. Continued development of NMD system was anticipated by this strategy for the first three years (1997-2000) to be pursued by a deployment decision (2000) if the system was considered as technologically practical. NMD system would have been set up within the second three year time (2000-2003) if a decision had been taken to this end. This strategy was later changed with a view to permitting a longer time period for its deployment.<sup>235</sup> In new strategy named A National Security Strategy for a New Century adopted by Clinton administration in 1999, there was a significant emphasis on missile defense issue. It was stated in this document that the possibility of intercontinental ballistic missile assault to be launched by “rogue states” had gradually increased and it was emphasized that in order to avert this risk, the U.S. had to develop missile defense system even if it was limited.<sup>236</sup> However, in September 2000, the U.S. President Clinton announced that authorization to deploy a national missile defense system would not be given. “He stated that he could not conclude that the U.S. has enough confidence in the technology and the operational effectiveness of the entire NMD system, to move forward to deployment.”<sup>237</sup>

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<sup>234</sup> Hildreth, *op.cit.*, p. 5.

<sup>235</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>236</sup> Çağrı Erhan, “ABD’nin Ulusal Güvenlik Anlayışı”, in *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi*, 56-4, 2001, p. 87.

<sup>237</sup> Hildreth, *op.cit.*, p. 5.

The U.S. President Bush came to the presidency with strong commitments to deploy missile defense as soon as possible.<sup>238</sup> President Bush aimed at averting ballistic missile assaults by way of locating pre-emptive missiles in allied countries located around “rogue states.” The focus here was not to take measure against the countries with nuclear capacity such as Russia and China, but the countries challenging global interests of the U.S. and estimated to have ICBM within 20 years. This system also strengthened the possibility that the share of the defense component in the budget would be increased.<sup>239</sup> “After the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, Bush insisted that a missile defence system was necessary for American security.”<sup>240</sup> To remove all limitations to develop a missile defense system, the U.S. withdrew from the ABM Treaty in 2002. During his term, missile defense program was reoriented with layered and integrated defense concept.<sup>241</sup> A layered system was expected to have the capacity of stopping missiles from platforms located on land, at sea, in space and in aircraft and in all stages of their flight which were boost, midcourse and terminal phases.<sup>242</sup> Boost phase interception would aim at capturing the missile at the time between its launch and entering the atmosphere. Midcourse phase interception would aim at striking the missile in space. Terminal phase interception would aim at hitting the missile when it re-entered into atmosphere. A multi layered tactic had the benefit of increasing the possibilities of interception.<sup>243</sup>

The short term aim of this program was to deploy a limited national missile defense system which had the capacity to safeguard the U.S. against a small number

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<sup>238</sup> Siracusa, *op.cit.*, p. 101.

<sup>239</sup> Erhan, *op.cit.*, p. 91-92.

<sup>240</sup> Siracusa, *op.cit.*, p. 101.

<sup>241</sup> Missile Defense Agency, *op.cit.*, p. 17.

<sup>242</sup> Philip E. Coyle, “Is Missile Defense on Target” in Paul J. Bolt, Damon V. Coletta and Collins G. Shackelford JR (eds), *American Defense Policy*, London: The John Hopkins University Press, 2007, p. 409.

<sup>243</sup> McDonough, *op.cit.*, p. 52.

of missile assaults. This missile defense program was akin to GPALS. It was aimed at uniting a limited NMD system with theatre and battlefield systems such as THAAD and the Patriot with a view to attaining global coverage.<sup>244</sup> The land based THAAD had been devised with a view to capturing and removing ballistic missiles while they were in terminal phase. Its maximum altitude is 150km. while its range is more than 200km. “THAAD is made up four components: truck mounted launchers, interceptors (eight per launcher), X-band radars and fire control and communication units.”<sup>245</sup>

The name of BMDO was changed as the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) by a memorandum which was issued in 2002.<sup>246</sup> Two dozen ground based interceptor missiles were deployed in California and Alaska by the MDA and agreements with a view to modernizing early warning and tracking radars in the U.K. and Greenland were signed.<sup>247</sup> That year, it was also declared by Bush administration that a limited ballistic missile defense system against long range missiles would be deployed by the fall of 2004. Although this aim was accomplished as a result of the installment of five ground based interceptor silos, technological problems showed that this system was still short of operational capability.<sup>248</sup>

Deployment and construction of a ground based mid course defense feature of the BMD system in Europe was formally proposed by Bush administration in 2007. In this regard, 310 million USD was asked by the administration for the 2008 fiscal year. The system would have involved fixed radar installation in Czech

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<sup>244</sup> Wirls, *op.cit.*, p. 152.

<sup>245</sup> John Wood, *Russia, the Asymmetric Threat to the US: A Potent Mixture of Energy and Missiles*, Oxford: Praeger Security International, 2009, p. 91.

<sup>246</sup> Missile Defense Agency, *op.cit.*, p. 17.

<sup>247</sup> Dave Webb, “NATO and European Missile Defense”, in *NATO Watch Briefing Paper*, No: 13, 13 August 2010, p. 2.

<sup>248</sup> Hildreth, *op.cit.*, p.5-6.

Republic, 10 silo based interceptor missiles to be positioned in Poland and transportable radar to be located in a country near Iran. These were supposed to be finished by 2013 and total cost was approximately four billion dollars. Agreements with Czech Republic and Poland were signed by the U.S. in summer 2008 to this end.<sup>249</sup> However, the agreements were not ratified by these states before the program was cancelled by Obama administration.<sup>250</sup> Poland and Czech Republic were enthusiastic about succeeding these plans, although the majority of the citizens were against the deployment of missile defense systems.<sup>251</sup>

Bush administration's move to deploy a missile defense system in Europe increased transatlantic tensions with European allies of the U.S. who were not consulted as well as caused further alienation of Moscow as these sites would have been located close to Russian borders.<sup>252</sup> Bush administration eliminated the division between TMD and NMD in its missile defense program. It was argued by the administration that this division was relied on the facts stipulated in the ABM Treaty and did not indicate that both systems could be employed interchangeably.<sup>253</sup>

#### **4.2 Origins of Soviet/Russian Missile Defense Projects:**

The U.S. domination of the nuclear weapons made the Soviet Union to focus on defensive systems. In 1947, experiments with anti aircraft missiles were started by the Soviets. In 1953, a TU-4 unmanned bomber was shot down by the Soviet V-300 missile and radar guidance system. After six months, the Soviets

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<sup>249</sup> Steven A. Hildreth and Carl Ek, *Long range Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe*, Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2009, p.1.

<sup>250</sup> *Ibid.*, p.9.

<sup>251</sup> Webb, *loc.cit.*, p. 3.

<sup>252</sup> Fyodor Lukyanov, "Russian Dilemmas in a Multi polar World", in *Journal of International Affairs*, Spring/Summer 2010, Vol. 63, No: 2, New York: Columbia University, 2010, p. 21.

<sup>253</sup> David S. McDonough, *op.cit.*, p. 52.



launched the production of an anti-aircraft missile defense system (S-5) which would ensure the protection of Moscow from up to 1.000 attacking bombers and in 1956, the Soviets aimed at constructing the first anti ballistic missile system (A-35 or Galosh) by 1967. However, the tests of its new S-350 interceptor missile showed the fact that Soviets were not at par with the new multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRV) of the U.S.<sup>254</sup>

In 1961, Soviet leader Khrushchev claimed that the “Soviets could hit a fly in outer space” and then Soviet Defense Minister Malinovsky stated that “the problem of destroying ballistic missiles in flight has been successfully solved” after R-12 missile was shot by the winged V-1000 missile in the course of military tests.<sup>255</sup> The Soviets intended to give the world the message that their missile technology had the capacity to handle a U.S. first strike.<sup>256</sup>

The Soviets replaced the A-35 ABM system with the A-135. This new system, which had two tier defense capabilities, was able to respond single or MIRVed ICBMs. “The first tier of the interceptor missiles with A-350 launchers would attack ICBMs outside the atmosphere.”<sup>257</sup> The production of seven A-135 sites around Moscow was authorized by the Soviet Defense Minister after the successful tests of the two tier system in 1975 and 1976. But, until 1997, the A-135 system was not fully effective.<sup>258</sup> The Soviets focused on building a theatre defense system using multi channel surface to air missile (SAM 300) system with a view to safeguarding their ICBM silos, industrial and administrative sectors against any cruise missiles. The S-300V was able to safeguard the army’s ground units, while

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<sup>254</sup> Siracusa, *op.cit.*, p. 86.

<sup>255</sup> Nigel Hey, *The Star Wars Enigma: Behind the Scenes of the Cold War Race for Missile Defense*, Washington D.C.: Potomac Books Inc., 2006, p .20

<sup>256</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>257</sup> Siracusa, *op.cit.*, p. 86.

<sup>258</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 86-87.

S-300 F had the capacity to provide protection for the naval ships and the S-300P could defend air forces of the country. In 1980, with a view to enhancing the A-135 system, the Soviets located the S-300PT system using the 5V55 surface to air missile around Moscow. In 1985, the upgraded SS-300PM system replaced the S-300PT system. In 2005-2006, Russian air forces reinstated its S300P with the S-400 surface to air missile systems with an interceptor which had the capacity to remove short and medium range ballistic missiles up to 400km. The S-400 had double range of the U.S. Patriot Advance Capability 3 (PAC-3) system and 2.5 times range of the S-300P.<sup>259</sup>

A research and development programme has been conducted by Russia for a S-500 Triumphator. This is more improved than the existing systems of Russia and expected to be operative in 2015.<sup>260</sup> Russia has continued to develop missile defense systems with the same understanding adopted by the Soviet Union during the Cold War years rather than taking part in NATO missile defense initiatives after the Cold War.

#### **4.3 Missile Defense of NATO until Lisbon Summit:**

The likelihood of the passing of nuclear weapons and its knowledge for their manufacture to the hands of “rogue states” stirred NATO to search the ways to avert this possibility.<sup>261</sup> In this regard, exploring the ways to initiate missile defense programs was decided by NATO members in 1999 and agreed in 2004 to continue the making up of a theatre missile defense system. This was aimed at safeguarding troops which were deployed overseas against short and medium range ballistic missile assaults.<sup>262</sup> Components of NATO’s missile defense policy are the Active

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<sup>259</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 87-88.

<sup>260</sup> Sokov, *op.cit.*, p. 237.

<sup>261</sup> Mustafa Kibaroglu, “The missile shield and Turkey’s position in the debate”, in *Today’s Zaman*, 1 November 2010.

<sup>262</sup> Cottey, *op.cit.*, p.165.

Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense System (ALTBMD) Capability and Missile Defense for the Protection of NATO territory. The protection of NATO deployed forces against short and medium range ballistic missile attacks up to 3000km. range is the main objective of NATO's ALTBMD capability.<sup>263</sup> In 2002, NATO Missile Defense Feasibility study was initiated to scrutinize the options for safeguarding the alliance forces, population and territory against threats.<sup>264</sup> In 2005, the NATO ALTBMD Programme Management Organization was set up by North Atlantic Council with a view to supervising the ALTBMD program. NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency (NC3A) and the NATO Air Command and Control System Management Agency (NACMA) are other main NATO institutions in this regard.<sup>265</sup>

In final communiqué of 2006 Riga summit, it was stated by NATO leaders that the study was finalized and long range BMD was considered technically practical. It asked for continued work on the military and political consequences of missile defense and update on developments regarding missile threats.<sup>266</sup> It was expected by Bush administration that missile defense would be approved by NATO at 2008 Bucharest Summit. As Hildreth and Ek explain;

The Summit declaration stated that the alliance acknowledges that ballistic missile proliferation poses an increasing threat. It further affirmed that missile defense is part of a broader response and that the proposed U.S. system would make a substantial contribution to the protection of the alliance. It declared that the alliance is exploring ways to link (the U.S. assets) with current NATO efforts to couple with any future NATO wide missile defense architecture.<sup>267</sup>

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<sup>263</sup> Missile Defense, [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_49635.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49635.htm) (accessed on 27 December 2011)

<sup>264</sup> Cottey, *op.cit.*, p.165.

<sup>265</sup> Missile Defense, [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_49635.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49635.htm) (accessed on 27 December 2011)

<sup>266</sup> Hildreth and Ek, *op.cit.*, p. 17.

<sup>267</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 18.

The Summit declaration, which was qualified by the U.S. Secretary of State Rice as a breakthrough document was understood by Bush administration as an approval of missile defense project of NATO.<sup>268</sup>

NATO countries foreign ministers repeated the same wording regarding missile in the final communiqué of December 2008 meeting and they remarked the signature of agreements by the U.S. with Poland and the Czech Republic as a related event. The conclusions of Bucharest summit regarding missile defense was confirmed in the 2009 Strasbourg and Kehl summit declaration by bring to the attention that this issue needs more work.<sup>269</sup> In this summit, NATO members stated:

We judge that missile threats should be addressed in a prioritized manner that includes consideration of the level of imminence of the threat and the level of acceptable risk. A future United States contribution of important architectural elements could enhance NATO elaboration of this Alliance effort.<sup>270</sup>

In 2009 NATO Foreign Ministerial Statement, the fact that missile defense would have a significant role as part of NATO's reaction to the risks driven by ballistic missiles was approved and the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA), which would strengthen NATO's role regarding missile defense in Europe was reacted in a positive way. NATO specified in this statement that the PAA would ensure a significant national contribution to territorial missile defense system if such a system was developed by NATO.<sup>271</sup>

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<sup>268</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>269</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 18-19.

<sup>270</sup> Department of Defense of the U.S., *Phased Adaptive Approach: Missile Defense for NATO*, Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, 2009, p.2.

<sup>271</sup> Frank A. Rose, *Ballistic Missile Defense System Joint/Combined Warfighter Conference 10-1*, Schriever Air Force Base CO, 2010, <http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/138554.htm> (27 December 2011)

#### **4.4 Cooperation and Challenges between Russia and the West until Obama Administration:**

The issue of missile defense has always been the fault line in the relations between the U.S. and Russia. Russia believes that regarding this issue, the aim of the U.S. is to contain Russia, which is a Cold war paradigm.<sup>272</sup> From the very beginning, the Russian government has been against the deployment of NMD and it is deemed by Russia that the deployment of such a system would weaken strategic nuclear deterrence of this country.<sup>273</sup> Russia approaches missile defense issue from the Cold War perspective and Russian intransigent attitude prevents collaboration between Russia and the West on missile defense.

The U.S. has sought for cooperation opportunities regarding the issue of ballistic missile defense since the beginning of 1990s. Clinton administration accepted the fact that the ABM Treaty banned the deployment of any BMD protecting the whole U.S. territory, but it was desired to obtain the Russian consent for modifying the treaty in a way which would allow the deployment of NMD system. However, this was not accepted by Russia, because the treaty in question was considered as an instrument which would avert the deployment of NMD by the U.S. Notwithstanding the U.S. guarantees that the NMD system was against a possible danger from rogue states, Russia worried that the U.S. was trying to gain a strategic advantage over Russia and as a result of this, the U.S. could intimidate Russia by neutralizing the strategic nuclear artillery of this country.<sup>274</sup> This indicates that Russia refrained from making collaboration with the U.S. on missile defense issue.

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<sup>272</sup> Wood, *op.cit.*, p.95.

<sup>273</sup> Margot Light, "Post Soviet Russian Foreign Policy: The First Decade", in Archie Brown (ed.), *Contemporary Russian Politics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 424.

<sup>274</sup> Hakan Karlsson, "The United States and Russia: A Clash of Strategic Visions", in Jan Hallenberg and Hakan Karlsson (eds), *Changing Transatlantic Security Relations: Do the U.S., the EU and Russia form a new Strategic Triangle?*, London: Routledge, 2006, p. 188-189.

When the U.S. President Bush explicitly showed that the U.S. would continue the NMD, Russian President Putin suggested loosening the said treaty's prohibitions regarding testing. However, this endeavour did not work and the U.S. withdrew from the treaty one-sidedly. Russian President Putin did not make this U.S. act turn into a crisis while stating his regrets. He qualified the U.S. move as a mistake and declared that Russia was not committed to reforming its nuclear artillery as provisioned by START I any more. After that time, the U.S. informed Russia about its plans on BMD. Within this framework, in 2001, the U.S. representatives went to Moscow with a view to attaining a formula that Russia would consent on the deployment of missile defense. This U.S. endeavour did not work due to negative response of Russia.<sup>275</sup>

Russian President Putin was in the opinion if the missile defenses were deployed by the U.S. in Eastern Europe, it would have influence over the relations between Russia and NATO and give rise to disagreements in Europe as well.<sup>276</sup> As an option to the U.S. missile defense programme, setting up a European ABM system was suggested by Russia. This system was thought to be constructed with the help of tactical ABM technologies of Russia that could safeguard Europe, in which European part of Russia was also included.<sup>277</sup> In this regard, Russian President Putin offered at the June 2007 G-8 Summit that the U.S. employ the radar station located in Gabala, which was leased by Russia to Azerbaijan. At the July 2007 Summit in Maine, Putin proposed allowing the U.S. to employ a radar system located in southern Russia (Armavir)<sup>278</sup>. At 2007 Kennebunkport meeting, Russian

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<sup>275</sup> Richard Weitz, *Revitalizing U.S. Russian Security Cooperation: Practical Measures*, New York: Routledge, 2005, p. 50.

<sup>276</sup> Stephen J. Blank, *Towards a New Russia Policy*, 2008, p. 31-32, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=833> (accessed on 27 December 2011)

<sup>277</sup> Shoumikhin, *op.cit.*, p. 123.

<sup>278</sup> Hall Gardner, *Averting Global War: Regional Challenges, Overextension and Options for American Strategy*, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007, p. 41-42.

President Putin offered to provide data from Armavir which would ensure a view from Russian territory into Iran. He also persisted that these sites would replace the sites to be located in Eastern Europe.<sup>279</sup> All these attempts indicate that Russia did not trust the missile defense initiatives of NATO and the U.S. and try to develop this system in accordance with its own rules. Moscow aimed at controlling the missile defense system instead of collaborating with NATO.

In 2007 Munich security conference, Russian President Putin criticized BMD and intimidated the international community that Russia would not be obliged by the provisions of the 1987 INF Treaty. Russian President Putin also stated that Russia terminated its conformity with the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty and indicated that the Czech Republic and Poland might be targeted by Russia and medium range ballistic missiles might be transferred to Kaliningrad, which is the Russian exclave.<sup>280</sup>

Russian President Putin reiterated his earlier warnings in February 2008 that Russia would re-target ICBMs toward the missile sites in case construction began on the missile defense facilities. At the meeting in Sochi in March 2008, the U.S. and Russian leaders tried to reach a consensus on missile defense and both leaders accepted to provide more transparency, search confidence building measures and intensify their dialogue on this issue. However, at the same time, Russia sustained its opposition to the possible deployment of missile defenses in Europe.<sup>281</sup> Russia also opposed to the signing of agreement by the U.S. with Poland and it was stated that Poland's consent in this regard could make this country a target for a nuclear assault. Later, Russian President Medvedev reiterated Russia's position that the interceptors generated a threat and stated that Russia would have to react by resorting to military ways. It was also declared that the discussions were

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<sup>279</sup>Kelleher, *op.cit.*, p. 128.

<sup>280</sup> Hildreth and Ek, *op.cit.*, p.19.

<sup>281</sup> *Ibid.*, p.21.

commenced between Russia and Belarus for the setting up a joint air defense system as a move in reprisal.<sup>282</sup> It was so clear that Russia followed inconsistent policies on missile defense issue as while Moscow was giving assurance to the U.S. for cooperation, at the same time this country continued to oppose the development of missile defense system.

As for the relations between Russia and NATO regarding missile defense, theatre missile defense was considered as another field that Russia and NATO could collaborate at that time.<sup>283</sup> At 2004 NATO Istanbul Summit, NATO leaders stated the necessity for NATO-Russia collaboration in situations of crisis response. It was also agreed on making collaboration on the development of short and medium range missile defense in Europe.<sup>284</sup> At 2008 NATO Bucharest Summit, NATO leaders affirmed their support for the continuation of endeavours with a view to reinforcing missile defense collaboration between NATO and Russia and declared that NATO was ready to seek the ways to connect the missile defense systems of the U.S., Russia and NATO in due course.<sup>285</sup> However, progress on the TMD collaboration between NATO and Russia had been slow when compared to other areas.<sup>286</sup> Russia aimed that NATO employ its missile defense systems. This expectation was considered baseless while taking the mistrust among NATO members against Russia into consideration.<sup>287</sup> Due to Russia's inconsistent stance on this issue, robust cooperation could not be achieved between Russia and NATO.

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<sup>282</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>283</sup> Weitz, *loc.cit.*, p. 69.

<sup>284</sup> Kelleher, *op.cit.*, p. 127.

<sup>285</sup> Hildreth and Carl Ek, *op.cit.*, p. 18.

<sup>286</sup> Weitz, *loc.cit.*, 70.

<sup>287</sup> Hannes, Adomeit, "Inside or outside? Russia's Policies Towards NATO" in Elana Wilson Rowe and Stina Torjesen (eds.), *The Multilateral Dimension in Russian Foreign Policy*, London: Routledge, 2009, p. 109.



To conclude, the issue of missile defense played a significant role in the relations between the Russia and the West. It is explicit that Russia followed an inconsistent policy on missile defense issue. While Russia was expressing that Moscow would collaborate with NATO on this issue, at the same time this country reiterated its opposition to the development of missile defense system of NATO. Russia tried to avert the deployment missile defense elements in Europe and in this regard, offered even joint development of this system as Russia wanted to have an authority in the decision making process of the system. As a result, at that time, the missile defense issue did not give rise to a conflict, but it was also clear that this was not the issue which would make the cooperation possible between Russia and the West due to Russian negative responses to the Western proposals to make cooperation on this issue. It was so explicit that regarding missile defense issue, Russia insisted on not to cooperate with the West and not to take part in missile defense system of NATO by approaching the issue from Cold War perspective despite the assurances given by NATO and the U.S. In the following chapter, I will focus on the current Western missile defense projects and explain that Russia has continued to follow reactionary policies against the missile defense projects in question.

## CHAPTER 5

### CURRENT WESTERN MISSILE DEFENSE PROJECTS AND RUSSIAN RESPONSE

In this chapter, the recent western missile defense projects and the irreconcilable stance of Russia in this regard will be examined. The focus will be on the missile defence project of Obama Administration and the missile defense system of NATO which was developed in 2010 NATO Lisbon Summit. I will also question here whether current missile defense system is about to create a partnership between Russia and the West. I will also refer the statements of high ranking officials of both sides especially Russian President Medvedev and the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to NATO, Rogozin to prove the fact that Russia is not cooperating with NATO on missile defense issue.

When the U.S. President Obama came to power, he was committed not to deploying missile defense system in the Czech Republic and Poland, which was proposed by Bush administration. He admitted a forward, sea based system with a view to dealing short and medium range missile threat. The sea based component of this new system would be located in the Eastern Mediterranean with a view to safeguarding the allies of the U.S.<sup>288</sup> This decision was taken on the basis of revised evaluations of the Iranian missile program.<sup>289</sup> It was stated that ballistic missiles owned by this country could have the capacity to intimidate its neighbours and argued that Iran could develop these missiles more quickly than expected. It was also put forward that short and medium range missiles possessed by Iran could create significant challenge against the U.S. and its allies and robust missile defense

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<sup>288</sup> James M. Goldgeier, "A Realistic Reset with Russia: Practical expectations for US-Russian relations" in Basil Germond, Jussi M. Hanhimaki and Georges-Henri Soutou (eds.), *The Routledge Handbook of Transatlantic Security*, London: Routledge, 2010, p. 269.

<sup>289</sup> Daniel Mockli, *Strategic Trends 2010: Key Developments in Global Affairs*, Zurich: Center for Security Studies, 2010, p.79.

system could reinforce the endeavours to reach a settlement which would force Iran to comply with international obligations.<sup>290</sup> It was stated by Obama administration that a region specific missile defense strategy would be focused as it would be more cost effective and practical.<sup>291</sup> In addition, the new START Treaty does not include any provisions which restrain the U.S. in this regard.<sup>292</sup>

The U.S. has adopted a phased adaptive approach on missile defense. U.S. State Department Deputy Assistant Secretary, Rose described this approach as follows:

Recognizing that each region has unique deterrence and defense requirements due to differences in geography, history and relationships, the United States is pursuing a region by region approach based on the following three principles: First, the United States will deter adversaries through strong regional deterrence architectures built upon strong cooperative relationships and appropriate burden sharing with the allies and partners. Second, the United States will pursue a Phased Adaptive Approach within key regions that is tailored to the threats unique to that region, including the scale, scope and pace of their development and the capabilities available and most suited for the deployment. This approach means the United States will phase in and implement the best available technology to meet existing and evolving threats, and adapt to situations that evolve in an unforeseen manner. Third, in order to meet a global demand for missile defense assets that will continue to exceed supply, the United States will develop mobile capabilities that can be relocated to adapt to a changing threat or provide surge defense capabilities where they are most needed.<sup>293</sup>

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<sup>290</sup>U. S. Missile Defense Policy and Europe,<http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/09/09STATE96526.html> (accessed on 27 December 2011)

<sup>291</sup> Mockli, *op.cit.*, p.79.

<sup>292</sup> Frank A. Rose, *Transatlantic Missile Defense: Looking to the Lisbon Summit*, Remarks at the Atlantic Council, Washington D.C., 2010, <http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/149360.htm> (accessed on 27 December 2011)

<sup>293</sup> Frank A. Rose, U.S. Missile Defense and Regional Security, Remarks at the Second Annual Israel Multinational Missile Defense Conference, Tel Aviv, 2011, <http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/169023.htm> (accessed on 26 December 2011)

## 5.1. U.S. Current Missile Defense Projects

New phased adaptive approach relied on the Standard Missile-3 of the U.S. Army is the main concept of Obama administration on missile defense. With this system, it is intended to concentrate on the threats against Europe and the U.S. overseas military personnel instead of longer term dangers against the U.S.<sup>294</sup> The new missile defense plan named European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) is more inclusive than the previous programs, deploys cost effective and verified capabilities, is based on the U.S. pledge with a view to safeguarding the U.S. against the dangers of long range ballistic missile launches and strengthens the defense of NATO allies.<sup>295</sup> This system, which is supposed to employ command and control architecture of NATO, also bolsters the endeavours of NATO in relation to developing missile defense system. “Most importantly, the Phased Adaptive Approach is designed to work in concert with Allied efforts to provide protection against ballistic missile attack for all NATO allies, reflecting the Alliance principle of indivisibility of security.”<sup>296</sup>

EPAA consists of four phases: Phase I (Initial Integrated Defense-2011 timeframe) deals with the risks of possible regional ballistic missile launches against the U.S. European Allies and U.S. overseas personnel by deploying Aegis BMD capable ships, with verified SM-3 Block IA interceptors and by locating land based AN/TPY-2 radar. The deployment of USS Monterrey to the Mediterranean was declared by the U.S. in March 2011 to start the deployment of Aegis ships.<sup>297</sup>

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<sup>294</sup> Webb, *loc.cit.*, p.3-4.

<sup>295</sup> U.S. State Department Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, *Fact Sheet on United States European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) and NATO Missile Defense*, Washington D.C., 2011, <http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/162447.htm> (accessed on 27 December 2011)

<sup>296</sup> Potus European Based Missile Defense Decision, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/09/09STATE96550.html> (accessed on 28 December 2011)

<sup>297</sup> U.S. State Department Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, *Fact Sheet on United States European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) and NATO Missile Defense*, Washington D.C., 2011, <http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/162447.htm> (accessed on 27 December 2011)

The aim in this phase is to have the capability of responding against Short Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs), Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs) and Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs). THAAD batteries is planned to be deployed starting from this phase.<sup>298</sup> In Phase II (Enhanced MRBM Defense-2015 timeframe), more capable type of the SM-3 interceptor (Block IB) and more advanced sensors will be deployed in Europe with a view to enlarging the defended site against the risks of short and medium range ballistic missile launches.<sup>299</sup> A land based SM-3 BMD interceptor site will also be located in this phase. In Phase III (Robust IRBM Defense-2018 timeframe), a more advanced SM-3 Interceptor (Block IIA) will be deployed and a second land based SM-3 site will be positioned in Eastern Europe with a view to responding the threats of possible short, medium and intermediate range missile launches.<sup>300</sup> In Phase IV (Early Intercept and Regional ICBM Defense-2020 timeframe) SM-3 Block IIB interceptor will be deployed with a view to strengthening the capacity of the U.S. to respond medium and intermediate range missiles and possible ICBM threats.<sup>301</sup>

Phase I has been operational as a result of the deployment of the USS Monterrey to the Mediterranean, which is an Aegis ship with BMD capacity.<sup>302</sup> Phase I also includes the deployment of a land-based early warning radar which

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<sup>298</sup> Missile Defense Agency, *MDA Fiscal Year 2012 Budget Outline*, Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, 2011, p.2.

<sup>299</sup> U.S. White House Office of the Press Secretary, *Fact Sheet on U.S. Missile Defense Policy: A Phased, Adaptive Approach for Missile Defense in Europe*, Washington D.C., 2009, [http://www.whitehouse.gov/the\\_press\\_office/FACT-SHEET-US-Missile-Defense-Policy-A-Phased-Adaptive-Approach-for-Missile-Defense-in-Europe](http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/FACT-SHEET-US-Missile-Defense-Policy-A-Phased-Adaptive-Approach-for-Missile-Defense-in-Europe) (accessed on 26 December 2011)

<sup>300</sup> U.S. State Department Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, *Fact Sheet on United States European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) and NATO Missile Defense*, Washington, 2011, <http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/162447.htm> (accessed on 27 December 2011)

<sup>301</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>302</sup> Frank A. Rose, U.S. Missile Defense and Regional Security, Remarks at the Second Annual Israel Multinational Missile Defense Conference, Tel Aviv, 2011, <http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/169023.htm> (accessed on 26 December 2011)

was admitted by Turkey to be hosted.<sup>303</sup> In this regard, a memorandum was signed between the U.S. and Turkey on 14 September 2011. According to this text, X-band AN/TPY-2 radar will be positioned at a military base in Kurecik (Malatya), Turkey. The officials stated that the radar would ensure early warnings for the missiles to be launched outside Europe.<sup>304</sup> It was emphasized that hosting early warning radar would make contribution to new defense system which has been developed in accordance with NATO's new strategic concept and reinforce Turkey's national defense system as well as of NATO's defence capacity.<sup>305</sup> Turkish officials also stressed that this country considers this system as NATO project instead of a project introduced by the U.S.<sup>306</sup> It was declared on 5 October 2011 that the U.S. and Spain reached an agreement with a view to reinforcing U.S. missile defense plans. According to this agreement, Spain will host the U.S. anti missile war ships at Rota, which is located on the Spanish coast. It was stated by the U.S. Secretary of Defense Panetta that four Aegis destroyers would be stationed in Rota and this agreement, displaying the U.S. pledge to Europe would be crucial for the missile defense project.<sup>307</sup>

Regarding Phase II, negotiations on hosting a land based SM-3 missile defense interceptor site were concluded between the U.S. and Romania in May 2011. In this regard, Deveselu Air Base located in Romania was chosen for the

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<sup>303</sup> U.S. White House Office of the Press Secretary, *Fact Sheet on Implementing Missile Defense in Europe*, Washington D.C., 2011, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/15/fact-sheet-implementing-missile-defense-europe> (accessed on 26 December 2011)

<sup>304</sup> Michail Fomichev, "Turkey Agrees to Host Powerful US Radar", in *RIA Novosti*, 14 September 2011, [http://en.rian.ru/military\\_news/20110914/166843361.html](http://en.rian.ru/military_news/20110914/166843361.html) (accessed on 27 December 2011)

<sup>305</sup> SC 26, [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/sc\\_-26\\_-1-eylul-2011\\_-disisleri-bakanligi-sozcusu\\_nun-bir-soruya-cevabi.tr.mfa](http://www.mfa.gov.tr/sc_-26_-1-eylul-2011_-disisleri-bakanligi-sozcusu_nun-bir-soruya-cevabi.tr.mfa) (accessed on 27 December 2011)

<sup>306</sup> Mustafa Kibaroglu, "The missile shield and Turkey's position in the debate", in *Today's Zaman*, 1 November 2010.

<sup>307</sup> David Brunnstrom and David Alexander, "Spain to host U.S. missile defense ships," in *Reuters*, 5 October 2011, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/05/us-nato-missile-defence-idUSTRE7945B620111005> (accessed on 27 December 2011)

deployment of this site.<sup>308</sup> The Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement between the U.S. and Romania was concluded on 13 September 2011 to this end.<sup>309</sup> Regarding Phase III, in October 2009, Polish President Tusk stated during the visit of the U.S. Vice President Biden to Warsaw that Poland would join new ballistic missile defense program of Obama administration and host SM-3 interceptor site.<sup>310</sup> In July 2010, an annex to the 2008 U.S. Poland agreement allowing the deployment of the U.S. BMD was signed by the U.S. Secretary of State Clinton and Polish Foreign Minister Sikorski. Sikorski also brought to the attention that permission would be given to Russia to inspect the sites<sup>311</sup>. “Finally with respect to Phase IV, the Department of Defense has begun concept development of a more advanced interceptor for deployment in the 2020 timeframe.”<sup>312</sup>

## **5.2. Russian Reaction to the U.S. Missile Defense:**

The U.S. has sought for collaboration with Russia on missile defense issue. As Weitz state;

In bilateral negotiations with Moscow, U.S. officials have been offering four concrete missile defense collaboration projects: Binational and multinational jointly manned centres where Russian personnel can see the nonthreatening nature of U.S. and NATO missile defense activities; joint U.S. Russian expert studies regarding how missile defense might

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<sup>308</sup> Frank A. Rose, U.S. Missile Defense and Regional Security, Remarks at the Second Annual Israel Multinational Missile Defense Conference, Tel Aviv, 2011, <http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/169023.htm> (accessed on 26 December 2011)

<sup>309</sup> U.S. White House Office of the Press Secretary, *Fact Sheet on Implementing Missile Defense in Europe*, Washington D.C., 2011, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/15/fact-sheet-implementing-missile-defense-europe> (accessed on 26 December 2011)

<sup>310</sup> Nichol, *op.cit.*, p. 54.

<sup>311</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 57.

<sup>312</sup> Frank A. Rose, U.S. Missile Defense and Regional Security, Remarks at the Second Annual Israel Multinational Missile Defense Conference, Tel Aviv, 2011, <http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/169023.htm> (accessed on 26 December 2011)

affect Russia's nuclear deterrent and what steps can be taken to minimize any problems; expanded NATO-Russian theatre level missile defense exercises that build on earlier collaboration- disrupted by the August 2008 Russia Georgia war- and that rehearse how deployed NATO and Russian forces can jointly defend against missile threats; an underlying legal framework to support these and other cooperative projects.<sup>313</sup>

As for Russian response to the U.S. missile defense plans, in November 2008, Russian President Medvedev stated that if the European Capability was materialized, Russia would deploy short range Iskander missiles to Kaliningrad just after the U.S. presidential elections.<sup>314</sup> In January 2009, the U.S. Secretary of State Clinton stated that the U.S. would intend to seek the means for collaboration with Russia in setting up missile defense system which would strengthen the safety of all Europe in her speech on the Future of the European Security in Paris. She also added that Europe would be a more secure place as a result of missile defenses and that security could extend to Russia, if Russia consented to cooperate and this would ensure an opportunity to create a partnership with this country in this regard.<sup>315</sup>

In February 2009, the U.S. Vice President Biden told at the Wehrkunde conference that developing missile defense system would be continued by the U.S. to respond a growing Iranian capacity and this would be realized in coordination with Russia and NATO. The U.S. Secretary of State Clinton stated during her visit to Prague in February 2009 that Iran would determine whether there would be any change in the U.S. policy regarding missile defense, but there had been no change in Iran's policy.<sup>316</sup> However, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov stated that Russian

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<sup>313</sup> Richard Weitz, "Getting to Yes on Missile Defense", in *The Moscow Times*, 22 August 2011, p.1, <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/getting-to-yes-on-missile-defense/442411.html> (accessed on 27 December 2011)

<sup>314</sup> Nichol, *op.cit.*, p. 53.

<sup>315</sup> Frank A. Rose, *Ballistic Missile Defense System Joint/Combined Warfighter Conference 10-1*, Schriever Air Force Base CO, 2010, <http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/138554.htm> (27 December 2011)

<sup>316</sup> Nichol, *op.cit.*, p. 53.



and the U.S. perceptions on Iran were not same and stressed that Russia did not support the possession of nuclear weapons by Iran, but one had to take the fact that these two countries were traditional and historical neighbours.<sup>317</sup> This approach confirms that despite the U.S. offers for collaboration, Russia prefers not to engage in NATO missile defense system.

In a joint statement dated April 2009, the differences regarding the deployment of U.S. missile defenses in Europe were accepted by Presidents Obama and Medvedev, but they committed to seek new opportunities for international cooperation on this issue. In June 2009, Russia stated that if the plans to set up missile defenses in Czech Republic and Poland were not cancelled by the U.S., this country might not decrease its nuclear weapons. It was also reiterated that if Patriot missile batteries were sent to Poland by the U.S., there would be a possibility for Moscow to locate Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad.<sup>318</sup> Russians also said that if the U.S. aimed at following sites in Europe, these sites should be located in the south and west of Europe with a view to reducing the influence on deterrence capacity of Russia.<sup>319</sup> At the July 2009 U.S.-Russia summit, Presidents Obama and Medvedev announced in a joint statement that they would continue to collaborate with a view to countering the threats driven by the proliferation of ballistic missiles. It was decided that experts from both countries would be assigned to collaborate with a view to scrutinizing the threat of ballistic missiles.<sup>320</sup> While Russian President expresses his intent for collaboration on missile defense issue, at the same time Moscow continues to take retaliatory measures to hinder the development of NATO missile defense system.

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<sup>317</sup> FM Lavrov Discusses Missile Defense and Iran with Codel Levin, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/04/09MOSCOW1111.html> (accessed on 27 December 2011)

<sup>318</sup> Nichol, *op.cit.*, p. 53-54.

<sup>319</sup> FM Lavrov Discusses Missile Defense and Iran with Codel Levin, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/04/09MOSCOW1111.html> (accessed on 27 December 2011)

<sup>320</sup> Nichol, *op.cit.*, p. 54.

It was also put forward at that Summit that both sides came to the point that a first strike could cause serious consequences. The U.S. President Obama stated at the Summit that the U.S. had to be capable of countering against missiles to be launched from Iran or North Korea and having the capability to avert such an assault was considered a significant matter for the U.S. and its allies. He also stressed that the U.S. would intend to cooperate with Russia to this end.<sup>321</sup>

However, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov told one day after the said summit that Russia might not be willing to reduce its nuclear artillery if the U.S. continued its missile defense plans. When a new defense program for a European based BMD was declared by Obama administration in September 2009, Russian President Medvedev qualified this as a responsible move and added that Russia would be prepared for a dialogue with the U.S.<sup>322</sup> In September 2009, in the press release of the White House, it was stressed that the Russian cooperation in the issue of missile defense was welcomed by the U.S. It was reiterated that the U.S. assured Russia that missile defense in Europe would not cause any threat to Russia's strategic deterrent and the aim here was to reinforce defense systems against the growing missile threats.<sup>323</sup> However, in January 2010, Russian Ambassador to NATO, Rogozin qualified the deployment of Patriot missiles in Poland as reckless.<sup>324</sup> It was stated by Russian officials that Russian Baltic fleet might be reinforced under these circumstances.<sup>325</sup> In February 2010, the U.S. Secretary of

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<sup>321</sup> U.S. White House Office of the Press Secretary, *Press Conference by President Obama and President Medvedev of Russia*, Moscow, [http://www.whitehouse.gov/the\\_press\\_office/Press-Conference-by-President-Obama-and-President-Medvedev-of-Russia](http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Press-Conference-by-President-Obama-and-President-Medvedev-of-Russia) (accessed on 27 December 2011)

<sup>322</sup> Nichol, *op.cit.*, p.54.

<sup>323</sup> U.S. White House Office of the Press Secretary, *Fact Sheet on U.S. Missile Defense Policy: A Phased, Adaptive Approach for Missile Defense in Europe*, Washington, 2009, [http://www.whitehouse.gov/the\\_press\\_office/FACT-SHEET-US-Missile-Defense-Policy-A-Phased-Adaptive-Approach-for-Missile-Defense-in-Europe](http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/FACT-SHEET-US-Missile-Defense-Policy-A-Phased-Adaptive-Approach-for-Missile-Defense-in-Europe) (accessed on 26 December 2011)

<sup>324</sup> Webb, *loc.cit.*, p. 5.

<sup>325</sup> Nichol, *op.cit.*, p. 55.

State Clinton stated at the NATO Strategic Concept Seminar that the U.S. would need Russia in its endeavours to avert nuclear proliferation and the U.S. ask this country to take part in missile defense system of NATO to safeguard all citizens of Europe as well as of Russia.<sup>326</sup>

In February 2010, the U.S. Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, Tauscher stated that the Russia was informed about the intended deployment to Romania by the U.S.<sup>327</sup> The U.S. Secretary of Defense Gates stated at the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee in June 2010 that the U.S. was discussing the ways to make cooperation with Russia on missile defense and this collaboration would be for the interest of the U.S. and Russia. He also added that these discussions would not bring any restrictions to the U.S. missile programs.<sup>328</sup>

At Berlin Press Roundtable in October 2010, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, Gordon stated that the U.S. intended to make cooperation with Russia on missile defense. He told that the target of the U.S. missile defense was not Russia and this system was not introduced to counter Russian capacity. He also stressed that missile defense project would not weaken strategic deterrent of Russia.<sup>329</sup>

U.S. officials state in numerous occasions that the deployment of radars and interceptors are aimed at ensuring defense against ballistic missiles driven from the Middle East and these systems would not be targeted to capture Russian ICBMs. It

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<sup>326</sup> Hillary Rodham Clinton, *Remarks at the NATO Strategic Concept Seminar*, Washington D.C., 2010, <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/02/137118.htm> (accessed on 27 December 2011)

<sup>327</sup> Nichol, *op.cit.*, p. 56.

<sup>328</sup> U.S. State Department Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, *Fact Sheet on Missile Defense Cooperation with the Russian Federation*, Washington D.C., 2010, <http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/152164.htm> (accessed on 27 December 2011)

<sup>329</sup> Philip Gordon, *Berlin Press Roundtable*, Berlin, 2010, <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2010/150148.htm> (accessed on 27 December 2011)

is also emphasized that providing assistance from Russia with a view to restraining the increasing missile threats is of significance for the U.S.<sup>330</sup>

Russia targets to conclude an agreement which is legally binding with the U.S. confirming that missile defense of the U.S. will never weaken strategic deterrent of Russia. But U.S. officials while emphasizing that the U.S. will not remove the strategic deterrent of Russia state that the administration cannot conclude such an agreement as it will restrain the U.S. capability to safeguard its country and its allies from any missile threats.<sup>331</sup> As an alternative, giving written assurances that this system would not be against Russia was offered by the U.S. to Russia.<sup>332</sup> However, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov stated that in addition to U.S. assurances, a legally binding document is compulsory and the lack of this agreement impedes the cooperation between Russia and the U.S. regarding missile defense.<sup>333</sup> It is explicit that Russia considers the West as a threat against itself and Moscow aims at reaching agreements that missile defense will not be against this country instead of cooperating with the West in the development of such a system.

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<sup>330</sup>U. S. Missile Defense Policy and Europe, <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/09/09STATE96526.html> (accessed on 27 December 2011)

<sup>331</sup> Richard Weitz, "Getting to Yes on Missile Defense", in *The Moscow Times*, 22 August 2011, <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/getting-to-yes-on-missile-defense/442411.html> (accessed on 27 December 2011)

<sup>332</sup> Nichol, *op.cit.*, p. 60.

<sup>333</sup> Information and Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, *Press Release titled Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov's Interview with RIA Novosti on Themes Related to Missile Defense, Bilateral Relations with the U.S. and the Situation Surrounding Iran's Nuclear Program*, 18 November 2011, [http://www.in.mid.ru/bdomp/brp\\_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/cd1f5f8834fd15d6442579500023680b!OpenDocument](http://www.in.mid.ru/bdomp/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/cd1f5f8834fd15d6442579500023680b!OpenDocument) (accessed on 26 December 2011)

### 5.3 NATO's Missile Defense since Lisbon Summit

NATO has already been focusing on a missile defense system with a view to safeguarding its troops on operations. NATO is assumed to be protecting European populations and territory from missile attacks as a result of expanding missile defense program and merging it with the missile defense of the U.S. integrated missile defense system would provide more ability than systems of individual states.<sup>334</sup> NATO attained the first phase of an initial capability to safeguard NATO forces against any missile threats in the beginning of 2010. Setting up a missile defense capability for NATO with a view to safeguarding its territory and populations was endorsed by the leaders of NATO at 2010 NATO Lisbon Summit.<sup>335</sup> Setting up of a missile defense system was defined by NATO within the framework of its Strategic Concept endorsed at Lisbon Summit.<sup>336</sup>

It was agreed at Lisbon Summit that the capacity to safeguard NATO territories and populations against the threat of ballistic missile assaults would be established. This system which would be the most significant factor in NATO's collective defense would make huge contribution to NATO's indivisible security. It was also stated that NATO would aim at cooperating on missile defense issue especially with Russia and other Euro-Atlantic partners. It was also stressed that ensuring full coverage and defense for all European populations, forces and territory against the threats emerged as a result of the ballistic missile spread would be the objective of this system. It was also emphasized that U.S. EPAA would be

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<sup>334</sup> Anders Fogh Rasmussen, "NATO Needs a Missile Defense" in *New York Times*, 13 October 2010.

<sup>335</sup> Missile Defense, [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_49635.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49635.htm) (accessed on 26 December 2011)

<sup>336</sup> Oliver Thranert, "NATO and Missile Defense: Opportunities and Open Questions" in Daniel Trachsler (ed.), *Centre for Security Studies Analysis in Security Policy*, Zurich: Centre for Security Studies, 2010. p.1

considered as a significant national contribution to missile defense architecture of NATO.<sup>337</sup>

NATO's new Strategic Concept explicitly confirms that the capacity to protect the members of this organization against any ballistic missile assaults to be launched from the Middle East will be established by NATO with the intention of ensuring that NATO is able to safeguard its safety and security against any threat. This new concept provides more cooperation prospects among NATO members through a formalized Command and Control system of NATO as contributions of each member state will be transferred to NATO's capacity.<sup>338</sup>

At Lisbon Summit, NATO's Strategic Concept did not identify any countries owing to Turkish concerns regarding missile defense.<sup>339</sup> It was stated by Turkey that if any country was identified as the source of concern, this would ensure this country a justification to further its missile initiatives.<sup>340</sup> At Lisbon Summit, NATO attempted to have a missile defense capability which would protect the entire alliance for the first time in its history. The new system is aimed at safeguarding the whole territory of NATO by way of ALTBMD system which was initiated in 2005. The system is anticipated to be concluded by 2018.<sup>341</sup>

In January 2011, the ALTBMD capability was transferred to military commanders at NATO Combined Air Operations Centre in Uedem, Germany. After the transfer, it was stated that the centre showed that this interim capability

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<sup>337</sup> Ian Davis, "NATO Reform Lite: An Evaluation of the Lisbon Summit (Part I)", *NATO Watch Briefing Paper*, No: 14, 2010, p. 9.

<sup>338</sup> Frank A. Rose, U.S. Missile Defense and Regional Security, Remarks at the Second Annual Israel Multinational Missile Defense Conference, Tel Aviv, 2011, <http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/169023.htm> (accessed on 26 December 2011)

<sup>339</sup> Thranert, *op.cit.*, p .2.

<sup>340</sup> Mustafa Kibaroglu, "The missile shield and Turkey's position in the debate", in *Today's Zaman*, 1 November 2010.

<sup>341</sup> Thranert, *op.cit.*, p .1.

permitted NATO commanders to conduct limited ballistic missile defense planning and exchange information on ballistic missile defense assets of member states for the first time.<sup>342</sup> It was acknowledged that this transfer would be a significant move in missile defense endeavours of NATO. This was also considered as a successful collaboration example within the framework of the ALTBMD program.<sup>343</sup>

#### **5.4 Russian Negative Stance on Recent Developments Regarding the Western Missile Defense System**

In December 2009, NATO Foreign Ministers stressed that they were in favour of new missile defense plan of the U.S. and stated that NATO was ready to make collaboration with Russia in this regard. As Nichol states;

The Russian media reported that NATO and Russia had formed a working group to study the issue. In a speech shortly thereafter, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said that he hoped the alliance and Russia would have a joint system by 2020.<sup>344</sup>

NATO Secretary General Rasmussen also stated that a new period for collaboration under the umbrella of Euro Atlantic security would be created by way of cooperation between Russia and NATO regarding this issue.<sup>345</sup> In May 2010, consultations on missile defense commenced in NATO-Russia Council (NRC) and NATO Secretary General Rasmussen brought to the attention that missile defence would strengthen NATO's relations with Russia in addition to the relations between

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<sup>342</sup> NATO Theatre Missile Defense Makes Progress: Russian disquiet on territorial version continues, <http://www.natowatch.org/node/455> (accessed on 27 December 2011)

<sup>343</sup> NATO achieves first step on theatre ballistic missile defense capability, [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news\\_70114.htm?selectedLocale=en](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_70114.htm?selectedLocale=en) (accessed on 27 December 2011)

<sup>344</sup> Nichol, *op.cit.*, p. 55.

<sup>345</sup> Anders Fogh Rasmussen, "NATO Needs a Missile Defense" in *New York Times*, 13 October 2010.

Europe and the U.S.<sup>346</sup> He stated that the potential should be analysed with a view to combining the missile defense systems of NATO, the U.S. and Russia.<sup>347</sup>

NATO aimed at cooperating with Russia on missile defense system. “Also in July 2010, it was reported that NATO Secretary General Rasmussen hoped not only to have Obama Administration’s PAA adopted as an additional alliance capability, but also to have Russia participate with NATO in missile defense.”<sup>348</sup> In September 2010, NATO invited Russia to participate in Lisbon Summit being held in November, 2010. The idea that cooperation regarding missile defense issue could be ensured by the NRC was supported by Rasmussen. In return, Medvedev declared in October 2010 that he would join NATO meeting in Lisbon despite the suspicions of some Russian officials.<sup>349</sup> However, Russia has continued intransigent attitude towards the development of this system despite Moscow’s commitments for cooperation in this regard.

It was emphasized at the summit that the endeavours to find the ways for cooperation with Russia on this issue would be sustained to be based on mutual trust, transparency and reciprocity. The willingness of NATO to invite Russia with a view to seeking the possible ways for combining existing missile defense systems at an appropriate time was also confirmed.<sup>350</sup>

At NRC meeting which was held at the sidelines of Lisbon summit, it was endorsed that NATO and Russia continue to cooperate regarding missile defense. NRC Joint Statement declared that NATO acknowledged to discuss cooperation

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<sup>346</sup> Webb, *loc.cit.*, p. 5.

<sup>347</sup> Phillip R. Cuccia, *Implications of a Changing NATO*, 2010, p. 18, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=990> (accessed on 27 December 2011)

<sup>348</sup> Nichol, *op.cit.*, p.57.

<sup>349</sup> *Ibid.*, p.57-58.

<sup>350</sup> Davis, *op.cit.*, p. 9.



and to continue dialogue on missile defense issue and an assessment on ballistic missile threat was agreed by both sides. It was also stated that cooperation on theatre missile defense would be embarked by NRC and the Council has been assigned to work on future cooperation in this regard. However, cooperation within the framework of NRC did not fully work. Russian President Medvedev warned that Russia would only admit cooperation on missile defense issue to be based on a full-fledged partnership.<sup>351</sup> Russian Prime Minister Putin also stated that Russia would have to safeguard itself by employing various means which would involve new missile systems with a view to eliminating the new threats to be directed against Russia if this country realized that Western missile defense program would weaken its nuclear deterrence.<sup>352</sup> After the summit, NATO officials were hopeful that regarding missile defense, Moscow would cooperate by radar sharing and intelligence. However, Russia only admitted to take part in a joint NATO-Russian technical study to be conducted on the operation of the system. “President Medvedev also insisted that Russia would not participate in anything less than a full-fledged strategic partnership.”<sup>353</sup> Russian President Medvedev’s attitude indicates that Russia has continued its opposition to the missile defense system instead of all endeavours conducted within the framework of NRC.

After I explained how the making up missile defense issue influenced the relations between Russia and the West, I will focus on the intransigent attitude of Russia’s top officials on this issue starting from Russia’s Ambassador to NATO, Rogozin. He underlined the Russia’s perceptions on missile defense as follows:

Russia acknowledges that missile threats are turning into a reality, in this regard there has to be a missile defense system to be depending on equal participation and indivisible security for all European countries. Russia is not in

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<sup>351</sup> Nichol, *op.cit.*, p. 58.

<sup>352</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>353</sup> Davis, *op.cit.*, p. 10.

favour of the U.S. missile defense to be extended to its territory considering the fact that if an unexpected scenario occurs, this may disrupt the strategic balance between Russia and the U.S. Eliminating any threat against the strategic capabilities of Russia is of utmost significance as this capacity assures independence and sovereignty of this country. The U.S. should assure Russia that the U.S. missile defense system is not against interests of Russia.<sup>354</sup> Rogozin's perceptions reflect the fact that Russia's policy on missile defense issue is still based on the Cold War thought by considering NATO as a threat rather than a partner.

Rogozin reiterated key preconditions for establishing a successful collaboration on missile defense during his meeting with President of Slovenia, Tuerk on June 28, 2011 as building trust and transparency between the parties, setting up missile defense architecture in a cooperative way, giving assurances that missile defense system of the U.S. and NATO is not aimed against the strategic nuclear posture of this country with definite qualitative and quantitative criteria and compliance of the European missile defense with the missile threat originated from the south as declared by NATO.<sup>355</sup> He stated during his visit to Turkey at the end of July 2011 that the U.S. followed its missile defense plans not taking the negotiations with European allies and Russia into consideration and added that the European missile defense project could be employed by the U.S. as preparation for an assault against Iran.<sup>356</sup> He stressed in Turkey that the deployment of any missile defense elements of the U.S. in the Black sea and its neighbourhood would be

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<sup>354</sup> Dmitry Rogozin, "Missile Defense: As friends or foes?" in *International Herald Tribune*, June 8 2011.

<sup>355</sup> On the Meeting of Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation for Interaction with NATO in Missile Defense Dmitry Rogozin with President of Slovakia Danilo Tuerk June 28, 2011, <http://www.natomission.ru/en/society/article/society/artnews/94/> (accessed on 28 December 2011)

<sup>356</sup> U.S. Missile Shield may be Precursor for Iran Attack-Rogozin, <http://hamsayeh.net/archive/996-us-missile-shield-may-be-precursor-for-iran-attack-rogozin.html> (accessed on 26 December 2011)

opposed by Russia even if it did not violate the interests of this country.<sup>357</sup> Russia also declared its opposition to the Spanish government's decision to allow Aegis ships which would be positioned at Spanish port, Rota.<sup>358</sup> In line with Rogozin's views, Russian Foreign Minister Ryabkov also stated that Moscow was not convinced that the possible risk was driven from Iran and this would necessitate an anti missile defense system such as the one that Obama administration proceeds.<sup>359</sup> At the same time, Russia does not seem to trust the U.S. assurances that missile defense is not against itself, but Iran.<sup>360</sup> This indicates that Russia opposes the development of missile defense system as Moscow still intimidates the West by taking additional measures against this system instead of taking part in Western missile defense initiative and making collaboration with NATO.

A sectoral missile defense plan was offered by Russia. According to this plan, NATO would be in charge of defending Russia from missiles, while Russia would capture missiles that pass over its territory, to be against Europe. However, NATO remained vigilant of entrusting Russia such a role in determining which countries create a threat. In this regard, NATO did not support the sectoral proposal, as it would render Russia responsible to safeguard NATO from the threats of nuclear missile.<sup>361</sup>

In May 2011, messages were sent by the Russian President Medvedev to the leaders of NRC member states explaining the stance of Russia regarding missile defense. He stressed in his message that new opportunities to set up a strategic partnership relying on the principles as mutual confidence, equality, indivisibility of

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<sup>357</sup> U.S. targets missile defense against Russia, <http://www.eutimes.net/2011/07/us-targets-missile-defense-against-russia-%E2%80%93-nato-envoy/> (accessed on 27 December 2011)

<sup>358</sup> Nichol, *op.cit.*, p. 60.

<sup>359</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 57.

<sup>360</sup> Webb, *loc.cit.*, p. 5.

<sup>361</sup> Russia Raising the Stakes on Missile Defense, <http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/russia-missile-defense-feb-456.cfm>. (accessed on 27 December 2011)

security and predictability were created at the Lisbon Summit of the NRC. He repeated the readiness of Russia to take up responsibility for ensuring security and stability by way of European missile defense system. He outlined that only if Russia took part in on equal footing; this system would be actually efficient and feasible and emphasized the necessity to guarantee that this system would not remove any parties' strategic stability.<sup>362</sup> Despite its commitments of cooperation on missile defense issue, Moscow continues to oppose the missile defense system of NATO. This confirms the intransigent attitude and inconsistent policy of Russia regarding missile defense.

At NRC Defense Ministers Summit in June 2011 in Brussels, it was agreed that NATO and Russia would focus on reaching agreement on key principles for the collaboration on missile defense issue. However, it was also brought to the attention that more work to be needed in the coming period.<sup>363</sup> At the NATO-Russia Council meeting in Sochi in July 2011, the pledge of making cooperation regarding missile defense was also reiterated.<sup>364</sup>

In his address to the Russian people on 23 November 2011, Russian President stated that missile defense has been a complicated issue in relations among Russia, the U.S. and NATO. He added that development of a new missile system via positioning missile defenses and military capacity of the U.S. close to Russian borders created an anxiety in Russia. He stressed that Russia would not take part in a programme which has the potential of lessening the nuclear deterrent capability of this country. He also added that Russia would take different steps and he stated that he took following decisions to pursue such as ordering the Ministry of Defense to place early warning radar station for missile assaults in Kaliningrad on

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<sup>362</sup> Messages to heads of state of NATO Russia Council members, <http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/2214> (accessed on 27 December 2011)

<sup>363</sup> NATO and Russia building trust through defense cooperation, [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news\\_75197.htm?](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_75197.htm?) (accessed on 27 December 2011)

<sup>364</sup> NATO Russia Council makes progress in Sochi, [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news\\_76039.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_76039.htm) (accessed on 27 December 2011)

combat alert as soon as possible, strengthening protective cover of nuclear weapons in Russian artillery as the most significant measure under the programme with a view to expanding space and air defenses, getting the Navy and new strategic ballistic missiles equipped with advanced warheads and high technology penetration systems, instructing the Armed Forces to work on measures for rendering missile defense system and guidance systems inoperative if necessary and finally deploying advanced offensive weapon systems in the west and south of the country if above mentioned measures were considered insufficient with a view to ensuring the country's ability to remove any element of the missile defense system of the U.S. in Europe, in which locating Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad would be one step to this end.<sup>365</sup> This address of Russian President Medvedev explicitly confirms the fact that Russia's policy missile defense system is developed in terms of Cold War parameters and Russia has not changed its mentality about global security issues.

After Russian President Medvedev's address, Russian Defense Minister Serdyukov reiterated similar views in an interview with *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* newspaper on 16 December 2011. He brought to the attention that the strategic balance would be broken as a result of the missile shield deployment of the U.S. in Europe and added that as soon as the first missile defense elements was operational in Poland, Russia would take responsive measures such as the deployment of Iskander missiles complexes in Kaliningrad because Russia could not permit the unilateral deployment of the missile defense system in Poland to infringe the current strategic balance.<sup>366</sup> Serdyukov also warned that new anti missile radar station which was opened at the end of November 2011 in Kaliningrad would be operational until 2014 and once operational, it would have the capacity to monitor

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<sup>365</sup> Statement by Dmitry Medvedev in connection with the situation concerning the NATO countries' missile defense system in Europe, <http://natomission.ru/en/security/article/security/artnews/135/> (accessed on 27 December 2011)

<sup>366</sup> Missile Shield to break strategic balance-Serdyukov, <http://www.itar-tass.com/en/c32/298892.html> (accessed on 27 December 2011)

500 targets at the same time at a distance up to 6.000 km. It was also told by Serdyukov that S-400 surface to air missiles could be deployed by Russia with a view to strengthening the security of the facility in Kaliningrad.<sup>367</sup> Russia's opposition to NATO missile defense is very clear in the statements of Serdyukov.

Lately, it is possible to ascertain similar negative remarks regarding missile defense of NATO in the statements of Russian senior officials. In this regard, the commander of the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces Lieutenant General Karakayev said:

Today, we have to vigorously respond to America's missile defense build up because the U.S. has chosen to ignore Russia's concern over it...It seems that as long as a stable mechanism of nuclear deterrence based on a threat to use nuclear weapons exists in the world, it should not be undermined, provoking a strategic offensive arms race. Should it happen, any strategic capability would be out of the question. I don't think that such a situation will benefit anyone.<sup>368</sup>

However, it is argued despite the warnings of Russian President Medvedev, Russia has no capacity to halt or postpone missile defense plans of the U.S. It seems that the negotiations between the West and Russia continue to be futile. In this case, Russia is expected to make decision whether this country goes on its negotiations with the West or put the country's plan B into action. When we look at Medvedev's speech, it is more likely that Russia begins to implement plan B, the features of which were elaborated in the President's speech.<sup>369</sup>

With President Obama came to power in 2009, he decided a new missile defense system in Europe and today, the first phase of this system was concluded and following phases will be expected to materialize in accordance with its

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<sup>367</sup> Russia's Baltic radar to be fully operational by 2014, <http://en.rian.ru/news/20111215/170284350.html>, (accessed on 27 December 2011)

<sup>368</sup> The Real Dangers of War: New Russian Strategic Missiles Can Penetrate U.S. Missile Shield, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/Print Article.php?articleId=28234> (accessed on 28 December 2011)

<sup>369</sup> Ruslan Pukhov, "Medvedev's Missile Threats are His Plan B", in *The Moscow Times*, 1 December 2011.

timetable. While NATO accepted to develop its respective missile defense system at 2010 NATO Lisbon Summit, missile defense system of the U.S. was welcomed as a significant national contribution to this end. From the very beginning, Russia has opposed the development of missile defense system and is not willing to make collaboration with NATO. However at the same time, Russia makes commitments that Moscow cooperates with NATO regarding missile defense issue. This confirms the inconsistent stance of Russia in this regard.

As NATO did not intend to give Russia the authority to operate its system by referring to Article 5 of NATO Treaty, Russia came to a point that despite all the assurances, the system could target at weakening Russia's nuclear deterrence. After analysing recent statements of Russian top officials in this chapter, I conclude that Russia will put an end to negotiations with the West and develop its own missile defense system as Russian security policies are still formulized in terms of Cold War parameters. Russia will not change its mentality on security issues and prefer to be out of Western system. As a result, this decision of Russia not only prevents a partnership between Russia and NATO by affecting the works conducted by NRC in a negative way, but also gives rise to a failure in reset policy which was initiated by the President of the U.S. and Russia with a view to creating a robust partnership between two countries.

## **CHAPTER 6**

### **CONCLUSION**

The main objective of this thesis is to scrutinize the possibility of partnership between Russia and the West by way of cooperation in the field of missile defense. In this thesis, the question whether the issue of missile defense has created an opportunity for cooperation or divergence with regards to the relations between Russia and the West, namely the U.S. and NATO is examined. The findings of this thesis verifies its argument that Russia has failed to collaborate with NATO in a meaningful manner on missile defense issue as Russia has not adjusted its security policies and nuclear strategy, which are still based on the Cold War thinking to the changing conditions of global security in the post Cold War era. It is concluded that the missile defense initiatives have a negative impact on the relations between Russia and the West due to intransigent stance of Russia on this issue.

In the second chapter, it is observed that Russia still tries to keep its strategic deterrent power and acts uncompromisingly regarding the issue of missile defense. Russian politicians still approach the missile defense issue from strategic deterrence. As deterrence is actually a Cold War concept, the stance of Russia on missile defense issue indicates that Russia perceives this issue from Cold War perspective and aims at ensuring deterrence against the West instead of making collaboration.

While looking at Russia's stance, one could conclude that deterrence still has an important function as Russia's concerns centre around the deterrent capacity of this country. On the other hand, the U.S. and NATO still emphasize in every occasion that missile defense initiatives will never threaten strategic deterrence of Russia and this system is aimed at responding an assault to be launched from a rogue state.



This approach reflects the defense dominance instead of deterrence and the theory of mutual assured destruction and makes liberal institutionalism applicable. This theory explains the behaviours of democratic states and their will to make cooperation in the post Cold War era. NATO and the U.S. give Russia an opportunity to integrate with the West and offer collaboration on the missile defense issue.

Realism is applicable to understand the behaviours of states that are resisting international collaboration and formulates its policies in accordance with Cold War principles. Russia's intransigent stance which was announced by Russian President Medvedev dated 23 November 2011 focusing on strengthening the nuclear capacity of this country in face of the evolving missile defense initiative rather than making collaboration with NATO on this issue can only be explained by realist thought.

In the third chapter, it is noticed that nuclear weapons have played a significant role in relations between the U.S. and Soviet Union/Russia. Although there is a change in the U.S. nuclear policy with Obama Administration, Russia still formulates its nuclear strategies as a response to the U.S.'s and in terms of Cold War thought. The threat rhetoric has been advocated by the political circles in Russia, despite the U.S. guarantees that missile defense system in Europe targets ballistic missile strikes to be launched from the Middle East and they are not technically capable of weakening Russia's nuclear potential.

It is viewed in the fourth chapter that Russia followed an inconsistent policy on missile defense issue. While Russia was expressing that Moscow would collaborate with NATO on this issue, at the same time this county reiterated its opposition to the development of missile defense system of NATO. It was so explicit that regarding missile defense issue, Russia insisted on not to cooperate with the West and not to take part in missile defense system of NATO.

It is still uncertain whether Russia actually would like to have a comprehensive partnership with NATO as this organization is still been considered as an adversary by the political military elite of Russia, albeit Russian leaders from time to time speak positively regarding the partnership between NATO-Russia.<sup>370</sup>

Regarding missile defense issue, all discussions are continued around two main offers of Russia, the sectoral missile defense and binding legal guarantees. However, both proposals seem unacceptable for NATO and the U.S. “As Secretary General Rasmussen noted, acceding to the first demand would violate the very concept of Article 5, NATO’s mutual defense clause and would be equivalent to outsourcing missile defense for the treaty area.”<sup>371</sup> Moscow has demanded for guarantees as signing a legally binding agreement that would constrain NATO’s capacity. In response, the U.S. did not accept this demand by stating that the parameters of missile defense system of NATO could not be dictated by Russia.<sup>372</sup> Russia’s negative response to the proposal for cooperation of NATO and demand for additional guarantees reflect the fact that Moscow considers this organization from Cold War perspective.

All parties were expected to make most of NRC, as this is the main forum for discussions between NATO and Russia. Russia might have used this Council for collaboration instead of obstruction.<sup>373</sup> However, it is clear that NRC would not go beyond rather than emphasizing the continuation of dialogue between NATO and Russia on missile defense due to the negative response of Russia to the proposals of NATO. The latest statements of Russian high ranking officials

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<sup>370</sup> Cuccia, *op.cit.*, p. 18

<sup>371</sup> Nichol., *op.cit.*, p. 60.

<sup>372</sup> Charles A. Kupchan, “Coming in from the Cold War”, in *International Herald Tribune*, June 8 2011.

<sup>373</sup> *Ibid.*

demonstrate that this Council would not ensure the reconciliation between Russia and the West in the field of missile defense.

In the last chapter, it is concluded that Russia will not change its mentality on security issues and prefer to be out of Western system. This decision of Russia not only prevents a partnership between Russia and NATO by affecting the works conducted by NRC in a negative way, but also gives rise to a failure in reset policy which was initiated by the President of the U.S. and Russia with a view to creating a robust partnership between two countries.

Russia has clearly demonstrated that this country will not take part in the Western missile defense initiatives alleging that this initiative will undermine the nuclear deterrent capability of Russia. It is so explicit that Cold War parameters are decisive factors in Russian foreign and security policy and Russia considers itself as superpower as it was during the Cold War years instead of a country which is integrated into Western world as a liberal democratic state. Thus, Russia misses an opportunity to be a part of Western world by rejecting making collaboration with NATO in the issue of missile defense.

Russian stance is still intransigent on the issue of missile defense. Moscow knows that its capacity in this regard is far behind those of NATO's and the U.S.'s. But, this fact is contrary to the Russian's demands to be treated as an equal partner.<sup>374</sup> Failure to collaborate regarding missile defense will have further unwanted outcomes for Russia. It might restart arms race, because Russia will try to protect its nuclear deterrent by way of redeploying offensive weapons. Replacing the outdated Russian nuclear arsenal will bring financial burden to Russian economy at a time when it is expected to allocate its financial resources to the economic revitalization of the country.

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<sup>374</sup> Thranert, *op.cit.*, p .3.

The relations between the West and Russia on missile defense will largely depend on the course of the Russian policy. If Prime Minister Putin regains his position as President, resolving the missile defense dispute will not be easy and most likely, the main cautions which were identified in Medvedev's speech will be materialized as there is no possibility for the U.S. and NATO to put an end to missile defense program. In this case, the absence of a joint NATO Russia missile defense could lead Moscow to embark on nuclear weapons build up. The main focus on missile defense from Russian perspective is the fear of a shift in the balance of power in the partnership toward NATO, decreasing Moscow's strategic potential. This decision could also put an end to the reset policy between the U.S. and Russia and impact the works of NRC negatively.

As a result, the issue of missile defense is far behind creating a robust partnership between Russia and the West on the grounds that the negotiations on this issue are about to come to an impasse and Russian leaders still have the concerns about the intentions of the U.S. and NATO driven by Cold War era. Missile defense issue continues to be a game changer in the relations between Russia and the West. In this case, Russia continues trying to regain its super power status through rearmament which has political and financial high costs for this country while the U.S. and NATO proceed to deploy missile defense system in Europe in accordance with its timeframe. Thus, missile defense will generate a disagreement between Russia and the West which has the potential to disrupt the existing relations of Russia with the West due to the irreconcilable behaviours of Russia despite all assurances given by NATO.

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## **APPENDICES**

### **APPENDIX A**

#### **TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS**

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Proceeding from the premise that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind,

Considering that effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile systems would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons,

Proceeding from the premise that the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems, as well as certain agreed measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms, would contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions for further negotiations on limiting strategic arms,

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to take effective measures toward reductions in strategic arms, nuclear disarmament, and general and complete disarmament,

Desiring to contribute to the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States,

Have agreed as follows:

#### **Article I**

1. Each Party undertakes to limit anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems and to adopt other measures in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty.
2. Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense, and not to deploy ABM



systems for defense of an individual region except as provided for in Article III of this Treaty.

## **Article II**

1. For the purpose of this Treaty an ABM system is a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, currently consisting of:

(a) ABM interceptor missiles, which are interceptor missiles constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode;

(b) ABM launchers, which are launchers constructed and deployed for launching ABM interceptor missiles; and

(c) ABM radars, which are radars constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode.

2. The ABM system components listed in paragraph 1 of this Article include those which are:

(a) operational;

(b) under construction;

(c) undergoing testing;

(d) undergoing overhaul, repair or conversion; or

(e) mothballed.

## **Article III**

Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems or their components except that:

(a) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred and fifty kilometers and centered on the Party's national capital, a Party may deploy: (1) no more than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, and (2) ABM radars within no more than six ABM radar complexes, the area of each complex being circular and having a diameter of no more than three kilometers; and

(b) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred and fifty kilometers and containing ICBM silo launchers, a Party may deploy: (1) no

more than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, (2) two large phased-array ABM radars comparable in potential to corresponding ABM radars operational or under construction on the date of signature of the Treaty in an ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers, and (3) no more than eighteen ABM radars each having a potential less than the potential of the smaller of the above-mentioned two large phased-array ABM radars.

#### **Article IV**

The limitations provided for in Article III shall not apply to ABM systems or their components used for development or testing, and located within current or additionally agreed test ranges. Each Party may have no more than a total of fifteen ABM launchers at test ranges.

#### **Article V**

1. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.
2. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test or deploy ABM launchers for launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time from each launcher, not to modify deployed launchers to provide them with such a capacity, not to develop, test, or deploy automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems for rapid reload of ABM launchers.

#### **Article VI**

To enhance assurance of the effectiveness of the limitations on ABM systems and their components provided by the Treaty, each Party undertakes:

- (a) not to give missiles, launchers, or radars, other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM mode; and
- (b) not to deploy in the future radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack except at locations along the periphery of its national territory and oriented outward.

#### **Article VII**

Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and replacement of ABM systems or their components may be carried out.

### **Article VIII**

ABM systems or their components in excess of the numbers or outside the areas specified in this Treaty, as well as ABM systems or their components prohibited by this Treaty, shall be destroyed or dismantled under agreed procedures within the shortest possible agreed period of time.

### **Article IX**

To assure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party undertakes not to transfer to other States, and not to deploy outside its national territory, ABM systems or their components limited by this Treaty.

### **Article X**

Each Party undertakes not to assume any international obligations which would conflict with this Treaty.

### **Article XI**

The Parties undertake to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms.

### **Article XII**

1. For the purpose of providing assurance or compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.
2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.
3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices.

### **Article XIII**

1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties shall establish promptly a Standing Consultative Commission, within the framework of which they will:

(a) consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and related situations which may be considered ambiguous;

(b) provide on a voluntary basis such information as either Party considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed;

(c) consider questions involving unintended interference with national technical means of verification;

(d) consider possible changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on the provisions of this Treaty;

(e) agree upon procedures and dates for destruction or dismantling of ABM systems or their components in cases provided for by the provisions of this Treaty;

(f) consider, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing the viability of this Treaty; including proposals for amendments in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty;

(g) consider, as appropriate, proposals for further measures aimed at limiting strategic arms.

2. The Parties through consultation shall establish, and may amend as appropriate, Regulations for the Standing Consultative Commission governing procedures, composition and other relevant matters.

#### **Article XIV**

1. Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing the entry into force of this Treaty.

2. Five years after entry into force of this Treaty, and at five-year intervals thereafter, the Parties shall together conduct a review of this Treaty.

#### **Article XV**

1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

2. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the

Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

**Article XVI**

1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. The Treaty shall enter into force on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

2. This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

**DONE** at Moscow on May 26, 1972, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

**FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:**  
**RICHARD NIXON**  
*President of the United States of America*

**FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:**  
**L. I. BREZHNEV**  
*General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU*

## APPENDİX B

### TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

#### ENSTİTÜ

- Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü
- Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü
- Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü
- Enformatik Enstitüsü
- Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü

#### YAZARIN

Soyadı : Civelik  
Adı : İsmail  
Bölümü : Avrupa Çalışmaları

**TEZİN ADI** (İngilizce) : Russia and the Western Missile Defense Initiatives:  
Towards a Partnership in the Making?

**TEZİN TÜRÜ** : Yüksek Lisans  Doktora

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
3. Tezimden bir bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz.

**TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ:**