

TESTING THE EU-NATO RELATIONS THROUGH THE CASE OF  
AFGHANISTAN (2001-2011)

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## ABSTRACT

### TESTING THE EU-NATO RELATIONS THROUGH THE CASE OF AFGHANISTAN (2001-2011)

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The thesis aims to chart the relations of the EU and NATO through the case of Afghanistan. It examines the role of ISAF in conjunction with PRTs and EUPOL to evaluate the relations between the EU and NATO. The involvement of the ISAF and EUPOL missions from their establishment to evolution and the limitations of both missions in accordance with the management of the US in the “War on Terror” are examined. The implications of American policies on the missions of both parties are explored, from the first term of Bush to the Obama administration. The thesis argues that while there has been cooperation between the EU and NATO without structural cooperation, thus being *ad hoc* cooperation, the US has been benefiting from this cooperation from the second term of the Bush administration to the Obama administration, thereby rehabilitating the tense relations between the EU and the US. In the final analysis, it may be said that this cooperation did not result in a success story in the case of Afghanistan.

Key words: Afghanistan, NATO, PRT, EU, the Bush and Obama administrations

## ÖZ

### AB VE NATO İLİŞKİLERİNİN AFGANİSTAN ÖRNEĞİ ÜZERİNDE TEST EDİLMESİ (2001-2011)

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Bu tez, Afganistan örneğini dikkate alarak AB ve NATO ilişkilerini gözden geçirmeyi amaçlamaktadır. AB ve NATO ilişkileri değerlendirilirken ISAF’ın rolü, İİE’ler ve EUPOL birlikte ele alınmaktadır. ISAF ve EUPOL misyonlarının kuruluştan genişlemeye kadar katılımları ve sınırlılıkları incelenirken ABD’nin “Terörizmle Mücadele” yönetimi ile bağlantıları ele alınmaktadır. Bush’un ilk döneminden başlayarak, Obama yönetimi de dahil olmak üzere ABD’nin uyguladığı politikaların her iki örgütün misyonları üzerindeki etkisi açıklanmaktadır. Bu tezde, AB ve NATO arasında yapısal olmayan bir işbirliği bulunduğu, ABD’nin Bush yönetiminin ikinci döneminden başlayarak Obama döneminde de işbirliğinin bu *ad hoc* özelliğinden faydalanmaya ve bu yolla AB ile ABD arasındaki gerginliği onarmaya devam ettiği ileri sürülmektedir. Son tahlilde, Afganistan örneği dikkate alındığında, bu işbirliğinin bir başarı hikâyesi ile sonuçlandığı söylenemez.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Afganistan, NATO, İİE, AB, Bush ve Obama yönetimleri

To my dear and loving husband  
*Murat*

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAP	Annual Action Programme
AIA	Afghan Interim Authority
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANP	Afghan National Police
ANSF	Afghan National Security Forces
CEP	Civil Emergency Action Plan
CESDP	Common European Security and Defence Policy
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CHCL	Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells
CIVCOM	Civilian Aspects of Common Security and Defence Policy
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Forces
CMC	Crisis Management Concept
CNPA	Counter- Narcotics Police of Afghanistan
CNTF	Counter Narcotics Trust Fund
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
CPJP	City Police and Justice Programme
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
CSP	Country Strategy Paper
DCI	Defence Capabilities Initiative
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EC	European Community
ECHO	European Community on Humanitarian Office
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EDC	European Defence Community
EEAS	European External Action Service
EGF	European Gendarmerie Force
EIDHR	European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights Programme
EPC	European Political Community
EPC	European Political Cooperation
ESDI	European Security and Defence Identity

ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
EUMS	European Union Military Staff
EUPOL	European Union Police Mission
EURS	European Union Special Representative
GAC	General Affairs Council
GPPO	German Police Project Office
GPPT	German Police Project Team
GWOT	Global War on Terror
HG	Headline Goal
I-ANDS	Interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy
IfS	Instrument for Stability
IJO	Italian Justice Office
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
IPCB	International Police Coordination Board
JANIB	Joint Afghan-NATO Inteqal Board
JEUAM	Joint EU Assessment Mission
JHA	Justice and Home Affairs
MACU	Military Anti-Corruption Unit
MAP	Membership Action Plan
MIP	Multi-Annual Indicative Programme
MoI	Ministry of Interior
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NIP	National Indicative Programme
NRF	NATO Response Force
NSS	National Security Strategy
NTM-A	NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
PAP-DIB	Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building
PAP-T	Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism
PCC	Prague Capabilities Commitment

PfP	Partnership for Peace
POERF	Post-Operations Emergency Relief Fund
PRTs	Provincial Reconstruction Teams
PSC	Political and Security Committee
QIP	Quick Impact Projects
RRM	Rapid Reaction Mechanism
STANAVFORMED	Standing NAVAL Force Mediterranean
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
WEU	Western European Union
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

## **CHAPTER 1**

### **INTRODUCTION**

In international politics, the definition of threat to international actors is imperative in restructuring their settings. That is to say, new needs bring new structures along with reformulation. Hence, the adjustment of international actors to the new conjuncture constitutes the initial point of my thesis. In this regard, the relation between the EU and NATO in accordance with the new adjustments is the main topic of my analysis. To be specific, I commenced my analysis by examining one of the most important milestones in determining the new perceptions of threat in international politics: the 9/11 attacks.

A bi-polar world order presided over the structure of the Cold War era where the Western and Eastern blocs had their own economic, political, and military institutions. During the Cold War, European security and defense were markedly dependent on these two rival blocs represented by the US and USSR. Hence, Europe was under the tutelage of a certain security comprehension in a bi-polar international system. However, the collapse of the USSR ended the Cold War structure. The dissolution of the bi-polar world security structure gave rise to insecurity through which new security issues were defined as global terrorism, rogue states, and weapons of mass destruction. The emergence of this ambiguous state of security was concretized by the attacks of 9/11 facilitating a delineation of the new structure as the “War on Terror.”

In this consideration, the relation between the EU and NATO has been reformulated within the framework of internal transformation in line with the newly emerging threat issues since 9/11. During the Cold War, on the one hand, NATO maintained its mission by protecting Europe from the Soviet threat by locating itself at the center of European security. The EU, on the other hand, made strong efforts to structure the European Defence Community (EDC) to secure its

own assets; which, however, failed due to problems arising in the ratification phase.

With the end of the Cold War, NATO added the strategic concepts of peacekeeping, peacemaking, and crisis management to its ever prevailing collective defense mission. The EU attempted to improve its own political structure by putting special emphasis on security and defense mechanisms. The establishment of the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) relying on the NATO assets and its efforts in setting up the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) with or without NATO are crucial initiatives in order to adapt to the newly emerging threats and destabilizing factors.

The attacks of 9/11 not only gave grounds to the launching of the “War on Terror” but, by strongly emphasizing international terror, also facilitated the perception of the conceptual link between the weak or “failed states” and security. Thus, the prevention of state failures and rebuilding of the weak or “failed states” has become the topical issue on the crisis management policy agenda. Considering this point, I decided to take Afghanistan as a specific case, where the international presence in the “War on Terror” is evident, within my analysis of EU-NATO relations.

Afghanistan signals both the transformation of NATO and the police mission of the EU in terms of their involvement. Moreover, it represents the primary context where the combat against terrorism is launched, and where the US is changing its strategies in line with the demands of administrations that are prominent in promoting the relations between the EU and NATO. The examination of the US strategies under the Bush administrations (2000-2008) and that of Obama constitute an essential part of my thesis in understanding the changing mission of NATO and its convergences and divergences within the EU in terms of security cooperation.

This thesis focuses on the analysis of the relations between the EU and NATO through the case of Afghanistan as it is the first battleground for the “War on Terror.” Second, Afghanistan is an out of area mission beyond Europe. In other words, it is a remote area for both the EU and NATO. Third, Afghanistan, having had no well-functioning government, poses difficulties in rehabilitation.

Therefore, this thesis aims to question the possible constraints for both implementing the police mission of the EU, and the out of area mission of NATO in Afghanistan. Considering the prevailing constraints, this thesis also attempts to explore the impact of administrative changes in the US and its policies on Afghanistan. Changes in policies bring changes in the state of affairs. In this respect, the thesis questions the changes in the US strategy, and their decisive role in revising the prevailing circumstances. Hence, the reference documents such as the US National Security Strategy (NSS) and the European Security Strategy (ESS), published in 2002 and 2003 respectively, hold a crucial importance to the understanding of the constructed discourse on the “War on Terror.” In addition, the War in Iraq (2003) is crucial for this thesis in indicating any change that might arise among the allies in Afghanistan. The revealing of the relations between the EU and NATO in Afghanistan, where they became ever critical in terms of the coordination and difficulties faced, has become more crucial in the aftermath of the War in Iraq.

Within the context of this thesis, the respective involvement of the EU and NATO in Afghanistan is taken into consideration separately, for each has its own means of employing its capacity. Moreover, this thesis, while focusing on the analysis of the NATO mission via the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), concentrated on the involvement of the EU in Afghanistan as a police mission (EUPOL) and as a part of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) operation, notwithstanding the challenges between the member states. Another aspect of this thesis is its aim to analyze the EU and NATO relations within ISAF and also PRTs. In this regard, PRTs deserves more attention, whose sponsoring are under their lead nation(s), together with undefined scope of joint civilian and military tasks. Hence, the challenges put forward by the members of both EU and NATO in enforcing their own policies while contributing to ISAF and PRTs. This approach will pave the way to the understanding of the challenges to be posed by the evaluation of security coordination within two given organizations. National prerequisites constituting the main obstacle in the coordination of allies are an issue that cannot be denied. Here, the examination of the disagreements as well as the consensus

among the actors of a given institution culminates in the understanding of the consequences of both member states' relations.

Another crucial issue in Afghanistan is the demarcation of EU-NATO relations regarding the EU's police mission constituting a part of ESDP operations. EUPOL is a EU initiative, set up in 2007 upon NATO's request to take the lead in police training missions and as a civilian crisis management task force, in addition to the NATO mission in Afghanistan. The viability of EUPOL in Afghanistan, along with its possible implications on the coordination or difficulties encountered, is attempted to be characterized. Additionally, the contribution of EU member states to EUPOL and their resource and staff management strategies are also incorporated into the thesis. The issues hitherto mentioned delineate the questions set forth to test the cooperative mission capabilities of the EU and NATO in Afghanistan.

The Afghan case is particularly significant in illustrating the difficulties encountered in the transatlantic cooperation toward newly emerging global challenges which the attacks of 9/11 incited. This thesis explores burden-sharing and its practicability among the allies in the country. To be brief, within the context of this thesis, Afghanistan is the practical ground to search for cooperation between the EU and NATO in accordance with the impacts of changing strategies of the US administrations.

In this thesis, following the introduction, chapter two establishes the historical background of EU-NATO relations. In this chapter, first, I will explain the structure of the Cold War by stating the position of NATO, WEU, and the EC. Then, I will illustrate the evolution of the EU position in the post-Cold War era by referring to the transition of its initiatives from ESDI to ESDP and the adaptation of NATO to such a new environment. In this manner, I try to evaluate the scope of relations by searching for cooperation between the EU and NATO, both in a bipolar environment and then a unipolar one.

Chapter three will attempt to analyze the initial responses of the US, EU, and NATO against the 9/11 attacks, with the initial period of war in Afghanistan. The main focus in this chapter will be devoted to the impacts of the "War on Terror" context on the policies of the EU and NATO, and at the same time, to the strategy



of the Bush administration toward both parties which was a crucial factor in laying the grounds for testing the relations between the EU and NATO over the issue of involvement in Afghanistan. This chapter will also study the documents of the NSS and ESS with an aim to further the understanding of the differences and similarities of perceptions between America and Europe following the attacks of 9/11.

Chapter four will examine the multilateral intervention in Afghanistan in accordance with the evolution of ISAF with PRTs under NATO and EUPOL under the EU. Hence, this chapter aims to search for the contribution of both parties to the Afghan case, under their missions, which, in return, brought the practical ground to see whether they cooperate or not in such a fragile environment. Additionally, this chapter will also try to explore the policies of the Bush administrations through their effects on both missions with a question of “how.” In this regard, this chapter will discuss the documents of the 2002 NSS and 2006 NSS in order to reveal the strategies of the Bush administration before and after Operation Iraqi Freedom, which are important to understand the impacts of such policies on the issue of relations between the EU and NATO. Lastly, this chapter will explain the adjustments in strategy by the Obama administration. This chapter will discuss how the strategy of the Obama administration regarding the Afghan case has been similar to or different from the Bush administration before it, especially by utilizing the 2010 NSS document. As a result, this chapter seeks to explore the relations of the EU and NATO under the framework of their missions in the Afghan campaign in accordance with the implications of US policies.

Finally, the conclusion will point out to what extent the EU-NATO relations through the Afghanistan case are a success story and whether this test case helped rehabilitate the relations between the EU and US, which had become tense during the first term of the Bush administration.

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **BACKGROUND TO EU-NATO COOPERATION**

#### **2.1 Introduction**

The security of Western Europe in a bipolar system gained importance with the division of Europe after two world wars. The conflict between US and USSR increased with the discussion over German rearmament, which paved the way for the creation of NATO and then the Warsaw Pact as two rival organisations. In addition to the confrontation of two superpowers, France was in search of the formation of a European defence structure to control West Germany under French leadership, whereas Britain aimed to integrate West Germany into the Western system. In this system, all of these efforts shaped the relations of NATO, WEU and EC within a bipolar restriction.

The fall of the Berlin wall and the collapse of the USSR affected not only the position of NATO, but also the environment of Europe. Now, on one hand, the initiatives of both France and Britain were moving towards a European defence structure with or without NATO. On the other hand, NATO was being renewed by the US leadership after the end of Cold War. All of these changes may shed light on the process of cooperation between NATO and EU in the new system.

#### **2.2 Cold War Structure: Plans, Initiatives and Fears**

The iron curtain in Europe cut Eastern Europe states to be cut off from Western European countries as adversaries. The two halves of Europe in a bipolar structure called for security organizations. Thereby, NATO was established by the US in order to secure Western Europe and Warsaw Pact was created for the security of Eastern Europe by the USSR. As a result, the term “divided Europe became part of the lexicon.”<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Alexander Moens, “The Challenges and Limits of NATO-ESDP Synergy,” in *The Changing Politics of European Security – Europe Alone?*, ed. by Stefan Ganzle and Allen G. Sens, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, p. 183

According to Hobsbawn, the effect of the Cold War in Europe led to the creation of the European Community, which was created “both by and against the US.”<sup>2</sup> Hobsbawn comments that for the US, the reconstruction of Europe would depend on Germany having a strong economy solidified by German rearmament.<sup>3</sup> However, for France, a weak and demilitarised Germany was crucial to achieve the reconstruction of Europe under French leadership. In this regard, France presented its own version of European integration as an alternative to the US proposal for Europe. According to France, the unity of France and Germany would be at the centre of the integration whereas the US stipulated that European security was to be provided by NATO.<sup>4</sup> As a result, the goals of France and those of the US could only be realized by cooperation through new initiatives and proposals.

The Schuman Plan (1950) was the first major cooperative initiative in post-war Europe. This plan was outlined by Jean Monnet and presented by French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman. The main objective was to create a European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in order to cover a surrender of sovereignty over the coal and steel industries through which any future conflict between France and Germany would be prevented.<sup>5</sup> These efforts, in terms of forming a supranational High Authority, were crucial to provide ECSC with a political blueprint for the future of European Union.<sup>6</sup> Schuman Plan was formalized with the Paris Treaty of 1952 in which Italy and the Benelux countries participated as well as West Germany and France. However, the question of German rearmament was still maintained in the background. In September 1950, at a NATO ministerial meeting in New York, Britain and the US emphasized the possibility of German

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<sup>2</sup> Eric Hobsbawn, *Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914-1991*, London: Michael Joseph, 1994, p. 240

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 241

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> Ian Bache and Stephen George, *Politics in the European Union*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, Second edition, 2006, p. 94

<sup>6</sup> Holly Wyatt-Walter, *The European Community and The Security Dilemma, 1979-92*, London: Macmillan Press, 1997, p. 19

remilitarisation as a further step in the context of European integration.<sup>7</sup> France was utterly opposed to German rearmament and presented a new initiative to maintain its policy of controlling German's post-war recovery.<sup>8</sup> The new initiative, the Pleven Plan, was launched by the French Prime Minister Rene Pleven under the auspices of the Jean Monnet scheme.

As Moens states, the Pleven Plan (1950) was an attempt to achieve what was intended for the coal and steel sector in ECSC for the defence and military field.<sup>9</sup> The main purpose of this plan was to form a European army in which German rearmament would be controlled. In accordance with such an initiative, European defence would be provided through the creation of European Defence Community (EDC) under ECSC authorization. In other words, "the rehabilitation of German military engine would be driven by the vehicle of European integration under French direction rather than the auspices of an Anglo-Saxon dominated NATO."<sup>10</sup> However, the problem of this plan was its lack of a common foreign policy to form a common European army.<sup>11</sup> In this way, the European Political Community (EPC) was created and linked to the EDC in a draft treaty. The EDC was established in 1952 with a draft Treaty of Paris, however, the French National Assembly rejected the EDC in 1954 and prevented the application of both the EDC and EPC. Hence, the demise of the EDC took place with the collapse of EPC.<sup>12</sup> As Dwan mentions, the fear of German rearmament and of the potential domain of West Germany in a European army facilitated the French parliamentary hostility against the EDC.<sup>13</sup> Additionally, the European political authority plan through a joint clause to the draft treaty (EPC) intensified French opposition as

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<sup>7</sup> Desmond Dinan, *Europe Recast: A History of European Union*, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2004, p. 58

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>9</sup> Alexander Moens, "The Challenges and Limits of NATO-ESDP Synergy," in *The Changing Politics of European Security – Europe Alone?*, p. 185

<sup>10</sup> Holly Wyatt-Walter, *The European Community and The Security Dilemma, 1979-92*, p. 21

<sup>11</sup> Ian Bache and Stephen George, *Politics in the European Union*, p. 109

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.* 109

<sup>13</sup> Renata Dwan, "Jean Monnet and The European Defence Community, 1950-54," *Cold War History*, Vol.1, No.1, (August 2000), p. 151

this plan would have a potential to threaten the existence of France as a Western power.<sup>14</sup>

It is important to state that the UK took no part in these plans and, ironically, the issue of European defence was to be solved in accordance with a British initiative in October 1954. The opposition of Britain to the EDC paved the way for an alternative security structure for Western Europe, called the Western European Union (WEU). This organization was set up by Paris Agreement which was the modification of the 1948 Brussels Treaty with the inclusion of Italy and Federal Republic of Germany.<sup>15</sup> However, various military functions of the WEU had become redundant with NATO and WEU was subsumed by NATO.<sup>16</sup> German rearmament was resolved as the opposite what France desired to avoid: the establishment of a separate West German army.<sup>17</sup> Hence, WEU was based on political objectives especially the British purpose of integrating Germany into the Western security structure.<sup>18</sup> In the final analysis, WEU served the US purpose of incorporating West Germany into NATO, which was achieved in May 1955.

The Fouchet Plan (1961) was a new French proposal, an attempt by President de Gaulle, to promote a separate West European defence by excluding Britain which would presumably result in decreasing American influence over European defence issues.<sup>19</sup> This plan assumed “a union of states was primarily directed against the US and in favour of a French-led Europe.”<sup>20</sup> This initiative of de Gaulle was interpreted by Wyatt-Walter as the prevention of a US led Europe by placing it under French leadership with the aim of providing a counterbalance to

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<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>15</sup> Ian Bache and Stephen George, *Politics in the European Union*, p. 110

<sup>16</sup> Derek W. Urwin, *The Community of Europe: A history of European Integration since 1945*, London and New York: Longman, Second Edition, 1995, p. 70

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 71

<sup>19</sup> Alexander Moens, “The Challenges and Limits of NATO-ESDP Synergy,” p. 186

<sup>20</sup> Holly Wyatt-Walter, “Historical and Conceptual Aspects of Security and Integration, 1945-79,” *The European Community and The Security Dilemma, 1979-92*, p. 30

the weight of the Anglo-American alliance.<sup>21</sup> Again, the absence of the UK in this plan was due to its closer relations with the US and its competitor position over France. However, the plan failed and Moens emphasises two defeats resulting from “the quest for a European only voice” in the security and defence fields: “one in an overreach of the community method (EDC) and another in a geopolitical overreach (Fouchet).”<sup>22</sup>

The ability to get a foothold in foreign and defence policies by European Community was realized in 1970 through the European Political Cooperation (EPC). This was a forum for the EC members to coordinate policy through having a voice in relations with that Europe did not have in NATO.<sup>23</sup> The establishment of the EPC was the creation of a common habitat for discussion and coordination of the EC in the foreign and security fields. Thus, it was an entity to be on common ground for the EC states. In particular, the EPC had an intergovernmental basis which had no mandate over security and defence issues although the economic and political aspects of security were on the agenda of EPC in the period between 1979-87 but it was still prohibited from intervening defence issues.<sup>24</sup>

The years between 1973 and 1984 marked the end of WEU being a conduit between the UK and EC, due to the participation of the UK into the EC in 1973.<sup>25</sup> Such period represented the gradually decreasing importance of the WEU. However, the Rome Declaration in 1984 was an important turning point in the European security issue. In this declaration the main argument was rested upon the fact that EPC was limited to the economic aspects and had no impact on the security and defence structures which in return fuelled the debate on European security.<sup>26</sup> In this way, the reactivation of WEU was considered to meet the wider

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<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>22</sup> Alexander Moens, “The Challenges and Limits of NATO-ESDP Synergy,” p. 186

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>24</sup> Holly Wyatt-Walter, *The European Community and The Security Dilemma, 1979-92*, p. 101

<sup>25</sup> WEU Website, “Origins of WEU: From the Brussels Treaty to the Paris Agreements (1948-1954), available at <http://www.weu.int/> (accessed on November 10, 2011 )

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*

security role for Europe. “The revitalization of Western European Union was an ambitious attempt to provide a European forum for defence discussion both to counter the American challenge and to bypass obstructionism within EPC.”<sup>27</sup> In particular, according to Wyatt-Walter WEU served as a vehicle for the accession of West Germany, then, WEU became a defunct skeleton organization over thirty years since it had abdicated most of its powers to NATO.<sup>28</sup> In a broader sense, as Aybet states, the main argument for the reactivation of WEU was generally to repair the weakness of European countries in the Atlantic Alliance over the burden-sharing issue and particularly to cope with the reluctance of the US to engage in consultations with Europeans about foreign and security affairs.<sup>29</sup> However, the position of WEU being secondary to NATO resulted in its being overshadowed by NATO.

### **2.3 Post-Cold War Structure: Defence Identity, Defence Policy, NATO**

The collapse of Berlin Wall in 1989 and the dissolution of Soviet Union in 1991 were the catalysts which signalled to the closure of the Cold War period. After the demise of the old enemy, there were questions relating to both the new security environment for Europe and the position of NATO in the new post Cold War structure. It was obvious that with the end of Cold War, the dissolution of Warsaw Pact as line with the collapse of Soviet Union would lead to an earthquake for the *raison d’etre* of NATO. In other words, NATO won the war with the demise of its main threat which in return shook the basis of NATO in terms of its existence. Thus, NATO needed to enter a period of renewal and update its traditional structure

Along with the conflicts in the Balkans and the secession of former Yugoslavia revealed that the end of Cold War had not promoted stability in European continent after the collapse of Soviet Union. Rather, there were new threats from

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<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 119

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>29</sup> Gülnur Aybet, *A European Security Architecture after the Cold War: Questions of Legitimacy*, London: MacMillan Press, 2000, p. 81

intra-state tensions and the ethno-political rivalries. These two elements in return raised the question about the civilian image of the EU. During the Cold War era, the EU left the defence aspects under the responsibility of NATO; however, the post-Cold War structure accelerated the issue of a common foreign and security policy for Europe. The new context at the end of Cold War was indicated the increasing efforts of the EU about its defence within or without NATO. In accordance with the remaining or changing policies of the EU member states, the defence structure of the EU was to adapt to the new environment.

In short, during the post-Cold War period, two important issues were highlighted; the first was the adaptation of NATO to the new security environment, and the second was the reorganization of the European defence structure. In this part of the chapter, the evolution of new summits, declarations and agreements were analyzed with respect to these two points.

The London Declaration of NATO, in July 1990, opened the way for the reform process of the Alliance. This declaration presented the importance of security and stability in Europe not only on a military basis but also as a political structure. This drove the Alliance to recognise the changing realities in the international arena. In other words, the Alliance “must and will adapt.”<sup>30</sup> Through such a declaration, the Alliance exerted all efforts to set up new partnerships with all European nations, including their former adversaries in Eastern Europe. With the London Declaration, NATO also called for the relegation of nuclear arms to be weapons of last resort, resulting in “a new Allied military strategy was to be prepared which would move away from forward defence and modify flexible response” with a lessening reliance on nuclear weapons.<sup>31</sup>

The other issue in the London Declaration was the recognition of the EC efforts toward political union. In this regard, it was the London Declaration that gave rise to NATO undertaking a reform process in the new architecture to enhance the role and responsibility of its European members in accordance with

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<sup>30</sup> Fergus Carr and Kostas Ifantis, *NATO in the New European Order*, London: Macmillan Press, 1996, p. 63

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 64



the search for strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance.<sup>32</sup> This paved the way for the EC to improve a European identity in the security field. While the concentration of NATO and the EC on the issue of security adaptation within the new context of international relations, the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990 brought new realisations to both parties at a practical level.

The Gulf War put forward serious lessons for Europe. At first, the Gulf War affected the emergence of debate over the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) with different perceptions among EU member states. Secondly, the war showed the limits of military capability of the WEU and therefore, demonstrated the necessity of reliance on the US. EC states responded politically and militarily to the invasion of Kuwait through EPC and WEU respectively. However, the declining political solidarity within the EC during the Gulf War, the conviction of Britain, Denmark and the Netherlands, which was the indispensability of NATO in security arena, was confined which, in return, made the ambitions of the CFSP would be unrealistic.<sup>33</sup> In addition, the inadequate intelligence services, technological weapons and air transfer services were evident in the Gulf War, compelled the conviction of France, Italy and Spain to work harder for a common policy.<sup>34</sup> Moreover, the Gulf War represented the constraints of the independent European military capacity through the WEU as in line with the fundamentality of using NATO assets under closer coordination with the US command. The Gulf War not only redefined NATO security interests abroad but also demonstrated the operational impotence of the WEU.

February 1991 witnessed the first ministerial meeting of Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union in which France and Germany presented a letter of proposal, that was a modified form of the one submitted in December 1990. In this meeting, the purpose was to develop CFSP in order to implement a common European defence system and to broaden the role of WEU to operate on behalf of the Union within the evolution of CFSP.<sup>35</sup> The proposal indicated the importance

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<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>33</sup> Holly Wyatt-Walter, *The European Community and The Security Dilemma, 1979-92*, p. 188

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 196

of NATO by stating that WEU could be cooperation channel between the EU and NATO despite the acceptance of WEU both part of and subordinate to the EU.<sup>36</sup> After such proposal was presented by both partners, the attitude of the US government was clear in the speech made by Ambassador William Taft IV, US Representative to the North Atlantic Council. Taft mentioned that “the US public would not understand what was going on if the Europeans stopped using NATO or began replacing it with other structures to perform its historic tasks.”<sup>37</sup> In this way, it was obvious that the US would not allow any organizational rivalry within Europe. This was also explicitly underlined in the “Bartholomew Telegram” in an extraordinary WEU Council meeting. This telegram was taken its name after Under-Secretary of State Reginald Bartholomew who warned against a “European caucus” which might disturb the Alliance.<sup>38</sup> In the telegram, it was stated that a European defence identity could only be promoted within the confines of NATO. However, after the outrage of Europe about the tone of telegram, Washington asserted that it had not been authorized.<sup>39</sup>

The following year at the NATO Rome Summit in November 1991, a new strategic concept was adopted. The focus in this adoption was the acceptance of additional tasks for NATO by referring to the peacekeeping and crisis management while the traditional role of NATO as providing common defence was reiterated.<sup>40</sup> This means that after the replication of NATO’s traditional responsibility to promote defence, deterrence and allied consultation, now, in order to achieve a stable security environment in Europe, NATO had to enter into a broader security assessment.<sup>41</sup> Within this new concept, a new political approach through dialogue and cooperation together with the traditional security understanding of collective defence was emphasised. In this way, for NATO, the

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<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>37</sup> William Taft cited by Holly Wyatt-Walter, in *The European Community and The Security Dilemma, 1979-92*, p. 198

<sup>38</sup> Holly Wyatt-Walter, *The European Community and The Security Dilemma, 1979-92*, p. 198

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, p.199

<sup>40</sup> Fergus Carr and Kostas Ifantis, *NATO in the New European Order*, p. 75

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*

political cooperation came to the fore. The result was the transition of NATO into the new security environment of Europe through the renovation of its security role. In this regard, NATO, WEU and the EU shared the similar themes in terms of crisis management, preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping.<sup>42</sup>

In December 1991, the Maastricht Summit witnessed massive changes in the European environment and it created the European Union through the Treaty on European Union was signed in 1992. Now, crucial cooperation existed between the CFSP and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). In line with the existing European Community system, CFSP and JHA formed the part of three the pillar structure in the European Union. In this system, the first pillar supported the community method of decision making through forming an area of pooled sovereignty; the second and third pillars represented the intergovernmental basis.<sup>43</sup> In this way, foreign and security policy were brought into a new pillar of the EU competence.<sup>44</sup>

Additionally, the Treaty on the European Union contained an annex about the structure of WEU in that it “will be developed as defence component of the European Union and as a means to strengthen the European pillar of Atlantic Alliance.”<sup>45</sup> In this regard, with the Declaration on WEU, the associate membership status was decided on, meaning that the non-EU members of NATO were included within the framework of WEU. This declaration was improved and formalized in June 1992 in the Petersberg Declaration in which such tasks as humanitarian, peacekeeping, and crisis management operations were assigned to be under the responsibilities of WEU.<sup>46</sup> Having a non-modified Brussels Treaty status meant that Associate Members could participate in WEU Council meetings

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<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 77-8

<sup>43</sup> Ian Bache & Stephen George, *Politics in the European Union*, p. 169

<sup>44</sup> Alexander Moens, “The Challenges and Limits of NATO-ESDP Synergy,” p. 181

<sup>45</sup> Official Journal of the European Communities, “Declaration on Western European Union,” Vol. 35, 29 July 1992, p.105 available at [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11992M/tif/JOC\\_1992\\_191\\_1\\_EN\\_0001.pdf](http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11992M/tif/JOC_1992_191_1_EN_0001.pdf) (accessed on November 15, 2011)

<sup>46</sup> Nathalie Tocci and Marc Houben, “Accommodating Turkey in ESDP,” CEPS Policy Brief No.5, May 2001, p. 3, available at <http://aei.pitt.edu/2002/1/PB05.pdf> (accessed on November 15, 2011)

with the right to speak and present proposals however, since they did not have a full membership rights they did not have a veto.<sup>47</sup>

For the first time, in 1994 Brussels Summit, NATO acknowledged the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) as a further step of European security to strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance. The emergence of the ESDI marked the legitimacy of European aspirations in terms of co-managing security in Europe.<sup>48</sup> In this sense, the recognition of ESDI by NATO brought the practical military cooperation between the EU, WEU and NATO to the attention. The logic of such a summit was to help to create the ESDI but not as a completely independent entity.<sup>49</sup> Rather, it would be constructed within NATO through drawing upon the military assets “separable but not separate” from the Alliance.<sup>50</sup> In this way, the emphasis was on the creation of ESDI as a portion of the NATO structure which allowed the use of NATO’s military capabilities by the WEU. This momentum facilitated the initiative of Berlin Agreement of 1996. The dominant idea in this agreement was to construct flexible military task forces in order to operate jointly with land, naval and air forces through the combination of different member states’ forces.<sup>51</sup> Hence, the model of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) would realize the possibility of; “military contributions to flexible missions -NATO or WEU- as well as flexible command -NATO alone or NATO in support of a WEU member state’s command-.”<sup>52</sup> Moens determined that the Berlin Agreement was a “breakthrough” in the EU-NATO relations on one hand and a “bottleneck” on the other. It was a breakthrough because, with the Petersberg tasks, European member states could undertake the missions in Europe with the help of NATO. This signalled the commencement of a practical European

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<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 4

<sup>48</sup> Alexander Moens, “The Challenges and Limits of NATO-ESDP Synergy,” p. 189

<sup>49</sup> Robert Hunter, *The European Security and Defence Policy: NATO’s Companion or Competitor?*, Rand Corporation, 2002, p. 13

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>51</sup> Jolyon Howorth and John T.S. Keeler, “The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy,” ed. by Jolyon Howorth and John T.S. Keeler, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p. 9

<sup>52</sup> Alexander Moens, “The Challenges and Limits of NATO-ESDP Synergy,” p. 189

security identity together with the debate over missions with or without direct US participation.<sup>53</sup> It was a bottleneck because the US and many other members tried to keep a single planning and command structure for all the operations under the NATO framework, which was clear in the logic of separable but not separate. Hence, the price for the EU for not to building a second integrated military planning and command structure within itself was that the EU would have to remain dependent on NATO.<sup>54</sup>

However, with the shifting policy of the UK, St. Malo Declaration in December 1998 was the fundamental initiative in terms of the European defence structure. As Hunter states, the meeting of Blair and Chirac in St Malo in December 1998 gave a new life to ESDI. This Declaration speeded up the application of what had been agreed in Amsterdam (1997) about the CFSP, by indicating the progressive structure of a common defence policy.<sup>55</sup> In this way, CFSP's first expansion in the security and defence policy field was actualized and at the same time it presented the obligatory bow to NATO owing to its formation on collective defence of its members.<sup>56</sup> However, St. Malo represented new ground where the necessity of the Union capability of autonomous action was asserted. In a broader spectrum, the St. Malo Declaration called for a separate military competency within the structure of the EU. This was a crucial breakthrough in the debate with NATO. While the declaration emphasized the intention of wide ranging developments among the EU members, it maintained agreement on the issue of collective defence of Europeans remaining under WEU and NATO. This signalled the beginning of the development of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). At that moment, in CFSP the relation was more directly to the realm of security and defence, focusing on ESDP as primary.

St. Malo Declaration represented the shifting British security policy whereas the roots of such alterations lay behind the Pörtlach Declaration in October

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<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.* 189

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, p.190

<sup>55</sup> Robert Hunter, *The European Security and Defence Policy: NATO's Companion or Competitor?*, Rand Corporation, 2002, p. 30

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*

1998. UK Prime Minister Blair was now in favour of European security and defence capability without NATO, which led to the revitalization of the relations between France and the UK.<sup>57</sup> Hence, St. Malo Declaration was a further step to open the door for autonomous action of the EU out of NATO context. Such a declaration was important in terms of emphasizing the autonomous defence structure of the EU. An immediate response from the US to the Franco-British defence initiative was released by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in which she presented the “3 Ds” which outlined three conditions to be fulfilled by potential EU forces: no discrimination against non-EU NATO members, no duplication of NATO assets, no developments that could lead to the decoupling of the US and Europe.<sup>58</sup>

In a broader sense, Hunter explains that the desire of the US on the decoupling issue was to prevent the possible risk of the ESDI perceiving its own security outside the Atlantic Alliance capability.<sup>59</sup> The small size and limited range of actions undertaken by the ESDI might decrease the decoupling of ESDI from NATO. Through discrimination, the US pointed out the risk of non-EU NATO members’ exclusion from their participation in WEU operations.<sup>60</sup> In this framework, the position of Turkey gained a particular importance in terms of whether Turkey would be able to take responsibility for taking part in full range of discussions and decisions within the EU institutions. In other words, for the US, Turkey was important owing to its potential membership of the EU in terms of whether Turkey would perform a full role in Western security institutions. The US was anxious about the extensions of the EU by drawing upon the NATO assets while Europeans expressed a desire to have autonomous action capability. However, avoiding unnecessary duplication was the major reason for having

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<sup>57</sup> Jennifer Medcalf, “Cooperation between the EU and NATO,” in *Unravelling the European Security and Defence Policy Conundrum*, ed. by Joachim Krause, Andreas Wenger and Lisa Watanabe, (Zurich 2002), p. 100

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>59</sup> Robert Hunter, *The European Security and Defence Policy: NATO’s Companion or Competitor?*, p. 35

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 37

established ESDI within NATO. With duplication, the US warned against a second set of military goods: one set as NATO and the other set as the WEU.<sup>61</sup>

The Kosovo crisis signalled the superiority of the US military capability as the Europeans were unable to develop a sustained strategy which, thus, called for the launch of a NATO campaign in the region. This crisis caused a further reconsideration of the European defence structure and made it obvious that it was necessary to promote the new partnership with the US, basically based on its military capabilities. Following the Kosovo crisis, the NATO Washington Summit in April 1999 released new initiatives. First, the basis of NATO's crisis management was formalized. Second, the Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) was put on the agenda to develop the interoperability of the Alliance and thirdly, the new members of Hungary, Poland and Czech Republic of the Atlantic Alliance were accepted.<sup>62</sup> Another initiative was released by based on Berlin Agreement that the EU had the capacity for autonomous action so that it could take part decisions and approve military action where the alliance as a whole was not engaged as well as emphasizing that the acceptance of the ESDI development within the context of NATO.<sup>63</sup> In this way, three types of military operations were underscored; EU access to NATO for EU-led operations, an autonomous EU mission and a NATO mission. The first category of such arrangements brought about the Berlin Plus Agreement. With this agreement, in actual military action, the primacy of NATO was reaffirmed and the autonomous notion of the EU was admitted; two words were added: "assured" as an access to NATO planning and "presumption" as an access to NATO capabilities and assets.<sup>64</sup>

In December 1999, the initial idea of the Franco-British initiative in the St. Malo was incorporated into the EU's Helsinki Summit Declaration. Now, a

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<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 41

<sup>62</sup> NATO Press Release, "Washington Summit Communique," Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C. on 24th April 1999, available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-064e.htm> (accessed on November 20, 2011)

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>64</sup> Robert Hunter, *The European Security and Defence Policy: NATO's Companion or Competitor?*, p. 55

Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP) was placed within the EU structure through setting a 'Headline Goal (HGs)' tasks by 2003. The purpose of the HGs was to create a rapid reaction force in order to achieve the Petersberg tasks when NATO as a whole chose not to intervene in a crisis situation.<sup>65</sup> In other words, the intention was to construct an intervention force of 50,000 to 60,000 troops in line with the command and control, air and sea-lift, and precision-guided weaponry requirement.<sup>66</sup> Then, the EU and NATO stipulated on the issue of operational agreement that between NATO and WEU, which was the transferring of WEU to the EU.<sup>67</sup> This means that WEU was incorporated into the EU to support the implementation of Petersberg tasks. In this way, the WEU has completed its mission through its transfer into the EU in 2000. In order to create the decision-making mechanism for the ESDP, the four main bodies were set up in the CESDP and listed as: the General Affairs Council (GAC) was formed at ministerial level including the foreign affairs ministers would be in authority. The Political and Security Committee (PSC) was crucial to the management of developing crises and give political advice to European Council while preparing the decisions of ministers. A EU Military Committee (EUMC) consisting of ambassadors from each member state in order to give advice and recommendations by issuing military directives to the European Union Military Staff (EUMS). EUMS was established to give military support to EUMC during the strategic planning phase.<sup>68</sup>

In short, Helsinki supported the position of NATO as central especially by referring to the Petersberg tasks, however, the role of the EU was limited to the arena where NATO would not engage. Importantly, with Helsinki, the debate over the participation of non-EU NATO members in EU-led operation was resolved as

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<sup>65</sup> Robert Hunter, *The European Security and Defence Policy: NATO's Companion or Competitor?*, p. 63

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 64

<sup>67</sup> Jennifer Medcalf, "Cooperation between the EU and NATO," in *Unravelling the European Security and Defence Policy Conundrum*, p. 101

<sup>68</sup> European Defence: A proposal for a White Paper, Report of an Independent Task Force, Institute for Security Studies (ISS), May 2004, p. 47-48, available at <http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/wp2004.pdf> (accessed on November 20, 2011)



follows; the participation of non-EU NATO members was restricted to the operations which required the appeal to NATO assets. However, in the operation where there was no recourse to NATO's capability, such countries would have to be invited by a Council decision.<sup>69</sup>

The Treaty of Nice, was signed in February 2001 and entered into force in 2003. The agreement was reached among member states on the issue that a Rapid Reaction Force would be put under the guarantee of NATO's assets in the peacekeeping and peacemaking operations whereas NATO would continue its responsibility of controlling the military planning.<sup>70</sup> With the Treaty of Nice, the "Brusselisation" of European foreign and security policy was completed through the agreement on the roles, modalities and functions of the ESDP bodies which were created in Helsinki.<sup>71</sup> Hence, Nice was the reaffirmation of the development of the ESDP to resolve the crisis management which gathered together the first and second pillars of the EU together.

## 2.4 Conclusion

During the Cold War, the issue about the cooperation between the EC, WEU and NATO was restricted by the bipolar system. Hence, the emphasis was more upon the security of Western Europe especially through NATO rather than the cooperation between such institutions. However, the end of the Cold War brought about the efforts to form cooperation mechanisms between the EU and NATO with the incorporation of WEU into the EU.

The new context, both with the adaption of NATO under the leadership of the US and the efforts of the EU in the formation of the ESDP, presents the encounter of the EU and NATO on the issue of crisis management, preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping. In this way, the conflicts inside and outside the continent have

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<sup>69</sup> Robert Hunter, *The European Security and Defence Policy: NATO's Companion or Competitor?*, Rand Corporation, 2002, p. 69

<sup>70</sup> Maria Raquel Freire, "The European Security and Defence Policy- History, Structures and Capabilities," in *European Security and Defence Policy: An Implementation Perspective*, ed by Michael Merlingen and Rasa Ostrauskaite, Routledge: London and New York, 2008, p. 13

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*

tested the capability of both allies while revealing the superiority of the US especially in terms of military assets. That is why neither NATO nor the EU can be explained without the US.

## CHAPTER 3

### “INTERNATIONAL” INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN AND INHERENT DIFFERENCE (2001-2002)

#### 3.1 Introduction

To understand whether a change in cooperation has occurred between NATO and the EU, this chapter examines the intervention in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2002 with a special emphasis on these cooperative relations in the period immediately after the 9/11 attacks on US soil. In this regard, the response of the Bush administration is fundamental to understand NATO’s role in the Afghan campaign, which also has a broad impact on NATO’s relation with the EU. The policy of the Bush administration towards Afghanistan paved the way for not only the split between NATO and the US but also the fissures within the EU.

#### 3.2 The Initial US Response to the 9/11 Attacks

This enemy attacked not just our people, but all freedom-loving people everywhere in the world. The United States of America will use all our resources to conquer this enemy. We will rally the world. We will be patient, we will be focused and we will be steadfast in our determination. This battle will take time and resolve. But make no mistake about it: we will win.<sup>72</sup>

President Bush made this speech to US public on 12 September 2001, a day after the attack. On 14 September 2001 the US Congress authorized the use of armed forces against terrorists.<sup>73</sup> On September 15, 2001, President Bush gave a promise to the US public to achieve “a broad and sustained campaign to secure our country

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<sup>72</sup> George W. Bush, “The Deliberate and Deadly Attacks...Were Acts of War,” *American Rhetoric*, 12 September 2001, available at <http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/gwbush911cabinetroomaddress.htm> (accessed on December 10, 2011)

<sup>73</sup> Patrick Hayden, “The War on Terror and the Just Use of Military Force,” in *America’s War on Terror*, ed. by Tom Lansford, Robert P. Watson, Jack Covarrubias, Surrey: Ashgate, 2009, p. 59

and eradicate the evil of terrorism.”<sup>74</sup> As a result, the foundation of the “Global War on Terror” (GWOT) was established by the US in response to the 9/11 attacks. Furthermore, on 20 September, 2001, in a joint session of Congress, Bush characterized al-Qaeda as the suspected perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks and remarked on the mutual interdependence of Taliban Government and al-Qaeda. In that session, Bush clearly identified that negotiation with the Taliban was not an option. In addition, Bush listed a series of the demands made to the Taliban Government in which this non-negotiation is evident:

Deliver to United States authorities all the leaders of al-Qaeda who hide in your land. Release all foreign nationals- including American citizens- you have unjustly imprisoned, and protect foreign journalists, diplomats, and aid workers in your country. Close immediately and permanently every terrorist training camp in Afghanistan. And hand over every terrorist and every person in their support structure, to appropriate authorities. Give the US full access to terrorist training camps, so we can make sure they are no longer operating. These demands are not open to negotiation or discussion. The Taliban must act and act immediately. They will hand over terrorists, or they will share in their fate.<sup>75</sup>

On October 7, 2001, the US and Britain gave notifications to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) that they would start military operations in Afghanistan. The notifications of both Britain and the US were based on the self-defence in accordance with the UN Charter. Both were addressed to the elimination of terrorist action supported by al-Qaeda and the Taliban regime. In addition to the Security Council notifications, President Bush identified the US military action in Afghanistan as part of wider campaign, including diplomatic, financial and political initiatives whereas President Blair characterized three important goals through Afghan campaign: the abolition of Bin Laden’s network of terror activities; the provision of diplomatic effort to construct a coalition of

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<sup>74</sup> George W. Bush, “First Radio Address following 9/11,” *American Rhetoric*, 15 September 2011, available at <http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/gwbush911radioaddress.htm> (accessed on December 10, 2011)

<sup>75</sup> “President Bush’s Address to the Nation,” *The Washington Post*, 20 September 2001, available at [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/bushaddress\\_092001.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/bushaddress_092001.html) (accessed on December 10, 2011)

support and working to promote humanitarian effort to support refugees within and outside Afghanistan.<sup>76</sup> In this regard, the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in October 2001 was clearly a US-led intervention with Britain, and then the participation of Canada, Australia, Germany and France as the operation unfolded.

Under the leadership and the discourse of the US, Rumsfeld explicitly explained the specific objectives of military operation,

...to make clear to Taliban leaders that the harbouring of terrorists was unacceptable; to acquire intelligence on al-Qaeda and Taliban resources; to develop relations with groups in Afghanistan opposed to the Taliban; to prevent the use of Afghanistan as a safe haven for terrorists; to destroy the Taliban military allowing opposition forces to succeed in their struggle.<sup>77</sup>

Thus, the response of the US-led coalition against al-Qaeda and the Taliban was neither a NATO action nor an appeal to the EU. This was an important moment since

the galling memories of bad coordination and planning, ill-preparedness and lack of suitable European capabilities that had marked the Kosovo military campaign of 1999 made an unencumbered the US military operation a *sine qua non*.<sup>78</sup>

More significantly, the Kosovo operation stretched both the patience of the US and the capabilities of Europe to their limits, which, in return, engendered America rethinking its relationship with its European allies in terms of calling upon them on an institutional basis for a likely new operation. Such a reluctance of the US escalated with their intention to engage in military action in Afghanistan, which required more militarily preparedness and retooling the Alliance in a way that was compatible with such a context. Therefore,

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<sup>76</sup> M.L. Roi and G. Smolyneec, "End States, Resource Allocation and NATO Strategy in Afghanistan," *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, Taylor & Francis Group, 2008, p. 291

<sup>77</sup> Donald Rumsfeld cited by Patrick Hayden, "The War on Terror and the Just Use of Military Force," p. 61

<sup>78</sup> Anne Deighton, "The Eleventh of September and beyond: NATO," *The Political Quarterly*, Oxford and Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2002, p. 119

non-US NATO's limited ability to project military power globally, combined with the difficulties of consensus politics decreased NATO's importance among US policy makers, for some, NATO as a whole was considered more of a hindrance than help.<sup>79</sup>

On one hand, the United States preferred to operate in a “don't call us, we'll call you” manner in the wake of 9/11 attacks with the aim of gaining a broader operational freedom.<sup>80</sup> On the other hand, the Bush administration turned to Russia to build a strategic cooperation with Russia in order to strengthen the practical area of war to achieve an easily delivery and deployment to Afghanistan during the campaign which had mutual pragmatic aims on both sides. This was defined as “a short-lived improvement in Russian-US relations immediately after the terrorist attacks on September 11.”<sup>81</sup>

In a broader sense, prior to the 9/11 attacks, the US had always stated that the justification for the war in Chechnya was unacceptable and in line with its European allies, and in line with this issue they considered cutting off IMF assistance and export/import loans by.<sup>82</sup> However, having taken the recognition of terrorism as a top-priority threat at the very centre of the US policy, Russia had an opportunity to cooperate with the US on the issue of terrorism by supporting the US-led Afghan war and permitting the presence of the US in Central Asia. What is more interesting here is that Russia did not contribute troops to fight in the Afghan war. Rather, by supporting combat against terrorism, Russia preferred to justify its involvement in the Chechen war and advocated the impossibility of simultaneously fighting in two wars.

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<sup>79</sup> “From Protecting Some to Securing Many NATO's Journey from a Military Alliance to a Security Manager,” ed. by Charly Salenius-Pasternak, The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, *FIIA Report* 17/2007, p.48, available at <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=46190> (accessed on December 15, 2011)

<sup>80</sup> Jolyon Howorth, “The Euro-Atlantic Security Dilemma: France, Britain and the ESDP,” *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, 3(1) 2005, p. 43

<sup>81</sup> Sean Kay, “Missile Defences and the European Security Dilemma,” in *NATO in Search of a Vision*, ed. by Gülnur Aybet and Rebecca R. Moore, Washington, D.C: Georgetown University Press, 2010, p.162

<sup>82</sup> James M. Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, *Power and Purpose: U.S. Policy toward Russia after the Cold War*, Brookings Institution Press: Washington D.C., 2003, p.307-308

Accordingly, the redefinition of the policy towards Russia led the Bush administration and the US to become less critical of the Russian led war in Chechnya. In this way, the discourse changed which was evident in the statement released by Colin Powell, the US Secretary of State, in May 2002: “Russia is fighting terrorists in Chechnya, there is no question about that, and we understand that.”<sup>83</sup> At that point, Russia both allowed the use of its lands for the delivery of NATO non-lethal supplies to Afghanistan and gave its consent for the deployment of NATO troops in the Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan bases.<sup>84</sup> As a result, the card of the US’s military intervention in Afghanistan was played at the expense of ignoring the issue of Russia’s activities in Chechnya. Briefly, the “War on Terror” was the retaliation of the Bush administration for 9/11 was based on a unilateral approach and opened the way for bilateral coalitions, even those which involved strategic cooperation with the old enemy, Russia.

### **3.3 Road to International Coalition**

#### **3.3.1 Bonn Agreement and the Establishment of ISAF**

The UN condemned the attacks of 9/11 and urgently called for “international cooperation to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of the outrages of 11 September 2001.”<sup>85</sup> Then the UNSC passed Resolution 1378 on 14 November 2001. UNSCR 1378, condemning the Taliban for permitting al-Qaeda to use Afghanistan “as a base for the export of terrorism,” and such a resolution “supporting the efforts of the Afghan people to replace the Taliban regime.”<sup>86</sup>

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<sup>83</sup> Colin Powell cited by James M. Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, p.317

<sup>84</sup> Robert Hunter, Sergey M. Rogov, “Engaging Russia as Partner and Participant: The Next Stage of NATO–Russia Relations,” *Conference Proceedings*, 2004, p. 18

<sup>85</sup> “Condemnation of Terrorist Attacks in the United States of America,” by UN General Assembly, 12 September 2001, available at <http://lcnp.org/global/unresolutionsresept11.htm> (accessed on December 20, 2011)

<sup>86</sup> For more details, see the full text: “United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1378 (2001),” 14 November 2001, available at [http://www.bits.de/public/documents/US\\_Terrorist\\_Attacks/UNSC141101.htm](http://www.bits.de/public/documents/US_Terrorist_Attacks/UNSC141101.htm) (accessed on December 21, 2011)

Additionally, the resolution underscored the need to establish a transitional administration in Afghanistan “by cooperating fully in international efforts to combat terrorism and illicit drug trafficking within and from Afghanistan.”<sup>87</sup> In terms of humanitarian aims, the interim Afghan administration would also have to “facilitate the urgent delivery of humanitarian assistance and orderly return of refugees and internally displaced persons, when the situation permits.”<sup>88</sup> It is important to state that all of these obligations were clearly similar with the OEF campaign.

In early December 2001, the UN organized a meeting in Bonn, which was later embodied in two UNSC Resolutions: 1383 and 1386. The Bonn meeting was crucial in achieving the creation of the Afghan Interim Authority (AIA), which began to function on 22 December 2001 under the chairmanship of Hamid Karzai. AIA was responsible for a six-month representation then to be replaced by a two-year Transitional Authority.<sup>89</sup> The Bonn Agreement also; set the objectives for the international community in Afghanistan; defined the role of UN in Afghanistan during the era of Interim Authority and identified the membership and ministerial positions.<sup>90</sup> Specifically, the signatories of the Bonn agreement wanted international engagement to form and train the new Afghan security, and armed forces. The Afghan representatives having asked UNSC for the early deployment of a United Nations mandated force to Afghanistan. The next two Resolutions of UNSC (1383 and 1386) in December 2001 endorsed the structure of the Bonn Agreement. The former called on the international community to work with AIA in order to provide the reconstruction of Afghanistan<sup>91</sup> and the latter authorized

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<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>89</sup> United Nations Website, “Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions,” 5 December 2001, available at <http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/afghan-agree.htm> (accessed on December 21, 2011)

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>91</sup> For more details, see the full text: United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1383 (2001), 6 December 2001, available at <http://daccessddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/681/09/PDF/N0168109.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed on December 21, 2011)



the establishment of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in order to assist AIA in the maintenance of security in Kabul and surrounding areas.<sup>92</sup>

On 19 December 2001, Britain offered in a letter from the Permanent Representative of the UK to the President of the Council, to take the lead in organization and command ISAF under the terms of Annex I to the Bonn Agreement.<sup>93</sup> On 20 December 2001, the UNSC authorized the early deployment, for six months, of ISAF in Afghanistan in order to give assistance to AIA in maintaining security. In this way, it was decided to implement six monthly national rotations for the leadership of ISAF with the UK occupying that role for the first six months.<sup>94</sup>

The UN called on member states to support ISAF especially in the establishment and training of the new Afghan security and armed forces. To encourage the contribution of member states to ISAF, the UN underlined that the mission of ISAF was “to assist the AIA in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, so that AIA as well as the personnel of UN can cooperate in a secure environment.”<sup>95</sup>

In January 2002, a “Military Technical Agreement” was signed between ISAF and the Interim Administration of Afghanistan, which marked the act of commitment to the environment in Kabul and its surrounding areas under the application of UN mandated ISAF mission. Through such mutual agreement, it was indicated that ISAF could assist the Interim Administration in developing security structures and reconstruction, and in training/supporting tasks for future Afghan security forces.<sup>96</sup> Briefly, it must be clarified that ISAF was mandated by

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<sup>92</sup> For more details, see the full text: United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1386 (2001), 20 December 2001 [http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/mandate/unscr/resolution\\_1386.pdf](http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/mandate/unscr/resolution_1386.pdf) (accessed on December 21, 2011)

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>96</sup> “Military Technical Agreement” Between the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Interim Administration of Afghanistan (‘Interim Administration’) available at <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+http://www.operations.mod.uk/isafmta.pdf> (accessed on December 22, 2011 )

the UN and the mission of ISAF was limited to Kabul until the takeover by NATO in 2003.

### **3.3.2 NATO: Wait for Being Substantial**

On 12 September 2001, the North Atlantic Council assembled in response to the 9/11 attacks against the US. The Alliance concurred that

...if it is determined that this attack was directed from abroad against the United States, it shall be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which states that an armed attack against one or more of the Allies in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.<sup>97</sup>

In this way, for the first time in NATO's history, there was an invocation of Article 5 in that it was collective obligation to defend the Alliance member under the Washington Treaty.<sup>98</sup> However, the US chose to seek the individual support of NATO members. In this respect, the US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld said that "this war will not be waged by a grand alliance united for the single purpose of defeating an axis of hostile powers. Instead, it will involve floating coalitions of countries."<sup>99</sup>

This speech was crucial to understanding the logic of the US following the 9/11 attacks. As Siegel comments, the perception of the Bush administration was

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<sup>97</sup> NATO Press Release, "Statement by the North Atlantic Council," 12 September 2001, available at [www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-124e.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-124e.htm) (accessed on December 25, 2011)

<sup>98</sup> Article 5 of the NATO Treaty: "The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking, forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area." The full text of the Treaty is available at [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official\\_texts\\_17120.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm) (accessed on December 25, 2011)

<sup>99</sup> Donald Rumsfeld cited by Ellen Williams, "Out of Area and Very Much in Business? NATO, the U.S., and the Post-9/11 International Security Environment," *Comparative Strategy*, Taylor & Francis Group, 2008, p. 68

fuelled by a strong scepticism of the usefulness of consulting allies before making crucial policy decisions.

Fears that national capitals or the NATO Council would have to be consulted before attacking each target, as well as a shortage of real capabilities, led the administration to pre-emptively exclude NATO from most of the actual military combat in the early years of the war.<sup>100</sup>

Hence, except on a bilateral basis, the contribution of NATO in Afghanistan could only be considered as fair or proportionate in accordance with the requests from the US.<sup>101</sup> This was the reason why the cooperation between the US and NATO operated on the basis of special measures and of logistical support.

On 4 October 2001, 3 days before the US-led OEF, the “NATO Alliance agreed to take eight measures, individually and collectively at the request of the US to expand the options available in the campaign against terrorism.”<sup>102</sup> These were listed as: enhancing intelligence sharing and cooperation both bilaterally and in the appropriate NATO bodies; providing assistance to Allies and other states, which are subject to terrorists acts as a result of their support for the anti-terrorist campaign; taking necessary measures in order to promote security for the facilities of the US and other Allies on their territory; backfilling selected Allied assets in NATO’s area of responsibility, which are required to be supported directly against terrorists; providing access for the US and other Allies to ports and airfields on the territory of NATO nations for operations; promoting blanket clearances for the US and other Allied aircraft for military flights related to operations.<sup>103</sup> The North Atlantic Council also agreed that NATO was ready both to provide elements of its

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<sup>100</sup> Scott N. Siegel, “Bearing Their Share of the Burden: Europe in Afghanistan,” *European Security*, Vol.18, No.4, December 2009, p.465

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>102</sup> NATO Speech, “Statement to the Press,” by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, on the North Atlantic Council Decision On Implementation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty following the 11 September Attacks against the United States, 4 October 2001, available at [www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s011004b.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s011004b.htm) (accessed on January 5, 2012 )

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*

standing Naval Forces to the Eastern Mediterranean and deploy elements of the NATO Airborne Early Warning Force in order to assist operations.<sup>104</sup>

These measures were the operationalisation of Article 5 by NATO, which indicated the clear support of this organization for the US-led fight in Afghanistan. As Williams states, the US was aware of the need not to alienate the Alliance.<sup>105</sup> Especially after the invocation of Article 5 by NATO, the US believed that there must be an attempt to give NATO more substance. In this way, the US made eight specific requests to NATO, which were masked by the Bush administration with the discourse of the Alliance's viability. In this regard, Williams indicated that the reason for the US bypassing NATO was according to the Bush administration, due to the different structure of the Afghan case from any other previous operations.<sup>106</sup> In a broader sense, through the Afghan campaign, the dual purposes of the administration were to overthrow the Taliban and at the same time destroy al-Qaeda in a country where the conditions were already problematic.

According to the Bush Administration, this decisive war required overwhelming force with quick deployment in order to defend the US interests with maximum efficiency. Following the attacks of 9/11, the national interests of the US gained top priority thus, saving the credibility of NATO was not of crucial importance to the Bush administration. Rather, US officials undertook policy planning that bypassed NATO which was accepted as the key advantage in forming a quick and efficient response.<sup>107</sup> However, as mentioned above, the unilateral manner of the Bush administration had tried to conceal the secondary importance of NATO in Afghan campaign. In this way, the US tried to maintain relations with the Alliance within a limited scope by concentrating on stated

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<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>105</sup> Ellen Williams, "Out of Area and Very Much in Business? NATO, the U.S., and the Post-9/11 International Security Environment," *Comparative Strategy*, Taylor & Francis Group, 2008, p. 68

<sup>106</sup> *Ibid.* p. 69

<sup>107</sup> *Ibid.*

requests. Thus, the use of NATO assets was only on an *ad-hoc* basis. This attitude of the administration was a factor that undermined the credibility of NATO.<sup>108</sup>

On October 8, 2001 NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson declared that

...Following a specific request from US, the Allies, today, agreed that five NATO AWACKS (Airborne Warning and Control Systems) aircraft, together with their crews, will be deployed to assist the US with counter-terrorism operations.<sup>109</sup>

On October 9, 2001 NATO proclaimed that its Standing Naval Force Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED) would deploy to the Eastern part of Mediterranean. On NATO's website STANAVFORMED is described as a "part of NATO's immediate reaction forces whose primary mission is to be able to deploy to an area of tension or crisis and also to build a powerful naval force whenever required."<sup>110</sup>

Thus, NATO started "Operation Eagle Assist," its first operation in combating terrorism. The US requested seven NATO AWACKS radar aircraft from mid-October 2001 to mid-May 2002. On 26 October 2001, NATO launched its second operation against terrorism, called as "Operation Active Endeavour." NATO's Standing Naval Forces were used in east part of Mediterranean to eliminate terrorist activities, including illegal trafficking. On 10 March 2003, Operation Active Endeavour was extended to cover escorting civilian shipping through the Straits of Gibraltar. In June 2004 at the Istanbul Summit, such operation was extended to the whole of the Mediterranean.<sup>111</sup>

Accordingly, in May 2001, at the Reykjavik meeting of NATO, it was decided that NATO would launch operations when and where it was necessary to combat

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<sup>108</sup> Andrew T. Wolff, "The Structural and Political Crisis of NATO Transformation," *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 4, December 2009, p. 487

<sup>109</sup> NATO Press Release, "Statement," by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, 8 October 2001, available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-138e.htm> (accessed on January 10, 2012)

<sup>110</sup> NATO Update, "NATO Naval Force Deploys to Eastern Mediterranean," 9 October 2001 and updated on 6 September 2011, available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2001/1008/e1009a.htm> (accessed on January 10, 2012)

<sup>111</sup> NATO Topic, "Countering Terrorism," available at [www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_77646.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_77646.htm) (accessed on January 10, 2012)

terrorism. In this way, the immediate reaction of NATO against 9/11 attacks was strengthened. This decision of NATO constructed the way for future engagement with ISAF in Afghanistan. Also, it was an important decision for the transformation of NATO's capabilities, which was initiated at the Prague Summit in November 2002.<sup>112</sup>

Lord George Robertson, the Secretary General of NATO, underlined that Prague Summit was different in that "past NATO Summits were about incremental change ... [whereas] Prague is about NATO's comprehensive transformation."<sup>113</sup> Robertson maintained that terrorism must be taken into consideration as an international security challenge after the 9/11 attack which revealed the unprepared global situation as such, the Alliance accepted that "NATO had no real recipe to deal with terrorism."<sup>114</sup> Moreover, it was also accepted that the invocation of Article 5 turned the fight against terrorism into a new mission for NATO, which forced the Alliance to increase its political and military transformation.<sup>115</sup> Hence, the Prague Summit was crucial in calling for a transformation of NATO.

In the light of these events and the special emphasis on terrorism, the agenda of Prague Summit moved onto the issue on transformation. Thereby, at the Summit, there was a change in the evaluation of aspirants in accordance with the changing agenda after the 9/11 attacks. The geopolitical/strategic factors were added to the formal NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) criteria. As Moore states, the aspirants were invited in relation to their willingness and ability to counter terrorism.<sup>116</sup> That was why the enlargement summit was quickly known as the transformation summit at which the necessity for new capabilities with new members and new partners were underlined. Moore adds that, the emphasis was

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<sup>112</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>113</sup> Lord Robertson Speech, "Towards the Prague Summit," *Foreign Policy. Org*, 15 November 2002, available at [www.foreignpolicy.org.tr/documents/robertson\\_151102\\_p.htm](http://www.foreignpolicy.org.tr/documents/robertson_151102_p.htm) (accessed on January 15, 2012 )

<sup>114</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>115</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>116</sup> Rebecca R. Moore, *NATO's New Mission- Projecting Stability in a Post-Cold War World*, Westport and Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2007, p. 83

on the need for the adaptation of NATO militarily in order to respond to terrorism despite the enlargement issue remaining on the agenda.<sup>117</sup>

Therefore, one of the crucial agreements at the summit was the creation of a NATO Response Force (NRF), which consisted of:

a technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable and sustainable force including land, sea and air elements, ready to move quickly wherever needed, as decided by the Council.<sup>118</sup>

Although the NRF had reached its operational capability in October 2004 and taken full operational capability in November 2006, the establishment of NRF was important for the improvement of Alliance's military capabilities. NRF consists of three parts; a command and control instrument from the NATO Command Structure; the Immediate Response Force, which is a joint force about 13,000 high-readiness troops acquired from the Allies; and a Response Forces Pool, which is a supplement for Immediate Response Force.<sup>119</sup> Thereby, the NRF was set up for the visible assurance of NATO's contribution to deterrence and collective defence.<sup>120</sup>

Additionally, it was an instrument that addressed to the growing capabilities gap between NATO and the US and within NATO itself. As Moore indicates, this gap was one of the reasons why the Bush administration rejected a broader role for NATO in Afghanistan.<sup>121</sup> In this way, the NRF was a means to allow European forces to contribute with the US forces to high-intensity conflict operations. At Prague, it was understood that the NRF would depend, to some extent, on the contributions from invitees and current, joint member states. This

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<sup>117</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>118</sup> NATO Press Release, "Prague Summit Declaration," Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Prague, 21 November 2002, available at [www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm) (accessed on January 15, 2012 )

<sup>119</sup> NATO Topic, "The NATO Response Force," available at [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_49755.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49755.htm) (accessed on January 15, 2012)

<sup>120</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>121</sup> Rebecca R. Moore, *NATO's New Mission- Projecting Stability in a Post-Cold War World*, p. 89

marked the transformation of NATO's military capabilities through the NFR. The main theme of enlargement at the summit was the evaluation of invitees in accordance with their contribution to a new NATO rather than researching how NATO would defend such members.<sup>122</sup>

In addition, the Alliance renewed their commitment through the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) to promote their capabilities for modern military operations. The aim of such a commitment was to provide the sufficient structuring in order to combat terrorism. However, the PCC was not limited only to fight terrorism; it also included the commitment to the areas of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence, together with surveillance and intelligence.<sup>123</sup>

Furthermore, the Alliance adopted the Prague package in order to structure NATO against the challenge of terrorism. In this regard, the Alliance approved the military concept for defence against terrorism, which was submitted on 18 December 2001 by the NATO Military Authorities with a political guidance from the North Atlantic Council. This concept revealed some responsibilities for NATO:

The Alliance's readiness to act against terrorist attacks or the threat of such attacks; to lead or support counter-terrorism operations; provide assistance to national authorities in dealing with the consequence of terrorist attacks; support operations by other international organizations and to conduct military operations to engage terrorist groups, as and where required, and as decided by North Atlantic Council.<sup>124</sup>

The other improvement, indicated in the Prague package, was the Alliance's first Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism (PAP-T). This initiative called for the partners to improve political consultations in line with information sharing and a broader preparedness for fighting terrorism. In order to protect the civil population against possible attacks with chemical, biological and radiological

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<sup>122</sup> *Ibid.* p. 90

<sup>123</sup> Didem Yaman, "NATO'nun Yeni Görevi: 'Terörizmle Mücadele' ve Bu Eksende Atılan Adımlar," *Uluslararası Hukuk ve Politika*, Volume 2, No.7, 2006, p. 47-48

<sup>124</sup> NATO Topic, "Countering Terrorism"



agents, the Alliance was committed to implement Civil Emergency Action Plan (CEP). Additionally, NATO strengthened its partnership through a comprehensive Review of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and Partnership for Peace (PfP).<sup>125</sup>

In short, with Prague summit, the transformation of NATO was enthusiastically supported by the US but whose support intermingled with the habit of issuing unilateral action.<sup>126</sup> In that summit, it was stated that, due to the contemporary threats likely to emanate from outside the European border that highlighted the expansion of NATO's reach. Thus, the Prague Summit was manipulated by thinking of security in military terms.<sup>127</sup>

### 3.3.3 EU: Individual and Bilateral Responses

As Hill argues, the immediate reaction of the EU against the 9/11 attacks was the presentation of solidarity.<sup>128</sup>

This would have been the case had the attack been carried out in Sidney or New Delhi, but the intimate connections with the US across all levels of European society made the identification more direct.<sup>129</sup>

On 12 September 2001, the Council of the EU organised a special meeting to announce their complete solidarity with the government of the US. In the Presidency statement, the Union condemned the organizers and sponsors of these terrorist attacks and it declared it was willing to work closely with the US to combat international terrorism and offered all possible assistance for the search and rescue operation.<sup>130</sup>

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<sup>125</sup> NATO Press Release, "Prague Summit Declaration"

<sup>126</sup> Andrew T. Wolff, "The Structural and Political Crisis of NATO Transformation," p.488

<sup>127</sup> Rebecca Moore, "NATO's New Mission- Projecting Stability in a Post-Cold War World," p. 109

<sup>128</sup> Christopher Hill, "Renationalizing or Regrouping? EU Foreign Policy Since 11 September 2001," *JCMS*, Vol. 42. No. 1, 2004, p. 145

<sup>129</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>130</sup> EU Presidency Statement, "Declaration," by the European Union, 12 September 2001, available at [http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article\\_56\\_en.htm](http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_56_en.htm) (accessed on January 20, 2012)

21 September 2001 witnessed an extraordinary European Council meeting in Brussels under the auspices of the Belgian EU Presidency. The purpose of the meeting was to analyse the international situations after the 9/11 attacks and to discuss the impact for the EU:

Terrorism is a real challenge to the world and to Europe. The European Council has decided that the fight against terrorism will, more than ever, be a priority objective of the EU. Moreover, the EU categorically rejects any equation of groups of fanatical terrorists with the Arab and Muslim world. The European Council reaffirms its firm determination to act in concert in all circumstances.<sup>131</sup>

In this meeting, the EU member states declared their solidarity with the US in combating terrorism and approved the “Plan of Action” on terrorism, which was agreed to implement in accordance with the timetable drawn up at the Laeken Summit on December 2001. The Plan of Action includes the measures of; enhancing the police and judicial cooperation; developing international legal instruments; combating the funding of terrorism in line with the acceptance of a broad definition of terrorist acts and terrorist groups, that they were not limited to the borders of the EU member states; strengthening air security; and coordinating the EU’s global action. The item was an attempt by the Council to develop CFSP for further the fight against terrorism and making ESDP operational at the end of the summit.<sup>132</sup>

On 19 October 2001, at the Ghent summit, to strengthen the instruments to fight the financing of terrorism and reinforce cooperation among the security and justice forces to combat international terrorism were at the fore by the EU leaders.<sup>133</sup> At this summit, it was also underlined that specific measures were at the request of the US, especially in the areas of judicial assistance and extradition. In this way, there was an agreement to reinforce judicial cooperation between the

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<sup>131</sup> “Conclusions and Plan of Action of the Extraordinary European Council Meeting,” 21 September 2001, available at [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/140.en.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/140.en.pdf) (accessed on January 20, 2012)

<sup>132</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>133</sup> Simon Duke, “CESDP and the EU Response to 11 September: Identifying the Weakest Link,” *European Foreign Affairs Review* 7: 2002, p. 156

US and EU in order to step up the efforts to control the exports of chemical, bacteriological and nuclear substances which were likely to be used for terrorist acts.

Beyond the meetings of member states, the crucial weakness of the EU was the diverging views among member states in reference to the provision of security. In that respect, as Gross states, the individual EU member states such as Britain, France and Germany contributed to the US-led war on terror through OEF and ISAF to show their solidarity with the US as well as to promote their international stand. Gross added that this;

provoked the charges of compromising EU unity and engaging in mini-lateralism: discussing military contributions in closed meetings, often ahead of EU summits, thereby sidelining the smaller EU member states including Belgium, which held the EU presidency during the second half of 2001.<sup>134</sup>

Furthermore, the real sign of the crack among EU member states was demonstrated with two mini-summits. The first was held on October 2001, prior to Ghent Summit in 2001. This was the meeting of three powerful states; UK, Germany and France in order to debate the Afghanistan operation, the struggle against terrorism and their stands on terrorism in international arena. As Akgül states, this meeting contributed greatly to the decline of CFSP and to the undermining of EU solidarity.<sup>135</sup>

Although there had been divisions between the member states before Summit, the fact that the decisions at the Summit were taken according to the big states' preferences as they had agreed in their mini-summit, proved the perception of the US that direct state-to-state contacts would be more useful than negotiating with the EU as a whole.<sup>136</sup>

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<sup>134</sup> Eva Gross, "The EU in Afghanistan: What Role for EU Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Policies?," *CFSP Forum*, Vol.4, No.4, July 2006, p. 12

<sup>135</sup> Deniz Altınbaş Akgül, "The European Union Response to September 11: Relations with the US and the Failure to Maintain a CFSP," *The Review of International Affairs*, Vol.1, No.4 Summer 2002, p.16

<sup>136</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 17

The second mini-summit was held on 4 November, a dinner at Downing Street hosted by the British Prime Minister Tony Blair who had planned to limit the meeting to the Germany and France. However, after receiving a phone call from the Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi, Tony Blair was forced to invite Italy which brought the necessity to invite the Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar and the CFSP High Representative Javier Solana, and then at the last minute, the Dutch Prime Minister Wim Kok also had to be invited.<sup>137</sup> The humanitarian relief and political feature of Afghanistan were at the top of the agenda. However, according to Akgül “mini summits clearly undermined one of the most essential purposes of the EU: to speak with one voice.”<sup>138</sup> Hill explores the damage caused by these mini summits on the solidarity of the EU by excluding certain other member states:

This was a humiliating public demonstration of the tensions between national and collective criteria, and between the stronger and weaker members of the European foreign policy system.<sup>139</sup>

Thus this initial period tended towards fragmentation instead of the unity within EU.

The rivalry between EU member states was to acquire a more effective position in international field through promoting good relations with the US. This was the facilitator factor for the individual EU member states to establish bilateral relations with the US. As Grant mentions, in the months after 11 September, Blair, Schroder and Chirac visited Washington separately. Although they informed each other before their visits, and discuss their arguments this was done without making much of an effort to talk on behalf of the EU.<sup>140</sup> This, in return, undermined the desire to set up a CFSP. Such mini-summits were the concrete

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<sup>137</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 17

<sup>138</sup> *Ibid.*, p.18

<sup>139</sup> Christopher Hill, “Renationalizing or Regrouping? EU Foreign Policy Since 11 September 2001,” p.147

<sup>140</sup> Charles Grant, “The Eleventh of September and beyond: The Impact on the European Union,” The Oxford and Malden: Political Quarterly Publishing, 2002, p. 139

indicators of incapability of the EU to constitute CFSP after the 9/11 attacks and the common threat of terrorism not only failed to unite the EU, but in fact, created divisions within the EU, and this brought the failure of CFSP. Briefly, the policies after the 9/11 attacks led to the fissures between the EU member states particularly between the more powerful states in accordance with the size of their military contribution and the less powerful states who felt they were on the bottom of the list. After the 9/11 attacks, the US preferred to appeal to the UK, instead of the whole EU structure, as a partner to launch the Afghan operation.

In addition to the UK, Germany was involved in Afghanistan, sending troops in order to gain a better position in international arena. Germany believed that Afghanistan would be the opportunity to gain an influential position in international relations. With the active position of Germany and the UK, France now had a triple competition in terms of attaining the leadership position. In the light of this situation, France continued to confirm solidarity with the US rather than daring to criticize whereas France had, in the past, the strongest anti-American views, especially since de-Gaulle's state policy.<sup>141</sup> Hence,

while the bigger EU states tried to use the situation to gain a better status and influence in international scene, and the general post September 11 policies of the European countries proved to be an American policy rather than an Afghanistan policy.<sup>142</sup>

Alongside the cooperation problems within the EU member states, similar problems were also observed at institutional level in relation to the Afghanistan involvement. The EU appointed Klaus-Peter Klaiber as a Special Representative (EUSR), in December 2001 succeeded by Francesc Vendrell in June 2002.<sup>143</sup> According to a report by the International Crisis Group, the EUSR has a capability

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<sup>141</sup> Deniz Altınbaş Akgül, "The European Union Response to September 11: Relations with the US and the Failure to Maintain a CFSP," p.11-12

<sup>142</sup> *Ibid.*, p.12

<sup>143</sup> "Rebuilding the Afghan State: The European Union's Role," *Asia Report*, No:17, 30 November 2005, International Crisis Group, p. 6, available at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/107%20Rebuilding%20the%20Afghan%20State%20The%20European%20Unions%20Role.pdf> (accessed on February 5, 2012)

to move faster and more decisively than the EU Presidency, because the latter must wait until all member states have communicated with their governments. However, an ill-defined relationship with the EU Presidency was the EUSR's problem. Hence, the report underlined the ambiguity in the delineation of responsibilities.<sup>144</sup>

Moreover, in February 2002, the European Commission set up a Delegation in Kabul. The EU Delegation functions like an Embassy in regard to its diplomatic mission on behalf of EU member states. The delegations of the EU in Kabul carried out the political analyses and reports in line with the provision of cooperation between the Afghan Government and the EU as well as Afghan and the International Civil Society. In this way, the regular consultations were held on the issues of major areas, such as donor coordination, capacity building and access to justice.<sup>145</sup>

However, the absence of direct and standardised links between the EU institutions and member states in Kabul was another coordination problem. Gross criticised both the absence of formal coordination between EUSR and European Commission Delegations and the lack of sharing and coordination among EU members and Gross also underlined that the reporting was not shared with NATO, which in return, led to the disconnection of the information.<sup>146</sup>

The fissure within the EU also existed over the military involvement in Afghanistan discussed during the Laeken Summit of European Council, which was held on 14-15 December 2001. The crucial theme about Afghanistan was the undertaking of the European Council to participate in the efforts of the international actors in accordance with the Bonn Agreement and relevant resolutions of UNSC.<sup>147</sup> However, there had been a debate over the participation

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<sup>144</sup> *Ibid.*, p.8

<sup>145</sup> European Union External Action, "Delegation of the European Union to Afghanistan," available at [http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/afghanistan/eu\\_afghanistan/political\\_relations/index\\_en.htm](http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/afghanistan/eu_afghanistan/political_relations/index_en.htm) (accessed on February 5, 2012 )

<sup>146</sup> Eva Gross, "The EU in Afghanistan: What Role for EU Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Policies?," p. 12

<sup>147</sup> Presidency Conclusions, "European Council Meeting in Laeken," 14 and 15 December 2001, available at [http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/background/docs/laeken\\_concl\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/background/docs/laeken_concl_en.pdf) (accessed on February 10, 2012)

of the EU in ISAF. It was the Belgian President, Guy Verhofstadt, that suggested since most EU member states were likely contribute to the ISAF the intervention would operate as a EU action. In addition, Belgian foreign minister, Louis Michael, later claimed that this force would operate under a EU flag. This caused media to speculate that a EU army would be sent to Afghanistan. Then, Belgian Minister quickly corrected himself in the light of reactions that it was an action by EU member states moving under UN. The conclusion of the EU heads of state underscored that there could be no joint EU presence in Afghanistan in terms of crisis management. By April 2002, thirteen EU member states contributed to ISAF (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and UK). Moreover, after that time, the reluctance continued on the part of the EU members in terms of undertaking military crisis management responsibilities.<sup>148</sup>

The confusion at Laeken over the contribution of the EU to ISAF exposed the EU's lack of preparedness for the hard security implications of crisis management. Ironically, it was the same summit that announced the ESDP as operational.<sup>149</sup> At the subsequent summits, mentioned in the previous chapter, the design of Rapid Reaction Force was to carry out Petersberg tasks, which were defined as humanitarian and rescue tasks with peacekeeping and combat forces tasks in crisis management. At Laeken, the declaration of ESDP as operational was problematic because there was as yet no agreement on the access to NATO planning assets. Furthermore, the International Crisis Group informed that this would have had less of a direct influence on ESDP itself because, it was stated that RRF was designed to achieve the Petersberg tasks.<sup>150</sup> In other words, by definition, RRF was formed to deal with crises outside of European borders. In that regard, relations between ESDP and terrorism was complex and even at the beginning of 2002, the scope of the Petersberg tasks were in the way of extension,

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<sup>148</sup> "EU Crisis Response Capabilities: An Update," International Crisis Group Issues Briefing , No.2, 29 April 2002, p. 3, available at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/europe/EU%20CRISIS%202.pdf> (accessed on February 10, 2012)

<sup>149</sup> *Ibid.*, p.6

<sup>150</sup> *Ibid.*

in order to include counter-terrorist actions and counter-terrorist units within RRF.<sup>151</sup>

On 13 December 2002, it had become crucial to improve ESDP because there had been an agreement between the EU and NATO on the issue of “supporting EU-led operations in which the Alliance as a whole is not engaged militarily in accordance with the decisions taken at the Washington Summit.”<sup>152</sup> The agreement paved the way for a permanent framework for joint action in support of peace and stability. In the same statement, it was emphasized that European Council agreed to implement provisions of the Nice Summit which made clear the involvement of non-EU European Allies in EU-Led Operations using NATO assets.<sup>153</sup>

On 16 December 2002, “EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP” was issued collectively by both organisations. In this statement, the EU would ensure the fullest possible involvement of the non-EU European members of NATO within ESDP. This lack of assurance had been the basic reason for several years that had delayed the NATO promise to support EU with assets in crisis situation. In addition to such an assurance, NATO would support ESDP by ensuring access for the EU to NATO’s planning capabilities. Finally, both institutions recognized the need for arrangements would ensure “coherent, transparent and mutually reinforcing development of the capability requirements common to the two organisations, with a spirit of openness.”<sup>154</sup>

Briefly, as Krow stated, the political action of the EU has been more tenuous. In other words, rather than acting as a unity, the Union itself acted bilaterally in accordance with the involvement of member states individually.<sup>155</sup> For instance,

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<sup>151</sup> *Ibid.*, p.12

<sup>152</sup> NATO Press Release, “Statement,” by the Secretary General, 13 December 2002, available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-140e.htm> (accessed on February 10, 2012)

<sup>153</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>154</sup> NATO Press Release, “EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP,” 16 December 2002, available at <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/committees/afet/20040217NATO/142en.PDF> (accessed on February 10, 2012)

<sup>155</sup> Matilka Krow, “The Fog of War? The EU in Afghanistan,” Dalhousie EUCE, No.2, 2009, p. 6, available at [http://euce.dal.ca/Files/Matilka\\_Krow\\_paper\\_May\\_2009.pdf](http://euce.dal.ca/Files/Matilka_Krow_paper_May_2009.pdf) (accessed on February 10, 2012)



the EU did not have a ESDP mission until 2006. However, in economic terms, the member states of the EU, with the European Commission could be considered much promising in comparison to the acts on behalf of the Union.

In this regard, after the Bonn Conference, the European Commission had drawn €4.93 million from the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) to use in Afghanistan.<sup>156</sup> The aim was both to support the newly established government and construct the confidence among the population. In a broader sense, RRM was a recent addition to EU's crisis management capabilities, which had been launched by External Relations Commissioner, Chris Patten, in February 2001. This was a funding mechanism designed to promote quick-impact stabilisers to decrease the economic results of violence and hence help facilitate crisis management.<sup>157</sup> In other words, RRM was the use of quick impact projects to provide and restore stability as a means of conflict prevention. In that respect, the purpose of RRM in Afghanistan focused on assisting the political transition in order to make this process as legitimate. A second similar-sized RRM program, accepted in May 2001, emphasized the support for the credibility of the Afghan Interim Administration among the Afghan people.<sup>158</sup> In addition to RRM, at Laeken, the Union announced that the EU was ready to pledge €360 million for humanitarian assistance, of which €106 million came from the Community budget.<sup>159</sup> At a donors' conference in Tokyo in January 2002, the EU and its member states pledged a further €600 million. From this year until 2006, the Commission pledged a total of €1 billion reconstruction aid.<sup>160</sup> In addition, the

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<sup>156</sup> EU Crisis Response Capabilities: An Update," International Crisis Group Issues Briefing, p.11

<sup>157</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>158</sup> "Rebuilding the Afghan State: The European Union's Role," *Asia Report*, No:17, 30 November 2005, International Crisis Group, p. 5

<sup>159</sup> Presidency Conclusions, "European Council Meeting in Laeken," 14 and 15 December 2001

<sup>160</sup> The Datas cited by Charles Grant, "The Eleventh of September and beyond: The Impact on the European Union," p. 137

Commission has had an office in Kabul since May 2002 particularly to implement aid delivery.<sup>161</sup>

Besides the aids and assistances pledged to Afghanistan, the Tokyo donor Conference had a different importance. This Conference tasked out five nations under the title of the “lead nation” in regard to specific areas that each took the responsibility. The aim was to deliver institution building in stated areas of Afghanistan. In this regard, the US took the Afghan National Army, Germany was allocated the Afghan National Police, Italy was under the task for judicial reform, the UK adopted the counter-narcotics and lastly Japan had the role of supervising the demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of armed groups.<sup>162</sup> However, such a situation by 2006 accelerated the calls for a broader EU involvement in Afghanistan, thus facilitating a EU mission related to these areas which will be discussed in the next chapter.

### **3.4 A Concrete Divergence: NSS versus ESS**

The discourse of the Bush administration was clearly stated in the document of National Security Strategy (NSS) in late 2002, which explicitly presented the unilateral attitude of the US. Similarly, the European Security Strategy (ESS) created in late 2003 by the EU was an instrument to show the strategy of the EU after the war in Afghanistan. Although there was one year between the two documents and this chapter is limited to 2001-02, these two documents are crucial in illustrating the different perceptions of the US and EU after the attack of 9/11. Therefore, these documents will be explained to show the first phase strategy of administration both for NATO and EU, which undermined the coalition between NATO and EU.

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<sup>161</sup> EU Council Secretariat Factsheet, “EU Engagement in Afghanistan,” November 2006, available at [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressData/en/esdp/91660.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/esdp/91660.pdf) (accessed on February 15, 2012)

<sup>162</sup> Tim Bird and Alex Marshall, *Afghanistan: How the West Lost Its Way?*, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2011, p. 119

## NSS

The NSS was declared on 17 September 2002 under the Bush administration. This document consisted of 31 pages which provided a detailed programme that addressed the security agenda after 9/11. NSS consisted of nine parts, which examined the world conjuncture and stated the American strategies. In the first part, “Overview of America’s International Strategy”, the aim was to set a “distinctly American internationalism” which referred to “the union of America’s values and national interests.”<sup>163</sup> In this way, the US was ready to help “the world become not just safer but better.”<sup>164</sup> Hence, this part focused on major aims of America at the world level by implying the international relations as a whole. The second part, “Champion Aspiration for Human Dignity” clarified the American stand: “The United States must defend liberty and justice because these principles are right and true for all people everywhere.”<sup>165</sup> In this respect, NSS claimed that

America’s constitution has served us well. Many other nations, with different histories and cultures, facing different circumstances have successfully incorporated these core principles into their own system of governance.<sup>166</sup>

Through NSS document, the Bush administration tried to show America as a forerunner with its constitution and inherited values for humanity. Nevertheless, the last sentence of this chapter sent an implicit warning: “We’ll champion the cause of human dignity and oppose those who resist it.”<sup>167</sup>

The third part, “Strengthen Alliances to Defeat Global Terrorism and Work to Prevent Attacks against US and Our Friends” clearly identified the enemy. In this sense, enemy was stated as terror which had reached a global scale. Furthermore,

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<sup>163</sup> The U.S. National Security Strategy, 17 September 2002, p.1 available at <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/> (accessed on February 20, 2012)

<sup>164</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>165</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 3

<sup>166</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>167</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 4

the document stated that the US made “no distinction between terrorists and those who knowingly harbour or provide aid to them.”<sup>168</sup> Additionally, in this chapter, the doctrine of pre-emption was indicated

While US will constantly strive to enlist the support of international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defence by acting pre-emptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country.<sup>169</sup>

Thus, the US underlined the necessity of homeland security within the framework of pre-emption strategy: “We recognize that our best defence is a good offense.”<sup>170</sup> Although the last part of this chapter emphasized the need of support from allies and friends, the focal point was the leading role of the US in combating terrorism. In the fourth part, “Work with Others to Defuse Regional Conflicts,” the emphasis was placed on regional areas that were supported by the US and other actors, such as South Asia, Indonesia, parts of Latin America, Colombia and Africa.

In the fifth part, “Prevent Our Enemies from Threatening Us, Other Allies and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction,” the focus built on the changing nature of security environment with the end of Cold War. This chapter mentioned “new deadly challenges” which had emerged from rogue states and terrorists, who were motive to use Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).<sup>171</sup> Hence, the intent was settled upon the necessity to combat WMD, which were to be used as “weapons of choice” rather than as a “last resort.”<sup>172</sup> In this way, this part signalled the importance of the time in which to take action: “The overlap between states sponsor terror and those who pursue WMD compels us to action.”<sup>173</sup> Therefore, this can be seen as an attempt to form a rationale to use pre-emption

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<sup>168</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 5

<sup>169</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 6

<sup>170</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>171</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 13

<sup>172</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 15

<sup>173</sup> *Ibid.*

against the existence of a closer threat. “US will, if necessary, act pre-emptively.”

<sup>174</sup> The next part, “Ignite a New Era of Global Economic Growth Through Free Markets and Free Trade” stressed that a strong world economy was necessary to be created through providing free trade and a free market under the leadership of the US in order to advance liberty and prosperity in the rest of the world. In this regard, the US mentioned the strategy to increase the global initiative to develop the connection between trade and development in order to promote security. In return, this was an attempt to promote the national security of the US.

Part seven entitled; “Expand the Circle of Development by Opening Societies and Building the Infrastructure of Democracy” stated that; the “administration’s goal is to help unleash the productive potential of individuals in all nations.” <sup>175</sup> In other words, the US, in accordance with such a goal, would try to support the provision of sustained growth and poverty reduction. The following part: “Develop Agendas for Cooperative Action with the Other Main Centres of Global Power” indicated that “America will implement its strategies by organizing coalitions” and mentioned the international institutions; the EU and NATO. Additionally, this chapter implied the new opportunities for developing relations with Russia and China.<sup>176</sup> In the last part, “Transform America’s National Security Institutions to Meet the Challenges and Opportunities of the Twenty-First Century,” the administration pointed out the necessity of transformation for the US: “A military structured to deter massive Cold War era armies must be transformed to focus more on how an adversary might fight rather than where and when a war might occur.” <sup>177</sup> Thus, again, this transformation was revealed to be under the leadership position of the US: “In exercising our leadership, we’ll respect the values, judgement and interests of our friends and partners.” <sup>178</sup>

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<sup>174</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>175</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 21

<sup>176</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 25

<sup>177</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 29

<sup>178</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 31

## ESS

ESS announced by the EU on 12-13 December 2003 under the authority of EU's High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana and adopted by Brussels European Council. This reference document was 14 pages and avoided details due to the number of nations and multiplicity of institutions under its scope. It was published in a time when there was an essential international disagreement about the Iraq War. ESS consisted of three parts; the security environment with global challenges and key threats, strategic objectives and the policy implications for Europe. In security environment section, the ESS began with negative aspects of globalization; poverty, competition for scarce resources, disease and global warming. Then, ESS identified five threats; terrorism that had reached a global level: the first was that "Europe is both a target and a base for such terrorism."<sup>179</sup> The second threat was the proliferations of mass destruction which was "potentially the greatest threat to our security."<sup>180</sup> At this point, the ESS presented its fear that: "the most frightening scenario is one in which terrorist groups acquire weapons of mass destruction."<sup>181</sup> Regional conflict which was a worldwide phenomenon was the third threat that could, "lead to extremism, terrorism, state failure."<sup>182</sup> The fourth threat was failure of the state which was a risk to global governance and regional stability. Furthermore, it was also associated with the possibility of terrorism. Lastly, organized crime was accepted as a threat which was generally dealt by failing or weak states. In the document, again, there was the emphasis on the fear of association with terror: "Such criminal activities can have links with terrorism."<sup>183</sup>

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<sup>179</sup> The European Security Strategy, "A Secure Europe in a Better World," Brussels, 12 December 2003, p. 3, available at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf> (accessed on February 25, 2012)

<sup>180</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>181</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 4

<sup>182</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>183</sup> *Ibid.*

The second part of the ESS contained three strategic objectives. The first addressed threats given in the first part through the adoption of a European Arrest Warrant in preventing proliferation and in countering the regional conflicts. The second objective was to build security in neighbours which indicated the importance of the enlargement of the EU and its neighbourhood policy. The last aim was to create international order based on effective multilateralism which called for cooperation and coalition on the global scene. The third part of the ESS explained the fundamental points in the application of such policies. In this respect, the ESS offered a “more active, more capable and more coherent” role for Europe with the necessity of “working with partners.”<sup>184</sup> In this way, ESS underlined international cooperation by referring both to NATO and the US.

### **Similarities between the NSS and ESS**

Although the differences are more visible there were five main similarities. First, the optimistic view of both papers after the end of Cold War; NSS emphasized the end of totalitarianism with the prevailing of liberty and new opportunities with new alliances. ESS said that Europe, now, witnessed the tendency towards peace which was unprecedented in its history. The second was that both documents sought the mixing of different levels in combating new threats. They suggested that the solution was to “blend military and non-military; states and non-state; internal and external levels.”<sup>185</sup> The third similarity was the mutual recognition of the ambiguity nature of challenges and threats. Furthermore, in both papers, there was consensus over the definition of new threats. The fourth similarity was the definition of objectives under dynamic terms especially in the definition of terrorism. In that sense, both documents explained terrorism in a more comprehensive way through mentioning the likely combination with other threats which led to much more dangerous situations. The

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<sup>184</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 13

<sup>185</sup> Fraser Cameron, “Transatlantic Differences On Security Perceptions and Responses,” in *The Changing Politics of European Security – Europe Alone?*, ed. by Stefan Ganzle and Allen G. Sens, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, p. 73

last commonality was in the advocacy of “both a proactive and anticipatory approach” for solutions however, there was a big difference between NSS and ESS in terms of pre-emption strategy.<sup>186</sup> Thus it can be seen that although both papers perceived the same threats and challenges their differences lay in implementation of the response to the issues.

### **Differences between the NSS and ESS**

In a broad sense, the NSS detailed the new threats and related decisions to combat such threats while the aim of the ESS was both to draw the EU members together after the division and to demonstrate to the world that they work. Additionally, the NSS was more spectacular in comparison to the ESS in terms of implying the promotion of freedom and democracy whereas

the claims are made on behalf of America’s own history and values, on behalf of American leadership and on behalf of the civilized world whose values are taken to be at one with those of the US.<sup>187</sup>

The introductory statements of the NSS and ESS were in contrast and clearly showed the emphasis of the document. Bush stated that:

the war against terrorists of global reach is a global enterprise of uncertain duration. America will help nations that need our assistance in combating terror. And America will hold to account nations that are comprised by terror, including those who harbour terrorists. Because the allies of terror are the enemies of civilization.<sup>188</sup>

Whereas the ESS, opened with the optimistic statement that:

Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure and so free ... As a union of 25 states with over 450 million of people producing a quarter of the world’s

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<sup>186</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>187</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 72

<sup>188</sup> The U.S. National Security Strategy, 17 September 2002, p. i-ii



GNP and with a wide range of instruments at its disposal, EU is inevitably a global player.<sup>189</sup>

The NSS contained a more religious and moral rhetoric while the ESS focused on the desire to share responsibility for global security with Europe being one of those global players. In other words, the US through NSS sought to control the whole cake whereas the EU through ESS was implying that they wanted a bigger slice of the cake.

From this perspective it is crucial to point out main differences between the NSS and ESS. The first difference was visible with the embracing of pre-emptive doctrine by the US in NSS whereas there was no reference to the pre-emption strategy in ESS. The doctrine of pre-emption was being concrete with the intervention of the US to Afghanistan and resonated so directly with the US-European difference over Iraq. The second difference was related to multilateralism; although it appeared that both documents contained a similar idea with the ESS stating “no single country is able to tackle today’s complex problems entirely on its own”<sup>190</sup> and the NSS accepted that “no nation can build a safer, better world alone,” however, the NSS continued to state that: “We seek to create a balance of power, we will defend the peace, and we will extend the peace.”<sup>191</sup> Thus, the US although agreed to cooperation wanted to control that cooperation between nations. The third difference also laid in the concept of cooperation. The ESS referred to cooperative actions in the document as a method of eliminating the coercion and violence and that achievement of institutionalisation was the end point. However, the NSS considered that “in terms of coalition leadership... institutions [would be] reduced to an instrumental role” instead of an end position.<sup>192</sup> The fourth essential difference was in the language of both papers particularly in the terminology. The NSS used terms such as

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<sup>189</sup> The European Security Strategy, “A Secure Europe in a Better World,” Brussels, 12 December 2003, p. 1

<sup>190</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>191</sup> The U.S. National Security Strategy, p. i

<sup>192</sup> Fraser Cameron, “Transatlantic Differences On Security Perceptions and Responses” p. 74

enemies and rogue states while the ESS had an abstention from the definition of such terms. The fifth difference concerned the focus of the execution strategy of the documents. The NSS stressed military strength while the ESS focused on the combination of resources. This again, showed the US tendency towards a military solution to the threats and challenges given the NSS. Finally, the world views of the NSS and ESS were substantially different from each other in the words of Cameron:

The NSS is much more black and white, with American military power serving as the chief weapon. Unlike the US document, the ESS also pays great attention to the importance of the UN as a legitimizing authority.<sup>193</sup>

### **3.5 Conclusion**

The unilateral manner of Bush administration was clearly observable after the 9/11 attacks. For NATO, this change in attitude was seen in the US in questioning the role of NATO and purpose in the post-September 11 era. This in turn, impacted on the security agenda of the Alliance and facilitated its transformation, particularly in terms of military capabilities.

For the EU, the involvement in Afghanistan campaign was based on individual contribution rather than a unified EU approach. Although the EU, with a joint declaration, announced its solidarity with the US in combating terrorism, the fissure within Union was visible especially between the large and smaller member states. This situation deteriorated with the US search for cooperation with member states of the EU on a bilateral basis.

In the war in Afghanistan, the United States did not want to engage in joint military operations with most of the European countries nor with NATO or the EU. Instead, the US tended to use European capability under the framework of special forces from several European countries. Therefore, although the US wanted to work with coalition partners, it did not want to be bound by them.

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<sup>193</sup> *Ibid.*

Furthermore, although the European nations underlined their solidarity both through the EU, (as shown in the ESS) and NATO (particularly evident in invocation of Article V), some countries were in fact willing to enter bilateral agreement with the US, who overemphasized the “coalition of willing power” policy evident in the NSS. This situation threatened the institutional characteristics of the EU and NATO. As a result, the road to cooperation between both parties was substantially limited.

## **CHAPTER 4**

### **AFGHANISTAN: AS A TEST CASE (2003-2011)**

#### **4.1 Introduction**

This chapter focuses on the evolution of the NATO-led ISAF and the EU mission of EUPOL. Since more attention is paid to the missions of the EU and NATO in detail, the scope of those missions is discussed while examining the ways in which they cooperate.

While it is attempted to examine the EU and NATO on the basis of their missions, the Bush administrations are at the centre of the analysis especially in regard to the Iraq crisis and the modification of the policies under two administrations. This chapter will show how US policy has the ability to split transatlantic relations and how it impacts on the configuration of both missions. Also, the US strategy in Afghanistan is explained through an analysis of the policies carried under both George W. Bush and current President Barak Obama. Lastly, this chapter explores the effects of the US policies on Afghanistan and the implications for the relations both within and between NATO-led ISAF and the EU's EUPOL.

#### **4.2 Modification of the US Strategy under Bush Administrations**

##### **4.2.1 The US Endeavour in Iraq and the Peak of Unilateralism**

Under the Bush Administration, the situation in Afghanistan both with the overthrow of the Taliban in November 2001 and the replacement of the Transitional Authority by the Afghan Interim Authority in mid-2002 facilitated the further military action to overthrow the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. In January 2002, in his State of the Union address, President Bush identified Iraq,

Iran and North Korea as the “axis of evil.”<sup>194</sup> In the same speech, Bush stated that “year after year, Saddam Hussein has gone to great lengths, spent enormous sums, taken great risks, to build and keep weapons of mass destruction.”<sup>195</sup> According to Kellner, in the “axis of evil” statement, Bush aroused the fear of nuclear missile attack on the US to justify pre-emptive strikes, a strategy which would soon be concentrated upon Iraq.<sup>196</sup> Kellner maintains that after the 9/11 attacks, the Bush administration used and utilized a discourse of fear to gain support for Iraq through evoking images of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons attacks and purported relations between Saddam Hussein regime and al-Qaeda.<sup>197</sup>

According to Horowitz and Johnson, the rationale for the Bush administration to intervene in Iraq was the claim that Saddam Hussein had broken the 1991 truce and defied seventeen UN resolutions culminating in UNSC Resolutions 1441, in order to prevent Saddam Hussein from pursuing programs to develop WMD.<sup>198</sup> UNSC Resolution 1441 referred to the use of diplomatic means to obtain Iraq’s compliance with international law, particularly with the arms-control agreements which had built after the Gulf War truce.<sup>199</sup> The adoption of UNSC Resolution 1441 in November 2002 offered Iraq under the regime of Saddam Hussein a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations under the relevant resolutions that included the cooperate with United Nations inspectors and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Additionally, this resolution warned Iraq that there would be serious consequences if it continued to violate these obligations. Thus, Resolution 1441 was an ultimatum and declared Iraq to be in

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<sup>194</sup> George W. Bush, “President George W. Bush’s State of the Union Address”, 29 January 2002, available at <http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/policy/bushstun2002.html> (accessed on March 5, 2012)

<sup>195</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>196</sup> Douglas Kellner, “Bushspeak and the Politics of Lying: Presidential Rhetoric in the ‘War on Terror’,” *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 37, no. 4 (December), 2007, p.632

<sup>197</sup> *Ibid.*, p.635

<sup>198</sup> David Horowitz and Ben Johnson, *Party of Defeat- How Democrats and Radicals Undermined America’s War on Terror*, Dallas: Spence Publishing Company, 2008, p.70

<sup>199</sup> For more details see: “Full Text: UN Security Resolution 1441 on Iraq,” *The Guardian*, 20 December 2002, available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/dec/20/iraq.foreignpolicy2> (accessed on March 5, 2012)

material breach of sixteen resolutions that aimed to enforce the Gulf War truce.<sup>200</sup> Resolution 1441 gave Saddam Hussein a thirty-day to comply and twelve days after the deadline had passed in December 2002, President Bush and Prime Minister Blair made a joint declaration that Iraq was in material breach of Resolution 1441. In March 2003, a coalition of America, Britain and other smaller allies went to war in Iraq.

Briefly, the Bush administration was determined to wage war in Iraq

charging that it had hidden WMD, repeatedly flouted its commitments not to deploy nuclear weapons, failed to allow for open UN weapons inspections, had links with al-Qaeda and had been covertly supporting this organisation.<sup>201</sup>

However, in 2006, the US Senate was informed from a Central Intelligence Agency report prepared in 2005 that there was no demonstration of formal links between the Saddam Hussein regime and al-Qaeda, and no evidence that Iraq had WMD.<sup>202</sup> Cameron comments that it was later come to the fore that American and British intelligence reports were manipulated to show that Iraq possessed WMD.<sup>203</sup>

The US-led war in Iraq brought about a major transatlantic crisis splitting NATO during its enlargement process. According to Buzan, through the invasion of Iraq, the US had a dual purpose to bring in a set of countries with strongly pro-American foreign policies and gain opportunities to locate its forces in Europe closer to the Middle East region.<sup>204</sup> The split in NATO took place in February

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<sup>200</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>201</sup> Andrew TH Tan, *U.S Strategy Against Global Terrorism- How It evolved, Why It Failed, and Where It is Headed*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, p.48

<sup>202</sup> "Report Of The Select Committee On Intelligence On Post-war Finding About Iraq's WMD Programs And Links To Terrorism And How They Compare With Pre-war Assessment Together With Additional Views," 8 September 2006, available at <http://intelligence.senate.gov/phasesiaccuracy.pdf> (accessed on March 5, 2012)

<sup>203</sup> Fraser Cameron, "Transatlantic Differences On Security Perceptions and Responses," in *The Changing Politics of European Security – Europe Alone?*, p.70

<sup>204</sup> Barry Buzan and Ana Gonzalez-Pelaez, "'International Community' After Iraq," *International Affairs* 81, I (2005), p. 42

2003 when Turkey requested that the Alliance protect the country from any potential attacks by Iraq. However, this was blocked by France, Germany and Belgium who stated that such protection would lead to a war, which would prevent the effort to find a peaceful solution for Iraq. At this point, the decision of the US with the UK, without a UN-mandate, to go to war in Iraq in March 2003 led to the sharpening of division in transatlantic relations.

Now, the split was focused on the use of power by the US in Iraq. Headed by France and Germany, there were other countries such as Luxembourg and Belgium, who were against the occupation of Iraq and opposed the unilateral behaviour of the US. However, Donald Rumsfeld stated that “military operations would not stop and would go ahead bilaterally if the alliance could not or would not form a plan of action” and underlined the fact that “the US and other alliance members would proceed with the planning outside of NATO if necessary.”<sup>205</sup> This internal crisis at NATO was resolved in an eventual agreement through the use of NATO’s Defence Planning Committee (DPC). The DPC was a former ultimate authority on the matters of the Alliance’s integrated military structure which was dissolved in June 2010 and its responsibilities absorbed by the North Atlantic Council.<sup>206</sup> At the time of crisis, the DPC consisted of all NATO members, except France since it was outside NATO’s integrated military structure. In this way, the DPC authorized the military authorities to apply defensive measures to assist Turkey as a matter of urgency.<sup>207</sup>

To sum up, Europe was divided over the war against Iraq with France, Germany and Belgium leading the opposition whereas the UK, Spain (until 2004), Italy, Denmark and most of the Central and Eastern European states supported US policy. On 22 January 2003, Donald Rumsfeld described this split as “old versus

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<sup>205</sup> Donald Rumsfeld cited by Barry Buzan and Ana Gonzalez-Pelaez, in ‘International Community’ After Iraq,” *International Affairs* 81, I (2005), p. 43

<sup>206</sup> NATO Archived, “The Defence Planning Committee,” available at [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_49201.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49201.htm) (accessed on March 7, 2012)

<sup>207</sup> *Ibid.*

new Europe.”<sup>208</sup> Subsequently, on 30 January 2003, heads of state and governments of the five NATO/EU member countries and three EU accession countries, (Denmark, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom joined by the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland) in the “Letter of the Eight” expressed their support for a US military intervention in Iraq. In February 2003, the foreign ministers of ten Eastern European countries (Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, and Slovakia) presented the “Vilnius-letter,” a similar statement of support for the US.<sup>209</sup> After these statements, on 17 February 2003 in an extraordinary European Council meeting in Brussels, French President Jacques Chirac characterized Central and Eastern European countries as “childish” accusing them of “missing a good opportunity to keep quiet.”<sup>210</sup> Chirac went further and threatened such countries, especially Romania and Bulgaria, that they had missed the chance of joining the EU.<sup>211</sup> Iraq Crisis showed the ease with which the US could split Europe and the inability of the EU to defend their foreign policy against the US.<sup>212</sup> Iraq Crisis, due to the Bush administration’s manner to favour some allies over others, contributed to the growing sense that the US perceived NATO “as little more than a toolbox” from which it could take support for its many military operations.<sup>213</sup> As a result, NATO and the EU became the weapons in the accelerating rift over US Iraq policy.<sup>214</sup>

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<sup>208</sup> Donald Rumsfeld cited in “Outrage at ‘Old Europe’ Remarks,” *BBC News World Edition*, 23 January 2003, available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2687403.stm> (accessed on March 7, 2012)

<sup>209</sup> Peter Kiss, “Eastern European Defense Review: Two Defense Secretaries and the ‘New Europe,’” *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, 28 June 2011, available at <http://csis.org/blog/eastern-european-defense-review-two-defense-secretaries-and-new-europe> (accessed on March, 7 2012)

<sup>210</sup> Jacques Chirac cited by Mustafa Türkeş, in “‘New Vs. Old Europe’: Contested Hegemonies And The Dual-Guarantee Strategy of The East European Countries,” *International Problems*, No.3, 2005, p.3

<sup>211</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>212</sup> Barry Buzan and Ana Gonzalez-Pealez, p. 45

<sup>213</sup> Rebecca Moore, *NATO’s New Vision- Projecting Stability in a Post-Cold War World*, p. 102

<sup>214</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 101



#### 4.2.2 Move from a Unilateral to a Multilateral Intervention

Mounting insurgency and overstretching in Iraq War conditions in mid-2003, showed that the unilateral approach was an obstruction to fight on two fronts. The Iraq crisis, together with its consequent crack in the transatlantic relations and the chastening experiences at the time of ongoing Afghanistan operation was the leading factor to reassess the manner for the Bush administration.<sup>215</sup> Despite the problems began in Afghanistan, the operation in that country “seemed a comparatively easier place to produce a visible measure of success.”<sup>216</sup> In this regard, the Bush administration realized that

the problems inherent in running a long-term, large-scale, *ad hoc* coalition were such that only an organization like NATO could provide the organizational structures necessary to help facilitate more efficient post-war reconstruction.<sup>217</sup>

This was the irony of the US position, the US had bypassed or limited NATO in Afghanistan but now it needed NATO over Iraq. As Williams states, the US made direct request from NATO in Afghanistan to receive only technical assistance whereas in Iraq, the Alliance had been in a debate over going to war.<sup>218</sup> Such a debate was solved in the Istanbul Summit (June 2004) by the decision that the assistance of NATO would only be a mission to train the Iraqi security forces and it would encourage other member nations to support this initiative in accordance with UNSCR 1546.<sup>219</sup> This comes to mean that NATO was in no position as a

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<sup>215</sup> Mark Webber, “NATO: The United States, Transformation and the War in Afghanistan,” *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, V.11, 2009, p. 52

<sup>216</sup> Astri Suhrke, “A Contradictory Mission? NATO from Stabilization to Combat in Afghanistan,” *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.15, No.2, April 2008, p. 218

<sup>217</sup> Ellen Williams, “Out of Area and Very Much in Business? NATO, the U.S., and the Post- 9/11 International Security Environment,” *Comparative Strategy*, Taylor & Francis Group, 2008, p. 72

<sup>218</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 71

<sup>219</sup> NATO Press Releases, “Statement on Iraq” Issued by the Heads of the State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, 28 June 2004. See the full text at <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2004/p04-098e.htm> (accessed on March 10, 2012); see also the full

main contributor to the Iraq War. At that context, Afghanistan was still the “good war” in accordance with ongoing international and domestic support in comparison to Iraq War.<sup>220</sup>

According to Buzan:

the Bush doctrine suggested the US abandonment of the kind of stable, long-term, multilateral partnership represented by NATO, and a move away from the sense of community embodied in such organization.<sup>221</sup>

That was the reason why the first administration, created a partnership with Europe that was not present until 2004, however, Bush used Blair’s official visit in November 2004 in order to declare his new approach.<sup>222</sup> November 2004 marked the re-election of Bush for a second term, and there was a willingness to reach out to their allies of “old Europe.” The difficulties experienced with Iraq and Afghanistan wars, now, seemed to indicate that there had been a change in the US approach since late 2003.

It is generally acknowledged, and increasingly so in the US itself, that the problems attending the occupation of Iraq by the US and its partners since Saddam Hussein fell have demonstrated both the limitations of military force alone for achieving transformational solutions and the US’s deficiency in the other skills and resources required.<sup>223</sup>

In this regard, the National Security Strategy (NSS) report in March 2006, which was an updated version of the earlier NSS (2002), was important in the examination of whether there had been change of the Bush administration

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text related to United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1546, 8 June 2004, available at <http://daccessddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/381/16/PDF/N0438116.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed on March 10, 2012)

<sup>220</sup> Astri Suhrke, “A Contradictory Mission? NATO from Stabilization to Combat in Afghanistan,” p. 218

<sup>221</sup> Barry Buzan and Ana Gonzalez-Pelaez, p. 43

<sup>222</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 51

<sup>223</sup> Fraser Cameron, “Transatlantic Differences On Security Perceptions and Responses,” p.74-75

approach in its second term. The new version of the NSS contained the same headings for the nine as the 2002 NSS, however, in the 2006 NSS were two new parts. Each of the nine parts consisted of a summary of the 2002 NSS, an explanation of the current situation and a short map for the way ahead. The crucial feature of the 2006 NSS, was its emphasis on the fact that “America is at war and this was a wartime national security strategy.”<sup>224</sup> In introduction, as Bush states, this strategy was founded upon two pillars:

The first pillar is to promote freedom, justice and human dignity- working to end tyranny, to promote effective democracies, and to extend prosperity through free and fair trade and wise development policies ... The second pillar of our strategy is confronting the challenges of our time by leading a growing community of democracies ... Yet history has shown that only when we do our part will others do theirs. America must continue to lead.<sup>225</sup>

It was underlined that multinational efforts were crucial to solve problems, however, they should be under the leadership of the US. Hence, the lead position of the US was refreshed with this new version of the NSS although there was much more enthusiasm for coalitions. In the next part titled “Overview of America’s National Security Strategy,” the focus was on the major policy of America “to seek and support democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.”<sup>226</sup> The NSS 2002 placed this goal under the part named “Overview of America’s International Strategy,” thus, the difference was only the name of the part not the content of it. The visible difference was the fact that the 2002 NSS strongly indicated “American internationalism” while the 2006 NSS never directly referred to this concept.

The situation in Afghanistan was directly explained in the part called “Champion Aspiration for Human Dignity” under the subtitle of “Success and Challenges Since 2002” by referring to the replacement of tyranny with

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<sup>224</sup> The U.S. National Security Strategy, March 2006, p. i, available at <http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/nss2006.pdf> ( accessed on March 10, 2012)

<sup>225</sup> *Ibid.*, p.ii

<sup>226</sup> *Ibid.*, p.1

democracy.<sup>227</sup> In this part, the overthrow of the Taliban; the freely-elected government with a written constitution and an elected legislature were shown as the successes of the US.<sup>228</sup> Similarly, in relation to Iraq, the toppling of Saddam Hussein regime with the nation's first free and fair election; a negotiated constitution was mentioned. In the 2002 NSS, the reference point was the American constitution to serve all humanity in order to defend justice and liberty for all people; however, the 2006 NSS underscored a common international effort by calling for the participation of other nations. However, it was the "US that will lead" such situation.<sup>229</sup> In the next part, "Strengthen Alliances to Defeat Global Terrorism and Work to Prevent Attacks against US and Our Friends" encompassed the fact that "the war against terrorism is not over."<sup>230</sup> This part, in related to Afghanistan, mentioned the degrading of al-Qaeda's haven with the capture of most of al-Qaeda leaders. In addition, this chapter constructed a correlation between winning the war on terror and winning battles in Afghanistan and Iraq.

In the 2002 NSS, pre-emption was at the top of the agenda to prevent terrorist actions, but, the current document did not refer to pre-emption explicitly. Instead, it placed more emphasis on the partnership of allies in combating terrorism by inviting new friends who would be recruited and led by the US.<sup>231</sup> Under the part, "Develop Agendas for Cooperative Action with the Other Main Centres of Global Power," the statement was built on global coalition against terrorism, especially in Afghanistan and Iraq by underlining the leading role of NATO in Afghanistan in accordance with its transforming capability to meet the current challenges.

Also, the document stated that relations with the main centres of global power must be set within an appropriate context and "bilateral policies that ignore regional and global realities are unlikely to succeed."<sup>232</sup> The criticism of bilateral

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<sup>227</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 2

<sup>228</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>229</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7

<sup>230</sup> *Ibid.*, p.8

<sup>231</sup> *Ibid.*, p.12

<sup>232</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 36

policies was ironically what the Bush administration applied in the initial period of the Afghan case. The 2002 NSS, in the same part, indicated that transformation of NATO was a necessity in order to act on and diminish vulnerabilities wherever the interests were threatened. Now, the 2006 NSS proclaimed the importance of the role of NATO, particularly in the stabilisation of Afghanistan. Thus, the second Bush administration maintained its policy on the issue of an organizational role for NATO instead of building bilateral relations in order to achieve success in Afghan case. However, again, the old discourse of the Bush administration was softened in this document:

We must be prepared to act alone if necessary, while recognizing that there is little of lasting consequence that we can accomplish in the world without the sustained cooperation of our allies and partners.<sup>233</sup>

The content of the last two parts, titled “Engage the Opportunities and Confront the Challenges of Globalization” and “Conclusion,” was addressed indirectly in the 2002 NSS but not in separate chapters. In 2006 NSS, the national security implications of globalization were covered with an emphasis on its transforming affect on national security through new flows of trade, investment, information and technology.<sup>234</sup> The rationale for this chapter was to reveal how globalization had exposed the US to new challenges, which were not traditional national security concerns and if left unaddressed can be a threat to national security.<sup>235</sup> Therefore, coalitions of new partnerships were presented as a catalyst to create responses where

the US must lead the effort to reform existing institutions and create new ones – including forging new partnerships between governmental and non-governmental actors, and with transnational and international organizations.<sup>236</sup>

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<sup>233</sup> *Ibid.*, p.37

<sup>234</sup> *Ibid.*, p.47

<sup>235</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>236</sup> *Ibid.*, p.48

The last sentence of the 2006 NSS, it stated that:

the time require an ambitious national security strategy, yet one recognizing the limits to what even a nation as powerful as the US can achieve itself, ... [thus] America must lead by deed as well as by example.<sup>237</sup>

To sum up, 2006 NSS was written with a less radical rhetoric, particularly with the absence of pre-emption, in comparison to the previous one in 2002. Also, this document tended to include more on the issue of partnership especially with NATO by supporting its transformation, in this way, showed appreciation for the stabilization role of NATO in Afghanistan. However, the previous document underlined the task of transformation as the primal necessity for NATO in order to carry out the mission. Hence, the 2006 NSS reflected the modification of the second Bush administration from only wishing to engage in special measures with NATO to the use of the whole NATO mission in the Afghan campaign. However, this document again reserved the right of the US “to act alone” if US interests are at stake. The difference in this document was the lesser emphasis on the issue of acting alone than in 2002 NSS, which contained strong tones in almost every chapter. Lastly, the similarity of the two Bush administrations was shown in these two documents in terms of his unchanged effort on setting the US as the lead in international arena.

Besides the NSS document, in 2007, the US had become reconciled with France since Nicolas Sarkozy had replaced Jacques Chirac. With the arrival of Sarkozy, American and French relations have entered a new dimension. The first signal came in June 2008, in Bush’s Paris meeting with Sarkozy, through the speech of Bush that “America’s first friend was France.”<sup>238</sup> Thus, the arrival of Sarkozy marked the end of the freeze under his predecessor Chirac. Dunn states that Sarkozy learned the lesson from Iraq Crisis that “you cannot hope to build a united Europe that is divided towards the US.”<sup>239</sup> Dunn maintains that the offer of

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<sup>237</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>238</sup> “Bush Compliments Sarkozy on Wife,” *BBC News*, 15 June 2008, available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7455156.stm> (accessed on March 15, 2012)

<sup>239</sup> David Hasting Dunn, “The Double Interregnum: UK-US Relations beyond Blair and Bush,” *International Affairs* 84:6 (2008), p. 1139

Sarkozy to return France to NATO's integrated military command structure was enough to prompt Bush to admit "his case for a distinct role for the EU in relations with the Alliance."<sup>240</sup> French policy under Sarkozy was demonstrated in the decision to send an additional 700 troops to Afghanistan, by the end of 2008, and the significance was greater in that, those troops went to the Eastern provinces of Afghanistan where the US forces were heavily involved in direct combat.<sup>241</sup>

As Howorth states, with the reintegration of France into NATO's military structure, there was no place to argue over the contradiction between European Security Defence Policy (ESDP) and NATO: "As Sarkozy never tires of saying, ESDP is an absolute priority. It is now vast panoply of instruments at the service of a historic-political project, the EU."<sup>242</sup> In this way, Howorth implies that NATO had been useful to France militarily to coordinate the security challenges of the post 9/11 world.<sup>243</sup> The practical basis for the usability of NATO was to show that it was a military institution in Afghanistan, which was an ongoing "good war" for the Alliance. Therefore, it could be seen that the second term of the Bush administration had crucial impacts on NATO; Britain had maintained its situation as an old ally for America in Afghanistan, France had raised its troop involvement within the NATO framework and NATO took over the full responsibility for the ISAF in Afghanistan.

In June 2008, ironically Bush said "one of the things I will leave behind is a multilateralism to deal with tyrants so problems can be solved diplomatically."<sup>244</sup> However, the emphasis on multilateralism in the second term of the Bush administration could only be thinkable if compared with the unilateral approach taken in his first term. Thereby, the Bush administration, by affirming that

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<sup>240</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1140

<sup>241</sup> Vincent Morelli and Paul Belkin, "NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Alliance," *Congressional Research Service*, 3 December 2009, p. 19, available at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33627.pdf> (accessed on March 15, 2012)

<sup>242</sup> Jolyon Howorth, "Sarkozy and the 'American Mirage' or Why Gaullist Continuity Will Overshadow Transcendence," *European Consortium for Political Research*, 2010, p. 209

<sup>243</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 210

<sup>244</sup> George W. Bush cited by Catherine Mayor in "Leaving Europe, Bush Eyes Legacy," *The Time*, 17 June 2008, available at <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1815259,00.html> (accessed on March 20, 2012)

Afghanistan and Iraq were the front lines of the “War on Terror” as outlined in the 2006 NSS, was then looking to NATO allies, the EU and other international partners to take on a broader role.<sup>245</sup>

### **4.3 NATO-EU COOPERATION IN AFGHANISTAN**

#### **4.3.1 The Role of the NATO-led ISAF**

By 2003, due to the initial opposition of the United States over the expansion of ISAF’s mandate, the scope of the international military presence was limited to Kabul. On 11 August 2003, at the request of the UN and Afghan President Hamid Karzai, NATO took the command of ISAF. In this way, NATO-led ISAF becomes a peace enforcement mandate under the UN’s Chapter VII.<sup>246</sup>

Although NATO has tried to manage a stabilization and reconstruction mission before Afghanistan (for instance in Kosovo), the situation of Afghanistan is more difficult. The out-of area mission in Afghanistan presents a different context in that: The Taliban and al-Qaeda insurgents provide broad resistance to the operation; Afghanistan has never experienced a well-functioning central government; it is troubled by a resilient narcotics trade; it is remote from Europe and the country’s terrain creates major obstacles for NATO manpower and equipment.<sup>247</sup> Moreover, the mission of stabilization and rehabilitation must be carried out while combat operations against Taliban insurgents continue. Thus, the mission of NATO in Afghanistan has become a litmus test for the ability of allies to be a fundamental contributor to new security challenges.<sup>248</sup>

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<sup>245</sup> “EU-US Security Strategies: Comparative Scenarios and Recommendations,” *Center for Strategic & International Studies*, 1 March 2011, p. 185, available at [http://csis.org/files/publication/110614\\_Conley\\_EUUSSecurity\\_WEB.pdf](http://csis.org/files/publication/110614_Conley_EUUSSecurity_WEB.pdf) (accessed on March 20, 2012)

<sup>246</sup> For more details, see the full text of “United Nations Chapter VII,” available at <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml> (accessed on March 21, 2012)

<sup>247</sup> Vincent Morelli and Paul Belkin, “NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Alliance,” p.1

<sup>248</sup> Stanley Sloan, “NATO in Afghanistan,” *UNISCI Discussion Papers*, no 22, January 2010, p.36



In October 2003, with UNSCR 1510, the UN extended the mandate of ISAF beyond Kabul in order to cover whole Afghanistan;<sup>249</sup> this was implemented through Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) which will be explained in detail in the following section. The aim of NATO-led ISAF is to:

prevent Afghanistan from once again becoming a haven for terrorists, to help provide security, to contribute to a better future for the Afghan people and to create the conditions whereby the government of Afghanistan is able to exercise its authority throughout the country.<sup>250</sup>

In order to achieve its mission, it is necessary that the ISAF manages population-centric counterinsurgency operations in partnership with the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and gives support to the government and international community in security sector reform by providing the training and operational assistance both to the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP).<sup>251</sup>

In June 2004, the Istanbul Summit noted the fundamentality of Afghan campaign for the Alliance. It was announced that the key priority for the Alliance was the contribution to the peace and stability in Afghanistan.<sup>252</sup> The main theme of this summit was to focus NATO's attention beyond Europe. In relation to counter-terrorism, the Alliance agreed a set of measures to develop their individual and collective contributions. These measures ranged from improving intelligence sharing among members, the use of NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Aircraft, extending the involvement for Operation Active Endeavour, and maintaining the operations in Afghanistan and the Balkans.<sup>253</sup> At this summit,

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<sup>249</sup> For more details, see the full text: United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1510, 13 October 2003, available at <http://daccessddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/555/55/PDF/N0355555.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed on March 21, 2012)

<sup>250</sup> NATO Topics, "ISAF's Mission in Afghanistan," available at [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_69366.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_69366.htm) (accessed on March 21, 2012)

<sup>251</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>252</sup> NATO Press Releases, "Istanbul Summit Communique" Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, 28 June 2004, available at [www.nato.int/docu/pr/2004/p04-096e.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2004/p04-096e.htm) (accessed on March 22, 2012)

<sup>253</sup> *Ibid.*

NATO initiated a second Partnership Action Plan on Terrorism, by focusing on defence reform, which was called the “Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building” (PAP-DIB). This initiative was open to all EAPC members and seen as a necessity in terms of international security cooperation in order to create stability in Euro-Atlantic area.<sup>254</sup> PAP-DIB, like the PAP-T that was initiated in Prague Summit, was crucial to enhance political cooperation with partners on the major issues of terrorism, democratization and increasing partner involvement in the operations led by NATO.

At the Istanbul Summit, the first Bush administration was in search of engagement with the allies in order to provide stability outside the Euro-Atlantic area. The Bush administration wanted to enhance its political dialogue within NATO to repair transatlantic relations to use the Alliance for fulfilling the US political and military purposes in Middle East, notably in Afghanistan and Iraq. The problem of Istanbul Summit was the deadlock on how NATO should be a global actor against the challenge of creating stability. In that respect, Moore suggests that purely thinking on regional terms was useless for NATO and creating a new political context about the security is essential for the Alliance.<sup>255</sup> This, in return, would at least call for a deep-dialogue about the main purposes of NATO that was mostly absent in post-9/11 era.<sup>256</sup>

The Riga Summit in November 2006 was important in confirming the ongoing role of ISAF for Afghanistan in accordance with the transformation process of the Alliance. At this summit, the Afghan mission, the future role of NATO in line with its enlargement and ongoing transformation, and deepening cooperation with partners were the crucial issues that were discussed. Also, NATO Response Force (NRF) which is fundamental in providing a swift immediate response to address any crisis as declared to be fully operational through this summit.<sup>257</sup>

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<sup>254</sup> Rebecca Moore, *NATO's New Vision- Projecting Stability in a Post-Cold War World*, p. 123

<sup>255</sup> *Ibid.* p. 141

<sup>256</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>257</sup> NATO Press Release, “Riga Summit Declaration,” Issued by the Heads of State and the Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Riga, 29 November 2006, available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm> (accessed on March 23, 2012)

Regarding Afghanistan, the Riga summit reconfirmed that the Afghanistan operation was NATO's key priority. It was highlighted that the assistance given to Afghan authorities through ISAF would continue in order to provide security, stability and reconstruction in that region. Moreover, as a result of the coordination between NATO and the Afghan government, it was decided to increase the support of NATO for the training and further improvement of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP). Therefore, at this summit, other nations and international organisations were invited to increase their support stating that "NATO will play its full role, but cannot assume the entire burden."<sup>258</sup> The last issue for the Afghan campaign concerned illegal narcotics in Afghanistan. At this summit, NATO decided to assist the counter-narcotics efforts of Afghan government since there are strong links between narcotics and insurgency in such country.<sup>259</sup>

Furthermore, in 2006, an ISAF Post-Operations Emergency Relief Fund (POERF) was established in order to provide rapid humanitarian relief for the local population of Afghanistan affected by ISAF military operations. This relief includes the provision of food, shelter, and medicines in line with the repairments for the key infrastructure.<sup>260</sup> After POERF, the NATO ANA Trust Fund established in 2007 to provide a mechanism for ANA under the assistance of ISAF nations. This arrangement covers the transformation and installation costs of equipment donations by ISAF, the purchase of ANA equipment and services for engineering projects, and training both inside and outside Afghanistan.<sup>261</sup> In 2009, the ANA Trust Fund was expanded to cover the long term sustainability of ANA by allowing the contributions from the broader international community.

In April 2008, in Bucharest, the "ISAF's Strategic Vision" document was present by the Heads of State and Government of the nations contributing to the

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<sup>258</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>259</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>260</sup> NATO Topics, "ISAF's Mission in Afghanistan"

<sup>261</sup> Public Diplomacy Division Press and Media Section Media Operations Centre NATO HQ Brussels, "Fact Sheet- Equipping and Sustaining The Afghan National Army, NATO-ANA Trust Fund," October 2009, available at <http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/factsheets/ana-trust-fund-factsheet.pdf> (accessed on March 25, 2012)

ISAF. In this document the guiding principles for rehabilitation of Afghanistan were listed as:

a firm and shared long-term commitment, support for enhanced Afghan leadership and responsibility, a comprehensive approach by the international community, bringing together civilian and military efforts, increased cooperation and engagement with Afghanistan's neighbours, especially Pakistan.<sup>262</sup>

The strategic vision of ISAF pointed out that extremism and terrorism would no longer form a threat for stability in Afghanistan, and in the long run, the ANSF would lead the extension of the principle of the rule of law, good governance, and reconstruction in the country.<sup>263</sup> According to the document, in order to ensure a secure environment in Afghanistan, NATO would continue to help the Afghan Government. In addition, the Alliance decided to provide training teams for the Afghan Army and continue giving support to the Afghan-led efforts to fight the narcotics problem. Moreover, the dialogue with neighbours, especially Pakistan, was stated as decisive in the stabilization of Afghanistan.<sup>264</sup>

According to the Bush administration, it was necessary to develop an initiative in response to the decreasing support of the Alliance in Afghanistan. Thus, the Bush administration, drawing closer to the end of second term of office, was aware of declining public support for the US-led effort in Afghanistan. In order to generate more public support for ISAF, the establishment of "ISAF's Strategic Vision" aimed to clarify and highlight the importance of the Alliance efforts in Afghanistan. In this way, it could be argued that last year of the second Bush administration had assessed the policy of long-standing in Afghanistan, together with the raising the importance of Afghan government taking responsibility for the Government of Afghanistan and lastly the Pakistan issue were put on the

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<sup>262</sup> NATO Official Texts, "ISAF's Strategic Vision" Declaration by the Heads of State and Government of the Nations contributing to the UN-mandated NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan on 3 April 2008, available at [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official\\_texts\\_8444.htm?mode=pressrealese](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8444.htm?mode=pressrealese) (accessed on March 25, 2012)

<sup>263</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>264</sup> *Ibid.*

agenda. This served as a foundation on which the Obama administration could move beyond such existing policies.

In April 2009, at the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit, the NATO Heads of State and Government agreed to implement new initiatives for Afghanistan. In this respect, the Alliance decided to provide additional military forces both to support the election process, and provide training and mentoring for the Afghan Security Forces. The crucial act of this summit was the decision to establish a NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan (NTM-A) in order to provide higher-level training to ANA and ANP. The Alliance also supported the expansion of ANA Trust Fund.<sup>265</sup> This was the first NATO summit in the Obama administration, and was important in that it gained NATO support and the European pledges for Afghanistan. In other words, this summit was, in part, a means to reach out European members of the Alliance in order to back the US Afghan strategy with the provision of unified NATO.<sup>266</sup> Hence, the creation of NTM-A presents a practical example to demonstrate the help that Europe was giving to Afghanistan, although the NTM-A would prove to have, crucial gaps in the provision of the trainers and mentors.

In October 2009, in Bratislava, NATO Defence Ministers, together with counter-parts from non-NATO ISAF contributing nations, organized a discussion to set key priorities for the Afghanistan's near future. In this meeting, the four key NATO priorities were determined. These priorities were to;

place the Afghan population at the core of NATO-ISAF's collective effort, an enhanced effort to build the capacity of the ANSF, to work more closely and effectively with our international and Afghan partners to promote better governance, to engage effectively with Afghanistan's neighbours, particularly Pakistan.<sup>267</sup>

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<sup>265</sup> NATO News, "NATO Expands Its Role in Afghanistan," 4 April 2009, available at [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news\\_52799.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_52799.htm) (accessed on March 27, 2012)

<sup>266</sup> Brian Katulis, "Transatlantic Policy On Afghanistan and Pakistan in Obama Year One: Missed Opportunities," *Friede Policy Brief*, No: 42, February 2010, p. 2, available at [http://www.friede.org/uploads/PB42\\_Transatlantic\\_Afpk\\_ENG\\_feb10.pdf](http://www.friede.org/uploads/PB42_Transatlantic_Afpk_ENG_feb10.pdf) (accessed on March 27, 2012)

<sup>267</sup> NATO News, "NATO Ministers Agree on Key Priorities for Afghanistan," 23 October 2009, available at [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news\\_58510.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_58510.htm) (accessed on March 27, 2012)

It was once again emphasized that the combination of civilian and military resources should be exploited in a comprehensive way. Furthermore, the Ministers approved the “Strategic Concept for the Transition to an Afghan lead,” which would pave the way for the definition of conditions on the ‘Transition Phase of the ISAF operation’ at a later stage.<sup>268</sup> The Ministers emphasized that the training of ANSF were fundamental for a transition to being led by Afghanistan.

In November 2009, having won the second Presidential term in Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai highlighted that it was time for the ANSF to gradually take the lead in security responsibility across Afghanistan. This was the beginning of the “Kabul Process”, in which the aim was Afghan leadership and ownership.<sup>269</sup> Then, in December 2009, the Foreign Ministers of ISAF nations made a statement on Afghanistan to reconfirm the commitment of ISAF nations to support stability in Afghanistan, which remains the key priority for the Alliance. Under the framework of this statement, it was underlined that the pace of the transition of Afghanistan as the lead in its security provision, the help of ISAF to the ANSF should be increased. As a part of this, the ISAF task was to strengthen the Afghan authority and support them in taking on further security responsibilities. In this regard, it was important to invest more in training, equipping and sustaining the ANSF, especially through NTM-A.<sup>270</sup>

In January 2010, at the London Conference on Afghanistan, the critical issue was to develop a plan for the phased transition to Afghan security lead by the Kabul Conference in July 2010. The NATO-ISAF partners were in full agreement with the government of Afghanistan, in accordance with UNSCR 9762.<sup>271</sup> In this

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<sup>268</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>269</sup> “President Karzai’s Inauguration Speech,” Permanent Mission of Afghanistan to the United Nations in New York, 19 November 2009, available at <http://www.afghanistan-un.org/2009/11/president-karzai%E2%80%99s-inauguration-speech/> (accessed on March 30, 2012)

<sup>270</sup> NATO Official Text, “Statement of Afghanistan” by Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Nations participating in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), 4 December 2009, available at [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news\\_59701.htm?mode=pressrelease](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_59701.htm?mode=pressrelease) (accessed on March 30, 2012)

<sup>271</sup> For more details, see the full text: United Nations Security Council, Resolution 9762, 8 October 2009, available at <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/sc9762.doc.htm> (accessed on March 30, 2012)

context, it was emphasised that ANSF would lead the process on a province by province approach. This marked the gradual shift of ISAF to a supporting role within those provinces.<sup>272</sup>

After consultations in April 2010, NATO and ISAF Foreign Ministers met in Tallinn and put emphasis on the issues of governance, security and development which were necessary to facilitate the transition in Afghanistan. Commenting on the process of transition the NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said that:

We also need to be clear about what the transition means and doesn't mean. Transition means that Afghan authorities take the lead, and we move into a supportive role. But it doesn't mean a rush for the exit.<sup>273</sup>

This means that the decisions would be taken for Afghanistan after extensive discussions with the Afghan authorities. Thus, NATO and ISAF officials with their Afghan and international counterparts would work to develop the concept of transition for the endorsement. The aim for this meeting was to launch the process in time for the Lisbon Summit in November 2010. Additionally, the meeting at Tallinn marked the launch of NATO's Afghan First Policy in order to increase the support for the NATO-ISAF in relation to the Afghan local economy.

Spending in Afghanistan rather than on Afghanistan is the core message of the NATO Afghan First Policy; it does not require increased funding but consists of a reorientation of NATO-ISAF common resources towards the Afghan private sector.<sup>274</sup>

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<sup>272</sup> ISAF Official Text, "Communique of London Conference on Afghanistan", 28 January 2010, available at [http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/factsheets/Documents\\_Communique%20of%20London%20Conference%20on%20Afghanistan.pdf](http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/factsheets/Documents_Communique%20of%20London%20Conference%20on%20Afghanistan.pdf) (accessed on March 30, 2012)

<sup>273</sup> NATO News, "NATO Agrees Roadmap for Transition to Afghan Lead," 23 April 2010, available at [http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news\\_62858.htm](http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_62858.htm) (accessed on April 2, 2012)

<sup>274</sup> NATO News, "NATO Ministers Launch Afghan First Policy," 23 April 2010, available at [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-5A1D5AD3-3DD57E9E/natolive/news\\_62903.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-5A1D5AD3-3DD57E9E/natolive/news_62903.htm) (accessed on April 2, 2012)

This is significant in the sense that, there were talks on a new strategic concept for NATO to decide the vision of the Alliance for further decades. The NATO Foreign Ministers recognised that the new strategic concept needed to be brought up to date in terms of current practices since NATO had been engaged in fields that were never exemplified in 1999 Strategic Concept. At the meeting, it was decided that such a new strategic concept would be approved during Lisbon Summit.<sup>275</sup>

Accordingly, in July 2010 in the Kabul Conference Communiqué, it was agreed to establish the Joint Afghan-NATO Inteqal Board (JANIB) as a mechanism to assess and monitor the Afghan provinces for the transition process.<sup>276 277</sup> This meeting set a date for a security handover together with a plan to rebuild the country. Moreau and Yousafzai underscored that the banner headline was President Karzai's speech that ANSF would take over complete responsibility for all the military and law-enforcement operations across country by the end of 2014.<sup>278</sup> At this Conference, the objectives of "Inteqal" were reconfirmed as strengthening Afghan ownership and leadership across all parts of Afghanistan together with the functions of government.<sup>279</sup>

In November 2010, at the Lisbon Summit, referring to "Inteqal," there was a declaration by NATO and Government of Afghanistan referring to an enduring partnership.<sup>280</sup> At this summit, the ISAF Heads of State and Government

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<sup>275</sup> NATO News, "NATO Foreign Ministers Hold Talks on New Strategic Concept," 22 April 2010, available at [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news\\_62706.htm?](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_62706.htm?) (accessed on April 3, 2012)

<sup>276</sup> Inteqal is the Dari and Pashtu word for transition

<sup>277</sup> ISAF Official Text, "Communique of Kabul International Conference on Afghanistan", 20 July 2010, available at <http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/official-texts/Communique%20-%20Kabul%20International%20Conference%20on%20Afghanistan%20-%2020%20July%202010.pdf> (accessed on April 3, 2012 )

<sup>278</sup> Kabul Conference Sets Lofty Goals, *Newsweek*, 21 July 2010, available at [http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2010/07/21/kabul-conference-sets\\_lofty-goals.print.html](http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2010/07/21/kabul-conference-sets_lofty-goals.print.html) (accessed on April 3, 2012)

<sup>279</sup> ISAF Official Text, "Communique of Kabul International Conference on Afghanistan"

<sup>280</sup> ISAF's Official Text, "Declaration by North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Government of The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan On An Enduring Partnership," 20 November 2010, available at <http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/official->



announced a list of principles that would guide ISAF's gradual movement from a combat to an increasing support role. Those principles was incorporated in the transition process, included as: ensuring a better alignment of NATO/ISAF support with Afghan national priority programmes, working through capable Afghan institutions, adjusting ISAF's troop profile by reinvesting the transition, through providing the critical security, training and mentoring needs where appropriate, strengthening the ANSF capacity, assisting the evolution of the international civilian effort, including PRTs, to ensure broader Afghan capacity and leadership.<sup>281</sup> Furthermore, it was emphasized that the security and stability in Afghanistan was directly linked to the security of the Alliance. In this regard, efforts to achieve full Afghan security responsibility and ownership have been underway since early 2011. Also, it was decided that after the implementation of the transition, NATO will commit to Afghanistan post-2014, remaining long after its combat effort is finished, this being in accordance with its long term support to ANSF and Afghan Government.<sup>282</sup>

In addition, this new strategic concept contains the vision of Alliance to be:

able to defend its members against the full range of threats; capable of managing even the most challenging crises; and better able to work with other organisations and nations to promote international stability. NATO will be more agile, more capable and more cost-effective, and it will continue to serve as an essential instrument for peace.<sup>283</sup>

In this summit, it was also decided to enhance the contribution of NATO to a comprehensive approach to crisis management and develop NATO's ability in reconstruction and stabilisation.

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[texts/Enduring%20Partnership%20NATO-GIRoA%2020%20Nov%202010.pdf](#) (accessed on April 4, 2012)

<sup>281</sup> NATO Media Backgrounder, "Transition to Afghan Lead: *Inteqal*," December 2011, available at [http://www.nato.int/nato\\_static/assets/pdf/pdf\\_topics/20111207\\_111207-Backgrounder-Inteqal-en.pdf](http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_topics/20111207_111207-Backgrounder-Inteqal-en.pdf) (accessed on April 5, 2012)

<sup>282</sup> NATO Official Text, "Lisbon Summit Declaration" Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon, 20 November 2010, available at [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official\\_texts\\_68828.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm) (accessed on April 5, 2012)

<sup>283</sup> *Ibid.*

On 22 March 2011, President Karzai announced the first set of Afghan districts and provinces that were to begin the Transition process the decision being based on the assessment and recommendation of the Afghan Government and NATO-ISAF through JANIB.<sup>284</sup> As an overall strategy, the transition is a conditions-based process rather than calendar driven. It draws on the JANIB's recommendation, which is dependent on an assessment of the security, governance and development situations. The main criterion for this process is marked to the ANSF being capable of undertaking additional security responsibilities from ISAF. In this way, the main rationale for NATO, in the long run is the assumption that the presence of ISAF is to be reduced as ANSF capabilities increase and threat levels decrease.<sup>285</sup>

#### **4.3.1.1 PRTs and the Evolution of the NATO-led ISAF**

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) were established in accordance with the discussion on how the effects of ISAF could spread without the expansion of ISAF itself. At the beginning of the mission, most regions outside the capital had no military presence to provide security because of the limited mandate for ISAF, as mentioned in previous part.<sup>286</sup> By the latter half of 2002, important American military assets had been moved out of Afghanistan in accordance with the aim of preparing for the decision to intervene Iraq. Additionally, the overthrow of the Taliban and the need for the rehabilitation of Afghanistan in the post-war situation facilitated the integration of civil-military affairs in the remainder of the country. PRTs are the “off-shoot of Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells (CHCL),” which was established by the US Military in early 2002.<sup>287</sup> The mission of CHCL was to

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<sup>284</sup> For more details see the full text:  
[http://www.nato.int/nato\\_static/assets/pdf/pdf\\_topics/20111207\\_111207-Backgrounder-Inteqal-en.pdf](http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_topics/20111207_111207-Backgrounder-Inteqal-en.pdf) (accessed on April 5, 2012)

<sup>285</sup> NATO Media Backgrounder, “Transition to Afghan Lead: *Inteqal*”

<sup>286</sup> Thomas Barfield, *Afghanistan- A Cultural and Political History*, Princeton University Press, 2009, p. 314

<sup>287</sup> Official Website of Bagram Airfield, “Afghanistan Provincial Reconstruction Teams,” 5 January 2011, available at

provide the information on humanitarian needs, establish the relations with UNAMA and non-governmental organizations in Afghanistan, and implement small reconstruction projects using the Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid; a US military fund, named. In this respect, the overall purpose of the 10-12 men teams was to build the trust and confidence among the population, particularly with the de-confliction through assistance in the aftermath of the intervention.<sup>288</sup>

In late 2002, the program was expanded to the Joint Regional Teams in Afghanistan which were the forerunners of the PRTs. The objectives of the regional teams were identified as the extension of legitimacy and authority of the Kabul government beyond the capital and facilitating reconstruction, together with the improvement of the security situation.<sup>289</sup> The architects of this plan were the US-led coalition representatives in Kabul. In November 2002, the Joint Regional Teams were replaced by the Provisional Reconstruction Teams which in the pilot phase began working in Gardez, Kunduz and Bamian, finally, the name was changed to Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) at the request of President Karzai since this would emphasize the support to provinces, which are headed by governors rather than warlords.<sup>290</sup>

The PRTs were established as an attempt to merge security and development in accordance with their joint structure of civil-military teams. It was intended that the PRTs would provide temporary support to the Afghan government in order to assist in developing government capacity in line with the expansion of their

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<http://www.bagram.afcent.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=4652> (accessed on April 6, 2012)

<sup>288</sup> “Appendix 2 to Annex C: Evolution of ISAF and PRTs,” *Unclassified ISAF PRT Handbook*, Edition 4, March 2010, p. 92, available at <https://www.cimicweb.org/Documents/PRT%20CONFERENCE%202010/PRT%20Handbook%20Edition%204.pdf> (accessed on April 7, 2012)

<sup>289</sup> Barbara J. Stapleton, “A Means to What End? Why PRTs are Peripheral to the Bigger Political Challenges in Afghanistan?,” *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies*, Fall 2007, Col.10, Issue 1. p. 11

<sup>290</sup> Oskari Eronen, “PRT Models in Afghanistan- Approaches to Civil-Military Integration,” *CMC Finland Civilian Crisis Management Studies*, Volume 1: Number 5/ 2008, p. 4, available at [http://www.intermin.fi/pelastus/cmc/images.nsf/files/8442FEDCC134982CC225755A0059D3D0/\\$file/Studies\\_5\\_Eronen.pdf](http://www.intermin.fi/pelastus/cmc/images.nsf/files/8442FEDCC134982CC225755A0059D3D0/$file/Studies_5_Eronen.pdf) (accessed on 7 April 2012)

authority to local areas, in the reform process, projecting stability, and creating the market infrastructure in Afghanistan. Briefly, PRTs are defined by NATO officials as the “leading edge of the alliance.”<sup>291</sup>

The US-led coalition claims that the focus, regarding the PRTs, is on “maintaining a light international security footprint.”<sup>292</sup> In this respect, the PRTs were a project of the US-led OEF coalition and the first PRT was established in Gardez by the US in January 2003. However,

the idea behind the ‘light footprint’ strategy was to give ISAF the function of a low profile stabilization force, rather than a combat force in order to avoid being regarded as occupying force.<sup>293</sup>

In a broader sense, in the debate about the security situation in Afghanistan, it was crucial to state that the Global War on Terror was maintained in Afghanistan under the OEF especially until NATO took over control of ISAF. More significantly, the level of acceptance of the OEF by the Afghan people had deteriorated rapidly due to the accelerating number of civilian casualties caused by the “disproportionate or indiscriminate use of force.”<sup>294</sup> Therefore, the PRTs appeared to be a combination of civil and military aspects, but, were under a military initiative with the aim of providing a basis for more countries to become involved in Afghanistan and also to respond to the pressure by both the international community and the Afghan government for a more comprehensive approach to the post-conflict situation.

In this regard, in October 2003, while it was decided to extend the mandate of NATO-led ISAF in accordance with UNSCR 1510, in this way, it was also

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<sup>291</sup> Vincent Morelli and Paul Belkin, “NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Alliance,” p. 12

<sup>292</sup> “Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan- An Interagency Assessment,” *USAID*, June 2006, p.8, available at [http://livebettermagazine.com/eng/reports\\_studies/pdf/USAID-provincial\\_reconstruction\\_teams\\_in\\_Afghanistan.pdf?session=user\\_pref:42F947961d9df34905nxpt32434F](http://livebettermagazine.com/eng/reports_studies/pdf/USAID-provincial_reconstruction_teams_in_Afghanistan.pdf?session=user_pref:42F947961d9df34905nxpt32434F) (accessed on April, 10 2012)

<sup>293</sup> Peter Runge, “The Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: Role Model for Civil-Military Relations?,” *Occasional Paper IV*, Bonn International Center for Conversion, Oct 2009, p.8, available at [http://www.bicc.de/uploads/pdf/publications/papers/occ\\_paper\\_04/occasional\\_paper\\_IV\\_11\\_09.pdf](http://www.bicc.de/uploads/pdf/publications/papers/occ_paper_04/occasional_paper_IV_11_09.pdf) (accessed on April 10, 2012)

<sup>294</sup> *Ibid.*

decided that the expansion of ISAF should be based on the PRTs concepts. At this point, UNSCR 1510 did not mention the PRTs, thus, the basis of the PRTs were adapted to this resolution. In other words, the NATO-led ISAF agreed to expand outside Kabul through both the creation of new PRTs and taking over the already established PRTs by OEF. Later, from 2003 to 2006, the NATO-led ISAF implemented a four stage process to cover the whole of Afghanistan with PRTs. In stage one, activated in December 2003 and completed in October 2004, NATO moved into the northern part of Afghanistan. In this phase, NATO initiated the expansion of ISAF by taking over the command of the PRTs in Kunduz led by Germany.<sup>295</sup> <sup>296</sup> The relocation of the Kunduz PRTs under NATO-led ISAF was accepted as the first step in the expansion of the mission however, the other eight PRTs remained under the command of the OEF. Six months later, at the Istanbul Summit, it was decided to establish four other PRTs in northern parts of Afghanistan in Mazar-e- Sharif, Meymana, Feyzabad and Baghlan.<sup>297</sup>

Stage two of the expansion of ISAF to the western part of the country, was announced by NATO in February 2005. This process began in May 2006 when two additional PRTs, in provinces of Herat and Farah, were taken under the command of ISAF.<sup>298</sup> At the beginning of September 2006, two further PRTs in the west (in Chaghcharan; capital of Ghor province and in Qala-e-Naw; capital of Baghdis province) became operational.<sup>299</sup> In stage three, planned in December 2005 and implemented in July 2006, the southern expansion of ISAF began with the addition of six PRTs in Day Kundi, Helmand, Kandahar, Nimroz, Uruzgan and Zabul.<sup>300</sup>

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<sup>295</sup> ISAF, "History," available at <http://www.isaf.nato.int/history.html> (accessed on April 10, 2012)

<sup>296</sup> Kunduz PRT was established by the US in March 2003 and in December 2003 it was taken over by Germany.

<sup>297</sup> NATO Topics: NATO in Afghanistan, "ISAF's Mission in Afghanistan," available at [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_69366.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_69366.htm) (accessed on April 10, 2012)

<sup>298</sup> ISAF, "History"

<sup>299</sup> NATO Topics: NATO in Afghanistan , "ISAF's Mission in Afghanistan"

<sup>300</sup> *Ibid.*

Lastly, stage four implemented in October 2006 was the final phase of the expansion with ISAF taking over the command of the international military forces in eastern Afghanistan from US-led Coalition.<sup>301</sup> Now, all 23 PRTs were under the command of the NATO-led ISAF.<sup>302</sup> Hence, the PRTs have responsibility for entire country and create a broader role for the ISAF in Afghanistan. Accordingly with this expansion, the success or failure of NATO in Afghanistan could be seen as a test of the future utility of the Alliance.<sup>303</sup>

In June 2011, the decision to begin to gradually dissolve all PRTs by the end of 2014 was taken in accordance with the Transition process. In this context, the PRTs will assist the implementation of the Transition by determining the gaps in governance and development then addressing those gaps. The completion of the evolution of the PRTs occurred with the shift of their efforts from direct delivery to technical support. In this way, the PRTs became responsible for the provision of capacity for Afghan institutions until the end of the Transition process, and with the end of the process, the ANSF are expected to deliver essential services to the Afghan people. Thus, the PRTs will hand over their functions to the government of Afghanistan and the international community and they will be phased out.<sup>304</sup>

It is important to highlight that the PRTs could be considered as a “civilian-military annex to a military force” in accordance with their various tasks including; patrolling, mediation, reconstruction projects, training and supervising armed forces and police personnel, demobilization, disarming and intelligence.<sup>305</sup> However, the mixed roles within a unit, naturally, blur the division between civilian and military tasks of the PRTs. This situation is exaggerated with the lack of an established model for the PRTs, some of which are civilian controlled and others run by the military. This is the main issue in the disconnected structure of

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<sup>301</sup> ISAF, “History”

<sup>302</sup> In December 2011, 27 PRTs had been in Afghanistan

<sup>303</sup> Stanley Sloan, “NATO in Afghanistan,” p.34

<sup>304</sup> NATO Media Backgrounder, “Transition to Afghan Lead: Inteqal”

<sup>305</sup> Peter Runge, “The Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: Role Model for Civil-Military Relations?,” p.11

the PRTs and the lack of a standardized system of operations under them. Hence, the activities of the PRTs are discussed in terms of what is the framework of their management, is it military or post-conflict stabilisation.<sup>306</sup> The military and civilian scopes of the PRTs are remained undefined and lead to the ambiguity of the PRTs mission within this too general disposition.<sup>307</sup>

In addition, the PRTs are led by nations and their civilian aspects are under the responsibility of their lead nations whereas the military scope is subordinated to the military command of ISAF. In this respect, whether it is an effective mechanism or not, especially is still open to discussion. Moreover, since 2006, six Regional Commands under the overall command structure of ISAF were established in order to coordinate the functions of the PRTs.<sup>308</sup> However, it could be again stated that this is only covers the military scope of the PRTs and the civilian dimension is separate from this structure. At that point, the PRTs have inherited the risk of being managed in terms of the main priority of their lead nations instead of their adaptation in accordance with the needs of local administration. This is accelerated by the funding structure of PRTs which is mainly provided by their lead nations. In this way, the ISAF operation maintains no control over the civilian roles of the PRTs. In short, this has a negative impact on the PRTs in Afghanistan results from a lack of clarification of the tasks in line with the lack of command over civilian activities with the domestic priorities of lead nations, since the civilian component has reported to their national capitals. Thus, the PRTs are prevented from following a coherent and coordinated manner in the conduct of NATO's own activities.<sup>309</sup>

Nevertheless, the flexible structure of the PRTs allows their adaptation to local situations separately in accordance with the different situations of the Afghan provinces such as the problems of narcotics trade, illegal armed groups and

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<sup>306</sup> Stanley Sloan, "NATO in Afghanistan," p. 37

<sup>307</sup> Oskari Eronen, "PRT Models in Afghanistan- Approaches to Civil-Military Integration," p.8

<sup>308</sup> The six Regional Commands under ISAF are listed as ISAF Regional Command "North", "South", "East", "West", "Southwest" and ISAF Regional Command "Capital"

<sup>309</sup> Peter Viggo Jakobsen, "Right Strategy, Wrong Place - Why NATO's Comprehensive Approach Will Fail in Afghanistan," *UNISCI Discussion Papers*, No 22, January 2010, p. 85

insurgent activities. For instance, in the southern and eastern parts of the country there is a more volatile structure, which requires more of a military involvement rather than a reconstruction commitment.<sup>310</sup> Therefore, each PRT has very different experiences. This constitutes a problem when such situations combine with the insufficient coordination of provincial units and weakness in sharing information, a lack of knowledge about Afghanistan and the absence of local language skill among the members of the PRTs. All of these factors cause the PRTs to act alone and they are generally managed their commanders not from a centralised command.<sup>311</sup>

Additionally, due to the responsibility of PRTs for the development projects in the provinces, the need for monitoring and evaluation after the project implementation is not at the centre of their focus. However, monitoring and evaluation help to identify the gaps and flaws in the stabilisation project, facilitating learning from past experiences in order to develop the future involvement in the same context or elsewhere, and serve as a crucial instrument to communicate with local communities.<sup>312</sup> Therefore, when the PRTs are implementing reconstruction projects to stabilise the country by implementing both the development and security provision, their outreach to the local public in accordance with the importance of applying the most useful projects to local situations should be improved and collect more information.<sup>313</sup>

To sum up, in Afghanistan, the new context of the PRTs was established and is still being implemented as other operations. Since 2005, in Iraq, there have been the PRTs, but, mainly within vastly different structure and almost all PRTs in Iraq are under US command. In future, the number of the PRTs may be increased in other countries however, for now; they are only in Afghanistan and Iraq. In

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<sup>310</sup> William Malley, "Afghanistan'da İl İmar Ekipleri- Nasıl Oluştular ve Nereye Gidiyorlar," *NATO Dergisi*, Sonbahar 2007, available at <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2007/issue3/turkish/main.htm> (accessed on April 20, 2012)

<sup>311</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>312</sup> Steven A. Zyck, "Measuring the Development Impact of Provincial Reconstruction Teams," *Civil-Military Fusion Centre*, June 2011, available at [https://www.cimicweb.org/cmo/afg/Documents/Economic/Development\\_Impact\\_of\\_PRTs\\_in\\_Afghanistan.pdf](https://www.cimicweb.org/cmo/afg/Documents/Economic/Development_Impact_of_PRTs_in_Afghanistan.pdf) (accessed on April 20, 2012)

<sup>313</sup> *Ibid.*



Afghanistan, some of the PRTs led by one nation and others led by one nation but with many contributing nations. Additionally, they can be established by one lead nation but then control can be transferred to other nations. In order to underline the differences among lead nations it is important to describe the four PRT models in Afghanistan.

Most of the PRTs in Afghanistan were established by the US and then transferred to other nations. In addition, the US is the contributing nation to many of the PRTs which are led by other states. Thus, the US PRT model is the major one. In Afghanistan, the first US PRT was established in Gardez. In such PRTs, there are 50 to 100 personnel of which 3 to 5 are civilians. The US PRTs are led by a military commander thus the civilian representatives are embedded to the military structure of the PRTs. The US model generally operates in high risk areas where the combat is often ongoing. The staffing is heavily weighted towards military personnel with the priority being placed on counter-insurgency operations.<sup>314</sup> The typical critique for the US model is its inefficient support for local capacity building. In this regard, the basis for the criticism is the PRTs' highly military structure which has neglected to examine the local requirements in detail.<sup>315</sup> This means that the US PRTs concentrate on highly visible Quick Impact Projects (QIP) with the aim of "winning the hearts and minds" of the Afghan public.<sup>316</sup> This rationale is fundamental for the US especially since it is mainly seen as an occupying power. Hence, the US has tried to raise the involvement of its European allies in the country and the PRTs are one way to realise this. However, almost all the PRTs with their weaknesses and from the lack of coordination ultimately weaken the already risky situation in Afghanistan.

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<sup>314</sup> Robert Perito, "Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Lessons and Recommendation," *Princeton University Woodrow Wilson School Graduate Workshop on Provincial Reconstruction Teams*, January 2008, available at [http://www.princeton.edu/research/pwreports\\_f07/wws591b.pdf](http://www.princeton.edu/research/pwreports_f07/wws591b.pdf) (accessed on April 21, 2012)

<sup>315</sup> Markus Gauster, "Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan," *Occasional Paper Series*, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, No: 16, January 2008, p.23, available at [http://www.marshallcenter.org/mcpublicweb/MCDocs/files/College/F\\_Publications/occPapers/occ-paper\\_16-en.pdf](http://www.marshallcenter.org/mcpublicweb/MCDocs/files/College/F_Publications/occPapers/occ-paper_16-en.pdf) (accessed on April 21, 2012)

<sup>316</sup> *Ibid.*

The other model of the PRTs is led by Germany and the first German PRT was established in Feyzabad. The German PRTs consist of 400-500 personnel of which 10-20 are civilian staff. The fundamental characteristic of the German PRTs is their dual leadership in which there is a military commander for the military personnel and a civilian leading the civilians.<sup>317</sup> The German PRTs are generally focused on the north region of Afghanistan consider reconstruction as the centre of their PRT activities.<sup>318</sup> In this respect, the typical critique is based on their self-imposed restraints on deployment and interference in the violence perpetrated by the local population. In other words, the German government prefers to deploy PRTs in more stable areas and limit their scope of action. It is important to state that German troops only go on patrol in armoured vehicles and in convoys with medical assistance.<sup>319</sup>

The other model for the PRTs is led by Britain and the first British PRT was established in Mazar-e Sharif. In a British PRT, the number of personal is 150 of which 20 to 30 are civilians.<sup>320 321</sup> The British PRTs are lead by a senior representative and these PRTs deploy in places where the poppy crop is highly cultivated and therefore they concentrate on counter-narcotics. Interestingly, before the establishment of the PRTs, the anti-drug program within the framework of security sector reform was started in 2002 in Afghanistan with Britain in charge.<sup>322</sup> Although there have been certain achievements in the places where the British PRTs are deployed, the typical critique for such PRTs are that they give secondary importance to the reconstruction and development projects.<sup>323</sup> Although the reduction in poppy cultivation is the main target of the British PRTs, they do

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<sup>317</sup> In Feyzabad PRT, all the military aspects were transferred to the civil head in December 2011

<sup>318</sup> Markus Gauster, "Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan," p. 24

<sup>319</sup> Peter Runge, "The Provincial..." p. 13

<sup>320</sup> Oskari Eronen, "PRT Models..." p. 45

<sup>321</sup> However, in Lashkar Gah the last British PRT, has a staff of 200 and civilian personnel of 120 due to the province being larger. Additionally, this PRT will be transferred to U.S. in 2012. For more details: [www.helmandpvt.com](http://www.helmandpvt.com) (accessed on April 22, 2012)

<sup>322</sup> Markus Gauster, "Provincial..." p.29

<sup>323</sup> Robert Perito, "Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Lessons and Recommendation"

not focus on ways of finding an alternative livelihood for the farmers which is a leading factor in the poor relationship between the local people and the personnel in the British PRTs.

The final model was created by Turkey who established a PRT in Wardak in October 2006 and in Jawzjan and Sar-i Pul provinces in July 2010 for the latter PRT, Sweden is the contributing nation in this region. The Turkish model differs from the other models in that it has a totally civilian structure and only a supportive military component. In other words, even in the protection of the civilian leadership, the military are not involved, rather, a team of Turkish Special Operations Police Officers undertake this responsibility. The number of staffing in Wardak is 70 personnel with 15 civilians and in Jawzjan the estimated number is 200 with 90 civilian staff.<sup>324</sup> The Turkish PRTs are headed by a senior diplomat and a civilian Deputy from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. More significantly, the Turkish PRT models in the country are the only PRTs that are supported by the Afghan population and at the time of writing none of the members of the Turkish PRT has been killed or attacked by the Afghan people. Also, there is no established critique for these models.<sup>325</sup> One of the reasons for the support could be the historical roots between Afghanistan and Turkey since foundation of Turkish Republic, and the assistance given by Turkey to Afghanistan under the major framework of Afghanistan's development in the fields such as health, education and military affairs, and security infrastructure rather than the concentration on fighting.<sup>326</sup> In this respect, it also could be considered that the US instance on Turkey in Afghanistan is highly related to the positive role of Turkey in the country. In conclusion, American, German, British and Turkish models are not the only PRTs models in Afghanistan, but they are the most

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<sup>324</sup> For more details see: <http://vardakprt.org/icerik.php?no=7>;  
<http://www.cevizcanprt.org/icerik.php?no=9> (accessed on April 22, 2012)

<sup>325</sup> Mehmet Yegin and Arzu Celalifer Ekinici, "Türkiye Afganistan'da Güven İnşaa Ediyor," *Analist*, Mayıs 2011, p. 58-9

<sup>326</sup> İhsan Bal, "Why is Turkey in Afghanistan?," *The Journal of Turkish Weekly*, 2 May 2012, available at <http://www.turkishweekly.net/columnist/3616/why-is-turkey-in-afghanistan.html> (accessed on April 22, 2012)

prominent.<sup>327</sup> The focus of almost all PRTs is on the QIP and they are managed with an ad hoc basis, thus, they remain fragmented in terms of their work. Due to the lack of evaluation and monitoring, they also fail to have a long-term impact especially in the fulfilment of projects. Therefore, Stapleton rightly underlines that:

the key question, (which the PRTs have never been resourced to address), is the continuing absence of an enabling environment for the development of the bottom up processes that are widely recognised to be axiomatic for the establishment of transparency and accountability.<sup>328</sup>

#### **4.3.1.2 Limitations of the NATO-led ISAF**

The essential problems of the NATO-led ISAF in Afghanistan are the misconduct of the mission and inability to solve the caveats on the deployment of troops and personnel. With the evolution of the ISAF in Afghanistan, such problems are combined with the difficulties in raising the number of troops for the country and the different views concerning the purpose of the mission. In addition, the attitude to the cultivation of opium poppies in Afghanistan is a divergent issue in the mission of the members of the Alliance.

As NATO has expanded its sphere of control to the whole of Afghanistan, the focus of the Alliance members is moving to the post-conflict situation. Now the rationale for the Afghan case is, not only to defeat al-Qaeda and remove the Taliban regime, but also to undertake state building and reconstruction in order to provide and maintain stability in Afghanistan. From this perspective, Afghanistan is a test case for how international support can achieve post-conflict peace building.<sup>329</sup> In this way, Afghanistan has become a groundbreaking experience for

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<sup>327</sup> There are also Spanish, Nordic, Italian, Australian, Czech Republican, New Zealand, South Korean, Lithuanian and Canadian PRT models in the different parts of the country

<sup>328</sup> Barbara J. Stapleton, "Political Theatre around PRTs," *Afghanistan Analysts Network*, 2 December 2011, available at <http://aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=1481> (accessed on April 22, 2012)

<sup>329</sup> Astri Suhrke, "A Contradictory Mission, NATO from Stabilization to Combat in Afghanistan," p.228

NATO with its requirement for both active combat and counter-insurgency operations.<sup>330</sup>

In accordance with the geographic expansion of ISAF from Kabul to the whole of Afghanistan, the main problem in the mission of the NATO is the contradiction between stabilisation and combat. It is important to identify how much of a role the military should play in the implementation of the Alliance mission.<sup>331</sup>

An effective strategy requires a reduction of offensive operations however; recognition of this fundamental contradiction of the mission does not provide ready answers for a solution to NATO's multiple dilemmas in Afghanistan.<sup>332</sup>

Suhrke explains that, first, NATO's combat situation as a part of its mission could undermine the stabilisation purpose of that mission, especially in the eyes of Afghan villagers. Second, the soldiers limited knowledge about the local affairs and the local language contributed to the complication in the success of the mission. Third, after destroying the Taliban, NATO and the US have experienced the contradictions in securing and reconstructing Afghanistan. The prime strategy of both was to remove the Taliban from the territory however, NATO and the US are faced with the problem of "to hold what they cleared" in order to prevent the revival of insurgency.<sup>333</sup>

In addition to the contradictions inherent in NATO's mission in Afghanistan, there is a complicated situation in the command-control structure of NATO-led ISAF and the US-led OEF. Due to the existence of two security forces in line with two commands, the absence of unity in this structure brings problems in the coordination level. In August 2009, this situation was relatively resolved through the establishment of a subordinate ISAF command, also led by an American general, in charge of combat operations.<sup>334</sup>

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<sup>330</sup> Stanley Sloan, "NATO in Afghanistan," p. 47

<sup>331</sup> Peter Viggo Jakobsen, "Right Strategy...," p. 81

<sup>332</sup> Astri Suhrke, "Contradictory...," p. 233

<sup>333</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 231

<sup>334</sup> Stanley Sloan, "NATO in Afghanistan," p. 39

The other problem in the mission of NATO-led ISAF is the frustrations among the Alliance members concerning the deployment of national troops. For example, the US, Canada, Britain, and the Netherlands underscored the fundamentality of the removal of the restrictions that are placed on the troops by the member states, especially in moments of danger in order to appeal to the partners for assistance.<sup>335</sup> The uncertainty about what is required and military unwillingness of the member states, especially due to the heavily combat situation and raising the number of casualties, prevent the efficiency of ISAF.<sup>336</sup> In this respect,

caveats in themselves do not generally prohibit the kinds of operation in which NATO forces can engage, but, caveats do pose difficult problems for commanders who seek maximum flexibility in utilizing troops under their command.<sup>337</sup>

The restriction upon the troops under ISAF limits the operational capabilities of the Alliance. Loan defines such limitations as the reflection of the domestic political realities of member states within NATO, which, in return, causes some allies to bear a disproportionate share of the combat.<sup>338</sup> For instance, while the US, Britain, and Canada face with greatest risk in southern part of the country; Germany by deploying in the more stable northern places takes fewer risks, which facilitate “the burden-sharing debate that cuts across the alliance at a very personal level.”<sup>339</sup>

In a broader sense, the greatest controversy in the Alliance is the nationally-imposed limitations on Germany’s ISAF commitment. The situation of German forces in Afghanistan mainly consists of civilian reconstruction, development projects and training activities for the army and police. At the Riga conference, Germany decided to permit German forces to support allied troops in an

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<sup>335</sup> Vincent Morelli and Paul Belkin, “NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Alliance,” p. 11

<sup>336</sup> Peter Viggo Jakobsen, “Right Strategy...,” p. 81

<sup>337</sup> Vincent Morelli and Paul Belkin, “NATO in Afghanistan...,” p. 10

<sup>338</sup> Stanley Sloan, “NATO in Afghanistan,” p. 50

<sup>339</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 52

emergency situation. In this respect, one of the criticisms of Germany is the focuses on the northern part of Afghanistan rather than more conflictual areas in the other parts of the country. The other criticism concerns the authorization that German troops can only intervene in a self-defence situation. In this way, German soldiers are prohibited from initiating a combat operation.<sup>340</sup> Thereby, the priority of Germany is not to act for counter-insurgency operations; rather, it engages in training activities for the stabilisation mission. Italy and Spain also oppose the deployment of troops in the southern parts of the country. Italy and Spain view ISAF as a peace support operation with the focus on reconstruction and Afghan capacity-building. In contrast, the US sees ISAF as a counter-insurgency operation with high-intensity combat.<sup>341</sup>

Britain has deployed troops and its PRTs in the unstable areas of Afghanistan, where opium poppy cultivation or resurgence of the Taliban are at the fore. Moreover, having both ISAF and OEF contingents, British combat aircraft gives assistance to both missions. The majority of British forces are deployed in Helmand which is the principal poppy growing provinces.

Britain has a clearly vested interest in ISAF's stabilisation mission, not only out of concern that terrorist activity has emanated from south Asia but because most of the heroin found in UK comes from Afghanistan.<sup>342</sup>

Briefly, the British are engaged in an armed struggle in some areas but their primary stress is not on combat. Britain is focused on building stability and security, particularly in terms of eliminating the trade in narcotics.<sup>343</sup> In Britain the debate over the balance between combat mission and reconstruction continues. Under Prime Minister Gordon Brown (2007-2010), the Government revealed that there must be more emphasis on the issue over the reconciliation of the elements of insurgency (who are not affiliated with Islamic extremism as being the other

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<sup>340</sup> Stanley Sloan, "NATO in Afghanistan," p.51

<sup>341</sup> Peter Viggo Jakobsen, "Right Strategy...", p. 82

<sup>342</sup> Vincent Morelli and Paul Belkin, "NATO in Afghanistan...", p. 26

<sup>343</sup> Astri Suhrke, "A Contradictory...", p. 224

levels of Taliban) through providing reconstruction, which produces jobs and builds the economy in Afghanistan.<sup>344</sup>

Additionally, the French Government states that ISAF must be a combat force in order to support the Afghan government in constructing legitimacy and good governance. Unlike Germany, French forces are trained for combat operations as well as stabilisation activities. Indeed, the Afghan campaign has brought about the crucial changes in French policy in relation to NATO. First, France gave a support for the invocation of Article 5 after 9/11 attacks. As detailed in the first section of this chapter, Sarkozy stated that NATO was an organization for European security, thus, must operate in or near European borders. After the 9/11 attacks, France became convinced that NATO must combat terrorism and WMD by becoming a global security organization. Since Sarkozy was in power, the French military presence has increased in Afghanistan, which became, for France NATO's most important mission.

Since the formation of the NATO-led ISAF increasing, the number of troops in Afghanistan has been a continuing problem. NATO officials have difficulty in persuading member states to provide sufficient numbers of personnel. This is also related to NATO's budgetary rules since when a member state decides to increase their troop commitments to a NATO operation, the state must pay the costs of this deployment, which forms a disincentive not only for increasing the troops but also to agree to contribute any troops in the first place.

This problem complicates attempts by leaders of fragile governments or coalition governments to convince their legislatures and public to support a deployment and the costs associated with that commitment.<sup>345</sup>

On the issue of the expansion of NATO-led ISAF, Canada and Britain were the first members to accept the need for the combat forces. In May 2006, the Canadian government decided to send 2,300 troops for duty in Afghanistan until February 2009. In July 2006 Britain promised to send 3,600 troops and by December 2009 this had increased to 8,300. However, as ongoing problems rose

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<sup>344</sup> Vincent Morelli and Paul Belkin, "NATO in Afghanistan....," p. 26

<sup>345</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 19



in the members of the Alliance concerning sending more troops to Afghanistan, in 2008 the Canadian government threatened to withdraw its deployment by the end of 2009 if the other allies did not contribute at least 1000 combat troops each. In response, America pledged an additional 5000 troops to be sent by the end of 2008, France decided to send 720 combat troops and Germany agreed to contribute to additional 1,000 personnel. In addition, the Czech Republic, Poland and many other allies pledged smaller commitments.<sup>346</sup> However, not all these additional soldiers were posted to risky places and this led to criticism of some allies who would not deploy combat forces or not send their troops to areas where Taliban was more active. This situation put the credibility of NATO at risk in the Afghan operation.

The elimination of the opium poppy crop of Afghanistan is the last crucial problem that the NATO-led ISAF have faced. Afghanistan supplies over 90% of the world's illicit opium, and the sale of this drug in part finances the Taliban.<sup>347</sup> However, at the beginning of the mission, NATO-led ISAF did not have a direct role in combating the narcotics. The NATO commanders were instructed to provide support to the local counter-narcotics authorities and the allies provide the Afghan army and police with training, intelligence and logistics in order to support them in the destruction of the poppy fields and opium labs.<sup>348</sup> In October 2008, the expansion of the ISAF mission to support the Afghan government in counter-narcotics activities was agreed at an informal meeting of NATO leaders in Budapest.<sup>349</sup> Thus, the ISAF forces are now authorized to take direct action with the Afghan forces against the opium labs and other facilities.

However, fight against narcotics poses a problem for the Alliance since many Afghan communities are dependent on the poppies for their livelihood. By

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<sup>346</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 18-19

<sup>347</sup> Christopher M. Blanchard, "Afghanistan: Narcotics and US Policy," *Congressional Research Service*, 12 August 2009, p.1, available at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32686.pdf> (accessed on April 25, 2012)

<sup>348</sup> Vincent Morelli and Paul Belkin, "NATO in Afghanistan...", p. 14

<sup>349</sup> NATO News, "NATO Step Up Counter-Narcotics Efforts in Afghanistan," 10 October 2008, available at [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-9D4FD5A1-F6215C05/natolive/news\\_50120.htm?](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-9D4FD5A1-F6215C05/natolive/news_50120.htm?) (accessed on April 25, 2012)

destroying the poppy crop the farmers will have no source of income and this could result in them turning to the insurgents for assistance. Thus, efforts must be made to encourage farmers, to switch with alternative crops as a part of the counter-narcotic strategy.<sup>350</sup> Furthermore, the lack of law enforcement in Afghanistan in line with the absence of a well-functioning judicial system complicated the situation. The drug trade contributes to the endemic corruption in Afghanistan which decreases the public confidence in NATO's mission.

The efforts of NATO in supporting the Karzai government in order to curtail the narcotics trade presented the ISAF mission with a dilemma because the allies must fight an insurgency bound to the opium trade while simultaneously attempting to gain public confidence via the reconstruction of the country in which it is essential that those in rural areas have an inadequate income.

### **4.3.2 The Involvement of the EU in Afghanistan**

#### **4.3.2.1 Towards a EU Mission in Afghanistan**

The crisis over the Iraq War, as mentioned above, froze the transatlantic relations on the issue of Afghan campaign. Whilst the commitments to Afghanistan were still ongoing to a lesser extent, the international attention on events in Afghanistan “quickly shrank against the backdrop of the run-up to coalition military operations against Iraq.”<sup>351</sup> Since the London Conference of 2006, combined with the “Afghanistan Compact”, the international attention again refocus on Afghanistan in which the Bonn Agreement was revitalised in accordance with the new duties over Afghanistan<sup>352</sup> (will be explained in the later parts of this chapter). In this regard, the period between 2003 and 2006 marked to less emphasis on Afghanistan under the French and German opposition as becoming mainly a response to the US policy in Iraq. Although various initiatives took place in Afghanistan at that period, the focus was not heavily on the

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<sup>350</sup> Vincent Morelli and Paul Belkin, “NATO in Afghanistan...,” p. 15

<sup>351</sup> Tim Bird and Alex Marshall, “*Afghanistan: How the West Lost Its Way?*,” p. 111

<sup>352</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 112

Afghanistan itself. As we will see, the acceleration of commitments and the establishment of a ESDP operation by the EU members will come to the fore after the increase efforts in Afghanistan by the US.

The initial effort after the Bonn Agreement (2001) was the first European Commission Policy Paper on Afghanistan that was prepared to cover the period from 2003 to 2006. This paper was adopted in February 2003, and focused on the initial reconstruction phase of Afghanistan and referred to the assistance of Commission in focal and non-focal sectors. The former sector consisted of rural development, health and social protection, public administration reform and infrastructure whereas the non-focal sectors included de-mining, regional cooperation, refugees/returnees and counter-narcotics under the support of Commission.<sup>353</sup> The assistance to be given by the Commission, especially in health and refugees/return programs was based on the earlier intervention of European Community on Humanitarian Office (ECHO) in the late 1990s.<sup>354</sup> In addition, the first Country Strategy Paper (CSP) 2003-6 and the National Indicative Programme (NIP) 2003-6 planned to contribute to the total development envelope for Afghanistan in keeping with the Tokyo (2002) pledge of 1 billion Euros for five years.<sup>355</sup>

In November 2005 in Strasbourg, the European Council adopted an “EU-Afghanistan Joint Declaration ‘Committing to a new EU-Afghan Partnership,’” which underlined the commitments of both parties “to a secure, stable, free, prosperous and democratic Afghanistan as laid out in the Afghan Constitution

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<sup>353</sup> European Commission, “Country Strategy Paper- Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2007-2013,” available at [http://eeas.europa.eu/afghanistan/csp/07\\_13\\_en.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/afghanistan/csp/07_13_en.pdf) (accessed on April 26, 2012)

<sup>354</sup> ECHO was established in 1992 to provide support for people in need. In 2004 it became the “Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid” before incorporating “Civil Protection” in 2010; European Commission Humanitarian Aid and Civil Commission, “About ECHO” available at [http://ec.europa.eu/echo/about/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/about/index_en.htm) (accessed on April 26, 2012)

<sup>355</sup> It is important to stress that the Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) are the main strategic instruments to plan the aid in the country whereas NIPs are the management tools to identify the actions for the objectives that are set up in CSPs. In other words, each CSP is accompanied by an NIP as an integral part of the overall strategy. For more details see: <http://www.acpprogramming.eu/wcm/en/programming-references/country-and-regional-programming/national-indicative-programmes-nips.html> (accessed on April 26, 2012)

adopted on 4 January 2004.”<sup>356</sup> This document highlighted the partnership position of the EU with Afghanistan via a joint ‘political’ declaration<sup>357</sup> in which the EU reaffirmed its support to the Government of Afghanistan to accomplish the following goals; consolidating the democratic political system, forming accountable government institutions without corruption, promoting the rule of law, protecting human rights and developing civil society, promote economic growth and combating poverty in order to build a country free from the threats of terrorism, extremism and organised crime.<sup>358</sup>

The Joint Declaration intended to create the first formal basis for the cooperation of the EU and the Afghan Government. It also provided the basis for regular high-political contacts between both parties. Additionally, the EU aimed to increase the assistance to counter-narcotics campaign in Afghanistan and to the Counter Narcotics Trust Fund (CNTF)<sup>359</sup>

On 31 January/ 1 February 2006, the five year ‘Afghanistan Compact’ was signed between the Government of Afghanistan and the international actors; ISAF, OEF and partner nations in security sector reform which established a mechanism for coordinating the efforts of all parties. The agreement aimed to address the conditions of security, governance, rule of law, human rights, economic and social development within specific timelines.<sup>360</sup> At that point, a new

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<sup>356</sup> Council of the European Union, “EU-Afghanistan Joint Declaration- Committing to a New EU-Afghan Partnership,” Strasbourg, 16 November 2005, available at <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/05/st14/st14519.en05.pdf> (accessed on 27 April, 2012)

<sup>357</sup> European Union Council Secretariat Factsheet, “EU Engagement in Afghanistan,” updated January 2010, available at [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/100218%20EU%20engagement%20Afghanistan-version5\\_EN.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/100218%20EU%20engagement%20Afghanistan-version5_EN.pdf) (accessed on April 27, 2012)

<sup>358</sup> Council of the European Union, “EU-Afghanistan Joint Declaration- Committing to a New EU-Afghan Partnership”

<sup>359</sup> The CNTF was created in June 2005 under UNDP to mobilize additional resources needed by Afghan government to execute the National Drug Control Strategy that was first launched by the Afghan Government in 2003. For more details see: United Nations Development Programme in Afghanistan, “Counter Narcotics Trust Fund (CNTF),” available at [http://www.undp.org.af/WhoWeAre/UNDPinAfghanistan/ClosedProjects/prj\\_cntf.htm](http://www.undp.org.af/WhoWeAre/UNDPinAfghanistan/ClosedProjects/prj_cntf.htm) (accessed on April 28, 2012)

<sup>360</sup> The London Conference on Afghanistan, “The Afghanistan Compact,” 31 January to 1 February 2006, London, available at [http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/afghanistan\\_compact.pdf](http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/afghanistan_compact.pdf) (accessed on April 28, 2012)

post-Bonn economic aid package was established by pledging to disburse \$10.5 billion for five years.<sup>361</sup>

In 2007, the Multi-annual Indicative Programme (MIP) drew up a general framework for the intervention of the European Commission, during the period 2007-10, in the focal and non-focal sectors. The total budget for the Commission bilateral development cooperation for this period was EUR 610 million. Furthermore, Afghanistan benefited from an Annual Action Programme (AAP), together with the MIP. Behind the scenes, Afghanistan has also benefited from regional programmes for Asia, including; “Aid for Uprooted People Programme”, assistance within the “European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights programme (EIDHR)” and “the Instrument for Stability (IfS),” all of which were articulated with bilateral cooperation.<sup>362</sup> Briefly,

the European Commission alone spent approximately 2.06 billion Euros from 2002-08 and 315 million in 2008 and during this period the Commission was the second largest donor for official development assistance (ODA) committed to Afghanistan.<sup>363</sup>

For the period 2002-2010, the total commitment of the EU, with its member states and European Commission increased to EUR 8 billion then for the next period of 2011-2013, the commitment of the EU (not including the member states) is around EUR 600 million for Afghanistan, based on a contribution of EUR 200 million per annum. Thus, the current total EU support with its member states, to Afghanistan is around EUR 1 billion per annum.<sup>364</sup>

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<sup>361</sup> Tim Bird and Alex Marshall, “*Afghanistan: How the West Lost Its Way?*”, p. 134

<sup>362</sup> For more details see: Delegation of the European Union to Afghanistan, “Cooperation for Development,” available at [http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/afghanistan/eu\\_afghanistan/development\\_cooperation/index\\_en.htm](http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/afghanistan/eu_afghanistan/development_cooperation/index_en.htm) (accessed on April 28, 2012)

<sup>363</sup> Vladimir Cirovski and Marcus Pistor, “Afghanistan: European Involvement,” *Parliamentary Information and Research Service*, Publication No. 2007-31-E, Revised 10 February 2010, available at <http://www.parl.gc.ca/content/LOP/ResearchPublications/prb0731-e.pdf> (accessed on April 29, 2012)

<sup>364</sup> European Union External Action, “EU Engagement in Afghanistan,” Updated April 2011, available at [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/missionPress/files/110411%20EU%20engagement%20Afghanistan-version%208\\_EN01.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/missionPress/files/110411%20EU%20engagement%20Afghanistan-version%208_EN01.pdf) (accessed on April 29, 2012)

The current CSP of European Commission was set up in 2007 to determine the Commission priorities in Afghanistan for the period from 2007 to 13. The CSP was established to complement the Afghanistan Compact and the interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy (i-ANDS).<sup>365</sup> The adaptation of CSP indicates that the;

guiding principles for EC assistance are to utilise Government structures wherever this is feasible in implementing programmes and to provide ongoing support for existing national programs.<sup>366</sup>

In other words, the paper means that the assistance of the Commission will focus on the fields where the commission has experience or where other donors are not engaged.<sup>367</sup> Furthermore, the CSP prioritises actions in accordance with the long term purpose of sustainable poverty reduction and aims to contribute to the efforts for dealing with the narcotics associated economy and to proper functioning rule of law in accordance with the protection of human rights in Afghanistan in order to assist in stabilization in Afghanistan over the stated period.<sup>368</sup>

In December 2008, the eleven pages “Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy” were devised under the title of “Providing Security in a Changing World.” Five years after 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) document, it was underlined that the EU was “an anchor of the stability.”<sup>369</sup>

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<sup>365</sup> The i-ANDS was drafted in 2005 in order to achieve the Millennium Development Goals of Afghanistan (MDGs) and to provide a more detailed analysis of the development activities that required for the next five years. For more details see: <http://www.undp.org.af/MDGs/index.htm> (accessed on April 29, 2012). Following the i-ANDS, Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) for the period between 2008-2013 built on the 3 pillars of the Afganistan Compact; security, governance and rule of law; human rights, economic and social development; whereas the EC assistance focuses on 2 pillars excluding the security pillar. For more details see: Afghanistan National Development Strategy 1387- 1391 (2008-2013), available at [http://www.undp.org.af/publications/KeyDocuments/ANDS\\_Full\\_Eng.pdf](http://www.undp.org.af/publications/KeyDocuments/ANDS_Full_Eng.pdf) (accessed on April 29, 2012)

<sup>366</sup> European Commission, “Country Strategy Paper- Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2007-2013”

<sup>367</sup> Vladimir Cirovski and Marcus Pistor, “Afghanistan: European Involvement”

<sup>368</sup> European Commission, “Country Strategy Paper- Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 2007-2013”

<sup>369</sup> “Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy -Providing Security in a Changing World-,” 11 December 2008, Brussels, p. 1, available at [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/104630.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/104630.pdf) (accessed on April 30, 2012)

Because, the 2008 report stated that “for our potential to be realised we need to be still more capable, more coherent and more active” which marked the reason why the report created.<sup>370</sup>

In a broader sense, the report underscored that this was not a replacement for the 2003 ESS; instead, this new version reinforced it. It was emphasized that this report explained “how the EU have fared in practice and what can be done to improve implementation.”<sup>371</sup> In this regard, there were three parts to the explanation: “Global Challenges and the Key Threats,” “Building Stability in Europe and beyond” and “Europe in a Changing World.” The first part emphasised the challenges and threats which were defined as proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and organised crime, climate change, together with cyber and energy security problems that were addition to the 2008 report.

The 2008 report reiterated the need to combat all manifestations of terrorism and called for an updated instrument for an early detection of radicalisation that financed terrorism.<sup>372</sup> The focus of the report was on the issue of human rights, international humanitarian law and the right of asylum, which were not mentioned in the 2003 ESS. Additionally, it was underlined that since it was a criminal offence to use the internet to promulgate terrorism, the creation of a European alert platform was seen as a necessity.<sup>373</sup> Lastly, the report highlighted Pakistan and Afghanistan as partner countries in countering terrorism, which was again not directly covered in the 2003 ESS.

The second part of the report underscored the enlargement of the EU as a powerful driver for stability, peace and reform. In this part, Afghanistan was given as a particular concern and the engagement of the EU at governance and development levels of Afghanistan together with the expansion of EUPOL was

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<sup>370</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 2

<sup>371</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 3

<sup>372</sup> Giji Gya, “The ESS Scorecard,” *European Security Review*, No. 42, December 2008, ISIS Europe, p. 2, available at [http://www.isis-europe.eu/sites/default/files/publications-downloads/2008\\_esr\\_66\\_esr42-dec08.pdf](http://www.isis-europe.eu/sites/default/files/publications-downloads/2008_esr_66_esr42-dec08.pdf) (accessed on April 30, 2012)

<sup>373</sup> *Ibid.*

claimed to be a practical improvement in the activities of the EU.<sup>374</sup> The report also added piracy as a new dimension of organised crime and a result of state failure that must be addressed.<sup>375</sup> In this regard, the first maritime European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) operation in Somalia to deter piracy was presented to show the involvement of EU in practice. The last part of the report was established as a response to the changing security environment. Thus, the EU contribution to international security was explained under its policies of a “more effective and capable Europe”, “greater engagement with neighbourhood” and the “partnership for effective multilateralism” by referring to the necessity of working together with partners.<sup>376</sup>

#### **4.3.2.2 EUPOL in Afghanistan as a ESDP Operation**

The EU, as contrast to the European Commission and individual member states, did not have a ESDP mission in Afghanistan until 2006<sup>377</sup> (ESDP renamed the Common Security and Defence Policy -CSDP- since the ratification of Lisbon Treaty). The transatlantic dispute over sharing the burden in Afghanistan led to the discussion over the involvement of the EU under ESDP. The option for a ESDP operation was agreed during the German Presidency in the first half of 2007. However, the ESDP operation was limited to a police mission and prior to the launch of a EU mission in Afghanistan since 2002 the reform of the police sector had been under the German Police Project Office (GPPO, later called the GPPT – German Police Project Team).

The project was staffed with 40 German police officers and the tasks of the GPPO were listed as the;

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<sup>374</sup> “Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy - Providing Security in a Changing World-”, p. 7

<sup>375</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 8

<sup>376</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9;10;11

<sup>377</sup> Daniel Korski, “Afghanistan: Europe’s Forgotten War,” *European Council on Foreign Relations*, 21 January 2008, p.9, available at [http://ecfr.3cdn.net/fcdc73b8da7af85936\\_q8m6b5o4j.pdf](http://ecfr.3cdn.net/fcdc73b8da7af85936_q8m6b5o4j.pdf) (accessed on May 2, 2012)



restructuring of the Afghan National Police (ANP), including matching salaries to those of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and instituting a more efficient leadership structure; restructuring the tasks and organisation for uniformed police; fighting crime and terrorism; border police; fighting the narcotics trade; and increasing female participation.<sup>378</sup>

The GPPT were involved in activities in Kabul, Mazar-e Sharif, Kunduz and Feyzabad. In Kabul, Germany created a Police Academy, which has been operational since 2002 and revised the existing training programme. The focus of German efforts was on “‘training the trainer’ by attempting to turn the most physically and intellectually promising candidates into model specimens for others to follow”<sup>379</sup> and their approach focussed on the reform of the Ministry of Interior (MoI), which had been created by the Bonn Agreement. However, such a long term approach of Germany to train 3.500 Afghan officers over three years, together with “‘deficiencies ranging from radios and body armour to basic housing, suitable prisons and even transport vehicles, particularly in the south of the country” led to the weakness of the police reform process under German leadership.<sup>380</sup>

From 2002 to 2007, Germany provided EUR 2 million annually for police reform in Afghanistan.<sup>381</sup> The involvement of the US in the police sector started in 2003 with the realisation that training the ANP was counterproductive without concurrent police reform. In other words, the failure in German approach brought the US State Department to focus on the bulk of the ANA training. With 2004, the US became committed to the training of the ANP and the ANA with the particular aim of ensuring free elections. The US expenditure in Afghanistan increased from

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<sup>378</sup> Eva Gross, “Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan: the EU’s Contribution,” *Occasional Paper* 78, European Union Institute for Security Studies, April 2009, p. 27, available at <http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/op78.pdf> (accessed on May 2, 2012)

<sup>379</sup> Tim Bird and Alex Marshall, “*Afghanistan: How the West Lost Its Way?*”, p. 122

<sup>380</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 122

<sup>381</sup> Ronja Kempin and Stefan Steinicke, “EUPOL Afghanistan: The Credibility-Test for Europe’s Civilian Engagement,” in *The EU as a Strategic Actor in the Realm of Security and Defence? - A systematic Assessment of ESDP Missions and Operations*, ed. by Muriel Asseburg and Ronja Kempin, SWP Berlin, December 2009, p. 137, available at [http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research\\_papers/2009\\_RP14\\_ass\\_kmp\\_ks.pdf](http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research_papers/2009_RP14_ass_kmp_ks.pdf) (accessed on May 3, 2012)

\$25.5 million in 2002 to \$2.7 billion in 2007 which outstripped the German contribution.<sup>382</sup> In this regard, the US Department of Defence Military Command is responsible for the US police-building efforts in the region; however, their training style in Afghanistan produced tension in the transatlantic relationship.

Such a situation was particularly evident in the investment of the Texas-based private security company, DynCorp. According to Bird and Marshall, this company allocated \$24 million to ANA with the aim of employing American police officers to run the three-week training courses for the Afghan officers and after the courses were completed by this group, it was followed by the other group of Afghan officers.<sup>383</sup> The result was the tendency more on short run training. Hence, the German focus was on the creation of a civilian force to provide law and order whether effective or not while the American point of view was the establishment of a force capable of protecting itself and combating terrorists.<sup>384</sup>

In this regard, the International Police Coordination Board (IPCB) was established in October 2006 in order to provide international networking and cooperation in Afghan police-building. At the beginning, the IPCB was under the supervision of Germany and the US and the responsibility of the secretariat is to coordinate operational measures, including training, mentoring, logistics and reporting. The overall aim is to support ANP in order that it becomes an effective civilian institution.<sup>385</sup> However, as Kempin and Steinicke state, “the Americans send only a single representative to the meetings of the IPCB secretariat and ignore their decisions, which rather undermine its authority.”<sup>386</sup> They maintain that such a drastic measure was seen by Washington as the most effective way to prod its European allies into stepping up their efforts in police-building.<sup>387</sup>

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<sup>382</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 138

<sup>383</sup> Tim Bird and Alex Marshall, “*Afghanistan: How the West Lost Its Way?*”, p. 123

<sup>384</sup> Ronja Kempin and Stefan Steinicke, “EUPOL Afghanistan: The Credibility-Test for Europe’s Civilian Engagement,” in *The EU as a Strategic Actor in the Realm of Security and Defence? - A systematic Assessment of ESDP Missions and Operations*, p. 138

<sup>385</sup> For more details see: <http://www.ipcbafghanistan.com/> (accessed on May 3, 2012)

<sup>386</sup> Ronja Kempin and Stefan Steinicke, “EUPOL Afghanistan: The Credibility-Test for Europe’s Civilian Engagement” p. 145

<sup>387</sup> *Ibid.*

Furthermore, until taken over by the EU, the police reform in Afghanistan under German leadership, had lack of coordination with the justice and rule of law reforms which had been undertaken by Italy which was the lead nation for justice reform.<sup>388</sup> The Italian Justice Office (IJO), which began operating in 2003, supported institutional reform by providing technical help through the placement of advisors in the Ministry of Justice, the Supreme Court and the Attorney General's Office.<sup>389</sup> The activities of IJO included legislative reform, rehabilitation of justice institutions, training courses, construction and the provision of equipment. IJO consisted of 4-5 Kabul-based staff, however, this was too limited to reform the justice sector and consequently this undermined the efforts towards police reform.<sup>390</sup> As a result, the 2006 London Conference pushed for a broader EU commitment to take the lead in justice reform in Afghanistan.<sup>391</sup>

In addition to German leadership in the police sector and the Italian-led justice reform, the UK has been involved in counter-narcotics efforts since the beginning of the Afghan campaign. For instance, Afghan Ministry of Counter-Narcotics was established in 2004 in order to coordinate all the counter-narcotics activities of the Afghan Government. Moreover, the Criminal Justice Task Force was established alongside UK support in 2005 to work with the Counter- Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA), which also receives assistance from the UK in the form of training and equipping the force dealing with drug prosecutions.<sup>392</sup>

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<sup>388</sup> Daniel Korski, "Afghanistan: Europe's Forgotten War," *European Council on Foreign Relations*, p. 12

<sup>389</sup> "The Ministry of Justice is responsible for the oversight of the prison service, the legislative department. The Supreme Court is the constitutional court of appeal and has responsibility for the administration of the courts system and the judiciary, and consists of about 1500 judges. The Attorney General's Office, which has the authority over the investigations of crimes, and includes some 2500 public prosecutors" ; Eva Gross, "Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan: the EU's Contribution," *Occasional Paper 78*, European Union Institute for Security Studies, April 2009, p. 37

<sup>390</sup> Eva Gross, "Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan: the EU's Contribution," *Occasional Paper 78*, European Union Institute for Security Studies, April 2009, p. 39

<sup>391</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>392</sup> Foreign & Commonwealth Office, "Counter Narcotics," available at <http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/global-issues/afghanistan/counter-narcotics/> (accessed on May 3, 2012)

However, according to Korski, the British have; “either ignored or deliberately circumvented the police and justice reforms put in place by the Germans and Italians.”<sup>393</sup> In other words, the lead nation approach was pursued without an effective coordination among these nations. The work of such a style was resulted in isolation from each other. In that context, EUPOL attempts to gather together the individual national efforts of the EU member states under the “EU hat” despite the meets with difficulties since the members of the EU have different priorities regarding Afghanistan.<sup>394</sup> On 13 October 2006, the Joint EU Assessment Mission (JEUAM) report was presented to the Political and Security Committee (PSC). It contained an analysis of the situation about the rule of law in Afghanistan and a recommendation to strengthen the contribution of EU to the country. The JEUAM report suggested that the EU could make a further commitment to assist the police sector through a police mission and it was recommended that before establishing this mission that a fact finding mission in Afghanistan was undertaken to ascertain the feasibility of a ESDP operation.<sup>395</sup>

After the discussion about the October 2006 report, the Committee for Civilian Aspects of CSDP (CIVCOM) provided advice to the PSC. At the same time, there was a call for broader international engagement which was followed by a NATO Summit in Riga in November 2006. Thus, the EU was under pressure to develop its plan for a EU mission.<sup>396</sup> In a broader context, with Riga Summit, the US, Canada, the Netherlands and Britain insisted that Germany should commit more funding and personnel to Afghanistan. In a move designed to silence the criticism

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<sup>393</sup> Daniel Korski, “Afghanistan: Europe’s Forgotten War,” *European Council on Foreign Relations*, p. 12

<sup>394</sup> Council of the European Union, “EU Police Mission in Afghanistan Starts,” 15 June 2007, Brussels, available at [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressData/en/esdp/94719.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/esdp/94719.pdf) (accessed on May 4, 2012)

<sup>395</sup> Official Journal of the European Union, “Council Joint Action on the Establishment of the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan,” 2007/369/CFSP, 30 May 2007, available at [http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2007/l\\_139/l\\_13920070531en00330038.pdf](http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2007/l_139/l_13920070531en00330038.pdf) (accessed on May 4, 2012)

<sup>396</sup> Giji Gya, “EUPOL Afghanistan- an Opportunity for Whom?” *European Security Review*, Number 33, May 2007, ISIS Europe, available at [http://isis-europe.eu/sites/default/files/programmes-downloads/2007\\_artrel\\_27\\_esr33eupolafghanistan.pdf](http://isis-europe.eu/sites/default/files/programmes-downloads/2007_artrel_27_esr33eupolafghanistan.pdf) (accessed on May 4, 2012)

of Germany's previous work the Germans revived their 2006 proposal calling for the launch of a EU mission to intensify the existing German efforts to reconstruct the Afghan police force.<sup>397</sup> A fact finding mission, was deployed to Afghanistan from 27 November to 14 December 2006 under the German EU Presidency. In February 2007, the Council approved the Crisis Management Concept (CMC) for a EU police mission to Afghanistan. On 23 March 2007, UNSC adopted Resolution 1746 on the extension of UNAMA's mandate:

which inter alia, welcomes the decision by the EU to establish a police mission in the field of policing with linkages to wider rule of law and counter-narcotics, to assist and enhance current efforts in the area of police reform at central and provincial levels, and looks forward to the early launch of the mission.<sup>398</sup>

On 23 April 2007, the Council ratified the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for a EU police mission to Afghanistan. Following the receipt of an invitation letter from the Afghan Government the EU Police Mission to Afghanistan (EUPOL) was established to operate for a period of minimum three years; the planning phase began on 30 May 2007 followed by the operational phase starting on 15 June 2007. The mission, with a non-executive mandate, aimed to contribute to the purpose of sustainable civilian policing to ensure that interaction with criminal justice system was in accordance with international standards. The mission has worked with the Afghan police force to support them in the provision of practical arrangements for the security and law enforcement mechanism. Thus, the mission is basically responsible for monitoring, mentoring, advising and training.<sup>399</sup> The political control of the mission is under the PSC exercise and at the beginning; the mission consisted of 160 to 190 personnel from both EU

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<sup>397</sup>Ronja Kempin and Stefan Steinicke, "EUPOL Afghanistan: The Credibility-Test for Europe's Civilian Engagement" p. 139

<sup>398</sup>Official Journal of the European Union, "Council Joint Action on the Establishment of the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan," 2007/369/CFSP, 30 May 2007; see also the full text of United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1746, 23 March 2007, available at [http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/mandate/unscr/resolution\\_1746.pdf](http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/mandate/unscr/resolution_1746.pdf) (accessed on May 4, 2012)

<sup>399</sup> Council of the European Union, "EU Police Mission in Afghanistan Starts," 15 June 2007

member states and third states, such as Canada, New Zealand and Norway.<sup>400</sup> Although the mission was due to end on 18 May 2010, it has been extended for three years until 31 May 2013.

According to report dated 30<sup>th</sup> May 2007,

the EU police mission will be set in the wider context of the international community's effort to support the Government of Afghanistan in taking responsibility for strengthening the rule of law, in particular, in improving its civil police and law enforcement capacity. Close coordination between the EU police mission and other international actors involved in security assistance, including the ISAF, as well as those providing support to police and rule of law reform in Afghanistan, will be ensured.<sup>401</sup>

In a broader sense, the strategic objectives of EUPOL are listed as the improving police structure, control and communications for the Ministry of Interior and the Afghan National Police, developing intelligence-led policing, building the capabilities of the Criminal Investigations Department and anti-corruption capacities, developing cooperation and coordination between Police and Judiciary sectors, and ensuring mainstream gender and human rights aspects within MoI and ANP.<sup>402</sup>

EUPOL is a part of the EU commitment to Afghanistan which includes local political guidance provided by EUSR and reconstruction effort managed mainly through the European Commission Delegation in Kabul.<sup>403</sup> As mentioned in chapter three, EUSR is responsible for monitoring and reporting on political, constitutional and security developments in Afghanistan in line with the implementation of Bonn Agreement. From July 2002 to July 2008 the head of

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<sup>400</sup> Giji Gya, "EUPOL Afghanistan- an Opportunity for Whom?" *European Security Review*, Number 33, May 2007

<sup>401</sup> Official Journal of the European Union, "Council Joint Action on the Establishment of the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan," 2007/369/CFSP, 30 May 2007

<sup>402</sup> EUPOL Afghanistan, "EUPOL Tasks and Strategic Objectives," available at <http://81.17.241.206/?q=node/4> (accessed on May 5, 2012)

<sup>403</sup> European Union Common Security and Defence Policy, "EU Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL AFGHANISTAN)," Updated February 2010, available at [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/100218%20FACTSHEET%20EUPOL%20Afghanistan%20-%20version%2017\\_EN.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/100218%20FACTSHEET%20EUPOL%20Afghanistan%20-%20version%2017_EN.pdf) (accessed on May 5, 2012)

EUSR for Afghanistan was Mr. Francesc Vendrel who followed by Ambassador Ettore Francesco Sequi until April 2010. Since the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force in December 2009, Ambassador Usackas has been both head of the EU Delegation and EUSR.<sup>404</sup>

The EUSR represents the EU and promotes Union policy objectives in Afghanistan in close coordination with the representatives of the EU member states. Also, EUSR supports both the political dialogue between the EU and Afghan Government and the transition process that was accepted in London and was followed by Kabul Communiqué, as mentioned in the previous parts. EUSR acts under the authority of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The PSC provides strategic guidance and political direction within its mandate and is the primary contact for EUSR in the Council. EUSR regularly provides the oral and written reports to the High Representative and the PSC also EUSR provides the head of EUPOL Afghanistan with local political guidance.<sup>405</sup> The mandate of EUSR has been extended until 30 June 2012. In this context, the overall basis of EUPOL Afghanistan is to support Afghans in taking responsibility for law and order, combined with the development of the provision of civilian policing and the rule of law expertise for the country.

Since March 2009, in order to expand the reforming activities, EUPOL has supported the expansion of the “City Police and Justice Programme” (CPJP) outside of Kabul, in places such as; Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif and Bamian. EUPOL also supports the establishment of the “Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office,” which consists of specialised prosecutors aiming to secure prosecution cases against high-profile public officials suspected of corruption.<sup>406</sup> Additionally,

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<sup>404</sup> Delegation of the European Union to Afghanistan, “EUSR”

<sup>405</sup> Official Journal of the European Union, Council Decision on extending the mandate of the European Union Special Representative in Afghanistan,” 2011/427/CFSP, 18 July 2011, available at <http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:188:0034:0036:EN:PDF> (accessed on May 6, 2012)

<sup>406</sup> European Union External Action Common Security and Defence Policy, “EU Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan),” Updated October 2011, available at [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/missionPress/files/111025%20FACTSHEET%20EUPOL%20Afghanistan%20-%20version%2026\\_EN.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/missionPress/files/111025%20FACTSHEET%20EUPOL%20Afghanistan%20-%20version%2026_EN.pdf) (accessed on May 6, 2012)



EUPOL trains inspectors within the MoI through training in basic investigative counter corruption techniques to implement an anti-corruption strategy.<sup>407</sup>

Since 8 December 2009 the European Gendarmerie Force (EGF) has been involved in Afghanistan. The force was inaugurated in January 2006 under the command of French Gendarmerie Brigadier and declared as fully operational in July 2006. It was an initiative of five EU member states: France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain but expanded to 6 EU states when in December 2008 the Romanian Gendarmerie joined the EGF.<sup>408</sup> The purpose of the force is to improve the EU's crisis management capability in areas where an interface between military and police forces is required. The main function of the EGF is its stated role of being facilitator through regarding to both substitution and the strengthening of the local police force to handle critical situations.<sup>409</sup> In Afghanistan, the role of the EGF is to contribute to NTM-A and ANP via the provision of mentors, training advisors and experts in accordance with its role of supplementing the EUPOL mission. While the EGF was initially deployed with a force of 196, there are now 388 personnel provided by France, Italy, Poland, Spain, the Netherlands and Turkey the latter being a contributor nation in Afghanistan not a member of the EGF.<sup>410</sup>

In March 2010, EUPOL signed an agreement with the Afghan Attorney General's Office to establish a "Military Anti-Corruption Unit" (MACU) in order to combat the corruption that exists within the ANP. The establishment of MACU at Attorney General's Office in Kabul under the supervision of the Deputy Attorney General was inaugurated by EUPOL in October 2010. Through MACU, the implementation of a case file management, together with an online tracking system and the provision of equipment are supported by EUPOL.<sup>411</sup>

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<sup>407</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>408</sup> For more details see: <http://www.eurogendfor.eu/> (accessed on May 6, 2012)

<sup>409</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 231

<sup>410</sup> For more details see: <http://www.eurogendfor.org/egfpages/egfparticipationtoNTMA.aspx> (accessed on May 6, 2012)

<sup>411</sup> European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan Press Release "Attorney General's Office and EUPOL Mission in Afghanistan: Agreement Signed to Fight Corruption," February 2010,



Since the Lisbon Treaty, the High Representative combines three different functions: Council Representative for the CFSP, President of the Foreign Affairs Council and Vice-President of the Commission. The High Representative is also responsible for steering foreign policy and common defence policy. Thus, the post is designed to enhance the consistency and unity of the EU's external action by the assistance of the European External Action Service (EEAS) that was launched in December 2010 and is scheduled to be fully operational in 2012. The EEAS was set up by the Treaty of Lisbon by officials from relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and of Commission, together with the diplomatic services of the Member States. Additionally, the functioning and organisation of the EEAS is under the control of the Council who will act on a proposal from the High Representative after the consulting with the European Parliament and obtain the Commission's consent.<sup>412</sup>

In this context, the EEAS combines the European Commission's humanitarian resources with the diplomatic and military weight of the European Council.<sup>413</sup> However, while the reforms in the Lisbon Treaty can be of assistance, the future success of ESDP will depend on the commitment of the EU member states. In this context, since Lisbon, the expectation from the High Representative of the Union regarding Afghanistan is to become a driving force for the whole EUPOL mission rather than the individual member states. Hence, Bloching emphasizes that the political leadership of the EUPOL should be guided from Brussels and inside EU Delegation in Afghanistan that could speak on the same level with MoI's officials.<sup>414</sup> However, is important to note that:

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available at [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/missionPress/files/100224-Anti-Corruption-EN.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/missionPress/files/100224-Anti-Corruption-EN.pdf) (accessed on May 7, 2012)

<sup>412</sup> General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, "Information Note: Treaty of Lisbon," December 2009, available at [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/111652.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/111652.pdf) (accessed on May 7, 2012)

<sup>413</sup> Daniel Keohane, "Lessons From EU Peace Operations", *Journal of International Peacekeeping* 15 (2011), p. 208

<sup>414</sup> Sebastian Bloching, "Policing in Conflict - An Overview of EUPOL Afghanistan, *European Security Review*, No.7, July 2011, ISIS Europe, available at [http://www.isiseurope.eu/sites/default/files/programmesdownloads/2011\\_artrel\\_646\\_esrbriefing7-eupol-afghanistan.pdf](http://www.isiseurope.eu/sites/default/files/programmesdownloads/2011_artrel_646_esrbriefing7-eupol-afghanistan.pdf) (accessed on May 8, 2012)

[Although there is] a real potential to increase the overall coordination of the EEAS's and the Commission's diverse activities, thereby ensuring a lasting impact through thorough follow up activities after the end of CSDP missions which usually only stay for a few years. However, as of May 2011 neither concrete support for the EU Delegations nor a clear division of labour between CSDP missions and the Delegations was institutionalised in the EEAS.<sup>415</sup>

#### 4.3.2.3 Limitations of EUPOL in Afghanistan

The police mission of the EU, as a ESDP innovation, is a commitment to the Civilian Capabilities in the context of the Civilian Headline Goal 2008. Hence, as Howorth comments; the police missions are

at the forefront of the operationalisation of the civilian component of the ESDP” and at the same time, “the overseas police missions by definition aim to bring about the transformation of the local by the international.<sup>416</sup>

Furthermore, Howorth maintains that such a mission has two aims: first to strengthen local police forces and the second is the substitution international efforts for the current direct policing.<sup>417</sup>

However, the challenge that the EU police missions meet is their limitation to their ability to strengthen rather than continuing the substitution which paved the way for the concentration of effort on the medium management levels of the police force. This in return, put less emphasis on community policing and the co-location remained insufficient. This is the main obstacle for the mission to achieve its long term goal to support the ANP step by step to transform into a police force.

In relation to a similar situation, the first-ever overseas EU Police Mission (EUPM) has been in Bosnia and Herzegovina from January 2003 to June 2012 in

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<sup>415</sup> Sebastian Bloching, “Security Sector Reform Missions under CSDP: Addressing Current Needs,” in *Communicate, Coordinate and Cooperate- A Series of Papers on the A-Z of Cohering EU-Crisis Management in the post-Lisbon Era*, ed. by Giji Gya, ISIS Europe, August 2011, p.16, available at <http://www.isis-europe.eu/sites/default/files/page-attachments/ssr-csdp-bloching.pdf> (accessed on May 8, 2012)

<sup>416</sup> Jolyon Howorth, *European Security and Defence Policy in the European Union*, p. 224; 226

<sup>417</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 226

accordance with its many times prolongation. The EUPM, as the EU's first serious experience in the operationalisation of the reform of the security sector, suffers from the slowness of the delivery, insufficient equipment and coordination problems between the mission itself and the efforts of the EUSR in a post-conflict state-building arena.<sup>418</sup> To some extent, in Afghanistan, the general picture in terms of the existing challenges within the police mission of the EU is little changed and the problems are increased given the specific conditions in the country.

In Afghanistan, a personalized system of power undermines the efforts to reform state institutions, in addition there is combined a lack of mechanisms for criminal prosecution and widespread corruption at local and state level. As a result, the illiteracy and the inexistent interface between the justice and police sectors are the fundamental weakness and lead to the serious limitations on every mission in the country. Therefore, the organisation of the EU missions needs to be as efficient as possible. As Keohane states "the stronger the political cohesion between EU member states, the larger the potential for a ESDP mission to be effective in the field."<sup>419</sup> However, the general problem for the ESDP missions is the inability and sometimes unwillingness of member states to meet the necessary level of staffing. This is mainly linked to the lack of deployable personnel in the member states since there is only a small number of national police, civil servants and experts who are ready to go to dangerous places, such as Afghanistan.

On the other hand, even if such people volunteer for a ESDP mission, their member states prevent from joining the mission because of the scarce number of specialised personnel at the national level which leads to the reluctance of member states to deploy valuable human resources. In fact, the success of a mission is often related to the number of personnel. This problem is exemplified in Afghanistan in the case of EUPOL due to its ongoing struggle to meet its staffing target of 400. Significantly, in terms of police officers, there is a problem of insufficient knowledge about the cultural context of the country and often

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<sup>418</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 227

<sup>419</sup> Daniel Keohane, "Lessons From EU Peace Operations," *Journal of International Peacekeeping*, p. 204

exacerbated by less trained police deployed as reform advisors. In addition, because of national regulations concerning staff turnover limits the service of police officers to six months or a year which can be considered an obstacle for long term efforts.<sup>420</sup>

Furthermore, the unwillingness of member states to the relatively militarised situation of Afghanistan is a trigger for the US to take over the lead role in police reform.<sup>421</sup> On one hand, this brings a complication in terms of the style of the two parties with the NTM-A seeing the mission as “a military police-building exercise” and EUPOL having the view that it is “a tentative but civilian-oriented police reform.”<sup>422</sup> The US strategy is to prepare the engagement of “robust” policing activities such as combating insurgents and fighting terrorism. It does this by achieving a high number of “boots on the ground” in a short time and this style mostly relies on military functions. However, the aim of the EU, which is written in the CSP of the Commission, is to support the ANP in relation to its goal of achieving an effective justice and police systems, in particular fighting drug trafficking and corruption. However, the EU has not yet resolved its main problem which is the need to create a comprehensive link between its policy and practice.<sup>423</sup>

On the other hand, since the US has a broader investment in this sector facilitates the superiority of NTM-A compared to EUPOL. The EEAS Factsheet shows that from 31 May 2010 to 31 May 2011, EUPOL had EUR 54.6 million at its disposal whereas NTM-A only had an annual budget of \$9.5 billion and \$3.5 billion of the amount was used for the improvement of the ANP.<sup>424</sup> Therefore, a further weakness in the mandate of the EUPOL mission is its lack of budgetary

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<sup>420</sup>Sebastian Bloching, “Security Sector Reform Missions under CSDP: Addressing Current Needs,” p. 9

<sup>421</sup> Sebastian Bloching, “Policing in Conflict - An Overview of EUPOL Afghanistan”

<sup>422</sup> Cornelius Friedendorf and Jörg Krempel, “Militarized versus Civilian Policing: Problems of Reforming the Afghan National Police,” PRIF- Report No. 102, translated by Lynn Benstead, *Peace Research Institute Frankfurt*, 2011, p. 13-14, available at <http://www.hsfk.de/fileadmin/downloads/prif102.pdf> (accessed on May 10, 2012)

<sup>423</sup> Sebastian Bloching, “Policing in Conflict - An Overview of EUPOL Afghanistan,” p. 2

<sup>424</sup> DATA is cited by Sebastian Bloching in “Policing in Conflict - An Overview of EUPOL Afghanistan,” p. 2

autonomy; rather, it depends on funds from individual member states and other countries.

Additionally, in terms of the number of personnel, EUPOL has between 300 to 320 staff whereas in 2011 NTM-A had 1500-2000 staff.<sup>425</sup> In addition, NTM-A provides short term basic police training courses for low level ANP officers while EUPOL focuses on long term training and offering advising to the sector. In this context, the insufficient funding, the lack of resources and personnel under the EUPOL paved the way for member states of the EU having a tendency to rely on NTM-A, who has its larger spending, rather than EUPOL in the police sector reforming. This marks to the lack of confidence within the EU for EUPOL.

In Afghanistan, there is a serious problem in that police officers have to operate in a war-like situation and they are not equipped or trained to cope with such conditions. This problem is that the ANP is still mainly targeted by insurgents and that the risk to ANP could be worse after the withdrawal of NATO forces due to possible intensification of the insurgency which could probably not be prevented by the ANA alone. Thus, the ANP is likely to become more involved in combat as a support military force of the ANA. In this respect, in the short term, the focus of the US is on “enabling the ANP and ANA to close immediate security gaps” however, this can be seen as detrimental to civilian policing in the long term and thus in opposition to EUPOL’s aim of enhancing the public confidence about the ANP.<sup>426</sup> In other words, while the police officers are constantly fighting, they are not able to spend time on patrolling neighbourhoods or making inquiries about crime.<sup>427</sup> This, in return, probably resulted in the lack of concentration on the issue of civilian policing arrangements, which serves as a limitation to the EUPOL’s affectivity.

The security for unarmed civilian personnel giving police training is another problem for the EUPOL since it relies on bilateral agreement of EU member states

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<sup>425</sup> European Union Common Security and Defence Policy, “EU Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL AFGHANISTAN),” updated April 2011, available at [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/missionPress/files/110408%20FACTSHEET%20EUPOL%20Afghanistan%20-%20version%2025\\_EN.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/missionPress/files/110408%20FACTSHEET%20EUPOL%20Afghanistan%20-%20version%2025_EN.pdf) (accessed on May 10, 2012)

<sup>426</sup> Sebastian Blocking, “Policing in Conflict - An Overview of EUPOL Afghanistan,” p. 4

<sup>427</sup> *Ibid.*

with PRT lead nations. When the lead nation for a PRT changes, EUPOL needs to renegotiate with the new lead nation on the issue of its staff security. In this way, the uncertainty about security provision for EUPOL staff, with the failure of EU to provide flexible security arrangements for its staff in order to operate in more dangerous parts of Afghanistan and the failure of EU member states to send sufficient numbers of trained personnel result in EUPOL to focusing largely on Kabul.

Additionally, the agreement with the US and Turkey affected EUPOL's deployment capacity. It is important to state that the agreement was blocked by Turkey who refuses to accept any deeper relations between the EU and NATO beyond the Berlin Plus Agreement until the Cyprus problem is resolved. Thus, it appears that to achieve a general agreement between the EU and NATO-led ISAF on the issue of protection of the EUPOL staff will be difficult.<sup>428</sup> Furthermore, in many cases, the PRTs only transport and protect the EUPOL staff when they have the personnel capacity resulting in the restriction of free movement of the mission staff.<sup>429</sup>

In February 2011, an agreement was signed between the Afghan MoI, EUPOL and NTM-A in order to provide a standardized method of instruction for ANP training. Moreover, NATO and EU made an agreement on the issue of the division of labour by creating the new Kabul Staff College and Bamyan Training Centre in May 2011.<sup>430</sup> The construction of the Kabul Staff College and regional police training centre in Bamyan operated and overseen by the EUPOL was financed by EU Delegation approximately €15 million under the EC Instrument for Stability funds.<sup>431</sup> EUPOL will provide the content of the training curricula and the project organisation at the college with the support of NATO especially in the improvement of the logistical assistance. This is a positive initiative however,

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<sup>428</sup> Ronja Kempin and Stefan Steinicke, "EUPOL Afghanistan: The Credibility-Test for Europe's Civilian Engagement," p. 144

<sup>429</sup> Sebastian Blocking, "Security Sector Reform Missions under CSDP: Addressing Current Needs," p. 12

<sup>430</sup> Sebastian Blocking, "Policing in Conflict - An Overview of EUPOL Afghanistan, p. 6

<sup>431</sup> European Union External Action Common Security and Defence Policy, "EU Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan)"

the practical implications of this agreement on the cooperation between the EU and NATO and its impact on policing in Afghanistan has to be assessed in the long term.

#### **4.4 Strategies of the Obama Administration towards Afghanistan**

During the election campaign, Obama portrayed the war in Iraq as a mistake since diverted the US from Afghanistan which he depicted as the true centre of the war against terrorism, thus, Obama promised to shift the focus of the US policy away from Iraq and back to Afghanistan.<sup>432</sup> Obama campaigned on the basis of the conflict in Afghanistan being the good war, which needed to be reinforced,<sup>433</sup> thus, in Gelb's words; "from the day President Obama took the office, Afghanistan became Obama's war."<sup>434</sup>

In February 2009, within a month of taking the office, the Obama administration announced that an additional 17,000 US troops would be sent to Afghanistan. The commitment of the US troops to Afghanistan was fundamental to seeking out European pledges for additional support. President Obama's outreach to Europe began during the election campaign and was maintained in the early months of his administration. In early March 2009, the Secretary of State Hillary Clinton met with the foreign ministers of the NATO members and Vice President Joe Biden, together with the North Atlantic Council to debate the new strategies regarding Afghanistan which was as part of the strategy review initiated

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<sup>432</sup> George Friedman, "Obama's Move: Iran and Afghanistan," *Stratfor Global Intelligence*, 28 September 2009, available at [http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20090928\\_obamas\\_move\\_iran\\_and\\_afghanistan](http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20090928_obamas_move_iran_and_afghanistan) (accessed on May 10, 2012)

<sup>433</sup> "Ending the Afghan War," *CFR.Org*, Stephen Biddle and Roger Hertog interviewed by Bernard Gwertzman, 16 March 2012, available at <http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/ending-afghan-war/p27668> (accessed on May 11, 2012)

<sup>434</sup> Leslie H. Gelb, "Why Obama Won't Speed U.S. Troop Withdrawal in Afghanistan," *The Dailybeast*, 19 March 2012, available at <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/03/18/why-obama-won-t-speed-u-s-troop-withdrawal-in-afghanistan.html> (accessed on May 11, 2012)

by the Obama administration.<sup>435</sup> Accordingly, President Obama released his new strategy as the first strategy review in late March 2009.

In this review, the Obama Administration indicated that the main target of the US policy towards Afghanistan, which was to prevent the country being used as a safe haven for terrorists, strengthen the capacity of Afghanistan's security forces and government to take the responsibility for the future and the elimination of al-Qaeda. In addition to 17,000 troops, Obama declared that an additional 4,000 trainers would be sent to Afghanistan to train the ANSF.<sup>436</sup> After President Obama the first strategy review, he scheduled an eight day-visit to Europe where he tried to gain allied endorsement and additional support for this strategy.

In December 2009, President Obama made a speech at West Point titled "Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan" in which he reaffirmed his first strategy review of March 2009. More significantly, in this speech, Obama announced the deployment of further 30,000 US troops to Afghanistan. Furthermore, at West Point, Obama underlined a three-fold strategy.<sup>437</sup> The first one is the use of the military in order to break Taliban control over 18 months. The additional soldiers would secure the population centres as part of a new population-centred counter-insurgency approach which was advanced by General McChrystal who had been appointed as ISAF Commander.<sup>438</sup> The second strategy is the necessity of working with partners for the US to pursue an effective civilian strategy and the third one was to forge links with Pakistan for the success in Afghanistan. Obama ended his speech by giving July 2011 as the start of exit from Afghanistan which marked the first American withdrawal timeline of Afghan war. Under the Obama

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<sup>435</sup> Brian Katulis, "Transatlantic Policy On Afghanistan and Pakistan in Obama Year One: Missed Opportunities," p. 2

<sup>436</sup> The White House Office of the Press Secretary, "Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan," 1 December 2009, available at [www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-address-nation-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan](http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-address-nation-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan) (accessed on May 11, 2012)

<sup>437</sup> C. Christine Fair, "'Clear, Build, Hold, Transfer': Can Obama's Afghan Strategy Work?," *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, Taylor and Francis Group, 2010, p.114

<sup>438</sup> The military strategy of McChrystal was to provide an additional commitment to protect the population rather than killing the enemy together with employing additional troops to increase the production of ANSF personnel.



administration, the counter-insurgency rationale of “clear, hold and build” was redefined as “clear, hold, build and transfer.”<sup>439</sup>

The 2009 pledges for additional troops made by European partners largely balanced for the withdrawal of the Netherlands combat soldiers in 2010 and the Canadian forces in 2011. Although a substantial number of the US troops were sent in Afghanistan by Obama administration there was still ongoing reluctance on the part of European countries to deploy more civilian and military personnel. Furthermore, the European public opinion concerning the war in Afghanistan was becoming increasingly negative. In France, 70 percent of adults were either completely or mostly opposed to the mission while in Germany 35 percent of the population wanted the removal of their troops and 44 percent wanted the soldiers to return home by 2011.<sup>440</sup> In Britain, only 32 percent of those polled supported the military operation with 60 percent being opposed.<sup>441</sup> In December 2011, EU member states contribution is approximately 23 percent of the ISAF personnel.<sup>442</sup>

In May 2010, in the second year of Obama administration, the new 52 page version of the National Security Strategy (NSS) was published. Although the new version of such a document under the Obama administration seemed as different in accordance with its rhetoric, the 2010 NSS reflected the politics of successive governments. This is basically evident in both documents’ statements that the overall aim of America, is to provide the sustainability of American leadership.

In terms of their scope, the 2006 NSS had eleven parts whereas 2010 NSS had four parts combined with most of the headings being different except for the “Overview of National Security Strategy” and “Conclusion.” The introduction to the 2010 NSS reaffirmed that America had been at war for nearly a decade

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<sup>439</sup> C. Christine Fair, “‘Clear, Build, Hold, Transfer’: Can Obama’s Afghan Strategy Work?” p.115

<sup>440</sup> The DATA is cited by Stephan Flanagan, T.J. Cipoletti and Amanda Tuninetti, in “Afghanistan: A Stress Test For Transatlantic Security Cooperation,” *The Transatlantic Relationship and EU-U.S. Cooperation in Security*, CSIS, Issue 4, 194

<sup>441</sup> Angus Reid Public Opinion, Poll Archive, “Opposition to Military Mission in Afghanistan Reaches 60% in Britain,” October 2010, available at <http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/43408/opposition-to-military-mission-in-afghanistan-reaches-60-in-britain/> (accessed on May 12, 2012)

<sup>442</sup> ISAF, “International Security Assistance Force (ISAF): Key Facts and Figures,” available at <http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/201112ISAFPlacemat.pdf> (accessed on May 12, 2012)

whereas 2006 NSS first and foremost underlined the wartime context of the US. In other words, the 2010 NSS concentrated on challenges other than merely the war situation of the US. In this respect, instead of putting the emphasis on terror and the current problems in Iraq and Afghanistan, the 2010 NSS also referred to the needs at home such as reducing deficit and developing clean energy in order to provide the strength of the America abroad. However, at the end of introduction to both documents' was the similar statement that "America is ready to lead once more."<sup>443</sup>

In the first part of the 2010 NSS, "Overview of National Security Strategy", the Obama administration highlighted the renewal of American leadership, "our strength at home, while shaping an international order that can meet the challenges of our time"<sup>444</sup> as the main theme of this chapter. Additionally, it is stated that the frontline of the war against a far reaching network of violence was Afghanistan and Pakistan.<sup>445</sup> In the 2006 NSS Afghanistan and Iraq were declared as the front lines in the war on terror and detailed the success and challenges in those countries, but the 2010 NSS rarely mentioned Afghanistan and superficially touches upon Iraq.<sup>446</sup> This is the most visible difference between the 2006 NSS and 2010 NSS. Furthermore, there is no mention in the latter of tyranny while it was the focus of the NSS in 2006. However, in the first part both refer to the greatest threat being WMD that this threat must be eliminated.

The second part, entitled "Strategic Approach" consists of many sub-headings which emphasized the stand of the US and its action to counter the new challenges. The whole chapter was centred on the claim that US leadership includes

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<sup>443</sup> The US National Security Strategy, May 2010, p. iii, available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss\\_viewer/national\\_security\\_strategy.pdf](http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf) (accessed on May 13, 2012)

<sup>444</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1

<sup>445</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 4

<sup>446</sup> The content about Iraq is limited to the removal of troops by the end of 2011, stressing the transitional process and the aim of U.S. to provide sustainable development for Iraq

military might, economic competitiveness, moral leadership, global engagement and efforts to shape an international system that serves the mutual interests of nations and people.<sup>447</sup>

In this part, the general framework for the role of the US was underlined especially from a whole of government approach to identify the strategy to make all tools of the US more effective at least in discourse.<sup>448</sup> These are listed as; defence, diplomacy, economic, development, homeland security, intelligence, strategic communication and the partnership with private sector, nongovernmental organizations and foundations. This list did not appear in the 2006 NSS.

The third part, “Advancing Our Interest” also consisted of various sub-headings, which examined the enduring national interests of the US and the road to provide for them. Those interests were listed as security, economic prosperity, respecting universal values and advanced international order created by the US leadership to meet the global challenges. In this chapter of the NSS, it was highlighted that the US was the only nation that had ability to develop and sustain large-scale military operations in distant lands. At this point, the document informed the reader that the US had the superior capability to deter and defeat enemies that threatened both for regional and global security.<sup>449</sup> This showed the importance of America’s military forces which was seen as decisive in global leadership. Additionally, the document maintained that since the enemy aimed to overextend the Armed Forces of US and drove a wedge between the US and those who shared the common interests, America must rebalance the statecraft means strengthening the preparedness and resilience of the US at home and via improving the alliances and new partnerships abroad.<sup>450</sup> This demonstrated that although the impact of non-military commitments was crucial, trusting in military

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<sup>447</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7

<sup>448</sup> Heather A. Conley and Michael Cass-Anthony, “The U.S. Case: 2002 and 2010 U.S. National Security Strategy,” *EU-U.S. Security Strategies: Comparative Scenarios and Recommendations*, Center for Strategic & International Studies, 1 March 2011, p. 22, available at [http://csis.org/files/publication/110614\\_Conley\\_EUUSSecurity\\_WEB.pdf](http://csis.org/files/publication/110614_Conley_EUUSSecurity_WEB.pdf) (accessed on May 13, 2012)

<sup>449</sup> The US National Security Strategy, p. 17

<sup>450</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 18

superiority was decisive in terms of security from the point of view the American administration. This was confirmed in the statement that:

US must reserve the right to act unilaterally if necessary to defend our nation and our interests, yet we will also seek to adhere to standards that govern the use of force<sup>451</sup>

This statement was the similar declaration presented in the 2006 NSS in the use of force context.

In the third chapter, the 2010 NSS stated that the US was waging a global struggle against al-Qaeda and its terrorist affiliates and emphasized the integrated campaign that formed as the combination of military and civilian efforts. In this regard, the discourse was not specifically concerned the war in Afghanistan was mentioned in the 2006 NSS. Instead, the main theme of the 2010 NSS was that “we are at war with a specific network, al-Qaeda, and its terrorist affiliates who support efforts to attack United States, our allies, and partners.”<sup>452</sup> Furthermore, the development of cooperation with Pakistan was put in terms of denying havens to al-Qaeda was not contained in the previous NSS therefore, in the most recent NSS Pakistan and Afghanistan, were considered to be the epicentre of the violent extremism which was practiced by al-Qaeda.<sup>453</sup>

The rest of the part in the 2010 NSS was focused on threats and challenges, covering biological and nuclear weapons, pandemics such as HIV/AIDS and food insecurity. In addition, the necessity for a secure environment were also examined which involved investing in people and technologies, strengthening education and human capital, enhancing science and innovation, accelerating sustainable development. The chapter indicated that the fundamental task was to strengthen the power of the US with the purpose of promoting democracy and human rights abroad. Both the 2006 and 2010 NSS referred to similar tasks. However the 2006 NSS referred to them briefly whereas 2010 NSS gave long explanations and

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<sup>451</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 22

<sup>452</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 20

<sup>453</sup> *Ibid.*

added the new fields such as cyberspace and cyber security. In the conclusion of the 2010 NSS, the renewal of American leadership was at the centre illustrated by the statement that “even in a world of enormous challenges, no threat is bigger than the American peoples’ capacity to meet it and no opportunity exceeds our reach”<sup>454</sup> and a similar message was contained in the 2002 NSS and 2006 NSS.

In conclusion, the 2006 NSS was the continuation of 2002 NSS but with a less strong discourse however, the 2010 NSS departed from the earlier reports. From the framework to the main themes, the 2010 NSS was different although it emphasized the role of partnerships with the NATO, EU similar to the previous NSS; it gave more importance to the strengthening national capacity of America. Thus, the 2010 NSS paid more attention to the domestic foundation of national security drawing a broader vision which incorporated domestic policy challenges.<sup>455</sup> Lastly, in the 2010 NSS, the Pakistan issue which always accompanied any discussion about Afghanistan was confirmation of effort that the Obama administration puts into its new strategy, called Af-Pak. Whether it is Af-Pak under the Obama administration or the “Global War on Terror” under the Bush administrations, the stability of Afghanistan must always be at the centre of the analysis in terms of the eradication of the Taliban.

In a broader sense, one major difference between the Bush and Obama administrations appears to be the shift of focus from Iraq to Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, this shift had already been announced by Bush’s Defence Secretary (Robert Gates) towards the end of his administration and Gates is now Obama’s Defence Secretary.<sup>456</sup> Briefly, under the Obama administration, the rationale for engagement in Afghanistan is narrowed while expanding its scope.<sup>457</sup>

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<sup>454</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 52

<sup>455</sup> Heather A. Conley and Michael Cass-Anthony, “The U.S. Case: 2002 and 2010 U.S. National Security Strategy,” *EU-U.S. Security Strategies: Comparative Scenarios and Recommendations*, p. 21, 23

<sup>456</sup> Nana De Graaff and Bastiaan Van Apeldom, “Varieties of US Post-Cold War Imperialism: Anatomy of a Failed Hegemonic Project and the Future of US Geopolitics,” *Critical Sociology*, 14 July 2011, p. 18

<sup>457</sup> James Dobbins, “Obama’s Af/Pak Strategy,” in *The Obama Moment- European and American Perspectives*, ed. by Alvaro de Vasconcelos and Marcin Zaborowski, European Union of Institute for Security Studies, 2009, p. 140-41, available at

In this regard, the Pakistan terrorist sanctuaries were put more explicitly on international agenda by the need to also eliminate the al-Qaeda havens in that country. Therefore, as Dobbins states, while Obama was building his policy upon the deliberations of Bush administration, his policy moved beyond where his predecessor had left it.<sup>458</sup>

To sum up, US policy on the issue of Pakistan in terms of supporting security and economic development in return for promise of increased cooperation in matters concerning the Taliban insurgency becomes unclear without a genuine strategy to provide such cooperation.<sup>459</sup> Furthermore, “as for the link between Afghanistan and Pakistan, little or nothing that happens in Afghanistan can materially affect the stability of that far, far larger, divided and nearly ungovernable nation.”<sup>460</sup> Therefore, by putting Pakistan forward as an integrated issue of the Afghan campaign has many potential difficulties regarding Pakistan’s deep-seated competition between moderate and extremist vision of Islam, its populous feature and significantly its nuclear power.

On 1 May 2011, President Obama announced that Osama Bin Laden, the leader of al-Qaeda, had been killed following the US military operation. Obama underlined that he had been briefed on a possible lead to Bin Laden in August 2010, which was far from certain, and took almost a year to run this trail to ground.<sup>461</sup> Obama maintained that “the death of Bin Laden marks the most significant achievement to date in our nation’s effort to defeat al-Qaeda.”<sup>462</sup> After President Obama had called Bush to inform him of the death of Bin Laden, his

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[http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/The\\_Obama\\_Moment\\_web\\_A4.pdf](http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/The_Obama_Moment_web_A4.pdf) (accessed on May 15, 2012)

<sup>458</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>459</sup> Mark Schrecker, “U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan: Flawed Assumptions Will Lead to Ultimate Failure,” *JFQ*, issue 59, 4th quarter 2010, p. 76, available at [http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-59/JFQ59\\_75-82\\_Schrecker.pdf](http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-59/JFQ59_75-82_Schrecker.pdf) (accessed on May 15, 2012)

<sup>460</sup> Leslie H. Gelb, “Why Obama Won’t Speed U.S. Troop Withdrawal in Afghanistan”

<sup>461</sup> New York Times News, “Obama’s Remarks on Bin Laden’s Killing,” 2 May 2011, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/02/world/middleeast/02obamatext.html?pagewanted=1&r=1&ref=asia> (accessed on May 16, 2012)

<sup>462</sup> *Ibid.*

predecessor released a statement saying, “this momentous achievement marks a victory for America, for people who seek peace around the world, and for all those who lost ones on September 11, 2001.”<sup>463</sup> Thus, for both President Obama and Bush administrations, the death of Bin Laden seemed as the most visible success for the US politics whereas Bin Laden was the person against who the war in Afghanistan declared to disrupt al-Qaeda under his leadership.

Over the course of the past decade, Osama Bin Laden was depicted as the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks on American soil after the end of Cold War era and as the face of global terror.<sup>464</sup> In this context, there are significant points to be made. First is the acceptance of the death of Bin Laden as a triumphant day for an American president who altered the policy after his predecessor. Simultaneously, this implies a reinforcement of the reputation, power and the influence of America.<sup>465</sup> The second point is the place where Bin Laden was found which was in the city of Abbottabad in Pakistan locates about an hour’s drive north from Islamabad, the capital. Hence, he was not caught in a distant tribal area along Afghan-Pakistan border where it had long been assumed he had taken cover.<sup>466</sup> More significantly, Abbottabad has a large Pakistani regiment and a military academy.<sup>467</sup> Although this might be a coincidence it has led to a questioning of how Bin Laden travelled to Abbottabad from Afghanistan and whether Pakistan

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<sup>463</sup> SALT TV Network, “Former President George W. Bush Comments on Bin Laden’s Death, 1 May 2011, available at <http://www.salttvnetwork.com/articles/20110501/former-president-george-w-bush-comments-bin-ladens-death> (accessed on May 16, 2012 )

<sup>464</sup> Peter Baker, Helene Cooper and Mark Mazzetti, “Bin Laden is Dead, Obama Says,” *New York Times*, 1 May 2011, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/02/world/asia/osama-bin-laden-iskilled.html?pagewanted=all> (accessed on May 16, 2012)

<sup>465</sup> Roger Cohen, “The Post-Bin Laden World,” *New York Times*, 2 May 2011, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/03/opinion/03iht-edcohen03.html?ref=asia> (accessed on May 17, 2012)

<sup>466</sup> Peter Baker, Helene Cooper and Mark Mazzetti, “Bin Laden is Dead, Obama Says”

<sup>467</sup> The Academy described as the Pakistan’s West Point is based on Kakul Road and the Frontier Force Regiment is based in Abbottabad and consists of 67 armoured artillery battalions. For more details see: [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rj-eskow/bin-ladens-cave-a-golf-co\\_b\\_856139.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rj-eskow/bin-ladens-cave-a-golf-co_b_856139.html) (accessed on May 17, 2012)

knew where Bin Laden was.<sup>468</sup> Although President Obama stated that Pakistan helped lead the US forces to the compound where Bin Laden was located, there has been no answer to the questions about why at that moment and not before Bin Laden was found and why he stayed in Pakistan. The last point is that Bin Laden was buried at sea to prevent the possibility of a shrine establishment for Laden followers.

In the long run, the killing of Bin Laden could mark the beginning of the end for the US intervention in Afghanistan. However, as the Obama administration states, this does not mean that the US efforts against al-Qaeda will not end. In direct contradiction, Bin Laden was a liability for the Taliban who had a stronger interest in retaking control of Afghanistan than waging a global jihad.<sup>469</sup> Now, the Taliban might move away itself from al-Qaeda and re-impose its authority over the remnants of its followers in Afghanistan. For al-Qaeda, it has already been trying to attack the US and the larger challenge remains as to whether the US can press and further dismantle al-Qaeda in the border lands of Afghanistan and Pakistan.<sup>470</sup>

#### **4.5 Conclusion**

The unilateral manner of the first Bush administration reached to peak with the invasion of Iraq, which undermined the transatlantic cooperation by creating a split within the European allies. Again it was the Bush administration, albeit within a modified structure, that considered the Afghan war to be “the good war.” This resulted in NATO’s takeover of the command of ISAF in Afghanistan. Now, the commitment of the EU member states to ISAF under NATO mission have been tested, but, despite certain achievements, the coordination of the EU and

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<sup>468</sup> Nicholas Kristof, “After Osama Bin Laden...,” *New York Times.Com*, 2 May 2011, available at <http://kristof.blogs.nytimes.com/2001/05/02/after-osama-bin-laden/?ref=asia> (accessed on May 18, 2012)

<sup>469</sup> Barak Mendelsohn, “A Devastating Blow,” *New York Times*, 24 May 2011, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/05/02/the-war-on-terror-after-osama-bin-laden/a-devastating-blow-to-al-qaeda> (accessed on May 18, 2012)

<sup>470</sup> Nicholas Kristof, “After Osama Bin Laden...,” *New York Times.Com*



NATO has heavily relied on the willingness of their member states. However, it appears that these efforts are no more than currying favour with the US.

The establishment of EUPOL marks to the inability of the EU under ESDP operation, which declared as operational in 2001, immediate after the war, but failed to materialise until 2007. This mission of the EU is problematic in itself in terms of the weak cooperation with NATO. On the one hand, EUPOL is far away from a general agreement with PRTs on the issue of security provision of its personnel for years. On the other hand, the task of training the ANA has been through separate approaches, which encourages competition between NTM-A and EUPOL rather than fostering cooperation.

In the second round of the Bush administration, in accordance with the search for enhancing relations with Europe, the US was willing to cooperate with the European allies in Afghanistan. Although during the Obama administration there were attempts to increase that cooperation, this occurred in the knowledge that the US had given a timetable for its withdrawal from Afghanistan. Thus, the existent difficulties within and between the EU and NATO missions remained still unresolved to a larger extent.

## **CHAPTER 5**

### **CONCLUSION**

The scope of EU-NATO cooperation was limited in the Cold War environment, characterized by the confrontation of USSR and the US as super powers. However, the impetus for EU-NATO relations was laid in post-Cold war period. This is the period in which the dissolution of the Soviet Union established the momentum for the US as the single super power. This unipolar power of the US, together with the inclusion of East Germany in NATO with the fall of Berlin wall, were marked changes to the international environment. This, in turn, came to mean also a change in relations of the EU-NATO within the reconfiguration of post-Cold War.

The post-Cold War era, on the one hand, brought the renewal of the importance of NATO. On the other hand, it gave dynamics for the EU to refocus on European security and defence structure. Because the US was the central power of this period, the interface of both organizations were not analysed without the decisive role of the US. In the case of the US, the emphasis was on burden-sharing with the Alliance and that was the reason why the US supported Europe within the framework of NATO. Despite the confirmation of the US for the efforts of the EU to take over the responsibility in terms of security and defence matters to some extent, it was again the US who had always underscored the predominance of NATO as a major security institution of Europe.

More significantly, the post-Cold War era revealed that the definition of enemy is no longer clear and the security concerns of Cold War period were irrelevant. The end of the Cold War brought on new dangers in line with the new tensions. In this regard, the regional ethnic-base conflicts in Yugoslavia and Balkans, and the war in the Gulf region gave further importance to the cooperation in the areas of foreign and security policy. In addition, these conflicts were combined with the adaptation of NATO through going beyond the collective defense mission whereas the EU started to get involved in foreign and security issues through

having an aim to be an effective international actor. Hence, the EU and NATO had converged on the ground of crisis management and peacekeeping operations.

It is important to highlight that both the adaptation process of NATO and the defence efforts of the EU were established under the influence of the US. In this respect, the new strategic concept of NATO -in order to enlarge the concept of security- and the emergence of ESDI -as a defence project within NATO- and then its turning to ESDP -to seek an autonomous EU in terms of decision-making and defence matters-, were shaped through the US concerns in accordance with its overall aim to prevent the duplication of NATO. However, the Kosovo War demonstrated that, on the side of the EU, these efforts failed because the EU member states had military deficiencies and mainly relied on the US for providing security. Hereafter, the EU decided to heavily concentrate on ESDP by beginning from Helsinki EU Council in order to make gradual progress regarding its military and defence capabilities. On the side of NATO, it was revealed that the Alliance, also, had a necessity to improve its capabilities in order to effectively address the new hazards. At that point, while it could be considered that activities of the EU and NATO coincided with each other in post-Cold War period, it was also displayed that the US had the superiority over them. In other words, the US benefited the most by reinventing the NATO.

The emphasis on the uncertainty of enemies, as the legacy from the post-Cold War era, has been placed at the top of the world agenda after the attacks of 9/11. This watershed moment affected the US engagement with the rest of the world and placed the fight against terrorism and its use of weapons of mass destruction as a top priority. In this way, it was obvious that the attacks against America would put an undeniable mark on both the policy of the US and the positions of regional and security organizations, especially the EU and NATO.

In a broader sense, in response to the 9/11 attacks, President G.W. Bush initiated the term, "Global War on Terror," and started the Afghan war with an aim to both overthrow Taliban and eradicate al-Qaeda. In this regard, while NATO invoked the Article V for the first time in response to such attacks, the EU declared its support for the US in combatting terrorism. At that point, Afghanistan became the test case for the EU-NATO relations in accordance with the

management of the US in the “War on Terror.” Hence, the war in Afghanistan tests the credibility of the Alliance and simultaneously evaluates the involvement of the EU, while also measuring the willingness of both organizations.

The first phase of war in Afghanistan, until the stuck of the US in Iraq, showed that the first Bush administration preferred “the coalition of willing powers” by taking lessons from the war in Kosovo. This was followed by a unilateral manner of the US which became the Bush doctrine in 2002 NSS. In this way, the Bush administration had an aim to deploy its forces unilaterally and associate allies under the title of “the coalition of willing powers” in order to maintain the freedom to determine when to proclaim victory and exit. Attempting to extend the realm of free movement, but paying less attention both to the EU and NATO in order to avoid any organizational basis, facilitated the individual commitments from members of both parties instead of fostering unity.

On the one hand, this led to splits within the EU, especially among Britain, France, Germany and the smaller European countries. On the other hand, NATO was turned to fulfill the transformation process particularly in regard to military engagement in the fight against terrorism. From the perspective of the US, only the use of NATO’s assets to some extent was preferable without inviting the whole NATO structure and the provision of bilateral support from member states of the EU was adequate in dealing with Afghanistan. Consequently, according to the US, few of the European countries had high-tech military capabilities that the US wanted to exploit in combatting Taliban and al-Qaeda. Hence, for the US, it was more available to use the special forces from various European countries. This combined with the reluctance of the US to work with NATO’s organizational structure or the EU countries. Therefore, in military terms, it would be easier and more effective to manipulate the war through the US chains of command, which, in return, constrained the ground for the organizational relations between the EU and NATO.

The unilateral interventions of America and Britain in Iraq put forward the fissure in Europe. France, Germany and Belgium led the opposition against the war in Iraq, while Britain, Spain, Italy, Denmark and most of the central and eastern European states supported the policy of the US, which gave way to US-led

discussion of an old versus new Europe. This is significant in the sense that it was France and Germany who gave the immediate support to the US for the war in Afghanistan, but it was again the Franco-German axis that strongly opposed the war in Iraq. What is more, the inability of the EU in making foreign policy against the US paved the way for the rift within the EU. In addition, after the accelerated insurgency in Iraq and the effort to provide long-term stability in Afghanistan, the Alliance's role was solidified. In this way, after NATO took command over ISAF by NATO, it was implied that Afghanistan was still the "good war" after the crisis in Iraq.

In this consideration, the second Bush administration sought to raise the troop numbers in Afghanistan under the NATO-led ISAF in accordance with the broader assistance from both organisations. Hence, the second term of Bush administration had a change in its discourse by searching for more commitments to the war in Afghanistan. Thus, instead of having a strong unilateralist policy, the manner of the second administration modified to a multilateralist one, minimizing the unilateral action but reserving the act of unilaterally as indicated in 2006 NSS. Such a policy tended towards the EU and NATO allies by implying that Afghanistan would continue be a solid ground to test the international partners under the title of dealing with terrorism. Furthermore, the second term of the administration was welcomed by the new president of France, Nicolas Sarkozy, who decided to return France to NATO's integrated military command structure. This was the reinvigoration of the relationship between France and the US, which was exemplified by France increasing the troop numbers for ISAF. The aftermath of the attacks of 9/11 was a moment from the last decades when France was clearly in support of backing NATO militarily. The Bush administration altered its discourse when the situation became more difficult to cope with and it was the time of rehabilitation rather than to immediately overthrow the existent authority. This was a basis upon which both the EU and NATO were able to cooperate in the war in Afghanistan.

In this conjuncture, the member states of the EU have contributed to ISAF by sending troops under the NATO umbrella as part of the efforts the campaign in Afghanistan. Such commitments to ISAF by member states of the EU were

mainly materialized on the political will of major powers. At that point, the main problems for cooperation of the EU and NATO under a NATO mission of ISAF can be stated as follows: The national caveats on troops which could limit the use of military capabilities and the deployment areas during the campaign, difficulties in raising troop numbers, and misconduct of the mission for either stabilization or combat or both of them but to what extent are critical issues that needed to be solved among the allied member states. In addition, whilst ISAF evolved in whole Afghanistan through PRTs, the PRTs under the military command of ISAF presents an ambiguity to providing coordination. This comes to mean that the civil-military integration of such a unit leads to the complicating of civilian and military duties. Furthermore, due to their dependence on their national budget, the PRTs are heavily constructed in accordance with the manipulation of the lead-nation(s). Nevertheless, the weakness of intelligence sharing and low-level contacts with one another particularly due to the limitations on military involvements and only being subordinate to the military command of ISAF, destroyed the grounds for cooperation of both the EU and NATO members. As a result, the cooperation of both allies remained subject to the will of the states due to the lack of budgetary and staffing problems. Under the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan, the member states of both EU and NATO have limited the already fragile scope of cooperation.

Until May 2007, the EU did not have a common ESDP mission regarding Afghanistan. In 2007, the EU established a joint declaration with the Afghan Government and it has given humanitarian and economic assistance in addition to its troop contributions to ISAF. However, a EU mission under the framework of ESDP has launched at the insistence of the US, Canada, Netherlands and Britain in the Riga Summit. In other words, the EUPOL has been dispatched as an answer to the pressure of the US for accelerated EU commitment to the war in Afghanistan. This is the police training mission of the EU, which had been led by Germany since 2002 under GPPT, and in 2007 was transferred to the EU as a whole. Since 2007, the EUPOL mission in Afghanistan was enlarged from reforming the police sector to include the rule of law and counter-narcotics.

Since the beginning, the EUPOL has been plagued by the inability and sometimes unwillingness of the member states on the issue of staff and resource deployment, together with either the personnel shortage or the limitations on them, due to national duty, and the lack of budgetary autonomy and limited material supports. Moreover, due to its civilian mandate, the mission does not qualify for NATO protection, which in return constrains the personnel intervention on the ground. Additionally, the differentiation between the NTM-A and the EUPOL in training police personnel is leading to deep complications of civilian oriented police reform and a military police-building one. Although new arrangements were organized in between EUPOL and NTM-A in 2011 over the division of labour and sharing a common database, it is still very early to evaluate whether lasting changes will occur. The examination of very recent events will be appraised within the wider process. However, due to the dominant role of the US in terms of stabilization efforts in Afghanistan, the superiority of NTM-A in comparison to EUPOL, causes competitiveness among the both allies.

Therefore, the overall picture in Afghanistan is very complicated in terms of the relations between the EU and NATO. On the one side, the EU member states are involved under the NATO-led mission in which the priority of member states of both are at the front. On the other side, the EU member states are contributing to a civilian mission under the EUPOL umbrella whereas NATO members states are also committing to NTM-A. However, a common style between EUPOL and NTM-A does not exist especially for the training. Consequently, this draws a weak, competitive and complex structure.

Under the Obama administration, the ongoing relations between the EU and NATO have not yet shown any radical difference. Although the Obama administration demanded more troops from the European countries, he announced simultaneously the removal timeline for those troops, which may be defined as a regulated withdrawal strategy. However, it is of great significance that while the end of the second Bush administration was approaching, there was an attempt to try new arrangements about the Afghan policy both on withdrawal and the issue of Pakistan. These policies have gained more attention and been solidified under the declaration of Obama's Af-Pak policy. Therefore, whereas the name of the

policies under the new president have changed as clearly shown in the 2010 NSS, lots of implications at the practical ground have remained the same, which is particularly visible with the continuity of Robert Gates as the Defence Secretary in the Obama Administration. Furthermore, the death of Bin Laden could be used as the claim of America's victory for the whole Afghan war after the completion of the transitional process. While the general aim of Inteqal is the transition of both missions' tasks, including EUPOL and ISAF, to the ANSF under the authority of Kabul government, the ongoing situation in Afghanistan exposes both sides of the coin: On the one side, it is the killing of American soldiers by Afghan soldiers, who are trained though international cooperation with American soldiers and on the other side of the coin, it is the shooting of Afghan people by the US or NATO soldiers who are believed by Afghans to have come to Afghanistan to provide their security. Thus, the death of Bin Laden could just be considered as an excuse by the President Obama while waiting to fulfill the withdrawal timeline. Based on the timeline, the missions of the EU and NATO also will be finished by the end of 2014 despite the possibility of retaining any number of staff in Afghanistan for an emergency situation.

Lastly, the Afghan case has an inherited speciality in accordance with its lack of well-established state structure throughout its history, corrupted institutions, high amount of poppy crops and its distant location, which make any cooperation on its soil more difficult. Nevertheless, the "War on Terror" as applied by the US in unilateralist manner, increased the tumultuous situation of Afghanistan. On those grounds, the relations of the EU and NATO has tried to be facilitated after a while of bypassing the organisational structures. Later on, the unilateral discourse was modified at the extent of stability provision by the inclusion of NATO-led ISAF and the civilian mission of the EU. While the two missions of both organisations are hoped to survive, the already fragile feature of the context is exacerbated by the limitations of the alliances. And as the time nears for an exit strategy from Afghanistan, it is clear that both missions, to a large extent, failed to create a functional state structure in Afghanistan.

All in all, the cooperation between the EU and NATO in Afghanistan, to a certain extent, has helped enhance relations between the US and major European



actors, for instance, France returning to the military wing of NATO. However, because of the difficulties existence in Afghanistan and the fault lines in the overall policy towards Afghanistan, the EU-NATO relations have not produced a promising structural cooperation. To this extent, the test of the EU-NATO relations may be regarded as a half-success story. It may further be stated that the Obama administration's strategy may be regarded as continuation of the second term of Bush administration's attempt to rehabilitate the US-European relations through promoting cooperation between the EU and NATO.

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