

MARGINALIZED OR EMPOWERED? CONFLICT-INDUCED
INTERNALLY DISPLACED KURDISH WOMEN'S EXPERIENCES
IN TURKEY

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ABSTRACT

MARGINALIZED OR EMPOWERED? CONFLICT-INDUCED INTERNALLY DISPLACED KURDISH WOMEN'S EXPERIENCES IN TURKEY

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This study is focusing on the conflict-induced internally displaced Kurdish women's experiences. There has been an ongoing internal armed conflict in Turkey since 1984 and one of the consequences of this conflict is the internal displacement that occurred in 1990s. In the displacement process, women and other family members were victimized. They did not only lose their homelands, but they also had to struggle in the city centers with poverty and discrimination.

After they started to live in the city centers, women may become both marginalized and empowered. The aim of the study is to understand the situations that lead Kurdish women to be marginalized and/or empowered in the cities to which they have been forced to migrate. After the displacement process, which is one of the major victimization processes for these women, some of them may be trapped in ethnic and gender-based discrimination and may become more marginalized in the city centers. But marginalization and empowerment are not fixed categories and there is always a possibility for these women to transform their marginalized position into empowerment. By political engagement, working outside house and/or being head of the household these women may break the cycle of their marginalization and become empowered in the city centers.

Keywords: Internal displacement, women's empowerment, marginalization, empowerment to cope, empowerment to change.

ÖZ

MARJİNALLEŞME Mİ GÜÇLENME Mİ? TÜRKİYE’DE ÇATIŞMA TEMELLİ YERİNDEN EDİLMİŞ KÜRT KADINLARIN DENEYİMLERİ

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Bu çalışma, çatışma temelli yerinden edilmiş Kürt kadınların deneyimleri üzerine odaklanmaktadır. Türkiye’de 1984 yılından beri silahlı bir iç çatışma süregelmektedir. 1990’larda gerçekleşen yerinden edilmeler, bu iç çatışmanın sonuçlarından biridir. Yerinden edilme sürecinde kadınlar ve diğer aile fertleri mağdur olmuşlardır. Sadece evlerini kaybetmemişler aynı zamanda şehirlerde yoksulluk ve ayrımcılıkla mücadele etmek zorunda kalmışlardır.

Şehirlerde yaşamaya başladıktan sonra, kadınlar hem marjinalleşmişler hem de güçlenmişlerdir. Bu çalışmanın amacı da, kadınların göç etmek zorunda bırakıldıkları şehirlerde marjinalleşme ve/veya güçlenme durumlarını anlamaktır. Mağdur olma durumlarının en temellerinden biri olan yerinden edilme sürecinden sonra, bazı kadınlar etnik ve toplumsal cinsiyet temelli ayrımcılık kapanına sıkışmışlar ve şehir merkezlerinde daha da marjinal konuma düşmüşlerdir. Fakat marjinalleşme ve güçlenme durumları sabit kategoriler değildir ve her zaman marjinal durumun güçlenme durumuna evrilme olanağı vardır. Yerinden edilmiş kadınlardan bazıları şehir merkezlerinde, siyasal sorumluluk, ev dışında çalışma ve/veya aile resisi olma durumlarıyla marjinalleşme çemberinden kurtularak güçlenme durumuna geçebilmektedirler.

Anahtar kelimeler: Yerinden edilme, kadınların güçlenmesi, marjinalleşme, başa çıkmak için güçlenme, değiştirmek için güçlenme.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

There has been an ongoing internal armed conflict in Turkey since 1984 between the non-state armed group, known as Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan, PKK), and the state security forces, which mostly refers to the Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri (Turkish Armed Forces, TAF). Because the conflict occurs mainly in the rural parts of the East and Southeast regions of Turkey, Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü (Security General Directorate, SGD), i.e. the police, are relatively less involved in the conflict. La Haye (2008: 5) defines internal armed conflict as, “the use of armed force within the boundary of one state between one or more armed groups and the acting government, or between such groups”. Similarly, it is mentioned in Article 1(1) of Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions that, internal armed conflicts “must take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement (Protocol II)”.

There are different reasons for internal armed conflict, including political, economic, structural, social, cultural (Brown 1996: 13) as well as elite-level factors (Brown 2001: 15). The reasons for the internal armed conflict in Turkey include all the factors that Brown (1996, 2001) mentions above. Due to the politically sensitive environment since the establishment of the Republic, political institutions that have been discriminatory towards ethnic minorities, economic instability, modernization developments, unequal educational opportunities, ancient enmity between ethnic groups and most importantly, the controversial decisions and actions of the elites, have all contributed to the ongoing internal armed conflict in Turkey.

The consequences of this internal armed conflict in Turkey are various. The excessive number of battle-related deaths is one of the outcomes of the conflict. There are also lots of people who have disappeared. Another direct result of the conflict is the “internal displacement” from East and Southeast regions to the city centers. As it is well known, there is a direct and linear relationship between conflict and displacement. As more people are

affected by the conflict, more are displaced as a consequence of it (Kälin 2011). In times of armed conflicts, people are forced to migrate to other places. If this migration occurs in the boundaries of the same country, it is known as internal displacement. There are approximately 27 million people who are internally displaced around the world, according to the 2010 United Nations data. UN *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (2001)* describes Internally Displaced People (IDPs) as; “persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internally recognized state border” (Mooney 2005: 11). There are two important points in the definition. First, there should be a force or obligation to move and second, the move must take place within the boundaries of one country (TESEV 2007: 34).

There are different types of internal displacement. These are, “conflict-induced internal displacement”, “disaster-induced internal displacement” and “development-induced internal displacement”. Disaster-induced displacement is defined as the “situations arising from natural disasters such as earthquakes, floods, volcanoes, or soil erosion and human-made disasters such as radioactivity, nuclear leaks, and industrial accidents” (TESEV 2007: 80). Whereas development-induced displacement is identified as “the displacement of persons living in a particular inhabited area, in accordance with sufficient advance planning, and on the basis of a development project” (TESEV 2007: 80). Finally, in the case of conflict-induced displacement “administrations and governments may be directly or indirectly responsible for the displacement as they are parties to the said conflict or disagreement. Displacements occur as a result of the direct or indirect pressure exercised by governments or by the groups in conflict with the governments” (TESEV 2007: 81). Conflict-induced internally displaced people are defined by Kunz (1981 cited in Lindley 2008: 8) as having the “absence of original positive intent to move and flight in response to on-going violent conflict which threatens the migrant’s life and livelihoods”.

Displacement of the Kurdish population has been an ongoing “counter-insurgency” strategy towards the Kurdish population since the 1925 East Reform Plan in Turkey. This strategy is a form of human rights violation that has been used as a mechanism to solve the Kurdish insurgencies since the beginning of the Turkish Republic. It is argued that, there have been mainly three major insurgencies of the Kurdish population in Turkey. The first one is the

Sheikh Said insurgency in 1925, the second one is the Dersim insurgency in 1934 and the final and the longest-running one is the PKK insurgency, started in 1984. In all three insurgencies, internal displacement was utilized by the state to empty the region of the Kurdish population and to cut the support from the villagers to the revolts. The roots of these insurgencies are based on the relationship of Kurds with the Ottoman Empire and their privileges and regional independence as a nation within the Empire's territory. In the Ottoman Empire, people were divided into Muslim and Non-Muslim categories (nation-millet) in the society and because Kurds are Muslims, they had the same rights as the ethnic Turkish population. The aim of the Turkish Republic to be a nation state composed of a Muslim-majority, Turkish-speaking nation, led to the negation of ethnic and religious identities other than "Turks" (Yıldız 2001: 100). With the Constitutional Law, established in 1924, the relationship of the nation with the other ethnic identities was shaken and the first Kurdish insurgency, Sheikh Said, was sparked because Kurds realized that they could not exercise full citizenship rights in the new republic (Yeğen 2009a: 12-13). As it is argued by most of the scholars who work on the subject of forced migration in Turkey, migrations that have been going on since the 1980s cannot be explained without taking into account the internal armed conflict and Kurdish issue in Turkey (Kaya 2009, TESEV 2007). Because of this reason, internal armed conflict in Turkey and the Kurdish issue are explored in detail in different chapters of the study.

Although there are some studies which focus on the internal displacement process in Turkey, they mostly lack a gender approach. They explain the effects of forced migration as being the same for both women and men. They are mostly inadequate to reflect the different experiences of women and girl children as a result of internal displacement. Hence, the different experiences of women and girl children in the cities after being forced to leave their homelands have not been evaluated enough in the existing studies that have been done in Turkey (Çağlayan et al. 2011: 29). The importance of this study is to focus on the experiences of women in the process of conflict-induced internal displacement in Turkey through 1990s. Thus, the aims of this study are to explore and critically analyze the experiences of conflict-induced internally displaced women in Turkey and contribute to the available knowledge regarding the way internal displacement affects women.

The main objective of the study is to examine whether internally displaced women are empowered and gain agency in the cities and challenge the patriarchal structure within their family and society or they are marginalized and trapped in patriarchal cycle more in a

different environment. In other words, the aim of the study is to understand the situations that lead Kurdish women to be marginalized and/or empowered in the cities to which they have been forced to migrate. These two situations for women are not fixed positions. Women may be trapped in the patriarchal and/or ethnic discrimination cycle more and may become marginalized in the city centers. But with some factors, such as political engagement, working outside house and/or being the head of the household, they may break the cycle and develop active agency, which may lead to empowerment of women after displacement. “Empowerment of women” concept in the study refers to the position of women that start “to realize their own worth and contributions in their families, which has potential to make women demand power and take action towards changing the structured gender inequality in society” as Erman et al. (2002: 396) explains. Throughout the study, empowerment concept is used as Erman et al. (2002: 396) defines alongside with the definition of Sharma (1991-1992 quoted in Batliwala 1994: 130), which is “a range of activities from individual self-assertion to collective resistance, protest and mobilization that challenge basic power relations”. According to these definitions, empowerment will be undertaken as a process starting from self-assertion to collective resistance and mobilization in order to change the existing power relations that include challenging the patriarchal gender order. It also contains transformation in structures and institutions, including governmental agencies as well as family. These two explanations of empowerment will exclusively be focused on in the study. Marginalization concept, on the other hand, refers to the process of impossibility for the individuals’ meaningful participation into the economic, religious and/or political status and symbols situation in a society (Marshall 1999: 472).

In this regard, the research question of the study is “What kind of experiences do the women go through during internal displacement and what is the importance of these experiences for women’s empowerment process?”. The main argument of the study is, internal displacement is a victimization process for the conflict-induced internally displaced women, who have been forced to leave their homelands and the victimization process may continue in the city centers. Therefore, with the negative consequences of the internal displacement, women may face ethnic and gender-based discrimination in the cities and may become marginalized after they were displaced. But, there is always a potential for women to spark active agency in this process and to be empowered. It is argued that the gender relations may be shaken in internal displacement process and there are different external factors for women, such as political engagement, working outside house and/or being head of the household that may interfere into women’s lives before and after the process. Victimization of women in conflict and

internal displacement process refer to the increase in women's physical and emotional vulnerability and the presence of the threats towards their human rights, such as increase of the violence against women, loss of family members and children and the exile from their homelands.

In this study, conflict-induced internally displaced women's experiences are focused instead of economic women migrants' experiences. Internally displaced women's experiences are based on the formation of the ethnic Kurdish identity, which is raised upon a collective trauma that Kurds have faced since the establishment of the Turkish Republic. This collective trauma may lead displaced women become politically engaged and active in the city centers different than the women, who have migrated with economic reasons. Rural to urban migration studies have also focused on women's situation after migration process into the cities. Because the experiences of women after conflict-induced displacement are different from economic migrations, alongside with the sociological explanations and concepts of women in rural to urban migration, Feminist International Relations (IR) Theory is focused in the study. Women's experiences in times of conflict and internal displacement are first studied by the Feminist IR Theory. Feminist IR Theory aims to make women's experiences valuable for the political arena in order to change the situation of women while finding solutions for their problems, which is seen as the missing part in the conventional IR theory. Most of the scholars in Feminist IR Theory share the perspectives of feminist standpoint position, postmodern feminism and critical feminist theory (Steans 1998: 35). A feminist approach suggests that there are some different consequences of forced migration for women. Two approaches have emerged from the theories about what happens to women in conflict in general and in the displacement process in particular. The first approach, essentialist feminism, views women's situation in times of conflict as "victims and marginalized group" and the second approach, feminist social constructivism, does not deny women's position as "victims" but argues that, there is a possibility for this situation to evolve into an "empowerment and/or active agency" position for women.

The essentialist approach is employed mostly by the standpoint feminist theories and argues that the world would be a peaceful place if it would be ruled by women because they are inherently peaceful beings. According to this point of view, women are the ones who suffer most in times of conflict and in the process of displacement. This approach positions women as the victims of the displacement process unquestionably and overlooks the transformative potential on women's lives such as women's agency and their empowerment in the process

of internal displacement. Social constructivism is opposed to any essentialism and denies women's inherent peacefulness and to positioning them as purely victims within conflicts. This approach is used mostly by postmodern feminism that is built on the theory of women's experiences. It argues that the gendered power and hierarchy situations are socially constructed (Tickner 2001: 18-19). Social constructivism deals with the potential of women's empowerment during and after times of conflict due to their experiences that differ from those of men, and argues that women are not victims of displacement by nature, but this victimization comes from the link between conflicts and patriarchy (Ertürk 2009). This study is based on the social constructivist approach and from a social constructivist point of view, Kurdish women in the process of conflict-induced internal displacement are argued to be not only victims and a marginalized population in the city center, but also there is a potential for them to develop active agency and be empowered in different aspects. In other words, women may become both marginalized and empowered in the city centers. Similarly Al-Ali (2007: 58) argues that, "women's and men's experiences of war, flight and diaspora formation are never unidimensional. Women should not be viewed solely as victims of war. They assume the key role of ensuring family livelihoods in the midst of chaos and destruction, they are active in peace movements at the grassroots level, they provide support for male soldiers, and they are themselves perpetrators of violence and killing".

The research is based on a qualitative study that includes primarily semi-structured in-depth interviews with 30 internally displaced women from the east and southeast of Turkey who now live in Diyarbakır, Mersin, and İstanbul, the cities in which most of the Kurdish population live after being displaced. These cities were chosen among the other ones because all three cities have Göç Edenler Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışma Derneği (Immigrants' Association for Social Cooperation and Culture, GÖÇ-DER) offices, which constitute the main gatekeepers of the study. In addition, these cities are like the representatives of the other cities in their region's situation. İstanbul is the city that was preferred in the western part of the country. Mersin is in the southern part of Turkey and represents the whole region. Diyarbakır on the other hand, represents the eastern side of Turkey and also has a privileged position among other cities such as Batman, Van, Bursa, Urfa, Adana, Antalya and İzmir because it is considered to be the capital of "Kurdistan" by the Kurdish population. In-depth interviews are used in order to obtain detailed information on the experiences of internally displaced Kurdish women and the interviews are supported by observations in some meetings.

This study is based on feminist methodology, as it aims to explain women's social reality in times of internal displacement and how their lives are oppressive, which classical approaches are too narrow to explain. The study is politically motivated to change the social inequality of the Kurdish women's situation in the society after the displacement process by encouraging their participation into the peace-making process. As Harding (1987: 6) mentions, traditional science only reflects men's experiences and also it is problematic because it gives precedence to white, Western, bourgeois men's perspectives. Feminist methodology has been used by the feminists to evaluate the existing methods to produce knowledge as masculinist and the existing understanding of the social life as gendered (Ramazanoğlu and Holland 2002: 15). In this regard it is mentioned that, feminist methodology is different than the other methodologies as it is shaped by feminist theory, politics and ethics and also it is taken from the experiences of women (Ramazanoğlu and Holland 2002: 16).

The field work lasted between May and August 2010. Six of the interviews out of 30 were conducted in Kurdish with the help of translators. I conducted my interviews through "purposeful sampling" in order to get the whole picture about the experiences of the internally displaced women, whether they are housewives or working women, whether they are peace activists or taking part in the armed struggle, whether they are politically engaged or politically detached, etc. According to Maxwell (2005: 88), "this is a strategy in which particular settings, persons, or activities are selected deliberately in order to provide information that can't be gotten as well from other choices". When the answers of the interviewees became repetitive, I decided to end the field research.

Some key concepts are used to elaborate the research question. These concepts are "political engagement", "political activity" and "gender awareness". "Political engagement" concept refers to women's knowledge of the ongoing Kurdish issue, internal armed conflict and their awareness of the reasons for the exile from their villages. If the woman defined her displacement as fate and the solution for the Kurdish issue as "religious brotherhood", then the woman was considered to be "politically unattached". "Political activity" on the other hand, is beyond political engagement, because these women are considered as activists struggling for Kurdish rights, especially members of the pro-Kurdish political party and/or Non-State Governmental Organizations (NGOs). The more the women get involved into the Kurdish rights movement, the more they are considered to gain "gender awareness" because of the women's engagement with the democratic socialist society ideology, which is

basically based on the “gender equality” insight of the Kurdish movement. According to this insight, without women’s emancipation, the emancipation of the nation would not be possible.

In the study, the marginalization and empowerment situations of internally displaced women are not used as unitary definitions. There are different positions to define both marginalization and empowerment situations of women. According to this consideration, marginalization of the internally displaced Kurdish women is divided into two situations: marginalization of women based on “ethnic discrimination” and marginalization based on “gender discrimination” in the cities. In the ethnic discrimination situations, discrimination based on the population’s Kurdishness is experienced. Women’s position is different than men’s in this situation because they do not know Turkish and because they are seen as the representatives of their nation. They experience ethnic-based discrimination more than men and as a consequence, it is more possible for them to be marginalized in the cities. Their experience of gender-based discrimination, on the other hand, is a result of the increased patriarchal control on women by male family members in the cities, as it is a new and an alienated environment for the family. It is possible for men to increase the control and oppression of women to protect the family’s “honor” in such an alienated environment.

The empowerment process of women in the cities also has two aspects. The first aspect is women’s “empowerment to cope” (Ertürk 2010) with the displacement process. In this situation, women are “empowered to cope” with the negative experiences, such as poverty, discrimination, etc. that they face in the cities. In the second aspect, they are “empowered to change” (Ertürk 2010) the ongoing patriarchal structure in the public and private spheres of their lives. “Empowered to cope” and “empowered to change” situations of the displaced women are based on some different factors, such as working outside house, being literate, taking part in the decision-making process in public and private spheres of life, etc. “Empowerment to change” situation leads women to work collectively and develops the collective action, which is a part of the politization of these women that based upon the development of the Kurdish identity.

The plan of the dissertation is as follows; in the next chapter, some of the important concepts and theories on forced migration will be examined. Causes and consequences of the internal armed conflict and internal displacement as one of the consequences of the internal armed

conflict will be discussed and the chapter ends with the explanation of the guiding principles on internal displacement.

In chapter three, starting from rural to urban studies, the theories that have focused on the experiences of women in the migration process will be evaluated. Then, different approaches to the changing situation of the conflict-induced internally displaced women will be overviewed. These different approaches that constitute the two debates in the Feminist International Relations Theory are essentialist feminism and feminist social constructivism. In order to understand the concept of empowerment, the roots of the concept should be discussed. In this regard, controversial concepts for the feminist theorists, active agency and autonomy will be explored in this chapter. After explaining the essentialist and social constructivist approaches towards the situation of internally displaced women, at the end of the chapter, an elaboration of the approaches for the internally displaced women's marginalization and/or empowerment situations in times of conflict will be presented.

In chapter four, the ongoing internal armed conflict and the internal displacement as the "counter-insurgency" strategy for the Kurdish population will be discussed. This chapter starts from the modernization process of Turkey that was based on homogenizing the society with the Kemalist reforms. Then the background of the Kurdish issue and the internal displacement policy before the establishment of the Turkish Republic will be explained. This chapter also includes the reports and case studies on conflict-induced internal displacement in Turkey. This chapter will end with the Kurdish women's position in the ongoing Kurdish movement, which examines the transformation in their symbolic representation into active agency in the struggle process.

Chapter five will be composed of the methodological approach, research techniques and the research process of the study. The research question, participants, the field, interviews and ethical considerations of the study will be explained in this chapter of the study.

Chapter six is the descriptive part of the dissertation. In this chapter, women's lives before the displacement process will be examined. Women's memories of the displacement process will be evaluated in order to provide women's experiences from all aspects of their lives.

In chapter seven, the factors that affect women's marginalization and/or empowerment in the cities after the displacement process will be analyzed. Different aspects of marginalization

and the different stages of empowerment for women in the cities will be discussed and at the end of the chapter, a new pattern for the situation of the internally displaced women will be proposed.

In the conclusion, it will be argued that, there is a potential for internally displaced women to be empowered in the cities, rather than remaining as passive victims. By taking account of the unquestionable victimization inherent in the internal displacement process, this study will claim that the internally displaced women may transform their victimization situation and escape from the marginalization factors that affect them after the displacement process. This study will indicate that, although it is a relatively rare opportunity for women to be “empowered to change” in the ongoing situation and struggle for gender equality in the public and private spheres of their lives, there is a high possibility for them to be “empowered to cope” with the negative consequences that they face in the cities.

CHAPTER II

INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT AND CONFLICT-INDUCED INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT

In this chapter of the study, first of all, the causes and the consequences of the internal armed conflict situations are discussed. After the Cold War Era in the 1990s, most of the conflicts occurred within the boundaries of countries, in other words, between the state armed forces and rebel groups or non-state armed groups. Similar to inter-state armed conflicts, civilians also become targets and they face destabilization, displacement and human rights abuses. Internal armed conflicts are also known as “intersurgencies” in military terminology. There are many reasons behind the emergence of internal armed conflicts, including structural, political, economic, social, and cultural factors. However, the main contributing factor is the elite-level activities which can also bring about human-rights abuses. “Ethnic conflict is often provoked by elites in times of political and economic trouble in order to fend off domestic challengers” (Brown 1996: 18).

Secondly, theories of forced migration are explained in general. Conflict-induced internal displacement is one of the consequences of the internal armed conflicts. The properties of this type of displacement among the other types and the Guiding Principles on the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) are also examined in the final sub-chapter of this chapter.

2.1. Causes and Consequences of Internal Armed Conflict

As La Haye (2008: 5) defines, internal armed conflict is “the use of armed force within the boundary of one state between one or more armed groups and the acting government, or between such groups”. There are different concepts that correspond with the term such as, rebellion, revolution, internal disturbances, violence, terrorism, guerrilla warfare, resistance, internal uprising, civil war, war of self-determination, etc. In this chapter and throughout the study, “internal armed conflict” will be used as the concept to define the situation in Turkey since 1984, when the most recent Kurdish insurgency was started by the non-state armed group, PKK.

Internal armed conflicts have increased and proliferated after the end of the Cold War in the 1990s. Internal armed conflicts are different from the inter-state conflicts in many ways. First of all, internal conflicts have a government army or militia fighting one or more rebel groups, whereas, an inter-state conflict has two armies fighting each other. Non-state armed groups aim for one or more objectives such as, “secession from or control over the state or parts of its territory, as well as resource exploitation” (Sriram et al. 2010: 13). On the other hand, similar to inter-state armed conflict, not only armed personnel, but also civilians are the targets in internal armed conflicts, being forced to flee both internally and to other countries. Civilians experience destabilization, displacement and human rights abuses (Sriram et al. 2010: 13).

Internal armed conflicts result in suffering mainly among civilians who are the targets of intimidation, assassination, rape, forced expulsion and systematic slaughter. Neighboring states are also affected as a result of forced migration since refugees are usually settled first in safe neighboring countries. Internal armed conflicts also demolish regional stability (Brown 1996: 3), since the neighboring countries are not always innocent and helpful but are sometimes contributors to internal armed conflicts (Brown 1996: 8). Although the international powers and organizations primarily deal with intra-state conflicts (Brown 1996: 9) it is also true that, “distant powers and, through them, international organizations have failed to prevent or resolve internal conflicts in many parts of the world” (Brown 1996: 11).

As mentioned above, the primary actors in internal armed conflicts are state security forces and a non-state armed group. The acts of the non-state armed groups are considered as “insurgencies”. Insurgency means, an organized armed political struggle that tries to obtain the control of the government. Some insurgencies, which historically are based on the dissatisfaction of human and material conditions, aim to break away from the state and form an autonomous one, whereas others aim to gain concessions from the government by using violence. Strikes, demonstrations, political activities, propaganda, coercion and diplomacy are the main tactics of insurgencies in order to gain active or passive support to achieve their goals. These tactics are used for the destruction of the symbolic economic and political symbols of the government. They target small state security forces in order to diffuse the perception that the government is unable to secure the population by using guerilla tactics, which can be listed as bombings, assassinations, kidnapping, threats, mutilation, murder, torture, and blackmail. The reason for using guerilla tactics is because the insurgents know that they cannot fight the state security forces in ordinary armed struggle, so they aim to

defeat the government politically and psychologically (Gallagher 1992: 33-35). Innocent parties, especially civilians, are targeted as a political and psychological weapon. Guerilla fighters actually target not the immediate victim, but the audience beyond them with a cheap, low-risk and very effective method (Gallagher 1992: 77-78).

There are multiple phases of an insurgency. In the first phase, the insurgency is in latent and incipient form, which can be defined as a relatively weak position of the insurgency in which the insurgents plan their activities, whether in rural or urban regions, and organize their campaigns and develop their ideological foundation. In this phase insurgents use psychological operations (PSYOPS), in order to “exploit grievances, heighten expectations, influence population, and promote the loyalty of insurgent members” (Gallagher 1992: 37). In the second phase, the insurgency movements are turned into guerilla warfare after gaining sufficient support to begin the warfare and other forms of violence against the government. Finally, in the third phase, which is defined as war, the movement reaches the point at which a conventional conflict begins between the forces of the insurgents and the state. To take an action against insurgencies with all military and other resources of the government is called as counterinsurgency which is based on the internal defense and development strategy (IDAD) “the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency” (Gallagher 1992: 37-39).

In military terminology, this situation is called as “counterinsurgency”, “low-intensity conflict”, “low-intensity warfare”, “counterterrorism”, “special operations”, etc. (Hippler 1988). But in Article 1(1) of Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, all these acts are called as the “internal armed conflict”, which refers to all armed conflicts that cannot be characterized as either international armed conflicts or wars of national liberation. Protocol II provides that internal armed conflicts “must take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement (Protocol II)”.

According to Brown (1996: 13), there are different reasons for internal armed conflicts. These are; structural, political, economic, social and cultural factors. Weak states, which refer to weak political legitimacy, political borders and political institutions, are the starting point of the structural factors. If the state is weak and getting weaker in time, independent

military preparations grow along the borders, which can then be seen as a security issue against the neighboring states defined as intra-state security concerns (Brown 1996: 15). Another structural factor is the ethnic geography of the state. If the state has ethnic minorities, it is more possible for them to experience internal armed conflict, but again to have a homogenous ethnic population cannot be a guarantee against having internal armed conflict, as there can be some other factors that may trigger the conflict (Brown 1996: 15). The living style of the ethnic minorities is also an important factor of internal armed conflict. As Brown (1996: 16) argues, if the ethnic minorities are intermingled with the rest of the population, internal armed conflict is less possible than it is in a separate living territory for the ethnic minorities.

Political factors are as important as the structural ones, which can be listed as, discriminatory political institutions, exclusionary national ideologies, inter-group politics and elite politics. The type and the fairness of the political system are important. If some groups are inadequately represented in government, courts, military, police and political parties and other related institutions, then there will be reasons for the internal armed conflict (Brown 1996: 16). Another important factor contributing to internal armed conflicts is the national ideology of the state. If nationalism and citizenship is based on primarily one ethnic group rather than the ethnicities of all the people living in the borders of the state, then conflict is more likely to happen (Brown 1996: 17). The probability of violence based on political, ideological, religious or ethnic differences may cause inter-group politics, and being dominated may be a reason for the conflict (Brown 1996: 18). The last determinant of the political factors is elite politics, i.e. “ethnic conflict is often provoked by elites in times of political and economic trouble in order to fend off domestic challengers” (Brown 1996: 18).

Economic problems, a discriminatory economic system and the trials and tribulations of economic development and modernization can be listed as the economic and social factors contributing to internal armed conflict. Industrialization and the introduction of new technologies that in turn effect migration and urbanization with disruption within the social systems and the family and other social changes, may cause instability in the country and lead to internal armed conflict (Brown 1996: 18-20). Cultural discrimination against minorities, such as unequal educational opportunities, legal and political bans on teaching and using minority languages, and constraints on religious freedom, can be listed as the discriminatory factors leading to internal armed conflict. The other factor is the assimilation of minorities by forcing population movements in and out of the region in which they live,

which can be referred to as “cultural genocide”. The other cultural factor that is effective is the “ancient enmity” between groups against each other, which refers to legitimate grievances based on historical facts. These can be counted as the cultural factors and in these conditions; the internal armed conflict is hard to avoid (Brown 1996: 20-22).

The five main factors above that may cause internal armed conflict are a step to start the analysis, but according to Brown, the main reason for internal armed conflict is the elite-level activities. “Elite decisions and actions are usually the catalysts that turn potentially volatile situations into violent confrontations” (1996: 23). “Bad leaders” and “bad neighbors”, the discrete actions of neighboring states, are the most important factors leading to internal armed conflicts for Brown, which are the missing points in the literature.

As Brown (2001: 15) mentions elsewhere, one of the main triggers of internal armed conflicts in a state is elite-level factors. Scholarly literature is inadequate to understand the roles of the elites and leaders and has mainly focused on structural, political, economic, social and cultural indicators. Although the other factors are undoubtedly important, “the decisions and actions of domestic elites often determine whether political disputes veer toward war or peace. Leaving elite decisions and actions out of the equation, as many social scientists do, is analytically misguided” (Brown 2001: 17). Some of the elite-triggered internal armed conflicts are based on ideological struggles, which are about the political, economic, and social affairs in a country that are either in economic or class terms or in fundamentalist religious phenomena. After the Cold War era, patterns have been changed into political, economic and cultural discrimination and the dissatisfaction with economic inequality. Criminal assaults on state sovereignty such as drug trafficking, is another elite-triggered internal armed conflict (Brown 2001: 18).

The third reason for the elite-triggered internal armed conflict is “raw power struggles”, which repress ethnic minorities and democratic activists. Brown (2001: 19) shows the internal armed conflict in Turkey as an example of this type. According to him, “the starting point is a lack of elite legitimacy, which sooner or later leads to elite vulnerability. Vulnerabilities can be brought about by weakening state structure, political transitions, pressures for political reform, and economic problems” (Brown 2001: 19). Weak structure of the state is as aforementioned another cause for the internal armed conflict.

The decisions of the elites in a state may lead to human rights violations which may be both one of the causes and consequences of internal conflicts (Sriram et al. 2010: 3). There is always more than one cause of conflicts; some may be more silent than others, but these causes are interrelated, coexist, and intersect, and in many conflicts, it is difficult to identify the main cause (Sriram et al. 2010: 15). Aside from the causes of internal armed conflicts listed above, Sriram et al. (2010: 4) similarly argues that, the causes include; “mistrust or grievances based upon ethnic discrimination or preferential treatment; competition over resources, whether political or economic; demands for political autonomy or independence; allegations of corruption; and myriad claims regarding current or past human rights abuses”. According to this view, human rights abuses constitute one of the major factors in internal armed conflicts and social conflict can be the consequence of the grievances over real or perceived denial of rights, which in other words means systematic discrimination, unequal access to education and health care, restricted expression of religion or denial of political participation based on race, ethnicity, caste, religion, language, or other characteristics.

Other reasons for conflicts can be illegal detention, extrajudicial execution, disappearances, torture, killings and/or genocide, which can also be counted as human rights violations. “Where civilians have already been targeted by such violence, whether committed by the state or by **non-state actors**, it is unlikely that peaceful resistance will have much effect, so it is yet more likely that affected individuals and groups will take arms to protect themselves” (Sriram et al. 2010: 5). On the other hand, human rights violations can be the consequences of conflicts. “A conflict may have been undertaken by the parties primarily out of concern to promote a political or ideological agenda or to promote the warfare of one or more identity groups, or over access to resources” (Sriram et al. 2010: 5).

2.2. Theorizing Forced Migration

In this part of the study, some theories that have been developed on the forced migration issue are given. Internal displacement is a kind of forced migration. If the displaced people stay within the borders of the state then they are called as Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), if they cross the borders of the origin state, then they are called refugees. Both of these types are composed of forced migrants. When a theory deals with forced migration, it may include both IDPs and refugees. According to Castles (2003: 13), forced migration includes, refugee flows, asylum seekers, internally displaced people and development-induced internally displaced people, all of which have increased significantly since the end

of Cold War. There are different enforcements causing forced migration and internal displacement and they will be explained in details below.

Migration is defined as a behavior that is composed of “an implicit dialogue between the conception of mobility as ‘changes in the places in which people live’ and mobility as ‘changes in the kinds of locational decisions which individuals make’” (Gale 1973: 257). According to Peterson (1958: 256-257), one of the first and best-known typologies on migration was developed by Henry Pratt Fairchild in 1925. According to this typology, there are basically four types of migration that happen from low culture to high culture or from high culture to low culture societies whether in peaceful or warlike times. If the migration happens from a low culture to high culture in warlike times, it is called an *invasion*. If the movement happens in reverse, from high culture to low culture, then this migration is called a *conquest*. If the migration flow goes from high culture to low culture, this type of migration refers to *colonization* type and finally if the cultures are on a same level, then this move is called as *immigration*. These migration types are represented schematically as in Table 2.1 below (Petersen 1958: 257):

Table 2.1: Fairchild’s Migration Typology

Source: Fairchild (1925)

Migration from	Migration to	Peaceful Movement	Warlike Movement
Low Culture	High Culture	-	Invasion
High Culture	Low Culture	Colonization	Conquest
Cultures on a Level		Immigration	-

Petersen (1958) constructs a migration model on five different types of movement. According to his migration theory, the first type of migration is *primitive type*, which results from an ecological push, which refers to the movements of “man’s inability to cope with natural forces” (Petersen 1958: 259). The second type of migration is called as *forced and impelled migrations*, although the push factor is ecological in the primitive migration type, in forced migration, the push factor is sometimes the state and sometimes an equivalent social institution. In *impelled migration type*, people have some power to decide whether or not to go but in forced migration type, they even do not have any choice (Petersen 1958: 261). In these three types of migrations, people are relatively passive. When the migrants are decisive elements, the type is called as *free migration*. “Free migration is always rather small, for individuals strongly motivated to seek novelty or improvement are not commonplace. The

most significant attribute of pioneers, as in other areas of life, is that they blaze trails that others follow, and sometimes the number who do so grows into a broad stream” (Petersen 1958: 263) and the migration type transforms from individual to *mass migration* type. The model is shown in Table 2.2 below:

Table 2.2: Peterson’s Migration Typology

Source: Peterson (1958: 266)

Relation	Migratory Force	Class of Migration	Type of Migration	
			Conservative	Innovating
Nature and man	Ecological push	Primitive	Wandering	Flight from the land
			Ranging	
State (or equivalent) and man	Migration policy	Forced	Displacement	Slave trade
		Impelled	Flight	Coolie trade
Man and his norms	Higher aspirations	Free	Group	Pioneer
Collective behavior	Social momentum	Mass	Settlement	Urbanization

Kunz (1973: 140) makes some differentiation between the displacement types. According to his typology, there is a form of displacement which is caused by flight that includes mass flight and individual or group escapes. The second displacement type is caused by force and includes army in flight or pursuit, separated army units, civilian evacuees, prisoners-of-war, expellees and population transfers, the banished, deported to captivity and forced laborers. The final type of displacement occurs because of absence and it includes delegations, travelers, etc.

Table 2.3: Kunz's Distribution of Some Demographic Characteristics by Form of Initial Displacement

Source: Kunz (1973: 143)

Refugee Movement		Refugee Characteristics			
Kinetic Type	Form of Displacement	Masculinity	Age	Educational Background	
Anticipatory	Door-to-door type refugee migration	Balanced Family Groups	Heads of Families mostly in the age 30-60 age groups	High to very high	
Acute Refugee Movements	Displacement by Flight	Mass Flight	Balanced: In wars low masculinity	All ages: In wars old and young over represented	Cross section
		Individual or group escape	High to very high masculinity	Active age groups predominate	Strongly biased towards higher education
	Displacement by force of discipline	Civilian evacuees	In the active age groups almost totally female	Children and old predominate	Highest educational strata almost totally absent. Otherwise cross section
		Army in flight or pursuit	Almost all male	Active age groups	Cross section
		Separated army units	All male	Active age groups	Cross section
	Displacement by force	P.O.W	All male	Active age groups	Cross section
		Expellees and population transfers	Balanced or slightly low masculinity	All age groups, old and young slightly over represented	Depending on policies an areas involved
		The Banished	Highly masculinity	Active age groups predominate	Usually high to very high
		Forced Labor	Highly masculinity or depending on policies	Active age groups including youths	Cross section on depending on policies
		Deported and concentrated	Depending on policies	Depending on policies	Depending on policies
	Displacement by absence	Displacement by absence	Balanced to slightly higher masculinity	Active age groups predominate	High to very high.

Kunz (1973: 141) explains displacement categories as shown in Table 2.3 above. Displacement by flight may occur as mass flights or individual and/or group escapes. Mass flights are caused by an immediate fear. On the other hand, individual or group escapes are

relatively more planned, prepared and secret actions. Displacement by force happens because of a disciplined and organized force and the population is moved outside of the country territory (and sometimes from their residence and stay in their own country). Displacement by absence happens in a peaceful environment and occurs when the person(s), such as member of delegations, diplomats, touring groups, travelers, etc., refuse to go back to their original state (or city/town) (Kunz 1973: 142).

According to Kuhlman (2000: 2), forced migration can be described “as migration under duress, in the face of a crisis of some sort. A crisis means that the condition is limited in time, the result of an event or a series of events, rather than a long-term condition. Duress implies that forced migration is explained mainly not by the motivation of the migrant, but by the crisis that made him flee”. In other words, he mentions that, whether the forced migration happens within the borders of a country or internationally, it is caused directly or indirectly by the state because the state has the monopoly over the violence and this violence is enough for people to leave their homes. Sometimes, people may move for the benefit of the nation or for their own good. An example of the former is the migrations caused by development projects and of the latter, migrations caused by natural disasters. Kuhlman has a typology for displacement. According to this typology, there are some factors that affect the displacement process such as the agents of the displacement cause, their motivation, the means that they use and the destination that the migrant chooses (in most cases). According to his theory, if the migrants are forced to flee their homes because of violence, they attempt to stay in their own country and if they can find any other possibility they may leave the country then. These arguments are schematized in Table 2.4 below:

Table 2.4: Kuhlman's Typology of Displacement

Source: Kuhlman (2000: 3)

Agent	Motivation	Means	Destination
Government	Development	Direct compulsion	Resettlement area (internal)
	Ethnic cleansing	Direct compulsion	Internal (usually organized)
			International (usually a particular country)
		Random violence	First internal (random) Then international (random)
	Persecution	International (random)	
	Eliminating dissidents	Direct compulsion	International (usually a particular country)
			Internal exile (organized)
		Random violence	First internal (random) Then international (random)
			Persecution
	Deportation of foreigners	Direct compulsion	Country of origin
Terrorist Groups (sponsored by state or acting in lieu of state)	Ethnic cleansing	Random violence	Internal (random)
			International (random)
	Eliminating dissidents	Random violence	Internal (random)
			International (random)
Commercial entities (with state backing)	Slave trade	Direct compulsion	Internal market
			World market
Natural disasters	Fear, loss of home, loss of livelihood	Controlled evacuation	Resettlement area (internal)
		Flight	Internal (random)

2.3. Conflict-Induced Internal Displacement as one of the Consequences of Internal Armed Conflict

“The salient fact about the war in the post-cold war era is that, apart from Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, it has taken place almost exclusively *within* the borders of states” (Cohen and Deng 1998a: 5). Because internal displacement is noticeable after the Cold War period, it is viewed mostly as the post-Cold War phenomenon as these conflicts have been directly affected by the Cold War policies (Cohen and Deng 1998b: 19). The first reason for the increased internal displacement is the nature of the conflicts that has changed after the Cold War and the rise of communal violence (Stremlau 1998 cited in Vincent 2001: 2), which uses the strategy of civilian displacement as a political and military objective. Secondly, the unwillingness of countries to accept refugees has also increased and these people who cannot be asylum seekers are caught in the borders of their own state (UNHCR 1997 cited in Vincent 2001: 2).

As mentioned above, mostly in times of armed conflicts and wars, people that are living in a territory that is under attack are forced to migrate to another place. This move can be either internal or international. If the move remains within the boundaries of a country, it is called internal displacement. Because it is a coerced and involuntary act, it is also a type of forced migration, which remains within the borders of one state. As Castles and Miller (2003: 30-31) argue, there is a difference between economically motivated migration and forced migration, which can be because of persecution, human rights abuse and violence. Kemirere in her thesis explains the situation of forced migration as “there is no prior intention or plan to leave. The concept describes a complex emergency situation that forces communities to relocate due to a particular type of disaster” (Kemirere 2007: 1).

On the other hand some scholars argue that the distinction between voluntary and forced migration is not valid anymore. Richmond (1988 cited in Boyle et al. 1998: 200) mentions that, the distinction between economic migrants and socio-politically motivated migrants is blurred, because in most cases the movement is due to the combination of two motives. He also points out that the dichotomy of voluntary and involuntary migration is impossible. Indra (1999: 18), in contrast, argues that “a key dimension of forced migration – whether politically, economically, environmentally or developmentally driven – is just that: it is forced”. In other words, according to Indra, the reason is not important; even if migration is economically driven, if the situation is forceful enough to lead to migration, if there is no

other choice, then this migration must be called forced migration. Similarly Lindley (2008: 9) mentions that, although migration is conceived of in dichotomies like force-choice, politics-economics and conflict-peace, usually the reality is blurred and most of the migrations occur as a combination of both force and choice.

According to the second Representative of the Secretary-General on the Human Rights of the Internally Displaced Persons, Walter Kälin (2011: 43), in the year that he started his duty in 2004, the number of displaced people in the world was 25 million and in the time he handed his mandate to Chaloka Beyani in 2010, the number had reached to more than 27 million. The UN Secretary General defined Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in 1992 as; “persons who have been forced to flee their homes suddenly or unexpectedly in large numbers, as a result of armed conflict, internal strife, systematic violations of human rights or natural or man-made disasters, and who are within the territory of their own country” (Cohen and Deng 1998b: 16). In 1998, the definition above was found narrow for describing internally displaced persons and a new definition was adopted by the United Nations *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (2001)* which describes internally displaced people as; “persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internally recognized state border” (Mooney 2005: 11).

There are two important points in the definition of internal displacement: first; there should be a force or obligation and second; the move must be within the boundaries of one country (TESEV 2007: 34). Another important point about internal displacement is that, it mostly happens because of internal conflict between state security forces and non-state armed groups (TESEV 2007: 36). Because there is no single organization that deals with internal displacement, with the suggestion of the first UN Representative of the Secretary-General on the Human Rights of the Internally Displaced Persons, Francis Deng, (mandated between 1992-2004), a collaborative approach was organized as mentioned in his options and recommend action (E/CN.4/1993/35), which put the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) at the center to strengthen the coordination between the organizations in times of emergency and a management model for assistance and protection of internal displacement is organized that includes local authorities and government and UN agencies, as well as other

national organizations and international and national NGOs to work together in the process (Vincent 2001: 3).

According to Holmes (2008: 3), IDPs are not identified and protected as the refugees and are usually vulnerable because they lose their property and access to livelihoods, they may separate from their families, and are discriminated against because they are displaced. Sometimes they lack any identity cards, they do not have any access to basic services, and they cannot exercise their political rights. They are vulnerable to gender-based and sexual violence and their vulnerability is difficult to measure. They lose their dignity and as the period of displacement extends, they lose their sense of hope.

An internally displaced population is the largest at-risk group who is unable to access adequate food, health, and proper shelter because as Cohen and Deng (1998b: 159) mention, the international community has difficulties defining who they are and gathering information about them, so it becomes difficult to reach them. Apart from the difficulties of identification and gathering information about the displaced population, as Korn (1999: 2) expresses, states and the other non-state armed groups may be a part of the abuse of internally displaced people and the population lacks the protection of the international community because they do not cross the borders of their own countries. As a negative consequence of displacement, “a crisis of national identity” occurs and as it is conceptualized, authorities of the governments are usually alien to people from different races, ethnicities, languages, cultures, or religions. For the internally displaced population, the government is not their authority, and this is the situation throughout the world, which makes a cleavage in national unity. One of the examples of this crisis of identities is in Turkey between Turks and Kurds (Korn 1999: 7-8). As Kälin (2011: 44) mentions, IDPs are not always living in camps after fleeing from violence and armed conflict. The reality is more complex as they are living outside camps, mostly dispersed in urban areas. Therefore, assistance and protection should be given with awareness of this reality. Also, there are some vulnerable groups such as women – especially women heading households –, children, the elderly, disabled people, people with chronic illnesses and those belonging to ethnic minorities and indigenous people among the IDPs and special practices should not be overlooked and applied to these groups. Another important point is, it is the government’s responsibility to address the internal displacement in their states but usually the governments are not taking this responsibility.

According to Türkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler Vakfı (Turkey Economic and Social Studies Foundation, TESEV) (2007), there are different types of internal displacements, which are called as; “conflict-induced internal displacement”, “disaster-induced internal displacement” and “development-induced internal displacement”. Disaster-induced displacement is defined as the “situations arising from natural disasters such as earthquakes, floods, volcanoes, or soil erosion and human-made disasters such as radioactivity, nuclear leaks, and industrial accidents” (TESEV 2007: 80). Whereas development-induced displacement is identified as “the displacement of persons living in a particular inhabited area, in accordance with sufficient advance planning, and on the basis of a development project” (TESEV 2007: 80). Finally, in the case of the conflict-induced displacement “administrations and governments may be directly or indirectly responsible for the displacement as they are parties to the said conflict or disagreement. Displacements occur as a result of the direct or indirect pressure exercised by governments or by the groups in conflict with the governments” (TESEV 2007: 81) and conflict-induced internally displaced people are defined by Kunz (1981 cited in Lindley 2008: 8) as having the “absence of original positive intent to move and flight in response to on-going violent conflict which threatens the migrant’s life and livelihoods”.

Throughout the world, the majority of the displacement is because of conflict between ethnic groups or between the government and racial, linguistic, cultural or religious minorities. The question that has arisen from this reality is why communities start fighting each other, even after living in peace for centuries. The answer to that question is “sometimes, communal rivalries were first exacerbated by the police of a colonial power that favored one community over another, and subsequently by political elites that sought to gain, perpetuate, or strengthen their hold on power by excluding other groups or by inciting against a particular group demonized as ‘the enemy’ or ‘the other’”. In other words, ethnicity is used as a weapon in order to start a civil strife (Cohen and Deng 1998a: 3).

Displaced persons are prejudged as the enemy “either through their association with an insurgent group, an opposing political or ideological tendency, or more generally with an ethnic, cultural, religious, or social group considered inferior, threatening or simply ‘other’” (Cohen and Deng 1998b: 6). Mooney (2005: 15) similarly argues that the displaced population is usually stigmatized and viewed in suspicion and hostility in the cities where they have migrated. In some of the countries, the displaced population is concentrated in camps or special settlements, which may be reachable, but in some other countries, they may

be dispersed and it is difficult to identify displaced people and gain access to them. When displacement happens because of natural or man-made disasters, governments are more ready to assist the people, but if it happens because of conflict or political causes, then governments are less willing to protect the population. They justify their neglect by claiming that they are defending their national sovereignty (Cohen and Deng 1998b: 6-7). The destruction of the displaced people's living standards is a common phenomenon, such as theft of crops and livestock, and/or bombing or burning the shelters or usurping private homes of the population are among the experiences especially in the conflict situation. When these people want to return to their home towns after the conflict, they might find their homes have been occupied by some other people (Cohen and Deng 1998b: 107-108). As Mooney (2005: 15) argues, it is not only the commodities that are lost; there are also symbolic values, such as cultural heritage, friendship and belonging to a particular place that are lost by the displacement. The impacts of displacement range from impoverishment, social isolation, and exclusion from health, welfare and education, the breakdown of social relationships, authority structures and social roles. Displaced people also become unskilled because they tend to be craft persons or farmers in their villages and they cannot find proper jobs in cities (Cohen and Deng 1998b: 25).

As Vincent (2001: 7-8) mentions, when studying internal displacement, "survival and coping strategies" is an important concept because, "the activities of most internally displaced persons reach far beyond merely securing physical survival, even when that is critical. Internally displaced persons, and others living under dire circumstances, are also social and cultural beings, and issues of identity, dignity and social standing remain important to them and are incorporated in their strategies".

2.4. Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement

Guiding principles on Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) are based on existing international humanitarian law and human rights instruments in order to guide governments and international humanitarian and development agencies that provide assistance and protection for IDPs. As Deng mentions in the introductory note of the guiding principles, it is a task of the international community to protect people that are uprooted from their homes but have stayed within the borders of their own countries because of violent conflicts, gross violations of human rights and other traumatic events. They suffer from deprivation, discrimination and other kinds of difficulties. Guiding principles were developed in order to overcome these

problems of IDPs in 1998. These principles aim to bring protection against arbitrary displacement, protection and assistance and guarantee a safe return, resettlement and reintegration (OCHA Online).

There are totally 30 principles under 5 different sections that target the protections of the IDPs. The first section is the general principles that deal with equality of the IDPs under international and domestic laws, in other words, it aims to guarantee IDPs' legal status equality. The second section is composed of the principles relating to protection from displacement that aim to protect IDPs from arbitrary displacements, assurance of the proper accommodation to the IDPs if the displacement is unavoidable and the protection of the dignity, liberty, and security of the people that are affected by displacement. Section three includes the principles relating to protection during displacement which protects the right to life of every IDP, aims to protect the dignity and physical, mental, and moral integrity of the displaced people and guarantees their liberty of movement and freedom to choose their residence and right of education. Section four is composed of the principles relating to humanitarian assistance and aims to guarantee the humanitarian assistance without any discrimination for the IDPs by the national authorities. The final section includes the principles relating to return, resettlement, and reintegration and aims to guarantee the primary duty and responsibility of the authorities to provide IDPs voluntary returns and reintegration when they are resettled. There should be special efforts for the management of IDPs' return or resettlement and reintegration (OCHA Online).

As Mooney (2003: 17) mentions, the Guiding Principles envisage three possible solutions for the displacement as the “(i) **return** to their home areas or place of habitual residence; (ii) **(re)settlement** in the localities where they go to one displaced; (iii) **resettlement** in another part of the country”. These responsibilities are set on the national authorities in order to meet return and resettlements should occur voluntarily and in safety and dignity, public affairs and public services should be accessed without any discrimination and there should be assistance for the recovery or compensation for property and possessions that have been destroyed or dispossessed of as a result of the displacement.

As soon as the IDPs leave the country of their origin, the Guiding Principles are not applicable anymore, because their status becomes refugee or a migrant and also their IDP status is not relevant if “they have returned to their homes or places of habitual residence (Principle 29) but they continue to enjoy the rights of returnees as long as they need such

protection (Principled 28-30). Once they are (re)integrated, have regained their property or received compensation and are no longer discriminated against because of their former displacement, Guiding Principles cease to apply” (Kälin 2003: 15). Besides, resettlement of the IDPs for different reasons should be permanent (Kälin 2003: 16).

Cohen and Deng (2008: 4) mention that, one of the major problems when the guiding principles were being developed was to define who is an internally displaced person, because some group IDPs were people who were uprooted from their homes by conflicts and persecution and if they crossed the border of the country they would be called refugees, however, for another group, natural disasters and development projects should be counted because these people were also displaced involuntarily and faced human rights and protection problems. The broader definition won out and covered all of these people that were involuntarily displaced.

Ten years after the development of the Guiding Principles for the IDPs, in a conference held on the 16-17 October 2008 in Oslo to evaluate the developments of the situation of the IDPs, it was argued that there was an urgent need for coordination between the humanitarian and development actors, governments, and financial institutions for durable solutions to the problems of the IDPs. It was also mentioned that still some of the governments are unable and unwilling to take the responsibility to protect IDPs. There were some achievements after the development of the principles, which became a key point of reference in developing frameworks of domestic laws and policies for the protection of the IDPs. For example, Turkey used the principles as the basis of its Compensation Law and developed Van Province Plan of action for IDPs, which were extended to the other provinces. Discussions on the guiding principles showed that these principles are operationally valuable for the protection and assistance of the IDPs (Forced Migration Review, GP10, December 2008 pp. 6-7).

2.5. General Appraisalment on Internal Displacement as a Consequence of Internal Armed Conflict

The ongoing conflict in Turkey since 1984 is called an internal armed conflict, which has basically two sides; the non-state armed group (PKK) and the state security forces. As a result of the non-state armed group’s insurgency, internal armed conflict began in the country. In order to achieve support from the public, the non-state armed group has used

“strikes, demonstrations, political activity, propaganda, coercion and diplomacy” tactics. As mentioned above, there are different reasons for the internal armed conflict. These are; structural, political, economic, social and cultural reasons. But most importantly, the main reason is the elite-level activities, which in other words refer to the violent incidences resulting from the decisions of the elite-level people, like politicians, etc.

As a result of the internal armed conflict, internal displacement occurs among the other consequences. Internal displacement is a kind of forced migration. According to Peterson’s (1958: 266) typology, forced or impelled migration results in displacement or flight. Conflict-induced internal displacement refers to the type of displacement which is caused by a conflict within the borders of one country. In 1998, Guiding Principles for the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) were developed, which are based on the existing international humanitarian law and human rights instruments, in order to guide governments and international humanitarian and development agencies to provide assistance and protection for the IDPs.

CHAPTER III

THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO THE CHANGING SITUATION OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED WOMEN IN ARMED CONFLICT

This chapter aims to explain the theoretical approaches to women's situations in times of conflict in general and in the process of the conflict-induced internal displacement in particular. There are sociological explanations on women's situation in times of economic migration, especially from rural to urban areas, but economic and forced migration and the effects of these migration types on women are different from each other. As mentioned before, in the situation of forced migration there is no plan to move but the emergency situation forces people to leave their homelands (Kemirere 2007: 1) and this can be because of persecution, human rights abuse and violence as Castles and Miller (1993: 30-31) argues.

Because of the unique properties of forced migration, although the concepts of sociological theories on rural to urban migration are used, the theories themselves are not enough to explain the situation of women in times of conflict-induced internal displacement. This inadequacy has some reasons. First of all, unlike forced migrant women, economic migrant women are willing to move to the cities and have an expectation before they came (Erman et al. 2002: 397-398) because there is a possibility for a better life in rural to urban migration (Erman 1997: 272). On the other hand, forced migrant women had to migrate immediately from their homelands and they even did not have time to expect something from the city life. Moreover, these women usually do not want a life in urban areas. Secondly, forced migrant women had to work in the cities because unlike economic migrants, they had to leave their accumulation in their homelands and did not have enough time for the preparation and faced economic difficulties from first day of their displacement. On the contrary, economic migrant women came to the cities with an expectation of being housewives, but the neo-liberal economic policies adopted after 1980s (Ecevit 1998 cited in Erman et al. 2002: 398), some of them had to work outside their houses. Thirdly, usually economic migrant women migrate together with their families, which is conceptualized as "wholly moving households" (Boyle et al. 2001: 203), or sometimes men goes first and then the family follows. But in the forced displacement, it may be possible for the women to migrate with children and the family separations in the process of displacement are mostly observed because of the

husbands' or children's death or imprisonment. Fourthly, economic migrant women consider city life as a freedom and away from the strict social boundaries of village life (Erman 1997: 267), but the forced migrant women become aggressive and depressed in the cities as it was an unwanted move from their homelands and consider the urban life as an imprisonment because of the language barrier and the continuation of the state oppression in the cities. Finally, economic migrant women have a chance to preserve the relations with the village and it is possible for them to visit their homelands for several occasions (Erman 2001: 122) with the increased communication and transportation possibilities (Erman 1998a: 542). But on the other hand, going back to the village is sometimes impossible for the internally displaced women because mostly there is no one left in the village as all family had to leave together and sometimes there is no village left as it was destroyed in the process of the evacuation. In other words, forced migrant women's relationship with their past are all erased and it leaves women rootless and totally deterritorialized.

These differences above make the situation of women in the conflict-induced displacements different than the economic migrations. In order to supplement the sociological theories on migrant women, Feminist International Relations (IR) theories are used in this study. Women's experiences in the conflict and displacement process are first studied by the Feminist IR theorists. According to these feminists, without gender analysis conflict explanations would be inadequate and unless masculinism is not challenged, political-military practices will be biased. In the light of these two contributions, basically two debates have emerged in Feminist IR Theory. The first approach views women's situation in times of conflict as "victim and/or marginalized" and the second approach views women's position also as "victims" but argues that, there is a possibility for this situation to evolve into an "empowerment and/or active agency" position for women. In this chapter, Sociological theories on the situation of women in rural to urban migration will be focused on first. Then, Feminist IR Theory and the terms active agency and empowerment will be presented broadly. Finally, the two approaches within the Feminist IR Theory will be explained in detail. At the end of the chapter, crucial concepts and approaches of the issue will be elaborated on as they relate to the conflict-induced internally displaced Kurdish women's situation in Turkey.

3.1. Sociological Theories on the Situation of Women in Rural to Urban Migration

Conceptualization of migration for demographers, whether internal or international, is “a change in the place of residence involving movement across a political and administrative border” (INSTRAW 1996: 1). Rural to urban migration explanations are undertaken as internal migrations, which indicates migrations from poorer to more prosperous areas (Jolly and Reeves 2005: 7). As it is argued in migration studies, migration literature has focused especially on autonomous or in other words, economic migration which is caused by unemployment reasons or for a better economic opportunity (INSTRAW 1996: 3). As Ilcan (1994) mentions there are basically two main approaches in the classical migration studies. According to the neoclassical migration explanations, in the process of migration, there are some push and pull factors. Push factors are defined as “poverty, low income, lack of educational and medical facilities” and the pull factors refer to “opportunities of employment and higher income and the availability of educational and medical facilities” (Ilcan 1994: 226). In this regard, migration refers to “the outcome of a rational evaluation of the costs and benefits of movement” (Massey 1990: 5). In the migration studies “decisions are inevitably made by actors who weigh the costs and benefits of movement, but these decisions are always made within specific social and economic contexts that are determined by larger structural relations in the political economy” (Massey 1990: 7). Marxist approach, on the other hand, argues that “population movements are seen to correlate with pressures and counterpressures in the social relations of production” (Ilcan 1994: 557). In this context, capitalist penetration in agriculture leads to economic differentiation among rural populations and creates rural displacements and makes people to look for seasonal or permanent wage work in urban areas.

Women migrants have been invisible for the theories for almost 40 years and with the efforts of feminist researchers, they were started to be studied in 1970s and 1980s (Jolly and Reeves 2005: 3). Feminist approaches bring new perspectives for “how particular gender roles, ideologies, and identities (e.g. of mother, daughter, etc.) and household divisions of labour are historically and contextually *produced* and *transformed*” (Lawson 1998: 50). In women and migration studies, “households”, “families” and “social networks” have gained special attention. This attention is because first of all, migration is not considered only as economic and political, but also a socio-cultural process. Secondly, it is the household members who decide where to and who will migrate. Finally, when studying migration process, especially in 1980s, social network gained importance (Mahler and Pessar 2006: 33). Household is the

most influential institution that affects the power, behavior and identity of men and women. In this context, feminists criticized that the households are unified entities that all the members are in collaboration and equal. Women and children may be vulnerable in this institution and sometimes they can create households survival strategies and they may also be dependent on male breadwinners” (Chant 1998: 8-9).

Through 1970s, women in migration studies were explained not only as autonomous beings because of their economic contribution to the household economy, but also dependent beings to their husbands in alienated environments. In both cases, they were added and stirred into the migration theories instead of taken separately. Some argued that traditional gender relations continue in the process of migration and others argued that migration brings opportunities for women to increase their status (Curran et al. 2006: 200-201). In other words, it is mostly argued by the rural to urban migration literature that, on the one hand, after migration there is a possibility for women to become more entrenched in the traditional gender relations and inequalities, which may put more pressure on women and make them more vulnerable as results of exclusion and isolation. On the other hand, especially income generating activities are very effective for women’s greater autonomy, self-confidence and social status and rural to urban migration may “provide new opportunities to improve women’s lives and change oppressive gender relations” (Jolly and Reeves 2005: 1). In other words, women’s work may disrupt the patriarchal relationships at home but still it depends on some factors such as, “who controls household funds and even where women’s work take place – at home, in a nearby or known workplace, or across the city” (Secor 2003: 2211). Hondagneu-Sotelo and Cranford (2003: 120) argue that, although power and gaining income makes women autonomous and independent, the husband or father still maintain the authority in the household. In some situations, migrant women do not have right to keep their income and have to spend all of it for the household needs. This situation refers to “gendered poverty” (Kalaycıoğlu 2006: 239). For rural women poverty refers to, “lack of labor market participation, the disadvantageous of homeworking and pieceworking, a lack of empowerment, initiate and representation in the public sphere, the inevitable dependency of women on the family unit and the comparatively higher levels of deprivation in the case of female-headed households” (Erman 2001 cited in Kalaycıoğlu 2006: 238-239).

Women’s situation after migration is also due to the fact of the women’s position because economic migrant women are not homogenous and there are various groups of women such as; initiating migrant women, submissive migrant women, economically advantaged migrant

women and struggling young migrant women (Erman 1998b: 151). Some of these women are in a position of demanding and some other are in a position to challenge in the city environment and gain a strong sense of self in the family and struggle to break the traditional gender roles in the household (Erman 1998b: 159). These women's experiences also depend on some factors like age and stage in the life cycle, status and economic wealth of the wife's family, and wife's relationship with it, husband's economic standing and women's education (Erman 1998b: 161). Tienda and Booth (1991 cited in Erman 2001: 121) indicate that, migrant women's status in the family may increase or decrease according to some factors like; whether she is single or married, young or old, whether she is working before or after migration, if she can control her earnings or not, whether the migration is permanent or temporary, whether the migration is long distance or short distance, and whether the woman has social networks or not.

"Social networks" concept is another important point that women and migration studies focused on. In migration literature, social networks concept means the personal relationships that are based on family and friendship. Newcomers are supported with emotionally and culturally and also it helps migrants to find jobs and other opportunities including housing. It is about to make migrants get used to their new environments, which in other words, works for migrants to "reduce the short-term costs of settlement" (Hagan 1998: 55). As Massey (1990: 8) argues, migration decisions are strongly affected from the social networks. If the social network bond is high, when the migrants reaches to a certain level and expand the network for the newcomers, then the decision for migration can be more possible. Because, "rather than isolated agents, people are linked one another through social networks. These connections have a ponderous effect on migration" (Curran and Saguy 2001: 60). Family's welfare and living conditions increase as if they have an ability to have and use the potential social networks in the new environment (Kalaycioğlu 2006: 239). For example, the economic migration in Turkey is based on "chain migration" and the social mobility can become possible with the *hemşehri* (people from same place) social networks. Chain migration refers to the act "those who move from the same village or region tend to cluster in the same neighborhood (usually squatter settlements), and hence those who share a common past and culture from their communities of rural origin in the city" (Erman 1998a: 544-545). In the process of chain migration, one person usually unmarried male member of the family moves to the city first as a "pioneer" and the other members of the family follows him as the kin group and finally the village community follows and moves to the same neighborhood (Kalaycioğlu 2006: 228).

Although social resources provide equal opportunities for men and women, it is more possible for men to benefit from the opportunities economically and socially. These opportunities may be limited for women (Hagan 1998: 60). Gender and migration studies show that, men are more mobile than women and they have greater opportunity to move variety of destinations and they also have more employment opportunities than women (Lawson 1998: 40). When rural migrant women move to the cities, they become more “restricted, house bond segregated and socially isolated” (Stirling 1979 cited in Erman 1997: 270). But still they have an “ability to form networks” (Erman et al. 2002: 400) in the new environments, especially if they are working outside their houses. Migrant women have also an additional duty as connecting the social network in the neighborhood to the family network in order to get information about job opportunities and cheap food (Kalaycıoğlu 2006: 239). Working migrant women have a chance to choose who to socialize instead of socializing with people that usually their husbands choose, such as their families and neighbors (Erman et al. 2002: 403).

Economic participation of the rural migrant women may work as an indicator for bargaining power in the family because it gives more independence, self-esteem and decision making power in the household to the migrant women (Erman et al. 2002: 396). But still, women’s work outside the house and contribution to the household economy effect the situation of women in the private sphere only as limited ways. It only gives some bargaining power for women but they remain lack of challenging the husband’s decisions openly (Erman et al. 2002: 402). At the end, women’s working life and contribution to the family income do not make improvements in their status (Erman 1998b: 160) and also their power and autonomy do not change much although the city life brings new bargaining potentials for women because migrant women’s relationship with patriarchy is “as a cultural script, without necessarily being internalized” (Bolak 1995 cited in Erman 1998b: 162).

Some of the studies argue that economic participation may bring empowerment for rural migrants in the cities in order to challenge the patriarchal relations (Lawson 1998: 50). For example, it is argued by Foner (1978 cited in Pedraza 1991: 321) that, migration is more difficult but also more positive for women than men because, “it allowed women to break with traditional roles and patterns of dependence and assert a new found (if meager) freedom” and Pedraza (1991: 322) mentions that, migrated women challenge patriarchal roles in the household, heighten their self-esteem, start participating as equals in the decisions about the household and secure more income and actualize their roles within the

family. On the other hand, some studies argue that, there are always problems that prevent women's empowerment after migration. For example, Erman et al. (2002: 406-407) argues, there is always an issue for migrant women in societies like Turkey. Men's right to control the women's honor is an obstacle in front of the women's empowerment and although women feel powerful and contribute to the household economy, they still define their husbands as the head of the household and leave the final decision to their husbands. Besides, instead of direct resistance, they are using "subtle strategies" to increase their status in the households. In the case of home-based work women are considered as making their "housewifely duties" and this type of contribution is not also recognized by the other family members. This is also another reproduction of the patriarchal relations in the urban context and becomes obstacle in front of migrant women's empowerments (Erman et al. 2002: 400). Women also may not value their contribution to the household economy by home-based work and this is called as "internalized oppression" (Rowlands 1998 cited in Erman et al. 2002: 396), which prevents the development of women's self-worth and is an obstacle in front of challenging the gender inequality.

Because of the situation explained above, the term empowerment is preferred to "be used with reservations". But still, women's self-definition as powerful and self-worth that depends on their economic participation, in other words "their personal feelings of empowerment" (Erman et al. 2002: 405) are considered as the seeds of their empowerment. But it is argued that, "empowerment needs to go beyond the experiences of individual women and must be transformed into collective action" (Erman et al. 2002: 407).

Although women and migration studies explains the situation of rural to urban migrant women widely, they are lack of the explanations of migrant women who have migrated as a result of conflict-driven reasons. The situation of women in conflict-induced displacement, or forced migration, is different than the situation of economic migrant women as aforementioned. Feminist International Relations Theory contributed to the gender and migration studies and fills the gaps in the missing issues on women's situation in the conflict-induced displacements.

3.2. Feminist International Relations (IR) Theory

Discussions on women's situation in times of conflict started with the Feminist IR theories, which were based on the feminist standpoint theory at the beginning, in order to indicate

women's different experiences as opposed to those of men (Steans 1998: 121). Feminist IR theory aims to make women's experiences valuable for the political arena in order to change the situation of women while finding solutions for their problems, which is seen as the missing part in the conventional IR theory.

Conventional IR discipline generally overlooks the issue of women and has an assumption that the "states protect and secure the members of the political community from threats emanating from the dangerous, foreign realm outside state boundaries" (Blanchard 2003: 1289). The state is privileged and conflict is seen as unavoidable by the discipline (Blanchard 2003: 1291). The critical question for Feminist IR Theory is "who is being secured by security policies" (Blanchard 2003: 1290). The notions of "who is the protector?" and "who is the protected?" are blurred and challenged by feminists. From this starting point, Feminist IR Theory has begun to challenge the existing conventional IR theory and re-conceptualize the highly masculine core concepts of IR, from a gendered point of view.

Feminist IR Theory's contribution to the conventional IR discipline consists of four different approaches of feminist theory. First, is the discovery of women's distinctive experiences in times of conflict in order to make women visible in international relations by using standpoint feminist theory. Secondly, women's protection in times of conflict by the state is questioned as a result of the influence of feminist critical theory. The third contribution is the questioning of women's inherent linkage with peace, which is the basic premise of essentialist feminism. Finally, the last contribution is to not only put women at the focal point but also to frequently use different concepts of masculinity such as "hegemonic masculinity", which was developed by Connell (1985 cited in Pettman 1996), in order to make gender analysis (Blanchard 2003: 1290). In other words, feminist IR Theory not only adds women into the core of the IR discipline, but also by developing new concepts, Feminist IR theorists have challenged the existing theory and have done a distinctive gender analysis on security and women (Tickner 1992: 18).

In order to make a broad analysis on women and security, Feminist IR Theory is based on many different feminist theories and that gives it strength and bifurcation for analyzing every situation of women during and after conflicts. As Steans (1998: 121) argues, "there is a long history of feminist thinking about war, peace and politics which starts out from the standpoint of women's distinctive social experiences". It is seen by the Feminist IR theorists that, there is a missing point in the conventional IR theory, which is the distinctive

experiences of women from men. By focusing on the causes and consequences of conflicts from a “bottom-up perspective”, instead of making “top-down” analysis as in conventional IR theory (Singh 2006: 6), Feminist IR theorists aim to analyze the situation at the micro-level by adopting gender as a category. Focusing on gender would fill the missing parts of the discipline and this could bring new explanations on the causes and the consequences of conflicts and wars (Tickner 2001: 48).

If the early works of Feminist IR Theory are put aside, most of the scholars of Feminist IR Theory share a perspective informed by a feminist standpoint position, postmodern feminism and critical feminist theory (Steans 1998: 35). As Sylvester (1994: 95) argues “the diversity of women’s daily experience and feminist interpretations of that experience complicates the effort to define a feminist standpoint in the context of the first debate of international relations”. In the 1970s and 1980s, Standpoint Theory emerged as a feminist critical theory which focused on the relationship between the “production of knowledge” and “practices of power”. It is presented as a way to empower oppressed groups by making their experiences valuable (Harding 2004: 1-2). For standpoint theorists, what the women’s movement needs is knowledge for women. Women could be the subjects of knowledge, which in other words refers to “whether women as culturally diverse collectivities, could produce knowledge that answered *their* questions about nature and social relations” (Harding 2004: 4). As Harding (2004: 7) argues, knowledge is always constructed socially and the experiences of the oppressed group are different from the experiences of the dominant and this leads the former be able to produce distinctive knowledge from the latter. In this respect, Feminist IR Theory used feminist standpoint theory to call attention to women’s experiences particularly those who have been excluded from power, and indicated how women’s experiences in times of war are different than those of men. They also made women’s experiences valuable for the political arena in order to change the situation of women and find special solutions for their problems during and after war. For Keohane (1989: 245), “feminist standpoint provides a particularly promising starting point for the development of feminist international relations theory”. On the other hand, standpoint theory has always been accused of approaching every woman as having the same conditions and experiences and denying the differences among them (Harding 2004: 8).

It is known that the goal of all feminist theories is to achieve the emancipation of women. Standpoint feminist theory tries to reach this goal by highlighting the common points and standpoints of women. In contrast, feminism under the influence of postmodernism tries to

resist producing “one true story” of women by using the method of deconstruction, which “seeks to expose the assumptions, presuppositions and biases which underpin universalist theories” (Steans 1998: 25). Postmodern feminism does not only problematize the binary opposition between women and men (Steans 1998: 153), but also it is against the understanding of a homogenous women group, who has common experiences, interests and perspectives (Steans 1998: 5-6). It also rejects the notion of fixed and essential gender identity. “Postmodern feminist thinkers argue that there is no authentic ‘women’s experience’ or ‘standpoint’ from which to construct an understanding of the social and political world” (Steans 1998: 27).

Standpoint theories, which were based on the knowledge of Western, white women’s experiences, have been criticized for unrecognized differences among women according to their race, class, social preference and geographical location. Feminist postmodernism criticized feminist standpoint theory for its understanding of an essentialist view of women. Postmodern feminism does not build its theory on women’s experiences, but rather sees gender as “a source of power and hierarchy” and tries to understand how this situation is socially constructed (Tickner 2001: 18-19). Postmodernism resists an either/or dichotomy and brings in both views. For example, for postmodernists it is possible to be a warrior and peacemaker at the same time (Sylvester 1994: 96). According to Hooks (1983 cited in Harding 1987: 188), feminism is not only possible by sharing the same experiences by women as a group. Patriarchal oppression differs according to the race, class, and culture of the women. Based on this argument, it is argued that, one feminist standpoint cannot be possible; there can be feminist oppositions and criticisms.

Another approach in Feminist IR Theory is Critical Feminist Theory, which is based on the postmodern and postcolonial critiques of Western feminism’s exclusionary character. It tries to build a theory by keeping in mind both the gender as a category of analysis and the emancipatory project of feminism (Steans 1998: 29). In this respect, Feminist Critical Theory not only brings in women to the theory or makes gender inequalities visible but also tries to empower women as subjects of knowledge. Besides, it “explores the intersections between individual, or subjective, experience and institutional structures” (Steans 1998: 31), which in other words fulfills the missing points of both standpoint and postmodern feminist theories. As Steans (1998: 173) argues, “feminist critical theory can be viewed as an approach which fuses elements of standpoint – in so far as it seeks to empower women as subject –”. According to Tickner (2001: 32), critical theorists are also postmodernists,

because both try to challenge the existing order and both are ambiguous, that is why it is argued that most IR feminists are at the intersection of critical and postmodern theories, because they are both unwilling to give up the emancipatory project.

Tickner (2001: 46-47) points out one of the critiques of conventional IR theory as its politics definition, which is based on the centrality and sovereignty of the state. This definition is rejected by the critical security studies. Instead of being a solution, the state has always been part of the insecurity problem. Although critical security theory does not ignore the importance of the state and the military dimensions of world politics, it examines the security notion from a bottom-up perspective which begins from the individual. Another important point in critical security studies is that, “emancipation” is one of the important concepts for the theory, which can be defined as to free individuals and/or groups from physical, economic and political constraints that prevent them from doing what they want to do.

As argued before, feminist IR theorists, like critical security theorists, made multidimensional and multi-leveled analysis of security while broadening the concept by taking into account not only the security of the state but also the individuals and groups within the state and taking into account the violence, both physical and structural, against individuals and groups. Feminists also have a primary goal of securing the emancipation of women, as similar to the starting point of critical security studies. Questioning the role of the state as a security provider is also questioned by the feminists, as it is by critical security studies. The difference of Feminist IR Theorists is the central category of analysis, which is the “unequal gender hierarchies” (Tickner 2001: 48).

Unlike conventional security studies concern with the causes and consequences of wars from a top-down perspective, feminist IR theorists adopt bottom-up perspectives to analyze the impacts of war on women and civilians by “challenging the myth that wars are fought to protect women, children and others stereotypically viewed as ‘vulnerable’... by so doing as well as adopting gender as a category of analysis, feminists believe they can tell us something new about the causes of war that is missing from both conventional and critical perspective” (Tickner 2001: 48).

In sum, there are many differences between conventional IR theory and Feminist IR Theory. For the former, security means protecting the boundaries of the state against a hostile international environment with its central element, military power. On the other hand,

Feminist IR Theory has considered security more broadly including all forms of violence against individuals in the definition (Tickner 1997: 624). Another difference is the view of military and power tasks. While Conventional IR Theories consider military as the protector of the state against outside threats, Feminist IR Theory sees military as “antithetical to individuals particularly women’s security” (Tickner 1997: 625). Finally, Feminist IR Theory analyzes the conflicts according to their consequences unlike Conventional IR Theories, which deal with the conflicts according to their causes (Tickner 1997: 625).

Feminist IR Theory has made multileveled and multidimensional analyses and highlighted women in times of conflict as victims, protesters, promoters and active participators (Tickner 1997). But, according to Singh (2003: 14), there is still an internal debate in Feminist IR Theory between essentialist and social constructivist approaches, which are dealing with the women’s experiences in times of conflict and displacement. An essentialist approach is used mostly by the standpoint feminist theories and argues that the world would be a peaceful place if it would be ruled by women because they are inherently peaceful beings. According to this point of view, women are the ones who suffer most in times of conflict in general and in the process of displacement in particular. This approach positions women as the victims of the displacement period unquestionably and overlooks the transformative potential on women’s lives such as women’s agency and their empowerment in the process of internal displacement.

The second approach, known as social constructivism, rejects claims to essentialist views and denies women’s inherent peacefulness and to positioning them as merely victims within conflicts. This approach is used mostly by postmodern feminism that is built on the theory of women’s experiences. It argues that the gendered power and hierarchy situations are socially constructed (Tickner 2001: 18-19). Social constructivism deals with the potential of women’s empowerment during and after times of conflict with their unique experiences that differ from that of men and argues that women are not victims of displacement by nature, but that this victimization comes from the link between the conflicts and patriarchy (Ertürk 2009). These two approaches will be explained further in the later sections of this chapter after defining some crucial concepts on the issue below.

3.3. Conceptualization of Women's Autonomy / Active Agency and Empowerment

“Active agency” and “empowerment” concepts are important while studying women in times of armed conflict and/or in the process of internal displacement because it is argued that internal displacement does not always have negative impacts, but also has positive ones such as empowerment and emancipation of women. As Merry (2009: 173-174) claims, women should not be seen as helpless victims of displacement because they may recreate their lives after displacement. But before going into the two debates of the Feminist IR Theory on women's marginalization and/or empowerment in times of conflict and in the process of internal displacement, it is necessary to explain some controversial concepts first.

3.3.1. Controversial Concepts for Feminist Theorists: Autonomy and Active Agency

An agent is a person who has autonomous character. The autonomy of a person is seen as the first step, in other words, a prerequisite concept for agency. Although there are some feminist theorists who have been against using the term autonomy because of its masculine character and its selfish feature, some other feminists have found it crucial in order to understand women's oppression, subjection, and agency. Feminist scholars have mainly five critiques on the term autonomy. They do not reject the term autonomy altogether, but reject some components of the term. These critiques are symbolic, metaphysical, care, postmodernist and diversity (Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000: 3-5).

“Symbolic critiques” are not geared towards any of the autonomy theories but they are against the abstraction of the ideal “autonomous man”. By valuing self-sufficiency and independence, substantive independence is also valued and the other values that come out from relationships such as friendship, caring and responsibility, etc. are overlooked. It omits diversity and describes every agent in the same way. It also threatens the values of cooperation and interdependence (Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000: 5-6). These are the Lorraine Code's (cited in Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000) critiques that lead feminists to reject the term autonomy all together.

The second critique on autonomy is metaphysical and relies on the claim that, “attributing autonomy to agents is tantamount to supposing that agents are atomistic, or separate, or radically individualistic. Since, as feminists and others have pointed out, agents are socially embedded and seem to be at least partially constituted by the social relations in which they

stand, if attributing autonomy to agents is indeed to presuppose individualism or atomism, then it seems that the attempt to articulate autonomy rests on a mistake” (Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000: 7). Individualism in this critique has basically four main meanings. The first one is the isolation of the agent, the second one is the agent’s sense of independence from their families and communities, the next one is the view of the essential properties of the agents as being intrinsic and not compromised, and the last meaning of the individual refers to agents as, “metaphysically separate individuals”. Feminists basically reject all the above meanings of the term individual because they imply a separate, isolated, agent existing outside social relations.

Mackenzie and Stoljar (2000: 9) put forward another critique which focuses on “care” as, “traditional conceptions of autonomy not only devalue women’s experience and those values arising from it, such as love, loyalty, friendship, and care, but also are defined in opposition to femininity” because these traditional concepts are masculinist. But care critiques do not reject the term autonomy all together, whereas they argue that the term autonomy should be reconceptualized so that the definition will not be opposed to femininity and also will not be against dependence and connection (Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000: 10).

“Postmodern critiques” of the term autonomy are based on theoretical perspectives such as psychoanalytic theory, Foucauldian theories of power and agency and feminist theories of sexual difference and otherness. Ideal autonomy, which is defined “as self-transparent, physically unified and able to achieve self-mastery” (Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000: 10), is criticized by postmodern critiques. Postmodern critiques reject the psychoanalytic notion of conflict driven, self-deluded and opaque agents. These critiques are also informed by Foucauldian theories that maintain agents are constituted by and within the regimes of discourses and micro practices of power.

“Diversity critiques” of autonomy, on the other hand, are very similar to the postmodernist critiques and mostly rely on the agents’ cohesive and unified character. According to these critiques, every individual has a multiple identity and these identities, such as gender and race, are intersectional. The autonomy theories and intersectional notions of individuals are incompatible with each other which in other words “implies that because different and sometimes conflicting group identities intersect in the formation of the individual identity, many individuals do not have a unified or integrated sense of self” (Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000: 12).

Feminist theories are critical for the postmodern critiques of autonomy because it is assumed that “the notion of autonomy is a historically, socially, and culturally specific ideal that parades a universal norm. Not only does this norm suppress internal differentiation within the subject, but also in masking its specificity behind a veneer of universality, it functions coercively to suppress different others” (Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000: 11). Although there are some feminist critiques of the term autonomy, some feminists use this term in order to explain women’s subordination and oppression. In the 1980s, the autonomy concept had started to be discussed and according to Govier (1993: 101), many feminist theorists questioned the autonomy idea. Alison Jaggar is one of these feminist theorists who explains autonomy as a politically liberal notion and defines it as an outcome of a human nature that is based on individualistic account. According to Jaggar (1985 cited in Govier 1993: 101), autonomy is the ability to determine and define one's emotional and mental situation. As Jaggar (1983: 44) points out, “central to the concept of autonomy is the idea of self-definition, a reliance on the authority of individual judgment. If individual desires and interests are socially constituted, however, the ultimate authority of individual judgment comes into question”.

Diana Meyers is also another feminist scholar who deals with autonomy. As Govier (1993: 103) mentions, Meyers’s views are on the aspect of controlling one’s own life which requires the ability to discover talents, feelings, beliefs, and values, in other words, one’s definition of oneself referring to the true self, and in turn to understanding oneself and directing one's own life. According to Meyers (1989: 76), “autonomous people must be able to pose and answer the question ‘What do I really want, need, care about, believe, value, etcetera?’; they must be able to act on the answer; and they must be able to correct themselves when they get the answer wrong. To perform these tasks, people must have autonomy competency – the repertory of coordinated skills that makes self-discovery, self-definition, and self-direction possible”. According to Meyers (1989 cited in Govier 1993: 111), self-respect is the necessary condition for autonomy, and self-respect, self-esteem, and autonomy notions are closely linked to one's self-trust value (Govier 1993: 109).

There are basically six dimensions of women’s autonomy. These are; knowledge autonomy, which refers to the awareness of new ideas, decision-making autonomy, or in other words to be able to make decisions about their own concerns, physical autonomy such as physical mobility and self-confidence in dealing with the outside world, emotional autonomy, which leads to greater bonding or intimacy among spouses, economic and social autonomy, which

refers to greater access to economic and social resources and self-reliance instead of reliance on husband or children or other family members. In highly gender stratified cultures, gender relations are not egalitarian and women do not have autonomy or the right to speak on behalf of themselves, while the father or other male relatives have authority over the family members (Jejeebhoy 2000: 206-207).

According to Grovier (1993: 104), it is paradoxical that some of the feminists have rejected the idea of autonomy although in and out of the feminist movements, a lot of women have been working for their self-worth, dignity, and capacity for independent action and these are the struggles for greater autonomy of women. Therefore, he agrees with the feminists that focus on autonomy and agency of women as a way to struggle against their oppression and subordination, first by understanding the situation and then by challenging the negative conditions in favor of women. As aforementioned, feminist theorists do not use autonomy and agency as completely different concepts, but see autonomy as a prerequisite for the agency of women.

Although it is overlooked, there is a distinction between autonomy and agency concepts. According to Bevir (1999: 67), “autonomous subjects would be able, at least in principle, to have experiences, to reason, to adopt beliefs, and to act, outside all social contexts. They could avoid the influence of any norms and techniques prescribed by a regime of power/knowledge”. On the other hand, “agents, in contrast, exist only in specific social contexts, but these never determine how they try to construct themselves. Although agents necessarily exist within regimes of power/knowledge, these regimes do not determine the experiences they can have, the ways they can exercise their reason, the beliefs they can adopt, or the actions they can attempt to perform” (Bevir 1999: 67). In other words, although they have similar meanings, autonomy refers to the ability to do or believe something, whereas agency is to have potential to exercise or perform according to the belief that has been adopted.

Besides autonomy, feminists have also focused on the terms “agency” and “empowerment”. Naila Kabeer is one of the feminist theorists, who have dealt mostly with the agency concept and with the empowerment of women. According to her (1999: 3), there are strategic life choices such as, choice of livelihood, where to live, who to marry, whether to marry, whether to have children, freedom of movements, etc. There are three dimensions that show

the ability to exercise strategic life. These dimensions are; resources (pre-conditions), agency (process) and achievement (outcomes).

Resources refer to, “the various human and social resources that enhance the ability to exercise choice” (Kabeer 1999: 3). In other words, resources refer to a broad concept which includes a variety of social relations and institutional domains, such as family, market, state and community in which social relations are exercised. Agency refers to, “the ability to define one’s goals and act upon them. Agency is more than observable action; it also encompasses the meaning, motivation and purpose that individuals bring to their activity – their sense of agency” (Kabeer 1999: 3) or as some feminists call “the power within”. In the social sciences, agency is mostly conceptualized as decision-making but it may take other forms like “bargaining and negotiation”, “deception and manipulation” “subversion and resistance”, etc. (Kabeer 1999: 3). Sen (1985 cited in Kabeer 1999: 4) suggests a “capabilities” concept for the combination of resources and agency concepts, which refers to the lives that people want to live by achieving “valued ways of being and doing”. According to Sen (1993: 30), capability is an individual's “actual ability to achieve various valuable functionings as a part of living”. Functionings refer to different states that one may manage to achieve in life, varying from elementary ones, such as to be in good health, to more complex ones, such as achieving self-respect. Capability is, in other words, to be able to choose one collection from the alternative functioning combinations (Sen 1993: 31).

In feminist literature there are various ways to define the “agency” concept. The first one is the decision-making agency (Kabeer 1999: 17). The second indicator of agency is the mobility of women in the public sphere, such as the local health center, local market, relatives’ homes, community center, fields outside the village, next to the village, the cinema, etc. (Morgan and Niraula 1995 cited in Kabeer 1999: 20). The final indicator of agency is reporting and struggling against male violence which “is generally seen as a direct expression of patriarchal power; men’s ability to resort to physical force to impose their own goals or to block women’s ability to achieve theirs” (Kabeer 1999: 21).

It is argued that there has been a false dichotomy in feminism between women’s victimization and agency. Women have been seen in static views as either victims or agents. But although the victimization approach is unquestionably important, it is limited in the context of denying women’s active efforts in protecting both themselves and their children and their ability to mobilize their resources to survive. “Concepts of women’s victimization

and agency are both overly simplistic; both fail to take account of the oppression, struggle, and resistance that women experience daily in their ongoing relationships” (Schneider 1993: 2). The complexity of women’s lives necessitates describing them as more than just victims or agents. Therefore, power feminism has been developed in opposition to “victim feminism”, and is “premised on women’s individual agency, choice, and exercise of responsibility” (Schneider 1993: 3). Both of the terms are problematic in that they are too narrow and incomplete and moreover, victimization and agency of women are not oppositional but complementary dimensions of women’s experience. “Neither victimization nor agency should be glorified, understood as static, viewed in isolation or perceived as an individual or personal issue, for gender subordination must be understood as a systematic and *collective* problem -- one in which women experience both oppression and resistance” (Schneider 1993: 3-4). A victim approach delineates women as stereotypically passive, pure and in need of protection. On the other hand, the concept of agency is also problematic because it is based on assumptions like individual choice and will to action. It has a perception that there are atomized individuals acting alone and free from social forces and structures and systematic hardship.

3.3.2. Different Points of View on Women’s Empowerment

In order to be an agent, women have to be autonomous, and without agency, the empowerment of women is not easily studied. Women can be active agents but not empowered because empowerment is a process that includes agency but also other indicators. In this section, the ongoing debates on empowerment will be discussed.

Empowerment concept is widely used by the third world feminists that bring women “greater self-reliance, and enable them to challenge their highly disadvantaged positions in society and family, gaining control over their lives” (Erman et al. 2002: 395). Empowerment refers to “a process which involves changes in gender relations in a plurality of domains – interpersonal, structural, psychological and discursive” (Molyneux 1999 quoted in Erman et al. 2002: 395). In this regard, empowerment refers to individual women’s lived experiences and the social and cultural context of their lives in order to get their experiences and strategies, “women’s own views should be considered” (Erman et al. 2002: 396).

Women’s empowerment is a concept which is used very frequently by feminist scholars but it is also a concept about which every feminist scholar refers to something different.

According to Kabeer, the central idea of empowerment is power. Power enables the ability to make choices. Empowerment is related with the concept of disempowerment which refers to “the processes by which those who have been denied the ability to make choices acquire such an ability” (1999: 2). In order to talk about empowerment, one should be disempowered in the first place and then gain power and become empowered. Similarly, Ferguson (2009: 85-86) points out, “the concept of empowerment of an individual or a social group presupposes that a state of social oppression exists which has disempowered those in the group, by denying them social power, opportunities and/or resources and by subjecting them to a set of social practices which has defined them as inferior humans, thus lowering their self-esteem”. The aim of empowerment, then, is to increase the individual’s or group’s power, self-reliance and strength.

Panda (2000: 2) similar to Kabeer (1999), puts the concept of “power” in the definition of empowerment along with four other elements, which are “autonomy and self-reliance”, “entitlement”, “participation”, “awareness development and capacity building”. Various forms of power, like “power to”, “power with” and “power from within”, construct different meanings of empowerment. Power of an individual depends on one’s power in the household to make decisions, the level of one’s political activity, one’s power to create individual resistance and mass mobilization, and the power and control on resources and benefits (Panda 2000: 10). The second element, autonomy and self-reliance, refers to freedom of actions, developing a sense of self, and planning the future and making one’s own decisions. The third element is entitlement, which “means rights to equitable share of resources in the home, village and society at large” (Panda 2000: 10). The following element is participation and it includes acceptance of responsibility for the consequences of a decision and also to influence a project program or decision. The final element is building awareness and capacity. Building awareness refers to building consciousness of the condition of women within the family and community and influencing the population to take action against these conditions politically and legally. Building capacity on the other hand, includes building the ability to undertake economic activities, like ownership and control of productive resources, socio-cultural activities such as participating in non-family group meetings, efficiency in the public sphere, mobility and visibility, and creating mutual dependence. It also includes political activities, such as the ability to transform institutions like family, education, and religious, legal, economic, and social structures, and at the same time to enhance self respect, which includes the ability for independent choice, to challenge the subordinate and develop

self confidence and assertiveness for the decision making status in the household (Panda 2000: 10-11).

Parpart et al. (2002) agree with Panda (2000) and Kabeer (1999) and concentrate on the meaning of the power concept when dealing with “empowerment”. As it has been mentioned, dealing with the concept of empowerment requires an understanding of the concept of power in a more detailed sense because empowerment does not refer to simply power over people or sources, but by prolonging the Foucauldian insight, it is argued that “empowerment involves the exercise rather than possession of power”, meaning that “empowerment cannot transcend power relations; it is enmeshed in relations of power at all levels of society” (Parpart et al. 2002: 4). Parpart et al. (2002) share the same opinion with Rowlands (1997) and argue that, empowerment is a process that includes individual conscientization which refers to the term “power within”, ability to work with others collectively, which indicates the term “power with” others which in turn brings the notion of “power to” in order to provide change.

According to Rowlands (1997: 11-13), men have always been afraid of women’s empowerment because it was seen as a kind of reversal of the power relationships which leads to women’s dominance over men. This fear has also been seen as an obstacle for the empowerment of women. Gender analysis of power relations has brought out the “internalized oppression” of women which is the maintenance of the inequality between men and women. She also explains that, there are different forms of power which is actually a process and composed of “power over”, “power to”, “power with” and “power from within” stages. Rowlands (1997: 13) gives the definitions of these terms as following: “Power over: controlling power, which may be responded to with compliance, resistance (which weakens processes of victimization) or manipulations. Power to: generative or productive power (sometimes incorporating or manifesting as forms of resistance or manipulation) which creates new possibilities and actions without domination. Power with: a sense of the whole being greater than the sum of the individuals, especially when a group tackles problems together. Power from within: the spiritual strength and uniqueness that resides in each one of us and makes us truly human. Its basis is self-acceptance and self-respect which extend, in turn, to respect for and acceptance of others as equals” (Rowlands 1997: 13).

Rowlands (1997: 15) also mentions that there are different dimensions of empowerment as shown in the Figure 3.1 below. These three dimensions are interrelated and work together.

Personal empowerment refers to the self confidence and realization of the “internalized oppression” and the capacity to struggle with it. Relational empowerment is the ability to negotiate with other people and to be able to make decisions within a group. Collective empowerment, finally, refers to the ability to work together and to have a broader impact as a group relative to the individual and is based on cooperative working instead of competition.

Source: Rowlands (1997: 15)




Figure 3.1: Different Dimensions of Empowerment

According to Rowlands (1997: 111-113), the core of the empowerment process is the personal empowerment which involves psychological and psycho-social processes. Self-confidence and self-esteem are the two crucial aspects of personal empowerment. Without developing a sense of agency and having dignity, which in other words, refers to self-respect that includes not only getting respect from other people but also to believe in having a right to be respected, the empowerment process for a person cannot be completed.

According to Parpart et al. (2002: 5), the empowerment concept can “fit in many shoes” beginning from the study of Paulo Freire who emphasized education for the empowerment of the poor and marginalized, which was used in the studies of the 1990s by development agencies for the population’s development. According to Ertürk (2010: 16-17), women’s empowerment and human rights issues are mutually inclusive and there are linkages between the two. In this regard, the international women’s movement has used the empowerment concept in the Women Development (WID) paradigm. In this paradigm, “empowerment was conceptualized as a means for achieving women’s economic autonomy and for meeting strategic gender needs through a bottom up mobilization” (Ertürk 2010: 17). But this

understanding usually was used to describe economic efficiency of women's positive market performance practices such as consuming. After the WID paradigm, the Human Development Report defined empowerment "as a well-being dimension where women's disadvantage is located in both political and economic institutions" (Ertürk 2010: 17) in 1995. Women's well-being was measured with two indexes which are the Gender Development Index (GDI) and the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM).

According to Anser (2010: 29), there are five important components of women's empowerment. These are; possessing a sense of positive self- image, having the right to access and make choices, equal access to resources and opportunities, self- determination and control over their own lives, ability to influence events locally and globally. Anser also mentions that there are three aspects of women's empowerment. The first aspect is economic empowerment, which refers to a "process that requires daring, comprehensive and sustained policies to advance women's chances and rights and to ensure they can participate effectively in all sorts of economic activities and their voice be heard" (Anser 2010: 30). In order to ensure economic empowerment of women, they need access to the labor markets, better paid and secure jobs, and a good environment to help in starting their own business. They also need land property, participation in decision-making, representation in local institutions, access to financial services and technical help (Anser 2010: 30).

The second aspect is political empowerment and it refers to "promoting women's political participation and involvement in public affairs" (Anser 2010: 32), which is not only a benefit for women, but also for men and the community in general because it is the development of the society as a whole. Political participation can be in many forms, such as active involvement in community life, civil society organizations, local authority bodies and government institutions and should be effective in decision-making positions (Nausbaum 2003 cited in Anser 2010: 32).

The third aspect is cultural empowerment of women, which is the most contested sphere that has diverse arguments on the policies enhancing women's status, such as established traditions, harmful customs and religion. These policies usually represent the status quo and interests of a social group, strata or class. In order to ensure women's cultural empowerment, cultural traditions that are harmful for women, such as forced early marriages, gender violence, denial of inheritance rights, have to be diminished (Anser 2010: 33).

Like other scholars (Parpart et al. 2002; Panda 2000 and Kabeer 1999), Stuckelberger argues, there is no consensus on the definition of empowerment, but the word “power” is at the center of the concept. Power of choice and power to change “with freedom of choice and action are fundamental” (Stuckelberger 2010: 41). Sara Longwe (cited in Stuckelberger 2010. 42) developed a women’s empowerment framework in the middle of the 1990s and defined five levels of empowerment for women. The first level is “control” that refers to the participation of women in decision-making positions in order to control production. The second level is “participation/mobilization” that implies equal participation in the decision-making, policy making, planning and administration processes. The third level is “conscientization” that shows the understanding of sex roles and gender roles differentiation and the belief that gender roles have to be equal. The fourth level is “access” that refers to the women’s access to production, land, labor, credit, training, marketing, etc. on an equal basis with men and the final level is “welfare” that implies the level of material welfare of women relative to men.

Empowerment is also seen as “a process by which the one’s without power gain greater control over their lives. This means control over material assets, intellectual resources and ideology” (Chandra 2007 cited in Kumari 2010: 81). As Kumari (2010: 81) mentions, empowerment can be evaluated as the process of social change where power relations between two sexes are restructured and renegotiated.

As it is seen from the empowerment definitions and explanations, the “power” concept is in the center and this complexity and different meanings and consequences can be best explained with the term “power”. The “power over” concept refers to the ability to change for a better world which includes revolution and fundamental social transformation. This approach offers that even the most marginalized people can bring social change by mobilization by power. Foucault (1979 cited in Parpart et al. 2002: 6), in his works, is “rejecting the notion that power is something held by individuals or groups (and not others), he argues that it permeates society. It is fluid, relational and exists only in the everyday relationships of people, both individually and in institutions. Such power can lead to repressive practices that are expressed in disciplined bodies, actions and thoughts/discourses”. From this point of view, he comes to a conclusion that, people are empowered and changed by resisting the power relations of the disciplinary institutions, but at the same time this resistance may strengthen their incorporation within the status quo.

Feminist scholars take Foucault's study one step further beyond his male-centric and Euro-centric assumptions. Since the 1980s, feminists have been wary about using the term power as "power over" people and resources because it means the power of the state. "Feminist scholars have addressed this issue in terms of both the institutional power of the state to privilege some (male) interests over other (female) ones and its capacity to maintain gender inequalities (MacKinnon 1987 cited in Parpart et al. 2002: 6). They also see the power of the state as the monopoly over and legitimacy of using violence. This power term has also been seen as hierarchical by reproducing the powerful protector, referring to the state and the elite, where the powerless implies the women, children and the poor, who are also evaluated as helpless, passive and needy. Instead of empowerment, the term "empowering" which may also be used interchangeably with "capacitating" and "enabling" has been preferred by the feminists (Yeatman 1999 cited in Parpart et al. 2002: 7). In sum, as it has been mentioned, according to the feminist approach, the concept of power is important to understand individual consciousness for "power within" and the collective action for "power with" and the "power to" notion in order to challenge gender hierarchies and improve women's lives (Parpart et al. 2002: 7-8).

Srilatha Batliwala (1994) is another feminist scholar who approaches empowerment of women as a process in which women may gain control over their own circumstances such as the control over physical, human, intellectual, and financial resources and also control over ideology such as beliefs, values and attitudes towards themselves. In other words, empowerment requires not only extrinsic but also intrinsic capability in order to overcome the external barriers and to change the existent ideology.

Kishor (1997 cited in Kabeer 1999: 16) defends Batliwala's claim and argues that, women's control over their own lives is defined in relation to the resources such as earnings and expenditures, self reliance, which means women's support of themselves without their husband's support, and decision making, which means who says the final sentence in making decisions on every kind of issue and choice, which refers to choosing who to marry. Batliwala (1994: 130) gives the definition of empowerment as "the process of challenging existing power relations, and of gaining greater control over sources of power" and also makes a broad definition of empowerment by giving the definition of Sharma (1991-1992 quoted in Batliwala 1994: 130) as "the term empowerment refers to a range of activities from individual self-assertion to collective resistance, protest and mobilization that challenge basic power relations. For individuals and groups where class, caste, ethnicity and gender

determine their access to resources and power, their empowerment begins when they not only recognize the systemic forces that oppress them, but act to change existing power relationships. Empowerment, therefore, is a process aimed at changing the nature and direction of systematic forces which marginalize women and other disadvantaged sections in a given context”.

As Batliwala (1994: 130) claims, the aim of the women’s empowerment is to challenge the existent patriarchal structure which is based on women’s subordination and men’s domination and to transform the structures and institutions, such as family, class, religion, ethnicity, education, media, laws and civil codes, governmental institutions, etc, which reproduce gender discrimination and social inequality. The family is seen as the most important structure which has to be challenged. As an activist (Kannabiran 1993 quoted in Batliwala 1994: 131) mentions, “the family is the last frontier of change in gender relations... and [empowerment] has occurred when it crosses the threshold of the home”. Besides, it is mentioned that, empowerment of women also empowers men in different aspects, because, for example, empowered women influence political movements by their insights, energy, leadership and strategy. Another aspect is that, an empowered woman is a benefit for men and children because they bring better ideas and opportunities for a better quality of life. Empowered women also free men from their oppressor and exploiter role and from gender stereotyping and it is also known that men experience the emotional satisfaction of sharing the responsibility and decision-making. With the process of empowerment, women gain access to different knowledge and choices of life which they did not know before and this is a radical change in their lives. This change in turn, makes a force on the society to change in favor of women, but can only be possible if women are mobilized in collectives to put pressure on society in order to stop subordination (Batliwala 1994: 132). “To transform society, women’s empowerment must become a political force, that is, an organized mass movement that challenges and transforms existing power structure” (Batliwala 1994: 134).

There is another point that was raised by Ferguson (2009: 86) on the discussions of empowerment. According to her, there are basically two camps in the academic literature on empowerment under the leadership of two scholars. The first camp is organized under Paula England, which considers that economic, personal and legal changes would be adequate for the empowerment of women. England defines power in a broader sense and she uses Weber’s definition of power, instead of Foucault’s, which defines power as “the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his [*sic*] own will

despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests” (1922 quoted in England 2000: 38-39). For her, there is an interaction between individual and collective actors in order to exercise the power. In other words, it is not a relation between individuals only, but it is a relation between the individuals and collectivities. There are economic resources and subjective states which are interactive and influence women’s exercise of power together. Laws, rules and norms, which constitute the objective bases of power and self-efficiency and entitlement, which constitute one’s subjective state together lead women to the use of power and this “casual sequence” is called as empowerment (England 2000: 40-41).

Exercising power affects the outcomes for women such as food, medical care, shelter, income, respectful treatment for herself, a job, property, privacy, freedom from violence, sexual pleasure, the family size, etc. These outcomes can be the consequence of or the actualization of economic resources. Although some scholars, like Naranyan (2005: 22), argue that “women may become income earners but still not increase their power in decision making, in social relations, or in freedom of movement”. This situation arises because as Erman et al. (2002: 396) mentions, it is the culture not the economic participation that indicates the empowerment of women and patriarchal culture evaluates women’s work as the extension of women’s traditional roles and may easily devalue women’s economic contribution. But according to England (2000: 43), “women get from earnings or any sources other than their husbands increases their bargaining power with their husbands for whatever they want within marriage – whether it is more freedom, a larger say in where the couple lives or what purchases are made, more respectful treatment, sexual fidelity, or other outcomes”.

It is also argued for empowerment that the internalization of patriarchal or feminist norms is very important because it affects the behaviors of women which in turn affects their well-being. It is also very important that the society internalize the feminist norms so that they “constrain women’s ability to realize their goals” (England 2000: 51). This is what England calls as objective basis and by this phenomenon she aims to explain how the external and internal bases of power are interrelated. Hence, the norms of the society are crucial and “norms are always contested by some individuals and sometimes by social movements, and groups disadvantaged by norms often internalize them less completely than groups advantaged by them. Nonetheless, to some extent women as well as men have internalized

the norms that disadvantage women, even when such norms are actively contested by a feminist movement” (England 2000: 52).

As Ferguson (2009: 86) argues, England’s point of view is that, if women obtain objective and subjective bases of power, they may use it as the outcomes of their self interest, in other words, they may become empowered. And this self interest, as England (2000: 57) mentions, depends on the women themselves but it would not be wrong to argue that women like men want well-being, which includes health, respect, and protection from violence and poverty. Ferguson (2009) mentions that, the second camp, on the other hand follows Jill Bystydzienski and considers empowerment as an aim of the radical social movements and stresses the material and personal power which can be a consequence of challenging the status quo by the group of people who have organized themselves. As Ferguson (2009: 86) explains, “this political process of empowerment has been conceptualized as a process in which the personal becomes political; as developed in the women’s movement and New Left social movements of the 1960s in the west, it involves what has been called ‘consciousness-raising’, that is, a participatory process of individuals sharing their life experiences with others in a regular group process”. The goal of this process is to challenge an individual’s low self-esteem, fear, misplaced hostility, and other problems such as internalized oppression, which in turn during the process, by sharing their experiences, brings awareness of the individual under oppressive structures and creates collective interest to challenge these structures.

Bystydzienski (1992: 3) explains that, politics is defined by the term “empowerment” in feminism and empowerment is a process in which oppressed people may gain power to control their lives by taking part in the activities which directly or indirectly affect them. The process of using power is not “power over” but instead it is the use of “power to” and these empowered people may be active in the process of social change. As Yuval-Davis (1997: 78) argues, Bystydzienski and other feminists evaluate this process as a way to break the boundaries between public and private and turn the personal into social and personal into communal, which in other words, has the notion that “the personal is political”. As Hill Collins (1990 quoted in Yuval-Davis 1997: 78) mentions, “offering subordinate groups new knowledge about their own experiences can be empowering. But revealing new ways of knowing that allow subordinate groups to define their own reality has far greater implications”.

Throughout the study, empowerment of women will be used as Erman et al. (2002: 396) defined the concept, which is “empowerment means women starting to realize their own worth and contributions in their families, which has potential to make women demand power and take action towards changing the structured gender inequality in society”.

According to Ertürk (2010), because women have been excluded from the dominant power relations in all levels of the society, they “are naturally self-empowered as they must develop strategies to *cope* with the challenges of everyday life and negotiate within the disempowering patriarchal system to survive and preserve their dignity”. In most of the difficult situations such as natural disasters or conflicts, they manage to nourish their children and support their families. In order to overcome unequal gender relations, transformative empowerment has to be achieved. This requires “self-empowered women” to start to organize and challenge the existent conditions of their lives. For Ertürk (2010), there are different strategies for “empowerment to cope” with and “empowerment to change” the ongoing everyday life and the latter is the strategy to develop collective agency and international gender equality documents. Unlike the definitions of the other theorists on empowerment, Ertürk (2010) argues that, the empowerment concept is more comprehensive in today’s literature as it includes women’s overall capabilities and abilities to change the unequal situation in economic, social, cultural and legal spheres of life and moreover, “to live a life not only free of violence but the right to reconstruct that life”.

As it is seen above, feminist scholars have used the concept “empowerment” of women differently from each other. But there are still common points in all of their definitions. They all reject a definition of empowerment that depends on the “power over” notion. Instead of this notion, they prefer “power within”, “power with” and “power to” in order to define empowerment of women for their control of their own lives, to make their own decisions and in their participation indecision-making positions in the family or society by collective experiences. These experiences that are shared with other women, raise their own worth, make them stronger within the group and allow them to gain power to change the patriarchal gender order.

3.3.2.1. Indicators of Women’s Empowerment

Different scholars have explained different indicators since the discussions on women’s empowerment have begun. Generally the main discussion is on “economic independence” of

women and the main debate is whether the women's economic independence leads to empowerment or are there any other factors that affect the situation of women's empowerment?

Before getting into the indicators of women's empowerment, it is crucial to mention that these indicators relate to the micro level and in some aspects the meso level of women's empowerment. There are basically three different levels of empowerment for women; micro, meso and macro levels. The micro level refers to the women's daily lives which includes personal empowerment or disempowerment. In the meso level, local policies and regulations, customary laws and practices, cultural beliefs, discourses and practices justified as traditions, and organizational structures such as gender systems, religion, kinship system, local economy and local government are prominent. The macro level has different areas; in the national area are policies and laws formulated for women's empowerment in compliance with the meso level and in the international area, agreements for women's empowerment like CEDAW or Beijing Platform are salient. This empowerment process can be adopted from bottom to top or from top to bottom (SEARC 2008: 26).

It is also argued that, there are different dimensions of women's empowerment and these are all interrelated. According to Stromquist (2002: 23) there are four components of empowerment, which are not sufficient on their own and are equally important. These are "the cognitive (critical understanding of one's reality), the psychological (feeling of self-esteem), the political (awareness of power inequalities and the ability to organize and mobilize) and the economic (capacity to generate independent income)".

Peralta (2004: 117) takes Stromquist's assumption of the dimensions of women's empowerment and adds the physical dimension to the analysis. According to her, women's empowerment is multidimensional and includes cognitive, economic, political, psychological and physical components that interact with each other. The cognitive dimension refers to women's understanding of the conditions and the reasons behind their subordination on various levels and women's efforts to challenge the existent cultural norms and expectations. The economic dimension insists on the access and control over productive resources to ensure economic independence. It is noteworthy that economic power does not bring gender equality automatically. The political dimension stresses women's capability to change the social order by analyzing and organizing mobilization. The psychological dimension requires improvement in individual realities then on the societal level. Finally, the physical dimension

refers to the control over women's own bodies and sexuality and the protection from sexual and other forms of violence.

One of the first scholars who dealt with women's empowerment is Giele (1977: 4), who presents a broad list of the indicators of empowerment and argues that, these indicators are, first of all "political expression", which refers to whether women have the same rights as men to join in community decisions, to vote, to hold property or to have public office, etc. The second one is "work and mobility", which asks whether women's movements are more restricted than men's, or if they are as active as men in the labor market, etc. The third indicator is the "family formation, duration and size", which looks at whether women are in control and if there are limitations on deciding who to marry or if they have right to divorce, etc. The fourth one is "education" which considers the enrollment of women in educational opportunities and the level of women in the education system. The next indicator is "health and sexual control" which refers to women's rights in health decisions, sexual control, etc. And the final indicator is "cultural expression" which refers to women's contributions to the religious culture, the arts or practical artifacts and inventions, etc.

Kabeer (1999: 24), on the other hand brought in the issue of financial autonomy of women as another indicator and listed the direct evidence of empowerment as being against the "devaluation of women" which means for example reporting spouse violence by the women, "women's emancipation", which includes supporting daughter's education, freedom of movement, etc., "sharing roles and decision-making with husband", "equality in marriage", "financial autonomy of women", in other words women's control on their own earnings.

According to Erman et al. (2002: 396), when empowerment occurs women start "to realize their own worth and contributions in the families, which has the potential to make women demand power and take action towards changing the structured gender inequality in society". Economic participation into the labor force is used as the key factor, which will increase women's bargaining power in the household and provide financial independence that leads to power of decision-making at home.

Rowlands (1997: 112-113), not only gives the encouraging factors of empowerment but also the inhibiting factors. According to her, encouraging factors of empowerment can be listed as "activity outside home, being part of a group and participating in its activities, ending isolation, 'travel', wider friendship, time for 'self', sharing of problems/support,

development of literacy skills”. On the other hand, “machismo, fatalism, active opposition by partner, health problems, ‘poverty’, dependency, lack of control over use of time, lack of control over fertility/constant childbearing, childcare obligations, male control over income” are the inhibiting factors of empowerment for Rowlands (1997: 112).

3.4. Victimization and Marginalization of Female IDPs in Times of Armed Conflict: Essentialist Explanations

Feminist IR Theory focuses on all types of violence including physical, structural and ecological and also by including these threats to the analysis of conflict, it deals with women and children who are adversely affected by conflicts, military occupation and militarization, forced migration, human trafficking, sexual and other forms of slavery and forced prostitution (Youngs 2004: 83). Feminist IR Theory has taken into account that women and children suffer from death and injury, rape, displacement and deprivation due to conflict, and also consider the roles of women in the peace building process when dealing with war, conflict and peace issues (Tickner 1997).

There are various ways that women are victimized in times of conflict and displacement. Ertürk (2008) argues that, “displacement and dispossession caused by conflict and war alters everyday life, manipulates identities and sanctions, making women and girls subject to rigid patriarchal control and vulnerable to domestic violence, incest among others” and also sexual violence. One of the common experiences of women in times of conflict is gender-based violence. As Skjealsbaek and Smith (2001: 3) argue, some of the violent acts that are perpetuated by men in conflict times are seen as a way to show their masculinity. “This view of masculinity as something to be reinforced through violence is linked to a view of femininity that emphasized passivity in those issues, like war, that are deemed to be men’s business” (Skjealsbaek and Smith 2001: 3). Ertürk (2009) identifies this kind of masculinity as provided by “self-assertion through a reliance on weapons and sexual violence”.

Many forms of violence against and among internally displaced people, but especially against women, are prevalent such as rape and other sexual attacks and general physical violence like increased domestic violence and marital rape as a result of the stress that displacement brings on the family. Besides this fact, increased sexual abuse of children, but especially girl children that are separated from their families is widely reported (Cohen and Deng 1998b: 95). Violence against women is a problem in that, women and girls are the

primary victims just because of their sex. It is a universal, structured and also systematic problem which is widespread across ethnic groups, classes and societies. It is a “more and distorted” problem especially during and after conflict times (Ertürk 2008). Similarly, Handrahan (2004: 430) mentions that, like in times of peace, violence against women continues in times of conflict, but the type and intensity of the problem changes. As Ertürk (2008) argues, violence against women in the public and in the private spheres, whether in times of peace or conflict must be treated as a continuum and all are equally important. Al-Ali (2007: 46) conceptualizes the continuation of violence in peace and conflict times as the “continuum of violence”. Feminist perspectives approach the problem of domestic, international, political and economic violence against women as permeable and interrelated (Tickner 1992: 23).

Sexual violence is one of the common experiences of women in times of conflict. Feminist IR theorists have brought new issues into the security agenda such as rape as a weapon of conflict/war and military prostitution, which are conceptualized as “**sexual violence**” common in times of conflict (Tickner 2004: 45). Sexual violence is about “involuntary sexual contact” and includes every type of sexual impact from sexual assault to rape which is defined as the hegemonic power relationship over women (Skjelsbaek 2001a: 71). Sexual violence in conflict happens at homes, fields, detention places, military bases, and refugee and IDP camps. In many conflicts, the victims of sexual violence are from a particular, marginalized ethnicity. Members of official armed and security forces, paramilitary groups, non-state armed groups, humanitarian and peacekeeping personnel and civilians are the perpetrators of the sexual violence. Sexual violence does not only have physical effects on women, but also psychological implications, such as trauma and depression and also social consequences, such as stigmatization, marginalization and social exclusion (Bastick et al. 2007: 9). For example Burundian women who have been raped reported in 2003 that they are mocked, humiliated and rejected by their relatives, classmates, friends and neighbors. Moreover, rape survivors in Rwanda explained their situation as “humiliated and tormented” by other women and also by their own daughters (AI 2004a: 24).

One of the most “notorious” and “brutal” impact on women in times of conflict is rape as a weapon of war/conflict (AI 2004a: 6). Sexual violence in conflicts includes raping and torturing of women in front of their husbands and other family members by using rifles and other objects, raping pregnant women which leads to miscarriages, mutilation of breasts and genital organs, mass rapes and other atrocities against women (UNRISD 2005: 215). Even

women, who live in refugee or IDP camps, are under the risk of sexual violence. For example, women in Darfur who go outside the camps for their needs such as, wood, food or water have been raped or harassed because men cannot leave the camp for fear of being killed (AI 2004a: 21). Rape also has negative health impacts for women, putting them at risk for infections like HIV and sexually transmitted diseases. Spreading HIV/AIDS among the enemy group has been a recent phenomenon. Even if it is not the aim it is a “net effect of using rape as a weapon of war” (Olonisakin 2004: 17). For example, in Liberia, all female patients who were raped by former government militia or armed opposition groups in 2003 tested positive for at least one sexually transmitted disease (AI 2004a: 25).

Rape and all forms of sexual violence in times of conflict are considered to be crimes against humanity by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Crimes against humanity also include sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy and enforced sterilization. These forms of violence are also included into the definition of war crimes (Sriram et al. 2010: 44).

According to Snyder et al. (2006: 185), biology based assumptions argue that war-time rape is very common because it is biologically determined and “natural” to men. It is an uncontrollable part of the male sexual drive. Connell (2000: 22) additionally mentions that, biological explanations assert that, men are inherently violent because of their testosterone hormone but these explanations lead us to biological determinism and they are not credible anymore. In contrast, feminist theorists explain sexual violence in times of conflict within the context of patriarchal culture in which men are socialized to degrade women and commit rape in times of conflict as an opportunity to exercise this humiliation of women (Snyder et al. 2006).

According to Seifert (cited in Skjelsbaek 2001a: 79-80), sexual violence is an integral part of warfare, it is an element of male communication which refers to the notion that men cannot protect their women and so their nation, it is a way for reaffirming masculinity that shows the loyalty to the cause and the loyalty among soldiers, it is a way of destroying the culture of the opponents, and finally it is an outcome of misogyny. Additionally, it is mentioned that, sexual violence in times of conflict, is mostly used to torture and humiliate people to have control over the victim, to diffuse terror in a population and make people leave the territory, to motivate the men in the group and “serve to affirm aggression and brutality” (Bastick et

al. 2007: 15) and finally, it is used because of some so-called cultural beliefs such as ‘raping a virgin brings magical power to the rapist’ (Bastick et al. 2007: 14-15).

UNHCR (2003: 22) fills in the missing points and explains the different reasons for sexual violence in times of conflict as physical trauma and stress of conflict, flight, displacement, the breakdown of social structures, exertion of political power and control over other communities, ethnic differences, socioeconomic discrimination, collapse of social and family support structures, unavailability of food, fuel, income generation, leading to movement in isolated areas, lack of police protection and lack of individual registration and identity cards and hostility of the local population.

As Ertürk (2009) claims, violence in the conflict zones and violence at home reinforce each other and both of them put women at risk. “**Domestic violence**” is a world-wide problem in peace times, but its presence during and after conflicts is usually overlooked. As Ertürk (2008) mentions, domestic violence is the most observed gender-based violence in times of conflict because the legitimized violence in conflict reinforces the normalization of domestic violence at home. For example, Palestinian women in the Occupied Territories of Gaza and the West Bank reported increased domestic violence since 2000, the year that the *intifada* (uprising) began. As a result of detainment by the Israeli forces, some men have used domestic violence against their wives, mirroring the violence that they faced in prisons. Similarly, the soldiers or former soldiers of the USA have perpetuated violence against female family members as a result of the habitual usage of force in training and the lived stress of “perpetual moves and separation”. Between 1991 and 1995, there have been more than 50.000 active duty service members who have hit or physically hurt their wives and in 2002, four women were killed by their husbands from US Special Forces, three of whom had just returned from the Afghanistan operation (AI 2004a: 18).

Domestic violence is also one of the major problems in displaced camps for women. Increased domestic violence is encountered by women because of the intense camp life, when families are displaced together. For example in a Burundi refugee camp, women reported increased domestic violence in 1999 to Human Rights Watch (AI 2004a: 28). Most of the women in Burundi refugee camps were physically assaulted by their husbands or intimate partners. They had scars, bruises, broken fingers, missing teeth and cuts all over their bodies. Although there is a high level of domestic violence in the camp, neither

UNCHR nor the Tanzanian Government had developed effective programs to deal with this violence (HRW 2000).

Domestic violence, which feminist theorists have given specific attention to in times of conflict, is another common experience that women live in such times. Domestic violence is increased in conflict times because of the presence of weapons, the experience of violence by the male family members and the reflection of it to women and children, lack of jobs, shelters and basic services and economic difficulties. Because men have perpetuated and witnessed violence during conflict against the enemy, they continue to perpetuate violence after the conflict in their homes towards their family members (Rehn and Sirleaf 2002: 16-17). Sach et al. (2007: 566) similarly argues that, “the active participation of men in military activities may affect higher rates of domestic violence, as the case of men who turn weapons obtained through their employment in security forces against their womenfolk”.

Other than domestic violence in times of conflict, it is argued that women are also vulnerable because of the loss of the male head of household. These women have to overcome the emotional psychological pain of the loss of their husbands, fathers, sons and brothers and also have to take care of the economic needs of the household and look after the dependent family members such as children and elderly (UNRISD 2005: 214). Loss of the male head of household and forced migration, which usually brings about the loss of contact between family members, increases the women and children headed households and most of these women are war widows because adolescent and adult males (and sometimes females) have participated in, died, or have been imprisoned as a result of the conflicts (Mazurana et al. 2005: 6). Loss of male family members means, loss of loved ones, loss of protection, loss of the breadwinner and loss of the household. For example, in Bosnia 92 percent of the missing people are male and in Kosovo it is 90 percent, which in other words implies that more than 90 percent of households lost male family members, including husbands, sons, or brothers (Lindsay 2004: 30).

With the loss of the head of household and with the destruction of family income, women and children undertake new economic roles. Women’s workload as providers and caregivers increase as they have new economic roles. Women are the first to become unemployed and underemployed in times of conflict. This situation puts women and girls in a risky position and makes them easy targets for prostitution, trafficking and begging (Mazurana et al. 2005: 5-7). According to Lindsay (2004: 32), women face difficulties and find themselves in a

risky position because they usually do not have an adequate educational background which is an obstacle to finding decent work.

Different cultures and religions may affect the impacts of widowhood. They may affect not only the physical safety but also the identity and the mobility of women. Especially in patriarchal societies, widowed women may also lose their social status in the community (Lindsay 2004: 32). This situation is a consequence of the position of woman as being “someone’s woman”. “When she is no longer linked with a man, this affects her social acceptability within the community” (Handrahan 2004: 435).

Besides other factors that victimize women in times of conflict, feminists argue that internal displacement independently has a victimization affect on women. According to El Jack (2002 cited in Kemirere 2007: 3), “displacement disadvantages women because it results in reduced access to resources that are required to cope with household needs which increase physical and emotional stress”. Displacement also brings social exclusion and poverty which are prolonged with the armed conflict. As a consequence of forced displacement, family breakdowns occur and because of the displacement, demographic changes begin, which results in many women becoming head of household, resulting in a shift in gender roles for both women and men.

In most of the studies on internal armed conflict and the impacts of conflict on different groups of people, women are one of the groups that are taken into account as “victims” and as a group who have to be protected like children, disabled people and elderly. Moser and Clark (2005: 3-4) argue that there is a role division between women and men when the subject is conflict. Men are the perpetrators who defend the nation, women and children are the victims of mostly sexual abuse and forced abduction. The involvement and participation of women into the conflicts have been generally overlooked. The victimization analyses have expanded and started to include human rights abuses of mothers and wives of the combatants and refugee and displaced women as victims of conflicts.

Women are not only victims of conflicts, but also they are sometimes supporters of the armed forces and guerilla fighting groups in their countries. For example, in Canada and the United States proper armed forces, women can serve in every branch including combat branches in the armed forces. Women are also actively joining fighting forces in liberation struggles as in El Salvador, Guatemala, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and

Palestine (Mazurana et al. 2005: 2). Reasons for participating in the guerilla fighting forces are explained as the situation of crisis, displacement, poverty and marginalization. Like men, women also experience similar difficulties in times of conflict and see no option other than going to the mountains because they also witness the murder of their families in front of them (AI 2004b: 58).

As former Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, Prof. Dr. Yakın Ertürk, (AI 2004b: 59) argues that because of the male oriented culture, these women are attracted by the uniform, weapons and power and join to the guerilla fighting groups thinking that they will have the same rights as men. But as argued, these women usually find themselves not only associated with domestic roles, but also as sexual slaves who are forced to take contraceptives or forced into abortion (AI 2004b: 59). For example, in Liberia 73 percent of the women and girls experienced some forms of sexual violence in the fighting forces in 2004 (OCHA/IRIN 2005: 185). Similarly, it has been argued that in Turkey, women who joined the branches of PKK have faced sexual assault in the organization by the male members of the group, including the leader of the organization, and have been seen as useless in times of action by the group just because they are women. In other words, it has been argued that, although women participate in the fighting forces, usually they cannot be active combatants like men, in contrast, they face sexual violence which makes them more vulnerable to victimization (Pirim and Örtülü 2000: 63).

3.4.1. Women's Inherent Peacefulness: An Essentialist Point of View

Essentialism refers to the understanding that “things have essential properties, properties that are necessary to those things being what they are” (Stone 2004: 138) and in feminist theory essentialism refers to the properties that are essentially women's characteristics in order to be defined as a woman. These essential properties can be both natural and socially constructed. In other words, these characteristics can also be culturally constructed, but they are still considered as essentialist characteristics. In a more detailed way, Witt (1995: 321) explores essentialism by using three different explanations, which are based on one or more characteristics such as; “1) causal or explanatory power: An entity's essence is meant to either explain or cause its characteristic behavior. 2) The basis of classification into kinds: Essential properties are thought to provide the criteria for classifying entities into kinds. 3) The basis for the identity of things: The identity of an object and its persistence through time is secured by its essential properties”. Similar to Stone (2004), Witt (1995: 322) argues that,

gender essentialism means that there are some necessary properties for being a woman like having proper genital organs or being oppressed. According to her, these experiences unite all women and these are the properties that constitute a human being as a woman.

There is a view that suggests that using an essentialist approach in order to unify women as a category has basically two problems. These are, first of all reducing women as only biologically female and secondly, ascribing particular properties to women and leaving some women outside of the category if they do not share the same social attributes or force women to fit in to these special categories. “Many leading feminist thinkers of the 1970s and 1980s rejected essentialism, particularly on the grounds that universal claims about women are invariably false and effectively normalize and privilege specific forms of femininity” (Stone 2004: 135). In the 1990s, it was seen that rejecting essentialism undermines politics, which is based on collective action coming from shared characteristics. It was argued that, essentialism is politically necessary for feminism. In other words, strategic essentialism constituted the basis of feminism (Stone 2004: 135-136).

According to Stone (2004: 153), the way to overcome the problem of an anti-essentialist approach that undermines the strategic unitary women's group is the concept of “genealogy” which may overcome the dilemma, and “despite their lack of common characteristics – women can still exist as a determinate group, susceptible to collective mobilization” (Stone 2004: 153). Another alternative to essentialism has been developed by Young (1994), who exposed gender as “seriality” and argues this concept may eliminate the problems that are mentioned above because “it does not claim to identify specific attributes that all women have”. According to her view, “saying that a person is a woman may predict something about the general constraints and expectations she must deal with. But it predicts nothing in particular about who she is, what she does, how she takes up her social positioning” (Young 1994: 733). According to her, using “seriality” refers to a social collective, which does not require common attributes or a common situation (Young 1994: 723) and also makes women as a reasonable social category that refers to a certain social unity and eliminates the problem of indicating women as a single group (Young 1994: 728).

In feminist essentialism, conflict and gender relations have been limited and stable for centuries, based on the fact that men are militarist and the perpetrators of all kinds of conflicts whereas, women are the pacifists and the victims of the conflicts. As Elshtain (1987: 165) mentions, “war is men’s: men are the historic authors of organized violence.

Yes, women have been drawn in – and they have been required to observe, suffer, cope, mourn, honor, adore, witness, work. But the men have done the *describing* and *defining* of war, and the women are ‘affected’ by it: they ‘mostly react’”. It has always been thought that, men are the ones who start the conflicts and the women, in contrast, try to stop them because they are the “beautiful souls” opposite to men who are the just warriors (Elshtain 1987: 165). Gnanadson et al. (quoted in Olonosakin 2004: 17) asks, “If women are so loving, peaceful and nurturing, why do so many of their sons become violent?” and the answer is because women as well as men are passionate when the subject is national defense and they are the ones who encourage their sons and husbands to mobilize for war to defend the nation (Olonasakin 2004: 17).

As Enloe (1993 cited in Pettman 1996: 99), mentions, women and children are the reasons, victims and symbols of the violence. Ideological work represents women as good, faithful and defenseless beings that need to be protected. The protector/protected dichotomy puts women in the dependent position on men and this also reflects conflicts as masculine. As Pettman (1996: 99) argues, “the protector/protected relationship is by definition unequal, and unequal relations rest ultimately on the threat or act of violence. There are also profound and dangerous political consequences of portraying women as in need of protection”. Because women are seen as inherently victims, weak and passive, their rights are undermined and their actions are depoliticized. This protected position also leads women to be considered as “naturally” peace loving beings. Women’s biology and social condition also suggest that women are inherently more “nurturing and caring than men” (Hunter cited in Mason 2005: 739).

It is the hormonal, physiological, genetic process or societal enforcement of nutritive characteristic of women that explains their natural peace loving character and why they are engaging in peace activities, while on the other hand, men are conceived of as the war-making sex as in the essentialists view (Tobach 2008: 17). That is why, “the idea of killing another human being is extremely alien to women. Aggressors have always been men” (Pietila 1984 cited in Ferris 2004: 4). The role division is based on the assumptions of essentialist feminism which argues that women are inherently peaceful and because of their peacefulness by nature, they are the ones who are passive in relation with conflict. As essentialist feminists argue, women’s inherent peacefulness comes from their nurturing and caring potential derived from their “motherhood” capability, which is suitable for giving life not taking it (Goldstein 2001: 41). Accepting the inherent linkage between women and peace

means legitimizing the “hegemonic masculinity” that assumes women as passive and helpless victims, which in turn places an obstacle in front of women’s access to equal rights and to social change in favor of women (Tickner 1992: 59). “Hegemonic masculinity” is the aggressive type of masculinity that implicates “violence in the ways it splits not only men from women but separates ‘feminine’ characteristics and values and assigns these to women and inferior men” (Connell 1985 cited in Pettman 1996: 94). Pettman (1996: 94) argues that, masculinity is a socially constructed notion (like motherhood) and as not all women are peaceful, not all men are violent; on the contrary, there are some men who are peacemakers and nurturers.

The “nurturer” concept takes us to the concept of motherhood automatically. According to Ruddick (1983: 480), “preservative love can be too sharply opposed to military strategy” and she also argues that, “there is a real basis for peacefulness in maternal practice” (Ruddick 1983: 489). In other words, the life giving character of women precludes the life taking and leaves women incapable of violence. In order to legitimize this claim, the motherhood notion is mostly used by essentialists (Skjesbaek 2001 cited in Mason 2005: 739). On the other hand Pettman (1996: 118) argues that, “popular associations of women’s giving life through birthing with a gender interest in preserving life, can obscure the problematic and socially constructed connections of women and peace”.

Motherhood is used for the inherent aspect of peacefulness and Ruddick was influenced from this argument (Forcey 1994: 361). According to Ruddick (1983: 479), peacefulness is a result of the “preservative love” that mothers and/or other caretakers have. All women are the daughters of the mothers who have “the preservative love and the maternal thinking arises from it”. As a feminist standpoint feminist, Ruddick (2002: 136) approaches maternal thinking as a critical and visionary perspective that may explain the destructiveness of the conflicts and the peace requirements. She mentions that, “just because mothering and peace have been so long and so sentimentally married, a critical understanding of mothering and maternal nonviolence will itself contribute to the reconception of ‘peace’” (Ruddick 2002: 137).

As related with her nurturing, caring and mothering characteristics, mothers are “scrounging for food to keep her children alive, weeping over the body of her son, nursing survivors, sadly rebuilding her home, reweaving the connections that war has destroyed – as she grieves over her particular loss, she mourns war itself. Where she gives birth and sustains

life, his war only hurts and destroys” (Ruddick 2002: 142). As an essentialist, she thinks that women are inherently peaceful nurturers and men on the other hand, are inherently war like, starting and continuing wars. As she mentions, war and conflict are in the hands of men. They invent guns and do the battle plans. On the other hand, while men fight, women usually, “watch, suffer, applaud, ameliorate, and forgive”. They are the ones who suffer and are killed and/or raped in the actions (Ruddick 2002: 143).

From this point of view, she argues that, if war and conflict are masculine, peace is totally feminine. This is the argument of the feminist standpoint theory. “Women’s peacefulness often begins in negotiation; alienated women insist that they stand outside men’s wars and are repelled by otherwise respect-worthy men who have been transformed by wars rhetoric” (Ruddick 2002: 146-147). As Ruddick (2002: 151) mentions, the masculine character of wars and conflicts come from men’s aggressiveness. As a biological class, they have potential to be motivated in the conflicts which require physical aggressiveness.

As Ruddick (2002: 148) mentions, maternal thinking leads to a difference between mothering and conflicts, because while mothering is about giving birth and promising life, conflicts are all about taking life and death, and she believes that, “everyday maternal thinking contrasts as a whole with military thinking”. According to her, there is nothing in women’s biology that prevents them from shooting a gun or firing a missile if she thinks that it is her duty (Ruddick 2002: 154), so she does not believe that women are inherently peaceful but she thinks, although a pure peacefulness does not exist (Ruddick 2002: 156), “maternal practice is a ‘natural resource’ for peace politics” (Ruddick 2002: 157). Maternal peace politics is based on the myth that, mothers are peacemakers who have no power and they are the ones who are outside of the wars and conflict processes and also the victims of these processes. While men fight, women support them (Ruddick 2002: 219). Although as mentioned above mothers are not inherently peaceful, peace is their business because of their birthing capability. “Despite clear historical evidence, the myth of maternal peacefulness survives” (Ruddick 2002: 220). As Bailey (1994: 194) mentions, “Ruddick’s investigation of maternal practice is fueled by her desire to identify *common* features of mothering useful in the construction of the feminist peace politics”. In other words, although Ruddick is aware that the mother’s natural linkage with peacefulness is as much a myth as is men’s aggressiveness, she has used an essentialist point of view in order to construct a common ground for feminist peace politics.

There are basically three different groups in feminism that deal with women and peace and war. The first group is the pacifists or maternalist feminists who consider women as peaceful and embrace gender differences as a source for women's peace politics. The second group is liberal feminists, who advocate the equality of women and men even in the military, including combat, and reject the "women's nature" notion. And the third group is the anti-militarist feminists that reject the sex stereotyping of women as peaceful but also reject the militarization and militarized definition of security and consider them as basically gendered (Burguières 1990 cited in Pettman 1996: 107-108). Similarly Steans (1998: 119) mentions that, "the association between women and peace has been criticized by some liberal feminists who argue that this association serves to reinforce the stereotype of women as incapable of functioning in the public realm and that this in turn taints obligations of family and childcare as uniquely women's work" by underlining the motherhood capability. Questioning peace and women's inherent relationship with it is one of the contributions that Feminist IR Theory has brought to the conventional security studies as aforementioned. Because, as Pettman (1996: 107) mentions, women's inherent linkage with peace is an obstacle to recognition of the differences among women and within feminism concerning the politics of war and peace.

Unlike the essentialist approach, Ertürk (2008) argues that, women are not always victims of conflicts but they may also be active agents by "coping with atrocities, protecting their families, identifying and helping victims of violence". Although all civilians are the victims in times of conflict, the reason that women suffer more is the patriarchal relationship in the society. As Ertürk (2009) argues, women do not experience violence in times of conflict because they are vulnerable and weak beings by nature, but because of "a patriarchal gender order that privileges male control over women in public and private life and violence is used as a tool to sustain this power asymmetry" (Ertürk 2009). This view rejects the assumptions of essentialism, which argues women are essentially different from men, making them more vulnerable in times of conflict. Likewise, Enloe (2005: 283) argues that, the big picture in all conflicts and its causes and consequences for women is patriarchy.

3.5. Transformation of Female IDPs' Victimization into Empowerment: Social Constructivist Point of View

Feminist theorists, like Simone de Beauvoir who argues that women are made not born, are opposed to the naturalistic position of gender, which is based on essentialism. As an anti-

essential position, social constructivism exposes that gender is socially constructed and rejects any kind of essentialism (Witt 1995: 324-325). Social constructivism, unlike essentialism, argues that essence is itself historically constructed. Constructivists start their projects by rejecting the essence and take into account representations, social and material practices, laws of discourses, and ideological effects. “In short, constructivists are concerned above all with the *production* and *organization* of differences, and they therefore reject the idea that any essential or natural givens precede the processes of social determination” (Fuss 1989: 2-3).

DiQuinzio (1993) argues that feminist theory rejects biological determinism, which has been equated with essentialism and deals with the different positions of men and women in the society. Therefore, how one becomes a woman is something that can be solved with a social constructivist approach, which makes a distinction between sex and gender. According to her, sex refers to the anatomical and physiological differences and gender refers to psychological, social, and political differences between men and women. Besides this distinction between men and women, “feminist theory argues that social construction of gender has historically resulted not only in difference but in inequality as well; the social construction of gender is a factor in the oppression of women. Masculinity and femininity are not only different but also differently valued” (DiQuinzio 1993: 2-3).

When we go back to the discussions on the situation of women in the internal displacement process, we realize that, the victimization notion denies women’s agency and women are assumed to be passive objects in the process of armed conflict and conflict-induced internal displacement. From this point of view, Behera (2006: 43-44) argues that, in migration studies, there is a binary opposition between the “agent” and “victim” position for women. The “victimization of women in conflicts” perspective focuses on the disadvantageous position of women in the process of migration, whereas, the “agency of women” perspective “questions stereotypical essentialising of women as ‘victims’ that denies their agency and assumes universal, simplified definitions of such phenomenon” (Behera 2006: 46).

Behera (2006: 46) argues that there are alternatives available among restricted resources in the daily lives of migrated women from which they may choose as social agents. In the process of displacement women gain new roles, such as becoming head of household and providers of family income. Not only in the private but also in the public sphere, women start taking new social roles such as dealing with government, military and humanitarian aid

agencies in times when their men folk are both present and absent. On the other hand, displacement brings liberation for women from gender hierarchies. It warrants women's mobility and empowerment.

From this point of view, unlike the victimization of women in times of conflict approach, women's empowerment in and after the displacement approach is closer to social constructivism. Instead of positing two distinct gendered categories of people in times of conflict as "victims" and "perpetrators", social constructivism is skeptical about established categories which have core essences (Goldstein 2001: 49). As mentioned above, unlike essentialism, it rejects biological sex differences and comes to the point that women and men and their characteristics are not biologically or essentially determined but socially constructed (Conover and Sapiro 1993: 1080). In other words, the "victimized" or "marginalized" situation of women in times of conflict and in the process of internal displacement is not due to their "inherent" linkage with peacefulness and their position as weak beings by nature, but because of the patriarchal social order. Besides, this situation is not unchangeable and stable because women are not only the victims of the conflict but also they can be active agents that can be empowered in times of conflict and in the process of displacement. They can also be both victims and active agents of the conflicts, which is determined by the social position of the women and by the other factors that are mentioned above.

Similarly, Skjelsbaek (2001b) insists in her article that there is not an absolute relationship between women and peace. According to her, women are not inherently peaceful. In her three different research areas, Former Yugoslavia, Vietnam and El Salvador, she shows that women's role in conflict differs according to the situation and the culture within the nation. Women can be both victims and also active agents which lead them to be empowered in conflicts. For example, the women's situation in Former Yugoslavia is identified as "victimized femininity" by Skjealsbaek, because of the mass rape, torture and sexual violence against women throughout the war, and the absence of male relatives to protect these women. On the other hand, Al-Ali (2007: 56) argues that, Bosnian women, who work as cleaners or nannies in the countries to which they have migrated as a result of conflict, are able to "leave the house, improve their language skills, get in contact with the local population and gain some financial independence and decision-making power", which can be defined as the indicators of empowerment.

According to Ertürk (forthcoming), because conflicts themselves create class, ethnicity and gender dislocations, they also cause “shifts and ruptures in pre-war relational hierarchies”. Because of these dislocations, patriarchal relations are also shaken by the displacement and this may spark potential for empowering women and women’s agency. Ruptured patriarchal structure provides women with expanded autonomous space. But it is not always the case; threats on group boundaries and masculinities may at the same time subordinate women and cause further marginalization of women in the cities after displacement.

3.5.1. Motherhood and Politicization of Mourning from a Social Constructivist Approach

3.5.1.1. Motherhood and Peace Politics

The “motherhood” concept is important both for the essentialist feminists and for the social constructivist feminists. In this study, it is crucial to take into account this concept because motherhood is one of the positions that enable women to take roles in political organizations whether an NGO or a political party, to start sharing experiences with other women and to begin to actively react against the dominant ideology of the state within that group.

Throughout the study, the “motherhood” concept is used from a social constructivist point of view. There are basically two understandings of motherhood. The first one is motherhood which has been seen as an inherent capability of women that comes from the core essence of femininity. The second one is the point of view that argues that the capability of motherhood may be constructed socially and culturally. According to the second point of view, being a woman does not require one to be a mother and by making a distinction between motherhood and womanhood, the social constructivist approach explains how female identity has become the basis for women’s reproductive capacity. By expressing this connection, it also undermines the naturalness of motherhood for women, which in other words means, mothering is constructed socially and culturally throughout history, instead of being a result of human biology (DiQuinzio 1993: 4). Pettman (1996: 118) similarly argues that, not only is the maternalist peace myth problematic, but so is the representation of peaceful women as mothers, because there are women who cannot or do not want to be mothers. In this point of view, besides its problematic nature, maternalist literature is also heterosexist and essentialist.

Third world women, women of color, lesbians, and working class women have all started to challenge the European and American dominant understanding of motherhood, and as with postmodern theorists, focus on the differences between women as much as the commonalities among them. They have brought different understandings of motherhood into the spotlight. “The existence of such historical and social variations confirms that mothering, like other relationships and institutions, is socially constructed, not biologically inscribed” (Glenn 2004: 3).

Mothering is defined as one individual’s care and nurturing for another which has cultural and historical bases. Besides, “mothering is constructed through men’s and women’s actions within specific historical circumstances. Thus agency is central to an understanding of mothering as a social, rather than biological, construct” (Glenn 2004: 4). Similar to the concept of gender in feminist theory and like the definitions of manhood and motherhood as being constituted, reproduced, changed, and contested, the motherhood concept is socially constructed and intertwined with gender concepts. In other words, they define each other as a “constitutive element to the other” (Glenn 2004: 4). Because of the defined gender relations between men and women, the mothering notion has been evaluated as natural, unchanged, essential and universal and the responsibility of motherhood has rested exclusively on women, whose primary role has been argued to be mothers. In the 1970s Oakley (1974 quoted in Glenn 2004: 9) stated that there are three beliefs upon which the motherhood concept rests: “that all women need to be mothers, that all mothers need their children and that all children need their mothers”. These are the conditions that make women become mothers and these were considered to be normal female characteristics by psychoanalytic theory in the 1920s and 1930s. In the 1960s, it was argued that every child needs a single caretaking figure and this preferably should be the biological mother.

After Simone de Beauvoir and Betty Friedan, feminists started to realize that the glorification of motherhood was contributing to women’s oppression. Feminists started to advocate the right not to be mothers. “They argued that the institution of motherhood as currently defined was harmful to children, and to mothers themselves” (Forcey 1994: 359). Simone de Beauvoir in particular, rejected being an essential motherhood advocator and approached women’s traditional identities and activities as oppressive for women and needing to be changed. According to DiQuinzio (1999: 91), “Beauvoir’s analysis of women’s difference and female embodiment explicitly addresses the issue of maternal embodiment while also directly challenging essential motherhood”. She definitely wanted to

challenge essential motherhood. Beauvoir argues that, not all women want to be mothers and/or enjoy being mothers because there are painful, difficult and frustrating aspects of mothering (DiQuinzio 1999: 99).

“Essential motherhood is an ideological formation that specifies the essential attributes of motherhood and articulates femininity in terms of motherhood so understood. According to essential motherhood, mothering is a function of women’s essentially female nature, women’s biological reproductive capacities, and/or human evolutionary development. Essential motherhood construes women’s motherhood as natural and inevitable” (DiQuinzio 1999: xiii). Essential motherhood is not only the requirement for mothering but also for femininity, which may deny the mother’s and the women’s individual subjectivity. “At the center of essential motherhood is the claim that what it means to be a woman is fundamentally a function of female embodiment. From this perspective, the fact that women play a specific role in the physical reproduction of the species means that to be a woman is to fulfill this role” (DiQuinzio 1999: 89).

An essentialist point of view assumes that men and women are different and have totally separate worlds in which women are more caring, cooperative and peaceful than men. Nancy Chodorow for example, argues that women are more caring, nurturing, less differentiated, more occupied with relationships than men and because they are more nurturing than men they also reproduce daughters who are the same as their mothers (Forcey 1994: 360). As Chodorow (1978: 211) mentions, “women come to mother because they have been mothered by women, which in other words show that it is not a product of physiology, but a mechanism that is produced from a socially structured psychology”. According to DiQuinzio (1999: 181), Chodorow explains this situation by using the concept of an Oedipal period and argues that although the mother-son relationship depends on differentiation of the son from the mothering, the mother-daughter relationship depends on the maintaining of the continuity of the relationship in a more intense and long-lasting way.

According to DiQuinzio (1999: 182), Chodorow implies that, mothering reproduction not only reproduces itself as a cycle, but also reproduces gender inequality and male dominance. By transferring motherhood from mothers to daughters, women are not allowed to have access from the private sphere to the public sphere and continue to not have access to economic independence by staying in the home and family. “Women’s mothering perpetuates male control of public resources and institutions, as well as men’s control of the

individual women and children who are economically dependent on them” (DiQuinzio 1999: 182). This in turn brings the continuation of the sexual division of labor. Carol Gilligan deepens the argument and mentions that mothering and caring are not the weaknesses of womanhood, in contrast, they are the strengths of mothers and because of these characteristics, women are more moral than men (Forcey 1994: 360).

According to Forcey (1994: 357), mothering refers to a “socially constructed set of activities and relationships involved in nurturing and caring for people”. Although many of the peace researchers take an essentialist position, some of the others do not share the same opinion and deny the essentialist polarizations. Forcey (1994: 359) is in the essentialist camp, and argues that, peace research should focus on the intrinsic values of mothering and caring. Similar to Forcey, Glenn (2004: 23) mentions, the reason that women take the leading roles in peace movements is because of their duty to become mothers. Mothers call for disarmament in the name of their children and as Forcey (cited in Glenn 2004: 23) mentions, this inspires collective action as a promotion of solidarity among women by arguing that women are essentially different than men.

The feminist peace studies field is a critique of the international relations field which is seen as male-dominated. “For peace researchers, a feminist standpoint that focuses on caring, nurturing, feeling, intuiting, empathizing, relating remains an important new catalyst to challenge militarism. This contribution of essentialist thinking to the field of international relations and the peace endeavor can be wonderfully refreshing, comforting, energizing, and affirming for women. It poses a very different set of questions from those traditionally asked by practitioners (mostly male) in both international relations and peace studies” (Forcey 1994: 356-357).

According to Carrol (1987: 15), if there is a connection between women and peace, it is definitely not inherent because women fight, use arms, can kill and torture and subjugate other people and children, and it cannot be argued that women who do such things are in the minority. Although it is not an inherent linkage, there is a historical connection between women and peace. Carrol (1987 15) argues that, this connection is because of an imposition on women and their subordination and stereotyped roles in the society. There is also another imposed connection which is between “femininity” and “passivity”. “Pacifism” is not related with “passivity” because “passivity” is rejected by both feminists and pacifists. One of the feminist theorists, Collins (1990 cited in Bailey 1994: 190) argues that, all mothers do not

nurture, protect, or socialize their children in the same way. Her motherhood construction is based on a particular group of mothers unlike Ruddick's generalization¹. According to Collins, mothers of color are associated with the forms of survival, identity and empowerment.

As Collins (cited in Bailey 1994: 193-194) insists, "the physical (and psychological) survival of their children is central to daily activities of these mothers. Unlike the survival of most children born into white middle-class communities, the survival of most racial-ethnic children cannot be taken for granted. Disproportionate rates of infant mortality, poor medical care, crime, and drugs require the daily attention of the mothers". Collins's mother's work also includes retaining children's identity as the participants of their subordination. Constructing individual and collective identity is a core element of educating children for her. Another important element of Collins's mother's work includes "struggle over the definition and control of their caring labor, to empower themselves so that they may meet the needs of their own children and their communities" (Bailey 1994: 194). Unlike Ruddick's definition of motherhood, which is based on preservative love, nurturing and social training, Collins defines racial-ethnic motherhood as survival, identity, and empowerment.

The traditional motherhood notion, which is based on an essentialist understanding of the inherent linkage between peace and motherhood, leads to another inherent linkage between women and peace because from an essentialist point of view, in order to fulfill the duties of womanhood, women have to give birth to children. In other words, a real woman has to be a mother, which is based on love and nurturing duties. According to the social constructivist point of view, there is not a natural bond between mothering and peace because motherhood is based on the social and cultural socialization of the person and not all the mothers are similar to each other; there are differences between mothers and motherhoods. Besides, mothering brings oppression to women because they are all defined under patriarchal relationships. According to Cockburn (2001: 24), "identification as mothers can enlist

¹ As Bailey (1994: 189) argues, social constructivist theorists use the "forms of life" concept of Wittgenstein, which can be defined as, the "existence of many truths, each arising from a particular social context". Ruddick (1989 cited in Bailey 1994: 189) defines motherhood as a form of life which means she approaches motherhood as not a biological destiny, but a social practice. Although Ruddick argues that there is diversity among mothers because motherhood is a form of life, she mentions that, all mothers are involved in the same forms of life (Bailey 1994: 192). As Ruddick (2002: 40) mentions, mother is defined as "a person who takes on responsibility for children's lives and for whom providing child care is a significant part of her or his working life". According to her, whatever female and male difference occurs between two sexes, it is not true that one sex is more capable of mothering from the other one (Ruddick 2002: 41).

generous feelings of care and love that powerfully contradict violence. But it skirts dangerously close to patriarchal definitions of women's role and can be co-opted by nationalisms propagating that very ideology”.

3.5.1.2. Politicizing of Mourning

As discussed above, “motherhood” is one of the crucial concepts among feminist theorists when it is considered from a “social constructivist” point of view. From an essentialist point of view, children are seen as the continuum of motherhood and as discussed before, mothers are the ones who mostly grieve for their loss and mourn due to conflicts, as they are inherently peaceful beings. Throughout the study, just as with the concept of motherhood, the situation of mourning will be addressed from a social constructivist point of view. In doing so, it will be shown how women use mourning for the collective empowerment process which is undertaken in a politicizing way. In other words, the essentialist point of view is rejected in this study, which is based on the inherent linkage between women and peace or motherhood and peacefulness. It is argued that, the act of mourning, by the mothers’ of the dead and/or missing non-state armed group members, is employed as a political reaction against the dominant national ideology. This is a result of the collective empowerment coming from the personal suffering of each mother.

As mentioned before, the social constructivist point of view rejects the inherent relation between mothering and pacifism. “Some mothers understand their attachments and responsibilities as requiring either the sacrifice of their sons for the state or nation, or the use of violence against other women’s sons – and daughters. Many women do organize or participate in political action and resistance, and in support of armed struggle, as mothers. But we can make no presumption about their particular politics. We can ask, though, why maternalist imaginary is so widespread and so effective in motivating and mobilizing women?” (Pettman 1996: 121). As social constructivists argue, it is not this inherent linkage that mobilizes women to act, but when their roles or other family members are threatened, women then get together and mobilize. For instance, Chilean women organized against Pinochet, when their homes were under military and police operation attacks (Pettman 1996: 122), which is similar to the Saturday Mothers (mothers of disappeared) and Peace Mothers (Mothers of non-state armed group members) Initiatives in Turkey.

The death of children has been counted as the most tragic of all losses because they occur out of the generational sequence (Walsh and McGoldrick 1991: 18). Violent deaths are, on the other hand, the source of nightmares and life-long depression because of bodily deformity and images of dismemberment. Still, people can be sure of their family member's death in both cases. Whereas, when there is an ambiguous loss, family members cannot be sure if the person is really dead or not because although the body is absent physically, the person is still present psychologically. The family members can still have the hope that the person will come back someday (Walsh and McGoldrick 1991: 14). This is a kind of personal suffering that is insightful and inspirational for the collective dimension of suffering and also for the political significance of collective empowerment (Chuengsatiansup 2001: 32).

According to Freud (1917 cited in Eng and Kazanjian 2003: 3), "mourning is regularly the reaction of the loss of a loved person, or to the loss of some abstraction which has taken the place of one, such as one's country, liberty, an ideal and so on". In this mourning process the libido of the mourner is detached slowly from the lost object and when the libido is detached from the object totally, the mourner realizes that the object is dead and moves on to find another object. If the mourning does not end, unresolved grief causes melancholia. Normal mourning is opposed to melancholia for Freud.

Mourning, which has been assigned particularly to women because of the sexual division of labor that is perpetuated in the private sphere, has started to be an issue in gender politics. As a gender politics issue, it has been transformed from the private sphere to the public sphere as a socially constructed act. Mourning can be read as a political act, as the mother's opposition to the state, enacted outside the traditional gendered roles (Rajan 2010: 171) which operate inside the private sphere. Death rituals are the events among limited others in which women may be seen and heard along side with men in the public sphere with their duties "to laments, to shriek and wail over the family dead" (Story 2008 cited in Rajan 2010: 171).

According to Gillian Rose (1996 cited in Rajan 2010: 171), "when women protest the denial of the customary 'right and rites' of mourning [...] they gain immense powers of opposition". This is basically women's opposition to the state as a gendered, private, and emotionally fraught political social act. An example is the mothers who want the bodies of their disappeared sons, which represents not only a limited political agency for women, but

also women's presence and voice in the public sphere (Rajan 2010: 172). Rajan (2010: 172), therefore asks, "how do we judge the political limits and possibilities of mourning viewed as a locus of female/feminist opposition to the state in this structure of antagonism?"

According to Butler (2004: xiv), there are certain kinds of grieving that are recognized nationally and others that are nationally unthinkable and ungrievable. Some lives are grievable and some are not, which brings the understanding that, "who is normatively human?" (Butler 2004: xiv-xv). In other words, the nation defines "who counts as human? Whose lives count as lives? And, finally, what makes for a grievable life?" (Butler 2004: 20). These people, who are seen as ungrievable when they are dead, are considered as "lost" or they were never alive, so must be killed, as they are against the hegemonic national unity. In other words, "certain lives are not considered lives at all, they cannot be humanized, that they fit no dominant frame for the human" (Butler 2003: 22).

Rajan (2010: 173) argues that, "the female subject defined by loss has unique access to the space of the political from which she is able to call an oppressive state to account for its violation of human rights". This is a transgressive performance of mourning for her, which leads to a constrained space available for women to exercise political agency, as "grieving mothers have for the expression of their maternal grief and anger that has allowed them to constitute themselves as political antagonists of the state" (Rajan 2010: 173) based on mostly human rights violations of the state.

Women's mourning as political agency is enacted in a limited sphere as postulated by their gender identity, as well as their enactment of traditional familial roles and as the mourning performance itself (Rajan 2010: 173). In other words, women's mourning, although it has become a political act occurring in the public sphere, is still within the boundaries of patriarchal gender relationships based on traditional women's roles that are enacted in a limited sphere. As Cockburn (2001 cited in Sjoberg and Gentry 2004: 36) argues, just as the women in the private sphere are protected by the male family members, in the public sphere, they are protected by the ideal of "motherhood", which is a product of the patriarchal ideology. Pettman (1996: 124) similarly argues that, acting in the name of mothers provides a justification to move in the public sphere, in other words, women are freer to move in the public space when they are acting within their traditional gender roles and identities. When women enter into the public domain as mothers they experience a more liberating, confident, and encouraging, space and are enabled to take up more political positions (Pettman 1996:

125). But still, the politics of mother's mourning is “active rather than reactive, prescient rather than nostalgic, abundant rather than lacking, social rather than solipsistic, militant rather than reactionary” (Eng and Kazanjian 2003: 2).

3.6. Elaborating the Approaches of Women's Situations in Times of Conflict with Regard to Internally Displaced Kurdish Women's Experiences

This study is based on the social constructivist approach. By rejecting the either/or dichotomy, Kurdish women's marginalized position and their potentially empowering process in the cities after being internally displaced from their villages are both accepted. Their empowerment potential is spread by the dislocations of gender, class, and ethnicity and provides an expanded autonomous space for women as Ertürk (forthcoming) demonstrates.

This focus does not deny the marginalization effects for women in the city centers as there is a potential for strict male control on women, increased poverty, and lack of education and literacy for women. In other words, conflict-induced internal displacement is undoubtedly a victimization process from the very beginning for women. But rather than approaching women as passive beings and merely victims in this process, as essentialism does, it is more appropriate to examine the issue in a multidimensional way by employing a social constructivist perspective. Multifaceted analysis could be made by approaching the issue as “not only, but also”, instead of in an “either/or” manner. From a social constructivist point of view, Kurdish women in the process of conflict-induced internal displacement are argued to be not only victims and a marginalized population in the city center, but also active agents who are empowered in different ways. The empowering and marginalization effects in this process will be discussed in later chapters of the study.

It is argued that, in and after the process of internal displacement, some Kurdish women acquire *power within*, in order to realize the oppression and be aware of self-assertion. They may also gain *power with* other women, who suffer from similar pains and *power to* struggle for peace as Rowlands (1997) established. Rowland's (1997: 15) different dimensions of empowerment, which are listed as personal, relational, and collective will also be used in the analysis. Empowerment will be undertaken as Sharma (1991-1992 quoted in Batliwala 1994: 130), Batliwala (1994:130) and as Erman et al. (2002: 396) define throughout the study. According to these definitions, empowerment will be taken as a process starting from self-assertion to collective resistance and mobilization in order to change the existing power

relations that include challenging the patriarchal gender order. “Empowerment of women” concept in the study refers to the position of women that start “to realize their own worth and contributions in their families, which has potential to make women demand power and take action towards changing the structured gender inequality in society” as Erman et al. (2002: 396) explains. The concept also implies the transformations in structures and institutions, including governmental agencies as well as family. These two explanations of empowerment will be focused on in the study while others will be excluded due to their limited usefulness in representing the features of the internally displaced Kurdish women’s situation. The indicators of empowerment are perceived by Giele (1977) as political expression, work and mobility, family formation, duration and size, education, health and sexual control, cultural expression, and from Kabeer (1999) as financial autonomy, reporting spousal violence, supporting daughter’s education, freedom of movement, and sharing decision-making with husband in the family. Rowlands (1997) is also included both for empowering and marginalization indicators for women. For the empowerment process, activity outside the home, being a part of a group and participating in its activities, travel, sharing problems with others and developing literacy skills are taken from her theory. On the other hand, machismo (or patriarchal relations), fatalism, health problems, poverty, dependency, lack of control over use of time, lack of control over fertility / constant childbearing, childcare obligations, and male control over income are taken as the marginalization effects from Rowlands (1997) for women in the process of internal displacement.

By keeping in mind the marginalization effects and victimization of women in the internal displacement process including violence in the conflict zones and under detention, sexual violence and the threat of it, domestic violence, and widowhood, which brings new economic roles to women, the empowering process will be analyzed. Just like a distinction between active agency and empowerment, there is a distinction between “empowerment to cope” and “empowerment to change”. This distinction of Ertürk (2010) will be used as the major body of the analysis. It is argued in the study that, the “empowerment to cope” situation is closer to the active agency position of women and progresses as “bargaining with patriarchy” (Kandiyoti 1988) while expanding some autonomy for women. The “empowerment to change”, on the other hand, is a process in which women may challenge the dominant nationalist ideology as well as the patriarchal gender order in their private and public lives. The degree of success of the empowerment process is affected by the internally displaced Kurdish women’s position as “politically engaged”, “politically active” and having “gender awareness”, which will be discussed in the following chapters of the study.

CHAPTER IV

ONGOING INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT AND CONFLICT-INDUCED INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT IN TURKEY

There is an internal armed conflict in Turkey between the state security forces and the non-state armed group (PKK) since 1984. The reasons of the ongoing internal armed conflict go long back to the process of the modernization efforts of Turkey in the beginning of the republic history. There are basically two approaches about this issue. On the one hand, Kemalist ideology aimed to have a homogenous population and tried to integrate the minorities into Turkish nation, including Kurds. On the other hand, some other scholars argue that Kemalist ideology denied the presence of all minorities and used strategies in order to assimilate Kurdish population. One of the assimilation strategies of the state ideology was to displace Kurdish population from their homelands to western parts of Turkey. By doing so, it was thought that Kurdish population could internalize Turkishness and became Turkified.

The aim of this chapter is to present the two points of views towards the background of the Kurdish issue. In order to examine the internal displacement of the Kurdish families through 1990s, presenting the Kurdish issue and the different point of views is crucial. Kemalist ideology approaches the issue as a modernization process and argues that without a homogenous population, modernization could not be achieved. In contrast, other viewpoints argue that it was a process of assimilation of the minorities, especially Kurds. In the last parts of the chapter, governments' and non-governmental organizations' (NGOs) reports and women in the Kurdish struggle will be presented.

4.1. Building a Modern Nation-State: “Happy is the One Who Says I am a Turk”²

Kemalist ideology is based on basically two crucial aspects. The first one is nationalism and the second one is modernization. In this regard, Kemalist reforms aimed to provide a homogenous society without any ethnic differences. It was thought that by eliminating the

² Atatürk used the phrase first in the 10th anniversary of establishment of the Turkish Republic, on October 29, 1933 (en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ne_mutlu_Türküm_diyene accessed on 24 March 2012).

differences among the population, reforms could diffuse easily in all parts of the society. Because modernism was one of the aims of the new republic, Kemalists tried to eliminate all the factors that might inhibit this goal. They also considered all the opposite views as they were against modernism and diminished immediately. In this regard, Kurdish insurgencies of that period were all seen as opposition to the modernization and demand for an Islamist state.

According to Berkes (1997: 17), Kemalist ideology is a modern regime that is based on national and popular sovereignty, republican regime and secularism. In this regard, it was not only nationalism and national sovereignty, but it was also a process of building a nation, which would be approved by the history, by the other nations and exist in the future. As Timur (2008: 317-319) mentions, Kemalism is a political doctrine that was created in 1920s and its ideology formation was shaped after the Kemalist reforms. Kemalist ideology was not against all the latitude of thought, but it was against the opposite reformist thoughts such as, imperialism or mandate.

Building the Turkish nation was a miracle and without Turkish nationalism, this nation could not be existed (Berkes 2002: 119). This nation was composed after the National War (1919-1923) by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (hereafter Atatürk) (Berkes 2002: 90). In this war, religion was also used as a strategy. On the one hand, this was a strategy to include all the Muslim population into the war and gain their full support and on the other hand, the strategy was used in order to prevent the understanding that, the war was against the religion (Timur 1968: 92).

Before the National War and the establishment of the the Turkish Republic, nation (millet) referred to religious communities within the Empire. Muslims and Turkish members of the Empire did not indicate themselves as nations. When the first nationalist claims started, Muslims rejected to be a nation and argued that they were members of ummah (ümmet) (Berkes 2002: 85). In the Ottoman Empire, the Muslim population was in the governor positions, but they did not constitute a homogenous nation, there were Turks, Kurds and Albanians (Timur 1998: 23). Lewis (2009: 459) similarly argues that, there was not such a nation called as Ottoman nation because it was composed of different nations. But still, the dominant population in the Otoman Empire was Turks and the valid language was Turkish. Turkish elites were speaking Turkish, but there were no efficient national identity evidences of Turkishness (Lewis 2009: 447). In 1925, in a speech, Atatürk indicated that the new bond among the citizens was Turkish nationalism. This nation was based on historical kinship,

moral kinship, political kinship, national kinship, genealogical and language unity. For Heper (2008: 138), this did not mean to assimilate Kurds and other ethnic groups; on the contrary, it was an aim to make the traditions and values of the ethnic Turkishness to be adopted by other ethnic groups in order to constitute a unitary and undivided state.

According to Berkes (1973: 436-437), it was not possible to have a democratic regime in the Ottoman empire system, because there were nation building aims of the non-Muslims and also the Muslim-Turkish population had a national heterogeneity and defined themselves with traditional religious terms. As Toprak (1998: 6-7) mentioned, republic ideology aimed to overcome the dualism of Muslim and non-Muslim dichotomy of the Ottoman Empire. After the establishment of the republic, state and religion issues were separated and all the people in the nation became equal citizens, who were able to benefit the rights and freedoms of the state. In this regard, it was argued that there was an umbrella identity beyond ethnic and religious properties and it was called as citizenship. After the republic, the citizenship was the Turkish citizenship regardless of the race, religion, language and class differences. All the other identities of the citizens were diminished and they were all replaced by Turkish citizenship in the early republican era. In the Turkish Republic, even the children of the Muslim Kurds, Arabs, Bosnians and Albanians were considered as Turkish. In other words, Turkish refers to all Muslims in this period (Lewis 2009: 483).

Timur (1998: 14) mentioned that, there was a wide distinction between the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic because of the reforms right after the National War. With these reforms, everything left behind the Ottoman Empire was cleaned and there was no link between the empire and the republic, also as Atatürk argued. These reforms were national movements and they were against all kinds of colonialism and imperialism. With the efforts of Atatürk, Turkey became an anti-imperialist nation-state. As Berkes (1973: 435) argues, Atatürk claimed that if the nations continued to live in Asian traditions, they were obliged to be colonies of the other states. When the National War ended in 1923, war against the imperialism of the west started and Turkey started to be modernized, although it rejected the values of the west (Berkes 2002: 104-105). Berkes (2002: 106) mentions that, national sovereignty and westernization were going hand in hand and it was not possible to be modernized without being westernized. For Turkey, anti-imperialism war was at the same time a war for modernization (Berkes 1973: 435). Timur (1968: 112) similarly claims that, the main argument of Atatürk was civilization, which referred basically western civilization that focused on economic, secular and cultural development.

As similar to Timur's (1998: 4) arguments, Berkes (1973: 455) mentions that, the Sultanate regime in the Ottoman period and the Republican regime were exact opposite to each other. With the efforts of Atatürk, nation-state was taking place of the religious state and this was the modernization process, which also brought along many reforms (Berkes 1973: 461). As Ahmad (2005: 69) mentions, Islamist state was not supported by Atatürk and his counterparts. This type of state was considered as the continuation of the backwardness.³ But the main idea on the establishment of the republic was transformation of Turkey into a modernized nation-state. This state had to be based on secular and positivist structure in order to provide scientific and modern education that leads to an industrialized economy.

As Timur (2008: 260) argues, Turkish National War was happened against the results of the Treaty of Sévres (1920) and the Turkish reforms came out from this war. A new idea emerged in the beginning of the Kemalist reforms, which was based in the Turkish nation in the well-defined Turkey (Lewis 2009: 477). The cultural nationalism since the first constitutionalism in 1908 made Turks accustomed to the idea of Turkishness. With Kemalist republic reforms, the idea of Turkey emerged. Until that date, there was not a single word that defines the motherland of Turks. In the young Ottomans period, this land was called as Turkistan, and the young Turks called it as Turkey. But this word was officially used by the Kemalist government first of all in the 1921 law and then in the 1924 constitutional law (Lewis 2009: 478-479).

According to Ahmad (2005: 64), all the nationalist discourse was build upon the thoughts of İttihat and Terakki (Union and Progress) Committee.⁴ Although it was considered that the first constitutionalist period was not reformist as it was neither against the Sultanate regime and the internal structure of the empire, nor the religious or existed institutions. As well as it did not have national aim or motto and they struggled for the Ottomans (Aydemir 1991: 127). Some scholars still argues that Kemalist reforms were the followers of that period's achievements. For example Lewis (2009: 308) argues that, although the main objective of the young Turks was to protect Ottoman Empire against the threats they were still reformists

³ According to Berkes (1997: 94-95), backwardness movements were called as religious law supporters, racism-pan-turanism or Anatolia supporters and all referred to gentry and landlord conservatism.

⁴ İttihat ve Terakki Committee was established secretly in 1889 as İttihad-ı Osmanî Cemiyeti by the young Ottomans in Askeri Tıbbiye (military medical school) against the Sultan Abdülhamit (Demir 2005: 8), then changed its name to İttihat ve Terakki Committee in 1895 with a positivist effect (Lewis 2009: 268). It achieved a success and announced "freedom" the first constitutionalist period against Sultan Abdülhamit in 1908 in Rumeli (Demir 2005: 9). In 1918, the committee proscribed itself after the armistice of moudros (Mondros Ateşkes Antlaşması) between Turkey and the entente countries, which was a great defeat for the Ottoman Empire (Demir 2005: 10).

and revolutionists and they contributed to the preparation of the republic. Reforms of the İttihat and Terakki Committee were basically on the institutions, economic problems of the empire, westernization movements, education and women's status in the society (Lewis 2009: 309-311). Doğan Avcıoğlu, who is considered as one of the left Kemalists in 1960s, also argues that the root of the Kemalist reforms were in the İttihat and Terakki Committee innovation movements. According to Avcıoğlu (1968: 133-134), İttihat and Terakki nationalism gave the first examples of the reforms that happened after the establishment of the republic. There were also some reforms on secularism in that period and the aim was to distinguish religion and the social and economic developments. Kemalist reforms were not developed by itself. They were all discussed for a long time and they were the results of an accumulation. That was the reason of Atatürk's trust on the members of İttihat and Terakki Committee and the leaders of the early republic were selected among these members (Avcıoğlu 1968: 134-135).

There were two main aims of the Kemalist reforms; these were nationalism and modern civilization. Nationalism refers to full independence and without this achievement modern civilization would not be possible. In order to provide secularism and social change, old institutions like Sultanate and Caliphate had to be diminished (Avcıoğlu 1968: 163). Before Turkey was shaped in the Kemalist formation, political power had to be taken from reactionary government (Ahmad 2005: 69). By the abolition of the caliphate in 1924, Atatürk attacked one of the most powerful structures of Islam, because God was the only power and law source and the Sultan was the representative of God in the earth. Following reforms were closing down the religious schools and the courts (Lewis 2009: 355-358). These reforms were followed by other symbolic reforms, such as the outfits, which was an important signifier of the Muslim population, were changed for modernization. Fes (tarboosh), which was seen as the last signifier of the Muslim identity, was forbidden.

Reforms were basically in political, law, education, economics, and social life and also in the units of measurement. These reforms were all considered as the modernization movements of the new republic. But as Mardin (1986: 125) mentions, the official attitude of the republic was as if the Anatolia had only one single ethnic group. It denied the heterogeneity of the ethnic groups living in the territory of the new nation. The republic heritage also continued in this attitude and the religious and ethnic identities have always been denied as they remained from the dark history of Turkey. Reforms that developed one another caused public indignation. There were insurgencies not only in the political party of the period, and

also in the Eastern parts of the country (Lewis 2009: 358-359). The modern nation building process was considered as the reason of the insurgencies that started with the Sheikh Said in 1925 after the abolition of the caliphate. According to Lewis (2009: 355-358), this insurgency was a serious threat against the republic regime. With a military operation, the insurgency was ended. It was argued that, this Kurdish insurgency was organized by the sheikhs and aimed the abolition of the republic and bringing back the caliphate regime. After this insurgency, Islamic monasteries were closed. Sheikh Said insurgency was considered as a sign of the resistance against the westernization and a demand for the caliphate (Lewis 2009: 360).

It is argued that, because of the tribal properties of the Kurdish population, with the foreign incitements Kurds cooperated with the Britain in 1925 and Sheikh Said insurgency happened although Atatürk was in agreement with the tribes before the establishment of the republic (Avcioğlu 1968: 151). It seems like there were some nationalist properties in this Kurdish insurgency but it was considered that the religious elements were dominant in the environment that the insurgency happened. The basic reasons of the insurgency were defined as backwardness and religion. It was seen as the sign of the resistance of the old structure of the empire (Ahmad 2005: 75). Sina Akşin (1998: 173), who is considered as one of the supporters of the left Kemalism in 1980s, similarly argues that, it is not enough to consider the Sheikh Said insurgency as a nationalist insurgency because tribal relationships were dominant as the social bonding, although there were some Kurdish nationalists in the incident. In a society like that, nationalist and citizenship rights demands were not possible. The properties of the insurgency were considered as religious-feudal, instead of nationalist. Şevket Süreyya Aydemir (1992: 213), who was considered as one of the first left Kemalists of 1930s, similarly argues that, it was impossible for the Kurds to have a nationalist insurgency, because on the one hand, their tribal life style would not let them develop a nationalist perspective. On the other hand, Kurds were not a homogenous population and they also did not have a language unity. In this regard, Sheikh Said insurgency could not be a nationalist insurgency; it could only be a demand for the caliphate.

Sheikh Said insurgency was considered as a resistance against modernization and as Berkes (1986: 147) mentions, all the resistance against the modernization movements were considered as religious. According to the Kemalist ideology, every nation had to be modernized and the ones that did not accept this trend had to be collapsed. With this attitude, all the military, religious or political oppositions against the republican regime were silenced

in 1927 (Lewis 2009: 370). McDowell (2004: 269) argues that, in the Sheikh Said insurgency (1925) in Bingöl, the subversion of the caliphate was the real reason behind the conflict. The insurgency was started because of the ties between the rebels and Sheikh Said. The gendarmerie tried to take the rebels and Sheikh Said did not want to give them and the fight burst out between the Gendarmerie and the followers of Sheikh Said. The insurgency was ended three months later and nearly 700 rebels were executed. The sheikhs, who were not even related with the insurgency, had to be exiled from the region to western Anatolia, the villages were evacuated and people were killed. The insurgency was a consequence of the state's idea of the confinement of religious institutions after the establishment of the republic (McDowell 2004: 272). According to Toprak (2012: 533-534), until Sheikh Said insurgency, the differences among the nation were defined in the official documents, but after the insurgency, they were all erased from the discourse and the focus shifted towards the unity of the state. In other words, Sheikh Said insurgency was the milestone for the Kurds. After that date, any of the documents, including press, could not use the word "Kurdish" (Toprak 2012: 557) and they begun to be called as "Turkmenians" (Toprak 2012:544).

In 1930s, after the Kemalist reforms were done, Turkish scholars started to work in order to strengthen the reforms and deal with the issues of immediate modernization and industrialization (Tekeli and İlkin 2007: 601). This trend was called as left Kemalism, which was considered as a political movement. This movement was organized in a journal structure and could never have an organization. Although left Kemalism was acknowledged after 1980s, it actually started with the *Kadro* journal in the early 1930s (Alpkaya 2002: 477). This journal started to be published in order to support the different perspectives and aimed to develop an ideology suitable with Kemalism, which was first of all based, on anti-imperialism. The second ideology of the *Kadro* members was statism. According to the scholars of the journal, only with statism the upcoming class struggle in Turkey could be overcome (Akşin 1998: 189-190). According to the journal members, the national homogeneity was provided with the Kemalist regime but it was time for economic independence and industrialization reforms (Alpkaya 2002: 477). The members of the journal were considered as socialists because they all had a socialist background. They had a strong nationalist point of view and in this regard, they were called sometimes as fascists (Tekeli and İlkin 2007: 600). They were all old communists; İsmail Hüsrev Tokin, Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, Burhan Belge, Vedat Nedim Tör. This journal was published until 1935.

In the modernization period of Turkey, in order to increase Turkish nationalist self-confidence, Turkish history thesis and language thesis were also started as an official state policy in 1930s along with the journal support and military operations for homogenizing the population. These theses were for the nationalism and to convince Turkish nation that their origin was the middle Asia and they were the real owners of this motherland. In this regard, these theses showed that being a nation was familiar to Turkish population (Lewis 2009: 486-488). According to Toprak (1998: 84), these studies on history, archeology and language were very effective on the formation of the Turkish identity. It was also sufficient for making a clear Anatolian history. These efforts were positive eugenic movements that give strength to and embraced the Turkish nation (Toprak 1998: 7). Similarly Timur (1998: 16-17) argues that, the leaders of the Turkish Republic were searching the childhood of the Turkish nation and they aimed to have the confidence of a golden age in the history after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. In this regard, it was aimed to stop the violence among the different ethnic groups in the Anatolia by melting all of them in the Turkish pot. All the race histories, measuring the skulls and ethnic generalizations were towards this aim. For example, in order to find a racial snapshot of Turkish citizens, Afet Inan, who was Atatürk's adoptive daughter, tried to measure the racial characteristics of Turkishness by a dissertation from University of Geneva with the Turkish state fellowship. This was a period of beginnings of 1930s "in which race marked a domain beyond citizenship both in the definition of Turkishness identity and the perceptions of minorities" (Ergin 2008a: 834).

Although there were aims to find the racial heritage of Turkishness, Berkes (2002: 134-135) mentions that, Turkish nationalism was based on neither religious elements nor race and blood. Historical Turkish presence was based on state, military and economics, especially industry. Turkishness was not a name of a race, but a name of becoming a modern nation. In this regard, the aim of the Turkish nationalism was independence of the state and economy. According to Toprak (2006), Turkish nationalism in 1930s was never like the race movements in Europe. In Turkey, the nationalists aimed to end the racist movements in that period and the nationalism never included state terrorism, violence or torture. Atatürk's nationalism was peaceful and away from racism. Atatürk did not say "happy is the one who is a Turk" he said "happy is the one who says I am a Turk". Because, every citizen of Turkey was Turkish, it did not matter if they were Greek, Cherkess, Kurd, Armenian, Jewish or Arab. This nationalism is not a right wing or conservative nationalism (Akşin 1998: 200).

While the studies for supporting the Kemalist reforms by the scholars continued, Dersim insurgency started in 1934. Heper (2008: 208-210) mentioned that, in the 1930s the operations in the region were very violent and there were written documents that explained if a village was involved in the fight against the state security forces, that village could be burned down and all the animals in the village could be confiscated. For example, Marshal Fevzi Çakmak in Dersim operation in 1938 declared a document which indicated that the villages could be punished (tedip) and destroyed (tenkil). In the period of his term as Chief of the General Staff (1922-1944), he gave permission to the military and civil personnel to put pressure on the Kurdish population in the region in order to make them not revolt again. He was also against the education of Kurds and claimed that they could not fight against the uneducated Kurds, so it was impossible to fight with the educated population. But this situation made Kurds more restless. After this period, the repressive acts towards the Kurdish population were continued.

It is also mentioned by Heper (2008: 19) that, after Kurdish insurgency movements started, the state applied the policy of overlooking ethnic identity because it tried to prevent Kurds from embracing their second identity Kurdishness and to stay in their first identity, which was Turkishness. According to him, there is a difference between a denying and an overlooking process. In the denying process, the empirical fact is denied but in the overlooking politics, the empirical fact is accepted but just overlooked in order to prevent the negative consequences. In other words, in the overlooking process, the second identity of Kurds was not denied, it was just overlooked to prevent the second identity from being replaced by the first one. In this context, the displacements of the Kurdish population were carried out only to prevent the second identity from being dominant in the population; it was not an assimilation politics against Kurds (Heper 2008: 21). For example, Compulsory Settlement Law in 1934 was not enacted to assimilate the Kurdish population, but aimed to integrate Kurds into the Turkish tradition and language in order to make the two ethnic groups feel and act the same to unify the Turkish state. The aim was to create unity among the citizens of the republic in language, opinion, culture and ideal, not by assimilation but by integration (Heper 2008: 246-247). According to Toprak (2012: 578-579), Dersim operation is the final modernization duty of the state that aimed to end the feudalism in the region. In this regard, the state's objective was to make a connection between the individual and the state and disconnect the individual and tribe, sheikh and landlord bond. In this context, the race issue of the state was not exclusive, but inclusive.

Between 1940s and 1960s, Kurdish insurgencies were silenced. With the increase in the left trend in 1960s, left Kemalism movement was also started to be supported again by the *Yön* journal in 1961. Doğan Avcıoğlu, İlhan Selçuk, Mümtaz Soysal were among the writers of the journal, who aimed to make a leftist evaluation of Kemalism. This journal was closed in 1968 and the *Devrim* journal was started to be published in 1969 (Alpkaya 2002: 478). After 1980 military coup, left Kemalism started to be an opinion that *Cumhuriyet* Newspaper writers supported, like Uğur Mumcu, Sina Akşin (Alpkaya 2002: 479). Yön-Devrim movement, which refers to the movements that organized around the journals, was considered as among the three leftist movements (the other two were Turkish Workers' Party – TİP and National Democratic Revolution – MDD) in 1960-1990 period in Turkey. According to Atılgan (2007: 612- 613), although *Yön* journal had a perspective of anti-imperialism that was based on socialism, *Devrim* journal had only Kemalist ideology. The scholars that were organized around these journals believed that they could finish the incomplete Kemalist revolution and make the economic and social structure of the society in a socialist order (Atılgan 2007: 615). They had an objective and they considered themselves as the inheritors of the young Ottomans, young Turks, Kemalists and *Kadro* journal members (Atılgan 2007: 616). According to these scholars, Turkey was still an underdeveloped country in 1960s and the only way to be a modernized state was the acceptance of the Kemalist perspective (Atılgan 2007: 618).

Republican efforts of writing Turkish history from the very beginning and also rejecting the imperial past in that history had some consequences like emergence of the racial discourses. But modernization was the most important goal for the republicans and they were ready to crush anything that may prevent modernization (Ergin 2008a: 837). As Ergin (2008b: 302) mentions, for republican reformers, penetration of the modernization in all strata of the society was only possible with a homogenous society, it was also the reason of the assimilation of the minority groups. Toprak (2012: 539) argues unity of the state could only be possible with overlooking the differences among the nation. This was the distinctive feature of the Turkish nationalism from the other nations, which was based on creating imaginary categories “in order to maintain Turkish nationalist homogeneity” (Ergin 2008b: 301). But still it is argued that, Turkish experience was different because of the racist concepts “never led to the institution of a racist state formation, while at the same time acknowledging the fascination with race in the republican era and its legacy in the formation and maintenance of Turkishness” (Ergin 2008a: 845). Toprak (2012: 579) argues that it is impossible to evaluate the unity of the nation aim from today's perspective. In order to be a

nation-state, homogenized nation was necessary. All the differences were tried to be diminished and a uniform citizens were intended. All the military operations were for the sake of the uniformed individuals and the modernization of the nation.

Metin Heper (2008: 184-187), who is considered as a contemporary statist, accepts that there were some promises given to the Kurdish population. In 1922 and early 1923, it was considered to give autonomy to the regions in which most Kurds live today in Turkey, but after the anarchy occurring in the region this plan was not applied. Atatürk decided not to give autonomy to the Kurds because he witnessed that the two groups had started to live closely and together in every part of the Turkey. Besides, Kurds had cooperated with the Britain and started to be a threat for the republic. Atatürk changed his mind and decided to silence the Kurdish population. He also thought that the Kurdish traditions were an obstacle to the westernization process of the Republic. He left the discourse that includes Kurds among the citizens of the new country and changed the term “nation of Turkey”. He started to say only “Turkish nation” after the 1st of March, 1923. There were other practices, such as exclusively employing Turks as civil servants changing the names of the provinces from Kurdish to Turkish, forbidding Kurdish names for newborn babies, and so on. According to the nationalist point of view, these actions were not the consequences of an ethnicist strategy of the new republic, but all were the consequences of the government’s disappointment with the Kurds for their insurgencies.

In the next section, opposition point of views towards the official state ideology and the details of the Kurdish insurgencies will be presented and the internal displacement strategy of the Turkish Republic as one of the counter-insurgency strategy will also be evaluated historically. This history will be undertaken since the Sheikh Said insurgency in 1925 until 1960s. PKK insurgency will be held separately in another section.

4.2. Considering Modernization Policies as Denial of the Non-Turkish Minorities: “Happy is the One Who can Say I am a Turk”⁵

As seen above, left Kemalism’s point of view was based on nationalism and modernization. According to these scholars, in order to be a modern nation-state, the population should have been homogenized so that the reforms could diffuse all the strata of the society. In this

⁵The title of Ahmet Yıldız’s book published in 2001. Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene: Türk Ulusal Kimliğinin Etno-Seküler Sınırları. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

regard, the nation homogenizing practices were not considered as racist; they were all seen as for the sake of the new born state and its modernization. Modernization had a crucial importance for these scholars because they believed that the states that could not be westernized and modernized were obliged to disappear. All the Kemalist reforms were considered for the modernization of Turkey and all the ethnic heredity research were in order to homogenize the society.

As İnel (2002: 18-19) mentions, because the ethnic structure of the society was not homogenous, the religious, social class and ethnic identities were prohibited in the public sphere. These identities were all considered as the threats for the future of the state. Left Kemalism made a wide society definition and labeled a narrow part of the society as backward or incited by the foreign states. In this regard, official policy of the Turkish Republic was nationalism and it was more effective than ethnic nationalism. The importance of nationalism was to protect the national sovereignty. There have been basically three movements that were seen as threats towards the Kemalist ideology. These are Kurdish movement, Islamist movement and the communist movement (Öngider 1991: 153). According to Akçam (2003: 58), the reason of this strict nationalism was because of the national development process of Turkey and the way it was defined by the siege mentality and also by the threat from foreign countries.

According to Çağaptay (2003: 260), the nationalism in 1930s of Turkey shows that race and nation implied the same aspects and in 1930s and race indicated a national community. But still, it indicated a community that defined by language. People that considered from Turkish nation had to speak in Turkish. It was desired by the republican elites that the minorities could also internalize Turkish language and be assimilated. According to Öngider (1991: 147), Kemalist movement was limited to the upper class people. It was powerful as it could collect the population against imperialism, but when it confronted with the Kurdish movement, it started to be dominated on minorities. As Öngider (1991: 152) argues, the biggest strike against Kemalist movement was the Kurdish national movement in the history. The official state policy depends upon the ignorance of Kurds and in 1970s, when the Kurdish movement became powerful, it is argued that Kemalism begun to be weaken.

Before coming to the republic history, it is important to discuss Kurds' relationship with the Ottoman Empire. According to Yeğen (2009b), Kurds had relatively "light" relationships with the Empire, which in other words means that, they had enjoyed some privileges since

the 16th century. There were also some insurgencies especially after Administrative Reforms (Tanzimat) in the Ottoman Period (1839), but these insurgencies had no Kurdish identity consciousness. They aimed to expand the area that they were governing or to resist increases in taxes (Hür 2008). The tribes in east and southeast of Turkey had some privileges and they were recognized as a part of the administrative system (Bahçeşehir Üniversitesi Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi 2009: 22). To have regional independency has always been a permanent theme of the Kurdish political life even in the Persian and Arabic governments (McDowell 2004: 47). In the Ottoman period, there were some places called as “sanjak”, especially in the border zones of the Empire, which were controlled by Kurds. This control was transferred from father to son. These places had to be settled and had to provide personnel to the army in times of war (McDowell 2004: 57).

As mentioned before, in the Ottoman Empire, non-Muslim groups such as Orthodox Christians, Armenians and Jews, constituted nations and Muslims constituted a separate nation, although there were ethnic and religious differences among them. Yıldız (2001: 50) argued that, in the national struggle period, Turk or Turkish identity concepts were not referred to. In all of the legal documents in that period, national identity was defined as Ottoman and/or Muslim. In this period, it was difficult to continue a national struggle because of difficulties in communication and transportation, the need for money and guns, and internal insurgencies and competitor ideologies. That is why pluralist discourse was used in the period (Yıldız 2001: 98-99). These discourses referred to the common threat as coming from the Armenians, reinforced the Islamic brotherhood between the Turkish and Kurdish populations, and referred mostly to the nation of Turkey instead of to the Turkish nation (Yıldız 2001: 100).

In the Ottoman period, neither Turks nor Arabs nor Kurds had an ethnic consciousness. They all were identifying themselves as Muslims (Kirişçi and Winrow 2007 cited in Akyol 2006: 37). Kurds had a very late-blooming nationalist consciousness, which was raised at the end of the Ottoman Period. In 1897 the first Kurdish newspaper *Kurdistan*⁶ was published as the sign of the emerging Kurdish nationalism (Akyol 2006: 57). But this was a limited nationalism because Kurds were still loyal to the Empire and fought in the Empire's military between 1912 and 1918 (Akyol 2006: 61). Not only in the Empire but also when the Republic was established Kurds were still one of the main components of the military in the

⁶ There was also an area called as “Kurdistan” as Seferoğlu and Türközü (1982: 50) argue, which was named by Seljuk Empire Sultan Sancar in the middle of the 15th century. This area was autonomous and Sultan Sancar’s brother Shah Süleyman was appointed as the provincial governor.

National War and also when Kurds were identified as minorities, this minority status was rejected by that period's prime minister in the Lausanne Meetings. Kurds were described as a nation next to Turks, as one of the main components of the Republic (Akyol 2006: 72-73).

Although there were Muslims, Christians, Jews, Turks, Arabs, Kurds, Greeks, Armenians, Serbs and Bulgarians in the Ottoman Empire, the Turkish Republic aimed to be a nation state and because the majority of the state was speaking Turkish and was constituted from the Muslim religion, the others were left aside (Yıldız 2001: 100). Kemalism was a way to be westernized by constituting Turkish identity (Yıldız 2001: 104) and the Turkish Republic established a nationalism that was formed from being against dynasty, not Islamist and having ethnic references (Yıldız 2001: 107). As aforementioned, Kemalists tried to find the "magnificent" past of the Turks before Islam and concentrated on language, history, literature and geography in order to have a history of which to be proud (Yıldız 2001: 110).

4.2.1. Sheikh Said Insurgency (1925) and the East Reform Plan (1925)

As mentioned in the previous section, Sheikh Said insurgency was considered as a religious one and happened as a result of the foreign incitement by the Kemalists.⁷ According to Yeğen (2009a: 11), the state ideology always argues that if Kurds had not carried out the Sheikh Said insurgency in 1925 for no apparent reason, the ongoing positive relationship between the state and the Kurdish population throughout the Turkish national independence period would not last. As Yeğen (2009a: 12) mentions, this is not the reality because the relationship was not demolished in 1925. It was already shaken by the Constitutional Law in 1924, which was claiming that all the non-Muslims had to be Turkified and all the expressions of autonomous government before 1924 were finished. Besides these phenomena, the caliphate was demolished, which had been an effective component in which Kurds took part in the Ottoman period. In other words it is argued that, Kurds did not start an insurgency for no reason, the ethno-cultural rights of Kurds had been dissolved and they understood that they could not enjoy full citizenship rights in the new republic. Another point is made by the dominant ideology that the privileges were ended by the republic, but as

⁷ According to this point of view, the Sheikh Said insurgency was a plan of Britain, which caused Turks from the mountains and Turkish soldiers to fight against each other for no reason (Seferoğlu and Türközü 1982: 69). The separatist movement, in other words the Kurdish problem, was first brought about by the Russians, who wanted to go down to the hot seas before the 1917 revolution (communism) and Britain continued it because of the Mosul question. Western countries tried to induce Kurds against Atatürk in the name of religion and tried to show it as a national movement (Seferoğlu and Türközü 1982: 87).

Yeğen (2009a: 12-13) argues, it is also not true because the Kurds' autonomous status was cancelled before the republic was established and also these privileges were not only promised by prominent Ottomans but also by the founders of the Turkish Republic⁸, as in the Amasya Protocol, İzmit Declaration and in Representatives Commission. These were the recognition politics towards Kurds for a period, but later in the period, these politics evolved into assimilation strategies by the founders of the republic. In sum, Yeğen (2009a: 14) argues that, first of all, the republic did not become authoritarian and unitary because it confronted with Kurdish insurgencies, but the Kurdish insurgencies broke out because the republic was authoritarian and unitary. Secondly, assimilation politics were not the product of the founders of the Republic, but were started before the republic by the reformist tradition in which the republicans were also raised. Finally, the republicans promised to recognize the rights of Kurds a few years before 1924.

According to Yeğen (2009a: 14-15), East Reform Plan is a guiding text of the republic. The paradigm was structured on this plan, which was based on the understanding of the 1924 Constitutional Law that claims none of the ethnic identities other than Turks would gain cultural rights. The main source of the plan is complementary and forced assimilation. The plan predicted that Kurds would be Turkified in about ten years and because Kurds do not have a strong socialization they may adapt to the plan easily. The contents of the Plan focus on making the East of Turkey completely Turkish via the military, education and transportation networks and until this Turkifying process is done, East of Turkey would be governed by special administration mediums and martial law. In the 1924 Constitutional Law, the difference between the Turk and Turkish citizen is very obvious. According to that difference, civil servant duty could only be held by Turks, not Turkish citizens. In other words, non-Turkish minorities, such as Kurds, could not be civil servants in Turkey. Not only civil servants but also pharmacists, doctors and workers in industry had to be Turks. The Surname Law can also be thought of as an outcome of the assimilation politics (Yıldız 2001: 234-235).

⁸ As Bayrak (2009: 19) mentions, there were a lot of promises that were given by the founders of the republic regarding the autonomous government of the Kurds. These promises can be summarized as the 1919-1920 Congress Protocols, 1921 Constitutional Law, Turkish Assembly Talks, Government Bill on the Kurdish Autonomy in 1922, the Circulars that were based on this Government Bill signed by Atatürk, the İzmit Declarations that mention the equal structuring of the state in 1923 and the prime minister of the period, İsmet İnönü's attending the Lausanne meeting as the delegation of the Turks and Kurds.

The summary of the articles of the East Reform Plan⁹ were as following: 1) Until the assimilation process for the Kurdish population in the area was complete, the region was to be governed by military governors (Bayrak 2009: 24). 2) Turkey was divided into 5 general inspectorships and the cities that were under the 5th inspectorships were; Hakkari, Van, Muş, Bitlis, Siirt, Genç, Diyarbakır, Mardin, Urfa, Siverek, Elaziz, Dersim, Malatya and Ergani provinces. 3) In the normal and martial law courts it was forbidden to have Kurdish lawyers. 4) Punishment of the people who participated in the insurgency movements. 5) Resettlement of the Turkish population in the empty houses left from Armenians. 6) Resettling a Turkish population between Midyat and Van provinces (Bayrak 2009: 36). 7) Bringing in Turkish populations from Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Caucasus and Azerbaijan in order to Turkify the region. 8) People who participated, or families of those who participated in the insurgency movement were displaced to the western parts of Turkey. 9) On the other hand, whoever helped the state in the counter-insurgency movement could stay in their villages (Bayrak 2009: 37). 10) The civil servants could only be from the Turkish population, even the second degree servants could not be Kurds. 11) Kurdish population could not carry or have arms. 12) Talking in Kurdish was strictly forbidden and punished. 13) Enforcing women and girls to learn Turkish. 14) Building huge government buildings and police and gendarmerie stations in the region. 15) Building roads in order to make the military move easily in the region (Bayrak 2009: 38). 16) Conscription branches were opened and young Kurdish men were sent to the western regions and they were forbidden to use arms throughout their conscription process (Bayrak 2009: 39).

In order to assimilate Kurdish population, the most effective mediums were displacement and forced resettlement. The Kurdish population was planned to be displaced and resettled in the western regions of Turkey and some Turkish families were resettled in the east (Yeğen 2009a: 15-16). Forced displacement, which was first used after the 1925 Sheikh Said insurgency and continued mostly with the 1934 Compulsory Settlement Law, brought an economic difficulty to the state's budget and the Kurdish population rejected being assimilated and the potential to become Kurdish for the settled Turkish group in the region forced the Kemalist government to end the migration and settlement policies. Forced displacement not only includes Kurdish population but also non-Muslim population, Armenians and Jews were also involved into the exercise (Yıldız 2001: 253). The second

⁹ As Ergin (2008b: 302) mentions, East Reform Plan divided Turkey into three categories; "those who were of Turkish culture *in* terms of language and race; those who were required to assimilate *into* Turkish culture; and those who were neither. The second category included immigrants as well as various resident groups including Kurds, Jews and Arabs".

effective medium was education. Residential schools and girl's schools gained importance. Kurdish was not only banned in the written language but to speak it was also banned. Speaking Kurdish was punished not only in the government agencies, but also in the streets. Another strategy was to develop transportation and to make accessibility to the region easier. As a result, the state planned to make railways and government buildings and police stations (Yeğen 2009a: 15-16).

The Sheikh Said Insurgency and the East Reform Plan fall into the second period of the construction of the Kemalist ideology in Turkey. As Yıldız (2001: 16-18) mentions, there are basically three periods in the construction of the Kemalist ideology in Turkey. The first phase is the period between 1919 and 1923. In this period the religious identity was dominant and citizenship was defined according to Islam. In the second period, between 1924 and 1929, there was a radical separation from the religious ideology and the Turkish national identity became dominant in the period. The aim in this period was unity in language, culture and ideals. A Turk was defined as the one who was the citizen of the Turkish republic, who spoke Turkish, who has grown up with Turkish culture and who was loyal to the republican ideal. The third period is between 1929 and 1938. In this period, racial and genealogical elements were added to the ethnic identity and the new aim was unity in language, culture and blood. These racial and genealogical elements gained importance in the Turkish national identity. The real Turk started to be defined as the one who was a citizen of the Turkish republic, who adopted the Turkish ideal, who was westernized, who was loyal to the Turkish culture, who was speaking Turkish and who was genealogically Turkish. In other words, the "others" were, religious Turks, the Muslims whose mother tongue is not Turkish and non-Muslim minorities. Kemalist nationalism did not recognize the ethnically different groups and decided to overlook them. In that context, Kemalist nationalism was not racist but an ethnicist ideology. The main strategy of this ideology was to assimilate and displace the others. In the speeches of the founders of the Republic racial characteristics were mostly seen, for example Atatürk and İsmet İnönü referred to the "dignification of the Turkish blood" in their speeches frequently (Yıldız 2001: 28).

İsmet İnönü made a speech right after the Sheikh Said insurgency and declared that, they were nationalist and their duty was to transform non-Turks into Turkish (Yıldız 2001: 155-156). The words of Atatürk, such as the "dignified blood", "happy is the one who says I am a Turk", "clever and hardworking" nation, "Turk, proud, work, trust", were to give self-confidence to the nation that had been defined as "backward, barbarian and brutal" before. In

other words, the thesis of the Turkish history and Turkish language were the consequence of this aim (Yıldız 2001: 163). The Sheikh Said insurgency was seen as the revolution against the secular formation of the republic. According to the General Staff of that period, Kurds had no idea how to be human and this is why they could not have any ideology and it is impossible to diffuse Kurdish nationalism among the population.

The Kurdish problem had always been described in reference to religious politics, tribal structure and regional backwardness by the Kemalists as seen in the previous section. The name of solving the Kurdish problem in the Kemalist discourse was the “Reform in the East Region”. This region was expected to be reformed by the properties of the republic which would diminish the backwardness of tribal structure and religion. It was first and foremost a security problem for the Kemalists and nationalists. The only aim was to end the insurgencies and bring tidiness to the region for İsmet İnönü (Yıldız 2001: 243). For example, as mentioned above, the Sheikh Said insurgency was represented by the state to the public as a religious issue. The hegemonic nationalist discourse still considers it as a religious movement today, although there are some state representative documents that show it was not a religious movement, on the contrary it was a nationalist movement. For example, in 1925 the minister of the Turkish assembly and member of the parliament from Çankırı, Abdülhalik Renda, defined the Sheikh Said insurgency as a national movement, which was portrayed to be religious (Yıldız 2001: 245; Bayrak 2009: 91-107). In other words, although it was known that Sheikh Said insurgency had nationalist elements, it was consciously denied and represented as a religious insurgency.

Another insurgency happened right after the Sheikh Said insurgency, which was called as the Ağrı insurgency in 1927. In the second insurgency, between 1927 and 1930, Ağrı (Ararat) Mountain was hosting some Kurdish bandits and because they did not surrender, the “iron wings of Turks” bombed this mountain and the Zilan River was turned into a cemetery for nearly 15.000 people. After this operation, İsmet İnönü, prime minister in those years, made a statement to the Milliyet Newspaper (31 August 1930) and said that “only Turks have the right to demand ethnic and racial rights”. Similarly, Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, minister of the justice in those years, said in the Milliyet Newspaper (19 September 1930) that, “Turks are the real master and owner of the country and the others who are not from the same racial background with Turks have only right to be servants and/or slaves” (Hür 2008). After this insurgency, displacement was again used as the strategy for the counter-insurgency and in 1927 there was the introduction of another law enforcing the forced displacement of the

Kurds from the region, called as “Some People’s Transfer from East Region to West Cities Law”, which broadened the context of the displacement (Bayrak 2009: 155-156).

As mentioned before, Kemalist ideology used positive eugenics as a strategy. Yıldız (2001: 170-171) similarly argues that the Kemalist regime has some eugenic tendencies. They never used negative eugenics but they used positive eugenic methods such as race reform politics. Atatürk was also talking about the beauty of the Turkish race, which shows that he adopted some eugenic tendencies. Race health, child education and marriage planning can be counted as positive eugenic exercises. The Body Training Law in 1938, which forced the younger generation to exercise in their free time in sport clubs and attend to the body training programs, could be an example for the eugenic exercises (Yıldız 2001: 237).

As Yıldız (2001: 241-242) argues, the aims to assimilate the Kurdish population and to eradicate the founders of the Kurdish ethnic nationalist identities were not sufficient and the insurgencies were started with the Sheikh Said insurgency in 1925 and continued with the Dersim insurgency in 1937-38. Kemalist discourses have never recognized a Kurdish problem, this problem having always been defined as a security problem in those years. Because there has been only one recognized ethnicity in Turkey, the other ethnic groups have never been recognized. But this unrecognizing of ethnic identity is always on the visible side of state policies. On the invisible side, it is obvious that Kemalist nationality has always paid serious attention to eradicate ethnic differences. The politics against Islamism, the attempts to eradicate tribal structure, taxation and conscription politics are also enacted in opposition to the Kurdish identity. For the founders of the republic, in the beginning of the republic establishment process, the Kurds were an ethnic group that had to be given cultural and political rights and the Kurdish problem had to be recognized. They first changed the recognition politics and then the cultural and political rights of the population. 1924 Constitutional Law showed their politics against the ethnic groups other than Turks. It was announced in this law that there was only one ethnic group in the state and the others would not be recognized. The only thing that the ethnic groups might do was to be Turkified. The recognition politics was left behind (Yeğen 2011: 27-28).

These Kemalist politics not only aimed to assimilate the Kurdish population, but also limited the development of the region. There were some military leaders who represented the most radical strategies of the period, such as Marshal Fevzi Çakmak, who aimed to limit the economic, cultural, educational and socio-political development of the East region in that

period. The economic development of the region was prevented by this Marshal. Without his permission, which he never gave, roads or factories could not be built. The “paranoia” regarding the Kurdish population’s progress also prevented him from giving permission to establish schools in the region in order to put an obstacle in front of the Kurdish nationalist intellectuals that supported separatist movements. The school numbers in the region decreased when compared with the number in the Ottoman Empire, although there were strong reforms in education nationwide in the republic (Yıldız: 259-260). Education was used as a unifying medium in the republic. With education, secular and Turkish society was aimed to be developed. Turkish was used as the legal education language, Turkish, history and geography, lessons were given by Turkish teachers, and the number of the minority schools decreased and were placed under the control of the National Education Ministry (Yıldız 2001: 280). Besides education, in the compulsory military service exercise, the discrimination process continued. General Kazım Karabekir’s opinion was adopted and the Kurdish population could not use arms and instead were utilized to work on road constructions in their compulsory military service process (Yıldız 2001: 262).

4.2.2. Compulsory Settlement Law (1934) and the Dersim Insurgency

After recognition politics was left behind in 1924, another politics started to be dominant in the republic. This new policy was the denying politics. The Kurdish problem was seen as an issue that could be solved with the modernization reforms. Kurdish insurgencies were perceived as movements against the modernization process of the republic not against the national context of the state. In other words, the Kurdish problem was not considered as an ethnic problem, it was a problem of the resistance to modernization and the Kurdish problem was denied. It was argued by the founders of the republic that, Kurds were not trying to protect their Kurdishness, but these movements were influenced by tribal or foreign incitements and they were trapped in backwardness and rebel structures. The counter-insurgencies were seen not as military operations, but as a “journey to the modernization” because all these traps might be demolished by the republic’s modernization reforms (Yeğen 2011: 28).

The Compulsory Settlement Law (1934) followed the East Reform Plan and the assimilation politics continued in 1930s. As mentioned before, there were many aims to diffuse the reforms to all strata of the population. These modernization movements were considered as assimilation politics by the scholars, who are from the opposition viewpoints to the official

state ideology. Forced displacement, exclusion of Kurds from the civil servant duties, Turkish education and forbidding Kurdish in daily life are some of the assimilation politics of the Republic towards the Kurdish population (Yeğen 2011: 32).

Although the Dersim insurgency is not seen as a national movement, it cannot be argued to be a religious movement. The Dersim insurgency is also included into the Kurdish resistance because the Kurdish issue is a bifurcated phenomenon and the Dersim insurgency was also against the reforms of the Turkish Republic. That is why it was happened right after the 1934 Settlement Law (Yeğen 2009d: 11-13), which was called as “Compulsory Settlement Law”. It is still in force in Turkey today with some changes. This law was considered as a strategy to “build a nation” and “works on modernization”, and also to deal with problems such as disarrangement of the tribes and solutions for insecurity (Aygün 2009: 83). But the real reason behind the law was to displace people from Dersim and settle them in western regions in order to assimilate them (Aygün 2009: 85). With the 1935 decision of the Cabinet, the name of Dersim was changed to Tunceli (Aygün 2009: 90).

In 1935, people in Dersim lost their trust in the State and were in turmoil. Dersim population was against the implementation of the East Reform Plan, which included forbidding using the mother tongue language (Kurdish), forbidding Kurdish newspapers, forced displacement and generally the assimilation politics, and as a consequence they decided to carry out an insurgency. The counter-insurgency in Dersim started in March 1937 and there were 3 operations. The last operation was in August 1938 against the Dersim population, in which it is argued that aerial bombardment, fire bombs, poisoned gas and dynamite were used against civilians including women and children (Kardaş 2009). In the Dersim counter-insurgency, there were 40-70 thousand deaths (Aygün 2009: 100). The leader of the insurgency Seyit Rıza and six more people were executed (Aygün 2009: 230) and Seyit Rıza’s body was burned in order to prevent the people of Dersim from making a mausoleum for him. Dersim counter-insurgency witnessed the harshest reaction on the part of the government against civilians in the Turkish Republic's history. As explained by General Staff War Department, in 17 days 7,954 dead and alive people were captured and 1,019 arms were collected. Kurds and Dersim people had to be assimilated according to the dominant national ideology, whether by their own will or by oppression (Yeğen 2009d: 13-14).

As Bayrak (2009: 58) mentions, after the Dersim counter-insurgency, which was started in 1937, more precautions were taken: Speaking Kurdish, writing in Kurdish, Kurdish

Education and all related areas were forbidden, prevention of the education of Kurdish youth even in the Turkish schools, actions taken in order not to educate Kurds in the military, prevention of the Kurds from being civil servants especially in the region, the words related to Kurdishness such as Kurd and Kurdistan were strictly forbidden and people were forcibly displaced to the Western parts of Turkey. As Bayrak (2009: 84) argues, there were a lot of murders and burned villages and forced displacement in this period. Even there was a guide prepared by the general staff that explains how to burn villages, which was called as “bandit following”. As Bayrak (2009: 158) explains, in the guide it was mentioned that, because the roofs of the village houses are made from stone and sand it is hard to burn these parts of the houses, but if the sand can be removed from the top, it may be seen that the branches of the trees are under the sand, by gathering together and burning some wood and bush, it is possible to burn the whole house. If wood could be added from the door of the house, the fire could spread wider.

It was considered that, in the 1940s the Kurdish insurgencies were finished and a lot of reforms were made for building a modern nation. The political integration of Kurds into the nation was successful. But the economic integration was poor for the state. After the 1950s, Turkish nationalism coded the Kurdish issue as an economic integration problem, in other words as “regional backwardness” (Yeğen 2006: 134). In the 1960s, Turkish nationalist discourse dealt with the problem as a security issue and it was still considered a threat related to “foreign incitement” (Yeğen 2006: 137), and until the 1990s, the discourse of Turkish nationalism did not change.

Although the 1960s was relatively a calm period for Turkish nationalists, there was still a leftist trend in the politics of Turkey. Kurdish issue was fed from this trend as well and the Kurdish dissatisfaction reemerged. Kurdish nationalism gained rise in the 1960s and an illegal party called the Turkey Kurdistan Democratic Party, which was seen as an extension of the Kurdistan Democratic Party in Northern Iraq, was established. This party aimed to name a special area as Kurdistan, in which Kurdish was to be the formal language and this area was to be represented in the Turkish Assembly. In other words, they wanted a federation to be established that was based on ethnicity. This party collapsed in 1968 and after this party, Kurdish nationalism developed in the Turkish left, Marxist and Leninist organizations. In 1969 a special organization was established and named as the Revolutionist East Culture Organization. This was the first legal organization in which Kurds were a founding member. PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan was also working in this organization. The Turkey Workers

Party, as a Marxist organization, was also supporting Kurdish rights and had a special group in the organization called as “Eastern Group” (Akyol 2006: 133). There were basically ten different Kurdish organizations in Turkey in the 1970s and they were closely working with the other leftist organizations, but they could not agree on the methodology of building a Kurdish state (Akyol 2006: 134).

4.3. Ongoing Kurdish Insurgency and the Conflict-Induced Internal Displacement since 1990s

“Even if I saw with my own eyes that the state had burned a village, I would not believe it. Do not think that every helicopter you see is ours. It could be a PKK helicopter. It could also be a Russian, Afghan, or Armenian helicopter”¹⁰

Turkish republic policies for the modernization process and the strategies of the republicans used in order to include all the populations in the boundaries of the new nation-state issues were presented in the previous section of the chapter. In this section, latest Kurdish insurgency, in other words PKK insurgency and the internal displacement as the counter-insurgency strategy of the Turkish Republic will be evaluated. PKK insurgency is different from the other Kurdish insurgencies by nature. Different from the others, this insurgency lasted longer, although it is confronted with a technologically more developed Turkish army and also this insurgency is more organized and could be able to include most of the Kurdish population as supporters. PKK insurgency was born in the late 1970s and started to be acknowledged by the public with its first operation against the Turkish military in 1984. Since then, the conflict has not been ended. This ongoing conflict is an internal armed conflict as defined in the Geneva Convention and has basically two major sides; State Security Forces and the PKK, which is the non-state armed group. In military terminology, this conflict is also conceptualized as “ethnic conflict” and/or “counter-terrorism”, etc. but in this study, the ongoing conflict in Turkey is conceptualized as ethnic-based internal armed conflict, in which a non-state armed group, the PKK, uses guerilla tactics in order to gain success and to promulgate their demands to the world.

¹⁰ Tansu Çiller’s (Prime Minister of the period) answer to a delegation of headmen from ten villages in the Ovacık area of Tunceli that shows the conscious blindness of the official policy after she was told that Turkish soldiers had burned a village and the helicopters supported the operation. (Cumhuriyet 28 October 1994 cited in HRW 2002:13).

When dealing with the Kurdish issue, it should be understood that the problem did not start with the PKK insurgency in 1984. Basically, this insurgency is not the reason for the Kurdish issue and the internal armed conflict that still continues today. On the contrary, the emergence of the PKK is the result of the ongoing systematic denial of the Kurdish identity since the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923. Similarly Yeğen (2006: 32) notes, the history of the PKK, starting from 1984, until the capture of its leader Abdullah Öcalan in 1999, is not enough to understand the nature of the Kurdish issue and there is a long history behind contemporary situation.

Although it is considered that the Turkish Republic denied the physical and ethnic presence of the Kurds after 1930s, it was still dealing with the problem by naming it everything but the “Kurdish issue”. For the republic, it was a social problem, which was labeled alternately as the demand for the Sultanate and Caliphate (Yeğen 2009c: 129), tribal resistance (Yeğen 2009c: 139), bandit problem (Yeğen 2009c: 144), foreign incitement (Yeğen 2009c: 150) and regional backwardness (Yeğen 2009c: 159). Naming the issue other than what it is has been one of the nationalist discourses of the Turkish Republic. Actually, “demand for the Sultanate and Caliphate” and “tribal resistance” were seen to be reactions against the revolutionary character of republican nationalism. For example, İsmet İnönü was the person who named the Kurdish issue as “resistance against modernization” of Turkey and tried to make revolutions especially in Dersim. In this context, Dersim was not a military intervention but a “modernization act” (Yeğen 2006: 131). On the other hand, naming the Kurdish issue as “foreign incitement” has always been the discourse of Turkish nationalism since the Sheikh Said Insurgency (Yeğen 2006: 132).

As Yeğen (2011: 13-14) argues, the Kurdish problem is first and foremost a political problem that has resisted the national ideal of the republic for almost 100 years. Accordingly, it was not easy to assimilate the Kurdish population, at least most of them, because they have a strong “us” feeling coming from their ownership in the region in which they live, as unlike the other ethnic groups, they did not come to this area by migrations. In other words, the insurgencies are not because of the foreign incitement British, Russian or as now discussed American, as Kemalists and nationalists argue, but originate in the self-styled “us” phenomenon of Kurds. Besides, Kurds have never forgotten the relationship and privileges that they lived in the Ottoman Period. Another reason for the “us” feeling is that Kurds are one of the largest ethnic groups in the state. The Barzani myth and the movements in Iraq helped Kurds to support their “us” feeling. And finally, Kurds have a very strong

attachment to their traditional living standards. In sum, Kurds are an ethnic group that has linguistic and regional unity and majoritarian presence in a certain region. In other words, they have that strong “us” feeling because they constitute a nation in Turkey (Yeğen 2011: 16-18).

The seeds of the last insurgency of the Kurds are present in the mid-1960s, approximately 40 years after the Turkish Republic was established and still continues despite the 1980 military coup that destroyed the leftist movements in Turkey including the Kurdish movement (Yeğen 2011: 35). As Özdağ (2010: 35) argues, there has been a Kurdish separatist ideology since the 1970s. Under this ideology the PKK was established in 1974 by a group of Kurdish communist students and the leader of the group was Abdullah Öcalan, who was also a student in Ankara University. The sympathizers of the group were called as “Apocular” (Apo followers) and this small group did not pose a serious problem for the governments. At the end of the 1970s, this group was well recognized and the group moved from Ankara to the South-East of Turkey with establishing strong connections with the rural population. By the late 1970s, the PKK started to attack the Turkish right wing and government officers. There was also an ongoing struggle against the other leftist and pro-Kurdish groups from the Apocular in order to be the only group that struggled for the Kurdish rights. Öcalan and his friends established the PKK in 1978 in a village of Diyarbakır (Özdağ 2010: 37). The PKK¹¹ started the “separatist insurgency” in the south-east part of Turkey in 1984¹², with its first attack on the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF). Since 1984, TAF have used approximately 300.000 soldiers and 67.000 village guards (korucu)¹³ and have spent at least 96 billion dollars to end the conflict (Hür 2008).¹⁴ In 1999, with the capture of Abdullah Öcalan, the

¹¹ Between 1984-2001, the opposition group was named as Kurdistan Worker’s Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, PKK), in 2002 the group changed its name to Freedom and Democracy Congress of Kurdistan (Kongreya Azadî û Demokrasiya Kurdistanê, KADEK) and in 2003 the name of the opposition group became Peoples Congress of Kurdistan (Kurdistan Gel Kongre, KONGRE-GEL).

¹² The fighting actually broke out in 1983 because the first battle-related deaths were recorded on 1 May 1983, and the first time the conflict reached 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year and fulfilled the definition of “armed conflict” in 15 August 1984 (UCDP/PRIO Data Set Main Conflict Table).

¹³ Provisional village guard system has been used since 1985 from among civilian rural population in the villages in the East and Southeast regions of Turkey in order to guard their villages against PKK. The village guards get arms and a salary from the state (TESEV 2006: 12). “The position of provisional village guards (geçici köy korucusu) was created on March 1985 through a clause added by Law no. 3175 to the 1924 Village Law (Law no. 442) (TESEV 2006: 20).

¹⁴ The defense budget of Turkey in 2007 alone was 13.1 billion Turkish Liras (Yetkin 2007 cited in Bahçeşehir Üniversitesi Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi 2009: 21). There are different figures about the battle-related deaths in the internal armed conflict in Turkey. But it is estimated that the total number of deaths since 1984 is between 30.000 and 40.000. Different sources give different figures for the total number of civilian and military personnel deaths. For example, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (2003 cited in UCDP/PRIO Battle Deaths Data Set, 1946-

head of the PKK, a ceasefire started. In 2004, the PKK ended the five years long ceasefire, and “armed clashes between Turkish security forces and Kurdish fighters have since increased” (Bastick et al. 2007: 139).

Initially, the PKK was established as a Marxist-Leninist organization, but then it was transformed into a separatist movement which highlighted Kurdish nationalism and ethnic identity (Pirim and Örtülü 2000: 15). Aysel Tuğluk, who was a member of the parliament from the previous pro-Kurdish political party Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi (Peace and Democracy Party, BDP)¹⁵, agrees that the PKK built its presence on a sovereign Kurdistan ideal in the beginning of its establishment, in 1979, with the assassination attempt against Mehmet Celal Bucak, who was the head of one of the biggest tribes in the east and also a member of the parliament (Marcus 2009: 69), then with the capture of Abdullah Öcalan in 1999, the sovereign Kurdistan ideal was discarded and the discourse of the group has evolved to demand equal citizenship for Kurds within a democratic Turkish nation (Aktan 2008).

As Yeğen (2011: 66) argues, the Kurdish issue is not an ethnic issue. It is a political issue that has ethnic references. The Kurdish issue is not something that all Kurds share, in other words, not all Kurds are involved in the Kurdish issue. Being Kurdish does not automatically mean being involved in the Kurdish issue. On a rough calculation, one third of the Kurdish population¹⁶ is directly involved in the Kurdish issue. The Kurdish issue is something that is

2005), there are more than 39.000 killed since 1984 and according to Clodfelter (2002 cited in UCDP/PRIO Battle Deaths Data Set, 1946-2005), at the end of 1998, Turkey announced official fatal casualties as 23,638 PKK militants, 5,555 Turkish Security personnel and 5,302 noncombatants bringing the total number to 34,495. The consequence of the internal armed conflict is not only the large numbers of deaths, but also there are lots of disappearances and internal displacements of the Kurdish population from villages in east and southeast of Turkey.

¹⁵ From now on, I will write pro-Kurdish political party instead of BDP, because due to party bans against the pro-Kurdish political parties, the name of the parties have changed many times. But the common characteristic of all is their aim to support the Kurdish rights. From 1990 until 2010, the party's name has changed from Halkın Emek Partisi (People's Labor Party, HEP) to Demokratik Halk Partisi (Democratic People's Party, DEP) from DEP to Halkın Demokrasi Partisi (People's Democracy Party, HADEP), from HADEP to Demokratik Halk Partisi (Democratic People's Party, DEHAP), from DEHAP to Demokratik Toplum Partisi (Democratic Society Party, DTP), from DTP to Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi (Peace and Democracy Party, BDP).

¹⁶ We do not know the exact number of Kurds in Turkey because since the 1965 population census, ethnic background and/or mother tongue have not been asked for (Hür 2008). But it is estimated that, the percentage of Kurdish citizens is approximately 15 percent of the total population (Yeğen 2009b). In Turkey's European Union Progress Report of 2004, it is mentioned that the Kurdish population in Turkey is estimated to be 15-20 million (Erdem 2008: 9). According to Mutlu (1996: 532), because of the high fertility rate, the Kurdish population has increased from 3.132 million in 1965 to 7.046 million in 1990, which means 9.98 percent in 1965 and 12.60 percent in 1990. On the other hand, McDowell (2004: 24) estimates that the percentage of the Kurdish population in Turkey is about 23

related with the Turkish republic's nationalism that was not convincing to one third of the Kurdish population. For some, the Kurdish issue is not something about Kurdishness, it is something about some Kurd's rejection of the nationalist politics of the Turkish republic. It is a real political issue that is related with convincing and denying.

By the 1990s, the state abandoned its policy of denial of the Kurdish problem.¹⁷ One such instance was the abandonment of the law that restricted Kurdish in early-1990s. Although there were assimilation politics until that date, the period of recognition was begun. It is argued by Yeğen (2009b) that the recognition was a result of some historical facts such as; Kurds are the owners of the region that they are living in, in other words they did not settle down with migration, they were there since the Ottoman Period and first of all because of this reason they could not be assimilated. Secondly, because they had some privileges in the Ottoman Period as discussed above, they want to continue their position in the republic. Thirdly, the developments in Iraq and the autonomy there gave hope to the Kurds within the Turkish nation. Another development was the "human rights discourse" in the international arena and Turkey's European Union (EU) candidacy (Yeğen 2006: 84). According to Özdağ (2010: 101), 1992 is one of the most important turning points in Turkey because in this year, it was observable that the PKK had an increased number of militants and arms and they started to be represented in the Turkish assembly (with a pro-Kurdish political party) and enjoyed great support from the Kurdish population. Another important point is that the state security forces were in a state of defense, instead of an attack position. A symbolic move came from the then president Süleyman Demirel by his statement that the state was recognizing the Kurdish reality. Yet, these symbolic moves did not preempt the intensification of the armed conflict. For Özdağ (2010: 119-120), the statement of the president was the biggest strike against the struggle with terrorism. Right after the statement,

percent. The discrepancy among the estimated figures of Kurds in Turkey is because of the lack of reliable and accurate data (İçduygu et al. 1999: 1001).

¹⁷ For example, before 1990s, as Seferoğlu and Türközü (1982:11) mentions, Kurds were identified as "Turks from mountains" and no language such as Kurdish is acknowledged to exist, but is identified as an old form of Turkish. In other words, Kurdish is Kurd's Turkish. As Seferoğlu and Türközü (1982: 31-33) mention, because this language is not a unique one, it cannot be an education language and because Turkish is widely used there is no need for a second language. It is impossible to do science in Kurdish because there is no literature worldwide in Kurdish; it is only used in three or five villages. It is also mentioned that, if everybody uses their mother tongue in everyday life, it will be an obstacle in front of development and it is also impossible to educate teachers in Kurdish as it is used as a neighborhood language. Unlike Armenian, Greek and Hebrew Language, Kurdish is a pseudo-language that is a product of *foreign incitement* in order to separate Turkey. Another important point is that because Turks and Kurds are coming from the same race, there is not a different history or culture for Kurds.

there was an attack on Turkish military unarmed personnel in 1993 and 33 soldiers were killed. After this attack “war on a large scale” was started and the pro-Kurdish political party of the period, HEP, was closed.

Nationalist point of view has always considered UN candidacy as a medium to manipulate Turkey. For example as Özdağ (2010: 13) mentions, Turkish military forces brought down the PKK in the most difficult area of low-intense conflict, in Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Iran in 1998 with the least military personnel deaths. In the period of 1999-2002, which is right after the above-mentioned military victory, the European Union placed a trap in front of Turkey and the military victory could not be turned into a political victory. Because of this reason, Turkey is still struggling with the Kurdish issue.

Between 1993 and 1999, the bloodiest period of the Kurdish issue was experienced. There were a lot of deaths from both the PKK and the state security forces, a lot of human rights violations occurred, a lot of unsolved political murders happened, a lot of villages were evacuated, and a lot of citizens were displaced (Yeğen 2009e). At the end of 1994, the number of evicted villages was 2,000 and the number of the displaced people was above 750,000 (McDowell 2004: 565). In 1995, a minister made a statement that there were at least 2,664 villages that had been evicted and at least 2 million people were displaced not only because of the attacks of the PKK, but also because of the security forces, and he lost his job because of this explanation (McDowell 2004: 581).

It is argued by Özdağ (2011: 220) that, the main focus of the PKK is on the Kurdish language ban that happened in the 1980 coup and although it has not been proven, the PKK still reproduces the myths of Kurds being forced to eat excrement, being pushed into acid wells, and being victim to 17,000 unsolved political murders, which all reveal the damnification of the Kurdish population. According to Özdağ (2011: 223), the village evacuations and the village burnings did not happen because these people were Kurdish but these incidents were perpetrated by the state security forces as a method to fight against “terrorism” and this situation has been exaggerated by the PKK and the pro-Kurdish political parties.

It can be argued that, internal displacement is one of the consequences of the Kurdish issue in Turkey, which has been used as a prime strategy to end Kurdish insurgencies since the establishment of the Turkish Republic. There have been three major insurgencies that Kurds

have started. The first one is the 1925 Sheikh Said insurgency, the second one is the 1934 Dersim insurgency and the final one was started by the PKK in 1984 and is considered to be the final and longest insurgency of Kurds. In all of these insurgencies, the state has used population displacement from the region to the western parts of Turkey in order first of all to empty the region from the Kurdish population and secondly to assimilate Kurds. According to Yeğen (2009a: 11), assimilation policies were the main strategy of the state and towards this aim, displacement, forced housing, residential education and compulsory Turkish speaking, were used since 1924 and these strategies were definitely started with the East Reform Plan and also continued in 1990s. As Yeğen (2009a: 16-17) argues, the displacement process of the Kurdish population was held widespread in 1927, 1934, 1938 and throughout the 1990s. Again Yeğen (2010: 102) mentions that displaced Kurds have been excluded from the basic citizenship rights, such as property rights and travel rights, among others. Displacement itself is a human rights violation and the process of the displacements reveals that the Republic may use discriminatory practices towards not only its non-Muslim citizens, but also to its Muslim citizens as well. Displacement has been a medium used to solve the Kurdish issue since the beginning of the Turkish Republic. In sum, it is not wrong to argue that, displacement has been a continuum strategy of the Republic towards its Kurdish citizens since its establishment up to the 1990s (Yeğen 2010: 104).

Village evacuations especially in 1990s have always seen as a military strategy by the nationalist wing and military leaders in Turkey. According to Özdağ (2010: 142-143), the Turkish government had realized that in order to fight against a non-state armed group, they would have to take the control of the rural areas. For this aim, they adopted a two-phase strategy. In order to cut the logistical support from the villages to the PKK, state security forces evacuated the villages that were helping the PKK and/or under the “threat” of the group. The logistical support, such as food, intelligence and gathering members for the group, was cut. The second phase was to observe the villages closely, in other words, put pressure on these villages. He expresses that, although the support was cut, there were also some negative consequences of the village evacuations because the state left the villagers alone to their own fate and did not help them in their new living environment. These villagers had to migrate to the metropolis and struggle with poverty. This was an efficient political arena for the PKK. Another important point was the number of village guards was increased. Because as mentioned by Özdağ (2010: 143), Human Rights Watch shows that there were three main reasons for the evacuations and the first reason was to deny enrolling into the village guard system. In other words, the number of the village guards was increased

because these villagers were forced to be village guards and if they denied, they were displaced from their villages. The second reason was the pressure from the state security forces (as mentioned before some of the villages were under a close observation) and the last reason was the PKK attacks and the activities in the area. In other words, the villagers were caught between the pressures from the state security forces and the activities of the PKK. They had to choose one side or the other and became the most vulnerable population.

There are basically two major internal migrations in Turkey. The first wave took place between the late 1940s till the early 1980s because of the mechanization of agriculture and integration of markets that lead the farmers to migrate to the cities first as seasonal and then as permanent workers. The second wave was started in the second half of the 1980s as forced migration from East and Southeast Anatolia. Migration started after 1984 and escalated after 1993 as a result of the village evacuations by the military which was started in the 1987 emergency rule, due to “the pressure of the PKK (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan – Kurdistan Workers’ Party) on villagers who do not support the PKK to leave their villages; and insecurity resulting from being caught between the armed insurgents and Turkish security forces” (Çelik 2005: 139).

The second wave of internal migration, which is defined as forced migration in contrast to the first wave, was related with the Kurdish question in Turkey because the migrants not only faced problems by being forced to leave their villages and move to the cities involuntarily, but also they faced ethnic related problems in the cities where anti-Kurdish sentiments were mostly created, as the conflict between the PKK and the Turkish military increased. In the literature on forced migration, it is said that the migrants leave their residence without having any material or social ties back home and the ones that migrate to the places that their relatives live, adapt to the city easier and faster. The second wave migrants in Turkey were in a more disadvantageous position than the first comers because of their low education level and the anti-Kurdish sentiments in the cities. Moreover, internally displaced Kurdish people had very little support from those who remained behind because they had to leave the home all together with the family (Çelik 2005: 140-141). Yılmaz (2007: 210) expresses the situation of the Kurdish migrants, who came to the cities after the 1990s, in terms of “poverty” and “deprivation”, which is worse when combined with ethnic-based discrimination that leads to social marginalization. As Cohen and Deng (1998b: 5-6) mention, most of the migrant Kurds had to settle down in the shantytowns around the cities

where they lacked proper health care and education for the young in addition to the lack of stable jobs in the cities.

According to the Göç Edenler Sosyal Yardımlaşma ve Kültür Derneği (The Association of Social and Cultural Solidarity of the Immigrants, GÖÇ-DER) Report (2001), forced migration reasons in 1990s were as such; economic sanctions, religious oppressions, inadequacy of education and health facilities, blood feud, mortal fear, village and hamlet evacuation, village guard imposition, plateau banishment, PKK oppression¹⁸, applications of security forces and OHAL and food control. According to the report published in 1998 that was prepared by an investigation commission formed in 1997 at the behest of a group of members of the Turkish Parliament, it was found “that the eviction of villagers by the security forces constituted one of the reasons behind displacement and that it was carried out unlawfully” (TESEV 2007: 146). Similar to GÖÇ-DER’s findings, the report reveals that the reasons for the migration in the 1990s from the East and Southeast regions of Turkey are; “1) The collapse of animal husbandry and agriculture because of the ban on the use of pastures and because of the environment of clashes/military operations; pressure exercised by the PKK on villagers who were village guards; the fact that security forces regarded with suspicion those villagers who did not accept to become village guards and, thus, intensified their operations on these villages, causing the villagers to desert their villages; 2) The PKK’s eviction of villagers who accepted to become village guards; and 3) The eviction by the security forces of villagers who did not accept to become village guards and who were thought to side with the PKK, the evacuation by the security forces of villagers whose security could not be ensured (TESEV 2007: 147).

According to Özerdem and Jacoby (2007: 163), it is difficult to differentiate conflict dynamics and socioeconomic changes that cause displacement in Turkey. In 2002, displacement from the east and southeast of Turkey reached to one million people, which includes both economic migration and conflict-induced displacement. Similarly Kaya (2009: 86) argues that, when the reason is economic for the displaced people from the region in Turkey, it includes more reasons than the classical migration literature because when the villagers mention the reason of their migration as economic sanctions, it includes that they cannot perform agriculture and animal husbandry as a consequence of the conflict in the region.

¹⁸ “Within the education sector, for instance, the PKK had, by 1995, murdered 150 teachers and burned down 192 schools, forcing the abandonment of teaching provisions in many areas and the closure of 5210 schools” (Özdamar and Jacoby 2007: 163).

Before the 1990s, migrated people had opportunities to find paid labor such as establishing a business with their own capital accumulation or they worked in unqualified jobs like construction workers. But the ones who were displaced after the 1990s, could not find jobs and lived difficulties because these families were displaced by losing their every economic property and the migration was sudden without any preparation time for the families (Çağlayan 2007: 47-48). Hundreds of thousands of people were displaced between 1984 and 1999 in Turkey (TESEV 2007: 19).¹⁹ In this displacement process, the Turkish Government did not provide any plan or program for the resettlement of the villagers and it also did not support the internally displaced people during and after their migration and left them to their own fate (Mutlu 2009: 24). On the other hand, the number of displaced people is controversial because the practice “was carried out without any scheme” and even any records were not kept on the number of internally displaced people (Mutlu 2009: 25).

Source: www.internal-displacement.org




Figure 4.1: Internal Displacement in Turkey

As seen in Figure 4.1 above, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) indicates that, the origin cities of the displaced people are Tunceli, Elazığ, Adıyaman, Diyarbakır,

¹⁹ According to Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies (HÜNEE) (2006: 106), it is estimated that between 953,680 and 1,201,200 people were displaced in the 1986-2005 period. Some of these people were displaced as a result of terrorism, government evacuations and conflict. 100,000 security related migrants have returned to their place of origin (IDMC 2007: 58-59).

Bingöl, Muş, Batman, Mardin, Ağrı, Bitlis, Siirt, Şırnak, Van and Hakkari provinces, where the conflicts have been going on mostly since 1984. Hacettepe Nüfus Etüdüleri Enstitüsü (Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies, HÜNEE) (2006: 106) indicates that, most of the migrations for security reasons that occurred in last twenty years, originated from these 14 cities mostly to İstanbul, Ankara, İzmir, Adana, Mersin, Bursa, Antalya, Malatya, Manisa, Kocaeli and to the city centers from the villages and hamlets of the originated cities. 87% of these migrations were involuntary, in other words those people were forced to migrate from their original residence (HÜNEE 2006: 77).

Displaced persons (mostly the villagers) faced a dilemma before migrating, which was either becoming village guards and facing PKK attacks or refusing being village guards²⁰ and facing the state security forces' attacks (HRW 2002: 12). Continuing the village guard system also inhibits the return to the villages from the cities because of "their threatening behavior towards individuals and their behavior regarding property (occupation of agricultural land, gathering of other people's produce, the cutting of trees, reaping of grass, grazing animals in other people's fields, etc.) affect return to evicted villages in Diyarbakır" (TESEV 2007: 184). According to the Interior Ministry (cited in TESEV 2006: 21), between 1985 and 2006, some of the village guards committed crimes, which were "terror" related, crimes directed against property, against individuals and related to smuggling. There were also some crimes such as murder, violation of firearms law, firing on arms in public places, forestry products smuggling and arms smuggling.

Although there have been crimes committed by some of the the village guards, Özdağ (2011: 228) argues that, the village guard system is a kind of buffer mechanism between the east and southeast and the rest of Turkey, which protects the social, cultural, and political bonds of the area and obstructs the PKK's ability to diffuse to the other areas of Turkey. This is the only combining mechanism of the Kurdish population to the political system of Turkey. The government does not pay enough attention to the village guards, they do not have social and health security and they need some special arrangements. On the contrary, Kaynak (2009: 81-82) argues that the village guard system is not the right strategy because to arm the villagers and tell them to protect themselves only shows the weakness of the state. For him, there are two basic strategies to fight against "terrorism", the first one is the intelligence and

²⁰ As Türker (2009) mentions, people in the villages were forced to be village guards and those who refused were forced to migrate from their homelands. In documents of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, in 1996 one-third of the village guards had become criminals most often under the guise of PKK militants. Their crimes ranged from rape to killing innocent villagers, from arms trafficking to drug smuggling.

the second one is the Special Forces. The village guard system and the PKK have fed each other. The reason that the PKK gets stronger is the village guard system and as it gets stronger, the village guard system becomes larger.

According to TESEV (2008: 179), the most common and problematic consequence of the internal displacement is economic. IDPs had to start in poverty and deprivation to a new life in the cities, whereas they were living in wealth in their villages. The second common problem is the increase in the domestic violence (TESEV 2008: 181-183). Because of the increased stress and decreased control on women and girls in the cities, an increase in domestic violence is observed. There is also an increase in child marriages and a decrease in the education of children, which are all the consequences of poverty. Women start living health problems and because they usually do not have health security, they cannot go to the hospitals and/or health centers. They also start experiencing problems because of their lack of language and they start living cultural problems as they do not know the living standards in the cities (TESEV 2008: 184). TESEV (2008: 272) explains that, IDPs that have to live in the western parts of Turkey face discrimination in education, shelter and employment just because they are Kurdish. They sometimes cannot rent a house because the owner does not want to rent it to a Kurdish family as if they might have a relation with the PKK. Even if they can rent a house, usually the living conditions are unhealthy because of their poverty and they have to force their children to work in the streets rather than sending them to schools (Adaman and Keyder 2006: ix). According to the TOHAV (2006: 10-11) report, because women usually do not know Turkish, they had difficulties in the cities, whether in the hospitals and/or shopping. They face discrimination because whenever they speak in Kurdish in the public sphere, they are labeled as “terrorist”. This caused their exclusion from social and cultural lives in the towns. It is also an obstacle in front of their integration into the city life. This caused some mental and physical trauma for the Kurdish women.

In 1999 the internal displacement debate entered a new phase with the EU membership candidacy. The government accepted the assistance and expertise of the UN in this matter and this was considered as an important development. When the government invited the UN Secretary-Generals’ Representative on Internally Displaced Persons, Francis Deng, to Turkey in 2002, the change has begun because it was considered as the government “acknowledged the existence of this problem” (TESEV 2007: 25). After Deng’s report on Turkey, the Turkish government put some laws in force and assigned tasks to some

institutions, like HÜNEE, to make surveys on the issue, which will be explained in the next sub-section.

Approximately 30 years long internal armed conflict and its consequences such as the increased number of deaths and internal displacement of the Kurdish population from their homelands to the city centers have affected public attitudes negatively. These attitudes towards Kurds mirrored that of the nationalist point of view in Turkey. The problematic years have positioned Kurds and Turks against each other in the cities, where Kurds were settled mostly after their displacement from the villages and also where Kurds were working as seasonal workers. Even the capture of Abdullah Öcalan could not end the collective anger towards Kurds (Yeğen 2006: 74). The prejudice towards Kurds, as every Kurd was potential “terrorist” and the opinion that the final goal of the Kurdish population was to eliminate Turkish national unity have accelerated year by year among Turks. As Bora (2006 cited in Saracoğlu 2009: 641) notes, the mainstream discourse towards Kurds has become more exclusive in the last ten years and this language has been labeling Kurds as “culturally backward”, “intrinsically incapable of adopting to the modern city life”, “naturally criminal”, “violent” and “separatist”. The increase in the number of Kurds in the western cities was evaluated as the “Kurdish invasion”. This anti-Kurdish discourse was conceptualized as “exclusionary recognition” by Saracoğlu (2009: 642). This concept is based on basically four common points. First of all, in contrast to the assimilationist discourse of the state, the new discourse evaluates Kurds as a separate group. Secondly, Kurds are attributed with negative traits, such as ignorant, culturally backward, etc., which is an *exclusionary* attitude. Thirdly, the agents of the anti-Kurdish discourse are the people who interact with Kurds in their everyday life in the cities, in other words with their own experiences they have developed a *recognition* towards Kurdishness. Finally, people who have an exclusionary recognition towards Kurds do not have such a negative attitude towards the other ethnic groups, for example not towards Armenians, Jews, etc.

The ongoing struggle regarding the Kurdish issue nowadays is about the Kurdish/Democratic Opening and its deadlock in Turkey, which was started by the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party, AKP). In 2005, the prime minister of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, made a statement that they were recognizing the Kurdish issue in Turkey and gained negative attention especially from the Turkish nationalists. According to these critics, there was only one problem in Turkey about Kurds which was called as “terror” and the PKK. For them, recognizing the Kurdish issue means recognizing the “PKK terror

organization”. Turkish nationalists in power consider that the Kurdish issue is about the regional backwardness and illiteracy in the region (İnsel 2005). For example according to Özdağ (2010: 251), the idea of the Kurdish/Democratic Opening is a kind of negotiation with “terrorism” and the first step of this negotiation was the inauguration of TRT6, the Kurdish speaking channel of the national television in 2009. For example, Osman Pamukoğlu, a retired general, similarly evaluated the opening discussions as a “worthless mass of academic blah” (Sevimay 2009: 120) and has always seen the problem as a security issue and the solution of it by the military operations against “terrorist organization” (Sevimay 2009: 123).

4.4. Reports and Case Studies on Conflict-Induced Internal Displacement in 1990s

4.4.1. Turkish Government’s Tendency to Deny the Causes of Internal Displacement and Human Rights Violations through the 1990s.

Through 1990s, Turkish government denied the responsibility of the internally displaced population and as mentioned before, they left these people to their own fate in the process of their migration. The government also denied the human rights violations alongside with internal displacement in that period. According to TESEV (2006: 42), recognition and official acknowledgment of the internal displacement in Turkey started with the EU candidacy. All the significant efforts including Francis Deng’s mission to Turkey and the other developments after his visit were due to the Helsinki Summit and to the need to fulfill the Copenhagen Criteria. In the 2004 Progress Report of Turkey, it was mentioned that although there were some improvements in the situation of the IDPs, it is still a critical issue. In order to fulfill the EU candidacy criteria, the Turkish government has taken some measures since 2002 and the Secretary-General Representative Francis Deng’s mission was also in these special measures.

Until that date, Turkey did not undertake very much concern as seen from the reports and projects that they made in 1990s. For example, in 1998 the *Parliamentary Investigation Commission Established with the Aim of Investigating the Problems of Our Citizens Who Migrated due to the Eviction of Settlements in East and Southeast Anatolia and to Assess the Measures that Need to be Taken* Report (hereafter Parliamentary Report) was published and it showed that there were 378,335 IDPs in total from 820 villages and 2,345 hamlets of 11 cities (Batman, Bingöl, Bitlis, Mardin, Muş, Diyarbakır, Hakkari, Siirt, Şırnak, Tunceli, Van), mostly between 1993 and 1994 (Bozkurt 2000: 225). It was mentioned in the report

that, the main reasons for the forced migration from the region were, first of all, the collapse of animal husbandry and agriculture because of the bans on the use of the pastures. Second reason was the PKK force on people to migrate from their villages if they accepted to become “village guards”. Thirdly, eviction of some villages by security forces was also a reason, if villagers refused to become village guards and supported the PKK and also if the villages could not be secured because of their location (TESEV 2006: 12).

As seen from the government’s report that the main reasons of the forced migration were presented as the PKK force on the villagers and the support of the PKK. From this explanation, we can understand that the government’s tendency was to deny their fault on internal displacement because in the later reports, after the visit of the UN Secretary General’s Representative on Internally Displaced Persons, Francis Deng in 2002, it was more obvious that the government started to take some responsibility indirectly about the forced migration of the Kurdish population in this period, as it will be explained in details below.

Although there was a project developed on returning back to the villages in 1994, called as *Return to Village and Rehabilitation Project (RVRP)*, for the internally displaced population, it was “inadequate” and “poorly-executed” (HRW 1996: 1). The aim of the project was to provide “secure [living] areas” for the IDPs that were evicted from their villages, which was announced by the prime minister of the period, Tansu Çiller, In 1995, it was announced that Diyarbakır and Batman provinces were chosen as the first stage sites to settlement for 12,000 displaced families. This project could not be started because of some funding problems.

It was again announced by the government in March 1999 officially as “Village Return and Rehabilitation Project” and the objectives were to resettle the villagers who wanted to go back to their provinces. The infrastructures of the villages would be completed, housing developments would be increased and health and education facilities would be completed with the project. It was important to have a project like this because it was the first official written document from the government (HRW 2002: 26-27). It was thought that this project was to keep the villagers from their original villages and by the Draft Housing Law in 1999, the suspicions became relevant because according to one of the articles of the law (article 14), “if [the displaced] do not accept to live in the places directed by the Office of the Prime Minister, their rights [to settlement] will be canceled by the local housing commission. Families in this situation may not make a second housing application” (HRW 2002: 27).

Internally displaced population was not satisfied with the project because they wanted to live in their original villages (HRW 2002: 31). RVRP project with the Parliamentary Report were inadequate to meet the needs of the displaced families. In other words, until the visit of Francis Deng, the government did not take serious actions against the victimization of the IDPs.

4.4.2. Turkish Government's Attempts to Recognize the Causes and Consequences of the Internal Displacement

After the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General's Representative on Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), Francis Deng's visit to Turkey and beginning with the year 2004, the government has taken serious measures such as the survey of HÜNEE, the enactment of Law 5233 entitled "Law on Compensation for Losses Resulting from Terrorism and the Fight against Terrorism" (Compensation Law) in order to compensate the material damages of IDPs and the cooperation agreement between the United Nation Development Program (UNDP) and the Ministry of Internal Affairs on a pilot project to address the needs of the IDPs in Van province.²¹

Francis Deng's mission to Turkey was between 27 and 31 May, 2002. It was assumed before the mission that, the government overlooks and denies the issue and rejects the international aid. The government not only denied the problem, but also has not helped the internally displaced people after they were exiled from their residence (Deng 2003: 2). After his mission to Turkey Deng advised that the government has to develop some emergent policies for the return, re-settlement and integrations of the IDPs (Deng 2003: 2). On the other hand, because it would take some time, until the IDPs could go back to their regions the government has to take some special measures by making coordination with the NGOs and UN to ameliorate the negative living standards of the IDPs. Besides these special measures, it was decided that the government had to collect relevant data on the issue. This data should include the new residence after displacement, the living standards and the tendencies of returning back and re-settlement of the IDPs, who were forced to flee because of the acts of both the PKK and the state security forces. In order to take some measures on IDPs, the government had to be in coordination with the NGOs working on this issue and also with the international agencies that did not demand any help before (Deng 2003: 3).

²¹ Before these measures, there are two assistance programmes for the IDPs, these are Central Village Programme (1994) and Return to Village Programme (1995).

Deng recommended that there should be non-discriminatory applications for the returning of the IDPs to their villages. In order to prevent the discrimination, displacement should include both the acts of the PKK and the state security forces. The people should also go back to their villages in a secure environment and should not face oppression from the Gendarmerie in the region. This secure environment also includes the abolishment of the village guard system in the region and cleaning the region from the mines, in the context of the government's guarantee by signing the Convention on Prohibition, of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of the Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Ottawa Convention) in 2003 (Deng 2003: 4). Finally, the government has to pass an ordinance on the Compensation of the IDPs' losses in the process of displacement (Deng 2003: 5).

TESEV published an evaluation report in 2006, which was called as *Report and Update on the Implementation of the Recommendations Made by the UN Secretary-General's Representative on Internally Displaced Persons Following His Visit to Turkey*. This report was a comprehensive assessment of the implementation of Deng's report on Turkey. It is basically based on the field research conducted in İstanbul, Diyarbakır, Batman and Hakkari provinces in 2005 and then follow-up research in 2006 (TESEV 2006: 8). Because the issue was acknowledged officially by the government with the visit of the Secretary-General's Representative Francis Deng, some measures were taken after his visit. There were mainly three important steps that were taken by the Turkish Government. These were, the *Law on Compensation for Losses Resulting from Terrorism and the Fight against Terrorism* (hereafter Compensation Law) in July 2004, HÜNEE Survey titled as *Study on Migration and the Displaced population in Turkey* (hereafter Hacettepe Survey) in December 2004 and the framework formulation document for the government policy titled as *Measures on the Issue of IDPs and the Return to Village and Rehabilitation Project in Turkey* (hereafter Framework Document) in August 2005. Although these are sufficient measures for IDPs, the general critique on them is that, they were taken without any cooperation with the relevant NGOs and they were structured as top-down plannings, which suffered from democratic deficit (TESEV 2006: 9).

As TESEV (2006: 33) argues, the most significant step for the IDPs in order to fulfill the recommendations of Deng was the Compensation Law that entered into force on 27 July 2004. The duration of the applications to get compensation because of the material damages since 1987 lasted until the beginning of 2007. This law was for the losses of the (but not limited to) the IDPs, members of the armed forces, the police and the village guards on their

damages to moveable or immovable property, damages to the life and body of the person, and the damages sustained due to inability to access one's property. Compensation Law is basically a result of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), as it had millions of applications from the IDPs in Turkey since 1993. Because in that period, ECtHR did not require the applicants to have answers from all the domestic legal sources, it replied to all the applicants until 2004. But in a case where ECtHR postponed the decision and supported this postponement by the draft law on "Compensation for Losses Resulting from Terrorism and the Fight against Terrorism", saved ECtHR from dealing with many cases and also forced Turkey to put this law in force (Özdoğan and Ergüneş 2007: 11).

Despite the fact that the Compensation Law was a positive step, it had some shortcomings. First of all, it was not suitable for the Guiding Principles for the IDPs, which includes all people who were displaced from the outcomes of the armed conflict, but the Compensation Law on the other hand, did not include people who were not directly affected from the displacement policy of the state security forces or the oppression of the PKK. Secondly, the law was based on a temporal scope. The law started from 1987, with the start of the State of Emergency and did not cover the displacements and damages between 1984 and 1987. This was seen as a weakness of the law (TESEV 2006: 34). Dissemination of the law was also not adequate. NGOs, for example, had difficulties getting information about the law. The awareness among the IDPs about the law was uncertain. Because the law had "terror" in its heading, some of the IDPs lived in confusion as they did not consider the struggle as "terror" and as a consequence did not apply to take compensation (TESEV 2006: 35). Not only the coverage date of the law and the failure in dissemination of the law, but also the deadline of the applications, which ended in the beginning of 2007, was problematic. There should not be any deadline for the application, if the intention is to compensate people's losses because of the internal conflict. Another important shortcoming about the law was the burden of proof. Because it was impossible to document the evictions that were made by Gendarmerie and the acts were still denied by the government, the IDPs had difficulties to prove their evacuation. This led to the rejections of one in every four applications because IDPs could not provide official documents on their eviction from their villages by the state security forces (TESEV 2006: 37-38). For example, as Özdoğan and Ergüneş (2007: 13) mention, commissions that deal with the compensations asked the gendarmerie stations, republic office of the attorney general and agriculture directorships to explain the reason of the migration from the region. The gendarmerie stations usually answer this question as the

migration was not forced, but it was caused because of economic, social and education reasons.

The second effective step of the government was the data collection attempt after the recommendations of Deng. The Hacettepe Survey was conducted by HÜNEE with the coordination of the State Planning Organization (SPO). At the beginning of the study, it was promised that the study would be done with the cooperation of NGOs from the region. As it was argued, although they made some consultations with the NGOs in the workshops, they did not share the questionnaire or build an efficient dialogue with them. They had problems with transparency and did not give any details about the preliminary findings when the study was going on (TESEV 2006: 18).

According to the Hacettepe Survey, there have been population movements from the east and southeast of Turkey because of the security, “terror” and development projects in the region. IDPs live in the shanty towns in the cities in unhealthy conditions and these uneducated and unqualified people live in bad conditions (HÜNEE 2006: 5). The reasons for the migration are listed as economic such as to search for jobs in the cities, to have enough salary, to have jobs in the villages; personal reasons, such as to marry, for education; security reasons, such as life and property security, deportation demand, “terror” organization pressure, village guard pressure, plateau ban; family reasons, such as to move with the family, assignation of the husband, etc. (HÜNEE 2006: 13).

As the report mentions, in security based migrations, personal migration is less common than the family migrations, because in this migration type, whole villages migrate simultaneously. 87% of the migrations happen involuntarily and the rest of the migrations are defined as voluntary migrations (HÜNEE 2006: 77). According to the report, when it was asked to the IDPs, “return to village” has different meanings for different people, it means return permanently or temporarily or for summer holidays or for funerals, etc. (HÜNEE 2006: 110). There are also some IDPs that do not want to return to their villages. The reasons for this are that in the cities, they have a good job, they have a better life, they feel safe, there is more education and access to social and cultural facilities, etc. (HÜNEE 2006: 112).

It was proved by the Hacettepe Survey in a more indirect and disguised way, even sometimes as not mentioning these people are Kurds, that these IDPs are mostly from the Kurdish population who were deported from their villages for security reasons, had pressure

from the PKK and did not have life security in the region (TESEV 2008: 294). As TESEV (2008: 295) mentions, the subject of the deportation acts, i.e. who wanted these people to leave their villages, was not addressed. Although it was mentioned in the report that the villages were told to be evicted, the subject of the act was not mentioned directly. These examples and the general language show the biased and indirect structure of the Hacettepe Survey. Despite the fact of its biased character, the report still mentions that there were village evacuations and these evacuations were not the decision of the villagers, they were departed from their villages by the state security forces, which in other words, falsifies the state discourse on the IDPs issue.

After Deng's visit, a pilot project was developed also in 2006, which was called as *Van Province Action Plan* by Van Governance in coordination with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in order to organize the services towards the integration, resettlement or return of the IDPs in the Van province. Van was chosen as the province for the action and the plan was a consequence of Deng's recommendations after his mission to Turkey. Van has IDPs in the province that came from the villages of Van and also from the other cities, such as Hakkari and Şırnak. The Secretary-General Representative of IDPs, Walter Kälin, found the Van Province Action Plan efficient for the IDPs and warned the governance to be in active coordination with all the share holders (TESEV 2009: 6).

Van Province Action Plan is coherent with the Guiding Principles for IDPs, such as underlining the freedom of the IDPs in choosing to stay or return to their village. Although it has some positive sides, it also has some negatives. For example, it does not mention the criteria of deciding the projects for the IDPs in the plan. It does not pay attention to the reality that most of the IDPs in the Van province have come from Hakkari and Şırnak provinces and it does not define IDPs, in the first place. The budget is also not mentioned in the plan. More importantly, the NGOs criticize the plan by indicating that it does not refer to the Kurdish issue and the obstacles blocking the IDPs' return. Ending the operations, abolishing the village guard system and mine clearance were not taken into consideration in the plan. Besides, the projects in the plan were all public sector based and NGO projects were left behind (TESEV 2009: 7).

4.4.3. Non-Governmental Organizations' (NGOs) Studies on Internal Displacement

Not only the government made some reports on internal displacement, but some the NGOs were also active in this process and developed some implications in order to force the government to take some actions about IDPs. For example, *Zorunlu Göçe Maruz Kalan Kürt Kökenli T.C. Vatandaşlarının Göç Öncesi ve Sonrası Sosyo-Ekonomik, Sosyo-Kültürel Durumları, Askeri Çatışma ve Gerginlik Politikaları Sonucu Meydana Gelen Göçün Ortaya Çıkardığı Sorunlar ve Göç Mağduru Ailelerin Geriye Dönüş Eğilimlerinin Araştırılması ve Çözüm Önerileri* (hereafter GÖÇ-DER research) in 2001, which was held by Mehmet Barut, is one of the first researches that was done on the IDPs in Turkey. Research was done in Diyarbakır, Van, Batman, İstanbul, İzmir and İçel between 1999 and 2001. According to the study, 98.8% of all the migrations are from the east and southeast of Turkey and 81.7% of them are from the villages (GÖÇ-DER 2001: 190). The reasons to migrate from the villages are as follows; OHAL applications, not accepting village guards system, not having life security, village evacuations because of the military operations, plateau ban, economic problems and not having education and health facilities in the villages. As the results show, 86.4% of the migrations are in mass migration type. The migration is happening with the family and the whole village together (GÖÇ-DER 2001: 191).

It is also mentioned in the report that, the consequences of the forced migration on the IDPs are as following; death, injury and mutilation of the family members, agricultural field demolitions, death of the livestock, destruction of the property, loss of jobs, leaving agricultural fields and home behind, division of the family and psychological problems. IDPs have chosen the place to migrate according to some criteria such as, proximity to other family members, knowing people from the same village in the new settlement place, the ability to find a job easily, for security reasons and to be close to the original village.

This study is an important source because it was one of the first studies on internal displacement with a limited budget and also it was one of the first attempts to show the deprivation situation of the IDPs in the cities, because of their forced displacement caused by the security forces. The study had some inadequacies such as; the report was lack of sociological analysis. It only describes the reasons and the results of the internal displacement. In other words, it is a descriptive study, which is lack of gender analysis and the situation of women was overlooked as one of the crucial consequences of the internal displacement.

Second example is the *Zorunlu Göç İle Yüzleşmek: Türkiye’de Yerinden Edilme Sonrası Vatandaşlığın İnşası* (Coming to Terms with Forced Migration: Post-Displacement Restitution of Citizenship Rights in Turkey, hereafter TESEV Study) in 2006. In 2004, a study group was established within TESEV to research the problems caused by internal displacement in Turkey and to develop policies towards this issue. Since 2005, the study group has conducted research, including qualitative field research on IDPs in the east and southeast of Turkey. The first outcomes were announced in 2005 with a report. In the research, interdisciplinary methods were used and law, reconstruction, psychology, demography and sociology disciplines were included (TESEV 2008: 23-24).

TESEV (2008: 278-282) lists the solutions for the internal displacement issue after the field research of the working group as follows; first of all, the problems of the IDPs should be well-defined. In order to define the problems, internally displaced people will be defined according to the Guiding Principles for the IDPs document and there should be an effective coordination between the NGOs, universities and public institutions. Secondly, there should be effective government policies. For this issue, the articles in the RVRP document should be applied by the government, the missing points of the framework document should be completed and the coordination with the NGOs is a vital point in this issue. Thirdly, in order to return IDPs to their villages, the returns should be voluntary, the infrastructure of the villages should be redesigned, the negotiation between the PKK, the villagers and the village guards should be planned by the help of the NGOs in the region and health and education facilities in the villages should be re-planned. Fourth, there should be some developments in city life, such as opening new jobs for the IDPs and some programs for the integration of the IDPs, the education of the women and children should be developed, poverty should be diminished in order to decrease child-labor and the social aid projects should be increased for the IDPs. Fifth, the compensation of losses of the IDPs issue should be immediately solved. In order to overcome the problem, the announcement of the law should be done effectively, the context of the people who may apply should be broadened and it should include every person who has been affected by the conflict situation, there should be a compensation for the moral damages, the deadline of the application should be extended, there should be a non-discriminatory evaluation process for every applicant and the applications should be evaluated according to the procedures and the denied applications should be evaluated again. Sixth, psychological and social rehabilitation should be constructed. For this construction, internal displacement should be evaluated as a public health issue, in order to solve the problem, there should be an inter-disciplinary technique

and IDPs' psychological and general health problems should be defined, the special needs of the IDPs should be acknowledged by the health personnel in the cities, there should be a Kurdish speaking personnel in the health centers in order to overcome the language problem, rehabilitation centers should be opened in coordination with the NGOs and public personnel and raising consciousness in the society about internal displacement. Finally, reconstruction should be finished and in order to do it, the conflict situation in Turkey should be ended, village guards should be disarmed and rehabilitation of these people and the PKK guerillas should be planned, human rights violations should be accepted by the government and the crimes committed by the state security forces and village guards should be punished.

The importance of this study comes into existence in the developed policies towards the issue. Its qualitative structure also enables to show detailed information on IDPs, including the situation of women after displacement process. It has a very broad conceptualization, research topics and analysis. In other words, it gives a detailed picture on the issue. In the report, it has topics on law, health, municipal problems, international implementations, psychological problems such as social discrimination and economic problems.

The final example is the Bilgi University study on *Türkiye'de İç Göçler: Bütünleşme mi Geri Dönüş Mü?* (Internal Migration in Turkey: Integration or Returning Back, hereafter Bilgi University Study) between 2006 and 2008. The study was coordinated by Ayhan Kaya with the support of Türkiye Bilimsel ve Teknolojik Araştırma Kurumu (Turkish Scientific and Technological Research Institute, TÜBİTAK). The field research was done in İstanbul, Diyarbakır and Mersin and in-depth interviews were held with 150 migration victims. In addition, interviews were also done with the NGO representatives. In-depth interviews were supported by 15 focus group interviews (Kaya 2009: xix).

According to Kaya (2009: 70), there has been an ongoing debate on the issue of the numbers of IDPs in Turkey, but more than the number of the victims of the displacement, whether the number is high or low, the situation of the internally displaced people in Turkey, their living conditions, poverty and deprivation is more important to study. It is seen from the study that, displacements from the region were mostly because of the security reasons. Although most of the interviewees in the study mentioned that, they were not related with the ongoing conflict situation in the region, some of them explained their relatives were in the non-state armed group. Whether or not they were related with the non-state armed group, they were forced to migrate from their homelands. Most of the displaced people were from the villages

and some of them from the towns and they all mentioned that there was no time for them to get ready for the migration, they were displaced suddenly from their residences (Kaya 2009: 171).

The destination of the migration was decided suddenly according to the economic capital of the migrants. The destination path was first to the nearest town and then to the final destination such as through Adana, Mersin, Antalya, İzmir, İstanbul or Ankara, in other words to the bigger cities. Some of them could not go that far and had to stay in Diyarbakır and Van provinces that the nearest cities to their villages. Because the migration happened suddenly, it caused some urbanization problems in the metropolis, such as developing shanty town areas and urbanization without any plan (Kaya 2009: 172).

The importance of the Bilgi University Study comes from its way to show what the situation of the IDPs in the cities is and how the destination cities were chosen by the internally displaced people. The study also presents the situation of these people before displacement and shows that how these people were unprepared before their migration and could only saved their lives and the consequences of this unpreparedness in their city lives afterwards.

4.5. Her/story in the Kurdish Struggle: Şêr Şêr e Çi Jin Çi Mêr e²²

From the early-1980s, Kurdish women started to be visible in the public sphere within their traditional clothing and also they were in front of the media as the relatives of the people in the prisons for political reasons. Although they were visible in the public sphere, they were not present in the boundaries of the academic interest. Because these were the days that Kurdish issue was politically sensitive and academicians were not able to focus on the women in the Kurdish struggle. Not only in the academic studies, but also the presence of the Kurdish women in the public sphere was overlooked by the women's movement, because their presence was seen as an interest of the Kurdish movement, instead of women's movement. Women were considered as passive objects that were directed by politically active men in the early-1980s (Çağlayan 2007: 19-20).

Not only information on the Kurdish women in the beginning of the Kurdish movement is absent, but also literature on women in the early Kurdish movement is inadequate. It is

²² This is a Kurdish byword which means "a lion is a lion, it does not matter whether it is a male or a female". This byword was used by one of the interviewees, Xaç Darik (In her house, İstanbul, 11.05.2010), in order to explain women in the Kurdish struggle.

known that, in the early Kurdish movements there were no women in the preparation process of the insurgencies (Çağlayan 2007: 77). Although there were women struggling in the movements, there is not much information on these women. For example Alakom (1995 cited in Çağlayan 2007: 78) argues that, women also participated into the Sheikh Said and Ağrı insurgencies but there are no academic studies on these women except the requiems and some memory books. Similarly in the Dersim insurgency, women were represented either as the patriot Kurds, who motivated their husbands and sons for the struggle or as the honor of the nation who committed suicide, when their honor was in danger (Çağlayan 2007: 79). Because the early Kurdish movements were led mostly by the tribe leaders and sheiks, who were strongly attached by the patriarchy and it was almost impossible to represent women in any other way (Çağlayan 2007: 85). After the late-1980s, Kurdish women's issues were started to be taken seriously, starting from the feudal family structure which could be a major obstacle in front of the nation's emancipation (Çağlayan 2007: 98). In this regard, after the late-1980s, women have started to be present in the public sphere, which also have taken the attention of the population towards the Kurdish struggle (Çağlayan 2007: 100).

In this part of the study, Kurdish women's situation in the Kurdish struggle will be presented. This presentation will be started from the late-1980s because, first of all, as it is well-defined by Çağlayan (2007), literature on the situation of women in the early Kurdish movements and also in the early-1980s is not adequate. Secondly, because the main focus of the study is the Kurdish women's experiences in the conflict-induced displacement in 1990s, women's situation in the last period of the Kurdish movement history will be evaluated. In this period, women's mass participation and mobilization was started (Aslan 2009: 75). As will be explained below, not only the mass movements of women were started in this period, but also women started to take active roles in the pro-Kurdish political party and the NGOs. This situation may make the integration of internally displaced women's participation to the public meetings and demonstrations easier. Because internally displaced women are coming from relatively a close environment like villages, presence of women in the institutions may have motivated women more about the attendance to the activities. It is also possible for internally displaced women to share their problems with women easier such as the situations of domestic violence, instead of men in institutions. On the other hand, the attendance of internally displaced women to the activities of the pro-Kurdish political party of NGOs may be more acceptable for men if there are women in the institutions. Similar to the participation of women into the PKK, participation of women into the pro-Kurdish institutions may have an effect on softening the strict patriarchal structure in the society and it may be easier for

men to accept women's presence in the public when it is supported by the Kurdish struggle leader.

4.5.1. General Information on Kurdish Women's Lives

The way patriarchal dynamics work in the majority of family structure is related to their tribal and semi-tribal structure (Yalçın-Heckmann 1995: 289). The properties of patriarchy can be defined as following; the oldest male member of the family holds the authority, which comes from the male blood, respectability is defined with age, there are different hierarchies for men and women, the spheres of actions are separated for men and women and males confiscate the women's labor and reproduction capacity when she is married (Kandiyoti 1997 cited in Çağlayan 2007: 38). The patriarchal system among Kurds is a cultural association, a type of social organization, an Islamic style of living, a male order, a way to show the class power and a composition of tribal, feudal and traditional styles of living (Çağlayan 2007: 40), which is basically based on the notion of "honor" and the one who is responsible for this honor is the oldest male in the family. In this family structure, women's sexuality is also under the control of the male family members especially under the control of her father, brother(s), etc. After marriage, control of women's sexuality is transferred to their husbands (Yalçın 1986: 276-277). Women's status is defined according to their age, marital status and their integration into the family, whether it is by marriage or by birth. The status of women is highest when they get older and the status is lowest when they get married and join their husband's family (Çağlayan 2007: 41-42).

Although there is a social change within the families with the migration process from villages to the cities, modernization sometimes brings troubles for Kurdish women in Turkey because of the language difficulties that women experience and because most of these women do not have civil marriage (Ertürk 1995 cited in Çağlayan 2007: 43). Besides these legal problems, it is mentioned that the traditional rules remain within the family despite migration to the cities. The difference in labor positions cannot be obtained for women and women mostly do not work in paid labor in the cities. Because the work load in the household decreases in the cities compared to that in villages, being a housewife becomes a status for women and young women want to work outside the home (Çağlayan 2007: 46-47).

After the information about the Kurdish women in general and their family structure in particular, the importance of the women in the Kurdish struggle can be understood better.

Most of the Kurdish women especially the group that are over the age of 40 do not have proper education and occupation, but still have appeared in the public sphere with their integration in the developments in politics after the 1990s (Çağlayan 2007: 50-51). Kurdish women are represented symbolically as emancipated women, warriors and leaders of the society relative to the women in neighboring countries, which does not actually overlap with reality (Çağlayan 2007: 67). For example, Kurdish women are portrayed as emancipated relative to their neighborhoods' position, are always lovely and cheerful, and always stand by their husband's side especially in the armed conflicts (Bedirxan 1933 quoted in Bayrak 2002: 15). Also in the western literature, Kurdish women are represented as free as they do not cover their faces, have dialogues with unknown men and are especially courageous warriors that take place at their husband's side in the wars (Gezik 2000 quoted in Bayrak 2002: 19). Representing Kurdish women as emancipated does not aim to integrate them into politics, but is used in order to defend the Kurdish nation as having a separate modern national ideology. Çağlayan (2007: 71-72) argues that, this is an early Kurdish ideology that represents women as emancipated, who do not wear the veil, who may travel freely, who may talk to unknown men and host them in their homes even if their husbands are not around and who may enjoy together with men in wedding ceremonies and festivals. This is an orientalist representation, which was used by the Kurdish intellectuals in the early Kurdish movement after World War I, in order to define the borders of the strategic identification of the Kurdish identity that camouflages the patriarchal pressure on women in Kurdish society. This symbolic representation, which was turned into myths of altruistic women that sacrifice their husbands, sons, and also themselves for the honor of the national interests, continued until the beginning of the 1980s. (Çağlayan 2007: 74-79).

As Nira Yuval-Davis and Floya Anthias (1989 cited in Rygiel 1998: 112) mention in the process of nationalist struggles, women come into force to symbolize the nation by their distinct roles of biological and cultural reproducers of the society and community in which they live. Incorporating women into the Kurdish liberation struggle is very much similar to the strategy used by the Turkish state in its nation-building process. Similar to the image of modern Turkish women in European-style dress without veils, Kurdish liberated women were represented as guerillas, who were easily distinguishable from the rural women. "Just as women's emancipation was intrinsic to the modernization project in Turkey, the liberation of Kurdish women is central to the PKK's struggle" (Rygiel 1998: 116). Similarly, Mojab notes, Kurdish nationalist movement is not different from other nationalist struggles. "Nationalists depict women as heroes of the nation, reproducers of the nation, protectors of

its ‘motherland’, the ‘honour’ of the nation, and guardians of Kurdish culture, heritage, and language” (2000: 89).

4.5.2. Separation of the Kurdish Women’s Movement from the Kurdish Struggle

Emine Ayna, one of the deputies of the pro-Kurdish political party, mentioned in an interview that, as in every mass movement, women’s emancipation and feminism were discussed in the Kurdish movement at the end of the 1980s. The main focus was how women in the movement could be more politicized (TDK 2010: 140). According to Çağlayan (2007), the history of the Kurdish women’s movement started in the 1980s with the new experiences of women as the relatives of the people in the prisons. The village evacuations and the other human rights abuses that happened throughout the 1990s were experienced differently by women and these experiences contributed to the women becoming politicized. These developments have also carried those politically engaged women to the cities. In this regard their traditional gender roles such as motherhood, wifehood and sisterhood have been politicized. As Bozgan (2011: 762-763) argues, not only the collective grief in front of the prisons, but also the global women’s movement affected Kurdish women in the 1990s. Their meeting with other women’s organizations in cities is also another important factor of the Kurdish women’s movement’s development. In the 1990s, women’s roles in the changing world system affected by the collapse of socialism and the end of the Cold War have led them to be identified as “peace-makers”, which was an essential outcome of their motherhood capabilities. In the same years, women started to attend the mass protests in the cities (serhildans) and were represented as the “grieved mothers”, who tried to end the conflict and other ongoing violations against the Kurdish nation.

The beginning of the 1990s can be defined as the “revival” period for the Kurdish women’s activism because it was a period when there was at least one person involved in the Kurdish movement from each household and women’s private spaces were politicized. The beginning of the women’s participation into the Kurdish struggle was considered as an accidental activism process by Bozgan (2011: 772-773) because they found themselves in the movement immediately, but they collectively constituted their ethnic and gender identity in this process which may also have brought about their revival. Kurdish women also started to organize under NGOs in the beginning of the 1990s. Different than being in the protests, this development was not an accidental process for Kurdish women. In 1991, Yurtsever Kadın Derneği (Patriotic Women’s Association, YKD) was constituted by Kurdish women. They

made consciousness-raising activities especially in the Kurdish neighborhoods. They opened literacy and health courses for uneducated Kurdish women. There were also women who started to be transferred to the pro-Kurdish political party from this NGO, as a result of the oppressions towards the associations in Turkey (Bozgan 2011: 772-774). Women were organized not only in the NGOs, but also under the groups publishing journals. The first Kurdish women's journal, called as "Yaşamda Özgür Kadın" (Free Women in Life), was published in early-1990s. (Bozgan 2011: 778). There were also other journals such as Roza, Jujin and Jiyar and these journals were effective in the consciousness-raising process of the Kurdish women because instead of theoretical knowledge, these journals reflected the experiences, observations and perspectives of women.²³ The first feminist Kurdish women's journal was Roza and it started to be published in 1996 (Açık 2002: 281). In the first volume of Roza, the editors mentioned that the reason for them to publish a journal for women was first of all, because of the government's oppression and politics against Kurds and secondly, the problem that Kurdish women faced with the Turkish women's movement. Not only the Kurdish women's way of living their womanhood but also the ethnic identity that Kurdish women experienced was different from that of Turkish women. The aims and the mediums to struggle for emancipation on the part of Kurdish women were different from that of the Turkish women. Turkish women overlooked Kurdish identity as they considered them under universal womanhood. These were the reasons for the Kurdish women to have their own journal to express their special experiences as women and also as Kurds. Kurdish women were under the control of both Turkish women and Kurdish men, because Turkish women wanted them to forget their Kurdishness, whereas Kurdish men wanted them to forget their womanhood. Roza journal was, thus, published in order to be the voice of the Kurdish women in that respect (Roza 1996: 3-4).

Another important development in those years was women's participation in the branches of the PKK and as a result of this development, the gender composition of the organization was changed. In 1993, one third of the members in the PKK were women.²⁴ In the establishment program of the PKK in 1978, women's role was clearly defined in the political process of the Kurdish movement. Women's passive roles in the patriarchal gender relations were criticized and the feudal family structure was the first target to be demolished (Filiz 2010: 129). Although Kurdish women were represented as the wounded mothers mostly, they were also

²³ www.sosyalistforumnet/kadin-sorunu/38775-1980-sonrasi-turkiyede-feminist-hareket-ve-kurt-kadin-hareketi.html

²⁴ [ibid.](#)

called for armed struggle to save the nation. Traditional family criticisms made women attend to the movement and struggle against feudalism. In this new social order, characteristics of women, which were attributed negatively, such as their sexuality, are also demolished and this new woman became a “sexless goddess”, who is ready to sacrifice herself to the nation. Zilan was the first female suicide bomber in PKK and killed a total of 6 soldiers from the military with herself. She was mystified as the goddess of the movement, as she sacrificed herself. This was considered as the sign of women’s empowered, courageous and decisive character, instead of being poor and dependent beings (Açık 2002: 285-287).

In the fifth report of the PKK in 1995, the discourse of the “ecological democratic society” was announced, which was composed of democracy, human rights, women’s rights and ecological balance. The themes of the social movements and the focus of the Kurdish movement were obviously women. This ideology was based on women’s active agency and survival from feudal and conservative ties, representing emancipated identity by finding emancipation in women instead of in Kurdish nation. Women’s emancipation was defined first of all by women’s survive from men. Separate branches of women in the PKK were a consequence of this emancipation in 1995 (Çağlayan 2011). Ideological transformation also brought criticism to the traditional men’s role in the private sphere in the middle 1990s as coming to the point of “killing the manhood”. It was the main theme of socialism. It refers to killing the power and the hegemony in men (Sayın 1998 cited in Çağlayan 2011). As Ayna mentions, it means killing the power and it is a mental revolution that is the target of the Kurdish women’s movement. It refers to the change of both sexes not only the masculinity, but also the femininity because the Kurdish movement has also denied the existence of womanness (TKD 2010: 145).

Women not only joined different branches of the PKK, but also participated in pro-Kurdish political party activities as deputies in the first half of the 1990s (Bozgan 2011: 764). One of the most well-known women was Leyla Zana, who was politicized in front of the prison while supporting her husband and then became a deputy and was sentenced for 15 years because she talked in an “unknown language”.²⁵ In the journal *Roza*, Leyla Zana was defined as a brave Kurdish woman, who displaced a courageous resistance in front of the prison by supporting her husband. She wanted peace and brotherhood in the parliament but other

²⁵ This is the way to define Kurdish in those years in the national ideology as a consequence of the denying politics of the Kurdish identity.

deputies did not want to understand her and she was imprisoned just because some in the Turkish nation could understand and support her. The Turkish parliament wanted to prevent the support from the Turkish nation to her (Çelik 1996: 10). In this process of Kurdish women's increasing political activism, the political parties also considered their official documents. For example in 1990, in HEP's program women's rights issues were included in the "social policies" context, while gender equality was considered under the "democratization" chapter of the DEP's program in 1993. The first outcome of the Kurdish women's active political involvement in terms of electoral politics came about in the 1999 local elections. There were three women mayors out of 39 from HADEP (Bozgan 2011: 779). "Despite their Marxist ideology, both HADEP and PKK mobilized women to conduct 'Islamic' politics in line with their 'Kurdish agenda' when the separatist Kurdish nationalists discovered the instrumental value of 'Islamic' propaganda in motivating people to take political action, legal or illegal" (Narlı 2007: 86). Women members of HADEP were referring to Shaafi Kurds by the slogan "revolt against an oppressive state in the name of Islam". They not only criticized the Turkish state's policies towards the Kurds, but also structure and patriarchal order in the region. They advocated "women's liberation from the shackles of tradition and the constraints of the feudal and male-dominated social order" (Narlı 2007: 87). According to Narlı (2007: 87), for the election victory, HADEP encouraged women's participation and supported their emancipation. It also represented women in the decision-making position in the party to make this encouragement visible.

Between 1999 and 2004, the Kurdish women's movement was developed rapidly. This period was also considered as a "searching" period for Kurdish women. In 2000, gender equality became an important aspect in the party program and "women's emancipation" issue was taken into the beginning part of the program in HADEP. They also put a 40% gender representation ratio to their regulations as a "positive discrimination" policy (Bozgan 2011: 781). Following the implication of the PKK, the pro-Kurdish political party constituted a women's branch in the process. This development also brought new success for Kurdish women in the party and in the 2004 local elections 9 elected mayors were women from DEHAP (Bozgan 2011: 765-767).

As seen above, the Kurdish women's movement has not been immune from patriarchal dynamics especially in the beginning. Women's active role in politics and their armed struggle in the PKK beside their male counterparts were taboos and it was demolished by the developments. Honor is transferred from the women's body to the language and identity of

Kurdishness. But patriarchy was still a dominant ideology although there were crucial developments in this period. It was a consequence of the understanding that Kurdish women's emancipation was tied to the Kurdish nation's emancipation (Filiz 2010: 129).

In the beginning of the Kurdish movement, Kurdish women developed a woman identity after having a Kurdish identity. In other words, their national identity always came first. This situation brought their representation as "mothers, sisters and/or fighters/goddess". The Kurdish women's movement is in the interface of the nation's emancipation and women's emancipation struggles. From the beginning of the women's movement, Kurdish women have been represented as "mourning mothers" of the nation, "virgin guerillas" that sacrifice themselves to the movement and "sexless politicians" who were first of all Kurdish and worked under the norms of patriarchy. With the help of the global women's movement, after Kurdish women's efforts on working on gender issues, they could relatively free themselves from the patriarchal norms in the Kurdish organizations and started to struggle not only for the Kurdish rights, but also for the women's rights. As Filiz (2010: 130) mentions, in the public meetings through the 1990s, they were in the first rows as politicized mothers and sisters, but in the neighborhoods and the private spaces, they were still in their traditional roles. Kurdish women have changed these representations through the 2000s.

4.5.3. Kurdish Women's Struggle for Kurdish and Women's Rights after the 2000s

Until 2003, Kurdish women carried the women's issues to the pro-Kurdish political parties. But in 2003, they realized that, women's issues should be carried out specifically in women's organizations especially under the municipalities such as the organizations under the Diyarbakır municipality, Diyarbakır Kadın Sorunlarını Araştırma Merkezi (Diyarbakır Women's Studies Research Center, DİKASUM), Kardelen Kadın Evi (Kardelen Women's House), Bağlar Kadın Kooperatifi (Bağlar Women's Cooperation), etc. Women's NGO experiences and political party experiences supported each other mutually at this point (Bozgan 2011: 785-787). Also in 2003, women's organizations were collected under an umbrella organization which was called as Demokratik Özgür Kadın Hareketi (Democratic Free Women's Movement, DÖKH) and organized within the boundaries of the political party. DÖKH can be considered as a coordination mechanism and a structure that could bring Kurdish women to work collectively (Bozgan 2011: 792-793).

Women in the NGOs could meet people from politics and bring out the women's issues and had a chance to solve the problems with the support from the political party. This development leads to the third stage in the Kurdish women's movement after 2005, which can be defined as the "re-organization" period (Bozgan 2011: 787). In this period, women's position in the political party became more emancipated and the women were empowered to struggle with the patriarchal structure within the party. Besides, as a result of Kurdish women's efforts, Kurdish women's issues started to be discussed in the parliament (Bozgan 2011: 788).

With the development in the Kurdish women's movement, women in politics also gained success and increased their numbers and positions in the pro-Kurdish political party. In the 2007 general elections, 8 women were selected as deputies out of 22 deputies from Demokratik Toplum Partisi (Democratic Society Party, DTP). It was the first time for a political party to achieve the 40% gender quota in Turkey. In the 2009 local elections, there were 14 mayors elected from the same political party (Bozgan 2011: 768). The real success of the Kurdish women's movement for Bozgan (2011: 759) was that, instead of Kurdish women's representations in different periods as mothers, sisters and fighters, they drew on their political subjectivities. Similarly Filiz (2010: 131) mentioned that, in the 2000s, Kurdish women's role in the political and social spheres of the Kurdish movement have changed from passive symbols to empowered subjects, which could also bring a potential for emancipation of the Kurdish nation. For example, the image of mourning Kurdish mothers has been transformed in this process from being seen as passive victims to being mothers who are patriotic and ready to participate actively in the Kurdish movement. They were involved in the national family and started to make their statements not only for their own children, but also for all the children who fight for the Kurdish rights by mentioning they are all their own children (Yalçın-Heckmann and van Gelder 2000: 329).

Çağlayan (2010: 16) supports the ideas of Filiz (2010) and Yalçın-Heckmann and van Gelder (2000) by arguing that, women do not participate in the national process as mothers of the soldiers and/or by their honor. They participate in the movements as much as other subjects and change their traditional roles. Kurdish women's participation in the Kurdish struggle is an example of this change. Although women experienced the negative consequences of the conflict process, they also experienced new social and political consequences of the conflict process that could empower them. Kurdish women were located in the public sphere in the pro-Kurdish political parties, migration and human rights associations and in the other

NGOs. These pro-Kurdish organizations are effective in the region. Kurdish women are not only the victims of this conflict, but also empowered political subjects that directly involved in the peace-building (or democratic opening) process in Turkey.

Identifying women as the symbols of the nation –as “accidentally” or “having to be” involved into the Kurdish movement– puts women in a position that they are passive objects of the nation. But as Yuval-Davis and Anthias point at (1994 cited in Yalçın-Heckmann and van Gelder 2000: 327-328), women are active agents who identify their own roles although they constitute the nation’s contemporary symbols. Kurdish women in this respect are considered as both symbols of the nation and also as the actors who define their own roles in the nation (Yalçın-Heckmann and van Gelder 2000: 327-328). In politically active Kurdish women’s accounts one can note the emphasis on the support by the head of the PKK extended to women’s activism in the Kurdish movement. This emphasis should also be interrogated in terms of patriarchal hierarchy.

4.6. Overall Evaluation of Conflict-Induced Internal Displacement in Turkey and Women in the Kurdish Struggle

The Turkish state’s counter-insurgency policy has not changed since the East Reform Plan that was established in 1925. According to this policy, internal displacement has been used to deal with the Kurdish insurgencies from the very beginning. Since that period the families involved in the insurgencies have been punished with displacement from their homelands to the western parts of Turkey. On the other hand, the families that helped the government in counter-insurgency periods could stay in their villages. This has been the situation since 1925, to the counter-insurgency strategy through the 1990s. Assimilation politics such as the ban on Kurdish language, changing the names of the villages from Kurdish to Turkish, Turkish education, etc. all went parallel with the displacement policy. The consequence of the last Kurdish insurgency is not only large displacements, but also there have been a lot of deaths from military personnel, the PKK and the civilian population. There are also a lot of disappearances among and human rights violations towards the Kurdish population.

Whenever a discussion at the governmental level on the Kurdish issue starts, nationalists interfere and argue that recognizing the Kurdish issue is a way to destroy the whole struggle against “terrorism”. Because according to the dominant ideology in Turkey, the Kurdish issue has never existed, the problem is one of security, economics and foreign incitement and

the issue cannot be a result of the decades-long discrimination of the Kurdish population. From this point of view, because discrimination and assimilation policies were ostensibly never used against Kurds in Turkey, these were only seen as policies towards the integration of the Kurdish population into the Turkish Republic. Moreover, Kurds never wanted to be integrated and aroused insurgencies since the establishment of the Republic.

Because the Kurdish issue was not recognized until the end of the 1990s, the reasons for internal displacement were also considered to be related solely to the PKK. This understanding was so prevalent that still most of the Turkish population does not know the reasons and negative consequences of internal displacement for the Kurdish population. They think that Kurds were coming to the cities with their own will and the cities were under the “invasion” of Kurdish villagers. This belief is so dominant that although the Turkish government has recognized the causes and consequences of internal displacement, as it is one of the requirements of the EU membership criteria, and even after Francis Deng’s mission to Turkey in 2002, the majority of people in the Turkish nation still consider the Kurdish populations that live in the cities as responsible for the internal armed conflict. Discrimination still continues towards the Kurdish population as they are assumed to be an extension of the PKK. To sum up, the Kurds, who were displaced and have to live in the cities, still have to deal with the negative consequences of internal displacement as well as discrimination since they were forced to leave their villages. Besides, the internal armed conflict still continues and the number of deaths unfortunately increases every day.

Kurdish women were also involved into the Kurdish struggle and they started to be visible in the public spheres especially in the 1990s. Their appearance was at first as symbols of the movement. They were represented as mourning mothers of the guerillas, sisters and the counterparts of the men in the struggle and virgin guerilla women who devote themselves to the struggle. After this representation process, women started to take active roles in the pro-Kurdish political parties and their struggle has gone hand in hand with the pro-Kurdish women’s NGOs. Their success in the struggle was the cooperation between the political party members and the NGO volunteers. Their presence in the Kurdish struggle allowed them to separate themselves from this struggle and finally, in the 2000s they became identified with a Kurdish women’s struggle, which has led to their gender identity taking precedence over their national identity in this struggle.

CHAPTER V

HEARING THE UNHEARD VOICES: LEARNING INTERNALLY-DISPLACED KURDISH WOMEN'S EXPERIENCES IN THE FIELD

In the beginning of the study, I had doubts about the alienation of the research field and my acceptance as a researcher in the field by the interviewees. Because I am not a Kurdish woman and have beginner-level Kurdish language skills, I was afraid that I could not enter into such a field. Then I met my gatekeepers and key respondents and understood that they are open and ready to help the researchers working on the issue. In order to study conflict-induced internally displaced Kurdish women, feminist methodology is embraced, and to fully grasp all the aspects of the experiences of these women, the in-depth interview technique is used. In this chapter of the study, the methodological approach and the process of the research beginning from the research question, research techniques, and the ethical considerations of the study will be explained.

5.1. Research Question and the Operational Definitions of the Study

The research question of this study is “What kind of experiences do the women go through during internal displacement and what is the importance of these experiences for women’s empowerment process?”. Some key concepts are used in order to elaborate on the research question. These concepts are “political engagement”, “political activity” and “gender awareness”. The political engagement concept refers to women’s knowledge on the ongoing Kurdish issue and internal armed conflict and their awareness of the reasons for the exile from their villages. If the woman defined their displacement as fate and the solution for the Kurdish issue as the “religious brotherhood”, then the woman was considered as “politically detached”. “Political activity” on the other hand, is beyond political engagement, because these women are considered as active agents and/or activists who struggle for Kurdish rights. The more the women get involved into the Kurdish rights movement, the more they are considered to gain “gender awareness” because of the women’s engagement with the democratic socialist society ideology, which is based on the “gender equality” insight of the Kurdish movement. According to this insight, without women’s emancipation, the emancipation of the nation would not be possible. There are different areas of struggle for

women on Kurdish rights. There are the Peace Mothers Initiative, pro-Kurdish political party members, pro-Kurdish political NGO members and women fighters in the PKK branches.²⁶ As will be explained in the following chapters, women from the Peace Mothers Initiative generally struggle for the Kurdish rights in a traditional way, which is in the boundaries of the traditional gender order. In other words, they are in the struggle as “mothers” and do not challenge the patriarchal structure of the population. This is a kind of “bargaining with patriarchy” which refers to being engaged in the Kurdish struggle without challenging the patriarchal order. Although politically active women are also negotiating with patriarchy in another way in the struggle, they are relatively closer to challenge the traditional gender order of the society and generally have may gained gender awareness in the struggle.

In the study, victimization, marginalization and empowerment situations of internally displaced women are also other key concepts. Victimization of women in conflict and internal displacement process refer to the increase in women’s physical and emotional vulnerability and the presence of the threats towards their human rights, such as increase of the violence against women, loss of family members and children and the exile from their homelands. In the ethnic discrimination situations, discriminations that are based on the population’s Kurdishness are understood. Women’s position is different than men’s in this position because they do not know Turkish and because they are seen as the representatives of their nation. They experience ethnic-based discrimination more than men and as a consequence, they are marginalized more in the cities. Their gender discrimination, on the other hand, is a result of the increased patriarchal control on women of male family members in the cities, as it is a new and an alienated environment for the family. Men increase the control on and oppression of women to protect the family’s “honor” in such an alienated environment.

²⁶ Throughout the study, the PKK is defined as a non-state armed group and the PKK fighters as non-state armed group members. In the research field, it was impossible to call neither the PKK as a “terrorist organization”, nor the fighters as “terrorists”, although PKK is accepted as a terrorist entity in the international arena. For example, Council of the European Union adopted Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism and updated the Common Position on 15 July 2008. The Common Position was published in the official journal of the European Union on 27 January 2009. According to the Common position, Kurdish Workers’ Party, PKK was defined as a terrorist entity among other persons, groups and entities from different countries. Because of the everlasting respect of the interviewees towards the PKK, the fighters are considered as “freedom fighters” by them and in order to develop a conversation with the displaced women, I had to use an objective language in the research field. In the study, the PKK is neither defined as a terrorist organization nor as a freedom fighters group. In order to be objective in the study and not to defend one part’s point of view, an objective name was chosen for this group. Whenever other people’s views were the case, I enclose “terrorist” in quotation marks. The word “guerilla” is used freely throughout of the study, because both the state and the PKK define the fighters as guerilla. For example, the state generally uses “guerilla tactics” term in order to define combat strategies of the PKK.

The final key concept of the study is women's empowerment and it refers to "women starting to realize their own worth and contributions in their families, which has potential to make women demand power and take action towards changing the structured gender inequality in society" as Erman et al. (2002: 396) explains. Throughout the study, empowerment concept is used as Erman et al. (2002: 396) defines, alongside with the definition of Sharma (1991-1992 quoted in Batliwala 1994: 130), which is "a range of activities from individual self-assertion to collective resistance, protest and mobilization that challenge basic power relations". In other words, in this study, empowerment refers to both women's realization of their own worth and also as their collective action to change the patriarchal gender order in the public and private spheres of their lives. The empowerment experience of women in the cities also has two aspects. The first aspect is women's "empowerment to cope" situation after the displacement process. In this situation, women are empowered in order to cope with negative experiences, such as the poverty and discrimination that they face in the cities. In the second aspect, they are "empowered to change" the situation that they face. This situation is about the ongoing prevalent patriarchal gender order that they face in their households in particular and in the society in general. All the different aspects are explained in Chapter 8.

5.2. Methodological Approach and Research Methods

This study is based on feminist methodology. As compatible with the objective of the study, the research is based on internally displaced women's experiences, which are considered as valuable social information, in order to find out their perspective that has been remained invisible (Harding 1987: 9) in the displacement studies for a long time, and to be a source for implications on internal displacement issue. The study is politically motivated to change the social inequality of the Kurdish women's situation in the society after the displacement process by encouraging their participation into the peace-making process.

As Bayrakçeken-Tüzel (2004: 152) mentions, classical approaches have limitations for explaining women's social reality and the oppressiveness of women's lives. On the other hand, the practices are hidden in the personal experiences. In this regard, in the feminist methodology, the subjectivities are discussed and this hidden experience in the personal lives can be discovered. Women are systematically ignored in traditional epistemologies and feminist methodology challenges these traditional assumptions. There are some important points in feminist methodology. The first one is, instead of being objective in feminist

methodology, women take sides consciously with the subjects of the research. Secondly, there is reciprocity in feminist methodology. Instead of a top-down perspective from the researcher to the participants, the perspective should be from bottom-up, in other words, the hierarchical relationships should be diminished. The research should serve the women's needs. Developing a systematic bottom-up perspective has many political and ethical aspects. Because quantitative studies have a top-down perspective, participants feel that they are being investigated by the researcher and try to show the demanded acts (Berger 1974 cited in Mies 1995: 52). Thirdly, spectator knowledge that depends on thoughts is not enough for women's emancipation. There should be active actions, movements and struggles instead of passive spectator knowledge. Research should be a part of this movement for the emancipation of women because women's studies is coming from the women's movement (Mies 1995: 52-53). Fourthly, women researchers should struggle for the women's rights and know the consequences of the patriarchy in the society. Fifthly, the research process should be a consciousness-raising process both for the researcher and the participants. Sixthly, women's collective consciousness-raising should follow the research on women's individual and social histories together. And finally, women researchers should make their experiences collective and save their own history. They have to overcome individualism, competition, and the emphasis on the researcher as the carrier of knowledge that male researchers usually represent (Mies 1995 54-55).

As Harding (1987: 6) mentions, traditional science only reflects men's experiences and also it is problematic because it gives precedence to white, Western, bourgeois men's perspectives. Feminist methodology has been used by the feminists to evaluate the existing methods to produce knowledge as masculinist and the existing understanding of the social life as gendered (Ramazanoğlu and Holland 2002: 15). In this regard it is mentioned that, feminist methodology is different than the other methodologies as it is shaped by feminist theory, politics and ethics and also it is taken from the experiences of women (Ramazanoğlu and Holland 2002: 16).

Feminists consider that traditional epistemologies deny women as knowers and carriers of knowledge. They assume that science is masculine and history was written by men. They advise alternative epistemologies that accept women as the subjects of knowledge (Harding 1987: 3). Besides, as Bayrakçeken-Tüzel (2004: 152) mentions, women are lost in the triangle of "holy knowledge", "authoritarian researcher" and "the people as objects of study". Feminism at this point re-organizes and re-defines the dichotomy of subject-object.

In order to challenge the false or under-representation of women, a special view is needed and this view is the “feminist standpoint” epistemology. This refers to “seeing the world through women’s eyes” (Christiansen-Ruffmann 1998 quoted in Bayrakçeken-Tüzel 2004: 153).

Feminist standpoint refers to scientifically preferable knowledge as it is considered as more complete and less distorted (Stanley and Wise 1990: 27). As Ramazanoğlu and Holland (2002: 61) mention, because women live in unequal gender relations, they may develop a feminist political consciousness and this leads to a production of knowledge from a feminist standpoint. This is the way to explore the male power that women exercise, because they live experiences different than men and intersexuals.

According to Ramazanoğlu and Holland (2002: 64), one of the characteristics of the feminist standpoint is originated from the women’s experiences that also include emotions and embodiment. As Bayrakçeken-Tüzel (2004: 154) mentions, in a world where women are systematically ignored and where their knowledge is hidden behind a patriarchal shadow, classical methodological approaches and techniques do not help us to see the reality. By using feminist methodology, which is based on the connection between knowledge and experience the reality behind the patriarchy shadow would be opened up to see. Feminist methodology also ignores the experiences affected by hegemony, which is also less distorted and more complete.

Feminist research is politically for women and as mentioned before, the starting point is the women’s experiences and the feelings of unjust gendered relationships (Ramazanoğlu and Holland 2002: 16). According to Ramazanoğlu and Holland (2002: 15), feminists have used and developed qualitative, politically sensitive research and field relations that make the women’s voices heard as a purposeful outcome of the research. According to Marvasti (2004: 7), qualitative research methods give a detailed description and analysis about the quality and/or the experiences of humans. Berg (2001: 6) argues that, “qualitative research properly seeks answers by examining various social settings”. Researchers are interested in how humans arrange themselves and their sense of the symbols, rituals, social structures, social roles, etc., that surrounds them. As a result, qualitative researchers share “the understandings and perceptions of others and to explore how people structure and give meaning to their daily lives” (Berg 2001: 7).

Semi-structured or unstructured interviews are one of the major techniques in qualitative research. It is different from structured research techniques as there is a free interaction between the interviewee and the researcher. This technique gives people space to open up and express their views of reality and it also allows the researcher the opportunity to generate a theory (Reinharz 1992: 18). According to Legard et al. (2003: 141-142), in-depth interviews, first of all, tend to be flexible and the relevant issues may be raised by the interviewees spontaneously. Secondly, the in-depth interview is interactive. The interaction occurs between the researcher and the interviewee. Besides, there is no limit for the answers of the interviewee. Thirdly, the researcher may use a technique to achieve an in-depth answer, such as penetration, exploration, and explanation. The researcher's aim is to obtain deep and full answers from the interviewees. Fourthly, the researcher tends to be open to new knowledge or thoughts. There may be some suggestions and ideas on the topic that are raised during the interview by the participants. Finally, interviews are always conducted face-to-face. This is a way to generate an intensive experience.

Although there are some common characteristics of in-depth interviewing, as seen above, there are different ways to interview. For example, feminist interviewing is considered to be more flexible and interactive and the researchers' aim is to take a non-hierarchical position towards the interviewees. The distance between the researcher and the interviewee is not stark and there is collaboration and a negotiation between them. Reciprocity is the most important point in the interview. The researchers should feel free to give their opinion, express their feelings and give personal information (Legard et al. 2003: 140). According to Reinharz (1992: 19), because interviewing gives an access to the people's personal ideas, thoughts and memories it gains importance especially when studying women. Because women's ideas have been ignored through the centuries, it is important for women to talk for themselves.

In order to find out the distinctive experiences of the conflict-induced internally displaced Kurdish women, feminist methodology is used in this study. As IR feminist theorists argue, women's experiences are different than men's in times of conflict in general and in times of internal displacement in particular. Because of the reality that the social life of women is hidden in personal experiences, this study only focuses on the Kurdish women's experiences through the 1990s in Turkey. Qualitative research and the in-depth interview technique with semi-structured questions are used in the study in order to obtain detailed information on the experiences of internally displaced Kurdish women. Throughout the interviews, Kurdish

women told their experiences before and after the displacement process with full courage. For me, the interviews were an impressive learning process instead of confirming the ideas in my mind before the research. This could provide the non-hierarchical position between me and the interviewees. The interaction between us was effective. Although I did not open up questions that may harm them as it is a politically sensitive and ongoing issue, the interviewees were willing to get into their personal lives throughout the interviews. After I finished the researched, I realized that there are a lot of people around me who do not know the reason of the Kurdish migration in 1990s, who have no idea about the hard situations that internally displaced women went through and whose attitudes are discriminative against displaced Kurdish population. This study became a threshold for me to struggle for the human rights abuses of the minority groups, but especially for the women as I am a feminist academician.

5.3. The Field and the Participants

5.3.1. Entering the Field

Ball (1990 cited in Rossman and Rallis 1998: 94) expressed that, going into the field is something like a “blind date” and the researcher has to charm the respondents in order to make them talk. Before I started my field work, I took Kurdish classes for a couple of months and at the end of these months, I was able to introduce myself and explain my reason to be in their neighborhood in Kurdish. Although sometimes my non-Kurdishness caused negative reactions, my little Kurdish usually saved me in the field. Before every interview, my limited Kurdish was effective on women to show that I was really there to understand them.

Before the interviews, I met the gatekeepers of my field work. According to Rossman and Rallis (1998: 94), meeting gatekeepers is one of the activities in the preparation process to enter the field. My gatekeepers in the study are the presidents of the Göç Edenler Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışma Derneği (Immigrants’ Association for Social Cooperation and Culture, GÖÇ-DER) in three of the cities (İstanbul, Mersin and Diyarbakır). Before I met the presidents, I visited Dilek KURBAN (program officer) from Türkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler Vakfı (Turkey Economic and Social Studies Foundation, TESEV) and she gave me the contacts of the presidents. After I met the president in İstanbul, Sami ÖZGEN, it was easier for me to meet the others, Selahattin GÜVENÇ from Mersin and Muzaffer ÖZDEMİR

from Diyarbakır, because I took their phone number and addresses and introduced myself to them by referring to Mr. ÖZGEN. I also had a chance meeting with some of the pro-Kurdish political party municipality's charity house personnel in Diyarbakır, for example, Özlem ÖZEN from Diyarbakır Kadın Sorunlarını Araştırma Merkezi (Diyarbakır Women's Studies Research Center, DİKASUM) and Mukaddes ALATAŞ from Kardelen Charity House and I also met the Nusaybin Mayor, Ayşe GÖKKAN when I attended a conference in Mardin Nusaybin and I made interviews with those people amongst other interviews with the GÖÇ-DER presidents.

It is recommended to know the field before entering and spend some time in the field before the research by Rossman and Rallis (1998: 95), but it was not easy in my case because the neighborhoods that I worked in were very suspicious towards strangers and it was not easy, almost impossible, to enter to the neighborhoods without someone from inside. In this regard, it is not wrong to say that these neighborhoods have a secluded structure.

When I visited the GÖÇ-DER office in İstanbul on 11 November 2009 and explained my study for the first time, they agreed to help me find women who were internally displaced because of the conflict. There was a weekly meeting when I visited the NGO, where I met one of my key respondents²⁷, who was also displaced from one of the villages of Bitlis in 1993. She is politically an active woman and she was my first interviewee. On the same day, she invited me to her house to introduce her friends to me. We arranged a focus group interview that day and I took her address. When I went to her house for the focus group interview, there were a lot of neighbors in the house who came to congratulate her daughter-in-law's newborn baby. I waited about 5 hours to start the focus group interview and at last, I was able to organize the focus group, which was composed of 4 women, who were all internally displaced, and the interview lasted 1 hour and 10 minutes in 14 November 2009. As Berg (2001: 111) mentions, the focus group interview is based on a group of people who respond to the questions of the researcher. Psychological and socio-cultural characteristics of the group may be obtained by the researcher and the biographies and life structures can be learned in the process of the interview. The discussion can be either guided or unguided. In that focus group interview, I realized that the most important characteristic of that group was their engagement in politics. Although they were willing to explain their displacement and the negative experiences after displacement process, they were more ambitious to explain

²⁷ In total I have four key respondents in three different cities (There were two in Mersin). All of them are members of the GÖÇ-DER NGOs in their own city. I cannot give detailed information about them in order to protect their security.

their relation with politics. And I was not aware of this characteristic of the internally displaced Kurdish women before. In spite of the fact that I did not use focus group interviewing as a data collection method in my study, only this one focus group interview directed me to add new questions to my interviews, which in the end also shaped the whole structure of my thesis.

I sometimes got involved into the activities of the women from the neighborhoods as an observer. For example, when I was interviewing a Kurdish woman in Mersin, she seemed to be in rush and when I asked what it was for, she told me that there was a neighborhood meeting of the pro-Kurdish political party that night and she had to participate, because she was working there. I also participated in the activity, which was about protecting Kurdish children from drug addiction, and I had a chance to observe how women in the activity behaved. It was a different experience for me because it was, first of all, my first political party meeting and secondly, I could see how Kurdish women behaved in a political meeting by myself. Because I was with that woman from the neighborhood, nobody asked who I was. But it was impossible for me to attend such a meeting without knowing someone from inside. I also attended an observation travel in Mersin with a group from GÖÇ-DER to Tuzla province and had the most shocking views in my life. People in that area were living in sheds which were made of shoddy bamboo for almost 20 years. They have no electricity, no water, no road, nothing. These people are the poorest of the poor population amongst the displaced Kurdish people, who work as seasonal workers on a daily-based salary in the agriculture fields. Because this province was not included into my field research and because it was only one day trip, I could not conduct interviews there, but I saw what extreme poverty means. People were living there under the threat of malaria among the other diseases and when the mosquitoes bit me, one of the Kurdish men said “I hope this bite itches for a long time. As long as it itches, there is a possibility for you to not forget us”. Unlike his prediction, although the bites no longer itch, I could never forget them.

Another observation was in Diyarbakır. I attended a protest about the dam project in the Hasankeyf area with the GÖÇ-DER members. Because peace mothers attend almost all of the protests that are organized by the Kurdish NGOs, I wanted to observe how they behave in a real protest, which was also not as politically sensitive as a funeral of a guerilla. It was still a very unusual activity for me because there were a lot of civilian policemen around, who were taking photographs and video recordings of the people that attended the protest, including me. Being able to observe the way the women took the activity very seriously, like

a guerilla funeral, and the way they behaved in the protest made it very worthwhile for me to attend this activity.

Throughout my research, I presented myself as a student, who is doing a research on the experiences of women in the cities after conflict-induced displacement. I always presented myself and my study openly. In other words, my role as a researcher was “overt” and my research explanation was “full”, which refers to fact that all the participants were aware of what I was studying and why I was conducting the interviews (Rossman and Rallis 1998: 99). Some questions in the interviews made some people uncomfortable because they could not see a connection between the experiences and political activity questions. This happened especially when there was a translator. Before translating the question they sometimes asked what the relevance was of the question, in order to protect the respondent. In such cases, I told the translator to ask my question and reminded the respondent that if they felt uncomfortable they always had the right not to answer the questions. Usually, unlike the translators, the interviewees were comfortable in the interviews and also ambitious to answer my questions with courage.

My field work lasted between May and August 2010. I visited İstanbul twice between 11 and 14 May 2010 and 21 and 22 July 2010. I conducted 10 interviews in İstanbul. I also went to Mersin two times between 25 and 27 May and 05 and 06 August and managed to talk to 11 interviewees. I visited Diyarbakır once and stayed there for 6 days between 21 and 26 June 2010 and conducted 9 interviews in this period. In total I have 30 Kurdish women interviewees in my study.

The most common question for the qualitative researchers is, when it is time stop interviewing. As Taylor (1991: 241-243) mentions, the answer to this question is not definite. The study should be finished when you understand the setting. One should continue to collect data until the pieces of the puzzle come together. Secondly, one should not leave the field until the data become repetitious. Thirdly, one should be aware of what might be missing in the study and finally, one should stay a little longer in the field although s/he thinks that the field research should be ended. I followed the same strategy as Taylor (1991) explains. I did not stop interviewing until I got the similar answers from the Kurdish women coming from different villages. The stories before their displacement process and their experiences in the cities were almost similar. In other words, the stories became almost repetitive. I also wanted to understand the differences between these women and tried to

grasp the puzzle of what is the indicator for those women who become empowered and for those who become marginalized in the city life. When I found the difference between internally displaced Kurdish women, I decided to end collecting more interviews. According to Mills (1959 cited in Taylor 1991: 247), “social scientists have a political role to play in helping people to translate troubles into public issues”. I consider my researcher role as a translator of those internally displaced women’s problems to the public from the very beginning of this study and as Taylor (1991: 247) again expresses, sometimes leaving the field means actually staying in the field as an activists for the human rights issues. In this regard, it seems like I will never leave this field and continue to be an activist for human rights issues.

5.3.2. Describing of the Field

Three cities were selected as the research field. These cities are İstanbul, Mersin and Diyarbakır. All three cities are among the cities that internally displaced Kurdish populations have lived mostly after their villages were evacuated (GÖÇ-DER 2001). These cities were chosen among the other ones because all three cities have GÖÇ-DER offices, which constitute the main gatekeepers of the study. Besides, they all represent basically their region’s situation. İstanbul is the city that was preferred in the western part of the country. Mersin is in the south part of Turkey and represents the whole area. Diyarbakır on the other hand, represents the east side of Turkey and besides, it has a privilege among the other cities like Batman, Van, Bursa, Urfa, Adana, Antalya and İzmir because as mentioned before, it is considered as the capital of “Kurdistan” by the Kurdish population. Kaya (2009) also chose the same cities as the research field and mentions that, if the family had more money they moved far away from the homeland to, for instance, İstanbul; if they had less money they moved to Mersin and if they had very little money, they moved to one of the cities in the South-East of Turkey, like Diyarbakır (Kaya 2009: 99). In other words, it is mentioned that the family's migration trends are defined by their economic conditions.

Table 5.1: Diyarbakır City and Village Population, Annual Growth Rate of Population, Surface Area and Density by Districts, 2000

Source: http://www.tuik.gov.tr/VeriBilgi.do?tb_id=39&ust_id=11

Province and district	1990(1)			2000			Annual growth rate of population (%)			Surface area Km ²	Population density
	Total	City	Village	Total	City	Village	Total	City	Village		
	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)		
DIYARBAKIR											
00. Center.....	472 150	373 810	98 340	721 463	545 983	175 480	42,39	37,87	57,89	2267	318
01. Bismil.....	99 662	39 834	59 828	126 885	61 182	65 703	24,14	42,90	9,36	1737	73
02. Çermik.....	49 107	16 531	32 576	46 050	15 843	30 207	-6,43	-4,25	-7,55	944	49
03. Çınar.....	50 445	10 080	40 365	58 583	13 282	45 301	14,95	27,58	11,53	1990	29
04. Çüngüş.....	17 067	3 935	13 132	15 521	4 708	10 813	-9,49	17,93	-19,42	465	33
05. Dicle.....	35 980	5 414	30 566	39 861	9 861	30 000	10,24	59,94	-1,87	705	57
06. Eğil.....	20 251	4 803	15 448	21 631	4 827	16 804	6,59	0,50	8,41	499	43
07. Ergani.....	78 603	37 365	41 238	87 467	47 333	40 134	10,68	23,64	-2,71	1429	61
08. Hani.....	28 703	10 266	18 437	31 794	10 918	20 876	10,22	6,16	12,42	413	77
09. Hazro.....	23 971	8 728	15 243	18 755	6 189	12 566	-24,53	-34,37	-19,31	425	44
10. Kocaköy.....	12 985	4 244	8 741	13 069	5 678	7 391	0,64	29,10	-16,77	151	87
11. Kulp.....	50 482	7 472	43 010	40 454	15 825	24 629	-22,14	75,02	-55,74	1610	25
12. Lice.....	47 088	12 227	34 861	24 877	11 927	12 950	-63,79	-2,48	-99,00	1026	24
13. Silvan.....	109 953	60 731	49 222	116 298	64 136	52 162	5,61	5,45	5,80	1397	83
Total	1 096 447	595 440	501 007	1 362 708	817 692	545 016	21,73	31,71	8,42	15058	90

The population in the South-East of Turkey moved from the periphery villages to the center of Diyarbakır as a consequence of the ongoing internal armed conflict in the region. As we may see from Table 5.1 above, some of the districts have lost population drastically, like Lice, Kulp and Hazro districts. Because I made some interviews from the villages of those districts, I have first hand information that, the village evacuations were enormous throughout the 1990s in their villages and the population decrease is a direct consequence of these displacements. In order to conduct interviews I visited Bağlar, Ofis, Ben u Sen and Kayapınar neighborhoods, which are all at the center of Diyarbakır. If we look at the center population of Diyarbakır we may realize that, the total percentage of the increase is 42.39‰, which is a noteworthy increase relative to the other cities in Turkey.

As we may see from Table 5.2 above, the population has increased in almost all of the districts of İstanbul and in the city as a whole between 1990 and 2000. But, there are some districts which have seen a tremendous increase after the migration flow throughout the 1990s. Some of these districts in which the Kurdish population mostly live after their displacement are, Ümraniye (69.13‰) Bağcılar (64.66‰), Gaziosmanpaşa (64.76‰), Küçükçekmece (52.14‰) and Bahçelievler (47.30‰). I have conducted my interviews in the Kurdish populated neighborhoods located in Beyoğlu (Tarlabaşı), Esenler, Küçükçekmece (Şirinevler), Fatih and Bağcılar. Some of these districts' population has been increased since the 1990s.

According to Kaya (2009: 104) there are approximately 20 neighborhoods in Mersin, which were constituted after the internal migrations after the 1990s. I have visited 3 of these neighborhoods for interviews. These neighborhoods are, Güneş, Demirtaş and Kurtali neighborhoods. All three of them are in the city center, but they are also away from the city because of their ethnic construction. As seen in Table 5.3 above, the city center population of Mersin has increased 29‰ since 1990 with the help of the migrants coming from villages in the South-East and East because of the village evacuations.

Table 5.2: İstanbul City and Village Population, Annual Growth Rate of Population, Surface Area and Density by Districts, 2000

Source: http://www.tuik.go.tr/VeriBilgi.do?tb_id=39&ust_id=11

Province and district	1990(1)			2000			Annual growth rate of population (%)			Surface area Km ² (2)	Population density
	Total	City	Village	Total	City	Village	Total	City	Village		
İSTANBUL											
01. Adalar.....	19 413	19 413	0	17 760	17 760	0	-8,90	-8,90	-	16	1110
02. Avcılar.....	126 493	126 493	0	233 749	233 749	0	61,39	61,39	-	39	5994
03. Bağcılar.....	291 457	291 457	0	556 519	556 519	0	64,66	64,66	-	21	26501
04. Bahçelievler.....	298 211	298 211	0	478 623	478 623	0	47,30	47,30	-	16	29914
05. Bakırköy.....	301 673	301 673	0	208 398	208 398	0	-36,98	-36,98	-	32	6512
06. Beşiktaş.....	212 570	212 570	0	246 006	246 006	0	14,60	14,60	-	7	35144
07. Beşiktaş.....	192 210	192 210	0	190 813	190 813	0	-0,73	-0,73	-	21	9086
08. Beykoz.....	161 609	142 075	19 534	210 832	172 291	38 541	26,58	19,28	67,94	238	886
09. Beyoğlu.....	229 000	229 000	0	231 900	231 900	0	1,26	1,26	-	9	25767
10. Eminönü.....	83 444	83 444	0	55 635	55 635	0	-40,53	-40,53	-	8	6954
11. Esenler.....	223 826	223 826	0	380 709	380 709	0	53,10	53,10	-	39	9762
12. Eyüp.....	211 986	200 045	11 941	255 912	235 116	20 796	18,83	16,15	55,46	213	1201
13. Fatih.....	462 464	462 464	0	403 508	403 508	0	-13,63	-13,63	-	13	31039
14. Gaziosmanpaşa.....	393 667	354 186	39 481	752 389	658 756	93 633	64,76	62,04	86,33	217	3467
15. Güngören.....	213 109	213 109	0	272 950	272 950	0	24,74	24,74	-	8	34119
16. Kadıköy.....	648 282	648 282	0	663 299	663 299	0	2,29	2,29	-	40	16582
17. Kagıthane.....	269 042	269 042	0	345 239	345 239	0	24,93	24,93	-	14	24660
18. Kartal.....	273 572	252 221	21 351	407 865	337 390	70 475	39,93	29,09	119,38	34	11996
19. Küçükçekmece.....	352 926	352 128	798	594 524	593 520	1 004	52,14	52,19	22,96	107	5556
20. Maltepe.....	254 256	254 256	0	355 384	355 384	0	33,48	33,48	-	113	3145
21. Pendik.....	200 907	198 150	2 757	389 657	384 668	4 989	66,22	66,32	59,29	158	2466
22. Sarıyer.....	171 872	160 075	11 797	242 543	219 032	23 511	34,43	31,35	68,94	162	1497
23. Şişli.....	250 478	250 478	0	270 674	270 674	0	7,75	7,75	-	35	7734
24. Tuzla.....	96 150	91 230	4 920	123 225	107 883	15 342	24,80	16,76	113,70	68	1812
25. Ümraniye.....	303 434	242 091	61 343	605 855	440 859	164 996	69,13	59,92	98,92	153	3960
26. Üsküdar.....	395 623	395 623	0	495 118	495 118	0	22,43	22,43	-	46	10763
27. Zeytinburnu.....	165 679	165 679	0	247 669	247 669	0	40,19	40,19	-	12	20639
28. Büyükçekmece.....	142 910	22 394	120 516	384 059	35 860	348 229	98,84	47,07	106,08	220	1746
29. Çatalca.....	64 241	11 550	52 691	81 589	15 779	65 810	23,90	31,19	22,23	1316	62
30. Silivri.....	77 599	26 049	51 550	108 155	44 530	63 625	33,19	53,60	21,04	894	121
31. Sultanbeyli.....	82 298	82 298	0	175 700	175 700	0	75,82	75,82	-	24	7321
32. Şile.....	25 372	7 872	17 500	32 447	10 262	22 185	24,59	26,51	23,72	903	36
Total	7 195 773	6 779 594	416 179	10 018 735	9 085 599	933 136	33,09	29,27	80,72	5196	1928

Table 5.3: Mersin City and Village Population, Annual Growth Rate of Population, Surface Area and Density by Districts, 2000

Source: http://www.tuik.gov.tr/VeriBilgi.do?tb_id=39&ust_id=11

Province and district	1990(1)			2000			Annual growth rate of population (%)			Surface area Km ² (2)	Population density
	Total	City	Village	Total	City	Village	Total	City	Village		
İÇEL (MERSİN)											
00. Center.....	548 923	422 357	126 566	733 660	537 842	195 818	29,00	24,16	43,63	1772	414
01. Anamur.....	66 400	38 817	27 583	83 864	49 948	33 916	23,34	25,21	20,66	1338	63
02. Aydıncık.....	10 882	7 040	3 842	11 501	7 941	3 560	5,53	12,04	-7,62	442	26
03. Bozyazı.....	31 238	22 168	9 070	43 835	26 314	17 521	33,87	17,14	65,82	566	77
04. Çamlıyayla.....	19 440	8 826	10 614	18 964	8 806	10 158	-2,48	-0,23	-4,39	683	28
05. Erdemli.....	100 563	30 042	70 521	142 355	40 175	102 180	34,74	29,06	37,07	2039	70
06. Gülnar.....	33 854	7 360	26 494	38 292	10 503	27 789	12,32	35,55	4,77	1563	24
07. Mut.....	56 303	17 600	38 703	74 373	36 482	37 891	27,83	72,87	-2,12	2518	30
08. Silifke.....	107 685	46 858	60 827	156 351	64 827	91 524	37,28	32,45	40,85	2560	61
09. Tarsus.....	291 965	187 508	104 457	348 205	216 382	131 823	17,61	14,32	23,26	2004	174
Total	1 267 253	788 576	478 677	1 651 400	999 220	652 180	26,47	23,67	30,92	15485	107

5.3.3. Selecting Participants and Ethical Considerations

In order to make comparisons between politically engaged and politically detached women, I asked my gatekeepers to direct me to internally displaced women that they knew who were NGO activists, had children in branches of the PKK, were pro-Kurdish political party members and/or were housewives. On the other hand, in order to see the effects of female head of households and working women on the experiences of these women after their displacement process, I asked my gatekeepers to direct me to the internally displaced women who were temporary or permanent heads of households and who were working outside. In other words, I conducted my interviews through “purposeful sampling”. According to Maxwell (2005: 88), “this is a strategy in which particular settings, persons, or activities are selected deliberately in order to provide information that can't be gotten as well from other choices”. Selecting the participants through GÖÇ-DER branches may cause biased information because GÖÇ-DER is a pro-Kurdish NGO. But because the neighborhoods that the Kurdish population lives mostly are closed areas and they are very suspicious towards foreigners, there were no other way for me to reach those women and make interviews without knowing someone from inside.

In order to prevent potential harm towards my interviewees, I carefully designed the data analysis structure. To provide “confidentiality”, which “is an active attempt to remove from the research records any elements that might indicate the subjects’ identities” (Berg 2001: 57), I do not give any of their village names. Besides, I do not give neighborhood names of their addresses in the destination cities, where they live now. Most importantly, I do not have any of their names in my records, because in the process of the interview I asked them not to tell their names to me. In order to provide “anonymity”, which refers to subjects remaining nameless (Berg 2001: 57), I gave each of them a Kurdish flower name as you may see below. To secure the data, I used a file in the computer, which needs a password to open and also put the voice records in a locked closet in my room. I promised the participants that only I would be the one who listen their voices and I would destroy all of them after my thesis is approved by the university. Besides, I destroyed all the phone numbers of my contacts.

In order to obtain the participants' consent and provide rapport with them, I always depended on my trust towards them. I also showed that I trusted them as if they were my family members. Whenever they invited me to their homes, I never rejected and visited them. I always carried sweets for the children around and I brought cakes whenever it was needed

for me to visit their houses since it is a part of the cultural tradition. I never rejected their honoring, always talked about other subjects if they wanted to and also told them about my personal life whenever they asked. There were times in the interviews that I cried with the interviewees and could not continue talking for a while. These interviews were a real consciousness-raising process for me and for them. It was a process for me to confirm that my knowledge was limited on the Kurdish issue and how the dominant ideology has overlooked the experiences of the IDPs. On the other hand, it was a process for them to believe there are some other women out there, who understand and want to share their grief. I explained my study openly and because they were silent for a long time in this society, they were ambitious to tell their own stories of displacement.

My Turkishness and limited Kurdish sometimes caused problems, especially for the translators. One day in Diyarbakır, when I was in one of the NGOs, the translator rejected translating the interview questions and asked me why I was doing this study if I did not know Kurdish. I told her that I wanted to learn Kurdish but there was no time to learn the language fluently. In the end, internally displaced women in that NGO interrupted and told the translator that although they were Kurdish, they always read their press statements in Turkish in order to make people hear them. Women in that NGO also told the translator that, they accepted to make the interviews with the help of a translator and they could find another one if she did not want to translate. It was the end of the incoherence and I was able to do three interviews in that NGO. Sometimes, I was suspicious of the translators during the interviews. Because the translators were not professional and were working for internally displaced women's rights for years, they tried to protect the participants before they translated some of the questions. I also openly explained my research to them and tried to explain the connections between my questions. But still, again in Diyarbakır, one of the translators, who also works in one of the charity houses for example, called my gatekeeper in Diyarbakır and complained about me to him. Because I explained my study to that gatekeeper very clearly and took his acceptance before I conducted the interviews, he told the translator to keep helping me.

5.3.4. Introducing Participants

There are totally 30 internally displaced women interviewees in the study, who do not represent a cross section of the Kurdish population. Instead, they represent a relatively small group with a specific internal displacement experience. I have reached a small number of

women and did not group them according to their age, religious background, level of education and/or political affiliation.

As it is seen from the Table 5.4 above, there are women from all ages in the study in order to provide the richness of the research and to represent all age group's experiences after internal displacement. The oldest interviewee is 68 years old from İstanbul, who is still working for a pro-Kurdish NGO and the youngest interviewee is 22 years old, who worked in the textile industry when she first came from their village when she was 8 years old and lives in İstanbul with her husband's family.

Participants of the study are mostly displaced from the villages of Diyarbakır. There are totally 12 interviewees from there. The other interviewees are from the villages of Bitlis, with 6 women, Siirt again with 6 women and Mardin with 3 women. There is only one interviewee from Dersim (Tunceli), one from Malatya and one from Şırnak. There are totally 30 internally displaced women in the study. Women from Diyarbakır mostly migrated to the center of the city. Only two of the interviewees from Diyarbakır migrated to Mersin. When we look at the displacement dates of the interviewees, we may realize that almost all of the interviewees were displaced through the 1990s, which was the period that the internal armed conflict reached its peak point in Turkey. The village evacuations, disappearances and killings were increased especially in those years as it was explained in detail in Chapter 4. Only two of the interviewees mentioned that they were displaced from their villages in Siirt in 1983. This date is the beginning of the last Kurdish insurgency and they might be one of the first families that were displaced from their villages in those years as a result of their support of the PKK.

As seen above in Table 5.4., almost all of the interviewees are married. Only two of them are single and these are the ones who served in the branches of the PKK, then were caught and imprisoned for a while. One of them is working as a nurse in İstanbul and the other one is working as a member of the pro-Kurdish political party municipality. There are totally 10 female heads of households among the interviewees. 3 of them are temporary heads of households, which in other words means their husbands are in prison for a while. The other 7 interviewees are permanently heads of households because 3 of the women's husbands are in prison serving life-long sentences and the other 4 internally displaced women are widows as a consequence of the ongoing conflict. Most of the interviewees' marriages were arranged with their relatives, like the son of their uncles or aunts, by the older family members when

they were in their early adolescence like 13-15 years old. The older interviewee was 20 years old when she got married. There are only 5 women in the study whose marriages were not arranged.

Most of the internally displaced women in the study are not literate. There are totally 7 women who know how to read and write. Although most of them have learned Turkish in the process of living in the cities after their displacement, there are still 6 women who do not know Turkish. Three of them are in Mersin and the other three are in Diyarbakır. If we look at internally displaced Kurdish women's work, we see that, only four of the women are working in insured jobs, mostly in the pro-Kurdish political party organizations. 6 of the women are working in uninsured jobs, such as cleaner and/or worker in agriculture fields. Home-based work to contribute to the household economy is held by 5 women. But there are also 3 women, who both work in uninsured jobs and do home-based work at the same time. In other words, the total number of the women in uninsured jobs is 9 and also the number of the women in home-based work is 8. There are 2 women who worked in the textile industry in their youth until they got married. 5 of the interviewees are not working because they consider working outside the house as not appropriate for the Kurdish tradition. Lastly, there are 5 women who are NGO activists among the interviewees. These women are going to the NGOs every day and attend to the activities regularly.

Table 5.4: List of the Participants and Their Profiles

Interviewees	Place of interview	Mig. From-To	Age	Marital S.	Age of mar.	Marital Type	# of child	Education	Work
Xaç Darik	İstanbul	Bitlis -Manisa-İstanbul 1993	68	Married	15	Arranged marriage (distant relative)	5	Left in 4th grade Literate	NGO Activist
Gerendefel	İstanbul	Bitlis-Manisa-İstanbul 1996	22	Married (Together with the husband's fam.)	18	Not arranged marriage	2	No school Not literate	Textile Industry
Gulalp	İstanbul	Malatya-İstanbul 1995	40	Not married	-	-	-	High school Literate	Nurse
Lilaq	İstanbul	Siirt – İstanbul 1994	48	Married (Husband in Russia)	13	Arranged marriage (relative)	5	No school Not literate	Home-based Hands and crafts Peeling Beans
Stêregul	İstanbul	Siirt – İstanbul 1994	46	Married (Husband in Russia)	14	Arranged marriage (relative)	4	Left in 3rd grade literate	Home-based Bead stuff Peeling Beans
Leven	İstanbul	Mardin – İstanbul 1995	38	Married (temporary head of household)	13	Arranged marriage (not relative)	7	No school Literate	Cleaner Restaurant
Berbiro	İstanbul	Bitlis –İstanbul 1995	48	Married	14	Arranged Marriage (not relative)	10	No school Not literate	Political Party Worker
Zehferan	İstanbul	Bitlis - İstanbul 1994	40	Married (permanent head of household – prison)	20	Arranged marriage (relative)	4	No school Not literate	Construction worker Home-based hands and crafts
Mexmork	İstanbul	Dersim-İstanbul 1994	54	Married	16	Arranged marriage (not relative)	5	Elementary school Literate	NGO Activist
Helal	İstanbul	Mardin – İstanbul 1993	44	Married	13	Arranged marriage (not relative) from same village	6	3rd grade Literate	NGO Activist
Gulgenim	Mersin	Siirt - Adana - Mersin 1983	41	Married	14	Not arranged	8	No school Not literate Does not know Turkish	Agriculture Field

Table 5.4: List of the Participants and Their Profiles (continued)

Interviewees	Place of interview	Mig. From-To	Age	Marital S.	Age of mar.	Marital Type	# of child	Education	Work
Gezink	Mersin	Mardin– Mersin 1992	67	Married (widow)	13	Arranged	2	No school Not literate Does not know Turkish	None
Kivark	Mersin	Diyarbakır– Mersin 1993	46	Married	15	Arranged	9	No school Not literate	Agriculture Field
Kez	Mersin	Diyarbakır– Mersin 1992	48	Married (permanent head of household – prison)	13	Arranged	5	No school Not literate	Agriculture Field Cleaning
Ta	Mersin	Diyarbakır – Mersin (1992)	25	Married	16	Not arranged	3	No school Not literate	Textile Industry
Nergis	Mersin	Şırnak– Mersin 1990	53	Married	14	Arranged (relative)	10	No school Not literate	None
Nefel	Mersin	Siirt – Mersin 1994	47	Married (permanent head of household – prison)	17	Arranged (relative)	8	No school Not literate Does not know Turkish	Peeling nuts at home
Beybîn	Mersin	Siirt – Mersin 1991	55	Married (widow)	15	Arranged (relative)	6	No school Not literate	Home-based hands and crafts
Givzong	Mersin	Siirt – Mersin 1983	43	Married	15	Arranged (relative)	8	No school Not literate	Home-based hands and crafts Agriculture Field
Binefşi	Mersin	Bitlis – Mersin 1995	53	Married	17	Not Arranged (relative)	8	No school literate	Agriculture Field
Gulbihara	Mersin	Bitlis – Mersin 1987	48	Married	15	Arranged (relative)	6	No school Not literate	Agriculture Field
Simbol	Diyarbakır	Diyarbakır – Center 1994	39	Married	17	Arranged (relative)	8	No school Not literate	None
Giya	Diyarbakır	Diyarbakır – Center 1991	65	Married (widow)	15	Arranged (relative)	6	No school Not literate Does not know Turkish	NGO Activist

Table 5.4: List of the Participants and Their Profiles (continued)

Interviewees	Place of interview	Mig. From-To	Age	Marital S.	Age of mar.	Marital Type	# of child	Education	Work
Adarok	Diyarbakır	Diyarbakır – Center 1992	45	Married (temporary head of household)	14	Arranged (relative)	7	No school Knows reading Cannot write	NGO Activists
Şilêra Dolê	Diyarbakır	Diyarbakır – Center 1992	35	Married	15	Not arranged (relative)	8	No school Not literate Does not know Turkish	Cleaning Home-based hands and crafts
Stîrî	Diyarbakır	Diyarbakır – Center 1992	47	Married	18	Arranged	7	No school Not literate Does not know Turkish	None
Gozîkê	Diyarbakır	Diyarbakır – Center 1993	42	Married	16	Arranged (relative)	9	No school Not literate	None
Gongiloka Dehlîf	Diyarbakır	Diyarbakır – Center 1993	48	Married (widow)	16	Arranged (relative)	8	Elementary school Literate	Home-based hands and crafts
Beybûn	Diyarbakır	Diyarbakır – Mersin - Center 1993	34	Married (temporary head of household)	19	Not arranged	1	Elementary school Literate	Working in Municipality Charity House
Kuxkê	Diyarbakır	Diyarbakır – Center 1992	29	Single	-	-	-	Elementary school Literate	Working in Municipality

5.3.5. Interviews and Data Analysis

The length of the interviews depended on the interviewees' will to explain the experiences that they face. The shortest interview lasted 30 minutes and the longest one approximately 3 hours and 30 minutes. Generally the interviews length is around 60 minutes. I conducted the interviews mostly at the participants' houses. There are some interviews that were in the Peace Mothers Initiative in three of the cities. Some were conducted in the Günışığı Charity House, which is an organization of the Municipality in Diyarbakır and some were in the Laundry House, which is also an organization of the Municipality in Diyarbakır. Generally the key participants and gatekeepers directed me to the interviewees. But sometimes the gatekeepers directed me to the pro-Kurdish political party offices in the districts, because they knew the people living in their district better than the members in the GÖÇ-DER.

Some of the women did not want to participate into the study because they were still afraid of the State. Although I had to stay longer in the field to find other internally displaced women, I did not force them to attend. I asked once and explained my study, if they said no, I thanked and left. There were 6 interviews out of 30 in Kurdish. Sometimes I had to wait in the field without conducting any interviews for days. Because my research did not have any financial support, I could not use a professional translator. But there were always people around in the pro-Kurdish organizations (NGOs and/or political party), whose mother tongue was Kurdish and they helped me a lot. One of my Kurdish friends also checked the translations after I finished the field work.

After the field work was done, I determined the categories and the relationships between the categories for data analysis. The data analysis of the study was supported by the NVivo7 qualitative research analysis program. You may find the categories and the relationships of the data analysis in the following two chapters.

5.3.6. Limitations of the Study

The first and the foremost important limitation of the study was my lack of Kurdish language. Because although women have learned Turkish and are able to speak it as fluently as their mother tongue, they all mentioned that, if the interview was in Kurdish, they would have told their stories better. On the other hand, six of the interviews were in Kurdish and in spite of the fact that I could understand most of their statements, I could not reply to their comments and although the translators worked very hard to translate the interviews sentence

by sentence, there would be some meaning lost in the translations. Besides, the meaning lost happened twice because these interviews that were translated from Kurdish to Turkish were also translated from Turkish to English for the study.

The second limitation was about time constraints. Although I think three of these cities are the main representations of the cities in which internally displaced people live after their forced migration process, if there was no time limitation for me to finish my PhD and also if there was financial support for my study, I wish I could include all the cities to which the Kurdish population have migrated after their villages were evacuated to see the differences and/or the similarities among the cities. Finally, if I could live in one of those neighborhoods and could make a participant observation, instead of making observations in limited incidents, the missing points in the study could be filled.

5.4. Concluding Remarks for the Methodology of the Research

This study is based on feminist methodology and qualitative research methods were used for collecting the data. In-depth interviews with 30 internally displaced Kurdish women were conducted and observations in various meetings and activities were done in the research field in order to support the data. To answer the research question of the study, which is “What kind of experiences do the women go through during internal displacement and what is the importance of these experiences for women’s empowerment process?”, some key concepts besides the categorization process were used. These are “political engagement”, “political activity” and “gender awareness” of the women. In order to include all the perspectives into the study, different types of women were included, such as activists, workers, female heads of households, PKK members, etc.

In order to explain internally displaced Kurdish women’s experiences in the cities, different aspects of marginalization and empowerment situations are considered. According to this consideration, marginalization of women after displacement depends on women’s experience of ethnic and gender-based discrimination in the cities. This is a double discrimination process for women as their Kurdishness and womanness are combined and constitute their marginalization. Their empowerment situation also has differences according to their political and gender awareness situation. Their political engagement leads to their “empowerment to cope” situation, whereas their gender awareness brings “empowerment to

change” the situation of patriarchy and their struggle against this type of relation in public and private spheres of their lives.

Although it was not easy to enter into the field, with the help of the gatekeepers and key respondents, the rapport with and the trust of the interviewees were established and the interviews were conducted from 30 minutes to 3 and half hours and the data was analyzed with the support of the NVivo 7 qualitative research analysis program. Some interviews were longer than the others because the length of the interviews depended on the interviewees’ ambition to tell the story. Unlike politically detached women, politically active ones were more willing to tell their stories and to show the public what has happened to their nation through 1990s and what they are struggling for since then.

CHAPTER VI

RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS TOWARDS CONFLICT-INDUCED INTERNALLY DISPLACED (CIID) KURDISH WOMEN'S LIVES BEFORE DISPLACEMENT

In this chapter, women's experiences before their displacement process will be analyzed. This analysis will be retrospective and includes the daily lives of women and basically the difficulties that they face in the conflict zones before the displacement process. Their relationship with the non-state armed group members is also evaluated in order to examine their political engagement situation. Not only the relationship with the non-state armed group members, but also the attitudes of the state security forces and the village guard system that is argued as a forced implementation on the villagers will be explained with the interviewee's expressions.

6.1. Daily Lives of CIID Kurdish Women in their Homelands

Because one of the major problems that women face in the city life after they are displaced from their homelands is poverty, they focus on their wealth in the villages before the displacement process. According to the interviewees, the village life was enchanting before the conflict period. They were able to prepare their own cheese, yogurt, milk and butter by themselves and they always had meat to eat because of the husbandry that they exercised. On the other hand, because they all owned agricultural fields, they always had full sacks of vegetables. Women mostly explained to me in the interviews that they had never experienced hunger in their homelands and they always had something to eat and feed their children. According to Çağlayan et al. (2011: 42), internally displaced women always report their economic situation in the villages as being "well". This may have two main reasons. First of all, they can romanticize about their living in the villages and secondly, their situation could be relatively better from their city lives. Similarly internally displaced women in this study explained their situation in the village life as "better" relative to their lives in the cities. This situation may also indicate that, with the displacement process, there was also a class shift in these women's lives. These women were economically repressed in the cities after displacement. This issue will be explained in detail in the following chapter.

As Beybûn mentions,

My grandfather was the owner of the village. Only the shepherd and the imam (prayer leader) were foreigners. The other villagers were all relatives. Our life was wonderful. Our economic situation was very good. We had a big garden and we had hot and cold water in the house. Our house was beautiful. But when these pressures begun, everything went worse (Günüştği Charity House, Diyarbakır, 24.06.2010).

Although sustenance was easy in the homelands, one of the major problems for women in the homelands was the strict control of the women by the male family members within the nuclear and extended families. Women in the study mentioned that they were forced to get married at very early ages. Some of them even not had their first menstruation. These marriages were mostly arranged by the older family members and women did not even see their husbands before the wedding day. As mentioned before, Kurdish women's status is defined by the women's age, marital status or their integration into the family (Çağlayan 2007: 41-42). Since these women got married at an early age and their status in the family was also low, this may have brought about their strict control by the male relatives in the name of "honor". Because of these early marriages, Kurdish women generally remained uneducated because they served as the helpers of their mothers before the marriage and then became the servers of their mothers-in-law after marriage. As it is the general case in the villages, it is considered that there is no need for them to be educated, especially in the villages.

Helal mentioned that,

I even did not have my menstruation. That is why my marriage was arranged according to the 'Hanefi' instead of 'Şafi' sect. There was no one except the imam that we could ask for advice. My marriage was arranged and I could not understand anything. Our relatives arranged my marriage (Peace Mothers NGO, İstanbul, 22.07.2010).

Similarly, Adarok expressed that she was very young when she got married,

When I got married, I did not have my period yet. I went very young (to the husband). Allah shouldn't let my mother to look after me. I will never give my blessing to her

(hakkımı helal etmeyeceğim).²⁸ She made too much cruelty to us and she earned a lot of money from my marriage (başlık parası)²⁹ (Peace Mothers NGO, Diyarbakır, 25.06.2010).

The husband's position in the family, on the other hand, was not very different from the women's, especially if he was also young when he got married. Women and their husbands did not usually have any permission to decide about anything in the household after marriage. It is usually the father-in-law that has the arbitrament and power to say the final decision in the family. Because of the prevalent patriarchal relations and strict control in the family, internally displaced Kurdish women generally faced domestic violence as a control mechanism from their husbands and this situation was considered as a normal situation in the village life and was also internalized by the women themselves. Interviewees explained this situation as the will of their husbands to prove that they became men to their older family members. There were times when fathers-in-law forced their sons to beat their wives just to see if their sons are under the control of their wives or not. In sum, in the village life it was generally the older family members, especially fathers and mothers-in-law that had the power and control not only over the women, but also over their sons.

As Kevz expresses,

When my husband was at home, he always beat me. If he was not there, there was no beating or abuse. The only reason of the beating was my mother-in-law. When she talks, he beat me. She interfered in everything that is between me and my husband. When my husband cannot beat me physically he always insulted me with his words. I still feel the pain that he gave. He even hit me with wood. But he never hit his children. My mother-in-law always got my husband's blood up and he beat me (Her house, Mersin, 27.05.2010).

Xaç Darik also mentions that,

My father-in-law told my husband that if he beat me, he would give him money. I was beaten up plenty of times.

²⁸ This is an Islamic phrase that refers to the kindness that you made for someone and do not let her/him to be free from this kindness when s/he dies. You keep these kindness with you. To die with these kindness, you cannot be relaxed when you die in the other world.

²⁹ *Başlık parası* means an amount of money that the bride's family determines and the groom's family has to pay in order to marry. This can either be money or other kind of materials such as gold, livestock, house, etc. This is simply considering girl children as commodities, which is one of the major indicators of the patriarchal society.

When we argue with my mother-in-law he beat me. I could not breathe but he and his mother did not even come and look to see if I was alive. I can never forget this. One day, my mother-in-law told me to wash beans in the fountain which was placed in the middle of the village. My father-in-law saw me washing the beans and told my husband. He got very angry and slapped my face hard. It was like a fire in front of my face. I could not understand what was going on because his mother told me to do it and I was afraid very much. I told him his mother gave me that duty and then saw his father was laughing. After my husband beat me my father-in-law told my husband that he loved him and he was a real man (Her house, İstanbul, 11.05.2010).

As seen in Xaç Darik's statement above, control on women in the village life was so strict that women even could not go out from home without permission from their husbands or in-laws. It was also mentioned by most of the interviewees that state security force's pressure was influential on the attitudes of men towards women in the villages. One of the victimization situations for women in times of conflict is the violence against women in public and private spheres. Men's reflection of violence that they face from the security forces towards women is a common attitude in times of conflicts. In other words, there is a continuation of violence from the public sphere to the private spheres. As aforementioned, Ertürk (2009) argues that, violence in the conflict zones and violence at home reinforce each other. Rehn and Sirleaf (2002) explains one of the reasons of this situation as the stress that male family members live because they face violence from state security forces and reflect it towards women and children.

Similar to the theoretical explanations above, Gongiloka Dehlî mentions that,

He was beating me and my children very badly, he was almost killing us. He was beaten up in the Gendarmerie station then he came and beat us. He was beating us by shouting out "God damn village guards! (Günüşığı Charity House, Diyarbakır, 24.06.2010).

Women in the study explained that domestic violence continued until men have learned things from the PKK and its leader. As mentioned before, one of the insights of the PKK is to destroy the hegemony and power of manhood in the society, in order to give rise to the emancipation of women in the society. As it is one of the major understandings of the Kurdish movement, without women's emancipation, the nation's emancipation would not be possible, as it is a consequence of the socialist ideology. Gezink's statement below about

the PKK leader is an example of the Kurdish movement's attempt. The PKK leader is seen as the facilitator of the women's emancipation in the Kurdish society. That is also a reason of the women's devotion to the Kurdish struggle without questioning it.

For example Gezink told that,

My husband perpetuated domestic violence to me when he faced violence at the gendarmerie station. When he beat me I always admitted it because he was my husband. He was going to the field, got angry because of something and beat me. I could not guess what he was angry for. He used to say where is the water, where is the bread and beat me. But God bless our leader (Adullah Öcalan) he explained things to our husbands... (Her house, Mersin, 26.05.2010).

Interviewees expressed that after they met non-state armed group members and after these members started their visits to the villages, the attitudes of men towards women were changed. Members of the non-state armed groups organized meetings with the villagers and started to give them speeches about the Kurdish struggle and the importance of gender equality for the struggle. These incidents were influential on the change of the relationships between women and men. Most of the interviewees mentioned that the life in the villages was glamorous after they interacted with the guerillas, because their ongoing oppression started to be weakened and their worth was proclaimed by the PKK members to their husbands.

As Xaç Darik told,

After PKK came, everything became very beautiful. Everybody was equal; there were no cruelty and insult towards women. I would not prefer İstanbul even they offer me gold. In the evenings it was time for guerillas to come and we could not understand how time passed. They told us things that nobody ever told us before. Not even our mothers or fathers. Before guerillas, nobody warned my husband when he treated me badly. But they showed what women and men equality is. They prevented the violence against women. They were collecting men in the mosque and teaching them how they should treat women. Female guerillas also came and showed us that they were fighting together and they were equal in the organization. Some of the men improved suddenly, for example the young men. My husband was one of them (Her house, İstanbul, 11.05.2010).

Similarly, Zehferan expressed that she was having difficulties looking after the children and cooking meals at the same time and her husband told her that she was a woman and had to deal with both of them. She then complained about her husband to the guerillas and her statement is one of the other examples of the PKK member's lessons to the men in the villages.

When they (guerillas) wanted tea from me after dinner, I told them to do it by themselves and told what my husband told me that morning. They offered me to punish my husband and asked me if it's okay for me to make him wash the dishes. I told them it is not a punishment because I do it every day. Then they made him stand on his one foot all night long (Her relative's house, İstanbul, 21.07.2010).

6.2. Difficulties of Living in the Conflict Zones

Before the displacement process, women all faced difficulties of living in a conflict zone and they were all victimized with their families in the first place. Not only the real artillery, rifles, bullets and mines were effective on villagers, but also the oppression from the state security forces. Villagers were in the middle of both the oppression of the state security forces and the support demands of the PKK in the rural areas, which in turn makes them civilian victims of the conflict. Villagers were psychologically affected, kidnapped, tortured, disabled, oppressed, victimized, insulted, frightened and killed in these areas. As mentioned before, women's experiences in the conflict times are different than men's and it needs a special examination as Feminist International Theories argue. Women's situation was also negative in a different sense because they were the ones who lost their husbands and children in this conflict. As El Jack (2002 cited in Kemirere 2007: 3) mentions, women's ability to reach to the resources are hindered in times of conflicts and women have to deal with the loss of the loved ones, feeding the dependent family members and having to cope with all these situations while struggling with the stress that they feel.

For example, the statements of Stêregul clearly define how close the conflict was to their village in Siirt province,

The conflict was very close to us. One day when I was baking bread, a group of soldiers passed by me and before all of them passed, PKK opened fire from the mountains and soldiers replied back. I was between two fires. I could not even go to my own house and hold the tray over my head and ran towards my neighbor's house.

I left the bread there and after they stopped the fire, I looked at my bread it was burned. When a conflict began everybody was coming to our house and because we were frightened a lot, we could not go out. We were eating whatever we had in the house until the conflict stops (Her relative's house, İstanbul, 13.05.2010).

Xaç Darik also mentioned that,

Our village was very close to a mountain. We could not sleep at nights because they (state security forces) were launching rockets towards the mountains –bam bam bam- all night long whether they see guerillas or not. They were trying to prevent the guerillas entrance into the villages. Our houses were shaking and we lived it every night until they burned down our village (Her house, İstanbul, 11.05.2010).

Women also told me that in the times that the guerillas were not visiting their village, state security forces still tried to keep villagers under pressure by violence. Although most of the women know the reason of these oppressions and threats towards the Kurdish population, some of them are still not aware of what was happening in the village and consider all these negative consequences as their own fates. There were some women, who had their children and relatives in the PKK and supported them in the villages, but on the other hand, some of them did not even know that there were guerillas in the village. In other words, not only the ones that are related with the non-state armed group members were internally displaced, but also villagers who did not have a relation with the non-state armed group members were displaced from their villages. These women's political engagement or detachment situations have the roots mostly in their relations with the PKK members before the displacement.

For example as Leven told me although they were not very close to the conflict zone, they were still displaced from their villages.

There were no guerillas in the village. I saw with my eyes that they killed a shepherd and declared him as they killed a "terrorist". There were no PKK around our village. I never saw PKK. They forced us to be village guards or ordered us to leave. When my brother-in-law and his wife were migrating, they (state security forces) killed their twin sons, just to convince them to be village guard. They killed our village headman just because he did not convince the villages on 'village guard' system. They (state security forces) were insulting girls in the village, they harassed them. We all as a family escaped from the village one

night. We went to my father's village, they also burned it down and one of my sons is disabled because of that fire. I could not even take a needle from my house and there is nothing left from our village (In her house, İstanbul, 14.05.2010).

Although women in the study experienced difficulties both in their personal lives and because they were living in the conflict zone, they still told me how beautiful their villages were and how they still want to spend their rest of their lives in the village. In other words, they romanticize their past lives because they are having troubles in living in the city centers. As most of the villagers could not integrate into the metropolis style of living and they have barriers such as language and literacy, of which they do not need in the villages. They are also afraid for their children because of the uncontrollable sphere in the city centers. According to them, the streets are full of threats. Most importantly, because they are in deprivation in the cities and experience poverty, they remember their past with wealth. Women in my study mostly told about the ongoing village guard system in their homelands and the ongoing conflict as the obstacles in front of their return. They also mentioned that they do not feel free and relieved in the cities. In sum, the alienation of the city life and their class shift caused negative consequences for women and caused an irresistible longing for their past after the displacement process.

For example Berbiro expressed that,

I miss my village. It is very beautiful. It is our home. Its weather, water everything is clean and beautiful. But there are still village guards in our village and the threat of unidentified murders. If these are finished, I may go back to my village. We are not free and relieved here. In the village we had everything from the agriculture fields. I wish I was in my village. I am not free in the city (Her house, İstanbul, 21.07.2010).

Gulbihara similarly tells of her village in Bitlis by romanticizing her previous life. She mentions that,

I went back to my village once to visit a relative. I miss my land, I miss it so much. It is like honey. I had to escape from my home to the city. What could I do? I always see my home in my dreams. There is a fountain in the village, it has vitality water. It is always cold, whether it is summer or winter. It is really royal water. I went to this fountain in my dream. I see the walnut tree in my dream, I see myself

picking walnuts... There are apples, there is a river... We were playing... Where is this pleasure? State evacuated me from my home. State hurt me. What can I do? This place is not my home, it is not my motherland. It is not my mother tongue. I don't love this land. I miss my 'welat' (motherland) very much. I cannot stand this hot weather in Mersin. It kills me. I am always sick here. I want peace. I want this bloody war to be ended. If it is ended, I can immediately go back to my village. I was relieved in the village. My village is life. I have everything there; I have animals, milk, cheese... I stay at home all day long. I do nothing all day. I am like in a prison in the city. I don't know Turkish and cannot go anywhere. If I see a Kurd, I go and talk to her. I also want to chat with Turks but I don't have enough Turkish to talk (Her house, Mersin, 06.08.2010).

6.3. Reasons of Internal Displacement

6.3.1. Supporting Non-State Armed Group Members

Almost all women in my study mentioned that the state is the reason of their displacement. Most of them acknowledged that the main reason that the state burned down their villages is their relationship with the non-state armed group members. Most of them saw guerillas visit their villages and some of them developed close relationships with non-state armed group members. They also helped guerillas whenever they needed it. Women legitimize this relationship as defining that guerillas are their children, not strangers. Women that mention close relationship with the guerillas mentioned that non-state armed group members improved their lives to a better one. Berbiro stated that, at the very beginning, people were afraid of the PKK but then they started to be sympathizers of the movement and supported the enrollments.

Guerillas were coming to our village, I saw them. They introduced themselves to us. People were afraid of them. But they told us that they are our children and they organized a meeting in the mosque. Then we understood that guerillas were struggling for us and we started to support them. We got lessons from them. We learned what we know today from them (Her house, İstanbul, 21.07.2010).

Women, who had close relationships and helped guerillas expressed that, their attitudes towards the villagers were also very close and friendly. Kevz told about the relationship as following:

They (guerillas) gave my children's names. They loved children. They were giving names to the newborn children. Girls were very beautiful and tall. I was never afraid from them. I was always proud of their struggle. I was cooking for them and we were chatting. They were telling what Kurdish issue means to us. Helicopters were flying over our village but we were never afraid. I was the head of the guerillas. Before anyone else I had a relation with them. They showered, chopped animals they hunted and left their ammunition in our house. Then other villages saw and told the state security forces, that is why they first burned down my house and then the whole village (Her House, Mersin, 27.05.2010).

Zehferan similarly expressed her relationship with guerillas like Kevz and mentioned that,

I was making bread everyday because they were coming every night and took the breads. People in the village always asked me why I cooked bread everyday and I was telling that I had guests. Guerillas were coming and staying every night at our house. They kept guard one night and an operation happened to our house. I protected them and banished the soldiers. Girls had difficulties and they were having shower in our house. One of them wanted to wash her hair and I said I could pour water. She first did not accept it but I insisted and poured cold water to make fun. Then she poured cold water on me and made me naked. We played like children. Another woman guerilla came to our house once, who also had a husband in the PKK. She wanted to use the toilet and I waited for her in front of the door. She hugged me and asked why I stood there. I said heval (my friend) your duty is that and my duty is this... They struggle with gun; we support them in all respects (Her relative's house, İstanbul, 21.07.2010).

Women knew that the reason for their displacement was these relationships and supports of the non-state armed group members. But they have never considered it as inaccurate. They supported the struggle full-heartedly and mystified the guerillas as heroes. They especially mystify female guerillas as devoting themselves to the struggle more than men. As mentioned in the previous chapters, in the process of the Kurdish movement, women have been represented in different roles. “Virgin fighter” representation is among the other ones such as “grieving mothers” and “sexless politicians”. They consider female guerillas as “virgin heroines”. To be virgin, for them, is the proof of the devotion. As it is considered, females participate into the organization just for the struggle. They do not have any other human reasons to be present in the organization. Almost all of the interviewees mentioned that nothing was wrong about the participation of girls in the PKK ranks. By the

mystification of the female guerillas, women tend to support the Kurdish struggle more. For them, female guerillas are a confirmation of the women's emancipation. In other words, women's emancipation was aroused with the female guerillas, which is the extreme representation of women in the society and it was equated with the women's freedom. This situation was considered as the signifier of the women's increased status in the society because if women could be in the mountains and fight side by side with men, then it is possible for them to be in every part of the public life. But this freedom for them was only possible with the nationalist purposes, because as mentioned before, without women's emancipation, the nation's emancipation would not be possible.

As Giya mentions women guerillas are like men in the PKK and told me that,

Girls in the PKK are more strong and strong-minded according to me. It does not matter if its girl or boy. They are struggling as sisters and brothers and they have the same goal. I am more interested in the women's struggle because woman means life, women are more courageous and more strong-minded. They have a stronger faith. That is why women are stronger than men (In the Peace Mothers NGO, Diyarbakır, 21.06.2010).

Kevz similarly mentioned that there cannot a sexual relationship between women and men because they both devote themselves to the movement.

They are brothers and sisters. Females forget their womanness in the mountains. Womanness disappears. They do not have a relationship. They have promises. They are respectful to each other. They do not have any more relations when they leave their homes. They do not have that sound and light. They do not have beds and comforters. They sit side by side and sleep together. Females are no longer women in the organization. They are men in the mountains. They do not have 'fanfan funfun' (she means sexual relationships). They also do not accept if someone tries that kind of relationship (In her house, Mersin, 27.05.2010).

According to them, because women have left all the human needs behind, a sexual relationship between women and men in the armed group is not possible. In this regard, in order to be supported by the Kurdish population, female guerillas had to be presented as virgin fighters. According to this representation, if there is an incident that shows female guerillas are not virgin, it could only be the fault of the state security forces. It is considered

that, state security forces could only cause the loss of virginity of the female guerillas after they were caught just to demolish the faith of the Kurdish population in the movement.

Leven wanted to explain this situation as following;

If a woman stays with the PKK members, nothing happens. But if a woman stays with Turkish soldiers one night, see what would happen. There are thousands of female guerillas fighting but they are all virgins. We were in our villages when a female guerilla died in the fight. The Turkish state security forces brought a doctor and told him to say she was not virgin. But he said that he could not lie and told everyone that the female guerilla was virgin. Nothing can be ever happening to women in the PKK (In her house, İstanbul, 14.05.2010).

Binefşi similarly mentions that,

I know what they (state security forces) do to female guerillas. They do everything to female guerillas when they catch them dead or alive. If my child was male I could easefully tell my son to participate into the PKK. But it is unacceptable what they do to the female guerillas. But still it is my daughter's idea. I cannot prohibit her. There was a female guerilla from our village. When she was caught after 16 years, she was still virgin. I know it. Female guerillas are very beautiful, you cannot even look them (In her neighbor's house, Mersin, 06.08.2010).

One of the female guerillas, Kuxkê explained this mystification as following,

When they (state security forces) caught me, they took me to a doctor for virginity test. Because they are using these kind of stuff very much. For example, they are making news on female guerillas and say that females use contraceptive pills in the PKK. A lot of female guerillas cannot have menstruation period in the mountains. I also had my last menstruation period when I first attended to the organization and then I could not have my period for 7 months. Maybe it is because of stress or too much exercise, I don't know. Our doctor friends give contraceptive pills because of this reason. To make female guerillas have regular periods. I cannot argue that there is no relationship between women and men in the organization. But it is very possible for the couples to be separated and fight in different places. You cannot guarantee anything in the mountains. One day you are there the other day you may die. When you live emotional relationships, you get

depressed easily when your loved one dies. I never saw a sexual aspect of the relationships. The leader always told us that if a man approaches you with a sexual aim, you have a right to shoot him and can protect yourself. You start seeing everybody including yourself as man when you are in this situation. Apo (the leader) gives so much importance to the female guerillas because women devote themselves more than men to the struggle. It is impossible in the organization for female guerillas to be left behind. They can be leaders and commanders. Men and women share opinions with each other and have consensus when something should be decided. That is why Apo left the struggle to the female guerillas when he was caught. He told that he did not trust men because they cannot devote themselves to the struggle. He knew that women can embrace the struggle but men not because women are protective and emotional because they can give birth. That is why women can turn into their essence when their consciousness is raised. Women know that everything positive in their lives is because of the leader and they may die for the leader but men do not have this consciousness (In her house, Diyarbakır, 26.06.2010).

It is a way that the struggle was accepted both by men and women and also by young and elderly. If they do not mystify female guerillas as virgins, it would be impossible for them to accept the ongoing struggle with women and men together because of the honor issue of the families. Women evaluate female guerillas as the major development and best example for Kurdish society. They are also considered as the beginning of the Kurdish women's emancipation, which was only accomplished by the PKK leader. This mystification is also seen in the most religious women's statements. They all approve of female guerillas and believe that they stay virgin and only devote themselves to the struggle. That shows how women's integration into the PKK is rationalized by the Kurdish population and how they are "bargaining with patriarchy". In other words, staying in the boundaries of virginity is a way to negotiate with patriarchy for the female guerillas. As seen above, some women's relationship with the guerillas is limited as they saw them while they were coming and going to the village. Some say they were the children of the village and some others had special visits to their houses because of the relationship of their husband with the non-state armed group. It can be argued that, women who had children in the PKK did not have guerilla visits because these houses are probably under control of the state security forces and non-state armed group members did not want to put these families at more risk.

6.3.2. Attitudes of State Security Forces towards Villagers and the Pressure of Village Guard System

As aforementioned, physical and sexual violence are mostly prevalent in the conflict zones towards women (Handrahan 2004: 430). Involuntary sexual contact as the expression of hegemonic power relations over women have occurred all over the world and have been studied by the IR feminist theorists (Tickner 2004: 45). Violence, but especially sexual violence, is used to torture and humiliate people to have control over them and to make people leave the territory (Bastik et al. 2007:15), which refers to a kind of “ethnic cleansing”. In this situation, the violence towards the Kurdish population in their homelands is both to prevent the rural support of the PKK from the villagers, to punish the Kurdish population as they are supporting the PKK and also as to have full control in the territory by forcing Kurds to leave their homelands.

In the homelands of the internally displaced people, the attitudes of the state security forces towards the villagers vary as the interviewees mentioned. According to these expressions, the attitudes were mostly negative and include violence. According to the women in my study, it is mostly men who faced brutal violence from Turkish commanders and soldiers. If the family had children in the PKK, the violence that they face increased and lasted a long time as evidenced by the torture experienced by those held in custody, sometimes as long as a month. In this process, state security forces were visiting the houses of these families and women told me that, they had to face some humiliations, insults and abuses because of their Kurdishness and their family’s support for the PKK. Women also pointed out that the violence of the state security forces sometimes reached to physical and a threat of sexual violence. As my respondents told me, they never faced sexual violence but they were always afraid of it because there was sense of the threat of it. As mentioned before, sexual violence or the threats of it have been used as one of the weapons of war to victimize women directly and men indirectly by destroying their honor. Almost all of the interviewees explained similar situations about the attitudes of the state security forces. They all complained about the negative behavior and treatment towards themselves and told me the following:

Giya from one of the villages of Diyarbakır told me that,

We had difficulties in the village. There were always military operations towards our village. They told us we were Kurds and we had children in the PKK. The

operations were whether with guns or just as searching. They were always coming and asking about my son in the PKK. They wanted to know where my son was. My husband was the village headman. They were abusing us a lot. They were ragging our house. They tried to burn our house three times and at the end, they bombed and destroyed it (In the Peace Mothers NGO, Diyarbakır, 21.06.2010).

Kevz from one other village of Diyarbakır pointed out that,

My husband and other men were working in the construction of the mosque. They (state security forces) came and did not ask anything. They started to beat the men. Our men tried to explain that they were working for the mosque and the commander said 'Fuck the mosque, there is no god here'. They also hit me and made me lie down. They accused us for feeding 'terrorists'. They mixed all the pulse on the ground, so they cannot be eatable anymore. Then they broke all the doors, windows and everything... They burned down everything the next day. In 10 days nobody could see each other... Puf, everything was gone. They put ropes to the heads of people. They killed an old man with rope. We escaped to another village. They killed a whole family with a pregnant woman. My daughter was just 2 days old. They also wanted to burn her with the house but a Kurdish soldier brought my baby to me. The commander killed that soldier in front of me just because he protected my baby. They killed even the chickens with the orders of their commanders. Before this incident one day I was making bread they again came and started to search the houses. They beat me a lot accusing me of making bread for the guerillas. They also beat a very old woman. They humiliated us and said they (the guerillas) were coming and fucking us and then took their breads. They put all the women into the mosque and wanted to rape. But there was a saint girl among them. She prayed and they let everybody in the mosque (In her house, Mersin, 27.05.2010).

Nefel from one of the villages of Siirt expressed that,

One day soldiers came home and asked for my husband. I told them he was with the animals in the plateau. They said I lied. They started to pour everything in the middle of the house, like rice, pulse, etc. I can never forget it. We could not eat any of them. Another day I went to the town to get burnt ointment for my daughter because she burnt her hand. They did not believe me and although I was pregnant, they hit my back and legs. Village guards made it

but there were also soldiers with them (In her house, Mersin, 05.08.2010).

Helal, from one of the villages of Mardin exposed that,

They stepped on our bread, they wrote defamations on our beds, on white sheets. We could not understand the writings but our men could. They were giving messages to our men. Those were very extreme defamations. That is the reason that the youth went to the mountains (In Peace Mothers NGO, İstanbul, 22.07.2010).

The reason of the violence was not only the participation in the PKK from these villages. It was also because the villagers did not accept being village guards and did not take guns from the state. The village guard system wanted to make the villagers fight against the PKK. All of the interviewees mentioned that they did not accept to be village guards and that was the reason of their displacement. They considered the village guards as betrayers of their own nation. They told me that it was impossible for them to take guns and fight against the PKK because the PKK was composed of all their children and relatives. Almost all of the interviewees expressed that they have guerillas from their families and some of them told that there were guerillas from their village but not from their own families. Fighting against the PKK was unacceptable for them as they know these children, they are from the same nation and blood for them.

As Xaç Darik mentions,

How could we be village guards? There were almost 10 children who went to the mountains from our village. It was impossible for us (In her house, İstanbul, 11.05.2010).

Similarly Helal pointed out that, although they faced the violence from the state security forces, they rejected being village guards and at the end they were evacuated from their village in Mardin.

They (state security forces) burned down our village. Before they burned it, they collected everybody in the middle of the village and kept us there under the sun in the summers and on snow in the winters. Children were having difficulties and wanted to go to the toilets. But they did not let them. They always told us that if we accept to be village guards, they would not hurt us. There were almost 50 children who participated in the PKK, how could we be

village guards? Who could we use the guns against? Everybody became relatives in the village; everybody was ashamed of each other. We denied being village guards and they burned the whole village in 1993 (In the Peace Mothers NGO, İstanbul, 22.07.2010).

Leven mentions that she had one son in the PKK and implied that,

We did not want to be village guards. Can brothers kill each other? They said find PKK and kill. Who is PKK? PKK is our son and our brother. The soldier is also my son, my brother. How can I fight against them? There were guerillas from almost all villages. The reason these children went to the mountains was the pressure that they faced from the state (In her house, İstanbul, 14.05.2010).

Villagers that accepted to be the village guards and took guns from the state deserved to stay in the village. As the interviewees mentioned, they are the major betrayers of the Kurdish nation. In most of the interviews, I heard that women called village guards as “caş”, which means donkey. They started to live in the most beautiful houses of the village and started to take all the crops from the fields of the villagers. Although displaced Kurdish families live in extreme poverty in the city centers, these village guards became rich in the villages. As mentioned before, when the state let villagers return to their villages by law, these village guards did not let them and committed crimes. As Gongiloka Dehlî, from one of the villages of Diyarbakır expressed below that,

After we were displaced from our village because of the village guards, they started to take advantage of our agriculture fields for ten years. When the state told us that the villages were free in 2002, we wanted to return back to our homeland. The village guards did not let my relatives in the village and shot my husband. Two of these village guards were condemned. There was no house left because village guards made new houses on our lands (In Günışığı charity house, Diyarbakır, 24.06.2010).

Although women in my study wanted to return to their villages and romanticized the village life, they are afraid to go back because of the village guard threat, ongoing security problems and mines, etc. Some of them do not have a village anymore because these villages were erased from the maps. Similarly, Development Center Association (2010: 13) mentions that, “blocking of access to some villages by state forces, feelings of insecurity, the existence of village guards and the possibility of re-experiencing some past events are all factors that dissuade people from return even if they actually want it”.

6.3.3. Leaving Behind the Homeland and Choosing the Destination City

As Development Center Association (2010: 23) mentions, most of the villagers were displaced against their will as a result of the state security forces with the feeling of insecurity and without any hope towards the future. Some of them had to leave their villages immediately and did not have the “chance to utilize their existing assets and make preparations in their point of destination and re-settlement” (Development Center Association 2010: 25). For all of the interviewees, the displacement process was one of the major traumas that they lived throughout their lives. They all expressed the time that they had to leave their villages as a “war like” situation. Almost all of the women in my study mentioned that they had no time to prepare for the migration. They were given mostly like 3 days and it was not enough for them to organize the household stuff and sell the animals to have some money before they left. That is the reason behind most of their poverty in the cities because they left everything they had behind and left their villages with minimum stuff. Some of them even could not take any household stuff and left the homeland only with their slippers. They consider this moment as the beginning of their dreadful lives in the cities. The target of their hate was defined in this specific moment as the state security forces. They see the state as the destroyer of their ongoing routine lives in the villages. Although some of the interviewees mentioned that they knew about the Kurdish issue before their displacement, this specific moment made them fully support the PKK to fight for the Kurdish rights. While some started to support their children in the PKK more and became politically engaged and active, some other interviewees considered this moment as their fate and did not evaluate it politically and stayed as politically detached. Whether or not women evaluated this experience politically, they remember every second of the moment and told me that they still feel the pain of the situation.

Lilaq and Stêregul were wives of the same man and were displaced from Siirt and came to İstanbul immediately. Lilaq mentioned that,

We escaped from the village at midnight and I could not even bring a pair of shoes to İstanbul... (Her relative's house, İstanbul, 13.05.2010).

Stêregul also expresses that,

When we left the village, the gas of the cooker was on and the teapot was staying over it. Our neighbors told us that

we were leaving. It happened immediately. I did not want to come to İstanbul because I thought that my children would lose their religion in a big city (Her relative's house, İstanbul, 13.05.2010).

Gıvzonk told me that they could not prepare for the migration as following,

"We were wealthy in the village. We had goats, animals and agriculture fields. We could not sell them before we left, we escaped in 3 days. We escaped from the village all together. We came to Mersin because my father was doing business in this city. He decided and we came. We started living here" (In her house, Mersin, 06.08.2010).

Gulgenim similarly mentioned that their leave from one of the villages of Siirt was sudden. She explains how they were displaced below,

We migrated because of the state. Helicopters bombed the village for three days. Our animals were dead and we could not even take a pillow from home. They told us we were 'terrorists'. We first went to Adana because the whole village went there and then we moved to Mersin. We rented a house and stayed in it with three families. We could only protect our lives. There was only one wall that stayed still from our house and the Kuran was hanged on that wall (In her house, Mersin, 25.05.2010).

Xaç Darik implied that they had to watch the burning of the neighbor village, where her father lived all night long. She mentioned that state security forces first burned down the houses that had children in the PKK. She explain that night in one of the villages of Bitlis as following,

They (state security forces) gave us time to leave the village but we did not. They first burned down my father's house in the neighbor village. We were watching it from our own village. It was closer to the mountain and because my brother was also a guerilla, they started from there. They burned the houses with its animals in it. I don't know how morning came without any sleep. In the morning I went and checked their village and saw a new group of soldiers came. They told me that 'terrorists' burned the village. We said they don't have tanks or long-range guns to burn down a village. There were still smoke coming from the houses. I saw my sister in the smoke; she was looking for the animals. The fence was broken and all the animals left. I said the animals were also gone to the mountains! I saw elder people hide in a house and peed in their pants

because they were afraid a lot. They took my uncle and killed him with torture. Then we saw it on news, they told that a 'terrorist' was killed, but my uncle was a father of 5 children and was not related with PKK. There were no one from PKK that night, it was not a conflict, it was one sided raid (In her house, İstanbul, 11.05.2010).

Gozike mentioned that they could not even get some food for the children when they were displaced from one of the villages of Diyarbakır. She told me that,

Soldiers burned down the house. Nothing left behind, neither a spoon nor a piece of bread. They put everything inside and burned the whole house. I could save my life and left only with my clothes on me. It was 6 a.m. and they did not come before to warn us. I begged them just to take a piece of bread for my children but they took that piece from my hand and throw it in the fire. My uncle brought us to İstanbul. We were miserable. We had no money, nothing... (In Kardelen Laundry House, Diyarbakır, 23.06.2010).

Almost all interviewees expressed that the destination city was decided by their husbands and mostly it is the city to which their husbands came went for business before the displacement. This city was also chosen because of the relatives that came before. In this regard we can argue that when displacements occurs, families wanted to have a connection with other relatives and/or friends as it is a "chain migration", although in this type, displaced families did not choose to leave their homelands, but were forced to leave.

Children of the displaced Kurdish population also experienced difficulties and had traumas because of the displacement and the incidents that happened before, during and after displacement. As aforementioned, young women like men, prefer to participate into the non-state armed groups because they have experience displacements, poverty and marginalization. They face the violence and murder of their families in front of them (AI 2004b:58). This is the case for the women in the PKK branch. As Gulalp mentions,

I witnessed the abuse of my mother and sister. I saw the torture that they made to my father. Two of my brothers participated into the ranks of the PKK. I was working in a journal that was known as the sympathizer of the organization. I also experienced torture under custody that I never want to remember. I was sentenced twice. The first one was because of the support of the non-state armed group members and the second one was because of being a member of the organization (In GÖÇ-DER NGO, İstanbul, 12.05.2010).

One of the mothers of a female guerrilla, Mexmork from Dersim, told me that her daughter participated into the organization when she was 12 years old just because of the pain that she witnessed. She expressed that,

In 1985 they (state security forces) came to our village and took all men named as Azad. My husband's name is also Azad and they took him just because of his name. They beat my husband in front of his children. I still hear the screams of my children. My husband stayed under custody and was tortured for 36 days long. When they let him out, I could not recognize him. All the ways of torture... Then they called as 'terrorists', as if we beat them in front of their children. These were the reasons that made my daughter participate into the PKK, when she was just 12 years old (In Peace Mothers NGO, İstanbul, 22.07.2010).

6.4. General Evaluation on Women's Memoirs of Their Homelands

In this chapter, retrospective analysis has been made to the women's daily lives before displacement. According to this, women's lives before security problems began were relatively safe and convenient in the villages. After the security problems began, they started to live difficulties and they faced oppression and pressure from the state security forces when they needed to support non-state armed group members. Living in the conflict zones was grueling for these women because it was always a war-like situation in the villages. Some of the women had close relationships with the guerillas, but on the other hand some women even did not see one guerilla in their villages. Whether they had relations or not with the non-state armed group members, these women were displaced and started to live in extreme poverty in the city centers with their families. In the cities, they did not only face problems because of the alienation of the cities for women, but also there was a class regress for most of the women as while they were living in relatively wealthy situation in the villages, they have become urban poor in the city centers. Except for the ones that had their own children in the organization, women that have relations with the non-state armed groups were usually the ones that had a husband related with the organization. They were giving food, let them stay and rest in the house and met some other needs such as shower, etc.

Women in my study mystified female guerillas occasionally and considered them as the heroines of the Kurdish struggle. They mentioned that everything positive including gender equality was learned from the leader of the PKK and he gave rise for the emancipation of

Kurdish women. The interviewees regarded the state as the reason of their displacement and deemed state security forces as the major enemies of the Kurdish nation. Because of this situation, they rejected the village guard system and considered the village guards as the betrayers of the Kurdish nation. According to them, village guards are fighting against their own brothers and kill Kurds just to be legitimated by the state. They explained that, although everybody who rejected being village guards was displaced from their homelands, the ones who took guns from the state and started to fight against non-state armed groups stayed in their homelands. They also benefited from the empty houses and unused agriculture fields of the villages and then became rich. These statements are very similar to the Kurd's displacement history after the establishment of the Turkish Republic. In those years, the strategy was the same and the families that helped the state remained in their homelands, whereas the ones that rejected helping were displaced to the western parts of Turkey.

As mentioned before, the Turkish state's counter-insurgency strategy has not changed since the East Reform Plan, which was established in 1925. From the very beginning of the Kurdish insurgencies, internal displacement has been used as a strategy against the Kurdish population. Although the displacement strategy was argued to be used as an integration policy and the aim was to have a homogenous population in Turkey ready for the Kemalist reforms, opposition viewpoints to the dominant nationalist ideology argues that these strategies were towards the assimilation of the Kurdish population. Beginning from the first Kurdish insurgency, families that were involved in the struggles have been displaced from their homelands and the ones that helped the state for the counter-insurgency were allowed to stay and gained benefits from their help. The village guard system was a way to help the state in their counter-insurgency strategy by fighting against the PKK through the 1990s. Villagers that did not accept village guard system were displaced in this process. This displacement was consequences of the will to punish the villagers, to cut the logistic support from the villages to the PKK and to clean the area from the Kurdish population in order to fight against the non-state armed group members more effectively. In sum, history has repeated itself again and again in Turkey on the issue of Kurds and the strategy of the counter-insurgencies.

CHAPTER VII

KURDISH WOMEN'S EXPERIENCES IN THE CONFLICT-INDUCED INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT

In the first part of this chapter, some of the internally displaced Kurdish women's marginalization situations after the displacement process will be examined. In the second part, the empowering effects of the experiences that some of the women face in the cities will be evaluated as compatible with the research question. A different understanding of conflict-induced internally displaced Kurdish women's position in the cities will be proposed as based on the research question of the study; "What kind of experiences do the women go through during the internal displacement process and what is the importance of these experiences for women's empowerment?"

As mentioned before, according to the essentialist feminists, women are inherently peaceful and are the victims of conflicts. Men, on the contrary, are the ones who start the conflicts and it is thought men are the describers of the conflicts and women are the ones who are affected by them because of their passive victim position. Women are also seen as the ones who try to stop the conflicts because of their peacefulness, which comes from women's motherhood capabilities (Elshtain 1987: 165). Women are seen as dependent beings and this takes us to the protector and protected dichotomy, which is a relationship of inequality (Pettman 1996:99). Besides, because women are seen as inherently peaceful and victims of conflicts, their rights are undermined and their acts are depoliticized (Hunter cited in Mason 2005: 739). Feminist IR Theorists are the leading feminists that deconstruct the women and peace relationship.

Throughout the study, by accepting that women are victims of conflict from a social constructivist approach, Ertürk's (2008) point of view is used, which is based on the assumption that women are not always the victims of the conflicts, but also they have a potential to develop active agency. Women's victimization is different than that of male civilians and is reinforced by patriarchy. Women are not victimized in times of conflict because they are vulnerable and weak beings, but because of the patriarchal gender relations that control women in both the public and private spheres and violence are used to stabilize

this power asymmetry. In other words, after the displacement process, women do not always remain in the victimized situation and become marginalized in the city centers, but they may also develop active agency and become empowered after their displacement. Çağlayan et al. (2011: 69) similarly mentioned that, considering internally displaced women only as victims may hide their coping and resisting strategies and also their subjectivities that were able to develop in the cities. Therefore, marginalization after displacement is not a frozen situation for women. There is always a possibility for them to transform their marginalization position into empowerment and it is also possible for them to develop active agency in this process.

In the first part of the chapter, the effects that marginalize Kurdish women in the process of displacement will be evaluated. There are basically two aspects of marginalization of women in the cities after they have been internally displaced. The first aspect is the social exclusion of women in the cities because they are Kurdish. The second aspect is focused on increased patriarchal relations within the displaced families. In other words, the first aspect is based on the ethnic dimension, whereas the second one is based on the gender dimension of the displaced Kurdish women in the cities. According to Rowlands (1997: 112) there are some inhibiting factors of empowerment, which are “machismo, fatalism, active oppression by partner, health problems, ‘poverty’, dependency, lack of control over use of time, lack of control over fertility/constant childbearing, childcare obligations, and male control over income”. In this respect, dependency, poverty and inadequate healthcare indicators are taken as “social exclusion”³⁰ factors from Rowlands’s theory. On the other hand, lack of control on fertility, childcare obligations and male control over income factors will be used in the analysis of women’s gender-based discrimination after displacement.

Apart from the fact that, Kurdish women are victims of the internal displacement in particular and the ongoing internal armed conflict in general, some women in the study may have developed active agency in the city centers, basically as results of their political engagement and also their work outside houses. As aforementioned, active agency is a result of the autonomy of the individual. Autonomy is basically the basis of a self-definition (Jaggar 1983: 44) and as Meyers (1989 cited in Govier 1993: 109) mentions, self-respect and self-esteem are necessary conditions for autonomy. After having self-esteem, it is possible for the internally displaced women to become ready to be active agents and as the next step; they may get empowered in the cities. In this study, empowerment is defined as the start for

³⁰“Social exclusion is a process whereby certain individuals are pushed to the edge of society and prevented from participating fully by virtue of their poverty, or lack of basic competencies and lifelong learning opportunities, or as a result of discrimination” (Adaman and Keyder 2006: 6).

women “to realize their own worth and contributions in their families, which has potential to make women demand power and take action towards changing the structured gender inequality in society” as Erman et al. (2002: 396) explains alongside with Sharma’s (1991-1992 quoted in Batliwala 1994: 130) definition which is “a range of activities from individual self-assertion to collective resistance, protest and mobilization that challenge basic power relations”. In sum, empowerment of women refers to the challenges of the existing patriarchal structure, which is based on the women’s subordination and men’s domination and the will to transform the existed structures and institutions, such as family, class, religion, ethnicity, education, media, laws and civil codes, governmental institutions, etc., which reproduces the gender discrimination and social inequality.

The aspect of this study’s contribution to the existing theory is coming into existence as making a differentiation between the women’s “empowerment to cope” and women’s “empowerment to change” (Ertürk 2010) situations after they were internally displaced. Women’s “empowerment to cope” situation refers to the women’s strategies that they developed for coping with the challenges of everyday life in order to survive and the latter one is for the collective agency in order to change the patriarchal gender order. Indicators of the “empowerment to cope” and “empowerment to change” situations were developed in and by the study.

In the second part of the study, not only the empowerment of women is discussed, but also internally displaced Kurdish women’s political activity and their gender awareness will be evaluated in relation with their empowerment situation. As mentioned before, throughout the study, women’s inherent victim and marginalization positions in the armed conflicts and internal displacements are rejected and it is argued that, there may be a potential for women to spark active agency and develop empowerment even in the worst situations.

7.1. Ethnic-Based Marginalization: Increased Social Exclusion of Women after Displacement

Some of the internally displaced Kurdish women may become socially excluded in the cities after they have been displaced from their homelands. This exclusion is mainly based on their ethnic discrimination as a consequence of the language barrier. Some women may also be marginalized because they are illiterate and they become dependent on other people. They are also negatively affected by poverty and have had difficulties because of the inadequate

health care that they and their children face in the city centers. Because of poverty, women have had to work in informal and uninsured jobs just like their husbands. These social exclusion indicators will be defined in this sub-chapter and the relationship between women's political engagement and their social exclusion will be examined, in order to introduce how political engagement affects women's experiences in the city centers after they have been internally displaced.

7.1.1. Dependency of Kurdish Women in the Cities

As mentioned before, from a social constructivist point of view, women's victimization in times of conflict and internal displacement is not denied. As Rowlands (1997) mentions, dependency is one of the indicators of social exclusion for women. Starting from this assumption, in this study it is argued that some of the internally displaced Kurdish women may socially excluded, first of all, because they are dependent based on their linguistic and illiteracy barriers as well as their immobile situation in the city centers. Although men have previous experiences in and about the city life, as they were moving back and forth between rural and urban areas before the conflict, the experience of the urban is a new phenomenon for internally displaced Kurdish women. It is an alien setting and it brings a new definition to the private and public areas. They have to organize their new way of life, which is based "on the new ways of doing things" (Gökalp 2007: 211). As Kaya (2009: 140) mentions, migration changes women's lives in a rapid and irreversible way. In cities, women's lives are stricter; they have less communication and less sharing with the people outside of their families. In cities women may remain outside the public life and are imprisoned at home. Some of the women may experience more pressure on them from the male relatives in the cities than in their village lives, because it is harder for men to control women in such an alienated place.

Kurdish women also face problems because of their illiteracy issue. Because they do not speak Turkish, they cannot find jobs and socialize with non-Kurdish citizens in the cities and it is likely for them to face a hostile environment (Çelik 2005: 144). The majority of the internally displaced Kurdish women in the study did not know Turkish when they came to the cities, because they could not attend schools in the villages. Their school attendance prevention has mainly two reasons; first of all, there were no schools in most of the villages in their school age period and if there was a school close to their village it was mostly attended by boy children, who were preferred by families to be educated. Secondly, as

mentioned before, even if the village had a school, it was considered unnecessary for Kurdish female children to be educated because of the early marriages and these children were needed for the domestic duties to help their mothers in the crowded households. Kurdish women were, on the other hand, traditionally obedient first to their fathers and then to their husbands when married at the age of 13-15. Hence, the female children's education was unnecessary. If Kurdish men could not go to school in their early ages, in the compulsory military service period, it was obligatory for them to learn Turkish and how to read and write.

Internally displaced Kurdish women have faced many problems in the cities especially in the early years of their migration. First of all, because of the trauma that they experienced, they were afraid of the state and could not go out easily from their homes in the cities. They also experienced trust problems to the Turkish people. Because of these reasons, they were afraid to go somewhere by themselves, because they do not speak Turkish, they could not explain their health problems to the doctors, which has also caused discriminatory attitudes of the doctors towards Kurdish women and they experienced self-confidence problems. They have always been dependent on someone who knows Turkish. Some of them continued not to speak Turkish although they know how to, because of their hatred for Turks and some of them could not even learn Turkish because of the stress that they lived in the process of the displacement. Learning Turkish was such a forced situation for some of these women, in other words it was coercion for them in order to survive in the cities. Interviewees defined their problems because of lack of language as following. These problems were worse, if women had to struggle by themselves as female head of household.

Leven lives in İstanbul and came to the city by herself with her children because her husband was in jail in 1995. According to her,

There are a lot of Kurds in our neighborhood now, but when we first came, for example I wanted to buy bread from the market and called it as 'nan' (Kurdish) and he said 'get out from my store', I was showing with my finger but he was telling me 'go and learn Turkish'. In the street market, they were asking, 'how many kilograms', but I could not tell, because I did not know what kilogram meant... (In her house, İstanbul, 14.05.2010).

As aforementioned, conflicts have increased the number of the female headed households. These women have to undertake new roles, such as economic duties different than before.

This leads women face negative consequences and look after their dependent family members. Similarly, Kevz explains the difficulties and how she was miserable when she was displaced from her village by herself in 1992. Her husband was a runaway when she first came to Mersin and she had to deal with the problems alone. Migrating to a city center alone caused self-distrust, which also brought psychological problems and also dependency on other people. As she mentioned,

I did not know Turkish and had many difficulties. For example, I wanted to buy something but could not know if it is the right thing or not. I cried a lot, I was very shy. Sometimes I came back home without buying anything. My children were very young. We did not have bread, we did not have our head of household, and we had nothing. We did not have our "owner" with us when we came to Mersin (In her house, Mersin, 27.05.2010).

Even if some of the women were not alone when they were displaced, it was still possible for them to face dependency problems because of the language barriers. Nefel also describes her dependency as following,

I always go to hospital with my daughter because my Turkish is not enough to explain my health problems. I also always do my shopping from Kurdish owned markets in the neighborhood. I never go out from the neighborhood and if I have to, I can never go out alone (In her house, Mersin, 05.08.2010).

Besides the language barrier, women also had to deal with their illiteracy in the cities. As mentioned before, different than men, women did not know how to read and write. Most of the women in the study still do not know how to read and write although they have learned Turkish from their children or neighbors. After displacement, illiteracy problem with lack of language brought many obstacles for some of the women and made them more likely to be socially excluded relative to internally displaced Kurdish men in the cities. They mentioned that, they do not feel free in the cities because they even do not know which bus they should take to go home. That is why they usually shop from the markets in the neighborhood, which are owned by Kurdish men and which may bring "neighborhood imprisonment" for these women for the rest of their lives in the cities. Ta from Mersin, who had to work in the textile industry in order to help her family economically, talked about the difficulties of being illiterate below.

I am not literate. I could not go to school after we were displaced. I had difficulties because of this. I had to go to work with my friends because I did not know which bus I should take. One day, they stopped coming with me to work and I did not know how to go back home. I waited a couple of hours and then I started to walk. I had to walk home. Then I learned the buses according to their colors. I sometimes got on the wrong bus. I had to change the buses several times. I could not ask because people humiliated me as we (Kurds) were ignorant and should have learned reading and writing” (In her mother’s house, Mersin, 27.05.2010).

Givzong also expressed below that without knowing how to read and write living in a city is difficult and it is a kind of social exclusion.

I face difficulties whenever I get on a bus, whenever I go to the shopping, whenever I go to the doctors because I do not know how to read and write. I go wherever a Kurd goes or I have to take someone with me everywhere. We go shopping all together. In the last 30 years, this neighborhood is like our village. I rarely go out from the neighborhood (In her house, Mersin, 06.08.2010).

Most of the internally displaced Kurdish women are immobile because of their linguistic barrier and illiteracy. They usually stay in their neighborhood and talk to their Kurdish neighbors all day long. They shop from the Kurdish owned markets. Although they live in the cities, they seem to be facing lifelong imprisonment in their neighborhoods. They are dependent on other people who know Turkish and who are literate. Their helpers are usually their children who are educated in the schools. This is the reason for them to move collectively in the cities. Women usually wait for their children to go to the doctors if they are especially living in the western parts of Turkey because in the east and southeast of Turkey, some of the doctors know Kurdish and women do not live the same difficulties and are not discriminated against, as will be explained later.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, because Kurdish women are immobile and depend on other people, they do not feel free in the cities. Although it seems like women are under pressure both in their villages and in the city centers, they still prefer to be in the villages, because they were “deterritorialized”, which also brought not only loss of homelands, but also loss of the feelings of belonging to a community and loss of a secure environment. Most of the women feel themselves as exiled and want to go back their homelands.

7.1.2. Discrimination of Kurdish Women in City Life

Another difficulty that internally displaced Kurdish women face in the cities is their discrimination. As mentioned before, there has been a discriminatory attitude towards the Kurdish population in Turkey since the establishment of the Republic. Since the last insurgency of the Kurds, this discrimination has increased. Kurds have been denied to be an ethnic group and then throughout the 1990s, the ethnicity was recognized but the discriminatory attitudes continued. They have been accused of being “separatist” and their forced migration to the western parts of Turkey have been evaluated as an invasion. As Bora (2006 cited in Saracoğlu 2009: 641) mentioned, attitudes and exclusive language towards Kurds have become more extreme in last ten years. This exclusiveness can be summarized as “culturally backward”, “intrinsically incapable of adapting to the modern city life”, “naturally criminal”, “violent” and “separatist”. Women in the study mentioned that whenever they leave their neighborhood that is full of Kurds, they face ethnic-based discrimination in other parts of the city in which they live. According to Çağlayan et al. (2011: 157), internally displaced people prefer to live in the same neighborhood as a coping strategy towards the discriminatory attitudes. These neighborhoods are “inter-space places” for women between their villages and the city centers that give the trusted environment after the displacement process to internally displaced women. Women that live in İstanbul after displacement experience the discriminatory attitudes more, whereas women living in Diyarbakır do not recognize it that much. This difference is because the majority of the population in Diyarbakır is composed of Kurds and the city is considered to be the capital of “Kurdistan” by Kurds. Diyarbakır is the largest city in the south-east of Turkey and Turks are only the 20% of the whole population (Demirer 2012: 43). There is a wide historical background that connects Kurdish identity to the city starting from the Sheikh Said insurgency in 1925, as being the final destination of the rebels, to the 1980 military coup as being the hometown of the famous number-five military prison.³¹ The importance of Diyarbakır emerges from being the corner stone of the historical events for the Kurds. This situation still continues in nowadays and the city has become the representative of the Kurdish identity for both Kurds and also Turks (Demirer 2012: 49-50). Still, everybody except Turkish officers and civil servants that were appointed in the city knows Kurdish.

³¹ In the “Kürtmüşüz” memory-narrative book of Necmettin Salaz the torture and bad-treatment in the number-five military prison is well-defined. According to Salaz (2010), some of the bad-treatment examples in the prison were as such; Kurdish speaking ban, including for the visitors, leaving the prisoners thirsty and hungry, nonstop torture, painful contact with the visitors, anguished transfer to the courts, etc.

My interviewees mentioned that, they mostly face ethnic-based discrimination³² in the hospitals and other governmental agencies, especially if they are living in İstanbul and Mersin. In Diyarbakır, women mentioned that everybody knows the ethnicity of the doctors and prefer to go Kurdish doctors instead of Turkish ones working in the area. They all are aware of the ethnic-based discrimination and have a story to tell about it. Some of the women who are also politically engaged respond and resist on personal bases, but some others do not respond to the discriminatory attitudes and as they reject going to the hospitals, they become socially excluded more. Discriminatory attitudes are mostly mentioned in the early years of the women's displacement, which corresponds to the 1990s and also the linguistic barrier is an important factor for experiencing ethnic-based discrimination. But this does not mean that ethnic-based discrimination ended in their later years of migration. On the contrary, this is one of the indicators of women's increased coping strategies as they stay longer in the city centers.

Berbiro, living in İstanbul told me a discrimination story that she experienced in a hospital about two years ago. She is now working as co-president of the pro-Kurdish political party in a township and is also a mother of a guerilla. These two positions make her politically active in the society, which also leads to her increased personal coping ability. Although she could not talk in Turkish fluently, she was able to struggle with the doctor instead of leaving the hospital.

Two years ago I went to doctor. I could not talk in Turkish. He told me 'go, learn Turkish and then come back' and asked me how long I had been in İstanbul. I answered 13 years. Then he asked me if I was here for 13 years why I hadn't learned yet. I told him I could understand but not talk. He again told me that I had to learn Turkish first then I could go to hospital. We had a fight in the hospital and the security guards took me outside. I went to another doctor later (In her house, İstanbul, 21.07.2010).

Similarly Lilaq, living in İstanbul expressed her discrimination experience in a hospital. She could not resist the doctor's attitude, as she is a politically detached woman. I could understand her political detachment from her expressions about their displacement as "fate" instead of a consequence of the ongoing Kurdish issue, although the reason of their

³²Ethnic-based discrimination "refers to processes of discrimination founded upon ethnicity, perceived 'racial' distinctions, culture, religion or language"
www.vichealth.vic.gov.au/~media/.../ResearchSummary_Discrimination.ash (accessed on 20 April 2012).

displacement and/or escape from the village was the village guard oppression that her husband did not accept. After a long torture period, he could not stay in the village and escaped one night with his family to İstanbul. She mentioned her desperation in front of the doctor as following:

One day we were in the hospital with my husband's sister, who knows Turkish. She was first in the doctor's office and when she came out; she said I should not go inside. But I went. He was an old man. He told me to get undressed. I said sorry but I can't. He told me if they did not be sorry for us, we would not be spoiled. He said "you kill us, come here and then say I am sorry". I immediately put on my coat and ran away. For example, our neighbors are Turk and they have never come to our house. They know our house but they do not come. They know we are Kurdish. We even do not say "hello" to each other. We do not chat. However, we are sisters in religion (In her relative's house, İstanbul, 13.05.2010).

From Lilaq's statements, we can clearly understand the difference between the attitudes of politically engaged and detached women from their coping strategies and personal resistance. Instead of resisting the doctor's discriminatory attitudes, Lilaq escaped from the hospital. In this respect, political engagement is a result of the collective trauma that has raised politization that based on upon Kurdish identity.

Adorok, who was a female head of household when she first came to Diyarbakır from a village, gives an extreme example of discrimination against the Kurdish population in the hospitals.

My younger daughter got very sick and I took her to hospital by foot. I had very little money. I wanted to buy medicine with this money. We did not need insurance or green card³³ in the village. The officer told me that the number for the row is 50 kuruş (approximately 25 cents), I only got 26 kuruş. I begged them to give me the number and told him that I don't have my husband with me. He asked me why my husband was in jail. I could not answer because I did not know that much Turkish. I could understand but could not reply. I told them they (state security forces) took my husband from home and then burned down my house. He told me we were fighting against the state and then came and begged help from the state. And told me I could not get a number. I had to take

³³ The green card system is a law in Turkey that is applied to poor people for free health care.

my daughter back home and bought some simple medicines from the pharmacy. In three days, unfortunately my daughter died in my arms (In Peace Mothers NGO, Diyarbakır, 25.06.2010).

Adorok mentioned that, not the displacement process or poverty, but her desperate position made her politically active, which is also based upon a Kurdish identity. Since that incident she with her children, who witnessed their sister's death, have been struggling for the Kurdish rights. It is not wrong to argue that, these extreme discriminatory attitudes against Kurds have caused a collective trauma and made women realize and strengthen their ethnic identity, although they were aware of it before their displacement, which as a result, made these women politically engaged in the Kurdish movement. Not only in the hospitals, but also in the neighborhoods women face discriminatory attitudes from other people living there. For example Xaç Darik mentioned that when they first came to İstanbul, she could not even talk in Kurdish with her children in the streets of her neighborhood.

My neighbors warned me when I talked in Kurdish with my children in the street. They told me that I was living in İstanbul and they said 'talk in Turkish lady'. My children did not know Turkish, I had to talk in Kurdish and it was our mother tongue. We were ashamed of our Kurdishness. Everybody discriminated against us when we talked in Kurdish. For example we could not talk in Kurdish in the buses. We were going and coming quietly. We were hiding in the city we could not tell anyone that we were Kurdish because they consider us as 'terrorist'. They consider every Kurd as 'terrorist' (In her house, İstanbul, 11.05.2010).

Besides hospitals and neighborhoods, women also face discrimination in their work places. Sometimes the bosses, sometimes the co-workers and sometimes the customers show the negative attitudes towards the Kurdish women and it does not matter if the woman is old or young, educated or uneducated. Whenever people recognize women's Kurdishness, they start ethnic-based discriminatory attitudes. This is a fact that women still experience discriminatory attitudes although it has been almost 15-20 years since they came to the cities.

For example, Kevz expressed the ethnic-based discrimination that she faced when she first came to Mersin without her husband as she explained below. She told me that her husband is in jail for life and she needs money to look after her 4 children.

There was a factory close to the neighborhood. I knew it, I knew women were going there to work but I did not know

what and how to ask about this factory. One day I asked to a woman where she was working and she did not tell me. Another woman from Mersin told me about the factory and took me there. Others had a fight with that woman because she took me there. They did not want me there. They did not want me because of my husband's imprisonment and because I came from east. I cried a lot because I was very alone. They did not talk to me, they did not eat with me, and they discriminated against me just because I was Kurdish. They told me I was ignorant and Kurds have spoilt the city. They always stayed away from me. They did not even say hello to me. I still experience the same things. For example, I will go to an agriculture field to collect apricots tomorrow, but the security guard decides which women can enter into the field; they have not called me for one week. I complained to the owner of the agriculture field, who is Arabic and he got mad at the security guard and they had to call me at the end (In her house, Mersin, 27.05.2010).

Leven told me that she faced discrimination a lot both when she was working and when she was trying to get a green card from the governmental office as follows:

I was working in a restaurant. I worked there for a month. When the president went to Diyarbakır and made a statement as the Kurdish issue exists, my boss got very angry, he was from Black sea region. He talked to himself aloud the president would let 'the dog' (implying our leader) free one day. I said 'tu kuçu ki', which means you are the dog and threw the sponge that I had to his face and left the restaurant. He was always telling me 'Kürdooo'³⁴ work work work!'. He always humiliated me. One day I went to get a green card; I told them I was coming from Kurdistan and talked in Kurdish. One of the female officers said 'fuck off bitch, which mountain did you come from?', I started pulling her hair. They called police. I told them I did not know any Turkish and they had to find a translator. The government officer came out from his office. I was shouting out. He asked what was going on and they told him I did not talk in Turkish. He said 'maybe she does not know Turkish, is it forbidden? What are you doing to this poor woman?'. I told him I would go to the human rights association. I said I would not go without taking my green card. I said I would do a sitting protest in the middle of the governmental office. Then they gave me my green card in the same day (In her house, İstanbul, 14.05.2010).

³⁴ It is a pre-judicial term to call Kurds.

Gulalp, who works as a nurse in a private hospital in İstanbul, explained the negative attitudes of the patients when they find out that she is from Malatya and a Kurd as below.

Patients in the hospital always ask about our hometown. I one day had to look for the blood pressure of a person that stayed in the hospital. She asked me if I was Azerbaijani and I said no I am Kurdish. Then she got angry and told me that it was not necessary to tell that I was a Kurd. I told her that I only mentioned that I was Kurdish. The patient then asked me when I was leaving the hospital. I told her that my shift ends at 8 p.m. I could not easily go to this patient's room until she was discharged from the hospital. But sometimes the Kurdish patients are relieved when I tell them I am Kurdish (In GÖÇ-DER NGO, İstanbul, 12.05.2010).

The expressions of the interviewees above are examples for the ethnic-based discrimination that Kurdish women have faced after they started to live in the city centers. These discriminatory attitudes against Kurdish population have increased since 1990s with the rise of the internal armed conflict and battle-related deaths. Discriminatory attitudes have gone parallel with exclusive language towards Kurdish population, such as “violent”, “separatist”, etc. (Bora 2004 cited in Saracoğlu 2009: 641) and women have also shared these discriminatory language in the daily lives, sometimes even more than men, because they did not have any experience about the city life before and did not know any word in Turkish. This situation also reinforces the collective trauma and the development of the ethnic identity among Kurdish population including women.

7.1.3. Poverty and Inadequate Healthcare of Kurdish Women

Almost all of the displaced families, who were mostly living in wealth in their villages, have to live in extreme poverty in cities. This situation is because they had to leave their villages suddenly and did not have any time to be prepared, such as selling their livestock or agriculture fields, etc. This situation is also a class shift for the displaced families. In the cities, besides the ethnic discrimination attitudes, they have to struggle with this class regress. Some of the displaced women were living in wealth in their villages because they were wives or daughters of the village landlords, who had their own navies in their villages. This caused a major class shift for these women both socially and economically when they were displaced. Although they had workers in their villages, women had to work for other people in the cities. In the villages, they were living in relatively big houses with their

animals but in the cities some of the families had to do without even a house, but live in a shed. Some of them do not have vital household appliances such as, a refrigerator and washing machines in their homes. They live in poor neighborhoods, mostly composed of slum houses after the migration flows. These problems are also shown as the reasons of increased suicide rates among Kurdish women in the region (Halis 2002: 36).

Most of the Kurdish displaced women are placed in the urban poor category. In rural-urban migration studies, this situation of migrant women is called as “gendered poverty”. Although all the family members live in deprivation in urban settings, women’s situation is worse than everyone else because when their illiteracy and linguistic barrier are combined with the unemployment problem some young Kurdish women are forced into prostitution in the cities. As mentioned before, forced prostitution is also a consequence of the poverty, which is caused by conflict situation. Because the families that are displaced from their homelands to the city centers face extreme poverty, women are forced to do prostitution. For example Smbl (2005: 17-19) mentioned that, in some of the Eastern cities of Turkey, but especially in Diyarbakır, young women are forced to do prostitution after they were displaced from their villages in order to support their families. Women, who make prostitution in Diyarbakır, are mostly the ones from periphery districts of Diyarbakır. The age of prostitution starts from 13 and these young women are generally illiterate or elementary school graduates. On the other hand, some of them are forced by the male members in the family due to the economic deprivation that their family lives after displacement.

Mukaddes Alataş (Head of the Kardelen Solidarity Organization in Diyarbakır – personal communication on 22nd of June, 2010) confirms the arguments of Smbl (2005) and mentioned that,

There was a woman whose husband forced her to do prostitution with many men just for 10 TL (which is approximately 6 Dollars) she burned her hand by herself just to make men reject to have a relation with her.

Because displaced families mostly prefer the neighborhoods that are chosen by the previous Kurdish migrants as a form of “chain migration”, when internally displaced Kurdish women and their families first come to the cities, their relatives and/or friends helped them and brought some household stuff such as plates, old carpets, clothes, etc. As mentioned before, since their migration was forced and immediate, internally displaced families came to the cities without any stuff from their houses. Some of them even did not have time to put on

their shoes and left the village with their slippers. And because they had no money with them, they needed help from the people around. Their extreme poverty started from the day that they were exiled from their homelands.

Kevz explains the deprivation and poverty that she and her children experienced when they first came to Mersin without her husband as following:

When we came to Mersin, we had no money, nothing. We came even without shoes. Kurds were giving me small things. I collected bread from the garbage, washed and fed my children with them. I put some water in the pan and acted like cooking something. My children were waiting for the food, but always slept hungry. People in the neighborhood sometimes helped on Fridays (as it is the holy day in Muslim societies). We were living in a shed that had no house stuff in it. I was collecting carton papers for my children to sleep on and picking grass and filling sacks with them to use them as comforters. I had to stay all nights long awake in those years because rats were coming in and out from the so-called roof of the shed (In her house, Mersin, 27.05.2010).

Leven, who was also displaced without her husband and came to İstanbul with her children, told me that because only a Kurdish gang leader and the pro-Kurdish political party helped her and her children. Although she had a son in the PKK, she was staying away from politics because of her other young children, but after those helps of the political party she begun to work in the pro-Kurdish activities for Kurdish rights. Her story is a good example that shows the class shift that some of the displaced families experienced after displacement. Although she was living in wealth and helped poor villagers before she came to İstanbul, she started to collect breads from streets after her family was displaced.

When I came to İstanbul and moved to this neighborhood, there were no other Kurdish families. I rented a basement in a building. Our relatives did not help because they were afraid of us as they also had problems with the state security forces. One of my children was disabled because of the fire in the village. I was leaving my children in the basement and went out to search jobs. I was working in a chocolate factory, but I could not eat lunch because my children were hungry at home. I was crying a lot. One day a young man saw me and asked why I was crying. I told him I had nothing at home. No pillow, no cooker, nothing. He told me he was also Kurdish and patriotic for Kurdish nation. He helped me; he gave me the leftovers everyday to

take for my children. One day I got sick and he took me to the hospital. The roof was streaming and there were rats in the house. He told me to go to the pro-Kurdish political party but I was afraid for my children and did not go. When I was sick at home, a gang leader from Diyarbakir saw my daughter and asked her house. He came to our house and saw its condition. He rented us a normal apartment, a small television, he brought us some food. He gave us money, bought my medicine. He also told me to go to the pro-Kurdish political party and I started to go. They also helped me. He gave my rent, etc. Before that, I was collecting bread from streets. I was looking after poor people in the village. I was giving each of them a sheep. Now I am the one who is desperate in the city (In her house, Istanbul, 14.05.2010).

As mentioned by the Development Center Association (2010: 10), migrants have turned into unskilled people in the cities after their displacement because rural employment skills were not sufficient in urban life and this in turn makes these people impoverished in the cities. Because neither their husbands nor women can work in insured jobs and because they are working mostly in low-paid jobs, Kurdish women also face inadequate health care both for themselves and for their children. In order to cope with their own health care needs and those of other family members, displaced families mostly apply to the “green card” system. Most of the families who have gained the right to have a “green card” mentioned that they were threatened by the state authorities, that if they participated in demonstrations of the PKK, their green card would be cancelled. Some of the families could get a green card in the later years of their displacement. Some women do not have green card and mentioned that they go to the doctors if they have money and they do not go if they do not have enough money, although some of them have serious health problems. Berbiro, for example, has kidney disease but does not have a green card or health insurance. It can be argued that some of them are still dealing with post-traumatic stress disorder because of the internal displacement and loss of the loved ones and also emotional stress because of the inadequate integration into the city life and became more and more marginalized in the metropolis without adequate healthcare. Besides, displaced women sometimes have to pay for their husband’s or children’s participation into the Kurdish struggle, because the state do not give green card right to the women, who have close relatives in the non-state armed group.

Mexmork explains her green card experience as following:

I don't have health insurance. I took a green card once, but never used it. It is such a humiliation to have a green card,

because the doctors and nurses treat us very disparagingly. If I have a health issue and have money I go to the doctor, if I don't have money I don't go. I did not give birth in Istanbul, it just did not happen. Maybe I became infertile by myself (In Peace Mothers NGO, İstanbul, 22.07.2010).

Zehferan also told me that they do not give a green card to her because she was taken into custody and her husband is in jail.

I still do not have green card. I neither have insurance nor green card. I have not had my period for two years and I cannot go to a doctor. I am not even 40 years old. Something is wrong but they do not give me green card because my husband is in jail and I was taken under custody (In her relative's house, İstanbul, 21.07.2010).

7.1.4. Economic Participation of Kurdish Women and their Exploitation in Working Life

As aforementioned, women and girl children have to undertake new economic roles in times of displacement in order to support dependent family members. Women's double burden in the economic deprivation situation after displacement is a form of victimization for some of them because besides other difficulties that they face in the cities, they additionally have to struggle with the economic support of their families. Kurdish women's uneducation and illiteracy barriers put them in the urban poor category. Besides, almost all of them lack Turkish language, as there was not a single opportunity for them to learn Turkish before displacement. These situations make them work in uninsured and low-paid jobs in the cities, if it is really relevant for them to work outside house as it is traditionally inappropriate for Kurdish women to work. Kurdish women traditionally do not work outside home if their husbands are alive or are not sentenced. Only some of them work with their husbands in the agriculture fields out of the city centers as cheap labors on a daily-based salary, in order to cope with the situation of poverty that they live in the city centers. Kurdish women's working life will be explained in detail in the following chapter. But very briefly because of their burdens combined with the patriarchal traditions, young Kurdish children start working in the cities as cheap laborers. Child labor is paradoxical for Yılmaz (2007: 221), because on the one hand, it is one of the major incomes of the Kurdish migrant families, but on the other hand, it is an obstacle for them to educate their children, which may allow them to pass to a higher level of social strata and escape from social marginalization. On the other hand, as Arı

(2010: 36) mentions, these uneducated children probably stay unskilled and cheap labors in their further lives and their possibility to be caught up in the cycle of poverty is gets higher.

Internally displaced Kurdish children cannot continue their education in the cities mostly because of the extreme poverty that their families experience. Similarly Arı (2010: 20) mentions that, for the internally displaced families, poverty is not temporary, but permanent and in this poverty situation, children of these families “are at potential risk of inheriting this poverty”. These children had to stop their education because of the impoverishment that their families face in the cities after migration. “Although education is free of charge, hidden costs of education such as registration fee, school uniforms, transportation costs and educational equipments bring an extra burden on poor families’ budgets” (Arı 2010: 26). In order to cope with the families’ poverty situation, boy children start working as street vendors and girl children usually work in the textile industry. Kurdish girl children start working in the textile industry in their early ages like 8-10 in bad conditions with long working hours. They have to work 10-12 hours in the confection ateliers and face physical and sexual abuse from the other workers or from their bosses. Traditionally like women, girl children cannot work outside the home in the Kurdish culture but the families had to let their children work in the textile industry because of the poverty.

Ta, who was a child when her family was displaced from Diyarbakır, talked about her 8 years experience in the textile industry as following:

I could not make so much money from the job. But still the boss could fire me and find 10 more girls if you say something negative. I was 13 when I started working. I was doing 7 people’s work at the same time. My boss was humiliating me a lot. I was cooking, cleaning, giving the things to the machines, etc. He was abusing me whenever he wanted. He considered me as alone and also I was coming from east. I had to do whatever he told me. He did not give me extra working salary. There were no Turkish girls, we were all Kurds. Turks were Alevis, which do not make them full Turk. I worked for 8 years and in 5 different factories. We were working in very bad conditions like a slave. But everybody had to work because of their family’s situation (In her mother’s house, Mersin, 27.05.2010).

Gerendefel, who was also displaced from Bitlis province when she was a young girl, similarly explained the working conditions of the textile industry. She also mentioned the

harassment situation that she experienced, which she did not recognize because of her young age.

I worked for 6 years in the textile factory. I was going to work at 8.30 and go out at 7.30. Sometimes we had to stay until 9 or 11 p.m. and sometimes until morning. The bosses of the factory wanted me a lot. The first day, they called me upstairs and said that they wanted to come to my house and ask my parents for a marriage with their nephew. I said I was sorry I didn't want. They were disturbing me a lot. They were very into marrying those young girls with old men. For example, they give 10-15 thousand Turkish Liras (8000 dollars) and take 15 years old girls to 30 years old men. I was afraid a lot when I was going and coming back from the work. I was afraid because I was engaged with my husband in those years and prayed not to have an accident (she means rape) before the marriage (In her mother-in-law's house, İstanbul, 11.05.2010).

Not only the displaced women, but also the girl children have to undertake economic responsibilities. Instead of continuing their education, young Kurdish girl children have to work in textile industries in negative conditions, until they get married. As Çağlayan et al. (2011: 75) mentions, women in the textile industry have to quit working when they get married. When they get married, one of the support branches of the family is stopped, but as Gerendefel mentioned, because families get bride price for her daughters from the groom's family, they probably prefer their daughters' marriage instead of their work.

7.1.5. Relationship between Kurdish Women's Political Engagement and Activity and Their Social Exclusion in the Cities

Political engagement and activity may affect women's personal resistance against the discriminatory attitudes of the people around them. As they become more politically engaged, it is more possible for them to realize their discrimination is nothing to do with "fate", but because of the historical oppression of the Kurdish population in Turkey. Political engagement of the women is usually developed by the non-state armed group members even before their displacement from the villages. These members usually visit the villages and supply their needs from the villagers as they are at the same time trying to increase the consciousness of the villagers about the Kurdish issue. Villagers usually do not regret to help guerillas, as they are considered as the children of the Kurdish nation. As the women interviewees mentioned, there were sometimes 50 young Kurdish children who participated

in the PKK from the same village. In sum, villagers consider non-state armed members as their children and do not hesitate to help them.

Some of the women had closer relations with the non-state armed group members; some even had their own children in the PKK, while others did not even see guerillas in their villages. This difference among women may lead to their political engagement or detachment after their displacement. It is likely for women, who are politically engaged and active in the cities, to realize that the reason for their displacement was because of their relationship and support of the PKK members, but they have never regretted that. Because some of the women in the study are politically engaged and some of them are also politically active and fight for the Kurdish rights they are more likely to be able to resist the attitudes of discrimination and oppression towards themselves. In other words, politization that based upon Kurdish identity may be a consequence of the collective victimization process that Kurdish population faced for a long time. Notwithstanding, political engagement is mostly developed in the villages before the displacement, it cannot be wrong to argue that, some women may become politically engaged in the city centers. It is mostly because their children participate into the PKK after they were displaced to the cities and the family and sometimes the women find themselves in the Kurdish struggle immediately. It is also possible for these women to be surrounded with Kurdish struggle in the cities and find an opportunity to participate in the struggle more, relative to their villages, where women were in the strict boundries of the patriarchal relationships and where there were many family members that interfere in the lives of these women, which in other words means, women could not decide by their own. In this regard, some women participate in the activities organized by the pro-Kurdish political party and/or NGOs and start working for the Kurdish rights. But these kinds of cases are very rare, and almost there are no incidents similar to this in my study. It is more likely the women that have children and/or other close family members in the non-state armed group are politically engaged and active.

It can be argued from the interviews that social exclusion tends to be higher when the women's political engagement is lower. For example, some of the displaced women do not develop a personal resistance towards the discriminatory attitudes because they consider these incidents as their fate. Because they are unaware of the historical background of the Kurdish oppression and the reasons for the ongoing Kurdish struggle, they mostly do not have an ethnic and Kurdish identity politics. It is possible for them to become passive beings in the cities and unable to resist discriminatory attitudes. The more they get passive, the more

they may get socially excluded and marginalized and retire into themselves, which in turn results in a lack of self-assertiveness.

On the other hand, not only discrimination but also poverty may affect some of the interviewees more when they are politically detached. Some of the displaced women become more and more imprisoned in their houses and neighborhoods, do not become mobile and do not meet new people and organizations that may support them or give information about the available assistance. It is more possible for them to become socially excluded more and they may remain as the marginalized group members in the cities. They may become the victims of lifelong imprisonment in their houses, and when combined with their linguistic barrier and illiteracy, they may be left without any mediums to cope with their situations. It is possible for these women to become more dependent on the other people, which is also one of the major indicators of the social exclusion.

As mentioned by Çağlayan et al. (2011: 162-163), the pro-Kurdish political party is an effective socialization and empowerment medium for some of the internally displaced women. The more they get involved into the activities of the party; it is more possible for them to avoid social exclusion in the cities after displacement. Throughout my study, I observed that some of the internally displaced women who were politically detached are socially excluded and could do nothing to challenge this situation. It is needless to say, this position is not a fault of these women. They usually do not have a medium to challenge their situation in the cities. Internal displacement, as a victimization process, makes women more likely become socially excluded and prisoners of their neighborhoods relative to displaced men, who at least know Turkish and are literate. When this situation is combined with the prevalent patriarchal gender order within the society, it is more possible for some of the women to become totally marginalized in the cities. Their duty becomes only about the private sphere and they may not have any control on their fertility, which also brings other health issues for women. Increase in the patriarchal relationship within the internally displaced Kurdish families and how it affects women is the topic of the next sub-chapter.

7.2. Gender-Based Marginalization: Increased Patriarchal Relationships after the Displacement Process

In the previous sub-section, it is evaluated that ethnic-based discrimination against Kurdish women leads them to social exclusion and this is the one aspect of their marginalization. In

this sub-section increased patriarchal relations in some of the displaced families and its impact on women's marginalization will be examined. This aspect constitutes gender-based marginalization of Kurdish women in the cities. As Ertürk (2009) argues, threats on group boundaries and masculinities may subordinate women and cause further marginalization of women in the cities after displacement. Moreover, Rowlands (1997) mentions that, machismo (or patriarchy), lack of control over fertility/constant childbearing, childcare obligations and male control over income are the marginalization indicators for women.

7.2.1. Increased Partner Violence, Oppression and Control

As mentioned before, women in the villages before displacement experience violence, oppression, and control from their male, as well as, female relatives. After displacement, this violence, oppression, and control on some of the women may increase in the cities, as a result of being in an alienated environment. It is possible for men to control their wives and other female relatives more because unlike their villages, cities are "full of danger" and except some of the relatives and friends in the neighborhood, nobody knows each other very well like they do in the villages. Similarly, Him and Gündüz-Hoşgör (2011: 342) mention that, "protecting *namus*³⁵ requires closer surveillance in the cities because of the proximity of strangers, the ambiguity of group boundaries, and an environment of insecurity resulting from displacement and the loss of community". Besides, as argued before, displacement disrupts the everyday life of the families, and women and girls become the targets of patriarchal control, which brings domestic violence (Ertürk 2008). Domestic violence in conflict times is normalized because the legitimized violence in the conflict zones reinforces the violence at home (Ertürk 2009). Domestic violence is the result of the presence of weapons at home, the experience of violence by the male family members and the reflection of it to the other family members, lack of jobs, shelter and basic services and the economic difficulties (Rehn and Sirleaf 2002: 16-17). Domestic violence is one of the major victimization and marginalization effects for women in times of conflict and in the process of internal displacement as mentioned before.

According to the traditions, the oldest Kurdish male member of the family, who comes from the male blood, holds the authority and respectability is defined with the age. There are different hierarchies for men and women and the spheres of actions are separated for different sexes. Men confiscate women's labor and reproduction capacity when she is

³⁵ "Namus" means honor in Turkish.

married (Kandiyoti 1997 cited in Çağlayan 2007: 38). The patriarchal system among Kurds is a cultural association-style way of social organization, an Islamic style of living, a male order, a way to show the class power and a composition of tribe, feudal and traditional styles of living (Çağlayan 2007: 40), which is basically based on the notion of “honor”. The one who is responsible for this honor is the oldest male in the family. Kurdish women’s status is defined according to their age, marital status and their integration into the family, whether it is by marriage or by birth. The status of women is highest when the women’s age gets older and the status is lowest when women get married and join her husband's family (Çağlayan 2007: 41-42). Besides, as mentioned before, displacement does not affect patriarchal relationships within the family and it remains same after the migration process. Gender hierarchy remains among the family members, which puts women in a disadvantageous position. The different labor positions cannot be obtained for women and women do not usually work in a paid labor in the cities. Because the work load in the household decreases in the cities related to villages, being a housewife becomes a status for women (Çağlayan 2007: 46-47).

It is more likely for the husbands of the displaced Kurdish women use the mediums of patriarchy, such as violence, oppression and control over women and the other family members in order to hold the power on the family members after displacement process. For example, Simbol did not want me to record her voice during the interview because she was afraid of her husband. She told that her husband’s psychology got worsen since they were displaced. He gets mad easily and beats her all the time. She told me that, this situation occurred after he was tortured by the state security forces (In Günışığı Charity House, Diyarbakır, 24.06.2010). This statement is one of the major examples of the increased control on women in the cities.

Mexmork also mentioned that she experienced domestic violence because she was going to the pro-Kurdish political party, after they were displaced from their village to İstanbul. As will be explained in detail later, political engagement may also become very effective on the struggle with the violence that women face within their families. She told that,

Of course I experience domestic violence as every woman. Although men argue that they are freedom fighters, they are all king at their own houses. The reason of the domestic violence was my participation into the activities of the pro-Kurdish political party. I also struggle with this. Because, not only for the Kurdish rights, but also I fight for the

women's rights. I now try to convince my husband gently, I don't argue with him anymore. I am conscious now because I have attended to the activities of the political party. He is afraid because of the violence that he faced from the state security forces (In Peace Mothers NGO, İstanbul, 22.07.2010).

Not only violence but also oppression, authority and control are likely increase in some of the displaced families. As mentioned before, the authority in the families were the older family members especially fathers-in-law. But after displacement because of the family separations, husbands have become the authority in the nuclear families and some of the interviewees mentioned that oppression in the cities towards women and girl children has increased. On the other hand, some of the displaced men that attended the village meetings of the non-state armed group and realized the gender equality, are considered to become relatively more egalitarian in the cities as they got free from the oppression and control of their fathers and mothers in the village life. But this situation is relatively rare among the interviewees. Most of the interviewees mentioned that the last word in decision-making is always the father's and/or husband's because he is the authoritarian figure in the home. Ta mentions that her husband controls her every move, although they are comparatively a young couple among the other interviewees. She expresses that,

I always do whatever my husband tells me. I can't go to the places I want. Turkish women are not like this, they have their own social lives. They do not have to bear the things they do not want; they have their own salaries and order. But it is not same for Kurdish women. They have family oppression, they don't have insurance, they don't know human rights, they don't know any other world, the only thing Kurdish women know is her family, mother and husband. They do not have any other life except these structures. For example, my husband has a textile factory but they do not let women work from their own family. I can only go to my mother's house but nowhere else. I cannot go anywhere without taking permission from him. If he lets me go to shopping, I cannot go alone. I can only go with his sister, mother or with my children (In her mother's house, Mersin, 27.05.2010).

Men still control the displaced family members, especially women, even when they are serving life sentences in prison. One of the female heads of household in the study mentioned that, she cannot visit her husband in prison by herself and although she is working as a domestic cleaner in Mersin and earns her own money, she always takes his permission when she starts a new house to clean. In some of the families, patriarchal relationships are so

prevalent that, the husbands are the authority although they are absent in the house. In other words, because the city environment is an alienated sphere for the displaced families, men tend to increase their control on women, even when they are not physically available in the households. As a female head of household for 20 years Kevz mentioned that,

My husband is sentenced to life and has moved to several prisons. He did not let me visit him by myself. I always go either with his family members or with my children. For example, he did not see my daughter's husband but he let her marry because he knew the family before. They were also from our village and were displaced right after us. I cannot go anywhere in Mersin by myself only the houses that I go for cleaning. I usually go to the same houses, but when I go to a new one, I always ask his permission. Because he knows that I go to the agriculture field, I do not ask his permission for it any more (In her house, Mersin, 27.05.2010).

In this regard, as mentioned before, being a female head of a household may become a victimization process for women, because of the increased responsibilities. In the case of the conflict-induced internal displacement process, it may also be a marginalization process for women. Although, it is possible for some of the women to develop coping strategies with the negative experiences that they face in the cities, some of them are still under the control of their husbands, in spite of the fact that the husbands are away from the house. Women may also be under the control of the other male relatives if their husband is dead or sentenced. It is likely the case if the women are politically detached in the cities after displacement.

Because of the husband's oppression and control, some of the displaced Kurdish women cannot travel around and live a life-long imprisonment in their neighborhoods. Increased control and oppression after displacement may make them marginalized more in the cities. Gozike explains that she cannot go anywhere although her husband works abroad. He always holds his control on his wife and the children in the family and calls and asks to his son what his mother does every time. She mentioned that, she went to a Kurdish protest once and lied to her children by saying that she went to the street market, but she said that she did not know the aim of the protest. She went to the activity just to go out from the house and see around. She said she did not do anything but just sat at the corner and watched people. She went back home with the group that the pro-Kurdish political party organized and did not tell her husband about this activity. She attends the activities of the pro-Kurdish party

municipality's laundry house that is located in her neighborhood, but she never goes out of the neighborhood. She mentioned that,

I want to work, but my husband does not let me. He is very religious. He can never accept such a thing. He lets my older daughter work but he doesn't let me. We have nothing at home, even a refrigerator, we really need money. I always come to the activities at this center just to be out of house. I never listen to the things they tell in the seminars. He says there are bad things happening in Diyarbakır and does not let my daughters hang around. I also can only come to the laundry house. He always calls and asks to my sons. He gets angry if he cannot find me at home. I cannot go anywhere. I sometimes sit in front of our house with my neighbors. Our village was beautiful; at least I could go to the plateau, gardens, etc. I can only stay in front of our house that is all (In Kardelen Laundry House, Diyarbakır, 23.06.2010).

Not only the husband, but also the other family members are controlling women in the cities. Although the control was apparent in the village life, women mentioned that their control has increased after their displacement. As Him (2010: 201) mentioned, “women and children continue to be subordinate not only to the father/husband but also to male kin”. For example some of the interviewees mentioned that, because their husbands were in prisons, brothers-in-laws were the ones who oppressed displaced women with children and even beat them as they did not listen to the words of these men. Patriarchal relationships are not only in the nuclear families, but also in the extended family structure. Kevz mentioned that she wanted to stay with her brother-in-law because she was alone and she did not want any misunderstandings from around. In other words, being alone for her may cause misunderstanding of being sexually available for other men and she wanted to prevent this understanding and protect her “honor” by staying with her brother-in-law. But her brother-in-law did not look after her and her children and also they faced violence a lot from him just because her husband had a relationship with the non-state armed group members before displacement. Because her brother-in-law did not want to be involved into their political relationships, he did not want them to live together with his family while her husband was in prison. According to her,

He wanted us to die. I was working outside. I was still in shock because of the experiences that I lived in the village. He was beating me and my children. He wanted them to work for him, but never helped us. He also lied to the neighbors as they were helping us and did not let the

neighbors help me and my children. We were his honor that was why I was staying with them. But he always beat me. I was beaten by my own brother-in-law. I wanted to stay there just to be protected from the bad words and bad looks of the people around. But he even broke my tooth while he was beating me (In her house, Mersin, 27.05.2010).

Although she was treated badly by her brother-in-law, Kevz still stayed with them because she was alone and did not have self-assertiveness. After she worked for years outside the house and could look after her children, she started to cope with the negativities and could separate her house from him, but stayed under the control of her husband because of her political detachment after the displacement process.

Female heads of households think first of their honor and the negative opinions that their neighbors evaluate them by. This may be the reason for them to stay with their brothers-in-law or fathers-in-law after the displacement period as they also have internalized the patriarchal gender order. This internalization of patriarchy is defined as “internalized oppression” and refers to women’s passive roles because of their strict attachment to the patriarchal gender relations (Rowlands 1997). Zehferan, who is also a female head of a household, told me that she preferred to stay with her brother-in-law just to avoid the negative opinions of the people around her. She expressed that, her brother-in-law kicked and almost beat her, but she begged him not to do it and explained to him that if he beat her, everybody would think she made a mistake and did not protect her honor in the first years of her displacement. Although Zehferan is a politically engaged and active woman, her honor still comes first in her life. But although she thinks of her honor, she can still resist her father-in-law when there is something about her personal choice. This is a consequence of her political engagement and gender awareness. She also told that,

I did not let him interfere to my working life. If he tried to I would give his answer. I am sure they worried where I was going everyday (In her relative’s house, İstanbul, 21.07.2010).

Expressions of the internally displaced Kurdish women above indicate the increase in the control, oppression and violence of the husbands and other male members in the families. This increase in oppression and violence may be a consequence of the displaced men’s will to control women in an alienated environment, even when they are away from the house, after the displacement. Increased male control and violence is another marginalization effect for

displaced women and it increases when it combines with poverty and the the ethnic-based discrimination that the displaced families face in the city centers.

7.2.2. Lack of Control on Money, Other Resources and Decision-Making

As a consequence of the possible increase in the patriarchal relationships within the displaced Kurdish families and oppression and the control of the husband in the household, the husband becomes the authority on decision-making and also it is possible for them to hold the total control on the money and other resources, as it is the similar case in village life before displacement. However this situation is closely related with the political engagement of the women in the city life. The more the women are politically engaged, it is more likely for them to participate into the decision-making. But still most of the women in the study mentioned that their husband is the one who decides everything in the household and says the last word. In the study there are some women who equally participate into the decision-making process with their husbands after their migration process and these women are generally the ones that politically active in the Kurdish movement. Although the others say they are in the decision-making position in the household, they only decide situations about their children's education. Because men see the subjects about children as the extension of women's domestic duties, it is more likely for them to let their wives to decide about children.

The interviewees also mentioned that men have the control over the money and other resources of the household. Even if women work, some of them do not usually have the control of their own money, which refers to "gendered poverty" as the rural-urban migration theorists define. For example, Gerendefel was displaced with her family from Bitlis and had to work in the textile industry. She mentioned that, she could not spend her money and always had to spend it for the expenses of the household. Her father was spending the money. He also spent the whole money that her husband's family gave for her dowry before the marriage (In her mother-in-law's house, İstanbul, 11.05.2010).

7.2.3. Unwanted Marriage, Lack of Control over Fertility and Childcare Obligations

Almost all of the interviewees got married in their early adolescence between the ages of 13-15, although they did not wish to marry so young. As an extension of the traditions, women could not decide who to marry. This situation is not very different in the city life for the interviewee's daughters. Daughters of the Kurdish women in the study mostly married with

their relatives and are mostly married before their twenties. Only some of the interviewees mentioned that their daughter still continues their education (there are also daughters who study in universities) and will get married to whomever she wants. This situation is an indicator of the “empowerment to change” the patriarchal structure that they live in and will be evaluated in the second part of the chapter. We cannot argue that the daughters of the women in the study had to marry men they did not want, just as their mothers’ were forced to, but it can be argued that, it is possible for these daughters to marry with their relatives because they could not have the chance to know people, except their family members. Fathers of these young women choose people from their own environment as grooms, whom they know well, which is also a consequence of the increased father control after the displacement process. Women also wanted their daughters to get married with Kurdish men instead of Turkish as they think Kurdish people can understand the experiences of the displaced families better.

As Him (2010: 97) mentions, conflict-induced Kurdish women’s high fertility cannot be explained without “social structural factors of political instabilities, migration, urbanization, new poverty, ethnicity” as well as patriarchy. In this sub-section of the dissertation, patriarchy is underlined and will be analyzed in details. Him (2010: 203) also argues that, traditional patriarchy, which has two aspects, is very influential on women’s lack of reproductive decision-making. The first aspect of patriarchy is based on the marriage system which has patrilocal or patrilineal kinship, the right of men to control women’s sexuality and men’s access to economic resources. The second aspect is the reconstruction of patriarchy in the cities, which is based on economic and psychological insecurities after displacement in an unfamiliar urban Turkish-speaking environment surrounded by strangers and women’s withdrawal from production and confinement in the house. Women’s lack of control over their fertility is a marginalization factor for women in the cities, which also negatively affects their mobility after displacement. Because looking after the children is considered as the duty of women, this obligation may make women marginalized even more in the cities.

As it is seen from Figure 7.1. below, two of the interviewees did not get married and do not have any children. Except for these two women, every married woman in the study had children. Besides, except for some of the female head of households, who had one, two or three children, most of the interviewees have at least four children. As it is clearly seen from the Figure 7.1, the fertility rate of the interviewees is high and this may be seen as a result of the traditions. High fertility rate is also a consequence of the early marriages of the

interviewees' and their fail to reach to the contraceptives as they were not mobile like men, as well as because of their uneducated profile as they were afraid of becoming infertile if they tried to prevent pregnancy.




Figure 7.1: Number of Children that the interviewees have

The expressions of the interviewees show that as they did not have control on reproduction in their homelands, they still do not have decision-making power on their own reproduction in the cities. This is also a sign of the ongoing patriarchal relationship in the households for some of the displaced families. Not using contraceptives stems from the reason of women's fear. As Ta mentions;

I wanted my first child. But I did want not the others. I was afraid to use contraceptives, 9 months after my first child, I had my second. I had some problems and had to be pregnant (In her mother's house, Mersin, 27.05.2010).

Women in the study also told me that they have no idea how they got pregnant, which is one of the other indicators of the lack of control on their fertility. For example Zehferan told me that she do not have an idea how her children were born.

I got married but I don't know how these children were born. He was coming back and forth from the mountain (she means the PKK) and every time he came I got pregnant. I don't know how it happened but it happened (In her relative's house, İstanbul, 21.07.2010).

Similarly, Lilaq mentioned that,

I don't know how it happened but once I got pregnant and then my "kuma" (the second wife of the husband) got pregnant. Then it went on and on, I got pregnant, she got pregnant... (In her relative's house, İstanbul, 13.05.2010).

Most of the interviewees even do not know if they are in menopause or not. They mentioned that they do not have children any more but they also said that they do not know why. For example Mexmork mentioned that, she did not get pregnant since she was 38 when they came to İstanbul.

I did not give birth in Istanbul, it just did not happen. Maybe I became infertile by myself (In Peace Mothers NGO, İstanbul, 22.07.2010).

Not only there is a high fertility rate among the interviewees, but also they look after their own children throughout their lives. Looking after the children by the women themselves is seen as the extension of the gender roles. Most of the interviewees showed childcare obligations as their excuse for not working outside the house. For example, Simbol mentioned that she had 8 children and although they needed and still need money, she did not work because she had to look after their children (In Gümüşüğü Charity House, Diyarbakır, 24.06.2010).

They also mentioned that, when they met the non-state armed group members, they already had children and although they wanted to join into the branches of the PKK, the organization did not let them join because of their children. For example Kivark, whose son is in the PKK and is not known to be dead or alive, mentioned that,

I wanted to go a lot to the PKK. But I have children I have to look after them. If I have money one day, I will go to the mountains; I will go to Iraq, to look after my son. I want to know if he is dead or alive (In her house, Mersin, 26.05.2010).

7.2.4. Relationship between Increase of the Patriarchal Relationships in the Household and Women's Lack of Political Engagement

As it is mentioned above, although there was a dominant patriarchal gender order before the displacement, it seems to increase for some families in the cities because of the alienated environment and unknown people around the family, which in turn makes men control women more in the households. The more the women lack political engagement, it is possible for the patriarchal relations increase in the displaced families. If women do not have a connection with the non-state armed group members or if their husbands have a relation with the PKK but did not involve women into this relationship, as it is considered as “men’s business”, women may become politically detached, which refers to no support of the PKK, no relationship or contact with the organization and/or political party. They also did not have children or close family members in the PKK. Unlike the women who are politically engaged and active, some of the women, who are politically detached are possibly marginalized more in the city centers and do not have a medium to struggle with the violence, oppression and control of the husband and/or the other family members. The strict patriarchal relationships in the villages may continue to occur in the cities and moreover these relationships seem to be increased because of the economic and psychological insecurities and unfamiliar urban structure surrounded by strangers among other factors as mentioned above. Some of the Kurdish women in the study accept the ongoing patriarchal gender order and “internalized oppression” while considering it as their fate and as a result, they may become more marginalized in the city centers. As they accept the ongoing structure, it is possible for them to become more voiceless on the control of the resources as they withdraw from the production and as a consequence of this; they may also detach from the decision-making power in the household.

Lack of control over fertility and having more children are also consequences of the patriarchal gender relationships and it probably gets higher in the city centers. Looking after children is seen as one of the duties of the women’s gender roles and childcare obligations are one of the obstacles in front of some politically detached women’s mobility and access to work. Although women wanted to work, because they had small children they could not and this possibly make them more marginalized in the cities. It would not be wrong to argue that the more women lack political engagement it is more likely for them to fall deeper in the patriarchy spiral, which may make them members of marginalized population relative to the politically engaged and active women in the city centers.

7.3. Displaced Kurdish Women’s Multiple Responsibilities and Their Coping Strategies for the Deprivations: Women’s “Empowerment to Cope” Situation in the Cities

As mentioned before, women’s roles are multiplied with the internal displacement and with the destruction of the family income. Women in the city centers have to be involved in the working life and/or have to do home-based work in order to contribute to the household economy and also develop some other strategies to cope with the deprivation situation in which they live in the city centers. In this sub-section, the strategies that women create to nourish their children and support their families will be explained. Before internal displacement Ertürk (1987 cited in Gündüz-Hoşgör 2011: 226) mentions that, Kurdish women were under the control of their husbands’ incomes in the villages and they were also oppressed under the power of men. The decisions and political issues were decided by men and women were marginalized in the villages. It is also mentioned that, women did not go out from their homes and villages, although men were going outside the villages as seasonal workers. It was the reason that the differentiation of the public and private spheres increased the male domination over women. From a situation like this, conflict-induced internal displacement may shake the ongoing power relations and patriarchal gender order. The living standards for some of the women may have changed since they came to the metropolis. It may also sparked some potential for at least some of them to cope with the situations and empower themselves in the cities. Although women’s multiple responsibilities have been considered as a victimization factor for some of the internally displaced women, it may also has an empowering effect on some of the women as it makes women go out from their houses and cope with the negativities that they experience. In other words, it may lead some of the displaced women to be empowered forcefully and takes these women from the victimized stage to the “empowered to cope” phase in the process, especially when combined with the women’s political engagement. Political engagement and women’s work support each other after the displacement process in the city life.

7.3.1. Home-Based Work of the Internally Displaced Kurdish Women

As Ecevit (2011: 135) mentions, women who do home-based work are the ones who have the least bargaining opportunities and who are ready for the lowest prices for their labor. Kümbetoğlu (1996 cited in Ecevit 2011: 135) argues that, the reason of this fact is the overlooking, underestimating, and undervaluing of these types of work done by women. That

is why women do not call these activities as work (White 1999 cited in Ecevit 2011: 135). Rural to urban migration studies have also focused on home-based work of women in the cities after migration and considered as “housewifely duties”. Similar to their discussions, home-based work is not evaluated as real work by the household members as well as by the women, although they contribute to the household economy. This undervaluation is also a “internalized oppression” as a result of the patriarchal relationships, which continue to be powerful in the urban context (Erman et al. 2002: 400) and which also prevents the development of women’s self-worth and challenging the gender inequality.

As mentioned before, internally displaced families are impoverished after the displacement process and because women traditionally do not work outside the home, some of them try to support their families by home-based work. In the study, when women were asked if they work or not, they do not count their home-based work as work and replied negatively to my question. Only when I specified my question to ask if they were doing some work at home to contribute to the household economy, they answered that they are doing home-based work, but still did not overrate their income. Some of the interviewees have used home-based work as a coping strategy for the poverty situations they have been living since they were displaced from their villages. They were making piece work for very small amounts of money. They are earning around five liras (approximately three dollars) for every piece they take from outside and only get the labor cost from the things they knit for their neighbors. Eight of the interviewees have done home-based work besides other works, such as going to the nearest agriculture fields to collect vegetables or fruits or cleaning people’s houses. Home-based work of these Kurdish women is composed of expurgating green peas, nuts, etc. knitting bath cloths, socks and other handmade stuff or making vignette for dowry.

On the other hand, if the women only work at home, it is because of first of all, their linguistic barriers and secondly and more importantly because of the strict patriarchal gender order in their families. Most of the Kurdish women who do home-based work mentioned that, in the traditional Kurdish culture, it is impossible for women or girl children to work outside the private sphere. As mentioned above, the differentiation between the public and private sphere in the villages, which makes women dependent on men and men dominant over women, is still effective for some internally displaced families. In some cases, although women became the head of household, because of her husband’s life-long imprisonment, she still rejects working outside the home as it is forbidden in the Kurdish traditions. For example, Nefel mentions that;

I have not worked except expurgation of nuts. I don't work even if we die because of hunger. I make this nut work because it is inside the home. If it was outside I would not do it. Only one of my sons is working. He sells vegetables. My daughters also do not work. They did not go to school. We were displaced and could not send them to school (In her house, Mersin, 05.08.2010).

Givzong explains the reason why she does not work as following;

In our tradition, women do not work. It is such a shame. I sometimes went picking nuts, that was all I did. I did not work much, I only did knitting socks and made vignette, that was all, not that important (In her house, Mersin, 06.05.2010).

Because some women do not go out to earn money, the home-based work seems to inhibit their self-assertiveness although they earn money and contribute to the household economy as it is the direct sign of the “internalized oppression”. The reason might be the nature of the work. Because women do not go out from their private spheres and produce similar products for their own families to sell, these kinds of work are considered as the extension of the women’s household duties, or in other words “housewifely duties” and are devalued by the women themselves and also by the other family members. In the study, home-based work is considered as one of the indicators of the “empowered to cope” situation of internally displaced Kurdish women in the cities because whether or not the women evaluate the home-based work as real work, they are still coping with the impoverishment that their families experience and it constitutes one of the base lines for the “empowerment to cope” situation in the urban context.

7.3.2. Learning Turkish and Developing Literacy Skills

As mentioned in the previous chapter, one of the major problems that women face after displacement is the linguistic barrier. They do not only lack Turkish, but also they are illiterate. This situation is one of the basic reasons of their marginalization in the city centers. In order to cope with this situation, some of the women aim to develop their literacy skills. Some of them only learned daily life Turkish from their children and neighbors and learned writing their names and signature, but some others have gone to literacy training in an elementary school to learn how to read and write and got a certificate from the school. There are 12 women in the study who are literate. Five of them finished elementary school before displacement and the rest of them learned how to read and write after the

displacement. One of them learned it in the prison, two of them learned it in an NGO literacy course and four of them took a certificate from the Ministry of the Education course. 18 of the interviewees still do not know how to read and write.

The more the women are politically engaged, it is more possible for them to give importance to literacy skills. For example, some of them learned Turkish and became literate in the prisons. For example Leven, who was taken under custody because she attended a Kurdish rights protest, mentioned that,

When they took me under custody, I did not know Turkish, I was talking in Kurdish and they beat me bad because I did not talk in Turkish. I could understand Turkish but could not talk. I swore to learn Turkish. When I was in prison, my friends were talking me in Kurdish, I told them to talk to me in Turkish. In the court, the translator was translating wrong. I was telling something else, but he was translating it to something else. I could understand but couldn't tell. I swore to learn Turkish and how to read and write until my next court (hearing). I learned them all. I told the judge I learned in the prison. They were swearing at me in Turkish but I couldn't reply to them back. They were hitting my breasts, pulling my hair, telling me bitch. I felt ashamed. They told me that 'PKK'ya şapur şapur bize yarabbi şükür' (you have sexual intercourse with the PKK and you get shy when we touch), I could understand but could not reply and spit on them. They kicked me and I was 2.5 month pregnant. The baby died, but the doctor gave me healthy report. They said the miscarriage happened by itself. I could not defend myself because I could not talk in Turkish. But in the following hearings, I could defend myself (In her house, İstanbul, 14.05.2010).

As mentioned by Leven, learning Turkish is as hard as learning reading and writing for these women, but because they do not want to be dependent on other people such as translators in the courts, husbands, other relatives and/or friends, these women learn Turkish and reading and writing. Learning Turkish is not only to defend themselves in the courts, but also to be mobile and independent in the cities whenever they need to go somewhere by themselves. Although most of these women were not educated in the villages and are not very young, they were politically engaged enough to improve themselves after displacement, which may make them “empowered to cope” with the situations that they face in the cities. Besides learning Turkish, developing literacy skills is also one of the empowering factors of women. Some women wanted to be more effective and mobile in the cities and also they do not want to be dependent on others, so they learned how to read and

write in the elementary schools or in the special training courses offered by NGOs. Binefşi for example is one of these women. She has a son in the branches of the PKK and she is a politically engaged woman. This is a reason for her to be empowered and she started from her basic problem, illiteracy. As she mentioned, she never went to school and when her father wrote her name to the school list, her brother went to the school, took her and beat her because he thought girls should not go to school.

I went to the literacy course of the Ministry of the Education. I was very successful. I went to the course totally 22 days. I decided to go to the course by myself. Because I had to ask every time I went out. I could not understand the addresses. Some people even do not tell me the address. They did not help me. I thought I could learn how to read and write. When I took my daughter to the school, her teacher asked me if I was literate and they took me to the course. My husband also did not reject (In her neighbor's house, Mersin, 06.08.2010).

Being literate is an important factor for internally displaced Kurdish women to become empowered. It is likely to be one of the major steps of the emancipation for women as they would not be dependent on the other people in the cities. As mentioned before, dependency is one of the marginalization effects for internally displaced women. In order not to be marginalized in the city centers, some of the Kurdish women at least attempt to learn Turkish and develop their literacy skills. This may be one of the indicators that proves internally displaced women are not only passive victims of the negative consequences of the displacement, but also are active enough to find solutions for their problems, which may lead to change their victimized position. The women, who learned how to read and write after the displacement, are the ones who are relatively more politically engaged than the other women who still are not literate. Only two of them, who went to a NGO, called as Çağdaş Yaşamı Destekleme Derneği (Association in Support of Contemporary Living, ÇYYD) literacy training as a result of their sister-in-law's insistence, do not use any word in Turkish in their daily lives and fall into the most marginalized group. Being literate is not enough by itself to escape from marginalization for the displaced women. These two women are politically detached and remained in the marginalized group in the city center. But the other politically engaged women use language and literacy frequently and also use it as a medium to struggle for the Kurdish rights.

7.3.3. Internally Displaced Women's Activity Outside Home

Different from the marginalized group, women who are “empowered to cope” with the situations they face in the cities after the displacement process, may spend more time outside their house. They work in uninsured and low-paid jobs, participate in some NGOs movements, participate in the Kurdish rights protests, etc. If women work outside the house and earn their own money, it is possible for them to develop self-confidence and also feel themselves powerful because they act outside the boundaries of the traditional gender relations. For example, Kevz, who has been a head of household since she was displaced, mentions that although she earns a small amount of money, she feels herself powerful. She mentioned that,

I go to cleaning every week to a house. I have 2 or 3 houses. I earn like 20 TL (approximately 10 dollars). But I earn it by my own effort. It is so much money for me. It is my gaining and my strength. I can feel it. I left all the pains behind. I did not forget but I want to be relieved (In her house, Mersin, 27.05.2010).

Rural to urban migration studies also have discussions on women's economic participation after the migration process. These discussions have two-sided aspects as aforementioned. On the one hand, some scholars argue that, economic participation of women does not challenge the ongoing patriarchal relations as this type of relation has a deep-rooted structure. On the other hand, some other scholars argue that, a major shake occurs in the family structure with the migration process and empowerment of women emerges alongside with their economic participation. Women's economic participation in the conflict-induced displacement situations is closer to the latter argument. In this regard, women who start working outside their houses contribute to the household economy on the one hand and on the other hand, they may challenge the patriarchal gender order at the same time. As Mazurana et al. (2005: 5-7) mentions, women and children start taking new economic roles after displacement and more so if the head of husband is not around. At the same time, the gender roles become different relative to the lives in the village. Although this double burden brings new troubles for women, it may improve their self-assertiveness and reveals their potential to be “empowered to cope” with these troubles.

As seen in Figure 7.2. below, there are totally 12 interviewees who have been working outside their houses, mostly as cleaners, workers in the agriculture fields and/or as seasonal workers.

Six of them have stopped working outside the house because they got old or because they got married and had children. Six of the interviewees are still working outside the house and are earning money. Three of them are relatively young and more educated and can be argued to be among the empowered group. The other three women have been heads of households, and two of them are still heads of their households. They had no one to look after themselves when they first came to the cities and had to work outside home, although three of them (Zehferan, Kevz and Leven) had young children with them. They are politically engaged and active members of the Kurdish struggle, which may bring their self-assertiveness and control on the money and other resources in the households. They are also in the decision-making process about the household and also in the public.




Figure 7.2: Working Status of the Interviewees

Some of the interviewees are heads of their households, which may bring more problems for them after they were internally displaced. As UNRISD (2005: 214) states, loss of male head of household in the conflict is one of the major problems for women. They have to overcome the emotional and psychological stress of losing the loved ones and also have to deal with economic problems and look after the dependent family members. Permanent loss is harder for women relative to temporary loss of the husband, because in the permanent loss, women have to deal with the problems by themselves for the rest of their lives. There are totally 11 female heads of households in the study. Five interviewees' husbands were temporarily

imprisoned and these women had to deal with the problems for a limited time. On the other hand, six internally displaced women are permanently heads of households. Three of them lost their husbands in the conflict and three of them have husbands imprisoned permanently because they were accused to be involved in the Kurdish struggle and had relationships with the PKK. In order to cope with the situation of the loss of the male head of the household, women who mostly do not have adult sons start living with other relatives, usually in the house of the father-in-law or brother-in-law when they first came to the cities. It is because of the relationships with the extended family members, which is mostly based on patriarchy and because traditionally Kurdish women do not work outside home and some of these women need someone to look after them. As aforementioned, although women live with their relatives for honor issues, in some cases their relatives do not want these women and their children around, especially if the husbands of the women are imprisoned because of the relationship with the non-state armed group. In sum, there can be some incoherence within the family members and female heads of households and/or widows have to work outside the home in order to look after the dependent family members and survive. They work in uninsured and low-paid jobs, such as seasonal workers or daily servants, because of their lack of education and lack of Turkish knowledge and begin to look after their families.

Working outside the house and participating in the activities of the NGOs may make these displaced women independent, powerful to express personal resistance, experienced in various issues, able to look after their own children and also contribute to the household economy and able to challenge the patriarchal gender relations in some ways. Daily order, for the women that were temporary head of households, who worked outside home in the absence of their husbands, could not be the same after their husband's return. The ordinary patriarchal gender relations may be diminished in the absence of the husband and the women may develop "new way of doing things" (Gökalp 2007: 211) when she was in charge of the household. It cannot be argued that these women were totally empowered just because they worked outside in order to survive, but it is possible for them to create self-assertiveness and shake the traditional gender relations in the family. They do every kind of work, such as cleaning the houses, buildings, working in restaurants, working in the agriculture fields and/or as seasonal workers, etc. One of the interviewees, who is a female head of household named Zehferan, is working as a construction worker and mentions that,

When my husband was captured and imprisoned we were economically in a very bad position. I have been working as a construction worker and earn money to feed my

children. I have been painting the apartments for 3 years. I struggle for my children. I still work in the constructions. Women have to get over this understanding. There are no women in this work except me. Men in this work are also confounded and wonder how I do this work. I wear my overalls, mix the paints and start painting the walls. I don't work on daily basis; I take an apartment and paint it in one day. I look after 4 children (In her relative's house, İstanbul, 21.07.2010).

As mentioned above, working women may also challenge the ongoing patriarchal gender order in the family. For example, Leven mentioned that her husband objected when she first said that she had to work outside the home. She told the story as following;

I told him that I was going to work, he said 'are you mad?' I told him, because he does not work, I should look after our children. I was making their meals and went to a restaurant with my friend, she was doing pancakes, I was doing the dishes. He got angry very much, we argued a lot. I said I wanted to work. I told him 'if you have not known me in 22 years, you cannot know me now'. Our friends from the party also talked to him. Before he got out from the prison, I was working outside home, leaving children at home. I was also working when he came out. He did not even recognize it. I was buying stuff for the home and for the children, he did not understand how. I talked to him and tried to convince him that we were not doing something bad. It is not shameful for women to work. We were working in the village. Now he trusts me a lot. I can go to Europe and he trusts me. But I convinced him. When he was in the hospital, I was going to home, making meals for my children, then going to work and then staying with my husband all night (In her house, İstanbul, 14.05.2010).

Some of the women not only work in paid labor outside the home but also participate in the NGO activities. Eight of the interviewees are working in the NGOs and three of them are working both outside home and in the NGOs actively. NGO activists participate in the activities of the organization. They are going almost every day to the NGOs and attend funerals of the non-state armed group members and press conferences. Activities of the internally displaced women in the NGOs will be evaluated in detail later. But very briefly it can be argued that, working in a pro-Kurdish NGO reinforces the political engagement and activity of the displaced women, which in turn reinforces the empowerment situation of women in the society. The more the women involve in the activities of the NGOs, it is more possible for them to be empowered in the city centers.

7.3.4. Getting Humanitarian Aid and Dealing with Governmental Issues

Because displaced families have to deal with the extreme poverty problems after displacement, some of the women have to find solutions to support their families. One of the major coping strategies of internally displaced Kurdish women for dealing with the poverty that they experience in the cities is to get humanitarian aid, like clothes, household stuff and food especially on special days like bayram (religious holiday), from municipalities and subsidiary companies of the municipalities. As Mukaddes Alataş (Head of the Kardelen Solidarity Organization in Diyarbakır – personal communication on 22nd of June, 2010) mentions,

Women are the ones who mostly (97%) get the aid for the family because men get embarrassed when the subject is getting aid for the family. In these situations their manhood suffers because they think everybody considers that they are not men enough to look after their families.

In order to deal with poverty after their displacement, some women start searching for humanitarian aid from municipalities. They usually use their social networks to learn the ways of getting help and these connections are mostly constituted in the neighborhood. Social networks concept, which refers to personal relationships that are based on family and friendship, is also focused by the rural to urban migration studies. As aforementioned, social networks are important factors that effect people's migration and also if women have an ability to use these networks, welfare and living conditions of the families increase. Similarly, in the conflict-induced displacement of the Kurdish population, women may develop coping strategies for their family's impoverishment situation in the cities. It is mostly displaced women, who write their names into the lists of the aid programs and follow the results, although most of them do not know Turkish and how to read and write. As mentioned before, instead of waiting as passive victims, some of the women may start taking active roles in the households to find solutions to support their family members.

On the other hand, some women have told that they could not get any aid from the governmental agencies. Leven explains this situation as below;

When I went to the municipality to get humanitarian aid, they told me that I was a 'terrorist' and did not give me aid. I told them my children were hungry, they said they would give everybody, except me. Because I had been imprisoned for a political crime, they closed every door. I

swear, I could not find anything to feed my children for two days. Yesterday we even could not eat bread. There was a packet of Turkish tea at home and we cannot drink Turkish tea. I took it to the market and changed it with bread and cigarettes. I went to the municipality several times, but they did not give me. I told them their president (she is talking about the Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan) was also imprisoned years ago, but now he is a president. They looked at each other and said 'look how she knows politics (In her house, İstanbul, 14.05.2010).

Although most of the displaced women are illiterate and do not have adequate Turkish skills to deal with the governmental agencies, it is still mostly women's duty to solve the governmental issues. For instance, women are the ones who deal with the issues in their children's schools, because although they are in the cities, it is women's duty to look after their children and take care of their problems. This is also another place for women to be discriminated against by the Turkish teachers because of their Kurdishness, as they do not know Turkish. Women also have to deal with the humanitarian aid that municipalities give and struggle with the civil servants in order to get help as mentioned above. It is also an area in which they face discrimination because if women have guerilla children and/or husbands, they cannot get any help and/or "green card" as a health insurance from the state. In other words, although women have not been directly involved in the guerilla activities, they are still labeled as guilty and have to struggle for their basic human rights. Undoubtedly, these struggles are discriminatory for Kurdish women but they may get together in these struggles and try to solve their problems. In other words, there is a possibility for these women to be self-assertive and empowered through the struggles. The more they struggle, it is likely for them to find coping strategies to survive. They are struggling collectively as women in neighborhoods and they are also supported by "neighborhood councils" of the pro-Kurdish political party and/or NGOs. Political engagement of the women is again very important for dealing with the governmental agencies and also to resist their discriminatory implementations. The more the women are politically engaged, the more they may develop individual and collective resistance for these implementations and develop mediums to struggle with the civil servants.

Xaç Darik mentioned her experiences with her daughter's teachers as following;

I am the tutor of my daughter for years. Not a single day her father has gone to her school. The first years when we came from the village, the tutor of her was my oldest son. Then I became her tutor. I sat quietly in the tutors meeting

and did not say anything; even I thought the ideas of the other tutors were wrong. I could not represent myself, I was very ashamed. Then the more I attended to the pro-Kurdish political party meetings, the more I started talking in the meetings. The more I talked in the meetings of the party, the more I started taking promise in the tutors meetings. The party was very influential on me (In her house, İstanbul, 11.05.2010).

Xaç Darik's expression is a good example of how political activities may become effective on displaced women. The more they involve into the activities, it is more possible for them to develop self-assertiveness and politicize on Kurdish identity bases that stemmed from the collective trauma that Kurdish population experience. As mentioned before, discriminatory attitudes towards displaced Kurdish women are a form of marginalization for them in the cities. But the more they are politically engaged, there is a more possibility for them to develop coping strategies to resist ethnic-based discriminatory attitudes. Helal also mentioned that, the Turkish tutor's attitudes are discriminatory and oppressive. She mentioned that, it was not a problem to deal with the language, but dealing with these attitudes is repressive. She told that, especially on the national holidays, the pressure on them to celebrate like Turks do is a form of oppression. She mentions that,

I deal with the school issues of the children. I told my husband to go and deal with these issues as I did not know Turkish, but he didn't. In the tutor's meeting I was always asking my son, what they were talking about and he was translating for me. Sometimes, there were Kurdish teachers and they were talking to us separately. The other tutors were giving us Turkish flags in the national days. They told us to sing national song. They repress us to shout out as 'happy is the one who says I am Turk'. It is like hitting my head with a thick stick. Where is my identity? Where is my mother tongue? I really have difficulties in these times (In Peace Mothers NGO, İstanbul, 22.07.2010).

7.4. Political Activity of the Internally Displaced Kurdish Women for the Kurdish Rights

*“As long as you have this pain in heart and I have the rancor, we cannot be friends...”
(Binefşi, Mersin, 06.08.2010).*

Political engagement of women is one of the major factors that affect women's position in the society after the displacement process. If the women are politically engaged, which in

other words refers to their consciousness about the struggle on Kurdish rights, it is more possible for them to be “empowered to cope”, if they are politically detached, they are more likely to be in the marginalized group after they start living in the cities. Women mostly got involved into the political activities after they were displaced as a result of their children’s involvement in the Kurdish struggle and because political activities occur more frequently in the city centers. Violence against children in the struggle influence women relatively more than the violence perpetrated against their husbands. Husband’s involvement in the struggle in this regard, is not as effective as the children’s, because it cannot be wrong to argue that, men usually do not let women get involved into the struggle by considering it as “men’s business”. On the other hand, women do not get involved into the struggle because they also consider it as “men’s business”. Women usually stay away from the ongoing struggle if their children did not involve because, on the one hand, women get married at a young age and their connection with their husbands is likely not very strong. On the other hand, these women observed what happened to their husbands, such as imprisonment, torture, etc. just because they were involved into political issues and they want to stay away from the struggle as well as they try to keep their children away from it. When their children participate into the branches of the PKK, it is more possible for these women to start taking place in the struggle with the help of pro-Kurdish NGOs, parties and the PKK. These institutions work hand in hand in order to integrate women into the movement by mostly “itching the wound” of the guerilla mothers.

Women tell about the development of their children’s political engagement and their participation into the PKK as following. For example, Kivark, whose son is in the PKK and who is working for the pro-Kurdish political party, expressed her son’s integration into the movement as below;

Before my son went, he always told us that he was going to participate into the PKK. Whenever police or soldiers came to our house, he repeated his will. We had wood in our garden, and he said ‘mom, burn this wood at Newroz³⁶ and went two days after. I searched for him a lot but could not find him. I had my younger daughter with me, and then

³⁶ Newroz is the celebration of spring in the north hemisphere and called as Nevruz, Newroz, Nooruz, Nowruz, Navrız, etc. by different nations of Anatolia, Middle East and Asia (Demirer 2012: 15). Ethnic research for the Kurdish identity aims emerged with the Newroz celebration in the mid-1970s and the political leadership of Kurds begun to use this celebration for the expression of the Kurdish ethnicity. Newroz has also used as the cultural aspect of the Kurds (Demirer 2012: 26-27). It has worked as an alternative institutionalization of routine collective action for the Kurdish politics that could not be effectively used by the other cultural mediums (Demirer 2012: 77).

the guerilla saw me when I was searching him. They said 'you have your daughter, we have your son'. When he participated, he was 15 years old. They said he was dead. Then the guerilla came to our village and said he was not dead. They brought me a wounded photo of him. His head was wounded. I cried, they told me not cry. Guerillas were coming to our village a lot. Soldiers knew it and they burned our village because of this reason (In her house, Mersin, 26.05.2010).

Children of the displaced families that witnessed village evacuations and/or oppression towards their families also tended to participate into the branches of the PKK. Similarly, in the interviews of Matur (2011: 99), it is mentioned that, most of the children of the burnt villages were also among the youth that went to the mountains. On the other hand, the ones that still try to survive in the cities decide to participate in the PKK because of the discriminatory attitudes of the people towards them as a consequence of their Kurdishness. The daughter of Gulbihara mentioned by herself that she wants to participate in the PKK, because of the discriminatory attitudes towards the Kurds in her environment. She mentioned that,

I want to be a guerilla. We cannot talk in Kurdish at school. Everybody abuses us, we are always under pressure. I want to be worthy of something. But I have a disease that is why I wait to participate. I always watch Roj TV and want to be there with them. Police beat a lot of children in our neighborhood, I wanted to interfere, but it is worthless, because you can be taken under custody for nothing. But we want to share our point of view. That is why it is more effective to participate in the PKK. You can do something there. You are guilty in the city just because you have an opinion. You have to be self-assertive to go to the mountains. Fight with the guns is not a solution but they force us to struggle this way. If I cannot participate in the guerilla fighting I can participate into the politics in the city (In her house, Mersin, 06.08.2010).

Almost all of the politically engaged women in the study have children in the branches of the PKK, whether in the mountains or in the city branches. These women told me that the reason for the participation of their children is the oppressive and violent attitudes that they witnessed from the state security forces, before and after the displacement process and also the discriminatory attitudes of the public in the cities after they were displaced. Interviewees mentioned that, children want to struggle against these attitudes and take the revenge of their close family members. When the children integrate into the movement, mothers

automatically find themselves in the struggle and start moving collectively under the guidance of the pro-Kurdish political party. The party is the first place they go when they first come to the cities. They go to the party to communicate with their children, to get help from the party and/or to get information about the aid organizations. Pro-Kurdish political party buildings are seen as the extension of their homelands for the displaced people in the city centers because everybody knows Kurdish and nobody discriminates or oppresses internally displaced Kurdish families. On the contrary, it is the place that internally displaced people, including women could get help about every problem that they face. That is why some of the interviewees mentioned that when they first went to the party buildings, they felt like they have found their relatives.

Some of the women even did not know why their husbands were oppressed and experienced violence from the state security forces. For example one of the interviewees, Simbol, mentioned that state security forces took her husband from the house and tortured him a lot. Then her husband stayed in the prison for a while. When I asked about her husband's crime, she told me that it was a political issue but she did not know the details because her husband never discusses such things with her. Interviewees that had a husband involved in the Kurdish struggle described their husband's position as below. Givzong for example is not sure why her husband was taken under custody and expressed that,

My husband was a little revolutionist. Police oppressed us a lot. That is why we escaped to Şırnak, because we had relatives in Şırnak. We stayed there 10 years then we came back here (In her house, Mersin, 06.08.2010).

The city of the women's residence is an important factor for their participation into the politics. For example, because pro-Kurdish NGOs are very effective in Diyarbakır province, women in Diyarbakır are more active in this regard relative to the other cities in the study. On the other hand, because Diyarbakır is closer to the region, they may easily get involved into the activities and protests. İstanbul is also a city that all kinds of political activities go on more effectively. It is a crowded and cosmopolitan city and it is also the first city that the Kurdish population migrated to after they were displaced. Most of the Kurdish population lives in İstanbul, which is a reason for them to react actively for every political issue. Mersin also has a relatively large Kurdish population but it can be argued that it is not as politically active as the Kurdish communities in İstanbul and Diyarbakır. Undoubtedly, there are also politically detached women living in İstanbul and Diyarbakır.

As mentioned before, politically active women in the study can be divided into three groups. The first group is the members of Peace Mothers Initiative and other pro-Kurdish NGOs, the second group is the women working in the branches of the pro-Kurdish political party and the third group is composed of the women active in the branches of the PKK. The first group of women is made up of those who have children in the PKK branches, who are still fighting or have already died. As aforementioned, this group of women has been symbolized as the “mourning mothers” by the members of the Kurdish struggle since the early 1980s. The second group of women is working in different positions in the party, such as working in the municipalities, as co-presidents of the townships, women’s branches, etc. In the beginning of the Kurdish struggle, these women were represented as the “sexless politicians”. The third group of women, which was symbolized as the “virgin guerillas” in the early-1980s, is composed of the ones who have participated actively in the PKK whether in the city or mountain branches.

Women explained their integration into the Peace Mothers Initiative as following; when they were displaced from their villages, they started going to the political party and then these women, who have guerilla children in the PKK, organized under the pro-Kurdish political party in the beginning and then they started to struggle as a separate group in 1996. They all suffered from the conflict and this situation brought them *power within* (Rowlands 1997) to realize and be aware of the power that they have inside. When they were forced to migrate to the cities, they came together and started to share experiences, this brought *power with* (Rowlands 1997) other mothers. Coming together no doubt happened with the help of pro-Kurdish NGOs, parties and the PKK. But these mothers finally gained the *power to* (Rowlands 1997) struggle for peace. These mothers have transformed their pain into a politicized attitude, which in other words means the situation has turned these grieving mothers into political subjects by using their “mourning” situation. Besides, the situation turned the powerless feminine into political power and empowered these women to negotiate with the state (Rajan 2010). These mothers have started to be visible in the public as mothers. As mentioned before, they are politically active and their political act is happening in the public sphere, but still within the boundaries of the patriarchal gender order based on their traditional women’s roles. In other words, they do not challenge the patriarchal gender order and are politicized in a traditional way. As Cockburn (2001 cited in Sjoberg and Gentry 2004: 36) mentions, as women’s protection in the family is performed by the male members, they are protected in the public sphere by the notion of “motherhood”, which is a product of the patriarchal ideology. It is possible to argue that, they are politically engaged

and active just for the Kurdish rights. Most of these women who are in the public as mothers are “bargaining with patriarchy” (Kandiyoti 1988), as they are using their motherhood capability. Guerilla mothers, by politicizing their status, may create a space in the public sphere and Kurdish men not only let women become mobilized, but also support their intentions because they are visible within the traditional gender roles. These women are organized for Kurdish rights, but not for women’s rights. In other words, they do not object meeting “strategic gender needs” (Molyneux 1985) and are closer to the “empowerment to cope” situation. Because most of these women’s interests are not geared towards women’s rights, only a few may be “empowered to change” the patriarchal relations within the family and society by being politically active outside the boundaries of traditional gender roles, which will be discussed later.

For example, Helal told about the process of her integration into the Peace Mothers Initiative as following:

The first we came to İstanbul, I looked for an organization for Kurdish rights. I first met with the HADEP (First pro-Kurdish political party), then the Peace Mothers Initiative was constructed. I am active in the Peace Mothers for 16-17 years (In the Peace Mothers NGO, İstanbul, 22.07.2010).

On the other hand, Giya, who is 65 years old, lost two of her sons in the conflict and saw another son sentenced to prison for a very long time as a political prisoner explained her duty in the Peace Mothers Initiative as following;

There have been protests and meetings to end the operations. We have gone to the funerals and condolences. We went to Ankara and demanded a meeting with the political parties. We stayed there for 3 days but they did not give us an appointment. The first aim of this initiative is peace. The soldier and the guerilla both are our children. We, Turks and Kurds, need to live together and the operations have to stop immediately (In Peace Mothers NGO, Diyarbakır, 21.06.2010).

As seen from the statements of Helal and Giya, they struggle for the Kurdish rights and aim to stop the ongoing conflict in Turkey. Internally displaced Kurdish women not only participate in the activities of the pro-Kurdish NGOs, but they also have integrated into the pro-Kurdish political party organizations. From the very beginning of the Kurdish struggle, as Ayşe Gökkan (Mardin-Nusaybin Mayor, personal communication on 26th of June, 2010) mentioned,

the political party has always followed the implementations of the PKK. When the PKK constituted a special branch for women, the political party also started to organize a women's group. As mentioned before, this situation is a consequence of both the Kurdish movement's dominant ideology that is based on gender equality and the Kurdish women's attempts to be subjects instead of passive symbols in the Kurdish struggle. As it is known, women have been represented in different roles in the Kurdish struggle and as mentioned before, "sexless politicians" is one of those representations. Women have started to take active roles in the political party especially after the 2000s. Internally displaced families first went to the political party to be organized and women started taking active roles in the party. For example Berbiro, who works as a co-president of a township, mentioned that;

People in this township selected me as the co-president. My duty is to be responsible for the women. I always ask what is going on in their lives. They come to me. They complain about their husbands, when their husbands beat or treat them bad. Men are always wrong. They do not want their wives to be conscious. The number of women attending the party meetings is not bad. They did not attend frequently before but now they are coming. We always call women to the party meetings to raise their consciousness (In her house, İstanbul, 21.07.2010).

Similarly Kivark, who also works in the pro-Kurdish political party in Mersin, explained that, her primary duty is to organize women in the neighborhood for the meetings and protests about the Kurdish rights. She also tries to convince men who do not let their wives attend these meetings to give them permission to participate. She mentions that,

Because I am working for the party, everybody respects me. They say, 'this aunt is from the party' and they respect me. Everybody in the neighborhood knows me for example. They commend their wives and children to me. They say 'they are going to the party please look after them, don't let anybody say something'. If someone does not let his wife to attend to the meeting I try to convince them. For example, my daughter's father-in-law does not let my daughter to attend to the activities of the party. I asked him if he was not Kurdish. He says she has got stuff to do at home. I said I am also a woman and I have stuff to do. Then when people ask me why my daughter doesn't attend, I got angry. I go to every meeting although I have a husband and school age son. I have a lot of stuff at home, why do I attend? Because I have pain. I have one son with the guerillas and another in the Turkish military (In her house, Mersin, 26.05.2010).

Some of the internally displaced Kurdish women attend the activities of the pro-Kurdish political party because “they have pain” about the issue and want to be a part of the solution as Kivark mentioned. On the other hand, it is likely for some women to attend the protests in order to make these events crowded and to be away from their life-long imprisonment in their house and neighborhood. In this regard, their husbands let them leave the house because it is a Kurdish rights activity so they may go out from their houses. In Demirtaş neighborhood of Mersin, which I made interviews, one of the Kurdish women in the street asked my key respondent if there was any “entertainment” nearby, meaning the Kurdish rights protests. When I asked my key respondent if there were any women who consider these events as entertainment, she replied there were some women who could only leave their houses through these activities. In sum, these activities are on the one hand the protests against the ongoing dominant nationalist ideology, which discriminates and oppresses the Kurdish rights, and on the other hand, these are opportunities for internally displaced Kurdish women to be mobile and take part in group, which in turn encourages their self-assertiveness. It is also same for the activities out of the cities. Some of the women participate in these activities, which are organized by the pro-Kurdish political party. Everything is planned by the party, the buses, the destination and every group has a responsible person as a female leader. Some of the women, who are relatively politically detached, participate into these activities just for travel. Çağlayan et al. (2011: 75) similarly mentioned that, relationships with the pro-Kurdish political party makes women politically engaged and socially active beings. On the other hand, they have the possibility to be more mobile with other women who are involved into the activities of the political party and travel from one district to another and even from one city to another. For example, Gongiloka Dehlî explained this situation as following;

We went to Batman, Ankara, Şırnak, a lot of places as a group. The party took us there. I did not shout out slogans, I was walking quietly. I was traveling and coming back. I even did not make peace sign with my hand. That is why police never touched me (In Günışığı Charity House, Diyarbakır, 24.06.2010).

Although the activities are “entertainment” for some of the politically detached women, which may still have an effect on their self-assertiveness and political engagement, these are crucial meetings for the politically engaged and active women. These activities strengthen their “power with” aspect of the struggle. The more they come together with other politically engaged and active women, it is possible for them to develop “power to” struggle for the

Kurdish rights. Mexmork for example told me how she was able to be a part of the pro-Kurdish political party and how she felt like an insider for the first time when she attended. She mentioned that this feeling is because of the “same pain” that all the women experienced in the conflict. She explains the situation as following;

I was not going out from my house when we first came to İstanbul. One day I went to the street market with my neighbor. When I saw the sign of the HADEP, I got happy very much. The next day, I could not find the way of the party building. I waited for the next week to go to the street market again and I entered in. I had a chat with the mothers. In those years, 1996-1997, it was even forbidden to go to the party. I saw that mothers were sharing their pains. I had the same pain with these mothers and I considered them as my relatives, they were that close. My husband faced torture and got angry to me because I was going to the party. He was afraid. Just because I went to the party they (state security forces) made an operation to my house. They tortured me in one of the police stations in İstanbul (In Peace Mothers NGO, İstanbul, 22.07.2010).

To be part of a group not only leads women to share their experiences and pain, it may also conduce women’s self-assertiveness and self-confidence. The more they go back and forth to the activities and organizations of the pro-Kurdish political party, the more they may develop active agency. Through participation to the political party, displaced Kurdish women had a chance to be responsible on a duty, such as being an accountant, or being responsible from other women in the neighborhood, which strengthen women’s self-assertiveness. These women felt for the first time that they are worthwhile in their society. For example Xaç Darik mentioned that,

The party is very effective on my character. I was an accountant in the women’s branch of the party. I was controlling the money. Three women, including me, were active in the public meetings. I was not ready in a big public meeting, but they announced me to the stage. My knees were shaking. I was a Kurdish woman, coming from a village and never talked with a microphone. I blushed. I got excited. I talked in Kurdish. They were all Kurdish and I wanted to represent myself in Kurdish. I talked about the prisons. I said ‘lion is a lion it doesn’t matter if it is a male or female’. In the meetings they force you to talk and represent yourself. You have to talk on the issue, they made everybody talk. I then worked in the GÖÇ-DER. I read a press statement on 4th of April (Abdullah Öcalan’s birthday). I read it in Turkish. I could represent myself very

good even in front of the press. Everybody liked it. Police was going to take me, my friends did not let them (In her house, İstanbul, 11.05.2010).

It is clear that, the more these women attend to some activities of the Pro-Kurdish political party and NGOs; it is more possible for them to increase their mobility. As mentioned before, being dependent on someone and being immobile is one of the marginalization effects for internally displaced women in the cities. They start going to the different parts of the city by themselves. The city is again very important at this point. Women feel more comfortable in Diyarbakır about mobility because it is a Kurdish speaking city as aforementioned. The majority of the population in Diyarbakır is Kurdish. For example, Giya, from Diyarbakır Peace Mothers Initiative, mentioned that,

I can go to the NGO by myself. I finally learned which bus I should take. I learned all the buses in the city. I ask to the driver where the bus is going and get on the bus. Everybody knows Kurdish in the city. I could never live in İstanbul; I could die in that city. Diyarbakır is my homeland (In Peace Mothers NGO, Diyarbakır, 21.06.2010).

Women, who know Turkish, are also mobile in the other cities as they have gained self-confidence. One of the interviewees mentioned that she knows Turkish better than her husband as a result of the activities of the pro-Kurdish political party that she has attended in İstanbul. According to Helal,

I am not literate; I only know how to write my name and my signature. But I know all the buses in the city. I can recognize the buses. I can go anywhere in İstanbul by myself. My husband says that, I take him everywhere and he was left behind me (In Peace Mothers NGO, İstanbul, 22.07.2010).

As a part of the “bargaining with patriarchy” (Kandiyoti 1988), these women, who are active in the Kurdish struggle, mentioned that they share the household responsibilities with their daughters and do not leave any domestic work to their husbands. If they do not have daughters, women start facing problems with their husbands. Mexmork for example, one of these women, mentioned that;

I have traveled half of Turkey as a result of these party activities. I have always experienced difficulties about the domestic responsibilities. I went for 15 days and all the

domestic duties had to wait (In Peace Mothers NGO, İstanbul, 22.07.2010).

Aside from the fact that internally displaced women mostly become politically active while “bargaining with patriarchy” (Kandiyoti 1988), the women who mostly challenge the patriarchal gender order at home, are from the group of women who take non-traditional roles in the Kurdish struggle, such as taking roles in the branches of the PKK. It is more likely for these women to challenge the ongoing basic patriarchal ideology relative to the other groups of women in the struggle, although they are also “bargaining with patriarchy” in another aspect. Similar to the situation of women exercising in traditional gender roles, such as motherhood, these female PKK members are also negotiating with patriarchy in the struggle with the presupposition that all the female guerillas are virgin. Under a male leadership, as though fatherhood, all the sexual relationships between male and female guerillas are forbidden and another consideration for female guerillas, except their virginity cannot be possible both for the political leadership and for the families that have female children in the PKK. In other words, because honor is an important notion for the families, similar to the mourning/politicized mothers, female guerillas do not fully challenge the ongoing patriarchal relationships and exercise safely in the boundaries of the pure/sexless womanhood. The difference between the two situations is, although being mother is a traditional sex role for the Kurdish women, being guerilla is a non-traditional sex role and in this regard, has a potential to challenge the ongoing patriarchal gender order partially. Being a mother of a guerilla brings respect of the society indirectly, but taking active roles in the political party may have a direct respect for women because of the everlasting and unlimited respect towards the leader of the struggle, Abdullah Öcalan.

Internally displaced families respect their daughters because they have done the most extreme action by taking part in the armed struggle and becoming one of the heroines for the Kurdish nation. Just as they respect the PKK, they respect their own daughters as they were a part of the organization. The families treat these women as equal to their sons and also as equal to the father of the household. Both a woman from the city branch and another one from the mountain branch of the PKK mentioned that they have been asked about their opinion in every single act of the family and without their approval nothing happened. But this situation is relevant as much as they stay in the boundaries of “honor” that the society decides for female guerillas. If they cross those boundaries and violate the negotiation with patriarchy then the respect towards these women may be ended. If they stay in the boundaries,

there is an endless respect both in public and private spheres of their lives. As Kuxkê expressed;

Even my father does not decide anything without taking my opinion. If I approve, my family does it if I do not approve they do not. My status increased relative to my past. When I came back they started to respect me and my ideas. Because you travel by yourself and you are single. They don't respect my sister that much. They are not comfortable. They think she cannot decide right. I sometimes do not come home at nights; they never call me or ask where I was. It is impossible for my sister. I sometimes warn my family about their fault but they do not see her as free and accuse the society. Of course the only thing they think is the honor issue. Their trust for me is like in the most modern societies. They even do not want a glass of water from me. My mother says, 'wanting something from you is like wanting something from a man'. My status is like a man's status in the family. Of course it was not like this before I participated into the PKK (In her house, 26.06.2010).

Politically active women, who have participated into the NGOs, pro-Kurdish political party and/or PKK, have faced violence from the state security forces. As mentioned above, this violence was extreme, as described by Leven, one of the internally displaced Kurdish women, who was integrated into the pro-Kurdish political party activity and who experienced a miscarriage due to mistreatment while in custody. Zehferan, who participated in the activities of the pro-Kurdish political party, states that;

I was bludgeoned, I experienced abuse, I experienced beating and I experienced discrimination. I was taken under custody in 1999. I stayed in there for 3 hours. They beat me. They asked me who I knew. They hanged me as if hanging a cloth. I told him even he could kill me but I would not tell him because I did not know. They asked me if I saw guns, I said no. They beat me in front of my children. I was always afraid for my children. They beat me but I never cried. After they went away, I cried (In her relative's house, İstanbul, 21.07.2010).

The more the Kurdish women are politically active, the more it is possible for them to develop personal resistance towards the ethnic-based discriminatory attitudes in all spheres of their lives because they become more self-assertive and learn more about the Kurdish issue. They start learning about the Turkish Republic's history and create some mediums to struggle with the dominant nationalist ideology. They become more self-assertive and do not run away in

times when the discriminatory attitudes come their way. The more they deal with the political activities, the more they may gain “gender awareness” as will be discussed next.

7.5. Gender Awareness of the Internally Displaced Kurdish Women

“Gender awareness” in this study is defined as the consciousness of the gender-based inequality and the demand for the gender equality in the private and public spheres of life. It is clear in the study that, the more the internally displaced Kurdish women are politically active, the more there is a possibility for them to develop gender awareness. Çağlayan (2007) also mentioned that, women may develop gender awareness and start demanding gender equality in their private lives, because having a close relationship with the political party has the potential to empower women both directly and indirectly. Throughout the study, it has been seen that, there are basically seven women among all interviewees that have “gender awareness” and struggle for gender equality in both the public and private spheres of their lives. These women are also the ones who are politically engaged and active mostly in non-traditional gender roles. The first of these women is Leven, who has been working in different branches of the pro-Kurdish political party and has a son in the PKK. Although she has a son in the PKK, she has not worked in Peace Mothers Initiative but in different branches of the pro-Kurdish political party. The second one is Mexmork, who works as a peace activist in the Peace Mothers Initiative and has a daughter in the PKK. The third interviewee is Xaç Darik, whose son is in prison for political reasons and works for GÖÇ-DER NGO. The Fourth woman is Zehferan, whose husband is in prison for political reasons and who is a permanent head of a household and has been working for the pro-Kurdish political party. The fifth woman, Gulalp is working as a peace activist and participated in the city branch of the PKK. The sixth woman, Kuxkê, was in the mountain branch of the PKK, and the last woman, Beybûn, is also from Diyarbakır. She is working in one of the charity houses of the municipality and is a temporary head of household, while her husband is serving time as a political prisoner. Among these women, five of them live in İstanbul and two of them live in Diyarbakır.

Gender awareness of these women has been developed with the political education. Because women’s emancipation is located at the center of the Kurdish struggle and this issue has been given major importance, women have been taught about gender equality and women’s emancipation in different circumstances, even in the trainings in the prisons. For example as Leven mentioned, there is a serious training in the prisons that women take as long as they

stay there. She says that, whatever she knows today about the Kurdish struggle and her womanhood she learned in prison. According to her;

I read Kadınin Sesi (a women's journal, Women's Voice) and Kurdistan Tarihi (a Kurdish journal, The History of Kurdistan). In Kadınin Sesi, women speak for women. I cannot tell my problems to men because they do not understand me. Only women may understand my problems, because they are also women, they are also mothers. I always want female doctors. I never go to male doctors. After I read those books, I felt pity for myself. I used to close my face when we had guests in our house. But in the party (pro-Kurdish political party) everybody says hello to each other, they chat, no matter if they are men or women. God bless Abdullah Öcalan, thanks to him men respect women now. We always felt it was a fault to be a woman. I do not listen to the words of my husband, father or my sons anymore. I know everything and I do not make mistakes. I am also a healthy human and I can work, I do not wait for my husband to bring money. I am now this kind of a person. I always argue with my sisters. They do not come to the party; I always ask them, in which age they are living? (In her house, İstanbul, 14.05.2010).

Almost all of the internally displaced Kurdish women, who have gender awareness, mentioned that, in spite of the traditional gender order in the Kurdish society, the late respect they had from men is through the insights of the PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan. As mentioned before, the PKK and the pro-Kurdish political party are the most respectful organizations for the Kurdish community as they struggle for the Kurdish rights. In these insights, Abdullah Öcalan always argued that, the only way to emancipate the Kurdish nation is through the emancipation of the Kurdish women and the destruction of the feudal order that is prevalent in the Kurdish society. An article written by N. Kuran (2010: 52-53), in one of the journals of the PKK, is about women's emancipation in democratic socialist ideology. This article reflects the doctrines of the PKK and its leader. According to this view, without overcoming gender inequality, democratic society construction is impossible. This is the basic premise of the women's emancipation struggle and this also leads to the emancipated society for the Kurds. With the destruction of the oppressive male identity, equal and emancipated life would only be possible. As mentioned before, women have been symbolized as ideal representations for Kurdish society, such as "virgin guerillas", "grieving mothers" and/or "sexless politicians". But with the struggle of the women from within the movement and with the help of the global women's movement, these passive representations

have been challenged and women in the struggle have developed their active agency, which is suitable for the democratic socialist ideology of the PKK.

Women who have been involved in the political activities of the pro-Kurdish political party and/or some other branches of the party have also participated in the gender equality lessons, which are the basic openings for the Kurdish nation and may have developed more gender awareness while struggling for the Kurdish rights. Mexmork for example expressed the changes in her personal life after she started to participate in the activities of the pro-Kurdish political party. She mentioned that, although she is still concerned with her domestic duties and sometimes has problems with her husband, she always attends the activities of the Peace Mothers Initiative, which was impossible for her before. Her expressions are a confirmation of the arguments of Batliwala (1994:132), who implies that the empowerment of women is the facilitator of the empowerment of men. The more the women are empowered, the more their male partners will be empowered because women's empowerment is a positive situation for men, as women can handle more things by themselves and support their families as well as men. She describes the changes as following;

We know that all the wars are because of the patriarchal system. Men do the wars. I also experienced violence from my husband as every woman did. That is why we also struggle for women's rights. We do not only struggle for the Kurdish rights. If I did not go to the party, I would never know my rights. I learned gender awareness and raised my husband's consciousness on this issue. I was a producer in the village. I was working in the agriculture field. But in the city, I have become worthless, because I am imprisoned in the house. I was valuable for myself, for my family, for my village and for the country before we were displaced. But now I live like a slave in the city. But in this struggle Kurdish women have been emancipated. Kurdish men cannot find slave women around anymore. As long as women become emancipated, men are also emancipated. Of course men do not want their wives to be emancipated. Which master wants his slave to be emancipated? But it is too late, the process has already begun (In Peace Mothers NGO, İstanbul, 22.07.2010).

7.6. Internally Displaced Kurdish Women's "Empowerment to Change" Situation after Displacement

Gender awareness of the internally displaced Kurdish women combined with the political activity constitutes the bases of the "empowerment to change" situation for women. As

mentioned before, “empowerment to change” is similar to Molyneux’s (1985: 232-233) “strategic gender needs” concept. This concept refers to the strategies that enhance gender equality and women’s emancipation. “Empowerment to change” in this regard, points to the struggle for the change of the patriarchal gender order in the private and public spheres completely. As mentioned before (Kannabiran 1993 quoted in Batliwala 1994: 131), the threshold of the change is the change that happens in the family structure of the Kurdish society. In this section of the study, women’s struggle to challenge patriarchal ideology in their families and/or in the society as the yield of their political engagement is discussed. Some indicators are determined for the “empowerment to change” the patriarchal gender order. These indicators, which are considered to be accumulated with the previous empowerment indicators that have been exercised, are first of all, the decisions about the girl children in the family (education, marriage). As Giele (1977: 4) mentions, education and family formation are among the indicators of women’s empowerment. Although some of the internally displaced women have already formed their families and old to get a formal education, they struggle for their daughter’s lives. Secondly, sharing household responsibilities with husband and making decisions in the household as Kabeer (1999: 24) indicates. Thirdly, having control on power and resources. Finally, challenging ongoing traditional conceptions on Kurdish woman, being a gender equality supporter and participating into the women’s rights activities.

7.6.1. Girl Children’s Education and Marriage Arrangements

As aforementioned, Kabeer (1999: 24) argues that, one of the indicators of women’s empowerment is defined by the emancipation of women which is based on different factors but mostly supporting daughter’s education. According to this point of view, some of the internally displaced Kurdish women support girl children’s education, although it is traditionally irrelevant for the girls to be educated as an extension of the prevalent patriarchal gender order. The more the women are politically active, the more it is possible for them to gain gender awareness and the more they know the importance of the girl children’s education, they may support their daughters’ higher schooling level. Although some of the displaced families have been living in extreme poverty situations, they preferred to educate their daughters instead of forcing them to work and contribute to the household income as they realize the importance of the education of girl children. One of the politically active interviewees mentioned that, her daughter’s education is a result of the Kurdish movement. Xaç Darik for example, mentioned that, her daughter wants to be a journalist and she would

do anything to help her daughter finish high school and enroll to a university in the future (In her house, İstanbul, 11.05.2010). Because girl children are usually victimized like their mothers in times of conflict and displacement, they usually cannot continue their education and start to undertake economic responsibilities. It is possible for the politically active women to realize the importance of the girl children's education as a result of the Kurdish movement's insights on women's equality and although they experience impoverishment, they want their girl children to continue their education.

Politically active women who also have gender awareness may share the same idea about their daughters' marriage arrangements. Although marriage is arranged by the family members of the girl children, these women are empowered to challenge the ongoing traditions and struggle not only for the Kurdish rights, but also for the rights of women and want their daughters to marry whomever they want at an older age than they themselves did. These women are also against the early marriages. They are first of all against early marriages because they experienced this situation and know the negativities of this kind of marriage and secondly, because the Kurdish movement focus on women's rights and is against patriarchy, early marriages also have not been approved by the movement. Some of the politically active Kurdish women, who also realize the importance of gender equality, may become aware of the struggles of the Kurdish movement and want their daughters to be educated instead of getting married, but if the girl child wants to get married they do not choose their son-in-law, but let their daughter decide who to marry. They only wish their son-in-laws to be Kurdish instead of Turkish as mentioned before.

Xaç Darik for example clearly states her will about her daughter's education as following:

I think she can get married when she is 30 years old. She should get married at the earliest at 25 because first of all, she has to finish her university degree. I want my daughter to marry with her own will and I want her to marry a man whom she loves. I do not want her to experience the conditions that I faced when I got married when I was 15 years old (In her house, İstanbul, 11.05.2010).

Zehferan explains her daughter's marriage arrangements by focusing on the negative experiences that she faced in her own marriage. Mexmork, similar to Zehferan, also focused on the experiences that she lived when she got married at the early age of 16, when she was talking about her daughters' marriage arrangement. Zehferan mentioned that,

A family wanted my daughter's marriage with their son. I said my daughter is only 15 years old. I did not want my daughter to face the same problems that I faced in my marriage. I said no to that family, my daughter is too young to get married (In her relative's house, İstanbul, 21.07.2010).

Mexmork also expressed that,

I do not want my daughters to experience the same things as we did. I trained my daughters in the Kurdish movement. They got involved in the activities of the pro-Kurdish political party. They know what conscious marriage means. One of my daughters is engaged. She wanted to be engaged with a man that she loves. They also know about the women's movement and women's rights (In Peace Mothers NGO, İstanbul, 22.07.2010).

Almost all of the politically active women, who have gender awareness, are against the tradition of early marriages. They are against their children's early marriage because they know from their own experiences that it is a kind of victimization for women and secondly, they are against all the patriarchal traditions as a consequence of the Kurdish movement's ideology on destroying the patriarchy and feudalism. Starting from their own experiences, some of the women want their daughters to be educated and reject early and arranged marriages. They mentioned that, the Kurdish movement ideology also supports them by being against the traditional patriarchal structure. The more they learn from the political movement, it is more likely for them to apply this knowledge to their personal lives and struggle against the patriarchy both in public and private spheres and raise their daughters in a more egalitarian way.

7.6.2. Women's Power and Ability to Make Decisions in the Household

Rural to urban migration studies focused also on the role of the families and households. The criticism of feminists was sparked from evaluating the households as unified entities and they argued that all the members of the households are not always in collaboration and equal. Sometimes women and children may suffer in their households and may create some strategies to survive (Chant 1998: 8-9). Households and the decision-making process of the households are also crucial issues in the conflict-induced internal displacement. As mentioned before, women are not only the passive victims of the conflicts and displacements. With displacement, gender relations have shifted and a potential for women

to develop active agency may spark. Women, usually the ones that are politically active, may start to be in the decision-making positions in their households although they did not have any decision rights before displacement. It was usually the father-in-law, who decided everything in the household. According to Panda (2000:10), the power of an individual rests on her/his power to make decisions in the household and her/his level of political activity as well as her/his control of the resources and benefits among other indicators. In this study, it is argued that, there is a possibility for internally displaced women with greater political activity, the status in the family may increase. Although it is traditionally difficult for women to be in the decision-making position in the household, politically active women not only gain self-assertiveness, but also it is possible for them to gain power to challenge the ongoing patriarchal gender order in the private sphere of their lives. The more the women become politically active; there is a possibility for them to be involved in the decision-making process in the households. In other words, their voiceless and invisible position in the private sphere may be diminished as they get more voice and become more visible in the public life as a consequence of the political activities.

For example, as it was delineated by Leven, one of the politically active internally displaced women in the study the situation changed after they were displaced. As she mentioned,

I am powerful because I am a mother. I can stand on my own feet. When my husband was in jail, I was both my children's mother and father at the same time. I, of course, always ask about things in the household but he always tells me that I know better. When we were living in the village, he was the one who decided everything (In her house, İstanbul, 14.05.2010).

Similarly Xaç Darik mentioned that, her father-in-law was the one who had the power in the household before their displacement. As she mentioned,

Things were completely different in the village. I begged my father-in-law on the religious holidays to buy a pair of shoes for my children. The power was in the hands of my father-in-law. He decided everything about the household. I was ashamed to want things from him. For example, when I needed pajamas I was ashamed and could not tell him. Now we go and buy whatever we want in the city. My daughter makes her own shopping and also my daughter-in-law. Now me and my husband decide together and also one of my sons, who brings money to the family (In her house, İstanbul, 11.05.2010).

In the study, it can be argued that, politically active women's status may increase in the household and it is possible for them to start participating into the decision-making process. Political activity does not only include the activities of the pro-Kurdish political party and NGOs, but also it includes the branches of the PKK. Women, who have taken active roles in the branches of the PKK, are in a more advantageous position in the families and moreover they compare their own position with the men's in the private sphere as aforementioned. For example Kuxke mentioned that,

Even my father cannot decide without me. I sometimes ask them why they can not decide without me. Even in the smallest thing they ask me. If I say okay, then they do it. If I do not say okay they do not do it. They tell me even the smallest problems. They feel safe if I know the problem. My status in the family increased a lot. After I came back (she means from the mountain), they know that my decisions about the life generally are always true. They trust me that much (In her house, Diyarbakır, 26.06.2010).

Undoubtedly, the power of the internally displaced Kurdish women may also come from their position as heads of households and their contribution to the household economy. But this kind of empowerment is in order to survive in the cities. In other words, although being head of the household and earning money by working outside house may challenge the patriarchal gender order in the household; these are actually power positions taken to cope with the situations in the cities. They do not work outside to struggle with patriarchy, but to feed their children. This type of empowerment is, in conclusion, the "empowerment to cope" for these women and they do not always show signs of gender awareness. It is unquestionably a form of empowerment for women after the displacement process, but it is not an empowerment position to change the patriarchal ideology. On the other hand, the political activity of the women may bring gender awareness as they spend more time in the Kurdish movement and learn more about gender equality as one of the results of the Kurdish movement's democratic socialist ideology that is based on gender equality. The more they learn, the more there is a potential for them to struggle for the women's rights and gender equality both in the public and private spheres.

Although it is against the traditional gender relationships, in some of the households, politically active women have started to share household responsibilities with their husbands. The importance of sharing the household responsibilities comes from the traditional division of gender roles in the society. As in every patriarchal society, women's roles are defined in

the private sphere and men's, on the contrary, in the public sphere. But the ongoing political activity of internally displaced Kurdish women may have an effect on changing the traditions and with the help of the Kurdish movement; it is possible for men to start sharing the household duties. In this study, this situation cannot be generalized but, although the number is low, there are still some families who have achieved to share the household responsibilities. For example as Mexmork mentioned, although it is still hard for her husband to accept sharing household responsibilities, she still struggles in the private life to change this ongoing patriarchal structure:

When I am away for an activity of Peace Mothers Initiative, my husband makes all the household duties. It sometimes causes problems between us, because he still does not want to do this stuff. He also sometimes cooks, especially on special days. These are maybe seen as small developments, but they are very important for me (In Peace Mothers NGO, İstanbul, 22.07.2010).

Although there are some cases where household responsibilities are shared between women and men in the displaced families, it is still generally women's duty to meet the household needs. In this regard, politically active women experience a double burden, although they have gender sensitivity, they struggle to change this tradition of gender roles. This situation is an example for the argument of Kannabiran (1993 quoted in Batliwala 1994: 131) that implies the family is a threshold for the change in the gender relations and it is also the last point for empowerment. In this regard, it can be argued that, although some of the internally displaced Kurdish women's status has started to be changed in the private sphere that followed the developments in the public arena, traditional gender relations are still dominant in the households.

7.6.3. Internally Displaced Kurdish Women's Position as Gender Equality Supporters and Women's Rights Activists

Kabeer (1999: 24) mentions that, equality in the household is one of the indicators for the women's empowerment. Internally displaced Kurdish women, who have become equality supporters in the process of the Kurdish struggle, argue that gender equality discussions could be possible as the struggles of the PKK leader in particular and of the Kurdish movement in general. With the insights of the PKK leader and the Kurdish movement, traditional gender relations could be shaken and a struggle against patriarchy has started. Some of the politically active women defined themselves as gender equality supporters. For

example, Xaç Darik gives an example from her own experiences and mentions that these all happened by the attempts of the PKK leader. She expressed that,

We owe a lot to the PKK leader and the pro-Kurdish political party. He has so much effect on us. He always gives lessons to men. He says, give opportunity to women, women's rights is important, he shares his ideas. He always talks on Roj TV, I always watch. He says that women should be free. But free does not mean bodily free. It means the freedom rights, it means defining herself. He says, the more she explains herself, the more she is valuable. For example, after I met with the party, I have not given birth. Because I know myself, I start to understand what he means. My husband also shared the same idea with me, he paid the abortion money and I went to the doctor and had abortion. In the village it would be impossible" (In her house, İstanbul, 11.05.2010).

Xaç Darik was talking about abortion when the subject is gender equality. For her, to have reproduction rights and controlling her reproductive capability is a way of gender equality. As mentioned before, similar to the village life, in the cities women lack control of their fertility and this makes them more marginalized in the cities. This is also a negative experience for women especially in the cities because they face extreme poverty and it becomes harder to nourish all children after displacement. But it was also mentioned by some of the interviewees that, their husbands' attitudes toward them changed after displacement. It would probably because of the combination of change in men's minds as a result of the Kurdish movement and the PKK leader's insights as well as men's freedom from their father's pressure. In sum, being in a politically engaged household away from traditional boundaries may also be effective on women's equality in the public and private spheres of life in the cities.

On the other hand, Zehferan talks about her working life when she was asked about her opinions on gender equality. According to her, women's work is as valuable as men's. She mentions that,

My husband doesn't say anything about my work. I was also working before he was imprisoned. He could not work, so I had to. Should I wait for money from him? I am not disabled. I can also work. I can do men's job, as I am working in the construction field. I always argue that, these traditions have to be diminished. Women have to struggle

for that. Women should convince men about such things (In her relative's house, İstanbul, 21.07.2010).

Gulalp, who worked in the city branch of the PKK and is also now working in a pro-Kurdish NGO, told about the situation in the PKK and confirmed the other interviewees' statements as following;

With the Kurdish women's movement and especially with the insights of the PKK leader, a lot of things have changed. Most importantly, men should internalize the insights of the PKK leader because as he mentioned, we are struggling against ourselves and the patriarchal structure in the Kurdish society. Political party quota against women was used for making women active. But now we don't need such a motivation for women. In the party, there is no discrimination against women. If a woman knows better, a man could be her student for example. Theoretical and practical education goes together. For example, women have their own military group in the PKK. Putting women in important positions is a tradition that was started by the PKK and continued with the political party. Men usually don't want this importance of women but the PKK leader gave a lot of importance to this subject. Politically active women are in a position to be a model for the women in different parts of the world (In GÖÇ-DER NGO, İstanbul, 12.05.2010).

As aforementioned, Kurdish women's efforts are also as effective as the insights of the PKK leader to destroy the hegemony of the patriarchal relationships. With the efforts of the women in the struggle, Kurdish women could be active agents instead of passive symbols of the nationalist discourse. Without women's efforts in the struggle, gender equality demands would not be as pervasive as they are now. Although it is still an ideal type of society among the Kurdish women and still gender equality could not be fully achieved, there are some politically active women, who struggle for women's rights in the public and also in their private lives. Although some of the politically active women are gender equality supporters among the interviewees, only Kuxke and Beybûn are working as women's rights activists among them. In other words, although some of them have gender awareness and support gender equality, all do not struggle against patriarchal gender order in the society. As Kuxke mentioned,

I found the women's movement very valuable. The movements in Europe for example are not fulfilled. Our movement on the other hand is valuable and fulfilled. It has

a very strong ideology and philosophy. We learn everything from this movement. Because we learn it later, it is a kind of disadvantage of course. It shows itself even in our women's movement. It is a theoretical movement but the practical part is not applied that much. You cannot see the reflection of the movement on the Kurdish society. Before women the patriarchal structure of the Kurdish family should be changed. You should give men the education first. If you don't make these people conscious about gender equality, you cannot be successful. Education is must. You cannot just change things by protests or activities (In her house, Diyarbakır, 26.06.2010).

Beybûn, on the other hand is active in the women's movement and explains her reason as following;

I actively participate into the women's movement because they are oppressed in double ways. They are discriminated both by the state because they are Kurdish and by their husbands because they are women. They are even oppressed by their own sons and also by their mother-in-laws. They are discriminated from all ways and they are protesting this situation. Sexual harassment and rape are not acceptable. I only participate into the activities. I am not a member but I, as an individual, participate into the activities. I watch everything about women both from Turkish television and Roj TV (In Günışığı Charity House, Diyarbakır, 24.06.2010).

It may be easier for young politically active women to be active in the Kurdish movement because there is a possibility for them not to internalize traditional roles as much as women who were born and raised in the villages. In the village life, traditions and patriarchal gender order are more prevalent, while on the other hand, in the politically intense environment of the cities, these traditional relations tend to be shaken by other factors like the women's movement in Turkey, and young women could become women's rights activists more easily than their mothers.

7.7. Proposing a New Pattern for the Situation of the Conflict-Induced Internally Displaced Women

The research question of the dissertation is "What kind of experiences do the women go through during internal displacement and what is the importance of these experiences for women's empowerment process?". This chapter is to elaborate the research question of the study. As mentioned above, there are basically two aspects of the marginalization of internally

displaced Kurdish women in the cities. The first aspect is the “ethnic-based discrimination” of the women because of their Kurdishness. When their ethnic identity combines with their education and a linguistic barrier as well as their class shift after displacement, it is more possible for them to become marginalized in the city centers. Moreover, if they are politically detached from the Kurdish struggle they may become unable to resist discrimination and lack coping strategies. This situation may make them not only “urban poor”, but also the marginalized group in the cities, who try to recover from the effects of the conflict in their small neighborhoods and experience life-long imprisonment in this living environment.

The second aspect of the Kurdish women’s marginalization is based on their increased “gender-based discrimination” in the cities after displacement. As mentioned above, it is possible for the patriarchal relationships to become stricken in the cities, which in turn may make women more voiceless and immobile in the cities. The more they are politically detached, the more it is possible for them to lack the mediums of struggling with this situation and become more marginalized in the cities. The more the political detachment increases, it is more likely fatalism, male control on women, women’s dependency on other women and immobility increase after displacement process.

In sum, the marginalization effects are composed of first of all, its “ethnic-based discrimination” of women after displacement, which is composed of dependency of the Kurdish women because of linguistic and illiteracy barriers, discrimination because of their Kurdishness, poverty and the class shift after displacement, inadequate healthcare and exploitation in the working life. Secondly, the marginalization effects are based on the “gender-based discrimination” of women, which is composed of increased partner violence, oppression and control, lack of control over money and other resources, lack of control over fertility and childcare obligations in the urban context. This pattern is different than the existing theories in some points of view. First of all, it brings a new aspect for the marginalization of displaced women as making a differentiation between the ethnic and gender-based discrimination of women in the urban context and secondly, although Rowlands (1997) mentioned “machismo” as one of the indicators of the marginalization of women, she did not explain it in detail. But in this study, “machismo” is considered as patriarchy and it is argued that, an increase in the patriarchal relationships may result in an increase of marginalization for women.

As aforementioned, this thesis is based on social constructivist approach and according to this view; women's essential marginalization and passive victim position in times of conflict and displacement are rejected. One of the original parts of this study, which contributes to the available theories on internal displacement, is that, there is a differentiation between the empowerment situations of women after displacement. According to this differentiation, there is a potential for women to be empowered after displacement, but women may be empowered in different aspects. According to this understanding, there are two stages in the empowerment process. According to Ertürk's (2010) theory, the first one is the "empowered to cope" situation and the other one is the "empowered to change" situation. Women may gain active agency after displacement and the more they are politically engaged, it is more possible for them to become self-assertive and personally resist the discriminatory attitudes, which in turn may increase their being "empowered to cope" with the negative consequences that they face in the cities.

In this study, it is accepted in the first place that, women are victimized from the internal displacement because by itself, internal displacement makes these people forcefully migrate from their homelands, which in other words caused "deterritorialization" of these people. As a consequence, these people not only lost their homelands, but also they lost a feeling of belonging to a community and being in a secure environment. It also caused traumas in these people's lives. But considering internally displaced women only as victims may lead us to a misunderstanding of the whole process in their lives, because there may always be a potential for those women to be empowered in different aspects, which is based on some basic indicators. The indicators of the "empowered to cope" situation in the cities are multiple. The first indicator is women's home-based work, which is a contribution to the household economy, although women do not count this type of labor as work. Another indicator is their development of literacy skills, which is one of the basic reasons of women's marginalization and by developing literacy skills, women's dependency decreases in the cities. Women's activity outside the home, such as working outside and/or participating in the activities of the pro-Kurdish political party and/or NGOs is another indicator of the women's "empowerment to cope" in the cities. This may make women mobile and act collectively, which are indicators of women's self-assertiveness. The final indicator is getting humanitarian aid, in order to cope with their poverty situation in the cities.

Women's "empowerment to cope" with their ongoing negative situations in the cities after the displacement process may lead them more and more attend to the political activities of

women. Some women are more ambitious to participate in these Kurdish rights activities but some are not. This difference may come from their relation with the ongoing political activities of the Kurdish movement. If the woman does not embrace the Kurdish movement it becomes more difficult for her to be involved in the activities. But on the other hand, if she internalizes the demands of the Kurdish movement, she may become a part of the movement. As a socialist movement, the Kurdish movement also wants the population be integrated as a whole, including Kurdish women. If woman's relation with the movement starts before the displacement process, in other words, if the children are in the movement, with the help of the pro-Kurdish political party and the NGOs, it may become easier to include women into the struggle. As a result, the more women have a relation with the movement, it is more possible for them to become a part of it and also internalize the demands of the movement.

Another important stage in the process of the empowerment of internally displaced Kurdish women is their gender awareness. The more the women get involved into the political movement; they are more likely become aware on gender issues. As aforementioned, Ertürk (forthcoming) argues that, the more the women are involved in political movements the more they are attached to the women's movement in one way or another. As a result of the socialist character of the Kurdish movement, women's emancipation is considered as one of the major achievements of the struggle. As the leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan mentions, women's emancipation from patriarchy has a priority in the emancipation process of the Kurdish nation. Demolishing the patriarchal structure of the Kurdish society is one of the aims of the movement. As a consequence of this aim, the more the internally displaced Kurdish women participate in the political activities; it is more possible for them to have gender awareness because of the insights of the Kurdish struggle. Gender awareness is an important stage in the empowerment process and after its achievement, "empowerment to change" the prevalent patriarchal structure in the private and public spheres could be introduced.

There are basically three different indicators of the internally displaced Kurdish women's "empowerment to change" their situation. These are, supporting girl children's education and also not getting involved into their marriage arrangement, gaining power and ability to be in the decision-making process in the household and being a gender equality supporter in every sphere of their lives and also attending to the women's rights activities. Although there are women who support gender equality and although there are gender equality aspects in the ongoing Kurdish struggle, such as the co-president implication in the pro-Kurdish political

party, patriarchal gender order is still seems to be prevalent in the private sphere. But still, there are some women that are working for the women's rights and aim for gender equality in their households. The process, which starts with the victimization of the internally displaced Kurdish women and ends with the "empowerment to change" the situation, is schematized below. The process is starting from the victimization of these women because it is considered that internal displacement is a victimization situation from the very beginning independently, but as argued throughout the study, there is always a potential for them to be empowered. In other words, from a social constructivist point of view, it is argued in the study that, internally displaced Kurdish women are victimized at the very beginning of the displacement process, but they do not always have to be marginalized in the cities as the consequence of this victimization. There is always possibility for these women to change their victim position, gain active agency and develop empowerment situation after the displacement process.




Figure 7.3: New Pattern for the Situation of the Conflict-Induced Internally Displaced Women

As aforementioned, in the very beginning of the process, all internally displaced women, who have been forced to leave their homelands, are considered to be victimized. They did not only lose their homelands, but they also lost the feeling of belonging to a community, which is described with the concept of “deterritorialization”. Before the displacement

process, it is mentioned by the interviewees that they faced negative attitudes from the state security forces. These attitudes were considered; first of all, for punishing the households if one of the family members supported the non-state armed group, secondly to make them leave the rural areas, as it was the region of conflict and thirdly, to prevent the rural support of the non-state armed group members. The negative attitudes included violence against the villagers, including women and sometimes as the threat of sexual violence as the interviewees mentioned. One of the major oppressions was because of the village guard system and villagers who did not accept being village guards were forced to leave their homelands. The oppression from the state security forces made these families become insecure in their homelands, as they were always under the threat of conflict, torture, loss of family members, insults and threats. Not only the state security forces, but also the non-state armed group members used oppression on the villagers as some of the women mentioned. In other words, it can be argued that, the villagers caught between two oppression sites; being village guards and helping the state security forces or denying village guard system and supporting the non-state armed group members.

Victimization period did not end with the migration to the cities. Displaced women may be trapped in ethnic and gender discrimination process in the city centers and they may become marginalized after they were displaced. In the city centers, one of the biggest marginalization factors for women is the language and illiteracy barriers. On the other hand, almost all of the families have to face impoverishment in the cities and become the members of the “urban poor” category. This situation also shows the class shift of these families. Although most of the families were living in wealth in their villages, they face extreme deprivation situations after displacement process. Another marginalization factor for these women is being imprisoned in their neighborhoods and to become dependent of their family members in the city centers. Besides this fact, they have to deal with the trauma that they faced in the displacement process. They are war-torn population of the country and when their deterritorialized situation combines with the loss of the family members, including children, brings along the feeling of insecurity. Most of them still face oppression from the state if they become politically engaged and participate to the political activities after displacement. These women have to deal with the feeling of insecurity and distrustfulness towards the state, which makes them remain more in the cycle of hopelessness.

In the study it is argued that, although all of the displaced women are victimized in the first place, there is a possibility for them to change their victimized situation into empowerment

position. There is always a possibility for these women to become marginalized especially when the victimization process combines with fatalism, increased male control, dependency on other people, impoverishment of the family, increased partner violence and immobility of women, which means the neighborhood imprisonment in the cities after displacement, the possibility of marginalization for women increases. Women's illiteracy and the language barrier make the situation worse in the cities. In the process of empowerment, there are some basic factors that affect the process. These factors are "political engagement", "political activity" and "gender awareness", which will be explained in details below. The Figure 7.3. above schematizes the potential empowerment process for internally displaced women.

Marginalization and empowerment are not fixed positions for women after displacement. There is always a transivity between these two situations. Marginalized group of women may become politically engaged in the city centers or may start working outside house and develop self-assertiveness, which is one of the first stages of the empowerment. Political engagement may be developed by displaced women's contact with pro-Kurdish political party, NGOs and/or the PKK. These contacts may also spark a possibility for women to become self-assertive and their marginalization situation may be shaken after displacement. It is also possible for women to develop self-assertiveness and gain active agency by working outside home. Because it is traditionally inconvenient for Kurdish women to work outside the house, by doing so, patriarchal relationships in the family may be shaken and as they realize their own worth, create individual confidence and self-respect as they act outside the boundaries of tradition and prove that they are contributors to the household income. Although women experience discriminatory attitudes from their job providers and/or from the other workers as a consequence of the ongoing discriminatory attitudes against Kurdish population in the society, working outside house is still an important factor that leads women to the "empowered to cope" situation. Working outside the home does not directly increase women's status in the household, because these women do not work outside in order to increase their status, but to cope with the impoverishment that they face in the cities after displacement. This is the reason for them not to fully challenge the ongoing patriarchal relations in the household, but to be "empowered to cope" with the situation that they face in the cities. A third possibility is the displaced women's head of household position but this is not always the case. Because displaced women prefer or have to live in their family member's houses, they may not always develop active agency. This situation may prevent women's self-assertiveness because the male family control and oppression may continue and increase in the city centers. In sum, especially two indicators; political engagement and

working outside the house may increase women's self-assertiveness and self-respect, which in turn may affect their active agency.

On the other hand, the more women participate in the activities of the pro-Kurdish political party and/or NGOs, the more their mobility may increase and the more the women may act collectively, their "power with" other people situation develops and their strength to engage in a "power to" struggle and resist discriminatory attitudes increases. They attend more to the pro-Kurdish political party's activities and usually they attend these activities with their neighbors or relatives, which may make these women feel more comfortable when acting in a group. The more their active agency develops, there is a possibility for the internally displaced women to be "empowered to cope" with the situations that they experience after displacement. They become empowered to meet their "practical gender needs" and also may develop active resistance strategies for the ethnic-based discrimination situations that they experience, instead of living in fear of the discriminatory attitudes of the public against Kurds. Because they gained an active agency, they may start developing their literacy, start searching for solutions for their families' poverty and deal with the governmental agencies in order to have a better living standard the city centers.

The next stage in the empowerment process is the "political activity" of women in the cities. The more the women become politically engaged after displacement, the more it is possible for them to take active roles in the Kurdish movement. As aforementioned, taking active roles in an organization is a new situation for women. The more they take active roles in the pro-Kurdish organizations, it is more possible for women to develop active agency and their resistance strategies may get stronger towards the discriminatory attitudes. There are basically two types of political activities in this study. The first one is the political activities that are in the boundaries of the traditional gender roles, such as being mother activists in the Peace Mothers Initiative and the second one is the political activities that are not in the boundaries of the traditional gender roles, such as being members of pro-Kurdish political party and non-state armed group. If the political activity is in the traditional gender roles, then it is more possible for them to challenge the dominant nationalist ideology and struggle for the Kurdish rights, such as education in the mother tongue and to end the ongoing conflict. Most of the Kurdish women political activists are in this stage. They struggle for the basic human rights of the Kurds, but they move within the boundaries of traditional womanhood. Because they are in the struggle as the mothers of the nation, they are "bargaining with the patriarchy" and do not cross the cultural and traditional boundaries. As

aforementioned, in this study, the motherhood concept is considered from a social constructivist point of view. According to this, instead of taking mothers as essentially peaceful women, mothers of the Kurdish movement are considered as active subjects, who have transformed their pain into political activities, in other words, who have politicized their motherhood to challenge the dominant nationalist ideology that is considered as oppressive towards Kurds. This politicization has given strength to the mothers to struggle in the Kurdish movement as active political agents. This is also against the representation of symbolic “grieving mothers” of the Kurdish movement image, because this image is also essentialist. But as the women’s representation in the movement has turned into real subjectivities, with the help of the global women’s movement and the ideology of the Kurdish movement, the grieving mother representation has turned into politicized motherhood. This is the reason why some of the women undertake traditional gender roles and have gender awareness at the same time. Although it is an exceptional case, in the study, there is one woman who is a member of the Peace Mothers Initiative and also has developed gender awareness. The difference of this woman from the other Peace Mothers Initiative’s members may be because of her relatively higher education.

If the politically active women undertake non-traditional gender roles in the Kurdish movement, such as being a member of the PKK or taking active roles in the pro-Kurdish political party, it is more possible for them to gain “gender awareness” and they start struggling for the destruction of “manhood” and power relations, which is the basic premise of the new social and democratic order of the Kurdish movement. Taking non-traditional gender roles in the struggle does not mean that they are away from negotiating with patriarchy. These women are also under a male-dominated leadership, which affects them in different aspects. For example, as mentioned before, female guerillas’ virginity is a taboo in the movement and the otherwise is unacceptable. But still, being a guerilla is an extreme service in the movement for the females and this brings along the respect of the society towards this women, which in turn affects the status of these women in the public and private spheres of their lives. On the other hand, from the very beginning of the Kurdish movement, the female activists have been represented as “sexless politicians”. But as mentioned before, these politically active women, who take non-traditional gender roles in the struggle, have turned their positions in the movement from passive symbols to active beings and they are closer to challenge the patriarchal gender order by struggling not only for the Kurdish rights, but also for the women’s rights. As aforementioned, especially in 2000s, women’s position in the pro-Kurdish political party became more emancipated and the women were

empowered to struggle with the patriarchal structure within the party by taking place in the decision-making process. This situation could be possible with the help of the non-state armed group's ideology that is based on gender equality and also with the help of global women's movement, which also affected these politically active women. It can be argued that, being a guerilla mother brings an indirect status for women because of her children's position in the struggle, where as taking part in the armed struggle or being a member of the pro-Kurdish political party brings a direct status for the women because they gain their status by themselves.

The more the women take non-traditional gender roles in the struggle, the more it is possible for them to develop gender awareness. Politically active women, who have developed gender awareness, in addition to the political activity, may attain to the "empowerment to change" situation, that refers to meeting the "strategic gender needs". In this position women start challenging the patriarchal gender order not only in their private spheres, but also in the public sphere and struggle for women's rights and gender equality. Some of the internally displaced Kurdish women in the study, although it constitutes the minority part of the interviewees, are "empowered to change" the situation that they experience after their displacement process. The more they are close to the non-state armed group's ideology and the more they may act outside the boundaries of the traditional gender roles, it is more possible for them to reach to the "empowerment to change" stage in the process.

In sum, although internal displacement is a victimization process for women, with other factors, especially political engagement and working outside house, there is a potential for women to be empowered after displacement. Similar to the argument of the study at the beginning, it is obvious that Kurdish women are mostly empowered in the cities after displacement. Although there are also marginalized women in the study, the majority of the displaced women have been empowered in the cities. Marginalized group of women may also change their position in the society as aforementioned. According to the statements of the interviewees, it is considered that, most of the internally displaced women are "empowered to cope" in the cities and some of them are "empowered to change" after displacement. Although the majority of them are "empowered to cope" it should not be understood that displacement is something positive for women. On the contrary, as it is mentioned in every occasion that displacement is victimization for all women and other family members, but instead of evaluating the women as passive victims, their potential to

develop active agency should never be overlooked. This potential should be analyzed as a result of the combination of the Kurdish movement and the global women's movement.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

Internal armed conflict and internal displacement have been highly sensitive subjects in Turkey and the academic research on these issues has started to be studied recently. In this study, all the results are based on personal perceptions of the displaced women interviewees. In depth-interview technique was used in order to obtain the experiences of women in the conflict-induced internal displacement process. This technique was sufficient to provide detailed perspectives of the displaced women, but on the other hand because of the time limitations, qualitative research methods had some restrictions. Because it takes time to make in-depth interviews, number of the interviews remained limited, which inhibits making generalization on the issue. Although the study had some limitations, it is important to unfold the distinctive experiences of the internally displaced Kurdish women, after they have started to live in the cities.

There is an ongoing internal armed conflict in Turkey between the state security forces and non-state armed group, PKK since 1984. The internal displacement through 1990s is a consequence of the ongoing internal armed conflict in Turkey. Internal displacements occurred from villages in eastern and southeastern Turkey to the city center. One of the reasons can be seen in attempts to cut off the rural support of the PKK. Villagers that accepted the “village guards” system, which means they took guns and salaries from the state and fought against the PKK, were approved to stay in their homelands. Some of these village guards have benefited from the empty houses and unused agricultural fields of the villages. Some of them got involved into criminal activities using their privileged position, thus some of the village guards have used their guns for their personal hostility; i.e. also in the blood feuds. It is also reported that some of them did not allow the villagers to return to their homes, when the government announced the “return to village project” in 1999. Cases of violence occurred and some of the village guards were imprisoned. Villagers that did not accept the village guard system were forced to leave their homelands and were left to their own fate in the destination cities.

Throughout the history of the Turkish Republic, internal displacements have been used as counter-insurgency strategies towards the Kurds. The displacement history for Kurds starts with the Sheikh Said insurgency, which was followed by the East Reform Plan in 1925. Starting from this date, internal displacement has been used to put down the Kurdish rebellions. Kemalist ideology has always considered these insurgencies as revolts against the modernization of the new republic and evaluated counter-insurgency strategies as the integration policy towards the minorities. Homogenizing the population was one of the aims of the republicans because it was necessary for the diffusion of the reforms into all strata of the nation. These displacements were considered as the assimilation policies towards the Kurdish population by some of scholars. Whether displacement policies were used for integration as Kemalist ideology argues, or as assimilation practices, it is one of the basic human rights violations that not only refers losing the homelands, but also losing to be in a secure environment, which is called as “deterritorialization”.

Women’s experiences in migration process are stressed by scholars working on rural to urban migration studies. Because of the different properties of forced migration, although the concepts of sociological theories on rural to urban migration are used, the theories themselves are not enough to explain the situation of women in times of internal displacement.

The concepts of sociology that were used in this study are as such; economic participation of women, housewifely work, internalized oppression, social network, gendered poverty, chain migration and role of the family/household. Conflict-induced displacement affects women differently than economic migration because, first of all, conflict-induced displacement is a kind of forced migration and in this type of movement, there is no intention, preparation, as well as expectation, before the migration. Secondly, social norms do not consider it as appropriate for Kurdish women to work outside their homes. If they work then they usually work in low paid and uninsured jobs. Thirdly, in economic migration, households often move jointly, whereas in internal displacement, frequently women may migrate by themselves as a result of family separations, such as loss or imprisonment of other family members. Fourthly, because internally displaced Kurdish women feel insecure in the cities and become distrustful to the state, that makes them aggressive and stressful and city life is often experienced as imprisonment. Fifthly, although it is possible for economic migrants to have a connection with their homelands, contacts with their home village is mostly impossible for the internally displaced women. This may happen as there may be no one left

behind, or sometimes there may be no village left. This situation makes internally displaced women rootless, homeless and insecure in their new residence. Finally and most importantly, different than economic migrants, internally displaced women are more inclined to be politicized in the cities. This can be linked partial to the fact that the victimization that the Kurdish population has experienced may be caused a collective trauma and resulted in the development of a politicized ethnic identity.

Women's experiences in times of conflicts in general and in times of internal displacement in particular are needed to be studied. Feminist International Relations Theory argues that, women's experiences in times of conflict and internal displacement are different than men's. It is an interdisciplinary area, which focuses on sociological, psychological, economic, international relations and feminist theories. By using mostly a feminist standpoint, this approach aims to make women's experiences valuable for the political arena and proposes special solutions for their problems. Conventional international relations theory has overridden the gender differences. In order to stress the role of women in times of conflict and internal displacement, women's different experiences are underlined, the state is questioned, as it does not protect the individuals and sometimes the individuals' harm is a result of the state, and they also undermine the essentialist features that have been attributed to women, such as women's inherent peacefulness. While highlighting women's experiences in times of conflict and internal displacement, Feminist IR scholars have developed two debates within the theory, which are the essentialist approach and the social constructivist approach. The essentialist approach argues that women in times of conflict and internal displacement are affected by the consequences of negative experiences, such as sexual violence, increased domestic violence and widowhood and are the passive victims along with children in the process. But social constructivism, on the other hand, argues that the problem is not women's essential victim position, but it is the prevalent patriarchal structure that puts women into this situation and there is a potential for women to develop active agency and empowerment (Ertürk forthcoming). In other words, the social constructivist approach does not deny the victimization process for women, but it rejects the source of this victimization as the women's essentially passive position and argues that it is the patriarchal structure of the society that puts women in this position and with the displacement process, the patriarchal relations may be shaken and a possibility for women to gain active agency may emerge.

The aims of this study are to explore and critically analyze the experiences of conflict-induced internally displaced women in Turkey and contribute to the available knowledge regarding the ways the internal displacement affects women. From a social constructivist approach, the argument of this study is internally displaced Kurdish women are victimized as they are forced to migrate from their homelands and have to struggle and find ways to survive negative situations in the cities after displacement. After the displacement process, women may be trapped in the marginalization situation because of the increased patriarchal relations, as a result of men's will to control women in an alienated environment and/or because of the ethnic-based discrimination that they face in the city centers. But there is always a possibility for displaced women to break ethnic and gender-based discrimination in the cities and they may gain active agency and be empowered after displacement by working outside their house and/or by political engagement. Marginalization and empowerment positions are not frozen situations for displaced women. There is always a possibility for the marginalized group to be empowered while they are living in the city centers. Thus, the research question is, "What kind of experiences do the women go through during internal displacement and what is the importance of these experiences for women's empowerment process?". In this regard, the first part of the research question focuses on the experiences of the Kurdish women before and in the process of displacement and the second part focuses on the women's potential of empowerment in the cities after their displacement process. This study utilizes feminist methodology, as conventional methodologies are inadequate to fully relate the women's personal experiences and the oppression in their lives and the in-depth interview technique is used to achieve in-depth information on the women's experiences in the process of internal displacement.

It is accepted in the study that, all of the displaced Kurdish women experienced negative situations and have become victimized before and after the displacement process. First of all, being in a conflict zone is victimization all by itself. They have to deal with the stress of the conflict everyday. Besides, because of this conflict, almost all of them lost at least one of their family members and some of them lost their children. Women's experiences before their displacement process were taken into consideration because this study does not deny that the displacement process is victimization for internally displaced families, including the Kurdish women. Besides, it is argued that, women's victimization starts in the period that they live in the middle of the conflict zones. When their lives before the displacement were analyzed, it can be seen that they faced many negative situations and victimization before their displacement. Almost all of the negative consequences of the armed conflicts that

Feminist IR Theory explains were influential on most of the displaced Kurdish women's village lives before they were forced to migrate. Although their economic situation was relatively better in the villages than their situation in the cities, they still had difficulties living in a conflict zone. Their economic situation was better because they could obtain their nourishment material in their own houses. Besides, because almost all of them had their own agricultural fields, they did not have to pay for food, unlike in the city centers. Because Kurdish families are usually crowded, as they usually live together as an extended family and have many children, it gets harder for them to subsist in the cities. Husbands of the households became unskilled in the city centers because they usually performed agricultural work and husbandry in their homelands and they had to work in unskilled and informal jobs on daily-based salaries in the cities, such as working in construction. Although there were strict patriarchal relations and control on women in the villages, women still preferred to live in their homelands instead of the cities. It is also mentioned that, strict control on women started to change after PKK members' visits to the villages. The relationships with the non-state armed group members started with their meetings with the villagers. Their speeches about the Kurdish struggle, Kurdish identity and the women's importance for the struggle were influential on villagers, which also affected men's attitudes towards their wives and girl children.

Because of the visits of the PKK members to the villages, the oppression of the state security forces increased. For villagers, it was necessary and accurate to support the PKK members because they considered them as the children of their villages. Almost all of the women mentioned that there were children from their villages, who entered the PKK. As a result of this reality, the villagers legitimized their support as they saw themselves as being from the same blood. That was also one of the reasons to reject the village guard system. Hence, internally displaced women considered the village guards as the betrayers of their nation and indicated hate towards them. According to the displaced women, the village guards were not only betrayers of the nation, but also the thieves of their houses and lands that they had to leave behind. One of the reasons that the internally displaced population could not return their homelands is the presence of the village guards in their homelands. Almost all of the houses were occupied by some of the village guards and they are one of the biggest threats towards the internally displaced families' lives. Besides the village guards, the internally displaced population cannot return to their homelands because some of the villages were destroyed and also their farming areas are not usable anymore. There is no house to return to, landmines even increase the risk. To sum up, the safety of the villagers is not guaranteed if

they want to return their homelands. Returning back to the villages should be evaluated in this context, as some of the villagers want to return back to their villages permanently, while others want to stay in the cities but want to visit their villages seasonally.

The villagers experienced oppression from the state security forces mostly because of their support of the PKK members. On the other hand, state security forces were using oppression on these villages to make them accept the village guard system. When the villagers did not accept to be village guards, they were forced to leave their homelands and they were not directed to any place. Not only were the men oppressed by the state security forces, but also the women experienced violence, especially if they had children in the PKK.

State security forces increased pressure on the families that had children in the non-state armed group. Besides the difficulties of living in a conflict zone and trying to stay alive, as it is mentioned, women experienced violence from the state security forces and there was always a fear of sexual violence. Although most of the displaced women mentioned that they had not been sexually assaulted by the state security forces, they were in constant fear as a consequence of the assaults and abuses of the state security forces towards the women. They were under the threat of violence, especially in times of domiciliary visits. In other words, the fear of sexual violence was prevalent among the internally displaced women. Women also witnessed violence, torture and killings of other people both from their own families and from other villages in times of attacks of the state security forces. Until the evacuations of the villages, these experiences terrified the internally displaced Kurdish women and the final evacuation caused serious traumas.

Some of the internally displaced women were aware that their support of the PKK members was the main reason of these oppressions towards their husbands and themselves. On the other hand, some of the internally displaced women had not even seen non-state armed group members in their villages, but because their village was evacuated they had to migrate with other people. The ones that mentioned these reasons had relatively closer relations with PKK members. Some of them had direct relations, but some of them had an indirect relation because of their husbands' role in the PKK. Women that had children in the PKK had relatively more direct relations with the organization, because for these women all the young people in the PKK were considered to be their children and this was also the way through which they could learn about their children's situation. The more the women had close and direct relations with PKK members; the greater is the possibility that they were politically

engaged in the Kurdish movement. Women fighters in the non-state armed group are also an effective factor for the internally displaced women's support of the PKK. Women have been represented as different symbols in the Kurdish Movement since the 1990s, and "virgin females" are representatives of their devotion for the struggle, which impressed internally displaced women and showed them that the emancipation of women could be possible in a new societal order. Women fighters are the extreme form of the emancipated women in the society. Their virginity represents that, although they are emancipated they still protect the "honor" of their families. This is why internally displaced women support female fighters in the non-state armed group wholeheartedly.

Internally displaced women also experienced increased domestic violence before and after their displacement process as a result of the "continuum of violence" from the conflict zones to their homes. Before displacement, women reported that they had faced violence, whenever their husbands experienced violence from the state security forces. After the displacement process, in some of the households, domestic violence increased because of the demand of husbands to control women in an alienated environment. Besides domestic violence and the fear of sexual violence, Feminist IR Theory argues that, in times of conflicts, women can become the head of the household and this may bring new economic and social roles for women. Not only the loss of the loved ones, but also these new responsibilities, were listed among the negative consequences of the conflict. Similarly, in the case of the internally displaced Kurdish women and as the result of the ongoing conflict, some of the women became permanent and some became temporary heads of the household. Because usually these families have many children, they had to look after these children by themselves and especially after their displacement. The women interviewed did not know Turkish and were illiterate; consequently, they had to struggle with many problems in the city centers and experienced impoverishment. Being head of households, even for a temporary period, may have an effect on women to develop active agency. Women generally remember their displacement process as a war-like moment, where nobody could find anybody to ask for help. In this specific moment everybody tried to save their own lives and some of them had to watch the burning of their own houses. Women defined this moment as the beginning of their dreadful lives in the cities. Their lives had changed dramatically and their poverty, deprivation and social exclusion started after displacement.

Their migration was also not safe; they had to stop by different villages before they reached to the final destination. Because internally displaced families had to leave their homelands

immediately, they could not make any preparation for their migration. This put these families in a deprivation. Upon arriving in the cities, they had to find shelter often they had to live in overcrowded houses and the ones, who helped them, were usually other Kurdish families. They settled in squatter housing areas, deprived of infrastructural services. Most of them lost their connections with the homelands because they had to leave as a family and this makes them more insecure in the cities.

Women mentioned how they have to deal with language and illiteracy barriers. Some of these women also cannot find jobs in the cities as consequence of the lack of language and then they become more dependent on other family members, which make them imprisoned in their urban neighborhoods. After the families are forced to migrate, it is likely for some of the women, who were politically detached and did not work outside their houses, to become marginalized in the cities. Their marginalization possibly has two dimensions; these are ethnic-based marginalization and gender-based marginalization. Their ethnic-based marginalization is a result of their dependency on other people. Because most of the internally displaced Kurdish women did not know Turkish when they arrived, they may be even more dependent on other people often for very simple needs. Women who had migrated to Diyarbakır were relatively freer because the majority of the people know Kurdish in Diyarbakır, so it was easier for them to be mobile and explain their situation in their mother tongue when it was needed. The others in Mersin and İstanbul experienced more negative situations and faced discriminatory attitudes because of their Kurdishness, especially in hospitals and other governmental agencies. This situation is a result of the prevalent discrimination towards Kurds in the society and displaced women have also experienced discriminatory attitudes. It is not wrong to argue that, women's situation was even worse than men's because men learned Turkish and how to read and write in schools or in their compulsory military service, but most of the Kurdish women did not have a chance to learn Turkish.

Because these people were displaced from their villages without any preparation and because the male family members became deskilled in the city centers and could not find jobs easily, these families experienced extreme poverty situations after their displacement. As a result of their parents' unemployment situation, the internally displaced children had to work in low-paid jobs and could not continue their education after displacement. Boy children generally work as street vendors and girl children work in the textile industry in their early ages in order to cope with the impoverishment, which may make them face physical and sexual

abuses from their bosses and other workers. Impoverishment also makes the next generation of the displaced families remain in the same poverty cycle. Because of the poverty situation and because neither the men nor the women could find insured jobs in the cities, their own and their children's health care was inadequate and they had to fight with serious diseases after they were displaced. They faced discrimination again in this situation because although there is a state implementation of the "green card" system, which refers to free health care for the poor families, some of the internally displaced people could not benefit from this system as a result of their close family members' participation in the branches of the PKK. For example, most of the female heads of households could not get a green card because of their husbands' relationship with the non-state armed group. These situations are among the reasons for the internally displaced Kurdish women's ethnic-based marginalization, which leads to their social exclusion.

Because this marginalized group of women are politically detached and immobile in the cities, in other words, they do not have any relationship with the non-state armed group or pro-Kurdish political party and do not attend any of the activities of the pro-Kurdish NGOs or party, it is more possible for them to lack the coping mechanisms to deal with their discrimination in the society and to fight against their poverty. The more the women are politically detached, the more likely for them it is to become imprisoned in their neighborhoods, lose their self-confidence and become fatalist. They become more marginalized in the cities as a consequence.

Their marginalization also has a gender-based dimension with the increase of the patriarchal relationships and male control on women in an alienated environment after displacement. As Ertürk (2009) mentions, threats on group boundaries and masculinities may cause subordination and further marginalization of women in the cities after displacement. In some of the internally displaced families, patriarchal relationships may increase relative to the village life and as a result some internally displaced women became even more marginalized in the cities. In some of the families, it is mentioned that, after the displacement, the male control, oppression and violence have increased and caused negative consequences for women. This control is not only the husbands' control on women. In some cases, when the woman is a widow of a temporary head of the household, the brother-in-laws get hold of the control over the woman and also her children and increase the oppression over them after their displacement. When women are politically detached, they may not know how to resist this control of the male family members.

In some other cases, women may remain out of the decision-making processes as they were in their villages. Husbands hold the authority in the household about the resources and other decisions. As aforementioned, women's marginalized position is not fixed situation and it may be transformed into empowerment situation with some factors, like political engagement. The more they participate in activities of the pro-Kurdish political party and/or NGOs, the more their self-assertiveness may increase and they may realize their own worth and in turn they may take part in the decision-making process in their households. Women's political detachment may however still lead them not to deny their girl children's early marriages although they all realized and mentioned the negative consequences of early marriages. The increased patriarchal relationships in the households after displacement may also leave women without reproductive rights. The more they are politically engaged, the more possible for them it is to learn about women's rights, as a result of the democratic socialist society order ideology of the Kurdish movement, which is mostly based on gender equality. The more they learn the ideology, the more they gain strength to get control of their reproduction.

To sum up, it is argued that, it is more possible for the politically detached women and other women, who do not work outside their houses because of the traditions, constitute the marginalized group among the internally displaced women. Their political detachment may lead to lack of coping strategies to deal with the ethnic-based marginalization dimension and the discriminatory attitudes of the society towards them. It may also lead to their lack of resistance to gender-based marginalization dimension that have appeared to be increased in the cities after the displacement process. In other words, the main reasons for the internally displaced women's marginalization in the cities may be their political detachment and the avoidance of participating into the activities of the pro-Kurdish political party and/or NGOs' activities that may lead to the political engagement of women after the displacement process, which may prevent the development of their active agency.

From a social constructivist point of view, in this study it is argued that, although all the internally displaced women are victimized from the very beginning of the process, they are not only marginalized in the city centers after displacement. On the contrary, there is a possibility for them to gain active agency and be empowered after the displacement process. In this regard, it is claimed that, some of the internally displaced women are marginalized in the city centers, but on the other hand, some are empowered. In other words, internal displacement causes both marginalization and empowerment of women in the cities. Active

agency of the internally displaced women is a result of mainly two factors. These are women's political engagement, whether gained before or after the displacement process and women's working outside their houses. It is also slightly possible for internally displaced women to gain active agency as a result of being head of households after displacement process. It is slightly possible because female head of households may also hide behind their relatives and may become under control of them. Political engagement refers to women's awareness about the ongoing internal armed conflict and the Kurdish issues. They support the Kurdish rights, but they are not actively involved in the pro-Kurdish political party or NGOs. They are aware; they support and sometimes participate in the activities. Their relationship with the pro-Kurdish political party and the non-state armed group members resulted in the political engagement of these women. If they had direct relationships with the members, it is possible for their political engagement level to be increased. These factors may lead women to gain active agency and to be "empowered to cope" (Ertürk 2010) with the negative situations that they face after the displacement.

The "empowerment to cope" situation of the internally displaced women has some indicators, such as: contribution to the household economy by home-based work; learning Turkish and developing literacy skills in order not to be dependent on others, which is one of the major reasons of marginalization; activities outside the house, such as working outside or participating in the activities of pro-Kurdish political party or NGOs; and getting humanitarian aid from different organizations in order to support the family members and struggle with the poverty that the family faces after displacement and dealing with the governmental agencies and struggling with the discriminatory attitudes of civil servants. These indicators may be effective on the increase of the women's self-assertiveness and result in the empowerment of women in the cities. This is the first stage of the empowerment. This empowerment may lead to the development of coping strategies for the support of the family members and to resist the discrimination directed towards these women by the society at large. Most of the internally displaced Kurdish women are "empowered to cope" after they were displaced, as a result of their political engagement. Some of the women had to work outside the house, although it is inappropriate for women to work in traditions and this in turn may increase their self-assertiveness and respect and the more they realized their self-worth it is possible for them to be "empowered to cope" with the negative situations that they experienced in the cities.

Political engagement of the displaced women may cause an increase in their awareness in the collective action that is based on Kurdish identity and rests upon the collective trauma of the Kurdish population. Political engagement may also increase the participation of women into the pro-Kurdish political party and/or NGOs activities after the displacement. Some of the women have started to take active roles that increase their self-assertiveness in the pro-Kurdish organization, which in other words refers to their political activity. Political activity of the women shows that, women not only participate in the activities of the pro-Kurdish organizations, but also they have started to take active roles as activists in the Kurdish movement. All of the politically active women in the study are argued to be “empowered to cope” after they were displaced from their homelands.

Internally displaced women’s political activity is differentiated according to the roles that women take in the activity. The role can be played either within the boundaries of the traditional gender roles or it can be enacted in non-traditional gender roles. If the political activity of women occurs in the traditional gender roles, such as motherhood, then the higher stages in the empowerment process could be relatively harder to achieve. An example for the traditional roles can be given as the women in the Peace Mothers Initiative, who are politically active and struggle for the Kurdish rights within the boundaries of the traditional gender roles. This does not mean that these women are passive symbols of the Kurdish movement; they are politically active women, who have transformed their grief into a political struggle. From this point of view, the motherhood concept is not taken into account as an essentialist notion. Motherhood in the Kurdish struggle is socially constructed. Mothers of the Kurdish movement are not inherently peaceful beings; they are active agents, who struggle with the dominant nationalist ideology. But, because they are in the Kurdish movement as mothers, they are still within the boundaries of the traditional gender roles and are protected in the society as a result of their motherhood role. In this context, it is a form of “bargaining with patriarchy” and does not challenge the ongoing gender inequality. In other words, they do not have trouble about gender equality, but about ethnic inequality. Peace mothers’ struggle may still be considered as an alternative way of empowerment, which is based on “peace politics”, but should be discussed in another study.

On the other hand, if politically active internally displaced women undertake non-traditional gender roles in the Kurdish movement, such as participation into the branches of the PKK, or active roles in the pro-Kurdish political party; their aim starts to be differentiated. The more they take on non-traditional gender roles; first of all, their status in the family and in the

society may change. This is a result of the respect towards the political party and the PKK. If women take active roles in one of these organizations, then they are seen as the heroines of the society. They are seen as the rescuers of the Kurdish nation from oppression as much as their male counterparts. And secondly, the more they take active roles in non-traditional gender roles in the movement, their “gender awareness”, which refers to support of gender equality, may increase because of the internalization of the socialist democratic society ideology of the PKK that aims to destroy the patriarchal gender relations and the hegemony of men in the society. These women, who undertake non-traditional gender roles, also negotiate with patriarchy, such as female guerillas’ virginity issue. But still, because their roles are not in the boundaries of the traditional gender roles, they are closer to challenge the ongoing patriarchal ideology both in public and private spheres of their lives. They also benefit from the direct respect of the Kurdish population by taking active roles within these organizations as a result of the everlasting respect towards the party and non-state armed group. The more the politically active women gain gender awareness, the more it is possible for them to struggle for gender equality in their families and in the whole society. The more the women struggle for gender equality, as well as Kurdish rights, the higher the level they may reach in the empowerment process. This level is “empowerment to change” (Ertürk 2010) the ongoing patriarchal relationships in the society. There are not many women in this level of the empowerment among the internally displaced group. But although there are some women, it is still an indicator of the possibility for women to be “empowered to change” the situation in the society.

“Empowerment to change” position is an indicator of the collective action that leads women to struggle for their “strategic gender needs” (Molyneux 1985). There are different indicators for the “empowerment to change” a situation. These are; girl children’s education and marriage arrangements, women’s power and ability to make decisions in the household and becoming women’s rights activists. First of all, the more the internally displaced women are “empowered to change”, the more there is a possibility for a change in their girl children’s lives. With the support of their empowered mothers, these children may continue their education and marry at a later age unlike their mothers. With the education of the girl children, their capture into the poverty cycle, which was considered as unchangeable, could be broken. Besides, with the later marriages, these children may also have more egalitarian marriages, unlike their parents. Secondly, politically active internally displaced women’s status in the household may be increased by undertaking non-traditional gender roles. As a result, not only do these women gain self-respect, but they may also gain the respect from

family members and from the society in general. The more they gain respect, the more they may gain power and take part in the decision-making process of the household. Finally, the more the women support gender equality, the possibility increases for them to be active in the women's rights, as well as the Kurdish rights movements. In the study there are few women who are active in the women's rights movement, but still it is an indication of the possibility.

To sum up, although internal displacement is a victimization process for women and may cause marginalization of women in the city centers by restraining them in patriarchal cycle, it is still possible for women to break the ethnic and gender-based discrimination boundaries, to gain active agency and to become empowered, instead of being passive victims, regardless of the negative consequences of the displacement process. From a social constructivist point of view, some of the internally displaced women may become marginalized and some of them may be empowered in the cities. The important factors that result in their marginalization and/or empowerment process are their "political engagement", "political activity" and "gender awareness" in the process. Once again it should be noted that, women are not powerless and passive victims of the negative consequences of internal displacement, there is always the possibility for them to gain active agency and reorient their future. Marginalization and empowerment positions are not frozen situations for women. There is always a possibility for displaced women to transform marginalization position into empowerment and break the cycle of patriarchy by working outside house and/or being politically engaged, etc. The contribution of this study is to show internally displaced women's collective action that leads to their empowerment in the city centers, which is based upon the collective trauma of the Kurdish population since the establishment of the Turkish Republic and the development of the ethnic Kurdish identity. In this respect, the situation of the internally displaced women is different from the situation of the economic women migrants. Kurdish struggle and the global women's movement are also the supporters of the women's empowerment possibility in the process of conflict-induced internal displacement.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

1) Personal Information:

- How old are you?
- Are you married? How old did you get married?
- Do you have children?
- Is your marriage arranged? Or did you want to get marry? Is your husband a relative?
- Do you live with your husband's family? Do you live with your family? Do you live separate? Why?
- What is the level of your education?
- What is your religion?
- Are you religious?
- Do you know Turkish? Where did you learn Turkish? Are you literate?
- When did you migrate? Where is your village? Which city did you migrate first and where did you stay?

2) Daily experiences in the shadow of the internal armed conflict in villages:

- What kind of difficulties did you experience in your homeland before displacement?
- Were you close to the conflict zone? How did it affect you?
- Was it possible to walk around in your village?
- Was it possible for your children to continue education in the villages?
- Was it possible to reach to the health centers in the village?
- Were you safe in the home? Have you been disturbed by the PKK or state security forces before displacement? What kind of a disturbance was it and why?
- Have you or your relatives ever experienced violence from the state security forces or the PKK?
- Have you ever heard about families that sell or rent their children to the PKK or state security forces? What is the aim of this tendency?

- Have you noticed that your family is forced to be village guards? Have you ever think about it? Why?
- Do you have family members that participate into the branches of the PKK? Why?
- Have you ever seen guerillas in your village?

3) Experiences in the process of the internal displacement:

- How old were you when your displacement process begun? Have you ever visited your village after the displacement?
- Who did decide the destination place to migrate and did you have any right to speak about it?
- Do you miss your village? Do you have any relatives in your homeland?
- Did you have time to prepare before you migrate to the city? Did you have chance to provide all your needs before migration? Could you pay your debts? Could you sell your animals? Could you sell other stuff that you had? Could you have a plan for the process of migration?
- Why did you migrate? Have your village evacuated or did you want to leave? Why was it evacuated?
- Where did the majority of the villagers mostly migrate?
- Could you please explain the displacement process in details? Was it hard? Do you miss your village?

4) Daily experiences after the internal displacement in the cities:

- Where did you first migrate? Where did you reside first? Did you have relatives around? How many families did you stay together? What were the difficulties of living in a crowded house? Did you experience sheltering problems? How was the cooperation between women? Are you planning to migrate to another city?
- Did you experience family break ups in the process of or after the displacement? What did you do to prevent this? Did you struggle?
- Did your husband's attitudes change towards you or the other family members in this stressed process? Did he behave brutal? Did he insult you? Did he use violence? Did this violence increase when he was arrested? Did it increase with the guerilla oppression? Did it increase with the state security forces oppression? Did it increase in the economic depression period? Did his attitudes change after the migration?
- What did you do to prevent this situation?
- Could you please tell the difficulties that you face in the city after displacement?

- When you compare the works in the village and city life, which one do you prefer? As a woman where do you prefer to live?
- Which one do you prefer? City life or village life?
- What kind of difficulties did you experience because you are lack of Turkish? What did you do to overcome this problem?
- What kind of difficulties did you experience because you are illiterate?

5) Women's experiences in the economic difficulties / women's multiple responsibilities and their coping strategies in these times:

- Did you experience breakdown in your economic situation after displacement?
- What do you do to meet the household needs?
- Do you take any humanitarian aids? How do you cope with the economic difficulties?
- Before you migrate, who were working in the household? What kind of works were they working?
- Did your children continue their education after migration?
- Did you work after migration in the cities? What kind of work is it? How did you find this work?
- If you did not face economic difficulties, did you still want to work?
- After you migrated to the city, did your husband find a job easily? What kind of work did he work in? Does he change jobs frequently?
- Did your children work after you migrated to the cities? What kind of work did they work in? At what age did they start to work?
- Did your children commit crimes? What kind of crime? Were they arrested?
- Do you think it is appropriate to work outside home? What about your children? Do you think it is positive? Do you think it is negative? Do you think it affects gender roles in the household? Do you do non-traditional gender jobs?
- What are the difficulties that you face in the working life?
- Are you satisfied with your salary?
- Are you satisfied with the working conditions?
- Have you ever faced sexual abuse in working life? Have you ever heard about it?
- Are you allowed to talk in Kurdish or is it prohibited by the boss?
- Do you experience difficulties at home because you are working outside? Did your husband approve your work?

6) Women's Discrimination, exclusion and marginalization / Victimization in the cities:

- Have your employee insulted you because you are Kurdish?
- Have your colleagues insulted, oppressed or discriminated you because you are Kurdish?
- What is your coping mechanism when you feel you are discriminated because of your Kurdishness?
- Do you have health insurance? What do you do when you face a health problem?
- Have you been discriminated in a health institute? What do you do when they discriminate you?
- How is your relationship with your Turkish neighbors? Do you have problems because you are Kurdish? Why?

7) Women's personal development after internal displacement / Empowerment:

- Have you gone to a course your self-development (such as hands and crafts, Turkish, etc.)? Do you think they are beneficial for your development?
- How did you learn Turkish?
- How did you learn reading and writing?
- How often do you get out of your house and why?
- Do you feel free and comfortable in the city center?
- Do you feel empowered because you earn money?
- Can you go shopping freely in the city?
- Do you think you are respectful because you join to the party activities? In the neighborhood, are the people respectful because you are from the party?

8) Women's political and civil or active participation into the internal armed conflict:

- Are you a member of a NGO, party or an organization?
- Do you participate into the demonstrations? What kind of demonstrations do you participate? Were you interested in politics before migration or did it increase after migration?
- Do you think women are active enough in the party? Do you want your daughters to participate into the activities of the party?
- Have you ever think about participation into the branches of the PKK? Why?

- What do you think about female guerillas? Do you think it is appropriate for them to stay together as females and males? What will your reaction if your daughter wanted to participate into the PKK?
- Have you ever arrested? Have you ever imprisoned? Why? What was the reaction of your husband and other relatives towards this situation?

9) Women's opinions on the Kurdish question and women's question in Turkey:

- What kind of rights do Kurds deserve?
- Do you think Kurds want to separate from Turkey and have a different country?
- Did you know something about the Kurdish issue before you migrated? Or did you learn it after your migration?
- What kind of rights do women deserve?
- Do you think migration is a solution for peace and happiness?

10) Challenging patriarchal structure at home:

- Do you want your daughter(s) make arranged or love marriage? At what age do you want her to get married? Do you want her to get marry with one of your relatives? Can you struggle with your husband if he wants her to make an arranged marriage in her early ages?
- Do you save your money to yourself or do you spend it for the household needs?
- Do you participate into the decision-making process in the household?
- What kind of duties do you have outside your house? Do you feel empowered because of these duties?
- Are you a self-confident person? Were you self-confident before marriage? How did the displacement process affect your self-confidence?
- Is it possible for you to cope with poverty if your husband does not work?
- What was the advantage of the Kurdish women before marriage and how did it affect the life in the cities?
- Which subject is a problem between you and your husband? What do you do to solve it?
- Are you free to go outside and walk around as you wish? What was changed after displacement?
- Are you free to see your relatives and friends whenever you want?
- What will you do to struggle with the violence of your husband? Which institution do you apply to complain him?

- Where do you think Kurdish men are stronger? In the cities or in the villages? Where they are more dominant?
- Who is more dominant at your house? Who does say the last word? Who does decide? How was it changed after migration?
- Who does deal with the governmental issues, children's school and humanitarian aid issues? Do you have problems to communicate with the civil servants or teachers? Did you deal with these issues before displacement?
- When you are in the demonstrations or party meetings, who do help with the household duties? Does your husband or son(s) help with the duties? What kind of duties do they perform?

APPENDIX B

TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Tezin Kapsamı

Bu tez 90'lı yıllarda zorunlu göçe maruz kalmış kadınların göç ettikten sonra şehirlerde yaşadıkları deneyimler üzerine bir örnekölay çalışmasıdır. İstanbul, Mersin ve Diyarbakır Kürtlerin yerinden edilmelerinden sonra yerleştikleri şehirlerin başında gelmektedir. Her üç ilde de Göç Edenler Sosyal Yardımlaşma ve Kültür Derneği (GÖÇ-DER) bulunmakta ve toplu halde yerinden edilmiş Kürtlerle ilgili çalışmalar yapmaktadırlar.

Toplu halde yerinden edilmeler, 1984 yılında başlamış ve hala süregitmekte olan iç çatışmanın sonuçlarından biridir. İç çatışmaların değişik sebepleri vardır. Bunlar siyasi, ekonomik, yapısal, sosyal, kültürel (Brown 1996: 13) ve elit-seviyedeki sebeplerdir (Brown 2001: 15). Buna göre Türkiye'de gerçekleşen iç çatışma bütün bu faktörleri kapsamaktadır. Siyasi olarak hasas bir çerçevesi olan Türkiye Cumhuriyeti kurulduğu zamandan itibaren, etnik azınlıklara karşı ayrımcı olan siyasi örgütler, ekonomik dengesizlik, modernleşme çalışmaları, eşit olmayan eğitim fırsatları, etnik gruplar arasındaki nefret ve en önemlisi çelişkili karar ve hareketlere sahip olan elitler Türkiye'deki iç çatışma alevlenmesini sağlamıştır.

İç çatışmanın farklı sonuçları vardır. Bu sonuçlardan ilki büyük çoğunluğu çatışmadan kaynaklanan insan ölümleridir. Bunun yanısıra, iç çatışma sebebiyle kendi rızası dışında kaybolan insanlar vardır. İç çatışmanın başka bir sonucu ise, yerinden edilmelerdir. Yerinden edilmeler, doğu ve güneydoğu bölgelerindeki köy ve kasabalardan şehir merkezlerine doğru olmuştur. Bilindiği üzere, yerinden edilme ve çatışma arasında doğrudan bir ilişki vardır. Ne kadar çok insan çatışmadan etkilenirse, yerinden edilmelerde o ölçüde artış gösterir (Kälin 2011). Çatışma zamanlarında insanlar yerlerinden yurtlarından edilirler. Bu yer değiştirme olayı ülke sınırları içerisinde kalırsa "yerinden edilme" adını alır. 2010 Birleşmiş Milletler verilerine göre, dünyada yaklaşık olarak 27 milyon kişi yerinden edilmiştir.

Yerinden edilmeler birbirinden farklılıklar göstermektedir. Buna göre, yerinden edilmeler "çatışma temelli yerinden edilmeler", "doğal afet temelli yerinden edilmeler" ve "kalkınma

temelli yerinden edilmeler” olarak ayrılmaktadır. Doğal afet temelli yerinden edilmelerde, deprem, sel, volkan, toprak kayması ya da insan eliyle gerçekleşen radyoaktivite, nükleer sızıntı gibi felaketler sonucu insanların yerinden edilmeleri söz konusudur (TESEV 2007: 80). Kalkınma temelli yerinden edilmelerde, belli bir alanda yaşayan insanların kalkınma projeleri ve planlamaları sonucu yerlerinden edilmeleri söz konusudur (TESEV 2007: 80). Çatışma temelli yerinden edilmelerde ise, belli bir çatışma sonucu insanların yer değiştirmelerinde hükümetlerin de doğrudan ya da dolaylı etkileri bulunabilmektedir (TESEV 2007: 81).

Yerinden edilmeler kadınları ve erkekleri farklı biçimlerde etkilemektedir. Hem kadınlar hem de erkekler için zorunlu göç bir mağduriyet durumudur çünkü bu nüfus hem evlerini ve memleketlerini kaybetmektedir hem de güvenli bir ortamda, sağlıklı biçimde yaşama durumları ortadan kalkmaktadır. Söz konusu durumlar “yersiz yurtsuzlaştırma” kavramı ile açıklanmaktadır. Yerinden edilme sonrasında bazı kadınlar etnik ve toplumsal cinsiyet temelli ayrımcılık çemberine hapsolabilmekte ve bu da onların şehir merkezlerinde marjinalleşmelerine neden olabilmektedir. Kadınlar hapsedikleri bu çemberi ev dışında çalışma, siyasal sorumluluk edinme ve/veya aile reisi olma durumlarıyla kırabilmektedirler. Bu kırılma sonucunda kadınlar etken özneler olarak hayatlarına devam edebilmekte ve kendi güvenlerini geliştirerek güçlenme durumuna geçebilmektedirler. Marjinalleşme ve güçlenme durumları sabit pozisyonlar değildir. Aralarında geçişlilikler mümkündür.

Çalışmanın Amacı ve Kullanılan Farklı Kavramlar

Her ne kadar Türkiye’deki yerinden edilmelerle ilgili çalışmalar yapılmış olsa da bu çalışmaların çoğu toplumsal cinsiyet bakış açısına sahip değildir. Yapılan çalışmalarda zorunlu göç kadın ve erkek için aynı etkilere sahipmiş gibi anlatılmaktadır. Kadınların ve kız çocukların zorunlu göçten farklı etkilenmeleri genellikle konu edilmemektedir. Bu çalışmanın önemi, 1990’lar boyunca gerçekleşen çatışma temelli yerinden edilmiş kadınların deneyimlerini konu almasıdır. Bu bağlamda çalışmanın amaçları çatışma temelli yerinden edilmiş kadınların deneyimlerini ortaya çıkarmak, eleştirel biçimde analiz etmek ve yerinden edilmelerin kadınları nasıl etkilediği konusunda varolan literatüre katkıda bulunmaktır.

Çalışmanın temel amacı, kadınların yerinden edilme sonrasında etkin özneler olup aile ve toplum içinde güçlenip güçlenmedikleri ve ataerkil yapıyı tartışmaya açıp açamadıkları veya şehir merkezlerinde daha da marjinalleşip marjinalleşmedikleri ve ataerkil çemberin içine

daha da hapsolup hapsolmadıklarını ortaya çıkarmaktır. Başka bir ifade ile, çalışmanın amacı, yerinden edilmiş Kürt kadınların marjinalleşme ve/veya güçlenme durumlarını ortaya çıkaran etmenleri anlamaktır. Kadınların güçlenme durumu, kadınların kendi değerlerinin ve ailelerine olan katkılarının farkına varıp aile içinde daha fazla yetki talep etmeleri ve toplumda varolan toplumsal cinsiyet eşitsizliğini gidermek için harekete geçmeleri anlamına gelmektedir (Erman et. al. 2002: 396). Bu bağlamda, kadınların güçlenmesi, temel güç ilişkilerini yerinden oynatmak için hem bireysel hem de kolektif direnç, karşı çıkış ve seferber olma durumlarını kapsayan değişik aktivitelerden oluşmaktadır (Sharma 1991-1992 Batliwala 1994: 130 içinde).

Yerinden edilmiş kadınların güçlenme durumları iki farklı şekilde görülmektedir. Bunlardan ilki “üstesinden gelmek için güçlenme” ve “değişiklik yapmak için güçlenme”dir (Ertürk 2010). Üstesinden gelmek için güçlenme durumu diğerine göre daha bireysel bir temelde gerçekleşmekte ve kadınların şehirlerde karşılaştıkları olumsuz durumlar ile başa çıkmak üzerine güçlenmelerini ifade etmektedir. İkinci durumda ise, kadınlar nispeten daha kolektif bir biçimde güçlenmekte ve sadece etnik temelli bir direnç değil, aynı zamanda varolan cinsiyet eşitsizliğini gidermeye yönelik değişiklik yapmak için güçlenmektedirler. Marjinalleşme kavramı ise çalışma boyunca, bireylerin toplumdaki ekonomik, dini ve/veya siyasi statü ve sembollere anlamlı biçimde ulaşamamaları olarak tanımlanmaktadır (Marshall 1999: 472).

Bu bağlamda, çalışmanın araştırma sorusu “Kadınlar yerinden edilme süreci boyunca ne tür deneyimler yaşamaktadır ve bu deneyimlerin kadınların güçlenme süreçleri üzerindeki anlamı nedir?”. Çalışmanın temel tezi, her ne kadar yerinden edilme süreci bir mağduriyet süreci olsa da, kadınlar bu süreç içinde etnik ve toplumsal cinsiyet temelli ayrımcılığa uğrayarak marjinalleşmemekte, aynı zamanda bu marjinalliği farklı bir takım etkenler ile ev dışında çalışma, okuma yazma öğrenme, aile reisi olma ve en önemlisi topluma siyasal katılım sağlama gibi, kırabilmektedirler. Yani kadınlar yerinden edilme sürecinde sadece pasif mağdurlar değil aynı zamanda etkin öznelerdir. Etkin özne olan kadınlar zaman içerisinde kendine güven geliştirerek güçlenme durumunun ilk basamağına sahip olmaktadır.

Türkiye'deki İç Çatışmanın Arka Planı

Kürtlerin yerinden edilmeleri 1925 Şark Islahat Planından beri uygulanagelmektedir. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin kurulmasından beri Kürt isyanlarını bastırmak için kullanılan yöntemlerden biri olan yerinden etme, en temel insan hakkı ihlallerinden biridir. Türkiye tarihinde üç temel Kürt isyanı olduğu iddia edilmektedir. Bunlardan ilki 1925 yılındaki Şeyh Said İsyanı, ikincisi 1934 yılındaki Dersim İsyanı ve 1984 başlamış olan sonuncu ve en uzun sürmüş PKK isyanı. Her üç isyanda da yerinden edilme bölgeyi Kürtlerden temizlemek ve Kürt köylerinin isyancılara olan desteğini kesmek için kullanılmıştır. Bu isyanların temeli aslında Kürtlerin Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ile kurdukları ilişkilere dayanmaktadır. Kürtlerin Osmanlı İmparatorluğu içerisinde daha ayrıcalıklı ve bölgesel özerkliğe sahip oldukları bilinmektedir. Osmanlı İmparatorluğu içerisinde nüfus Müslüman ve gayri-müslüman olarak gruplandırılmaktaydı. Kürtler de müslüman oldukları için etnik olarak Türklerle aynı haklara sahipti. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin amacı müslüman ve Türkçe konuşan bir nüfusa sahip olmaktı ve bu da diğer etnisite ve dinlerden olan azınlığın yadsınması üzerine kurulmuştu (Yıldız 2001: 100). 1924'te yürürlüğe giren anayasadan hemen sonra Kürtler tam vatandaşlık haklarını kullanamayacaklarını anladıkları için Şeyh Said isyanını başlatmışlardır (Yeğen 2009a: 12-13). Türkiye'de zorunlu göç çalışanların ortak olarak birleştikleri nokta, Türkiye'deki yerinden edilmelerin Kürt sorunu gözardı edilerek çalışılmayacağı noktasıdır. Bu sebeple bu çalışmada Türkiye'deki iç çatışma ve Kürt sorunu detaylı olarak ele alınmıştır.

Kürt sorununun çıkışıyla ilgili temel olarak iki yaklaşım vardır. Bunlardan ilki Kemalist ideolojidir ve soruna modernleşme sürecinin bir sonucu olarak yaklaşır. Diğer taraftan, bu görüşe karşı çıkanlar, modernleşme sürecini azınlıkların, özellikle de Kürtlerin, asimilasyona uğradığı bir süreç olarak değerlendirir. Kemalist ideology temel olarak iki temel yaklaşım üzerine kurulmuştur. Bunlar; milliyetçilik ve modernleşmedir. Bu bağlamda Kemalist reformlar, etnik farklılaşmadan uzak homojen bir ulus kurmayı hedeflemişlerdir. Nüfus içindeki farklıların önlenmesi ile birlikte, reformların daha hızlı ve etkin biçimde topluma nüfus edeceği düşünülmüştür. Modernleşme temel hedeflerden biri olduğu için Kemalist elitler bunu önleyebilecek her tedbiri almaya çalışmışlardır. Bütün karşıt fikirler modernleşme karşıtı olarak değerlendirilmiş ve bu fikirlerin yok edilmesine yönelik çalışmalar hızla yapılmıştır. Bu bağlamda bütün Kürt isyanları modernleşme karşıtı hareketler olarak değerlendirilmiş ve hızla bastırılmaya çalışılmıştır.

Modernleşme hedefinin yanısıra, Türk milleti aslında bir mucizedir ve Türk milliyetçiliği olmadan bu milletin varolması mümkün değildir (Berkes 2002: 119). Mustafa Kemal Atatürk tarafından ortaya atılan Türk milliyetçiliği fikri 1919 ve 1923 yılları arasında gerçekleşen Kurtuluş Savaşı sonrasında gelişmiştir. Bu savaş esnasında bütün müslümanların, savaşa katılması için din bir araç olarak kullanılmıştır (Timur 1968: 92). Timur'a göre (1998: 14) Kurtuluş Savaşı öncesindeki Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ile sonrasındaki Türkiye Cumhuriyeti arasında reformlara dayanan temel farklılıklar bulunmaktadır. Bu reformlar ile Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndan ardakalan her şey temizlenmiş ve bu reformlar aynı zamanda kolonizm ve emperyalizme karşıt olarak yapılmıştır. Atatürk'ün çabaları sayesinde, Türkiye modern ve anti-emperyalist bir ülke olmuştur, çünkü modernleşme karşıtı ülkeler yok olmaya ve emperyalizme yenilmeye mahkumdurlar (Berkes 1973: 435).

Berkes'e (2002: 106) göre, bu bağlamda milli egemenlik ve batılılaşma el ele giden bir süreçtir çünkü modernleşme batılılaşma olmadan mümkün değildir. Anti-emperyalizm savaşı aynı zamanda modernleşme savaşıdır (Berkes 1973: 435). Kemalist rejimin kaygılarından biri olan milliyetçilik, mutlak bağımsızlık gerektirmektedir ve modern bir ulus olunmadığı sürece mutlak bağımsızlığa kavuşmak mümkün değildir. Laiklik ve sosyal değişmeye kavuşmanın ilk aşamaları Sultan ve halifelik kurumlarının ortadan kaldırılmasıdır (Avcıoğlu 1968: 163). Kemalist reformların yürürlüğe girebilmesi için mutlaka yönetimin bir devrimci hükümet tarafından devralınması gerekmektedir (Ahmad 2005: 69). Halifeliğin kaldırılması için Atatürk islamın en önemli kurumlarından biri olan Sultanlık rejimine saldırmış ve dini okul ve medreseleri kapatmıştır. Bu da modernleşme yolunda atılmış ilk adımlardan biridir. Diğer bütün adımlar toplum içerisinde farklılaşmaya yol açan dini ve etnik farklılıkları ortadan kaldırmaya yöneliktir, çünkü bu farklılıklar karanlık bir tarihten kalmıştır.

Kemalistlere göre birbiri ardına yapılan bu reformlar toplumda hoş karşılanmamıştır özellikle de vatanın doğu bölgelerinde (Lewis 2009: 358-359). Modern devlet kurma çalışmalarına karşı çıkan görüşlerin ilki halifeliğin kaldırılması ardında gerçekleşen 1925 yılındaki Şeyh Said isyanıdır. Lewis (2009: 355-358) bu isyanı cumhuriyet rejimine yönelik girişilmiş ilk ciddi tehdit olarak değerlendirir. Aynı zamanda bu isyan batılılaşma ve modernleşme karşıtı bir hareket olarak değerlendirilmektedir.

Yeğen'e (2009c) göre, Kürt sorunu günümüze kadar hep farklı isimler almış ama bir türlü Kürt sorunu olarak adlandırılmamıştır. Cumhuriyet rejimi için temel sosyal sorunlardan biri

olan Kürt sorunu, Sultan ve Halifelik isteği, aşiret direnci, eşkıya problemi, yabancı kışkırtması ve bölgesel geri kalmışlık olarak adlandırılmıştır. Bütün bu adlandırmalar Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin milliyetçi söylelerinin bir sonucudur ve Kemalistlerin modernleşme ve milliyetçilik hedeflerine karşı çıkış olarak değerlendirilmektedir.

İnsel'e (2002) göre, Türkiye'deki etnik yapı homojen olmadığı için bütün dini, sosyal sınıf ve etnik temeller engellenmeye çalışılmıştır. Bütün bu farklılıklar ülkenin geleceği için tehdit olarak değerlendirilmiştir. Milliyetçilik hedefinin en büyük amacı milli egemenliği sağlamaktır ve temel olarak milli egemenliğin en büyük üç düşmanı Kemalistler tarafından Kürt hareketi, İslami hareket ve Komünist hareket olarak kurgulanmıştır (Öngider 1991: 153).

Modernleşmenin etnik kimlikleri inkar ettiğine dayanan görüşe göre, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti kurulduğunda içinde Müslümanlar, Hristiyanlar, Yahudiler, Türkler, Araplar, Kürtler, Ermeniler, Yunanlılar, Sırlar ve Bulgarlar vardır fakat modern bir ulus devlet yaratmak ve homojenliği sağlamak için ülke içinde çoğunlukta olan Türkçe konuşanlar ve Müslümanlar temel alınarak diğerleri görmezden gelinmiştir (Yıldız 2001: 100). Bu bağlamda, homejen bir toplum yaratmak amacıyla Kemalistler Türklerin islamdan önceki muhteşem tarihlerine odaklanmış ve Türk dili, tarihi, coğrafyası ve edebiyatı üzerine çalışmalar yapmışlardır (Yıldız 2001: 110).

1925 yılındaki Şeyh Said isyanı ve 1934 yılındaki Dersim isyanı Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin kurulması ve modernleşmesi sürecinde görmezden gelinen ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda oldukça fazla ayrıcalıklara sahip olan Kürtlerin etnik temelli isyanlardır. Bütün bu isyanlar bastırılmaya çalışılırken kullanılan yöntemlerden biri de bölge halkını göçe zolayarak alanı Kürtlerden temizlemek ve aynı zamanda asimilasyon çalışmaları yürüterek Kürtlerin Türkleşmelerini sağlamaktır. 1984 yılında başlayan Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK) hareketi de bu tarihsel gelişmelerin bir sonucu olarak değerlendirilmektedir. Bütün etnik farklılıkların yok edilmesi ve modern ulus devlet sınırları içinde eritmeye çalışılması sonucu bir isyan başlamıştır. PKK isyanı diğer isyanlardan yapısal temellerde farklılık göstermektedir. Bu isyan diğerlerine göre oldukça uzun sürmüş, daha örgütlü bir yapıya sahip olmuş ve günden güne genişleyerek geniş bir Kürt tabanına hitabetmeyi başarmıştır.

Kürt sorunu ile ilgilenen çalışmalar PKK isyanının 1984 ile başlamadığını ve süregiden sistematik bir Kürt kimliği inkarının bir sonucu olduğunu vurgulamaktadır. Yeğen'e (2011:

13-14) göre, Kürt sorunu önce ve öncelikli olarak etnik temelleri olan siyasi bir sorundur. Kürt halkının asimilasyona olan direnci sayesinde cumhuriyetin kurulmasından günümüze kadar süregelmiştir. Başka bir ifade ile Kemalistlerin ve milliyetçilerin savunduğu gibi dış mihrakların kışkırtması sonucu değil etnik bir ulus kimliğine ve biz bilincine sahip olmaları sonucudur.

PKK isyanının tohumları 1960'lı yılların ortalarında yani Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin kurulmasından yaklaşık 40 yıl sonra atılmış ve 1980 askeri darbesinde sol hareketler yok edilmeye çalışılmış olsa da hala devam etmektedir. Özdağ (2010: 35) bu isyanı ayrılıkçı hareket olarak değerlendirir ve ona göre bu ayrılıkçı hareket 1970'lerde PKK'nın Ankara'da "Apolcular" olarak adlandırılan bir grup komünist öğrenci tarafından başlatılmıştır. 1970'lerin sonunda bu grup bağlantılarını güneydoğu bölgesine taşımış ve kırsal kesimle bağlantılarını geliştirmişlerdir. 1978 yılında Abdullah Öcalan ve arkadaşları Diyarbakır'ın bir köyünde PKK'yı kurmuşlardır. 1984 yılında Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerine yönelik ilk operasyonu ile "ayrılıkçı harekete" başlamıştır. 1999 yılında PKK lideri Abdullah Öcalan'nın yakalanması ile bir ateşkes ilan etmiş ve 2004 yılına kadar bu ateşkes devam etmiştir.

Bazı görüşlere göre, PKK Marksist-Leninist bir örgütlenme olarak kurulmuş fakat daha sonradan ayrılıkçı bir hareket olma yönünde evrilmiştir (Pirim and Örtülü 2000:15). Başka görüşlere göre ise, her ne kadar egemen Kürt devleti saikleriyle yola çıkmış olsa da Öcalan'nın yakalanmasından sonra egemen Kürdistan düşüncesi çözülmüş ve bu düşüncenin yerini demokratik Türkiye devletinde eşit haklara sahip vatandaşlar için mücadele amacı almıştır. 1993 ve 1999 yılları arası silahlı çatışmanın en yoğun olduğu dönemdir. Bu dönemde hem Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri ve Emniyet güçlerinden hem de PKK'dan insan kaybı oldukça fazla olmuştur. Bunun yanısıra, insan hakları ihlalleri yaşanmış, faili meçhul cinayetlerde artış olmuş ve köyler boşaltılmış insanlar yerlerinden yurtlarından edilmiştir (Yeğen 2009e). Yerinden edilmiş nüfusun sayısı hakkında tam bir bilgi yoktur çünkü bu işlem tamamen kayıt altında tutulmadan gerçekleştirilmiş ve Kürtler bu süreçte gidecekleri yerde yapayalnız kalmış kendi kaderlerine bırakılmışlardır.

GÖÇ-DER raporlarına göre, Türkiye'de zorunlu göç sebepleri şu şekildedir; çatışmadan kaynaklı ekonomik sıkıntılar, dini baskılar, eğitim ve sağlık hizmetlerinin yetersizliği, kan davası, ölüm korkusu, köy ve kasabaların boşaltılması, köy koruculuğu baskısı, yayla yasakları ve PKK baskısı, güvenlik güçlerinin uygulamaları ve Olağan Üstü Hal (OHAL) ve

yiyecek kontrolü. Buna göre, temel olarak köylüler devlet ve PKK arasına sıkışmışlardır. Bir yandan devletten köy koruculuğu baskısı gelmekte diğer taraftan PKK'nın köylülerden destek talepleri olmaktadır. Köylüler PKK'daki gençlerin kendi çocukları olduğunu düşündüğü için yardımda bir yanlış taraf görmemekte fakat tam da bu yardımlar neticesinde devletten baskı gördüklerini belirtmektedirler. Köy korucusu olmak çoğu Kürt için ihanetle eş değer bir durumdur çünkü köy korucuları devlet ile işbirliği yaparak kendi halklarından gençlerin öldürülmesine sebep olmaktadır.

Yerinden edilmeler çoğunlukla Tunceli, Elazığ, Adıyaman, Diyarbakır, Bingöl, Muş, Batman, Mardin, Ağrı, Bitlis, Siirt, Şırnak, Van ve Hakkari iline bağlı köylerden şehir merkezlerine doğru olmuştur. Yerinden edilmiş Kürtlerin istikamet şehirleri kendi ekonomik sermayeleri ile doğru orantılıdır. Aynı zamanda daha önceden göç etmiş akrabalarının ve tanıdıklarının yanına göç etmek tercih edilen bir sebeptir. Buna göre çoğunlukla tercih edilen istikametler; İstanbul, Ankara, İzmir, Adana, Mersin, Bursa, Antalya, Malatya, Manisa, Kocaeli ve göç edilmiş şehirlerin köylerinden şehir merkezlerine doğru olmuştur.

Kürt hareketi içine kadınların da dahil olması ile hareket bütün toplumu kapsayacak bir duruma bürünmüştür. 1980'lerin başından itibaren Kürt hareketi içinde kadınlar da görünür olmaya başlamışlardır. Her ne kadar kamusal alanda görünür olsalar da Kürt kadınlarının hareket içindeki yeri akademik hayat tarafından dönemin hassasiyeti neticesinde yeterince dikkate alınmamıştır. Bunun yanısıra, Kürt kadınlarının hareket içindeki yeri toplumsal cinsiyet çalışmaları tarafından siyasi bir mesele olarak görülüp Kürt sorunu çalışmalarının alanına bırakılmıştır.

1980'lerin sonlarından itibaren Kürt kadınlar çalışmalara dahil edilmişlerdi. Bu dönemde Kürt kadınların toplu hareketleri ve hareket içinde aktif roller üstlendikleri görülmektedir. Bu durum aynı zamanda şehirlerde yerinden edilmiş kadınların da siyasi parti ve Sivil Toplum Kuruluşlarının (STK) etkinliklerine katılmalarını kolaylaştırmıştır. Kadınların bu tür örgütlenmeler içinde yer alması yerinden edilmiş köylü Kürt kadınların bu örgütlere eklenmesini hızlandırmış ve kolaylaştırmıştır.

Teorik Bakış Açısı: Sosyal Yapılandırmacı Yaklaşım

Köyden kente göç ve kadın deneyimleri sosyolojik teorilerle çalışılmış olsa da, zorunlu göçten ziyade ekonomik göç ile kırdan kente göç etmiş kadınların deneyimlerine odaklanılmıştır. Halbuki zorunlu göç ile şehirlere gelmiş kadınların durumları ekonomik göç

ile gelenlerden oldukça farklıdır. Bu farklılık bazı temel nedenlere dayalıdır. Öncelikle ekonomik göç ile gelen kadınlar göç etmeden önce bir hazırlık aşaması yaşamışlardır, halbuki zorunlu göç mağduru kadınlar hazırlanmaya fırsat bulamadan yerlerinden edilmişlerdir. İkinci olarak, ekonomik göç ile şehire gelen kadınların geride kalan aileleri ile irtibatları bulunurken, bunu zorunlu göç ile şehre gelen kadınlar için söylemek çok doğru olmaz çünkü zorunlu göç ile şehire gelen aileler, hep beraber köyden ayrılmışlar ve çoğunlukla arkalarında akraba bırakmamışlardır. Bazen arkalarında kalan bir köyden bahsetmek bile güçleşmektedir çünkü köyler yok edilmiştir. Bazen de bu kadınlar ve aileleri şehirlerde kaçak olarak yaşadıklarından köylerine dönmeleri kendileri için risk teşkil etmektedir.

Ekonomik ve zorunlu göç ile şehire gelmiş kadınlar arasındaki en büyük fark kolektif bir harekete mensup olup olmadıklarıdır. Zorunlu göç mağduru kadınlar Kürtlerin cumhuriyetin kurulmasından beri deneyimledikleri mağduriyet durumlarının bir uzantısını yaşadıkları için kolektif travmaya ortak olmuşlar ve bu da onların siyasallaşmasını nispeten kolaylaştıran bir süreç olmuştur. Ekonomik göç ile gelen kadınlar da şehirlerde umduklarını bulamayıp mağdur olabilmekte fakat bu daha ziyade bireysel bir mağduriyet durumunda kalmaktadır. Zorunlu göç mağduru kadınların mağduriyeti ise bireysel bir konumu aşip kolektif bir konuma ulaşmış durumdadır.

Yukarda sayılan sebepler neticesinde, ekonomik göç ile şehire gelmiş kadınların deneyimlerine odaklanan sosyolojik teoriler yerine interdisipliner bir çalışma alanı olan Feminist Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorileri (FUİT) odak noktası olarak alınmıştır. FUİT, kadınların çatışma alanlarında yaşadıkları deneyimlere ve zorunlu göç mağduru kadınların deneyimlerine odaklanan ilk disiplindir. En başta kadınların erkeklerden farklı deneyimler yaşadıkları gerçeğine odaklanarak feminist bakış açısı teorisini benimsemişlerdir. FUİT'in daha sonradan bir çok farklı teoriden beslendiği söylenebilir. Örneğin, feminist bakış açısı teorisinin yanısıra, postmodern feminizm ve eleştirel feminist teori FUİT'in beslendiği teori kaynaklarıdır. Bu da teoriye kadınların deneyimlerini analiz etmede daha güçlü ve farklı bakış açıları kazandırmıştır. FUİT çok katmanlı ve açılı analizler yapmış ve kadınların çatışma ve zorunlu göç durumlarında mağdur, mücadeleci, destekleyici ve aktif katılımcılar olarak yer aldıklarını göstermiştir.

FUİT içindeki teorisyenler temel olarak iki farklı yaklaşım etrafında gruplanmışlardır. Bunlardan ilki özcü yaklaşım diğeri de sosyal yapılandırmacı yaklaşımdır. Özcü yaklaşıma

göre, kadınların çatışma durumlarında mağdur olmalarının sebebi onların içsel olarak barışçıl olmalarıdır. Bu yaklaşım kadınların hayatlarında güçlü değişiklikler olabileceği gerçeğini görmezden gelir ve onları hep mağdur olarak tanımlar.

İkinci yaklaşım da kadınların çatışma ve zorunlu göç sonucu mağdur olduklarını kabul eder fakat, onların içsel olarak barışçıl oldukları için bu pozisyonda olduklarını reddeder. Sosyal yapılandırmacı yaklaşım kadınların mağduriyetlerini ataerkil yapıya bağlar. Başka bir deyişle kadınlar çatışma zamanlarında daha fazla mağdur olurlar fakat bu içsel olarak daha kırılğan ve hassas oldukları için değil, çatışma ve ataerkillik arasındaki kuvvetli bağlantıdan kaynaklanmaktadır. Bunun yanı sıra, sosyal yapılandırmacı yaklaşım kadınların etkin özneler haline gelebilecek potansiyele sahip olduklarını ve bu mağduriyetlerini güçlenmeye çevirebileceklerini savunur.

Kadınların zorunlu göç ve çatışma sonrasında mağdur olmaları ve toplum içinde marjinalleşmeleri bazı etkenlere bağlıdır. Bu etkenler kısaca, çatışma alanlarında kadına yönelik şiddet, ev içi şiddet, tecavüzün savaş silahı olarak kullanılması, kadınların sevdiklerini kaybetmekten kaynaklanan travmaları, aile reislerinin kaybı sonrasında üstlendikleri yeni ekonomik rollerolarak sıralanabilir. Kadınlar her zaman bu marjinal durumda kalmayabilirler. Sosyal yapılandırmacı yaklaşım bu marjinal durumun kırılabileceğini belirtir. Etkin özneler haline gelen kadınların kendilerine güvenleri geliştikçe güçlenmeleri söz konusudur. Annelik durumları bile bu yaklaşım ile sosyal yapılandırmacı bir açıklamaya sahip olmaktadır. Buna göre, çatışmaya katılanların anneleri politik bir kimlik edinerek acılarını siyasal bir mücadele pozisyonuna getirebilmektedir.

Kadınların çatışma ve zorunlu göç sonrasında güçlenmeleri iki farklı şekilde tezahür eder. Ertürk'e (2010) göre, "üstesinden gelmek için güçlenme" ve "değişiklik yapmak için güçlenme" şeklinde iki farklı kadın güçlenmesi şekli vardır. Üstesinden gelmek için güçlenme durumu diğerine göre daha bireysel bir temelde gerçekleşmekte ve kadınların şehirlerde karşılaştıkları olumsuz durumlar ile başa çıkmak üzerine güçlenmelerini ifade etmektedir. İkinci durumda ise, kadınlar nispeten daha kolektif bir biçimde güçlenmekte ve sadece etnik temelli bir direnç değil, aynı zamanda varolan cinsiyet eşitsizliğini gidermeye yönelik değişiklik yapmak için güçlenmektedirler.

Feminist Metodoloji ve Derinlemesine Mülakat Yöntemi

Bu çalışma feminist metodoloji üzerine temellendirilmiştir. Çalışmanın amacı ile uyumlu olarak araştırma yerinden edilmiş kadınların şehirlerde yaşadıkları deneyimlere odaklanmış ve şimdiye kadar görmezden gelinen değerli kadın deneyimlerini görünür kılmayı amaçlamıştır. Bu çalışma kadınların deneyimlerini görünür kılmak suretiyle sosyal eşitsizliklerinin giderilmesine yönelik politik bir motivasyona sahiptir. Klasik metodolojik yaklaşımlar kadın deneyimlerini oraya çıkarmada yetersiz kaldıkları için feminist metodoloji yönetmi kullanılmıştır.

Zorunlu göçe maruz kalmış kadınların şehirlerde yaşadıkları deneyimleri ortaya çıkarmak amacıyla İstanbul, Mersin ve Diyarbakır'da toplam 30 kadınla derinlemesine mülakat yapılmıştır. Mülakatlara başlamadan önce GÖÇ-DER başkanları ile tanışılmış olup, mülakata katılanlara yönlendirilmeleri istenmiştir. Katılımcılar, farklı gruplardan kadınların deneyimlerini kapsamak amacıyla seçilmişlerdir. Bu araştırma sonuçları genelleme yapmak için değil, bir örnek olay araştırması ortaya çıkarmak ve değişimleri göstermek amacıyla kullanılmıştır.

Saha araştırması Mayıs ve Ağustos 2010 döneminde gerçekleştirilmiştir. İstanbul 2 kere ziyaret edilmiş ve 10 mülakat yapılmıştır. Mersin de iki kez ziyaret edilmiş ve toplam 11 mülakat yapılmıştır. Diyarbakır araştırma kapsamında bir kez ziyaret edilmiş ve orada da 9 mülakat gerçekleştirilmiştir. Mülakata katılan kadınlar arasında ev kadınları, ev reisleri, STK aktivistleri, ev dışında informal işlerde çalışan kadınlar, evden parça başı iş yapan kadınlar ve PKK katılımcıları vardır.

Mülakata katılan kadınların kimliklerini korumak adına isimleri ve soyadları araştırmacı tarafından da alınmamıştır. Bunun yanısıra göç ettikleri köy adları verilmemiş sadece köy hangi şehire bağlıysa oranın adı verilmiştir. Katılımcıların her birine Kürtçe çiçek adları verilerek çalışma boyunca sistematik bir kategorileştirme yapılmıştır. GÖÇ-DER başkanlarından, çalışanlarından ve BDP çalışanlarından elde edilen telefon numaraları saha araştırması biter bitmez yok edilmiştir. Bunun yanısıra, mülakat kayıtları ve deşifreleri çalışma jüri kararı ile kabul edildikten sonra imha edilmiştir.

Saha araştırması boyunca karşılaşılan en büyük sınırlılık Kürtçe konusunda olmuştur. Sınırlı biçimde Kürtçe bildiğim için bazı mülakatlarda Türkçe bilmeyen kadınlarla konuşurken çevirmene ihtiyaç duyulmuş ve bu da bilgilerin doğrudan elde edilmesini engellemiştir. Türk

kimliğim çoğu zaman problem yaratmasa da, önemli olan birilerinin dertlerini dinlemeleri olarak görüldüğü için, Kürt olmamam bazı katılımcı ve çevirmenler üzerinde “casus” olmama yönelik şüpheli bir durum yaratmıştır. Fakat GÖÇ-DER başkanlarının yardımları ile bu durumlar fazla uzatılmadan kapanmıştır.

Araştırma Bulguları

Araştırma sonuçları temel olarak iki farklı bölüm halinde sunulmuştur. Birinci bölümde araştırmanın betimleyici kısmı verilmiştir. Buna göre, köyden kente göç etmiş kadınların şehire gelmeden önceki hayatları geriye yönelik olarak (retrospective) analiz edilmiştir. Kürt kadınların şehirlere gelmeden önceki günlük hayatları şehirlerle karşılaştırıldığında bolluk içinde geçmektedir. Kendi tarım toprakları ve hayvanları olduğu için, et, süt, tereyağı, peynir, kuru baklagiller, sebzeler hepsine para vermeden ulaşma imkanları vardır. Hatta bazıları ağa kızı ya da muhtar karısı olduğu için topraklarında çalışan işçilere bile sahiptirler. Bu kadınlar için her şeylerini bırakıp şehre gelmek muazzam bir sınıf farklılaşması ortaya çıkarmıştır. Köylerinde başkalarına yardım eden ailelerden gelen kadınlar şehirlerde başkaları için çalışan işçiler pozisyonuna düşmüşlerdir.

Kadınların köylerde yaşadıkları en büyük problem aile fertleri tarafından sürekli kontrol altında tutulmalarıdır. Ataerkil baskı köylerde kadınların hayatının bir parçası olmuştur. Bu baskının bir parçası olarak köylerde kadınlar erken evliliklere maruz kalmışlardır. Araştırmaya katılan kadınların hemen hemen hepsi çok erken yaşlarda evlenmişlerdir. Hatta bazıları daha ilk periodlarını bile yaşamadan çocuk yaşta evlendirilmişlerdir.

Kadınlar için başka bir problem çatışmalar başlayınca çatışma alanlarının tam ortasında yaşamak zorunda kalmalarıdır. Kendi güvenliklerini ve çocuklarının güvenliklerini sağlayamamak bu kadınlar için büyük problemler oluşturmuştur. Kadınlar yaşanan çatışma ve köy baskınları sonucu psikolojik olarak etkilenmekte bunun yanısıra aile fertlerinin işkence, kaçırma, sakat bırakılma, mağdur edilme korkutulma ve hatta öldürme acılarıyla başa çıkmak zorunda bırakılmaktadırlar. Sadece aile fertlerinin değil zaman zaman kadınlar kendileri de bu acıları yaşamaktadırlar. Özellikle eğer çocukları PKK'ya katılmışsa güvenlik güçlerinin tavırları sertleşmekte ve kadınlara da baskı uygulayabilmektedirler.

Bazı kadınlar köylerinin boşaltılma sebebinin PKK ile olan ilişkileri olduğunun farkındayken bazıları nedenini hala sorgulamaktadır. Bazı kadınların PKK üyeleri ile yakın ilişkileri varken diğerleri köye PKK'nın gidip geldiğini bile farkında değildir. Bütün kadınlar kendi

köylere yönelik devletten korucu olma baskısı yaşadıklarını olmamaları durumunda köyü boşaltın tehdidi ile karşılaştıklarını belirtmişlerdir. Göç edilecek şehir, genellikle evin babası tarafından seçilmiş ve daha önce göç eden akrabaların olduğu şehirler tercih sebebi olmuştur.

Daha önce de belirtildiği üzere, göç ettikten sonra kadınlar şehirlerde bir takım olumsuzluklarla karşılaşmaktadır. Bunların en başta geleni etnik temelli ayrımcılıktır. Kadınlar şehirlerde dil bilmedikleri ve okuryazar olmadıkları için daha fazla göze batmakta ve yaşadıkları mahalleden her çıktıklarında ayrımcılık ile karşılaşmaktadırlar. Bunun yanı sıra, Türkçe bilmedikleri için sürekli Türkçe bilen birilerine bağlı kalmakta ve bu da mahalleleri içine hapsedilmelerine neden olmaktadır. Bu hareketsizlik ve dil bilmeme durumları kadınları şehirlerde marjinal grup haline getirme olanağı yaratmaktadır. Aynı zamanda kadınlar etnik temelli ayrımcılık durumlarıyla hastanelerde ve çocuklarının okullarında sıklıkla karşılaşmaktadırlar. Kadınların şehirlerde marjinalleşmesine sebep olan başka bir neden şehire geldikten sonra yaşadıkları yoksulluk ve yetersiz sağlık koşullarıdır. Göç eden kadınlar şehirlerde korkunç bir yoksulluk yaşamakta zaman zaman çocuklarını doyurmak için ekmek bile bulamamaktadırlar. Eğer kadın şehire tek başına göç etmek durumunda kaldıysa yoksulluk durumu daha da vahim bir hal almaktadır.

Bu yoksulluk durumunun sonucunda ve köylere tarım ve hayvancılık ile uğraşıldığından hem kendileri hem de kocaları şehirde iş bilmez duruma düştükleri için, sağlık giderlerine ayıracak yeterince paraları olmamakta ve sağlık hizmetlerinden yararlanamamaktadırlar. Kendilerinin ve kocalarının hatta çocuklarının ciddi sağlık problemleri olsa dahi doktora gidememektedirler.

Kadınların siyasal katılım seviyeleri arttıkça bu problemler karşısında sessiz kalma olasılıkları artmaktadır. Siyasal bilince sahip olmayan kadınlar etnik temelli ayrımcılık problemleri ile nasıl başa çıkacaklarını bilememekte ve şehir merkezlerinde daha da marjinalleşmektedirler. Etnik temelli ayrımcılığın dışında kadınları göç ettikten sonra marjinalleştiren başka bir unsur da şehire göç edilince artan ataerkil kontroldür. Ataerkil kontrol kadınların göç sonrası toplumsal cinsiyet temelli bir ayrımcılıkla karşılaşmalarına sebep olmaktadır.

Yabancılarla dolu olan bilinmeyen bir ortamda erkekler kadınlar ve kız çocuklar üzerindeki baskıyı artırabilmekte bu da kadınların eve hapsedilmeleri ile sonuçlanabilmektedir. Kocalar evde olmasa bile kadın üzerindeki kontrolü sağlamaya yönelik baskılara devam etmektedir.

Bazı durumlarda kocalar şehir dışında çalışabilmekte ya da ömür boyu hapis cezası almış olabilmektedir. Yine de kadın kocasının baskısını hissettiği için ev içine hapsolabilmektedir. Sadece kocalar değil aynı zamanda diğer aile fertleri de şehirlerde göç etmiş kadınların üzerinde baskı kurabilmektedir. Özellikle kadınlar kocalarının ailelerinin yanına yerleşirlerse kocaların yokluğunda kadın üzerindeki baskı daha da artmaktadır.

Göç etmiş kadınların kendi kızları da bu baskı sonucu erken evlilikler yaşamak zorunda kalmaktadır. Göç etmiş erkekler kendi kızlarını bu yabancı ortamda korumak amacıyla erkenden tanıdıkları ailelerin çocukları ile evlendirmeye karar verebilmektedirler. Kadınlar kendi çocuklarına bakmak durumunda kalmakta bu da onları daha çok eve hapsedmektedir.

Kadınların siyasal katılım düzeyleri düşük oldukça toplumsal temelli ayrımcılık ile mücadele etme yollarından da uzaklaşabilmektedirler. Göç sonrasında yabancı bir ortamda bulunmaları erkeklerin kadınlar üzerinde daha fazla baskı yaratmalarına neden olabilmektedir. Bu da kadınların toplumsal cinsiyet temelli olarak ayrımcılıkla karşılaşmalarına ve ev içlerine hapsolarak şehirlerde marjinalleşmelerine yol açabilmektedir.

Kadınların göç sonrası marjinalleşme durumaları sabit durumalar değildir ve bazı faktörler ile birlikte kırılabilir. Yaşanan kırılma sonrasında kadınlar öncelikle “üstesinden gelmek için güçlenme” durumu yaşayabilmektedir. Üstesinden gelmek için güçlenme durumunda bazı kriterler vardır. Bunlardan ilki, kadınların ev içinde çalışarak aile ekonomilerine yaptığı katkıdır. Her ne kadar kadınlar evden yaptıkları işleri gerçek iş olarak değerlendirmeseler de, yoksulluk ile başa çıkma yöntemlerinin ilki olduğu için kadınların güçlenmelerine katkıda bulunan bir süreçtir.

Kadınların karşılaştıkları etnik temelli ayrımcılık ve başkalarına bağımlı olma durumlarıyla mücadelede kullandıkları en önemli yöntem Türkçe öğrenmeye başlamaları ve okur yazar olmaya başlamalarıdır. Bu hem toplum içine katılımlarını sağlamakta hem de herhangi bir durumda kendilerini savunma becerisini getirmektedir.

Kadınların ev dışında aktivitelere katılması, örneğin parti veya STK'ların mitinglerine gitmeleri kendilerine güvenlerini sağlamakla beraber aynı zamanda kadınların siyasal bilinçlerini de yükselterek ev dışına çıkmalarına neden olduğu için sosyalleşmelerine ve karşılaştıkları güçlüklerle başa çıkma konusunda güçlenmelerine katkı sağlayan en önemli etkenlerden biridir. Kadınlar daha çok ev dışına çıktıkça ve aktivitelere katıldıkça, insani

yardım alma konusunda daha çok olasılıktan haberdar olabilmekte ve ailelerine yardım etmek üzere daha çok resmi kurumlarla yardım almak için mücadele etmektedirler.

Kadınlar bu tür aktivitelere katıldıkça ve siyasi bilinçlerini yükselttikçe, aktif olarak politik hayata katılmaya eğilimli olabilmektedirler. Aslında kadınların aktif olarak politik hayatta yer almaları, daha çok PKK ile ilişkilerine ve siyasi parti ile yakınlıklarına bağlıdır. PKK'da çocuğu olan kadınlar politik hayata katılmaya daha yatkındırlar. Politik hayata katılım göç etmiş kadınlar için iki türlü olabilmektedir. Geleneksel toplumsal cinsiyet rollerine uygun aktivitelere bulunmak ve geleneksel toplumsal cinsiyet rollerinin dışında aktivitelere bulunmak. Barış Anneleri örneğin, geleneksel kadın rolleri içerisinde yer almaktadır. Bunun yanısıra, PKK içinde bulunmak ya da siyasi parti içinde erkeklerle dirsek teması halinde çalışmak kürt kadınlar için geleneksel kadınlık rollerinin dışındadır. Göç etmiş ve geleneksel kadınlık rolleri dışında politik hayatta aktif rol almış kadınlar toplumsal cinsiyet bilincine daha rahat erişebilmektedirler.

Kadınlar toplumsal cinsiyet bilincine eriştikçe, toplumsal hayattaki ataerkil düzeni değiştirmeye yönelik güçlenmektedirler. Bu aşamanın ilk belirleyicisi, kadınların kendi kız çocuklarının eğitimleri ve evlilik düzenlemeleri ile ilgilidir. Kadınların toplumsal cinsiyet bilinci artıkça, kız çocuklarının eğitime daha fazla önem verildiği ve bunun yanısıra, kız çocuklarının erken evlendirmelerine karşı çıktıkları gözlenebilmektedir.

Başka bir belirleyici, kadınların toplumsal cinsiyet temelli bilinçleri yükseldikçe, ev içinde de güçlendikleri ve ev içinde karar mekanizmalarında yer almaya başladıkları gözlenmektedir. Kadınlar toplumu ve kendi hayatlarını değiştirmeye yönelik güçlendikçe, ataerkil yapı ile de mücadele güçleri artmaktadır. Bu da onların doğrudan ev içi karar mekanizmalarında rol oynamalarına yol açan bir etmendir.

Kadınların toplumsal cinsiyet bilinçleri yükseldikçe cinsiyet eşitliği savunucusu ve kadın hakları aktivisti olmaya eğilimleri artmaktadır. Bu durum genç ve aktif olarak politikanın içinde olan göç etmiş kadınlar için nispeten kolay olabilir. Yaşça daha ileri olan kadınlar köylerde doğup büyüdüklerinden ve ataerkil sistemi daha fazla içselleştirdikleri için, geleneksel kadınlık rolleri içinde politik aktivite yapmaları daha olasıdır.

Sonuç olarak, yukarıdaki veriler değerlendirildiğinde kadınların göç etmeden önce ve sonra çatışma temelli mağduriyetleri söz konusudur. Bu mağduriyet sonrasında kadınlar şehirlerde etnik ve toplumsal cinsiyet temelli ayrımcılıkla karşılaşmakta ve bu da onları şehirlerde

marjnal konumda kalmaya itmektedir. Fakat bu marjinal durum kadınlar için sabit bir durum değildir. Yukarda sayılan etkenler ile birlikte, özellikle siyasi bilinç kazanma, ev dışında çalışma ve aktivitelere katılma ve evin reisi olma durumları ile bu marjinallik çemberi kırılabilmekte ve kadınlar değişik güçlenme durumları deneyimleyebilmektedir. Son söz olarak şu belirtilmelidir ki, Kürt hareketi ve evrensel kadın hareketi yardımı ile zorunlu göçe maruz kalmış kadınlar kendilerine güven kazanabilmekte, etkin özneler haline gelebilmekte ve pasif mağdur durumlarını her zaman güçlenme durumu ile değiştirme potansiyeline sahip olabilmektedirler.

APPENDIX C

CURRICULUM VITAE

PERSONAL INFORMATION

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MS	TMA Crime Research	2005
BS	Hacettepe Uni. Sociology	2001
High School	ODTÜ Geliştirme Vakfı Özel Koleji	1997

WORK EXPERIENCE

Year	Place	Enrollment
2010 Fall Semester	FCWSRC (Mt Holyoke)	Research Associate
2007-present	Başkent Uni. Communication Department	Research Assistant
2007 April-November	UNFPA Ankara	National Short Term Expert
2004-2007	Research Assistant of (previous) UN Special Rapporteur on VAW (Prof. Dr. Yakın Ertürk)	Administrative/Research Assistant

FOREIGN LANGUAGES

Advanced English

PUBLICATIONS

1. Kuloğlu, Ceyda (2011). The Military in Turkey from a Gender Perspective: Gender Related Problems that Women Face in the Turkish Military. Saarbrücken: Lambert Publishing.

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APPENDIX D

TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü

Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü

Enformatik Enstitüsü

Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü

YAZARIN

Soyadı : KULOĞLU-KARSLI

Adı : CEYDA

Bölümü : SOSYOLOJİ

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) : MARGINALIZED OR EMPOWERED? CONFLICT-INDUCED
INTERNALLY DISPLACED KURDISH WOMEN'S EXPERIENCES IN TURKEY

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans

Doktora

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3. Tezimden bir bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz.

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