

THE LEGAL, POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL ROOTS OF
TUTELARY REGIME IN SINGLE-PARTY PERIOD

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Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

Prof. Dr. Meliha Altunışık
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science/Arts / Doctor of Philosophy.

Prof. Dr. Ayşe Saktanber
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science/Arts/Doctor of Philosophy.

Assoc. Prof. Ceylan Tokluoğlu
Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Prof. Dr. İhsan Dağı	(METU,SOC)	_____
Assoc. Prof. Ceylan Tokluoğlu	(METU,SOC)	_____
Prof. Dr. Mesut Yeğen	(İST. ŞEHİR U.,SOC)	_____
Assist. Prof. Çağatay Topal	(METU,SOC)	_____
Assist. Prof. Ahmet Murat Aytaç	(ANK. U., POLS)	_____

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Name: Hatem Ete

Signature:

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ABSTRACT

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Ete, Hatem

Ph.D. Department of Sociology

Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ceylan Tokluođlu

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This dissertation examines the political regime during the single party rule in Turkey between the years of 1923-1950 in relation to the concept of tutelage. The main argument supported in this work is that tutelary tendencies, contrary to the assumptions of Kemalist historicization, do not serve as segue to democracy, but rather make consolidation of democracy difficult, even impossible. In support, this dissertation provides a close examination of the Kemalist nation building process beginning from the Ottoman modernization process extending to the demographic engineering projects of the Republic.

The examination reveals that tutelary tendencies are a reflection of the savior mission undertaken by the elite during the Ottoman-Republican modernization process. The political elite, in their mission to save and build the nation, not only ignored the political and social fabric of the time, but they insisted on radical interventions to the demographic fabric of the society in order to transform it to the nation they envisioned. During the execution of the nation-building project increasingly more authoritarian measures were legitimized by declared target of democracy. The social resistance to the radical interventions was suppressed by more authoritarian measures that were perceived as the cost of achieving democracy.

The elite perceived themselves uniquely fit for deciding what is in the best interest of the people. Whether the aim of democratization was reached or not was also decided by the tutelary elite. Not wanting to let go of the power, they continuously invented

new prerequisites to democracy. This cycle resulted in the persistence of the authoritarian regime. In the final analysis, this dissertation reveals that the tutelary tendencies of the avant-garde elite are the biggest obstacle on the path to democracy.

Keywords: Tutelage, Avant-garde elite, nation-building process.

ÖZ

TEK PARTİ DÖNEMİ VESAYET REJİMİNİN YASAL, SİYASAL VE SOSYOLOJİK KÖKLERİ

Ete, Hatem

Doktora, Sosyoloji Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Ceylan Tokluoğlu

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Bu çalışma, 1923-1950 yılları arasında Türkiye’de hüküm süren tek parti iktidarının siyasal rejimini vesayet kavramı çerçevesinde ele almaktadır. Çalışma, vesayetçi eğilimlerin, Kemalist tarih yazımının varsaydığı aksine, demokratik rejime geçişi kolaylaştırmak yerine zorlaştırdığını hatta zaman zaman imkânsızlaştırdığını savunmaktadır. Bu çerçevede çalışma, vesayet eğiliminin elitlerin Osmanlı-Cumhuriyet modernleşme sürecinde edindikleri kurtarıcılık misyonunun bir yansıması olduğunu ortaya koymaktadır.

Elinizdeki çalışmada, vesayetçiliğin demokratik rejime geçişi kolaylaştırdığı iddiasını sınamak üzere Kemalist ulus inşa sürecine bakılmıştır. Hayata geçirilmek istenen ulus inşa sürecinin dönemin toplumsal dokusunu hesaba katmaması, dahası mevcut toplumsal dokuya radikal müdahaleler öngörmesi, projenin toplumsal dirençle karşılaşmasına yol açmış, öncü kadrolar, direnci bastırmak için rejimi otoriterleştirmişlerdir. Öncü kadrolar, toplum için öngördükleri hedefe varmak için otoriter bir rejime ihtiyaç duymuşlardır. Otoriter rejim, bu hedefler için gerekli ve meşru görülmüştür. Böylece, ulus inşa süreci otoriter rejime gerekçe kılınmış, rejimin demokratikleşmesi bu sürecin tamamlanması koşuluna bağlanmıştır.

Kemalist seçkinler, toplum adına ‘doğru’ ve ‘gerekli’ olanın ne olduğuna karar verme hakkını kendilerinde görmüşlerdir. Hedefe varılıp varılmadığı veya

koşulların geçersiz hale gelip gelmediği kararının, öncü kadroların tekelinde olması, vesayetçiliğin demokratik öngörüsünün gerçekleşmemesine, otoriter rejimin kalıcılığını sürdürmesine yol açmıştır. Öncü kadrolar, iktidarı ellerinde tutmak ve alternatif kadrolarla paylaşmamak için sürekli yeni misyonlar edinmiş ve demokratik geçişi bu misyonların başarılması koşuluna bağlamışlardır. Bu döngü, demokratik rejimin geciktirilmesine ve otoriter rejimin süreklileşmesine yol açmıştır. Sonuç olarak, bu çalışma, öncü kadroların vesayetçi eğilimlerinin demokratik siyasetin önündeki en güçlü engel olduğunu ortaya koymaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: vesayet, öncü kadrolar, ulus-inşa süreci.

To My Parents

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1. TUTELAGE: SEGUE OR IMPEDIMENT TO DEMOCRACY?

Although Turkey enjoyed a parliamentary system since its foundation and a multiparty political system for more than half a century, it is yet to resolve its democracy problems. On the one hand, formal democracy has functioned in Turkey with near perfect regularity since the early days of the Republic. Elections have been held on a regular basis; the legislative, executive and judiciary branches have functioned in accordance with the constitutional framework. On the other hand, the political agenda is dominated by discussions such as ‘the will of the nation’, ‘bureaucratic tutelage’ and coup attempts.

The fundamental reason for these discussions was the leading elites’ proclamation of their primary duty of protecting the progress made during the single party regime and the nation-building process with the fear that after the transition to the multi-party regime these advancements would be reverted. The elite core, due to the distrust they had in the elections and the parliamentary system, had intervened in the system and carved themselves a privileged position in the name of protecting the regime and the nation. In this context, the avant-garde elite had intervened in the system after ten years of Democrat Party (DP) incumbency, which had taken over the power from Republican People’s Party (CHP) after its twenty-seven yearlong administration. The political history of the Republic was going to witness various other interferences with the democratic order, including three more military coup d’états after 1960 (1971, 1980, 1997) and numerous attempted coups. These interventions that were led by the military bureaucracy solicited support from the civil bureaucracy and the intelligentsia as well. The constitutions prepared in after the coups had attached a constitutional legitimacy to the elites’ protective instincts and their perceived right to exercise this instinct. The fourth article of the 1961 Constitution had established that the people would exercise its sovereignty through “constitutional organs.” The

constitutional organs had given constitutional legitimacy to the elites' right to intervene in the political functioning and to serve as the guardian of democratic politics in the name of Kemalist ideology. The elite core's attainment of constitutionally legitimized right to intervene in the political system had increased the political privileges of the appointed positions while diminishing the effectiveness of the elected officials and as such had brought the political system under bureaucratic tutelage.

One of these constitutional organs, The Constitutional Court (*Anayasa Mahkemesi*) was vested with the authority to audit both the legislation and the political parties. To this end, the Court has closed down 24 political parties since its establishment in 1963.¹ These closures, despite the lack of any wrong doing by the parties who are only guilty of representing and defending the demands of their constituency within the established legal and political limits, evince the influence of tutelage on the political activities in Turkey. That these parties were closed down because of their incompatibility with the Kemalist ideology (secularism, nationalism, and unitary state) also reveals the limits of the political arena that are marked by something other than the exercise of violence and force (Aslan, 2002: 9-25; Erdem, 2004: 252-301; Özbudun, 2010: 125-142). Another constitutional organ, the National Security Council (*Milli Güvenlik Kurulu*), had made it possible for the military elite to be directly involved in the governing of the country. Governments were obliged to comply by the decisions taken by the National Security Council, which consisted of civilian and military representatives. With this council, the military bureaucracy, along with the elected governments, were given a controlling and decision making influence over the administration of the country both *de jure* and *de facto*. Until recently, the Council has served as a platform of bureaucracy's primacy over the popularly elected parliament (Cizre, 1997: 157). The military coup d'état via memorandum in 1971 both increased the autonomy and the influence of the military on the political system. The reassignment of administrative investigation of military

¹ Before the establishment of the Constitutional Court in 1963, two political parties were shut down— Nation Party (Millet Partisi, 1948-1953) by the Ankara Peace Court and Democrat Party (1960) by Ankara civil court.

personnel from the Council of State (*Danıştay*) to the Supreme Military Administrative Court (*Askeri Yüksek İdare Mahkemesi*) had increased the military's autonomy by releasing it from civilian scrutiny. The 1980 military coup d'état and 1982 constitution both increased the influence of the avant-garde elite on the political system and prioritized an authoritarian ideology that imposed constraints on all political activities. The emphasis on the unitary state and Atatürk nationalism in the constitution built on the perceived threat of separatism rendered the security concern the most fundamental criterion of all political activity (Heper and Evin, 1994; Parla, 1993). The privileges ascribed to the elite cadres within the political system and powers vested in them to monitor the political regime itself created a double-headed political system and deficiencies in the democratic system.

It is the contention of this dissertation that the dynamic underlying these tensions is the concept of tutelage and that Turkey's democratic experience and trials are framed by this very concept. Tutelage is conventionally defined as the prerogatives of an elite class who believe in their own superior judgment to decide what's best for the common interest of the people and in their right to govern the people without popular consent in order to achieve that common interest. The elite classes claiming a special communion with and knowledge of nation's interests purport to govern the nation for the people despite the people. These tutelary tendencies are neither a new phenomenon, nor the consequence of the coup d'état of 1960 as it is often claimed.

In fact, in the following pages, it will be argued that tutelage has been the most determinative influence on politics in the form of secularist and Turkish-nationalist policies since the Young Turks under different labels. The traces of tutelage in Turkey's democratic experiences can be observed in government functions ranging from the judiciary to the executive branches. The tutoring elite utilized a number of instruments in order to nudge (and sometimes shove) the nation into what they have determined as the right path for the nation.

The scholarly treatment of Turkey's single party regime experience and democratic problems often overlook the molding influence of tutelage on the Turkish political system. When tutelage is addressed, both in political discourse and academic

scholarship on Turkey, it is often in the context of Turkey's democratic experience after 1960. These discussions are framed by the assumptions that tutelage regimes (1) are not totalitarian (ergo must have democratic potential); (2) have democracy as their ultimate target; (3) are temporary (interim governments); (4) are segues to democracy (ergo not authoritarian). These assumptions that underlie almost all examinations of the Turkish democratic experience result in the analyses of the single party regime in one of two ways: The first, and more prevalent analysis offered for the single party regime understands it as segue to democracy, an interim government the authoritarian practices of which are legitimized by tutelage. The second and less common analysis explains the single party regime as an authoritarian regime and criticizes the view that defines it as a tutelary democracy. What is questioned in the second perspective is not the concept of "tutelary democracy" itself, but whether Turkey's single party regime was indeed a tutelary democracy. These two perspectives converge on the idea of tutelary regime as a form of interim government and segue to democracy.

In contrast to these studies, this dissertation does not perceive tutelage as an interim state on the path to democracy. Instead it questions the validity of the "tutelary democracy" concept. The argument presented here is, not only tutelage is not a segue to democracy, but it is an insurmountable impediment on the path to democracy. The concept of tutelage, or in other words, vesting of residual authority, *de facto* or *de jure*, in political guardians as guarantors of the nation's permanent interests, is not compatible with democracy. The exercise of government authority, by those claiming a teleological project or a "historical mission" to impose a common interest and defend that interest against all perceived threats, is incompatible with democratic politics. Achieving the "common good" in this sense permits little or no tolerance of opposition and perceives any divergence in ideology a potential threat (Loveman and Davies, 1997).

Furthermore, when ideological missions are institutionalized in the practices of tutelage by the tutoring elite, the regular functions of a formal democracy masks the fundamental characteristics of tutelage politics. Political behavior under these

conditions are constrained by intimidation (as was the case with the party closures mentioned above), if the guardians perceive some actions or practices as a threat to the nation's interests and decides those practices cannot be tolerated, even if such actions are formally legal. Tutelage system sets vague formal limits on the scope of legal activity and reform. It is premised on the notion that the people must be protected from themselves and from organizations that might subvert the existing political order. Under this type of regime compliance with democratic procedures—including elections, congressional debates, judicial deliberation, media reporting, and government succession—masks the permanent threat of veto by guardians' swords.

Adam Przeworski (1993) argued that the essence of a democratic government lies in the principle “that no one can be certain that their interests will ultimately triumph”; “No one can wait to modify outcomes *ex post*”; and there should be “no group whose interests would predict outcomes with a near certainty.” The practice of tutelage, in the context of the Turkish experience, proved to be precisely the opposite of this process. If democracy is defined by the existence of a political arena “in which the polity specifically arranges itself for political contestation to gain control over public power and the state apparatus” (Stepan, 1988), then tutelage is the antithesis of democracy in that it tries to eliminate the existence of such an arena for the common good. In this study the practice of tutelage is conceptualized as a process in which those who monopolize the quest for the “common good” gradually eliminate all possibilities of doing politics because the exercise of politics becomes a perceived threat.

In the context of Turkish experience, the practice of tutelage is a product of the Ottoman modernization evolving into the modernization tendencies of the Republic. Ottoman modernization, in contrast to 19th century modernization projects around the world, was led by the sovereign and the ruling class. The modernization process, despite having been initiated by the Sultan, became a vehicle for new political actors enter the political arena in their quest for the “common good” and “common interest.” It was these quests for “the good of the people” that made a political arena as described by Stepan a possibility. Having defined tutelage, in this dissertation, as

the process of establishment of a monopoly on the definition of the “common good” by the elite at the cost of eliminating all alternative searches, we can assert that although, the sultan ruled for the “common good” with the “best interest of the people” at heart, his rule cannot be considered a “tutelage system.” Tutelage is a product of modern politics, in which contestations exist to begin with, but are eliminated for the success of an imposed idealized historical mission. If we take Linz’s widely used definition of authoritarian regimes as “political systems with limited, not responsible, political pluralism...without intensive nor extensive political mobilization ... and in which a leader (or occasionally a small group) exercises power within formally ill-defined limits” as the base it becomes clear that tutelage systems are form of authoritarian regimes.

Once we categorize a tutelage system a form of authoritarian regime we open up a host of other questions. For instance, it is widely accepted that those who excluded the people from the political stage, as we defined tutelary elite above, do because they have no legitimating ideology and could only defend themselves as provisional stewards of the nation (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986: 15). If they sought to prolong their rule indefinitely, they had to resort to elections and other democratic procedures, thereby adopting a form of republicanism with a face of elections even as they disavow the very basics of a republican system. The tutelary elite, in this line of academic inquiry, is understood to act only with the motivation of self-interest. In other words, elite in this form of authoritarianism does not initiate modernization or transition to democracy unless they are faced with a threat, whether it be public mobilization or international pressure, that is worse than democratization.

All these explanation, both comparative politics and Turkey focused expositions, fail to explain the single party regime, the persistence of the tutelage system for half a century after Turkey transitioned into multi-party regime and motivations behind the elites’ actions. For this reason, it is necessary to examine the emergence of the elite class who remained as the “tutelary elite” of the nation for half a century. Contrary to the assertions that authoritarian elite are motivated by self-interests and do not have a legitimizing ideology, Turkish case proves that the Kemalist elite did indeed

sincerely believe that they acted in the best interest of the nation, but claimed that only they could know where that best interest lied. The authoritarian epistemology of the Kemalist elite, animated by their positivist education and ways of thinking, assumed the mission of building a nation-state. They legitimized all authoritarian practices with the objective of nation-state building as the ultimate good.

In sum, to better understand Turkey's political regime and its democratic trials we must first examine the unique formation of the Kemalist elite and the processes through which they have come to identify themselves as the chosen saviors of the nation. This examination will reveal that the ideological roots of the Kemalist elite can be found in the Young Turk period and their evolution from the resistance movements to independence war to nation state building have shaped their tutelary tendencies which is constituted by their unshakable belief in their mission to save, build and protect the nation and their unique fitness to undertake this mission. The tutelage system persists because the condition of "reforming the public into citizens of a nation-state that is conducive to democracy" could never be met. There are two reasons for this quest to be an unreachable one: first of all the concept of tutelage itself, by definition, vests too much initiative and authority in the tutors for democracy to flourish. Second, the Kemalist elite associated the condition of becoming conducive for maintaining a long-term democracy with the idea of adoption of Kemalist ideology by the masses and equated democracy with Kemalism. Therefore, the authoritarian practices that were meant to prepare the masses for democracy were in fact carried out in the name of Kemalism.

When these dynamics are evaluated, it becomes clear that biggest obstacle Turkey faces for democratic consolidation is the tutelage system itself. Once this tutelage was established, it was not difficult to find reasons for its prolonged stay. This dissertation is an attempt to explain the process through which tutelage system has become an obstacle to Turkey's democratic consolidation. It is one of the arguments of this study that this process can only be explained through tracing the Kemalist rationale to its origins in the late Ottoman and to the dynamics of the single party regime. To that end, the remainder of this chapter will develop the conceptual

framework of this examination. It will unfold in three sections. First, academic scholarship that evaluated Turkey in the context of comparative single party regime studies will be addressed. In the second section, four underlying assumptions of tutelage theories will be examined and refuted. The third section will provide an outline for the unfolding argument and organization of chapters.

1.1 Turkey (1923-1945): A Single-Party or an Authoritarian Regime?

With the proliferation of countries regressing back into an authoritarian form of government, scholars tried to identify a series of variables such as the nature of the previous regime, the modes of transition to the regime and the ruling elite's perception of democracy that could explain the democratic trials regimes experience after the presumed transition to democracy. Typologies and explanatory models rise or fall according to their analytic usefulness to researchers (Sartori, 1993). Explanatory models of single party regime types and authoritarian regime types have consistently failed to explain the Turkish single party regime, because the single party regime did not adhere to one clearly defined category. In fact, it will become clear in the unfolding chapters that, while it could be argued Turkey's single party regime was authoritarian between the years of 1925-1930, it has fluctuated between authoritarianism and totalitarianism during 1930-1945.

Scholars of Turkish democratic history who defined the single party regime as an interim government and as such a potential or incomplete democracy, prefer to examine Turkish experience under the single party regime models because of their hesitancy to label the tutelage system an authoritarian regime due to the positive connotations attached to tutelage as a segue to democracy. Those who claim single party regime in Turkey as an authoritarian regime choose to instrumentalize authoritarian regime models in which the elite classes are conceptualized as fundamentally interested in their own survival in power and thus neglect the ideological and idealist dimensions of the ruling elite in relation to the civilizing mission. To the extent that authoritarian regimes can be understood as modern conceptions, single party regimes and authoritarian regimes can in fact be used interchangeably. Students of authoritarian regimes have increasingly focused on the

function single party regime serves in the system. Two interwoven functions the single party serves in an authoritarian regime are often highlighted—the bargaining power the party provides the elites and therefore minimizes potential threats to their stability; and a mobilizing function where dictators use the party machine to mobilize mass support. To this end, it could be argued that the single party regime in Turkey have served both of these functions if we add the mission of crafting a nation conducive to democracy as their teleological motivation. Without this consideration, single party approaches to Turkish experience and authoritarian models fail to offer any comprehensive understanding of the dynamics of the Turkish political system.

1.1.1 Single-Party Approaches

As argued above, there is a significant overlap between the approaches to authoritarian regimes and single party systems. The most authoritative typology of party systems posits seven types of party systems: one-party (or single-party), hegemonic party, predominant party (or one-party dominant), two-party, limited pluralism, extreme pluralism, and atomized (Sartori, 1976: 125). All types of party systems except the one-party presuppose a competitive political regime. Predictably, this typology has been the source of considerable ambiguity and confusion, as Sartori himself recognized (1976: 220), because of the appearance of democratic elections held in the single party regimes. The confusion caused by the conflation of these concepts can also partially be related to the newness of the category of the single-party regime. Although authoritarian polities had existed throughout history, one-party systems were the principal form of authoritarian politics in the modern world just as plural party systems were the principal manifestation of democracies and no-party regimes had been the main pre-modern form of authoritarianism (Huntington and Moore, 1970, 509). Indeed, Duverger (1969: 255) argued that the single party could be considered the great political innovation of the twentieth century. The inherent ambiguity and the overlap with authoritarianism of the one-party category prevented its theoretical development and failed to add any substantial analytical value (Kalyvas, 1999). To call a polity a one-party system does not really tell us very much apart from the fact that it has a single party (Huntington, 1970: 6). Sartori

(1976: 222) acknowledged, “when the study of parties came to the fore, it did not add much to what had already been discussed in terms of totalitarian or authoritarian dictatorships. Nevertheless, in the 70s, scholars like Sartori and Moore attempted to explain Turkey’s single party regime in terms of single party model due to the failure of the authoritarian model, as understood then, when applied to the Turkish case.

The most influential formulation for comparing and classifying party systems has been Giovanni Sartori’s seminal *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis*. Sartori saw two dimensions of party systems as being particularly important: the number of relevant parties and the degree of ideological polarization. In counting parties, Sartori included those that have ‘coalition potential,’ i.e., those that might form part of a governing coalition, as well as parties whose existence affected the tactics of party competition. His measure of ideological polarization, most clearly operationalized in Sani and Sartori (1983), focuses on the ideological distance among parties, i.e., the breadth of ideological divergence. Using these two dimensions, his typology includes four types of democratic party systems: two-party, moderate pluralism (multipartism with low ideological polarization), polarized pluralism (multipartism with considerable polarization), and predominant (in which the same party consistently wins a majority of seats). “A party system is precisely the system of interactions resulting from inter-party competition.” A party system “results from, and consists of, the patterned interactions of its component parts, thereby implying that such interactions provide the boundaries, or at least the boundedness, of the system” (1976: 44, 43). In these terms, totalitarian parties demonstrate tendencies to hegemonize the society by imposing an inclusive ideology. Totalitarian parties do not allow opposition groups or parties and display arbitrary behaviors (1976: 225). Authoritarian single parties possess ideologies that are not all inclusive and they simply exclude opposition groups. They display an authoritarian form of government that allows non-political groups to exist with limited arbitrariness. Pragmatic single party systems display a weak and exclusive ideology. These parties identify with opposition groups instead of excluding them, and allow for the autonomy of sub groups (1976: 226-227). Although the single party system in Turkey carried traces from all three typologies, it could be said that it was

authoritarian between the years of 1925-30 and fluctuating between authoritarian and totalitarian tendencies between the years of 1930 and 1945.

Moore (1970: 48-72) on the other hand classifies single party regimes into four in terms of a relationship between ideology and the extent of transformation they prescribe—instrument ideology, expressive ideology, total transformation and partial transformation. Parties with instrumental ideologies guide the people with action-oriented approaches. Expressive ideologies are difficult to practice in daily life, such as legends and myths. Parties that defend a total transformation with the guidance of an instrumental ideology are defined as totalitarian; parties that exercise partial transformation with instrumental ideology are tutelary; parties that defend a total transformation under expressive ideology are chiliastic, and parties that exercise partial transformation with expressive ideology are classified as administrative. Moore argues that the former three types can be found in authoritarian regimes. Despite the fact that Moore situates Turkey's political party in the tutelary one party system, it could be argued that CHP has demonstrated all four characteristics at one time or another. For example, when the sole motivation of that shaped the single party regime—to reach the level of modern civilizations—is considered, it could be argued that the party exercised an abstract expressive ideology that was not receptive of rational criticism. On the other hand, if the motivation is understood as the construction of a secular Turkish nation, then it could be argued that the party had an instrumental ideology. In terms of the transformation, the party had prescribed both partial and total transformation in different fields. While insisting on a total transformation in political, economic, social and cultural fields, it exercised a partial transformation in terms of constructing a small class of elite both in the center and the periphery.

The only renewed attempt to develop a theory of one-party systems was Huntington's in 1970. It was grounded in modernization theory; the origins of single-party systems were to be found in highly polarized societies where modernization led to the breakdown of traditional society structures and the subsequent mobilization of new groups. In such contexts, Huntington (1970) argued, one-party systems

represented the efforts of leaders of “more modern” social forces to suppress “more backward” social forces on the way to modernity. Huntington called for a focus on such key variables as the role of the ruling party in the political system, the strength of the party relative to other institutions, and the societal actors who interact with the single party. He linked the evolution of one-party systems to the shifting roles of competing actors vying with ruling parties for supremacy in the system. He classified single parties in terms of the policies it developed for the weak and suppressed social groups as revolutionary or exclusionary. Revolutionary one party system tries to negate the polarization in the society by way of assimilating and eliminating the socially repressed and weak groups. Exclusionary one party system on the other hand excludes the counter groups by way of excluding them from politics. Huntington’s approach suffered from a structuralist bias, inherited from modernization theory, which led him to posit incremental political reform in the spirit of one-soul-at-a-time as the only way out of single-party rule (1988: 9).

Huntington situated Turkey within his exclusionary one-party systems and argued that exclusionary one party systems showed the potential to transition into a competitive political systems on the conditions of (1) international pressure to transition to democracy, (2) an increase in social awareness and access to political participation due to increasing urbanization and education in parallel to modernization and (3) disintegration of the elite alliances (1970: 17-23). It could be argued that, although the single party system in Turkey roughly falls into the exclusionary single party system, in the context of nation-building project, the nationalist and secularist policies of the Kemalist elite shifts Turkey’s single party experience more towards the revolutionary systems.

1.1.2 Authoritarian Regime Approaches

This is not to say that the conventional definitions of authoritarian regimes offer any more analytical value to the democratic experiences. As it will become clear in the following section, one of the arguments around the concept of tutelage hinged on the nature of the tutelary regime—whether it was authoritarian or democratic. The classical theories on nondemocratic regimes devised during the 1950s and 1960s

were based primarily on a distinction between totalitarianism and authoritarianism. By the 1970s this dichotomy of democratic vs. nondemocratic regimes, Linz argued, obscured the totalitarian phenomenon and did not capture adequately the reality of the Soviet regimes (Linz, 2002). When Linz wrote his article “An Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Spain” he wanted to call attention to the existence of a third type of stable polity between what were then seen as the two major stable poles of democratic and non-democratic regimes (Linz, 1970: 255). He defined this third type of regime as authoritarian regimes that were “political systems with limited, not responsible, political pluralism, without elaborate and guiding ideology, but with distinctive mentalities, without extensive nor intensive political mobilization, except at some points in their development in which a leader or occasionally a small group exercises power within formally ill-defined limited but quite predictable ones.” In his later work with Alfred Stepan (1996), they distinguished totalitarian regimes from both democracy and types of authoritarian regimes. In this work, they offered this definition for totalitarian regimes:

If a regime has eliminated almost all pre-existing political, economic, and social pluralism, has a unified, articulated, guiding, utopian ideology, has intensive and extensive mobilization, and has a leadership that rules, often charismatically, with undefined limits and great unpredictability and vulnerability for elites and non-elites alike, then it seems to us that it still makes historical and conceptual sense to call this a regime with strong totalitarian tendencies (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 40)

Linz and Stepan (1996) showed that authoritarianism differed from totalitarianism on four points—pluralism, ideology, mobilization, and leadership. The defining characteristic of totalitarianism was that there was no political, economic or social pluralism in the polity and that pre-existing sources of pluralism had been uprooted or systematically suppressed. In an authoritarian regime there was some limited political pluralism and often quite extensive economic and social pluralism. In an authoritarian regime, many of the manifestations of the limited political pluralism and the more extensive social and economic pluralism predate the authoritarian regime. Totalitarian leadership was unconstrained by laws and procedures and was often charismatic. The leadership could come from the revolutionary party or movement, but members of this core was vulnerable to the sharp policy and

ideological chances enunciated by the leader (even more so in terms of possibility of losing their lives) as the rest of the population (See Table 1).

The category of authoritarian regimes had proved useful in the early analyses of democratic breakdowns in states that transitioned to democracy in the aftermath of the World War II. However, Linz and Stepan argue, this tripartite analytical tool became soon obsolete in the face of differing democratic experiences in the world in the 70s and the 80s. As such, they refined this typology by adding the categories of “post-totalitarianism” and “sultanism” to the classical distinction. While these distinctions between authoritarian and totalitarianism proved useful for limited purposes they became obsolete once again with the proliferating experiences of democratic breakdowns.

To sum, the conceptualization of a non-authoritarian single party system vs. the postulation that all single party systems are necessarily authoritarian was what was at stake in the discussions over tutelage theories.

Table 1: Regime Type and their Defining Characteristics

Characteristics	Totalitarianism	Authoritarianism	Democracy
<i>Pluralism</i>	No significant economic, social or political pluralism. Official Party has de jure and de facto monopoly of power. Party has eliminated almost all pre-totalitarian pluralism. No space for second economy or parallel society.	Political system with limited, not responsible political pluralism. Often quite extensive social and economic pluralism. In authoritarian regimes, most of pluralism had roots in society before the establishment of the regime. Often some space for semi opposition.	Responsible Political pluralism reinforced by extensive areas of pluralist autonomy in economy, society and internal life of organizations. Legally protected pluralism consistent with “societal corporatism” but not “state corporatism”
<i>Ideology</i>	Elaborate and guiding ideology that articulates a reachable utopia. Leaders, individuals, and groups derive most of their sense of mission, legitimation, and often specific policies from their commitment to some holistic conception of humanity and society.	Political system without elaborate and guiding ideology but with distinctive mentalities.	Extensive intellectual commitment to citizenship and procedural rules of contestation. Not teleological. Respect for rights of minorities, state of law, and value of individualism.
<i>Mobilization</i>	Extensive mobilization into a vast array of regime created obligatory organizations. Emphasis on activism of cadres and militants. Effort at mobilization of enthusiasm. Private life is decried.	Political system without extensive or intensive political mobilization except at some points in their development.	Participation via autonomously generated organization of civil society and competing parties of political society guaranteed by a system of law. Value is on low regime mobilization but high citizen participation. Diffuse effort by regime to induce good citizenship and patriotism. Toleration of peaceful and orderly opposition.
<i>Leadership</i>	Totalitarian leadership rules with undefined limits and great unpredictability for members and non members. Often charismatic.	Political system in which a leader or occasionally a small group exercises power within formally ill defined but actually quite predictable norms. Effort at cooptation of the old elite.	Top leadership produced by free elections and must be exercised within constitutional limits and state of law. Leadership must be periodically subjected to and produced.

Source: Linz and Stepan, 1996: 44-45.

1.2 Assumptions and Shortcomings of Tutelage Theories

Tutelage theories, although built on the classical political conceptions of stewardship, were crafted specifically to explain Turkey's experience in transition to the multi-party regimes, which was equated with democracy at the time. The section below offers a representative sample from the most prevalent tutelage theories based on the four assumptions identified above and examines their shortcomings in the context of Turkish experience.

Maurice Duverger is one of the few and most influential scholars who paid attention to the unique attributes of Turkey's single party experience. Duverger, rather than contextualizing his examination of Turkey's single party regime within the comparative studies of single party regimes in academic literature, placed Turkey in a category of its own (1959: 275-280). The rationale behind Duverger's classification of Turkey as a unique case was Turkey's peaceful transition to multi-party system in 1945 and the peaceful change of power in 1950. For this reason, Duverger classified Turkey as a "tutelary" or "potential democracy" (1959: 280).² Duverger's examination of the single-party system is in accordance with the arguments posed by Turkish academics such as Tarık Zafer Tunaya and Bülent Daver, and Ergun Özbudun who developed a more refined interpretation. Duverger, Tunaya, Daver and Özbudun proposed to attach the label, "tutelary democracy", to Turkey's single-party regime for its non-totalitarian and temporary nature, its circumstantial authoritarianism, its democratic credentials, and for the democratic structures it helped build. Tutelage theory suggests that the justification offered above qualifies the Kemalist single-party regime for the category of tutelary democracy.

Tutelage theory, in its observations on Turkey's single-party system, has two significant shortcomings. First, this theory commits many conceptual errors and makes several assumptions based on false optimism. Secondly, this theory bestows a positive meaning upon an ideology of tutelage and assumes that their tutelary ambitions endow single-party regimes with democratic qualities. Consequently,

² Özbudun in his newly published book (2011) declared that he had changed his previous assessment of Turkey's single-party regime as a tutelary regime (2011: 110).

tutelage theory ignores the process of founding the single-party regime and fails to predict and explain the problem of repeated military interventions after the transition to multiparty system. The section below will begin by examining the four assumptions that frame tutelage theories, and identify their shortcomings.

1.2.1 “Tutelage Regime is Non-Totalitarian”

Tutelage theory, first of all, supports that the single-party system in Turkey differs from totalitarian regimes for its ideological elements and the policies adopted at the time of its application. The single-party system in Turkey is identified as a non-authoritarian system for not following or endorsing a dominant ideology, for enacting a partial – not a total – transformation of the society, and for accommodating pluralism, albeit with limitations.

Duverger explains the non-totalitarian nature of Turkey’s single-party system thus:

... some single parties are not really totalitarian either in ideas or in organization. The best example of this is provided by the People’s Republican Party, which operated in Turkey from 1923 to 1946 as a single-party. Its first claim to originality lay in its democratic ideology. In no way did it set itself up as an Order or a Church like its fascist and Communist brethren. It imposed on its members neither faith nor mystique: the revolution of Kemal was essentially pragmatic. Its task was to ‘Westernize’ Turkey by fighting the prime obstacle to any modernization amongst the peoples of the Middle East; that is Islam. The anti-clericalism and rationalism of the leading strata of the party gave it a definite resemblance to nineteenth-century Liberalism: even their nationalism was not very different from that which convulsed Europe in 1848. The attitude of the People’s Republican Party has sometimes been compared with that of French radical Socialist party in its prime; the comparison is not far-fetched. Its very name ‘Republican’ links it much more with the French revolution and the terminology of the nineteenth century than with the authoritarian systems of the twentieth (1959: 276).

Tarik Zafer Tunaya also argues that Turkey’s single-party system is different from totalitarian regimes:

Though all single-party regimes may not be totalitarian, they are authoritarian, without exceptions. In some cases, a single political party goes as far as declaring that it serves a temporary function, leading the country towards a more democratic and modern system. (...) Thus, such a single-party constructs a regime based on guardianship. (...) This sort of a political party certainly possesses most of the characteristics that other single parties have. However, the key distinction is that this particular sort of single-party regime is not and cannot be totalitarian. And as it sets

the stage for democracy, it also prepares its own demise. The Kuomintang in China and the CHP in Turkey are examples to this sort of single-party (1966: 208-209).

Özbudun explains the democratic potential of the Kemalist regime by relying on the distinction Linz (1970) made between totalitarian and authoritarian regimes mentioned above (see Table 1). He argues that the discourse and policies of the single party regime in Turkey fits perfectly well these distinctions (1981). Özbudun offers the emergence of six principles of Kemalism (which will be elaborated in Chapter 4), gradually over time and out of pragmatic needs, CHP's lack of an official party charter until 1931 and the limited effort made to define Kemalism as an ideology, as his evidence for arguing that the Kemalist regime relied on what Linz and Stepan (1996) named mentalities instead of an ideological doctrine (1981: 95-97). In terms of the distinction between the mobilizing efforts of authoritarian and totalitarian parties, Özbudun offers CHP elite's composition of military-bureaucratic elites and local notables, the party's commitment to nurturing a westernized, elite middle class instead of mobilizing support from rural communities as the evidence of party's non intention of social transformation (1981: 90, 93-95). On whether Turkey's single-party regime allowed for limited pluralism, Özbudun notes that in the CHP bloc in TBMM (*Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, TBMM*), party members were permitted to speak their minds, particularly on the issue of statism, and that there was an attempt in 1930 to move out of the single-party regime with the Free Republican Party (*Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırka*) experience.

These two examples demonstrate that, tutelage theories (theorists) assume that the single party regime in Turkey, carried a democratic potential based on the simple fact that it differed from what was understood to be a totalitarian regime. This conception of the single party regime in Turkey as a non-totalitarian party either skips the category of "authoritarian" regimes (Duverger, Tunaya) or fails to consider the significant distance between authoritarian and democratic regimes. As mentioned above, the conceptualization of authoritarian regimes was born out of the necessity to identify those regimes that were neither totalitarian nor democratic. This distinction often escapes the tutelage theories. Duverger and Tunaya both neglect this category

and claim that single party regime, for the simple virtue of not being totalitarian, must carry democratic potential.

By arguing that the single-party regime in Turkey has a democratic potential because it is non-totalitarian, tutelage theory either omits debating whether Turkey's single-party regime is 'authoritarian' (Duverger, Tunaya) or fails to factor in the distinction between democratic and authoritarian regimes (Tunaya, Özbudun). Duverger and Tunaya ignore the category of authoritarian regimes all together and suppose that a non-totalitarian single-party regime inevitably bears democratic potential. Thus, authoritarianism is not considered in the theory's attempts to distinguish between totalitarianism and democracy and a false assumption that regimes that are not totalitarian may be labeled democratic is made. The democratic qualities of the Kemalist regime are shown through its differences from those cases of totalitarianism often referred to in political science literature, namely Communist Soviet Russia under Stalin or fascist Germany under Hitler and Italy under Mussolini.

Until Juan J. Linz (1964) observed the Franco regime in Spain to identify authoritarianism as a distinct regime type that is different from totalitarian regimes and liberal democracies and has particular dynamics, political systems were defined according to the categories of totalitarianism and democracy. In this framework, single-party regimes that were not easily filed under either of these two traditional categories were identified as temporary single-party systems, de facto single-party system, potential democracy, tutelary democracy, etc (Linz, 2000: 52-53; Özbudun, 2011: 3). Duverger named Turkey's single-party system as 'potential/tutelary democracy' in his book, *Political Parties* (1951), which was published at a time when the academic literature distinguishing authoritarianism as a regime type different from totalitarianism and democracy was not widely available. Tunaya published at a relatively early date (1966) his analysis on Turkey's one party system where he referred to Duverger's term and did not feel need to revisit his use of tutelary democracy despite the evolution in relevant political science literature.

There is a significance difference between tutelage theories advanced by Duverger and Tunaya on the one hand and Özbudun on the other. Özbudun defines the single-

party regime as authoritarian based the formulation offered by Linz. However Özbudun, associates the state of being ‘non-totalitarian’ with the state of being authoritarian; and he equates authoritarian with the concept of tutelage which brings him closer to Duverger’s and Tunaya’s assessment of Turkey’s single-party regime. According to Özbudun’s analysis, Turkey’s single-party system bears a democratic potential not only because it is not totalitarian but also because it is authoritarian (1981, 1986). Yet, this argument goes against basic theories of political science and the conceptualization offered by Linz on authoritarianism, from which Özbudun borrows his terminology. Linz (2000: 53) explains that authoritarian regimes breed single parties that follow the model of Leninist revolutionary parties and aim to build a new state and society. The reproduction of single parties, armed with the task of constructing new states and nations, necessitated the identification of a regime type, authoritarianism, which was markedly different than political democracies-totalitarian regimes. In this framework, Turkey’s single-party regime corresponds to Linz’s conceptualization on single parties found in authoritarian regimes. Özbudun, however, correlates authoritarian regimes with democratic ones based on a shared trait, ‘non-totalitarianism’. Yet, a regime that is not totalitarian cannot automatically be assumed to possess democratic qualities; nor can a regime that is authoritarian be considered democratic by default.

According to Linz, authoritarian regimes may be different from totalitarian and democratic regimes but authoritarian and totalitarian regimes share a common trait: neither is democratic (2005: 53). Moreover he argues that while it is difficult to distinguish totalitarian regimes from authoritarian ones due to blurring of the borders, it is significantly easier to distinguish democratic regimes from non-democratic regimes. Linz explains this phenomenon in the following passage:

The borderline between nondemocratic and democratic regimes is therefore a fairly rigid one that cannot be crossed by slow and imperceptible evolution but practically always requires a violent break, anti-constitutional acts, a military coup, a revolution, a foreign intervention. By comparison, the line separating totalitarian systems from other nondemocratic systems is much more diffuse, and there are obvious cases in which systems lost the characteristics that would allow us to define them as totalitarian in any meaningful sense of the term without becoming democracies and in a way that does not allow the observer to say exactly when and how the change

took place. Despite our emphasis on the importance of retaining the distinction of totalitarian and other nondemocratic types of polity, these have more in common with each other than with democratic governments, justifying nondemocratic as a more general comprehensive category (2000: 60-61).

Therefore, the non-totalitarian nature of Turkey's single-party regime does not directly lead to its nomination as a tutelary democracy. Non-totalitarianism may only imply that the single-party regime in Turkey was authoritarian. The linkages between totalitarian and authoritarian regimes are far more pronounced than those between democratic and non-democratic regimes. Authoritarian tendencies in Turkey's single-party regime prevented opportunities for democracy from arising and especially after 1930s increasingly resembled totalitarian regimes in terms of its discourse and practices. It is important to note that those traits Özbudun offers as evidence of the authoritarian nature, as defined by Linz, of Turkey's single-party regime are found in the period before 1930. After 1930 and particularly during the term of Recep Peker as CHP's Secretary General, the single-party regime's discourse and practices began to fall out of line with the three qualities that authoritarian regimes are expected to have; Özbudun fails to account for this change in the regime and for its extensions such as the fact that the party ideology was being formulated through the magazine, *Ülkü* (Ethos); *Halkevleri* (People's Houses) and *Halk Hatipleri Teşkilatı* (Public Speakers Organization) were institutionalized in attempts to mobilize and transform society; and that Press Law, Law on Foundations, the office of the 'national chief', etc. were founded to abolish limited pluralism.

1.2.2 “Tutelage Regime Aims Democracy”

The second proposition made by the tutelage theory is that Turkey's single-party regime was democratic in its intents and purposes. Tutelage theory asserts that although the regime had democratic intentions, the socio-economic structure at the time and the targets it adopted obliged CHP to resort temporarily to authoritarian practices. In other words, theory suggests that a distinction ought to be made between the mentality of the single-party system and its practices. Kemalism clearly advanced a democratic rationale and intended to transform Turkey into a liberal democracy for all intents and purposes, however adverse conditions delayed Turkey's stride towards

liberal democracy. Authoritarian policies were employed so as to undermine those adverse conditions and ultimately to deliver democracy.

Tutelage theory bases the democratic nature of the single-party regime in the principle of “populism” (halkçılık). References to and definitions of the principle of populism found in Atatürk’s public statements and CHP’s party program and manifesto are frequently addressed in the relevant literature. Özbudun professes that Kemalist ideology demonstrates its democratic spirit through the principle of populism, which means ‘political democracy’ and Atatürk repeatedly referred to populism as one of the main ushers of the new regime in countless speeches he gave since the beginning of the national war of independence. In his book, *Medeni Bilgiler* (Civil Information), Özbudun quotes from Atatürk’s public statements on the principle of populism from the period between 1921 and 1923 and concludes that,

Atatürk’s interpretation of populism... is not a representative regime where an elite imposes upon the masses what is for the common good. His understanding of democracy is truly a political democracy. Namely, a system that rests on the principle of the rule of the peoples. In other words, a regime that cherishes freedom and liberalism (1986: 167).

Özbudun further argues that Atatürk’s thinking culminated in actual policies designed and applied during the early years of the Kemalist regime, between 1920 and 1925.

Daver, who emphasized the tutelary nature of the single-party system, also believed that Atatürkist thought was essentially democratic:

Democracy was Atatürk’s political system of choice. He wholeheartedly believed in the superiority and true value of this system. He professed that the values that members of the Turkish nation share make them more susceptible to accepting democratic rule. That he had long been planning to establish a democratic republic, even as early as the beginning of the war of independence is highly likely and there are not insignificant indications to support this claim (1983: 252).

Daver wrote the 1924 constitution was drafted with the intention of instituting a democratic republic, and therefore young Turkey was at least on paper a democracy, which was in its configuration not very different from Western democracies.

However according to Daver “in practice, Turkey was not a Western democracy; in fact, it was ruled by an authoritarian, if not a dictatorial, regime” (1983: 253).

Tutelage theory makes a distinction between the policies adopted by the single-party regime and the rationale that feeds these policies. It assumes that the ideological foundations of the single-party regime were democratic and yet historical conditions prevented the party leadership from putting into practice the democratic ideals they espoused. To convey the democratic ideals of the party leadership, proponents of tutelage theory refer primarily to public statements of Atatürk and to a lesser extent to speeches of other leading party figures. However, only those references in public statements of party leadership that demonstrate evidence for the existence of a democratic mentality are selected, and anti-democratic statements are ignored. Certainly, the period of one party rule in Turkey is laden with messages in favor of and opposing democracy. Besides, the single-party regime reached a political and ideological breaking point in 1930s after which the democratic spirit, which tutelary theory persistently draws attention to, was gradually overtaken by a totalitarian mentality. In other words, after the 1930s not only did the policies of the single-party regime become authoritarian, the rationale behind it also becomes tainted with authoritarianism. For this reason, it is impossible to toss aside these authoritarian practices and assume that Turkey’s one party rule had a democratic potential.

Özbudun and Daver assess the democratic rationale of the single party regime based on Atatürk’s interpretation of the principle of “populism” during the Independence war, as “rendering the national will supreme”. However, Atatürk and his party leadership redefined the principle of populism gradually in parallel to their changing political priorities. During the Independence War and before the founding of the single-party regime in 1925, the meaning of the principle of populism changed according to zeitgeist and either refers to ‘democracy’ (sovereignty unconditionally and unreservedly belongs to the nation) or to ‘republic’ (the nation is the sole and exclusive master of its fate). In order to recruit broad social support and to build social coalition during the war of independence, Atatürk frequently used concepts like ‘national will’ and ‘national sovereignty’. However, after the war was over, the

democratic content of the principle of populism was gradually altered. Even as early as 1923 when the principle of populism was widely accepted to mean ‘national sovereignty’, Atatürk declared that because political parties were essentially class-based, in a young society like Turkey where social class distinctions did not exist, founding multiple political parties would be potentially dangerous and unnecessary (1997, II: 96-97). With these words that legitimize a single-party regime in Turkey, Atatürk granted CHP with the power of representation. According to Atatürk, CHP already defended the interests of the nation so there was no need for other parties to volunteer for the same role.

Following the (bitter) experiences of the Sheikh Said (Kurdish) rebellion and the Progressive Republican Party (*Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası, TpCF*), the Kemalist cadres were confronted with the challenge of sustaining their political power and responded by adopting an elitist and solidarity-based approach to the principle of populism. Atatürk’s announcement in 1925 that the CHP is “tasked to enlighten and guide the nation” (1997, II: 227) is testament to the new approach taken then. The institutional bases of national sovereignty, or in other words the formal mechanisms of representative democracy, were preserved; however, the democratic spirit of the principle of populism was crushed by attacks on and theoretical arguments ridiculing alternative political parties. Thus, multiparty system was de facto abolished and the single-party system was legitimized by theoretical amendments on the principle of populism. Since different social classes did not exist in society, there was no need for different political parties. These arguments were used to abandon the wartime idea of relying on the masses for political legitimacy and to concentrate political power in the hands of the CHP, with the motto, “for the people, in spite of the people.”

After the Free Republican Party (*Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası, SCF*) experience in 1930, the single-party regime experienced a significant transformation in its thinking and practices. CHP leadership was deeply affected by the remarkable attention the public paid the SCF and they were convinced that the key tenets of the revolution were yet to be internalized by the masses. At a time when the free world was

grappling with severe economic depression, fascist regimes were accruing considerable economic and political power and this intrigued CHP leadership. The single-party regime in Turkey was already burdened with many challenges so they drew inspiration from the fascist regimes' success and embarked on a decisive path towards authoritarianism. The ideological transformation after the 1930s introduced authoritarian elements to the key tenets of the regime. Particularly, the principles of populism and nationalism were transformed and thereby the regime's democratic potential was replaced with authoritarianism and an emphasis on solidarity. During this period, CHP's leading administrators and intellectuals were also impressed by the strength of communist and fascist regimes' public outreach, mass mobilization and economic growth. On occasions where authoritarianism was dominant, fascist and communist regimes were praised and liberal democratic regimes were scorned (Öz, 1992: 114-115; Özbudun, 2011: 96-97; Yetkin, 1983: 31-42).

1.2.3 “Tutelage Regime is Temporary”

The third assumption tutelage theory makes is that the single-party system in Turkey does not rest on a doctrine that legitimizes the existence of a single political party. This conception draws its support from prevalent democratization theories that understand interim governments legitimized only by the virtue of their being temporary guardians (Przeworski, 1993). In this conception, the party leadership does not consider the single-party system an ideal condition and are ashamed to exercise single-party rule - only temporarily - due to the conditions imposed upon them. This argument, which correlates to the dichotomy offered above between democratic rationales versus authoritarian practices, further states that Turkey's single-party system did not follow a single-party doctrine, that single-party rule was not a sustainable and favorable option for policymakers, and that it was a temporary consequence of the conditions of the time.

Duverger backs this argument with the following statement:

The Turkish single-party-system was never based upon the doctrine of a single-party. It gave no official recognition to the monopoly, made no attempts to justify it by the existence of a classless society or the desire to do away with parliamentary strife and

Liberal democracy. I was always embarrassed and almost ashamed of the monopoly. The Turkish single-party had a bad conscience-differing in this from its fascist or Communist brethren, who offer themselves as models to be imitated. For its leaders the ideal remained a plural party-system, monopoly being a result of special political situation in Turkey. On several occasions Kemal attempted to bring it to an end, and this fact itself is deeply revealing. Nothing similar was conceivable in Hitler Germany or the Italy of Mussolini (1959: 277).

Özbudun, too, defends the tutelary character of Turkey's single-party system by underlining its temporariness, its constraints, and its progressive nature:

In Turkey, Atatürkist thought always treated the single-party system, and its anti-democratic practices or those practices that we are today labeling anti-democratic, as products of the constraints that were believed to exist at the time. The single-party system was never idealized. Nor was it ever considered a long-term option. In addition, political democracy was never deemed a real target for liberal democracy (1986: 170).

The tutelary nature of Turkey's single-party regime is explained by the temporariness of the one party rule, the fact that the regime did not rely on a doctrine and that the party held power temporarily so as to steer Turkey out of the difficult conditions it faced and prepare the foundations for a democratic regime. Evidence for the argument above is offered from some public statements and practices from before 1930. For examples of practices, the literature lists the founding of TpCF and the establishment of SCF by Atatürk himself; and for examples of public statements the literature contains quotes from an interview Atatürk gave *The Times* and Fethi Bey's speech at the inauguration of the SCF.

Atatürk's comments on TpCF in an interview on 21 November 1924 with a reporter working for *The Times* are often used to demonstrate the tutelary characteristics of the regime. Atatürk said the following on TpCF: "In countries, which are ruled by national sovereignty and particularly in Republican regimes, naturally, political parties exist. No doubt, political parties that will compete with the single-party will emerge" (1997, III: 109). These words, published on 11 December 1924 in the newspaper *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* indicate that Atatürk would receive the emergence of a second political party competing with CHP well. However, this statement does not reflect the truth and is not supported by the events that ensued. The full text of the interview presents a different picture : In the full text, Atatürk confessed that he

thought the TpCF leadership to be dishonest, devious, backward, ungrateful and disloyal (Öz, 1992: 92; Zürcher, 1988: 18). Evidently, TpCF, founded four days before the interview was due to be held (17 November 1924), was prohibited and closed down by the order of the Cabinet 7-8 months later (3 June 1925).

Moreover, there is a more elaborate statement by Atatürk where he described his views on the existence of political parties. In his statement, delivered in Balıkesir on 7 February 1923, he had the following to say on political parties:

This nation suffered profoundly at the hands of political parties. Allow me to say that in other countries, political parties have often been and continue to be established for economic reasons. This is because in those countries, there are social classes. A political party forms to defend the interests of a particular social class against the interests of another social class, represented by another political party. This is very common. Political parties are established on a false assumption that there are social classes in our country too, and everyone knows the problems we face because of those political parties. However, the People's Party (Halk Fırkası, HF) embraces not a part of but the entire nation. Let us consider our society (...) Alas, since different vocational groups coexist in Turkey, it is not possible to think of our society as consisting of classes; we are all common folk. The People's Party will instruct our society on political behavior (1997, II: 101-102).

This statement indicates that Atatürk associated political parties with social class and believed that since there were not diverse classes but professional/vocational groups in Turkey, there was no need for competing political parties. He added that political parties have burdened the country in the past. As will be discussed below, these ideas expressed by Atatürk in the early days of the republic were developed and utilized in 1930s to legitimize an authoritarian single-party regime, based on social solidarity. A report by the British Embassy, the closing of TpCF eight months after its inception and Atatürk's musings on the relationship between political party formation and social class debunk tutelage theory's hypothesis that Turkey's single-party regime did not hold an official doctrine and discredit the source often used to support this hypothesis, namely the interview published in *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*.

A second example offered by tutelage theory to support the hypotheses that one party rule in Turkey was conceived as an unavoidable and temporary period; that it did not possess an official doctrine; and that it had democratic intentions was the fact that the SCF was established as an initiative by and through the support of Atatürk and İnönü.

A more thorough evaluation of the SCF experience and the developments that followed its demise reveal that the SCF experience fails to prove the temporariness of the single-party regime and instead affirms the survival of the one party rule. Taking SCF's fate in to consideration, it becomes evident that Atatürk and CHP leadership aimed primarily to present Turkey as a democracy to the West and then to discipline CHP bloc in the parliament in the area of economic policy in particular. Therefore, the role assigned to SCF did not involve competing for office against the CHP by effectively demonstrating its credo as the main opposition. SCF, on the other hand, either misunderstood or ignored the instructions it was given and rallied for popular support, vied for political power and functioned as a genuine opposition party; therefore, it threatened CHP (Barutçu, 1977: 285; Karaosmanoğlu, 1968: 105; Okyar, 1980: 377-547; Us, 1964: 142).

The SCF experience urged CHP administration to leave behind the practices of a non-indoctrinated/de facto single-party; to come to terms with the single-party regime; and, to subsequently develop ideological and institutional mechanisms to correspond to the one party rule. CHP adopted a definition of society that is susceptible to single-party regime; at every step, established strong links between the party and the state; either abolished or merged with every non-partisan organization and institution; nurtured a cadre of supporters who would bear the weight of party on their shoulders and act as agents of the party in society; and invented policies to educate the society. These acts served to embed the single-party regime further in the system and to deepen authoritarianism. All these developments, particularly the SCF experience indicates that CHP underwent an ideological and political transformation. Before 1930, one party rule was pursued for practical reasons and pragmatically; after the SCF experience, the single-party regime was sustained decisively and consistently based on an ideology and concrete policies. As such, it could be argued that the postulations tutelage theory relies on—namely that the single party system was not transformed into a single party doctrine and that single party system was temporary and carried out of pragmatic reasons—lost their validity after 1930, even though they could be partially supported by the developments before that time.

1.2.4 “Tutelage Regime is Segue to Democracy”

The last one of the four assumptions that frames tutelage theory asserts that tutelage system not only makes transition into democracy easier, but it renders democracy inevitable due to the rationale behind the tutelage system and its structural composition. Not only democratic consolidation was an ineluctable consequence of the single party regime in Turkey, but it was also the conscious choice of the tutelary elite who saw democratic consolidation as their teleological project. In other words, Turkey was not forced into a transition from single-party to multiparty system by unforeseeable domestic and international developments; system change was a natural and inevitable outcome of the Kemalist regime’s structural dynamics and of the ruling elite’s preplanned policies and foresights. Duverger was one of the earliest supporters of the hypothesis stated above. He believed that the single-party system was a step on the road to democracy in Turkey (1970: 294). According to Duverger,

... A system that definitely stated that the single-party was transitional, that it considered it to be no more than a necessary stage on the road to pluralism, could well be considered to be potentially democratic. (...) The idea of ‘potential democracy’ may provoke a simile; the idea of a single-party evolving towards pluralism may be greeted with skepticism; both ideas however have a basis in fact: the post-1923 evolution of Turkey that ended in the 1950 elections with the peaceful triumph of the opposition. With neither checks nor disturbance, Turkey passed from the single-party system to pluralism. (...) The example of Turkey ... seems to demonstrate that the technique of the single-party, applied with discernment, makes it possible gradually to build up a new ruling class and the independent political elite, which alone make it possible to establish at some date on authentic democracy (1959: 280).

Similar to Duverger, Tunaya argued that the revolutionary characteristics of the single-party system in Turkey compelled its transition to democracy:

Some single-party regimes declare that their rule is to be temporary and that they aim to serve as bridges leading to more civilized and democratic systems... (These parties) self-terminate as they prepare for a democratic system. The Kuo Min Party in China and CHP in Turkey possess these qualities (1966: 208-209).

The single-party regime in Turkey did not consider its rule to be permanent, announced as a fundamental principle its commitment to temporary rule and to facilitating democratic transition. It volunteered to realize a revolutionary movement or cause towards development and modernization. (...) In a way, the single-party regime had an operational character (1966: 241).

Özbudun relates the democratic potential that the single-party system had with the system's revolutionary agenda. Turkey's single-party regime may have resorted to authoritarianism for some time however it would have ultimately realized democratic transition.

By the same token the CHP ideology displayed the inherent contradictions commonly found in tutelary regimes. When the limited goals of partial transformation were largely achieved, the ideology ceased to be a source of legitimacy. Precisely because of its instrumental character, it was left vulnerable to rational criticism. Once a secular, republican nation-state seemed securely established, it became legitimate to ask whether Kemalist goals could not be better pursued under a competitive political system. (...) In a real sense, therefore, the success of the Kemalist reforms undermined the long-term legitimacy of the single-party system in Turkey (1981: 90–91).

Özbudun claims that the nature of the Kemalist regime permitted Turkey's transition from single to multiparty system to occur peacefully. According to Özbudun, "the exceptional character of this transition in Turkey can be explained, at least partly, by the nature of the Kemalist political regime itself. Although it was an authoritarian regime, many of its characteristics made it a logical candidate for potential democratization" (1981: 80).

The main argument formulated by Duverger, Tunaya and Özbudun supposes that the CHP administration aspired to a democratic system however was obliged to prolong the single-party rule for a while due to the adverse conditions Turkey found itself in. When more favorable conditions were obtained, the party administration initiated democratic transition. In other words, tutelage theory assigns a democratic characteristic to the single-party regime in Turkey on the grounds that it permitted the system to evolve into a multiparty regime in 1946; transferred power to the democratically-elected Democrat Party (DP); and this move was driven almost entirely by internal dynamics and İnönü's personal longing for democracy. This analysis overlooks the external dynamics that triggered Turkey's transition into multiparty democracy and prompted CHP to agree to transfer power to DP. In fact, the theory's dismissal of external dynamics is deliberate for it is assumed that factoring in the impact of external dynamics on democratic transition would weaken the arguments in favor of the single-party's democratic potential. However, any

analysis that omits external dynamics will inevitably fail to explain why, suddenly, a single-party regime that has since 1930s followed the organizational models of fascist regimes to consolidate one party rule and grown more authoritarian through its use of Kemalist principles decided to consider the option of multiparty system. Thus emerges the need for a new analysis that takes into account external dynamics as well as internal ones.

At the end of the Second World War, the most important development that cemented Turkey's political orientation was the security threat posed by Soviet Russia when it demanded that the future of Russia's special relationship with Turkey depended on Turkey's and USSR's agreeing to declare the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits a common defense zone. In fact, since the beginning of the war of independence Turkey may have been expected to follow the international trends and to ultimately align with western powers by democratizing its regime. Evidently, at the time, İnönü, party intelligentsia and İnönü's opponents were joined in thinking that a consequence of Allied powers' victory for Turkey's domestic politics was to democratize. As early as May 1944, articles published in Vatan and Tan newspapers called for greater freedom of thought and press, and CHP bloc in the parliament began to criticize the government for its policies and its management of the national budget. When stories on the criticism raised against CHP leadership were published, the government put into force Article 50 of the Press Law, which authorized for the prohibition of newspapers (Toker, 1970: 31-40).

Nevertheless, the security threat posed by USSR compelled the single-party regime to consider the option of democratic transition seriously and to take the necessary steps forward hastily. Turkey refused to fight in the Second World War next to the Allied forces, maintained its commercial and political relationship with Germany throughout the war, and its political regimes bore resemblance to fascist regimes in Europe; for these reasons, USA and England did not respond in Turkey's favor to the Soviet threat and Turkey was left to its own devices (Erkin, 1968: 251-155; Yılmaz, 1997: 5-6). İnönü interpreted the Soviet's precondition to build a common defense zone in the Straits as an indication of Soviet intentions to turn Turkey into a satellite

state and perceived this as an existential problem for Turkey's Kemalist regime (Toker, 1970: 196).

For the single-party leadership the safest way to deal with the Soviet threat and to sustain their power was to demand the protection of the US-led western bloc. To this end, İnönü prioritized earning the friendship of USA and England and to subscribe Turkey to the Western bloc for protection against the Soviets (Toker, 1970: 41-43). Consequently, Turkey ended its policy of non-alignment and froze its bilateral relationship with Germany; thus Turkey entered the Western bloc. On the domestic front, Turkey triggered a process of democratization. The Parliament legislated to end political and economic relations with Germany on 2 August 1944 and ratified Turkey's decision to enter into war against Germany and Japan on 23 February 1945, thereby qualified for membership in the United Nations and for co-signing the Treaty of San Francisco with the Allied powers.

USSR officially communicated to Turkey's ambassador to Moscow on 19/21 March 1945 its decision not to renew the Turkey-Soviet Friendship Agreement, signed in 1925 and due to expire in November 1945. İnönü was able to partially secure Turkey against the Soviet threat by entering into the Western alliance and becoming a UN member state however to ensure full protection against the USSR, Turkey still needed American and British assistance. The easiest and safest way to ensure full protection from the Soviet threat was to change Turkey's regime into a democracy. Hence, İnönü gave the most powerful indication of Turkey's intentions for democratic transition in his statement on 19 May 1945, after having received the official communication quoted above from USSR and before the signing of San Francisco Treaty:

Our country's political system will continue to evolve in every possible direction, guided by our nation's will reflected in the Republic. When the restrictions pressed upon Turkey due to difficult wartime conditions are lifted, there will be more leeway to exercise principles of democracy in the our thinking and politics. (...) TBMM will ensure that this country, which accomplished great and revolutionary changes in a short period of time, will continue its progress without any setbacks (Toker, 1970: 76).

İnönü's recent demonstrations in Turkey and abroad of his will to facilitate democratization charged Turkey's opposition with confidence to vehemently argue in the parliament against the Land Law in the second half of the month of May. MPs Bayar, Köprülü, Koraltan and Menderes formed an opposition group in the CHP and presented a draft proposal to the CHP bloc in the parliament on 7 June 1945 offering to secure personal freedoms and to expand parliamentary oversight. Then, the CHP Administrative Council, convened by İnönü, agreed to prohibit intra-party opposition and yet to allow a second political party to emerge (Toker, 1970: 91). Thus, while The Manifesto of the Four was rejected in the parliament, Menderes and Köprülü took the debate public by using the press and Vatan and Tan newspapers ran stories to support this wave of liberalization. On 15 August 1945 during parliamentary sessions on ratifying San Francisco Treaty the speech Menderes gave reflected the extent of the liberal debate in the parliament and also the strong link between domestic and foreign policy in Turkey. Menderes said the following in the parliament:

The international Constitution we are about to accept does not place us under any obligation that violates our commitment to our national Constitution or the core values it espouses. However, we may be compelled to remove the differences between the values embedded in our Constitution and the de facto situation and this may enable us to deliver those promises that our most fundamental piece of legislation makes to our people (Toker, 1970: 98-99).

This statement caused intense debate in the parliament and Menderes and Köprülü pursued the debate further on newspaper columns. Finally, in September, Köprülü and Menderes were expelled from CHP. On 1 November 1945, İnönü gave important signals for Turkey's intentions to move from a single-party system to a multiparty system.

Throughout the Republican era, there was a strong commitment to preserving democratic credentials. Dictatorship was never accepted in principle and was always condemned as potentially hazardous to and unsuitable for the Turkish nation. (...) We merely lack a second party that could challenge the party in government. There were even attempts by those in power to establish a rival political party. Unfortunately, twice these initiatives succumbed to social pressure and failed. However, guided by the needs of the country and as a result of the proper functioning of the mood of freedom and democracy, it is possible for new political parties to emerge. (...) We do not know whether a new political party will form in time (for the next elections) and whether it will emerge within or outside of the parliament. We do know however that the correct path, which also is more attuned to

the interests and political maturity of our nation, to follow is not for those politicians who disagree in principle and practice with their peers to form cliques inside the ruling party but for them to exercise their political agenda and plans independently/externally (İnönü, 1993: 60-63).

Particularly the last few sentences of the excerpt above addressed Bayar and his colleagues and İnönü implied that he wished them to leave CHP to establish a new political party. Bayar and his colleagues treated İnönü's speech as an affirmation and began working towards finding a new party. Subsequently, on 1 December 1945, Bayar announced their intentions to establish a political party and on 7 January 1946, DP was officially founded. Before the 1946 elections, the two-tier election system was replaced with the one-tier election system and Article 50 of Press Law was removed. These strides towards democratization and the first national elections with two parties campaigning for power galvanized the positive reaction that İnönü anticipated in the West and USA was compelled to encourage Turkey to reject the demands USSR voiced repeatedly, in August and September 1946.

Without a doubt, İnönü, with his title as national chief and his unequivocal influence on Turkey's political life, served as the most crucial driving force of the democratization process. Since 1945, İnönü employed his power and influence to democratize the regime and pursued the path towards a multiparty system decisively. In this framework, there is consensus on İnönü's influence and power over democratic transition. Disagreement arises when İnönü's motivations to support democratization are considered. Was İnönü driven by democratic intentions that were primordial to the single-party system or by foreign policy dynamics and concerns over national security? Toker observes that four months after İnönü's appointment to Presidency, he delivered a speech at the Istanbul University where he declared that he desired democratic transition. İnönü said in his speech on 6 March 1939;

Our political life will always advance to higher and more progressive phases of a popular regime. Unless there is genuine de facto oversight of the nation over the government and unless the nation believes that they have the ability to exercise democratic oversight, the regime cannot be considered popular (Toker, 1970: 18).

Toker evaluates these comments as a clear indication of İnönü's commitment to free elections and democratic transition. Toker finds traces of this sentiment in a later

statement by İnönü, delivered after the transition to a multiparty system: “I remember following those countries around us hold free elections and feeling deeply ashamed” (Toker, 1970: 18-19). According to Toker, İnönü delayed his dream of realizing democratic transition because the Second World War started and yet he never really abandoned the idea all together. Therefore, from 1944 onwards the waves of liberalization in domestic politics and the ultimate decision to move to multiparty system were results of İnönü’s conviction that the time for change had come (1970: 31, 105). Toker refers to the conversation İnönü had with Nihat Erim immediately after he delivered his famous 19 May 1945 speech to prove his point:

Our current system is entirely dependent on its leader. These kinds of regimes often start gloriously and sometimes even sustain their glory for some time. However, they cannot live forever as such. When the leader leaves the stage, the survival of the regime becomes uncertain. Single-party regimes have fallen when they were not able to make the necessary transition to democracy on time. Beneath the rubble laid many institutions that have taken great effort to build. We need to protect our country from meeting such an end. We need to quickly adopt serious and effective systems of oversight and opposition. (...) I might live only to see a single-party regime in Turkey. However, I am concerned about what might ensue after I pass. Therefore, we need to act quickly (Toker, 1970: 77).

Not unlike Metin Toker, Bernard Lewis (1979: 313-314) and Feroz Ahmad (1977: 24) disagree with the claim that Turkey attempted to democratize only to respond to its foreign policy challenges. They base their criticism on the grounds that the US would not have acted to protect the interests of Turkey or any other country simply because of its democratic credentials and would have considered first and foremost the strategic worth and consistency of the country concerned.

Özbudun (2011: 124-125) on the other hand professes that though Lewis’ and Ahmad’s observations on US policy preferences ought to be considered, a more significant consideration is how CHP administration viewed those policy preferences. Özbudun argues that İnönü and his close aides were convinced that democratization would be an effective tool to attract US protection against the Soviet threat. Yılmaz shares Özbudun’s view and suggests that in order to best analyze US policy at the time, a distinction needs to be made between America’s basic intentions and its revealed ideals (1997: 8-9). Yılmaz notes that those members of the CHP leadership who were less familiar with US policy paid more attention than was due to public

statements on freedom and democracy, such as those reflected in the Atlantic Declaration signed by President Roosevelt. Therefore, CHP leadership failed to consider that America's real interests might have been markedly different. Based on this reasoning, Yılmaz presents the three public statements delivered by İnönü (on 19 May 1945, 1 November 1945, and 12 July 1947) as evidence for how the process of democratization in the home front ran parallel to Turkey's bilateral relationship with the US. More specifically, Yılmaz connects the two speeches in 1945 with the San Francisco Treaty and the 1947 Declaration with the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan.

The developments that took place until the establishment of the Democrat Party and the events that followed, especially until the 12 July 1947 Declaration, show that external dynamics influenced both CHP's and DP's policies. CHP expected democratic transition to solidify Turkey's place next to its Western allies and DP, aware of İnönü's conviction, confidently demonstrated its opposition. As a result, evaluating democratic transition in Turkey by studying its internal dynamics alone and by assuming that transition was prompted by the nature of the single-party regime will be as faulty as studying external dynamics alone, without paying attention to internal dynamics and the influence of İnönü.

However, two more points need to be considered for a complete analysis of the transition in 1945 and the transfer of power in 1950. The political histories and personalities of Bayar and his colleagues and the party program of DP have influenced the process of transition and of transfer of power. In 1945, there were quite a few opponents to İnönü who might have founded a political party to rival the CHP. However, İnönü asked Bayar to establish the new political party because İnönü was confident of Bayar's allegiance to the Kemalist regime and Atatürk's legacy. For İnönü, the lines that were never to be crossed were demonstrating anti-Atatürkist tendencies, fuelling religious fundamentalism, and pursuing a radically different foreign policy. Bayar was equally sensitive about the first two items. Since the basis of Bayar's disagreement with İnönü was financial, it was assumed that Bayar would

agree with İnönü on Turkey's foreign policy direction as well (Toker, 1970: 52-62, 112-113).

The second point to be considered when explaining the smooth transfer of power in 1950 was the strong conviction that İnönü shared with CHP leadership that their party would not lose the elections. There are many indications to prove this claim. The first indication is that CHP, worried that the post-election parliament where the embattled DP has not earned even a single seat would not be well received in the west, offered DP reserved seating/contingency seats in the parliament (Ahmad, 1977: 30; Ahmad and Ahmad, 1976: 62; Karpat, 1959: 239; Yalman, 1971: 208). The second indicator was that CHP did not consider introducing certain legislative/constitutional changes that would have helped it to consolidate its position of power after the elections. Hence, CHP did not offer to introduce a system of direct elections for the post of President (İnönü); to consider a second house or representative assembly; to adopt the system of proportional representation (Özbudun, 2011: 127; Yılmaz, 1997: 26-27). Furthermore, İnönü's regret after the CHP's defeat in the 1950 elections (Arzik, 1966: 44) and the inclusion of these measures listed above at the urging of CHP to the 1961 constitution prove that CHP did not feel the need to employ such safety mechanisms because of its faith in electoral victory. İnönü's misguided faith testifies to CHP's distance from social realities and to CHP's conviction that the nation felt indebted to it for its wartime performance. However, it is certain that İnönü did not expect to lose political power so soon. Therefore measures to introduce judicial oversight of the elections, the launch of the proportional representation system which earned DP far more seats than the votes it gained at the ballots, and CHP's reluctance to instigate mechanisms that could have helped it preserve its position of power are steps taken because CHP expected to win the 1950 elections.

Clearly, whatever reasons there may have been for democratic transition, the fact that a single-party regime was able to turn into a democracy is noteworthy. However, the internal and external dynamics of the period must be factored into assessments on the nature of the single-party regime, instead of assigning primordial democratic

qualities to it. İnönü's comments to Erim, democratization policies to counter the Soviet threat by recruiting US assistance, and facilitating the establishment of DP based on a personal trust to Bayar all reveal the concerns of CHP leadership over maintaining their hold on power and their pragmatism. In other words, the transition to democracy is not a consequence of the single-party regime, as tutelage theory suggests. However, single-party regime did not have a structure that presented obstacles to democracy building and hampered democratization either. Since there was not a categorical rejection to democracy as a regime type, when favorable internal and foreign conditions were reached, the single-party regime was able to democratize. By implication, just as the top leadership of CHP was influenced by totalitarian-fascist regimes in 1930s for various reasons, they were drawn to western democratic regimes in the 1940s for more or less similar reasons. The single-party regime adopted authoritarianism and democracy for pragmatic reasons; they were not drawn to either regime type for their principles or ideals. The party leadership effortlessly employed authoritarianism, to the extent that it seemed impossible then for the regime to ever consider democratic rule, in the 1930s and a decade later, they just as easily espoused democratic ideals. They were so convinced of the merits of democracy that they seemed to have never advocated authoritarianism. Their capacity to transform so remarkably is testament to their pragmatism, which is guided by their concerns of threats to the security of their country.

To conclude, tutelage theory's arguments to prove the existence of an undisclosed but nevertheless inevitable democratic agenda in the single-party regime in Turkey rest on assumptions and ignore the authoritarian tendencies that the regime demonstrated in the 1930s, thereby provide a misreading of the historical events. It is possible to detect these conceptual fallacies by looking at the period of transition to multiparty system in 1946 and of transfer of power in 1950. The real value in these two historical developments is that both transitions were peaceful. Tutelage theory, springing from this simple observation, of peaceful transition, arrives at wrong conclusions.

1.2.5 Critique of Tutelage Theories

The second shortcoming of the tutelage theory—which is beyond a simple conceptual fallacy and which, in fact, is source of the conceptual fallacies described above—is that tutelage theories insists on ascribing positive conations to the tutelage system. In these theories, that the tutelary tendencies of the single party administration carried an inherent democratic potential and that democratic potential was realized between 1946 and 1950 is a considered a given. Yet, a closer look at Turkish political history in terms of the tutelary tendencies of its rulers reveals that the interval that needs to be examined is the period between 1925-1960.

Tutelary democracy theory, in understanding the single party system as given and an inevitable passage to democracy ignores the fact that the single party regime was founded after it put an end to the pluralist political system of the time. It is a common misconception of the democratic transition theories in general that it in order to offer an accurate reading of the political system, they often examine the nature of the previous regime and the mode of transition to that regime (Geddes, 1999). What is often ignored in this literature is that an analysis on the nature of the single-party regime ought to consider the condition under which such regime was formed as well as how it ended.

The Kemalist regime systematically eliminated all opposition and viable contenders for power in this political landscape that supported a pluralist political system in terms of its social base and political representation. The Kemalist incumbents, then, moved onto the project of homogenizing the pluralist platform on which the Republic had been built. As such, the Republic, which had inherited the legacy of more than one hundred political parties since the formation of the *İttihat ve Terrakki Cemiyeti* (The Society for Union and Progress) in 1889, moved to institutionalize the single party regime after destroying pluralism and eliminating any viable alternatives for power (Tunaya, 1966: 261). Therefore, when the nature of the single party regime is being examined, it is of utmost importance to consider the process through which CHP, coming from a multi-party pluralist political culture, became the dominant party and then institutionalized the single party regime. When examined from this

perspective, it becomes clear that the exception is not the multi-party regime after 1950, but the authoritarian single party political system of 1925-1945. The architects of this exception are the military-civilian elite classes whose agenda was nation state building.

Tutelage theories, in line with democratization theories, attempt to offer an understanding of the nature of the single party regime by examining only the transition in 1950 and ignoring the military intervention of 1960. However, in the span of a decade, Turkey had already undergone enough political changes to grant another examination of the single party regime. The military junta had overthrown the government and with the 1961 constitution endorsed by the CHP and Kemalist Intelligentsia, bureaucracy had become an accomplice to power. As such, the military intervention just a short ten years after the transition and the Constitution drafted in its aftermath had both tainted the rightly earned fame of the transition experience and established a guardianship that would maintain its influence to this day.

Duverger (1951) introduced the term “tutelary democracy” to the literature on Turkey’s political history long before the military intervention of 1960; however neither he nor other political scientists, who also embraced tutelage theory, felt compelled to revisit their arguments after the coup. In fact, the 1960 coup is as relevant as the 1950 democratic transition to the arguments on the political nature of the Kemalist regime. In other words, the Kemalist single-party regime that had made the peaceful democratic transition in 1950 possible had also made the military intervention of 1960 and the tutelage system formed in its aftermath, possible. The coup illustrated that the democratic transition of 1950 could not be sustained and the single party regime harbored characteristics that were not conducive to democratic consolidation.

Furthermore, the arguments offered by Kemalist elites to justify both the transition from a pluralist party tradition to a one party rule in 1925 and the overturning of a democratic regime by a military junta in 1960 revealed their tutelary intentions. In other words, Kemalist elites acted on their tutelary intentions on both occasions and

legitimized their actions by their tutelary ambitions. Consequently, if the democratic transition of 1950 allowed Turkey's single-party regime to discover its democratic potential, then the judicial coup in 1925 and the military coup in 1960 ought to be examined to discover whether the same single-party regime might possess dynamics that work against democracy. Kemalist regime possessed the necessary potential and qualities to build a formal democracy and it also holds the key to why this formal democracy was bound to exist within an institutional guardianship. Kemalist regime presents a diverse set of narratives on the political system established in 1950 and the system it was replaced with in 1960. Yet, tutelage theory almost automatically assigns democratic qualities to the single-party regime; it cannot explain military and bureaucratic attacks to politics. Thus, its reliance on only one of these two significant political-historical realities renders the retrospective analysis of tutelage theory insufficient. The single-party regime combines both political-historical realities. Thus, a new definition/analysis to capture the essence of both experiences is needed.

In closing this section, it is necessary to mention the few attempts at a critique of tutelage theories. These critiques target some of the assumption that undergirds tutelage theory: that the single-party regime was temporary and that it ultimately had democratic intentions. Critiques attempted to show that the Kemalist elites designed the one party rule as a permanent regime. Ahmet Demirel (1994) concentrated on political debates in the First Assembly; Mete Tunçay (1989) on the period of founding the single-party; Çetin Yetkin (1997) on political developments after 1930; Walter Weiker (1973) on SCF experience; and Esat Öz (1992) on political participation in the single-party period to draw similar conclusions on the permanent nature of the single-party regime. These critiques contributed to the academic literature substantially by uncovering the shortcomings of tutelage theory and the authoritarian elements of the one party rule in Turkey; however, they did not question the concept of "tutelary democracy".

In other words, these earlier works did not problematize tutelage theory's practice of combining the terms tutelage and democracy and asserted that since the single-party regime was authoritarian, it was not tutelary. Levent Köker's work (1995) differs

from the works cited above in that he critiques tutelage theory by reflecting on the dangers posed by the concept of tutelage to democracy. He professes that the authoritarian elements of the single-party regime exist because of its tutelary nature. Köker exposes the anti-democratic components of the concept of tutelage and relies on CHP's official documents and CHP partisans' statements to prove his arguments. The study at hand concurs with the critique advanced by Köker and highlights the importance of his contribution to the academic debate on the concept of tutelage. Nevertheless, it differs from Köker's analysis in two ways. First, Köker limits his analysis with the CHP's documents. This work, on the other, hand expands Köker's analysis to include the formation and evolution of an elite class in the modernization process, authoritarian political mechanism of the single party regime and the nation-building process. Second, Köker stops short of extending his analysis of tutelage as an impediment to democratic consolidations, but states that single party regime in Turkey's political history was constituted an impediment to democracy.

1.3 Organization of the Dissertation

Tutelage theory, referred to in analyses on Turkey, falls short of defining the political nature of the single-party regime in Turkey because it commits conceptual errors and assigns a positive meaning to the concept of tutelage. Hence, this dissertation engages in a critique of tutelage theory. Different from other academic publications that criticize tutelage theory, this dissertation proposes to question the democratic quality of the concept of 'tutelage'. In that sense, the tutelary nature of Turkey's single-party regime does not possess a democratic potential or core; on the contrary, it makes the realization of democracy impossible or at least dampens the prospects of democracy. In other words, this dissertation proposes that instead of facilitating democracy, tutelage presents obstacles to and sometimes completely hampers democracy. The dissertation converges with Köker on the anti-democratic character of the concept of tutelage. However, different from Köker, this dissertation bases its arguments on the concept of a privileged/progressive class in the Turkish modernization, the authoritarian mechanisms of the single-party regime, and the agenda of nation-state building.

1.3.1 Methodology

In the following pages, a combination of historical-institutional and literature review approach will be utilized to explain Turkey's democratic trials that stretched over a half a century. The theory developed here that the tutelage system is the most difficult obstacle to overcome on the path to democratic consolidation builds on an array of existing arguments about regime changes, authoritarianism and political institutions, even as it offers an alternative interpretation to these accounts. In this account, the institutional legacies of early elite formation are the parameters that circumscribe subsequent political actors' contests for monopoly on deciding what is in the best interest of the nation.

The approach outlined in this study can be characterized by three features—it addresses a substantive agenda question (How can we explain Turkey's democratic experience if explanatory models remain inadequate?); it takes the historical tracing of events and transformations seriously; it analyzes macro context of Turkish nation-building and makes assertions about the combined effects of institutions and processes rather than examining just one process at a time. Taken together, these three features add up to a method close to historical intuitionist approaches and an important contribution to our sociological understandings of government, politics, and public policies. These three features necessarily include three variables that will be evaluated in the remainder of this work—actors, historical processes, and institutional context. First, it pays special attention to political actors' strategic choices and the constraints imposed or opportunities afforded to the political actors in the existing circumstances. It takes account of institutions to the extent that they frame the political actors' strategic choices. This is not to say that political actors in study are simply considered as self-interested or rational. Second, a sociological approach to democratization problems requires us, rather than conceiving people as self-interested actors as social actors who follow the web of their own casting (Weber). In this sense, institutions and rules become an important instrument of analysis in that they frame the political actors' behavior in the context of historical changes. To this end, the historical processes of transformation both in terms of the

elite and in terms of the larger context of historical circumstances become important. Finally, the contexts in which these transformations take place are considered. In the context of Turkish democratic experience, the context is the nation-building process in the post WWI conditions of the world. How actors behave is evaluated on the context and the institutional framework. While this accounting of the three variables paid attention may seem simple, it has huge implications for how we should approach explaining Turkey's democratic experience.

This approach begins with the realization that the empirical patterns of Turkey's democratic experience runs counter to academic wisdom and that it remains as an unexplained real world variation of democratic transition. In other words, the democratic trials in Turkey go unaddressed despite all attempts to explain them as "growing pains." Therefore, this study begins with the question "How can Turkey's democratic trials be explained in relation to the historical processes that have shaped the political regime today?"

1.3.2 Outline of Chapters

The chapters in the study at hand are organized with consideration of these three variables. While each of these variables, when evaluated on its own, fall short of offering a comprehensive explanation of the political regime and its trials today, taken together they form a rather comprehensive picture. As such, the following three chapters (Chapters 2, 3, 4) are devoted to each variable respectively. Namely, Chapter two evaluates the formation of the political actors, chapter three the historical process of establishing the institution of the single regime, chapter four the institutional mechanisms these political activities were undertaken. Chapter five evaluates all these tree variables in relation to the elites' nation-building mission in the context of these historical processes outline in the previous chapters.

The analysis begins with an inquiry into the tutelage regime. In order to analyze the conditions of possibility of the tutelage regime, it is necessary to trace the emergence of modern politics in the Ottoman. The Ottoman modernization had begun with Ottoman rulers' quest to "save the state", however, in time this quest had grown

independent from the ruler. The beginning of politics in Ottoman coincides with the advent of the quest for the common good and the best interest of the people. As argued above, without a modern political arena in which alternative quests contest, it is not possible to speak of a tutelage system which has been defined in the preceding pages as the process of monopolizing the quest for the “common good” by an elite class who believes in their own unique fitness to know what is in the best interest of the people (Chapter 2).

Tanzimat period can be considered the beginning of the quest for the “common good” by different (and new) political actors. The modernization process in this period had made it possible for the civil bureaucracy to end the Sultan’s monopoly on doing politics—or knowing what is the best interest of the people. The Young Ottoman movement, for its part, made it possible for a second political actor after the civil bureaucracy—namely the intelligentsia—to joint the game of politics. It would not be until the Young Turks that the military would also join the game of politics. As such, beginning with the Abdulhamid, II’s rule, at least five types of political actors were participating in the game of politics: the sultan, Ulema, civil bureaucracy, intelligentsia and the military. When the former two began to lose their influence and authority, starting in 1908, the latter three were just beginning to attain some influence and govern the political arena.

Modern politics in Turkey was shaped by the political consciousness of the elite classes composed of the military-intelligentsia-bureaucracy tripartite. This group, from here on, will be referred to as the Avant-garde elite. The expression “Avant-garde”, literally “advance guard” is a French term that refers to people that are experimental or innovative, particularly with respect to art, culture and politics. Avant-garde represents a pushing of the boundaries of what is accepted as the norm or the status quo, primarily in the cultural realm. There are two reasons for the ascription of this adjective to the elite classes that will be discussed in this dissertation. First, it allows us to bypass the uncomfortable distinction between the elected vs. non-elected or ruling vs. non-ruling elite. As it will become clear, the conventional categorization and definition of the elite classes do not correspond to

the real life variations of balance of powers. One of the most important premises that undergird this study is that the tutelary elite cannot be limited to the military, or the incumbents or civil bureaucracy. The tutelary elite, to the extent they shape the political arena, is rather an amalgamation of all these groups unified under the savior mission of first saving the state, then building the nation and finally protecting the country. Second, this conceptualization of elite classes is a new take on elite theories, which conceive the elite in two classes—ruling vs. non-ruling (Mosca, 1956)—and as such the avant-garde is a fitting expression.

Beginning with the Ottoman modernization, the consciousness of the avant-garde elite was shaped by two influences—elitism (the belief in the superiority of their judgment and knowledge) and the savior mission (the belief in their unique fitness to save the state and build the nation). These classes are the product of the Ottoman modernization, which was undertaken with the intention to save the empire. The positivist and materialist education they received motivated their elitist tendencies. The merging of their elitist tendencies with the idea of nation needed saving created the tutelary tendencies. In other words, the tutelage system is a consequence of the development of the concepts of elitism and savior mission. The *raison d'être* of the avant-garde elite became the mission of 'saving the state', during the CUP administration and the Independence War and 'building the state/constructing the society' between the years 1923-1950. The constructing mission became 'protecting Kemalism' mission after the May 27 coup when political alternatives became visible in the horizon.

The most important element of the tutelage knowing, namely having the ultimate claim on what is in the 'best interest' of the nation was made possible when the savior mission became the defining characteristic of the elite classes. This authoritarian epistemology created by positivist thought when combined with the savior mission excluded politics from the public sphere (or the people from politics). The purging of politics from the administration of the state was legitimized with the claim that this was in the best interest of the people.

To this end, all viable contenders for power were offset, removed from the political, and the nation-building process was initiated at once (Chapter 3). To build a secular Turkish nation state from a multi-ethnic and multi religious society, it was necessary to transform the composition of the envisioned state. Mustafa Kemal had foreseen the necessity of an authoritarian regime. To achieve this vision, first the non-Muslim populations in the territory were reduced and the country was homogenized to become Muslim-Turk nation. Second, secularist and nationalist policies were developed in order to break Islam's hold on the society and make "Turkishness" the new unifying primary identity. These policies that aimed to replace Islam with Turkishness and melt multi ethnicity in the pot of Turkishness met with popular resistance. These pockets of resistance were suppressed and eliminated harshly and effectively (Chapter 5).

Kemalist modernization, throughout this process, had to build an authoritarian regime. The Kemalist elite devised a mechanism that was to be permanent and unaccountable. This mechanism was what made it possible for the single regime to become authoritarian (Chapter 4). The first instrument of this mechanism was the de facto prevention of other political parties from the political arena despite this having been institutionalized in the constitution. More importantly the Kemalist elite advanced elitist and solidarist theories to legitimize their actions. First of all, it was claimed that class differences did not exist in Turkey. The territory was a unified society and as such different political parties representing the needs of different classes had not utility in this context. Based on this argument, the second claim was that as the party only party where those enlightened cores that won the Independence War for the nation had united and as such it represented the whole nation, thus had the monopoly on deciding on what was in the best interest of the country. Since the public did not yet know what was in its own best interest, it was not capable of deciding, thus the avant-garde elite not only had the right, but the duty of to exercise the national will in the name of the people. Until the avant-garde could build the nation capable of making its own decisions, the CHP would be there to oversee.

The second instrument in the mechanism that legitimized the authoritarianism of the single party regime was the chiefdom system. The chiefdom system meant that the general president of the party was protected under permanent presidency and was vested with unlimited authority on the operation and future of the party. As such, due to the structure of the single party system, every single decision related to the political regime was, in fact, made by the National Chief and the Chairmanship Council (*Riyaset Divanı*), which consisted of two members appointed by the Chief himself. The decisions were adapted by the party council and ratified by the parliament. In this context, the parliament was not a decision-making organ; it had simply remained as an organ in which the decisions made by a small group in the party were approved. In this way, the chiefdom system effectively foreclosed the democratic mechanisms provided by the 1924 Constitution and made an authoritarian regime possible.

The third instrument that made the single party regime authoritarian was the two tiered electoral system. In this system, in which the top management of the CHP remained influential, first secondary voters were determined by the CHP offices and approved by the people, and later a list of candidates for parliamentary seats prepared by the top management was approved by the secondary voters. This two-tiered electoral structure was one of the most important instruments of the single party regime. This system in which the only political party presence was the CHP created an inherently anti-democratic structure. Since these elections were not competitive, the CHP had not felt obliged to consider constituency's tendencies and demands, but had moved according to their own tutelary tendencies.

The ideological structure of the single party regime, the chiefdom system and the two tiered electoral system shaped the single party regime into an authoritarian structure both in terms of ideology and practice in a way that was not provided by the constitution. Powers not vested to the incumbents by the constitution was attained via CHP's party charter. In other words, although the political system maintained its democratic façade, an authoritarian system remained in effect de facto.

The authoritarian regime constructed through these instruments was legitimized by the concept of tutelage. To reiterate, the Kemalist elite with their belief in their chosen status and their perceived duty to construct the nation and the state, found in themselves right to decide on what was in the best interest of the nation. Since, tutelage had legitimized the practice of politics behind doors without any public sphere discussions, politics was excluded from the public life to a large extent. Since democratic politics would necessary allow different strategies for the mission and offered viable resolutions that would serve as alternatives to the elites' plans, practice of democratic politics was not allowed. An authoritarian system would be the only way to carry out the envisioned mission and construct the imagined nation. The ideological and sacred status ascribed to the elites' mission had in fact legitimized the authoritarian regime. The only legitimizing factor of the single party regime was their target of establishing a democratic political system that would be sustainable. To sustain this system, the public had to be educated to reach the maturity that could practice democratic politics (chapter five). In other words, the tutelary rationale had legitimized its existence with construction of a utopia in which tutelage would no longer be needed.

To sum the argument of this chapter, the thesis of this dissertation is that the Turkish political system in general and the single-party regime in particular, cannot be examined independently from the political will of the elite. The leader class comprised of the military-bureaucracy-intelligentsia alliance has subscribed to elitist, tutelary and Salvationist inclinations since the Young Turks era. During the Young Turk and Kemalist periods, these classes acted on their mission and instinct to "salvage," "constructs," and "protect" the state and society. This authoritarian epistemology, which feeds from positivist thought, has cast out "politics" by merging with the rescuing mission. In the pretense of acting for the common good of the people, the authoritarian politics gained legitimacy. Both the ensuing problems of Turkish democracy and the authoritarian regime in the single-party era have emerged from this tutelary regime. The tutelage regime is an authoritarian regime because of its leaders' resistance to democratic politics, as well as because of its tendency to index democratic politics to an impossible process of society engineering.

CHAPTER 2

2. THE GENESIS OF TUTELAGE

Tutelage is the product of the evolution of the dynamics created Ottoman-Turkish modernization through different intervals of history. As mentioned in the introduction to this dissertation, Ottoman modernization had made the introduction of different actors into the political arena possible after having released the mission of saving the state from the prerogative of the Sultan. The civil bureaucracy during the *Tanzimat*, the intelligentsia during the first *Meşrutiyet*, and the military during the second *Meşrutiyet* had joined the quest for political alternatives and as such affected the decision making process. Modern politics in Turkey was shaped with the political projects, ideational structures and political wills of these elite classes composed of the military-intelligentsia-civil bureaucracy tripartite. For this reason, a comprehensive evaluation of the tutelary dynamics of political activities in Turkey can only be offered through an examination of the emergence of the avant-garde elite, the dynamics of their formation, and their political priorities.

The Ottoman-Turkey modernization process was made possible with the loss of confidence in the classical Ottoman administration and with the advance of the West as the model political structure once again. The process of modernization was the catalyst first for the change in the make of the Ottoman ruling classes and later the ideational-philosophical structures on which the Ottoman ruling classes relied. During the rise of the empire, the ruling classes consisted of the members of the palace, janissaries and the ulema. These classes were the direct consequence of the needs of the empire—janissaries for conquest, the members of the palace for institutionalization of the administrative system, and ulema for legitimizing the Ottoman rule. It is possible to see these classes as the traditional counterparts of the military, civil bureaucracy and intelligentsia classes respectively. The roles of all

three classes of the ruling elite went through transformations due to the changing needs of the empire during the stagnation and fall of the empire. While the armed forces that resisted the change and the ulema lost their privileges, the bureaucracy, originally formed within the palace, moved out of its confines and constituted a balancing force for the Sultan. The intelligentsia and the modernized military, as the most important products of the modernization process, became staunch defenders of the modernization dynamics.

The Ottoman modernization was a period of contestation among these three classes of the elite as much as the contestation of the elite classes against the traditional actors of the administration. Each stage of the modernization process instigated by the Ottoman ruling class served to highlight a different segment of the new rising elite. Despite the fact that the modernization process began with the modernization of the military, the military had not joined the political scenes until the Young Turks. In the period building up the military's emergence in the political scene, first bureaucracy emerged, and later the intelligentsia appeared as a balancing power for the westernization tendencies of the civil bureaucracy. Military modernization policies, whose seeds were planted during the rules of Selim III and Mahmut, II, came to fruition during Abdulhamid, II's rule. Military that was primarily occupied with raising and training elite classes that moved onto becoming political actors, until then, with the influence of the political ideas advanced and defended by the intelligentsia became politicized and appeared on the political scenes. During Abdulhamid, II's rule, the military and the intelligentsia joined forces, along with the opposition in the bureaucratic classes of the Abdulhamid administration, in order to overthrow the regime of 'oppression' and transition into a legitimized political system. This coalition persisted through the last days of the Ottoman, the Independence War and the founding of the Republic.

The military modernization projects, undertaken by strong rulers such as Selim, III (1789-1807) and Mahmud, II (1808-1839) with the aim of reversing the piling military defeats against the West, were carried on by the initiatives of the elite classes (military-bureaucracy-intelligentsia) during Tanzimat (1839-1871) and

Meşrutiyet (1871-1922). Each of these periods witnessed significant developments such as the centralization of the Ottoman administrative system, replacement of the traditional administrative structures by modern administrative mobilization, the replacement of traditional politically influential classes by the modern classes, the replacement of traditional ideational foundations that shaped the political activities with modern schools of thoughts.

That the Ottoman modernization process was instigated by the ruling classes' concerns of strengthening the state was a determinative factor of the nature of the political activities. In this sense, the modernization processes, which manifested as the political struggles of the bourgeois against the traditional political systems in the West, worked in reverse in the Ottoman-Turkey modernization processes. The "bottom-up" modernization model of the Western practices manifested itself as "top-down" in the Ottoman-Turkey modernization process (Kahraman, 2008: 59-75). This resulted in the prioritization of the state's needs instead of popular demands in the Ottoman-Turkey modernization process differently from the Western modernization processes. The genesis of the authoritarian and statist political tradition and its institutionalization can be traced to the modernization process with was shaped by the ruling classes concerns of strengthening the state instead of the people's struggle against the ruling classes. That the Ottoman modernization processes was shaped by the ruling elite's decision and will instead of popular demand prevented the practice of modernization to be adopted by a wide social base (Zürcher, 2004b: 45-46, 66-67). The avant-garde elite, whose consciousness was formed by socialization process that differed from the rest of the population had assumed a savior mission and devised institutions with their tutelary tendencies in order to re-build the society. This process, while rendering the political regime authoritarian on the one hand, crafted the elitist-tutelary relationship that created tensions between the state and the people, on the other. The founding core of the republic had inherited the fundamental practices of the Ottoman modernization and carried these practices to a more radical level.

The steering of the modernization process through these three actors determined the nature of the modernization process. The Republican modernization inherited (and

was shaped by) the fundamental dynamics of the Ottoman modernization process in terms of the identity, political tendencies, and state-people perceptions of the founding elite. The elitist, authoritarian and tutelary characteristics of the single party regime were in fact the result of the preferences of these three classes. The Kemalist regime, after having been established by the will of these classes, continued to rely on these classes in order to maintain its existence and influence the society. In this sense, the military-bureaucracy-intelligentsia tripartite served as both the founding and maintaining classes of the Republican modernization. Moreover, the sense mission this tripartite undertook in the founding and maintenance of the regime determined the nature of the political system. As such, the tutelary tendencies of the Kemalist regime were to a great extent caused by the state-people relationship conception of these classes. The elitist and tutelary ideational structure of the elite tripartite rendered the single party regime authoritarian. These founding classes assumed the mission to protect after the regime was institutionalized. This protective mission served as the platform for the elite tripartite's intervention in the political during the multi-party regime as well in the name of the mission to protect the Kemalist vision.

In this section, the emergence of the military-bureaucracy-intelligentsia tripartite on the political scene during the Ottoman-Turkey modernization process and the different roles they undertook in different stages of the process will be discussed.³ The avant-garde elite that had assumed a "savior mission" during the Ottoman modernization and Independence war had undertaken constructive mission between the years of 1923 and 1930. After 1930, while maintaining their constructive mission and building new institutions, they undertook a 'protective' mission. This elite class that distanced from politics with the DP victory carried out the May 27, 1960 coup, and legitimized its existence after the coup with the protective mission of the Kemalist regime.

³ Hasan Bülent Kahraman (2008) labels the military-bureaucracy-intelligentsia tripartite with the Gramscian terminology of 'historical bloc'. This scholarly treatment of the shaping influences of these three classes on the political history during the Ottoman-Republican modernization process fills an important lacuna in the literature on political dynamics of the Republican history.

2.1 The Emergence of the Avant-Garde Elite

The Ottoman Empire defined itself as a “world empire” until the end of the seventeenth century. The confidence and pride resulting from this definition caused the Ottoman to attribute the military defeats and loss of land it had just began to face to technical and military advantages rather than the superiority of the West. Thus, the first step in remedying the situation was to acquire the advanced military techniques of the West by sending off students to be educated in Western institutions. Although the students were subjected to indoctrination and isolation policies in order to extract the needed technical information without being exposed to harmful ideas of the West, they returned substantially influenced by the Western culture and values (Hanioğlu, 1989: 13). This event marked the beginning of the reshaping of social conscience, which has become the breaking point in the societal changes of recent history. The reshaping of the social conscience was immediately observable in the changing ideas of the Ottoman intelligentsia. “The comforting trust in the superiority of Islam over other religions and the Muslim Ottoman Civilization over the West was dissipating.” (Dawn, 1988: 142) While, previously, with the confidence of being the “world empire”, the problems were evaluated in terms of their distance from the ‘classical’ structure and were resolved ‘within the system’, now defeats and problems were explained in the context of Western comparisons with the assumptions that the West was superior. In other words, the assumption that Ottoman truths were absolute gave way to the assumption of Western supremacy. The acceptance of this assumption and the consequent quest for the reasons behind this superiority marked the beginning of Ottoman modernization (Hanioğlu, 1983: 16). What needed to be done was to identify the reasons for Western superiority and adapt them.

Although the need for reform, triggered by the piling defeats, targeted military as its subject, the modernization process did not remain limited to military reforms. The modernization process, initiated by military concerns, transformed first the administrative structure, then the intellectual formation of the Ottomans. The first reformist Sultan Selim III, in order to reorganize the military brought in military advisors and trainers from France and established schools specifically for military

training. In order to modernize the administrative system, he established embassies in foreign countries and tried to strengthen the influence of the central administration on the periphery by restructuring the local administration systems (Ahmad, 2003: 25–26; Findley, 1994: 97–98; Hanioglu, 2008: 44–54). The two strong classes of the traditional administrative system that were adversely affected by the modernization policies, the intelligentsia and the military (janissaries) resisted Selim, III. Selim, III, in order to bring the intelligentsia under the state control advanced two important policies: he brought civil administrative offices (*evkaf*) under the state control and the *ulema* under the control of *Shaykh al-Islām* with a strict hierarchal structuring (Zürcher, 2004b: 40).

Mahmud II carried the mission of modernizing the military and the administrative system from Selim III one step further. After having solicited the support of the *ulema* and the local commerce associations, which had originally been a source of support for the janissaries, abolished the Janissaries in 1826 and established a new army under a different name. In consideration of the Janissaries' ties with the Bektashis, the new army's ties with the religious groups were severed and the military was trained with modern training methods. He continued to build educational institutions such as the Royal Medical Academy, the School for Surgeons, the School for Military Sciences, and the Military School for Engineering in order to raise staff for the newly transformed military and administrative system. Realizing, military education was not enough to reverse the decline of the empire, he sent more students abroad for education in various disciplines. Mahmud II also took important steps towards centralizing the administrative system by strengthening and institutionalizing relations between central and peripheral administrations (Zürcher, 2004b: 41). The restructuring of the administrative system was inspired by the French model. The Sublime Porte (*Bab-ı ali*), which was at the heart of the Ottoman administrative system, was modernized and divided into ministries. The office of Grand vizier (*Vezer-i azam*) was converted to the Office of Prime Minister and the three ministries (the Ministries of Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Finance), which would form the core of the modern bureaucracy, were established. New regulations for the appointment and promotion of the religious, military and bureaucratic

personnel were imposed (Ahmad, 2003: 28–29; Hanioglu, 2008: 58–63). This indicated that the civil bureaucracy would continue to gain strength for a long time until the new army came to fruition

Tanzimat and reforms carried out during the rule Selim III and Mahmud II improved communications between the Ottoman ruling elites and Europe (mainly the French). European educators lecturing in the newly established schools, students sent to Europe for education and the embassies established in European countries were all factors in creating a strong support base for the modernization mission. With the support of young military officers and civil servants, influenced by the rational enlightenment thought and administrative mechanisms based on rational thought, the mission of modernization became more of a bureaucratic process rather than something done at the will of the Sultan. As such, after Mahmud, II, the modernization dynamics, having eliminated the necessity to rely on strong ruler's decisive policies, became a bureaucratic process. The next thirty years witnessed the decisive political efforts of the three strong statesmen (Mustafa Reşid Paşa, Mehmed Emin Ali Paşa ve Keçecizade Mehmed Fuad Paşa) to subject the administrative structure to the rules and regulations of the bureaucracy. The bureaucratic core of the Sublime Port carried on the efforts to rationalize and centralize the administrative structure until 1871 despite the objections of the Sultan (Findley, 1994: 56; Hanioglu, 2008: 73).

The rationalization of the administrative structure by the modernization process and the assumption of the mission of modernization by the Tanzimat bureaucracy shifted the balance of power in the empire pushing the sultan to second plan. The initial execution of modernization policies by strong and decisive sultans without any popular base not only lead Tanzimat bureaucrats to own up the modernization process when the Sultan's interest in the mission dwindled, but also to search for allies against the Sultan and forces in opposition to modernization. Pashas of the Tanzimat period took both internal and external precautions against Sultan and other power groups. They simultaneously expanded the bureaucratic body by expediting the institutional and legislative changes that would rationalize the administrative

structure; and sought support for the modernization mission from European countries that would serve as a guarantee against the Sultan (Ahmad, 2003: 34; Hanioglu, 2008: 73). During this period, the modern bureaucracy became the most powerful institution of the empire in terms of both volume and political influence.

The first strand of the emerging elite class, the Tanzimat bureaucracy, with its popularization and expansion of Westernism in political, social and cultural fields and its break away from the palace laid the ground for the emergence of the second strand of the elite: intelligentsia. In fact, secular and Western tendencies made prevalent in the administrative, political and cultural life by the Tanzimat reforms led to the first civilian political movement of the Ottoman Empire. The Young Ottomans⁴ (*Yeni Osmanlılar*), consisting of former bureaucrats and intellectuals, emerged as opposition to Tanzimat bureaucracy criticizing weight attributed to bureaucracy in the political system, its tendencies of westernization and secularization and the privileges it granted to non-Muslims. According to the Young Ottomans, the Tanzimat Reforms adopted Western legislation without any consideration to the needs of the local Muslim population and vested too much power in the bureaucratic structure, which would lead to tyranny. The Young Ottomans advanced the idea of constitutionalism based on Islamic references against the practice of adopting Western legislation without modification and the iron cage rule of bureaucracy. To that end, Namık Kemal and Ali Suavi reconciled the ideas of the European scholars such as Montesquieu, Danton, and Rousseau with the Islamic political terminology. A constitution, which would take its reference from Islam, would both protect the Ottomans against the secular thoughts infected by the Western modernity and would limit the arbitrary power of the bureaucrats by making the rule of law the supreme law of the land (Hanioglu, 2008: 103–104, 111–112). The influence of what could be considered the strongest and most effective response that considers modern developments and schools of thought, given by the Islamic factions who were negatively affected by the modernization policies.⁵

⁴ Cf. Mardin, 1998 for a comprehensive study on the New Ottoman.

⁵ Cf. Türköne, 2003 for an analysis of the New Ottoman as the advent of Islamism

The Young Ottomans, who were the product of western education and intellectual life made possible by the modernization process, with their critique of the modernization mission and their synthesis of western and Islamist thought prepared the ground for the emergence of an Ottoman intelligentsia. The Young Ottomans, who were also the first political-ideological opposition in the empire, worked to shape the public opinion and to create a support base for themselves through the concepts they developed and articles they wrote for popular publications (Zürcher, 2004b: 2). The Sublime Porte's attempts to create obstacles for the Young Ottomans through strict censorship regulations and sending their most effective writers such as Namık Kemal and Ali Suavi to exile in France backfired bolstering their opposition (Ahmad, 2003: 37). The New Ottoman which constitute the first ideological political movement in the Ottoman, attempted to create a public consensus with their popular publications and concepts they advanced (Zürcher, 2004b: 2). This was how a modern intellectual class with political intentions, motivation to change the existing regime, and capable of securing the popular support of the public was born in the Ottoman Empire.⁶ The political influence of the intelligentsia continued to increase in the coming years.

The modernization process, ongoing since the rule of Selim III, was carried on with increasing force during the rule of Abdulhamid II, albeit unintentionally. Abdulhamid, while continuing to expand bureaucracy, which was a product of the modernization process, quantitatively on the one hand, tried to intervene in its operations qualitatively on the other. Abdulhamid II tried to reverse bureaucracy's

⁶ The New Ottomans, who were essentially conservative with Islamic tendencies, at the hands of the Young Turks attained a Westernist approach that supported the modernization process. This transformation was the consequence of the merging of several developments. The reassertion of the Sultan's power by Abdulhamid, II after having abolished the *Kanun-i Esasi* the new Ottoman had struggled for united the bureaucrats and the intelligentsia. The demand for constitution was no longer a tactic to harness the power and influence of the bureaucracy, but had become an instrument in controlling the sovereign's power. The Young Turks, dismissing the Islamic tendencies of the Young Ottoman, appropriated Namık Kemal's concepts such as "freedom" and "homeland" and emphasized his patriotism. As such, the Young Turks were able to bracket the Young Ottoman's criticisms of the modernization process and inherited their practice of opposition. The merger of these classes (bureaucracy, intelligentsia, conservatives, liberals and Westernists) with different agendas and tendencies in terms of the modernization process under the mission of overthrowing Abdulhamid and the demand for constitution resulted in the intelligentsia's owning of the modernization process and the New Ottomans to leave behind their Islamic-conservative tendencies behind.

breaking away from the sovereign's will and the inherent value attributed to government due this break. He tried to bring back the traditional Ottoman government, which held no inherent value and was rendered meaningless without the will of the sovereign. Ironically, his interventions only contributed to the independence of bureaucracy from the sovereign. Abdulhamid II maintained the trend of centralization and bringing the periphery under central administration by strengthening relations with local administrations. He carried on the practice of establishing new institutions and employing more civil servants, thus contributing to the growth of civil bureaucracy. The civil bureaucracy consisting of 1000-1500 civil servants at the end of the 18th century employed almost one hundred thousand civil servants during the rule of Abdulhamid II (Findley, 1994: 56–57, 143). The Royal Academy of Administration was established in order to answer the increasing demand for civil servants. Abdulhamid also utilized the press to his benefit in his efforts to centralize the government and in the struggle against the West by enforcing strict censorship.

Abdulhamid followed a decisive policy in order to debilitate the Sublime Porte, which had become increasingly independent during the Tanzimat period. He attempted to shift the Sublime Porte's loyalties from the loyalty to the state back to loyalty to the Sultan by bringing them under his direct control (Findley, 1994: 202; Hanioglu, 2008: 123–125). He did not hesitate to violate the bureaucratic hierarchy structure in order to reward bureaucrats who declared their commitment and loyalty to him. Under Abdulhamid's rule the office of the sadrazam lost its leverage against the sovereign, and the office changed hands thirty two times among nineteen sadrazams between the years 1871-1908 (Findley, 1994: 205).

Although the interventionist policies of Abdulhamid diminished the political influence of bureaucracy, they failed to reverse the transformation of the social consciousness as a result of Westernization, rationalization, secularization and politicization introduced by the modernization process. The policies that were intended to bring back loyalty to the sultan instead of loyalty to the state had some unforeseen consequences. Instead of undermining the increased autonomy of

bureaucracy, these policies helped shift the political influence lost by bureaucracy towards the intellectual elite and more importantly to the military. The civil bureaucracy, who had enjoyed substantial political influence since the beginning of the modernization process, would not regain its political capital until the İnönü administration.

Although Abdulhamid's policies distanced bureaucracy from its leadership position in the modernization process, it resulted in other recently politicized classes to lead the modernization process. As such, during Abdulhamid's rule, the modernization process, let alone regressing and slowing down, became stronger, more radical and political. The students of the modern administrative and military education institutions, such as *Mülkiye* and *Harbiye*, were influenced by the Ottoman's both patriotic and liberal/constitutional ideas. Abdulhamid, II's revocation of *Kanun-i Esasi*, his oppressive practices intended to increase loyalty to the Sultan had increased the political activities of the opposition both in these schools and among the Western-traveled elite and had radicalized the opposition. This opposition was qualitatively transformed and united under the umbrella of the Young Turks. As a reaction to the heavy constraints and pressures of the Abdulhamid rule, the military schools established during the modernization process became increasingly politicized. The military, instead of joining forces with the politically weakened bureaucracy, merged with the opposition movement under the name of Young Turks. The most important impact of the military joining forces with the opposition, now called the Young Turks, was to shift the modernization mission from "reforming the state" to "saving the state." The formation of the Avant-garde elite, which would be the most influential political actor for years to come, was completed when the military joined forces with a weakened civil bureaucracy and a robust intelligentsia for the political struggle against Abdulhamid's rule. The military's joining to the political struggle as a pro-modernization party had completed the composition of the avant-garde elite that would continue to be influential on the political arena for years to come. The modernized military who had attained its power later, the bureaucracy who marked the political life in Tanzimat with its qualitative and quantitative transformations, and the intelligentsia who emerged towards the end of the Tanzimat but became

influential during the rule of Abdulhamid II, united, under the umbrella of Young Turks, in the political struggle to overthrow Abdulhamid and transition into a constitutional monarchy. In this context, the Young Turk title and era demonstrates the avant-garde elites –which had merged by the strong coalition of the military and the intelligentsia and the weak support of the bureaucracy—stamping of the political struggle.

2.2 The Chosen Saviors of the State

The Young Turks was the common name for various actors and organizations with different visions that merged with the aim of halting the Ottoman disintegration. Ideas advanced towards stopping the disbanding of the Empire constituted the subjects of discussion and contestation of the time. The common ground for the Young Turks was the opposition of Abdulhamid who had abolished the parliament in 1877 and the demand for reopening the parliament. While the objective of “saving the state” attributed a pragmatic character to the movement, the opposition of Abdulhamid rendered it revolutionary. In addition to this common ground of pragmatism and revolutionarism, it is possible to evaluate the Young Turk movement as two different formations in terms of the composition of membership, their ideologies and political methods (Aydın, 2001: 117-128).

The actors that make up the first formation mostly consisted of the intelligentsia and civil bureaucrats that could be considered a continuance of the New Ottomans and lacked a military influence. This movement harbored representatives from various groups of the Empire and defended Ottomanism expressively. Ideationally, this movement relied on France (Aydın, 2001: 118). The first formation was internally divided by their differing ideas on how to build a new state. While the group under Ahmet Rıza’s leadership defended a national economy and centralized government, the group under Prince Sabahattin defended private enterprises and a decentralized government system. Although these two groups came together in the congresses between the years of 1902 and 1907, in order to struggle under the same objective as two separate groups, the faction between them only deepened. The group under Ahmet Rıza’s leadership reestablished under the title of *Osmanlı Terakki ve İttihat*

Cemiyeti while Prince Sabahattin's group re-established under the name of *Teşebbüsi Şahsi ve Âdem-i Merkeziyet Cemiyeti* (Akşin 1999; Mardin, 1983; Hanioglu, 1989).

The second formation that was established in 1906 in Salonica (Selanik) under the leadership of low ranking public servants and officers, joined with Ahmet Rıza's group in Paris under the name of *İttihat ve Terakki* but continued to hold the power (Aydın, 2001: 124-126). This formation differed from the first formation in terms of member composition, ideology and governing system. The only common bond between the first formation and the second was their objective of overthrowing Abdulhamid and establishing a constitutional regime. None of the members of this formation was ethnically (completely) Turks. 48% of the members came from Balkans, mostly from Thessalonica and 26% were from İstanbul (Zürcher, 2009: 149). The Greek and Macedonian influences on the formation of the Young Turks ideational foundations and administrative strategies were significant. Nationalist consciousness and the intensity of the struggle, the clashes between different ethnic groups, the high education rates, economic welfare of the non-Muslims and antipathy towards Muslim Turks have been important influences on the political decisions of this elite group that would overthrow the government in 1908 and govern the nation until 1918 (Aydın, 2001; Zürcher, 2009). In contrast to the heterogeneous ethnic composition of the first formation, this group supported a majority of Turkish participation with limited Jewish presence (Olson, 1986: 219-235). The second formation, differently from the first formation dismissed intellectual approaches with the influence of German ideational system and conceptualization of the state and prioritized pragmatic and result oriented approaches to government. Their preferred strategy was to mobilize paramilitary forces, in other words establishing insurgency (*komitacılık*) (Aydın, 2001: 126). The ideology adopted by this formation was Turkish nationalism.

This formation that was to govern the Ottoman beginning in 1908 had been the determinative force both of the fate of the empire and of the CUP in terms of its member composition, preferred strategies and ideology. Two factors were influential on the ideational foundations of this formation that led to the tutelary and savior missions of its members. First, Young Turks were primarily young in age. When

Meşrutiyet was declared in 1908 only a few of the Young Turks were over the age of forty (Zürcher, 2009: 145). Middle aged (or older) bureaucrats were reluctant towards any structural change, partly because they had more to lose and partly because they had been indoctrinated with the idea of “loyalty to the sovereign.” Young Turks, by the nature of their age, were braver, more aggressive and even a little reckless. Furthermore, they stood to benefit from a complete overhaul of the system rather than having anything to lose (Akşin, 1998: 841). Second and most influential factor in Young Turks taking the stage as the chosen saviors of the state was their education. They were all educated in institutions modeled after western educational system, such as military academies, the Faculty of Politics (Mulkiye) and medical schools. Contrary to the traditional education, Young Turks were trained in positivist and enlightenment schools of thought that valued rationality above all. The graduates of these schools took it for granted that positivist science was the basis for everything and the validity of any idea could only be measured against positive sciences. Hanioglu, referring to the medical school wrote, “The environment was one where heated debates on the existence of God often resulted with the victory of the biological materialists” (Hanioglu, 1989: 46). Mardin argues it is not surprising that Young Turks value biology, anatomy, and physiology above all. Young Turks, he continues, by the nature of their education, understood “life” and “health” only in terms of a biological equilibrium, not in terms of religious and traditional values (1983: 50).

Young Turks’ education that valued rational thought above all made it impossible for Young Turks to accept the principle of blind loyalty to the sultan. The modernization process until the rule of Abdulhamid II had already shifted the principle of loyalty from the sovereign to the state. As mentioned above, Abdulhamid had tried to reverse this process by undermining the political influence of the civil bureaucracy. Despite Abdulhamid’s efforts, Young Turks’ rationalist thoughts prevented them from declaring their blind loyalty to the sovereign. Hanioglu states the hardest thing for the students of *Mekteb-i Tıbbiye* (the medical school), an important hub for Young Turks, was chanting “long live the sultan” during ceremonies (1989: 63). In

fact, one of the criticisms Young Turks railed against the government was that civil servants were appointed, not by merit, but by their loyalty to the Sultan.

Young Turks' positivist education separated them from their cohorts who were educated in the traditional madrasas. Young Turks developed a new identity based on their education in positive sciences. The source of their knowledge was geography, physics, chemistry and biology which were changing and developing at a fast pace. The madrasa education, on the other hand, had limited sources of knowledge and mainly depended on the repetition of previously written information. The recognition of this difference in their education contributed to their belief that their positivist education and capacity for rational thought allowed them the opportunity to make better decisions and develop better strategies than the rest of the population. Another consequence of the Young Turks' education in the new institutions was their isolation from the general population. The traditional education system did not impose spatial segregation. Students, in continuous interaction with general population, were educated by trial and error method in their everyday lives. In the new education system, students were taught abstract concepts and principles, isolated in schools, away from the daily Ottoman life. Thus, this generation, writes Mardin, "thought that life portrayed in books was more real than life itself" (1997: 59). These learned realities that they found to be more real than life itself, lead them to devise abstract and utopian future plans, which could only be achieved through "progress." As a consequence of positive sciences becoming the ultimate reference of truth, Young Turks lost their faith in religion and traditional sources of information and believed that westernization would be achieved once the role played by religion in the society was replaced by hard sciences. Young Turks, the majority of whom were medical school graduates, interpreted the process of "life" with chemical, physical and biological factors within the materialist-Darwinist context. They reduced the statesman-state relationship to doctor-patient relation and fancied themselves as doctors of society (Hanioglu, 1989: 607; Mardin, 1983: 17). This construction was based on the assumption that social order was dependent on an organic balance and thus entrusted Young Turks the role of educator. Since it was the doctors who determined the course of treatment and wrote the prescription for the recovery of the

society (in other words for its progress), Young Turks, as doctors of society, had the right to govern the country (Köker, 1995: 128).

At first, general public was also part of this construction, however, when Young Turks did not find the support base they imagined for their coup d'état plans in the public; they decided that involving the public was not efficient. This led Young Turks to more elitist alternatives. Influenced by Ahmet Rıza, they directed their attention to the commissioned officers who had the capacity to shift the political balances in the empire (Hanioğlu, 1989: 613; Mardin, 1983: 219). The alliance between the intellectual elite and the military was sealed at the Second Congress of Young Turks (1907). Decisions made at the congress included increasing propaganda and recruiting efforts within the ranks of military, organizing armed and unarmed protests and strikes against the government, and calling on the public for their 'passive' support to the resistance (Tanör, 1998: 175).

With this alliance, Young Ottomans' patriotism and Young Turks' positivist education combined to create the idea of the 'chosen saviors.' It was the army who would save the country and lead the public. Officers educated in the military academies adopted this idea. The concept of "chosen saviors" changed the balances of the modernization process. The military replaced civil bureaucracy at the center of the political. The military's taking over of civil bureaucracy's role in the political sphere modified the mission of the newly emerged elite class. While the bureaucracy had focused its efforts on reforming the existing system, the military transformed the mission of reforming the country into a revolutionary mission of saving the country. The military was indeed warming up to the idea of overthrowing the government.

The political struggle of the military-intelligentsia alliance to save the state within the context of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) can be considered as the beginning of the tutelary tendencies in Turkish political life (Kahraman, 2008: 73). The unwavering belief of the military-intelligentsia alliance that they are the chosen saviors with unique capacities to save the state is a result of the modernization process and all the structural changes it triggered. The tutelary tendencies enhanced by the rescuing mission were empowered with the positivist-materialist education

system, patriotic thoughts argued by neo-Ottomans, elitist thoughts argued by Ahmet Rıza, and the question “how would the state be rescued?” —were all in the agenda with the modernization process. Leaguings together shortly before 1908 in the last period of the Young Turks, these dynamics constituted a brief tutelary tendency. The revolutionary pragmatism with the objective of building the state had changed the demand for a constitutional regime, what had served as the quest for a legal political regime since Tanzimat, into an instrument that functioned to establish a party dictatorship after having neutralized the Sultan and gained the control of the parliament. In the name of saving the state, exceeding the legal limits that framed and legitimized the state was not hesitated, In the name of saving the state, every resource had been instrumentalized. The target of building the state had rendered actors that struggled to realize this objective supreme over the law and exempted them from legal legitimization (Aydın, 2001: 128). In other words, this perspective normalized the existence of actors and institutions that transcended the legal mechanisms in their purpose of saving the state. CUP had legitimized its authoritarianism with the savior mission.

Thus, modernization, which progressed with the decree of the sultan at the first stages, became the focus of the political struggle of a leading class. The effect of positivist and elitist theories revealed itself in this leading class in seeing itself as authorized to rescue the state and transform the society. This pioneer class would maintain hold of the monopoly of knowing what was beneficent to state and society, and would accept all kinds of alternative ideas as harmful. Within this framework, the rescuing mission and tutelary tendency would naturally result in an authoritarian regime that excluded politics (Kahraman, 2008: 72–85). In reality, the politics would be excluded and an authoritarian regime would be built during the period of the CUP (1913–1918), which tended for the rescuing and founding missions with tutelary tendencies and in the period of Kemalist rule (1923–1946), which took over that heritage.

2.3 Towards the Nation State: Saving through Turkification

The modernization project since Selim III's rule had, as its objective, reforming the state in order to save it. Modernization reforms, it was believed, would be enough to restore to the state to its former glory. The continuous military defeats and loss of land demonstrated that modernization reforms were not enough to save the state. Strategies such as Islamism and Ottomanism had failed to give the necessary edge to save the state. The state was still under direct threat. After the CUP had gained the power, savior mission had descended from the level of administration to the level of the people. This is also a turning point in the modernization process. CUP radically altered the rules of the savior mission. Muslim Turks were perceived as the largest and most loyal ethnic group of the Empire, as such it was decided that any rescue efforts would have to rely on Turkism. The new meaning of saving the state was saving Turkishness and Turks (Kahraman, 2008: 142-143; Keyder, 1995: 87). As such, with the critical intervention to CUP's question "How is the nation saved?" that gave its meaning to the modernization period, a new meaning was ascribed to the modernization process—Turkification.

As mentioned above, the modernization process was initiated with the need to prevent the empire from disintegrating. The military-intelligentsia alliance under the umbrella of Young Turks, having assumed a savior mission, had only one objective: to save the state. Saving the state under external threats meant empowering the state, thus the ground for a centralized authoritarian regime was laid. This kind of administrative system was not conducive to the ethnic and religious diversity of the Ottoman Empire. Besides, rescue strategies that capitalized on the diversity of the Empire had already been tried and failed during the modernization period. Young Turks, as the chosen saviors of the state, had to devise a new formula—saving the state by Turkism.

This new saving strategy was shaped by the independence movements in the Balkans and the loss of land in North Africa and the Middle East almost as much as it was molded by the evolution of the intelligentsia-military alliance in the quest to first reform and then, to save the state. The only way to save the state was to capitalize on

the “Turk” factor of the Empire. This, in reality meant, in line with the political trends of the time, building a nation state. The new strategy of saving the state by Turkification had not only changed the rules of the modernization game, but also paved to road towards tutelary politics. However, because the empire had based its legal, cultural, economic and religious structure, for centuries, on the diversity principle, the Turk factor by itself was not enough to serve as the skeleton of a new nation. The ruling elite of the Ottoman had in fact neglected Anatolia for the last two centuries focusing their attention on the Balkans.

For this to happen first a category of Turkishness had to be constructed and then it had to be rejuvenated. Objectives such as national economy, national bourgeois, nation state, and national education constituted the most important parameters of this process. The unionists had adopted nationalism, which they understood as the last resort in order to save the state, and benefiting from the conditions of the war had taken radical steps to re-imagine Turks as the fundamental and strong factor of the empire. This process was not going to be easy, because the Ottoman had based its legal, cultural, economic and religious structure based on a multi-ethnic structure for centuries. The coalition intelligentsia that possessed a positivist and materialist ideational structure formed with the military with the same ideational structure was going to ensure the process progressed with determination and expedience. In this context, religion that sentenced the Turks in Anatolia to darkness would be battled, non-Muslim groups that sentenced Turks to poverty would be ‘purged’, and privileges of certain groups would be revoked. In sum, a comprehensive political, economic, social and cultural program would be launched in order to transfer power to Turkishness. These policies would come to fruition during the occupation of the Ottoman after the defeat in the war, and they would help win the Independence War under Mustafa Kemal’s leadership.

The defeat of the Ottoman in the World War I, and its occupation after the Armistice of Moudros had solidified the urgent need to save the nation. The state that needed to be saved in order to prevent disintegration and to get stronger previously, now needed to be saved from the actual physical occupation it was under. This meant that another breaking point in the modernization process. It was also the time to test the

“saving through Turkification” method that was established in the late period of the Young Turks. The new mission of the military-intelligentsia coalition was to save Anatolia that “needed to be saved from darkness” from “occupation.” As such, the military intelligentsia coalition that has been formed in the concept of the savior mission since the 20th century, with the joining of civil bureaucracy, directed its efforts to a new type of savior mission.

The leading core of the Unionists that had to transfer power had left the borders of the empire. An intense search for the method on how to save the nation from occupation began both in the capital and in Anatolia. The Unionists, with the local groups they mobilized in Anatolia began their struggle for independence.⁷ Congresses, one after other were organized with the initiative of the intelligentsia, ulema, local businessmen and commerce organizations in the four corners of the country and the local resistance movements had begun. In this context, 28 congresses had assembled between the years of 1918-1922 in order to mobilize national resistance efforts (Tanör, 1992: 22-23). These congresses, despite having made resolutions beyond their regions, had not reached a national and centralized quality until Mustafa Kemal and his close circle had assumed the leadership of the resistance movement. Mustafa Kemal and the young officers he moved in tandem with until the Independence War resulted in victory managed to unite the national resistance movements under the same roof in Amasya-Erzurum-Sivas-Ankara and instigated the resistance. The emergence of this military intelligentsia coalition under Mustafa Kemal’s leadership with their savior mission on the political scene had changed the fate of the Independence War. The leadership of the Independence war was transformed to officers in their forties who had joined the Young Turks they had established the military intelligentsia coalition that took over the administration of the Ottoman in 1908, and who had formed their political consciousness in the ranks of the CUP (Kahraman, 2008: 96, 148; Zürcher, 2009: 49-50).

⁷ Cf. Zürcher, 1984 for a more detailed analysis of the role the Unionists played in the national resistance movement.

This cadre, under the leadership of the military that had embraced a pluralist and populist political agenda by establishing coalitions with the local political actors until the Lausanne Accord, after the victory, attained political hegemony by purging all alternative contenders from the political arena in the 1923 elections.⁸ Mustafa Kemal who had risen to the national leader status by soliciting the support of the military-intelligentsia during the Independence War, after the victory, denied the positive contributions of the Unionists on the victory and as well as the relationship of the military-intelligentsia bloc with the Unionists and initiated a movement whose history began with Mustafa Kemal.⁹ This movement would come to be called Kemalism in 1930s.

2.4 From ‘Saving the State’ to ‘Building the Nation’

The state was rescued with the victory of the in the Independence war; and a new state was founded in Anatolia with the Treaty of Lausanne and the Declaration of Republic. The new mission of the leading classes was to found state and protect the people. The question that lay ahead for the leading classes was on what foundations the new state would be founded. The conflicts that were neglected, the objectives that were not disclosed, the ideological agendas kept away from the political agenda due to the urgency of saving the state from occupation were all put back on the agenda after the victory. Although the conflicts from the first Assembly had not formed an impediment to the efforts during the Independence War, they had brought political and ideological factions to light. The years between 1923 and 1927 would witness the political struggle that the leading classes experienced both with each other and with the social zones.¹⁰ The balance of power of the fight for sovereignty would clarify on which foundations the state and society would be founded.¹¹ The group, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, would win the struggle and then would reconstruct the state and the society with a modernization program that would be

⁸ The details of the dissolution of the coalition and the purging of alternative contenders for Powers from the political arena by the military intelligentsia coalition under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal will be discussed in detailed in chapter two.

⁹ *Nutuk* is the oldest and most effective example of this history-writing practice.

¹⁰ The details about this struggle take place in the chapter 2.

¹¹ Detailed information is included in chapter 3.

called Kemalism. It is logical to search both the composition and the ideological and political agendas of the leading classes to understand the causes of the struggle among the leading classes and the process of construction of the state and nation in a more explicit way. Requisite to this goal is an examination of the foundational heritage left to the Kemalists by the Young Turks and the political and ideological relations between the Kemalists and the Young Turks.

It is clear that there was a similarity/parallelism between the period of the Young Turks and the modernization of the Republic of the Ottoman within the context of the composition, political ideology, and development phases of the leading classes. The most prominent difference between the Kemalists and the Young Turks was not the actors that the modernization process depended on or the political ideologies of these actors, but the method of the modernization process. Specifically, the War of Independence did not cause a change in the composition, political ideology, or the development phases of the leading classes, but it did cause a change in the political agenda of them.

While the alliance of the military and intelligentsia, which the modernization process realized under the leadership of the Young Turks, depended on what seemed enthusiastic participation in the War of Independence in Anatolia, the civil bureaucracy, which lost its efficiency in the Tanzimat Reform Era under the leadership of the Young Turks, behaved unwillingly in passing to Anatolia. This situation resulted in a complete transformation of the components of sovereignty during the period of the Young Turks and up until the period of the Republic. The alliance of the military and intelligentsia undertook the leadership of the modernization process during the period of the Republic, and the civil bureaucracy, which behaved unwillingly in participating in the War of Independence, had a difficult time finding a place in the political center of the newly founded state. The Kemalist elite relied on the military-intelligentsia class and left the civil bureaucracy under the guardianship of these classes almost completely until the 1930s. As it will be discussed in detail below, after it made a serious refinement in the civil bureaucracy and trained civil bureaucrats according to its own political ideology, the

Republic began to give the civil bureaucracy a place in the power balance during İnönü's period. Until this period, the political power was almost completely under the control of the military-intelligentsia block. This situation is clear from the occupational distributions of the Assembly and the government.

There is a parallelism between the Young Turks and the Kemalists in terms of political strategy. Zürcher (2009: 56–61) presents this parallelism between the political strategies of the Young Turks and Kemalists in a dramatic way. According to Zürcher, both movements passed through the phases of resistance, pluralism, and dictatorship. While the Young Turks resisted the regime of Abdulhamid II between the years 1906 and 1908, the Kemalists resisted the foreign invasion and the government in Istanbul between the years 1919 and 1922. Both movements sealed an alliance with different social and political movements. The first power phase of the two movements witnessed a pluralist period, which was required by the alliances during the phase of resistance. The Young Turks assented to a free environment in which different political movements functioned instead of fully taking the power under their guardianship between the years 1908 and 1913. Similarly, the Kemalists assented to a democratic and pluralist political environment as the reflection of the alliances, which resulted from the War of Independence, between the years 1922 and 1925 and after the glory. Both movements decided on an authoritative regime in which different political actors and movements were put out of sight and democracy was laid aside in the last phase. In 1913, the Young Turks staged a coup against the government when they thought that the state was in danger and, by suppressing the opposition, they governed the country as a one-party state until 1918. Even though it continued its existence, the assembly became dysfunctional and the actual power was held by a small group within the Party. During this period, a number of radical reforms were realized in the direction of secularism and nationalism. The Kemalists did away with the opposition by claiming that the Sheik Said Rebellion, which broke out in the year 1925, and put an authoritative regime into force with the help of Law on the Maintenance of Order (*Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu*) and Independence Tribunals. Although the Assembly and the Constitution of 1924 continued their existence until the year 1946, a small group of CHP elite indeed held the power. This authoritative

regime was legalized with the intent of building a new state and nation based on secularism and Turkishness. A number of radical reforms were applied toward this goal.

Within the context of the political ideologies of the ruling class, it is clear that there was also continuity between the Young Turks phase of Ottoman and Republic modernization. Reforms made in the arenas of politics, society, economy, and culture (especially during the period of the Committee of Union and Progress after 1913) were more radically sustained during the period of the Republic. It is possible to find the roots of all the principles, which were formed with the political thought and applications of the 1920s during the period of the Republic, and which were entitled to Kemalism in the 1930s during the period of the Young Turks (Zürcher, 2004a; 2005; 2009: 45–61). After the War of Independence, since the need to cooperate with religious and ethnic segments of society has been disappeared, the Kemalists resumed the political and ideological tendencies of the Young Turks. Within this framework, it is possible to see the War of Independence as an exception within the tendency of the modernization process for Westernization and secularization. After it removed the foreign invasion and domestic power alternatives, the Kemalist power resumed the policies of the Young Turks including the nation state, national economy, national education, etc.

The parallelism in these three points originated from the fact that the modernization of the Young Turks and the Kemalists was rooted in the same structural and ideological codes. The common structural element was that they both relied on the alliance of the military and the intelligentsia. The common ideological element was nationalism and secularism. A selective and tutelary political regime was formed with the gathering of structural and ideological characteristics. The selectiveness legalized pioneering the rescuing process of the state and the tutelage was legalized through the application of a radical reform program. Both movements depended on broad social alliances in certain phases of the development process, and realized a Turkist and secular reform program by eliminating these alliance elements after success was attained. This composition did not allow for a democratic policy. An

authoritative regime was needed so that the “rescuing” or “founding” process would be successful. The authoritative regime was accepted as necessary and legal for these goals. In a step forward, the same justifications would be put in place to “protect” the state and society that was “rescued” or “founded,” and the authoritative regime would be accepted as legal and necessary for the process of “protection.”

At all these points, the Kemalist modernization inherited the modernization of the Young Turks. However, the Kemalist modernization differentiated from the modernization of the Young Turks and went beyond it at one point. This difference was that the “founding” motivation/need replaced the “rescuing” motivation/need as the main goal of the modernization process between the years 1918 and 1922. The Young Turks were concerned with rescuing the present state/hometown. For this reason, the quests were maintained in a system and the innovations were compiled with the present ones. Above all, a quest for a radical political regime was not in question for the Young Turks. The goal for centralizing the current regime and amending the political, social, and economic elements on which the state relied was in the foreground. Within this framework, there was no such goal as abolishing the sultanate and/or caliphate (Kahraman, 2008: 97–98). The matter of change in regime automatically came into the agenda since the Kemalist modernization developed under the conditions of the War of Independence. The struggle against foreign invasion and the sultan-caliph, the meanings given to the term national sovereignty, and the Assembly government constructed in Ankara, automatically brought the matter of political regime into the agenda. The sultanate was done away with in a natural course, and Mustafa Kemal’s voluntary and decisive attitude was determinative in the process of declaration of the Republic and the abolition of the caliphate. In reality, the caliphate and Republic issues were determinative in the separation among the Kemalist elite.

The Kemalist elite put this difference from the Young Turks on the center and denied the parallelism in the modernization processes. Mustafa Kemal put himself at the center of the movement and eliminated all the actors who could potentially be an alternative to him and this was regardless of their being close-far, modernist-

conservative, or Westernist-Islamist. The struggle that developed among the Kemalist elite as an objection to Mustafa Kemal being the “only man” and that was enhanced with the methodical differences in the reform process, contributed to Mustafa Kemal’s ability to form a modernization narrative that put him at the center. Kemal initiated a new historiography in which the history of modernization started with him and the ones who struggled against him were accused of being supporters of the ancient regime with *Nutuk*, which he read in 1927, the year when all the opponents were eliminated. This historiography put the name Kemalism in circulation and the uniqueness of the modernization of the Republic would be crowned with this new name.

2.5 Kemalist Modernization and the Avant-Garde Elite

As the educated classes of the new Republic, the military, intellectuals, and the civil bureaucracy played important roles in this process. The pioneer classes both affected the struggle of Mustafa Kemal against his opponents and they were additionally affected by this struggle themselves. The role they played during the establishment and the consolidation process of the Kemalist power directly affected their positions in the political center. They continued their “constituent” role while the Republic was established and in order to “protect” during the consolidation process. Below, military, civil bureaucracy, Party bureaucracy, intellectuals, and education institutions, which played important roles during the formation of state and nation process as the constituent and protector/supporter cadres of the Kemalist regime, would receive scrutiny. Beginning with the Young Turk period, the military was the most important institution in maintaining this mission. For this reason, the position of civil bureaucracy, Party bureaucracy, and intellectuals will first be evaluated briefly; after that, the role of the military will be evaluated in more detail.

2.5.1 Civil Bureaucracy

Beyond civil bureaucracy, Mustafa Kemal based the power and support of the military within the institutionalization stage both during and after the War of Independence. The basic reason for this was that despite the fact the military never

hesitated to act in conjunction with Ankara, as of the beginning of the War of Independence, the civil bureaucracy was late in deciding whether to side with Ankara or Istanbul (Rustow, 1959: 524). This situation led Mustafa Kemal not to trust the civil bureaucracy and hence to restructure it and put it under the command of CHP administrators (Heper, 2006: 103, 109) until the new bureaucracy was raised.

The members of the Party of Union and Progress, who rendered the military as the sole actor for the modernization project, led the civil bureaucracy to get closer to the sultan. Thus, the modernization experience based on bureaucracy was replaced by a modernization practice based on the military. Within this process, the military's leading actors considered the civil bureaucracy a class, which was a step backward, looking to its own benefit, and not hesitating to be loyal to sultan for the sake of their own future (Heper, 2006: 103–104). The War of Independence was constructed significantly over this heritage. While the military's leading commanders were attending the national War of Independence, by taking the risk of facing up to the sultan's will, the civil bureaucracy largely preferred to act in conjunction with the Istanbul government (Rustow, 1959: 524). In fact, during the War of Independence, Mustafa Kemal criticized the civil bureaucracy's preference of the sultan, their opposing attitude toward the War of Independence, and he additionally questioned their nationalism.

Due to this perception and distrust toward civil bureaucracy, throughout the War of Independence, civil bureaucracy was taken under the military's supervision and control (Selek, 1973: 59–60; Heper, 2006: 105). The War of Independence period and the subsequent proclamation of Ankara as the capital city revealed a dual civil bureaucracy structure. On the one hand, there were the bureaucracy's old officers who were charged in Istanbul and remained loyal to the sultan along with the struggle, and on the other, there were the bureaucracy's young officers, who provided active support to the struggle in Anatolia and who considered their existence dependent on Ankara. The struggle between these two groups, just as it continued during the War of Independence, also continued after Ankara became the capital city, and the bureaucrats living in Istanbul were not disposed to come to Ankara (Heper, 2006: 106).

In order to remove this duality and pave the way for the young bureaucracy in Ankara by getting rid of the Istanbul bureaucracy, the Ankara government decided to restructure the civil bureaucracy. TBMM, with the law enacted on October 1, 1922, dismissed all officers. Each ministry was authorized, under the consideration of their attitudes in the War of Independence and nationalist tendencies, to form their new staff from among their previous state officers. Officers, who failed in the tests of nationalism and support for the War of Independence, were discharged through “Discharge Commissions,” which were constituted for that purpose (Heper, 2006: 106). Based on this law, on one hand, young nationalist officers who provided support to the War of Independence were rewarded and, on the other hand, the new state was delivered to safe hands. Staff members who were not trusted by the new state and regime were discharged.

Mustafa Kemal’s mission, which he appointed for the civil bureaucracy in the new order was that they would not only perform their duties within their field of activity in a “machine model” manner but they should also be loyal to principles, which shall later be called as Kemalism and should follow up a specific ideological mission (Heper, 2006: 117). Because it was charged for a mission over their defined field of duties or, in other words, it was charged to perform their defined duties under the Kemalist ideology’s guidance, there was a desire to make civil bureaucracy subject to a specific period of training. Until the civil bureaucracy reached a competence level capable of undertaking significant roles by recovering its weaknesses born due to its inadequacy of personnel and ideal, CHP was obliged to play an important role. Mustafa Kemal, in considering that the civil bureaucracy was not satisfactory to represent the state, appointed TBMM and, its core, appointed CHP as the trustee for the civil bureaucracy (Heper, 2006: 107, 109).

Thus, the new civil bureaucracy, who had been charged for discharge and re-appointment, was substantially made subject to Party bureaucracy. CHP, which was brought in to be the main actor of the war for the new political regime by being founded just after the War of Independence and as it was more reliable than the civil bureaucracy in terms of Kemalist staff and more competent for the principles of the new political regime to be founded, took on the role of the supervision of the

bureaucracy. Within this framework, in CHP's Second Congress in 1927, it was decided that administrators who shall be appointed to civil bureaucracy institutions, which shall directly affect the qualification of the political regime as well as the village leaders, should be subject to the approval of Party inspectors (Heper, 2006: 106). The Party, which includes all the responsibility and authority within its scope, including everything from determining the principles of the new regime to be established to the application of policies and raising new carrier staff to directly supervising the institutions, continued in line with its mission, including the function of training, appointment, and audit of civil bureaucracy (Lewis, 1961: 382–383).

Due to his distrust of civil bureaucracy, Mustafa Kemal showed a special sensitivity to assigning persons that he trusted to top-level civil positions. Within this framework, embassies, governorates, and general inspectorships were essentially chosen from those with a military background or civil service individuals from Atatürk's circle. However, after addressing the political mission, which was requisite to follow up the bureaucracy and until the civil bureaucracy gets ready for this mission and after putting it under the supervision of the political staff, Atatürk did not intervene in the general functioning of the bureaucracy (Heper, 2006: 124–126). He spent his working hours devoted to research and reforms in the issues of religion, culture, and history, which would reconstruct the Turkish nation. Upon his status of prime minister and CHP General President, general functioning was traced by İsmet İnönü.

In that İnönü had an appropriate personality and style of management in compliance with bureaucratic functioning, he also undertook the leadership of political and bureaucratic staff thus bringing the bureaucracy to the forefront. As Aydemir stated, "İnönü has never been a man of major moves. He always stayed in the order, which he considered as a static and holy order, and named as government. He always preferred law and order to spectacular actions. He searched the reform within the established order" (1968: 220). Within this framework, hierarchy between the bureaucracy and Party under İnönü's management began to be lost and then turned toward the favor of bureaucracy. Therefore, while the Republic was being established, on the axis of Mustafa Kemal's founder leadership, works for the

construction of the political regime through CHP staffs entered into the supervision of the bureaucracy under İnönü's management. Civil bureaucracy, under İnönü's management, increased both its prestige and its effectiveness within the political regime (Szyliowicz, 1971: 378–395). Party-state identification, which became law in CHP's Fourth Congress in 1935, paved the way for the absolute domination of the bureaucracy. Therefore, the political staff and the bureaucratic staff became identified with each other, Kemalist ideology became a routine under bureaucracy (Heper, 2006: 128; Özbudun, 1970: 393; Rustow, 1968: 794), and the Party melted within the state (Koçak, 2009: 91–94).

Instead of working with the military, which dedicated its existence to Atatürk and Kemalism with a supra-politics mission, İnönü preferred to cooperate with civil bureaucracy, which was get behind during the Atatürk period. While Atatürk, giving the civil administration under the command of military in crisis periods upon his trust with the military and taking the civil bureaucracy under the command of military forces accordingly; İnönü; upon the law and by the law he enacted in 1940, made the determination of the authority scope of martial law command posts and utilization of these authorities subject to the approval of civil bureaucracy. These arrangements, which were directed toward obstructing the military's independent action and taking it under the order of civil bureaucracy, was an indicator that İnönü relied on the civil bureaucracy more than the military. Within this framework, it can be said that İnönü preferred to act together with civil bureaucracy in order to escape Atatürk's legacy and work with his own staff. Because of the combination of justifications listed above, during the İnönü period, civil bureaucracy increased its intensity within the political system, found opportunity to recover its position, which was disadvantageous compared to the military bureaucracy, and became the new powerful actor of the political system. As stated by Özdağ, "One of the characteristic features of the National Chief period was that the political elite of this period was comprised of bureaucrat-intellectuals or bureaucratized revolutionists more than "revolutionist warriors." The official/unofficial elite of the 1923–1983 period, which conglomerated around Atatürk and which took its efficiency from Atatürk was substantially neutralized" (Özdağ, 2006: 141).

2.5.2 Party Bureaucracy

The Republic, while restructuring military and civil bureaucracy staffs, substantially utilized from those institutions' past during the Ottoman period. Western educated military officers, between the ages of 30–40 years old, came to Anatolia during the national struggle and constituted the primary staff of the state. The civil bureaucracy, although fewer in number than the military, participated in the national struggle particularly through young military officers. These young military officers and officers who graduated from modern Western institutions in Ottoman (Military Academy and Civil Service) did not have difficulty complying ideologically with Kemalist staff and they formed the Republic's primary carrier staffs. Thus, in the context of military and civil bureaucracy, it is possible to express that a strong institutional permanency exists between the Ottoman and the Republic. Besides these two staffs, which the Kemalist staff took over during the period of constructing a new political regime and nation, the most important staff it generated was the CHP bureaucracy (Zürcher, 2004a: 100–103).

The Party, which was founded after the proclamation of the Republic, was the most significant impetus for the foundation and institutionalization of the political regime. Mustafa Kemal, while approaching a decision process regarding the political regime after the War of Independence was ended by victory, decided to establish the Countrywide Resistance Organization, which constitutes the roots of CHP, as one of the most important attempts to support himself. Mustafa Kemal, in founding a group, forced opponent segments, which seemed to be weak and disconnected, to have an attitude, and establish a front around him by disciplining the Assembly. Mustafa Kemal hence enabled the confrontation by establishing a group under the umbrella of TBMM, which makes decisions in integration during the toughest moments of the War of Independence without the constitution of a party, and politicized the process after victory. With this move, Mustafa Kemal displayed his determination to keep his hands on the road map of the state, which was to be established, as well as the political regime. Before elections, Mustafa Kemal directed the election process by showing his intention for converting the group into a party (December 6, 1922), and

he both succeeded his opponent, who had joined under the group of the First and Second Assembly to participate in the Second Assembly and also provided that only persons approved by him could be elected as deputy.

CHP, which was founded by relying on the institutional roots of Countrywide Resistance Organizations, which was the most important formation of a framework (August 9, 1923), pioneered the foundation of the political regime as being the most important representative of the national will. CHP backed up the prestige of national resistance and victory by forcing itself to rely to the most broad-based organization of the War of Independence.¹² The existence of CHP enabled all segments, which are disposed to contribute for the process of construction of a nation, to join around Mustafa Kemal (Zürcher, 2004a: 104). As of 1924, all significant decisions regarding the foundation of the political regime were made in the CHP Party; they were enacted upon CHP's existence in TBMM, and thus were put into force.

As of July 1925, CHP remained the only political party in Turkey. During the process of the foundation and institutionalization of the political regime, all significant decisions, from making the political regime authoritative, to constructing a modern nation, were made by CHP's decision making bodies and executed by those same bodies. The Party became the unique official and legal body, which was constituted by the official ideology of the Republic (Mardin, 1981: 210). Party programs gave government programs a direction and became the source of inspiration for constitutional regulations. Through İsmet İnönü simultaneously undertaking the duties of Party presidency and Prime Ministry, the political system was decided primarily in Party bodies, and afterwards was implemented in state institutions. The CHP congresses were the decisive factor for the direction in which the political regime would evolve. Mustafa Kemal read the *Speech* in the CHF Congress. Prior to being entered into the Constitution, the Six Arrows were accepted into the CHP Congress, were thus put into the CHP program, and subsequently named Kemalism.

¹² In reality, CHP named the 1927 Congress as the Second Congress and considered the Sivas Congress as performed by the Committee of Union and Progress as the primary congress.

Throughout this period, CHP not only made decisions but also undertook raising the requisite staffs to execute the decisions. Until 1930, focusing on cultural reforms in the context of the foundation of the political regime, CHP, with its Third Congress, focused on forming a carrier staff for the regime and providing a social base. Therefore, since 1931, CHP became the most important center of social mobilization. After the 1931 Congress, all institutions that existed and acted outside of the Party were abolished and reestablished under the umbrella of the Party with an appropriate format and content with the predictions of the political regime. CHP led both the civil and the military bureaucracy. In every stage of the administration, from recruiting officers to appointing headmen, CHP representatives took the initiative. By introducing the obligation of appointing CHP members into civil association and societies, all political and cultural activities were to be organized under CHP's supervision. In this period, the CHP bureaucracy, as the single force determining the parameters and policies of the political regime, strived to provide an ideological ground for the regime and afterwards to fill the content of the principles, which would later be named Kemalism. Focusing on efforts toward the creation of an intellectual class, which would constitute a ground for the regime in the society, efforts were made to enable the regime to lean on specific social segments. Within this context, Community Centers, Community Chambers, and Public Preacher Organizations were founded.

CHP's tendency to penetrate into all fields, whether political, social, or cultural reached official ground when CHP principles were first named as Kemalism and then gained a constitutional status. The state was led to identify with CHP when CHP ideology became the official ideology of the state. CHP was the most important institution to decide on behalf of the nation, shape the nation, and use the national will during the process of construction of a new nation/public. CHP, which was a significant center in which elitist policies were produced and applied, formed a relationship based on self-interest and independency between CHP and career staffs. The elitist policies CHP produced and applied alienated it from the society, which despite considering CHP the most important representative of the state, ignored it. When the multi-party political system was implemented, CHP's elitist character on

one hand strengthened the relation based on independency with the carrier staff of the Republic, and on the other, increased its distance from the society.

2.5.3 Intelligentsia

The Republic, after being founded in cooperation by the modern and conservative intellectual class, deactivated the conservative intellectual (*ulema*) category in Ottoman and leaned on modern-Western intellectualism. Therefore, the process of developing Western intellectualism, which had been developing against *ulema* since the reforms, reached their completion. Secular policies in 1924 (closure of *madradas*, the abolishment of the *Sheikhulislam* administration, acceptance of civil law) and institutions, which *ulema* chose as legacy, and which could renew itself, were all abolished and taken out of political and social life both actually and legally (Zürcher, 2004a: 102). The Western intellectual category, which appeared in the reforms, remained. During the process of reforms, Western intellectualism was based on a state policy, which was constituted by sending students abroad, bringing teachers from foreign countries, and raising students on established Western educational institutions. Being a product of policies, which the state applied for its own survival, also determined the intellectual's relation with the policy. The Ottoman intellectual was, as a bureaucrat, an intellectual who was "enlightened" by the initiative of the state and was employed in state institutions after being enlightened (Belge, 1983: c-1: 124). In this context, the Ottoman intellectual was a missionary intimate with the policy whose priority was to rescue the state.

The Republic, after deactivating the *ulema*, was founded by this bureaucrat-intellectual class and later institutionalized. This elitist mass, giving priority for the salvation of the state and considering themselves, as being enlightened people-superior rather than unenlightened social segments and attempting to enlighten the public by the mission undertaken, served the new regime under the direction and supervision of the CHP/Kemalist staff. The intellectual class, in the absence of social classes, took it as a mission to establish the regime, to find a scientific ground for the regime, to convert the society within the framework of these perspectives, and produce knowledge in compliance with this mission (Belge, 1983: c-1: 124). Below,

by looking at the higher education reform, the formation of Village Institutes and People's Houses, the policy of the Kemalist regime toward intellectuals and the intellectuals' effort in order to produce an ideology and form a base for Kemalism will be mentioned.

One of the most important grounds of the Kemalist staff during the period of construction of a new nation was education institutions. Between 1923–1927, after focusing on the determination of the basic parameters of the political regime and the refinement of the political center from its opponents, the Free Republican Party (*Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası, SCF*) experience necessitated the Kemalist staff expanding the regime to the base. After the 1930s, the Kemalist staff decided to focus on the institutions for the creation of actors, which would develop and adopt the ideology of the regime and spread it to the larger masses. For enabling the adoption of reforms by the society, institutions, which would be the instruments of a cultural attack by carrying the values of the new regime to Anatolia, would thus generate and establish a secular national identity (Yeğen, 2003: 181). Within this context, educational institutions addressed a serious break up in the elitist policies of the Kemalist staff. This failure, after the working hours were expended in the 1920s to capture and construct the center, means that in the 1930s, the center was mobilized to convert the rural areas.

Higher Education: After the 1920s, which dealt with the establishment of a political center, as the political system gained an authoritative character, in the 1930s, when it was decided for the attack for a social transformation, the Kemalist staff needed to utilize more from the intellectual class to enhance this effort. Within this context, the higher education policy was revised and a new higher education system was founded under the supervision of the state.¹³ Then, along with the reform, the Kemalist staff expected support from the Ottoman University but could not find it. During discussions in TBMM, the Deputy Minister of Education, Reşit Galip, expressed disappointment regarding the Ottoman University with the following words:

¹³ For more detailed information about the single-party period university reform, see Arslan and Selçuk, 2008: 349–370; Bilse, 1943; Ergün, 2008: 321–348; Tekeli, 2010: 127–162; Widmann, 2000.

The Darülfünun of İstanbul could not accomplish the expectations of Turkish modernization in terms of improvement, development and progress. Various political and social revolutions are conducted in the country and Darülfunun remained indifference to these revolutions. In economic sphere, several significant reforms are made, but Darülfunun seemed unaware of these developments. Radical changes are implemented in law, then again Darülfunun contented only with including new laws into the education program. Then alphabet reform is made and a movement is launched to replace foreign words with Turkish words. But once again Darülfunun did not even care these developments (cited in Tekeli, 1983: 663).

These words display the Kemalist staff's approach toward intellectuals in the context of the Ottoman University. Within the political concept of the 1930s, higher education would not be permitted to focus on its own works without providing support to Kemalist reforms. With a move similar to abolishing civil institutions, which were outside of CHP, and bringing them into the scope of the Party, the Ottoman University would be transformed into a university. Within this context, on May 31, 1933, the Ottoman University was abolished, and the Ministry of Education was charged to found Istanbul University on August 1, 1933.¹⁴ Upon law no. 2467, which was enacted in 1934, the autonomy of the university was removed. The university was subsequently brought under the supervision of the Ministry of Education, and the dean was brought in as a representative of the Minister of Education in the university (Tekeli, 1983: 663).

Applying the same method, which had been applied for the restructuring of the military and civil bureaucracy, when the Ottoman University was restructured under the name of university, the staff were not all permitted to transfer. Among 240 lecturers (88 professors, 44 assistant professors, and 108 assistants) in the Ottoman University, 157 of them were dismissed. The major discharge was performed in the professorship cadre: 71 out of 88 professors were dismissed (Bilse, 1943: 37; Widmann, 2000: 85).¹⁵ With these discharges to be repeated in almost every decade, a strong message was given to universities that they should perform "scientific studies" in the direction set forth by Kemalist ideology (Küçük, 1983: 140). Thus, the discharges taught intellectuals what they had to do, as well as what they should not do. Afterwards, university lecturers began to serve the Kemalist regime within

¹⁴ See the Istanbul University Foundation law no. 2552, dated May 31, 1933.

¹⁵ For different numbers regarding discharges, see Tekeli, 2010: 150.

the limits envisaged by the Kemalist staff. The most brilliant examples of this service were provided by Turkish History and Language Theses.

Turkish History and Language Theses began directly under the control and direction of Mustafa Kemal. Intellectuals performed “scientific studies” in line with Mustafa Kemal’s directives and they proved the realities that Mustafa Kemal claimed to be “proven.” Actually, the justification and results of these theses were political beyond being scientific. Their goal was that Turks should be proud of being Turkish and put forth their Turkishness instead of being Muslims as well as Turks and should thus reveal their contributions, which they provided all along the history thus to remove the negative Turkish image held by Western societies. During the process of construction of a new nation, intellectuals were mobilized to put forth these theses, which were taken very seriously by Mustafa Kemal, and produce a requisite knowledge. Within this framework, Turkish History and Language Theses reveal the most apparent and strongest example about how intellectuals were encumbered with a mission by the regime. The intellectual is liable to perform its function in scientific platforms, which is similar to those that the military bureaucracy displayed in security, and civil bureaucracy put forth in the field of administration as well as identical with the Party bureaucracy’s involvement for the determination of the political program for the regime.

Village Institutes: Another institution, which was founded for the purpose of forming a carrier staff and providing social support to the Kemalist regime, was the Village Institute.¹⁶ Village Institutes (*Köy Enstitüleri*) were founded and made legal on April 17, 1940, as an autonomous education-training project.¹⁷ The autonomy of the institute not only had the goal of education-training, but it also envisaged both changing the life style of villages and their economic traditions (Karaömeroğlu, 1998: 54). Within this framework, there were two major objectives for the institutes:

¹⁶ The law that regulated the foundation and functioning of Village Institutes was the law dated 1940 and no. 3083. This law was improved by the Village Schools and Institutes Organization Law dated 1942 and no. 4242.

¹⁷ More detailed works and analyzes on Village Institutes can be found in the following studies; Dündar, 2000; Gedikoğlu, 1971; Kirby, 2010; Tonguç, 1970.

to increase the literacy rate by extending education into the villages and to increase the agricultural production capacity by introducing villages to modern life styles and agricultural techniques (Tekeli, 1983: 665–666). In line with this purpose, with the concept of “education-training for work” (Karaömeroğlu, 1998: 57), 21 institutes were opened in various parts of the country, which were all suitable for agricultural development.¹⁸ Between 1941–42 and 1951–1951: in these institutes, 17,341 teachers—1,398 were female and 15,943 were male, were educated. In addition, 8,675 trainers, of which 29 were female and 8,646 were male, were trained (Gedikoğlu, 1971: 231; Özkan, 2008: 205–206).

After attempting to raise a carrier elite segment in the rural areas by initiatives such as People’s Houses, etc., the tendency for giving direction to rural areas from the center in the 1930s, which this trend penetrated into the society; moved toward the villages in the 1940s and was then applied in a move to convert the village people into citizens as set forth by the new regime. The Village Institute, as a project, was for developing village teachers, but it did not train teachers who would only train the villages in terms of culture. The teacher was the actor of the action of training/education, which would bring a very new behavior mode for the life style of the village people as well as introduce innovations in production. The village should be subject to an extensive change from the means of production to a mentality such that the Republic could reach a firm and constant social base. Within this framework, the teacher was trained in such a manner as to be the unique representative and actor of the Kemalist staff.

Institutes, which were established for training teachers, had a curriculum, which could be broke down into three fields. On the one hand, in compliance with the agricultural features of the region in which the institute was established, applied courses for economic production such as farming, stockbreeding, and bee keeping were provided. Institutes had their own agricultural lands, barns, and workshops. On the other hand, culture/art courses were also provided to develop the teachers’ intellectual capacities and life philosophies. Teachers read Western classics and they

¹⁸ For the list of institutes, see Gedikoğlu, 1971: 50.

were trained in such a manner that they could at least play one musical instrument and they were further directed toward the theater. Finally, in line with their educational activities, students were provided Turkish, mathematics, and science courses. With these curriculums, it is obvious that village institutes, beyond a classical training institution, set forth a policy for raising a generation, which would reply against Kemalist ideology's search for a base. In fact, İsmet İnönü, in a speech he made in 1964, said the following as regards Village Institutes, "I can say without considering any of my duties in my political and military life that I will have left two pieces to the Turkish nation when I die. One of them is the village schools and the other is several parties" (cited in Yiğit, 1992: 43). With these words, İnönü expresses that he cares for the Village Institutions as much as he does paying attention to the implementation of the multi-party system.

In 1946, as Hasan Ali Yücel, the Minister of National Education was discharged, the institutes began to fall from favor. Due to law and circulars enacted in 1947 (Laws no. 5012, 5117, 5129, 5210), applied courses of the institutes were decreased, besides the course work, the number of teachers and trainers were reduced, the male and female students were separated from each other, the list of free reading for students was restricted, and finally, upon enacting law no. 6234c in February 1954 by the DP government, the institutes were closed and combined with traditional primary teacher schools.

People's Houses: The first move of the cultural attack by the Kemalist staff, which they initiated as they noticed in the early 1930s that the regime had not been satisfactorily adopted in Anatolia, was the foundation of the People's Houses (*Halk Evleri*). The decision, which had been made in CHP's 1931 Congress, was implemented on February 19, 1932, by opening Public Houses in 14 provincial centers. The People's Houses¹⁹ were established, "as cultural and political centers designated to indoctrinate the masses with the nationalist, secularist, and populist ideas of the Republican regime" (Karpat, 1974: 69). Their goal was to build national

¹⁹ For more detailed information on the People's Houses, see Çeçen, 1990; Şimşek, 2002; Toksoy, 2007; Yerlikaya, 1999.

unity by explaining the principles of the RPP to the masses and bring the elites and the villagers together (Zürcher, 2004a: 106). To fulfill this goal, the People's Houses had an intense scheduled program of activity. In 1939, in order to expand the Houses movement into the villages, a smaller organization, People's Rooms (Halk odaları)²⁰ was established. The Rooms, similar to Houses, were guided by secular and nationalist principles. Until 1950, the number of People's Houses opened in various places in Anatolia reached 478, whereas the number of People's Rooms reached 4,322 (Karpat, 1963: 61–63).

Community centers, which functioned with a concrete ideological loyalty for bringing CHP and the government's reforms into Anatolia, displayed a remarkably high performance, particularly between 1932 and 1940. During this period, 23,750 conferences and 9,050 concerts were hosted, and 12,350 plays were staged. In its first foundation year, 149,949 people utilized the People's Houses and this number reached 2,557,853 in 1940. Within the scope of the People's Houses, around 50 magazines and limitless books and brochures were issued (Çavdar, 2008: 355).

After the 1930s, the community centers comprehensively supported all of the ideas and policies developed by Kemalist power. They provided serious contributions for the dissemination of the policies determined in Ankara and the theses developed for rural areas and for its conversion into a social mobilization. The best example for this can be found in the move for a simplification of the language. In all these works, the People's Houses, which faced up to a hard party hierarchy, displayed a closed structure for social participation and displayed a function, which increased the social distance in the relations established by civil bureaucracy and intellectuals with the society as regards directive and pragmatic elements. In spite of the high-minded ideals and intense program of activity, the Houses and Rooms, largely, remained a meeting place for professionals and bureaucrats and few peasants and farmers were allowed into this circle (Çavdar, 2008: 357; Karpat, 1963: 65–67; Zürcher, 2004a: 107).

²⁰ The Rooms were established in rapid succession: 141 in 1940, 143 in 1943, 2,338 in 1945, and reached a total of 4,322 in 1950 (Karpat, 1963: 63).

Although these institutions were unsuccessful in their attempt to instill Kemalist principles in the peasants, they were successful in creating a middle class in the towns. For the most part, these strategies of penetrating secular ideology, affected the intellectuals, who were already willing to accept it. However, since the strategy of the elites was dependent on exchanging the traditional values with that of a Western lifestyle and culture, people in the villages and small towns resisted this strategy and continued to preserve their basic Islamic customs and traditions (Karpas, 1957: 271). As Zürcher (2004a: 107) put it, “Their efforts to encourage a European lifestyle and culture and the lack of interest in, and respect for, expression of traditional cultures may actually have created resentment among the masses of the population.” Secularist nationalism, which was mobilized to occupy the space of Islam in the public sphere, failed to appeal to the conservative rural population. As a result, a large section of the population, not only rejected the secularist values that were being imposed on them, but they came to dislike the ruling elites for imposing these ideologies.

Within the İnönü period, the carrier staff introduced an administrative elite class. This elite class lost its motivation and dynamism during the Atatürk period and became a routine, which actually increased the alienation of the society. In order to enable national will to introduce a result in favor of nation, the postponement of the democracy, which appeared as a result of elitist and authoritative civilization efforts, was thought of as an obligatory stage and thus removed the democratic mentality, which was applied during the foundation of the state. The society primarily resisted this modernization project coming from the top down but after the political system became introverted and authoritative and after the resistances were suppressed by hard policies; it became introverted and alienated from both the policy and the state. This hard introversion, which accompanied the suppression, led the claim for democracy to acquire a revanchist character. The Kemalist staff were obliged to personally deal with members of the general public, who were offended by the staff's elitist policies applied for construction of a nation, which consists of multitudes of people and to increase the sovereignty to such a level as to be utilized, in the beginning of the political life of the multi-party system To the extent that social

choices carried the DP to power, it was concluded that the nation had not yet been constructed and the tutelage should be re-established. Turkish political life after the 1960 military coup is the story of this process.

2.5.4 Military

The military was the strongest supporter during all the processes Mustafa Kemal lived or envisaged from the beginning of the national struggle to the victory, from the establishment of the state, to the construction of the political regime, from the purification of the political center from the opposition, to the formation of a new nation. Mustafa Kemal, who was also an Ottoman Military officer himself and started the national struggle with his military status, organized the Independence War together with a number of high-level military officials. Most of the Ottoman military staff, who gained their military experience during the Balkan War and World War I, without hesitating to join the resistance, served as the core of the struggle, which flourished against the invasion in the Anatolia (Zürcher, 2004a: 100–101). While 12 of the 17 commanders of the Ottoman Military, who served during World War I, joined the resistance in Anatolia, only two of them preferred to stay with the sultan (Lerner and Robinson, 1960: 25). The circumstances of the War of Independence, the Western education they received, and the influence of the political ideas of the CUP, made the military officers the constituent and conveyor cadres of the War of Independence and the political regime that was to be established.²¹ So, the central position of the military in the political system was primarily related to the vital role it played in the national struggle. Thus, the military actively contributed to the structuring of politics both during the War of Independence process and in the first periods after the victory.

²¹ The Turkish Military, which was formed with the officers who graduated from the Ottoman military academy, bore the signs of Ottomans under the command of Çakmak until 1952 when Turkey became a member of NATO. In such a way that Cemal Gürsel, who led the 1960 coup, and then Cevdet Sunay, who became chief of staff and later president, were the last generation who had had their military education in the Ottoman period. After the May 27 coup, which was staged by the military officers educated during the Republic period, the signs of the Ottoman period were wiped away when all the military officers educated in the Ottoman period were retired.

In the first period, the military had a high level of representation both in the Parliament, the government, and in the administrative units. This high level of representation was based on two reasons: firstly, Mustafa Kemal preferred to rely on the military until he settled the revolutions because the military was under his command. The other reason the military had such a high level of representation was that the military had the most qualified human resources who believed in the revolutions. Because of these two facts, until the 1930s, the military was used both in official and in civil institutions; however, the gradual weight of the military in the personnel pool was reduced because the opposition ended, the revolution raised its own cadres, and the decline of the military was allowed in favor of the civilians (Frey, 1960: 8–10; Lerner and Robinson, 1960: 21; Rustow, 1959: 550).

The function and position of the military during the first period of the Republic were shaped through a series of regulations, which were partially voluntary (due to the preference of Mustafa Kemal) and partially compulsory (due to the course of events). After the War of Independence ended with victory, firstly the elimination of the civilian actors from the political center by the military cadres and then going into a fight for power themselves, resulted in a series of regulations on the relations of the military with politics.

Military as the Basis of the Struggle for Power

Both during the War of Independence and after winning the war, there was significant opposition and numerous threats regarding the leadership of Mustafa Kemal. Nonetheless, Mustafa Kemal had little difficulty eliminating the opposition of the external enemies, including Circassian Ethem, the Second Group in the First Assembly, and the members of the Committee of Union and Progress, among the nationalists. During the fight for power against all these wings, the commanders, who had led the War of Independence, sided with Mustafa Kemal. This union enabled the easy elimination of the opposition centers, which were against Mustafa Kemal. However, after the War of Independence ended with victory and the state was established, Kemal came across with his friends from the military, with whom he had organized the War of Independence.

This controversy during the Second Assembly period was the main factor that affected both the political system, which was established and the position of the military in that political system. The fact that the wing, which was opposed to Mustafa Kemal, was composed of high-level commanders who had organized the War of Independence from the beginning, led to the military being the most important variable in the fight for power on the political center (Bayramođlu, 2004: 65; Rustow, 1959: 548–549; Ően, 2005: 17–27). In order to win this fight, between the years 1923–1927, Mustafa Kemal used the military as a variable able to change the balance of power. Within this frame, the heritage Kemal left to the Republic in terms of the meaning of the military in the political system, was actually the product of those historical conditions. The whole of the dynamics, which still had importance such as, the autonomy of the military, not being under the control of the assembly, its relation with the daily politics and protection of the regime, etc., are the products of the use of the military by Mustafa Kemal as an effective variable to eliminate his opponents. When, with a multiple stage plan, Kemal eliminated even possible threats of opponents, the position of the military in the Republic became clear as well.

Military as an Institution above Politics and Affiliated with Mustafa Kemal

The effects of the fight for power between Mustafa Kemal and his opponents on the reformation of the military can be followed through three laws. The first application regarded gaining the autonomy of the military from politics and getting it affiliated with the personality of Mustafa Kemal, who had the title of presidency at that time, was the conversion of *Erkan-ı Harbiye-i Umumiye Vekâleti* (Ministry of Military) into *Riyaset* (General Staff) with a law²² enacted in March 1923, when the struggle in the assembly was at its peak. The conversion of the organization from ministry to general staff level took the military from a political position and provided it with a bureaucratic mechanism. With this law, the General Staff was organized as an independent bureaucratic organization and the domination of TBMM and

²² For the text of the Law no. 429, whose last five articles restructured the Ministry of Defence as General Staff, see *Kavanin Journal*, Vol. 2, Term 2, p. 241. For the Parliament debate regarding the law, see *Assembly Minute Records*, Vol. 8, Term 2, pp. 336–341. For the meaning of the law in that period, see Bayramođlu, 2004: 67–70; Özdađ, 2006: 50–52.

government domination of it was dissolved by directly affiliating the military to the Presidency. The job description of the General Staff, which was affiliated to a position that was non-labile in terms of politics (presidency), was left obscure and given authorization to exchange correspondence with any of the ministries in “the subjects under its duties” (Bayramođlu, 2004: 71; Özdađ, 2006: 50–52).²³ With this regulation, where the Ministry of Defense, which carried out activities in the same field, “was made busy with the support services of the military” (Cebesoy, 2007: 536), the General Staff obtained a higher level and independent status than the ministry.

The purpose of the law was to enable the General Staff be independent from TBMM and the political government and to allow no one but Mustafa Kemal to have domination of the military. The establishment of the military, which was under the command of TBMM when it was a Ministry, as a bureaucratic institution while it was being converted to General Staff was a reflection of the policy of Mustafa Kemal to directly transform it to a power in his hands by freeing it from the affect and audit of TBMM. The military structure, which was taken out of the politics and freed from being in the impact area and in view of the political debates, was actually transformed to a suppression tool, which Mustafa Kemal could use in order to gain control over TBMM when necessary (Cizre, 2001: 160; Harris, 1965a: 58; Özdađ, 2006: 51).

Although the short-term purpose of that regulation was to neutralize the opposition and to turn the military as a toll under the control of Mustafa Kemal, its effects were not limited by that purpose and it constituted the basis for the political independence of the military within the newly established political system. The General Staff, which was equipped with an obscure and extended job description and affiliated to the Presidency by being granted autonomy from politics, took over the mission to protect Mustafa Kemal during his lifetime, and then Kemalism, which formed the ideological basis of the new Republic after him. The roots of the understanding of the

²³ Regarding the examples that this situation enabled the General Staff to evaluate the political issues from a security point of view, see Bayramođlu, 2004: 70.

military to serve the state beyond the politics/government independent from the current political government and with a mission over it during the Republican period began and was institutionalized with that implementation. In fact, Fevzi Çakmak, who was in the chief of staff position, often attended to the meetings of the Council of Ministers during his term until 1944 and he further undertook a mission to audit the activities of the government from industry to education with security concerns. He intervened with the locations where the industrial estates would be constructed and prevented the economic development and education campaigns, which were planned for the Eastern and South Eastern regions (Harris, 1965a: 60).

Another regulation, which was effective on the position of the military in the political system was the “Law On The Provisions To Which the Members Of The Military Who Have Been or Will Be Elected to TBMM Will Be Subject”²⁴ enacted on December 19, 1923. The law resolved that members of Parliament, who still had military status, would no longer be elected as members of Parliament, and could not attend the debates in Parliament. With this law, members of Parliament who did not resign from their military duties within a period of ten days were banished from their work in Parliament. In fact, Kazım Karabekir and Ali Fuat Pasha, who were actively carrying on their military duties, were prevented from attending the debates in the Parliament according to that regulation.

There is extensive debate in the political literature as to whether this law was a product of democratic prediction, which attempted to draw away the military from politics and make them focus on the defense of the country or if it attempted to enable Mustafa Kemal to control the military and terminate the influence of the political opposition on the military. Opposed to the opinions, which support that Mustafa Kemal withdraw the military from politics and be directed totally to defense priority issues (Eroğlu, 1982: 285; Kili, 1982: 161–162; Mumcu, 1979: 126), there are also the opinions, which support that Mustafa Kemal drew away the military from the Parliament because the majority of the military was standing close to the

²⁴ For the “Law on the provisions to which the members of the military who have been or will be elected to the TBMM will be subject” with no. 385 dated December 19, 1923, see *Kavanin*, Vol. 2, Term 2, p. 172. For the meaning of the law in that period, see Özdağ, 2006: 48–50, 81–87.

opposition²⁵ and at last affiliated the military to himself and changed the balance in his favor in the fight for power with the opposition (Szyliowicz, 1975: 32; Frey, 1965: 334; 1960: 5–7; Hale, 1996: 74–75; Özdağ, 2006: 48, 56, 81–87).

When it was time to decide for the political regime after the War of Independence resulted in victory, Mustafa Kemal obtained a decision for the elections on April 1, 1923 in order to get rid of the opposition, which had gained strength in the Parliament. The new Assembly would decide for the political regime, organize the political center, and make radical reforms. The Assembly, which was renewed with the elections with which Mustafa Kemal managed the members of the Second Group was not elected, held its first session on August 11, 1923. On October 29, 1923, the Proclamation of the Republic took place. The method and timing of the Proclamation of the Republic led to a new dispute. There had been a tension between Mustafa Kemal and Kazım Karabekir, Ali Fuat Pasha, and Refet Pasha, who had all been high-level commanders in the War of Independence and supported Mustafa Kemal against the opposition in the First Assembly. Kemal decided that carrying out the commandership duty, as a member of Parliament, would be dangerous because of the military nature of the opposition.

This implementation, which necessitated making a choice between military service and politics, may have led to an understanding that Mustafa Kemal drew the military away from politics when it separated from its content. In the end, it is obvious that this interpretation is correct when we look at the heritage this implementation left for the Republican history after the heat of those incidents faded away. However, when it is evaluated within the context of the period and the tendency of Mustafa Kemal to use the military as an effective power in his own fight with the opposition considered, the thesis is that Kemal appealed to this move to eliminate the influence of the opposition rather than as a principle attitude. In reality, the concrete result of the law was in this direction and the military became more dependent on Mustafa Kemal because of this move.

²⁵ Frey (1965: 334) puts forward that although 44% of the members of Parliament with military roots in the Parliament took a place in TpCF (Progressive Republican Party-Opposition) while 18% of them took a place in the CHF (Republican People's Party).

Kazım Karabekir and Ali Fuat Pasha, who thought that their military status would be helpful in their struggle against Mustafa Kemal, carried out their duties in the military for 10 months and they did not attend the debates in the Parliament. However, the facts that they realized they had not been effective while they stayed in the military during that period and the Parliament had taken some critical resolutions such as the Abolition of the Caliphate, made the Pashas chose politics. Other resignations followed the consecutive resignations of Kazım Karabekir and Ali Fuat Pasha from the military in October 1924. In order to establish the Progressive Republican Party (TpCF), upon the Pashas resignation from their duties in the military, Mustafa Kemal wanted all the members of Parliament with a military background, whom he could influence, to prefer the military. In this way, the military came under the full control of Mustafa Kemal by November 1924. As a matter of fact, while İnönü was commenting on these developments, he stated that the move of Atatürk and the directions after that move allowed him to understand the reality of who really had his hands on the military (İnönü, 1985–87, Vol. 2: 192). Shortly, with that move, Mustafa Kemal both took the military under his control and cleaned the military from opposition groups.

The third step concerned drawing the military away from the opposition and the possible effects of TBMM and bringing under the control of the personality of Mustafa Kemal and in this way, gaining autonomy was taken with the Law on Supreme Military Council²⁶ (March 8, 1925). This law, which regulated the interior organization of the military and its relations with civilians, was presented to the Parliament by the government (January 26, 1925) two months after the organized opposition against Mustafa Kemal in the Parliament had been institutionalized under the name of TpCF. The timing of the law can be read as the indicator of the importance Mustafa Kemal gave for getting the support of the military for the struggle he carried out against the opposition. The most disputed issue of the law was the article, which authorized the president to chair the High Military Council. The

²⁶ For detailed information, see *Kavanin Mecmuası*, Vol. 2, Term 2, p. 240. For the Parliament debate regarding the law, see *Assembly Minute Records*, Vol. 11–12, Term 2, pp. 338–344. For the meaning of the law during that period, see Bayramoğlu, 2004: 71–75; Özdağ, 2006: 63–70.

opposition, particularly Karabekir and Cebesoy, considered this law more political than military and severely criticized the fact that the law gave the opportunity to the president for any kind of disposal on the military (Cebesoy, 2007: 534–536).

When the content of the law and opinions voiced by the spokespersons of Republican People's Party (CHF) and TpCF in TBMM are considered, it is clear that the law was a step to carry out the current political struggle over the military. During a period when the political struggle against the opposition was going on and when the public opposition might raise with the radical political revolutions, Mustafa Kemal attempted to secure his position by affiliating the reformation of the military to himself. The opposition rightly understood the strategy of Kemal for keeping the military under his hands against the possibility of the change in the balance of power and attempted to keep the military at least at the position of a referee by attempting to prevent the military from going under the control of Mustafa Kemal (Özdağ, 2006: 69); however, could not prevent the law from being enacted in the Parliament. While the debates were going on in the Parliament, the Sheikh Sait uprising began and the TpCF was closed. In this way, Mustafa Kemal got rid of his opponents both in his struggle with the military and in the political struggle. The Law on the Maintenance of the Order was enacted with the uprising and opposition was suppressed on all fronts.

The 1923–1927 period witnessed an intensive struggle of power between Mustafa Kemal and his opponents and the military was the most important dynamic in that struggle. The laws, which regulated the formation of the military under Riyaset (General Staff), forcing the members of the Parliament from the military to make a choice between the Parliament and the military and regulating the management of the military should be read as the most important indicators that an important part of the political struggle was made over the military and the power relations were determined with the ability to influence the military. The natural result of the all three laws had been the termination of the influences of the opposition commanders such as Karabekir and Cebesoy, who could have an important influence on the military with their military careers and their duties and contributions during the War of Independence. With the first law, Mustafa Kemal affiliated the military, which

was reformed as General Staff, to himself by freeing it from the possible interventions of TBMM. He took the military under his control by cleaning it of his political opponents with the second law and the third law, he intensified his control over the military by handing over all the political, administrative, financial and military issues regarding the defense to a council, which would be formed under himself, and ensured the military against the opposing influences. With these three laws, both the influences of the opposition on the military were prevented and the military was freed from the control of the Parliament and affiliated to Mustafa Kemal himself. The natural result of that was gaining autonomy of the military from the Parliament and the politics under the influence of Mustafa Kemal, and being the protector of his personality and ideas. In fact, the military would be a party in favor of Kemal and be the protector of the politics throughout the term of Çakmak. The military, which played an active role in the structuring of both the political regime and political center during the establishment period, had a protector role, which would be called out when necessary; however, actually, as the guarantee of the reforms made/to be made during the institutionalism period.

Military, as the Guardian of Republic and Kemalism

The execution of the struggle for power over the military during 1923–1927 also increased the military's power in the political center. The military, in taking sides with Mustafa Kemal and being utilized as a deterrent power for the suppression of opponents, forged a bond between the military and the Kemalist revolution. Thus, because of Kemal, the military became the guardian of the regime and the guarantee for its existence. After 1927, in which the struggle for power resulted in favor of Kemal, the military's mission was to protect revolutions/reforms and assist in its institutionalization. Within this framework, as the power struggle ended in favor of Kemal, his not taking part in the front line does not mean that the military stood apart from the politics during 1927–38. Within this period, the military again supported the intensive and modern program, which was implemented by Mustafa Kemal to provide social and political transformation and continue as a deterrent factor against probable opposing powers (Karpaz, 1981: 115). In other words, the new mission of

the military, which remained out of daily politics, was to guide Republic values, which were institutionalized by the reforms implemented by Mustafa Kemal.

In fact, Mustafa Kemal, in his 1931 speech to military members, puts forth the mission of the military as follows:

The Turkish nation, whenever it wanted to make a step to rise, saw its military comprised of its own heroes every time as the leader of these steps, as the pioneer of accomplishing a higher national ideal [...] Again, in the future, the hero military sons of this nation shall lead for the accomplishment of a higher ideal for the nation. The Turkish nation, always completely considers that the hero of every accomplishment and success is its own military. [...] Friends! When I am talking about the military, I am actually talking about the intellectual sons of the Turkish nation who are the real owners of this country (Atatürk, 1997–II: 302).

Atatürk, in his speech on November 1, 1937 in the opening of TBMM, reveals the position of the military in the political system as below:

Our military is the unbeatable guarantee for Turkish land and for our systematic works, with which we attempted to accomplish the ideal of Turkey. [...] I have no doubt that the necessary efforts shall be made for bringing the military, which is already a big national discipline school into a bigger school, which would raise the necessary staff for our economic, cultural, and social wars at the same time (Atatürk, 1997–I: 421).

It is obvious that the mission of the military, which was referred to in Atatürk's speeches at various times, was not limited to protecting the country from foreign enemies. Atatürk considered the military an institution to accomplish and protect the nation's ideals and he also considered it as a school, an intellectual class, which raises people to rescue the country not only in military wars but also in economic, cultural, and social struggles as well. This mission was defined by Article 34 of the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law dated 1935; which, afterwards, served as a justification for the military's intervention into policy in the following years. "The duty of the Armed Forces is to protect and watch out for the Turkish Republic, the Turkish native country indicated in the Constitution."²⁷ Within the scope of this mission, the military, with its supra-political position and with its motivation of "protecting and watching for the Republic," continued its efficiency within the political system. Primarily, Fevzi Çakmak, despite the fact he had been taken out of the cabinet within the framework of the restructuring of the military as presidency in

²⁷ This mission, which was repeated in Article 35 of the Military Internal Service Law, no. 1960, was construed such that the military forces were entitled to intervene in policy in order to rescue the state from dangers, thus it became a justification for the May 27 coup and those that followed.

1924, frequently attended cabinet meetings and became effective for the reflection of the military's sensibilities into government policies (Rustow, 1959: 549–550). Çakmak's existence in the cabinet and his capability of direct correspondence with each ministry led the presidency to audit the politics and caused all kinds of applications to be made subject to public order. Nevertheless, due to the military's safeguarded status within the system, despite its cost born from economic policies in the 1930s, Çakmak's military sensitivities about geopolitics and internal security was taken into consideration (Bayramoğlu, 2004: 69–71).²⁸

Furthermore, although a gradual diminution has occurred in favor of civilians, retired military personnel continued to be utilized as deputy, minister, and top managers (Rustow, 1959: 550; 1964: 385; Lerner and Robinson, 1960: 28). Particularly, the selection of ministers of defense, transportation, and interiors from military based people continued almost as a tradition (Rustow, 1964: 385). In all cabinets during the single-party period, military origin persons were included, the first cabinet, which did not include a military origin minister, was the 1948 Hasan Saka Cabinet (Rustow, 1959: 550). Despite a gradual decline experienced in the proportion of military origin persons in the Assembly, until 1950 DP power, the deputyship of military people

²⁸ Samet Ağaoğlu strikingly expresses Çakmak's supervision, which he established over his concerns on security; "Fevzi Paşa's conservative thoughts in terms of military forces obstructed positive economic decisions, which were considered to be taken. For instance; he did not accept Karadeniz Ereğli as the location for the establishment of the iron and steel industry, as suggested by the Ministry of Economics under the consideration of economic management, based on the justification that it was a hard place to defend in terms of military approach [...] and he caused the iron and steel industry to be established in Karabük, having heavier conditions economically [...] Marshall again did not approve the establishment of industries and the construction of roads in the East and South provinces upon the same consideration and asserted that the county could be easily invaded by the enemy, which could easily intrude through these borders. [...] According to Marshall, opening new schools in Eastern provinces would awaken the public and lead some separative streams such as Kurdism (Ağaoğlu, 1972: 135). Samet Ağaoğlu's witness: just as displaying the effectiveness of the military on the policy, also shows how the Kemalist staff made decisions under the effect of a paranoia of invasion and division, influenced by Çakmak. The policy sharing of Çakmak's concerns were not only related to the power of the military but it also indicates that the same fears and concerns were shared by political actors. Another example for Çakmak's approach on security asserting that investing in the Southeastern area would feed Kurd nationalism was evident in Bayar's witness. Feeling the need to emphasize that Urfa was Turkish and the investment should be accomplished therein, Urfa Deputy Behiç Bey received a response by Celal Bayar, the Minister of Economy; "Here is the telephone, under your service, let's call Marshall, let's find him, you better talk to him. If he permits, I will lay the foundation of a factory in Diyarbakır and Urfa. You should get permission first. But Marshall does not approve it, he obstructs it" (Madanoğlu, 1982: 125). For the evaluation of this and similar cases, see Bayramoğlu, 2004: 70–71.

remained at a serious level. The proportion of military persons in TBMM was 15% in 1920, and in parallel with the termination of a broad based social coalition, this increased up to 20%. Until the 1943 elections, this rate continued to be over the proportion in the Assembly of 1920. For the first time, this proportion, which had declined to 14% in the 1943 elections, decreased to 11% in the 1946 elections. In the following elections, in which DP constituted the majority of radical falls were experienced and the rate fell down to 6% and 4% in the Assemblies in 1950 and 1954 respectively (Frey, 1965: 181).

Mustafa Kemal's Heritage to the Military in the Context of Military-Politics Relations

While evaluating Mustafa Kemal's heritage to the Republic in relationship to the military's place within the system, two opposite attitudes and tendencies can be mentioned. The two opposing tendencies finally came together and formed a model. The first tendency was in Mustafa Kemal's words and opinions about cost, both in terms of politics and military discipline, which were born due to the military getting involved with the politics during the CUP period (Frey, 1960: 5; Heper, 2006: 101). The second tendency, which seems contrary to this tendency, is related to Kemal's feeling that the necessity of basing the support of the military for disabling the opposition against him and applying the radical reform program. By setting off this divergence between normative platform and factual platform, is it possible to reach a generalization about Mustafa Kemal's positioning of the military?

The factual platform for the structuring of the military during the Mustafa Kemal period is related to the existence of the new Turkey's most organized, educated, and loyal personnel pool within the military both during the Independence War and after the victory was achieved. This factual platform rendered the military's support inevitable for providing social acceptance both for a power struggle and against radical reforms, and placed the military in the center of the politics. When Mustafa Kemal's opinions (normative platform) as of the last periods of the Ottomans, regarding the damages of the military's involvement with politics is compiled with the necessity for the weight of the military within the system (factual platform); the

position that appeared is that the military should be kept in a status, which is powerful within the system but not involved with daily politics.

Substantially, the supra-politics status of the military, which was formed gradually by the power struggle between 1923–26, is in fact related to Mustafa Kemal identifying himself with the Republic after 1927 and keeping himself in a supra-politics position. The military, which was removed from TBMM during the power struggle and brought under the command of Mustafa Kemal with the capacity of the president, after 1927, because the Republic's values were identified with Mustafa Kemal's ideas and policies, was the guardian and security of the Republic and Kemalism. Within the period until 1927, the military, which was one of the significant actors for Mustafa Kemal's rise to power during the power struggle and for the institutionalization of the Republic, was the "protective power of the Kemalist revolution" after 1927. Within this context, after the Free Party experience in the 1930s, in the absence of opponent political groups, during the period in which the development of policies for placing the revolutions and developing the country were dealt, the military staying away from daily politics should not be observed as its effectiveness on politics was going down. Within this period, although a general policy for not getting involved with the daily politics was followed up, with a supra-politics position, the mission for being the guarantee of the existence and values of the Republic was maintained. Upon the mission of being the guide of Kemalist ideology, the military had an active attitude for the election of İnönü as president after the Mustafa Kemal period. İnönü's need for negotiating with the military and taking its approval prior to implementing the multi-party system should be remembered in terms of the accurate evaluation of the military's position within the system. İnönü, considering the fact that the military would identify him with Kemalist ideology, made his decision certain after giving a guarantee to the military that the multi-party political system would not create a danger for Kemalist gains and would not harm the military's traditional guidance mission (Karpaz, 1981: 114).

2.6 Conclusion

European countries, which became powerful in the late seventeenth century, gained success in both military and bureaucratic fields and changed the Ottoman's political system and its perception of the order. The economic costs born from military defeats led the Ottoman administrative class to a search and the Ottoman modernization process began. The modernization process, as of the early eighteenth century, passed through various phases; in each stage a privileged agenda of the modernization process and carrier class changed; but, modernization continued to progress through a centralist and Western line. Selim III and Mahmud II, who developed reforms in the military, bureaucratic, and administrative fields, decreased the power of the traditional manager class within the system on one hand and caused new classes to gain power in the political system on the other. The renewal of the educational and administrative system in modern schools featured the bureaucracy. The Period of Reforms took the faith of the civil bureaucracy's modernization process from the initiative of the sultan and caused it to bring a priority of its own existence. The modernization process was removed from being dependent on the decisions of powerful sultans and put into an autonomous and bureaucratic process. The featuring of bureaucracy and Westernization during the Reforms period caused an Islamist intellectual class feeding from the modernization process but producing an objection against this process to be born. New Ottomans, by synthesizing the modern education and Islamic thoughts, paved the way for the appearance of an intellectual class and caused it to play an effective role in the modernization process in parallel with the military bureaucracy. In the Abdulhamid II period, on one hand the institutional and administrative restoration tendency of the modernization process was being continued, but on the other, a struggle was made against bureaucracy, which was also gaining in autonomy against Westernization as a consideration defended by this bureaucratic class. This tension caused the modernization process and the leading classes, which undertook the spokespersonship of this process, to approach politicization. This caused a failure in the modernization process. The Period of Politics, which was conducted by the palace in order to rescue the state, ended and a process began in which pioneer classes were struggling against the

palace for rescuing the state again. This fight unified the leading classes and initiated a new dynamic, which supported modernization was decisive for rescuing the state. The struggle between leading classes and Abdulhamid II, under the umbrella of the Young Turks, caused the leading classes to interiorize their mission of rescue and to carry selective-tutelary tendencies.

The Abdulhamid regime and the Young Turk movement attempts to destroy this regime left very powerful legacies to the Republic in terms of the modernization process and the formation and development of leading elites. Within this framework, it can be stated that both periods came up to a very significant moment of failure in terms of the development of a modernization process and the leading elites' political roles. During this period, the intellectual class, which owned an aristocratic and conservative character in the new Ottoman format and resisting against Westernization triggered by the modernization process showed a change in both denominational and political agenda. Primarily, the intellectual class was beginning to be represented by a segment that supported the modernization process, which was Western, secular and politicized. Abdulhamid's pressure toward conservative intellectuals caused intellectuals to join under the umbrella of the Young Turks. The Young Turk movement stimulated the intellectual class toward a tendency that supported both modernization and Westernization. Secondly, because of the need for diplomatic tools to compete with European forces, the Tanzimat period's Ottoman administration gave priority to the strengthening of civil bureaucracy (Findley, 1994: 51–53). In addition, because the civil bureaucracy's effectiveness in the administration and military training had not yet begun to move forward, civil bureaucracy, which was the leader of modernization, began to lose power. The third point is that the modern military training, which was planted during the Selim III and Mahmud II periods, began to give fruitful results. Because of Abdulhamid's policy to restrain the power of civil bureaucracy, the Yong Turk Movement was organized in military schools, which were the most modern educational institution of the emperorship, thus politicizing the military and converting it into the most powerful class supporting modernization.

The Abdulhamid regime and the Young Turk Movement, besides changing the balance of power between leading classes, also qualitatively changed the roles of these classes within political life. During these periods, leading classes allied, became politicized, and undertook a rescuing mission. Along with the emperorship's remaining life and the early years of the Republic, the most firm dynamic in political developments was the alliance established by the pioneer classes and this rescuing mission was undertaken.

As the military-intellectual alliance came to power in 1908, the modernization process entered into a new phase. Within the scope of the CUP, the military entering into the modernization process as a willing and decisive power for the consideration of rescuing, changed the codes of policy. With the effect of the accumulation caused from the modernization process, along with the nineteenth century, the thought for rescuing the state became emergent and began to expand among leading classes and it was also understood that the public could not be an effective partner for this rescue action. The core of the separation among the Young Turks was comprised of this elitism and political concept, which was fed by this elitism. In its disintegration, the group, which was included and became powerful within the CUP, felt that the military-intellectual class should intervene in policy and handle the power directly for the salvation of the state. Since the public does not have adequate interest, determination, and power to rescue the state, the military-intellectual alliance would accomplish the military coup. Thus, in 1908, the military seized power. As of the beginning of the modernization process, the military, which had provided its institutional development and decided how the state should be saved, was the main actor of the modernization process and mission for rescuing the state as of the beginning of the twentieth century.

During the power of the CUP, some ethnical factors, which became independent in the Ottoman, Balkan Wars, and the World War, added a new dimension to the idea of "rescuing." This moved away from being an abstract target and reached concrete priorities. The military-intellectual alliance actually seized power as of 1913 and laid its hands on the "rescuing the nation" mission. Because rescuing projects, such as Ottomanism and Islamism failed, Turkism began to be perceived as a remedy for

salvation. The Young Turks adopted the strategy of “rescuing the country by Turkification” and developed various policies accordingly. The tendency in the period, which became most prominent, was nationalism. Rescuing was identified with Turkish nationalism. The new geography became Anatolia and the new policy became nationalism. To rescue Anatolia, extensive policies were developed in political, social, economic, and cultural fields. The military-intellectual alliance under the leadership of the CUP focused nationalism, secularism, and etatism policies in order to build up a modern nation and to hand over this modern nation to the Ottomans.

The Ottoman’s defeat in World War I and the invasion of the country by the enemy began another period in the modernization process. The “rescuing” mission emerged and turned into a more concrete necessity. The CUP staffs began to organize the resistance in Anatolia, in various places, local congresses for resistance were held. The military-intellectual class, within the scope of the CUP, passed to Anatolia and undertook the leadership of the War of Independence. Thus, policies within the Young Turks period reached a concrete ground and Anatolia was saved accordingly.

As the group under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal discharged opponent political and social actors after the victory, a new stage began both in the modernization process and in the rescuing mission. The country was saved but it was still waiting to be constructed. This required the application of an extensive reform program. Kemalist elites, who gained political consciousness under the Young Turk political environment, caught the chance for “constructing” a new state and society in line with the ideology they had acquired. The positivist and materialist education process would be tested by a political and social project. The project of placing Anatolia, which had a religious and ethnical pluralism over secular and Turkist foundations, would be difficult to achieve. Therefore, Kemalist elites would show the same reflex that the Young Turks had shown in 1913. They would discharge political and social segments that were against power and implement an authoritative regime. As it was between 1913 and 1918, and again after 1925, the opportunity for policy would be removed and an elitist and tutelary power practice would be implemented. In parallel with an intensive power struggle and political discharge and in line with secularism

and nationalism, between 1922–1927 a radical reform program was applied, while Kemalists were simultaneously constructing the state and society.

During the process for restructuring the political center, an intensive struggle was experienced. Mustafa Kemal discharged various groups, which had been successful during the process of “saving/rescuing” the state enabled both a Kemalist modernization experience and radicalized this experience. Members of the CUP, members of the Second Group in the First Assembly, conservative, traditional, leftist, and liberal local actors and Pashas who pioneered the War of Independence with Mustafa Kemal but founded TpCF by coming into conflict during the Second Assembly period, were all discharged by Mustafa Kemal. Within this period, the sultanate and the caliphate were removed, and the Republic was proclaimed. Mustafa Kemal implemented a history thesis in which the modernization process began with himself. Leading classes unified around Mustafa Kemal, specifically, they came under his supervision and thus enabled Kemalist modernization. The military, the intellectual class, and civil bureaucracy all contributed to Kemal’s success, those who took part in the “wrong” front were discharged. Kemalist power subsisted on discharges and the accomplishment of the discharge process by pioneering classes that were disconnected by the link of Kemalist modernization with Ottoman modernization and additionally caused pioneering classes to be dependent on Kemalism.

The Kemalist elite collected leading classes around him and took the existence of pioneering classes under his own supervision, which radicalized the nation-construction process. Within this process, in which no opposition existed and pioneering classes were under the supervision of Kemalist elites, society was reconstructed in line with some principles, which would later be called “Kemalism.” The pioneering staff, with its elitist and tutelary tendencies, considered itself entitled to construct the nation and it became motivated with the mission for “bringing the society to the level of modern civilizations.” Policies, which were specifically implemented in line with the principles of secularism and nationalism, alienated the society from Kemalism. The SCF experience revealed this situation. Afterwards, the construction process of Kemalist modernization began more intensively. Policies

were developed for the production of a new class, which would provide the acceptance of a construction process, which would defend Kemalist principles. This indicates the deepening of the construction process and the beginning of a protective period. Due to these policies in rural areas, Kemalism was adopted, an elite class, which would enable the permanence of the construction process, was created.

Along with this “construction” and “protection” process, until 1946, a democratic political regime was considered dangerous. The elitist and tutelary agenda legalized the authoritative regime that had been applied. It was asserted that the society had not reached a level of using its democratic will, it was expressed that a democratic regime would be implemented when the society and would be “enlightened” due to Kemalist policies. In 1946, as various internal and external dynamics came together, it was decided that the regime would be democratized. In 1950, CHP lost power and DP came to power. The loss of power strengthened elitist and tutelary tendencies and it was concluded that the society had not yet reached democratic maturity. This means that leading classes would remember their mission of “protecting the regime.” Within this context, in 1960, upon the alliance of the military officer-intellectual, a military coup was made and a new type of tutelage was introduced by the 1961 Constitution. “Political tutelage” in the single-party period, as a requirement of a democratic political environment, was converted into “an institutional tutelage.” Thus, within a historical slice of three hundred years, the avant-garde elites, who passed through different stages and intervened in the policy, enabled the Republic; but obstructed the democratization of the Republic. Elitist and tutelary tendencies, with the impetus of appropriating and protecting the Republic, made the democratization process difficult.

CHAPTER 3

3. CONSTRUCTION OF TUTELARY AUTHORITARIANISM

First of all, the tutelage system denies all alternative political quests. The elitist savior mission of the avant-garde elites assumes its own project to be the only one that could benefit the society. This assumption both requires and legitimizes the purging and elimination of all viable contenders for political power from the political arena. As such, for the tutelage system to be established, the avant-garde elite is required to remove both its opposition and its contenders from the political sphere and govern the country as the sole sovereign. In this section, the processes and instruments through which the Kemalist elite purged the groups and actors of the opposition as well as viable contenders from the political center and thus became the sole power to govern the country will be examined. The power struggle the Kemalist elite utilized in order to realize its tutelary mission had authorized the political regime and eliminated the opportunities for any discussion of a pluralist political regime.

The single-party regime was established after having evolved through several distinct phases between the years of 1923 and 1945. It passed through the founding of the state, the establishment, institutionalization and normalization of the Kemalist regime and the single-party administration, branching into factions in each of these phases. During the first period, the group, which would later make up the core of the Kemalist regime, brought local organizations leaning towards independence under a single roof; fought for independence and won; and established the state. The second period began with the parliamentary elections that allowed for the first alliance towards a political coalition that would carry out the struggle for independence and with the establishment of the People's Party. During this period, the struggle toward establishing the political center and regime determined the content of the political

activities. The Kemalist core's struggle to dominate the political center and its consequent success rendered the political system authoritarian. Accordingly, at first, the civil and local figures of the national resistance were eliminated and then the military-bureaucratic-wing adversary, which was separated from the Kemalist core and had the potential of becoming an alternative to Mustafa Kemal, was eliminated. Simultaneous to the struggle for the domination of the political center where the single-party regime prevailed, the main framework of the Kemalist regime was determined, and new policies toward building a new nation were put into practice.

In the third period, the policies toward both institutionalizing and strengthening the roots of the single-party system and the Kemalist regime were developed. When, contrary to the expectations of the Kemalist core, the citizens welcomed an attempt to establish an opposing party that would come up with alternative policies on economy following the dissipation of alternative political and social actors, the single-party administration focused on developing policies that would deepen the political tutelage. All Organizations but the Party were closed and programs and institutions within the scope of the Party were developed in order to train the society. The single-party administration was inspired by fascist countries and they adopted and put into practice a political system very similar to that of totalitarianism.

The fourth period began when Atatürk died and İsmet İnönü came to power. This period was identified with the chiefdom system and the title of National Chief of İnönü. This period can be regarded as the routinization of Kemalism. The most important dynamic that marked this period was the policies that were developed in order not to take part in World War II and to minimize the costs incurred under wartime conditions. Indeed, wartime conditions resulted in occasional economic problems and an authoritarian political environment close to that of totalitarianism. The period ended when the multi-party system was adopted in order to get the support of the allies against a Soviet threat.

This chapter dwells on the establishment and development dynamics of the Kemalist party in power and the Kemalist regime within the scope of the above-mentioned periods. The instruments of the tutelage system, the agenda for building a new nation,

and new agents/carriers of the Kemalist regime, which were established to render the tutelage system sustainable, will be analyzed in separate chapters. Therefore, this chapter will only focus on the political developments that enabled the Kemalist core to build a tutelary regime. It is necessary to analyze the developments of the four periods in chronological order to get a clear picture of the process of how the new state became authoritarian and how this authoritarianism was legitimized through tutelage.

3.1 Founding of the New State (1918-1923)

This stage is defined by Mustafa Kemal's joining the resistance movements and turning them into an organized national effort. As such, it will be examined under two sub sections as the period leading up to the founding of the parliament and after the parliament.

3.1.1 National Resistance Movement and Mustafa Kemal

Local independent resistance movements were popping up in different regions of Anatolia, in the form of congresses, long before Mustafa Kemal²⁹ and his circle made the move to Anatolia. In fact, in the seventeen months, immediately following the Mudros Armistice (October 30, 1918), until the establishment of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM, April 23rd, 1920), a total of twenty-four local and regional assemblies were held to mobilize resistance movements against occupation. Mustafa Kemal and his circle, attended only two of these twenty-four congresses—Erzurum and Sivas, and organized only one—Sivas. The determinative influence in the local congresses had been the CUP.³⁰ As soon as it became clear that the World War I was going to end with defeat, the incumbent Unionists began to prepare the

²⁹ Mustafa Kemal Ataturk has been known by many different names during his life and death. These names are often qualified with revering epithets such as Mustafa Kemal Pasha, The Honorable Veteran, and His Veteran Majesty etc. However, a critical discourse of recent history can only be possible when actors' names are purged from their adjectives. This thesis uses the name "Mustafa Kemal" for the period leading up to November 24, 1934. On this date, by the Last Name Reform Law, Mustafa Kemal was given the last name Ataturk. This dissertation observes this difference and uses Mustafa Kemal Ataturk for the period after the name change.

³⁰ For a more detailed work regarding the role of the members of the party of Union and Progress in the War of Independence, see Zürcher, 1984.

public bureaucracy and the local administrative forces they maintained relationships for a national struggle. For this reason, the organizers of many local and regional congresses are the Unionists. To the extent that the 164 of the 197 local offices of the most widely mobilized national resistance movement, the Society for the Right of Defense, (*Müdafaai Hukuk Cemiyeti*) boasted a Unionist structure.³¹ The local congresses that took place, before Mustafa Kemal assumed the national resistance leader status, demonstrates the existence of a national awakening and resistance movements already in progress when Mustafa Kemal and his close circle came to the stage (Tanör, 1992: 22–23).

More importantly, these local resistance movements were not initiated or mobilized by regional representatives of the military and administration, but by civilians, such as local business owners, merchants, local intellectuals and the clergy (Karpaz, 2007: 21; Tanör, 1992: 52–53; 1998: 228). The evolution of local grassroots resistance movements into a grand scale national resistance demonstrates that the struggle for independence was not ignited by a single hand, a single force mobilizing the people from the top, as it is often claimed, but rather that resistance movements simultaneously broke out in different regions. In his comprehensive study on the congresses, Tanör (1992: 123) argues that local congresses showed that independence was possible through democracy and they allowed local civic leaders to become part of local politics, instead of bureaucrats or the feudal figures of the region. A political alliance for independence between intellectuals, notables, landlords, and men of religion advanced the idea of national sovereignty. Tanör concludes that these congresses, precisely because of this, constitute an important part of the national inheritance.

Mustafa Kemal's efforts to unite local resistance movement in Anatolia under his command for national resistance begin with the Amasya Circular (June 22, 1919).

³¹ The Kemalist staff; due to their power in political and social fields and their effects in the War of Independence, saw members of CUP as a rival. They attempted to passivize the Unionists during the War of Independence and attempted to make their effects in the resistance to be forgotten. Unionists were not permitted to be included in the lists in the 1923 elections, which were extensively prepared upon Mustafa Kemal's initiative, and due to the elimination process applied after the 1926 İzmir Assassination trial, the last members of the Party of Union and Progress were discharged.

When Mustafa Kemal failed to secure a high ranking position in the Istanbul government which would allow him to contribute to the recovery efforts of the post-armistice period (Tanör, 2009: 42), he directed his efforts towards mobilizing and uniting fragmented resistance movements in Anatolia with his close circle including Ali Fuat Pasha (Cebesoy), Rauf Bey (Orbay), and Fethi Bey (Okyar), 1953: 29–41). Taking advantage of his appointment to Anatolia as a local administration inspector, he traveled to Amasya to meet with other high ranking military officers and civil bureaucrats who would join him in the efforts to mobilize a national independency war. The Amasya Circular was issued on June 22, 1919 as a result of deliberations with Ali Fuat Pasha, Refet (Bele), and Rauf Bey present in Amasya; Kazım Karabekir and Cemil Pasha contributing through telegraphs.³²

The Amasya Circular was significant not only because it determined a strategy and general principles of conduct for the resistance movement in order to reach the goal of national independence, but it also assigned military leadership to the national struggle. The core cadre, who got together in Amasya, collectively decided to mobilize resistance against occupation and became the determinative factor of the resistance movement both because of their vision of national self-determination and their bureaucratic-military influence. This change in leadership, precipitated by the Amasya Circular, led to the gradual decline of the Unionists' influence over the independence war (Shaw and Shaw, 1977: 343).

The second step on the ladder to leadership for Mustafa Kemal was the Erzurum Congress (July 23–August 7, 1919). Mustafa Kemal and Rauf Bey who attended the congress upon the invitation of delegates from local resistance movements in Trabzon and Rize, succeeded not only in gaining support for the Amasya Circular, but also getting Mustafa Kemal elected as the president of the Representative Committee, *Heyet-i Temsiliye*, which would serve as the de facto government for the

³² Mustafa Kemal, in the *Speech (Nutuk)*, explains comprehensively that; the strategy of national resistance, which was detailed in the Amasya Circular, was completely his own creation. The meeting was not held, Pashas referred to therein unwillingly provided support under his pressure (1968: 32–34). On the other hand, one of those Pashas, Ali Fuat Cebesoy states that the document certainly exists, which is not included in the *Speech*, but indicates that the meeting was held, relevant decisions were made in the meeting, and these decisions were given as a group (1953: 73–76).

next seven months, until the establishment of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (*Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi*, TBMM). The importance of the Erzurum Congress was three fold—it legitimized the Amasya Circular; the acceptance of the circular also carried the congress from being a local resistance to issuing a national call; and served as an initiation rite for Mustafa Kemal who as a result of it was approved by other high-ranking military officers as the new leader of the national movements. As a consequence of his efforts toward organizing the resistance movement in Anatolia, İstanbul government relieved him of his duties and thus Mustafa Kemal was deprived of his military status necessary to lead the resistance. Kazım Karabekir, at that point, by his pledge of allegiance to Mustafa Kemal without hesitation, once again cleared the path to Mustafa Kemal’s leadership.³³

After Erzurum, Mustafa Kemal and his circle organized the Sivas Congress (September 11, 1919), which is the most significant congress of the independence movement for two reasons. First, it marked a turning point in the struggle for independence. With the Sivas congress the process of local resistance movements evolving into a full force national struggle for independence was completed. Despite their aspirations to spread nationally, these local movements had not been able to mobilize with enough force to go beyond their territories until Mustafa Kemal and his cadre joined the resistance (Tanör, 1992: 57–58). When Mustafa Kemal and his

³³ Mustafa Kemal refers to the dismissal issue in the *Speech* but does not mention the developments, which provided the conditions enabling the continuation of the leadership of the resistance after dismissal. In the period in which the *Speech* was read; Mustafa Kemal’s discharging movement toward his friends from the political center seems to have paved the way that availability of his leadership was not referred to in the Congress. Lord Kinros dramatically explains Mustafa Kemal’s resignation, upon the support and suggestions of Kazım Karabekir, Rauf Bey, and Refet Pasha against İstanbul government’s calls for his appointment for another mission after coming back to İstanbul. “The ADC came into the room and said that Kazım Karabekir Pasha wanted to see him. There was a look in Mustafa Kemal’s eyes. He knew that the Ministry of War had offered his post to Kazım. He feared that after all he might now accept it. [...] Kazım entered the room with the air of an officer who confronts his superior. He greeted Mustafa Kemal with official respect, standing at attention and saluting. He said, ‘I have brought you the respects of my officers and men. You are still our honored commander, as you were in the past. I have brought your official carriage and cavalry escort. We are, all of us, at your orders, Pasha.’ Overcome with emotion, Mustafa Kemal swayed a little. He rubbed his eyes, as though awaking from a dream. Then he walked up to Kazım and hugged him, kissing him on both cheeks, thanking him many times over. [...] His position was now assured and his confidence restored. He had the military of the east securely behind him” (1990: 178). For another expression of this event, see Mango, 2007: 281-284.

cadre assumed leadership, these local resistance movements were suddenly transformed into military initiatives due to the cadre's military background and high ranks in the army. In fact, in the seven months following the Sivas Congress (September 11, 1919) until the first session of TBMM (April 23, 1920) all decisions for the nation were going to be made by the military—either by the representative committee, for which Mustafa Kemal was elected president, or a bigger committee in which actors with military backgrounds had the final say.

Second, it was at this congress that Mustafa Kemal and his circle rose to leadership with the endorsement of high ranking military officials. Sivas was the first and only congress assembled upon Mustafa Kemal's call. The attendance was scarce, indicating the lack of a popular base. The number of delegates attending the Congress was reported to have been 31 (Selek, 1973: 284) and 38 (Goloğlu, 2008a: 11–13). These figures indicated that the call issued in the Amasya Circular for a congress in Sivas (art. 2) failed to penetrate local movements. Due to low participation levels, Mustafa Kemal appointed his friends as delegates for regions not represented in the assembly at that time. As a result, the Sivas Congress became the congress in which military and civil bureaucracy had the most influence due to their high participation rates. Despite the low representation and participation rates, the congress, with the establishment of the Society for the Defense of Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia (*Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti*, ARMHC), took it for granted that the Sivas Congress and the ARMHC represented the whole nation, declared itself the only representative of the struggle for national independence, designated all local organizations as regional offices of the society, and announced that any opposition to the decisions of the congress would be considered “treason” (Art. 6) (Tanör, 2009: 187, 191).

The increasing influence of the Sivas Congress and its evolvement into the TBMM, despite the lack of representation and participation can be attributed to three factors. First, the resolutions of the Congress were the culmination a centralized national movement and determined the peoples' position in the national struggle despite the low participation. When Mustafa Kemal and his circle came along promising a vision of a centralized national resistance movement the local congresses had not been able

to achieve, both the people and Ottoman administrators did not hesitate to unite under Mustafa Kemal's command. Mustafa Kemal and his core group managed to convince both the Ottoman administrators and the people that the shared common goal was national self-determination. This determination and clarity achieved by the Congress resolutions were the most effective factor in the national struggle's success. Second, the military-bureaucracy characteristics of the delegates and the Representative Committee (*Heyet-i Temsilliye*), facilitated,³⁴ both the enforcement of the resolutions on the local public offices and the capacity to influence local civic leaders. Finally, the Amasya Protocol (October 20-22, 1919),³⁵ signed between the Istanbul government and Mustafa Kemal as a result of the Sivas Congress, officially recognized the national independence movement and increased the influence of Kemalist leadership. Mustafa Kemal, who had joined the national resistance when he attended the Amasya Congress as the most influential member of the military elite, had become a legitimate national leader with the Erzurum and Sivas Congresses (Tanör, 2009: 192–203).

3.1.2 The Question of the Political Regime

The resolutions issued by the Erzurum and Sivas Congresses (Art. 7/3) granted the Representative Committee elected to lead the war for independence in Erzurum—executive powers: “The Representative Committee [...] is authorized to take any military or political measures and enforce compliance with such measures, in order to maintain the unity of the homeland and gain independence of the nation” The main decision making body was actually the peoples' assembly that elected the committee and the Committee was liable to the people. However, since the Congress could not be held, the Committee de facto exercised power as the only authorized

³⁴ For the list of delegates who attended the Congress, including the 31 individuals, see Selek, 1973: 284. For Mustafa Kemal's list of Representative Board members, including 16 people in which Rauf Bey was Deputy Chairman, see Selek, 1973: 291.

³⁵ For broad information regarding decisions made and negotiations performed between Minister of Navy/Admiralty (*Bahriye Nazırı*) Salih Pasha and Mustafa Kemal, Rauf Bey and Bekir Sami Bey after a serial of negotiations and telegrams between the Representative Board in Anatolia and Ali Rıza Pasha Government, which was formed upon the fall of the Damat Ferit Government, see Selek, 1973: 298–313.

body during the War of Independence. The Representative Committee would function as de facto government during the seven-month period (September 11, 1919–April 23, 1920) until the establishment of TBMM (Tanör, 2009: 210–211). The Representative Committee was composed of 16 members (Art. 7/3). In the first three-month period (September 11–December 13, 1919), the Committee was held in Sivas almost every day and issued close to 500 resolutions. The number of people who issued these resolutions varied from four to eleven and the resolutions were published with Mustafa Kemal’s signature. Taking Karabekir’s warning that single signature on the documents could result in unwarranted criticisms into consideration; Mustafa Kemal began to sign the resolutions “Mustafa Kemal on behalf of the Representative Committee” (Tanör, 2009: 214).³⁶

In the last days of 1919, with Mustafa Kemal’s departure for Ankara, the Committee was down to four members, and due to the appointments of three members in various provinces, the Committee could not meet for a period of four months. During this time, Mustafa Kemal made all decisions alone. As a result, suspicions about Mustafa Kemal becoming the only authority or the sovereign were voiced. Thus, Kazım Karabekir often asked Mustafa Kemal, How and with whom he made the decisions (Goloğlu, 2010: 10–12). Mustafa Kemal began to consult members of the Committee and other military commanders by telegraph. The military-bureaucratic makeup of the committee and the addition of military consultants gave the administration a military bureaucracy characteristic. Therefore, during this period the leadership in the struggle for independence was de facto and de jure assumed by the military bureaucracy, which exercised its power to control local civil powers. In this bureaucratic structure, Mustafa Kemal, by the nature of his title as the president of the Committee, held the power both de facto and de jure, and rose to the status of the national leader.

Faced with the movement in Anatolia, the Ottoman administration decided to hold an election for the Chamber of Deputies in December 1919. Once the new Parliament,

³⁶ For the text of the telegram sent by Kazım Karabekir regarding the issue between Kazım Karabekir and Mustafa Kemal, see Atatürk, 1968: 997–998, Doc. 96. For the text of Mustafa Kemal’s reply and his approach against Kazım Karabekir’s warning, see Atatürk, 1968: 152–156.

composed mostly of ARMHC members approved the National Pact (*Misak-ı Milli*) (January 28, 1920), İstanbul was occupied (March 16, 1920) and the Parliament was dissolved (April 11, 1920). Upon Mustafa Kemal's call elections were renewed. New members and existing members of the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies came together on April 23, 1920 and established the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, TBMM. On April 24, Mustafa Kemal's opening address to TBMM which declared its establishment, its sovereignty, and working principles, was accepted as the first resolution of the Assembly. With this resolution, the superiority of the Parliament and its obligation to form a government were substantiated. It was additionally decided that the head of the Parliament would use authority as the head of the state and the sultan's status would be revisited in the future (Tanör, 1998: 234–236). Consequently, the Assembly became the sole body representing the national will and holding legislative and executive powers. With the establishment of the Independence Tribunals (*İstiklal Mahkemeleri*, September 11, 1920) and the appointment of its members by the Parliament, the Assembly also enjoyed judiciary power.

The diversity of the parliament members reflected the diversity of the people who had come together in the war for independence. The first parliament was composed of public administrators (23%), clergy (17%), military personnel (15%), lawyers (13%), tradesmen (12%), and farmers (6%) (Frey, 1965: 181). Moreover, during this period the local representation was also high with 62% of the parliamentarians being nominated from their hometowns (Frey, 1965: 187–188). These figures indicate that the national struggle had a democratic structure because, it not only represented a wide range of social and political groups but it also had deep ties with local groups. In that sense, the First Parliament was a mirror of the social groups that were supporting the national struggle. Despite the opposition of the İstanbul government; the need for weapons, money, and soldiers in the struggle against occupation, the existence of alternative methods towards independence, along with domestic uprisings, forced Mustafa Kemal and the military cadre with him to form alliances with various groups who had strong local ties (Oran, 1988: 92–97). After TBMM was convened, the national resistance movement regained its civilian status; however,

Mustafa Kemal and the military faction continued to be influential through his presidency of the Assembly and the Cabinet Council. Since the first days Mustafa Kemal had risen to the leading status in the War of Independence and resided over the Representative Committee, the parliament was sensitive to the concentration of power at Mustafa Kemal's hands. Their resistance to Mustafa Kemal's absorption of powers at the cost of excluding the parliament from the decision making process is the underlying reason beyond the tensions between Mustafa Kemal and the parliament that marked the first term of the Grand National Assembly.

The drafting of the Turkish Constitution of 1921 (*Teşkilat-ı Esasiye Kanunu*, TEK)³⁷ set a legal framework for all of these developments and tensions. At the end of long heated meetings,³⁸ it was agreed that the controversial issues would not be included in Constitution. Only articles that were unanimously agreed upon would be written (Özbudun, 2008: 49–50). The first constitution, TEK, which included the twenty four articles agreed upon unanimously, was drafted in order to meet the needs of the transition period. It was anticipated that this draft would not be adequate at certain points, in case of which, *Kanun-i Esasi*, the Ottoman Constitution of 1876, would apply.

The 1921 Constitution (TEK) first settled the disputes regarding the right of sovereignty, which was in force since the constitutional monarchy period (1876–1908), declaring the sovereignty of the people. The first article, “Sovereignty is vested in the nation without condition. The governmental system is based on the principle of self-determination and government by the people,” granted sovereignty to the nation and thus marked not only the abolition of the Sultanate but also the foundation of the Republic. The principle of national sovereignty, which was emphasized in the Amasya Circular as “the independence of the nation will be saved once more by the determination and decisiveness of the people” (Art. 3), and which was again emphasized by the goal to “establish the will of the nation as the sovereign

³⁷ For the complete text of the 1921 Constitution, see Kili and Gözübüyük, 2006: 105–108. For the value of the Constitution in the War of Independence and in the historiography of Turkish Constitution, see Özbudun, 2008; Tanör, 1998: 225–289.

³⁸ Negotiations cover the period between September 18, 1920–January 20, 1921.

power” (Art. 2) at the Erzurum and Sivas Congresses, was finally legitimized. The third article, “The Turkish State shall be governed by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey,” established this new state as the State of Turkey. As such the Turkish State was mentioned in the constitution almost two years before TBMM declared the end of Ottoman sovereignty.³⁹ By declaring, “The government of Turkey shall be known as the Government of the Grand National Assembly,” in the same article, it was adjudicated that the state would be governed by the parliament and a confrontation with the Sultanate and Caliphate was avoided. The consolidation of power principle was adopted in the second article, which stated, “Executive power and legislative responsibility shall only be vested in the Grand National Assembly, which is the sole and real representative of the nation.” Similarly, by adopting the principle of parliamentary government, the autonomy of the Cabinet Council and the possibility of the Cabinet Council to exercise power independent of the Parliament were limited.

The principles of national sovereignty and the representation of this sovereignty by the Assembly were overemphasized in the 1921 Constitution in these articles. The granting of these almost “dictatorial”⁴⁰ rights to the Assembly had other political justifications beyond the emphasis on establishing the will of the national as the sovereign power. In terms of ideological tendencies, the first Parliament enjoyed a pluralistic political representation. In addition to Unionists and their opposition, there were Kurdish, religious, conservative, leftist, and liberal members in the Parliament.⁴¹ The diversity of the first parliament led to the emergence of interest groups such as *Tesanüd*, *İstiklal*, *Islahat*, *Halk Zümresi*, and *the Society for the Defense of Rights* mentioned above (Atatürk, 1968: 594; Çavdar, 2008: 244; Demirel, 1994: 212–215; Sezgin, 1984: 18–19). Therefore, the underlying reason of the

³⁹ *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun İnkıraz Bulup Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Hükümeti Teşekkül Ettiğine Dair Heyeti Umumiye Kararı* (30 October 1922), Decision No: 307, (Kili and Gözübüyük, 2006: 111).

⁴⁰ During the Assembly negotiations of the 1924 Constitution, Ahmet Ağaoğlu states that; the Constitution “awarded to First Grand National Assembly the dictatorship law and it even announced itself the dictatorship law” (Gözübüyük and Sezgin, 1957: 368; Tanör, 1998: 261).

⁴¹ For more information on grouping in the Assembly and political tendencies of these factions, see Akın, 2001; Demirel, 1994; Güneş, 1985; Finefrock, 1979, and Sezgin, 1984.

overemphasis of TBMM's sovereignty and popular legitimacy was these factions' attempt to curtail Mustafa Kemal's power and authority. While Mustafa Kemal and his circle tried to hold first the Representative Committee during the war, then the Council of Ministers (*İcra Kurulu*) under their direct control, these internal factions by insisting on the primacy of the Assembly tried to curtail Mustafa Kemal's powers.

Towards the end of the independence war—which as described above was based on the coalition of diverse groups with numerous interests—tensions rose when important decisions had to be made, such as the abolition of the Sultanate, the Law of the Supreme Military Command (*Başkumandanlık Yasası*), and Lausanne negotiations. In this framework, the authority granted to the Grand National Assembly, namely the concept Assembly government and the principle of unity of powers while enabled Mustafa Kemal and his core circle to govern without confronting the Sultanate-Caliphate problem, gave some control to the interest groups, remnants of the wide base of the war, to curtail Mustafa Kemal's power. Without a doubt, Mustafa Kemal was the determinative actor of the Independence War by the nature of his duties as the head of the parliament, the head of the government, de facto head of the state, and commander in chief. Nonetheless, the opposition tried to restrain him by vesting the authority to appoint members to the Council of Ministers, obliging the council to consult the parliament and by restricting the length of the law of exception (Özbudun, 2008: 58–74).

Mustafa Kemal rendered all these restrictions useless during the War of Independence. Although TEK had not granted the Council of Ministers autonomy and held them liable to the Parliament by decree, the council debilitated the interest groups and assumed all executive powers de facto. In addition to executive power, the Council also took liberties with the judiciary. This is to say that 79.8% of all judiciary activities between April 23, 1920 and February 28, 1921, were proposed by the Council of Ministers, while only 20.25 % were proposed by the rest of the parliament (Özbudun, 2008: 72). As such, the Council not only violated article 8 of TEK, which stated, “The government of the Grand National Assembly exercises the executive function through ministers,” but also established its hegemony in the judiciary.

Mustafa Kemal increased his authority and power (both de facto and de jure) by not backing down from decisions even when faced with the majority, and even threatening with his influence over the military. Mustafa Kemal and the military commanders acted together at every critical turning point of the War of Independence from the Amasya Circular to the Erzurum-Sivas Congresses and the establishment of the Assembly. This alliance facilitated the leadership of the military personnel through their exercise of both civil and military powers during the war, and gave Mustafa Kemal advantage over other factions in the parliament in the case of opposition.⁴²

The manifestation of Mustafa Kemal intimidation of the opposition with his military support can be seen during the drafting of the Law of Supreme Military Command, its enactment and extension, as well as the discussions leading to the abolition of the Sultanate. The Law of Supreme Military Command meant consolidating judiciary and executive powers in one person. Following heated debates (Demirel, 1995: 260-301), the law was passed with an expiration date of three months (August 5, 1921) and the Assembly opposed every single proposal for the extension of the law after that. When, the third extension was rejected by the parliament due to strong opposition, Mustafa Kemal passed the extension by threatening with military action. The fourth extension, with no expiration date this time, easily passed the parliament (Özbudun, 1998: 276).

The process of the abolition of the Sultanate is another example that illustrates Mustafa Kemal's influence over the Assembly and how he obtained this influence when necessary. The ally states invited representatives from both the İstanbul and Ankara governments to the peace talks in Lausanne, which indicated that it was necessary to remove the confusion regarding the sovereign authority since both the Congress and TBMM were in effect. The Assembly took two successive decisions⁴³

⁴² This support shall continue until Mustafa Kemal's achievement for his discharging the opposition, afterwards internal separation of militarist elites shall exist.

⁴³ For the texts of *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun İnkıraz Bulup Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Teşekkül Ettğine Dair Heyet-i Umumiye Kararı*, which were dated 30 October 1922 and no. 307, and *Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisininin Hukuk-ı Hâkimiyet ve Hükümrânininin Mümessil-i Hakikisi Olduğuna Dair*

—it first declared that TBMM is the sole and real representative of the right to sovereignty and right to rule and the Ottoman Empire, which “relies on the sovereignty held by a single person,” no longer existed; however, “because the Republic of Turkey hosted the institution of the Caliphate,” TBMM was going to appoint one “academically and morally qualified and capable dynasty member” to the Caliphate belonging to the Ottoman.

The separation of the Caliphate and the abolition of the Sultanate provoked intense debates in the parliament. Mustafa Kemal addressed the parliament in a long speech and through examples from history of Islam and Turkey, he established that the caliphate was a separate institution and not attached to sultanate previously. He also declared that the existence of the parliament rendered the Sultanate meaningless. When he realized this bill would not pass the parliament, he threatened the members into passing the proposal.⁴⁴

Even with his great reputation and prestige among the military personnel, and his leadership in the committee and the parliament, Mustafa Kemal (1968: 594) had difficulty in gaining full support for his decisions during the war due to the coalition’s diversity. On May 10, 1921, he established *Defense of Rights Group of*

Heyet-i Umumiye Kararı, which dated 1–2 November 1922 and no. 308, see Kili and Gözübüyük (2006: 110–112).

⁴⁴ Mustafa Kemal conveys the case as follows: “It is evident that it would have been of no avail to expect a settlement of the question in the direction at which we were aiming from such a debate at this. I was perfectly certain about that. Finally, I asked the chairman of the mixed Committee for permission to speak, and, standing on the bench in front of me, I made this statement in a loud voice: ‘Gentlemen,’ I declared ‘neither the sovereignty nor the right to govern can be transferred by one person to anybody else by an academic debate. Sovereignty is acquired by force, by power and by violence. It was by violence that the sons of Osman acquired the power to rule over the Turkish nation and to maintain their rule for more than six centuries. It is now the nation that revolts against these usurpers, puts them in their place and actually carries on their sovereignty. This is an actual fact. It is no longer a question of knowing whether we want to leave this sovereignty in the hands of the nation or not. It is simply a question of stating a reality, something which is already an accomplished fact and which must be accepted unconditionally as such. And this must be done at any price. If those who are assembled here, the Assembly and everybody else would find this quite natural, it would be very appropriate from my point of view. Conversely, the reality will nevertheless be manifested in the necessary form, but in that event it is possible that some heads will be cut off.’ (...) ‘Pardon me’ responded Hoca Mustafa Efendi, deputy for Ankara, ‘we had regarded the question in another light. Now we are informed.’ The question was settled in the mixed Committee. The draft of the Act was quickly drawn up and was read on the same day in the second sitting of the Assembly.” (Atatürk, 1968: 690–691; 2008: 569–570).

Anatolia and Rumelia which was also called “the First Group.” Establishing this First Group meant that the war for independence and the parliament were now politicized (Kahraman, 2010: 20). Approximately two years later, those who were excluded from the First Group formed the *Second Defense of Rights Group of Anatolia and Rumelia*, in July of 1922.

Some sources attribute the contestation between the two groups to nature of the political regime and to the disagreement over whether the regime would include the sultanate and the caliphate (Sezgin, 1984: 53–54, 102–107; Tanör, 1998: 281). However, the dissent resulted mostly from the disagreements over the principle of ‘separation of powers’ and over the jurisdiction conflicts of the Parliament and the *Heyet-i Temsiliye* established with the Erzurum Congress (Demirel, 1994: 232, 241). Specifically, there was disagreement on the distribution of authority between the legislative and executive powers. The Second Group prioritized legislation and argued that the Parliament must hold control of the political instruments (Demirel, 1994: 36). The underlying reason of the contestations over the jurisdiction of the committee vs. parliament, or separation of powers vs. unity of powers, was the need to curtail Mustafa Kemal’s ‘single man’ status. In fact, the first resolution of the Second Group focused on the sovereignty of the parliament and prevention of personal sovereignty (Demirel, 1994: 398–401). Mustafa Kemal’s forcing the parliaments hand in order to pass the resolutions he wanted on the abolition of the Sultanate, the supreme military command and its extension led the opposition to emphasize the sovereignty of the Parliament against Mustafa Kemal’s personal power (Demirel, 1994: 260–301). By emphasizing the sovereignty of the Parliament against Mustafa Kemal’s personal power, the opposition argued that the nation would determine its own future through its representatives, not Mustafa Kemal (Mazıcı, 1984: 79–82).

The dissension, which was bracketed during the War due to the necessity of a wide base coalition, became more visible towards the end of the war when it was time to define the characteristics of the regime. Mustafa Kemal, who had not hesitated to make executive decisions in critical junctures during the War of Independence; was equally bold when he articulated the polarization in the parliament and announced

that he would establish the “People’s Party,” Halk Fırkası (December 6, 1922). Mustafa Kemal had anticipated that the Lausanne Accord would not be ratified by the parliament due to dissent (1968: 721; Tunçay, 1989: 49); thus, he called for early elections in order to neutralize the Second Group and to build a parliamentary composition that would comply with his demands (April 1, 1923). The conditions of the Lausanne accord did not satisfy any one but the Kemalist core; thus opposition in the Parliament grew. Mustafa Kemal failed to convince even his closest generals.⁴⁵ Therefore, he delayed the ratification of the accord until the second parliament. Despite the opposition of the Second Group, the first term of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey concluded with the passing of the amendment that qualified opposition to the assembly government and campaigning for the abolition of the sultanate as high treason *Hıyanet-i Vataniye Kanunu* (April 15, 1923).

⁴⁵ Rauf Bey informed Mustafa Kemal that he wished to preside over the Lausanne Committee and İsmet İnönü should also be taken as a military counselor. Mustafa Kemal sent İsmet Pasha to Lausanne as the Chief of the Committee (Atatürk, 1968: 768). Appointment of İsmet Pasha, who attended the War of Independence late, for the mission of Lausanne instead of Rauf Bey, who was always the second man near Mustafa Kemal as of the beginning of the War of Independence stressed Mustafa Kemal’s relation with his old commander friends. Since then, Rauf Bey entered into a tough struggle with İsmet İnönü, who has been considered the second man instead of him. During the Lausanne negotiations, the Chairman of the Committee of Ministers, Rauf Bey, inquired regarding İsmet Pasha’s performance in Lausanne. He did not appreciate his decisions, and did not congratulate İsmet Pasha after the Lausanne Agreement, but wrote a cold letter of congratulation upon the warning Mustafa Kemal made through Kazım Karabekir. Meanwhile, the Chairman of the Committee of Ministers, Rauf Bey, wanted to leave Ankara so that he could not meet İsmet İnönü, upon Mustafa Kemal’s laying down as a condition that he should resign from his duty, he abandoned the presidency of the Committee, and thus he did not congratulate İsmet İnönü. After Rauf Bey left the presidency, Ali Fuat Pasha, who substituted him, also resigned and became military inspector. Kazım Karabekir also resigned from the Assembly and became inspector. For the explanation of this process from Atatürk’s point of view, see 1968: 769-795. All along with this process, Mustafa Kemal’s support to İnönü further tensed the relation between Mustafa Kemal and the pashas. Kazım Karabekir conveyed to Mustafa Kemal that he wanted to be Chairman of the Delegation of Lausanne, but Atatürk said; “I cannot assign you as the head negotiator to the our peace delegation because you may act as you wish to do, I will send İsmet Pasha, he would take my advice” (Mumcu, 1990: 52). Within this context, Lausanne created a failure threshold between Mustafa Kemal and the pashas in terms of both the process and its consequences. Kazım Karabekir relates the Kemalist staff mentality such that ‘Islam is against the progresses and their policy against Islam with their secret promise given at Lausanne. When Karabekir asked İnönü why Mustafa Kemal was making speeches as a religious man during the War of Independence, but adopted a policy and expression against Islam after Lausanne, İnönü replied; ‘Hungarians and Bulgarians battled together against allied countries and although they were defeated they protected their independence because they were Christians; on the other hand, we have not been awarded independence as we are Muslim. We have been able to rescue today but as long as we remain Islamic colonist states, the English especially shall always be against us’ (Mumcu, 1990: 95-96).

To sum, the first Assembly witnessed strong opposition to Mustafa Kemal's leadership and the political regime he envisioned for the new state. During the War of Independence, Mustafa Kemal's strategy to win the war against occupation was to create a common working ground with diverse groups with differing interests. One way to establish such a coalition was to focus on common interests and postpone any controversial issue until the war was won. After victory, Mustafa Kemal, in order to increase his hold on the Assembly, declared his decision to form his own interest group. While this decision rendered the opposition and dissension in the first Assembly more visible, it gave Mustafa Kemal room to maneuver. During this period, the biggest disagreement was over Mustafa Kemal's tendency to establish his personal sovereignty, forcing the opposition to emphasize over and over again the primacy of the authority of the Parliament. In other words, the opposition against Mustafa Kemal's personal sovereignty resulted in the democratic characteristic of the 1921 Constitution. After the Assembly was established and the Lausanne Accord was signed, Mustafa Kemal's strategy was transformed from creating common grounds to eliminating any opposition that would stand in his path to the political regime he imagined and the new society he wanted to build. The primary reason for the new elections was this—eliminating the opposition. Mustafa Kemal by declaring that he was going to form his own political party declared that the new period's agenda was going to be set by political concerns. Nevertheless, although the elections allowed Mustafa Kemal to eliminate the Second Group opposition of the first Assembly, it was going to create an even stronger front for the opposition.

3.2 The Establishment of the Single-Party Regime (1923-1927)

With the end of the First Grand National Assembly's term, the most welcoming and inclusive period, both in terms of the political discourse and the social groups represented in the Parliament, had also ended. The new term would prove to be constrictive for both discourse and representation. The contradictions the first term harbored would be resolved by an authoritarian regime and secular-nationalist political program Mustafa Kemal implemented after having dispelled first the civil opposition and later the military elite he collaborated with in the first term.

Following the victory and the renewed elections, an entirely new era began under the leadership of the Kemalist core. The main characteristics of this era was the transformation of the religiously and ethnically pluralistic political discourse of the period between 1919 and 1923 and the political representation envisaged by this diversity into a nationalist secular political discourse, and an authoritarian regime fed by limited representation, in a short period. Essentially, the purpose of the elections was to eliminate both the Second Group and the Unionists who had the potential to oppose Mustafa Kemal, which was effectively achieved (Zürcher, 1991: 27–31). When the Parliament, which was dissolved in April 1923, was renewed by the general elections in June 1923, none of the members of the Second Group was reelected. Therefore, Mustafa Kemal organized the national struggle not only against occupying forces but also against the Ottoman government in İstanbul. In addition, he got rid of the pluralistic structure of local actors that he had formed alliances during the war. With the narrowing political representation and the dissolution of coalitions formed during the war, Mustafa Kemal was able to start the reform process with a parliament he personally put together.⁴⁶

The occupational distribution of the elected parliamentarians also indicates that Mustafa Kemal broke the old social alliances and formed a new alliance where bureaucratic-military groups dominated. Considering the occupational distribution of the 1920 and 1923 elections, the rate of public officials (23–25%) and lawyers (13–12%) enjoying high representation and farmers (6–6%) having a limited representation remained the same. On the other hand, a serious increase was witnessed in the rate of military elites (15–20%), and a serious decline in the number of clergy (17–7%) and tradesmen (12–7%) (Frey, 1965: 181). In terms of local representation, with 62%, the Parliament still had a high representation (Frey, 1965: 187–190). The first distinguishing characteristic of the second parliament was that the military elite had replaced the clergy in the seats. The change in the political representation witnessed in the composition of the Second Assembly (military-

⁴⁶ Mustafa Kemal Atatürk expresses his expectations for the Second Assembly, which was formed upon the renewal of elections: “I had intended to organize an assembly of a totally different character and endowed with other powers, and with it to overcome the successive stages of the revolution that I had in my mind” (1968: 425; 2008: 361).

bureaucratic alliance replaced the sociological one) is indicative of the political agenda of the new era. The broad-based sociological coalition required by the War of Independence had pushed the core group in Mustafa Kemal's leadership to use a religious and multicultural political discourse. After the war was won, the Sultanate abolished, and Parliament homogenized the need for the Kemalist core to rely on a broad based coalition and the pluralistic-Islamic discourse this coalition necessitated had disappeared.

The first task to be accomplished by the Second Assembly was to sign the Treaty of Lausanne, which verified the decisions of the National Pact (*Misak-i Milli*) except Mosul and Hatay (August 23, 1923).⁴⁷ The new state was, now, internationally recognized. The second task was the establishment of the People's Party (*Halk Fırkası*), as declared before the elections (October 23, 1923). In fact, ARMHC was transformed into People's Party (HF). This meant that a structure that organized the War of independence with the alliance of broad based social groups was transformed into a political party by Mustafa Kemal in order to disqualify the opposition and insert his own political agenda. Founding a new political party on the structure built by ARMHC made the new party not only the party that "founded the state" but it was also the party that "saved the nation." The founding of the People's Party on the pillars of ARMHC had another meaning beyond appropriating the prestige of an organization that was instrumental in winning the war. ARMHC was a coalition that represented all social segments in the country. Broadcasting the People's Party as a continuation of ARMHC gave Mustafa Kemal the opportunity to claim the People's Party represented the whole society. In fact, this symbolic meaning would later legitimize the Republican People Party's as the single-party regime. The third task following the proclamation of the Republic was the election of Mustafa Kemal as

⁴⁷ The Lausanne Agreement was one of the most significant decisive factors of conservative and secular social segment perceptions toward Kemalist staff. For the Conservative segment's perception of Lausanne, see Mısıroğlu, 1992, 2009, 2010. For works that appreciate the Lausanne Agreement, see Karacan, 1993; Bilsel, 1998. For a comprehensive reference on the Lausanne Agreement, see Budak, 2008. For telegrams of the Lausanne negotiations, see Şimşir, 1990. For minutes of the negotiations in the Lausanne Conference, see Meray, 2001.

President,⁴⁸ following a fabricated crisis⁴⁹ (Tunçay, 1989: 59–60). As such, not only the question of the political regime was resolved but the status of the head of the state was clarified.

The issue that was determinative of the political agenda of the second assembly was the institution of the Caliphate, which had become much more ambiguous following the abolition of the Sultanate and the proclamation of the Republic.⁵⁰ The 16-month-period from the abolition of the Sultanate (November 1, 1922) to the abolition of the Caliphate (March 4, 1924) witnessed the formation of different factions to fill the Caliphate's place in the political regime. Particularly, the absence of an official head of the state during the year between the abolition of the Sultanate and the proclamation of the Republic, before the abolition of the Caliphate, had caused the proponents to hope that the Caliphate would be given political authority. Thus, the abolition of the Caliphate had disappointed these factions and sharpened the lines that separated the opposition. The first manifestation of this is the dissolution of the coalition between the military elites. The factions among the military elite and the struggle for power had result in Mustafa Kemal completely dominating the political center.

3.2.1 Polarization of the Military-Bureaucratic Elite

The military elite who stood by Mustafa Kemal against the Second Group in the First Assembly began to grow uncomfortable with Mustafa Kemal's continuous attempts to monopolize the power. Mustafa Kemal had systematically eliminated the Second

⁴⁸ For the text of *Teşkilat-ı Esasiye Kanunu'nun Bazı Mevaddının Tavzihan Tadiline Dair Kanun and Reis-i Cumhuriyet derhal İntihabı Hakkında Heyet-i Umumiye Kararı*, which was made upon this Law, dated October 29, 1923 and no. 364, see Gözübüyük and Kili, 2006: 119–120.

⁴⁹ For the explanation of the crisis from Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's point of view, see Atatürk, 1968: 793–815.

⁵⁰ The reason why the Caliphate was not removed together with the Sultanate has been frequently discussed. There are reasons regarding both the domestic and foreign policy. In terms of domestic policy, the removal of Caliphate has been generally associated with secularism in literature and it is expressed that the society is not ready for this (Ortaylı, 2004: 263; Jaschke, 1972: 119). This comment can be extensively correct, but it seems that delay of the removal of the Caliphate also depends on the justifications that are born from foreign policy. During the Lausanne negotiations, the Caliphate was needed (Tunçay, 1989: 69); on the other hand, it was approved that both material and moral assistances, provided by significant Islamic states by associating with the Caliphate, should be continued (Jaschke, 1972: 119).

Group and the Unionists in the process of forming the state, alienated commanders with whom who fought the Independence War, and had started to consult with Fevzi Çakmak and İsmet İnönü when making decisions (Kahraman, 2010: 45–46). Rauf Orbay, Kazım Karabekir, and Ali Fuat Cebesoy, felt uncomfortable with this change of attitude, which in turn resulted in tension between Mustafa Kemal and the generals. The emergence of this tension on the eve of decisions that would determine the faith of the regime pushed Mustafa Kemal to make a move and the military characteristic of the opposition forced his hand to make this move on military grounds. In other words, contrary to the opposition in the First Parliament, actors who would come together under the framework of the Progressive Republican Party (*Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası, TpCF*) were the powerful commanders of the War of Independence. Thus the military that had not been resorted to in the political strife against the opposition in the First Assembly was going to be in the elimination of the opposition in the Second Assembly (Kayalı, 1994: 43). Considering that many members of the opposition were active commanders with influence on the military, would force Mustafa Kemal to fight for the elimination of this opposition on military grounds.

As such, the military was restructured on August 5, 1923 in a way that would lead to the departure of the powerful generals of the War from Ankara and the weakening of their influence on the military. Mustafa Kemal's aim in restructuring the military was to weaken the opposition that was sharply defined by the proclamation of the Republic and the abolition of the Caliphate on both the military and political grounds. The new military was composed of three inspectorships and nine military corps. Kazım Karabekir was appointed inspector of the First Army division to serve in Istanbul despite having been stationed in Ankara. Ali Fuat Cebesoy was appointed inspector of the Second Army division and was headquartered in Konya. Cevat Pasha who did not have much influence in the military for having made his career outside

the borders determined by the National Pact was appointed inspector of the Third Army division, which was headquartered in Diyarbakır (Özdağ, 2006: 47).⁵¹

The result of the expulsion of these pashas, who led the opposition against Mustafa Kemal, from the political center by way of appointments in other cities, was their effective exclusion from decision making process.⁵² The pashas, expelled from politics, were not able to rise within the army, either, for the rest of their careers. This can be attributed to the limits placed on the duties and authority of the inspectors. The new structure of the military, which was more inspectorship oriented than battle front oriented, limited the authority and duties of the inspectors to auditing the army division they were assigned to, and sending the audit report to the Chief of the General Staff (*Erkan-ı Harbiye-i Umumiye Reisi*). The inspectors were not only stripped from their commanding duties, but they were also limited by the Chief of General Staff's prerogative to perform their auditing duties. Therefore, a direct line of command was established between the Chief of the General Staff and the military commands that bypassed the inspectors (Bayramoğlu, 2004: 65–66).

The real intent behind the restructuring of the military in which Fevzi Çakmak, an ally to Mustafa Kemal, was assigned as the Chief of the General Staff holding vast powers and in which the opposition was exiled to inspectorships was to prevent the military commanders of the opposition to gain ground in the parliament. The prevention of the inspectors establishing direct command without the Chief's permission was intended to prevent them to use their influence in the army. In fact, the inspectors' requests for audits were rejected, their stipends cut, and their correspondence with the military command monitored (Cebesoy, 2007: 494–495). In the end, following the restructuring of the military and the appointment of the

⁵¹ According to Özdağ (2006: 47–48), the assignment of Karabekir as an Inspector to the First Military in charge of Ankara and West of it was a conscious decision. Karabekir was the commander of the eastern front during and after the War of the Independence. He knew the region well and he was popular there. For this reason, the assignment of Karabekir to the western part of Turkey was the result of a conscious strategy to render him inactive.

⁵² In fact, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk did not mention his intention or the plan in which the new regime would be a republic. Kazım Karabekir and Ali Fuat Pasha—who were appointed as inspectors—and Refet Pasha and Rauf Bey—who would take place together in the progressive Republican Party—learned about the foundation of the Republic later while they were away from Ankara (Kazım Pasha was in Trabzon, whereas other three persons were in İstanbul) (Özdağ, 2006: 47).

commanders as inspectors, the government consolidated its domination over the military and Mustafa Kemal successfully expelled all those who had the potential to become strong opponents.

3.2.2 The Formation of the Political Regime

Following this process, which eliminated the strongest opposition, a bill was passed in the Parliament on October 29, 1923 to name the new state a Republic and Mustafa Kemal, the president. Mustafa Kemal proclaimed the Republic by fabricating a government crisis at a time generals who had the potential to object were outside Ankara. He made a critical decision in proclaiming the Republic without informing high-ranking commanders with whom he organized the independence struggle, which was the first serious faction of the new era. Kazım Karabekir found out about the proclamation of the Republic only after he heard the cannons fired for celebration and expressed his irritation (Mumcu, 1990: 109). Ali Fuat Pasha, Refet Pasha, and Rauf Bey found out about the proclamation of the Republic while they were in İstanbul (Zürcher, 1992: 49). This increased their opposition to Mustafa Kemal and at times they voiced their discomfort about the way the Republic was proclaimed.⁵³

Following the proclamation of the Republic, heated debates on the institution of caliphate continued.⁵⁴ The conditions that necessitated the preservation of the

⁵³ Rauf Bey, in his statement published in *Vatan ve Tevhid-i Efkar* newspapers dated November 1, 1923, expressed that the Republic has been rushed (Cebesoy, 2007: 441). For the complete statement published in the *Vatan* newspaper, see Demirel and Korur, 2002: 23–30. Rauf Bey's statement made Mustafa Kemal and his friends very angry and the Party Group met on November 22, 1923 and held a comprehensive meeting. In the meeting; Rauf Bey, was questioned by various persons who took chair, thus Rauf Bey found the opportunity to state his complaints. Views set forth in the meeting displayed enlightening information on the reasons for the recent disputes between Mustafa Kemal and the Pashas. For the minutes of the meeting, see Demirel and Konur, 2002: 7–107. For Cebesoy's comments on the meeting, see Cebesoy, 2007: 446–453. Ali Fuat Pasha, after the decision, in a meeting in which he did not attend individually, implied that; upon his considerations putting forth that; for a decision made by 158 attendees in the Assembly, which totally includes 286 members could not meet a three thirds majority, the legal legitimacy of such an important decision on the faith of the regime is suspicious. For Cebesoy's approach toward the proclamation of the Republic, see Cebesoy, 2007: 437–446. Kazım Karabekir expressed his reaction against the process of the proclamation of the Republic with the following words; "No one informed me about anything to me although I was both a Deputy and the Military Commander. This situation rightfully troubled the military and the public" (Mumcu, 1990: 109). For the explanation of the process of the proclamation of the Republic by the witness of Mustafa Kemal, see Atatürk, 1968: 803–845.

⁵⁴ The hardening of the attitude against the caliph in such a manner meant that the environment was made ready for the removal of the Caliphate upon the proclamation of the Republic. Upon the

caliphate when the sultanate was abolished had changed. That there was no urgent need for support from domestic and external actors fed into the reemergence of the debate. A month before he made the decision about the Caliphate, Mustafa Kemal traveled to Izmir to meet with the press, members of the press and the universities in February 1924, both to measure the pulse about the issue and to find support. The nature of the groups from which Mustafa Kemal sought support also indicated the direction the quest for a new ally in the political center. It soon became clear that the grassroots coalition that was built from bottom up was going to be replaced with a new elite coalition composed of civilian intellectuals and military professionals. What Mustafa Kemal surmised from these meetings was that certain sections of the country were ready for the abolition of the Caliphate (Tunçay, 1989: 84–86; Turan, 2004: 241–245). The sociological coalition that was built from bottom to top during the War would be replaced with a new elite coalition composed of civilian intellectuals and military professionals.

The Caliphate was finally abolished on March 3, 1924.⁵⁵ The abolition of the caliphate served both as the beginning of a secular nationalist political agenda and triggered a polarization among the military elite into factions.⁵⁶ The political regime that had completed its process of institutionalization with the abolition of the caliphate following the abolition of the sultanate and the proclamation of the republic

discussions that took place in the press in relation to the Caliphate, Prime Minister İsmet Pasha, sent a telegram to Mustafa Kemal while he was in İzmir and said; he was sorry for the news published in the newspapers and Caliph Abdülmecit wished that the allowance for the Caliphate should be increased and official delegations coming to İstanbul should also visit him. Mustafa Kemal's reply to İsmet Pasha made clear his opinions about the Caliphate and the new decisions that would soon be made: "In his private life, and especially in his public appearances, the Caliph seems to follow the system of Sultans, his ancestors. [...] The Caliph himself and the whole world must know in a categorical manner that the Caliph and the office of the Caliph as they are now maintained and exist, have in reality neither a religious nor a political meaning nor any right to exist. The Turkish Republic cannot allow itself to be influenced by fallacies and cannot expose its independence and existence to danger. [...] The dignity of the Caliphate can have no other importance for us than that of a historical memory" (1968: 845–848; 2008: 673–674).

⁵⁵ For the complete text of the discussions in the RPP group meeting dated March 2, 1924, on three laws accepted in the Assembly on March 3, 1924, see Demirel and Konur, 2002: 393–483.

⁵⁶ Kazım Karabekir, while objecting directly to both the removal of the Caliphate and its type of removal, (2005: 249–250), Rauf Orbay and Ali Fuat Cebesoy added annotation that they were not against the removal of the Caliphate but they objected to the method of the removal of the Caliphate. Separation processes appeared among the military elite who had been directly effective on the instruments of the political regime and the determination of the military within the regime.

would continue on its path towards new alliances equipped with a new political discourse. After the institutionalization was completed with amendments to the 1921 constitution, the drafting of a new constitution began on March 9. Mustafa Kemal had rejected Rauf Orbay's proposal to delay the proclamation of the republic to the second constitution discussions on purpose (Kahraman, 2010: 47–48). He intended to address the need for a new constitution only after institutions that would pose as obstacles to his vision of the constitution. The first three articles of the Turkish Constitution of April 20, 1924,⁵⁷ defined the regime, the role of Islam in the state, and the principle of sovereignty: “The Turkish State is a Republic” (Art. 1), “The religion of the Turkish State is Islam” (Art. 2), “Sovereignty belongs to the nation without any restriction” (Art. 3).

The Constitution of 1924 differed from the Constitution of 1921 on two points. First, the Constitution of 1921, reflecting the needs of the Kemalist core to form coalitions with diverse social factions during the war, emphasized Islam as the common ground and did not give any credence to nationalism based on Turkishness. The 1924 Constitution is the harbinger of a new sense of nationalism that replaced Islam with Turkishness, born out of the need of the Kemalist core to form coalitions with different social factions after their victory. The new legislations, which would be accelerated immediately after the drafting of the new constitution, would no longer take Islam as the basis of unity of the nation and Turkishness would become the new definition of citizenship. The constitution describes the official language as Turkish (Art. 2), describes the name of Turk (Art. 88), and addresses itself to “Turk” rather than Islam.

Second, although the 1924 Constitution carried over the source of legitimacy from the 1921 constitution, the way sovereignty was applied had changed. “The governmental system is based on the principle of self-determination and government by the people,” (Art. 1) provision of the Constitution of 1921 had granted all authority to the Parliament and prescribed a parliamentary government. The

⁵⁷ For the full text of the Constitution dated April 20, 1924 and no. 491, see Kili and Gözübüyük, 2000: 127-151.

justification for the excessive authority granted to the Parliament was to prevent the accumulation of power in one center. This was a direct articulation of fear of Mustafa Kemal's visible intentions to become the sovereign authority. This article was not included in the Constitution of 1924. When Vehbi Bey, member of the parliament representing Karesi, asked why this article was removed, the answer was the country would be governed by the Council of Ministers (Gözübüyük and Sezgin, 1957: 101).

Nevertheless, the Parliament continued to defend its authority against the displacement of the executive and the authority they wanted to be granted to the President through the Constitution. During the discussions on the Constitution, the Parliament resisted the executive authority to be vested in the President and Mustafa Kemal was forced to make concessions to the parliament.⁵⁸ The resistance in the parliament was mainly concerned with the national sovereignty principles. Based on this principle, the Assembly insisted on the unity of power and the primacy of the Parliament. Even though it granted more authority to the executive and the president than what was granted in the Constitution of 1921, in this framework, the Constitution of 1924 preserved the unity of power and adopted the separation of duties principle (Kahraman, 2010: 47).⁵⁹

⁵⁸ Due to the discussions in the Assembly, compared to the proposal of the Commission, some examples restricting the authority of the president and executive power are as follows; (Gözübüyük and Sezgin, 1957; Tanör, 1998: 291–293; Tunçay, 1989: 89–90): Authority for the termination of the Assembly, although for presidency besides the Grand National Assembly, has been rejected (Art. 25). Although the term of office of the president was suggested to be seven years, it was limited by a single election term (Art. 31). Although they wanted the presidency to be awarded the capacity of commander in chief, it was accepted that this should be awarded to the Grand National Assembly and should be represented by the presidency (Art. 40). Although it was considered satisfactory that the political opinion of the cabinet to be formed by the prime minister who has been selected by the president shall be adequate, it was stipulated that a vote of confidence should be provided by the Assembly (Art. 44). Although the Government decided for the proclamation of stage of siege and it was proposed to be submitted for the approval of the Assembly when it functions in its regular process if it is not open, it was decided that the Assembly should be immediately called for a meeting and the period can be either extended or shortened if required (Art. 86).

⁵⁹ However, despite the emphasis of the Assembly government performed in the 1921 Constitution, similar to the Executive Board, which has used the initiative and kept the Assembly out of function; resistance shown by the Assembly against the executive power and president in the 1924 Constitution, shall become meaningless following the enactment of Law on the Maintenance of Order and the government shall collect the powers.

3.2.3 The Unmaking of the Political Center

Although numerous opposition groups emerged during the first year of the Second Assembly, especially on the discussions for the 1924 Constitution, they remained within the confines of the People's Party. Meanwhile, the friction between the government faction led by Mustafa Kemal and the other faction led by Rauf Bey, Kazım Karabekir, and Ali Fuat Cebesoy increased daily. Commanders leading the opposition believed Mustafa Kemal had been trying to establish personal power; and that if an authoritarian political system were founded, they would be excluded from the new established order. Appointments with the restructuring of the military, the proclamation of the Republic, the law that regulates the military-political relations, the way the Caliphate was abolished, and the debates on the Constitution of 1924 all widened the gap between the regime and the opposition. Consequently, a parliamentary proposal on population exchange policies discussed in the Parliament (October 20, 1924) cut all ties between the factions.

In fact, this polarization into factions happened ten months late. Before the Caliphate was abolished and the Constitution of 1924 was enacted, in December 1923, Mustafa Kemal made the Parliament pass a law that would force the members of the opposition to choose one identity—military or political. This was done as a means to reduce the influence of the generals in the opposition. The law that banned military personnel from serving in the parliament without leaving their military posts aimed both to cut the military support of the opposition in the parliament and to lessen the influence of military commanders of the opposition on active forces.⁶⁰ The law decreed that those who held both positions would not be allowed to be run in the upcoming elections and would not be able to participate in parliamentary meetings during the term in session. As such, commanders such as Kazım Karabekir, Ali Fuat Pasha, and Cevat Pasha, who held both positions (commander and member of the Parliament), were forced to give up their position as parliamentarians.

⁶⁰ For the Law no. 385 of "*Türkiye Büyük Millet meclisine intihab edilen ve edilecek olan bilimum mensubu askeriyyenin tabii olacakları şeriat hakkında kanun*," see *Kavanin Mecmuası*, vol. 2, Term. 2, p. 172. For the explanation of the meaning of the Law for the political environment of the relevant period, see Özdağ, 2006: 48–50, 81–87.

It took ten months for the leading figures of the opposition to decide on what to do in response to these moves. Karabekir and Cebesoy preferred politics and submitted their resignation to Fevzi Pasha with a difference of four days in October 1924.⁶¹ Two weeks later (November 17, 1924), the Progressive Republican Party (*Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası*, TpCF)⁶², under the leadership of Kazım Karabekir, was formed.⁶³ Thirty-two parliamentarians who left the Republican Party joined TpCF, such as Ali Fuat Cebesoy as the secretary general, Rauf Orbay and Adnan Adıvar as deputy party leaders, Refet Bele and Cafer Eğilmez as members of the party (Zürcher, 1995: 245).

Even though they held second and third positions in the military hierarchy, Karabekir and Cebesoy had realized that they would not have any influence on the military considering their posts and duties. Realizing they were being alienated from politics, not being consulted on critical issues, they decided to carry out their political struggle in an organized fashion. These resignations, which Mustafa Kemal dubbed “timid conspiracy” (1968: 852–856),⁶⁴ were in reality the enactment of the decision to carry their political struggle into the parliament by the pashas who had lost their influence with their inspectorship appointments (Özdağ, 2006: 56).

⁶¹ For Mustafa Kemal’s point of view and expression on the resignations of pashas and how he managed the political consequences of the political consequences of the resignations, which he considers as a conspiracy, see Atatürk, 1968: 852–863. Explanation of facts regarding the pashas’ resignation from their military duties and first hand establishing a party can be followed from the following resources; Cebesoy, 2007: 494–508; Karabekir, 2005a: 310–320.

⁶² For some comprehensive works regarding the Progressive Republican Party, see Ateş, 1994; Yeşil, 2002; Zürcher, 1991.

⁶³ Learning that the name of the party to be established (Progressive Republican Party) shall include the verbiage of “Republic”, People’s Party was disturbed as the opposition party which was considered not tolerated the republic regime used a name including “Republic,” although the name of the founder of the republic does not include the word; “Republic.” Within this framework, upon a decision made in the PP group meeting on November 10, 1924, the name of the party was changed to “Republican People’s Party,” thus, received the prestige of having the name “Republic” from the opposition’s hand.

⁶⁴ For the evaluation of the factualness of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s concern, see: Hale, 1996: 73–75; Özdağ, 2006: 48–62.

When the military commanders in TpCF opted to stay in politics instead of their military posts, Mustafa Kemal demanded that commanders,⁶⁵ who he believed were allies, opt for politics as well.⁶⁶ Those that refused to comply were relieved of their military post. Mustafa Kemal's demand for these commanders to choose politics was related to his concerns that the oppositions' resignations had been part of a conspiracy, the need to prevent the strengthening of opposition in the military and to increase his own influence over the military (Kayalı, 1994: 45–46). Thus, military member politicians who stood with Mustafa Kemal were not really given any choice on the matter. Consequently, following the resignation of the generals and the appointment of loyal commanders to the vacated posts effectively purged the military of any commander with the potential to rival Mustafa Kemal (Tunçay, 1989: 113). This was not enough for Mustafa Kemal to believe he was free of rivals. The continued opposition of the former commanders in the parliament made Mustafa Kemal uncomfortable even with his preventative measures.

Even though the TpCF emphasized that it differed from the CHF in certain points, such as democracy, liberalism, decentralization, and piety, in its founding declaration,⁶⁷ charter (*Beyanname*),⁶⁸ and Program;⁶⁹ the essence of its difference from the CHF was the claim that the CHF became oligarchical and the allegation that Mustafa Kemal was constructing a personal sovereignty (Kahraman, 2010: 49–58). It is possible to interpret the emphasis on democracy within the Party, the thought that holding a single-stage election is essential for democracy and the necessity to emphasize that the president must be above the parties as discomfort from Mustafa

⁶⁵ For the list of commanders from whom Mustafa Kemal Atatürk called for the resignation of deputyships and the expression of their replies from the first person, see Atatürk, 1968: 856–860.

⁶⁶ The Third Military Commander Cevat Pasha and the Seventh Corps Commander Cafer Tayyar Pasha rejected Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's wish and preferred deputyship, but afterwards they were convinced by Atatürk and returned to their former duties and commandship; however, Atatürk worried as they hesitated initially and preferred to disconnect their relations with the military (Atatürk, 1968: 858–860).

⁶⁷ For the complete text of the petition, see Yeşil, 2002: 439–440.

⁶⁸ For the complete text of the statement, see Yeşil, 2002: 443–445. Zürcher, 1992: 167-169.

⁶⁹ For the complete text of the program, see: Yeşil, 2002: 446–453; Zürcher, 1991: 138-146.

Kemal's personal domination and the authoritarian structure of the current political system.

In this framework, the TpCF was more disturbed by the practice of the political regime than its quality (the abolition of the Sultanate, the proclamation of the Republic). They were opposed not to the proclamation of the Republic but to the way it was proclaimed. Indeed, they thought they had supported Mustafa Kemal since the beginning of the War of Independence but Mustafa Kemal did not appreciate their contributions in the War after victory and instead made his decisions by consulting İsmet İnönü and Fevzi Çakmak who were latecomers to the resistance movement. Rauf Bey's address to the Party when the CHF wanted him to defend the his interview, published in *Tanin*, in which he expressed his irritation that the Republic was proclaimed while they were out of town (Demirel and Konur, 2002: 393–483); the memoirs of Ali Fuat Pasha (2007: 437–446) and Kazım Karabekir (2005a) demonstrate they were not opposed to the proclamation of the Republic. What they did oppose was the regime's becoming increasingly authoritarian, the fait accompli nature of the proclamation and their exclusion from the process. As such, it is not possible to identify the opposing generals as religious-conservative as it was later claimed in the official discourse of the Republican People's Party. On the contrary, Kazım Karabekir had thought Mustafa Kemal's religious discourse during the War was rather excessive,⁷⁰ found it necessary to modernize and Turkify Islam and the madrasas,⁷¹ and felt uncomfortable with the number of clergy in First Parliament.⁷² As such, the generals who came together under the Progressive Republican Party established an organized opposition and forced Mustafa Kemal, with whom they agreed on many political issues, to work with them (Özdağ, 2006: 60–61).

⁷⁰ Kazım Karabekir expresses his reaction against Mustafa Kemal's speech in Balıkesir with the following words: "We suffered a lot as we put world affairs into mosques? Why do we put our national affairs into mosques [...] The Turkish nation needs regeneration and we can achieve this by experts. Not by mosques and not by conservatives" (Mumcu, 1990: 76).

⁷¹ "Old style schools, religious schools should not exist. Our religion and books should be rescued from the Arabic and Persian veneer" (Mumcu, 1990: 67).

⁷² "I consider it very important that; in the election after the formation of peace, relevant measures should be taken against the inclusion of some conservatives into the Assembly instead of valuable persons" (Mumcu, 1990: 48).

3.2.4 The Regime Becomes Authoritarian

The Law on the Maintenance of Order (*Takrir-i Sükun*), was passed as a reaction to the rising opposition, both within and outside the parliament, to the authoritarian and secular political programs Mustafa Kemal and his core group was enforcing via legislative and executive practices. Three days after the establishment of the TpCF, the prime minister of the time, İsmet İnönü, asked the parliament to declare martial law and resigned when his demand was rejected (November 21, 1924). Even though Mustafa Kemal supported İsmet Pasha's demand for martial law in the name of strengthening the executive branch by indicating, "Religious reactionarism has the risk of counter-revolution," he failed to get support from the parliamentary group and accepted a government change with the statement, "I smell gun powder and blood. I hope I am the one who is mistaken" (Tunçay, 1989: 105–106). Following the resignation of İsmet Pasha, Mustafa Kemal assigned the task of forming the cabinet to Fethi (Okyar) Bey, who was known to be reconciliatory (November 21, 1924–March 2, 1925), in order to prevent the factions in the CHF from deepening⁷³ (Tunçay 1989: 137).

Many of the military and civilian actors who had been on Mustafa Kemal's side since the beginning of the national independence struggle who had the potential to rival him, or who believed they were on par with him, were united in the TpCF⁷⁴ (Rustow, 1959: 548). The biggest obstacle to the single party regime was this group who were carrying out an organized opposition within the political context. The Sheikh Said Revolt, which broke out in 1925 (February 13–May 31, 1925), gave the CHF a chance to purge the political from the opposition. Following the revolt, Mustafa Kemal withdrew his support from Fethi Bey because he found his precautions not strict enough and assigned the task of building the government, once

⁷³ Tunçay (1989: 137) expresses that although he resigned from the mission of the Prime Ministry, this relief is a temporary measure as İsmet Pasha continues his mission of RPP Deputy Chairman.

⁷⁴ Kayalı (1994: 48–49) expresses that Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's sensitivity toward the consistence of Free Republican Party leadership staff from the civil people is sourced from his concern about the military identifications of those who established the Progressive Republican Party.

again, to İsmet Pasha (March 4, 1925).⁷⁵ İsmet Pasha reclaimed his position as the prime minister and passed the Law on the Maintenance of Order (*Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu*)⁷⁶ which included harsher measures than the state of exception rejected by the parliament which had caused his resignation. He also passed the bill to establish two Independence Tribunals (*İstiklal Mahkemeleri*)⁷⁷ one in the region where the revolt had broken out and one in Ankara (Tunçay, 1989: 139).

The TpCF expressed its opposition, through Karabekir and Orbay's addresses to the Parliament, to certain issues, such as the enactment of the Law in the whole country when the revolt had been regional was regional, the fact that the government was vested with powers to decide on such a Law without asking the Parliament for its approval, and that the Independence Tribunals violated constitutional freedoms. Because the Law had the potential to render the political center authoritarian, it provoked heated debates in the Parliament;⁷⁸ however, it was enacted despite the opposition on March 4, 1925.

The Law on the Maintenance of Order, which was in effect for two years (Art. 2), granted the authority to prevent any attempt that could disturb the peace, to the government with the consent of the president or to Independence Tribunals with the direction of the government (Art. 1). Independence Tribunals, in the region where the revolt broke out were, were exempted from the consent of the Parliament in any decision, including death penalties, in virtue of the urgency of the situation while death penalty decisions, which were taken by the Court in Ankara was subject to the

⁷⁵ Making a 10-hour speech in the meeting—that continued for 12 hours—resulted in the fall of the Fethi Bey government, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk said; “The nation needs assistance.” “Those who initiated the revolution shall complete it,” and gave signs of a new authoritative period (Tunçay, 1989: 139).

⁷⁶ For the text of *Takrir-i Sükûn Kanunu* (Law on the Maintenance of Order) dated March 4, 1925 and no. 589, see Yeşil, 2002: 463; Tunçay, 1989: 139–140.

⁷⁷ For the text of *Harekât-ı askeriye muntıkasında ve Ankara’da birer İstiklal Mahkemesi teşkili hakkında Heyet-i Umumiye Kararı* dated March 4, 1925 and no. 117, see Tunçay, 1989: 139. For more detailed sources on Independence Tribunals, see Aybars, 1975; Kılıç Ali, 1955; Nedim, 1993; Olgun, 1990.

⁷⁸ Rauf Bey and Kazım Karabekir indicated that Şeyh Sait Rebel did not endanger the whole country and it is not correct to act as if a rebellion that started in a specific area exists in the whole country (Yeşil, 2002: 310–312). For discussions in the Assembly regarding the Law, see Göldaş, 1997; Tunçay, 1989: 139–140.

consent of the Parliament. The Law on the Maintenance of Order and the Independence Tribunals⁷⁹ enacted following the Sheikh Said Revolt not only bypassed the Parliament but also enabled Mustafa Kemal to suppress his opponents and any institution or person that could potentially oppose him (Tokluoğlu, 1995: 242; Hunt and Tokluoğlu, 2002: 622).⁸⁰ The government's decision to establish the Ankara Independence Tribunals with jurisdiction in regions other than the region of the revolts was intended to suppress the resistance to reforms as well as the political opposition. It was directed toward suppressing both the current and potential social and political opposition.

The first effect of the enactment of the Law was the suppression of the press. Only a day after the law was enacted the members of the İstanbul press were silenced regardless of their ideological positions (March 6, 1925). The *Tevhid-i Efkâr*, *İstiklal*, *Son Telgraf*, *Aydınlık*, *Orak Çekiç*, *Sebilurreşat*, and *Tanin* newspapers were all closed; many of the journalists of the time were arrested by the East Independence Tribunal on charges of indirectly provoking the revolt (Tunçay, 1989: 142–143). The trial process of the journalists exemplified the government's control over the Independence Tribunals and how the tribunals were turned into instrument of domination at the hands of Mustafa Kemal and İsmet Pasha. In order to provide a justification for these arrests, the Tribunal committee offered Sheikh Said a plea bargain to reduce his sentence on the condition that he stated that he was influenced by certain journalists' ideas. İsmet Pasha convinced the tribunal judges that the sentences delivered would only increase their prestige. The sentenced journalists were also instructed to send telegraphs to Mustafa Kemal in supplication and the ones who did so were released (Tunçay, 1989: 143–145).

⁷⁹ Selection of members for the Independence Tribunals in which Progressive Party members and some part of the RPP members did not attend (March 7, 1925) was performed in difficulty to reach the majority in the Assembly (Tunçay, 1989: 141–142).

⁸⁰ İsmet Pasha, during the removal of the Independence Courts (March 2, 1927) in his speech in the Assembly, stated that the meaning of the enactment of the law on the maintenance of the order and formation of Independence Tribunals, "The most important part of the case we experienced two years ago was not *Şeyh Said* rebellion. The main danger was the confusion and instability that existed in the country. [...] The mentioned disorder was created by degenerate intellectuals with minor ambitions" (Tunçay, 1989: 138).

Another application of the Law and the Courts was to suppress any opposition in the Parliament. Following the establishment of the TpCF, İsmet Pasha had demanded martial law even when there had been no revolt that could be used to justify the state of exception. In addition, Mustafa Kemal had not hesitated to show his discomfort with the establishment of TpCF. Both Mustafa Kemal and Ismet Pasha utilized all of their powers and authorities in order to exclude TpCF from the parliament.⁸¹ When members of TpCF were associated with the cases being tried in the Independence Tribunals,⁸² the government seized the opportunity to shut down TpCF under the Law on the Maintenance of Order (June 3, 1925). At first, on May 25, 1925, the East Independence Tribunal closed the regional offices of TpCF with the justification that they provoked disorder in the society through exploitation of religion (Tunçay, 1989: 146; Yeşil, 2002: 366–376). The remaining offices of TpCF were closed by the government with a law decree⁸³ issued on June 3, 1925 (Tunçay, 1989: 147; Yeşil, 2002: 385; Zürcher, 1991: 91). The decree, first, detailed the decisions taken by the tribunals concerning the regional offices and members of the TpCF; then stated that the provision “to respect the ideas and religious beliefs” included in the TpCF’s charter provoked reactionarism. Finally, the decree underlining the “legal legitimacy ground” provided by the tribunal decisions and the article in TpCF’s charter that was

⁸¹ Government; before resolving to close the Progressive Party by the East Independence Tribunal and its legal decision, claimed Progressive Party leaders to terminate the party though Fethi Okyar, the prime minister of the period, but as Karabekir rejected this offer, the Progressive Party was closed accordingly. Ali Fuat Cebesoy describes what he remembers of the situation; (2007: 542–543): “Fethi Bey accepted me in his office in the afternoon on February 25, 1925 and indicated that; I have been assigned to convey to you that you should discharge your party. If you do not, I see the future extremely terrible. Blood shall spill. Karabekir Pasha—we are allowed to form a party within the scope of the law. However, discharging it is not something we are allowed to do. You are the government. You have power and instruments. If you wish to discharge our party as soon as possible, you can do it. Fethi Bey—I am sorry as I talk to you in this manner. As you know, I am against all kinds of actions with martial law. I am afraid to be in the minority.” In fact, Fethi Bey shall be in the minority and resign on March 3, 1923 to be substituted by the İnönü government. Upon this change, the government shall close the Progressive Party by using its forces and instruments addressed by Karabekir.

⁸² Primarily, the Eastern Independence Tribunal committed the retired Lieutenant Colonel who was Urfa Clerk to prison for five years due to the accusation of provocation of rebellion, and closed all Progressive Party branches in its field under his responsibility on May 25, 1925. Similarly, the Ankara Independence Tribunal accused two members of the Progressive Party with using religion with political aims in Istanbul, initiated an inquiry; and declared that the principle for “respect to religious thought and beliefs” included in the Party’s program has been proved to provoke bigotry, thus called the government to take the necessary action (Tunçay, 1989: 146–147).

⁸³ For the text of the Decree, see Cebesoy, 2007: 561–562.

deemed to “provoke reactionarism” program, declared that the government would not tolerate the activities of the TpCF in the name of protecting citizens from deception and provocation. In this way, the link between the purging of opposition from the political center and protection of the people from harmful ideas was established in accordance with the tutelary frame of thought.

The accusation of opposition with provoking reactionarism attributed an “enlightenment” mission to the single party regime. The elimination of opposition by accusations of provoking reactionarism is only one manifestation of the political language in the new era. Even though the ethnic dimension of the Sheikh Said Revolt was taken into consideration in practice, it was evaluated as a reactionary attempt in discourse. The impact of Kurds’ forced assimilation into Turkishness was ignored in the discourse on the revolt, and the impact of opposition to the secularist western reforms was emphasized. After that, any time an opposition emerged such as the Free Republican Party (*Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası, SCF*), the single party administration was going to resort to this language and eliminate the threat justified by its “enlightenment mission.” The closure of the TpCF after the press was suppressed allowed Mustafa Kemal to become the only determinative decision maker of the political order. The single party regime had become possible in a parliament completely purged of any opposition and politics was deprived of any political competition.

In addition to suppressing the press and the opposition within the Parliament, the Tribunals, until their annulment, were also used in suppressing social reaction to the reforms. When the reaction to the successive reforms such as the Hat Law (*Şapka Kanunu*, November 25, 1925) and the closure of dervish lodges (*tekke ve zaviyeler*, November 30, 1925), the Ankara Independence Tribunal served as a circuit court in order to suppress the unrest in various regions of the country (Tunçay, 1989: 158). After any remnants of opposition was purged via Izmir Assassination case heard by the Ankara Independence Tribunal,⁸⁴ as it will be discussed below, and after Seyh Said case was heard by the East Independence Tribunal, the power and jurisdiction

⁸⁴ For the minutes of the Ankara Independence Tribunal see: Ilıkan and Ilıkan, 2005; Nedim, 1993.

of the tribunals were annulled (Tunçay, 1989: 149–168).⁸⁵ Although their power and jurisdiction were rescinded in 1927 after they completed their mission of purging the opposition, the Courts were kept legally active until May 4, 1949 (Tunçay, 1989: 167–168).

3.2.5 Purging of the Opposition from the Political: The İzmir Assassination

Following the closure of the Progressive Republican Party (TpCF), Mustafa Kemal's stripping of this opponents' first their military status, then their political status did not end the conflict. Mustafa Kemal's last strategy to eliminate all generals of the opposition was to indicate them in the assassination attempt against him, which was revealed before his visit to Izmir in July 1926. Zürcher draws attention to a crucial detail in the implication of the Republican Party members in the assassination attempt. According to Zürcher, the decree of the council of ministers dated June 3, 1925 closed the central and regional offices of the TpCF but its legal status of the party remained. In this framework, during the 1925–1926 legislative years, TBMM group of the TpCF consisting of 21 members continued to function and practiced their right to veto the government by block votes (1991: 92). Therefore, the TpCF members were not only symbolic but also a de facto danger for the CHF.

In literature, there is a consensus that the Independence Court had indicated all people who opposed or had the potential to oppose Mustafa Kemal in addition to those who were involved in the assassination conspiracy (Hale, 1996: 75–76; Kayalı, 1994: 51–53; Özdağ, 2006: 77–81; Tunçay, 1981: 161–168; Zürcher, 1991: 93–94). The İzmir assassination⁸⁶ gave Mustafa Kemal the opportunity to eliminate his opponents and jump-started the process of politically disabling all groups who sided with the opposition between the years of 1923 and 1926. Up to that point, three groups had the audacity to carry out an organized opposition to Mustafa Kemal—the

⁸⁵ Although the court was actually kept closed, it remained legally effective until May 4, 1949 in case of need. The Law on The Maintenance of Order remained effective for two more years after the Court (Tunçay, 1989: 149–168).

⁸⁶ For more detailed references on the İzmir assassination, see Şahin, 2005. For the explanation of the İzmir assassination from Mustafa Kemal's point of view, see Atatürk, 1968: 893-894. For the explanation of the İzmir assassination from Kazım Karabekir and Cebesoy's point of view, see Karabekir, 2005b; Cebesoy, 2007: 595-624.

Unionist Wing during the National Struggle, the Second Group in the first parliament, and the TpCF in the second parliament. Members of these three wings were arrested and tried.⁸⁷ In this way, not only the existing opposition was eliminated, but they were made examples for any potential opposition in the future. Afterwards, the leaders of the TpCF left the political arena for a long time. Even though the generals came back to politics during the last years of Mustafa Kemal upon his invitation and during the İnönü era, they failed to be politically effective.

To sum, the İzmir assassination proceedings resolved the problem of opposition completely for Mustafa Kemal. The opposition had given up on politics in general. In fact, Orbay rejected İnönü's offer to establish a separate party twenty years later when the multi-party regime was adopted (Kayalı, 1994: 56). Therefore, Mustafa Kemal not only got rid of his opponents in both military and politics but he also became the sole sovereign of the political center.

3.3 Consolidation of the Single-Party Regime (1927-1938)

As discussed above, the most fundamental changes of the Republic's history took place during the second term of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (1923-1927). The three developments that signaled the establishment of the regime were the proclamation of the Republic (October 29, 1923), the abolition of the Caliphate (October 3, 1924), and the Constitution of 1924 (April 20, 1924). The most significant developments that signaled the influence of the political party in power were the enactment of the Law on the Maintenance of Order (March 4, 1925), which granted the government the right to bypass the Parliament, the establishment of Independence Courts, which facilitated the suppression of rebellions and any opposition from the public (March 4, 1925), and the elimination of all of the opposition from the political center following the İzmir Assassination (1926). While there was an ongoing power struggle to dominate the political order, decisive efforts

⁸⁷ Cebesoy explains the function of the Court for the İzmir assassination as below: "Independence Tribunal's real engagement within sixteen, seventeen months was that its foundation was to remove the members of the opposition, individuals remaining outside the struggle for power or members of old and new parties and societies, rather than works regarding the assassination. Those who have been able to defect in the People's Party could get out of a scrape." (2007: 616-617).

were made through policies toward secularity and nationalism in order to build a new nation.

Until 1924, the focus was on political reforms outlining the legal and institutional framework of the new regime and after 1924, the focus was on the reform process toward building a Westernist-secular social and cultural structure. The Law on the Maintenance of Order and the Independence Tribunals had been instrumental both in suppressing the resistance against reforms and in the victory of the Kemalist core in the battle to dominate the political center. During this time, which could be called the founding period of the political regime, the military bureaucracy stood with the Kemalist administration both in the power struggle between the military elite and in suppressing the social resistance caused by the policies toward building a new nation. Military's support of Mustafa Kemal and his policies during the shaping of the regime and the political had increased the military bureaucracy's influence and importance.

To sum, in the second Parliament, the Kemalist core faction and the Kemalist regime were defined, the political center was purged from the opposition and radical political and cultural-social reforms were initiated. The period to follow would witness the emergence of a new elite that would be instrumental in bringing the reforms to fruition. In this period, the regime would be named Kemalism, the principles of Kemalism would be defined, the single party regime would be institutionalized and Kemalism would be legitimized by the constitution and become the main reference in governing the country. The new period began with the renewal of TBMM in 1927, the second convention of the CHP, and Mustafa Kemal's three day long address of the congress, *Nutuk*. In other words, when *Nutuk* put an end to the establishment period of the political regime and the power, a new period—namely the institutionalization period, began. It was during this institutionalization period that the regime was named Kemalism and the single-party regime started to gain permanence. Especially after the Free Republican Party trial failed, the Kemalist core changed its strategy, and the CHF began to intervene in every aspect of the political, economic, cultural, and social spheres.

3.3.1 The Institutionalization of the Republican People's Party (CHF)

The first significant development of the third period was the transfer of the power to determine the members of the parliament and to execute elections from the Party Council (*Fırka Divanı*) to the president of the party (*Umumi Reis*) with an amendment to article 26 of the 1923⁸⁸ charter of Republican People's Party (CHF), immediately after the call for new elections. With this amendment the power to select members of the parliament was concentrated in a single person, the party leader, rather than the large committee consisting of ministers, the administrative committee of the party (*Parti Umumi İdare Heyeti*), and the administrative committee of the Parliament (*Meclis İdare Heyeti*) (Art. 20) it rested with previously. The CHP was the only party participating in the elections and the election were based on a two tiered system. In the elections where only CHF took part, the parliamentarians appointed by Mustafa Kemal were approved by the second electorate (*müntehib-i sani*) (Öz, 1992: 100).

Following the elections, the Second Convention of the CHF was held on October 15, 1927. This convention was significant for two reasons: first, *Nutuk* delivered by Mustafa Kemal attached a historical importance to the convention. Second, on the path to the single party regime, steps towards centralization and authoritarianization were taken. The first step on this path was the downsizing of the decision-making center of the party. As stated above, the authority to select members of the parliament and to execute the electoral system were vested in the Party Council (*Fırka Divanı*) with the 1923 charter of the Party. This authority was reassigned to the Chairmanship Council (*Riyaset Divanı*) with the article 23 of the 1927 Charter. The Party Council was turned into an advisory body responsible only for internal party issues such as the enforcement of the party charter (Art. 26). The Chairmanship Council was composed of the Chairman, the Vice President, and the General Secretary (Art. 21) of the Party. The CHF Group was obligated unconditionally to execute the decisions made by the Chairmanship Council (Art. 22). The concentration of power in a council of three members rather than the larger and more

⁸⁸ For the 1923 Regulation of the People's Party, see Tunçay, 1989: 362-369.

participatory board, fortified the hierarchical structure of the Party, centralized the decision-making mechanism, and effectively removed the participatory characteristic of the party.

Another development reflective of the tendency toward centralization was the reduction in the frequency of the party conventions. The 1923 charter of the party had held that the convention would meet annually (Art. 8), which in reality was not carried out with any regularity. The 1927 convention held that a general convention would only be held every four years (Art. 10). Moreover, Party membership was made contingent on the sponsoring of the candidate by at least two existing members. Despite the opposition on grounds that it isolated the party from popular participation and transformed it into an elitist institution, the article was accepted. Another development that facilitated the institutionalization of the single party regime and single party regime's control of civil society was the authority granted to party inspectors to have a say in the management of all civil society organizations. The principles of republicanism, populism and nationalism, which would later become the founding principles of Kemalism, were written into the first article of the 1927 charter as the core characteristics of the CHF. This was an important step towards solidifying the CHF ideology and systemization of Kemalism.

The sixth article of the charter declared Mustafa Kemal the chairman and the founder of the CHF and the seventh article made the sixth article unchangeable.⁸⁹ The charter of the second convention of the People's Republican Party proved to be an important instrument in facilitating its institutionalization as a centralized, authoritarian, elitist organization which legitimized its rule over the people with the presumed need for

⁸⁹ In the first Regulation of the People's Party, it was declared that the Chairman shall be elected by the Congress (Art. 5). In the 1927 Regulation of the Party, Mustafa Kemal was declared as the Chairman and the founder of the Party in the sixth article, while in the seventh article it was written that the first six articles should not be amended. Accordingly, it was seen that Kemal's position in the Party would not change. In the following Regulations, his status would be directly declared. The 1931 Regulation and the 1935 Regulation would mention Mustafa Kemal as the "eternal chairman" (Art. 2) and the "permanent chairman" (*değişmez genel başkan*) of the Party (Art. 2) relatively. In the Extraordinary Congress held in 1938 following the death of Atatürk, Atatürk was defined as the Eternal Chairman (Art. 2), while İnönü became the non-amendable Chairman (Art. 3). The non-amendable chairmanship of the Party would be terminated following an amendment (Art. 4) made in the Second Extraordinary Congress of the Party, which was held in 1946.

tutelage (Öz, 1992: 99–100). This convention assembled at the end of a process that eliminated all opposition with potential to carry on the political struggle for power served as a model for future conventions with the resolutions it passed towards making CHP a centralized and authoritarian mechanism. The resolutions passed in this convention were going to be adopted in future conventions reinforcing the tendency to centralize and become authoritarian. As such, the authoritarian governing of the political and social sphere promoted by the law on the Maintenance of Order was reflected in the structure and functioning of the party and laid the ground for the tutelary regime.

3.3.2 The Free Republican Party (SCF) Experience

The most significant development influencing the ideological, political, and economic life in the new era was the establishment of the Free Republican Party (*Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası*, SCF).⁹⁰ The SCF experience reminded the Kemalist core the need to institutionalize the regime and to promote representative actors to defend and develop their values and principles. In order to achieve this objective an authoritarian-totalitarian regime was adopted. Five years after the Progressive Republican Party experience and three years after the Law on the Maintenance of Order and Independence Courts were annulled because it was believed that political arena was purged from all opposition, Mustafa Kemal was convinced of the necessity of a new political party. After having debilitated all opposition with potential to become strong contenders in the struggle for power, Mustafa Kemal started to articulate the necessity of a new party. Mustafa Kemal's wish to appeal to the Western democratic countries (Tunçay, 1989: 245–246), the increasing dissatisfaction with the government after the Great Depression of 1929 (Aydemir, 1966, III: 379–381; Koçak, 2006: 628; Tunçay, 1989: 246), and the increase in bureaucracy in the party administration (Aydemir, 1966, III: 386) were cited among the reasons for this heart of change. Mustafa Kemal's wish to shift the balance of power in the Party (Karaosmanoğlu, 1968: 101; Us, 1964: 133–134) by promoting a

⁹⁰ For comprehensive studies on the Free Republican Party, see Emrence, 2006; Koçak, 2006; Weiker, 1973; Yetkin, 1998.

contender to İnönü and his belief in the necessity of the multi-party system were mentioned (Weiker, 1973: 55; Yetkin, 2004: 45). The reasons cited above, as well as the developments after the establishment of SCF, indicate that an opposition party was needed to legitimize CHF and to ensure the wellbeing of its members. SCF served its purpose well. In fact, Tunçay (1989: 247) argued Mustafa Kemal needed the SCF not because he thought it would be beneficial to the country but because he thought that it would strengthen CHF and the Kemalist core. Regardless of which one of the above mentioned reasons proved to be most influential, Kemal believed the establishment of an opposing party towards the mid-1930s would benefit the party.

Turkey's Ambassador to France in Paris, Ali Fethi (Okyar) Bey, was offered the leadership of the opposition party during a visit with Mustafa Kemal, in which İsmet Pasha was also present, at the end of July 1930, in Yalova. Mustafa Kemal offered the position with the following words:

Today, what we see is pretty much a dictatorship. In reality, there is a parliament. However, people both inside and outside the country consider us as dictators... However, I did not proclaim the Republic for personal interests. We are not eternal. After I die, the system that I will leave behind is an institution of despotism. However, I do not want to bequeath despotism to the nation and to make history accordingly. We will face up to all difficulties. I have trust in your friendship, morality, and knowledge. What matters is that the Republic becomes deeply rooted without being dependent on the life of individuals. You must undertake this mission (Okyar, 1980: 392–393).

When Fethi Bey expressed his concerns that it would be difficult for the government to tolerate any competition in a political culture where the government was accustomed to being the only power for years; Mustafa Kemal and İsmet Pasha both agreed that they would assist him (1980: 394–395). Attending the meeting later on, Kazım (Özalp) Pasha, the Chairman of TBMM of that era stated that the opposition would also please the Western public. Fethi Bey further agreed that an Independent Opposition Group (*Müstakil Muhalif Grup*) within the Party would be better in the beginning; however, Mustafa Kemal stated that İsmet Pasha did not welcome this

idea (1980: 396–397).⁹¹ Nonetheless, Mustafa Kemal insisted on the establishment of an independent party and stated that the Party must politically position itself to the left of the CHF opposing any party that would position itself to the right. He also stated that previously eliminated opposition, even Kazım Karabekir Pasha and Refet Pasha, could participate in this Party, which would position itself to the left of the CHF (1980: 400–402). When Fethi Bey failed to convince Mustafa Kemal to establish a faction within the Party, he accepted the offer to establish a party on the condition that Kemal remain impartial (Okyar, 1980: 409).⁹² Kemal assured them that he would be impartial (Okyar, 1980: 409); however, he wanted Fethi Okyar to address him as President and Chairman of the CHF in his correspondence⁹³ (Okyar, 1980: 414). Kemal's insistence showed his loyalty to CHF. Moreover, it also indicated that he did not really consider the Free Republican Party as a viable option to replace CHF. In other words, his insistence on being the Chairman of the CHF indicates that he envisaged the Free Republican Party as an opposition party that would rejuvenate CHF rather than a party that had potential to actually govern the country.

After the decision was made to establish the party, the number of parliamentarians to be transferred to the Party from CHF was debated and İsmet Pasha promised to transfer 40–50 parliamentarians to the Free Republican Party. In the 1931 elections the number and the positions of the members that would be transferred to SCF were

⁹¹ İsmet Pasha found it more acceptable to establish an opposition outside the party rather than establishing an internal group that would disturb the harmony within the party. The opposition outside the party would contribute to the harmony within the party and strengthen the RPP. Besides, it would be easily closed when it grew as it would be closed in 99 days. A group within the party would on the other hand harm the harmony within the party. İsmet Pasha also convinced Mustafa Kemal of this idea. This idea indicates that the internal balances and welfare of the RPP were of greater priority than the welfare of the regime with regard to the establishment of an opposition party.

⁹² The Free Republican Party, just like the Progressive Republican Party, wanted to grant Mustafa Kemal with a supra-political position and compete with İsmet Pasha. As a result, both parties opposed İsmet Pasha not Mustafa Kemal. However, Mustafa Kemal opposed the demand of both parties (he had opposed more strongly to the Progressive Republican Party) and preferred to identify himself with the RPP rather than taking a supra-political position. In this framework, Fethi Bey offered Mustafa Kemal the Presidency in order to enable him to identify with the RPP and to remain impartial in the competition between the Free Republican Party and the RPP (Okyar, 1980: 432–433).

⁹³ Ahmet Ağaoğlu, who was one of the founders of the party, claims that the letters of both Fethi Bey and Mustafa Kemal were written in a process, which was detailed, devised by Mustafa Kemal, İsmet Pasha, and Fethi Bey, and written by İnönü himself (Ağaoğlu, 1994: 30–31).

discussed, and when İsmet Pasha and Fethi Bey disagreed on the number, Mustafa Kemal settled the dispute at 70 members (Okyar, 1980: 416, 483). Nevertheless, despite İsmet Pasha's promise of 40-50 members, the Free Republican Party was not only limited to fifteen parliamentarians, but it would not survive in the parliament until the elections (Tunçay, 1989: 258).

That Mustafa Kemal formed the Free Republican Party, personally electing all personnel from its chair to its founding members and determining from its program to its discourse within the context of a certain strategy rendered the ideological identity of the SCF significant. The most determining characteristics of the founding members were that they were civilian with liberal tendencies and they were close to Mustafa Kemal. These characteristics defined both the limitations and the role it assigned to the opposition. It is important to underline that the founding members were all civilian without exception. Kayalı (1994: 48–49) argues that the reason behind Mustafa Kemal's insistence on civilian founders was his experience with the Progressive Republican Party, TpCF. Even though five years had passed since the TpCF experience and military had seized control, Mustafa Kemal still found it risky to have people with a military background in the new party. The liberal identity of the founders necessarily determined the political and ideological path of a party that would oppose the statist characteristic of the party in power. In other words, the only acceptable opposition to the authoritarian and statist practices of the CHP was possible through a liberal political-economic program. Moreover, the liberal character of the party in opposition was beneficial in that it could be used to test the social reaction to the CHP's statist policies, which were bound to become even more radical. The purpose of the selection of members from Mustafa Kemal's close circle was both to prevent the opposition from developing political ideologies outside the parliament's realm, and to assuage Fethi Bey's concerns about the establishment of this party. Mustafa Kemal, by appointing his sister and his close friend Nuri Conker as founding members, tried to ease Fethi Bey's hesitation to stand in opposition to him and took precautions against the opposition party's branching out and becoming independent.

The Free Republican Party was officially established on August 12, 1930. The new party differed from the CHF in two respects. The first was the way in which the CHF governed the country while the second was the economic policies of the new party. In this sense, SCF supported liberty in both politics and economy. This can be gathered from the correspondence between Fethi Bey⁹⁴ and Mustafa Kemal, the Party Charter,⁹⁵ and the Party Program.⁹⁶ Encouraged by Mustafa Kemal's support, Fethi Bey directed harsh criticism towards the CHF administration within these documents. Although the SCF agreed on the principles of the political regime envisaged by the CHF, it opposed the way this political regime was put into force by CHF. In other words, SCF was loyal to CHF's westernization project carried out by way of secularism and nationalism, particularly owning up the secularism principle.⁹⁷ In his letters, Fethi Bey emphasized "the deficiencies of the CHF in judiciary and in domestic, foreign policies." He also underlined the lack of criticism within the Parliament by arguing, "Because party members hesitate to criticize their Council, there isn't much discussion in the National Assembly."

The first four articles of the party charter of SCF were dedicated to the political principles and freedoms adopted by the Party. The fourth article counted the freedom of conscience, freedom of expression and association, freedom of trade, the mechanism of checks and balances and the right of the people to local administrations among the fundamental principles on which the party was established. In the program, loyalty to secularism and constitutional freedoms were emphasized and a resolution to the bureaucratic problems, as well as a single tiered electoral system, was promised. This is to say, principles on free trade and economy

⁹⁴ Fethi Bey's letter was published in the newspaper dated August 11, while Mustafa Kemal's reply was published on August 12. For the full text of the letters, see Ağaoğlu, 1994: 31–35; Yetkin, 1998: 255–258.

⁹⁵ For the full text of the Regulation, see Yetkin, 1998: 261–269.

⁹⁶ For the full text of the Program, see Yetkin, 1998: 259–260.

⁹⁷ Loyalty to the secularism principle was particularly emphasized in all of the documents including the letters. In fact, Mustafa Kemal first tells the position and importance of the opposition and then states that "unity on secularism principle" is necessary for both Parties in his reply to Fethi Bey. The principle of secularism is also written in the name of the Party in the regulation. According to the Regulation, the name of the party is written as "Liberal, Secular, and Republican Party." Throughout the Regulation, the Party is mentioned with its abbreviation as SLCF (the Turkish abbreviation for *Serbest, Layik ve Cumhuriyet Fırkası*).

occupied a bigger percentage of the party documents than the principles of the political regime.

In reality, the essence of SCF's criticism of CHF was on its economic policies. In his letter to Mustafa Kemal, Fethi Bey wrote, "The economic depression influenced Turkey more deeply than other countries in the world because of the (wrong) fiscal and economic policies which had been in effect for the last five years." Similarly, after having defined the political principles in the first four articles, the fifth article of the charter based its definition of liberty in economy on the principle, "to remove obstacles to the development of both large and small economic enterprises and organizations," and "to prevent interventions that violate the control limits the state is responsible for." In the fifth article of the Program, state intervention was limited to cases "when the power of the individuals are limited," and emphasized that any intervention in fiscal and economic enterprises had to be avoided. The second article promised that "taxes would be affordable" while the sixth article announced that peasants were to be saved from usury and provided with low-interest credits.

With its views on the political regime and economy, the SCF had the potential to carry out a liberal opposition contrary to the statist and authoritarian practices of the CHF.⁹⁸ The structure of the SCF, ideologies of its founders and its program were designed to prevent SCF from posing a serious threat to the political agenda of the CHF. The founding members did not have any military-bureaucratic character that could disrupt the balance of powers. SCF was composed of civilian people who were known for their loyalty to Mustafa Kemal. Although SCF did not oppose CHF in either the fundamental principles of the regime or the Party's ideal to build a new society, it did oppose its economic policies and the way the power mechanism functioned. Nevertheless, despite all measures taken to prevent any disruption of

⁹⁸ However, the interesting thing is that while the Free Republican Party was arguing economic liberalization and limited state intervention, the Republican People's Party defined itself as statist even though it did not follow any statist policy at that period (Kahraman, 2010: 80). Considering the liberal orientation of SCF, which was developed by Mustafa Kemal and İsmet İnönü, it appears that they decided RPP would have a statist orientation and they assigned the SCF as the opposition to the etatism. Ağaoğlu notes that there was no reference to RPP's etatism until İnönü's famous speech in Sivas. Although the party was established before the speech, he claims that the party declared its statist orientation in this speech. Ağaoğlu argues, "We need to admit that the ones who assigned the newly established party as 'liberal' also named the old party as 'statist'" (1994: 42).

power and to construct a controlled opposition, SCF did not bring the desired results. This was primarily because SCF wanted to carry out a real opposition and found popular support in a short frame of time. These went beyond founding purposes of SCF. Faced with the insistence of SCF to carry out real opposition and the increasing popular support, Mustafa Kemal and the administrators of CHF put an end to SCF.

Mustafa Kemal had not anticipated the popular support SCF would receive in a short period. In fact, believing that SCF would not find any support in the popular base, he had decided to reserve a number of seats for SCF in the 1931 elections. Faced with the unexpected rise of SCF, the central and regional administrators of the CHF began to show concern and adopted exclusionist attitudes rather than friendly towards SCF. Another factor in the change of attitudes towards SCF was Fethi Bey's declaration of his candidacy as a contender to power, shortly after the establishment of the party. İnönü and the administrators of CHF were irritated by Okyar's candidacy as a contender and his intentions to actually win the elections (Okyar, 1980: 474–475, 507–508). The strong reaction of the party administrators to SCF's intent to come to power is telling of the reasons behind the founding of the opposition party. SCF was not supposed to act like a real party in opposition and contend for power by carrying out effective opposition to CHF. Because SCF neither grasped nor consented to its role it presented a real threat to the CHP (Barutçu, 1977: 285; Karaosmanoğlu, 1968: 105; Okyar, 1980: 377–547; Öz, 1992: 105; Us, 1964: 142; Yetkin, 1998: 229–244). In fact, Kemal expressed his irritation with Fethi Bey's rush to seize the power as follows:

You are trying to seize the power in just a few months. You are impatient. If you oust the ones in power today and seize the power, will you be able to keep the security and peace in the country? At first, you must guarantee this (Cited in Us, 1964: 142).

In this trial run for the multi-party system, in which SCF was cast as the satellite party and CHF as the hegemony, SCF was prevented from any opportunity to actually become a real contender in the race both in theory and in praxis. The duty assigned to SCF was to legitimize CHF in a fabricated electoral system in which CHF would remain in power forever (Özbudun, 2011: 95). By not accepting to play

second to CHF's hegemony, SCF became a threat to the administration of CHF and consequently ceased to exist.

The second reason SCF fell from grace was the popular support it found which became clear in SCF's Izmir meeting. The number of people gathered in the Izmir meeting,⁹⁹ the enthusiasm and outburst of the people frightened both Mustafa Kemal and İsmet Pasha.¹⁰⁰ Mustafa Kemal consequently made Yunus Nadi publish an article addressing him in *Cumhuriyet* and invite him to explain his continuing ties with CHF. Following this article, Mustafa Kemal declared that he was still the Chairman of CHF and he added that he would not give up this position (Ağaoğlu, 1994: 74–76; Okyar, 1980: 502–503).

The popular support to the new opposition became apparent once again in the local elections held in October 1930.¹⁰¹ In the elections held for 502 mayoralties, the SCF participated in the elections of 37 provinces and won in forty electoral districts including two urban centers (Samsun and İçel) (Emrence, 2006: 183–184). The SCF was particularly successful in Western Anatolia (65%) and Marmara (22, 5%), including Thrace. SCF was organized and their efforts to dispense political propaganda proved successful. These regions differed from the rest of the electoral districts both in their high population of immigrants and the high impact of the economic crisis. This indicates that the economic discourse of SCF had found popular support (Emrence, 2006: 184–185; Kahraman, 2010: 83). Furthermore, SCF also nominated Rum, Armenian, and Jewish candidates, and they received additional support from these groups (Bali, 1997: 25–34; Emrence, 2006: 194–195). The elections took place with the intervention of the bureaucracy on behalf of CHF,¹⁰²

⁹⁹ Izmir had a population of 150,000 and Tuncay (1989: 266) argues that there were 50,000 people rallied for the meeting of the Free Republican Party while Mango (1999: 472) claims that there were 100,000 people in the meeting.

¹⁰⁰ According to Karpat (1963: 58), Mustafa Kemal said, “We were standing on powder kegs and did not know it,” when he was informed about the size of the SCF's meeting in Izmir and the public's enthusiasm toward the meeting. For the full text reports on the Izmir meeting, which were written by the Secretary-General of RPP and by the governor of Izmir Kazım Dirik, see Koçak, 2006: 211–223.

¹⁰¹ For a study, which includes the official documents on how the SCF and RPP prepared for the local elections, see Koçak, 2006: 224–342.

¹⁰² Regarding the interference of the bureaucracy to the elections, Ağaoğlu claims (1994: 187): “The order that ‘In any case and whatever happens, RPP would win the elections was carried out exactly

(Emrence, 2006: 173–180) combined with a smear campaign of alleged corruption in SCF by CHF (Emrence, 2006: 164–173).

Fethi Bey proposed a motion for vote of confidence on November 15, 1930 based on the allegations of corruption for the Minister of the Interior, Şükrü Kaya. The vote of confidence for the Minister passed with exception of ten votes. During the debates in the Parliament, the government accused the Free Republican Party of provoking reactionary groups while Fethi Bey stated that economic reasons lied behind the peoples' dissatisfaction, and that CHP deliberately misrepresents this economic dissatisfaction as a political issue (Emrence, 2006: 187–188). Fethi Bey, concerned about the picture emerging from the debates in the parliament and CHP's intentions to attribute the social unrest to reactionarism, feared from Mustafa Kemal's wrath and closed SCF on November 17, 1930. Fethi Bey based his decision for the closure, in a letter addressed to the Ministry of the Interior, previously read and approved by Mustafa Kemal and Istemet Pasha, on the possibility of having to face "his veteran Excellency" (*Gazi Hazretleri*), on the political arena (Ağaoğlu, 1994: 116–117; Okyar, 1980: 528).¹⁰³

The SCF had carried out a successful opposition campaign on the economic platform in a country under authoritarian rule. Specifically, at a time when reforms were shaped by the political and cultural vision of the administration, SCF ran an opposition campaign on the mistakes made by the government's economic policies without shifting its political discourse to anything more than ordinary daily political

and RPP won the elections by a ninety percent victory. Now, inspectors, provincial and district governors, police, and the gendarmerie would all be justifiably proud." The dialogue between H. R. Soyak and Mustafa Kemal indicate that Mustafa Kemal was aware of the significant role of the bureaucracy in the election victory of RPP. Soyak argues, "The arguments and complaints of the liberals were not totally fiction and Mustafa Kemal knew this fact. One day when I was talking about the results of the elections, which were mostly on behalf of RPP, he asked me 'Which party is winning the elections?'; and when I said 'Our party (RPP) my Pasha, for sure', he laughed and said 'No actually, not at all! Let me tell you which party is winning; the winner of the elections is the party of the bureaucracy (*idare firkası*), which means gendarmerie, police, provincial, district and local governors. You should know that.'" (Soyak, 2004: 418)

¹⁰³ For the full text of Fethi Bey's letter, which explains the reasons for the party closure, see Okyar, 1980: 528. In Fethi Bey's memories (*Üç Devirde Bir Adam*), the parts in which he discusses the Free Republican Party (1980: 377-547) are good examples of disappointment with Atatürk's neutrality promise. Fethi Bey sometimes indecisively criticizes İsmet Pasha, sometimes remonstrates with Atatürk, and sometimes blames himself as he naively believed in this promise.

incidents, and brought an undeniable dynamism to the political arena. The SCF was mobilized in 166 locations, including 29 urban centers. They held two large conventions, approximately 30 receiving ceremonies, and despite all forms of oppression they faced from CHP's local actors, they won in forty electoral regions (Emrence, 2006: 192).

SCF's incredible success in its 99 days long political life (August 12–November 17, 1930) despite its inorganic emergence can only be interpreted as that SCF made an already existing need in the society visible and addressed it. The hasty closure of SCF in three months, after having already negotiated the terms of the 1931 elections, relates to this existing dissatisfaction and need.¹⁰⁴ That a party designed to operate on an economic platform by a group of economy experts received overwhelming popular support¹⁰⁵ scared¹⁰⁶ Mustafa Kemal and Ismet Pasha. They were concerned that Fethi Bey would eventually respond to this support and become an actual contender with potential to win the elections.

¹⁰⁴ Cemal Kutay, who prepares Fethi Bey's memories (1980) to the publication, quotes a dialogue between Mustafa Kemal and Kazım (Özalp) depending on Tahsin Uzer from the Free Republican Party (1980: 405–406, footnote-1), which clearly indicates Atatürk's delusion on society's political attitudes during the 1930s: "In a dinner after the closure of the Free Republican Party, Gazi told the President of the Parliament Kazım Pasha, 'You, as the President of the Parliament, have a closer relationship with the society. Hence, you have the opportunity to observe more closely the consolidation of the reforms in daily life. [...] You should have explicitly warned me.'"

¹⁰⁵ Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu (1968: 105) claims that Fethi Bey's mistake that led to the party closure was his unwillingness to remain within the Parliament and his efforts to rally people. Mustafa Kemal's complaint with Fethi Bey was about Fethi Bey's rush for coming to power and the reason for his complaint was highly meaningful. Mustafa Kemal told Fethi Bey, "You are trying so hard to come to power in such a short time. You do not have any patience to wait. Could you rule this country in peace and stability if you could overthrow the people in office now? So, you have to convince me first on this issue?" (Us, 1964: 142). Faik Ahmet Barutçu, who was an RPP deputy during the 1940s and very close to National Chief İnönü, quotes İnönü's evaluation about the Free Republican Party in 1945: "Fethi Bey wanted to come to power in 1931. I told him to work to come to power in 1935 and in 1935, I would turn over the rule with my own hands, become the opposition party and so we would change the shifts. But he did not accept my offer and this was his mistake." (Barutçu, 1977: 285)

¹⁰⁶ İsmet İnönü, in his memories (*Hatıralarım*), mentions Mustafa Kemal's annoyance with the favor toward the Free Republican Party. He claims, "Mustafa Kemal said, you do not even mind, to me. What happened? I asked and he answered, we are on fire. I said, not at all, you are exaggerating, and left him. Mustafa Kemal was considering the current situation at that time. Later in another day, [...] he said to me, look you do not involve in these issues as I see but let me tell you something. We are going to start over because we are done now. He asked me if I have the courage to start over and if I am in and I answered if we are desperate, we may start all this again and finish this time. I added that he did not have to be worried as I did not see the problems had gone too far, and he said, they have gone too far." (İnönü, 1987-2: 229)

The Kemalist core elite had only allowed this controlled trial of political competition because they believed the project they had been carrying out since 1925 to eliminate all potential opposition through instrumentalization of the Law on the Maintenance of Order and Independence Tribunals had succeeded. Despite all preventative measures, SCF's designs on power and overwhelming popular support posed a risk to spin this controlled exercise out of control and necessitated the hasty closure of the opposition party. In fact, concerning the SCF experience, Mustafa Kemal stated, "We found out whether or not the reforms, innovations were absorbed by the society" (Kılıçali, 2005: 277). In the end, SCF's decision to cease its own existence was triggered by Mustafa Kemal and the CHP administration's resentment of four developments. These four developments signaled to Mustafa Kemal and the CHF administration that SCF was not content with the role cast for it and reacted harshly. In order to avoid the end TpCF suffered, SCF administrations decided to cease their activities.

3.3.3 The Consolidation of the Regime

While the CHF was still recovering from the disappointment caused by SCF's success, Menemen incident that took place on December 23, 1930 caught the administration off guard.¹⁰⁷ Six people in Menemen, believing that a person named Dervish Mehmet was the Mehdi and attempted to declare Sharia. In the proceeding armed struggle two night guards and Lieutenant Mustafa Fehmi Kubilay were killed. The administration declared martial law in the region and opened an investigation into the incident. As a result of the investigation and trial, 34 people were sentenced to death and 41 were sentenced to imprisonment (Tunçay, 1989: 293–295). This incident in the aftermath of the SCF experience was traumatic for the Kemalist core.¹⁰⁸ Nevertheless, the Kemalist core would manage to turn this incident into an effective myth for its enlightenment mission.

¹⁰⁷ For more information on the Menemen Incident, see Anıl, 2007; Müftüoğlu, 1991; Üstün, 1977.

¹⁰⁸ The general at the Martial Law Fahrettin Pasha claimed that in a meeting on this incident, Mustafa Kemal commended a search to find out whether the people, especially if Karabekir and other members of Progressive Republican Party behind this incident, and İsmet Pasha wanted to reveal whether the Free Republican Party experience had any influence on this incident (cited in Tunçay, 1989: 294).

Mustafa Kemal had already embarked on a three month tour (November 18, 1930–January 7, 1931, January 26, 1931–March 4, 1931) of twenty provinces to investigate the reasons behind the popular dissatisfaction and the failure of his reforms when this incident broke out (Başar, 1981). Witnessing first hand that the reforms were not rooted in the society, Mustafa Kemal decided that new initiatives were needed for the consolidation of the regime. The economic depression of 1929, the success of SCF's liberal economic policies against the statist practices of the CHF, and the Menemen incident perceived as a reactionary threat impelled the CHF, after 1930, to develop radical reform policies that could penetrate the society.

The SCF experience had three significant consequences that impacted all CHF policies implemented after 1930. First, this experience showed that although all potential contenders for power had been eliminated during the purging of the opposition period, which lasted until 1927, popular opposition and dissatisfaction with CHF continued. Popular dissatisfaction was so high that even a fabricated opposition loyal to the administration could be seen as an alternative. Based on this experience, CHP would not allow any opposition in the parliament even in the form of an oversight committee until 1945. Second, it demonstrated that the people had neither adopted nor welcomed the modernization reforms that lasted until 1930. The administration's response to this realization was going to be indoctrinating citizens of the new state in Kemalist ideology and establish various institutions such as People's Houses (*Halk Evleri*) to facilitate the penetration of the reforms into the society. Third, the claim that the CHF represented the nation in its entirety proved to be fictitious. The quick success of a fabricated opposition party had damaged the legitimacy of CHF as national hegemony.

After Mustafa Kemal returned from his tour, he called for elections. The debates leading up to the elections and in the Third Convention of CHF (May 10-18, 1931) clarified the priorities of the third period (1927-1938). As it was mentioned in the previous section, the second convention of CHF had taken place immediately after Mustafa Kemal had won the power struggle and suppressed the resistance against reforms. The most significant event of the second convention was the delivery of Mustafa Kemal's *Nutuk* which had not only created a historical record of the

previous term but had initiated a new era in the history of the Republic. The Kemalist core spent the years between the second and third conventions believing that they had suppressed all resistance to reforms and eliminated all opposition from the political center. After having established the new state on secular and nationalist foundations during the second period, the Kemalist core's new focus in the third stage (1927-1938) had become giving the regime a strong ideological base and indoctrinate new generations that would carry on this ideology and mission.

However, the SCF experience and the Menemen incident demonstrated to the Kemalist core that they were mistaken in thinking that all opposition had been eliminated and that the reforms had penetrated the society. This prompted the Kemalist core to search for new strategies and new policies. In this sense, it could be said that although the beginning of the second period can be placed in 1927, the new era did not actually begin until 1931. The priorities of the third period were determined only after the third convention of party in 1931. It was after 1931 that CHP focused on policies and discourses that would not only ensure the continuity of the single party regime, but would increase CHP's control over the society. CHP developed radical policies that increased its control over civil society in order to penetrate the public at every level and initiated projects that would promote the identification of the state with the party (Öz, 1989: 22; 1992: 107).

In fact, the third period can be read in two dimensions. First, during this period an authoritarian party regime was established through practices such as the hierarchical restructuring of the party, reorganization of the party-state and party-society relations, inclusion of the principles that shaped the political regime that had later come to be known as Kemalism first into the party program, then into the constitution. Parallel to the restructuring of the political order, the Party and the state apparatus, with all their existing and new institutions, attached a lot weight and importance to the process of building a nation state. It is also worth mentioning that during the search for a new political outlook and new policies in Turkey, single party regimes were rising in popularity as an attractive governance method in Europe. The economic and political policies of Hitler in Germany, Mussolini in Italy, and Stalin in the Soviet Union made the totalitarian systems to seem attractive. These developments

influenced the political tendencies in Turkey and legitimized the CHF's nearly totalitarian policies. The intellectuals and administrators of the time closely followed the developments in these three countries and made suggestions on policies and practices to adopt from these three countries. Policies of the CHF restructuring period that were aimed to associate the party with the state and to penetrate the society, were particularly influenced by this quest for new strategies and political outlook.¹⁰⁹ In the remainder of this section, CHF's efforts to consolidate the Kemalist regime will be discussed along these two parallel dimensions—consolidating the regime by creating an identification of the state with the party and constructing a nation state.

First strategy the Kemalist core followed in order to consolidate the regime—the state dimension of the consolidation efforts—was legitimizing the authoritarian single party regime by carrying the party protocol into the constitution. This was done gradually in several phases. As it might be recalled, the third convention of the CHF was an important turning point in the history of the single party regime in Turkey. It was in this convention that the CHF, who had been limited to “Nine Principles” since 1923, finally received its official party charter. This development was significant in that, it would come to determine the nature and structure of the single party regime. The principles of statism (*devletçilik*), secularism (*laiklik*), and revolutionarism (*inkılapçılık*) were added on to the principles of republicanism (*cumhuriyetçilik*), nationalism (*milliyetçilik*) and populism (*halkçılık*) that were accepted as the operating principles of CHF (see above) in the second convention held in 1927 (CHF Nizamnamesi, 1927: Art. 1) forming the “six principles” (CHF Program, 1931). What the transformation of the meanings attached to these principles is indicative of the ideological transformation of the CHF. This transformation can best be observed in the transformation of the “populism” principle.

¹⁰⁹ For the influence of fascist and communist single-party regimes in Europe on Turkish intellectuals and politicians, see Yetkin, 1983: 31-42. For totalitarian regimes in Europe and their influence on Turkish rule, see Uyar, 1998: 22-51.

During the Independence War the concept “populism” generally meant sovereignty of the people. The terms “sovereignty of the nation” and “national sovereignty” were repeated often, similar to the 1921 constitution, in the “Nine Principles”¹¹⁰ document in which Mustafa Kemal had announced the transformation of the ARMHC into the People’s Party right before the 1923 elections. In the 1923 party protocol,¹¹¹ although concepts such equality before the law and nullification of class privileges were attached to the principle of “populism,” its original meaning “government of people by the people” was maintained (Özbudun, 2011: 90). The second article of the 1923 protocol declared:

In the eyes of the People’s Party, the concept of nation does not belong to any group. He, who does not claim any privileges and who accepts equality before the law, belongs to the nation. Populists are the ones who refuse any privilege bestowed upon any family, group, community, or individual and who grant absolute freedom to legislate laws.

The same article was maintained in the party protocol¹¹² of 1927 with similar connotations.

After 1931, the principle of populism was had come to mean an anti-democratic solidarism. Although the original meaning of the principle was maintained in the party protocol of 1931 (İkinci Kısım-C), the following idea was attached to the principle: “One of our fundamental principles is to consider that the people of the Turkish Republic do not consist of separate classes but are a group of people who are divided into different class members in terms of the division of labor for individual and social life” (İkinci Kısım-E, 2). Mustafa Kemal had articulated these thoughts occasionally since his speech in Balıkesir on February 7, 1923 where he announced his intentions to establish the People’s Party HF. These thoughts were gradually included in the Party program finally becoming official. With this shift in meaning, what had been understood as rejection of all class privileges came to mean rejection of classes. The intelligentsia and the CHF administration legitimized their defense of the single party regime with this article that had changed the meaning of populism. In

¹¹⁰ For the text of *Dokuz Umde* (Nine Principles), see Tunçay, 1989: 354-356.

¹¹¹ For RPP Regulation in 1923, see Tunçay, 1989: 362-369.

¹¹² For RPP Regulation in 1927, see Tunçay, 1989: 382-394.

other words, the CHF's status as the single party was legitimized by when populism came to mean "lack of class" in the society. The same semantic shift observed in the principle of 'populism' was can also be traced in the principles of nationalism and statism. As such, the 1931 party protocol has the specific attribute of officially documenting the policies, ideas and discourse of the new period.

The fourth convention of the CHF, which convened on May 9-16, 1935, proved to be equally determinative of the political regime to come.¹¹³ In this convention, the 1931 protocol and charter was readmitted to the program. There were, however, two significant developments that transformed the CHF charter and protocol into a fundamental source of reference for both the regime and the state. First, the six principles of the 1931 protocol were recognized as the 'six principles of Kemalism.'¹¹⁴ Second, the state-party identification was completed. İnönü, as the deputy chair of the CHF and the prime minister, announced the adoption of the six principles of Kemalism in a circular letter published on June 18, 1936 and the provincial chair of CHP was appointed governor while the Secretary General of the CHP was appointed Minister of the Interior¹¹⁵ (Uyar, 1998: 78; Yetkin, 1983: 27). The constitutional amendment made in 1937 carried this resolution of the fourth convention and included the six principles into the constitution. Thus, the party-state identification was given a constitutional legitimacy. When the proposal¹¹⁶ İnönü and his 153 friends had presented was being debated in the Parliament, Recep Peker explained the reason for the constitutional amendment as follows:

¹¹³ For fundamental documents and discussions on the Fourth Congress of RPP, see *CHP Tüzüğü. Parti'nin Dördüncü Büyük Kurultayı*, Ulus Basımevi, Ankara, 1935; *CHP Dördüncü Büyük Kurultayı Tüzük ve Program Komisyonlarınca Onanan Program Taslağı*, Ankara, 12 Mayıs 1935; *CHP Dördüncü Büyük Kurultayı Görüşmeleri Tutulgası*, Ankara, 9-16 Mayıs 1935.

¹¹⁴ The conceptualization of Kemalism in the party program is as follows: "The major ideas of the Republican People's Party Program constituted the basis of the all projects conducted since the beginning of Turkish revolution. [...] These major ideas were placed in the general principles of the Party regulation that were approved by the Party Congress in 1927 and in the notice of the Party leadership approved by the same congress and in the notice of the 1931 general elections. [...] these major ideas underlined by the party are principals of Kemalism."

¹¹⁵ The practice, which was started on June 18, 1936, was terminated on June 7, 1939.

¹¹⁶ The Law no. 3115 dated on February 5, 1937 on the amendment of certain articles of the Turkish Constitution of 1921 (5 Şubat 1937 tarih ve 3115 Sayılı Teşkilatı Esasiye Kanununun Bazı Maddelerinin Değiştirilmesine Dair Kanun).

We want to make the fundamental principles, which grew under the influence of the CHF and which are integrated in the special and professional policy of the party, the official and legal regime of the whole nation by including this article into the Turkish Constitution of 1921. This is such a crucial issue, it could be considered as a great revolution. From the moment these principles become official, all of the citizens (from professors to the ones who are not involved in politics, from presidents to rail switchman) will believe in, love these principles, and be obliged to obey these principles (cited in Öz, 1992: 119).

As such, the six principles of the CHF protocol were first named Kemalism and then were added to the constitution becoming binding to all citizens. When Kemalism became an official ideology, the state-party identification went beyond an administrative practice and gained constitutional legitimacy. As such the state dimension of the consolidation of the Kemalist regime was achieved.

The second step in the consolidation of the Kemalist regime—the public dimension of the consolidation efforts—was the country wide campaign to educate the people. After the 1931 convention of the party, the Kemalist core had launched a pedagogical campaign towards the construction of a new nation and had made attempts to subsume civil society under the state-party apparatus. First, all independent unions and institutions that had no institutional ties with the CHF were either abolished or brought under the CHF apparatus. On March 25, 1931, Mustafa Kemal justified the new policy as follows:

In the history of the nation, there exists certain periods when it is necessary to bring each and every moral and material force together and to direct them to the same route in order to meet the goals. [...] All of the nationalist and republican forces must come together to protect the country and the revolution against internal and external threats. [...] forces of the same kind must unite under the same goal (1997, III: 130).

In response to Mustafa Kemal's call, the party eliminated all forms of civil society organizations that had no links with the party¹¹⁷ and replaced them with new ones, which were completely under party control (Zürcher, 2004a: 106).¹¹⁸ The campaign to educate the people began with the most effective instrument of ideological indoctrination the Turkish Hearths. These centers which were brought under the

¹¹⁷ The unions and institutions, which were closed during this period include the Turkish Women's Union, the Freemasons' Lodges, the Teachers' Union, and the cultural and educational clubs of the Turkish Hearths (Zürcher, 2004: 106).

¹¹⁸ For example, the women's branch of the Party replaced the Women's Union and the People's Houses were created to replace the Turkish Hearths (Zürcher, 2004a: 106).

party control in the 1927 convention declared itself ceased and were united with CHF on April 10, 1931. The subsumption of these hearths that were not established or managed by the CHF under the party apparatus indicated that all intellectual life would be under the absolute control of the Party.

The new policy was first put into force in Turkish Hearths (*Türk Ocakları*), one of the most influential ideology production centers of the time. The Turkish Hearths were put under the control of the party (Copeaux, 1998: 40). Approximately a year later, the People's Houses (*Halk Evleri*)¹¹⁹ took over the hearths' function in the society.¹²⁰ In order to infuse the regime into the society and to create closer contact between the CHF and the people, People's Houses were established in 14 city centers on February 19, 1932. By the time these Houses were abolished by the Democratic Party (DP) in 1950, their numbers had reached 478. People's Houses, which attempted to spread the influence of Kemalism in the political center across to the social and cultural spheres, served as an instrument that modernized traditional daily life in Anatolia and created a modern public sphere. Until they were closed in 1950, these Houses (along with People's Rooms-*Halk Odaları*) played a leading role in bringing the Kemalist reforms and its political and cultural perspective to the provinces. After the Turkish Hearths, other unions and institutions also dissolved themselves and donated all their assets to the CHF. Unions such as the Freemasons' Lodges, the Turkish Women's Union, the Teachers' Union, etc., justified their dissolution stating, "Their goals were realized by the CHP, they did not have any other task to realize and it would be better to work under the framework of the CHP" (Yetkin, 1983: 78).

The policies implemented in the civil society sphere continued with the penetration of the state over social and economic life. In this regard, 'the Law on Press' (*Matbuat Kanunu*), which indicated the authoritarian spirit of the era, should be emphasized. There were two significant results of the Law enacted on August 8, 1930 over the

¹¹⁹ For more information on the establishment motive, role and activities of the People's Houses, see Karpat, 1963.

¹²⁰ For other explanations on the replacement of the Turkish Hearths by the People's Houses, see Öz, 1992: 108–114; Tunçay, 1989: 295–299; Yetkin, 1983: 52–63, 87–90.

press. First, the owning or operating of newspapers or journals was made more difficult with the increased qualifications necessary to own or become editor-in-chief (Art. 12 and 15). Second, the authority to shut down newspapers and journals was vested in the Council of Ministers (art. 50). This law, which remained in effect until 1945, made severe censorship and pressure on the press in the country possible and justified the closure of many newspapers and journals. With an amendment to the Law on the Press on June 27, 1938, the press was given the mission of explaining and creating sympathy for the regime in the society (Öz, 1992: 120).

Another strategy in the public dimension of the consolidation efforts was the University Reform intended to facilitate CHF's penetration into every sphere of the society. The justification for the reform was the inadequacy of the support for the Turkish revolution by the Darülfünun (Ottoman University). Therefore, a different type of higher education institution was needed, one that would contribute to the revolution and support the political regime. During the transition from Darülfünun to the modern university structure, professors who did not support the new regime were fired, and those who supported the revolution were promoted. As such, only fifty-nine of the total of 150 faculty members kept their positions while ninety two faculty members were dismissed. Hence, the CHF successfully transformed Darülfünun into a modern university that defended the principles of the revolution and was contingent on the party (Yetkin, 1983: 72-77).

These policies consolidating the regime were first shifted to a new direction in 1936 with the resignation of Secretary General Recep Peker. Then, in 1937, İnönü left the office and Bayar was assigned as Prime Minister. Although Mustafa Kemal's death and the election of İnönü as the President through alliance slightly revised the organization of the political system, the mentality behind the organization remained fundamentally the same. During the İnönü era, due to the conditions of the Second World War, the attempts for consolidating the regime left its place to the authoritarian and stable organization of the political center. It also led to the bureaucracy's conquest of the state and the Party and routinized Kemalism.

3.4 Stabilization of the Single-Party Regime (1938-1945)

The period which began with Atatürk's death and ended with the transition to the multi-party system (1938–1945) is dubbed the “National Chief Period.”¹²¹ During this period, İsmet İnönü, CHP's constant General President as well as the President of the Republic, was called ‘National Chief’ (*Milli Şef*). İsmet Pasha, who he joined the national resistance in April 1920, as the Commander of the Western front, the head of Turkish delegation in Lausanne, and the prime minister after the proclamation of the Republic, had always stood beside Atatürk and had been one person he trusted the most. Atatürk and İnönü acted in unison in every step towards the construction of the political center and the establishment of the regime. To the extent that Mustafa Kemal alienated the military commanders with whom he started the national resistance before İnönü joined the resistance. This alienation brought Mustafa Kemal and İnönü even closer together. In the beginning of the 1930s, having overcome struggles of establishing the political center and the regime, Atatürk concentrated on research on language, culture and history while İnönü rose to the front lines with his influence over the party organs and bureaucratic apparatus and undertook important functions in the institutionalization of Kemalism.

After Atatürk, İsmet İnönü,¹²² the ‘second man’ of the Atatürk period, was the most significant political figure of the single-party period. İnönü who served as the prime minister for twelve years during Atatürk's lifetime, and as the president for twelve years after his death was of crucial importance in the consolidation of Kemalism, which determined the political grammar of the fourth period. İnönü served as the General President of the CHF from the proclamation of the Republic in October 1923 until September 1937 contiguously; and as the prime minister for the same time period with the exception of three months during the Fethi Okyar government (November 21, 1924 -March 2, 1925). İnönü who was forced to hand over his duties as the General President of the party and prime minister to Celal Bayar after a

¹²¹Cf. Akandere, 1998; Koçak, 2008, 2009; Vanderlippe, 2005 for scholarly treatments of the National Chief Era.

¹²² Cf. Aydemir, 1968; Heper, 1998 for specialized studies on İnönü.

dispute with Atatürk on September 20, 1937. Following Atatürk's death, he won the presidential elections, for which he was the only candidate, unanimously. As the president and "national chief" of the Republic, İnönü was the most influential political actor of the single party regime after Atatürk.

3.4.1 National Chief Era

The Military played an important role in the election of İnönü as the second President of Turkey. As it became clear that Atatürk would never regain his health, in early November, the Military's high command met under the presidency of Fevzi Çakmak, Chief of Staff, and agreed that the elections for the presidency were to be conducted by the Assembly and the Military was to stand aside. Bayar, upon finding out of the military's decision to stand aside, offered Fevzi Çakmak the candidacy and expressed that the parliament would support him. Fevzi Çakmak rejected the offer. Around the same time period, in order to determine the Military's tendencies, another meeting was held under the presidency of the First Military Commander General Fahrettin Altay between Corps and Division Commanders. In this meeting, Altay convincing Çakmak that military's support was with İnönü, changed the General Staff decision to remain impartial and made sure the parliament was notified of military's support for İnönü (Koçak, 2008: 134–135; Özdağ, 2006: 117; Özdemir, 1989: 71–74; Vanderlippe, 2005: 30–31).

The Military's decisive support, along with the abstention of influential political actors with potential to become strong contenders from the race, the absence of any change in the composition of the parliament that would reduce İnönü's influence combined to expedite İnönü's election to presidency as the sole candidate despite the opposition from Atatürk's close circles. İnönü, after being nominated as the sole candidate in the CHP Group on November 11, 1938, was unanimously elected as the president with the unanimous votes of 348 attendees. The presence of the Chief of Staff Fevzi Çakmak and the First Military Commander Fahrettin Altay in the Assembly during the elections was perceived as a reflection of the Military's interest in elections and its power within the political system (Koçak, 2008: 141–142; Özdağ, 2006: 117; Vanderlippe, 2005: 31–32).

İsmet İnönü, in order to get out of Atatürk's shadow and to exert his own authority and his own political style, had to confront Atatürk's legacy. As such, while İnönü was trying to prevent rise of any criticism or questions about Atatürk and his term on the one hand, he was trying to establish his own political legitimacy paying close attention not to even utter Atatürk's name except in official ceremonies, on the other (Koçak, 2009: 85). Although he protected Atatürk and his legacy, he did not permit Atatürk to shadow his own power. Asım Us makes this observation in relation to the priorities of the İnönü period; "CHP's bosom shall be opened to those who, after having been blown by the wrong winds, and asked for redemption. Atatürk's memory shall be respected" (1966: 330).

In order to implement a new political management and to consolidate his own power, İnönü restructured the party, the Assembly, and the government. He made peace with influential political actors who were opposed to Atatürk. Although he was uncomfortable with Atatürk's interventions in the governmental affairs while he was prime minister and Atatürk was president, during his own leadership, İnönü continuously intervened in the administration. In this sense, it is difficult to distinguish the İnönü administration from the Atatürk administration in terms of centralization or operational methods. İnönü acted as the single authority in party organization, Assembly Group, and government composition, not hesitating to directly get involved in the nation's domestic and foreign policies. Although İnönü, despite Atatürk's charisma, enjoyed considerable influence over the political system due to his continuous appointments as the prime ministers and CHP's Deputy General President; when he became the president he did not allow any one figure to rise and to be identified with the party by changing prime ministers often. This arrangement afforded him the ability to be more influential and involved in party and government affairs than Atatürk. During the National Chief period, due to the decisiveness of foreign policy over politics, İnönü took foreign policy under his own supervision and worked directly with the minister of foreign affairs, thus he was personally able to define the outlines of Turkey's foreign policy.

İnönü's first move towards consolidation of his power was his gaining the status of the permanent general president of the party in the CHP convention held on

December 26, 1938 (Art. 3). Mustafa Kemal had been elected as the permanent general president of the party in CHP's Third Convention held in 1931; and he was qualified as the immortal president in this extraordinary convention in 1938 (Art. 2); while İnönü was declared the permanent general president (Art. 3). The permanent status of the CHP General President was first recognized in the 1927 protocol of the party which remained in effect in the 1931 and 1935 protocols of the party as well. The amendment of this protocol in 1938 attributed this permanent position to the new general president İnönü. This remained in effect until the single party status of the CHP had ended with transition to the multi-party system in 1946. On May 10, 1946, in the exceptional convention of the CHP, the position was eliminated.

Although the title “national chief”¹²³ attributed to İnönü was not included in the party's charter, it was included in the proposal for the amendment. During the convention, Bayar and Saydam used the expression of ‘National Chief’ to define İnönü. In fact, Turkish public was already familiar with the terms ‘chief’ and ‘National Chief’ during this period. This expression, inspired by the totalitarian single regime party regimes in Europe, was used to define Atatürk since 1930. Recep Peker, in particular, used to refer to this title and defined it as the one who “united the nation in his person” and the one who “represented the national will” (Peker, 1936: 63–65). Nevertheless, during the Atatürk rule, the title of National Chief had not spread widely in the political life and did not go beyond being an expression, which was sometimes used by some authors and administrators as an expression of respect. However, during the İnönü period, the expression, ‘National Chief,’ began to be used officially and became a widespread term defining the İnönü period (Akandere, 1998: 29–34; Koçak, 2008: 167–171; Yetkin, 1983: 158–160). The definition of the ‘national chief’ in the proposal for the amendment to the Party protocol summarized the authoritarian outlook of the party's conception of the state:

People with the same political point of view are scattered in the nation. These people can only be united by a Chief who brings them under an organization. The Chief's role is very important in every country and particularly in countries transitioned into the political party system. Because it is the duty of the Chief to unite political

¹²³ For more extensive evaluations on National Chiefdom System, see Akandere, 1998: 29-67; Koçak, 2001: 119-137; Yetkin, 1983: 157-174.

approaches under principles and allow them to mature and engrain these principles and feed them constantly, to direct national policy, to raise people in the field of policy.

In the remainder of the proposal for the amendment, it was stated that since persons with these qualifications were difficult to come by and since repeated elections in the every convention would diminish the chief's authority, the position of the national chief had to be assigned permanency. Furthermore, according to the proposal, since the CHP represented the entire nation, it was only natural that its chief would be the national chief (Akandere, 1998: 38–39; Koçak, 2008: 166–167; Yetkin, 1983: 160–161). The national chief was mystified and had been attributed a divine characteristic in the party's protocol and some magazines and journals close to the CHP. Both the status of the national chief itself and these divine characteristics attributed to the chief were seriously influenced by the expressions such as the 'Duçe' or the 'Führer' in fascist countries (Akandere, 1998: 59–67, Nadi, 1965: 16-17; Yetkin, 1983: 166-168). In fact, characteristics attributed to the national chief were the same irrational characteristics attributed to totalitarian leaders.

The political psychology behind the metaphysical characteristics attributed to the national chief personified by İnönü can be explained as follows: Atatürk was able to make the political system work with his prestige and charisma during his administration without needing additional legal legitimacy. In other words, the source of Atatürk's legitimacy, influence and power was his own charisma. His death created a power vacuum in the single party regime right before the Second World War. Although İnönü enjoyed a certain degree of power and influence due to his status as the "second man" of the Republic during Atatürk administration, it was nowhere near that of Atatürk. In fact, there were a number of political actors who saw themselves on equal footing with İnönü. Thus, the title of "national chief" was aimed to ascribe a certain degree of political power and authority to İnönü. That is to say, the mystification of the "national chief" is intended to allow İnönü, who is not the Atatürk of the nation, to rule as if he were. With this title, İnönü rose from being "second man" to "single man."¹²⁴

¹²⁴ For similar views see, Nadi, 1965: 186; Kili, 1976: 86; Giritlioğlu, 1965: 141.

The title of “national chief” suggested a political regime beyond the existing single party regime at the time in Turkey. It rendered all political mechanisms meaningless and placed the national will in the person of a single man. Çetin Yetkin argues that the institution of the national chief pushed the limits of the constitutional legitimacy of the single party regime:

It should be also stated that national chiefdom is an institution that did not exist in the constitutional order of the time. In fact, the concept of the national exceeds the institution of presidency both in terms of structure and powers vested in it. Both the authority vested in the national chief and the qualifications he is assumed to possess render all constitutional institutions meaningless. When faced with a leader who anticipated all the needs of the nation, ruled the country and the nation with his direct command stood above everyone and everything, neither the parliament nor the government held any significance. With the existence of a national chief, these institutions are transformed into officers only responsible with executing the national chief’s commands. In fact this has been the case, de facto. It is for reason that when, during the vote of confidence for Refik Saydam administration, Refik Şefket İnce stated that since the national chief approved the government, there was nothing to do but approve, he was only articulating the current reality (1983: 173-174).

İnönü would exercise this power and authority vested in him to the maximum and would rule Turkey with an iron fist during the Second World War. Metin Toker explains İnönü’s political regime and its justifications as follows:

The President acted like the national chief in every sense of the word throughout the war years. The Grand Assembly and the government existed legally. However, all politics was managed by İnönü directly. (...) Everything the national chief considered harmful was banned in Turkey. (...) This was what the president was afraid of. That is to say, he was afraid of the existence of a different perception of Turkey’s political situation in London and Berlin than the one he carefully managed and Berlin and London acting on this perception. Therefore, sometimes instructions were sent to the newspapers on the types of news and comments they could publish. (...) Sometimes, these instructions included the directive to write about the national chief or even his family. This would demonstrate the power of the sovereign İnönü to the world (1970: 21, 24–27).

Another one of İnönü’s strategic moves to differentiate his rule was making peace with individuals who were offended or alienated during Atatürk administration. İnönü, believing the continued animosity of the political actors who were expelled from the political center during the founding stage of the regime could produce political instability, made every effort to reconcile. He convinced Kazım Karabekir, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, and Fethi Okyar to run for seats in the parliament and facilitated their victory in the elections held on December 31, 1938. In the same

elections, Hasan Rıza Soyak, who had served as the General Secretary for the Office of Presidency during Atatürk's rule and who had also tried to prevent İnönü from becoming the president after Atatürk's death, was also given a seat in the parliament. Moreover, immediately after the elections, Ali Fuat Cebesoy and Refet Bele who had won seats in the parliament as independent candidates were admitted to the CHF (Koçak, 2008: 175–180). İnönü's attempts at reconciliation continued. On March 4, İnönü contacted one of the previous grand viziers, Salih Pasha, retired General Ali İhsan Sabis, retired General Cafer Tayyar, and the previous Prime Minister Rauf Orbay. İnönü, asked Rauf Orbay to come serve as a parliamentarian in the new term. Although Rauf Bey rejected the offer for the general elections held in March 1939, he was obliged to run for the empty seat in the by elections conducted for an empty seat in October of the same year. His name had been implicated in the İzmir assassination case and was sentenced to imprisonment.¹²⁵ İnönü pardoned his sentence and cleared Orbay's name shortly before the by elections. Rauf Orbay was thus elected as the Member of Parliament representing the district of Kastamonu (Orbay, 1993, c-2: 249-250). That Orbay's name was cleared and his sentence by the Ankara Independence Tribunal was lifted confirms the political reasons behind the implication of pashas in the assassination attempt. On June 10, 1939, İnönü reconciled with Adnan Adıvar and Halide Edip Adıvar, who had benefited from the climate of peace, returned from Paris, and settled in İstanbul. After the reconciliation Halide Edip Adıvar was given tenure in İstanbul University (Koçak, 2009: 45). İnönü distinguished his presidency by reconciling with all the leading actors of the previously suppressed opposition. He made an effort to start with a clean state and thus achieved unity in the party in the absence of Atatürk.

When the call for early elections on January 25, 1939 was approved, the Bayar administration submitted their resignations and the task of forming the new

¹²⁵ The declaration published on 10/22/1939 with the signature of RPP Deputy General President was as follows: "It was decided by the General Presidency Council that İstanbul Deputy and former Prime Minister Rauf Orbay shall be candidate for Kastamonu deputyship which became empty due to Kastamonu deputy Hüsnü Açıksöz's decease. As regards the objection against the imprisonment sentence given by İzmir Independence Courts previously about Rauf Orbay, relevant General Amnesty Acts eliminated the action attributed as well as enabled the reopening of the case and actually it was considered that in case the reopening of the case was enabled, he would be certainly acquitted. I hereby inform and declare to distinguished second electorates" (Orbay, 1993, c-2: 250).

government was assigned to Refik Saydam. The significance of these elections for İnönü rule was that it provided an opportunity to İnönü to change the composition of the assembly. İnönü prevented leading political actors such as Hasan Rıza Soyak, Şükrü Kaya, Kılıç Ali, Nuri Conker, Tahsin Uzer, etc., known for their loyalty to Atatürk and Bayar, to win seats in the parliament, effectively eliminating them from the political center (Koçak, 2009: 35–36). Although the composition of the parliament changed only by 25%, this was enough for İnönü to establish his hegemony. The rate of military personnel and civil bureaucracy declined in the new assembly and the rate of businessmen and other professionally employed member increased slightly without creating a significant change in the numbers of the General Assembly (Frey, 1965: 181).

The renewed elections and substitution of Saydam with Bayar marked the end of the transition process to the post-Atatürk period and the beginning of the İnönü period. The Saydam government was a follow up of the Bayar government and the only meaningful change between these governments was Saydam's appointment, who was known for his loyalty to Atatürk instead of Bayar. One of the first initiatives of the Saydam government was to attempt a reversal of the party-state identification implemented in 1936. While Saydam continued to hold his appointments as prime minister and party leader simultaneously, the practice of appointing party General Secretary as the Minister of the Interior was discontinued. İnönü believed this practice took away from the functions of the state bureaucracy, and attempted to restore party's former performance and its political autonomy. In this way, the party was detached from the state to a certain extent, even if not completely. Another step towards detaching CHP from the state came in the local elections of July 1939 immediately after the fifth convention of the CHP. In this election the practice of district governors also serving as the district leader of the party was discontinued. Although district governors after these elections preserved their membership in the party, they no longer served as district leaders for the party (Akandere, 1998: 83–84; Koçak, 2009: 91–93).

1939 elections witnessed another first by the CHP. İnönü announced his decision to implement the condition of approval by the party council for any candidate who

would run for office from the CHF. He justified this decision with the recent initiative to increase the efficiency of the party organs and steps towards breaking the links between the CHP and the state. For the first time in its history, candidates to be nominated were determined as a result of a deliberative process in the party (Koçak, 2009: 31–33). Further changes, in accordance with İnönü’s strategy to increase political participation of public at large, were introduced during the 1943 elections. The first change was the enactment of the Law on MP elections on December 14, 1942.¹²⁶ All elections in the new Republic were conducted in accordance to the 1908 electoral law with some minor amendments. Finally, after twenty years, the Republic’s law on the electoral process was updated (Erdem, 1982: 138–173). With the new law, elections became two tiered. The first round determined those who would be nominated as candidates in the elections. Members of the Parliament would be determined in the second round from among the winners of the first round (Art. 17–42). The second change was the nomination of more candidates than the thirty eight empty seats in the parliament in the 1943 elections (Koçak, 2009: 290–292). This practice was implemented partially to give the electorate a choice in the elections, even if limited; and partially to eliminate the unwanted candidates as a result of a ‘democratic’ process.

After the March 1939 elections, in CHP’s Fifth Convention, held on May 29, 1939, a new party charter¹²⁷ and protocol were accepted. The convention, hearing İnönü’s messages in regard to rejuvenating the party during his presidency, passed two resolutions that would solidify İnönü’s call to bring back the former dynamism of the party. First was the formation of Party Inspectorships (Art. 20/Ç) and a group within TBMM independent from the state (Art. 20/F). Inspectors, who were given jurisdiction over several provinces, were expected to inspect CHP organizations located in provinces, towns, sub–districts, and villages at least twice a year. They were also responsible with monitoring the developments in other organizations and enterprises in their region and reporting to the center. In June 1939, 20 party inspectors came into office and this figure was increased to 25 on October 1, 1940,

¹²⁶ ‘Mebus Seçim Kanunu’ (Deputy General Elections Law) dated December 14, 1942 and no. 4320.

¹²⁷ See CHP’s 1939 Program.

afterwards it was increased again to 29 (Akandere, 1998: 85–86; Koçak, 2009: 94–104). This practice on the one hand encouraged local CHP offices to work more efficiently, and on the other strengthened the party's centralized structure. Nevertheless, İnönü's aim in implementing this practice was to prevent the party's dissolution into the state, and repower it to perform the duties expected from a political party.

Another important resolution of the fifth CHP convention was to establish an autonomous group to monitor the practices of the CHP group in the parliament. In a way, this independent group's function was to create a mechanism that could control the administration in a single party regime. The autonomous group consisted of twenty one CHP parliamentarians and its head was appointed by the permanent president İnönü. Although the autonomous group criticized the administration mildly from time to time, its members neither voted against the administration nor abstained from voting on issues. In this sense, the group never really accomplished becoming a control mechanism to the government as it was expected (Uran, 344–345).

3.4.2 Mitigation of the Authoritarian Rule

Policies implemented to minimize the negative impact of the war on the country throughout the National Chief era were increasingly becoming sources of dissatisfaction with the government and were heavily criticized. Fearing political instability, the government did not tolerate these criticisms. Freedom of Press was severely curtailed; and in cases where legislation could not provide the needed censorship, the Law on National Protection was exercised, newspapers were shut down on executive orders of the Minister of the Interior without due process. During the war years, *Cumhuriyet* was closed five times, *Tan* seven times and *Vatan* nine times (Vanderlippe, 2005: 51). With the end of the war, the political was signaling some mitigation in the authoritarian tendencies. This was reflected in the relaxation of the press censorship. Prior to the San Francisco Conference, closed newspapers were allowed to publish again as a gesture to ally countries.

The victory of the democratic front in the war, alienation of the CHP constituency due to the economic policies implement during the war, the accumulation of opposition against CHP since 1923, vocal criticism railed against CHP by internal and external opposition, and İnönü's tendencies to mitigate the authoritarian rule of the single party regime caused disintegration of authoritarian proclivities of the administration from 1945 on. İnönü, who had been the determinative factor in every economic all political decision during the National Chief period, was also the determinative factor in mitigating the authoritarian rule with his inclination towards attenuating the authoritarian rule of the political center. As such, the second half of 1945 saw the political system in Turkey leave the door ajar for the opposition, even if temporarily. İnönü played a guiding and encouraging role in the process of the internal opposition breaking away from the party to form a separate political party (Koçak, 2009: 553–561).

The process leading to the formation of a separate party began in early 1945. The internal opposition began to exercise their right to veto and abstain from voting at an unprecedented rate in the political system. In January 1945 the bill that proposed the state appropriation of *Şirket-i Hayriye*¹²⁸ received seven vetoes,¹²⁹ 171 abstentions against the 248 affirmative votes, Parallel to the developments in the opposition, İnönü began to familiarize the decision makers in the CHP with the idea of democratizing the political system (Barutçu, 1977: 283). He signaled the coming of a new era in his address of May 19, 1945: “As the country is relieved of the war conditions that necessitated severe preventative measures, democratic principles will prevail in its political and intellectual spheres” (Cited in Toker, 1970: 76). Following this address, İnönü, accepting blame for the failed attempts of transition to multi-party system, emphasized the necessity of democratizing the political system¹³⁰

¹²⁸ For discussions regarding the proposal, see: TBMM TD, Term: 7, Meeting: 2, Volume: 15, Session: 25 (15.1.1945).

¹²⁹ Those who gave a dissentive vote included Arif Çubukçu, Ali Rıza Eren, İzzet Arıkan, Muhtar Berker, Münir Bırsel, Hazım Atıf Kuyucak, and Recep Peker,

¹³⁰ Barutçu, in the days following May 19, in a dinner, which he attended, states İnönü's determination for democratization of the system with the following words: “Democratic government is the management of human. We shall develop this management with its all lines. Our democratic institutions are complete. What is lacking here is a second party. Here is the history of the process: If,

(Barutçu, 1977: 285). Inspired by the international political atmosphere and encouraged by İnönü's speeches, the internal opposition in the CHP became more vocal and took a stronger stance against the administration.

In the following months, radical opinions on the discipline in the party, the isolation of the parliament and parliamentarians from the public at large, and failures of the administration became more vocalized.¹³¹ For example, the debates on the Budget Law in May 1945 were significant in that they led to a demand for vote of confidence against the administration. The law was approved with 368 votes, against the five vetoes¹³² and 77 abstentions.¹³³ Opposition called for a vote of confidence for the Saraçoğlu administration. With 359 votes of confidence, seven votes of no-confidence¹³⁴ and 84 abstentions, the existing administration was approved (Goloğlu, 1974: 354–355; Koçak, 2009: 555–556). After the 'four objective proposal' (*Dörtlü*

Party of Union and Progress, we could appreciate the attempt for liberty and dispute with any price, two party traditions and education should have been settled now. (...) In Republic period Party of Union and Progress was established by our friends. As Seyh Sait rebellion scared us, we closed this party with the concern of protecting this new revolution but it was not a good order. We should protect it, we made a mistake. If we did, now this tradition would settle down. As regards Free Side action. (...) With any price, we should have protected it and made the second party to live. If we did now we would not face up this missing part. We shall complete this missing part. Those who performed this revolution shall also accomplish this: I see this power with me. (...) We shall certainly do this. Suppression administration is easy; the more important is that to manage democracy, which is the management of human. I shall protect the second party, I will not let it to be crashed by a stronger party. This party in case Assembly is formed, our position shall be same against it" (Barutçu, 1977: 285-286).

¹³¹ Faik Ahmet Barutçu (1977: 288-289), reflects the climate in the Assembly with his words: "According to Muhittin Baha (Bursa deputy), "There are gaps between Assembly and country; nation and deputies. During First Grand National Assembly period, deputies were respected. Wherever they go people stand up; but now this climate has changed and people keep their distance now. In fact deputies were accomplishing their mission of inspection and criticism, but these were not reflected outside. Make discussions open, let the nation know us this shall increase the respect" he said. Various negotiators took chair. Köprülüzade Fuat went ahead, he told he was shy as he was a deputy, he attacked to the government hard. (...) Prime Minister replied against these words and stated that he supported these negotiations. (...) These negotiations were useful from this point of view: Assembly discussions were provided to be reflected to newspapers on daily basis and newspapers also published these discussions freely.""

¹³² Those who gave dissentive votes included Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes, Refik Koraltan, Fuat Köprülü, and Emin Sazak.

¹³³ For discussions in the Assembly regarding the law see TBMM TD, Term: 7, Meeting: 2, Volume: 17, Session: 58 and 65 (21, 29.5.1945).

¹³⁴ In the vote of confidence, besides those who gave a dissentive vote for budget voting, Recep Peker and Hikmet Bayur also displayed their lack of confidence. Recep Peker emphasized the reason of his lack of confidence in the manner that he was different from Bayar and his friends, thus he did not move together with them (Koçak, 2009: 556; Toker, 1970: 85-86).

Takrir) that aimed to increase freedom of speech and liberalization of policies was submitted on June 7, 1945, the opposition both in the party and parliament reached a new level (Barutçu, 1970: 302–309; Toker, 1970: 89–95; Us, 1966: 639–664).

Although the administration rejected the proposal with the signatures of İnönü, Bayar, Menderes, Koraltan, and Köprülü, the proposal was not simply suppressed but was given a response and policy changes were made. The Minister of Trade Memduh Şevket Esenal was relieved of his duties as the CHP General Secretary and Nihat Atıf Kansu was appointed to replace him. On June 17, in the by-elections in six provinces, CHP decided not to nominate an official candidate and thus giving the public at large right to representation for the first time (Toker, 1970: 87).

The leading political actors of the opposition that became more vocal with the budget debates in May and solidified their position as opposition with *DörtlÜ Takrir* were going to form an opposition party only six months later. Formalization of the opposition, which initially sought only to effect change within the party, into a separate political party under the name Democrat Party (DP) in January 1946 was made possible by internal and external developments. İnönü by not meeting the democratization claims within the party pushed the three significant names of the opposition out of the party, thus enabling them to form their own political party (Koçak, 2009: 559). In other words, external and internal opposition that began to emerge in early 1945 was pushed into mobilization as a political party by İnönü and Turkey moved towards democratizing its political system with the influence of international developments. The establishment of the Democrat Party under the leadership of Bayar put an end to the single party regime and moved onto “Multi-party system under National Chief” (Velidedeoğlu, 1972: 19). Although İnönü’s influence on the system continued until 1950s, with the formation of DP a viable alternative in the political center appeared and the National Chief gradually lost its effectiveness. One manifestation of this fading influence was the lifting of the “permanent general president” and “national chief” titles were lifted in the CHP convention in 1946. DP, encouraged by the public support initiated a series of practices, beginning in 1948, which had a moderating effect on the application of the secularist principle.

3.5 Conclusion

The Kemalist power and regime was established and institutionalized by experiencing four important phases. In the first period, the Independence War, which began by the natural and fragmental mobilization of the environment, gained a central and national character in Amasya-Erzurum-Sivas-Ankara but stops with the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, his military, and bureaucratic staff and it was concluded by the victory. This period is a pluralist and democratic era in terms of decision-making mechanisms and levels of participation. During the war years, the authority for decision-making was Grand National Assembly of Turkey in which all social segments entered into the war are represented. Following the victory, Mustafa Kemal, considering that this pluralist and democratic structure would not implement the political regime in his mind, developed an exclusionist strategy. During the first and second assembly periods, in the developments on the axis of the Sultanate-Republic-Caliphate, the Kemalist staff's ignoring the deliberation and agreement with the environment and establishing a new political system created reactions, the Kemalist staff introverted initially by forming a group and then a side. Discharge of the primary opposition upon the renewal of elections directly affected the means of development of the political system and regime and placed the Kemalist staff in the center. During the Second Assembly period, suppression of the opposition against power and regime has been more difficult and instruments as Law on the Maintenance of Order and Independence Tribunals during the conflict period have made the political regime authoritative. All potential opponent sections against the Kemalist power and regime were discharged and a provision for establishing an actual single-party was provided upon the İzmir Assassination proceedings.

The most critical phase of the foundation of the Kemalist regime began with the 1923 elections and ended with the İzmir Assassination, is the foundation of the People's Party. The foundation of the People's Party (Halk Fırkası, HF) over the basis of the Society for the Defense of Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia (ARMCH) provided the opportunity for Kemalist staff to declare that they represent all sections entered into the War of Independence and founded the Republic. While founding HF,

Mustafa Kemal stated that parties should lean on denominational bases, and that there was no need for the foundation of different parties since no classes were available in Turkey, the HF party, which entirely encompasses the society, has a mission such as to educate the society. Mustafa Kemal's opinions on HF's place in the political system and on its missions and foundation of HF as leaning on the heritage of ARMHC put forth the justifications beyond the political discharges and reforms accomplished after 1923. Therefore, while founding HF in 1923, Mustafa Kemal put forth the tutelary agenda of the regime to be established. Prior to 1927, discharge of political and social opposition and the single-party regime founded after 1930, received their legitimacies from this tutelary agenda. The discharge and introversion process, which enabled Mustafa Kemal to be leader and to bring his military-bureaucratic staff to power, was legalized with this tutelary agenda.

The availability of the Kemalist regime with discharges and lack of social consent by reforms, which have been applied for a establishing a new nation, caused Kemalist staff to shy away from social tendencies and forced him to consider that keeping political channels closed was inevitable for his existence. SCF experience, despite all measures taken, by finding a support from people, threaten CHP power, and frightened the Kemalist elites. SCF experience caused the Kemalist elites to be further introverted and thus ossified the regime's bureaucratic central property. Due to this concern, even opposition inside the party was rejected and even a little hesitation regarding party policies was perceived as a regime problem. Political opposition was suppressed by discredit toward the society and the policy was rejected. As the obligatory conditions for continuation of alliance with the environment disappeared, Kemalist elites settled into the center completely and showed a tendency to lean on the institutional center instead of the social environment. Kemalist staff did not hesitate to implement its own agenda, to implement policies toward establishment of a nation, and accordingly form the required institutions. Suspension of the regime from the society provided the ossification of the military-bureaucracy-intellectual alliance.

SCF experience pushed Kemalist elites toward the search for consolidating the political regime and establishing a carrier institution and staff. These searches caused

Kemalist staff to feel sympathy toward totalitarian regimes; this regime was inspired for the structuring of state, society, and party. Within this context, as of 1930, policies for the institutionalization of the political regime and dissemination of the political regime in the society were accelerated. Primarily, CHP was restructured to train the society, party-state, party-society, and state–society relations were defined again. Kemalist principles were specified, in the 1927 and 1931 Congresses, these principles were included in the CHP program; in the 1935 Congress it was named as Kemalism, and was taken into the constitution in 1937. Therefore, the applicable political regime was named Kemalism and brought into a constitutional status. In 1935, the party-state integration was provided; the CHP program gained the status of state, and the political regime’s basic reference text. With all these developments, the regime was brought to a doctrine under the name of Kemalism and the state column of the institutionalization of the regime was completed. Another step for recovering the consolidation weakness of the Kemalist regime was to close all political-cultural associations that have no ties with CHP and establish new institutions instead of within the scope of CHP. Within this context, CHP began to establish a carrier institution and staff to disseminate the regime to rural and to educate the society. As of the Congress in 1931, the Kemalist staff initiated a pedagogic mobilization to educate the society and form a new nation, thus civil society was added into the party-state identification. Efforts were made to create a frontier section adopting the reforms in rural areas through community centers.

After Atatürk’s decease, İsmet İnönü, in undertaking the missions of the CHP General Presidency and Presidency of the Republic, gained the title CHP’s Constant General President and National Chief and he took over Atatürk’s power on the political system. In this period, the National Chief period (1938-1945), İnönü gained an unlimited power on the party and government and became the final determinant of both the politics and economic policies. The outbreak of World War II caused the National Chief period’s authoritative and tutelary tendencies to become more intense than they were during Atatürk’s period. Policy and economic policies also caused state-society and center-periphery relations to become tenser.

During the period between 1923 and 1945, the political center was entirely determined by Kemalist core. The framework of the regime was formally drawn by 1921 and 1924 constitutions respectively, but Mustafa Kemal gave practically all decisions regarding internal and foreign policies. As of 1927, Mustafa Kemal brought his power on political mechanisms to a formal plane through CHP by-law. As the political system has been constructed over single-party power CHP by-law in practical, became privileged than the constitution and became the basic determining element for the decision making process. By law's having superiority compared to constitution practically provided for the CHP Chief to be the single decision maker within the scope of authorities set forth by the by-law. By laws accepted in 1927, 1931, 1935, 1939, and 1943, Congresses vested to the CHP Chief extensive capacities more than those vested within the constitutional system. Due to the single-party and single-party regime being applicable, because of the authority received from party by-law, Atatürk and İnönü acquired extensive authority from determining the party hierarchy to determining the candidates of deputies and became the unique decisive factor on the political system. Due to this system, the 1924 Constitution could not find the opportunity to keep the government responsible against the Assembly Chief and his environment made decisions, these decisions were accepted in the party group and the Assembly approved them. Assembly with the 1924 Constitution could not utilize the authority for the supervision of legislation and execution and was obliged to approve the decisions made in the party group (Koçak, 2001: 120–122; 2009: 579–581).

The Kemalist political system, first depending on actual rather than the official single-party system, is a political system in which all powers are gathered on the chief, all decisions are made by the chief, and which is an authoritative and totalitarian system legitimized its powerful and centralized property by the mission of guiding the society. In the Atatürk period, this mission was used as an excuse for disqualification of the democratic mechanism, and in the National Chief period, war conditions were added into this excuse.

As of 1945, as the war ended by the victory of the allied countries, Turkey's requirement for the support of allied forces so that it could resist against the Soviet

threat, allied countries' exposing encouragement to those countries which are in alliance to walk toward democracy and uneasiness produced by war conditions in the society and political center caused Turkey to abandon the single-party regime, which had been implemented for 22 years.

CHAPTER 4

4. THE INSTRUMENTS OF THE TUTELAGE REGIME

The Republican People's Party (CHP), in the founding and settlement phases of the single-party regime, utilized various tools relevant to the period. For instance, during founding phase, 1923–1927, the Party capitalized on both the military and the judiciary. It intimidated its opponents by increasing its hold over the military and used the Law on the Maintenance of Order (*Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu*) and Independence Tribunals (*İstiklal Mahkemeleri*) to abate any political and social opposition. However, the contributions of the military and judiciary to the establishment of the single-party regime were confined to the period before 1927. CHP utilized various tools, in addition to the above-mentioned ones, even more effectively during its stay in power. In fact, it was utilization of these tools that allowed for an authoritarian single-party regime structured under a tutelary ideology. The tools that made for the scaffolding of the single-party regime include the social construction of a single-party ideology, CHP's declared mission towards such ideology, the chiefdom system and a two-step election system.

CHP in its single-party existence, the enlightenment mission on which it was based, and its assertion that all manners of political activity are harmful to the nation made it impossible for any political opposing factions to survive. The chiefdom system confined CHP in an elitist and tutelary administrative structure and forced a fusion of the concepts of the party and the state. The two-tiered election system provided for national will to be realized within the framework set forth by the CHP administration and ensured CHP's victory and incumbency. CHP created the necessary conditions to bypass the democratic mechanisms provided by the 1924 Constitution through the utilization of these three instruments. The democratic mechanisms provided by the Constitution were suspended through these mechanisms, and CHP administration

exercised authority and power that was not anticipated by the Constitution. These instruments allowed for RRP's operating charter and regulations to be more effective on the political system than the Constitution itself, hence ensured the continuation of the single-party regime. CHP realized an authoritarian tutelary political regime by these tactical instruments.

4.1. The Single-Party System and CHP's Mission

The most significant tool that sustained the single-party regime was that CHP had become the basic decisive force of all political activity, first as the de facto single-party, and later as the de jure single party. The de facto ban on founding political parties, despite the lack of any legal obstacles allowed CHP to become the absolute hegemony in the entire political system. The 1924 Constitution which was drafted with multi-party provisions had remained in effect, elections were held regularly, the TBMM had functioned in its constitutional framework until 1950 when CHP transferred power to the new incumbents. Lack of any political parties until 1946 had necessarily brought all organs of the system under CHP's administration. The single party incumbency sustained its domination over the political system by vesting any power that was not granted to it by the constitution via its own party charter.

4.1.1 The Intellectual Foundations of the Single-Party System

CHP, having based its existence on certain assumptions, believed in its own unique fitness as the single party and contended this was in the best interest of the country. With these assumptions, it had claimed the necessity of suspending all democratic mechanisms in order to achieve the democratic systems in the imagined new state and had not allowed the any viable contenders for power to survive. The unique fitness of the CHP cadres to carry the nation to a prosperous future and the unique fitness of the CHP charter and protocol to carry out this mission was asserted and as such the single party regime was established, first de facto, later de jure. The single-party regime, which was established on the assumption it would be temporary prior to 1930 when there were other political groups still in existence, played the role of a permanent and official character after 1930. CHP convinced itself that the country's

future depended on its own future and did not grant any other party except itself the option to survive. It is possible to detail the assumptions of CHP's legitimacy, which are based on being a single-party, as follows:

Appropriation of Victory

One of the leading facts, which CHP relied on for its existence as a single-party, was that the 'Society for the Defense of Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia' (*Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdafai Hukuk Cemiyeti*) was converted into a political party and established accordingly. This foundation provided CHP the appropriate victory and the ability to include an organization to lead the independence and build a hedge round the entire society. Atatürk, for the first time, in his statement to Ankara newspapers on December 6, 1922, announced his intention to establish a party, which would be named the People's Party (*Halk Fırkası*)¹³⁵ (1997-II: 50-52). In his statement, he expressed the idea that programmed reformation attempts were needed for the prosperity and development of the country after victory; therefore, he intended to establish "a political party based on populism under the name of the People's Party." In January 1923, Atatürk, in his own press conference, which was held in İzmit, repeated his intention to establish a party (1997-II: 68). In his speech on February 7, 1923, he mentioned details about the scope of the party he was going to establish (1997-II: 101-102). On April 8, 1923, one week after it was decided that the elections would be renewed (April 1, 1923), Atatürk published his 'Nine Principles' (*Dokuz Umde*), which stated that the 'Defense of Rights Group of Anatolia and Rumelia' (*Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdafai Hukuk Grubu*) in the Assembly, known as the First Group, shall convert into the People's Party (*Halk Fırkası*, HF).¹³⁶ On the same day, sending a letter to the ARMHC organizations, Atatürk reminded them that deputies who won the elections on behalf of the organization shall take over the administration of the country under the umbrella of HF, which was to be established in the Assembly and he invited the organization's members to support works for election. While members of the Second Group and

¹³⁵ The People's Party was renamed as the Republican People's Party on November 10, 1924.

¹³⁶ For the full text of the Manifesto of Nine Principles, see Tunçay, 1989: 354-356; Uyar, 1998: 71-74.

members of the CUP could not be successful, list of ARMHC won a concrete victory in the election. In the first month following the elections, HF's bylaw works were completed and on September 9, 1923, the HF was founded. The General President of the HF, Atatürk, became president on October 29, 1923 as the republican regime was entered into force. He assigned İsmet Pasha as the Prime Minister. İsmet Pasha sent a memorandum to the branches of ARMHC on November 20, 1923 stating that existing administrative boards should continue to work and function under the name of HF. After this memorandum, branches located in the four corners of the country changed their signboards to HF; thus, the conversion process of ARMHC to HF was completed (Giritlioğlu, 1965-1: 41; Uyar, 1998: 75-76).

In the following months, the HF administrators frequently used the conversion of the ARMHC into a political party and the foundation of HF on September 9, 1923 (İzmir's Independence Day) as a ground for the legitimization of CHP's single-party regime. When the HF established its foundation date as September 9, 1923, to coincide with the first anniversary of İzmir's Independence Day, it consciously made a connection with a symbolic date, on which the War of Independence was ended by a victory. Accordingly, based on the ARMHC, which expressed the centralization and nationalization of the War of Independence and actually directed the Independence War, it both appropriated the prestige of the victory and mentioned the thesis that it surrounded the entire society. The HF defined its primary Congress in 1927 as the Second Congress and accepted the party's First Congress as the Sivas Congress in which the ARMHC had been established and Atatürk had been selected as the president of the 'Representative Committee (*Heyet-i Temsiliye*) and reached the leadership of the Independence War. The Sivas Congress, which was the first and unique Congress held upon the initiative of Atatürk and his friends, enabled the Independence War to be centralized and to reach a national dimension. The ARMHC, which were also established in this Congress, provided the unity of all social sections that participated in the war.

All of these historical references enabled the HF to build the prestige of the victory of the national struggle while it additionally established a ground for the argument

asserting that HF encompassed and represented the entire society. The HF argued that the group, which directed and won the national struggle, was later converted into a political party and subsequently moved forward on its way (Uyar, 1998: 67-71, 75). Accordingly, a uniformity and permanency was provided between the groups, which won the war and established the state (Societies) and group (Party), and those, which shall establish and administer the state and find a solution for socio-economic problems.

Inclusivity of CHP and the Idea of a Classless Society

Another foundation that CHP laid in preparing its starting point for being a single-party is the assertion that there was no need for different political parties due to the nonexistence of classes and that CHP is a national party that both includes and environs the entire nation. Atatürk, in his speech before the formation of PP on February 7, 1923 in Balıkesir; put forth the following as to how the political parties prepared the foundation for their own existence;

This nation suffered tremendously from parties. I would like to state that in other countries, parties are certainly based on economic purposes. This is because; in those countries, there are classes. Against the establishment of a party to protect the interests of a class, another one shall be established to protect the interests of another class. It is very natural. We too experienced dreadful consequences due to the establishment of some such parties, as if various classes even exist in the country. However, when we mention People's Party, the whole nation is included in this party; it is not just a specific part of the nation. [...] Because the members of various professions are similar to each other, it is impossible to divide the people into classes and this party includes the whole nation. Furthermore, the PP shall be a school to provide political education to our public (1997-II: 101-102).

In this manner, Atatürk relates the existence of political parties with class differentiation and expresses that relying on the basis that differentiation in Turkey is professional differentiation beyond being a denominational one, there is no need for different political parties. In fact, the existence of different parties had led the country into trouble in the past. After the 1930s, these opinions, which were put forth in the early years of the Republic, were developed and used for legitimization of an authoritative single-party regime over a corporatist and solidarist vision of society.

CHP accepted the “Nine Principles,” which were published in 1923, as its principle program up until 1931 when it prepared a new program in the 1931 Congress. In this program, the corporatist approach, in which Atatürk evaluated the nation over a professional differentiation in 1923, was systemized. Thus, populism, which had been used as in the meaning of equity before national sovereignty and the law during the national struggle process and primary years of the Republic, was brought into a solidarist definition in the 1931 program. Under the title of, “No class but distribution of work,” the principle of populism (*halkçılık*) was defined as below:

It is one of our principles to see people of the Turkish Republic not in separate classes but in a society, which has been divided into separate work branches in terms of distribution of task for both individual and social life. [...] The goal of our party, with this principle, is to provide a social order and cooperation instead of a class struggle and to create a harmonization in benefits under an environment free from conflicts (CHF Programı, 1931: 32).

Assigned as CHP General Secretary after the SCF experience in 1930 and contributed seriously for the systemization of the single-party system until he was dismissed from duty, Recep Peker explains the principle of populism as below:

In the light of examples experienced in the whole world, the idea of being divided into classes creates a merciless, passionate, and fanatic class struggle and this leads to continuous conflict between citizens. This conflict slowly destroys national unity and the idea of nationality, which is the most important power for the existence of a state and its protection against dangerous factions. [...] Therefore, we reject being divided into classes and defend instead the idea of amalgamation (*kitleleşme*) as an entire nation (cited in Parla, 1992: 112).

Within the framework of these definitions, populism reached a meaning, which rejects the existence of classes by associating it with the probability of interest, and struggle, defines the society over distribution of task instead of class, and harmonizes the distribution of tasks within the scope of the party by defining it over union of interest. When the principles of populism and nationalism are considered together, it is understood that the CHP imagines the Turkish nation as an “integral and coherent mass, which shares the same language, culture and ideal, in which no deep conflicts exist between their interests” (Özbudun, 2011: 106).

When Atatürk’s speech of 1923 is examined in the context of CHP’s definition of populism in its 1931 program and Recep Peker’s populism approach, it becomes

clear that CHP believed in the sufficiency of single-party system for a single class society and dispensed with the multi-party approach. In fact, the CHP represents the entire nation, not just a part of it. With these arguments, CHP, particularly after 1930, defended a society imagination that legitimizes the single-party regime. In this period, assumptions that Turkey was a classless society and that CHP represents the entire society have become the basic arguments of the single-party regime.

CHP's Perception of the National Will

Another argument that CHP used for its existence as a single-party is the conceptualization of 'national will.' Beginning with the stage of the War of Independence, Atatürk made a distinction between society's real tendencies and its visible tendencies. According to Atatürk, society, although supporting itself to attain a civilized level, due to unsuccessful administrations and habits of the past—still appropriates some backward ideas today. He felt that the society did not properly attend the administration during the Ottoman period and thus remained ignorant. Therefore, as a whole, it is not aware of where its real interest is and can hence be easily deceived. In fact, it is not possible that a public which is loyal to dreamers who explore religious feelings or are loyal to the reign of a sultan can be civilized. The task of policy and intellectual staff is to raise the awareness of the public, to enlighten and "bring it" to the level of "contemporary civilization." In other words, the duty of the policy is to bring out the real tendencies within the population. Thus, reforms should be made "from top to bottom," and the nation should have been established upon the enlightenment of the public. The nation that would use this sovereignty was this nation. As the Turkish nation is not yet at this stage, according to the measure of civilization, for a specific period, supremacy should have been used on behalf of the nation (Heper, 2006: 97–98, 112–113). Within this framework, until the real tendencies inside the public appear, sovereignty cannot be completely transferred to the public and can thus be used by elites and political staff on behalf of the public.

It is possible to detail these ideational structures, which were applied to establish a tutelary and elitist single-party theory, as given below:¹³⁷ Atatürk, in the early years of the Republic, upon some terms such as the following; “society’s common opinion” (1997–II: 205), “society’s real feeling” (1997–II: 223), “people’s real tendency in their spirits and consciences” (1997–II: 224), and “nation’s real feelings and actions” (1997–II: 245), expressed that the public had a secret desire and tendency different from what was readily seen. This tendency is to proceed through the national route of civilized progression (1997–II: 223). However, this tendency is not seen by everyone and it does not appear that in order to bring out these tendencies and observe the public’s real tendencies, the revolution of progress and modernization is required. Genuine revolutionists can only achieve this. Atatürk summarized this thought as; “real revolutionists (*inkılapçılar*) or populists (*halkçılar*) are aware of how to penetrate into the real tendency of the spirit and conscience of the people whom they wish to direct toward progression and modernization revolution” (1997–II: 224).

According to Atatürk, the nation is not generally aware of these secret but real tendencies, which individuals keep inside themselves. Previous suppressive procedures have blinded the public so that individual citizens are unaware of its secret power and inclinations. In fact, the War of Independence put forth the obvious pattern of this situation. The nation, although it was not in favor of them, did not rebel against the invasion of their own free will (1968: 10–11, 22).

After pain and hard days, recovery of the nation from this grave [...] has been achieved because the intellectual and enlightened individuals of the nation have guided and directed them all toward the general objective in every case (1997, II: 159).

The same situation is also valid for the new political and social order that was to be established after independence was provided. When left alone, the individuals of this society drifted behind sheiks, ancestors, khans, etc., and beliefs in fortunetellers, magicians, healers, etc. It is obvious that such a nation cannot be considered a

¹³⁷ In this sub-section, it was applied extensively to Heper (1983: 209–243). Nonetheless, it should be emphasized that Heper has never questioned these thoughts and considered them rarely as a legal and reasonable opinion system and society has recorded significant improvements through this thought.

civilized nation (Atatürk, 1968: 896). Therefore, it is essential to guide the society and bring out the real tendencies from inside. For achieving this, a “from top to bottom” program should be implemented (Atatürk, 1997, II: 11).

It is not possible to say that society is on the right path under the current circumstances. The real soul of the public and its genuine proclivities are under the pressure of centuries of bad political and social policies. In the first instance, this fact should be made visible. For this reason, it is not possible to rely on populist opinion or popular sovereignty. First, the Assembly, elites, intellectuals, and governmental institutions shall enlighten the society, provide for it to go forward toward renovation, rise the society’s awareness to a certain level of civilization, then it shall be attributed that supremacy unconditionally belongs to the nation. Therefore, from the point of view of Atatürk, the nation does not have a formed and completed category but an imaginary integral, which must be constructed. According to Atatürk, sovereignty does not belong to an existing nation, which consists of crowded people and interest groups but it belongs to the nation, which expresses an imaginary integral (Heper, 1983: 226; 2006: 96; Rustow, 1968: 72). This nation, which represents the collective conscience, general benefit, and general will, is not yet a nation. The mission of policy is to construct this nation. Specifically, as the society today is helpless to see the truths, ‘national sovereignty’ or the ‘sovereignty of the people’ (*hakimiyet-i milliye*) cannot be determined by the society’s tendencies for today. Thus, until the tendencies inside are revealed by intellectuals, the society cannot move in line with the core of political activity and toward the public’s desire. Policy means to keep trying until the core inside the public is finally brought fourth. Both the Assembly and the government should first and foremost carry out a policy in this direction:

The duty of both TBMM and the government is [...] to search for and determine the best and correct ways with its all assets to bring the country and people up to the level of progression that is required for the existing civilization and humanity, and to explain to the nation that this is the best way to be followed and to provide the nation the ability to proceed with great speed and large steps in this direction (Atatürk, 1997, II: 63).

As can be easily comprehended, this is not actually any different than forcing the people to adopt the real tendency in Atatürk's mind. Within this framework, it can be stated that what Atatürk meant by "common idea" (*maşeri fikir*) is the six principles of Atatürk, which had been systemized by the policies, named as Kemalism, implemented up until 1931, and brought into a constitutional stage in 1937 (Heper, 1983: 229). Before these principles were brought into a legal status under the title of Kemalism, the real extent of the final idea or public's real tendency is Atatürk and CHP. Specifically, Atatürk and CHP determined what the society really thinks about and should think about. Tendencies that deviated from what they envisaged were rejected as being considered against the public's real tendencies.

In Heper's evaluation of Atatürk's words, sovereignty of the nation also exists in autocracy and constitutional monarch regimes even if it is at a minimum level compared to national sovereignty in a republic regime. Thus, national sovereignty should not be perceived as a fixed political structure, but should be understood on case-by-case basis with "essence and spirit." (Atatürk, 1968: 884–885)

In Atatürk's consideration of state, republic is not deemed a public administration, which the sovereignty completely belongs to public. Because, in Atatürk's republic, the public acquires a part of the sovereignty, whereas another part belongs to the authority of the Presidency (he is president at the time). From this perspective, it becomes clear that sovereignty of nation is not a pattern. Sovereignty of nation as "essence and spirit" is the public's general interest. What the "sovereignty belongs to the public unconditionally" means is that general interest and the future of the public depends on the person or people who care about their general interests, not to those who only care their own benefits and future (Heper, 1983: 239).

After the "sovereignty of nation" concept has been classified in terms of pattern and core, it is possible to defend the applications against sovereignty of nation as they comply with it in terms of core. Basing "sovereignty of nation" on the conceptualization of "general interest," which Atatürk and CHP can only define, enabled the Kemalist staff extensive mobility. No one is entitled to define the general interest except the Kemalist staff. This authority can only be achieved by the implementation of the national will in terms of pattern, that is to say—by elections only; but Atatürk closed this approach from the beginning. Heper provides a detailed retrospective of the meaning Atatürk attributed to sovereignty and national will:

Ataturk believed the public was steadily moving on the path towards a more civilized life style. Therefore, the leaders and elites around him were responsible to examine this process well and accelerate it. According to Atatürk, society's general interest could not be determined by applying to society's vote. Only the national will could determine a different reality from the total votes of the individuals as what complies with the general interest of the society, and what does not. National will could appear to the extent the society reaches a more civilized life style (2006: 118).

In accordance with this frame of mind, the Assembly, as long as it made decisions under the supervision of Atatürk and his friends, was appreciated as a political body in which the national will is manifested, the faith of the public is determined, and the real tendencies of the nation are revealed. When some factions appeared against Atatürk and friends, the Assembly began to deviate from this honorable purpose (Atatürk, 1968: 798). Therefore, it was inevitable to waive from the thought that identifies the Assembly with national will and state and to transfer the exercise of power to the presidency, thus to implement the republic regime. The same condition is also valid for the existence of political parties. It is impossible that the Progressive Republican Party, which threatens the People's Party's domination over the Assembly and power monopoly, can conduct politics in favor of the public. For this reason, it should be destroyed since its existence harms the society. The destiny of the Free Republican Party, which was individually established by Atatürk to supervise the CHP, depends on whether or not SCF threatens the power monopoly of CHP. The fact that the SCF was founded with the intent it would remain as an internal auditing body. Thus, when SCF wanted to come to power, the CHP administration thought that SCF's existence began to disturb the public. Neither of the political parties could survive since neither of them had the ability to perceive that only CHP made decisions regarding what would be in favor of the society.

Atatürk's thought process was systematic in the manner that he felt the society was now too far away to notice its internal secret truths, policy and elites are liable to reveal these secret truths, the national will can only appear in this process, and it is obviously a selective and guarded approach. With this opinion, which can be summarized by the term, "for the public, despite the public," Atatürk and CHP submitted a ready mission and until this mission is achieved, it was ordered that domination would be used by Atatürk and CHP on behalf of the public. Furthermore,

until the public reaches this level, the domination cannot be acquired by the public and shall belong to Atatürk and CHP on behalf of the nation. Because it is regarded as only under Atatürk and CHP's control to know where the interest of the public is, until 1946 this approach legitimized CHP as being the single-party, its identification with the state as being the single-party, and actual elimination of the 1924 Constitution.

CHP's Civilizing Mission

One of the leading grounds CHP legitimizes its being a single-party is the mission it has undertaken. Atatürk, at various times in his speeches, underlined the mission of CHP and stated that it has responsibilities beyond that of being an ordinary political party.

People's Party shall be a good school to submit a political discipline to the public (1997, II: 101–102).

The People's Party never appreciates any sophistry and it is the reflection of a revolutionary spirit, which founded Turkish Republic [...] Our society, our party is integrated with the nation and aims to lead and guide to save the country as well as to guide intellectual and social revolution, and shall be successful howsoever (1997, II: 195).

The Republican People's Party, of which I am proud to be president, is not an ordinary party doing street politics as seen in other countries. I shall repeat with respect that the People's Party is liable to enlighten and guide the entire society just as the Society for Defense of Rights did (1997, II: 235).

Our Party should not be considered as an ordinary political party such as in other countries. As you know, political parties are established for restricted purposes. [...] However, our Party is not an organization tracing a limited objective. On the contrary, it is an organization, which aims to protect the interests of all classes within the society without harming any others. Our attitude is the proof of this approach. This shall continue in this manner as well. There is no need to search for any similar institution in other countries (1997, II: 296–297).

With his respective speeches in 1923, 1924, 1925, and 1931, Atatürk underlined the mission of CHP and laid a burden on CHP to “introduce political discipline to the public,” “to guide the nation for intellectual and social revolution,” “to enlighten the nation,” and “to accomplish the interests of the public.” Equipped by these missions, CHP was the leading institution, which was attributed a responsibility for the objective of reconstruction of a political, economic, and social structure. CHP was

the most significant institution making decisions on behalf of the nation, shaping the nation, and using the national will within the process of the nation-building mission.

With this mission set forth on CHP, Atatürk considered CHP the most important impetus of the republic and identified his own destiny with that of CHP. The staff leader of the Progressive Republican Party established in 1924 agreed that Atatürk would undertake the role of an arbitrator as regards CHP-Progressive Republican Party competition and would lead them in the position of a supra political (*siyaset-üstü*); however, Atatürk rejected this role and preferred to continue in his function as CHP president. A better reflection of Atatürk's identifying CHP both with his own future and that of the political regime to be established occurred with the SCF experience. The SCF was established directly by the orientation of Atatürk on its staff and program in such a period in which the power struggle against Atatürk had completely ended and even a small hesitation against his leadership did not appear. With lessons learned from the Progressive Republican Party experience, the only condition for Fethi Bey to accept to establish SCF was that Atatürk should keep his objectivity in the CHP-SCF competition. Atatürk gave this guarantee but he refused to relinquish the identity of CHP General President and he needed to remind the public of his title of General President when within a short time the SCF displayed a strong opposition against CHP. Within this framework, as Atatürk preferred to support CHP between two parties, which have been established with a time interval of five years and as he became the General President of CHP indirectly in the 1927 Congress and directly in the 1931 Congress, this situation shows that a permanent connection exists between him, the CHP, and the political regime that was to be established.

This strong connection between CHP, Atatürk, and the political regime is relevant with either the mission CHP undertook or the one Atatürk placed on CHP. This mission provided CHP with the privilege of being a single-party and made it the most significant actor of the new political and social order.

4.1.2 Ruptures in Single-Party System

CHP put its signature on the period that lasted until 1946 as the single-party based on four assumptions—that it embraced the Kemalist core that led the independence war; it represented the entire population because no class differentiation had yet existed; it had the burden of appropriating people’s will in the name of the people in the process of turning making them into a nation; and that it had a responsibility to enlighten the masses as they become a nation. The Party believed these assumptions not only legitimized its existence as the single-party, but they required it. CHP became identified with the reform and its administration with successful implementation of reforms. Parties and organizations that opposed CHP were automatically perceived as opposed to reform.

Since it was the Society for the Defense of Rights—the precursor of CHP—that won the war, and since, it was CHP that successfully implemented the reforms, any threat to CHP’s administration was seen as a threat to the objectives of the reform.

The four assumptions above mentioned suspended all politics. It was assumed that political and democratic competition would be permitted when the CHP achieved its civilizing mission. Until then, it was believed that the establishment of different political parties would interrupt any progress towards becoming a civilized nation, and prevent the reforms that were supposed to give the public equal footing with other civilized nations to take effect. Within this framework, establishment of any political party was seen as an unnecessary threat. First, the members of the Union and Progress party and the Second Group were eliminated with the 1923 elections. Then the Progressive Republican Party was disqualified by the newly passed “Law on the Maintenance of Order” (*Takrir-i Sükûn Kanunu*). As of 1925, a de facto single-party regime was established. CHP appointed itself as the executor of the civilizing mission through nation-building and removed all real and imagined political obstacles from its path.

De Facto Single-Party Regime (1925–1930)

After the Progressive Republican Party closed, CHP became the single-party in the country. In order to remove potential power alternatives and resistance against reforms, Independence Tribunals removed all existing and potential opposition factors. This discharging process was ended by proceedings related to the İzmir Assassination. The Ankara Independence Tribunal, which was ruling in the İzmir Assassination case, although any possibility for making an organizational opposition was removed, including all actors-which might be potential opposition factors-into the adjudication process and made them ineffective. Within this framework, Unionists, members of the Second Group, and founders of the Progressive Republican Party were judged and punished. After this intimidation and discharge, no power remained that could object to CHP's policies.

In 1930, the foundation of an opposition party was permitted in order to keep CHP stronger by criticizing it. The mission laid on the SCF, which was founded under the guidance of Atatürk, was to provide power legitimacy by showing the deficiencies of CHP on an equation where CHP could maintain its rulership (Özbudun, 2011: 95). Nonetheless, the SCF could not survive because it rejected the role, which was expected not to oppose CHP's rulership monopoly. The SCF did not accept the role laid on it for playing a limited and controlled opposition, mentioned frequently its intention of power, and thus drew the CHP administration's reaction. The SCF, upon these reactions, decided in favor of termination in order to avoid ending up like the Progressive Republican Party leaders. CHP was surprisingly against the social support, which the SCF obtained within a period of three months, and concluded that the society had not yet internalized the revolution. Following this experience, a real single-party regime was established in terms of discourse and application. The single-party regime was defended within the framework of a doctrine and idealized institutional arrangements concerning the permanency of the regime were accomplished. Such that 1930 functioned as a milestone for the evaluations toward the political nature of the party regime. CHP was frightened by the excitement created in the society by a guided and reliable opposition party and it closed its doors entirely against the probability of a real opposition party.

From Single-Party Regime to Party-State (1930–1939)

The SCF experience provided for the CHP administration to leave the application of an actual single-party regime without a doctrine, make peace with the reality of being a single-party, and develop ideological institutional regulations in respect thereof. CHP made an appropriate description of a society with a single-party regime, took steps which gradually identified the party with the state, terminated all kinds of organizations and institutions outside of the party or included them into party, attempted to establish carrier staff to keep the party alive and bring it together with the society, and developed policies to train the society. All of these activities served the single-party in taking root and becoming authoritative. Following these developments, it was put forth more obviously that CHP designed the single-party regime not temporarily with actual and pragmatic concerns but as an ideal and permanent regime. In fact, the permanency of the ideological conversion of CHP after 1930 has also been stated in party programs. In the introductory sections of CHP party programs dated 1931 and 1935; it was expressed that “the outlines of our projects indicated here collectively are not only for a few years but also including the future,” thus the permanency of the mindset providing an ideological ground for the single-party regime was emphasized.

The most important effect of the SCF experience on CHP is that training activities have been concentrated on in order to strengthen CHP ideologically, organizationally, and in mobilization. Within this context, for the most part, all self-reliant associations and institutions were abolished or included within the scope of CHP. On March 25, 1931, Atatürk provided the follow justification in relation to abolishing the Turkish Hearths (*Türk Ocakları*):

There are some periods in the history of nations that in order to reach certain objectives, all power either physical or moral should be collected and brought together and should be directed toward the same objective. [...] For the protection of the revolution against domestic and foreign attacks, all nationalist and republican powers should be collected in a certain place. [...] The same type of power should unite toward a common objective (1997–III: 130).

Primarily as a requirement of the call of Atatürk, the Turkish Hearths, which was one of the most effective ideology production centers in the society, made a decision for

the abolishment of their own organization and then the People's Houses (*Halkevleri*) were opened to fulfill their mission. Following the lead of the Turkish Hearts, other associations, and institutions also abolished themselves and appropriated their assets to CHP. Associations such as the Masonic Lodge (*Mason Locası*), the Union of Women (*Kadınlar Birliği*), and Unions of Teachers (*Muallim Birlikleri*) all had the following expressions in documents declaring their decisions of abolishment, "Their purposes have already been achieved by CHP, no additional works are required, it shall be more useful to work within the scope of RP" (Yetkin, 1983: 78).

CHP's 1935 Congress brought the ideological conversion in the 1931 Congress to its natural conclusion. Primarily, the decision for party-state integration was made. The CHP General Secretary Recep Peker explained his decision, which means that the line followed by CHP so far, should be appropriated to the state:

The main distinctive property of the new program, which attracts attention, is the strict approximation of the existence of CHP and existence of the state, which has already been in cooperation in new Turkey. [...] The Turkish Republic is a party state and the Party works together with the state (Peker, 1935: 248–250).

One month after the Congress (June 15, 1935), Recep Peker was relieved from his post as CHP General Secretary. This decision, which was made by the Congress, was formally announced by the Prime Minister İnönü in his June 18, 1936 address:

In order to accelerate and achieve the purposes of CHP in relationship to the country's political and social life, the General Presidency Council decided that a better connection and proximity to administration should be established regarding the practical and actual applications between party activities and the government (Yetkin, 1983: 27).

After the circular, the Minister of Interiors was offered the position of CHP General Secretary; provincial governors were offered assignments as CHP Provincial President, and at the same time, General Inspectors were offered assignments of CHP Inspectors. In addition to providing party-state integration, CHP's Fourth Congress named CHP's principles as Kemalism and brought them forward as the basic reference for the state. Upon the amendment of the Constitution in 1937, CHP principles were included in the constitution under the name of Kemalism; thus, CHP's relation with the state was brought into a constitutional status. All of these

developments reveal that the single-party regime in terms of legal-constitutional aspect had begun to be considered not as a temporary situation but as a permanent and ideal situation.

Founded on the consideration that party-state order is better for the country's needs, these applications for arbitrating CHP's power in the political system at the same time rendered the existence of the party meaningless. To unite the party with the state caused the existence of a "Party-State" order as well as the establishment of a "Republic without Party" order. Upon CHP's departing from its qualification of being a political institution and its disintegration within the state, the "Republic with a Single-party" relinquished its place to the "Republic without a Party" (Goloğlu, 2009: 209–212).

National Chiefdom (1939–1945)

While during the İnönü period, the tendency in recent years to strengthen CHP-state relations, which remained from the Atatürk period, was continued, attempts were also made to take measures against the disintegration of the party due to this relation. As the National Chief system was being implemented, party-state identification was strengthened and an attempt was made to avoid disintegration of the party within the state, which was a result of the abandonment of the party-state system.

The most important development within that period was the receipt of the title of National Chief by İnönü. In the Extraordinary Congress held on December 26, 1938, the bylaw was amended and İnönü was assigned as the Permanent General President of CHP. The "National Chief" expression in the by-law amendment was justified in the manner that CHP was not a political party in the strict sense but it was the party of the whole nation since it collects all citizens under its umbrella, thus the chief of the party and/or the chief of all society, shall naturally be the "National Chief." Therefore, after 1930, this application was a natural consequence of the consideration of an adopted classless society and CHP is the party of the entire nation. Hence, the National Chief represents the national will of the society, just as the party chief represents the will of the party.

Another significant development during the İnönü period was that the decision for unity of the party-state, which had been given in the 1935 Congress, was abandoned in the 1939 Congress. CHP, while giving its order to the state, made its existence meaningless and thus decided to convert into an independent political institution again. This does not mean that the party breaks its connection with the state, but it should be construed as the establishment of a strong connection with the state in which its own existence shall not become meaningless. Within this framework, before Congress was held on January 28, 1939, instead of assigning the Minister of Interior, the Prime Minister and CHP Deputy General President Refik Saydam assigned Erzurum Deputy A. Fikri Tüzer as CHP General Secretary. However, in the Congress held on May 29, 1939, it was set forth that the CHP General Secretary should have been included as the Minister of State into the Cabinet (Art. 29). Therefore, this change was made to re-design party-state relations on a formula that would strengthen the party. CHP General Secretary Fikri Tüzer's statement regarding this decision, which was made in the Congress, addressed this situation:

Observations during the three-year period of the implementation of the decision accepted on June 18, 1936 by the General Presidency Council regarding the union of the government and party showed that this situation is not required to be continued and in order to provide a safer and firm activity opportunity for the party, which is a control body, it was considered that primarily the General Secretary and Ministry of Interior should be separated from each other. The same impact shall be seen over the organizations in the provinces. Provincial party organizations were obliged to be separated from the governments as well. Essentially, the purpose of the decision given by the General Presidency Council consisted of provision of the opportunity for the administration of party activities in harmony, but because this aim has not been achievable and the harmony therein was strictly required, the person to take charge as General Secretary was also required to be included in the government cabinet. Therefore, the General Secretary would get the opportunity to discuss the society's problems with his friends and solve them accordingly since he would perform his task of administration under better circumstances (CHP V. Büyük Kurultay Zabıtları, 1939: 30).

One month after the Congress (July 5, 1939), the CHP General Secretary decided to eliminate the party-state unity. In the circular signed by CHP General Secretary Fikri Tüzer, which was sent to governors and CHP organizations, it was stated that the union of party-state, which was applied since 1936 was removed. In contrast, the application which the governors take charge as provincial president at the same time was also abandoned, but reminding that the Party General Secretary was included in

the government as state minister, it was claimed that the governors should continue to work in close cooperation with the party.

I wish to state that I appreciate our governors for their services for our party and country for three years acting as Party President and I wish them to continue to serve in this capacity. New regulation provided the Party General Secretary to be included in the Cabinet as State Minister and Party and Government Union have been maintained accordingly. Actually, I consider it very natural that our governors shall provide assistance and support to our party in the future just as they have done so far (cited in Akandere, 1998: 84; Koçak, 1999: 91–92).

Therefore, provisions were made that the CHP-state cooperation be maintained with a new formula, which would be used to strengthen the party. The structure in which the governors take the duty of CHP provincial president at the same time has been abandoned but they claimed not to break connection with the party and to consider party affairs as a state issue in which they would get involved. In the same way, the capacity in which the Minister of Interior functions as Party General Secretary has also been abandoned but the Party General Secretary was given the opportunity to enter into the cabinet in the capacity of State Minister in order to support party-state relations. Although Koçak (1939: 93–94) thinks that CHP administrators wish to break their connections with the party but they could not achieve it due to CHP's organizational weakness, actually it should be better to consider that there was a deliberate decision wherein CHP has been removing the elements of the application coming from 1936, which harmed the party but did not wish to sever the connection of the party with the state. For this reason, instead of considering CHP's decision in 1939 for the rearrangement of party-state relations as the failure of CHP for something it wishes greatly due to its weaknesses or regular practices, it might be better to perceive it as a planned decision implemented by CHP for strengthening its own existence as a party.

This interrelation between the party and state continued in this manner during CHP rule. Governors and other administrative chiefs, as CHP officers, worked in line with the party administrators' wishes and claims. Besides being a single-party, participation of the Party General Secretary in the cabinet established a legal basis for this relation.

4.1.3 Single-Party System and the Tutelage Regime

One of the most important grounds of the authoritative and political tutelage system during the single-party system was that CHP was the single-party and intellectual presumptions upon which it was based include that of being a single-party. CHP primarily developed intellectual presumptions, which its single-party application shall be necessary and inevitable for the future of the society and political regime. It leaned on the roots of the Society for the Defense of Rights and appropriated the War of Independence, which found the existence of other parties unnecessary upon the assumption of a classless formed society, claimed that it covered all of the society, defended the authority of using the national will on behalf of the nation until the nation exists claiming that the society has not been able to reach a nation-level, and pointed out its mission for the civilization of the society. Afterwards, for the sake of these presumptions, all formations having a political impact or having the potential to acquire a political impact apart from itself have been eliminated. Along with this process, an authoritative regime was established, but it was claimed that this authoritative system was essential in order to achieve a more democratic political system, more civilized social structure, and for stronger economic development.

All-important decisions made during the process of establishment and institutionalization of the political regime were taken and carried out by CHP's decision-making bodies. The party became the unique official and legal body in which the republic's official ideology had been established (Mardin, 1981: 210). Party programs directed government programs and became a source of inspiration for constitutional regulations. CHP congresses were the decisive factor in the direction of the political regime. Upon the implementation of the party-state union in 1936 and the accession of Kemalism—comprising the principles of the party into the constitution in 1937, CHP became officially identified with the state. Simultaneously identifying itself with both the Turkish state and the Turkish nation, during its rule CHP, applied tutelary policies for the reconstruction of state and society and it became the most important institution, deciding on behalf of the people during the construction process of a new nation, shaping the nation, and using the national will.

4.2 The Chiefdom System

The chief system was one of the most significant tools that sustained the single-party regime. This system reduced the participation of party organs in politics and empowered the party leader with full authority. Therefore, the system granted absolute authority to the Kemalist cadre and it eliminated opposition within the party. Although the constitutional regime was regulated according to the 1924 Constitution, in this single-party period, the regulation of CHP was more effective than the constitution because of the dominance of CHP in the political system. In this respect, due to the CHP Regulation, the authority that the 1924 Constitution did not confer to the president and the government was granted to the CHP party leader and its leading faction. As a result, the constitutional regime turned into an authoritarian anti-democratic political system, which was based on the absolute power of the party leader.

4.2.1 The Founding of the Chiefdom System

The application of the chiefdom system during the single-party regime relied on two major elements: first, the position of the president of the party was given a permanent status and second, the authority this position could exercise on the structural organization of the party was increased. Both of these changes were put into practice in 1927. In this respect, it could be said that the single-party regime was, in fact, based on the chiefdom system since 1927. This is directly correlated to the resolution of the power struggle between 1923 and 1927 in Atatürk's favor. In fact, since 1923, Atatürk had de facto authority over CHP and through CHP over the political system the same as in the chiefdom system. After the elections of 1923, Atatürk declared that the Societies for the Defense of Rights would become the People's Party and as the leader of the First Group in the Assembly, he played a large role in the selection of deputy candidates for the 1923 elections. This was while he simultaneously prevented selection of the members of the opponent Second Group in the Assembly. Although Regulation of the 1923 People's Party¹³⁸ included several provisions that would hinder the chiefdom system, Atatürk exercised more power than the

¹³⁸ For 1923 Charter of People's Party, see Tunçay, 1989: 362–369.

Regulation entitled him. The Regulation ruled that the People's Party would convene Congress annually (Art. 8), the party leader would be elected by the Congress (Art. 5), and the deputy candidates would be determined by the party council (Art. 26). This democratic structure of the People's Party, which would hinder the chiefdom system, was due to the presence of opposition to Atatürk within the party. Atatürk was not the only determinant over the party and the political system yet.

Despite the exclusionist position of Atatürk in the 1923 elections, the existence of opposition in the Second Assembly affected the drafting process of the 1924 Constitution. There were heated discussions about the legislation-execution relations and Atatürk was not able to enact his demands on behalf of the execution and the presidency in the new constitution. The parliamentary group of the Republican People's Party agreed on a new constitution, which was based on the union of powers and devoted sovereignty to the Assembly. The authority of the president over the execution was restricted and execution was subjected to the Assembly. In this respect, the principle of union of powers based on the separation of duties was adopted.

However, the president continued to maintain his identity as the party leader and this situation eased the transition to the chiefdom system. This political system was designed for a multi-party system to strengthen the execution. However, in a single-party regime, this system created an opportunity for the president to increase his power, which was not granted by the Constitution but by Party Regulation, as he was the party leader at the same time. In the First Assembly, the opposition group separated from CHP and established a new party group as the Progressive Republican Party. This opposition group obstructed Atatürk and CHP from establishing a de facto chiefdom system by enacting every regulation they demanded in the Assembly. However, through the Law on the Maintenance of Order and Independence Tribunals, Atatürk disregarded the 1924 Constitution, which links execution to the Assembly and devoted power to the execution. He also closed down the Progressive Republican Party and initiated a de facto one-party rule. The elimination of the opposition and de facto one-party rule eased the establishment of

the chiefdom system. Within this framework, several regulations were made to formalize the chiefdom system in the 1927 Congress.

The first regulation that enabled the transition to the chiefdom system was realized with the change of party regulation before the general elections and Congress in 1927. With the change in Article 26 of the 1923 Party Regulation, the authority to determine the deputy candidates and manage election affairs was given to the Party Leader (*Umumi Reis*) from the Party Council (*Fırka Divanı*). In this regard, the authority to determine deputy candidates was withdrawn from a large committee, which included the ministers who were members of the party, the Administrative Committee of the Party (*Parti Umumi İdare Heyeti*), the Administrative Committee of Assembly (*Meclis İdare Heyeti*) (Art. 20), and entitled to only one man, the CHP leader. After the power struggle, which resulted on behalf of Atatürk, he used his authority to determine deputies according to his own judgment. Since only the CHP participated in the elections, the new Assembly was formed with the approval of the deputy candidates who were elected by Atatürk.

After the elections, the Party Regulation of 1927 was approved on October 15, 1927 in the Second Congress of CHP.¹³⁹ This new Regulation included several articles that helped to establish the chiefdom system. Primarily, the decision-making center of the party was narrowed down. The authority to determine deputy candidates and manage election affairs was given from the Party Council to the Chairmanship Council (*Riyaset Divanı*) (Art. 23) and the Party Council turned into an advisory body of the party that debates internal affairs of the party and explains the Regulation (Art. 26). The Chairmanship Council was composed of the Party President (*Umumi Reis*), the Party Vice President (*Reis Vekili*), and the General Secretary (*Fırka Katibi Umumisi*). The Vice President and the General Secretary were appointed by the Party Leader (Art. 21). The CHP group was obligated unconditionally to execute the decisions of the Chairmanship Council (Art. 22). While the Chairmanship Council consisted of three members, the Party Council was composed of the Chairmanship Council, cabinet members, the General Administrative Committee (*Umumi İdare*

¹³⁹ For the 1927 Charter of RPP, see Tunçay, 1989: 382–394.

Heyeti), and the Administrative Committee of Party Group (*Fırka Grubu İdare Heyeti*) (Art. 21 and 25). Consequently, delegating a great deal of power from a large Party Council to the relatively small Chairmanship Council, which was composed of three members, strengthened the hierarchical structure of the party. The decision-making mechanism of the party was centralized and participation was reduced. Another regulation supporting this trend is that the Congress would be convened every four years (Art. 10), whereas in the Regulation of 1923, the Congress would be convened annually (Art. 8) (this was never fulfilled at the elapsed time).

The Regulation of 1927, which was approved in the Second Congress, included several articles that formalized the chiefdom system. Through these articles, CHP was centralized, and became authoritarian as well as elitist. The Regulations of 1931, 1935, 1939, and 1943, accepted the power of the party leader as was recognized previously with the Regulation of 1927. Through these authorizations, the concepts such as “chief” (*şef*) and “national chief” (*milli şef*) were used for the first time in CHP Regulation. Ten years before 1938 when these concepts were widely used to describe the İnönü era, the chiefdom system was established de facto. The party organ composed of deputies selected by the party leader and Secretary-General had the right to speak on behalf of the party, make decisions that concern the whole party, oblige the party to obey all its decisions, and select the deputy candidates. Considering the fact that the party leader was the president at the same time, it is fair to say that the president as a party leader enjoyed a large power, which was not granted by the Constitution and the chiefdom system was in charge.

Along with these authorizations, another issue that made the chiefdom system possible was the inalterableness of the party leader. According to the first Regulation of the People’s Party in 1923, the party leader was elected by the Congress (Art. 5). The Regulation of 1927 indirectly lifted this article. First, Atatürk was recognized as the party leader and founding father (*banisi*) of CHP in Article 6. Then, Article 7 stated that the first six articles were non-amendable. Thus, Atatürk became a constant leader of the CHP. The following Regulations directly indicated the status of

Atatürk. The Regulation of 1931¹⁴⁰ designated Atatürk as ‘Constant Party Leader’ (*Daimi Umumi Reis*) (Art. 2) and the Regulation of 1935¹⁴¹ declared him ‘Immutable Party Leader’ (*Değişmez Genel Başkan*) (Art. 2). In the Extraordinary Congress of December 26, 1938, which met after the death of Atatürk, he was described as the ‘Eternal Leader’ (*Ebedi Başkan*) (Art. 2) and İnönü was described as ‘Immutable Party Leader’ (*Değişmez Genel Başkan*) (Art. 3) by the change in the Regulation.¹⁴²

Two significant developments indicating the strength of the informal chieftain system in Atatürk’s era occurred when the party needed to elect a new party leader after the death of Atatürk. CHP Regulation assigned the duty to call for an ordinary or Extraordinary Congress to the party leader and the possible absence of the party leader was not considered. Secondly, it was not stated how to elect the new party leader. Nonetheless, these two points were vital instruments to ensuring the continuity and functioning of the party. The CHP Regulation that did not include the process of electing a new party leader and of convening the Congress in the absence of the party leader indicates how the chieftain system diffused to the CHP Regulation to dissolve the institutional continuity of the party.

These two issues were resolved in 1938 through on the spot decisions rather than party regulation (Koçak, 2001: 123–128). For the first issue, the Vice Chairman of the Party, Celal Bayar called for an Extraordinary Congress. The second issue was resolved through a regulation change. The Party decided not to elect a new party leader, instead party leadership was regarded as an incontestable right for İnönü, who was elected as the president on November 11, 1938. The Non-Amendable Party Leadership of İnönü formalized with an additional article in the Party Regulation and the ratification of this article approved his leadership. In other words, İnönü became the Non-Amendable Party Leader of CHP not through a voting process but with a change in the Regulation (Koçak, 2001: 134).

¹⁴⁰ For the full text of 1931 Program of RPP, see *CHF Programı*, 1931.

¹⁴¹ For the full text of 1935 Regulation of RPP, see *CHP Tüzüğü. Parti’nin Dördüncü Büyük Kurultayı*, 1935

¹⁴² For the full text of the amendment of the Charter, see *CHP Üsnomal Büyük Kurultayı’nın Zabtı*, 1938: 37.

The changes in the Regulation that resolved these issues include the following:

Art. 2: Eternal leader and founder of the party is Kemal Atatürk who established the Republic of Turkey.

Art. 3: Non-Amendable Party Leader is İsmet İnönü.

Art. 4: Non-Amendable Party Leadership would be terminated with regard to three circumstances: a) Death, b) Having a fatal disease preventing the ability to carry out the duties of the position, c) Resignation. In one of these three circumstances, the Party Grand Congress would meet immediately to elect a Non-Amendable Party Leader among the party deputies (CHP Üsnomal Büyük Kurultayı'nın Zabtı, 1938: 37).

4.2.2 Legalizing the Chiefdom System

Regulation change solved two issues, which occurred with the death of Atatürk, and which additionally helped to formalize the chiefdom system. Primarily, non-amendable party leadership became not just a status peculiar to Atatürk but an important continuous component of the party regime. Hence, İnönü's leadership became non-amendable as well and even the next party leader following his leadership would become not only the leader of the party but also a Non-Amendable Party Leader. Another important issue is that for the first time concepts like 'chiefdom system' and 'national chief' were deployed officially to justify the change in regulation. The reason for the party leader having non-amendment shield and chief status is explained in the justification of the regulation change.

Political parties are political organizations in which citizens who share a common understanding with regards to national interests constitute. People among a nation with common political opinion are disorganized. A chief would bring them together under an organization.

The duty of the chief is very important, especially in states, which are newly experiencing political party life. Because, the chief has to unite political opinions in the form of political principles, mature them, engrain them in minds, and feed them—the chief would raise the nationals who would manage the national politics in the political field.

It is especially difficult to find persons qualified to be a chief in every party and group as well as it is difficult to change these qualified persons as often as they manage and represent the party for not to weaken the authority of the party.

The Republican People's Party is a political party, which guided the nation in its struggle for independence and progress, and adopted the principles such as

Republicanism, Revolutionarism, and Secularism that would eventually increase the reputation and welfare of the nation as uncompromised political doctrines of the party, and represent all nationals by exceeding the ideological limits of political parties. The leader of such a party inherently acquires the title “National Chief.” Hence, it is for the sake of national interest that the Party Leader of the party not be subjected to deliberation and contention every four years and in every Congress, and to strengthen the authority and stability of the statue (CHP Üsnomal Büyük Kurultayı’nın Zabtı, 1938: 35–36).

The regulation change of 1938 along with its justification includes many elements of the authoritarian single-party rule. The documents give reference to CHP’s mission of guiding the nation and emphasizes that the leader of the party must be called as national chief because CHP represents all Turkish people since the Turkish nation is not composed of classes. The chief is assigned to unite the society, gather all nationals under one roof, and educate them. Furthermore, it is assumed that subjecting the chief to the elections would undermine his authority and thus non-amendment and non-liability status are recognized for the chief. Therefore, İsmet İnönü became “National Chief” as Non-Amendable Party Leader of CHP for his entire lifetime and it is declared that the following leader after İnönü would have a non-amendment shield as well. The CHP Regulations of 1939 and 1943 also adopted this provision. In this respect, the non-amendment status of the CHP leader is continued until the change in (Art. 4) the Regulation at the Second Extraordinary Congress on May 10, 1946.

As mentioned above, even though the system was not called so, the chiefdom system became official in 1927, since the CHP’s ruling cadre and decision-making mechanism are constricted, and Atatürk is covered with the non-amendment shield. The developments in the İnönü era officially name this status, maintaining it as a permanent status rather than a peculiar position to Atatürk and attributing a meaning to it. On the other hand, the single-party rule in the Atatürk era never used the word “chief” to describe the existing political regime. The word “chief” is kept as an honorific expression used occasionally in the media for Atatürk, Fevzi Çakmak, and İnönü (Akandere, 1998: 29–34; Koçak, 2008: 167–171; Yetkin, 1983: 158–160). Celal Bayar mentioned ‘directives of the chief’ 39 times in referring to Atatürk in the Government Program of 1937 (Koçak, 2008: 85). In addition, Peker used the word

chief for CHP leader in his writings and speeches to give a similar insight of the justification of the regulation change of 1938 (Peker, 1936: 63–65). However, during the İnönü era, the word “National Chief” is used officially to refer to a certain political regime and attributed to a political meaning.

The articles changed in the CHP Regulation and their justification legitimated many anti-democratic elements, which were in force but not official during the Atatürk era. In other words, the chieftom system was institutionalized as many privileges of Atatürk were also formally recognized for İnönü. During the Atatürk era, the political system is not called a chieftom system and this preference hindered the attribution of many anti-democratic and divine (super-human) mystifications to the Chief. However, during the İnönü era, the chieftom system is officially institutionalized and several anti-democratic and divine features are attributed to the Chief. In fact, after many superior abstract features are attributed to the chief, electing such a great leader for the office every four years is assumed as a kind of criteria that would weaken the authority of the chief and the stability of the country. Hence, the chief is officially accepted as non-amendable. The determination of the criteria for amendment as death, resignation, and having a fatal disease preventing from work led non-liability and non-surveillance of the chief. Apart from these defined criteria, the chief is accepted as non-amendable and his term in office cannot be terminated. Thus, the chief had an anti-democratic protection and the non-liability shield before the law and all state institutions. Therefore, the regulation change made for İnönü recognized more privileges for İnönü compared to the regulation in force during the Atatürk era. The non-amendment shield of Atatürk was not defined according to any criteria; hence, there was an open door to pierce this shield when necessary. However, exceptions defined for the chief amendment in the İnönü era guaranteed that the non-amendment shield could not be pierced apart from these exceptions.

Besides this significant difference between Atatürk and İnönü, the non-amendment status in both eras rendered the party leader as non-labile. In a multi-party political system, this anti-democratic privilege would only contain CHP. However, in single-

party rule, it became the political regime of the country. Thus, significant power, which is not granted by the Constitution, is devoted to the chief through CHP Regulation. Atatürk and İnönü derived the significant measure of their authority and privileges not from the 1924 Constitution in force while they were the presidents but from CHP regulation since they were the party leaders at the same time. Although the Constitution requires elections for the Presidency after every general election, this criteria became meaningless as the CHP's party leader became the non-amendable chief of the single-party regime.

The chieftain system, besides its anti-democratic tendencies and its clash with the existing legislation (*yasal mevzuat*) in the country, was the basis for several irrational and mystifying conditions. After having received the title of the chief, İnönü was attributed many characteristics by the media that were associated more with a fascist mindset than a democratic one, to the extent that it is possible to talk about a large body of literature that is based on these associations. In this discourse,¹⁴³ the national chief is perceived as a hero, a guide, a master instructor, the most prominent representative of the Turkish nation, the founder and protector of Turkish culture; both the author and the actor of national development. He is a leader who embodies the national character, whose will functions as the national will; a leader who holds the fate of the nation in his hands, who symbolizes unity, and brotherhood, who unites the people as one heart, one goal and one love; who is the object of affection for all and the monarch of all hearts. He is the source of infinite inspiration. He is who sees it all with his keen and superior observation skills. He is who not only anticipates the direction of future events and makes appropriate decisions, but actively steers progress and the future of the nation. He is who is a role model for all political and party leaders with his political skills, dignity, good manner, and mature tone; and who was the most powerful and talented guard of Turkish independence. He was a high rank soldier and a high rank diplomat; a citizen of the world; warden of the World War and peace; and inspired all the people around the world with his speeches (Akandere, 1998: 49–59; Yetkin, 1983: 161–169). These glorifications and

¹⁴³ For more information on this corpus, see Akandere, 1998: 49–59; Yetkin, 1983: 161–169.

mystifications granted various superhuman features to İnönü, which were not even granted to Ottoman sultans or Atatürk.

The national chief bestowed with these anti-democratic privileges and superhuman features established an absolute domination over the political system of the period. When the chief did not mark this period yet (January 27, 1939), Manisa Deputy Refik Şevket İnce's speech in the Parliament before the vote of confidence for the Refik Saydam Government indicates this domination. While discussing the government program, İnce claimed, "It is a national duty to our national chief for all of us to trust his nominees and suggestions for government just because we trust him" (Goloğlu, 1974: 6; Yetkin, 1983: 163). Hence, the government program became meaningless and the will of the national chief determined İnce's will. As the national chief assigns the government, İnce's part is to give a vote of confidence. In fact, İnce indicated the de facto position of the CHP group in the Parliament and accordingly the sum total of the members of the Parliament during the single-party regime. During the single-party rule, the İnönü, Bayar, Saydam, and Saraçoğlu governments unanimously won votes of confidence. None of the regulations brought by the governments to the General Assembly was rejected and in several exceptional cases, a limited number of abstaining or dissent votes were used.

4.2.3 The National Chief İnönü

There is a large literature the reasons for İnönü's insistence on officially labeling the system as the chieftain system while the system worked well with various de facto and de jure privileges without having been labeled during Atatürk's administration. It is necessary to clarify one point before moving on to examine this body of scholarship.

İnönü was chosen unanimously as the president one day after Atatürk's death (November 11, 1938). Six weeks later (December 26, 1938), Vice Chairman Bayar called for an Extraordinary Party Congress to change the party regulations in order to elect a leader for the party. In the meantime, CHP did not have a party leader and İnönü ensured that the Extraordinary Congress would appoint him as Non-

Amendable Party Leader and National Chief. It was possible that the Congress would perceive 'Non-Amendable' status as a peculiar privilege to Atatürk and would not honor İnönü with this status. However, elapsed time from the death of Atatürk to the Extraordinary Congress date provided opportunity for İnönü to eliminate this possibility. After he was elected as president, he assigned his best man Refik Saydam, who would be his Prime Minister until his death, as Minister of Interior in Bayar Government and hence as the Secretary-General of CHP. Accordingly, this assignment paved the way for İnönü to dominate the party. It is obvious that İnönü on his own demanded to be the Non-Amendable Party Leader and National Chief. The only agenda of the Congress was to change the party regulation in order to honor İnönü with these statuses. In this regard, without a doubt, the party was called for an Extraordinary Congress due to İnönü's order and the regulation change was formulated according to İnönü's demands.

Both the political actors and the scholars of the period advanced various reasons for İnönü's need for the official title of the "National Chief."¹⁴⁴ These reasons can be classified under three titles: İnönü's concerns about the political atmosphere, the influence of the fascist regimes of the era, and the effects of the Ottoman modernization. The common thread that runs in this literature is the recognition that after the chiefdom system was formalized, the political regime was transformed into a more authoritarian, and more centrist and anti-democratic regime than it was during its de facto practice in Atatürk administration. In other words, the official chiefdom system increased İnönü's hold over the political system more so than it did that of Atatürk. It is also necessary for the purposes of this dissertation to address the reasons İnönü needed more power than Atatürk. While the first of these three reasons given for İnönü's increased power is directly related to İnönü's need for such power, the last two are related to the formation of political subjectivity in that period.

The primary reason why İnönü needed more power was that he felt inferior when compared to Atatürk's authority over the political system. İnönü was "the second

¹⁴⁴ For a comprehensive evaluation of the literature on why İnönü needed a National Chief status, see Akandere, 1998: 42-65; Yetkin, 1983: 157-174.

man” throughout his career and he was faced with the risk of losing this position in 1937. During Atatürk’s illness, he was faced with strong opposition and various threats that ranged from being exiled to assassination. He evaded the refinement, which was similar to the refinement of the generals of the War of Independence in the mid-1920s and that was due to the support of the military, Çakmak and Bayar (Koçak, 2008: 134–135; Özdağ, 2006: 117; Özdemir, 1989: 71–74; Vanderlippe, 2005: 30–31). Thus, İnönü did not have indisputable and unquestionable power. In order to be competent, have an absolute power over the political system, and be backed by both CHP and the society, he had to acquire several privileges and statuses, which were not previously granted to Atatürk. In this regard, İnönü needed a non-amendment shield and national chief status since he wanted to acquire the influence and charisma of Atatürk as well as he wanted to secure his position against his opponents.

Secondly, the Kemalist regime was established with decisions that Atatürk had made during hard times. Although İnönü was the leading executor of Atatürk’s policies, Atatürk had been sustaining the system. The single-party regime was established as Atatürk eliminated all current and potential opponents to the government. During this process, powerful political figures who saw themselves as equals to İnönü but were forced by Atatürk to step aside were still living. After Atatürk died, it was possible that these figures would return to politics and establish an opposition party together with the support of other opponents. Because of this possibility, İnönü was in need of a system that would strengthen his power. Hence, he followed peace policy and ensured significant privileges for himself through a non-amendment shield and chief status in order to prevent excluded political actors forming an opposition block. In addition, he assigned Bayar to reconcile these offended political figures (İnönü, 1987–2: 326–327) and in the general elections held right after the presidential elections (December 31, 1938), Karabekir, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın and Fethi Okyar were elected as deputies. Ali Fuat Pasha and Refet Bele, who were elected as independent deputies in the general elections of 1935, joined the CHP parliamentary group. Rauf Orbay, who was the most significant opponent of Atatürk and İnönü, entered Parliament as a CHP deputy in the interim elections on October 22, 1939. On

this policy, İnönü claims, “After Atatürk’s death, I thought ensuring stability in the internal affairs was essential. Appeasement of the opponents and attaching them to the party, if possible, was invaluable. Factions and dissensions were in fact derived from personal reasons (their attitude toward Atatürk)” (1987–2: 327). In this way, İnönü brought in powerful figures to CHP who would oppose him if they were to enter politics. Finally, İnönü’s desire for more power, which was not granted to Atatürk, would be about approaching World War II. He might have needed absolute power to rule the country with an iron fist in order to ensure stability in domestic and foreign affairs during the war.

There is a common concern driving the three factors that led İnönü to need more power. İnönü was worried that he, with his current political career and qualifications might not rule the country using only the same authority that was officially granted to Atatürk. For this reason, İnönü needed additional authority, which Atatürk did not need, in order to rule the country with the same power that Atatürk had. Thus, after he acquired these statuses, he did not need to shelter under Atatürk’s shadow to consolidate his power. He avoided the discussions of Atatürk’s policies in daily debates, but he went further in not allowing any eminence to be focused on the importance of Atatürk in the political regime. For instance, he abolished Atatürk’s photos and printed his own photo on the money. This change was important since it symbolizes İnönü’s attitude toward Atatürk’s memory (Koçak, 2001: 135–137). In this way, İnönü indicated that he was in charge now and Atatürk remained in the past.¹⁴⁵ Consequently, İnönü needed the chief status, which Atatürk did not need, in order to promote himself from the second man position to the first man position.

According to the relevant literature, another reason İnönü was interested in the chieftom system is found in the influence of the fascist regimes over CHP politicians (Ahmad, 1986: 235–236; Akandere, 1998: 59–65; Aydemir, 1968, II: 49–50; Burçak, 1979: 16; Giritlioğlu, 1974: 140; Kili, 1976: 86; Nadi, 1965: 16–17; Koçak, 2001; 137; Yetkin, 1983: 166–167). During the years when İnönü was titled as the national

¹⁴⁵ The significance of Atatürk in the current political system was substantially derived from policies of the Democrat Party government. Bayar separated the Atatürk era from the İnönü era and then glorified him in order to even himself up with İnönü.

chief, totalitarian regimes in Europe were politically and economically strong and substantially prestigious. The Soviets, Germany, and Italia were exporting their regime types due to their stabilized domestic affairs, power, and welfare. The idea that the successful development of these countries depended on their regime types attracted attention in Turkey and this included the attention of intellectuals and CHP politicians. The discipline, hierarchic structure, stability, and welfare of these regimes were all interlinked and for improvement in Turkey's stability and economic welfare, a centralist and authoritarian political regime was emphasized. In this regard, the "one nation, one party, one leader" understanding was transferred from the authoritarian European regimes and used in CHP publications. The motive behind the non-amendment attribute and chief status was the search for stability. In such a political atmosphere, İnönü was titled as "National Chief," which was comparable with titles such as 'Duce,' which was granted to Mussolini, and 'Fuhrer,' which was granted to Hitler. Hence, in a short time, the authority of the national chief was increased to a level similar to that of the Fuhrer or Duce and superhuman attributions were granted to İnönü.

Finally, there are traces of Ottoman modernization behind İnönü's interest in the chiefdom system. According to Koçak (2001: 135), the regulation change, which recognized İnönü as national chief, was an attempt of the elites who participated in the modernization process of the Ottoman Empire to continue to modernize the society as they anticipate. He claims that the fundamental objective of the chiefdom system was parallel to the mission of training the society of the elites who were immanent in Ottoman modernization. Indeed, both the justification of the regulation (change) and CHP politicians and intellectuals assigned the missions of training, guiding and instructing the society to the National Chief. These missions formed a tutelage mindset, which constituted the basis of the single-party regime and Kemalist reforms and became cemented in the figure of National Chief.

4.2.4 The Chiefdom System and the Tutelage Regime

The chiefdom system, which was officialized when İsmet İnönü started to use the title of "National Chief," but indeed was de facto in force since 1927, pushed the

limits of the democratic regime of the 1924 Constitution. The structure of the chiefdom system was beyond the constitutional order and subsequently rendering the system nonfunctional and meaningless. Considering the power and personal attributes of the national chief, it is clear that this status was exceeding the position of the president. The authority and power, which were de facto used by Atatürk but granted officially to İnönü, made meaningless the principle of segregation of duties as well as the unity of powers, which were based on the legislative supremacy of the parliamentary system. The Grand National Assembly and the government were subordinated due to the authority and power of the (national) chief. The Parliament became a political body that approves the political decisions made by a small team rather than making the law. The government was not accountable to the Parliament, but it was liable to the chief. The Parliament could not fulfill its legislation and supervision of the government duties recognized by the 1924 Constitution. It moved, as it was obliged to approve the decision of the CHP leading cadre and to give a vote of confidence to the government assigned by the Chief. Every decision dealing with the political system was taken in the chairmanship council, including the Chief and two members he assigned, adopted in the CHP parliamentary group, and approved in the Parliament. According to Koçak (2001: 122), “In such a political mechanism, the duty of Parliament only consisted of approving the decisions or laws that were brought before the Parliament. In fact, the Parliament was needed only for this duty. Hence, the Parliament was an institution that approves and legislates the decisions made by a small group of CHP politicians.”

In this system, all procedures in the constitution were followed but indeed the constitutional principles were completely ignored. Because of the operation of the single-party regime, the organs of the party undermined the features of the political system. For instance, the Parliament elected the president after every general election. However, the president, who was also the party leader, determined the deputies who were electing himself as the president. Hence, because of the authority he held over the party as the Non-Amendable Party Leader of CHP and the National Chief, he became the sole decision-maker in the political system.

The power granted to the president by the single-party rule was always questioned by the opposition parties that were established in all attempts at transition to a multi-party system. For instance, the Progressive Republican Party and the Free Republican Party argued that Atatürk should quit the leadership of the CHP. However, Atatürk rejected this suggestion, because if he quitted the party leadership, he knew that he would lose most of his power and would have to be content with the authority granted to him by the 1924 Constitution. The 1924 Constitution was written in a political environment that protected the superiority of the legislation over the execution and was not yet dominated by Atatürk. Aware that he could not acquire more power with regards to this Constitution, Atatürk had rejected this suggestion and maintained the party leadership. Furthermore, since 1946, Democrat Party politicians more frequently mentioned the same opposition that were claiming İnönü must quit the party leadership and only maintain the presidency. However, İnönü rejected this suggestion and argued that the same person should maintain both the party leadership and the presidency. He claimed:

I see that I am criticized because I maintained my position as the CHP leader while I am also the president of Turkey. [...] This is a constitutional issue. Our Constitution unified all powers of the state at the Parliament and thus the head of the state, the president, has no power to pursue national interest and ensure stability when it is required. It is only through that, as the president would be elected from the majority party, he would protect the coherence and stability through his presence (cited in Akandere, 1998: 72).

This speech of İnönü was a clear confession that explains how the chiefdom system disabled the Constitution of 1924. İnönü felt that the authority and power of the president were insufficient and the necessary power could be granted only through party leadership.

In this regard, two different political systems were in force—de facto in the Atatürk era, but formalized in the İnönü era, during the single-party rule. ‘The parliamentary system’ formulated by the Constitution of 1924 foresaw the unity of powers based on the superiority of the Parliament and the chiefdom system, which was derived from the single-party rule. During the single-party regime, Turkey was ruled with the parameters of the chiefdom system and the parliamentary system was de facto

disabled. CHP Secretary General Mahmut Şevket Esenal defines the current political system in 1944 as:

Some states have written constitutions, but some have unwritten constitutions. For instance, France has a written constitution, but there is no written British constitution. Regarding Turkey, we have two constitutions: Written and unwritten. The written constitution is the Constitution of 1924 (Teşkilat-ı Esasiye) and the unwritten one is the current political system, the chiefdom system. The strength of this system derives from the CHP (Velidedeoğlu, 1973: 25–26).

As Esenal claims, the strength, and the legal grounds for the chiefdom system are derived from CHP and hence bypassed the constitutional order. The constitutional institutions became meaningless because of the power of the single-party regime and the power of the chiefdom system. With this power, the Eternal National Chief followed an authoritarian and tutelary regime.

4.3 Election System

In addition to the single-party fact and the chiefdom system, another tool that enabled an authoritative and tutelary regime during the single-party period was the two-stage election system.¹⁴⁶ During the single-party period, elections were held regularly every four years. Elections and Assembly; even at an expressional level, were evaluated as a reflection of the national will. Elections and TBMM's functionality were considered the most important legitimacy source of the government. Within this framework, the CHP Congresses were delayed after the elections and they constituted one of the most important milestones in each election and Assembly period. During the election process, in the works carried out by the Assembly and Congress, all procedures indicated in the Constitution and Party Bylaw were complied with exactly, and the significance was attributed to legal legitimacy.

However, the reality of the single-party, combined with the chiefdom system and the two-stage election system obstructed the elections to reflect the national will. The CHP top management had been the basic decisive factor in deputy elections; but the

¹⁴⁶ Due to its effect on the determination of central policy, in this section only general elections are examined

two-stage election system provided the approval of the deputy list since the non-competitive indirect elections led an anti-democratic structure and provided the permanency of the single-party power. The two-stage election system applied within the single-party political order was one of the most important tools to feed the authoritative and tutelary structure of the single-party regime.

4.3.1 Ruptures in the Election System

During the Republican period, all elections held until 1943 were based on Deputy Election Law (*İntihab-ı Mebusan Kanun-ı Muvakkatı*)¹⁴⁷ enacted in the Second Constitutional period (July 20, 1908). Until then, the legal part had been amended;¹⁴⁸ the primary unique election law of the republic period was the Deputy Election Law (*Mebus Seçim Kanunu*), which was accepted in December 1942.¹⁴⁹ Both of the laws promoted the two-stage election system. The Deputy Election Law (Milletvekili Seçim Kanunu), which was accepted in 1946, enabled the first single-stage elections.¹⁵⁰ Although the Democrat Party's single-stage election proposal was accepted, the law was criticized because of the open vote implicit enumeration system. The first important development removing CHP's dominancy on the election system came on August 9, 1948 with the Law on Amendment of Some Provisions of the Deputy Election Law and Addition of Some Provisions (*Milletvekilleri Seçim Kanununun Bazı Maddelerininin Değiştirilmesine ve Bu Kanuna Bazı Maddelerin Eklenmesine Dair Kanun*), which was therein accepted. Upon this amendment, eight provisions of the existing law were amended and three new provisions were added.

After these amendments and additions, election progress was made subject to legal inspection (Art. 14) and the secret vote (Art. 24) open enumeration (Art. 27) principle was accepted. However, the most significant amendment made during the

¹⁴⁷ For the text of *İntihab-ı Mebusan Kanun-ı Muvakkatı* held July 20, 1908, see Erdem, 1982: 138-151.

¹⁴⁸ For amendments on the applicable law until new election laws were enacted in 1942, see Erdem, 1982: 152-173.

¹⁴⁹ For the text of the Deputy Election Law dated December 14, 1942 and no 4320, see Erdem, 1982: 49-183. For the large summary of the Law, see Koçak, 1999: 285-288.

¹⁵⁰ For the text of the Deputy Election Law dated June 5, 1946, see Erdem, 1982: 184-192.

single-party period was accomplished by the new Deputy Election Law (*Milletvekilleri Seçim Kanunu*) accepted on February 16, 1950.¹⁵¹ The first provision of the Law puts forth the main innovation in the Law:

Article 1- Deputy election is a single-stage election performed in the manner of a secret vote-general equality according to majority procedure. Vote is free and personal. Enumeration and separation of votes are performed openly.

All elections during the single-party period were held according to the two-stage election system. In the elections, first, the first electorate elected the second electorate, and then the second electorate elected the members of the parliament. In both election processes, electors were not left free to act and were obliged to approve the list provided by CHP. In the first stage of the elections, secondary electors, which are entirely comprised of CHP members specified by CHP organizations, were announced as a list and elections were held for the approval of these lists. Therefore, the first elections were concluded upon the approval of the secondary electors list, which was approved by the primary electors. After the secondary electors are specified, the deputy candidates list approved by the CHP Presidency Council (CHP General President, CHP General President Deputy, and CHP General Secretary) was announced by a communiqué issued by the CHP General President. The second stage of the elections was concluded upon the approval of the deputy candidates, which were announced by the CHP General President. Within this context, in all the various stages of the elections, lists determined by CHP were selected unanimously (Akandere, 1998: 114–116; Koçak, 1999: 30–34; Öz, 1992: 155–156; Uyar, 1998: 268–170).

4.3.2 Objections to the Election System

The two-stage election system entered into force upon *İntihab-ı Meb'usan Kanun-ı Muvakkatı* dated 1908 was a matter of debate since its date of enactment. In the primary period in which the law was enacted, during the discussions on the election law in the Ottoman Assembly of Deputy (*Osmanlı Mebusan Meclisi*), one group of deputies expressed, the Assembly formed due to indirect elections is not qualified to

¹⁵¹ For text of the Deputies Election Law dated February 16, 1950, see Erdem, 1982: 200–237.

represent the public, privilege for direct electing which is vested to the public in Europe should also be provided to the Ottoman public. However, these objections were rejected upon the justification that the public was inexperienced and did not have adequate political maturity and the two-stage election was decided (Öz, 1992: 152). The same debates were also experienced during the Republican period. Opposition or circles of power set forth that indirect elections did not provide opportunity for the reflection of national will into the Assembly and defended the single-stage election system. The government conversely put forward that the public was inexperienced and it would be better for them to vote for those whom are known, thus defending the two-stage election system.

During the First Assembly period, the Second Group gave a place to the election system in its program (Art. 16); in the program, it was committed that deputy election law shall reach a structure wherein national sovereignty (*hakimiyeti milliye*) can be accomplished (Demirel, 1994: 399). In fact, after the decision for going to the 1923 elections was taken in the Assembly, the Second Group members submitted a motion offering a change in the election system. According to the motion, which offered various changes to the existing law, the single-stage election system would be taken as the basis but the two-stage election system would be continued and provide more validity during the three election periods (Art. 12). The mentioned article was excluded in the Constitutional Council and the motion submitted to the General Council was accepted therein despite the objections raised from the Second Group members.¹⁵² The first opposition party of the Republican period, the Progressive Republican Party, considering that the two-stage election system would obstruct the reflection of the national will on the one hand create such a result in favor of the CHP, which was the leading party, on the other hand, it envisaged that the election system should be a single-stage type. Within this framework, in the Progressive Republican Party Program,¹⁵³ a provision was included that stated, “In

¹⁵² For the content of the offer and debates on the offer and its grounds, see TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, C.28, İctima 4, s. 322–349. For an extensive summary of discussions on the motion, see Demirel, 1994: 516–525.

¹⁵³ For the text of the Progressive Republican Party Program, see Tunçay, 1989: 371–376.

the deputy elections, a one-degree general vote procedure shall be accepted” (Art. 8). In the program of the Free Republican Party, which was the second opposition party of the single-party period and which was established under Atatürk’s guidance,¹⁵⁴ the single-stage election system was set forth. This issue was included in the program as, “The Party shall defend the single-stage election procedure” (Art. 11).

The single-stage election system, on which the opposition focused as a necessity of national will, was submitted as an ideal in the CHP programs during the periods in which the single-party regime could not yet be institutionalized by CHP nor could a mentality for this purpose be converted. In the 1927 and 1931 programs, although CHP accepted that the single-stage election system was better, they decided for the application of a two-stage election system because there was no opportunity to know the deputies. In the program statement dated 1927,¹⁵⁵ CHP put forth its attitude regarding the election system:

The goal of our Party is that in general elections the single-stage election system should be applied. [...] It is not possible to estimate how much time is required for achieving this result. However, our Party shall attempt to achieve this in the shortest time possible (cited in Tunçay, 1989: 395).

CHP’s 1931 program, regarding the election system, defended a similar attitude:

The application of the single-stage election is our most important purpose. Nonetheless, our citizens should be provided information regarding the procedure they prefer. We consider that it will be better to provide the opportunity for the citizens to vote for people whom they know better in terms of the democratic system’s requirements until the desired system shall be applicable (CHP Nizamnamesi ve Programı, 1931: 7).

After 1930, together with the conversion of the single-party administration toward authoritativeness and centralization, the ideal of the single-stage election was abandoned and it was thought that the two-stage elections would be more suitable for democracy. This new tendency was stated in the approach provided in CHP’s 1935 Program, which is shown below:

¹⁵⁴ For the text of the Free Republican Party Program, see Tunçay, 1989: 404–405.

¹⁵⁵ For the text of the Republican People’s Party Manifesto dated 1927, see Tunçay, 1989: 395–397.

The deputy election law shall be renewed. According to general conditions of our country, we consider it suitable to leave the citizen free to select persons whom they know as secondary electors and we should arrange the deputy elections accordingly (CHP Programı, 1935: 6).

The defense concept for the two-stage election system based on the grounds, “public’s voting for people whom they know and rely on, complies with the spirit of the democracy,” which took place in CHP’s 1943 program as well (CHP Program ve Nizamname, 1943: 4).

Hilmi Uran explains below, with reference to Atatürk, how CHP provided a justification for the two-stage election system, which was applied alongside the single-party regime:

During Atatürk’s lifetime, the discussion also continued about whether the single-stage election would be proper with municipality general Assembly members (local elections) and Assembly members (general elections) who have been charged by the election system. Nonetheless, Atatürk always defended the two-stage election system. He stated that this system was more available to control the conclusion and defended it in that in our country it was more probable to reach more fair and correct results using this system and that he probably tried additionally meant that by using this method citizens could vote for those people whom they know and who are intellectuals in their respective environments, thus those representatives could select real deputies more correctly than the citizens themselves (1959: 397–398).

4.3.3 Filling the Void of Opposition

Until 1946, since parties other than CHP were prohibited from attending elections, the elections remained only to approve the CHP lists. In this sense, during the single-party period, it is difficult to infer that elections based on competition revealed the real reflection of national will. To provide the legitimacy of CHP, elections fundamentally relied of the corroboration of the people, in that capacity; the party wanted them to be deputies, thus secondary electors.

In 1930, Atatürk, in considering that the single-party, which had been bereft of opposition since 1925 was driving CHP to stagnancy, lead the way for the establishment of a guided opposition party and thus a more efficient political system. Since the SCF refused to carry out a prearranged opposition, CHP faced the danger of losing its governorate and thus abandoned this course of action. After the SCF

experience, CHP did not permit the establishment of another opposition party until 1945; nonetheless, it did not abandon the search to keep the CHP group alive in the Assembly. After the SCF experience, CHP developed formulas wherein they should not contact the society but would keep the CHP Assembly group alive. Within this context, some policies were followed such as to leave a place for independent candidates in some of the election locations, not to delegate any candidate for some election locations, to show a number of candidates more than the number of deputies to be elected in some locations, and to establish an independent group (*Müstakil Grup*) in the Assembly.

Independent Candidates

CHP, in the early elections held in 1931 just after the SCF experience, determined the number of candidates deficient by 8% of the Assembly chair and provided independent candidates to be elected (Öz, 1992: 170; Tunçay, 1989: 304). CHP enabling the election for 30 deputies in 22 election locations was evaluated with astonishment by CHP organizations and some portion of the press supporting CHP; therefore, Atatürk needed to publish a declaration in order to clarify the relevant decision.

My CHP secondary electorate friends, [...] we consider it necessary that activities and suggestions provided by our party should be examined and criticized by those deputies who do not agree with our opinions and idea. [...] As intellectuals who are aware of what we are doing and believing in our policies, we consider ourselves to be criticized. [...] Therefore, I requested serious duty from you who are my party's members, to vote for candidates who do not agree with our program. [...] The only point I bring into the attention of my second electors about those candidates is that, they should be particularly secular, republican, nationalist, and sincere. For those places I left available, I do not have any suggestion either on behalf or against any of the candidates (cited in Öz, 1992: 171).

The declaration, which was published by Atatürk for the clarification of the issue, obviously puts forth both the justification of the application and the fictional aspect of the elections in the single-party period. Primarily, the purpose of the application is explained as being opposed to criticism. Secondly, Atatürk, using first-person singular in the declaration, mentioned his own party, the criteria he determined, and the places he left open. This reveals that even before the 1940s, CHP acquired a proper structuring for the chiefdom system when this system was discussed. Thirdly,

the Declaration puts forth the performative function of the elections. It is obvious that elections consist of CHP's secondary electors just approving the deputy candidates selected by Atatürk. Atatürk evaluates that it is a heavy burden for secondary electors—who cannot vote freely—to vote in line with their own decisions and attempts to convince the secondary electors to act in this manner. Finally, explanations regarding under which criteria the independent deputies shall be specified, address the limits of political activity in the single-party period. Therefore, what is expected from the independent candidates is to help CHP strengthen its policy within the limits of CHP's ideology, rather than proposing an alternative policy. Limits of policy exactly were the CHP's program.

In the end, Atatürk's Declaration probably was not able to convince the secondary electors who got used to approving the list submitted by CHP; therefore, 20 chairs were selected among 30 chairs and 10 were left empty. For those places left empty, another election was made and CHP members were placed therein. The deputyship of two elected deputies were cancelled, 10 of them attended to CHP within the first year, and finally eight deputies remained in the Assembly (Öz, 1992: 171–172; Tunçay, 1989: 304–305). Independent deputies brought economic and social issues to the Assembly's platform with a poised manner, these speeches were responded to by the CHP deputies, and they were reminded that they could be elected since they had accepted the 'party principles' (Öz, 1992: 171–172).

Soyak, in his memoirs, expresses an anecdote (2004: 48–50), revealing different approaches and limits of endurance in CHP top management in relation to the independent deputies issue. The fact was experienced in a discussion made in the Party General Presidency Council (Atatürk, İnönü, Peker) regarding whether Sırrı Bey, who was selected as an independent deputy in the 1931 elections, shall be supported again as an independent deputy for the 1935 elections. Atatürk affirmed that he was satisfied with Sırrı Bey's works in the Assembly, therefore he wished him to be elected again, but upon Peker's objection and İnönü's support to Peker, support to Sırrı Bey was abandoned. Recep Peker's objection to Sırrı Bey was, "Sırrı Bey made hard criticisms during the last term, he acted as if he was an opponent and

caused us to confront serious difficulties. His participation in the Assembly is certainly wrong.” Although Atatürk reminded them that independent candidates were considered in order to provide criticism against government and to mitigate the noticeable void of a lack of opposition, critics should not be bothered. Nonetheless, upon Peker and İnönü’s insistence, the case was closed and support for Sırrı Bey was abandoned.

The dialog experienced in the General Presidency Council, in which the deputy of 1935 elections were discussed, puts forth some realities regarding the election system and showing a distinct candidate. Principally, it is revealed that secondary electors vote under the guidance of the CHP administration and the decision about which independent candidate would be supported is decided by the General Presidency Council. Therefore, secondary electors do not decide by considering independent candidates but they act upon the guidance of CHP top management. The second point is that there exists a difference of opinion in CHP top management regarding the policy of showing an independent candidate. Based on the justification that the government would be inspected and the lack of opposition removed, Atatürk paid attention to the election of independent candidates; however, İnönü and Peker seemed to defend that the application was for show only and the government could not be criticized. Finally, Atatürk’s consent with Peker and İnönü’s decision indicates that the case of independent candidates shall not go beyond an ostensible decision. Sırrı Bey fulfilled the criticism task that was expected from him; nonetheless, he was dismissed. It is difficult to consider that this case would not be an example for other deputies.

The practice of leaving an empty place/deficient place for independent candidates also continued in the 1935 elections. Although it was announced that one chair from each of the 16 election regions was reserved for independent candidates, CHP nominated in three further regions, thus the number of chair positions reserved for independent candidates fell to 13 (Goloğlu, 2009: 169–171; Öz, 1992: 172–174). Although there were 30 in 1931, reducing the number of empty chair positions to 13

for the 1935 elections can probably be explained by the resistance in the party and CHP's attitude toward the authoritativeness experienced during those years.

In the 1931 and 1935 elections, the application of independent candidates who attempted to leave preference for secondary electors and fulfill the need for criticism against the government changed its direction in the 1939 elections. In 1939, only four independent candidates were nominated whereas in 1943 elections no any candidates were nominated. In spite of this, an attempt was made to mitigate the necessities which reasoned the application of nominating independent candidates by two different applications. Primarily, as of the 1939 elections, independent candidate applications were initiated. Consequently, a group of deputies to be selected upon CHP deputies shall establish a separate group out of the CHP Assembly Group and shall function to audit the government.¹⁵⁶

Consulting Secondary Electors

Another innovation applied as regards the election system was that İnönü negotiated with secondary electors and asked their opinions regarding the lists before both the 1939 and the 1943 elections. Although it was criticized that the negotiation was only a formality (Koçak, 1999: 31–33), İnönü's negotiation with secondary electors one day before he announced the lists should be taken serious. Although it did not bring considerable consequences, as of 1923, consulting the opinions of secondary electors who were obliged to approve the list offered by CHP top management can be considered a serious development.

Nominating an Excessive Number of Candidates

Another application for relieving the close circuit functioning mechanism of the election system was that in the 1943 elections, the CHP nominated more candidates than the number of deputies to be elected. While the number of candidates was not increased in four provinces, in 38 provinces the number of candidates nominated was more than the required by 78¹⁵⁷ (Armağan, 1975: 171–172; Koçak, 1999: 288–292;

¹⁵⁶ The purpose of the Independent Group is discussed more extensively below.

¹⁵⁷ For a list of the provinces in which the number of deputy candidates was more than those to be elected, See Koçak, 1999: 290-291; Öz, 1992: 209.

Öz, 1992: 175). The concerns of a specific group of CHP deputies about this course of action, which means that an CHP list has been driven into competition for the first time during the single-party period, puts forth the elitist and tutelary side of the single-party. Faik Ahmet Barutçu, who was one of the CHP deputies during that term, explains below how this application was perceived by the deputies:

Deputies who only care with their own locations and deputies who are not from the relevant people in the location were trying to put forth propaganda about the disadvantages of the enquiry and time conditions that do not comply with the enquiry. A deputy said, 'In all of my life, I always thought about the revolution and my chiefs, now I am instructed; go and ask for the public's vote, is that selling myself or not?' Another deputy complained, 'The Chief in the speech during his last visit in Bursa, said that the public thinks that the public did not make the required assistance as regards the food supply to the republic government, you know what I shall write as a journalist. Now I am told that I will ask for a vote from the public. Isn't it strange?' (Barutçu, 1977: 277).

The deputies putting forth their opinions as regards they have been obliged to want the public's votes obviously reveals the quality of representation of elections during the single-party period. Deputies reasoned that they do not apply to the public due to their loyalty to the chief; this position reveals how the CHP Assembly group evaluated the public and which missions they brought into the foreground during their deputyships. The two-stage election system applied in the single-party period created a deputy profile, which attacks the deputy's application to the public and which grounds the loyalty to the regime for their distance to the public.

As of 1931, within this context in the election system, applications toward opening a place to real representation should not be evaluated as a future-oriented application for the representation of the national will, although it includes an improvement in comparison to the previous arrangement. Primarily, in all applications, the most important criteria taken into consideration were that of CHP's ideology. All of these different applications were achieved not to pave the way for political activity and not to provide the political program to be suggested, but to provide the accomplishment of a partial inspection of the government. Therefore, beyond these applications, it is difficult to find a democratic concern for achieving justice and accuracy in representation. During the 1935 elections, indicating his opinions in the direction that

CHP should tolerate the activity of independent candidates within the Assembly, Ahmet Ağaoğlu also reveals the limits of the independent candidates:

We believe that the independent deputy should be deemed that he has accepted CHP's program as regards republicanism and nationalism and should consider himself that he is in charge of protecting it. In these fields, such a deputy cannot deviate from the Party's program. Because he has only been voted conditionally, he has maintained all of his independent qualifications (liberty) except this and he is completely free as regards to vote. [...] It is obvious that parties abstain from criticizing governments, which they support because in doing so, they lessen its credibility and reliability in the public's point of view. [...] However, independent deputies are not involved in these issues. Provided they do not exceed CHP's republicanism and nationalism principles, they can audit the government within this scope and this audit shall be considerably useful for CHP (cited in Öz, 1992: 173).

Ağaoğlu's considerations for providing CHP not to be frightened away from independent candidates and to drive these independent candidates to behave bravely, reveals the limits of independent candidacy. Independent candidates were exempt from party discipline since they could not be party members. Therefore, they can criticize the government. However, they cannot object to CHP's program, ideology, or policy. The limits drawn for independent candidates put forth that the application was far beyond providing the justice and existence of national will in representation. However, deputies who exaggerated their liberty of criticism were not allowed to be selected again in the following election. During the İnönü period, the abandonment of the independent deputy application and putting into effect the application of nominating a greater number of candidates than the number of deputy chairs attempts to obstruct the election of a probable surprise deputy despite all the measures that were taken. CHP's removal of the application made by independent candidates and reserving more places for those in its own list determined the limits of the secondary electors' right of preference. This application, which fell beyond the realm of the previous application, reveals CHP's sensitivity to control.

Another element, which indicates that these applications toward the election system are not attempting to resolve a real representation relation, is that a new regulation for secondary electors was not implemented. No change was made or accomplished in the profile of secondary electors, which take place in the most critical position of the election system, no concessions were made to applications in which secondary

electors can be CHP members, and they can be chosen by CHP organizations. After the secondary electors' loyalty to CHP has been taken under guarantee, any potential surprises in the deputy elections were avoided.

All these points indicate that CHP's investigations toward the election system did not convert into a basic policy for removal of the single-party fact and the anti-democratic structure caused by the two-stage election system. With these investigations, CHP provided a partially democratic image and again attempted to partially fulfill the necessity of criticism of the government, but they could not accomplish either of these goals due to authoritative elements that penetrated into the mentality and structure of CHP.

4.3.4 Participation in Elections

Although the elections consisted of a two-stage system and approval of the candidates specified by the CHP General Presidency Council, during the single-party period, elections were generally considered arranged. From 1923 to 1945, general elections were held regularly every four years. Although guaranteed consequences were achieved, party administrators were aware of the political legitimacy provided for the government by the elections and continuously stressed that TBMM was the symbol of national will. In parallel with the significance attributed to elections and the Assembly at the expressional level, works for increasing the rate of participation in the election were performed (Öz, 1992: 159). On the other hand, the rate of public participation in elections was raised because elections continued to consist of formalities, discharge of alternative staffs, and disturbances created by the applied reforms over the major party of the society. Throughout the single-party period, the population masses, which did not have serious expectations from the policy to be created by the elections, did not show significant attraction to the elections. Within this context, it is meaningful that in the 1927 elections, in which most of the reforms were implemented, the society and policy was suppressed due to the Law on the Maintenance of Order and the political reckoning, which had already ended, was concluded by a rate (20%) of the lowest participation ever during the single-party period. The 1931 elections were also imposed to a rate of participation below 50%

(45%). In the following elections, the rates of participation began to increase due to the party administration's policy attempts to increase the rate. The rates of participation to elections recorded; 68.5% in 1935, 77.8% in 1939, 80% in 1943, and 75% in 1946 elections (Öz, 1992: 160).

Noticing that the lower rates of participation were harming its political legitimacy, CHP instructed the party organizations to raise the rate of participation in elections, which produced guaranteed results and provided special measures to be taken for providing the participation of the public in elections. Esat Öz (1992: 62–63) addresses the probability of the exaggeration of publications regarding the participation to the elections should be considered and the rate of participation was increased since the public was forced by the state to vote. Accordingly, in order to increase the legitimacy of the single-party regime and to prove the satisfaction of the public, CHP both forced the public to participate in elections and they showed the rate of participation as higher. CHP's justifications for accomplishing the elections regularly and for increasing the rate of participation are naturally important. Nevertheless, both of these facts have a dimension exceeding the justifications of CHP. Due to the sensitivity of the two points being displayed, CHP established a familiarity toward democratic mechanisms. When the multi-party life system was entered into force, it should be noticed that this familiarity provided a significant increase toward the establishment of a democratic order.

4.3.5 Election System and Political Representation

During the single-party period, the structure of the Parliament consisted of the approval of lists specified by the CHP General Presidential Council. Therefore, Parliament, rather than functioning as a reflection of the society, became the reflection of constituents and of a social structure imagined by CHP. Within this context, an analysis of the parliament members' profiles could provide direct data about the political priorities of the single-party regime and about the social segments that supported the single-party administration. Not only can such analysis reveal the political priorities of the time during the single-party regime, but can also illuminate

the extent to which the national will was represented in the Parliament, as well as CHP's understanding of the concept of political representation.

Reelection

The primary point that required focus regarding the structure of the Parliament is the higher rate of re-election of deputies during the single-party period (1923–1946). Approximately three-fourths of the deputies were selected again. Two exemptions for this general tendency were the First Assembly and the Eighth Assembly periods. The rate of deputies who passed from the First Assembly to the Second Assembly is 30%. In the renewed 1923 elections, Atatürk, in order to initiate the reform process, considered the majority of deputies in the First Assembly defective and provided new individuals, with whom he could cooperate, to be elected as deputy. The rate of deputies who could pass from the Eighth Assembly to the Ninth Assembly was 12%; the lowest rate, which is related with the DP'S election victory. However, except for these two exceptions, along with the single-party period, CHP top management maintained the rate of change in the Parliament by 25%.

Table 2: Parliamentary Service, Experience, and Reelection, by Assembly

ASSEMBLY		SERVICE					REELECTED ^b	PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE	DEPUTY TOTAL ^c
<i>No.</i>	<i>Years</i>	<i>Resigned</i>	<i>Died</i>	<i>Elected</i>	<i>Removed</i>	<i>Completed</i>			
I	1920–1923	16%	5%	7%	1%	70%	30%	23% ^d	437
II	1923–1927	6	8	14	1	72	67	37	333
III	1927–1931	3	5	6	1	86	74	63	333
IV	1931–1935	3	7	10	1	80	85	71	348
V	1935–1939	2	8	10	–	80	73	66	444
VI	1939–1943	1	10	10	–	80	75	68	470
VII	1943–1946	1	6	8	–	85	61	67	492
VIII	1946–1950	1	8	7	1	83	12	59	499
IX	1950–1954	1	5	4	–	90	54	19	494
X	1954–1957	1	3	–	–	96	48 ^e	49	537

^a Percentages may not add up to 100 because of rounding.

^b Excludes those who died.

^c Absolute number of persons elected to a deputyship during Assembly.

^d Experience in previous Ottoman Assemblies.

^e To the Eleventh Assembly (1957–1960).

Source: Frey, 1965: 164.

Age Average

The fact that the deputy staff within the Assembly is maintained constant by 75% during the single-party period can be also seen from the Parliament's average age. The youngest average age in the Parliament during the single-party period was 43.0 during 1920–1923, whereas the oldest average age was 54.0 in the 1943–1946 period. In fact, while around 25% of the Parliament's average age was between 43.0–45.0, the general average age of the Parliament continued increasingly to rise. When young political actors who initiated the War of Independence got older, the average age also rose. When we observe that the average age of the Parliaments of 1950 and 1954 governed by DP recorded sharp drops, it is possible to realize that this is directly related to the average age of the Kemalist staff.

Table 3: Average Age and Average Age at First Election of Deputies, by Assembly

	ASSEMBLY									
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX	X
Average Age ^a	43.0	43.2	46.2	48.3	51.8	53.3	54.0	52.8	47.8	46.7
Difference in Average Age from Subsequent Assembly	0.2	3.0	2.1	3.5	1.5	0.7	-1.2	-5.0	-1.1	-0.8
Average Age on First Election	43.0	42.3	43.3	43.4	45.0	46.1	45.9	46.2	45.9	43.9

^a Age at time of first Assembly meeting.


Source: Frey, 1965: 170.

Localism

One of the basic indicators showing the quality of the representation relation and the relation which the policy established with the society is the localism; that is the

percentage of deputies born in the province they represented in Parliament. One of the significant indicators revealing the elitist and tutelary side of the single-party period is the low level of rates of representation of the locations in the Parliament, the locations where the deputies born. When this indicator, which directly specifies the deputies' relations with the electors, is observed during the single-party, it is seen that localism continuously declined. The first Assembly had the highest level of localism with a rate of 62%, the fall as of the Second Assembly reached 34% in the Fifth Assembly period. When the single-party period ended, this rate increased rapidly and reached 66% in 1954. When localism of recently elected deputies is evaluated, this situation reaches an attractive point. The general tendency is that the single-party period relied on the new elite, which was raised in the center and the deputy contingency was reserved for this elite. The rate of locality of the recently elected deputies is at a lower average level than the Parliament. The only exemption of this tendency was the CHP's attempt upon the SCF experience toward a policy change. For this reason, in the 1931 Parliament, the locality rate of deputies recently elected recorded a partial rise. But as the CHP decided to deepen its authoritativeness, this caused the lowest rate of locality to exist during the single-party period. Within this framework, in the 1935 Parliament, the rate of locality of deputies recently elected dropped to 15%. Together with the DP government, the locality speed experienced a fast rise and reached 70%. These rates, during the single-party period, obviously reveal that the level of representation remained low and the deputies had no connection with the settlements where they were elected. In line with this, the single-party period addresses the large number of national elites that have no connection with local ties, whereas the DP period indicated a fall in the number of national elites and a rise in local elites.

Table 4: Percentages of new deputies, carryover deputies, and all deputies born in the province represented in the Assembly



Source: Frey, 1965: 207.

Table 5: Regional Birthplaces of All Deputies and Newly Elected Deputies, by Assembly

BIRTHPLACE (Region)	ASSEMBLY									
	<i>I</i>	<i>II</i>	<i>III</i>	<i>IV</i>	<i>V</i>	<i>VI</i>	<i>VII</i>	<i>VIII</i>	<i>IX</i>	<i>X</i>
North Central	10%	10–7%	8–6%	11–17%	9–7%	8–9%	8–10%	10–12%	10–10%	10–11%
Aegean	11	14–15	17–16	16–12	13–7	16–16	14–13	13–13	12–12	12–7
Marmara	13	20–20	24–34	22–15	28–39	29–30	33–31	24–19	21–20	16–13
Mediterranean	7	6–7	5–4	5–9	5–5	8–11	7–6	9–10	9–8	9–10
Northeast	7	4–7	3–2	3–3	3–1	4–3	5–4	6–5	5–4	7–9
Southeast	12	8–8	4–0	3–1	3–0	2–2	2–4	6–9	7–6	8–8
Black Sea	12	10–10	11–12	11–12	8–6	8–8	8–6	9–10	13–14	14–15
East Central	11	7–6	6–5	5–2	5–5	4–3	6–8	8–9	8–8	9–11
South Central	7	6–7	6–4	7–12	5–3	6–6	5–6	6–7	7–7	8–9
Foreign	11	13–13	16–16	15–18	21–26	14–12	13–12	9–5	9–9	8–7
(Istanbul)	(8)	(13–13)	17–28	(16–14)	(24–31)	(22–23)	(26–26)	(15–13)	(15–15)	(11–9)
(Unknown)	(33)	(17–22)	–	(2–6)	(0–1)	–	–	–	–	–
Total Percent	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N ^b	360	280–161	333–122	346–101	443–149	470–152	492–163	499–204	494–402	537–271

^a Percentages may not add up to 100 because of rounding. Istanbul and the unknowns are not included in the percentage computations.

^b Those for whom age was unknown have been excluded (77 in the First Assembly; 53–48 in the Second; 2–2 in the Fourth and 1–1 in the Fifth).

Source: Frey, 1965: 203.

Birthplace

Another indicator, which will make these indicators more meaningful, is the birthplace of the deputies. Indicators related to birthplace reveal the connection and dependency of the single-party regime on the center. During the single-party period, the Marmara region and particularly İstanbul, sent the highest number of representatives to the Parliament. The lowest rates were from the South East and North East Anatolian regions. These rates put forth the distinction between locations in which lower rates of locality function either against or in their favor. These rates take more deviated positions regarding the recently elected deputies. As they are the direct indicators of the government's political tendencies, the rate of recently elected deputies might provide results that are more accurate. There is also a higher distinction between regions, which is more so than the average for the Parliament. In the Third, Fourth and Fifth Parliament terms, in which the single-party power became settled, the rate of new deputies from İstanbul rose over that of the generals of the Parliament whereas the rate of deputies from the East is recorded as being lower than the average level in the Parliament.

Occupation

One of the significant indicators to reveal the social structure on which the single-party period depends is the occupational characteristics of the deputies. During the single-party period, the official group, which consists of military, government (officer), and education (trainer) staff, forms the backbone of the Parliament. Although the distribution within these three classes differs in specific periods, during the single-party period, it continued to make up 50% of the Parliament. This is a very clear indicator given the professional components of the single-party period. The official rate recorded a vast decline, primarily in the 1946 period, and this fall continued with increasing speed in the DP period. A second point on which attention is necessary is that the professional class, which consisted of law, the health sector, and the engineering sector, in due course displayed an increasing tendency, which although low is stable. During the Atatürk period, this class, which corresponded to

one-fifth of the Assembly, rapidly increased during the İnönü period to reach one-fourth primarily and one-third afterwards. The rate of professionals during the İnönü period was also maintained during the DP period. Within this context, it can be emphasized that the most visible permanency between the CHP and DP periods is in the percentage of the professional class represented in the Assembly. Another point, which can be focused on regarding the vocational structure of deputies, is the percentage of economic classes, which consist of trade, agriculture, and banking. The economic class having a representative rate with one-fifth in the First Assembly, decreased to one-sixth in the following two Assembly periods and rose up to one-fifth again within the single-party's strategy of dissemination into the society upon the lesson derived from the SCF experience. The percentage rate of merchant class, which displayed a decline again in the İnönü period began to rise in the 1946 elections and reached the highest point of 30% during the DP period. Within this framework, it can be said that the most important difference between CHP and DP, after the official class, is experienced in the intensity of economic classes within the Assembly. In the DP period, the number of official based deputies recorded fell while a serious rise appeared in the economic classes. Finally, the share of the religious group in the Assembly can be observed. The religious group, which had a higher percentage rate than the military based staff in the First Assembly, showed a sharp fall in the Second Assembly, and continued to fall during both the single-party period and the DP period.

Table 6: Occupations of Deputies, by Assembly

BIRTHPLACE	ASSEMBLY									
	<i>I</i>	<i>II</i>	<i>III</i>	<i>IV</i>	<i>V</i>	<i>VI</i>	<i>VII</i>	<i>VIII</i>	<i>IX</i>	<i>X</i>
Law	13%	12%	12%	13%	12%	13%	17%	19%	26%	27%
Medicine	4	7	8	7	9	11	10	11	13	11
Dent., Pharmacy, & Vet. Med	1	–	1	1	2	2	2	3	2	2
Engineering	–	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	4	4
Government	23	25	25	20	19	18	19	14	10	9
Military	15	20	19	16	18	16	14	11	6	4
Education	5	9	10	9	11	13	14	11	6	8
Trade	12	7	9	11	10	10	7	13	17	17
Agriculture	6	6	6	10	8	6	7	9	10	10
Banking	1	1	1	1	1	3	2	2	2	2
Religion	17	7	4	3	3	2	1	1	1	1
Journalism	2	4	5	7	5	5	3	3	4	4
Other	2	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	–	1
Total ^a	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Unknown	(15%)	(12%)	–	(1%)	–	–	–	–	–	–
Total Number of Deputies	437	333	333	348	444	470	492	499	494	537

^a Percentages may add to 99 or 101 because of rounding.

(Source: Frey, 1965: 181)

When we roughly classify the Assembly into three groups as official, professional, and economic occupation, it can be said that there is a parallelism between the recently elected deputies and the general of the Assembly. The official group remained the backbone of the Assembly among the recently elected deputies until the 1946 elections when they began to decline and their numbers fell. During the single-party period, the professional group showed a faster increase than the general of the Assembly did and it reached a higher number than the official group as of the 1946 elections. Among the recently elected deputies, the professional group undertook the frame of the Assembly as of 1946. The economic class displayed a lower stable character in terms of recently elected deputies during the single-party period and it began to rise rapidly with the 1946 elections. The unique exception to these general tendencies is the 1931 Assembly. The search of the CHP after the SCF experience reflected into the deputies' vocational distribution. This search in the vocational backgrounds of the recently elected deputies can be clearly seen. However, this search reversed direction in the 1935 elections. CHP abandoned this search and returned to the class on which it was previously based. In the 1931 Parliament, the rate of official backgrounds acquired by recently elected deputies fell by 24%, the rate of those acquiring economic background increased by 24%. In the 1935 Parliament, a reverse tendency occurred. The rate of new deputies with an official background rose by 24%, whereas those with an economic background by 20%.

Table 7: Occupations of Newly Elected Deputies, by Assembly

OCCUPATION	ASSEMBLY									
	<i>I</i>	<i>II</i>	<i>III</i>	<i>IV</i>	<i>V</i>	<i>VI</i>	<i>VII</i>	<i>VIII</i>	<i>IX</i>	<i>X</i>
Government	23	23	23	7	15	12	14	12	10	10
Military	15	19	23	8	18	12	9	3	5	5
Education	5	9	11	8	15	14	15	7	6	8
(Official)	(43)	(52)	(57)	(23)	(47)	(38)	(38)	(23)	(21)	(23)
Law	13	16	9	17	9	13	24	21	26	26
Medicine	4	6	7	5	14	13	12	10	13	8
Dent., Pharmacy, & Vet.	1	–	2	2	5	3	2	4	2	2
Engineering	–	2	2	4	1	2	4	3	4	5
(Professional)	(18)	(25)	(20)	(28)	(29)	(30)	(42)	(42)	(46)	(41)
Trade	12	6	9	20	10	15	5	22	17	19
Agriculture	6	5	7	21	8	7	8	12	9	11
Banking	1	1	2	–	3	3	3	2	2	2
(Economic)	(19)	(12)	(17)	(41)	(21)	(25)	(16)	(40)	(28)	(32)
Religion	17	7	2	–	–	–	–	–	1	–
Journalism	2	5	5	7	1	6	3	3	4	3
Other	2	–	–	–	1	1	1	–	–	1
Unknown	(15)	(18)	–	(2)	(1)	–	–	–	–	–

^a Totals may not add up to 100 because of rounding. Unknowns were excluded in computing percentages.

Source: Frey, 1965: 210.

According to the previous indicators, when evaluated together, it can be stated that in the single-party period, the deputy profile represented the political regime of the single-party. The nonexistence of a competitive and direct election system and CHP top management's being the unique decisive factor over deputy elections caused the structure of the Assembly to be shaped in parallel with the presumption of a Kemalist elite society. The single-party power leaned on political elites generally having official background and being born in the Marmara region. During the single-party period, 75% of the Assembly was kept constant whereas 25% of it changed. This general tendency followed by the single-party period showed radical changes in the two election terms upon the effect of the multi-party regime. The first radical change appeared in 1931 elections, which followed the unsuccessful SCF experience. Since it was noticed that CHP rule and reforms were not generally considered satisfactory in the society, this situation motivated the Kemalist elite to change the policy. It is possible to notice this policy change in all indicators mentioned above and particularly in terms of recently elected deputies. For instance, officials who formed the frame of CHP experienced a radical drop whereas deputies acquiring economic background, which were represented by the lowest rate in the single-party period displayed a sharp rise. Similarly, in this period, a serious increase at the locality level, which indicated the deputies' connection with the society has been experienced. However, it can be said that this period was a period of panic period for Kemalist elites. Since in the 1935 elections indicators returned to the general characteristics of the 1927 period, Kemalist elites abandoned policy change and again appropriated the class and attitude upon which they were based.

Another important change in CHP's deputy profile was experienced in the 1946 elections. Entering into a multi-party system directed CHP to make changes in social classes, which it based on different segments of society. Similar to the tendency in the 1931 elections, in the 1946 elections, the number of deputies with an official background, which was the framework of the CHP, recorded a sharp decrease, while recently elected deputies with an economic background rose by 24%, which was the

same as it was in 1931. Similarly, the same scenario was experienced regarding the locality of the deputies. The level of localism, in particular, in recently elected deputies reached its highest level during the single-party period.

Serious changes, which occurred in the CHP's deputy profile during the two multi-party system periods, clearly demonstrate CHP's elitist and tutelary behavior. CHP requiring contact with the public during competition, combined with the years in which an opponent party was not permitted and the election system was uncompetitive, left the desire to construct the political and social structure, which it envisaged without taking in to consideration the social tendencies. For this reason, even the deputy profile provides adequate material with which to indicate the authoritative and tutelary structure of the single-party regime.

4.3.6 Function of the Assembly

The function of the Assembly is directly affected by the election system and CHP's operating charter, which put the election of parliament members entirely under the supervision of the CHP's high-level management. Although the 1924 Constitution provided the authority to the Assembly to audit the executive power in accordance with the principle of union of powers and as it represents the national will, the Assembly was practically imposed on the party organs and executive power. As a single-party reality, the chiefdom system, and the election system came together and fed an authoritative system. The Assembly functioned to legitimize the decisions made by the single-party government (Weisband, 1974: 59). Thus, the superiority of the legislation set forth by the 1924 Constitution could not be accomplished and in practicality, legislation became subject to execution.

Due to the single-party structure, the function of audit, which was performed by the Assembly, was partially accomplished by the CHP Assembly Group. All decisions were made upon closed-confidential meetings, discussed primarily in the CHP Presidential Assembly Group, afterwards in the CHP Assembly Group, and finally brought to the

Assembly General Council (Balta, 1960: 44–50; Soysal, 1964: 111–113). The CHP Assembly Group was functioning under rules in CHP's Regulations. According to the 1923 Regulation, the Assembly Group, which consists of CHP deputies (Art. 83), should meet at least once a week (Art. 88). Group members were completely free to decide and act and could state their opinions regarding governmental issues and they could ask for an explanation from any Minister (Art. 92). However, this freedom, which was introduced for deputies in the CHP Assembly Group, was restricted in the works of the General Council of the Assembly. According to the Regulation, "Decisions agreed in the group upon discussions are deemed to have been accepted by all members" (Art. 93). Deputies could not give an abstaining or a dissenting vote against the decisions made in the CHP Assembly Group in the General Council of the Assembly and they could not abstain through non-attendance (Art. 94). As regards the issues that have been discussed in the group but not resolved, members could freely use their votes. However, no one, except those assigned by the Party President or the CHP group, can state any opinion on behalf of the Party (Art. 98). Deputies who comply with the rules are imposed to request for the first time, to warning for the second, and to be punished by discharge from the Party by the General Presidency Council or Executive Committee for the third time (Art. 100).

Within this context, it can be stated that party and government issues were primarily discussed in the CHP Assembly Group, although at times, strong arguments existed therein (Uran, 342), decisions were made as regards the offers, and generally, they were approved without any problem in the General Council of Assembly where they were submitted. CHP Regulations, as such did not present freedom in the General Council of Assembly, which was vested in the CHP Assembly Group. The General Council of Assembly reached a structure where significant negotiations and criticisms did not exist and where offers brought from both the party and the government were easily approved (Uyar, 1998: 273, 289). Specifically, in accordance with the Party Regulation, the binding level of the decisions made in the CHP Assembly Group and the dissenting vote

against this decision in the Assembly group transformed the Assembly into a ratifying organization. Consequently, the single-party concept juxtaposed with the election procedures of parliament members in the context of CHP's procedures that adjudicated the compulsoriness of group decisions rendered the Assembly ineffective. The Assembly simply functioned as a legitimizing and ratifying institution. In reality, almost all of the proposals brought into the Assembly passed unanimously without ever being extensively discussed (Koçak, 1999: 578–580).

The Independent Group

In order to put forth the function of the Assembly as more obvious during the single-party period, the performance of the Independent Group (*Müstakil Grup*) established to audit CHP and government directly could also be examined. The Independent Group was founded within the scope of the decisions made in CHP's Fifth Congress in 1939. The Independent Group was founded to recover the necessity of criticizing the government and CHP as of 1931 and was an application put into effect during the İnönü period following the application of Independent deputy. The Independent Group, which was regulated by Articles 125–130 of the 1939 Regulation, was set forth to reach an organization parallel to CHP. Like CHP, it depended on the decisions of the Presidential Council and instructions of the CHP General President. İnönü was simultaneously the General President of CHP and the Independent Group. He formerly assigned Deputy General President to CHP, as well as to the Independent Group. The Independent Group Deputy General President had the same rights as the Deputy General President of CHP. Members of the Independent Group would be selected by the Congress and new members, if any were required, would be assigned by the General President. Twenty-one persons, which shall be selected by the Congress, would form a group in the Assembly and would attend CHP Assembly Group meetings but they would not be able to either take the floor or vote. The Independent Group would state their opinions within the scope of their own group in the Assembly and they would be able to vote.

CHP's 1939 Regulation indicated the duties of the Independent Group as follows:

Duty of Party (CHP) Independent Group;

a) To provide the accurate execution of state affairs, the best execution of party regulation and program, and decisions of the major Congress; to audit these executions without being subject to the CHP Assembly Group's decision. This group submits a report to the following Congress, regarding four years of activity.

b) Upon the resolution of the General Council, the Independent Group can ask questions and request explanations to/from Ministers and ask for a vote of confidence for executive deputies. Similarly, it can ask for a discussion in the Assembly on any governmental decision.

c) The focus of the Deputy General President of Independent Group is toward the success of the government, cares to assist and to avoid disunion, separation, obsession and individual benefits (Art. 128).

In a speech to the Congress, CHP General Secretary Fikri Tüzel explained the justifications of the foundation of the Independent Group:

Considering the changing parts of our political history, which lasted around a quarter-century, it can be concluded that the single-party system is the most useful system for our distinguished and holy country. However, it is also a fact that it was formed from a single structure, the Assembly also needs to be criticized and audited. [...] I believe that the Independent Group is capable of achieving this significant task (CHP V. Büyük Kurultay Zabıtları, 1939: 30).

Thus, the Independent Group was expected to criticize and supervise the government. Therefore, an attempt was made to mitigate the lack of criticism that occurred within the single-party Assembly composition by Independent deputies during the Atatürk period. Afterwards, during the İnönü period, an Independent Group attempted to recover this ability. However, from the very beginning, the duties and capacities of the Independent Group were designed in such a framework as to block the accomplishment of an effective opposition and auditing mission.

Considering that after the decisions of CHP are discussed in the CHP Assembly Group and finally resolved; generally, a group decision is made accordingly, and they are brought into the Assembly, it was seen that probable criticism to be performed by the Independent Group in the Assembly would not be functional. Nevertheless, many of the deputies who got the floor in the Congress claimed that for the Independent Group to be

effective over party and government decisions, their members should also be introduced with the right to speak in the CHP Assembly Group, which is the main place where actual decisions are made (CHP Beşinci Kurultay Zabıtları, 1939: 31–77). After discussions, the Independent Group was approved within the framework of the pattern submitted by the CHP administration. Therefore, the Independent Group's working limits, discussion in the Congress and CHP top management's insistence reveal that expectations from the Independent Group were restricted by showing the failures of CHP decisions, beyond effecting the decisions of the government and the party. CHP deputies who were obliged to vote in line with group decisions in accordance with CHP Regulation were not affected by the Independent Group, which was only permitted to state their opinions in the Assembly. On the other hand, the Independent Group had no right to state an opinion in the CHP Assembly Group where all relevant decisions were given. For this reason, what was expected from the Independent Group was not to be effective over the CHP Group or the government, but to perform a stating opinion procedure, which practically shall not be functional since no opportunity was provided to influence the completed resolutions. In other words, the function expected from the Independent Group was to mediate for the provision of a democratic view against a domestic and foreign public, and to function as a warning mechanism against unsuccessful policies (Koçak, 1999: 2).

The National Chief, who had the authority to determine the top management of the party and to assign the government, as well as having an absolute capacity over all policies, was the one who also assigned the Independent Group Chief Deputy and members thereof. The Independent Group application was an auditing attempt, which was more cautious but less functional than the Independent Deputy application and the SCF experience, which were both put into effect during the Atatürk period. In order to obstruct the formation of an opposition inside the party against his attempt for forming an Independent Group, İnönü provided a place for various safety mechanisms so that the Independent Group finally reached such a level where it could not achieve its auditing

function. When the necessity of an audit and concern for the formation of an opposition matched, the auditing function became a secondary element and this attempt was unsuccessful from the very beginning. Within this framework, the formation type of the Independent Group and the limits of its authority produced such a result that made the expected function meaningless.

The Independent Group elaborated to perform all procedural mechanisms as CHP. Regular meetings were held, meeting notes were introduced to press by an official communiqué just as in CHP, from time to time moderate critics and suggestions were introduced on economic policies and works performed were brought to the agenda of Congress by a report (Koçak, 1999: 80). Besides these procedural studies, along with two Assembly periods, no affirmative or dissenting vote was used for the government, no parliamentary question or motion of non-confidence was given, and the government was supported unconditionally.

Hilmi Uran evaluated the Independent Group's performance for two parliamentary terms in the manner given below:

The Independent Group was a step forward for the role to be undertaken by an opposition party in the future and the Assembly was expected to be familiarized with various party-regimes. [...] Nevertheless, the Independent Group could not achieve what was expected from itself and could not achieve its duty to provide familiarization in this respect. [...] It may prepare well for its own group meetings, but real critics were produced by the Independent Group against the cabinet and its members. However, this much of it was even accomplished in CHP main group meetings, even harder and disrespectfully. [...] In the Assembly's open meetings, the Independent Group formerly acted more cautious and tentative than the main party group. On the other hand, no one expected more from this group, which was under the control of the CHP General Presidency and which is known to have been an artificial structure and the artificialness of the group has been its major weakness (1959: 344–345).

Uran's evaluations regarding the Independent Group were shared by various researchers (Giritlioğlu, 1974: 148–149, Koçak, 1999: 80–82; Goloğlu, 1974: 16–17; Öz, 1992: 177–178). Within this context, the Independent Group, which was established to provide a harmless opposition within the Assembly against CHP did not perform any serious

activity in terms of providing opposition against and auditing the government. It could not achieve the duties attributed to it and it remained under guidance. However, even being under control and guidance as well as ineffective, it can still be said that the Independent Group experience played a familiarization role during the transition period to democratic life.

4.3 7 Election System and the Tutelage Regime

The two-stage election system had been one of the major elements that kept the single-party regime alive. In all stages from the beginning to the end, in the two-stage election system in which the CHP top management and bodies were effective and measures were taken in the early stages to avoid any surprises, secondary electors, which had been selected by the CHP top management were approved first, and secondary electors, which had been specified again by CHP bodies were approved by the public afterwards, and then the deputy lists that were specified by the CHP top management were approved by the secondary electors. This system provided a guarantee election to CHP and introduced a significant legitimacy to the government. In an environment where only CHP could attend the elections, the elections system that was applied created an anti-democratic structure. Therefore, as of 1908, its primary application year, the two-stage election system had been continuously criticized by the opposition parties. In the republican period as well, all parties against CHP criticized the election system and claimed the single-stage election system. Taking these claims out of initial consideration, CHP paid attention to these requests only when it was obliged to implement a multi-party system, accepted this system in 1946, and developed it in 1950.

During the single-party, implementation of a two-stage election system was excused upon the justification that the public had not yet reached political maturity yet and it was applied accordingly. However, the real factor beneath this expressional justification was that the election system provided the permanency of CHP and it was a source of

guaranteed legitimacy. The CHP leading staff, via guarantees introduced by the election system, formed a uniform Assembly Group.

Atatürk and İnönü, as of the 1931 elections, searched for how to recover the necessity of auditing and criticizing the party and government. Within this framework, a contingency was reserved for those independent deputies whose numbers were increasingly going down in the 1931, 1935, and 1939 elections. However; as CHP top management intervened in the selection of deputies and secondary electors abstained to display an independent will and on the other hand because of CHP top management's impatience against critics and as independent deputies who criticized the government could not be elected again in the next elections; expected functions from this search became ineffective. During the İnönü period, the independent deputy application was abandoned and the application that provided the right of preference for the secondary electors and which directed deputies to search for support; showing an excessive number of candidates was put into effect. This system was only applied in the 1943 elections. Together with entering into the multi-party system, this application was abandoned as well. In both of these practices, the intolerance of the ruling councils towards any criticism and its anxiety of opposition stunted the authoritarian administrative style of CHP and prevented the party from achieving its objectives.

The fact that the ruling council of the CHP determined the list of candidates to be approved for parliamentary membership and the election procedure that allowed for the approval of these lists in total renders the member profiles indicative of CHP's political stance. Specifically, an analysis to be directly performed on a deputy profile shall reveal what type of policy is implemented by CHP top management. All during the single-party period, almost 75% of the deputies remained constant; an attempt was made to keep the need for change rate at 25%. The locality of deputies recorded a fall as of 1923 and remained around the level of 50% during the single-party period. The Assembly's geographical distribution was in favor of the Marmara region and against the East. In terms of the general of deputies as well as the recently elected deputies, the framework

of the Assembly was comprised of deputies who acquired official background, whereas deputies having commercial background remained lower. This general view changed in two critical elections in which the multi-party political system was attempted. The first change was experienced after the SCF experience, in which CHP top management needed to change all previous tendencies in the 1931 elections. However, in the 1935 elections, CHP turned back to its previous policy. The second change was experienced in the 1946 elections and in the 1950 elections, this remained constant since DP formed the majority in the Assembly.

The profile of the Assembly with these general tendencies obviously puts forth that CHP has followed an elitist and tutelary policy throughout its incumbency. By using the privileges provided by the election system, by the end, CHP also preferred political privileges, which do not consider social tendencies specified in the center. As it changed its policy upon SCF shock imposed in 1931 and because it was obliged to compete in 1946, it shows that it can develop a strategy protecting social tendencies relevant with political elites within competitive election circumstances. However, as the elections are competitive, CHP did not feel it necessary to protect social tendencies in its deputy preferences and moved under the effect of elitist and tutelary concerns.

The election system and CHP's deputy preference directly reflected onto the functioning of the Assembly. Deputies, who needed the support of CHP top management rather than the society, abstained from serious criticisms toward government and party policy. Those who did lost their positions. This situation resulted in a functionless Assembly. Government and party policies were discussed in CHP Assembly Group and resolved afterwards, in accordance with the group decision being made unanimously. Deputies were obliged to approve the offers submitted to the General Council. The Assembly's function was limited by providing political legitimacy toward CHP and the government. The motion of censure mechanism was not affected in the Assembly; dissenting and affirmative votes in relation with the governmental activities remained low. Even the Independent Group, which was established by İnönü directly to audit the government

and the party, could not be successful due to the single-party reality as well as the authoritative political mentality acquired by the single-party regime. The Independent Group existed in a framework without opportunities for an effective opposition, thus it could not function for an effective opposition and auditing. In fact, under an environment in which the Independent Group, which was in charge of auditing the government, was unsuccessful, it was not realistic to expect the Assembly to criticize and audit the government.

Finally, it will not be incorrect to state that the two-stage election system, which was applied during the single-party regime, has been an important instrument of the single-party regime. With the opportunities provided by this election system, the single-party government provided its democratic legitimacy in view and obtained the opportunity to apply its tutelary and elitist policy practice.

4.4 Conclusion

The CHP incumbency, lasting from its de facto establishment in 1923 until 1950, demonstrated an authoritarian and tutelary character. The constitutional political system that was in effect during this period was not responsible for the Party's authoritarian and tutelary style. Despite the fact that the 1924 Constitution provided for a multi-party regime and parliamentary sovereignty in a democratic framework and that it allowed for the representation of the national will in the political structure of the country, the CHP rule developed the necessary instruments to bypass the Assembly and to render a democratic system authoritarian. Although the 1924 Constitution remained in effect during its incumbency and although the democratic mechanisms and political concepts provided by the constitution were in effect de jure, CHP managed to suspend the de facto effect of the constitution on the political system through the instruments it developed. Eradication of any opposition, constructing authority that legitimizes the single-party regime, implementing a two-staged election system that ensured the victory and continued incumbency of the party, and the continuation of the chiefdom system can be enumerated as the mechanisms that suspended democratic mechanisms. It was these

mechanisms that enabled the single-party regime to evolve into its authoritarian and tutelary structure. With these instruments, a political order that was not anticipated by the Constitution, both in theory and praxis, was maintained. Authority and prerogative not trusted to the ruling administration by the constitution were obtained through CHP's operating charter. Even though a democratic political system seemingly existed de jure, a de facto authoritarian political system remained in effect.

CHP its quest for an authoritarian regime that could bypass the constitutional system utilized both ideological justifications that legitimized the single-party regime, and institutional organizational structures that allowed the regime to function. CHP developed assumptions that would necessarily depict the single-party regime's existence as the most fundamental requirement for the future of the society and the political system of the nation. It appropriated the victory of the War of Independence by aligning itself with the Society for the Defense of Rights (ARMHC). Assuming that all political parties are based on class interests, CHP declared the existence of opposition both unnecessary and harmful in Turkey where, the founders believed, no class differentiation existed and the masses were welded into a classless nation. They defended the thesis that, after having saved the state, CHP was solely responsible for building a new nation as it housed the enlightened elite that made the victory possible and it encompassed the entire society. This responsibility was also legitimized by the assertions that the society had not yet been transformed into a nation that could determine its own interests and thus could not exercise national sovereignty to realize such interests. The administration had to undertake the project of establishing a nation and as such had the authority to hold the sovereignty of the nation in the name of the nation until the party's own policies could transform the society into a functioning nation-state.

Consequently, with its civilizing mission and its interpretation of a society, the party emphasized its own tutelary nature and legitimized some authoritarian practices under this tutelage. This particular interpretation of the society in tandem with the tutelage system allowed CHP to declare any political activity and the existence of any opposing

factions or actors not only unnecessary but also harmful. CHP justified its quest to dispel all opposing factions and actors or even factions or actors that had the potential to become opposition by its tutelary mission. This justification and the tutelary mission, in fact, pushed the political system into a vicious cycle. On the one hand, the tutelary mission was the justification for the authoritarian turn in the political system, and on the other hand, it was claimed that the authoritarian regime was necessitated by the passage to a more democratic political system and more civilized society.

These ideological assumptions made the defense possible for CHP's authoritarian single-party administration for the good of the society. In fact, these assumptions and this defense was the platform on which the mechanisms that bypassed the constitution were created. Leading these mechanisms was the chiefdom system. Although this system was actually practiced during the Atatürk administration, it was not until the İnönü administration that it was made official. As of 1927, the CHP president had been given unlimited authority on the operations and future of the party. The Party president shielded by his permanent and immutable position was given the authority to appoint members of the parliament. Since CHP was the single-party of the political order, these authorities vested to the CHP president enabled him to be the single defining factor in the political order. Thus, with its foundation in the 1924 Constitution, the chiefdom system forced the limits of the democratic system. Capacities, which were in practice used by Atatürk were now formally awarded to İnönü (National Chief), officially made the parliamentary system meaningless, both on the principle of the unity of power and the separation of duties, which were based on the superiority of the Assembly. Assembly and the government converted into a meaningless political existence against the chief's power and capacities. Due to the single-party political order, each decision relevant to the political system was made by the chief himself and the Presidency Council, which consisted of two persons appointed by him. These decisions were all adopted in the CHP Assembly Group and subsequently approved in the Assembly. All of the procedures previously determined by the Constitutions had been applied; but, in reality, all of the

principles assumed by the Constitution were reversed. Due to the single-party system, the bodies in the party made the bodies of the political system meaningless. Within this framework, since its function was essentially to approve the political decisions made by what was by then a significantly diminished staff, the Assembly was never a decision making body. The Government never actually took responsibility against the Assembly either but instead felt that was the responsibility of the chief. Furthermore, the Assembly could neither completely fulfill its duty of legislation nor its duty of auditing the government, which were both vested by the 1924 Constitution. Thus, the chiefdom system enabled CHP to bypass the democratic systems of the 1924 Constitution and put an elitist, tutelary, and authoritative regime into effect.

Another mechanism, which enabled the authoritative single-party regime, which had been considered obligatory upon a tutelary consideration and legalized by CHP, is the two-level election system. The two-level election system was one of the key instruments to survive the single-party regime. In an environment in which only the CHP could attend elections, the election system applied what was ultimately revealed as an anti-democratic structure. In all stages, from the beginning until the end, in the two level election system in which CHP top management and bodies were effective, first the secondary electors which were specified by CHP were approved, and then a list of deputies, which again were determined by CHP organizations, were approved by the secondary electors.

The determination of the list of deputies in the CHP Presidency Council and the subsequent approval of the election lists—exactly as they were—due to the election system—created a uniform Assembly Group. During the single-party period, almost 75% of the deputies remained unchanged, while an attempt was made to cover the necessity of change by a rate of 25%. The locality of the deputies experienced a decline as of 1923 and it remained around 50% during the single-party period. The geographical distribution of the Assembly was recorded against the eastern and in favor of the Marmara region. Both in terms of deputies in general and those recently elected, the

frame of the Assembly was constituted made up of deputies with an official background. The Assembly's profile, along with these general tendencies, clearly reveals that CHP implemented a tutelary and elitist policy during its single-party power.

Up until the end, CHP utilized the privileges provided by the election system and made its preferences according to political privileges, which had been determined in the center, and which took no consideration of societal tendencies. Since the elections were not competitive, CHP had no need to consider social tendencies in regards to the deputy elections and thus behaved with elitist and tutelary concerns. Both the election system and CHP's preference for deputy reflected directly to the Assembly's function. Government and party policies were resolved upon discussions in the CHP Assembly Group, commonly in accordance with the decision made by the group; since deputies were obliged to approve the proposals submitted to the Assembly General Council. Motion of the censure mechanism had not been applied in the Assembly, and dissenting and abstaining votes about government proposals remained at an exceptionally low level. The Assembly's function remained limited only by providing political legitimacy to CHP and the government.

The two-level election system had been variously excused and legitimized on the justification that the public had not reached an adequate level of political maturity and was applied accordingly. However, the real factor lying behind this reasoning was that the election system guaranteed the continuation of CHP's power and provided a democratic legitimacy to CHP. Within this framework, the two-level election system, which was applied during the single-party period, can be stated as the most important instrument of the single-party regime. By means of this election system, the single-party power acquired the opportunity to provide legitimacy to the elitist, tutelary, and authoritative regime, which it indeed applied.

In conclusion, the single-party regime found the opportunity to eliminate the applicable 1924 Constitution through its elitist mission, the chiefdom system, and the two-level

election system, which it legitimized on its tutelary mentality. Through these instruments, CHP power exploited various authorities, which were not set forth by the Constitution. These tools caused the CHP by-law to be more effective over the political system than the Constitution itself. Hence, CHP, by using these tools, implemented an elitist, tutelary, and authoritative political regime.

CHAPTER FIVE

5. TURKISH NATION-BUILDING PROCESS

The nation-building process is one of the most important titles under which all reflections of the avant-garde elites' tutelary tendencies can be observed. The nation-building process was both realized via the tutelary tendencies of the avant-garde elite and provided platform for the continued existence of tutelage. The nation-building process, which began with the avant-garde undertaking, a savior mission under CUP rule and staking the saving of the state on the construction of a nation on which the state could be based was carried out by the Kemalist cadres with changing dynamics. The efforts to save the state had been limited to institutional restructuring until the CUP administration. However, the avant-garde elite, during the single party regime put the urgency of building a new nation and the radical social and cultural changes necessitated by the nation-building on top of the country's political agenda. In order to homogenize the nation and remold it to fit the nation-state model radical policies directed both towards instrumentalizing demographic engineering and transforming the cultural, communal and economic life were followed.

As a result of the demographic engineering devised in order to purge Anatolia from non-Muslim populations and allocate it to Muslim-Turks, Anatolia was, to a great extent, homogenized into a Muslim-Turkish territory. The Kemalist cadres, in addition to their policies of ethnographic engineering during CUP rule, developed policies that aimed to cultivate a nationalist consciousness based on Turkishness in Anatolia. The secularist policies that were developed not only to render Islam, which was considered an impediment to the identification with Turkism ideologies, ineffective, but also to alter it

in a way that would lend support to Turkism ideology, were followed by “official” history claims that would cast Turkism in a prestigious light. While non-Muslim groups who were not considered befitting to Turkishness by ethnicity were tied to Turkishness by citizenship; all Muslim ethnic groups living in Anatolia were declared Turkish. Resistance and uprisings against the policies, which were intended to replace Muslim identity with Turkish identity and to force the people relinquish all ethnic identities for the sake of Turkishness, were suppressed harshly by utilizing expressions that were suitable to the “security” discourse such reactionarism, insurgency, defenders of the old order etc.

The Kemalist core’s imposition of Turkish identity on all ethnic groups in Anatolia was only possible in the context of the new ethnic and religious map of Anatolia that was the consequence of the demographic engineering project that began during the CUP administration and was carried out during the Republic. Both the secularist-Turkish nationalist policies of the Kemalist core during the nation-building process and the authoritarian regime through which these policies were executed had become possible only after the homogenization of Anatolia. In this context, the nation-building project which as an instrument of the tutelary tendencies, in return strengthened the tutelage regime.

Policies executed during the nation-building process were not really necessitated by the conditions of the time, but rather was the result of choices made by the avant-garde elite, influenced by their ideologies in the socialization process. Neither CUP, nor the Kemalist core was forced to displace a quarter of the total population in order to homogenize Anatolia; to dispatch non-Muslims from Anatolia; to construct Turkishness to replace Islam; and to render Turkishness the only inevitable form of belonging for all groups in Anatolia while excluding non-Muslims from Turkishness by ethnicity. None of these critical moments were unavoidable moments forced upon by the historical conditions. All of these were the product of the conscious decisions made by the elite classes that were molded into their tutelary characteristics by the elitist and missionary

influences of the Ottoman modernization process. Ideological conceptions of saviorship and a version modernization that accounted for diverse ethnicities, religions and cultural values existed both among the Young Turks and the Kemalists. In both cases, these conceptions and cadres that supported them were eliminated by the cadres with more authoritarian tendencies.

In this context, the nation-building process had taken the peoples as they were at time, but felt compelled to rebuild it. Certainly, rebuilding the nation was not the only way to save the state. The state could have been saved by relying on its existing components at the time. As it was argued in the previous chapter, one of the fundamental arguments of the avant-garde elite was presenting their conscious decisions as the unavoidable actions necessitated by the conditions of the time. However, different paths and different choices are possible under any conditions. Their elitist and missionary tendencies had afforded the Avant-garde elite the privilege of marketing their own preferences as unavoidable strategies. This privilege forms one of the most important dynamics of the tutelage regime.

The policies executed by the avant-garde elite during the nation-building process had legitimized the tutelage ideology and authoritarian regime and ascribed them with permanency. The existence of tutelary and authoritarian regime was made possible by the nation-building process because of the perceived necessity to eliminate pluralism, ethnic and religious differences; to instrumentalize demographic engineering; executing secularist and nationalist policies; to impose assimilation and most importantly to build a new society. In fact, it could be argued that it was the nation-building process itself that legitimized the existence of a tutelary authoritarian regime. In other words, the regime had legitimized itself through these policies. The radical interventions proposed to alter the existing composition of the public and assumptions that these changes could only be achieved through authoritarian and oppressive practices, the impossibility of achieving the imagined nation-state model and other similar difficulties had rendered the authoritarian regime permanent.

5.1 Precursors of Nation-building

Nation-building policies, as a natural consequence of the objective of rescuing the Empire that gave meaning to the Ottoman modernization process, were featured in the leading cadres' agenda from the Tanzimat forth. Starting that period, these groups placed greater emphasis on administrative/government centralization and social homogenization in an attempt to ensure the Ottoman polity's survival. As these policies came to transform traditional forms of administration and belonging in the Ottoman Empire, the nation-building process became part of the leading groups' savior mission. As such, the process which was implemented through centralizing and homogenizing policies underwent at least two distinct phases. The primary phase up until 1913 witnessed the avant-garde elite's preoccupation with persuading the various nations within the Empire to adopt a common sense of belonging in order to keep them together. Therefore, Ottomanism served as the background against which centralization and homogenization policies toward various national identities operated until 1913. As the elite moved on to the second phase from 1913 on, they came to prioritize a piece of land whereupon the state would rest and a homogeneous nation that would safeguard the state. Consequently, the dual agenda of nationalist ideology and Turkification provided the momentum for policies of centralization and homogenization after 1913 (and including the Republican period).

5.1.1 Ottomanism

Ottomanism served as the official ideology of both the CUP and the 1908 revolution until 1913 (Keyder, 1995: 85; Tanör, 1999: 170; Zürcher, 1996: 188). It aimed at providing an overarching supra-identity to keep together different groups within the Empire who simultaneously experienced a decrease in their privileges and autonomy as a result of aforementioned policies, and a rise in nationalist fervor and desire for independence. As such, the goal of constructing a new national identity along the lines of Ottoman patriotism served as the main dynamic behind this period's policies. 'Unity of communities' (*ittihad-ı anasır*), the Ottomanist ideology's motto, referred to a

common Ottoman citizenship inclusive of all the Sultan's subjects regardless of race, faith or language to unite them within a single nation with undivided loyalty.

Until 1913, the CUP remained loyal to the idea of Ottomanist rather than pan-Turkism, as they believed that only an Ottomanist consciousness/sense of belonging inclusive of all the different groups could ensure the Empire's survival. It was therefore presupposed that every individual possessed two identities –their own ethnic identity and an Ottoman identity. As such, debates in this period focused on the contents of the latter. The CUP insisted that the notion of Ottomanism had rest upon Turkish identity. Making the case that it was normal for one nationality to be superior to all others in multi-national settings, the Committee maintained that Turks must serve as the main ethnic group (*unsur-u aslı*) (Hanioglu, 1989: 627, 630, 632; 2001: 295-302; Tunaya, 1989: 307).

The CUP's adoption of a strand of Ottomanist thought with the Turks' position as the dominant nationality was an extension of centralization. Seeking to suppress a national consciousness that was likely to result in separatism, the Committee believed Turkish identity would function as a common ground for various nationalities. The CUP leadership's conviction that political foundations seeking to spread national and ethnic consciousness elevated nationalist fervor and separatist tendencies among the empire's national groups led to the enactment of the Law on Associations on August 23rd, 1909 which banned all such organizations. Although the Law met fierce opposition from non-Muslim and non-Turkish groups in the Parliament, the CUP stood its ground to effectively shut down all ethnic associations (Ülker, 2005: 619).

Non-Muslim and non-Turkish elements claimed that the Committee covertly pursued a pan-Turkist agenda in the guise of Ottomanism. According to the CUP leadership, however, designating Turks as the Empire's dominant nationality and Turkish as the official language did not contradict Ottomanist principles. A centralizing state was compelled to settle on a common language and it was only natural that Turkish would fulfill this function. After all, it was precisely this notion that caused the 1876 and 1908

Constitutions to declare Turkish to be the official language. Along this line of thinking, the Committee's 1909 program featured a clause (Article 10) to increase the reach of Turkish language: "The language of instruction in both elementary schools and home schooling is Turkish. Nonetheless, local languages may be used in secondary education" (Arai, 1994: 77).

CUP-initiated policies to render Turkish as the sole language for official correspondence as well as education were met with non-Muslim and non-Turkish elements' charges of pan-Turkism. In response, the Committee denied the allegations and claimed that emphases on Turkish language and identity were mandatory steps toward stronger communication and relations between the imperial center and the periphery. It also underlined the need for an instrument to re-unite separatist ethnic groups with the Empire –a role only Turkish language could serve due to the Turks' dominant nationality status. While the CUP's willingness to limit Turkish language monopoly to primary education and to allow instruction in local languages in later stages weakens the charge of pan-Turkism directed toward the Committee leadership, it supports the position that the organization aimed at centralization and the subsequent construction of an Ottoman identity (Ülker, 2005: 620).

As a result, it may be argued that the CUP implemented a dual strategy. It was compelled to adopt an Ottomanist position in the form of Ottoman patriotism in order to prevent the different groups within the Empire from seceding. On the other hand, the possibility of Ottomanism's failure to meet expectations required the constitution of a national identity that would ensure the Empire's future survival. As such, the Committee executed its policy of Ottomanism in such a way that both these goals could be simultaneously achieved. The notion of 'unity of communities' resting upon a dominant nationality (Ottomanism based on pan-Turkism) emerged and operated to satisfy this need.

In short, the first phase of the nation-building process in the Ottoman Empire took place along the lines of the CUP's Ottomanist policies and the centralization attempts to constitute an Ottoman nation and its citizens. This initial experience ceased in 1913 amidst allegations of pan-Turkism and separatism as well as CUP policies to fortify Turkish identity. The implementation of 'union of communities', a central feature of the Ottomanist political agenda, with an emphasis on the Turks' role as the main ethnic group (*unsur-u aslî*) paved the way for post-1913 policies of pan-Turkism. Resting upon the premise of Turkish privilege, this specific interpretation of 'union of communities' empowered Turkish national identity and language and therewith served as the prelude to full-fledged Turkism.

5.1.2 Turkism

Two events, the military defeat in the Balkan War and the CUP putsch in the Sublime Porte (*Bâb-ı Âlî*) initiated a new phase of the nation-building process. The Albanian uprising and military defeat in the Balkans deeply affected the Committee. Over the three-year period between 1910 and 1913, the Ottoman Empire lost 1,100,000 km² of its previous territories that amounted to approximately 3,000,000 km² in addition to 5,000,000 people out of the original 24,000,000 (Ahmad, 1996:186) The fact that most of these losses occurred in the Empire's Western parts rendered them graver in at least two ways. First, the Ottoman state had to give up 83% of its European territories and 69% of its European population (Shaw and Shaw, 1983: 359). This, in turn, caused the empire to turn to the Anatolian peninsula while the population became more homogeneous. Moreover, losing Rumelia severely traumatized the great majority of the CUP leadership who hailed from that part of the empire. In addition, losing the Balkans not only demonstrated the Ottoman Empire's inability to stop separatist movements within its polity but also increased the relative number of Turks within the population entire, and territorially confined the Empire to Anatolia. Due to these various influences, the Balkans' loss triggered a new nation-building effort that was based on Turkification.

The Ottomanism policy's failure to keep non-Muslim elements within the empire resulted in Muslim Turks being regarded as the largest and most loyal ethnic group, therefore leading the CUP to conclude that the state's survival could only rest on pan-Turkism (Keyder, 1995: 87). The Committee's usurpation of political power and repression of all opposition allowed it to establish monopolistic authority over the military and the bureaucracy. The CUP also effectively justified societal engineering policies of the World War I era with security arguments, while the influx of Muslims from the Empire's former periphery expedited homogeneity-based nation-building efforts (Şeker, 2007: 464). It is in this framework that an in-depth nation-building process gained momentum. What was experienced in the Balkans had to be prevented in Anatolia. Anatolia was the last castle of the Turks (Zürcher, 2009: 153). For this reason, the Turkish groups had to be fostered and non-Muslims had to be purged. First, non-Muslim groups were deprived of their economic privileges simultaneously with economic nationalization policies directed at boosting Turks' prominence in economic life. Later, a detailed demographic engineering program informed by national and security concerns was implemented in Anatolia to constitute a predominantly Turkish and Muslim population 'cleansed' of non-Muslim elements. In short, a comprehensive political, economic, social and cultural program was put in place along the lines of Turkism.

5.1.3 Nationalization of the Economy

At the heart of the CUP's economic nationalization policy lay the replacement of non-Muslims with Muslim Turks. The Committee was distrustful toward the Greek and Armenian bourgeoisie who controlled trade and finance due to their perceived proneness to foreign influences (Okutan, 2009: 203). The organization's emphasis on the economy became clear as early as 1909, at a time when they had to monitor parliamentary proceedings from the outside, with the admission of Unionist Cavit Bey to the cabinet as Minister of Finance (Ahmad, 1996: 33). From 1913 on, the Committee pursued decisive policies to create a national bourgeoisie, which represented at the time a necessary step

to establish a national economy and consequently an independent state. Intellectuals such as Ziya Gökalp, Yusuf Akçura and Tekin Alp who exercised considerable influence over the Unionists also argued that a national state could be established if and only if a national bourgeoisie already existed (Ahmad, 1996: 57-58). As such, the CUP regarded World War I as an important opportunity to build a nation in Anatolia along Turkist lines. Following a wartime declaration on the abolishment of economic privileges (capitulations), the Committee implemented a conscious policy to raise a Muslim entrepreneurial class through generous subsidies (Ahmad, 1996: 41; Keyder, 1995: 89). The same year, the government passed a Law on Industrial Encouragement to pledge that domestic production would be prioritized and local factories would work more easily (Ahmad, 1996: 42). The ‘language reform’ of 1915 followed. Accordingly, Turkish was established as the exclusive language for all correspondence and official accounting transactions (Keyder, 1995: 90). This indicated that the state now saw Turkish entrepreneurs as its true counterpart and that non-Turkish speakers had no place under the new system. The same year, the CUP established the Artisans’ Association (*Esnaf Cemiyeti*) to facilitate commercial organization. The League aimed at ensuring wartime solidarity while simultaneously strengthening the local bourgeoisie (Mardin, 1995: 634).

This way, nationalism took the form of boosting Muslim presence in the economic arena, in other words, striving to encourage employment and enterprise. Ziya Gökalp would go on to declare in 1916 that “one of the factors that will bless the Turks with national character and contribute to the rise of a Turkish culture [was] national economy” (cited in Ahmad, 1996: 46). However, policies geared toward a national economy could not operate within the Ottoman millet system that continued to survive. Only after Ottomanism was abandoned and a uni-national Turkist strategy based on Muslim Turks became state policy were all state capabilities combined to forge a national economy and a local bourgeoisie.

These policies that the CUP formulated in the economic realm attempted to use the World War as leverage toward the goal of nation-state formation. Namely, the unilateral abolishment of economic privileges, putting an end to the privileged position of foreign public- and insurance companies (Toprak, 1995: 2), legislating to designate Turkish as mandatory language for all commercial transactions, placing high taxes on import goods and instituting new tariffs to safeguard local industries (Ahmad, 1996: 47-49), and state financing of Muslim merchants to elevate them to being the state elite's primary counterparts (Keyder, 1995: 94-95; Toprak, 1995: 3) were some of the policies that the Committee adopted during its wartime tenure toward the goal of a state with national bourgeoisie.

5.1.4 Demographic Engineering

In addition to the economy's nationalization, another significant policy that the CUP implemented in the nation-building process consisted of demographic engineering activities geared toward making Anatolia the new heartland for the state. Three areas of concern to the Committee were positioned at the heart of demographic engineering activities between 1913 and 1918. The first related to security. The CUP had a security concern pertaining to all non-Muslim elements that were subjected to involuntary resettlement. Greeks and Bulgarians to the west, along with Armenians and Kurds to the east gave rise to a perceived threat to military security against the background of wartime conditions. Therefore, the CUP deemed it necessary for these elements to either be forced out of the Anatolian peninsula or be confined to the middle of Anatolia and away from the borders. Another source of concern was the emerging nationalist ideology that campaigned for the establishment of an ethnically homogeneous, Turkish-dominated Anatolian peninsula. Rapid, subsequent territorial losses had confined the Ottoman Empire to Anatolia. As such, the Rumelian majority among the CUP (and therefore state) leadership thought it necessary to empower the Turkish population of Anatolia to prevent the peninsula from sharing the Balkans' destiny. The nation-building process first and foremost depended on the right demographic composition. The third

and final concern was the pressing need to settle Muslim immigrant pouring into the Empire from lost territories. From the CUP perspective, settling Muslim immigrants served as a shortcut solution to the remaining two problems. In other words, Muslim immigrants represented an opportunity to both relieve the security concern and be receptive of nationalist ideology. Therefore, the CUP employed various instruments such as population exchange, forced migration, forced settlement, and assimilation in order to draw national boundaries around Anatolia as well as to ethnically homogenize and turkify the region's population during this period when the three concern areas worked together.

The Ottoman Empire was faced with the problem of immigration during its expansion and recession periods. Therefore, the state was no stranger to settlement policies. However, both the increasing volume of migration in the aftermath of the Balkan Wars and the political implications of population movements attached a brand new function and came to occupy a central place in the Ottoman government's political agenda. The CUP's designation of Anatolia as the Empire's new heartland transformed settlement into one of the most efficient weapons available to the organization in its efforts to create a homogeneous society.

Population Exchange

The first opportunity to homogenize the Anatolian population arose out of the population exchanges set forth by post-Balkan Wars agreements between the Ottoman Empire and the remainder of the warring parties. The exchange was a mutually desirable instrument for both emerging nation-states in the Balkans and the CUP leadership who shared the intent to establish ethnic homogeneity (Dündar, 2001: 66). The first article on population exchange appeared in the peace treaty signed on September 29, 1913, between the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria following the second Balkan War. This arrangement resulted in the deportation of 48,570 Muslims from Bulgaria and 46,764 Bulgarians from Ottoman Thrace (Ladas, 1932: 20). As a result of this exchange and the subsequent forced migration, the Ottoman Empire got rid of Bulgarians not only in

Thrace but also in Anatolia where they were less in numbers. Following the population exchange, Turks arriving from Bulgaria were settled in previously Bulgarian areas. This was an important step toward the Turkification of the Empire's European borderlands (Dundar, 2008: 188-191). Upon the finalization of its agreement with Bulgaria, the CUP government proceeded to negotiate a population exchange with Greece where a May 1914 agreement involving 150,000 Greeks from Thrace and 52,000 Muslims from Macedonia was reached. However, the exchange never took place since World War I broke out before the details could be worked out and the negotiating parties entered the war in opposite fronts (Mourellos, 1985: 394; Ladas, 1932: 21).

Forced Migration

Where population exchange through mutual agreement was not a viable option, governments resorted to forced migration and settlement. The CUP engaged in a policy of forced migration toward non-Muslims in order to both accommodate the Muslim immigrant seeking refuge in the Empire and to homogenize the Anatolian population. Forced migration resulted from both nationalist sentiments such as building a homogeneous nation of Muslim Turks, and security concerns like getting rid of the seemingly unreliable non-Muslims. To this end, the Committee enacted the Law on Forced Migration on May 27th, 1915. The Law authorized the military to displace and resettle those suspected spies and traitors (Dündar, 2001: 62). In line with this act, the CUP effectively deported Armenian, Greek, Jewish and even Muslim populations during the war on 'military grounds' (Dündar, 2001: 62-65).

Thrace was the first region that represented an urgent matter for the CUP's forced migration and settlement agenda. It was necessary to settle Muslim immigrants that left their homelands following the Balkan Wars while fortifying the Empire's Western borders. The plan to serve both purposes was to push Bulgarians and Greeks out of this region and to replace them with Muslim immigrants. In this sense, Bulgarians were the first to go as part of the population exchange agreement with the Bulgarian government. In late 1913 and early 1914, forced migration policies targeted the Greek populations.

Although the state was not officially involved in these activities that aimed at displacing the Greeks, Muslim gangs and the Special Organization (*Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa*) participated in the efforts. Solely relying on intimidation and forced removal, over 100,000 Thracian Greeks was forcibly sent to Greece (Dündar, 2008: 194-196; McCarthy, 1995: 287; Şeker, 2007: 465).

Once Thrace was largely 'cleansed' of its Greek population, the CUP began from mid-1914 on to target Greek residents of Anatolia and particularly the Aegean. The Committee's desire to replace Aegean Greeks with Muslim immigrants rested on two grounds: Primarily, the government did not trust the Greeks resident in the Aegean, a border region with Greece. Therefore, military security concerns accounted for the targeting of Aegean Greeks. The second reason was economic. The Aegean was one of the most fertile regions of the Anatolian peninsula with a vibrant economic life. This meant that the CUP believed the regional economy had to change hands in order to facilitate economic nationalization policies crucial for nation-building efforts. To both ends, Muslim immigrants flowing in from the Balkans to be settled represented the most appropriate instrument. Based on these reasons, cooperation between informal agents and government officials made possible a comprehensive action plan to force Aegean Greek populations into 'voluntary' migration. A variety of activities including economic boycotts, intimidation through terror, and Muslim immigrants' settlement into predominantly Greek residential areas were employed for this purpose. All three methods aimed at (and successfully managed to) make daily life unbearable to Greeks. In order to avoid foreign pressures and interventions, the Ottoman state seemed interested only in settling Muslim immigrants while the CUP's local branches or other local groups pursued forced migration policies against Greeks. Consequently, 126,000 Aegean Greeks left for Greece while over 100,000 Muslim immigrants settled in previously Greek areas in 1914 alone (Dündar, 2008: 197-216).

As a result of external pressures, uncertainty of wartime alliances, negotiations on official population exchange and difficulties related to mass migration's management,

the CUP temporarily paused its activities toward the Aegean Greek population's removal in late 1914. Government policy on Aegean Greeks between 1915 and 1918 was geared toward relocating Greeks –in accordance with official orders and plans- in coastal areas to the depths of Anatolia and particularly mid-Anatolia. It would appear that the Greek population's preference of Anatolia over Greece was linked to the possibility of having to serve in the Greek army following forced migration as well as the potential hostage status attributed to Greeks in Anatolia against Greek advances. During this period dominated by wartime conditions, Greek populations near Ottoman coasts were dispersed –with help from up-to-date statistical data- across Greek or now-vacant Armenian villages in the peninsula. Muslim immigrants were settled in former Greek residential areas without further delay. Consequently, notwithstanding the numerical variation among different sources, the first and second forced migration of Greeks affected approximately half a million people (Dündar, 2008: 225-246; İçduygu, 2008: 364; Selek, 1987: 64).

The Armenian forced migration is one of the prime indicators of the ways in which the CUP utilized involuntary resettlement policies to define Anatolia's ethnographical borders, which constituted an important element of the nation-building process. The Muslim-Turkish Anatolian heartland's existing and potential borders from a CUP perspective helped define where the Armenian populations were removed and resettled. The likelihood of a post-war Armenian national polity usurping predominantly Armenian provinces was influential in the Committee's attempts to 'cleanse' these areas from their Armenian residents. Therefore, the Armenian resettlement –with the exception of its initial stage that took place in January and February of 1915- was directed not deeper into Anatolia but instead southward outside the peninsula's borders. Although the CUP saw the closest foreign territory as the destination for forced migrants during the Bulgarian population exchange and the pre-war Greek resettlement, it altered this strategy as the World War began. As such, the same factors that contributed to the Committee's prioritizing Anatolia over Greece for Greek resettlement also influenced

the Armenian resettlement. Concern over forcibly removed Armenian populations fighting against Ottoman forces upon leaving the Ottoman lands and/or returning to their original homes in the event of Ottoman recession resulted in these groups' being directed south of the border as opposed to the northeastern border into the Russian Empire. This decision led to a permanent Turkification of eastern and southern borderlands of the Anatolian peninsula.

Even though the basic reasoning behind the CUP's decision to resettle the Armenians was the goal of transforming Anatolia into a national homeland through ethnic homogenization policies (Akçam, 2001: 161-174), other military and political factors also seem to have contributed to the situation. The leading such factor was the Committee's fear that Armenians were going to revolt during the war. The Armenian organizations' refusal to fight alongside the imperial forces against Russia, as well as the presence of Armenian troops within Russian forces in Sarikamis and the Armenians' failure to join the Ottoman army in Adana and Aleppo under the command of Cemal Pasha, coupled with leaked information to foreign submarines aggravated distrust toward Armenians. The CUP's firing of unreliable Armenian officials, shutting down foreign institutions that worked with Armenians, confiscating Armenian-owned mass-communication channels fueled this distrust and tensions between the Committee and Armenian organizations and communities. The Ottoman army's January-February 1915 pursuit of Armenian deserters resulted in Armenians perceiving the event as ethnic cleansing and arming against the Ottoman military forces which rapidly paved the way for the Armenians' forced removals from the Dortyol-Adana area. Following violent confrontations triggered by the army's pursuit of deserters, the CUP forced local Armenian populations to leave the area based on the premise of maintaining security. The Committee's moving of Armenians into Anatolia undid all existing affinity between Armenian organizations and the CUP, and caused the latter to adopt an even more comprehensive and decisive approach (Dündar, 2008: 258-275). During the Adana conflict, Armenian organizations from the Ottoman Empire and elsewhere argued that

an annihilation of Armenians was already underway, and proposed that Armenians joined the Entente powers in return of protection. In the aftermath of the events, the CUP agreed that Armenians could not be trusted under wartime conditions and decided to pursue a total solution that indicated their mass exile to the desert areas in the south.

On April 24th, 1915, the CUP resolved to exile Armenians to the south, and targeted the leadership of Armenian political parties, organizations and association through arrests, exile and travel bans (Dündar, 2008: 276). This was a defining move vis-à-vis the Armenian forced migration's later stages. Armenian groups, thinking that their fears of Ottoman-led annihilation came true, organized resistance movements in Van and Erzurum to fight back against the Ottoman forces. Upon the fall of Van due to Armenian resistance and continued approach of Russian forces, the CUP extended the scope of the original plan from Adana and Hatay to include Van, Erzurum and Bitlis on May 9th, 1915. This was followed by a May 23rd, 1915 order that the two regions would be subjected to forced removals (Adana, Antep and Hatay to the west, and Erzurum, Van and Bitlis to the east) and be cleansed of all Armenians who would then be relocated to Urfa, Zor, Mosul, Southeastern Syria and Aleppo. During the relocation process and amidst rising external pressures, the Committee decided to adopt the previously concealed policy of resettlement as the official government position. By the end of May 1915, both a parliamentary resolution regarding Armenian resettlement and a Law on Resettlement with no specific reference to Armenians was passed. On June 21st, 1915, an additional resolution was passed to enable the removal of all Armenians even in previously unaffected areas such as Trabzon, Diyarbekir, Canik, Sivas and Elazığ provinces. Although resettlement decisions were made regarding Armenians in individual locations throughout 1916, mass- and intense resettlement came to an end (Dündar, 2008: 276-297).

Muslim immigrants were settled in residential areas that were left empty following the forced migration of Armenians. In the face of the resettled population's inadequacy to fill the void of forcibly removed groups, the leftover Muslim populations in the Balkans

and Russia were requested to relocate to the Anatolian peninsula. The acts of forced migration and resettlement operated with help from up-to-date data and according to a definite plan. The 10-percent rule was applied to remove Armenians, while surplus populations were relocated in case their relative size exceeded the permissible ratio. Similarly, the relative size of Armenians allowed to remain in Anatolia was diligently kept below 5 percent. Talat Pasha, along with the Directorate for the Resettlement of Immigrants and Tribes and the Public Authority on the Directorate for Tribes and Immigrants, closely followed the ethnographic data from all parts of the peninsula subject to forced migration and involuntary resettlement, and executed the operation with great diligence and awareness. According to Ottoman sources, the number of Armenians residing in Anatolia in 1914 amounted to approximately 1, 5 million. Of these, 800,000 were subjected to forced migration. Whereas 300,000 of these perished en route, 500,000 were successfully relocated to desired areas. While 281,000 Armenians were exempt from forced migration due to their functional value to the CUP and therefore remained in Anatolia, approximately 255,000 others managed to avoid forced migration and escaped the Ottoman Empire for destinations abroad. Therefore, it is possible to state that roughly 50% of Ottoman Armenians survived the forced migration policies implemented in 1915-16, while only 18% remained in the Anatolian peninsula (Dündar, 2008: 335-340).

To conclude, the same factors that informed all other non-Muslim groups' involuntary resettlement operated in the context of Armenian involuntary resettlement campaigns as well. However, a variety of factors such as military security concerns, fears of a potential Kurdish-Armenian alliance and concerns over a post-war Armenian polity in Armenian-dominated eastern provinces resulted in the Armenian forced migration being more rigid, decisive and wholesale than other non-Muslim groups.

There is no question that the CUP aimed at –and to a great extent succeeded in– cleansing the Anatolian peninsula from non-Muslim elements and, in particular, Armenians and Greeks. Although the Committee's systematically and decisively

pursued policies of forced migration and involuntary resettlement were fundamentally motivated by a nationalist sentiment to homogenize Anatolia, military necessities and national security also played an important role in the process. Considering the fact that resettled groups such as Armenians and Greeks lived in Eastern Anatolia and the Aegean that were, respectively, under the threat of Russian and Greek invasion, it becomes clear that the CUP's decisive pursuit was indeed influenced by nationalist fervor as well as security concerns. Therefore, it is possible to assert that multiple factors –most prominently the CUP government's homogenization policies- led to the forced migration that affected nearly two million non-Muslims.

Resettlement

After the Balkan Wars and during World War I, a large number of Muslim immigrants relocated to the Ottoman Empire as a result of both Ottoman encouragement and pressures from new governments now ruling over their areas. The number of Muslim immigrants compelled to move to Anatolia, where they were eventually resettled, remains unclear. Although different sources cite a variety of numbers, it is possible to claim that nearly half million immigrants from the Balkans and approximately 1,5 million Muslims from the east came to Anatolia in this period (Dündar, 2008: 48-49; Karpat, 2003: 115; McCarthy, 1995: 30-32, 186-192; Tekeli, 1990: 56-57).

The CUP stationed Muslim immigrants in an attempt to transform Anatolia into a Turkish motherland and according to a definite plan. In order for the nation-building process to be successfully implemented in Anatolia, it was believed that the dominance of Muslims and Turks in the peninsula had to be furthered. On May 13th, 1913, the Immigrants' Resettlement Statute (*İskân-ı Muhacirin Nizamnamesi*) was adopted to govern the involuntary resettlement program. The establishment of the Directorate for the Resettlement of Immigrants and Tribes (*İskân-ı Aşair ve Muhacirin Müdüriyeti – İAMM*) followed in 1914. On March 14th, 1916, the İAMM's scope was extended as the institution was reorganized as the Public Authority on the Directorate for Tribes and Immigrants (*Aşair ve Muhacirin Müdürlüğü Umumisi – AMMU*) (Dündar, 2001: 60-61;

2008: 180-181). The İAMM/AMMU's mission was to execute the involuntary resettlement policies in line with certain plans and concerns. These institutions implemented a population count with an eye on ethnic distribution prior to and after each forced migration or involuntary resettlement operation, based on which information future involuntary resettlement plans were altered.

The CUP's first priority was to facilitate the assimilation of Muslim immigrants within the Turkish majority in order to put into motion a nation-building process. This was their primary concern as the locales and their population density were taken into account for the involuntary resettlement of immigrants. In this sense, immigrants were not regarded as a homogeneous group but instead were subject to relocation policies that varied according to the immigrants' original location and ethnic background (Ülker, 2005: 627). For instance, the CUP imposed the tightest and detailed regulations for Albanians. These groups did not abandon the Ottoman Empire even after Albanian independence or preferred the Empire over Albania after the Balkans were subjected to involuntary resettlement. Albanians were effectively banned from Thrace and the broader Marmara area. Existing residents and newcomers alike were relocated to the depths of Anatolia. During this process, it was ensured that their numbers in these new areas did not exceed 10% of the entire population (Dündar, 2001: 112-122). On the other hand, the CUP did not feel the need to treat another group of Balkan immigrants, the Bosnians, with the same kind of reservations. These were subject to the 10% ratio restriction and relocation in Anatolia, but –unlike the Albanians- Bosnians experienced no geographical ban (Dündar, 2001: 123-127). Roma immigrants from the Balkans were divided among Muslims and non-Muslims. The CUP allowed the Muslims to be resettled while non-Muslims were denied entry to the Ottoman territories. Due to the increasing number of Roma immigrants, the Committee resolved in 1917 that Turks would be selectively admitted from among immigrants from Serbia, while the Roma would be sent back (Dündar, 2001: 128, 170).

The CUP's primary concern with regard to Kurdish immigrants taking refuge in Anatolia against Russian military advances was to develop an involuntary resettlement strategy that would cause them to set aside their ethnic identity and assimilate into Turkish identity. Talat Pasha's encrypted telegram dated May 2nd, 1916 to Diyarbakir province forbade Kurds' relocation to eastern territories such as Urfa and Zor due to the possibility of "them remaining a useless and harmful element by maintaining their national identity or undergoing Arabization" and ordered them to be sent to the Anatolian steppes. Talat also instructed in this telegram that Turkish immigrants be settled in Urfa, Maraş and Antep provinces while Kurdish immigrants were expected to be separated from tribe leaders and other local notables, and to be directed to Niğde and Kayseri provinces where they would be unable to retain their national identity. Other immigrants were ordered to relocate to places such as Amasya, Tokat and Malatya (Dündar, 2001: 140-141). Other encrypted messages sent to administrative offices in Urfa, Maraş, Antep, Ankara, Konya, Kayseri, Niğde and Kütahya pointed to the same issues. Kurdish refugees shipped to these centers were not to reside together, their relative numbers were not to exceed 5% of the entire local population where they would be kept away from tribe leaders, sheiks, imams and other notables, and were to be settled to the west of Konya. The underlying purpose for all these rules was that they "would abandon their language and customs to become useful elements" (Dündar, 2001: 142-149). Turkish immigrants who left the same areas as the Kurds for the same reasons, on the other hands, were kept in Kurdish- and Arab-dominated eastern provinces based on the premise that they were 'an element that fortified Turkish dominance in the region.' Telegrams on Kurdish involuntary resettlement ordered that Turkish refugees be located to Urfa, Maraş and Antep provinces from which Kurds were banned, while emphasizing that previously settled Turks must not be allowed to leave (Dündar, 2001: 142, 167-168, 172).

The CUP pursued a comprehensive nation-building project in Anatolia through wartime policies of forced migration and involuntary resettlement. These policies aimed at

Anatolia's geographic Turkification and Muslim immigrants' assimilation into Turkish identity. Since this was the goal to begin with, both with great care and with the help of up-to-date ethnographic data. In every involuntary resettlement campaign's aftermath, the Committee diligently monitored which Muslim group would be relocated to still vacant areas as well as demographic changes pre- and post-settlement, and the ratio of incoming and outgoing populations to the entire population. Muslim immigrants were settled in accordance with ethnic and demographic surveys of the Anatolian peninsula. The golden rule for the involuntary resettlement policy was to not allow the immigrant ratio to all locals to exceed the 10% threshold and to not keep immigrant groups together. These were meant to prevent immigrants from clinging onto old identities/traditions and to help them assimilate into Turkish identity. Along this goal, Greek and Bulgarian forced migration and Balkan immigrants' involuntary resettlement between 1913 and 1915 gave way to the CUP to turn eastward from 1915 onwards. The main policy here was to forcibly remove Armenians, to resettle Kurds in Anatolian provinces and to fortify the peninsula's eastern borders by directing Turkish immigrants to these now-vacated territories. The fact that Muslims escaping Russian military advances were separated along ethnic lines (Turks versus Kurds), and the two groups' subjection to different rules and policies, is manifest to assimilation's central role in the involuntary resettlement agenda.

This nation-building process whose CUP-era details were explained in detail above is one of the most important subjects where all reflections of the avant-garde elite's tutelary tendencies may be directly observed. In line with positivism's well-known doctor-patient metaphor, the CUP perceived itself as the former, while state and society were perceived as their patient. This tutelary idea in which elitism, the savior role, hierarchy and mechanic perceptions are hardly concealed entrusted the CUP with the authority to perform all kinds of operations on society and landscape that it perceived to be sick. The processes of inspection, diagnosis and treatment, which are intrinsic to the doctor-patient relationship, came to be applied –almost without concessions- as part of

the nation-building process. In this sense, the operation was pursued with great ‘scientific’ diligence with help from statistics, demographics, maps and sociology. The CUP moved on with its treatment while the movement of four million people in Anatolia triggered major transformations. During the operation, the Committee did not allow any violations of the rules and did not even hesitate to impose new mass movements in order to abide by on-paper equations (such as the 10% maximum ratio for settlers/total population). This savior mission also entitled Talat Pasha to misguide and misinform the Parliament for the sake of a work that he knew to be self-righteous.¹⁵⁸ Believing that the doctor could indeed cure the patient with the right kind of treatment, the CUP thought that it healed the Anatolian geography –that was thought to resemble a sick patient– through demographic engineering that was part of the nation-building agenda.

In conclusion, a grand demographic engineering operation was pursued between 1913 and 1918. Considering that roughly two million non-Muslims and nearly two million Muslims were subjected to, respectively, forced migration and involuntary resettlement, it is possible to argue that five years of CUP rule distributed a total of four million people across the Anatolian peninsula. Provided that the Anatolian population amounted to approximately 16 million in 1914, the numbers reveal that a quarter of the peninsula’s entire population relocated due to forced migration and involuntary resettlement policies (İçduygu, 2008: 363). As a result of this large-scale, ethnicity-based demographic engineering operation, the Committee successfully transformed Anatolia into a highly homogeneous landmass where Turks were the dominant element. This CUP-orchestrated nation-building activity greatly contributed to the establishment of ‘National Pact’ (*Misak-ı Milli*) borders contemplated during World War I and affirmed in the Treaty of Lausanne. Had it not been for the CUP’s wartime policies of demographic engineering, neither the Republican-era border of Anatolia nor the Kemalist elite’s pan-Turkist nationalism policies would have been possible. Significantly, the Republican

¹⁵⁸ For examples of how Talat Pasha misled the Parliaments regarding forced migration and involuntary resettlement policies, see Dündar, 2008: 219-225, 324-330, 440.

government –both during and after the War of Independence- followed its predecessor’s nation-building efforts with different priorities. In this sense, while on one hand homogenization policies were put in place to cleanse Anatolia of non-Muslims, a greater emphasis was placed on activities to have Anatolian populations adopt a Turkish national consciousness.

5.2 Nation-building in the Kemalist Period

The nation-building process during the Republican period, having inherited the central role assigned to demographic engineering from the CUP period, was able to develop social engineering policies based on this demographic makeup. After having altered the religious map of Anatolia with demographic engineering, the Kemalist cadres prioritized ethnic homogenization and assimilation projects. As such, radical secularist policies were developed that mitigated the sense of belonging cultivated by religion and assigned new meanings to Turkishness in order to fill the void created by the declining influence of religion.

Although Kemalist cadre had been a product of the modernization movements since the Tanzimat period and implemented a more radical program than Tanzimat elites; the Kemalist elites needed to establish the new state and society by setting itself against the *ancien regime* (Mardin, 1971: 209). This rhetoric of ‘rupture’, which had been applied so that Kemalist leadership could become the founders, was accepted easily by the political elites with the assistance of the Anatolia-İstanbul tension during the Independence War. Nonetheless, the Kemalist reform process meant that the CUP would resume its perception of modernization. In fact, most of the policies to be applied in the single-party system were policies that were discussed between the Young Turks.

However, the modernization process of the Republic followed both a more decisive and a more radical line when compared to the Ottoman modernization. When assessing the expediency and effience in which the secularist and nationalist policies were executed during the Republic, it is necessary to take the objective circumstances of the time as

much as the Kemalists absolute faith in these principles into consideration. Neither the ethnic nor the religious structure the Ottoman modernization targeted was conducive to a nationalism project. Although Young Turks had tried to modify the demographic structure of the by stretching all resources at the time, and in fact achieved a modest success, had not been able to prevent the dual and eclectic structure of the Ottoman to persist. Therefore, both modern and ideational structures and institutions continued to exist together. The Kemalist core was afforded the opportunity to carry out these policies in significantly more conducive environment (Mardin, 1986: 141). Thus, the modern-traditional tensions between ideational structures and institutions were ultimately decided in favor of the modernity. The ethnic and religious structure of the Ottoman had resulted in the modernization project, which was instigated to save the state, finding inspiration in pluralist and eclectic schools of thought. Within this context, Ottomanism (*Osmanlılık*), Pan-Islamism (*İslamcılık*), and Turkism (*Türkçülük*), all provided inspiration in different levels to the modernization process within the same period. The Republic utilized the advantage of having a more homogenous society in term of religion and ethnicity to eliminate the Ottomanism and Islamism projects and instead operationalize a radical secularist and nationalist project that was in accordance with the westernization perspective.

The Independence War had, in part, hindered the efforts to direct the political and ideational structure of the modernization policies of Tanzimat and Meşrutiyet towards secularism and nationalism. The Islamic discourse had served as the most effective method to convince non-Turk Muslims such as Kurds, Laz and the Circassian to join the Independence War. The fundamental unity and social mobilization required by the conditions of the War of Independence necessitated the utilization of Islam's unifying dynamic. Islam's status as the prevalent ideational structure of the time was not entirely due to the political military elites' instrumental-strategic actions. Because the War was enabled by the resistance in which local social elements participated autonomously, Islam was the most acceptable expression during that period. Military elites have

conversely been accepted as an effective instrument of Islam due to the composition of these facts, which participated in the resistance. To the extent that winning the War terminated the need for both a unifying expression and a broadly representative social base, the constraints in terms of pluralism that had been lifted during the modernization process were replaced with a more radical secularist and nationalist agenda.

However, Mustafa Kemal was ascribing a different meaning to the concept of “nation” than the contenders in the political center. He neither thought of the ‘nation’ with its Islamic connotations as it was in the first assembly, nor in terms of a front of united peoples. For Mustafa Kemal nation meant a product of imagination that had yet to be created. As such, sovereignty did not belong to the people that consisted of crowds and interest groups, but to the imagined community that represented the unity of the country (Heper, 2006: 96; Rustow, 1968: 72). This nation that represented the collective consciousness, common interest and the common will did not yet exist. The mission of the political center was to construct this nation. Heper describes this meaning Atatürk attached to national consciousness in a rather unique way:

“According to Atatürk, the peoples were going through phases of progress on the path to a more civilized lifestyle. Therefore, the leader and his circle were compelled to analyze and expedite this process. For Atatürk the common interest of the people could not be determined by the votes of the people. Only the national will, which was something different than the total of the individual votes, could determine what was in the best interest of the nation. However, the National Will could only appear to the extent that the people had attained a civilized lifestyle (2006: 118).

According to Atatürk, the public did not participate in politics during the Ottoman period and was kept ignorant. For this reason, the public did not know where its ‘real interest’ lied and could be easily deceived. In fact, it was not possible for a public loyal to charlatans exploiting religious emotions or to the sultan to be civilized. The mission of the politics and the enlightened elites was to raise the awareness of the public and “to bring them up to a contemporary level of civilization.” For this reason, reforms had to be executed “from top down” and the nation had to be developed and built up on the enlightenment of the public. A nation that practiced popular sovereignty was considered

an enlightened nation. Since, according to this measure of civilization, the Turkish nation was not at this level, for a while, sovereignty had to be exercised on behalf of the nation by the enlightened elites (Heper, 2006: 97–98, 112–113).

Mustafa Kemal was motivated with these missionary tendencies, which he attributed to the nation and the nation's sovereignty in every phase, between 1922 and 1926 in his struggle for power with his opponents; in 1927, after taking over the power establishing an authoritarian regime; in his nation-building policies aimed to construct a secular Turkish nation from a multi-ethnic religious society. The struggle for power in the political center and the authoritarian political agenda of the regime were both made meaningful with this mission. The politics of secularism and nationalism, which were implemented on the axis of this mission, under the umbrella of Westernization, were attempting to build a new nation (Tokluoğlu, 1995: 223). At the end of the process in which religion would lose its effectiveness on both society and policy making, where individuals would think rationally and scientifically and the society would adopt Turkish identity with pride; the public only then would become a nation and sovereignty could then be handed over to the nation. This was the purpose of the principles, which would later be named Kemalism. The duty of all institutions and actors of the Republic was to work and build up the nation “for the public, despite the public” (Oran, 1988: 121).

Building a new nation required serious demographic and political engineering, which was fundamental to changing the ethnic and religious map of the relevant period (Jenkins, 2008: 90–92). It required that the non-Muslim populations, which had been associated with the occupying forces of the war be diminished and a homogeneous Muslim society to be constructed. In addition, Islam's influence on the society had been decreased and Turkishness was promoted as the new constituting identity. To substitute the sense of belonging nurtured by Islam with Turkishness, and melt ethnic pluralism within the bounds of Turkishness, required accepting a painful process. The Kemalist core performed a series of purges in order to accomplish this difficult task and to become the single dominant factor of this political center. In order to break the social

resistance in an environment where no alternative political groups existed, an authoritarian political regime was constructed.

5.2.1 Homogenization of Anatolia

The primary dynamic of the nation-building process during the republic, similar to the CUP era, was policies of homogenization through population exchanges for a population with majority of Turks and Muslims. During the single party regime, policies towards purging Anatolia of Non-Muslims whose numbers were already dwindling were executed in a gradually declining intensity in tandem with the assimilationist policies inherited from the CUP for Muslims and Turks who were resettled to Anatolia.

By the time the Independence War ended, the population in Anatolia had already decreased by 30%. During the period beginning with the population exchanges and the wars in 1912 and ending with the wars in 1922, the Muslim population in Anatolia had decreased from 13.7 million to 11.2 million; and the non-Muslim population from 3 million to half a million¹⁵⁹ (McCarthy, 1983: 140). Although the perceptions of the most three populous minorities, who were afforded minority status by the Lausanne Accord, differed in the perspectives of the political elites and the people, the Anatolian homogenization policies required that the distributive weight of all three groups were diminished and the Turkist policies of the Kemalist cadres required their assimilation. The policies executed by the Kemalist cadre between the years of 1920 and 1930, in an effort to close that gap between formal status and political status, fluctuated sometimes excluding and sometimes excluding the non-Muslim populations. Although, the

¹⁵⁹ The dates for population figures for this period differ in multiple sources. Selek (1973: 62), relying on the circular provided to four heads of states in February of 1919 by the Istanbul government as a preparation for the Peace Conference posits the following population figures: Muslims in Anatolia 9,291,346; Non-Muslims 1,682,548 (Greek, 1,014,612; Armenians, 542,572; Jews, 93,364). According to these numbers, non-Muslim populations in 1919 constituted 15% of Anatolian population. When we consider these numbers in the light of voluntary departures of Greek in large numbers after the Greek defeat in the Independence War (Alexandris, 1992: 104), we can see that the population figures of non-Muslim populations come close to the figures given above.

Kemalist elite preferred an Anatolia without non-Muslim populations, they did not close the door on the assimilation of the existing populations.

Beginning in 1924, the Kemalist elite pressured the non-Muslim minorities into relinquishing rights that were afforded to them in Lausanne such as right to build schools and establish courts. In 1925, all three-minority groups renounced these rights publicly (Alexandris, 1992: 135-139; Bali, 1999: 59-77; Çağatay, 2006: 46). The Kemalist elite began to intervene in the minority schools gradually with the passing of Law on Unification of National Education. Of these interventions, the one that had the most impact on the minorities was declaring Turkish classes compulsory in minority schools and establishing new regulations in which teachers of Turkish Language, History and Geography courses were appointed by the Ministry. This was followed by a more radical policy in 1927. The ministry made the hiring of native Turkish speakers as teachers in minority schools. Teachers working in minority schools were given Turkish language tests, and those who did not pass were dismissed. Another interventionist policy came in 1937, which required that, the deputy headmasters in minority schools to be appointed by the Ministry (Okutan, 2004: 167-172). The interventionist policies of the Kemalist elite towards minorities were intended to include the minorities in the nation-building process. The Kemalist elite found it absolutely necessary to intervene in the minority schools due to their belief that maintaining a sense of belonging to anything but Turkishness would in effect hinder that nation-building process. The priority assigned to Turkish language in these interventionist policies were, in fact, in line with the nationalist policies of the time. The Kemalist elite considered unification of language the most important aspect of the nation-building process and the minorities' ability to speak Turkish an indication of their loyalty. The campaigns for the promotion of Turkish as the most prevalent form of communication were a consequence of these tendencies that targeted the Jewish community that did not speak Turkish. While the constraints imposed on the autonomy of minority schools, compulsory Turkish, History and Geography lessons in these schools, holding teachers obligated to speak Turkish and

administration to hire non-native Turkish speakers were elements of nation-building process for the Kemalists, it had an enervating effect on the minorities.

The assimilationist policies during the 1920s necessitated different stances towards the three non-Muslim minorities; however, with the fading of the Republic's security concerns, and the drop in the population of non-Muslims in Anatolia below the level of a liable threat in the 1930s, the Kemalist elite started to alter their approaches towards each minority. Kemalist core's opinion of the Greek and Armenian were worse in relation to the Jewish minority. Both the Greek and the Armenian were still being treated as enemies because of their position in the World War I—they had opted to side with the opposition groups instead of standing by the Ottoman or the Ankara government. Therefore, the Armenians in the Eastern border and the Greek in the Western border were exiled for purported security reasons (Çağaptay, 2006: 46). This perception became the determinative factor the Kemalist treatment of the Greek and Armenian minority in the peacetime.

The Kemalist treatment of the Greek was progressing parallel to Turkish Greek relations. When the Turkey-Greek relations were softened allowing some room for bilateral treaties and exchange of protocol towards the end of the 1920s, Kemalists' policies towards Greek minorities also softened. In mid 1930s, the Greek minority's right to travel within the borders was restored. Two members of the Greek minority were given seats in the Assembly and the regulations on travel between Turkey and Greece were relaxed (Çağaptay, 2006: 200-205). This was not the case for the Armenians who were subjected to more displacements by exhaustion strategies. The determining factors in Kemalists' oppressive treatment of the Armenians were memories of the war and the negative lobbying of the Armenians in diaspora against Turkey.

One of the most instrumental factors forcing Armenians to exile was burdensome regulations imposed on church activities and the attacks against the clergy. The cruel killing of two priests in Mardin and Diyarbakır in 1929 drove many priests in the East to

shut the doors of their churches and leave the country. Approximately 10,000 to 20,000 Armenians immigrated to Syria towards the end of 1929 and the beginning of 1930 followed by a wave of immigration to Iran in the first months of 1930 (Çağaptay, 2006: 53-60). In sum, the constraints imposed on Armenians for travel and commerce, the state's intervention in religious life and education, the hostile attitudes of the people in general, the ease of immigration to Syria facilitated by the French administrators were all influencing factors of the Armenian diaspora towards the end of the 1920s.

The Jewish minority, in contrast to their Armenian and Greek counterparts was not held in contempt by the Kemalist core. On the contrary, they had fought along the Muslim Turks during the World War I (Bali, 1999: 34-40). For this reason, Turkish nationalism in practice did not harbor any negative feelings towards the Jews. Two things brought the Kemalist wrath on the Jews. The first was economic reasons. The economic policies, carried out since the CUP, for nationalization of the economy targeted the Jews as much as the Greek and the Armenian. The fact that vacancies in some sectors left by the Greek were filled by the Jews in the Republic was enough for targeting Jews for economic reasons (Aktar, 1996: 4-18). The second reason for calling the Kemalist wrath was Jews' preference for French or Ladino instead of Turkish. For the Kemalists, this was an issue of loyalty. In the context of citizenship policies of the 1920s that were based on Turkish speaking, speaking of Turkish by the Jews was seen proof of their citizenship. This led Kemalists to take measures to force the elite members of the Jewish community to learn Turkish. While the leaders of the Jewish community struggled to escape the Kemalist wrath, the members of the community were abused for this reason in many an occasions (Bali, 1999: 105-108).

The cultural and economic oppression of the Jews, merging with the security concerns in 1934, triggered one of the most tragic events towards the Jews. The mass attacks on Jews and the looting of their property in Trachea, third most populous area of Jews after Istanbul and Izmir forced a numerous Jewish families to diaspora. Although the Jewish community was oppressed on economic grounds since the beginning of the Republic, the

oppressive practices and discrimination had not reached the masses. The new dynamics that served as catalyst for the events in Trachea were increase in the anti-Semitic publications influenced by the 1930s Germany and Italy and the practices that aimed to strength the Turkish character of Trachea on the eve of the World War II. When these issues combined with the Jews' perceived wealth and refusal to speak Turkish, a widespread antagonism towards the Jews emerged. All these factors and the fact that Jew population concentrated on a strategic region transformed Jews into a security concern for the Kemalists (Bali, 1999: 243-254). The involuntary resettlement of minorities from regions with concentrated populations under the 1934 Law on Resettlement served to encourage the Trachea attacks. Events that began as mass boycott movements against the Jewish goods in Trachean cities such as Çanakkale, Kırklareli, Edirne and Tekirdağ quickly turned into looting. Approximately three to eight thousand Jews fled to İstanbul. While the leaders of the Jewish community tried to appear unaffected by the events in order not to complicate their relationship with the Kemalist core any further, the Kemalists renounced their involvement in the events and opened an investigation to find the perpetrators. Ankara, called on the Jewish community to return to their properties, banned the anti-Semitic publications that had caused the Jews to complain and an indication of good will allocated a seat to a Jewish community member in the parliament. Nevertheless, the events led to the Jewish diaspora from the area in the following years, let alone returning (Çağaptay, 2006: 229-235).

If the Trachea events in 1934 were the last example of the Kemalists demographic engineering of the non-Muslim minorities, then the last Kemalist move for the nationalization of the economy was the Law on Wealth Tax. To the extent that these two events can be excluded from our consideration, the 1930s appear as the years in which the Kemalist cadres, having left their issues with the non-Muslims behind, prioritized their policies of assimilation of minorities into Turkishness. The Kemalist cadre had achieved the objectives of the policies it carried out 1920s and had rendered the non-Muslims non-threat. Therefore, the Kemalists were trying to cultivate more peaceful

relationship with the non-Muslims. As such, the Law on Wealth Tax was going to prove the last move in the non-Muslim policies of the nation-building process.

Even though the Wealth Tax¹⁶⁰ was given the appearance of having the objective of mitigating the adverse effects of the War on the economy, in reality, it was crafted in order to overturn the non-Muslim domination of the commerce world. Prior to the passing of the law, the press had begun to publish commentaries against the non-Muslim businessmen who had become wealthier during the war and were publishing caricatures and news claiming that Jewish businessmen's wealth were gained through lawn sharking and in the black market¹⁶¹ (Bali, 1999: 424-444). The law which remained in effect for sixteen months from November 11, 1942 until March of 1944 was meant to help close the budget deficiency by taking some of the unjust wealth gained during the war.

Any appeals to the one time wealth tax determined by the council under the leadership of the regional governors were blocked, and those liable were forced to pay within fifteen days. For those who were unable to pay in the time allotted were assessed a 1% late fee for one week, and 2% for two weeks, and those who could not pay in one month would be forced to servitude in Erzurum-Aşkale until the tax debt was paid. While the tax liabilities were being determined, the liable parties were classified into groups such as Muslim, non-Muslim, Sabbateans, and non-Muslims were assessed five to ten times more taxes than the Muslims (Ökte, 1951: 54-92). While the servitude was not enforced for Muslims, it was strictly enforced for non-Muslims. That 1,229 of the 1,400 tax liable citizens who were sent to Aşkale were from İstanbul indicates that this tax in fact targeted the wealthy non-Muslims. All these combined with the fact that there was no negative press about the law demonstrates that the law, in effect, was intended to diminish the non-Muslim business bourgeoisie's influence on the economy. In fact, the

¹⁶⁰ Law on Wealth Tax dated November, 11 1942 and numbered 4305.

¹⁶¹ Cf. Ökte, 1951 who worked as the İstanbul treasurer on his memoirs of enforcement of the Wealth Tax. Cf. Akar, 1992 for a detailed analysis of Wealth Tax in context of discrimination against non-Muslims.

prime minister of the time Şükrü Saraçoğlu's statement on the law to the CHP group in the Assembly highlights the state's real intent behind this law:¹⁶²

This law is at the same time a law of reform. We are faced with an opportunity that will restore our economic independence. We, will in this way, eliminate the foreigners who dominate our market and hand the Turkish market to the Turks (cited in Barutçu, 1977: 263)

The Wealth Tax accomplished what was expected of it. The state was both able to collect 74% of all the taxes assessed (Akar, 1992: 76) and diminished the non-Muslim domination of the market to a great extent giving the Muslim-Turk entrepreneurs and chance to command the market. As such, a big step was taken in the efforts replacing the non-Muslim capital with the Muslim capital.

With the use of instruments such as population exchange, involuntary resettlement and exile suitable for demographic engineering and cultural, political and economic pressures, the Kemalist core was able to prevent the non-Muslim population becoming impediment to the Republican nation-building process. The living field of the non-Muslims was narrowed down further and further with the application of policies in the 1920s and the support of ethnic nationalist policies in the 1930s. The emigration of the non-Muslims out of Anatolia in the 1930s continued. The non-Muslim population had dropped down to 340 thousand (110,000 Greek; 77,000 Armenian, 82,000 Jews and 71,000 other ethnicities) against the Muslim population of 13,290. As such, non-Muslim population that corresponded to 19% of the total population 1914 (Karpas, 1985: 168-169), and to 15% in 1919 (Selek, 1973: 62) had come down to 2.5% by 1927 (Directorate of Statistics, 1929). The homogenization project that was aimed to transform Anatolian population into a Muslim majority via exile and involuntary resettlement policies since 1913, first under the CUP, later under the single party, administration had reached its goal. The non-Muslim population in the coming years

¹⁶² Faik Ökte, in his memoirs speaks of the perception of the government and application of the Wealth Tax: "The parliamentarians who were in contact with me blamed for having assessed tax on Turkish as well, and told me that this was not how the law was envisioned. (...) Some governors did not want to assess walth Tax to Turks" (1951: 53).

would continue to dwindle. In the 1935 census, the non-Muslim population was only 1.6% of the total population; and in the 1945 census it had come down to 1.3% (General Directorate of Statistics, 1937, 1950).

5.2.2 Transforming the Ethnic Map

During the single party regime, especially in the early years, involuntary resettlement policies were prioritized both to increase settlement in Anatolia and to homogenize existing population towards a Muslim majority. Although the single party administration although rejected pan-nationalism movements, it made a special effort to promote Anatolia as the ‘homeland’ for Muslim Turks who lived outside its borders (Bora, 1995: 35-36). The Republican elite, most of whom had roots in the Balkans, considered facilitating the return of the Muslim Turks they left behind to the homeland not only a necessity for the success of the homogenization project, but also a moral duty. To this end, during the single party regime close to one million Muslim immigrants were resettled in Anatolia. While approximately 850 thousand of the one million came from the Balkans, approximately 100 thousand immigrants came from countries neighboring the Northern and Southern borders. The biggest wave, with 384 thousand immigrants, was the result of the population exchange treaty signed with Greece in the context of the Lausanne Accord in 1923. This group consisted of nearly 200 thousand Bulgarian, a little over 100 thousand Yugoslavian, and a little over 100 thousand Romanian immigrants (Kazgan, 1983, c.6: 1556; Kirişçi, 2000: 8). It is imperative to mention the additional 100 thousand Muslim immigrants from various regions such as Cyprus, Syria, Jordan, Russia and Georgia during this period (Ülker, 2007: footnote, 6).

As a result, the early years of the Republic was marked with a significant wave of Muslim resettlement in Anatolia. The administration signed bilateral treatments with neighboring countries to facilitate the resettlements. In these treaties, religion was used as the qualifying criteria for the resettlement (Çağaptay, 2009: 132). Islam was the qualifying criteria for the move to Anatolia, but language was the determinative factor

for the resettlement region. In other words, while the Ankara administration used an inclusive criterion for admittance to Anatolia, in determination of the settlement areas the process of building a Turkish nation played an influential role. In reality, this was a continuation of the CUP's qualifying criterion, which had not yet been named. The criteria that were determined over principles such as adaptation to the region and creating sense continuity in belonging were reclassified speaking Turkish.

The decree on the resettlement policies of the Greek Muslim immigrants set the condition of non-Turkish speaking immigrants not to exceed 20% of the total population in the region of the resettlement.¹⁶³ The Republic established the Ministry of Exchange, Reconstruction and Settlement on October 13, 1923 to manage the population exchanges of the time.¹⁶⁴ The Ministry paid special attention to the assimilation of the immigrant Muslims to the local communities while carrying out their involuntary resettlement activities. For instance, resettling Bosnians, Albanians and Bulgarians in inner Anatolia was preferred to settling them in regions along the borders. Konya, Niğde, Nevşehir, Kayseri and Eskişehir were considered ideal locations for the resettlement of Muslim immigrants (Ülker, 2007: paragraph, 28-31). The incumbent Kemalists passed an act to prevent the violation of resettlement conditions on November 30, 1925.¹⁶⁵ According to this new law, the immigrants had to reside a minimum of five years in the regions to which they were assigned.

The Kemalist incumbents passed the first law that compiled all these regulations on the involuntary resettlement policies on May 21, 1926, which served as the reference on all population movements for the incumbents until 1932 Law on Resettlement.¹⁶⁶ This law

¹⁶³ '30 Kanunısani 1923 Tarihinde Lozanda Yunan Murahhaslarıyla Yapılan Mukavele Mucibince Tanzim Olunan Talimatnamenin Mer'iyete Vaz'ı Hakkında Kararname', no. 2600, *Düstur*, Tertip: 4, Cilt: 3, pp. 135-142.

¹⁶⁴ 'Mübadele İmar ve İskân Kanunu', no.368, *Düstur*, Tertip: 3, Cilt: 5, p. 407.

¹⁶⁵ 'Mahalli İskânlarını Bila Mezuniyet Tebdil Eyleyen Muhacir ve Mültecilerle Aşair Hakkında Kanun', no.675.

¹⁶⁶ 'İskân Kanunu', no. 885, *Düstur*, Tertip: 3, Cilt 7, pp. 1441-1443.

had formalized the adoption of Turkish culture as a condition of settlement. This condition, which was in line with the Kemalist elite's tendencies, of the time, to conceive nationalism along the lines of common cultural values, facilitated the ease admittance of the Muslim populations of the late Ottoman. As mentioned above, the purpose of the law on resettlement was twofold—to increase and homogenize the Anatolian population. This purpose, in addition to serving as a guiding principle for the resettlement policies, also steered the policies on the exile of existing Anatolian populations. The law on settlement, with use of the word “nomad” had meant the Kurds had vested the Ministry of the Interior with the power to force involuntary settlements. With this law, not only the newly received immigrants, but also the settled populations of Anatolia were subjected to involuntary resettlement policies. Parallel to the maximum of 20% condition intended for the assimilation of the immigrant communities, the local resettlement policies targeted the assimilation of the Kurds.

By the 1930s, the ethnic nationalist ideals that were solidified in the Turkish History Thesis were already reflected in the involuntary resettlement policies. In fact, the Law on Settlement that was proposed as a part of the East Reform Plan but not passed until June 14, 1934 was drafted specifically with this purpose in mind.¹⁶⁷ The Law on Settlement is an important text that demonstrates the formation of the Kemalist incumbents' conception of nationalism in the ten years following the founding of the Republic. First of all, it was text in which the nationalist ideas that had been dominant among the Kemalist incumbents since the 1930s were expressed freely without guile and without any hesitation to reference race in the context of nation state building. Frequent references to race, blood and descent it revealed the racist dimension of the Kemalist nationalism. This meant the replacement of nationalism with a focus on culture with nationalism with a focus on race and Turkish ethnicity. In other words, this law was the manifestation of the changing definition of Turkishness from shared “language, culture and ideology” in the 1920s to shared “language, culture and blood” in the 1930s (Yıldız,

¹⁶⁷ Cf. “İşkân Kanunu,” Resmi Gazete, No: 2633, 21 Haziran 1934

2001: 248). The earlier assimilationist involuntary resettlement policies had led to Turkification of neither the Muslim immigrants nor the Kurds—it had not facilitated the crafting of a uniform Turkish speaking population. In this context, the context was an instrument in the realization of one of the most important strategies of the Kemalist incumbents during the nation-building process. The “non-Turkish speaking” population was going to be subjected to assimilationist interventions, and the nomads would be forced to benefit from the Republican amenities.

The Law had classified the population into three based on Turkish speaking and commitment to Turkish culture principles. First group were those who spoke Turkish and practiced Turkish culture. Second group consisted of citizens who did not speak Turkish but had the potential to adopt the Turkish culture. Muslim immigrants such Bosnians, Albanians, Tatars and Pomaks were considered to fall into this group. The third group consisted of those who neither spoke Turkish nor had any visible commitment to Turkish culture. Non-Muslims and Muslims who were ethnically Kurd or Arab also fell into this third category. The first resettlement section corresponded to the living area of the first group. This region was open to resettlement by all, both from within and outside the Anatolian borders. The second resettlement section was the region in which whose consciousness of Turkishness needed improvement. The third section was those areas, which were closed to resettlement because of perceived security, or health threats, which had actually hosted the Kurdish uprisings. With this distribution, the Law on Settlement had provided the Kemalist incumbents the legal platform for their project of social and demographic engineering towards Turkishness.

When the Law on Settlement, the Regulations on Exemptions from Resettlement (*İskân Muafiyetleri Nizamnamesi*),¹⁶⁸ Report of Executive Committee of the Provisional Settlement Law (*İskân Kanunu Muvakkat Encümen Raporu*)¹⁶⁹ and debates in the

¹⁶⁸ Cf. “İskân Muafiyetleri Nizamnamesi”, Resmi gazete, 5 Ocak 1935.

¹⁶⁹ Cf. İskân kanunu Muvakkat Encümen Raporu,” 27 Mayıs 1934, TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Sıra Sayı 189, c.23. ss. 5–20.

parliament over the law¹⁷⁰ are examined the Kemalist elites' target of creating a homogenized nation and restructuring of the ethnic map towards that end becomes clearly visible.

What was expected of the Law on Settlement was assimilation of local non-Turk groups such as Kurds and Muslim immigrations to Turkishness via involuntary resettlement and, as such, transformation of Turkey into a country of shared language, ideals and feelings (Kirişçi, 2000: 5-6; Yıldız, 2001: 250–252). It could, in fact, be argued that although these targets were only revealed and legalized with the 1934 Law on Settlement, the Kemalist involuntary resettlement policies had taken these targets as its guiding principles since the early years of the Republic. The nation-building project that aimed to homogenize Anatolia into Turkish homeland since the CUP administration was achieved through demographic engineering. The Kemalist incumbents had inherited the same target with the same concerns. The blatant references to race in the 1934 law are related to the social transformation of both the avant-garde elite and the makeup of Anatolian populations. In this context, it could be argued that the racist dimension of the avant-garde elites mission of nation-building which had demographic engineering as one of its most important instruments had actually been, at least for the Kemalist incumbents, a part of the process.

5.2.3 The Rehabilitation of the Kurds

The Kemalist core, during the single regime administration, in order to melt the minority groups of Anatolia in the pot of Turkishness have instrumentalized various instruments ranging from pressure to consent; from strong state to developing civil society. These groups faced a different dimension of the nation-building process based on their ethnic make-up, religious belonging, the number of their population, or their nomadic lifestyles. Non-Muslims were subjected first to deportation, later, when their numbers have dwindled and their concentration diluted, to assimilation. Muslim immigrants, after

¹⁷⁰ TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Devre IV, Sıra Sayısı 189, c.23.

having been distributed to four corners of Anatolia in order to cut their loyalties to their previous lives, with detailed involuntary resettlement policies, were also subjected to assimilation policies. The settled population of Anatolia and the Muslim Turks who had been the sine qua non of the nation-building process were forced to relinquish the identity building factors of their religious beliefs for the sake of their nationalist identity through comprehensive secularist and nationalist policies. Although the Kemalist core had not been 100% successful in the policies executed on these three minority groups, they had not meant any significant difficulty either. The Kurds, who fall outside these groups due their roots in Anatolia, their population in the country and concentrated populations in the East, resisted the Kemalist core's nation-building project and Turk nationalist policies and continued to create difficulties for the Kemalist core.

The political discourse of the Independence war was comprehensive and accommodating of ethnic differences. With its emphasis on Islam, this discourse had united all ethnic differences of non-Turk Muslim minorities such as the Laz, Circassians and especially the Kurds that were part of the National Pact. This demographic makeup, as mentioned in the earlier chapters, was the basis of the broad based coalition of the leading elite of the Independence War which had been manifested in discourse that was accommodating of different ethnicities. During the independence war, with expressions such as "İslam ekseriyeti" (Muslim majority) and "bircümle anasır-ı İslamiye" (all Muslim elements), multi-ethnicity was recognized under the umbrella of Islam (Zürcher, 2010: 223-227). ARMCH, who had led the struggle for independence until the founding of the TBMM, had recorded the respect and recognition afforded to the multi-ethnicity of the social coalition that had pioneered the resistance movements in the first article of its charter:¹⁷¹

All the Muslim elements (ethnic groups) living on Ottoman territory are genuine brothers who are full of feelings of respect for and devotion to each other and are respectful to each other's social and ethnic norms and local conditions (Tunçay, 1989: 341).

¹⁷¹ Cf. Tunçay, 341-346 for a complete text of ARMHC Charter.

This often repeated sentence in the documents of the Independence War evinces that during the Independence War, the existence of various Muslim communities with different ethnic backgrounds was recognized and their rights were guaranteed in legal documents. Nevertheless, in 1924, the Kemalist core not only cut all ties with Islam, which was the common ground for the diverse ethnic groups, with the radical secularist policies they initiated in 1924 with the abolishment of the Caliphate; but they also denied the existence of diverse ethnic groups with nationalist policies that prioritized Turkishness. The Kemalist core, despite the secularist and nationalist policies it followed, continued to conceive religion as the determinative factor of ethnicity and identified all Muslim groups with Turkishness. In a discourse, in which Muslimness was purged of its content and then identified with Turkishness, all Muslim ethnic groups were perceived as Turks. The Kemalist core declared all Muslim groups who lived within the borders of the National Pact Turks. This official discourse utilized for the assimilation of non-Turk Muslim groups in 1920s, it was utilized to deny the ontological existence of other ethnic groups in the 1930s. With this turn of mind, the Kemalist core denied the existence of Kurds and declared that there were no other Muslim groups within in the national borders other than Turks.

The Kemalist cadres were relying on the homogeny Muslim Turk ethnographic map it had created via demographic engineering in the last ten years in their developing of this particular discourse. The expediency with which the Muslim Turks from the Balkans were integrating was encouraging the Kemalist core (Zürcher, 2000: 179). The Kemalists had come to believe that the other local Muslim ethnic groups just as the Kurds, Arabs and Laz, would just as easily assimilate (Çağaptay, 2009: 31). However, the case for the settled Muslim groups was different. The Kurds, the largest non-Turk population in Anatolia, had not warmed up to this idea. Kurds' high population concentrated in particular areas and their autonomy—which they had maintained since the Ottoman—made it their assimilation a distant possibility (Çağaptay, 2009: 31–32). Despite these factors, the Kemalists expected Kurds to comply with the idea of

Turkishness relinquishing all other identities. Kurds were antagonized by the Kemalists' ascription of Turkishness as the common ground instead of Islam in two ways. First, the Kemalists were destroying any common ground they had with the execution of the secularist policies despite the fact that Kurds had moved with the Kemalists both in terms of their feelings about the abolishment of the Caliphate and about ascribing Islam a common ground. Second, the Kemalist core was not only imposing Turkification on them, but was also denying existence despite having afforded them recognition as an independent ethnic group during the Independence war. These two antagonizing factors pushed both resistance against assimilation and Kurdish nationalism into becoming wide-spread movement (Bruinessen, 1981: 10–13; Yeğen, 1999, 2007).

Kurds resisted assimilation with several uprisings. Mete Tunçay (1981: 127-128), relying on a book published by the General Staff in 1972, states that only two of the eighteen uprisings in the 1924-1938 interval (1924-Nasturi and 1930-Menemen) were not directly related to Kurds. It took years to suppress some of the revolts. For instance three consecutive revolts took place in Ağrı (1926, 1927, and 1930) with Sason lasting 12 years (1925-1937) and Dersim Tedip Operation two years (1937-38).

Majority of the resistance and uprisings the Kemalist elites encountered came from the Kurds. This led the Kemalist cadres to prioritize the elimination of the separatist threat and the territorial integrity of the country above all (Tokluoğlu, 1995: 243-244). The Kemalists' perceived threat of the Kurdish resistance movements resulted in their radicalization of the Turkish ideology and their denial of the existence of the Kurds. The Kemalist core, staying loyal to their discourse, hesitated to use ethno-political terminology and chose to explain Kurds' resistance to these policies by factors such as backwardness, rejection of authority, feudal life styles and reactionarism. In the official Kemalist discourse, these revolts were the result of the exploitation of the poor peoples of the region by sheiks and tribe leaders. The Kemalist core was going to save the regional peoples from these evils sooner or later and bring the peoples to the progress and prosperity-promising path of the Republic. With this discourse, the Kemalist core

was, in effect, detaching the Kurds' aggravation and revolts from its ethno-political content and assessing them as the feudal, reactionary and religious reactions of the residents of the old order who were discontented with the new order and the enlightenment, civilization, progress and prosperity this new order represented (Yeğen, 1996, 1999: 562-563, 2003: 134-149, 2007: 126-129). Since all groups in Anatolia were Turks and since the Kurds did not exist ontologically, it was in fact not possible for the revolts to have an ethno-political ground. As such, these revolts were opposing all those values the Republic stood for. The logical conclusion of this inference was that rehabilitation was a necessity. Comprehensive policies were developed to modernize all elements (groups) that continued to carry the relics of the old period and as such prevent them from becoming obstacles to Republican order. These rehabilitation programs did not target Kurds; it targeted bandits. With these rehabilitation programs; the Kemalist cadres did not aim assimilation of the Kurds, they aimed rehabilitation of bandits. This rationale caused the Kurd's discontents to be perceived as security and backwardness problems.

The Plan for the Rehabilitation of the East

The Prime Minister İsmet Paşa sent the house speaker Abdülhaluk Renda and the Minister of the Interior Cemil Uybadyın to the areas of the revolts in 1925.¹⁷² The Directorate of the General Staff had also prepared a report, the same year (Bayrak, 1994: 257). With an undisclosed resolution of the Council of Ministers (Bayrak, 1993: 481), a committee, consisting of Uybadyın, Renda, the Minister of Justice Mahmut Esat Bozkurt and the second Chief of Staff Army General Kazım Orbay, was formed in order to assess these reports and determine a policy. This committee, titled "Council for the Rehabilitation of the East", prepared and presented the "Plan for the Rehabilitation of

¹⁷² Cf. Bayrak, 1993: 452–466 for a complete text of Abdulhalik Renda's report that was the preliminary study for the Plan for the Rehabilitation of the East; Cf. Yayman, 2011: 66–71 for a summary and analysis of the report; Cf. Bayrak, 1993: 467-80 and Bayrak, 1994: 256-257 for the complete text of the report prepared by Cemil Uybadyın. Cf. Yayman, 2011: 72-76 for a summary and analysis of the same report.

the East” to the Council of Ministers on September 24, 1925.¹⁷³ Some of the action items in this that shaped the Republic’s policy towards Kurds were as follows: To prevent the Kurdification in areas cohabitated by Kurds and Turks, speaking Kurdish in public was to be banned; in Arab speaking regions (Mardin, Siirt) that were ethnically Turkish but were in danger of Kurdification, Turkish Hearths, boarding schools and all girls schools were to be opened in order to expedite assimilation; only ethnically Turkish and idealist public servants were to be appointed to be these regions instead of Kurdish public servants; strong tribes were to be dispatched to the West; approximately 500 thousand Turks from the Balkans and the Caucasus were to be settled in the area over a span of ten years; roads, railroads and gendarme stations were to be built to ensure safe passage to the area; Public Inspection Offices were to be established; until the time provisions could be executed the area was to stay under military administration (Bayrak, 1993: 481–489).

The Plan for the Rehabilitation of the East, which was intended to bring a permanent solution to the “East Problem” after the Sheik Said uprisings in 1925 (cf. chp 3), is the cost of resistance to assimilation. The government, with this plan, had effectively mobilized all its resources and institutions for a comprehensive Turkification campaign. The Kemalist core did not hesitate to resort to racist tendencies when faced with resistance to these policies that forced ethnically non-Turk citizens to consent to Turkification in order to be good citizens. This policy that represented the essence of Turkish nationalism produced two separate practices towards the mid-1930s towards the Muslim groups who were not ethnically Turks (particularly Kurds) and towards non-Muslim groups (particularly Trachean Jews)—establishment of Public Inspection Offices and the practices of involuntary migration and settlement.

¹⁷³ Bayrak, 1993: 481–489 for the complete text of the plan.

Public Inspection Offices

The Public Inspection Offices were established with a law passed on June 26, 1927 as one of the provisions of the Plan for the Rehabilitation of the East.¹⁷⁴ The law provided for five offices to be established in the interval of 1927-1945.¹⁷⁵ The first public inspection office, established on January 1st, 1928 in Diyarbakır¹⁷⁶, became the longest running (1928–1947) office with the widest jurisdiction (17 provinces in the East and the Southeast). After the Sheik Said revolts, the Council of Ministers had declared martial law in some of the Eastern provinces (February, 25 1925).¹⁷⁷ The Public Inspection offices were, in effect, established to fill the power void left after the martial law expired on October 23, 1927 in these provinces. In fact, the first public inspection office's jurisdiction covered precisely these areas. The public inspection offices carried on the functions of the martial law under a different name. When traditional governance and public inspection offices are evaluated in juxtaposition to each other it becomes clear that the government had operated under a state of exception in Kurdish population concentrated areas from 1925 to 1947, almost the entire duration of the single party regime (Yıldız, 2001: 259).

The regions that were brought under the jurisdiction of the inspection offices, the identity and the position of the appointed inspectors demonstrate this form of

¹⁷⁴ Umum Müfettişlik Teşkiline Dair Kanun dated June, 26 1927 and numbered 1164

¹⁷⁵ The first Public Inspection Office was established in Diyarbakır in 1927 and covered Elazığ, Urfa, Hakkâri, Bitlis, Diyarbakır, Siirt, Mardin and Van. Second Public Inspection Office was established on February 19, 1934, centered in Edirne and covered Kırklareli, Tekirdağ and Çanakkale. The third Public Inspection Office was established following İnönü's trip to the area after the uprisings of Ağrı and Zilan on September, 6 1935. Centered in Erzurum covered Erzurum, Kars, Gümüşhane, Çoruh, Erzincan, Trabzon and Ağrı. Fourth Public Inspection Offices following the same trip, in order to prepare for the Dersim operation, was established on January 1st, 1936. The Fifth Public Inspection Office was established in Adana in 1945 and covered Adana, İçel, Hatay, Gaziantep ve Maraş illerini kapsamıştır. Cf. Koçak, 2003 for more detailed informatin on the Public Ispection Offices

¹⁷⁶ Cf. *Güneydoğu Birinci Genel Müfettişlik Bölgesi*, Umumi Müfettişlik teşkilatı, İstanbul, 1939 for more detailed information on the First Public Inspection Office

¹⁷⁷ Cf. 'Şark Vilayetlerinin Bir Kısımında (Elaziz, Genç, Muş, Ergani, Dersim, Diyarbakir, Mardin, Urfa, Siverek, Siirt, Bitlis, Van, Hakkâri, Malatya, Kiğı ve Hıms) İdare-I Örfiye İlanına Mütedair Karar,' Karar No: 114, *Resmi Gazete*, No: 85, 25 Şubat 1925.

governance was discriminating towards the regions that had the potential to resist the authoritarian and centralist administration of the single party regime.¹⁷⁸ The vast range of the areas under jurisdiction and the length of time the offices remained in effect also demonstrate that the intention behind the establishment of these offices was to bring Kurdish populations under the central administration, to suppress actual and potential uprisings and to assimilate the Kurds. Almost all public inspection offices, except for the second office, were centered in Kurd populated areas to the extent that none of the Kurdish villages in the country fell outside the jurisdiction of one of these offices. In sum, the Public Inspection Offices were a particular form of governance devised especially to govern the Kurdish populations (Çağaptay, 2009: 79; Koca, 1998: 57–151).

Settling Nomads

The Kemalist core, in addition to the Plan for the Rehabilitation of the Kurds and the Public Inspection offices, developed settlement policies, which had actually been one of the most important instruments of assimilation since the CUP administration. Kurds were included in the two settlement laws passed during the single party regime (1926, 1934) with the use of the word ‘nomad’. This word paralleled the Kemalist core’s perception of the Kurdish problem. The Kurds were being resettled, not to assimilate, but to transition them from a nomadic existence to a settled life style, in terms of a popular expression of the time, to “transform them into productive members.” Nevertheless, the real intention of the Kemalist incumbents was to eliminate the obstacle to their homogenized nation project through the resettlement policies.

¹⁷⁸ The second Public Inspection Office was established on February 19, 1934 in Trachea which was heavily populated by non Muslims. İbrahim Tali Öngören, Kazım Dirik and Abidin Özmen were appointed to this inspectorship, respectively. İbrahim Tali Öngören and Abidin Özmen, after their tours in the first public inspection Office that involved Kurdish policies were now appointed to non-Muslim populations. This indicates that the single party incumbency followed similar policies on both fronts. During the first years of the Inspectorship, particularly during Öngören’s inspectorship, policies directed to reduce the population of non-Muslims were followed and achieved some success. Afraid of Italy’s pan-policies, and after leaking the turkification Project of Trachea, the Jewish community were attached in June and July of 1934 and approximately 5000 families moved to Istanbul as a result (Aktar, 1996: 49–52; Bali, 1999: 254).

Despite the legal provisions, the Kemalist cadres avoided making Kurdish settlement the agenda determining policy once again in the 1920s. The Kemalist incumbency limited itself to the use of two basic policies. The first was the settlement policies directed to the Kurdish families that participated in the revolts and influential Kurdish leaders. The government that focused on establishing the security of the regions in which Kurds lived compelled those who participated in the revolts to resettlement policies while preferred to scare the remained. As such, from the Sheik Said revolts to uprising in Ağrı in 1930, prominent families were forced to settlement; however, the numbers were kept low.¹⁷⁹ Second set of policies was focused on the assimilation of the Kurds who were to be resettled among migrant populations. In this context, some of the migrants to Anatolia were resettled in the Kurdish settlements in the East in order to turkify the populations there (Çağaptay, 2009: 41-43; Ülker, 2007: paragraph, 47). In addition to these policies, another resettlement policy that gave the appearance of being motivated by security concerns was the resettlement of Kurds who lived in the mountainous regions to valleys. It is possible to account the forced resettlement of those who lived in Dersim to the Elazığ valley among these practices.¹⁸⁰ Ideas and plans of utilizing resettlement policies towards the assimilation of Kurds was a part of Kemalist incumbency's agenda and there were newspaper articles to this effect. These were never realized to the extent it was anticipated in a way to achieve any significant policies. For instance, out of the 742,720 persons resettled in the West during the years of 1920-1932, only 2,774 were Kurds (Çağaptay, 2009: 135–140). However, these ideas were never given up on completely. In fact, the Law on Settlement passed in 1934 with a broader base than the previous law contained these ideas.

In sum, the Kemalist core, contrary to the discourse of the Independence War, denied the existence of the Kurds beginning in 1924, and claimed that all groups living in Anatolia were Turks. Kurds resisted the denial of those factors such as religion and ethnic

¹⁷⁹ 'Bazı Eşhasın Şark Menatıkından Garp Vilayetlerine Nakillerine Dair Kanun', no. 1097.

¹⁸⁰ 'Elazığ Ovasına Yerleştirilen Dersimliler Hakkında', no.8734; 'Dağlık Mıntikalarda Yaşayan Halkın İskânı', no. 10822.

recognition that made common living possible and mobilized against the Kemalist incumbency in various ways until the mid-1930s. The Kemalist cadres, parallel to the nationalist discourse, instead of defining the uprisings with an ethno-political terminology, perceived them as the relics of an old order. As such, it believed the problem could be resolved with the rehabilitation of those who revolted. In this context, during the single party regime the Kurds were referred to with terms such as Kurds, nomads, and rebels. The Kemalist core prepared plans towards Kurds' rehabilitation, developed settlement policies and in order to disperse the security concerns governed the regions with Kurdish populations via public inspection offices.

5.2.4 Citizenship and Assimilation

The most important difference of the Kemalist incumbency from the CUP incumbency was to limit the nation-building process with demographic engineering. The first years of the Republic was marked with democratic engineering guided by comprehensive involuntary migration and settlement policies. As a result of these policies, by 1927, a religiously homogenous, but ethnically and linguistically heterogeneous, society was formed. Diverse ethnic and religious groups existed within the borders of the National Pact. In 1927, in Turkey 1,764,985 people out of the population of 13,524,795 (13.58%) spoke a language other than Turkey. The majority of non-Turkish speaking citizens were Kurds with a population of 1,184,446. The homogenous religious composition of the population was reflected in the population as well. 97, 36% of the total population was Muslims while only 2.64% of the population was non-Muslims (Çağaptay, 2009: 25–27). The problem lied in the method that would bring this religious and linguistic diversity under one definition of citizenship.

Defining Citizenship

The Kemalist core's reforms directed to countermand Islam as the primary indicator of belonging necessitated a redefinition of "Turkishness" which were being used interchangeably with Muslim-ness since the Islam was left devoid of its content (Karpas,

1991: 50). Since a definition of Turkishness devoid of any Muslim elements only referenced ethnicity, its transformation to become a marker of political belonging was going to be difficult. The 1924 constitution established the difference between ethnic belonging and political belonging in article 88: “The people of Turkey regardless of their religion and race would, in terms of citizenship, be called Turkish” (Kili ve Gözübüyük, 2000: 147). This formula, which was intended as a solution in fact, rendered the conflict even more visible. The conflict was in the declaration of Turkish, which had only been an ethnic designation until then, to be rendered a political designation after that point.

Another issue here was the article’s definition of the “Turkish People” as Turks “by citizenship. In a straight forward reading, it is easy to assume that the legislators were opposed or sensitive towards assimilation policies and therefore entered the expression “by citizenship” in order to protect those who did not consider themselves ethnically or religiously Turk. However, the discussions recorded in the TBMM on this particular article reveal that this expression was added, on the request of ethnically Turkish members, not out of a concern of inclusivity, but out of a demand to exclude all groups but Turks from the definition of citizenship. The first draft of the article presented in the parliament did not include expression “by citizenship.” The original article read, “The People of Turkey regardless of their religion and race would be called Turkish.” The basic criticism against the original version of the article as that it conflated citizenship with nationality. During the discussions, Hamdullah Suphi, articulated that all who lived within the borders of the nation could be considered Turkish, however, it would not be accurate to call Armenians and Greeks who had been enemies of the state until recently, and perhaps would be in the near future, Turks. As such, the ambiguity of the in the article had to be clarified, Suphi further argued. He proposed the version of the article that made it into the constitution (Gözübüyük and Sezgin, 1957: 436-437; Yeğen, 2004: 59-61). Therefore, this article both points to a Turkishness more authentic and real than Turkishness by citizenship and records a definition of citizenship that distinguishes between the two. The gap left between Turkishness only by citizenship and Turkishness

by ethnicity in other words the gap between the political and ethnic definition of citizenship, resulted in the dual connotations attached to citizenship—legal and political. The gap created by this dual definition lasted throughout the single party regime.

While the legal definition of citizenship was broad, its political definition was narrowed down further in each term with a different political definition. While the term Turkish citizenship referred to the legal definition, the expression “Turkish Nation” pointed to the political definition. The official articulation of the legal definition was in fact article 99 of the 1924 Constitution. This inclusivity of this article was necessitated both as the political result of the Independence War and a condition of the Lausanne Accord.

The Muslim ethnic groups had provided support during the war, and the non-Muslim groups were accorded the ‘minority’ status by the Lausanne Accord and therefore both had to be included in the citizenship. However, the compulsory inclusivity of the definition of citizenship was narrowed down in practice. This narrowing involved the political aspect of citizenship. The criterion for the narrowing down of the definition was related to the connotations and meaning loaded to the definition of the Turkish Nation. In this context, changes made to the definition of the ‘Turkish Nation; had, in fact, altered the political definition of citizenship (Yeğen, 2004: 56-58). It is possible to express this in reverse. Throughout the single party regime, Turkishness was prioritized above Turkish citizenship and was given certain privileges. After having bestowing ‘Turkishness by citizenship’ to all in the eyes of the law, an opportunity to become ethnically Turkish was given to these Turks by citizenship. The criteria that measured ethnic Turkishness were determined according to priorities of the term. One criterion that did not change was religion. As such, non-Muslims were excluded from the privilege of becoming Turks, but Muslims always had the opportunity to become ethnically Turkish. Nevertheless, other defining criteria of both inside and outside the circle of Turkishness changed along with the Kemalist core’s ideational structure and their needs during the nation-building process.

During the 1921-1923 period to the extent that the fundamental reference for the Turkish nation was Islam, Turkishness was equated with Muslimness and as such non-Muslims were excluded from the definition. Muslims who were not ethnically Turks were considered preferred citizens by the political definition. In the period 1923-27, despite the ongoing secularist policies, the criterion of religion remained in effect, and Islam was continued to be perceived as the fundamental defining feature of Turkishness. As such, the religious criterion of the population exchanges specified in the Lausanne Accord was applied in the 1930s as well. When Gagauz Turks who were Christian wanted to immigrate to Turkey were rejected on the basis of their religion (Oran, 1988: 174–175). Due this conception that found its inspiration in the demographic composition, societal perceptions and historical experiences, while non-Turk Muslim groups were classified as those who could be turkified by assimilation, non-Muslims continued to be defined as “Turks by Law” (Yıldız, 2001: 151). Non-Muslims were considered Turkish by citizenship but had not been included in the definition of the Turkish nation.

In terms of the Muslim groups, since the strong bond between Turkishness and Muslims were dissolved as a consequence of the Kemalist core’s secularist policies, other criteria were advanced to be considered suitable for citizenship. These included voluntarism, the content of their Turkishness, the unity of land and language (Çağaptay, 2009: 25; Yıldız, 2001: 139–148). In other words, those who wanted to become Turks, who lived within the borders of the National Pact and spoke Turkish, would be considered Turks. The problem was the extent to which these principles would be adequate to unify the existing diverse religions and ethnicities. To the extent that the experience of the Independence War could show the willingness of the Muslim ethnic groups who lived within the borders of the National Pact to present a unified front, the Kemalist core’s policies were directed towards creating unity in language. In this sense, the idea to replace the principle of unity in religion with the principle of unity in language as aimed at making nationalism the new condition of belonging in the Muslim groups, instead of Islam. The

Muslim groups were continued to be prioritized over non-Muslim groups, however, these groups were demanded to learn Turkish, in other words become Turkish. The most important and most difficult of these conditions was the demand for these groups to abandon their native languages and speak Turkish.

In the 1927-1938 interval, the bond between Turkishness and Muslimness was loosened even more after the results of the harsher secularist policies were felt. The provisions of 1928 (the revocation of Islam as the state religion, acceptance of Latin alphabet, and the broadcasting of Ezan in Turkish) constitutionalized the dissolving bond between Turkishness and Muslimness. The Republic, with these provisions, had purged the definition of Turkish Nation from Islam. As such, the 1927-38 interval's most significant feature in terms of identity was the effect of the campaign to spread Turkish speaking in the nation. This campaign, prepared the ground for the assimilation projects that were intended to eradicate multi-ethnicity. The Kemalist cadre had mobilized all of its resources both to purge Turkishness from Islam and to render Turkishness the hegemonic identity. Speaking Turkish in the public sphere was made compulsory, campaigns with the slogan "Citizen! Speak Turkish" were initiated, and Turkish name and last name was made compulsory and those who did not comply were punished (Yıldız, 2001: 140).

The change in the Kemalist core's definition of citizenship was reflected in its most clear form in the CHF's party charter. The 1927 CHF Charter and Protocol declares that the party considers it its primary duty to "propagate and promulgate Turkish language and Turkish culture, because the strongest bond between citizens are shared language, feelings and ideas; and to attach this principle the utmost importance and priority" (CHF Nizamnamesi, 1927). The Charter and protocol CHF passed in 1931 defined the nation as "a political and social group consisting of citizens who are bonded on the basis of their language, culture and ideology" (CHF Programı, 1931). The ideal of shared language, culture and ideology of the 1927 Charter and 1931 protocol were repeated in full in the 1935 and 1939 protocols of the party (CHP Programı, 1935; 1939).

The continuity in the definition of the nation also modified the conditions of acceptance into the party. Article 3 of the 1923 charter states, “Any Turk and any individual who accept the Turkish culture and identity can become a member” (CHP Nizamnamesi, 1927). Article 8 of the 1927 charter bases acceptance to the party on the condition of “accepting all principles of the party and Turkish culture wholeheartedly” (CHF Nizamnamesi, 1927).

Speaking Turkish

As of 1931 the condition of “speaking Turkish” was added to the conditions. Article 8 of the 1932 charter of CHF stated another one of the conditions of acceptance to the party: “If one speaks Turkish and accepts all principles of the party and identifies with the Turkish culture, he can be admitted to the party” (CHF Nizamnamesi ve Programı, 1931). Same expression is repeated in the 1935 and 1939 charters and protocol (CHP Tüzüğü, 1935; CHP Nizamnamesi, 1939). The condition of speaking Turkish appearing in the CHF charters and protocols as of 1931 is a change in accordance with the Kemalist core’s agenda that prioritized nationalism based on ethnicity. This change in policy that was put in effect simultaneously with the Turkish History Thesis was reflected in Mustafa Kemal’s speeches. Mustafa Kemal, immediately before the Turkish History Congress in 1932, associated speaking Turkish with belonging to the Turkish nation, and expressed that those who consider themselves part of the Turkish nation, above all had to speak Turkish, otherwise, they could not be considered Turks (İnan, 1969: 371).

This emphasized association between speaking Turkish and being Turkish led non-Muslim Turks to instigate a Turkish speaking campaign with the belief that they could become accepted citizens by speaking Turkish. In this context, Turkish Jews led the “Citizen! Speak Turkish” campaigns that began in the 1930s. This was a strategic move on the part of the Izmir Jews who had drawn antipathy due to their support for SCF and their visible %10 population in Izmir after the Greeks and Armenians left the country (Bali, 1999: 131-148; Çağaptay, 2009: 92–93; Heyd, 1954: 30). This campaign led the

Kemalist core to monitor other groups as well. The campaign was enforced strictly particularly in Mersin which boasted one of the most cosmopolitan population and Kurds, Arabs, Cretans and Assyrians were arrested for not having spoken Turkish in the public sphere (Çağaptay, 2009: 95).

With the effective campaigns led by the community centers and the Turkish National Student Associations, the whole country was mobilized in speaking Turkish. These mobilization efforts were transformed into state policies with İnönü's address in the 1935 CHF Convention in which he stated that every citizen in Turkey had to speak Turkish and they would no longer remain silent against those who did not speak Turkish¹⁸¹ (Çağaptay, 2009: 96).

The Law on Family Name

Another manifestation of sensitivity felt towards speaking Turkish in the interval of 1927-28 transforming into an assimilationist political practice is the Law on Family Name. The draft of the Law on Family Name stated that family names were an element of national identity and that the chosen last names had to reflect one's Turkishness.¹⁸² The regulations of the Law on Family name passed by the Council of Ministers banned all last names that reflected ethnicity other than Turkishness such as Kürtoğlu, Çerkes Hasanoğlu; and prepositions that were identified with other ethnicities such as yan, of, ef, viç, is, dis, pulos, aki, zade, mahdumu, veled ve bin.¹⁸³ As such, taking Armenian, Bulgarian, Macedonian, Bosnian, Serbian, Croatian, Greek, Cretan, Persian, Georgian and Arabic last names, respectively, was banned. In the council meetings, the proposition to allow last names that indicated ethnicity in order to identify such different ethnicities were denied and it was argued that last names that reflected different last names damaged the unity of the nation. Assimilation policies via last names were

¹⁸¹ Cf. CHP Dördüncü Büyük Kurultay Görüşmeleri Tutulgası, 1935 for a complete text of the discussions.

¹⁸² Cf. TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Devre IV. C.23, Sıra No: 203 for details.

¹⁸³ Cf. 'Soyadı Nizamnamesi', Resmi Gazete, No: 2805, 20 Aralık 1934 for the regulations

preferred to the alternative. On November 24, 1934, the Parliament granted Mustafa Kemal the last name Atatürk with the passing of act no. 2662.¹⁸⁴

All these efforts directed at spreading speaking Turkish reflect the Kemalist ideology's conception of nationalism. The Kemalist core, despite the emphasis they put on Turkish History Thesis and Sun Language Theories, through compulsory policies such as assuming Turkish last names and speaking Turkish lit a green light to the non-Muslim and non-Turkish Muslim groups to become bone fide Turks. Focusing on the policy that allowed for those who were not Turks to be included into Turkish via assimilation policies, instead of given and conventionally exclusionary definitions of racism is one of biggest proofs that the Republic was not racist. In other words, the Kemalist ideology compelled all to become Turks by rendering Turkishness the only valid category. However, the definition of Turkishness was not based on the given racist definition, but on a conception of ethnicity that allowed for assimilation via language. In this context, the door to become Turkish was open to all citizens to the extent that they relinquished their native language and public expression of their ethnic differences. This policy was reflected in a speech İnönü gave in the parliament following his trip to eastern Kurdish populated villages in 1932:

Who is a Turkish citizen? We are sincere and serious in the definition of Turkishness that is legalized in the official documents. We do not expect anything extraordinary from individuals who live in this country to become Turkish nationalists and Turkish citizens. Choosing and accepting Turkishness is an adequate condition to benefit from all the rights and privileges of belonging to the Turkish nation...When we were traveling in the country, both in the East and the West, I did not allow any citizen who knows and accepts his Turkish to worry about not benefiting from the rights and privileges to which every Turkish citizen is entitled (cited in, Yıldız, 2001: 290).

This speech summarizes all expectations of the Kemalist imagination of citizenship and nation-state. First of all, it distinguishes between citizenship and nationality, and then expresses that Turkish ethnicity is the preferred condition of citizenship. However, this

¹⁸⁴ Cf. TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Devre IV. C. 25/1, s. 202–203 for the text of the discussions.

speech leaves room for every citizen to become preferred citizens by accepting Turkishness.

5.2.5 Secularism: Islam in the Service of Nationalism

The links between the principle of secularism and the nation-building process have been largely ignored thus far. However, the reason underlying the Kemalist cadre's secularist policies was to take preemptive measures against the potential of Islam presenting an obstacle to the Kemalists' imagined community and to the nationalist ideology on which this imagined community was hinged; and if it was possible to reformat Islam in way that endorsed this imagined community. In this context, the principle of secularism is first and foremost related to construction of the new nation and nationalism. The Kemalist elite regarded the presence of Islam, the defining element of individual and social identity for centuries, as the most important obstacle before its goal of establishing Turkish identity as the fundamental determinant of the nation. According to Mustafa Kemal, Islam was an Arab faith that served Arab dominance (Hanioglu, 2011: 132). In line with his vulgar materialist thinking, Kemal characterized Islam as follows: "Turks used to be a great nation before adopting the Arab religion ... but the Arab religion weakened Turks' national ties. ... Those who believed the Mohammedan religion suppressed their own identities and devoted their lives to spreading the name of Allah all around" (Inan, 1969: 364-366). In this sense, the Kemalist elite led by Mustafa Kemal anticipated that the nationalist agenda might have failed in the absence of a comprehensive policy of secularism, and embarked on a series of reforms that would undo Islam's influence over individual and social life before providing the people with a new sense of identity based on Turkish nationalism. As such, the most significant goal for the intensive reform program of 1924-1928 was to render Islam –which was the main source of a common identity and mass influence, and therefore could potentially hinder the nation-building policy- merely into a matter of conscience (Toprak, 1981: 219). A series of regulations from the symbolic level to legal and institutional settings, primarily aimed rendering Islam conducive to a nation-state (Ayata, 1996: 41).

In this sense, the Kemalist elite were not after a total elimination of religion or the adoption of another faith. They simply believed that, instead of dealing with the likely case of social resentment stemming from total elimination, religion needed to be reshaped in order for it to become functional in facilitating and supplementing the Turkification project. In this context, the principle of secularism prescribed that all elements of religion that might hinder nationalism's emergence as the primary sense of identity be eroded and, if possible, religion be reformed to support the nationalist agenda. Islam did represent something reactionary and outdated in its Arab-Ottoman practice, but one could live with it if it could be reformed and transformed into an 'official Islam' or 'Turkish Islam'. According to Mustafa Kemal, Islam's potential and power to penetrate society did not allow it to be left on its own.

For the purposes of the Kemalist elite's political project, Islam had to be domesticated under state control, and to be Turkified and made compatible with nationalism (Hanioglu, 2011: 446-447). In accordance with this line of thinking, the Kemalist elite predicted that separating religion from the political would not be possible in a Muslim society, and planned to subsume religion under politics' influence (Toprak, 1981: 57). Thus, the unique feature of Turkish secularism was its attempt to take Islam under control rather than separate it from the state. The Directorate of Religious Affairs (DRA, 1924) was established for this purpose. By placing the DRA under the control of the Prime Minister, Islam was institutionalized in the form of a government agency and was integrated into the government structure. The DRA was conceived to reinterpret Islam according to the needs of the secular-nationalist state. In other words, the main aim of the DRA was the creation of an 'official Islam' that would interpret Islam in an enlightened manner (Atasoy, 2005: 38; Ayata, 1996: 42; Cizre, 1996: 234; Toprak, 1981: 56-57).

In this sense, it is important to note that the most important aspect of Turkish secularism was the lack of religion's complete autonomy. Religion was placed under tight state control both in the domains of education and daily life. In addition to the abolishment of

madrastas and tariqas that previously made it possible for religion to be self-sufficient that served this end, religious actors' development of independent thought and policy was also prevented. For this purpose, the DRA and the National Education Authority served as the primary safety switches. This conception distinguished Turkish secularism from its foreign counterparts that engendered a sphere of autonomy for religion. This way, Kemalism attempted to dodge a variety of dangers associated with the elimination of Islam by developing a redefinition thereof to provide it some functional value within the new order.

In order to undermine Islam's society-wide social, cultural and political implications, the Kemalist elite introduced a radical and comprehensive set of secularization reforms. These entailed a new nation with a novel sense of social and political identity that derived its symbolic meaning from the domains of nationalism, secularism and Western customs as opposed to tradition and Islam (Dağı, 2005: 23). First, Islam's institutional presence was eliminated while new, state-controlled institutions emerged. On March 3rd, 1924, the Caliphate and the Ministry of Shari'a and Pious Foundations (*Şeriye ve Evkaf Vekaleti*) were abolished to establish the Directorate of Religious Affairs and the Public Authority on Foundations under the Prime Minister's office. The same day, the enactment of the Law on the Unification of Education (*Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu*) subsumed all madrasas and other institutions of religious education under the Ministry of National Education. This way, a series of laws enacted on the same day made it impossible for Islam to survive and for Islamic knowledge to be produced independently of the state, and created new institutions to serve these functions.

These legislations undid the autonomy previously enjoyed by Islamic institutions and thereby allowed the state to control religious knowledge and activities. Besides the institutional and functional significance of these reforms, they also had a noteworthy symbolic meaning. The symbolic value of the Caliphate was self-evident. As a political and spiritual leader of Muslims around the world, the Caliph –even though he had no real power of ruling over and directing the umma- symbolized with his presence an

Islamic set of relations that superseded political conceptualizations and national borders. The Kemalist elite abolished the institution of Caliphate to eliminate this symbolic meaning that contradicted the sort of secular-Turkist identity that it envisaged. By eliminating the office of the Sheikh al-Islam, the madrasas, and public offices that governed religious affairs and pious foundations, the Kemalist elite aimed at weakening, if not altogether destroying, the power of orthodox Islam. They took a major step in reversing the existing set of relations between state and religion since the Ottoman times as institutions that previously engendered autonomous economic power and sponsored the means to generate Islamic training and knowledge, and thereby placed religion under the secular state's control. The elimination of religious organizations' internal autonomy signaled that religious activity under the new regime would serve national sovereignty and national interests rather than divine will (Toprak, 1981: 46)

Following these steps regarding Islam's institutional presence, a new law was enacted on November 25th, 1925, that declared it mandatory to wear Western-style hats in an attempt to directly intervene with Muslims' daily life under the authority stemming from the Law on the Maintenance of Order (*Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu*). However, this legislation was met with stronger resistance than surpassed the expectations. This was, with the notable exception of the Sheikh Said Rebellion, the strongest resentment against a secularization reform. As both the Sheikh Said Rebellion and the anti-Hat reactions pointed to members of Naqshbandi orders, the Kemalist elite directed their attention to tariqas (Chehabi, 2004: 215-216). According to the elite, these institutions represented the residue of Ottoman-Islamic legacy that kept the people from positive knowledge and the therefrom-stemming civilization, which were the right ways. In line with this mindset, religion was associated with reactionarism in the context of tariqas, while the desired destination manifested itself as Western civilization that was identified with science. However, the tariqas' most important shortcoming vis-à-vis the nation-building context was that they offered a form of identity and belonging other than the Kemalist-endorsed Turkish identity. It was not possible for the Kemalist elite to allow any such

identity that could have served as an alternative to Turkishness. As such, they next targeted the tariqas once secularizing legislations were enacted in the spring of 1924 to eliminate the intelligentsia class. On July 28th, 1925, the Eastern Court of Independence (*Şark İstiklal Mahkemesi*) shut down all tariqas of Southeastern Anatolia based on the premise that they were accomplices in the Sheikh Said Rebellion. In September 1925, the government extended the Court's ruling to the entire country and shut down all tariqas. A legislation passed on November 30th, 1925 abolished all tariqas and dervish lodges across the country, and effectively banned all titles, clothing and activities associated with the said institutions.

A month after the Caliphate was abolished, on April 8th, 1924, the Shari'a Courts were shut down as part of a step forward to secularize the judiciary. However, the major step for judicial secularization was taken in 1926, as the Swiss Civil Code (February 17th), the Italian Penal Code (March 1st), the Swiss Law of Obligations (April 22nd), and the German-Italian Commercial Code (May 9th) were translated and adopted. This represented an end to Islamic law's validity in all aspects of life.¹⁸⁵

In an effort to distance the public from religious texts, Islamic traditions and Ottoman history, the Arabic alphabet was replaced on November 1st, 1928 with the Latin script. Notwithstanding the practical reasons and pedagogical discourse that Kemalist elites utilized to legitimize language reform, the main purpose was “to slam the door on the past and to open a new door to the future” (Toprak 1981: 41). Once the ulema and the tariqas, two rather crucial pillars of Islamic society, were eliminated, the elites took another important step to transform the country's cultural sphere. The alphabet/script served as a transmitter of the tradition and culture of the new republic's Islamic past. Therefore, the reform aimed to interfere with the continuities between the Islamic-Ottoman value system and the new generations. As Toprak perfectly described, “it was a

¹⁸⁵ Cf. Aytaç, 2007: 111-160 for a more detailed study of the impact of legislative measures on the transformation of the society devised by Ottoman modernization in the context of the concept of modern family.

conscious policy to create a nation of forgetters” (Toprak, 1981: 42). As part of a public campaign to boost the use of Turkish language that began on February 3rd, 1928, the language of Friday khutbas and sermons were changed from Arabic to Turkish. From 1931 onwards, Islamic rituals were gradually conducted in Turkish language –a transformation that reflected the broader government policy to Turkify Islam. On January 22nd, 1932, the Qur’an was recited in Turkish at the Yerebatan Mosque, while the call to prayer was recited for the first time in Turkish on January 30th, 1932. With the DRA’s July 18th, 1933 resolution, Turkish became the exclusive language for the call to prayer, and this continued until 1950.

In an attempt to finalize reforms enacted since 1924 to decrease Islam’s influence over the public sphere, Islam’s constitutional presence came to an end in 1928. The constitutional amendment that deprived Islam from its official religion status (Article 2) also eliminated religious elements previously found in the oath for members of Parliament (Article 16) and the President (Article 38). Three years after the undoing of Islam’s residual presence in the Constitution, in 1931, the principle of secularism became one of the Republican People’s Party’s six arrows, and eventually came to be featured in the Constitution (from 1937 on) as a fundamental quality of the Turkish state (Article 2).

Other reforms geared toward a re-organization of society along Western lines accompanied these aforementioned reforms that aimed at diminishing Islam’s institutional, social and legal presence. Since the new regime inherited an Islamic society where religion was influential in almost every aspect of life, abolishing major institutions of the Islamic value system proved to be inadequate for the Kemalist elites who wished to institute a new, secular and nationalist society. Therefore, after abolishing religious institutions and eliminating their influence on society, the elites sought to substitute some of these with novel, secular institutions that collectively constituted a Westernization drive for the rearranging of Turkish society’s daily life. In 1925, the new regime outlawed the fez and endorsed Western-style headgear, and instituted the

Gregorian calendar instead of the Muslim calendar (Hicri) and the Roman calendar (Rumi). European numerals (1928), the metric system (1931) were adopted, while family names were introduced in 1934. Finally, the elite reorganized weekdays by declaring Sunday (instead of Friday) to be the weekly holiday in 1935. Cultural life was not ignored either. The 1930s witnessed the establishment of new theaters and opera houses. A conservatory was founded in Istanbul to instruct Western classical music, while instruction of Turkish and Anatolian music was banned. On December 31st, 1932, Mustafa Kemal hosted a new year's gala at the Ankara Palas hotel. This new entertainment ritual, established under Kemal's auspices and attended by members of the new elite, was repeated for all official holidays and festivities. Ankara Palas became an arena where the Kemalist elite would internalize Western lifestyle and forms of entertainment, and then lead people in this area. These reforms that organized society's daily practices and aimed at replacing the symbolic values of the traditional Islamic society with their Western counterparts were part of an effort to boost the internal secularization of Turkish society. In 1934, Ministry of the Interior Sukru Kaya summarized the religion policy of the 1930s in a parliamentary address as follows: "Religions fulfilled their goals and lost their functionality. They are institutions that cannot renew their organisms and replenish" (Ahmad, 1991: 8). This way, Islam was entirely excluded from political discourse and the public sphere until the introduction of a multi-party system in 1945.

The Kemalist elite regarded Islam as the foremost obstacle before the creation of a new nation along Turkist principles. The policy of secularism that emerged as complementary to nationalism simultaneously aimed to abolish Islam's role in social life, and attempted to reform it to fortify Turkish identity. In this sense, forms of identity that Islam provided at individual and societal levels were abolished to further Turkism, while religious life was restructured under state control to serve Turkist ideals. From 1924 on, a series of secular reforms strived to sever the ties between Islam and the masses, and to have them settle for Turkishness. However, Turkish nationalism did not

possess adequate content to fill the void of Islam. As such, just like Islam was restructured, Turkish identity too had to undergo some renovations. The Kemalist elite therefore focused its actions throughout the 1930s on these construction efforts.

5.2.6 Glorifying Turkish History and Language

The secularization policy that set out to deprive Islam of its status as the fundamental component of identity resulted in an unmistakable shortage of legitimacy for both the regime and the nation. The Kemalist elites led by Mustafa Kemal attempted to make up for this inadequacy through efforts to institute a civic religion (Hanioglu, 2011: 160-161). The redefinition of Turkish identity that did not have any reassuring contents in the period's context was therefore reinforced through civilization-building content such as the Turkish History Thesis and the Turkish Language Thesis. In other words, secularization policies geared toward rendering Islam ineffective alone could have been inadequate in order to curb Islam's power that was capable of downplaying ethnic differences and to institute Turkishness as the society's new identity. Similarly, Turkishness had to be provided with content and elevated to a status in order for it to compete with Islam. Turkish identity could only replace Islam if and when it was reconstructed and equipped with the kind of meaning that any strong form of identity necessitated. 'Scientific' theses that Turks had thousands of years of history that they should be proud of and a civilization-building language would serve to convince society to give up Islam and settle on Turkish identity instead. This was the context wherein the Turkish history and language theses operated throughout the 1930s.

The Turkish History Thesis

The Turkish History Thesis (*Türk Tarih Tezi*) was an attempt to replace Islam, now excluded from political and social life, with Turkish identity. It was one of the brightest examples of the alliance between politicians and the intelligentsia in their efforts to build a new nation. In order to place Turkishness instead of Islam that was excluded with help from government policies formulated in the 1930s, Turks had to be shown to have been

a respectable, long-established and local population. The Turkish History Thesis could manage to replace Islam only to the extent that it succeeded in demonstrating these aspects. The Thesis attempted to achieve these goals by deliberately avoiding any association of Turks with Islam and, for this purpose, searching for Turks' ancient roots that predated Islam. These efforts that emerged out of and with the help of Mustafa Kemal's particular interest and guidance stemmed from two main concerns. The study of history aimed at glorifying the Turks' Asian roots to help construct an understanding of Turkish identity independent of their Islamic-Ottoman past, and to discover Anatolian ancestors to prove -in the face of Greek and Armenian nationalists' claims- that Anatolia was indeed a Turkish homeland (Copeaux, 1998: 32; Hanioglu, 2011: 163-171). This way, historical studies that picked up their pace in the 1930s set out to demonstrate that Anatolia belonged to Turks for a long time and that Turks had a praiseworthy civilization that extended into pre-Ottoman and pre-Islam periods in an attempt to construct a secular national identity. In other words, these efforts were intended to simultaneously glorify the Turks and discredit the influence of Ottoman and Islamic traditions (Cizre, 1992: 143).

The Turkish History Survey Board (*Türk Tarih Tetkik Heyeti*), established at the Turkish Hearths' headquarters at Ataturk's request, undertook the mission to develop the Turkish History Thesis (April 30th, 1930). Its members were notable Kemalist ideologues who were active at the Hearths and known for their nationalist sentiments.¹⁸⁶ The Board's first assignment was to publish a textbook titled *The Elementals of Turkish History (Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatları)* in 1930. The book, which offered detailed, accounts of the Turks' ancient roots over 606 pages, set aside only 50 pages for the Ottoman Empire (Copeaux, 1998:40).

¹⁸⁶ The commission consisted of the following (Copeaux, 1998: 38-39): RPP Secretary-General Recep (Peker), Minister of Justice Mahmut Esat (Bozkurt), Founding President of the Turkish Hearths Dr. Reşit (Galip), Secretary-General of the President's Office Mehmet Tevfik (Bıyıklıoğlu), Yusuf (Akçura), M. Fuad (Köprülü), Semih Rıfat (Horozcu), Sadri Maksudi (Arsal), Yusuf Ziya (Özer), Şemsettin (Günaltay), Şükrü (Saracoğlu), Vasıf (Çınar).

Once the Turkish Hearths were shut down and incorporated into the Republican People's Party on April 10th, 1931, the Board was renamed the Turkish History Survey Association (*Türk Tarih Tetkik Cemiyeti*) on April 15th, 1931. The Board, comprised of the same members as before, began to rapidly produce school textbooks inspired by the previously published text. Four volumes were made ready by the end of July, and these were featured in secondary school curricula in the fall of 1931 (Copeaux, 1998: 40). A year after this initial effort to promote national consciousness through history education, the first Turkish History Congress took place on July 2-11th, 1932.¹⁸⁷ The paper presented by Afet İnan titled 'Before History and at the Dawn of History' (*Tarihten Evvel ve Tarihin Fecrinde*) at the Congress (where Mustafa Kemal too was in attendance) embodied a summary of the Turkish History Thesis' fundamental elements. According to İnan, the Turks are a brachycephalic people who founded civilization everywhere they migrated to due to climate change, and the founders of Anatolia's most ancient civilization and its local people (Copeaux, 1998: 45-48).

This narrative that delivers these two goals of the Turkish History Thesis described above simultaneously aimed at undoing the image of the barbaric Turk in the West. Destroying this perception was one of the fundamental points of emphasis for Mustafa Kemal. The notion that the Turks were members of the brachycephalic race (as opposed to the yellow race which was regarded as inferior) as well as the claim that they established great civilizations in Egypt, Anatolia and Mesopotamia desired to provide self-confidence as much as it resulted from a defensive mindset (Yıldız, 2001: 162-163). This way, the Turkish History Thesis provided the kind of assumptions that would guide the three basic principles (secularism, nationalism, Westernism) of the Kemalist elite's political agenda.

¹⁸⁷ For papers and discussions from the first Turkish History Congress, see. Birinci Turk Tarih Kongresi. Konferanslar, Muzakere Zabıtları, 1933.

The Language Congress and Linguistic Purification

When establishing the Turkish History Survey Association, Atatürk demanded that the institution proved that Turkish history gave rise to great civilizations, and that the Turkish language was the main language of great civilizations (İğdemir, 1963: 664-666). To this end, Atatürk requested that the Turkish Language Survey Association (*Türk Dili Tetkik Cemiyeti*) was established. He believed that Turkish stemmed from the same roots as Indo-European languages and asked that the Association demonstrated that “the Turkish language was a main factor in the emergence and maturing of all world languages” (İğdemir, 1963: 647). Following the first Turkish History Congress, the Turkish Language Survey Association organized the first Turkish Language Convention (*Birinci Türk Dili Kurultayı*) on September 26th, 1932.¹⁸⁸ In terms of the participants’ identities, their purpose in attending, and their expectations, the Convention bore close resemblance to the recently convened Turkish History Congress. The Convention established that Turkish was indeed a rich and ancient language, which was distorted throughout the Ottoman period under the influence of Islam, and needed to be reformed in order to achieve its past glory (I. Dil Kurultayı, 1933: 401-403). This way, following the History Congress that disassociated Islam from the historical identity formation processes, Islam’s influence could be curbed in the area of linguistics as well. Secularization through Turkification or Turkification through secularization continued to be the endorsed formula.

Purification¹⁸⁹ would be achieved by replacing Arabic and Persian words with their Turkish counterparts. This process began with the names of the official institutions that came up with this idea. *Türk Dili Tetkik Cemiyeti* gave up the Arabic words of *tetkik* and *cemiyet* and assumed their Turkish counterparts *araştırma* and *kurum*.¹⁹⁰ This way, the

¹⁸⁸ For more information, see *Birinci Türk Dil Kurultayı*, 1933.

¹⁸⁹ For two more detailed studies on linguistic purification activities, see Heyd, 1954; Lewis, 1999.

¹⁹⁰ Mustafa Kemal’s name was also affected by the purification efforts to ‘rescue’ Turkish language from Arabic and Persian influence. Kemal, who was the patron of the purification efforts, changed the Arabic-origin ‘Kemal’ into ‘Kamal’ (Yıldız, 2001: 137).

TDTC became the Turkish Language Research Institution (*Türk Dili Araştırma Kurumu*, TDAK) on July 12th, 1932. Later, in November 1932, the Parliament enacted a resolution for local government agencies to gather words and idioms, although not found in dictionaries, were utilized by the people (Heyd, 1954: 26). The TDAK made use of these popular usages whilst manufacturing novel words that would replace the old. In order to have the people use the new words and to receive their feedback on newly manufactured words, the newspapers published 10-20 words a day. As a result of the cooperation between the People's Houses (*Halkevleri*) and public schools, around 125,000 words were transmitted to the TDAK within 10 months. The Institution, in addition to about 1,400 new words published in newspapers, began to publish the occasional Surveying Journals (*Tarama Dergisi*) (Heyd, 1954: 29-30).

In 1936, the Turkish History Thesis and the subsequent, complementing linguistic purification efforts spread by the RPP's local organizations and institutions entered into a novel stage. First, the School of Language, History and Geography (*Dil, Tarih ve Coğrafya Fakültesi*) was founded on January 9th, 1936 based on the June 14th, 1935 resolution of the Parliament (Copeaux, 1998: 48). This way, the Turkish History Thesis was linked to an educational institution that would conduct research and raise educators. The second important development that took place in 1936 was the Sun-Language Theory (*Güneş Dil Teorisi*) that was made public in the third Language Convention that took place in August.¹⁹¹ The theory claimed that the Turks developed the first language and that all world languages stemmed from the Turkish language through migration. These extreme views that offered linguistics support for the Turkish History Thesis were abandoned after a while (Copeaux, 1998: 49-50; Hanioglu, 2011: 176-180).

These efforts that were conducted under Mustafa Kemal's direct supervision in the 1930s aimed at providing both Turks and Turkish nationalism a kind of superiority over Islam as well as scientific approval and popular reputation. Throughout the Ottoman

¹⁹¹ For more detailed information, see III. Dil Kurultayı. Tezler, Müzakere Zabıtları, 1937.

period, Turkishness was not referenced –since at first ethnic nationalism was not at high demand and later in order to not fasten the Empire’s disintegration- and there was therefore no existing body of literature on the matter. In this period, Turkishness had negative rather than positive connotations. Once Mustafa Kemal excluded Islam as a fundamental determinant of identity, he found it necessary to include some positive content in this now-endorsed category of Turkishness. The ‘scientific’ theories’ goal in defining Turkishness and the Turkish language with reference to a founding past and function was to construct a sense of identity that the people could be proud of. Turkishness was thus an identity belonging in which was a source of pride.

In conclusion, the Kemalist elite took over the nation-building process from where the CUP left it, and pushed it further in accordance with the period’s necessities. The CUP’s single most important inheritance to the Kemalist elite was its successful transformation of the Anatolian peninsula through a grand ethnographic engineering effort and making Muslim Turks into the dominant group in a largely homogeneous population. The elite, particularly in the 1920s, furthered the Turkification policies through demographic instruments such as population exchange, forced migration and resettlement. In line with the CUP period, population mobility became instrumental for decreasing the number of non-Muslims or relocating them in Anatolia, and for facilitating Muslims’ assimilation into Turkishness. While the CUP spent most of its time trying to establish a Muslim-Turkish domination over the Anatolian peninsula, the Kemalist elite focused on the Turkification of a Muslim population from different ethnic backgrounds. In this context, religious identity was regarded as an impediment for the construction of national identity, and secularization policies were implemented to minimize Islamic influence over the population. Secularization policies helped both eliminate Islamic features that could hinder the creation of a Turkish nation, and reform Islam so that it would contribute to the nation-building efforts. These were followed by other policies that attempted to establish Turkishness as the new form of belonging. The Kemalist elite, while they tried to prove that Turks were a civilization-founding element through

‘scientific’ studies on Turkish history and language, also developed instruments to render Turkish as the sole language of nation-wide communication. Under an authoritarian rule where grievances stemming from assimilation could be easily suppressed, the elite implemented a secular, nationalist nation-building process based on Turkish ethnic identity.

5.3 Conclusion

The nation-building process was the most direct reflection of the avant-garde elite’s tutelary tendencies. Starting from the CUP period when the elite assumed a ‘savior’ mission, the process emerged as the primary item in the political agenda. Following the defeat at the Balkan War in 1913, the avant-garde elite under the CUP umbrella believed that Anatolian Turkification was the key to rescuing the state and therefore placed a greater emphasis on nation-building efforts. The first step in this context consisted of demographic engineering steps geared toward increasing Anatolia’s Turkish population as well as religious and ethnic homogenization along the lines of Turkishness and Muslim identity. In line with this goal, a number of instruments including population exchange, forced migration and resettlement were implemented to diligently conduct every stage of the demographic engineering project. Over the five years of CUP rule between 1913 and 1918, nearly four out of the total sixteen million imperial citizens (a quarter of the entire population) were subjected to relocation. As a result of this grand demographic engineering efforts, the CUP succeeded in transforming Anatolia into a near-homogeneous geography where the Turks were the dominant element. This nation-building activity had a defining role both for the establishment of Turkey’s current borders and the facilitation of the Kemalist elite’s Turkish-based secular nationalist policies. The Kemalist elite, too, prioritized the continuation of demographic engineered policies in effect since 1913. This way, the 10 years of intense demographic engineering between 1913 and 1923 turned Anatolia from a multi-religious, multi-ethnic area to one under Muslim-Turkish dominance and largely homogeneous in its constitution. In later

years, too, was the homogenization policy that aimed at cleansing Anatolia of non-Muslims continued with prominent results.

Once the nation-building process' first step –the demographic engineering efforts to turn Anatolia into a homogeneous geography under Muslim-Turkish identity- was achieved, the Kemalist elite focused on the construction of a secular national identity that constituted the nation-building agenda's second step. Both for Anatolia's local populations and newcomer Muslim immigrants, religious identity superseded ethnic identity. As religion also served a fundamental role for the *millet* system, Turkishness was synonymous to Muslim identity. This was also the situation among the Kemalist elite during the Republic's initial years. Turkishness that was synonymous to Muslim identity in their relations with non-Muslims was not at all featured in relations with Anatolia's local populations. Therefore, the Turkish nation that the elite wished to construct was alien to even the ethnic Turkish populations of Anatolia. In this sense, the Kemalist elite prioritized the principle of secularism. The secularization policy aimed at undoing Islam's influence over individual and social life and, to the greatest extent possible, at reform Islam to contribute to the project of Turkification. Once Islam's potential as an adversary to Turkishness was abolished, nationalist policies were implemented to render Turkishness as the novel form of identity. While non-Muslim elements were invited to Turkishness via citizenship ties, Muslim elements were left with no option but to become Turkish. From 1924 on, all the different ethnic groups – most prominently the Kurds- were claimed to be Turkish, while Kurdish revolts were interpreted as residual feudalism, foreign provocation, banditry and resistance to sedentary life. In order for 'Turks' to internalize their new secular ethnic identity, 'scientific' studies were conducted to demonstrate that the Turks were an ancient, civilization-founding race in an attempt to make the nation proud of its newly acquired identity.

The Kemalist elite's goal was to construct a new nation. During the 1920s, both social consciousness and demographic structure made the masses unfit for this aim. Replacing

Islam, one of the most effective forms of belonging, with Turkishness and forging a variety of ethnic identities into Turkishness required a challenging process. The Kemalist elite, in order to achieve this challenging task, conducted a number of efforts to cleanse the political center and leave itself uncontested in that domain. In a political environment where there were no alternative political elites, an authoritarian political regime was instituted to crush social resistance. The imposition of a political agenda contrary to society's ethnic and religious constitution through authoritarian instruments to construct a secular nation based on Turkishness deeply influenced relations between state and society, politics and society, and state and politics. The great majority of the people –with the exception of a small group indoctrinated by the Kemalist elite's ideological institutions, a small number of capital-holders with vested interests in the regime and bureaucrats- were disgruntled with the emerging political order and the kind of political activism that turned into a theatre among the elites. Expressions of unhappiness with secularism and nationalism-related policies were met with rather forceful instruments of suppression. The Kemalist elite utilized popular resistance as a reason for the political system's authoritarianization and went on to strictly control the political center in order to implement the nation-building process.

The fact that the political program implemented to construct a new nation rested on the principles of secularism and nationalism caused two main sources of concern for the Kemalist elite and their political regime. The Kurds' grievances regarding and objections against the policy of nationalism was branded an act of separatism, while the religious elements' problems with secularization policies were regarded as reactionarism. These two fears proved useful for the political elite to criminalize all kinds of alternative political projects, and served as an excuse for the political regime's authoritarianism. During the single-party period, all opponents were suppressed in the guise of these two dangers, while the Kemalist elite emerged as the political center's single controller. In later periods, too, did the threats of separatism and reactionarism serve as a reason to suppress/delay democratic demands, to maintain the political

system's authoritarian nature, and for the avant-garde elite to establish tutelage over democratic mechanisms as part of their status as the guardians of the regime.

6. CONCLUSION: DEMOCRACY AND THE TUTELAGE REGIME

This dissertation contends that the political system in Turkey and particularly the political nature of the single-party regime cannot be considered independent of the avant-garde elites' political wills. The political wills of the pioneer classes has been formed through a long history beginning from the Young Turks period and took its shape with elitist, guarding and “saviour” tendencies. The avant-garde elites, based on the alliance between military–intellectual–bureaucracy, acted with a specific mission/motive, defined as to “rescue”, “establish/found” and “protect/safeguard” the state and the society during the Young Turk and Kemalist periods. Defined through these missions, the pioneer classes enabled themselves to abstract and outline the meaning and definition of “public good or general interest” and established its monopoly over it. This authoritarian epistemology, formed through a positivist methodology, coincided with the saviour mission, in consequence, has excluded the ‘politics’ and has legitimized authoritarian tendencies in the name of protecting, defining and delineating the public good.

This was nothing but a political tutelage. This tutelage, alongside and despite its claim for modernization and democracy works through and by the exclusion of (the plurality of) democratic politics and wills. Political tutelage, by its nature relies on the negation of the very basic requirement of any democratic regimes, the existence of plurality of political positions.

The political tutelage did not transform or lay the ground for cultivation of a democratic utopia, as since the very beginning it has been tied with an (im)possible mission, defined as “civilizing mission”. Creating a new society, another project on the agenda of pioneer

classes, fed and enhanced such difficulty. Kemalist elites, in its discourse, declared to *create* a unified national identity (Turkish) and a secular society, which are taken to be the very basic requirements of the formation of a democratic regime. Nonetheless, the ideological antecedents, political wills and vision of reconstruction period and the implemented instruments made such a transition difficult and even impossible.

The social formation process, envisaged by the Kemalist tutelage stipulated a radical change in which the demographic and cultural map of the society was not taken into consideration. Creation of a secular nation, unified by a single national identity out of a multi-ethnic social landscape and predominantly Muslim society had been intended. To realize such a difficult task, the Kemalist elites preferred to invest into creation of a small cadre guarding the society rather than implementing a structural policies enabling and enhancing the transformation of society, and acted to transform social mentality rather than socio-economic conditions. Hence, both envisaged purposes and implemented instruments to realize such tasks made it difficult to reach that purpose, if not made it impossible. The continued failure to realize the task, in turn, enabled and fed the continuation and reproduction of the tutelage tendencies. In addition, the inability of accomplishing the mission of tutelage prevented transition to democracy. Therefore, the tutelary regime, which by nature does not allow any space for democratic politics, continued to reproduce authoritarianism because of the difficulties encountered throughout the envisaged formation process. One may find, as a consequence, the reasons of the ruptures in the multi-party democratic system by coup d'état as well as writing of Constitutions, right after the post-coups periods, for sustaining the tutelage system. Below, the relationship between democracy and tutelage will be evaluated by examining the emergence of avant-garde elites, the acquisition of the tutelage mission and different stages it went through during the Ottoman and Republican period.

6.1 Tutelage and the Avant-garde Elite

Turkey, as of its foundation until today, except for few years, has coddled to apply her formal mechanisms of the democracy. However, despite the permanency of formal

mechanisms of democracy, political activity has been maintained in the shade of open and secret limitations. These limits, in academic studies and in popular political discussions, which determined the framework of the policy, are evaluated by the concept and fact of tutelage.

Tutelage can be defined as an elite group's consideration that they are, on behalf of society, entitled to define and decide the public good and public interest, and to administrate and to govern the society and the state, in realizing public interest without claiming or asking the social consent. The abstract definition of tutelage, when applied to Turkey, is embodied by Kemalism. Kemalism defined in such a framework; refers to the orientation of every inch of social and political life under the guidance of "six arrows" toward elevating of Turkey to the *level of modern civilization*. The very mission of Kemalist elites is taken to be as providing the policies to maintain execution of politics to remain within the ground specified by these principles. In this framework, the tutelage refers to both Kemalist ideology, specifying the ground and the limits of political activity and activity of Kemalist elites, maintaining the monopoly on defining this ideology, construing it through historical process and providing the policy to be executed on the axis of this ideology. In other words, "tutelage" implies; the attempt of Kemalist elites for bringing Kemalism—whose meaning is defined through their monopoly on its content- to be the basic authoritative discourse and determinant factor in politics. Such condition, led the real framing of politics and policies to be defined through dynamics struggling for the arbitration or adjustment of Kemalism since the foundation of the Republic.

While the tutelage has been embodied by the Kemalists throughout the Republican period, Kemalism cannot be defined as the unique and original source of tutelage tendencies. Rather, Kemalism constitutes the final and the most effective chain of such tendency, originated from the late Ottoman period. The tutelary system owes its existence to the emergence of an elite class, claiming to decide and make policies and

undertaking a rescuing mission. The emergence of this elite class as well as its acquiring a rescuing mission is a consequence of a long term and complex political process.

This tendency can be dated back to the intellectual transformation in which Ottoman elites began to define “the resolution of problems within the limits of the system” and to take the “the west imitable in terms of military and administrative aspects”. This intellectual-conceptual transformation resulted in the emergence of Ottoman modernization, which led radical changes in its traditional political structure and culture. Reforms initiated in military and administrative field by Selim III (1789-1807) Mahmud II (1808-1839), to prevent the decline of the Ottoman Empire planted the primary seeds of this process. Military and administrative structure has been modernized following the Western (particularly French) education system and institutional culture. Realization of reform attempts by the will of Sultan (modernization from above) and following the western culture as a pattern (Westernization) laid the ground of a political culture, which would gain a tutelary qualification by passing through elitist and rescuing phases.

6.1.1 Emergence of the Avant-garde Elite

An elite class willing to make policy appeared primarily during Tanzimat period (1839-1871). Civil bureaucracy strengthened qualitatively and quantitatively by the reforms performed by Selim III and Mahmud II, reached a rational functioning and an autonomous structure under the leadership of Reşid, Fuad and Ali Pasha. Careers of three powerful men of the period display the main dynamic of the modernization process. Their bureaucracy careers began with working in Translation Chamber (*Tercüme Odası*), established to raise bureaucrats for foreign affairs (except Reşid Pasha), continued as being ambassador in western countries and ended in Ministry of Foreign Affairs and/or grand vizier. All of these three statesmen, made remarkable contributions to the reform processes of the period, were raised from structures emerged out of modernization process.

Education obtained in modern schools in Ottoman or directly obtained in European countries and duties performed in European Embassies led the expansion of western languages, thought and political functioning as well as life style within the bureaucracy. Thus, efforts for reform initiated by powerful sultans to strengthen the empire led the emergence of a class, whose member having a strong and deep-rooted political vision and do not leave the destiny of the county into Sultan's will. In this context, one may contend that the Tanzimat could be defined as a period in which the civil bureaucracy, with a motivation of rescuing the state; participated into political activity and took the initiative of modernization process from the hands of sultan. Therefore, civil bureaucracy has been the primary modern class participated into political activity with the motivation of rescuing the country.

Emerged as the first elite class throughout the modernization, the bureaucracy caused to the emergence of another elite class. The popularization and expansion of Westernism in political, social and cultural fields and the furthering of autonomous existence of bureaucrac laid the ground for the emergence of a new intellectual class.

Known as Neo-Ottomans, a product of the western education system stipulated by the modernization process, they presented a political opposition fed from Islamic political thought framed in a modern/ western language and constitutional solution against bureaucratic domination and western-focused visions. New Ottomans's success in introducing the concepts of "nation" and "liberty" to the political language through newspapers resulted in popularization of the mission of "saving and rescuing the state" beyond the walls of the palace, by which the mission ceased to be a technical issue, defined through bureaucratic arrangements, but a politicized popular one. The criticism offered by the Neo Ottomans against the bureaucratic modernization resulted in three significant contributions to the modern politics of the late Ottoman Empire. First; it was a solid sign of an emergence of a second elite class, whose mission is defined by rescuing the state, similar to the bureaucratic elites. Secondly, it was through their popular discourse that modernization process ceased to be a technical issue as it had

been intensively politicized. Third point is that; the mission of rescuing the state had been freed from the monopoly of statesmen, became popularized and transformed into a civil claim.

Abdulhamid II period, witnessed the appearance of the third and the final class of modernization process: The military. Abdulhamid's policies expanded and intensified the politicization of the modernization process: on the one hand he implemented policies such as expanding modern education, strengthening center-rural relations and extending bureaucratic mechanism to realize the administrative modernization; on the other hand, simultaneously he resisted against the political thoughts and actions emerging out of these processes by attempting to substitute loyalty to the sultan instead of bureaucratic rationality and by suspending the constitutional monarchy.

Hence, it is contended that the modernization process, quantitatively enhanced by the policies of Abdulhamid, but qualitatively it has been enhanced over and through the political opposition to the Abdulhamid regime. It was the struggle between Abdulhamid and Young Turks which caused modernization to be synonymous with struggling against the sultan in order "to rescue the state". Young Turks' success in appropriating the notions of liberty and fatherland, while stripping away from their Islamic code as in the usage of Neo-Ottomans, had strengthened the intellectual class and begun to look for alliance in overthrowing the regime. Civil bureaucracy's 'bureaucratic conservatism' and its weakening during Abdulhamid period compelled the intellectual class to ally with the military which was already politicized and transformed through the western education system, maintained throughout the reform efforts. Consequently, the military took its place as representing the final and the strongest elite groups in the politics. Upon military's participation into political discussions as being the last leading class, both the emergence of avant-garde-pioneer classes have been completed and led to the acceleration of political search into concrete actions.

6.1.2 Emergence of Tutelage

The alliance between intellectuals, military and the civil bureaucracy under the umbrella of Young Turks, with the purpose of “rescuing the state”, brought a new phase in the Ottoman modernization. The two basic dynamics of this phase is the elitist attitude and rescuing mission. Positivism and materialism, learnt through the modernization and modern education processes, was the ideology of political elites and providing them an elitist position. Elitism enabled political elites to claim a rescuing mission. The content of such mission had been defined as secularism and nationalism. The merger, conjunction and unification of elitist attitude with the mission of rescuing led the hegemony and domination of tutelary political vision. This result was born due to evolution of two basic dynamics, which enabled ottoman modernization possible – realization of reforms by the hands of the sultan and by taking the west as a pattern- for a century. Throughout this process, the sultan ceased to be a driving figure in the reform process while the new elites began to take the initiative and the modernization process led the expansion of Westernist political vision. Therefore, elitist form of rescuing the state became the central dynamic in the search for “saving the state” and period of tutelage began accordingly. In the subsequent phases of Ottoman-Republic modernization tutelary mission would not change but take different priorities. Political elite; composed of these three classes, whose political impact and weight varies from time to time, would undertake a “rescuing” mission during the reign of Committee of Union and Progress and during the war of independence, a “founding” and “protecting” mission during the single party era and a “protecting” mission throughout the multi-party system of the Republic.

Embodied in the activities of Young Turks, the intellectual-military alliance, which accomplished the 1908 revolution by undertaking a “rescuing” mission, left behind saving strategies, which had been tried by the state authorities all along the 19th century. They considered those strategies to be failing and applied a new rescuing strategy. Young Turks began to implement a policy of Turkish nationalism for rescuing the state

instead of both Ottomanism, began in Mahmud II period and reached its peak level by the Rescript of Gülhane (1839) Royal Edict of Reform (1856), and Islamism implement by Abdulhamid II.

This new formula; did not only contribute to the rescue mission of new intellectual class, beginning from New Ottomans (Namık Kemal's emphasize on 'fatherland') to the Young Turks (Yusuf Akçura and Ziya Gökalp's focus on Turkish nationalism) but it was also the response to trauma of Balkan wars, independence moves as well as loss of territory in the Middle East and North Africa. The increased loss of territory as a consequence of military defeats and independence movements popularized the idea that administrative reforms cannot prevent the decline had urged the alliance of military and intellectuals to intervene radically to "rescuing" mission. It was claimed, to save the Empire, the Turkic nature and Turkish element must be strengthened. This claim has transformed the whole dynamics of modernization process and paved the way for tutelary politics. This, in fact, meant; 'to construct a nation'. Ottoman, through centuries, as constructed its legal, cultural, economic and religious structure over a multi-ethnic social composition, the Turkish element of the Empire, was far away from establishing the framework for the state to be rescued. Ottoman administrator elite, within last few centuries, directed its interest towards Balkans and neglected Anatolia.

"Rescuing the state by strengthening the Turkish element" required an extensive nation-building process. Tutelary vision, composing both an elitist attitude and rescuing mission stepped in during this period. The alliance established by the intellectual class in cooperation with the hard power of the military – both sharing a similar worldview by being positivist and materialist – initiated the "nation-building" process under the guiding principles of secularism and nationalism: Throughout this transition, the "privileges" of non-Muslim and Non-Turkish segments of the society transferred to the Turkish groups, however simultaneously the impact of Islam over the Turkish segment of the society tried to be reduced as it was thought to weaken Turkish identity. In this context, by the full utilization of the World War I conditions, the Empire formed around

millet system (multiple existence of national affiliations) was tried to be transformed into a “single nation state”.

Committee of Union and Progress’ answer to the question of how to save the state as the “establishing of a Turkish state based on domestic-national bourgeoisie” was a critical intervention to the modernization process. This vision reached a concrete result upon Ottoman’s defeat in World War I and invasion of Anatolia. Certain segments of the elites of Empire, particularly those having a specific political vision, moved to Anatolia and participated into the resistance organized by local and civil segments. Young military officers and nationalist intellectual took their part at the initial stages while the members of civil bureaucracy divided amongst themselves. While the young officers moved to Anatolia, the old ones preferred to stay in the center of the Empire.

Resistance in Anatolia enabled the leading class to materialize their rescuing mission, which takes Anatolia and Muslim–Turkish element to be the focus of attention. New mission of the pioneering class was defined as to rescue the Turks¹⁹² and the state from the invasion. In Anatolia, the struggle organized by various social segments upon the orientation and support of the members of the CUP transformed into a national level. In this process, particularly the activities of young officers, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, in Amasya–Erzurum-Sivas–Ankara route unified the resistance movements. The trajectory of War of Independence and the destiny of founded state after the war has transformed by the intervention of leading classes, whose members began their vocational and political careers in the CUP and took place in the political searches and discussions throughout this period.

The behavioral patterns of the pioneer cadres before and after the victory are similar to the behavioral patterns of the Young Turks, from where they were originated, before and

¹⁹² It should be noted that throughout the early Republican years and the War of Independence, the category of Turkish identity perceived as interchangeable with the category of Muslimness. Such usage could be seen in almost all official texts and Lausanne Treaty. See chapter II for a detailed discussion on the transformation of Turkishness.

after their government. As the year 1913 constituted a landmark on the political strategy of the CUP government, the year 1923 symbolizes a similar milestone for the elite cadre under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal. Both of those groups had sealed alliances with various social and political groups before they came to power in realizing their goals, adopted a democratic and pluralist language to maintain the alliances, and stayed away from the controversial fields until they realized their goals. That strategy enabled the pioneer groups to achieve their aims, which cannot be realized alone. Both groups seized the government once they managed to achieve their aims. For both, to getting the control, the support of the military was effective. Further to that, both of the groups eliminated the wide political and social coalitions by which they had sealed alliances in achieving their goals after they came into power. For the Young Turks, the Balkan Wars served as a “legitimate” justification to materialize the mission of saving the state and for the Kemalist elites, it was the Sheikh Sait uprising which functioned for the legitimizing a similar politic. The elimination of adversaries and formation of a unified single power had brought an authoritarian political language and political regime. During both periods, the Parliament remained open and the Constitution survived. However, again in both periods a small cadre in the political groups was decisive on the policies. Both of the groups legitimized the authoritarian regime by referring the necessity for the success of the radical social engineering projects, defined as requirements to save the country, enhance the social benefit and the building of the nation.

These similarities derived from the fact that both of the pioneer groups bore the same structural and ideological elements. Both of the groups relied on the same alliance of military and intellectuals. The shared class characteristics enabled them to share a similar ideological stance. Positivist and materialist thoughts enabled them to sustain an elitist position. Elitism led them to think that they had the privilege and right to make decisions, on behalf of the people. It was this assumption of natural right to led them to believe in leading the rescuing and founding of the state. The infusion, combination and

unification of elitism and the rescuing mission in practice had necessarily paved the way for tutelary politics.

6.2 Kemalist Tutelage and Democracy

In terms of all aforementioned aspects, there was continuity between Kemalism and Young Turks. In other words, Kemalism inherited the heritage of the Young Turks. However, Kemalist politics differentiated itself from Young Turks in two aspects. This, I believe, is a consequence of the transformation in the meaning of elites' mission. The mission has been identified with "founding" during the single party era and "protecting" during the multi-party era, which differentiated the Republican modernization process from the Ottoman modernization. These differences deeply influenced the Republican period modernization and the democratic development. As the political quests during the Ottoman and the Republican periods were directly affected by the missions of the avant garde elites, the differentiation in the framing of elites' mission influenced the political system during the Republican period.

6.2.1 Founding Mission and Political Tutelage

The most distinctive feature of the Kemalist politics during the single-party era was the nation-building process. In other words, the primary mission of Kemalists was not to 'rescue the state' similar to the Young Turks, but to 'establish the state and construct the nation.' Young Turks aiming to save and rescue the existing state, continued their quests within the system; and hence they protected the old institutions while they were establishing the new ones. However, the Kemalist period was of an establishing the state after the complete destruction of the old one. Because of such difference, Kemalist elites took radical decisions in defining the new political regime by abolishing both the sultanate and the caliphate and declaring the Republican system, and gave priority to construction of new institutions, popularization of new values and creation of new actors without any feeling to protect the old actors, institutions and values.

To realize such a task, different alternative power centers have been either eliminated or dissolved. The process particularly took place between 1923 and 1927 with the direct support of the military. The Law on the Maintenance of Order (*Takrir-i Sükûn Kanunu*) and the Independence Tribunals (*İstiklal Mahkemeleri*) suppressed all the political and social oppositions during that process and an authoritarian regime came into force, in which Mustafa Kemal was the sole power. Simultaneous with elimination of social and political opposition, the process of building a new nation began immediately and decisively. In order to construct a secular and a unified Turkish nation out of a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society, the elites compelled to believe to change the ethnic and religious composition of Anatolia. Mustafa Kemal considered the existence of the authoritarian regime necessary for such difficult but “necessary” task. To achieve this aim, first of all, every required action was taken to reduce the impact and presence of non-Muslims in the population for the sake of homogenizing the social composition. Then, in order to reduce and control the influence of Islam on the society and to make the Turkishness as the unique source of new identity in constructing values, the policy of laicism and nationalism were developed. However, the policies of replacing Islam with Turkishness and dissolving all different ethnic identities into Turkishness faced with severe social resistance. Nonetheless, all of these resistances and uprisings were countered in a decisive and firm manner.

It should be noted that Mustafa Kemal did not only eliminate the supporter of the *ancien regime* but also the figures in favor of the regime while staying in opposition to his leadership (Unionists, members of the Second Group, and members of TpFC). Likewise, he implemented decisive policies for establishing a completely new political regime and constructing a nation. Such a position and the implemented policies enabled Mustafa Kemal to reject his relationship with Young Turks. Throughout the whole process of eliminating the legacy of the Empire, with all of its institutions, actors and values, Mustafa Kemal remained to be the sole actor. The new political condition was

completely an original phase in the history of modernization process continuing over more than a century.

The continuity in terms of mentality and politics was cut off in terms of actors. This claimed rupture, enabled Mustafa Kemal to place himself in the centre of the movement and to develop a new modernization discourse, that begun with his own leadership. In the framework of this discourse, the modernization process became synonymous with Kemalism as well becoming the name of the new saviour. Nonetheless, during this period, Kemalism meant only a disengagement from the Ottoman modernization, rather than having and presenting specific and delineated sets of values. Rather, it meant to provide legitimacy for building of a new nation by the new elites. As a matter of fact, the efforts for defining and creating a doctrine out of Kemalism did not have serious support and remained weak during the initial period. It was through the actions taken in 1930s and 1940's, in which the efforts to create a society fully adopting Kemalist reforms, we witness a radical acceptance of the Kemalist disengagement rhetoric amongst the Republican elites. Such an acceptance led the new elites to acquire a new mission during 1950's. Before dealing with that I will focus on the authoritarian regime during the single party period.

Mustafa Kemal had it established a new political party, assumed to present its opposition via economic issues. However, SCF (Free Republican Party) gained an unexpected social support in a short period, which appalled Mustafa Kemal and the elites. The disappointment, shock and fear have left deep impact on the pioneer classes' perception of politics. The potential political costs of democratic politics led Mustafa Kemal and the new elites to decide the continuation of a single party system and era. The SCF experience persuaded the new elites to realize that there is a strong social opposition, displaying the failure in persuading the society to adopt the reforms and inability of CHP to influence the society. After this realization, Kemalism began to focus more on the discourses and policies to maintain the continuity of single-party era to reorganize the relationship between the party and the state, on the one hand and the party and the

society on the other. Therefore, the whole civil and social organization brought under the strict control of the party and a decisive education campaign implemented to construct and train a pioneer cadre aligned with Kemalist values and beliefs. The years between 1930's and 1940's witnessed detailed efforts of Kemalists in creating a Kemalist generation.

Kemalist modernization established an authoritarian regime during that period to realize the tutelage mission. The new regime was established by invention of some instruments, allowing the disabling of then Constitution. The reason for developing such instruments was related with the discomfort toward the 1924 Constitution, which was enacted during the period in which the Kemalist elites did not have adequate power to have a monopoly over the Parliament. It was the time in which even CHP-affiliated parliamentary members could resist against Mustafa Kemal in the name of protecting the power of the Parliament. The constitution of this period was relatively a democratic one as it envisaged a multi-party political system, recognized the control of the Parliament on the government and the primacy of legislation. Despite that, in parallel with Mustafa Kemal's policies to eliminate the opposition, in practice, the political system envisaged by the Constitution could not be implemented adequately even beginning from 1927. Kemalist elites built a mechanism enabling their power to be continuous and unquestionable. Construction of an authoritarian regime out of a single party system relied mostly on this mechanism.

The first instrument of the mechanism was to prevent the establishment of any other oppositional political parties despite being a constitutional right. Kemalist elites actively prevented the establishment of any other parties and began to develop theories to legalize such stance.

The second mechanism, which enabled to disable the democratic qualities of the 1924, Constitution and construction of an authoritarian regime was the Chiefdom system. Although the system gained an official status in 1939, it begun to be implemented, in

practice, beginning from 1927. The Chiefdom system meant to bring the presidency of CHP under guarantee, granting the President by the limitless authority over the operation and the future of the party. Being the only political party in the system, the privileges given to President of CHP meant to make the leader of the party the sole determinant in the political regime as a whole. Therefore, TBMM (Grand National Assembly of Turkey) and the government have turned into meaningless political entities comparing to the power and authority of the Chief. The process of decision-making was quite clear: any decision on the political system would be taken by the Chief and *Riyaset Divanı* (the Chairmanship Council), composed of two members assigned by the Chief, and then it would be adopted by the parliamentary group of CHP and finally it would be approved by TBMM. In this framework, the parliament, rather than being the forum for discussions or taken the decision on the fate of political regime was more of an institution, for approval of the political decisions taken by a limited cadre in the Party. The Chiefdom system allowed CHP to deactivate the democratic features of 1924 Constitution and to implement an authoritarian regime.

Another mechanism enabling the construction of the authoritarian single party regime was the two-stage election system in which political sections of CHP were the only effective group from the beginning to the end. First of all, the public would approve the second voters, who were nominated by the representatives of CHP, and then a list including the potential members of parliaments, again composed by the leading figures of CHP would be presented to the second voters for approval and confirmation. The two-stage election had been one of the most important instruments of CHP to keep the single party system standing. In a context in which only CHP could participate into “elections” as a party, the implemented election system continued to reproduce an anti-democratic structure.

The absence of contestants in the elections enabled CHP to feel free from the social tendencies in its choices of nominating members of parliament and acted with tutelage thoughts. Through such mechanism of single party, chiefdom system and two-stage

election system, a political regime, not envisaged by the Constitution was built both in practice and normalized in terms of perception. Bypassing the constitution for getting the authorization, which were not granted by the Constitution through the charter of CHP enabled the Kemalist to maintain the establishment of an authoritarian regime, while supposedly a democratic political system existed in discourse.

The authoritarian regime, relying on the aforementioned instruments was normalized and legitimized by a tutelary vision. During the single party era, the Kemalist elites who acquired the mission to ‘build the state and the society’, found the right for themselves on behalf of the society to decide for what was ‘right’ and ‘necessary’ for the society. Because the elitism and tutelage fed the legitimacy of closing doors for public discussion on the definition of what is right and necessary for the society, it by definition excludes politics. Otherwise, the democratic politics could have brought different and alternative political strategies, including for founding or saving the state, and as much it opens the space for discussion, it could have become an alternative to the strategies of the new elites. Therefore, the democratic politics had been prevented. The claim was clear enough: the society is not aware of what is good for themselves and only the elites has the right and ability to decide on the public good and general interest on behalf of the society. In this framework, it is assumed until the “awakening and enlightening of society” by the political reforms decided and implemented by the elites, it was claimed that the national will should be implemented by and through the actions of the elites. The will, was, supposed to be implemented by the elites on the behalf of the society’. These assumptions led the acceptance of authoritarian regime, defined as necessity for a successful maintenance of the ‘saving’ and ‘establishment’ process. Authoritarian regime was held necessary and legitimate for those purposes.

6.2.2 Protecting Mission and Institutional Tutelage

The tutelary vision in the founding period of Kemalist modernization created a vicious circle for the political regime. That vicious circle constitutes the blind point of the

tutelage. Tutelage aiming to establish a democratic political system, found it necessary to maintain the existing authoritarian regime. The authoritarian regime laid its legitimacy solely into its claim to transform the society into a level to enjoy its democratic rights and establish a democratic political system. In other words, the tutelary vision normalized and legitimizes its existence by a utopia in which there would be no need for tutelage. The question whether such a task was possible to realize? Would the society reach a level where tutelage would not be necessary? Who would decide whether the society reached that level? Was there any chance to close gap between the elites and the society in the future? Was it possible for the society to identify with the elites in a way that would not necessitate tutelage?

Looking at the development of the politics after single party period might provide some answers to these questions. Kemalist elites gave up most of the instruments, enabling the continuity of the authoritarian regime between 1946 and 1950, during the transition to the multi-party based political system. Letting the establishment of DP (Democratic Party) was an end to certain aspects of tutelary vision such as defining the existence of other parties as harmful and unnecessary. Likewise the chiefdom system, which relied on the principle stating that ‘the President of CHP cannot be changed’ was given up. And finally, the two-level election system, which guaranteed the victory of CHP for 27 years was revised. Allowing the establishment of other political parties and changing the election system started a brand new period in the Turkish political life. CHP lost its power in the 1950 elections and DP came to power. DP continued to remain in power during 1954 and 1957 elections and CHP could not get enough social support. As the DP could not be overthrown through free elections, the military coup was staged on 27 May 1960.

However, the transition to the multi-party system was not an end to the tutelary vision as the military intervention displayed that the Kemalist elites had acquired a new tutelage mission. This time, the mission was defined as ‘protecting Kemalism’. Kemalist elites left behind the mission for ‘building a new regime and nation’ right after the beginning

of DP period and acquired the mission. In other words, the priorities in defining the meaning of mission have been changed. That was the result of the new modernization stage, initiated by the 'disengagement' discourse after 1930's. It was claimed that the policies implemented to create a new, enlightened, secular and unified nation did not seem to be adopted well by the general mass and hence the founding process relied on the authoritarian structure of single party and elite classes. Therefore the loss of CHP in the elections became synonymous with the loss of this elites. The pioneer elites of the Republican period identified 'saving the state' with loyalty to Kemalism and took Kemalism to be the only form of saving the state. Identification of Kemalism with CHP paved the way to consider any loss of power of CHP to be as the Kemalism's loss. DP against such linkage and to resist the identification of Atatürk with CHP began to bring Atatürk to political agenda more than İnönü's CHP. However, the strategy did not work well as for Kemalist elites continued to identify Atatürk with CHP. In this framework, DP and its actions was coded as 'counter-revolutions' and a coup was staged and the new regime was restructured for 'protection' of Kemalism.

Such an equivalence or condition did not exist previously in the history of modernization. During the Tanzimat, Young Ottomans and Young Turks periods, the pioneer classes adopted a dynamic 'saving' strategy according to the conditions of the period and requirements of the state. When the main purpose was to save the state, all the strategies from Islamism to Westernisation, Ottomanism to Turkism were put into use with a pragmatic concern. However, the new pioneer classes, socialized through a modernization practice formed by the discourse relying on the leadership cult of disengagement defined Kemalism as the only element 'to be saved'. This was taken to be the most appropriate 'saving strategy' of the period in order to 'protect the state'. Attributing such a value and creating equivalence between Kemalism and modernization meant to lose the dynamic nature and formation of modernization. The loss of dynamism enabled the replacement of "saving" and "founding" missions with 'protecting' mission. This was a sign of a new phase, after the 'saving' and 'founding' missions. The new

mission of the pioneer elites was to protect Kemalism. After that, the elites would identify their saviour missions with Kemalism and the tutelage politics would serve for Kemalism.

The Kemalist elites, who relied on the military – intellectual alliance after the coup, agreed on defining the developments taken place between the years 1950-1960: It was argued that the Kemalist modernization was not completed yet, in other words, the society did not reach to the competence to have a voice on their ‘will’. The remaining most important matter of discussion was how to construct a political system after the coup to maintain such a political vision to remain intact. While the radical wing of the elites proposed an authoritarian regime like the one during single party regime, while the moderate wing proposed a formula, which would enable Kemalist modernization to continue without leaving the free elections and multi-party political life behind. 1961 Constitution was prepared after the moderate wing eliminated the radical wing and the multi-party political life continued. Kemalist elites found a brand new formula, which would enable the requirement of the continuation of the Kemalist modernization and the continuation of the multi-party political life at the same time. That formula defined the new form of the tutelage. This tutelage, in which the Kemalist elites acquired a protective role, can be defined as the period of ‘institutional tutelage’ period.

The constitution, which CHP determined its basic principles when it was opposition party (Declaration of First Targets - *İlk Hedefler Beyannamesi* - issued by CHP in 1959), built a mechanism limiting the reflections of the elections on the political system. The essence of that mechanism was the authorization of the Kemalist elites to protect the regime (Kemalism) through the establishment of autonomous institutions. 1924 Constitution formulated the use of sovereignty as following in the 3rd and 4th Articles: “Sovereignty rests unconditionally with the nation”, “Only Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM) represents the Turkish nation and only TBMM could use the right of sovereignty on behalf of the nation”. The ‘political tutelage’ during single party period made it possible to deactivate this formulation of sovereignty envisaged with 1924

Constitution, by preventing the establishment of other parties, chiefdom system and two-stage election system. After 1960s as it was not possible to have single-party era and the free elections would continue, there was no way else than to absorb the new tutelage system into the Constitution.

Because of this reason, the Kemalist elites felt it necessary to put the tutelage regime into a constitutional status. It implemented previously without the necessity to frame it into such a status but the actual impossibility of implementation after 1960 led the Kemalist elites to prepare the 1961 Constitution with such a logic. Within this frame, 1961 Constitution formulated sovereignty as follows in the 4th Article: “Sovereignty rests unconditionally with the Turkish nation. The nation uses its sovereignty through the authorized institutions in accordance with the principles set forth by the Constitution”. By this article, 1961 Constitution transferred the right of sovereignty, which 1924 Constitution granted only to TBMM, to the authorized institutions. The most important ones of these authorized institutions are the Constitutional Court and National Security Council. In this way, by the invention of the authorized institutions formula, the Kemalist elites began to function as “protectors/safeguards” against the possibility of the change in the system by and through the social tendencies. ‘The right to use the national will on behalf of the nation’, which constituted the essence of the political tutelage during the single party period, gained a constitutional status in a form of ‘institutional tutelage’ in 1961. Although this institutional tutelage period recently has faced with serious resistance and has been subjected to revisions in many ways, it is still the most important subject of discussion in the Turkish politics.

The democratic experience of Turkey after 1950s and 1960s displayed the existing problematic relation of tutelage with democracy. By relying on the assumption that the society does not have the competence to use its political rights, the tutelage politics envisages to govern the society under an authoritarian regime for the sake of the society. The tutelage politics bases its existence on the assumption that this requirement would end one day and the society would gain the competence to use its democratic rights.

However, this dissertation contends that this to be a paradoxical assumption. The democratic history of Turkey reveals that the assumption of democratic politics would follow political tutelage would not take place. Further, it takes the tutelary vision as the strongest obstacle against democratic politics. The realization of democratic system postponed to an uncertain future contingent upon adequacy of social conditions had been the central reason that prevents the materialization of the assumption. The privilege to define whether the social conditions are ready for democracy has been appropriated by the elites, creating a vicious circle. After 1960s, tutelary vision did not encounter any difficulty to legitimize the continuity of tutelage system by continuous updating of its excuses of “conditions/maturity required for democracy”.

Two reasons enabled tutelary vision to make the transition to democracy difficult: Assumes the requirement of certain “conditions/maturity for democracy” and appropriated the right to decide whether the socio-political conditions are ready for a democratic politics. The transition to democracy had become almost impossible through these assumptions. In the case of Turkey, laying the ground for the coming of democracy has been tied to nation-building process. Kemalist elites attributed a temporal character to the authoritarian regime by assuming that a successful nation-building process would lay the ground for necessary conditions. Such a claim deployed to find excuses and legitimize authoritarian politics of single-party era. The transition in 1950s understood as the completion of the creating a society ready for democratic conditions. The post 1960s developments witnessed another aspect of tutelary vision: this was a period of protection. The tutelary elites have identified their own position with the tutelary politics up to a degree that defines any kind of rise by another political segment into power as the verification of claiming “the society is not ready and mature enough for democratic system.” This was a consequence of defining their own position as the sole guarantee of democracy, which was nothing but the result of elitism. Hence, the elitist mission of protection put the democratic process into a never-ending circle. The post 1960s, institutional tutelage is an example of this process.

As a conclusion, it is argued that the history of democracy in Turkey displays it well that the assumption of laying the ground for democratic politics by and through tutelary politics is proven wrong and the tutelary vision is the biggest obstacle against consolidation of democratic regime.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A. ÖZET

Bu çalışma, vesayet kavramına dayanarak, tek partinin siyasal rejiminin demokratik niteliğini ele almaktadır. Literatürde, çoğunlukla, vesayet kavramı, elitlerin toplum için 'iyi olanı' düşünmesi bağlamında ele alınarak olumlanmaktadır. Tek partinin uyguladığı otoriter rejim ve gerçekleştirdiği tasfiyeler, vesayetçi eğilimlerle meşrulaştırılmaktadır. Bu çerçevede, Kemalist elitlerin, toplumun 'genel çıkarı' ve Türkiye'nin daha sağlam bir demokratik yapıya kavuşması uğruna istemeden ve geçici bir süre ile otoriter bir tek parti rejimi kurguladığı ifade edilmektedir. Dolayısıyla, vesayetçiliğe olumlu bir anlam atfedilerek, otoriter uygulamalar meşrulaştırılmaya çalışılmaktadır. Başka bir deyişle, tek parti rejimini tanımlamak için kullanılan vesayetçi sıfatı, rejimin totaliter olmayışını, demokrasiyi hedeflediğini ima etmek için kullanılmaktadır. Kemalist elitlerin değişik vesilelerle ve defalarca vurguladığı bu tezler, bir kısım akademisyenler tarafından da benimsenmektedir. Bu düşünceler, Türkiye'nin tek parti rejimini 'vesayetçi demokrasi' olarak nitelendiren bir külliyat oluşturmuş durumdadır. Bu teze karşı çıkan bir kısım akademisyen de, tek parti rejiminin otoriterliğinin demokratik bir hedef taşımadığını savunarak, rejimin vesayetçi olduğuna yönelik yaklaşımları eleştirmektedir. Bu akademisyenlere göre, vesayet, demokrasiye geçiş hedefi dolayısıyla olumlanabilir bir siyasal eğilimdir ancak, tek partinin buna sahip olduğunu iddia etmek mümkün değildir. Bu iki tezin ortak noktası, vesayetçi eğilimi demokratik düzene geçiş için olumlamasıdır. Bu her iki yaklaşımdan farklı olarak, elinizdeki çalışma, vesayetçi eğilimin, demokratik bir sistem için olumlu bir nitelik oluşturmadığını bilakis demokratik sistemi zora sokan, hatta imkânsızlaştıran bir niteliğe sahip olduğunu ortaya koymaya çalışmaktadır. Başka bir deyişle, bu çalışma, tek parti rejiminin vesayetçi bir eğilime sahip olduğuna katılmakta ancak, Kemalist tarih yazımında savunulanan aksine, bu eğilimin

demokrasiye geişi zorlaştırdığını iddia etmektedir.

Elinizdeki alıřma, drt blmden oluřmaktadır. İlk blm, nc sınıfların siyasi sahneye ıkıřları ve vesayeti eęilimler edinmelerini konu almaktadır. İkinci blm, nc sınıfların vesayeti eęilimlerini hayata geirmek iin siyasi merkeze yerleřme srelerini ve bu srete oluřturdukları siyasi rejimi ele almaktadır. nc blm, siyasi rejimin demokratik nitelięini ve vesayetilięin pratikte hangi mekanizmalarla yol aldıęını tartıřmaktadır. Drdnc ve son blm, nc kadroların vesayeti misyonlarının en nemli gerekesini ve yansımısını teřkil eden ulus-inřa srecini ele almaktadır.

Vesayetın Kkenleri

Avrupa devletlerinin 17. yzyılın sonlarında glenmesi ve hem askeri hem de brokratik alanda bařarı kazanması, Osmanlı'nın siyasi sistemini ve dzen algısını deęiřtirmiřtir. Askeri yenilgilerin rettięi ekonomik maliyet, Osmanlı ynetici sınıfını arayıřlara sevk etmiř ve Osmanlı modernleřme sreci bařlamıřtır. Modernleřme sreci, 18. Yzyılın bařlarından itibaren, birok farklı evreden gemiř, her evrede modernleřme srecinin ncelikli gndemi ve tařıyıcı sınıfı deęiřmiř, ancak, modernleřme merkeziyeti ve batıcı bir hatta ilerlemeye devam etmiřtir. III. Selim ve II. Mahmud'un askeri, brokratik ve idari alandaki reformları, geleneksel ynetici sınıfın sistem iindeki aęırlıklarını azaltırken, yeni sınıfların siyasi sistemde g kazanmasına yol amıřtır. Modern okullardaki eęitim ve idari sistemin yenilenmesi, sivil brokrasiyi n plana ıkarmıřtır. Tanzimat dnemi, sivil brokrasinin, modernleřme srecinin kaderini Padiřah'ın inisiyatifinden kopararak kendi varoluřsal ncelięi haline getirmesine yol amıřtır. Modernleřme sreci, gl padiřahların verdięi kararlara baęlı olmaktan ıkarılarak zerk ve brokratik bir srece sokulmuřtur. Tanzimat dneminin brokrasiyi ve batılılařmayı n plana ıkarması, modernleřme srecinden beslenen ancak bu srece itirazlar reten bir İslamcı aydın sınıfının doęmasına yol amıřtır. Yeni Osmanlılar, aldıkları modern eęitimle İslami dřncelerini sentezleyerek, aydın sınıfının doęmasına

ve ordu-bürokrasiye paralel olarak modernleşme sürecinde etkin bir rol almasının yolunu açmışlardır.

II. Abdulhamid döneminde, bir yandan modernleşme sürecinin kurumsal ve idari restorasyon eğilimi sürdürülürken, öte yandan özerkleşen bürokrasi ve bu bürokratik sınıfın savunduğu batılılaşma düşüncesi ile mücadele edilmiştir. Bu gerilim, modernleşme sürecinin ve bu sürecin sözcülüğünü üstlenen öncü sınıfların siyasallaşmasına yol açmıştır. Bu, modernleşme sürecinde bir kırılmaya yol açmıştır. Devleti kurtarmak üzere saray eliyle yürütülen politikalar dönemi son bulmuş, devleti kurtarmak üzere öncü sınıfların sarayla mücadele ettikleri bir süreç başlamıştır. Bu mücadele, öncü sınıfları birleştirmiş ve modernleşme taraftarı, devleti kurtarmaya azimli yeni bir dinamiği başlatmıştır. Öncü sınıflarla II. Abdulhamid arasındaki mücadele, Jön Türk şemsiyesi altında, öncü sınıfların kurtarıcılık misyonunu içselleştirmelerine ve seçkinci-vesayetçi eğilimler taşımasına yol açmıştır.

Abdulhamid rejimi ve bu rejimi ortadan kaldırmaya yönelik Jön Türk hareketi, hem modernleşme süreci hem de öncü elitlerin oluşumu ve gelişimi açısından Cumhuriyete çok güçlü miraslar bırakmıştır. öncü sınıflar ittifak kurmuş, siyasallaşmış ve kurtarıcı bir misyon edinmiştir. İmparatorluğun geride kalan süresi boyunca ve Cumhuriyetin ilk yıllarında, siyasal gelişmelerdeki en güçlü dinamik, öncü sınıfların kurduğu ittifak ve edindiği bu kurtarıcı misyon olmuştur.

Ordu-aydın ittifakının 1908'de iktidara gelmesiyle, modernleşme süreci yeni bir evreye girmiştir. İttihad ve Terakki bünyesinde, ordunun kurtarıcılık fikrine hevesli ve kararlı bir güç olarak modernleşme sürecine girmesi, siyasetin kodlarını değiştirmiştir. On dokuzuncu yüzyıl boyunca modernleşme sürecinin yarattığı birikimin etkisiyle, hem devletin kurtarılması fikri aciliyet kazanıp öncü sınıflar arasında yaygınlaşmaya başlamış hem de halkın kurtarma işlevinde etkili bir ortak olamayacağı anlaşılmıştır. Jön Türk'ler içerisindeki ayrışmanın özünü, seçkincilik ve bu seçkincilikten beslenen siyaset anlayışı teşkil etmiştir. Ayrışmada, İttihat Terakki içerisinde yer alan ve güçlenen grup, devletin kurtulması için ordu-aydın sınıfının siyasete müdahale ederek doğrudan iktidarı

eline alması gerektiği düşüncesindedir. Halk, devleti kurtarmaya yönelik yeterli bir ilgiye, kararlılığa ve güce sahip olmadığına göre, ordu-aydın ittifakı ihtilali gerçekleştirecektir. Böylece, 1908’te ordu yönetime el koymuştur. Modernleşme sürecinin başından itibaren, kurumsal gelişmesini sağlamış ve bu süreçte devletin nasıl kurtarılacağına dair düşünsel bir karara varmış olan ordu, 20. Yüzyılın başından itibaren modernleşme sürecinin ve devleti kurtarma misyonunun baş aktörü olmuştur.

İttihat-Terakki iktidarında, Osmanlı’daki bazı etnik unsurların bağımsızlaşması, Balkan savaşları ve Dünya savaşı, ‘kurtarıcılık’ fikrine yeni bir boyut kazandırmıştır. Kurtarıcılık soyut bir hedef olmaktan çıkarak somut önceliklere kavuşmuştur. Ordu-aydın ittifakı, 1913’ten itibaren iktidara fiilen el koyarak, ‘vatani kurtarma’ işine el atmıştır. Osmanlıcılık ve İslamcılık gibi kurtarma projelerinin sonuç üretmemesi, Türkçülüğün kurtuluş çaresi olarak algılanmasına yol almıştır. Jön Türkler, ‘vatani Türkleştirerek kurtarma’ stratejisini benimsemiş ve bu yönde birçok politika geliştirmiştir. Dönemin en fazla öne çıkan eğilimi, milliliktir. Kurtarıcılık Türk milliyetçiliğiyle özdeşleştirilmiştir. Yeni coğrafya Anadolu, yeni politika milliyetçilik olmuştur. Anadolu’yu karanlıktan kurtarmak üzere, siyasal, toplumsal, ekonomik ve kültürel alanda kapsamlı politikalar geliştirilmiştir. İttihat-Terakki öncülüğündeki ordu-aydın ittifakı, modern bir ulus inşa etmek ve Osmanlı’yı bu modern ulusa emanet etmek üzere, milliyetçilik, laiklik ve devletçilik politikalarına ağırlık vermiştir.

Osmanlı’nın I. Dünya Savaşında yenilmesi ve düşman ülkelerinin işgaline uğraması, modernleşme sürecinde başka bir dönemi başlatmıştır. ‘Kurtarıcılık’ misyonu, daha da acil ve somut bir ihtiyaca dönüşmüştür. İttihat-Terakki kadroları, Anadolu’da direnişi örgütlemeye başlamış, birçok yerde direnişe yönelik yerel kongreler toplanmıştır. İttihat-Terakki bünyesindeki ordu-aydın sınıfı, Anadolu’ya geçerek kurtuluş savaşının liderliğini üstlenmiştir. Böylece, Jön Türk dönemindeki politikalar, somut bir zemine kavuşmuş, Anadolu kurtarılmıştır.

Mustafa Kemal önderliğindeki grubun, zaferden sonra rakip siyasal ve toplumsal aktörleri tasfiye etmesiyle hem modernleşme sürecinde, hem de kurtarıcılık misyonunda

yeni bir evre başlamıştır. Vatan kurtarılmış, ancak inşa edilmeyi beklemektedir. Bu kapsamlı bir reform programının uygulanmasını gerektirmektedir. Jön Türk siyasal ortamında siyasal bilinç kazanmış Kemalist elitler, sahip oldukları siyasal ideoloji doğrultusunda yeni bir devlet ve toplum 'kurma' şansını yakalamıştır. Pozitivist ve materyalist eğitim süreci, siyasal ve toplumsal bir proje ile test edilecektir. Dindar ve etnik bir çoğulculuğa sahip Anadolu'yu, laik ve Türkçü temeller üzerinde yeniden inşa etme projesinin demokratik bir ortamda başarıya ulaşması zor olacaktır. Bu nedenle, Kemalist elitler, Jön Türklerin 1913'te gösterdiği refleksi gösterecek, iktidara alternatif siyasal ve toplumsal kesimleri tasfiye edecek ve otoriter bir rejimi yürürlüğe sokacaktır. 1913-1918 yılları arasında olduğu gibi, 1925 yılından sonra da, siyaset imkânı ortadan kaldırılacak, seçkinci ve vesayetçi bir iktidar pratiği yürürlüğe sokulacaktır. 1922-1927 yılları arasında, yoğun bir iktidar mücadelesi ve siyasal tasfiyeye paralel olarak, laiklik ve milliyetçilik hedefi doğrultusunda radikal bir reform programı uygulanmıştır. Kemalistler devleti ve toplumu eş zamanlı olarak yeniden inşa etmektedir.

Siyasal merkezi yeniden inşa etme sürecinde yoğun bir mücadele yaşanmıştır. Mustafa Kemal'in devletin 'kurtarılması' sürecinde etkili olmuş birçok grubu, 'kurma' sürecinde tasfiye etmesi, hem Kemalist bir modernleşme deneyimini mümkün kılmış, hem de bu deneyimi radikalleştirmiştir. İttihatçılar, I. Meclis'teki II. Grup mensupları, muhafazakâr, geleneksel, solcu ve liberal yerel aktörler ve Mustafa Kemal'le birlikte kurtuluş savaşında öncülük etmiş, II. Meclis döneminde ihtilafa düşerek TıCF'yi kurmuş paşalar, Mustafa Kemal tarafından tasfiye edilmiştir. Bu süre içerisinde, saltanat ve halifelik kaldırılmış, Cumhuriyet ilan edilmiştir. Mustafa Kemal, modernleşme sürecini kendisi ile başlatan yeni bir tarih yazımını hayata geçirmiştir. Öncü sınıflar, Mustafa Kemal'in etrafında birleşerek, daha doğrusu Mustafa Kemal'e tabi olarak, Kemalist modernleşmeyi mümkün kılmışlardır. Ordu, aydın sınıfı ve sivil bürokrasi, Mustafa Kemal'in başarıya ulaşmasına katkıda bulunmuş, mücadele esnasında 'yanlış' cephede yer alanlar tasfiye edilmiştir. Kemalist iktidarın tasfiyelerle mümkün olması ve tasfiye sürecinin öncü sınıflar eliyle gerçekleştirilmesi, hem Kemalist modernleşmenin Osmanlı modernleşmesiyle bağımlı koparmış, hem de öncü sınıfları Kemalizm'e bağımlı kılmıştır.

Kemalist iktidarın öncü sınıfları etrafında toplaması, öncü sınıfların varlığını kendisini bağlaması, ulus-inşa etme sürecini radikalleştirmiştir. Muhalefetin olmadığı, öncü sınıfların Kemalist elitlere tabi olduğu bu süreçte, daha sonra Kemalizm ismini alacak ilkeler doğrultusunda toplum yeniden inşa edilmiştir. Seçkinci ve vesayetçi eğilimlere sahip öncü kadro, toplum inşa etme hakkını kendinde görmüş, toplumu ‘muasır medeniyetler seviyesine çıkarmak’ misyonuyla motive olmuştur. Özellikle, laiklik ve milliyetçilik ilkeleri doğrultusunda hayata geçirilen politikalar, toplumu Kemalizm’den soğutmuştur. SCF deneyimi, bu durumu gözler önüne sermiştir. Bundan sonra, Kemalist modernleşmenin inşa süreci daha yoğun bir şekilde başlamıştır. Kemalist ilkeleri savunacak, inşa sürecinin toplum tarafından benimsenmesini sağlayacak yeni bir sınıfın üretilmesi için politikalar geliştirilmiştir. Bu hem kurma sürecinin derinleştirilmesi, hem de koruyucu bir sürecin başlaması anlamına gelmektedir. Bu politikalar neticesinde, taşrada Kemalizm’i benimseyen, Kemalist inşa sürecinin devamını sağlayacak bir elit sınıf yaratılmıştır.

1946’ya kadar süren bu ‘kurma’ ve ‘koruma’ sürecinde, demokratik bir siyasal rejim tehlikeli görülmüştür. Seçkinci ve vesayetçi ajanda, uygulanan otoriter rejimi meşrulaştırmıştır. Toplumun henüz demokratik iradesini kullanacağı bir seviyeye ulaşmadığı iddia edilmiş, Kemalist politikalar neticesinde toplum ‘aydınlatıldığında’, demokratik bir rejime geçileceği ifade edilmiştir. İnönü döneminde, taşıyıcı kadroların bir yönetici elit sınıfı doğurması ve bu elit sınıfının Atatürk dönemindeki motivasyon ve dinamizmini yitirerek rutinleşmesi, toplumun yabancılaşmasını arttırmıştır. Milli iradenin millet lehine sonuç vermesi için, zorunlu bir aşama olarak düşünülen seçkinci ve otoriter medenileştirme çabalarının demokrasiyi ertelemeye yönelik sonucu, devletin kuruluşundaki demokratik zihniyeti ortadan kaldırmıştır. Toplum, bu yukarıdan aşağıya modernleşme projesine başlarda direnmiş ancak siyasal sistemin içine kapanarak otoriterleşmesi ve dirençlerin sert politikalarla bastırılması sonrasında, toplum içine kapanarak siyasete ve devlete yabancılaşmıştır. Bastırmaya eşlik eden sert kapanma, demokrasi talebinin rövanşist bir karakter edinmesine yol açmıştır. Kemalist kadro, kalabalıklardan müteşekkil halktan bir millet inşa etmek ve egemenliği kullanabilecek

düzeve yükseltmek için uyguladığı seçkinci politikalarla küstürdüğü toplumla çok partili siyasal yaşamın başlangıcıyla karşılaşmak durumunda kalmıştır. Toplumsal tercihler, DP'yi iktidara taşıdığı ölçüde, milletin henüz inşa edilemediği ve vesayetın yeniden tesis edilmesi gerektiği sonucuna varılmıştır. 1960 askeri darbesinden sonraki Türkiye siyasal yaşamı bu sürecin hikâyesidir.

1946'da, iç ve dış birçok dinamiğin bir araya gelmesiyle, rejimi demokratikleştirme kararı alınmıştır. 1950'de CHP iktidarı kaybetmiş, DP iktidara gelmiştir. İktidar kaybı, seçkinci ve vesayetçi eğilimleri güçlendirmiş ve toplumun henüz demokratik olgunluğa erişmediğine hükmedilmiştir. Bu öncü sınıfların 'rejimi koruma' misyonunu hatırlaması anlamına gelmektedir. Bu çerçevede, 1960'ta subay-aydın ittifakıyla askeri darbe gerçekleştirilmiş ve 1961 Anayasası'yla, yeni bir vesayet türüne geçilmiştir. Tek parti dönemindeki 'siyasal vesayet', demokratik bir siyasal ortamın gereği olarak, 'kurumsal vesayet'e dönüşmüştür. Böylece, üç yüz yıllık bir tarih diliminde, farklı aşamalardan geçerek, siyasete müdahil olan öncü sınıflar, Cumhuriyeti mümkün kılmış ancak Cumhuriyetin demokratikleşmesini engellemiştir. Seçkinci ve vesayetçi eğilimler, Cumhuriyeti sahiplenme ve koruma güdüsüyle, Cumhuriyetin demokratikleşme sürecini zora sokmuştur.

Vesayet Rejiminin Kurulması

Kemalist iktidar ve rejim dört önemli evreden geçerek kurulmuş ve kurumsallaşmıştır. İlk dönemde, çevrenin doğal ve parçalı mobilizasyonu ile başlayan Kurtuluş Savaşı, Amasya-Erzurum-Sivas-Ankara duraklarında Mustafa Kemal ve etrafındaki askeri-bürokratik kadronun önderliğiyle merkezi ve ulusal bir karakter kazanmış ve zaferle sonuçlanmıştır. Bu dönem, karar alma mekanizması ve temsil ve katılım düzeyi itibarıyla çoğulcu ve demokratik bir dönemdir. Savaş boyunca nihai karar alma mercii, savaşa katılan bütün toplumsal kesimlerin temsil edildiği TBMM'dir. Zaferin elde edilmesinden sonra Mustafa Kemal, öngördüğü siyasal rejimin bu çoğulcu yapı ve demokratik mekanizma ile hayata geçmeyeceğini düşünerek dışlayıcı bir strateji geliştirmiştir. I. ve II. Meclis döneminde, Saltanat-Cumhuriyet-Hilafet hattındaki

gelişmelerde, Kemalist kadronun çevre ile müzakereyi ve mutabakatı göz ardı ederek, yeni siyasal sistemi inşa etmesi tepkilere yol açmış, Kemalist kadro önce grup ardından da fırka kurarak içine kapanmıştır. Seçimlerin yenilenmesiyle ilk muhalefetin tasfiyesi, siyasal sistemin ve rejimin gelişim mecrasını doğrudan etkilemiş ve Kemalist kadroyu merkeze yerleştirmiştir. II. Meclis döneminde, iktidar ve rejime yönelik siyasal ve toplumsal muhalefetin bastırılması daha zor olmuş ve ihtilaf sürecinde kullanılan Takrir-i Sükûn Kanunu ve İstiklal Mahkemeleri gibi enstrümanlar siyasal rejimi otoriterleştirmiştir. İzmir Suikastı yargılamalarıyla Kemalist iktidar ve rejime muhalif bütün potansiyel kesimler tasfiye edilerek fiili bir tek parti iktidarı kurulmuştur.

1923 seçimleriyle başlayıp İzmir Suikastı davası ile son bulan Kemalist rejimin kuruluş dönemindeki en kritik evre, Halk Fırkası'nın kurulmasıdır. HF'nin ARMHC temeli üzerinde kurulması, Kemalist kadroya Kurtuluş Savaşını veren ve Cumhuriyeti kuran bütün toplumsal kesimleri temsil ettiği iddiasını dillendirmesine imkân tanımıştır. Mustafa Kemal HF'yi kurarken, Partilerin sınıfsal temellere yaslanması gerektiğini, Türkiye'de sınıfların bulunmayışından ötürü farklı partilerin kurulmasına gerek olmadığını, HF'nin toplumun tamamını kuşatan bir parti olduğunu ve toplumu eğitime gibi bir misyona sahip olduğunu ifade etmiştir. Mustafa Kemal'in HF'nin siyasal sistemdeki yeri ve misyonuna yönelik kanaatleri ve HF'nin ARMHC mirasına yaslanarak kurulması, 1923 sonrasındaki siyasi tasfiyelerin ve gerçekleşen reformların ardındaki gerekçeleri ortaya koymaktadır. Böylece, 1923'te HF'yi kurarken, Mustafa Kemal, kurulacak rejimin vesayetçi ajandasını ortaya koymuştur. 1927 öncesinde, siyasal ve toplumsal muhalefetin tasfiye edilişi de 1930 sonrasında kurulan tek parti rejimi de meşruiyetini bu vesayetçi ajandadan almıştır. Mustafa Kemal'in liderliğe yükselmesini ve etrafındaki askeri-bürokratik kadroyu iktidara taşımasını sağlayan tasfiye ve içe kapanma süreci bu vesayetçi ajanda ile meşrulaştırılmıştır.

Kemalist rejimin, tasfiyelerle mümkün hale gelmiş olması ve yeni bir ulus inşa etme hedefiyle uygulanan reformların toplumsal rızayı gözetmemesi, Kemalist kadronun toplumsal eğilimlerden ürkmesine ve siyaset kanallarının kapalı tutulmasını varlığı için

vazgeçilmez bulmasına yol açmıştır. SCF deneyiminin, alınan bütün tedbirlere rağmen, CHF'nin iktidarını tehdit edecek bir toplumsal destek bulması Kemalist kadroyu ürkütmüştür. SCF tecrübesi, Kemalist kadronun daha fazla içe kapanmasını sağlamış ve rejimin bürokratik-merkezi niteliğini kemikleştirmiştir. Bu kaygı dolayısıyla, parti-içi muhalefet bile reddedilmiş, parti politikalarına yönelik en ufak tereddüt bir rejim sorunu olarak algılanmıştır. Topluma duyulan güvensizlikle siyasal muhalefet bastırılmış, siyaset reddedilmiştir. Çevre ile ittifakı sürdürmenin zorunlu koşulları ortadan kalkınca, Kemalist kadro merkeze tamamen yerleşmiş ve toplumsal çevre yerine kurumsal merkeze dayanma eğilimi göstermiştir. Kemalist kadro, kendi ajandasını uygulamaya koymak, ulus inşa sürecine yönelik politikaları hayata geçirmek ve bunun için gerekli kurumları ihdas etmekte tereddüt göstermemiştir. Rejimin toplumdan kopuşu, ordu-bürokrasi-aydın ittifakının kemikleşmesini sağlamıştır.

SCF deneyimi, Kemalist kadroyu siyasal rejimi konsolide etme ve taşıyıcı kurum ve kadro inşa etme arayışına sevk etmiştir. Bu arayışlar, Kemalist kadronun totaliter rejimlerine sempati beslemesine yol açmış, devlet, toplum ve partinin yeniden yapılandırılmasında, bu rejimlerden esinlenilmiştir. Bu çerçevede, 1930 yılından başlayarak, siyasal rejimi kurumsallaştırma ve topluma yayma politikalarına hız verilmiştir. Öncelikle, CHF, toplumu eğitmek üzere yeniden yapılandırılmış, parti-devlet, parti-toplum ve devlet-toplum ilişkisi yeniden tarif edilmiştir. Kemalist ilkeler belirlenmiş, 1927 ve 1931 kongrelerinde CHF programına alınmış, 1935'teki kurultayda Kemalizm olarak isimlendirilmiş, 1937'de de anayasaya alınmıştır. Böylece, yürürlükteki siyasal rejim, Kemalizm olarak isimlendirilerek anayasal bir statüye kavuşturulmuştur. 1935'te parti-devlet özdeşliği sağlanmış, CHF programı, devletin ve siyasal rejimin temel referans metni statüsü kazanmıştır. Bütün bu gelişmelerle, rejim Kemalizm ismi altında bir doktrine kavuşturulmuş ve rejimin kurumsallaştırılmasının devlet ayağı tamamlanmıştır. Kemalist rejimin konsolidasyon zaafını gidermenin bir diğer adımı, CHF dışındaki bütün siyasi-kültürel derneklerin kapatılması ve yerlerine CHF bünyesinde yeni kurumların ihdas edilmesidir. Bu çerçevede, CHF, rejimi taşraya yaymak ve toplumu eğitmek üzere taşıyıcı kurum ve kadro oluşturmaya başlamıştır.

1931'deki kurultaydan itibaren Kemalist kadro, toplumu eğiterek yeni bir ulus inşa etmek üzere pedagojik seferberlik başlatmış ve böylece parti-devlet özdeşliğine sivil toplum da eklenmiştir. Halkevleri ve Halkodaları aracılığıyla taşrada reformları benimseyen öncü bir kitlenin oluşturulmasına çaba gösterilmiştir.

Atatürk'ün ölümünden sonra, CHP Genel Başkanlığı'nı ve Cumhurbaşkanlığı'nı üstlenen İsmet İnönü, CHP'nin değişmez genel başkanlığı ve 'Milli Şef' statüsü edinerek Atatürk'ün siyasal sistem üzerindeki gücünü devralmıştır. Milli Şef Dönemi (1938-1945) olarak nitelenen bu dönemde İnönü, parti ve hükümet üzerinde sınırsız bir güç edinerek siyasi ve ekonomik politikaların nihai belirleyicisi olmuştur. II. Dünya savaşının patlak vermesi, Milli Şef döneminin otoriter ve vesayetçi niteliğinin Atatürk döneminden daha yoğun olmasına yol açmıştır. Siyaset ve ekonomideki politikalar, devlet-toplum ve merkez-çevre ilişkilerinin daha da gerilmesine yol açmıştır.

Vesayet Rejiminin Araçları

1923'ten itibaren fiilen kurulup 1950'ye kadar süren CHP iktidarı, otoriter ve vesayetçi bir karakter arz etmektedir. Tek parti siyasal rejimine damga vuran otoriter ve vesayetçi karakter, bu dönem boyunca yürürlükte olan anayasal sistemden kaynaklanmamıştır. Siyasal sistemi tanımlayan 1924 Anayasası, demokratik bir siyasal zihniyet ekseninde, çok partili rejimi, Meclis'in hâkimiyetini, milli iradenin siyasal sisteme yansımını öngörmesine rağmen, CHP iktidarı, Anayasayı devre dışı bırakacak bazı enstrümanlar geliştirmiş ve bu enstrümanlar aracılığıyla demokratik sistemi otoriterleştirmiştir. 1924 Anayasası, CHP iktidarı boyunca yürürlükte kalmış, Anayasanın öngördüğü demokratik mekanizmalar ve kavramlar varlığını dürdürmüş, ancak, CHP, Anayasa'nın siyasal sistem üzerindeki belirleyiciliğini, geliştirdiği bir takım mekanizmalarla devre dışı tutmuştur. Bu mekanizmaları, başka partilerin yaşamasına izin vermeme, CHP'ye tek parti rejimini meşrulaştıracak anlamlar atfetme, CHP'nin mutlak iktidarını sağlayan iki dereceli seçim sistemini uygulama ve Şeflik sistemini sürdürme olarak saymak mümkündür. Tek parti rejiminin otoriter ve vesayetçi bir yapıya kavuşması, büyük oranda bu araçlar sayesinde mümkün olmuştur. Bu enstrümanlar aracılığıyla, hem

zihniyet hem de uygulama düzeyinde, Anayasanın öngörmediği bir siyasal düzen tesis edilmiştir. Anayasa'nın iktidara vermediği yetkiler, CHP'nin tüzüğü aracılığıyla elde edilmiş ve demokratik bir siyasal sistem görünürde varlığını sürdürmesine rağmen, fiilen otoriter bir siyasal sistem yürürlükte kalmıştır.

CHP, anayasal sistemi devre dışı bırakıp otoriter bir rejimi kurgularken, hem bu düzeni meşrulaştıracak ideolojik argümanlara, hem de düzenin işlemlerini garantiye alacak kurumsal düzenlemelere başvurmuştur. CHP, tek parti oluşunu toplumun ve siyasal rejimin geleceği için gerekli ve zorunlu kılacak düşünsel ön kabuller geliştirmiştir. ARMHC'nin köklerine yaslanarak kurtuluş savaşı zaferini sahiplenmiştir. Siyasal partilerin sınıfsal çıkarlara dayandığı varsayımıyla, sınıfsal farklılaşmanın olmadığı, toplumun sınıfsız-kaynaşmış bir kitle olduğu Türkiye'de, başka partilerin varlığını gereksiz ve zararlı bulmuştur. Bütün toplumu kapsayan ve zaferi mümkün kılan aydınlanmacı kesimleri bünyesinde barındıran CHP'nin, devleti kurtardıktan sonra yeni bir toplum inşa etme misyonuyla karşı karşıya olduğunu savunmuştur. CHP, mevcut toplumun henüz millet olmadığını, kendi çıkarının ne olduğunu fark edemediğini, bu nedenle de milli iradeyi kullanamayacağını iddia ederek, iktidarın millet oluşturma misyonunu üstlenmesi gerektiğini, bu nedenle de, kendi politikaları eliyle millet oluşana kadar milli iradeyi millet adına kullanma yetkisinin kendisinde olduğunu savunmuştur.

Böylece, benimsediği toplum tasavvuru ve kendisine biçtiği toplumu medenileştirme misyonuyla, vesayetçi niteliğinin altını çizmiş, otoriter uygulamalarını da bu vesayetçi nitelikle meşrulaştırmıştır. Bu toplum algısı ve vesayetçi nitelik, her türlü siyasal faaliyeti, başka partilerin ve siyasal kadroların yaşamasını gereksiz ve zararlı kılmıştır. CHP, kendisi dışında siyasal bir etkiye sahip olan veya olma potansiyeli taşıyan bütün oluşumları ve aktörleri tasfiye ederken, bu vesayetçi misyona yaslanmıştır. Bu süreçte, CHP iktidarının vesayetçi niteliği siyasal rejimi bir kısır döngüye sokmuştur. Bir yandan, vesayetçi misyon, mevcut siyasal rejimin otoriterleşmesinin gerekçesi olmuş, öte yandan, kurulan otoriter rejimin, daha demokratik bir siyasal sistem ve daha medeni bir toplumsal yapı için gerekli ve zorunlu olduğu iddia edilmiştir.

Bu ideolojik ön kabullerle, CHP'nin tek başına iktidar olması gerektiği ve toplumun selameti için rejimin otoriterleşmesinin zorunlu olduğu savunulmuştur. Bu düşünceyle anayasayı devre dışı bırakacak bir takım mekanizmalar geliştirilmiştir. Bu mekanizmaların başında Şeflik sistemi gelmektedir. Şeflik sistemi, Atatürk döneminde fiili olarak, İnönü döneminde de resmi olarak uygulanmıştır. 1927'den itibaren, CHP başkanına partinin işleyişi ve geleceği üzerinde sınırsız yetkiler kullanma hakkı verilmiştir. Parti başkanı değişmezlik zırhına alınmış ve milletvekillerini belirleme yetkisine sahip kılınmıştır. CHP'nin siyasal düzenin tek partisi olması dolayısıyla, CHP başkanına verilen bu yetkiler, CHP başkanının siyasal düzenin tek belirleyicisi olmasını sağlamıştır. Böylece, Şeflik sistemi, 1924 Anayasasına dayalı demokratik sistemin sınırlarını zorlamıştır. Atatürk'ün fiilen kullandığı, İnönü'ye de (Milli Şef) resmi olarak tanınan yetkiler, parlamenter sistemin Meclis üstünlüğüne dayalı kuvvetler birliği prensibini de görev ayrılığı prensibini de anlamsızlaştırmıştır. TBMM ve hükümet Şef'in gücü ve yetkileri karşısında anlamsız bir siyasi varlığa dönüşmüştür. Tek partili siyasal düzen dolayısıyla, siyasal sistemi ilgilendiren her karar, Şef ve kendi atadığı iki kişiden oluşan Riyaset Divanı'nda alınmış, CHP Meclis grubunda benimsenmiş ve TBMM'de onaylanmıştır. Anayasa'nın belirlediği bütün prosedürler uygulanmış, ancak gerçekte Anayasa'nın varsaydığı ilkeler tamamen tersyüz edilmiştir. Tek parti sistemi dolayısıyla, partideki organlar siyasal sistemin organlarını anlamsızlaştırmıştır. Bu çerçevede, Meclis siyasi karar alma organı olmamış, dar bir kadronun aldığı siyasi kararları onaylayan bir organ olmuştur. Hükümet Meclis'e karşı sorumlu olmamış, Şef'e karşı sorumluluk hissetmiştir. Meclis 1924 Anayasasında kendisine tanınan yasama görevini de, hükümeti denetleme görevini de yerine getirememiştir. Böylece, Şeflik sistemi, CHP'nin, 1924 Anayasasının demokratik mekanizmalarını devre dışında bırakarak, seçkinci, vesayetçi ve otoriter bir rejimi yürürlüğe koymasını mümkün kılmıştır.

CHP'nin vesayetçi bir zihniyetle gerekli ve zorunlu görüp meşrulaştırdığı otoriter tek parti rejimini mümkün kılan bir diğer mekanizma, iki dereceli seçim sistemidir. İki dereceli seçim sistemi, tek parti rejimini ayakta tutan en önemli araçlardan biri olmuştur. Sadece CHP'nin parti olarak seçimlere katılabildiği bir ortamda, uygulanan seçim

sistemi anti-demokratik bir yapı ortaya çıkarmıştır. Başından sonuna bütün aşamalarda, CHP üst yönetimi ve organlarının etkili olduğu iki dereceli seçim sisteminde, önce CHP örgütlerince belirlenen ikinci seçmenler halk tarafından onaylanmış, ardından da CHP üst yönetiminin belirlediği milletvekili listeleri ikinci seçmenler tarafından onaylanmıştır.

CHP Riyaset Divanı'nın milletvekili listelerini belirlemesi ve seçim sistemi dolayısıyla seçim listelerin olduğu şekliyle onaylanması, tekdüze bir Meclis Grubu oluşturmuştur. Tek parti dönemi boyunca milletvekillerinin yaklaşık %75'i sabit kalmış, değişim ihtiyacı %25'lik bir oranla karşılanmaya çalışılmıştır. Milletvekillerinin yerelliği 1923'ten itibaren radikal bir düşüş yaşamış ve tek parti dönemi boyunca %50 civarında kalmıştır. Meclis'in coğrafi dağılımı Doğu aleyhine ve Marmara bölgesi lehine işlemiştir. Hem milletvekillerinin geneli hem yeni seçilen milletvekilleri açısından Meclisin omurgasını devlet memuru kökenli milletvekilleri oluşturmuştur. Bu genel eğilimlere sahip meclis profili, CHP'nin tek parti iktidarı boyunca, vesayetçi ve seçkin bir politika izlediğini bütün açıklığıyla ortaya koymaktadır. CHP, seçim sisteminin kendisine sağladığı ayrıcalıkları sonuna kadar kullanarak, toplumsal eğilimleri hesaba katmayan, merkezde belirlenmiş politik önceliklere göre tercihte bulunmuştur. Seçimler yarışmacı olmayınca, CHP, milletvekili tercihlerinde, toplumsal eğilimleri gözetme ihtiyacı duymamış, elitist ve vesayetçi kaygılarla hareket etmiştir. Seçim sistemi ve CHP'nin milletvekili tercihi, Meclis'in işlevine de doğrudan yansımıştır. Hükümet ve parti politikaları CHP Meclis Grubunda tartışılarak karara bağlanmış, çoğunlukla alınan grup kararı uyarınca, milletvekilleri Meclis Genel Kuruluna gelen teklifleri onaylamak durumunda kalmıştır. Meclis'te gensoru mekanizması çalıştırılmamış, hükümet tekliflerine yönelik red ve çekimser oylar çok istisnai düzeyde kalmıştır. Meclis'in işlevi, CHP'ye ve hükümete siyasi meşruiyet sağlamakla sınırlı kalmıştır.

İki dereceli seçim sistemi, halkın siyasal olgunluğa henüz erişmediği gerekçesiyle mazur gösterilmiş ve uygulanmıştır. Ancak, bu gerekçenin ardında yatan esas faktör, seçim sisteminin CHP'nin iktidarının kalıcılığını garanti altına alması ve CHP'ye demokratik bir meşruiyet sağlamasıdır. Bu çerçevede, tek parti dönemi boyunca uygulanan iki

dereceli seçim sisteminin, tek parti rejiminin en önemli araçlarından biri olduğunu söylemek mümkündür. Bu seçim sisteminin aracılığıyla, tek parti iktidarı, uyguladığı seçkinci, vesayetçi ve otoriter rejime demokratik bir meşruiyet sağlama imkânına kavuşmuştur.

Sonuç olarak, tek parti rejimi, vesayetçi zihniyeti ve bu zihniyet doğrultusunda meşrulaştırdığı şeflik sistemi ve iki dereceli seçim sistemi aracılığıyla, yürürlükteki 1924 Anayasası'nı devre dışı bırakma imkânına sahip olmuştur. CHP iktidarı, bu enstrümanlar aracılığıyla, Anayasanın öngörmediği birçok yetkiyi kullanmıştır. Bu araçlar, CHP tüzüğü'nün siyasal sistem üzerinde, Anayasa'dan daha etkili olmasına yol açmıştır. CHP, bu araçlar aracılığıyla, elitist, vesayetçi ve otoriter bir siyasal rejimi hayata geçirmiştir.

Vesayetin Ajandası: Ulus-İnşa Süreci

Ulus-inşa süreci, öncü kadroların vesayetçi eğilimlerinin bütün yansımalarının doğrudan izlenebileceği en önemli başlıklardan biridir. Ulus-inşa süreci, hem öncü kadroların vesayetçi eğilimleriyle gerçekleştirilmiş, hem de vesayetin sürmesine zemin hazırlamıştır. Seçkinlerin 'kurtarıcı' bir misyon edindikleri İttihad ve Terakki döneminden itibaren, ulus-inşa süreci, siyasi mesainin en önemli gündem maddesi olmuştur. Öncü kadroların İttihad ve Terakki iktidarında, 'kurtarıcı' misyon edinmesi ve devletin kurtuluşunu Anadolu'nun Türkleştirilmesine bağlamasıyla başlayan ulus-inşa süreci, Kemalist kadro tarafından farklı dinamiklerle devam ettirilmiştir. İttihad ve Terakki döneminde, Anadolu'yu gayri Müslim unsurlardan arındırmak ve Müslüman-Türk unsurlarla tahkim etmek amacıyla başvurulmuş demografi mühendisliği neticesinde, Anadolu büyük ölçüde homojen bir Müslüman-Türk coğrafyaya dönüştürülmüştür. Kemalist kadro, bir yandan, İttihad ve Terakki dönemindeki etnografik mühendislik politikalarını sürdürürken, öte yandan, Anadolu'daki nüfusun Türklüğe dayalı bir milli bilince kavuşmasına yönelik politikalar geliştirmiştir.

1913 Balkan Savaşı yenilgisinden sonra, İttihad ve Terakki şemsiyesi altındaki öncü kadrolar, devleti kurtarmanın Anadolu'yu Türkleştirmekten geçtiğini düşünerek ulus-

inşa sürecine ağırlık vermeye başlamışlardır. Ulus-inşa sürecinin ilk ayağı, Anadolu'daki Türk nüfusu arttırmaya ve dini ve etnik heterojenliği Müslümanlık ve Türklük ekseninde homojenleştirmeye yönelik demografik mühendislik politikaları olmuştur. Bu hedef doğrultusunda, nüfus mübadelesinde, tehcir ve iskana bir çok enstrüman kullanılmış; demografik mühendisliğin her aşaması büyük bir titizlikle sürdürülmüştür. 1913-1918 yılları arasındaki beş yıllık iktidarında, İttihad ve Terakki, 16 milyon civarındaki imparatorluk nüfusunun yaklaşık dört milyonunu (nüfusun ¼'ünü) nüfus hareketliliğine tabi tutmuştur. Etnisiteye dayalı bu muazzam nüfus mühendisliği sonucunda, İttihad ve Terakki, Anadolu'yu Türklerin başat unsur olduğu, büyük ölçüde homojen bir coğrafya haline getirmeyi başarmıştır. İttihad ve Terakki'nin bu ulus-inşa faaliyeti, hem Türkiye'nin bugünkü ulusal sınırlarının oluşmasında, hem de Kemalist kadronun Türklüğe dayalı seküler milliyetçilik politikasını hayata geçirmesinde belirleyici olmuştur. Cumhuriyet yönetimi, İttihad ve Terakki'den devraldığı bu ulus-inşa sürecine, farklı önceliklerle, kaldığı yerden devam etmiştir. Kemalist kadronun da önceliği, 1913 yılından yoğun bir şekilde sürdürülen demografik mühendisliği sürdürmek olmuştur. Böylece, 1913-1923 tarihleri arasındaki on yıllık zaman kesitinde sürdürülen yoğun demografik mühendislik neticesinde, çok dinli, çok etnik yapılu Anadolu, Müslüman-Türklerin hâkimiyetinde, büyük oranda homojen bir coğrafya haline getirilmiştir. İlerleyen yıllarda da Anadolu'yu gayri Müslimlerden arındırarak homojenleştirme politikası sürdürülmüş ve epey mesafe alınmıştır.

Ulus-inşa sürecinin, Anadolu'yu gayri Müslim nüfustan arındırarak Müslüman-Türkler hâkimiyetinde homojen bir coğrafya kılmak şeklindeki demografik mühendislik ayağı başarılıdıktan sonra, Kemalist kadro, ulus-inşa sürecinin ikinci ayağı bağlamında seküler bir milli kimlik inşasına ağırlık vermiştir. Anadolu'nun yerli halkı için de, Anadolu'nun dışındaki dört bir yerden gelen Müslüman göçmenler için de, dinsel kimlik etnik kimlikten önce gelmektedir. Din ekseninde örgütlenmiş millet sisteminde, kimliğin belirleyicisi din olduğundan, Türklük Müslümanlıkla özdeş kullanılmaktadır. Bu Cumhuriyetin kuruluşunda Kemalist kadro için de geçerli bir durumdur. Gayri Müslimlerle ilişkilerde Müslümanlıkla özdeş olarak kullanılan Türklük, Anadolu'daki

Müslüman halkla ilişkilerde gündeme bile getirilmemektedir. Dolayısıyla, Kemalist kadronun inşa etmeyi düşündüğü Türk ulusu, Anadolu'daki Türk etnisiteye bile yabancı bir kurgudur. Bu nedenle, Kemalist kadro, önceliği, laiklik ilkesine vermiştir. Laiklik politikasıyla amaçlanan, İslam'ın bireysel ve toplumsal hayat üzerindeki etkisini ortadan kaldırmak ve mümkün olduğu ölçüde, İslam'ı Türkleştirme projesine yardımcı olacak bir forma sokmaktır. İslam'ın Türklüğe alternatif olma potansiyeli ortadan kaldırıldıktan sonra, Türklüğün yeni aidiyet formu olmasına yönelik milliyetçi politikalar geliştirilmiştir. Gayri Müslim unsurlar vatandaşlık bağıyla Türklüğe davet edilirken, Müslüman unsurlara Türk olma dışında bir seçenek bırakılmamıştır. 1924'ten itibaren, Kürtler başta olmak üzere, bütün farklı etnik grupların Türk olduğu iddia edilmiş, Kürtlerin isyanı feodal kalıntılar, yabancı kışkırtıcılığı, eşkiyalık ve yerleşik hayata geçmeye direnme olarak kodlanmıştır. 'Türklerin' yeni seküler etnik kimliklerini benimsemeleri için, Türklüğün medeniyet kurucu kadim bir ırk olduğuna dair 'bilimsel' araştırmalar yapılmış, ulusun yeni kimliğiyle guru duyması sağlanmaya çalışılmıştır.

Kemalist kadronun hedefi, yeni bir ulus inşa etmektir. 1920'lerde, hem toplumsal bilinç hem de demografik yapı açısından kitleler 'ulus' olmaktan uzaktı. En etkili aidiyet formlarından biri olan İslam'ı Türklükle değiştirmek ve etnik çoğulculuğu Türklük parantezinde eritmek, sancılı bir süreci göze almayı gerektiriyordu. Kemalist kadro, bu zor görevi yerine getirmek için, siyasal merkezin tek hâkimi olmaya yönelik bir dizi tasfiyeyi gerçekleştirmiştir. Alternatif siyasal kadroların olmadığı bir ortamda toplumsal dirençleri kırmak için de otoriter bir siyasal rejim inşa etmiştir. Türklüğe dayalı seküler bir ulus inşa etmek üzere, toplumun etnik ve dini yapısına tamamen ters bir siyasal programın oldukça otoriter enstrümanlarla dayatılması, devlet-toplum, siyaset-toplum ve devlet-siyaset ilişkisini derinden etkilemiştir. Kemalist kadronun ideolojik kurumları marifetiyle endoktrine edilmiş toplumun küçük bir kesimi veya Kemalist kadro ile çıkar ilişkisine sahip bir avuç sermayedar ve bürokrat dışında toplumun büyük çoğunluğu, kurulan siyasal rejimden ve elitler arası bir kurguya dönüşen siyasal faaliyetten rahatsızlık duymuşlardır. Laiklik veya milliyetçilik politikalarına yönelik toplumsal rahatsızlıkların dışavurumu oldukça sert enstrümanlarla bastırılmıştır. Kemalist kadro,

toplumsal direnci, siyasal sistemin otoriterleşmesine gerekçe kılmış ve siyasal merkezi tamamen denetim altına alarak kararlılıkla ulus inşa etme projesini uygulamaya devam etmiştir.

Yeni bir ulus inşa etmek üzere, uygulanan siyasal programın laiklik ve milliyetçilik ilkelerine dayanması, Kemalist kadroyu ve siyasal rejimi iki büyük endişeye sevk etmiştir. Kürtlerin milliyetçilik politikasına yönelik rahatsızlık ve itirazları bölücülük, dindar kesimlerin laiklik politikasına yönelik rahatsızlık ve itirazları irtica ile damgalanmıştır. Bu iki korku, siyasal elitlerin her türlü alternatif siyaset projelerini mahkûm etmelerine gerekçe sağlayarak siyasal rejimin otoriterleşmesine bahane kılınmıştır. Tek parti döneminde, bu iki tehlikenin gölgesine sığınarak bütün muhalifler sindirilmiş ve Kemalist kadro siyasal merkezin tek hâkimi haline gelmiştir. Daha sonraki dönemlerde de, irtica ve bölücülük tehdidi, demokratik taleplerin bastırılmasına/ertelenmesine, sistemin otoriter yapısının sürdürülmesine ve öncü kadroların rejimin bekçisi statüsüyle demokratik mekanizmalara vesayet kurmasına gerekçe kılınmıştır.

Ulus-inşa sürecinde uygulanan politikalar, koşulların dayattığı bir zorunluluk değil, öncü kadroların sosyalleşme süreçleri ve ideolojilerinden beslenen tercihler neticesinde gerçekleştirilmiştir. Ne İttihad ve Terakki ne de Kemalist kadro, Anadolu'yu homojenleştirmek üzere nüfusun ¼'ünü yerinden etmek, gayri Müslimleri Anadolu'dan çıkarmak, Türklüğü İslam'ın yerine inşa etmek, Anadolu'daki gayri Müslimleri etnik Türklüğün sınırları dışında bırakırken, Anadolu'daki bütün unsurlar için Türklüğü kaçınılmaz tek aidiyet formu kılmak zorunda değillerdi. Bu kritik momentlerin hiçbirisi tarihin zorunlu kıldığı kaçınılmaz momentler değildi. Bunların tamamı, Osmanlı modernleşme sürecinin doğurduğu ve seçkin, misyoner ve vesayetçi olarak formatladığı öncü kadroların bilinçli tercihlerinin sonucuydu/ürünüydü.

Bu çerçevede, ulus-inşa süreci, toplumun verili durumunu temel almamış, toplumu yeniden inşa etme gereği duymuştur. Toplumu yeniden inşa etme, elbette devleti kurtarmanın yegâne yolu değildi. Pekâlâ, toplumun mevcut bileşenlerine dayanılarak da

devlet kurtarılabildi. Nitekim öncü kadroların seçkinci zihniyetlerinden ve kurtarıcı misyonlarından beslenen en önemli iddialarından biri, kendi bilinçli tercihlerini, koşulların zorunlu kıldığı kaçınılmaz kararlar olarak sunmasıdır. Oysa tercih ve farklı seçenekler her zaman mevcuttur. Seçkincilik ve kurtarıcılık öncü kadrolara, tercih ettikleri yöntemleri, zorunlu ve kaçınılmaz yöntemler kılma imtiyazı sağlamaktadır. Bu imtiyaz, vesayetçiliğin en önemli dinamiklerin birini oluşturmaktadır.

Öncü kadroların, ulus-inşa sürecinde uyguladığı politikalar, vesayetçi ideolojiyi ve otoriter rejimi mümkün kılmış, meşrulaştırmış ve süreklileştirmiştir. Ulus-inşa süreci, çoğulculuğu ve etnik-dini farklılıkları ortadan kaldırmayı, demografi mühendisliğini, seküler ve milliyetçi politikalar uygulamayı, asimilasyonu öngördüğü için vesayetçi ve otoriter bir rejimi mümkün kılmış, kolaylaştırmıştır. Ulus-inşa sürecinin devleti kurtarma ve devletin varlığını mümkün kılacak bir ulus yaratma misyonlarıyla yol alması, vesayetçi ve otoriter rejimin varlığını meşrulaştırmıştır. Rejim, bu misyonlarla kendisini meşrulaştırmıştır. Ulus-inşa sürecinin toplumun verili yapısına radikal müdahaleler gerektirecek bir formu öngörmesi, bu forma ancak otoriter ve baskıcı enstrümanlarla ulaşılabileceğinin varsayılması, dayatılan formun başarıya ulaşmasının imkânsızlığı, vb. zorluklar vesayetçi ve otoriter rejimi süreklileştirmiştir. Dolayısıyla, öncü kadroların devletin kurtuluşu için öngördükleri ulus-inşa süreci, hem vesayetçi düşüncelerle hayata geçmiş, vesayetçi bir rejime yol açmış ve vesayetçi rejimi süreklileştirmiştir.

Sonuç olarak, elinizdeki çalışma, Türkiye'deki siyasal sistemin ve özelde tek parti rejiminin siyasi doğasının, öncü sınıfların siyasi iradelerinden bağımsız ele alınamayacağını iddia etmektedir. Öncü sınıfların siyasi iradesi, Jön Türk döneminden başlayarak, seçkinci, vesayetçi ve 'kurtarıcı' eğilimlerle şekillenmiştir. Ordu-aydın-bürokrasi ittifakına dayalı öncü sınıflar, Jön Türk ve Kemalist modernleşme sürecinde, devleti ve toplumu 'kurtarma', 'kurma' ve 'koruma' misyonuyla/güdüleriyle hareket etmiştir. Bu misyonlar, sadece öncü sınıfların bilgisine sahip oldukları bir 'genel çıkar' tanımını mümkün kılmıştır. Pozitivist düşünceden kaynaklanan bu otoriter epistemoloji,

kurtarıcılık misyonuyla birleşerek 'siyaseti' dışlamıştır. Toplumun genel çıkarı adına demokratik siyaset dışlanmış, otoriter siyaset meşrulaştırılmıştır.

Bu bir vesayet rejimidir. Vesayet rejimi, öngördüğü bütün 'medenileştirme' hedefine rağmen, demokratik siyaseti dışlayan bir rejimdir. Vesayetçi eğilimin, demokrasinin tanımını gereği gerekli gördüğü, farklı siyasi tezlere açık olması vesayetçi tutumun doğasına aykırıdır. Türkiye'de tek parti iktidarı boyunca uygulanan vesayetçi rejimin demokratik bir ütopyaya dönüşmesini engelleyen en önemli unsur, 'medenileştirme' hedefinin gerçekleşmesi mümkün olmayan bir hedef olmasıdır. Bu imkânsızlık, öncü sınıfların toplum inşa etme ajandasıyla da beslenmiştir. Kemalist elit, tek parti döneminde laik ve Türk bir toplum inşa etmeyi arzulamış, demokratik rejimi bu inşa sürecinin tamamlanması şartına bağlamıştır. Ancak, hem inşa sürecinin dayandığı ideolojik öncüller, hem de inşa sürecinde uygulanan enstrümanlar, inşa sürecinin başarıya ulaşmasını zorlaştırmış, hatta imkânsız kılmıştır.

Kemalist vesayetçiliğin öngördüğü toplumsal inşa süreci, toplumun demografik ve kültürel haritasını hesaba katmayan radikal bir değişiklik öngörmüştür. Çoğunluğu Müslüman olan ve birden çok etnik yapıya dayanan bir toplumdan seküler ve Türkçü bir yapı çıkarılması hedeflenmiştir. Kemalist elitler, bu zor hedefe ulaşmak için, kapsamlı bir toplumsal değişimi mümkün kılacak yapısal politikalar geliştirmek yerine, topluma bekçilik yapacak küçük bir kadro yetiştirmeye öncelik vermiş ve toplumun zihniyetini değiştirmeyi sosyo-ekonomik koşullarını değiştirmeye tercih etmiştir. Dolayısıyla, hem öngördüğü hedefler, hem de bu hedefe varmak için uyguladığı enstrümanlar, hedefe varmayı zorlaştırmış, hatta imkânsızlaştırmıştır. Hedef bir türlü gerçekleşmedikçe de vesayetçi eğilimler varlığını sürdürmüştür. Vesayetçiliğin misyonunu tamamlayamaması, demokratik siyaset imkânının da kapalı tutulmasına yol açmıştır. Böylece, zaten doğası gereği, demokratik siyasete imkân tanımayan vesayetçi rejim, hedeflediği inşa sürecinin zorluğu ile otoriterliği süreklileştirmiştir. Bu nedenle, çok partili siyasal sistem, darbelerle kesintiye uğramış, darbe sonrasında 'vesayet'i süreklileştirecek Anayasa'lar düzenlenmiştir.

Nitekim Türkiye'nin 1950 ve 1960 sonrası demokratik tecrübesi, vesayetçiliğin demokrasi ile var olan sorunlu ilişkisini gözler önüne sermiştir. Vesayetçi siyaset, toplumun demokratik haklarını kullanabilecek yetkinliğe sahip olmadığı varsayımına dayanarak, toplumun iyiliği için, toplumu otoriter bir rejim altında yönetmeyi öngörmektedir. Vesayetçi siyaset, varlığını, bu zorunluluğun bir gün sona ereceği, toplumun demokratik haklarını kullanacak yetkinliğe ulaşacağı varsayımına dayandırmaktadır. Türkiye örneğinde, 'demokrasiyi uygun koşullara bağlama' süreci, ulus inşa etme süreciyle ilişkilendirilmiştir. Kemalist elitler, ulus-inşa sürecinin başarıya ulaşmasının demokratik sistemi kalıcı hale getireceğini iddia ederek, sürdürdükleri otoriter rejimin geçiciliğini savunmuşlardır. Türkiye demokrasi tarihi, bu varsayımın geçersizliğini ortaya koymaktadır. 1950'deki geçiş, hem yurt içi hem de yurt dışı akademik çevrelerde, vesayetçi siyasete ve otoriter rejime gerekçe teşkil eden 'toplumu demokratik koşullara hazır hale getirme' sürecinin tamamlandığı şeklinde anlaşılmıştır. Ancak, 1960'taki askeri darbe ve sonrasındaki siyasi gelişmeler, vesayetçi siyasetin bitmediğini, Kemalist elitin, 'koruma misyonu' çerçevesinde vesayetçi eğilimlerini sürdürdüğünü göstermiştir.

Vesayetçi siyasetin, 'toplumu demokrasiye uygun hale getirmek' koşulunun bitmemesi, iki nedenden kaynaklanmaktadır. Öncelikle, bu düşüncenin kendisi, yanlış, önü açık ve seçkin bir iradeye inisiyatif sağlayan bir düşüncedir. İkincisi, Kemalist elitler, vesayetçiliğe mazeret kıldıkları 'toplumu demokrasiye uygun hale getirmek' koşulunu, 'topluma Kemalizm'i benimsetmek' olarak algılamışlardır. Kemalist elitler, bu düşünceyle, demokrasi ile Kemalizm arasında özdeşlik kurmuşlardır. Tek parti döneminde, 'toplumu demokrasiye hazırlamak' sürecinin Kemalist ulus inşa etme politikalarıyla mümkün olacağı düşüncesi, Kemalizm ile demokrasi arasında bir özdeşliğin kurulmasına yol açmıştır. 27 Mayıs 1960 darbesi, 'toplumun henüz demokrasiye uygun hale gelmediği'nin fark edilmesinden dolayı değil, 'toplumun henüz Kemalizm'i benimsemediği'nin anlaşılmasından dolayı gerçekleştirilmiştir. Böylece, toplumun Kemalizm'i benimsemesi, demokratik olgunluğunun tek geçerli kriteri olarak algılanmıştır. Dolayısıyla, 1960'tan sonraki vesayet, demokrasi adına değil, Kemalizm

adına yürütülmüştür. Kemalist elitler, 'Kemalist ideolojinin bekçisi' misyonuyla, siyaset üzerinde vesayet kurmaya başlamışlardır.

Türkiye demokrasi tarihinin dinamikleri göz önünde bulundurulduğunda, demokrasi önündeki en önemli engelin, seçkincilik, kurtarıcılık ve vesayetçilik olduğu ortaya çıkmaktadır. Seçkinci bir zihniyet ile kurtarıcı bir misyon edinen elitler, toplum ve siyaset üzerinde vesayet kurmuştur. Bu vesayet bir kere kurulduğunda da, devamlılığını sağlayacak gerekçeler bulmakta zorlanmamıştır. Sonuç olarak, Türkiye demokrasi tarihi, vesayetçi siyasetin demokratik siyaset öngörüsünün gerçekleşmeyeceğini, demokratik siyasetin önündeki en güçlü engelin vesayetçi zihniyet olduğunu ortaya koymaktadır.

APPENDIX B. CURRICULUM VITAE

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Surname, Name: Ete, Hatem

Date and Place of Birth: 06 February 1976, Mardin-Turkey

Marital Status: Married with two children

email: etehatem@gmail.com

EDUCATION

Degree	Institution	Year of Graduation
MS	Middle East Technical University, Institute of Social Science, Department of Sociology	2002
BS	Middle East Technical University, Faculty of Arts and Science Department of Sociology	1999

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APPENDIX C. TEZ FOTOKOPİ İZİN FORMU



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Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü

Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü

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Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü

YAZARIN

Soyadı :

Adı :

Bölümü :

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) :

.....

.....

.....

.....

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans

Doktora

1. Tezimin tamamı dünya çapında erişime açılsın ve kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla tezimin bir kısmı veya tamamının fotokopisi alınsın.

2. Tezimin tamamı yalnızca Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi kullanıcılarının erişimine açılsın. (Bu seçenekle tezinizin fotokopisi ya da elektronik kopyası Kütüphane aracılığı ile ODTÜ dışına dağıtılmayacaktır.)

3. Tezim bir (1) yıl süreyle erişime kapalı olsun. (Bu seçenekle tezinizin fotokopisi ya da elektronik kopyası Kütüphane aracılığı ile ODTÜ dışına dağıtılmayacaktır.)

Yazarın imzası

Tarih