

**THE BIFURCATION OF POLITICAL ISLAM IN TURKEY:
THE CASE OF THE PEOPLE'S VOICE PARTY**

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ABSTRACT

THE BIFURCATION OF THE POLITICAL ISLAM IN TURKEY: THE CASE OF THE PEOPLE’S VOICE PARTY

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This study aims to show why there was a schism within National Outlook (Milli Görüş, MG) in Turkey during 2000s, why political Islamist parties having different discourse from MG emerged, and more specifically why and how People's Voice Party (Halkın Sesi Partisi - HAS Party) differed from MG and political Islamist parties. The argument of this study is that socioeconomic factors have played an important role in differentiation of political Islam in Turkey and transformation of MG. Consequently, I tried to find why the HAS Party came about on the basis of the transformation of the MG movement, considering the effects of the changes in socioeconomic and political fields on MG/political Islam. In this respect, I took advantage of the interview done with some senior staff of the HAS Party, and İhsan Eliaçık, a HAS Party supporter, through semi-structured questions; of the comparison of party programs; of the articles in the press on the HAS Party; of the statements and articles of party representatives, as well as of the literature in question.

It has been seen that different parties have emerged from MG due to socioeconomic changes, as well as to internal and external factors. While there have not

been more changes morally in political Islamist parties apart from expressing Islamist notions or values in a common language, it has been seen that the ideas in the field of economy could change accordingly to the current year, and that this change showed parallelism with the development process of capitalism. It can be said that MG-based people within the HAS Party did not ideologically dissent from the SP, that they seceded because of not being able to make the changes they wanted in the party's politics, that therefore the HAS Party was a follow-up party of the MG, taking Islam as a reference and giving great importance to personal conservatism and religious education, and that it had a different approach from the traditional MG in terms of economy and external relations. It can be said also that the most important difference of the HAS Party compared to other political Islamist parties is that it finds itself under the same roof with socialists, having thus the characteristics of a social democratic party with Islamist spirit.

Keywords: Islamism, National Outlook, People's Voice Party, Muslim Left

ÖZ

TÜRKİYE’DE SİYASAL İSLAMIN ÇATALLANMASI: HALKIN SESİ PARTİSİ ÖRNEĞİ

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Bu çalışma Türkiye’de 2000’li yıllarda Milli Görüş içinde neden bir ayrışma yaşandığı ve MG’nin söylemlerinden farklı söyleme sahip siyasal İslamcı partilerin neden ortaya çıktığını; daha spesifik olarak da Halkın Sesi Partisi’nin MG’den ve siyasal İslamcı partilerden neden ve nasıl farklılaştığını göstermeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu çalışmanın argümanı MG’nin değişiminde ve Türkiye’de siyasal İslam’ın farklılaşmasında sosyo-ekonomik faktörlerin önemli bir rol oynadığıdır. Bu nedenle Sosyo-ekonomik ve siyasal alandaki değişikliklerin MG/siyasal İslam üzerine etkilerine bakılarak MG hareketinin dönüşümü üzerinden HAS Parti’nin ortaya çıkma nedeni araştırılmıştır. Bunun içinde HAS Parti’nin bazı üst düzey yöneticileri ve HAS Parti’ye dışarıdan destek veren İhsan Eliaçık ile yarı yapılandırılmış sorularla yapılan mülakattan, parti programlarının karşılaştırılmasından, basında HAS Parti ile ilgili yazılanlardan, parti temsilcilerinin demeçlerinden, yazılarından ve literatürden yararlanılmıştır.

MG içinden sosyo-ekonomik alandaki değişikliklerin iç ve dış faktörlerin etkisiyle farklı partilerin ortaya çıktığı görülmüştür. Siyasal İslamcı partilerde manevi

yönde İslami kavramlar ya da değerlerin evrensel bir dille ifade edilmesi dışında çok fazla bir değişiklik görülmezken, ekonomi alanında ise görüşlerin içinde bulunulan döneme göre değiştiği, bu değişikliğin kapitalizmin gelişme süreciyle paralellik taşıdığı görülmüştür. HAS Parti içinde yer alan MG kökenlilerin Saadet Partisinden ideolojik olarak kopmadıkları, partinin politikalarında yapmak istedikleri değişiklikleri yapamamaları nedeniyle ayrıldıkları dolayısıyla HAS Parti'nin İslam'ı referans vermesi, kişisel muhafazakarlık ve dini eğitime önem vermesi nedeniyle MG'nin devamı bir parti olduğunu, ekonomi ve dış ilişkiler konularında geleneksel MG'den farklı bir yaklaşım içinde olduğunu söylemek mümkün. HAS Parti'nin diğer siyasal İslamcı partilerden en önemli farkının sosyalistlerle aynı çatı altında buluşması, dolayısıyla İslamcı ruha sahip sosyal demokrat bir parti özelliği taşıması olduğu söylenebilir.

Anahtar Kelimeler; İslamcılık, Milli Görüş, Halkın Sesi Partisi, Müslüman Sol

To my sad losses: my father, mother and brother.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 The Aims and the Scope of the Study

The question that this thesis has tried to answer is: why was there a schism within National Outlook (Milli Görüş, MG) in Turkey during 2000s, why did political Islamist parties with different discourse from MG emerge, and more specifically why and how did People's Voice Party (Halkın Sesi Partisi, HAS Party) differ from MG and other political Islamist parties?

Islamism did not show any presence at the political party level until the period 1970 in Turkey. However, it can be said that Islamism and Islamist demands were taken into consideration with the policies of Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti, DP) after the multi-party system. Since 1970s, Islamism had been the ability to do politics for its own sake through National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi, MNP) and National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi, MSP) based on the philosophy of MG. Moreover after 1980s, it has been set forth by many authors at that time that there were regulations in political and social fields with the new economic model sought to be applied in Turkey, and these regulations caused Islamism to strengthen. In 1990s, an Islamist Party (Welfare Party-Refah Partisi, RP) became a partner with the ruling party by increasing its votes significantly, and also this has been interpreted as a sign for the visibility of this revival in the political field. However, since 2000s, the fact that some parties (Justice and Development Party-Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP and HAS Party), established under the leadership of people coming from MG tradition – which was the origin of Islamist parties in Turkey –, have adopted a discourse that kept them away from this tradition could be seen as an indicator for bifurcation in political Islam. It can be said that HAS Party that is the subject of this study has been historically the last example of this bifurcation.

There are various reasons for studying the HAS Party. First of all, although there are more individual or comparative studies about Islamist parties, the number of studies on the bifurcation of political Islam is relatively lesser. Secondly, while the studies about political Islamist parties focus generally on the identities of these parties, they poorly emphasize their class aspects. Thirdly, even though there are still and more studies on AKP – which was the first example of bifurcation of political Islam –, there isn't any study about the HAS Party. Another reason to discuss the HAS Party for the bifurcation of political Islam is that this party has been newly established and there is no study about it; moreover, the discourse and administrative staff of the party are different from other Islamist parties operating in the past and now in Turkey. Which led me to formulate this idea is the unwillingness, stated by party administrators, of not doing politics by means of identities and the presence, among senior representatives of the party, of people coming from both MG tradition and socialist view. Lastly, in the second half of 1960, whereas the efforts aimed at showing the coincidence of socialism and Islam in Turkey remained as a pursuit at the intellectual level, the presence of some socialists and Islamists under the same roof of a party today is another indicator of the fact that this subject is worth studying, seeing that Islam is identified with the right in Turkey.

In this study, it is asserted that the ideology of the MG which forms the basis of political Islamist parties is not a fixed/unchangeable ideology, and that it has undergone a transformation in the historical process, due to socioeconomic factors. This argument will be tried to be proven by indicating how the capitalist system tries to overcome the crisis into which it fell by reorganizing economic, political and social fields, and by indicating how these arrangements are effective in the transformation of political Islam as well.

Therefore, it is necessary to examine the changes occurred in the Turkey's socioeconomic structure and their effects on MG in order to understand why parties with different discourse but from the same MG tradition emerged. In the studies conducted in Turkey, researchers emphasize generally the role of identity/religion when explaining the transformation of political and social structure in Turkey. Identities play inarguably a

decisive role in political behaviors of individuals in Turkey. It can be said that this stems also from doing politics over identities, placing Islamist parties in a different position in political field according to their political identities, as well as from the discourse of some intellectuals who pretend that people are excluded from political and social fields because of their religious identity. However, it can be stated that it is a deficient and problematical approach to explain the transformation only according to cultural factors, without considering the conflicts in capitalist class, as well as the effect of the economic models implemented in the political and social changes Turkey. As for this study, it will be tried to be explained the transformation of political Islam in Turkey, by considering that infrastructure and superstructure don't cause independently or separately changes in society, and there is a dialectic relation between both of them.

The fact that there have been political, economic and social changes in the ruling term of AKP – the first example of the bifurcation of political Islam –, i. e. the redefining of the state and the civil society, as well as the expanding of the market area, gives rise to the question “Do they try to establish an order suitable for applying new liberal policies via Islamism/political Islam?”. Some facts lead to the question whether a disintegration in political Islam is being experienced, in other words why the HAS Party has used a different discourse from MG and other political Islamist parties: the HAS Party's discourse against AKP's political economy, insisting on the growing imbalance of income distribution due to neo-liberal policies implemented by AKP during its ten-year period, and on the articulation of Islam to capitalism by it; the implementation of its politics (AKP) through conceptualization of oppressor-oppressed, getting away from MG's discourse of identity.

The thesis question will be tried to answer on the basis of above-mentioned arguments and within the scope of the following chapters. Chapter II consists of theoretical points of views related to Islamism. Firstly, the definition of Islamism will be done in this chapter. Then, the approaches developed on the emergence and rise of Islam will be stated, and finally the approach of this study will be tried to put forward by evaluating critically these approaches. Orientalism tries to explain Islamism through the

essence of Islam, while the theory of Modernism explains Islamism in conjunction with modernization. Both approaches try to explain the East through West, and on the basis of religion. Apart from these ones, there are some approaches trying to explain Islamism in relation with political, social and economic reasons. In these approaches, the emergence and the rise of Islamism are explained on the basis of a single reason or class. However in this study, it will be tried to be indicated that socioeconomic changes have had an impact on political Islam in the historical process, by opposing the ideas that Islam is a monolithic religion, and that Muslims are a homogenous society. The material world that covers religion is in a state of perpetual change. This situation involves the presence of judicial opinion (içtihad) institution in Islamic societies. For this reason, if we want understand Islamism, we should look at what happens in the reality and not at the essence of the religion. "Islam is subject to perpetual changes, its living area being based on a persistent interaction of earthy and ethereal fields; big and small innovations come into people's life on the sly. Renewal (Tecdid) and judicial opinion become a part of Islamic societies" (Özdemir, 2012). It necessary to examine the historical process in order to understand the differentiation in political Islam. Namely, religion and the movements related to it can be understood in their own socioeconomic contents. Islam does not determine the nature of Islamist movements by itself. It is the socioeconomic and historical content that will determine the direction Islamists will follow. Otherwise, these changes in politic behaviors cannot be analyzed historically.

In the last part of this chapter, the perspective of this study will be put forward. The subject to be emphasized while analyzing the political Islam in Turkey will be the changes in economic field in the historical process, as well as the arrangements done in political and social fields depending on these changes. Therefore, it should be put forward how political and social fields have been restructured in Turkey in order to apply the required economic models (depending on the capitalist system of the world). Moreover, it will be tried to explain state, civil society and religion/identity notions, thinking that they play an important role in this restructuring process.

As mentioned above, the changes occurred in the economic, political and social fields in the historical process in Turkey will be the subject to be focused on in the historical context. Therefore, I think that taking a glance at the process that precedes the emergence of MG tradition will help us understand how Islamism entered the political field, and what conditions led to the formation of MG. So, in the first part of the Chapter III, it will be given place to the position of Islamism from its emergence to the transition to multiparty system in Turkey, as well as the conditions that led to the revival of the Islamism and the emergence of political Islamist parties. In the second part of this chapter, the emergence and transformation of MG will be explained because it is important to analyze the MG movement in order to understand the emergence of the HAS Party which includes a group of politicians with MG tradition, separated from the Felicity Party (Saadet partisi, SP), and to decide whether it got away from this tradition or not.

As there is a common idea that MNP is the first party to represent MG, and that the succeeding parties, i.e. MSP, RP and Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi, FP) are representatives of MG, the emergence of the SP and AKP from the FP has caused debates. Although Erbakan, the natural leader of the MG, was the leader of the SP and stated to be the real representatives of MG, and that Erdoğan, the leader of the AKP, did not refuse its origins and pretended to be changed by saying "We took off our MG shirts", it has not been sufficient to put an end to debates on the identity of AKP at the level of society and political parties. While in these debates some people claimed that the AKP was the successor of the MG and that their discourse "we have changed" was intended to hide the truth, others thought that the statements of the AKP were true and that they might be accepted such as. In these debates, there is a crucial point overlooked: that whether the MG has changed in time or not is not emphasized (Şen, 2004:9-10). Moreover, as Mustafa Şen told, taking the AKP as an example of the harmonization of political Islam with neo-liberalism will be a realistic approach with regard to explanations whether the AKP is the successor of the MG or not (Şen, 2008:23).

With the emergence of the HAS Party, some questions have arisen about its identity as in the case of the AKP. The political discourse of the HAS Party, the separation of the leader from the HAS Party, and the leftist origin of some party administrators led to debates on how the party would be named, as well as to question marks in the mind. Some people named it as an Islamist party, while others named it as a Muslim left; but the party officials were against to these definitions.

In this study, it is necessary to get out of these sustained debates and the frame in which they are carried out in order to understand the differentiation in political Islam. The emergence reason of the HAS Party will be revealed through the transformation of MG movement, by explaining how and why MG movement has changed in this process. Therefore, the effects of the internal and external dynamics will be examined in this transformation of MG, thus of political Islamist parties. As mentioned above, the argument of this study is that socioeconomic factors played an important role in the transformation of the MG and the differentiation of political Islam in Turkey. Inarguably, the changes in economic field are not sufficient to explain this transformation alone. As Poluantzas (1980:18) stated:

Imperialism, a stage of capitalism in the international plan, is not only a fact reducible to economic process. Moreover, the specific international character that social relations took in this stage can be explained only insofar as imperialism is considered as a fact which affects economy, politics, and ideology at the same time. In fact, these “economic” data determine the reorganization of the whole capitalist system, and thereby the deep changes occurred in *ideology and politics*.

Therefore, the transformation of the MG/political Islam in Turkey will be tried to be explained by examining the changes in economic, political and social fields, as well as their effects on each other. Besides, it will be tried to be indicated that how Islamists were affected at ideological level by changes in the world and Turkey, by emphasizing the reasons for which AKP, adapting to the new world order in Turkey, has not defined itself as Islamist, but as "conservative democrat", and in a similar way the HAS Party

has not described itself as Islamist, but as a “social justice party” (not yet clear, but in the general sense). In the last part of Chapter III, the elements that differentiate AKP from political Islamist parties will be examined. So, It will be taken a look at AKP’s approaches to socioeconomic subjects, to its statements on identity, and to the effects of internal and external dynamics; it will be also mentioned briefly the relations between AKP and capital class. Finally, this analysis aims at revealing how the relations between political Islamist parties and capital class have changed from the MNP, the first political Islamist party, and how their approaches to socioeconomic and cultural subjects have transformed.

In Chapter IV, the HAS Party will be analyzed within the framework of theoretical perspective mentioned in this study and in connection with historical content (transformation of the MG and economic policy of AKP). Thanks to this analysis, it will be put forward how and why Islamists and socialists could come together, the dynamics from which the HAS Party emerged, how and why the HAS Party differentiated from MG, SP and AKP, how the HAS Party defined itself, and the approach of the HAS Party to the notions such as capitalism, identity, class.

Finally, after this study is completed, but just before I defended the thesis in front of the jury, the HAS Party experienced a development: it decided to join the AKP. Therefore, this development will briefly be evaluated in the conclusion part.

1.2 Methodology

To answer the question of this thesis, theoretically I made use of literature, party programs, and articles on the HAS Party in the press, as well as the statements and articles of the party representatives. In practice, some senior administrators of the HAS Party and İhsan Eliaçık, a supporter of the HAS Party, were interviewed through semi-structured questions.

All the HAS Party officials interviewed were the members of Founders' Committee and General Executive Board. Some of the interviewees; Kazım Arslan, Şeref Malkoç, Cafer Güneş, Hayrünisa Kökbıyık and Mehmet Bekaroğlu broke away from SP. As for Zeki Kılıçaslan and Cem Somel, they come from socialist tradition. İlhami Güler is a professor at the Faculty of Theology, while İhsan Eliaçık is a writer who left the Faculty of Theology and didn't take part in the HAS Party. In total nine persons were interviewed. It was paid attention to select the interviewees among the founders of the party, those who are coming from MG and socialist tradition, as well as those who have a certain background in terms of Islam and economics. Then, those who broke away from SP and founded the HAS Party among people from MG tradition were determined. As a result of the researches made (by review of press) among them, the most active people in the party were determined. Secondly, there was made also a selection among officials of socialist origin as founders. Even in this selection, through a press research, those who came to the forefront with their articles and interviews before and after the establishment of HAS Party were determined. Thirdly, there was made a selection among people that didn't take part in a political Islamist party before, but received theological studies. Lastly, a person who was closely involved in economy was determined. The reason why the interviewees were determined in this way – by selecting them among party founders – can be explained as follows: to meet with senior officers and to understand the dynamics creating the party. The reason for selecting the HAS Party founders who broke away from the SP is to understand much better the reasons behind their separation from the SP, and their ideological distance to MG. The reason for selecting the comers from socialist tradition is to be able to understand why and how they got together in the same party, the majority being from Islamist tradition. The reason for interviewing with theologians is to set forth how they correlate Islam and left/socialism. Moreover, among those who got theological studies, İhsan Eliaçık was preferred because, inspite of not being a member of the party, he was supporting the party from outside, and known with his writings and interviews in the groups named as "Muslim Left". It was wanted to set forth the differences in this subject by interviewing

with a former bureaucrat who is closely interested in economy, because HAS Party pretends that one of the most important differences of AKP from other political Islamist parties is its view toward economy, and that it strongly objected to AKP's neo-liberal policies.

As it is mentioned above, I requested also an appointment for an interview with Hasan Basri Aktan, the former president of the Account Experts Board of Ministry of Finance and the member of the General Executive Board, in order to get more information about ideas of the party on the economic field, but I could not meet him due to his intensive works and meetings. I didn't request another appointment because of the information obtained from other interviewees (it was stated that the party didn't make a comprehensive study on the economic field, and that the goals were specified in broad terms). Moreover, despite all my efforts, I couldn't get an appointment from Numan Kurtulmuş, the party leader of the HAS Party, because he didn't much time. Eight interviews took place in Ankara, 6 of which in the headquarters of the party, and 2 outside. As for İhsan Eliaçık, I met with him in İstanbul. As the interviewees' statements started to become similar during the interviews, and that I got sufficient information on this matter, I didn't find it necessary to make interviews with other people.

The interviews were carried out through semi-structured questions and lasted nearly one and a half hour. In total, nineteen questions were asked to the interviewees, collected under four headings: the distance of the HAS Party to political Islamist parties/MG ideology and the dynamics from which the HAS Party emerged; the identity of the HAS Party; their approaches to Islam and socialism; the approaches of the HAS Party to capitalism, class, religious identity.

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 The Definition of Political Islam

I think that it is important to talk about “Islam(s)” before defining the political Islam. In the studies on the Eastern societies, done in both Turkey and the West, the attempt was to define the Eastern societies and Islamism with reference to Islam. However, there is a problem in these approaches: it is claimed that Qur’an is a doctrine and that Islam is unable to adapt to changing conditions. Islam is the general name of the belief system born in the Arab peninsula in the 7th century and based on its holy book Qur’an and its Prophet Mohammad's sayings and acts. However, the material world which contains also the religion is in perpetual change. In relation to that, what is changed is the interpretation of Qur’an, the holy book of Islam, and of the hadiths belonging to its Prophet Mohammed. The reason of this differentiation of interpretations is that socioeconomic and political structures have differentiated throughout the historical process.

Even before the movement of Islamism has emerged, after about one century from the birth of Islam, Islam was subject to religious factions, and some differences occurred in the perception of Islam. Islam has different meanings in different socioeconomic and political structures, and is in interaction with all of the structures instead of being a structure formed with specific connections (Gilsenan, 1982). Similarly, Geertz (1968) asserts that Islam has taken different forms in relation to the historical, cultural and economic environment. He rejects the Orientalist approach which mentions a single Islam and defines the Islam society with its essential characters.

Today, the perception of Islam shows more variations than in the past. In other words, different societies not only attribute different meanings to Islam, but also Islam

within the same society is perceived differently. At the present time, there can be made more than one interpretation of Islam regarding to the socioeconomic and political contexts, as in the case of differentiation in political Islam. If we put it more clearly, today Islam is interpreted in two different ways in Turkey. The first group of Islamists tries to connect Islam to liberalism with the interpretation that Islam is compatible with capitalism, or more precisely to liberalism. However, the second group rejects this view and tries to show that Islam is compatible with socialism, emphasizing the egalitarian and social aspects of the Islam. As seen in these different interpretations, although the sole reference source is Qur'an, the interpretations of Islamists based on Qur'an may be various. In brief, since its emergence, Islam has been interpreted differently, depending on the conjuncture, and adapted to changes. So, it can be said that interpreting Islamism according to the essence of Islam is a problematic approach.

As for the concept of political Islam that this study will focus on, the ideologicalization of Islam is called political Islam or Islamism. "We can consider Islamism as an identity, a perception that can occur whenever political behavior meets the perception of Müslimism. "Whatever the interpretation of Islam may be, every Islamic formation putting the Islam into the center of the political practice is Islamism" (Bora & Gültekingil, 2005:18). Ayoob (2004:1) says that a more analytically useful definition of political Islam or Islamism is that provided by the political scientist Guilian Denoeux, who writes of Islamism as "a form of instrumentalization of Islam by individuals, groups and organizations that pursue political objectives" Roy (1994: ix) refers to the Islamist movement which conceives of Islam as a political ideology as "Islamism". As for Kara (1986: 481), he defines Islamism as follows: "Islamism is a theory that emerged at the end of 19th century in the Ottoman Empire and other Islam countries; it aims to render Islam dominant over the politics and the society, to get the equivalent of universal ideas and theories of the West from Islam, and to systematize the Islam as an ideology in the Western sense. "Political Islam is not an exotic and distant phenomenon, but one intimately linked to contemporary political, social, economic and moral issues of near universal concern" (Fuller, 2004: xxi).

While Islamism is defined in the way it is expressed above, there are different views and discussions about the political aspect of Islam. While Toprak (1981: 22-23) states that Islam has been a political religion since its birth, most authors (such as Sarıbay, 1985: 30; Sambur, 2009: 118; Zubaida, 1989) claim that Islam has gained an ideological character against modernization, and that Islamism has been a product of modernization. On the other hand, some authors explain the political dimension of Islam as follows: the important role that the religion plays historically and the political conception of some principles of Islam have led the political dimension of Islam to stand out (Bulaç, 1995:961 cited in Akdoğan, 2005:620). What influenced the emergence of political Islam is: the idea that the religion was attacked during the secularization process, the ideological pressure on religion, and the desire of Muslims to participate in political and sociocultural sphere (Akdoğan, 2005:620).

Concepts emerge depending on the political, economic and ideological conjuncture. Similarly, the increased importance of concepts in specific periods, the meanings they consist of, their relations and contradictions with other concepts cannot be isolated from political, economic and ideological conjuncture. This also applies to the concept of Islamism. The birth of Islamism, its revival and differentiation are also closely related to important changes and transformations occurring in the world. Furthermore, as Sambur (2009:119) stated, it is possible to see a lot of variations in political Islam in practice. Every country has its own version of Islamism, due to the different context they are in. However, it is not possible to make generalizations about political Islam since Islamist parties have different identities and characteristics despite some common features (Sambur, 2009:119). In short, Islamism changes from country to country; it even evolves with time in the same country according to various dynamics.

2.2 Approaches on Islam/Islamism

There are different approaches as for studies on Islamism. So, these approaches will be explained categorically under the headings: “Orientalist (Cultural-Essentialist) Approach/ Modernism Theory” and “Different Approaches to the Study of Islamism”. The approach of this study to Islamism will be presented by revealing the lacking and problematic aspects of these approaches.

2.2.1 Orientalist Approach/Modernism Theory

Orientalists try to explain the East in comparison with the West. They claim that the historical difference between the East and the West is a result of the religious differences. From this point of view, Islam represents irrationality. The argument that Islam lacks the idea of progress is legitimized by Islam's representing itself as the last religion of the world. That is to say, Islam's not attempting to take something from other civilizations in terms of ethics or culture is considered as the evidence for Islam's non-adaptation to social transformations. According to this approach, Islam creates a conservative culture and reacts to the social changes. They say that the classes and the revolutions in the East are absent due to Islamic civilization. They see Islam and Islamic world as a whole. According to Turner (2001), when explaining the Eastern societies, Orientalism is based on a theory according to which these societies have a supra-class bureaucracy without classes and revolutions. Therefore, he claims that Orientalism attempts to explain social development only with the inner characteristics and cultural features of the society. It is also possible to see the traces of Western Orientalist approaches in the analysis of some authors in Turkey. Especially Şerif Mardin, in his analysis of Ottoman-Turkish society relies upon a Weberian Orientalism. Mardin puts the Ottoman-Turkish society into the East-West axis and tries to resolve it by reducing this to the opposition center (state) and periphery (civil society). Mardin examines the

structure of the society by claiming that there is a cultural conflict between the center and the periphery, i.e. he tries to resolve it at the cultural/superstructural level, also thinks that the secondary institutions and class struggle emerging along with the capitalism in the West do not exist in the East (1992:57). Consequently, “The attitudes, habits and values created by the secondary institutions in the West are absent in the Islamic societies” (Mardin, 1993: 75).

According to the evolution model presented by Modernism theory, there is a transition from traditional to modernization, and all societies would pursue a historical progress corresponding to this natural flow. Modernization theory claims that Western institutions have been formed in a straight and uninterrupted evolution and that the East should also imitate this (Turner, 2001). Modernity is defined as being Western, rational, scientific while traditional is defined as lacking them. Daniel P. Lerner claims that Islam is a traditional ideology reacting to the modernization processes and that, in the case of Turkey, the country is forced to make a choice between Mecca and mechanization (Yavuz, 2008:32).

Orientalist approach and Modernism theory try to explain the East through the West. They make this explanation on the base of religion, and conclude that the Islam religion cannot adapt to social transformations. Based on this conclusion, they define the Islamist movements as movements resisting to modernization.

2.2.2 Different Approaches to the Study of Islamism

Various authors examined Islamism under different headings, but by taking the same dynamics into consideration. For example, Yavuz (2008) examined the analysis related to Islamism under the headings “Essentialism”, “Contextualism” and “Constructivism” while Tuğal (2010) examined these approaches under the headings “Orientalism and Modernization Theory”, “Political Economy”, “Social Movement Studies and Doctrinarism”, “Modernity and Civil Society”. The explanation related to

Essentialism/Orientalism and Modernism Theories is given above. Approaches apart from these would be explained within two categories due to differentiation and redundancy of the conceptualization.

According to some of the researchers of the first group, Islamism was born as a reaction to problems emerging as a result of corruption of the state elite, unemployment, migration from rural to urban areas. Dramatic socioeconomic transformations such as industrialization and rapid urbanization due to development of capitalism were lived through. These transformations led to increase in unemployment, poverty and inequality, which caused the anger of the masses. Secular state (nation-state) and political elites could not produce solutions and Islamists filled this gap (Zubaida, 1989). Some researchers in this group indicate the collapse of center parties and the emergence of secular elites who feel sympathy towards Islamism as the reason for the rise of Islamism (Tuğal, 2010:33). Lastly, some researchers in this group focus on how the activists mobilize people, their organization and leadership characteristics along with the characteristics of the masses, in order to understand the rise and popularity of Islamism (Yavuz, 2008: 34; Tuğal, 2010: 32).

The authors in the second group interpret Islamism through the concepts of modernity and civil society. Authors such as Göle (2000) and White (2002), as well as modernization theorists, consider Islamism as a movement emerging as a result of modernization. However, they claim that the group excluded by modernization has become integrated to modernity via Islamism. Nonetheless, Toprak (1981) conceptualizes Islamism as a reaction to the common transformations emerging during the transition to the modern society from traditional society. She claims that Islamist movements will disappear with the development of capitalism and the deepening of modernization. The authors attempting to explain Islamism from the point of civil society – especially Şerif Mardin (1993) who is supposed to be the initiator of this approach in Turkey – base their theories on the contradiction between state and civil society. They claim that the center excludes the periphery and Islamism is a reaction to

this. Yavuz (2008:34) qualifies the authors in this group as “Contextualists” and claims that they focus on the dominant role of the state at the time of formation of nation states.

2.3 The Criticisms Related to the Approaches on Islamism and the Perspective of the Study

The criticisms about the approaches of Orientalism and Modernism theory have increased due to the developments in Islam societies in terms of modernization and especially the rise of Islamism in the historical process. Shortly, the criticisms to these approaches are as follows: Çınar (2005) and Tuğal (2010) insist on the inaccuracy of the ideal/idealized types in these approaches. Çınar (2005: 32) draws attention to the fallaciousness of the explanations made by stereotyping Islam and idealizing modernity. He claims that the concept of modernity is too ambiguous to be used for depicting and understanding Islamism. He says that the approach of explaining Western rationality with its culture naturally attributes the “irrationality” and backwardness of the East to its culture determined by its religion. He argues that essentialist approaches neglect the contexts, roles and aims of the Islamist movements.

The criticisms against the views of the authors grouped under the title of “Different Approaches to the Study of Islamism” can be summarized as follows: Yavuz (2008:33-34) claims that the explanations of Islamism according to the rapid social change involve an instrumental reading of Islamic identity and discourse. He draws attention to the effects of the opportunity areas on the rise of Islamism. Also Tuğal (2010:32-33) asserts that drawing attention to the importance of networks and resources in the rise of Islamism is correct but not adequate, that the people advocating this approach handle these dynamics without giving attention to social formations and sociopolitical envisagement, and that therefore they could not understand why the target and expectations of Islamic movements emerged and underwent a transformation. Tuğal indicates that the approaches based upon state and civil society opposition is problematic, and that the source of the problem consists of defining the civil society as the source of

solidarity and the state as the source of coercion. Even he states that “civil society is a crucial factor in terms of continuity of the system based on inequality with the active involvement of secondary sectors of the society” (Tuğal, 2010:35).

It is possible to state that Orientalist approach and Modernism theory lost their validity, taking into account the fact that Islam societies underwent progress and appropriate transformations in the historical process. Islamism can be explained according to the transformations in socioeconomic and political structures. However, the kind of approach reducing Islamism to a single class should not be adopted, such as “The base of the Islamism consists of the groups migrating to the cities and losing their jobs due to socioeconomic transformations”, because at the present time Islamism is a formation consisting of many different classes. Thus, it can be said that the approaches reducing Islamism to a single class is deficient and problematic. That is to say, it should not be ignored that Islamist movements are supported not only by a group of urban poor, unemployed and marginal people from lower class, but also by entrepreneurs and intellectuals from middle class. Moreover, the generalization such as “The base of Islamism consists of poor masses marginalized by the center” is also problematic. First of all, masses are not homogenous. There are people supporting different ideologies in spite of sharing the same favorable or unfavorable socioeconomic circumstances. Even there can be ideological twists due to the changing political atmosphere. Secondly, it is not possible to say that there is a constant discomfort in the society regarding Islam (Islam being oppressed, religious people being excluded, the Islamist symbols being not used and so on). When the historical context is taken into consideration, it can be observed that this kind of problems and complaints have emerged in some [specific] periods. Also Tuğal (2010: 33) asserts that social discomforts are formed socially and culturally, that there has not been a constant discomfort of the people in the Middle East, and that it has appeared in some periods. He also states that he does not support the idea that the poor have always supported the Islamists. For him, “the poor are not natural allies of the Islamists; they are *naturalized* allies”.

The approaches explaining Islamism through state-civil society opposition can be criticized from different views. First of all, the state-civil society or center-periphery paradigm is a problematic conceptualization in itself. That is to say, with this conceptualization, center and periphery have been taken as abstract and homogenous concepts. In fact, periphery (civil society) is not a homogenous, but a heterogeneous structure (Jessob, 2009:88). Civil society has a heterogeneous structure due to the fact that it involves different groups politically, economically and ideologically. Therefore, as Mardin states, periphery does not have an undeserved, opponent and democrat structure. As the structure that Mardin has abstracted and homogenized as periphery contains feudal classes, villagers, petite bourgeoisie of the industrial and agricultural capital, different sects, and that there are surely conflict between them, how can it be possible to assert that all of these classes and other social layers forming the periphery are homogenous, that they are all victims of the state, and that they represent the opposition against the state (center)? Secondly, what Mardin means by the concept he has abstracted and absolutized as “center” is the secular rulers of the state. However, from the first years of the Republic, in the center, there have been both supporters of Islamism and secularists. That is, center is not a homogenous and absolute concept neither. The separation between periphery and center is not defined according to cultural codes, but to class positions. And even if merchants, feudal lords, etc. live in the rural area, they are part of the center (Yaşlı, 2009:97). Shortly, the fact that Mardin analyzes the social change in Turkey by reducing the conflicts due to the effect of modernization to cultural conflicts reveals that he ignores objective historical conditions, as well as inner and outer dynamics effective in the change.

It was tried to be explained above various approaches to Islamism, as well as their erroneous and incomplete parts. As Tuğal (2010:35) has stated, there are things to learn from all of these, while defining Islamism and explaining the reasons of its rise. But, the important point is to see that religious movements, economic models, state and civil society are interconnected. When the process from the emergence of Islamism to nowadays is analyzed, explaining Islamism only with rapid urbanization or the

inefficacy of political structures, the conflict of the civil society called periphery with the center and so on is a deficient and problematic approach. Therefore, in order to understand the emergence and rise of Islamism, as well as the differentiation in political Islam nowadays, we should analyze changes in socioeconomic and political fields, taking into account the interaction of economic, political and social structures.

While analyzing the subject, I will proceed according to specific concepts. Therefore, first of all, I will try to present below the development and transformation of Islamism by explaining how I define these concepts.

It is possible to state that socioeconomic factors play an important role in the emergence and bifurcation of political Islamist parties, and that these parties were involved in the politics as representatives of specific classes. What is meant here is *not* that the changes in the economic field and the demands of specific classes lead directly and on their own to the emergence and differentiation of political Islamist parties. When observing the historical process, we can see that developed capitalist countries try to establish an order according to the economic models they wish to apply. In other words, while establishing this order, they reshape the political and social structures in accordance with the economic model they want to apply. Therefore, while developed capitalist countries are regulating their societies, on the other hand, they reorganize the societies of developing countries dependent on capitalist countries at political and ideological levels and in terms of social relations, by collaborating with local forces. The political order in underdeveloped countries is usually accomplished via military coups; then, the state and the “intellectuals” try to legitimize this new order ideologically. The social relations are reshaped in this frame. In the example of Turkey, this legitimation is done by questioning the current order and by criticizing the old one. From this point of view, the matter which will be focused on while analyzing the political Islam in Turkey, in the historical process, is the changes in the economic field and along with these changes, the regulations in the political and social fields. The concepts of “state”, “civil society” and “religion/identity” appear as important components in the transformation in economic, political and social fields. In Turkey, in order to understand the

transformation of political Islam, it should be looked at how these concepts are being defined and how the relations between them are formed or broken off. So, in this study, if we want especially to point out how these concepts are defined, our first concept would be *state*. In the Marxist definition, state is a state of class. States do not hold a supra-class status. At every stage of capitalism, state has an economic role (Poulantzas, 1980:315). In the period from World War II to 1980s, the Turkish state accomplished some functions of the welfare state; it implemented also some policies to increase the savings of the industrial class of capital (Boratav, 1993). In the 1970s, with the crisis of the capitalism in America and Europe, it is considered that the interventionist model of state regulating the economic field should be abandoned, and in the early 1980s, a new accumulation model appeared: the global stage of capitalism. After 1980s, the state has been restructured. As Şen (2008:19) stated, the restructuring-of-the state strategy of the neoliberal hegemony, which was tried to be formed in the post-80 period, was based upon ending the “class-based politics”. In the developed capitalist countries, the transition to a new accumulation model is made by democratic means; in the countries integrated to the world capitalist system in a dependent mode like Turkey, it is made by the military coups. As a requirement of the new accumulation model, the economic activities of the state are minimized while the market area is enlarged. The distancing of the state by these liberal policies from the economic domain did not change the class status of the state; on the contrary, as the interests of the capitalist class required this, the state got away from the economic domain. However, here, a point should be underlined: as Jessob (2009) stated also, state continues to intervene in the economics for rescuing the companies and economics from the crisis when it is needed.

According to Marxist classics, a state, which is a class state, is defined not only with its physical suppression power in hand, but especially with its social and political functions. The class-state function provides the unity and solidarity of social formation, the conditions of production, and thus reproducing social conditions of production. Generally, the dominant ideology creates the mortar of social formation. So, it never means that the state has only a

repressive or ideological function. State itself undertakes also directly a function that can be called economic function, according to the modes of production and their stages, as well as to ranks and periods of a social formation. State is not limited to the reproduction of social conditions of production, but it intervenes personally in the reproduction of the production cycle (Poluantzs, 1980:314-315).

With the transition to the capitalist system, economic and political areas have presented different aspects. However, accepting – without questioning – the distinction between these areas as data means not seeing the mechanisms hiding the class nature of the state (Savran, 1987a: 191). Today, in the present state, almost all of the social relations are formed on the basis of economic relations.

It is stated that the capitalist system applies a new economic model, by changing the capital accumulation model, in order to overcome the economic crisis which it enters. But, it is not sufficient for the state to restructure the political area to apply this model. At this point, another instrument of the state, i. e. ideology appears in the picture. In other words, the state and intellectuals introduce the ideology which would serve to the formation of a new order and to its legitimation in the social sphere. There are various methods which the political authorities could use to put into practice the ideology which they intend to render dominant: oppression, physical violence, censorship, etc. However, these authorities should refer to intellectuals in order to make the masses internalize this ideology, apart from the political power. Gramsci (1971) states that the intellectuals play a role in organizing, generating and spreading the ideology. For him, the intellectuals cannot be considered as a separate category from state or classes. Associating the intellectuals with the classes, Gramsci states that every class has its own intellectuals.

In Turkey, while the above-mentioned developments took place in economic and political domains as a result of the economic model applied, at the ideological level, social transformation was ensured with the introduction of the Turkish-Islam synthesis (Türk-İslam sentezi) by the state as the official ideology in 1980s. This ideology was imposed to the masses by Islamist and right-wing intellectuals. With the September 12 coup, left wing organizations and leftist ideology have been tried to be annihilated. In

order to provide stability and get legitimacy in the eyes of the public, the military government included Islam into the official ideology. Therefore, on the one hand, the military government paved the way for Islamism against the left as an ideology, on the other hand it enlarged its space within the society by letting it have place in the polity. Bora and Can (2000:148) indicate that Turkish-Islam synthesis is used for attaching Islam to the official ideology. According to Tekeli (1987: 7-8), as a natural result of this, Islam has come into prominence with time and this has led political Islam to rise.

The explanations above show the class structure of the state, the function attributed to the state in relation to the economic model wished to be applied in Turkey, and its effects on the development of the political Islam. The indicator for the class structure of the state is its support to the capitalist class. The State, while giving this support, has taken side with the big industrialists on the one hand, and on the other hand, it has led to the conglomeration of companies by contributing to the development of the Islamist capital/Anatolian bourgeoisie (especially in the Özal period via economic incentives). At the official level, it has legitimized these policies in the eyes of the society by calling out ideological instrument (Turkish-Islam synthesis). Besides, the restructuring of the political domain with the coup is also an indicator of how it removes obstacles in formation of a new socioeconomic order by using the instrument of coercion of the state. The acquisition of Islamism is that suppressing the left permitted it to be the only ideology unifying the society. The experiences in this process provided some opportunities for Islamists to insert themselves in social, political and economic domains for their development. Thus, in order to understand the status of political Islam in Turkey in 2000s, it is necessary to remember the past period and the role of the state in this period.

The second concept that would be focused on is *civil society*. Marx defines civil society as a conflict area where contradictions come together, which leads the state to emerge. According to Marx, civil society does not encapsulate all the social area outside the state. Also, state does not produce an area completely impartial of the society (Savran, 1987b:53). There is a relation between the development of material production

and the emergence of classes, as well as between specific production and change relations and the political legal structure of the society. In other words, there is a causality relationship between the socioeconomic structure of a period and the civil society and the structure/organization of the state (Marx, 1977d:518 cited in Yetiş, 2003:64). State presents an independent structure as illusion, since it shapes the necessities in the civil society area (in fact, consistent with the interests of the dominant class). In fact, “The one which conditions and organizes the civil society is not the state, but it is the civil society that conditions and organizes the state.” In other words, political history can be explained by the economic relations and their historical developments (Engels, 1977a: 178 cited in Yetiş, 2003:66). If some segments of the civil society question the state consciously and can situate themselves outside of the state hegemony, it can be said that there is a contradiction between the civil society and the state. That is to say, “the subject of the struggle of freedom is not the whole civil society, but some classes composing civil society and other oppressed categories.” (Savran, 1986: 27) According to Gramsci (1971), the domain of civil society is the area where class struggles are given. In order to say that civil society is in opposition with the state, there should be society segments within the civil society consciously stayed outside of the hegemony of the dominant classes and opposing this.

As it is explained above, Mardin, in his book entitled “Religion and Ideology”, analyzed the Ottoman-Turkish society through state-civil society opposition. Similarly, in his book “Alienation of the Order: Westernization” (Düzenin Yabancılaşması: Batılılaşma), İdris Küçükömer (2003) tried to analyze the society through this opposition. The opposition mentioned in these books is not a state-civil society opposition as explained above; it is formed by taking state and civil society as homogenous and abstract concepts. That is to say, the bond between state and society is torn off. Therefore, some elements are not included in the analysis: the class nature of the state, the classed structure of the civil society, and the status that the classes have in political-ideological balance of the power.

With the center-periphery approach, the situation that Turkey deals with was easily reduced to the states' tyrant character and the powerlessness of civil society, being isolated from every point of view based on classes, the mode of production and the relations with imperialism, etc. (Yaşlı, 2009:97).

In the 1980s, the concept of civil society was brought to the agenda again. The civil society described at the end of 1960s was given prominence, due to its aggrieved, dissident characteristics, and was named as periphery; since 1980s, the civil society has been qualified as the area of pluralism and democracy, by emphasizing the relationship between civil society and market. Despite this positive meaning attributed to civil society, state is attributed a negative meaning, being defined as an instrument of oppression and bureaucracy (Savran, 1986). As civil society is considered as a whole due to this opposition, the contradictions, separations and inequalities within it are ignored; on the other hand, state is transformed into an instrument disconnected from the classes and oppressing these classes at the same time (Savran, 1986:25-26). One should explain not only how the concept of civil society is being defined, but also why the civil society approach is brought to the agenda again. So, the historical reasons giving birth to civil society concept should be examined. In short, the factors having an impact on the internalization of this concept in Turkey can be listed as follows: abandonment of welfare state policy and spread of neo-liberal ideology; the demoralization which the left underwent in late 1970s and the reaction to the bureaucratism in countries like East Europe, China and so on, in the process of transformation to socialism; the fact that majority of the leftist intellectuals started to serve the interests of the market and capital, because of the needs of the capital for the qualified and educated manpower; the fact that the Turkish left was affected by left liberalism/civil societism movements occurred in the West (Savran,1986:12-15). As a result, in Turkey, the civil societist discourse has been an intersection of left liberal and right-wing ideologies. It can be said that the real reason why right-wing ideology gave prominence to the concept of civil society that much is, on the one hand, widening the market area as a requirement of the neo-liberal economy whose implementation conditions were formed with 1980 military coup, and on the

other hand, the attempt to create a free space for religious orders by considering the religious communities and religion as a constituent of civil society and that the democracy is required. Lastly, the fact the civil societism in this period situated the state in a supra-class position and considered religious orders supporting the political Islamist parties as a part of civil society showed, on the one hand, the big capital outside the state and caused, on the other hand, the Islamic religious orders conglomerated by being articulated into the market to appear as structures outside the state (Özgüden, 2007). In the following years, religious orders became an efficient power with the capital accumulated in the areas such as education, media and so on, and thereby helped political Islamist parties become stronger. In 2000s, instead of the distinction made in 1980s-1990s on the basis of state-civil society opposition, new oppositions started to be made like Kemalist/liberal, secular/democrat, etatist-elite/conservative-periphery (Şen,2008:22).

As for the issue of *Identity*, two types of identity were given priority in the modern era: nation-identities and class-identities. In the postmodernist period, both of these identities fell in the second plan. This situation can be explained in relation to globalization: developed capitalist countries needed to enlarge both domestic and foreign markets in order to overcome their economic crisis. This is why privatization policies were enabled. However, the obstacle behind the application of these policies was nation-states. Thus, nation states were weakened. As Güalp stated, in this process, it can be understood that the weakening of national identities has started with the abandonment of developmentalist and welfare policies of the nation-states. However, in every society, while the income and wealth polarization within itself and the class polarization in the world have increased, the decrease in the class identity is a contradictory situation (Güalp, 2003:123). This situation can be still explained with globalization; in the process of globalization, first of all, it was transformed from Fordist mode of production to post-Fordist mode of production. Post-Fordist mode of production segmented the Fordist assembly line and transmitted it to subcontractor companies throughout the World. Therefore, the world-wide circulating capital was rescued from the pressure of

unions, and the regulations disabling dismissal and drop of wages (Harrison, 1994 cited in Gülalp, 2003:124). Global capital incorporated small-scale businesses and provided opportunities to their expansion. The expansion of these small companies and paternalist systems weakened the organization of the working class, having transformed the objective base of the class struggle (Harvey, 1999:176-177). Secondly, as Miner stated, “The relationship between the postmodern situation and the decreased class struggles occurred in the emergence of cultural identity conflicts and new cultural movements” (Gülalp, 2003:124). In the cultural identity conflicts were involved intellectual middle class and people from other classes. However, the reason why intellectuals were involved in this conflict cannot be explained only by the position of their material interests in the status hierarchy, as Gülalp claimed (Gülalp, 2003:126). It is at the same time related to these intellectuals which consciously or unconsciously were serving the capital. Besides, as there was a shift in time and place of the globalization process, and that the position of people toward the world changed, people started to be in search of reforming the identity (Harvey, 1993:55-59). From this point of view, it is possible to state that a tendency toward ethnic and religious identities is observed since nation and class identities have been shaken and there is no way of expressing them.

Considering Turkey, it is possible to state that politics are made over cultural identities. In 1970s, the class identities started to become visible, but after 1980 the identities based on class have lost their visibility and the politics based on cultural (ethnic-religious) have come into prominence. However, at the present time, it is seen that the politics made upon identities and the prominence given to identities do not contribute to the solution of basic class contradictions. In other words, the answer to Harvey's question “Do we still witness the existence of the known questions in this storm of economic, politic and cultural changes which ravage our environment?” is “Yes” (Harvey, 1993:55-59).

Consequently, in the process of nation-state formation, the efforts to form a class consciousness instead of religious identities under the identity based on ethnicity pushed both religious and some ethnic identities into the second plan. On the other hand, the fact

that capitalism is based on the logic of accumulation of capital gave rise to the capitalist class and the worker class resisting to this. Nowadays, the fact that politics are carried out upon identities and that identity struggles are given priority has reduced the importance of class differences. What is meant here is not that the differences and problems based on cultural identity are unimportant, but that these struggles can go hand in hand with the struggle for classless society and even that these problems can be overcome in the social order which would be reached as a result of this struggle. In other words, to handle the issue only with its cultural identity dimension leads to an inadequate struggle against the capitalism which is at the origin of this problem.

In this sense, in Turkey, Islamism is a typical identity politics. Islamists shift their attention to the issues away from labor-capital contradiction, and do not question capitalism as a socioeconomic system although it constitutes the source of some of the problems they deal with. Therefore, they either ignore the issues of social structure and class conflict or they try to form a social theory which reduces especially the importance of the class concept and doesn't care for searching different options other than capitalism (Gülalp, 2003:152).

Islam religion gives priority to values of community in the way of life or cultural areas. Postmodernism also encourages the sense of community since it supports the right of "every individual to transform his/her way of life to a culture". At this point, postmodernism causes the community values to gain legitimacy as a basic reference frame in determining the identity (Saribay, 2003: 10-11). With this emphasis of postmodernist discourse on identity, Islamists started to defend the identity politics with more courage, and had more opportunity to voice themselves as a result of the development of technological possibilities. Consequently, in post-modernism, social conflicts were replaced by culture wars (Saribay, 2003:9-10). Thus, it is possible to say that the world created by global capitalism Islamism has created a space in itself, legitimized with postmodernism arguments.

In Turkey, for many years, it has been claimed that there is an inequality resulting from the religious identity in economic, political and social areas. However, in the 2000s, as it was attempted to be explained above, although the identity politics were dominant and the “opportunity to live” the religious identity was supposed to reach a great extent, Islamist community noticed that inequality and exploitation were still under way. So, the HAS Party voicing this situation emerged. Exactly at this point, it can be stated that the economic dimension at the background of identity politics has become more visible. However, the HAS Party emerged with the discourse that they would not do politics over identities, and agreed with some names from the left to do politics on “common values”. But, according to the information obtained during the interviews, it is possible to conclude as follows: the HAS Party formed its politics and discourse by taking one of the most important aspects of the identity – religion – as a reference, but by formulating it with universal terms.

In the third part, the effects of the changes in economic, political and social areas on political Islamist parties will be explained in detail within the framework of the above-mentioned concepts, by examining some segments of the capitalist class, Islamist intellectuals and the transformation of some leftist intellectuals in this process.

CHAPTER III

ISLAMISM, NATIONAL OUTLOOK AND POLITICAL ISLAMIST PARTIES

3.1 Islamism in the Process from its Emergence to the Transition to Multiparty System in Turkey

There is not any consensus about when the Islamism as a political ideology emerged in Turkey. According to the general opinion, Islamism emerged after Second Constitutional Era. Tunaya, Kara and Mardin are among the defenders of this view. According to them, Islamist movement emerged under the leadership of Cemalettin Afgani (Tunaya, 2003; Kara, 1986; Mardin, 1983). Despite this common belief, Türköne claims that Islamism was developed by the Ottoman intellectuals between 1867-1873 (Türköne, 1994:32-33).

In the Ottoman Empire, the general view as for the emergence of Islamist movements can be summarized as follows: in the Ottoman State, the Westernization movement had gained intensity since Mahmut I period. The reforms due to this movement started to distort the traditional structure of the Ottoman society which was based on Islam. This led to the reactions of the Muslim segments. There are other reasons for these reactions: establishment of some reforms for non-Muslims, adoption of the Westerner approaches to Islam by the intellectuals coming back after getting education from Europe, and the insufficiency of the Westernization movement in bringing a solution to the problems (Türköne, 1994). Thus, it is argued that Islamist movements emerged under the influence of these factors, as a solution to the problems and a reaction to Westernization. The most important reason behind the religious nature of the reaction was the Islamic identity, the most evident identity in that period in the Islamic countries. In addition to these internal factors, the claims of the Orientalist approach that Islam by its very nature forms an obstacle to the progress, as well as the

criticisms against the Qur'an and the Prophet which are sacred for the Muslims have been effective in the birth of Islamism (Hatemi, 1987:282).

It can be claimed that Islamism became politicized in 1908 as other political thought movements in the Ottoman Empire. The question of the intellectual movements emerging at the final stage of the Ottoman Empire is "*How this empire would be rescued?*" What differentiates these movements is the answers they give to this question. It can be argued that Islamism is a view discussed in the intellectual level and under the leadership of intellectuals.

With the declaration of the Republic, the discussions about liberation ended with the victory of the views favoring Westernization. Thus, the debates on Islamism were interrupted from the formation of the Republic to multiparty system period. In the debates related to the Constitutional period, Islamism (like other movements of thought) focused on the idea how the Empire would be rescued; in other words, it was shaped as a "*liberation ideology*". With the transition to multiparty period, Islamism emerged this time as a movement reacting to the Republican reforms (Mert, 2005:413-414). In the nation-state established after the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, there was a transition from "ummah" concept to nation concept in order to develop the conscience of citizenship (Özek, 1968:61; Toprak, 1981). That is why the evident constituents of the "ummah" identity were tried to be forgotten. The aim of the Republican regime was to implement nationalist ideology instead of religion. The nationalist ideology would assume the unifying function that was assumed before by religion (Toprak, 1981).¹

However, the transition from traditional societal structure to modern society does not happen suddenly. So, the effects of religion in the sociopolitical domain do not disappear at a sudden; on the contrary, a rivalry between the old and new values emerges. Therefore, the rivalry between the Republican ideology nationalism and the Islamism ideology is natural. The only way to get victory in this rivalry would be possible by

¹For extensive information on Islam and politics for the first years of the Republic, see Binnaz Toprak (1981). "İslam and Political Development in Turkey", Leiden; EJ. Brill.

providing a large social base. For this reason, both ideologies would try to transmit their political cultures (Sarıbay, 1985). In this period of tension, the reactions of the Islamist segments were named as "cultural reactions". The common point of the two reactions in Ottoman Empire period is the prominence given to the Islam religion in the reactions against the dislocation of the order: the ones reacting to the reforms aiming the empowerment of the center (the empowerment of the center is against the interests of landed proprietor and seigneurs and Anatolian tradespeople and craftsmen have provoked the public) and the reactions by the encouragement of the Anatolian tradespeople and craftsmen and religious communities in the first years of the Republic. In fact, reactions defined usually as religious/cultural were based on completely non-religious reasons or interests hidden behind the religion (Sarıbay, 1985). Also Özek (1968:54-55) states that the economic structure based on handicrafts could not deal with capitalism since capitalism developed in the West and Ottoman Empire became a market. He states that the segments whose economic conditions got worse in this period attributed it to new order and demanded the previous order since the transition to new order worsened their conditions. "Considering the issue from this point of view, the reactions of the public to the changes were in fact economic, despite their religious appearance."

According to the explanations above, it is possible to state that Islamist ideology and Islam have been used by Muslim individuals and groups, political parties as an instrument to actualize their aims and/or enlarge their bases – and as Özek has claimed– by bourgeoisie (Özek, 1968) both in the single-party period and in the period from transition to multiparty system to nowadays.

Above, the reasons of emergence of Islamism, the way in which Islamism ideology was been shaped before and after the declaration of Republic, the visible and hidden reasons of the reactions were attempted to be summarized shortly. The reason why this part was held short can be understood better by considering the margins of the thesis and especially the fact that the real issue of this thesis is the transformation of Islamism in the period started when the Islam took place in the political arena.

3.2 The Conditions Preparing for the Revival of Islamism and the Emergence of Political Islamist Parties

In Turkey, after the transition to multiparty system until 1970s, an independent Islamist formation was not observed. Until the establishment of MNP, Islamists used to take place in center-right parties. Although between 1945-1950 many parties aiming to exist in the politics by using religion emerged, none of them became successful. The failure of these parties suggests that religion is not an important factor on its own for orienting the voters to a party. It can be claimed that people, despite their religiosity, do not wish to have a system based on Islam, seeing that Nation Party (Millet Partisi) – the most important one amongst religious parties after the transition to multiparty system – was not successful in the elections (Toprak, 1981:76). So, it is not possible to agree with the argument that Islam was politicized by means of suppression and marginalization. From this point of view, in this part of the study, the revival of Islamism and the emergence of the first political Islamist party (MNP) shall be analyzed by taking the socioeconomic and political issues into consideration. Thus, we will try to present the difference of this analysis in comparison to unilateral and superficial evaluations about the revival of Islamism.

Before the first political Islamist party was established, Islamists had taken place in the Democrat Party (DP). The 1950 elections brought about the victory of DP which used to give message to the traditionalist circles, despite its secular character. The failure of the Millet Partisi despite the whole support from the media organs of traditional-Islamist circles, as well as some implementations of DP in favor of traditional circles just after its access to power, led Islamists to turn towards to DP to a great extent. Although it was not an Islamist party, DP tolerated the Islamists. The religious orders, which used to continue their underground activities in the single-party period, started to integrate into the system in order to act more freely, benefiting from this flexibility.

Until the emergence of economic problems in the second half of 1950s, DP did not have a religious character openly (Toprak, 1981:72; Yücekök, 1971a:153). DP,

which won the 1954 elections with a great success, started to use Islam more apparently and to make new concessions when it started to lose power because of the worsening economic situation and intraparty oppositions in a few years later. Having used mostly religious mottoes in 1957 elections, it made an election alliance with the Nurcu movement. Despite this, DP could not get the support it had wanted and lost the votes. Even if the concessions made did not help DP in 1957 elections, they encouraged all of the Islamist-traditionalists powers in the country to become more active, including the ones within the party (Timur, 1969:4).

At the end of this process, the DP government was put end by the military coup. Therefore, in 1960, Turkey experienced its first military coup. However, the coup was not staged against the Islamist movement as Islamist circles claimed, and did not aim at oppressing the Islam and so on. On the contrary, the attitude of the coup leaders created a basis for the development of Islamism. Prepared after the coup, the new constitution has allowed the Islamist movement to integrate in the Turkish right since 1950, to separate itself from the liberal right and express itself independently.

The coup and what it has left behind are important for this thesis, because in Turkey military coups have led the economic models – implemented by capitalist developed countries– to become applied also in Turkey, via restructuring the state. Regarding the economic policies applied, transformations occurred in the social structure, and needless to say, these transformations affected and transformed Islamism. On the basis of the above-mentioned expressions, the constitution and attitudes of coup leaders, as well as their effects in society, will be presented below, by taking into account the economic model implemented officially by the 1960 coup.

After World War II, capitalist countries adopted Keynesian economic policies, welfare state and planned economy applications. As for Turkey which depended on the capitalist world system at that time, it passed, with 1960 military coup, from the model based on agricultural and commercial capital accumulation to the industrial capital accumulation model (Gülalp, 1993:34). The military coup formed social politics, political balance and administrative mechanism of this new capital accumulation model

(Pamuk, 1983:51). One of the very first decisions of the military government was to put officially import-substitution industrialization (ISI) model into practice and to establish the State Planning Organization (Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, DPT) (Gülalp, 1993:35). The ISI model was an inward-oriented, industry-centered and foreign-dependent model (Boratav, 1993:95-102). Since the survival of the ISI model depended on the state support, and due to structural reasons, the products produced in industry could not be sold in the foreign markets; the need of the industry for foreign exchange is met from exportation of agricultural products (Gülalp, 1993; Boratav, 1993; Keyder, 1995). While DPT sources were reallocated, government business enterprises (Kamu İktisadi Teşebbüsleri, KİT) undertook the production of intermediate goods for industry. The state, via DPT and KİTs, intervened into the economy while it supported the agricultural sector. The reason why the state supported agricultural sector is: on the one hand, the fact that it provided the industrial sector with the necessary foreign exchange, and on the other hand, that the state would have liked to prevent tension by reconciling the interests of industrial capital and landowners (Gülalp, 1993; Boratav, 1993). The role of the state in ISI model is to increase capital accumulation and enable domestic consumption in order to spread it to large masses of people (Keyder, 1995). That is why all of the segments of the society should reconcile. This reconciliation would be as follows: agricultural sector would be supported with high purchase prices. In addition, industrial sector would be financed with foreign exchange transferred from agricultural sector. Also, the wages of the working class would be kept higher, taking their demand stimulating aspects into consideration. While the wages rise as a result of the right to strike provided by the constitution, and unionization opportunities, the enlargement of domestic market will be ensured on the one hand and, and the working class will be integrated with the political system on the other hand (Gülalp, 1993; Boratav, 1993). Intellectuals and professionals of the middle classes advocate the policies implemented in this period (Gülalp, 1993: 37).

During 1960s, a rapid growth rate was caught. However, this rate resulted in external deficits due to structural reasons. Since the domestic market was not big enough,

large scale investments were not made. Since the competitive capacity in world markets was weak, exportation was not carried out at sufficiently. The insufficiency of exportation led to the unbalance of foreign payments. Therefore, the economy would turn inevitably towards export (Savran, 1987:143).

Consequently, the populist policies of the state (a form of distribution based on consensus between all classes) could not be implemented due to the class conflict as a result of economic crisis (Gülalp, 1993:44) and to discontinuity in growth rate.

It is not possible to state that the applied ISI model had positive effects on the peasantry as they empower agricultural capital. The application of this model led to social mobilization, and as a result of this, the urban poor grown. In the following years, benefiting from the opportunities provided by the political atmosphere, Islamism got organized within this mass, and this mass partially composed the base of political Islamist parties. If we clarify the subject, as a result of the economy politics (ISI) applied between 1950 and 1970 and of the mechanization in agriculture, migration from rural areas to urban areas increased. The financial aid of the USA to Turkey in the post-war period accelerated industrialization and mechanization in the agriculture. However, in industrialization, this growth could be provided with regional disparities. That is to say, between East and West, an inequality in favor of the West emerged. As a result of this, migration from rural areas to urban areas accelerated. The ones migrating to urban areas composed an important segment of the newly-emerging working class. The newcomers to the cities tried to solve their economic problems by mainly working informally and their housing problems by building slum houses. These employees, who could not be able to benefit from labor union protecting their interest, providing a sense of solidarity because of the work in grey economy, have tried to satisfy their needs through religious parishes and ecclesiastics associations based on conventional networks (Yavuz, 2008). Yücekök (1971a:132-133) stated that the economic model applied in 1960s affected socioeconomic conditions, that the dynamism occurred in the society as a result of liberties provided by 1961 constitution, as well as changing production relations, gave new social powers to the society. He also stated that in these associations, one of these

new social powers, ecclesiastics associations in which craftsmen were predominant increased rapidly between 1950 and 1968 in developed provinces. According to Yücekök's findings from his field study conducted in Turkey between 1946 and 1968 in Gölcük, Çankırı and Mardin, the religion is not composed of a single socioeconomic source. In Turkey, the religion was used as an instrument to protect the interests of dominant classes in developed regions against laborers and intellectuals who react against the system of exploitation, and in underdeveloped regions, to feed feudalism. Moreover, religion became the ideology of the oppressed classes, and the petite bourgeoisie got mobilized in order to protect its interests against the bourgeoisie under the leadership of Erbakan (Yücekök, 1971a:153-157). Yücekök's findings, which are summarized above, are important for this thesis because they should help us analyze the MG movement correctly, understand the interaction of changing socioeconomic conditions in the political sphere. However, it doesn't mean that the ones migrating to the urban areas turn directly towards Islamism. No one should forget how left fractions were dissolved and how political Islamist parties leaned towards these fractions to fill the gap arising from them and link them with Islamist associations. Islamist fractions benefited also from an environment established by the 1960 constitution to express their thoughts freely and to establish associations. Let's look now over the approach of coup leaders toward religion: the leaders of the 1960 military coup did not see religion as an enemy; on the contrary, they benefited from religion to ensure the social control. However, the Islamist-traditionalist environments considered the 27 May movement as a tool to reinstate forcefully the enemies of Islam and society and brought in a short time the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi, AP) to power, assuming it as DP (Yücekök, 1971b:96).

In the late 1960s, Islamist circles were more and more involved in politics. Although the approach to religion of the AP which claimed to be inheritor of DP – did not change significantly, religious groups within the party were liquidated. The AP as well as DP adopted politics in favor of industrialists and market. However, the fact that these policies pursued by the AP were in favor of big industrialists and traders disturbed the small- and medium-sized capital. As it will be more detailed in the next section, we

simply specify that the rise of Necmettin Erbakan on the scene was due to the fact that Süleyman Demirel prevented this people from expressing their complaints by bureaucratic ways within the party.

In summary, ISI model was officially implemented with the 1960 coup. As a result of the economic policies carried out between 1950 and 1970, migration from rural to urban areas has increased. This model was no longer applicable due to structural reasons and troubles of the capitalist system. As the balance between classes, which was based on reconciliation, deteriorated, the base of class conflicts emerged. The state was restructured. Both the attitudes of the military government and the freedom atmosphere due to the coup constitution were effective in the revival of the political Islam. These summarized developments led to the revival of Islamism and the emergence of the MG which constitutes the philosophical base of political Islamist parties. Below, this issue will be analyzed in more detail.

3.3 The Emergence of National Outlook Movement

The MG movement is usually defined by various authors in terms of its cultural aspect and opposition to Westernization. For instance, Sambur (2009:120) states that three main characteristics of MG are Islamism, nationalism and anti-Westernization. Also, Atacan (2005:189) states that MG emerging in 1970s was based on moral and spiritual values where Islam was not mentioned openly. In this study, the reasons of the changes in the discourse of MG will be presented, by arguing that MG fundamentally emerged as a view on economic and social issues, that its discourse was decorated with cultural/religious components and changed throughout time its approach to both economic and cultural issues. Also, Dağı and Mert state that the most important characteristic of the MG movement is the emphasis put on modernization and development. Dağı (2005:4-5) states that MG differentiated itself from other political movements since it was opposed to the westernization of Turkey, while Mert (2005:414)

claims that MG differs from other developmentalist views by the emphasis on the spiritual aspect of development.

What influenced the expansion and development of the Islamist thought is: the freedom atmosphere brought by the 1961 constitution, the economic model applied and its effect on the classes, reappearance of religious orders which went underground in the single-party government period, spreading of Said Nursi's writings in this period, establishment of Nur community and the attitude of the military coup government towards the religion. The views of the Nur community that was involved in the politics in DP government passed from oral form to published form. After DP, Nur and Nakşibendi religious orders supported Justice Party. The fact that their ideas were spread through printed writings and their communities were involved in politics was very effective on Islamist movement. In the following years, their mission as conveyor of Islamism continued by their support to both political parties and Islamist businessmen.

The political opening provided by the multiparty political system and developments due to the economic model implemented gave rise to new political opportunities for Islamists. The social structure was transformed, due to the acceleration of the process of capitalization, and thus to intensive industrialization and urbanization; small- and medium-scale capital was uncomfortable with the policies of AP in favor of big industrialists; the failure of ISI model, which was based on balance between classes, deteriorated the balance between classes. As a result of all these factors, some groups against the system emerged. More radical right groups separated from center-right were gathered under the roof of MNP and Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP). While right ideology was disintegrated into different groups like this, left ideology organized itself by getting away from Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP). At this point, it should be underlined that the emergence of left ideology and its discourse against capitalism had an important role in spreading Islamism and getting into action in the political sphere, because in Turkey left was perceived by bourgeoisie as an obstacle for the development of capitalism. For this reason, since 1970s, the state's desire to suppress the left and policies in this direction

contributed to the emergence of political opportunities for Islamist movements. As Özek (1982:561) stated after 1960, Islamist powers were used as an instrument to suppress leftist movements which were the new opponent of bourgeoisie. In another words, in the cold-war period, the fact that Turkey was the ally of USA, one of two superpowers (USA-USSR), and that it perceived communism as a threat and Islamist movement as an antidote for left provided political opportunities to Islamism. The Islamists, naming themselves as “*nationalist-sacredist*” before 1970s, took a stance against secularist-Westernist circles and defined their aims as demolishing CHP's “irreligiousness” policy. Since 1970s, the first target of their attacks has been left movements (Özek, 1982:561).

Being the base of political controversies between the years 1950-1960, the problems of formal freedom were replaced with concrete freedom, equality, full independence subjects. These new views and developments were dangerous and frightful for bourgeoisie, because they aimed at changing the political power on the basis of class. That’s why the targets of *nationalist-sacredist* powers’ attacks changed, reaching to an extent beyond secularist-Westernist bureaucrats. *Nationalist-sacredist* powers did not content themselves with advocating the formation of theocratic political order; they started to evaluate current problems from Islamic point of view (Özek, 1982:560-562).

Showing armed reactions in the first years of Republic, in the single-party period, Islamism went underground and carried out inward-oriented activities. However, in the DP period, Islamism went into action as a movement aiming at determining the center, and until now maintained it. It can be thought that throughout 1960's, Islamists, who used to take place in the political life by supporting AP which they perceived as successor of DP, gradually started to detach from AP and move towards an independent political movement. Supposedly, this stems from the fact that sects took especially a political structure, and that some Islamic communities wanted to act independently and not with AP. M. Zahid Kotku, leader of İskender Paşa Community which is a Nakşibendi sect, as well as the people around him, formed necessary networks in order to transform

this movement into an Islamist political party, creating thus MNP (Yalçın, 1994:52; Yavuz, 2008: 279).

At the end of this process, Islamist movements have begun to move away from being radical movement. As Yavuz stated, changes in state policies, desire of sects to direct the politics, their cooperation with the employer class, and expansion of the fields of Islamist discourse were effective in evolving Islamist movements from radicalism to a social movement (Yavuz, 2008:57).

In addition to the above-mentioned internal conjuncture, the external conjuncture also influenced Islamism. Since 1970s, the Islam conception of MG movement has started to change by translating into Turkish the books of philosophers such as Hasan el-Benna, Seyyid Kutub, Mevdudi. Influenced by these writers, Islamism turned into the public sphere, and the conception of universal Islam began to appear. The demand of carrying Islam into the public sphere and the discourse “world of Islam” were transferred into the political area by MSP (Çaha, 2005:477).

The MG movement emerging at the end of this above-summarized process took place in the political realm with the establishment of MNP. We will try to explain below the factors influencing the development and transformation of this movement, thus of politic Islamist parties, starting with the first political party representing MG.

3.4 The First Political Islamist Parties of National Outlook Movement: National Order Party and National Salvation Party

Above, it was tried to be explained the dynamics which formed MG, i.e. the rise of MG on the dynamics of the country, especially the effects of the policies applied and religious orders in the emergence of this view. Below, we will try to explain how the political Islamist parties representing MG emerged, their relations with the regime and the capitalist system, how Islamist capital and political Islamist parties feed each other, and the effect of the changing socioeconomic structure on these parties. Thus, by revealing the factors affecting political Islamist parties in 1970s and the ideological

structure of MG, we will have the opportunity to see more clearly how the discourse of MG changed in relation to domestic and foreign dynamics in the following decades.²

Changing economic conditions due to the development of capitalism in Turkey caused small traders, tradesmen, craftsmen and peasants with a small land to get into financial straits and lose their roles in the society. These segments hold Westernization and capitalist economic system as responsible for this situation. Segments badly affected by the change because of the conflict of interests between big industrials, commercial bourgeoisie and petite bourgeoisie reacted against capitalist development and the AP which was symbolizing it (Özek, 1982:564-565). In fact, in 1970's, the opposition of Islamism-traditionalism to the order of big traders and industrial bourgeoisie does not mean a revolt, but a self-protection, because, in 1960s, the process of transformation from commercial capitalism to industrial capitalism began. In this process, while the economic power of the bourgeoisie increased, the left movements which had a dialectic relationship with the development of this power developed also. For this reason, the petite bourgeoisie, feeling that its existence was in danger with this transformation and development, aimed at protecting its existence by taking place in traditionalist-Islamist political organizations (Özek, 1982:566).

The ISI model implemented in this period used to aim at increasing industrial capital accumulation. The policies were implemented with this purpose. The AP, with these policies favoring big capitalists and taking other capitalist groups under its hegemony, could not maintain its power on small capitalists due to socioeconomic changes. Small-scale companies needed state support and financial incentives in order to maintain their existence. However, AP did not make the necessary. Therefore, small capitalists started to feel the necessity of a political party that would respond to their needs. As a result of these changes in the socioeconomic structures, a disengagement from AP and a new political party became inevitable. As Özek (1968:568) stated, “this

² Shortly after the closure of MNP, founded in 1970, the MSP was established on October 11, 1972. The two parties will be evaluated together in this study, because they have the same party program and administrators.

disintegration and this reformation have an unquestionable relationship with social-economic structures.” In other words, as a result of the problems and tensions caused by capitalism and crystallization of the class distinction, MNP emerged.

The 1970s were the years when the class contradictions of petite bourgeoisie with big bourgeoisie became evident and Islamist-traditionalist political organizations took place. So, interpreting the internalization of religious parties as a recrudescence of “bigotry and obscurantist” attitudes is a non-scientific, shallow and artificial conception (Özek, 1982:566).

Like Özek, I affirm that considering the emergence of political Islamist parties as a “*recrudescence of obscurantist attitudes*” is an ahistorical, non-scientific and unrealistic approach, that political Islamist parties emerged as a result of the changes in the above-mentioned conditions, and that they have undergone a transformation since the emergence of MG up to now. MG movement should not be perceived within static molds. In other words, the political Islamist parties differentiating from MG tradition didn’t differentiate from MG as a constant invariant. So, we can analyze better the real reason of the change, as well as the relationship between the system and the parties of this movement by getting out of the frame which explains MG only by its anti-regime aspect, i.e. cultural dimension. If we take into account this point of view, we can analyze it on a realistic base by going beyond both the political Islamist parties claiming not to be the successor of MG and the political-ideological debates of the opposing parties claiming that these parties did not change.

Maybe the question that should be asked at first in order to understand the relationship of MG with the regime and capitalist system is: “Is MG movement against capitalist system?” When examining the party program of MNP, we can see that the party situates itself against communism and capitalism. In fact, even if it is supposed to be against capitalism, when its program is examined more carefully, it can be seen that MG is not against capitalism, but against monopoly capital, oligopoly markets and European Common Market. In its discourse, MG presents itself as a third way between

capitalism and communism. MG determines its position as opposing to communism which prevents individuals from having their freedoms and economic rights, and to liberalism which does not limit the capital movements and thus negatively affecting their material and spiritual development (Erbakan, 1975:149). According to this movement, the behavior norms of the human beings in the process of industrialization in Western societies are determined by economic interests. Therefore, people in these countries are materialist and individualistic. On the contrary, this movement claims that a believer person type can overcome all adverse outcomes of industrialization (Saribay, 1985:37). The economic model envisaged by MG is a private sector developed with state support, under state control and a functioning free market economy. MG parties, in their party programs, emphasize the economic development and indicate that state should take an important function in the economic area, because since there was not enough capital accumulation in this period in the country, capital accumulation was provided by the state, and the state was needed not only in the economic area, but also in many other areas. However, the fact that the state has an important role in economy does not mean that MG does not give importance to private sector and its development. On the contrary, in their party programs, they emphasize the importance of creating a widespread private sector. According to MG point of view, one should give priority to underdeveloped regions for a national, powerful, speedy and widespread industrialization within the frame of “economic order”. In order to ensure this, it is a must to adopt the principles of “Horizontal Etatism” and “Widespread Private Sector.” These concepts summarize the role of the state and private sector in economy.

“Horizontal Etatism” means that the state is playing the head role in the formation of any institution, except from being the owner of this institution in any sense. “Widespread Private Sector” is an incorporated company having at least 100 partners, and none of the partner's share is over 5%; its role is transferring the money gained via these companies to envisaged investment fields with interest-free credit funds of the state (İbrahimoglu, 1975:109-110 cited in Saribay, 1985:125).

In addition to that, while putting forth its aim of industrialization, MSP claims also that interregional inequality should be abolished, and that these companies – which would be the driving force of Anatolian economic development – belong to the nation itself, and not to the state or a minority (Erbakan, 1975:123). Examining these concepts, it is possible to claim that the solutions proposed by MG ideology at this period were in relation with the development level of capitalism. MG does not reject modernization completely; it aims Turkey's technological renovation, by making a distinction between Western culture and technology (Dağı, 2005:5).

MSP advocates the policies dedicated to protecting the class interests of petite bourgeoisie in its approach to economic issues, but it defines its attitude towards work life related to economy on a base apart from economy. MSP adopts an attitude foreseeing the full control of labor relations and work life. It proposes a work life that would be controlled not only by state but also by professional organizations and ethical groups (MSP party program). In MSP party program is defined a working class outside of world standards, whose place in relation to production tools and production process is not taken into consideration. MG parties, by adopting agricultural policies in favor of transition from traditional agriculture to modern agriculture, tried to pave the way for development of capitalism in Turkey. By realizing that modernization in agriculture will destroy the class balance in the rural area, they indicated in their programs what should be done in order to integrate people to the capitalist system (Şen, 2004:104).

In short, in this period, MG parties adopted the developmentalist policies where the development should be maintained under state control and with state incentives, aiming to integrate national market and favoring widespread private sector. In MSP's party program, ethical order was defined as the base of economic order. For this movement, there is a maximum performance in societies where people are strong in terms of moral values. So, it gives importance to education, especially to ethical education and claims that Islamist work ethic can be formed by forming believers this way. MG parties included cultural elements in their programs, emphasized the spiritual aspect of development in their discourses. In other words, when MG parties intended to

get votes from one group (religious) by the language they used and the cultural elements they highlighted, they aimed at developing capitalism with their own methods in terms of economy.

Why does MNP have this view in the subject of economy? It can be stated that the party's view on economy was determined by the stage which capitalism was in, as well as by the characteristics of the class which supported the establishment of the party and which the party has relied on. Many authors have a common point that the establishment of MNP resulted from the class tensions inside AP. The relationship between MG and small-scale capitalism can be put forth more clearly by examining the process how Necmettin Erbakan came to the point to establish MNP. When it was understood that there would not be common interests between big industrial/commercial bourgeoisie and petite bourgeoisie, the reconciliation which was achieved previously under the roof of AP ended (Alkan, 1984:97). The representatives of big industrialists, and tradesmen, as well as the owners of small- and medium-sized enterprises, began to compete in the Turkish Union of Chambers and Exchange Commodities (Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği- TOBB). The great number of small- and medium-sized business owners in the Turkish Union of Chambers facilitated the election of Erbakan as president of the union. His election as president of TOBB was protested in İstanbul and İzmir Chamber of Commerces where big bourgeoisie was effective. As a result of this, he was not recognized as president by Demirel. Even his candidacy for being a secondary candidate in parliament was vetoed. Then, Erbakan was elected as an independent candidate from Konya in 1969 general elections. Small- and medium-scale entrepreneurs of Anatolia, with the support of religious orders and under the leadership of Erbakan, mobilized their political organization and established Milli Nizam Partisi on January 26, 1970. MNP was established as a “nationalist and sacredist” party in order to protect the class interests of provincial small entrepreneurs and transform it to the masses via a religious-cultural political discourse (Bakirezer ve Demirer, 2009:20).

In short, it can be stated that behind the establishment of MNP, there is Erbakan's struggle in the name of Anatolian capital in Chamber of Commerce. Erbakan's following statements explain better the situation:

The economic mechanism operates in favor of large urban merchants, and Anatolian merchants perceive themselves as sons-in-law... Deposits are invested in the Anatolian banks by the Anatolian public; however, this money is delivered to big merchants in the form of credits. The Chamber of Commerce acts as an agent of a comprador-mason minority (Sencer, 1971:365).

In addition to that, another point to be underlined is: the shareholders of Gümüş Motor Factory which was founded in 1958 were mainly followers of Nakşibendi Sheik Kotku and representatives of the small capitalists who wished to have state incentives and support, and Erbakan was the general manager of this factory (Yalçın, 1994).

Another dimension of the relationship between this capitalist class and political Islamist parties was composed of the financial support that these capitalists gave to MNP. Yücekök (1971b:178) states that many religious associations of artisans occurred in 1960s, and that they were in a positive correlation with the level of development of the cities. He claims also that religious associations had a high amount of capital accumulation. As for Çakır (1994:22), he says that the capital accumulation of religious people in the developed cities and in rural areas where commerce and industrialization started to develop helped MNP to have a tough financial base since its establishment.

What is explained above does not mean that the base of the political Islamist parties is only composed of petite bourgeoisie, but that MNP emerged as a class-oriented party, specifying the reason behind its approach to economy. Besides petite bourgeoisie, some of the people migrating from rural to urban areas compose the base of political Islamist parties. Many authors claim that Islam provided opportunities to communication and solidarity in the squatter areas. Migration from rural to urban areas resulted in politicization of identity differences and transformations of social functions of religion. Meanwhile, religious doctrine and practices were redefined according to the urban

conditions, in order to make the city life more meaningful (Karpaz, 2003). Karpaz (2003) claims that religious youth groups taking place in political actions in 1970s were composed of the young formed in the cities, as well as of a group coming to big cities to work or study at university and reacting to bad living conditions. However, as many authors have pointed out, urbanization process in Turkey cannot be characterized as newcomers' isolation from the ones migrated to the city before. However, it can be argued that people in the squatter areas have expectations about upward mobilization. As a result of this, another effect of migration can be seen in the change of social composition of bureaucracy throughout 1970s. One indicator of this is that children of migrant families started to have positions in education institutions, central and local bureaucratic mechanisms after getting education in various domains and levels (Yavuz, 2008:122). However, if we remember how powerful were especially left fractions in 1970s in these areas, and that all of the migrants to the city were not Sunni-Muslims, it should be underlined that all people migrating to the city did not turn towards to Islamist parties. Considering the fact that Islamism was not in rise in 1970s where migration from rural to urban areas was intense and also taking into consideration that revolutionists were effective at that time, Sönmez (2008:118-119) makes the following observation: this situation shows us that Islamism was not "corollary" of neo-urbanization and that Islamism has not been a spontaneous movement. He explains the rise of Islamists by the support given to Islamists since 1980 coup, the relationship of the capital in question with the segments sharing the same views, and also by the fact that Islamist organizations filled the gap resultant from the passivity of left movements. In addition to that, while the social community and authority views of the ones migrating to the city were rooted from their rural culture, their demands for the welfare of squatter areas represent the urban and new image of the political culture of these people. This clearly shows that these people do share the view that the source of the political authority of the state is not a divine power (Karpaz, 2003:296). From this point of view, the reactions of migrants were not based usually on culture/religion as it was claimed; their demands were related to material world (unemployment, education, health etc.),

and there were reactions against these unfulfilled demands and expectations. However, these reactions were usually shown by highlighting their cultural aspects.

Within the frame of the explanations above, it is possible to say that general socioeconomic process and structural-institutional changes and their transformative effects on society were taken into consideration; it would be a more accurate approach to say that Islamism was not only a cultural reaction, but a phenomenon emerging with the historical conjuncture and a developing phenomenon. However, saying that "The base of Islamism consists of migrants to the cities and the poor masses of the cities" would not be an accurate approach, because migrants and poor masses do not have a homogenous structure. Moreover, the Islamic movement is composed not only of one segment of the poor and the migrants, but also of an elite segment from Islamist entrepreneurs and intellectuals and bureaucrats. Another subject to take into consideration is the structure of the center: the ruling class of MG usually consists of government officials, engineers, medical doctors, teachers, i.e. the members of the urban social group having a close relationship with the center (Saribay, 1985:184; Yavuz, 2008:281). Besides, at the end of 1970s, the conflict between executives and youth organizations within MNP reveals that there was a center-periphery reality within MG movement. Thus, as the representatives of MNP did not come from periphery, Islamists didn't consist of a single class. Lastly, from the economic point of view, small- and medium-scale companies were not pushed to periphery position completely. While owners of big capitals controlled the capital accumulation and distribution of products, the production of byproducts was done to a great extent with the support of small capitalists. This situation provided opportunities to the existence of various small- and middle-scale companies.

According to Modernization paradigm, Islamism expresses the reactions of the traditional and conservative minority which consists of villagers and owners of small- and medium-scale companies, in order to fight against socioeconomic conditions subject to concentration of capitalism. This theory is based on the idea that these minority groups would disappear actually with the progress in modernization. However, as it was

discussed above, historical facts show that Islamism doesn't take its support only from the reactions of these groups to socioeconomic changes. Those migrating from villages to cities redefined the Islamic values in accordance with urban conditions, and included these values into the political discourse while they were expressing their demands related to social change. Moreover, the socioeconomic status of villagers and owners of small- and middle-scale companies were defined by historical conditions of the period, i.e. they didn't constitute a social group inclined to disappear in the process of Turkey's integration with world capitalism. In addition to that, when taking into consideration the socioeconomic policy proposals of MG and their projects, it is observed that their demands for more shares within the political authority were hidden in their reactions to social changes.

Consequently, this movement itself was nourished by Turkey's modernization and integration with capitalism. When the political discourse and socioeconomic projects of MG are analyzed, it is revealed that throughout 1970s, this movement was integrated to the aim of modernizing the society. So, it does not express only the reaction of the Muslim society to modernization theories of secular elites; it advocates also the authentic way of modernization by opposing the identification of modernization with Westernization. However, when examining the programs of MG parties, we can say that they have utilized Islam to justify modernization theories rather than to create authenticity. For this reason, we can state that the authors claiming that Islamism would be unsuccessful with the deepening of modernization (Toprak, 1981; Alkan, 1984) have overlooked this characteristic of MG.

Although the objective conditions necessitating the establishment of MNP were due to the intensification of functional divisions of the Turkish society in industrialization, the press and public opinion characterized the new party and its administrators as supporters of Islam in Turkey by legal means (Sarıbay, 1985:99).

The biggest reason of characterizing MNP in this way is the political views and attitudes of the founders of the party.

This part will be finished with the question that we are concerned about. Although MSP was a party ideologically in the same line with MNP, why its establishment was not objected? Sarıbay's response to this question is as follows: 12 March coup was an experiment of the bureaucracy to re-exert its authority on the government. However, the bureaucracy at the time of MSP was not powerful enough to control the government. Therefore, nobody objected the establishment of MSP since the political atmosphere gradually calmed (Sarıbay, 1985:107-108). In addition to Sarıbay's observation, even if they were claimed to be anti-regime and then closed, MG parties were not completely pushed out of the system; they managed to maintain their existence in Turkish political life by re-established new parties. The reasons of this situation can be listed as follows: first of all, in 1970s, the state perceived the rise of the left and socialist movements as a more urgent and important danger (in terms of the interests of bourgeoisie). Moreover, it wanted to integrate radical Islamists into the system. So, during those years, the state wanted to form the moderate Islam model against both leftist powers and radical Islamists. The second reason was the approaches of those parties to capitalism. In fact, MG parties are not anti-capitalist, but they criticize Turkish capitalism for its uneven development. In reality, these parties criticize the socialist system not only for its "opposition to religion", but also for its opposition to capitalism. That's why the state tried to integrate political Islamist parties into the system. In 2000s, this process of integration was accomplished via AKP.

3.5 After Military Coup; Economic, Political and Social Transition and its Effects on National Outlook

The foreign exchange crisis emerging as a result of ISI model required the restructuration of the process of accumulation of the industrial capital (Boratav, 1993; Tünay; 2002; Keyder, 1995), and March 12 coup was the corollary of this process. In this period when the army stayed in power for two years after the coup, the political power block formed by industrial capital and big landowners cracked; the wages, as well

as the financial support given to agriculture, diminished. Thus, the monopolistic industrial capital was created by transferring resources to the large industry (Gülalp, 1993; Boratav, 1993; Keyder, 1995; Tünay, 2002.). However, the industrial capital, although dominant, could not establish its hegemony. “Gramsci drew attention to the rupture of relations between the dominant class and its political representatives, as an indicator of hegemonic crisis. In Turkey, a similar phenomenon appeared in this process”. Industrial capital, although a dominant class, had a weak position in the political power block and was under pressure of sub-classes related to power block; so it could not establish hegemony (Tünay, 2002:186). At this period, as a result of monopolization of capital, the working class, ideologically empowered, started to be perceived as a threat. As a result of this, as a justification of social unrest and anarchy, September 12 coup was staged. In fact, as Yavuz (2008) and Tünay (2002:186) also stated, economic crisis contributed to social unrest which was presented as the reason for September 12 coup. September 12 coup facilitated the application of structural adjustment programs which were necessary to pass from ISI model to export-based industrialization (Yavuz, 2008:123).

For export-oriented industrialization models, it was necessary for the state to be restructured. In Turkey, this reconstruction was put into practice under the name of "structural adjustment programs" thanks to January 24 decisions. January 24 decisions are composed of the components of IMF's stabilization program and World Bank's structural adjustment program. As stated previously, it is not possible to determine economic policies and political transitions in Turkey –which was attached to the center/developed capitalist countries as a periphery/developing country – only by internal factors. Therefore, the crisis which developed capitalist countries fell into and the economic model they applied to recover from the crisis and the new-right philosophy legitimizing this were transformed to underdeveloped countries via IMF and World Bank (Boratav, 2005: 82). While neo-liberal policies were put into practice via military coup, the coup administration undertook the missions of preparing the constitution and shaping the new political life.

In short, this transition period was carried out by the state in three steps. First of all, January 24 decisions were taken. Secondly, the military coup was staged in order to put these decisions into practice. And thirdly, Turkish-Islam synthesis of the Heart of Intellectuals (Aydınlar Ocağı) was introduced as the official ideology.

As it is indicated above, because AP moved away from representing the interests of petite bourgeoisie, disintegration within the right started, and MSP and MHP were established as the representatives of this disintegration within the political sphere. Taking into consideration revolutionist movements and CHP with its new social-democrat tendency, the idea that there would be a weakness as a result of the disintegration in the right and that this would lead to the danger of communism gave rise to the establishment of Aydınlar Ocağı. Established in 1970, it aimed at forming the ideological unity of the right. (Bora & Can, 2000:151-152). At this period, close relationships were formed between Nakşibendi religious order, Aydınlar Ocağı and Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, ANAP). Therefore, it can be argued that Islamists took place in the government and in the formation of new order at ideological level because of the regulations on Political Parties Law, in spite of not having place in political sphere. Turkish-Islamic synthesis, which was brought up by Aydınlar Ocağı, became the official ideology of that period, articulating Islam to the official ideology (Bora & Can, 2000). With September 12 Coup, a new policy was adopted in order to Islamize society from top to bottom by injecting Turkish-Islamic synthesis (Çakır, 1998:12). Military government paved the way for Islam as an ideology against the left, and with this strategy, aimed to destroy the left ideology which it perceived as the only reason for opposition to capitalism.

Shortly, it can be stated that the coup, in order to serve the monopolist bourgeoisie class, put January 24 orders into practice, prepared the constitution to restructure the state, Islamized the society in a controlled way; thus, with this strategy, it liquidated both organizationally and ideologically the left opposition which threatens the bourgeoisie.

The ANAP government, which came to power after Military Coup government prepared the required conditions to put liberal policies into practice, started to implement these policies. What's important in this study is how the process affected Islamism. That's why it's necessary to examine more closely changes in the political, economic, ideological and social spheres during the ruling period of ANAP.

As it is stated before, in order to overcome the hegemony crisis in 1970s, ANAP gathered the disintegrated right together. So, it included in its cabinet old MHP members and Islamists. Thus, these groups were articulated to the political power bloc in conformity with the new conditions. Moreover, Islamic capital accumulation was insured by articulating, to the market, religious orders like Nakşibendi and Nurcu which took part in the establishment of the Party. Islamic capital was accumulated through exportation to Gulf countries as a foreign market, investments made to these countries and the entrance of Arabic capital to Turkey via banking. The relations of Nakşibendi with the Gulf countries played an important role in the increase of exportation of Turkey to Gulf countries and in the provision of petroleum needs (Ayata, 1996: 45). In Turkey, religious orders, in their relations with the state before 1980, acted with a protectionist and reconciliatory attitude. After transition to multi-party system, they were in close relations with the political power. In the relations between religious orders and the state after September 12 Coup, a qualitative change occurred. Although the religious orders in close relations with the parties were closed by the military coup, the religious orders supported the coup (Çakır, 2002:99). Although this can be perceived as a contradiction at first glance, one should claim that the reason of this support by the religious orders might be related to the fact that left/communism – which religious orders qualified as “irreligiousness” – was knocked down by the military coup.

It is also mentioned that religious orders were represented also in the government during ANAP period. In this period, as stated before, the capital accumulation of religious orders increased. With this increasing capital, educative activities were fortified and increased by establishing private foundation schools, and the spreading of Islamism at ideological level was tried to be legitimized by forming Islamist media. In

this period, Islamist entrepreneurs were created and empowered through the support to entrepreneurship. And new Islamist entrepreneurs supported in turn the development of Islamism/ political Islam.

In order to establish well this new order began in the ANAP period, i.e. to legitimize liberal economy policies, it was necessary to transform the society. “Creation of a new hegemony means transformation of old ideological domain and creation of a new world view” (Tünay, 2002:181). This social transformation is tried to be done by criticizing the old. The criticism of the old is made through state-civil society opposition, by giving prominence to civil society. For this, first of all, a definition of civil society is made. According to this definition, the outside area of the state is called civil society, and state is perceived as a suppression instrument while civil society is perceived as the domain of economic progress and democracy. In this approach where everything is evaluated according to market, success and failure are attributed to the individual. An individual, who is talented and entrepreneur, is successful. With this approach, the inequality within the society is disguised. Social relations, where a distinction is made between economic field and political sphere as a result of capitalism, take different appearances accordingly. Being defined as a domain without state intervention, self-governing and outside of the state, the market is considered as identical to civil society. Similarly, since the religion also is a domain outside of the state, religious orders are perceived as organizations composing civil society where no one should intervene. Shortly, market and religion (religious orders) are defined as non-state domains which compose the civil society. As stated before, proceeding by concepts such as state-civil society opposition, center-periphery opposition doesn't allow a healthy analysis, since the conceptualization is problematic in itself. That is, as it is claimed, state and civil society are not independent and separate domains.

While regulating its relationships with the society, the state chose the way of revitalizing and popularizing Islam. Revitalization/legitimization of Islam was done over the criticism of the past by ideologists of the neo-liberal order. While, on the one hand, the political/ideological dimension of Islam was revitalized through the criticism of the

past, on the other hand, sects were transformed into an economic, political, ideological and organizational power, by articulating liberalism and Islamism to each other. When talking about politicized Islam in this period, we should open a parenthesis and underline the following point: republican revolutions did not politicize Islam as it was claimed; on the contrary, they intended to prevent the politicization of Islam. They tried to eliminate the power of the religion in the political sphere according to the universal principle of governance of the nation. Islam religion and sects were deperated by the secularization project from the public-political sphere and restricted to the area of individual conscience³. This also means the prevention of religion coming to power with politicization.

The articulation of liberalism and Islamism at the ideological level took was carried out by: criticisms of the old by the Islamist/rightist intellectuals, the attempts of establishing similarities between Islam and liberalism, and supports of liberal leftist intellectuals. Criticism of the old was done by some assertions and reasoning. One of the assertions is: the republican regime distanced people from Islam. The second one is: as a result of the statist economic policies applied, people trusted in the state. These assertions led to the following reasoning: if people were not distanced from Islam, they would believe in God and not in state to protect its Muslimism. Moreover, if etatist policies were not implemented, people would be consisted of entrepreneurs and responsible individuals trusting in themselves instead of the state (Özgüden, 2007:73). It is not possible to consider these claims as a healthy and scientific approach since they do not take the conditions of the period into consideration, i.e. analyzed the republican revolutions with an ahistorical approach, by isolating them from the process of formation of nation-states, from the universal principles of nation-states and from domestic and foreign political power balances.

Secondly, an attempted was made to present the similarities between Islam and liberalism, even to prove that Islam was a liberal religion. For instance, according to

³ For more detailed information on this issue see; Niyazi Berkes (2010). “Türkiye’de Çağdaşlaşma”
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Berzeg, "In Islam, property acquisition is appropriate, heritage is halal (permissible). Islam encourages Muslims to work, to earn, to be wealthy and to save money. The aspect of liberalism related to property ownership reconciles with Islam. According to Islamic belief, "Nine-tenths of livelihood is provided by trade". This means that Islam is consistent with the free market principle of liberalism, which consists of the right to contract and the freedom of enterprise. All human beings are equal before Allah. And this means that Islam does not create a differentiation within society. Another consistency with liberalism and Islam is observed within the principle of "equality before the law" (Berzeg, 2000: 31).

In this process, intellectuals liberalized Islam by integrating it to the market. By ignoring some emphasizes of Islam on social justice and equality, neo-rightist intellectuals interpreted Islam as consistent with liberalism. It can be said that in 1990s, especially the founding president of the Association of Independent Businessman (MÜSİAD) Erol Yazar, like Berzeg, tried to prove that Islam was a liberal religion in it discourses. By 2010s, Islam and liberalism were identified with each other. However, the HAS Party, established in 2010, entered the political scene by emphasizing the ignored aspects of Islam and tried to reach both Islamist groups and poor masses with this discourse. In the fourth part of this study, the party's approach to liberalism will be explained more clearly with the emphasis put on HAS Party.

Lastly, the support given by liberal leftist intellectuals to right ideology facilitated the articulation of Islam to liberalism. Özgüden explains how this point of support was reached as follows: after September 12, the socialist left turned towards organizations – that can be named as new social movements – such as greens, homosexuals etc., which weakened its revolutionary approach. In addition to that, it tended to interpret democracy as disconnected from its class content, by reducing the concept of democracy to cultural pluralism concept as liberals perceived. In this period, since the left disassociated democracy from its class nature, i.e. left aside social justice, equal distribution of income, the approach of organized struggle of the workers class, it can be said that it came to a point that it couldn't object to free market which is the

source of inequality. The liberal left focused on the concept of identity instead of the concept of class (Özgüden, 2007:89-90). The liberal left, with this approach, reformulated social and class differences and inequalities as the form of cultural pluralism. Within this frame, the liberal left, as Mert suggested, supported the new right in orienting these conflicts to cultural conflicts in order to suppress class tensions (Özgüden, 2007:147).

Not only internal dynamics but also developments outside Turkey have been effective in the development of Islamist intellectuals, and generally of the right ideology. In Turkey, as stated before, radical Islamists were mobilized in order to prevent the treat of communism, as a result of the agreement between USA and the state. In this period, benefiting from the atmosphere provided by the new order, political Islamists intellectuals managed to voice their views easily and loudly. Moreover, the process of returning to religion throughout the world led Islamists in Turkey to express themselves more comfortably and more confidently. The post-modern discourse contributed a lot to this process of expression. In any case, transition to post-modernism – in the economic domain with post-Fordism discourses and in the cultural domain with post-modern discourses – enabled the development of Islamism.

The rise of Islam is not limited to Turkey. In Islamic countries, the wide increase of poverty with globalization was effective in the rise of Islamism. Globalization increased the economic exploitation of these countries and, at the same time, led to the transition of Western culture and values. In order to stand against the exploitation and impositions of the West, the people in these countries resorted to Islam. On the other side, the spread of communication networks via technological advances and communication facilities enabled Islamist ideas to spread and to provide solidarity network. Another factor in the rise of Islamism is 1979 Iranian revolution. This revolution influenced Islamists in Turkey, as well as in other Islam countries.

In summary, while economic restructuring in Turkey contributed to the rise of Islamist entrepreneurs, sects found opportunities for growth by taking place politically in the government, economically in the market and socially in the social sphere, being

regarded as a civil society organization. And Islam occurred as a component of national unity via Turkish-Islamic synthesis. That is, the economy and cultural policies of the state promoted Islamist actors as an important politic and economic actor. From this point of view, it is possible to state as follows: deepening and expansion of capitalism geographically, its influence on social relations does not cause the decline of religion; on the contrary, religion has an important function in acquiring new markets through globalization of capitalism. Also the easiness and enlargement of communication network – another pillar of globalization – have been effective in financing Islamic entrepreneurs and revitalizing Islamism. Lastly, the project of the military coup for annihilating the left and the disintegration of the left led to the rise of political Islam.

After the abandonment, in 1980, of the concept of welfare state which was put into practice partially from World War II to 1980s, the emphasis was put on the minimal state and the widening free market; then, the concept of welfare state was strongly criticized. But, what is interesting is that the RP grew by carrying out some functions of the “welfare state” collapsed in 1980s via religious orders and associations (Gülalp, 2003:55). The situation of political Islam in 1990s in Turkey will be presented below by analyzing the rise of the RP.

3.6 The Rise of Political Islam: Welfare Party Period

The RP was established in 1983 as the successor of MSP. But, the RP could enter only to 1984 local elections since the military government of September 12 forbidden its entrance to general elections. Although it got 4.4% of the votes in these elections, it constantly increased its vote rate in the subsequent elections. In 1995 general elections, it got the biggest vote rate with 21.4 %. At this point, this question should be answered: What are the dynamics which led to the rise of RP?

The enlargement of the social base of RP should be dealt with in relation to historical conjuncture. As the party itself and some authors claim, dealing with RP as the

party of civil society/periphery against center/state means not taking the conjuncture into consideration; as Güllalp states, since center-periphery conceptualization is problematic in itself, it is insufficient in explaining why Islamism has become stronger in the last years. Moreover, taking into consideration the rise of Islamism by reducing the periphery to professional middle class according to the thesis of opposing elites would mean not taking into consideration other classes, which would be also a deficient approach in defining the rise of political Islam (Güllalp, 2003: 43).

The rise of RP can be analyzed by examining internal and external dynamics. Internal dynamics will be categorized under the headings: situation of other political parties and movements in Turkey, differences between the discourse and the strategies of RP and social effects of neo-liberal economy policies. External dynamics will be gathered under the headings of globalization, technological progress, postmodern discourse, the rise of Islamism in other Islam countries and international developments. Thus, we will try to show how these factors contribute to the rise of political Islam/the RP, and how internal dynamics are affected by the external dynamics.

When examining Turkish politics in 1990s, one should observe the following scene: a disintegrated center-right, and political parties in legitimation crisis. As mentioned previously, in 1970s, Islamists got the opportunity to take part in the political domain as government partners; even they did not exist as a political party in 1980s, they took ideologically part in government. Moreover, both in 1970s and 1980s, according to the state's political-cultural strategy, Islam/Islamism was supported as a power/precaution against the left, since it was perceived as a social unifier. It can be said that the basic reason behind this support is the desire of creating an atmosphere where new economy policies can be applied. At this point, it should be especially emphasized that, in this period, Islamists were neither in a passive situation nor used by others. On the contrary, they took advantage of the process, taking part both in government and economy. That Islamists gave their supports to ANAP at this period might be an indicator that they benefited from the government and the economic opportunities of ANAP, although RP took part in the political sphere in 1983. However, in the last

quarter of 1980s, the popularity of ANAP and Özal started to decrease under the effects of the decrease in wages and increase in poverty and so on. Being the leader of the party after Özal's election to Presidency of the Republic, Mesut Yılmaz didn't stand at an equal distance to all fractions within the party and adopted an attitude in favor of big businessmen, which increased conflicts within the party. As ANAP didn't get a successful result in 1987 and 1991 elections, the party started to disintegrate into groups like Islamists, nationalists and liberals. At this point, I think that this metaphor of Bora is very relevant: he states that the Turkish right consists of nationalism, conservatism and Islamism, and that these should be understood as "states of matter" rather than positions. He interprets these trios as forms convertible to each other. Nationalism is the "solid state" of the Turkish right, while Islamism is its "liquid state", being able to change containers and take the form of the container which contains it. And Conservatism is the "gas state" of the Turkish right, as a form of spiritual state, perception and way of thinking (Bora, 1999: 8). Thanks to Bora's definition, we can understand better how and why the Turkish right has united in some periods and separated in some others in Turkey. In other words, according to the conditions, these three tendencies either united to constitute the center-right or disunited to take different appearances such as Nationalism, Islamism and Conservatism, due to their interchangeability and the uncertainty of the border between them. This argument can be well illustrated by either the transitions between AP, MHP and MSP or their integration in the period of ANAP and their disintegration in 1990s.

Consequently, the disintegration of the center-right led the Islamist wing within the ANAP to show tendency to the RP. There are other reasons behind the inclination of the masses toward the RP which emerged with the "Just Order" (Adil Düzen) discourse: the parties representing right and left had almost the same approach about economic and social subjects; the parties in question didn't sufficiently deal with the increased unemployment, poverty and corruption; the main subjects of the discourse of the center-left were laicism and anti-laicism; and it voiced only the concerns of the secular middle class, neglecting the problems of the lower classes of the society.

We stated that one of the internal factors causing the rise of the RP was the difference its discourse and strategy. The emergence of the RP with the discourse of Just Order is very meaningful in an atmosphere where the political parties failed to find solutions for deteriorated income distribution and increased corruption. The notion of Just Order emphasized the unequal/unjust aspects of the system on the one hand, but on the other hand it made a religious connotation. So, it can be said that this notion has affected the expansion of the party's base by addressing the sensitivity of different parts of the society. In fact, Just Order discourse was a discourse unclear and discrepant (Kongar, 2006:270; Çınar, 1994). For instance, with Just Order discourse, they defended on the one hand the market economy (capitalism), and on the other hand they were against interest. The attitudes adopted by the ruling party and opposition parties, the reactions they caused as a result of their policies, and the approaches of the RP criticizing the system and all political parties led the voters to adopt the Just Order discourse, in spite of its ambiguities and contradictions (Kongar, 2006:270). Also, Mert (2005:417) says that the Just Order discourse was effective in the rise of Islamism in this period, and that the emergence of the just order discourse was largely due to the great defeat of the left with the coup of 1980, to the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and to the crisis in the center-right. Moreover, the RP changed its strategy and started to target all segments of the society. Within this frame, the concepts it used in its discourse were more universal concepts (such as human rights, discrimination and so on) than the ones used by the first MG parties. That is, they dealt with religious belief and identity issues with universal concepts, without making a distinction between secular and anti-secular. However, unlike 1993 RP congress, Erbakan didn't refer to Just Order discourse in 1996 congress, but instead of that, stated that the RP was the real follower of Atatürk, and claimed that it was candidate to fill the gap resulting from Özal's death. That is, the RP was getting ready to take place at the center.

According to many authors, RP is the successor of MSP. According to Güllalp, this continuation was mainly observed in the target towards ethical order. However, the RP's attitude towards industrialization, protection of national economy and activities of

the state in the economic domain was different than that of the previous MG parties. As stated previously, the importance of spiritual and moral education was emphasized in the MSP program. Similarly, that's what was stressed in the RP's Just Order discourse. In fact, while MSP in 1970s attached great importance to establish a "heavy industry" under the leadership of the state, RP didn't mention the heavy industry at all during its period. While MSP consistently mentioned the state intervention, RP emphasized the private enterprise. While MSP advocated the protection of the domestic market, RP stressed the importance of taking part in the international market (Gülalp, 2003: 63-64). Even Erbakan underlined that the RP was really a private sector party and indicated that the state should withdraw from all economic activities, and deal only with infrastructure services and security issues (Erbakan, 1991:69). What was opposed in the programs of both parties was monopolist capitalism. Neither of them opposed private property or making profits. When the RP's program is examined, it can be seen that its approach to economy is generally similar to the first two parties of MG, but it started to change while not expressed to the masses. While the changes in the RP's attitude towards economy were seen in the 4th Great Congress of RP, they could only take place in the program of FP (Şen, 2004:58-70). The RP's emphasis on its being the only private-sectorist party is an indicator that it was affected by neo-liberal ideology.

It can be claimed that the discourses of MG parties have changed according to current conditions and economic policies implemented: With Just Order discourse, Erbakan's pre-1980 state concept changed. Erbakan's pre-1980 state concept was a concept which undertook and led great industrial investments, in compliance with the prevailing conditions of capital accumulation. After 1980, Erbakan introduced a state concept using the opportunities of the state to meet the needs of private enterprise, and regulating the market. This concept is consistent with the demands of the capital which entered the accumulation process outward as a requirement of neoliberal policies (Akpınar &Arman, 2011).

When the subject is examined at the ideological level, it is possible to say that there was an atmosphere where these criticisms in the RP period were voiced with more

confidence, could be reached and accepted more easily by a lot of people, although the criticisms of RP and previous MG parties towards Kemalism were the same. The factors which contributed to this atmosphere are as follows: the advantages provided by globalization (fast and wide communication opportunities due to technological progress), the importance given by the postmodernist discourse to the issue of multiculturalism, the emergence of the civil societism approach in Turkey, the opportunities provided by the new order after 1980, and the developments in other Islam countries. Naturally, it can be said that this atmosphere was in favor of RP.

The application of neo-liberal economy policies caused changes in the social structure. The class base of the RP changed and enlarged. In other words, the class base of the RP consisted not only of the petite bourgeoisie of small Anatolian cities, but also of university youth, people from professional middle class, workers and poor people who migrated to big cities, but could only work in informal sectors. Moreover, a segment which cannot be defined with its class position – some of the Kurdish people – also supported the RP (Gülalp, 2003:72).

Why did these segments move towards the RP? Seeing that migration and poverty problems existed before, and that workers and poor people supported mainly left parties especially in 1970s, it would be partially wrong to claim that the ones migrating to the cities resorted to religion, because of the alienation they experienced there, and of the newcomers' reproducing the rural life in the urban area (Gülalp,2003:71). The RP's attracting the urban poor can be explained partially by the same role it played as the left did in 1970s (Gülalp, 2003:72; Sönmez, 2008:118-119). Moreover, when taking into consideration that the demands of the newcomers to the cities were mainly related to the economic domain rather than the cultural one, and that they underwent an upward movement instead of being a closed static group, one should see that the explanations given above are not sufficient. On the other hand, the fact that some educated people living in the city and informed about modern technology – different from the Islamists who are previously claimed to be consisted of poor and uneducated people advocating a traditional way of life – supported the RP was not perceived as meaningful by some

parts of the society. However, seeing that Islamists have been benefiting from the state's support to entrepreneurship since 1980s, that they became a notable actor of the new middle class growing in number and in terms of business scale, that the education level of Islamist youth increased through the foundations and private schools since 1980s, and that the first people who migrated to the city attached more and more importance to the education of their children, it is an understandable situation that a middle class people and Islamic segment – educated, closely interested in the world-wide developments and emerged in the 1990s – supported the RP. Moreover, Mohammed Salih (2009:211) suggests that, in the mid-1990s, the Islamist movement got a mass support by creating an alternative world. He argues that this alternative world was organized in accordance with Islamic lifestyle, and created through establishing aid organizations, associations, foundations, domestic and foreign companies, and newspapers.

The interesting conclusion to be deduced from the explanations above is that the RP was supported by both the winners and the losers. Professionals and Islamist entrepreneurs forming the new middle class represent the winner group, taking advantage of opportunities provided by globalization, as well as by new political, economic and ideological atmosphere established in Turkey after 1980; workers, people from lower classes, the ones who had to migrate to the city represent the loser group, being harmed by the implementation of new economy policies. In fact, it's understandable why the losers opposed the system and they turned towards the RP which claimed to be opponent of the regime and presented an alternative world, under the pretext that other available political parties represented this system and were already given a chance and didn't have a different discourse from each other; but, how can the support given to the RP by the winners by opposing the present system be explained?

The New Islamist bourgeoisie had the opportunity to increase their capital accumulation and develop the scales of their companies with the advantages provided by new production modes and incentives allocated in the Özal period. New Islamist entrepreneurs had a different structure than traditional petite bourgeoisie in terms of relations with politics and political parties; they were also more educated and followed

developments in the world. Anatolian bourgeoisie, one of the winning groups, did not have an independent economic organization before they established MÜSİAD. It is argued that different factors were effective in the establishment of MÜSİAD in 1990: first of all, the development of Islamist companies both in number and scale enabled the establishment of such an organization; secondly, Islamist entrepreneurs were aware of the advantages of the close relationship between the capital and the government in Turkey, but felt upset by the close relationship of Association of Turkish Industrialists and Businessman (TÜSİAD) with the state; Lastly, not only economical and sociopolitical factors but also cultural and religious factors contributed effectively to the establishment of MÜSİAD and the formation of its identity (Özdemir, 2006:74). The interesting point for this study is that members of MÜSİAD were aware of the advantages provided by the close relations between the capital and governments. Thus, it is possible to state that MÜSİAD supported an Islamist party in order to form a relation exactly similar to the one between TÜSİAD and the state. However, while MÜSİAD supported the RP on the one hand, on the other hand it found it inadequate in terms of economy, and tried to change it. Businessmen of MÜSİAD considered the Just Order approach of the RP as unacceptable since it was not in accordance with the facts of modern economies (Özdemir, 2006:117). At the end, MÜSİAD, similar to Western bourgeoisie, established its own party (AKP).

Let's touch lastly and briefly on the issue of Kurds as an internal dynamics. As mentioned above, Kurds are another segment which constitutes the RP's growing social base. It can be stated that the RP's presenting Islam as an identity over Turkish and Kurdish identities and a component unifying them, the dissatisfaction resulting from the state's approach to Kurdish issue and its insufficiency to solve it were affective in the RP's getting some Kurdish votes.

The external factors effective in the rise of political Islam in the world and in Turkey are generally presented as the collapse of the materialist world with the end of cold war, and the return to religion throughout the world. In this study, however, the external factors affecting the rise of political Islam/the RP will be explained beyond

these generalizations and not simply over the results, but by examining its reasons in relation to the neoliberal hegemony the capitalist system tried to form. In 1980s, there was a world-wide transition from Fordism to post-Fordism. This change in the mode of production has been effective in the differentiation of the RP's social base, enabling indirectly the development of small-scale companies. Let's develop the issue a little more to express better what we mean. Fordist production is done with inflexible assembly line technology and in large scales. That is, it's question of mass production and mass consumption in Fordism. State functions as welfare state, and reconciles the interests of all classes. Therefore, the development in economy is enabled as such. However, in post-Fordism, it's question of flexible production. One of the most important forms of this flexible production is contract manufacturing, i.e. having subcontractors make the production. Thus, the opportunity for unionization disappears and work conditions, wages, security and similar issues as a whole are determined only by the employers, since there is no union pressure. This enables low wage, flexible (long) working hours and use of child labor. Thus, since small-scale industrialists could work in flexible production mode which didn't have strict rules, they found the opportunity to develop and increase in number. In addition to that, the implementation of neo-liberal economy policies required diminishing the power of the nation-state, and the state fell into such a situation that it couldn't implement social state policies. As a result, the weakening of worker class politics, the increase in the number of small companies, and the insufficiency of the state to perform its social functions were in favor of the political Islam in Turkey; these functions were undertook by associations and religious orders. After 1980s, with the effect of globalization, nation-states started to decline. This situation continued in 1990s. The weakening of the nation-states caused the emergence of two opposite-seeming tendencies: subnational (ethnic) separatist movements and supranational-based (religion) movements (Gülalp, 2003:44). Exactly at this point, it is possible to state that, globalization and postmodernist discourse had big effects on the internal dynamics. The new order wanted to be built in order to recover from the economic crisis in which the capitalist system dropped was applied via these three

factors: first of all, neo-liberal economy policies started to spread throughout the world via globalization; secondly, the progress in technology facilitated worldwide finance movements, trade, production of goods in underdeveloped countries, and made possible the creation of widespread communication networks. While these developments facilitated the economic activities of the international companies, growing communication networks provided Islamists with solidarity and communication possibilities. Lastly, the ideology of the new order was legitimized by being spread to the world via ideologists. Moreover, the postmodern discourse which became widespread at this era, in spite of being against modernism, helped the capitalism arisen from modernism to recover from the crisis in which it dropped via its discourse on difference and multipartiteness. That is, the post-modernist discourse advocating both the variety in the mode of production and cultural differences helped capitalism to recover from the crisis in which it had dropped. In the cultural domain, the emphasize put on the importance of knowing different cultures had a positive effect on the spread and approval of Islamism as a cultural movement. Dağı (2005) states also that the RP's victory in elections was due partially to some international developments which he explains as follows: the rejection of Turkey's application for full membership to EU in 1989 led almost all segments of the society to the idea that it was especially due to religious and cultural reasons. With the end of cold war, the idea that in this period the war would be between Islam and the West emerged. Samuel Huntington's book named "The clash of civilizations" caused this idea to spread, and what Muslims experienced in Bosnia and Azerbaijan in 1990s, as well as the West's reaction against this situation, reinforced this idea.

Generally, observations and criticisms related to this process and MG can be summarized as follows: since the first years when MG first emerged, it has defended the ISI model. It supported an economy under state control. Later, with the implementation of liberal economy policies, MG adopted free market economy as a model. This change can be observed in the party programs of the parties representing MG. The implemented economic models involved the restructuring of the state and the creation of social

organizations suitable to that. Generally, it is possible to state that there has been a change in MG's concept of capitalism. Starting to advocate a more developed capitalist model in time, MG tried to redefine at the same time its relations with big capital and bureaucracy, and to organize its relations with different classes and layers of society. These reasons enable to evaluate MG as a movement aiming to integrate masses into the system via its parties, and trying to enlarge the domain of capitalism.

The relations between state and Islamists can be summarized as follows: first of all, rather than referring to an exclusionist strategy of the secular center towards political Islam/Islamists, it should not be ignored that the elites of Islamist movements also have close relations with the center. Secondly, when Turkish history is considered, it can be observed that the state's attitude toward Islamists was in dilemma. Despite being closed frequently, political Islamist parties were again and again reestablished, and the state frequently tolerated Islamist politics in order to have social control. However, in the situations where the political Islamist parties did/could not remove the obstacles in front of the capitalist class way, i.e. in situations where political Islamist parties didn't implement policies suitable to big capital interests, it is possible to observe a tension between them. And the February 28 period emerged a result of this situation. Şen (1998:19) asserts that the economic policies implemented after September 12 were generally backed by the capitalist class, but that they also created the base of the conflicts between big capitalists and the Islamist capital which was supported during the Özal period and strengthened in the RP government period. He argues that what led to February 28 was in fact a conflict within the capital classes, that masses were included in the process of establishing the hierarchy within the capital class, that tensions emerged under either cultural or political-ideological aspects, and that the class dimension of the conflict was ignored in assertions.

3.7 The Last Party Representing National Outlook: Felicity Party

On 28 February, 1997, National Security Council (MGK) published an ultimatum which advised Refah-Yol government about the measures that should be taken. The impossibility of toppling RP government by a military coup was due to the fact that 1982 Constitution institutionalized MGK as a permanent organ of state which arranged government affairs (Gülalp, 2003:83). As it was tried to be expressed above, we started to observe important changes in the RP's discourse during Refah-Yol government period. As Çakır stated, RP and MG movement lost their discourses, especially with Refah-Yol process. Therefore, the most important problem for a new party that would be established after the RP's closure was whether it would restrain itself to a certain group as in MSP period or would define itself in the center, i.e. whether it would present a specific ideological stand or develop strategies to transform itself into a mass party. That is, the RP could not be a center-right party and seem as Islamist at the same time. As Tanıl Bora stated, "It couldn't and can't become an ideological mass party" (Çakır, 1998:13). As the events developed in the subsequent process proved, the FP introduced itself as a centralist party. Before the RP was closed, Erbakan had İsmail Alptekin establish the FP. When the RP was closed on January 1998, Erbakan and some of the managers of the party were banned from politics for five years. Most of the members of the RP were transferred to FP. In the first congress, Recai Kutan was elected to its presidency; in his first interview, he stated that the FP was different from the RP and that the primary aim of the party was not to establish "Just Order" but promote the development of democracy, human rights and political freedoms in the country. Unlike MSP and the RP, FP took a positive stance toward EU and USA (Gérard Groc, 2000 cited in Atacan, 2005:188).

Even if FP claimed that it was not the successor of the RP, the votes of the FP which was composed of the same cadre decreased. The reasons can be listed as follows: one of the reasons behind the rise of RP was the RP's presenting itself as an alternative to center politics. However, FP had to introduce itself as a centrist party because of the

conditions which it was in. Since 1987 elections, center parties have started to lose their popularities in the eyes of the public; MHP had an electoral campaign focusing on Islamic issues; Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti, DSP) started to show nationalist tendencies, not claiming to have the heritage of CHP. Because of these factors, more marginal parties (MHP and DSP) got higher votes than the FP which defined itself as in the center (Gülalp, 2003:86). Another reason for FP's loss of votes was the opinions of the voters that the chance to form government would not be given to a political Islamist party in Turkey. In any case, the fact that FP's vote rates in municipality elections were close to the RP's was an indicator of this. On the other side, constant closures of political Islamist parties resulted in demoralization of both political actors and party activists, and decreased house visits which used to be done intensely in the RP period, and the ties started to weaken. In addition to these, it can be said that FP didn't get an impact in the political and social sphere for these reasons: FP's cautious behaviors with the effect of February 28 period, its instability, the non-closure of the party and impossibility for Erbakan to do politics out of legal initiatives dedicated to lifting prohibitions for him, its reconciliatory efforts and inability to establish a bond with society, impossibility to prevent the division within the party (Çınar, 2005:103). The division within the party started with the splinter movement before 1999 elections, and came out as a traditionalist-reformist movement. There were two tendencies in terms of class politics within the movement. The first tendency (traditionalists) was advocating a corporatist project aiming to protect petit bourgeoisie and a social aid and solidarity to protect the poor. The second tendency (reformists), on the other hand, was supported by MÜSİAD, a growing Islamic capital class, i.e. it advocated the principle of globalization and free market (Bakırezer&Demirer, 2009:21).

After the closure of FP in 2001, in the same year, traditionalists established the SP and reformists established the AKP. In order to differentiate their political identities from AKP saying "We've changed", traditionalists tried to present their political identities with the "We haven't changed" discourse (Çınar, 2005:105). If the subject is dealt with from this point, i.e. from the concept of change, the subject of change was a

concept emphasized/discussed by SP and AKP, as well as by other political parties and public opinion. While the public opinion mostly perceived SP as a party of MG, it didn't reach to an agreement about AKP. For other political parties, especially for CHP, SP was a MG party. However AKP, despite being a MG party, was hiding this identity. In fact, it is not an accurate approach to define party positions with the statements like "we've changed" and "we haven't changed". In addition, when the concept of "change" is discussed, the most important problem is taking MG as a whole stable and unchangeable. When analyzing above the political Islamist parties, we tried to present how and why MG movement/Islamism has changed since its emergence, in relation with the socioeconomic and political atmosphere. That is, we tried to show that MG didn't have a constant/ stable structure. It is possible to see the change of MG by examining the party programs, discourse and strategies of the political Islamist parties representing MG. However, when mentioning the change of MG, this point should be underlined: the change in the approaches of MG parties to economic issues was advocating the passage from primitive capitalism to advanced capitalism. Since MG has never opposed capitalism in any time, it can be mentioned that the criticisms were directed only to its monopolist structure, and that its approach to economic issues changed depending on the conjuncture. "MNP, MSP and RP have advocated a state-oriented, protectionist and planned economic model, due to relatively-weak capital accumulation in Turkey (Şen, 2004:373). At this period, MG highlighted traditionalism by forming its discourse consistent with this; although it evaluated the segment continuing the traditional mode of production and social relations as an element of power in order to protect its political position in the political sphere, it advocated the improvement of capitalism in the economic field and didn't clash with the system (Şen, 2004:376). That is, the MG parties, which didn't clash with the system thanks to their views in the economic field, clashed with the system by their discourse in the cultural sphere. The RP didn't have the adequate facilities for the implementation of the capital accumulation model changed in 1980 and was unable to meet fully the needs of the segments called Islamic capital. It can be said that the RP's free market discourses were absent in the party program, even

if they were stated in the RP's 4th Major Congress. Free market economy took place firstly in the program of FP, and then in those of SP and AKP (Şen, 2004: 70-71).

As explained above, both internal and external dynamics resulted in transition to the accumulation model called as export-oriented industrialization, and then economic relations and social structure were shaped according to this model. This situation required the reorganization of political structure and power relations. In the subsequent process, new balances in the world order started to emerge with the disintegration of USSR. Therefore, the necessity to regulate one again power relations in Turkey emerged. As Şen (2004:375) stated, the search for redesigning power relations found its response in February 28, 1997; this intervention ending Refah-Yol government aimed at restructuring economic, political and cultural domains according global-regional targets. This restructuration resulted in tensions between the ones who wanted to continue power relations as it was before and the ones favoring this restructuration. These developments affected MG. It can be said that the distance gradually widening between their beliefs and the real situations caused the re-definition of some rules. Let's talk briefly about the effects of the intervention of February 28 on the Islamist groups: with this process, Islamist intellectuals and politicians started to rethink about their identity and discourse. They realized that reformatting their identity and discourse would provide them legitimacy both in country and abroad, and that their existence depended on the integration with the EU because they believed that the EU would be equitable towards them, their lifestyle and way of thinking. Therefore, they started to emphasize in their discourse the lack of democracy in the country; they used concepts such as human rights and democracy instead of an Islamic terminology. Moreover, after the establishment of AKP, they began to use a new identity (Conservative Democrat) and became for the EU. Consequently, at the end of this process, Islamists came to the same stance as liberals. There are several reasons behind their liberal stance: the support given by liberals to them in the 28 February, and businessmen's demands for the necessity of implementation of neoliberal policies in the economic sphere (Özipek, 2005:645). Precisely at this point it should be said that taking the fundamentalist threat as the reason

of intervention for the 28 February conceals the changes in the field of material relations (Özipek, 2005:641). As it can be understood from above-mentioned explanations, the February 28 intervention didn't only end Refah Yol Government, but also led to the emergence of different political parties in MG. However, it is not a true approach to say that the 28 February intervention was decisive in this differentiation within MG. It would be more accurate to say that this differentiation started first within the RP and became more visible after the February 28 process.

At the end of this process, different political parties emerged. However, when examining their party programs, we can see that the SP party program was in accordance with new economic model, as the FP program. Even, the approaches and observations foreseen in the FP program were developed more in the SP program (Şen, 2004:376). What is more interesting: even though the AKP party program and the SP party program resemble each other, AKP considered itself as a party separated from the MG tradition while SP proved to be a party advocating the MG tradition. From this point of view, a response would be given to the question "What did it make AKP different?".

3.8 The First Example of Bifurcation in National Outlook: Justice and Development Party

Atacan claims that Birlik Vakfi played an important role in the differentiation of views between the old and new leaders of the MG; Birlik Vakfi was founded in 1986 by Ismail Kahraman, leader of National Turkish Student Union (Milli Türk Talebe Birliği, MTTB). Established first in 1916, closed in 1936, re-opened in 1946 and re-closed in 1980 with the 12 September military coup, MTTB played an important role in the education of AKP leaders including Recep Tayip Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül. Being in the same line with Kemalist ideology until 1960s, MTTB started in 1965 to advocate Turkish nationalism, anti-communism and Islam as religion of Turks. Since the mid-1970s, it has started to defend the idea that an Islamist state should be established in Turkey. In this period, Islamist movements separated themselves from nationalist and

conservative movements, and a rivalry between them started to emerge. Birlik Vakfi, which put a distance between itself and RP until early 1990s, placed their members into the municipality after Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's election as Istanbul Mayor in 1994. In this period, their taking place in the RP did not create a problem. However, since they wanted some changes in the structure and policies of the party and supported Erdoğan, Birlik Vakfi was considered as a factor disintegrating MG (Atacan, 2005:194-195). For the younger generation taking place in FP, the time for old political cadre was up. Their visions didn't adapt to modern times. That is, reformists were criticizing the etatist, patriarchal, challenging policies of the old cadre, as well as their views on politics, society and economy. Therefore, they wanted to seize the power within the party and change its vision. However, as they couldn't succeed in these efforts, they established AKP. While SP turned back to its previous discourses (classical discourses of MG), AKP had a positive attitude towards issues like secularism, democracy and cooperation with the West. However, while not referring clearly to Islamism openly, AKP underlined the religiosity of the party leaders. Religious freedom was dealt with within the framework of human rights and freedom of expression.

Despite its Islamist origin, AKP presented a different image from previous political Islamist parties in terms of discourse, political aims and market-oriented economy program (in SP program also, free market was emphasized, but its discourse was the same as in the past). Various authors explain the difference in the AKP's discourses as follows: AKP, despite its origin, does not have an Islamist agenda (despite the accusations that it placed Islamists into civil bureaucracy and pursued Islamization efforts at the local level) (Rabasa& Larrabee, 2008:ix). AKP has been into an attitude referring lesser to Islam and emphasizing political and social issues (Salih, 2009:215; Sambur, 2009:127). Some AKP members tried to formulate a new ideology named "Conservative Democrat" in order to differentiate themselves from MG (Atacan, 2005:188-189). Top management of AKP made a distinction between political party and religious party (Çınar, 2006:474).

The difference in AKP's economic orientation is that it undertook the implementation of neoliberal policies. As mentioned above, it tried to articulate Islam with liberalism. This would not be detailed again here. However, it should be noted that by referring to Qur'an in this articulation and trying to prove that Islam and liberalism coincide, AKP's political strategy coincided with neoliberal state concept. According to state concept of liberalism, state should be impartial, in other words, it should not have an ideology. The approach that Islam is not an ideology but a religion can lead to the conclusion that Islamism can coexist with liberalism (Şen, 2008:20-21). However, a point should be underlined here. As it was emphasized since the beginning of the study, Islamism evolved. As Mert (2005:418) stated, while taking part in center-right after 1980s, Islamism was affected by center-right discourses; liberalism and civil societism discourses were adopted by Islamists since then. This adoption became clear in the AKP period. As political Islam entered into an evolution process with the RP, the fact that AKP became an implementer of neoliberal policies doesn't mean disengagement with the previous Islamist parties (Şen, 2008:22).

What is important is to know which factors led to the emergence of this group named as "reformists" and what caused the difference in these discourses. It can be said that the Islamist capital and demands of middle class have been effective in the emergence of AKP. A distance occurred between the beliefs of Islamists and the real situation, which led to a tension. Islamist actors tried to overcome this tension, by correcting the inner values of Islam and establishing the entrepreneurial Islam in relation to modern economy and politics. As Durak stated (2011:19), the concept of Moderate Islam found many supporters, and throughout time the cursor of Islamic concept of world changed from romantic-ideological to rational-economic targets. The political and economic structure of the countries known as Islamic has started to sympathize with globalization and economic liberalization since late 1980s. Islam coexisted with various socioeconomic structures and legitimized different economic models. The transformation of MG from statist and developmentalist approach to liberal economic model in Turkey and the support given by AKP to neo-liberalism have been the

indicators of such a situation. The communication between Islamists, other Muslims and the entire world as a result of globalization, and the increase of Islamist movement in the international arena promoted a concept of Islamism having international concerns and assertions instead of nationalist-developmental Islamism illustrated best by MG in Turkey (Bilici, 2004: 800).

It is possible to interpret the change in discourse of AKP, i.e. the statement of AKP leader Erdoğan “We've taken off the shirt of MG” and their self-definition not as a political Islamist party but as a “Conservative Democrat” party, as follows: with this definition, AKP aimed to emphasize that it is different from the previous parties, and tried to persuade the secular segments of the society that it is not a religious party.

After the emergence and development of AKP in the political arena have been mentioned, the reason of its success (high vote rate) and legitimacy in the public should be focused on, because the prediction of the coming process is not possible without knowing the reasons affecting the legitimacy of AKP in the society, its supporters and the reasons of their support. Moreover, it is not possible to reveal the reasons of emergence, differences and statements of the HAS Party. In other words, it is necessary to put forth the dynamics that led to the emergence of AKP as well as the reasons of its “the success”, in order to analyze not only how and why AKP differentiated from other political Islamist parties but also the reasons of emergence of HAS Party with a opposite discourse. While current dynamics created HAS Party, the emergence of these dynamics was due to historical transformations. In short, it is not possible to comprehend present conditions without considering the historical process, socioeconomic and political structures in this process and the transformations in them. Therefore, it is necessary to expose the historical process before analyzing HAS Party.

The most important of the internal dynamics giving birth to AKP was Islamist businessmen. RP aimed to be both an ideological party and a mass party. So, on the one hand it stated that it gave importance to traditions and kept the Islamist values alive, and on the other hand it tried to implement policies that would ruin the traditional structure. RP promised that it should not only end poverty thanks to Just Order but also implement

the market economy in order to develop private sector. The contradictions/indefiniteness of these statements gathered on the one hand the masses around the RP; on the other hand, Islamists businessmen and radical Islamists moved away from the party. While the Islamist enterprises represented by MÜSİAD opposed the economic promises by referring to their doubts, some radical Islamist groups got away from the party on the grounds of its nebulous demands on Islam and equality (Tuğal, 2010:16). The leaders of AKP tried, by ending this vagueness, to market the party as a party at peace with secular state and supporter of West and capitalism (Tuğal, 2010:16). The transformation of the visions of Islamist businessmen to the visions of religious sections via (Tuğal, 2010:17) can be seen as one of the indicators that have proved the importance of socioeconomic factors in terms of the transformation of political Islam.

Liberal leftist groups and generally rightist intellectuals contributed a lot to the legitimation of AKP in the society. Trying to show that many basic principles of conservatism and liberalism overlap, many authors like Taha Akyol didn't only legitimize, but also created the possibilities of integration of Islam with capitalist system by the promises of defense of Islam, by stressing both the need and importance of the liberalism to defense Islam which is one of the conservative values of Turkey. In other words, these authors have prepared the way of articulating to liberalism via Islamists. Mustafa Şen (2008b) summarized well this situation with this expression: "Liberal spirit has found its body in Islamism."

In Turkey, Islamists/political Islamist parties have been carefully tracked, forbidden or supported by the secular state according to the conjuncture since their establishment. In this process, political Islamist parties were organized both within the state and within the society; they could reach different segments of the society, by taking place in the political sphere and getting the opportunity to share power in different periods. They could get an economic power and find opportunity to legitimize themselves partially due to the changes in Turkey and the world. Political Islamist parties mobilized the masses with radical discourses; on the other hand, they controlled radical Islamist movements, using them sometimes as a threat factor to the secular state

and society; and sometimes they tried to render them moderate in order to protect their own power in the party. At the end of this process, the point where the state, some political Islamist groups and dominant actors came together is the “Moderate Islamic Model”. All of these parties have got the best of this model: For the USA, which is the only dominant power in the world, the moderate Islamic model has enabled the implementation of Great Middle East Project (Although the USA are the implementer of the project, this project protects the interests of multinational companies). From the point of view of the state, an atmosphere was insured in order to weaken radical components, to protect the secular structure and to conduct collaboration compatible with the West and America. Moreover, a political and social structure was formed, in which all obstacles were removed (for capitalist segments) in order to put a new economic order into practice. For some Islamist cadres (reformist), it has become a way of coming to power and sustaining it by developing the Islamic capital.

For all three segments, it is very important to have a stable environment in order to reach their aims. For this reason, it was necessary to persuade secular parts of the society that Islamism does not form a threat to society, empower the relationship between religion and democracy, satisfy the need of the groups whose religious awareness is high by not making a secular/anti-secular discrimination, without referring to Islam, by focusing on religious issues/freedoms on the basis of Western terms, and assimilating the radical Islamists.

As a result, AKP got the support of dominant powers (USA and national capital) in terms of the economic policies it promised to follow, the support of some of the secular people with its discourse that it would not harm the structure of the secular system, the support of the liberal left with its emphasis on democracy, and that of religious segment (being one of them).

CHAPTER IV

PEOPLE'S VOICE PARTY: THE LAST EXAMPLE OF BIFURCATION IN NATIONAL OUTLOOK

4.1 Is Socialism Being Articulated to Islam or is Islam Being Articulated to Socialism?

The discourse and structure of People's Voice Party are different from Islamist parties acting in the past and at the present time in Turkey. An indicator of this difference is that administrators of the party emphasized the common values/coincidence between Islam and socialism, and that there are individuals from both MG tradition and socialist view among the senior representatives of the party.

It is not the HAS Party that tried first to show that socialism coincides with Islam in Turkey. In the Cold War period, intelligentsia in Muslim Arab countries and Western Marxist intelligentsia tried to set forth that Islam didn't conflict with socialism. They tried to indicate this by stressing the common values of Islam and socialism. It is possible to express the reason of this quest in the bipolar world of the Cold War period as follows: the USA was on one side of the bipolar world and the USSR on the other side. In this period, while many of Arab countries were struggling against the colonialism of imperialist USA and West, they were supported by USSR in this struggle. Apart this support, they agreed ideologically on the point that they had both an anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist discourse. Turkey, which was on the side of the USA in the Cold War period, determined its policy according to the USA policy. The policy pursued by the USA was to destroy the hegemony of the USSR by preventing the spread of socialism in this region. Within the scope of this policy, Green Islam project was put into practice (Sözen, 2008). Within the frame of this project, the anti-communism propaganda was made with the support of Islamists associations and unions. In these propagandas, socialism was shown as enemy of religion. In 1965, in Turkey, some

Marxist intellectuals, just like Arabian socialists, featured the common values of Islam and socialism such as equality and social justice by rallying around the name of Yön movement. On the one hand, French Marxist author R. Garaudy's book named "Socialism and Islam" was translated into Turkish by Yön magazine; on the other hand, the idea of "Muslim Anatolian Socialism" was set forth by Islamist-Conservative Nurettin Topçu. While Yön movement was trying to articulate Islam to socialism, it aimed to enlarge the socialist front, and became partly successful in this (Atılın 2002: 146-157). While Garaudy (?:45) expressed in his book that "in socialism there is nothing contrary to the spirit of Qur'an", Topçu (1997:174, cited in Gündođan, 2000:101) explained "Muslim Anatolian Socialism" as a matter of right and the epitome of Islam. According to Topçu (1997, cited in Gündođan, 2000: 102):

What Islam desires is not a community of the rich in every district of which a millionaire appears, because the command of Islam is that "the poor are entitled to goods of the rich", and "believers! Only your daily bread is halal to you!", and "At the same time, all believers are brother and sister; however, brotherhood is out of question where labor is exploited.

Seemingly, the search for common points between socialism and Islam in the 1960s gained speed in the 2000s. The movement called "East Conference" in which people with different opinion took part emerged as a result of this search. There were individuals from left-wing and Islamist tradition in this movement, and the main item of its agenda was "peoples of the Muslim world suffering from imperialism". Those taking part in this movement visited Muslim countries and interviewed with the thinkers of these countries. They prepared joint action plans in order to stand against imperialism with Islamic countries sharing the same fate according to a common target (Coşkun, 2009). It can be said that the East Conference led by Mehmet Bekarođlu expressed the quest of creating a common language by people with different identities such as Fikret Bařkaya, Hakan Albayrak, Aydın Çubukçu, Haluk Gerger, İlhami Güler, Nihat Genç, Ömer Laçiner, Yılmaz Ensariođlu, Nuray Mert, Yıldız Ramazanođlu.

Mehmet Bekarođlu, the owner of “Dođudan Magazine” which is a media organ issued by East Conference Association, formed a platform called “New Politics Formation” with individuals like Ertuđrul Gūnay from left-wing before the establishment of HAS Party. Those who took part in this platform began to search for a party called “Muslim left-wing” by public opinion, an egalitarian and pro-social justice party which does not exclude Islamic values. However, Ertuđrul Gūnay and some people from left-wing joined on the proposal of Recep Tayyip Erdođan, by interrupting their party works. In consequence, this quest was over without founding a party. However, those who think that Islam and socialism have common values and that they should get united around these values continued their quest. Even today, this quest is seen in articles and books of some authors, in magazines and small groups. For example, Birikim magazine, which tried to redefine socialism (Laçiner, 2010:17), issued the 250th number with the title of “Left and Theology”, while Ruřen Çakır underlined the requirement of convergence between these two segments in his series that he wrote under the title of “Left and Islam” in the newspaper “Vatan”. As for İhsan Eliaçık, a writer from Islamist tradition, he became one of the prominent names in this subject both with his books/articles and interviews. Furthermore, it is necessary to state that İhsan Eliaçık (2011), in his book named “Social Islam”, has shown more radical attitudes than the HAS Party in his view especially about private property and savings.

At the end of the process summarized above, with the foundation of HAS Party, these quests became concrete under the identity of a party. In the current state, this question comes out: Is socialism being articulated to Islam or is Islam being articulated to socialism? My opinion before the interviews was in the direction that Islam was articulated to socialism. What led me to form this opinion is that while Islam was articulated to liberalism by, HAS Party emerged with a discourse against’s neoliberal policies, and in the Party there were individuals from socialist tradition and mostly from MG tradition. However, when analyzing the statements of interviewers, it is more accurate to say that meeting under the roof of HAS Party was an effort for articulating socialism to Islam, and not Islam to socialism. The bases of this view could be explained

as follows: primarily, “Islamists” authorities of HAS Party that I interviewed stated that Islam was above all of these ideologies (socialism, capitalism), and that some values and concepts remained in the monopoly of socialists, the social aspect of Islam being ignored until that time. İhsan Eliaçık particularly pointed out that there was no question of articulating Islam to socialism, and that Islam included in fact all the ideologies:

Disintegration within Islam has begun since the early days. Ebu Zer⁴ corresponds to socialist act, and Muawiya⁵ to capitalist act... Mohammed clearly resembles Ebu Zer. Even if socialism never existed in the world, even if left-wing thoughts did not exist, this was already available. That is, Either Muslims inclined to capitalism or Muslims prone to socialism in our era have their roots in the history. Images, symbols and arguments of the left, the socialist world existed in the history of Islam. Left and socialism took all their arguments from the religious world.

It is possible to find the clues related to the articulation of socialism to Islam because the views of Islamists are more dominant in the party, and also in the approaches of authorities from socialist origin on the relationship between socialism and religion; the statements that socialists joined the HAS Party by accepting the discourses of those coming from MG tradition indicate the dominance of Islamist view. As Kazım Arslan stated:

... As the segment which is qualified as Muslim from outside and has Islamic sensitivity talked for the first time about these kinds of things, people found this strange. They are asked: “Are you

⁴ Ebu Zer el- Gifari (Abū Dharr al-Ghifārī : ? - 652): He was an early convert to Islam. He belonged to the Banu Ghifar, the Ghifar tribe. Abu Dharr is remembered for his strict piety and also his opposition to the caliph Uthman ibn Affan. Abu Dharr was exiled first to Syria, so that he would be under the eyes of Muawiya. In Sham (Lebanon and Syria), Abu Dharr started spreading the Shiaa belief, and he was fighting Muwaiya. He was regarded by many, including Ali Shariati, as the first Islamic socialist or the first socialist altogether.

⁵ Muawiya (Mu'āviyye ibn Ebu-Sufyān) (602 – 680) was the first Caliph of the Umayyad Dynasty. After the conquest of Mecca by the Muslims, Muawiyah's family converted to Islam. Muawiyah fought a protracted campaign against Ali.

socialist?” Secondly, socialists say “We love you so much because you are talking like us. I tease them and say “this existed before you, but you searched for social justice in the wrong place, etc.” You searched for social justice in Marx’s books. But if you read our books, you would find it before, and be a better Muslim than me. Some (Islamists) are trying to create a reaction with a notion like Islamist left by indicating our words as left-wing. It’s said: they are with leftists. – But, anyway you are with leftists – They joined the party by accepting our discourses. When saying ‘by accepting our discourses’, in fact we tell the common truths. What we say includes also what they say. However, we say much more things, in the sense that we speak of very different things.

I think that it won’t be wrong to state that the approaches of the HAS Party members from socialist origin to the relationship between socialism and religion enabled them to take part in the HAS Party. Their approaches to this subject could be summarized as follows: They state that being socialist doesn’t require being atheistic, and that the opposite approach of this constitutes an obstacle before socialism as well. In other words, they state that the socialists gathered under the roof of the HAS Party didn’t take a stance against religion, and that it was necessary to give up distracting people from religious matters in order to include them in the struggle for sharing, equality and solidarity. They also criticized the socialists in Turkey for getting involved in such efforts. The following statement of Güler who described himself as Islamist seems to be interesting, showing the approach of socialists in the party to religion and their position in the HAS Party:

The HAS Party does not have any problem with the conservative codes (faith, belief, religion) of the society. Socialists did, as you know, but now they have gradually recovered... We have never accepted the definition of the Islamist left. And when people listen to these leftists, no problem occurs.

Finally, one of the most significant indicators of the endeavor for the articulation of socialism to Islam is that authorities from both socialist and MG traditions share the same view about the failure of real socialism experience and the subject that people do

not consider socialism as an alternative and that socialists do not have any alternative project.

Those coming from socialist tradition take part in the HAS Party by putting forward a new definition of socialism, by criticizing previous socialism experiences, by stating that the conditions of a socialist revolution are inexistent and that socialists do not have any project, and without excluding religious people. So to say, those coming from Islamist tradition show their tolerance by accepting individuals from socialist and other views to HAS Party. While socialists find the values of socialism in Islam, Islamists claim that these values have already existed in Islam. Consequently, it can be said that common values have been reached through these ways. The common values enabling Islamists and socialists to get together are: equality, liberty and social justice.

Describing himself as collectivist, not socialist with humor “*Let’s speak Turkish for citizen to understand*”, Zeki Kılıçaslan explains the reason why they have come under the same roof with those from Islamist tradition as follows:

I define myself as collectivist; I am in favor of social justice and equality, and therefore the values on which we agree are these. We can have various references about when and from where these values derive. However, consequently if we can unite around the same values, if we make political struggle for these values, there is no problem.

We can understand Cem Somel’s view on the subject of socialism, and how and why he participated in the HAS Party from his following statements:

My opinions on the way to reach the order of equality and fraternity have changed in time, and therefore I joined the HAS Party. When I joined it with this mood, political Islamist friends did not make a fuss. The majority of people in the world believe that there will not be any order except capitalism or even if the pungent, oppressive aspects of capitalism are reformed, the opinions about how much they will be reformed are disorganized. So, after compromising on the principle of social justice, we are still in search of how much this will be carried out. Getting together under the same roof of HAS Party will contribute to both class struggle and the entire struggle for

equality. If we return to such a kind of struggle, we would have returned to the former socialist discourse.

In brief, socialists and Islamists in the HAS Party think that socialism does not have the feature of being an alternative. I suppose it will not be wrong to state that while Islamists have hope and project for actualization of Islam in its entirety, those coming from socialist tradition do not have any hope and project for actualization of socialism, and that consequently bringing them together under the same roof of HAS Party is an effort for articulating socialism to Islam, not Islam to socialism.

4.2 The Dynamics that Gave Rise to the People's Voice Party

It can be said that the emergence of the HAS Party was the result of losing the power struggle with within the SP rather than an ideological disengagement from MG. It is possible to deduce from the statements of İlhami Güler, a member of General Executive Board of HAS Party who didn't take part in SP, that there was not an ideological disengagement: *"The reason of the disengagement was the power problems in the party. There was not disengagement by self-criticizing within the party, by criticizing the ideology."* Also Eliaçık stated that *"differentiation did not lead to disengagement, but disengagement led to differentiation."* The reason of the power struggle is explained as follows: the senior management of the party tried to block the efforts for changing the party under the pretext that SP was not a party satisfying the needs of the society. It was stated that the transformation of the party could not be achieved because of its authoritative structure, and that SP could not fulfill the needs of the society. Arslan stated:

The policies of Numan Kurtulmuş were suspected and seen as actions and applications to divert the party from its line. These forced us to break away from the SP... We made a congress to finish the debates and ensure the authority within the party. We did not make it to leave the SP.

Those who left the SP for the HAS Party stated that they tried to pay attention to the demands of the society, that they struggled vainly to accomplish these demands within the SP, and that they aimed to carry out these demands within the HAS Party. However, it should be noted that, although the interviewees indicated the demands of the society, the founders of the party decided alone on what people needed rather than their demands as expressed by themselves. This situation is set forth clearly by Arslan's statement:

There is an inequality in the society. The structure of Turkish people is a bit traditional and fatalistic. They say "May God be pleased with the state". What we say is: it's question of the nation of the state. However, we say that there is not a nation of the state, but a state of the nation. We say that this should be in this manner as educated people of Turkey. The citizens are not aware of the inequality while demanding.

It has been stated in the interviews that the social transformation in Turkey is only possible with the awareness and organization of people, and that this awareness is to be formed especially through the university youth. Therefore, it would not be wrong to say that the HAS Party is a party working to create a base, a mass for itself rather than a party having a certain base. The statements of Arslan and Kılıçaslan show respectively that the party does not have a base: *"We are trying to constitute also our own masses to introduce and explain the notion named "civilization politics" and "The HAS Party may be a premature party. It is a political movement emerged with the division in the SP"*. Although the party doesn't have a base, opinions have been expressed recently and dispersedly in the society, similar to the HAS Party discourse (both by leftists and Islamists). In other words, it can be said that, although the HAS Party is not a party having emerged from these dynamics, it is trying to meet this segment in the society and constitute a base for itself. The statements of Eliaçık – Although he didn't take part in the HAS party, he gave it visibly his supports –, related to the dynamics having emerged the HAS Party express clearly the situation:

The HAS Party is now walking towards its own dynamics. It is strange that it recognizes its dynamics afterwards. First, they left SP and then asked: What will we defend? A political party emerged first (he means the HAS Party), then it is said that this should have a social base, a line. If we were like AK Parti, then there would be no need for us in the political area. What is it lacking in the AK Party? Social justice. Namely, does not defend the lower classes; they are involved in bids and seeking for rent. It is said that something should be done against this and that a way should be found....This does not mean that there is no internal dynamic. There is a dynamic in the social base, but the HAS Party has difficulty in meeting it.

As it is mentioned above, the HAS Party is not a party founded as a result of the demands of the public. It is a party found by persons with different views in search for a new discourse and policy. The common statements of the interviewees have proved this. The important here is the factors which bring together these people from different views. First of the things that enable Marxists and Islamists to gather is that they thought that they would not have any chance in the political field with their current identities from both MG and socialist tradition. Secondly, they have a similar interpretation on recent history and . Thirdly, the old socialists and Islamists interviewed thought that socialism and the MG were utopic for today, inapplicable in current conditions, and couldn't satisfy the needs of today. However, it's worth opening a parenthesis here and mentioning this: Islamists (except for Mehmet Bekaroğlu and İlhami Güler) didn't question the past nor MG, in contrast to those who came from a socialist tradition and questioned and criticized the socialist experiences. Islamists stated that the MG satisfied the needs of that day, not today. Generally, Islamists defend the MG even if indirectly. Even some interviewees indicated that the HAS Party was a real MG party. Lastly, they thought that it was more realistic to be a mass party rather than an ideological party.

We will try to set forth in detail why and how people from MG tradition and socialist tradition have come together:

First of all, they stated that the thought that they had no chance with their current identities in the political sphere led them to gather under the same roof. Not wanting to take part in the political sphere with their current identities led them to redefine/revise

their identity. It can be said that this redefining and revision on the identities paved the way to come together. The interviewees stated that generally they didn't want to do politics over these concepts because they believed that their current identities (Islamist, socialist) were misunderstood. However, apparently, they didn't do politics on the basis of Islamist or socialist discourse; they indirectly protected their identity. Bekaroğlu stated: *"I am a Muslim. However, I am not an Islamist like others saying they would come to power and change others, according to a belief shaped after the Cold War. Nevertheless, I am talking with Islamic reference."* With this statement, he has defined himself as an Islamist by redefining Islamism, but the criticisms of other interviewees on the Islamist notion are that Islam cannot be restricted by appendixes or the word "Islamist" would be more assertive. Arslan expressed his opinions as follows:

I am defining myself as moralist, because Islamism is more assertive. We have not the right to monopolize the notions as Islam, Islamism. This would be an indignity to Islam. We cannot disgrace Islam so. We have defined ourselves as the people aiming to serve Islam. In that point, the most important thing is to remind the forgotten Islamic values (social dimension of Islam on morality) with "Civilization Politics".

Considering the above expressions, it can be seen that those who define themselves as Islamist redefine first the notion of Islamism, and then they say to be Islamist according to this definition. It can be said that those who do not define themselves as Islamists avoid this, attributing a great meaning to this notion or for fear of narrowing the Islam. However, my impression is that the main reason for which they wanted to stay away from doing politics by using Islamist identity was the perception created by this identity/notion in the public. While they stayed away from using the notion of Islamism to identify their identity because it didn't evoke a positive connotation amongst the people, HAS Party authorities stated that the negative perception formed in the public about this notion was also a wrong perception

Those coming from a socialist tradition preferred to use their identity by redefining socialism, indicating that notions of socialism/socialist were misunderstood. Here are Cem Somel's some statements on this issue:

If we describe the word socialism as supporting social justice and solidarity or objecting discrimination, I am a socialist and I did not change. However, if we claim that socialism includes also a linear and progressive philosophy of history, a modernist view of world, then I would not be considered as socialist.

It is possible to deduce from Zeki Kılıçaslan's below-mentioned statement that the main concern in the background is that they had no chance in the political field with these identities: "*in order to form a new part in the society, we should use a new discourse, not these concepts*". So, he insisted on the necessity of using a different discourse from these ones because of the perceptions formed in the society about the notions Islamist and socialist.

As it can be seen, the second common point between Islamist and socialist is their evaluation about the recent past and the AKP. They adopted the center-periphery paradigm, when evaluating the recent past. As the supporters of the center-periphery paradigm claimed, they seem to share the same opinion that the state was oppressive and excluded the periphery until the came to power. Moreover, it can be seen that they thought jointly that there was a political tutelage regime in Turkey, and that they considered as positive the efforts of AKP to demolish this regime.

Thirdly, they had the idea that socialism and the MG were utopic for today, inapplicable in current conditions, and couldn't satisfy the needs of today. Their opinions about socialism were stated above. Their approaches to the MG (under the title of the ideological distance of the HAS Party to MG) will be given below. Therefore, these common points won't be mentioned here again.

The statement of Güneş shows below also that one of the things enabling the socialists and Islamists to come together is their thought that a mass party is more realistic than an ideological party in conditions of today:

If you present Islam in the sense as understood in Turkey, there are many non-Muslim people. But, we are the party of Turkey. *“We will not want anything for someone else that we do not want for ourselves”*. This is the hadith of the prophet Muhammad. If I appear on the TV and say the hadith like this, more people would be against me. However, when you look at the content, the expression is very good, and there is no need to add the words Islam and socialist somewhere. Therefore, a political party should not say it would actualize the discourse of a belief. We are doing politics, and dealing with all people. If we said that the holy hadith prescribed like that, this would disturb us. However, if we did what the hadith prescribed, both people and the Allah would be satisfied.

The dynamics which gave rise to HAS Party are presented above. The most important of these dynamics seems to be the non-fulfillment of the changes foreseen to be done in the SP. At the same time, this shows that put forth clearly through FP that there was a divergence before the SP, that they thought there should be a change within the FP, and that those who tried to do this change without leaving the party didn't carry out it within the party. Güneş's statement can be given as an example for this: *“If we had taken a stand against with Numan Kurtulmuş when Abdullah Gül was a candidate for general presidency, the SP would have been today an influential party in Turkey.”*

The differences and similarities of the HAS Party with the MG and other political Islamist parties will be emphasized below in order to understand clearly why and how the HAS Party emerged.

4. 3 The Distance of the People's Voice Party to the Ideology of National Outlook

“The walls of the MG stayed in the SP. The shape of the MG is in the hands of Mr. Tayyip. However, its spirit and essence stayed in the HAS Party”.

It is possible to say that the authorities of the HAS Party coming from the MG tradition embraced the MG, and that the HAS Party aimed to transfer the discourses of

the MG to the public by using more universal notions, by convincing the public and not dictating them as the MG done. While claiming the spirit of the MG ideology, namely while adopting the MG ideology as an essence, the criticisms directed towards the MG in general are that the MG was utopic (having no sufficient projects to put into practice its thoughts), didn't satisfy the needs of today, and hadn't an inclusive language, i.e. its discourses and approaches were wrong. In fact, when the statements are analyzed, it can be seen that what's generally opposed to is the SP's mode of discourse and approach today and in the past, rather than the MG ideology itself. In other words, it can be said that the HAS Party members leaving the SP wanted to give the MG a language suitable for today's conditions, and to make the MG adopt more concrete and realistic projects in the socioeconomic field. At this point, what stands out when embracing the MG is that they do not consider it as a stable structure. It is possible to deduce this from their criticisms toward the SP (being more conservative and returning back to traditional discourses) and from their adoption of the differences in the discourse in the RP period (expressing religious subjects with universal concepts and embracing the changes in the economic field).

Malkoç's statement shows well how the MG were embraced, the struggle done for adapting the MG to today's conditions within the SP, in other words, how they were opposed to protecting the style of the SP and the traditional concept of MG:

What we describe as the MG is the name of the spirit that conquered Anatolia when Alparslan entered into Anatolia. We look at the MG as inclusive. If the MG was evaluated only as the vision of the SP, this would be unfair. What the MG had was similar to other things there (rates may be different): right, freedom, justice, democracy, the demand for solidarity. The MG satisfied the important needs of the society. However, the MG should renew its conception, mentality, points of views. There was no problem until Erbakan Hodja died. Now, I mean the difference between us and the SP. *The walls of the MG stayed in the SP. The shape of the MG is in the hands of Mr. Tayyip. However, its spirit and essence stayed in the HAS Party.*

"When we found this party, we realized that the MG shirts were tightly fitting to us. If we consider past political conceptions as shirts, we should do politics by wearing the kaftan of Fatih". This statement of Güneş shows that they embraced on the one hand the MG ideology, and that, on the other hand, they wanted to make changes in the MG, to render it more inclusive.

One of the underlined points of the HAS Party in the election declaration and interview is neither market nor politics approach. HAS Party emphasized this approach to distinguish itself from other political parties. However, this statement shows parallelism with the discourse of the MG in its first years, putting forward its difference from liberal and leftist parties. This statement is the transformation of the discourse "neither communism nor capitalism" into "neither politics nor market".

Somel's statement explains below the transformation of the MG and reveals that the HAS Party is the successor of the MG in a certain sense: *"The HAS Party turned into a movement searching for solutions to social and economic problems of the world among political Islamists, through the principles of the Islam in the unipolar world that we live in now".*

Above, we talked about how the MG was *generally* embraced and the fact that actually criticisms were generally addressed to the SP, because of the different styles to be followed (as their differences and criticisms related to the SP will be mentioned below, we do not enter into detail here). However, this does not mean the MG has never been criticized. It's question of criticisms done for the MG directly too. Firstly, it can be said that all those coming from the MG tradition adopted the essence of the MG with the thought that MG has the demand for social justice and has the belief that İslam will be able to solve the problems, and that they criticized the ideology of the MG for not having a concrete project to fulfill this demand. All those coming from the MG tradition make this criticism. However, there are also other criticisms except for this common one: Bekaroğlu and Güler questioned the MG for having a totalitarian and ideological structure, as well as for not having a concrete project. Bekaroğlu stated:

Islamism shaped in Turkey during 1970s has problems. It was shaped in the Cold War period. The MG is black and white. It is unexpectedness. It has an intentional totalitarian structure for changing and transforming the society downward, by dealing with the institutions. In this sense, it was affected a lot by Kemalism. It coincides with Sunni caliphate tradition in the history. All ideologies were affected by Kemalism. MG is an ideological and problematic study in this sense. This problem bumped into 28 February process when the MG (RP) had already started to rise. There is a trouble there. And they began to discuss it. Therefore, are we pro-MG? Generally speaking, if the MG did not use the Just Order discourse, now we would use it freely. We (HAS Party) try to use it, but it does not work. They can call us pro-MG. In general, I do not object to it in terms of the demand for justice. However, if you ask how it will be, it is problematic.

While criticizing the MG because of its ideological and totalitarian character, Güler states the distance between the HAS Party and the MG as follows:

The MG ideology did not have anything concrete, except a naive belief that Islam is good and would solve the problems. It had a structure that copied to a great extent the Marxist totalitarian organization, and sometimes etatist economies or mixed economies where it was. Obviously, the MG did not have content. Consequently, that aim continues that the morality of Islam is good and for the benefit of people. Mr. Numan also came from there. However, Islam is no longer an ideology in the HAS Party. It is no longer a hollow utopia as it was in the MG. MG is gaining a more concrete content in the HAS Party, taking into account the concrete realities of life as the British say, i.e. a more concrete, more realistic content, but not contradicting with Islam. When you look at the program of the HAS Party, you can see these. These are Islam. They are Islamic. What we call Islam is something like this. Islam is neither an ideology nor a dogma.

One of the subjects where the HAS Party and the MG got separated from one another is seen in their points of views about different religion and ideologies. In other words, the objection of the MG to Zionism, to Christianity directly is not seen in the HAS Party. While there was a dominant view that their parties were open for everyone except for masons, communists, and Zionists in the political Islamist parties under the

presidency of Erbakan (Sarıbay, 1985: 99), namely while they defended the superiority of the Muslims, it is possible to say that the HAS Party showed a deviation from the MG in this sense, and that its approach included not only Muslim community, but also oppressed people.

To sum up, it is possible to say that the HAS Party is the successor of the MG in terms of adopting the MG spirit, the views for establishing the just order, the views for capitalism and communism. However, it should be stated that while following the MG, they thought to continue the MG tradition by rendering it suitable to today's conditions, not by its traditional structure. The fact that the HAS Party has a more democratic stance than the MG both in the party and in the political field, and that it advocates the impartiality of the state towards religions and ideologies show the differences between the HAS Party and the MG.

4.4 The Differences between the People's Voice Party and the Felicity Party

We see that the authorities of the HAS Party have a dominant tendency to evaluate the SP as before and after Erbakan. In these criticisms, generally the SP was criticized not the MG. These attitudes show that the disengagement from the SP was not an ideological one as stated before. It can be said that those continuing their way with the SP are more conservative, and that those choosing the HAS Party have a discourse that covers all parts of the society.

The differences between the HAS Party and the SP can be grouped under these titles: firstly, the differences on style and procedure are mentioned. Secondly, it has been stated that the SP is conservative and against changes, but that the HAS Party is for changes. Thirdly, the SP is seen as more hierarchic and totalitarian; yet, it is claimed that the HAS Party has a democratic view both in the party and for Turkish politics. As the fourth difference, it has been indicated that the SP highlighted the worship dimension of Islam, based on the worship as the indicator of pietism (this is a criticism against all

political Islamist parties at the same time), and that the HAS Party also highlighted the social dimension of Islam.

When these above-stated titles are considered in detail, the style and method differences between the SP and HAS Party can be explain as follows: it can be said that the first of the important features that separated the HAS Party from the SP is the transfer of the same ideology to communities by means of different languages and methods. The difference of language is that the HAS Party avoids especially using Islamic notions, while the difference of procedure is that the party substantiates its views by not dictating them to people, but by persuasion and by bringing together people from different ideologies. Malkoçoğlu's statement shows the differences between the HAS Party, the SP and other political Islamist parties: *"The difference between us and the SP is the approach to events. We can do politics with Zeki Kılıçaslan. We have the open mind and tolerance."*

The second difference between the SP and HAS Party is that the SP is conservative and not prone to changes, while the HAS Party is for changes. We can see this claim in Arslan's statement: *"...In time, the SP has become more traditional and more conservative. When we have pursued policies to embrace the whole society, we have come across the traditional structure in the party for this time"*. The statement "The SP has become more traditional in time" shows that the MG was not conservative, as well as the common view of those coming from the MG tradition that it became conservative with the SP. At the same time, this statement indicates that the members of The HAS Party tried to avoid criticizing the MG generally, but that they needed to show a reason for disengagement from the SP. In other words, they aimed to show that the differences they wanted to carry out in the MG were not contrary to the content of the MG by describing the MG as a dynamic ideology, and that the conditions created this need.

Bekaroğlu asserted that those who stayed in the SP had conservative views, while themselves (as founders of the HAS Party) wanted changes, and that this divergence emerged in previous periods, i.e. started in the RP period. Here is Bekaroğlu's statement:

There were debates in the RP and the FP. There were three wings in the party before and after the 28 February. They broke away from the party. We stayed in the SP. However, we continued to say that state, economy and justice should be reviewed, and that these should be changed and transformed as soon as we founded the SP. We did not do wrong. The group, not making a self-criticism anyway by saying that the wrong is to try to stop us, is now in the SP. The language, discourse of the SP was shaped in 1970s. It is losing also little by little the feature of being a political party. It has become an identity. It is something spinning around the hodja (Erbakan) cult. Actually, the main transformation is 1991 elections. It was a more social and libertarian discourse. What we say today in the HAS Party was said firstly in 1991 elections. The current point of the SP is not that point; it retreated into itself and became more nationalist.

In Chapter III, it was stated that a change started in the RP in political Islam, how this was reflected into the discourse from its socioeconomic and social dimension. The statement above shows why and how this change happened. Therefore, the emergence of both and HAS Party should be seen as a result of the changes in the historical process of the MG rather than a disengagement from the MG.

The third difference is said to be that the SP has a hierarchic totalitarian structure, and that the HAS Party is democratic both in the party and in its view for Turkish politics. One of the reasons of the separation from the SP is also this structure of the SP. As Kılıçaslan stated:

The SP is a structure influenced greatly by Erbakan and having internal problems. The reason of the separation from the SP is a reaction against non-transparent and non-democratic processes there. When saying “we are not conservatives”, our party leader doesn’t mean “We are not religious”. He means not taking a radical position against the established order. We say that the SP has a traditional style of politics. The RP was on the point of adapting itself, but it gave up this. However, the HAS Party is going towards an interpretation to systematize that trend with its own values, its Islamists policy values. I do not want to say that all the elements of the party are the same. However, the party represents such a quest.

As the fourth difference, it is indicated that the SP is based on worship as an

indicator of pietism, highlights the worship dimension of Islam (this is a criticism against all political Islamist parties at the same time, included the SP and), whereas the HAS Party highlights the social dimension of Islam. In other words, in the HAS Party, pietism is determined by its social dimension rather than its personal one. Interviewees confessed that they were talking about the unspoken aspect of Islam for the first time. That is to say, pietism should be measured by the attitude towards economy, not by worships. Arslan states that HAS Party differs from others on this issue as follows:

In Turkey, the worship dimension of Islam has been highlighted for years. This dimension was seen as an indicator of pietism. However, what we say is not a new discourse. In fact, the notions like social justice, labor and freedom are already present in the content of Islam. We are talking about the unspoken side of Islam – The discourse of the MG was also about social justice, just order. Is there a divergence from the MG with these statements? – No, at that point. We believe that everything should be based on justice, because on the other hand Islam is somewhat personal. It is between Allah and the creature. Nevertheless, when we say justice, freedom, equality, we talk about the social dimension of Islam. According to us, it is the side that has been neglected up to now. It has been neglected in the politics, neglected by all parties.

I think it would not be wrong to make this observation here. Until last years, the Islamist discourse was that people in Turkey could not practice their religious belief (worship, woman's scarf) freely in Turkey, and that the public space was closed to religious people. The inequality between people was evaluated as originated from religious identity; this discourse found itself a place in the literature with center-periphery paradigm. However, the fact that Islamic styles of life and worships have become visible in the public space (I don't say they are liberated) does not provide a place to a discourse in this field. Besides, one of the reasons why the HAS Party highlighted the social dimension of Islam is the socioeconomic changes occurred in Turkey in last years. The fact that the AKP took the power alone revealed to some extent that an Islamist identity had nothing to do with an equitable sharing, and that the reason of inequality between people was not due to identity. That's exactly what the HAS Party

has already seen and used in its discourse. In other words, it is possible to say that there are these two reasons behind the HAS Party's highlighting the social dimension of Islam. But, as the majority of the HAS Party members come from the MG tradition; they interpret the source of inequality by an Islamic reading.

4.5 The Differences between the People's Voice Party and Justice and Development Party

There are some differences between the HAS Party and AKP in terms of their approaches to economic and political issues, as well as to Islam and MG. These differences will be tried to be explained below by including the expressions of the HAS Party authorities.

In the field of economy, the HAS Party differs from AKP in this regard: firstly, while AKP implements neoliberal policies, the HAS Party is opposed to neoliberal policies. It could be said that the HAS Party, in a sense, proposes the social state model. Secondly, whereas AKP evaluates the "well-being" of economy by taking into account the rates of growth (this point of view reflects the approach of liberal economists to economy), the HAS Party evaluates it according to the "Fair distribution" of national income.

As it can be seen, the HAS Party objected to AKP mostly for the implementation of neoliberal policies. It was against these policies under the pretext that they weren't in accordance with Islam and didn't take into consideration social justice. Malkoç expressed the differences between the HAS Party and AKP in the field of economy as follows:

AKP continues to implement the neoliberal policies brought by Kemal Derviř. What is the feature of this? You will give a privilege to certain groups of capital. Social justice is not of prime importance.

While criticizing AKP for its neoliberal policies, the HAS Party foresees a model aiming to overcome the failures and inadequacies of the market economy in general terms (according to the party program, the election declaration and the statements of interviewees). The HAS Party stipulates that there are some problems in the social structure, and that these problems can be overcome through social policies and reorganization of the public. It asserts that as a solution, the accumulation of wealth in some hands should be prevented, and that one of the methods of this is to impose heavy taxes. Moreover, it advocates that state should undertake certain functions in the fields of education, health, etc., in contrast to AKP's implementations, i.e. neoliberal policies. The HAS Party objects to AKP's approach to the subject of interest, because interest is considered as illicit in Islam, and in this sense it takes a similar stance with MG.

Some differences have been noticed in the political approaches of the HAS Party and AKP as well. Firstly, it can be said that the HAS Party is re-determining the way of Islamism under today's conditions, while AKP maintains its rightist liberal attitude. Secondly, as Malkoç stated, "*When AKP came into power, it was a party that changed the actors, not the existing system,*" while the HAS Party is a party that aims to change the system (herein by 'system', I mean the judicial, administrative system). Their last difference on this point occurs in their attitudes to foreign politics. It is possible to say that the HAS Party stands between traditional MG discourse and AKP's implementations on the subject of foreign politics.

Güler explains AKP's orientation to the right-wing by comparing it with the perception of MG during Erbakan's period as follows:

The tradition of MSP, of Erbakan had something like political Islamism, in inverted commas. It was somewhat an Islamism whom ideological leader was Seyyid Kutub Mevdudi. Consequently, AKP separated itself from those. AKP became conservative like a typical right-wing party, i.e. like Menderes, Demirel, Özal and Tayyip. While, in Islamism, Islam is a matter of thought, axiom, consciousness, a total demand and a projection claiming the whole society, conservatism is a thing that signifies more respect for memory, custom and tradition. Hence, it is a matter of transition

from consciousness to memory, tradition, custom, and a respect for them. I think the main difference is that. We are conservative in terms of respect for the religious demand of the public. However, we are not conservative in political terms. We are more modernist, and make more reference to consciousness, awareness, substance and conscience.

While Güler specifies that AKP is a right-wing party by comparing it with Erbakan period, and that it ensures the continuity of the system just like other parties in Turkey, Bekaroğlu states that there has been a right-wing approach in MG since longtime. Bekaroğlu says:

In MG, there have been two veins related to Islamism from the beginning. In my opinion, the one is the approach that attaches importance to market, trade and growth – if we indicate it with a universal term, the rightist order approach –, i.e. AKP. The other one is the approach that gives priority to justice, i.e. the HAS Party. AKP is really a rightist party, but not because it governs the state. In the RP, there was always a wing close to Özal.

Malkoç explains what differentiates them from AKP in terms of foreign politics as follows:

AKP has been excessively influenced by America and NATO. However, it has not to act so much under the influence of especially America and Europe, because of Turkey's geography, location, history, culture and background. By considering the benefits and burdens of our presence within NATO, we can revise our stance. Our approach to foreign politics is more real, more local and more national. This does not mean that we would be at loggerheads in any case. We would act according to the interests of Turkey, of the region and of the humanity.

The HAS Party differs also from AKP in its approach to social issues. It seems that the HAS Party highlights “morality” in social and interclass relations, while AKP acts according to the requirements of neoliberal policies. The second difference is related to the actors of social transformation. While AKP tries to transform Turkey through Islamic capital and intellectual middle class, the HAS Party aims to accomplish

the social and mental transformation through university students in general. HAS Party thinks that this moral approach should be dominant in all of economic, social and political fields, with reference to Islam. They summarize their approach to social subjects and what differentiates them from AKP through their criticisms towards neoliberal policies as follows: neoliberal policies deteriorated income distribution and didn't attach importance to social justice. They point out that AKP gives help through informal relations in order to solve partially the deteriorated income distribution and thus reduce social reaction, instead of ensuring a real and fair income distribution. AKP was criticized because of its side with capitalist class, and the importance of unionization was emphasized.

It can be said that the HAS Party and AKP have different approaches on the subject of Islam and MG. This difference is observed in three points. While AKP tried to articulate Islam to capitalism according to its reading Qur'an, the HAS Party gives prominence to the social justice aspect of Islam in its reading of Qur'an. Another difference occurs in their interpretation of piety. In other words, whereas AKP adopts a manner that features the aspect of Islam concerning worship and rituals, the HAS states that worships and rituals are important, but not an indicator of piety alone, and that the moral dimension in the approach to economy is also an indicator of piety. Lastly, these two parties have different attitudes on embracing Milli Görüş. In other words, this difference can be summarized as follows: while AKP takes off MG shirt, HAS Party puts on Fatih's (Padishah, Fatih Sultan Mehmed) kaftan.

Finally, some members of the HAS Party identify AKP as pro-MG, while others claim the opposite. However, when the statements are analyzed, it will be more accurate to remark that the HAS Party members consider AKP as pro-MG in some respects, and that they do not consider it so in some aspects. Arslan, one of those claiming that AKP is not pro-MG, expresses his opinions on this subject as follows:

They ask us what the difference is between us and AKP. You are the same people; you are also pious and perform prayer. You are from Imam Hatip and so are they. When we think like this, there is no

difference. If we approach superficially, there is no difference. However, when we look at the social dimension of Islam, many differences emerge. When AKP said “We took off MG shirt”, it gave a message to some segments. By saying “Give me a rest, I will be as you wish”, it has preferred such a discourse to secure its power. While there is a party calling itself pro-MG, it would not be convincing to say “I am pro-MG” by seceding from this party. It gave the message “Be at ease, I has already broken away from them (MG), to the segments enabling the politics of AKP by blocking MG. It needed to describe itself and have a manner; so, it tried to adopt a definition of conservative democrat. When saying “We took of MG shirt”, it revealed its desire to take a liberal attitude. In fact, it acted so in practices. In other words, it took off MG shirt. In time, it carried out some implementations as MG desired and intended (for instance, the discussions on piety that happened in those days led to arrangements regarding education system). But, when looking at the majority of its implementations, they are opposite to MG politics.

Whereas Malkoç describes AKP as pro-MG due to its social aids, he does not regard it as pro-MG because of its implementations in the field of economy:

AKP is implementing neoliberal policies. But, as they are from MG tradition, they say that there are so many poor people in need, and that it is a shame not to help them. So, they give them pasta, coal, and a little bit support in terms of health services. As for us, we say that everyone should get a fair share from national income.

While explaining how AKP came into power with the 28 February process, and was separated from MG, Güler sets forth in a sense the similarities between the MG and HAS Party:

Hodja (Erbakan) was for independence. He attempted to establish D-8. He balanced the budget. He aimed to make Turkey self-sufficient, and in a sense to create an ummah in the hinterland of Islamic word like EU. For this reason, the 28 February process began. The reason of 28 February process was not reaction. Behind the event, there was an international conspiracy. The purpose of the coup was to keep Turkey again in the West Block, the American block. If AKP was the product of 28 February process, these guys guaranteed that they would keep the country here. They promised they would keep it in the webs of global capitalism with America, so it cannot be said that

they are the same as MG.

While other interviewees stated that the HAS Party adopted MG in terms of spirit, and thus represented MG in this sense, Bekaroğlu asserted that AKP represented MG in this sense, taking into account the approach of MG to the political and economic system. He expressed his opinions on this subject and the emergence of AKP as follows:

We omitted the real politics, so we could not preserve the power we got. Thus, we should take into consideration realities of the world. This shirt is problematic; let's take off it and get the power in harmony with realities of the world. AKP emerged in this way. In this sense, the successor of MG is AKP rather than the HAS Party. Why are they? For example, they did not profoundly examined administration, economy. This is abhorrent to the people. But, I assert that if Erbakan had continued, such a party would have been at the head of the party. The RP would have been such a party.

After specifying the differences between AKP and the HAS Party in their approaches to economic, social and cultural/religious issues, it should be said lastly that AKP and the HAS Party have different approaches to the subject of democracy. Güler states:

The HAS Party has a more open and more democratic structure that respects more the lifestyle of social segments both inside and outside the party, while AKP has an authoritarian, hierarchical and totalitarian mentality which fetish national will.

Considering the expressions above, it is possible to state in brief as follows: the HAS Party members consider AKP as a pro-MG party because it has carried out social aids, given priority to religious education, and protected the personal conservatism of its members. However, they think that AKP differs from MG because of implementing neoliberal policies, neglecting social justice and being politically conservative (ensuring the continuity of the system, instead of changing it).

When taking into consideration the expressions above and the changes occurred in MG in the historical process, it could be said that AKP is a successor party of MG in

the sense that it takes Islam as reference, tries to highlight the rituals and worship aspect of Islam, gives priority to religious education, shows a different approach from traditional MG in terms of economy and foreign relations, and moves to the rightist line. However, as mentioned before, it will be more accurate to evaluate this as a transformation – rather than a separation from MG – , by taking into account the changes occurred in the socioeconomic process, the roles of internal and external factors in this process.

In addition, while the HAS Party authorities criticize the political attitude, economic policy, foreign policy, sense of democracy, sense of morality and society-polarizing discourse of AKP, the fact that they appreciate AKP for its implementations in accordance with the demands of MG (the revision of the education system with the method 4+4+4, and abolishing “tutelage” system) reveals how the HAS Party is close to MG.

The distance of the HAS Party to the ideology of MG, its difference and similarities with SP and AKP, and the way the interviewees define these parties have been tried to be described above. When the expressions of the interviewees are analyzed, it could be mentioned that there are three tendencies in the HAS Party. The individuals who are supposed to represent the first tendency are Şeref Malkoç, Cafer Güneş, Kazım Arslan and Hayrünisa Kökbiyık. As it can be seen, these individuals adopt MG by associating it with Ottoman-Turkish history and evaluating it as a more extensive view. It can be said that the interviewees with this tendency desire to sustain MG by bringing it to the condition of satisfying today’s needs, rather than criticizing MG. Furthermore, the fact that they consider the Ottoman Empire as a state representing the structure of an ideal state and society, claim that the moral structure of Turkey has deteriorated and think that the ideas adopted by the HAS Party in order to reach the social structure desired should be local ideas based on Islamic values correspond with the discourses of Turkish-Islamic synthesis. Finally, those taking part in this group avoided criticizing party members; they took care of criticizing SP and AKP as a party. On the basis of the information obtained during the interviews, it would be said that this stems from their

hope to come together again one day. Bekaroğlu and İlhami Güler showed a different tendency from those who were in the first group, and questioned MG as an ideology. Bekaroğlu who was in this group showed a different approach in this respect, as well as with his statement “The successor of MG is AKP rather than HAS Party. If Erbakan had continued this way (if he had been at the head of AK Party), the RP would have been such a party”. Those coming from a socialist tradition form the third tendency in the HAS Party. As mentioned above, those who were in this group took part in the HAS Party because they thought that Islam included in itself the notions of social justice and equality, and that it was impossible to implement socialism by itself. When considering these three tendencies, one should see that the opinions of Bekaroğlu and those coming from socialist tradition are closer to each other, and to Eliaçık’s ones. In other words, one should see that Bekaroğlu and İhsan Eliaçık has tried to create a new language through a common quest with the left-wing in contrast to the efforts of those of the first group to make MG dominant.

After this evaluation, this chapter will be completed below by describing the HAS Party’s views on the subjects of capitalism, class and identity. While describing the HAS Party’s approach to the notions of capitalism, class and identity, its difference from AKP on these subjects will be shown in detail.

4.6 The Approach of the People’s Voice Party to Capitalism, Class and Identity

“God does not care whether a man has full hands or not. God cares whether they are clean or not.”

“There are oppressors and oppressed as identity and class. Both oppressors and oppressed have identity and class.”

The HAS Party's approaches to capitalism, social classes and identities will be described successively below. The first notion is capitalism. The question "Is the HAS Party an anti-capitalist party?" was asked to all of the HAS Party members interviewed; they all answered "yes". When more explanation was requested, they used these expressions: *"The HAS Party is anti-capitalist, but not opposed to private property. The HAS Party is anti-capitalist, but not opposed to capitalist class. The HAS Party is anti-capitalist, but prone to free market economy. The HAS Party is anti-capitalist, but prone to privatization."* The interviewees explained the reason why they were against to capitalism in this way as depending on Islam. They stated that Islam was not opposed to private property, but that the income should be gained by halal ways, and some of the income should be transferred to the society. They are not opposed to private property because they think that the property belongs to God. Arslan states as follows:

The HAS Party is anti-capitalist. We are never opposed to wealth, to wealthy people in anyway. Capitalism means a different thing as definition in the world. By capitalism, we mean a conception or an ideology holding the assets inequitably. We mean a conception deepening more the despotism order by means of these resources. If people were getting rich like Hz. Ebubekir⁶, it would be no problem for us.

The HAS Party is not opposed to free market. However, it is opposed to the current operation of the free market and to financial capital because interest is forbidden by Qur'an. The problem for the members of the HAS Party is not the free character of the market, but its uncontrolled functioning and the interest (gaining money from money). In other words, they base the idea of being opposed to capitalism, but not to free market on the pretext that the universal definition of capitalism is wrong and that an Islamist society may not be capitalist. Güler states:

⁶ Ebubekir (Abu Bakr, 573-634) became the first Muslim Caliph following Muhammad's death. He became a cloth merchant and traveled extensively in Arabia and neighboring lands in the Middle East, through which he gained both wealth and experience. He was instrumental in preserving the Qur'an in written form.

What are the values advocated by capitalism? They are private property, money and the state. These values have been already accumulated by humanity throughout the history. Therefore, defining capitalism with these values is wrong. Namely, if you adopt the market, you are capitalist. If you adopt private property, you are capitalist. There is no such a thing. These values have been accumulated throughout the history. Mohammedanism has no problem with these... I have the conviction that the economic and political structure formed by people with an Islamist philosophy of life is not capitalist, because there is the other, sociality in Islam. There is private property, okay. There are state, market, but not savagery... We can show that market system or private property may not create such a cruel structure exploiting people when people believing in Islamist philosophy of life establish the sociopolitical structure. This is the perspective of civilization. In capitalism there is absolute property. In fact, the property belongs to Allah in Islamist philosophy of life. We are custodian.

They are not opposed to capitalist class because what they are against is not capital, but accumulation of property. However, they are opposed to domination of the capitalist class. Güneş explains the reason as follows:

...Now it's question of the domination of the market. It's question of the domination of capitalists. What is one of our four main elements? Neither market nor politics... There was a structure that gave priority to state previously. Today, everything is for market. However, there must be trade unions which would balance the employers.

As stated before, the principle "Neither market nor politics" of the HAS Party is the same as the objection of the MG to capitalism and socialism in 1970s. Therefore, it will not be wrong to say that the third way suggested by the first MG parties has been suggested by the HAS Party, as well.

When the objection of the HAS Party to capitalism is evaluated, it is possible to say that this is a limited objection. In other words, they are opposed to the operation of capitalism today, not to the capitalist system itself. It is possible to say that they consider the controlling of the capitalist system operations with certain principles (with rules/prohibitions of Islam) as being opposed to capitalism. The HAS Party aims to

restrain the savageness of today's capitalist system to some extent by means of control and restrictions.

Lastly, capitalism regulates all political, economic and social fields. Namely, it is a system. While the members of the HAS Party said that they would change the system, they talked about capitalist system. However, seemingly there is no an exact clearness in the HAS Party on how the changes of the system would be carried out as we can understand from Kökbıyık's statement: *"There is a global system. It should be changed through efforts at the intellectual level. It's not sufficient to say "Let's eliminate the interest". We have tried to establish a structure of thought and systematize it."* Furthermore, by change of system, they mean reforming the system, but not a radical change. Bekaroğlu expresses his views as follows:

There is not a clear answer to how we will change the economy. Something may change step by step. We do not have such a claim; we have established a system A to Z in every aspect, with its economy and social relations, with theoreticians, ideologues and excellent politics. We have started with rejections. We have set up rules, principles. We let people free within the framework of these principles. For example, we say the interest is forbidden by religion. People ask what the alternative of this is. We will see how this will happen. Namely, we set principles. For instance, accumulation of property and unearned incomes are forbidden. We don't say that we will make changes by means of revolution. We offer people a more equitable and participative politico-economic system under control.

In Chapter III, the view of the MG on capitalism, as well as the reason and manner of change of this view in historical period has been explained. In a similar way, it should be said that the approach of the HAS Party has emerged depending upon historical and sociological facts. The criticisms toward capitalism and the limitations of this may be better understood, when considering that many socioeconomic troubles occurred both in Turkey and the world in the current stage of capitalism, and that there are people from Islamist tradition and socialist tradition in the HAS Party.

We have tried to show above that HAS Party has not a direct stance against capitalism nor capitalist class. The approaches of the HAS Party to all classes will be described below:

The HAS Party aims to be a mass party, not a party with an ideological stance, advocating the interests of a certain class. This can be deduced from both election declaration and statements of the interviewees. Not being against to a society with class-based structure, trying to use in their statements generally the notions such as social segments, social strata, oppressor and oppressed rather than social classes show that they aim at becoming a mass party. From Kökbıyık's statements below, one should understand that there is an opinion in the HAS Party requiring the emphasis on oppressor-oppressed, and not on the class differences:

There are oppressors and oppressed as both identity and class. Oppressors and oppressed people have identity and class. Some people oppress with state domination. Others oppress with capital. Class struggle is not healthy and permanent. The values that make human as human are important. You may be an employer or an employee. What is important is to protect the humanistic values. Social change may be possible with idealist people, with their increase and efforts.

The second indicator may be that they attach generally importance to awareness of people and transformation of mentality rather than to class struggle in terms of social transformation, and that they aim to accomplish this predominantly and primarily through the university youth.

Besides, they state that the HAS Party has not a stance against the capitalist segment, and aimed at establishing a system in which the workers get their rights, the capital accumulation is not gathered in certain hands, there is no economy of rent, subcontracted work is abolished, and it is not allowed to use state's opportunities politically or by certain segments. However, it should be stated that the worker's right is considered as a life without being in need of someone else. Güneş states as follows:

People may be worker or capitalist. None of them should benefit illegally from the advantages of the society. We should establish a system that prevents this. If the tax was collected from the capital, not from profit, people would get a little hurt. If you established a minimum subsistence level for the other person (the worker), i.e. if everyone got their share from the advantages of the society, this would be magnificent.

These policies to be applied aim at creating a sort of capitalism which is not savage but docile, a capitalist which cares of the benefits of the country, not of big profits. Such capitalists will be formed by creating a moral structure, expecting that it should decrease their ambitious to make profit because of the economic crisis on the way to the world and Turkey. They think also that the structure in question will be ensured when these capitalists consent to the regulations the HAS Party plans to make. Kökbıyık explains the approach of the HAS Party to capitalist class and its expectations with these words:

When we get the power, we will determine the position of the capitalist class. The capitalist class will not object to this definitely. They are living in Turkey. I do not think they would want to cause tension in the public, to be seen as against to the public. The capital should be orientated towards investment. If the capital was supported in this way, this would be in favor of the capital. Because, when the finance sector is chocked, they should have something. They will understand this thanks to the system we will bring. They will not make big profit. We will find a way for them to consent to this.

Bekaroğlu states that the capitalist class shouldn't be subject to segregation according to identities with these words:

I think there would not be a real segregation as MÜSİAD, TÜSİAD, conservative and center. This can be used in competition, but in reality they have a lot of partnerships. They are not different from each other. We are at the same distance with both. However, we will not oppose to the capitalist class.

Somel states that the important is to eliminate the grievance of people whether it is due to classes or identity:

When the identity politics first emerged, I regarded this as the endeavor of bourgeoisie to divide the proletarians. Then, I understood that this reflected a quest and demand all around the world against the standardization policies of the bourgeoisie and Marxists. Therefore, I had the conviction that all these hierarchical relations of dominance should be eliminated whether it was question of socialism or an order based on justice. The identity policy overlaps the class differences. By class, you mean the groups based on the property of production means. The grievance of persons has not a hierarchy. People feature whichever aspects they are mistreated. In order to invite laborers to a struggle for the sake of social justice, a just order, it is necessary to recognize other grievances and eliminate completely all grievances during the struggles...Gathering under the roof of the HAS Party will contribute to struggles of both class and equality. If we turn back to such a class struggle, we will turn back to the former socialist discourse.

Briefly, it can be said that the HAS Party does not see civil society as a field for class struggle. They try to explain the current situation of Turkey not in correlation with a point of view of class, production type, but by considering the division relations, over the qualifications of the state; so, their proposals of solution would be developed according to this point of view. They think that the state has not a class nature, and should not have; they take into consideration the class structure of the civil society, but this is not considered in social analysis. In other words, class structure is not a problem; the problem is the expansion of the differences between classes. So, the problem is supposed to be resolved with a compromise between classes. The HAS Party tried to ensure a "just" sharing without changing production relations, and wanted to organize the social and juridical structure according to this. Therefore, it didn't establish a causality relation between the socioeconomic structure and the structure of the state.

This part shall be completed by describing the approach of the HAS Party to identities. According to the statements of the officials of the HAS Party, articles written

by some of its members, their reportage and the questions they talked about more and the most clearly during the meetings, it is possible to say that the HAS Party is opposed to do politics over identities. It is possible to find the approaches to identity from the answers given by interviewers. These approaches will be briefly summarized so as not to be repeated, because they are present in the statements above.

The interviewers state that people generally vote on the base of their identities, i.e. that the identity effects political behaviors. For example, it is indicated that people do not react to poverty and corruption, and that the identity of AKP and religion play an important role in this, as well as the policies of AKP. In other words, the main reasons of unresponsiveness of people are: the support given to the poor by AKP and the fatalistic mentality of the society due to its religious identity. They stated also that some social segments were alienated throughout the Republic history until AKP got the power, and today thought that they had/would have the chance of taking advantage from the opportunities provided by the ruling party, and thus they were not against some policies of AKP although they didn't approve them. The general approach of the interviewees is that the society has right, i.e. it is alienated in this respect. However, they stated that they were opposed to the policy of AKP such as "Let ours benefit from opportunities" and to the attitude of the public that consented to this situation – no matter the reason was, either identity or interest – as their party was in power,

They stated that the world conception of people was affected by material conditions, but that this was not reflected in the political behavior of people in Turkey, and that this was due to the reasons above and to politics over identities. Even if they talked about the rights of Alevi people and their opportunity of living their identities, they mentioned that Turkey had a traditional structure, that a structure in conflict with religion had no chance in Turkey, and that even CHP changed its attitude in this respect, we may ask this question: Did they refer to Sunni sect when speaking about Islam?

Most of the ones who came from MG have stated that it was difficult or impossible to establish an equitable order without Islamic values. Therefore, although

they were against politics based on identities, they took religion as reference in terms of regulation of political, economic and social relations.

The interviewers argued that radical Islamists had good relationship with AKP and that their interests were before their radicalisms. This situation is important in terms of proving the priority of economic interests in comparison to religious demands and reactions. In other words, (as it was stated before) Islamists mostly reflected the economic and political demands of religious segments by religious demands/reactions. In today's context, the attitudes of moderate Islamists and radicals who took part in politics and economy proved this evaluation.

The reason why the ones with different identities became together in the HAS Party is explained as follows: there have been a search and a struggle for justice under different names of different political spectrums and movements that occasionally took a stand against each other because of their identities, by forgetting the sense of justice, which caused the loss of power. However, they argued that they had difficulty in explaining the reasons why the ones coming from leftist side took place in the party. Hereby, when the general stories and the news in the press are focused on, it can be seen that the leftists have a positive approach to the HAS Party whereas Islamists have usually reacted against it. In other words, these reactions can be referred to as indicators of the identification of Islam with rightists in Turkey.

Finally, although the ones from the HAS Party usually used terms such as "social just" and "spiritual", they did not give a clear explanation about the identity of the HAS Party. While some of them expressed it as "Not defining our identities leads to indefiniteness, but this gives us a chance to express ourselves", the others said "We are in search for an identity/slogan." It can be stated that this indefiniteness is partly due to the absence of an identity which can be adopted or is unowned in the political field.

After the expressions of interviewers on identity issue have been summarized above, the reasons of the HAS Party's opposition against policy on identities can be summarized as follows. First of all, they believe that they have not any place in the political field with their current identities; secondly, they all desired to be a mass party

rather than an ideological one; thirdly, they all are aware of the fact that any politics done on the basis of religious identity shall be meaningless in present conditions, i.e. that today's conditions were not favorable for grievance speeches about religious identity. Finally, they believed that any politics done over identities should polarize the society and that this was wrong and could cause negative results in elections, as long as such a polarization continues.

As it was stated in the second part, cultural conflicts substituted social conflicts with Postmodernism, and Islamism done identity politics in Turkey. However, while identity-based discourses became dominant with postmodernism, i.e. while the only reason of injustice was reduced to identity, it was seen that injustice, poverty and exploitation still continued in Turkey and the world. The HAS Party emerged with a discourse that there was in Turkey an inequitable and exploitative order, but that they had to change it by remaining in capitalism, and that they were against politics on identities. To conclude, it can be stated that the HAS Party moved away from Islamism by refraining from doing politics on identities, criticized Islamism partially, i.e. came close to Islamism, not having emphasized labor-capital opposition.

When the distance between the HAS Party and other political Islamist parties, as well as its approaches on class and identity issues, are interpreted together, it can be concluded that: the HAS Party adopted the spirit of MG, developed a discourse against neoliberal policies of AKP and came together around common values with socialists. The HAS Party's neither market nor politics approach can be interpreted as a social democrat approach. Although there were opposing views (İsmail Cem, 1984:25), it can be stated that social democracy was a third way between liberal ideology and socialism. The HAS Party desired to solve troubles and inequalities caused by globalization and capitalism by using its political power, with democratic way and reforms. The HAS Party intended to decrease poverty, improve working and living conditions of labor class by staying in market economy. It stated that it was necessary to regulate the operation of market and ensure a fair distribution for this. So, it aimed to provide equality over consumption/distribution rather than distribution of production means. It can be argued

that the HAS Party defended the welfare state model against global capitalism and neoliberal politics by willing to reduce the inequalities of capitalism, give rights to labors, stress the importance of trade union, stress the responsibilities of state in terms of education and health, change social security system, by presenting proposals of solution on how these would be fulfilled. The HAS Party considers class differences as normal, in other words, it aims at carrying out mediator politics rather than emphasizing class differences. Thus, it uses a cohesive discourse. This discourse aims to become a mass party by creating a wide mass. The HAS Party aims to ensure solidarity, social justice and equality. (While Islamists defend these terms by referring to Islam, socialists defend them by referring to socialism.) The HAS Party wants to improve not only material conditions, but also esteem and value of people. Finally, the HAS Party desires to change the society with ideals through mentality transformation. It bases its politics, even economic politics on morality.

As a result of this assessment, it would not be wrong to qualify the HAS Party as *a social democrat party with an Islamist spirit*. When looking at the HAS Party's approach, solution proposals and methods, one should see that these are at the same time the bases of social democrat ideology. The concept of state adopted by this ideology is welfare state too. Besides, social democracy differs from liberal rightist ideology and Marxism in its concept of state. In other words, social democracy considers the state as an important instrument which ensures equality and social justice.

It can be said that welfare state has three key features. A state is interventionist (to market), a regulator (determining workers' wages, undertaking social security and social assistance services) and an agent of income redistribution (Durdu, 2009:43). The HAS Party doesn't foresee a state taking part into economy, but suggests that the state should undertake a regulatory role, and that distribution of income should be carried out through specific tax policies (high taxes proportional to income, collecting wealth tax) and transfer of wealth (e.g. zakat). The HAS Party doesn't have a net ideology. It tries to develop an approach suitable to Turkey's conditions through common values of Islam and socialism. Social democracy doesn't have a net and definitive ideology either. One

of the features of social democrat ideology is the changing weight of thought resources according to nation and party (Cem, 1984:23-24). To make an analogy, the HAS Party's concept of welfare state can be identified with the concept of liberal welfare state where private sector plays an important role in employment – having no stance against privatization – (Özdemir, 2007:698), and with social democratic welfare model (Scandinavian model), trying to separate health from market relations (Durdu, 2009:44).

CONCLUSION

When taking into account the historical process, it is seen that MG is not an entity against capitalist development. When the ideology of MG emerged, it highlighted the development as other political parties did. What it differed in from other political parties in terms of development was its emphasizing both spiritual and material development. While MG talked about both spiritual and material development in 1970s, and highlighted Just Order after 1980s (the RP period), it started to speak about the harmony between Islam and capitalism in the 2000s. However, the HAS Party aims to accomplish Just Order with more concrete, more realistic projects by depriving it from its utopic content. To conclude, while the programs and views of political Islamist parties in the economic field change in accordance with the current period, there is no much change morally except expressing Islamic terms or values universally according to daily conditions, because the spiritual aspect is based on Islamic values with the idea that Islam is a religion without time and space, while the material aspect is determined according to the form of relations of production, and to the social reflections of them. While political Islamist parties under the leadership of Erbakan had a more subjective point of view about history and society, political Islamist parties developed a more objective point of view about history and society as a result of the bifurcation.

Although its effects are different, religion becomes one of the ideological means of the reproduction process of the capitalist system. (Akpınar&Arman, 2011:79 cited in

Althusser, 2002). The common point of MNP, MSP, RP and AKP is the reconciliation of Islamic values with economic models applied in Turkey depending on the world capitalist system. Civil society ideology and Turkish-Islamic synthesis have played a crucial role in this reconciliation process. The feature of this process which can be referred to as the articulation process of Islam to capitalism is giving priority to religious identity, and thus hiding the contradictions of capitalism and class differences to ensure the continuity of capitalism. However, political, juridical and religious practices hide on the one hand the contradictions related to mode of production, and on the other hand these contradictions become visible in these structures. In other words, infrastructure and superstructure are not independent from each other. They both have interaction between each other, and do not cause any transformation in the society by themselves. The discourse of the ones explaining the social transformation in Turkey and thus the transformation of Islamism by not taking into account the effects of internal and external dynamics as well as the changes of objective conditions, but according to the conflicts in the cultural field only, i.e. according to the center-periphery paradigm, has acquired a new content during the AKP period. They developed a discourse where a relationship between civil society and state was established, in other words, periphery was transferred to center. However, this approach connecting the inequality and exploitation to pressure and isolation over religious identities seems to be unable – incomplete and problematic – to explain why inequality and exploitation are still present although “periphery was transferred to center and living the religious identity was no more a problem”.

So, the transformation of the MG movement and the difference of the HAS Party have been tried to be evaluated by taking into account the changes occurred in the social, economic and political spheres as well as the relationship between them. The dynamics which gave rise to the HAS Party and its difference from other political Islamist parties have been tried to be explained by showing how the MG movement was affected by the changes in the mode of capital accumulation in Turkey, and thus by the regulations in the political and social spheres through analyses of political Islamist parties. This study

aims to go beyond evaluations made on political Islam in today's world, to deal with this subject by focusing on the relationship of political Islamist parties with the capitalist system and their class position, rather than referring to the identities.

Generally, political parties are submitted to an evaluation on the basis of their identities, although they represent the interests of specific classes. In the same way, although political Islamist parties are Islamist, their primary concern is economy, and they represent specific classes. It is easy to realize such fact since the emergence of the first political Islamist party up to now. Erbakan took his place in the political sphere in order to defend the interests of Anatolian capital against Istanbul capital. Özal (although not an Islamist party, ANAP should be taken into consideration here, because it included Islamist too, and that Özal was a member of Nakşibendi sect) took 24 January decisions, harmonizing the interests of both international and Turkish capital (Boratav, 1993:121123), while Erdoğan took part in the political sphere thanks to the 28 February process which is a result of the efforts of reestablishment of the balance between capital classes in Turkey.

When looking at the transformation of MG, the changes in its discourses and approaches to economy, as well as the declarations of the interviewers, it can be stated that the HAS Party didn't separate from MG ideologically, and that the differences between them were due to their discourse style and methods. Although the HAS Party claims that the social – and not the worship – aspect of Islam should be emphasized, it want to arrange the economic field in accordance with spiritual values rather than any kind of change in the approach to spiritual subjects. The most important differentiation in political Islam is related to the approach of MG to economy. In other words, MG had always a justice discourse. The indicators of such a situation are: the emphasis on justice/just order of political Islamist parties under the leadership of Erbakan, the presence of such a discourse even in the name of AKP, and the self-expression of the HAS Party with terms like judicious, moralist and social justice. The transformation of MG can be observed in the approaches to economic models. As stated before, this undergoes a process in connection with the development of the capitalist system. The

shift from a statist-developmental discourse during MNP-MSP period to liberal discourse in the last days of RP is a process which can be summarized as undertaking the mission of implementation of neoliberal policies with AKP. The actual position of the HAS Party can be interpreted as a different stance, a stance against the course of capitalism. However, when their views on capitalism, as well as controversial sustainability of neoliberal policies due to the crisis of capitalism, are taken into consideration, it can be interpreted as a moderate capitalist perspective –in accordance with the progress of capitalism also – rather than an opposition. Although the HAS Party declares itself as anti-capitalist, it tries to find a solution within the capitalism for the troubles due to capitalism. It envisages policies combining social justice and market mechanism, i.e. trying to reduce the market dominance and soften the troubles caused by market economy. It can be said that the HAS Party has the characteristics of a mass party rather than an ideological one, in other words, a social democrat party, because it wants to solve problem within the parliament (via a democratic approach), through the state, by making reforms; it thinks that it is necessary to provide at least a minimum level in terms of health, education and livelihood for every segment of society; it has a unification discourse for all classes aiming to reduce the differences between the classes rather than stressing the classed-structure of the society.

As politics are done over political identities, and religious identity is given prominence in Turkey, people ignore the class position of both political parties and their own, more accurately, don't become aware of this fact. The picture occurred during the AKP period shows that religious identity is not related to the position of the oppressor or oppressed; it also reveals the importance of class distinction. However, the fact that the established hegemony and people have still hope in taking profit from the system, and that the conception of identity is still effective, the social reactions are still very weak. At this stage, as the HAS Party is from MG tradition, this picture – when explained – may be very effective on religious segments. When the HAS Party is compared with other Islamist parties, the most important difference is its structure established by those coming from Islamist and leftist tradition.

If the HAS Party took part in politics by continuing its actual discourses, it could contribute a little bit for the society to move away from the concept of identity which covers the class differences. However, when this study was completed, the HAS Party decided to integrate to AKP as a result of the offer made by AKP. This decision can be evaluated as follows: Firstly, as it is explained above, the HAS Party did not emerge as a result of an ideological disengagement from MG. One of the indicators of this fact is the support given to AKP's policies in accordance with MG. When taking into account the fact that the HAS Party was in search for identity, and that its followers came mostly from MG tradition, its decision to integrate to AKP can be evaluated as the dominance of its initial identities. Secondly, as there were three tendencies in the HAS Party, that people from the first tendency were in a great number, and that they hoped/thought to come together with the ones who were close to them but from other parties, it can be understood more clearly why they supported the decision of integration with AKP. During the interviews, it was stated that the traditional base of the party was against the changes the party tried to make, and that Islamists groups opposed doing politics with people from socialist tradition, as well as the discourse of the HAS Party after its establishment. Therefore, it can be said that both Islamists and lower cadres did not oppose this decision of integration, even supported it. Thirdly, it was also stated that the views of MG about economy changed in parallel with the development of capitalism, and that the HAS Party was not an anti-capitalist party either but with a social democrat character. As social democracy is somewhere between capitalism and communism, it can be stated that most of the members of the HAS Party got closer to capitalism or were already closer to it, with the HAS Party's decision of integration with AKP. Finally, according to the statements of the interviewers, the fact that the HAS Party did not get the expected results in the first experience of election arouse more debates in the party; and this seems to have affected the future plans of the party members. It was explained above that other two approaches in the HAS Party and the groups and people named as Muslim leftists outside the party criticized AKP and capitalism more radically. At the current state, it can be stated that the ones who supported such a tendency in the HAS

Party adopted a more consistent/decisive attitude about the development of a different, a common language. In other words, it seems that the HAS Party members having shared a common past were also eager to share the future, and that there were also some people desiring to do politics with different identities, but by putting them aside, which is the point which differentiates the HAS Party from other political Islamist parties. It is estimated that a certain group within the party and other people with a similar tendency in the public will continue to search for a new language and make a compromise on common values. The effects of these efforts on the society or, as indicated in this study, their contributions to the creation of a mentality on the ignorance of identities in political preferences can be examined in future studies.

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APPENDIX

TEZ FOTOKOPİ İZİN FORMU

ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü

Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü

Enformatik Enstitüsü

Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü

YAZARIN

Soyadı : Arslan

Adı : Nursel

Bölümü : Sosyoloji

TEZİN ADI : The Bifurcation of Political Islam in Turkey:
The Case of the People's Voice Party

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans Doktora

1. Tezimin tamamı dünya çapında erişime açılsın ve kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla tezimin bir kısmı veya tamamının fotokopisi alınsın.
2. Tezimin tamamı yalnızca Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi kullanıcılarının erişimine açılsın. (Bu seçenekte tezinizin fotokopisi ya da elektronik kopyası Kütüphane aracılığı ile ODTÜ dışına dağıtılmayacaktır.)
3. Tezim bir (1) yıl süreyle erişime kapalı olsun. (Bu seçenekte tezinizin fotokopisi ya da elektronik kopyası Kütüphane aracılığı ile ODTÜ dışına dağıtılmayacaktır.)

Yazarın imzası

Tarih